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THE ISIS GENOCIDE DECLARATION: WHAT NEXT?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, 

GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 26, 2016

Serial No. 114–211

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

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C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Carl A. Anderson, Supreme Knight, Knights of Columbus ........................... 6

Mr. Sarhang Hamasaeed, senior program officer, Middle East and Africa 

Programs, U.S. Institute of Peace ....................................................................... 14

Mr. Johnny Oram, executive director, Chaldean Assyrian Business Alliance ... 27

Ms. Naomi Kikoler, deputy director, Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention 

of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum ............................... 34

Mr. David M. Crane, professor of practice, Syracuse University College of 

Law (former chief prosecutor, United Nations Special Court for Sierra 

Leone) .................................................................................................................... 42

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Carl A. Anderson: Prepared statement ........................................................... 9

Mr. Sarhang Hamasaeed: Prepared statement ..................................................... 17

Mr. Johnny Oram: Prepared statement ................................................................. 31

Ms. Naomi Kikoler: Prepared statement ............................................................... 38

Mr. David M. Crane: Prepared statement ............................................................. 46

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 68

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 69

Ms. Naomi Kikoler: U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Report, ‘‘Our Generation is Gone,’’ The Islamic State’s Targeting of Iraqi Minorities in Ninewa ... 70

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New Jersey, and chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global 

Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations: 

Ninevah Plains Paper by Mr. Gregory Kruczek ................................................ 72

Documenting Genocide White Paper .................................................................. 76

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THE ISIS GENOCIDE DECLARATION:

WHAT NEXT? 

THURSDAY, MAY 26, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:02 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. Smith 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SMITH. The subcommittee will come to order, and good afternoon and welcome to everyone. In January 2014, ISIS terrorists 

captured the city of Fallujah in central Iraq a decade after it had 

been won at the cost of so much American, Iraqi, and British blood. 

ISIS moved north, taking more territory, and conducting its genocidal campaign again Christians, Yazidis, and other religious minorities. By early August, Yazidi men, women, and children were 

trapped on Mount Sinjar facing annihilation when the U.S. initiated airstrikes to save them. 

However, beyond that, it soon became clear that the administration had no comprehensive plan to prevent ISIS from continuing to 

commit genocide, mass atrocities, and war crimes or to roll ISIS 

back. 

This subcommittee, along with the Middle East and North Africa 

Subcommittee, co-chaired by my good friend and colleague, Ileana 

Ros-Lehtinen, convened a hearing on the genocide in December 

2014 and called for the administration to act before those communities of Christians and others were annihilated. 

Meanwhile, across the porous border in Syria, the Assad regime 

was targeting and killing tens of thousands of civilians. I renewed 

my call again for a Syrian war crimes tribunal to be established 

to hold all sides in the conflict of Syria accountable, and we had 

heard from such great leaders, the former chief prosecutor who will 

testify today, David Crane, about the importance of taking action 

in a tribunal that had the flexibility and the capability to really 

hold people to account on all sides. The world knew that ISIS was 

committing genocide. Civil society groups, including some present 

at this hearing today, mobilized, writing letters and holding meetings with the administration, making statements and reporting stories. 

As a matter of fact, parenthetically, my first hearing that I held 

here in this room was more than 3 years ago on the genocide 

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against Christians. Why was there such an indifference on the part 

of some within the administration? 

However, some members of the administration were pushing 

hard internally for the word ‘‘genocide’’ to be publicly spoken and 

for action to be swiftly taken. Yet the administration still had not 

acknowledged it and still had no strategy to prevent it from happening. Such was the situation in December 2015 when this subcommittee convened yet another hearing. Shortly after, the Congress passed and the President signed into law the Fiscal Year 

2016 appropriations bill, the omnibus bill, which required the Secretary of State to report to Congress with his evaluation on whether ISIS had perpetrated genocide. 

Perhaps the most important push outside the government and off 

the Hill was the 280-page report commissioned by the Knights of 

Columbus and developed in partnership with the tireless organization In Defense of Christians meticulously documenting the genocide against Christians. That report may have made the difference 

with the administration, so I am personally grateful to Carl Anderson, the Supreme Knight who is here to testify again, and for the 

Knights, along with the other groups, including A Demand For Action, that have done so much to ensure that genocide against 

Christians and others could not be ignored, trivialized, or denied. 

The House passed H. Con. Res. 75, authored by my good friend 

and colleague, Jeff Fortenberry, together with the Syrian War 

Crimes Tribunal Resolution that I had sponsored, H. Con. Res. 121, 

3 days before the Secretary’s evaluation was due. Finally, on March 

17, Secretary Kerry declared that ISIS is ‘‘responsible for genocide 

against groups in areas under its control, including Yazidis, Christians, and Shia Muslims.’’

Although the administration made the right determination, a 

long time coming but they did, the question arises now, now what? 

I already have concerns that historical mistakes are being repeated. Leading up to Secretary of State Colin Powell’s historic 

genocide determination in September 2004—and I was very much 

a part of pushing for that to happen, along with others like Frank 

Wolf—the State Department’s legal adviser had issued a memorandum that concluded that ‘‘a determination that genocide has occurred in Darfur would have no immediate legal—as opposed to 

moral, political, or policy—consequences for the United States.’’

Secretary Kerry’s legal advisers reportedly reached the same conclusion before he made his determination about ISIS. And so it 

again begs the question, now what? 

For years, the administration has been unwilling to effectively 

address the slaughters in Syria and Iraq. If it still thinks it has 

no obligation to act, it will likely continue its policy of acting too 

little too late. I am also concerned that the administration continues to conflate its strategy to combat ISIS with a strategy to 

protect religious minorities from genocide, war crimes, and mass 

atrocities. They are not the same. Combatting and defeating ISIS 

and Islamist extremism, of course, is essential. However, there are 

many other elements of an effective comprehensive civilian protection strategy, putting effective monitoring and response systems in 

place, and we have yet to hear them from the administration. 

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Civilian protection has long been missing from the administration’s response to the carnage in Syria. More than half its population, an estimated 13.5 million inside Syria, as of May 2016, plus 

another 4.8 million registered as refugees abroad, are in need of 

humanitarian assistance and protection. According to an April 2016 

review of the casualty estimates of that conflict, the number of people who have died during Syria’s civil war conflict since March 11, 

2011, range from 250,000 to 470,000. Notwithstanding the challenges of knowing exactly how many of those people were civilians 

and exactly how many were killed by the Assad regime and its 

proxies, we know this: The dictatorship has consistently, deliberately targeted civilians, hospitals, and schools with bombs and 

bullets and starved entire cities. 

While Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah have fueled the fires of death 

in Syria, the administration has mostly just watched Syria burn. 

Let me also point out that, in his testimony today—and it is worth 

really highlighting because others will make similar points—but 

Carl Anderson makes the point that ‘‘we are reliably informed that 

official government and U.N. aid does not reach the Christian genocide survivors in Iraq or in Syria. Repeatedly,’’ he goes on to say, 

‘‘we hear from church leaders in the region that Christians and 

other genocide survivors are last in line for assistance from governments. Significantly, the Archdiocese of Erbil, where most Iraqi 

Christians now live, receives no money from any government whatsoever. If assistance from outside church-affiliated agencies ends in 

Erbil, Christians there will face a catastrophic humanitarian tragedy within 30 days. The situation is similar in Syria, according to 

Christian leaders there.’’

There is no easy single solution to the threats to religious and 

ethnic minorities and other civilians in Iraq and Syria. Obstacles 

clearly abound, including failures to implement the Iraq Constitution, especially the decentralized power and localized governance 

and security; longstanding unresolved disputes between Iraqi 

Arabs and Kurds over territory and natural resources; lack of accountability for genocide, mass atrocities, war crimes, torture, 

kidnappings, displacement, and more by a range of actors; the actions of an indigenously developed, internally supported national 

reconciliation process; conflicts over revenue sharing, corruption 

and radicalization. 

The list is long, complex, and it must never, however, be an excuse for indifference and inaction. However, unless key issues that 

preceded the genocide are addressed, the genocide may be perpetuated again, and it certainly is going on right now. 

Over the coming weeks, I plan to introduce a comprehensive 

piece of legislation aimed at contributing to the safety and security 

of religious and ethnic minorities and civilians more broadly in Iraq 

and Syria. It will also address the need for accountability for genocide, mass atrocities in those conflicts, and will also again call for 

a tribunal, like we saw in Sierra Leone, Rwanda, or the former 

Yugoslavia, and I do hope that the Senate at some point, hopefully 

soon, takes up our resolution that is pending before the Sentate 

Committee on Foreign Relations. 

I would like to yield to my good friend and colleague, the ranking 

member, Ms. Bass. 

4

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good afternoon to the witnesses. 

I look forward to hearing your perspectives regarding these critical issues. As you know, on March 17, 2016, Secretary of State 

John Kerry declared that ISIS is responsible for genocide against 

groups in areas under its control, including the Yazidis, Christians, 

and Shia Muslims. The Secretary went on to chronicle numerous 

atrocities against various ethnic and religious groups by ISIL over 

the last few years. The question posed to the witnesses today is a 

logical result of the determination of genocide, specifically what actions need to be taken by the U.S., the international community, 

and, frankly, the region, to prevent further genocide. 

Secretary Kerry noted in his statement on March 17 that the 

best response to genocide is a reaffirmation of the fundamental 

right to survive of every grouped targeted for destruction. 

I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today on how that 

can best be achieved, bearing in mind the ongoing suffering of 

women, men, and children who live in constant fear. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you so much. 

We are joined by the famous chairman, Dana Rohrabacher, the 

gentleman from California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. When 

we come to this issue and we look at this, it behooves us to open 

our hearts and try to come up with a formula that is going to help 

those people who are who are most in need and people whose lives 

are most in jeopardy. And, unfortunately—and I am just going to 

have to say, and I will try not to make this political—but our President has not come to the standard that I believe is adequate to 

deal with this horrible situation and the challenge that we face in 

the Middle East. It could be the guy’s unable to say ‘‘radical Islamic terrorism,’’ even after our Ambassador was slaughtered and 

murdered in Benghazi, and he hasn’t been able to say those words 

since. 

And we have been on him because of that, but that mindset will 

have implications, and it has implications in the issues that we are 

talking today. We have innocent people by the hundreds of thousands, if not by the millions, who are in jeopardy of being slaughtered in the same way the Jews were slaughtered during the Holocaust. 

And when I look at the figures of the people who are being permitted into this country right now under this administration, the 

Christians who are the basic target, the most vocalized target of 

these radical Muslims who are there who are involved with this 

terrorist activity, the Christians are underrepresented in the number of immigrants in terms of refugees and in terms of people who 

are actually immigrating from those countries in which they have 

been targeted for genocide. This is wrong. This is absolutely wrong. 

It is like sending the Jews back and saying: We are going to have 

a more open policy because of the Nazis, but the Jews aren’t going 

to be able to come in. 

I would hope that we as Americans, both Republicans, Democrats, and this administration and this Congress, recognize we are 

in a moment now where we are defining ourselves, and we need 

5

to make sure that when Christians are under the threat of genocide, that they should have some priority over those other people 

in those countries that are not targets of genocide. And this isn’t 

some sort of discrimination against Muslims or anybody else or 

Shiites or anybody else, but let’s recognize that that is what is 

going on and that is what the threat is and deal with the threat 

and not try to have a debate that is sanitized over here in theory. 

So I am very pleased, and I am grateful to Congressman Smith, 

who, again, has demonstrated his total commitment to human 

rights of every person on this planet and how he commits himself 

to these issues. 

Chairman Smith, I would suggest that we again, and today we 

are reaffirming that we hear ISIL when they say that they are 

going to slaughter all the Christians. We hear them when they 

make proclamations of genocide against Christians and, yes, 

Yazidis as well and others as well, but specifically to the Christians 

and the Yazidis, and that we will then make sure that we mobilize, 

and we help mobilize the American people, which is what this 

hearing is all about, to save the Christians from genocide. It is up 

to us. I don’t want future generations to look back on this generation of Americans and say: They closed their ears because they had 

clinical analysis to do whether or not you could single out one 

group that is being targeted for genocide for preferential treatment 

in terms of immigration and refugee status. I don’t want to hear 

that, which resulted in hundreds of thousands or maybe millions 

of Christians dying in the Middle East. 

