J-S42017-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

JEREMY CRUZ 

Appellant

v.

MADELINE SABLE MORALES AND 

JOSE AGAPITO MORALES

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 583 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered April 12, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Civil Division at No(s): No. 

10726 of 2021

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: May 5, 2023

Appellant, Jeremy Cruz, appeals pro se from the April 12, 2022 order 

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County that sustained the 

preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer filed by Madeline Sable 

Morales and her father, Jose Agapito Morales, (collectively, “Morales”) and 

dismissed Appellant’s second amended complaint with prejudice.1 We affirm.

We previously summarized the procedural history as follows:

On August 16, 2021, Appellant filed pro se a complaint against 

Morales for, inter alia, two claims of breach of contract stemming 

from Appellant's marriage to, and subsequent divorce from, 

Madeline Morales. Appellant's Complaint for Breach of Contract, 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1

In his notice of appeal, Appellant stated that he appealed from the “judgment 

entered in this matter on [April 12, 2022.]” Notice of Appeal, 5/12/22. In 

fact, Appellant appealed from the April 12, 2022 order sustaining the 

preliminary objections and dismissing his second amended complaint.
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8/16/21, at ¶66. On September 17, 2021, Morales filed 

preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer to Appellant's 

complaint, as well as a motion to dismiss the complaint with 

prejudice. On September 30, 2021, Appellant filed a petition, 

seeking leave of court to amend the complaint to include two 

claims of breach of contract, as well as a claim for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress. The trial court subsequently 

denied Appellant's petition as moot, having found that Appellant 

filed his petition, which the trial court deemed an amended 

complaint, within twenty days of service of Morales’ preliminary 

objections. Trial Court Order, 10/6/21; see also Pa.R.Civ.P. 

1028(c)(1) (stating, “a party may file an amended pleading as of 

course within twenty days after service of a copy of preliminary 

objections”).

On October 15, 2021, Morales filed preliminary objections in the 

nature of a demurrer to Appellant's amended complaint, as well 

as a motion to dismiss the amended complaint with prejudice. On 

November 8, 2021, Appellant filed a second amended 

complaint.[FN1] On November 24, 2021, Morales filed preliminary 

objections in the nature of a demurrer to Appellant's second 

amended complaint, as well as a motion to dismiss the second 

amended complaint with prejudice. Appellant filed a response to 

the preliminary objections on December 10, 2021. On December 

20, 2021, Morales filed a brief in support of the preliminary 

objections, and Appellant filed a response to the brief on January 

3, 2022.

[Footnote 1] Appellant, who was incarcerated in a state 

correctional institution at the time, received service of 

Morales’ preliminary objections on October 27, 2021. See

Appellant's Pro Se Correspondence, 11/4/21. Therefore, 

Appellant's second amended complaint was timely filed on 

November 8, 2021, pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(c)(1).

On January 21, 2022, Morales filed a supplement to the brief in 

support of the preliminary objections. On February 7, 2022, 

Appellant filed a petition to strike the supplement to Morales’ brief 

in support of the preliminary objections and requested oral 

argument on the matter pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 211. See

Pa.R.Civ.P. 211 (stating, “Any interested party may request oral 

argument on a motion. The court may require oral argument, 

whether or not requested by a party. The court may dispose of 

any motion without oral argument.”). On April 12, 2022, the trial 

court sustained Morales’ preliminary objections in the nature of a 
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demurrer to Appellant's second amended complaint and dismissed 

Appellant's second amended complaint with prejudice.

On May 12, 2022, Appellant filed pro se a timely notice of appeal. 

On May 25, 2022, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) no later than Tuesday, June 21, 2022. Trial Court Order, 

5/25/22. The May 25, 2022 order provided Appellant the mailing 

address to be used in serving a copy of his Rule 1925(b) statement 

on the trial court and advised Appellant that “any issue not 

properly included in his Rule 1925(b) statement, timely filed and 

served pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), shall be deemed waived for 

purpose of appeal.” Id. The May 25, 2022 order also contained 

a notation that notice had been provided to Appellant on May 25, 

2022, pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 236, and a review of the trial court 

docket confirms that notice was provided on that date. Id.; see 

also Trial Court Docket at 5/25/22 entry[;] Pa.R.Civ.P. 236(a)(2) 

and (b) (requiring the prothonotary to note in the trial court 

docket the date upon which notice of a trial court order is provided 

to each party's attorney of record or, if unrepresented, to each 

party). A copy of the May 25, 2022 order was mailed via “legal 

mail” to Appellant using the legal address of the state correctional 

institution where Appellant was incarcerated, as well as 

Appellant's control identification number.

