Supreme Court

No. 2023-67-Appeal.

No. 2023-68-Appeal.

(WC 21-568)

The Preserve at Boulder Hills, LLC, 

et al.

:

v. :

Laura Kenyon, in her capacity as 

Finance Director for the Town of 

Richmond, et al. 

:

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision 

before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers 

are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme 

Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, 

Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or 

Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical 

or other formal errors in order that corrections may be 

made before the opinion is published.
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Supreme Court

No. 2023-67-Appeal.

No. 2023-68-Appeal.

(WC 21-568)

The Preserve at Boulder Hills, LLC, 

et al.

:

v. :

Laura Kenyon, in her capacity as 

Finance Director for the Town of 

Richmond, et al. 

:

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ. 

O P I N I O N

Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. These appeals arise out of a dispute 

between the Town of Richmond (the town)1and a group of developers (plaintiffs or 

The Preserve).2 Following a hearing on the town’s motion to dismiss and for 

judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Superior Court Rules of 

Civil Procedure, the Superior Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims for violations of

substantive due process, tortious interference with contract, tortious interference 

1 The named defendants are the Finance Director of the Town of Richmond, the 

President of the Richmond Town Council, and members of the Richmond Town 

Council in their official capacities. 

2 The plaintiffs are The Preserve at Boulder Hills, LLC; The Preserve at Boulder 

Hills II, LLC; The Preserve at Boulder Hills III, LLC; The Preserve at Boulder Hills 

IV, LLC; M.T.M. Investment Group L.P.; and Castle Residences, LLC. The 

plaintiffs own a total of 756.53 acres in the development.
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with prospective business advantages, civil liability for crimes and offenses pursuant 

to G.L. 1956 § 9-1-2, and a violation of the civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 

Organizations (RICO) statute pursuant to G.L. 1956 chapter 15 of title 7. Before 

this Court are both an appeal by the plaintiffs and a cross-appeal by the town. 

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the 

Superior Court. 

I

Facts and Travel

We derive the following facts from plaintiffs’ first amended complaint. For 

the purpose of a Rule 12(c) motion, “we confine ourselves to the four corners of the 

complaint, assume that the allegations set forth are true, and resolve any doubts in 

favor of the complaining party.” Montaquila v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 288 A.3d 967, 

971 (R.I. 2023) (quoting Chase v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 160 

A.3d 970, 973 (R.I. 2017)).

In 2011, plaintiffs entered into an agreement for the purchase of the original 

178 acres in the development, identified as Assessors’ Plat No. 6B, lot No. 4 in 

Richmond, Rhode Island. Prior to closing, plaintiffs informed the town that they 

intended to operate an outdoor shooting range and gun club on the property, which 

was a permitted use in the planned development zone. At public hearings, both the 

planning board and town council informed plaintiffs that an indoor gun range “would 
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be an even more acceptable use.” The plaintiffs thereafter closed on the property 

and began marketing the property by highlighting recreational activities, which 

included an indoor and outdoor shooting range; they additionally began selling 

memberships based upon their marketing campaign. 

In 2014, plaintiffs met with the town planner to discuss plans for an indoor 

and outdoor shooting range. At that time, plaintiffs learned that, under a recent 

zoning ordinance amendment, indoor and outdoor shooting ranges were no longer 

permitted uses in the planned development zone. The plaintiffs further discovered 

that most of their planned outdoor recreational uses were no longer permitted uses 

and that many commercial and residential uses had also been eliminated. The 

plaintiffs had not been given notice of the proposed zoning amendments. 

Subsequently, in 2016, a new zone—the Preserve Resorts District—was 

created, covering the majority of plaintiffs’ property. Under the new zoning regime, 

indoor and outdoor shooting ranges were once again permitted. The plaintiffs 

indicated that this two-year delay for the restoration of various permitted uses caused 

them to lose substantial revenue including the sale of memberships and properties. 