Let’s get serious about this. I appreciate this opportunity to join 

you, Mr. Chairman, in this very moral effort to make sure our 

country is practical and is courageous enough to handle this challenge, this moral challenge of our day, to save the people who are 

being targeted for genocide. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Chairman Rohrabacher, for your very 

powerful statement and for your leadership on human rights. I appreciate it. We all do. 

I would like to introduce our very distinguished panel beginning 

with Mr. Carl Anderson, who is Supreme Knight of the Knights of 

Columbus, where he is chief executive officer and chairman of the 

board of the world’s largest Catholic family fraternal service organization, with over 1.9 million members. Mr. Anderson has had a 

distinguished career in public service and as an educator as well. 

From 1983 to 1987, he served in various positions in the Executive 

Office of the President of the United States, including Special Assistant to the President, and Acting Director of the White House 

Office of Public Liaison. Following his service in the House, he also 

served for nearly a decade as a member of the U.S. Commission on 

Civil Rights. 

I will then move on to Mr. Sarhang Hamasaeed, who is a senior 

program officer for the Middle East and North Africa Programs at 

the U.S. Institute of Peace. He joined USIP in February 2011. He 

works on program management, organizational development, monitoring, and evaluation. He also provides political and policy analysis on Iraq to the Institute of Peace and other peacekeeping actors. As Deputy Director General of the Council of Ministers of the 

Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq, he managed strategic govVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:53 Sep 22, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\052616\20260 SHIRL
6

ernment modernization initiatives through information technology 

with the goal of helping to improve governance and service delivery. He has also worked with the Research Triangle Institute International, Kurdistan Save the Children, the Los Angeles Times, and 

other media organizations. 

We will then hear from Mr. Johnny Oram who is the executive 

director of the Chaldean Assyrian Business Alliance, dedicated to 

professional and social advancement of communities worldwide. He 

has been involved in the advocacy for the plight of the Iraqi and 

Syrian Christians who have been displaced due to the conflict. Additionally, Mr. Oram is involved in advocacy of the rights of the 

disabled, specifically those with autism spectrum disorder, or ASD. 

He has served in numerous capacities at the local, State, and Federal levels of government, worked for the Michigan legislature, Hawaii legislature, and in the U.S. Senate. 

We will then hear from Ms. Naomi Kikoler, who is the Deputy 

Director of the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide 

at the United States Holocaust Museum. For 6 years, she developed and implemented the Global Centre for the Responsibility to 

Protect work on populations at risk and efforts to advance R2P 

globally and led the Center’s advocacy, including targeting the U.N. 

Security Council. She is also an adjunct professor at the New 

School University and author of numerous publications previously. 

She worked on national security and refugee policy for Amnesty 

International Canada and in the office of the prosecutor of the 

United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. 

We will then hear from Mr. David Crane, who was appointed a 

Professor of Practice at Syracuse University College of Law in December 2006. He was the founding chief prosecutor of the Special 

Court for Sierra Leone, an international war crimes tribunal that 

put many of the worst actors in that terrible, terrible tragedy behind bars. Ultimately, Charles Taylor got 50 years of prison sentence at The Hague because of the great landmark work that Professor Crane did. Professor Crane’s mandate was to prosecute those 

who bore the greatest responsibility committed during the civil war 

in Sierra Leone in the 1990s. He served for more than 30 years in 

the Federal Government. He has held numerous key managerial 

positions and has been dogged in his work to document the atrocities that are occurring in Syria and in the region. 

So thank you all for being here. What you convey to us and, by 

extension, to the Congress, hopefully to the administration, will 

help provide us with a roadmap going forward. So, Mr. Anderson, 

please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF MR. CARL A. ANDERSON, SUPREME KNIGHT, 

KNIGHTS OF COLUMBUS 

Mr. ANDERSON. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for 

the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee today. The 

House of Representatives, the State Department, and the United 

States Commission on International Religious Freedom are all to 

be commended for declaring the situation confronting Christians 

and other religious minorities in the Middle East to be genocide. 

As we all know, the world’s greatest humanitarian crisis since 

World War II is unfolding now in the Middle East. In addition to 

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millions of refugees, many of the region’s indigenous communities 

now face extinction. These communities may disappear in less than 

a decade, but their fate is not inevitable. The United States can 

avert this unfolding tragedy with a policy that contains, we believe, 

the following six principles: First, increase aid and ensure that it 

actually reaches those most in need. We are reliably informed, as 

the chairman has stated earlier, that official government and U.N. 

aid does not reach the Christian genocide survivors in Iraq and 

Syria. Repeatedly we hear from church leaders in the region that 

Christians and other genocide survivors are last in line for assistance from governments. Significantly the Archdiocese of Erbil, 

where most Iraqi Christians now live, receives no money from any 

government whatsoever. If assistance from outside church-affiliated 

agencies ends in Erbil, Christians there will face a catastrophic humanitarian tragedy within 30 days. And the situation is similar in 

Syria, according to Christian leaders there. 

Those who face genocide are a tiny fraction of the population. 

They often must avoid official refugee camps because they are targeted for violence there by extremists. As a result, these minorities 

often do not get official aid, and this will continue to be the reality, 

unless specific action is taken to bring the aid to where these minorities are forced to reside by continuing violence. 

Knights of Columbus and other private sources have responded 

to this situation, but nongovernmental organizations can only do so 

much. It is essential, therefore, that government aid is increased 

and that we ensure it reaches those most in need, even if special 

emergency appropriations are required to do this. 

Second, support the long-term survival in the region of these ancient indigenous religious and ethnic communities. In Iraq, the 

Christian population has declined by more than 80 percent, and in 

Syria, it has declined by almost 70 percent. American policy should 

recognize the important differences in the situations of those fleeing violence and those targeted for genocide, and quite frankly, we 

should prioritize the latter. Consider this analogy: After World War 

II, there were approximately 50 million refugees, but only a small 

fraction were Jews. Yet the world understood that Jews who had 

survived genocide faced a qualitatively different situation and deserved heightened consideration. The same is true today for the indigenous minorities of the region. They have an indisputable right 

to live in their country in whatever region of it they wish. Depending on the circumstances, this may mean that they will live where 

they are originally from or where they find themselves now, but as 

survivors of an ongoing genocide, they deserve to be prioritized in 

American policymaking decisions. 

Third, punish the perpetrators of genocide and crimes against 

humanity. The United States should support action by the U.N. Security Council to refer key perpetrators of genocide for prosecution. 

Equally important, we should support the Iraqi Government and 

the Kurdish Regional Government’s adjudication of the cases of 

thousands of ISIS fighters and supporters who remain in local detention centers. This will assist in the important work of obtaining 

and preserving evidence of genocide. 

Fourth, we should assist victims of genocide in attaining refugee 

status. The news report as of last week indicated that of the 499 

8

Syrian refugees admitted to the U.S. in May, not one was explicitly 

listed as being Christian or as coming from any of the groups targeted for genocide. We must ask, how long will this situation be allowed to continue? The U.S. should appropriate funding and work 

with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees to make provisions 

for locating and providing status to individuals, such as Yazidis 

and Christians, that have been targeted for genocide. As I mentioned earlier, many of these genocide survivors fear going into official U.N. refugee camps where they are targeted. Thus, they are 

overlooked and find it nearly impossible to acquire official refugee 

status or to immigrate. 

Congress should act now. Senator Tom Cotton has introduced the 

Religious Persecution Relief Act, S. 2708, to provide for overlooked 

minorities in the prioritization of refugees. We support this bill, 

and we urge its passage. 

Fifth, prepare now for the foreseeable human rights challenges 

as ISIS--controlled territory is liberated by ensuring that Christians and other minorities have equal rights to decide their future, 

and obviously, this is going to happen very soon as a result of what 

is happening in Fallujah and Mosul. We should prepare now for 

the consequences of the liberation of ISIS-controlled areas. We are 

likely to see another humanitarian crisis as thousands of civilians 

flee the fighting or return to their former communities when the 

fighting ceases. 

There has been much debate concerning plans for victims of 

genocide in Iraq. Some have argued for returning people safely to 

the Nineveh region; others that they should be allowed to stay in 

Kurdistan; still others that they should be allowed to immigrate. 

But these are not necessarily ultimately exclusive competing proposals. People should be allowed to decide their own future, and 

when they do, we should work to ensure that they are treated with 

fairness, dignity and equality. This also means that it will be increasingly important to ensure that the property rights and claims 

of minority groups are respected. 

And, finally, sixth, promote the establishment of internationally 

agreed-upon standards of human rights and religious freedom as 

conditions for our humanitarian and military assistance. The 

United States should advocate for full and equal rights for religious 

and ethnic minorities in the region in exchange for our military 

and humanitarian aid. A necessary first step to prevent genocide 

is to overcome the social and legal inequality that is its breeding 

ground. We should not accept one standard for human rights in the 

region and another standard for the rest of the world. The rich tapestry of religious pluralism in the region must be preserved now, 

or it will be lost forever. With its loss will come increasing instability and threats to our own national security and that of the 

world. 

We have a unique opportunity, and some would say a unique responsibility, to protect the victims of genocide. The United States 

can provide such protection with a policy that includes the principles outlined above. 

Mr. Chairman, we thank you very much for your leadership and 

that of the other members of the committee. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Anderson follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Mr. Anderson, thank you so very much for your comments, the very tangible support you are providing to the at-risk 

minorities, especially Christians. And those six points, they are 

very, very, very well thought out. 

I would like to now recognize Mr. Hamasaeed, and thank you for 

being here and for your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF MR. SARHANG HAMASAEED, SENIOR PROGRAM OFFICER, MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA PROGRAMS, U.S. 

INSTITUTE OF PEACE 

Mr. HAMASAEED. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, and 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I am testifying as a senior program officer of 

the U.S. Institute of Peace. The views expressed here are my own 

and do not represent that of the institute. USIP works extensively 

and closely with Iraqi minorities, specifically religious minorities. 

We support them by establishing an organization called the Alliance for Iraqi Minorities so that they have the capability to represent themselves, and so, in that vein, a lot of what I mention 

today is coming from experience directly engaging and trying to 

help those minorities. 

Definitely, the minorities in Iraq need all the support that they 

can get as well as other communities, nonminority communities, in 

Iraq. 

The dilemma of the religious minorities is not something new. I 

think it is important to look into some of the history so that we 

can inform solutions that will, to see if they will work and how do 

we prepare for those. The reality is that the minorities have, over 

the past few decades, been caught in between the conflicts and the 

problems of actors that they were not a part of. They didn’t choose 

those conflicts, but they were affected by those conflicts. And ISIS 

is not a product, and what they have done is not a product of 

today. ISIS is a cause of atrocity, but it also is a symptom of failure 

of governance and the space it has created resulting from the political divisions among the big actors in Iraq and the region. 

So it is true that the minorities have suffered probably the most 

at the hands of ISIS in the sense that they came under attack, for 

displacement, for genocide, and also chemical attacks against the 

Turkomans in the Taza district of Kirkuk. The Yazidis have had 

their women and others taken as sex slaves. The Christians have 

been labeled, their houses labeled, and they came under specific attack. 

Then the question comes: What was the response? The specific 

question that was addressed to me to talk about was the response 

of the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government. And to look at this, you can look at this from the perspective 

of a glass half full or a glass half empty. The reality is that the 

minorities believe that the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan 

Regional Government have not been able to protect them; that they 

have been displaced, and they have been affected. But it is also 

true that the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Government 

of Iraq have provided camps and shelters and provided food and assistance. They were also supported by the Iraqi community—which 

15

I think is important—and they have to recognize their efforts in absorbing this crisis and the problems here. 

But the reality is that the scope of the problem is well beyond 

the capacity of one single actor, one single government, or one single community. It requires a collective action. And there is a sense 

of fatigue for the years of displacement, especially since 2003. The 

limited capacity of the government and other actors needs to be 

taken into consideration into what assistance is provided. 

I think that there is a need for rethinking the assistance that is 

given to the minorities and their situation. On protection, the call 

for protection is not something new. This has been, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, there has been a call by the minorities to 

address this for a long time. And the kind of risk that the minorities are confronted with, they are existential threats that threaten 

their collective well-being. It is also a direct risk to their security 

as individuals and communities. 

