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94–542 PDF 2015

DOJ IG: HANDLING OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND 

MISCONDUCT ALLEGATIONS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

APRIL 14, 2015 

Serial No. 114–17 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://www.house.gov/reform 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

ROD BLUM, Iowa 

JODY B. HICE, Georgia 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin 

WILL HURD, Texas 

GARY J. PALMER, Alabama 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MATT CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan 

TED LIEU, California 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands 

MARK DeSAULNIER, California 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico 

SEAN MCLAUGHLIN, Staff Director 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

RYAN M. HAMBLETON, Professional Staff Member 

SEAN BREBBIA, Senior Counsel 

MELISSA BEAUMONT, Chief Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on April 14, 2015 .............................................................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

The Hon. Michele M. Leonhart, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 6 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 8 

The Hon. Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 24 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 26 

Mr. Kevin L. Perkin, Associate Deputy Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 32 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 34 

APPENDIX 

Memo from Attorney General Eric Holder to all Department Personnel on 

‘‘Prohibition on the Solicitation of Prostitution’’, entered by Mr. Chaffetz ..... 88 

DEA Memo Response to the DOJ Inspector General’s Draft Report, entered 

by Mr. Chaffetz .................................................................................................... 89 

Minority Oversight Committee Staff summary of New Internal DEA Report 

on Colombian ‘‘Sex Parties’’, entered by Mr. Cummings .................................. 90 

Statement of Congressman Gerald E. Connolly (VA–11), entered by Mr. 

Connolly, ............................................................................................................... 93 

(1) 

DOJ IG: HANDLING OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT 

AND MISCONDUCT ALLEGATIONS 

Tuesday, April 14, 2015 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, 

WASHINGTON, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 2154, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jason Chaffetz (chairman of 

the committee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Chaffetz, Mica, Duncan, Jordan, 

Walberg, Amash, Gowdy, Farenthold, Massie, Meadows, DeSantis, 

Mulvaney, Buck, Walker, Hice, Russell, Carter, Grothman, Palmer, 

Cummings, Maloney, Norton, Lynch, Connolly, Duckworth, Kelly, 

Lawrence, Lieu, Plaskett, DeSaulnier, and Lujan Grisham. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Good morning. The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform will come to order, and without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess at any time. 

We are here today to talk about some alarming problems at our 

country’s premier law enforcement agencies. The latest report from 

the Department of Justice inspector general outlines a number of 

problems with the conduct of both law enforcement officers and the 

agencies that manage them. 

That report outlined a number of key problems. First, law enforcement personnel at home and abroad engaged in reprehensible 

sexual harassment and misconduct that jeopardized our national 

security. 

Second, the agencies they—where they work mishandled their responses to those incidents by failing to properly report them, leading to insufficient punishment. 

And, third, the FBI and the DEA tried to hide these incidents 

from the inspector general by improperly withholding information 

and encouraging employees not to cooperate with the inspector general. 

Hiding information from the inspector general is simply and totally unacceptable. The Department of Justice inspector general report documents a number of highly concerning findings about Federal law enforcement. One of the most shocking incidents Mr. Horowitz described in his report involved DEA agents in Colombia 

partying with prostitutes paid for by drug cartels. While the DEA 

agents were spending time with those prostitutes, local Colombian 

police were watching the agents’ guns and property. 

The fact that this happened was bad enough, but none of these 

agents were really even punished by the DEA. Most of the agents 
2 

involved were suspended for a few days and allowed to return to 

work with their security clearances in full. 

Based on the testimony we have read from the DEA Administrator, she says she doesn’t have the power to simply fire these 

people. I don’t buy it. The American public doesn’t buy it. And for 

the thousands of men and women who serve honorably—they’re patriotic, they work hard, they put their lives on the line—this administration, this DEA Administrator, has got to hold those people 

accountable and get them out of there. 

If this is the kind of behavior that they’re going to engage in, it’s 

totally unacceptable. They should not have a security clearance, 

and they should be fired. 

Some of these agencies compromised our national security and 

then essentially got a vacation. The punishment for engaging in 

this type of behavior was 2 to 10 days off paid leave—or nonpaid 

leave. That sounds like a vacation to me. It doesn’t sound like punishment. To suggest that these people couldn’t be fired or do something more severe is simply unacceptable. 

And, again, I want to remind our members. This is a matter of 

national security. We’re talking about peoples’ lives. And the DEA, 

as much as anybody, puts people overseas in very tough and difficult situations. But when we have bad apples who repeatedly do 

the same type of behavior, compromise our national security, then 

they need to lose their national security clearances, and they need 

to be fired. 

The IG report found that this is hardly an isolated incident. The 

report highlights repeated abuses of sexual misconduct, including 

unreported cases of ATF training instructors sleeping with their 

students, using government vehicles to facilitate inappropriate sexual relationships, and managers sexually harassing employees and 

asking them to watch pornography. 

The report also makes clear that when law enforcement agents 

engage in inappropriate and illicit sexual behavior, the agency they 

work for oftentimes just simply looks the other way. To use the 

IG’s language, these cases of sexual misconduct are treated as, 

‘‘local management issues.’’ In other words, they’re basically swept 

under the rug. 

Adding to the concerns raised in this report is the fact that the 

DEA and the FBI tried to hide these incidents from their own inspector general. Both the DEA and the FBI went out of their way 

to impede and delay the inspector general’s report. According to the 

report, the DEA and the FBI delayed responding to requests for information, provided heavily redacted documents, and even told 

their employees not to cooperate. 

For example, the inspector general asked the DEA to run more 

than 40 search terms to search their data base and identify relevant information. The three terms, three out of the more than 40 

that they ran, included ‘‘sex,’’ ‘‘prosti,’’ and ‘‘exposure.’’ Not included 

were ‘‘brothel,’’ ‘‘escort,’’ ‘‘harass,’’ ‘‘rape,’’ ‘‘solicit,’’ and the list goes 

on. Why exclude? Why exclude the search terms that the inspector 

general is asking for? It’s not the DEA’s responsibility to weed that 

out. Your job is to allow the inspector general to get in there and 

get his fingernails dirty and go figure out the truth. But that’s not 

what happened. 
3 

I want to put up a slide here. 

When the DEA finally did provide information after significant 

delay, in some cases, documents were so heavily redacted the IG 

couldn’t even tell what the documents were about. This is the type 

of documentation that the inspector general was given by you at 

the DEA. And we want answers as to why that is. The good men 

and women who work at the Inspector General’s Office do tough, 

difficult work. But they can’t do anything if they get that kind of 

material from the DEA. 

And it’s not just the DEA. It’s the FBI. It’s the other agencies 

as well. It’s not acceptable. 

We have a lot of questions for our witnesses who are here today 

to testify on both behalf of the DEA and the FBI. It’s incumbent 

upon the leadership of these law enforcement agencies to weed out 

employees who put our security at risk, embarrass the country, and 

break the law. To the good men and women, the overwhelming majority of men and women, who do their job in a patriotic hard-working way, put their lives on the line, God bless you. We need you. 

We love you. We care for you. 

But it’s also irresponsible of management to not deal with the 

bad apples. People are going to make mistakes. OK? But these 

weren’t simple mistakes. This went on and on and on. Multiple reports of sex parties, of loud parties, to the point that the landlord 

was actually complaining back to our government about how out of 

control our own Federal employees were serving overseas. 

Again, the people who cause these problems I recognize are a 

small population—a small percentage of the total population who 

have not been held accountable for their dangerous lapses in judgment. 

I would ask unanimous consent. I would like to enter two documents into the record. 

First of all is from our Attorney General Eric Holder on April 10 

of this year, a Prohibition on the Solicitation of Prostitution. How 

bad is it? One of his last acts as the Attorney General, Eric Holder 

has to actually go forward and issue a memorandum explaining to 

people that you can’t do this. Again. It’s almost embarrassing that 

he has to do this. I appreciate that he did it to clarify if there’s 

some misunderstanding out there. But I’d like to enter that into 

the record. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I also want to enter into the record a document response—this is to the assistant inspector general for evaluations and inspections of the Office of Inspector General to Nina— 

I’m going to slaughter her last name—Pelletier, I guess. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And it’s from Michael Dixon, who is the 

acting deputy chief inspector, Office of Inspection, saying that—I’m 

going to read this quote here from the very last line: DEA did a 

second review of the cases the OIG reviewed to determine if the Office of Professional Responsibility had appropriately and thoroughly 

investigated these allegations. It was found through the review 

that the investigations were investigated properly through DEA’s 

disciplinary process related misconduct—basically telling the inspector general that, yes, we did everything we could. That it was 

properly moved—investigated properly through DEA’s disciplinary 

process, and it’s a sad day for the DEA. 
4 

With that, I will now yield to the gentleman from Maryland, the 

ranking member, Mr. Cummings, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And set forth, Mr. Chairman, at the beginning of the inspector 

general’s report is a well-known doctrine for law enforcement officers. It simply says, ‘‘Given the nature of their work, Federal law 

enforcement employees are held to the highest standards of conduct and must be accountable for their actions both on and off 

duty.’’ Although this tenet should be obvious, it bears repeating 

here today. And it bears repeating every day. The inspector general’s report details conduct that is simply deplorable for anyone, 

let alone law enforcement officials serving the United States of 

America. 

The report describes allegations that a Colombian police officer, 

‘‘arranged sex parties,’’ ‘‘with prostitutes funded by the local drug 

cartels for these DEA agents at their government-leased headquarters or quarters.’’ 

Although the inspector general’s report describes activities between 2005 and 2008, last night our committee obtained new documents showing that some of these allegations were made far earlier, and some date back as early as 2001. In response to the committee’s request, the DEA has now produced to the committee 88 

internal reports issued by its Office of Professional Responsibility. 

One of these reports in particular, case number 20120085, goes into 

great detail about these allegations. However, the agency has 

warned that releasing the entire report could, ‘‘expose complainants, witnesses, and victims.’’ So we must summarize its findings 

today. 

This new internal report details years of allegations beginning in 

2001 that portray DEA agents as completely out of control. They 

appear to have fraternized with cartel members, accepted lavish 

gifts, and paid for prostitutes with no concern whatsoever for the 

negative repercussions with security vulnerabilities they created. 

This new internal report describes not one or two isolated incidents 

but literally dozens of parties with prostitutes in which DEA 

agents used government funds and government offices. 

Mr. Chairman, my staff prepared a summary of this new internal 

report, and I ask unanimous consent that it be included in the 

hearing record. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. This new internal report details a truly breathtaking recklessness by DEA agents who are sworn to protect our 

country. Today I want to know how these egregious misconduct incidents could have continued for so long, for the better part of a 

decade, without being addressed. The head of this agency, Michele 

Leonhart, is here with us today. Given her extended tenure at DEA 

during the same timeframe of these abuses, we will have very direct questions for her. The Administrator was nominated by President Bush in 2003 to serve as Deputy Administrator of DEA. She 

began serving as Acting Administrator in 2007, and President 

Bush nominated her to serve as the Administrator in 2008. She 

was nominated again by President Obama and confirmed by the 

Senate in 2010. 
5 

The inspector general reports, says that ‘‘The DEA supervisor 

has treated alleged sexual misconduct and sexual harassment as a 

local management or performance-related issue.’’ It also finds that 

when the Administrator learned about these allegations, her agency imposed extremely light penalties. For example, when she was 

informed about wild parties involving prostitutes, she, ‘‘counseled 

the regional director for failing to report the allegations.’’ That was 

it. Just counseling. No other disciplinary actions. 

One critical question for the Administrator is what women who 

work in these law enforcement agencies must think. With only 

counseling sessions and suspensions of 2 weeks or less for misconduct like this, what incentive do women employees have to report sexual harassment by their supervisors? 

So, on Friday, the Attorney General sent a letter to the committee outlining steps to address the issues. And we’re very pleased 

to receive that letter. These included reexamining the security 

clearances of those involved, reviewing DEA procedures when investigating misconduct, and prohibiting the solicitation of prostitution regardless of whether it may be legal overseas. These steps are 

critical, but they are clearly long, long overdue if the first instances 

of this misconduct occurred in 2001. 

Finally, let me note that these problems transcend politics. On 

March 27, Chairman Chaffetz and I wrote a bipartisan letter to the 

DEA announcing our investigation, and we are fully committed to 

working together to investigate these incidents, how the agency responded, and whether additional steps are needed to help prevent 

this misconduct from ever happening again. 

And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

We will hold the record open for 5 legislative days for any member who would like to submit a written Statement. 

We will now recognize our first and only panel of witnesses. 

We are pleased to welcome the honorable Michele Leonhart, Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Agency; the honorable Michael Horowitz, inspector general of the United States Department 

of Justice; and Mr. Kevin Perkins, Associate Deputy Director of the 

FBI, the Federal Bureau of Investigation. We welcome all of you 

and thank you all for being here. 

Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn before 

they testify. If you’ll please rise and raise your right hand. 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are 

about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 

the truth? 

Thank you. 

Let the record reflect that all witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

In order to allow time for discussion, we would appreciate limiting your testimony to 5 minutes. Your entire written Statement 

will be made part of the record. 

So the DEA Administrator, Ms. Leonhart, we will recognize you 

first. 
6 

WITNESS STATEMENTS 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MICHELE M. LEONHART 

Ms. LEONHART. Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member 

Cummings, distinguished members of this committee, thank you 

for the opportunity to discuss the Department of Justice Office of 

the Inspector General’s report on sexual harassment and misconduct allegations by the Department’s law enforcement components. 

DEA has a single mission: To enforce our Nation’s drug laws. 

Our more than 9,000 employees, including over 4,600 special 

agents, are dedicated to this single mission, and each one of us 

took an oath, the same one I took over 30 years ago, to serve the 

citizens of the United States with honor, professionalism, and 

pride. 

DEA personnel located in over 300 offices around the world, including 67 foreign countries, are doing extraordinary work under 

often difficult and dangerous circumstances. And this includes the 

investigation and arrest of leaders of the most violent and sophisticated drug cartels in the world. Unfortunately, poor choices made 

by a few individuals can tarnish the reputation and overshadow 

the outstanding work being done at the DEA. 

I want to assure the members of this committee that, like you, 

I am disgusted, I am appalled, by the behavior described in the inspector general’s report. And to see the integrity of my agency and 

of Federal law enforcement, which I have been a part of for nearly 

my entire professional life, damaged by these allegations has not 

been easy. This conduct is a violation of the high professional 

standards of conduct that the men and women of the DEA are held 

to and undermines our effectiveness in fulfilling our mission. And, 

as noted in the report, this behavior is contrary to the behavior of 

the overwhelming majority of those at DEA. 

Although the OIG audit generally found that there were relatively few reported allegations of sexual harassment and sexual 

misconduct, the serious allegations OIG highlight are certainly 

troubling and describe behaviors that cannot be ignored. 

In particular, the allegations that agents assigned in Bogota engaged in prostitution and accepted gifts from drug traffickers was 

pursued by our Office of Professional Responsibility. However, the 

resulting investigation left some questions unanswered. Even 

though the events in question occurred between 2001 and 2004 and 

were not reported and investigated until 2010, it is nevertheless 

important that we hold our employees to the highest standards. 

And, in this instance, I assure you that I was quite disappointed 

in the penalties imposed. 

However, consistent with the protections afforded to employees 

under civil service laws, I do not have ability to change the imposed penalties. I can and do, however, ensure that disciplinary actions are appropriately noted in an employee’s personnel file, which 

is taken into consideration when that employee is considered for future positions within the DEA. This behavior should not be rewarded. 

As outlined in my written Statement, DEA concurred with and 

has begun implementing changes responsive to each of the OIG 
7 

recommendations. However, it is also essential that we make clear 

to all employees that this behavior is not acceptable. It is my hope 

that the additional training and guidance that we have provided to 

all personnel, particularly those stationed overseas, will prevent 

similar incidents from occurring in the future. 

DEA has taken specific concrete steps to accomplish this, including ensuring that it is clearly understood by all DEA employees 

that this kind of behavior is unacceptable; outlining the steps employees and supervisors must take when incidents occur; increasing 

training for all employees, especially those employees assigned 

overseas; further clarifying the guidelines for disciplinary offenses; 

and improving internal procedures so that appropriate individuals 

in field management and the Office of Security Programs and in 

the Office of Professional Responsibility are made promptly aware 

of allegations and can take appropriate action in a timely manner. 

In closing, I want to reiterate that the kind of activity reported 

by the OIG has not and will not be tolerated. OIG plays an important role in reviewing our policies and procedures, and I am committed to working with the OIG to ensure they have access to the 

documents they need to do their work. 

We have taken steps to address this kind of behavior, and moving forward, DEA will respond to this kind of misconduct head on 

and with the decisive resolve you and the public expect. We are 

open to further recommendations so that we can continuously improve our policies, policies that demand the highest levels of personal and professional integrity from our employees. 

And thank you again for the opportunity to address you today. 

[Prepared Statement of Ms. Leonhart follows:] 
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Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

I now recognize Mr. Horowitz for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL HOROWITZ 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cummings, 

members of committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today. 

Federal agents are held to the highest standards of conduct, both 

on and off duty. As a former Federal prosecutor and as an inspector general, it has been my experience that the overwhelming majority of Department agents meet those high standards and perform their work with great integrity and honor, thereby helping 

keeping—keep our communities safe and our country safe. Nevertheless, we find instances where law enforcement agents engage in 

serious misconduct and even criminal violations, affecting the agency’s reputation, potentially compromising prosecutions, and possibly affecting the security of the agents and agency operations. 

Furthermore, misconduct that involves sexual harassment affects 

employee morale and creates a hostile work environment. 

