Anthony A. Braga

Rutgers University and Harvard University

David L. Weisburd

George Mason University and 

Hebrew University Law School

Crime Prevention

Research Review

No. 6

Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence 

Strategies to Prevent Crime
Suggested citation: 

Braga, Anthony A., and David L. Weisburg. 2012. Pulling Levers 

Focused Deterrence Strategies to Prevent Crime. No. 6 of Crime 

Prevention Research Review. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department 

of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. 

The opinions contained herein are those of the author(s) and 

do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of 

the U.S. Department of Justice. References to specific agencies, 

companies, products, or services should not be considered an 

endorsement by the author(s) or the U.S. Department of Justice. 

Rather, the references are illustrations to supplement discussion 

of the issues. 

The Internet references cited in this publication were valid as of the 

original date of this publication. Given that URLs and websites are 

in constant flux, neither the author(s) nor the COPS Office can 

vouch for their current validity.

The Campbell Collaboration Crime and Justice Group 

(www.campbellcollaboration.org/ccjg) is an international 

network of researchers that prepares, updates, and rapidly 

disseminates systematic reviews of high-quality research 

conducted worldwide on effective methods to reduce 

crime and delinquency and improve the quality of justice.

August 2012

ISBN: 978-1-932582-59-8 
1

Contents

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Identifying Evaluations of Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Programs. . . . . . . . 8

Characteristics of Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Programs. . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Effects of Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Programs on Crime. . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Conclusion and Policy Implications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Bibliography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Appendix A: Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Programs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Appendix B: Results of Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Evaluations. . . . . . . 31

Focused deterrence strategies honor core deterrence ideas...

while finding new and creative ways of deploying traditional 

and non-traditional law enforcement tools.

Introduction
4

1 This paper briefly reviews the research 

on the crime control effectiveness 

of pulling levers focused deterrence 

programs. Readers interested in a 

more detailed assessment of the 

crime prevention value of pulling 

levers focused deterrence programs 

should acquire the full report (Braga 

and Weisburd 2012) available on the 

Campbell Crime and Justice Group web 

page (www.campbellcollaboration.org).

Introduction

Deterrence theory posits that crimes can be prevented when the offender perceives that the 

costs of committing the crime outweigh the benefits (Gibbs 1975; Zimring and Hawkins 

1973). Most discussions of the deterrence mechanism distinguish between general and special 

deterrence (Cook 1980). General deterrence is the idea that the general population is dissuaded 

from committing crime when it sees that punishment necessarily follows the commission of 

a crime. Special deterrence involves punishment administered to criminals with the intent 

to discourage them from committing crimes in the future. Much of the literature evaluating 

deterrence focuses on the effect of changing certainty, swiftness, and severity of punishment 

associated with certain acts on the prevalence of those crimes (Apel and Nagin 2011; 

Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin 1978).

In recent years, scholars have begun to argue that police interventions provide an effective 

approach for gaining both special and general deterrence against crime. A series of rigorous 

program evaluations have shown that the police can be effective in preventing crime (Braga 

2001; Skogan and Frydl 2004; Weisburd and Eck 2004) and that such crime prevention 

benefits are not offset by displacement of crime to areas near police interventions (Braga 2001; 

Weisburd et al. 2006). Durlauf and Nagin (2011) have drawn from this literature to argue 

that “[i]ncreasing the visibility of the police by hiring more officers and by allocating existing 

officers in ways that heighten the perceived risk of apprehension consistently seem to have 

substantial marginal deterrent effects” (14). Indeed, they conclude that crime prevention in the 

United States would be improved by “shifting resources from imprisonment to policing” (ibid, 

9–10).

A recent innovation in policing that capitalizes on the growing evidence of the effectiveness of 

police deterrence strategies is the focused deterrence framework, often referred to as pulling 

levers policing1 (Kennedy 1997, 2008). Pioneered in Boston as a problem-oriented policing 

project to halt serious gang violence during the 1990s (Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga 1996), 

the focused deterrence framework has been applied in many U.S. cities through federally 

sponsored violence prevention programs, such as the Strategic Alternatives to Community 

Safety Initiative and Project Safe Neighborhoods (Dalton 2002). 
5

Focused deterrence strategies honor core deterrence ideas, such as increasing risks faced by 

offenders, while finding new and creative ways of deploying traditional and non-traditional 

law enforcement tools to do so, such as communicating incentives and disincentives directly to 

targeted offenders (Kennedy 1997, 2008). The focused deterrence approach is also consistent 

with recent theorizing about police innovation, which suggests that approaches that seek both 

to create more focus in the application of crime prevention programs and to expand the tools 

of policing are likely to be the most successful (Weisburd and Eck 2004).