Additionally, Assessors’ Plat No. 5B, lot No. 38, which is the portion of 

property owned by The Preserve at Boulder Hills III, LLC, was subject to a 

1,000-foot buffer zone prohibiting the use of all-terrain recreational vehicles and 

largely rendering that property “unusable.” There was also a 100-foot buffer around 
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the whole district property, which prohibited plaintiffs from cutting trees or 

otherwise developing the land in that buffer. These buffers impeded the use of 

plaintiffs’ property until they were eliminated in 2019. 

Prior to the elimination of the buffers and under the restrictions of the earlier 

zoning amendment, plaintiffs proceeded with development of the resort. By 

November 2015, a clubhouse with a restaurant and banquet facility, golf course,

tennis facility, trails, and fishing ponds were near completion. The plaintiffs then 

applied for a 150-room hotel, conference center, and related structures. The 

plaintiffs were charged a $500 pre-application fee and a master plan application fee 

of $15,050; they also paid for a traffic study costing $8,500. As a condition of master 

plan approval, the town required plaintiffs to pay for peer review of the traffic study 

($3,000), peer review of the wetlands and wastewater system designs ($5,891), and 

evaluation of the town’s water system and the water supply for the resort ($4,800). 

According to plaintiffs, these requirements increased their expenses and delayed the 

project. The plaintiffs received master plan approval for the hotel project “in or 

about May 2016[.]”

Subsequently, plaintiffs submitted their preliminary application package to 

the town for the same project and were required to pay another application fee of 

$15,050. When plaintiffs submitted their final submission, they were required to 

pay an additional $7,527.50. The plaintiffs asserted that these fees, totaling $38,137 
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in application fees and $22,191 in peer-review fees, were arbitrary and constituted

obtaining money under false pretenses “for the benefit of the consultants retained by 

the [t]own to perform the peer review.” Additionally, plaintiffs alleged that, when 

submitting their preliminary application package, they informed the town that their 

financing would expire at the end of July 2016. Despite knowing about plaintiffs’ 

financing deadline for the hotel, the planning board did not schedule its first hearing 

until August 2016, after the financing had expired. The plaintiffs indicated that this 

delay caused them financial damages and substantial harm. 

The plaintiffs submitted that unreasonable delays continued in the hearing 

process. On October 11, 2016, the planning board approved the preliminary plan 

for a five-story hotel with 150 rooms, a conference center, a 132-seat restaurant, a 

pool area, an outdoor game area, an outdoor seasonal dining area, and 5,000 square 

feet of retail space. On February 8, 2017, plaintiffs received final approval of the 

land development for the project, including the hotel. 

The plaintiffs pointed to several other actions by the town that increased their 

costs, which included: the town’s failure to remove boulders on a public road and

resulting access issues for construction; the town’s interference with plaintiffs’ 

purchase of a parcel facilitating access to landlocked property; the town’s “arbitrary 

and capricious” peer-review requirements; and the town’s “purposeful, arbitrary and 

capricious waffling” on various approvals needed by plaintiffs. The plaintiffs 
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additionally alleged that the town’s planner, Sean Lacey, admitted that plaintiffs 

were “treated unfairly and prejudiced.” 

The plaintiffs filed the instant action on December 16, 2021. On October 6, 

2022, plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint. The plaintiffs asserted claims for 

violation of their substantive due-process rights under the Rhode Island Constitution 

(count one); tortious interference with contract (count two); tortious interference 

with prospective business advantages (count three); civil liability for crimes and 

offenses (count four); and violation of the civil RICO statute under G.L. 1956 

chapter 15 of title 7 (count five). 

The town filed an answer on February 4, 2022. The town then filed a motion 

to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Superior 

Court Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the alternative, a motion for summary 

judgment. A hearing on that motion was held on November 1, 2022. 

The town raised six affirmative defenses in support of its Rule 12(c) motion: 

(1) inadequate notice; (2) statute of limitations; (3) legislative immunity; (4) the 

public-duty doctrine; (5) the voluntary payment doctrine; and (6) failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies. As to the merits, the town argued that plaintiffs’ claims for 

violations of substantive due process and tortious interference should be dismissed 

as a matter of law. As to plaintiffs’ claims for civil liability for a crime and RICO, 

the town argued that the amended complaint did not assert sufficient facts for a prima 
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facie case. The plaintiffs disputed each affirmative defense in their objection, and 

they argued that the town failed to satisfy the standard for either dismissal and 

judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. 

