U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

21–542PDF 2016

TURKEY AFTER THE JULY COUP ATTEMPT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND 

EMERGING THREATS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 14, 2016

Serial No. 114–222

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS

DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Ms. Nina Ognianova, coordinator, Europe and Central Asia Program, Committee to Protect Journalists ............................................................................... 5

Mr. Alan Makovsky, senior fellow, Center for American Progress ...................... 14

Ahmet S. Yayla, Ph.D., deputy director, International Center for the Study 

of Violent Extremism ........................................................................................... 29

Aaron Stein, Ph.D., resident senior fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle 

East, Atlantic Council .......................................................................................... 43

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Ms. Nina Ognianova: Prepared statement ............................................................ 8

Mr. Alan Makovsky: Prepared statement .............................................................. 16

Ahmet S. Yayla, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ......................................................... 32

Aaron Stein, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................... 45

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 68

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 69

(1)

TURKEY AFTER THE JULY COUP ATTEMPT 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:25 p.m., in room 

2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me go on record right off the bat by saying how happy I am that Congressman Meeks and I decided to 

have haircuts on the same day. All right. Okay. 

I call this hearing to order. Just over 2 months ago, this subcommittee met for a hearing focused on Turkey’s democratic decline, the second such hearing that has been held by this committee. Eight days later, an attempt was made to overthrow the 

AKP government, and during the chaos and conflict on the night 

of July 15, over 240 Turkish civilians were killed, and the Turkish 

Parliament bombed from the air. 

As one might expect, this and the following upheaval that followed it has been a traumatic experience for the people of Turkey. 

Let them have no doubts, however, that the United States stands 

by them in our support for democracy and the rule of law. President Obama has made that clear on July 15, and that remains the 

case. 

Unfortunately, great damage has been done, and great damage 

has been done as part of the coup attempt, but, at the same time, 

President Erdogan has been making a bad situation worse by using 

the failed coup as an opportunity to expand his own political power. 

In short, after the coup collapsed, a state of emergency was declared, and the government began arresting a wide range of opponents that had nothing to do with the coup. Journalists, 

secularists, military officers, government officials who did not agree 

with President Erdogan’s vision for Turkey, they were arrested, 

10,000 of them, and they have been arrested, and a number of 

them have been tortured. 

The Turkish Government is blaming its travail on—and I can’t 

pronounce his first name—Fethullah Gulen. Okay. 

Mr. WEBER. Fethullah Gulen. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. There it is. 

A Turkish religious philosopher living in exile on a Pennsylvania 

farm. The claim that he personally planned and ordered the coup 

has been accepted by many Turkish citizens despite the lack of 

2

substantial evidence to indicate that. To this effect, I don’t find 

such charges to be credible, and I believe that the Turkish Government has erred by proclaiming anyone and everyone involved in 

the Gulenist religious movement to be part of a conspiracy that put 

on the coup. 

Again, over perhaps 100,000 civil servants, military officer, 

teachers, policemen, prosecutors, even judges have been removed 

from their jobs and many of them have been arrested. They have 

been replaced by Erdogan’s cronies, by political opportunists, and, 

yes, by even Muslim Brotherhood radicals and other Islamic fascists. As one example of how far these ridiculous purges have gone, 

the Turkish soccer authorities announced they have fired 94 officials, including a number of soccer referees, for their ties to the 

coup. Over 20,000 people—whatever that exact number, it is in the 

tens of thousands—have been arrested, and the Government of 

Turkey has used this coup to settle old scores and to clean out the 

house of those it does not seem—or deem sufficiently loyal to 

Erdogan’s vision for Turkey. 

Incredibly, it was reported last month that Turkey would release 

38,000 criminals from prison to make room for those taken into 

custody in these purges, letting murderers, rapists, thieves go in 

order to make room for political opponents. It doesn’t get much 

worse than that. 

As we have in our conversations about recent events in Turkey, 

I want to underline my desire to see Turkey become an economically strong partner of the United States that is at peace both at 

home and with its neighbors. The Turks have been wonderful allies 

of the American people. And as we are going through this testimony today and we are seeing what the current regime in Turkey 

is doing, which is heavy handed and wrong—let’s not forget that 

the Turkish people themselves have been so loyal to us. We must 

wish them well and do what we can to try to help them through 

this confusing time period. I mean, Turkey, as I say, needs, in 

order to do that and to—and for us to succeed and for them to succeed, Turkey needs to have strong democratic institutions, a free 

press, and a country in which people abide by the rule of law. 

The government’s current witch hunt that sees disloyal Gulenists 

behind every door is bound to backfire, even in the short run, but 

be disastrous in the long run. The fear and tension created by a 

thuggish coup and by a heavy-handed response does not and is not 

serving the Turkish people well. 

I want to thank our witnesses for appearing here today. And, 

without objection, their written statements will be made part of the 

record, and all members will have at least 5 legislative days to submit additional written questions or extraneous materials for the 

record. 

I now turn to our ranking member, Mr. Meeks, for his opening 

statement. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Chairman Rohrabacher, for calling today’s hearing on Turkey and giving us an opportunity to discuss 

the attempted coup and its consequences for Turkey and the 

United States and Turkey’s relationship. 

Clearly, the coup was a traumatic shock to the system. I can recall when it was taking place looking at my television screen in disVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:48 Oct 06, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\091416\21542 SHIRL
3

belief. So it is clear, and I agree with Mr. Rohrabacher in this aspect, I stand in solidarity with the democratically elected Turkish 

Government and against any violent attempts to overthrow it or 

any other democratically elected government. Democracy is important. We can’t have coups d’etat. We have got to speak out against 

coups d’etat in order to have democratic order. 

When I think about over 270 people were killed as the Parliament and ministries were attacked with helicopters and F-16s 

joining the fight, I can’t even imagine such a scene here in Washington, DC, soldiers firing into civilian crowds. We cannot, and I 

can’t believe as Members of Congress that that is something that 

we want to see or can condone in any way. It is our job to respect 

and defend the democratic process, and a democratic Turkey is in 

everyone’s best interests. 

Following the failed coup, there has been a big issue of Mr. 

Gulen, his residency in Pennsylvania, and his movement’s involvement in the coup. And it has taken on an increasingly charged role 

in Turkish-U.S. relations. The United States has taken the accusations and requests for Mr. Gulen’s extradition and detention very 

seriously, but as I say, in democracies, there are processes. There 

are institutions, and there is a judicial process that is in place now 

and a related treaty that will determine this outcome. So it is not 

something that could be done arbitrarily or capriciously or anything of that nature. There is a process that has to be had and 

should be. That is the reason why we have these institutions, and 

that is the reason why we have these treaties. 

So I say just linking the U.S. Government to the coup, apart 

from being false, damages our important relationship, and it is 

something that I deeply care about because the relationship between the United States and Turkey is very important. I understand that members of the Turkish Government are understandably angry, but emotional statements and accusations will not expedite the judicial process. It has to run its course, as our judicial 

system demands. 

And perhaps, as a result of the failed coup and subsequent 

purges, Turkey has markedly stepped up its fight against Daesh in 

Syria. Turkey is a NATO ally and plays an essential role in the region, and has sought to mend relations with Russia and Israel. And 

while cooperation with those countries is welcome, Turkey’s role in 

NATO and as host to over 1,500 U.S. troops remains especially important to the United States Congress. 

In our previous hearing on this topic we discussed Turkey’s 

democratic development, the Kurdish question, and the role of a 

civil society in Turkey. During the failed coup and afterwards, in 

an impressive show of unity, all Turkish political parties came to 

the defense of the elected government and even supported a search 

for those allegedly responsible for the coup, including Gulenists and 

members of Hizmet movement. Indeed, those found guilty should 

be rooted out of the government’s organs and brought to justice. 

The state of emergency, however, must not be used to cover, to 

detain, arrest, and fire those with no responsibility for the coup. 

How many judges, teachers, and businessmen have been found innocent and allowed to return to their posts? We must look at and 

analyze because if you had nothing to do with this and you are 

4

found innocent, as I am sure there are many individuals, they 

should be returned to their posts. Furthermore, are members of the 

legal pro-Kurdish movement, the HDP, being unjustly ensnared in 

a political war? As previously mentioned, we must protect the 

United States-Turkey relationship and simultaneously encourage 

strong democratic institutions and respect for the law. 

So, for me, this is an important hearing to listen to these witnesses, to get your expert viewpoints on what is or is not taking 

place in Turkey, because it is important for us to decide as Members of the United States Congress what we should or should not 

do, what we should or should not say. 

Just as I say that, the Turkish Parliament should not do things 

based upon emotion, I also believe that we in the United States 

Congress should not do something just based upon emotion. We 

need to try to figure out what the issues are and what the facts 

are, and move accordingly because it is important for our relationship, and I think all over the world that the U.S. and Turkey have 

a strong relationship. 

So I want to thank the witnesses in advance for their testimony, 

and I look forward to asking questions as we move forward. And 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I thank you, Mr. Meeks. 

One of our members also has a 1-minute opening statement, 

Colonel Cook from California. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. 

I think a number of us are worried about Turkey. Obviously, this 

is a Foreign Affairs Committee hearing. I am also on the House 

Armed Services Committee. I am also on the NATO Parliament. As 

already discussed, everybody knows that Turkey has been a key 

ally. It is a member of NATO. The Turkish Americans in my district throughout California, very, very close to the business climate, 

all those pluses. I think right now everybody is very, very nervous 

about the Erdogan government, some of the things that are happening as we speak, obviously, the relationship with the Kurds, the 

relationship with some of the Christians. And I am not sure—right 

now, I don’t have that optimism about Mr. Erdogan. And this was 

well before the coup. And this is going to determine whether our 

military relations continue. We have a key base at Incirlik. We had 

problems before. We are going to see what happens after the coup. 