Following the incidents during the President’s trip to Colombia 

in 2012, the OIG conducted two reviews, one relating to Department policies and training involving off-duty conduct by employees 

working in foreign countries, and one relating to the handling of 

allegations of sexual harassment and misconduct by the Department’s law enforcement components. 

Our off-duty conduct report found a lack of Department-wide 

policies or training requirements pertaining to off-duty conduct 

whether in the United States or in other countries. This was particularly concerning, given that we made recommendations back in 

1996 in an OIG report involving allegations at the time about Department law enforcement agent off-duty conduct. Despite those 

earlier recommendations, we found little had changed in the intervening two decades. We did find, however, that the FBI made 

changes, including providing comprehensive training for its employees to help them make day-to-day decisions—to make appropriate day-to-day decisions about off-duty conduct while working 

abroad. However, we found that the other three Department law 

enforcement components contained little or no information about 

off-duty conduct before sending their employees abroad. Having 

only one of four law enforcements components effectively preparing 

its employees for overseas assignments demonstrates the need for 

Department-wide training and policies. 

In March 2015, we issued our report on the nature, frequency, 

reporting, investigation, and adjudication of allegations of sexual 

harassment or misconduct in the Department’s four law enforcement components. The report identified significant systemic issues 

that require prompt corrective action by the Department. These 

issues include a lack of coordination between internal affairs offices 

and security personnel; failure to meet misconduct—to report misconduct allegations to component headquarters; failure to investigate allegations fully; weaknesses in the adjudication process; and 

weaknesses in detecting and preserving sexually explicit text messages and images. 
25 

Together our reviews demonstrate the need to improve disciplinary and security processes as well as to clearly communicate the 

DOJ’s—to communicate to DOJ and components’ employees the expectations for employee conduct. Strong and unequivocal action 

from Department and component leadership at all levels is critical 

to ensure that Department employees meet the highest standards 

of conduct and are held fully accountable for any misconduct. 

As we also described in our March 2015 report, the failure by the 

DEA and FBI to promptly provide information we requested significantly impeded our review. Both agencies raised baseless legal objections and only relented when I elevated the issue to agency leadership. However, even then, the information we received was still 

incomplete. We, therefore, cannot be confident that the FBI and 

DEA provided us with all information relevant to this review. 

In addition, after we completed our draft report, we learned that 

the DEA failed to conduct the entire search of its data base we had 

requested. In order to conduct effective oversight, the OIG must 

have timely and complete access to documents and materials. This 

review starkly demonstrates the dangers in allowing the Department and its components to decide on their own what documents 

they will share with the OIG. The delays we experienced impeded 

our work, delayed our ability to discover the significant issues we 

ultimately identified, wasted Department and OIG resources, and 

affected our confidence in the completeness of our review. 

Unfortunately, this was not an isolated incident. Rather, we 

faced repeated instances in which our timely access to records has 

been impeded. Congress recognized the significance of this impairment and included a provision in the recent appropriations act, section 218, prohibiting the Department from impeding our timely access to records. Nevertheless, the FBI continues to proceed exactly 

as it did before section 218 was adopted, spending appropriated 

funds to review records to determine if they should be withheld 

from the OIG. 

We’re approaching the 1-year anniversary of the Deputy Attorney 

General’s request to the Office of Legal Counsel for an opinion on 

those matters, yet that opinion remains outstanding, and we have 

been given no timeline for its issuance. Although the OIG has been 

told that the opinion is a priority, the length of time that has 

passed suggests otherwise. Instead, the status quo continues. The 

American public deserves and expects an OIG that is able to conduct rigorous oversight of the Department’s activities. Unfortunately, our ability to conduct that oversight is being undercut every 

day that goes by without a resolution of this dispute. 

I want to thank the committee again for its bipartisan support 

for our work, and I have—would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have. 

[Prepared Statement of Mr. Horowitz follows:] 
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Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you, Mr. Horowitz. 

I will now recognize Mr. Perkins for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF KEVIN PERKINS 

Mr. PERKINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning, Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings, 

and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to 

appear before you today to discuss issues raised in the inspector 

general’s audit entitled ‘‘The Handling of Sexual Harassment and 

Misconduct Allegations by the Department’s Law Enforcement 

Components.’’ 

The FBI’s policy on sexual harassment and sexual misconduct is 

very simple: The FBI does not tolerate sexual harassment or sexual 

misconduct within the ranks. The FBI has a robust disciplinary 

process guided by well-established policies, procedures, and practices. It consists of trained special agents in the Inspection Division’s Internal Investigations Section, who conduct thorough investigations of employee misconduct. When the investigation is completed, a team of experienced lawyers in the FBI’s Office of Professional Responsibility take over, reviewing the investigative materials and determining whether applicable policies, rules, regulations, laws, or other legal standards were violated and, if so, what 

penalty should be imposed on employees in question, up to and including dismissal. 

In addition, the Office of the Inspector General reviews all allegations of misconduct at the FBI prior to any investigation being 

initiated and all final adjudications of misconduct at the FBI are 

reported on a regular basis to the OIG. 

We are pleased that the Office of the Inspector General found 

relatively few reported allegations of sexual harassment and sexual 

misconduct in the Department’s law enforcement components for 

fiscal years 2009 through 2012. In fact, the OIG found that the FBI 

had the lowest rate of this type of misconduct across the components. While we strive to have no cases of sexual harassment or 

misconduct, we have and we will continue to implement measures 

to better address these types of allegations. 

We are also pleased that the OIG’s audit recognizes the FBI’s coordination between our internal investigations section and our security divisions as a best practice to ensure that misconduct allegations are evaluated for potential security concerns, including continued eligibility to hold a security clearance. 

Notwithstanding these findings, there are improvements to be 

made. We must always look to improve and evolve as an organization, and we appreciate the OIG’s recommendations for making our 

process better. 

As a result, the FBI concurs with the recommendations in the 

OIG’s report. The FBI takes very seriously our obligation to enable 

Congress and the OIG to conduct effective oversight of all of our 

activities. We work closely with the OIG staff to ensure that we are 

responsive to their requests and that issues are identified and 

promptly resolved. 
33 

You may also be aware that we have a good-faith disagreement 

with the OIG regarding what law requires with respect to providing FBI documents that have been obtained pursuant to provisions of law such as the Wire Tap Act, the Bank Secrecy Act, and 

those related to grand jury proceedings. We have been completely 

transparent with the OIG and the leadership of the Department of 

Justice with respect to our legal disagreement and are presently 

awaiting the Office of Legal Counsel to render an opinion as to the 

correct reading of the law. 

In the interim, we are giving the OIG an assumption of access 

to these—in these audits with respect to title III, rule 6(e), and 

FCRA materials. Senior leadership has also directed that our internal business process consulting group rigorously evaluate our processes to ensure that we are as effective and efficient as possible in 

providing the inspector general with requested documents in a 

timely fashion consistent with the law. 

Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings and members 

of the committee, I thank you for the opportunity to testify before 

you today concerning these—our commitment to ensuring allegations of sexual harassment and misconduct are addressed in a 

prompt, thorough, and equitable manner. We take our responsibilities on this topic very seriously and appreciate your interest in 

these matters. 

Now I’m happy to answer any questions you may have. 

[Prepared Statement of Mr. Perkins follows:] 
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Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

I now recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

Mr. Perkins, I totally disagree with your assessment that you’re 

being open and transparent and providing access to the inspector 

general. That is a topic we will continue to discuss today, but I find 

your comments to be totally inconsistent with what the inspector 

general is telling us, and we need to hash that out. It’s one of the 

reasons that you’re here today. Glad that you’re here, but my questions—I want to focus with the DEA here for a moment. 

Do you have any questions, Administrator, as to the accuracy of 

the OIG report? You don’t question the accuracy of the report. Do 

you? 

Ms. LEONHART. I don’t question the accuracy. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So this included allegations and examples 

of DEA agents participating in so-called sex parties where local police were watching DEA equipment, which included a, ‘‘loud party 

incident’’ involving what one would consider bad judgment for allowing prostitutes and allowing those in close proximity with DEA 

agents to be actually in these agents room and housing, you 

wouldn’t then have a problem with these—this going away party 

that was—involved a DEA assistant regional director at his residence. You wouldn’t disagree, then, with the assessment that they 

had multiple accounts of the landlord complaining about the loud 

parties and whatnot were going on there. 

Is it wrong for prostitutes to be in government housing? 

Ms. LEONHART. Well, first of all, it’s deplorable behavior by those 

agents. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. But is it a violation of policy? 

Ms. LEONHART. It’s absolutely a violation of policy. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Is it wrong to have a foreign national in 

close proximity to a DEA agent, close to their guns, personal effects, computer, smart phones? Does that pose any sort of security 

risk? 

Ms. LEONHART. Of course, it poses security risks, and that is why 

it’s—these are very serious allegations. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Did you do any investigation as to the age 

of the women that were involved? Were they just simply there for 

entertainment? 

Ms. LEONHART. The investigation, although it’s 10 years later, 

the investigation—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Don’t try to paint a picture that this is one 

incident 10 years ago. There’s an incident, for instance, in July 

2009, for instance, where the DEA agent in Bogota was accused of 

physically assaulting a prostitute over a payment dispute. A security guard witnessed this agent throwing a glass and hitting the 

woman. This agent then claimed that the woman had had a seizure 

while she was in the bathroom and cut herself on a candlestick, but 

later admitted that, yes, he had engaged with a prostitute. And you 

know what the punishment for this person was? Fourteen days unpaid leave. Go on vacation for 2 weeks. 

You can sit here and cry a pretty picture about how deplorable 

it is, but your actions suggest otherwise because there was not the 

consequence that should have happened. This person is imposing 

a national security risk, engaging in behavior that is just—it’s em-
39 

barrassing that we have to talk about this. It’s an embarrassment 

that you don’t fire that person. It’s an embarrassment that you 

don’t revoke his security clearance. 

Why can’t you revoke their security clearance? What prohibits 

you from revoking that person’s security clearance? 

Ms. LEONHART. Everything you’ve said about the behavior I completely agree with. 

As far as the disciplinary penalties that were handed out in that 

case, I’m very disappointed in that and the—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. You’re the administrator. 

Ms. LEONHART. The system that’s set up following civil service 

laws, I don’t—I don’t fire. I can’t—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Can you revoke their security clearance? 

Ms. LEONHART. I can’t revoke their security clearance. I can ensure that there’s a mechanism—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Why can’t you? 

Ms. LEONHART [continuing]. Like I did after the Cartagena incident, make sure that there is a mechanism in place for those security—for a security review which resulted in those three agents 

having their security clearances revoked, and they were fired. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And here’s the problem. Here’s the concern 

I have. High profile. It’s in all the media. Everybody’s reporting 

about the Secret Service engaging with prostitutes. You all get 

nervous about it, and those people have some discipline, but when 

it’s quiet and nobody hears about it, and it comes across your desk 

and your senior staff, can you show me another example where 

people were engaging in prostitution and creating these national 

security problems where you revoked their security clearances? 

That’s what I want to see. Because in this case, that’s not what 

happened. That wasn’t too long ago. You’re not disputing any of the 

facts that show up in the report. There’s nothing that—there’s no— 

is there a statute of limitations? Is there a limit that you can’t 

reach further back? And yet you allow this person who engages a 

prostitute, throws glass at her, breaks the skin, there’s blood all 

over the place, and they’re still employed at the DEA? And you 

allow that. You’re allowing that. 

Did you—I mean, did you try to fire them? Did you try to revoke 

their security clearance? Do we need to change that law? What do 

we need to do? 

Ms. LEONHART. Well, you could look at an exemption like the FBI 

has because the current disciplinary process, myself and other directors of Federal law enforcement agencies are not allowed to invoke ourselves in the disciplinary process. If we were exempted or 

if there was other legislation passed that would allow that, that 

would allow our directors of Federal law enforcement to take that 

action. The same thing that—with a result like Cartagena, where 

they have done these deplorable activities, that it is investigated, 

and that a decision is made by the agency without appeal rights 

to the MSPB. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. OK. So my concern is high profile, you take 

action. When it’s not so high profile and there’s a woman involved, 

you don’t take action, and that’s a concern, but I hear what you’re 

saying. 
40 

The last question, because I’ve exceeded my time. If you are both, 

the FBI and the DEA, sincere about rooting out this problem and 

finding solutions, then you need to allow the inspector general to 

look at the information. Why do you continue to prohibit him from 

seeing that information? Why do you hold it back? Why not do all 

45 search terms? Why did you only do three. So I really got to 

question your sincerity about getting out and rooting out this problem if you don’t even know the extent of the problem. You don’t 

even know the extent of the cases because you won’t even allow the 

inspector general and his staff to actually look at the cases that are 

there. You’re limiting the inspector from doing their job, which is 

to help you, help us, help them, help the rest of the agency. 

That’s—I need you to both explain that answer to me, and then I’ll 

yield to the ranking member. 

Go ahead. 

Ms. LEONHART. The—moving forward, because there’s a number 

of things that I put in place after Cartagena, and you should know 

that the other incidents I learned about after Cartagena, but they 

had already been through the system, what we put in place in 

Cartagena moving forward, is the model for how we will handle—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Is the model to impede the ability of the inspector general to look at the information? 

Ms. LEONHART. I’m talking about the—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I’m talking about the IG. Why can’t the IG 

look at this? 

Ms. LEONHART. And know that those cases, when they were first 

reported, are reported immediately over to the OIG. They handed 

those cases back to us to handle as management—as a management review. We felt that the behavior was so outrageous they 

needed to be investigated. What we’ve put in place—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. But you went back and investigated them 

again and still came to the same conclusion, that we would have 

came to this same conclusion. 

My time is far exceeded, but you gave them 2 to 10 days paid 

leave, you put them on vacation, you didn’t take the disciplinary 

action. 

I’ve got to yield to the gentleman from Maryland. 

Oh. We’re going to go actually to Ms. Plaskett first. You’re now 

recognized for 5 minutes plus very generous overtime if you need 

it. 

Ms. PLASKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member. 

Good morning to you all. 

You know, of course, we all find the reports of sexual harassment 

and misconduct, particularly, I think, the actions of the DEA spanning back to 2001, extremely troubling, and the American people 

seem understandably outraged over this behavior, and particularly 

women. 

The IG report States, ‘‘Sexual misconduct and sexual harassment 

in the workplace also affect employee morale and hamper employees’’ ability to have and maintain effective working relationships.’’ 

Mr. Horowitz, can you explain how sexual harassment and sexual misconduct can impact employee morale. 
41 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, it has a significant debilitating effect on 

morale, particularly when the individuals in the workplace try to 

report the information and see no results. And that’s one of the 

things we highlight here that’s particularly concerning when, for 

example, in three of the incidents we identified, in one of them we 

learned about it or it was reported—— 

Ms. PLASKETT. And which agency is that? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. These are on the three matters involving DEA 

that we have been discussing. 

One is reported in June 2010 through an anonymous letter. 

That’s how that information gets forwarded. The 2001 to 2004 

events that are referred to in the report as the sex parties, those 

don’t get reported until 2009, 2010, when the corrupt law enforcement officers are charged. 

Ms. PLASKETT. And what’s the rationale that you were given as 

to why they weren’t reported? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Because they were dealt with locally, reviewed locally and didn’t need to be reported to—— 

Ms. PLASKETT. And were they dealt with? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. They were not, and that was the concern we 

identified. 

And on the third incident that we report there, that’s sent to the 

OIG and DEA by the State Department, not through the DEA. Employees in the organizations not only need to know they have a safe 

work environment to go to and a nonhostile work environment, but 

they need to know they can come forward, report allegations, and 

that they’ll be taken seriously and that they’ll be addressed 

promptly. 

Ms. PLASKETT. OK. Thank you. 

Ms. Leonhart, you spoke about how your own outrage being a 

law enforcement officer for 30 years. I completely understand that. 

I was raised by a New York City police officer who says every good 

cop hates the most a bad cop because they make all the good 

cops—it completely taints everyone else. But do you agree with the 

IG that sexual harassment negatively impacts morale, and have 

you seen that in your agency? 

Ms. LEONHART. I know it has the potential to do that, and that 

is why several directives, reminders—— 

Ms. PLASKETT. But I didn’t ask you its potential. I asked you has 

it affected the morale. 

Ms. LEONHART. In the offices where the employees attempted to 

report misconduct and there was nothing that happened, it was not 

reported up and investigated, I can imagine that those employees 

felt they lost faith in the agency. 

In a number of other cases, however, where they are reported up. 

They are investigated. The supervisors take immediate action, help 

the employee who has come forward with a complaint. I see over 

my 35 years in DEA a huge change, more willingness to report, 

more willingness for supervisors to help that employee who came 

forward with it, and my job is to work on the disciplinary end to 

make sure that, as these are reported, as they’re thoroughly investigated, that the proper discipline is handed out. 

Ms. PLASKETT. Well, that’s interesting that you say that it’s your 

job to deal with the discipline because you’ve just Stated earlier to 
42 

the chairman that you don’t have any say over the discipline. So 

which one is it? Do you or don’t you have say over the discipline 

of those individuals? 

Ms. LEONHART. I am not in the process for investigating, proposing, or handing out discipline. What I can do is what I did a 

year ago. I sent out a directive to every DEA employee and said, 

Here are the conduct issues I am concerned about. They must be 

reported. They’re not acceptable. This is not acceptable behavior in 

about five or six different areas, and I sent a strong message to the 

board of conduct and to the deciding officials that in these types 

of instances, there should be severe discipline handed out. 

