IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

IN RE: §

§ CASE NO: 16-10992 (SMB)

SUNEDISON, INC., et al.,

Debtors.

§ CHAPTER 11

§ (Jointly Administered)

§

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 

RICHMOND DIVISION

IN RE: §

§ CASE NO: 19-00302 (KRH)

OLD ANR, LLC, et al.,

Debtors.

§ MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDING

§

§

§

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

HOUSTON DIVISION

IN RE: §

 § CASE NO: 18-35672

WESTMORELAND COAL COMPANY, et al., §

 §

 §

 Debtors. §

 CHAPTER 11

(Jointly Administered)

UNITED STATES TRUSTEES’ STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF SETTLEMENT

AGREEMENT BETWEEN UNITED STATES TRUSTEE PROGRAM AND MCKINSEY & 

COMPANY, INC. AND CERTAIN OF ITS AFFILIATES

Henry G. Hobbs, Jr., the Acting United States Trustee for Region 7, William K. Harrington, 

the United States Trustee for Region 2, and John P. Fitzgerald, III, the Acting United States Trustee 

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for Region 4 (collectively, the “USTP”), provide these statements in support of the Settlement 

Agreement Between United States Trustee Program and McKinsey & Company, Inc. and Certain of 

Its Affiliates filed on March 7, 2019 (the “Settlement”). For the following reasons, each of the 

respective Courts should approve the Settlement.

I. The Courts Should Approve the Settlement Because it is a Good Faith Compromise

and is Reasonable.

1. The USTP has alleged that McKinsey1 has failed to satisfy its disclosure obligations 

under the Bankruptcy Code and Rules as an estate-retained professional and has repeatedly 

demonstrated a lack of candor with the Courts and the USTP in connection therewith. By 

approving the Settlement, each of the respective Courts will hold McKinsey accountable for its 

conduct right now—and the parties thereby avoid both the delay and risks of protracted discovery 

and litigation. It will also ensure a definitive consequence by requiring monetary payments that are 

among the largest ever by a professional in connection with disclosure disputes under Rule 2014. 

Most importantly, the Settlement neither excuses McKinsey from its obligation to be free from 

conflicts, nor does it dictate that McKinsey’s employment be approved in the Westmoreland case. 

Instead, the Settlement ensures that McKinsey will either make retention disclosures in compliance 

with bankruptcy law (including in the Westmoreland case) or face further actions and potentially 

more severe consequences in the future. Furthermore, it preserves the USTP’s ability to take action 

if McKinsey is conflicted in any case (either in the past or in the future), and it preserves the rights 

of all other interested parties to pursue whatever claims or causes of action they may have. 

 1 “McKinsey,” “Mar-Bow,” and other terms not specifically defined herein shall have the meaning ascribed in 

the Settlement.

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2. The Settlement was the product of a Court-ordered mediation before the Honorable 

Marvin Isgur.2 Based on his observations of the parties’ negotiations, Judge Isgur reported to these 

Courts that “the proposed settlement between the United States Trustee and McKinsey resolves the 

parties’ good faith disputes concerning the application of Bankruptcy Rule 2014.” See Mediator’s 

Notice to Court, In re Westmoreland Coal Company, Case No. 18-35672, Docket No. 785. 

3. The Settlement’s terms are reasonable and reflect a good faith compromise of the 

disclosure-related disputes between McKinsey and the USTP that holds McKinsey accountable and 

eliminates the uncertainty and delay of protracted discovery and litigation. 

4. First, the Settlement requires McKinsey to pay $15 million in these three cases to 

remedy inadequate disclosures of connections. The payment will be distributed to the creditors and 

other parties in these cases in accordance with applicable law, including the reorganization plans 

approved by these Courts.3

 This is one of the highest repayments made by a bankruptcy 

professional for its alleged failure to comply with disclosure requirements. 

5. Second, McKinsey must make additional disclosures in the pending Westmoreland

case that fully comply with bankruptcy law and otherwise demonstrate that it is eligible under 

section 327 to be retained in that case. The Settlement expressly carves out and preserves the 

rights of the Acting United States Trustee for Region 7 to contest the adequacy of any 

supplemental disclosures that McKinsey will make in the Westmoreland case.

4

 And it does not 

 2 The USTP is grateful to Judge Isgur for the time and expertise he shared with all parties to the mediation. 

Without his expert handling of strong disagreements between the parties, it is unlikely that a settlement could have 

been reached. 

