IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2013-IA-01951-SCT GREATER FAIRV

IEW MISSIONARY

BAPTIST CHURCH , PAY

TON LACY

, BAXTER EV

ANS, HARRELL NEAL, KELV IN THIGPEN AND DAV ID EDWIN LEV

Y

v. DANNY RAY

HOLLINS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/30/2013 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. J. DW AYNE THOMAS TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: PRECIOUS MARTIN SUZANNE KEYS FELICIA PERKINS JESSICA AYERS MINOR BUCHANAN COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: FELICIA PERKINS JESSICA AYERS ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: SUZANNE KEYS NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND VACATED - 03/26/2015 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE DICKINSON, P.J., LAMAR AND CHANDLER, JJ. LAMAR, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Greater Fairview Missionary Baptist Church’s pastor, Danny Ray Hollins, was placed

on paid adm inistrative leave af ter he was a ccused of inappropriate sexual c ontact with a

m inor. W hen the church m em bers decided to v ote on whether to r etain him as pastor, hesought i njunctive relief in chancery c ourt. T h e c h a n cellor issued a tem porary r estraining order, but the church voted any way and dism issed Hollins. T he chancellor then vacated the

vote and ordered the church to cond u ct another v ote, this tim e with certain court-ordered procedures r egarding notice, eligibility , vote-counting, and security

. This C o urt granted the church def

endants’ m otion f

o r interlocutory appeal, and we now vacate the c h ancery court’s orders in this case.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. In October 2012, Danny Ray Hollins w as pastor of Grea t e r F a i r v i e w Missionary Baptist Church in Jackson. That m onth, he w a s p laced on paid adm inistrative leave when

a m em ber of the church accused h im of inappropriate s e xual b ehavior with a m inor. 1 Later that y ear, the church decided to hold a vote on whether to retain Hollins as pastor. That vote originally was scheduled to take place in early 2013. But t ensions arose i n the c h urch about Hollins’s status, giving r ise to a “chaotic situation , ” a n d t h e vote did not take place as planned. I nstead, t he church voted to a llow the D eacons’ M inistry t o f orm a l egal com m ittee

a n d t o hire outside legal counsel f or assistance in resolving the internal conf lict. W ith t h e help of a local law f

irm , the church developed an election procedure a n d s c h eduled a vote f or March 2, 2013.

1 D u rin g th i s actio n , th at m in o r su ed H o llin s f o r th e alleg ed sex u a l m isco n d u ct. In h er co m p lai n t , s h e a lleg ed th a t H o llin s h ad lu red h er in to a h o t el ro o m “to en g ag e in sex u al in terco u rse as w ell as o th er lew d an d lasciv io u s acts.” 2¶3. One of the d eacons 2 com piled a list of active church m e mb e r s w h o w e r e a t least sixteen y ears old and certif ied it u nder oath the day

bef o re the vote. The deacons and their counsel arranged f

or a c ertif ied p ublic accounting f

irm to count and certif

y the votes and f

or security personnel to be present. Upon enterin g the church, m em bers r eported at various tables based on the f

irst letter of their last nam e, identif ied them selves, and received a ballot. That b allot was “regular” if t he voter was o n the m em b ership roll and “conditional” if he or she was not. Ballots also were distributed to m em bers o f the church who were “shut-in” and could not m ake it to the church tha t d a y . O nce the ballots were com pleted, they were deposited into boxes which were under the control of the CPA and his assistant. ¶4. On Marc h 1 , 2 0 1 3 , t he day bef ore the vote, Hollins f

iled a petition in the Hinds County C hancery Court seeking “to enjoin any unauthorized and im proper m eetings and/or actions taken outside a p roperly c alled m em bership m eeting.” The petition n am ed the church and f ive deacons a s def

e ndants. 3 Hollins asserted that the church planned to have a m eeting

on March 2 “to vote on a resolution discharging [ h im ] as pastor.” He claim ed that the vote would be invalid b ecause (1) “there ha[ d ] been no certif ication of the list of m em

bers in good standing who would be entitled to vote

. . .”; 4 ( 2) a bsent s uch certif

ication, a dequate notice

to eligible m em

bers could not b e a ccom

plished; and (3) t he state d enom inational g uidelines

2 T h is d eaco n w a s n o t

o n e o f th e d eaco n s later n am ed a s a d ef en d an t b y H o llin s.