And we also have an impending sale of F-35s, the most advanced 

aircraft. And whether that will still be approved by the administration and Congress, that is something that is coming up. 

So this coup and everything that has happened there, I am not 

as optimistic as my colleagues because of some of the mixed signals, but then you look at Israel, that a year or 2 years ago, they 

had severed diplomatic relations, and surprisingly enough, recently 

they have kind of normalized relations with Turkey. 

So, hopefully, we can get passed this, hopefully we can establish 

a dialogue with Mr. Erdogan, and hopefully, we can have a democracy in a country right now where, in my opinion, it does not exist. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Today, we have four excellent witnesses. And 

my direction would be, as usual, if you could get to the heart of the 

matter and give us 5 minutes of the basic information you think 

5

we need to know. The rest of your statement will be made part of 

the record. And we will proceed with that in mind. 

And our first witness—and I will introduce all witnesses, and 

then you will testify—Nina, and, again, I am going to pronounce 

this, Ognianova? That is good enough? All right. And she is the coordinator for Europe and Central Asia programs for the Committee 

to Protect Journalists, where she has tracked developments in Turkey for the past several years. Previously, she worked as a writer 

for the International Journalists Network and earned a master’s 

degree from Missouri School of Journalism. 

And next is Alan Makovsky, who is a senior fellow at the Center 

for American Progress. He has been with us several times, and I 

am finally learning how to pronounce his name. It is a private 

think tank, of course, the Center for American Progress, and it is 

here in Washington, DC. And for more than a decade, he served 

as a senior professional staff member right here, so we give him 

a little leeway that way, on the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 

House Foreign Affairs Committee, covering the Middle East, Turkey, and the other problems that we tackled in this committee. Before that, he directed the Washington Institute’s Turkey Research 

Program and was an employee of the State Department. 

We have next Ahmet Yayla. Good. Got it. And he is an adjunct 

professor at the Department of Criminology, Law, and Society at 

George Mason University, and the deputy director of the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism. He has a long 

career as a Turkish law enforcement officer and served as chief of 

the antiterrorism division of the Turkish National Police. And he 

has earned his master’s degree and Ph.D. Degrees from the University of North Texas. And he is the author of a recent book, and I 

would ask you to give us the title of your book during your testimony. See? There you go. Okay. 

And then there is Aaron Stein, a senior fellow at the Atlantic 

Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East—Hariri, okay—

where this institute follows and comments on developments in Turkey and in the region. Dr. Stein received his Ph.D. In Middle East 

and Mediterranean studies at King’s College in London. 

Does that mean you are English? 

Mr. STEIN. No. American. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Oh, there. All right. 

So we will start on this end, and we will then, after 5-minute 

presentations, open it up for questions from the panel. Okay. 

Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF MS. NINA OGNIANOVA, COORDINATOR, EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA PROGRAM, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on press freedom in Turkey after the July 15 coup attempt. My name is Nina 

Ognianova, and I am the Eurasia program coordinator at the Committee to Protect Journalists. We are a press freedom organization 

dedicated to defending the rights of journalists worldwide, and it 

is an honor to speak with you today. 

6

My oral statement will be a summary of my written statement, 

which contains extended analysis and specific examples of press 

freedom violations in Turkey. 

On July 15, military officers attempted to overthrow Turkey’s 

elected government. Thousands of Turks took to the streets to defend it, and more than 200 were killed. In this crucial moment, 

Turkey’s usually polarized society was united. The AKP received 

overwhelming support from across the political spectrum, but instead of channeling that support to bridge differences, authorities 

have been using the failed putsch to purge their opponents: Mounting a sweeping crackdown on the critical media when Turkey most 

needs a plurality of voices. The government immediately blamed 

the coup on the Hizmet movement, followers of preacher Fethullah 

Gulen, whom the Turkish Government accuses of leading a terrorist organization. Gulen has denied all accusations. 

Within days after the putsch, the AKP announced the state of 

emergency that allowed it to govern by decree. Within a few weeks, 

the government had closed down more than 100 media, including 

broadcasters, newspapers, magazines, publishers, and distribution 

companies, and it had detained over 100 journalists. At least 30 

news Web sites were censored by state regulators. Some journalists 

have managed to escape into exile. Others’ passports were canceled 

to prevent their departure. Judges suspected of having ties to 

Hizmet were purged and replaced with AKP loyalists. 

The Prime Minister’s office has revoked the press credentials of 

over 600 journalists. In mid-August, CPJ’s 2016 International 

Press Freedom Award recipient, Can Dundar, resigned his editorship of the daily Cumhuriyet and said he would not return to Turkey while the state of emergency was in effect. Trusting the judiciary, Dundar said, would be like laying one’s head on the guillotine. 

The scope of the purge has spread far beyond the requirements 

of the safety and security of the Turkish state. With all the media 

outlets perceived as tied to Gulen already shuttered and with the 

list of journalists arrested for once having worked at this media 

growing by the day, the purge has now moved on to individual critics of both the government and the Hizmet movement, and the 

long-standing judicial and police harassment of the Kurdish media 

has intensified. 

The state of emergency has given security agencies the right to 

detain individuals for up to 30 days without access to a judge, 

which has created conditions in which detainees are at risk of 

abuse. In my written testimony, I have described several cases of 

reported police abuse of journalists in custody, and all of these 

abuses have been carried out with impunity. 

CPJ is dismayed at the cancellation of a growing number of journalists’ passports. This punitive measure has been extended to the 

family members of the accused. In one disturbing recent case, on 

September 3, Can Dundar’s wife, Dilek, here in the picture, was 

prevented from traveling to Europe to visit her husband in exile. 

Security officers confiscated her passport without giving any reason. She has not been charged with a crime, so the only explanation for this official action is that she is being punished for her 

husband’s journalism. 

7

There is much that remains unclear about the July 15 coup attempt, but instead of allowing Turkish journalists to do their job 

and to investigate the truth about this conspiracy, the government 

is making the press pay the price for the illegal actions of rogue 

military officers. 

Turkey’s domestic purge of its media has international repercussions. Credible independent media reports are vital for the world’s 

understanding of Turkey’s handling of the Syrian refugee crisis or 

the battle against Islamic State. 

While it is important to condemn the coup attempt, we strongly 

urge U.S. leaders to condemn the continuing purge of opposition 

and independent media. The U.S. should allow Turkish journalists 

caught in the post-coup purge to travel to the United States. CPJ 

awardee Can Dundar hopes to travel to New York in November to 

receive his award. The U.S. should not honor Turkish arrest warrants for journalists and should encourage other countries not to 

honor those warrants as well and should treat journalist’s travel 

documents as valid even if Turkey has already canceled them. We 

urge Congress to consider imprisoned Turkish journalists as prisoners of conscience, including the more than 100 journalists detained in the aftermath of the failed coup. 

Plunging to a naked authoritarianism risks destabilizing Turkey, 

which is a vital U.S. ally. Putting an end to the ever broadening 

crackdown on independent media is a vital step toward stopping 

and reversing that plunge before it becomes too late. 

Thank you for providing CPJ with the opportunity to address you 

today. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ognianova follows:]

8


21542a-1.eps
9


21542a-2.eps
10


21542a-3.eps
11


21542a-4.eps
12


21542a-5.eps
13


21542a-6.eps
14

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Makovsky. 

STATEMENT OF MR. ALAN MAKOVSKY, SENIOR FELLOW, 

CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS 

Mr. MAKOVKSY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Meeks, esteemed members of 

the subcommittee——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Put the mike a little closer to you. There you 

go. 

Mr. MAKOVKSY. Yeah. I forgot to turn it on. Second time in a row 

I have done that. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. How much you forget. 

Mr. MAKOVKSY. Yeah. I told you I wasn’t on this side of the table 

before. Anyway, I will start again. 

Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Meeks, esteemed 

members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to have been invited 

back to testify here today on this important topic. Maybe I will get 

it right this time. 

Mr. Chairman, any discussion of the post-coup environment in 

Turkey must begin with an acknowledgement that Turkish society 

endured an enormous trauma on July 15, as you and the ranking 

member and Mr. Cook all said in your opening remarks. As well, 

I think we should acknowledge that the U.S. and, for that matter, 

European Union’s response to the coup was less than optimal, inadvertently feeding conspiracy mindedness in Turkey. 

That said, it is now 2 full months since the coup, and it is more 

than fair to take stock of the Turkish Government’s reaction. Their 

reaction has been found wanting in three major ways. First of all, 

the vastness and persistence of the purge of the civil service, which 

you have detailed in your opening remarks, the arrest of journalists, the closure of media outlets, the arrests for spurious reasons, 

many of these arrests having nothing whatsoever—of people having 

nothing whatsoever to do with Gulen or Gulenists, has turned a 

somewhat understandable initial desire to err on the side of caution into an unbridled witch hunt. Even President Erdogan recently expressed some concern about how vast this is, and he said 

to governors: You should not vie with one another to see who can 

arrest more people. 

And this is happening against a background of growing 

authoritarianism in Turkey that predates the coup attempt, as we 

discussed at our previous hearing. 