Ms. PLASKETT. And what do you—what would you consider severe discipline? 

Ms. LEONHART. I would consider what happened with the 

Cartagena agents to be severe discipline. 

Ms. PLASKETT. What about the agents who were given 2 to 10 

days of paid leave? 

Ms. LEONHART. I’m not happy with that. I am not in the disciplinary process. I am very disappointed—— 

Ms. PLASKETT. OK. Wait a minute. You mean, so you’re not in 

the disciplinary process, but you’re responsible for the discipline? 

Ms. LEONHART. I’m responsible for the whole agency. So I am responsible to set up a mechanism to send messages to our employees to hold people accountable if they’re not going to—if they’re 

going to conduct this misbehavior, that they face significant discipline. And that is what I have done over the last couple of years 

to send that message to make sure our employees, No. 1, report— 

report their allegations; and No. 2, hold managers accountable for 

not reporting; and No. 3, make sure that we set up a process, have 

good OPR inspectors. I was one at one time. Do the investigation 

so that our disciplinary process, our board of conduct that proposes, 

and our deciding officials have all the information they need to be 

able to impose severe discipline. 

Ms. PLASKETT. But don’t you believe that the morale of your 

agents and the good men and the women of that agency would 

have been better served, and they would have believed that you 

really stood behind that if the information had been more fully and 

quickly forthcoming to the IG? How can you say that you are—you 

weren’t pleased with the discipline when you and your agency impeded the investigation at the IG level? 

Ms. LEONHART. The IG gave the investigation back to DEA. 

As—— 

Ms. PLASKETT. But they gave you the portion of it related to disciplining the individuals, not to investigating the systemic problems in the structure of your agencies. 

Ms. LEONHART. No. They gave us back the investigation and said 

that they would not take it. It looked like a management issue. We 

investigated as misconduct, and as we investigated it and we 

learned more and more by interviewing a number of witnesses in 

the old Bogota case, the information that was put together, the 

interviews, all of that was entered into the discipline system. And 

I am very disappointed that our discipline system did not do what 

it needed to do. And we have to fix it, and I’ve put mechanisms in 

place moving forward to make sure that that does not happen 
43 

again because I don’t believe that that discipline that was doled out 

in those cases that Chairman Chaffetz mentioned is even close to 

what it should be. 

Ms. PLASKETT. OK. I’ve run out of more than the generous time 

that you’ve given me, Mr. Chairman, ranking member. But it’s my 

assessment that the discussion here and the actions are at a complete disconnect. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you the gentlewoman. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mica, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me ask—let me followup on some of the questioning that’s taken place as to whether 

there was a full investigation of this whole matter. 

You claim, Administrator, that there was a full investigation of 

the matter—all of these sexual harassment—sexual assault issues 

that have been raised that were—that were part of the inspector 

general’s review. You claim—again, just tell us. You believe they 

were fully investigated. 

Ms. LEONHART. I believe that they were investigated. I have concerns about the completeness, thoroughness, of a couple of the investigations. 

Mr. MICA. So then you agree with Mr. Horowitz, the OIG, that 

there was not a thorough investigation of all of the incidents? 

Ms. LEONHART. I agree that some of the incidents were not thoroughly investigated and fully investigated, yes. 

Mr. MICA. OK. And that was your position too and the assumption that I have from your report. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. That’s correct, Congressman. 

Mr. MICA. OK. Well, that in itself raises great questions when 

the inspector general says that the—these incidents were not fully 

investigated. So that, to me, is a big issue right there. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. MICA. Yes, I yield for—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And I hate to do this to you. On March— 

but I just was handed something. March 26 of this year, you, Ms. 

Leonhart, as the administrator, sent this email out within your 

agency. And you said these allegations were fully investigated by 

the DEA Office of Professional Responsibility. 

Yield back. 

Mr. MICA. Again, there seems to be a conflict between again 

what the chairman has just cited, what we’ve had as previous testimony, and what the inspector general’s—OK. That being said—and 

I have some questions too. 

You say you don’t have the authority, but you took the authority 

post-Cartagena. It looks like before Cartagena—and you’ve been 

there since 2010. Is that right? 

Ms. LEONHART. That’s correct. 

Mr. MICA. You didn’t just arrive on the block, and you see the 

conduct that took place in 2006, 2008, the sex parties, the assaults, 

all of these things that were going on, Cartagena was, what, 2 

years ago. 

Ms. LEONHART. 2012. 

Mr. MICA. Three years ago. Well, what happened is you set up 

a culture within the agency that you could get away with this, and 
44 

you were there. You must have known some of this was going on. 

Cartagena brought it to the press and our attention that—the size 

and scope of what was going on. 

The thing that concerns me is, before that, some of the people 

got—who were involved, looks like if you attended a sex party, one 

report here, one agent was cleared of any wrongdoing. Seven of 10 

agents ultimately attended to the parties and engaging with prostitutes. So it looked like the penalty—they got suspensions of a few 

days. And I think the most was like 6 days up to that time. So that 

was sort of the standard operating procedure while you were there 

until Cartagena. That’s the kind of penalty they were getting. 

Right? 

Ms. LEONHART. If I can explain, Congressman. The first—the 

first I heard of any of these sex parties or the behavior that’s described in the reports was actually Cartagena. When Cartagena 

happened, I became concerned, is this systemic? Has this happened 

before? And we went back and we took a look at where this activity 

had occurred, if anybody had been disciplined for it, and we found 

one Bogota case. 

Mr. MICA. Well, again, we have instances, and we have penalties. 

Most of them only got minor penalties, and it was known that some 

of this had posed great security risks. I guess drug folks were paying for some of this activity, and they got anywhere from 4 to 6 

days. Only a suspension of 15 days or more is considered serious 

for adverse employment action. So those people went right on 

working at that time. 

So what I’m saying is a culture existed while you were there up 

to Cartagena, and there were low penalties. After Cartagena, you 

did some—you took some action. Some people were actually fired. 

Is that correct? 

Ms. LEONHART. Yes. That’s the first case that came—— 

Mr. MICA. And the difference, folks, members of the committee, 

this is the same thing whether it’s Secret Service, VA, IRS, HUD, 

any agency. She doesn’t have the right to summarily fire people. 

She has to go through a process, Merit System Protection, the protections of Title V, a Federal act created by Congress. Unless you 

change that law and give these people the ability to fire people 

summarily when they are found in, you know, a proper process and 

a speedy process to violate, whether it’s sexual assault, sexual harassment, you’ll have this continue—all these problems continue 

across the scope of all of our civil service system. The only one exempt from that, I understand, is FBI. I didn’t get enough time to 

ask you questions about how many people you’ve fired, but we’ll get 

that in the record at some point I hope. 

Yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank the gentleman. 

I now recognize the ranking member—I’m sorry—Mr. Lynch, the 

gentleman from Massachusetts, who is the ranking member of the 

Subcommittee on National Security, now recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. L YNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank the ranking member, Mr. Cummings, for allowing me to go in his place. 

Ms. Leonhart, how do you hold people accountable if you are not 

able to discipline them? 
45 

Ms. LEONHART. The system in place, it is a three-tiered system. 

There’s the inspectors who investigate—— 

Mr. LYNCH. You’re not answering my question. 

Basically, very briefly, because I only have a couple of minutes, 

how do you hold people accountable when you cannot discipline 

them when they do, like, OK, so we have got 15 to 20 sex parties, 

15 to 20. We have got all these allegations. A lot of these agents 

admitted to prostitution, to soliciting prostitutes, having sex with 

prostitutes. We don’t know their ages because there’s been nothing 

disclosed here. We have them taking weapons. We have got foreign 

individuals, parts of terrorist groups complicit in this. We have got 

national security at risk, and you don’t have the ability to discipline these people. 

You know, when I came to this hearing, I thought my problem 

was that we weren’t disciplining these people. I think the problem 

here, now after hearing you testify, even though you’ve said you 

were not happy, even though you said you were very disappointed—this is a prostitution ring—15 to—they are using taxpayer money to solicit and pay for prostitutes. And you’re very disappointed; you’re not happy. I think we’re at different levels here. 

And I find completely vapid the Statement that we are not going 

to let this happen again. We’re not doing anything. We’re not doing 

anything. 

We haven’t—I think the problem now is we’re protecting these 

people. That’s what’s happening in your agency. You’re protecting 

the people who solicited prostitutes, who had 15 to 20 sex parties, 

went through this whole operation, used taxpayer money to do it 

and, I believe, compromised the national security. And you’re not 

happy. You know, that’s not what I would expect from your department. I really wouldn’t. 

I worked with DEA in Afghanistan, and those folks did a great 

job. And I think this is a disgrace that their reputation, I see—and 

they were in some dangerous, dangerous places in Afghanistan, 

down in Helmand Province trying to deal with the opium exportation there, doing heroic work. Those are the DEA agents that I 

know that worked hard and upheld the dignity of this country and 

worked with the local families down there, the farmers, just to try 

to protect them. I’m proud of those DEA agents. They’re doing wonderful work on behalf of our country. And this is a blemish. You 

know, this is just disgraceful that they should be associated with 

this activity. 

So I actually feel your system is protecting these people. So 

there’s these 15 or 20 sex parties and then—and by the way, it 

says here sexual harassment and misconduct. It should be sexual 

misconduct upfront. That’s what we’re talking about here. This is 

a very serious issue, and you’ve done nothing. You’ve done nothing. 

How about disclosure? If you can’t even—if you can’t prosecute 

them, if you can’t bring justice to the situation, why are we stopping the inspector general from looking at this? Why do the American people do not—why do they not have the names of these individuals? 

Ms. LEONHART. Well, we did provide the inspector general with 

the information so that he could do his review. 
46 

As far as protecting them, I take great offense to that because 

I feel exactly—— 

Mr. LYNCH. You do? You do? You take offense that someone who 

runs 15 to 20 prostitution parties, abusing women gets a 3-day, 2- 

day, 1-day, you’re offended by that? You’re offended by that? 

Ms. LEONHART. I’m offended by their conduct. I’m offended 

by—— 

Mr. LYNCH. I don’t see it, though. 

Ms. LEONHART [continuing]. The behavior. I am trying to fix the 

system. I can’t fire. I’m trying to fix a system. 

Mr. LYNCH. How about just naming them, name and shame? 

How about that? You get—there was some discipline here. It’s 

laughable. It’s laughable, but you did suspend some people here 

with pay for—1, 2, 3—10 days. One guy got 10 days, conduct unbecoming and poor judgment. 

It’s just—you know what I think? You know and I appreciate the 

gentleman’s earlier comments about we’ve got to give you power. 

I don’t think that’s the answer. I think there’s a mentality here 

that needs to be extricated root and branch from the DEA operation. I think we have to have an independent agency that actually 

goes in that’s not part of the old good ole boy network, that actually 

goes in and, with sunlight, with disclosure, goes after these people 

who—like I say, you know, when I think of the DEA agents and 

the jobs they’re doing in Afghanistan right today, today and trying 

to protect the homeland, you know, this is a real—this is a disservice to those good agents. 

I’ll yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank the gentleman. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Farenthold, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Horowitz, Mr. Lynch really hit on something with respect to 

the good ole boy culture. And this is my concern that I’m seeing 

more and more of the good ole boy culture as this committee continues its investigation. I mean, we’ve seen it with the DEA sex 

parties. We’ve seen it with some of the things going on in the Secret Service admittedly, you know, not subject to this. We see it in 

a lot of government agencies. 

In your investigation, do you get a sense that there is a good ole 

boy mentality? Is it as bad as I think it is? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, it’s interesting, Congressman, you use these 

words because this all—our first review was of the good ole boy 

roundup events. Back in the early nineties, we did a report in 1969 

about the culture and the need to make it clear about what is permissible and what clearly isn’t permissible on and off duty, and yet 

we’re 20 years later and there are still no department-wide policies 

or training. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Ms. Leonhart, do you run the DEA. Do you 

think it’s appropriate in your off time, even in a country where 

prostitution is illegal, to engage prostitutes? 

Ms. LEONHART. Absolutely not. And it’s against DEA policy. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. And how—— 

Ms. LEONHART. It’s illegal. 
47 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. How could any of your agents not know this? 

This strikes me as just common sense that—I mean, and we have 

a memo from Eric Holder. Admittedly, not a fan of Mr. Holder. 

But, I mean, he really—I can’t believe there’s even a need for a 

memo that says it’s not appropriate to hire prostitutes. 

I mean, let me read from the memo—a couple of things from the 

memo: The solicitation of prostitution threatens the core mission of 

the Department, not simply because it invites extortion, blackmail, 

and leaks of sensitive or classified information, but because it is 

also undermines the department’s effort to eradicate the scourge of 

human trafficking. Regardless of whether prostitution is legal or 

tolerated in the particular jurisdiction, soliciting prostitutes creates 

a greater demand for human trafficking victims and, as a consequence, an increase in the number of minor and adult persons 

trafficked into commercial sex slavery. 

And now he goes on: For this reason, I want to reiterate to all 

Department personnel, including attorneys and law enforcement officers, that they’re prohibited from soliciting, procuring, or accepting commercial sex. 

To me, it seems ludicrous that we would even have to write a 

memo like this. It defies common sense. 

Mr. Perkins, what about the FBI? Is there anybody in the FBI 

thinks it’s OK to go hire a prostitute? 

Mr. PERKINS. No, sir. We make it very clear to our employees 

both here domestically and overseas that’s not going to be—— 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. But the message we’re getting, with no disciplinary action or time off with pay, tends to reinforce that. 

Mr. Horowitz, is there congressional action that needs to be 

taken? Do we need to change some of our laws to make it easier 

to fire people who are proved to have engaged in this? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, that’s certainly something Congress could 

look at. As been noted, the FBI has certain authorities that the 

other three components do not. I will add that one of the things 

that would help address these is that the OIG—that they get reported as they should to headquarters, that they get reported to 

the OIG as they should, and that we get copies of records that we 

need promptly so that we can look at them promptly. That would 

help as well, and that takes no congressional action because you already have the law in the IG Act that says that should occur, but 

it’s not occurring. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. All right. So what do we do to fix that? I mean, 

somebody is going to have to be disciplined for not reporting. It’s 

not just the rank-and-file men and women who are engaged in misconduct that need discipline. It’s their superiors that are covering 

it up and obstructing. Is that not correct? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. It’s certainly our view that if an employee fails 

to report to headquarters what the policy requires, which in all law 

enforcement agencies cases in the Department, that’s the policy, 

that is a violation that should be looked at. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Now, but we’re also seeing—you want disclosure from the folks that you’re investigating. 

We’re starting to see lots of redacted stuff here in Congress when 

the IG Act only says the identity needs to be—needs to be with-
48 

held. In fact, had we wanted more information withheld, we could 

have modified it on Section 6103 of the taxpayer—of the IRS code. 

I mean, you want full reporting. What’s the excuse for not giving 

us more access here in Congress? 

Mister—anybody want to field that? I mean, some of it’s the IG, 

Mr. Horowitz. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. We’ve certainly put forth, on our Website publically and sent to Congress, everything that we’re allowed to put 

forth pursuant to the Privacy Act. We’ve—we have not withheld 

material. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. I think we have a differing interpretation of 

that, but I see I’m out of time. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The gentleman will yield. 

Ms. Leonhart, will you agree to allow the inspector general to 

search all 45 terms? You’ve limited it to three. 

Ms. LEONHART. Yes. We don’t have the search capabilities that 

his systems have. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Will you allow him full and unfettered access to review these records? 

Ms. LEONHART. We would be glad to run that search. We had 

problems in doing a search that many names. We found a different 

way to do it by running offense codes. But I—Mr. Horowitz and I 

have a very good working relationship. And if there’s something 

that he wants, he has not hesitated to pick up the phone and talk 

to me about it. And we’ll work it out. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Has she allowed you all the access that you 

want? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I think the problem has been that, frankly, I’ve 

had to call too much. I shouldn’t have to make those calls, frankly, 

to the Administrator to get access. The staff—my staff shouldn’t 

have to spend 4 months going back and forth with the line DEA 

staff getting redacted versions, being told they can’t get things because of privacy issues when we—that is not a basis for a legal objection, which the DEA and the FBI ultimately conceded. 

But I shouldn’t have to be engaging at the highest levels of the 

FBI and the DEA to get the access that occurred—and let me just 

put in a—say something here about two agencies that complied 

fully. The ATF and the U.S. Marshals Service got us the material 

immediately. We had no delays. What it took us four, five—I don’t 

even know how many months—to get from DEA and ATF we got 

in a matter of weeks from ATF and the Marshals Service. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Did you mean the—— 

Mr. HOROWITZ [continuing]. Who fully cooperated with us. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I think you meant to say DEA and FBI. 

Correct? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I’m sorry. FBI and DEA compared to ATF and 

the Marshals Service, who fully cooperated with us. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you very much. I see my time is expired. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

I now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Cummings, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 
49 

Ms. Leonhart, do you think that you’re the right person for this 

job? You know, I’ve been—I just intentionally wanted to hear some 

of the testimony. I have a lot of concerns. 

It seems like there’s a culture that has developed here. And even 

the Attorney General’s letter when he has to say ‘‘don’t fraternize 

with prostitutes’’—hello? Am I missing something? I mean, I think 

that we are at an all-time low here. Don’t you? 

Ms. LEONHART. As a DEA agent and a female DEA agent for the 

past 35 years, I’m appalled of it over this as well. And like the Attorney General had to send a memo reminding people last Friday, 

I had to send one last year to remind everyone and put everybody 

on notice. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. OK. I only have a few minutes, but I just—I’m 

very concerned, Mr. Horowitz. And on page 12 of your report, you 

made the following Statement, ‘‘We found the regional director and 

acting assistant regional director and the group supervisor failed to 

report through their chain of command or to DEA OPR repeated 

allegations of DEA special agents fraternizing with prostitutes and 

frequenting a brothel while in an overseas posting, treating these 

allegations as local management issues.’’ 