3 Those deacons were Pay ton Lacy , Baxter E vans, Harrell Neal, Kelvin Thigpen, and David Edwin Levy

.

4 H o llin s d id n o t sp ecif

y w h o h e th o u g h t sh o u ld h av e “certif ied ” th e list. 3had not b een f o llowed b ecause “there ha[ d] been no attem pts at Conciliation o r o ther notice given to Plaintif

f as pastor as required.” ¶5. Hollins a lso claim ed that he would be irreparably harm e d i f h e w a s “ v oted out as Pastor,” in that h is r eputation would suf f er, he would lose his incom e, and he would suf f er

em otionally

. Finally , Hollins asserted that there was “a high likelihood [ that he would succeed] in the m e rits of

his case, nam ely that any m e e ting of church m em bership without
proper certif

ication of v oter rolls and notice an d a d h e r e n c e to all established guidelines is void

. . . .” Hollins’s counsel certif ied that a tem

porary restraini n g order (“TRO”) was needed, that he had been unable to notice the def endants, that the def

endants would not be prejudiced by the TRO, and that on “inf o rm a tion and belief [ the church] is not represented by counsel duly hired by

the church m em

bership.” 5 ¶6. The chancellor issued the TRO, apparently without reading it. 6 W hile f ive deacons and t he church i tself were nam ed as def endants, the TRO was served on only f o u r o f the dea c o n s , a s the agent f

or service of p rocess f

or the c hurch was deceased and could not be served. The TR O p urported to enjoin “any m em bership m eeting,” but the c h ancellor later explained it was intended to “restrain any vote that m a y t ake place.”

5 T h e reco rd r ef

lects th at, p rio r to f

ilin g th e p etitio n , H o llin s h ad atten d ed a m eetin g at t h e ch u rch an d h ad o b serv ed th e ch u rch ’s co u n sel, F elici a P e rk in s, ex p l ain i n g h o w th e u p co m in g electio n w o u ld b e co n d u cted an d f ield i n g q u e s tio n s ab o u t th e v o tin g p ro cess. B u t ap p aren t ly it w as H o llin s’s b eli e f t h a t , b e c au se h e h ad n o t p resid ed o v er o r called th e m eetin g w h erein th e ch u r ch g av e th e D eaco n s ’ M in istry au th o r ity to h i re co u n sel, su ch co u n sel w as “n o t d u ly

h i red ” an d th eref

o re n o t d u e to b e n o ticed o f t h e p etitio n o r T R O

. 6 T h e ch an c ello r said f

ro m th e b en ch : “I d o n o t

— I u su ally d o n ’t read th e o rd er sp ecif ically . I tru st th e law y ers to w o rd th eir o r d ers as th ey ch o o se to w o rd th em .” 4¶7. Despite the T R O, the v ote took place as s c h e d u l e d o n M a r ch 2, 2013. The ballot

contained one question: “Should Danny Hollins, Ph.D., rem ain pastor of Greater F airview
M.B. Church? ” More t han f our hundred church m em

bers v oted, and less than f if ty percent voted to retain Hollins as pastor. ¶8. Hol l i n s q u i c k l y f

iled a m otion to set aside the results of the vote and t o hold the church def

endants i n contem

pt and incarcerate them

. Hollins also f i led a m otion asking the court to set a procedure f

or determ ining eligible voters and f or voting. On March 7, 2013, def endants f iled a m otion t o dissolve t he TRO, to d i s miss the action, and f or sanctions against Hollins. The chancello r h e a r d b rief argum ents f rom each side t he next day

. Although no evidence w as introduced at that tim e, the c hancellor did set a s ide the results of the March 2 vote. 7 ¶9. The chancellor also s tated that “we will conduct f urther evidence to allow a f urther

vote by this church to determ ine if Mr. Hollins is the pastor of this church or not.” He asked the parties to provide him with the “docum ents necessary t o start t hat,” e xplaining, “I have done several o f these bef ore. If y ou can’t do it, I will.” He c o n t i n ued, say ing, “we will conduct a vote, a nd I will supervise it with proper guidelines.” In h is Order, the chancellor

