alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1

                           SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION

In connection with the Annual Report of HEICO Corporation (the "Company") on
Form 10-K for the period ended October 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report") I, Laurans A. Mendelson,
Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

        (1)     The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
                or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

        (2)     The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
                material respects, the financial condition and results of
                operations of the Company.


Date:  December 28, 2007                                /s/ LAURANS A. MENDELSON
                                                        ------------------------
                                                        Laurans A. Mendelson
                                                        Chief Executive Officer
EXHIBIT 99.2

BlastGard International Reports Second Quarter 2008 Results

BlastGard International Reports

Second Quarter 2008 Results

CLEARWATER FL, August 14, 2008 - BlastGard International (OTCBB; BLGA) reported financial results for the quarter ended June 30, 2008. Revenues for the second quarter were $8,324 compared to $11,320 reported in the second quarter of 2007. For the second quarter of 2008, BlastGard International reported a net loss of $387,717 or $(0.01) per share based on the weighted average of 40,013,544 shares outstanding compared to a net loss of $1,321,743 or $(0.04) per share reported in the second quarter of 2007 based on the weighted average shares outstanding of 33,844,970.

About BlastGard International, Inc.



BlastGard International, Inc. creates designs, develops, manufactures and markets proprietary blast mitigation materials. The Company's patent-pending BlastWrap® technology effectively mitigates blast effects and suppresses post-blast fires. This unique technology is being used to create new, finished products or to retrofit to existing products. BlastWrap® is a market leading product from which blast protection solutions are built to save lives and reduce damage to valuable assets from explosions. Additional information on BlastGard can be found at http://www.blastgardintl.com.

``Safe Harbor'' statement under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Except for historical information, all of the statements, expectations and assumptions contained in the foregoing are forward-looking statements that involve a number of risks and uncertainties. It is possible that the assumptions made by management are not necessarily the most likely and may not materialize. In addition, other important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially include the following: the Company's ability to market its products; the Company's ability to obtain additional funding; the Company's ability to obtain regulatory approvals on new products, the general economy; competitive factors; ability to attract and retain personnel; the price of the Company's stock; and other risk factors. The Company takes no obligation to update or correct forward-looking statements.

Company Contact:

BlastGard International, Inc.

Michael J. Gordon

(727) 592-9400
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    Exhibit 10.9

January 20, 2000

Jon C. Thomas
Thomas Pierce & Company
3512 Maclay Boulevard., South
Tallahassee, FL 32312

Re:      Amendment #1 to Exclusive Sales and Marketing Distributorship Agreement
         dated January 5, 2000
                       ---------------------------------------------------------

Dear Jon:


We hereby extend the termination date of our above captioned Letter of Intent
(as defined in Paragraph 6) from February 1, 2000 to March 31, 2000.


                                           Very truly yours,

                                           /s/ John R. DePhillipo

                                           John R. DePhillipo
                                           Chairman and CEO


AGREED TO AND ACCEPTED:


/s/ Jon C. Thomas
Jon C. Thomas, President                                           Date: 1/20/00
Thomas Pierce & Company
#### Bette Gaida-Newman et al., Respondents, v Dean A. Holtermann et al., Appellants, et al., Defendant.

[825 NYS2d 503]

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries and wrongful death, etc., the defendants Dean A. Holtermann and Vivian Reonegro appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Giacobbe, J.), dated June 8, 2005, as denied those branches of their motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action to recover damages for the decedent’s conscious pain and suffering, and the fifth cause of action to recover damages for loss of services, insofar as asserted against them.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The Supreme Court properly denied those branches of the appellants’ motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action to recover damages for the decedent’s conscious pain and suffering, and the fifth cause of action to recover damages for loss of services, insofar as asserted against them as they failed to meet their initial burden of establishing entitlement to judgment as a matter of law *(see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp.,*68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). Assuming that the plaintiffs decedent was negligent, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the plaintiffs decedent was the sole proximate cause of the plaintiffs decedent’s injuries or that the defendant Dean A. Holtermann was not negligent in failing to keep a proper lookout and failing to take some evasive action in an effort to avoid the subject collision *(see Risco v State of New York,*13 AD3d 605 [2004]; *King v Washburn,*273 AD2d 725, 726 [2000]).

