updated

In A Moment’s 

Notice: Surge 

Capacity 

for Terrorist 

Bombings

Challenges and Proposed Solutions

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Centers	for	Disease	Control	and	Prevention
Updated In A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for 

Terrorist Bombings

Challenges and Proposed Solutions

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

Thomas Frieden, MD, MPH, Director

Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health 

Robin Ikeda, MD, MPH, Director

National Center for Injury Prevention and Control

Robin Ikeda, MD, MPH, Acting Director

Division of Injury Response

Richard C. Hunt, MD, FACEP, Director

Authors of the “Updated In A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings” 

2010: Richard C. Hunt, MD, FACEP, Vikas Kapil, DO, MPH, FACOEM Sridhar V. Basavaraju, MD, 

Scott M. Sasser, MD, FACEP, Lisa C. McGuire, PhD, and Ernest E. Sullivent, MD, MPH, FACEP

Authors of the “In A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings” 

2007: Scott M. Sasser, Richard C. Hunt, Bob Bailey, Jon Krohmer, Steve Cantrill, Kevin Gerold, 

Mark Johnson, Arthur Kellermann, Patricia Lenaghan, James Morris, Brent Myers, Richard Orr, 

Thomas Peters, and Paul Schmidt

Suggested Citation: National Center for Injury Prevention and Control: Updated In A Moment’s Notice: 

Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings. Atlanta, GA: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; 2010.

Disclaimer

The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent 

the views of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
updated

In A Moment’s Notice: 

Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings

Challenges and Proposed Solutions
t a b l e o f c o n t e n t s

Executive Summary 2

Introduction 4

Surge Capacity Challenges and Solutions: 

System-Wide Challenges 8

Surge Capacity Challenges and Solutions: 

Discipline-specific Challenges 12

Addressing Discipline-specific Challenges: 

Surge Action Templates 20

Surge Action Templates 20

1. Emergency Medical Services System Response 21

2. Emergency Department Response 25

3. Surgical Department Response 28

4. Intensive Care Unit Response 31

5. Radiology Response 34

6. Blood Bank Response 37

7. Hospitalist Response 43

8. Administration Response 45

9. Drugs and Pharmaceutical Supplies 50

10. Nursing Care 53

Acknowledgement and Special Thanks 56

References 59
2

Executive Summary

Explosive devices and high-velocity firearms are the most common weapons used by terrorists. The 

morbidity and mortality inflicted in two European capitals, Madrid, Spain, and London, England, in 

2004 and 2005 respectively, demonstrates the impact of detonating explosives in densely populated 

civilian areas. Explosions can produce instantaneous havoc, resulting in numerous casualties with 

complex, technically challenging injuries not commonly seen after natural disasters. Because many 

patients self-evacuate after a terrorist attack and prehospital care may be difficult to coordinate, 

hospitals near the scene can expect to receive a large influx, or surge, of victims after a terrorist strike. 

This rapid surge of victims typically occurs within minutes, exemplified by the Madrid bombings 

where the closest hospital received 272 patients in 2.5 hours. Such a surge differs dramatically from 

the gradual influx of patients after infectious disease outbreaks or environmental emergencies such as 

heat waves. In addition, injuries to workers involved in rescue and recovery can lead to a secondary 

wave of patients. 

Health care and public health specialists should anticipate profound challenges in adequately caring 

for the surge of victims following a terrorist bombing. The health care system, especially emergency 

care, is already strained by routine daily volumes. Furthermore, emergency departments (EDs), 

inpatient units, and intensive care units (ICUs) of acute care hospitals are chronically overcrowded 

and resource constrained. 

Without immediate federal assistance, many, if not most, communities would have difficulty caring 

for a surge of victims resulting from a terrorist bombing event. 

To address the challenges posed by such an event, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

(CDC)’s National Center for Injury Prevention and Control (NCIPC), Division of Injury Response 

(DIR) convened expert panels in October 2005, January 2006, and June 2009. These panels included 

experts in emergency medical services (EMS), emergency medicine, trauma surgery, burn surgery, 

pediatrics, otolaryngology, intensive care medicine, hospital medicine, radiology, pharmacology, 

nursing, hospital administration, bloodbanking, and public health. The panels were tasked with 

identifying creative strategies that could be adopted in a timely manner to address medical care 

surge issues from terrorism, and the panel experts focused on rapidly managing large numbers of 
bombing casualties. They examined challenges that would confront not only the general emergency 

medical response and health care system, but also select medical disciplines. Although developed for 

addressing a surge of injuries from a terrorist bombing, the recommendations in this report may also 

improve the management of a surge from other mass casualty events, including biological, chemical, 

or nuclear attacks.

This document reflects the recommendations of the expert panels. It includes a description of 

system-wide and discipline-specific challenges as well as recommendations to address these issues. 

Solutions for the discipline-specific challenges have been incorporated into easy-to-use templates 

that can assist various disciplines in managing surge needs for injuries. The needs and resources 

of each community must be considered to effectively plan for a surge of patients into an already 

overburdened health care system. 

Updated In A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings | Challenges and Proposed Solutions

3
4

c h a p t e r o n e

Introduction

A b a c k g r o u n d

Current patterns in terrorist activity increase the potential for civilian casualties from explosions. 

Recent events in Egypt, India, Iraq, Israel, Pakistan, Spain, and the United Kingdom indicate that 

bombings targeting civilian populations are a continuing danger. The U.S. Department of State 

reported 7,000 terrorist bombings worldwide between 1968 and 1999.1

 From 2001 through 2003, 

more than 500 international terrorist bombings caused 1,579 civilian deaths, excluding the attacks 

of September 11, 2001.1–3

The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation confirmed 324 incidents of terrorist bombings in the 

United States between 1980 and 20014

. More than 21,000 bombing incidents (actual, accidental, 

or attempted) occurred in the United States between 1988 and 1998.5

According to reports compiled from the Terrorist Attack Archives at the Terrorism Research Center, 

758 terrorist events were staged in 45 countries in 2005, and more than half (N = 399) were 

bombings. These events resulted in 8,019 injured persons and 3,049 civilian deaths.6

Despite justifiable concerns about the dangers of chemical, biologic, or nuclear terrorist attacks, 

bombings with conventional explosives remain the most common method. Explosions, particularly in 

confined spaces, can inflict multisystem injuries on numerous patients and produce unique challenges 

to health care providers. Unlike the gradual influx of patients after events such as infectious disease 

outbreaks or heat waves, the surge of patients after an explosion typically occurs within minutes of 

the event and can quickly overwhelm nearby hospital resources.7–8 The potential for many casualties 

and an immediate surge of patients may stress and limit the ability of EMS systems, hospitals, and 

other health care facilities to care for critically injured victims.9–11

The persistent threat of terrorist activities, combined with documented evidence of decreasing 

emergency care capacity, requires appropriate preparation.12 Health care and public health systems, 

individual hospitals, and health care personnel must collaborate to ensure that strategies are in place 

to effectively receive, evaluate, and treat large numbers of injured patients. In addition, rapidly 

identifying and stabilizing the most critically injured patients should be the main focus. Collaborative 

efforts must also strategically plan for future incidents.
5

According to reports compiled from the Terrorist Attack Archives at 

the Terrorism Research Center, 758 terrorist events were staged in 

45 countries in 2005, and more than half were bombings.

B r o l e o f t h e c d c ’ s i n j u r y c e n t e r

The mission of CDC’s Injury Center is to increase the capacity to prevent injuries and their 

adverse health effects by working with partners to develop, evaluate, and promote evidence-based 

surveillance, prevention, and care practices.13 One of CDC’s strategic goals is to protect people from 

health consequences resulting from terrorist attacks. The Injury Center uses a systematic public 

health approach to define the injury problem, identify risk and protective factors, develop and test 

prevention interventions and strategies, and ensure widespread adoption of effective interventions 

and strategies. 