3 As with all mediated disputes, the agreed monetary allocation was the product of negotiation between the 

parties. The Settlement requires McKinsey to make the monetary payments in these three open cases, thereby 

obviating the need to reopen earlier cases that have been closed and fully administered years ago.

4 To be clear, nothing in the Settlement endorses or approves the disclosure protocol that McKinsey intends to 

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waive the Acting United States Trustee for Region 7’s rights to challenge McKinsey’s additional 

disclosures in Westmoreland or otherwise challenge its retention. 

6. Third, the Settlement is limited to resolving the USTP’s allegations that McKinsey 

failed to make disclosures in accordance with Bankruptcy Rule 2014 or other applicable law, and it 

contains critical safeguards applicable in both past and future cases. See Consent Order, Article III, 

¶¶ 5-6. Importantly, if evidence later shows that McKinsey had actual conflicts of interest, or that 

McKinsey made material omissions, misrepresentations, or engaged in fraud, the USTP may 

undertake any additional action and seek appropriate relief in any case.

5

 See Id. The Settlement 

also does not release claims for the inadequacy of future disclosures. If McKinsey’s conduct 

repeats, the USTP will seek even more stringent remedies.

7. Fourth, as is standard in most settlements, the Settlement contemplates mutual 

releases between McKinsey and the USTP. McKinsey has never suggested that it holds any claim 

against the USTP, and the claims that the USTP brought and that are being released under the 

Settlement are limited to the USTP’s civil enforcement claims relating to McKinsey’s disclosure 

compliance in these three open cases and in 11 other cases that are all closed, some as long as nine

years ago, in which there are no pending actions.

8. Finally, the Settlement does not bind or prejudice the rights and claims of any nonsettling third party, including the 14 bankruptcy estates named therein. The releases included in the 

Settlement bind only the USTP and McKinsey. Specifically, the relevant release terms expressly 

 

develop pursuant to a separate settlement agreement between the firm and the debtor in Westmoreland. Thus, approval 

of the Settlement does not affect the validity of McKinsey’s contemplated process. Instead, the Acting United States 

Trustee for Region 7 will evaluate McKinsey’s supplemental submissions in the same way that he does for any 

professional retention applicant.

5 In addition, the Settlement also expressly provides that “claims with respect to any criminal liability are not 

released.” Consent Order, Article III, ¶ 10.

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state that only the USTP is releasing the relevant claims against McKinsey and that the releases do 

not bind or prejudice any other party. Settlement, Article III, ¶ 10. Nothing in the Settlement 

precludes Mar-Bow Value Partners, LLC (“Mar-Bow”) from continuing to prosecute its claims 

against McKinsey, nor does it prevent any other non-party from pursuing whatever rights or claims 

it may have against McKinsey. Similarly, no governmental entity is restricted in any way from 

taking any action.

9. All of these reasons justify approval of the Settlement and the resolution of the 

extant disputes between the USTP and McKinsey, which appear in the written record before these 

Courts.6 Even with estate causes of action—which are in no way compromised here—case law

establishes that “it is unnecessary to conduct a mini-trial to determine the probable outcome of any 

claims waived in the settlement. ‘The judge need only apprise himself of the relevant facts and law 

so that he can make an informed and intelligent decision.’” Official Comm. of Unsecured 

Creditors v. Cajun Elec. Power Coop. (In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop.), 119 F.3d 349, 356 (5th 

Cir. 1997) (quoting La Salle Nat’l Bank v. Holland (In re American Reserve Corp.), 841 F.2d 159, 

163 (7th Cir. 1987)). 

II. The Courts Should Decline Modifications Based on Mar-Bow’s “Limited” Objection.

10. Mar-Bow has asserted a “limited” objection to the Settlement (the “Limited 

Objection”). Unfortunately, Mar-Bow fundamentally misunderstands and misconstrues important 

 6 The USTP requests that pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201 (made applicable herein under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9017), 

the Courts take judicial notice of the pleadings evidencing these disputes, including:

(1) Comments of United States Trustee Regarding McKinsey RTS’s Opposition to Mar-Bow Partners, LLC’s 

(I) Motion to Reopen Case and (II) Motion for Relief from Judgments and for Indicative Ruling, In re

Alpha Natural Resources, Inc., Case No. 15-33896, Docket No. 4164; and

(2) Acting United States Trustee’s (1) Objection to Debtors’ Application for Entry of an Order Authorizing 

The Retention And Employment Of McKinsey Recovery & Transformation Services U.S., LLC as 

Performance Improvement Advisors to the Debtors Nunc Pro Tunc to the Petition Date; and (2) Response 

to Court’s Order Dated November 30, 2018, In re Westmoreland Coal Company, Case No. 18-35672, 

Docket No. 785.