So the risk of revenge, I would like to single out. We talked 

about the post-return. There is a scenario of protracted displacement, which will be a scenario that we have to deal with. In the 

2006, 2007 peak of violence in Iraq, about 1 million people never 

returned home. And the current 3.3 million people that are displaced, about 1 million of them minorities, they will likely not be 

able to return for quite some time because of problems that are on 

the ground, and the revenge is killing and the potential violence 

coming in those areas is a potential risk to them. 

The U.S. Institute of Peace has worked on models that help the 

return of IDPs and prevent violence. We have done this in the context of Salahuddin and the Speicher massacre that ISIS perpetrated against the Shia cadets and soldiers who were in that 

camp. We facilitated dialogue among the tribes, and we have been 

able to mitigate the violence and prevent killing and facilitate the 

return of IDPs. Tikrit right now has about 150,000 people who 

have returned since May of last year. 

The same kind of effort will be needed in the context of the minorities because there are several layers of conflict that need to be 

addressed: Risks coming from existential threats like ISIL; then 

there are risks that will come from competition over scarce resources; and there will be risks coming from just tensions of some 

of the minorities considering what has happened to them by some 

of their Arab neighbors. There are minority-minority tensions that 

need to be addressed. There are Arab minority issues and KurdishKurdish issues that need to be addressed. There is a need for conflict resolution to help them with the long-term viability. 

The minorities have the organizations and the capabilities to 

help themselves. They have been a partner and a voice for the minorities over the years. The Alliance of Iraqi Minorities has worked 

with the national government and with the Kurdistan Regional 

Government to pass legislation and make sure their issues have 

been prioritized. And they could continue to play that role. But at 

the end of the day, the scope of the need, the magnitude of the 

problem, will require more than what has been provided to date. 

I cannot emphasize enough the need for international support for 

early detection and action on those warning signs that the minorities have been giving us. 

16

It goes without saying that actually solving the bigger problems 

of Iraq will go a long way in helping the minorities over the longterm to stay safe and not to be attacked. While the minorities will 

be able to develop the capabilities to provide local security, larger 

existential threats coming from problems like ISIL, will require the 

help and the support of the Iraqi Government and the Kurdistan 

Regional Government and the larger communities around the minorities. So it is important to put emphasis on, how do you rebuild 

those relationships? How do we put mechanisms in place that will 

prevent those kinds of attacks? 

I think the capacity is limited and the peaceful coexistence is the 

emphasis that we need to put in as a mechanism. Civil society organizations have been a good vehicle to help the Government of 

Iraq and the international community. They will need help in both 

a scenario of return, but also a scenario of protracted displacement, 

to prevent host community tensions as well. 

So, with that, I will stop. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hamasaeed follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Mr. Hamasaeed, I am going to say thank you very 

much for your testimony, which was very extensive. I have read it, 

and other members, I am sure, have read it. 

Without objection, your and all of the distinguished witnesses’ 

full statements and any information you would like to attach to it 

will be made a part of the record. So thank you for that testimony. 

Mr. Oram. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JOHNNY ORAM, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

CHALDEAN ASSYRIAN BUSINESS ALLIANCE 

Mr. ORAM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members, 

guests. My name is Johnny Oram. I am the executive director of 

the Chaldean Assyrian Business Alliance based in Detroit, Michigan. We are an organization that is aimed at fostering professional 

relationships and also to enhance the betterment of our societies 

globally, especially at a critical time when the existence of our peoples in our motherland as well as in Syria is being threatened. 

Before I go into recommendations for this committee, I would like 

to talk briefly about our peoples’ presence here in the United 

States. We the Assyrians, Chaldeans, and the Syriacs are the descendants of the original peoples of Abraham. We are the indigenous peoples of Iraq. We are defined by our language, which is Aramaic, the language that the Lord Jesus Christ spoke. Oldest language in the world. We are also defined by our faith. We are a part 

of the Eastern Rite of the Roman Catholic Church in union with 

Rome. A good number of our Assyrians are from the Assyrian 

Church of the East, the Ancient Church of the East, and the Syriac 

Church, as well as the Presbyterian, and many other denominations. 

My people immigrated to the United States in the early 20th century to come to the greatest nation in the history on Earth, a land 

where they can seek opportunities and be free to profess their 

faith. They came to communities such as Detroit to seek employment in our automotive plants. They came to the United States not 

only because of economic opportunities, but they came to the 

United States because the church and we had communities here 

that they were attracted to. When you have a church, they will 

come. And, subsequently, there are schools, which I will elaborate 

here a little bit later, but that is very important to our communities: The faith and family. 

Oftentimes, the Assyrians and the Chaldeans are categorized as 

Arabs. However, we are not Arabs, but rather, we are in predominantly Arab countries, though many of our people live in Iran and 

Turkey, which are not Arab countries. Again, we are the indigenous peoples of the land. Nineveh was the capital of Assyria 

afterall. We have close to 150,000 Chaldeans and Assyrians in the 

metro Detroit region alone and an additional 200,000 throughout 

the United States in Chicago, Phoenix, San Diego, San Jose, 

Turlock, and Modesto. We also have a significant Syriac community 

in New York and Connecticut. 

My people here in the United States have a deep connection and 

a relationship to our persecuted refugees in Iraq and Syria. And we 

have welcomed thousands of them who have come to the United 

States with open arms. We feel for them. 

28

I would like to touch point on the people who want to leave. So 

I am going to go ahead and kind of emphasize on that here. Seeing 

as Christians and other minorities are particularly targeted by the 

Islamic State, it is imperative that they be given special consideration in the search for asylum. This is amplified by the fact that 

they even face persecution in asylum and shelters in Europe by 

radicals. Nuri Kino, a world renowned investigative journalist and 

founder of the grassroots human rights organization A Demand for 

Action, has been instrumental in uncovering this in Sweden and 

other places throughout Europe. Our people are being harassed. 

Our people are being threatened. They are being intimidated. They 

are being coerced, even in Europe. 

The opening of the new processing centers in Erbil and Beirut, 

where the majority of Christians flee from Iraq and Syria, were 

positive steps. But the number of people processed must be increased to deal with the overwhelming. As far assimilating into the 

United States, I think this is a perfect time to have a conversation 

and to talk about schools like Keys Grace Academy in Madison 

Heights, Michigan. I alluded to schools. This is a first of its kind 

in the Nation where they have engaged in Assyrian language immersion and basically preserving our identity and our culture. And 

the school has also helped kids adjust and integrate into American 

culture while maintaining their heritage in a meaningful way. 

The public education system here in the United States is woefully unprepared to deal with these kids, many of them who have 

seen severe trauma. But schools, like Keys Grace Academy, which 

are run by our own Chaldean and Assyrian people, who understand 

what they have been through, are extremely critical. Furthermore, 

groups like the Chaldean Community Foundation in Sterling 

Heights, Michigan—basically it is a suburb of Detroit. This organization has been instrumental in helping Assyrian and Chaldean 

refugees to assimilate into American society. The foundation processes over 20,000 visitors annually as they help our new arrivals 

into the metro Detroit region seek employment, health care, assistance, education, moral support, and so on. Our community in metro 

Detroit is 150,000 strong and growing. As you are all aware, Mr. 

Chairman, members and guests, my Congressman from Michigan’s 

11th congressional district, David Trott, offered an amendment to 

the NDAA, the National Defense Authorization Act, that passed 

the House on May 17, which is aimed at protecting Christians and 

other religious minorities throughout the Middle East from the Islamic State-led genocide by establishing a U.N. refugee processing 

center in Erbil. This requires the United Nations to step up and 

do its share to protect our vulnerable communities in Iraq, as well 

as the United Nations. 

I also urge the United States Congress to reform the Refugee Act 

of 1980 by establishing more P-2 and P-3 visas for our refugees and 

bypassing the U.N.-mandated refugee allotments and quotas. Moreover, this is also going to be important for the refugees in that they 

can apply directly to admission to the United States of America, 

rather than be sent off to other lands, such as various designations 

in Europe and elsewhere, where they have been unwelcome. 

Now, I would like to elaborate on the people who want to stay. 

The reality is that the vast majority of people will not be able or 

29

desire to leave. So the particularly important measure will be with 

those that deal with the situation in Iraq and Syria. In the short 

term, emergency aid going directly to these organizations on the 

ground is extremely critical. Aid organizations, like Help Iraq, the 

Assyrian Aid Society, ACERO, the Syriac Patriarchate, et cetera, 

have a proven ability to actually get aid to our people. Other organizations, such as my colleague Shachar Zahavi over at IsraAID, 

Israel’s leading humanitarian organization, have been instrumental 

in providing aid, relief, and medical care for our refugees. 

The fact that our people are still being targeted in UNHCR 

camps by locals, not by U.N. staff, they almost exclusively stop 

going to these U.N.-run camps and, therefore, critical aid doesn’t 

reach them through traditional channels. Our aid organizations, 

which I have alluded to earlier, fill in the void as much as possible. 

But resources are always in dire straits. We have seen some legislative support in the Senate’s foreign operations appropriations. 

But, unfortunately, the legislative support has not translated to 

enough material support on the ground. 

I can’t really emphasize how important this is, but we must directly support our indigenous aid organizations on the ground. For 

example, our own USAID sends funds to the United Nations with 

the intent of distributing these funds to our communities in Iraq 

and Syria. The Iraqi and Syrian Christians are not receiving any 

of these moneys. All this money goes to the UNHCR camps, a place 

which is unsafe for Christians and Yazidis and other religious minorities. Where is the security apparatus to protect our people in 

these camps, especially when they are trying to receive critical aid 

for their very own survival? Supporting local security forces in Iraq 

and Syria is the best way to ensure a stable environment where 

people are able to return. After the Islamic State invaded, both the 

Peshmerga and the Iraqi Army abandoned Christian and Yazidi 

areas of the Nineveh Plains and Sinjar, leaving the inhabitants defenseless and deeply distrustful of the institutional security apparatus. 

Support authorized through the NDAA for the Assyrian, 

Chaldean, Syriac Christians, and other minorities in Iraq and 

Syria is crucial in standing up to these forces. 

I worked with A Demand For Action on these efforts, and there 

has been some support realized for Syriac Assyrian forces in Syria, 

but the forces in Iraq are going to need considerable support. But 

it is support that they deserve and that they are entitled to and 

is the only way to gain confidence of the people who have inhabited 

these lands for thousands of years. 

Finally, the creation of a safe haven with international protection 

which ultimately would be transitional to a province in the 

Nineveh Plains with the semblance of self-governance and self-security is the only way to regain the trust of the minorities who feel 

that they were betrayed by the Iraqi Government and the KRG. 

These issues affecting our communities in Iraq and Syria are especially addressed in H. Res. 440, a resolution introduced by Congressman David Trott and Congressman Sherman of California, 

which calls for precise actions that can positively affect the situation on the ground. Marking up that resolution is critical as it 

would additionally serve as a moral boon to the beleaguered people 

30

as it is the first resolution in congressional history to recognize the 

Simele massacre in 1933, an event where 3,000 Assyrians were 

massacred under the watch of the Iraqi Government. 

I would like to talk on the IDP situation in Turkey. Sixty-seven 

years ago, right here in Washington, DC, all the signatories to the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, agreed to the following: The parties to this treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their 

desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They 

are determined to safeguard the freedom, the common heritage, 

and the civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of 

democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. They seek to 

promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They 

are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the 

preservation of peace and security. 

Mr. Chairman, Members, being a member of NATO requires respecting peoples of all religions and all faiths. Many of our churches in Turkey are being confiscated by President Erdogan and the 

Council of Ministers in Turkey under this whole guise that they 

are basically going to reform and revitalize those communities that 

have been impacted by war, especially in places like Diyarbakir. 

My very bishop, Francis Kalabat, in Detroit, Michigan, and many 

Assyrian and Chaldean clergy oftentimes have to travel to Turkey 

to administer to the faithful there because our faithful basically 

cannot profess their faith freely. 

This is a NATO ally. This is basically a campaign to begin the 

extermination of Christianity in the Middle East, and that really 

doesn’t bode well for us. This is of extremely vital importance to 

our national security and to the security of the world. These include Catholics, Protestants, and Orthodox churches that date close 

to 2,000 years. 

Mr. Chairman, I would sincerely request that you and your colleagues move forward existing efforts in Congress to urge the Turkish Government, led by President Erdogan and his Council of Ministers, to immediately return these churches to their rightful owners. This right here is an example of continued persecution and displacement of Christians in the region. Again, Turkey is supposed 

to be our ally, but they are not being a good actor in the situation. 

