united states cryptologic history

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

The Origins of the

1940-1952 (U)

National Security Agency

II...NBLE til... eOMINT ell...NNELS ONLY

Classified By NSA/CSSM 123-2

Declassify On. Originating Agency's Determination Required

".ppr.?\lecJ .for R-:lea~;e by ~\JS.~ o~l

,]3-[.11-20[.17 Ft .l1A. Case # 5'1 ::;,'1 d
~~--------- -- -------- •

DOCID: 3109065

T9PSEERET

UNITED STATES CRYPTOL0 GICHISTORY

Series V,

Volume 1

The Origins ofthe

National Security Agency

1940-1952 (U)

Thomas L. Burns

CENTER FOR CRYPrOLOGIC mSTORY

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

1990

'F8PSECRET

HAND' i "It COIII:NT'lH.....:NNIl1:B9!iM!'
DOCID: 3109065

1=9PSECAET

Table ofContents

Page

Foreword v

Acknowledgments vii

Introduction: The Struggle to Control a Unique Resource 1

Chapter I: Early Army-NavyCOMINTRelations, 1930-1945 5

Chapter II: The Military Services and the

Joint Operating Plan, 1946-1949 29

Chapter III: The Emerging National Intelligence Structure and the

United States CommunicationsIntelligence Board,

1946-1949 45

Chapter IV: Creation ofthe Armed Forces Security Agency,

1949-1952 59

Chapter V: AFSA, the CONSIDO Plan, and the Korean War, 1949-1952 81

Chapter VI: The Brownell Committee and the

Establishment OfNSA, 4 November 1952 97

Chapter VII:

Summary: The Struggle for Control Continues 113

Abbreviations............................................................... 121

Notes....................................................................... 125

Notes on Sources 143

Index....................................................................... 155

iii

wt ~U VIA S9MIN'I' SIIM1NBbS 8Nb".t.T

%OP&&CAET
DOCID: 3109065

"F9PSECRET

Foreword

The Center for Cryptologic History (CCH) is proud to publish the first title under its

own imprint, Thomas L. Burns's The Origins ofNSA.

In recent years, the NSA history program has published a number of volumes dealing

with exciting and even controversial subjects: the Berlin tunnel, the EC-121 shootdown,

and a new look at the Pearl Harbor attack, to cite just three. Tom Burns's study of the

creation ofNSA is a different kind ofhistory from the former. It is a masterfully researched

and documented account of the evolution of a national SIGINT effort following World War

II, beginning with the fragile trends toward unification of the military services as they

sought to cope with a greatly changed environment following the war, and continuing

through the unsatisfactory experience under the Armed Forces Security Agency. Mr.

Burns also makes an especially important contribution by helping us to understand the

role ofthe civilian agencies in forcing the creation of NSA and the bureaucratic infighting

by which they were able to achieve that end.

At first glance, one might think that this organizational history would be far from

"best seller" material. In fact, the opposite is the case. It is essential reading for the

serious SIGINT professional, both civilian and military. Mr. Burns has identified most of

the major themes which have contributed to the development of the institutions which

characterize our profession: the struggle between centralized and decentralized control of

SIGINT, interservice and interagency rivalries, budget problems, tactical versus national

strategic requirements, the difticulties of mechanization of processes, and the rise of a

strong bureaucracy. These factors, which we recognize as still powerful and in large

measure still shaping operational and institutional development, are the same ones that

brought about the birth of NSA.

The history staff would also like to acknowledge a debt owed to our predecessors, Dr.

George F. Howe and his associates, who produced a manuscript entitled The Narrative

History of AFSAINSA. Dr. Howe's study takes a different course from the present

publication and is complementary to it, detailing the internal organization and

operational activities of AFSA, and serves as an invaluable reference about that period.

The Howe manuscript is available to interested researchers in the CCH; we hope to publish

it in the near future.

It remains for each reader to take what Tom Burns has presented in the way of

historical fact and correlate it to hislher experience. This exercise should prove most

interesting and illuminating.

Henry F. Schorreck

NSA Historian

v

n ....!fBbB 7}IIi: e8MI!f'f eUltmfeb9 8!fl:l':

T9PSECRET
---------- ------------------

DOCID: 3109065

1=9PSECAET

Acknowledgments

Many people played a part in developing this expanded report on the origins of NSA.

In particular, I want to extend thanks for the research help I received from the Office of

Archives and Repository Services of the Telecommunications Organization and from my

colleagues in the Center for Cryptologic History (CCH).

During the saga associated with the preparation of this volume, I became indebted to

Henry F. Schorreck, NSA Historian, for his continuing confidence and support. In the

latter stages of the review process, David W. Gaddy, Chief, CCH, and David A. Hatch,

drawing on their broad experience and knowled e of the A enc provided fresh

perspective and comments. My appreciation goes to (b) (3)-PoLo 86-36 for enterin the

draft manuscript into the word processor. Among the cycle ofeditorSib) (3) -Po Lo 86-3~a.nd I (b) (3) - PoL 0 86 -36 Iprovided the initial editing of text, as well as the selection of

photographs. Barry D. Carleen and his staff provided the editing actions associated with

the final nreparation of the manuscrint ~ecial thanks are due tol (b) (3) - PoL 0 86 -36 I I (b) (3) - PoL 0 86 -36 Jortheir editing contributions.

Finally, my appreciation goes tol (b) (3)-PoLo 86-36 lour former colleague, for his

unfailing assistance in the shaping and organizing ofthe report, for his enthusiasm about

the project and its scope, and for his helpful suggestions for sharpening and clarifying the

text.

vii

HA)ij:9bE yl.... S9MIHl' SH!:NNEbB9Nb¥

'F8P5EERET
ricIn: 3109065

T9PSECRET

Introduction

The Struggle to Control a Unique Resource

A half century has passed since the outbreak of World War II. During that war, a

small number of organizations provided the total intelligence gathering activities of the

United States government. Army and Navy authorities played a preeminent role in the

production ofthis intelligence. Since 1945 a great number of organizational changes have

occurred in the management and direction of U.S. intelligence activities, and the

intelligence community has greatly expanded. There is now a National Security Council

(NSC), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DlA), National

Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB), and National Security Agency (NSA), as well as the

military services, Department ofState, Federal Bureau oflnvestigation (FBI), Department

of Energy, Department of the Treasury, and Commerce Department. All are involved in

intelligence activities, and all rely on or have access to communications intelligence

(COMINT). COMINT is a unique, extremely valuable intelligence source. This study traces

the evolution of the military structures from the early 1930s to the establishment of a

unique agency to deal with COMINT - the National Security Agency - in 1952.

In the late 1930s, the major COMINT issue among the services related to the coverage of

foreign diplomatic targets. Regardless ofduplication, each service insisted on holding onto

whatever diplomatic targets it could intercept. The realities of World War II, however,

finally forced the services to work out an agreement on wartime cryptanalytic tasks. The

Navy, because ofits limited resources and its almost total preoccupation with Japanese

and German naval traffic, ultimately softened its position and asked the Army to take over

the entire diplomatic problem for the duration of the war. Based on an informal

agreement by the Army and the Navy, the Army assumed responsibility for all targets in

the diplomatic field, as well as its own commitmentsin the military field.

As late as 1942, however, the Army and Navy still resisted the introduction of any

major changes in their relationship and sought to maintain their traditionally separate

cryptanalytic roles. Each service worked independently and exclusively on its assigned

cryptanalytic tasks, as was agreed upon previously, and later endorsed by President

Franklin D. Roosevelt. The services not only continued to demonstrate little enthusiasm

toward closer cooperation in COMINT matters, but maintained their traditional hostility

towards proposals for merger, or even towards opening up new dialogue on operational

problems. Consequently, their interaction on COMINT matters was minimal.

Nevertheless, out of the disaster at Pearl Harbor came persistent demands for the

establishment of a truly centralized, permanent intelligence agency. As early as 1943,

proposals for the establishment of a single United States intelligence agency became the

routine topic for discussion in the various intelligence forums of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

At the same time, the military COMINT authorities foresaw their vulnerability to

congressional criticism and future reductions in resources since they conducted their

COMINT operations on a fractionated and sometimes duplicatory basis. Recognizing these

threats to a continuation of their separate existence, the services, after two years of

1

IIA?iBbB VIA 68MIN'I' SUAlUTBcB 9NcY

'fep SEERE'f
-~-_._- ---- -- ----_.. ..._-----

DOCID: 3109065

T9PSECRET

superficial coordination, established closer technical cooperation among their COMINT

organizations.

During the war, the independent Army and Navy organizations accomplished a great

number of spectacular intelligence successes in support of the Allied war effort. These

included cryptanalytic breakthroughs against the communications of German

submarines, German and Japanese armed forces, and the diplomatic communications of

the Axis countries of both the European and Pacific theaters. The victory at Midway and

the submarine war in the Atlantic are but two examples of how intelligence derived from

enemy communications contributed to the success ofthe U.S. war effort. Ironically, these

successes later became the measuring rod for criticism of the postwar military COMINT

organizations.

By the end of World War II, many policymakers had a new respect for COMINT.

However, there were also major questions concerning the management and control of this

valuable resource. In 1951 President Truman established a Presidential Commission

under the chairmanship of George A. Brownell to study the communications intelligence

effort and to make recommendations concerning the management of the effort. From the

Brownell Report grew the managerial foundation of the organization now known as the

National Security Agency.

This study documents the origins ofthe National Security Agency. It is an attempt to

set before the reader the "what happened" in terms of the issues and conflicts that led toTruman's decision to establish a centralized COMINT agency. It traces the evolution ofthe

military COMINT organizations from the 1930s to the establishment of the National

Security Agency on 4 November 1952.

While the lineal origins of the National Security Agency are clearly traceable to the

military COMINT structures and represent a fairly simple audit trail oforganizations, there

is more to the origin of NSA than a mere chronology of organizations. The political

struggles and operational considerations that led to the establishment of NSA are complex.

The National Security Act of 1947, the expanding intelligence requirements of the

growing intelligence community, and the continuing controversy between the military

and civilian agencies over the control ofintelligence became prominent factors in the move

to reorganize the nation's cryptologic structure.

This account seeks to highlight the main events, policies, and leaders of the early

years. Its major emphasis is directed toward communications intelligence and its

identification as a unique source of intelligence information. One theme persists

throughout: the jurisdictional struggle between the military and civilian authorities over

the control and direction ofthe COMINTresources ofthe United States. Special attention is

also directed toward consumer relationships, intelligence directives, and consumer needsparticularly when those considerations may have influenced the shaping and formation of

the cryptologic structure.

The communications security (COMSEC) role of NSA is addressed only in the broad

context of representing a basic responsibility of the new agency. The development of

national COMSEC policies did not take place until after the establishment of NSA, which is

outside the scope ofthis report. As directed by President Truman on 24 October 1952, the

solutions to national COMSEC problems and the formulation ofthose solutions in directives

l'9PSECRET 2
DOCID: 3109065

TOPSSgST

became the responsibility of a special committee of the National Security Council for

COMSEC matters. The beginnings of an expanded COMSEC role for NSA did not occur until

the mid-1950s, following the issuance of a preliminary report (NSC 168) on 20 October

1953, which provided the basis for a later clarification of COMSEC roles and responsibilities

within the government.

The study is organized basically in a chronological approach with chapters reflecting

the prewar period, the war years, and the immediate postwar era. Major events or policy

actions are reflected within this chronology. The early chapters address the evolution of

the Army and Navy COMINT relationships from 1930 through the war years and later the

establishment of a third cryptologic service, the Air Force Security Service (AFSS), in 1948.

Next, emphasis is placed on the three-year period from 1946 to 1949, which marked the

passage of the National Security Act of 1947 and the beginning of high-level efforts to

centralize U.S. intelligence responsibilities. This section traces the organization of the

COMINT structure as military authorities moved in the direction of a joint Army and Navy

Communications Intelligence Board (ANCIB) and closer cooperation. This period of

experimentation included the establishment of the Joint Army and Navy Operating Plan

in 1946 and of the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) in 1949. Both structures

encountered great difficulties, with AFSA receiving continuing criticism from the consumer

community for its performance during the Korean War. Finally, as the prologue to the

establishment of NSA, there is an extensive discussion of the Brownell Committee,

including the reasons for its establishment and the nature of its deliberations. The study

concludes with an overall review of the organizational changes and a suggestion that

struggle for control ofthis unique resource is far from over.

3 .QP SiCAri.
DOCID: 3109065

1=9PSEelET

Chapter I

Early Army-Navy COMINT Relations, 1930-1945

During the 1930s and throughout World War II, the United States Army and the

United States Navy dominated the U.S. COMINT effort. The Army and Navy COMINT

organizations operated as totally autonomous organizations. They were fiercely

independent, with little dialogue or cooperation taking place between them. Their

working relationship represented a spirit ofstrong rivalry and competition, with overtones

ofmutual distrust. During the rust two years ofthe war, the Army and Navy persisted in

maintaining their totally separate cryptanalytic roles. Each worked independently and

exclusively on its assigned cryptanalytic tasks, as approved earlier by the Joint Chiefs of

Staff and President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Each service continued to oppose cooperation

in COMINT matters. Both maintained a traditional hostility toward thoughts of merger, or

even ofopening up a dialogue with the other on cooperation.

Near the end of World War II, as the service COMINT organizations foresaw major

reductions in their COMINT programs, their attitudes toward cooperation began to change.

Moreover, as the pressures mounted for organizational change in the entire U.S.

intelligence structure, the service cOMiNT authorities now initiated voluntary moves

toward closer interservice cooperation, primarily as a self-preservation measure. In 1944,

for example, the services expanded their cooperation on operational functions related to

collection and cryptanalysis. The services also established the first joint forum for

discussion of cryptologic matters, the Army-Navy Communication Intelligence

Coordinating Committee (ANCICC). ANCICC, in tum, quickly evolved into the rust overall

COMINT policy board, the Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Board (ANCIH). As

further evidence of the broadening of the COMINT base, the Department of State accepted

an ANCIH invitation to join the Board in December 1945. A civilian agency was now a part

ofthe COMINT decision-making process.

As early as the World War I era, the U.S. Army and Navy COMINT organizations

intercepted and processed foreign military and nonmilitary communications for

intelligence purposes. For all practical purposes, each functioned on a totally autonomous

basis. Each service operated independently of the other, and each conducted its own

intercept and exploitation activities. In this early period, intelligence requirements did

not exist as we know them today. Generally, each service determined its own intercept

targets and then, based on its own processing priorities, decrypted or translated whatever

communications could be exploited. The Army and the Navy COMINT organizations

disseminated the decrypts to the intelligence arms of their parent services, as well as to

other governmental officials.

Except for a very restrained and limited exchange concerning cryptanalytic

techniques, little cooperation or dialogue took place between the military COMINT

organizations. Traditionally, each worked exclusively on those military and naval targets

of direct interest to itself. Thus, the Army handled military radio stations and military

messages, and the Navy handled naval radio stations and naval messages. The coverage

ofdiplomatic targets, however, reflected a totally differentstory.

5

1IA.~w.I: VIA 'lQMINT GH.....NNIi:b8 9N1iV

~PSEERH
DOCID: 3109065

T9PSEERET

The coverage ofdiplomatic links always ranked as a top priority for both the Army and

Navy, as it represented the only intelligence of real interest to nonmilitary consumers,

namely, the Department of State and the White House.l Recognizing the need for

budgetary support from these influential customers, each service sought to retain a

posture of maximum coverage on diplomatic targets. Consequently, the Army and Navy,

operating under an unwritten and loose agreement, shared the responsibility for the

intercept and processing of diplomatic traffic, with each service making its own

determination concerning what diplomatic coverage it would undertake. 2

Despite the increasingly apparent need for cooperation, neither service, because of

strong mutual distrust, pressed very hard for a cooperative agreement. The nearest that

the services came to concluding an agreement during the 1930s occurred in April 1933.

The occasion was a planning conference ofrepresentatives of the War Plans and Training

Section ofthe Army and representatives ofthe Code and Signal Section ofthe Navy.3 The

agenda for the conference was very broad, including items on both communications

security and radio intelligence matters. The conferees reached a very limited informal

agreement on a delineation ofthe areas of paramount interest to each service.· Although

formal implementation of the agreement never took place, the conference itself was a

significant milestone. For the first time in the modern era, the services had agreed, at

least in principle, on the need for a joint Army-Navy dialogue on COMINT matters.

From 1933 to 1940, little change took place in this relationship. Each service

continued to go its own way, working generally on whatever traffic was available to it. In

the fall of 1939, General Joseph A. Mauborgne, Chief Signal Officer, U.S. Army, and Rear

Admiral Leigh Noyes, Director of Naval Communications, attempted an informal

agreement concerning diplomatic traffic.lI They agreed that diplomatic traffic would be

divided between the two services on the basis of nationality. This agreement, like the one

in 1933, however, was never implemented. The Army Signal Corps, on orders from its

General Staff, worked on German, Italian, and Mexican diplomatic systems, thereby

GeneralJoseph A. Mauborgne

Chief'Signal Officer, U.S. Army

TQPseCAET 6

Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes

Director of'Naval Communications
DOCID: 3109065

"Fep SEERE"F

Colonel Spencer B. Akin Commander Laurance F. Safford

duplicating the Navy's efforts in this area. This effort completely nullified the earlier

agreement negotiated by Mauborgne and Noyes.6

By the summer of 1940, the war in Europe, coupled with the increasingly warlike

posture of the Japanese in the Pacific, brought renewed pressures for closer Army-Navy

cooperation. In addition, changes occurred in some foreign cryptographic systems that

foretold the beginning of new technical challenges for both services. Despite the strong

service antagonisms, the inevitability of closer cooperation and pooling of COMINT

resources in some manner became apparent to many Army and Navy officials.

In mid-1940, a new round of formal Army-Navy discussions took place concerning

"Coordination of Intercept and Decrypting Activities." The services established a Joint

Army-Navy Committee, under the chairmanship of Colonel Spencer B. Akin and

Commander·Laurance F. Safford, to develop a method ofdividing intercept traffic between

them. 7

The Army and Navy planners had no problem in reaching agreement on the division of

responsibility for the coverage ofcounterpart targets. They simply opted for the status quo

in the intercept coverage of military and naval targets. Thus, the Army retained the sole

responsibility for the intercept and analysis of all foreign military traffic, and the Navy

concentrated on the intercept and analysis ofall foreign naval radio traffic.8

The discussions, however, failed to generate a solution to the issue of diplomatic

coverage. Each service presented a number ofproposals and counterproposals, but neither

would yield any of its responsibility for coverage of diplomatic traffic. 9 The primary

diplomatic targets under discussion at this time were German, Italian, Mexican, South

American, Japanese, and Soviet.

Given the attitudes of the two services, there seemed little likelihood of achieving any

agreements on diplomatic targets. The Army, having canceled the earlier 1939

7

IIltliBbB VIA eSMIlf'f eIIA!fN'BbS SlibY

1=9P5ECAET
.__.__ ._.~ ..

DOCID: 3109065

'f9PSECRET

understanding with the Navy, continued to work on German, Italian, and Mexican

diplomatic systems, as well as on a number of machine problems of interest to the Navy.

By 1940, the Navy, because of its heavy commitment to operational naval problems,

stopped working on the German, Italian, and Mexican diplomatic targets. As a matter of

principle, however, the Navy refused to concur on the exclusive assignment of these

diplomatic targets to the Army on a permanent basis.10 Another even more contentious

item arose at the conference concerning the coverage ofJapanese diplomatic traffic. Japan

had become a prime intelligence target whose diplomatic communications were obviously

ofparamount interest and importance to each service - as well as to civilian U.S. officials.

Neitherservice would relinquish any coverage ofJapanese diplomatic communications.

In short, the joint conference resolved little. Since each service COMINT organization

viewed its survival as being contingent upon the production of diplomatic intelligence,

neither consented to giving up diplomatic coverage on a permanent basis. Colonel Akin

and Commander Safford finally opted to refer the matter to their superiors - General

Mauborgne and Admiral Noyes - for a decision on how to divide the Japanese COMINT

problem.

As a last resort, Mauborgne, attempting a Solomonic approach, suggested that the

Army and Navy simply alternate daily in their diplomatic coverage of certain functions

such as decryption and translation duties. Adopting this suggestion as the way out oftheir

dilemma, Mauborgne and Noyes informally concluded an agreement in August 1940,

which became known as the "odd-even day" agreement. The agreement established the

immediate prewar basis for the division oflabor on all Japanese intercepts and delineated

the responsibilities for decryption, translation, and reporting of Japanese diplomatic

traffic. 11

Under the terms ofthe agreement, the Army assumed responsibility for decoding and

translating the intercepts of the Japanese Diplomatic and Consular Service on the even

days of the month. The Navy became responsible for translating the messages of the

Japanese Diplomatic and Consular Service on the odd days ofthe month. The agreement

also included a restatement of the COMINT responsibilities for the intercept of Japanese

military and naval traffic. The Army retained its responsibility for decoding and

translating intercepts of the Japanese Army (including military attaches). The Navy

continued to have the exclusive responsibility for the intercept and translation of the

Japanese Navy targets (including military attaches).12

As a corollary to the informal odd-even arrangement, Mauborgne and Noyes ratified a

supplemental technical agreement on 3 October 1940 concerning the division of

intercept.18 Colonel Akin and Commander Safford countersigned this agreement for the

Army and Navy COMINT organizations. The agreement essentially represented a joint

analysis ofthe existing intercept facilities and their capabilities. It reiterated the need for

closer Army-Navy cooperation in order to provide better intercept coverage and to reduce

duplication ofeffort. The report also reflected the considerable reliance placed at that time

on the courier forwarding of traffic, both by air mail and surface transport, to achieve

timeliness.14 During the early part ofWorld War II, the intercepted traffic was sent by sea,

or by aircraft, and often arrived months late at its destination. This situation gradually

changed as new radio teletype systems were installed.

'f9PSECRET 8
DOCID: 3109065

"F9PSECRE"F

The Mauborgne-Noyes odd-even verbal agreement remained in effect from 1 August

1940 until shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.15 This

odd-even arrangement proved to be fundamentally unsound. Cryptanalytically,

alternating the responsibility for reporting greatly increased the risk of error, duplication,

and omission. It also destroyed the element of continuity so critical to COMINT reporting

and cryptanalysis.16 Political,ly, however, the odd-even day arrangement accomplished a

public relations function that was vitally important to the services. This arrangement

divided the problem equally and permitted each to retain visibility with the White House

and those officials who controlled the budget process.

Ten years later, Admiral Joseph N. Wenger defended the odd-even day arrangement.

He indicated that in 1940 each service had all the available intercept in the Japanese

diplomatic traffic and in some cases the means for breaking them. As a result, whenever

an important message was read, "each service would immediately rush to the White House

with a copy of the translation in an effort to impress the Chief Executive." According to

Wenger, the awkwardness of this situation was the main reason for the adoption of the

odd-even day arrangement as the only acceptable and workable solution for the services.

Wenger conceded that the odd-even arrangement for processing traffic was a strange one,

but in his view it was practical since traffic could be readily sorted according to the

cryptographic date.17 Wenger did not mention that it also achieved its main purpose, as

each service remained visible to the White House.

The Wenger view represents the pragmatic view traditionally taken by the Army and

Navy authorities at the time. Later assessments, however, differ in their treatment ofthe

odd-even split, and are generally not as charitable. In a recent NSA Cryptologic History,

author Fred Parker presents a new perspective on the issue. While recognizing the Navy's

limited resources, compounded by the primacy ofthe war in the Atlantic, he contends that

the Navy misgauged the relative importance ofJapanese diplomatic communications, and

in the process lost valuable time in its pursuit ofthe more critical Japanese naval targets.

He concludes that "had Navy cryptanalysts been ordered to concentrate on the Japanese

naval messages rather than Japanese diplomatic traffic, the United States would have had

a much clearer picture ofthe Japanese military buildup and, with the warning provided by

these messages, might have avoided the disaster ofPearl Harbor."ls

The attack on Pearl Harbor brought about increased activity in the conduct of U.S.

intelligence activities. By the spring of 1942, a growing number of U.S. agencies began to

conduct their own communications intelligence operations. Agencies now engaged in

COMINT activities included the Department ofState, Federal Bureau ofInvestigation (FBI),

and Federal Communications Commission (FCC), as well as the Army and Navy.19 This

proliferation of COMINT activities became a matter of great concern to the military COMINT

organizations. Because of security considerations, as well as the scattering of scarce

analytic resources, the Army and Navy sought to restrict sharply the number of U.S.

agencies engaged in the cryptanalysis offoreign communications.

Turning to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military authorities requested a high-level

decision limiting governmental activities in COMINT matters. Since the Joint Chiefs of

Staff had the national responsibility for adjudicating issues related to intelligence, it

represented the only forum available for defining U.S. jurisdictional responsibilities in the

field of cryptanalysis. In its response, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) of the JCS

9

IIA:N'Bbi!l '/tAe8MUf'f eIIA:!mel:B 8N'tlC

"F9PSECRET
DOCID: 3109065

'Fep SEERE'f

established a new Inter-Departmental Committee, entitled "Committee on Allocation of

Cryptanalytical Activities." This committee, which had the task ofsurveying the entire

field of cryptanalysis in the United States, included members from the Army, Navy, and

FBI. It scheduled a conference for 30 June 1942.20

Leaving nothing to chance in their advance preparations, Army and Navy officials

held a number of closed meetings prior to the meeting ofthe full committee. They sought

primarily to resolve their long-standing disagreement on coverage of diplomatic targets.

Five days before their meeting with the FBI, the Army and Navy succeeded in reaching an

agreement on the division of COMINT responsibilities between their organizations,21 The

solution, urgently promoted backstage, resolved the nagging question of how to allocate

service responsibility for diplomatic traffic. At the Navy's request, on 25 June 1942 the

Army-Navy participants agreed to transfer the entire diplomatic problem to the Army for

the duration ofthe war.

#'==S SA' - Ii .. ·l .....

=4

.- -.- ---r-r~ ... ~.= ..'•.!3.

..... • r¥,

War Department Munitions Building

'Fep SEERE'f 10

IIAl'TBJ:.S VIA seMm~ SIlAl'HTSJ:.S el'TJ:.Y
DOCID: 3109065

TQPSIiCRiT

Many factors contributed to this decision. One related directly to a question ofCOMINT

resources and capabilities. At the time, the war was primarily a naval war in both the

Atlantic and Pacific theaters. As a result, the Navy, with its limited personnel resources,

wanted to place its total emphasis on the naval problems. It recognized that its original

ambitions for COMINT activities far exceeded its level of COMINT resources. For example,

because of the restrictive Navy policy permitting only military personnel to work on

COMINT-related matters, the Navy had a grand total of 38 people assigned to diplomatic

operations.22 The Army, however, with a larger and predominantly civilian organization,

was doing relatively little in military cryptanalysis. Since military traffic was virtually

impossible to copy at long distances because of the low power used, the Army had very

little to work on except diplomatic traffic.23 As a result, the Army was able to assume

exclusive responsibility for the diplomatic field without prejudicing its work on military

targets.

A second factor, known to be of great concern to the Navy, was the planned relocation

of the Army's COMINT facility from the old War Department Munitions Building on

Constitution Avenue in Washington, D.C., to a site near Frederick, Maryland. Because of

the distance to Frederick, the Navy viewed such a relocation as virtually ending the close

daily collaboration between the Army and Navy on the diplomatic problem. In addition,

both services, now sensitive to criticisms following the attack on Pearl Harbor, were

anxious to forestall future charges about duplication of effort, wasted COMINT resources,

and critical delays in the reporting ofintelligence information.24

The new agreement concerning the transfer of diplomatic coverage also included

guidelines governing the dissemination of COMINT from diplomatic sources to U.S.

authorities.25 Despite the transfer ofthe basic responsibility for the diplomatic problem to

the Army, the prior Army-Navy arrangements for the dissemination of diplomatic COMINT

product remained in effect. The Army continued to supply the State Department with

intelligence, and the Navy supplied the president with COMINT product. Following the 25

June 1942 agreement, the Army provided translations and decrypts to the Navy for

delivery in the Navy Department and to President Roosevelt.

At the insistence of the Army, the 25 June 1942 agreement was a purely verbal

arrangement"between the officers in charge of the cryptanalytic sections. Commander

John R. Redman, USN, represented the Navy, and Colonel Frank W. Bullock, USA, spoke for

the Army.26 The agreement later became known as the "Gentlemen's Agreement."

Despite its informal nature, this understanding constituted a landmark in terms ofArmyNavy collaboration in cryptanalysis. The earlier agreements were, in effect, little more

than agreements"to talk," and generally resulted in no changes in the service roles. This

agreement, however, became the first joint arrangement ofany substance and the one that

determined the shape and scope of a later wartime cooperation between the Army, Navy,

and FBI.

When the full committee ofArmy, Navy, and FBI representatives convened on 30 June

1942, it simply accepted the earlier Army-Navy agreement and formally incorporated its

provisions in a new document. The new document also addressed other issues that directly

influenced the scope of U.S. cryptanalytic actions for the next few years. The agreement

concluded that the conduct of cryptanalytic actions should be confined exclusively to the

Army, Navy, and FBI, and it established the wartime policy governing the dissemination of

11

IIld~Bce "(IA eSMm'f eUA!UfF.lOS SNhY

T9PSECRET
DOCID: 3109065

'1'6' SECRET

the intelligence. In addition, the committee created a permanent standing committee to

monitor the implementation of the agreement and to facilitate resolution of any problem

areas. The formal Agreement, of30 June 1942, now became the official benchmark for the

division ofcryptanalytic responsibilities within the United States.27

CommanderJohn R. Redman, USN Colonel Frank W. Bullock, USA

On 6 July 1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported to President Roosevelt that such an

agreement had been reached, and recommended that other U.S. agencies be excluded from

the field. 28 On 8 July 1942, Roosevelt instructed Harold D. Smith, Director of the Budget,

to issue instructions "discontinuing the cryptanalytic activities of the Federal

Communications Commission, the Office of Strategic Services, the director of Censorship

as well as other agencies having this character."29

The presidential memorandum did not relate to or affect the division ofresponsibilities

developed by the Army, Navy, and FBI in the 30 June meeting. It was always clear (at

least to the military participants) that the 30 June 1942 agreement, as endorsed by the

president, was a wartime arrangement made primarily to eliminate the FCC, 088, and

othersfrom the cryptanalytic field, and to restrict the COMINT activities ofthe FBI.30

In implementing the agreements ofJune 1942, the Army assumed the Navy's previous

responsibility for all cryptanalysis on other than naval problems and naval-related

ciphers.31 Thus, all foreign military traffic and all diplomatic communications fell to the

Army. The Navy acquired responsibility for enemy naval traffic, enemy naval air and

weather systems, and through its wartime control of the Coast Guard, surveillance of

clandestine communications. The conference concluded that there was sufficient

clandestine material to occupy both the FBI and the Navy (Coast Guard) with reference to

Western Hemisphere clandestine work since both were engaged in it and had a vital

interest in the results. For other than the Western Hemisphere, the Navy (Coast Guard)

acquired exclusive responsibility for international clandestine communications. The FBI,

in addition to sharing the responsibility with the Navy for clandestine targets in the

Western Hemisphere, worked domestic voice broadcasts and domestic criminal actions.32

l8PSECR!'f 12

IlANBbE VIA G9MUPl' GIlA~r~rl!lb8 9m:rY
DOClD: 3109065

19P5ECRET

This overall division of cryptanalytic effort·proved to be an effective wartime arrangement

and continued into the postwar period.

Coincidental with the negotiations over the allocation of cryptanalytic targets and in

anticipation of new and greatly expanded operational missions, each service initiated

search actionsfor the acquisition ofnew sites to house their already overcrowded facilities.

Within one year, the services accomplished major relocations and expansions of their

operations facilities within the Washington, D.C., area.

Aerial view ofArlington Hall Station

13

IWJ9:b8 trJ. S9MHf'f eUAlftfJ!l1:i8 8lih¥

"FQPSEEAET
DOCID: 3109065

Tar-SECRET

The site ultimately selected by the Army came to the attention ofthe authorities quite

by chance in the spring of 1942. On returning from an inspection ofthe proposed site for a

monitoring station at Vint Hill Farms, near Warrenton, Virginia, the Search Team,

among whom was Major Harold G. Hayes, Executive Officer, Signal Intelligence Service

(SIS), happened to notice the impressive grounds and fdocilities ofthe Arlington Hall Junior

College at 4000 Lee Boulevard, Arlington. Almost immediately, the Army sought to

acquire the property, which was then in receivership. The property, as it turned out, was

not on the governmental list for possible purchase, nor was it on the market at the time.

The Army, however, sought to acquire it through a straight purchase arrangement, but

failed to reach agreement with the seller on the price. Arlington Hall Junior College

officials valued the buildings and grounds (approximately 96 acres) at $840,000 while the

Army appraised the property at $600,000. Following litigation actions and condemnation

of the property under the War Powers Act, the court established the final price at

$650,000. The SIS took official possession ofthe property on 14 June 1942. By the summer

of 1942, the Army's Signal Intelligence Service organization completed the move from the

Munitions Building on Constitution Avenue in Washington, D.C., to its new location, now

called Arlington Hall Station.33

Aerial view of Navy Headquarters at Nebraska Avenue, March 19119

The Army then began a major building program to accommodate the wartime

expansion of personnel and equipment. The building program provided for the

construction of temporary buildings, without air conditioning or other refinements. The

initial expansion included a rehabilitation of the main school building and the

construction of barracks for enlisted men and operations buildings. In September 1942,

the Army started construction of the new barracks and broke ground for the construction

+9PSEERET 14

IIAl'iBhB VIA S9MIl'i'f SIIMUiBhS 91'ihY

----_.__._._----------~-~---
DOCID: 3109065

'Fep SEERE'

of a new operations building. Operations A Building, 607 feet long by 239 feet wide,

provided approximately 240,000 square feet of floor space, and was designed to

accommodate 2,200 personnel. Within two months, operational elements started to move

into the new quarters as the spaces became ready for occupancy. By November 1942,

however, the SIS announced a further expansion ofits civilian personnel to a total of 3,683

employees. Consequently, the Army broke ground on 4 December 1942 for the

construction of a second operations building similar to Operations A Building, but

somewhat smaller in size. The new Operations B Building became fully occupied by 1 May

1943.34

The same situation applied to the Navy - namely, a pressing need for additional

personnel, space, and security in order to meet the increased operational requirements of

war. In 1942, Navy planning called for a major expansion of its eoMINT unit, the

Supplemental Branch (OP-20-G) located in the Navy Department on Constitution Avenue

in Washington. The Navy, preferring to stay in Washington, acquired the site of the

Mount Vernon Seminary at 3801 Nebraska Avenue. On 7 February 1943, OP-20·G moved

from the Navy Department to its new site of 35 acres, now called the Communications

Supplementary Annex, Washington (eSAw). Commensurate with the size ofthe property,

which was considerably smaller than Arlington Hall Station, the Navy undertook a

building program to meet its particular needs. Unlike the Army, however, the Navy

tended to construct permanent buildings rather than temporary structures. The

expansion of the eSAW site included modifications of existing structures, construction of

new support facilities, and construction ofa major new building.35

During the first two years of the war, the services continued to expand their eOMINT

resources, both in Washington and overseas. Despite the proximity of their eOMINT

headquarters and the working agreement, each service remained aloof and zealously

guarded its own operations. Each worked independently ofthe other. By the end of 1943,

however, with the end ofthe war in sight, the eOMINTauthorities in both services foresaw

that the survival of their eOMINT operations would be in jeopardy if they persisted in

maintaining totally independent operations. This factor became the main catalyst in

developing closer cooperation.

The year 1944 marked the beginning of a new period in Army-Navy collaboration in

cryptanalysis. During 1944, the Army and Navy completed a number of supplemental

agreements, all of which reflected logical extensions or clarifications of the earlier 1942

agreement, and which moved in the direction of establishing closer coordination. On 19

January 1944, for example, a joint agreement signed by General George C. Marshall and

Admiral Ernest J. King promulgated the "Joint Army-Navy Regulations for the

Dissemination and Use of Communications Intelligence Concerning Weather." The

agreement addressed the special nature and perishability of Japanese weather

intelligence. Heretofore, the services traditionally handled weather intelligence as a

special category of intelligence, with each having totally separate rules to govern its

classification, handling, and dissemination. The King-Marshall agreement changed this

by establishing new uniform security regulations to govern all U.S. services in their

handling ofJapanese Special Weather Intelligence (SWI).38 On 7 April 1944, an additional

Army-Navy agreement defined the basic allocation of cryptanalytic tasks against

Japanese weather systems. This second agreement included specifics on the realignment

15 Htz~lQbS 'lIA SQMUl'f SIIMlllSbS 9!'lbYTepSECRET
M~or General HarryC.Ingles

ChiefSignal Officer

DOCID: 3109065

l'QPiiCRi+

of cryptanalytic tasks on the weather problem, a new policy statement authorizing a

complete exchange of all information concerning weather systems, and new guidelines

governing the exchange ofweather intelligence.s7

The Army-Navy authorities also completed two additional policy agreements in 1944.

On 4 February 1944, Marshall and King issued a "Joint Army-Navy Agreement for the

Exchange of Communications Intelligence." This agreement, applicable only to the

Washington area and only to the Japanese problem, provided for the first exchange of

liaison officers between Army and Navy communications intelligence organizations. In

addition to their liaison role, the officers were to "have access to the ... intelligence files

and records" in the Army (SSA) and Navy (OP-20-G) COMINT organizations.s8 (As the Army's

Signal Intelligence Service evolved, it became the Signal Intelligence Division (1942); the

Signal Security Service (1942); the Signal Security Agency (1943); and the Army Security

Agency (1945).) The second agreement, which formalized a long-standing working

arrangement, concerned the sharing ofcommunications circuits. During the early years of

the war, the Army permitted the Navy to use the Army's communications circuits to

Australia. In response to a Navy request, on 15 June 1944 Major General Harry C. Ingles,

Chief Signal Officer, agreed to the "continued and perhaps increased movement of Navy

traffic over the channels of Army Communications Service, extending between the United

States and Australia."s9

Despite the positive progress taking place in the course of Army-Navy cooperation in

COMINT matters, the June 1942 agreement remained the dominant and most important

component governing their intelligence relationships. While the services did agree to a

minimal expansion of intelligence arrangements existing on the periphery oftheir basic

dealings, neither sought to amend the

earlier agreement. As the war

progressed, the cryptologic services

continued to concentrate on the targets

previously allocated to them. The

Army processed the foreign diplomatic

communications, while the Army and

Navy targeted their efforts, on a

counterpart basis, against the military

and naval communications of Japan

and Germany. This breakout of cryptanalytic tasks proved to be conceptually sound and completely acceptable

to each service.

Also, the communications security

practices of foreign countries reinforced the U.S. decision concerning the

division of the intelligence effort

between the Army and Navy. Developments during World War II indicated

that there existed no centralized control within Japan and Germany over

the development of their crypto-

'fePSEERET 16
DOCID: 3109065

"f9PSECRET

systems. The systems employed by the Japanese and German users were designed

separately by their foreign offices and armed services. Having worked independently for

so many years, this fractionation offoreign responsibility for crypto-development worked

to the advantage of the Army and Navy in their technical efforts to exploit enemy

communications. Moreover, the organizational design of the U.S. cryptologic structure

facilitated the targeting of enemy communications on a totally decentralized basis by

existing organizations - and without the requirement for establishing a unified center for

the analysis ofcommunications.40

Devoting extensive resources and talent to their missions, the Army and Navy COMINT

organizations accomplished some remarkable exploitation of enemy communications

during the war. The Army enjoyed extraordinary successes against foreign Japanese

diplomatic traffic enciphered in a electro-mechanical system known as the "Red" and

subsequently as the "Purple" machine. The Army also exploited the Japanese Water

Transport Code, which it broke in April 1943, as well as other military systems.41 In its

exploitation of the Water Transport Code, which utilized a Japanese Army cryptographic

system, the Army provided valuable advance warning about the movements ofJapanese

merchant shipping that operated in support of enemy ground forces and helped eliminate

nearly ninety-eight percent of the Japanese merchant fleet by the end of the war.

Similarly, the Navy enjoyed its share of spectacular successes against Japanese and

German naval communications. Navy COMINT provided the breakthrough to IN-25, the

majorJapanese fleet system that helped the United States win the battles ofCoral Sea and

Midway, the turning points in the Pacific War.42 The Navy also achieved a number of

other critical breakthroughs in the decoding of Japanese convoy messages, as well as

German communications concerning the movements ofsubmarinesin the Atlantic.43

While their cryptanalytic accomplishments were impressive, both services recognized

that their joint efforts were far from ideal. The war compelled them to develop closer

COMINT relationships with each other, but there still persisted a highly competitive and

frequently hostile relationship. Each service cooperated with the other to the extent

agreed upon - but there was little evidence ofenthusiasm or voluntary efforts to go beyond

the formal arrangement. A spirit of competition rather than coordination continued

throughout the early years of World War II. In such an atmosphere, the intensity of

competing interests tended to create unnecessary difficulties for each organization.

Recurring problems, such as the recruitment ofsuitable personnel or the procurement of

highly complex and unique cryptanalytic machinery, were often complicated by the

competition of both services for the same items.44 Thus, limited coordination and the

absence of free and open dialogue between the services on day-to-day operational

relationships meant that the Army and Navy were often working at cross-purposes.

Even in such a sensitive area as foreign relationships, each COMINT service

demonstrated a predisposition to act on a completely independent basis. For example, the

Army and Navy persisted in establishing their own technical agreements with their

British counterparts, but without coordination or dialogue with the other U.S. service.

These agreements frequently conflicted, usually with respect to the amount and kinds of

intelligence information to be exchanged. Because of these diverse agreements, a

potential for serious damage to American intelligence interests always existed.4~

17

1IA:N'BbB VIA: e8MI!Pf ellAmiBbB8tUi':

T6PSEEAET
DOCID: 3109065

Tep SECRE:r

Similarly, on U.S. intelligence matters, each service operated with little consideration

for the parallel activities and interests ofthe other. A policy of noncoordination seemed to

prevail, which applied particularly to the relationships of the intelligence services with

each other and with the Office ofStrategic Services (OSS) and the FBI. Lacking any central

authority for intelligence activities, the services for the most part had free rein in their

operations. An internal FBI memorandum in 1939 to FBI DirectorJ. Edgar Hoover testifies

to the disunity in noting that "another feud had broken out between the Army and Navy

Intelligence sections" because the Army Military Intelligence Division (G-2) had approved

the request for representatives of the Japanese Army to examine certain plants and

factories in the United States after the Navy had turned down the request.46 This pattern

of independent and autonomous operations by the intelligence services continued

throughout the war years.

Since no national intelligence structure existed, the Joint Chiefs of Staffserved as the

primary U.S. mechanism to govern U.S. intelligence activities during World War II. The

need for establishing a coordinating committee composed of representation from the

various departments and agencies was recognized early in the war, resulting in the

creation of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At its

first meeting in March 1942, the membership consisted of the intelligence chiefs of the

Army and Navy, and one representative each from the Department of State, the Board of

Economic Warfare (later the Foreign Economic Administration), and the Coordinator of

Information (subsequently the Office of Strategic Services). The Intelligence Chief of the

Army Air Corps was added in 1943.47

As its principal function, the JIC provided intelligence estimates of enemy capabilities

for use in developing strategic war plans for the JCS. In addition, the JIC provided advice

and assistance to the JCS on other intelligence matters and also served as a coordinator of

intelligence operations conducted by the member agencies. The JIC, with its many

subcommittees, provided the primary forum for community discussion of intelligence

reports, estimates, requirements, and related topics. During the first two years ofthe war,

it was within the JIC that the first joint producer and consumer discussions concerning

COMINT matters took place. The topics included such recurring items as possible ways to

improve COMINT product, COMINT dissemination procedures, and the matter of cooperation

between the COMINT organizations.48

As early as 1942, however, it became evident that COMINT agencies were making

independent decisions concerning requirements and the priorities of intercept,

cryptanalysis, and reporting. While the consumer representatives such as State and oss

may have been uneasy about this situation, they were unable to change things because of

their lack of influence in directing the overall COMINT structure. It was basically

controlled by the U.S. military. Toward the end of the war, the question of how to

influence and guide the collection and reporting priorities of the U.S. COMINT structure

surfaced as a fundamental issue within the U.S. intelligence community. Nothing really

changed at the time, however, and the ramifications ofthis unresolved issue extended well

into the postwar period.49

In much the same vein, recognizing the magnitude of the intelligence picture, and

seeking to benefitfrom "lessons learned" during the war, the Joint Intelligence Staffofthe

Joint Chiefs of Staff started to explore the concept of establishing a central intelligence

:rep SECRE:r 18

I1"'~iBbl'!11jI'" SQMI~Jrf SII"'~J~Jl'!1b8 Q~Jb¥
DOCID: 3109065 19P5ECRET

organization for the United States for the postwar period. Brigadier General William J.

Donovan, head of the Office of Strategic Services, became a major catalyst for these

discussions. 50 In late 1944, Donovan, functioning as a member of the Joint Intelligence

Committee of the JCS, presented his first proposal for the establishment of a central

intelligence agency. Among other things, Donovan's proposal recommended the

establishment of a National Intelligence Authority and a Central Intelligence Agency.

While Donovan's proposal generated much discussion in the JCS Committee structure, it

never went beyond the proposal stage during the war, and remained within the JCS

structure.51

When discussing COMINT activities, the various JCScommittees always emphasized the

need for much closer cooperation by the COMINT producers. This consideration, coupled

with the recurring proposals for centralization ofintelligence activities, brought new fears

to the COMINT service organizations, however. The COMINT authorities in each service

recognized that a disunited COMINT structure would be more vulnerable to a takeover in

the event centralization ofintelligence actually wasforced upon them.52

Yet another consideration influenced the thinking ofthe COMINT hierarchy. Recalling

an earlier parallel from World War I, both Army and Navy policymakers became

apprehensive about the effect ofdemobilization on their COMINT organizations. They were

concerned lest the situation that had occurred at the end of World War I might happen

again - namely, dwindling appropriations and the inability to provide for future COMINT

needs. In looking at the pattern following World War I, one Navy study concluded that

"lost opportunities and neglect, which was the fate of all American military and naval

enterprises in the postwar era, was suffered [sic] by United States Army and Navy

Communication Intelligence organizations.,,53 No one in the Army or the Navy wanted a

repeat ofthe World War I experience.

Moving in the direction ofstill greater cooperation, on 18 April 1944, the services set

up an unofficial working committee known as the Army-Navy Radio Intelligence

Coordinating Committee. Members ofthe committee were Colonel Carter W. Clarke and

Colonel W. Preston Corderman for the Army; and Captain Philip R. Kinney, Captain

Henri H. Smith-Hutton, and Commander Joseph N. Wenger for the Navy. The

committee's mission involved policy, planning, and technical matters. It met monthly, and

in general, worked on postwar plans, coordination offuture operating plans in the Pacific,

and coordination ofrelationships and agreements with allied radio intelligence activities.