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elements of the Settlement, which leads it to mistakenly conclude that modifications to the 

Settlement are warranted. 

11. Mar-Bow first seeks to impose broad and sweeping additional language into the 

Settlement purporting to make “crystal clear” that Mar-Bow’s rights and claims are not prejudiced 

as a result of the Settlement. See, e.g., Westmoreland Objection at ¶ 4. It proposes to impose an 

additional provision comprising not less than five different sub-parts that essentially restates in a 

very complicated and confusing manner that Mar-Bow’s rights and claims are unaffected by the 

Settlement. Mar-Bow does not argue that the Settlement is vague or unclear as to its impact on 

third parties. Instead, it argues that the Settlement is not clear enough for Mar-Bow. 

12. While the USTP understands Mar-Bow’s desire to vigorously protect its rights, 

Mar-Bow has not articulated any substantive reason justifying its requested change. In fact, MarBow’s Limited Objection even posits that its requested changes are “clarifications” and does not 

argue that the Settlement prejudices non-party rights, but instead asserts that it wants to make 

“crystal” clear that Mar-Bow’s rights and claims in particular are not prejudiced. See Id.

Incorporating the suggested changes injects uncertainty and may lead to potential litigation by 

suggesting that the rights of non-parties other than Mar-Bow are somehow altered. The existing 

carve-out language in the Settlement is crystal clear in stating simply and directly that the 

Settlement does “not bind or prejudice the rights and claims of any non-party,” which would 

include the rights and claims of Mar-Bow.

13. The other clarification requested by Mar-Bow relates to its desire to alter terms 

relating to the payments contemplated under the Settlement. Mar-Bow argues that the parties to 

the Settlement are improperly dictating the manner in which the “sanctions” are distributed. This is 

simply not the case. The only thing being submitted for the Courts’ review and approval is a joint 

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consent order that embodies the USTP’s and McKinsey’s agreement. Mar-Bow posits that the 

parties are asking the Courts to independently enter sanctions against McKinsey and therefore 

argues that the payment of those sanctions is subject to the discretion of the Courts. Unfortunately, 

Mar-Bow’s premise is fundamentally wrong as it conflates judicially imposed sanctions with the 

administration of settlement proceeds. See Id. at ¶ 8.

14. The parties have submitted the Settlement to the Courts for their review and 

approval as the product of the Court-ordered mediation. By its terms, the Settlement only seeks to 

have continuing jurisdiction of the Courts for enforcement and interpretation should disputes 

relating to the Settlement arise between the USTP and McKinsey, and to document the resolution 

of pending contested matters relating to the USTP’s pending objections in the ANR and 

Westmoreland bankruptcy cases.7

 Most importantly, the Settlement is being submitted to ensure 

transparency in the resolution of those contested matters. However, the Settlement is not presented 

as a Bankruptcy Rule 9019 motion, as it does not resolve any claims of the bankruptcy estate or, as 

explained above, affect any rights of non-settling third parties.

15. Mar-Bow’s position that the parties are improperly “dictating the distribution” of the 

payments required in Paragraph 3 of the Consent Order is also wrong because the Settlement 

contemplates nothing more than that the funds be distributed as required by applicable law. There 

are controlling plans in these cases, which mandate the treatment and distribution of estate 

property. Moreover, the Settlement provides that if applicable law warrants that the payments be 

distributed in some other fashion than under the confirmed plan, then the funds will be so 

distributed. 

 7 And while no formal pleadings were filed, the issues were joined in the SunEdison case as well.

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16. Although Mar-Bow’s objection is purportedly limited to two points of clarification, 

two of Mar-Bow’s most patent inaccuracies in the Limited Objection require correction. 

17. First, Mar-Bow’s Limited Objection asserts that the Settlement “violates” Rule 2014 

by “illegally excusing” McKinsey from disclosing its confidential clients. E.g., Westmoreland 

Objection at ¶ 16. The Settlement does nothing even remotely consistent with that assertion. 

McKinsey will file new disclosures in the Westmoreland case and, as expressly stated in the 

Settlement, the Acting United States Trustee for Region 7 has every right to object to those 

disclosures should they be inadequate, incomplete, misleading, or improper. Proposed Consent 

Order at ¶ 9(a). 