7 In addition to vacating the vote, the chancellor also v e r b ally ordered the c hurch to resum e p ay ing Hollins his salary , stating that “[ Hollins] can be the interim preach e r or the at large preacher o r whatever they want to call him , but he will be paid and he will be given his k ey to the church.” W hen the order w as reduced to writing and f iled, however, it did not explicitly m ention p ay ing H ollins, but said he was to “be reinstated as an em p loy ee.” The church never resum ed p ay ing him

. The parties a rgued this point in several m otions and at several hearings.

5explained that he was setting aside the vote because “[ d]ef endants went f

orward with their

m eeting or vote in spite of this Court’s order.” ¶10. On March 12, 2013, the def endants f i led a m otion f

o r reconsideration. They

argued that “[ t]here w ere sever a l egregious m istakes of f act and law m a de in the Court’s Order

. ”
Am ong those, they said that the TRO did n ot expressly prohibit a v o t e ; t h a t n one of the def endants w as served prior to t h e vote; that on March 8 there were no issues bef ore the chancellor because the TRO was m oot at that point since the vote had taken place; that the chancellor had r

u l e d w i t hout any evidence o n M arch 8; and that b y reinstating Hollins as “interim pastor,” the court had g r anted relief that Hollins did not request. The def endants also argued that t he c hurch had “em ploy ed extraordinary m easures and i ncurred considerable
expenses i n its ef

f orts to regain peace a nd dignity within the church;” that m ore than f our hundred m em

bers of the church had voted, including Hollins’s wif e, children, and siblings, and that m ore than f

if t y percent voted to rem ove Hollins. The def endants c o n c luded by stating t hat “[ t]he church has s poken,” and an “unconscionable injustice would occur if [ Hollins was af

f orded relief

] .” ¶11. The litigation continue d f o r s e v e r a l m o n ths, w ith additional h earings on various recusal m otions, contem

p t m otions, m otions to dism iss, and e f f orts b yHollins to get backpay f rom the c hurch. On O ctober 8, 2013, the chancellor issued the M em orandum Opinion of the Court. I n it, t h e c h a n c e l l o r noted that “ in an ef f ort to extract [ him self

] f rom this ‘religious thicket,’ [ he had] on n um erous occasions, urged the parties to m eet together and

6devise a n agreed procedure f or a new v ote.” The chancellor also noted t hat t he Constitution and By laws of

the church provided that: the governm ent of the Church is vested in the body of believers who c om pose it. It is subject to t he c ontrol of no other Ecclesiastical body , but it r ecognizes and sustains the obligations of m ut u al counsel and co-operation which are com m on am ong Baptist Churches. The chancellor f

ound that “[ t]he Constitution and By laws do not address the procedure f or notif y ing the congregation of

such events.” He f

urther f ound that t he “norm al custom and practice” of the church was “l a c k i n g i n f orm ality , ” so t he Deacons’ Ministry , “ along with counsel, attem

pted to f orm ulate a f air procedure f

or t he vote on the dism issal of [ Hollins].” However, the chancellor then determ i ned that “ t hese ef f orts f a l l s h o rt in that they were a violation of this Court’s Temporary Restraining Order

. ” (Em phasis added.) ¶12. Bef

ore setting out the specif

ic guidelines f

or how the new vote should take place, the chancellor noted that the church had adopted a Constitution and By laws an d a H a n dbook of C hurch Ministries Policies and Procedures. This Court has thorou g h l y a n d caref ully reviewed each of these d ocum ents. Af ter such review, this C ourt c an unequivocally f ind that [ the ch u r c h ] l acks the adopted procedures f o r determ ining c hurch m em bers eligible f

or v o t i n g , notif

ication p roceedings necessary f or establishing a voting m e eting, procedures f or conducting a vote with regard to the discharge or retention of a pastor, a nd procedures f or t he determ ining the proper num

ber of votes necessary

to discharge or retain a pastor. Furtherm o re, despite the chancellor’s hesitation to get involved in “ecclesiastical m atters,” the chancellor determ i ned that h e “m ust intervene in an ef

f ort t o r e s t o r e peace to the congregation and to prevent f urther deterioration of a c h urch congregation.”