*635Additionally, while a plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proof at trial on the issue of conscious pain and suffering, on a motion for summary judgment the defendant bears the initial burden of showing that the decedent did not endure conscious pain and suffering (see *Schild v Kingsley,*5 AD3d 103 [2004]; *Massey v New York City Hous. Auth.,*230 AD2d 601 [1996]). Although the appellants established their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by submitting a police report which stated that the decedent “was DOA at the scene,” the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact by submitting an affidavit of a witness who testified that he saw the decedent groaning and moving his head up and down after the accident *(see Saguid v Kingston Hosp.,*213 AD2d 770, 772 [1995]; *Parker v McConnell Mfg. Co.,*40 AD2d 587 [1972]).

Therefore, the Supreme Court properly denied those branches of the appellants’ motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the first and fifth causes of action insofar as asserted against them. Adams, J.P., Ritter, Lunn and Covello, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>
 
                                                           HECO Exhibit 10.15(a)



                                                               December 18, 1995



Hawaiian Interisland Towing Incorporated, Inc.
735 Bishop Street, Suite 312
Honolulu, HI 96813
Attn:  Mr. Gordon Smith, President

Subject:  Option to Extend Term under Contract of Private Carriage by and
          between Hawaiian Interisland Towing, Inc., and Maui Electric Company,
          Ltd.

Dear Mr. Smith:

This letter will confirm the understanding between Hawaiian Interisland Towing,
Inc. ("HITI"), and Maui Electric Company, Ltd., ("MECO") relating to the
extension of the Contract of Private Carriage between HITI and MECO, dated
November 12, 1993.

It has been mutually agreed to between HITI and MECO that the Contract of
Private Carriage is hereby extended pursuant to section 1.2 (Option to Extend
Term) for an additional two year period beginning January 1, 1996.  All
previously agreed to terms and conditions, amendments, and addendums apply to
this extension.

Please indicate your acknowledgment and agreement to the foregoing by signing in
the space provided below.

                               Best Regards,                      
                                                                  
                                                                  
                                                                  
                               /s/ Floyd Shiroma for J. C. Aicken 
                               Jeffrey C. Aicken                  
                               Director, Fuel Resources            


ACKNOWLEDGED AND AGREED TO:

THIS 26th DAY OF December, 1995

HAWAIIAN INTERISLAND TOWING, INC.


BY:       /s/ Gordon L. Smith
ITS:      President
Editorial Note on Part 1239
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 1239 appear at 68 FR 9846, Feb. 28, 2003, and at 68 FR 10355, Mar. 3, 2003.

§ 1239.2 Cancellation of notice to appear. ( a ) *Prior to commencement of proceedings.* For provisions relating to the authority of an immigration officer to cancel a notice to appear prior to the vesting of jurisdiction with the immigration judge, see 8 CFR 239.2(a) and (b).
( b ) *Ordering termination or dismissal.* After commencement of proceedings, an immigration judge or Board member shall have authority to resolve or dispose of a case through an order of dismissal or an order of termination. An immigration judge or Board member may enter an order of dismissal in cases where DHS moves for dismissal pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section. A motion to dismiss removal proceedings for a reason other than those authorized by paragraph (c) of this section shall be deemed a motion to terminate and adjudicated pursuant to 8 CFR 1003.1(m), pertaining to cases before the Board, or 8 CFR 1003.18(d), pertaining to cases before the immigration court, as applicable.
( c ) *Motion to dismiss.* After commencement of proceedings pursuant to 8 CFR 1003.14, government counsel or an officer enumerated in 8 CFR 239.1(a) may move for dismissal of the matter on the grounds set out under 8 CFR 239.2(a). Dismissal of the matter shall be without prejudice to the alien or the Department of Homeland Security.
( d ) *Motion for remand.* After commencement of the hearing, government counsel or an officer enumerated in 8 CFR 239.1(a) may move for remand of the matter to the Department of Homeland Security on the ground that the foreign relations of the United States are involved and require further consideration. Remand of the matter shall be without prejudice to the alien or the Department of Homeland Security.
( e ) *Warrant of arrest.* When a notice to appear is canceled or proceedings are terminated under this section any outstanding warrant of arrest is canceled.
( f ) [Reserved]
[62 FR 10366, Mar. 6, 1997. Duplicated from part 239 at 68 FR 9838, Feb. 28, 2003, as amended at 69 FR 44907, July 28, 2004; 89 FR 46794, May 29, 2024]
###### Editorial Note on Part 1292