Initially, the committee had no formal organization and little official power.54 Following

its first two meetings (18 April and 19 May 1944), the committee changed its name to

Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Coordinating Committee (ANCICC) to reflect the

increasing usage of the term "communications intelligence" in place of "radio

intelligence."55

The establishment of ANCICC represented a significant step forward in the area of

service cooperation. There now existed a forum, albeit informal and with a limited

charter, empowered to consider a broad range of COMINT problems. On controversial or

critical issues, ANCICC lacked the authority to make decisions. COMINT officials from both

services, such as Carter Clarke, Preston Corderman, and Joseph Wenger, recognized the

obvious need for another, higher level board, with broader authority, to discuss COMINT

19

MAUBbl!1 '.tIt. S9MUJ'I' SIIA!J!Jl!1b8 9!JbY

'fa, SEER!'f
DOCID: 3109065

Tor S;E;ERET

problems independently of other forms of intelligence. Each service, therefore, agreed to

study the possibility of establishing a higher level military board to govern COMINT

matters.58

In less than a year, the services succeeded in establishing such a policy board. In an

exchange of letters in 1945, Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations and

Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet (COMINCH), and General George C. Marshall, Chief of

Staff, U.S. Army, agreed in principle to the establishment of an Army-Navy Intelligence

Board. Based on national intelligence interests, they considered it imperative that the

Army and Navy intelligence organizations work more closely together on an

interdepartmental and permanent basis.57

On 10 March 1945, Marshall and King cosigned a Joint Memorandum to the Assistant

ChiefofStaff(G-2), to the Commanding General, Signal Security Agency, to the Director of

Naval Intelligence, and to the Director of Naval Communications, that formally

established the Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Board (ANCIB). The MarshallKing memorandum defined the authorities and responsibilities of the new board, and

redesignated the informal ANCICC as an official working committee ofANCIB.58

Because of security considerations, Marshall and King insisted that ANCIB function

outside the framework ofthe Joint Chiefs ofStaffand report directly to them. Their major

concern about security was the exposure of sensitive COMINT information via the multilayered correspondence channels of the JCS. The placement of ANCIB within the JCS

structure would have required the automatic routing ofall papers and reports through the

JCS Secretariat, thereby exposing ULTRA intelligence to personnel not considered as having

the "need-to-know."59

According to its charter, ANCIB was established primarily to avoid duplication of effort

in COMINT matters and to ensure a full exchange oftechnical information and intelligence

between the services. However, it also included a self-restricting provision that required

unanimity of agreement on issues requiring a decision by the board. This rule enabled the

military COMINT structures to appear to coordinate operations on a voluntary basis

without, in fact, yielding any oftheir independence. By simply exercising its veto power, a

service could prevent the implementation ofany controversial proposal. In later years, the

rule ofunanimity developed into a major problem for the entire intelligence community.

Nevertheless, the Marshall-King agreement represented a significant milestone in

service cooperation - the establishment ofthe first interdepartmental board devoted solely

to COMINT matters. With the establishment of a joint Army-Navy board, the services

created their own self-governing mechanism to administer their COMINT effort.

When discussing the merits of establishing a new Army-Navy Communications

Intelligence Board, Rear Admiral Joseph R. Redman presented very bluntly some of the

fears and concerns ofthe military services. He stated in a letter to Vice Admiral Richard

S. Edwards, ChiefofStaff', Office ofNaval Operations:

••• The public is acutely conscious ofthe lack of unified direction .•. in American

intelligence activities. The supposedly secret plan ofthe assfor coordination ofall

these activities is widely known.•.. In addition, there seemsto be little doubt that

other civilian agencies will insist on a reorganization of American intelligence

T9PSEERET 20

lI1dofBbB 'IIAeeMIlf'f ell:!t!fNJ!ibB9Nl:iY
DOCID: 3109065

mpSECRET

activities. It is important that the Army and Navy take progressive steps ... to

ensure that their legitimate interests in communication intelligence are not

jeopardized by the encroachment ofother agencies. The formal establishmentof

an Army-Navy CommunicationsIntelligence Board will ensure that communication intelligence, the most important source of operational intelligence, will be

discussed independently of other forms of intelligence.... Finally, informed

observers will have some assurance that nothing has been left undone to ensure

that another Pearl Harbor will not occur.60

Whatever motivations may have contributed to the establishment ofANCIB, the new board

became a powerful joint institutional force in the adjudication of COMINT matters, both at

the policy and operational levels.

The establishment of ANCIB did not diminish the competition between the Army and

Navy COMINT organizations, however. Despite the new ANCIB, the services were more

determined than ever to preserve their separate COMINT organizations. They viewed

ANCIB as a valuable joint mechanism that would assist in sheltering their COMINT

activities from external scrutiny and in the resolution ofjoint problem areas. But they

also foresaw that the structure of the new board would permit each service to remain

totally independent.61

In the closing days ofthe war, the services seemed to be driven by two compelling and

overlapping objectives. First, they desired to fmd a way to formalize their joint day-to-day

relationships as an initial step toward protecting the existing COMINT resources of the

Army and Navy from drastic budget cuts. Second, they believed some way had to be found

to continue the progress achieved during the war in conducting COMINT collaboration with

Great Britain.62 This wartime liaison with the British in COMINT proved to be highly

beneficial to each country, as it permitted not only a sharing of cryptanalytic techniques

but also a sharing ofcryptanalytic successes.

The establishment of ANCIB marked the first step toward accomplishing the first

objective. The Army and Navy now had an interdepartmental forum for joint discussion of

COMINT matters. Accomplishing the second objective required considerable internal joint

discussions, as well as a new round ofexternal negotiations with British officials.

The origins of the highly secret U.S.-U.K.COMINT cooperation stemmed from the

outbreak ofwar in Europe in 1939 and the German blitzkrieg through sections ofWestern

Europe. By the summer of 1940, Great Britain, under heavy siege by German forces,

intensified its efforts to acquire military assistance from the then neutral United States.

President Roosevelt, at least in the early days of the war, sought to achieve a partial

posture ofneutrality for the United States, but it was evident that he personally favored a

policy of "all-out aid" to Great Britain. When Winston Churchill became the prime

minister ofthe United Kingdom in May 1940, Roosevelt and Churchill quickly established

a direct and personal communications channel on matters related to the war. This

extraordinarily close relationship of the two leaders reinforced the concept of a strong

British-U.S. alliance, and influenced many of the joint military decisions during the

course ofthe war.63

In 1940, following a number of high-level conferences in London and Washington, the

two governments concluded "a general, though secret agreement ... for a full exchange of

military information."M Following this very broad agreement, the United Kingdom and

21 lOPS&CAEi
DOCID:

---

3109065 TOP-5-ECRET

United States representatives began very limited exploratory talks in August 1940

concerning the establishment ofa cryptanalytic exchange between the two nations. These

discussions marked the beginning of a cryptanalytic exchange, but one that functioned on

a very limited and cautious basis and that took place at a service-to-service level.65 Close

cooperation did not actually begin until February 1941. Each U.S. service, from the

outset, worked independently in developing its own agreements or understandings with its

British counterpart and seldom told the other ofits accomplishments.

In July 1942, basically unaware ofthe service competition in this field, Prime Minister

Churchill brought up the subject by informing Roosevelt that the British and American

naval "cipher experts" were in close touch but that a similar interchange apparently did

not exist between the two armies.66 Roosevelt asked Marshall to take this up with Field

Marshall Sir John Dill, British Ministry Office Liaison Officer in Washington. 67 In a

response to Marshall's request for information, on 9 July 1942 Major General George V.

Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, stated that an interchange of cryptanalytic

information between the British and American armies had been taking place for over a

year - and that it appeared to be satisfactory to both sides.88 Strong further stated that if

the Navy exchange of cryptanalytic information with the United Kingdom seemed to be

more advanced, it was simply because coordination between the two had been necessary

for a much longer time.

In 1943, however, the U.S. Army and British authorities completed a formal

agreement concerning collaboration on their major military COMINT targets. Under the

agreement, the U.S. Army assumed as a main responsibility the reading of Japanese

military and air traffic. The British Government Code and Cipher School (G.c. & C.S.)

assumed a parallel responsibility for a cryptanalytic effort against German and Italian

military and air traffic. The agreement provided for complete interchange of technical

data and special intelligence from the sources covered, and for dissemination of such

intelligence to all field commanders through special channels. On 10 June 1943, Major

General Strong signed the agreement for the U.S. War Department, and Edward W.

Travis, Deputy Director, G.C. &C.S., signed for the British.69

Thus, during the war years the Army and Navy followed the established policy of

working independently with the British, with each U.S. service having separate

agreements or understandings with its British counterpart. In general, because ofmutual

distrust, each consistently failed - or refused - to inform the other of the existence or

nature oftheir agreement with the United Kingdom.

The first clear indication that the services were beginning to be more open with each

other concerning their foreign COMINT arrangements occurred during 1944. This change of

attitude came about, in part, because of the establishment of the new Army-Navy

Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee; a general acceptance of the need

for tighter control of foreign agreements on COMINT matters; and the likelihood of

continuing U.S. collaboration with the British.70 Using the informal forum provided by

ANCICC, each service began to reveal the specifics of its agreements with foreign nations,

especially their COMINT relationships with Great Britain. It was small progress and did

not undo immediately the independent agreements made earlier by each U.S. service with

foreign organizations. Nevertheless, it was progress.

WP5ECRET 22

UAliBbEl VIA 8eMIrA' ell:AtUiElbB alieY
DOCID: 3109065

Tap SECRET

Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill established a direct channel

ofpersonal communicationsin 1940, reinforcing strong ties between

the United States and Great Britain.

23

n"'~T'9bg VIA S9UI:NT SM A :N~Tgb8 g:Nb¥

1=9PSEGiAE1=
OOClO: 3109065

T8PSECRET

Major General George V.Strong

AssistantChiefofStaff,G·2

Edward W. Travis

Deputy Director,G.C. &: C.s.

In exploring the possibility of establishing postwar collaboration with the United

Kingdom, many alarming reports emerged about the earlier lack of Army-Navy

coordination and the existence of overlapping agreements with the United Kingdom. For

example, the Navy noted, "the lack of coordination between the Army and the Navy was

strikingly demonstrated by an Army-British agreement which was made during the war

without the concurrence of the Navy, even though it directly afTected the air material in

which the Navy had a vital interest. It also provided for a complete exchange between the

Army and the British of all technical material, although the Navy had an agreement to

make only a limited exchange with the British.'m The Navy cited similar problems in

some of its COMINT relationships with U.S. consumers. It noted that both services

experienced similar difficulties stemming from their unilateral dealings with the FBI and

OSS. It was not until the creation ofthe informal ANCICC that the Army and Navy achieved

a united front in dealing with these agencies." By the end of the war, Army and Navy

officials came to realize that COMINT agreements with foreign governments or other

domestic agencies could no longer be determined on an ad hoc basis by each service.

At the same time, ANCIB undertook its own efforts to strengthen the U.S. COMINT

structure. As a part of this effort, ANCIB sought to fmd a way to continue U.S.-U.K.

collaboration in COMINT, and to establish itself as the sole U.S. spokesman for the conduct

ofpolicy negotiations with all foreign countries on COMINT matters.73

The board saw British-United States cooperation as the key. By early 1945, as the

primary wartime targets began to dry up, Great Britain and the United States began a

redirection of their COMINT efTorts. At that time, there emerged a dominant view among

the allied nations that the Soviet Union was a hostile and expansive power with whom

good relations seemed highly unlikely, at least for the immediate future. Since both

nations recognized the mutual benefits oftheir earlier collaborative efforts, they agreed to

investigate the feasibility ofestablishing some form ofpostwar collaboration on the Soviet

T9PSECRET 24

Ii A Wr..i: 'R:/: QQMUff ellA!fNBbB6Ifb·...
DOCID: 3109065

MPSEERET

problem that heretofore had received minuscule attention. As their COMINT priorities

changed, both the Army and Navy began to direct greater attention to Soviet targets.

Each service gradually succeeded in reading some Soviet traffic, but without revealing

that fact to the other.74 The British were in a similar position and started their own highly

compartmented effort against Soviet targets.75 However, motivated in large .part by

sensitivity and security considerations, and seeking to avoid a repetition of the many

separate wartime agreements with each other, representatives ofboth nations agreed that

a new set of ground rules would be necessary for their next round of collaboration. Both

authorities agreed to establish mechanisms within their own countries to bring about a

greater degree of centralized control of their COMINT resources. This move to establish a

new cycle ofBritish-U.S. collaboration also meant that the U.S. services would have to be

more open with each other about their COMINT programs and successes.

Within the U.S. intelligence structure, the Army and Navy now endorsed the concept

of centralized control to govern their foreign COMINT relationships. In the negotiation

process, the services agreed to the establishment ofwell-defined policies and procedures to

govern the conduct of United States COMINT liaison with the British COMINT authorities.

Under the new concept, all U.S. foreign liaison on the Soviet problem with Great Britain

would take place under the auspices of the United States policy board (ANCIB/ANCICC)

rather than individually by each service.

Five years after the initial U.S.-U.K. collaboration inCOMINT, the two nations began a

new chapter in their cooperation in COMINT matters. Following several months of

technical discussions, both in London and Washington, representatives of the London

Signals Intelligence Board (LSIB) and the Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board

on 15 August 1945 informally approved the concept of establishing U.S.-U.K. cooperation

on the Soviet problem.76 This unwritten agreement was predicated on an understanding

arrived at by Group Captain Eric Jones, RAF, and Rear Admiral Hewlett Thebaud,

Chairman of ANCIB. The informal understanding identified LSIB and ANCIB as the

respective governmental authorities for all COMINT negotiations and outlined in general

terms the framework and procedures to govern the new working partnership.

Initially, the U.S. services identified this new phase ofU.S.-U.K. collaboration as the

RATTAN Project, the original British cover term for their effort on the Soviet cryptanalytic

problem. Following the U.S.-U.K. understanding of 1945, however, at the suggestion of

the United States the cover term BOURBON replaced RATTAN, and came to identify the joint

collaboration to exploit Soviet communications.77

BOURBON collaboration soon resulted in a broad exchange of operational materials

between the COMINT centers of both nations, and in the establishment of reciprocal Joint

Liaison Units stationed in London and Washington. These liaison units evolved into the

liaison mechanisms that exist today, the Senior U.S. Liaison Officer, London (SUSLO), and

the Senior U.K. Liaison Officer, Washington (SUKLO).78

In the implementation of BOURBON, ANCICC established the Army and Navy COMINT

organizations as its focal points, to serve on a rotating basis for the conduct ofliaison with

Great Britain. Initially, an Army officer represented ANCICC in London, assisted by a

Navyofficer. Similarly, a naval officer, assisted by an Army officer, represented ANCICC in

Washington. This detail rotated every six months, so that first one service represented

25

I1td~Bl:te VIA eeMlt:l'f 6UAN!i8b8 9!iirY

T9PSECAET
DOCID: 3109065

T9PSEERET

ANCICC as senior liaison officer, followed by a member of the other service. This system

worked very well. Itserved to keep each service in the forefront on operational and policy

matters while at the same time providing a new degree of centralized control over COMINT

activities under the aegis of ANCIB. It also helped to prevent the United Kingdom from

playing one service off against the other, as had occurred frequently during World War

11.79

BOURBON became the springboard for further U.S.-U.K. negotiations to consider the

establishment of even broader collaboration for the postwar period. With this objective in

mind, the COMINT authorities brought the matter of U.S.-U.K. collaboration to the

attention of President Truman through the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

(SWNCC). In 1945, in a joint memorandum to Truman, Acting Secretary of State Dean

Acheson, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, and Secretary of the Navy James V.

Forrestal recommended the continuation ofcollaboration between the United States Army

and Navy and the British in the field of communications intelligence.so On 12 September

1945, Truman concurred. He authorized the Army and Navy"... to continue collaboration

in the field ofcommunication intelligence between the United States Army and Navy, and

to extend, modify, or discontinue this collaboration as determined to be in the best

interests of the United States."St Based on this presidential authorization, the Army and

Navy immediately initiated U.S.-U.K. discussions through ANCIB to explore expanded

postwar collaboration in COMINT.S2

As ANCIB pursued its objectives, however, a new COMINT unit, outside the military

structure, appeared in the U.S. intelligence community. In recognition ofthe importance

of COMINT as a source of political and economic intelligence, the Department of State

unilaterally established its own unit to exploit COMINT. Because ofthe desire to bring all

the COMINT activities of the United States under the control of ANCIB, ANCIB officials

agreed to seek the expansion ofits membership to include State.

On 13 December 1945, ANCIB forwarded its proposal for expansion of the board to

General Eisenhower and to Admiral King for approval. They approved the

recommendation, and the Department ofState accepted membership onANCIB, effective 20

December 1945. ANCIB and its working committee became the State-Army-Navy

Communication Intelligence Board (STANCIB) and the State-Army-Navy Communication

Intelligence Coordinating Committee (STANCICC).83 Alfred McCormack, special assistant

to the Secretary of State, became the first State Department member of STANCIB.Sol A

civilian agency was now an official part ofthe United States COMINT structure.

In summary, by the end ofthe war, the United States COMINT services had reason to be

proud oftheir accomplishments. They had achieved spectacular COMINT successes against

the military and diplomatic communications of Germany and Japan. To achieve a greater

degree of efficiency and to avoid costly duplication, they had set up their own selfgoverning mechanisms - a policy board (ANCIB) and a working level committee (ANCICC).

Despite all their efforts, however, they still basically functioned as independent units in

the COMINT arena.

These successes notwithstanding, out of the disaster at Pearl Harbor came recurring

demands for a truly centralized, permanent intelligence agency and increased

participation of the civilian agencies in COMINT matters. Proposals for the establishment

T9PSEERET 26

nAtfBbB YIA S9MUf'l' snANtfses 9!'fJ,,¥
DOCID: 3109065

T9PSECRET

of a single United States intelligence agency became routine topics for discussion in the

Joint Intelligence Committee ofthe JCS and in congressional investigations.

The combination of service competition, pending budget reductions, and high-level

investigations foretold sweeping changes in the intelligence structure in the postwar

years. The end ofWorld War II signaled the beginning ofthe end ofthe exclusive military

domination of the Army and Navy COMINT organizations. Because of the ·increased

emphasis given to economic, political, and diplomatic intelligence, civilian agencies now

pressed for a much greater voice in the direction ofU.S. COMINT activities.

27

I1ANBhS VIA GeMINI' GHA~bB9NI:.¥

lap SEEREl
DOCID: 3109065

1'8P SEfR!'f

Chapter II

The Military Services and the

Joint Operating Plan, 1946-1949

Immediately following World War II, American policymakers looked for ways to

achieve major reductions in the military budget. Despite the spectacular successes

achieved by the Army and Navy COMINT organizations during the war, they quickly

became prime candidates for reorganization and for major reductions in their resources.

As the Pearl Harbor investigations continued, interest in intelligence matters also

increased dramatically. For the first time, U.S. intelligence operations came under

outside scrutiny. By 1946, service COMINT officials found that they were no longer able to

act as free agents in making many ofthe basic decisions affecting their COMINT operations.

Their days ofcomplete autonomy were numbered.

Other fundamental intelligence relationships were also changing. Within the COMINT

community, the addition ofthe State Department to the membership ofthe COMINT policy

board changed not only the composition of the board but the scope of its intelligence

interests as well. At the international level, the Great Britain-United States negotiations

to extend COMINT collaboration into the postwar period were nearing completion. Finally,

in the military itself, there now existed demands for closer cooperation between the Army

and Navy COMINTorganizations.

In addition, developments during World War II forced a new reassessment and push

toward unification of the military services at the national level. Despite widespreac;l

agreement OD the need for postwar organizational reform of the military services, there

existed deep philosophical differences and suspicions among the services that could not be

resolved easily. As debate progressed during this period, it became clear that Congress

would have to legislate a structure that would be acceptable to the military services.

All ofthese activities - foreign negotiations and unification - impacted on the COMINT

structure that sought to achieve its own degree of unification within the intelligence

organizations ofthe War and Navy Departments. As a principal means ofachieving closer

cooperation, the service COMINT organizations responded to these pressures by

establishing a joint operating agreement. This new alliance called for a collocation ofthe

Army and Navy COMINTprocessing activities in the United States, as well as cooperation

in their COMINT collection and reporting programs. While the services remained

organizationally independent, the joint operating agreement did call for a totally new

managerial concept, namely, operating on the basis of "shared" or "joint" control over a

number of COMINT targets and resources. While this was a difficult period of adjustment

for the COMINT services, they not only survived but made some significant COMINT

contributions during thistime.

As the services moved into the postwar period, they found that peacetime operations,

rather than simplifying the conduct oftheir COMINToperations, brought new problems and

highlighted even more the glaring disunity of the U.S. COMINT structure. By 1946, the

harsh realities ofthe new situation began to hit home. Operationally, the services had lost

their wartime targets of Germany and Japan, and the source of many spectacular

29 l8PSECRET
DOCID: 3109065

T6P5EERET

successes. At the same time, the services were confronted with the specter of rapidly

shrinking resources. Shortly after V-E and V-J Days, their parent headquarters ordered

drastic reductions oftheir COMINT facilities. Demobilization actions were under way with

dire consequencesfor the service COMINT operations.

While the services no longer had the urgency of a wartime situation to support their

requests for resources, the likelihood of going through an extended period of austerity did

have one practical effect. It forced the services to reevaluate their joint posture and to

think more seriously about closer cooperation between their organizations. Because ofthe

new public investigation of Pearl Harbor with its intensive probings into intelligence

matters, the COMINT officials saw that they would be vulnerable, once again, to charges of

duplication of effort and inefficient use of resources if they continued to maintain totally

separate and independent COMINT organizations.

Fortuitously, in the postwar period a new operational target emerged for the U.S.

COMINT services. As the hostility of the Soviet Union toward the West became more

apparent, the Army and Navy began to plan for a major adjustment of their COMINT

coverage, to focus on Soviet targets. But the realignment was not all that simple. Some

very fundamental questions existed concerning intercept and processing that could only be

answered on a communal basis. For example, what were the new collection priorities?

What were the new intelligence priorities? Who would establish these priorities? What

were the interests and roles of the nonmilitary consumers? How would the intercept and

processing ofthe Soviet material be divided between the services? It became obvious that

the service COMINT organizations, as constituted, could not answer these questions.

A number of other jurisdictional issues confronted the services as well. Foremost on

the list was the old question of how to divide the responsibility for coverage of diplomatic

targets. The question was temporarily resolved in 1942, when the Army, at the request of

the Navy, had assumed the responsibility for handling all diplomatic traffic coverage

during the war years. At the end of the war, however, the Navy wanted to resume

coverage of some diplomatic targets, but the Army insisted on maintaining the total

responsibility for diplomatic traffic and refused to transfer any part orit back to the Navy.1

Because of these problems, the services perceived an immediate need for

accomplishing some form of cooperation that went well beyond the scope of any previous

efforts. The military authorities fully recognized that, at best, they had made only

superficial progress toward the establishment of closer cooperation between their

organizations in the production of COMINT. Earlier moves toward closer cooperation,

dictated by wartime necessity, had been carefully designed to be limited in scope, as well

as to avoid any interference with the primary interests of each service. The wartime

agreements had accomplished little more than a basic division of labor and had avoided

the real issue ofestablishing a centralized cooperative effort. In the main, the spirit ofthe

earlier measures seemed to reflect an inherent attitude that cooperation in COMINT

matters was a necessary evil, rather than any real conviction about the benefits of

centralization or cooperation.

Seeking to shelter their vital COMINT functions from further budget reductions, the

military authorities intensified their efforts to achieve closer cooperation and coordination

between their COMINT organizations. The likelihood offurther b.udget reductions and the

+9PSECiAE:r 30

U1dfBl:il!: -;111: e6MI!ff eU1I:Infl!:I:iS 6Ifl:i....
-------- -------- ---------

DOCID: 3109065

T9PSECRET

question of survival of their separate COMINT organizations forced the two organizations

together.

A few Army and Navy officials, aware ofthe magnitude ofthe COMINT successes during

World War II, became the prime movers in the effort to preserve the Army and Navy

COMINT structures. Three officers in particular stand out in the postwar era - Colonel W.

Preston Corderman, USA, Colonel Carter W. Clarke, USA, and Captain Joseph N. Wenger,

USN. 2 As early as 1943, these officers took the essential first steps in pressing for the

preservation and fusion of the military COMINT resources. Over the next few years, they

consistently took the lead in facilitating a dialogue between the services to foster the

preservation of military COMINT resources. For the most part, they sought to promote

service discussions covering a broad range oforganizational relationships, such as division

of responsibility on cryptanalytic tasks, the feasibility of joint operations, and possible

ways to avoid unnecessary duplication. -Each ofthese officers encountered varying degrees

of opposition, sometimes from within their own service, and sometimes from the other

service. Despite the continuing lack of enthusiasm encountered at various echelons ofthe

military structures for consolidation, they had the foresight to view COMINT as a national

asset that would be vital in meeting future U.S. intelligence needs. Corderman, Clarke,

and Wenger never wavered in their single-minded determination to save the existing

military COMINT structure from a dismantling process through budget cuts.3

Of the postwar intelligence machinery, the establishment of the Army-Navy

Communications Intelligence Board was probably the most important component for the

Army and Navy. With the creation of ANCIB in March 1945, Corderman, Clarke, and

Wenger succeeded in establishing the nucleus for a structured, communal approach to the

basic handling of COMINT matters - and in moving the services toward toward greater

cooperation in their intelligence relationships. Operating with a very limited charter,

ANCIB quickly emerged as a policy mechanism for the COMINT services and brought a new

semblance ofunity and order to the COMINT structure.

Reinforcing their goal ofcreating a self-governing mechanism for the COMINT agencies,

the leaders brought about the establishment of an expanded policy board - the StateArmy-Navy Communications Intelligence Board - in December 1945. The members

designated STANCIB as the sole organization empowered to ratify government-togovernment agreements with foreign nations on COMINT matters, thereby removing a

long-standing irritant in U.S. interservice relationships. As a parallel responsibility, the

members established STANCIB as the primary governmental mechanism to coordinate and

guide the activities of the COMINT structure and to assist in its reorganization during the

postwar period.4 In retrospect, the development ofa strong role for the policy board stands

as a tribute to the military leaders, particularly when recognizing that STANCIB was

operating without an official charter.

Despite the fresh dialogue and new perspective on a broad range of COMINT matters,

one critical element was still lacking within the COMINT structure that could prevent

STANCIB from acting as the COMINT broker, at either the international or domestic level.

While the services had achieved considerable progress in expanding their dialogue at the

policy level, they had not made similar progress in designing an operational plan that

would enforce closer cooperation at the working level. Unless some additional leverage

was brought to bear upon the services, the authorities recognized that the Army and Navy

31

IIAPiBI5B VIi, S9MI~i'fSUAUNB158 Q:D'Tb¥

Tap SECIU!T
DOCID: 3109065

T9iiiiCRET

had gone about as far as they could - or would - go in achieving closer cooperation at the

working level. Since voluntary merger was not likely to occur, direct intervention by

higher authority was inevitable.

The proposal to merge the Army-Navy communication intelligence activities had been

under periodic discussion by the services as early as 1942. The Army authorities generally

supported the proposals for merger, while naval officers were unanimously opposed. For

the Army, Major General George V. Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, repeatedly

expressed his strong support of the concept.s From the outset, however, the naval

authorities opposed the concept of merger. Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval

Operations, supported the position ofthe Navy's intelligence and COMINTofficials that its

COMINT operations should remain under exclusive naval control.8

The Navy's persistent opposition to the centralization of cryptologic resources

stemmed, in large part, from its perception of its fundamental intelligence needs, as

contrasted with those of the Army. The Navy considered that its intelligence

requirements expressed statements of need for intelligence information of a strategic

nature and of national-level interest, that could be properly handled only by a full-scale

technical center under the operational control of the Navy. In contrast, the Navy

perceived the Army's intelligence requirements as reflecting needs of a more limited

nature, which were exploitable in the field at a tactical level. Leaving little room for

negotiation on the issue, the Navy generally discouraged exploration of the concept of

merger during the 1940s.

But the developments associated with the end ofWorld War II brought about a general

reopening ofthe feasibility ofthe merger concept. By V.J Day (14 August 1945), a number

of new problems confronted the services that involved both operational and political

considerations, and which forced them to take a new look at the organization of their

cryptologic structures. Of the two services, the end of hostilities brought far greater

adjustments for the Navy than for the Army. Losing its primary wartime targets, the

Navy had few COMINT tasks of any significance for its operational elements. Primarily

because of its insistence on retaining the responsibility for diplomatic communications,

the Army, however, found itselfin a much better operational position. For the first time,

the situation seemed to have evolved to the point where the services might be able to

reconcile their different concepts, without causing harm to their separate structures. By

agreeing to a realignment of cryptologic tasks and a fusion of their COMINT processing

activities, the services could resolve most of their dilemmas concerning functional tasks.

In essence, the concept of merger was becoming more attractive as an operational

necessity in order to ensure survival, rather then serving merely as an academic option for

debate.

At the same time, there existed a number of parallel developments at the national

level that also seemed to threaten the COMINT services. Confronted with the reality of

budget cuts, the services recognized that they would have to acquire new priority tasks in

order to justify the continuance of their separate organizations. Moreover, the concept of

centralization had acquired new credibility and momentum within the upper levels of the

government. There existed growing pressures, emanating from both the presidential and

congressional levels, to establish a new centralized intelligence agency and to accomplish,

MPSECRET 32

HhNBbB YI:A 69MIN'f 6HhN!lB~9Nb\"

_. -_..-==.0... ..'----- _
DOCID: 3109065

I ,.epS£CR5T

in some form, an integration of the military services. Once again, the issue for the

military organizations related directly to the question oftheir continued existence.

Because ofthese factors, the Army and Navy command authorities moved to a position

that clearly supported a merger of the COMINT services. A few days after the surrender of

the Japanese, because of budgetary retrenchment actions and the loss of the major

wartime targets, the Army and Navy command authorities clearly supported a merger of

the COMINT services. An exchange ofArmy-Navy correspondence appeared to set the stage

for accomplishing a merger action. General George C. Marshall, ChiefofStaff, U.S. Army,

in a letter of 18 August 1945 to Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations,

recommended a complete physical merger ofthe COMINT processing activities ofthe Army

and Navy.7 He proposed that the Joint Policy Board (ANCIB) study the proposals and

develop specific recommendations on "how to insure complete integration." In his

response of21 August 1945, King expressed complete agreement with Marshall. King also

noted that he had directed the Navy members of ANCIB to work with the Army

representatives in the development ofrecommendations.8

With the Marshall and King exchange, the basic decision to merge the COMINT

activities was made. All that remained was simply the matter ofdeveloping the ways and

means for executing the decision for merger. On the surface it looked simple.

Implementing the merger became the responsibility of ANCIB and its working committee,

ANCICC.

On 28 August 1945, ANCICC responded by establishing a Subcommittee on Merger

Planning (SMP). In its instructions to the SMP, ANCICC noted that the subcommittee had the

task "ofmaking recommendations in implementing the decision of General Marshall and

Admiral King that the Army, Navy intercept, cryptographic, and cryptanalytical

activities be merged underjoint direction." The ultimate objective ofthe committee was to

accomplish a prompt and complete merger ofArmy and Navy organizations in one location

underANCIB.9

One of the main tasks assigned to the committee was the selection of a site for the

consolidated COMINT operations. Because of the need for direct exchange between

producers and consumers, the committee concluded that the activity should remain in the

Washington area. ANCICC presented an analysis and comparison of the Army site at

Arlington Hall with the Naval Communications Annex (which it called the Mount Vernon

Seminary). Because of its greater potential for expansion, the committee selected

Arlington Hall as its fll'st choice for the relocation of all COMINT activities. The Arlington

Hallsite ofninety-six acres was considerably larger than the Navy site ofthirty-five acres.

In its final report of7 September 1945, however, the committee concluded that both sites

should be retained, with COMINT activities to be located at one, and communications

security activities at the other. lO

During the policy deliberations within ANCIB, Colonel Corderman, Chief, Army

Security Agency, reiterated the traditional Army position for an immediate and complete

physical merger of the two organizations. While Captain Wenger, head OfOP-20.G, fully

supported the concept of eventual consolidation, he personally espoused the view that

33

H.\NBbfl VIA GeMINi SHANNI!i~eNI:.Y

'fOP SECR!'f
DOCID: 3109065

"F9P SECRE"F

merger should be accomplished as a gradual process in order to accommodate differences

in organization and methods. These differences in approach, however, did not affect the

final report that recommended a complete merger. 11

But the situation soon changed within the Navy. The command authorities of the

Navy, supporting the traditional naval view concerning central authority, overrruled

Wenger at the eleventh hour. When ANCICC considered the final report on 12 September

1945, a new Navy submission completely nullified Wenger's earlier concurrence and

indicated that even the concept of gradual consolidation went further than the Navy was

willing to go. The Navy memorandum stated that "a full physical merger of Army and

Navy communications intelligence activities does not seem desirable to the Navy ...."

The memorandum also pointed out that "the Navy must retain complete control over all

elements of naval command, so that the Navy will be free to meet its interests, solve its

special problems ... [and] must, therefore, have complete control over its operational

intelligence.,,12

The Navy's abrupt reversal ofits earlier position brought to a complete standstill the

entire move toward consolidation. On 26 September 1945, ANCICC closed out the activities

of its Special Committee on Merger Planning and referred the matter to ANCIB for

guidance.1s ANCIB, however, had no authority to resolve the conflict between the services

and looked instead to the departmental authorities for resolution. In trying to pick up the

pieces, Marshall and King exchanged four additional letters during September and

October 1945. But the letters reflected no change of positions, as each simply reiterated

the previous position of its intelligence service, with no specific suggestions offered for

compromise.14

On 14 October 1945, King reported to James V. Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, that

he and General Marshall continued to agree that the coordination of signal intelligence

activities could be improved, but they had not achieved a solution satisfactory to both

services. King noted that both services agreed that the processing of nonmilitary and

nonnaval traffic should be jointly undertaken, but the exact manner in which this might

be accomplished remained unresolved. "The Army favors a complete merger of our

cryptanalytic units under one director," he stated, "whereas the Navy, desirous ofinsuring

its control of operational intelligence essential to naval commands, does not favor a

complete merger but would rather effectuate the desired results by joint effort under joint

direction. "15

By December 1945, however, new participants appeared on the scene. General of the

Army Dwight D. Eisenhower replaced General Marshall as ChiefofStaffofthe Army, and

Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz relieved Admiral King as ChiefofNaval Operations. In

a positive move toward solution ofthe problem, Eisenhower reopened the issue in a letter

of2 January 1946, suggesting that "we should make a fresh start on this entire subject."

Remarking about their earlier experiences as commanders ofcombined forces, Eisenhower

commented that "we both know how vital it is to resolve any differences of opinion and to

achieve complete integration as soon as possible." His proposal was very simple. He

proposed that the Army and Navy members of ANCIB should either solve the problem by

themselves or develop alternative proposalsfor decision by Eisenhower and Nimitz. UI

"F9PSECRET 34

HA NDU "I A QOUlNT QlIl.I'JNI!l1=.8 9llM."
DOCID: 3109065

Tap SEERET

Nimitz readily accepted Eisenhower's suggestion for making a fresh start on the issue

of how to integrate and coordinate the COMINT activities of the Army and Navy. As

evidence of a softening of the Navy's position, Nimitz instructed the Navy members of

ANCIB to consider the problem with open minds, free of any restrictions stemming from

earlier policy guidance. 17

With the new push from Eisenhower and Nimitz, the COMINT officials ofthe Army and

Navy began to reassess their earlier positions. In lieu of having a solution directed by

higher authority, both services obviously preferred to solve the problem at the COMINT

level. Even the monolithic Navy, after having derailed the earlier efforts toward merger,

indicated a surprising new willingness to go a!ong with the move toward consolidation. As

the spokesman for the Navy COMINTorganization, Wenger pressed again for the concept of

gradual consolidation as representing an attainable solution.is Similarly, the Army

advocates of consolidation ultimately modified their earlier position on merger and came

to acknowledge that the objective of a complete merger would have to be deferred for a

later date. Corderman, one ofthe main proponents ofmerger, had also insisted previously

that the senior joint official selected to head the merger should be identified as the

"Director" rather than "Coordinator." Before the new negotiations were over, however,

Corderman would yield on this point as well.is

The Navy resubmitted Wenger's earlier concept paper as its new bargaining position.

In effect, the naval authorities supported a position that went one step further in the move

toward consolidation but that still fell short of complete merger. The Navy officials would

support a concept described as the establishment of an "effective working partnership"

between the Army and Navy. In a modification of Wenger's earlier paper, the Navy

proposed the establishment of a new position, the Coordinator ofJoint Operations (CJO).

The CJO would not function as a czar with unlimited authority, but rather would have the

responsibility for facilitating interservice coordination and cooperation. Under the terms

of the new Navy proposal, the services would function as coordinating but independent

organizations. Some joint operations would be established, primarily on diplomatic and

other nonmilitary communications. Further, the services would ensure a continuous

cooperation and exchange of information on all other COMINT problems. Policy control of

the structure would be vested in a Joint Policy Board (ANCIB-STANCIB) that in turn would

reflect the interdepartmental authority of the chief of staff, U.S. Army, and the

commander in chief, U.S. Fleet and ChiefofNaval Operations.2o

By early 1946, the British-United States ofAmerica Agreement (BRUSA) negotiations,

initiated in 1945 to establish postwar collaboration in COMINT between the two nations,

were nearing completion. Since the concept ofBRUSA collaboration was predicated in part

on the existence of centralized controls of COMINT activities within both countries, the

approaching ratification and implementation ofthe agreement brought anew, compelling

urgency for the United States to put its own house in order. These international

considerations, coupled with the departmental pressures stemming from the EisenhowerNimitz exchange, prompted new discussions in STANCIB concerning possible ways to merge

the Army and the Navy COMINTorganizations.

On 13 February 1946, STANCICC considered at length the earlier Navy proposal for

closer cooperation of the Army-Navy communications intelligence activities.2i Moving

very quickly on the issue, on 15 February 1946, STANCIB approved in principle the

35

IbUfBI:JB VIA eeMHi'f eIIAfHfBt.S elfDY

'FOP SECRE'F
Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg

STANCIB Chairman

DOCID: 3109065

'fell SECRET

framework for a new concept ofArmy-Navy cooperation inCOMINT. The Navy's insistence

on establishing a "Joint Effort under Joint Direction" prevailed in the discussions of the

C,OMINT policy board. STANCIB accepted the framework for a new period of Army-Navy

cooperation in COMINT, based on the Navy's earlier proposal of "joint" but "separate"

COMINT activities.1l1l

The STANCIB decision ruled out the possibility of any actual merger of Army-Navy

COMINTprocessing activities. Instead, the services would now undertake new initiatives to

achieve closer cooperation on all phases ofthe COMINT process. This improved cooperation

would be achieved by establishing closer working liaison on a day-to-day basis in the

functional areas ofintercept, analysis, and reporting. Integration of technical personnel

from the opposite service would also take place - primarily on analytic problems - at

Arlington Hall and the Naval Communications Station. The new agreement, however,

pertained only to the collection and production of information from foreign

communications. It excluded such intelligence functions as estimates or the dissemination

ofCOMINT information asfinished intelligence.

The COMINT organizations would coordinate their activities but would remain totally

independent organizations. In addition to the integration of Army-Navy personnel on

certain analytic problems, STANCIB divided the Army-Navy responsibility for military and

naval targets along the traditional lines and identified the diplomatic and commercial

communications as a "joint" responsibility, to be placed under the direction of the new

Coordinator of Joint Operations. To implement this new concept of Army and Navy

cooperation, STANCIB directed the Chiefs of ASA (Army Security Agency) and OP-20·G to

draw up the details of a plan and statements of general principles governing the roles and

responsibilities ofthe services and the Coordinator ofJoint Operations.23

By approving this new concept of

"partnership," STANCIB succeeded in keeping its

efforts to reorganize the U.S. COMINT structure in

tandem with the progress of the BRUSA

negotiations. By 1946, STANCIB, although lacking

a national charter, had succeeded in positioning

itselfas the primary U.S. authority and spokesman

for policy negotiations with foreign nations on

COMINT matters. At the same time, STANCIB also

greatly enhanced its stature as the central

organization for promoting closer cooperation

between the U.S. services.

On 5 March 1946, the U.S.-U.K. representatives formally signed the British-United States

of America Agreement, which authorized

continued postwar collaboration in COMINTmatters

on a governmental basis. Lieutenant General

Hoyt S. Vandenberg, STANCIB Chairman, signed

the agreement for the United States, and Colonel

lOPS&CRE:r 36

IIhNBbB '/1.'. S9MUFi SUl.N!iBbB9NbY
."'.

_.~

DOCID: 3109065

'fePSEGR:iT

Colonel w. Preston Corderman, USA Captain Joseph N. Wenger, USN

Patrick Marr-Johnson, representing the London Signals Intelligence Board, signed for the

United Kingdom. 24 The wider collaboration established under the BRUSA Agreement

absorbed the earlier BOURBON Project, thereby terminating the separate identity and

treatment ofBOURBON-related matters.

As a follow-up to the BRUSA Agreement, a "Technical Conference" took place in London

several months later. The primary task of this conference was to develop the overall

blueprint for the development oftechnical appendices to the agreement. Over the next few

years, this initial effort resulted in the development of a number of appendices to the

BRUSA Agreement, which governed such areas as security, collection, liaison, and other

aspects ofcollaboration.25

On 22 April 1946, six weeks after ratification ofthe BRUSA Agreement, STANCIB issued

the "Joint Operating Plan" (JOP). The JOP also became known as the "Corderman-Wenger

Agreement:' named for the principal Army and Navy negotiators (Colonel W. Preston

Corderman, USA, and Captain Joseph N. Wenger, USN).26 The plan, in effect, represented a

quasi-merger of the services, confirmed the appointment of a Coordinator of Joint

Operations, and divided the COMINT problem between the Army and the Navy. As agreed

earlier within STANCIB, the plan divided the responsibility for cryptanalytic work into

three categories. The Army retained complete responsibility for the intercept and analysis

of military communications, while the Navy retained total responsibility for all naval

communications. The work on diplomatic and other communications was considered to be

a joint activity and came under the direction of the newly established Coordinator ofJoint

Operations (CJO).21

As an integral part of the plan, STANCIB approved an expansion of its own charter.

This change provided for the establishment of a fundamentally new position, the

Coordinator of Joint Operations. The new coordinator, it was hoped, would become a

driving force in unifying the COMINT structure. According to the charter, the CJO would

function in a dual capacity and under dual command lines. First, the CJO would function

37

iIA~19al!i YIlt e9Mnl'f eIlhlfffBCS 9l:fbY

'F9P 5ECRIIi:r
---- DOCID: 3109065

'f9PSECRET

as an executive for STANCIB, and thus would be responsible for directing the

implementation of STANCIB's policies and directives relating to intercept and processing

tasks, as well as for all joint projects with other U.S. and foreign intelligence agencies. In

addition to his STANCIB role, the CJO would acquire a new leadership role within the Army

and Navy COMINT structures on day-to-day operations involving joint tasks.

Organizationally, the CJO would have dual subordination lines, reporting to STANCIB as the

CJO, and to his individual service in his capacity as chief of a military COMINT

organization.28

Under the Joint Operating Plan, there were two key positions that governed the

conduct of COMINT operations. These were the CJO and the chairman of the working

committee (STANCICC) of the COMINT Policy Board (STANCIB). The chief of the Army and

Navy COMINT organizations rotated yearly as the incumbent of each position. This

rotation ofthe senior service officials gave each service a continuing and powerful voice in

the "coordination" and "policy" roles.29

The STANCIB-STANCICC structure served to facilitate resolution ofsome disagreements,

but there were still problems. The rule of unanimity still prevailed on the policy board as

well as on its working level committee. Thus, whenever STANCIB-STANCICCfailed to reach

a unanimous decision on an issue, it remained unresolved.

Colonel Harold G. Hayes,ChiefofArmy Security Agency,

first ChiefofJoint Operations

Vandenberg, as chairman of STANCIB, recommended that the first coordinator be

selected from the Army since the Army had conducted all wartime COMINT activity in the

diplomatic and commercial field. 3o Following this recommendation, STANCIB selected

Colonel Harold G. Hayes, chief of the Army Security Agency, as the first CJO on 1 May

1946. The operating chiefs of ASA and OP-20-G became responsible to Hayes for

T9PSEERET 38
DOCID: 3109065

l'9P SEEAEl'

accomplishing those tasks that he allocated to them. 31 Hayes was "to coordinate,"

however, and not "to direct." It was an important distinction.

Under the plan, the Army and the Navy maintained their independent COMINT

organizations. The Joint Operating Plan directed that the responsibility for each COMINT

problem be allotted to the Army or Navy in such a way as to prevent any duplication or

overlapping of effort. Thus each service continued to control a large percentage ofits own

intercept and processing capacities. Each service also performed "tasks of common

interest," such as work on guerrilla and weather targets. Although the CJO allocated these

tasks to the services, the actual intercept facilities remained under the tasking and control

ofthe services. The CJo, however, did control and coordinate the intercept coverage and

reporting on the "JointTasks."

The term '"joint" applied generally to all tasks not strictly Army or Navy. These tasks,

which were primarily in the areas of diplomatic and commercial traffic, represented areas

ofspecial interest to nonmilitary consumers. The CJO exercised his authority over these

tasks by establishing a committee on group structure, designed along functional lines, that

reported to him. These areas included intercept, processing, and liaison activities.32

Administratively, three subordinate groups assisted the CJO: a Joint Intercept Control

Group (JICG), a Joint Processing Allocation Group (JPAG), and a Joint Liaison Group

(JLG).33 A deputy coordinator served as the chief of each group. While the CJO was to use

existing facilities whenever feasible, each service also assigned personnel to him for his

own staffsupport. This included clerical, administrative, and analytical assistance. The

coordinator's senior assistant was from the opposite service and normally served as chiefof

the JPAG. Captain Charles A. Ford, USN, served as the first chief ofJPAG. The officer in

charge ofthe Joint Liaison Group was also from the opposite service. Commander Rufus L.

Taylor served as the first chief of the JLG under Hayes. The officer in charge of the Joint

Intercept Control Group was from the same service as the coordinator; Lieutenant Colonel

Morton A. Rubin, USA, served as first chiefofthe JICG.34

The mission of the Joint Intercept Control Group was to develop a plan for intercept

coverage that would provide intelligence of maximum value to the consumers. The JPAG

allocated processing responsibilities to the Army and Navy. As the U.S. overseer of

foreign liaison, the JLGarranged for and supervised U.S. working arrangements in COMINT

with the United Kingdom and Canada. In addition, six standing subcommittees of the

COMINT policy board served as advisory committees in the areas of intercept and direction

finding, cryptanalytic research and development, communications intelligence and

security, traffic analysis, and collateral information. In this complex structure of

functional groups and STANCICC subcommittees, the deputy coordinators ofthe groups and

chairmen ofthe STANCICC subcommittees were under the directsupervision ofthe CJO.35

Mter the establishment of the JOP in April 1946, additional organizational changes

took place affecting the STANCIB structure. After examining a draft of the BRUSA

Agreement, J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI, expressed an interest in obtaining

membership on STANCIB.38 Adding the FBI to its membership on 13 June 1946, the board

and its subordinate committee became the United States Communication Intelligence

Board (USCIB) and the United States Communication Intelligence Coordinating

Committee (uSCICC).37 When Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, assistant chief of

39

H-"~bE VIA C9MIN'FCII....NN8b8 SNI:rY

l=QP5ECRET
---.---------___c_-----==-~-------____=~___c____c_----=

DOCID: 3109065

'fap SEERE:r

staff, G-2, became the second Director ofCentral Intelligence in June 1946, USCIB agreed to

expand its membership once again by including the DCI as the representative of the newly

established Central Intelligence Group (CIG).38 (The CIGcame into existence on 22 January

1946.)