7¶13. The cha n c e l l o r relied on this Court’s decision in P ilgrim R est M

issionary Baptist
Church ex rel. Board of

Deacons v. Wallace , 835 So. 2d 67 ( Miss. 2003), and explained that the “Mississippi Suprem e Court has previously deter m ined t hat w here a congregational church

. . . lacks the established procedures f or electing i ts leaders, the Court m ay decide on

a proper proc e d u r e.” The chancellor then laid out procedures f or the n ew vote, including

voter e l i gibility and n otice requirem ents. The chancellor originally scheduled the vote f or Decem ber 1, 2013, but because several m otions subsequently were f iled and set f

o r hearing, the vote was rescheduled f or January 5, 2014. O n Decem ber 19, 2013, this Court granted the def endants’ petition f

or interlocutory

appeal and stay ed the trial court proceedings.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶14. This Court e mp l o y s a l i mi t e d s t a ndard of review when reviewing d ecisions of a

c h a n c e l lor. McNeil v. Hester , 753 So. 2d 1057, 1063 (Miss. 2000) (citing Reddell v. Reddell , 696 So. 2d 287 ( Miss. 1997)). But a “de n ovo s tandard of r eview is applied to questions of law, l egal conclusions, and jurisdictional questions.” Aladdin C onstr. Co., Inc.

v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co. , 914 So. 2d 169, 174 (Miss. 2005) (internal citations om itted).
DISCUSSION ¶15. The church def

endants present three issues on appeal:
1. D id the trial c ourt have subject-m atter jurisdiction over t he proceeding and personal jurisdiction over the parties? 2. Did the tem porary restraining order prohibit the March 2 vote? 3. Did the trial court correctly apply Pilgrim Rest ?

8¶16. W e decline to address the second issue, as the other two issues are dispositive, and

we have reorganized those issues f or purposes of

this opinion.
I. The chancery court had personal jurisdiction over the parties. ¶17. The c hurch argues that the chancery court lacked personal j urisdiction over i t, because Hollins s erved the TRO on only f our of the deacon def

endants individually

. They argue that “[ t]here was no e vidence bef ore the t r i a l c ourt, and the t rial c ourt did n ot f ind, that the individual deacons who were sued

. . . had any indi v i d u a l authority to conduct any thing at the church

. . . . ” Hollins argues that the deacons who were served were a uthorized agents of t he church f

or service of process, because t hey had som e authority , and because the other possible agents w ere either deceased or adverse. We a g r e e with Hollins and f ind that the def endants were properly

served. ¶18. “The concept o f personal jurisdiction c om p r i s e s t w o d i s t i n c t c o m

p o n e n t s : a m e n a

b ility

to jurisdiction and service of process.” DeMolo v. Toche Marine, I nc. , 711 F. 2d 1260, 1264 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing Terry v. Raym ond Int’l, Inc. , 658 F. 2 d 3 98, 401 ( 5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied , 456 U.S. 928 (1982)). 8 “Service of process is sim

ply the phy sical m eans by

which that jurisdiction is asserted.” Id. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(4) governs service of process on an organization such as a church. U n der that rule, service “shall be m ade

. .

. by d e l ivering a c opy of the sum m ons and of the c om plaint to an of

f icer, a m anaging or

8 There is no question that t he church and its m em bers were am e nable to jurisdiction in Hinds C ounty Chancery Court, so the only issue i s w hether the church w as properly served. 9general agent, or to any o ther agent authorized by appointm ent or by law to receive service

of process.” Miss. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(4). ¶19. This Court has stated that it “m ust exam ine each c ase to determ ine whether the person

was authorized as an agent f or purposes of accepting service of process.” Johnson v. Rao , 952 S o . 2 d 1 5 1 , 1 5 6 (Miss. 2 007) (citing W illiam s v. K

ilgore , 618 So. 2d 51, 56 (Miss. 1992)). “ Only em

ploy ees with som e authority are c l assif ied as a gents authorized to accept service of process on b e h a l f of a n em ploy er.” J

ohnson , 952 So. 2 d a t 154 (citing Saxony Mills v. Wagner & Co. , 47 So. 899, 901 (Miss. 1908)). ¶20. Hollins served the TRO on Pay ton L a c y , Harrell Neal, K elvin Thigpen, and David Edwin Levy