Is that correct? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. That’s correct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So despite these facts, none of these employees— 

the special agent, the group supervisor, the regional director, and 

the acting assistant regional director—ever reported these allegations to the Office of Professional Responsibility or to you at the 

IG’s office. Is that right? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. That’s correct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, Mr. Horowitz, when these allegations finally came to light in 2012, your report States—‘‘The DEA Administrator counseled the regional director for failing to report the allegations.’’ Is that right? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. That’s correct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And, Ms. Leonhart, is that correct? Did you personally counsel the regional director? 

Ms. LEONHART. The regional director was first counseled by the 

chief inspector. He was then counseled by the deputy administrator, and then I counseled him as well. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, was that the only discipline that he got, 

somebody sitting there saying, you’re supposed to do your job? 

Ms. LEONHART. Yes. He was—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Please. You mean to tell me that was the discipline—‘‘Do your job’’? That’s not discipline, is it? 

Ms. LEONHART. The regional director—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Come on. 

Ms. LEONHART. The regional director—the regional director was 

not aware of any allegation until it was brought to light a year, a 

year after an incident. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Who was the regional—— 

Ms. LEONHART. So when I counseled him—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. OK. 

Ms. LEONHART. So when I—when I talked to him and went—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, just tell us what you said very briefly. I 

only have a minute or so. 
50 

Ms. LEONHART. I was concerned that he had warnings that this 

person was involved with prostitutes. And I talked to him because, 

if that was the case, I would have been looking at significant discipline. It was not the case with him. I even went and looked at 

the letters that were sent. The letters were sent to—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And so what did he say? I mean, I wish I had 

a tape recording of that conversation, but—— 

Ms. LEONHART. Right. 

Mr. CUMMINGS [continuing]. In 30 seconds, what was said by 

him? 

Ms. LEONHART. He said, when he was aware of it, he was notified by the Embassy, the RSO, of what had happened. He was told 

about the incident. He called the agent in. That was the first he 

knew that this agent was involved with prostitutes. He called the 

agent in, told the agent, You’re out of here, you’re going home. He 

sent him TDY back to the States until he could finalize the tour. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So were they suspended at all? 

Ms. LEONHART. I’m sorry? 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I mean, you said he sent them back to the 

United States. 

Ms. LEONHART. Yes. The agent received 14 days off. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And this—and so did you think that was sufficient? 

Ms. LEONHART. The regional director took action when he heard 

about it, and he took action immediately after to put in place some 

mechanisms to make sure that those types of behaviors were reported promptly. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Who was the highest ranking DEA official between 2001 and 2008 who was aware of these misconduct issues? 

Ms. LEONHART. Are you talking about the Bogota incidents? 

Mr. CUMMINGS. No. I’m talking about the—well, let me change 

that to 2005 to 2009. 

Ms. LEONHART. That they were aware of it? Probably—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes. The highest ranking person. 

Ms. LEONHART. Probably a group supervisor. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Did you have power to discipline on the level of 

the regional—— 

Ms. LEONHART. I could discipline the regional director. He’s an 

SES. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So you could have fired him. Is that right? 

Ms. LEONHART. I couldn’t—I couldn’t fire him. You have to show 

misconduct for him to be fired. But with what the law allows me 

to do with an SES, he was counseled. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So you do feel that he did something wrong? 

Ms. LEONHART. He failed to report it when he learned about it. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And so you—and you failed to discipline him, 

other than counseling him? 

Ms. LEONHART. The discipline available to me—appropriate discipline—was to reprimand him—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, who came up with the suspension, then? 

I’m confused. 

Ms. LEONHART. In SES, the discipline, there has to be misconduct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Right. 
51 

Ms. LEONHART. And the discipline has to be 15 days or more. Reporting it to an embassy and working it out locally with the embassy rather than reporting it to OPR would not raise to that 

level—it’s the only time that’s happened with him—would not raise 

to the level to be misconduct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Just one more question. 

Ms. LEONHART. So I counseled him. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. The OP—if—reporting, now if he had reported it, 

he was supposed to have reported to the Office of Professional Responsibility. Is that correct? 

Ms. LEONHART. That’s correct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And if he had reported that there was a possibility that the agent would lose their security clearance. Is that 

right? Is that right, Mr. Horowitz? Do you know that? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. They certainly could lose their security clearance 

if the process was followed through as it’s supposed to be followed 

through. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And if they lost their security clearance, does 

that mean they, then, lose their job? 

Ms. LEONHART. Yes. Like the three Cartagena agents. If you lose 

your security clearance, then, you—you cannot be a special agent. 

You would be demoted. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So, in looking at it in hindsight, the regional director, do you feel that he received appropriate discipline? 

Ms. LEONHART. I believe he made a mistake by not reporting it 

in. He took action, but it wasn’t the right action. And he has—that 

has not happened with him in the past, and he’s done a number 

of things in Colombia since that incident to ensure that this does 

not happen again. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Do you think there’s a culture problem here? 

Ms. LEONHART. I believe there may have been a culture problem. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. May have been? May have been? 

Ms. LEONHART. May have been a culture problem. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. When did it stop? 

Ms. LEONHART. Years back. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. When did it stop? 

Ms. LEONHART. I—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. When did it stop? You said ‘‘may have been,’’ so 

you’re assuming that—I assume you have a date that you think it 

stopped, and I’d like—I’d love to know what it is. 

Ms. LEONHART. When you—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Why you say that. 

Ms. LEONHART. When you see that these parties and what was 

happening in 2000 to 2004 were by one group of agents within Bogota, Colombia, I would say that’s a culture problem. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Now recognize the gentleman from South 

Carolina, Mr. Mulvaney, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Leonhart, I’m new to the committee so I’m going to ask you 

questions that I’m just curious as to the answer because I’m very 

confused. You said some things today that, I think, strike me as 

being unusual. They may be true. And I’m certain if anybody back 

home is watching it, they don’t understand it either. 
52 

You said you can’t fire people. Why can’t you fire people? Everybody else could be fired. Why can’t you fire people that work for 

you? 

Ms. LEONHART. Under the civil service laws, I can’t intervene in 

the disciplinary process and that’s why DEA’s process is similar to 

some of the other agencies, is a three-tiered process. The Administrator, the Deputy Administrator, management is not—cannot intervene in the disciplinary process, so that’s a prohibited personnel 

practice. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Who can fire people when they commit misconduct, egregious misconduct, like participating in—— 

Ms. LEONHART. Our deciding—— 

Mr. MULVANEY [continuing]. Cartel-funded prostitution. 

Ms. LEONHART. Our deciding officials. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Who? In your agency, who is a deciding official? 

Ms. LEONHART. We have two deciding officials. They are senior 

DEA 1811s with prior OPR experience. They make all of the disciplinary decisions for the agency. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Are they senior to you or junior to you? 

Ms. LEONHART. They’re junior to me. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Could you recommend that they fire somebody? 

So if somebody—you’re saying you can’t fire somebody, but somebody junior to you can fire somebody? Is that what you—is that 

what you’re telling us? 

Ms. LEONHART. My position as Administrator, under the Civil 

Service Act, we have to follow certain civil service protections. And 

so our system is set up that the discipline is decided by these two 

senior people within DEA, deciding officials, who have—— 

Mr. MULVANEY. Senior people, but not senior to you. But I get 

that. So, OK, let’s say that you wanted to fire these people. Let’s 

say you saw some activity that merited somebody getting fired. Did 

you ever—by the way, have you ever seen that since you’ve worked 

there? Has any of this conduct that we’ve talked about today in 

these couple dozen sex parties, in your mind, merit dismissal? 

Ms. LEONHART. The activity that’s been explained today, I believe, not knowing all the facts, not knowing—— 

Mr. MULVANEY. Now, how could you possible—I can’t let you off 

the hook like that, Ms. Leonhart. How do you not possibly know 

all the facts by now? 

Ms. LEONHART. Not knowing the same facts that the deciding officials look at, which are called the Douglas factors. So not—not 

knowing that piece, only knowing what the behavior was and what 

the investigations show, I took action last year to put the agency 

on notice that activity like that—and I named it, prostitution, and 

named four or five other things—required significant discipline. 

And that put our deciding officials and our board of conduct on notice. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Do you have any idea how absurd all of that 

sounds to an ordinary human being? 

Ms. LEONHART. I can see someone, not knowing the civil service 

system and not understanding our system, would think that. 

Mr. MULVANEY. All right. Let’s assume—because I think I just 

asked you if you saw anything that merited somebody being dismissed, and you didn’t say yes, which I assume means you meant 
53 

no. But let’s assume for the sake of this discussion you saw something that merited dismissal, what would you do? 

Ms. LEONHART. I can’t intervene in the process the way the law 

is set up. 

Mr. MULVANEY. How do you start the process? 

Ms. LEONHART. What I can do is put the agency on notice, like 

I did last year, that this will not be tolerated and that I, in writing, 

told the deciding officials and the board of conduct that these kinds 

of behaviors required significant discipline. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Mr. Horowitz, Mr. Perkins, is it like this at the 

other agencies? Does everybody deal with these arcane rules at 

other agencies? 

Mr. PERKINS. Congressman, I can’t speak for the other agencies. 

But for the FBI, we are exempt from Title V and civil service rules, 

regulations, and statutes. Director Comey can and has summarily 

fired individuals. We do have a highly structured disciplinary process within the Bureau that will, as you go through the process, it 

raises it up to the appropriate levels for the appropriate level of 

punishment. There are occasions when the conduct is so egregious 

that the Director can intercede and summarily dismiss somebody 

and has. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Mr. Horowitz. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. My understanding is that the FBI is unique in 

that regard, as Mr. Perkins outlined, and that the other three law 

enforcement components in the Department have to follow the Title 

V rules and the civil service rules. 

Mr. MULVANEY. One last question Ms. Leonhart, then I’ll wrap 

up. Is it true, Ms. Leonhart, that if you suggest a suspension longer 

than 14 days—and in all the examples that I’ve got the paperwork 

on, on these couple dozen events—no one was ever suspended for 

more than 14 days. Is it true that if you recommend or if someone 

gets a suspension of more than 14 days, that a Merit System Protection Board takes over the investigation in the handling of that 

matter? 

Ms. LEONHART. Not quite. If the deciding officials dole out discipline and it’s more than 14 days suspension, the employee can 

appeal it. And when the employee appeals it, it goes to the Merit 

System Protection Board. 

Mr. MULVANEY. And who takes over the investigation of the matter when the Merit System Protection Board gets involved? 

Ms. LEONHART. No one takes over the investigation because the 

investigation has already been done. This is at the very end of the 

disciplinary process. So the DEA deciding official can say 30 days. 

Mr. MULVANEY. But is that internal to you, or is it external to 

you? 

Ms. LEONHART. The deciding officials is internal. The MSPB is 

external. 

Mr. MULVANEY. I thank the gentleman. 

I thank the chairman. I asked both the chairman and the ranking member to—this is just—this is nuts. How we can’t fix this, I 

have no idea, but clearly she is telling us she doesn’t have the legal 

authority to do what everybody on this committee thinks that she 

should have done. Maybe we should try and figure out a way to fix 

that. 
54 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. DeSaulnier, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will say as a new 

Member of this body, I keep thinking I’ve gone through the looking 

glass and I won’t do it again. And then you come to a hearing like 

this, and this just seems, on the surface, it’s hard to believe. It does 

bring a number of questions, including sort of the collateral consequences to direct dealers on the street and the larger problems 

we have to face in this country when people see this kind of—this 

different type of administration of justice. 

So, Mr. Horowitz, first question is: What was different, do you 

think, between ATF and the U.S. Marshals that you were—your 

underlings, your mid-management people were able to access the 

information you asked for so quickly as opposed to the DEA and 

the FBI? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. They’ve been fully cooperative throughout our reviews, have not raised legal objections, and have read the IG Act 

and complied with what we’ve asked for. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Is it a cultural thing? Is it an enforcement 

thing? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well—— 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Do you need more enforceability? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, certainly there—we don’t have any enforceability at this point, other than my testifying publically and raising 

it to the—— 

Mr. DESAULNIER. It doesn’t seem to be sufficient in this instance. 

Mr. HOROWITZ [continuing]. Folks. It ultimately turns out to be, 

in some instances, but it’s a problem and it’s a repeated problem. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Ms. Leonhart, so the individuals involved in 

the sex parties, the Rolex, the accepting sophisticated weapons, are 

they still employed? 

Ms. LEONHART. The majority are still on the job, yes. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. And it’s hard to believe—it just seems completely counterintuitive that they could go back to work with as little as 10 days suspensions and be model agents. Have you had to 

spend extra time overseeing their job performance? 

Ms. LEONHART. Their supervisors, their special agents in charge 

or their—their high-level bosses are aware of the conduct. And with 

the exception of one, we have not seen any misconduct since. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Do they have heightened supervision because 

their past conduct? 

Ms. LEONHART. The reason that the supervisors are made aware 

of what the conduct is so that they can put them in positions where 

they can have good supervision. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. So go back to the questions asked Mr. Horowitz. Why is it that it took so long to get this information? Why 

was it—why did it take so long for the IG to get the information 

from your underlings? Being aware that you—didn’t you feel at 

some point that you were spending too much time on this? Didn’t 

you admonish people underneath your command that they should 

be more forthcoming to the IG? 

Ms. LEONHART. Well, I knew early on that there was disagreement or misunderstanding in a couple of areas. What the scope of 

the audit was, that delayed it. What type of records they were look-
55 

ing for, that delayed it. I wish I would have known about all of 

those delays and I could have done something more about it. But 

at the end of the day, the reports did get to Mr. Horowitz. And with 

audits since, he and I, we kind of have an agreement that if someone is going to deny something to the IG, that it has to be raised 

up to my level right away so that he and I can discuss it. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Wouldn’t—sitting here, it seems like it’s a 

question of management. That you have to spend this amount of 

resources in something that’s such an egregious case, it just seems 

a misappropriation of taxpayer funds. 

So, Mr. Horowitz, if the DEA had at that time the same exemption that the FBI has, would that have been a more efficient response by Congress in terms of making sure that the management 

tools were there? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, certainly on the personnel side, on the discipline side, that would be something that could occur. Frankly, on 

the access issues and getting the records promptly, there is no reason why DEA and FBI shouldn’t have done the same thing the 

Marshals Service and ATF did. They didn’t question the scope of 

our audit. They didn’t raise concerns about whether we could see 

names or see the facts or run the search terms. They just did it. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. So that seems, Ms. Leonhart, you’re complicit 

in the management problems. That it’s just not culture problem. 

And with all due respect to your years of service, we heard this, 

I believe, from the IG when it came to Secret Service, sometimes 

you need somebody from the outside. So how do I defend your performance? 

Ms. LEONHART. I think being a DEA agent and being within the 

agency, I can intervene in ways—— 

Mr. DESAULNIER. All evidence to the contrary, with all due respect, in this case. 

Ms. LEONHART. On this audit, I think there was misunderstandings, misunderstandings of what the scope was as well as 

misunderstanding on this Bogota case—or on this Bogota case—— 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Ms. Leonhart—— 

Ms. LEONHART [continuing]. Was not a closed case. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Excuse me. My time has expired. But for me 

to go back and talk to somebody in a poor section of my district 

or any of these members who have people who are selling drugs 

who say, ‘‘How can you admonish us and want to make laws tougher for us when you let the DEA manage their own department this 

way,’’ is quite—is counterintuitive, with all due respect. 

I yield back what time I have. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank the gentleman. 

Will now recognize the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. 

Gowdy, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GOWDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Administrator Leonhart, if an agent Stateside were soliciting a 

prostitute that was provided by a drug conspiracy he was investigating, what would—punishment would you recommend? 

Ms. LEONHART. I can’t recommend a punishment. I would just 

hope that would be thoroughly investigated and—— 

Mr. GOWDY. So you’re telling me nobody cares what the administrator of the DEA thinks should happen to an agent? 
56 

Ms. LEONHART. I believe—— 

Mr. GOWDY. You’re powerless to express your opinion? You have 

no First Amendment right when it comes to who works for your 

agency? 

Ms. LEONHART. I have expressed my opinion in a number of 

ways. 

Mr. GOWDY. What was your opinion? What did you express? 

What did you think the proper sanction was? 

Ms. LEONHART. Last year—last year I sent an email and I sent 

a memo to every employee in DEA and put them on notice that this 

kind of conduct was not—— 

Mr. GOWDY. My question must have been ambiguous because I 

wasn’t talking about future conduct. I was talking about past conduct. 

What punishment did you recommend for conduct that happened 

in the past? 

Ms. LEONHART. Under the civil service law, I cannot recommend 

a penalty. I can’t intervene in the disciplinary process. I can’t even 

make a recommendation to the deciding official. 

Mr. GOWDY. What does it take to get—what would it—hypothetically, what would it take to get fired as a DEA agent? Because 

the agents I used to work with were worried about using their car 

to go pick up dry cleaning. They were actually worried about using 

their OGF, OGV to pick up dry cleaning. They were worried about 

being disciplined. Apparently, that world has changed. 

Do you know whether any of the prostitutes were underage? 

Ms. LEONHART. I don’t know that. 

Mr. GOWDY. Would that impact whatever recommendation you 

might have in terms of a sanction? 