18. Second, Mar-Bow also appears to argue that the Settlement should be submitted to 

every bankruptcy court in which McKinsey was ever retained for review and approval. Here, too, 

Mar-Bow’s position is patently wrong. Mar-Bow puzzlingly posits, without any authority, that if a 

party makes a reasoned determination to release potential claims, it is “illegal” if the party does not 

submit its decision to forego those possible claims to the courts in which the claims may have been 

asserted. Thus, Mar-Bow asserts that the Settlement “illegally deprives” bankruptcy judges in 

long-closed cases—where no disputes are even pending between the USTP and McKinsey as the 

only parties to the Settlement—of their “authority and responsibility” to review the Settlement. 

Westmoreland Objection at ¶ 18; Old ANR Objection ¶ 19; SunEdison Objection ¶ 17. No party 

requires a court’s approval to release its own claims when there is no pending dispute or contested 

matter before the court. Unlike these three bankruptcy cases in which the Settlement was filed

because the issues have been joined between the parties, there is no reason—much less an 

obligation—to submit the Settlement in long-closed cases where there are no pending disputes.

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19. In sum, Mar-Bow’s requested “clarifications” to the Settlement are unnecessary and 

inappropriate. And its musings on the propriety of the Settlement should be ignored both based on 

their inaccuracy and because Mar-Bow expressly states that they do not comprise an objection to 

the Settlement. Westmoreland Objection ¶ 12; Old ANR Objection ¶ 14; SunEdison Objection

¶ 12.

III. The Settlement Should be Approved Notwithstanding McKinsey’s Characterizations 

of its Conduct.

20. The reasons stated herein provide ample bases for the Courts to approve the 

Settlement. McKinsey has nevertheless sought to excuse past violations as the product of a mere 

misunderstanding. See McKinsey’s Response to Mar-Bow’s Motion [Dkt. 1585] to (I) Reconsider 

the Court’s Order Granting the Joint Motion in Furtherance of Mediation Agreement [Dkts. 1422, 

1423, 1427] and (II) Set a Hearing Regarding Discovery on Mar-Bow’s Amended Objection to the 

Debtors’ Application to Employ McKinsey RTS, In re Westmoreland Coal Company, Case No. 18-

35672, Docket No. 1659 at pp. 17-21. To dispel any doubt, the USTP has historically taken the 

position that: (1) bare identification of connections as “confidential clients” does not satisfy Rule 

2014; and (2) the duty to disclose connections reaches all affiliates unless the professional firm can 

establish that the affiliates are sufficiently separate and that there are appropriate information 

barriers, especially with respect to investments. 

21. Moreover, McKinsey’s conduct only reinforces the need for a prompt settlement. 

As the USTP has alleged in its filings in these cases, McKinsey has failed to be candid with the 

Courts and USTP. For example, after agreeing in the ANR case that it would disclose “confidential 

client” names, McKinsey turned around and asserted in Westmoreland that it did not need to 

provide any information—not even under seal—about a client responsible for 17.5 percent of the 

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annual revenues of McKinsey RTS. Approving the Settlement allows the Courts to impose 

accountability now while preserving the right of further action if new facts emerge showing an 

impermissible conflict or if McKinsey repeats its unacceptable practices of non-disclosure in the 

future.

IV. Conclusion.

22. The terms of the Settlement, the extensive legal and factual records before these 

Courts, and the totality of the facts and circumstances easily provide these Courts with the 

necessary basis to approve the Settlement. Doing so will hold McKinsey accountable for its 

conduct, promote transparency, and instill public confidence in the bankruptcy system.

WHEREFORE, for the reasons above, each of the respective Courts should approve the 

Settlement and grant any other relief as may be just and appropriate.

Respectfully submitted,

John P. Fitzgerald, III

Acting U.S. Trustee – Region Four

By: /s/ Robert B. Van Arsdale

Robert B. Van Arsdale (VSB # 17483)

701 East Broad Street, Suite 4304

Richmond, VA 23219

robert.b.van.arsdale@usdoj.gov

By: /s/Hugh M. Bernstein

Hugh M. Bernstein (Md Fed Bar No. 23489)

101 W. Lombard Street, Suite 2650

Baltimore, Md. 20201

hugh.m.bernstein@usdoj.gov

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SERVICE LIST

12

David R. Ruby 

William D. Prince, IV

ThompsonMcMullan, P.C.