. A ll f

our were deacons of the church, elected by t he m e m bers and vested with

som e authority , e specially i n tim es when there was no pastor. There was also testim ony that

one o f the deacons was a “f a cilitator,” a nd as such, had som e authority even as to the other deacons. Af

ter caref ul exam ination of the record, we are s atisf ied that the f

our deacons who

were personally serv e d h a d “som e authority ” and were theref ore qualif ied as “authorized agents” to accept service.
II. The chancery c ourt did not have subject-m atter jurisdiction over this action. ¶21. Although we f

ind that the chancery

court had personal jurisdiction over the church, that does not end the inquiry

. Mississippi courts “are not authorized to resolve every claim and dispute that m ay

arise between our citizens. The plaintif f m u st f i le a com p laint which alleges som e cognizable c laim or cause of a c tion against the def endant.” I

n re Bell , 962 So. 2d 537, 541 (Miss. 2007) (em phasis added). And even though S ection 159 of the Mississippi

1 0Constitution gives chancery courts jurisdiction over “[ a ] ll m atters in equity ,” t hat jurisdiction

has lim its. Miss. C onst. art. 6, § 1 59. One i m portant lim it, this Court has explained, is the “require[ m ent] t hat an application f o r injunctive r elief b e p redicated upon some legal or equitable claim which w ill, at some point, proceed to the merits

. Indeed an application f or injunctive relief m

ust dem onstrate

. . . a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits of the claim .” In re Bell , 962 So. 2d at 541 (citations om itted) (em phasis added). ¶22. Here, H ollins cannot prevail on the m erits, because the United States Suprem e Court has m ade it clear that the First Am endm ent p laces m inisterial church-em ploy m ent decisions bey ond the reach o f courts. See H osanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School

v. E .E.O.C. , 132 S. C t. 694, 181 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2013). In other words, Hollins cannot satisf y
t he “cognizable claim ” requirem ent established by this Court. See, e.g. , Hosan n a - T a b o r , 132 S. C t. at 704 ( 2012) ( “Our d ecisions in that area conf irm t hat it is im

perm issible f

or the
governm ent to contradict a church’s determ ination of w ho can act as its m inisters.”); Sawyer

v. B randon , 825 So. 2d 26, 30 (Miss. 2002) (“The church a u thorities and such tribunals as they m ay set up f

or them selves are suprem e in such m atters. Their decision is f inal as to who shall be the pastor and other of f icers. Such disputes are ecclesiastical in t heir nature and the courts have no control over them .”) (em phasis added). ¶23. In H

osanna-Tabor , a Lutheran church school f ired a teacher, apparently in retaliation
f or threatening t o t a ke legal action. Hosanna-Tabor , 132 S. Ct. at 700. The EEOC f iled suit, “alleging that [ the t eacher] had been f ired in retaliation f

o r her threatening to f

i l e a n ADA lawsuit.” Id. The school invoked w h a t i s k nown as the “m i nisterial e xception,”

1 1arguing that “the suit was b a r r e d b y t he First Am endm ent, because the claim s at issue

concerned the e m

p loy m ent relationship between a religious institution and one of its

m inisters.” Id. at 701. 9 ¶24. In a f

f irm i ng t he teacher’s d ism issal, the Court began its analy sis b y detailing religious
f reedom f rom the Magna Carta to t h e P uritans escaping religious p ersecution and state control in England, to colonial parishioners at odds w ith church leadership based in England, and ultim ately

to the ratif

ication of the First Am endm ent. Id. at 702-03. That am endm ent bears directly

on ecclesiastical decisions such as choosing m inisters: By f orbidding the “establishm ent of religion” an d g uaranteeing the “f ree exercise thereof

,” the Religion Clauses e n s ured that the new Federal Governme n t —unlike the English C rown—would have no role in f illing ecclesiastical of

f ic e s. The Establishm e nt Clause prevents the Governm ent f rom appointing m inisters, and t he Free Exercise Clause pre v e n ts i t f rom interf ering with the f

reedom of religious groups to select their own.
Id. at 703. ¶25. The Court then noted t hat, because of t hat un d e r s t a n d i n g of religious f reedom and because of a g eneral l ack of governm ent em ploy m ent regulation, “it was som e tim e bef ore questions about governm ent interf erence with a church’s ability t o select its own m inisters

cam e b ef ore the courts.” Id. at 704. Its decisions “in the context o f disputes over church property ,” however, “conf irm t hat it is im

perm issible f

or t he g overn m e n t t o c o ntradict a church’s determ ination of who can act as its m inisters.” Id.