These actions clearly undermine the very agreement that the Turkish Government signed to become a member of NATO in 1952. 

We, the United States of America, have a moral and fundamental obligation. We need to step up as leaders of the free world 

and help the thousands of Christians and other religious minorities 

escape displacement and death, give them hope when they have 

lost hope, and to reassure them that they have a place that they 

can come to if they so choose where they can be a part of a nation 

and contribute to our economy and our society. 

As I have mentioned earlier, we have the resources to absorb 

them. This is the right thing to do. Thank you very much, Mr. 

Chairman. May God bless you and God bless America. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Oram follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Thank you so much, Mr. Oram, for your testimony 

and recommendations and insights. 

I would like to now recognize Ms. Naomi Kikoler, and thank you 

for being here. 

STATEMENT OF MS. NAOMI KIKOLER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, 

SIMON-SKJODT CENTER FOR THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE, UNITED STATES HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM 

Ms. KIKOLER. Thank you, Chairman Smith and Ranking Member 

Bass, for holding a hearing on this important issue and for the opportunity to testify. I ask that you include in the record the text 

of the Holocaust Memorial Museum’s report issued last November, 

entitled ‘‘Our Generation is Gone: The Islamic State’s Targeting of 

Iraqi Minorities in Ninewa.’’

Last month, I was sitting with a Yazidi woman in a displaced 

persons camp outside of Dohuk in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. 

She was kidnapped by Islamic State fighters in the village of Kocho 

during an attack where hundreds of Yazidi men were killed. When 

I met her, she, along with her two young children, had escaped her 

Islamic State captor in Syria only 2 weeks earlier. She had been 

forcibly converted to Islam, and for almost 2 years, she was held 

as a sex slave. She and her children are the face of a modern day 

genocide that is being perpetrated by the Islamic State. For those 

still being held today, that genocide is ongoing. 

The administration’s determination that this self-proclaimed Islamic State committed genocide and crimes against humanity 

against religious minorities is an important recognition of the heinous crimes committed by the Islamic State and the suffering of 

victims like the woman I met and her children. 

However, if the label of genocide is truly to have meaning for the 

victims of that crime, then this discussion should evolve from a 

question of what happened to how to protect vulnerable communities, using military and nonmilitary tools, from future threats by 

the Islamic State and other extremist groups. This includes how to 

secure justice and accountability for the victims of their crimes. 

Genocide is a rare occurrence. There is no blueprint for how the 

United States Government responds in situations where genocide 

has been committed or is taking place. With this in mind, we at 

the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide traveled 

last month to the Kurdistan region of Iraq and to newly liberated 

areas by Mount Sinjar to assess what needs to be done to protect 

vulnerable minorities as a followup to the report released in November 2015 documenting the commission of genocide, crimes 

against humanity, and ethnic cleansing committed by the Islamic 

State against minorities. 

Our trip starkly revealed that these communities remain at risk 

of future atrocities. Those who stay in exile in the Kurdistan region 

of Iraq are physically safe, yet they yearn to return home. As long 

as the Islamic State exists, these communities will remain vulnerable. The Islamic State still occupies large swaths of land in 

Nineveh, making it impossible for minority communities to return 

home. 

Certain liberated areas are also too dangerous for civilians to return home as they are within the range of ISIS mortar fire. This 

35

is particularly true for communities on the south side of Mount 

Sinjar and those close to Mosul. 

Defeating the Islamic State, therefore, should remain a key priority of the U.S. Government’s efforts if our hope is to ensure the 

very survival of these communities. Yet to animate this objective, 

civilian protection and the prevention of atrocity should be at the 

core of that strategy. We know from past cases that this requires 

a comprehensive and sustained strategy using military and nonmilitary tools that is calibrated to respond to evolving conditions on 

the ground to prevent genocide and other mass atrocities. In this 

context, a strategy would include day-after planning to identify scenarios and tools that would mitigate potential future flashpoints 

and implement strategies to address them, including rebuilding liberated areas, promoting reconciliation between groups, advancing 

justice and accountability efforts, and securing a political resolution 

between the Government of Iraq and the Kurdish Regional Government to the disputed areas in which many of Iraq’s minorities live. 

The most common sentiment that we heard from displaced minority communities and one that needs to be addressed is their 

lack of trust in the officials and institutions that are responsible for 

their physical protection and for guaranteeing their legal rights, as 

well as their deep distrust of their former Sunni Arab neighbors 

who they perceive as having been complicit in ISIS’ attacks. 

Religious minorities continue to feel that the Iraqi security forces 

and the Kurdish Peshmerga abandoned them when the Islamic 

State attacked Nineveh. Many also continue to feel that they are 

being used as political pawns by the Government of Iraq and the 

Kurdish Regional Government in the ongoing contest over the disputed areas. This leaves them nervous about who and how their 

land will be administered should they return home. 

For over 10 years, religious minorities were targeted on the basis 

of their identity by extremist groups and were politically 

marginalized. The early warning of their vulnerabilities went largely unheeded, and as a result, many saw fleeing the country as their 

only protection option. Today, in the absence of what they, again, 

see as being credible actors to provide their physical protection, 

many communities are seeking to arm themselves. New threats are 

also emerging for not just religious minorities but also for the 

Sunni Arab population who may be the victims of revenge killings. 

The proliferation of unregulated and poorly trained militias may 

pose additional threats to civilians in areas liberated from the Islamic State as they seek to liberate additional territory. Many that 

we interviewed expressed concerns about the potential for conflict 

between militias within particular religious communities and 

amongst religious groups. 

This all underscores that defeating the Islamic State and protecting vulnerable communities requires more than just a military 

strategy if civilians are to be protected. It requires tackling the root 

causes that allowed the Islamic State to rise and that enhance the 

vulnerabilities of minority communities. 

In light of this, we believe that there are four principle areas 

where additional efforts could be paid to ensure both the immediate protection needs of vulnerable communities seeking to return 

36

home and ensure that the long-term and systematic drivers of conflict are mitigated. 

Those are, first, an explicit policy to provide genuine physical 

protection to vulnerable populations. Protection could include strategies for employing local, domestic, and international actors to provide security to ethnic and religious minorities returning to liberated lands and Sunni Arab populations at risk of reprisal killings. 

In planning military operations and broader policy objectives, actors should consider the possible unintended consequences of the 

actions taken and whether they will heighten risks for civilian populations living under the Islamic State’s control and/or might contribute to future cycles of violence. 

The Iraqi Government and international donors should ensure 

that all Iraqi security forces, Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga, and local 

militias fully adhere to international human rights and humanitarian law standards and are held accountable for violations in accordance with international standards. Withholding military assistance to those groups who do not adhere to these standards could 

be a powerful tool in addressing the behavior of bad actors. 

Second is support for stabilization and reconstruction efforts in 

liberated areas. This includes increasing the presence of development assistance from relevant agencies and departments. Many of 

the displaced expressed concerns to us that they will be unable to 

return home in the absence of economic opportunity and the reconstruction of their devastated region. High rates of unemployment 

within the Sunni population and perceived economic inequity was 

one of drivers of the rise of the Islamic State. Affected regions must 

be rebuilt and the engagement of the international community 

must be sustained in that endeavor in the years to come. 

A critical component of stabilization and reconstruction efforts is 

investing in reconciliation so that diverse communities can once 

again live alongside each other. In the absence of such efforts, 

there is a grave potential for future conflict between communities. 

Third, transitional justice efforts are central to responding to the 

commission of past crimes and the deterrence of future crimes. The 

clearest obligation in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide is to punish the perpetrators of 

genocide, and international justice is the cornerstone upon which 

the international community has responded to the crime of genocide, from Nuremberg 70 years ago to the international criminal 

tribunals for Rwanda, Yugoslavia, and Cambodia. 

Today, substantial support is needed to investigate, collect, and 

analyze evidence; secure mass grave sites; and detain perpetrators 

for the purpose of future prosecution. In this effort, we can’t lose 

sight of the importance of holding individuals accountable for 

crimes committed at the local level. 

The most common answer to the question of how can trust be 

built between minorities and the Sunni Arab population that we 

pose to people who are displaced was that those who committed 

crimes in their towns and villages needed to be held accountable 

in a court. The rampant culture of impunity has left high levels of 

distrust amongst ordinary Iraqis. They need to see justice advanced 

not only against the Islamic State’s leaders for genocide but also 

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munities. This necessitates detaining fighters, investigating their 

crimes, and then prosecuting them at the national as well as possibly the international level. 

Fourth is securing the political resolution to the ongoing dispute 

between the Kurdish Regional Government and the Iraqi Government over Nineveh. Our report was very clear in identifying the 

ongoing dispute as a key factor that exacerbated the vulnerability 

of minority communities in part because the dispute is perceived 

as having contributed to growing support for extremist groups, and 

when the Islamic State advanced, there were no clear lines of responsibility. As long as responsibility for protecting these communities remains in question, vulnerabilities will remain acute and 

create a vacuum that the Islamic State or a successor group could 

exploit. 

Finally, to recognize a genocide has happened is to acknowledge 

a collective failure to prevent the crime of all crimes and to uphold 

the commitment to never again. Going forward, the U.S. and other 

governments will need to place civilian protection and the prevention of atrocities at the core of their counter-ISIL strategies, but 

the commitment to prevent and protect minorities must extend beyond the current threat posed by the Islamic State. We must endeavor to ensure that in 10 years, we are not yet again meeting 

in the wake of another failure to protect vulnerable minorities in 

Iraq and Syria. 

Countering the Islamic State and preventing future atrocities 

perpetrated by other groups necessitates an ongoing assessment of 

those groups’ motivations, organization, and capabilities for committing atrocity crimes, and of the vulnerabilities of at-risk communities. Continuous monitoring and analysis of the warning signs 

and risk indicators on the ground will be needed and strategies developed to ensure that threats facing minorities in the future are 

mitigated. 

That is what upholding the commitment to prevent, enshrined in 

the Genocide Convention, should mean. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Kikoler follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Thank you so very much for your testimony and for 

reminding us of what the face of genocide is with your experience 

with the young woman and her two children. As you pointed out, 

she was forcibly converted to Islam. For almost 2 years, she was 

held as a sex slave. That is just numbing in how awful and horrific 

that reality has been, so thankfully you were there, and now you 

have conveyed that message to all of us. And that should be fresh 

impetus for all of us to do even more. 

I would like to now yield to Mr. Crane, a former chief prosecutor 

of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID M. CRANE, PROFESSOR OF PRACTICE, SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW (FORMER 

CHIEF PROSECUTOR, UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COURT 

FOR SIERRA LEONE) 

Mr. CRANE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank the subcommittee, its staff and, in particular, its 

chairman for its decades-long fight against the atrocities committed 

by state and nonstate actors around the world. In fact, you and I 

have been working together since 2002, along with many members 

of this committee, in seeking justice for the oppressed. 

We are in an age of extremes with adversaries never contemplated facing challenges that are most likely not solvable. The 

21st century is shaping up to be no better than what I call the 

bloody 20th century, where over 225 million people died of nonnatural causes, over 100 million of which that I estimate at the 

hands of their own governments. 

In the 21st century, conflict will be kaleidoscopic and dirty, with 

one or all sides ignoring international law. Our current planning 

in the United States and preparation cycle make us incapable of 

dealing with these kaleidoscopic conflicts and events, and I am 

working with the International Peace and Security Institute to 

quantify that data. 

Despite this, we have seen the evolution of modern international 

criminal law, which has now given us the practical and legal capability of holding dictators, thugs, and their henchmen accountable 

for atrocity if there is a political will to do so. I underscore ‘‘if there 

is a political will to do so.’’ If we do have that political will, we have 

the experience now to prosecute those who feed on their own peoples. 

Now, we have mentioned many numbers this afternoon related 

to casualties: 300,000 persons killed, over 10 million refugees moving about the region with no hope and no homes. But I do want 

to underscore that these are about human beings, individual 

human beings. When I was in Sierra Leone, I would hold townhall 

meetings, and I was in Makeni, the headquarters of the infamous 

Revolutionary United Front, who cut hands off of victims and other 

body parts. And as I was holding this townhall meeting, a young 

child soldier stood up. He was about 12, and he looked at me in 

the eye, and he began to weep, and he said: I killed people. I am 

sorry. I didn’t mean it. 

