# Official Journal L 347/2014

| | ISSN 1977-0677 |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | L 347 |
| | |
| English edition | Legislation | Volume 573 December 2014 |

ISSN 1977-0677

Official Journal

of the European Union

L 347

English edition

Legislation

Volume 573 December 2014

---

| Contents | | II   Non-legislative acts | page |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS |
| | | 2014/866/EU |
| | * | Council Decision of 21 October 2014 on the conclusion of an Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation concerning cooperation on the application of their competition laws | 1 |
| | | Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation concerning cooperation on the application of their competition laws | 3 |
| | | REGULATIONS |
| | * | Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1280/2014 of 26 November 2014 approving non-minor amendments to the specification for a name entered in the register of protected designations of origin and protected geographical indications (Bra (PDO)) | 10 |
| | * | Commission Regulation (EU) No 1281/2014 of 1 December 2014 establishing a prohibition of fishing for plaice in VIIh, VIIj and VIIk by vessels flying the flag of Ireland | 11 |
| | * | Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1282/2014 of 2 December 2014 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 180/2014 as regards maximum quantities of processed products which may be exported or dispatched from Spanish and French outermost regions and the third countries concerned | 13 |
| | * | Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1283/2014 of 2 December 2014 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel, originating in the Republic of Korea and Malaysia following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 | 17 |
| | | Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1284/2014 of 2 December 2014 establishing the standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables | 38 |
| | | Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1285/2014 of 2 December 2014 fixing the allocation coefficient to be applied to applications for export licences for certain milk products to be exported to the Dominican Republic under the quota referred to in Regulation (EC) No 1187/2009 | 40 |
| | | ACTS ADOPTED BY BODIES CREATED BY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS |
| | | 2014/867/EU |
| | * | Decision No 1/2014 of the EU-PLO Joint Committee of 8 May 2014 amending Article 15(7) of Protocol No 3 to the Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on trade and cooperation between the European Community, of the one part, and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, of the other part, concerning the definition of the concept of originating products and methods of administrative cooperation | 42 |
| | | 2014/868/EU |
| | * | Decision No 1/2014 of the EU-Egypt Association Council of 4 September 2014 amending Article 15(7) of Protocol No 4 to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Arab Republic of Egypt, of the other part, regarding the definition of the concept of originating products and methods of administrative cooperation | 44 |
| | | 2014/869/EU |
| | * | Decision No 1/2014 of the EU-Morocco Association of 3 October 2014 amending Article 15(7) of Protocol No 4 to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part, regarding the definition of the concept of originating products and methods of administrative cooperation | 45 |

Contents

II   Non-legislative acts

page

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

2014/866/EU

*

Council Decision of 21 October 2014 on the conclusion of an Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation concerning cooperation on the application of their competition laws

1

Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation concerning cooperation on the application of their competition laws

3

REGULATIONS

*

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1280/2014 of 26 November 2014 approving non-minor amendments to the specification for a name entered in the register of protected designations of origin and protected geographical indications (Bra (PDO))

10

*

Commission Regulation (EU) No 1281/2014 of 1 December 2014 establishing a prohibition of fishing for plaice in VIIh, VIIj and VIIk by vessels flying the flag of Ireland

11

*

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1282/2014 of 2 December 2014 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 180/2014 as regards maximum quantities of processed products which may be exported or dispatched from Spanish and French outermost regions and the third countries concerned

13

*

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1283/2014 of 2 December 2014 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel, originating in the Republic of Korea and Malaysia following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009

17

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1284/2014 of 2 December 2014 establishing the standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables

38

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1285/2014 of 2 December 2014 fixing the allocation coefficient to be applied to applications for export licences for certain milk products to be exported to the Dominican Republic under the quota referred to in Regulation (EC) No 1187/2009

40

ACTS ADOPTED BY BODIES CREATED BY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

2014/867/EU

*

Decision No 1/2014 of the EU-PLO Joint Committee of 8 May 2014 amending Article 15(7) of Protocol No 3 to the Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on trade and cooperation between the European Community, of the one part, and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, of the other part, concerning the definition of the concept of originating products and methods of administrative cooperation

42

2014/868/EU

*

Decision No 1/2014 of the EU-Egypt Association Council of 4 September 2014 amending Article 15(7) of Protocol No 4 to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Arab Republic of Egypt, of the other part, regarding the definition of the concept of originating products and methods of administrative cooperation

44

2014/869/EU

*

Decision No 1/2014 of the EU-Morocco Association of 3 October 2014 amending Article 15(7) of Protocol No 4 to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part, regarding the definition of the concept of originating products and methods of administrative cooperation

45

| | | Corrigenda |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | * | Corrigendum to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1014/2014 of 22 July 2014 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 508/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2328/2003, (EC) No 861/2006, (EC) No 1198/2006 and (EC) No 791/2007 and Regulation (EU) No 1255/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regards to the content and construction of a common monitoring and evaluation system for the operations funded under the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund ( OJ L 283, 27.9.2014 ) | 46 |

Corrigenda

*

Corrigendum to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1014/2014 of 22 July 2014 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 508/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2328/2003, (EC) No 861/2006, (EC) No 1198/2006 and (EC) No 791/2007 and Regulation (EU) No 1255/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regards to the content and construction of a common monitoring and evaluation system for the operations funded under the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund ( OJ L 283, 27.9.2014 )

( OJ L 283, 27.9.2014 )

46

| EN | Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.
  The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk. |
| --- | --- |

EN

Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.

The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk.

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II Non-legislative acts

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

| 3.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 347/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 347/1

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COUNCIL DECISION

of 21 October 2014

on the conclusion of an Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation concerning cooperation on the application of their competition laws

(2014/866/EU)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Articles 103 und 352, in conjunction with Article 218(6)(a)(v) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

Having regard to the consent of the European Parliament,

Whereas:

| (1) | In accordance with Council Decision 2013/203/EU (1), the Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation concerning cooperation on the application of their competition laws was signed on 17 May 2013, subject to its conclusion. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

In accordance with Council Decision 2013/203/EU (1), the Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation concerning cooperation on the application of their competition laws was signed on 17 May 2013, subject to its conclusion.

| (2) | The Agreement should be approved, |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The Agreement should be approved,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation concerning cooperation on the application of their competition laws is hereby approved on behalf of the Union.

The text of the Agreement is attached to this Decision.

Article 2

The President of the Council shall, on behalf of the Union, give the notification provided for in Article 14 of the Agreement (2).

Article 3

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Done at Luxembourg 21 October 2014.

For the Council

The President

S. GOZI

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(1)  Council Decision 2013/203/EU of 22 April 2013 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of an Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation concerning cooperation on the application of their competition laws (OJ L 117, 27.4.2013, p. 6).

1

(2)  The date of entry into force of the Agreement will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union by the General Secretariat of the Council.

2

Official Journal of the European Union

---

| 3.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 347/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 347/3

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AGREEMENT

between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation concerning cooperation on the application of their competition laws

THE EUROPEAN UNION, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Union’,

of the one part, and

THE SWISS CONFEDERATION, hereinafter referred to as ‘Switzerland’,

of the other part,

hereinafter referred to as ‘Party’ or ‘Parties’,

CONSIDERING the close relations between the Union and Switzerland and recognising that cooperation on addressing anticompetitive activities will contribute to improving and strengthening their relationship,

NOTING that the sound and effective enforcement of competition law is a matter of importance to the efficient operation of their respective markets, as well as to economic welfare of consumers of both Parties and trade between them,

BEARING IN MIND that the competition enforcement systems of the Union and of Switzerland are based on the same principles and provide for similar rules,

NOTING the revised Recommendation of the Council of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development concerning Cooperation between Member Countries on Anticompetitive Practices Affecting International Trade, adopted on 27 and 28 July 1995,

RECOGNISING that cooperation and coordination, including the exchange of information and in particular the transmission of information that has been obtained by the Parties in the course of their investigative processes, will contribute to the more effective enforcement of the competition laws of both Parties,

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

Article 1

Purpose

The purpose of this Agreement is to contribute to the effective enforcement of the competition laws of each Party through cooperation and coordination, including the exchange of information, between the competition authorities of the Parties and to avoid or lessen the possibility of conflicts between the Parties in all matters concerning the application of the competition laws of each Party.

Article 2

Definitions

For the purpose of this Agreement, the following terms shall have the following definitions:

| (1) | ‘competition authority’ and ‘competition authorities’ of the Parties mean:






  (a) | for the Union: the European Commission, as to its responsibilities pursuant to the competition laws of the Union; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

(1)

‘competition authority’ and ‘competition authorities’ of the Parties mean:

(a)

for the Union: the European Commission, as to its responsibilities pursuant to the competition laws of the Union; and

| (b) | for Switzerland: the Competition Commission, including its Secretariat; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

for Switzerland: the Competition Commission, including its Secretariat;

| (2) | ‘competent authority of a Member State’ means the authority of each Member State of the Union competent for the application of competition laws. Upon signature of this Agreement a list of such authorities will be notified by the Union to Switzerland. The European Commission will notify to the competition authority of Switzerland an updated list each time a change occurs; |
| --- | --- |

(2)

‘competent authority of a Member State’ means the authority of each Member State of the Union competent for the application of competition laws. Upon signature of this Agreement a list of such authorities will be notified by the Union to Switzerland. The European Commission will notify to the competition authority of Switzerland an updated list each time a change occurs;

| (3) | ‘competition laws’ means:






  (a) | for the Union, Articles 101, 102, and 105 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (hereinafter referred to as ‘Regulation (EC) No 139/2004’), Articles 53 and 54 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area (hereinafter referred to as the ‘EEA Agreement’) when used in conjunction with Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and their implementing regulations as well as any amendments thereto; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

(3)

‘competition laws’ means:

(a)

for the Union, Articles 101, 102, and 105 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (hereinafter referred to as ‘Regulation (EC) No 139/2004’), Articles 53 and 54 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area (hereinafter referred to as the ‘EEA Agreement’) when used in conjunction with Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and their implementing regulations as well as any amendments thereto; and

| (b) | for Switzerland, the Federal Act on Cartels and Other Restraints of Competition of 6 October 1995 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Acart’) and its implementing regulations as well as any amendments thereto; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

for Switzerland, the Federal Act on Cartels and Other Restraints of Competition of 6 October 1995 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Acart’) and its implementing regulations as well as any amendments thereto;

| (4) | ‘anticompetitive activities’ means any activities that may be subject to a prohibition, sanctions or other relief measures by competition authorities under the competition laws of one of the Parties or of both Parties; |
| --- | --- |

(4)

‘anticompetitive activities’ means any activities that may be subject to a prohibition, sanctions or other relief measures by competition authorities under the competition laws of one of the Parties or of both Parties;

| (5) | ‘enforcement activities’ means any application of competition laws by way of investigation or proceedings conducted by the competition authority of a Party; |
| --- | --- |

(5)

‘enforcement activities’ means any application of competition laws by way of investigation or proceedings conducted by the competition authority of a Party;

| (6) | ‘information obtained by investigative process’ means any information obtained by a Party using its formal investigative rights or submitted to a Party pursuant to a legal obligation.






  (a) | For the Union, this means information obtained through requests for information according to Article 18 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (1) (hereinafter referred to as ‘Regulation (EC) No 1/2003’), oral statements according to Article 19 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 and inspections conducted by the European Commission or on behalf of the European Commission according to Articles 20, 21 or 22 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 or information acquired as a result of the application of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(6)

‘information obtained by investigative process’ means any information obtained by a Party using its formal investigative rights or submitted to a Party pursuant to a legal obligation.

(a)

For the Union, this means information obtained through requests for information according to Article 18 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (1) (hereinafter referred to as ‘Regulation (EC) No 1/2003’), oral statements according to Article 19 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 and inspections conducted by the European Commission or on behalf of the European Commission according to Articles 20, 21 or 22 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 or information acquired as a result of the application of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004.

| (b) | For Switzerland, this means information obtained through requests for information according to Article 40 Acart, oral statements according to paragraph 1 of Article 42 Acart and inspections conducted by the competition authority according to paragraph 2 of Article 42 Acart, or information acquired as a result of the application of the Ordinance on the Control of Concentrations of Undertakings of 17 June 1996; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

For Switzerland, this means information obtained through requests for information according to Article 40 Acart, oral statements according to paragraph 1 of Article 42 Acart and inspections conducted by the competition authority according to paragraph 2 of Article 42 Acart, or information acquired as a result of the application of the Ordinance on the Control of Concentrations of Undertakings of 17 June 1996;

| (7) | ‘information obtained under the leniency procedure’ means:






  (a) | for the Union, information obtained pursuant to the Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

(7)

‘information obtained under the leniency procedure’ means:

(a)

for the Union, information obtained pursuant to the Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases; and

| (b) | for Switzerland, information obtained pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 49a Acart and Articles 8 to 14 of the Ordinance on Sanctions Imposed for Unlawful Restraints of Competition of 12 March 2004; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

for Switzerland, information obtained pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 49a Acart and Articles 8 to 14 of the Ordinance on Sanctions Imposed for Unlawful Restraints of Competition of 12 March 2004;

| (8) | ‘information obtained under the settlement procedure’ means:






  (a) | for the Union, information obtained pursuant to Article 10a of Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (1) (hereinafter referred to as ‘Regulation (EC) No 773/2004’); and |
| --- | --- | --- |

(8)

‘information obtained under the settlement procedure’ means:

(a)

for the Union, information obtained pursuant to Article 10a of Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (1) (hereinafter referred to as ‘Regulation (EC) No 773/2004’); and

| (b) | for Switzerland, information obtained pursuant to Article 29 Acart. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

for Switzerland, information obtained pursuant to Article 29 Acart.

Article 3

Notifications

1.   The competition authority of a Party shall notify in writing the competition authority of the other Party with respect to enforcement activities that the notifying competition authority considers may affect important interests of the other Party. Notifications pursuant to this Article may be made by electronic means.

2.   Enforcement activities that may affect important interests of the other Party include in particular:

| (a) | enforcement activities concerning anticompetitive activities other than concentrations against an undertaking incorporated or organised under the laws and regulations applicable in the territory of the other Party; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

enforcement activities concerning anticompetitive activities other than concentrations against an undertaking incorporated or organised under the laws and regulations applicable in the territory of the other Party;

| (b) | enforcement activities which involve conduct believed to have been encouraged, required or approved by the other Party; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

enforcement activities which involve conduct believed to have been encouraged, required or approved by the other Party;

| (c) | enforcement activities which involve a concentration in which one or more parties to the transaction is an undertaking incorporated or organised under the laws and regulations applicable in the territory of the other Party; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

enforcement activities which involve a concentration in which one or more parties to the transaction is an undertaking incorporated or organised under the laws and regulations applicable in the territory of the other Party;

| (d) | enforcement activities which involve a concentration in which an undertaking controlling one or more of the parties to the transaction is incorporated or organised under the laws and regulations applicable in the territory of the other Party; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

enforcement activities which involve a concentration in which an undertaking controlling one or more of the parties to the transaction is incorporated or organised under the laws and regulations applicable in the territory of the other Party;

| (e) | enforcement activities against anticompetitive activities other than concentrations which also take place or took place to a significant extent in the territory of the other Party; and |
| --- | --- |

(e)

enforcement activities against anticompetitive activities other than concentrations which also take place or took place to a significant extent in the territory of the other Party; and

| (f) | enforcement activities which involve remedies that expressly require or prohibit conduct in the territory of the other Party or contain binding obligations for the undertakings in that territory. |
| --- | --- |

(f)

enforcement activities which involve remedies that expressly require or prohibit conduct in the territory of the other Party or contain binding obligations for the undertakings in that territory.

3.   Notifications pursuant to paragraph 1 with respect to concentrations shall be given:

| (a) | in the case of the Union, when initiating proceedings pursuant to point c of Article 6(1) of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004; and |
| --- | --- |

(a)

in the case of the Union, when initiating proceedings pursuant to point c of Article 6(1) of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004; and

| (b) | in the case of Switzerland, when initiating proceedings pursuant to Article 33 Acart. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

in the case of Switzerland, when initiating proceedings pursuant to Article 33 Acart.

4.   Notifications pursuant to paragraph 1 with respect to matters other than concentrations shall be given:

| (a) | in the case of the Union, when initiating proceedings referred to in Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004; and |
| --- | --- |

(a)

in the case of the Union, when initiating proceedings referred to in Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004; and

| (b) | in the case of Switzerland, when initiating proceedings pursuant to Article 27 Acart. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

in the case of Switzerland, when initiating proceedings pursuant to Article 27 Acart.

5.   Notifications shall include in particular the names of the parties to the investigation, the activities under examination and the markets they relate to, the relevant legal provisions and the date of the enforcement activities.

Article 4

Coordination of enforcement activities

1.   Where the competition authorities of both Parties are pursuing enforcement activities with regard to related matters, they may coordinate their enforcement activities. They may in particular coordinate the timing of their inspections.

2.   In considering whether particular enforcement activities may be coordinated, the competition authorities of the Parties shall take into account in particular the following factors:

| (a) | the effect of such coordination on the ability of the competition authorities of the Parties to achieve the objectives of their enforcement activities; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

the effect of such coordination on the ability of the competition authorities of the Parties to achieve the objectives of their enforcement activities;

| (b) | the relative abilities of the competition authorities of the Parties to obtain information necessary to conduct the enforcement activities; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the relative abilities of the competition authorities of the Parties to obtain information necessary to conduct the enforcement activities;

| (c) | the possibility of avoiding conflicting obligations and unnecessary burdens for the undertakings subject to the enforcement activities; and |
| --- | --- |

(c)

the possibility of avoiding conflicting obligations and unnecessary burdens for the undertakings subject to the enforcement activities; and

| (d) | the opportunity to make more efficient use of their resources. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

the opportunity to make more efficient use of their resources.

3.   Subject to appropriate notice to the competition authority of the other Party, the competition authority of either Party may, at any time, limit the coordination of enforcement activities and proceed independently on a specific enforcement activity.

Article 5

Conflict avoidance (Negative comity)

1.   The competition authority of a Party shall give careful consideration to the important interests of the other Party throughout all phases of its enforcement activities, including decisions regarding the initiation of enforcement activities, the scope of enforcement activities and the nature of sanctions or other relief measures sought in each case.

2.   If a specific enforcement activity envisaged by the competition authority of a Party may affect important interests of the other Party, the former, without prejudice to its full discretion, shall use its best endeavours:

| (a) | to provide to the competition authority of the other Party timely notice of significant developments relating to the interests of that Party; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

to provide to the competition authority of the other Party timely notice of significant developments relating to the interests of that Party;

| (b) | to give the competition authority of the other Party an opportunity to provide comments; and |
| --- | --- |

(b)

to give the competition authority of the other Party an opportunity to provide comments; and

| (c) | to take into consideration the comments of the competition authority of the other Party, while fully respecting the independence of the competition authority of either Party to make its own decision. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

to take into consideration the comments of the competition authority of the other Party, while fully respecting the independence of the competition authority of either Party to make its own decision.

The application of this paragraph is without prejudice to the obligations of the competition authorities of the Parties under paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 3.

3.   Where the competition authority of a Party considers that its enforcement activities may adversely affect important interests of the other Party, it shall use its best endeavours to seek an appropriate accommodation of the respective interests. In seeking such accommodation, the competition authority of the Party concerned should consider the following factors, in addition to any other factor that may be relevant in the circumstances:

| (a) | the relative significance of the actual or potential effects of the anticompetitive activities on the enforcing Party's important interests as compared to the effects on the other Party's important interests; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

the relative significance of the actual or potential effects of the anticompetitive activities on the enforcing Party's important interests as compared to the effects on the other Party's important interests;

| (b) | the relative significance to the anticompetitive activities of conduct or transactions occurring within the territory of a Party as compared to conduct or transactions occurring within the territory of the other Party; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the relative significance to the anticompetitive activities of conduct or transactions occurring within the territory of a Party as compared to conduct or transactions occurring within the territory of the other Party;

| (c) | the extent to which enforcement activities by the other Party with respect to the same undertakings would be affected; and |
| --- | --- |

(c)

the extent to which enforcement activities by the other Party with respect to the same undertakings would be affected; and

| (d) | the extent to which undertakings will be placed under conflicting requirements by both Parties. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

the extent to which undertakings will be placed under conflicting requirements by both Parties.

Article 6

Positive comity

1.   If the competition authority of a Party believes that anticompetitive activities carried out in the territory of the other Party may adversely affect the important interests of the former Party, it may, taking into account the importance of avoiding conflicts regarding jurisdiction and taking into account that the competition authority of the other Party may be in a position to conduct more effective enforcement activities with regard to such anticompetitive activities, request that the competition authority of the other Party initiate or expand appropriate enforcement activities.