The hearing justice issued a written decision on December 12, 2022. The 

hearing justice began his decision by addressing each of the town’s affirmative 

defenses. The hearing justice first determined that the notice of claim sent by 

plaintiffs to the town was sufficient. With regard to the statute of limitations, the 

hearing justice found that the substantive due-process claim and the tortious 

interference claims were subject to a three-year statute of limitations and that the 

continuing tort doctrine did not apply. He therefore determined that those claims 

(counts one through three) were barred because plaintiffs did not file their action 

until December 16, 2021. Additionally, because the civil liability claim for crimes 

and the RICO claims did not have specified statutes of limitation, the hearing justice 

determined that a ten-year statute of limitations applied. 

As to legislative immunity, the hearing justice found that the town council 

members were protected by such immunity in enacting zoning amendments. He also 

indicated that the amendments to the buffer zones set out in the zoning ordinances 

were subject to legislative immunity; however, the town’s other actions were not 

entitled to legislative immunity. 
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As to the public duty doctrine, the hearing justice determined that it would 

protect the town only against the tortious interference claims. He further found that 

the voluntary pay doctrine applied because “it is difficult to find that [p]laintiffs were 

not aware of all the facts” when paying fees to the town prior to the hearings being 

delayed. He additionally determined that plaintiffs were not required to exhaust 

administrative remedies because “[p]laintiffs have not raised a cause of action that 

has an administrative remedy[.]” 

The hearing justice then examined whether plaintiffs had set forth a prima 

facie case with respect to their claims. Although he found that the first three counts 

were barred by the statute of limitations, he “nonetheless analyze[d] [p]laintiffs’ 

claims asserted in their [a]mended [c]omplaint to determine if any or all of them 

state a claim upon which relief could be granted if such affirmative defenses did not 

exist.” He determined that the allegations in the amended complaint did not indicate 

conduct on the part of the town that shocked the conscience and that, therefore, 

plaintiffs could not succeed on their substantive due-process claim. He noted that 

approvals of plaintiffs’ applications were issued within the statutory time frames and 

that the peer-review requirements were not egregious. As to the tortious interference 

claims, the hearing justice found that the facts set out in the amended complaint did 

not show improper interference by the town. 
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In addressing the civil liability claim, the hearing justice determined that 

plaintiffs did not plead sufficient facts to support a claim of obtaining money under 

false pretenses, and he dismissed the claim. The hearing justice likewise dismissed 

the civil RICO claim, because he found that the facts alleged were insufficient to 

establish obtaining money under false pretenses relative to the peer-review 

consultants. 

The hearing justice granted the town’s motion to dismiss and for judgment on 

the pleadings on all counts, and an order to that effect entered on January 10, 2023. 

Final judgment entered the same day. The plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal, 

and the town filed a cross-appeal on January 17, 2023. 

II

Standard of Review

“A judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) * * * provides a trial court 

with the means of disposing of a case early in the litigation process when the material 

facts are not in dispute after the pleadings have been closed and only questions of 

law remain to be decided.” Premier Home Restoration, LLC v. Federal National

Mortgage Association, 245 A.3d 745, 748 (R.I. 2021) (quoting Nugent v. State 

Public Defender’s Office, 184 A.3d 703, 706 (R.I. 2018)). “We review the granting 

of a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings under the same test we utilize 

to review a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Id. “Therefore, a judgment on the 
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pleadings ‘may be granted only when it is established beyond a reasonable doubt 

that a party would not be entitled to relief from the defendant under any set of 

conceivable facts that could be proven in support of its claim.’” Id. (quoting Nugent, 

184 A.3d at 706-07). 

Furthermore, “in reviewing the trial justice’s legal determinations, this Court 

has a ‘prerogative to affirm a determination of a trial justice on grounds different 

from those enunciated in his or her decision,’ as well as a prerogative to overturn 

such a determination on different grounds.” Miller v. Metropolitan Property and 

Casualty Insurance Co., 111 A.3d 332, 339 (R.I. 2015) (brackets omitted) (quoting

John Marandola Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Delta Mechanical, Inc., 769 A.2d 1272, 

1275 (R.I. 2001)). 