Many agencies have addressed issues of surge capacity for events such as biological attacks, most 

notably, CDC’s public health and laboratory programs and the Health Resources and Services 

Administration (HRSA)’s hospital preparedness program. After in-depth discussions with HRSA, 

the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the National 

Highway Traffic Safety Administration, CDC undertook efforts to play a unique role in identifying 

surge capacity issues and proposing solutions related to terrorist bombings. Any solutions to enhance 

surge capacity in preparation for terrorist bombings could also apply to surge issues resulting from 

other man-made or natural disasters. 

In October 2005 and January 2006, the CDC’s Injury Center convened expert panels to identify 

problems and recommend feasible and affordable strategies for rapidly managing large numbers of 

bombing casualties. These recommendations, in the form of surge action templates, were designed 

for emergency medical services, hospital, and public health systems, with the recommendation that 

immediate steps be taken to ensure an effective response. The expert panels were also charged with 

Updated In A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings | Challenges and Proposed Solutions
6

identifying creative strategies that could be adopted in a timely manner to address surge issues from 

terrorist bombings. To begin the process, the first panel had three objectives:

1. Increase collaboration between CDC and federal agencies, external partners, and other experts on 

issues of surge capacity for injuries from conventional terrorist bombings;

2. Identify factors that limit rapid assessment and treatment of injured patients in the field and at 

hospitals (including triage, availability of radiology, and access to operating rooms) and develop 

mechanisms to address these factors; and

3. Develop strategies and identify mechanisms to widely disseminate and implement findings from 

the expert panel (i.e., Internet, print publications, and training curricula).

In June 2009, CDC convened another expert panel to update and revise the surge action templates. 

Attendees involved in the expert panel meetings came from many countries and represented a 

broad spectrum of medical care and administrative disciplines required to care for bombing victims. 

Panel members included personnel from emergency medical services; physicians specializing 

in emergency medicine, trauma surgery, burn surgery, pediatrics, otolaryngology, intensive 

care medicine, hospital medicine, and radiology; experts in pharmacology, nursing, hospital 

administration, and bloodbanking; and experts in public health. The expert panel members are 

listed in the acknowledgments section of this report. At the June 2009 panel session, expert working 

groups reviewed each of the original templates and their suggested changes were presented to the 

plenary body for discussion. The templates provided later in this report represent the modifications 

recommended by this latest expert panel. 

C l e s s o n s l e a r n e d f r o m m a d r i d

To provide a framework for discussions at the first meeting, the panel was presented with the example 

of the March 11, 2004, Madrid bombings. The Madrid experience provides a real-life scenario of 

what U.S. health care providers and systems must be prepared to confront: a complex, coordinated 

attack with thousands of injured victims and a rapid surge 

of patients to surrounding hospitals. Between 7:37 a.m. 

and 7:42 a.m., 10 terrorist bombs were detonated on four 

crowded commuter trains, killing 177 people instantly 

and injuring more than 2,000 persons.14 Gregario 

Maranon University General Hospital staff evaluated and 

treated 312 patients, with 272 of them arriving between 

7:50 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. The Madrid response entailed 

multiple logistical and operational challenges, including 

field triage and transportation of injured persons; 

discharge of inpatients to free hospital beds; evacuation 

of EDs and ICUs; and multiple surgical procedures 

and diagnostic tests such as hundreds of radiographs, 

computerized tomography (CT) scans, and ultrasounds. 
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Updated In A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings | Challenges and Proposed Solutions

Panel members were asked to describe how members of their clinical discipline would respond to the 

Madrid example. 

D t e r r o r i s t b o m b i n g s i n t h e u n i t e d s t a t e s : 

a “ p r e d i c t a b l e s u r p r i s e ”

The persistent global reality of complex terrorist 

bombings, such as in Madrid, suggests that similar 

events in the United States could be described as a 

“predictable surprise.” The expert panel reviewed 

the characteristics of “predictable surprises” outlined 

by Bazerman and Watkins15 to provide background 

on common problems that could hinder effective 

surge response. 

The following characteristics of “predictable surprises” 

outlined by Bazerman and Watkins apply to terrorist 

bombings and the United States:15

1. A shared trait of predictable surprises is that leaders knew a problem existed and 

that the problem would not solve itself. 

2. Predictable surprises can be expected when organizational members recognize that 

a problem is getting worse over time. 

3. Fixing the problem would incur significant costs in the present, while the benefits 

of action would be delayed and ambiguous.

4. Decision makers often fail to prepare for predictable surprises because the natural 

human tendency is to maintain the status quo. 

5. A small vocal minority benefits from inaction and is motivated to subvert the 

actions of leaders for their personal benefit.

6. Leaders can expect little credit for the prevention of predictable surprises
c h a p t e r t w o

Surge Capacity Challenges and Solutions:

System-wide Challenges

8

Hospitals and emergency health care systems face enormous challenges. The threat of terrorism 

exists at a time when hospitals and emergency departments in the United States are struggling 

to manage the current volume of patients who present for care. Reductions in hospitals with 

emergency departments, regionalization of surgical care, increases in nonemergency patient visits to 

emergency departments, diversion of emergency medical services, and personnel shortages have led 

to unprecedented crowding in emergency departments.16–20 These challenges are highlighted in three 

Institute of Medicine reports outlining the burdens of the American emergency care system.21–23

Ambulances are routinely diverted from one facility to another.24 According to a 2003 report from 

the National Center for Health Statistics, 34% of U.S. emergency departments diverted ambulances 

from primary destinations.24 Diversions occurred more frequently in metropolitan areas. Emergency 

departments also operate above capacity, forcing paramedics to wait for extended periods before 

patient care can be transferred to hospital staff. Patients are evaluated and treated in emergency 

department hallways and held for hours, or even days, awaiting placement in an inpatient bed due to 

high occupancy.25 In 2003, 113.9 million visits were made to emergency departments in the United 

States, representing a 26% increase from 90.3 million visits in 1993. During this same period, the 

number of U.S. emergency departments decreased by 14%.26 The problem intensified during the 

1990s when the United States lost 103,000 staffed inpatient medical and surgical beds and 7,800 

intensive care unit beds.25

Several issues affect the spectrum of injury care from prehospital through rehabilitation and also affect 

personnel, including fire chiefs, trauma surgeons, and nursing supervisors to emergency medical 

technicians (EMTs). Many problematic areas stand between the current reality of emergency care in 

the United States and the effective management of an event like the Madrid bombing. The following 

list describes these specific areas.

A o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d l e a d e r s h i p

Effective preparedness and response demand an established, functional leadership structure with clear 

organizational responsibilities. In many instances, particularly at the local operational level, such 

preparation has not occurred. Consequently, confusion over specific roles and responsibilities during 

response efforts could occur.
9

A CDC publication reported that about three fourths of hospitals had disaster plans that addressed 

explosives, but few (one fifth) had actually conducted a drill involving simulated use of explosives.27

B a l t e r a t i o n s i n s t a n d a r d s o f c a r e

As part of the response to a terrorist bombing, revisions to standard of care could be required, 

emphasizing the greatest good for the community. No universal methodology exists for altering 

standards of care, and the process is fraught with ethical, societal, medical, and legal issues. A protocol 

is needed to determine when and how to alter standards of care without the health care provider or 

facility experiencing repercussions. An altered protocol, simultaneously implemented by all hospitals 

within a system, would improve the ability to manage assessment, treatment, flow, and outcomes for 

the greatest number of patients. In August 2004, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality at 

the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) convened a panel of experts to examine 

the complex issues surrounding alterations in clinical care. The panel’s findings are published in the 

monograph Altered Standards of Care in Mass Casualty Events.28

C e d u c a t i o n

Disaster preparedness and response education is not included in most medical or nursing school 

curricula. With the exception of emergency medicine, preparedness and response is also not required 

in most residency training programs. As standard curriculum, EMT paramedics are required to 

complete a module on medical incident command. Yet, EMT-Intermediates and EMT-Basics do not 

receive this essential training. Standardized training that addresses clinical care and systems issues 

should be given to all levels of providers.