Appellant subsequently filed his Rule 1925(b) statement. The 

Rule 1925(b) statement was dated June 21, 2022, and Appellant 

avers in the certificate of service that the document was duly 

mailed on June 21, 2022. Appellant's Pro Se Rule 1925(b) 

Statement. The Rule 1925(b) statement, however, was 

time-stamped as having been received in the prothonotary's office 

on June 27, 2022, and the envelope Appellant used for mailing the 

Rule 1925(b) statement bears a postage meter time-stamp of 

June 24, 2022.

Cruz v. Morales, 2023 WL 371665, at *1-*2 (Pa. Super. Jan. 24, 2023) 

(unpublished memorandum) (original brackets and some footnotes omitted).

On January 24, 2023, this Court remanded the case to the trial court for 

the purpose of determining the timeliness of Appellant’s Rule 1925(b)

statement. Id. at *2. On March 20, 2023, the trial court filed a supplemental 
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Rule 1925(a) opinion stating that, upon concluding an evidentiary hearing on 

the matter, the trial court found Appellant’s testimony and the evidence

submitted at the hearing to be credible and that the Rule 1925(b) statement 

was timely filed on June 20, 2022, or June 21, 2022, pursuant to the prisoner 

mailbox rule.2 See Trial Court Opinion, 3/20/23, at 2 (stating, the trial court 

“credits the testimony of [Appellant] that he deposited the filing with prison 

officials either on [June 20, 2022, or June 21, 2022.] This is corroborated by 

[Appellant’s exhibit 3,] a copy of a cash slip dated June 21, 202[2], with the 

word ‘deadline’ handwritten on the document.”); see also Commonwealth 

v. Jones, 700 A.2d 423, 426 (Pa. 1997) (explaining the well-established 

principle, commonly referred to as the “prisoner mailbox rule,” under which a 

document is deemed “filed” on the date an inmate deposits the mailing with 

prison authorities or places it in the prison mailbox).

Upon review, we concur with the trial court, and the certified record 

supports, that Appellant timely filed his Rule 1925(b) statement. On July 20, 

2022, the trial court filed its initial Rule 1925(a) opinion, addressing 

Appellant’s issues raised in his Rule 1925(b) statement. Therefore, we 

proceed to address the merits of Appellant’s appeal.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

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2 The trial court also noted that Morales “did not meaningful[ly] refute the 

evidence presented by [Appellant].” Trial Court Opinion, 3/20/23, at 2 n.1.; 

see also N.T., 2/16/23, at 3.
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[1.] Did the [trial] court erred by dismissing Appellant's 

complaint without a trial by jury?

[2.] Did the [trial] court violate Appellant's [first] amendment 

right [of freedom of religion granted by] the United States 

Constitution?

[3.] Did the [trial] court abuse its discretion by dismissing 

Appellant's complaint?

[4.] Did the [trial] court violate[ A]ppellant's United States 

constitutional right[ of trial by jury]?

[5.] Did Appellant and [Madeline Morales] enter[] into a legally 

binding[,] enforceable [oral contract]?

[6.] Was [] Appellant required to seek [] relief and/or bring an 

action for support in the Domestic Relations Court?

[7.] Was [Madeline Morales’] promise to financially care for 

Appellant whenever Appellant was in need [] far too vague 

to constitute a legally enforceable promise?

Appellant’s Brief at 1 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

3

In sum, Appellant challenges the trial court’s order sustaining Morales’ 

preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer to Appellant’s second 

amended complaint. Id. at 2-13; see also Rule 1925(b) Statement, 6/21/22. 

Appellant’s second amended complaint asserts claims for breach of contract 

and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) against Madeline 

Morales and a claim for IIED against Jose Morales. See generally, Second 

Amended Complaint, 11/8/21.

Our standard of review of an order of the trial court overruling or 

[sustaining] preliminary objections is to determine whether the 

____________________________________________

3 For ease of identification, we have assigned page numbers to Appellant’s 

unpaginated brief.
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trial court committed an error of law. When considering the 

appropriateness of a ruling on preliminary objections, the 

appellate court must apply the same standard as the trial court.

Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer test the legal 

sufficiency of the complaint. When considering preliminary 

objections, all material facts set forth in the challenged pleadings 

are admitted as true, as well as all inferences reasonably 

deducible therefrom. Preliminary objections which seek the 

dismissal of a cause of action should be sustained only in cases in 

which it is clear and free from doubt that the pleader will be unable 

to prove facts legally sufficient to establish the right to relief. If 

any doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be sustained, it 

should be resolved in favor of overruling the preliminary 

objections.

Albert v. Erie Ins. Exch., 65 A.3d 923, 927-928 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation 

omitted); see also Am. Express Bank, FSB v. Martin, 200 A.3d 87, 93 

(Pa. Super. 2018) (stating, this Court’s review of a trial court order sustaining 

a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer is plenary).

“To successfully maintain a cause of action for breach of contract [a]

plaintiff must establish: (1) the existence of a contract, including its essential 

terms, (2) a breach of a duty imposed by the contract, and (3) resultant 

damages.” Albert, 65 A.3d at 928 (citation omitted). “While not every term 

of a contract must be stated in complete detail, every element must be 

specifically pleaded. Clarity is particularly important where an oral contract is 

alleged.” Pennsy Supply, Inc. v. Am. Ash Recycling Corp. of 

Pennsylvania, 895 A.2d 595, 600 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted), 

appeal denied, 907 A.2d 1103 (Pa. 2006).

Where the existence of an informal contract is alleged, it is 

essential to the enforcement of such an informal contract that the 

minds of the parties should meet on all the terms[,] as well as the 
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subject matter. If anything is left open for future negotiation, the 

informal paper cannot form the basis of a binding contract.

GMH Assocs., Inc. v. Prudential Realty Group, 752 A.2d 889, 900 

(Pa. Super. 2000) (citation and quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 795 

A.2d 976 (Pa. 2000).

To establish a claim for IIED, a plaintiff must sufficiently plead that (1) 

the conduct of the defendant or defendants was extreme and outrageous, (2) 

the conduct was intentional and reckless, (3) the conduct caused emotional 

distress, and (4) the distress was severe. Jordan v. Pennsylvania State 

Univ., 276 A.3d 751, 775 (Pa. Super. 2022).

For an IIED claim to survive a preliminary objection, a [trial] court 

must determine, as a matter of law, whether there is sufficient 

evidence for reasonable persons to find extreme or outrageous 

conduct. The conduct must be so outrageous in character and so 

extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of 

decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable 

in a civilized community.

Id. (citations omitted).

In the case sub judice, the trial court, in sustaining Morales’ preliminary 

objections, held that Appellant failed to plead an enforceable contract for 

support based upon the exchange of marriage vows because, inter alia, the 

exchange of wedding vows does not create an enforceable contract based 

upon the representations expressed within the vows themselves. Trial Court 

Opinion, 4/12/22, at 3-4. Moreover, in finding that Appellant failed to plead 

an enforceable oral contract based upon the verbal exchange between 

Appellant and Madeline Morales at the time Appellant signed an affidavit of 
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consent to the entry of a final divorce decree, the trial court stated, “[Madeline 

Morales’] alleged promise to financially care for [Appellant] whenever he was 

in need is far too vague to constitute a legally enforceable promise.” Id. at 5

(noting that, Appellant “characterizes the promise as one to support him 

whenever he is ‘in a serious pickle,’ but it is not clear from the averments that 

the parties actually contemplated such a ‘serious pickle’ term, nor is it clear 

what circumstances would or would not qualify under this vague standard”). 

The trial court further noted that, in his own pleadings, Appellant conceded 

that no specifics about the terms of the oral contract were discussed at the 

time Appellant executed the divorce document. Id. Finally, regarding the 

IIED claims, the trial court explained,

[Appellant’s two-part claim] that [Madeline Morales] refused to 

support him financially while [Appellant was] facing criminal 

prosecution or otherwise, or that [Jose Morales] interfered with 

his marriage, [which] caused him to lose faith in any future 

fathers-in-law, and led him to take pain medications, [] fall[s]

woefully short of outrageous conduct [required to demonstrate a 

claim for IIED.] Such allegations of negligence and carelessness 

do not rise to the level of conduct premised upon standards such 

as “atrocious” and “utterly intolerable” behavior.