And as I was holding him in my arms as he wept, a young 

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cause it had been put in a pot of boiling water. She was holding 

her child, and she, through cracked lips, said: Seek justice. 

That is why we do this. And that is why I want to underscore 

in my remarks today that we don’t forget that it is individual 

human beings, one person at a time. 

There has been a complete breakdown of the rule of law and accountability in the Levant. The laws of armed conflict are ignored, 

resulting in mounting civilian casualties. There is an increased use 

of banned weapons systems, such as barrel bombs and chemical 

weapons, along with the increase in various torture and execution 

methods not seen since the Dark Ages. The Caesar Report, which 

I coauthored and which we testified a year or so ago, found direct 

and clear and convincing evidence of this horror. 

In the Levant region, there are three international crimes that 

are being committed. They have been highlighted in this testimony 

and are well-known by this subcommittee: War crimes, crimes 

against humanity, and possibly genocide. I want to underscore and 

caution that we have to be very careful that politicians and diplomats tend to rank or tier international crimes and holding out 

genocide as the top tier. 

Well, I would just submit respectfully to this subcommittee that 

300,000 people killed as a result of an international crime don’t 

care whether it is a genocide, crime against humanity, or war 

crime. So I want to caution our use of terms. They are important, 

but they are crimes, and I also want to point out, of these three 

crimes, one is a specific intent crime, which means that you have 

to have a specific intent to destroy in whole or in part a peoples. 

It is a difficult crime to prove, and in some cases, you almost 

need a smoking gun, so I would just caution this subcommittee, 

when they are considering the war crimes, watch out for tiering 

and ranking the crimes, as well as understanding that genocide, 

even though a very serious crime indeed, a crime of crimes, is a difficult and very specific type of crime, which at the legal level, has 

to be clearly or beyond a reasonable doubt proven each and every 

element. 

So what is next then? You asked me that question. First, there 

must be a realization that the ISIS phenomenon is a decades-long 

challenge. We are entering into an effort that is of cold war ramifications. 

At this time, we do not have a solution for this challenge. Until 

we do have a realistic and practical solution, we must understand 

that we may not be able to restore international peace and security, only manage some sense of security in the Levant. The conflict 

there truly is kaleidoscopic in nature, where if one thing changes, 

everything changes. We cannot predict or plan what happens next. 

The cornerstone to a possible beginning of a solution is Arab resolve and cooperation. However, this may not be possible given political realities. The West cannot be seen as an interloper, only as 

a patient enabler and a facilitator. We can’t be seen as launching 

the seventh crusade, so to speak. 

Over the next several years, you must contain the ISIS threat regionally, stamp out ISIS’ attempts to further their cause elsewhere 

and focus on achievable programs in the region locally and domesVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:53 Sep 22, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\052616\20260 SHIRL
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tically, and I would underscore some of the important points made 

by my colleagues this afternoon. 

I just would like to say a young man or woman who has a job 

and some hope for a better future is less likely to turn to terror 

and to ISIS. Essentially, what I am saying is that we cannot defeat 

ISIS using kinetic energy alone. In reality, it can only be done 

through economic revitalization, almost a Marshall Plan for the 

Middle East. It is that kind of commitment. 

Additionally, we can take realistic steps to start an accountability mechanism for the region, particularly as it relates to ISIS 

atrocities. If we have the political will, we can establish some tried 

and true methods. We should start with a truth commission, not 

a reconciliation commission at this point, but start with a truth 

commission. Let’s get something started. Let’s get something going. 

We also have the ability and the experience to set up a domestic 

court or an internationalized domestic court, even a hybrid regional 

court, which we did in the Special Court for Sierra Leone. The 

International Criminal Court, though an important and permanent 

entity, is politically, unfortunately, neutralized by the United Nations Security Council and, unfortunately, will not play a major 

part in this effort, even though we need to recognize that they do 

have a potential place. The practical reality is, a domestic court, an 

internationalized domestic court, or hybrid regional court supported by regional countries, countries in the region, is the most 

practical and realistic opportunity. 

Now, these mechanisms can be headquartered in Iraq, Turkey, 

or Jordan, supported by members of the Arab League. The international community could assist and train commission or court personnel as requested and needed. The idea is having Arab states 

prosecuting Arabs for crimes against Arab peoples in violation of 

Arab laws. 

Now, we have done this before with the Special Court for Sierra 

Leone. We have moved into an area, worked with peoples, developed methodologies, efficiently managed justice mechanisms and 

broad accountability to millions of victims there in West Africa. We 

have translated this success into the Syrian Accountability Project, 

where we have built a conflict map, a crime base matrix, sample 

indictments so that someday, when a domestic, regional, or international prosecutor is designated, we can hand this package over 

to them for their consideration to get things started. 

So what are my conclusions? The Levant is an unmanageable 

space. International peace and security cannot be restored using today’s outmoded problem-solving techniques. Thus, there are no 

foreseeable political or military solutions. This is a multifaceted, 

and I underscore, decades-long struggle. It is truly kaleidoscopic. 

Our next step should be to continue to try and contain ISIS. On 

the periphery, create achievable regional and domestic programs, 

and I would humbly suggest perhaps that Marshall Plan. 

Let’s take away the reason for ISIS to be—no hope in the future. 

We have and can offer better alternatives, such as freedom and a 

jobs plan, possibly. It is within the realm of possibility to development a justice mechanism outside the U.N. Security Council. The 

focus should be using regional and domestic arrangements to create 

45

those mechanisms. We must not be discouraged. We must be patient and firm in our resolve for accountability, stability, and peace. 

A little over 10 years ago, President Charles Taylor never 

thought that he would be held accountable for his crimes in West 

Africa, but today, he sits in a maximum security prison in Great 

Britain for the rest of his life paying the price for aiding and abetting the murder, rape, maiming, and mutilation of over 1.2 million 

human beings. We can hold ISIS accountable for their crimes and 

begin to establish some sense of peace in the Levant. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this time. I stand ready to answer 

any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Crane follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Professor Crane, for your testimony, for 

your leadership. And one of the pictures that I will never forget is 

the picture that was all on the front pages or page 3 of most of the 

newspapers around the world of Charles Taylor receiving a 50-year 

prison sentence, eyes cast down, thinking, I am sure, that he would 

never be held to account for the atrocities he committed on the Liberian, Sierra Leonean, and other people of the region. 

So thank you for that successful prosecution of the other men 

who committed such horrific acts of violence against innocent people, especially women and children, for that and for your recommendations. They are outstanding. 

Just a few questions to start off. I will yield to my colleague, and 

then we will have perhaps a few more additional questions. 

Mr. Anderson, you make a very strong point—Mr. Oram, you do 

it as well—that the aid that is meant to go to—or what many people think would get to Christians is not getting through and to 

other persecuted minorities, like the Yazidis, and the importance of 

backing indigenous efforts, particularly the churches, to get that 

aid through. 

We had a hearing last—I chaired it with the Assistant Secretary 

Anne Richard under the auspices of the Helsinki Commission on 

why is it so many people went to flight and left and made their 

way into Europe? One is that there was gross underfunding of the 

international calls for subsistence. 

Mr. Hamasaeed, you made the point as well that efforts continue 

to fall woefully short of the need for food, shelter, healthcare, education, and psychosocial support for those to deal with trauma in 

your testimony, and the number that we got was about 40 percent 

of the requests of the competent authorities, like the UNHCR, that 

is all they got. And this year, so far, we are at, for 2016, 23 percent 

funded, although we are not done, 2016. Forty percent, 42 percent, 

is, as you said, woefully, woefully underfunding. 

One of biggest takeaways from that hearing came from the 

UNHCR representative, who said the reason why people left, one 

was the loss of hope; secondly, a cut to the World Food Programme 

of about 30 percent. And they said: That is it. They don’t have our 

back. We are going to stagnate here, maybe even die. We are going 

to head to Europe or Germany or somewhere else where the pastures might be greener. 

So the international community fatally, I think, underfunded 

those efforts. The U.S. led the effort. Perhaps we should have done 

more or mobilized more. This isn’t a hearing to point fingers. It is 

to say: We have got to get it right. And my hope is that we will 

do a second hearing. Just so you know, Ms. Bass and I, we have 

already asked Rabbi Saperstein to come, the top point person for 

religious freedom. He couldn’t come today, but he sends his regrets. 

He will make an appearance. We will also ask Anne Richard, Assistant Secretary at PRM, and others, because I do think there is 

a place where we need to be joined at the hip, congressional and 

executive branch, to make a difference in the lives of these people. 

But the gross underfunding, and if you would elaborate a little 

bit on this 30-day window. Mr. Anderson, you talked about that if 

people don’t get food and medicines—and any of you who would 

51

like to touch on this—they are literally at the point of starvation 

and, obviously, other terrible consequences from malnutrition. 

Mr. ANDERSON. Well, I would say, Mr. Chairman, most of what 

we hear is anecdotal. Just this week, my assistant is in Erbil. I was 

speaking with him this morning, and he was calling me from a 

Yazidi camp. He told me that what he had been told was that the 

Yazidis in this camp had received one food drop from the U.N. 

when they arrived, and since that time, all of their assistance has 

come through the Archdiocese of Erbil. For example, all of their 

medical assistance comes through the medical clinic that we have 

been funding. 

So if those sources stop, you can see here is a community, they 

are still living in tents. There is nothing available for them. So I 

would think maybe have the same kind of evidence that you are 

receiving, but we hear this from the religious leaders in Erbil, and 

we hear it from the religious leaders in Aleppo and throughout 

Syria. It is the same, same issue. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes, Mr. Oram, and then Mr. Hamasaeed. 

Mr. ORAM. Mr. Anderson, thank you. Yes, that is a common narrative in Erbil for our people. So, as I had mentioned in testimony, 

Mr. Chairman, organizations like Help Iraq, Assyrian Aid Society, 

ACERO, and others are basically doing the job of what governments and governmental agencies should be doing. And a lot of our 

people, a lot of this assistance goes to the U.N. and U.N.-run 

camps. But a lot of our Christians and other religious minorities 

are afraid to go to those camps because the—so one recommendation is to, really, in addition to the refugee processing center—we 

don’t know—I know that there has been legislation to call for that 

and also to form some other—a venue for them to go and receive 

aid, so there needs to be a security apparatus in place, especially 

even at the U.N. camps, because most—a bulk of that aid goes to 

those camps. 

Mr. SMITH. And you know, when I raise it with the UNHCR, as 

I did at that hearing and I have done ever since and before, they 

are very defensive, and I understand where they are coming from. 

It is not them. It is the people in the camp. 

Mr. ORAM. Right. 

Mr. SMITH. Those who wish them ill, ‘‘they’’ being the Christians 

or the Yazidis or the other minorities. 

Mr. ORAM. That is correct. You are absolutely right. 

Mr. SMITH. But that doesn’t mean I don’t have a responsibility 

and all of us to get the money, the food, and humanitarian assistance to those who are suffering. 

Mr. ORAM. And that is why it is so extremely critical in, you 

know, the Senate’s foreign operations appropriations mechanism to 

increase aid for these international nongovernmental organizations 

because they are preparing. So what oftentimes has happened is 

organizations like Help Iraq are vested with a responsibility of engaging in fundraising campaigns throughout the world. 

In Detroit, we have raised hundreds of thousands of dollars from 

our community, and all that money, and clothing, drives for clothing and food and blankets, especially in the wintertime. That is 

also a critical time. 

52

But our communities in northern Iraq, the Assyrians and the 

Chaldeans, they are basically prisoners in their own country. The 

other important issue is, and, Mr. Anderson, the Assyrians, the 

Chaldeans can’t be gainfully employed in Kurdistan. Now, we have 

a problem with that. 

Mr. SMITH. Yeah. 

Mr. ORAM. You can’t seek employment. Kurdistan, so far as I understand, is still a part of Iraq. Our people are basically depending 

on the diaspora communities for their survival. I have had conversations with folks from the United Nations, and they basically 

said when it came to the issue pertaining to the security of 

Nineveh and the communities in Syria and what have you, 

Qamishli and what have you, they basically said that they don’t 

have the resources or they are not in a position to provide U.N. 

peacekeeping forces to protect those communities that are being 

threatened. 

So, really, the United Nations really needs to step up to the 

plate. 

Mr. SMITH. Yeah. 

Mr. ORAM. And be a leader and providing a security apparatus. 