D c o m m u n i c a t i o n s

Although effective and timely communications are essential to functional command and 

control, communication failure (prehospital, hospital, and public) is a recurrent theme during 

and immediately after a disaster.29 Communication planning should include community education 

before, during, and after an event to promote public acceptance and understanding 

of the disaster response.

Updated In A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings | Challenges and Proposed Solutions
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E t r a n s p o r t a t i o n

Coordinated transportation service is vital. Hospitals must make timely and effective use of mutual 

aid transport units to transfer inpatients to tertiary or alternate care centers, (e.g., home, long-term 

care facilities) and free acute care beds. Effective plans to transport resources, personnel, supplies, and 

equipment by integrating private, public, and military transportation resources are required.

F i n f r a s t r u c t u r e a n d c a p a c i t y

Communities differ in their capabilities and infrastructure to handle disasters in terms of prehospital 

and hospital capacity. Regardless of a community’s capabilities and the level of coordination between 

resources, those people injured from an explosion will rapidly seek care at the nearest hospital and 

may not present to facilities designated by existing response plan.29, 30 Thus, all communities should 

develop plans that have been successfully and repeatedly tested with drills. In addition, facilities vary 

in capabilities and staffing. All facilities, including tertiary, community, rural, and alternate care, may 

face problems in the following areas. 

1. Personnel

Shortages of qualified personnel, including nurses and specialized technicians, exist throughout 

the health care system. During a mass casualty event, these shortages could be further magnified. 

Some staff may not respond during a bombing or other disaster event for reasons that include fear 

for personal safety, family responsibilities, or injury. Conversely, the screening, managing, and 

credentialing of well-intentioned volunteers during a disaster can be challenging.

2. Equipment and supplies 

Shortages of essential equipment and supplies often occur in the aftermath of a terrorist bombing or 

natural disaster. During response efforts, shortages may be exacerbated by the fact that most facilities 

in a given region use the same suppliers for back-up stock and equipment (e.g., pharmaceuticals, 

general medical supplies, ventilators). 

3. Information technology (data management/data systems)

Often, software systems involving EMS, hospitals, and health departments are incompatible. 

To maximize patient outcomes and allow individuals to quickly locate family members, a data 

management system should be able to track patients from the scene and throughout their 

hospitalization and subsequent transfer to other facilities. 

4. Cost 

Preparation and incident mitigation requires a commitment of resources. Training prehospital 

providers, stockpiling key equipment, and reserving capacity will require considerable financial 

investment.
11

Updated In A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings | Challenges and Proposed Solutions

5. Interoperability 

An effective medical response to a terrorist bombing requires that system components (personnel, 

organizations, and command structures) be interoperable. Currently, services, agencies, and systems 

are not integrated for maximum efficiency.

G p o t e n t i a l b o t t l e n e c k s

Response and capability of some clinical care areas may affect patients across the spectrum of care, 

causing potential bottlenecks. Consider the following list to maximize response capabilities. 

1. Radiology

Given the nature of injuries related to terrorist bombings, many victims will undergo multiple 

radiology studies14. The numbers of patients requiring studies may lead to a bottleneck and hinder 

the institution’s ability to streamline care. Although professional radiology societies have addressed 

detection and treatment of radiation emergencies, they have not focused on surge capacity for 

bombing victims. 

2. Critical care

If a terrorist bombing increases the demand for critical care/ICU services that, in turn, exceeds reserve 

ICU capacity, hospitals would have limited ability to divert or transfer patients to other hospitals and 

will need a plan in place to provide emergency mass critical care. 

3. Pharmacy 

Ensuring an adequate supply of required pharmaceuticals throughout an institution and community 

is of great importance. Maintaining adequate drug stocks may be complicated because 

many facilities in a region use the same distributors.

4. Triage

Current planning and preparedness activities assume that prehospital providers will have a 

coordinated dispatch, arrive on the scene to triage patients, and transport them to the appropriate 

facilities. In many disasters, however, most victims self-transport or are transported by other 

laypersons, resulting in a patient surge at nearby facilities31.

5. Legal issues

Examples of legal issues encountered during a terrorist bombing response include credentialing of 

providers; revising standards of care; altering standards for clinical documentation; and suspending 

provisions in the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, Health Insurance Portability 

and Accountability Act, or Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments. 
c h a p t e r t h r e e

Surge Capacity Challenges and Solutions:

Discipline-specific Challenges

12

Although each of the system-wide challenges may affect the broad range of patient care, unique 

challenges also exist for many disciplines. The expert panel identified the following discipline-specific 

challenges and provided feasible and affordable strategies for effectively addressing surge capacity. The 

proposed solutions are provided in template format in the next section of this document.

A e m e r g e n c y m e d i c a l s e r v i c e s ( e m s ) r e s p o n s e

As initial responders, EMS providers and personnel must confront several of the following issues:

1. Personal protection

Currently, no unified approach exists to protect rescuers or stage a response. Specifically, a challenge 

in response planning is identifying circumstances in which appropriate concern for scene safety and 

the potential for secondary explosive devices may hinder the initial response.

2. Decontamination 

Though treatment will be delayed, immediate 

decontamination may be imperative. Uniform 

policies and protocols for decontaminating 

personnel and patients need to be established for 

varying scenarios, including weather-related disasters 

and terrorist bombings. 

3. Incident command

Interoperability between prehospital and hospital 

command structures is a challenge. A unified incident 

command structure must be incorporated into health 

care response, including designating EMS as part of 

the field response command structure.

4. Field triage

Although multiple triage systems are used across the United States, no agreed-upon methodology for 

field triage during a disaster exists.
13

5. Destination decisions

Determining the appropriate destination following an event may be difficult, especially if the 

initial scene assessment has not been thoroughly conducted. 

6. Hospital evacuations

EMS transfer of patients from hospitals to free acute care beds often adversely affects routine 

hospital functions. 

7. Sustainability of operations

Providing personnel with needed support (physical and emotional) and maintaining facilities, 

equipment, and supplies in the aftermath of an event is an ongoing challenge.

B e m e r g e n c y d e p a r t m e n t r e s p o n s e

The emergency department is the entry point to most hospitals and the site where initial information 

related to a disaster is communicated. The challenge is to determine the magnitude of the event 

and initiate the appropriate institutional response. This response must be in concert with the 

assessed magnitude, including decisions to declare an institutional disaster, initiate an institutional 

lockdown, and determine if recipient victim decontamination is needed. The quality and quantity 

of information from the field and between the regional emergency operations center and hospitals 

is critical to determining the extent of the response. Frequently, information challenges and 

communications are a source of failure.29

In a large-scale event, each hospital should have the capability to increase staffing, rapidly assess 

available bed status, and open occupied beds, especially in the ED, operating rooms, and intensive 

care units. During a mass casualty event, transfer of patients to an alternative care site may be delayed 

due to the time, personnel, and equipment needed to establish the site. However, development of an 

alternative location will, eventually, free noncritical care beds. 

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A list of key issues are highlighted below:

1. Ascertaining the validity and scope of the event. Notification is essential to activate and implement 

an appropriate response. Information updates must be consistent and frequent. 