Second, even in ostensibly pursuing post-coup unity, President 

Erdogan’s approach has been divisive. Revulsion of the coup attempt and justifiable pride in thwarting it through popular action 

united many Turks in the coup’s immediate aftermath. However, 

government-led post-coup efforts at healing were, in fact, themselves divisive, excluding the party that most Kurds in Turkey’s 

southeast support, the People’s Democracy Party, or HDP, which is 

in fact, the third largest party in Parliament. For example, HDP 

has been excluded from talks on a new Turkish constitution, and 

it was excluded from the emotional August 7 Istanbul rally that attracted millions of Turks supporting democracy and condemning 

the coup. 

15

Third, the Turkish Government has engaged in anti-U.S. 

scapegoating following the coup attempt, primarily through means 

of the heavily pro-government media, which has repeatedly blamed 

the coup attempt on the U.S. Government and various U.S. citizens, both public and private. The government has reinforced this 

scapegoating by raising suspicions regarding Fethullah Gulen’s 

long-time residence in the United States and by leading the Turkish public to expect the United States to deliver Mr. Gulen to Turkey quickly, with little acknowledgement that extradition is a 

lengthy process that can only be successfully achieved with hard 

evidence. 

According to a generally reliable Turkish poll taken during the 

third week of August, one-quarter of Turks believe that the United 

States was behind the coup whereas 55 percent believe Gulen was 

the mastermind. That means one-quarter believe we were much 

more behind it than even Gulen. Anecdotal evidence, I would say, 

however, suggests that far more than one-quarter believe the U.S. 

had at least indirect involvement in or prior knowledge of the coup 

attempt. According to the same poll, 90 percent of Turks now have 

an unfavorable view of the U.S., with only 9 percent favorable. 

Looking ahead, it is clear that President Erdogan is now a far 

more dominant ruler than he was even before the coup attempt. He 

is also likely to remain a difficult partner for the United States. I 

don’t believe Turkey wants to leave NATO, nor should we want it 

to do so, but President Erdogan’s Turkey is likely to push the 

boundaries of partnership at times and use its reborn relationship 

with Russia as well as manipulate anti-Americanism at home as leverage with us on bilateral issues. 

Two final points quickly, Mr. Chairman, if I may. A good relationship with Turkey remains a highest priority U.S. national interest, but we should not turn a blind eye to Turkey’s deteriorating 

human rights situation nor conveniently forget that this deterioration began well before the July 15 coup attempt. 

Second, and finally, more broadly, we must remain alert to the 

possibility that Turkey could indeed drift from the Western alliance. I do not believe that will happen, but given the many strains 

on U.S.-Turkish bilateral relations, the possibility of Turkey turning away from the West is now sufficiently plausible that it would 

be wrong not to plan for that contingency. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Makovsky follows:]

16


21542b-1.eps
17


21542b-2.eps
18


21542b-3.eps
19


21542b-4.eps
20


21542b-5.eps
21


21542b-6.eps
22


21542b-7.eps
23


21542b-8.eps
24


21542b-9.eps
25


21542b-10.eps
26


21542b-11.eps
27


21542b-12.eps
28


21542b-13.eps
29

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you for that important warning. 

Next, we have Mr. Yayla. 

STATEMENT OF AHMET S. YAYLA, PH.D., DEPUTY DIRECTOR, 

INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM 

Mr. YAYLA. Thank you very much, Chairman Rohrabacher, 

Ranking Member Meeks. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And we would like you to speak right into 

that microphone. 

Mr. YAYLA. Okay. Dear Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Meeks, members of subcommittee, and ladies and gentlemen, 

it is an honor to testify before you today. Since we have 5 minutes, 

I have detailed in my written statement, but I would like to go over 

a few quick points very fast. 

I think it is critical to understand the pre-coup conditions in Turkey, especially in regards to President Erdogan. The economy before the coup was suffering very deeply. The tourism industry was 

almost dead after the several terrorist attacks. After the shootdown 

of Russian airplane, the sanctions put on Turkey by Putin were deteriorating. The economy was very bad, especially tourism suffered 

a lot. And after 2013 December criminal charges against the government, the rule of law had started to mean nothing, and several 

international businessmen, businesses and investors left Turkey, 

like Tesco, PayPal, also. And freedom of speech, free media, and 

the rule of law started to mean nothing in Turkey, basically eroding the foundations of democracy in Turkey. 

Turkey was going through tough times, and the relationship with 

the West, with the EU, and NATO was deteriorating. Erdogan, as 

the gatekeeper of ISIS, kept tricking the EU with the sending of 

several thousand refugees to the European countries. The U.S. was 

upset with Turkey’s failed commitment to fight with ISIS and 

Erdogan’s, or Turkey’s, illicit support to ISIS. For example, the 

leader of Turkish ISIS, Halis Bayancuk, was released from prison 

almost a year ago, and right now, he freely operates inside Turkey 

without any problems. 

Just a week ago, suspects of Sultanahmet’s Blue Mosque ISIS 

suicide attack were released from prison. If you look at the arrests 

of those ISIS people, ISIS suspects, when they got arrested somehow they were not handcuffed, but if you look at the journalists, 

when they got arrested, they were handcuffed from the back. So 

that is the approach of the government, unfortunately. If you compared the ISIS members and the journalists or other people getting 

arrested. 

Another problem was the Zarrab case. Right now, Zarrab, an Iranian Turkish businessman, in New York Federal—being tried in 

New York Federal court, and he was the key person to Turkey’s oilto-gold scheme, which was managed by the government and Zarrab 

was managing that, and right now is being tried for money laundering, bank fraud, and evading sanctions against Iran. And that 

person was arrested during 2013, corruption charges raised by 

Istanbul police, who Erdogan backed up very furiously and who 

pledged to Erdogan’s wife’s foundation millions of dollars. 

30

Close associates of Erdogan and his sons were being named with 

dealing with ISIS oil on the media, and Erdogan could not produce 

a diploma, university diploma, which was being circulated on social 

media against him. It was very obvious that Erdogan was not able 

to reach his goal through democratic means with all those troubles, 

as the polls showed that his support was diminishing. 

When we look at the aftermath of the coup, I have spent almost 

20 years as a chief of counterterrorism operations in Turkey, and 

I know the capacity of government officials and counterterrorism of 

the police. As the police was dealing with the coup attempters, the 

security services and intelligence, all of a sudden, after 3 hours, 

Erdogan left Ataturk Airport. We had a list of 1,653 military officers who were deemed as the perpetrators of the coup, and of 

whom almost 90 percent were not on the field. And all of a sudden, 

the security services in 3 hours found ways to investigate the coup 

attempt. They analyzed the evidence they had. They made a list of 

1,653 military officers all over Turkey. They got warrants for those 

officers and distributed those warrants to 81 provinces all over 

Turkey in 3, 4 hours. And then the police somehow started to arrest those people in their homes or at their vacation places. And 

from a technical perspective, it should take months, not weeks. So 

it is very clear that that list was prearranged. And also we can see 

that from a list of prosecutors and judges who were fired. They 

fired immediately 2,000 something prosecutors. One the prosecutors was deceased 57 days at the time of his firing. So they fired 

someone who died 2 months ago. 

And we can see a lot of examples of that. For example, Saygi 

Ozturk, a prominent journalist. We listed a few of them. The list 

the government had when they were firing the judges and prosecutors was prepared almost 2 years ago because the cities where they 

were working were the cities where they were working 2 years ago. 

Another important aspect involves the purge, firing, and arrests. 

Over 100,000 people were fired, and almost 60,000 people were arrested and detained. And nobody knows how those lists were arranged and how those people were involved in the coup. 

Another important factor is the questions and inconsistencies of 

the statements of important people after the coup. For example, the 

chief of staff, Akar, the Turkish national intelligence director came 

out and said that he informed Akar at 4 p.m. About the coup. However, Akar himself, he was sitting in his office up until 9 p.m. 

When he was—until he was arrested. He did not inform Erdogan. 

He did not inform the Prime Minister nor did he inform his commanders of the air force, army. The air force commanders learned 

about the coup at a wedding in Istanbul. The commander of Gendarmerie learned about the coup in Ankara at a wedding. So this 

is a very questionable act on not letting know his superiors, President Erdogan and the Prime Minister and others. 

I would like to finish, as I am out of time. My book’s name is 

‘‘ISIS Defectors: Inside Stories of the Terrorist Caliphate.’’

And I would like to finish with one note. My son was arrested 

after I wrote an article on this issue in Turkey because my passport was canceled, and the charges against my son is—the reason 

that he was arrested was because my passport was canceled. 

31

And I would like to give a story from the prophet Muhammad. 

One companion of the prophet Muhammad asked the prophet Muhammad, ‘‘What is the biggest jihad?’’ Because nowadays, with 

ISIS, we hear a lot of stories about jihad. The prophet Muhammad 

said, ‘‘A word of truth in front of a tyrant’s ears.’’

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yayla follows:]

32


21542c-1.eps
33


21542c-2.eps
34


21542c-3.eps
35


21542c-4.eps
36


21542c-5.eps
37


21542c-6.eps
38


21542c-7.eps
39


21542c-8.eps
40


21542c-9.eps
41


21542c-10.eps
42


21542c-11.eps
43

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you. And we will keep your son 

in mind. And——

Mr. YAYLA. Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. I hope whoever is reading this 

testimony in Turkey understands that we know who your son is, 

and we will not—it will not escape our attention if he is continued 

in captivity. 