And, also, when—I would like to jump into the refugee issue. Yes, 

we have, as far as refugee admission to the United States, the 

Christians have really been—about we are 1 percent—less than 1 

percent of admissions into this country. I am not here to have a 

debate about religion and about Islam and Christianity, but it 

seems 99 percent of the refugees that have been admitted into the 

United States are Muslim. 

And when the United States basically was debating as to whether or not to declare this a genocide, their whole concern was, well, 

the Christians, they have options. They can pay jizya, a fee to basically stay alive. It took 11⁄2 years for Secretary Kerry to make this 

declaration, and basically, all experts throughout the world came 

to the understanding and conclusion that this was actually a genocide, and I do commend the Secretary for finally making that declaration. 

So, yeah, we need to really step up to the plate and provide financial assistance to these organizations and so the money can get 

to the communities. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. 

Mr. HAMASAEED. Yeah, if I may just stress that the point I made 

in the written testimony as well, which the need today, whatever 

is seen by the international community, is far greater than what 

the system captures because the system does not see the amount, 

the volume of assistance that came from the local communities, 

from the Iraqis, whether in the Kurdistan region or the rest of the 

country. They have helped a lot in shouldering this and, actually, 

were the first responders in a way to the wave of crisis. 

But I think, in addition to seeing the current need, we have to 

also look forward toward what would be the magnitude of the problem in a scenario of a protracted displacement a year from now, 2 

years from now. A good number of those people will stay with us, 

and the kind of tensions that we see today in the housed communities, in the IDP camps, and a good number of people are outside 

the IDP camps, sometimes not registered in this system because of 

53

lack of documentations or the bureaucracy does not have the capacity to handle this magnitude. 

Neither the Kurdistan Regional Government nor the Iraqi Government have handled something like this from a bureaucracy assistance standpoint. They don’t have the capacity. Then there is the 

issue of resources. The communities have exhausted their resources 

that they have because of the economic downturn in Iraq. The drop 

in oil prices has strained the system. The country is fighting ISIL, 

so there are the military expenses. You have the destruction that 

comes from this fight. Ramadi: 80 percent destruction, other towns, 

the pictures are horrible. Sinjar, other minority places; the potential for return is a significant problem. 

So the tensions will be something that we need to focus on. And 

it is important as we do this, there are issues that are directed at 

minorities from ISIL and other groups, but some of this is just a 

natural product of the chaos and the conflict where people do not 

have income and resources. They don’t have jobs. There is a pressure on the governments of the region, in Iraq or elsewhere, to provide economic opportunities and give job permits. But the economy 

being down and people not having jobs is not just—you can go outside the camps, but there are no jobs. 

There are many, many IDPs who have been interviewed, and 

they say: The economy outside is such that there is nobody to hire 

us because the economy is down. Oil prices are down. And the 

Kurdistan Regional Government and its tensions with Baghdad, 

they are late 3 months in the payment of their public servants. 

Their resources to help with the IDPs are far more limited. 

So, therefore, the international community really takes this seriously from a humanitarian standpoint but also from a conflict prevention standpoint because the more displaced, the more—they either have to migrate, or there will be—they are vulnerable for 

other forms of radicalization as a response to the problem that they 

face. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Kikoler. 

Ms. KIKOLER. Thank you for raising that question, and maybe 

just to pick up on some of the things that Sarhang mentioned. 

I think it is really important to underscore that the implications 

of the underfunding means that this crucial conversation about the 

day after—and in reality, we are talking about today. For areas 

that are already liberated around Sinjar, this is a question that 

people are grappling with today. Do people return? Can they return? Who is taking the leadership in pushing that conversation? 

That discussion of the day after should be a central component 

of our counter-ISIL strategy conversations right now. All of us have 

highlighted a couple of components that usually fall outside, as 

Sarhang mentioned, of the traditional discussion of conflict prevention or counterterrorism. That is reconciliation, reconstruction, addressing political grievances, and the importance of accountability. 

Each of those require resources dedicated toward them, yet they 

are simply not a priority right now for many of the actors that we 

hope to take a leadership role in these particular issues. 

Mr. SMITH. If you could just elaborate, not a priority for whom? 

The U.S. Government? The governments in the region? 

54

Ms. KIKOLER. I think it would be fair to say the international 

community, as a whole, has not been focused on this day after conversation, and I think there is an important role that Congress and 

others can play in raising that particular issue. 

When we went to areas that had been newly liberated, to highlight what Sarhang mentioned, you see town after town and village 

after village that has been simply devastated: Homes that have 

been bombed; every gas station has been destroyed; water is down; 

electricity is beginning to be back in order. People are waiting to 

return home because they are waiting to see the schools in the 

Kurdish Regional Government close, waiting to see schools open 

now in newly liberated areas. Those are the types of urgent needs 

that need to be addressed and need to be part of that counter-ISIL 

strategy. 

I think just to underscore a point that was made before too, those 

are not traditional kind of kinetic issues that need to be prioritized 

from an atrocity-prevention perspective, and it means that they are 

being viewed as second-order priorities whereas, really, they should 

be first-order priorities if we are hoping to prevent a recurrence of 

these crimes, and we need to do that with the recognition, as 

Sarhang said, that the capacity of the Government of Iraq and the 

capacity of the Kurdish Regional Government to address these 

issues is really quite diminished, and there are also concerns about 

the political will to address some of these particular concerns. 

Mr. CRANE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As I am sitting here thinking of time and how long this conflict 

has gone on, I recall back in March 2011, I was asked by the Syrian National Congress at the time to meet with me and The Hague 

to talk about justice mechanisms that we could implement in the 

spring of 2011. It was a time of hope and excitement. It was the 

Free Syrian Army versus the Assad regime. It was not that completely simple, but that was pretty much it. 

They were enthusiastic. They were listening, and I had been 

working with that group, along with the International Criminal 

Court, United Nations, and other countries in dealing with the 

transitional justice process. But dealing with my Syrian colleagues, 

I have noticed a sadness in their eyes, and they realize that this 

isn’t going to go well, and I agree with them. 

I particularly noticed, after the summer of 2013, when a certain 

line was drawn in the sand, saying: If you do this, then the international community will step in. It happened and nothing happened. And as we had been collating and putting in the crime base 

matrix events that have taken place that possibly could be war 

crimes, crimes against humanity, what have you, there was a 

pause in that summer of 2013 when the threat was made that if 

you do this, then we are going to step in. We actually saw, 

anecdotally, a decrease in atrocities. As soon as that line was 

drawn and was stepped over, then all hell broke loose, and we saw 

an increase in atrocities, which have gone off the chart since that 

time. Our crime base matrix at the Syrian Accountability Project 

is now over 7,000 pages of incidents that have taken place that 

could amount to international crimes. 

55

So I just want to underscore, when we are talking about the urgency of time, we have now moved into an era where there is no 

practical solution to the Levant. 

Mr. SMITH. I have some additional questions, which I will hold 

for a few moments, but I would like to yield to my friend and colleague, Ms. Bass, the ranking member. 

Ms. BASS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair. I appreciate you giving me 

the opportunity. 

First of all, I would really like to thank all of the witnesses for 

not just your testimony but the work that you do. It has really 

been sobering. 

I wanted to ask a couple of questions of you, Mr. Oram, about 

the Assyrian population in the U.S. You mentioned the Michigan 

area, and I was wondering, are there other places around the U.S. 

where there is a population? 

And the other thing you mentioned was the population in Europe 

is experiencing some problems. It sounded like it was internal to 

the community, but I wonder if those same types of problems are 

being manifested in the United States. 

Mr. ORAM. Thank you. Thank you very much, Ms. Bass. 

We have, in the metro Detroit region, close to 200,000 Assyrians. 

We have been in the United States for decades. In addition to Detroit, there is a significant population of about 70,000 Assyrians in 

Chicago alone. And then we have communities in San Diego, Phoenix, and the Central Valley of California, the Modesto-Turlock 

area. 

Ms. BASS. Uh-huh. 

Mr. ORAM. So, yeah, we have a considerable population of our 

communities. 

I will go to your Europe question on Europe, but as far as the 

problems here, no. When the the refugees immigrate to the United 

States, like specifically in Detroit, in particular, we have a community in Detroit that is so strong and well rooted, groundly rooted 

in the community, people in the community know who the 

Chaldeans and the Assyrians are. But, you will have your occasional individual or individuals that will basically categorize the 

Assyrians and the Chaldeans as being Arabs and Muslims and we 

are terrorists and what have you, but see, a lot of it is also about 

education. We go around to communities, and we educate policymakers all throughout the country and business leaders about who 

we are, what our identity is and our faith, and so that is extremely 

important. 

But no. Our communities don’t face violence here in the United 

States. 

Ms. BASS. Uh-huh. 

Mr. ORAM. This is the land of the free. This is the greatest country in the history of Earth. 

And as far as Europe is concerned, yes, what is happening is a 

lot of the refugees are being grouped up, and it is not the governments that are really conducting this. It is basically the populace 

in some of these countries. Europe’s borders are very porous. 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Mr. ORAM. And so what is happening is, you know, we have our 

refugees that are in Sweden and all throughout Europe as Nuri 

56

Kino, the investigative journalist and the founder of a Demand For 

Action, has spent 30 years documenting the issues of refugees and 

migration and what have you, and so there are communities in Europe where they face violence because of their faith. 

Ms. BASS. Okay. Thank you. I appreciate that. 

Mr. ORAM. Sure. 

Ms. BASS. And then, Mr. Crane, I really admire what you have 

done in the past, and Mr. Smith has shared with me a few minutes 

ago about how you faced daily death threats during the time of Sierra Leone, and to come through that, you come through it with a 

certain amount of soberness. 

I didn’t particularly like to hear what you said, but I appreciate 

the reality. When you said that, one, you characterized it as Cold 

War ramifications, and I think you meant by that that this is nothing that is going to be solved quickly. 

Mr. CRANE. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. BASS. But I appreciate you saying that because there is too 

much rhetoric out there about why don’t we just do this and it fixes 

it, and I think you painted a far more realistic picture, and I appreciate that, even though it was difficult to hear. 

So I wanted to know if you would elaborate a little more about 

some of the solutions that you talked about. You talked about a 

Marshall Plan. I was wondering what your vision would be as to 

who would come together to do that. 

You talked about holding ISIS accountable, and you mentioned 

a hybrid court, and I wanted to understand what exactly that 

meant, how that would be. 

What you went through in Sierra Leone, trying to imagine holding ISIS accountable like that when the leadership is so diffuse. 

How would you hold ISIS accountable? What are some of your 

thoughts about that? 

Why don’t we start there? 

Mr. CRANE. Thank you, Ms. Bass. 

I appreciate your comments, and I think your questions are very, 

very important. What I really wanted to underscore in my comments this afternoon is that this truly is a decades-long effort. In 

this age, where we try to solve problems within 24 hours, it just 

can’t be done. 

After World War II and facing the Cold War and the challenge 

of the Soviet Union, the world got together and created the political 

will to face down the Iron Curtain and what was behind it. We created NATO. We moved into Korea. We are still in Korea. 

Ms. BASS. Uh-huh, right. 

Mr. CRANE. 1950. NATO is a successful example of a commitment by the world to stop tyranny. So there is historical precedent 

if there is the political will to come in and begin a process, begin 

a process where we have the international community, administered probably by the region where we have the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, others where we have funds where 

instead of spending billions dollars a week bombing what we perceive to be a threat and creating job programs. 

I mean, what a wonderful thing it is to see almost like a Civilian 

Conservation Corps out there creating roads and building and reconstructing the damage that has been done. Again, I know it is 

57

not that simple, but at least if we change and shift our emphasis 

on construction as opposed to destruction, I think that we have a 

better chance in succeeding. So that was what I meant by the Marshall Plan. 

Ms. BASS. Let me interrupt you for just a minute about that. 

Okay. 

Mr. CRANE. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. BASS. One, I would love to see that actually here with our 

infrastructure, our failing infrastructure, and need for jobs. But 

this is what confuses me, and that is, who would the actors be? 

Because post-World War II—I mean, and most of what you described in terms of International Monetary Fund, World Bank, et 

cetera, are European based, you know what I mean, and how—

what parts of the region come together considering, you know, 

whether they are actively involved or not, how would you have the 

European-based powers then go in and say here is a Marshall Plan 

for what is predominantly the Arab world? 