2. Implementing incident command. Incident command must be implemented within the ED, 

hospital, and community. Each hospital should be part of a regional unified command structure. 

3. Discharging patients from the ED. To free resources, patients should be discharged or transferred to 

other areas for care.

C s u r g i c a l a n d i n t e n s i v e c a r e u n i t (i c u ) r e s p o n s e

Multiple factors affect trauma surgery and its preparedness and response to a bombing event or 

natural disaster. These factors include:

1. Changes in surgical practice

The increased interest in disaster response capabilities is contrary to the general surgery community’s 

decreased interest in managing emergency surgery. Thus, the knowledge base and skill set to manage 

a Madrid-type scenario is being concentrated at fewer hospitals. Many hospitals with the capacity to 

handle surge, as it relates to beds and staffing, have little technical capability.

2. Time of day 

As in the Madrid bombings, the time of the event is critical for trauma centers and community 

hospitals. However, disaster planning often does not consider time of day. At 2:00 a.m., for example, 

a community hospital may not have operating room capability.

3. Limited ICU beds

Overcrowding may require decisions to delay nonemergent surgeries, identify beds in other areas of 

the hospital, or transfer patients to another facility. 

4. Loss of excess capacity/capacity on a given day 

The health care system has systematically and deliberately eliminated unused capacity to contain cost. 

5. Education 

More surgeons, especially those in trauma centers, require further education on the planning and 

response process. The U.S. military in Iraq has successfully demonstrated concepts in surgical surge 

capacity management that could be translated to civilian medicine. Furthermore, the U.S. military 

emergency surgery experience in Iraq has shown that more lives can be saved through temporizing 

damage-control surgery than if patients receive time-consuming definitive procedures. 

In addition to these factors, after a terrorist attack, critical care services will be required to treat 

seriously ill or injured patients. The emergency mass critical care plan should address hemodynamic 

resuscitation and support using intravenous fluids and vasopressors, administration of antibiotics and 

other disease-specific countermeasures, prophylactic interventions to reduce adverse consequences of 
15

Updated In A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings | Challenges and Proposed Solutions

critical illness, and basic modes of mechanical ventilation. Emergent critical care interventions should 

include those that 

1. improve survival without which death is likely and

2. do not consume extensive staff or hospital resources. 

Critical care areas should be equipped to 

measure, at a minimum, oxygen saturation, 

temperature, blood pressure, and urine output. 

When critical care units are full, hospitals can 

create additional capacity in non-ICU rooms 

concentrated on specific wards or floors. Patient 

care areas with critical care capability, such 

as endoscopy and surgical suites, are good 

alternatives. These improvised critical care areas 

will increase capacity only slightly and require 

cessation of services normally provided. 

When a hospital cannot meet increased demand for ICU services by using existing critical care 

practitioners, a two-tiered staffing model comprising noncritical care physicians and nurses may 

be substituted. Members of the Working Group on Emergency Mass Critical Care (Center for 

Bioterrorism at the University of Pittsburgh) and the Society of Critical Care Medicine concluded 

that a critical care physician can supervise up to four noncritical care physicians who can each manage 

up to six critically ill patients.31 Recommendations included a critical care nurse supervising up to 

three noncritical care nurses with each caring for two patients. In this model, a hospital’s critical care 

staff is multiplied to where one critical care physician could oversee the care of up to 24 critically 

ill patients, and one critical care nurse could oversee the care of up to six critically ill patients.31 In 

addition, many leading children’s hospitals with large pediatric intensive care units (PICUs) in the 

United States operate at maximum capacity. If a mass casualty involving children and infants were to 

occur, the PICUs’ response and ability to provide intensive care would be severely constrained.32

D r a d i o l o g y r e s p o n s e

Whereas in many areas (ICU beds, operating rooms, ventilators, etc.) the United States has 

diminished capacity, our nation has a slight surplus of radiology,33 which is beneficial in managing 

multiple bombing victims. 

Hospitals have invested in imaging technologies, including CT, magnetic resonance imaging 

(MRI), and ultrasound. Still, relatively few U.S. hospital centers and health care systems have 

enough capacity and ability to maintain sufficient staffing levels to effectively use these modalities. 

Each hospital differs in its capabilities, equipment, and personnel (technicians and radiologists). 

Additional problems may include preserving radiology for the most appropriate critical patients, 

ensuring immediate access to backup components of critical equipment, and interacting with 

vendor technicians. 
16

E b l o o d b a n k r e s p o n s e

In the last 30 years, the United States has experienced only five disasters requiring more than 100 

units of blood.34 If a terrorist bombing occurs, large amounts of blood will be required only if many 

victims are seriously injured. The blood banking community has formed an interorganizational 

task force to address blood needs in the event of a disaster. The AABB (formerly the American 

Association of Blood Banks) Interorganizational Task Force on Domestic Disasters and Acts of 

Terrorism (AABB Interorganizational Task Force) unites virtually all national blood organizations 

(AABB, America’s Blood Centers, and American Red Cross) and hospital and supplier associations. 

The task force also includes liaisons from the Department of Health and Human Services, Food and 

Drug Administration, CDC, and Armed Services Blood Program to coordinate preparing for and 

responding to disasters affecting the blood supply. 

Potential issues with the U.S. blood supply are as follows:

1. Disruption of the blood supply system

Blood shortages are unlikely to occur in the event of a mass casualty event (MCE). However, 

interference of the blood supply system could complicate patient care. Blood collection, processing, 

and testing are highly regulated procedures in a technical system that requires trained staff. During 

times of disaster, including terrorist attacks, the general public will often want to provide assistance 

to relief efforts. Blood donors may potentially present to hospitals 

and blood centers and overburden the system. On September 11, 

2001, New York and New Jersey used 224 units of blood, while 

Washington, DC, and Virginia used 34, totaling 258 units. These 

units were all in supply before the disaster occurred.34 However, 

across the nation, more than a half million people donated blood. 

In the event of a disaster, the AABB Interorganizational Task Force 

will inform the public if blood donations are needed and provide 

instructions on how and where to donate. In most instances, the 

appropriate message will state that additional blood is not needed 

immediately after the disaster. 

2. Transportation of blood

Even when blood products are not shelved at the surge capacity site, 

the products can be available within hours. Blood can be transported 

to a disaster location faster than donations can be processed. However, logistical issues are associated 

with the transportation of blood. For example, authorization may be required to transport blood 

around the state or country. In addition, blood centers may have difficulty obtaining fuel to power 

generators or operate vehicles that transport blood. Federal, state, and local emergency preparedness 

officials should prioritize the transportation of blood products.

3. Local organization

In a disaster, blood products should be strategically placed at hospitals serving the large influx of 

patients. In some metropolitan areas, hospitals may be served almost entirely by one blood center, 
17

Updated In A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings | Challenges and Proposed Solutions

while in other cities, by several centers. Planned and coordinated efforts are needed during a disaster 

to know which blood centers will service hospitals at surge capacity. Within an hour of a disaster, the 

AABB Interorganizational Task Force will convene a conference call of national blood organizations, 

HHS, and local affected blood centers to determine local needs for blood and actions necessary to 

meet those needs. The task force will meet again hours or days later to evaluate subsequent bloodrelated efforts.

4. Staff who can administer blood

Most hospitals maintain a 72-hour supply of blood. If blood is not stored at the hospital, it can 

generally be readily accessed. During a mass casualty event, consumption of a 72-hour blood stock 

in a few hours is highly unlikely. Instead, the hospital may have too few trained staff to administer 

blood. Several documents are available to assist blood centers, hospital blood banks, and transfusion 

services to prepare for and respond to disasters and acts of terrorism.35–37

F h o s p i t a l i s t s r e s p o n s e

Hospitals and outpatient primary care physicians are increasingly favoring the transfer of inpatient 

care to full-time hospitalists. The number of hospitalists in the United States has grown from a few 

hundred in 1996 to approximately 20,000 currently.38 Although they may not be directly involved in 

the care of casualties from a terrorist event, hospitalists will be vital in rapidly discharging inpatients, 

accepting transfers from ICUs, and freeing bed space for victims.

