Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 59 / Monday, March 28, 2011 / Notices 17159 

develop solutions of the type under 

discussion, and researchers who exploit 

these solutions. The goal is to engage in 

robust debate of topics generally 

believed to be true to determine to what 

extent that claim is warranted. The 

adversarial nature of these debates is 

meant to ensure the threat environment 

is reflected in the discussion in order to 

elicit innovative research concepts that 

will have a greater chance of having a 

sustained positive impact on our cyber 

security posture. 

The third topic to be explored in this 

series is ‘‘Distributed Data Schemes 

Provide Security.’’ The workshop on this 

topic will be held in Gaitherburg, MD 

on May 17, 2011. 

Assertion: ‘‘Distributed Data Schemes 

Provide Security’’. 

Distributed data architectures, such as 

cloud computing, offer very attractive 

cost savings and provide new means of 

large scale analysis and information 

sharing. There has been much 

discussion about securing such 

architectures, and it is generally felt that 

distribution, and the replication that is 

usually associated with it, provides 

some inherent protection; adversaries 

will have difficulty locating your data in 

the cloud, and by breaking it up and 

replicating different segments 

throughout the platform we send the 

adversary on a wild goose chase to find 

and reassemble all the relevant bits. It 

is also felt that cryptographic 

mechanisms like bound tags, 

encryption, and keyed access control 

can be used to develop distributed 

platforms with a high level of assurance. 

There are several applications of 

distributed architectures that offer nonsensitive peer to peer TV services. 

Applications are also offered for 

potentially sensitive uses like document 

collaboration. Yet it is unclear whether 

these applications can safely be 

extended to highly sensitive uses. Could 

we readily support a distributed 

electronic health care system that 

securely supports ad hoc consultations 

or remote surgery with full access to 

patient history while protecting patient 

privacy, for example? 

To answer this question we need to 

take a closer look at the protection 

provided inherently and 

cryptographically. With respect to the 

former, we must think about how the 

architecture can be designed to provide 

secure availability to friend and not foe. 

We must examine the impact of the 

design for security, resilience, and 

availability and understand the trades 

we are implicitly making among these 

attributes. We must consider whether 

the data about data that is required by 

these architectures introduces a new 

data risk. We must think about the 

multiplicity of paths provide by these 

architectures. We must figure how to do 

risk analysis on a system when key 

information like data location is 

unavailable by design. With respect to 

the latter, we must consider whether the 

key management strategy is robust 

enough to operate in a distributed 

architecture. We have to think about the 

assurance of tag binding and access 

update and revocation. We must 

consider the vulnerabilities of the 

platforms that host the cryptographic 

mechanisms and the distribution of 

those functions in the architecture. 

In this workshop, we will explore the 

implications of distributed data on 

security. We will consider what effect 

the introduction of the notion of a 

determined adversary has on our 

analysis of data security requirements. 

In the first session, we will discuss the 

properties of distributed platforms that 

are thought to make such architectures 

inherently more secure. In the second, 

we will discuss the issue of 

cryptography and distributed platforms. 

How To Apply 

If you would like to participate in this 

workshop, please submit (1) a resume or 

curriculum vita of no more than two 

pages which highlights your expertise in 

this area and (2) a one-page paper 

stating your opinion of the assertion and 

outlining your key thoughts on the 

topic. The workshop will accommodate 

no more than 60 participants, so these 

brief documents need to make a 

compelling case for your participation. 

Applications should be submitted to 

assumptionbusters@nitrd.gov no later 

than 5 p.m. EST on April 15, 2011. 

Selection and Notification: The 

SCORE committee will select an expert 

group that reflects a broad range of 

opinions on the assertion. Accepted 

participants will be notified by e-mail 

no later than April 27, 2011. We cannot 

guarantee that we will contact 

individuals who are not selected, 

though we will attempt to do so unless 

the volume of responses is 

overwhelming. 

Submitted by the National Science 

Foundation for the National Coordination 

Office (NCO) for Networking and Information 

Technology Research and Development 

(NITRD) on March 18, 2011. 

Suzanne H. Plimpton, 

Reports Clearance Officer, National Science 

Foundation. 

[FR Doc. 2011–7173 Filed 3–25–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7555–01–P 

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION 

Advisory Committee for Engineering; 

Notice of Meeting 

In accordance with the Federal 

Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92– 

463, as amended), the National Science 

Foundation announces the following 

meeting: 

Name: Advisory Committee for 

Engineering Meeting, #1170. 

Date/Time: April 13, 2011: 12 p.m. to 6 

p.m., April 14, 2011: 8 a.m. to 12 p.m. 

Place: National Science Foundation, 4201 

Wilson Boulevard, Suite 1235, Arlington, 

Virginia 22230. 

Type of Meeting: Open. 

Contact Person: Deborah Young, National 

Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, 

Suite 505, Arlington, Virginia 22230. 

Purpose of Meeting: To provide advice, 

recommendations and counsel on major goals 

and policies pertaining to engineering 

programs and activities. 

Agenda: The principal focus of the meeting 

on both days will be to discuss emerging 

issues and opportunities for the Directorate 

for Engineering and its divisions and review 

Committee of Visitors Reports. 

Dated: March 23, 2011. 

Susanne Bolton, 

Committee Management Officer. 

[FR Doc. 2011–7175 Filed 3–25–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7555–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[NRC–2009–0476; DC/COL–ISG–018] 

Office of New Reactors; Final Interim 

Staff Guidance on Standard Review 

Plan, Section 17.4, ‘‘Reliability 

Assurance Program’’ 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC). 

ACTION: Notice of availability. 

SUMMARY: The NRC staff is issuing its 

Final Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) DC/ 

COL–ISG–018 (Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System 

(ADAMS) Accession No. 

ML103010113). The purpose of this ISG 

is to clarify the NRC staff guidance on 

the design reliability assurance program 

(RAP). This ISG updates the guidance 

provided to the staff in Standard Review 

Plan (SRP), Section 17.4, ‘‘Reliability 

Assurance Program,’’ of NUREG–0800, 

‘‘Standard Review Plan for the Review of 

Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear 

Power Plants,’’ March 2007. This ISG 

revises the NRC staff’s review 

responsibilities and further clarifies the 

acceptance criteria and evaluation 

findings contained in the SRP Section 

17.4 in support of the NRC reviews of 


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