Dr. Stein, would you like to proceed? 

STATEMENT OF AARON STEIN, PH.D., RESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW, RAFIK HARIRI CENTER FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, ATLANTIC COUNCIL 

Mr. STEIN. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, 

other members of the committee, as well as my panelists for the 

opportunity to speak today. 

I am going to dispense with reading my full statement, and instead, in the interest of time, just focus on the main takeaways. 

I think the failed coup on July 15, I mean, it was obviously a 

very serious event, and I think the scale of the Turkish trauma has 

been underestimated in this country, even people who say that 

they understand that this was a serious event I think still to a certain extent underestimate what took place on July 15. 

I also believe that the coup plotters themselves have been cast 

wrong. You know, I don’t think that they were these series of bumbling fools who made a series of errors. I think that they were very 

serious individuals. I think the coup attempt was larger than most 

people realized. It involved a number of different branches of the 

armed services from two different land—you know, land armies, 

the air force special operations command, the navy, and the coast 

guard. And I do think that there is, you know, enough evidence put 

forward in the Turkish press to say that there was Gulenist involvement, but there were also a lot of other people involved as 

well. 

The post-coup purges have obviously been very, very large. I believe the last count was 80,000 suspended, with some tens of thousands formally arrested. I think it is important to note that a lot 

of these purges have public support in Turkey, and that is because 

of the deep distrust amongst various elements of the Turkish, you 

know, both electorate and people for Fethullah Gulen and his role 

in Turkish society. But I will say this: I think there are signs that 

this unity and this general support for the purges is beginning to 

pass. So, if the rally around the flag, you know, is always palpable 

in states or countries that undergo trauma, you know, thinking 

about our own country after 9/11, it eventually does pass, and I 

think we are in that moment at the moment in Turkey. 

I do believe, however, that the sense of nationalism has been bolstered by two interrelated things. One is that there is a concurrent 

war going—or counterinsurgency, I should call it, in the southeast 

between the Turkish security forces and the PKK. And just to give 

a sense of how large that conflict is—it largely escapes international attention—is, since July, there has been greater than 600 

Turkish security personnel killed and, in a number of different cities that have been destroyed by fighting, more than 500,000 IDPs. 

So this is independent of the Syria conflict as well. 

44

And the other is the instrumentalization of anti-Americanism. 

Now, I agree with Mr. Makovsky that this has been 

instrumentalized and that this is largely a populist crutch that the 

Turkish Government is using, one, because I believe, as, you know, 

a public opinion poll has pointed out, that people do actually believe that the United States was involved in the coup. I think that 

is far more widespread than most people realize. And if we weren’t 

directly involved, because, you know, trying to explain the ins and 

outs of extradition law to any public, you know, causes most people’s eyes to glaze over and they flip the channel. 

And the other is that it is useful because it is always easier to 

blame the foreign other than it is to look internally to what was 

a very domestic Turkish event that the United States has nothing 

to do with the coup; we have nothing to do with the execution of 

Turkish domestic politics, with one exception, that Fethullah Gulen 

is a green card holder. 

The Turkish military, I will focus on as I begin to wrap up, has 

already been affected, and the operational readiness is nowhere 

near where it was before the coup began: 149 flag-ranking officers 

have been purged, replaced with 99, so they are 50 short of admirals and generals than where we were on July 14. The air force has 

plans to shutter three squadrons, perhaps in addition to two more, 

for a total of five, which means that the operational readiness with 

the commitments that they have in three different countries, their 

own, Iraq, and Syria, you know, begin to come into question about 

how large a scale and how they can actually sustain current level 

of operations both against ISIS and the PKK. 

And I think, in closing, I think it is important for us all to realize 

that Turkey is actually unstable, and it is a very difficult ally, but 

nevertheless, it is an important ally. I mean, you can’t really put 

your finger on anything that says, ‘‘This is why Turkey is absolutely instrumental for American interests abroad,’’ except for the 

idea that NATO matters, transatlantic relations matter, especially 

at a time when that sort of fundamental aspect of American foreign 

policy is being called into question more and more about the value 

of overseas alliance. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stein follows:]

45


21542d-1.eps
46


21542d-2.eps
47


21542d-3.eps
48

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That last statement was——

Mr. WEBER. Interesting. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. Is very important, in that we 

have to—look, Turkey—I am 69 years old, for those younger people 

out there who haven’t been around that long. Ever since I can remember, the Turks have always been at our side, and we have 

been at their side. What a tragedy to lose that goodwill and that 

sense of family that we have had with the Turks. And that is one 

of the reasons why as, over the years, there have been different 

controversies and areas of friction that have emerged, I have always bent over backwards to try to be fair to my Turkish friends, 

because they are our friends. 

And, unfortunately, we have now, from what I can see, is that 

the government has gone—the Government of Turkey has gone 

way beyond its bounds of not only propriety but of any type of acceptable response to what was an illegal and bloody and thuggish, 

as I say, coup attempt. And a thuggish coup attempt does not justify creating a dictatorship and an oppressive regime allied with 

radical Islamic forces and eliminating pro-Western people from 

areas of influence in their country. There is no justification for it, 

although we have to recognize, as all of our folks have, that they 

have gone through a trauma. 

However, that is where my line of questioning begins, I would 

suggest, I believe, that just what you can presume that this didn’t 

just happen in terms of the response. This was not a response to 

something that happened. That response was in place. In other 

words, there—and I will ask Mr. Yayla about this. You said that, 

within a matter of hours, thousands of people were being arrested. 

What does that indicate to you as a former officer in Turkish intelligence and law enforcement, that those arrests were ready to be 

made even before the coup? Isn’t that correct? 

Mr. YAYLA. Definitely. You cannot make just a list of 1,653 people from the military as the police—or as the intelligence, because 

the lists are not out there. So those lists were studied, analyzed, 

investigated at least, in my experience, 6 months before. And in 

hours, very short term, while you are dealing with the trauma, 

with all your forces in the field fighting against the coup makers, 

with your intelligence and investigators on the—taking precautions 

and preventative measures, you cannot prepare a list of 1,653 military officers and most of whom were not directly involved with the 

coup, also. Several of them were taken from their vacation places. 

And there was not any indication that those people were related 

with the coup. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So we have all kinds of people who had nothing to do with the coup——

Mr. YAYLA. No. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. Who have been arrested, and we 

have, obviously, a list of people to be arrested long before the coup 

even happened. 

Mr. YAYLA. Yes. In the list, there were deceased people. There 

were several people wrongly listed, and they were already fired. 

Even though they were fired, they were relisted. So it also shows 

that the lists were prearranged because they refired five people. 

49

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. I would like to ask our first two witnesses to put this in perspective for us. Was there this type—was 

there a major increase, because last time we had a hearing, that 

is one of the things we talked about, an increase of repression 

going on in Turkey before the coup? Did we see journalists arrested? Did we see newspapers closed? Did we see opposition parties or whatever suppressed before the coup? 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. I can speak about the situation with the press 

and the media. We have been following daily events, press freedom 

events in Turkey for years, but because of the magnitude of the 

crackdown, which had started months and months before the coup 

attempt, we were compelled to create a daily chronicle of those 

events. We started putting it out in March, which is when the—

we thought that was the peak of repressions, when the Zaman—

the Feza media group, which includes Zaman and a number of 

other big pro-Gulen media, were basically confiscated by the state. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And that is—when was that? 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. That was in March. And that was really a peak 

moment that we thought that this was the culmination of months 

and months before that of repressions, but we were wrong because 

after we started this daily chronicle in March, we started reporting 

and documenting dozens of cases on a weekly basis. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Dozens of cases——

Ms. OGNIANOVA. Dozens of cases of violations of press freedom, 

including detentions of journalists, prosecutions on politically motivated charges, including terrorism charges, criminal charges, insult 

charges, the de facto imprisonment of detained journalists, the 

shuttering of media outlets——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Ms. OGNIANOVA [continuing]. Their confiscation by the government and their use for—basically they became mouthpieces. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Thank you. We see, in the press area, 

there was this repression a long time before the coup. 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. A long time before the coup. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So no matter how thuggish the coup was, 

that can’t be an excuse for the tyranny that happened even before 

it and, as we heard from the witness, was probably arranged—the 

thousands of people were probably arranged even before there was 

a coup. 

Mr. Makovsky what about—excuse me. The press, what about 

other opposition parties, et cetera, did we have that type of repression before the coup? 

Mr. MAKOVKSY. Yeah. Absolutely. I would fully associate myself 

with Ms. Ognianova’s remarks. And as I testified last time, media 

repression in Turkey has been going on for years, and a lot of it 

has been very insidious and not so visible: In-house censorship, a 

lot of self-censorship, many firings have been going on for a long 

time. Most people who work on Turkey in this town have many 

friends who suffered as a result, journalist friends and—suffered 

well long before the coup. 

I wonder, Mr. Chairman, if it is the appropriate time, I was 

going to say a word or two about the Gulen movement and the——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You know what? Let’s hold that off until the 

other questions——

50

Mr. MAKOVKSY. Sure. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. But I will suggest, unless one of 

my colleagues would like to ask specifically about it, but if it does 

not get covered in the questions, we will come back, and I will be 

asking all of you what specifically you believe about the Gulenist 

movement. Is it indeed a conspiratorial movement that tries to in 

some way capture power from a democratically elected government? 

And do you have one comment on whether or not this repression 

that came immediately after the coup and what we have been talking about was in some way already in place before the coup? 