G a d m i n i s t r a t i o n r e s p o n s e

A surge of patients from a bombing event will likely contribute to administrative stresses on a 

hospital. Hospitals face formidable challenges in the post-September 11, 2001, era. Shrinking 

revenue margins put pressure on budgets and complicate investment decisions to purchase items 

for contingency operations. The current U.S. health care industry must support its contingency 

investment needs by pooling a mix of private funding with local, state, and federal resources. As 

a result, every hospital has some capacity, but specific clinical and administrative capabilities vary 

widely between facilities. 

The United States has 5,010 community hospitals, of which 274 are major teaching hospitals.39

The major teaching hospitals, components of most academic medical centers, often include a Level 

1 trauma center, and may coordinate local EMS transport. These hospitals are the focal points of 

graduate medical education and tertiary services. During a response, these hospitals will serve the 

local community, through either direct clinical care or system coordination. Maintaining these 

hospitals in the face of falling revenue margins strains the ability of any organization to support 

infrastructure for response capability. 

Nonteaching hospitals face a similar situation. The total number of staffed beds in the United States 

has dropped to 951,045.39 Outsourcing outpatient services and procedures to nonhospital settings has 

further reduced revenue. Reduction in revenue has furthered a decline in investment to strengthen 

hospital infrastructure. A gradual erosion of sophisticated diagnostic services offered by hospitals has 
18

complicated the U.S. health care industry’s ability to respond to traditional challenges and further 

weakened the potential to respond to extraordinary circumstances. 

Within each community, leadership from the health care industry is key in an effective response. 

Hospitals must be linked to provide mutual aid and assist patient transfers. Businesses function on 

increasingly narrow inventory levels, and hospitals in the same community usually rely on the same 

suppliers. In a crisis, suppliers will resort to rationing inventory. Regional and multistate mutual 

aid plans should be developed. In catastrophic events, help from outside the affected zone may take 

days to arrive, underscoring the need to identify resources to support 3 days of operations before 

reordering supplies. 

Hospital responses to mass casualty events are often chaotic due to lack of training and experience. 

The disorganized response is compounded by the lack of an appropriate command structure such as 

the Hospital Incident Command System (HICS). Although using an appropriate incident command 

system does not guarantee a successful response, absence of one will increase the likelihood of failure. 

Hospital personnel must understand the concept of regional unified command and be willing 

participants during a disaster. 

When a situation demands swift action, hospital administrators have to focus on many areas 

simultaneously. By using a stepwise approach, administrators can limit disorganization and improve 

response times, thereby saving lives. Administrators should focus on the critical areas in the following areas:

1. Control of the external environment

The external environment will change rapidly during a large event. Maintaining control of hospital 

grounds (facility security and traffic) is essential. Clearing beds to accommodate incoming casualties, 

redirecting nonemergency patients to other areas, and managing overall movement of staff will 

require effective management of the external environment, including media, family members of 

injured patients, and curious bystanders.

2. Implementation of the HICS

HICS is a widely used emergency management system known for providing a chain of command that 

can rapidly mobilize.40 The system also enables accountability of position functions, flexible responses 

to emergencies, and improved documentation of facility actions. HICS provides a common language 

to facilitate outside assistance and allows for the development of prioritized response checklists for 

senior leadership. In large-scale disasters such as the Madrid bombings, prior identification of the 

appropriate decision makers is crucial.

3. Personnel issues

Balance must be struck between the needs of staff and the larger organization to ensure adequate 

coverage for short- and long-term medical responses. Early decisions should include when staff 

can leave duties to check on family members and contingencies for staff members leaving during a 

response. A method to request additional staff on short notice coupled with defining an individual 

institution’s surge capacity can assist in finding the right mix of clinical and nonclinical support to 

handle the increased workload. 
19

Updated In A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings | Challenges and Proposed Solutions

4. Memorandums of understanding or agreement

Formal agreements to share supplies, personnel, or equipment should be written and drilled to 

support local, regional, and state partners following an event.

5. Logistics and supplies

Coordinating with key suppliers and maintaining inventories throughout the health system will ease 

escalation of response efforts. During particular events, some clinical areas (i.e., obstetrics, outpatient 

surgery, and various clinics) may not be directly affected and could provide supplies. Effective 

logistics management would also include transporting patients to and from appropriate care settings. 

Although the housing of evacuees is a municipal function, knowing the locations of designated Red 

Cross shelters throughout the vicinity and transportation resources for low-acuity patients will hasten 

discharge planning and improve patient flow in the emergency department.

6. Alternate care sites 

Triage systems are typically used to prioritize patients so low-priority patients can be directed from 

the main hospital, thus allowing ambulances and hospital staff to focus on high-priority patients. 

Alternate sites may allow large health systems to facilitate triage and direct patients and families to 

appropriate sources of care.

7. Credentialing 

The Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO)’s emergency 

credentialing system must be tested within a facility before implementation. State Emergency Systems 

for Advance Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals reflect JCAHO requirements and provide 

a standardized set of verified credentials for volunteers who may be called to assist hospitals during 

emergency situations.41 Many aspects of staff credentialing can be streamlined, but formal enrollment 

cannot be avoided. In most hospitals, formal enrollment provides access to delivering routine care, 

including entering orders and prescriptions, ordering laboratory tests, and documenting care by using 

automated systems. Whether credentialing is handled by human resources or a professional staffing 

office, the design of the system should support the use of volunteers in nonclinical activities.

8. Patient tracking 

Tracking patient movement is critical during mass casualty events. Successful tracking begins when 

a patient enters the health care system. The ability to track patients, identify supply consumption, 

and monitor bed use enables senior management to proactively meet the needs of health care. Patient 

tracking systems should be designed to allow automated tracking for exercises and real disasters.

This list is exhaustive for all facilities. The staff of any health care organization should periodically 

evaluate areas such as plant and materials management, social work resources, safety, biomedical 

equipment and repair, service procurement, and patient admission to help prepare for mass casualty 

events. Often, disaster preparedness is solely focused on the transfer of care between provider and 

patient and is not focused on infrastructure.
20

c h a p t e r f o u r

Addressing Discipline-Specific Challenges:

Surge Action Templates

This section contains 10 templates developed by the June 2009 expert panel to help various 

disciplines address issues of surge capacity. Most, but not all, of these disciplines (e.g., 

drugs and pharmaceutical supplies and nursing care) have been discussed in the preceding 

sections. However, the issues the disciplines face are of significant concern to systems 

planners, and, therefore, the expert panel recommended that these easy-to-use templates 

be included as solutions to help ease discipline-specific challenges to surge capacity. 

The templates are ordered in the general flow through the health care system.

1. Emergency Medical Services System Response

2. Emergency Department Response

3. Surgical Department Response

4. Intensive Care Unit Response

5. Radiology Response

6. Blood Bank Response

7. Hospitalist Response

8. Administration Response

9. Drugs and Pharmaceutical Supplies

 10. Nursing Care

Along with general information (i.e., purpose, background, goals), each template provides 

basic and, in most cases, low-cost strategies that can be rapidly implemented to better 

manage surge capacity. The templates emphasize the importance of practicing and 

evaluating plans. 