l 00 Shockhoe Slip, Third Floor 

Richmond, VA 23219

E-mail: druby@t-mlaw.com

E-mail: wprince@t-mlaw.com

Local Counsel for Mar-Bow Value 

Partners, LLC

Steven Rhodes

Steven Rhodes Consulting, LLC

I610 Arborview Boulevard 

Ann Arbor, Ml 48 I 03

E-maiI: rhodessw@comcast.net

Judith K. Fitzgerald 

Tucker Arensberg, PC 

1500 One PPG Place 

Pittsburg, PA 15222

E-mail: jfitzgeral(@tuckerlaw.com

Susan M. Freeman

Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP 

201 East Washington Street, Suite 1200

Phoenix, AZ 85004-2595

E-mail: sfreemanra),lrrc.com

Lois R. Lupica

Maine Law Foundation Professor of Law 

University of Maine School of Law

246 Deering Avenue

Portland, ME 04012

E-mail: lupica(@maine.edu

Steven M. Biskupic 

Biskupic & Jacobs, S.C.

1045 W. Glen Oaks Lane, Suite 106 

Mequon, WI53092

E-mail: sbiskupic@biskupicjacobs.com

and

John A.E. Pottow

John Philip Dawson Collegiate 

Professor of Law

University of Michigan Law School 

625 South State Street

Ann Arbor, MI 48 l 09

E-mail: pottow<@.umich.edu

Of Counsel for Mar-Bow Value 

Partners, LLC

Richard H. Verheij

Alpha Natural Resources, Inc.

Executive Vice President, General Counsel 

& Corporate Secretary

One Alpha Place 

Bristol, VA 24209

E-mail: rverheij(@alphanr.com

Tyler P. Brown

J.R. Smith

Henry P. Long, Ill 

Justin F. Paget 

Hunton & Williams 

951 East Byrd Street 

Richmond, VA 23219

E-mail: tpbrown@hunton.com

E-mail: jrsmith(@hunton.com

E-mail: hlongra2hunton.com

E-mail: jpaget@hunton.com

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Carl E. Black 

David G. Heiman 

Thomas A. Wilson 

Jones Day

Nmth Point

90 I Lakeside Avenue 

Cleveland, OH 441 1 4

E-mail: ceblack@ jonesday.com

-mail: dghe iman (@.jonesday.com

E-mail: taw ilson(@, jonesday.com

Counsel for Debtors

Hugh M. Bernstein

Onicc of the United Sta tes Trustee 

District of Maryland

IO1 West Lombard Street, Suite 2625 

Baltim ore, MD 2120 I

E-mail: Huuh.M.B ernstein@usdoj.gov

Elisabetta G. Gasparini

Office of the United States Trustee 

1835 Assembly Street, Suit e 953 

Columbia, SC 2920 I

E-mail: clisabetta.l!.gasparini(@,usdoj.gov

Dennis F. Dunne 

Evan R. Fleck 

Erick K. Stodola

Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCoy LLP

28 Liberty Street

New York , NY I 0005

E-mail: ddunne <w.mi lb ank.com

E-mail : cfleck<@.mi lbank.com

E-mail: estodola@milbank.com

Andrew L. LeB!anc

Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCoy LLP 

1850 K Street, N.W., Suite 1100

Washington, D.C. 20006

E-mail: aleblanc@m ilbank.com d

William A. Gray

W. Ashley Burgess 

Roy M. Terry

Sands Anderson P.C.