Identifying Evaluations 

of Pulling Levers Focused 

Deterrence Programs

Pulling levers focused deterrence strategies are often 

framed as problem-oriented exercises.
8

Identifying Evaluations of Pulling Levers Focused 

Deterrence Programs

We examined the effectiveness of pulling levers focused deterrence programs by reviewing all 

available academic studies evaluating pulling levers strategies. To be eligible for this review, 

programs had to fit within the basic pulling levers focused deterrence framework described by 

Kennedy, which included (2006, 156–157):

•	 Selecting a particular crime problem, such as youth homicide or street drug dealing

•	 Pulling together an interagency enforcement group, typically including police, 

probation, parole, state and federal prosecutors, and sometimes federal enforcement 

agencies

•	 Conducting research, usually relying heavily on the field experience of front-line police 

officers, to identify key offenders—and groups of offenders, such as street gangs and 

drug crews—and the context of their behavior

•	 Framing a special enforcement operation directed at those offenders and groups and 

designed to substantially influence that context, for example, by using any and all legal 

tools (or levers) to sanction groups whose members commit serious violence

•	 Matching those enforcement operations with parallel efforts to direct services and the 

moral voices of affected communities to those same offenders and groups

•	 Communicating directly and repeatedly with offenders and groups to let them know 

that they are under particular scrutiny, what acts (such as shootings) will get special 

attention, when that has happened to particular offenders and groups, and what they 

can do to avoid enforcement action: e.g., offenders are invited or directed (if they are on 

probation or parole) to attend face-to-face meetings (i.e., forums, notifications or callins) with law enforcement officials, service providers, and community figures
9

2 These evaluation designs permit 

the clearest assessments of “cause 

and effect” in determining whether 

hot spots policing programs prevent 

crime. These designs examine pre- and 

post-program measurements of crime 

outcomes in targeted locations relative 

to “control” locations. The control groups 

in the identified hot spots evaluations 

received routine levels of traditional 

police enforcement tactics.

We used this basic framework to assist in determining whether particular programs engaged 

the focused deterrence approach. However, certain programs that were determined to be 

eligible for this review did not necessarily follow the specific pulling levers steps identified by 

Kennedy (2006). Pulling levers focused deterrence strategies are often framed as problemoriented exercises where specific recurring crime problems are analyzed and responses are 

highly customized to local conditions and operational capacities. As such, we fully anticipated 

a variety of pulling levers focused deterrence strategies to be identified by our systematic 

review. Identified studies were further screened to ensure that rigorous evaluation designs, such 

as randomized experiments and quasi-experiments, were used.2

We paid particular attention to studies that measured crime displacement effects and diffusion 

of crime control benefit effects. For instance, Kennedy (2009) described a place-based 

application of pulling levers focused on a disorderly drug market operating in High Point, 

North Carolina. Crime prevention strategies focused on specific locations have been criticized 

as resulting in displacement (see Reppetto 1976). More recently, academics have observed that 

crime prevention programs sometimes result in the complete opposite of displacement—that 

crime control benefits can be greater than expected and “spill over” into places beyond the 

target areas (Clarke and Weisburd 1994). 

Our review was not restricted to a specific time period. Eligible studies included published 

as well as unpublished works: e.g., journal articles, theses/dissertations, reports, books, book 

chapters, and conference papers. (For further details of the systematic search methodology, see 

Braga and Weisburd 2012.) 
10

We reviewed a total of 2,473 article summaries for any suggestion of an evaluation of a pulling 

levers focused deterrence program. Of the 2,473 summaries, we selected 93 for closer review. 