Id. at 8 (citation and some quotation marks omitted).

A review of Appellant’s second amended complaint demonstrates the 

following pertinent averments in support of Appellant’s claims for breach of 

contract and IIED.

24.) At the [pre-marriage meeting with the Reverend who was 

to perform the marriage ceremony, the Reverend] spoke to 

[Appellant] and [Madeline Morales. H]e explained what 

marriage means and he also strictly explained to the couple 
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the basic fundamentals of marriage under God. [Appellant 

and Madeline Morales] agreed and accepted the terms and 

conditions of that bond which is also known as a “contractual 

relationship”.

25.) [In October 2011, the Reverend] married [Appellant] and 

[Madeline Morales.]

. . .

31.) [Jose Morales] would always seem to interrupt [Appellant’s 

routine of picking up Madeline Morales’ children from school] 

and the manner [in which Madeline Morales] and [Appellant] 

would raise the children[. Jose Morales] would disregard 

the rules that [Madeline Morales and Appellant] set as 

parents. [Appellant] understands that [Jose Morales] is the 

[children’s] grandfather and he wants to spoil the children, 

but when [his actions go] against what the [parents put] in 

place, it causes problem[s].

. . .

33.) [Jose Morales] seemed to always battle and challenge the 

role that [Appellant] was given by [Madeline Morales. 

Appellant] was “Papi”, which means “Dad” and [Jose 

Morales] never respected that fact which caused [Madeline 

Morales and Appellant] to argue.

. . .

36.) [Madeline Morales] filed for [] divorce.

37.) [Appellant] refused to sign the [divorce documents] and 

[Madeline Morales] was his support and [Appellant] was left 

out to dry.

38.) One day [Madeline Morales] asked [Appellant] if he could 

meet her[. At the meeting, Madeline Morales] made a deal 

(oral contract) with [Appellant. The deal was] that if 

[Appellant] signed the divorce papers, that [Madeline 

Morales] would financially take care [of Appellant whenever] 

he was in need. No specifics [were] said about the deal, 

only that if [Appellant] was in a struggle that she would be 

there to assist him.

39.) [Appellant] eventually agreed and he signed the divorce 

papers without reviewing the documents because [Madeline 
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Morales] advised [Appellant] of what was in the divorce 

documents.

. . .

42.) [A] few years [later Appellant] reconnected with [Madeline 

Morales,] and during that time, [Madeline Morales] bought 

a [vehicle] for [Appellant] because [he needed a vehicle for 

his employment.]

43.) [Appellant] was instructed to pay $200.00 a month for the 

vehicle.

. . .

46.) [At some point, Appellant] ended up going to jail for [an

issue unrelated to the current controversary,] and 

[Appellant] stayed in jail no more than 3 days [before

Madeline Morales paid the bail for his release.]

. . .

48.) [In August 2017, Appellant] was charged with some very 

serious criminal charges and needed financial help to retain 

an attorney to defend [Appellant].

51.) [Appellant] did his best to contact [Madeline Morales] and 

he was being ignored. [Madeline Morales] had a contract 

with [Appellant] which needed to be performed on her end.

52.) Due to [Madeline Morales] not performing her end of the 

“deal”, [Appellant] had no choice but to go ahead with the 

public defender that the [trial court] appointed and that 

attorney did absolutely nothing for [Appellant. D]ue to the 

attorney doing not a thing for [Appellant, Appellant] was 

ultimately found guilty after a jury trial.

. . .

73.) [Appellant] avers that the only reason why he signed [the]

divorce document[] was [] because [Madeline Morales] 

made a deal and a promise [] that when [Appellant] was in 

need of financial help[] she would be there to help.

. . .

76.) [Appellant] avers that he did not file for alimony simply 

because he had an agreement with [Madeline Morales] so 
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he was not worried about money. [Appellant] knew that if 

he was seriously in a serious pickle, that he could count on 

[Madeline Morales.]

. . .

80.) As for the [IIED claim, Madeline Morales] did cause that 

[distress] because she did know that she had an 

obligation[,] and in the community, everybody speaks, and 

when [Appellant] was charged, everybody started to talk 

about the problem that [Appellant] was in, and [Madeline 

Morales] was told by a family member, and she did not aid 

[Appellant] in his worst time of his life.

. . .

