1The Honorable Gregory W. Carman, Chief Judge, United States Court of

International Trade, sitting by designation.

2The Honorable Mark W. Bennett, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Northern District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 00-2146

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Northern District of Iowa.

Kevin William Beck, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: April 10, 2001

Filed: May 18, 2001

___________

Before WOLLMAN, Chief Judge, MURPHY, Circuit Judge, and CARMAN,1

Chief Judge.

___________

WOLLMAN, Chief Judge.

Kevin William Beck appeals the conviction and sentence entered by the district

court2 following his guilty plea to arson in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). We affirm.
3

In light of Beck’s desire to raise an ineffective assistance claim, the Federal

Public Defender filed a motion to withdraw, which we denied.

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I.

On May 13, 1999, Beck entered St. Paul’s Lutheran Church in Fort Dodge,

Iowa, through an attached school and set fire to the building. Beck was arrested and

charged with one count of arson. On January 20, 2000, the district court accepted

Beck’s guilty plea, and on April 25, 2000, noting that the arson conviction was Beck’s

fourth, sentenced him to the statutory maximum imprisonment of 240 months, to run

consecutively with three one-year sentences previously imposed in Iowa state court for

unrelated crimes, followed by three years of supervised release. In addition, the court

ordered Beck to pay more than two million dollars in restitution and imposed a $100

special assessment. Although the court noted that Beck was financially unable to pay

restitution, it indicated that any money that he earned from prison employment should

be applied toward that amount. Beck was represented by the Federal Public

Defender’s Office at all stages of the proceedings.

Before accepting Beck’s plea, the district court inquired whether Beck admitted

each of the elements of section 844(i). The court asked whether he agreed “that the St.

Paul’s Lutheran Church in Fort Dodge, Iowa, was a building and activity which

affected and was used in interstate commerce.” Beck answered “Yes.” The record

reflects that St. Paul’s Church has 1400 members, that it has 160 students in its school,

that the church is affiliated with the St. Louis Synod of the Lutheran church and is a

part of the national organization of the Lutheran Church, that money collected in the

church goes to national and international ministries, and that funds from churches in

other states are likewise used to support St. Paul’s.

On August 11, 2000, Beck’s counsel filed an Anders brief attacking Beck’s

sentence and alleging, at Beck’s request, the ineffective assistance of counsel.3 On
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May 22, 2000, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Jones v. United States, 529

U.S. 848, holding that the interstate commerce element of section 844(i) is narrower

in scope than our previous cases had suggested. On August 11, 2000, a panel of this

court remanded another church arson case for consideration of whether the interstate

commerce element as described in Jones was satisfied. United States v. Rea, 223 F.3d

741 (8th Cir. 2000), conviction reinstated on remand, No. Crim. 97-235, 2001 WL

407238 (D. Minn. April 18, 2001). Beck’s counsel filed a supplemental brief on

September 25, 2000, arguing that, in light of Jones and Rea, Beck’s conduct was

insufficient to constitute a crime under section 844(i).

II.

Section 844(i) criminalizes the arson of a building “used in . . . any activity . .

. affecting . . . [interstate] commerce.” United States v. Ryan, 227 F.3d 1058, 1061

(8th Cir. 2000). The Court’s Jones decision “substantially changed the law of the

Eighth Circuit regarding the reach of § 844(i).” Rea, 223 F.3d at 743. Prior to Jones,

we had held that the requirement that the building in question be used in an activity

affecting interstate commerce was satisfied by a passive connection to interstate

commerce. Ryan, 227 F.3d at 1062 (previous cases found requisite nexus to commerce

in buildings that received and used natural gas from an out-of-state source). Under the

more restrictive approach required by Jones, the building must be actively employed

in interstate commerce in order to be within the scope of section 844(i). Ryan, 227

F.3d at 1062. 

Beck argues that his conduct “did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement” of

section 844(i). He asserts that whether the interstate commerce element of the statute

was satisfied is a question of law that we should review de novo. We disagree, for the

qualifying words “used in,” as used in section 844(i), constitute a limitation on the

reach of the federal arson statute rather than the expression of “Congress’ intent to

invoke its full authority under the Commerce Clause.” Jones, 529 U.S. at 854. “[T]he
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nexus with interstate commerce, which courts frequently call the ‘jurisdictional

element,’ is simply one of the essential elements of § 844(i). . . . It is not jurisdictional

in the sense that it affects a court’s subject matter jurisdiction, i.e., a court’s

constitutional or statutory power to adjudicate a case.” United States v. Martin, 147

F.3d 529, 531-32 (7th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see United States v. Rea, 169

F.3d 1111, 1113 (8th Cir. 1999), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 223 F.3d

741 (8th Cir. 2000) (“section 844(i)’s ‘interstate commerce’ requirement, while

jurisdictional in nature, is merely an element of the offense, not a prerequisite to subject

matter jurisdiction”); see also United States v. Harris, 221 F.3d 1048, 1050 n.2 (8th

Cir. 2000) (declining to consider whether a church satisfied interstate commerce

element of arson charge because Jones did not “cast aspersions upon the constitutional

application of § 844(i) to places of worship”). 