III 

Discussion 

On appeal, plaintiffs submit that the hearing justice committed four errors: (1) 

in ruling that plaintiffs failed to state claims for crimes and offenses (count four) and 

civil RICO (count five); (2) in determining that plaintiffs failed to state claims for 

tortious interference (counts two and three); (3) in failing to apply this Court’s prior 

holdings that the public duty doctrine does not apply to intentional torts; and (4) in 

finding that plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the voluntary payment doctrine.
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The town cross-appealed, claiming defective and insufficient notice and 

arguing that the three-year statute of limitations barred all of plaintiffs’ claims, not 

just the claims for substantive due process and tortious interference. The town 

additionally submits that plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies 

and that the town, as a government entity, cannot be held liable under § 9-1-2 or the 

civil RICO statute. 

At the crux of these appeals are issues concerning the statutes of limitations. 

Two statutes at play are § 9-1-25(a), which governs “claims in tort” against the town,

and § 9-1-14(b), which pertains to “injuries to the person”; both provide for a 

three-year limitations period. Also relevant is § 9-1-13(a), which establishes a 

catch-all statute of limitations of ten years. Section 9-1-25(a) provides in pertinent 

part:

“[I]n cases involving actions or claims in tort against the 

state or any political subdivision thereof or any city or 

town, the action shall be instituted within three (3) years 

from the effective date of the special act, or within three 

(3) years of the accrual of any claim of tort. Failure to 

institute suit within the three-year (3) period shall 

constitute a bar to the bringing of the legal action.”

Section 9-1-14(b) states that “[a]ctions for injuries to the person shall be commenced 

and sued within three (3) years next after the cause of action shall accrue * * *.” 

Finally, § 9-1-13(a) requires that “[e]xcept as otherwise specially provided, all civil 
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actions shall be commenced within ten (10) years next after the cause of action shall 

accrue, and not after.”

In his decision, the hearing justice applied the three-year statute of limitations 

set forth in § 9-1-14(b) to plaintiffs’ substantive due-process claim. The hearing 

justice then applied the three-year statute of limitations set forth in § 9-1-25(a) to 

plaintiffs’ two claims for tortious interference. Finally, as to the claim for civil 

liability for crimes and offenses and the claim for civil RICO, the hearing justice 

found that the ten-year statute of limitations governed. 

On appeal, plaintiffs assert that the hearing justice erred in finding that the 

three-year statute of limitations barred their claims for tortious interference, because 

the continuing tort doctrine applied to those claims and thus tolled the statute of 

limitations. The plaintiffs submit that, in finding the allegations in the complaint to 

be separate and distinct acts, the hearing justice improperly drew inferences in favor 

of the town. As to their claims for civil liability for crimes and offenses and civil 

RICO, plaintiffs assert that the hearing justice correctly found that the ten-year 

statute of limitations governs because the claims are neither “claims in tort” nor 

“injuries to the person.” 

In its cross-appeal, the town agreed with the hearing justice that plaintiffs’

first three counts—substantive due process, tortious interference with contract, and 

tortious interference with prospective business advantages—were barred by the 
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three-year statute of limitations. However, the town asserts that the two remaining 

counts—civil liability for crimes and offenses and civil RICO—should have also 

been barred. Specifically, the town submits that these claims were subject to the 

three-year statute of limitations under either § 9-1-25(a) or § 9-1-14(b).

The limitations issues before us are two-fold. First, we must determine 

whether plaintiffs’ claim for civil liability for crimes and offenses and their claim 

for civil RICO are “claims in tort,” as argued by the town. If not, the ten-year 

limitations period obtains. We must then determine whether the three-year statute 

of limitations has been tolled as to plaintiffs’ claims for tortious interference. 