We acquired and carefully assessed the full-text reports, journal articles, and books for these 

evaluations to determine whether pulling levers interventions were involved and whether 

the studies used rigorous evaluation designs. Using these methods, 10 pulling levers focused 

deterrence evaluations were identified and included in this review:

1. Operation Ceasefire in Boston, Massachusetts (Braga et al. 2001)

2. Operation Ceasefire in Los Angeles, California (Tita et al. 2003)

3. Indianapolis (Indiana) Violence Reduction Partnership (McGarrell et al. 2006) 

4. Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago, Illinois (Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan 2007)

5. Operation Peacekeeper in Stockton, California (Braga 2008)

6. Project Safe Neighborhoods in Lowell, Massachusetts (Braga et al. 2008)

7. Drug Market Intervention in Nashville, Tennessee (Corsaro and McGarrell 2009)

8. Drug Market Intervention in Rockford, Illinois (Corsaro, Brunson, and McGarrell 2010)

9. Cincinnati (Ohio) Initiative to Reduce Violence (Engel, Corsaro, and Tillyer 2010)

10. Operation CeaseFire in Newark, New Jersey (Boyle et al. 2010)
Characteristics of 

Pulling Levers Focused 

Deterrence Programs

The deterrence message was...a promise to gang members 

that violent behavior would evoke an immediate and intense 

response from law enforcement.
12

Characteristics of Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Programs

The 10 selected studies (see page 10) examined pulling levers focused deterrence interventions 

that were implemented in small, medium, and large U.S. cities (see Appendix A on page 30). 

Six studies (Boston, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, Los Angeles, Lowell, and Stockton) evaluated the 

crime reduction effects of pulling levers strategies on serious violence generated by street gangs or 

criminally active street groups. Two studies (Nashville and Rockford) evaluated strategies focused 

on reducing crime driven by street-level drug markets; these types of programs are generally called 

“Drug Market Intervention” (DMI) pulling levers focused deterrence strategies. Two studies 

(Newark and Chicago) evaluated crime reduction strategies that focused on individuals.

The pulling levers focused deterrence strategies designed to reduce violence by gangs and 

criminally active street groups generally replicate the Operation Ceasefire process developed in 

Boston during the 1990s (Braga et al. 2001). Briefly, the Boston Operation Ceasefire program 

was designed to prevent violence by reaching out directly to gangs, explicitly saying that 

violence would no longer be tolerated, and backing up that message by “pulling every lever” 

legally available when violence occurred (Kennedy 1997). The chronic involvement of gang 

members in a wide variety of offenses made them, and the gangs they formed, vulnerable to a 

coordinated criminal justice response. As such, the authorities could: 

•	 Disrupt street drug activity 

•	 Focus police attention on low-level street crimes, such as trespassing and public drinking 

•	 Serve outstanding warrants 

•	 Cultivate confidential informants for medium- and long-term investigations of gang 

activities 

•	 Deliver strict probation and parole enforcement 

•	 Seize drug proceeds and other assets 

•	 Ensure stiffer plea bargains and sterner prosecutorial attention 

•	 Request (and enforce) stronger bail terms 

•	 Bring potentially severe federal investigative and prosecutorial attention to gang-related 

drug and gun activity 
13

3 A “banked” case refers to a potential 

prosecution for narcotics sales. The 

prosecution is supported by audio 

and video evidence usually obtained 

through a controlled buy that is held at 

an inactive status unless the subject of 

the prosecution continues dealing, at 

which point an arrest warrant is issued 

and prosecution proceeds.

Simultaneously, youth workers, probation and parole officers, and later churches and other 

community groups offered gang members services and other kinds of help. 

The Boston Ceasefire working group, consisting of criminal justice, social service, and 

community-based partners, also delivered an explicit message that violence was unacceptable 

to the community and that “street” justifications for violence were mistaken. The Boston 

Ceasefire working group delivered this message in formal meetings (i.e., forums or call-ins) 

with gang members, through individual police and probation contacts with gang members, 

in meetings with inmates at secure juvenile facilities in the city, and through gang outreach 

workers. The deterrence message was not a deal with gang members to stop violence. Rather, 

it was a promise to gang members that violent behavior would evoke an immediate and 

intense response from law enforcement. If gangs committed other crimes but refrained from 

violence, then the normal workings of the police, the prosecutors, and the rest of the criminal 

justice system dealt with these matters. But if gang members hurt people, the Boston Ceasefire 

working group concentrated its enforcement actions on those gangs.