Unlike the defendant in Rea, Beck’s guilty plea was not a conditional one, and

he did not reserve any right of appeal. Compare 223 F.3d at 743 (remanding for

consideration in light of Jones when defendant pled guilty to arson of a church but

reserved right to appeal district court’s denial of motion to dismiss for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction or enter a judgment of acquittal). Because Beck did not challenge

the interstate commerce element before the district court, we will reverse the district

court only if we conclude that the entry of judgment was plain error. See United States

v. Fountain, 83 F.3d 946, 949 (8th Cir. 1996) (an error not argued to the district court

is grounds for reversal only if the error “prejudices the substantial rights of the

defendant and would result in a miscarriage of justice if left uncorrected”). Plain error

review is extremely narrow and is limited to those errors which are so obvious or

otherwise flawed as to seriously undermine the fairness, integrity, or public reputation

of judicial proceedings. Id.; Greaser v. Missouri, 145 F.3d 979, 984 (8th Cir. 1998).

Beck contends that there was an insufficient factual basis for the interstate

commerce element to sustain his guilty plea. At oral argument, he added the contention

that his plea was not knowing and intelligent because he had admitted the elements of
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the statute as set forth in this court’s pre-Jones cases, rather than the elements as the

Supreme Court subsequently defined them. Neither contention supports a finding of

plain error.

By pleading guilty, Beck waived his right to appeal the district court’s finding

that the interstate commerce element was satisfied. “The general rule is that a valid

guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects. Stated differently, a valid guilty plea

forecloses an attack on a conviction unless ‘on the face of the record the court had no

power to enter the conviction or impose the sentence.’” Walker v. United States, 115

F.3d 603, 604 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Vaughan, 13 F.3d 1186, 1188

(8th Cir. 1994)). “[A]bsent misrepresentation or other impermissible conduct by state

agents, a voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made in the light of the then applicable

law does not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the plea

rested on a faulty premise.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970) (citation

omitted). We have held that a new rule of state law announced after the entry of a

guilty plea does not invalidate the plea, even though it would render inadmissible the

primary evidence against a defendant. Country v. Foster, 806 F.2d 182, 184 (8th Cir.

1986) (plea voluntary and intelligent despite decision of Nebraska Supreme Court six

years later holding hypnotically refreshed testimony inadmissible in criminal trials,

undermining state’s case). 

A guilty plea admits the interstate commerce element of a criminal charge.

United States v. Vong, 171 F.3d 648, 654 (8th Cir. 1999) (guilty plea to robbery charge

waives attack on interstate commere element); White v. United States 858 F.2d 416,

422 (8th Cir. 1988) (in pleading guilty, a defendant foregoes the possibility that

subsequent events would have led to a not guilty verdict); Mack v United States, 853

F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (guilty plea waives jurisdictional element

of armed bank robbery charge). Our review of the holdings of other circuits confirms

that a defendant who tenders an unconditional guilty plea to a section 844(i) indictment

waives his right to appeal the district court’s decision that the interstate commerce
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element of the statute has been satisfied. See United States v. Grassie, 237 F.3d 1199,

1208 (10th Cir. 2001) (stipulation that church was engaging in activities affecting

interstate commerce sufficient to satisfy interstate commerce element); Martin, 147

F.3d at 533 (by pleading guilty defendant waived right to claim that requisite nexus

with interstate commerce was lacking); United States v. Viscome, 144 F.3d 1365, 1370

(11th Cir. 1998) (defendant’s guilty plea waived appeal on all elements). 

Moreover, Beck’s claim that his waiver was not knowing and intelligent is

unconvincing. The Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Jones two months before

Beck entered his plea, Jones v. United States, 528 U.S. 1002 (1999), putting Beck on

notice that the interstate commerce element was subject to clarification. Compare

United States v. Johnson, No. 98-50396, 2001 WL 314606 at *2 (5th Cir. April 2,

2001) (remanding for consideration of whether guilty plea to church arson entered

before certiorari was granted in Jones rested on sufficient factual basis to support

interstate commerce element). Accordingly, by entering an unconditional guilty plea

and specifically admitting each element of the arson statute, Beck waived his right to

appeal the district court’s conclusion that the interstate commerce element was

satisfied. Thus, we find no plain error in the district court’s acceptance of his plea.

We find Beck’s other arguments to be without merit. 

The judgment is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.