The plaintiffs submit that counts four and five—crimes and offenses and civil 

RICO—stem from their allegation that “the [t]own engaged in conduct that amounts 

to larceny—namely, collecting ‘substantial fees and assessments from The Preserve 

under false pretenses’ and ‘through the establishment and/or operation of an 

enterprise * * * consisting of certain purported consultants and third party 

contractors retained by the [t]own[.]’” (Footnote omitted.) They argue that, based 

on their allegations, these are not “claims in tort” and that the hearing justice 

correctly applied the ten-year statute of limitations. In response, the town uses 

plaintiffs’ assertion that the claims amount to larceny to argue that “[c]laims of fraud 

and deceit, whether or not they are considered to be ‘injuries to the person[,]’ are 
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certainly ‘claims in tort’” and, further, that “[p]laintiffs’ claims concerning larceny 

or misappropriation also sound in tort.” We address each of the counts in turn. 

The plaintiffs’ claim for civil liability for crimes and offenses is governed by 

§ 9-1-2, which states: 

“Whenever any person shall suffer any injury to his or her 

person, reputation, or estate by reason of the commission 

of any crime or offense, he or she may recover his or her 

damages for the injury in a civil action against the 

offender, and it shall not be any defense to such action that 

no criminal complaint for the crime or offense has been 

made; and whenever any person shall be guilty of larceny, 

he or she shall be liable to the owner of the money or 

articles taken for twice the value thereof, unless the money 

or articles are restored, and for the value thereof in case of 

restoration.”

In their amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged that “[t]he [t]own collected substantial 

fees and assessments from [plaintiffs] under false pretenses” in violation of § 9-1-2. 

In dispute is the applicability of our holding in Commerce Park Realty, LLC 

v. HR2-A Corp., 253 A.3d 868 (R.I. 2021). Both the hearing justice and plaintiffs 

rely upon this case to support the imposition of the ten-year statute of limitations to 

this claim; the town disputes this assessment. In Commerce Park Realty, the plaintiff 

sought damages pursuant to § 9-1-2, and the defendant moved for summary 

judgment, arguing that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by the ten-year statute of 

limitations. Commerce Park Realty, LLC, 253 A.3d at 877. The hearing justice 

agreed, and this Court affirmed that decision, stating: 
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“The provision setting forth the statute of limitations for 

civil actions, including those brought pursuant to § 9-1-2, 

plainly states, ‘except as otherwise specially provided, all 

civil actions shall be commenced within ten (10) years 

next after the cause of action shall accrue, and not after.’

Section 9-1-13(a). Because the cause of action accrued in 

December 2000, and the complaint was not filed until 

April 2011, [the] plaintiffs’ claims under § 9-1-2 are 

barred by the ten-year statute of limitations set forth in 

§ 9-1-13(a).” Id. at 879 (brackets omitted). 

In contrast, however, the case before us involves a suit against a municipality rather 

than a private entity. See id. at 871. Additionally, our review of Commerce Park 

Realty reveals that no dispute existed as to the applicable statute of limitations that 

this Court would have had the opportunity to address. See generally id. Indeed, 

without a state or municipal defendant, the applicability of § 9-1-25(a) was not an 

issue in that matter. Therefore, our holding in Commerce Park Realty is inapposite

to the issue at bar. 

A tort encompasses injury to the person and to property—it is “a civil wrong 

* * * for which the law will provide a remedy in the form of an action for damages.”

74 Am. Jur. 2d Torts § 1 (February 2024 Update). 

“A ‘tort’ constitutes an invasion of a private interest for 

which the plaintiff seeks compensation for the damage 

they have personally suffered and a judgment to fairly 

allocate the loss. On the other hand, a ‘crime’ is an 

invasion of the interests of the people as a whole, and a 

criminal prosecution acts to protect and vindicate the 

public interest, and a judgment thereon functions to punish 

and rehabilitate the defend[ant].” Id. 
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Here, certainly, plaintiffs brought a civil action in order to “seek[] compensation for 

the damage they have personally suffered * * *.” Id. 