9 T h e C o u rt n o ted th at th e f ed eral “C o u r

ts o f A p p eals h av e u n if

o r m ly reco g n ized th e ex isten ce o f a ‘ m in isterial ex cep t io n ,’ g ro u n d ed in t h e F irst A m en d m en t, th at p reclu d es ap p licatio n o f su ch l eg islatio n (T itle V II) to claim s co n cern in g t h e em p lo y m en t relatio n sh ip b etw een a relig io u s in stitu tio n a n d its m in i sters.” H o s a n n a -T a b o r , 1 3 2 S

. C t. at 7 0 5 ; see a lso id . n .2 (co llectin g cases). 1 2¶26. The C ourt h el d t h a t b o t h the Establishm e nt and Free E xercise clauses bar suits brought

on behalf of m i nisters against their churches claim ing term ination in v i o l a t i o n o f e m ploy m ent discrim ination laws. Id. at 705-06. To hold otherwise, t he Court explained, would allow an unlawf ul interf erence that robs churches of protection the First Am endm ent guarantees: The m em bers of a religious group put their f aith i n the hands o f their m inisters. Requiring a c hurch to a ccept or retain a n unwanted m ini s t e r, or punishing a church f or f a i l i n g t o d o s o, intrudes upon m ore than a m ere em ploy m ent decision

. S u c h action interf eres w ith the internal governance of t he church, depriving the church of control over t he selection o f those who will personif y its belief s. B y im posing an unwanted m inister, the state inf ringes on the Free Exercise C lause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape i ts own f a ith and m ission through i ts appointm ents. Accor d i n g t he state the power to determ ine which individua l s w i ll m inster to the f aithf u l also violates the Establishm ent Clause, which prohibits g o v e r n m ent involvem ent i n such ecclesiastical decisions.
Id. at 706. ¶27. Here, Hollins did not even claim that Greater Fairview had term inated him in v i o lation of any discrim ination law or any other law. Rather, he argued g e n e rally that the church should not have been able to term inate h i m in the m a nner it chose. As detailed a bove, the law i s clear that c ourts cannot constitutionally pass on that i s s ue, and the chancery judge theref ore erred when he e ntered the TRO initially , as well as w h en he vacated the church’s vote and ordered a new one. ¶28. W e disagree w ith Hollins’s argum ent that this Court’s decision in P i l g r im Rest

is “well-established precedent” t hat chancery courts h ave j urisdiction o ver “business af f airs of

a congregational c hurch, and that it is “the sem inal authority

. . . on issues i nvolving the role

o f courts in congregational church governance.” First, this Court has m e ntioned Pilgr i m

1 3Rest only once when addressing the question o f court i nvolvem ent i n c hurch m atters, 10 so we

do not view it as the “well-established precedent” presented by Hollins. ¶29. Second, and m ore im portantly , when read in light of the rest of this Court’s “church governance” jurisprudence, Pilgrim Rest represents a narrow exception t o the longstanding practice o f this C ourt to ref use to involve itself i n ecclesiastical m atters. 11 There, this Court

10 See R o m an Catholic Diocese o f Jackson v. Morrison , 905 S o. 2d 1 213, 1241 (Miss. 2 005) (distinguishing Pilgrim Rest because it involved a congregational church and not a hierarchical o n e, and citing it only f or the proposition that civil courts m ay , “ in appropriate circumstances , order that [ a] vote take place”) (em phasis added).