The templates are intended as guides because specific preferences, needs, and 

capabilities vary among communities. Furthermore, the templates propose solutions that 

assume that communities are currently engaged in disaster planning and preparedness 

activities. Therefore, a significant portion of the personnel and resource costs is expected 

to be absorbed by these ongoing activities. Exact costs should be determined by local 

communities and institutions. 
21

Emergency Medical 

Services System 

Response

Emergency Department 

Response

Surgical Department 

Response

Intensive Care Unit 

Response

Radiology Response

Blood Bank Response

Hospitalist Response

Administration Response

Drugs and Pharmaceutical 

Supplies

Nursing Care

Managing Surge Needs for Injuries

Emergency Medical Services System Response

p u r p o s e

To provide guidance for local emergency medical services (EMS) response and to 

mobilize additional EMS-related resources needed in a community within 4 hours 

of an explosion. These resources are intended to treat at least 300 injured patients.

b a c k g r o u n d

The Madrid, Spain, terrorist bombings were used as a model to help develop solutions 

for managing rapid surge problems during a mass casualty event. 

On March 11, 2004, 10 explosions occurred almost simultaneously on commuter 

trains in Madrid, killing 177 people instantly and injuring more than 2,000. On 

that day, 966 patients were taken to 15 public community hospitals. More than 270 

patients arrived at the closest facility between 8:00 a.m. and 10:30 a.m.

Federal resources should not be expected to arrive sooner than 72 hours from the time 

of the explosion. Resources can be delayed by the time taken to deploy them and by 

emergency personnel responding to multiple communities.

g o a l

To mobilize the appropriate number and type of EMS resources to adequately evaluate 

injuries, initiate triage, begin transporting at least 300 injured patients, and establish 

ongoing EMS operations for up to 72 hours.

r e q u i r e d r e s o u r c e s

♦ Personnel must:

1. Be appropriately trained, equipped, and knowledgeable about chemical, 

biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE) detection, personal 

protection, and decontamination;

2. Be educated in the care of blast-related injuries for adult and pediatric patients;

3. Be prepared to institute triage;

4. Have the necessary resources and be capable of rapidly detecting CBRNE 

agents to assist with decontamination plan; and 

5. Be prepared to institute and participate in unified incident command. 

Updated In A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings | Challenges and Proposed Solutions
22

♦ An incident management process to address 72-hour operations.

♦ A communications system that is interoperable with the public safety disciplines (fire, law 

enforcement, EMS, and emergency management) and with receiving hospitals, other health care 

facilities, and local public health officials. 

♦ Rapid access to a medical cache(s) sufficient to treat the volume of critically injured patients.

♦ Ambulance resources to transport critically injured patients.

♦ Alternative resources (i.e., buses) to transport noncritically injured persons.

♦ Decontamination equipment for ambulatory and non-ambulatory patients. Equipment should be 

rapidly deployable to the explosion site, a secondary treatment site, or a hospital.

♦ Secondary triage and treatment sites that can be determined/implemented within the community.

♦ A demobilization plan that includes access to mental health professionals. 

This document is a resource guide. Local needs, preferences, and capabilities of the 

affected communities may vary.

a s s u m p t i o n s

♦ EMS systems in the United States are highly variable, with a wide range of available resources, 

experience, and financing.

♦ A functional EMS system is a critical component for the prehospital management of injured 

bombing victims and the rapid redistribution of patients from any initial hospital that is 

overwhelmed with casualties.

a c t i o n s t e p s

The following outlines the appropriate steps for managing surge capacity:

1. Education.

♦ Train EMS dispatch personnel about 

appropriate strategies to organize 

EMS response to bombing incidents.

♦ Train responding EMS personnel 

about how to treat primary, secondary, 

tertiary, and quaternary blast-related 

injuries. For guidance, go to www.

bt.cdc.gov/masstrauma/explosions.asp.

♦ Train EMS personnel about National 

Incident Management System (NIMS) 

compliance and the incident command 

system (ICS). The importance of 

command, staging, triage, and 

treatment of initial casualties (regardless 

of rank of the provider) should be 

emphasized. 

⊲
23

Updated In A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings | Challenges and Proposed Solutions

Develop a plan that includes expectations for initially arriving 

personnel, including scene assessment, consideration of secondary 

devices, and attention to safety.

♦ Train EMS personnel about the use of personal protective equipment (PPE) and the potential 

risks of transporting contaminated patients. Train EMS officials in advanced ICS (ICS-700 

or equivalent).

♦ Train responding personnel to be aware of the need to preserve forensic evidence.

2. Local policy and planning.

♦ Facilitate fire, EMS, law enforcement, 911 centers, emergency management, hospitals, other 

health care facilities, and public health collaborating to develop written plans, as listed in the 

bullets below. The recommended time for completing these plans is 6 to 12 months. The 

planning process should include business and community partners. Within 6 months of the plans’ 

completion, other agencies listed in these plans (including mutual aid agencies, etc.) must be 

included in ongoing planning and evaluation.

♦ Plan for mobilizing the appropriate number of ambulances within 10 minutes following the blast. 

At least 75% of these resources should arrive at staging areas in the first hour, with all arriving 

in the first 90 minutes. This mobilization should be accomplished by using 911 EMS resources, 

mutual aid agreements with other EMS providers, or mutual aid agreements with nonemergency 

transport providers.

♦ Develop a plan that includes expectations for initially arriving personnel, including scene 

assessment, consideration of secondary devices, and attention to safety.

♦ Describe in a plan each agency’s role in the command structure. Plan should include how critical 

functions of command, safety, staging, and triage will be accomplished in the first 10 minutes of a 

response; how treatment, transport, and additional ICS elements will be filled over the first hour; 

and how the ICS structure will be formally filled by officials trained in advanced ICS (ICS-700 or 

equivalent) by the end of the first hour.

♦ Describe in a plan how alternative transport for 200 ambulatory patients will be initiated in the 

first 10 minutes after an explosion.

♦ Plan for personnel accountability and patient tracking.

♦ Describe in a plan the details of interdisciplinary communications (primary and alternatives). 

Representatives from fire, EMS, law enforcement, emergency management, hospitals, and public 

health must be included in this plan. The planning process should also involve business and 

community partners.

♦ Plan for decontamination and protection of personnel. This plan should address the following:

1. agency responsible for scene assessment and determining what (if any) decontamination 

measures are required;

2. realistic assessment of the time required to deploy decontamination resources for ambulatory 

and non-ambulatory patients; and

3. deployment of decontamination resources to event site, secondary triage sites, or receiving 

hospitals.
24

♦ Determine the extent of decontamination required before transport (e.g., none, gross, 

and/or technical).

♦ Ensure that a plan is in place to enable the rapid redistribution of casualties, if required, 

from a hospital overwhelmed with a surge.

♦ Plan to establish secondary triage points for ambulatory patients (ideally, within the first 

hour after the explosion). 

This plan should address the following:

1. how sites can be activated and staffed with sufficient medical personnel, law enforcement 

personnel for security, and support staff to record arrivals,

2. how such patients will be reassessed,

3. how immediate needs for medical care will be met until transfer to definitive care occurs 

(e.g., allocation of medical supplies and personnel), and

4. how to establish criteria for determining death at the scene, particularly in a mass casualty 

situation, and for appropriately managing the deceased. 

e va l u a t i o n

♦ Plan and conduct exercises (tabletop, functional, and full scale). 

♦ Generate an after-action report that assesses overall objectives. 

♦ Refine plan.

For more information, visit http://emergency.cdc.gov/masscasualties.
25

Updated In A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings | Challenges and Proposed Solutions

Emergency Medical 

Services System Response

Emergency 

Department Response

Surgical Department 

Response

Intensive Care Unit 

Response

Radiology Response

Blood Bank Response

Hospitalist Response

Administration Response

Drugs and Pharmaceutical 

Supplies

Nursing Care

Managing Surge Needs for Injuries:

Emergency Department Response

p u r p o s e

To activate additional emergency department (ED) resources needed within 

4 hours of an explosion. These resources are intended to rapidly treat and 

disposition 300 injured patients for 12 to 24 hours. 

b a c k g r o u n d

The terrorist bombings in Madrid, Spain, were used as a model to help develop 

solutions for managing rapid surge problems during a mass casualty event. 