Additionally, in analyzing whether a claim constitutes a personal injury, this 

Court has broadly defined personal injury, but excluded such interests created by 

contract or property. See Commerce Oil Refining Corporation v. Miner, 98 R.I. 14, 

20-21, 199 A.2d 606, 610 (1964). The claim of civil liability for crimes was not 

created by a contract or a property interest. Indeed, in their complaint, plaintiffs 

asserted that the underlying crime for this count is obtaining money under false 

pretenses. This Court has pronounced that obtaining money under false pretenses 

includes an intent to cheat or defraud. See State v. Doyle, 235 A.3d 482, 515 (R.I. 

2020). We have also stated: “Fraud is usually a tort, but in some cases (especially 

when the conduct is willful) it may be a crime.” Pleasant Management, LLC v. 

Carrasco, 918 A.2d 213, 219 n.8 (R.I. 2007) (brackets omitted) (quoting Black’s 

Law Dictionary 685 (8th ed. 2004)). Because the underlying wrongful act for this 

claim—obtaining money under false pretenses—is a tort, we hold that count four is 

barred by the three-year statute of limitations under § 9-1-25(a).

Racketeering activity under the RICO act is outlined in G.L. 1956 chapter 15 

of title 7. Section 7-15-2 defines the prohibited activities, which include:

“(a) It is unlawful for any person who has knowingly 

received any income derived directly or indirectly from a 

racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful 

debt, to directly or indirectly use or invest any part of that 
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income, or the proceeds of that income in the acquisition 

of an interest in, or the establishment or operation of any 

enterprise.

“(b) It is unlawful for any person through a racketeering 

activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to 

directly or indirectly acquire or maintain any interest in or 

control of any enterprise.

“(c) It is unlawful for any person employed by or 

associated with any enterprise to conduct or participate in 

the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise through 

racketeering activity or collection of an unlawful debt.

“(d) Provided, that a purchase of securities on the open 

market for purposes of investment and without the 

intention of controlling or participating in the control of 

the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, is not unlawful 

under this section if the securities of the issuer held by the 

purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his 

or her or their accomplices in a racketeering activity or the 

collection of an unlawful debt after the purchase do not 

amount in the aggregate to one percent (1%) of the 

outstanding securities of any one class, and do not, either 

in law or in fact, confer the power to elect one or more 

directors of the issuer.”

Section 7-15-4(c) provides:

“Any person injured in his, her, or its business or property 

by reason of a violation of this chapter may sue in any 

appropriate court and shall recover treble damages and the 

cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee. In 

order for an injured person to recover pursuant to this 

subsection, it is not necessary to show that the defendant 

has been convicted of a criminal violation of this chapter.”

This Court has yet to substantively pass on a civil RICO action, nor has it opined on 

the issue of whether civil RICO is a tort. However, at least three federal appellate 
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courts have classified civil RICO as a tort, under the federal RICO statute. See 

Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1189 (4th Cir. 1988), abrogated on other

grounds by Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Company, 517 U.S. 706 (1996)

(“Civil RICO is of course a statutory tort remedy—simply one with particularly 

drastic remedies.”); Reynolds v. East Dyer Development Company, 882 F.2d 1249, 

1253 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Civil RICO is a statutory tort, so causation principles that 

generally apply in tort cases apply in civil RICO cases.”); Kaufman v. BDO Seidman, 

984 F.2d 182, 185 (6th Cir. 1993) (same). Although the federal RICO statute is not 

identical to our own, the list of prohibited activities is sufficiently similar, and it 

likewise provides for an individual bringing a civil suit. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 

1964. 

Furthermore, like plaintiffs’ allegation of civil liability for crimes, the civil 

RICO claim was not created by a contract or a property interest. Indeed, the 

underlying wrongful act for this claim is also obtaining money under false pretenses. 

We therefore hold that count five is barred by the three-year statute of limitations 

under § 9-1-25(a). Accordingly, counts four and five are time-barred.

We turn next to whether the three-year statute of limitations was tolled. The 

plaintiffs assert that the hearing justice erred in finding that the three-year statute of 

limitations barred their claims for tortious interference (counts two and three). 