11 S e e S m ith v. Charles , 24 So. 968, 968 (Mi s s . 1 8 99) (af f irm ing a chancellor’s dism issal of an intra-church dispute in three sentence s: “This is a contest between two f actions of King Solom on’s B aptist Church o f V icksburg. The chancellor dism i ssed the bill f or want of jurisdiction in the c ourt to entertain the case m a de b y the bill and t he proof

. W e concur in his view, t hat the court had no jurisdiction.”) ; Mt. Helm Baptist Church v. Jones , 30 So. 714, 716 (Miss. 1901) ( explaining that thi s C o u r t “exercises no e cclesiastical jurisdiction. I t accepts what the highest ecclesiastical authority in each church p rom ulgates as the f a ith and practice o f that church; t hat authority , under Baptist p ol i ty , being each separate Baptist church”); Windham v . Ulm er , 59 So. 8 10, 8 10 (Miss. 1912) (“The Baptist Church does not, a s a religious s ect or denom ination, possess a constitution or c r eed, like the P r e s b y t e r i an, Methodist, a nd m any other churches. Its f o rm of g overnm ent is congregational , and theref

ore purely dem ocratic.”) (quoting Poynter v . P h e l p s , 111 S.W

. 699, 702 (Ky

. 1908)) (internal quotation m arks om itte d ) ; Allen v. Roby , 67 So. 8 99, 900 (Miss. 1915) (holding that when a sim

ple m ajority of a Baptist church m akes a decision, “the c ourts will not interf ere to d eterm ine questions involving doctrines or governm ent of a Baptist church”); Edw a r d s v . D e V ance , 103 So. 94 (Miss. 1925) ( “The of f ice of deacon is purely ecclesiastical, and the incum bent thereof is subject at all tim es to t he control o f t he church; the only persons entitled thereto being those the church recognizes as s uch. Over the of f ice and electio n s t o i t the courts have no control, and it is here wholly im m aterial whether the e l e ction of any of the parties hereto was illegal; t hat being f or the determ i nati o n o f t h e churc h , and those of t he parties hereto who are r ecognized by t he c hurch a s such have the right to discharge the duties o f deacon thereof

. ” ); Grantham v. Hum

phries , 1 8 8 S o. 313 (Miss. 1939) (Facing the ques t i on whether a n ousted p astor and those loy al to him were entitle d to injunctive relief and use of t he church p roperty , this court “reach[ ed] the sam e conclusion the chance l lor did. The question involved is ecclesiastical and not one f or the civil courts. The c hurch authorities and such tribunals as t hey m ay set u p f o r them selves are suprem e in such m atters. Their decision i s f inal as to who s h a l l b e the pastor and other 1 4addressed a dispute between two o pposing f a ctions in a Baptist Church. Pilgrim R est , 835
So. 2 d at 6 9

. One f

action, including the pastor and s everal deacons, f iled a com

plaint (on behalf of the church) i n chancery c ourt t o enjoin another f action, which included another deacon and the Board of Trustees, f rom “doing any act relating to the b usiness a f f airs of the Church which is against the Church’s by -laws.” Id. ¶30. In r esponse, the Board o f T rustees f iled a com p laint t hat also purported to be on behalf of the church. Id. The Trustees’ com plaint sought “a declaration t hat the Church

m em bership had t he right to relieve [ the pastor]

. . . .” Id. T he c o m plaint also sought a TRO enjoining the other f

action f rom spending any of t he church’s f unds and requiring “them to provide an accounting and reim burse the Church f

or f unds spent.” Id. ¶31. The chancery court “granted the Trustees a p r e l i mi n a r y i n j u n c tion f

reezing the
C h urch’s f

unds and appointed [ two] consulting experts to com plete an accounti n g o f a l l

of f icers. S uch disputes are ecclesiastical in their n ature and the courts have no control over them .”); Blue v. Jones , 230 So. 2d 569 (Miss. 1970) ( concluding “that the question of who are the proper trustees of the property of this congregational church, and the identity of the pastor and d eacons are ecclesasti c a l q uestions r ather than issues of property rights. The governm ent of a Baptist C hurch is congregational a n d d e mo cratic, with each church a distinct organization, independent of others. The m em bers of the c hurch have f

ull power to call a pastor and elect property trustees and deacons. In a long l ine o f decisions, this Court has held that it will n o t interf e re to d e t e r m ine questions involving the governm ent of a congregational t y