DMI strategies seek to shut down overt drug markets entirely (Kennedy 2009). Enforcement 

powers are used strategically and sparingly, employing arrest and prosecution only against 

violent offenders and when nonviolent offenders have resisted all efforts to desist and receive 

help. Through the use of “banked” cases,3 the strategy makes the promise of law enforcement 

sanctions against dealers direct and credible, so that dealers have no doubt concerning the 

consequences of offending and have good reason to change their behavior. 

The strategy also brings powerful informal social control to bear on dealers from immediate 

family and community figures. It organizes and focuses services, help, and support on dealers 

so that those who are willing have what they need to change their lives. Each operation also 

includes a maintenance strategy.

The two crime reduction strategies that focused on individuals deviated from the classic 

pulling levers focused deterrence approach developed in Boston and defined by Kennedy 

(2006). However, after a careful review of program elements, we determined that the necessary 

components of an eligible study were present. 
14

Boyle et al. (2010) described Newark’s Operation CeaseFire strategy as focused on preventing 

gun violence by criminally active individuals; this hybrid of the Boston Ceasefire pulling levers 

model (Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga 1996) and the Chicago CeaseFire public health approach 

uses trained street outreach staff, public education campaigns, and community mobilization to 

prevent shootings (Skogan et al. 2008). 

The Chicago Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) study evaluated the violence reduction effects 

of a strategy comprised of four key interventions (Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan 2007): 

1.Increased federal prosecutions for convicted felons carrying or using guns

2. Lengthy sentences associated with federal prosecutions

3. Supply-side firearm policing activities

4. Social marketing of deterrence and social norms messages through offender notification 

meetings
Effects of Pulling Levers 

Focused Deterrence 

Programs on Crime

...these programs generated significant crime 

control benefits.
16

4 During our search for eligible studies, 

several scholars suggested that 

the systematic review include the 

Hawaii Opportunity with Probation 

Enforcement (HOPE) randomized 

controlled trial (Hawken and Kleiman 

2009). HOPE was a community 

supervision program aimed at 

substance-abusing probationers. 

The program relied on a mandate to 

abstain from illicit drugs, backed by 

swift and certain sanctions for drug 

test failures, and preceded by a clear 

and direct warning. While this program 

represented a departure from our 

selection criteria, we agree that the 

deterrence mechanisms in HOPE are 

similar to those engaged by the 10 

pulling levers focused deterrence 

evaluations included in this report. 

Similar to the findings of the other 

programs, HOPE generated impressive 

crime control benefits. Only 21 percent 

of HOPE probationers experienced new 

arrests as compared to 47 percent of 

control probationers.

5

Meta-analysis is a technique used to 

investigate overall program effects 

associated with a selected set of studies 

(see Lipsey and Wilson 2001).

6 Although the reason why the Newark 

program failed to generate larger 

impacts on gun violence is unclear, 

growing evaluation evidence suggests 

the CeaseFire Chicago communitydriven violence reduction approach—

with its premium on gang violence 

mediation and negotiation work by 

“violence interrupters”—may not 

produce the desired violence prevention 

benefits (see Papachristos 2011).

Effects of Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Programs 

on Crime

Nine of the 10 pulling levers focused deterrence evaluations concluded that these programs 

generated significant crime control benefits (see Appendix B on page 31).4 A meta-analysis 

of these pulling levers strategies also found that these programs generated an overall 

statistically significant reduction in crime outcome measures (see Braga and Weisburd 