Specifically, they argue that the continuing tort doctrine applied to those claims, and 
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therefore tolled the statute of limitations, given that their amended complaint 

demonstrated that the town’s actions constituted a “continuous, related, repeated and 

ongoing pattern and practice of discriminatory conduct.” In response, the town 

contends that the three-year statute of limitations was not tolled. 

“Under the continuing tort doctrine, where a tort involves a continuing or 

repeated injury, the limitations period does not begin to run until the date of the last 

injury or the date the tortious acts cease.” Boudreau v. Automatic Temperature 

Controls, Inc., 212 A.3d 594, 602 (R.I. 2019) (quoting 54 C.J.S. Continuing Torts

§ 223 at 258 (2010)). When applicable, the continuing tort doctrine allows a plaintiff 

to recover for the entire period of the defendant’s tortious actions. See 54 C.J.S. 

Limitations of Actions § 222 (March 2024 Update). 

The plaintiffs now ask this Court to review their complaint and conclude that, 

in finding the allegations in the amended complaint to be separate and distinct acts, 

the hearing justice improperly drew inferences in favor of the town. In making this 

argument, plaintiffs point us to portions of their amended complaint that they allege 

demonstrate that the town “engaged in a continuous, related, repeated and ongoing 

pattern and practice of discriminatory conduct.” First, plaintiffs direct us to

paragraphs fourteen through sixteen of their amended complaint, which allege: 

“14. The Preserve brings this action after years of 

consistent and repeated discriminatory conduct by [the 

town] and its elected and appointed officials, which 

continues to the present, and which as a continuing 
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deprivation of The Preserve’s rights, has caused and 

continues to cause The Preserve substantial harm and 

damages. By way of example, the [t]own’s wrongful, 

tortious, discriminatory, arbitrary and capricious actions 

and omissions, inter alia, have substantially and 

unnecessarily driven up the cost of The Preserve’s 

development of its property, slowed down the regulatory 

approval process, stifled and/or interfered with The 

Preserve’s use of its property, caused The Preserve to lose 

a significant financing opportunity and continues to cause

The Preserve to unnecessarily and detrimentally alter 

financing arrangements, conditions and terms. The 

[t]own’s discriminatory conduct, at times, has been clear 

and direct and, at other times, has been shrouded by 

pretext as the [t]own attempted to justify or excuse its 

otherwise discriminatory conduct. The [t]own also 

engaged consultants and others who worked with certain 

appointed and/or elected [t]own officials to continuously 

and purposefully frustrate The Preserve’s legitimate 

development efforts.

“15. The [t]own’s discriminatory conduct has 

purposefully spanned across numerous areas of regulatory 

procedure and governance, including taxation, permitting, 

planning and zoning.

“16. Although The Preserve’s claims of illegal and 

discriminatory taxation are not the specific subject of this 

Complaint, they are related to the claims asserted herein,

and are also relevant background to the pattern and 

practice of wrongful conduct by the [t]own and are

separately pending before this Court via 15 petitions for 

Tax Year 2020 and 18 petitions for Tax Year 2021 filed 

pursuant to R.I. Gen. Law § 44-5-26 as a result of the 

[t]own’ s illegal and disproportionate assessment of real 

property taxes on various properties located within The 

Preserve’s Master Development, further illustrating the 

[t]own’s continued discriminatory treatment of The 

Preserve and other property owners within The Preserve, 
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and further demonstrating the [t]own’s tortious plan to 

harm The Preserve.” (Emphasis added.) 

The plaintiffs additionally point us to paragraph sixty-one of the complaint, which 

alleges:

“Over The Preserve’s many years of dealings with the 

[t]own, [t]own elected and appointed officials, and 

authorized representatives and agents of the [t]own, made 

representations and gave assurances to The Preserve, 

which were subsequently disavowed both publicly and 

privately by successor elected and appointed officials, 

resulting in not only confusion but also delay and expense 

to The Preserve.” 

Building on that argument, plaintiffs submit that their complaint is “premised on a 

continuing pattern of conduct” and that the question of “whether the facts are 

sufficient to trigger the continuing violation doctrine or, instead, are discrete events 

* * * should be addressed on summary judgment after discovery.” 