pe church. ”); Church of G od Pentecostal, Inc. v. Freewill Pentecostal Church o f God, Inc. , 716 S o. 2d 200, 206 (Miss. 1998) (a d o p t i n g a “neutral-principles approach” to resolving property disputes involving c h urches, but af f irm ing that m atters ecclesiastical are “outside the param eters of the application of neutral principles”); Sawyer v. Brandon , 825 S o. 2d 26 (Miss. 2002) (noting that a chancellor had jurisdiction over the p r o p e r t y a s p ect of a church dispute, but h ad “wisely declined to becom e e nsnared in th e controv e rsies regarding m em bership and voting as t hese were certainly e cclesiastical m atters”).

1 5f

unds deposit e d a n d t o reconcile Church f inances.” Id. T hereaf

ter, the chancery court consolidated the two actions and conducted a hearing. At the hearing, t he p astor testif ied that he had ignored a letter f

r om t he church announcing his rem oval because t he m em bership had

not com p lied with the by laws. Id. at 7 0. Specif ically , the pastor argued that the accusations against him had been m ade by t wo i n active m em bers, and t hose a ccusations had not been investigated by t he deacons as the by laws required. I d. A lso, although the church m em bers had m e t and voted to r em ove the pastor, h e alleged that the m e eting “was im proper because it was not held on church property , and it was n ot set by the Board of Deacons and presided over by the pastor.” I

d. ¶32. Af ter the hearing, “the chancellor ordered a l ist of qualif ied voters to b e com

piled and

a f orm al election f

o r the m em

bers to decide if [ the p astor] would rem a i n pastor.” Id. at 69. The c hancellor’s order explained t hat she had exam ined the church’s by laws and had f ound, based on the hearing testim o ny , t hat very f ew of the by laws had been f ollowed. Id. She expressed her doubts as to whether one could f ollow the by laws even if one wanted to, given the “am biguity ” and “unclearness.” The chancellor ordered a new vote, and the church voted
54-0 t o r em ove the pastor, who, along with the deacons, a p pealed. Id. at 70-71. They argued “that t he chancellor’s judgm ent violated the First and Fourteenth Am endm ents to t he United
States Constitution in that a civil c ourt becam e involved in a[ n] ecclesiastical dispute.” Id.
at 71. ¶33. Although this Court af f i rm ed the chancellor, it was caref ul to note that t he dispute was

not about “ the propriety or justif ication f or dism issing a pastor.” Id. at 71. Rather, the issue

1 6bef

ore this Court was whether the “church itself has spoken. If it has, this court inquires no f urther. It if

has not, this court m ay

restore the status quo to enable the church to act.” Id.

at 72. H ere, we a re not f

aced with two f

actions of a church f

ighting o ver m oney and property and arguing about whether the by

- laws have been f ollowed. Rather, we are f aced only with

an aggrieved p a s t or who is u nhappy that his church voted to term inate him

. As this Court stated in Pilgrim Rest , the ‘“court’s jurisdiction is l im ited to purely secular issues, and the

court m ust not be involved in ecclesiastical issues.’” Id. at 72 (citation om itted). I n s u m ,

we f i nd that t he chancery judge e rr e d w h e n he treated this e cclesiastical controversy as a secular one—a pastor who is unhappy about being term inated by a church sim

ply does not present a secular controversy

. As such, the c hancellor had no authority i nitially to issue the
TRO or to vacate G reater Fairview’s vote and order a new one, as Hollins cannot prevail on the m erits of

his claim

. CONCLUSION ¶34. Because H ollins’s request f or a TRO presented a purely ecclesiastical c o n t r o versy , the chancery court was without jurisdiction to hear it. As such, he erred when he issued the TRO and when he vacated Greater Fairview’s vote and ordered a new one, and we ther e f o re reverse and vacate the orders of the Hinds County

Chancery

Court in this m atter. ¶35. REVERSED AND VACATED. WALLER, C .J., D ICKINSON A ND RANDOLPH, P . J J., KITCHENS, CHANDLER, PIERCE, KING AND COLEMAN, JJ., CONCUR.

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