Ms. LEONHART. I don’t recommend the sanction. I can’t fire. I 

can’t recommend a penalty. There’s a guide that the deciding officials abide by, and they have a penalty guide that they look at, and 

the penalty guide for this kind of activity is anything from reprimand to removal. 

Mr. GOWDY. How about security clearance, do you have any impact over that, whether or not an agent has a security clearance? 

Ms. LEONHART. No. There’s adjudicative guidelines and that has 

to be adjudicated—— 

Mr. GOWDY. Well, I—— 

Ms. LEONHART [continuing]. By the security people. 

Mr. GOWDY. Honestly, what power do you have? You have to 

work with agents over whom you can’t discipline and have no control and you have no control over the security clearance, what the 

hell do you get to do? 

Ms. LEONHART. What I can do is build on and improve mechanisms to make sure that the outcome is what we believe the outcome should be. And that is what happened in Cartagena. That is 

what’s going to happen moving forward. 

Mr. GOWDY. Inspector General Horowitz, I find that stunning. 

Let me ask you this: Did the agents know that the cartels were 

providing the prostitutes? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. What we found, Congressman, from looking in 

the file was that they should have known, given they’re trained law 

enforcement agents and they were dealing with corrupt law en-
57 

forcement—local law enforcement that was providing them with 

the prostitutes as well as the various gifts. 

Mr. GOWDY. Were they supposed to be investigating these cartels? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. They were. 

Mr. GOWDY. So they are receiving prostitutes from cartels that 

they are supposed to be investigating and she can’t fire those 

agents? Do you agree with her, she can’t fire them? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I think, as a matter of Title V, she can’t directly 

intervene and fire them. I do think one of the concerns we outlined 

in the report as to DEA and the other three agencies is how they 

adjudicate these cases. They undercharge them in some instances. 

And so, at DEA, for example, sexual harassment if you’re charged 

with that, there’s only one punishment, removal. But if you’re 

charged with conduct unbecoming or poor judgment, which isn’t 

even actually a category, then you’ve got a range of penalties. And 

so one of the issues, you know as a former prosecutor, is how you 

charge the case, and that has a consequence. 

Mr. GOWDY. Well, Mr. Chairman, I don’t know what would need 

to be done. But I, like my friend from South Carolina, find it stunning that you can solicit prostitutes—Administrator Leonhart, do 

we know whether any of the prostitutes were underage? Do we 

know whether any of them were part of any human trafficking 

rings? 

Ms. LEONHART. Because the Bogota case happened a decade ago, 

there were no interviews of prostitutes. On the more recent one, 

the Cartagena one, it did not identify an age for the prostitute involved. 

Mr. GOWDY. Mr. Chairman, I would just find it impossible to explain to any reasonable-minded person how an agent cannot be disciplined for soliciting prostitutes from drug cartels that they were 

ostensibly investigating. I find that stunning. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. If the gentleman will yield? 

If somebody murdered somebody, could you fire them? 

Ms. LEONHART. If someone murdered someone, there would be 

criminal charges, and that’s how they’d be fired. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. But if they were—could you take aware 

their security clearance? 

Ms. LEONHART. The Office of Security Programs can review security clearances and take their clearances, just as they did with the 

three agents in the Cartagena incident. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Gentleman from South Carolina. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Gentleman yield for just a second. 

I’m sorry, I heard you say that there’s one thing you could actually fire somebody for, which is sexual harassment. So let me see 

if I’ve got this correct, Mr. Horowitz, Ms. Leonhart. If I flirt with 

a coworker in the office and that constitutes sexual harassment, I 

can be fired, but I can take an underage hooker from a cartel I’m 

investigating and you can’t fire me. Is that what we’re talking 

about here? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Actually, Congressman, if you charge the offense, 

removal is a possibility. If you charge something less, conduct unbecoming or poor judgment—you don’t charge what actually oc-
58 

curred—that’s when the ability to discipline is limited. And that’s 

the concern we found, as you know, in our report. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Thank you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank the gentleman both from South 

Carolina. 

I will now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Lieu, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you. I’d like to talk to you folks a little bit about 

the possible security risks from the sex parties. And on page 15 of 

the LPO report, it says the following: It says, Mr. Corroborator 2 

Stated he believed that Mr. Corroborator 1 gained information from 

the U.S. agents by getting their guard down through the use of 

prostitutes and paying for parties. Mr. Corroborator 1 bragged 

about the parties with prostitutes and how he sowed relationship 

closeness with agents. Two, Mr. Corroborator 2. And then Mr. Corroborator 1 said that he could easily get the agents to talk. 

So, Ms. Leonhart, do you believe actual information was compromised through these sex parties? 

Ms. LEONHART. There’s no evidence that actual—that any was 

compromised. But the concern is that participating in this kind of 

behavior, bringing four nationals, bringing prostitutes to your GLQ, 

bringing them around other agents, all of those are security risks. 

Mr. LIEU. Doesn’t the report itself provide evidence that you had 

agents in compromised positions that, at least, foreign officials believed that the agents were compromised and they could get the 

agents to talk? Did you do an investigate—how do you know that 

agents didn’t say something that they maybe should not have said 

or disclosed some information they should not have? 

Ms. LEONHART. Reading the report, one of the concerns was that 

the agents got very close to these two corrupt Colombian national 

police and that the Colombian national police were providing prostitutes and gifts to get in the good graces of the agent. And that’s 

about the furthest that it goes. 

Mr. LIEU. Did you then do an investigation as to what information may or may not have been leaked? 

Ms. LEONHART. The OPR investigation, because it was 10 years 

after the fact, did not identify any instances. And, in fact, the 

agents were all out of country by the time it was investigated. But 

that is a major concern. 

Mr. LIEU. So it’s possible the information was leaked or compromised? 

Ms. LEONHART. Absolutely. That’s a major concern. 

Mr. LIEU. So let me focus again on this discipline issue. When 

I served Active Duty in the Air Force and still in the Reserves as 

a JAG, I dealt with the Douglas Factors. And I understand some 

of the restrictions that you have because we’re a civil service system. 

The FBI is not under Title V. DEA agents, like FBI agents, go 

undercover. They’re law enforcement. Any reason not to move the 

DEA out of Title V? 

Ms. LEONHART. We would entertain any look at that, any exemption that could be given so that an administrator or director can 

take action and make sure that only the people with outstanding 

reputations and ethics are employed by the agency. 
59 

Mr. LIEU. If the deciding officials make a decision you don’t like, 

can you do anything with that decision? 

Ms. LEONHART. I can’t do anything with the decision, but I can 

do what I did last year. And that is put on notice for the entire 

work force, not any one particular case, put on notice for the entire 

work force that this behavior is unacceptable and that I ordered 

the deciding officials and the board of conduct to consider significant discipline to include up to removal for behavior in these areas 

moving forward. 

Mr. LIEU. Now, even though there are civil service protections for 

sort of the rank and file, when something goes badly wrong and it’s 

a climate issue, a cultural issue, what happens is leadership resigns or it gets fired. So, for example, in the Air Force, when there 

was problems with some of the nuclear weapons we had, even 

though the Secretary of Air Force at the time, the chief of staff of 

the Air Force that really didn’t know about it, wasn’t aware, but 

because those things happened, they were both removed. Secret 

Service, their head is gone. 

Do you believe it’s a climate issue? And if it’s a climate issue, do 

you believe then maybe, instead of focusing on the rank and file, 

maybe you need leadership change or removed? 

Ms. LEONHART. We have changed leadership. We have a different 

set of leaders within DEA now than we did a decade ago. And I 

believe that, moving forward with our—a better system to deal 

with discipline and moving forward with—instead of looking at 

what the discipline was in the past that was doled out to individuals who took part in this kind of behavior, the deciding officials 

and the board of conduct has the clear ability now to—it’s a reset 

and they can—they can look at the activity, and they can say this 

is—the Administrator said this is—deserves significant discipline, 

and they can take that kind of action. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank the gentleman. 

Now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Walker, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Leonhart, you have said earlier today that you do not—this 

dispute, the report, I believe, is your exact words. Yet a couple of 

times you’ve mentioned this was an isolated incident. 

From what we’ve heard today, this has been sort of a spring 

break, frat party mentality for the last 15 years. Now, the adjudicative guidelines for determining eligibility for access to classified information, these are the considerations for whether or not someone 

is given a security clearance. Is that correct? 

Ms. LEONHART. That’s correct. 

Mr. WALKER. OK. Part of the guidelines covers conduct that reflects lack of judgment or a person’s ability to protect classified information. Is that correct? 

Ms. LEONHART. That’s correct. 

Mr. WALKER. Are you aware of anyone who’s ever been fired for 

breaching that? 

Ms. LEONHART. Cartagena, the three agents. And we’ve had 

other agents throughout DEA’s history that have been fired. 
60 

Mr. WALKER. Did you ever have a role in someone losing their 

job because of the security breaches? 

Ms. LEONHART. Cartagena. 

Mr. WALKER. OK. Soliciting prostitutes, does that expose an 

agent to blackmail? Weren’t some of those agents married? 

Ms. LEONHART. I believe so. 

Mr. WALKER. You know what really even is a—to me is a more 

potent question, 2 weeks ago we had the largest human trafficking 

event in North Carolina, brought members from 40 agencies across 

the State. Talked about the human trafficking specifically the drug 

cartels are involved with: 83 percent of those girls are from 12 to 

14. 

So my question is this: Having gratuitous sex with an underage 

prostitute, first of all, how egregious it is to even use that despicable language, but second of all, at what point does it become 

a security breach? You’ve mentioned the world ‘‘appalled’’ several 

times. Are you appalled with that? 

Ms. LEONHART. Absolutely. 

Mr. WALKER. Well, how appalled do you have to be before you 

jump up and down and scream and holler and say, This cannot be 

tolerated? 

Ms. LEONHART. The first incident that I had any dealings with 

in this manner or about this behavior was Cartagena, and I made 

sure that the disciplinary system, that there was coordination between the people that do the investigations and the people that do 

the security clearances because I, like you, feel it is outrageous behavior. But there are security concerns. They have put themselves 

in danger. They have put other agents in danger. They have not 

protected—— 

Mr. WALKER. Sure they have. But, listen, there’s no statute of 

limitations in our countries for having sex with a 13-or 14-year old. 

Why are we just—why are you just telling me that, well, that was 

long ago, but picking up at this point on, we’re trying to—I don’t 

understand that. Can you help me understand it? 

Ms. LEONHART. Well, I will say that the security clearances, if all 

the people involved in the Bogota incident, the person—the one 

person involved in 2009, those security clearances are currently 

under review by the Department of Justice. 

Mr. WALKER. Do you have any concrete proof of the age of these 

prostitutes that these men were involved with? Have you done any 

research on that at all? Is there any record that you’ve read? 

Ms. LEONHART. I have read the reports, and there’s nothing to 

indicate a name or an age. 

Mr. WALKER. So maybe nobody ever even asked that question. 

Let me ask you something else. Last Friday, April 10—the chairman referred to this a little bit earlier—3 days before this hearing, 

the Attorney General had to send out a memo reminding law enforcement agents that they are not to solicit prostitutes. Are you 

familiar with that memo? 

Ms. LEONHART. Yes, I am. 

Mr. WALKER. The problem with it. Or else what? What happens? 

Just a reminder. I mean, first of all, the fact that we have to remind these agents to be on your best behavior is ludicrous. But the 

fact is, then what? 
61 

Evidently, in the past, Hey, you may take a couple of days off 

or even unpaid for 2 weeks at the most. Where is the ‘‘or else’’ in 

this? Would you answer that question, what happens? I mean 

what’s—what’s—the Attorney General sent it out and said, Listen, 

hey, guys, you know leave the prostitutes alone. Well, what else? 

Or what’s the penalty? What’s the concrete solution that has been 

clearly communicated? Can you explain that or talk about that? 

Ms. LEONHART. Well, working within our system, in the same 

way the Attorney General put the entire Department of Justice on 

notice, I a year ago—last year—put the entire DEA work force on 

notice that this type of behavior was not to be tolerated and that 

there would be significant discipline. 

Mr. WALKER. Well, you know, I have three children, and I tell 

them—talk about sometimes not to do that. But unless the consequences are very clearly communicated, I don’t have a shot that 

they’ll change their behavior. 

Last question, and I’ll yield back. If you had a chance going back, 

would you be so appalled that you would do some things different 

in handling these matters? 

Ms. LEONHART. Without a doubt. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you. 

Yield back. 

Chairman MEADOWS [presiding]. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from the District of Columbia, Ms. Norton. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I don’t know how to describe what we’ve seen here: Boys going 

wild; out of sight, out of mind. But what we do know and what 

most concerns me is how these prostitutes were funded. We are— 

it looks like we have implicated taxpayer funds, that some may 

have come out of official funds and some out of cartel funds. It’s 

hard for me to know which is worse. 

But it does seem pretty clear that we may be dealing, to be sure, 

with a cultural problem but with a cultural problem that has—is 

so deep that it is now a problem of corruption. And I say that because I’m looking at some of the excerpts from the reports where 

apparently there were corroborating witnesses. And some of this is 

so eye-popping, I’m going to have to ask you what is your response. 

You know, I’m not going to ask you about why you don’t fire people 

because I do understand that when the State—that’s the United 

States or any of its agents—is an actor, then, due process, of 

course, requires you to go through certain processes; after all, those 

processes have been put there by the Congress of the United 

States. 

So I’m going to ask you whether—about some things that perhaps you could do. This corroborating witness Stated, he recalled 

that the ASAC, that’s the Assistant Special Agent in Charge, I believe, that his farewell party where part of the—that was in 2003 

and 2004—where part of the money requested from an operational 

budget—those are the operative terms, ‘‘operational budget’’—was 

used for his party. He Stated that the—his party was organized by 

the assistant special agent in charge and that he paid 500,000 

pesos—that’s approximately $261—for each prostitute with funds 
62 

from an operational budget. Now, I want to try to identify what 

that means. 

What is the purpose, Ms. Leonhart, of an operational budget? Is 

it taxpayer funds? 

Ms. LEONHART. What I believe that refers to is money is given 

to the Colombian national police to pay for their operations that 

they’re doing in collaboration with us. 

Ms. NORTON. So it’s given—taxpayer funds are given to them. So 

what we’re talking about funds that were paid, not by—in this 

case, out of the operational budget, it looks like, by agents. Who 

is responsible for accounting for these funds in the regional office? 

Ms. LEONHART. The regional director would be responsible for 

that. 

Ms. NORTON. Now, if that’s the case—since, of course, you have 

indicated—and I understand why you can’t precipitously fire someone as if this were the private sector when the State is an agent— 

would that fund continue to be under the same supervision if you 

had—having this kind of information as it was before? 

Ms. LEONHART. The Bogota incident you’re talking about was—— 

Ms. NORTON. I am. 

Ms. LEONHART [continuing]. Was three regional directors ago. 

And the way that DEA operates with the Colombian national police 

in these special units has completely changed since—— 

Ms. NORTON. Well, I didn’t ask you that. 

Ms. LEONHART. —2000, 2003—— 

Ms. NORTON. I’m asking how the operational—and now how is 

the operational budget dealt with? In other words, now it is not in 

control of the agents themselves to pass out this money to Bogota 

or anybody else? Is it controlled from your office? 

Ms. LEONHART. No. The funds by the DEA Bogota office that go 

to the Colombian national police for operations now are audited. 

They require receipts. The 2000 to 2003 timeframe was at the beginning stages of these units. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, according to this cooperating witness, the— 

again, the word ‘‘operational’’—operational budgets were presented 

to the DEA, and there was additional information here—and I 

want to quote—for additional funds—apparently not enough funds 

were in the operational budget—for additional funds which were 

used for prostitution and parties for agents. 

Are you aware of that allegation that they didn’t have enough so 

they went back and got some more funds? 

Ms. LEONHART. I’m aware that the corrupt national police officers who ended up being indicted by DEA and convicted, that what 

they were talking about is padding their operational requests that 

went to—— 

Ms. NORTON. Yes. 

Ms. LEONHART [continuing]. DEA to get additional money. 

Ms. NORTON. In other words, fraudulent budgets? 

Ms. LEONHART. Yes. On behalf of the Colombian national police. 

Ms. NORTON. You can’t wipe—you can’t wash the hands of the 

office. Look, this is a corroborating witness here who Stated that 

the operational budgets were presented to the DEA to cover operational expenses. So it doesn’t seem to me you can wash your 
63 

hands of that as the DEA or that they could have washed their 

hands of that. 

Has someone looked back at how these funds were expended during this period so that you could now lay out exactly what happened during this period? Part of the problem here and the frustration, I think, of the committee is that it’s taken so long because you 

had no policy to go up the chain of command. And so you can tell 

me, well, this was 2003 and 2004. But I will tell you, if I was there, 

I’d want to know exactly what happened then so I’d make sure it 

wasn’t happening now. 

Ms. LEONHART. One part of the investigation was to go through 

and audit and do just that. 

Ms. NORTON. From that period? From that period? 

Ms. LEONHART. Yes. To look at the books from that period of 

time. 

Ms. NORTON. Because we understand, again, from one of these 

cooperating witnesses, he could obtain—and this is a quote, ‘‘Prostitutes for agents from the DEA Bogota office.’’ This is what the cooperating witness said: He could—he would pay the girls to come 

to the parties and then the agents would pay the girls directly for 

any sex they wanted. He recalled getting prostitutes for these 15 

to 20 parties. 

Weren’t the DEA agents in Colombia there to crack down on the 

agents who were—on the cartels who were given funds to pay for 

these parties? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The gentlewoman’s time is expired, but the 

gentlewoman may answer. 