2.   The request shall be as specific as possible about the nature of the anticompetitive activities and their actual or potential effect on the important interests of the Party whose competition authority has made the request, and shall include an offer of such further information and other cooperation as the requesting competition authority is able to provide.

3.   The requested competition authority shall carefully consider whether to initiate enforcement activities, or whether to expand ongoing enforcement activities, with respect to the anticompetitive activities identified in the request. The requested competition authority shall inform the requesting competition authority of its decision as soon as practically possible. If enforcement activities are initiated or expanded, the requested competition authority shall inform the requesting competition authority of their outcome and, to the extent possible, of significant interim developments.

4.   Nothing in this Article limits the discretion of the requested competition authority under its competition laws and enforcement policies as to whether or not to undertake enforcement activities with respect to the anticompetitive activities identified in the request, or precludes the requesting competition authority from withdrawing its request.

Article 7

Exchange of information

1.   In order to achieve the purpose of this Agreement as set out in Article 1, the competition authorities of the Parties may share views and exchange information related to the application of their respective competition laws as provided for in this Article and in Articles 8, 9 and 10.

2.   The competition authorities of the Parties may discuss any information, including information obtained by investigative process, as necessary to carry out the cooperation and coordination provided for under this Agreement.

3.   The competition authorities of the Parties may transmit information in their possession to each other when the undertaking which provided the information has given its express consent in writing. When such information contains personal data, those personal data may only be transmitted when the competition authorities of the Parties are investigating the same or related conduct or transaction. Paragraph 3 of Article 9 otherwise applies.

4.   In the absence of a consent as referred to in paragraph 3, the competition authority of a Party may, upon request, transmit for use as evidence information obtained by investigative process that is already in its possession to the competition authority of the other Party, subject to the following conditions:

| (a) | information obtained by investigative process may only be transmitted where both competition authorities are investigating the same or related conduct or transaction; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

information obtained by investigative process may only be transmitted where both competition authorities are investigating the same or related conduct or transaction;

| (b) | the request for such information shall be made in writing and shall include a general description of the subject matter and the nature of the investigation or proceedings to which the request relates and the specific legal provisions involved. It shall also identify the undertakings subject to the investigation or procedure whose identity is available at the time of the request; and |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the request for such information shall be made in writing and shall include a general description of the subject matter and the nature of the investigation or proceedings to which the request relates and the specific legal provisions involved. It shall also identify the undertakings subject to the investigation or procedure whose identity is available at the time of the request; and

| (c) | the requested competition authority shall determine, in consultation with the requesting competition authority what information in its possession is relevant and may be transmitted. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

the requested competition authority shall determine, in consultation with the requesting competition authority what information in its possession is relevant and may be transmitted.

5.   Neither competition authority is required to discuss or transmit information obtained by investigative process to the other competition authority, in particular if it would be incompatible with its important interests or unduly burdensome.

6.   The competition authorities of the Parties shall not discuss or transmit to each other information obtained under the Parties' leniency or settlement procedures, unless the undertaking which provided the information has given its express consent in writing.

7.   The competition authorities of the Parties shall not discuss, request or transmit information obtained by investigative process if using such information would be prohibited under the procedural rights and privileges guaranteed under the respective laws of the Parties and applicable to their enforcement activities, including the right against self-incrimination and the legal professional privilege.

8.   If the competition authority of a Party becomes aware that any document transmitted under this Article contains incorrect information, it shall immediately inform the competition authority of the other Party which shall correct it or remove it.

Article 8

Use of information

1.   Information that the competition authority of a Party discusses with or transmits to the competition authority of the other Party under this Agreement shall be used only for the purpose of enforcing that Party's competition laws by its competition authority.

2.   Information obtained by investigative process and discussed with or transmitted to the competition authority of the other Party under this Agreement shall only be used by the receiving competition authority for the enforcement of its competition laws with regard to the same or related conduct or transaction.

3.   Information transmitted under paragraph 4 of Article 7 shall only be used by the receiving competition authority for the purpose defined in the request.

4.   No information discussed or transmitted under this Agreement shall be used to impose sanctions on natural persons.

5.   The competition authority of a Party may require that information transmitted pursuant to this Agreement shall be used subject to the terms and conditions it specifies. The receiving competition authority shall not use such information in a manner contrary to such terms and conditions without the prior consent of the transmitting competition authority.

Article 9

Protection and confidentiality of information

1.   The competition authorities of the Parties shall treat the fact that a request has been made or received as confidential. Information obtained pursuant to this Agreement shall be kept confidential by the receiving competition authority according to its respective legislation. Both competition authorities shall in particular oppose any application of a third party or another authority for disclosure of information received. This does not prevent disclosure of such information for the purpose of:

| (a) | obtaining a court order in relation to the public enforcement of the competition laws of a Party; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

obtaining a court order in relation to the public enforcement of the competition laws of a Party;

| (b) | disclosure to undertakings which are subject to an investigation or a procedure under the competition laws of the Parties and against whom the information may be used, if such disclosure is required by the law of the Party receiving the information; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

disclosure to undertakings which are subject to an investigation or a procedure under the competition laws of the Parties and against whom the information may be used, if such disclosure is required by the law of the Party receiving the information;

| (c) | disclosure to courts in appeal procedures; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

disclosure to courts in appeal procedures;

| (d) | disclosure if and in so far as it is indispensable for the exercise of the right of access to documents under the laws of a Party. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

disclosure if and in so far as it is indispensable for the exercise of the right of access to documents under the laws of a Party.

In such cases, the receiving competition authority shall ensure that the protection of business secrets remains fully guaranteed.

2.   If the competition authority of a Party becomes aware that, despite its best efforts, information has accidentally been used or disclosed in a manner contrary to the provisions of this Article, it shall notify the competition authority of the other Party forthwith. The Parties shall promptly consult on steps to minimise any harm resulting from such use or disclosure and to ensure that such situation does not recur.

3.   The Parties shall ensure the protection of personal data in accordance with their respective legislations.

Article 10

Information of the competition authorities of the Member States and the EFTA Surveillance Authority

1.   The European Commission, acting in accordance with the Union's competition laws or other international provisions relating to competition:

| (a) | may inform the competent authorities of a Member State whose important interests are affected of the notifications sent to it by the competition authority of Switzerland pursuant to Article 3; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

may inform the competent authorities of a Member State whose important interests are affected of the notifications sent to it by the competition authority of Switzerland pursuant to Article 3;

| (b) | may inform the competent authorities of a Member State of the existence of any cooperation and coordination of enforcement activities; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

may inform the competent authorities of a Member State of the existence of any cooperation and coordination of enforcement activities;

| (c) | may only disclose information transmitted by the competition authority of Switzerland pursuant to Article 7 of this Agreement to the competent authorities of the Member States in order to fulfil its obligation of information under Articles 11 and 14 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 and Article 19 of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004; and |
| --- | --- |

(c)

may only disclose information transmitted by the competition authority of Switzerland pursuant to Article 7 of this Agreement to the competent authorities of the Member States in order to fulfil its obligation of information under Articles 11 and 14 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 and Article 19 of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004; and

| (d) | may only disclose information transmitted by the competition authority of Switzerland pursuant to Article 7 of this Agreement to the EFTA Surveillance Authority in order to fulfil its obligations of information under Articles 6 and 7 of Protocol 23 of the EEA Agreement concerning the cooperation between the surveillance authorities. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

may only disclose information transmitted by the competition authority of Switzerland pursuant to Article 7 of this Agreement to the EFTA Surveillance Authority in order to fulfil its obligations of information under Articles 6 and 7 of Protocol 23 of the EEA Agreement concerning the cooperation between the surveillance authorities.

2.   Information, other than publicly available information, communicated to the competent authorities of a Member State and to the EFTA Surveillance Authority pursuant to paragraph 1 shall not be used for any purpose other than enforcement of the Union's competition laws by the European Commission, and shall not be disclosed.

Article 11

Consultations

1.   The Parties shall consult with each other, upon request of either Party, on any matter which may arise in the implementation of this Agreement. Upon request of either Party, the Parties shall consider reviewing the operation of this Agreement and examine the possibility of further developing their cooperation.

2.   The Parties shall as soon as possible inform each other of any amendment to their competition laws, as well as of any amendment to other laws and regulations and of any change in the enforcement practice of their competition authorities that may affect the operation of this Agreement. Upon request of either Party, the Parties shall hold consultations in order to assess the specific implications of such amendment or change for this Agreement, and in particular to determine whether this Agreement should be amended pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 14.

3.   The competition authorities of the Parties shall meet at the appropriate level, at the request of either competition authority. At these meetings, they may:

| (a) | inform each other on their current enforcement efforts and priorities in relation to the competition laws of each Party; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

inform each other on their current enforcement efforts and priorities in relation to the competition laws of each Party;

| (b) | exchange views on economic sectors of common interest; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

exchange views on economic sectors of common interest;

| (c) | discuss policy issues of mutual interest; and |
| --- | --- |

(c)

discuss policy issues of mutual interest; and

| (d) | discuss other matters of mutual interest relating to the application of the competition laws of each Party. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

discuss other matters of mutual interest relating to the application of the competition laws of each Party.

Article 12

Communications

1.   Unless otherwise agreed between the Parties or their competition authorities, communications under this Agreement shall be made in the English language.

2.   The competition authority of each Party shall designate a contact point to facilitate communications between the Parties on any matter relating to the implementation of this Agreement.

Article 13

Existing law

Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prejudice the formulation or enforcement of the competition laws of either Party.

Article 14

Entry into force, amendment and termination

1.   This Agreement shall be approved by the Parties in accordance with their own internal procedures. The Parties shall notify each other of the completion of the respective procedures. This Agreement shall enter into force on the first day of the second month following the date of the last notification of approval.

2.   The Parties may agree on any amendment to this Agreement. Unless otherwise agreed upon, such amendment shall enter into force through the same procedures as laid down in paragraph 1.

3.   Either Party may terminate this Agreement at any time by notifying the other in writing through diplomatic channels. In that event, this Agreement shall cease to have effect six (6) months from the date of receiving such a notification.

In WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto by the respective Party, have signed this Agreement.

Done in duplicate, at Brussels on 17 May 2013 in the Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish and Swedish languages.

---

(1)  In accordance with Article 5 of the Treaty of Lisbon, Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty establishing the European Community were renumbered as Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

1

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REGULATIONS

| 3.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 347/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 347/10

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COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 1280/2014

of 26 November 2014

approving non-minor amendments to the specification for a name entered in the register of protected designations of origin and protected geographical indications (Bra (PDO))

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs (1), and in particular Article 52(2) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | By virtue of the first subparagraph of Article 53(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, the Commission has examined Italy's application for the approval of amendments to the specification for the protected designation of origin ‘Bra’, registered under Commission Regulation (EC) No 1263/96 (2). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

By virtue of the first subparagraph of Article 53(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, the Commission has examined Italy's application for the approval of amendments to the specification for the protected designation of origin ‘Bra’, registered under Commission Regulation (EC) No 1263/96 (2).

| (2) | Since the amendments in question are not minor within the meaning of Article 53(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, the Commission published the amendment application in the Official Journal of the European Union
   (3) as required by Article 50(2)(a) of that Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Since the amendments in question are not minor within the meaning of Article 53(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, the Commission published the amendment application in the Official Journal of the European Union
   (3) as required by Article 50(2)(a) of that Regulation.

| (3) | As no statement of opposition under Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 has been received by the Commission, the amendments should be approved, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

As no statement of opposition under Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 has been received by the Commission, the amendments should be approved,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The amendments to the specification published in the Official Journal of the European Union regarding the name ‘Bra’ (PDO) are hereby approved.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 26 November 2014.

For the Commission,

On behalf of the President,

Phil HOGAN

Member of the Commission

---

(1)  OJ L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 1.

1

(2)  Commission Regulation (EC) No 1263/96 of 1 July 1996 supplementing the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 1107/96 on the registration of geographical indications and designations of origin under the procedure laid down in Article 17 of Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92 (OJ L 163, 2.7.1996, p. 19).

2

(3)  OJ C 205, 2.7.2014, p. 15.

3

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| 3.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 347/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 347/11

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COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 1281/2014

of 1 December 2014

establishing a prohibition of fishing for plaice in VIIh, VIIj and VIIk by vessels flying the flag of Ireland

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009 of 20 November 2009 establishing a Community control system for ensuring compliance with the rules of the common fisheries policy (1), and in particular Article 36(2) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Council Regulation (EU) No 43/2014 (2) lays down quotas for 2014. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Council Regulation (EU) No 43/2014 (2) lays down quotas for 2014.

| (2) | According to the information received by the Commission, catches of the stock referred to in the Annex to this Regulation by vessels flying the flag of or registered in the Member State referred to therein have exhausted the quota allocated for 2014. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

According to the information received by the Commission, catches of the stock referred to in the Annex to this Regulation by vessels flying the flag of or registered in the Member State referred to therein have exhausted the quota allocated for 2014.

| (3) | It is therefore necessary to prohibit fishing activities for that stock, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

It is therefore necessary to prohibit fishing activities for that stock,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Quota exhaustion

The fishing quota allocated to the Member State referred to in the Annex to this Regulation for the stock referred to therein for 2014 shall be deemed to be exhausted from the date set out in that Annex.

Article 2

Prohibitions

Fishing activities for the stock referred to in the Annex to this Regulation by vessels flying the flag of or registered in the Member State referred to therein shall be prohibited from the date set out in that Annex. In particular it shall be prohibited to retain on board, relocate, tranship or land fish from that stock caught by those vessels after that date.

Article 3

Entry into force

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 1 December 2014.

For the Commission,

On behalf of the President,

Lowri EVANS

Director-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries

---

(1)  OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 1.

1

(2)  Council Regulation (EU) No 43/2014 of 20 January 2014 fixing for 2014 the fishing opportunities for certain fish stocks and groups of fish stocks, applicable in Union waters and, to Union vessels, in certain non-Union waters (OJ L 24, 28.1.2014, p. 1).

2

---

ANNEX

| No | 72/TQ43 |
| --- | --- |
| Member State | Ireland |
| Stock | PLE/7HJK. |
| Species | Plaice (Pleuronectes platessa) |
| Zone | VIIh, VIIj and VIIk |
| Closing date | 24.10.2014 |

No

72/TQ43

Member State

Ireland

Stock

PLE/7HJK.

Species

Plaice (Pleuronectes platessa)

Zone

VIIh, VIIj and VIIk

Closing date

24.10.2014

---

| 3.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 347/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 347/13

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COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 1282/2014

of 2 December 2014

amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 180/2014 as regards maximum quantities of processed products which may be exported or dispatched from Spanish and French outermost regions and the third countries concerned

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 228/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2013 laying down specific measures for agriculture in the outermost regions of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 247/2006 (1), and in particular Article 14 thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Article 15(1) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 180/2014 (2) provides for the possibility for operators to export, in the context of traditional trade flows or regional trade, and to dispatch, in the context of traditional trade flows, processed products containing raw materials which have benefited from specific supply arrangements as referred to in Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No 228/2013. Processors intending to export or dispatch those products in this context may do so within the limits of the annual quantities indicated in Annexes II to V to Implementing Regulation (EU) No 180/2014. The list of third countries to which those products can be exported is set out in Annex VI to that Implementing Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Article 15(1) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 180/2014 (2) provides for the possibility for operators to export, in the context of traditional trade flows or regional trade, and to dispatch, in the context of traditional trade flows, processed products containing raw materials which have benefited from specific supply arrangements as referred to in Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No 228/2013. Processors intending to export or dispatch those products in this context may do so within the limits of the annual quantities indicated in Annexes II to V to Implementing Regulation (EU) No 180/2014. The list of third countries to which those products can be exported is set out in Annex VI to that Implementing Regulation.

| (2) | The French authorities requested the Commission to adapt the list in Annex II to Implementing Regulation (EU) No 180/2014 with respect to Martinique by changing the maximum quantities of processed products corresponding to codes CN 0403 10, and CN 1101 00 and by adding quantities for products corresponding to codes CN 2202, CN 2105 and CN 2007. For Guadeloupe, they requested the Commission to adapt this list by changing the maximum quantities for products corresponding to codes CN 1101 00 and CN 2309 90, and by adding quantities for products corresponding to codes CN 0402 10 and CN 2007, 2008 and 2009. They also requested to add new third countries for Martinique and Guadeloupe in the list in Annex VI to that Implementing Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The French authorities requested the Commission to adapt the list in Annex II to Implementing Regulation (EU) No 180/2014 with respect to Martinique by changing the maximum quantities of processed products corresponding to codes CN 0403 10, and CN 1101 00 and by adding quantities for products corresponding to codes CN 2202, CN 2105 and CN 2007. For Guadeloupe, they requested the Commission to adapt this list by changing the maximum quantities for products corresponding to codes CN 1101 00 and CN 2309 90, and by adding quantities for products corresponding to codes CN 0402 10 and CN 2007, 2008 and 2009. They also requested to add new third countries for Martinique and Guadeloupe in the list in Annex VI to that Implementing Regulation.

| (3) | The maximum quantities of processed products which can be exported or dispatched annually from Canary Islands in the context of traditional exports and consignments are set in Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) No 180/2014 and the quantities which can be exported annually from the Canary Islands in the context of regional trade are set in Annex V to that Implementing Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The maximum quantities of processed products which can be exported or dispatched annually from Canary Islands in the context of traditional exports and consignments are set in Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) No 180/2014 and the quantities which can be exported annually from the Canary Islands in the context of regional trade are set in Annex V to that Implementing Regulation.

| (4) | Spanish authorities requested the Commission to simplify the lists in Annexes IV and V to Implementing Regulation (EU) No 180/2014 by summing the quantities of processed product corresponding to subheadings related to codes CN 1806 and CN 1905. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Spanish authorities requested the Commission to simplify the lists in Annexes IV and V to Implementing Regulation (EU) No 180/2014 by summing the quantities of processed product corresponding to subheadings related to codes CN 1806 and CN 1905.

| (5) | Implementing Regulation (EU) No 180/2014 should therefore be amended accordingly. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Implementing Regulation (EU) No 180/2014 should therefore be amended accordingly.

| (6) | The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Direct Payments, |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Direct Payments,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Amendment of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 180/2014

Annexes II, IV, V and VI to Implementing Regulation (EU) No 180/2014 are amended in accordance with the Annex to this Regulation.

Article 2

Entry into force

This Regulation shall enter into force on the third day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 2 December 2014.

For the Commission

The President

Jean-Claude JUNCKER

---

(1)  OJ L 78, 20.3.2013, p. 23.

1

(2)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 180/2014 of 20 February 2014 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) No 228/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down specific measures for agriculture in the outermost regions of the Union (OJ L 63, 4.3.2014, p. 13).