Mr. STEIN. I would agree with most of the statements from the 

colleagues. Yes, because it was in place of when the Gulen movement and the AKP had their political falling out in December 2013, 

so I would say beginning in January 2014 was when you had what 

we would call purges beginning. And so, yes, those lists were already there, because the targeting of the Gulen movement and its 

listing as a terrorist organization in Turkey had already taken 

place before that. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. And correct me if I am wrong. The 

falling out—that the Gulenist movement supported Erdogan prior 

to—well, when he was first coming to power politically, and the 

falling out they had was after the Gulenists in the media reported 

on corruption of the Erdogan government. Is that correct? 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. If I can just——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. That is when—okay. Jump in at that 

point, and then we will go on to my colleagues. 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. There were released recordings of conversations, 

or alleged conversations, between government officials, including 

Erdogan, and his family members and other members of his——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Ms. OGNIANOVA [continuing]. Circle that were leaked on social 

media first, and from there on, the media picked them up. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But the——

Ms. OGNIANOVA. So they were first leaked on——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But the actual——

Ms. OGNIANOVA [continuing]. The media——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But the actual——

Ms. OGNIANOVA [continuing]. On social media. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The releases were releases concerning——

Ms. OGNIANOVA. Corruption. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. Corruption. Right. 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. Correct. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is an——

Ms. OGNIANOVA. Correct. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. Important distinction between 

somebody who gets mad because his children are being talked 

about in a bad way on social media versus somebody who is angry 

because his corrupt practices that were enriching him and his family have been exposed. It is a big difference. 

It is yours. Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As I indicated in my opening statement, you know, I am always 

concerned about democracy and democratic institutions. So my first 

51

question would be, were any members of the Parliament allegedly 

a part of the coup d’etat? Does anybody know? From any parties. 

Were any arrested or charged with anything or dismissed from the 

Parliament or anything of that nature? 

Mr. MAKOVKSY. There were charges against some of the Kurdish 

members of the Parliament, but not specifically about the coup. 

Mr. MEEKS. Right. I am talking about the coup. I am talking specifically about the coup at this point. 

Mr. MAKOVKSY. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. MEEKS. Okay. 

Mr. YAYLA. Not the Parliament members, but Baskan Saban 

Disli, deputy general director of AKP, was reported—Major General 

Mehmet Disli was reported to be among the coup makers. And, in 

fact, Akar testified that he put a gun on his head to sign off to a 

coup statement. However, strangely, when Akar was saved from 

Akinci Base, Mehmet Disli, Major General Mehmet Disli was with 

him arriving the Presidency, and on 16th morning, Mehmet Disli, 

Major General Mehmet Disli, brother of Saban Disli, the AKP deputy general director, arrived to the Prime Ministry with Akar, chief 

of staff. 

Mr. MEEKS. Right. I am specifically focused on the Parliament 

right now. 

Mr. YAYLA. That is the only connection I have. 

Mr. MEEKS. Right. I want to know about that because, you know, 

that is part of democracy, because part of what I believe democracy 

also includes is elections, and there were parliamentarian elections 

in 2015, I believe. And I don’t—you know, I think that we should 

change governments but via democratic elections, you know, like a 

President, like a Prime Minister, you know, member of Parliament, 

you remove them by elections, and so that becomes tremendously 

important to me. 

Let me also ask, because I am trying to make sure that I understand what, if any, differences there are, particularly in dealing 

with journalists, A, are the journalists freely able to report on the 

failed coup and the aftermath and what took place in Turkey, and 

B, how would you describe how journalists—or the differences between how journalists are treated in Turkey as opposed to Russia? 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. Well, the answer to the first question is a plain 

and simple no. They are not freely able to report on the coup or 

on any other sensitive issues. Turkey had been using overly broad 

antiterror laws for months before the coup, but now there is, plain 

and simple, no independent and opposition media to be voicing an 

alternative version of events to what the government is broadcasting happened during the July events. 

As I said before, more than 100 media outlets were shut down 

directly after the coup. And these figures, the 100 detained, the 46 

broadcasters shut down and accreditation taken, are merely a 

snapshot that were taken a couple of weeks after the coup. The 

events on the ground are evolving, and unfortunately to the worse 

for journalists. So chances are there are many, many more journalists detained. 

But, as far as we know, there is no alternative voices that are 

available on the ground at the moment, minus the social media, 

Twitter, which has also been under attack——

52

Mr. MEEKS. Attack. 

Ms. OGNIANOVA [continuing]. In Turkey. 

And in regard to the comparison with Russia, well, in the months 

before the coup, I personally had made this comparison between 

the tactics that President Putin had been taking in regards to the 

Russian media for the past 10 years and what Mr. Erdogan had 

been able to achieve in a matter of a couple of years. In 3 or 4 

years, Erdogan and his government were able to achieve the level 

of censorship in Turkey and Turkish media that the Russian Government had been able to achieve within 10 years. 

Mr. MEEKS. Okay. 

Let me ask Mr. Stein, how have coups in Turkey’s past affected 

Turkey’s relationship to the United States and within NATO? And 

how do you see this failed coup playing out in relation to others? 

Mr. STEIN. I think this coup attempt differs because it wasn’t 

successful, you know. And so what you had is a group of military 

officers who did not succeed in their mission, which was, I think, 

first and foremost, to decapitate the government. 

And because of that, because of the purges, I think you will have 

an effect on the Turkish-NATO relationship, largely because general fear or sort of skepticism about Western institutions is very 

high in Turkey right now. A lot of the forces involved in the 

Istanbul component of the coup attempt were part of NATO’s, you 

know, rapid deployable force. And so it breeds a conspiracy theory 

that NATO must have also known about the coup beforehand. And 

so, when you begin to lose officers who were exposed to NATO, you 

know, were operating within NATO, obviously, it creates friction 

between the two. 

And I would say, just generally, when there are large-scale 

purges going on in any institution, people operating in those institutions are less free to speak their minds or to speak critically of, 

you know, their superiors. And so you will have a tendency within 

the armed forces basically to run everything up the chain of command so that you aren’t, you know, sort of, accused of stepping out 

of line or stepping too far out of line. And so things will begin to 

slow down all throughout Turkey, at least in decisionmaking processes, and be made at the highest levels. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you. 

And my last question would be to Mr. Makovsky. 

One of the things that I believe also sometimes threatens democracy is when countries get so nationalized, nationalism. So I would 

like to ask you, what are the consequences of the rise of Turkish 

nationalism? 

And within that rise, are there any liberal voices calling for the 

protection of institutions regardless of the party in power? Let’s remain that we need to talk to or get close to understand—get a better understanding of what is going on. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Well, I think the primary consequence of the rise 

of nationalism is that it will make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to repair relations between Turks and Kurds. 

There had been a peace process. That peace process fell apart, 

actually, last year. And I think it is now clear, I think President 

Erdogan has made clear there will now be all-out war on the PKK. 

53

And the, sort of, scorched-earth policies of attacks in the southeast 

will alienate the population, already has alienated the population. 

But I think fighting the PKK has great support in Turkey. It always has. And, actually, I think—I know I refer to polls a lot, but 

there was one recently; which is the terrorist group that threatens 

us the most? And PKK was far and away number one; Fethullah 

Gulen, number two; ISIS, number three. I think that will be the 

primary result. 

Are there liberal voices? Yes, there are still liberal voices. And 

I think particularly from the secular opposition party, center-left 

party, there has been a lot of criticism, particularly lately, about 

the purge. There was initially nationwide support for the purge, 

but lately the leader, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, of that party has been 

speaking out against its excesses and also, I think, speaking out 

against some of the excesses against the Kurds. So, there are liberal voices. 

Also, I would just say, on the media, I don’t think we ought to 

think it is North Korea. What it is is a very random process. There 

are still journalists you can read that criticize the government. I 

think if you look at the Hurriyet Daily News today, you will see 

a couple of op-eds that are critical of the government. The problem 

is the journalists never know when that pink slip is going to come. 

And so I—and, of course, they do a lot of self-censorship. 

Thank you. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Colonel Cook? 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Dr. Stein, going back to the military situation, the U.S. military 

is obviously caught between a rock and a hard place. And this antiAmerican—how about all the dependants? Is there a restriction 

now on American military personnel, their families being outside 

the wire, so to speak, where, before, you could visit the whole country and anywhere, right? Isn’t that in effect right now? 

Mr. STEIN. Yes, it is. 

Mr. COOK. And the same thing with Incirlik? Even though we 

have a lot of military operations, everything is under the total control of the Turks in terms of airspace and everything that goes on 

there? 

Mr. STEIN. That is also correct, yes. 

Mr. COOK. Yeah. 

And you kind of alluded to it. Yeah, I know it is a NATO ally, 

I know everything like that, but we have to face reality. If they 

want to shut down all U.S. American operations tomorrow, they 

could do it because they control everything. 

The comment I made about the F-35s, do you have any reaction 

to that question that I refer to? Your feelings? Yes? No? Maybe? 

Mr. STEIN. I think Turkey is—it is a Tier 3 partner in the program and has obviously invested money on it. And they will host 

both the maintenance facility, I believe, for the engines inside Turkey and are producing fuselages for the program. So, yes, I think 

it should be approved. 

Mr. COOK. Even with the fact that getting that technology, their 

new friends are the Russians? Why not just give it to the Chinese 

54

or sell it to the Chinese, which is the rationale why we are developing that weapon, right? 

