This opinion is subject to revision before final

publication in the Pacific Reporter

2017 UT 44

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

In the interest of K.T., C.T., Ka.T., and Ca.T.,

children under eighteen years of age.

B.T. and S.T.,

Appellants,

v.

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee.

Nos. 20160410, 20160386

Filed August 8, 2017

On Certification from the Court of Appeals

Third District Juvenile, Salt Lake

The Honorable Charles D. Behrens

Nos. 1125972, 1125975, 11255977, 1125980

Attorneys:

Sheleigh A. Harding, Salt Lake City, for appellant B.T.

Jordan Putnam, Cottonwood Heights, for appellant S.T.

Sean D. Reyes, Att’y Gen., Carol L.C. Verdoia, John M. Peterson, 

Asst. Att’y Gens., Salt Lake City, for appellee

Martha Pierce, Salt Lake City, for Office of Guardian ad Litem

JUSTICE PEARCE authored the opinion of the Court, in which

CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE,

JUSTICE DURHAM, and JUSTICE HIMONAS joined.

JUSTICE PEARCE, opinion of the Court:
In the Interest of K.T., et al.

Opinion of the Court

2

INTRODUCTION

¶1 At the disposition hearing in their child welfare case,

appellant parents stipulated to a set of facts, including a statement 

that one of the family’s children had “disclosed that [the mother] has 

spanked and disciplined her and her siblings with a belt.” 

Appellants also stipulated that the same child had disclosed that the 

father “has spanked the children with a belt historically.” The 

parents contend that this was an insufficient factual basis to permit 

the juvenile court to conclude that they had harmed the children 

within the meaning of the Utah Code. We agree that the juvenile 

court needed additional evidence before it could conclude by clear 

and convincing evidence that the children had been harmed. We 

reverse.

BACKGROUND

¶2 This case involves four children—K.T., C.T., Ka.T., and Ca.T. 

Appellant S.T. (Mother) is the mother of all four children. Appellant 

B.T. (Father) is the biological father of the younger two—Ka.T. and 

Ca.T. Father is the stepfather of the oldest two—K.T. and C.T.

¶3 The State filed a Verified Petition in February 2016 seeking 

to adjudicate the children as abused and neglected under Utah Code 

section 78A-6-105 (2008).1 Following a preliminary shelter hearing, 

the juvenile court placed K.T., C.T., Ka.T., and Ca.T. into the custody 

of the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS).

¶4 The parties stipulated to a number of findings of fact. One 

stipulated finding indicated that “[K.T.] also disclosed [Mother] has 

spanked and disciplined her and her siblings with a belt. The mother 

uses a black belt with rhinestones. [Father] has spanked the children 

with a belt historically.”2

¶5 Based on the stipulated findings of fact, the judge 

concluded: 

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1 This section of the Utah Code has since been amended. The 

parties cite, and we will therefore reference, the 2008 version of the 

code.

2 Both Father and Mother responded to this fact under Utah Rule 

of Juvenile Procedure 34(e). All parties acknowledge that Mother 

and Father stipulated to this fact.
Cite as: 2017 UT 44

Opinion of the court

3

1. Hitting a child with a belt or strap or another 

object is abuse.

2. The pain caused by the striking is non-accidental 

harm.

3. The court cannot envision a scenario where 

striking or hitting a child, of any age, would be 

appropriate or reasonable discipline.

4. The court can envision a parent, as a child, being 

hit with a belt or strap as discipline at that time, in 

that day and age, many years ago that type of 

discipline was deemed appropriate and perfectly 

reasonable.

5. As a society we’ve progressed to the point where 

it’s not acceptable to strike a child and certainly to 

strike a child, of any age, with an object, a belt, a 

strap, or a paddle or anything of that nature.

6. We’ve evolved beyond it being appropriate to 

strike a child with an object.

7. The simple striking of the child with a belt caused 

pain and is abuse.

¶6 The juvenile court determined that Mother and Father 

(collectively Parents) abused the children under Utah Code section 

78A-6-105.