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 1292 appear at 68 FR 9846, Feb. 28, 2003, and 68 FR 10360, Mar. 5, 2003.

#### § 1292.3 Conduct for practitioners and recognized organizations—rules and procedures.

Practitioners, as defined in § 1003.101(b) of this chapter, and recognized organizations are subject to the imposition of sanctions as provided in 8 CFR part 1003, subpart G, § 1003.101 *et seq.,* and 8 CFR 292.3 (pertaining to practice before DHS).

[81 FR 92367, Dec. 19, 2016]
#### § 971.100 Purpose.

The purpose of this subpart is to provide definitions for terms used in this part.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Bergdorf Goodman Co., Inc., Appellant.

Present — Martin, P. J., Untermyer, Dore, Cohn and Callahan, JJ.; Dore, J., dissents and votes to affirm.
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY REG I ON 8

Ref: 8P
-AR Martha Rudolph Colorado Department of Public Health

and Environment 4300 Cherry Creek Drive South Denver, CO 80246-1530 Dear Ms. Rudolph: 1595 Wynkoop Street DENVER, CO 80202-1129 Phone 800-227-8917 http://www
. epa . gov/region08



# AUG O'l 2013

This letter r espond s to Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment's (CDPHE) July I , 2013, submittal for approval of a regional high wind event in sout hern Colorado. CDPHE determined that this regional high wind event caused emi ssion exceedances ofthe PM 10 NAAQS at the monitor in the Pagosa Springs PM 10 maintenance area and at two Alamosa monitors on May 11 , 20 10. EPA has reviewed the documentation provided by CDPHE to demonstrate that these exceedances on May 1 1 , 2010, meet the criteria for an exceptional event under the Exceptional Events Rule (EER), 40 CFR 50.14. EPA concurs based on the weight ofevidence that CDPHE has successfully made the demonstrations necessary to comply within 40 CFR 50.14. In addition, CDPHE has met the schedule and procedural requirements in section 50.14( c) with respect to the demonstration. A more detailed assessment ofCDPHE's demonstration is enclosed . My staffhas, or shortly will, enter "concurrence flags. " for these data into EPA's Air Quality System (AQS). Based on the se dete rminations, E PA will exclude these data from the following types of calculations and activities: • E PA 's AQS will not count these days as exceedances when generating u ser reports , or include them in design values estimates, unless the AQS user specifically indicates that they should be included. • EPA will accept the exclusion of these d ata for the purposes of selecting appropriate background concentrations for New Source Review air quality analyses. 1 • EPA will accept the exclus ion of these data for the pw·poses of se lecting appropri ate background concentrations for transportation conformity hot spot analyses. 2

1 1f EPA i s the permitting authority , EPA will propose penn its on this basis. If EPA is com m en tin g on another permitt i n g autho rit y's proposed action, EPA's comments will be consistent with the determ inat i ons in this l etter. 2 Applicabl e on ly to PM 10 and PM2.s ·The determinations conveyed in this letter do not constitute final EPA action regarding any matter on which EPA is required to provide an opportunity for public comment. In particular, this applies to determinations regarding the attainment status or classification of the area. Final actions will take place only after EPA completes notice and comment rulemaking on those determinations. As an additional clarification, the determinations conveyed in this letter are applicable only to determinations incorporating the submitted data relative to the PM10 NAAQS. If you have any questions or wish to discuss this matter further, please contact Carl Daly at (303) 312-6416.