2

---

ANNEX

Annexes II, IV, V and VI to Implementing Regulation (EU) No 180/2014 are amended as follows:

| (1) | In Annex II, the tables for Martinique and Guadeloupe are replaced by the following:

  ‘Martinique








  (Quantity in kilograms (or litres *)) |
| --- | --- |
| CN code | To the Union | To third countries |
| 0403 10 | — | 77 500 |
| 1101 00 | — | 199 500 |
| 2309 90 | — | 102 000 |
| 2202 | 229 000 | 5 500 |
| 2105 | 146 000 | — |
| 2007 | 1 000 | 500 |

(1)

In Annex II, the tables for Martinique and Guadeloupe are replaced by the following:

‘Martinique

(Quantity in kilograms (or litres *))

CN code

To the Union

To third countries

0403 10

—

77 500

1101 00

—

199 500

2309 90

—

102 000

2202

229 000

5 500

2105

146 000

—

2007

1 000

500

Guadeloupe

| (Quantity in kilograms (or litres *)) |
| --- |
| CN code | To the Union | To third countries |
| 0402 10 | 45 000 | — |
| 1101 00 | — | 128 000 |
| 2309 90 | — | 522 000 |
| 2007-2008-2009 | 4 000 | —’ |

(Quantity in kilograms (or litres *))

CN code

To the Union

To third countries

0402 10

45 000

—

1101 00

—

128 000

2309 90

—

522 000

2007-2008-2009

4 000

—’

| (2) | Annex IV is amended as follows:






  (a) | the lines corresponding to subheadings 1806 10, 1806 20, 1806 31, 1806 32 and 1806 90 are replaced by the following:







  ‘1806 | 490 500 | 265 000’ |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |

(2)

Annex IV is amended as follows:

(a)

the lines corresponding to subheadings 1806 10, 1806 20, 1806 31, 1806 32 and 1806 90 are replaced by the following:

‘1806

490 500

265 000’

| (b) | the lines corresponding to subheadings 1905 20, 1905 31, 1905 32, 1905 40, and 1905 90 are replaced by the following:







  ‘1905 | 916 500 | 878 000’ |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

(b)

the lines corresponding to subheadings 1905 20, 1905 31, 1905 32, 1905 40, and 1905 90 are replaced by the following:

‘1905

916 500

878 000’

| (3) | Annex V is amended as follows:






  (a) | the lines corresponding to subheadings 1806 10, 1806 31, 1806 32 and 1806 90 are replaced by the following:






  ‘1806 | 266 000’ |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

(3)

Annex V is amended as follows:

(a)

the lines corresponding to subheadings 1806 10, 1806 31, 1806 32 and 1806 90 are replaced by the following:

‘1806

266 000’

| (b) | the lines corresponding to subheadings 1905 31 and 1905 32 are replaced by the following:






  ‘1905 | 225 000’ |
| --- | --- | --- |

(b)

the lines corresponding to subheadings 1905 31 and 1905 32 are replaced by the following:

‘1905

225 000’

| (4) | The part of Annex VI concerning the French overseas departments is replaced by the following:

  ‘Réunion: Mauritius, Madagascar and Comoros

  Martinique: Lesser Antilles (1), Surinam and Haïti

  Guadeloupe: Lesser Antilles, Surinam and Haïti

  French Guiana: Brazil, Surinam and Guyana |
| --- | --- |

(4)

The part of Annex VI concerning the French overseas departments is replaced by the following:

‘Réunion: Mauritius, Madagascar and Comoros

Martinique: Lesser Antilles (1), Surinam and Haïti

Guadeloupe: Lesser Antilles, Surinam and Haïti

French Guiana: Brazil, Surinam and Guyana

---

(1)  Lesser Antilles: Virgin Islands, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Sint Maarten, Anguilla.’

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| 3.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 347/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 347/17

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COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 1283/2014

of 2 December 2014

imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel, originating in the Republic of Korea and Malaysia following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community (1), and in particular Article 11(2) thereof,

Whereas:

1.   PROCEDURE

1.1.   Measures in force

| (1) | The anti-dumping measures in force on imports of certain tube and pipe fittings (‘TPF’ or ‘the product concerned’) originating in the Republic of Korea and Malaysia ‘the countries concerned’) were originally imposed by Council Regulation (EC) No 1514/2002 (2) (the ‘original measures’). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

The anti-dumping measures in force on imports of certain tube and pipe fittings (‘TPF’ or ‘the product concerned’) originating in the Republic of Korea and Malaysia ‘the countries concerned’) were originally imposed by Council Regulation (EC) No 1514/2002 (2) (the ‘original measures’).

| (2) | The anti-dumping duties in force for Malaysia are 75 %, except for the companies Anggerik Laksana Sdn Bhd and Pantech Steel Industries Sdn Bhd, which are subject to an anti-dumping duty of 59,2 % and 49,9 % respectively. For the Republic of Korea the duty is 44 % for all companies. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The anti-dumping duties in force for Malaysia are 75 %, except for the companies Anggerik Laksana Sdn Bhd and Pantech Steel Industries Sdn Bhd, which are subject to an anti-dumping duty of 59,2 % and 49,9 % respectively. For the Republic of Korea the duty is 44 % for all companies.

| (3) | The original measures were maintained by Council Regulation (EC) No 1001/2008 (3) as last amended by Council Regulation (EU) No 363/2010 (4) (‘the measures in force’). |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The original measures were maintained by Council Regulation (EC) No 1001/2008 (3) as last amended by Council Regulation (EU) No 363/2010 (4) (‘the measures in force’).

1.2.   Measures in force in respect of other third countries

| (4) | Outside the scope of this proceeding, anti-dumping measures on the product concerned are currently in force on exports from the People's Republic of China and Thailand (5). The measures on the product concerned originating in China were extended to imports of the same product consigned from Taiwan (6), Indonesia (7), Sri Lanka (8), and the Philippines (9). On 3 September 2014, the Commission initiated an expiry review under Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation on imports of TPF from People's Republic of China and extended to Taiwan, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and the Philippines. It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union
   (10). The anti-dumping measures on exports from Thailand have expired. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Outside the scope of this proceeding, anti-dumping measures on the product concerned are currently in force on exports from the People's Republic of China and Thailand (5). The measures on the product concerned originating in China were extended to imports of the same product consigned from Taiwan (6), Indonesia (7), Sri Lanka (8), and the Philippines (9). On 3 September 2014, the Commission initiated an expiry review under Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation on imports of TPF from People's Republic of China and extended to Taiwan, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and the Philippines. It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union
   (10). The anti-dumping measures on exports from Thailand have expired.

| (5) | In January 2013, measures were imposed on imports of the product concerned originating in Russia and Turkey (11). |
| --- | --- |

(5)

In January 2013, measures were imposed on imports of the product concerned originating in Russia and Turkey (11).

1.3.   Initiation of an expiry review

| (6) | On 8 February 2013 the European Commission (‘the Commission’) published a notice of impending expiry (12) of the anti-dumping measures in force concerning TPF originating in the Republic of Korea and Malaysia. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

On 8 February 2013 the European Commission (‘the Commission’) published a notice of impending expiry (12) of the anti-dumping measures in force concerning TPF originating in the Republic of Korea and Malaysia.

| (7) | On 26 June 2013, the Commission received a request for the initiation of an expiry review of those measures under Article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 (‘the basic Regulation’). |
| --- | --- |

(7)

On 26 June 2013, the Commission received a request for the initiation of an expiry review of those measures under Article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 (‘the basic Regulation’).

| (8) | The request was lodged by the Defence Committee of the Steel Butt-Welding Fittings Industry of the European Union (‘the applicant’) on behalf of producers representing more than 40 % of the total Union production of the product concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

The request was lodged by the Defence Committee of the Steel Butt-Welding Fittings Industry of the European Union (‘the applicant’) on behalf of producers representing more than 40 % of the total Union production of the product concerned.

| (9) | The request was based on the grounds that the expiry of the measures would likely result in recurrence of dumping and recurrence of injury to the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

The request was based on the grounds that the expiry of the measures would likely result in recurrence of dumping and recurrence of injury to the Union industry.

| (10) | On 15 October 2013, the Commission initiated an expiry review under Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation. It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union
   (13). |
| --- | --- |

(10)

On 15 October 2013, the Commission initiated an expiry review under Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation. It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union
   (13).

1.4.   Interested parties

| (11) | In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited interested parties to contact it in order to participate in the review investigation. The Commission specifically informed the applicant, other known Union producers, users and importers, exporting producers in the Republic of Korea and Malaysia, and the Korean and Malaysian authorities about the initiation of the expiry review and invited them to cooperate. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited interested parties to contact it in order to participate in the review investigation. The Commission specifically informed the applicant, other known Union producers, users and importers, exporting producers in the Republic of Korea and Malaysia, and the Korean and Malaysian authorities about the initiation of the expiry review and invited them to cooperate.

| (12) | All interested parties had the opportunity to comment on the initiation of the review and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

All interested parties had the opportunity to comment on the initiation of the review and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings.

1.4.1.   Sampling

| (13) | In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it might sample the Union producers, importers and Korean exporting producers, in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it might sample the Union producers, importers and Korean exporting producers, in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation.

(a)   Sampling of Union producers

| (14) | In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it had provisionally selected a sample of Union producers and invited interested parties to comment. The sample was selected on the basis of production and sales volumes of the like product during the review investigation period (‘RIP’) in the Union whilst ensuring a geographical spread and was comprised of four Union producers or groups of Union producers (five individual companies) located in Germany, France, Italy, Romania and Austria. No comments were received and the provisionally selected companies were retained in the final sample. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it had provisionally selected a sample of Union producers and invited interested parties to comment. The sample was selected on the basis of production and sales volumes of the like product during the review investigation period (‘RIP’) in the Union whilst ensuring a geographical spread and was comprised of four Union producers or groups of Union producers (five individual companies) located in Germany, France, Italy, Romania and Austria. No comments were received and the provisionally selected companies were retained in the final sample.

| (15) | However, after the initiation of the proceeding the Commission had to exclude from the sample two Union producers due to a lack of cooperation. The two remaining companies/group of companies (three individual companies) represent 49 % of Union production and 45 % of Union sales and have production facilities in three different countries. Therefore, the modified sample was still considered representative of the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

However, after the initiation of the proceeding the Commission had to exclude from the sample two Union producers due to a lack of cooperation. The two remaining companies/group of companies (three individual companies) represent 49 % of Union production and 45 % of Union sales and have production facilities in three different countries. Therefore, the modified sample was still considered representative of the Union industry.

(b)   Sampling of importers

| (16) | To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked unrelated importers to provide information specified in the Notice of Initiation. However no importer cooperated with the investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked unrelated importers to provide information specified in the Notice of Initiation. However no importer cooperated with the investigation.

(c)   Sampling of exporting producers in the Republic of Korea

| (17) | To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked all exporting producers in Korea to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. In addition, the Commission requested the Mission of the Republic of Korea to the European Union to identify and/or contact other exporting producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked all exporting producers in Korea to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. In addition, the Commission requested the Mission of the Republic of Korea to the European Union to identify and/or contact other exporting producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation.

| (18) | Two Korean exporting producers provided the requested information, but only one agreed to cooperate and be included in the sample. It was therefore decided that sampling of the Korean exporting producers was not necessary. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

Two Korean exporting producers provided the requested information, but only one agreed to cooperate and be included in the sample. It was therefore decided that sampling of the Korean exporting producers was not necessary.

(d)   Exporting producers in Malaysia

| (19) | In view of the low number of known Malaysian exporting producers, the Commission did not foresee sampling in the Notice of Initiation. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

In view of the low number of known Malaysian exporting producers, the Commission did not foresee sampling in the Notice of Initiation.

| (20) | The Commission invited all exporting producers to make themselves known within 15 days after the publication of the Notice of Initiation. In addition, the Commission requested the Mission of Malaysia to the European Union to identify and/or contact other exporting producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

The Commission invited all exporting producers to make themselves known within 15 days after the publication of the Notice of Initiation. In addition, the Commission requested the Mission of Malaysia to the European Union to identify and/or contact other exporting producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation.

1.4.2.   Replies to questionnaire

| (21) | The Commission sent questionnaires to all sampled companies in the Union, the cooperating Korean company and all known Malaysian exporting producers. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

The Commission sent questionnaires to all sampled companies in the Union, the cooperating Korean company and all known Malaysian exporting producers.

| (22) | One Union producer failed to respond to the questionnaire while another Union producer submitted only a partial answer and failed to reply after a deficiency letter had been sent. These two Union producers were subsequently excluded from the sample (see recital 15 above). One Korean exporting producer replied to the questionnaire. None of the Malaysian exporting producers submitted a reply to the questionnaire. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

One Union producer failed to respond to the questionnaire while another Union producer submitted only a partial answer and failed to reply after a deficiency letter had been sent. These two Union producers were subsequently excluded from the sample (see recital 15 above). One Korean exporting producer replied to the questionnaire. None of the Malaysian exporting producers submitted a reply to the questionnaire.

1.4.3.   Verification visits

| (23) | The Commission sought and verified all the information it deemed necessary for determining the likelihood of recurrence of dumping and resulting injury and for assessing whether the imposition of measures would be against the Union interest. Verification visits pursuant to Article 16 of the basic Regulation were carried out at the premises of the following companies: | Union producers:







  — | Erne Fittings GmbH, Schlins Austria and the related company Siekman Fittings, Lohne, Germany, |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

(23)

The Commission sought and verified all the information it deemed necessary for determining the likelihood of recurrence of dumping and resulting injury and for assessing whether the imposition of measures would be against the Union interest. Verification visits pursuant to Article 16 of the basic Regulation were carried out at the premises of the following companies:

Union producers:

—

Erne Fittings GmbH, Schlins Austria and the related company Siekman Fittings, Lohne, Germany,

| — | Vallourec Fittings SA, France. |
| --- | --- |

—

Vallourec Fittings SA, France.

| | Exporting producers in the Republic of Korea:







  — | TK Corporation, Busan. |
| --- | --- | --- |

Exporting producers in the Republic of Korea:

—

TK Corporation, Busan.

1.5.   Review investigation period and the period considered

| (24) | The investigation of likelihood of recurrence of dumping covered the period from 1 October 2012 to 30 September 2013 (‘the review investigation period’ or ‘RIP’). |
| --- | --- |

(24)

The investigation of likelihood of recurrence of dumping covered the period from 1 October 2012 to 30 September 2013 (‘the review investigation period’ or ‘RIP’).

| (25) | The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of the likelihood of a continuation or recurrence of injury covered the period from 1 January 2010 to the end of the review investigation period (‘the period considered’). |
| --- | --- |

(25)

The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of the likelihood of a continuation or recurrence of injury covered the period from 1 January 2010 to the end of the review investigation period (‘the period considered’).

1.6.   Disclosure

| (26) | On 12 September 2014, the Commission disclosed to all interested parties the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it intended to maintain the anti-dumping measures in force and invited all interested parties to comment. The comments made by the interested parties were considered by the Commission and taken into account, where appropriate. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

On 12 September 2014, the Commission disclosed to all interested parties the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it intended to maintain the anti-dumping measures in force and invited all interested parties to comment. The comments made by the interested parties were considered by the Commission and taken into account, where appropriate.

2.   PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT

2.1.   Product concerned

| (27) | The product under review is tube and pipe fittings (other than cast fittings, flanges and threaded fittings), of iron or steel (not including stainless steel), with a greatest external diameter not exceeding 609,6 mm, of a kind used for butt-welding or other purposes, originating in the Republic of Korea and Malaysia, currently falling within CN codes ex 7307 93 11, ex 7307 93 19 and ex 7307 99 80 (‘the product concerned’ or TPF). |
| --- | --- |

(27)

The product under review is tube and pipe fittings (other than cast fittings, flanges and threaded fittings), of iron or steel (not including stainless steel), with a greatest external diameter not exceeding 609,6 mm, of a kind used for butt-welding or other purposes, originating in the Republic of Korea and Malaysia, currently falling within CN codes ex 7307 93 11, ex 7307 93 19 and ex 7307 99 80 (‘the product concerned’ or TPF).

2.2.   Like product

| (28) | The review investigation confirmed that, as in the original investigation, the TPF produced in the countries concerned, sold domestically and/or exported to the Union and/or other export markets, have the same basic physical, technical and chemical characteristics and end uses as the products sold in the Union by the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

The review investigation confirmed that, as in the original investigation, the TPF produced in the countries concerned, sold domestically and/or exported to the Union and/or other export markets, have the same basic physical, technical and chemical characteristics and end uses as the products sold in the Union by the Union industry.

| (29) | The Commission decided that this product is therefore a like product within the meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

The Commission decided that this product is therefore a like product within the meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation.

3.   LIKELIHOOD OF RECURRENCE OF DUMPING

| (30) | In accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the expiry of the measures in force would be likely to lead to a recurrence of dumping from the countries concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

In accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the expiry of the measures in force would be likely to lead to a recurrence of dumping from the countries concerned.

3.1.   Republic of Korea

3.1.1.   Preliminary remarks

| (31) | One of the largest Korean producers of TPF, TK Corporation, cooperated with the investigation. This cooperating company accounted for 25 %-40 % of Korean exports of TPF (the exact figure is not provided for reasons of confidentiality). TK Corporation provided the Commission with a questionnaire reply including data on domestic and export sales and cost of production. The Commission considered that the analysis of Korean dumping during the RIP and parts of the recurrence analysis could be based on this company's data given its share of Korean exports of TPF. The reply of TK Corporation was verified. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

One of the largest Korean producers of TPF, TK Corporation, cooperated with the investigation. This cooperating company accounted for 25 %-40 % of Korean exports of TPF (the exact figure is not provided for reasons of confidentiality). TK Corporation provided the Commission with a questionnaire reply including data on domestic and export sales and cost of production. The Commission considered that the analysis of Korean dumping during the RIP and parts of the recurrence analysis could be based on this company's data given its share of Korean exports of TPF. The reply of TK Corporation was verified.

3.1.2.   Dumping of imports during the RIP

| (32) | In the RIP only negligible volumes of TPF (less than 50 tonnes) were imported into the Union from Korea. Some of these sales were made by the sole cooperating exporting producer, TK Corporation. It was clear that these quantities were not representative as they represented less than 0,1 % of the production of TK Corporation. In addition, it was unclear whether an anti-dumping duty had been paid on imports from the TK Corporation, which casts doubt on whether they had actually entered the Union customs territory. Moreover, those sales were for three specific projects with their own specifications for fittings (therefore, an unrepresentative sale) and the sales were made as a ‘package’ with other fittings (mainly stainless steel). For the above reasons, no meaningful analysis of dumping based on imports of TPF from TK Corporation to the Union during the RIP could be made. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

In the RIP only negligible volumes of TPF (less than 50 tonnes) were imported into the Union from Korea. Some of these sales were made by the sole cooperating exporting producer, TK Corporation. It was clear that these quantities were not representative as they represented less than 0,1 % of the production of TK Corporation. In addition, it was unclear whether an anti-dumping duty had been paid on imports from the TK Corporation, which casts doubt on whether they had actually entered the Union customs territory. Moreover, those sales were for three specific projects with their own specifications for fittings (therefore, an unrepresentative sale) and the sales were made as a ‘package’ with other fittings (mainly stainless steel). For the above reasons, no meaningful analysis of dumping based on imports of TPF from TK Corporation to the Union during the RIP could be made.

| (33) | Following disclosure, TK Corporation submitted that the Commission should have based its dumping analysis on the Union export sales of the company, for the following reasons: (i) its export sales to the Union during the RIP were significant and therefore representative, as they consisted of ‘no less than 26 invoices with 282 individual transactions, despite duties being in place’; (ii) in the absence of clarity as concerns anti-dumping duty payment, some of the sales (destined for an offshore project) would not be subject to the anti-dumping duty, whereas for other sales that occurred during the RIP, anti-dumping duties were not always paid by importers as a result of misclassification of those products due to which the importers did not realise that anti-dumping duties were payable. In the meantime, importers were made aware of this error and they have since paid those anti-dumping duties retroactively; and (iii) the conditions for the export sales to the Union were normal as shorter delivery times were not applied nor were the prices charged subject to cross-compensation. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

Following disclosure, TK Corporation submitted that the Commission should have based its dumping analysis on the Union export sales of the company, for the following reasons: (i) its export sales to the Union during the RIP were significant and therefore representative, as they consisted of ‘no less than 26 invoices with 282 individual transactions, despite duties being in place’; (ii) in the absence of clarity as concerns anti-dumping duty payment, some of the sales (destined for an offshore project) would not be subject to the anti-dumping duty, whereas for other sales that occurred during the RIP, anti-dumping duties were not always paid by importers as a result of misclassification of those products due to which the importers did not realise that anti-dumping duties were payable. In the meantime, importers were made aware of this error and they have since paid those anti-dumping duties retroactively; and (iii) the conditions for the export sales to the Union were normal as shorter delivery times were not applied nor were the prices charged subject to cross-compensation.

| (34) | These comments were duly analysed. The low level of its export sales to the Union, in absolute terms as well as compared to the company's total production of the like product (being less than 0,1 %) was not contested by TK Corporation. The Commission maintains that such a very small volume in both relative and absolute terms does not qualify as being representative. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

These comments were duly analysed. The low level of its export sales to the Union, in absolute terms as well as compared to the company's total production of the like product (being less than 0,1 %) was not contested by TK Corporation. The Commission maintains that such a very small volume in both relative and absolute terms does not qualify as being representative.

| (35) | Furthermore, the Commission could not, on the basis of the provided documents, ascertain which part of TK Corporation's alleged Union sales had eventually been properly classified and imported and also the claim that the prices had not been subject to cross-compensation could not be verified and therefore could not be accepted as the supporting documents were only provided after the verification visit. In any event, as concerns both issues, in view of the conclusion of the analysis under recital 34 above, there is no need for the Commission to make a final determination as even the total reported Union sales volumes of TK Corporation cannot be considered sufficiently representative. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

Furthermore, the Commission could not, on the basis of the provided documents, ascertain which part of TK Corporation's alleged Union sales had eventually been properly classified and imported and also the claim that the prices had not been subject to cross-compensation could not be verified and therefore could not be accepted as the supporting documents were only provided after the verification visit. In any event, as concerns both issues, in view of the conclusion of the analysis under recital 34 above, there is no need for the Commission to make a final determination as even the total reported Union sales volumes of TK Corporation cannot be considered sufficiently representative.

| (36) | The Commission therefore confirms that the Union sales of TK Corporation during the RIP cannot be used for a meaningful dumping analysis in the framework of this expiry review investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The Commission therefore confirms that the Union sales of TK Corporation during the RIP cannot be used for a meaningful dumping analysis in the framework of this expiry review investigation.