¶7 Parents now appeal that conclusion. They contend that the 

stipulated facts do not support an abuse determination. More 

specifically, they argue that the juvenile court erred when it 

concluded that spanking a child with a belt, without any additional 

proof of harm, constitutes abuse within the meaning of Utah law.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶8 We review a juvenile court’s conclusions of law based upon 

stipulated facts for correctness. State ex rel. B.T., 2009 UT App 182, 

¶ 5, 214 P.3d 881.

ANALYSIS

¶9 To find abuse under Utah law, a court must find harm. Utah 

Code section 78A-6-105(1)(a) defines “abuse,” in relevant part, as 

“nonaccidental harm of a child” or “threatened harm of a child.”

And, in the 2008 version of the Code the parties cite, “harm” means, 
In the Interest of K.T., et al.

Opinion of the Court

4

in relevant part, “physical, emotional, or developmental injury or 

damage.” Id. § 78A-6-105(19). ”If, at the adjudication hearing, the 

[juvenile] court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the 

allegations contained in the petition are true, it shall conduct a 

dispositional hearing.” Id. § 78A-6-311(1).3

¶10 Parents argue that the State failed to put evidence before the 

court that would allow it to conclude that the discipline Parents

administered resulted in harm. “Simply put,” they argue, “there are 

no stipulated facts regarding ‘harm.’” Parents are correct. The State 

failed to introduce evidence that the parental discipline had harmed 

the children and left the court to speculate from the stipulated facts

that the children had been harmed.

¶11 The juvenile court attempted to bridge the evidentiary gap 

with the conclusion that “[a]s a society we’ve progressed to the point 

where it’s not acceptable to strike a child and certainly to strike a 

child, of any age, with an object, a belt, a strap, or a paddle, or 

anything of that nature.”4 Although not explicit in the juvenile 

court’s order, it appears from the argument’s transcript that the court 

may have relied on State ex rel. C.I. to reach that decision. 2009 UT 

App 141U (per curiam). In C.I., the “[m]other hit C.I. on his arms 

with a belt, and also hit C.I. near his eye.” Id. at *1. The record 

indicated that, as a result of the blows, C.I. suffered a “black eye and 

bruising.” Id. The mother argued that her actions did not constitute 

abuse because she “reasonably disciplined him.” Id. The court 

rejected the mother’s argument and found that “[s]triking a child 

_____________________________________________________________

3 The clear and convincing standard demands the introduction of 

evidence that makes “the existence of the disputed facts . . . very 

highly probable.” Lovett v. Cont’l Bank & Tr. Co., 286 P.2d 1065, 1067 

(Utah 1955). Translated to the case before the juvenile court, the State 

needed to present evidence that would allow the court to conclude 

that it was “very highly probable” that the children had been 

harmed. Essential Botanical Farms, LC v. Kay, 2011 UT 71, ¶ 24, 270 

P.3d 430 (citing Lovett, 286 P.2d at 1067).

4 The juvenile court also reasoned that it could not “envision a 

scenario where striking or hitting a child, of any age, would be 

appropriate or reasonable discipline.” The parties did not argue, and 

we will not address, any reasonable discipline exception under Utah 

Code section 78A-6-105(1)(b)(i).
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Opinion of the court

5

with a belt does not constitute the use of reasonable discipline as it is 

an ‘unreasonably cruel punishment.’” Id. (citing State ex rel. L.P., 1999 

UT App 157, ¶ 8, 981 P.2d 848). The court in C.I. affirmed the 

juvenile court’s order because its determination that C.I. had been 

abused was not contrary to “the clear weight of the evidence.” Id.

The court of appeals’ seemingly definitive statement about striking a 

child with a belt may have given the juvenile court in this case 

comfort in announcing that “[h]itting a child with a belt or strap or 

another object is abuse.”

¶12 State ex rel. L.P., on which the per curiam C.I. relies, was not 

so definitive. Rather, L.P. listed a number of factors that a juvenile 

court should consider before determining whether a child has been 

abused within the meaning of the statute. 1999 UT App 157, ¶ 8. 

“Such factual findings may include, but are not limited to, the 

following: . . . evidence of any bruises, contusions, or abrasions on 

the child; . . .[and] evidence of unreasonably cruel punishment such 

as beatings with a belt . . . or other object.” Id. L.P. clarified that

“[n]one of the factors listed above is necessarily dispositive . . . .