As the membership of the policy board increased, the civil agencies such as the

Department ofState, FBI, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began to participate in

the activities of USCIB and the JOP of the Army and Navy. (The National Security Act of

1947 established the CIA on 18 September 1947, superseding the CIG.) As members of

USCIB, however, they participated only as observers in the activities ofthe Joint Intercept

Control Groups and the Joint Processing Allocation Group. From 1946 to 1949, these

committees of USCIB and the CJO were the primary mechanisms available to the

intelligence consumers for expression of their intelligence priorities and specific

requirementsfor COMINT information.3ll

A major problem area for the JOPproved to be intelligence requirements. The military

services continued to handle their requirements basically on a service-to-service basis.

For example, the Army G-2 tasked the Signal Security Agency for its COMINT requirements,

with the same parallel applying to the Navy. However, the area of "joint" interests

remained poorly defined, both for military targets and for other broad targets ofinterest to

civilian agencies. Despite the organizational change in the COMINT structure, the civilian

agencies quickly recognized that they still had no real voice or representation in the

adjudication or establishment of intelligence priorities.40 Changes were taking place,

however, that would give a new prominence to the consumer role, as well as a greater

participatory role for the civilian agencies in the operations ofthe COMINTstructure.

After operating for three years under a purely interdepartmental charter, USCIB

acquired a new national charter in 1948. The new National Security Council Intelligence

Directive Number 9, "Communications Intelligence," established USCIB as a national

COMINT board reporting directly to the National Security Council rather than to the

military departments. The charter, however, was not appreciably strengthened, and still

reflected a preponderance of military membership. But the change of subordination,

coupled with the establishment ofCIA in 1947, meant that the military COMINT community

could no longer act in a totally independent manner.41

Under the JOP, the primary vehicle for the dissemination of COMINT to consumers was

the published translation or bulletin, issued in a standard format prescribed by the JPAG.42

The Army and the Navy generally issued separate bulletins on their respective military

and naval targets. Bulletins on joint-interest targets were published asjoint Army-Navy

products. Within this overall framework also existed a number of separate reporting

seriesfor major categories ofinformation such as Soviet COMINT. As provided in the BRUSA

Agreement, bulletins were exchanged with GCHQ.43

The creation of the JOP marked the introduction of major changes involving producer

and consumer relationships. These changes provided the consumers with greatly

expanded technical information in COMINT reporting and granted them greater access to

COMINT activities. At its 30th meeting, 27 April 1948, USCIB approved a CIA request for

greater access to COMINTactivities." This decision authorized all ofthe consumer agencies

to receive raw translations and other unfinished products considered necessary for the

:rep SECRET 40

Ii 6 NQI.l1lJ1A S9MIl*TSlh'.!UFBI:iS9N&'l

---. --------------
DOCID: 3109065

Tap SEERET

fulfillment oftheir mission ofproducing finished intelligence. In addition, consumers now

had the option of placing indoctrinated representatives within the COMINT production

organizations ofthe Army and the Navy. The ground rules governing these relationships

required that specific arrangements be worked out in each case, primarily through

working-level contacts or through the service COMINT authorities. Lacking resolution via

these channels, the consumer still had the option of referring the matter to USCIB for

further consideration.

During this period, any evaluative process or further dissemination ofCOMINT became

the responsibility of each consumer. Generally, the agencies accomplished this by

collating the COMINT with other intelligence information and by preparing special fusion

reports containing both COMINT and other intelligence sources. Since most of the USCIB

members prepared their own community-wide reports, this resulted in a wide variety of

publications. These included a daily "Diplomatic Summary" published by the Department

ofState; the Army's "Military Digest" and the Navy's "Soviet Intelligence Summary," both

issued weekly; and various otherspecial reports issued by the Army, Navy, and CIA.45

To assist the agencies in their evaluation ofCOMINT, the Army-Navy COMINTbulletins

included specific data related to the origins of intercept. The bulletins included the

identification of the transmitting radio circuit as well as the identification of the

cryptographic system used. In addition, the consumers, on request, could receive raw

translations and other unfinished COMINT products that they considered necessary for

their own evaluation.48 Each consumer also prepared its own estimates. This often

resulted in a number of different intelligence estimates on anyone subject - with no

organization producing a consolidated estimate. Thus, the difficulties associated with

centralization ofthe COMINT organizations extended to the entire intelligence process, and

to the consumer membership ofUSCIB such as CIA, State, Army, Navy, and Air Force.

In summary, in response to growing national pressures, and as a principal means of

achieving closer interservice cooperation, the COMINT services established a joint

operating agreement rather than undertake a merger of their separate COMINT

organizations. The mechanics ofthis new alliance called for a collocation ofthe Army and

Navy COMINTprocessing activities in the United States, as well asfor major organizational

changes in their collection and reporting tasks. The move to establish joint service

operations reflected a realization of their increasing interdependence as well as of the

inevitability ofstill further changes in the management of COMINT resources. While the

services remained organizationally independent, the joint operating agreement called for

the introduction ofa totally new managerial concept for the services, namely, operating on

the basis of"shared" control over COMINT resources.

Because of the magnitude of the governmental changes from 1946 to 1949, the JOP

represented a period of great adjustment for the COMINT services, as well as for the entire

intelligence community. At a time when the services and Congress were still debating the

unification issue, the creation ofthe JOP occurred harmoniously and by mutual agreement

olthe Army and Navy. By collocating and integrating their COMINTprocessing centers at

Arlington Hall and the Naval Security Station, the JOP achieved a level of interservice

cooperation never previously accomplished by any military organization.

41

IIAfiBbB VIA eSMIN'f eIIAfifiBbS S!fbY

MPSECRET
DOCID: 3109065

'f6'SEEREl

The concept of the JOP was very simple. It called for the services to act as coordinated

but independent agencies. In developing the blueprint for the JOP, the primary objective

was to devise a structure that by its very nature would promote greater cooperation and

dialogue between the military COMINT organizations. At the same time, Army and Navy

authorities insisted on maintaining their separate identities and organizations. In the

implementation, some elements of the reform process proved to be highly effective as the

services actually began to cooperate on COMINT matters. The plan was seriously flawed,

however, as it stemmed from a proliferation of military command lines and created a rash

of new bureaucratic channels requiring coordination. For example, the CJO functioned

under dual subordination, reporting to USCIB as the CJO, and to his individual service as

the chief of a military COMINT organization. This dichotomy of authority proved to be not

only conceptually unsound, but detrimental to the timeliness ofCOMINT operations.

Another organizational drawback of the JOP structure was that it called for a large

committee structure to work on functional matters ofan operational nature, and to operate

under the aegis of the CJO. While these committees soon became pivotal coordination

points, they also became representative of a "management by committee" syndrome with

all the traditional weaknesses of a committee process, such as procedural delays and the

inability to make timely decisions.

In a more positive vein, however, the JOPmerits high marks for some very significant

accomplishments. Considering the innate service opposition to the concept of merger of

their COMINTprocessing activities, it was a major achievement that the services agreed to

adopt a concept ofcollocation and integration ofany kind. By establishing a form of quasiconsolidation, and operating on the principle of gradual change, the JOP constituted a

compromise. It provided a logical transitional structure for the services as they entered

the postwar period. In addition, the JOP accomplished sweeping organizational changes for

the services, such as realignments ofoperational elements, personnel, and mission without

causing a catastrophic upheaval oftheir operational missions and functions.

By achieving a nominal degree of centralization of U.S. COMINT efforts, the JOP

facilitated the ratification of the BRUSA Agreement. Without this tightening of controls

over the Army and Navy COMINT activities, the BRUSA Agreement would not have been

attainable, as it implicitly called for greater centralized control ofCOMINT activities within

both nations.

Operationally, the JOP facilitated the realignment of U.S. COMINT targets for

peacetime, including the assumption of a new national target, coverage of the Soviet

Union. It also gave formal recognition, for the first time, to the growing intelligence

interests and requirements ofthe nonmilitary members ofthe intelligence community. It

established a new category of intercept targets, known as "joint" interest targets, which

included diplomatic, commercial, and other targets of broad national interest. By

assigning the responsibility for joint targets to the CJO, the JOP ended the long-standing

controversy over which service should have the primary responsibility for the intercept

and processing of diplomatic communications. This action became a very significant

milestone, as it completely removed any connotation of military "ownership" ofdiplomatic

targets. The targets, in effect, became targets of interest to the entire community, and

came under the management and control ofUSCIB, via the CJO.

1'9PSECREl 42

IIANBbS YIA ElSMl!ff 811A!iNSbB StibY
DOCID: 3109065

l:OP SE(;AET

Finally, by virtue ofthe cosmetic fusion of the two services via the JOP, the Army and

Navy COMINT organizations were largely able to survive the chaotic period of

demobilization and budget reductions following the war. Despite heavy attrition, these

two organizations maintained a solid operational base, along with a cadre of professional

talent, for the next cycle ofreorganization.

-----,._---

43

IIftliBbEl VIA G9Mni~ GIIfdHiElbB 9~ibY

l'9P SEeIU!T
DOCID: 3109065

1'9PSECRET

Chapter III

The Emerging National Intelligence Structure and the

United States Communications Intelligence Board,

1946-1949

The period 1946-1949 marked the beginning of efforts at both the presidential and

congressional levels to view intelligence matters as a national responsibility. As a first

step toward the centralization of U.S. intelligence activities, in 1946 President Truman

established a National Intelligence Authority (NIA) and a Central Intelligence Group (CIG).

One year later, in the summer of 1947, Congress passed the National Security Act, which

resulted in a further realignment of the national intelligence structure. This landmark

legislation disestablished the NIA and CIG and created a National Security Council and a

Central Intelligence Agency. The act also provided for a Secretary of Defense and a

realignment ofthe U.S. defense organization. These changes were only the beginning.1

The COMINT structure felt the impact of these changes almost immediately. By 1948

the United States Communications Intelligence Board had a new official charter that

made it subordinate to the National Security Council. This was the result of a series of

controversies over the jurisdiction of COMINT issues. The participants in making these

changes were James V. Forrestal, Secretary of Defense; Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter,

DCI; Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary, NSC; and the members of USCIB,

Army, Navy, State Department, and the FBI. The main battle was fought over what

organization should "control" USCIB, as well as the various components of the COMINT

structure. This was essentially decided when the National Security Council issued USCIB's

new charter in 1948.

As an agency of the NSC, USCIB now acquired a greatly enhanced policy role in the

intelligence community. In addition, the new charter recognized that the civilian agencies

had a vital part to play in the development of national intelligence policy and in the

establishment of national intelligence priorities. A review of the debates during the

reform process strikingly illustrates the major changes in the U.S. intelligence structure

and USCIB. It also shows the sharp divisions that existed among the members of the

intelligence agencies.

At the end ofthe Second World War, there existed no semblance ofunified control over

the conduct ofU.S. COMINTactivities- nor was there any external body that had sufficient

authority to provide guidance and direction to the extremely powerful military COMINT

structure. The primary management controls over the COMINT functions came from three

sources, namely, USCIB, and the headquarters of the Army and Navy COMINT

organizations. A creation ofthe military departments, USCIB served as the nominal policy

authority for COMINT matters, while the military departmental authorities provided a

number ofinternal controls relating primarily to administrative and budgetary matters.

45

I1A:NBbiil VIA eSMUi'f eU{.Nti&1:S 9til>rY

T8PSECREf
------------------------------

DOCID: 3109065

,wi'iiC:R&:r

James V.Forrestal,

First Secretary ofDefense, 1947-1949

Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter

Director ofCentralIntelligence

lap SEeREl 46

Admiral Sidney W. Souers

Executive Secretary, NSC

Mt:~n}J:.8 \tIt: 89MHf'F 8IIAUUel::iS 6NLT
DOCID: 3109065

T9PSECRET

By 1946, USCIB'S membership included representation from the Army, the Navy, the

FBI, the Department of State, and the CIG. Because of the dual representation accorded

each service, the Army and Navy played dominant roles in the activities of USCIB and its

many subcommittees. For example, the assistant chief ofstaff, 0.2, and the Commanding

Officer, Army Security Agency, represented the Army. The assistant chief of staff for

Intelligence, U.S. Fleet, and the Director of Naval Communications provided

representation for the Navy. Each had a vote; the other members of USCIB - FBI, State, and

the CIG- had only one representative and one vote each.2

During this early period, the Army provided coverage of the intelligence interests of

the Army Air Force. In May 1947, however, the Army Air Force obtained its own separate

representation. On 7 May 1947, USCIB invited the commanding general, Army Air Force,

to appoint representatives to USCIB and to its subordinate committee, the U.S.

Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee (USCICC). On 29 May 1947, the

Army Air Force designated Major General George C. McDonald, assistant chief of staff,

Army Air Force, as its representative to USCIB. Brigadier General Francis L.

Ankenbrandt, communications officer, Army Air Force, became the representative to

USCICC.3

USCIB's early charter of 31 July 1946 stated that USCIB would meet only to decide

questions of major policy or to consider matters that its working committee, USCICC, could

not resolve.4 Procedurally, USCIB elected its own ch~irman, usually the senior member,

who served for one year. It met at the will ofthe chairman, or subject to the concurrence of

a majority, and the request of any member. The rule of un~nimity governed both USCIB

and USCICC discussions. When agreement could not be reached, the only option was to

refer the matter to higher authority within the members' departmental organizations. In

short, USCIB functioned solely in the capacity of providing guidance and coordination for

the services, which they were free to accept or reject.5

Despite the limited nature of its founding document, the Marshall and King

Agreement of 1945, USCIB achieved considerable progress as the self-appointed authority

for COMINT matters. By expanding its membership to include the FBI, State Department,

and the CIG, USCIB had become a joint military and civilian board, with increasing

involvement in the activities of the entire U.S. COMINT structure. Unfortunately, the

governing documentation of USCIB had not kept pace with the scope of its activities. The

documentation relating to membership changes was reflected only in the

interdepartmental correspondence and in the subsequent updates of the USCIB

Organizational Bulletin. The actual enabling document remained unchanged with no

attempts made to amend or to reissue the document at a higher level to reflect the broader

role and responsibilities ofUSClB.6

Within the government, the nature of the intelligence process itself tended to foster

the continuing independence, if not isolation, of the military COMINT activities. Long

before Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, the services traditionally handled communications

intelligence, as well as all matters related to the COMINT process, as extremely sensitive

information, releasable only by a strict interpretation of the "need-to-know" principle.

The advent of World War II reinforced this well-established practice as the dual

requirement for secrecy and anonymity of organizations intensified. Even within the

47

IIh~TBhB YIlt S9MIN~ SII"'~T~TBhB 9~Thy

MP 5ECRE'f
------------------------------- - ._-

DOCID: 3109065

TerSi:(RET

COMINT structure itself, ULTRA and MAGIC materials, for example, were always strictly

guarded and controlled, with only a very limited number of people being aware of these

sources and their origins.7 Distribution was made only to an authorized list of recipients,

which included key military commanders and a few top officials of the Armed Forces, the

FBI, and the Department ofState.

These dual factors - the rigorous compartmentation practices and the absence of any

dominant central authority - tended to foster an atmosphere ofindependence and isolation

among the services. Except for administrative and budgetary guidance provided by their

own departmental authorities, the Army and Navy COMINT organizations generally

remained sheltered from critical review by external authority. They continued to be free

agents and made their own decisions concerning their intelligence priorities and intercept

coverage. When the USCIB became more ~ctive in these areas, itsoon found itselfpowerless

to direct the COMINT activities, primarily because ofthe inherent weaknesses of the USCIB

charter and the military domination of the structure. As a result, the services generally

encouraged and facilitated continuation of the status quo, thereby assuring themselves of

almost complete freedom ofaction in the running ofthe COMINT business.

The same amorphous situation applied to general intelligence collection as well. No

single organization had the overall authority and responsibility for the oversight of

matters relating to the collection, analysis, and dissemination of all-source intelligence

information; nor did any central organization exist with authority over the many and

diverse producers of intelligence information. Each military department had its own

intelligence branch and producing elements, as did the Departments ofJustice, Treasury,

andState.8

Long before V-E and V-J Days, considerable discussion and debate took place within the

Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military departments, as well as in State and the FBI,

concerning the organization and nature of the U.S. intelligence gathering apparatus for

the postwar period.9 By the fall of 1945, President Truman, known to favor a concept of

centralized control, had already received several proposals for the establishment of a

peacetime intelligence structure. He had drafts from the War Department, the Joint

Chiefs ofStaff, the Office ofStrategic Services, the two military services, the Bureau ofthe

Budget, and the Department of State. A number of these plans, primarily from the

military organizations, recommended the establishment ofa single centralized agency, but

differed considerably on the designation ofthe controlling authorities. Proposals from the

Department of State and the Bureau of the Budget generally recommended a status quo

approach that would permit the intelligence offices of all departments to remain

independent agencies, with no centralized agency to be established. Under this concept,

however, there would exist a number of advisory committees to assist a National

Intelligence Authority in providing guidance to the intelligence activities of the various

departments.to

Within a few months, Truman acted to centralize the intelligence structures. In a

letter dated 22 January 1946 to the Secretaries ofState (James F. Byrnes), War (Robert P.

Patterson), and Navy (James V. Forrestal), Truman established a National Intelligence

Authority (NIA) and ordered the secretaries to establish a Central Intelligence Group. 11

One day later, Truman appointed Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, the deputy chief of

19P5ECRET 48

IIANBbB YIA El8MUPf 8I1A!f!'fl!lbS 8!iJ:.\·
DOCID: 3109065 'fep SECRE'f

Naval Intelligence, as the director ofthe CIG, and the first Director ofCentral Intelligence

(DCI).

The membership of the NIA consisted of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and

the president's personal representative, Rear Admiral William D. Leahy, his chief of

staff.12 Based on the presidential directive, its mission was to ensure "that all Federal

foreign intelligence activities are planned, developed and coordinated so as to assure the

most effective accomplishment ofthe intelligence mission related to the national security."

Truman further directed the secretaries "to assign persons and facilities from your

respective organizations, which persons shall collectively form a Central Intelligence

Group and shall, under the direction of a Director of Central Intelligence, assist the

National Intelligence Authority.,,13

The initial CIG was a unique structure. It had no assets or resources of its own. As a

"collective interdepartmental group," it operated within the limits of the resources

provided by the State, War, and Navy Departments. As an interdepartmental

coordinating group, the CIG was responsible for planning and coordinating the

government's intelligence activities and for evaluating and disseminating intelligence.

Because of its limited charter and its limited resources, the CIG proved to be an interim,

ineffective structure. However, by the mere establishment of the CIG, Truman had

succeeded in setting in place the initial framework for the development of a centralized

intelligence structure.

In addition, Truman's letter directed the establishment of the first postwar

Intelligence Advisory Board (lAB), which served in an advisory capacity to the DCI. The

lAB'S membership consisted of representatives from the principal military and civilian

agencies ofthe government that had functions related to national security, as determined

by the National Intelligence Authority. The initial membership from the four

departmental intelligence services consisted of Colonel Alfred McCormack, USA, State;

Lieutenant General Hoyt Vandenberg, Army; Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Navy; and

Brigadier General George C. McDonald, Air Force.14

Eighteen months later, still further changes took place at the national level, all of

which greatly strengthened the initial presidential efforts toward centralization.

Following months of intense debate by congressional and departmental authorities over

the nature ofAmerica'ssecurity and defense force, Congress passed and President Truman

signed into law the National Security Act of1947 on 26 July 1947.15

With.the passage of the National Security Act, also known as the Unification Bill,

Congress abolished the National Intelligence Authority and its operating component, the

Central Intelligence Group. In their place, the National Security Act established the

National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency. Among other things, the

Act created a National Military Establishment (NME) and three coequal departments of

the Army, Navy, and Air Force within the Defense Department. It also established the

United States Air Force, a War Council, and a Research and Development Board.16

The mission of the newly established National Security Council was to serve in an

advisory capacity to the president in matters concerning the integration of domestic,

foreign, and military policy. Its permanent membership consisted of the president, vice

49

I1AnBbB 'ilA e8Mfn'f eIlAnNt!lbS 8NM.'

-------- --_.._---_. --.

"F8P SECRET
...........

DOCID: 3109065

'FQp§ECRET

PresidentTruman signing amendments to the

National Security Act of 1947

president, the Secretary of State (Dean G. Acheson), Secretary of Defense (James V.

Forrestal), and the chairman, National Resources Board. Optional attendees, depending

upon the subject matter, were the secretaries and under secretaries of other executive

departments and the military departments, the chairman ofthe Munitions Board, and the

chairman, Research and Development Board.17 The initial membership of the NSC did not

include the DCI.

The effect of the National Security Act of 1947 on the direction and organization of

COMINT activities was not at first discernible. Under the act, the National Security

Council (NSC) received the broad mission of advising the president on matters of policy

concerning national security. The new CIA, headed by the DCI, acquired a statutory base,

and became an independent agency under the NSC. This new intelligence agency had the

stated responsibility for correlating, evaluating, and disseminating national intelligence;

for rendering intelligence services to other agencies; and for advising the NSC in

intelligence matters. 18 Under this vague charge, however, the relationship ofthe CIA to the

T9PSECRET 50

iii A :~l'In.1i: lilA SQMII'l'f SIIAIOU!ib8 e~fh¥
Major General Roy H. Lynn, USAF

-- - --- ---------------------

DOCID: 3109065

19P5ECREl"

COMINT-producing agencies remained

obscure. It would be many years before

CIA would assume its full responsibilities

as initially conceived in the National

Security Act.

From a military perspective,

however, the National Security Act of

1947 had an immediate impact on the

COMINT community. After the establishment of a separate Department of the Air

Force, the Army Security Agency (ASA)

continued to provide COMINT support and

other support services to the Air Force on

a transitional and interim basis. On 3

June 1948, ASA established an Air Force

Security Group (AFSG) as a unit within its

own Plans and Operations Staff. The

AFSG, composed exclusively of Air Force

personnel, operated as an Army element

on an interim basis, with the mission of

assisting the Air Force in its gradual

assumption of COMINT responsibilities.

By January 1949, following the approval

by the Secretary of Defense of an Army

and Air Force Agreement, the Army

transferred personnel, facilities, and

missions to the new Air Force Security

Service (AFSS). This transfer included the

personnel of three Radio Squadrons

Mobile (lst, 2nd, and 8th) and of the

136th Radio Security Detachment. On 1

February 1949, Colonel Roy H. Lynn,

USAF, became the first commander of the

USAFSS. 19

USCIB also changed and became much more active in COMINT matters. Two months

after the passage of the National Security Act, USCIB began to hold regular monthly

meetings. This action came about mainly at the urging of Admiral Earl Stone, one of the

Navy members ofUSCIB, at the 21st meeting of USCIB on 4 November 1947. At the same

meeting, Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, who became the third DCIon 1 May 1947,

raised the issue of USCIB's outdated charter. He commented that the existing

interdepartmental charter in the form of an agreement by Marshall and King did not

include the more recent members of USCIB - the CIA and the Department of State.

Hillenkoetter, obviously eager to use his new departmental authority, pressed for the

issuance of a higher-level charter to be issued in the form of an Executive Order by the

president. Following Hillenkoetter's urging, USCIB directed its subordinate committee,

51 l'9P5EERET
DOCID: 3109065

TGFSECitET

USCICC, to examine the question of the proposed charter and to prepare several alternate

versions. 20

No disagreement existed among the military services on the need for a new charter.

They recognized that USCIB had been performing as a national-level structure, but without

the benefit of a charter commensurate with the scope ofits activities and responsibilities.

In the area offoreign collaboration in particular, they considered that USCIB needed a more

authoritative charter because of the growing U.S. involvement in foreign COMINT

relationships. When General Vandenberg signed the BRUSA Agreement for USCIB in 1946,

he did so only after receiving prior approval ofthe agreement from Admiral Leahy, chief of

staff, to President Truman. 21 Consequently, the Army, Navy, and Air Force

representatives enthusiastically supported the view that USCIB's authority should stem

from a national-level issuance rather than from the existing military documentation.

Despite the apparent agreement, the task would not be accomplished easlIy. Many

jurisdictional and political problems now surfaced, the foremost of which related to the

basic question of"control.,,22

During this period, a membership change also took place in USCIB. In November 1947,

the FBI voluntarily withdrew from the USCIB. In his letter of withdrawal, J. Edgar Hoover

noted that "USCIB's discussions have been primarily concerned with methods of policy

formulation within the Armed Services." At the 21st Meeting of USCIB, however, the

remaining members expressed the view that as a practical matter, the FBI was

withdrawing from the cryptanalytic field primarily because ofa lack offunds.23

Since the FBI had never been a very active participant in the activities of USCIB, its

withdrawal had no immediate impact on the intensity of the charter discussions. The

representatives of the State Department and the CIA continued to play the major role in

representing the "civilian" interests in the USCIB deliberations. The representatives of

State, in particular, were consistently articulate and persuasive in the presentation of

their positions. Their position, however, was not always predictable, as they frequently

joined the military members in opposition to CIA efforts to acquire greater control of all

intelligence operations.U

The competing interests of the board's military and civilian membership occupied

center stage in the USCIB deliberations. Each group pressed for the supremacy of its own

interests in the realignment of the COMINT policy board and in the competition for scarce

COMINT resources. The battle lines reflected the JCS interests in military intelligence as

opposed to the interests of the State Department and the new CIA in diplomatic and other

nonmilitary categories of intelligence information.25 The controversy over the proposed

new USCIB charter continued for the next seven months. The basic issues were (1) what

organization should be the parent body ofUSCIB and (2) what should be the role of USClB -

should it control or coordinate the national communications intelligence effort?

On the rust issue, the parent body OfUSCIB, the Navy, the State Department, and the

DCI, preferred that the NSC or the Secretary of Defense have overall supervision. The

Army and the Air Force favored the JCS as the ultimate authority. A compromise,

originally suggested by the Navy, and later proposed formally by the State Department,

was the creation of a "Committee of Four" as an appellate body for USCIB. Such a

T8PSECRET 52 u ....:trQbl!l ',tIl: El9MUi'l' ElIlAN!iBbB SUM:
DOCID: 3109065

;OPSEERE'f

committee would be composed ofthe three service Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretary

ofState. USCIB accepted this proposal on 3 February 1948.28

On the second issue, whether USCIB should control or coordinate intelligence activities,

there was a wide divergence of views.among the members ofUSClB. At the USCIB meeting

of6 January 1948, the members analyzed at length the nature ofUSCIB'S political power

over COMINT. Navy officials supported the view of the DCI and State that USCIB should

exercise control authority over COMINT because ofthe national aspects ofthe COMINT effort.

They uniformly identified the COMINT function as representing an intelligence resource of

national potential rather than one of purely military interest. They further believed that

the services had failed in their efforts to improve interservice coordination, and they

strongly favored granting USCIB control offacilities assigned to common interest targets.

Hillenkoetter even insisted that "COMINT agencies are military units in a limited sense

because the civilian departments and agencies have an equal interest in the COMINT

product.,,27 Hence, it was a national resource and should be controlled by USCIB.

While the Navy strongly opposed the centralization of COMINT resources, it moved in

the other direction in terms of how the COMINT policy board should be subordinated. For

example, during the preliminary U.S. actions associated with the BRUSA Agreement of

1945, the Navy expressed concern in STANCIB meetings about the limited scope and

questionable legality ofthe STANCIB charter, particularly in the area offoreign relations.

Similarly, in recognition of the unique intelligence requirements of the CIA and the

Department of State, the Navy had cited the need for a neutral, national forum to allocate

intelligence priorities. In effect, the Navy had consistently argued for a stronger USCIB to

reflect national interests. Considering the centralization ofintelligence resources and the

subordination ofUSCIB to be two separate issues, the Navy never considered its position on

these issues to be contradictory.

The Army and Air Force members OfUSCIB, however, were equally adamant in their

opposition to any arrangement that would give USCIB primary control over COMINT

functions. They objected to placing USCIB, with its civilian members, in a chain of

command between the military authorities and their operating COMINT agencies.

Nevertheless, the Army and Air Force supported a lesser coordinating role for USCIB, with

the primary control over the COMINT activities remaining in each department and agency.

In fact, the Army officials preferred to dilute the authority of USCIB even further. They

suggested that the role of the board should be confined to establishing intelligence

priorities, with a coordinator functioning under the jurisdiction ofthe Joint Chiefs ofStatT.

The JCS would handle the allocation ofcryptanalytic tasks and intercept coverage.28

On 3 February 1948, the board tentatively defined its role as being one of providing

"authoritative coordination" rather than "unified direction."29 In essence, the board

adopted a modified Army and Navy position. As established under the earlier Army-Navy

operating agreement, there would be a Coordinator of Joint Operations, but he would

continue to operate under the direction OfUSCIB rather thanJCs.30

At the same meeting, USCIB accepted a draft Executive Order and a draft revision ofits

charter. The board then established a rigorous method for approval. It stipulated that the

draft documents be forwarded to the chief ofintelligence of each member organization for

discussion. The DCI had the responsibility for clearing the documents with the Secretary of

53

M".~19Ul YIA GQMItl'l' GIIA~1~lKL8 QNL¥

'F9PSECRET
---~---- -~-

DOCID: 3109065

Ter Si:EAE:r

Defense. When everyone had approved the drafts, a master memorandum would be signed

by the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the

Navy, and Secretary of the Air Force. This memorandum, in turn, would then be

transmitted to the DCI for presentation to Admiral Leahy, who in turn was to present it to

the president.Sl

In his 13 February 1948 response to the three service secretaries, Secretary of Defense

Forrestal dramatically rejected the proposed documents. He felt strongly that the use of

an Executive Order was not necessary and that in accordance with the National Security

Act of 1947, USCIB should be subordinate to the National Security Council and that the NSC

was the proper office to provide direction to the board.s2 His memorandum caused

considerable anguish within the military structure as the JCS, Army, and Air Force

expressed a strong disagreement with the direction ofthe guidance. They believed that a

military structure and not a joint board such as NSC should be the primary voice in the

control of USCIB activities. The Navy, however, did not have any problem with the

proposal. From the outset of the discussions the Navy viewed COMINT as a national

resource and endorsed the placement ofUSCIB under the NSC.ss

Before the dispute was finally settled, Forrestal and Hillenkoetter played major roles

in shaping USCIB's new charter. Hillenkoetter pressed for a more important role for CIA, for

CIA control of the COMINT function, and for the placement of USCIB under the National

Security Council. Forrestal, despite his role as the Secretary of Defense, also clearly

preferred that the USCIB not be placed in a s~bordinate position to the military structure.

He consistently advocated that there should be some sort of a direct relationship between

USCIB and the NSC. He believed that these were national functions and therefore

demanded a correlation with a national authority representing all elements of the

government. Forrestal's concepts on this point paralleled the Navy's views as well as those

of Admiral Souers, the first DCI, now serving as the Executive Secretary of the National

Security Council.

Forrestal's opposition to the use of an Executive Order for promulgation of the USCIB

charter apparently stemmed in part from earlier instructions he had received from

President Truman. Truman wanted to minimize the number of requests for presidential

orders- on the premise that the establishment ofthe National Security Council had as one

ofits main purposes the removal ofthis onus from the chiefexecutive.34

Irritated over the lack of progress in issuing USCIB's charter, the Secretary of Defense

addressed a second and final memorandum to Hillenkoetter on 17 March 1948. Forrestal

stressed that he had not changed his mind since his original memorandum and that the

DCI should get on with the business of providing USCIB with its new charter. Forrestal's

main objective was to achieve the placement of USCIB under the NSC. The wording of

Forrestal's memorandum left no doubt that the charter would ultimately appear in one of

the regular National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCID).35

With Forrestal's memorandum, the level and intensity ofthe debate changed. Assured

of the backing of Forrestal, CIA redrafted the charter to give the DCI greatly expanded

authority and control. This second draft would have established USCIB under the NSC to

effect "authoritative coordination and unified direction" of COMINT activities and to advise

the DCI in matters relating to the protection of COMINT sources and "those matters in the

T8PSEEAE:r 54

IIJdfBLE r;b\ eSMIU'f 8I1ANfllU.s QfTb¥
DOCID: 3109065

19P5ECRET

field of communication intelligence for which he is now responsible or may hereafter be

responsible."36 When the Navy member objected to the DCI exercising "unified direction"

over COMINT activities and to the broad extension of the DCI role to "matters for which he

may hereafter be made responsible," Hillenkoetter acquiesced and modified his draft.37

His new proposal established USCIB under the NSC and authorized it to act for the NSC,

under the principle of unanimity (except in electing a chairman by majority vote), in

carrying out its responsibility for "authoritative coordination" (but not "unified direction")

ofCOMINT activities. It also stated that the board would advise the DCI in "those matters in

the field ofCOMINT for which he is responsible.,,38 At the 31st Meeting ofUSCIB on 13 May

1948, USCIB approved the redraft with only minor editorial amendments.39 On 18 May

1948, the DCI forwarded the proposed directive to the executive secretary ofthe NSC.

But the struggle was far from being over. Admiral Sidney W. Souers, executive

secretary, NBC, returned the draft to Hillenkoetter for reconsideration and further

discussion. Souers, who had served as the first DCI, suggested the strengthening ofthe role

and authority of the DCI. In particular, he sought to establish the DCI as the predominant

authority in USCIB.4o

Mter receiving the comments from the NSC, Hillenkoetter withdrew his concurrence of

the earlier USCIB version. Hillenkoetter now had two powerful supporters - Forrestal, who

insisted that USCIB be subordinated to the NSC, and Souers, the former DCI, who urged that

the role of the DCI should be greatly strengthened in terms of its relationship with USCIB.

Combining these elements, Hillenkoetter developed a third and final draft that would

dramatically change the nature ofUSCIB.41

A central element ofthis revision was the downgrading of USCIB to serve in the role of

advisor and assistant to the DCI. As the designated agent of the NSC, the DCI would now

become not only the coordinator of COMINT activities, but the overseer as well. In the

process, the DCI would also acquire the responsibility for executing all NSC directives. In

short, the revision reflected a substantive change ofpolicy as it would change the nature of

the USCIB structure, and it would give to a non-military agency a position of coordination

and control in the field ofmilitary departmental intelligence.f2

Because of Hillenkoetter's reliance on Forrestal, the service intelligence chiefs felt

powerless about the new developments. The Army and Air Force were particularly upset

with the concept ofCIA's controlling the shaping ofthe charter and the attachment of USCIB

to the National Security Council. Although the service intelligence chiefs strongly

opposed the new charter draft, they failed to make any headway against it. The civilian

service secretaries (Army, Kenneth C. Royall; Navy, John L. Sullivan; Air Force, W.

Stuart Symington) were reluctant to confront Forrestal after he had stated his views ofthe

USCIB charterso forcefully and unequivocally.43

Hillenkoetter's third draft, which greatly strengthened the DCI role over the board,

went too far. It evoked strong opposition from almost everyone. The Department of State,

in the person ofW. Park Armstrong, Jr., became the spokesman for this new opposition. In

a memorandum to all the members of USCIB of 7 June 1948, Armstrong protested that the

draft reverted to a viewpoint previously considered objectionable by the Department

55 19P §&eRi:r
DOCID: 3109065

l"BP !iEEOREl"

ofState and that "it contravened, misconstrued,

and overlooked many fundamental principles

requisite to a secure and efficient utilization of

communications intelligence by the United

States Government." Armstrong objected to the

DCI becoming the national authority and

coordinator for COMINT activities. He also

argued against the parallel downgrading of

USCIB to the status of a mere advisory

mechanism, existing solely for the benefit of the

DCI. He maintained further that no

consideration ever justified giving the DCI a

position of primary control over departmental

intelligence. Armstrong stressed that it was

unnecessary under the law and militarily

unsound to place the head of a nonmilitary

agency in control of strictly military functions

that were vitally important to the military

departments and that were integrated within

the military commands. Armstrong's

memorandum insisted on the reinstatement of

the earlier version in the second draft of 13 May

1948 as unanimously accepted by USCIB and the

w. Park Armstrong,Jr. Intelligence Advisory Council (lAC).'"

In retrospect, the role played by Armstrong on the USCIB was highly unusual.

Armstrong's position was contrary to the normal pattern in which the State Department

usually joined forces with the CIA in opposition to the military control ofCOMINT activities.

Although the State Department was indeed generally unhappy with the military direction

of COMINT activities, it now became alarmed about the obvious CIA ambitions to acquire

direct control of all intelligence. This resulted in Armstrong's forming a most unusual

alliance with the military members in opposition to the DCI. State's position was quite

clear. If USCIB needed a new national charter, State preferred the status quo to DCI

domination. Major changes in the military structure would have to come later.

Following the vigorous protest by Armstrong, Hillenkoetter, as directed by USCIB,

submitted a summary report ofall viewpoints on 7 June 1948 to the executive secretary of

the NSC.4l1 With the Secretary of State now a member of the NSC, and with the other

members of USCIB unanimously opposed to the third revision, it became clear that the DCI

(who was not a member of the NSC) had lost the battle. In its deliberations, the NSC

approved the earlier version endorsed by USCIB.

The National Security Council on 1 July 1948 issued NSCID No.9, "Communications

Intelligence." This directive was a major organizational turning point for USCIB and the

newly established DCI. USCIB now had an official national charter that linked its

subordination to the National Security Council. The charter also reflected another

extremely significant change. It accorded a new status and prominence to the civilian

agencies on the board, namely, the DCI and the Department ofState.46

"F9P5&CA&T 56

IIltNBl:iF.l VIA eaMIPi'f eUANfifBf::S 6Nf::"f
DOCID: 3109065

,epSEEMl

Si.nce the FBI had voluntarily dropped out of USCIB earlier, the new board was

reorganized with two representatives from each armed service, two representatives from

the Department ofState, and two from the CIA. Except for the election ofa chairman based

on majority vote, decisions of USCIB continued to require the unanimous vote of all

members. Otherthan establishing a basic change in its subordination, the new charter did

not strengthen the authorities and responsibilities of USCIB. USCIB had "authoritative

coordination" not "direction or control" over all COMINT activities.

In summary, the period 1946-1949 marked the beginning of efforts to establish a new

central mechanism for the handling national security matters, including unification ofthe

armed forces. With PresidentTruman serving as a focal point, these efforts resulted in the

enactment of the National Security Act of 1947, which created a new hierarchy for

handling of national security and intelligence matters. The act established a National

Security Council to serve in an advisory capacity to the president, and a Central

Intelligence Agency to be headed by a Director ofCentral Intelligence, who reported to the

president. The act also directed a major realignment ofthe military structure.

The first impact ofthese new authorities on the COMINT world took place in USCIB. DCI

Hillenkoetter, with strong support from Secretary Forrestal, succeeded in obtaining a

revision of the charter for USCIB. On 1 July 1948, the National Security Council issued

National Security Council Intelligence Directive Number 9, a new charter for USCIB that

subordinated USCIB to the NSC rather than to the military authorities. This provided

positive recognition to the growing concept that intelligence matters had broader

ramifications than those of purely military connotations or interests. The civil agencies,

such as State Department and the CIA, now had a new status and voice in a forum

previously dominated by the military organizations.

Forrestal supported Hillenkoetter on the subordination issue, but his support ended

there. In his eagerness to revise and expand the charter, Hillenkoetter alienated the

military and State Department representatives in his efforts to acquire substantive CIA

control over COMINT, as well as over other intelligence matters. As a result, a very

superficial and limited revision of the charter emerged, which meant that many of the

vestiges of m~litary control remained. Among other limitations, the revision perpetuated

the requirement for unanimity among the membership on issues passed to the Board for

decision. .

On the military side, the National Security Act had an additional impact on the

COMINT community with the establishment of the Air Force as a separate department.

This resulted in the establishment of the new COMINT organization, the U.S. Air Force

Security Service. A third military COMINT organization now existed competing for COMINT

resources and for the assignment ofcryptanalytic targets and tasks.

57

UlttTBr..J!l YIlt SeNnA' SIIlttTtT8CS eNJ:.¥

T-QPSECRET
DOCID: 3109065

"F6PSEERET

Chapter IV

Creation ofthe Armed Forces Security Agency,

1949-1952

On 20 May 1949, Louis A. Johnson, Secretary of Defense, established a new defense

agency, the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA). Johnson directed a merger of the

COMINT processing activities of the Army and Navy and placed the new AFSA structure

under the control and direction ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff. AFSA's mission was to conduct

all communications intelligence and communications security activities within the

Department of Defense, except those performed by the military services. With AFSA,

Johnson hoped to achieve a degree of unification of the services as well as "efficiency and

economy" in the management ofthe cryptologic structure. He also sought to minimize the

resource and duplication problems associated with the new Air Force Security Service and

its rapidly expanding cryptologic organization.

The predominantly negative reactions to AFSA included the usual controversy over

unification, as well as jurisdictional concerns over basic intelligence authorities and

relationships. The Navy and Air Force had opposed consolidation, while the Army

supported the general concept. Even greater protests came from the USCIB structure,

mainly from the representatives ofthe Department ofState and the CIA. They maintained

that the AFSA charter was in direct conflict with the new national charter of USCIB.

Johnson's refusal to consult or even to coordinate with USCIB added to the ill will.

Elements in the JCS moved to modify AFSA'S charter within a few months after its

establishment. JCS 2010/6 accomplished a number of substantive changes in the AFSA

charter, all of which sought to weaken the role and authorities of AFSA. The changes

stressed the 'autonomous role ofeach military COMINT organization. The net result ofthese

actions was not unification, but an acceleration ofthe controversy within the intelligence

community over the control ofthe COMINT structure.

AFSA failed for two reasons. It did not succeed in centralizing the direction of the

COMINT effort; and it largely ignored the interested civilian agencies - the Department of

State, the CIA, and the FBI. The director did not have the authority to "direct" the military

services, nor did he have the authority to suppress conflicts and duplication among the

Army, Navy, and Air Force. As a result, AFSA spent most ofits existence negotiating with

the services over what it could do. The full extent and impact of the operational

weaknesses of AFSA did not become widely recognized until the beginning of the Korean

War in June 1950.

As part of the original National Security Act, Congress created the United States Air

Force on 18 September 1947. The separation ofthe Air Force from the Army resulted in an

additional cryptologic branch, first through the Air Force Security Group (AFSG) and then

through the U.S. Air Force Security Service (AFSS). In the transition to a three-service

structure, the Army continued to provide the Air Force with support, including cryptologic

activities. On 3 June 1948, Headquarters, ASA, established the AFSG (as part of its Plans

and Operations stafi'), with an initial cadre of eleven officers under Major Idris J. Jones.!

The Air Force, however, clearly preferred to have direct control of its own COMINT

production. On 20 October 1948, Air Force officials established a new major Air Force

59 'F9P SEEAE:r
DOCID: 3109065

1'6P 5ECRE:r

command, the Air Force Security Service (AFSS), with temporary headquarters at

Arlington Hall Station.

Louis A.Johnson, Secretary ofDefense

_.~.,.

. . .~

: ',-. .". . _.... -",;: ..FOver the next three years the Air Force, as an independent service, had a major impact

on the Army-Navy COMINT organizations. The establishment or the AFSS indicated that

Air Force officials demanded a security service or cryptologic organization equal to the

Army or the Navy COMINT structures.

Competition for COMINT targets and resources

intensified. Moreover, the three services now

competed for recruitment of personnel to

augment (or replace) the dwindling military

competence in COMINT.

Traditionally, the Army and the Navy held

divergent views on the use of civilian

personnel in manning their COMINT

organizations. Reliance on civilian personnel

represented no major change for the Army.

Throughout the 1930s the Army recruited

high-level mathematicians as well as civilians

with other technical skills for its cryptologic

organization. During World War II, the Army

continued to rely on a large civilian work force.

In contrast, at the conclusion of the war, the

Navy COMINT organization employed only

about seventy civilians out of almost eleven

thousand persons.2 The latter, however, did

include a large number ofengineers, scientists, and college professors who became

naval officers during the war. Many of these were recruited personally by Commander

Joseph N. Wenger from 1938 to 1939, as part of his attempt to seek candidates for the

Naval Reserve program and cryptologic work.a Wenger's ultimate purpose, of course, was

to offer direct commissions to selected individuals, thereby facilitating their immediate

assignment to the Navy COMINT organization. This situation reflected the traditional

Navy policy of having a purely military organization. The Navy philosophy stressed the

beliefthat a military organization permitted stricter security control, facilitated rotation

of personnel, provided greater flexibility in assignments, and reflected better overall

control ofCOMINToperations by the military commanders.

In the postwar period of budget reduction, Navy officials found it necessary, however,

to modify drastically their deeply ingrained opposition to the use of civilians in their

COMINT organization. However desirable a completely military organization might be in

war, these Navy officials recognized that such an approach would be difficult to achieve in

peacetime. They therefore established a number ofpositionsin the upper levels ofthe civil

service grades for key cryptologic personnel. For many policymakers, this raised the old

fundamental question of possible conflict between military and civilian authority. The

issue became a matter ofreconciling how naval and civilian authority could exist side by

side and still retain naval control over the COMINTmission.

,epSEeRET 60

HA~b8 VII. ~9MIH'I'~lIhNN81:B9Nl:JY
DOCID: 3109065

18PSECRE:'f

In effecting the transition to a greater use of civilian personnel, the Navy rationalized

the change on the basis of a definition concerning the two types of control, "management"

and "technical.'" It defined management control as the day-to-day administration and

control of operations of a unit in the performance of its primary function. It defined

technical control as the specialized or professional guidance needed by a unit to perform its

primary function. Using this distinction between management mechanisms, Navy

officials in the postwar era delegated responsibility for technical direction over COMINT

matters to top-level civilian employees, while reserving management and policy

authorities exclusively for military officers. Under this concept, the Navy authorities

determined "what is to be done while the civilian technicians determined how it is to be

done."s

The Navy's change of heart about the use of civilians in COMINT activities and its

rationalization about the nature of their' role generally resolved the Navy dilemma. But

manpower problems still remained for the three services. As the new Air Force Security

Service sought to recruit personnel from the Army and Navy COMINT organizations,

competition between the services for the dwindling manpower intensified. This situation

caused Department of Defense authorities to focus anew on the basic question ofwhether a

consolidated and centralized agency should be established. In addition to manpower

questions, there existed a number of other operational considerations as well. For

example, on the technical side, since the cryptography ofthe Soviet Union was known to be

centrally controlled, a growing recognition developed among U.S. policymakers that a

centralized cryptanalytic attack by the United States on Soviet systems would be

beneficial.8

In late July 1948, Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of the Army, formally brought the

problem to the attention of Forrestal. Royall reasoned that the only way to avoid the

increased costs associated with the new AFSS would be to establish some form of unified or

joint security agency capable of serving the armed forces as a whole at the Washington

level. He noted that field COMINT and security functions should probably continue to be

the responsibility of the separate service departments and recommended that the

secretary establish a study group to review the entire question of unification ofthe COMINT

effort.7

By this time, "economy and efficiency" had become the watchwords of the Truman

administration as it sought to balance the national budget. A major corollary to this

recurring budgetary theme was the continuing campaign to reorganize or unify the armed

forces, especially their intelligence apparatus. This issue represented a carryover, in large

part, from the earlier congressional investigations into interservice cooperation - or the

lack thereof - preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor. The majority report of the

congressional investigation ofthe Pearl Harbor attack recommended on 20 July 1946

that there be a complete integration of Army and Navy intelligence agencies in order to

avoid the pitfalls of divided responsibility which experience has made so abundantly

apparent; .•. efficient intelligence services are just as essential in time ofpeace as in war.8

Drawing on this report, Forrestal and his advisers took a critical look at the military

COMINT services. They questioned the wisdom of having a dual track Army-Navy COMINT

61

KlJo:N9b8 VIA 89MIN'f 8U....NNBbB 9Nb¥

'fell 5I!CIt!T'
.- -..-.