3.1.3.   Evidence of likelihood of recurrence of dumping

| (37) | The Commission analysed whether there was a likelihood of recurrence of dumping should the measures lapse. When doing so, the following elements were analysed: export price to other destinations, the production capacity and spare capacity in Korea and the attractiveness of the Union market. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

The Commission analysed whether there was a likelihood of recurrence of dumping should the measures lapse. When doing so, the following elements were analysed: export price to other destinations, the production capacity and spare capacity in Korea and the attractiveness of the Union market.

3.1.3.1.   Exports from Korea to other destinations

| (38) | Due to the small volume of imports of TPF from Korea to the Union, and the lack of reliability of the prices made for these sales (see recitals 32 to 36), the Commission concluded that data concerning sales of TPF from Korea to other countries should be used to assess the likely future level of export prices to the Union, should the measures be allowed to lapse. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

Due to the small volume of imports of TPF from Korea to the Union, and the lack of reliability of the prices made for these sales (see recitals 32 to 36), the Commission concluded that data concerning sales of TPF from Korea to other countries should be used to assess the likely future level of export prices to the Union, should the measures be allowed to lapse.

| (39) | It was considered appropriate to first analyse Korean sales to the United States (‘US’) since, unlike any other Korean export destination, that market is of a similar size as the Union market, with many domestic producers but also with a large proportion of imports and low import tariff rates, making it a very competitive market. Furthermore, the US is the major destination for exports from Korea in general and also for TK Corporation. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

It was considered appropriate to first analyse Korean sales to the United States (‘US’) since, unlike any other Korean export destination, that market is of a similar size as the Union market, with many domestic producers but also with a large proportion of imports and low import tariff rates, making it a very competitive market. Furthermore, the US is the major destination for exports from Korea in general and also for TK Corporation.

| (40) | In addition, all other export sales of TPF from Korea were also examined during the investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

In addition, all other export sales of TPF from Korea were also examined during the investigation.

| (41) | Dumping calculations were made for both US sales and sales to all other export destinations (excluding the Union for the reasons mentioned in recitals 32 to 36 above). |
| --- | --- |

(41)

Dumping calculations were made for both US sales and sales to all other export destinations (excluding the Union for the reasons mentioned in recitals 32 to 36 above).

(a)   Normal value

| (42) | In accordance with Article 2(1) of the basic Regulation, the normal value for TK Corporation was based on the prices paid or payable, in the ordinary course of trade, by independent customers in its domestic market, when it is was possible to do so. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

In accordance with Article 2(1) of the basic Regulation, the normal value for TK Corporation was based on the prices paid or payable, in the ordinary course of trade, by independent customers in its domestic market, when it is was possible to do so.

| (43) | For the product types, which did not allow for this methodology, the normal value was constructed in accordance with Article 2(3) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

For the product types, which did not allow for this methodology, the normal value was constructed in accordance with Article 2(3) of the basic Regulation.

| (44) | This was done on the basis of the actual cost of production of TK Corporation, as provided in the questionnaire reply, namely actual cost of manufacturing plus actual SGA and profit in accordance with Article 2(6) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

This was done on the basis of the actual cost of production of TK Corporation, as provided in the questionnaire reply, namely actual cost of manufacturing plus actual SGA and profit in accordance with Article 2(6) of the basic Regulation.

(b)   Export price

| (45) | As explained under recitals 32 to 36 TK Corporation's Union sales could not be used for the dumping calculation and therefore export prices were based on its exports to third country markets. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

As explained under recitals 32 to 36 TK Corporation's Union sales could not be used for the dumping calculation and therefore export prices were based on its exports to third country markets.

| (46) | In accordance with Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation, the export price of TK Corporation to other countries was taken, adjusted back to an ex-works level by taking into account, where appropriate, for the costs of, inter alia, transport, duties and taxes. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

In accordance with Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation, the export price of TK Corporation to other countries was taken, adjusted back to an ex-works level by taking into account, where appropriate, for the costs of, inter alia, transport, duties and taxes.

(c)   Comparison and adjustments

| (47) | The weighted average normal value was compared with the weighted average export price of TPF, in accordance with Article 2(11) of the basic Regulation, both at ex-works level. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

The weighted average normal value was compared with the weighted average export price of TPF, in accordance with Article 2(11) of the basic Regulation, both at ex-works level.

| (48) | For the purpose of ensuring a fair comparison between normal value and export price, account was taken of differences in factors affecting prices and price comparability in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. In this respect, adjustments were made for inland and ocean freight, insurance, handling, loading and ancillary costs. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

For the purpose of ensuring a fair comparison between normal value and export price, account was taken of differences in factors affecting prices and price comparability in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. In this respect, adjustments were made for inland and ocean freight, insurance, handling, loading and ancillary costs.

| (49) | In order to differentiate between the various types of the product concerned, the original Product Control Number (PCN) methodology for capturing product types foresaw an 11-digit system. The dumping calculations were performed using a slightly reduced PCN structure using 7 digits. The specification standard and material grade fields were replaced by a simplified criterion which differentiated between products made from carbon steel and alloyed steel. This was because it was found that there was little difference between the standard specifications used (such as ANSI or EN) and the material grading systems followed the standard used. Therefore, the simplified system increased the level of matching for dumping (and injury) calculations for thousands of PCNs without distorting the result of the calculation itself. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

In order to differentiate between the various types of the product concerned, the original Product Control Number (PCN) methodology for capturing product types foresaw an 11-digit system. The dumping calculations were performed using a slightly reduced PCN structure using 7 digits. The specification standard and material grade fields were replaced by a simplified criterion which differentiated between products made from carbon steel and alloyed steel. This was because it was found that there was little difference between the standard specifications used (such as ANSI or EN) and the material grading systems followed the standard used. Therefore, the simplified system increased the level of matching for dumping (and injury) calculations for thousands of PCNs without distorting the result of the calculation itself.

| (50) | TK Corporation requested the Commission to increase the original PCN system to 16 digits but this claim was rejected because the system used was already capable of categorising the product concerned efficiently. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that it was clear that the dumping (and injury) margins calculated would not change to any important degree if they were based on 7, 11 or 16 digits because the average prices sold by TK Corporation on the various markets varied substantially. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

TK Corporation requested the Commission to increase the original PCN system to 16 digits but this claim was rejected because the system used was already capable of categorising the product concerned efficiently. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that it was clear that the dumping (and injury) margins calculated would not change to any important degree if they were based on 7, 11 or 16 digits because the average prices sold by TK Corporation on the various markets varied substantially.

| (51) | A second calculation issue concerned the volume method to be used for the dumping calculation. TK Corporation argued that since on its sales invoices, its price guidelines to (potential) customers and in its accounting ‘pieces’ are used to record quantity, pieces should also be used as unit of measurement in the calculation. The questionnaire requested quantity by weight but for some of its sales, TK Corporation replied in pieces. For those sales, the conversion from pieces to weight was provided by TK Corporation as part of the deficiency process. The Commission decided that weight was the best methodology because:






  — | pieces as unit of measurement could lead to distortions as regards the average price per unit, as pieces do not reflect the weight per piece, which is an important determinant for the cost (and thus price) of the product concerned, |
| --- | --- | --- |

(51)

A second calculation issue concerned the volume method to be used for the dumping calculation. TK Corporation argued that since on its sales invoices, its price guidelines to (potential) customers and in its accounting ‘pieces’ are used to record quantity, pieces should also be used as unit of measurement in the calculation. The questionnaire requested quantity by weight but for some of its sales, TK Corporation replied in pieces. For those sales, the conversion from pieces to weight was provided by TK Corporation as part of the deficiency process. The Commission decided that weight was the best methodology because:

—

pieces as unit of measurement could lead to distortions as regards the average price per unit, as pieces do not reflect the weight per piece, which is an important determinant for the cost (and thus price) of the product concerned,

| — | the weight is required for the injury calculations because this is the methodology employed by the Union producers and it would be incongruous to use different methodologies for dumping and injury (undercutting) calculations, and |
| --- | --- |

—

the weight is required for the injury calculations because this is the methodology employed by the Union producers and it would be incongruous to use different methodologies for dumping and injury (undercutting) calculations, and

| — | data of Union customs offices and Korean export statistics are only recorded by weight for the product concerned. |
| --- | --- |

—

data of Union customs offices and Korean export statistics are only recorded by weight for the product concerned.

| (52) | Furthermore, it should be pointed out that overall the dumping margins calculated did not appear to change to any important degree if they were based on pieces, due to the significant differences found in average prices sold by TK Corporation on the various markets. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

Furthermore, it should be pointed out that overall the dumping margins calculated did not appear to change to any important degree if they were based on pieces, due to the significant differences found in average prices sold by TK Corporation on the various markets.

| (53) | Following disclosure, TK Corporation resubmitted the comment that the Commission should have based its dumping calculations on pieces rather than on weight. One of the reasons provided was that TK Corporation's sales and cost data are expressed in pieces and thus, the conversion to weight would have led to distortions in the dumping margin calculations. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

Following disclosure, TK Corporation resubmitted the comment that the Commission should have based its dumping calculations on pieces rather than on weight. One of the reasons provided was that TK Corporation's sales and cost data are expressed in pieces and thus, the conversion to weight would have led to distortions in the dumping margin calculations.

| (54) | As for comparability with the Union industry, TK Corporation commented that the Commission did not calculate an injury margin, while for the dumping margin no comparison with the cost and sales data of the Union industry needs to be made. In addition, TK Corporation argued that the unit of measurement used in transactions, also by the Union industry, would be piece and not kilogram or tonne. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

As for comparability with the Union industry, TK Corporation commented that the Commission did not calculate an injury margin, while for the dumping margin no comparison with the cost and sales data of the Union industry needs to be made. In addition, TK Corporation argued that the unit of measurement used in transactions, also by the Union industry, would be piece and not kilogram or tonne.

| (55) | Finally, TK Corporation did not see the relevance of the data of Union customs offices and Korean export statistics being recorded by weight. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

Finally, TK Corporation did not see the relevance of the data of Union customs offices and Korean export statistics being recorded by weight.

| (56) | The above comments were duly analysed. It is firstly important to note that TK Corporation did not submit an ‘alternative’ calculation of dumping on a per piece basis. Indeed, although it claimed that a ‘per piece calculation’ would give a more accurate result, it failed to actually demonstrate this. The Commission reiterates that the dumping margins calculated are substantial and, as explained in recital 52, no significant differences were found between the dumping margins calculated based on weight and the dumping margins based on pieces. In other words, it is uncontested that whichever method was used, large dumping margins would be established. Furthermore, it is important to recall that the conversion from pieces to weight in the TK Corporation sales and cost data was done by TK Corporation itself, using their own methodology. Furthermore, its catalogue, available on its own website, provides for each type of fitting the approximate weight. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

The above comments were duly analysed. It is firstly important to note that TK Corporation did not submit an ‘alternative’ calculation of dumping on a per piece basis. Indeed, although it claimed that a ‘per piece calculation’ would give a more accurate result, it failed to actually demonstrate this. The Commission reiterates that the dumping margins calculated are substantial and, as explained in recital 52, no significant differences were found between the dumping margins calculated based on weight and the dumping margins based on pieces. In other words, it is uncontested that whichever method was used, large dumping margins would be established. Furthermore, it is important to recall that the conversion from pieces to weight in the TK Corporation sales and cost data was done by TK Corporation itself, using their own methodology. Furthermore, its catalogue, available on its own website, provides for each type of fitting the approximate weight.

| (57) | Transactions made by the Union industry are expressed both in weight and in pieces, as demonstrated by the invoices verified by the Commission. Apart from invoicing, weight is the methodology used for determining capacity, production volume and production costs — not only in the Union, but around the world and also in Korea. Raw materials, the largest element in the production costs of the product concerned, are purchased in tonnes. Other factors, such as energy consumption, labour and freight costs are also calculated based on weight. The Union industry also determines end year rebates to customers based on the volume (in tonnes) purchased by the customer, not on the number of pieces. Furthermore, undercutting margins needed to be (and have been — see recitals 98-105 calculated in this expiry review and, therefore, the argument that the Korean and the Union industry data would not need to be compared, as suggested by the claim summarised in recital 54 above, is incorrect. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

Transactions made by the Union industry are expressed both in weight and in pieces, as demonstrated by the invoices verified by the Commission. Apart from invoicing, weight is the methodology used for determining capacity, production volume and production costs — not only in the Union, but around the world and also in Korea. Raw materials, the largest element in the production costs of the product concerned, are purchased in tonnes. Other factors, such as energy consumption, labour and freight costs are also calculated based on weight. The Union industry also determines end year rebates to customers based on the volume (in tonnes) purchased by the customer, not on the number of pieces. Furthermore, undercutting margins needed to be (and have been — see recitals 98-105 calculated in this expiry review and, therefore, the argument that the Korean and the Union industry data would not need to be compared, as suggested by the claim summarised in recital 54 above, is incorrect.

| (58) | Worldwide statistics collected and used as part of the investigation, including Korean export and Union customs statistics, were only expressed in weight. These were used, inter alia, to analyse Korean exports of the product concerned to the Union and to third countries. To establish TK Corporation's share in this and to cross-check its sales volumes to the Union as reported in its questionnaire reply, the conversion of TK Corporation's data to weight was necessary, as it would not have been possible to convert the Korean export statistics and the Union customs statistics to pieces. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

Worldwide statistics collected and used as part of the investigation, including Korean export and Union customs statistics, were only expressed in weight. These were used, inter alia, to analyse Korean exports of the product concerned to the Union and to third countries. To establish TK Corporation's share in this and to cross-check its sales volumes to the Union as reported in its questionnaire reply, the conversion of TK Corporation's data to weight was necessary, as it would not have been possible to convert the Korean export statistics and the Union customs statistics to pieces.

| (59) | Finally, it is important to note that in previous investigations (such as the investigation leading to the original measures and the first expiry review leading to the measures in force) as well as in the more recent investigations concerning the same product from Russia and Turkey, the methodology based on weight was also used. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

Finally, it is important to note that in previous investigations (such as the investigation leading to the original measures and the first expiry review leading to the measures in force) as well as in the more recent investigations concerning the same product from Russia and Turkey, the methodology based on weight was also used.

| (60) | In view of the above, the Commission confirms that the claim that calculations should be made on a per piece basis should be rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

In view of the above, the Commission confirms that the claim that calculations should be made on a per piece basis should be rejected.

(d)   Dumping during the RIP

| (61) | The dumping margins thus calculated for TK Corporation were 46 % and 27 % depending on the export destination. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

The dumping margins thus calculated for TK Corporation were 46 % and 27 % depending on the export destination.

3.1.3.2.   Korean production capacity

| (62) | As concerns the total Korean production capacity and spare capacity, the Commission did, in the investigation, not obtain information from any of the Korean producers except TK Corporation. The Commission had accordingly to rely on Article 18 of the basic Regulation to make findings in this respect, and the information at its disposal is the verified information provided by TK Corporation, which only concerned that company, and the country-wide information included in the expiry review request. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

As concerns the total Korean production capacity and spare capacity, the Commission did, in the investigation, not obtain information from any of the Korean producers except TK Corporation. The Commission had accordingly to rely on Article 18 of the basic Regulation to make findings in this respect, and the information at its disposal is the verified information provided by TK Corporation, which only concerned that company, and the country-wide information included in the expiry review request.

| (63) | The spare capacity reported by TK Corporation was duly verified. By extrapolating the spare capacity reported by TK Corporation during the RIP on the basis of its share of the total Korean export volumes, the Commission calculated that the total spare capacity in Korea would amount to at least 15 000 tonnes, which represent around 25 % of total Union consumption. Concerning such calculation, however, it is important to note that production volumes as compared to production capacity is very company-specific and, in addition, although TK Corporation is one of the larger producers of the like product in Korea, it is only one out of many and certainly not dominant. The Commission therefore cross-checked that finding with the information contained in the request. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

The spare capacity reported by TK Corporation was duly verified. By extrapolating the spare capacity reported by TK Corporation during the RIP on the basis of its share of the total Korean export volumes, the Commission calculated that the total spare capacity in Korea would amount to at least 15 000 tonnes, which represent around 25 % of total Union consumption. Concerning such calculation, however, it is important to note that production volumes as compared to production capacity is very company-specific and, in addition, although TK Corporation is one of the larger producers of the like product in Korea, it is only one out of many and certainly not dominant. The Commission therefore cross-checked that finding with the information contained in the request.

| (64) | The spare capacity information provided in the request was based on estimated capacity and production figures for all Korean producers identified by the applicant. Regarding production capacity, for the three largest producers, publicly available data were used. For the other (much smaller) Korean producers, no such data were publicly available and the applicant therefore used other reasonable methods to estimate their production capacity. The applicant further assumed a certain level of Korean domestic consumption and accounted for imports into Korea as well as exports from Korea in order to estimate spare capacity. Both for the calculation of production capacity and spare capacity, appropriate deductions were made to account for production of other types of products not falling within the product scope. That totality of information was clearly considered more complete and conclusive than the information referred to in recital 63 above. No submissions have been received which would contradict these figures. On that basis, using the facts available, the spare capacity in Korea is estimated to amount to 119 300 tonnes which equals, by itself, two times the size of the Union market in the RIP. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

The spare capacity information provided in the request was based on estimated capacity and production figures for all Korean producers identified by the applicant. Regarding production capacity, for the three largest producers, publicly available data were used. For the other (much smaller) Korean producers, no such data were publicly available and the applicant therefore used other reasonable methods to estimate their production capacity. The applicant further assumed a certain level of Korean domestic consumption and accounted for imports into Korea as well as exports from Korea in order to estimate spare capacity. Both for the calculation of production capacity and spare capacity, appropriate deductions were made to account for production of other types of products not falling within the product scope. That totality of information was clearly considered more complete and conclusive than the information referred to in recital 63 above. No submissions have been received which would contradict these figures. On that basis, using the facts available, the spare capacity in Korea is estimated to amount to 119 300 tonnes which equals, by itself, two times the size of the Union market in the RIP.