2012).5 Although Boyle et al. (2010) reported a small but positive reduction in gunshot 

wound incidents from Newark’s Operation CeaseFire, this evaluation was the only one to 

not report any discernible crime prevention benefits generated by the violence reduction 

strategy.6

Evaluations of pulling levers strategies targeting gangs and criminally active groups reported 

large, statistically significant reductions in violent crime. These results included a 63 percent 

reduction in youth homicides in Boston (Braga et al. 2001), a 44 percent reduction in gun 

assault incidents in Lowell, Massachusetts (Braga et al. 2008), a 42 percent reduction in 

gun homicides in Stockton, California (Braga 2008), a 35 percent reduction in homicides 

of criminally active group members in Cincinnati (Engel, Corsaro, and Tillyer 2010), 

a 34 percent reduction in total homicides in Indianapolis (McGarrell et al. 2006), and 

noteworthy short-term reductions in violent crime in Los Angeles (Tita et al. 2003). 
17

The two DMI evaluations also reported statistically significant crime reductions. The DMI 

generated a 55 percent reduction in illegal drug possession incidents in Nashville (Corsaro and 

McGarrell 2009) and a 22 percent reduction in non-violent offenses in Rockford (Corsaro, 

Brunson, and McGarrell 2010). While Newark’s strategy did not generate statistically 

significant crime control gains when high-rate offenders were targeted, the Chicago PSN 

intervention—the other program focused on individuals—was associated with a 37 percent 

reduction in homicide (Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan 2007). 

Two of the three studies that measured possible crime displacement and diffusion effects 

reported noteworthy diffusion of crime control benefits associated with the focused deterrence 

intervention. Consistent with the absence of a treatment effect, the Newark evaluation did not 

report any statistically significant crime displacement or diffusion effects (Boyle et al. 2010). 

The Nashville evaluation reported statistically significant reductions in drug offenses and total 

calls for service in the non-treated area immediately adjoining the targeted drug market area 

(Corsaro and McGarrell 2009). The Los Angeles evaluation found statistically significant 

reductions in violent crime in areas surrounding the targeted census block groups as well as 

noteworthy reductions in violent offending by non-treated gangs that were “socially tied” to 

treatment gangs (Tita et al. 2003).

Conclusion and 

Policy Implications

...jurisdictions...should add focused deterrence strategies 

to their existing portfolio of prevention and control 

interventions.
20

Conclusion and Policy Implications

The available scientific evidence on the crime reduction value of focused deterrence strategies 

has been characterized as “promising” but “descriptive rather than evaluative” (Skogan and 

Frydl 2004: 241) and as “limited” but “still evolving” (Wellford, Pepper, and Petrie 2005: 

10) by the U.S. National Research Council’s Committee to Review Research on Police Policy 

and Practices and its Committee to Improve Research Information and Data on Firearms, 

respectively. 

However, our systematic review identified 10 evaluations of focused deterrence strategies; 

nine of these evaluations were completed after the National Research Council reports were 

published. A better-developed base of scientific evidence now exists to assess whether crime 

prevention impacts are associated with this approach.

The basic findings of our review are very positive. Nine out of 10 eligible studies reported 

strong and statistically significant crime reductions associated with the approach. The findings 

of eligible focused deterrence evaluations fit well within existing research suggesting that 

deterrence-based strategies, if applied correctly, can reduce crime (Apel and Nagin 2011). 

The focused deterrence approach seems to have the desirable characteristic of altering offenders’ 

perceptions of sanction risk. Our findings are also supported by the growing body of scientific 

evidence that suggests police departments, and their partners, can be effective in controlling 

specific crime problems when they engage in a variety of partnerships and tailor an array of 

tactics to address underlying criminogenic conditions and dynamics (Skogan and Frydl 2004; 

Weisburd and Eck 2004). Indeed, our study suggests that Durlauf and Nagin (2011) are 

correct in their conclusion that both imprisonment and crime can be reduced through the 

noteworthy marginal deterrent effects generated by allocating police officers, and their criminal 

justice partners, in ways that heighten the perceived risk of apprehension.

While the results of this review support deterrence principles, other complementary crime 

control mechanisms are at work in the focused deterrence strategies described here that need 

to be highlighted and better understood. In Durlauf and Nagin’s (2011) article, the focus is on 

the possibilities for increasing perceived risk and deterrence by increasing police presence. 