Mr. STEIN. I think it is important to distinguish between, say, 

the Russians-Chinese potential adversaries and a NATO ally, so—

but I do think that there are frictions over sort of the——

Mr. COOK. Okay. Sometimes we get it mixed up. Snowden 

stopped off in China; then he went to Moscow. So maybe I am old 

and I get them confused sometimes. 

I am very, very, very worried about the Kurds. This is our ally. 

We had talked about them. We have deserted them in the past, 

with the history of Middle East. And it is like, here we go again. 

And, yeah, they have been—and I see it is not going to be just 

the PKK, I think. Quite frankly, I think they are going to kill a 

number of them because of the population demographics and the 

fact that they can have a political influence, and this is obviously 

the opportunity to finally eliminate the Kurds as a political threat 

once and for all. 

Do you agree with that premise? 

Mr. STEIN. No, I don’t. I think that they took a different tactic 

between 2013 and 2015 to try and reach political concessions. But 

one—the previous, Mr. Meeks’ question about the rise of nationalism and perhaps poor decisionmaking by elected leaders is that 

you can lose touch with your population and then you can have a 

return to insurgency in the southeast, and I don’t see a way out 

of that. But, no, I don’t think that the plan is to eradicate the 

Kurds in Turkey. 

Mr. COOK. Well, not completely, but to the point where they are 

not going to be a viable third party in Turkey. I believe it is 11 

percent. Correct me if I’m wrong. 

Mr. STEIN. I believe at the last election it was 10.7, about 11 percent, yes. 

Mr. COOK. And the threshold is 11, right? 

Mr. STEIN. Yeah. 

Mr. COOK. And you don’t think there is going to be any type of 

discrimination to push them over the border or eliminate them, almost similar to the Russians in Chechnya in terms of some of their 

policies? 

Mr. STEIN. No, I don’t think so. Although if their poll numbers 

do drop below 10 percent, you could have the AKP government contemplate early elections. 

Mr. COOK. Okay. 

Last question, I guess, going back to Russia. You know, a year 

ago, those of us in the NATO arena, we were worried about the 

snap exercises, flying in over Kaliningrad, everything like that. 

And the three countries that a lot of the NATO theorists thought 

would destroy the NATO alliance were Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; Latvia because they have such a high number of—Jerry is 

looking at me—Russian speakers. 

And now I am saying here is a golden opportunity for Putin to 

grant his wish, and that is to destroy the NATO alliance. And you 

would not suggest that right now, instead of concentrating on those 

nations—this is a golden opportunity for Putin to finally separate, 

get Turkey out of the NATO alliance. For all intents and purposes, 

I think he would destroy it. 

55

No comment? Anybody? 

Mr. STEIN. I do think that there are parallels between Putin’s 

current strategy versus how the Russians have historically approached, say, you know, East Germany during the cold war and 

exactly why it is important to lean in and continue to engage with 

Turkey and perhaps with——

Mr. COOK. No, no. I meant in relation to Estonia, Latvia, and 

Lithuania. 

Mr. STEIN. I can’t comment on that. 

Mr. COOK. Okay. 

Anyone? No one agrees? 

Okay. I think I am used up. I yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Colonel. 

I will just note, from everything that I have read about the F35, well, maybe we should give it to the Turks at this point. We 

wouldn’t necessarily be doing them a favor, from what I understand. 

Mr. Weber? 

Mr. WEBER. I think you have Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You are up because I am not on the subcommittee. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You are on the committee. 

Mr. WEBER. If I had known that, I would have written down 

some questions. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I can take the time and then come back. 

Mr. WEBER. Go ahead. I am good with that. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Weber yields to Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank my friend from Texas. 

I am here both as a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and as the co-chairman of the Congressional Caucus on Turkey. I happen to believe that the U.S.-Turkey relationship is a very 

strategic and critical one. It is not one that can be dispensed with. 

I also happen to believe that it is in Europe’s interest to see ultimate Turkey integration with the West and with Europe. 

However, I share the concern of the chairman and my colleagues 

that President Erdogan, in his desire to consolidate power after a 

thwarted coup—and, by the way, the thwarting of the coup had 

universal sympathy. It had political sympathy in Turkey among 

the opposition parties. It had virtually complete sympathy here, in 

the West. It was condemned by all the right people. And in a very 

short period of time, politically, by overreaching, it would seem 

that President Erdogan has actually lost sympathy. 

And I am very concerned about crackdown on the press, crackdown on political dissent, crackdown on political opposition, and, of 

course, using the coup, perhaps, as a pretext to get at any and all 

Gulenists, real or perceived. 

And, Mr. Makovsky, I know that the chairman was going to give 

you an opportunity to talk a little bit more about Gulen, and I 

would welcome anybody else. 

But I met with a Turkish delegation recently, and, from my point 

of view, look, the rule of law applies to you and to us. And you 

don’t get to demand someone’s extradition as some kind of symbol 

of our undying support. The burden is on the Government of Turkey to present evidence that would meet any reasonable legal 

56

threshold to justify the extradition of any individual, including Mr. 

Gulen, no matter how unpopular he may be in your ruling circle. 

And the fact that we don’t do that in no way can be construed or 

should be construed as lack of support of this government for your 

government. 

I wonder if you would comment on that. Because I was alarmed 

by the seeming lack of appreciation for what, to us, is a fairly simple legal precept. And you can expand on Gulen, with the consent 

of the chair. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. I completely agree with you, Congressman. I 

think it has been difficult for the Turks to understand—and those 

who do in the leadership understand have certainly not tried to 

educate their public—that this process is about hard evidence. And 

just as you said, if the hard evidence is there, then almost certainly 

Mr. Gulen will be extradited. 

As I understand it, this process is primarily done in the Justice 

Department. They decide if it is worth sending to the courts. If the 

courts decide he is extraditable—I mean, there can be an appeal 

process, but assuming that he is deemed extraditable, the State 

Department has final sign-off. And the State Department has the 

right to make sure, before signing off, that he will receive a fair 

trial and humane treatment. But that is the basic process. If the 

hard evidence isn’t there, he cannot be extradited. 

Look, I just wanted to say something regarding the movement, 

the Gulen movement itself, because it is very hard to separate now 

discussion of post-coup Turkey from a discussion of the nature of 

the Gulen movement. 

I think there are two very positive and significant hallmarks of 

the movement that distinguish it from a lot of Islamic movements, 

particularly radical movements that we have become very familiar 

with in this century and earlier, and that is they established a lot 

of schools that focused on subjects like math and science instead 

of religion, and they preached a message of peace and tolerance 

and interfaith comity. 

That said, however, I think there is now a strong set of circumstantial—circumstantial—evidence that Gulenists have used 

the institutions of the Turkish state in order to pursue their enemies. This was particularly true with—or is widely believed to 

have been the case with the judicial actions against primarily military officers and other seculars in 2008 through 2010. And many 

innocent people, now free, now the conviction has been overturned, 

but many innocent people suffered and went to jail because of that. 

I think there is some strong reason to believe that Gulenists 

were involved and were driving the process. That said, the fact that 

followers of Mr. Gulen may have been involved in such things or 

even in the coup doesn’t make Mr. Gulen himself guilty. And I 

think that is what has to be decided through the evidence presented by the Turks in the extradition case. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chairman and my good friend Mr. 

Weber for their courtesy. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Do you yield back to Mr. Weber? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I certainly do. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Weber, you are recognized. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you. 

57

Would you slide his questions over here to me? 

Dr. Stein, you said in your comments, if I understood correctly, 

that it was hard to put your finger on why Turkey was so important abroad. Is that what you said? 

Mr. STEIN. What I meant is it is hard to point to one single 

thing. You know, you can replace air bases, you know, but it is 

hard to replace the idea of a strong transatlantic relationship. And 

so it is that nebulous idea of strong transatlantic ties that makes 

Turkey most important. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Well, let me do it this way then. How about 

if we just use one word, ‘‘geography’’? 

Mr. STEIN. That is a good word. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. So you would agree that, if for no other reason, their geographical location is fairly strategic? 

Mr. STEIN. Absolutely. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. I rest my case, Your Honor. I thought so. I 

mean, it is extremely important, especially with Syria and all of 

the unrest. We need that ally. And, of course, I could go into energy 

pipelines and the finds in the Mediterranean Sea and the islands 

of Cyprus and just on and on and on. But Turkey is a very, very 

strategic, in my opinion, country that we need to be absolutely sure 

we take every necessary step—reasonable step to keep them as 

friendly to the United States as we can. 

Having said that, I think it was—pronounce your last name for 

me, ma’am. 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. ‘‘Ognianova.’’

Mr. WEBER. ‘‘Ognianova’’? Okay. I think it was you who said that 

you began your daily chronicle of the problems with the media in 

March 2016. 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. That is correct. 

Mr. WEBER. Are you a Turkish citizen? 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. No, I am not a Turkish citizen, nor am I an 

American citizen, but I have been covering Turkey since 2012. And 

what I said in relation to that daily documentation was that I 

wanted to stress when we were compelled to start a daily chronicle 

of coverage on Turkey. We have always covered Turkey, like any 

other country——

Mr. WEBER. From 2012? 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. I have covered Turkey since 2012. CPJ has been 

covering it for years and years on end. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. It came on my personal purview in 2012, and 

since then, we have been covering Turkey very regularly. But this 

March, we were compelled to start a daily chronicle——

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Ms. OGNIANOVA [continuing]. On press freedom in Turkey. 