Although this Court has seldom had the opportunity to address the continuing 

tort doctrine, in Boudreau this Court noted that we had “declined to apply the 

continuing violation doctrine to an age discrimination case when the underlying act 

was ‘a discrete act’ and held that any alleged claims of discrimination after that act 

did not toll the running of the statute of limitations, but were merely continuing 

consequences of that single act.” Boudreau, 212 A.3d at 603 (citing Croce v. State, 

Office of Adjutant General, 881 A.2d 75, 79 (R.I. 2005)). In Boudreau, this Court

again refused to apply the continuing tort doctrine, because just such a discrete act 
- 22 -

had occurred when the defendant installed tracking software on the plaintiff’s work 

computer. Id. at 604. 

Our review of the complaint and, in particular, the specific portions that 

plaintiffs direct us to in order to show a “continuing or repeated injury,” lead us to 

the conclusion that, like Boudreau, the harm that continues to present is the 

consequence of separate and discrete acts that had previously occurred. See 

Boudreau, 212 A.3d at 602. Indeed, the alleged wrongful conduct underlying the 

tortious interference claims appears to have ended on February 8, 2017, when

plaintiffs received final approval on the land development for the resort, including 

the hotel. The complaint contains no specific reference to injury after that date, 

beyond alleging that the town “continues to cause The Preserve substantial harm and 

damages.” 

Even assuming that all of the allegations in the amended complaint are true 

and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, our review of the 

complaint indicates that the harm still allegedly present is “merely continuing 

consequences of” the separate and distinct acts that plaintiffs allege occurred prior 

to February 8, 2017. See Boudreau, 212 A.3d at 603. Notably, in listing its counts, 

plaintiffs submit for count two that: 

“The [t]own tortiously interfered with [contracts for 

properties and services that The Preserve had with its

members] by interfering with The Preserve’s ability to 

honor its contracts, have the members use and enjoy their
- 23 -

properties, and provide the services and amenities that The 

Preserve had promised to its members, based upon prior 

assurances that The Preserve had been given by the 

[t]own.” 

As for count three, plaintiffs claim that:

“The [t]own knew or should have known about the 

prospective business advantages that The Preserve had 

with potential members who were planning to purchase 

properties, services and amenities at The Preserve and 

with lenders of The Preserve concerning, inter alia, actual 

and prospective contracts for membership services, 

property ownership, services and amenities and lending 

relationships to service such business advantages of The 

Preserve.

“[] The [t]own tortiously interfered with The Preserve’s 

prospective business advantages and relationships.” 

There is no indication, for either count, that there is a basis for a “continuing or 

repeated injury” sufficient to toll the limitations period. 

The facts pled are insufficient to show that the two counts of tortious 

interference—tortious interference with contracts and tortious interference with 

prospective business advantages—were a “continuing or repeated injury” to 

plaintiffs beyond February 8, 2017. The plaintiffs, however, filed the complaint in 

this action more than three years later, on December 16, 2021. 
- 24 -

Accordingly, we hold that the statute of limitations was not tolled. Therefore, 

albeit on different grounds than those relied upon by the hearing justice, we affirm 

the grant of the town’s motion to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings.3 

IV

Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. 

The record may be returned to the Superior Court. 

3 Because we conclude that each of the plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the statute of 

limitations, we need not address the remaining issues. 
SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE

Licht Judicial Complex

250 Benefit Street

Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case

The Preserve at Boulder Hills, LLC, et al. v. Laura 

Kenyon, in her capacity as Finance Director for the 

Town of Richmond, et al.

Case Number

No. 2023-67-Appeal. 

No. 2023-68-Appeal.

(WC 21-568)

Date Opinion Filed April 24, 2024

Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and 

Long, JJ.

Written By Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell

Source of Appeal Washington County Superior Court 

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Richard A. Licht

Attorney(s) on Appeal

For Plaintiffs:

John A. Tarantino, Esq. 

For Defendants:

James P. Marusak, Esq.