Regional Administrator Enclosure
cc: William Allison, CDPHE Air Pollution Control Division



### 2 

# G) Printed on Recycled Paper
(55 South. 687.)

No. 18,864.

#### STATE v. JONES.

(June 5, 1911.)

*(Syllabus by the Oourt.)*

1. Criminal Law (§ 1019*) — Appellate Jurisdiction-Conviction oe Misdemeanor.

In misdemeanor eases, the Supreme Court has no appellate jurisdiction except where a

fine exceeding $300 or imprisonment exceeding six months is actually imposed, or where some municipal ordinance or law of the state has been declared unconstitutional.

[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Dec. Dig. § 1019.*]

2. Criminal Law (§ 1019*) — Appellate Jurisdiction.

The raising of a federal question does not give the state Supreme Oourt jurisdiction.

[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Dee. Dig. § 1019.*]

Appeal from the Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of Ouachita; J. P. Madison, Judge.

Joe Jones was convicted of misdemeanor, and appeals.

Dismissed.

Percy Sandel, for appellant. Walter Guión, Atty. Gen., and Fred M. Odom, Dist. Atty. (G. A. Gondran, of counsel), for the State.

LAND, J.

The accused was indicted, tried, convicted, and sentenced for a violation of Act No. 54 of 1906, making it a misdemeanor for any person to willfully violate a hire, tenant, or share contract, upon the faith of which money or goods have been advanced, etc.

The accused moved to quash the indictment on the ground that said statute is null and void, because repugnant to the thirteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and in contravention of sections 1990 and 5526 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, pp. 1266, 3715), denouncing the crime of peonage.

The motion to quash was heard and overruled. The accused was sentenced to pay a fine of $15 and costs of prosecution, and in default of payment to he imprisoned in the parish jail for 20 days. The accused was granted an appeal to the Supreme Court.

Motion to Dismiss Appeal.

[1] This motion must be sustained, as this court has no appellate jurisdiction over such a sentence, and no law of this state has been *1099declared unconstitutional. Article 85, Const. 1&98; State v. Hunter, 114 La. 939, 38 South. 686; State v. Price, 124 La. 670, 50 South. 647; State v. Mitchell, 119 La. 374, 44 South. 132; State v. Richart, 126 La. 672, 52 South. 985. [2] The 'raising of a federal question

will not give this court appellate jurisdiction. Appeal' dismissed.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1016 

KA 08-01205 

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., FAHEY, SCONIERS, GREEN, AND MARTOCHE, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DEVIN J. GLOVER, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (KIMBERLY F. DUGUAY OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

MICHAEL C. GREEN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (STEPHEN X. O’BRIEN OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (John R.

Schwartz, A.J.), rendered December 17, 2007. The judgment convicted

defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a weapon

in the second degree. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him

upon his plea of guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the

second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to defendant’s

contention, County Court properly refused to suppress both the handgun

seized by the police from defendant’s person and defendant’s

subsequent statements to the police. The record establishes that the

officers were entitled to approach defendant to conduct a common-law

inquiry because they had “a founded suspicion that criminal activity

[was] afoot” (People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 223). According to the

testimony of two police officers at the suppression hearing, they were

traveling in a marked police vehicle when they observed defendant turn

and whistle toward a group of males standing in an area known for drug

sales, at which time the group immediately dispersed from the area

(see generally People v Williams, 39 AD3d 1269, 1270, lv denied 9 NY3d

871; People v Rivera, 175 AD2d 78, 79-80, lv denied 78 NY2d 1129). 

The officers also testified that, upon exiting their vehicle and

approaching defendant, he “refus[ed] to remove his hand from his

pocket despite the repeated demands of . . . the officers that he do

so” (People v Mack, 49 AD3d 1291, 1292, lv denied 10 NY3d 866). 