Ms. LEONHART. That’s what’s so appalling about this, that although the agents didn’t know, the corrupt police were getting 

money from the traffickers. They were on their payroll and using 

that money for the prostitutes. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. Thank the gentlewoman. 

I will now recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Hines, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. HINES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Horowitz, in your office report you noted that during the 

interviews some in your office staff were evidently told that some 

DEA employees were under the impression, at least, that they were 

not to discuss information regarding open cases. 

Do you know who provided that information? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. We don’t know who told them that information, 

but that is, in fact, what we were told. 

Mr. HICE. All right. So did you ever determine whether or not 

the DEA staff, in fact, someone communicated that information? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. We didn’t determine definitively whether it occurred. We believe it did occur given we were told that by several 

individuals. 

Mr. HICE. All right. So you were told by several individuals that 

was not an isolated incident. All right. So you did not investigate 

further. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. We did not. 

Mr. HICE. OK. Ms. Leonhart, did your office ever give information, instructions to that effect? 
64 

Ms. LEONHART. No. My office didn’t and when the report—I saw 

the draft asking the Office of Professional Responsibility and Inspections about that, they said that there was a miscommunication. 

They were—they were under the belief that closed cases were not 

a part of what Mr. Horowitz’ audit would cover. 

Mr. HICE. All right. Well, there was obvious confusion. Did you 

yourself at any time ever give instructions to anyone to withhold 

information? 

Ms. LEONHART. Absolutely not. 

Mr. HICE. Did anyone in your staff? 

Ms. LEONHART. No. No one in—— 

Mr. HICE. How do you know? 

Ms. LEONHART. Because we weren’t involved in that—in that 

part of the process. 

Mr. HICE. Well, then you can’t definitively say that no one did 

it. If you weren’t involved in the process, I mean, obviously, there 

were reports. There was testimony given to Mr. Horowitz’ team 

that your employees were instructed not to give information. 

Ms. LEONHART. The inspectors that were interviewed received instructions from OPR and the Office of Inspections. There’s—I have 

no information about what information was relayed to them other 

than it was relayed—— 

Mr. HICE. All right. So you don’t know is the bottom line. You 

don’t know if that information was relayed or not. 

Let me—Ms. Leonhart, you were all over the board today. You 

say you can’t fire anyone and that you didn’t have all the facts, and 

yet you send information that this behavior is not going to be tolerated. It’s absolutely all over the board. You have junior officers who 

evidently can fire, but you cannot fire. Do you have any authority 

over them? Can you fire those junior officers? 

Ms. LEONHART. If they are not doing their job, they can be replaced, and that is done by the—— 

Mr. HICE. Did they do their jobs by not disciplining appropriately 

in this situation? 

Ms. LEONHART. I’m disappointed in the discipline. I think that 

it’s not enough. 

Mr. HICE. So why were those junior officers not replaced? 

Ms. LEONHART. Again, I can’t interfere with the disciplinary 

process, but I can make sure through our career board that replacements or people that are coming up to take those positions 

are—are of utmost—— 

Mr. HICE. So do you or do you not have any authority over the 

junior officers? 

Ms. LEONHART. I don’t have the authority to intervene in the disciplinary process. 

Mr. HICE. All right. A moment ago you said you would act differently if you had this to do all over again. Why in the world 

would you say that? It seems that you’ve made it clear today that 

you—your hands are tied, that you can do nothing. I’m really having a difficult time understanding. It appears to me that no one listens to you, quite frankly. You write a letter saying this behavior’s 

not going to be tolerated, and yet you have no influence as to 

whether that behavior’s going to be tolerated or not. 

Did anyone listen to you when you wrote what letter? 
65 

Ms. LEONHART. Yes. The entire work force listened to me, and, 

in fact, like me—— 

Mr. HICE. Why would they listen to you if you have you no influence whatsoever on the disciplinary process? Ms. Leonhart, I’ve 

just got to tell you, you say you are in charge of discipline on one 

hand; then you come back and you say you have nothing to do with 

discipline. You’re in charge of the entire agency; then you come 

back and say you have nothing to do with correcting problems. It— 

quite honestly, I have serious questions as to your competence, 

quite frankly, and it appears to me that we need to seriously consider new leadership at the DEA. 

And I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Before the gentleman yields back, I’d like 

to give Mr. Horowitz an opportunity to respond to the questions 

that Mr. Hice was asking earlier, if you could address that directly, 

Mr. Horowitz. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Certainly. With regard to the production of information and answering questions, again, the frustration we had 

with both the FBI and DEA during this process was we kept having to go back and ask for more once we learned what we weren’t 

told originally. That was the case with regard to documents. We 

got redacted information. We had to—I had to elevate it in both instances months after this all started. 

With regard to the interviews, we learned later in the process 

that certain individuals at DEA that we had interviewed hadn’t 

told us about an open case because of their understanding that 

they shouldn’t talk about an open case. We found out that when 

we did get productions from both the FBI and the DEA that they 

didn’t give us everything. We only learned that because we went 

back and checked our own records to compare and see if we had 

everything that—whether they provided us with everything that 

we already had. We thought they had even more than we had, 

which is why we went to them in the first instance for the information, but then we found out that the production was incomplete. We 

then had to go back and ask for a further review, and then after 

we did the draft report, we found out that the DEA hadn’t run all 

the search terms we had done without telling us that they had 

made that decision on their own. 

So we had multiple instances where that occurred. It delayed our 

report. I can assure you it frustrated the good, hard-working folks 

in my office who spent months just trying to get information. And 

I will go back to what I said earlier: The ATF and the U.S. Marshal 

Service, we asked the same—made the same requests of them. We 

got the material. And we got it fast, and we never thought we 

didn’t get from them what we were entitled to. That should have 

happened across the board, and it should be happening across the 

board in all instances. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Appreciate it. 

We’ll now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

holding this hearing. 

Mr. Horowitz, the IG report we’re discussing today would seem 

to suggest the DEA’s tolerance level for prostitution depends on the 
66 

local culture in which the—what we’d call offense occurs. For example, your report says the DEA inspector told us that prostitution 

is considered a part of the local culture and is tolerated in certain 

areas called tolerance zones. Is that correct? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. That’s correct. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Ms. Leonhart, does the DEA recognize that prostitution is embedded in certain local cultures and by implication, 

therefore, tolerable, and that you recognize—the agency recognizes 

tolerance zones for prostitution? 

Ms. LEONHART. No. What I believe the inspector was talking 

about was, in Colombia, there’s certain tolerance zones for prostitution. It doesn’t matter with the DEA; the partaking in that kind 

of behavior is against all DEA policies. It’s not—doesn’t matter if 

it’s legal in a particular country. It doesn’t matter if it’s legal in 

a particular area of a city. It doesn’t matter. They’re not to take 

part in that type of behavior. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So it’s always wrong in terms of your policy no 

matter where, no matter when, no matter what the circumstances. 

Ms. LEONHART. That’s correct. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And that’s an explicit policy? 

Ms. LEONHART. It’s—it’s—you find it in our personnel manual. 

You find it—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. There’s a chapter called ‘‘Thou Shalt Not’’? 

Ms. LEONHART. Basically. It’s very clear. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. OK. Mr. Horowitz, did you confirm that? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, certainly that wasn’t the case back in—during the course of the years that we reviewed this. That’s the problems that we identified here. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. It was not no case. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. That was not—certainly not the culture and certainly not the understanding based on the interviews we conducted. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I’m going to get to that, but did you find an explicit policy in their personnel manual, human resource policy that 

explicitly barred such illicit activity. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. It did not at that time. It does now in light of 

both the Administrator’s memo and the Attorney General’s memo. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So, Ms. Leonhart, when you said to me just now 

that’s a violation of our existing policy, you meant the new existing 

policy. Is that correct? 

Ms. LEONHART. The new existing policy, but it existed in our personnel manual in a couple of different sections. One about you cannot have a relationship with someone involved in illegal activity. 

You can’t do anything that—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, wait a minute. Wait, wait, wait, wait, wait. 

You just said to me that the tolerance zones referred to Colombia, 

not to DEA designating tolerance zones, in which prostitution, in 

fact, was legal. You just cited something that refers to illegal, but 

if you go to Colombia, it is not illegal in certain parts of the country, and does—did your policy, therefore, in a sense open the door 

for what we would consider in most of the United States illegal activity that was not prohibited in the host country? 

Ms. LEONHART. What we found with the Cartagena case was our 

policies didn’t specifically say you cannot partake in prostitution, 

but we had different sections in our personnel manual, different 
67 

sections in our standards of conduct that every agent in the agency 

signs once a year and acknowledges, things such as DEA personnel 

are prohibited from engaging in any criminal, infamous, dishonest, 

or notoriously disgraceful conduct, or other conduct prejudicial to 

DEA, to DOJ, or the Government of the United States. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, apparently, some of your agents, when they 

went to Cartagena thought prostitution was not included in that 

litany. 

Ms. LEONHART. No DEA agent thought that prostitution was OK. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, I don’t think that’s what the inspector general found. 

Let me read to you further from the report: According to the inspector, it is common for prostitutes to be present at business 

meetings involving cartel members and foreign officers. The DEA 

inspector also Stated that the acceptability of this type of behavior 

affects the way in which Federal law enforcement employees conduct themselves in a particular country. 

So what you just read to us not withstanding, the practice seems 

to be very much contingent upon local acceptable practices and 

were influenced by that, your policy not withstanding. Would that 

be fair to say? 

Ms. LEONHART. I would say every DEA agent knows, to include 

going back to 2000 to 2004, in that period of time, knows that 

that—partaking in that kind of activity is against DEA policy. 

When Cartagena happened and we reviewed all our policies just 

to make sure, we decided to strengthen them and to put wording 

in about prostitution specifically just so that—just to put everybody 

on notice and make sure it was clear. Our policies were not as 

clear. They did not specifically say ‘‘prostitution,’’ but there are 

three or four different places in our standards of conduct where you 

could point to that and say that’s a violation of standards of conduct. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Would the chairman allow me one more question? I just have one more question if the chair would indulge. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Perkins, the report talks about FBI providing employees 

with extensive predeployment training regarding conduct abroad 

and has done the most to prepare its employees to make day-today decisions, unlike, apparently, DEA or even the Secret Service. 

Can you comment on that? I mean, does your training program, 

in terms of deployment overseas, explicitly deal with issues like 

prostitution and the sense of dishonor it brings on the United 

States if its employees engage in that kind of activity? 

Mr. PERKINS. Yes, Congressman, it actually covers a universe of 

issues from the personal security of the individuals going overseas 

to the standards of conduct that we would expect them to exhibit 

while they’re overseas. A good bit of this began actually under 

former director Louis Freeh as we began to expand our overseas 

presence. With the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, we had a significant presence overseas at that time which required yet again additional training added to that. As our overseas presence remains 

high, we see great benefit in maintaining that type of 

predeployment training for these individuals. 
68 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And final point on training, Ms. Leonhart, does 

DEA have a program similar to the FBI in terms of predeployment 

training? 

Ms. LEONHART. Yes, we do. It’s called the Foreign Orientation 

Program, and in May 2012, we started—we were handing out State 

Department cable prohibiting prostitution even if it’s legal in a 

country. We also added extra slides to a presentation that our OPR 

gives to all the employees and their spouses before they head overseas, and that includes information about prostitution, information 

about security clearances. So there—they are informed before they 

go overseas. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. OK. Thank you. My time is up. Mr. Chairman, 

I just would like to pursue with you at some point this whole issue 

of training because I think that has a great bearing on what was 

allowed to happen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

Now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Meadows, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Leonhart, you’ve been with DEA for how many years? 

Ms. LEONHART. 35. 

Mr. MEADOWS. 35 years, and as I understand it, about 5 years 

as—in your current position from—— 

Ms. LEONHART. Since 2010. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Since 2010. So you take this very seriously being 

part of law enforcement. You know, I enjoy a great relationship 

with law enforcement back home and in the standards of which 

they take, and so standards that are violated by some within our 

ranks really paint a very bad picture for the rest who serve diligently. Wouldn’t you agree with that? 

Ms. LEONHART. Yes. These are, you know, a few compared to the 

4,600 agents that work for DEA. I’m very proud of our agency, and 

this hits us hard. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, and it should hit you hard, and it sounds 

like that, you know, you keep saying that you’re appalled and that 

you just can’t believe this kind of behavior, but my concern is, is 

in 1994 there was a GAO report that outlined, and you were there 

at that particular time, that outlined, you know, sexual misconduct 

within the agency. Then again in 2004, there was an OIG study 

that talked about this same kind of inappropriate behavior. And 

yet here we are today with a new OIG report that’s over 100 pages 

in length, but we’re addressing a decade-old cultural problem. 

Aren’t we? This is not new to you. Is that correct? 

Ms. LEONHART. This is—this is new to me in this position, but 

in law enforcement, obviously every—every company, every organization has some people that are not going to follow the rules, and 

to see what happened back in 2000 to 2003 in Colombia, to see 

what happened in 2009 with the incident with the agent in Bogota, 

and then to see Cartagena, this is our opportunity to make sure 

that that culture, if there was one that existed, that there’s— 

there’s no doubt that employees know that this is unacceptable and 

see what will happen to them. That is why firing the three employ-
69 

ees, agents, after Cartagena sets the tone for what happens from 

here on. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, it might if it wasn’t reinforced in other 

ways. And let me tell you, you keep coming back to Cartagena because it really may be the only time that there have been people 

that have actually been disciplined for improper conduct. Wouldn’t 

you agree with that? So you keep running back to this as a good 

example, but yet your directive didn’t come out until 2 years after 

that event. You were bragging about your directive that you sent 

out. Didn’t that go out in 2014? 

Ms. LEONHART. Yes. It went out—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. So why—if you were concerned about the culture, 

wouldn’t it have gone out immediately after the event, or is it just 

that the press has started to report this as a problem and now it’s 

a problem for you? 

Ms. LEONHART. No. Actually, we—we had discussion, the executive staff, on what—what things we should put in place, and we 

started putting things in place in 2012 after the discovery of what 

happened in Cartagena. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So it is your testimony that it took you 2 years 

to figure out what to put in a directive? Is that your testimony here 

today? 

Ms. LEONHART. No. Actually, we drafted that back after a working group got together to decide what steps should we immediately 

put in place. We drafted that and on the heels of the Cartagena 

case being able to show here’s what happens if you partake in this 

behavior. We had the case—disciplinary case finalized. We went 

out with a series of things. That memo—we had already put additional training—every basic agent training, every intel analyst 

training—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. OK. I’m running out of time. So let me—let me 

do this one followup because I have reason to believe that some of 

the people that today you’re saying maybe should have been fired 

but that you didn’t give a directive, but I have reason to believe 

that some of them have actually gotten promotions, have gotten bonuses, and have gotten new assignments. Would you agree with 

that? 

Ms. LEONHART. I know that—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. That some of them. 

Ms. LEONHART. I know that a number of them were promoted between the activity in 2000 and when it came to light in 2010. I can 

tell you that since the allegations were raised and investigated, 

there have been no promotions. 

Mr. MEADOWS. How about bonuses? Because I have reason to believe that there were bonuses that were given. I’m sure you’ve just 

looked into all of this. So were there bonuses given to some of those 

folks? 

Ms. LEONHART. Of the—I know that there were bonuses given to 

the regional director. I don’t know about bonuses given to the—I 

don’t know about—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. So some bonuses were given to people who were 

directly involved in this particular thing that most Americans find 

offensive? 

Ms. LEONHART. The regional—— 
70 

Mr. MEADOWS. Yes—yes or no. 

Ms. LEONHART. No. The regional director was not—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, you said you just didn’t know. So how would 

you know that—— 

Ms. LEONHART. No. The regional director that got bonuses was 

not directly involved in this. 

I don’t know as to the other employees. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So is it possible they got bonuses? 

Ms. LEONHART. It’s very possible. 

Mr. MEADOWS. It’s very possible. Because our intel would say 

that it is. So here’s my—I appreciate the patience of the chair. 

If you would give, without names, because obviously that is critical, would you agree today to give the names and the number of 

people involved in this to the OIG so he can report back to this 

committee on how many of those people got bonuses? Would you 

agree to do that? Because I find that that’s reenforcing a bad behavior, if they’re getting bonuses. Would you do that? Would you 

agree to that? 

Ms. LEONHART. I will work with the department who is going to 

be giving you additional information here shortly to see about adding that in. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So we can get bonus information to see if these 

people that were involved in this got bonuses. And you can redact 

the names. I just want to know the number of them. 

Ms. LEONHART. So I’ll discuss it with the department at—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. So is that a no? I mean, you’re the Administrator. 

You can make the decision. Are you going to give it to us or not? 

Ms. LEONHART. If I’m able to give it to you, you’ll get it. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Mr. Chairman, I—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. If the gentleman would yield. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Yes. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. We’re asking you to provide the information to the inspector general. Will you or will you not do that? 

Ms. LEONHART. If it was up to me to give it to you—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. You’re the administrator. 

Ms. LEONHART [continuing]. I’d give it to you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. You’re the Administrator. Who do you have 

to ask? Who do you report to? 

Ms. LEONHART. The documents that are going to your committee 

were—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. We’re asking you to give them to the inspector general. 

Ms. LEONHART. If the inspector general wants that, we’ll give 

him it. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Does the inspector general want that information? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I’d be happy to take that information and look 

into the issue. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Will the inspector general report back to 

this committee at his—— 

Mr. HOROWITZ. We will. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ [continuing]. Earliest convenience about 

these particular individuals? 
71 

And to suggest that the more senior person wasn’t directly involved, he was involved. Was he not? 

