alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
FILED

Oct. 25, 1995

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate Court Clerk

WILLIAM WAYNE BRAY, )

)

Plaintiff/Appellant, )

) Appeal No.

) 01-A-01-9506-CV-00228

VS. )

) Clay Circuit

e ) No. 1227

WANDA LEE JONES BRAY, )

)

Defendant/Appellee. )

COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE

APPEALED FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CLAY COUNTY

AT CELINA, TENNESSEE

THE HONORABLE JOHN TURNBULL, JUDGE

E. GUY HOLLIMAN

WILLIAM JOSEPH BUTLER

FARRAR & HOLLIMAN

102-A Scottsville Highway

P. O. Box 280

Lafayette, Tennessee 37083

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 

JAMES D. WHITE, JR.

101 Green Street

Celina, Tennessee 38551

Attorney for Defendant/Appellee

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE

CONCUR:

TODD, P.J., M.S.

LEWIS, J.
1Rule 10(b) of the Rules of the Court of Appeals reads as follows:

The Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may

affirm, reverse or modify the actions of the trial court by mem orandum opinion when

a formal opinion would have no precedential value. W hen a case is decided by

mem orandum opinion it shall be designated "MEMORANDUM OPINION," shall not be

published, and shall not be cited or relied on for any reason in a subsequent unrelated

case.

- 2 -

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

In this case the husband has appealed the trial judge's award of $14,750

to the wife as her share of the marital property. The trial judge made the following

findings: that the husband's property had increased in value during the marriage in

the amount, when added to the value of some property acquired by the parties, of

$34,000; that the cattle acquired by the parties had a negative value of $4,500,

leaving a net value of $29,500; that the wife had made a contribution to the

preservation and appreciation of the property; that the wife had a greater need than

the husband; and that the husband had a greater ability to produce income in the

future. Taking the net increase in the marital estate of $29,500 the trial judge then

awarded half of it to the wife.

We find from the record that the evidence does not preponderate

against the trial judge's findings of fact. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's judgment

and tax the costs on appeal to the appellant.

_____________________________

BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE

CONCUR:

_______________________________

HENRY F. TODD, PRESIDING JUDGE

MIDDLE SECTION

_______________________________

SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE
----

RESERVE LISTS (1)

OPEN COMPETITION EPSO/A/21/04

HEADS OF UNIT (A3 - A*12)

of Cypriot, Czech, Estonian, Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Slovenian and Slovakian citizenship in the following fields: law, macro/microeconomics, statistics, auditing/financial management, European public administration

(2005/C 110 A/02)

Field: Law

MERIT GROUP 1

MERIT GROUP 2

Field: Macro/microeconomics/Statistics

Field: Auditing/Financial management

Field: European public administration

MERIT GROUP 1

MERIT GROUP 2

The lists will be valid until 31 December 2005 and may be extended.

----

(1)  At a candidate's request, his/her name will not be published.

----
|Exhibit 32.2
|------------

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of PremierWest Bancorp (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ending March 31, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Tom Anderson, the Chief Administrative Officer and Principal Accounting and Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

|1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                                       
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|  
|2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company for the period certified.
|  

This certification is being furnished solely to comply with the requirements of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, and shall not be incorporated by reference into any of the Companys filings under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or otherwise be deemed to be filed as part of the Report or under such Acts.

|Date: May 12, 2008 | /s/ TOM ANDERSONTom AndersonExecutive Vice President and Chief Administrative Officer 
(Principal Accounting and Principal Financial Officer)
|------------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

---
**EXHIBIT
      32.2**




**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED**


**PURSUANT
      TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**




In
      connection with the Annual Report of Health-Chem Corporation (the “Company”) on
      Form 10-KSB for the periods ended December 31, 2003 and December 31, 2004 as
      filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
“Report”), the undersigned, acting in the capacity of the Company’s Chief
      Financial Officer, certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
      pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his
      knowledge:




1.
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




2.
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.





**SIGNATURE**
            **TITLE**
            **DATE**/s/
                Ronald
                Burghauser
              Ronald
                Burghauser
            Chief
                Financial
              Officer
            July
                7, 2006
### §583k–1. Definitions

In this subchapter:

#### (1) Administrative Unit

The term "Administrative Unit" means a national forest or national grassland.

#### (2) Outfitter or guide

The term "outfitter or guide" means an individual, organization, or business who provides outfitting or guiding services, as defined in section 251.51 of title 36, Code of Federal Regulations.