DOCID: 3109065

'f8P SEERE'f

structure, especially given the complexity and centralization ofthe Soviet communications

security effort; the need for developing a coordinated United States analytic attack against

the Soviet COMINT target; and the need for recruitment and training ofpersonnel in unique

cryptologic technical skills. Prompted by the specific proposal from Royall, and by the skyrocketing costs for cryptologic activities, l"orrestal was looking for a way to avoid an

increase in the budget. He associated the projected higher costs for cryptologic activities

primarily with the plans of the Air Force for a new COMINT agency of its own. Hoping to

reduce COMINT costs by preventing duplication from becoming triplication, Forrestal

decided to postpone the Air Force plans for expansion until he had explored the feasibility

ofcombining all military COMINT activities at the Washington level.9

Forrestal referred Royall's memorandum to his War Council, the new advisory

mechanism established under the National Security Act of 1947, whose mission was "to

advise the Secretary of Defense on matters of broad policy pertaining to the Armed

Forces:10 Chaired by Forrestal, the War Council was composed of the three service

secretaries and the service chiefs. On 3 August 1948, the council recommended that a

study group be established to consider the cryptologic needs of the entire government,

including both military and civilian interests.

Accepting the council's recommendation, on 19 August 1948 Forrestal established a

military committee to consider the "creation ofa Unified Armed Forces Security Agency."

The Terms of Reference for the committee gave the study a purpose, directed at both

foreign communications intelligence and the security of United States communications.ll

Forrestal's general mandate to the committee considered two broad questions:

Should there be created a joint or unified Armed Forces agency for the production of

communications intelligence and, ifso, whatform should it take?

Should there be joint or unified cryptographic security activities of the Army, Navy,

and Air Force, and ifso, what form should they take?

The committee consisted of six officers: for the Army, Major General Alexander R.

Bolling, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and Colonel Harold C. Hayes, Chief, Army Security

Agency; for the Navy, Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone, Director, Naval Communications, and

Captain William S. Veeder; and for the Air Force, Major General Charles P. Cabell,

Director of Intelligence, and Brigadier General Francis L. Ankenbrandt, Director for

Communications.12

At its first meeting on 25 August 1948, the committee selected Acimiral Stone as its

chairman. This resulted in the group's common designation as the Stone Board.13 Hayes,

however, was the only committee member actively engaged in the production ofCOMINT at

the time, as well as the only member having any experience in COMINT.

While the committee focused essentially on communications intelligence and

communications security activities from a military point of view, it also recognized the

cryptologic interests ofother parts ofthe government. Its Terms ofReference instructed it

to consult with the State Department and the CIA as part of its fact-finding effort for the

preparation ofa final report. 14

'f8P SECRE'f 62

IIAtfBhB YIA eeMI:!f' eUklfI4'BtS6Ntlt
DOCID: 3109065

18PSECRrf

Despite Forrestal's interest in consolidation, the establishment of the new agency did

not come about easily. Lasting several months, the Stone Board deliberations revealed

that the Navy and the Air Force were not ready to accept the kind of unification proposed

by the Army. After considerable debate, the Stone Board submitted its final report to

Forrestal in December 1948.15 The Stone Board's report, actually a majority report and an

accompanying minority report, did not reconcile the conflicting views ofthe services.

The majority report, written by the Navy and Air Force, essentially recommended a

continuation of the basic arrangements existing under the old Joint Operating Plan. It

added several organizational changes related primarily to the new Air Force Security

Service and proposed exempting tactical support areas from central control. The majority

report also proposed the allocation ofjoint tasks to a new Air Force Agency "on an equal

basis with the Army and Navy." In addition, the Navy and Air Force sought to exempt

from unified control those parts ofthe effort that pertained directly to the specific military

responsibility of each service and that would remain in each service as a command

function. Navy and Air Force officialsjustified their recommendation in terms ofthe need

for flexibility ofoperation and speed ofdecision in matters pertaining to responsibilities of

the services during wartime. In short, they basically desired to maintain the status quo

and their own separate and independent cryptologic efforts. Consolidation was not in their

plans.

In the minority report, the Army officials took a far different approach. They

emphasized economy and the avoidance of duplication of effort. 16 The Army officials

argued that foreign communications were becoming increasingly sophisticated and

consequently were much more difficult to exploit. Accordingly, the Army plan placed

primary importance on maintaining and exploiting technical relationships among all

analytic problems. To achieve this capability, the Army recommended consolidation ofthe

COMINT services into a single unified agency. The unified agency would have

responsibility for central control of processing and dissemination activities for the entire

U.S. COMINT effort. In effect, the minority Army plan proposed that all COMINT production

other than intercept and field processing be conducted by one organization, staffed by

personnel from the three services. This new unified agency "would determine COMINT

implementation priorities based on intelligence requirements ... and would determine the

specific employment ofthe intercept facilities."17

Under the Army concept, no single service would perform central processing activities

in the United States. The services could, however, perform a limited field processing

effort, primarily on tasks ofa direct support nature as necessary for military operations of

each service. The individual services would each maintain COMINT organizations to

conduct intercept, direction rmding, and necessary field processing; to train service

personnel; and to engage in research and development actions for COMINT operations. As

part of their basic responsibility to the new joint agency, the services would provide

"intercept facilities and personnel." Their fixed field sites would conduct intercept

activitiesin response to the tasking ofthe newjointstructure.

In support of its proposal, the Army drew a parallel between the Navy-Air Force

proposal and the situation that prevailed in the German COMINT services during World

War II. According to the Army, at the end of the war all of the German COMINT services

and agencies were independently duplicating the work of one another in an atmosphere of

63 MP5ECRET
DOCID: 3109065

TePSEERET

great hostility. The Army believed that the establishment of three independent COMINT

activities would be divisive to United States interests and would, in time, degenerate into

a situation similar to that encountered by the German SIGINT services during the war.111

In contrast to the German structure, the Army cited the coordination and

accomplishments achieved by the British in their in~lligence structure. In the Army's

view, the COMINT organization of the British, with apprDximately thirty-five years of

continuous experience in this field, had been unified in a m~nn.er similar to that described

in the Army proposal.19 Citing the German and British exampl~s,.the Army plan stressed

the need for consolidating into a single armed forces activity all but the most narrowly

defined problems ofprimary interest to each service.

While the majority and minority reports disagreed on the issue of consolidation, they

did agree, in principle, on the need for better integration of overall COMINT support. Both

plans agreed that all three services should participate in this integration under the

coordination of an Armed Forces Communications Intelligence Board (AFCIB) and a

Director ofJoint Operations (DJO).20 Both reports proposed that the new Armed Forces

Communication Intelligence Board be subordinate to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that it

consist of the military members of USCIB. This new AFCIB would be the policy board for

providing guidance to COMINT activities, and would provide liaison with USCIB on all

matters within the cognizance of USClB. The role of the DJO would vary, however, under

each report. Under the majority report, the DJO would represent an expanded role for the

existing Coordinator ofJoint Operations. Under the Army report, the DJO would, in effect,

have two hats, serving as director of the new unified agency, and as the Director ofJoint

Operations.

The military services were not the only ones interested in the Stone Board Report.

From the outset, the civilian agencies- the Department ofState and the CIA - followed the

activities ofthe Stone Board closely, and soon expressed strong objections to various parts

ofthe final report. The main issue raised by the CIA and the State Department concerned

the establishment of an Armed Forces Communications Intelligence Board whose

relationship to USCIB was unclear. CIA and State authorities viewed the new board as a

threat to USCIB. 21

While the relationships of AFCIB may have been unclear, the strategy of the military

services was obvious. Their intent was to establish AFCIB as a purely military structure

running parallel to USCIB, but as one that would contravene the policy role of USCIB. It

would, in effect, leave USCIB with no significant role. With this proposal, the military had

resurrected the acrimonious issue of one year earlier when the NBC had established USCIB

as subordinate to the NSC rather than the JCS.

Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, DCI, strongly argued that the creation of an

Armed Forces .Intelligence Board would clearly be in conflict with the new authority

granted to USCIB by the issuance of NSCID No.9 in 1948.22 In his view, the creation of an

AFCIB would serve to give the military authorities total control over activities that should,

in the national interest, be directed more to the requirements of the civil agencies.

Hillenkoetter also took the position that in the cold war the Central Intelligence Agency

and State Department were the primary players on the covert and diplomatic front.

According to his estimate, three-fourths of the current production of COMINT came from

T8PSEERE'f 64
DOCID: 3109065

I

T9PSECRET

diplomatic and economic sources and was of primary interest to the CIA and the State

Department.

W. Park Armstrong, special assistant to the Secretary of State, also attacked the

concept ofan AFCIB as a "military controlled structure parallel to USCIB and independent of

it." His strong objection also reflected the view that the nonmilitary consumer would lose

the ability to influence the military COMINT structure in terms ofstating its requirements

for COMINT information. 2S

The civilian objections, along with the basic service disagreement over consolidation,

prevented any immediate action. A serious illness suffered by Forrestal also contributed

to the postponement of any final decision. The two reports submitted by the Stone Board

awaited disposition in the office ofthe ~ecretaryofDefense for more than four months.

When Louis A. Johnson became the Secretary of Defense on 28 March 1949 following

Forrestal's death, he acted quickly to resolve the issue. He called in General Joseph T.

McNarney, USA, known to be a supporter ofthe consolidation concept, to assist in resolving

the dilemma.24 McNarney, who served as director of Management Services for Johnson,

recommended a plan that required a merger, but left the three services the right to

maintain their separate organizations. It was a compromise solution. Johnson later

reissued it as a draft directive calling for the establishment of an Armed Forces Security

Agency that would be along the lines ofthe recommendations in the Army minority report.

The new Johnson directive was then scheduled for discussion and decision by the JCS and

the Secretary's War Council.

At a JCS meeting in the morning of 18 May 1949, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air

Force ChiefofStaff, suddenly announced the reversal ofthe earlier Air Force position and

indicated that the "Air Force supported the Armys consolidated concept and not the

Navy's nonconsolidated concept for COMINT processing."25 Vandenberg appears to have

voted for merger only after having obtained prior assurance that each service would be

allowed to have its own agency for the conduct of those cryptologic operations peculiar to

its needs.26 With this official reversal of the Air Force vote, the Navy remained the sole

dissenter to the establishment of an Armed Forces Security Agency. But its position soon

collapsed. At an afternoon meeting on the same day, the Secretary's War Council met to

consider Johnson's draft directive. At the council meeting, the newly appointed Secretary

ofthe Navy, Francis P. Matthews, overruled the position ofthe Chiefof Naval Operations,

Admiral Louis Denfield, and argued for consolidation of the COMINT structure.27 Thus, by

the evening of 18 May Johnson had succeeded in overturning the split report of the Stone

Board and gaining the support ofall three servicesfor consolidation.

The reasons for the change of position by the Air Force and Navy officials were

probably associated more with high-level political factors rather than any conceptual

changes by the services themselves. From 1947 to early 1950, President Truman,

Congress, and the secretaries of defense actively supported a concept of genuine

unification ofthe military services. As a result, this period was characterized by a number

of bitter interservice rivalries and disputes concerning the issue of unification as well as

questions concerning the role of each service. Many ofthe same officials who participated

in the Stone Board decision were also active in other ongoing political battles within the

National Military Establishment. One such battle, associated with the Navy's desire to

65

UAl'iBbl!llJlA S9MHfl' SIiMiNl!lbS 9NbY

1=OP&&CA&T
DOCID: 3109065

,wii ii'REi

hold nuclear weapons, came to a climax at the time of the deliberations about AFSA in

1949. The Navy and Air Force were in violent disagreement over the strategic role of the

Navy and clashed over the construction of a new supercarrier and the development of the

latest strategic bomber, the 8-36. This resulted in a chain reaction of events achieving

national prominence, and soon involved both the executive and legislative branches ofthe

government. These conflicts resulted in Johnson's cancellation, on 23 April 1949, of the

construction of the 65,OOO-ton aircraft carrier, the USS United States; the resignation of

Secretary ofthe Navy John L. Sullivan on 19 April 1949; and the continuing public rivalry

between the Air Force and Navy, usually labeled "the revolt ofthe admirals." 28

Thus, the atmosphere for cooperation and consolidation was volatile. However, by the

time the vote on the AFSA merger took place, Johnson had appointed a new Secretary ofthe

Navy, Francis P. Matthews, whom he had selected personally.29 Matthews supported

Johnson's position. As for the Air Force, Vandenberg, as Air Force Chief of Staff, had

consistently and actively promoted the growth ofthe Air Force as an independent service.

In addition to the commitment for an independent cryptologic arm for the Air Force, it is

also likely that Vandenberg envisaged receiving greater financial support for aircraft

programs if he went along with consolidation in other areas such as the merger of

cryptologic activities.

The Johnson Team

left to right: Secretary ofthe Army, Gordon Gray; Secretary ofDefense, Louis A.Johnson; Secretary of

the Navy, Francis P. Matthews; and Secretary ofthe Air Force, StuartSymington

TepSECRET 66

M.\NQbK '11.\ SQMUT'I' SMAtTNKb8 QNbY

--------..._--
DOCID: 3109065

'l"6P SEERItT

There also existed other pressures on the services. As a political reality, the Navy-Air

Force decision to vote for merger was consistent with President Truman's desire for

unification of the military COMINT organizations which, in turn, reflected the mood in

Congress, as well as the tenor of the National Security Act. In later years, Brigadier

General Carter W. Clarke, USA, a participant in the AFSA deliberations, commented about

the political pressures existing at the time. Clarke, an official with many years ofservice

in ASA and the office of the Army Chief of Staff for Intelligence, maintained that while

Johnson pressed hard for merger, the real leverage for final service approval of the AFSA

concept came from Truman and Congress.so

During the sessions ofthe Stone Board, the Navy made elaborate studies and charts of

the major elements in both the majority and minority reports. As a result of this critical

analysis, the Navy developed a unique grasp of the weaknesses and strengths of each

report. Recognizing that the establishment of a consolidated agency was inevitable, and

seeking to strengthen the operations of the new agency, the Navy sought at the eleventh

hour to have some positive changes made to strengthen the new organization.

On behalfofthe Navy organization, Stone conferred at length with General McNarney

about the directive and proposed some substantive changes in the text. In particular, the

Navy sought changes in the charter concerning the distinction existing between "fixed"

and "mobile" collection sites. The draft directive stated that the fixed intercept

installations would be "manned and administered by the service providing them, but will

be operationally directed by AFSA." On the other hand, the mobile sites were to be

excluded from any AFSA control and would be operationally controlled by the parent

service. With unusual foresight, the Navy sought to eliminate this distinction, which it

correctly predicted would be an issue of great difficulty for the new agency. McNarney,

however, refused to make any substantive changes, insisting that his authority, as

executive secretary ofthe War Council, extended only to editorial changes.31

With a unanimous vote now supporting the concept of merger, Johnson was ready to

act. On 20 May 1949,Johnson ordered the issuance ofJCS Directive 2010, establishing an

Armed Forces Security Agency for the conduct of communications intelligence and

communication security activities within the National Military Establishment. The new

ag~ncy would be headed for a two-year term by a flag or general officer, to be chosen in

turn from each service. The agency would function under the management control of the

JCS, and would conduct its common activities "in not more than two major

establishments." Johnson's directive established a date of 1 January 1950 for completion

ofthe merger ofthe COMINT services.32

In taking this decisive action only two months after coming into office, Johnson ended

the impasse that had existed for over a year. With the formation of AFSA, the military

COMINT structure acquired a new identity and structure. While Johnson sought to

recognize the unity of the COMINT mission and resources, he believed that a consolidation

ofthe service COMINT efforts would be responsive at the same time to the public pressure

for effecting greater economies in government.

Because of the concerns expressed earlier by the civilian agencies, Johnson also sent

parallel letters to Dean Acheson, Secretary of State; Rear Admiral Roscoe H.

Hillenkoetter, Director of Central Intelligence; and Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers,

67

J;;IAJi[DLE VI•.''". 'lQMlmGIIANN8hS 9NbY

tOP5&CAET
DOCID: 3109065

'fep 5EERET

executive secretary ofthe National Security CounciL33 He informed them ofthe formation,

with the approval of the president, of a unified cryptologic establishment - the Armed

Forces Security Agency (AFSA) - and of the subordination and missions of the new

structure. The tone of the letters was conciliatory as Johnson sought to assure each that

the implementation of his new directive would not interfere with the functions of the

USCIB. The final AFSA charter included no vestiges of a high-level Armed Forces

Communications Intelligence Board, which had drawn such violent protests earlier from

the CIA and the Department ofState.

The JCS then reissued Johnson's directive as JCS 2010 on 20 May 1949. The JCS

established a steering committee to assist in the planning of the many administrative,

logistic, and operational actions necessary for physical merger of service resources. Its

members were those representatives of the military departments then serving on USCIB.

They were, for the Army, Major General S. Leroy Irwin and Colonel Carter W. Clarke; for

the Navy, Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis and Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone; and for the Air

Force, Major General Charles P. Cabell and Colonel Roy H. Lynn.34

In the selection process for the position ofthe director, AFSA, each service proposed one

candidate. The nominees were Major General J.V. Matejka, USA, Chief Signal Officer,

USEUCOM; Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone, USN, Director of Naval Communications; and

Major General Walter E. Todd, USAF, Joint Staff. On 15 June 1949, the JCS selected Stone.

The appointment of Stone, who had no experience in COMINT, was a sign to some that

consolidation might be aborted. Stone, who represented the service most consistent in its

desire for cryptologic autonomy, had

signed the majority report opposing the

creation of the agency he was now to head.

Consolidation seemed injeopardy.

As a result of AFSA's creation, the

existing CJO (Admiral Wenger) and the

director, AFSA, now had overlapping

responsibilities. The CJO had been

established earlier as USCIB's executive for

the discharge of certain responsibilities,

which the services, along with the civil

agencies, had agreed should be vested in

USCIB. Subsequently, with the establishment of AFSA and without prior

concurrence ofUSCIB, these responsibilities

were arbitrarily assigned to the director,

AFSA. This situation presented a major

dilemma for USCIB, particularly in the

policy area of foreign liaison, a

responsibility that NSCID No.9 assigned to

USCIB.

At the 41st meeting ofUSCIBon 17 June Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone,

1949, the representatives of the Central firstdirectorofAFSA

T9PSEERET 68

HANgUl VIA SaMIN'fSUA-N!iBbB aNt....
DOCID: 3109065

f6P SECRET

Intelligence Agency (Admiral Hillenkoetter) and the Department of State (W. Park

Armstrong) cited the conflicts existing between the new AFSA Directive and the

responsibilities of USCIB and the role ofthe CJO under NSCID No.9. The military members

of USCIB were unresponsive to the complaints of the CIA and State Department members,

refusing essentially to go counter to a directive from the Secretary of Defense. The

meeting ended with the agreement that the CIA and State Department should address a

letter to Secretary Johnson expressing their views about the conflicts between the USCIB

and AFSA charters.35

On 27 June 1949, Hillenkoetter sent such a letter to Johnson. Johnson, however, took

no action. General McNarney, head ofJohnson's management committee, met with USCIB

to discuss the letter, but adamantly refused to pursue any changes to the AFSA Directive.36

Hillenkoetter and Armstrong concluded that McNarney's views were inflexible and that

further effort to change them wasfutile. "They would have to wait for a new opportunity.

Although USCIB'S nonmilitary members were unanimous in their opposition to the

establishment of AFSA, they were unable to convince USCIB to take any stronger action

protesting the establishment of AFSA. Because of charter limitations and the

preponderance of military membership, USCIB would not challenge Johnson's plan.

Recognizing that they could do nothing about the establishment or the structure ofAFSA,

the USCIB had no choice but to cooperate with the new agency during the interim period of

its establishment. Further, lacking any response to Hillenkoetter's letter, the only

solution for USCIB out ofitsjurisdictional dilemma was to appoint the director, AFSA, as the

CJO.37 In his capacity as CJO, the director of AFSA had a parallel responsibility to USCIB,

which made the situation salvageable for USCIB. Consequently, USCIB agreed that the

existing CJO (Admiral Wenger) should serve as the deputy CJO during the transition

period, to assist primarily in the area ofSecond Party collaboration.

When Johnson established AFSA in May 1949, he simultaneously ordered the

establishment of an advisory mechanism to exist within the AFSA structure. His directive

defined the nature, role, and composition of the Armed Forces Communications

Intelligence Advisory Council (AFCIAC), designed to serve solely in the capacity of an

advisory mechanism for AFSA and the JCS. Johnson's directive, however, indicated very

clearly that AFSA, subject to the JCS, had the primary responsibility for formulating and

implementing plans, policies, and doctrine relating to communications intelligence and

communications security activities. AFSA, in effect, had the actual responsibility for

running the COMINT and COMSEC operations, excluding only those responsibilities that

were delegated individually to the Army, Navy, and Air Force.38

This dichotomy of organizational roles and division oflabor did not last long. Within

two months after the establishment of AFSA, the JCS proposed substantive changes to

Johnson's directive. On 28 July 1949, JCS issued a new charter for AFCIAC, which not only

changed the nature and role of the AFCIAC mechanism, but affected areas of authority of

AFSA as well. After circulating the document to Johnson for information, the JCS approved

the new AFCIAC charter on 1 September 1949.39

The changes in JCS 2010/6 tended to diminish the connotation of AFSA as representing

a "unified" organization, while at the same time placing greater emphasis on '10int"

operations. JCS accomplished this by transferring responsibilities to AFCIAC from the JCS,

69

II:A:NBbl!l VIA OOMIN'f OIlANNBbS ONbY

'Fep SECRE'F

.---------------------.
DOCID: 3109065

T9PSECRET

as well as from the Director, AFSA. As noted above, AFSA initially had the authority to

formulate and, after JCS approval, to implement plans, policies, and doctrine relating to

communications intelligence and communications security activities. Under the new

AFCIAC charter, however, AFSA no longer performed these basic tasks. Instead AFCIAC

became the structure to "determine policies, operating plans and doctrines for the AFSA in

its production of communications intelligence, and in its conduct of communications

security activities." In addition to its originally assigned advisory functions, AFCIAC

acquired considerable staff authority over AFSA. Thus, AFCIAC no longer functioned as an

advisory mechanism within AFSA, but "became the agency of the JCS charged with the

responsibility for ensuring the most effective operation of the AFSA." As the new policy

authority and overseer of AFSA's operations, AFCIAC emerged as the real power in the

COMINT structure.

In short, before the AFSA structure even became operational, the JCS had eroded much

ofAFSA's already limited authority. As happened during the period ofthe Joint Operating

Plan, the military authorities turned once again to the use of a "committee" structure to

run the COMINT organization. They also repeated the practice of excluding the civilian

agencies from any participation in the committee process. These charter changes tended

not only to destroy the separate identity of AFSA, but also to preserve the independent

identity ofthe separate military COMINT services. The net result was an acceleration ofthe

antagonism within the intelligence community over the control ofthe COMINT structure.

At the fourth meeting of AFCIAC, the council proposed to the JCS that its name be

changed to Armed Forces Security Agency Council (AFSAC). Admiral Stone proposed the

use of the word "security" because it was a generic term that embraced both the

communications intelligence and communications security fields. Because of AFCIAC's

jurisdiction over COMINT as well as COMSEC, the new title was considered to be more

accurate. It also avoided the use ofthe term "communications intelligence" which at that

time was considered to be classified. Following JCS approval of the change on 22 October

1949, the Secretary of Defense approved the change on 9 November 1949. After that, the

Council was known as AFSAC.40

The Director, AFSA, chaired the AFSAC, which now became the mechanism through

which AFSA reported to the JCS. AFSAC had ten members, including the chairman - three

each from the' three services, one from each of their communications, intelligence and

cryptanalytic organizations. Consistent with the traditional practice in arrangements for

joint operations, actions on substantive matters brought before AFSAC could be taken only

by unanimous vote. Because of the diversity of the membership and their different

interests, the requirementfor unanimity made decision making difficult, ifnot impossible.

This factor ultimately caused major problems for AFSA, as the services tended to vote along

party lines wll-enever major issues arose. The hope that AFSA would develop a truly

consolidated intelligence effortseemed remote.

Stone began his tour as Director, AFSA, and the CJO on 15 July 1949.41 He was assisted

by three deputy directors. Each deputy served as the liaison between AFSA and his parent

service, and assumed specific functions within AFSA. Colonel Samuel P. Collins, the Army

deputy director (AFSA-OOA), was responsible for communications security, research and

development, and communications. Captain Joseph N. Wenger became the Navy deputy

director (AFSA-OOB), and assumed control of COMINT. Wenger also received an additional

T9PSEERET 70

IIhNBce "ItA 89MI!i'f 8IIltNNBbS 9NbY
DOCID: 3109065

TOP5ECRET

'duty in a major policy area. When USCIB appoint.ed Stone as the CJO, Wenger, who was CJO

at the time, agreed to step down and to become the deputyCJO. As the deputyCJo, Wenger

then assumed the responsibility for directing foreign liaison relationships on behalf ofthe

dual interests of USCIB and AFSA. On the Air Force side, Colonel Roy H. Lynn of the Air

Force (AFSA·OOC) became responsible for staffand administrative functions. 42

On the question ofphysical consolidation offacilities, neither the Army site (Arlington

'Hall Station) nor the Navy site (Naval Security Station) could accommodate all of AFSA's

COMINT and COMSEC functions. One proposal was to make the split along COMINT-COMSEC

lines; another placed all analysis on Soviet problems at Arlington Hall and all other

cryptanalytic problems (ALLO) at the Navy site; a third left physical arrangements as they

were, with a mixture ofboth COMINTand COMSEC remaining at the two installations.43

Stone opted for a division along the major functional lines of COMINT and COMSEC. He

placed almost all ofthe COMINToperations and related research and development activities

at Arlington Hall and all COMSEC operations, with related research and development

aspects, at the Naval Security Station. Staff and other support functions were divided

between the two sites depending on equipment and other logistical considerations. Stone

established his new headquarters and administrative offices at the Naval Security

Station."

Stone also established four Monitor Groups - representing major functional areas - to

direct the actual integration of the service elements into AFSA. The COMINT Monitor

Group, headed by Captain Redfield Mason, was concerned with the merger ofthe largest of

AFSA's operating units. This organization was to merge the Army Security Agency's

Operations Division (AS-90) with the Processing Department (N.2) of the Navy's

Communications Supplementary Activity, Washington (CSAW), as well as related units of

both agencies. It also had the responsibility for the assimilation of two committee

structures that operated under the aegis of the superseded Joint Operating Plan. This

included the JPAG and the JICG of the JOP. The resulting structure became the Office of

Operations, with Mason designated asitsfirst chief.45

With the physical merger ofthe Army and Navy COMINT processing organizations into

the AFSAstructure, each service contributed many talented individuals with distinguished

careers in cryptography. A number of these had achieved technical accomplishments of

exceptional merit and possessed a combination of knowledge and experience that would

become invaluable assets to the new agency. The Army's principal cryptologists were

civilians, most of whom had acquired wartime commissions; the Navy's leading

cryptologists were mostly career Navy officers.

Moving into the AFSA structure in 1949, William F. Friedman clearly stood out as the

dean of Army cryptologists. During his career in the War Department and the Signal

Intelligence Service, Friedman's contributions embraced not only cryptanalytic operations

but research and development activities (both COMINT and COMSEC) and cryptologic

education as well. While Friedman has received recognition for his abilities in the field of

cryptanalysis, possibly his most lasting contribution may be in the area of training.

Singularly gifted as both a teacher and a writer, Friedman left a legacy oftraining lectures

and programs that have broad application even today. In April 1930, in his search for new

talent for the newly established Signal Intelligence Service, Friedman personally

71

IIJdUlhi!l Vhf[ e6MIN'f elIAtHiBbS 9!iI:iY

TOP5ECRET
DOClD: 3109065

T9PSECRET

Captain Redfield Mason

Chie~.COMINT Monitor Group

Dr. Solomon Kullback

Chief.Research and Development

Monitor Group

..". ...... ...........

Dr. Abraham Sinkov

Chief.Communications Security

Monitor Group

Captain John S. Harper

Chief, Administration

Monitor Group

T9PSECRET

AFSA Monitor Group Chiefs

72

IIMl'Bbl!l 'II'" 89MI!'R 8Ih\!'l'!l'l!lbB 9tl'bY

...._-_._-------------------------- ===-_._--_._--.----------
DOCID: 3109065

TePSCERCT

recruited three young mathematicians - Frank B. Rowlett, Abraham Sinkov, and Solomon

Kullback - as junior cryptologists. As the Army continued its recruitment through the

1930s, the SIS gradually developed a small cadre of personnel who were highly trained in

cryptology. During World War II, Rowlett, Sinkov, and Kullback, in particular, attained

high personal accomplishments. They became representative of a new generation of

cryptanalysts.

In contrast, the manpower of the Navy's COMINT organization in 1949 essentially

represented a military cadre. The new Navy policy ofthe postwar period that moved in the

direction ofincreased recruitment and use ofcivilian personnel had not been in effect long

enough to have a significant impact on its overall structure. The Navy authorities, by

......

...

.

...

.'~

FrankB. Rowlett

encouraging professional careers in cryptology for its officers, had traditionally placed

primary reliance on naval officers for the performance ofCOMINT duties. By the time AFSA

was established, many Navy officers had acquired a broad background in communications

intelligence matters, some dating back to the mid-1920s, including a number of

73

HANBI:.B 'lIk seMINi SIIANNBI:.6 eNI:.Y

TO' SECRET
· ............

DOCID: 3109065

T9PSEERET

"

assignments as either producers or consumers of intelligence. During World War II,

officers certified in the cryptologic field filled positions of major responsibility for the

Navy in Washington and in field installations. Some ofthese field installations were Fleet

Radio Unit, Pearl Harbor (FRUPAC) in Hawaii; Fleet Radio Unit, Melbourne (FRUMEL) in

Australia; Radio Analysis Group Forward Area (RAGFOR) on Guam; and a number of

communications and interceptsites. Based on this broad depth oftraining and experience,

AFSA acquired a talented and highly professional organization from the Navy. The list of

officers assigned to AFSA with their initial assignments included Captain Joseph N.

Wenger, deputy director, AFSA (for COMINT); Captain Laurance F. Safford, special assistant

to the director; Captain Thomas A. Dyer, chiefPlans and Policy; Captain Redfield Mason,

chief, Office of Operations; and Captain Wesley A. Wright, chief ofthe Special Processing

Division.

The other Monitor Groups were Research and Development, headed by Dr. Solomon

Kullback; Communications Security, headed by Dr. Abraham Sinkov; and

Administration, headed by Captain John S. Harper, USN. William F. Friedman became

research consultant for the new AFSA. Frank B. Rowlett, a member ofthe Army team that

broke the Japanese diplomatic system (Purple) during World War II, became AFSA's

Technical Director. By the end of 1949, over 4,000 personnel (military and civilian) were

assigned to AFSA. Of this figure, approximately 2,900 were assigned to COMINT; 500 to

COMSEC; 500 to research and development; and 230 to administration.46

Initially, Stone had two roles: one as Director, AFSA, and the other as the coordinator

and executive agent for USCIB. As the director, Stone reported to Secretary of Defense

Johnson through the JCS. He had the responsibility for all cryptologic activities in the

Department of Defense. He was responsible for the furnishing ofCOMINT, not only to the

military services, but also to other government departments. As director, he was also

subject to the policies and rules of USCIB governing the production and dissemination of

COMINT. However, once the COMINT was distributed to authorized intelligence recipients,

Stone had no jurisdiction over its use or physicalsecurity. These became the responsibility

ofthe user.47 When acting as the coordinator and executive agent for USCIB, Stone worked

under a different authority and in wider fields than he did as the Director, AFSA. As

coordinator, Stone was responsible to the NSC through the USCIB. In this capacity, his

authority extended to the use of COMINT by any U.S. agency. As director, AFSA, or as

coordinator of USCIB, Stone was an ex officio member of USCIB, without a vote, and was

ineligible to become chairman of USCIB (which was then held on a rotating basis among the

membership).48 Later, this lack of voting status in USCIB became a major obstacle for Stone

and his successor as they were excluded from participation in the actual decision-making

process ofthe Board.

During his first year, Stone constantly sought to clarify the nature and role ofthe AFSA

structure and to accomplish all necessary consolidation actions. For the first seven

months, his major objective was to develop administrative policies and procedures for the

continuation of communications intelligence and communications security activities. He

placed major emphasis on actions dealing with physical and administrative consolidation,

and budget and financial factors. In his first progress report to AFSAC, Stone cited 15 July

1949 as the date ofthe formal activation ofAFSA.49 The report also noted the following as

AFSA's milestones: On 1 October 1949, AFSA assumed operational control ofits cryptologic

T9PSEERET 74

IIAlIBDB VIA GSMIN~ GIIA~INBDS SliDY
DOCID: 3109065

T9PSECRE:r

activities; and on 25 December 1949, AFSA assumed administrative control of all its

allocated civilian personnel. The transfer and consolidation offacilities and personnel in a

six-month period was a significant accomplishment. Merger seemed a reality.

The contrast between the earlier JOP and the new AFSA was readily apparent. Under

the JOP, the Army and Navy processed the foreign traffic oftheir service counterparts. The

effort against the nonmilitary targets was performed jointly by the CJO assisted by his

small staff (committees) for intercept control, allocation of processing tasks, and foreign

liaison. Under the JOP, the services worked together on a voluntary basis, operating

essentially under a "management by committee" approach, with each service retaining its

own independence - particularly when joint agreement could not be reached. AFSA differed

from the JOP principally in that the COMINTprocessing activities ofthe Army and Navy in

the United States were now physically merged at two locations. It performed both military

and nonmilitary tasks. It was a major step toward consolidation.

With the merger of the Army and Navy COMINT processing organizations under AFSA,

there no longer existed any need for the JICG or the JPAG, both of which were creations of

the earlierJoint Operating Plan. The functions ofthe Joint Intercept Group and the Joint

Processing Group were merged into a new AFSA Office ofOperations. The duties ofthe JLG,

however, required no realignment within the AFSA structure. The JLG, which dealt

essentially with foreign liaison matters, continued to be a responsibility of the CJO under

his USCIB hat. The responsibility for foreign COMINT liaison, administered by the JLG and

its supporting staff, remained the responsibility of USCIB. This function remained under

Stone as the Coordinator ofJoint Operations.

Although the processing activities of the Army and Navy were now merged and the

three services now functioned under AFSA as a joint agency ofthe JCS, the new agency faced

some fundamental problems. The services generally took full advantage of the many

loopholes existing in the AFSA charter in order to preserve their independence. For

example, the AFSA charter withheld from AFSA any authority for the tasking of mobile

collection sites.50 This "exclusion" clause caused serious operational problems.for AFSA

from the outset. Initially, the Army and Navy reserved "mobile" or close-support facilities

in the field for their exclusive control. According to the military services, this ensured that

each satisfied the requirements of its own commanders for the production of COMINT for

tactical purposes. This blanket delegation ofauthority to the services proved to be a major

problem for AFSA, particularly in its relationships with the newly established Air Force

Security Service.

By the simple act of declaring an intercept facility as mobile, a service could withhold

any collection activity from Stone's control. The Air Force used this exclusion to the

maximum by conveniently identifying all of its intercept facilities as mobile sites.

Because of this situation, AFSA and the U.S. Air Force concluded an agreement on 18

September 1950 that essentially reflected a shared arrangement for AFSAlAFSS tasking of

Air Force mobile collection sites.51 The agreement concluded with the candid admission

"that the agreement was made unilaterally between AFSA and the Air Force, in view of the

fact that the latter is not providing any fixed intercept installation for operational

direction of the Director, AFSA." This sharing of tasking reflected the best arrangement

that AFSA was able to achieve with the AFSS. During the remainder of Stone's tour, as well

75

wt )UU.K VIA SQMIN!f SIIAN!lSr:.S eUJ:lI

'fe' 51!eRI!T
DOCID: 3109065

TOP' S::CRET

as his successor's, the Air Force continued to withhold the assignment of fixed stations

fromAFSA's control by continuing to identify all ofits sites as mobile.52

Later these same difficulties over the question of fixed and mobile collection sites

extended to relationships with the Army, but to a lesser degree. While the Army did not

exclude AFSA from tasking its mobile sites, it did establish elaborate procedural channels

for the relay ofAFSA tasking instructions. Except in an emergency, AFSA could not task the

sites directly, but had to go through intermediary channels, such as headquarters

installations in the United States and in the field. The process was cumbersome and

inefficient and worked against the timeliness of COMINT reporting.53 The Navy was the

only service that did not create problemsin this area.

Another broad question that plagued AFSA officials was the division of responsibility

between AFSA and the services. In its relationships with the services on processing and

reporting matters, for example, AFSA once again found itselfat odds with the AFSS. Neither

the Army nor the Navy undertook to establish processing units within the United States.

The Air Force, however, insisted on having its own processing unit within the United

States.54 AFSA considered this a major violation of its responsibilities. It asked the JCS to

settle the dispute. Since the JCS failed to rule publicly in favor of either organization, the

Air Force finally abandoned its plans for establishing a domestic processing unit.55 The

issue, however, did not go away. During the entire period of AFSA's existence, its

relationships with the Air Force remained highly contentious over this issue, as well as

over the question ofmobile collection facilities.

Although in principle the military cryptologic community was officially committed to

making the merger work, this commitment was not reflected uniformly throughout the

services. There still remained much open hostility and skepticism about the workability of

the concept of consolidation. In addition, the nonmilitary members of USCIB continued to

raise questions about AFSA'S role and its relationships to USCIB. They complained about

the lack ofa civilian voice in this military hierarchy.58

By June 1950, AFSA had been operational for six months. It was still preoccupied with

efforts to sort out its managerial role and its authority in the COMINT structure, as well as

its relationships with the consumer community. The outbreak of the Korean War on 25

June 1950, however, completely changed the focus ofAFSA's activities. The war put new

pressures on all '[J.S. intelligence sources. Both military and civilian intelligence

authorities immediately pressed for an improvement in the quality and timeliness of

COMINT reporting.57 The war, however, quickly revealed the limitations ofAFSA. Duplicate

collection efforts, processing problems, service rivalries, and communication delays were

prevalent. AFSA's limited ability to direct COMINT activities in support of national targets

soon became evident to the entire intelligence community.

As the Korean War continued, the U.S. COMINT community achieved a mixed record of

successes and failures. Because of the practice of counterpart coverage, each service

concentrated on intercepting and processing the communications of its foreign

counterpart. For example, the Army and Air Force intercepted the communications ofthe

Korean military ground and air forces, respectively. The Navy handled the

communications ofKorean naval forces. Because ofthis reliance on counterpart coverage,

the major COMINT successes took place in the area of tactical support. The Army and Air

T9PSECRET 76

II1t:NBcB "ItA e8MlfPf eIU.~TNJn.s9Jtlb¥

----------------------------------.....;.......:.;......._-----_...--.------
77

IIAI;fBbB VIA 8aMIN'f 81h\liNBaS ariDY

DOCID: 3109065

l=9PSECRET

Force, working independently on the low-grade communications of their counterpart

targets, had the most success. The field exploitation of North Korean and Chinese

Communist traffic both voice and lain text roved to be ofsi ificant value to the U.S.

field commanders.

By late 1951, because of the continued absence of COMINT from high-echelon enemy

communications, the U.S. intelligence community, both military and civilian, became

increasingly impatient with the quality and timeliness of AFSA's COMINT reporting. The

mi:'litary desired increased expenditures of effort and personnel on the high-grade analytic

problem. The civilian officials complained about the lack of channels for expressing their

intelligence requirements and priorities to AFSA.58 Pressure mounted on Stone and AFSA to

improve the responsiveness ofthe COMINT structure.

As Stone's two-year tour was coming to a close, AFSAC convened in January 1951 to

nominate a successor. According to the agreed procedures, the council would consider

nominations made by the Army and the Air Force, but not the Navy, since the Navy had

provided the first director. The Air Force, however, declined, and supported the Army's

candidate, Major General Ralph J. Canine, USA.59 On 15 February 1951, the Secretary of

Defense approved the appointment ofCanine as Director, AFSA.80

During World War II, Canine, an artillery officer, had served under General George

Patton as Chief of Staff, XII Corps, 3rd Army. Other than having been a user of

intelligence, Canine came to the AFSAjob with no prior intelligence experience. However,

prior to assumption of his AFSA duties, Canine had a unique opportunity to participate

directly in a great number ofmatters involving AFSA's responsibilities and relationships.81

As the Army's alternate member ofAFSAC and USCIB, he participated in their meeti.ngs for

a six-month period and learned fJ.rsthand about many ofthe issues confronting AFSA.. This

extended period of orientation gave him a valuable preview of the AFSA structure before

hisformal assumption ofthe position.

On 15 July 1951, Canine succeeded Stone as the second Director, AFSA. Canine's

arrival heralded no immediate major changes in the AFSA structure, however. AFSA

continued to operate under a multiple control arrangement, functioning ullder the

guidance of USCIB and the JCS. USCIB provided limited guidance on policy matters, while

the JCS pr.ovided the management and operational authority over AFSA. The Armc:ld Forces

Security Advisory Committee continued to oversee the operations of AFSA for the JCS, and

at the same time exercised a heavy hand in the direction of AFSA activities. As noted

earlier, AFSA did not have complete freedom of action in the policy and planning areas. A

very early revision ofthe AFSA charter required that all major policy and planning actions

by AFSA had to have prior approval ofAFSAC. Concerning the very critical policy question

of the division of responsibility between AFSA and the services, AFSAC con.sistently

.supported the service views rather than AFSA's. AFSAC also required unanimous approval

by the members prior to taking action on an issue. This meant that it was very difficult, if

not impossible, for AFSA to win a favorable decision on controversial issues.

Canine's arrival also brought no real changes in terms ofAFSA's working relationships

with the service COMINT organizations. If anything, a steady deterioratio~ in these

working relationships continued. Mter the establishment ofAFSA, even the Adny's initial

(b) (1)

(b) (3) -50 USC 403

~(b) (3) -18 USC 798

(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
~-

support and enthusiasm for the centralized concept began diminish and soon matched

that ofthe other services in opposition to unification. In the Army's case, the change was

due primarily to the reassignment of Brigadier General Carter W. Clarke, USA, Chief,

Army Security Agency, who was considered to be the primary architect of the

consolidation concept.82 Clarke became Commanding General, Southwestern Command

Japan, and remained temporarily out of the intelligence field until returning to

Washington in late 1953.63 With Clarke's departure, no one in authority in the Army

wholeheartedly supported consolidation.

The services did agree on one major issue. They were united in their belief that the

Director should have no authority over them. They viewed him solely in the role of

"Coordinator," not "Director." Each of the first two Directors ofAFSA, Stone and Canine,

bitterly fought this concept. They believed this approach to be contrary to the spirit and

intent ofthe AFSA charter. It inhibited them from doing their job properly. As a result of

continuing pressure from Stone and Canine for changes, hostility continued to build

between AFSA and the COMINT services.

Despite Stone and Canine's efforts, by December 1951 management and control issues

remained unresolved. Critical to the successful functioning of AFSA were centralized

processing; better communications, including courier forwarding of raw traffic as well as

improvement ofAFSA's own communications capability; and AFSA's control and direction of

the services.

In summary, while logic seemed to argue for physical merger of the service COMINT

activities, the actual establishment of the Armed Forces Security Agency did not occur

without major opposition. Most authorities, both military and civilian, opposed its

establishment.

With the exception of Defense Secretary Johnson and the initial support ofthe Army,

the majority of the military authorities strongly opposed AFSA as conceptually unsound.

The Navy and the Air Force felt that they would lose control oftheir resources as well as

the ability to provide timely tactical support to their field commanders. Of the civilian

authorities, the representatives of the Department of State and the CIA proved to be even

more strident in their opposition to the establishment of AFSA. They viewed the AFSA

concept as detrimental to national intelligence interests, and representative of still

another effort by the military to control COMINT resources and intelligence priorities.

From their perspective, the AFSA charter completely ignored the roles and authorities of

USCIB as established by the NSC in July 1948.

Despite this opposition, Secretary Johnson almost singlehandedly accomplished the

establishment of AFSA. Because of the new national interest in unification, as well as

presidential support, Johnson pushed through the establishment of the Armed Forces

Security Agency on 20 May 1949. In the process of establishing AFSA, Johnson overrode

the objections of USCIB, the Navy, and the Air Force. General Canine described the

situation best when he characterized the establishment ofAFSA "as representing Johnson's

shotgun wedding ofthe Army, Navy, and Air Force organizations."(W

The original charter, as issued by Johnson, would have permitted a more autonomous

role for the new agency. But an almost immediate modification ofthe AFSAcharter by the

JCS greatly diminished the authority of AFSA and effectively ruled out any real change of

TQPSECRE:r 78

1I!z!fBI:iB YIA eSMI!f'F 81I!z!UfBI:iS SUI:i....
DOCID: 3109065

'f61' SECRET

direction for the COMINT structures. Because of the charter change, the Armed Forces

Security Council, originally envisaged as an internal advisory mechanism for AFSA,

became instead a military tribunal that directed the activities ofAFSA- and left AFSA little

authority ofits own. The military authorities sought to dominate and control all COMINT

assets and to prevent them from coming under the direction ofthe CIA and the Department

ofState. This proved to be a tactic that they would later regret.

During its three years of existence, AFSA was continually confronted with unresolved

operational and jurisdictional problems, many ofa critical nature. But AFSA did succeed in

accomplishing the physical merger of the COMINT processing activities of the Army and

Navy organizations. Organizationally at least, AFSA must be viewed as an important step,

no matter how incomplete, in the movement toward the establishment of a national

cryptologic effort. The AFSA concept and structure became another building block - and

training ground - in the progression toward the centralization of a United States COMINT

authority.

79

M....HQbK 'II.... G9MIHTGMANHKb8 9Hb¥

1=QPSECRET
DOCID: 3109065

T9PSEERE!'