Ms. LEONHART. He was not involved in the activity. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Did he properly report up the chain of command? 

Ms. LEONHART. He didn’t report it to the right place. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. OK. So he was involved in it. He may not 

have been naked and having sex in his apartment like everybody 

else was, but he was involved. Correct? 

Ms. LEONHART. He failed to report to OPR. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. That person should be included in the information that you give regarding bonuses and promotions. Now, 

can we also add into there promotions, title changes? Bonuses, title 

changes, promotions. Is that fair? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Yes. We will followup. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Looking for a yes here from the Administrator. 

Ms. LEONHART. We’ll work to get you that information. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Is that a yes or no? 

Ms. LEONHART. Yes. We’ll get you that information. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

Gentleman have any other—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. I thank the chair for their patience. I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Did you want to add something, Mr. Horowitz? It looked like you may have wanted to—— 

Mr. HOROWITZ. No. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. OK. 

We now recognize the gentleman from Wisconsin. He is now recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Sure. Couple questions for you. One of the 

things that’s a little bit frustrating about this hearing, and I apologize. I feel a little bit sorry for you is that you’ve expressed concerns about some of the civil service protections. And so people 

back home understand civil service protections are very important 

because if we didn’t have civil service protections, you could wind 

up at an agency like the IRS or something firing anybody who 

wasn’t on the right side politically. Nevertheless, you have expressed frustration, and I do believe some of people are expressing 

the greatest anger at you today, or some of the people express 

anger at you may be the first to fight any change in those civil 

service laws. 

But could you give us some suggestions that you may have to 

make it easier to remove an employee who is a misbehaving employee? And I’ll tell you one of the things that frustrates me today, 

and you can think about this when I talk about it. We have a situation in which people are just behaving in outrageous conduct. I 

mean, something just—you know, somebody—if a late night talk 

show host made it up you wouldn’t believe it, but it really happened apparently. So things that are obviously wrong. It makes me 

wonder what’s happening if we just have employees who aren’t 

doing a very good job at their job—right—where it’s a little bit 

more subjective. But could you give me any suggestions you’d have 

for changing the civil service laws? 
72 

Ms. LEONHART. If you looked at giving us the same exemption as 

the FBI, I think that we then would be able to make sure that the 

penalties were appropriate. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. And what would you think an appropriate penalty is for this behavior? 

Ms. LEONHART. I think this is outrageous behavior, and that 

knowing the facts of the cases as I do, without having to be concerned with the appeal rights and being able to sustain it in a 

Merit System Protection Board, I believe that some of these—some 

of the behavior would raise to the level of removal. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. By ‘‘removal,’’ you mean they should be fired. 

Ms. LEONHART. Just like Cartagena, yes. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. OK. Just because you kind of dance around, 

could you just describe to the public today why you feel this behavior was wrong so I get a sense? Why is this bad behavior? Could 

you explain in your own mind? 

Ms. LEONHART. Well, partaking—it’s—it’s wrong on a number of 

levels. Start with prostitution itself. You know, it’s—human trafficking is like the second highest illegal market besides drug trafficking. Look at all the efforts the government has been putting 

into—especially in recent years—to go after the human trafficking 

threat. That’s No. 1. 

No. 2, it is so far away from the type of conduct and ethical behavior that is required of someone to carry a badge as a Federal 

agent, that those are the reasons, and the security clearance issues. 

The security—putting—putting people and our information at risk 

are all reasons that I—this is appalling. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. It is appalling. When I read this stuff, is it right 

that some of this stuff was maybe brought to the attention or made 

aware Colombian authorities? They were aware of this. 

Ms. LEONHART. Actually, the Colombian authorities, by the time 

this was discovered on the corruption of the two police officers, the 

Colombian national police did a great job in helping us convict 

them. And also they removed a number of Colombian national police officers who were involved in this same activity. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. OK. I’ll ask the same question to Mr. Horowitz 

there because he seems a little—could you comment on how you 

feel we should change without—with still keeping protections for 

people but change things a little bit so that we maybe had a little— 

not just outrageous conduct but even competent conduct out of the 

DEA. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, within the current structure, there needs to 

be prompt reporting, prompt investigating, prompt disciplinary action, and follow through. I mean, that’s—within the current structure, that can be done. It’s—you mention the Colombian national 

example. Those events that were learned about from the Colombian 

national officers who were corrupt and disclosed the information related to the 2001, 2004 events. All of the DEA officials involved in 

those events down in Colombia said nothing about it. Think about 

it: It was learned 8 years—6, 7, 8 years later when corrupt Colombian national officers disclosed it. That’s a problem, a serious problem, that no one thought that that was reportable to headquarters 

and that there needed to be follow through, whether it’s the current system, frankly, whether it’s under an FBI regime, that was 
73 

the fundamental flaw there. Right? No one thought it was important enough or serious enough to raise to headquarters. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Well, it’s good that the Colombian people had a 

little higher standards. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, these were the corrupt officers. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Right. But, I mean, eventually that they—that 

they felt there was something wrong. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Right. That they felt it was wrong and once they 

of course got arrested, they were more than happy to come in and 

report out on what had occurred. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Thank you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank the gentleman. 

Now recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Palmer, for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. PALMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Leonhart, is there any policy against turning over DEA 

weapons or communication devices to foreign agents or any nonDEA or non-U.S. officials? 

Ms. LEONHART. If I hear you right, you’re asking about prohibition on turning over a device? 

Mr. PALMER. Not having immediate supervision of the weapons 

and devices that belong to an agent. 

Ms. LEONHART. Well, No. 1, securing your weapon, that’s—that’s 

required. 

Mr. PALMER. No. I’m not asking you about that. I’m asking you 

is there any policy at the DEA that would result in any kind of reprimand or punishment for not having immediate supervision of 

your weapons and communication devices? That’s a yes or no. 

Ms. LEONHART. It could fall under—depending on the circumstances—— 

Mr. PALMER. No. It’s a yes or no. You either have a penalty for 

not securing your weapon and your communications devices because there are things on those communications devices that could 

be used against other agents, against this country. 

Ms. LEONHART. It could fall under poor judgment. There’s a number of areas—there’s policies on securing—— 

Mr. PALMER. Poor judgment has already been—it’s already been 

pointed out. Poor judgment’s not one of those official criteria, and 

what happened here, you talked about these corrupt police officers, 

is it true that the same officers who helped facilitate these parties, 

may have helped pay for the prostitutes, supervised, had control of 

the agents’ weapons and communication devices, possibly the security—their badges, and is that also the case? 

Ms. LEONHART. Part of the report is that while some of the 

agents were involved in that activity—— 

Mr. PALMER. No. It’s a yes—it’s a yes or no. 

Ms. LEONHART. Yes. 

Mr. PALMER. OK. As egregious as the activity that the agents 

were involved in, which is, in many respects, a crime against humanity because of the ages of these girls, could you not find a reason to reprimand or fire agents for turning over their weapons and 

their communication devices to foreign nationals? I mean, for crying out loud, China is investing in South America and Latin America. They’re going to spend another $250 billion over the next 10 
74 

years down there. Did it not occur to anyone that this might also 

be a national security breach or a problem along that line? 

Ms. LEONHART. Someone doing a security adjudication could look 

at that and find that those are reasons why a security clearance 

should be suspended and revoked. 

Mr. PALMER. Were they for any of these people? 

Ms. LEONHART. For the Bogota case, their clearances were never 

looked at. 

Mr. PALMER. OK. Let me ask you this, and, Mr. Chairman, you 

brought this up. Who is your immediate supervisor? Who do you 

report to? Who has the authority to hold you accountable for the 

oversight of the DEA? 

Ms. LEONHART. The Deputy Attorney General. 

Mr. PALMER. OK. Have you discussed this with the Deputy Attorney General and how to proceed with this? 

Ms. LEONHART. I briefed the Deputy Attorney General on these 

cases recently. 

Mr. PALMER. Did he make any recommendations about how to 

proceed? 

Ms. LEONHART. Yes. The security clearances are currently being 

reviewed by—— 

Mr. PALMER. No. I want to ask you something more specific. Did 

the Deputy Attorney General express any reservations about how 

the DEA has handled this, and in the discussions, was there any 

discussion about how to respond to the requests from the Inspector 

General’s Office? Office of the Inspector General. 

Ms. LEONHART. I’ve had multiple conversations with the DAG’s 

Office on document—turning over documents to the OIG. And 

they’ve given us good guidance on that. 

Mr. PALMER. So they gave you good guidance. So that means 

they approved of not turning over the documents that the inspector 

general requested? 

Ms. LEONHART. No. Actually, we didn’t know—we were worried 

about the victim—victims’ names and how to handle that. 

Mr. PALMER. Mr. Horowitz, you have said that there have been 

numerous instances where the FBI has failed to submit sufficient 

material to the office. You mentioned it about the DEA. When you 

were here in January and you spoke of agencies, particularly the 

FBI and others delaying production of material, I asked you then, 

did this rise to obstruction? You said it had a significant impact on 

reviews but failed to go as far as—you failed to go as far as calling 

it obstruction. I want to ask you that again. Are you willing to call 

it obstruction now? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. What occurred back in 2013 when we were given 

redacted documents, it impeded and obstructed our ability to move 

forward with this investigation in a timely manner, and it took 

months, and it required me to elevate it to the leadership of both 

agencies. And it was when I elevated it that we got—got the reaction, but I didn’t have to do that with ATF and the Marshal Service, and I shouldn’t have to do that. 

Mr. PALMER. Right. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. And I’m still having to do that in multiple instances. 
75 

Mr. PALMER. You know, I’m not trying to put you on the spot, 

but it appears to me that you’ve been obstructed. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Yep. I—I think, in this instance, we were obstructed. 

Mr. PALMER. Ms. Leonhart—is there still information that you’d 

like to get from the DEA? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I think at this point we made a decision to simply 

move forward, issue the report, even though we had concerns about 

both the FBI and DEA’s productions because this was so important 

to put forward. And, frankly, at this point, we’ve got other reports 

to do and get to that we still have the same issues on, just different 

context. 

Mr. PALMER. Is there additional information you’d like to 

have—— 

Mr. HOROWITZ. On this issue, no. 

Mr. PALMER. OK. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. On others, yes. 

Mr. PALMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank the gentleman. 

Now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I’m not sure if the memo from Attorney General 

Holder has been admitted into evidence, but in case it hasn’t, 

would you without—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. LYNCH. OK. Great. 

Ms. Leonhart and Mr. Horowitz, in the Attorney General’s memo 

for all department personnel, dated April 10, 2015, subject, ‘‘Prohibition on Solicitation of Prostitution,’’ it says that solicitation of 

prostitutes creates a greater demand for human trafficking victims 

and a consequent increase in the number of minors and adult persons trafficked into commercial sex slavery. 

Do you agree with that? Do you agree with that assessment? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I certainly think it raises the risks. 

Mr. LYNCH. Do you agree with that? 

Ms. LEONHART. I certainly do. 

Mr. LYNCH. Yes. OK. And also in—you know, under the Department of Homeland Security regs and a couple of the statutes we 

have, what we’re talking about here, the solicitation of prostitutes 

for 15 to 20 parties, is clearly within the definition of human trafficking. And—and yet the DEA is actually charged—I know that 

Mr. Farenthold and Mr. Gosar and myself and Mr. Issa were down 

in Central America recently, and that’s a big part of the DEA’s 

mission is really to combat human trafficking. And we actually give 

grants to the department of—to the DEA and to the FBI and to 

State Department as part of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act 

and the Violence Against Women Act. We give—we give grants to 

your agency to prevent human trafficking. Prevent prostitution. 

And yet the very people—the very departments that are getting 

this money, in this case, are engaging in human trafficking, and it 

just brings me, you know, back to the unbelievability of what has 

happened here. It is really—it is really unbelievable. 

Under the Douglas Factors that we use in determining discipline, 

one of the factors is the seriousness of the offense and whether the 
76 

offense is—is in direct violation of the agency policy. And the notoriety of the offense and whether that offense prohibits that individual from doing their job. 

So, in this case, we have DEA agents that are still on the job 

that are receiving Federal grants to stop trafficking who have already engaged and admitted to trafficking, and I don’t see the end 

of this. I don’t see the end of this if we leave this situation the way 

it is. And so, Ms. Leonhart, you know, I wouldn’t believe this would 

be necessary, but we may need to amend Title V. We may have to 

put in a provision that says that—that holds you accountable because right now you could pass it off to somebody below you. You 

don’t have to accept responsibility, and you haven’t, and that’s— 

you know, that’s clear. But if we adopted an amendment to Title 

V that said outrageous and/or criminal conduct in direct violation 

of an agency’s mission would give you the ability to fire somebody, 

that would solve this, I think, in part. And also the failure to report because that’s where this has started, where the managers at 

the lower levels did not report, did not kick this up the chain of 

command, and so we need to hold them accountable too. And there 

should be a provision that says refusal or failure to report an offense like this will give the agency and the government the ability 

to claw back pensions, claw back salary that was accepted by those 

individuals who were violating the law. It’s a shame that we have 

to get to this, but, you know, I actually think that that may be 

where we’re at right now. 

I’ll yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank the gentleman. 

I’m going to recognize myself. I do have a series of questions as 

we wrap up here. 

Administrator Leonhart, you became the—you’ve tried to paint a 

picture of this as a decade ago. I heard you say multiple times 10 

years ago. When did you become the Deputy Administrator? 

Ms. LEONHART. I was confirmed in March 2004. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. How many deputies are there? Deputy Administrators are there? 

Ms. LEONHART. There’s one. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So you were the sole Deputy Administrator, and then you became the acting administrator, and when 

was that? 

Ms. LEONHART. 2007. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And then you were confirmed in 2000—— 

Ms. LEONHART. Ten. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. —10. So it’s pretty safe to say that you’ve 

had your finger on the pulse of this department or this agency for 

more than a decade. Correct? You’ve been there 35 years. Correct? 

Ms. LEONHART. Either as the Deputy Or the Acting Administrator Or Administrator, yes, since 2004. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. One of the things that you said that is 

troubling in a long list and was brought up by Mr. Lynch, is the 

idea that—and it was in response to some of the gentlemen over 

here who asked the question about those that were directly involved. I got to—I want you to seriously consider—I want all the 

departments and agencies to seriously consider—in my mind, they 

are directly involved if they fail to report. You may not have been 
77 

the person who was directly fully engaged in the inappropriate behavior, but once you know about it, you have a responsibility to 

deal with it under the department policies. Correct? 

Ms. LEONHART. That’s correct. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So when you suggest that they weren’t directly involved, that offers me great concern. Do you understand 

that? 

Ms. LEONHART. I do understand that. I was—I was just making 

the point that he wasn’t involved in the behavior. He failed to report and—and that’s what his shortcomings were. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Part of the abhorrent behavior is covering 

it up. That’s the concern. And that’s essentially what it is. It’s covering it up by not reporting it up the chain because, as Mr. Horowitz pointed out, the only—the only alternative based on the law 

enforcement component offense tables in appendix 3 of sexual misconduct and sexual harassment is removal. It’s the only one. 

There’s no—there’s no ifs, ands or buts. There’s no ambiguity. I 

know there are things that we’re going to look at with Title V and 

whatnot, but removal is the only option. 

So let me ask you, Administrator, do you believe that soliciting 

prostitution is sexual harassment? 

Ms. LEONHART. No. I believe that prostitution is sexual misconduct. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Explain the difference between sexual misconduct and sexual harassment. 

Ms. LEONHART. Sexual harassment is a workplace behavior. It’s 

what you—sexual harassment is something that affects the employees in the workplace or an employee. 

Sexual misconduct is outside of the work—outside of the workplace, like prostitution. There’s a difference. Does it affect the employee getting a raise? Does it affect an employee getting a transfer, getting a particular job? Is it a hostile work environment? 

Those are sexual harassment. 

Sexual misconduct is a different—you could have sexual misconduct that’s also sexual harassment, but there is a difference. 

Prostitution would be sexual misconduct. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So explain to me then exactly what you believe—fully more explain to me what you think sexual harassment 

is. What would be some examples, and what’s sexual harassment? 

Ms. LEONHART. Unwelcome remarks. Touching an employee. A 

supervisor touching an employee. A supervisor making threats 

about you’re not going to get that promotion unless you do A, B, 

C, and D. Those kinds of activities. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Mr. Horowitz, do you want to weigh in 

here, the difference between sexual harassment and sexual misconduct? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, I think it’s based on what you have before 

you which is what’s written down as the definitions and looking at 

the actions. Some of these—for example, one of the incidents that 

we cite talks about the assistant regional director making inappropriate sexual comments, forcing others to watch pornographic movies, yelling at employees, other kinds of actions obviously clearly 

within the definition of sexual harassment. 
78 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So, within the report, do you believe that 

those are sexual harassment? 

Ms. LEONHART. That’s sexual harassment. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So if you’re a DEA agent in this case, and 

you’re having sex—commercial sex paid for, you don’t believe that 

that’s sexual harassment? 

Ms. LEONHART. No. That’s sexual misconduct. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Is procuring a prostitute sexual harassment? 

Ms. LEONHART. It would be sexual misconduct. It didn’t happen—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. No harassment. 

Ms. LEONHART. It’s not the workplace. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. It happened in government housing. 

Ms. LEONHART. It’s not—it’s not behavior against an—a fellow— 

another employee. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So, in your mind, in your world, which is 

a different planet than I live, it’s not sexual harassment if you do 

something to somebody who is not a Federal employee? 