#### (3) Partner

The term "partner" means a non-Federal entity that engages in a partnership.

#### (4) Partnership

The term "partnership" means arrangements between the Department of Agriculture or the Forest Service and a non-Federal entity that are voluntary, mutually beneficial, and entered into for the purpose of mutually agreed-upon objectives.

#### (5) Priority area

The term "priority area" means a well-defined region on National Forest System land selected by the Secretary under section 583k–3(a) of this title.

#### (6) Secretary

The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of Agriculture.

#### (7) Strategy

The term "strategy" means the National Forest System Trails Volunteer and Partnership Strategy authorized by section 583k–2(a) of this title.

#### (8) Trail maintenance

The term "trail maintenance" means any activity to maintain the usability and sustainability of trails within the National Forest System, including—

(A) ensuring trails are passable by the users for which they are managed;

(B) preventing environmental damage resulting from trail deterioration;

(C) protecting public safety; and

(D) averting future deferred maintenance costs.

#### (9) Volunteer

The term "volunteer" means an individual whose services are accepted by the Secretary without compensation under the Volunteers in the National Forests Act of 1972 (16 U.S.C. 558a et seq.).

(Pub. L. 114–245, §3, Nov. 28, 2016, 130 Stat. 990.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

The Volunteers in the National Forests Act of 1972, referred to in par. (9), is Pub. L. 92–300, May 18, 1972, 86 Stat. 147, which is classified generally to section 558a et seq. of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 558a of this title and Tables.
IM Information Update

JULY 2014 | IM-INFO-2014-05

US Securities and Exchange Commission

 Division of Investment Management

PROXY VOTING RESPONSIBILITIES OF INVESTMENT 

ADVISERS – STAFF LEGAL BULLETIN

On June 30, 2014, the Division of Investment Management, jointly with the Division 

of Corporation Finance, issued Staff Legal Bulletin No. 20 (IM/CF) (the “Bulletin”). 

The Bulletin addresses some of the common questions raised about the use of proxy 

advisory firms by providing guidance regarding: (1) investment advisers’ responsibilities 

in voting client proxies and retaining proxy advisory firms; and (2) the availability and 

requirements of two exemptions from the federal proxy rules that are often relied 

upon by proxy advisory firms. 

The Bulletin may be found here: http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb20.htm. 

The Investment Management Division works to:

s protect investors

s promote informed investment decisions and 

s facilitate appropriate innovation in investment products and services 

through regulating the asset management industry.

If you have any questions about this IM Information Update, please contact:

Chief Counsel’s Office/Public Inquiry

Phone: 202.551.6825

Email: IMOCC@sec.gov
Exhibit 32

            SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION OF PAUL EGAN AND CIARAN EGAN

                           SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION

         In  connection  with  the  quarterly  report  of  FreeStar   Technology
Corporation  ("Registrant")  on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended March 31, 2004
as  filed  with  the  Securities  and  Exchange   Commission   ("Report"),   the
undersigned,  in the capacities and on the dates indicated below, hereby certify
pursuant to Section  906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C.  Section
1350) that to their knowledge:

         1. The Report fully complies with the  requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         2. The  information  contained in the Report  fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Registrant.

Dated: June 23, 2004                    By: /S/  PAUL EGAN
                                            ----------------
                                        Paul Egan, President

Dated: June 23, 2004                    By: /S/  CIARAN EGAN
                                            ----------------
                                        Ciaran Egan, Chief Financial Officer
§ 751.21 Relocation assistance. Relocation assistance benefits pursuant to 49 CFR part 24 are available for: ( a ) The actual reasonable moving expenses of the junk, actual direct loss of tangible personal property and actual reasonable expenses in searching for a replacement business or, if the eligibility requirements are met, a payment in lieu of such expenses.
( b ) Relocation assistance in locating a replacement business.
( c ) Moving costs of personal property from a dwelling and relocation assistance in locating a replacement dwelling, provided the acquisition of the real property used for the business causes a person to vacate a dwelling.
( d ) Replacement housing payments if the acquisition of the dwelling is found by FHWA to be necessary for the federally assisted junkyard control project.
[40 FR 8551, Feb. 28, 1975, as amended at 50 FR 34094, Aug. 23, 1985; 54 FR 47076, Nov. 9, 1989]
#### Stephen M. KELLY, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. CITY OF OAKLAND a municipal corporation; Kent McNab; Richard Wirkkula; Antonio Romero; Douglas Anderson; Joseph Samuels, Jr., Defendants—Appellees.

