FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D18-3108

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TAMIKA REESE,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.

Angela C. Dempsey, Judge.

June 12, 2019

WETHERELL, J.

Tamika Reese appeals the order summarily denying her 

motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 3.850. We affirm.

Background

Reese was convicted of multiple felony offenses1 arising out of 

a home invasion robbery during which Reese shot one victim and 

 1 Burglary of a dwelling with person assaulted (count I), 

robbery (count II), attempted armed robbery with a firearm (count 

III), false imprisonment with a firearm (count IV), aggravated 
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her co-defendant attacked another victim. Reese was sentenced to 

life in prison as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) for burglary and 

concurrent sentences ranging from time-served to 25 years for the 

other offenses. Reese’s judgment and sentence were per curiam 

affirmed on direct appeal. See Reese v. State, Case No. 1D14-2229, 

229 So. 3d 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (table).

Reese filed a timely rule 3.850 motion in which she raised six 

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and one claim of 

cumulative error. The trial court summarily denied the motion on 

the merits. Reese filed a timely motion for rehearing, which the 

trial court denied. This appeal followed.

Applicable Legal Standard

To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 

defendant must establish that (1) defense counsel’s performance 

was deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the 

defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To 

establish deficient performance, the defendant must overcome the 

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was reasonable and 

show that the conduct fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness based on prevailing professional standards. Id. at 

688-89; see also id. at 687 (“[The deficient performance prong] 

requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel 

was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth 

Amendment.”). To establish prejudice, the defendant must show a 

reasonable probability—i.e., a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome—that the result of the proceeding would 

have been different but for counsel’s unprofessional errors. Id. at 

694; see also id. at 687 (“[The prejudice prong] requires showing 

that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of 

a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”).

Analysis

We fully agree with the trial court’s analysis of claims 1, 3, 6, 

and 7, and we affirm the denial of those claims without further 

 

battery with a firearm (count V), battery (count VI), and possession 

of a firearm by a convicted felon (count VII).
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comment. We affirm the denial of the other claims for the reasons 

that follow.

Claim 2

In claim 2, Reese alleged that her trial counsel was ineffective 

for not presenting mitigating evidence at trial. The trial court 

correctly found this claim to be refuted by the record (based on a 

colloquy between the court and Reese at trial) and legally 

insufficient (because “[m]itigating evidence is not admissible at 

trial, only at sentencing”).

In her motion for rehearing, Reese clarified that this claim 

also alleged that her counsel was ineffective for not presenting 

mitigating evidence at sentencing. Even with this clarification, the 

claim was properly denied because Reese cannot show prejudice

since the trial court was required to impose a life sentence for the 

burglary under the PRR statute irrespective of any mitigating 

evidence that might have been presented. See Ellington v. State, 

96 So. 3d 1131, 1131-32 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (“It is well-settled 

that, once the State proves by a preponderance of the evidence that 

a defendant qualifies as a [PRR], the trial court must sentence the 

defendant in accordance with the provisions of section 775.082(9), 

Florida Statutes. A trial court does not have discretion to depart 

from the sentence mandated by section 775.082(9), and the refusal 

to impose the mandatory minimum sentence is error as a matter 

of law.”) (citations omitted).

Claim 4

In claim 4, Reese alleged that her trial counsel was ineffective 

for not asking the victim about his pending criminal charges to

show that he had a motive to testify that his attacker was a woman

(Reese) as the State claimed, and not a man as he originally told 

the police. The trial court denied this claim, concluding that 

counsel could not have attacked the victim’s credibility with the

pending charges.

Contrary to the trial court’s reasoning, “when charges are 

pending against a prosecution witness at the time he testifies, the 

defense is entitled to bring this fact to the jury’s attention to show 

bias, motive or self-interest.” Larkins v. State, 655 So. 2d 95, 99 
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(Fla. 1995) (quoting Torres-Arboledo v. State, 524 So. 2d 403, 408 

(Fla. 1988)). However, even if counsel was deficient for not asking 

the victim about his pending charges, this claim was properly 

denied because Reese cannot establish prejudice. 

Although trial counsel did not impeach the victim with his 

pending charges, counsel extensively cross-examined the victim 

about his drug use at the time of the offense (he admitted to 

smoking marijuana the night before the attack) as well as his 

original description of his attacker as a man (he explained that he 

mistook the attacker for a man because she was smaller than the

co-defendant and was wearing men’s clothing), and counsel 

emphasized the victim’s credibility issues during closing 

argument. Additionally, counsel made the jury aware of the 

victim’s pending charges by eliciting testimony from a police officer 

about the victim’s arrest for drug offenses based on evidence found 

during the officer’s investigation of this case, and counsel used this 

fact in closing argument to further attack the victim’s credibility.2 

Under these circumstances, Reese cannot show that the outcome 

 2 Specifically, counsel argued:

Look at [the victim’s] situation. [He] is a drug dealer. 

He’s got marijuana not just not just in his possession, he’s 

got it up in his apartment and he sells it.

In fact, [the police] charged him with possession of 

contraband for the purpose of sale. He’s a defendant. 

That case is still pending. Look what he’s doing. [He] is 

doing the same thing as [the co-defendant]. He’s trying 

to line up with the State, get his story where it kind of 

makes the State's case against [Reese] easier. . . . .

* * *

[The victim] feels like he can come in here and get out of 

the mess that he’s in to deal with these pending charges, 

to stay out of jail or state prison, if he gets his story 

straight that it matches up with the prosecution in this 

case, which is built almost entirely . . . on the testimony 

of [the co-defendant].
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of the case would have been any different had trial counsel asked 

the victim about his pending charges.

Claim 5

In claim 5, Reese alleged that her trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to argue that her convictions for aggravated battery with 

a firearm (count V) and battery (count VI) were barred by double 

jeopardy. The trial court denied this claim as “meritless” because 

the offenses contained different elements. We agree that this

claim is meritless, but for different reasons. 

The record reflects that counts V and VI were based on 

different victims: count V was based on the victim shot by Reese 

whereas count VI was based on the victim attacked by her codefendant for which Reese was convicted as a principal. It is 

axiomatic that multiple battery convictions—whether simple or 

aggravated—are legally permissible where multiple victims are 

battered. See Williams v. State, 106 So. 3d 964, 966 (Fla. 3d DCA 

2013). Accordingly, Reese cannot show deficient performance in 

her counsel’s failure to argue that her dual battery convictions 

violate double jeopardy. See Teffeteller v. Duggar, 734 So. 2d 1009, 

1023 (Fla. 1999) (“Trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for 

failing to raise meritless claims . . . .”).

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the order denying 

Reese’s rule 3.850 motion.

AFFIRMED.

RAY and WINSOR, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Tamika Reese, pro se, Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Anne C. Conley, Assistant 

Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.