This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. No. A-1-CA-36427 4 ORLANDO M. SISNEROS, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OTERO COUNTY 7 James Waylon Counts, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 for Appellee 11 Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender 12 Santa Fe, NM 13 Steven J. Forsberg, Assistant Public Defender 14 Albuquerque, NM 15 for Appellant 16 MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 VIGIL, Judge. 18 {1} Defendant appeals his convictions for possession of methamphetamine, 192 pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-23 (2011) and possession of drug 1 paraphernalia, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-25.1(A) (2001). We issued a 2 calendar notice proposing to affirm Defe ndant’s convictions. Defendant filed a 3 combined memorandum in opposition and a motion to amend the docketing statement 4 (MIO). After due consideration, we remain unpersuaded. Accordingly, we affirm. 5 {2} To the extent possible, we will avoid repetition here of pertinent background 6 and analytical principles set forth in our calendar notice. Instead, we will focus on 7 Defendant’s MIO. 8 {3} Appellant asks us to revisit his argument that the district court abused its 9 discretion when it denied Defendant’s moti on to continue. In our calendar notice, we 10 pointed out the analytical framework applied by our courts to a motion for a 11 continuance. See State v. Torres , 1999-NMSC-010, ¶ 10, 127 N.M. 20, 976 P.2d 20 12 (stating that a district court should consider“the length of the requested delay, the 13 likelihood that a delay would accomplish th e movant’s objectives, the existence of 14 previous continuances in the same matter, the degree of inconve nience to the parties 15 and the court, the legitimacy of the motives in requesting the delay, the fault of the 16 movant in causing a need for the delay, and the prejudice to the movant in denying the 17 motion”); State v. Salazar , 2007-NMSC-004, ¶ 16, 141 N.M. 148, 152 P.3d 135 (“In 18 addition to meeting the Torresfactors, [a d]efendant must show that the denial of the 193 continuance prejudiced him.”). Defendanthas not addressed that framework or 1 otherwise persuasively supported his points with authority. For example, Defendant 2 states that the district court relied on a rule that addresses timing for a motion to 3 suppress, Rule 5-212(C) NMRA, in denyi ng his motion to continue, but does not 4 analyze this point through the lens of the Torresfactors or tether the point to any 5 authority for reversal. In fact, Defendantsupports his argument on this entire issue 6 with only one authority, State v. Stefani , 2006-NMCA-073, 139 N.M. 719, 137 P.3d 7 719. [MIO 2-3] That case is readily disti nguishable on the basis of the facts in the 8 record before this Court. In Stefani , this Court held that the district court abused its 9 discretion where: the district court denied the defendant’s last moment request for a 10 continuance in order to maintain a policy of not granting continuances and manage its 11 docket; the defense argued that the case was inherently complex; eleven or twelve 12 witnesses were yet to be interviewed by the defense; the defense had yet to obtain a 13 necessary expert; the defense made an effort to set up interviews the day before trial; 14 the defense informed the district court of several specific aspects of his lack of 15 preparedness and that possible defenses had not been explored; the co-defendant 16 agreed to a plea on the morning of trial and agreed to testify for the prosecution; the 17 State explained to the district court th at the defendant was on the phone with the 18 district attorney “constantly” on the day before trial in an attempt to “figure 194 everything out” and “really did make an effo rt” to prepare for trial; and the State did 1 not object to a continuance. Id. ¶¶ 13-14, 19. On the basis of the information before 2 the Court, this case is not Stefani . In sum, Defendant’s MIO has not dissuaded us from 3 our proposed conclusion on this point. See Curry v.Great Nw. Ins. Co. , 2014-NMCA4 031, ¶ 28, 320 P.3d 482 (“Where a party cites no authority to support an argument, we 5 may assume no such authority exists.”); Farmers, Inc. v. Dal Mach. & Fabricating, 6 Inc. , 1990-NMSC-100, ¶ 8, 111 N.M. 6, 800 P. 2d 1063 (stating that the burden is on 7 the appellant to clearly demonstr ate that the trial court erred); State v. Murillo , 2015- 8 NMCA-046, ¶ 17, 347 P.3d 284 (s tating that we will not construct a party’s argument 9 on the party’s behalf). 10 {4} We turn next to the motion to amend. Such a motion will only be granted upon 11 a showing of viability. See generally State v. Ibarra , 1993-NMCA-040, ¶ 13, 116 12 N.M. 486, 864 P.2d 302 (observing that a motion to amend will be denied if the issue 13 is not viable). By his motion to amend, Defendant seeks to advance a claim of 14 ineffective assistance of counsel. [MIO 1-2] For the reasons that follow, we conclude 15 that this issue is not viable and therefore deny the motion. 16 {5} In order to establish any entitlement torelief based on ineffective assistance of 17 counsel, Defendant must make a prima f acie showing by demonstrating that: (1) 18 counsel’s performance fell below that of a reasonably competent attorney; (2) no 195 plausible, rational strategy or tactic e xplains counsel’s conduct; and (3) counsel’s 1 apparent failings were prejudicial to the defense . See State v. Herrera , 2 2001-NMCA-073, ¶ 36, 131 N.M. 22, 33 P.3d 22 (setting out the factors for a prima 3 facie case of ineffective assistance). 4 {6} Defendant bases his claim on the failureof his counsel to file a motion to 5 suppress prior to the expiration of the d eadline to file such a motion. [MIO 2] 6 Defendant does not a ddress the factors required to establish a prima facie case of 7 ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendantdoes not indicate what evidence he hoped 8 to suppress or why he might be entitled to suppress that evidence. In other words, 9 Defendant does not make any argument that addresses the first two prongs of the test. 10 See Herrera , 2001-NMCA-073, ¶ 36 (stating that the first two requirements for a 11 prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel are that: “(1) it appears from the 12 record that counsel acted unreasonably; [and] (2) the appellate court cannot think of 13 a plausible, rational strategy or tactic to explain counsel’s c onduct”). Defendant also 14 fails to make any argument or show ing directed to the third prong. See State v. Jensen , 15 2005-NMCA-113, ¶ 18, 138 N.M. 254, 118 P.3d 762 (“The type of prejudice required 16 to establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel is that there exists 17 a reasonable probability that without counsel ’s errors, the result of the trial would 18 have been different such that confidence inthe outcome of the trial is undermined.”). 196 1 {7} We conclude that Defendant has faile d to make a prima facie showing of 2 ineffective assistance of counsel and therefore deny his motion to amend. To the 3 extent that Defendant may wish to pursue the matter further, we suggest that habeas 4 proceedings would be the appropriate avenue. See generally State v. Baca , 5 1997-NMSC-059, ¶ 25, 124 N.M. 333, 950 P.2d 776 (“A record on appeal that 6 provides a basis for remanding to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on 7 ineffective assistance of counsel is rare. Ordinarily, such clai ms are heard on petition 8 for writ of habeas corpus[.]”); State v. Martinez , 1996-NMCA-109, ¶ 25, 122 N.M. 9 476, 927 P.2d 31 (“This Court has expre ssed its preference for habeas corpus 10 proceedings over remand when the record on appeal does not establish a prima facie 11 case of ineffective assistance of counsel.”). 12 {8} Accordingly, for the reasons stated in our notice of proposed summary 13 disposition and above, we affirm. 14 {9} IT IS SO ORDERED. 15

__________________________________ 16 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 17

WE CONCUR: 187 ____________________________ 1 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 2

____________________________ 3 HENRY M. BOHNHOFF, Judge 4