No. 00-16566. D.C. No. CV-95-00969-MMC.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted April 10, 2002.

Decided May 8, 2002.

Before SCHROEDER, Chief Judge, FLETCHER B„ and KOZINSKI, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

When this case was previously before us, we ruled out any multiplier applied on account of two factors: (1) novelty and complexity of the case, and (2) loss of other clients. We also held that the multiplier should not have been applied to hours spent on the fee application. *Kelly v. City of Oakland,*198 F.3d 779, 786-87 (9th Cir. 1999). We remanded for the district court to redetermine the fee award. On remand, the district court rejected all of the factors newly proffered by the plaintiff as justifying a multiplier, and this rejection is not appealed. Rather, the plaintiff now contends on appeal, that the “undesirability” of the case justifies a multiplier. It is clear to this court that the “undesirability” of the case was subsumed in the original district court ruling on the “novelty and complexity” of the case and in our court’s rejection of that factor in the first appeal. This is because the claimed “undesirability” in this case stems from the fact that the law at the time was adverse to the plaintiffs position. This goes to the novelty and complexity of the case, not to what we term “undesirability.” *Compare Guam Soc’y of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Ada,*100 F.3d 691, 695-99 (9th Cir.1996) (case undesirable because of extreme unpopularity of the cause within the political environment of Guam and resulting in death threats); *with Harmon v. San Die*
      *372
      *go County,*736 F.2d 1329, 1331 (9th Cir. 1984) (rejecting claims of undesirability based on unpopularity of the cause because there was no danger of ridicule or condemnation).

There was no error in the district court’s reliance on federal law; plaintiff prevailed on federal claims as well as on a state claim. *See Carreras v. City of Anaheim,*768 F.2d 1039, 1050 (9th Cir.1985).

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Edith H. Browne, Respondent, v. William W. Browne, as Executor of Miles E. Browne, Deceased, Appellant.

*665Close, P. J., Hagarty, Carswell, Adel and Taylor, JJ., concur.
### §558d. Authorization of appropriations

There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of sections 558a to 558d of this title.

(Pub. L. 92–300, §4, May 18, 1972, 86 Stat. 147; Pub. L. 95–289, §1, June 5, 1978, 92 Stat. 289.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

1978—Pub. L. 95–289 struck out limitation requiring not more than $100,000 to be appropriated in any one year.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of 1978 Amendment

Pub. L. 95–289, §2, June 5, 1978, 92 Stat. 289, provided that: "The amendment made by this Act to the Volunteers in the National Forests Act of 1972 [amending this section] shall become effective October 1, 1978."
Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed January 9 , 2014

.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 13

- 00051

- CR

JOHNATHAN WAYNE HUNT , Appellant

V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from County Court at Law No

. 5 Montgomery County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 12

- 281528

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

A jury convicted Johnathan Wayne Hunt of the misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated. The trial court sentenced Hunt to forty

- fiv e days in the Montgomery County Jail. Hunt filed a notice of appeal. We affirm.
In a single issue, appellant claims the trial court erred in admitting evidence regarding his sobriety because that evidence was obtained after appellant was unlawfully detai ned. To preserve a complaint for our review, a party must have2

presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion that states the specific grounds for the desired ruling if they are not apparent. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Rothstein v. State , 267 S.W.3d 366, 373 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d). Preservation of error is a systemic requirement. Archie v. State, 221 S.W.3d 695, 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). T o preserve error about illegally obtained evidence, a defendant m ust either file a motion to suppress and obtain a ruling on the motion or timely object when the State offers the evidence at
trial. Ross v. State, 678 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Stults v. State, 23 S.W.3d 198, 205 (Tex.App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref ’ d) (op.
on reh ’ g)

. Although appellant claims the admission of the evidence was "plain error," appellant cites no authority, and we are aware of none, abrogating this
Court ’ s controlling precedent as set forth in Ross and Stults. See S aldano v. State
, 70 S.W.3d 873, 88 6

- 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ; Perez v. State
, 13

- 10

- 00613

- CR,
2011 WL 6777944 , *1

- 2 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi Dec. 21, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
The record reflects no pretrial motion to s uppress was filed . In addition to
the testimony of Deputy Kyle Stone and Trooper Derek Peterson, the videos from each of their patrol cars were admitted into evidence without objection. A ppellant not only did not object to the admissibility of any evidence obtained after the allegedly illegal detention , but also indicated agreement on the record to his
counsel ’ s decision not to object to the admission of much of that evidence