Mr. CRANE. Well, again, an excellent question and probably an 

unanswerable question as far as political will. We just have to step 

back and stop using kinetic energy to solve the problems in the 

Middle East. It is not working, and yet we take all of those billions 

and, in some cases, now probably trillions——

Ms. BASS. Trillions, right. 

Mr. CRANE [continuing]. Of dollars, and we could have shifted 

that in a way that would have revitalized an area. Not making it 

a religious base, not making it Sunni versus Shia or Christian 

versus Muslim, an ability for the region, backed by Arab states as 

well, with some leadership by the European Union, what have you, 

to do this. 

It is not going to be easy. 

Ms. BASS. Uh-huh. 

Mr. CRANE. But I am just trying to get a conversation going and 

asking the question, can we do better than just kinetic energy, 

bombing our way out of a solution? 

Ms. BASS. I appreciate that. 

Mr. CRANE. So, again, forgive me for not being able to give you 

specific answers because——

Ms. BASS. That is okay. 

Mr. CRANE [continuing]. I don’t, but I think that changing our 

perspective will certainly be important. 

Now, you also bring up a—the hybrid court idea. At the end of 

the day, this is all about the victims, right. We are very arrogant 

about how we approach international justice. We don’t have all the 

solutions. There are certainly other justice methodologies. I always 

used to ask the question, is the justice we seek the justice they 

want? I think that is really an important question because we tend 

to think that the European model of international justice or the 

common law model is the model, but some of these justice mechanisms in other parts of the world have been around for thousands 

of years and have worked. 

So we have to be very, very humble to realize what do the victims in Syria and in the Levant and in northern Iraq, what is justice to them? And once we begin to consider that, there are many, 

many possibilities, and it may not be an international system. So 

58

a hybrid court or a domestic court or internationalized domestic 

court may be something that may be important. Even going back 

and looking at tribal and cultural type of methods of justice may 

be a start or a beginning. 

How would you hold members of ISIS accountable? Well, of 

course, that is a challenge. I think that once we were able to do 

that—that is part and parcel to this overall A plus B plus C plus 

D step forward, is begin to try to contain ISIS. A good example is 

ISIS is like a cancer that is not going to cause a fatal result, but 

it is there, and so your doctor is going to have to say: We are going 

to have to manage this. 

Ms. BASS. Uh-huh. 

Mr. CRANE. And so we should manage ISIS like such, try to cut 

out areas that they try to grow in other parts of the world, Libya, 

for example, and other parts. Deal with those smaller problems, 

but try to contain ISIS, and then begin to develop many things, to 

include a justice mechanism where it can be seen that the international community, the region itself is actually doing something. 

It doesn’t have to be elaborate. It can be just a simple step of creating a truth commission where we have the trust being garnered. 

Again, if you build it, they will come. I have been told, well, you 

can’t have a truth commission for these various reasons, what have 

you. Well, we have got to do something. We have got to be seen 

at doing something in the transitional justice area other than talking about various ways that we can go about that. 

That is just a simple example. But this is all part and parcel to 

a larger achievable results: Contain ISIS and begin to pick out 

areas where we can succeed so we can bring back that hope, which 

robs ISIS of its ability to recruit, and that cancer begins to shrink. 

Now, again, there are many, many levels of problems here that 

could throw this off the rails. But we just have to look at this a 

little bit more simply and a little bit more objectively and step back 

and go what really is working and what really isn’t working, and 

I will guarantee you, it is not using kinetic energy. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Mr. CRANE. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. BASS. I yield back. 

Mr. HAMASAEED. Just quickly on the question of justice, this is 

something that the U.S. Institute of Peace is dealing within areas 

that have been liberated, because we have the experience that we 

are looking at, like, what does that look like? And that—this is 

closer to Salahuddin and not directly minority areas. But the issue 

of justice where you have tribes, they have their local mechanisms 

that usually they go for revenge and there is exacting blood money, 

and these have complicated the situation. 

In the case of Tikrit, after what is known as Camp Speicher 

where ISIL killed 1,700 soldiers and cadets, we managed to tap 

into those local traditions through facilitated dialogue—using 

facilitators USIP trained over the years—there is a level of venting 

that needs to take place among those actors. That happened. And 

then they engaged on the substance. They realized that going into 

this cycle of violence will change the nature of the problem, and it 

will make things more complex. 

59

So there are ways that you can deal with this and tap into those 

local solutions and prevent violence. There was a question of justice. So, for those who have been killed, for those who have been 

displaced, what does justice look like? And there is no universal answer. It really varies depending on what the different communities 

accept. In Tikrit, they decided they will work with the judicial system of the government. The tribe said: We will work with the system, and we will bring perpetrators to justice, and we will work 

with you. 

In a town few miles away, in Yathrib, Salahuddin, the local population, to date, are not allowing people to return because they do 

not necessarily accept that other local solution. And the government doesn’t have the capacity to deal with the justice of ISIS because, as you alluded to, these are fragmented members. It is not 

an entity that you can go to one place and capture them. 

And unless the local population cooperates with this process to 

help you identify who did this and what, then it will be very difficult to bring perpetrators to justice. And I have to warn about 

after 2003, de-Ba’athification was getting rid of the members of 

Ba’ath party was a big problem, contributed in the way it was dealt 

with to giving the—add to the problem of today. Actually, the day 

after of this problem, liberated areas, I think this is our problem: 

Going after those labeled as collaborating with ISIS and then what 

will be the ramification for the political process? For the stabilization? For the next cycle of the problem? 

So putting energy and resources and building it bottom up, tapping into both what the system can do, but also really getting the 

community to work with this issue because they have seen it in the 

most painful way now. They have been displaced. They have seen 

their people killed. I think there could be an opening to tap into 

that and build upon that. But if we just leave it like this, I think 

it will fester, and this will become the underestimated problem that 

we face. 

Many people underestimated that the vacuum in Iraq could give 

us ISIS in its current form. And then there was underestimation 

of the damage that ISIS could do and the response needed. I think 

the post-ISIS situation also is probably underestimated right now 

and could use more attention. Thank you. 

Ms. KIKOLER. Thank you very much. 

One of the purposes of our recent trip was also to look at issues 

relating to accountability and justice, hence our recommendation 

around the need to prioritize transitional justice. And just very 

briefly, I think there are five points that I would make. 

The first is there is a need for there to be an independent international investigation into what happened to ensure that there can 

be the collection of evidence and the preservation of evidence and 

their analysis in accordance with international standards, to help 

establish truth, to help families identify what happened to their 

loved ones, and to push for future prosecutions and accountability. 

The second is that there needs to be an investment in supporting 

the capacity building and rule of law efforts of the Government of 

Iraq and the Kurdish Regional Government. That is needed immediately, but it will have long-term benefits to ensure that the rule 

of law actually means something and that minority communities 

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feel that should their rights be violated in the future, they can resort to courts and not have to take up other means to protect themselves. 

The third is both the Government of Iraq and the Kurdish Regional Government currently lack legislation that allows them to 

prosecute genocide. There is an effort under way to create such legislation. The political will to do so is mixed. There is an important 

role that the international community can play in pushing for the 

enactment of that legislation so that we could possibly see cases 

brought at the national level. 

The fourth, as I mentioned earlier, is the importance and priority 

that should be placed on local cases, trying people for murder, for 

these kind of property seizures, for what happened in their own 

communities, and there is an important issue that arises on that. 

It requires the detaining of people and the investigation for future 

prosecutions. 

Now, many Islamic State fighters tend to blow themselves up or 

killed on the battlefield. It is unclear for those who are being detained by different forces what is happening to them. We need to 

do a better job of trying to arrest people, ensure that there can be 

future prosecutions with them. That is going to be very pertinent 

when we see a liberation of Mosul. And it is going to raise a lot 

of challenging human rights questions about the vetting of people 

as they flee Mosul in ensuring that not all Sunni Arabs are stopped 

and detained and assumed that they are Islamic State supporters 

but that those few that have actually committed crimes are actually held responsible. 

And then, finally, to underscore the point that Sarhang made 

about the critical need to support local civil society that is undertaking these efforts to do documentation but also to do the conflict 

management and mediation and reconciliation work that will be so 

critical to ensuring that we don’t see a further recurrence of atrocities. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Ms. Bass. 

And thank you. 

Just some final questions. 

Mr. Anderson, you pointed out in your testimony that American 

policy should recognize the important differences in the situation of 

those fleeing violence and those targeted for genocide, and we 

should prioritize the latter, and I would add with emphasis, especially since the administration has made the designation of genocide against Christians and other minority faiths. 

Consider this analogy, you point out, after World War II, there 

were approximately 50 million refugees. Only a small fraction were 

Jews, yet the world understood that Jews who have survived genocide faced a qualitatively different situation and deserved heightened consideration. 

I believe strongly—and if you want to elaborate on that—that 

you could put exclamation points on that for the Christians, the 

Yazidis. Today, when they can’t even get into an UNHCR or IDP 

camp or a refugee camp, are unwanted, at risk, and as you pointed 

out, a news report showed or indicated that of the 499 Syrian refugees admitted to the United States in May, not one, I repeat and 

61

say again, not one was listed as being Christian or as explicitly 

coming from any of the groups targeted for genocide. 

To me, that has got to change. I mean, that is unconscionable. 

It is not like we haven’t been raising this for, in my case, 3 years. 

In the cases of so many others, 3 years, and we have had hearing 

after hearing. You talk about protecting, and Ms. Kikoler, your 

point about civilian protection as being a core, I think, is very well 

placed. It has not been, and maybe you might want to elaborate on, 

do you sense that it is becoming a core protection, especially in 

light of the genocide statement? 

And let me also ask about the idea of stabilization, and again, 

there is so much overlap, great minds think alike, and you five 

have provided expert testimony, and there are a number of areas 

where there is an overlap of concern and recommendation. I chair 

the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe and have 

been very involved for years on Bosnia, was actually in Vukovar 

right before it fell, before Serbia conquered it 3 or 4 weeks before 

it fell, and worked very hard with the Yugoslav court to hold people 

who committed those atrocities to account. 

Well, the whole idea of stabilization, one of our members of the 

full committee, Scott Perry, was part of the stabilization force and 

can tell you, as was mentioned earlier by Professor Crane, we are 

still in Korea. The stabilization force, it took years, and I remember 

being in burnt-out homes throughout Bosnia. I was actually in 

Srebrenica, where the genocide against Muslims occurred, which 

was horrific. I was there for one of the re-interment ceremonies. 

My point being, we do have to plan for that post-conflict when 

there is a liberated area? I am concerned we are not doing the kind 

of aggressive planning that is necessary. Because we had forces on 

the ground in Tuzla and elsewhere, we did a lot of that. It still 

wasn’t perfect. 

But get this, as of yesterday, and I had a hearing on Bosnia, 

there are still approximately 800 people who committed horrific 

crimes in Bosnia, mostly against Muslims, who the criminal court 

for the former Yugoslavia devolved to the local courts, and they—

not one—not one—have been taken up. 

So the importance of the courts can’t be overstated as a means 

of meting out justice and giving the survivors at least some peace 

that their next door neighbor or the guy that is one block away 

wasn’t someone who was putting bullets in the heads of family 

members or committing acts of torture. 

I do meet frequently with these folks in Bosnia, and if we don’t 

have lessons learned from all of that, shame on us. So all the more 

reason why a court needs to be set up. 

And I really, really appreciate again, Professor, your point about 

the cornerstone of a possible beginning of the solution is to get 

Arab resolve in cooperation. The idea of having Arab states prosecuting Arabs for crimes against Arab peoples in violation of Arab 

laws, the idea that at least you have ownership, and I think that 

is a very, very important point for all. We want to lend and assist. 

And, again, on capacity, as was mentioned by some of our witnesses, you, in Sierra Leone, left not only well-trained prosecutors 

and people who understood rule of law and how to garner evidence 

and present it in court, you left buildings where people could work 

62

and do the important work of justice. And I think all the more reason why we need to push that. 

But if you could speak to these questions that I am raising—all 

of you or some of you, however you would like—I would appreciate 

it. 

Maybe start with you, Mr. Anderson, on this. We have got the 

designation. Why aren’t Christians being focused upon? There is no 

religious test here. I think the President erred when he said we 

don’t have religious tests. When Jackson-Vanik passed and the Soviet Union and Jews were escaping the horrific psychiatric prisons 

of the Soviet Union, and I actually went to Perm Camp 35, where 

a number of political and religious prisoners were—and it was terrible—but we saved hundreds of thousands of Jews through limiting MFN to the Soviet Union based on focusing on Jewish people 

who were being so persecuted by the Soviet Union. 