3.1.3.3.   Attractiveness of the Union market

| (65) | It is recalled that TPF is used mainly in the oil and gas industry, construction, energy generation, shipbuilding and industrial installations. None of the facts available point to a substantial growth or decline of these sectors in Korea and hence, the Korean domestic market for TPF is considered to remain rather stable for the years ahead and to not offer any substantial expansion possibilities for the Korean TPF. Besides Korea, the main export markets for these industries are the Union, the US, the Middle East countries and South-East Asia. No information collected during the investigation suggests that the demand on any of those markets would shrink or increase to a significant extent in the coming years. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

It is recalled that TPF is used mainly in the oil and gas industry, construction, energy generation, shipbuilding and industrial installations. None of the facts available point to a substantial growth or decline of these sectors in Korea and hence, the Korean domestic market for TPF is considered to remain rather stable for the years ahead and to not offer any substantial expansion possibilities for the Korean TPF. Besides Korea, the main export markets for these industries are the Union, the US, the Middle East countries and South-East Asia. No information collected during the investigation suggests that the demand on any of those markets would shrink or increase to a significant extent in the coming years.

| (66) | Korean exports to the US, the Middle East countries and South-East Asia are already at high levels and therefore these markets do not have significant growth potential for the Korean industry. It is also recalled that significant dumping of 46 % was established for Korean exports to the US. The Union market, which is one of the largest markets worldwide, therefore is an attractive growth market if measures are repealed as this market so far is not yet fully exploited by the Korean exporting producers in view of the measures in force. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

Korean exports to the US, the Middle East countries and South-East Asia are already at high levels and therefore these markets do not have significant growth potential for the Korean industry. It is also recalled that significant dumping of 46 % was established for Korean exports to the US. The Union market, which is one of the largest markets worldwide, therefore is an attractive growth market if measures are repealed as this market so far is not yet fully exploited by the Korean exporting producers in view of the measures in force.

| (67) | In terms of size and market conditions, the US market and the Union market are similar. On both markets there are a large number of domestic producers and imports take up a significant market share. The investigation has revealed that the average sales price on the Union market (taking into account all sales by Union producers as well as all import sales into the Union) is EUR 2 600/tonne. The average Union market price is thus similar to the average price which the Korean exporting producers obtain on the US market (EUR 2 700/tonne), with the difference that they are not subject to anti-dumping measures in the US. The current marginal Korean sales to the Union are therefore most likely the result of the existing measures on the product concerned. It is recalled that, during the RIP, the US was the largest export market for the Korean exporters. This demonstrates that the Union would be an attractive market for Korean exporters and that, should the duties be repealed, it could be expected that the Union market would attract similar large volumes as the US market. During the RIP, Korean TPF accounted for 20 %-25 % of all TPF imports to the US and between 10 % to 15 % market share of the total US TPF market (exact figures are not provided for reasons of confidentiality). In other words, Korean producers are likely to use the available spare capacity, as described in recital 64, to re-enter the Union market, if measures were repealed. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

In terms of size and market conditions, the US market and the Union market are similar. On both markets there are a large number of domestic producers and imports take up a significant market share. The investigation has revealed that the average sales price on the Union market (taking into account all sales by Union producers as well as all import sales into the Union) is EUR 2 600/tonne. The average Union market price is thus similar to the average price which the Korean exporting producers obtain on the US market (EUR 2 700/tonne), with the difference that they are not subject to anti-dumping measures in the US. The current marginal Korean sales to the Union are therefore most likely the result of the existing measures on the product concerned. It is recalled that, during the RIP, the US was the largest export market for the Korean exporters. This demonstrates that the Union would be an attractive market for Korean exporters and that, should the duties be repealed, it could be expected that the Union market would attract similar large volumes as the US market. During the RIP, Korean TPF accounted for 20 %-25 % of all TPF imports to the US and between 10 % to 15 % market share of the total US TPF market (exact figures are not provided for reasons of confidentiality). In other words, Korean producers are likely to use the available spare capacity, as described in recital 64, to re-enter the Union market, if measures were repealed.

| (68) | As explained in recital 39 above, apart from the US, there is no second destination for Korean exports which can be reliably employed in the analysis of the development of the Union market if measures would expire. Therefore, grouping all export sales to destinations other than the Union or US together in this analysis is not considered to yield reliable average prices in view of the different circumstances applicable to all these (much smaller) individual markets. In view of the limitations of this analysis, as described above, and the lack of significant growth potential of these ‘other markets’ in the near future, it is however not expected that these markets would absorb significant extra imports from Korea. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

As explained in recital 39 above, apart from the US, there is no second destination for Korean exports which can be reliably employed in the analysis of the development of the Union market if measures would expire. Therefore, grouping all export sales to destinations other than the Union or US together in this analysis is not considered to yield reliable average prices in view of the different circumstances applicable to all these (much smaller) individual markets. In view of the limitations of this analysis, as described above, and the lack of significant growth potential of these ‘other markets’ in the near future, it is however not expected that these markets would absorb significant extra imports from Korea.

3.1.3.4.   Conclusion on the likelihood of recurrence of dumping

| (69) | Given the above, there is a likelihood that, if measures were to lapse, dumping would recur. The investigation showed that Korean sales of TPF to the US and to other third countries were found to be exported at dumped prices, with dumping margins of 46 % and 27 % respectively. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

Given the above, there is a likelihood that, if measures were to lapse, dumping would recur. The investigation showed that Korean sales of TPF to the US and to other third countries were found to be exported at dumped prices, with dumping margins of 46 % and 27 % respectively.

| (70) | In addition, the Korean spare capacity is significant in comparison with the Union consumption during the RIP. If this capacity is used to export to the Union and to compete on price with the Union producers or on price with the major imports from third countries, then there is a strong likelihood that such exports would be made at dumped prices. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

In addition, the Korean spare capacity is significant in comparison with the Union consumption during the RIP. If this capacity is used to export to the Union and to compete on price with the Union producers or on price with the major imports from third countries, then there is a strong likelihood that such exports would be made at dumped prices.

3.2.   Malaysia

3.2.1.   Preliminary remarks

| (71) | In the absence of cooperation from any exporting producers in Malaysia, the overall analysis had to be based on information available to the Commission from other sources. In this respect, and in accordance with the provisions of Article 18 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined various statistical sources. The import statistics collected pursuant to Article 14(6) of the basic Regulation (‘Article 14(6) database’) provided the best information available to establish import quantities and prices for the Union market. Other sources such as Eurostat were not used because the product concerned could not be separated from other products also using the 8-digit code. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

In the absence of cooperation from any exporting producers in Malaysia, the overall analysis had to be based on information available to the Commission from other sources. In this respect, and in accordance with the provisions of Article 18 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined various statistical sources. The import statistics collected pursuant to Article 14(6) of the basic Regulation (‘Article 14(6) database’) provided the best information available to establish import quantities and prices for the Union market. Other sources such as Eurostat were not used because the product concerned could not be separated from other products also using the 8-digit code.

3.2.2.   Dumping of imports during the RIP

| (72) | Article 14(6) database showed that there were no imports to the Union market from Malaysia. It was therefore concluded that no continuation of dumping had taken place during the RIP of Malaysian exports. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

Article 14(6) database showed that there were no imports to the Union market from Malaysia. It was therefore concluded that no continuation of dumping had taken place during the RIP of Malaysian exports.

3.2.3.   Evidence of likelihood of recurrence of dumping

| (73) | The Commission analysed whether there was a likelihood of recurrence of dumping should the measures lapse. When doing so, the following elements were analysed: export price to other destinations, the production capacity and spare capacity in Malaysia and the attractiveness of the Union market. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

The Commission analysed whether there was a likelihood of recurrence of dumping should the measures lapse. When doing so, the following elements were analysed: export price to other destinations, the production capacity and spare capacity in Malaysia and the attractiveness of the Union market.

3.2.3.1.   Exports from Malaysia to other destinations

| (74) | Due to the lack of imports of TPF from Malaysia to the Union market, the Commission resorted to using data from another country. The US was considered appropriate, since the market is of a similar size as the Union market, with many domestic producers but also with a large proportion of imports, making this market a very competitive one. In addition, the US is by far the largest destinations for exports from Malaysia, accounting, during the RIP, for 87 % of Malaysian exports. This approach is identical to the one applied in the previous investigation for Malaysia as well in the assessment of ‘likelihood of recurrence of injury’. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

Due to the lack of imports of TPF from Malaysia to the Union market, the Commission resorted to using data from another country. The US was considered appropriate, since the market is of a similar size as the Union market, with many domestic producers but also with a large proportion of imports, making this market a very competitive one. In addition, the US is by far the largest destinations for exports from Malaysia, accounting, during the RIP, for 87 % of Malaysian exports. This approach is identical to the one applied in the previous investigation for Malaysia as well in the assessment of ‘likelihood of recurrence of injury’.

(a)   Normal value

| (75) | In the absence of any cooperation from Malaysian exporting producers, the normal value was based, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, on the data provided in the review request, namely estimated cost of manufacturing to which was added 6 % for SGA and profit, expressed as a percentage of ex-works cost. It is considered that the above percentage is conservative. This is corroborated by the fact that for the sole cooperator in this proceeding (TK Corporation, Korea) the actual figure was well above 6 %. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

In the absence of any cooperation from Malaysian exporting producers, the normal value was based, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, on the data provided in the review request, namely estimated cost of manufacturing to which was added 6 % for SGA and profit, expressed as a percentage of ex-works cost. It is considered that the above percentage is conservative. This is corroborated by the fact that for the sole cooperator in this proceeding (TK Corporation, Korea) the actual figure was well above 6 %.

(b)   Export price

| (76) | In accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, and in the absence of cooperation from Malaysian exporting producers, the export price was calculated by using the Malaysian export prices for the product concerned to the US, derived from the US import statistics. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

In accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, and in the absence of cooperation from Malaysian exporting producers, the export price was calculated by using the Malaysian export prices for the product concerned to the US, derived from the US import statistics.

(c)   Comparison

| (77) | The weighted average normal value was compared with the weighted average export price of TPF, in accordance with Article 2(11) of the basic Regulation, both at ex-works level. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

The weighted average normal value was compared with the weighted average export price of TPF, in accordance with Article 2(11) of the basic Regulation, both at ex-works level.

| (78) | For the purpose of ensuring a fair comparison between normal value and export price, account was taken of differences in factors affecting prices and price comparability in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. In this respect, the SGA and profit percentage mentioned above in recital 75 was on an ex-works basis and excluded inland and ocean freight, insurance, handling, loading and ancillary costs. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

For the purpose of ensuring a fair comparison between normal value and export price, account was taken of differences in factors affecting prices and price comparability in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. In this respect, the SGA and profit percentage mentioned above in recital 75 was on an ex-works basis and excluded inland and ocean freight, insurance, handling, loading and ancillary costs.

(d)   Dumping margin during the RIP

| (79) | Following the methodology described above, which had also been employed in the first expiry review extending the measures (‘the measures in force’), the dumping margin found was 57,7 %. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

Following the methodology described above, which had also been employed in the first expiry review extending the measures (‘the measures in force’), the dumping margin found was 57,7 %.

3.2.3.2.   Malaysian production capacity

| (80) | In the absence of cooperation from Malaysia, no information was submitted regarding production and spare capacity. The information in the request points at a total installed capacity in Malaysia of around 55 000 tonnes and a spare capacity of ca. 27 000 tonnes. The analysis leading to that volume accounted for excluding the manufacturing (capacity) of other products and it is therefore considered reasonable. The Malaysian spare capacity of 27 000 tonnes represents around 40 % of total Union consumption during the RIP. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

In the absence of cooperation from Malaysia, no information was submitted regarding production and spare capacity. The information in the request points at a total installed capacity in Malaysia of around 55 000 tonnes and a spare capacity of ca. 27 000 tonnes. The analysis leading to that volume accounted for excluding the manufacturing (capacity) of other products and it is therefore considered reasonable. The Malaysian spare capacity of 27 000 tonnes represents around 40 % of total Union consumption during the RIP.

3.2.3.3.   Attractiveness of the Union market

| (81) | As concerns the development of the main user industry markets worldwide, as explained in recital 65 above, the Union market is one of the major markets for TPF and there is no information on the file which suggest that demand on those markets would shrink or increase to a significant extent in the coming years. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

As concerns the development of the main user industry markets worldwide, as explained in recital 65 above, the Union market is one of the major markets for TPF and there is no information on the file which suggest that demand on those markets would shrink or increase to a significant extent in the coming years.

| (82) | The investigation has revealed that the prices of the Union producers for sales on the Union market are higher than the Malaysian export prices to other export markets, in particular the US market. Indeed, the average Union market price is EUR 2 600/tonne, whereas US statistics show that the average US import price for Malaysian imports is EUR 1 600/tonne. Thus the Union market would be an attractive market for Malaysian exporters if the measures were repealed. This is highly relevant in view of the Malaysian spare capacity, but it is also recalled that currently 87 % of Malaysian exports are directed to the US where the Malaysian exporting producers sell at much lower prices. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

The investigation has revealed that the prices of the Union producers for sales on the Union market are higher than the Malaysian export prices to other export markets, in particular the US market. Indeed, the average Union market price is EUR 2 600/tonne, whereas US statistics show that the average US import price for Malaysian imports is EUR 1 600/tonne. Thus the Union market would be an attractive market for Malaysian exporters if the measures were repealed. This is highly relevant in view of the Malaysian spare capacity, but it is also recalled that currently 87 % of Malaysian exports are directed to the US where the Malaysian exporting producers sell at much lower prices.

3.2.3.4.   Conclusion on the likelihood of recurrence of dumping

| (83) | Given the above, there is a likelihood that if measures were to lapse, dumping would recur. Malaysian sales of TPF to the US were found to be exported at dumped prices, with dumping margins of 57,7 %. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

Given the above, there is a likelihood that if measures were to lapse, dumping would recur. Malaysian sales of TPF to the US were found to be exported at dumped prices, with dumping margins of 57,7 %.

| (84) | In addition, the Malaysian spare capacity is significant in comparison with the Union consumption during the RIP. In view of the price level in the Union, this capacity is likely to be used, at least partially, for exports to the Union if measures are repealed. It can also be expected that, in that case, a good part of the exports to the US will be redirected towards the Union market in view of the prevailing prices on the Union market as compared to those in the US. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

In addition, the Malaysian spare capacity is significant in comparison with the Union consumption during the RIP. In view of the price level in the Union, this capacity is likely to be used, at least partially, for exports to the Union if measures are repealed. It can also be expected that, in that case, a good part of the exports to the US will be redirected towards the Union market in view of the prevailing prices on the Union market as compared to those in the US.

3.3.   Conclusion on the likelihood of a recurrence of dumping

| (85) | In the light of the above, i.e. the high dumping margins, the large spare capacities available in the countries concerned together with their high export capacities and the attractiveness of the Union market in terms of prices and size, it may be concluded that dumped imports from the Republic of Korea and Malaysia to the Union would resume if the measures were allowed to lapse. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

In the light of the above, i.e. the high dumping margins, the large spare capacities available in the countries concerned together with their high export capacities and the attractiveness of the Union market in terms of prices and size, it may be concluded that dumped imports from the Republic of Korea and Malaysia to the Union would resume if the measures were allowed to lapse.

4.   LIKELIHOOD OF RECURRENCE OF INJURY

4.1.   Definition of the Union industry and Union production

| (86) | The Union industry did not undergo any major structural changes compared to its situation as described in Council Regulation (EC) No 1001/2008 referred to above in recital 3. The like product was manufactured by 22 known producers in the Union during the RIP. They constitute the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

The Union industry did not undergo any major structural changes compared to its situation as described in Council Regulation (EC) No 1001/2008 referred to above in recital 3. The like product was manufactured by 22 known producers in the Union during the RIP. They constitute the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation.

| (87) | The total Union production during the RIP was established at around 57 736 tonnes. The Commission established this figure on the basis of all available facts concerning the Union industry, such as verified data of the sampled companies and data provided by the applicant. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

The total Union production during the RIP was established at around 57 736 tonnes. The Commission established this figure on the basis of all available facts concerning the Union industry, such as verified data of the sampled companies and data provided by the applicant.

| (88) | The sampled companies/group of companies in the investigation represent 49 % of Union production and 45 % of Union sales (see recital 15 above). The data of the sample are thus representative for the situation of the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

The sampled companies/group of companies in the investigation represent 49 % of Union production and 45 % of Union sales (see recital 15 above). The data of the sample are thus representative for the situation of the Union industry.

4.2.   Union consumption

| (89) | The Commission established the Union consumption on the basis of: (i) the volume of sales of the Union industry on the Union market based on data provided by the applicant; and (ii) imports from third countries based on Article 14(6) database. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

The Commission established the Union consumption on the basis of: (i) the volume of sales of the Union industry on the Union market based on data provided by the applicant; and (ii) imports from third countries based on Article 14(6) database.

| (90) | Union consumption developed as follows:

  Table 1


  Union consumption (metric tonnes) | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | RIP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Total Union consumption | 55 497 | 62 426 | 58 941 | 59 992 |
| Index (2010 = 100) | 100 | 112 | 106 | 108 |
| Source: Data provided by the applicant and Article 14(6) database |

(90)

Union consumption developed as follows:

Table 1

Union consumption (metric tonnes)

2010

2011

2012

RIP

Total Union consumption

55 497

62 426

58 941

59 992

Index (2010 = 100)

100

112

106

108

Source: Data provided by the applicant and Article 14(6) database

| (91) | In 2011 the consumption increased by 12 % compared to the level in 2010. It decreased again in 2012 but remained above the level of 2010 (6 % increase). Between 2010 and the RIP Union consumption increased by 8 %. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

In 2011 the consumption increased by 12 % compared to the level in 2010. It decreased again in 2012 but remained above the level of 2010 (6 % increase). Between 2010 and the RIP Union consumption increased by 8 %.

4.3.   Imports from the countries concerned

4.3.1.   Volume and market share of the imports from the countries concerned

Republic of Korea

| (92) | The Commission established the volume of imports on the basis of information from Article 14(6) database. The market share of imports was established on the basis of data of Article 14(6) database and data provided by the applicant. |
| --- | --- |

(92)

The Commission established the volume of imports on the basis of information from Article 14(6) database. The market share of imports was established on the basis of data of Article 14(6) database and data provided by the applicant.

| (93) | Imports to the Union from the Republic of Korea developed as follows:

  Table 2


  Import volume (metric tonnes) and market share | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | RIP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Volume of imports from the Republic of Korea (tonnes) | 301 | 208 | 204 | 18 |
| Index | 100 | 69 | 68 | 6 |
| Market share | 0,5 % | 0,3 % | 0,3 % | 0,03 % |
| Index | 100 | 62 | 64 | 6 |
| Source: Data provided by the applicant and Article 14(6) database |

(93)

Imports to the Union from the Republic of Korea developed as follows:

Table 2

Import volume (metric tonnes) and market share

2010

2011

2012

RIP

Volume of imports from the Republic of Korea (tonnes)

301

208

204

18

Index

100

69

68

6

Market share

0,5 %

0,3 %

0,3 %

0,03 %

Index

100

62

64

6

Source: Data provided by the applicant and Article 14(6) database

| (94) | During the period considered the volume of imports from the Republic of Korea was very low compared to the overall Union consumption. In the RIP the volume further decreased to 18 tonnes. The import levels have been at this low level since the imposition of the original measures in 2002 and can thus be assumed to be the result of the anti-dumping measures in force. |
| --- | --- |

(94)

During the period considered the volume of imports from the Republic of Korea was very low compared to the overall Union consumption. In the RIP the volume further decreased to 18 tonnes. The import levels have been at this low level since the imposition of the original measures in 2002 and can thus be assumed to be the result of the anti-dumping measures in force.

Malaysia

| (95) | The Commission established the volume of imports on the basis of information from Article 14(6) database. The market share of imports was established on the basis of data of Article 14(6) database and data provided by the applicant. |
| --- | --- |

(95)

The Commission established the volume of imports on the basis of information from Article 14(6) database. The market share of imports was established on the basis of data of Article 14(6) database and data provided by the applicant.

| (96) | Imports into the Union from Malaysia developed as follows:

  Table 3


  Import volume (metric tonnes) and market share | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | RIP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Volume of imports from Malaysia (tonnes) | 19,4 | 0,03 | 0,27 | 0,13 |
| Index | 100 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Market share | 0,03 % | 0 | 0,0005 % | 0,0002 % |
| Index | 100 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Source: Data provided by the applicant and Article 14(6) database |

(96)

Imports into the Union from Malaysia developed as follows:

Table 3

Import volume (metric tonnes) and market share

2010

2011

2012

RIP

Volume of imports from Malaysia (tonnes)

19,4

0,03

0,27

0,13

Index

100

0

1

1

Market share

0,03 %

0

0,0005 %

0,0002 %

Index

100

0

1

1

Source: Data provided by the applicant and Article 14(6) database

| (97) | During the period considered the volume of imports from Malaysia was very low compared to the overall Union consumption. The highest (but still very low) volume was imported in 2010 (19,4 tonnes) but since 2010 the volume of imports has virtually ceased. The import levels have fluctuated since the imposition of the original measures in 2002, but they have never reached the levels of pre-imposition of measures. It can thus be assumed that the very low of imports level since imposition of the original measures in 2002 is the result of the anti-dumping measures in force. |
| --- | --- |

(97)

During the period considered the volume of imports from Malaysia was very low compared to the overall Union consumption. The highest (but still very low) volume was imported in 2010 (19,4 tonnes) but since 2010 the volume of imports has virtually ceased. The import levels have fluctuated since the imposition of the original measures in 2002, but they have never reached the levels of pre-imposition of measures. It can thus be assumed that the very low of imports level since imposition of the original measures in 2002 is the result of the anti-dumping measures in force.