On March 11, 2004, 10 explosions occurred almost simultaneously on commuter 

trains in Madrid, killing 177 people instantly and injuring more than 2,000. On 

that day, 966 patients were taken to 15 public community hospitals. More than 270 

patients arrived at the closest facility between 8:00 a.m. and 10:30 a.m.

Federal resources should not be expected to arrive sooner than 72 hours from the time 

of the explosion. Resources can be delayed by the time taken to deploy them and by 

emergency personnel responding to multiple communities.

g o a l

To establish policies, procedures, didactic training, and drills to improve institutional 

preparedness for rapidly treating and managing 300 injured patients for 12 to 24 hours. 

r e q u i r e d r e s o u r c e s

♦ Staff: adequate medical, nursing, and support staff available to provide initial 

triage, evaluation, and stabilization for 300 persons. This ability includes:

1. Visually identifying the patients (such as with digital photography),

2. Tracking patients during their care, and

3. Maintaining chain of evidence.

This document is a resource guide. Local needs, preferences, and 

capabilities of the affected communities may vary.

⊲
26

a s s u m p t i o n s

♦ The emergency department will have established the following:

1. Disaster medical record packets;

2. Procedures for obtaining additional equipment, supplies, and beds; 

3. Plan for notifying and activating backup personnel;

4. Procedures for triage, emergency identification of patients, discharge of patients, and quick 

documentation; and 

5. Temporary disaster log to document basic information.

♦ Patients will be regularly reassessed for change of status and priority.

♦ Patients may require decontamination.

♦ Initial evaluation and triage of self-referred patients should be rapidly facilitated.

♦ Emergency medical services unit’s turnaround and return to service should not be impeded 

by patient reassessment and ED bed assignment process.

♦ All patients potentially requiring operative intervention should be prioritized in consultation 

with the appropriate member of the surgical staff.

♦ The ED and hospitals closest to the event may be overwhelmed with casualties, and the 

response may require rapid triage and redistribution of patients to additional hospitals and 

health care facilities.

♦ ED staff will be familiar with the hospital disaster plan, their individual roles and responsibilities, 

and the roles and responsibilities of all essential departments.

a c t i o n s t e p s

1. Conduct drills.

Implement and drill a hospital emergency incident management system (such as the Hospital 

Incident Command System (HICS)). Clinical care providers should be included in the training 

and drills.

If hospital personnel (e.g., practitioners, administrators, 

nurses) have not trained or drilled in a hospital emergency 

incident management system, learned about the National 

Incident Management System (NIMS), or understood 

the function of a hospital incident command center, this 

information should be included in training sessions.

2. Educate clinical staff.

Instruct clinical staff, especially surgeons and 

emergency physicians, about the unique aspects of 

blast-related injuries and care following an attack 

with a radiation dispersal device (RDD).
27

Updated In A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings | Challenges and Proposed Solutions

3. Establish an institutional lockdown process.

Establish an institutional lockdown process and drill regularly; include radiation detection and 

decontamination of arriving patients.

4. Update the institutional call-down list and perform a functional call-down exercise. 

5. Identify surge staff.

Identify potential institutional surge staffing from employees with clinical training but not currently 

tasked with clinical jobs.

6. Identify patient supplies.

Identify patient care supplies that would be needed in a surge situation, such as additional 

intravenous (IV) equipment, bandages/dressings, gowns, gloves, masks, etc.

7. Develop a regional unified command structure.

Develop a regional unified command structure that includes local emergency management and area 

hospitals. Local emergency managers should guide and lead this development.

8. Identify nonpatient care areas.

Identify nonpatient care areas in the institution that could be converted to patient care to expand 

surge bed capacity.

9. Conduct drills for early patient discharge.

Establish and drill a procedure for early patient discharge to increase bed capacity in the ED and in 

critical patient care areas. Drills and procedures should be coordinated with intensive care unit (ICU) 

staff to appropriately plan for potential early discharge, movement of patients to non-ICU beds, and 

transfer to alternative care sites.

e va l u a t i o n

♦ When appropriate, evaluation drills have been incorporated into the action steps listed above. The 

institutional disaster preparedness plan should be updated based on each drill experience. 

For more information, visit http://emergency.cdc.gov/masscasualties.
28

Emergency Medical 

Services System Response

Emergency Department 

Response

Surgical Department 

Response

Intensive Care Unit 

Response

Radiology Response

Blood Bank Response

Hospitalist Response

Administration Response

Drugs and Pharmaceutical 

Supplies

Nursing Care

Managing Surge Needs for Injuries:

Surgical Department Response

p u r p o s e

To mobilize and assign operating rooms and related assets to provide life- and limb-saving 

surgical care to those who could most benefit of 300 patients injured from explosions (care 

extends to patients from the community with acute surgical illness) for up to 72 hours after 

a bombing. 

b a c k g r o u n d

The Madrid, Spain, terrorist bombings were used as a model to help develop solutions for 

managing rapid surge problems during a mass casualty event. 

On March 11, 2004, 10 explosions occurred almost simultaneously on commuter trains in 

Madrid, killing 177 people instantly and injuring more than 2,000. On that day, 966 patients 

were taken to 15 public community hospitals. More than 270 patients arrived at the closest 

facility between 8:00 a.m. and 10:30 a.m.

Federal resources should not be expected to arrive sooner than 72 hours from the time of 

the explosion. Resources can be delayed by the time taken to deploy them and by emergency 

personnel responding to multiple communities.

g o a l

Within 2 hours of a blast event, establish a person with decision-making capability who is 

responsible for operating rooms and surgical support areas for up to 72 hours from the time of 

the event. This person will be trained, have an appropriate knowledge base for triaging patients to 

the proper place, and occupy a position in the hospital’s incident management system.

r e q u i r e d r e s o u r c e s

♦ Operating room equipment: sufficient stocks of operating room supplies to conduct emergent 

surgical procedures for up to 72 hours.

♦ Staff: Arrangements should include a contingency schedule to staff operating rooms 

concurrently or in succession for up to 72 hours. Staff should include surgeons, nurses, 

operating room technicians, anesthesiologists, administrative and clerical staff, and 

support personnel. 

♦ Medications: sufficient quantities of required anesthetic agents and other medication for 

surgical procedures.
29

Updated In A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings | Challenges and Proposed Solutions

a s s u m p t i o n s

♦ The event in the surgical department will extend beyond the emergency department (ED) event 

and may last for days. 

♦ Operating room (OR) assets are a critical component of surge capacity after an explosion and 

must be mobilized quickly. 

♦ The OR capacity of any institution or community (i.e., number of operating rooms) is fixed 

because of structural requirements. 

♦ One or more surgeons, anesthesiologists, and critical care specialists will be in the hospital or be 

available immediately after an event occurs.

♦ Other surgeons, anesthesiologists, and critical care specialists can be available within 2 hours of 

an event to provide direct patient care in the operating rooms and related areas.

♦ The ORs, post-anesthesia care units (PACUs), and intensive care units (ICUs) will already be 

in use.

♦ Casualties of the blast and patients already in the hospital system, or in other treatment centers 

in the community, will require one or more of these three areas—OR, PACU, or ICU—within 

72 hours. 

♦ If these areas are not made available in a timely manner, patients will be detrimentally affected. 

♦ Federal resources cannot be expected to arrive sooner than 72 hours from the time of an explosion.