Chapter V

AFSA, the CONSIDO Plan, and the Korean War, 1949-1952

From its inception, AFSA faced pressures to restructure it, to weaken its authority, or to

abolish it altogether. Almost immediately after AFSA was created, the Army proposed the

creation of a new military intelligence agency to be known as the Consolidated Special

Information Dissemination Office (CONSIOO). It would control U.S. COMINT requirements

and the dissemination of all COMINT. The draft proposal provided for exclusive military

control over the U.S. COMINT effort. It quickly drew bitter opposition from the civilian

agencies: CIA, the State Department, and the FBI. No sooner had the CONSIDO proposal

been rejected than the Korean War broke out and AFSA again found itselfin the middle of a

major controversy. The war spotlighted AFSA activities and highlighted major weaknesses

in the U.S. COMINT structure. Even before the war ended, AFSA became the center of a

high-level investigation to reevaluate the role and placement of the U.S. COMINT

organization in the overall U.S. intelligence structure.

When AFSA was established in 1949, Secretary Johnson considered a parallel Army

proposal to create a Consolidated Special Information Dissemination Office. The Army's

plan, with support from the Navy and Air Force, sought to bring all consumers together in

a central evaluation unit. The new office would be under military control, and would serve

as an "intelligence" counterpart ofthe COMINT structure. CONSIDO would be charged with

the responsibility for performing the requirements and dissemination functions related to

the COMINT process for the entire intelligence community. Even more controversial than

the original plans for the establishment of AFSA itself, the proposal had far-reaching

implications and led to a new struggle between the military and civilian members ofUSCIB

over the control ofbasic intelligence functions and relationships. 1

The proposal itself was not new. Near the end of World War II, there had been

extensive discussions by the Army and the Navy concerning the concept of a joint

evaluation and dissemination center for COMINT product. However, when the services

could not reach agreement on a proposal to merge their cryptologic activities, the concept

was abandoned. The idea, however, remained alive within each service. Many military

officials continued to believe that there should be an integrated COMINT structure charged

with responsibility for performing intelligence functions such as the evaluation and

dissemination ofCOMINTproduct. Three months before the establishment ofAFSA, William

F. Friedman, chief, Technical Division, ASA, played a major role in regenerating the plan.

Working in conjunction with the Intelligence Division, Department of the Army,

Friedman reworked the proposal, which the Army forwarded to Secretary Johnson a few

days before the establishment ofAFSA.2

The plan recommended the establishment of a new consolidated intelligence agency

that would be composed of analysts from the various intelligence agencies, and would

operate under the aegis ofa military organization - either the director, AFSA, or some other

military organization. The chief, cONsiDO, would exercise total control over the

development of COMINT requirements, as well as the evaluation, publication, and

dissemination of all intelligence based upon COMINT raw material. The proposal

81

116NBhl!l TrItz S911IN'I' SllAfJNl!lhS 9Nb¥

MPSECRET
DOCID: 3109065

T8PSECRE:r

envisioned the establishment of a CONSIDO office in Washington and the establishment of

overseas branches.3

The stated fundamental objective of the CONSIDO consolidation plan was to improve

Department of Defense intelligence and contribute to "efficiency and economy." With the

establishment ofCONSIDO, the COMINT exploitation units of all other departments were to

be abolished. CONSIDO was to provide integrated intelligence estimates on all available

COMINT and was to reflect the joint view of all intelligence agencies." General Joseph T.

McNarney, special assistant to the Secretary ofDefense, became an enthusiastic supporter

William F. Friedman

of the plan, believing it would result in great savings. He directed that the proposal be

coordinated with State, CIA, and the FBI in order to make it as acceptable as possible to

them. McNarney, however, showed little real consideration for the civilian views. He

remarked that he was "sure that it had been made clear to these agencies previously that

the consolidation was a Department of Defense matter and would take place regardless of

their opinions."5

Secretary Johnson did not immediately endorse the proposal, but instead referred it to

the JCS for review. 6 During the next several months, various redrafts emerged

throughout the intelligence community for establis~ing some form of "CONSIDO." The

TePSECRE:r 82

1IA:N'BbB YIA: eeMUi'f eUA!UfBJ:B enb¥

-- ... -- ..-
DOCID: 3109065

lQPSECRET

main issues alwaysfocused on what organization would control the CO NSIDO structure, and

the role of CIA, State, and the FBI in a CONSIDO-type intelligence operation. Pentagon

officials recommended that AFSAC, the same committee that directed the activities ofAFSA,

control CONSIDO. This, ofcourse, would keep control ofthe organization in the hands ofthe

military authorities. The three civilian elements adamantly opposed exclusive military

control over CONSIDO or any organization that sought to administer the intelligence

requirements process for the total U.S. COMINT effort and that sought to establish strictly

military control over policies governing evaluation and dissemination of COMINT

information.

The debate finally reached the USCIB, when Colonel James R. Lovell of the Joint

Intelligence Committee oftheJCS presented the CONSIDO proposal on 2 December 1949.7 In

the ensuing discussions, the USCIB representatives generally reaffirmed their

organizational positions. State and CIA indicated they would not support the concept

unless they were made jointly responsible with the Department of Defense for running

CONSIDO. Both the State Department and the CIA supported the concept of a CONSIDO type

operation, but they opposed the specific proposal because ofits military orientation.8

W. Park Armstrong, speaking for State, insisted that "the civilian agencies retain

their position of equality with regard to their authority and responsibilities in the COMINT

field.'09 In a memorandum to the members OfUSCIB, Admiral Hillenkoetter, DCI, also stated

his vehement objections to the CONSIDO proposal. He considered the plan to be in complete

derogation ofthe COMINT roles ofthe DCI as assigned by the National Security Act of 1947

and USCIB as established by NSCID No.9. He objected to placing intelligence functions,

such as evaluation, correlation, and dissemination of AFSA product, under exclusive

military control. Stating that intelligence requirements and priorities were a clear-cut

legal responsibility of the CIA, Hillenkoetter further objected to the placement of these

functions under the JCS. In short, Hillenkoetter stressed that many of the CONSIDO

functions were national in nature and could not arbitrarily be assigned to a structure

totally under military control.10

Within the new AFSA structure itself existed a wide divergence of opinion concerning

CONSIDO. Many of the senior military officials felt that the CONSIDO proposal was

conceptually sound. However, Admiral Stone, the director of AFSA, firmly opposed the

CONSIDO concept. Because ofpossible infringements on AFSA's mission and function, Stone

argued against the establishment of an additional agency outside the AFSA framework for

the production of communications intelligence. Stone took the position that approval of

CONSIDO would require a simultaneous revision ofAFSA's charter. He stressed that AFSA

must be responsive to the needs of the State Department and CIA as well as those of the

military. 11

Because of the objections raised by State and CIA (AFSA was not a voting member of

USCIB), USCIB referred the issue to an ad hoc committee under the chairmanship of T.

Achilles Polyzoides ofthe Department of State. 12 The committee continued to struggle for

several more months to develop a compromise solution. Although all members of USCIB

agreed that the six agencies represented on USCIB might integrate COMINT exploitation

activities, they could not agree upon the best form oforganization for that purpose. Two

83

flAtfeet] '';1* eeMUf'f efl*NNI!lbS etfbY

19P5ECRET
DOCI D: 310 9 9,ij.~lECRET

(b) (1)

(b) (3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

quite different proposals finally emerged from the ad hoc committee. One would establish

a eONSIDO under the control of USCIS, the other would establish a CONSII)O under the

control ofthe military.13

The end ofthe eONSIDO discussions took place at the 53rd meeting of USCIS on 14 July

1950. Under USCIB rules, a unanimous vote was required on all useIS decisions. Since the

members were sharply divided on the subordination OfCONSIDO, "all the members agreed

that eONSIDO should be removed from the agenda, subject to a possible restoration at a

later date."14 This action marked the conclusion of formal discussions over eONSIDO. It

never reappeared on the useIS agenda.

Although CONSIDO was dead, it left permanent scars within the intelligence

community. It clearly illustrated the difference of opinion between the civilian agencies

and the military establishment about the control ofUnited States intelligence reSources.15

The distinction between "military" and "national" interests began to receive \greater

attention. The eONSIDO concept soon became the symbol of a new battle to acquire control

over the entire intelligence process.

As AFSA struggled to establish itself, the North Koreans launched an attack against

South Korea on 25 June 1950. AFSA and the rest ofthe U.S. intelligence community were

caught unprepared.18 The COMINT requirements in force in June 1950 (issued by the

Intelligence Committee of USCIS) stressed primarily the need for information concerning

the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union and Communist China. South Korea

was considered to be outside the defensive perimeter of the United States. The list of

countries and subjects "considered to be of greatest concern to U.S. polic;:y or security"

included no reference to Korea. One entry on the list did refer to "unusual activities of

armed forces ofthe Soviet Satellites," but the content ofthis requirement referred only to

the countries of Eastern Europe. Korea was included in the list of secondary

requirements. This category was identified as being of "high importance" and as one that

required "expeditious" handling to the extent possible. Korea was! ~s

Item 15 in a list of 16 items. Item 15 read: "North Korean-Chinese Communist

Relations," and "North Korean-South Korean Relations, including activities of armed

units in border area."17 This low priority statement of interest clearly did not reflect any

great consumer interest - nor was it sufficient to justify broad eOMINT coverage of North

Korean communications prior to the invasion ofSouth Korea.

Because of the absence of consumer intelligence requirements on Korea, AFSA had

established no COMINT effort ofany kind on North Korean communications.18 There was no

effort on the North Korean problem even on a "caretaker" basis. At the time of the

invasion. the only intercept available to AFSA was a limited amount of unidentified traffic.

The communications ofNorth Korea first became known to AFSAin 1950 during the course

of routine intercept searches for Soviet Far Eastern links. The United States initially

intercepted North Korean communications in May 1949 when a search position at an

Army installat~on intercepted an unidentified radio net using Soviet communications

procedures. On 21 April 1950, at the request of Army G-2. AFSA assigned an intercept

position to the specific mission of searching for and developing information on North

Korean communications.19 As a result of these searches. 220 cipher messages were

obtained.20 For the purpose ofidentification, this traffic had passed back and forth between

the group of AFSA analysts working the Soviet problem and the group working the Far

lap SECREl 84
DOCID: 3109065

TOP$ECRET

East problem. By the end of April, the Soviet analysts had concluded that the messages

were "probably North Korean," but the two analytic groups could reach no agreement. It

was not until after the war had started that the traffic was firmly identified as North

Korean.21

The outbreak of the war severely strained the limited COMINT resources available to

the United States and required considerable diversion ofresources and tasking. Not only

was the collection and reporting posture on Korean targets very weak in June 1950 but

this situation extended to all supporting backup areas as well. There were no traffic

analysts working on North Korean communications, no Korean linguists, no dictionaries

ofthe Korean language, no books on the Korean language, no Korean typewriters - and an

almost total absence ofknowledge ofNorth Korean military and technical terminology.22

After the initial attack, AFSA made immediate and drastic adjustments in its COMINT

posture, focusing on the now urgent North Korean tasks. Two weeks after the invasion,

the intercept coverage of North Korean communications had been increased from two to

twelve positions.23 Drastic changes in other intercept coverage also took place. For

example, the COMINT processing activities both in the United States and overseas,

established 24-hour operations. At the same time, however, there was no compensating

reduction in the priorities of other USCIB requirements.24 As a result, AFSA continued its

intercept and reporting of other targets. This coverage included priority reporting on the

Soviet Union and European Satellite countries, as well as onl I

and from the Far East. The increasing number ofpriority targ~dthe limited intercept

capabilities presented AFSA with serious problems in allocatil'lg its resources for intercept

and processing activities. Lacking any unified direction from the consumers, AFSA

generally became the tiebreaker in making decisions on cQl1flicting priorities. In other

cases it simply deferred to the decision ofthe military services based upon their intercept

capability.25

Ironically, the outbreak of the Korean War proved to be beneficial to AFSA in one

respect. By bringing national-level attention to the AFSA plight, the war helped to break

the budgetary straitiiacket that had hampered AFSA. In addition, the possibility that the

war might expand to a global conflict led to the levying ofa multitude of new requirements

on AFSA, mainly for intelligence information about the USSR, the Soviet satellites, China,

and North Korea. It quickly became evident that the struggling AFSA needed additional

resources. This led to increases in AFSA's authorizationsfor manpower and facilities, as

well as an expansion ofthe resources for the entire U.8. COMINT effort.28

The Korean War brought into focus another problem for AFSA that would require more

than a simple expenditure ofresources to fix. It was organizational and related to AFSA'S

position in the COMINT structure and its authority to di~ct the activities of the military

services. With the Korean War, AFSA sought to establish itself as the central U.S.

authority for COMINT matters. Unfortunately, the conflict between AFSA and the services

could not be resolved and greatly impeded AFSA's efforts to fulfill its overall intelligence

role. The difficulties stemmed from the inherent wea.kness of AFSA's charter with its

ambivalence about the roles and authorities of the principal participants in the COMINT

process.

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

85

IIM'BbF.l VIA eSMU,'I' eUIzNNBCS 9!'H:rY

'1=QPSEERET
DOCID: 3109065 ,eiSEtnerWhen Secretary Johnson established AFSA, he designated the new agency as the

central defense authority for the communications intelligence activities of the United

States, but with one significant exception. The charter excluded from AFSA's control those

COMINT facilities and activities that served in direct support of the field commanders for

the purpose of providing tactical intelligence.27 The control and direction of these latter

activities remained the responsibility ofthe military departments. This exclusion clause

proved to be highly divisive. It resulted in a continuing and frequently bitter feud between

AFSA and the services over who was actually in charge of COMINT. The Army and Air

Force, in particular, took advantage of the clause and came into frequent conflict with

AFSA overjurisdictional issues. The conflict usually involved tasking matters - questions

primarily related to the exercise ofoperational and technical control over the military field

installations. As a practical matter, during the Korean War the Army and Air Force

directed their major emphasis toward' the development of their own field collection and

processing activities~ primarily to meet the intelligence needs of their field commanders.

In the judgment of the military COMINT services, they were tasked primarily by military

authorities for the intercept of military counterpart traffic at the tactical level.

Secondarily, they were tasked by AFSA to intercept those nonmilitary targets ofinterest to

the rest of the intelligence community. This latter category included the intercept of

targets identified as being of joint interest, such as' civil and diplomatic links. This

division of effort resulted in the issuance of separate and independent tasking from both

the military intelligence officials and AFSA.28 The unfortunate split in the exercise of

control over the COMINT effort constituted a direct challenge to AFSA's dominant role in

U.S. COMINT.

Admiral Stone, alarmed by the continuing feud, sought to clarify and resolve the

conflict. Issuing AFSAC 60/26 on 13 September 1950, Stone proposed a more precise

definition of the division of responsibility between AFSA and the services, as well as a

greater role for AFSA in the tasking offield sites. Stone did not question the need for the

services to conduct field processing activities in support of the field commanders, but he

maintained that AFSA should be the primary organization to provide the centralized

operational direction of field processing efforts. He proposed specific procedures for

accomplishing a division ofresponsibility between AFSA and the services.29

In AFSAC 60/26, Stone stated plainly what he considered to be AFSA's role as the

centralized COMINT authority in guiding the overall direction of the entire U.S. COMINT

effort including those field operations that were delegated to the military departments for

direct support purposes.30 Stone's proposal, at least in the view ofthe Army and Air Force,

was totally unacceptable. It reopened all the earlier arguments over the validity and

fundamental purpose of the AFSA concept. The Army's official response, to Stone's

amazement, totally rejected the idea of AFSA's exercising any operational direction and

control over the Army's field processing effort. Stone noted on his copy of the Army's

response that it was the most extraordinary example ofa complete reversal ofposition that

he had ever seen. In essence, the Army now claimed that AFSA did not have the

responsibility for providing the Army's field commanders with combat COMINT. The Army

maintained that it would reserve to itself the right of conducting all of its intelligence

operations as it deemed necessary or desirable.31 Similarly, the Air Force, stressing the

+OP5&CRIiT 86

n....!iBbB VIA S9MlPi'f sn...miS~ ,nibY
DOCID: 3109065

T=9PSE(iRET

need for having its own independent processing capability, rejected AFSAC 60/26, and

insisted on controlling Air Force operationsfor the production ofcombat Air Intelligence.32

In a reversal ofits earlier position, the Navy became the only service to support Stone's

paper.33 This switch was due in large part to Captain Joseph N. Wenger, USN, and his

perception of the AFSA role. Wenger's participation in joint Army and Navy discussions

extended from the late 1930s to the early 1950s. During the Stone Board deliberations, he

provided staffsupport to the Navy member and was an articulate spokesman against the

AFSAconcept. Despite his personal feelings about the wisdom ofthe merger, Wenger, as a

deputy director of the new AFSA, played a key role in implementing the merger actions.

Motivated mainly by the realities of the situation, however, Wenger came to recognize

that even greater centralization actions would be necessary in the future. He became a

supporter ofthe AFSA concept and personally drafted the paper (AFSAC 60/26) that laid out

a strong role for AFSAin directing the cOMINTeffort.:U This now became the Navy position.

In assessing the Army's strong disagreement with AFSAC 60/26, Wenger remarked

about the ironies ofthe situation. He recalled that the Army had been the main proponent

for the establishment OfAFSA, whereas the Navy had opposed it, primarily for operational

reasons. According to Wenger, the new Army position was completely counter to what was

understood to have been the aim of AFSA and to what experience had shown to be the

technical realities of COMINT operations. He also saw a real threat to the continued

existence of AFSA if the Navy came to support the Army and Air Force position over the

control of field resources. If this happened, Wenger speculated that the services would

acquire complete independence in large sections ofthe COMINTproblem, thereby depriving

AFSA of its primary reason for existence as a military agency - the centralization and

coordination ofU.S. COMINT.35 He recognized that the Army and Air Force dissents simply

represented a reopening of the earlier controversy over the issues of centralization, but

with one radical difference. The Army and the Navy, who had been the principal players

during the Stone Board deliberations, were no longer speaking from positions of great

operational strength. Each had lost its primary COMINT processing center to AFSA.

According to Wenger, when AFSA absorbed the COMINT processing activities of the

Army and Navy, both services lost highly skilled organizations that took years to develop

and would require many years to replace. Each organization had turned over a major

portion ofits COMINT-trained manpower, its COMINTmachinery, and its COMINT facilities to

AFSA in an effort to make that organization work. The Air Force, however, had lost

nothing, as it possessed no major resources of its own at the time. In the Navy view, the

magnitude ofloss for the Army and Navy revolved around the particular needs of each for

the production of combat intelligence - which the Navy believed differed greatly for each

service. During the Stone Board discussions, the Navy repeatedly stressed this aspect. It

asserted that much of the Army's combat intelligence program was targeted against lowlevel systems, which were exploitable in the field at the tactical level. In contrast, Wenger

and other naval officials always maintained that the entire naval problem could be

handled properly only in a full-scale technical center, as its complexity required

exploitation at the highest analytical leve1.36 Based on this rationale, the Navy

consistently maintained that it had suffered a greater loss than the Army when AFSA

absorbed the two processing centers in 1949.

".

87

IItdof5t~ VIA eSMIfi'f eUltNNBbB 9~

T8PSECRET
DOCID: 3109065

T9PSECRET

Navy authorities now perceived AFSA to be a permanent organization and that the

Army and Navy must rely on it for COMINT support. While the Navy authorities had

earlier opposed the creation of AFSA, they now felt that it was too late to think in terms of

restructuring or abolishing it, particularly during an ongoing war. Consequently, Navy

officials, led by Stone and Wenger, supported AFSA and helped it to expand its technical

resources and capabilities, including its professional talent and complex machine

equipments. They believed that such an expansion ofAFSA's technical capabilities would

help AFSA meet the future intelligence needs of the three services as well as those of the

other members of the intelligence community.37 In taking this position, Navy authorities

made it clear that they would oppose any effort by the Army and Air Force to undo the

AFSA merger.

With only the support of his own service, however, Stone made little progress in his

efforts to strengthen the concept of a centralized COMINT authority. Discouraged, Stone

finally agreed to defer any further consideration of AFSAC 60/26 by the members of the

Armed Forces Security Agency Council. Recognizing that he would not win support in the

JCSfor AFSAcontrol offield relationships, Stone also chose not to submit AFSAC 60/26 to the

JCS for decision. Instead he modified his initial broad approach and narrowed his

argument to a single issue - Air Force processing ofCOMINT in the United States.38

In a memorandum to the JCS(AFSAC 60/42) of24 November 1950, Stone took on a headon challenge from the AFSS concerning the role and authorities ofAFSA. AFSS insisted on

establishing its own centralized processing activity at Brooks Air Force Base, Texas.

Stone asserted that this plan was in direct conflict with the AFSA charter.39 Although the

JCS never took official action, the AFSS canceled its plan to develop Brooks as a centralized

processing center. The Air Force, however, soon announced new plans (AFSAC 60/49) to

establish two major processing centers in the field, one in Europe and the other in the Far

East..co This action strongly reinforced the concept that the services were in charge of

conducting tactical field operations.

With this sequence of actions involving AFSAC 60/26 and AFSAC 60/49, the Army and

the Air Force prevailed over AFSA in their insistence that the services, not AFSA, should

maintain the dominant role in controlling the activities of their field resources. The

distance from Washington, as well as the need for timeliness in reporting the intelligence

information, contributed to this victory. Moreover, this was an era when service collectors

were tasked primarily with the intercept of the communications of their foreign

counterpart service, and secondarily with the intercept of joint targets (Le., civil and

diplomatic). Thus, for a combination ofreasons, the military commanders in Korea would

rely primarily on their respective military services for tactical intelligence rather than on

AFSA. While AFSA officials continued to believe that AFSA should exercise operational and

technical control over all COMINT activities, they did not have sufficient power and

authority to impose their will on the military COMINT services.

As the Korean War continued, both the Army and the Air Force organizations

expanded their field intercept capability and established their own field processing

activities. Despite the continuing controversy, the operational elements of AFSA and the

military services worked together in great harmony. In their day-to-day coordination on

operational matters, they demonstrated a strong spirit of mutual cooperation and

assistance. They freely exchanged information and technical details related to the

T-9PSECRET 88

IIItNBbB 'flit 8SMIti'f 8IIAtiliBtJB SliM."
DOCID: 3109065 lQPSECREl

collection and analytic processes, including such items as translations, cryptanalytic

recoveries, and interc~ptdata. There were also personnel exchanges between AFSA and the

services over a broad range of operational functions. For example, AFSA sponsored

continuing programs for AFSA personnel to perform temporary duty assignments in the

field in order to assist the services - and for military personnel to participate in orientation

and training programs at AFSA prior to their assignment to the field. 41 By the time the war

ended, these field programs became major focal points for COMINT reporting and provided

unique intelligence contributions to the field commanders.

From the beginning ofthe war, it was evident that U.S. combat forces in Korea would

rely on the individual service processing units in the Far East for tactical COMINT support.

Starting with only one intercept stationl Ithe Army COMINT organization

ultimately acquired the largest contingent of field units in support of U.S. operations in

Korea. The Army set up its field headquarters, the Army Security Agency, Pacific

(ASAPAC), in Tokyo. ASAPAC also served as a major processing center in the theater,

directing Army fixed intercept sites located in Japan, Hawaii, and Korea. In addition,

ASAPAC established a number ~.f advance detachments in Korea. By 1951, the 501st

Communications Reconnaissance Group headed all Army \.COMINT units in Korea.

Subordinate units were designated Communications Reconnaissance Battalions or

Companies (CRB, CRC). ASAPAC exercised overall control of Army COMINT operations in

Korea, including South Korean detachments.42

At the outbreak of war, the only Air Force unit in the Far East was the 1st Radio

Squadron Mobile (RSM) with detachments scattered throughout Japan. After the North

Korean attack, the Air Force established a detachment of the 1st RSM in Korea for

intercept and reporting and for direction of a South Korean unit. In 1951, the Air Force

began to deploy smaller teams to Korea for the production of tactical COMINT for the 5th

Air Force. Eventually, the Air Force established the 6920th Security Group, an area

headquarters, in Tokyo. The 6920th gradually assumed responsibility from ASAPAC for the

intercept and processing ofthe ground communications ofthe North Kor.ean Air Force.43

The reliance on counterpart coverage, coupled with the small number ofNorth Korean

or Chinese naval forces involved in the war, precluded any major role for U.S. naval

COMINT units. In the course of the war, however, the Navy's radio facility,I I

I Idid provide important assistance to the overall Far East COMINT effort..

The Communication Supplementary Detachments (COMMSUPDETS) afloat also contributed

unique intercept of SovietOround Control nets and Chinese Merchant Shipping

activities."

At the Washington level, AFSA alsO attempted to improve its relations with consumerS.

Stone, in his dual role as AFSA Director and Executive Agent of USCIB in COMINT matterS,

attempted to keep the consumer community current on all AFSA actions. He not only

encouraged the establishment of consumer liaison offices at Arlington Hall but also

promoted an expansion of the direct dialogue between intelligence analysts and COMINT

producers. Traditionally, the two performed their tasks withlittle interaction. This new

dialogue took place in an era when the COMINT community was particularly sensitive to

the release of "technical" information or "tech data" to consumers. The term "tech data"

generally referred to the operational details of the intercept, analysis,afld translation

process. It included specifics related to collection sources, callsigns, identifi,catlon of

-:!t

..:...

89

MA~bii \lIA S9Mnf'l' 8IIAN!fBbSS!it.....

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

i8P5El(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
DOCID: 3109065

TOp SEERET

communications links, identification of cryptographic systems, and other details of the

analytic process.4S The issue over providing technical data to the consumers was never

resolved. It continued to be a source of conflict between COMINT producers and consumers.

Many consumers, especially CIA, demanded the data. The producers opposed providing it.

Initially, Stone's push for a freer interchange between producers and consumers

caused considerable opposition within the COMINT family itself. Many AFSA personnel

viewed the move toward closer dialogue as blurring the distinction that traditionally

existed between the roles ofthe COMINT analyst and the intelligence analyst. The COMINT

analyst was to provide only raw data. The intelligence analyst produced finished

intelligence. Because of the war and its pressing priorities, however, such distinctions

soon dissipated.46

Despite such problems, there existed major areas of cooperation among the

intelligence producing agencies in Washington. Long before the establishment of AFSA,

the Army G-2 and the Office of Naval Intelligence established collocated offices with their

service counterparts at Arlington Hall Station and the Communications Supplementary

Activity, Washington. Within each service, the consumer and producer elements

developed harmonious working relationships and operated with a minimum of

correspondence or formality. These consumer contacts extended not only to the COMINT

processing elements but to the policy-making officers of the COMINT organizations as

well.47

When AFSA was establishe~, many of the Army and the Navy COMINT officials simply

moved over to new positions of authority corresponding to their previous roles in their old

agencies. In this manner, the liaison arrangements between the military producers and

consumers operated smoothly during the transition period.

This liaison arrangement worked particularly well for the Army's Special Research

Branch (SRD) during the Korean War. One ofthe most active consumers wasG-2. Early in

the war, SRD collocated personnel in AFSA'S North Korean section, where they worked

closely with the AFSA COMINT analysts in almost all phases of the exploitation process.

Since the SRB representatives scanned all translations and traffic analysis reports prior to

publication, they were able to develop a unique perspective of COMINT operations. In

addition to this direct participation in COMINT activities, SRB served as a general channel

for the dissemination ofCOMINTfrom AFSA to the Far East commands.48

In contrast to the long-standing working arrangements of the Army and Navy

consumers with their military COMINT counterparts, the Air Force started from scratch.

When the Air Force became a separate service in 1947, the Army continued to provide

intelligence support to the new service on an interim basis. Within a year, the Air Force

activated the AFSS, its own COMINT processing organization that began operations at

Arlington Hall Station on 1 February 1949 and relocated to Brooks Air Force Base in

Texas in May 1949.49

Responding to the demand for more timely COMINT product, the Air Force relocated a

part ofits Office of Intelligence (AFOIN-C/R), under Colonel Horace D. Neely, to Arlington

Hall in 1950. The purpose of the move was to enable Air Force intelligence analysts to

work more closely with AFSA, as well as with the Army (Special Research Branch) and

Navy (OP·922YI) intelligence organizations. The operations of the new AFOIN·c/R soon

'fep SEEREf 90

IIAliBI:oB YJIA 68Mm'f 8IIAmiBbB 8NM,'
DOCID: 3109065 ;.,;.~,

.- .,ep SEERE.,

paralleled that of other consumers, with its intelligence analysts consulting freely with

processing personnel in AFSA's working areas.50

In time, however, the AFSS assumed administrative control of all Air Force COMINT

activities in the Washington area. By February 1952, all of the Air Force units were

combined into the Washington, D.C., Control-Collection Office (WDC/CCO) of AFSS headed

by Colonel James L. Weeks. This organization represented the Air Force in a dual

capacity, both as a producer and user of COMINT. As a COMINT producer, it worked with

AFSA's Office of Operations in the development of intercept assignments and served in a

general liaison capacity as AFSA's point of contact with the AFOIN-c/R and the AFSS. As a

consumer, it produced fmished intelligence and represented the Air Force on USCIB and

AFSA boards and committees. By 1952, the Air Force was the largest consumer delegation

resident at AFSA, with well over 100 people assigned to its control-collection office.51

Although the Department of State's active involvement in postwar COMINT dated back

at least to 1945, when it joined with the Army and Navy organizations to form STANCIB,

the establishment of a full-time State liaison officer at Arlington Hall did not come about

until the Korean War. 52 It grew out ofdiscussions ofthe USCIB on 14 July 1950 concerning

mobilization and later discussions on the subject between Rear Admiral Stone and W.

Park Armstrong, the State Department's representative on USCIB. When Armstrong

suggested State's willingness to provide direct financial support to AFSA for increasing

COMINT output, Admiral Stone countered by suggesting that the establishment of a State

Department liaison group in AFSA might be more useful. Stone felt that State could assure

fulfillment of its intelligence requirements by an "on-the-spot audit of the COMINT

production program," and could also handle such working problems as determination of

priorities and transmission ofcollateral.53

Armstrong accepted Stone's offer, but the State Department took no official action

until a year later. On 15 July 1951, the department established a liaison unit at Arlington

Hall consisting ofJohn Crimmins and three assistants. The unit had no specific title at

first, but was later designated the "Field Branch, Special Project Staff." The new Field

Branch followed the pattern of operation of other liaison offices, but on a much smaller

scale. It worked directly with AFSA 02, advising it of State Department COMINT

requirements. It also worked directly with the analytic and collection elements of the

AFSA Office of Operations in order to provide more detailed information about the

requirements transmitted through the USCIBcommittee structure.54

AFSA's relationship with CIA underwent a greater change than with any other

consumer group. Although initially uncertain of its charter and authorities, the new CIA

gradually began to seek greater participation in COMINT activities. In response to a

request from DCI Admiral Hillenkoetter, in 1948 USCIB authorized CIA direct access to

COMINT activities. USCIB also authorized, under certain circumstances, the direct

participation by consumers in actual COMINT production activities. It represented a major

change in the consumer-producer relationship.55

Shortly after the physical merger of Army and Navy COMINT processing activities in

1949, CIA, with the concurrence ofAdmiral Stone, moved into its first official liaison office

at Arlington Hall. Starting in late 1949, John S. Ward served part-time as the first CIA

Liaison Officer. During this period, the main CIA interest was Soviet plain text. Based

91

MAN9bE ¥11'. GeMINI GHANNflI7.S eNtl\'"

lOP SECRET
DOCID: 3109065

upon the earlier USCIB decision, CIA arranged with AFSA for the assignment of some CIA

personnel to the Russian Language Branch (AFSA 246) where they were integrated within

the AFSA structure. With the support and guidance of AFSA personnel, CIA carried on its

own research in the plaintext unit. In addition, CIA assigned a limited number of

personnel to work in the collateral and COMINT files of the Central Records Office (AFSA

25).58 With the onset of the Korean War, CIA merely expanded its cooperative effort with

AFSA.

By 1951, the entire consumer community had liaison offices at Arlington Hall.

Because of their well-established relationships with their military counterparts in

COMINT, however, and because ofAFSA's military orientation, the Army and the Navy

representatives enjoyed a greater access to AFSA's operational offices than those from the

Department of State and the CIA. AFSA, as a predominantly military organization, tended

to be more responsive to the military when determining intercept priorities. Nevertheless,

the representatives ofthe civilian agencies welcomed the establishment of a beachhead at

Arlington Hall and the opportunity for direct and continuing dialogue between the

producers and consumers on intelligence matters. While these measures contributed to a

less confrontational attitude within the intelligence community, representatives of the

civilian agencies still felt uncomfortable with the basic design ofthe U.S. COMINTstructure

and their lack of influence with AFSA. It was a continuation of the strong objections

expressed by officials of the State Department and CIA when AFSA was first established as

an autonomous intelligence arm ofthe Department ofDefense.57

Despite problems, AFSA did succeed in making significant changes in its relationships

with the consumers. Stone designed a new "open-door" policy for COMINT relationships

with consumers, both military and civilian. He encouraged and facilitated the

establishment of consumer offices at Arlington Hall in an effort to improve the dialogue

between the producers and consumers. Both seemed to benefit. The consumers, by virtue

oftheir physical presence at the COMINTcenter and by their participation in AFSA's priority

mechanism, saw at first hand the inner workings of the AFSA structure - as well as the

major problems confronting AFSA. In addition, the consumers began to display a greater

appreciation of COMINT as a unique and valuable source of intelligence information.

Although the concept of exercising "oversight" over the COMINT structure had not yet

materialized, the intelligence community began to move in the direction of discussing

more critically and more openly the quality, the utility, and the timeliness of COMINT

reporting. Joint community actions and discussions ofan evaluative nature now occurred

more frequently. For example, the USCIB Intelligence Committee began publishing a

monthly report listing the total number of COMINT messages published. It was broken

down by country and series and indicated whether the messages were plaintext or

encrypted. The report also showed the statistical improvements in volume over the

previous month.58 Despite the improving relationships, AFSA made no real progress in

resolving the serious management and operational problems affecting its relationships

with the military COMINT services by the summer of 1951.

The basic question of operational control of service intercept facilities remained

unresolved. Stone, the first director of AFSA, in fact controlled fewer intercept positions

than his predecessor, the Coordinator ofJoint Operations under the earlier Joint ArmyNavy Operating Plan. Under the Joint Operating Plan, the CJO had direct access to joint

'fe' SEEREl' 92
DOCID: 3109065

----------------

(b) (1)

(b) (3)-50 USC 403

~(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

intercept positions and a restricted access to all other intercept positions. But Stone, as

AFSA director, did not have this same access. As noted earlier, a large number\of the

intercept facilities, namely the mobile collection sites, were removed totally from the

control ofAFSA. These sites were under the exclusive operational control of the services.

Even in exercising AFSA'S authorized control over the flXed intercept sites, Stone had to

operate under a rigid set of arrangements and rules prescribed by each service.59 \\The

system was not designed to enhance timely reporting ofCOMINT information.

Another nagging problem for AFSA was the extent to which the services conducted

their own autonomous processing activities in the field. While AFSA'S protestations over

the control ofthe field processing centers had abated somewhat with the Korean War, the

problem remained. The services continued to dilute AFSA's role as a central authority. In

particular, problems with the Air Force intensified as the AFSS persisted in its efforts to

acquire primary control over the total air problem. Even more damaging to U.S. COMINT

than the friction generated by this issue was the broader question ofduplication and waste

ofresources both in the field and stateside processing centers.

For example. in early 1951 ASAPAC and AFSS both covered Chinese Communist and

Soviet targets. I'---=-____:~:__-:-~:__:=:-:-~:_:_--___=~___:::__-"""':"_==_~:__---_=_---' Concerned, Major General Charles A. Willoughby, 0-2 of the General Headquarters, Far

East Command (FECOM) requested that a high-level AFSA team visit the theater to assist 0-

2, FECOM, and ASAPAC in a consultative capacity.60 On 12 March 1951, Stone sent two of his

senior officials to the Far East Command to brief Willoughby and review the field

operational problems. Benson K. Bufiham, assistant chief, General Processing Division,

and Herbert L. Conley, a senior manager and collection specialist, went to Korea. In their

final report of 2 April 1951, Bufiham and Conley cited the duplicative efforts of AFSA,

ASAPAC, and the AFSSon the North Korean problem. Among their recommendations they

proposed that ASAPAC and AFSS divide and coordinate their efforts, particularly on the

Soviet and Chinese Communist Air problem. Despite the urgency of their

recommendations, duplication continued until March 1952, when the AFSS assumed total

responsibility for the Chinese Communist and Soviet Air problems.81

During 1951, AFSAconfronted a number of operational problems as well. U.S. COMINT

contributions to the war effort were far below the achievements of COMINT during World

War 11.62 Suffering from a shortage of intercept facilities, short tours of duty by military

personnel, and difficulty obtaining linguists, AFSA could not fully exploit COMINT

possibilities during the war.8S

Moreover, by the fall of 1951, the North Koreans introduced new and more

sophisticated cryptographic systems,!

J

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

93

UANBI:JB lIlA 09MIN'I' OUANNE:b8 9Pa.¥

'F9P SE'AE'F
DOCID: 3109065

Tap SECREf

Benson K. Buffham

"(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Herbert L.Conley

As the war dragged on, AFSA concentrated its efforts at increasing the flow of tactical

COMINT from the services to the field commanders. The real COMINT success story of the

Korean War proved to be in the area oftactical support. Because ofthe nature ofthe land

war, coupled with the assignment of counterpart coverage to each service, the Army and

Air Force controlled, almost totally, the intercept coverage and reporting on the Korean

and Chinese targets. In providing direct support to the Eighth Army and the UN Forces,

the Army and Air Force are generally acknowledged as having made the principal

military contributions to the COMINT effort in Korea. An unpublished NSA review of

COMINT in the Korean War written/in 1953 emphasized this point:

Perhaps the most interel\ting development of COMINT in a tactical support role was the

successful expansion and utilization oflow-Ievel voice intercept. In August 1951, the effort was of

the mostrudimentary nature - but the nature ofthe intelligence provided was ofsuch immediate

tactical value to corps, division and regiment commanders that those eommanders clamored for

additional support. By the end ofOctober 1951,seven low-level voice teams had been formed in

support ofthe u.s. I and IX Corps. By June 1952, there were ten teamsin action along the Eighth

Army front.

These teams were able to advise frontline unit commanders ofimminent enemy artillery Of

infantry action and their advance warningsthrough the balance afUte war were instrumental in

the success ofUN counter actions and the saving ofmany UN lives.88

Korean and Chinese militar

1=OP S&CREf 94
DOCID: 3109065

lQPi&<:RIiT

extremely thin, especially with the lack of COMINT froml Icommunications.67

Many officials in the U.S. intelligence community, aware of the impressive contributions

made by COMINT in World War II, complained about AFSA'sl I

I r

While the military services were, in general, satisfied with AFSA'sattention to their

intelligence requirements, State Department and CIA officials were not. They felt that

their intelligence requirements were not being met. They complained a.bout their lack of

input in establishing intelligence requirements and AFSA's lack of authol'ity in translating

these priorities to the collectors. AFSA officials made vague attempts to pacify the civilian

complaints stating that "we will take care ofit,"\that "of course, this is otinterest to all of

us," and "you can be sure that you will get your share." But this did notsatisfy the State

Department nor the CIA. In truth, the civilian agencies were correct.. There was no

existing mechanism whereby the rapidly growing CIA could express its needs for economic,

scientific, and general intelligence information to the cryptologic community. Similarly,

there existed no regularized channels open to the Department of State whereby it could

levy its requirements for diplomatic intelligence with any degree of assurance that its

needs would even be considered by AFSA. 69

By 1951 the flaws of the AFSA experiment were clear. The division of responsibility

between AFSA and the services prevented AFSA from undertaking any serious new

initiatives to improve the total U.S. COMINTproduct. As\a direct corollary of this, Stone's

lack ofauthority over the services greatly diminished the quality and timeliness ofCOMINT

reporting and resulted in duplication of COMINT coverage~ Fractionalization prevented

AFSA from operating as a centralized COMINT organization.

Because AFSAC invariably supported the service viewpoints rather than AFSA's on the

issue of AFSA'S authority, AFSAC was of no assistance to AFSA in resolving the serious

jurisdictional disputes. The last avenue of appeal was to USCIB.. However, UBCIB was little

more than a coordinating body with no real authority over the AFBA structure itselfor its

organizational role. Although USCIB had a vital interest in the\intelligence produced by

the military components, it could not resolve the jurisdictional issues between AFSA and

the services.70

In summary, AFSA received persistent criticism from the time ofits creation. The U.S.

Army's CONBIDO proposal was an attempt by the U.S. military to\establish a separate

COMINT intelligence agency parallel to AFSA that would maintain strict military control

over most U.S. COMINT sources. Itmet with bitter opposition from the civilian intelligence

agencies such as CIA and the Department of State. Although the proposal was defeated,

the deliberations concerning CONSIDO reinforced the generally hostile climate existing in

intelligence matters, and the continuing concerns of CIA and State that their intelligence

needs were not being met.

The Korean War proved to be a major turning point in the history ofthe U.S. COMINT

structure. At the outbreak ofthe war, glaring weaknesses appeared in the AFSA structure.

There were major problems with resources, intercept and reporting capabilities, and the

cryptanalytic attack itself. Most importantly, the war illustrated AFsA's\.inability to

control the COMINT organizations ofthe services and its inability to control and direct U.S.

COMINT resources in an efficient, effective manner. Despite AFSA's attempts a'increased

(b) (1)

(b) (3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

95 (b) (3) - P . L . 8 6 - 3 6

UhlfBl:lS VIA S8MU'i'F SIIMiHKbS 8ML:¥
DOCID: 3109065 -';T~C~r~SilE!fe~ItHl!~T'""---

coordination and some success with the exploitation of low-level technical

communications, U.S. policymakers came to see AFSAas a basic failure. It did not or could

not duplicate the COMINT successes of the Second World War. It thus became the

centerpiece in a high-level investigation to reform and redirect the entire U.S. COMINT

structure.

Tap SECRET 96

IIAPiBbB •..11\ esi'viHi't 6llAutiBt.Belftrz
DOCID: 3109065

7=9PSE€RE'F

I Chapter VI

The Brownell Committee and the

Establishment ofNSA, 4 November 1952

On 24 October 1952, President Truman issued an extraordinary directive that

changed the organization and direction of the U.S. communications intelligence structure

and laid the policy framework for the modern system. Truman stated that the

communications intelligence function was a national responsibility rather than one of

purely military orientation. This triggered actions that reorganized the U.S. military

COMINT effort and strengthened the COMINT roles of the USCIB and the NSC and brought a

wider role for the civilian agencies in U.S. COMINT operations. The president's

memorandum also contained the first reference to a "National Security Agency," to be

established in place ofthe Armed Forces Security Agency. Under Truman's directive, the

Department ofDefense became the executive agent ofthe government for the production of

communications intelligence information, thereby removing the JCS as the controlling

authority for the COMINTprocess.

Truman's directive stemmed from the recommendations of a presidential commission

known as the Brownell Committee. Truman established the committee to conduct an

investigation of the efficiency and organization of the entire U.S. communications

intelligence effort. By December 1951, AFSA'S disappointing wartime performance had

been brought to the attention ofthe White House, and Truman responded by calling for a

complete review of the COMINT structure. Setting up a mostly civilian committee,

however, caused great alarm within the military, particularly in the JCS. In February

1952, the JCS complained that it had no part in the deliberations leading to the committee's

establishment and that the U.S. military had been excluded from membership on the

committee and itssupport staff.

The final Brownell Report emphasized the need for the establishment of one

organization to manage the communications intelligence activities of the government.

The report provided a strong indictment ofservice unulCation as it existed under AFSA as

well as an indictment of the management and policy echelons existing above AFSA. The

report recommended a complete reorganization of the U.S. COMINT effort, and provided a

blueprint for the new structure. As its main theme, the Brownell Committee pressed for

the elevation of the COMINT structure to a new status, requiring national-level attention

and interest. It also spoke out against the almost total autonomy ofthe military in COMINT

matters. This chapter details the history of .the creation of the Brownell Committee, its

report to the president, and subsequent acts that had a major impact on the U.S.

intelligence community and led to the creation ofthe National Security Agency.

By 1951, the CIA and the Department of State representatives of USCIB felt vindicated

in their original opposition to the establishment ofAFSA. The problems associated with the

operations of AFSA had grown considerably and now extended to a broad range of

intelligence community relationships. Organizationally, the fundamental issue over the

division ofresponsibiIity between AFSA and the military COMINT services appeared to be no

97

nldiBI:dS VIA eeMUi'f enAmR!lbBeNb¥

lap SECREl
DOCID: 3109065

T9P5ECRET

closer to a solution. The Korean War evoked new criticisms ofthe AFSA structure. A spirit

ofdisunity and turmoil characterized the activities ofthe entire intelligence community.

The major players of the intelligence community were locked in a struggle over "who

was in charge" and over the acquisition of expanded responsibilities and authorities. The

military and 'civilian agencies continued to argue over basic jurisdictional and

organizational relationships. These disputes greatly complicated the entire intelligence

picture. The new CIA, seeking to expand its role, pushed for greater authority in the total

intelligence process. While the Department of State had different intelligence interests

than CIA, it generally aligned itself with CIA on most issues during the USCIB meetings and

in the protests over the lack ofcivilian/military equality in the COMINT field. 1

In particular, the vigorous and heated discussions over the establishment ofAFSA, and

later over the JCS proposal to establish a new military intelligence agency, CONSIDO,

constituted head-on challenges, not only to the role of CIA in the intelligence field, but to

the authority of the National Security Council as well. Although the CONSIDO proposal

was dropped, CIA and State viewed it as an attempt to acquire a dominant and proprietary

role for the military in such intelligence functions as estimates, evaluations, and

dissemination ofintelligence.2 CIA and State perceived a constant erosion in their abiliby

to get the COMINT structure to consider and satisfy their intelligence needs.s

The stage was set for reform. But what shape should the reform take? What were the

avenues for resolution of the "AFSA problems" - and the increasing tension within the

community over the ownership and control of ancillary COMINT functions? AFSA by itself

could not resolve the many managerial and operational conflicts. Nor did there appear to

be any likelihood of a solution emanating from USCIB, which remained powerless because

of its limited charter and military-dominated membership. Because of its membership

majority, the military organizations were able to control the board in its working-level

committees.·

Given the rigidity of the existing COMINT structure, CIA and State officials probably

concluded that further dialogue would be fruitless. Taking direct action, they pressed for

fundamental changes in the intelligence structure. It was an opportune time. The

Truman administration was extremely budget conscious and was known to favor

centralizing and consolidating intelligence responsibilities and functions. 5

There was also a new DCIon the scene. General Walter Bedell Smith, USA, appointed

by President Truman on 21 August 1950, succeeded Admiral Hillenkoetter as the fourth

Director of Central Intelligence. The appointment of Smith represented a significant

change of leadership for CIA and foretold a change in the CIA posture as well as in its

approach to intelligence community relationships. Having served as chief of staff under

General Dwight D. Eisenhower in the European Theater from 1942 to 1945, and as U.S.

ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1946 to 1949, Smith had gained the personal support

and confidence of President Truman. Known to be an exceptionally strong and forceful

executive, Smith was highly respected by Eisenhower and other top military and

government officials, particularly for his organizational talents. During his three-year

tour as DCI, Smith played a preeminent and rigorous role in the organizational evolution of

the DCI and CIA roles. This, in turn, had a major impact on the entire intelligence

community. Aggressive action became a keystone ofSmith's new approach.6

'f8PSECRET 98

HA~JQbK '.zlA S9MIWf SlI"'~J~JKbS9~Jby
DOCID: 3109065

,epSECRET

i

/

General Walter Bedell Smith, DCI

With a view to reforming the COMINT

structure, Smith brought the AFSA problem to

the attention of the NSC on 10 December 1951

and recommended an overall survey of the

COMINT structure. His recommendation for

such a survey was based on a study by

Kingman Douglass, who was then the CIA

COMINT officer. The NSC, in turn, forwarded

Smith's proposal to President Truman. Three

days later, Truman directed Secretary of State

Dean Acheson and Secretary of Defense Robert

Lovett, assisted by Director of Central

Intelligence Smith, to review in depth the

communications intelligence activities of the

United States government.7

Acheson, Lovett, and Smith responded by

creating a high-level committee to accomplish

the survey. On 28 December 1951, they

created the Brownell Committee, headed by

George A. Brownell, a prominent New York

City attorney. Brownell was assisted by

Charles E. ("Chip") Bohlen, Counselor, State Department; William H. Jackson, Special

Assistant to the DCI; and Brigadier General John Magruder, USA (Ret.), Special Assistant

to the Secretary of Defense. The CIA and the Department of State provided the staff

members ofthe committee: Lloyd N. Cutler and Harmon Duncombe, CIA; Grant C. Manson

and Benjamin R. Shute, State. All of the staff members had served previously in the

Special Intelligence Branches ofthe Army or the Navy. The Brownell Committee and its

support staff took up residence at CIA and were administratively supported by CIA. The

carefully tailored composition ofthe Brownell Committee and its supporting staff omitted

one important group. The military authorities, who heretofore had dominated the U.S.

COMINT structure, were not included at any level in the actual review process.8

Acheson, Lovett, and Smith directed the Brownell Committee to undertake a survey of

the COMINT structure and to submit recommendations on two general subjects:

(1) the needs of each governmental department and agency for the production of

departmental intelligence, and of the Director of Central Intelligence for the

production ofnational intelligence, and

(2) the most effective allocation of responsibilities for COMINT activities, and the

extent to which these activities should be performed by a single department or

agency as a service of common concern - and to which department or agency such

assignment should be made.9

In short, the committee was to look at centralization and placement of the entire U.S.

COMINTeffort in the U.S. intelligence community.

99 lOP§ECRET

I1t.~t9bS VIA e8MI!if'f GHkNUElbS eUb"i'
DOCID 3109065

Ftll" :,fCREl

George A. Brownell

TOP "CREf 100

HANSel!! VIA OSMm'f 6HAPlNEbS 8tl'bY
\-_. " . (~~:.,:':~..

DOClD: 3109065

.....

o

.....

Meeting ofthe National Security Council,January 1951
DOCID: 3109065

"FeP SECRET

~" -,"\

••.._ •.1..

Charles E.("Chip") Bohlen William H.Jackson BGen John Magruder, USA, Ret.

The establishment of the Brownell Committee provoked immediate outcries within

the U.S. military. Four weeks after the creation of the committee, the Joint Chiefs

summoned the Director, AFSA, the three Service Directors ofIntelligence, and the Deputy

Director, Joint Intelligence Group, JCS, to a special meeting to discuss the Brownell

Committee's investigation of COMINT activities.10 On 4 February 1952, Major General

Ralph J. Canine, USA, Rear Admiral Frank L. Johnson, USN, Major General Alexander R.

Bolling, USA, Major General John A. Samford, USAF, and Brigadier General Richard C.

Partridge, USA, met with the Joint Chiefs. The message of the meeting was clear - the

Joint Chiefs were alarmed over the activities of the Brownell Committee. The service

chiefs complained that they had not been consulted about the investigation prior to its

conception, that they had no representation on the board, and that the line of questioning

indicated a possibility that the board would recommend transfer ofAFSA from the control of

the JCS. Despite their forebodings, however, the options open to the JCS remained limited,

particularly in light ofthe fact that the committee was already in operation. Without the

unanimous support of the NSC or the USCIB, the JCS was obviously in no position to risk a

head-on challenge with the president or the secretary ofdefense. 11

In trying to salvage something, the JCS had little choice but to settle for some rather

pro forma actions. They asked General Omar Bradley, Chairman, Jes, to meet with

Secretary Lovett and "again express the considerable concern of the JCS over the possible

transfer of AFSA from their jurisdiction." They also decided that the JCS would make its

own full-scale review ofthe AFSA problem - but at a later date - to determine whether more

authority should be given to the director "so he could actually control in one organization

the COMINT effort ofthe United States. "12 While this projected study was a tacit admission

that all was not well within the COMINT structure, it reflected a glimmer of JCS optimism

"FeP SECRET 102

II1t!i8bB Vb... SaMm'fSUAIU,1!J1::S 6l(LY
----- -----

DOCID: 3109065

.,.SP SEERC.,.

that somehow the Brownell effort would wither and die without producing any tangible

results. The JCS never got around to conducting its projected study. The Brownell

Committee moved. too swiftly.

The final Brownell Report, submitted to Acheson and Lovett on 13 June 1952,

confirmed that JCS apprehensions about the loss of AFSA were well founded. The report

completely demolished the concept of unification of the three services as it existed under

AFSA. The committee concluded that the structure of COMINT activities did not reflect

unification under single control, but rather a structure offour associated agencies - one of

which, AFSA, performed limited functions in ways acceptable to those who controlled the

other three. In short, it was a military organization controlled by the military.13

The report hammered out the theme that the director, AFSA, had insufficient authority

or control over the COMINT activities of the three services. It noted, "... that for all

practiCal purposes the AFSA charter made AFSAC (which is nothing except a committee

made up ofthe three services) the boss ofAFSA, which in turn is completely dependent upon

the Service organizations for all its communications and practically all ofits collection of

COMINT.,,14 In reviewing the management framework in which AFSA operated, the report

noted that the director had to spend much of his time and energy on cajolery, negotiation,

and compromise in an atmosphere of bitter interservice rivalry. According to the report,

the director ofAFSA had no real degree ofcontrol over the Service COMINT units- but rather

was under their control by virtue oftheir representation on AFSAC. His only appeal was to

the same three services.

The committee also had harsh words for other parts ofthe U.S. intelligence structure.

It strongly criticized the management and policy structures existing above AFSA (USCIB,

JCS, and AFSAC) for their total lack of effectiveness in providing guidance, direction, and

management support to AFSA. Noting that "the U.S. Communications Intelligence Board

(on which the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau

of Investigation, as well as the three services, are represented) has inadequate authority

and has become an ineffective organization," the committee concluded that "the COMINT

effort of today has too many ofthe aspects of a loose combination of the previous military

organizations and too few of a true unification of the COMINT activities and interests of all

the interested departments and agencies...15

In reaching its conclusions, the Brownell Committee stated that its basic thinking was

influenced by "two controlling but somewhat conflicting factors."18 As a first and

fundamental premise, it believed that all of the interested services and agencies should

have a voice in determining AFSA policies and giving it guidance. Second, as a counterbalance to this, and in order to strengthen the COMINT structure, the committee stressed

that AFSA should be placed under a single governmental department for administrative

purposes. This line of reasoning signaled, for the first time, the identification of COMINT

resources as being national in nature. It signaled too the probable end of the era of

exclusive military control of COMINT resources. Thus, in the view of the committee, the

removal ofthe COMINT structure from JCS control was a necessity. Ideally, and in order to

provide an effective COMINT response to the intelligence requirements ofall consumers, the

responsibility for the COMINT function should be centralized in a neutral governmental

agency that would have some latitude in its operation.

103

MAN'QbE VIA G9MINTGMANMEb8 9Mb¥"

Tep SE'Rlii
DOCID: 3109065

1=QP5ECRET

The Brownell Report concluded that a point had been reached in the evolution of the

United States intelligence community that now made it essential "to carry further the

1949 reorganization of the COMINT structure."17 It proceeded to outline many actions that

should be taken "to strengthen AFSA itself and to increase its authority over COMINT

results." These recommendations, directed essentially toward a reorganization and

unification of the COMINT structure, addressed a number of broad COMINT relationships,

both within and outside the COMINT structure. The scope of the recommendations

extended into the major operational and management phases of the COMINT business,

including the production of COMINT, the centralization of COMINT authority, the

management ofCOMINT resources, and policy oversight ofCOMINT resources. 18

From the outset, the Brownell Committee recognized that complete unification would

be impossible because ofthe dependence UI,on the military structures to man field stations.

Consequently, Brownell concluded that the service units must retain their own authorities

and responsibilities within their military departments. To ameliorate this and to assist

AFSAin its mission of providing effective, unified organization and control ofCOMINT, the

Brownell Report recommended that AFSA should have operational and technical control

over all the COMINT collection and production resources of the military services. The

Brownell Committee also supported the services' traditional position that they must

control the close and direct intelligence support of the forces in the field. The committee

fully recognized that it was creating a problem area between the new central authority

and the services, but concluded that a solution could be found "with sincere and intelligent

cooperation between the commandersinvolved."

Specifically, the committee proposed structural changes affecting the three levels of

AFSA's organizational relationships: below AFSA (i.e., external service relationships);

within AFSA; and above AFSA (Le., USCIB and the Department of Defense). As to the first,

the committee recommended that AFSA be established as the keystone of the COMINT

organization - with its mission clearly defined by Presidential Memorandum. As outlined

by the committee, the mission statement would give AFSA the responsibility and authority

for providing a unified organization and control of the COMINT activities of most of the

federal government.III

For those changes projected within AFSA itself, the committee concentrated principally

on "people" considerations. It recommended that the director be a career military officer of

at least three-star rank, with a tour of at least four years, rather than the two-year

rotational tour established by the AFSA charter. The option of appointing a civilian

director was left open if the particular circumstances warranted. The military director

would have a career civilian as deputy .- with the converse to apply in the event of a

civilian director. In stressing the need for the development of a strong personnel program,

the final report included a major discussion of a broad range of personnel considerations.

The report concluded that the existence of a well-rounded personnel development program

was essential to the future growth and success ofAFSA. It stressed the dimensions of the

"people" problems then existing at AFSA, including the exceedingly high rate of turnover

among AFSA civilians and the lack of professional and managerial opportunities for the

civilian workforce. The report strongly recommended that AFSA initiate greatly expanded

efforts to develop career and professionalization programs for civilian and military

personnel- at both the managerial and professional levels.20

TOP SECRET

_________ -----0---

104

HAI'TQbE !,tIl. Q9MII'T'I' 8n"'f'UlBI:lB 8m:H

----_.._--_._- ._-----
DOCID: 3109065

In discussing projected organizational changes "above the AFSA level," the committee

remarked that this category represented the single most diflicult question it confronted.

As the cornerstone ofits recommendation in this area, however, the committee expressed

no qualifications about the need for severing the relationship between the JCS and AFSA. It

recommended the immediate termination of the 1949 "experiment" that had placed AFSA

under the control ofthe JCS. As a corollary, the committee proposed the abolition ofAFSAC.

In place of JCS control, the Brownell Committee suggested that AFSA be directly

subordinated to the Department of Defense as the executive agent of the government for

COMINT activities. 21

In much the same vein, the report recommended a revitalization and restructuring of

USCIB. The report proposed sweeping membership changes including a significant

decrease of military representation as well as the simultaneous elevation of AFSA to a

position of full voting membership on the new USCIB. The report recommended that

USCIB'S membership consist of a representative ofthe Secretary of Defense, the Secretary

of State, the DCI, the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, the FBI, and the

Director ofAFSA. Itfurther recommended that the DCI become the permanent chairman of

USCIB. This would bring to an end the long-standing practice of selecting a new USCIB

chairman annually, based upon a vote ofthe membership. The report also included a new

procedural methodology to govern USCIB operations - with the objective of giving it a

greater responsibility "for policy and coordination" in COMINT matters. It also proposed to

establish a majority-rule principle when voting in USCIB on matters under the jurisdiction

ofAFSA. For those COMINT matters outside the jurisdiction of AFSA, however, it proposed

retention ofthe rule requiring unanimous agreement ofthe members.22

Finally, in a related matter, the committee discussed the existing manpower levels

and dollar expenditures ofthe entire U.S. COMINT effort in order to provide an indication of

the cost to the government for the production ofCOMINT. It developed the data based upon

figures received from AFSA and the three services. While acknowledging that its figures

were possibly only little better than informed guesses, the committee cited these as

representing a reasonable approximation of the resources spent in acquiring and

processing communications intelligence information.23

In this investigation, the committee established that the combined manpower levels

for AFSA and the three cryptologic services totaled 32,500 personnel in 1952. Ofthisfigure,

AFSA had a total of 7,600 - 2,200 military and 5,400 civilians. It estimated direct cost

expenditures for the combined activities at 400 million dollars annually - with AFSA's

expenditures listed at 35 million. Because of security factors, the report noted that the

cryptologic budgets were not subject to the usual checks and balances normally associated

with the budget cycle process. Considering this as well as the magnitude of the

expenditures for COMINT, the committee concluded that the fiscal process represented

another compelling reason for establishing a strong and responsible AFSA - operating

under the positive guidance of a policy board acting with real authority.24

On 23 June Secretary Lovett sent the Brownell Report to General Canine for his

personal comments and recommendations. In a lengthy response, Canine enthusiastically

supported the major conclusions and recommendations ofthe report. Canine did, however,

105

M.....:N9Ui VIA El9MIfi'f eUAlmecs em:!..'

'f8PSECAET
·_-~

DOCID: 3109065

T8PSECRET

.. _.,. ._-~. -.- ..,..... ".. *

. .1 i 1 .J

f. ( I

Major General Ralph J. Canine

take issue with some aspects of the report. The committee had proposed an extension of

the responsibilities of AFSA to include a communications security responsibility for the

entire United States government rather than merely the Department of Defense, as was

then the case. Canine agreed in principle with the proposal but pointed out that the

committee had included very little on communications security in its report. He

recommended that the proposed directive be confined to COMINT, with communications

security to be made the subject of another study and to be addressed in a separate

directive. Canine also argued strongly against retention of the rule of unanimity - even

for COMINT matters outside the jurisdiction of AFSA. He pointed out that this would only

serve to perpetuate one of the chief difficulties that had hampered USCIB in the past. He

urged the acceptance of a majority-rule principle to govern all USCIB decisions. Lastly,

Canine pointed out that the Brownell Report had omitted the generally accepted

T9P §IiCRi:r 106

WAJOlBbB VIA sa MIN" SIlA:lfIf~t:S610ft: 1

---_._.._---_._. - -._..
DOCID: 3109065

t=9PSECRET

identification of COMINT activities as being outside the framework of security rules

governing other intelligence activities. Canine recommended that the same stringent

security considerations then existing in NSCID No.9 be carried over into the new

directive.25

During the next four months, extended negotiations took place among the

representatives of the Department of State, the CIA, the Office ofthe Secretary of Defense,

and AFSA over the exact wording ofthe implementing Presidential Memorandum. Some of

the issues discussed included the definitions of communications intelligence and finished

intelligence; principles to govern the production of COMINT by the cryptologic structures;

and a number of other policy considerations concerning relationships between producers

and consumers in the production, evaluation, and dissemination ofCOMINT. The principals

in these discussions and drafting sessions were W. Park Armstrong, State; Loftus E.

Becker, CIA; General Magruder, Office ofSecretary ofDefense; Admiral Wenger, AFSA; and

General Canine.26

Truman's directive, approved on 24 October 1952, affirmed that communications

intelligence was a national responsibility. Truman directed the secretaries of State and

Defense as a Special Committee of the NSC for COMINT, to establish, with the assistance of

the Director of Central Intelligence, policies governing COMINT activities. He designated

the Department of Defense as the executive agent of the government for the production of

COMINT information. His memorandum also contained the first reference to the National

Security Agency. In addition, Truman's memorandum provided the basis for a

reconstitution of USCIB with broadened duties and responsibilities to correspond to those

recommended by the Brownell Committee.27

On 24 October 1952, the National Security Council issued a parallel document,

National Security Council Intelligence Directive Number 9, Revised, entitled

"Communications Intelligence." This directive established the new membership ofUSCIB,

defined its duties and responsibilities, and prescribed the procedural methodology

governing its participation in COMINT matters. The NSC directive implemented much of

Truman's directive.28

The composition of the new USCIB differed only slightly from that proposed by the

Brownell Committee. Under the NSC directive, the three armed services retained their

membership, while the Joint Chiefs were not represented at all. The director, NSA, became

a full voting member. The NSC directive also made the DCI the permanent chairman and

provided that board decisions should be based upon majority vote. The NSC directive also

stated that each member ofthe board "shall have one vote except the representatives ofthe

Secretary of State and the Central Intelligence Agency who shall each have two votes."29

The restructuring of USCIB meant that it became the new mechanism and forum for

establishing and adjudicating problems associated with intelligence and processing

priorities. With the new voting structure, this assured a more balanced participation by

military and civilian representatives ofUSClB in the decision-making process.

Simultaneously with the release of NSCID No.9, Revised, President Truman issued a

second directive that declared communications security to be a national responsibility to

be discharged by a new United States Communications Security Board. He designated the

secretaries of State and Defense as a Special Committee of the National Security Council

107

MMfBI:.1!i 'Ilk 68MIN'f eU:A:NffEtS 6NtT

'F8P SEeREl'

._. ---------- -----_. --_. __ ._------------------
Robert Lovett, Secretary ofDefense

----_..._-_.._.. _, ----- .. ------,

DOCID: 3109065

T9PSECRET

on COMSEC matters and directed them to develop policies and directives relating to the

communications security function, including responsibilities, authorities, and

procedures.3o

There remained establishment of the "National Security Agency," as called for by

Truman's directive. Secretary Lovett, as the executive agent of the government for

communications intelligence, had the basic responsibility for starting the new agency. In

the conversion of AFSA to NSA, Lovett had to deal with the issue of communications

security. Since Truman's memorandum of 24 October 1952 had excluded communications

security from the scope ofthe COMINT directive, Lovett had to define the extent of the new

agency's role in communications security matters. Accordingly, Lovett issued two

memoranda associated with the establishment ofNSA.31

In a remarkably sparse announcement, Secretary Lovett accomplished the actual

establishment of the new National Security Agency in his memorandum of 4 Novem~er

1952. In his memorandum to the service secretaries, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the

director, National Security Agency, he described in general terms the basic institutional

changes that now governed the cryptologic community. Lovett declared:

• The designation of the Armed Forces Security Agency was changed to the National Security

Agency.

• The administrative arrangements for military and civilian personnel, funds, records, and other

support categories previously authorized for AFSA were now available and in effect for NSA.

• All COMINT collection and production resources ofthe DepartmentofDefense were placed underthe

operational and technical control ofthe director, NS....

• Communicationssecurity activities previously assigned to AFSA were now assigned to the director,

NS....

• Addressees were directed to appoint a representative to a working group to be chaired by the

director, NS..... to develop necessary directivesfor formal implementation ofNSCID No. 9.32

With Lovett's memorandum, Canine

acquired a new relationship with the

military services and their COMINT

activities. Theoretically, he now had

control over all COMINT collection and

production resources. Canine started a

four-year term of office as the director of

NSA on 4 November 1952. In accordance

with its new charter, he received a third

star. Each ofthe services assigned one or

two two-star grade officers to the new

agency. This change was consistent with

Truman's decision to elevate the status of

the unified agency. The reorganization of

AFSA removed the COMINT structure from

exclusive military control and

theoretically gave all intelligence

agencies, military and civilian, an equal

voice in the COMINT processing and

requirements process.

T9PSECRET 108

iii A l'Tl)bl!l VIA SQMl!i'P eIIltfUfl!!bS 6NL-..-

':"'::======================-====:"':'::=== ----------- ----
DOCID: 3109065

'F9P SECRET

The new directives, however, did include a "delegation of authority" provision that

diluted to some degree the concept of central controL The drafters of the final directives,

accepting the Brownell conclusion, supported the position that the services must retain

control ofthe close and direct intelligence support ofthe forces in the field. Consequently,

the final directives made provision for this broad exception by requiring the director to

delegate responsibility to the services for direct support as may be required.

The shock waves ofreorganization quickly hit the JCS. With the issuance of President

Truman's directive and Lovett'sfollow-up memorandum, the dire predictions about the JCS

loss ofAFSA had come true. The director, NSA, was no longer under the control ofthe Joint

Chiefs of Staff except, during a transition period, for COMSEC matters. By creating a new

agency, Truman had shifted control of COMINT from the JCS to the Department of Defense

and the new USCIB. The likelihood of bringing about any reversal of this policy appeared

remote.

Three months after the establishment of NSA, Lieutenant General Charles P. Cabell,

USAF, Director, J-2, presented General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the JCS, with a

lengthy appeal. In Cabell's view, the Brownell Committee had largely overlooked the

progress achieved in the postwar evolution ofAFSA.33 Addressing the allegation ofAFSA's

failure to satisfy the intelligence requirements ofState and CIA, Cabell maintained that a

.major part ofthe requirements problem had stemmed directly from the failure ofState and

CIA to seek adjustments in requirements through the existing mechanisms. They had

sought a "revolution" instead. Making one final gesture to retain JCS control over the U.S.

COMINT effort, Cabell proposed that the Secretary of Defense delegate responsibility for

direction and oversight ofthe new NSA to the director ofthe Joint Staffofthe JCS. Bradley

forwarded the proposal to Lovett, who chose not to override the spirit of the earlier

presidential guidance. Instead, Lovett opted to place within his own office the

responsibility for exercising a supervisory role over the new NSA. Lovett delegated this

responsibility to General Graves B. Erskine, USMC, (Ret.) as the newly established Special

Representative ofthe Secretary's Office, who would function without organizational ties to

the JCS. This sequence marked the end of JCS efforts to change the direction of the

Brownell Report and its implementation.34

Established in the fall of 1952, NSA superseded AFSA. The Brownell Committee had

succeeded in writing the organizational obituary of AFSA in less than six months. Its

report was one of the most significant and far-reaching reviews ever prepared on' the

COMINT activities of the United States. The recommendations of the committee were

accepted and put into effect almost in toto, resulting in a major restructuring of the

COMINT community. The report became a kind of Magna Carta for U.S. COMINTactivities

and the new NSA. Within four months of its completion, a chain reaction of new national

level issuances followed that affected the entire COMINT structure and produced a new

COMINT agency.

In summary, there probably never existed a more propitious time for making

fundamental changes in the U.S. COMINT structure than in 1951 when the Brownell

Committee came into being. After a six-year postwar period of self-study and

organizational experimentation, the COMINT community was still groping for answers to a

number of major questions. There was also a strong new DCI, who was determined to

strengthen the role and mission of his young agency and to establish its permanent niche

109

IIAtiBbfl VIA eaMIlf'f eIIANNELS aNtS

T9PSECRET
DOCID: 3109065

T8PSECRET

in the national intelligence structure. The Korean War, in highlighting the intelligence

failures ofthe entire U.S. community, revealed that a great amount of discord and turmoil

existed in the intelligence structure and provided an example for the voices that clamored

for fundamental change.

The Brownell Committee, established to conduct an unprecedented wartime probe of

the COMINTcommunity, was well staged and well directed by officials from State and CIA.

Within six months it produced an impressive report in support of centralization and

unification. It radically altered the existing U.S. COMINT structure and permitted U.S.

military officials little time to counter its major recommendations.

In the long struggle between the military and civilian agencies over the control of

COMINT resources, the turning point came when DCI Smith orchestrated the founding ofthe

Brownell Committee. With Truman's approval, it began its work without the

foreknowledge or participation ofthe military community. Its primary committees and its

supporting staff operated without representation from the military community. From the

outset, the CIA and State Department domina.ted the Brownell Committee. There were old

animosities to resolve, and CIA and State, while undoubtedly motivated by national

security considerations, left nothing to chance in their efforts to realign the COMINT

structure and ensure their greater participation in the intelligence process.

Operationally, the Brownell Committee went as far as it could in its proposals for the

centralization of COMINT resources. Because of the almost total dependence upon the

military installations for the intercept of traffic, the committee concluded that complete

centralization of COMINT would not be possible. It recognized that the COMINT services

would have to be incorporated into the new centralized structure. Despite this difficulty,

the Brownell Report strongly recommended the establishment of a central authority to

guide the activities olthe military COMINTorganizations.

As a result of the Brownell Report, a revised National Security Council Directive of

1952 defined the mission and authority of the new National Security Agency. NSA

remained within the Department of Defense, subject to the direction of the Secretary of

Defense. The director acquired new authorities and responsibilities to assist him in

providing unified operational and technical control of COMINT. He acquired operational

and technical control over all military COMINT collection and production resources of the

United States He was authorized to issue instructions directly to operating units of

military agencies engaged in the collection and production of COMINT. The directive did,

however, contain one "exception" clause that weakened NSA authority. The directive

required that the director make provision for delegation of operational control of COMINT

activities to the military services for direct support purposes, as he deemed appropriate.

This supported the traditional military position regarding tactical COMINT.

The committee recognized that this exception to the director's control authority would

further weaken the concept ofcentralized control. But in creating a gray area between the

services and the central authority, it somewhat optimistically concluded that a solution

could be found by the development of greater cooperation between the director and the

field commanders.3s

The implementation ofthe Brownell Report clearly represented a strong positive move

toward unification of the COMINT effort. Because of factors associated with the

T9P5ECAET 110

Ii A ~IQbl!i VIA 88MIPi'f ellAfifNELS 6IfLi

_. --_._._.._"" .....;.;.. .. ...;.. . ...;.;.;.;;;;;.;.;..;...
DOCID: 3109065

T9P5!eR!T

organizational nature of the military structures, there remained the same number of

agencies engaged in cryptologic activities. But NSA represented a vastly stronger

structure than AFSA. With the acknowledgment by Brownell that direct support to field

forces should be controlled by the Service Cryptologic Agencies rather than NSA, the

services retained a significant degree ofindependence. This still presents problems today.

111 i9PSECRET
DOCID: 3109065

fap SECRET

Chapter VII

Summary: The Struggle for Control Continues

World War II marked a key juncture in the growth and expansion of the U.S. Army

and Navy COMINToperations. The war had a monumental and immediate impact on U.S.

COMINT collection and reporting operations. Even more significantly, World War II

marked the start often years of change and evolution for the military cryptologic services.

After World War II, there was no returning to the era of total independence for the

military COMINT organizations. Massive changes culminated with the establishment of

the National Security Agency in 1952 and the strengthening of the United States

Communication Intelligence Board. While the organizational origins of the new agency

represent a fairly simple audit trail, the political struggles and cross-pressures that led to

the establishment of NSA are far more complex. The expanding intelligence requirements

of the federal government, the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, budgetary

considerations, and bureaucratic in-fighting between the military and civilian agencies all

were prominent factors in the effort to centralize the communications intelligence

functions ofthe federal government into one agency.

By the summer of 1942, as a result of action by President Roosevelt, the Army and

Navy cryptologic structures became the principal U.S. organizations devoting efforts to

foreign communications intelligence activities. Their organizations had evolved along

different lines, within different departments, and no one organization directly supervised

their efforts. As a result of this dichotomy of origins and structure, a well-established

pattern of independence - if not isolation - characterized Army-Navy relationships on

COMINT matters. In June 1942, the services did reach an agreement on a division of

cryptanalytic tasks, but there occurred no immediate change in their working

relationships.

Until 1942, the Army and Navy resisted the introduction ofany major changes to their

relationships and sought to maintain their traditionally separate cryptanalytic roles.

Each worked independently and exclusively on its assigned cryptanalytic tasks. The

services not only continued to demonstrate little enthusiasm toward closer cooperation in

COMINTmatters, but maintained their traditional hostility toward proposals for merger, or

even ofopening up a new dialogue on operational problems. Consequently, cooperation on

COMINT matters was minimal during the first two years ofthe war.

Nevertheless, out ofthe disaster at Pearl Harbor and the pressures of all-out war came

persistent demands for the establishment of a truly centralized, permanent intelligence

agency. As early as 1943 proposals for the establishment of a single United States

Intelligence Agency routinely surfaced in the various intelligence forums of the JCS. At

the same time, some military COMINT authorities foresaw their vulnerability to

congressional criticism and future reductions in resources since they conducted their

COMINT operations on a fractionated and sometimes duplicatory basis. Recognizing these

threats to a continuation of their separate existence, the Army-Navy COMINT

organizations took steps to establish closer technical cooperation.

113

II"'!iBbB ¥Ii\: eeMUf'f eII...!mBbB8!Ul:

Mil SIiCR&i
DOCID: 3109065

l'QP5EERET

In 1944 some positive signs of the services moving toward an expansion of interservice cooperation occurred. That year saw the conclusion of a number of technical

agreements between the services and the first exchange of liaison officers in Washington

on the Japanese problem. It also saw the establishment of ANCICC. While the dialogue was

carefully prescribed and did not change the overall independent operations, it represented

movement toward some form ofconsolidation.

Operating as separate COMINT organizations, both the Army and Navy experienced

major successes during the war. Included were cryptanalytic breakthroughs against the

communications of German submarines and the German and Japanese armed forces, as

well as the diplomatic communications of the Axis countries, both in the European and

Pacific theaters. These accomplishments heightened the sense of value and appreciation

of intelligence among the military commanders and the leaders of the government.

Communications intelligence generally came to be identified as the most important form

ofintelligence. Ironically, the magnitude ofthese intelligence successes later became the

measuring rod for criticism of the postwar achievements of the military COMINT

organizations.

As the war came to a conclusion, some Army and Navy officials realized that the loss of

their primary targets (Germany and Japan) meant dire consequences for their

organizations and budgets. Because of worsening Soviet-U.S. relations. however, the

services began to explore the possibility of directing a major effort against Soviet targets.

The services also anticipated major organiza.tional changes in intelligence activities as the

war wound down. The first of these changes occurred within a few months after V-J Day

when President Truman ordered the establishment of new intelligence organizations. and

authorized continuing relations with the British cryptologic organization. In January

1946. Truman created a National Intelligence Authority. a Central Intelligence Group.

and a Director ofCentral Intelligence.

Eighteen months later. Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947. which

reinforced and amplified the earlier Truman action concerning centralization of the U.S.

intelligence effort. The act gave birth to a National Security Council. a Central

Intelligence Agency. and a National Military Establishment. with three coequal

departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. By 1948, a third military COMINT

organization emerged. the Air Force Security Service. It began competing for scarce

COMINT targets and resources.

Within a few months after the Truman Directive of 1946. the service COMINT

organizations initiated their own reorganization effort. This effort marked the beginning

of a six-year period of experimentation. Basically. the military authorities sought to

centralize military control over COMINT activities and to develop an organization that

would be responsive to military needs. especially with regard to the Soviet Union.

The first major change occurred in May 1946 when the services formed a joint working

agreement. which became known as the Joint Operating Plan. The plan brought about a

voluntary collocation ofArmy and Navy processing activities in the United States. Under

the JOP. however. the services retained their separate identities and organizations. The

plan also called for a radically new position. the Coordinator of Joint Operations. The

position was literally that - a coordinator. not a director ofoperations.

l'QP5EERET 114

I111:ffBI:iB ·1111: eer.fIN'f ell1l:lUflill:iS 6lfbY
DOCID: 3109065

l'SPSECRET

Under the new JOP a new layer of committees subordinate to the CJO was also created.

The CJO became a super-chairman for all the committees established under the JOP.

Although he had a coordination role, he was powerless to direct the services, even on

matters ofjoint tasks. This management weakness was compounded further when ArmyNavy officials failed to reach agreement on what constituted joint tasks or the amount of

their manpower contributions to joint tasks. Moreover, by this time, the civilian agencies

had come to recognize that they had little or no voice in setting intelligence priorities for

COMINT. Military interests simply dominated the process.

In late 1947, a major struggle developed between the military and civilian members of

USCIB. Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter, the third DCI, became the primary catalyst for the

issuance of a new charter for USCIB. Hillenkoetter's general intent was to rewrite the

charter to reflect the expanded membership of USCIB and to correlate the authorities ofthe

Communications Intelligence Board with the National Security Act of 1947. Hillenkoetter

wanted to give the civilian agencies a greater voice on policy matters relating to COMINT.

He openly sought to bring U.S. COMINT under the direct control ofthe DCI.

After several months of negotiations, the members ofuSCIB (Army, Navy, Air Force,

State, and CIA) could not agree on which organization should have the ultimate authority

over the COMINT community. (The FBI retired from the board in 1947.) The board was

deadlocked. The Armed Services took the position that USCIB should report to the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. State and CIA, however, believed that the board should report stalemated

questions to the National Security Council instead.

On 1 July 1948, the National Security Council broke the deadlock by issuing National

Security Council Intelligence Directive No.9, "Communications Intelligence." The new

directive, with the strong personal support of the Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal,

represented a major victory for the civilian members ofUSClB. Under the provisions of the

new NSCID No.9, USCIB reported to the NSC as its parent body rather than to the individual

military department heads. Also, for the first time, USCIB had an official charter issued at

the national level. The rule of unanimity continued to govern USCIB'S decision-making

process, however, and hindered the effective functioning ofthe board.

Although Hillenkoetter achieved a major victory with the issuance of NSCID No.9, he

failed in his attempt to place the COMINT functions directly under the DCI. In the view of

most military authorities, however, the outcome was still a catastrophe. The JCS clearly

lost out in its counterproposal to be designated the "parent body" of USCIB for unresolved

issues. Nevertheless, while NSCID No.9 effectively dealt the JCS a blow in its efforts to

control U.S. COMINTactivities, it did not result in any immediate change in the day-to-day

activities of USCIB and its subordinate committees. Since the military organizations had a

majority on the board, they continued to dominate the discussions. The situation was

clearly changing, however. As the major beneficiaries of the new directive, the State

Department and CIA began to exert a much greater influence in all COMINT deliberations

and decisions.

Within ten months of the issuance of the NSC directive, another major change took

place in the intelligence structure. On 20.May 1949, Defense Secretary Louis Johnson

directed a physical merger of the central processing activities of the three cryptologic

services by establishing the Armed Forces Security Agency. He placed the cryptologic

115

I1A:NBhB VIA: CSMm'f CIIANNBhS SNh'Y

18PSECAET
==~---- --~---

DOCID: 3109065

"fep SECRET

functions under the exclusive control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. AFSA came about as a

result oftwo interrelated political factors. On the one hand was the announced objective of

Secretary Johnson to achieve "efficiency and economy" in the management of the

cryptologic effort. On the other was the obvious strategy of the JCS to strengthen and to

reestablish its hold on COMINT resources. The military was once again in a dominant

position on COMINT matters.

From the perspective of the civilian agencies, the creation of AFSA meant the renewal

of the military and civilian struggle over the control of COMINT resources. CIA and State

Department representatives argued strongly against AFSA, which in their view existed in

direct conflict with the new USCIB charter. They maintained further that AFSA was

established without their participation and over their protests. Secretary Johnson,

however, not only refused to discuss it directly with them, but refused as well to make any

changes in the basic AFSA charter. Johnson did make one concession. He canceled the

proposed Armed Forces Communication Intelligence Board, which would have become a

policy board running parallel to USCIB.

Although the establishment ofthe Armed Forces Security Agency seemed to represent

a consolidation of the U.S. COMINT effort and a more efficient approach to U.S. COMINT

activities, AFSA was fundamentally unsound from both a conceptual and managerial

viewpoint. Pentagon authorities, however, viewed AFSAas a reasonable and evolutionary

step toward "service unification." Unification proved to be an ephemeral and elusive

concept, however.

Although some military officials acquiesced in the concept of consolidation, it soon

became clear that the bureaucracy in each service never seriously envisioned a true

merger and the resulting diminution orits own responsibilities and authorities. AFSA was

the creation of Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense. He sought to achieve a degree of

unification of the services as well as "efficiency and economy" in the management of the

cryptologic structure. While a form of merger took place, no fundamental changes were

made in the way each service conducted its own operations.

In the actual implementation of the AFSA charter, the services took full advantage of

loopholes in the charter to preserve their independent status. For example, the Air Force

used the "exclusion clause" in AFSA's charter (which withheld from it any authority for the

tasking of mobile collection sites) to exclude AFSA from any role in controlling Air Force

collection sites. In fact, by 1952, AFSA had no authority over any Air Force collection sites.

All had been conveniently identified by the Air Force as mobile facilities. In addition, two

months after forming AFSA, the Joint Chiefs made substantive changes in the AFSA

charter, and drastically diluted its basic authorities.

These problems, combined with a waning military support for the general AFSA

concept foretold its ultimate demise. Of the three COMINT services, it was ironic that the

Navy, which from the outset had strongly opposed even the AFSA concept of cooperation,

ultimately provided the greatest support for AFSA. Although the Army, in the person of

Colonel Carter W. Clarke, became identified as the originator of the AFSA concept, Army

support for its offspring quickly diminished and could be characterized at best as

"lukewarm." The Air Force, with its newly established AFSS, aggressively opposed AFSA,

TepSECRET 116

nANBJ:.B 'lIlt e9MIN~OnA~lNElbS9Nb"l
DOCID: 3109065

Tap SEEfte1"

seeking primarily to build its own structure and achieve total independence in COMINT

matters.

From AFSA's first days, there was no way in which its first director, Admiral Earl

Stone, could make it operate as a centralized unified structure. However, the full extent

and impact of the weaknesses of the AFSA charter would not become widely known - or

recognized - until the onset of the Korean War. By 1951, General Ralph Canine, the

second director, AFSA, was encountering the same open opposition from the services to his

efforts at centralization and consolidation as Stone had experienced.

The Korean War revealed the inherent weaknesses not only ofthe AFSA structure, but

of the USCIB as well. During the Korean War, U.S. COMINT produced a mixed record. Its

major successes took place in the area oftactical support, achieved rimarily by the Arm

and Air Force. AFSA came under heavy criticism because of

its problems in attempting to control and direct the COMINT military services. The.

civilian members of USCIB now pointed to the lack of direction and unity in the COMINT

effort. AFSA was not providing results.

The Army proposal to establish a new military agency to be known as the Consolidated

Special Inform.ation Dissemination Office (CONSIDO) shocked the civilian members o~

USCIB. The proposal drastically limited civilian input on COMINT matters. CONSIDO soo~

became the symbolofa new battle between the military and civilian members of USCIB fo~

control ofCOMINT.

CIA and State officials completely understood the military rationale for th~

establishment of AFSA - although they thoroughly disagreed with it. The CONSIDc?

proposal, however, represented an even more encompassing threat to civilian input to th~

COMINT process. Not only was the control ofCOMINT and its dissemination at stake, but the

control ofall-source intelligence estimates and evaluation actions appeared to be at risk als

well. The concept of a military CONSIDO controlling dissemination, estimates, a~

evaluative actions seemed to crystallize the major fears ofthe civilian agencies about their

diminishing policy role in all intelligence matters. Because of this major opposition, the

proposal died in USCIB in December 1950. . .

The long debate over CONSIDO left a lasting impression on CIA, State, and the FlU

(reinstalled as a member of USCIB in 1950). They now believed that the military

authorities would not relent in their pursuit of thecoNSIDO-type concept, and would

probably submit an amended version ofCONSIDO at a laterdate. .

By 1951, it was clear to the civilian agencies that the military organizations were

incapable ofjointly developing a structure that would meet, without bias, the needs of the

growing United States intelligence community. Mter six yearsQf experimentation a.!nd

reorganization and two attempts to consolidate and centralize the communications

intelligence activities ofthe United States, instability, disunity, and decentralization still

existed. CIA and State were not totally altruistic in their opposition to military plans.

They often appeared more concerned about the long-range overtones of military control of

the intelligence role than about the actual level of COMINT support received.during the

Korean War, for example. They realistically concluded, however, that any fumiamental

reworking ofthe communications intelligence structure would come about only as a.result

117

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

T9PSECI(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
DOCID: 3109065

T8PSECRET

of outside intervention. Any further joint military-civilian dialogue seemed useless.

Working together, CIA and State officials proceeded to develop their own strategy for a

"new look" at the organization ofthe COMINTstructure. This time the civilians would have

a major input.

The military authorities previously had set up AFSA without prior coordination with

USCIB or the civilian members of the COMINT community. Now a complete reversal took

place. The military authorities were completely left out of the deliberative and decisionmaking process leading to the termination of AFSA and the creation of a new centralized

COMINT agency.

General Walter Bedell Smith, as the fourth DCI, became the catalyst for bringing about

a new national-level review of the COMINT structure. In a memorandum to the National

Security Council, dated 10 December 1951, Smith recommended an overall review of

United States COMINT activities, based upon an earlier study by Kingman Douglass. The

NBC, in turn, forwarded the proposal to President Truman. Three days later, on 13

December 1951, Truman directed Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson and Secretary of

Defense Robert A. Lovett, assisted by Director ofCentral Intelligence Smith, to review in

depth the communications intelligence activities of the United States. The resulting

review process was carefully orchestrated.

On 28 December 1951, in response to Truman's request, Acheson and Lovett

established the Brownell Committee to study the existing structure and make

recommendations. George A. Brownell, an eminent attorney in New York City, headed

the committee. Brownell served as chairman, assisted by Charles E. (Chip) Bohlen,

Counselor, State Department; William H. Jacltson, special assistant to the DCI; and

Brigadier General John Magruder, USA (Ret), special assistant to the Secretary ofDefense.

The CIA and the Department of State provided the four staff members for the committee,

all of whom had served previously in the Special Intelligence branches of the Army or

Navy. During the period of the survey, the Brownell Committee and its support staff

resided at CIA and received administrative support from the CIA. The military

organizations had no representation on the Brownell Committee or on its supportstaff.

Within six months, the Brownell Committee completed its report. It stressed the need

for the unification of U.S. COMINT responsibilities and recommended a major overhaul of

the existing COMINT organization as well as the USCIB structure. The final Brownell

Report completely demolished the concept of "unification" as it existed under AFSA.

During the next four months, extended negotiations took place among the representatives

ofCIA Departments ofState and Defense and the director, Armed Forces Security Agency,

over the exact wording ofthe implementing directives to be issued by the president. The

Joint Chiefs of Staff were also excluded from these discussions. Ten months after the

establishment of the Brownell Committee, Truman, accepting the report, issued two

directives that led to the establishment of the National Security Agency with its dual

responsibility for the communications intelligence and communications security activities

ofthe government. There would be a centralized authority for U.S. COMINT activities, and

the civilian authorities, by virtue of a major restructuring of USCIB, would playa major

role in directing the scope ofNSA'S operations.

l'9P &ECAEl' 118
---- - ----------------

DOCID: 3109065

Tep SEER!",

In conclusion, the directive establishing NSA clearly identified the national rather

than the solely military character of U.S. COMINT activities. Within well-defined limits it

strengthened the role and authorities of the director, NSA, over COMINT. It greatly

expanded administrative and operational controls over all U.S. cryptologic activities. For

the first time, the director acquired the authority to issue instructions directly to military

units without going through military command channels. However, there remained some

significant built-in limitations in the NSA charter. Although a nominal unification took

place, efforts to unify and centralize COMINT authorities and responsibilities in one

organization achieved only a partial and limited success.

From the outset, the designers of the NSA charter clearly recognized that complete

unification would be impossible because ofthe dependence upon the military structures to

man field stations. Consequently,- although the service units were incorporated

organizationally into the central organization, they retained their own authorities and

responsibilities within their military departments. To ameliorate this, and to assist NSA in

its mission ofproviding effective, unified organization and control ofCOMINT, the enabling

directives provided that NSA would have operational and technical control over all the

COMINT collection and production resources of the United States. Even this did not solve

the problem.

There also existed a "delegation of authority" clause in the new charter that further

diluted the concept ofcentralized control. The Brownell Committee, as well as the drafters

of the implementing presidential directive, supported the services' traditional position

that they must control the close and direct intelligence support of the forces in the field.

Consequently, the final directive made provision for this broad exception by requiring the

director to delegate responsibility to the services for direct support as may be necessary.

The committee fully recognized that it was creating a problem area between the central

authority and the services, but concluded that a solution could be found "with sincere and

intelligent cooperation between the commanders involved."

Finally, despite the reorganization the same number of agencies remained engaged in

cryptologic activities as before - namely, NSA, CIA, Army, Navy, and Air Force. NSA had in

many respects simply replaced the defunct AFSA. The services retained a significant

degree ofindependence. They retained their own separate organizations and identities, as

well as administrative and logistic control oftheir field operations. The struggle over who

would control U.S. COMINT resources would continue.

119

UA!'TBJ:.S Vh'. El8MIN'f ElHA!'T!'TSJ:.S 8!'TJ:.Y

T9PSECRET
DOCID: 3109065

J9P SEeRl!"

Abbreviations

AFCIAC- Armed Forces Communications Intelligence Advisory Council (later

redesignated as Armed Forces Security Agency Council)

AFCIB - Armed Forces Communications Intelligence Board

AFOIN - Air Force Office ofIntelligence

AFSA - Armed Forces Security Agency

AFSAC- Armed Forces Security Agency Council

AFSG- Air Force Security Group

AFSS- Air Force Security Service

ANCIB - Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board (joint policy board that later

became State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board)

ANCICC - Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee (working

level committee ofArmy-Navy Communications Intelligence Board)

ASA - Army Security Agency

ASAPAC - Army Security Agency Pacific

CAHA - Cryptologic Archival Holding Area

CIA - Central Intelligence Agency

CIG- Central Intelligence Group

CJCS- Chairman,Joint Chiefs ofStaff

CJO - Coordinator ofJ oint Operations

CNo-ChiefofNavalOperations

COl- Coordinator ofInformation

COMINCH - Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet

COMINT - Communications Intelligence

COMMSUPDETS- Communications Supplementary Detachments

COMBEC - Communications Security

CONSIDO - Consolidated Information Dissemination Office

CRB - Communications Reconnaissance Battalion

CRC- Communications Reconnaissance Company

CRG- Communications Reconnaissance Group

CSAW - Communications Supplementary Annex, Washington (Navy facilities at Ward

Circle, Washington, D.C.)