Defendant’s conduct, along with the fact that a shooting had recently

occurred in the area of the encounter, “provided the officers with

reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant posed a threat to their

safety” (id.; see People v Robinson, 278 AD2d 808, lv denied 96 NY2d

787; see generally People v Hensen, 21 AD3d 172, 176, lv denied 5 NY3d
-2- 1016 

KA 08-01205 

828). Thus, the frisk conducted by one of the officers at that time,

as a result of which the officer discovered a loaded handgun in

defendant’s coat pocket, “was a ‘constitutionally justified intrusion

designed to protect the safety of the officers’ . . ., and [we

conclude] that the court properly refused to suppress the evidence

seized as a result thereof, as well as defendant’s ensuing statements”

(Mack, 49 AD3d at 1292).

Entered: September 30, 2011 Patricia L. Morgan

Clerk of the Court
### §580p–1. Property of the United States

The following are hereby declared the property of the United States:

(1) The name and character "Smokey Bear".

(2) The name and character "Woodsy Owl" and the associated slogan, "Give a Hoot, Don't Pollute".

(Pub. L. 93–318, §2, June 22, 1974, 88 Stat. 245.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section was formerly classified to section 488b–4 of Title 31 prior to the general revision and enactment of Title 31, Money and Finance, by Pub. L. 97–258, §1, Sept. 13, 1982, 96 Stat. 877.
### §6811. Enforcement and protection of receipts

#### (a) Enforcement authority

The Secretary concerned shall enforce payment of the recreation fees authorized by this chapter.

#### (b) Evidence of nonpayment

If the display of proof of payment of a recreation fee, or the payment of a recreation fee within a certain time period is required, failure to display such proof as required or to pay the recreation fee within the time period specified shall constitute nonpayment.

#### (c) Joint liability

The registered owner and any occupant of a vehicle charged with a nonpayment violation involving the vehicle shall be jointly liable for penalties imposed under this section, unless the registered owner can show that the vehicle was used without the registered owner's express or implied permission.

#### (d) Limitation on penalties

The failure to pay a recreation fee established under this chapter shall be punishable as a Class A or Class B misdemeanor, except that in the case of a first offense of nonpayment, the fine imposed may not exceed $100, notwithstanding section 3571(e) of title 18.

(Pub. L. 108–447, div. J, title VIII, §812, Dec. 8, 2004, 118 Stat. 3390.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

This chapter, referred to in subsecs. (a) and (d), was in the original "this Act", and was translated as reading "this title", meaning title VIII of div. J of Pub. L. 108–447, Dec. 8, 2004, 118 Stat. 3377, known as the Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act, to reflect the probable intent of Congress. For complete classification of title VIII to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 6801 of this title and Tables.
% Food exposure

% Once daily oral exposure, dose from cpfs SS F13_49 foodonly exp distribution.csv 99.9th percentile % Female adult, Body weight set to 72.9 kg % Cecilia Tan % August 25, 2015

prepare @clear @all % Setting model parameters start @NoCallback use human_parameters_MRP use preg_female_parameters

BWSW=1; % Set to 1 if BWT is provided BWST=72.9; % Initial BW in kg PREG=0; % Not pregnant TSTOP= 1008; % Exposure duration in hrs

%Single daily oral exposure DT = xlsRead("Food.xls", "999p", "A1:A43"); % Dosing Times DORAL=xlsRead("Food.xls", "999p", "B1:B43"); % Dose in ug/kg prepare time rbcce cv urinetcpy start@nocallback

% Output RBC AChE, urine TCpy, venous blood conc of chlorpyrifos, in ug/L mytable = [_time _rbcce _urinetcpy _cv*350.6]; save mytable @file='food_999.txt' @format=ascii

min(_rbcce) % display peak RBC AChE inhibition
Young Adults: Care for yourself one small way each day

Find creative ways to safely spend time with friends, 

like virtual movie parties.

Treat yourself to healthy foods 

and get enough sleep.

Make time to relax by reading, listening 

to music, or exploring a new hobby.

Head outdoors and get moving

Remember you’re not alone.

320352-D

cdc.gov/coronavirus Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration

Disaster Distress Hotline: 1-800-985-5990 or text TalkWithUs to 66746
### §346c. Administration

The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to administer Zion National Park as hereby established in accordance with his authority over the park heretofore granted by the Congress and in accordance with the general laws governing areas of the national park system.

(July 11, 1956, ch. 568, §2, 70 Stat. 527.)