P.O. Box 1998

Richmond, VA 23218-1998

E-ma il : 8Gray@sandsanderson.com

E-ma il: ABurges s@SandsAnderson.com

E-mail: RTerry@SandsAnderson.com

Counsel to Creditors Committee

Lynn L. Tavenner 

Paula S. Beran 

David N. Tabakin

Tavenner & Beran, PLC

20 North Eighth Street, Second Floor 

Richmond, VA 23219

E-mail: ltavenner@tb-law.com

E-mail: pberan@tb- law.com

E-mail: dtabak in@tb -law.com

and

John R. Owens 

Jeremy D. Capps 

Melissa Y. York

Harman, Claytor, Corrigan & Wellman

P.O. Box 70280

Richmond, VA 23235

E-mail: iowen@hccw.com

E-mail: jcapps@hccw.com

E-mail: myork@hccw.com

Counsel to Reliree Cammi/Jee

Damian S. Schaible 

Damon P. Meyer 

Bradley A. Schecter

Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP 

450 Lex ington Avenue

New York, NY 10117

E-mail: damian.schaible(@davispolk.com

E-mail: damon.meyer@davispolk.com

E-mail: Bradley.schecter@davispolk.com

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Dion W. Hayes 

Sarah 8. Boehm

K. Elizabeth Sieg 

McGuireWoods LLP 

Gateway Plaza

800 East Canal Street 

Richmond, VA 23219

E-mail: dhayes@mcguirewoods.com

E-mail: sboehm@mceuirewoods.com

E-maiI: bsieg@.mcguirewoods.com

Counsel to DIP Agent and First Lien 

Agent

Paul M. Basta 

Stephen E. Hessler 

Kirkland & Ellis LLP

601 Lexington Avenue 

New York, NY I 0022

E-mail: paul.basta@kirkland.com

E-mai I: stephen.hessler@kirkland.com

Gregory F. Pesce 

Kirkland & Ellis LLP 

300 North LaSalle

Chicago, IL 60654

E-mail: gregory.pesce@kirkland.com

Michael A. Condyles 

Peter J. Barrett 

Jeremy S. Williams 

Kutak Rock LLP

I I 11 East Main Street, Suite 800

Richmond, VA 23219-3500

E-mail: michael.condyles@kutakrock.com

E-mail: peter.barrettl@.kutakrock.com

E-mail: jeremy.williams@kutakrock.com

Counsel to Ad Hoc Committee of 

Second Lien Noteholders

Debra A. Dandeneau 

John J. Dedyo

Weil, Gosthal & Manges LLP

767 Fifth Avenue 

New York, NY 10153

E-mail: debra.dandeneaul@.weil.com

E-mail: john.dedyo@weil.com

Counsel to General Electric Credit 

Corporation

Jayne T. Goldstein 

Kenneth Pasquale 

Gabriel E. Sasson

Strook, Strook & Lavan LLP 

180 Maiden Lane

New York, NY 10038-4982

E-mail: jgoldstein@strook.com

E-mail: kpasquale@strook.com

E-mail: gsassonl@.strook.com

Counsel Jo Second Lien Notes 

Trustee

Sharon L. Levine 

Paul Kizel

Philip J. Gross 

Nicole M. Brown

LowensteinSandler LLP 

65 Livingston Avenue

Roseland, NJ 07068

E-mail: slevine(@,lowenstein.com

E-mail: pkizel@lowenstein.com

E-mail: pgross(@lowenstein.com

E-mail: nbrownr@lowenstein.com

Troy Savenko

Kaplan Voekler Cunningham & Frank, PLC

1401 East Cary Street 

Richmond, VA 2319

E-mail: tsavenkol@.kv-legal.com

Counsel to UMWA

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SERVICE LIST

Grant Crandall

United Mine Workers of America

18354 Quantico Gateway Drive, Suite 200

Triangle, VA 22172

E-mail: gcrandall@umwa.org

Uniled Mine Workers of America

Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC 

Attn: Joe Morrow

2335 Alaska Avenue 

El Segundo, CA 90245

E-mail: alphanrinfo(@.kccllc.com 

Claims and Noticing Agent

Harold L. Kaplan 

Mark F. 1-lebbeln 

Foley & Lardner LL P

321 North Clark Street Suite 2800

Chicago, IL 60654-5313

E-mail: hkap lan(@.foley.com

E-mail: mhcbbeln@foley.com

Counsel to the Indenture Trustee for 

the Debtors' Secured and Unsecured 

Noles

Christopher L. Perkins

LeClairRyan, P.C.

919 East Main Street

Twenty-Fourth Floor

Richmond, VA 23219

Christopher.Perkins@leclairryan.com

Bruce H. Matson

LeClairRyan, P.C.

919 East Main Street

Twenty-Fourth Floor

Richmond, VA 23219

Bruce.Matson@leclairryan.com

McKinsey Recovery & Transformation Services U.S., L.L.C.

55 East 55nd Street

New York, N.Y. 10055

Attn: Kevin Carmody

Kevin_Carmody@mckinsey.com

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SERVICE LIST

Martin J. Bienenstock

Proskaur Rose LLP

Eleven Times Square

New York, New York 10036-8299

mbienenstock@proskauer.com

Edward C. Dolan

Hogan Lovells US LLP

Columbia Square

555 Thirteenth Street, NW

Washington, D.C. 20004

Edward.dolan@hoganlovells.com

Peter A. Ivanick

Hogan Lovells US LLP

875 Third Avenue

New York, New York 10022

Peter. Ivanick@hoganlovells.com

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