81.) [Jose Morales] did cause [IIED] to [Appellant] and also

physical pain as well. [Appellant] can’t sleep at times, and 

he has to take pain pills to [alleviate] his head pain[. 

Appellant] lost trust for any father[-]in-laws in the future, 

and that is not right. [Jose Morales] did directly and 

voluntarily cause problems to the marriage of [Madeline 

Morales and Appellant.]

Second Amended Complaint, 11/8/21 (extraneous capitalization and 

emphasis omitted).

We first examine the argument that the exchange of wedding vows 

between Appellant and Madeline Morales created an oral contract under which 

Madeline Morales was obligated to provide financial support to Appellant. We 

disagree, as a matter of law, with the trial court’s conclusion that the exchange 

of wedding vows does not “in and of [itself create] legally enforceable 

obligations.” See Trial Court Opinion, 4/12/22, at 4. It is well-established 

that marriage is a civil contract “entered into by words in the present tense”

and “does not require any particular form of solemnization before officers of 

church or state.” Fiedler v. Nat. Tube Co., 53 A.2d 821, 822 (Pa. Super. 
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1947); see also In re Estate of Carter, 159 A.3d 970, 974 (Pa. Super. 

2017) (stating that, marriage is “a civil contract made between [two] parties 

with the capacity to so contract”). A ceremonial marriage, such as the one 

Appellant avers occurred between he and Madeline Morales in the case sub 

judice, “is a wedding or marriage performed by a religious or civil authority 

with the usual or customary ceremony or formalities.” Carter, 159 A.3d at 

974. Our Supreme Court has described a ceremonial wedding as typically 

involving an exchange of vows between the individuals “to support one 

another emotionally and financially[.]” Devlin v. City of Philadelphia, 862 

A.2d 1234, 1243 (Pa. 2004); see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4321(1) (stating, 

“[m]arried persons are liable for the support of each other according to their 

respective abilities to provide support as provided by law”).

Nonetheless, just as a general contract can be terminated pursuant to 

its terms or by agreement of the parties, it is well-established that a marriage

contract may be terminated by, inter alia, divorce. See Eisenberg v. 

Eisenberg, 160 A. 228, 230 (Pa. Super. 1932) (stating, a marital contract “is 

dissolved from the date of the entry of the [divorce] decree”); see also 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 3102 (stating that, the legislative intent behind the passage of the 

Divorce Code, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3301-3904, was to enact a law “for [the] legal 

dissolution of marriage”). In the case sub judice, Appellant and Madeline 

Morales were divorced on August 8, 2013. Second Amended Complaint, 

11/8/21, at ¶62. As such, any contractual obligations which arose out of their 

marriage contract, i.e., mutual promises to financially support each other 
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during the marriage, ended upon entry of the divorce decree.

4, 5

 Eisenberg, 

160 A. at 230.

Turning to Appellant’s argument that an oral contract arose from his 

encounter with Madeline Morales pertaining to his signing of divorce 

documents, we are ever-mindful that “[f]or a contract to be enforceable, the 

nature and extent of the mutual obligations must be certain, and the parties 

must have agreed on the material and necessary details of their bargain.” 

____________________________________________

4 We concur with the trial court that any “financial obligation arising from the 

marriage” that continues after divorce, “must be brought in the form of a 

support action under [the] Domestic Relations Code.” Trial Court Opinion, 

4/12/22, at 4; see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701 (pertaining to the award of 

alimony as part of a divorce proceeding).

Moreover, aside from the general obligations to emotionally and financially 

support each other that are inherent to a marriage contract, Appellant did not 

allege any specific vows or promises in the second amended complaint that 

were made during the wedding ceremony between Appellant and Madeline 

Morales. Appellant simply alleged that the Reverend “explained what 

marriage mean[t]” and Appellant and Madeline Morales “agreed and accepted 

[] the terms and conditions of that bond.” Second Amended Complaint, 

11/8/21, at ¶ 24.