121 19P5ECREf
------ DOCID: 3109065

T9P SIiCRlii

DCI- Director ofCentral Intelligence

DlA- Defense Intelligence Agency

DJO - Director ofJoint Operations

DJS- Director, Joint Staff

DMC- Defense Management Committee

DoD - Department ofDefense

DOE - Department ofEnergy

ELINT- Electronic Intelligence

E.O. - Executive Order

FBI - Federal Bureau oflnvestigation

FCC - Federal Communications Commission

FECOM - Far East Command

G.C. & C.S.- British Government Code and Cipher School

GCHQ - Government Communications Headquarters (U.K. SIGINT Organization)

G-2 - Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff

lAB - Intelligence Advisory Board

IAC- Intelligence Advisory Council

Jlc-Joint Intelligence Committee (within the Joint Chiefs ofStaffstructure)

JICG-Joint Intercept Control Group

JCs-Joint Chiefs ofStaff

JLG-Joint Liaison Group

IN-25 - U.S. Navy designator for Japanese 5-digit code used by Japanese fleet

JOP-Joint Operating plan ofArmy and Navy, 1946-1949

JPAG-Joint Processing Allocation Group

LSIB - London Signals Intelligence Board

NIA- National Intelligence Authority

NME - National Military Establishment

NSA - National Security Agency

NSC - National Security Council

NSG- Naval Security Group

NSCID - National Security Council Intelligence Directive

NSS- Naval Security Station

T9PSECRET 122

II...NBhS 'fIt.El9MIN'f 611ANNSbB 9NhY
DOCID: 3109065

'f9PSECRET

ONI - Office ofNaval Intelligence

OPNAV- ChiefofNaval Operations

OSD - Office ofthe Secretary ofDefense

088- Office ofStrategic Services

RAF - Royal Air Force

RSM- Radio Squadron Mobile

SCA - Service Cryptologic Agency

SECNAV - Secretary ofNavy

SIGINT - Signals Intelligence

sIs-Signal Intelligence Service (Army)

SMP- Special Committee on Merger Planning

SRB - Special Research Branch (Army Intelligence)

SSA - Signal Security Agency (Army)

STANCIB - State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board (joint policy board that

later became the United States Communications Intelligence Board)

STANCICC - State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee

(working level committee ofState-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board)

SUKLO - Senior U.K. Liaison Officer

SUSLO - Senior U.S. Liaison Officer

SWl- Special Weather Intelligence

SWNCC- State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

USA-U.S. Army

USAF - U.S. Air Force

USCIB - United States Communications Intelligence Board

USCICC-Unit~d States CommunicationsIntelligence Coordinating Committee (working

level committee ofUnited States Communications Intelligence Board)

USEUCOM - U.S. European Command

USN- U.S. Navy

we - War Council

WDCICCO- Washington, D.C. Control-Collection Office (Air Force Security Service)

123 19P5ECRET
DOCID: 3109065

19P SEEREl

Notes

ChapterI

1. Admiral Joseph R. Redman, OP·20, memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy. "The Navy's Interest in the

Processing of Intercepted Foreign, Nonmilitary Communications," 24 September 1945 Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, Accession No. 4614, eBIB 38, NSA (TS). (Hereafter cited as Redman memorandum, 24 September

1945.)

2. History ofthe Signal Security Agency in World War II, "Organization, 1939-1945," (MA, 1945), Vol. I, Part I,

pp. 90-103, History Collection, NSA, Series IV (TS). (Hereafter cited as History ofthe Signal Security Agency, Vol.

I, Part 1.)

3. John W. McClaran, OP·20·G, memorandum for the Director, 12 April 1933, (Documents on Pre-1952 Cryptologic

Organization and Policy - Vol. I, (Pre-1942», History Collection, NSA, Series VII (S).

4. The Navy had the primary responsibility for naval radio activities relating to all foreign powers, and for the

diplomatic radio intelligence activities ofthe four major naval powers (England, France,Italy, and Japan). The

Army had the primary responsibility for military radio traffic relating to all foreign powers, and for the

diplomatic traffic ofall foreign powers other than England, France, Italy, and Japan.

5. Laurance F. Safford, OP·20·G, memorandum for OP·20, "Coordination ofIntercept and Decrypting Activities of

the Army and Navy," 25 July 1940, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 4614, eBIB 38, NSA (sl.

(Hereafter cited as Safford memorandum, 25 July 1940.)

6. Ibid.

7. Commander Laurance F. Safford and Colonel Spencer B. Akin, Directive to Joint Army-Navy Committee, 31

July 1940, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 4614, eBIB 38, NSA(S).

8. Commander Laurance F. Safford, OP·20-G, memorandum for Admiral Leigh Noyes, 27 July 1940, Cryptologic

Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 4614, eBIB 38, NSA (sl.

9. Safford memorandum, 25 July 1940.

10. Ibid.

11. John R. Redman,oP.2o.G, memorandum to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, "Cryptanalytical and

Decryption Operations on Diplomatic Traffic," 25 June 1942, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No.

4614, CBIB 38, NSA (S); and Laurance F. Safford, memorandum for OP·20-4, "Responsibility for Decoding and

Translating Japanese Intercepts," 14 February 1946. History Collection, NSA, Special Series VII, Bos: 4.

(Hereafter cited as Redman memorandum, 25 June 1942 and Safford memorandum, 14 February 1946.)

12. Ibid.

13. Colonel Spencer B. Akin and Commander Laurance F. Safford, memorandum for ChiefSignal Officer and the

Director ofNaval Communication, "Traffic Division," 3 October 1940, History Collection, NSA (s).

14. Ibid.

15. Safford memorandum, 14 February 1946.

16. Redman memorandum, 24 September 1945.

17. Joseph N. Wenger, Vice Director,NsA, memorandum for Grant Manson, Staff Member, Brownell Committee,

"Draft of Part I of the Brownell Committee Report," 27 March 1952, History Collection, NSA, Series VI.C (TSe);

History ofthe Signal Security Agency, Part I, p. 90.

18. Frederick D. Parker, A New View to Pearl Harbor: United States NalJY Communication Intelligence, 1924-

1941, United States Cryptologic History Series, (NSA, 1988), Series IV, World WarII. Vol. II, pp. 53-55,1988 (s).

19. Captain John R. Redman, memorandum for Captain Joseph N. Wenger, (OP.20.G), "Army-Navy Agreement

Concerning Allocation of Diplomatic Traffic," 9 February 1945, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession

No. 4614, eBIB 38, NSA (TS).

125

IIs'.~JBI:.g YIA SQUUTT SWA~T~Tgl.:i QNl.:¥

TePSECRET
DOCID:

------.....-

3109065 Tor 5I:CAE=F

20. Ibid.

21. Redman memorandum, 25 June 1942.

22. Safford memorandum, 25 July 1940.

23. Ibid.

24. Redman memorandum, 25 June 1942; and Joseph N. Wenger, memorandum for OP-20·G, "Future Cooperation

between Army and Navy," 1June 1943,Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 4614, CBIB 38, NSA(S).

25. Redman memorandum, 25 June 1942.

26. Joseph N. Wenger, memorandum for OP·20·G, "Future Cooperation between Army and Navy," 1 June 1943,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 4614, CBIB 38, NSA (s); and History ofSignal Security Agency,

World WarII, p. 93.

27. Report ofthe Army-NaVY-FBI Allocation Committee, "Report ofConference Appointed to Study Allocation of

Cryptanalysis," 30 June 1942, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 4614, CBIB 38, NSA (s).

(Hereafter cited as Report ofAllocation Committee, 30 June 1942.)

28. ErnestJ. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and George C. Marshall, ChiefofStaff, memorandum for the

President, 6 July 1942, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 4609, CBIB 38, NSA(B).

29. Franklin D. Roosevelt, memorandum for the Director of the Budget, 8 July 1942, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, Accession No. 4609, CBIB 38, NSA (B).

30. Redman memorandum, 25 September 1945.

31. Report of Allocation Committee, 30 June 1942. A summary of the committee's allocation for cryptanalysis

follows:

Diplomatic:

Enemy Naval Operations:

Enemy Military Operations:

Western Hemisphere Clandestine:

International Clandestine

(other than Western Hemisphere):

Trade Codes:

Army Weather:

Navy Weather:

Domestic Criminal:

Voice Broadcast:

Cover Text Communications:

Miscellaneous:

32. Report ofAllocation Committee, 30 June 1942.

33. HistoryofSigool Security Agency, Vol. I, Part I, p. 121.

34. Ibid.

Army

Navy

Army

FBI-Navy

Navy

(To be assigned by Committee)

Army

Navy

FID

FBI

FBI

(To be assigned by Committee)

35. The NAVBECGRU Bulletin, Vol. III, Number 2, March-April 1969 History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H (u).

36. OP·20·G "Outline ofthe Collaboration in Cryptanalysis Between the Army and the Navy," 18 August 1944, p. 7,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 4609, CBIB 38. (Hereafter cited as Outline ofCollaboration by

Army and Navy, August 1944.)

37. Outline ofCollaboration by Army and Navy, August 1944, p. 8 (TB).

38. George C. Marshall and ErnestJ. King, "Joint Army-Navy Agreement for the Exchange ofCommunications

Intelligence," 4 February 1944, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 2465, CBIB 14, NBA (s).

<Hereafter cited asJoint Army-Navy Agreement, 4 February 1944.)

39. BRH-200, OP-20·G File on Army-Navy Collaboration, 1831-1945, Part 2, p. 7, Special Research History (SRK) 200;

Record Group 457, National Archives. <Hereafter cited as RG-457, NSA.)

40. Briefing by Brigadier General Woodbury M. Burgess, USA, Assistant Director for Production, February 1957,

File: Robertson Committee Background, History Collection NSA, Series VI.C (S).

=FOP 5ECAE=F 126

H..4,H9bE lilAS9MnrT SHAHl'rEb8 91'~bY
DOCID: 3109065 lOPSEC~

41. History ofthe Signal Security Agency, "The Japanese Army Problems- Cryptanalysis," 13 May 1947, Vol. 3,

p.24.

42. Henry F. Schorreck. "The Role ofCOMINT in the Battle ofMidway," 8RH 230, RG-457.

43. Brownell Committee, Report to the Secretary of State and the SecDef, 13 June 1952, pp. 22-29. History

Collection, NSA, Series V.F (TSC).

44. Admiral Joseph R. Redman,oP.2o, memorandum for Admiral Edwards, "Formalization of Army-Navy

Communication Intelligence Coordinating Committee (ANCICC) - Need for," 18 January 1945, Cryptologic

Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 2463, CSIS 14, NSA (T8). (Hereafter cited as Formalization of ANCICC, 18

January 1945.)

45. Joseph N. Wenger, OP·20·G, memorandum for OP·20 via F20, "RATTAN Liaison," 16 July 1945, Cryptologic

Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 7779, CSQM 36, NSA (u).

46. Dennis DeBrandt, "Structuring Intelligence For War," CIA Studiesin Intelligence, Vol. 32, No. I, Spring 1988,

pp. 43-56 (U).

47.James S. Lay, CIA, draft manuscript, undated, entitled "History OfUSCIB," Vol. 1, p. 3, History Collection, NSA,

Series XII.H. BOll: 47 (s). (Hereafter cited as Lay Report.)

48. Ibid.

49. During this period, intelligence requirements were generally handled on a service-to-service basis. For

enmple, the military consumers would originate their intelligence requirements and forward them to the

respective COMlNT organizations for satisfaction. Following the establishment ofUSCIS, and the passage of the

National Security Act ofl947, minor procedural changesin the processstarted to take place in the postwar years.

The first major effort to change the requirements process occurred in the mid-1960s with the establishment ofthe

Intelligence guidance for COMlNT Programming (IGCP). Further changes took place in the mid-1970s when the

intelligence community established a National SlGlNT Requirements System (NSRS) thatsuperseded the IGCP.

50. Lay Report, Vol. 1, p. 5.

51. In 1941, New York lawyer William J. Donovan was appointed Coordinator oflnformation (COl) by President

Roosevelt. In 1942 this organization was redesignated the Office of Strategic Services and transferred to the

jurisdiction ofthe JointChiefs ofStaft'. Its mission was to collect and analyze strategic information asrequired by

the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to conduct special operations not assigned to other agencies. United Swtes

Government Organization ManlUll, Summer 1944, p. 162. See also John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and

Declineofthe CIA (New York,Simon and Schuster, 1986).

52. Formalization ofANClCC, 18 January 1945.

53. Ibid.

54. Joseph N. Wenger, memorandum for the Chairman, USCIS, "Report on the Status and Authority of USCIS,

USCICC, its members and the Coordinator ofJoint Operations," 7 February 1947, Appendill: A, p. I, Cryptologic

Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 5061, CSIS 23, NSA (TS). (Hereafter cited as Wenger Rep~rt to USClS, 7

February 1947.)

55. Minutes of3rd meeting ofArmy-Navy Communication Intelligence Coordinating Committee, 19 June 1944,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 2154, CBPC 26, NSA (TSC).

56. General George C. Marshall, memorandum for Admiral Ernest King, "Army-Navy Communication

Intelligence Board - Establishment of," 9 March 1945, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 2463,

CSIS 14, NSA (TS).

57. Wenger Reportto USCIB, 7 February 1947, AnnuCol.

58. Wenger Report to USCIS, 7 February 1947, Annell: C-2.

59. Formalization ofANClCC, 18 January 1945.

GO. Ibid.

61. ANClS was primarily structured to serve as a coordinating mechanism for handling the joint plans and

operations of the Army and Navy COMlNT organizations, and such other issues as could be resolved amicably.

From the outset, however, ANCIB was intended to function only as a brokering or coordinating organization, and

not as an authoritarian voice. While the COMlNT services accepted ANCIB as a coordinating and negotiating

127 T9PSEERET
DOCID: 3109065

l'9P SECREl'

mechanism, they never viewed ANClS'S charter as giving it sufficient authority to cut across the command

channels ofthe Army and Navy whenever disagreements arose. The heads ofthe Army Security Agency and the

Navy Supplementary Activity continued to be directly responsible to their respective military commanders.

62. Dean Acheson, Henry L. Stimson, and James V. Forrestal, joint memorandum for President Truman,

"Collaboration with the British in the Communication Intelligence Field, Continuation and Extension of,"

undated, History Collection, NSA, Series V.A (TSC). (Hereafter cited as Acheson, Stimson, and Forrestal

memorandum.)

63. Richard Hough, The Greatest Crusade - Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Naval Wars, (New York: William

Morrow and Company, Inc. 1986) pp. 25-27.

64. History ofthe Sigool Security Agency, Vol. 1, Part 1, p. 144.

65. Lieutenant Commander Alwin D. Kramer, memorandum for OP.20-G, "Cryptanalysis: FBI Activities and

Liaison with the British," 8 June 1942, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box No. 47 (s).

66. Franklin D. Roosevelt, memorandum for General Marshall, dated 9 July 1942. Text of memorandum is

quoted in History ofthe Sigool Security Agency in WOl'ld WarII, Vol. I, Part I, p. 118.

67. Ibid.

68. Major General George V. Strong, Assistant Chief ofStaff, G-2, memorandum for Chief of Staff, 9 July 1942.

Text ofmemorandum is quoted in History ofthe Sigool SecurityAgency, Vol. I, Part I, p. 110.

69. Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney, USA, Deputy Chief of Staff, memorandum for the Chief of Staff,

"Agreement between British GovernmentCode andCipher School, and U.s.War Departmentin regard to certain

SpecialIntelligence," 10 June 1943, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 2401, CBTJ 66, NSA(S).

70. Outline ofCollaboration by Army and Navy, August 1944, pp. 44-48.

71. Formalization ofANClCC, 18 January 1945.

72. Ibid.

73. Minutes of27th meeting ofthe State-Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Coordinating Committee, 13

February 1946, History CoUection,NsA, Series XII.H, Box 37 (TS).

74. Background notes prepared by Admiral Joseph Wenger, Deputy Director, MSA, for General Ralph Canine,

Director, MSA, in connection with the activities ofthe Brownell Committee in 1951, p. 5, History Collection, NSA,

Series VI.C (s-cco).

75. Ibid.

76. Rear Admiral Hewlett Thebaud, Chairman, ANClS, memorandum for General Clayton Bissell, Admiral John

R. Redman, and General W. Preston Corderman, "British Reply to U.S. Proposal Regarding RATTAN (BOURBON),15

August 1945, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 7779, CBQM 36, NSA (TSC). (Hereafter cited as

British Reply on RATTAN.)

77. U.S. Navy Serial oP.2o.a-Q.lolat, "Proposed Plan for the Coordination of U.S. Army.Navy Communication

Intelligence Effort on the RATTAN Project," 13 June 1945, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 2463,

CBIB 14, NSA (TS).

78. John F. Callahan and Wason G. Campbell, Secretariat ofSTANCIBlSTANCICC, memorandum for members of

STANCICC, "Establishment of a U.S. Combined Intelligence Liaison Center in Great Britain," 3 May 1946,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 2156, CBPC 27, NSA(S).

79. Ibid.

80. Acheson, Stimson, and Forrestal memorandum.

81. Harry S. Truman, memorandum for Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, 12 September 1945, History

Collection, NSA, Series V.A (TS).

82. Minutes of the 22nd meeting of Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Coordinating Committee, 16

October 1945,CryptologicArchival Holding Area, Accession No. 2154, CBPe 26, NSA(TSC).

l'9P SECREl' 128

IIAlfBtJ!l VIA eOMINT ettANNELS ONL i
DOCID:

I

3109065

T9PSECRET

83. Rear AdmiralJoseph R. Redman, Senior Member, ANCIB, memorandum for General Eisenhower and Admiral

King, 13 December 1945, "State Department Representation on ANCIB·ANCICC," Cryptologic Archival Holding

Area, Accession No. 5061, CBIB 23, Annex 0·2, p.l,NSA(TSC).

84. Rear Admiral Joseph R. Redman, Senior Member, ANCIB, memorandum for Alfred McCormack, "State

DepartmentRepresentation on ANCIB·ANCICC," 11 December 1945, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession

No. 5061, eBIB23, Annex 0·2, p. 2, NSA (TS). Alfred McCormack entered the War Department as Special Assistant

to Henry Stimson, Secretary of War, in 1942. He was appointed Deputy Chief Special Brlmch, Military

Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff on 17 June 1942. In 1944, he became Director of

Intelligence, Military Service, in charge of providing intelligence for the Operations and Planning Division and

for the commands in aU theaters ofwar. On 1 October 1945, McCormack became Special Assistant to James F.

Byrnes,Secretary ofState, with the task oforganizing an intelligence unit in that department. He resigned from

State in April 1946.

Chapterll

1. J.N. Wenger, USN, OP·20·Q 1, memorandum for OP·20·G, "Future Cooperation between Army and Navy,· 1 June

1943, Accession No. 4614, CBIB 38, CryptologicArchival Holding Area, NSA(S). See also General Marshall's letter

as Army ChiefofStaff, for Admiral King, concerningSignal Intelligence, 18 August 1945. Same Accession No.

Paragraph two of Marshall's letter made it clear that the Army sought to retain the total responsibility for

diplomatic tratrlC following the termination ofhostilities.

2. The Navy provided posthumousrecognition ofAdmiral Wenger on 7 July 1976, with the dedication ofthe Rear

AdmiralJoseph N. Wenger NavalCryptologic Museum. In the dedication ceremony,special note wasmade ofhis

"helping to establish the Armed Forces Security Agency and later serving as Vice Director ofits successor, the

NationalSecurity Agency."

3. Minutes of the 14th meeting of Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee, 9 May

1945, Section III (Army Proposal Regarding Army-Navy Collaboration), pp. 7-8, Accession No. 2154, CBPC,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS). Captain J.N. Wenger,oP.2o-G, memorandum for Captain W.R.

Smedberg, III (F.20), "Policy regarding collaboration between the Army and the Navy in the Communication

Intelligence Field,· 30 May 1945, Accession No. 5061 N, CBSB 23,Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (s).

4. Minutes of 8th meeting of Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Coordinating Committee, 8 November

1944, Section I (Joint American-British Postwar Agreement), pp. 6-8, Accession No. 2154, CBPC 26, Cryptologic

Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

5. OP·20-G staft'study, "Outline ofthe Collaboration in Cryptanalysis between ~he Army and Navy," 18 August

1944, Part VII (Discussions prior to 1944) pp. 55-69, Accession No. 2468, CHIB 15, Cryptologic Archival Holding

Area, NSA(TS).

6. Ibid., p. 58.

7. George C. Marshall, memorandum to Admiral King, "Signal Intelligence," 18 August 1945, Accession No.

5061N, CBSB 23,Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TSC).

8. FleetAdmiral ErnestJ. King, memorandumfor General George C. Marshall, "SignalIntelligence," 20 August

1945, Enclosure B to ANCIBminutes, 21 August 1945, Accession No. 2155, CBPC 27, Cryptologic Archival Holding

Area, NSA(TS).

9. John V. Connorton and Robert F. Packard, Secretariat, ANCICC, memorandum for the Subcommittee on Merger

Planning(SMP), 30 August 1945, Accession No. 2468, CBIB 15,Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

10. John V. Connorton and Robert F. Packard, Secretariat, ANCICC, memorandum to members of ANCICC,

"Recommendations of SMP concerning a location for the merged Army-Navy C.I. Organization," 7 September

1945, Accession No. 2468, CBIB 15,Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA(TS).

11. Ibid.

129 T9P5EERE:r
DOCID: 3109065

,e'5EERET

12. Brigadier General W. Preston Corderman, USA, Acting Chairman, ANCICC, memorandum for ANCIB, "Merging

of Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Activities," 26 September 1945, Accession No. 2468, CBIB 15,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

13. Ibid.

14. See Documentary Appendix to Part I, History ofAFSA/NSA (Hereafter referred to as Documentary Appendix for

AFSAINSA) (Enclosure A), History Collection, NSA, Series V.A (TS). Copies ofall ofthe letters in the Eisenhower and

Nimitz eJ:change of1945 concerning merger are included in thisfile.

15. Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, memorandum for Secretary of the Navy, "The Navy's Interest in the

Processing ofIntercepted Foreign, Nonmilitary Communication," 14 October 1945, Accession No. 2468, CBIB 15,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA(TS).

16.See Documentary Appendix A for AFSAlNSA, Item 11.

17. See Documentary Appendix A for AFsAlNSA, Item 12.

18. Memorandum, STANCICC to STANCIB, "Coordination of the Army and Navy Communication Intelligence

Activities," 15 February 1946 <Incl. A ofminutes OfSTANCIB-STANCIccjoint meeting, 15 February 1946), History

Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 36 (TSC).

19. Ibid.

20. Joseph N. Wenger, OP·20·G, memorandum for Captain W.K. Smedberg, III, (F.20), "Policy regarding

collaboration between the Army and Navy in the Communication Intelligence Field," 30 May 1945, Accession No.

5061N, CBSB 23, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA(TS).

21. Minutes of27th meeting of the State-Army-NavyCommunications Intelligence CoordinatingCommittee, 13

February 1946, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H, Box 37 (TS).

22. Minutes ofjoint meeting of the State-Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Board and the State-ArmyNavy Intelligence Coordinating Committee, 15 February 1946, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 36.

(TSC).

23. Ibid.

24. British-United States Communication Intelligence Agreement, 5 March 1946, History Collection, NSA, Series

XII.H. BOJ: 47 (TSC).

25. See Wenger Collection in Cryptologic Archival Holding Area for information and chronology concerning the

development ofthe separate appendicesto the BRUSA Agreement. See Accession Nos. 9090 and 9091, CBm 24.

26. Colonel W. Preston Corderman, and Captain Joseph N. Wenger, memorandum for STANcm, "Coordination of

Army and Navy Communication Intelligence Activities," 5 April 1946, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area,

Accession No. 2468, CBIB IS, NSA (TS). (Hereafter refel'red to as Corderman-Wenger Agreement.) The data for

approval, 22 April 1946, is that given in Captain Wenger's memorandum to Chairman, USCIB, "Report on the

status and authority OfUSCIB.USCICC, its members and the Coordinator ofJoint Operations," 7 February 1947.

(Annex A, Item 19). See Accession No. 5061 N, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

27. Corderman-Wenger Agreement.

28. Ibid.

29. See Dr. George F. Howe's Narranue Hiatory ofAFSAINSA, PartI, pp. 28-30, History Collection, NSA, Series V.A

(TSC). (Hereafter cited as Howe's History ofUSA/NSA).

30. Minutes ofjointSTANCIBISTANCICC meeting, 15 February 1946 <Item 3), History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H.

Box 36 (TS).

31. Howe's History ofAFSAINSA, pp. 28-30.

32. E.M. Huddleson,Jr., Director, Special Projects Staff, Department ofState, memoranda for the Coordinator of

Joint Operations, "CommunicationsIntelligence Priorities," 24June and 19 November 1946,Accession No. 1984,

CBPC 27, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TSC).

33.Corderman-WengerAgreement.

Te'5EERET 130

IIhtfBbB "111\ eeMIN'f eII:A:mf:BbB aut......
DOCID: 3109065

19P5ECRET

34. Memorandum for CJO, Subject: Report of Joint Intercept Control Group for the period 1 April 1946 to 28

February 1947,6 March 1947, from Lieutenant Colonel Morton A. Rubin, USA, Cryptologic Archival Holding

Area, Accession No. 1379, CBPB 57, NSA (TS).

35. See enclosure to Corderman-Wenger Agreementof5 April 1946, entitled "Coordination ofthe Army and Navy

Communication Intelligence Activities, 15 February 1946," Accession No. 2468, CBIC 15, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, NSA (s).

36. Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, to Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chairman,

STANCIB, 14 February 1946, included as Annex Q to memorandum for members of USCICC, 25 August 1945,

Accession No. 5061 N, CBSB 23, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (Restricted).

37. Copy of memorandum from Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, USA. Chairman, STANCIB, to J. Edgar

Hoover, Director, FBI, "FBI Representation on STANCIB," 4 June 1946, included as Annex S to memorandum for

members OfUSCICC, 25 August 1945, Accession No. 5061, CBSB 23, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA

(Restricted).

38. Major General S.J. Chamberlin, Senior Member, USCIB, memorandum for Lieutenant General Hoyt S.

Vandenberg, DCI, "Central Intelligence Group Representation on USCIB," 3 July 1946. For text ofmemorandum

see J.N. Wenger memorandum for the Chairman, USCIB, "Report on Status and Authority OfUSCIB-USCICC," 7

February 1947,Annex U, Accession No. 5061, CBSB 23, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

39. See Accession Nos. 1984 and 1377, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA, for a great variety of

correspondence concerning the intelligence requirements ofthe civilian members OfUSCIB. These requirements

are originated by the Department ofState, CIA, and the FBI, and are addressed to the intelligence and priorities

committees OfUSCIB and the CJO.

40. J.N. Wenger, memorandum for CJO, "Priority Problems," 24 October 1946, Accession No. 1984, CBSC 27,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA(TS). See also minutes of34th meeting ofuscICC (Item 3), 9 October 1946,

History Collection, NSA., Series XII.H. Box 37 (TSC).

41. Grant Manson, State Department Member OfUSCIB Intelligence Committee, "State Department Proposalsfor

Modification ofRequirements Expression," 25 February 1949, Accession No. 7674, CBSC 72, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, NSA (TS).

42. George F. Howe al (b) (3) - P . L . 8 6- 3 6listoricalStudy ofCOMINT underthe JointOperating Plan, 1946-1949,

pp.164-65, History Co~lection,NSA, Series V.E (TSC).

43. Ibid.

44. Minutes of30th meeting OfUSCIH, 27 April 1948, with enclosure (USCIB: 5136,9April 1948), HistoryCollection,

NSA, Series XII.H. Box 37 (TSC).

45. Historical Study,JointOperating Plan, p. 165.

46. Ibid., p. 164.

Chapterm

1. One year later,further changestook place at the national level, which primarily involved the military services

and the defense establishment. Congress, in August 1949, amended the National Security Act converting the

National Military Establishment into the Department ofDefense, and making it a cabinet-level agency. By this

time, there was a new Secretary of Defense, Louis A. Johnson. The new act made the three military services

subordinate departments within the new Department ofDefense structure. At the same time, Johnson acquired

unqualified authority and control over the entire organization and became the "principal assistant to the

President in all matters relating to the Department ofDefense." Steven L. Rearden, The History ofthe Office of

the SecretDry ofDefense: The Formative Years, 1947-1950, Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of

the SecDef, 1984), pp. 53-55. (Hereafter cited as Rearden, The Formative Years.)

2. United States Communications Intelligence Board, Organizational Bulletin No. II, 31 July 1946, p. 8, History

Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 34 (TS). (Hereafter cited as USCIB OrganizationalBulletin.)

131

nl.HBclil JIM S911HN'P SUl.N~H!l:bS 9NC¥

l'9PSEERET
DOCID: 3109~EEAET

3. Ibid.,pp.6-7.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. On 10 March 1945, General George C. Marshall, and Admiral ErnestJ. King co-signed a Joint Memorandum

to the Assistant Chief of Staff(G.2) and the Commanding General, Signal Security Agency, and the Director of

Naval Intelligence and the Director of Naval Communications, which formally established the Army-Navy

CommunicationsIntelligence Board. For the text ofmemorandum see the USCIB Organizational Bulletin, pp. 2-3.

7. The term ULTRA is generally used to refer to the British exploitation of German messages encrypted on the

Enigma machine. The term MAGIC refers broadly to the work ofthe United Statesin reading high-leveldiplomatic

communications ofthe Japanese in the Pacific Theater, primarily on the Purple machine.

8. See Rearden, The FormatilJe Years, p. 141.

9. Lay Report.

10. Thomas F. Troy, DOnDlJan and the ClA: A Hilltory ofthe Establillhment ofthe Central Intelligeru:e Agency

(Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study ofIntelligence, 1981), pp. 305-40. (Hereafter cited as Troy,

Hi,tory ofclA.)

11. See Troy, History ofelA, p. 464, for the text of Truman memorandum to the Secretaries of State, War, and

Navy.

12. Ibid., p.351.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. See Rearden, The Formatiw Years, pp. 23-27.

16. Ibid., pp. 24-27.

17. Ibid.

18. For the text ofTruman memorandum establishing the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), see Troy, Hiswry of

CIA,p.464.

19. Howe's History ofAFSAlNSA, PartI, p. 143.

20. Minutes of the 21st and 22nd meetings OfUSCIB, 4 and 19 November 1947, History Collection, NSA, Series

XII.H. Box 36 (TS).

21. See minutes of 25th and 27th meetings of the United States Communication Intelligence Coordinating

Committee (USCICC), 17 February 1946 and 23 October 1946, pp. 4-5 and pp. 3-6, History Collection, NIlA, Series

XII.H. Box 36 (TS).

22. Startingwith its 21st meeting on 4 November 194·', USCIB discussed the question of"control" authorities over

USCIB during many meetings. <Hereafter cited as minutes of21st Meeting OfUSCIB.) In particular,see minutesfor

the 25th meeting OfUSCIB, 19 December 1947, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 36 (Tac).

23. See minutes of21st meeting ofusclB.

24. W. Park Armstrong,Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary for Research and Intelligence, memorandum to all

the members OfUSCIB. "Amended Draft. ofNSCID Establishing USCIB," 7 June 1948, History Collection, NBA,Series

XII.H. Box 34 (c). (Hereaft.er cited as Armstrong memorandum, 7 June 1948).

25. Minutes of 26th, 27th, and 28th meetings of uscm, 6, 20 January 1948 and 3 February 1948, History

Collection, MBA, Series XII.H. Box 38 (TS).

26. Lay Report, pp. 32-34. See also minutes of28th meeting OfUSCIB, 3 February 1948.

27. See minutes of26th meeting OfUSCIB, 6 January 1948.

28. Ibid.

29. See minutes of28thmeeting OfUSCIB, 3 February 1948.

TQP5EEAET 132

I1AllSeB "lIA eeMIl;f'f 8lfAllllBJ:iBeNe\"
DOCID: 3109065

19P5ECRET

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Forrestal memorandum for Secretaries of Army, Navy and Air Force, 13 February 1948, Spint File, CIA

Archives, Langley, USCIB Charter (TS).

33. Grant Manson, State Department Liaison Officer, memorandum to Park Armstrong, Special Assistant, State

Department,3 March 1948, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Bolt 47 (5)

34. Ibid.

35. Grant Manson, State Department Liaison Officer, memorandumfor the record, "Current Developments on the

Charter," 23 March 1948, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 47 (TS).

36. R. H. Hillenkoetter, DCI, memorandum to Lieutenant General S.J. Chamberlin, Chairman, USCIB, 22 March

1948, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 47 (5).

37. Lay Report. pp. 34-35.

36. Lay Report. pp, 34-36.

39. See minutes of31st meeting OfUSCIB, 13 May 1948.

40. See Howe's History ofAFSAINSA for an excellent account ofthis entire sequence concerning the USCIB charter.

In particular,see pp. 122-29.

41. See Armstrong memorandum, 7 June 1948. The enclosure to the basic memorandum summarizes the major

issues between CIA and other members OfUSCIB concerning the charter controversy.

42. Howe's History ofAFsAlNSA, pp.126-28.

43. Grant Manson, memorandum, "Various Views Concerning Developments on the Charter," 25 March 1948,

History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Bolt 47 (TS).

44. See Armstrong memorandum of7 June 1948.

45. C.T.R. Adams and J.E. Fitzpatrick, Ad Hoc Secretariat, memorandum for the DCI, "Action agreed upon at the

time ofthe Ad Hoc meeting ofthe IAC held at 1410 on 11 June 1948," History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 34

(c). Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, DCI, memorandum for the Executive Secretary of the National Security

Council, "Proposed NSC Intelligence Directive, Communication Intelligence," 11 June 1948, History Collection,

NSA, Series XII.H. Bolt 34 (5).

46. NSCIDNo. 9, "Communications Intelligence," 1 July 1948, HistoryCollection,NSA,Series V.A. (c).

ChapterIV

1. Howe's HistoryofAFsAiNsA, Partl,pp.I-26.

2. Joseph N. Wenger, USN, memorandum for Director, AFSA, "Consolidation of CSA and ABA," 12 July 1949,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 3791, CBPI 48, NSA (TS).

3. Interview of Stuart MacClintock, 25 February 1986, by Robert D. Farley, OH-05·86, Center for Cryptologic

History, NSA (5).

4. Joseph N. Wenger, OP·20·G, memorandum for Civil Service Board, Staff and CINC NEGAT, "Authority of Civil

Service Appointees," 24 April 1946, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 3791, CBPI 48, NSA (TS).

5. Joseph N. Wenger, memorandum for OP·20, "Civil Service," 18 December 1945, Cryptologic Archival Holding

Area, Accession No. 3791, CBP! 48, NSA (TS).

6. Woodbury M. Burgess, USAF, "Briefing ofRobertson Committee," 1957, History Collection. NSA, Series VI.C.

7. Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of the Army, memorandum for James V. Forrestal, "United Armed Forces

Security Agency," 24July 1948. Accession No. 2459, CBIB 14,Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (u).

133

lIANBbB VIA 8SMl!i'f 81IAPUiIU.S S"PfbY

19P5EEREl
DOCID: 3109065

---=-Tjuii-n:F~S;;"iI!cEetlR~E~=f~-

8. Report ofthe Joint Committee ofthe Investigation ofthe Pearl Harbor Attack, U.S. Congress, 1946, p. 253,

NSA Cryptologic Collection, NSA (U).

9. Howe's History ofAFSAlNSA., Part I, pp. 144-46.

10. Rearden, The Formative Years pp.53-55.

11. James V. Forrestal, memorandum to Secretaries ofthe Army, Navy, and Air Force, "Terms of Reference for

the Committee on the Creation of a Unified Armed Forces Security Agency," 19 August 1948, History Collection,

NSA, Series VII. Bolt 4 (s). (Hereafter cited as Forrestal Letter.)

12. Ibid.

13. Minutes ofthe 1st meeting ofthe Committee on the Creation ofa Unified Armed Forces Security Agency, 7

September 1948, History Collection, NSA, Series V.F (TS).

14. Forrestal Letter.

15. Earl E. Stone, memorandum for SecDef, "Committee on the Creation of a Unified Armed Forces Security

Agency - Report of," 30 December 1948, Historical Collection, NSA, Series V.F (TS). (Hereafter cited as Stone

Board Report).

16. Ibid., (Tab D - Army View).

17. Ibid., p. 6.

18.Ibid., p. 5.

19. Ibid., p. 5.

20. Ibid., (Part A), p. 9.

21. Minutes of 41st meeting OfUSCIB, 17 June 1949 (USClB 25/1), "Establishment of Armed Forces Security

Agency," History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Bolt 37 (TSC). (Hereafter cited as 41st meeting OfUSClB.)

22. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, 00, memorandum for SeeDef, "Report ofthe Committee on the Creation ofa Unified

Armed Forces Security Agency," 14January 1949, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Bolt 38 (TSC).

23. 41st meeting OfUSCIB, and Howe'sHistory ofAFBAlNSA., p. 155.

24. Brownell Committee, Report to the Secretary ofState and SecDef, 13 June 1952, p. 21, History Collection,

NSA, Series V.F (TSC). (Hereafter cited as BrownellReI)orL)

25. Minutes of13thmeeting ofMSAC, 28 April 1950,(MSAC 25fl4), pp. 14-15,HistoryCollection, NSA,SeriesXII.A

(TS).

26. George F. Howe, "The Early History OfNSA," Cryptologic Spectrum, (Spring 1974), pp. 11-17.

27. Howe'sHistory ofAFSAlNSA., pp. 158-59.

28. Rearden, The Formative Years, pp. 410-22.

29. Captain Paul R. Schratz, USN (Ret.), "The Admiral's Revolt," U.S. Naval lnatitute Proceedings, (February

1986).

30. Interview of Brigadier General Carter W. Clarke, 3 May 1983, by Robert D. Farley, OR-OS·SS, History

Collection, NSA. (Hereafter cited as CarterClarke interview.)

31. Howe's History ofAFsAlNSA., p. 159.

32. LouisJohnson, memorandum for the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, "Organization ofCryptologic Activities within the

National Military Establishment'" 20 May 1949,Accession No. 1404,CBDD II,Cryptologic Archival HoldingArea

(TS). (Hereafter cited asJohnson Directive Establishing AFSA.)

33. Louis Johnson,letter to Secretary ofState, 20 May 1949, Accession No. 6490, CBIB 44, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, NSA (TS).

34.Johnson Directive establishing MSA.

35. 41stmeeting ofusclB.

T9PSECRET 134

flA:lfBbe ";IA: e6Mm'f eflA:NUeCS6lfb"t
DOCID: 3109065

1=OP&[CAET

36. Howe's Hiatory ofAFSAINSA, pp. 165-66.

37.Minutes of41st meeting ofUSClB.

36.Johnson Directive establishing AFSA.

39. JCS 2010/6, Charter for Armed Forces Communications Intelligence Advisory Council, 28 July 1949,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 1404, CBSD 11, NSA(TS). (Hereafter cited asJCS 2010/6.)

40. JCS 2010/12, Change in title of "Armed Forces Comunications Intelligence Advisory Council," Cryptologic

Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 1404, CBDD 11, NSA(TS).

41. While Stone reported as Director on 15 July 1949, the earlier date ofJohnson's Directive, 20 May 1949, is

generally cited asthe date for the establishment ofAFSA.

42. Howe's Hiatory ofAFSAINSA, PartII, pp. 3-6.

43. Ibid.

44. AFSAC 25129, Progress Report as of 30 January 1950 by Director, AFSA, to AFSAC, 27 January 1950, Accession

No. 5253, eBSB 71,Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS) and Howe's History ofAFSAINSA, PartII, pp. 15-39.

45. Howe's Hiatory ofAFSAINSA, PartII, p. 15.

46. Ibid. PartII, p. 40.

47. Travis M. Hetherington, ChiefPlans and Policy Divisions, memorandum for General Canine, "Establishment

ofa USCIB Coordinator's Group," 13 May 1952, with enclosure, pp. 3-4 ofenclosure, Cryptologic Archival Holding

Area, Accession No. 2960, eBSB 33, NSA (TS).

48. Ibid.

49. Earl Stone, memorandum for members ofAFSAC, "Progress Report as of30 January 1950," 27 January 1950,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 5253, NSA (TS).

50.Johnson Directive establishingAFSA.

51. AFsAlAir Force Agreement on Task Assignments to AFSS Mobile Intercept Sites, 22 September 1950 (AFSAC:

60124), Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 4820, CBSB 57, NSA (TS).

52.Joseph N. Wenger, memorandum to George F. Howe, NSAHistorian, "Comments on Historical Study," 25 May

1960, Part II, XII, History Collection, NSA, Series VI.D (TS). (Hereafter cited as Wenger, comments on AFSAINSA

Hiatory.)

53. Howe'sHiatory ofAFsAlNSA, pp. 78-80, 92-94.

54. JCS 2010123, "Division ofResponsibility between Armed Forces Security Agency and the Military Services,"

18 November 1950,Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 1404,CBDD 11, NSA (TS).

55. Ibid.

56. During 1949 and 1950, CIA and State continually stressed the issue oftheir lack of an authoritarian role in

USCIB activities. In particular,see minutes of41stmeeting OfUSCIB,17 June 1949, pp. 2-8, HistoryCollection,NSA,

Series XII.H. BOJ: 34 (TS).

57. Louis W. Tordella, "Presentation to Eachus Study Group," 10 September 1968, p. 12, History Collection, NSA,

Series VI.D (Tse).

58. Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone, Director, AFSA, memorandum for Assistant ChiefofStaff, 0.2, Director of Naval

Intelligence, Director ofIntelligence, USAF, "Formulation ofSpecial Intelligence Requirements," 18 August 1950,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 39058, NSA (TS).

59. JCS 2010128, "Succession of Directors, Armed Forces Security Agency," 17 February 1951, Cryptologic

Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 1404, CBDD 11, NSA (TS).

60. Ibid., and Howe's Hiatory ofAFSAINSA, PartII, p. 137.

61. Howe'sHiatory ofAFsAlNSA, PartII, pp. 137-38.

62. Interview of Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone, 9 February 1983, by· Robert D. Farley, OH-03-S3, Center for

Cryptologic History, NSA andWenger, commentsOnAFsAlNsAHistory,Centerfor Cryptologic History,NSA.

135

lII'dfBhB VIA e8MIlff eUAIUfJ!l1::S 8N'U..'

'Fep SEERE'F
DOCID: 3109065

ftjpSECAET

63. Carter Clarke interview.

64. Major General Ralph J. Canine, Director, NSA, Presentation to Agency seniors at Arlington Hall Station, 25

November 1952, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 4918, CBNB 61, NSA(TS).

ClaapterV

1. See minutes for 48th meeting OfUSCIB, concerningCONSIDO,13 January 1950. Accession No. 6490 (Folder '2),

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TSC).

2. Howe's History ofMSAlNSA, PartII, pp. 126-29.

3. Louis Johnson, memorandum for the Joint Chiefs ofStaft', "Maximum Exploitation ofCOMINT," 19 May 1949,

with enclosure, Accession No. 6491, CBIB 45, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TSC). (Hereafter cited as

Johnson Memorandum,19 May 1949, concemingcoNSIDO.)

4. Ibid.

5. Major General S. Leroy Irwin, USA, Director ofIntelligence, memorandum for Joint Intelligence Committee,

"Conference with General McNamey on Draft. CONSIDO Paper," 20 October 1949, Accession No. 6491, cm 45,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA(TS).

6. Johnson memorandum,19 May 1949,concerningcoNSIDO.

7. USCIB 2611, Item 7 ofthe Agenda for 47th meeting OfUSCIB, 2 December 1949, "Presentation of Draft. CONSIDO

Paper," Accession No. 6490 (Folder #2), CBIB 45,Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA(TS).

8. USCIB 26/4 Item 2, Section I, ofthe Agenda for the 48th meeting OfUSCIB, held 13 January 1950, "Draft. Proposal

on the Establishment of CONSIDO," Accession No. 6490 (Folder 11), CBIB 44, History Collection, NSA (TSC).

(Hereafter cited as USCIB 2614, 13 January 1950.)

9. USCIB 26/4, 13 January 1950.

10. Rear Admiral R.H. Hillenkoetter, USN, DCI, memorandum fur USCIB Members, 12 January 1950, Accession No.

6491,CBIB 45,Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA(TSC).

11. USCIB 26/4, 13 January 1950.

12. Ibid.

13. USClB 26n,Item 2 ofthe Agenda for the 49th meeting OfUSCIB, held on 16 March 1950, "Draft. Proposal on

Establishment OfCONSIDO," History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 38.1 (TSC).

14. USCIB 26/13,ltem 2 of the Agenda for the 53rd meeting OfUSCIB, held on 14 July 1950, "Draft. Proposal on

Establishment ofCONSIDO," History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 38.1 (TS.)

15.See minutes of30th meeting ofuSCIB, 27 April 1948,pp. 2-7,w/enc1(memorandumfor Rear AdmiralRoscoe H.

Hillenkoetter, Director, Central Intelligence, for Lieutenant General S.J. Chamberlin, Rear Admiral T.B.lnglis,

and Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone, dated 21 April 1948, concerning CIA request for access to COWNT activities and

materials), History Collection, NSA, Series XlI.H. Box 38.1 (TSC).

16. Watson, FarEa,t. p.33.

17. Charles P. Collins, CIA, Chairman, USCIB Intelligence Committee, memorandum to Coordinator of Joint

Operations, "Recurrent Intelligence Requirements List No.3," 15 May 1950, Accession No. 1378, CBPB 57,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TSC).

18. Ibid.

19. Captain Mason, Chief of Office Operations, teletype message for Captain Wenger, V/DIR, undated, but

apparently originated soon after the start ofthe Korean War. During this period, there existed a teletype circuit

(known as "pony" circuit) between the Office ofOperations at Arlington Hall Station and the MSA Directorate at

Naval Security Station. The circuit was used primal"ily for exchange of operational communications between

T8PSEEREf 136

tI1d4'm.E VIAe6MlIf'f eUANNEhS 6ffb"{
DOCID: 3109065

1=9P 'EGRET

AFSAofficials. Copy ofmessage is in Wenger Collection. See Accession No. 9139, CBIB 26, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, NSA (TSC). (Hereafter cited as Mason to Wenger Message.)

20. Carolyn J. Fox, The U.S. COMINT Effort During the Korean Conflict, June 1950 - August 1953, (unpublished

manuscript, 6 January 1954), pp. 1-2, History Collection, NSA, Series V.M (TSC). (Hereafter cited as Fox Report,

Korea.)

21. Ibid., p. 2.

22. Ibid., p. 3.

23. Mason to Wenger Message.

24. Fox Report, Korea, pp. 2-3.

25. Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone, Director,AFBA., memorandum for ASsistant ChiefofStaff, G·2, Director of Naval

Intelligence, Director oflntelligence, USAF, "Formulation ofSpecial Intelligence Requirements," 18 August 1950,

Accession No. 39058A,Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS). See also responsesfrom Army, Navy, andAir

Force as promulgated by AFSAC 60fl5, Accession No. 39058A, NSA(TS).

26. Watson,FarEast, pp. 33-34, 57-58.

27. LouisJohnson, memorandum for the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, "Organization ofCryptologic Activities within the

National Military Establishment," 20 May 1949, Accession No. 1404, CBDD 11, Cryptologic Archival Holding

Area, NSA (TS).

28. Brigadier General W.N. Gilmore, Chief, ABA, memorandum for Major General Bolling, Assistant Chief of

Staff, G·2, "Korean Intercept Effort Prior to the Outbreak of Korean Hostilities," 5 October 1950, Accession No.

9139, CBIB 26, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA(TSC).

29. AFSAC 60126: Report by the Director, AFSA, to the Joint Chiefs ofStafT, via the Armed Forces Security Agency

Council, "Division of Responsibility Between AFSA and the Services," 18 September 1950, Accession No. 5864

(Folder #3), CBIB, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

30. Ibid. See also Joint memorandum from Rear Admiral Felix Johnson, Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear

AdmiralJohn R. Redman, Director ofNaval Communications, and Captain L.S. Howeth, Head Security Branch,

Naval Communications, for Chairman, Armed Forces Security Agency Council, "Comments on AFSAC 60126," 27

October 1950, Accession No. 5864 (Folder #3), CBIB 31, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

31. Stone wrote these informal remarks on the Army's response to AFSAC 60130, 19 October 1950, Accession No.

9092, CBIB 24, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

32. AFSAC 60130, 19 October 1950: Major General C.P. Cabell, Director of Intelligence, USA, memorandum for

Chairman, AFSAC, "Report by DIRAFBA., AFSAC 60126," Accession No. 5864 (Folder #3), CBIB 31, Wenger Collection,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

33. AFSAC 60133, 24 October 1950: Major General Alexander R. Bolling,AssistantChiefofStafT, G-2, memorandum

for Chairman, AFSAC, "Comments on AFSAC 60fl6," Accession No. 9092, CBIB 24, Cryptologic Archival Holding

Area, NSA (TS).