Although Durlauf and Nagin’s conclusion is warranted by the data and represents an 

important component of the causal mechanisms that have increased the effectiveness 

of focused deterrence strategies, we believe it misses an important part of the story. 
21

In the focused deterrence approach, the emphasis is on not only increasing the risk of 

offending but also decreasing opportunity structures for violence, deflecting offenders away 

from crime, increasing the collective efficacy of communities, and increasing the legitimacy 

of police actions. We suspect that the large effects we observe come precisely from the multifaceted ways in which this program influences criminals.

A number of scholars have focused on the mechanism of discouragement when discussing the 

crime prevention benefits of interventions (see Clarke and Weisburd 1994). Discouragement 

emphasizes reducing the opportunities for crime and increasing alternative opportunity 

structures for offenders. In this context, situational crime prevention techniques are often 

implemented as part of the core pulling levers work in focused deterrence strategies (Braga and 

Kennedy 2012). For instance, the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence used civil forfeiture 

techniques to close down a highly problematic bar that generated recurring serious violence 

(Engel, Corsaro, and Tillyer 2010). Extending guardianship, assisting natural surveillance, 

strengthening formal surveillance, reducing the anonymity of offenders, and utilizing place 

managers can greatly enhance the range and quality of the varying enforcement and regulatory 

levers that can be pulled on offending groups and key actors in criminal networks (see Welsh 

and Farrington 2009). 

The focused deterrence approach also seeks to redirect offenders away from violent crime 

through the provision of social services and opportunities. In all the gang/group interventions 

reviewed here, gang members were offered job training, employment assistance, substance 

abuse treatment, housing assistance, and a variety of other services and opportunities.

Aspects of the “broken windows” theory may also be relevant for understanding how and 

why focused deterrence programs reduce crime (Wilson and Kelling 1982). The theory argues 

that intensive police efforts to reduce social and physical disorder can reverse the breakdown 

of community social controls that accompany untended and unrestrained violations of 

social order. Thus, crime is reduced in part because of police efforts and in part because of 

community members’ increased vigilance. Kleiman and Smith (1990) describe the potential 

benefits of an intensive police effort to reduce drug crime and disorder, noting “a dramatic 

police effort may call forth increased neighborhood efforts at self-protection against drug 

dealing activity; given police resources, such self-defense may be essential to long-run control 

of drug dealing” (88). 
22

Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) emphasize the capacity of a community to realize 

common values and regulate behavior within it through cohesive relationships and mutual 

trust among residents. The authors argue that the key factor determining whether crime will 

flourish is the sense of a community’s collective efficacy. A community with strong collective 

efficacy is characterized by high capacities for collective action for the public good. Focused 

deterrence enhances collective efficacy in communities by emphasizing the importance of 

engaging and enlisting community members in the strategies developed. The DMI strategy, 

for example, draws upon collective efficacy principles by engaging family, friends, and other 

influential community members in addressing the criminal behaviors of local drug dealers 

(Kennedy 2009). 

Finally, the focused deterrence approach takes advantage of recent theorizing regarding 

procedural justice and legitimacy. Policing’s effectiveness is dependent on public perceptions 

of the legitimacy of police actions (Skogan and Frydl 2004; Tyler 1990, 2004). Legitimacy is 

the public belief that the community has a responsibility and obligation to voluntarily accept 

and defer to the decisions made by authorities (Tyler 1990, 2004). Recent studies suggest that 

when procedural justice approaches are used by the police, citizens will not only evaluate the 

legitimacy of the police more highly but also be more likely to obey the law in the future (see 

Paternoster et al. 1997). Advocates of focused deterrence strategies argue that targeted offenders 

should be treated with respect and dignity (Kennedy 2008, 2011), reflecting procedural justice 

principles. The Chicago PSN strategy, for example, sought to increase the likelihood that the 

offenders would “buy in” and voluntarily comply with the pro-social, anti-violence norms 

being advocated by criminal justice, social service, and community representatives interacting 

with offenders in ways that enhance procedural justice in their communication sessions 

(Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan 2007). 