We are talking about minority faiths here. We need to redouble 

our efforts, as you pointed out on the Tom Cotton bill, and thank 

you for that. Well, maybe you want to elaborate, if you would. 

Mr. ANDERSON. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman, and 

especially for your leadership for so many years on this. 

It goes without saying: Every human life has dignity, has sanctity. We should do whatever we can to support each individual who 

is in these tragic situations, and of course, the help that we are 

doing, as I mentioned, helping Yazidis, helping Muslims, there is 

not a distinction of helping the individuals. But I think we have 

to realize a basic reality here, that there are minority, indigenous 

communities that have been in these lands for thousands of years, 

and they are going to be extinguished. And that is a different qualitative reality. And so what the world has to ask itself is, are we 

going to allow that to happen? Are we going to allow it to happen? 

And, therefore, if the decision is, no, we are not going to allow 

this, then we have to make special efforts. We have to give special 

attention to preserve these communities. It is just as simple as 

that. Nobody wants to apply religious tests, but the fact is these 

people, these communities, this heritage will be gone unless we do 

something extra to save it. 

Mr. SMITH. Answer to any of those questions? 

Mr. ORAM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Again, I commend you for your leadership in spending so many years in this respective body fighting for religious freedoms throughout the world. 

Mr. Anderson is correct. The Assyrian and the Chaldean communities of Iraq and Syria do face extinction, but another problem 

that I would like to kind of touch on is the central government in 

Baghdad. After the war, the Coalition Provisional Authority 

dialogued with the Iraqis in basically implementing Article 125, the 

redrafting of the Iraqi Constitution with Article 125 which basically 

talked about the protection of Iraq’s Christian minorities. Article 

125 is a moot point right now. The Iraqi Government has failed in 

upholding its constitutional duties. When the Islamic State came 

barreling through many towns and villages of the Nineveh plains, 

the Iraqi Army, 50,000-60,000 and some odd to about 10,000 or 

9,000 thugs, basically, surrendered and basically relinquished their 

weapons, arms, clothing, and uniforms and fled. That is basically 

negligence on the Iraqi Government’s part. We can basically sit 

63

here and point fingers about they did this and play the blame 

game, but let’s move forward. I urge that this Congress basically 

urge the Iraqi Government to step up to the plate and help these 

communities, everything from financial assistance to each individual that has been impacted because, again, the Iraqi Government has a moral and fundamental responsibility to protect its citizens, and they failed. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. If I could, and Professor Crane, if you 

could, in addition to those questions, in your statement, you talk 

about the Syracuse Syrian Accountability Project, which you have 

founded: Over the past 5-plus years, we have built a trial package 

that a domestic, regional, or international prosecutor can consider 

in developing a case against all parties committing atrocity in the 

Levant. This package includes a conflict map, a crime base matrix, 

and other associated documents to include sample indictments. 

And you pointed out how you used that very same technique in 

successfully prosecuting Charles Taylor and other henchmen. 

Can you elaborate on that because that is absolutely vital, I 

think, to the future of successful prosecution? It is not like it all 

has to be reinvented. Don’t reinvent the wheel. You have readymade tools here. 

Mr. CRANE. I think it is very important that we do understand 

that we have made great strides in the past 20 years in international criminal law. Most of this was theory when I was in law 

school or not even taught because it didn’t even exist. What we do 

now, we have this capacity, the rules of evidence, the practical experience, and the jurisprudence to prosecute and hold accountable 

any individual who commits atrocities, international crimes. Again, 

the bright red thread of all of this is politics, and that is always, 

always a challenge related to dealing with these types of issues. 

But at the end of the day, because we have this practical experience now of taking down and holding accountable a head of state, 

his henchmen, for what they have done to a region, we need to continue to work together to use those techniques so that someday, 

whether it be tomorrow, next year, or 10 years, we will have that 

ability then to hold accountable those who have destroyed this area 

of the world. 

So we do have a conflict map. We have literally developed a 

criminal history of the Syrian conflict and in the Levant since 

March 2011. We continue to monitor that and write that chapter. 

We also have that crime base matrix, which lists by date, time, location, perpetrator, as well as the specific violation of the Rome 

Statute, international humanitarian laws, such as the Geneva Conventions, and we have translated the Syrian criminal code, which 

is a good criminal code, one that could be used for the basis for domestic prosecutions, into English. And so we have also identified 

by paragraph and line the violations of Syrian law as well. That 

particular aspect of the Syrian Accountability Project now numbers 

over 7,000 pages. In fact, there is so much of it that we have put 

it into a memory stick because I can’t transport that around. In 

fact, the chairman knows; I gave him a copy of that last week. Now 

we share this. This is not all about the Syrian Accountability 

Project at Syracuse University College of Law. This is about justice 

for the people of Syria. So we share all of this data, and have since 

64

March 2011, with our colleagues in the United Nations, various key 

countries, such as the United States, our friends in the war crimes 

office there, along with the international criminal accord. I personally give this data to the chief prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, as well. 

So we are sharing. We are working with other important accountability organizations to work together to make sure that, again, at 

the end of the day, it is about the victims and justice for the victims. 

But one caution here. You know, 10, 12 years ago, when I was 

investigating west Africa, we went out and did it the old way, cops 

going out, gathering evidence, taking statements and what have 

you. Now, with this social media age, we are inundated by a tsunami of information. It is too much. The challenge now is not finding the evidence. The challenge is now finding the evidence in a 

haystack. Ninety-nine-point-nine percent of the data coming out of 

Syria in whatever capacity being held by whatever organization is 

not evidence. We cannot use it in a court of law. I think that is 

really important for us to understand. It is a great historical body 

of information. It is important in many other ways, but it can’t be 

used in court. I think we tend to forget that, that we have all this 

information, but it is just information. It is not evidence. And so 

I think we have to be very, very careful when we say we have cases 

against all these individuals. The answer is we may have cases 

against these individuals, and we have to be very, very careful. 

But, again, that is up to a prosecutor, a local, regional, or international prosecutor, to take this and hopefully take our trial package and use it in whatever way he or she can use it in order to 

seek justice for the people of the Levant region. 

Mr. SMITH. Before we conclude, anything else that any witness 

would like to—yes, Ms. Kikoler. 

Ms. KIKOLER. Just in light of the question that you asked about 

the integration of civilian protection, I think it is really important 

to underscore that defeating ISIS but failing to prevent atrocities 

and provide adequate security to all Iraqis will likely fuel future 

grievances, a proliferation of armed groups, and continued conflict. 

In our original report, we highlighted that the current counterterrorism and counterinsurgency paradigms don’t prioritize an assessment of or compel a response to, in a systematic way, the unique 

threats and risks of mass atrocities that local populations and individuals may face, so, as a result, going forward, we do feel that it 

is important to prioritize the mapping of the motivations, organizations, and capabilities of perpetrators and the vulnerabilities of atrisk communities. 

Finding proactive ways to identify where these communities are, 

our report focused on Iraq—there are communities in Syria that remain at risk: Mapping their location, tracking the movement and 

mobilization of potential perpetrators, and identifying other actors 

that enable or inhibit the perpetration of mass atrocity crimes. This 

includes intelligence gathering and analysis that plays a critical 

role in developing the strategies that will be used to provide protection for communities and prevent future atrocities going forward. 

Mr. SMITH. Could I ask you, on that parallel, if you would, would 

a safe haven, is that more of a surface appeal but strewn with a 

65

number of challenges that may make it unachievable, or is it something that ought to be, in your opinion, promoted? 

Ms. KIKOLER. I think, from our perspective, there are a host of 

questions that need to be asked about how to provide protection, 

and we don’t necessarily go into military strategies at the Museum 

ourselves. I think the questions that can be asked about areas like 

safe havens and other options are, what are the specific threats 

facing civilian populations? What are the resources that are needed 

to provide protection? What are the various options that are available to ensure that, over a sustained period of time, communities 

will be protected and a host of other scenarios? 

In the case of northern Iraq, one of the things that we have highlighted is the need to focus on addressing the deep distrust that 

communities feel toward others and recognizing that the areas that 

we are talking about are not ethnically or religiously homogenous. 

Communities live alongside each other, and any discussion about 

local administration, physical protection, has to take into account 

those realities in that particular area, but I think others would 

probably be more well-versed. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. 

Mr. HAMASAEED. Yes. So I think that it is important to look at 

the different scenarios that we talked about, the protracted stay 

but also the scenario of return. The whole system is struggling 

with providing food and assistance, so that is a level of need we 

are talking about, and the scenario of return, there is a physical 

protection of those people, and then ideas, such as safe havens and 

all of that, there are practicality elements that need to be taken 

into consideration. 

Okay. What objective will that serve? So, in the past, a safe 

haven, again, is a system like Saddam Hussein could have—a systemic protection would have been helpful, but right now, the threat 

is far more retail in the sense of you have a terror organization 

that knows no boundaries. And then you have the fear of revenge 

that is actually at the individual and tribal and family level sometimes. So a safe haven or the concept of protection and physical 

protection, that changes how you deliver that. This is where the 

better relationship with the neighboring communities and working 

on that becomes necessary. And I think one of the things that could 

be helpful for the Iraqi minorities—as important as they make this 

case, as they present solutions—some of the solutions will create 

other problems, will create other conflicts and other competition. It 

is important that at this moment of frustration and this moment 

of anger—and it is a lot, and they have every right to be angry and 

frustrated and disappointed. But getting back to what Mr. Crane 

said about achievable programs and achievable objectives, it is important to look at a framework solution for Iraq. Without fixing 

that, the minorities will always be caught in between those. 

I would like to stress that the military approach is probably important for certain problems, but it will not solve the long term. 

And preserving those communities, you may be physically safe if 

you relocate to the Kurdistan region or you relocate to outside, but 

preserving the community, as a community—and for SabeanMandeans, their numbers have dropped over the years to about a 

couple of thousand worldwide. This is how you lose a community. 

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The Christians have seen their numbers drop from about 1.5 million in 2003 now to about less than a third of that in Iraq. Preserving the sense of community will require for the minorities to 

be striking those relationships with those Iraqi communities for the 

long term. But also the civil society and the external assistance 

could go also into preserving those communities in terms of education, in terms of programs that will provide services to those 

areas. And this is what the Alliance of Iraqi Minorities has done 

very successfully: Working with the Iraqi Government and with the 

Kurdistan Regional Government. Those efforts could help the minorities help themselves, be the voice of the community, and engage the international actors. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. Oram. 

Mr. ORAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for touching on the safe 

haven question. You know, right now, a good number of our people 

do not want to return back to their villages and towns in the 

Nineveh plains because they have lost the confidence and the trust 

of not only their government, but remember, a lot of their Sunni 

neighbors in the villages essentially marked them for death. They 

basically went ahead and etched on the big ‘‘N’’ for Nazarene, identifying them as Christian families, but the only way for an effective 

safe haven mechanism is obviously laying a foundation for the successful liberation of Mosul, which is basically the gateway of Iraq’s 

Christian region, and also to ensure that the Assyrian communities 

of northern Iraq enjoy their own self-autonomous identity, their 

own affairs, as well as a security apparatus through the support of 

our Government. That is the only way that they can have their 

confidence and their hopes restored, by having a security mechanism in place, their own autonomy, dictating their own policies and 

what have you. This is extremely important for a long-term effort, 

for fulfilling a safe haven for our communities in northern Iraq. 

And that is why it is important now to address this and this is 

going to be a long process, and so I think, right now, we really need 

to identify the current situation at hand with respect to the IDPs, 

the violence and the harassment, the lack of aid that they are receiving, as well as reforming our immigration or Refugee Act of 

1980, designating new visas, the P-2 and the P-3 visas, for many 

of these Christian families to come to the United States. And a lot 

of them have relatives and friends and families in the United 

States. They can come back here and join them. This is important, 

but I think it should be a part of our long-term foreign policy strategy to preserve Christianity in the Middle East. We are the oldest 

in civilization. We are the indigenous peoples, and it is vital to 

America’s national security to make sure that this is reached. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. I want to thank each and every one of you for your 

time, your leadership, for taking the time to present very, very incisive testimonies to the committee, and we will share this with a 

large number of people, so thank you, and I look forward to working with you going forward. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:17 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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