4.3.2.   Prices of the imports from the countries concerned and price undercutting

Republic of Korea

| (98) | During the RIP, the very few imports to the Union of the company cooperating in the investigation (TK Corporation) were significantly below the Union industry prices at CIF level. However, as stated in recital 32 above, there were doubts whether these products actually entered the Union customs territory. |
| --- | --- |

(98)

During the RIP, the very few imports to the Union of the company cooperating in the investigation (TK Corporation) were significantly below the Union industry prices at CIF level. However, as stated in recital 32 above, there were doubts whether these products actually entered the Union customs territory.

| (99) | Nevertheless the total of Korean imports to Union is very low — see recital 32 — as they only represent 0,03 % of Union market share (see Table 2 above). In view of the very limited imports from the Republic of Korea to the Union and in view of the large variety of different types of product the prices of these imports could not be used to determine the price undercutting. |
| --- | --- |

(99)

Nevertheless the total of Korean imports to Union is very low — see recital 32 — as they only represent 0,03 % of Union market share (see Table 2 above). In view of the very limited imports from the Republic of Korea to the Union and in view of the large variety of different types of product the prices of these imports could not be used to determine the price undercutting.

| (100) | Therefore the Commission used the export prices from Korea to the US and to other countries as a proxy to establish what would have been the undercutting if Korean companies sell at these prices to the Union. |
| --- | --- |

(100)

Therefore the Commission used the export prices from Korea to the US and to other countries as a proxy to establish what would have been the undercutting if Korean companies sell at these prices to the Union.

| (101) | As the exports worldwide of TK Corporation represented around 25 %-40 % of all of the exports of TPF from the Republic of Korea, these sales were considered representative of Korean export sales. These prices were thus used to make the comparison. The Commission adjusted upwards the export prices to take into account duty, loading and handling fee. |
| --- | --- |

(101)

As the exports worldwide of TK Corporation represented around 25 %-40 % of all of the exports of TPF from the Republic of Korea, these sales were considered representative of Korean export sales. These prices were thus used to make the comparison. The Commission adjusted upwards the export prices to take into account duty, loading and handling fee.

| (102) | The undercutting margin thus found is 17 % for sales to US and 10 % for sales worldwide. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

The undercutting margin thus found is 17 % for sales to US and 10 % for sales worldwide.

Malaysia

| (103) | No company in Malaysia cooperated with the investigation. Based on information from statistics of Article 14(6) database, the imports to the Union were negligible during the RIP (see Table 3 above). In view of the very limited imports from Malaysia and in view of the large variety of different types of product the prices of these imports could not be used to determine the price undercutting. |
| --- | --- |

(103)

No company in Malaysia cooperated with the investigation. Based on information from statistics of Article 14(6) database, the imports to the Union were negligible during the RIP (see Table 3 above). In view of the very limited imports from Malaysia and in view of the large variety of different types of product the prices of these imports could not be used to determine the price undercutting.

| (104) | The Commission therefore established the price undercutting using the same methodology as in the previous expiry review, namely by comparing the export prices of Malaysia to the US with sales prices on the Union market. The Commission adjusted the export price to take into account duty, loading and handling fee. |
| --- | --- |

(104)

The Commission therefore established the price undercutting using the same methodology as in the previous expiry review, namely by comparing the export prices of Malaysia to the US with sales prices on the Union market. The Commission adjusted the export price to take into account duty, loading and handling fee.

| (105) | The undercutting margin thus found is 34 % for sales to US. The Commission also compared the sales prices from Malaysia to other countries and the undercutting margin for those sales was 28 %. |
| --- | --- |

(105)

The undercutting margin thus found is 34 % for sales to US. The Commission also compared the sales prices from Malaysia to other countries and the undercutting margin for those sales was 28 %.

4.3.3.   Imports from third countries

| (106) | The following table shows the development of imports to the Union from other third countries during the period considered in terms of volume and market share, as well as the average price of these imports.

  Table 4


  Imports from third countries











  Country | | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | RIP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| People's Republic of China | Volume in tonnes | 5 618 | 5 867 | 6 844 | 6 589 |
| Index | 100 | 104 | 122 | 117 |
| Market share | 10 % | 9 % | 12 % | 11 % |
| Average price | 1 125 | 1 261 | 1 544 | 1 426 |
| Index | 100 | 112 | 137 | 127 |
| Other third countries | Volume in tonnes | 11 668 | 12 938 | 11 630 | 12 036 |
| Index | 100 | 111 | 100 | 103 |
| Market share | 21 % | 21 % | 20 % | 20 % |
| Average price | 2 175 | 2 352 | 2 437 | 2 482 |
| Index | 100 | 108 | 112 | 114 |
| Total of all third countries except the countries concerned | Volume in tonnes | 17 286 | 18 805 | 18 474 | 18 625 |
| Index | 100 | 109 | 107 | 108 |
| Market share | 31 % | 30,1 % | 31,3 % | 31 % |
| Average price | 1 834 | 2 011 | 2 106 | 2 108 |
| Index | 100 | 110 | 115 | 115 |
| Source: Article 14(6) database |

(106)

The following table shows the development of imports to the Union from other third countries during the period considered in terms of volume and market share, as well as the average price of these imports.

Table 4

Imports from third countries

Country

2010

2011

2012

RIP

People's Republic of China

Volume in tonnes

5 618

5 867

6 844

6 589

Index

100

104

122

117

Market share

10 %

9 %

12 %

11 %

Average price

1 125

1 261

1 544

1 426

Index

100

112

137

127

Other third countries

Volume in tonnes

11 668

12 938

11 630

12 036

Index

100

111

100

103

Market share

21 %

21 %

20 %

20 %

Average price

2 175

2 352

2 437

2 482

Index

100

108

112

114

Total of all third countries except the countries concerned

Volume in tonnes

17 286

18 805

18 474

18 625

Index

100

109

107

108

Market share

31 %

30,1 %

31,3 %

31 %

Average price

1 834

2 011

2 106

2 108

Index

100

110

115

115

Source: Article 14(6) database

| (107) | The market share of imports originating in third countries other than the countries concerned reached 31 % of total Union consumption in RIP. The biggest market share is represented by imports from the People's Republic of China — 11 % of total Union consumption. In the RIP other substantial imports came from Thailand (4 % of the Union market), Vietnam (3 % of the Union market) and Saudi Arabia (from no imports in 2010 to 4 % market share in RIP). |
| --- | --- |

(107)

The market share of imports originating in third countries other than the countries concerned reached 31 % of total Union consumption in RIP. The biggest market share is represented by imports from the People's Republic of China — 11 % of total Union consumption. In the RIP other substantial imports came from Thailand (4 % of the Union market), Vietnam (3 % of the Union market) and Saudi Arabia (from no imports in 2010 to 4 % market share in RIP).

| (108) | The prices at which these imports entered the Union were relatively low in comparison to the average Union industry prices, in particular the imports from the People's Republic of China. Even with the anti-dumping duties of 58,6 % on imports from the People's Republic of China, the average price of Chinese imports is lower than Union domestic price (see Table 4 above). |
| --- | --- |

(108)

The prices at which these imports entered the Union were relatively low in comparison to the average Union industry prices, in particular the imports from the People's Republic of China. Even with the anti-dumping duties of 58,6 % on imports from the People's Republic of China, the average price of Chinese imports is lower than Union domestic price (see Table 4 above).

4.4.   Economic situation of the Union industry

4.4.1.   General remarks

| (109) | In accordance with Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation, the examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered. |
| --- | --- |

(109)

In accordance with Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation, the examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered.

| (110) | For the injury analysis, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators. The Commission evaluated the macroeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the request for review and from statistics. The data relate to all known Union producers. The Commission evaluated the microeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers. The data relate to the sampled Union producers. Both sets of data have been found to be representative of the economic situation of the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(110)

For the injury analysis, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators. The Commission evaluated the macroeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the request for review and from statistics. The data relate to all known Union producers. The Commission evaluated the microeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers. The data relate to the sampled Union producers. Both sets of data have been found to be representative of the economic situation of the Union industry.

| (111) | The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, growth, employment, productivity, magnitude of the dumping margin, and recovery from past dumping. |
| --- | --- |

(111)

The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, growth, employment, productivity, magnitude of the dumping margin, and recovery from past dumping.

| (112) | The microeconomic indicators are: average unit prices, unit cost, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, and ability to raise capital. Figures relating to the microeconomic indicators are based on verified data from the two sampled companies or group of companies only. These data are therefore only provided in indexed form or in ranges in order to ensure that its confidential nature is preserved. |
| --- | --- |

(112)

The microeconomic indicators are: average unit prices, unit cost, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, and ability to raise capital. Figures relating to the microeconomic indicators are based on verified data from the two sampled companies or group of companies only. These data are therefore only provided in indexed form or in ranges in order to ensure that its confidential nature is preserved.

4.4.2.   Macroeconomic indicators

4.4.2.1.   Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

| (113) | The total Union production, production capacity and capacity utilisation developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 5


  Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | RIP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Production volume (in tonnes) | 48 017 | 52 754 | 55 787 | 57 736 |
| Index | 100 | 110 | 116 | 120 |
| Production capacity (in tonnes) | 179 912 | 180 364 | 180 364 | 180 364 |
| Index | 100 | 100,3 | 100,3 | 100,3 |
| Capacity utilisation | 26,7 % | 29,2 % | 30,9 % | 32 % |
| Index | 100 | 110 | 116 | 120 |
| Source: Request |

(113)

The total Union production, production capacity and capacity utilisation developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 5

Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

2010

2011

2012

RIP

Production volume (in tonnes)

48 017

52 754

55 787

57 736

Index

100

110

116

120

Production capacity (in tonnes)

179 912

180 364

180 364

180 364

Index

100

100,3

100,3

100,3

Capacity utilisation

26,7 %

29,2 %

30,9 %

32 %

Index

100

110

116

120

Source: Request

| (114) | The production volume increased by 20 % during the period considered. Since the Union consumption only increased by 8 % in the same period, the remaining part of the production was exported. |
| --- | --- |

(114)

The production volume increased by 20 % during the period considered. Since the Union consumption only increased by 8 % in the same period, the remaining part of the production was exported.

| (115) | The capacity utilisation during the RIP appears to be low (32 % in the RIP). The reported capacity depicted in the table above was based, in line with the standard practice of this particular industry and the method used in the previous proceedings, on the theoretical maximum capacity on the basis of 3 shifts/day, 6 days/week, 48 weeks/year. However, in reality, the industry is only operating on the basis of 2 shifts/day, 5 days/week, 48 weeks/year. The reported capacity does therefore not necessarily reflect accurately the actual capacity during the RIP. |
| --- | --- |

(115)

The capacity utilisation during the RIP appears to be low (32 % in the RIP). The reported capacity depicted in the table above was based, in line with the standard practice of this particular industry and the method used in the previous proceedings, on the theoretical maximum capacity on the basis of 3 shifts/day, 6 days/week, 48 weeks/year. However, in reality, the industry is only operating on the basis of 2 shifts/day, 5 days/week, 48 weeks/year. The reported capacity does therefore not necessarily reflect accurately the actual capacity during the RIP.

| (116) | The capacity utilisation slightly increased during the period considered. The increase by 20 % of capacity utilisation reflects the increase of production volume in the period considered. |
| --- | --- |

(116)

The capacity utilisation slightly increased during the period considered. The increase by 20 % of capacity utilisation reflects the increase of production volume in the period considered.

4.4.2.2.   Sales volume and market share

| (117) | The Union industry's sales volume and market share developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 6


  Sales volume and market share | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | RIP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Sales volume on the Union market (in tonnes) | 38 185 | 43 414 | 40 262 | 41 350 |
| Index | 100 | 114 | 105 | 109 |
| Market share | 68,8 % | 69,5 % | 68,3 % | 68,9 % |
| Index | 100 | 101 | 99 | 100 |
| Source: Request |

(117)

The Union industry's sales volume and market share developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 6

Sales volume and market share

2010

2011

2012

RIP

Sales volume on the Union market (in tonnes)

38 185

43 414

40 262

41 350

Index

100

114

105

109

Market share

68,8 %

69,5 %

68,3 %

68,9 %

Index

100

101

99

100

Source: Request

| (118) | The sales volumes on the Union market increased by 14 % in 2011 compared to volumes sold in 2010. The sales volumes subsequently decreased to 41 350 tonnes representing an increase of 9 % over the period considered. |
| --- | --- |

(118)

The sales volumes on the Union market increased by 14 % in 2011 compared to volumes sold in 2010. The sales volumes subsequently decreased to 41 350 tonnes representing an increase of 9 % over the period considered.

| (119) | The market share of the Union industry remained more or less stable throughout the period considered. |
| --- | --- |

(119)

The market share of the Union industry remained more or less stable throughout the period considered.

4.4.2.3.   Growth

| (120) | In line with the moderate growth in Union consumption during the period considered (+ 8 %) the Union producers' sales grew by 9 %. |
| --- | --- |

(120)

In line with the moderate growth in Union consumption during the period considered (+ 8 %) the Union producers' sales grew by 9 %.

4.4.2.4.   Employment and productivity

| (121) | Employment and productivity developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 7


  Employment and productivity | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | RIP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Number of employees | 1 064 | 1 022 | 979 | 957 |
| Index | 100 | 96 | 92 | 90 |
| Productivity (unit/employee) | 45 | 52 | 57 | 60 |
| Index | 100 | 114 | 126 | 134 |
| Source: Request |

(121)

Employment and productivity developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 7

Employment and productivity

2010

2011

2012

RIP

Number of employees

1 064

1 022

979

957

Index

100

96

92

90

Productivity (unit/employee)

45

52

57

60

Index

100

114

126

134

Source: Request

| (122) | During the period considered the number of employees progressively decreased by 10 %. As a result, together with the increase of production the productivity of the Union producers' workforce, measured as output (tonnes) per person employed per year, increased by 34 % between 2010 and the RIP. |
| --- | --- |

(122)

During the period considered the number of employees progressively decreased by 10 %. As a result, together with the increase of production the productivity of the Union producers' workforce, measured as output (tonnes) per person employed per year, increased by 34 % between 2010 and the RIP.

4.4.3.   Microeconomic indicators

4.4.3.1.   Prices and factors affecting prices

| (123) | The weighted average unit sales prices of the sampled Union producers to unrelated customers in the Union developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 8


  Sales prices in the Union | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | RIP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Average unit selling price in the Union on the total market (EUR/tonnes) | 2 500-3 000 | 2 500-3 000 | 2 400-2 900 | 2 300-2 800 |
| Index | 100 | 100 | 98 | 94 |
| Unit cost of production (EUR/tonnes) | 3 500-4 000 | 3 300-3 800 | 3 400-3 900 | 3 300-3 800 |
| Index | 100 | 94 | 97 | 94 |
| Source: Verified data of the sampled companies |

(123)

The weighted average unit sales prices of the sampled Union producers to unrelated customers in the Union developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 8

Sales prices in the Union

2010

2011

2012

RIP

Average unit selling price in the Union on the total market (EUR/tonnes)

2 500-3 000

2 500-3 000

2 400-2 900

2 300-2 800

Index

100

100

98

94

Unit cost of production (EUR/tonnes)

3 500-4 000

3 300-3 800

3 400-3 900

3 300-3 800

Index

100

94

97

94

Source: Verified data of the sampled companies

| (124) | During the period considered the sales prices in the Union decreased by 6 %. While the prices remained relatively stable between 2010 and 2012 the biggest decrease occurred between 2011 and the RIP. |
| --- | --- |

(124)

During the period considered the sales prices in the Union decreased by 6 %. While the prices remained relatively stable between 2010 and 2012 the biggest decrease occurred between 2011 and the RIP.

| (125) | Due to the important part of fixed costs in the production the increase in production by 20 % during the RIP resulted in the decrease of unit cost of production. The average unit selling price decreased accordingly. |
| --- | --- |

(125)

Due to the important part of fixed costs in the production the increase in production by 20 % during the RIP resulted in the decrease of unit cost of production. The average unit selling price decreased accordingly.

4.4.3.2.   Labour costs

| (126) | The average labour costs of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 9


  Average labour costs per employee | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | RIP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Average wages per employee (EUR) | 45 000-50 000 | 50 000-55 000 | 51 000-56 000 | 52 000-57 000 |
| Index | 100 | 107 | 108 | 110 |
| Source: Verified data of the sampled companies |

(126)

The average labour costs of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 9

Average labour costs per employee

2010

2011

2012

RIP

Average wages per employee (EUR)

45 000-50 000

50 000-55 000

51 000-56 000

52 000-57 000

Index

100

107

108

110

Source: Verified data of the sampled companies

| (127) | The average labour costs per employee had an increasing trend in the period considered. Between 2010 and the RIP the average labour costs per employee increased by 10 %. |
| --- | --- |

(127)

The average labour costs per employee had an increasing trend in the period considered. Between 2010 and the RIP the average labour costs per employee increased by 10 %.

4.4.3.3.   Inventories

| (128) | Stock levels of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 10


  Inventories | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | RIP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Closing stocks (in tonnes) | 5 500-6 000 | 5 000-5 500 | 5 600-6 100 | 6 000-6 500 |
| Index | 100 | 93 | 104 | 111 |
| Closing stocks as a percentage of production | 25 %-30 % | 20 %-25 % | 21 %-26 % | 22 %-27 % |
| Index | 100 | 79 | 83 | 87 |
| Source: Verified data of the sampled companies |

(128)

Stock levels of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 10

Inventories

2010

2011

2012

RIP

Closing stocks (in tonnes)

5 500-6 000

5 000-5 500

5 600-6 100

6 000-6 500

Index

100

93

104

111

Closing stocks as a percentage of production

25 %-30 %

20 %-25 %

21 %-26 %

22 %-27 %

Index

100

79

83

87

Source: Verified data of the sampled companies

| (129) | The closing stock first decreased in 2011 by 7 % compared to 2010 and then increased by 11 % in the RIP compared to 2010. Compared to the level of production, the closing stock decreased by 13 % between 2010 and the RIP. |
| --- | --- |

(129)

The closing stock first decreased in 2011 by 7 % compared to 2010 and then increased by 11 % in the RIP compared to 2010. Compared to the level of production, the closing stock decreased by 13 % between 2010 and the RIP.

4.4.3.4.   Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital

| (130) | Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 11


  Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | RIP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Profitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (% of sales turnover) | – 20 %/– 15 % | – 15 %/– 10 % | – 10 %/– 5 % | – 14 %/– 9 % |
| Index | 100 | 118 | 151 | 133 |
| Cash flow (EUR) (index) | 100 | – 10 515 | – 6 086 | – 8 933 |
| Investments (EUR) (index) | 100 | 115 | 112 | 105 |
| Return on investments | – 25 %/– 20 % | – 45 %/– 40 % | – 40 %/– 35 % | – 45 %/– 40 % |
| Index | 100 | 81 | 64 | 80 |
| Source: Verified data of the sampled companies |

(130)

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 11

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments

2010

2011

2012

RIP

Profitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (% of sales turnover)

– 20 %/– 15 %

– 15 %/– 10 %

– 10 %/– 5 %

– 14 %/– 9 %

Index

100

118

151

133

Cash flow (EUR) (index)

100

– 10 515

– 6 086

– 8 933

Investments (EUR) (index)

100

115

112

105

Return on investments

– 25 %/– 20 %

– 45 %/– 40 %

– 40 %/– 35 %

– 45 %/– 40 %

Index

100

81

64

80

Source: Verified data of the sampled companies

| (131) | The Commission established the profitability of the sampled Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales. |
| --- | --- |

(131)

The Commission established the profitability of the sampled Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales.

| (132) | During the period considered the Union industry suffered significant losses. In 2010 the industry registered a loss of – 20 %/– 15 %. Between 2010 and the RIP the losses decreased by 33 % but the result still remained negative in the RIP – 14 %/– 9 %. The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. The cash flow was positive in 2010. It suddenly fell in 2011 reaching negative values and remained negative in the RIP. |
| --- | --- |

(132)

During the period considered the Union industry suffered significant losses. In 2010 the industry registered a loss of – 20 %/– 15 %. Between 2010 and the RIP the losses decreased by 33 % but the result still remained negative in the RIP – 14 %/– 9 %. The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. The cash flow was positive in 2010. It suddenly fell in 2011 reaching negative values and remained negative in the RIP.

| (133) | The investments followed an increasing trend. Compared to 2010 it increased by 15 % in 2011 and by 12 % in 2012, and remained above the level of 2010 by 5 % during RIP. |
| --- | --- |

(133)

The investments followed an increasing trend. Compared to 2010 it increased by 15 % in 2011 and by 12 % in 2012, and remained above the level of 2010 by 5 % during RIP.

| (134) | The return on investments is the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments. It was at – 25 %/– 20 % in 2010 then fell to around – 45 %/– 40 % where it remained in the RIP. |
| --- | --- |

(134)

The return on investments is the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments. It was at – 25 %/– 20 % in 2010 then fell to around – 45 %/– 40 % where it remained in the RIP.