Mr. WEBER. But you would readily admit that those kinds of 

abuses of power had been going on for years. 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. Oh, absolutely. They have been going on for 

years. But it was this year that they reached catastrophic proportions——

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

58

Ms. OGNIANOVA [continuing]. And we were compelled to start 

covering press freedom issues daily. We basically became a wire 

service for press freedom on Turkey on a daily basis in March. 

Mr. WEBER. Were you doing it from inside the country or from 

afar? 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. Well, we are headquartered in New York, but 

we have a correspondent——

Mr. WEBER. I am talking about you personally. And I don’t mean 

to pry, if that is okay. 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. I am the coordinator of the program, so in my 

program, apart from Turkey, I cover 30 other countries. But——

Mr. WEBER. But you aren’t in Turkey itself. 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. I go to Turkey every year. But our correspondent on the ground is the one who feeds us the daily chronicle of events. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. And——

Ms. OGNIANOVA. He is the reporter on the ground. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. And I think you mentioned later in the discussion that there are still some reporters or some media that still 

criticize the government, but they are kind of self-regulated? 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. Well, there are individual journalists and some 

news outlets on the margins that do that, but they do that at an 

enormous personal risk. They could be prosecuted at the whim of 

the government at any time. And now that we have the state of 

emergency, the——

Mr. WEBER. The stakes are much higher. 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. Absolutely. And all the Parliament or judicial 

scrutiny is gone for this——

Mr. WEBER. Forgive me, but let me break in. I don’t want to run 

over too much time. 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. Uh-huh. 

Mr. WEBER. Not that some others haven’t. 

Would you say that the number of media organizations has gone 

from 300 in 2012, for example, to 50? Can you give me those numbers? 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. I can tell you how many were purged. More 

than 100 in a matter of 2 weeks. Those are the hard numbers. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. When was that 2 weeks? 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. Two weeks after the coup attempt. 

Mr. WEBER. Oh, in that——

Ms. OGNIANOVA. We registered more than 100 being closed down. 

Since then, there were more that were closed down, but we captured that statistic 2 weeks after the coup. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Dr. Stein, I am going to come back to you. In your discussion 

with Colonel Cook, I think you mentioned that there is anti-U.S. 

sentiment. Would you say it was building before the coup attempt, 

or was that primarily since the coup attempt? 

Mr. STEIN. The United States has never really been all that popular inside Turkey, so levels of anti-American sentiment has always been high. But, you know, it has reached new levels. It is levels I have never seen before. And, you know, things that escape detection, you know, prominent people on their sort of equivalent of 

59

cable talk shows going on television every single night and pointing 

to CIA involvement——

Mr. WEBER. Did that grow when Erdogan, in the last, say, 6 

years, since he has begun to dismantle the constitution? 

Mr. STEIN. I would say it has grown most heavily in the past 

year with the breakdown of the peace process and our actions in 

Syria. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

I am concerned about the military base established in 1951, 

3,300 acres in an area—Incirlik? Is that how you say that? 

Mr. YAYLA. ‘‘Incirlik.’’

Mr. WEBER. ‘‘Incirlik’’? In an urban area of 1.7 million people. 

The colonel alluded to that, them being inside, I guess, the compound proper, the base. Are they in danger? 

Mr. YAYLA. Are they——

Mr. WEBER. Are the military personnel there on our base, are 

they in danger? Yes, sir. Go ahead, Dr. Yayla. 

Mr. YAYLA. I believe they are in danger. And the reason for that 

is that after the coup, per Erdogan, media finger-pointed Americans so harshly that people on the street, because they cannot feed 

themselves with other free media, started to believe that the coup 

was really carried out by the American soldiers, with their support. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Now, somebody else said that—was it Twitter was under attack? 

How so? 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. In the many cases of detentions of journalists, 

prosecutions of journalists, those detentions have happened in retaliation for tweets, not simply articles published or broadcast. 

Mr. WEBER. It is not the Twitter company, per se, but whoever 

is doing the tweeting. 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. Whoever is doing the tweeting is being prosecuted, detained, et cetera, but we have to say that Twitter, as a 

company, has censored a number of accounts——

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Ms. OGNIANOVA [continuing]. On the questions and requests of 

the Turkish Government. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. And we are now trying to figure out why they 

have done that. 

Mr. WEBER. So we are losing civil rights hand over fist. 

Now, Fethullah Gulen, but all accounts—one of you said it—is 

teaching multiculturalism, diversity, and he is going some good 

work in terms of schools. Is that you all’s general consensus, the 

panel here? 

Dr. Stein? 

Mr. STEIN. He is not new in Turkish society. And I think the allegations that he is an insidious character in Turkish society has 

been around since the 1970s, and that is why the purges have such 

wide-scale support. 

Nobody really likes him because, while he does good work because he does set up charter schools, sometimes violating our own 

laws in terms of fair hiring practices, he is widely believed to be 

instructing his followers to infiltrate Turkish institutions to try and 

remake the Turkish state. 

60

Mr. WEBER. Dr. Yayla, do you concur with that? 

Mr. YAYLA. No, I don’t, but it is very difficult to talk about it because, as soon as I speak, I am going to be labeled as Gulenist. 

But, however, I have to speak the truth. 

I spent years on the ground to fight against terrorism, and I 

raided several thousand apartments for that because of the 9-1-1 

calls saying that or tipping that there are terrorists in those flats, 

especially in Ankara. And this happened on several occasions. And 

with those raids, we raided several Gulen flats where students 

were staying, deemed from the outside as terrorists. 

I have never, or my people, my officers, never found anything to 

incriminate in terms of violence. However, if it was a terrorist organization flat, there was always evidence. 

Mr. WEBER. Oh, absolutely. 

Mr. YAYLA. And then I think Gulenist people came out in regards 

to radical Islam and to jihadi terrorism, especially after 9/11 and 

with the ISIS, as the strongest voices against terrorism. Gulen 

himself was one of the few persons who came out and said——

Mr. WEBER. Right. 

Mr. YAYLA [continuing]. That a terrorist cannot be a Muslim, a 

Muslim cannot be a terrorist. 

Mr. WEBER. Let me move over here to Mr. Makovsky, but before 

I do, you had a son that was arrested? 

Mr. YAYLA. Yes. 

Mr. WEBER. And what is his status? 

Mr. YAYLA. My son was arrested when he was leaving legally 

from the borders. Because my passport was canceled, I——

Mr. WEBER. He is still under arrest? 

Mr. YAYLA. He is still under arrest. And he was released. As soon 

as he was released, he was rearrested in front of the prison again. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. And how long——

Mr. YAYLA. The only charge is being my passport is canceled. 

Mr. WEBER. Has that been since July 15th? 

Mr. YAYLA. Oh, yeah. After I wrote an article saying that I don’t 

believe this was a real coup. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, we wish him the best——

Mr. YAYLA. Thank you. 

Mr. WEBER [continuing]. And hopefully he will be able to get out. 

Mr. Makovsky, do you agree with the statement that, generally 

speaking, Gulen is viewed as doing some pretty good things? 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. You are talking about within Turkey? 

Mr. WEBER. Well, we would say—over here—well, let’s just—you 

make an interesting point. Here and in Turkey. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Look, as I said, he is, I think, viewed by many 

people—because of the nature of the schools and the teachings, he 

is viewed by many people here as something hopeful, a hopeful 

sign——

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY [continuing]. In the Islamic world. In Turkey, 

there has been, I think, widespread criticism of him. He was initially——

Mr. WEBER. More so since July 15th? 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Well, absolutely. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

61

Mr. MAKOVSKY. He—if I could——

Mr. WEBER. So Erdogan has, you would argue, perhaps, has been 

successful in making him part of the scapegoat. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Yeah, he has been demonizing him. And there is 

no doubt that there is a vendetta, particularly since December 

2013——

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY [continuing]. As we discussed earlier. 

Mr. WEBER. Let me move on, I am way over, if I may. 

And can I just call you Nina? 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. Yes. 

Mr. WEBER. Do you agree with that assessment? 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. Well, I haven’t seen any evidence against——

Mr. WEBER. But you are reading all the tweets. 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. And I think that we should come from the presumption of innocence and everyone should be innocent before 

proven guilty. 

Mr. WEBER. Sure. 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. And that has been the biggest issue with this 

crackdown, is that it is continuing without us having seen any evidence against these detainees. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, with how many prearranged warrants did one 

of you say? There was how many people were arrested within a 

couple of days? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Hours. 

Mr. WEBER. Hours. 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. I mean, hundreds of warrants, but——

Mr. WEBER. Right. 

Ms. OGNIANOVA [continuing]. In terms of journalists——

Mr. MAKOVSKY. July 16th, the very next day, 2,745 judges were 

arrested. 

Mr. WEBER. And, you know, if you do the math on that, if you 

signed a warrant a minute, that is 2,500 minutes, okay? 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. I mean, no wonder that now the prisons are 

being cleaned of actual convicted criminals so that there could be 

enough space for the detainees after the coup plot. 

Mr. WEBER. Yeah. 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. I think what is really important is to note that 

the cancellation of passports is a critical issue at the moment. And 

many, many civilians have been canceled, their passports—journalists, civil activists, and their families, like we see in the case of Dr. 

Yayla. And we should be very vigilant about that. The U.S. leaders 

should not recognize these canceled passports. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, thank you. I am way over time. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. 

Now, to bring this hearing to a close, we are going to ask Mr. 