In closing, focused deterrence strategies are a recent addition to the existing scholarly 

literature on crime control and prevention strategies. While the evaluation evidence needs to 

be strengthened and the theoretical underpinnings of the approach need further refinement, 

jurisdictions suffering from gang violence, overt drug markets, and repeat offender problems 

should add focused deterrence strategies to their existing portfolio of prevention and control 

interventions. The existing evidence suggests that these new approaches to crime prevention 

and control generate noteworthy reductions in crime.
Bibliography
24

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Appendix
30

Appendix A: Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Programs

Study Program Type

Boston (MA) Operation Ceasefire

Braga et al. (2001)

Pulling levers strategy focused on reducing serious violence by street gangs

Los Angeles (CA) Operation Ceasefire

Tita et al. (2003)

Pulling levers strategy focused on reducing serious violence by street gangs

Indianapolis (IN) Violence Reduction 

Partnership

McGarrell et al. (2006)

Pulling levers strategy focused on reducing serious violence by street gangs

Chicago (IL) Project Safe 

Neighborhoods

Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan (2007)

Gun violence reduction strategy comprised of four interventions: (1) increased federal 

prosecutions for convicted felons carrying or using guns, (2) lengthy sentences associated 

with federal prosecutions, (3) supply-side firearm policing activities, and (4) social marketing 

of deterrence and social norms messages through offender notification meetings

Stockton (CA) Operation Peacekeeper

Braga (2008)

Pulling levers strategy focused on reducing serious violence by street gangs

Lowell (MA) Project Safe 

Neighborhoods

Braga et al. (2008)

Pulling levers strategy focused on reducing serious violence by street gangs

Rockford (IL) Drug Market 

Intervention

Corsaro and McGarrell (2009)

Pulling levers strategy focused on reducing crime driven by a street-level drug market

Nashville (TN) Drug Market 

Intervention

Corsaro, Brunson, and McGarrell (2010)

Pulling levers strategy focused on reducing crime driven by a street-level drug market

Cincinnati (OH) Initiative to Reduce 

Violence

Engel, Corsaro, and Tillyer (2010)

Pulling levers strategy focused on reducing serious violence by criminally active street groups

Newark (NJ) Operation CeaseFire

Boyle et al. (2010)

Violence reduction strategy targeting individual gang members, described as a “hybrid” 

between the Boston CeaseFire pulling levers strategy and the Chicago CeaseFire streetworker program
31

Appendix B: Results of Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence 

Evaluations

Study Crime Outcomes Displacement / Diffusion

Boston (MA) Operation Ceasefire

Braga et al. (2001)

Large reductions in youth homicide incidents, 

gun assault incidents, and shots-fired calls 

for service

Not measured

Los Angeles (CA) Operation 

Ceasefire

Tita et al. (2003)

Short-term reductions in violent crime 

reported while intervention was in place

Diffusion of crime control benefits reported

Indianapolis (IN) Violence 

Reduction Partnership

McGarrell et al. (2006)

Large reduction in total homicide incidents Not measured

Chicago (IL) Project Safe 

Neighborhoods

Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan (2007)

Large reduction in total homicide incidents; 

reductions in gun homicide and aggravated 

assaults

Not measured

Stockton (CA) Operation 

Peacekeeper

Braga (2008)

Large reduction in gun homicide incidents Not measured

Lowell (MA) Project Safe 

Neighborhoods

Braga et al. (2008)

Large reduction in gun assault incidents Not measured

Rockford (IL) Drug Market 

Intervention

Corsaro and McGarrell (2009)

Reduction in non-violent offenses Not measured
32

Study Crime Outcomes Displacement / Diffusion

Nashville (TN) Drug Market 

Intervention

Corsaro, Brunson, and McGarrell (2010)

Reductions in illegal drug possession offenses, 

illegal drug equipment offenses, and property 

crime offenses

Diffusion of crime control benefits reported

Cincinnati (OH) Initiative to Reduce 

Violence

Engel, Corsaro, and Tillyer (2010)

Large reduction in group member-involved 

homicides

Not measured

Newark (NJ) 

Operation CeaseFire

Boyle et al. (2010)

No noteworthy effects on gunshot wound 

incidents reported

No displacement or diffusion effects reported

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

145 N Street, N.E.

Washington, DC 20530

To obtain details on COPS programs, 

call the COPS Office Response Center at 800.421.6770.

Visit COPS Online at www.cops.usdoj.gov.

August 2012

e041218459

ISBN: 978-1-932582-59-8