4.4.3.5.   Magnitude of the dumping margin and recovery from past dumping

| (135) | As the imports from the countries concerned substantially decreased and were negligible during the period considered (see Tables 2 and 3 above), the magnitude of dumping margins cannot be assessed. However, in the light of the assessment referred to below in recitals 136-144, the Union industry was found to be still in a fragile and vulnerable situation. |
| --- | --- |

(135)

As the imports from the countries concerned substantially decreased and were negligible during the period considered (see Tables 2 and 3 above), the magnitude of dumping margins cannot be assessed. However, in the light of the assessment referred to below in recitals 136-144, the Union industry was found to be still in a fragile and vulnerable situation.

4.5.   Conclusion on the situation of the Union industry

| (136) | In Regulation (EC) No 1001/2008, the Council concluded that the anti-dumping measures on the imports of the product concerned from the Republic of Korea and Malaysia introduced in 2002 led to only a partial recovery of the Union industry. The (positive) development during the period considered in the previous review (January 2002-June 2007) of the injury indicators was to a large extent due to the boost in demand in 2007 and 2008. |
| --- | --- |

(136)

In Regulation (EC) No 1001/2008, the Council concluded that the anti-dumping measures on the imports of the product concerned from the Republic of Korea and Malaysia introduced in 2002 led to only a partial recovery of the Union industry. The (positive) development during the period considered in the previous review (January 2002-June 2007) of the injury indicators was to a large extent due to the boost in demand in 2007 and 2008.

| (137) | After 2008 the situation of the Union industry however substantially deteriorated (compared to the situation in 2007 and 2008). This development was to a major extent due to the drop in demand after 2008. |
| --- | --- |

(137)

After 2008 the situation of the Union industry however substantially deteriorated (compared to the situation in 2007 and 2008). This development was to a major extent due to the drop in demand after 2008.

| (138) | Some of the indicators show a positive development since 2010. For instance, between 2010 and the RIP, the Union production increased by 20 %. This increase was partly due to the increase in the Union consumption which increased by 8 % during the same period. The increase in production resulted in a better capacity utilisation which increased by more than 20 %. The sales volumes of the Union industry increased by 9 % which correspond to the increase of Union consumption while market share of the Union companies remained the same. As the consequence of a reduction in the number of employees by 10 % the productivity also increased (by 34 %). |
| --- | --- |

(138)

Some of the indicators show a positive development since 2010. For instance, between 2010 and the RIP, the Union production increased by 20 %. This increase was partly due to the increase in the Union consumption which increased by 8 % during the same period. The increase in production resulted in a better capacity utilisation which increased by more than 20 %. The sales volumes of the Union industry increased by 9 % which correspond to the increase of Union consumption while market share of the Union companies remained the same. As the consequence of a reduction in the number of employees by 10 % the productivity also increased (by 34 %).

| (139) | The capacity utilisation was however low. This is partly explained by the fact that the existing infrastructure was planned to be used at 3 shifts/day and 6 days/week, and the maximum capacity was calculated accordingly. However, during the period considered, Union industry was only working at two shifts/per day on 5 days/week. |
| --- | --- |

(139)

The capacity utilisation was however low. This is partly explained by the fact that the existing infrastructure was planned to be used at 3 shifts/day and 6 days/week, and the maximum capacity was calculated accordingly. However, during the period considered, Union industry was only working at two shifts/per day on 5 days/week.

| (140) | Because of an important share of fixed costs in the production, the Union industry remained in important losses during the period considered. Despite the improvement by 30 % of the financial results between 2010 and the RIP, the losses were still significant in the RIP (loss in the range between – 14 % and – 9 %). |
| --- | --- |

(140)

Because of an important share of fixed costs in the production, the Union industry remained in important losses during the period considered. Despite the improvement by 30 % of the financial results between 2010 and the RIP, the losses were still significant in the RIP (loss in the range between – 14 % and – 9 %).

| (141) | These important losses together with the significant negative cash flow are important indicators showing the vulnerable situation of the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(141)

These important losses together with the significant negative cash flow are important indicators showing the vulnerable situation of the Union industry.

| (142) | It is noted that Council Regulation (EU) No 78/2013 by which anti-dumping measures were imposed against imports of the product concerned from Russia and Turkey found that the Union industry was in an injurious and dire economic situation. The period considered by that proceeding started from January 2008 to September 2011 and partially overlaps with the period considered under the current investigation (14). |
| --- | --- |

(142)

It is noted that Council Regulation (EU) No 78/2013 by which anti-dumping measures were imposed against imports of the product concerned from Russia and Turkey found that the Union industry was in an injurious and dire economic situation. The period considered by that proceeding started from January 2008 to September 2011 and partially overlaps with the period considered under the current investigation (14).

| (143) | The measures adopted in the abovementioned regulation appear to have had a positive impact since several injury indicators (for example production, capacity utilisation, profitability, productivity and consumption) show a positive trend. However, as the current investigation has demonstrated, the Union industry has not fully recovered from past dumping. |
| --- | --- |

(143)

The measures adopted in the abovementioned regulation appear to have had a positive impact since several injury indicators (for example production, capacity utilisation, profitability, productivity and consumption) show a positive trend. However, as the current investigation has demonstrated, the Union industry has not fully recovered from past dumping.

| (144) | Therefore, the Commission concludes that the Union industry is still in a vulnerable situation and, in some aspects, far from the levels that could be expected had it recovered fully from the injury found in the previous investigations. |
| --- | --- |

(144)

Therefore, the Commission concludes that the Union industry is still in a vulnerable situation and, in some aspects, far from the levels that could be expected had it recovered fully from the injury found in the previous investigations.

5.   LIKELIHOOD OF RECURRENCE OF INJURY

5.1.   Impact of the projected volume of imports and price effects in case of repeal of measures

| (145) | In recital 85, the Commission concluded that the repeal of the measures would in all likelihood result in a recurrence of dumped imports from the countries concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(145)

In recital 85, the Commission concluded that the repeal of the measures would in all likelihood result in a recurrence of dumped imports from the countries concerned.

| (146) | The investigation has shown that the situation of the Union industry is vulnerable. Although the situation slightly improved in the RIP, during the period under consideration the Union industry never achieved any profits. |
| --- | --- |

(146)

The investigation has shown that the situation of the Union industry is vulnerable. Although the situation slightly improved in the RIP, during the period under consideration the Union industry never achieved any profits.

| (147) | Therefore, any recurrence of dumped imports from the countries concerned would further deteriorate the precarious situation of the Union industry. These imports are susceptible to take over the market share of the Union industry on the Union market. This would result in even lower capacity utilisation by the Union industry which is one of the crucial elements contributing to the negative results of the Union industry over the period considered. |
| --- | --- |

(147)

Therefore, any recurrence of dumped imports from the countries concerned would further deteriorate the precarious situation of the Union industry. These imports are susceptible to take over the market share of the Union industry on the Union market. This would result in even lower capacity utilisation by the Union industry which is one of the crucial elements contributing to the negative results of the Union industry over the period considered.

| (148) | Any recurrence of dumped imports would exercise an even stronger price pressure on the Union industry and would thus contribute to further deterioration of the financial results of the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(148)

Any recurrence of dumped imports would exercise an even stronger price pressure on the Union industry and would thus contribute to further deterioration of the financial results of the Union industry.

| (149) | The Commission therefore concludes that the repeal of measures against the Republic of Korea and Malaysia would in all likelihood result in a recurrence of dumped imports from these countries resulting in a downward pressure on Union industry prices, sales volumes and market share and a worsening of its economic situation. The repeal of measures against the Republic of Korea and Malaysia would therefore likely result in a recurrence of injury due to the likely exacerbation of the already bad economic situation in which the Union industry was currently found to be. |
| --- | --- |

(149)

The Commission therefore concludes that the repeal of measures against the Republic of Korea and Malaysia would in all likelihood result in a recurrence of dumped imports from these countries resulting in a downward pressure on Union industry prices, sales volumes and market share and a worsening of its economic situation. The repeal of measures against the Republic of Korea and Malaysia would therefore likely result in a recurrence of injury due to the likely exacerbation of the already bad economic situation in which the Union industry was currently found to be.

6.   UNION INTEREST

| (150) | In accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether maintaining the existing anti-dumping measures against the Republic of Korea and Malaysia would be against the interest of the Union as a whole. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers, wholesalers, and users. |
| --- | --- |

(150)

In accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether maintaining the existing anti-dumping measures against the Republic of Korea and Malaysia would be against the interest of the Union as a whole. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers, wholesalers, and users.

| (151) | All interested parties were given the opportunity to make their views known pursuant to Article 21(2) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(151)

All interested parties were given the opportunity to make their views known pursuant to Article 21(2) of the basic Regulation.

| (152) | In the original investigation the imposition of measures was considered not to be against the interest of the Union. As this investigation is a review and measures have been in place since 2002 the analysis thereby allows the assessment of any undue negative impact on the parties concerned by the anti-dumping measures in place. |
| --- | --- |

(152)

In the original investigation the imposition of measures was considered not to be against the interest of the Union. As this investigation is a review and measures have been in place since 2002 the analysis thereby allows the assessment of any undue negative impact on the parties concerned by the anti-dumping measures in place.

| (153) | On this basis it was examined whether, despite the conclusions on recurrence of dumping and likelihood on recurrence of injury, compelling reasons existed which would lead to the conclusion that it was not in the Union interest to maintain the existing measures. |
| --- | --- |

(153)

On this basis it was examined whether, despite the conclusions on recurrence of dumping and likelihood on recurrence of injury, compelling reasons existed which would lead to the conclusion that it was not in the Union interest to maintain the existing measures.

6.1.   Interest of the Union industry

| (154) | Although the anti-dumping measures in force prevented dumped imports from entering the Union market, the Union industry is in a fragile situation, as confirmed by the negative trends of some key injury indicators. |
| --- | --- |

(154)

Although the anti-dumping measures in force prevented dumped imports from entering the Union market, the Union industry is in a fragile situation, as confirmed by the negative trends of some key injury indicators.

| (155) | Should the measures be allowed to lapse, it is likely that the likely influx of substantial volumes of dumped imports from the countries concerned would cause injury to recur. This influx would likely cause, amongst others, loss of market share, decrease in sales price, decrease in capacity utilisation and in general a serious deterioration of the Union industry's financial situation. |
| --- | --- |

(155)

Should the measures be allowed to lapse, it is likely that the likely influx of substantial volumes of dumped imports from the countries concerned would cause injury to recur. This influx would likely cause, amongst others, loss of market share, decrease in sales price, decrease in capacity utilisation and in general a serious deterioration of the Union industry's financial situation.

| (156) | The Commission thus concludes that the maintenance of anti-dumping measures against the Republic of Korea and Malaysia would not be against the interest of the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(156)

The Commission thus concludes that the maintenance of anti-dumping measures against the Republic of Korea and Malaysia would not be against the interest of the Union industry.

6.2.   Interest of unrelated importers and users

| (157) | In the original investigation it was found that the impact of the imposition of measures was not likely to have a serious negative effect on the situation of importers and users in the Union. None of the importers or users cooperated in the current investigation. Bearing in mind that there is no evidence suggesting that the measures in force have considerably affected these groups, it can be concluded that the continuation of measures will not negatively affect the importers and users Union importers to any significant extent. |
| --- | --- |

(157)

In the original investigation it was found that the impact of the imposition of measures was not likely to have a serious negative effect on the situation of importers and users in the Union. None of the importers or users cooperated in the current investigation. Bearing in mind that there is no evidence suggesting that the measures in force have considerably affected these groups, it can be concluded that the continuation of measures will not negatively affect the importers and users Union importers to any significant extent.

6.3.   Conclusion on Union interest

| (158) | On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons that it is not in the Union interest to impose measures on imports of the TPF originating in the Republic of Korea and Malaysia. |
| --- | --- |

(158)

On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons that it is not in the Union interest to impose measures on imports of the TPF originating in the Republic of Korea and Malaysia.

7.   ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

| (159) | It follows from the above considerations that, under Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of certain tube and pipe fittings originating in the Republic of Korea and Malaysia should be maintained. |
| --- | --- |

(159)

It follows from the above considerations that, under Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of certain tube and pipe fittings originating in the Republic of Korea and Malaysia should be maintained.

| (160) | Nevertheless, as demonstrated by this investigation the global situation of the Union industry is gradually improving, and the imposition in 2013 of definitive anti-dumping measures against imports from Russia and Turkey of the same product (see recital 5) appears to have had an additional positive effect on the situation of the Union industry, as explained in recital 143. Consequently it was assessed that, considering the overall injury analysis and the likely market developments with the measures in place, a shorter period than five years may be enough for the Union industry to complete its economic and financial recovery. |
| --- | --- |

(160)

Nevertheless, as demonstrated by this investigation the global situation of the Union industry is gradually improving, and the imposition in 2013 of definitive anti-dumping measures against imports from Russia and Turkey of the same product (see recital 5) appears to have had an additional positive effect on the situation of the Union industry, as explained in recital 143. Consequently it was assessed that, considering the overall injury analysis and the likely market developments with the measures in place, a shorter period than five years may be enough for the Union industry to complete its economic and financial recovery.

| (161) | Moreover, the situation of the Union industry and the injury analysis cannot be assessed only considering the (potential) imports of the product concerned from the Republic of Korea and Malaysia — the situation of the Union industry is affected by other imports and the measures against these imports, such as in particular the abovementioned measures against Russia and Turkey. |
| --- | --- |

(161)

Moreover, the situation of the Union industry and the injury analysis cannot be assessed only considering the (potential) imports of the product concerned from the Republic of Korea and Malaysia — the situation of the Union industry is affected by other imports and the measures against these imports, such as in particular the abovementioned measures against Russia and Turkey.

| (162) | Therefore, it is considered that in light of the specific circumstances of this case, the measures should exceptionally not be extended for the full five-year period provided under the basic Regulation, but that they should expire at the same time as the definitive measures on imports from Turkey and Russia, in particular. Such alignment of the duration of the measures would also allow for a comprehensive and coherent examination of the effects on the Union industry of possible dumping practices, should such a review be necessary in the future. |
| --- | --- |

(162)

Therefore, it is considered that in light of the specific circumstances of this case, the measures should exceptionally not be extended for the full five-year period provided under the basic Regulation, but that they should expire at the same time as the definitive measures on imports from Turkey and Russia, in particular. Such alignment of the duration of the measures would also allow for a comprehensive and coherent examination of the effects on the Union industry of possible dumping practices, should such a review be necessary in the future.

| (163) | These measures currently in force against imports of TPF from Russia and Turkey are due to expire on 29 January 2018. Accordingly, the definitive anti-dumping measures against imports of TPF originating in Korea and Malaysia should be accordingly aligned and should therefore expire on the same date. |
| --- | --- |

(163)

These measures currently in force against imports of TPF from Russia and Turkey are due to expire on 29 January 2018. Accordingly, the definitive anti-dumping measures against imports of TPF originating in Korea and Malaysia should be accordingly aligned and should therefore expire on the same date.

| (164) | The Defence Committee of the Steel Butt-Welding Fittings Industry of the European Union agrees that the proposed expiry date would allow for a joint review proceeding in the future should one be requested and thus a comprehensive dumping and injury analysis covering imports from several countries. They claimed however that after the review investigation period (RIP) total imports from all countries of the product concerned have massively increased whilst the average price of those imports have sharply decreased. This post-RIP development has allegedly led to a worsening of the Union industry's situation and the conditions for imposing definitive anti-dumping measures for a period of less than five years are therefore no longer present. |
| --- | --- |

(164)

The Defence Committee of the Steel Butt-Welding Fittings Industry of the European Union agrees that the proposed expiry date would allow for a joint review proceeding in the future should one be requested and thus a comprehensive dumping and injury analysis covering imports from several countries. They claimed however that after the review investigation period (RIP) total imports from all countries of the product concerned have massively increased whilst the average price of those imports have sharply decreased. This post-RIP development has allegedly led to a worsening of the Union industry's situation and the conditions for imposing definitive anti-dumping measures for a period of less than five years are therefore no longer present.

| (165) | The Commission notes that the alleged post-RIP development (i.e. increased imports at decreased prices) is based on publicly available Eurostat data, which includes product types that are not covered by the current investigation. Post-RIP import statistics that are available to the Commission and which relate only to the product concerned, indicates however that the imports have decreased post-RIP by 10-15 % albeit the average price of those imports have also decreased (15-20 %). The Commission considers that the post-RIP development of imports of the product concerned, in the absence of any other supporting evidence regarding the Union industry's situation, does not render the Commission's conclusions as regard the appropriate period for imposing definitive anti-dumping measures, invalid (see recitals 160-163). This claim is therefore rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(165)

The Commission notes that the alleged post-RIP development (i.e. increased imports at decreased prices) is based on publicly available Eurostat data, which includes product types that are not covered by the current investigation. Post-RIP import statistics that are available to the Commission and which relate only to the product concerned, indicates however that the imports have decreased post-RIP by 10-15 % albeit the average price of those imports have also decreased (15-20 %). The Commission considers that the post-RIP development of imports of the product concerned, in the absence of any other supporting evidence regarding the Union industry's situation, does not render the Commission's conclusions as regard the appropriate period for imposing definitive anti-dumping measures, invalid (see recitals 160-163). This claim is therefore rejected.

| (166) | Accordingly, and in view of the conclusions reached with regard to the likelihood of recurrence of dumping and injury, it follows that the anti-dumping measures in force applicable to imports of tube and pipe fittings originating in the Republic of Korea and Malaysia, maintained by Council Regulation (EC) No 1001/2008 as last amended by Council Regulation (EU) No 363/2010, should be maintained until 29 January 2018. |
| --- | --- |

(166)

Accordingly, and in view of the conclusions reached with regard to the likelihood of recurrence of dumping and injury, it follows that the anti-dumping measures in force applicable to imports of tube and pipe fittings originating in the Republic of Korea and Malaysia, maintained by Council Regulation (EC) No 1001/2008 as last amended by Council Regulation (EU) No 363/2010, should be maintained until 29 January 2018.

| (167) | The Committee established by Article 15(1) of the basic Regulation did not deliver an opinion, |
| --- | --- |

(167)

The Committee established by Article 15(1) of the basic Regulation did not deliver an opinion,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

1.   A definitive anti-dumping duty is imposed on imports of tube and pipe fittings (other than cast fittings, flanges and threaded fittings), of iron or steel (not including stainless steel), with a greatest external diameter not exceeding 609,6 mm, of a kind used for butt-welding or other purposes, currently falling within CN codes ex 7307 93 11, ex 7307 93 19 and ex 7307 99 80 (TARIC codes 7307931191, 7307931193, 7307931194, 7307931195, 7307931199, 7307931991, 7307931993, 7307931994, 7307931995, 7307931999, 7307998092, 7307998093, 7307998094, 7307998095 and 7307998098) and originating in the Republic of Korea and Malaysia.

2.   The rate of the definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, of the products described in paragraph 1 and produced by the companies listed below shall be as follows:

| Country | Company | Rate of duty (%) | TARIC codes |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Malaysia | Anggerik Laksana Sdn Bhd, Selangor Darul Ehsan | 59,2 | A324 |
| Pantech Steel Industries Sdn Bhd | 49,9 | A961 |
| All other companies | 75,0 | A999 |
| Republic of Korea | All companies | 44,0 | — |

Country

Company

Rate of duty (%)

TARIC codes

Malaysia

Anggerik Laksana Sdn Bhd, Selangor Darul Ehsan

59,2

A324

Pantech Steel Industries Sdn Bhd

49,9

A961

All other companies

75,0

A999

Republic of Korea

All companies

44,0

—

3.   Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

It shall expire on 29 January 2018.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 2 December 2014.

For the Commission

The President

Jean-Claude JUNCKER

---

(1)  OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 51.

1

(2)  Council Regulation (EC) No 1514/2002 of 19 August 2002 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitely the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel originating in the Czech Republic, Malaysia, Russia, the Republic of Korea and Slovakia (OJ L 228, 24.8.2002, p. 1).

2

(3)  Council Regulation (EC) No 1001/2008 of 13 October 2008 imposing a definitive duty on imports of certain tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel, originating in the Republic of Korea and Malaysia following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) No 384/96 (OJ L 275, 16.10.2008, p. 18).

3

(4)  Implementing Regulation of the Council (EU) No 363/2010 of 26 April 2010 amending Regulation (EC) No 2001/2008 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain tube and pipe fittings of iron or steel originating, inter alia, in Malaysia (OJ L 107, 29.4.2010, p. 1).