Meeks, any questions he has about the Gulenist movement, but 

anything else and to have a wrap-up statement. 

Mr. MEEKS. Well, I don’t have any specific question about the 

Gulenist movement. I think that it is a complicated scenario. 

I think the entire relationship and where we are with Turkey is 

very, very complicated. When I look at the scenario and this nationalism, I know, the passion of nationalism generally also creates 

62

emotionalism, whether it is in Turkey or whether it is in the 

United States or wherever it may be. 

I do know that we have a firm commitment to make sure that 

wherever, in Turkey, in Russia, in the United States, whether it is 

violation of human rights, where we don’t have freedom of the 

press, where we don’t have sound institutions, we have to speak 

out. We can’t be silent about that. We can’t just allow it to go. 

That does not mean that we want to be enemies or anything of 

that nature. That means we want the same things for all people—

human rights, freedom to determine your own self-determination. 

And when any of those things are not happening, I think we need 

voices to speak out loudly and clearly. 

And if you don’t feel—you know, for me, not equating the two, 

but what is great about the United States, in my estimation, is 

when I have a scenario like Colin Kaepernick, that he has the freedom to express——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. His ignorance. 

Mr. MEEKS [continuing]. His—well, you say it is his ignorance. 

It is the freedom of this country. Because if you say Turkey, they 

will say it is ignorance also, with something that we disagree with, 

and that is why it is complicated. But you should have the freedom 

to express yourself, because people feel differently. 

I mean, for example, for us, our number-one enemy is Daesh, or 

ISIL, because we feel threatened by them. To the Turks, it is the 

PKK, because they feel threatened by them. So we can’t self-impose 

how they feel and say, well, you should feel exactly the way we 

feel, and if you don’t feel the way we feel, you are wrong. Nor 

should they. And that is kind of where we are. 

And I think Mr. Stein said, yes, geography does have a lot to do 

it. Yes, the fact that they are NATO allies has a lot to do with it. 

Yes, because we want to make sure that we are not condemning 

the entire Muslim population has something to do with it. If you 

have moderate Islamic countries, we want to make sure that we 

are engaging with them. We don’t want to get rid of them. That 

is why it is important and why I think also, in the United States, 

we have Muslims, we have Christians, and they all should be welcome. 

So my summary is, there is a lot of work and thought and negotiations that have to happen here. This is not a simple matter of 

you are right and you are wrong. It is a matter, though, that I 

think is unquestioned, that the number of individuals that have 

been arrested and detained and the journalists is a violation of 

human rights, that they are entitled to hearings and jurisprudence 

and should be returned, and it should not be something—that is 

something that is wrong. And we have to speak out about that 

loudly and clearly even if they are an ally, but also understand 

that we would be doing this because we want to work together, and 

our relationship is so important that we have to figure this thing 

out. 

And I thank the witnesses for your testimony. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Meeks. 

And I will just—a couple short questions, and then I will do a 

little wrap-up. 

63

In terms of the Gulenists, let me ask—so far, it sounds like you 

are the only one who believes that the Gulenists, or at least some 

Gulenists, are involved with a nondemocratic approach to power, 

meaning being willing to be part of a coup and things such as that. 

We will go with—first, let’s ask Mr. Stein. 

Mr. STEIN. I won’t speak for the other panelists, although I presume that others probably think——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, I am going to ask them too. 

Mr. STEIN [continuing]. Like I do. 

I think the Turkish people think that. And I think it is important, if we want to understand how they are——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. What are your—you are a specialist. Do you 

believe that the Gulenists were the organizing force behind this 

coup? 

Mr. STEIN. I can’t speak to that because I haven’t seen any evidence to that. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So you don’t know——

Mr. STEIN. But were they infiltrating Turkish institutions? Absolutely. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. But you don’t know, and that is your 

answer to that question. 

Mr. STEIN. I don’t know because the events of July 15th have not 

been told in full detail. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Okay. Whatever the reason. I mean, 

you are an expert in a lot of these areas, including this, but there 

is not information enough for you to have made up your mind on 

that. 

Mr. STEIN. No, I haven’t seen anything. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. 

How about you, Mr. Yayla? 

Mr. YAYLA. I don’t believe that Gulenists were behind the coup 

because I have worked with several high-level generals in the military in the field, and most of the generals and high-level commanders in the military are known for their strong secularist approaches, and many of them do not like or hate Gulen. So I don’t 

buy that. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So it is no. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. As I tried to explain earlier to Mr. Connolly’s 

question—perhaps I did so fairly inarticulately—I agree with Dr. 

Stein that there is strong circumstantial evidence that Gulenists 

have infiltrated, tried to infiltrate the——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But that is not the question. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. The question is just about the coup? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is correct. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. I think we know nothing at this point about the 

coup. And I——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So we don’t know. So your answer is 

you don’t know because we don’t know enough about—and you 

don’t know if the Gulenists were involved in the organizing the 

coup or not. Okay. 

Ms. Ognianova? 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. I absolutely concur with Mr. Makovsky. 

And I also want to add that the persons who are qualified to 

make investigations and independent investigations in the media 

64

about the coup plot are now intimidated into silence. So, not only 

don’t we know what happened, but those who are able to help us 

know more are either incarcerated or exiled. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So I see we don’t know, but one of the reasons we don’t know is because the government is cutting off information sources to give us an accurate assessment, whether or not 

even the charge. 

However, we do have one person, one witness today, Mr. Yayla, 

who served as a high-level intelligence officer in the police and in 

terms of confronting terrorism, and he has a long history involved 

and says that he does not believe the Gulenists were involved in 

organizing the coup. So, we have that as the answer for that question. 

In general, do you see—look, obviously, the Gulenists are trying 

to be portrayed as a conspiratorial organization. 

By the way, do Gulenists go to a particular church or mosque? 

Do they do things in public? They just have private meetings, that 

is it? 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. That is my understanding. I have asked 

Gulenists this question, and they said they do not pray at their 

own mosques. So that adds to sort of the aura of mystery——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY [continuing]. For many churches. No one knows 

exactly——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, I know that we had a problem in our 

country with a group of people who had an interesting philosophy; 

they were called Masons. And early in our country’s history, there 

was this Masonic conspiracy that was supposedly around. But I 

looked at it, and I have read history—I am a history major, and 

I have done a lot of reading on it. George Washington was a Mason 

and all the rest of these people. And it seems to me what they had 

was a group of people who have shared values. And although they 

were private and did not make everything public, it was far from 

a conspiracy to try to take over governments, et cetera. Although, 

Masons had a lot of influence here—not enough influence to justify 

overthrowing George Washington and his government, because 

George Washington was a Mason. 

We also today we have determined that before the coup attempt 

we already had signs of tyranny and repression and, even more important, corruption in Erdogan’s government, perhaps leading all 

the way up to Erdogan himself. The fact is that, before there was 

reporting on that corruption, Erdogan himself did not seem to have 

any trouble with the Gulenists. But the Gulenists felt obligated to 

report it, knowing it would break their camaraderie, their tie to the 

man in power. 

That indicates something good to me; that doesn’t indicate something bad to me. That indicates that you have people who are courageous enough, knowing that their children could be arrested, 

even, by what appears to be someone who is becoming a megalomaniac. That sounds like a courageous group of people to me. Although they say there are people who are in parts of groups like 

this who are good people and bad people. Maybe there are some 

bad people too. We don’t know. 

65

But I think that the fact that Turkey and the Turkish Government was clearly involved with repressing opposition prior to the 

coup and, immediately after the coup, arrested thousands and 

thousands of people, many of whom could not have possibly had 

anything to do with the coup, suggests to us that today we have 

to be very concerned about the nature of Mr. Erdogan’s government. 

If he wants to use this as an excuse to eliminate real democratic 

rights of his people, if he wants to use this as an excuse to perhaps 

sever bonds with the West he is so upset with or whatever, if he 

uses this as an excuse to, for example, call off elections, to end the 

democratic things right—as if there is a state of emergency right 

now, that there is an army of Gulenists at the door ready to take 

over the country, so, thus, we have to arrest more people and shut 

up more newspapers. And this is—it is not only unacceptable, but 

it is also a historic disaster for the people of Turkey. 

And, again, let’s go back to the fundamental, and that is the people of Turkey have been good friends of the United States. We need 

to be concerned about them. And we need to basically not only pray 

for them, if we are religious, pray for them and that they come out 

of this, but also do what we can to at least ease this government 

over into the right direction. 

And we can’t do it by not admitting the challenge that we have, 

however, we can’t do it by trying to cover up the fact that 

Erdogan—and, by the way, so when did Erdogan break with the 

Gulenists? When they started reporting on corruption that directly 

affected his entourage in government. So this is what everybody 

needs to know. 

Now, with that said, thank you all for testifying today. You 

know, we are having a crazy political year here in the United 

States. 

Mr. MEEKS. We are? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It is about the craziest year I have ever seen. 

And what is going on in Turkey and this—which will change everything. I mean, the alliance and the stability that we have had, if 

Turkey goes with more radical, more anti-Western forces that are 

at play in Europe, the stability that we have had is going to go 

right out the window. It is going to change the history of the world. 

So let’s pray that people who do believe in a more free society 

and acceptance and open societies and believe in peace and harmony with their neighbors, let’s hope that these are the people that 

come to power not only in Turkey but throughout the Mideast. 

So, with that said, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(67)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

68

f


21542n.eps
69

Æ


21542m.eps