. Accordingly, the issue was no t preserved and nothing is presented for our review

. See Tex. R. App. P. 31.3(a) ; Sample v. State, 405 S.W.3d 295, 301 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2013, pet. ref’d )

.3

Appellant ’ s issue is overruled and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

/s/ Sharon McCally

Justice
Panel consists of Justices McCally, Busby, and Donovan.
Do Not Publish

— Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Before the

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

August 25, 2021

In the Matter of

Triton Emission Solutions Inc.,

File No. 500-1

ORDER OF SUSPENSION OF

TRADING

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) that there is a 

lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Triton Emission Solutions 

Inc. (“DSOX1”) (CIK No. 1143238), a good standing Delaware corporation located in 

Vancouver, BC with a class of securities registered with the Commission pursuant to Securities 

Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") Section 12(g) because it is delinquent in its periodic 

filings with the Commission, having not filed any periodic reports since it filed a Form 10-Q for 

the period ended March 31, 2020. On July 2, 2021, the Commission’s Division of Corporation 

Finance (“Corporation Finance”) sent a delinquency letter to DSOX requesting compliance with 

its periodic filing requirements, which was delivered. As of July 28, 2021, the common stock of 

DSOX was quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group Inc. (formerly “Pink Sheets”) 

(“OTC Link”), had five market makers, and was eligible for the “piggyback” exception of 

Exchange Act Rule 15c2-11(f)(3). 

 

1 The short form of each issuer’s name is also its stock symbol.
2

The Commission is of the opinion that the public interest and the protection of investors require a 

suspension of trading in the securities of the above-listed company. Therefore, it is ordered, 

pursuant to Section 12(k) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, that trading in the securities of 

the above-listed company is suspended for the period from 9:30 a.m. EDT on August 26, 2021, 

through 11:59 p.m. EDT on September 9, 2021.

For the Commission, by the Division of Enforcement, pursuant to delegated authority.

Vanessa A. Countryman

Secretary
p.1 

OAR Box 1828 

Prepped by Ollie Stewart 

Document Number: 

188) ll-K- (I) -1 

Docket Number: 

A-83-27 

Printed 11/12/200811:12:54 AM Sheet 188 of 325 
P.2 

COSTS OF PROCESS EQUIPMENT. 

Chemical Engineering. 

H-K-(I)-1 

March 16, 1964. 

THIS INFORMATION CAN BE FOUND IN DOCKET A-79-02, ITEM 

II-K-(I)-1
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-7173

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DAVID MERO,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Newport News. Mark S. Davis, Chief District Judge. (4:17-cr-00013-MSD-RJK-1; 4:20-

cv-00038-MSD)

Submitted: February 17, 2022 Decided: February 22, 2022

Before AGEE and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

David Mero, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

USCA4 Appeal: 21-7173 Doc: 9 Filed: 02/22/2022 Pg: 1 of 2
2

PER CURIAM:

David Mero seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255 motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 

certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). A certificate of appealability 

will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies 

this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists could find the district court’s 

assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 

759, 773-74 (2017). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the 

prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable and that 

the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Gonzalez v. 

Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 140-41 (2012) (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). 

Limiting our review of the record to the issues raised in Mero’s informal brief, we

conclude that Mero has not made the requisite showing. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b); see also 

Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The informal brief is an important 

document; under Fourth Circuit rules, our review is limited to issues preserved in that 

brief.”). Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

DISMISSED

USCA4 Appeal: 21-7173 Doc: 9 Filed: 02/22/2022 Pg: 2 of 2
#### § 2.1 Authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security.

All authorities and functions of the Department of Homeland Security to administer and enforce the immigration laws are vested in the Secretary of Homeland Security. The Secretary of Homeland Security may, in the Secretary's discretion, delegate any such authority or function to any official, officer, or employee of the Department of Homeland Security, including delegation through successive redelegation, or to any employee of the United States to the extent authorized by law. Such delegation may be made by regulation, directive, memorandum, or other means as deemed appropriate by the Secretary in the exercise of the Secretary's discretion. A delegation of authority or function may in the Secretary's discretion be published in the Federal Register, but such publication is not required.

[68 FR 10923, Mar. 6, 2003]