34. Memorandum for the Record by Captain Joseph N. Wenger, Deputy Director, AFSA, "Comments on AFSAC

60fl6," November 1950, Accession No. 5864, (Folder #3) CBIS 31, Wenger Collection, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, NSA (TS).

35. CaptainJoseph N. Wenger, USN, Deputy Director, AFSA, memorandum for Director, AFSA, "ArmyComments on

AFSAC 60fl6," 26 October 1950, Accession No. 5864, CBIB 31, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

(Hereafter cited as Wenger memorandum, 26 October 1950).

36. Wenger memorandum, 26 October 1950. See also memorandumfrom Captain Rufus L. Taylor, OP·322Yl,forOP·

32,"Comments on JCS 2010124," 15January 1951,Accession No. 5864,CBIB 31,Cryptologic Archival HoldingArea,

NSA(TS).

37. Wenger memorandum, 26 October 1950.

38. Admiral Earl E. Stone, Director, AFBA, memorandum for Major General Alexander R. Bolling, USA, "AFSAC

60126," 1 November 1950,Accession No. 9092, CBIB31,Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

137

M.'\NBbS 'lIt: G9MIN'I' GIIftNNSbS 9NbY

T9P&&CA&T
DOCID: 3109065

"FQP5ECRET

39. AFSAC 60/42: Admiral Earl E. Stone, Director, AFSA, memorandum for Members of AFSAC, "Division of

Responsibility Between AFBA and the Military Services," 24 November 1950, Accession No. 5864, CBIB 31,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NBA (TS).

40. AFSAC 60/49,12 July 1951: Brigadier General Roy H. Lynn, Commander, USAFSS, memorandum for Director,

AFSA, "Establishment ofGroup Headquarters in Europe and the Far East," 18 June 1951, Accession NOll. 4820,

2422, and 3756N, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

41. Watson, Far East, pp. 37-39.

42. Ibid., pp. 35-43.

43. Ibid., p. 36, 39-40.

44. Ibid., p. 35.

45. Minutes of 53rd meeting ofuSCJB, 14 July 1950, pp. 6-11 (USCJB 77/4: Selective Intelligence Mobilization)

History Colleetion, NBA, Series XII.H. Box 35.1 (TS).

46. Robert J. Watson, COMumer Liaison Unita, 1949-1957, Aprll1957, pp. 7-10, Accession No. 10684, CBm 52,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NBA (TSC). (Hereafter eited as Watson, COMumer Liaison.)

47. Ibid., pp. 2-11.

48. Ibid., pp. 3-11.

49. Colonel Roy H. Lynn, memorandum for Coordinator ofJoint Operations, "Scheduling of USCJB Committee

Meetings," 2 May 1949, Accession No. 1426, CBPB 63, Cryptologie Arehival Holding Area, NSA (s). Colonel David

Wade, USAF, Viee Commander, memorandum for CJO, "Transmission ofClassified Material to this Headquarters,"

9 May 1949, Aeeession No. 1426,CBPB 63, Cryptologie Arehival Holding Area, NSA (s).

50.Watson, Consumer Liaison, pp.19-23.

51. Ibid.

52. Within the State Department, the Special Projeets Staff (sPs) became responsible for the receipt and

dissemination ofCOMINT. In May 1947, Robert F. Packard served as the first COMIN'I' liaison officer for the SPS,

which wasthen located atthe Pentagon. See WatsoD, Consumer Liaison, PP. 33-34.

53. Minutes of 53rd meeting of USCIB, 14 July 1950, pp. 6-11, (USCJB 77/4: Selective Mobilization), History

Collection, NSA, Series XII H, Box 38.1 (TS).

54. T. Achilles Polyzoides, Director, Special Projects Staff, Department ofState, memorandum for Direetor, AFSA,

"Establishment ofa Department ofState (Special Projects Staft) Liaison Unit at AFSA 02," 25 June 1951, History

Collection, NSA, Series XII H (TS). Admiral Stone, Director, AFSA, memorandum for the Special Assistant,

Department ofState, "Establishmentofa DepartmentofState (Special Projects Staff) Liaison Unit at MSA 02," 5

July 1951, History Collection, NBA, Series XII.H (TS).

55. See minutes of30th meeting ofuSCJB, 27 April 1948, pp. 2-7, w/ene1(memorandumfor RearAdmiral Roscoe H.

Hillenkoetter, Direetor, Central Intelligence, for Lieutenant General S.J. Chamberlin, Rear Admiral T.B. Inglis,

and Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone, dated 21 Apri11948, coneerning CIA request for access to COMlNT activities and

materials) History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 38 (TSC).

56. Ibid.

57. Minutes of 41st meeting OfUSClB, 17 June 1949 (USCJB 25/1), "Establishment of Armed Forces Security

Agency," History Colleetion, NSA,Series XII.H. Box 38.1 (TSC).

58. Stephen J. Donchez, CIA Member, USCJB Intelligence Committee, memorandum for Chairman, Intelligence

Committee, 27 August 1950, Accession No. 7960, CBSD 14,Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TSC). See also

memorandum to Distribution from Stephen J. Donchez, Chief Assessment and Requirements Branch, Special

Research Center, CIA, "Report on Messages Received in July," 21 August 1950, Aecession No. 7960, CBSD 14,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NBA (TSC).

59. AFSAiAir Force Agreement on Task Assignments to AFSS Mobile Intercept Sites, 22 September 1950 (AFSAC

60124), Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 4820, CBSB 57, NSA (TS). Wenger, "Comments on

Historical Study."

60. Watson,FarEast,pp.45-46.

WP 5IiCAIi:r 138

i;lA :NgJ"E VIA Q9MIJ'J'P ellAmfBtBaUto-....
DOCID: 3109065

l'9P SEeREl'

61. Major General Charles A. Willoughby, G·2, Far East Command, message dated 12/1908Z March 1951,

addressed to ACSI, Washington, Accession No. 9139, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS). Captain J.S.

Holtwick, USN, Chief, Office of Operations, memorandum for B.K. Buftbam and H. Conley, "Visit to FEC," 12

March 1951, Accession No. 9139, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (s). Major General Charles A.

Willoughby, Assistant Chief ofStaff, G·2, Far East Command, memorandum for Herbert Conley and Benson K.

Buftbam, 15 March 1951, Accession No. 9139, Cryptologic Archival HoldingArea, NSA. (TSC). Report ofTour ofFar

East Command, by B.K. Buftbam and H.L. Conley, 4 April 1951, Accession No. 9139, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, NSA. (TSC).

62. Brownell Committee, Report to the Secretary ofState and SecDef,13 June 1952, p. 62, History Collection, NSA,

Series V.F. (TSC). (Hereafter cited as Brownell ReporL)

63. Ibid. See also Captain Redfield Mason, Chief, MSA 02, memorandumfor Commanding General, ABA, "Korean

Linguists for ASAPAC," 1 August 1950, Accession No. 9139, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA.(TSC).

64. These improvements are generally attributed to the intervention ofSoviet advisors who became alarmed over

the communications procedures ofthe North Koreans. See Richard Chun, "A Bit on the Korean COMINT Effort,"

(unpublished manuscript, 1971), p. 3, History Collection, NSA., Series V.M.1 (SC).

65. Ibid.

66. Robert E. Drake, "The COMINT Role in the Korean War," (unpublished manuscript, Circa 1954), p. 6, History

Collection, NSA, Series V.M (TSC).

67. Watson, Far East, pp. 78-81,116-18.

68. BrownellReport, pp. 22-28.

69. Louis W. Tordella, "Presentation to Eachus Study Group," 10 September 1968, p. 12, History Collection, NSA,

Series VI.D (TSC).

70. The minutes ofthe USCIB meetings from 1949-1950 provide evidence ofthe beginning of a gradual change in

the attitude ofthe CIA.representatives. DCI Hi11enkoetter, who served as the third DCI from 1 May 1947-7 October

1950, became more assertive in his effortsto carve outa greater role for CIA in the national intelligence process. In

particular, see USCIB 2614,13 January 1950. See also the minutes of the 41st meeting OfUSCIB, concerning the

establishment of A.FSA., 17 June 1949, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 38.1 (TSC). (Hereafter cited as

minutes of41st meeting OfUSCIB,17 June 1949.)

Chapter VI

1. During the USCIB meetings of 1949 and 1950, CIA. and State continually raised the issue of their lack of an

authoritarian voice in guiding the activities ofAFSA.. In particular, see the minutes ofthe 41st meeting of uscm,

17 June 1949, pp. 2-8, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H (TS). (Hereafter cited as minutes of 41st meeting of

USCIB, 17 June 1949.)

2. In later years, a portion ofthe CONSIDO concept was resurrected anew and implemented by the SIGINT Policy

Board. Twenty·five years after the disapproval ofthe CONSIDO proposal, the National Foreign Intelligence Board

established the National SIGINT Requirements System (NSRS) as a community requirements mechanism in 1975.

3. Minutesof41stmeetingofuscIB,17 June 1949.

4. The standing requirement for a unanimous vote on major decisions had prevailed in USCIB for a number of

years. Consequently, it became very difficult for the representatives of CIA. and State to win support for a

favorable decision in USCIB on controversial issues, particularly when they sought to acquire an enhanced role in

influencing the A.FSA intelligence process. See NSCID No.9, "Communications Intelligence," 1 July 1948, History

Collection, NSA, Series V.A (TS).

5. John Ranelagh, Tlut Agency: Tlut Rise and Decline oftlut CIA: New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1986, pp.

102-11 and Rearden, Tlut FormatilJfl Years, pp. 20-27.

139

UA!iBbfl VIA eeMllff eUAfUiflbSe!ibY

iQPSECRET
DOCID: 3109065

l'9PSECRET

6. Lawrence K. White on the Directors, Oral History Interview by Dino Brugioni and Urban Linehan, Studies in

Intelligence (CIA), Winter 1987, Vol. 31, No.4, pp. 1-6.

7. Walter B. Smith, DCI, memorandum for Executive Secretary, National Security Council, "Proposed Survey of

Communications Intelligence Activities." 10 December 1951 (CIA Archives) (TSC).

8. RobertA. Lovett and Dean G. Acheson-letter to Brownell, Bohlen, Magruder and Jackson, 28 December 1951

(Exhibit A in Brownell Report), History Collection, NSA, Series V.F (TSC).

9. Ibid.

10. Lieutenant General Ralph J. Canine, "Memorandum for the Record," 7 February 1952, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, Accession No. 6009. CBSD 75. NSA(S).

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Brownell Report. p.62.

14. Ibid.• p. 50.

15.Ibid•• p. 6.

16. Ibid.• p. 134.

17. Ibid•• p. 6.pp. 121-24.

18. Ibid.• pp. 121-28.

19. Ibid.• p. 7 ofcover letter.

20. Ibid.• pp. 124-28.

21. Ibid•• pp.129-34.

22. Ibid.• pp. 131-34.

23. Ibid.• pp. 53-56.

24. Ibid.

25. Ralph J. Canine. Director. AFSA. memorandum for SecDef. "Brownell Committee Report." 8 July 1952.

CryptologicArchive Holding Area. Accession No. 5741 N. CBSC 33, NSA (TS).

26. Memorandum for the Record by Rear Admiral J.N. Wenger. Deputy Director for Intelligence. AFSA. "Draft of

Proposed Presidential Directive for Organizing the COMINT Activities ofthe U.S.... 14October 1952, Accession No.

5741 N. CBSC 33.Cryptologic Archival Holding Area. NSA (TS).

27. Harry S. Truman. memorandum for the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, 24 October 1952,

History Collection. NSA. Series V.A (TS).

28. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No.9. Revised. Communications Intelligence, 24 October

1952.CryptologicArchival Holding Area. Accession Number 14842.CBRD 76. NSA(TS).

29. Ibid.

30. Harry S. Truman, memorandum for the Secretary of State and the SeeDef. "Communications Security

(COMBEC) Matters. History Collection. NSA. Series V.A (TS).

31. Robert A. Lovett. SeeDef. memorandum. for the Service Secretaries.Joint Chiefs ofStaff. Director. National

Security Agency. "Interim Implementation OfN8CID No.9. Revised. 4 November 1952. History Collection, NSA,

Series V.A (TS).

32. Ibid.

33. Lieutenant General C.D. Cabell, Director Joint Staff. memorandum for General Bradley. General

Vandenberg. General Collins. and Admiral Fechteler. "National Security Agency." 9 February 1953. Cryptologic

Archival Holding Area. Accession No. 2466. CBIB 15. NSA (8).

34. Ibid.

T8PSECRET 140
DOCID: 3109065

1=9PSECRET

35. Almost four decades later, the national directives unequivocally identify N5A as the central authority in the

field of U.S. cryptology. N5CID No.6, issued in February 1972, charges the Director with "full control" over all

SIGINT collection and processing activities, which now includes COMINT and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)

processing activities. But, as in 1952, there still exist a number of grey areas between NSA and the services,

mainly because ofcharter limitations and exceptions to the authority ofNSA. Moreover, national directives also

provide for the delegation ofSIGINT authorities, as necessary, to the military services for conducting a number of

direct support activities, including tactical ELINT operations. While considerable progress has been made in

pulling together U.S. SIGINT activities into the semblance ofa single system, divided controlstill exists.

141

IIhNBb5 Viti 68MIli'F 6lb\NN5b8 8NbY

-.:gP SECRET
DOCID: 3109065

T9PSECRET

Notes on Sources

Most ofthe documents used in the preparation ofthis history are in the holdings ofthe

Office of Archives and Repository Services and the Center for Cryptologic History. A

diverse number of sources originated these holdings, which reflect a broad range of

departmental, national, and operational relationships extending over this period of

cryptologic history. The Office ofArchives and Repository Services (T54) holds three basic

groups of resource materials: the stored records that are held for a temporary period

pending a disposition review by the owning organization; the retired records that are

undergoing an appraisal to determine their archival value; and the accessioned records

that are filed as permanent Agency records in the Cryptologic Archival Holding Area

(CAHA), or Archives. The Agency's Center for Cryptologic History (D9) maintains its own

research collections.

Among Agency records, two separately organized collections deserve special mention.

These are the accessioned records ofthe Archives and the special collections maintained by

the Center for Cryptologic History. For the researcher, there is very little distinction

between the kind of records in the Archives and those maintained in the Center for

Cryptologic History. There are major distin~tions, however, in the method of organization

and arrangement ofthe documents for retrieval purposes - and in the continuity accorded

historical themes. These differences in organization stem mainly from basic differences in

the approach to records keeping as well as factors associated with the organizational

evolution of each organization. In the course of developing into today's structures, each

organization underwent a different sequence of growth, and each developed its own

operating concepts and methodology.

Starting with the AFSA period and extending into the NSA years, the Office of the

Adjutant General (AG) served as the first administrator of cryptologic records. During the

early 1950s, the AG established the beginnings of the Agency's records management

program and directed the creation ofa Records Repository for the retention ofvital records.

These early rudimentary actions safeguarded from destruction massive holdings acquired

from the World War II era as well as other essential records associated with the

establishment of AFSA and NSA. However, as NSA directed its primary energies toward its

operational missions and as organizational changes occurred, the position of Agency

officials concerning the priority of non-operational tasks ofthis nature became clear. The

resource allocation officials consistently demonstrated little enthusiasm for the program

and generally provided only token support in terms ofresources and priorities.

In responding to its new national role, NSA commenced a pattern of frequent

organizational change that extended from 1952 until the late 1970s. This pattern of

recurring institutional change impacted unfavorably on the direction and emphasis

accorded its records management function. During this period of approximately twentyfive years, the management responsibility for the task rotated among at least six Key

Components: Office of the Adjutant General, Office of Administrative Services,

Comptroller, Office of Policy, Office of Management Services, and Office of

Telecommunications. Despite this cycle of change and the continuance ofthe strictures on

resources, the records management program achieved some progress over the years. But

143

IIft~iB158 '11ft SQMINl' SHA~)ii::r..8 g~:r..¥

1=9PSECRET
DOCID: 3109065

1'9P SECKEl'

overall, these circumstances clearly affected the quality and scope of the program and

impeded its implementation. They also encouraged the creation of special collections of

historians and history-minded technicians.

As the Agency expanded, the lack of storage facilities emerged as another major

problem in the conduct of the Agency's records management program. Until the late

1970s, the Agency resorted to storing its record holdings at several different locations

within the Agency as well as a number oflocations outside NSA's control. These external

locations included facilities at Crane, Indiana; Arlington Hall Station; Vint Hill Farms;

Torpedo Station, Alexandria, Virginia; and Fort Holabird, Baltimore. The dispersal of

records represented an inefficient method of operation and impacted negatively on the

various steps in the review and disposition cycle. As a practical matter, however, perhaps

the greatest damage occurred in the retrieval process. The dispersal ofstored, retired, and

permanent records not only affected the quality and timeliness of service provided to

operational elements, but it also impeded the retrieval efforts of researchers and

historians.

All ofthese factors contributed to a lack ofdirection and stability for the entire records

program. The big push for change did not come until 1977, when the Agency established

the Cryptologic Archival Holding Area (CAHA) - or Archives, as it is commonly called. The

establishment of an Archives stemmed from action by President Carter directing the

mandatory declassification of intelligence documents that were thirty years old or older.

In complying with Executive Order 12065, Admiral Inman ordered that a new urgency be

placed on declassification matters and on the records management program ofNSA. As an

integral part ofthis action, Inman directed the immediate establishment ofa new archival

office to assume archival responsibility for all elements of the Agency and to function

under the control ofthe Director's Policy Staff. By 1980, with the physical relocation of all

of the stored, retired, and accessioned records in the Office of Archives and Repository

Services, the Agency concluded its first serious attempt to establish an archival program.

Ofthe records processed thus far by the archives since its establishment in 1977, the

accessioned records generally start with the World War I era and extend to 1960. The

accessioned records yielded significant information for this study. These records are

arranged and filed under a nine-letter code group, called a Cryptologic Record Group

(CRG), which identifies the file location as well as the "origin, geographic pertinence, and

subject content" ofthe record. The most useful part ofthisimmense collection is itssubject

correspondence file ofletters, memoranda, reports, and other correspondence between the

Army and Navy cryptologic organizations and between the military services and officials

in the defense establishment, the National Security Council, the White House, and other

executive departments. There are also a number of Special Collections within these

holdings, such as the Wenger Collection, personal papers, and various project files, that

proved to be extremely valuable.

The Center for Cryptologic History traces its origins to the AFSA era when a history

office was established as a very small element within the training division (AFSA 14). But

shortly after the establishment of NSA in 1952, the history function received new attention

and emphasis at the Directorate level. This change occurred mainly because of the

interest of General Canine, who wanted the events associated with the establishment of

NSA to be documented from an historical viewpoint. He supported the recruitment ofthree

1'9PSECRET 144

IIl:NBr:.S VWt S9MU1'l' SIIl:NtlSr:.s 9Nr:.y
DOCID: 3109065

19P5ECREf

professional historians and created a new history element, which functioned as a part of

his Plans and Policy Staff. Following the appointment of Dr. George F. Howe as the first

professional historian, the history program enjoyed some degree of high-Ievet'support and

recognition which lasted for several years. Within a few years, however, following the

retirement of General Canine, the political situation began to change for the history

element. By the mid-1950s, as the growing Agency became increasingly preoccupied with

more pressing operational considerations, the position of the history group began to

deteriorate. Lacking any sponsorship at the Directorate level, the group encountered

great difficulty in obtaining support and resources for conducting even a modest history

effort.

Like the early Records Oftlce, the History Office became a casualty of frequent

reorganization actions, as well as periodic resubordinations within the Agency. By 1989,

the History Office had been placed organizationally in at least seven different Key

Components. These Key Components included the Training Office, Plans and Policy, the

Central Reference Organization in the Office of Operations, the Policy Staff, the

Management Organization, the National Cryptologic School, and the Office of

Telecommunications.

Vice Admiral Studeman's 17 September 1989 memorandum announced the decision to

establish the Center for Cryptologic History as an element ofthe Director's Staff (D9) and

marked a new departure for the Agency's history program. Personnel were transferred

from T54 the following month to constitute the core ofthe new organization, with Henry F.

Schorreck retaining his position as NSA historian. Components of the Center include the

oral history program, the NSA museum collection, and the publishing arm (which also

publishes Cryptologic Quarterly, the Agency's professional journal) as well as the research

collections and historians.

During the years of austerity, the NSA Historian of necessity performed only limited

research activities and concentrated on the development of historical records relating to

the evolution of the cryptologic structure of the United States. Today, the Center for

Cryptologic History, by virtue of its History Collection, is· a major holder and authority on

early u.s. cryptologic records. The collection is designed to assist in meeting the needs of

Agency researchers and in providing information supportservices to Agency officials.

The records in the History Collection begin with the American Revolution and extend

into the present. These holdings are divided into Series, generally on a chronological

basis, with further subdivisions made topically. The History Collection contains published

and unpublished manuscripts, a broad range of policy and operational correspondence,

personal collections, crisis files, historical studies, and transcripts of oral history

interviews. Another important collection of historical records exists as a totally separate

entity within the Center. The "Cryptologic Collection" became a part of the History

Collection in 1987. Originally a part of the Technical Documents Section of the NSA

Library, the Cryptologic Collection is slanted heavily toward technical matters. It

contains a wealth of material on cryptographic systems from the World War II period and

earlier, descriptions of cryptanalytic solutions and techniques, and extremely useful

information concerning cryptologic organizations.

145

UAlfBI:iI!l'IIA SeMIrA' 8UAlfNI!ll:08 e!ib¥

T8PSECRET
DOCID: 3109065

T\;rSiZCRET

Among the records acquired from the three services for this early period, the holdings

contributed by the Army are noteworthy and are the most prolific of the three military

services'. During the early 1980s, the u.s. Army Intelligence and Security Command

(INSCOM) welcomed NSA personnel in their screening ofINSCOM holdings from World War I

to the post-World War II period. As a result ofthis cooperation, the Archives now holds an

immense collection ofArmy cryptologic recordsfor the early years ofcryptology.

The archival holdings acquired from the Navy and Air Force vary considerably. With

particular reference to the Navy, the Archives does hold a collection ofArmy-Navy records

that devolved to NSA following the organizational realignments occurring during the

postwar years. Initially this sequence began with the Joint Army-Navy Operating

Agreement of 1946, which forced each service to move toward closer cooperation on

cryptologic matters. The Agreement resulted in a first-time consolidation of a broad range

of Army-Navy operating documents and correspondence, including the records of the

various Joint Committees. As a part of this process, the Navy also intermixed with its

contemporary holdings some earlier naval records dating to the immediate pre-war period.

As further organizational changes occurred, this collection ofjoint Army-Navy holdings

passed to the custody of each successor structure. The cycle of institutional change,

extending over a six-year period, included the establishment of AFSA in 1949 and ended

with the creation of NSA in 1952. Today this legacy of Army-Navy records is invaluable,

not only for research, but also as a source of accurate perspective on the nature and

problems ofthese earlyjoint operations.

Because ofits later arrival as a third cryptologic service, the Air Force records for this

early period do not start until after World War II. The Air Force created the Air Force

Security Service (AFSS) as a separate command in Texas in 1949, five months before the

establishment of the Armed Forces Security Agency. During a transition period, the

initial AFSS structure relied on the Army Security Agency for administrative and

operational support. By the time ofthe Korean War, however, the AFSS started to function

as an independent service and acquired its own facilities and targets. Still, even for this

latter period, there is a paucity ofinternal Air Force documentation at NSA concerning the

inner workings of the new cryptologic service. This may have been due, in part, to the

remote location ofAFSS Headquarters in Texas. Today the Air Force Unit Histories appear

to constitute the bulk of the Air Force cryptologic records in the archives. But for the

purposes ofthis report, these Unit Histories proved to be ofminimal value.

The combined holdings ofthe Archives and the Center for Cryptologic History contain

significant documentation issued not only by the military services (both the cryptologic

and intelligence organizations), but also by the evolving United States Communication

Intelligence Board (ANCIB - STANCIB - USCIB) and the civilian consumer agencies. In

particular, the correspondence, agendas, and minutes ofthe initial policy boards (ANCIB -

STANCIB - USCIB) provided exceptional perspective about the nature of the conflicts and

power struggles taking place within the intelligence structure during the postwar period

from 1945 to 1952. The internal correspondence from some consumer agencies gave

special insights into the unity reflected by the representatives of CIA and State in their

joint opposition to the exclusive military control ofthe COMINT effort. This block ofrecords

also provided enlightening perspective, once again from the point of view of the nonmilitary consumer, about the AFSA structure and the activities ofthe Brownell Committee.

T8PSECRET 146

n1l:1fSJ:iFl "/111: eSMIli'f en...:PJHSbS SNbY
------- ---

DOCID: 3109065

'f8PSEERET

Oral interviews, conducted mainly by Robert D. Farley, the NSA Oral Historian, and

selected Special Research Histories (SRH), resulting from declassification, helped fill out

the documentary record.

147

IIAN'Bbl!l 7;11\ eSMIN'f 6IIl.NNKbS 9NbY

Te'3EERET
DOCID: 3109065

1'9P SEEREl'

Primary Sources

U.S. Congress

U.S. Congress, House Hear"ings, Committee on Expenditures in the Executive

Departments, National Security Act of1947, 80th Congress, 1st Session, 1947.

U.S. Congress, Senate Hearings, National Security Act Amendments of 1949, 81st

Congress, 1stSession, 1949.

U.S. Congress, Joint Committees, Report ofthe Joint Committee ofthe Investigation ofthe

Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, 1946. (Joint Committee Print.)

Presidential Papers

Acheson, Dean, Henry L. Stimson, and James V. Forrestal, Memorandum for President

Truman, "Continuation and Extension of Collaboration with the British in the

Communications Intelligence Field," undated, NSA Center for Cryptologic History.

Roosevelt, Franklin D., memorandum for the Director of the Budget, 8 July 1942, NSA

Archives.

Roosevelt, Franklin D., memorandum for General Marshall, 9 July 1942, NSA Center for

Cryptologic History.

Truman, Harry S., memorandum for the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, 12

September 1945, NSA Centerfor Cryptologic History.

Truman, Harry S., memorandum for the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense,

24 October 1952, NSA Centerfor Cryptologic History.

Truman, Harry S., memorandum for the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense,

"Communications Security (COMSEC) Matters," 24 October 1952, NSA Center for

Cryptologic History.

National Directives

United States National Security Council, NSCID Number 9, Communications Intelligence, 1

July 1948.

1'9P SEERE1' 148

iii AMDLE lZI ACOUIMT C:W: A:N:NEI.Iil O:NL¥
DOCID: 3109065

'f9PSEERET

United States National Security Council, NSCID Number 9, Revised, Communications

Intelligence, 24 October 1952.

International and United States Military Agreements

"Army-Navy Agreement concerning Allocation of Diplomatic Traffic," 30 June 1942, NSA

Centerfor Cryptologic History.

"Agreement between British Code and Cipher School and U.S. War Department

concerning Special Intelligence," 10 June 1943, NSAArchives.

Marshall, George C. and Edward J. King, "Joint Army-Navy Agreement for the Exchange

ofCommunications Intelligence," 4 February 1944, NSA Centerfor Cryptologic History.

"Outline of the Collaboration in Cryptanalysis between the Army and the Navy," 18

August 1944, NSAArchives.

"British-United States Communications Intelligence Agreement," 5 March 1946, NSA

Centerfor Cryptologic History.

"Corderman-Wenger Agreement concerning Coordination of Army and Navy COMINT

Activities," 5 April 1946, NSAArchives.

"Establishment of a United States Combined Intelligence Liaison Center in Great

Britain," 3 May 1946, NSAArchives.

"AFSAlAir Force Agreement on Task Assignments to AFSS Mobile Intercept Sites," 22

September 1950, AFSAC 60/24, NSA Archives.

Official Documents Issued by United States Intelligence Boards

Most important to this study were the minutes, agendas, and organizational bulletins of

the evolving ANCIB-STANCIB-USCIB structures. High-ranking officials of the military

cryptologic organizations and the civilian agencies presented their views on the COMINT

structure, its functioning, and its placement in the national intelligence structure. From

1945 to 1952, the issuances of the early intelligence boards revealed the conflicts and

struggles of the intelligence community relating to the issues of unification and the

consolidation of cryptologic responsibilities. These unique sources are in a single

consolidated grouping within the NSA Center for Cryptologic History. This brief list

reflects only a sampling ofthe documents available for this period.

149

---------------------_._-..- -------_. - - -

'fe' SEelt!T
......

DOCID: 3109065

T9PSECRET

Minutes ofthe Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee, 1944-

1945.

Minutes ofthe Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board, 1945-1946.

Minutes ofthe State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board, 1945.

Minutes of STANCIB concerning the establishment and operation of the Joint Operating

Plan, 1946-1949.

Minutes of USCIB Meetings concerning the establishment of AFSA in 1949 and the parallel

proposal concerning the CONSIDO Plan.

Executive Department Documents and Reports

Army-Navy-FBI Allocation Committee, "Report of Conference Appointed to Study

Allocation ofCryptanalysis," 30 June 1942, NSA Archives.

"Report of Joint Army-Navy Intercept Control Group for the period 1 April 1946 to 28

February 1947," 6 March 1947, NSA Archives.

Stone Board Report to the Secretary of Defense concerning the Creation of a Unified

Armed Forces Security Agency, 30 December 1948, NSACenterfor Cryptologic History.

Progress Report by Director, AFSA, to Armed Forces Security Advisory Council, 27

January 1950, NSAArchives.

Report by Director, AFSA, to Armed Forces Security Advisory Council, concerning Division

of Responsibility Between AFSA and the Services, 18 September 1950, AFSAC 60/26, NSA

Archives.

Departmental and Military Organizational

Bulletins, Directives, Charters, and other Issuances

Joint Military Memorandum to Army and Navy COMINTCommittee, 31 July 1940.

Joint Army and Navy Report to Chief Signal Officer and the Director of Naval

Communications, 3 October 1940.

Report by Secretariat of Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Coordinating

Committee concerning Merger Planning, 30 August 1945.

TePSECRET 150

H AMCI.K HI'" egMUr~SUAN!H!lbB6Nt.-..-
DOCID: 3109065

')':OPSEEAE'J

United States Communications Intelligence Board Organizational Bulletin No. II, 31 July

1946.

Secretary of Defense, "Promulgation of Terms of Reference for the Committee on the

Creation ofa Unified Armed Forces Security Agency," 19 August 1948.

JCS 2010/12, Organizational Announcement concerning Armed Forces Communications

Intelligence Advisory Council, 28 July 1949.

Secretary of Defense Directive, "The Establishment olthe Armed Forces Security Agency

within the National Military Establishment," by Louis A. Johnson, 20 May 1949.

JCS 2010/23, "Division of Responsibility Between AFSA and the Military Services," 18

November 1950.

AFSAC 60/49, "Announcement ofthe Establishment ofAFSS Group Headquarters in Europe

and the Far East," 18 June 1951.

Secretary of Defense, "Implementation ofNSCIDNumber 9," Revised, by Robert A. Lovett,

4 November 1952.

Historical Studies and Monographs

History of the Signal Security Agency in World War II, "Organization, 1929-1945" (ASA

1945), Vol. I, Part I.

History of the Signal Security Agency, "The Japanese Army Problems - Cryptanalysis,"

(ASA 1947).

Howe, George F. ,Narrative History ofAFSAINSA, PartsI-IV, (NSA 1959).

Howe, George F. and Robert J. Watson, Historical Study of COMINT under the Joint

OperatingPlan, 1946-1949 (NSA).

Parker, Frederick D., A New View to Pearl Harbor: United States Communication

Intelligence, 1924-1941, United States Cryptologic History Series. (NSA 1988)

Oral Interviews

Clarke, Carter W., Interviewed by Robert D. Farley, Clearwater, Florida, 3 May 1983 .

NSA Center for Cryptologic History.

151

IIldfBbfJ VIA e8MUff ellldftfEib6 8Nf:11

1=9PSECRET
DOCID: 3109065

'Fep SEERE'f

MacClintock, Stuart, Interviewed by Robert D. Farley, Fort Meade, Maryland, 25

February 1986, NSA Center for Cryptologic History.

Stone, Earl E., Interviewed by Robert D. Farley, Carmel, California, 9 February 1983, NSA

Center for Cryptologic History.

White, Lawrence K., Interviewed by Dino Brugioni and Urban Linehan, Washington,

D.C., 8 June 1972, CIA History Office.

Special Research History (SRH)

SRH 200 - Army-NavyCollaboration, 1831-1945, Part 2.

SRH 230 - The Role ofComint in the Battle ofMidway, Henry F. Schorreck.

Unpublished Studies

Chun, Richard A., A Bit on the Korean Effort. Typescript. Working note prepared for NSA

History Office, 1971.

Drake, Robert E., The COMINTRole in the KOl'ean War. Typescript. Study prepared for the

Director, NSA, circa 1954.

Fox, Carolyn J., The U.S. COMINTEffort During the Korean War June 1950-August 1953.

Typescript. 1954

Lay, James S., History ofusclB. Vol. I. Typescript. Study prepared for CIA Historical

Office, undated.

Secondary Sources

Monographs

Hough, Richard, The Greatest Crusade - Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Naval Wars (New

York: Willow Morrow and Co., 1986).

Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline ofthe CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster,

Inc., 1986).

TeP SEERE'f 152

HAH915S 'JI·A S9MnJ'I' SHAHJtJSI:B 9JtJL¥
DOCID: 3109065

T9PSEERB

Rearden, Steven L. The History of the Office of the Secretary ofDefense, The Formative

Years, 1947-1950 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1984).

Troy, Thomas F., Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central

Intelligence Agency (Central Intelligence Agency, 1981).

Schratz, Paul R., The Admiral's Revolt (U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1986).

-- ------

153

MhN9bK VIA SSMI!'t'i SnAmU!]f:J8 elfl:..l

T9PSECRE'f
DOCID: 3109065

'f8p seCRe,-

Index

Acheson, Dean: pp.26,49,67,99,103,118

Air Force Office ofIntelligence (AFOIN): pp. 90-91, 121

Air Force Security Group (AFSG): pp. 51, 59, 121

Air Force Security Service (AFSS): pp. 51,59-61,63,75,88,90-91,93, 114, 116, 121

Akin, Spencer B., Colonel: pp.7-8

Ankenbrandt, Francis L., Brigadier General: pp. 47,62

Arlington Hall: p. 13-15

Armed Forces Communications Intelligence Advisory Council (AFCIAC): pp. 69-70, 121

Armed Forces Communications Intelligence Board (AFCIB): pp. 64-65, 121

Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA): pp. 3, 59, 66 -79, 81- 99, 102-111, 116-119, 121

Armed Forces Security Agency Council (AFSAC): pp. 70, 74,77,83,86-88,95,103,105,121

Armstrong, W. Park, Jr.: pp. 55-56, 65, 69, 83, 91,107

Army Security Agency (ABA): pp. 36,38,51,59,67,81,121

Army Security Agency, Pacific (ABAPAC): pp. 89,93,121

Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board (ANCIB): pp. 3,5,20-21,24-26,31,33-

35,121

Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee (ANCICC): pp. 5, 19-

20,22,24-26,33-34,114,121

Army-Navy Joint Operating Plan (JOP): pp. 37, 39-43, 71, 75,114-115

B-36 Strategic Bomber: p. 66

Becker, Loftus E.: p. 107

Bohlen, Charles E. ("Chip"): pp. 99, 102, 118

Bolling, Alexander R., Major General: pp. 62, 102

BOURBON: pp. 25-26, 37

Bradley, Omar, Brigadier General: pp. 102, 109

British-United States ofAmerica Agreement (BRUBA): pp. 35- 37, 39- 40, 42, 52- 53

Brownell, George A.: pp. 2,99-100,104,111,118

Brownell Committee: pp. 3,97,99,102-105,107,109-110,118-119

Brownell Report: pp. 2,97, 103 -106, 109-110, 118

Buftham, Benson K.: pp. 93 - 94

Bullock, Frank W., Colonel: pp. 11-12

Bureau ofthe Budget: pp. 48

Byrnes,James F.: p.48

Cabell, Charles P., Major General: pp. 62,68, 109

Canine, RalphJ., Major General: pp. 77 -78,102,105-108,117

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): pp. 1,19,40-41,45,49-57,59,62,64-65,68-69,78-79,

81-82,90-92,95,97-99,107,109-110,114-119,121

Central Intelligence Group (CIG): pp. 40, 45, 47-49, 121

ChiefofNaval Operations (CNO): p. 20, 32-35, 65,121

ChiefofNaval Operations (CNO): pp. 20, 32-35, 65,121

Churchill, Winston: pp. 21- 23

Clarke, Carter W., Colonel: pp. 19,31,67-68, 78, 116

155

IIAUBI:J!l VIA eSMIn'f 81hftllNtihS 9llh¥

TOil SECRET
.............

DOCID: 3109065

16P$ECRET

Collaboration: pp. 11,15,21-22,24-26,29,35-37,52,69

Collins, Samuel P.: p.70

Collocation: pp. 29, 41- 42,90, 114

Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet (COMINCH): pp. 20, 121

Communications Reconnaissance Battalion (CRB): pp. 89, 121

Communications Reconnaissance Company (CRC): pp. 89, 121

Communications Reconnaissance Group (CRG): pp. 89, 121

Communications Supplementary Activity, Washington (CSAW): pp. 15,71,121

Communication Supplementary Detachments (COMMSUPDETS): pp. 89, 121

Conley, Herbert L.: pp. 93 - 94

Consolidated Special Information Office (CONSIDO): pp. 81-84,95,98, 117, 121

Coordinator ofJoint Operations (CJO): pp. 35 - 40,42, 68-71, 75, 92, 114-115

Corderman, W. Preston, Colonel: pp. 19,31,33,35,37

Crimmins,John: p. 91

Cutler, Lloyd N.: p.99

Defense Management Committee (DMC): ppJf9, 122

Denfield, Louis, Admiral: p. 65

Department ofDefense (DOD): pp. 45, 49-52,54,59,61-62,65,70,74,77-78,82-83,86,97,

99,105,107-109,115,118,122

Department ofState: pp. 5,6,11,18,26,29,40-41,45,47-48,51-53,55-57,59,62,

64-65,68-69,78-79,81,83,91-92,95,97 -99,103,106,109-110,115-118,123

Dill, SirJohn: p. 22

Director ofCentral Intelligence (DCI): pp. 40, 45-46, 48-57, 64, 83, 91, 98-99,105,107,

109-110,115,118,121

Director ofJoint Operations(DJo): pp.64,122

Donovan, William J., Brigadier General: p.19

Douglass, Kingman: pp.99,118

Duncombe, Harmon: p. 99

Edwards, Richard S., Vice Admiral: p. 20

Eisenhower, Dwight D.: pp. 26, 34-35, 98

Erskine, Graves B., Brigadier General, USMC: p. 109

Federal Bureau ofInvestigation (FBI): pp. 9-12, 18,24,39-40,45,47-48,52,57,59,81-83,

103,105,115,117,122

Federal Communications Commission (FCC): pp. 9, 12, 122

Forrestal,James V.: pp. 26, 34, 45-46, 48, 50, 54-55, 57, 61-63, 65,115

Friedman, William F.: pp. 71, 74, 81- 82

Government Code and Cipher School (G.C.&C.S.), U.K.: pp. 22,24,122

Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), U.K.: pp. 40, 122

Harper,JohnS.,Captain: pp. 72,74

Hayes, Harold G., Major: pp. 14, 38- 39, 62

Hillenkoetter, Roscoe H., Admiral: pp. 45-46, 51, 53-57, 64, 67, 69, 83, 91, 98,115

Hoover,J. Edgar: pp.18, 39, 52

Ingles, Harry C., Major General: p. 16

MP5ECRET 156

I1h~lBI:.1!l VIA B9MIN'f BIIAfHfFltS9ffbY
DOCID: 3109065

l'OPSECRET

Inglis, Thomas B., Rear Admiral: pp. 49, 68

Intelligence Advisory Board (lAB): pp. 49,122

Intelligence Advisory Council (lAC): p. 56, 122

Irwin, S. Leroy, Major General: p. 68

Jackson, William H.: pp. 99,102,118

Japanese Special Weather Intelligence (SWI): p. 15,123

Joint Army-Navy Agreement for the Exchange ofCommunications Intelligence: p.16

Joint Army-Navy Regulations for the Dissemination and Use ofCommunications

Intelligence Concerning Weather: p. 15

Joint Chiefs ofStaff(Jcs): pp. 9,18-20,27,52-54,59,64-65,67,70,74-78,82-83,88,

97-98,102-103,105,109,113-115,122

Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), JCS: pp. 9, 18, 122

Joint Intercept Control Group (JICG): pp. 39, 71, 75, 122

Joint Liaison Group (JLG): pp. 39, 75, 122

Joint Processing Allocation Group (JPAG): pp. 39 - 40, 71, 75, 122

King, ErnestJ.,Admiral: pp. 15-16,20,26,32-34,47,51

Kinney, Philip R., Captain: pp. 19

Korean War: pp. 59,76,81,85-86,88,90-95,98,110,117

Kullback, Solomon, Dr.: pp.72-74

Leahy, William D., Rear Admiral: pp. 49, 52

London Signals Intelligence Board (LSIB): pp. 25, 122

Lovell, James R.: p. 83

Lovett, Robert: pp. 99, 102-103, 105, 108-109, 118

Lynn, Roy H., Colonel: pp. 51,68,71

Magruder, John, Brigadier General: pp. 99, 118, 102, 107

Manson, Grant C.: p. 99

Marr-Johnson, Patrick, Colonel (U.K.): p. 37

Marshall, George C., General: pp. 15-16,20,22,33-34,47,51

Mason, Redfield, Captain: pp. 71-72, 74

Matejka,J.V., Major General: p. 68

Matthews, FrancisP.: pp.65-66

Mauborgne,JosephA.,General: pp.6-8

McCormack, Alfred: pp. 26, 49

McDonald, George C.,Brigadier General: pp. 47, 49

McNarney,Joseph T., General: pp. 65, 67, 69, 82

Munitions Building: p. 10-11, 14

National Intelligence Authority (NIA): pp. 45, 48-49,122

National Military Establishment (NME): p. 117

National Security Act of 1947: pp. 2-3, 40, 45, 49-51, 54, 57, 59, 62, 65, 67, 83,113-115

National Security Agency (NSA): pp. 2-3, 9, 97,107 -111,113,118-119

National Security Council (NBC): pp. 3,45-46,50,52,54-57,64,74,78,97,99,102,107,

115,118

157

1:1 A )l'J;)I.i: VIA El9MII'J'I' SIIAliNBLS eULY

TOP &IIiCRIi:r
DOCID: 3109~i:cRET

National Security Council Intelligence Directive Number 9: "Communications

Intelligence" (NSCIDNo. 9): pp. 40, 54, 5'"1, 64, 68-69, 83, 107 -108,115,122

Naval Security Group (NSG): pp. 122

Navy Security Station (NSS): p. 71,122

Neely, Horace D.: p.90

Nimitz, Chester W., FleetAdmiral: pp. 34-- 35

Noyes, Leigh, Rear Admiral: pp. 6- 9

Office ofNaval Intelligence (ONI): p. 122

Office ofStrategic Services (OSS): pp. 12, 18, 20, 24, 123

Office ofthe Secretary ofDefense (OSD): p. 122

Parker, Frederick D.: p.9

Partridge, Richard C., Brigadier General: p. 102

Patterson, Robert P.: p.48

Pearl Harbor: pp. 1,9,11,21,26,29-30,47,74,113

Polyzoides, T. Achilles: p. 83

Radio Squadron Mobile (RSM): pp. 89, 122

Redman, Joseph R., Admiral: p. 20

Redman. John R., Commander: pp. 11-12

Roosevelt, Franklin D.: pp. 1, 5, 11-12, 21- 23, 113

Rowlett, Francis B.: pp.73-74

Royal Air Force (RAF): pp. 25, 123

Royall, Kenneth C.: pp. 55, 61-62

Rubin, Morton A., Lieutenant Colonel: p. 39

Safford, Laurance F., Commander: pp. 7 - 8, 74

Samford, John A., Major General: p. 102

Senior U.K. Liaison Officer (SUKLO): pp. 25,123

Senior U.S. Liaison Officer (SUSLO): pp. 25, 123

Shute, Benjamin R.: p. 99

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT): pp. 62, 123

Signal Intelligence Service (Army), (SIS): pp. 16-17,71,123

Sinkov,Abraham, Dr.: pp.72-74

Smith-Hutton, Henri H.,Captain: p. 19

Souers, Sidney W., Admiral: pp. 45 - 46,48, 54-55, 67

Special Committee ofMerger Planning (SMP): pp. 33. 123

Special Research Branch (Army Intelligence) (SRB): pp. 90, 123

State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board (STANCIS): pp. 27, 31, 35- 39. 53.

91,123

State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee (STANCICC): pp.

26,38-39.123

State-War-NavyCoordinatingCommittee (SWNCC): p. 26, 123

Stimson. Henry L.: p. 26

Stone Board: pp. 62-64. 67, 87

Stone, Earl E., Admiral: pp. 51. 62. 67-68, 70-71. 74-75. 77-78,83.86-93,95,117

T9P5ECRET 158
---------

DOCID: 3109065

---------

lap SEERrl

Strong, George V., Major General: pp. 22, 24, 32

Sullivan,John L.: pp. 55, 66

Symington, W. Stuart: p.55

Taylor, Rufus L., Commander: p. 39

Thebaud, Hewlett, Admiral: p. 25

Todd, Walter E., Major General: p.68

Travis, Edward W. (U.K.): pp. 22,24

Truman, Harry S.: pp. 2, 26,45,48-50,52,54,57,61,65,67,97-99,107 -110,114,118

U.S.-U.K. Relationship: pp. 22-23, 25-27, 36-37, 39, 117 -118

Unanimity: pp.,20, 38, 47, 55, 57,70,106,115

United Nations (UN): p.91

United States Communication Intelligence Board (USCIB): pp. 39-41,45,47-48,51-57,

59,64-65,68-69,71,74,76-78,81,83,85,89,91-92,95, 97 -98,102-107,109,

115-118

United States Communication Intelligence Coordinating Committee (USCICC): pp. 39,47,

52,123

Vandenberg, Hoyt S., Lieutenant General: pp. 36, 38-39, 49, 52, 65-66

Veeder, William S., Captain: p.62

War Council (WC): pp. 49, 66, 65,123

Ward,JohnS.: p.91

Washington, D.C. Control-Collection Office (woc/cco): pp. 91, 123

Weeks, James L., Colonel: p.91

Wenger,JosephN.,Admiral: pp. 9, 19, 31, 33-35, 37,60,68-70, 87-88, 107

Willoughby, Charles A., Major General: p.90

159 1'8' SEER!'f

nAtiBbl!i VI-A 8SMHi'f 8nJdn~ebSSlibY D9· MAY 91 • YI . 1310.92
DOCID: 3109065 TOP SECRET

HAN6LE 'f'IA eOMINT eHANNELS ONLY

TOP SECRET

______ ----------------0-----