Instead, these evidentiary factors should guide the juvenile court as 

it exercises its broad discretion in making [an abuse] determination.” 

Id.

¶13 Moreover, we do not interpret C.I. as imposing a rule that

every use of any object to discipline a child constitutes per se abuse. 

Although the C.I. court stated that striking a child with a belt cannot 

be reasonable discipline, the court in C.I. did not rely solely on the 

mother’s use of a belt to conclude that C.I. had been harmed. Rather,

just as it did in L.P., the court of appeals relied on additional findings

that spoke to the harm C.I. had suffered. For example, the court

noted C.I.’s black eye and bruising. C.I., 2009 UT App 141U at *1.

¶14 To be clear, in this case the State would not have needed to 

forward much additional evidence to allow the juvenile court to 

infer harm. Had there been evidence of the effects of the spanking—

as in C.I.—the court may have been able to conclude that the 

children had been harmed. Or, if there had been additional evidence 

about the particular way that Mother “uses a black belt with 

rhinestones,” the juvenile court could have inferred the existence of 

harm. But without such information, the court was presented with 

two options: improperly speculate about what the spankings and 

discipline mother administered looked like, or rely on a per se rule 

that harm occurs any time a child is struck with any object. The 

juvenile court opted for the per se rule.
In the Interest of K.T., et al.

Opinion of the Court

6

¶15 The rule the juvenile court articulated—that “[h]itting a 

child with a belt or strap or another object is abuse”—is overbroad

and alters the statutory meaning of “abuse.” See UTAH CODE § 78A-6-

105(1). The juvenile court’s per se rule expands the definition of 

“abuse” to capture the myriad ways a parent might “hit a child” 

with “another object” that would not actually harm the child. For 

instance, under the rule the juvenile court announced, a parent 

throwing a pillow or a rolled up pair of socks at a child would be 

considered per se abusive. Hitting a child with a Nerf sword 

playfully as part of a game would also meet the definition. And 

although those situations are different than those confronting the 

juvenile court in this case, the need to resort to a per se rule exposes 

the problem with the factual record before the juvenile court. 

Although we might speculate that Mother was doing more than 

spanking her children with the belt lightly so that it did not cause 

physical or emotional injury within the meaning of the statute, we 

don’t know that.5 And we don’t know that with the level of certainty 

needed to meet a clear and convincing evidentiary standard.

¶16 In other words, while use of an object to spank or discipline 

a child might provide persuasive evidence that the child experienced 

harm, that evidence may not be dispositive. As the court of appeals 

has noted, “there are a myriad of circumstances with countless 

permutations, which may or may not justify intervention of the 

juvenile court.” L.P., 1999 UT App 157, ¶ 7. Because of the many 

ways adults interact with children, juvenile courts need the 

flexibility to examine situations as a whole. And it is incumbent 

upon the State to present the evidence the juvenile courts need to 

accurately assess the situation. Failure to provide that evidence 

invites speculation and increases the potential for reaching an 

erroneous conclusion.

¶17 Parents stipulated that “[K.T.] also disclosed [Mother] has 

spanked and disciplined her and her siblings with a belt. The mother 

uses a black belt with rhinestones. [Father] has spanked the children 

with a belt historically.” We have before us no additional relevant 

facts demonstrating harm. The juvenile court made no findings that 

inform us whether the children experienced any “physical, 

_____________________________________________________________

5 The statute defines harm as “physical, emotional, or 

developmental injury or damage.” UTAH CODE § 78A-6-105(19).
Cite as: 2017 UT 44

Opinion of the court

7

emotional, or developmental injury or damage.” See UTAH CODE 

§ 78A-6-105(19). It is unclear how hard Parents hit the children, 

whether the children suffered emotional or physical pain, and 

whether the children were injured. Without more, the juvenile court

was forced to rely on a per se rule that has the potential to sweep 

non-abusive behavior into its net.

CONCLUSION

¶18 The juvenile court erred when it concluded that the 

stipulated facts supported an abuse determination. We reverse.