4

(5)  Council Regulation (EC) No 803/2009 of 27 August 2009 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel, originating in the People's Republic of China and Thailand, and those consigned from Taiwan, whether declared as originating in Taiwan, or not, and repealing the exemption granted to Chun Hsin Enterprise Co. Ltd and Nian Hong Pipe Fittings Co. Ltd (OJ L 233, 4.9.2009, p. 1).

5

(6)  Ibid.

6

(7)  Council Regulation (EC) No 2052/2004 of 22 November 2004 extending the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Regulation (EC) No 964/2003 on imports of tube or pipe fittings, of iron or steel, originating in the People's Republic of China to imports of tube or pipe fittings, of iron or steel, consigned from Indonesia, whether declared as originating in Indonesia or not (OJ L 355, 1.12.2004, p. 4).

7

(8)  Council Regulation (EC) No 2053/2004 of 22 November 2004 extending the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Regulation (EC) No 964/2003 on imports of tube or pipe fittings, of iron or steel, originating in the People's Republic of China to imports of tube or pipe fittings, of iron or steel, consigned from Sri Lanka, whether declared as originating in Sri Lanka or not (OJ L 355, 1.12.2004, p. 9).

8

(9)  Council Regulation (EC) No 655/2006 of 27 April 2006 extending the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Regulation (EC) No 964/2003 on imports of tube or pipe fittings, of iron or steel, originating in the People's Republic of China to imports of tube or pipe fittings, of iron or steel, consigned from the Philippines, whether declared as originating in the Philippines or not (OJ L 116, 29.4.2006, p. 1).

9

(10)  Notice of initiation of an expiry review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of certain tube and pipe fittings of iron or steel originating in the People's Republic of China and extended to Taiwan, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and the Philippines (OJ C 295, 3.9.2014, p. 6).

10

(11)  Council Implementing Regulation (EC) No 78/2013 of 17 January 2013 imposing a definitive ant-dumping duty and collecting definitely the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain tube and pipe fittings of iron or steel originating in Russia and Turkey (OJ L 27, 29.1.2013, p. 1).

11

(12)  Notice of the impending expiry of certain anti-dumping measures (OJ C 36, 8.2.2013, p. 24).

12

(13)  Notice of initiation of an expiry review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of certain tube and pipe fittings of iron or steel originating in the Republic of Korea and Malaysia (OJ C 299, 15.10.2013, p. 4).

13

(14)  See more details in Commission Regulation (EU) No 699/2012 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty, OJ L 203, 31.7.2012, p. 37.

14

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| 3.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 347/38 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 347/38

---

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 1284/2014

of 2 December 2014

establishing the standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007 (1),

Having regard to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 of 7 June 2011 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 in respect of the fruit and vegetables and processed fruit and vegetables sectors (2), and in particular Article 136(1) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 lays down, pursuant to the outcome of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations, the criteria whereby the Commission fixes the standard values for imports from third countries, in respect of the products and periods stipulated in Annex XVI, Part A thereto. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 lays down, pursuant to the outcome of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations, the criteria whereby the Commission fixes the standard values for imports from third countries, in respect of the products and periods stipulated in Annex XVI, Part A thereto.

| (2) | The standard import value is calculated each working day, in accordance with Article 136(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011, taking into account variable daily data. Therefore this Regulation should enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The standard import value is calculated each working day, in accordance with Article 136(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011, taking into account variable daily data. Therefore this Regulation should enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The standard import values referred to in Article 136 of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 are fixed in the Annex to this Regulation.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 2 December 2014.

For the Commission,

On behalf of the President,

Jerzy PLEWA

Director-General for Agriculture and Rural Development

---

(1)  OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 671.

1

(2)  OJ L 157, 15.6.2011, p. 1.

2

---

ANNEX

Standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables

| (EUR/100 kg) |
| --- |
| CN code | Third country code (1) | Standard import value |
| 0702 00 00 | AL | 60,4 |
| IL | 114,8 |
| MA | 94,2 |
| TR | 111,9 |
| ZZ | 95,3 |
| 0707 00 05 | AL | 53,8 |
| JO | 206,0 |
| MA | 170,1 |
| TR | 132,0 |
| ZZ | 140,5 |
| 0709 93 10 | MA | 45,2 |
| TR | 126,4 |
| ZZ | 85,8 |
| 0805 10 20 | TR | 74,4 |
| UY | 52,1 |
| ZA | 46,4 |
| ZW | 27,3 |
| ZZ | 50,1 |
| 0805 20 10 | MA | 78,0 |
| ZZ | 78,0 |
| 0805 20 30, 0805 20 50, 0805 20 70, 0805 20 90 | IL | 112,8 |
| TR | 80,2 |
| ZZ | 96,5 |
| 0805 50 10 | AL | 64,4 |
| TR | 81,0 |
| ZZ | 72,7 |
| 0808 10 80 | BA | 27,0 |
| BR | 54,5 |
| CA | 134,8 |
| CL | 82,2 |
| MK | 38,0 |
| NZ | 96,9 |
| US | 113,5 |
| ZA | 172,4 |
| ZZ | 89,9 |
| 0808 30 90 | CN | 81,0 |
| TR | 158,2 |
| US | 163,9 |
| ZZ | 134,4 |

(EUR/100 kg)

CN code

Third country code (1)

Standard import value

0702 00 00

AL

60,4

IL

114,8

MA

94,2

TR

111,9

ZZ

95,3

0707 00 05

AL

53,8

JO

206,0

MA

170,1

TR

132,0

ZZ

140,5

0709 93 10

MA

45,2

TR

126,4

ZZ

85,8

0805 10 20

TR

74,4

UY

52,1

ZA

46,4

ZW

27,3

ZZ

50,1

0805 20 10

MA

78,0

ZZ

78,0

0805 20 30, 0805 20 50, 0805 20 70, 0805 20 90

IL

112,8

TR

80,2

ZZ

96,5

0805 50 10

AL

64,4

TR

81,0

ZZ

72,7

0808 10 80

BA

27,0

BR

54,5

CA

134,8

CL

82,2

MK

38,0

NZ

96,9

US

113,5

ZA

172,4

ZZ

89,9

0808 30 90

CN

81,0

TR

158,2

US

163,9

ZZ

134,4

---

(1)  Nomenclature of countries laid down by Commission Regulation (EU) No 1106/2012 of 27 November 2012 implementing Regulation (EC) No 471/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Community statistics relating to external trade with non-member countries, as regards the update of the nomenclature of countries and territories (OJ L 328, 28.11.2012, p. 7). Code ‘ZZ’ stands for ‘of other origin’.

---

| 3.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 347/40 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 347/40

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COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 1285/2014

of 2 December 2014

fixing the allocation coefficient to be applied to applications for export licences for certain milk products to be exported to the Dominican Republic under the quota referred to in Regulation (EC) No 1187/2009

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007 (1), and in particular Article 188 thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Section 3 of Chapter III of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1187/2009 (2) determines the procedure for allocating export licences for certain milk products to be exported to the Dominican Republic under a quota opened for that country. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Section 3 of Chapter III of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1187/2009 (2) determines the procedure for allocating export licences for certain milk products to be exported to the Dominican Republic under a quota opened for that country.

| (2) | Article 29 of Regulation (EC) No 1187/2009 provides for the possibility for operators to lodge export licence applications from 1 to 10 November if, after the period of submission of licence applications as referred to in the first paragraph of that Article, any quantity under the quota remains available. Article 1 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 649/2014 (3) specifies that the total remaining quantity for the quota year 2014/15 is 12 358 tonnes. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Article 29 of Regulation (EC) No 1187/2009 provides for the possibility for operators to lodge export licence applications from 1 to 10 November if, after the period of submission of licence applications as referred to in the first paragraph of that Article, any quantity under the quota remains available. Article 1 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 649/2014 (3) specifies that the total remaining quantity for the quota year 2014/15 is 12 358 tonnes.

| (3) | The applications lodged between 1 and 10 November 2014 for the remaining period of the running quota year 2014/15 cover quantities less than those available. As a result, it is appropriate, pursuant to the fourth subparagraph of Article 31(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1187/2009, to provide for the allocation of the remaining quantity. The issue of export licences for that remaining quantity should be conditional upon the competent authority being notified of the supplementary quantity accepted by the operator concerned and upon the interested operators lodging a security, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The applications lodged between 1 and 10 November 2014 for the remaining period of the running quota year 2014/15 cover quantities less than those available. As a result, it is appropriate, pursuant to the fourth subparagraph of Article 31(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1187/2009, to provide for the allocation of the remaining quantity. The issue of export licences for that remaining quantity should be conditional upon the competent authority being notified of the supplementary quantity accepted by the operator concerned and upon the interested operators lodging a security,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The applications for export licences lodged from 1 to 10 November 2014 for the remaining period of the running quota year 2014/15 shall be accepted.

The quantities covered by export licence applications referred to in the first paragraph for the products referred to in Article 27(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1187/2009 shall be multiplied by an allocation coefficient of 3,071073.

Export licences for the quantities exceeding the quantities applied for and which are allocated in accordance with the coefficient set out in the second paragraph, shall be issued after acceptance by the operator within one week from the date of publication of this Regulation and subject to the lodging of the corresponding security.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the third day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 2 December 2014.

For the Commission,

On behalf of the President,

Jerzy PLEWA

Director-General for Agriculture and Rural Development

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(1)  OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 671.

1

(2)  Commission Regulation (EC) No 1187/2009 of 27 November 2009 laying down special detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 as regards export licences and export refunds for milk and milk products (OJ L 318, 4.12.2009, p. 1).

2

(3)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 649/2014 of 17 June 2014 fixing the allocation coefficient to be applied to applications for export licences for certain milk products to be exported to the Dominican Republic under the quota referred to in Regulation (EC) No 1187/2009 (OJ L 178, 18.6.2014, p. 9).

3

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ACTS ADOPTED BY BODIES CREATED BY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

| 3.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 347/42 |
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3.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 347/42

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DECISION No 1/2014 of the EU-PLO JOINT COMMITTEE

of 8 May 2014

amending Article 15(7) of Protocol No 3 to the Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on trade and cooperation between the European Community, of the one part, and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, of the other part, concerning the definition of the concept of ‘originating products’ and methods of administrative cooperation

(2014/867/EU)

THE JOINT COMMITTEE,

Having regard to the Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on trade and cooperation between the European Community, of the one part, and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, of the other part, and in particular Article 39 of Protocol No 3 thereto,

Whereas:

| (1) | Article 15(7) of Protocol No 3 to the Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on trade and cooperation between the European Community, of the one part, and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, of the other part (1), (‘the Agreement’), as amended by Decision No 1/2009 of the EU-PLO Joint Committee of 24 June 2009 (2), allows drawback of, or partial exemption from, customs duties or charges with equivalent effect, subject to certain conditions, until 31 December 2009. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Article 15(7) of Protocol No 3 to the Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on trade and cooperation between the European Community, of the one part, and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, of the other part (1), (‘the Agreement’), as amended by Decision No 1/2009 of the EU-PLO Joint Committee of 24 June 2009 (2), allows drawback of, or partial exemption from, customs duties or charges with equivalent effect, subject to certain conditions, until 31 December 2009.

| (2) | Further to a request from the PLO, in 2010 the Commission proposed extending the application period of Article 15 of Protocol No 3 to the Agreement until 31 December 2012. However, the EU-PLO Joint Committee never adopted that decision. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Further to a request from the PLO, in 2010 the Commission proposed extending the application period of Article 15 of Protocol No 3 to the Agreement until 31 December 2012. However, the EU-PLO Joint Committee never adopted that decision.

| (3) | The parties to the Agreement have agreed to extend the application period of Article 15(7) of Protocol No 3 to the Agreement by six years with effect from 1 January 2010 to provide clarity, long-term economic predictability and legal certainty for economic operators and to establish the period covered by the Commission proposal. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The parties to the Agreement have agreed to extend the application period of Article 15(7) of Protocol No 3 to the Agreement by six years with effect from 1 January 2010 to provide clarity, long-term economic predictability and legal certainty for economic operators and to establish the period covered by the Commission proposal.

| (4) | Protocol No 3 to the Agreement should therefore be amended accordingly. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Protocol No 3 to the Agreement should therefore be amended accordingly.

| (5) | Since Article 15(7) of Protocol No 3 to the Agreement no longer applies as of 31 December 2009, this Decision should apply from 1 January 2010, |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Since Article 15(7) of Protocol No 3 to the Agreement no longer applies as of 31 December 2009, this Decision should apply from 1 January 2010,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The final subparagraph of Article 15(7) of Protocol No 3 to the Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on trade and cooperation between the European Community, of the one part, and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, of the other part, concerning the definition of the concept of ‘originating products’ and methods of administrative cooperation is replaced by the following text:

‘This paragraph shall apply until 31 December 2015 and may be reviewed by common accord.’

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

It shall apply from 1 January 2010.

Done at Brussels, 8 May 2014.

For the Joint Committee

The President

H. MINGARELLI

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(1)  OJ L 187, 16.7.1997, p. 3.

1

(2)  OJ L 298, 13.11.2009, p. 1.

2

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| 3.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 347/44 |
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3.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 347/44

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DECISION No 1/2014 OF THE EU-EGYPT ASSOCIATION COUNCIL

of 4 September 2014

amending Article 15(7) of Protocol No 4 to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Arab Republic of Egypt, of the other part, regarding the definition of the concept of ‘originating products’ and methods of administrative cooperation

(2014/868/EU)

THE ASSOCIATION COUNCIL,

Having regard to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Arab Republic of Egypt, of the other part, and in particular Article 39 of Protocol No 4 thereto,

Whereas:

| (1) | Article 15(7) of Protocol No 4 to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Arab Republic of Egypt, of the other part (1), (‘the Agreement’), as amended by Decision No 1/2010 of the EU-Egypt Association Council of 3 August 2010 (2), allows drawback of, or partial exemption from, customs duties or charges with equivalent effect, subject to certain conditions, until 31 December 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Article 15(7) of Protocol No 4 to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Arab Republic of Egypt, of the other part (1), (‘the Agreement’), as amended by Decision No 1/2010 of the EU-Egypt Association Council of 3 August 2010 (2), allows drawback of, or partial exemption from, customs duties or charges with equivalent effect, subject to certain conditions, until 31 December 2012.

| (2) | In order to provide clarity, long-term economic predictability and legal certainty for economic operators, the Parties to the Agreement have agreed to extend the application period of Article 15(7) of Protocol 4 to the Agreement by three years, with effect from 1 January 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

In order to provide clarity, long-term economic predictability and legal certainty for economic operators, the Parties to the Agreement have agreed to extend the application period of Article 15(7) of Protocol 4 to the Agreement by three years, with effect from 1 January 2013.

| (3) | Protocol No 4 to the Agreement should therefore be amended accordingly. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Protocol No 4 to the Agreement should therefore be amended accordingly.

| (4) | Since Article 15(7) of Protocol 4 to the Agreement no longer applies as of 31 December 2012, this Decision should apply from 1 January 2013, |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Since Article 15(7) of Protocol 4 to the Agreement no longer applies as of 31 December 2012, this Decision should apply from 1 January 2013,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The last subparagraph of Article 15(7) of Protocol No 4 to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Arab Republic of Egypt, of the other part, regarding the definition of the concept of ‘originating products’ and methods of administrative cooperation, is replaced by the following text:

‘This paragraph shall apply until 31 December 2015 and may be reviewed by common accord.’

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

It shall apply from 1 January 2013.

Done at Brussels, 4 September 2014.

For the Association Council

The President

F. MOGHERINI

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(1)  OJ L 304, 30.9.2004, p. 39.

1

(2)  OJ L 249, 23.9.2010, p. 5.

2

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| 3.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 347/45 |
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3.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 347/45

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DECISION No 1/2014 OF THE EU-MOROCCO ASSOCIATION

of 3 October 2014

amending Article 15(7) of Protocol No 4 to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part, regarding the definition of the concept of ‘originating products’ and methods of administrative cooperation

(2014/869/EU)

THE ASSOCIATION COUNCIL,

Having regard to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part, and in particular Article 39 of Protocol No 4 thereto,

Whereas:

| (1) | Article 15(7) of Protocol No 4 to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part (1), (‘the Agreement’), as amended by Decision No 1/2010 of the EU-Morocco Association Council of 23 August 2010 (2), allows drawback of, or partial exemption from, customs duties or charges with equivalent effect, subject to certain conditions, until 31 December 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Article 15(7) of Protocol No 4 to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part (1), (‘the Agreement’), as amended by Decision No 1/2010 of the EU-Morocco Association Council of 23 August 2010 (2), allows drawback of, or partial exemption from, customs duties or charges with equivalent effect, subject to certain conditions, until 31 December 2012.

| (2) | To provide clarity, long-term economic predictability and legal certainty for economic operators, the Parties to the Agreement have agreed to extend the application period of Article 15(7) of Protocol 4 to the Agreement by three years, with effect from 1 January 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

To provide clarity, long-term economic predictability and legal certainty for economic operators, the Parties to the Agreement have agreed to extend the application period of Article 15(7) of Protocol 4 to the Agreement by three years, with effect from 1 January 2013.

| (3) | Protocol No 4 to the Agreement should therefore be amended accordingly. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Protocol No 4 to the Agreement should therefore be amended accordingly.

| (4) | Since Article 15(7) of Protocol 4 to the Agreement no longer applies as of 31 December 2012, this Decision should apply from 1 January 2013, |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Since Article 15(7) of Protocol 4 to the Agreement no longer applies as of 31 December 2012, this Decision should apply from 1 January 2013,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The last subparagraph of Article 15(7) of Protocol No 4 to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part, regarding the definition of the concept of ‘originating products’ and methods of administrative cooperation, is replaced by the following text:

‘This paragraph shall apply until 31 December 2015 and may be reviewed by common accord.’

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

It shall apply from 1 January 2013.

Done at Brussels, 3 October 2014.

For the Association Council

The President

F. MOGHERINI

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(1)  OJ L 70, 18.3.2000, p. 2.

1

(2)  OJ L 248, 22.9.2010, p. 66.

2

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Corrigenda

| 3.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 347/46 |
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3.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 347/46

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Corrigendum to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1014/2014 of 22 July 2014 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 508/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2328/2003, (EC) No 861/2006, (EC) No 1198/2006 and (EC) No 791/2007 and Regulation (EU) No 1255/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regards to the content and construction of a common monitoring and evaluation system for the operations funded under the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund

(
  Official Journal of the European Union L 283 of 27 September 2014
  )

On page 16, in the Annex, Part II ‘Output indicators’, Section ‘Union priority 4 — Increasing employment and territorial cohesion (Number of projects, except 1)’:

for:

| ‘1. | Number of local development strategies implemented’ |
| --- | --- |

‘1.

Number of local development strategies implemented’

read:

| ‘1. | Number of local development strategies selected’ |
| --- | --- |

‘1.

Number of local development strategies selected’

on page 17, in the Annex, Part III ‘Result indicators’, Section ‘Union priority 1 — Promoting environmentally sustainable, resource efficient, innovative, competitive and knowledge based fisheries’:

for:

| ‘5. | Change in fuel efficiency of fish capture (in litres of fuel/EUR landed catch)’ |
| --- | --- |

‘5.

Change in fuel efficiency of fish capture (in litres of fuel/EUR landed catch)’

read:

| ‘5. | Change in fuel efficiency of fish capture (in litres of fuel/tonnes landed catch)’ |
| --- | --- |

‘5.

Change in fuel efficiency of fish capture (in litres of fuel/tonnes landed catch)’

on page 19, in the Annex, Part III ‘Result indicators’, Section ‘Union priority 4 — Increasing employment and territorial cohesion’:

for:

| ‘1. | Employment created (FTE) in the aquaculture sector’ |
| --- | --- |

‘1.

Employment created (FTE) in the aquaculture sector’

read:

| ‘1. | Employment created (FTE)’ |
| --- | --- |

‘1.

Employment created (FTE)’

on page 19, in the Annex, Part III ‘Result indicators’, Section ‘Union priority 4 — Increasing employment and territorial cohesion’:

for:

| ‘2. | Employment maintained (FTE) in the aquaculture sector’ |
| --- | --- |

‘2.

Employment maintained (FTE) in the aquaculture sector’

read:

| ‘2. | Employment maintained (FTE)’ |
| --- | --- |

‘2.

Employment maintained (FTE)’

---