5 To the extent that Appellant argues that the trial court violated his 

constitutional right to freedom of religion by sustaining the preliminary 

objections on the ground a marriage contract between the parties was not 

enforceable, we find this argument to be without merit. As stated supra, 

marriage is a civil contract that may be dissolved by divorce, and Pennsylvania 

has the power to regulate marriage and divorce without encroaching upon the 

ecclesiastical aspect of the marital bond and beliefs, as well as an individual’s 

freedom of religion. Thus, while the state and courts no longer recognize 

Appellant’s marital contract, it is still his constitutional prerogative to believe 

that in the eyes of God, a marital bond still exists. See Pankoe v. Pankoe, 

222 A.3d 443, 449-450 (Pa. Super. 2019), appeal denied, 237 A.3d 965 (Pa. 

2020), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 1063 (2021).
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Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 30 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that, “[a]n 

enforceable contract requires, among other things, that the terms of the 

bargain be set forth with sufficient clarity”); see also United Envtl. Group, 

Inc. v. GKK McKnight LP, 176 A.3d 946, 963 (Pa. Super. 2017) (stating, 

“the essential terms of that agreement [must be] certain enough to provide 

the basis for providing an appropriate remedy”). “If the essential terms of the 

agreement are so uncertain that there is no basis for determining whether the 

agreement has been kept or broken, there is not an enforceable contract.” 

United Envtl. Group, 176 A.3d at 963.

Here, as the trial court stated, and the record supports,

it is impossible to tell whether [Appellant’s] desire for a private 

defense attorney to be funded by [Madeline Morales] was 

contemplated under the alleged agreement or not. [Appellant] 

characterizes the promise as one to support him whenever he is 

“in a serious pickle,” but it is not clear from the averments that 

the parties [subjectively defined between themselves what was 

contemplated by the term “serious pickle”], nor is it [objectively] 

clear what circumstances would or would not qualify under this 

vague standard.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/12/22, at 5. In his second amended complaint, 

Appellant averred “no specifics” were discussed as part of the oral contract 

that Appellant contends was formed when Madeline Morales agreed to 

financially support Appellant “[whenever] he was in need” in exchange for his 

consent to the entry of the final divorce decree. Second Amended Complaint, 

11/2/21, at ¶38. As such, accepting the material facts in the pleadings as 

true, while Madeline Morales may have made such a promise to Appellant in 
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exchange for his signature on the relevant consent forms, we concur with the 

trial court that the essential terms of that agreement, namely the conditions 

under which Madeline Morales was obligated to financially support Appellant 

(in other words, what constitutes a “serious pickle”), are too vague and 

uncertain as to permit the enforcement of such a contract.

Finally, we consider Appellant’s IIED claims. Based upon the allegations 

contained in Appellant’s second amended complaint (together with any

reasonable inferences deducible therefrom), we concur with the trial court that

Appellant has not come forward with averments that support his IIED claims

by demonstrating extreme or outrageous conduct on the part of either 

Madeline Morales or Jose Morales. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/12/22, at 8. 

Put differently, we are without doubt that Appellant will be unable to prove 

facts legally sufficient to establish his right to relief on his second theory of 

recovery. In sum, Appellant avers that Madeline Morales failed to support him 

financially so he could retain a private defense attorney in his then-pending 

criminal charges and that Jose Morales interfered with his marriage and family. 

See Second Amended Complaint, 11/8/21, at ¶¶80-81. This conduct by 

Madeline Morales, who was under no obligation to support Appellant, or by 

Jose Morales, is not the type of conduct which is so extreme or outrageous to 

be regarded as “atrocious[] and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” 

Jordan, 276 A.3d at 735 (stating that recovery for IIED is allowed in only 

“very egregious cases”).
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For these reasons, we discern no error of law by the trial court in 

sustaining Morales’ preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer and 

dismissing Appellant’s second amended complaint with prejudice.6

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/5/2023

____________________________________________

6 Moreover, we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion by the trial court 

in sustaining Morales’ preliminary objections and dismissing Appellant’s 

second amended complaint without first convening an evidentiary hearing. It 

is well-established that “[p]reliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer 

require the [trial] court to resolve the issues solely on the basis of the 

pleadings[. N]o testimony or other evidence outside of the complaint may be 

considered to dispose of the legal issues presented by the demurrer.” Hess 

v. Fox Rothschild, LLP, 925 A.2d 798, 805 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal 

denied, 945 A.2d 171 (Pa. 2008). Because the trial court’s decision to sustain 

Morales’ preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer must be based 

upon a review of Appellant’s second amended complaint and all inferences 

reasonably deducible therefrom, it was without error or abuse of discretion

that the trial court sustained the preliminary objections without first convening 

an evidentiary hearing.