What if they were here in the Washington, DC.—or you were in 

charge of Los Angeles field office. Is it sexual harassment if they 

go up to somebody in Los Angeles and start saying, you know, 

some ridiculous comments and trying to solicit somebody? That’s 

just harassment? Or isn’t? It’s not in your world. 

Ms. LEONHART. As it’s—as it’s defined for government, as it’s defined by the EEO in EEO terms, it’s all workplace related. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So, in the course of the workplace, somebody they’re investigating, if they accept—the Federal employee accepts commercial sex, is that sexual harassment? 

Ms. LEONHART. That’s sexual misconduct. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. We’ll have to further explore this because 

I think this is—we’re getting to the heart of one of the biggest 

problems here, which is, in your world, which I don’t think is the 

real world, the charge here for the person in Bogota was improper 

association. Does that sound like the appropriate charge? 

Ms. LEONHART. For which person in Bogota? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The Bogota—the DEA agent in Bogota in 

July 2009 when they engaged—this is the case with the prostitute. 

They had a payment dispute. He throws a glass at a woman. A security guard sees this happening. There’s no doubt about the facts, 

according to your previous testimony. So that was not sexual harassment? 

Ms. LEONHART. It’s sexual misconduct. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Wow. And under sexual misconduct, do you 

think that improper association is one of the proper charges? Do 

you think this person was properly—I guess the word is ‘‘charged?’’ 

Based on that case and everything that you know, this person was 

suspended without pay for 14 days for conduct unbecoming and improper association. Do you believe that that was the proper charge 

for that person? 

Ms. LEONHART. I believe those are two proper charges. The deciding official had a number of other charges that they could have 

looked at as well. 
79 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I’m asking what you personally believe. 

What do you believe they should have been charged with, or do you 

believe that that was the proper conclusion? 

Ms. LEONHART. I think it would be conduct unbecoming. It is improper an association. I would have concerns about false Statements. I have a number of concerns with those cases. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Any other—your professional opinion, your 

experience, you worked for the OPR, you’ve been at the agency for 

30-plus years. You’ve been either the Acting Or the Deputy Or Administrator for more than a decade. Do you believe that this person 

in Bogota was properly charged, or do you believe that they fell 

short? What else—if they did fall short, what else do you think 

they should have been charged with? 

Ms. LEONHART. I do believe it felt short. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So what else should they have been 

charged with? 

Ms. LEONHART. As I said, it’s not so much the charge; it’s the 

penalty. The other charges that could have been not—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The charge determines the penalty. And 

when you say that this person engaging with a prostitute, throwing 

a glass at her, I mean, how many things could we list out that are 

wrong with that at every step? And improper association is the one 

that they go with? 

Ms. LEONHART. The penalty for improper association and conduct 

unbecoming can be removal. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And it was only 14 days. We even has an 

eyewitness. Security guard. Worked for the Federal Government. 

Do you think any of these cases that we brought before you 

should be—there should be additional charges? 

Ms. LEONHART. Again, not knowing all the facts that the—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. You said you knew all the facts. You just 

issued a memo on March 26 saying that you had fully investigated 

this. 

Ms. LEONHART. If I can—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. It says, ‘‘These allegations were fully investigated by DEA Office of Professional Responsibility.’’ You sent this 

out at 5:33 p.m., on March 26, 2015. 

Ms. LEONHART. Not knowing all the circumstances that the deciding officials, who are the only ones that can decide punishment 

in DEA, not knowing everything they took into consideration, 

they—they could have—by charging conduct unbecoming and improper association, the penalties are up to removal. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Mr. Horowitz, do you have a comment on 

this? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, I think the concern we found as we cite in 

our report is that they were charged with offenses, such as conduct 

unbecoming, poor judgment, which, by the way, isn’t the category, 

and others, that were inconsistent. And the concern is, and we deal 

with this in our own agency when we have to look at individuals 

who may have engaged in misconduct, you want to charge what the 

number of charges should be in part because there’s precedent. You 

look to what prior individuals got for similarly situated conduct 

under similar charges, and so that’s one of the concerns we have 
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as we lay out here as to the importance of consistent charging and 

charging the appropriate offense. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. To the Administrator, are you—is the DEA 

part of the intelligence community? 

Ms. LEONHART. A sliver of DEA—a sliver of DEA is a part of the 

intelligence community. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Is it governed by the intelligence community directive No. 704? 

Ms. LEONHART. That sliver of the agency is, yes. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Define that sliver, please. 

Ms. LEONHART. Under 60 positions in DEA within the Intelligence Division. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Those that are serving overseas, would 

they be subject to this? 

Ms. LEONHART. Depends on the position. There are in some countries some intelligence analysts that would be under that. The special agents would not. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Again, we’re getting close to wrapping up. 

I promise. We’re not at half time. We’re well past that. 

So walk me through security clearances. Who makes the determination who gets the security clearance, and who makes the decision as to whether or not it’s revoked and when? 

Ms. LEONHART. The same office that determines that a new employee gets a security clearance, that same office makes a determination—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. What office is that? 

Ms. LEONHART. Office of Security Programs. They do all adjudicating of security clearances for new employees, for contract employees, for anybody that’s going to be in the work force within 

DEA. The same office also handles review—periodic reinvestigations and handles reviews of people who already have security 

clearances. So, for instance, in the Cartagena case, OPR referred— 

referred the case over to Security Programs when they had completed their investigation. And Security Programs did a complete 

review of their security clearances, adjudicated it, made a decision 

that there was enough to move to suspend the clearance. And then 

the agency moved for, because the person no longer has a security 

clearance, removal from service because they can’t be a DEA employee without having a security clearance. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So what are the standards by which you 

can have and not have a security clearance? Where is that standard? 

Ms. LEONHART. There’s a number of things they look at. The 

main thing is securing—securing information, national security interest information. 

Does this person with their—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Contact with a foreign national, allowed or 

not allowed? Unreported, I should say. 

Ms. LEONHART. Not allowed if it’s unreported, and there’s rules 

for reporting. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Is there a document that determines—that 

governs what you will and will not give to—for security clearances? 

Ms. LEONHART. There’s a document that every employee is to fill 

out, an SF86 that—— 
81 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. But it’s just a couple of dudes down in the 

bowels of the DEA that just make a random decision, or how is the 

decision made? 

Ms. LEONHART. No. They’re trained on adjudication. They review—if there’s anything that is a red flag for them like past—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Sexual misconduct a red flag? 

Ms. LEONHART. Sexual misconduct, if a person was disciplined, 

received any discipline, they on their—on their form, check it. Office of Security Programs does a review of that. The gentleman—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Has the Office of Security, have they—have 

they ever revoked somebody’s security clearance for people engaging in prostitution? 

Ms. LEONHART. I don’t know about prostitution. I know that they 

have revoked security clearances. So other than the three—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Right. 

Ms. LEONHART [continuing]. From Cartagena, I’m not sure. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. You’re just the Administrator. 

Mr. Horowitz, have you looked into the security clearance possibilities? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. We didn’t look into what could have happened 

had they been referred to the Office of Security Programs primarily 

because the concern we saw was that they weren’t being referred 

to the Office of Security Programs. So we weren’t in the position 

to review what actions they took with regard to these matters because we learned that OPR, when they did finally get these allegations, never turned around and sent them to the OSP to look at. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. What do you say that about, Ms. Leonhart? 

Ms. LEONHART. That’s one of the changes we’ve put in place. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. When? 

Ms. LEONHART. November. November of last year. We—we’ve 

never had—in the history of DEA, we’ve never had a formal mechanism for those security clearances to be reviewed upon an OPR investigation. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So you were the Administrator Or the Deputy Administrator or the Acting Administrator for almost 10 years 

at that point and you had never had that policy in place. It seems 

like a, well, duh. 

Ms. LEONHART. We never had a formal policy. It would be up to 

the Office of Professional Responsibility to flag an internal investigation that had security issues and then to refer that over to security programs. So we’ve set up a mechanism for that to happen 

automatically. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So were those recommendations made before or after the draft report from the inspector general? 

Ms. LEONHART. The recommendation that security programs— 

that Office of Professional Responsibility flag security violations 

and give them to security programs was happening long before 

that. 

What we did is, in Cartagena, made sure that the security clearances reviewed—were reviewed and then, more recently, in November, set up a mechanism so that security programs and OPR have 

a mechanism to pass on a regular basis security clearances over. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. That’s just unbelievable to me. It just—you 

know, there are some things you just think—you just think this 
82 

has to be happening. On the one hand, you’ve got this problem— 

I mean, we’ve listed out the host. This is not one incident. I mean, 

we’re going to have some people do something stupid somewhere. 

People are going to make mistakes. People are going to get themselves into trouble. I get this. But this is happening with such frequency. To not have that moved up the chain, for you to earlier 

not—say, Well, they weren’t directly involved. You have got to hold 

everybody accountable to get that thing all the way to the finish 

line. I just don’t understand why you personally don’t take a hand 

in that. 

Mr. Horowitz has referenced these made-up categories of offenses. Why did you make those up? 

Ms. LEONHART. That’s how employees for the last 40 years have 

been charged at DEA. So that—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So never mind the guidelines. You just—so 

we just keep doing it like we did 40 years ago. What? 

Ms. LEONHART. Part of—part of charging by the Board of Conduct and by the deciding officials is to look at agency precedent and 

government precedent and so the—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The problem though—and, again, we’ve exhausted this. We’re getting to the end—is that this is a problem. 

You say, you come to—you get called before this committee and 

say, Oh, it’s terrible; it’s awful. But you, you personally have been 

responsible for this for more than a decade, and you didn’t do anything about it. You may cry in the mirror. But I’m telling you, you 

are in a position to do it and you didn’t. 

And after Cartagena, that should have been a wake-up call, and 

it took you 2 years to get out a memo, 2 years, as Mr. Meadows 

brought up. I—I—we have a lot more that we need to go through. 

Mr. Horowitz, are there any other outstanding issues that you 

need help with from the department, the Drug Enforcement Agency? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. With the Drug Enforcement Agency, no. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. With the FBI? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. We have, not as to this review, but as to at least 

four other ongoing reviews, we still do not have all the records that 

we need because of the FBI’s continuing process of reviewing 

records, determining what it is allowed under its legal judgment to 

provide to us, go through that process, go to the Attorney General 

or the Deputy Attorney General, get their approval and then get 

it to us. So as to several ongoing reviews, we still do not have all 

the materials that are responsive to our requests. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So, Mr. Perkins, why does the FBI think 

that they’re so special and don’t have to adhere to the law and 

don’t do what the other agencies are doing within the Department 

of Justice? 

Mr. PERKINS. Mr. Chairman, we are adhering to the law. I take 

exception with the inspector general’s comments along those lines. 

Let me tell you, sir, there are—in his latest letter, dated yesterday, his 218 letter as we refer to them, were five investigations 

noted. The records, they are—that they wish to receive; they’re 

being delayed—involve email. We have turned over 35,000 emails 

to them. There are 200 emails in question out of 35,000 that we 
83 

are working with them to go through. We believe in the rule of law. 

We have a legal disagreement with the Inspector General. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Mr. Horowitz. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Can I be clear? They’re not working with us to 

get us the 200 emails. They haven’t given us the 200 emails. Our 

understanding is it’s because they believe they have a legal review 

to conduct. That’s why our—what our understanding is as to why 

we’re not getting them. 

For several of these matters, these are multi months we’ve been 

waiting for them. There is no reason why we should not be getting 

the materials immediately. None whatsoever. I understand they 

have a legal position that is different. Frankly, the easiest way to 

resolve this—and I think on this we’re in complete agreement—is 

if the Office of Legal Counsel would simply issue its opinion, I 

think, we would both say we would be very satisfied on that point. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And how long has this been pending at the 

OLC? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, May will be the 1-year anniversary. 

Mr. PERKINS. I concur with the inspector general. We—we will 

follow the OLC opinion to the letter. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Why are you different than the other departments and agencies within the Department of Justice? 

Mr. PERKINS. I can’t speak for the other agencies, Mr. Chairman. 

What I can speak for is matters involving rule 6(e), matters involving the Financial Privacy Act and other matters that we believe— 

we strongly believe we have a legal responsibility to review and 

provide them to the inspector general. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. What are you not willing to share with the 

inspector general? 

Mr. PERKINS. Any number of series of items. As I mentioned, for 

instance, rule 6(e) material, there are certain aspects from—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Explain that people so people can understand. 

Mr. PERKINS. I’m sorry. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Yes, yes. 

Mr. PERKINS. —6(e) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the secrecy rules involving grand jury information. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. But you had given that to them previously? 

Mr. PERKINS. Once—once matters had been reviewed, once matters are—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. No. But it had been a longstanding practice 

of the FBI to provide the inspector general this material. Correct? 

Mr. PERKINS. I can’t speak to that, sir. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. You can’t speak to the history of the FBI 

document production? That’s why you’re here. 

Mr. PERKINS. Yes, sir. We can—we provide the information once 

there has been a legal review that says—that we determine legally 

that we are on solid ground to provide the information. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. But that’s a change; correct? 

What was it before, Mr. Horowitz? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Pre–2010, there was no such objection from the 

FBI as to wiretap information, Fair Credit Reporting Act information, grand jury information. We got that material. In fact, in a 

1998 and 1999 proceedings in District Court in Oklahoma, the de-
84 

partment itself took the position that we were entitled to grand 

jury material and two Federal judges agreed. 

This has all changed since 2010 with no change in the law. The 

only thing, frankly, that occurred was several hard-hitting OIG reviews about how the FBI was handling some of its national security authorities. Other than that, nothing changed in 2010. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And, Mr. Perkins, that’s the concern from 

this committee. And we—we have hundreds of people working for 

the Inspector General’s Office there in the Department of Justice 

intending to be the fair arbiters who can get in and look under the 

hood and see and ferret out these problems. 

And, quite frankly, this—the reason that the DEA and the FBI 

are here today is they’re the problem children. We’ve cited several 

times that ATF and Marshals and others, this is not a problem. It’s 

not an issue. Now, they’ve got problems in the Department within 

their agencies, don’t get me wrong. They—they’ve got things 

they’ve got to clean up and we’re going to work with them on that. 

But the reason you’re sitting here today in the hearing—and I 

know we were very focused on the DEA—but the two agencies, the 

FBI as well as the DEA, are impeding the ability to understand 

and unearth what the problems are. 

Mr. PERKINS. Mr. Chairman, let me clarify. There’s an applesand-oranges issue here. With regard to this particular report that 

we’re here today for, there are process issues within the FBI that 

the Deputy Director has made changes that the inspector general 

is aware of and those changes in our business process will eliminate these types of holdups—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. All of them? 

Mr. PERKINS. For these types of records. Not having to do with 

the other issues that he brings up in 218. We are waiting—as the 

inspector general said, if OLC would render their opinion, we will 

march forward and abide by it 100 percent. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. And I would just add on that, I think we would 

both take any opinion at this point, good or bad, because this is ongoing. We completely disagree on the legal issue. And certainly 

we’ve questioned why all of a sudden in 2010—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And this is why—again, we’re wrapping up. 

I got hours of questions on this, but we are going to wrap up here 

pretty quick. 

This act, the inspector general act, authorizes, ‘‘to have access to 

all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations and other—or other material available to the applicable establishment which relate to the programs and operations 

with respect to which that inspector general has responsibilities 

under this act.’’ It doesn’t sound ambiguous. It doesn’t sound like 

there—and there was no change in the law. 

It’s just, in 2010, after the inspector general was unearthing a 

lot of very difficult things for the agency, they just decided, ah, 

we’re going to change the rules. We’re going to change the rules. 

I’m not suggesting, Mr. Perkins, that you personally did that. 

But the consequence is—the consequence is we have hundreds of 

people at the Inspector General’s Office who can’t do their job and 

you, the FBI, are standing in their way, and the DEA is standing 
85 

in their way. And we’re going to keep yanking you up here time 

after time after time if we have to. 

You know, I am fortunate enough to become the chairman of this 

committee. The very first hearing we had is on this. And I can 

promise you, I can promise you we will continue to yank you up 

here as long as this continues to be a problem. 

The act is clear, the inspector general is to have unfettered access to all records, not just the ones you want to choose from. I 

don’t—this idea that an OLC opinion is just pending and it’s going 

on for close to a year is just intolerable. And there’s not a prevailing attitude within the FBI or the DEA that believes that the 

inspector general work is of value to those departments and agencies; otherwise, they would want them to come in and help clear 

their good name or ferret out problems and work to fix it. 

See, in this Nation, we’re different. We are self-critical. I can’t 

have this type of hearing in another nation. I probably couldn’t go 

to Colombia and do this type of hearing, but you can in the United 

States, but it requires good people to allow somebody to come in 

and check and look under the hood, which is what the inspector 

general is supposed to do. 

We’ve had a long hearing. I appreciate your patience. We need 

your help and cooperation moving forward. Again, to the thousands 

of men and women who serve in these departments and agencies, 

I cannot thank them enough for putting their lives on the line. My 

grandfather was a career FBI agent. I care about the agency. 

Mr. PERKINS. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. OK. I care about law enforcement in this 

Nation, but we’re going to do it the right way. We’re going to do 

it the right way and allowing sexual harassment or misconduct to 

get a little slap on the wrist with 2 to 14 days paid leave is not 

acceptable. It wasn’t then. It isn’t now. And it shouldn’t be moving 

forward. 

We’re going to look toward other things we can do within law to 

give future administrators and directors more latitude. 

And to the inspector general, I thank you for this report. We 

wouldn’t have known about it without your good work and the good 

people in your agency within the—and so we thank you. 

And this hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:11 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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