♦ Surgical staff will be familiar with the hospital disaster plan, their individual roles and 

responsibilities, and the roles and responsibilities of all essential departments.

a c t i o n s t e p s

1. Identify medical leadership.

Identify medical leadership within surgery and anesthesiology 

departments who will actively participate in disaster planning. 

These individuals should collaborate in designing, implementing, 

and refining an incident command system for OR capacity. In 

addition, OR disaster planning should be conducted in conjunction 

with representatives of critical care, emergency medicine, 

administration, and others involved with the institution’s proposed 

incident command system. These discussions should be facilitated 

by the hospital disaster committee.

2. Establish a flexible or adaptable response.

Establish a flexible or adaptable response so that unused operating 

space could be readily converted for critical care use. 

3. Select individuals for incident command role and define processes and 

responsibilities. Create job action sheets for each position.

♦ Specify the authority, process, and responsibilities of the OR incident command and a call 

schedule identifying individuals available to fill their roles 24 hours a day, beginning within 

2 hours of the event, and extending for 72 hours. 
30

♦ Although individuals from several disciplines and departments may assist the incident command, 

final decision-making authority should rest with one person. This person has the authority to 

cancel scheduled OR cases, rearrange OR schedules, identify patients that could be transferred, 

call in and deploy OR teams, and prioritize patients for beds in the OR, PACU, and ICU. This 

person should directly communicate with incident command through a counterpart who is 

knowledgeable about OR and ICU utilization. 

♦ Candidates for this decision-making role should be able to assess medical needs of various patients 

requiring OR services. An individual serving in this role should not have primary patient care 

responsibility at the same time (i.e., be part of a surgical team).

♦ Communication systems linking surgery, nursing, anesthesiology, critical care, ED, and hospital 

administration should be specified if not already specified by the hospital incident command system. 

♦ Methods for data collecting, testing, and monitoring and improving the system should be specified.

Ensure that individuals who assume leadership roles within the 

incident management system are trained and knowledgeable about 

working within the chosen system, operations of other hospital 

components, and community disaster response.

4. Train incident management leaders.

Ensure that individuals who assume leadership roles within the incident management system are 

trained and knowledgeable about working within the chosen system, operations of other hospital 

components, and community disaster response. Training requirements should be specified in writing. 

5. Establish lines of communication.

Identify lines of communication and interactions, including training and exercises with other 

components of the community-wide disaster plan and regional trauma system.

6. Develop plans to move patients to different care sites if needed.

e va l u a t i o n

♦ Participate in community-wide drills and evaluate performance of OR incident command.

♦ Determine when individuals should be on-site. Review triage decisions and quality, quantity, and 

appropriateness of information obtained from and given to others, including hospital incident 

command, emergency medicine, and other community assets. 

♦ Refine and conduct further planning based on drill experience. 

For more information, visit http://emergency.cdc.gov/masscasualties.
31

Updated In A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings | Challenges and Proposed Solutions

Emergency Medical 

Services System Response

Emergency Department 

Response

Surgical Department 

Response

Intensive Care Unit 

Response

Radiology Response

Blood Bank Response

Hospitalist Response

Administration Response

Drugs and Pharmaceutical 

Supplies

Nursing Care

Managing Surge Needs for Injuries:

Intensive Care Unit Response

p u r p o s e

To mobilize and assign intensive care unit (ICU) beds and related assets to 

provide life- and limb-saving care to those who could benefit most out of 300 

patients injured from explosions (care extends to patients from the community 

with acute illness) for up to 72 hours after a bombing. 

b a c k g r o u n d

The Madrid, Spain, terrorist bombings were used as a model to help develop solutions 

for managing rapid surge problems during a mass casualty event. 

On March 11, 2004, 10 explosions occurred almost simultaneously on commuter 

trains in Madrid, killing 177 people instantly and injuring more than 2,000. On 

that day, 966 patients were taken to 15 public community hospitals. More than 270 

patients arrived at the closest facility between 8:00 a.m. and 10:30 a.m.

Federal resources should not be expected to arrive sooner than 72 hours from the time 

of the explosion. Resources can be delayed by the time taken to deploy them and by 

emergency personnel responding to multiple communities.

g o a l

Within 2 hours of a blast event, mobilize the resources of the intensive care units and 

related support areas and sustain response for up to 72 hours from the time of the event. 

r e q u i r e d r e s o u r c e s

♦ Resources needed for communicating within the organization and with the 

community (e.g., satellite phone and other portable communication devices). 

♦ Transportation resources for the patients who may have severe burns. After initial 

resuscitation, some of these patients may require transfer to a burn center. 

♦ Additional ventilators may be needed. Most, if not all, ICUs and ventilators and 

other usual ICU resources will be in use at the time of the incident. 

This document is a resource guide. Local needs, preferences, and 

capabilities of affected communities may vary.

⊲
32

a s s u m p t i o n s

♦ Patient care in the ICU will extend beyond the emergency department surge and may last for 

days or weeks. 

♦ ICU assets are a critical component of surge capacity after an explosion and must be mobilized quickly. 

♦ The ICU capacity of any institution or community (i.e., number of beds) is fixed because of 

structural requirements. 

♦ Some critical care physicians, nurses, respiratory care practitioners, and pharmacists will be in the 

hospital or be available within 2 hours after an event occurs. 

♦ The majority of critical care patients will require mechanical ventilation. 

♦ The institution will be capable of caring for burns and open fractures for a minimum of 24 hours.

♦ Occult injuries may become apparent in the ICU or outside the ICU and, therefore, need 

additional resources.

♦ Other critical care specialists can be available within 2 hours of an event to provide direct patient 

care in the operating rooms and related areas.

♦ If operating rooms and related areas are not made available in a timely manner, patients could 

suffer adverse consequences. 

♦ Some patients could be moved to different care sites. 

♦ Federal resources cannot be expected to arrive sooner than 72 hours from the time of an explosion.

♦ ICU staff will be familiar with the hospital disaster plan, their individual roles and responsibilities, 

and the roles and responsibilities of all essential departments.

a c t i o n s t e p s

1. Involve leadership.

Critical care leadership should be involved in all components of hospital disaster planning.

2. Designate medical and nursing leadership.

The hospital should designate medical and nursing leadership to coordinate critical care resources and 

report through the incident management system.

3. Plan for patient overflow.

Hospitals will identify ICU overflow sites for patients who cannot 

be admitted to an existing ICU and ensure that adequate staff 

support and monitoring can be provided.

4. Plan for secondary triage.

ICU referral may differ in a mass casualty event. Expertise is 

required in secondary triage and in ongoing care for decisions 

regarding application of resources.
33

Updated In A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings | Challenges and Proposed Solutions

5. Develop a plan to ventilate patients.

Hospitals will have a plan to obtain additional ventilators and/or personnel if needed. The plan 

should include a protocol for managing patients when ventilators are not available. 

6. Educate incident command leaders.

Ensure that individuals who will assume a role in the critical care component of the incident 

command role are knowledgeable about incident command, operations of other hospital components, 

and community disaster response.

7. Identify lines of communication.

Identify lines of communication and interactions with other components of the community-wide 

disaster plan and regional trauma system. 

8. Establish admission protocols.

Ensure that protocols for admission to the ICU during a disaster are in place.

9. Ensure that supply of critical and necessary medications is available. 

e va l u a t i o n

♦ Participate in community-wide drills and evaluate performance of ICU incident management.

♦ Determine when individuals should be on-site. Review triage decisions and quality, quantity, and 

appropriateness of information obtained from and given to others, including hospital incident 

command, emergency medicine, and other community assets. 

♦ Refine and conduct further planning based on drill experience. 

For more information, visit http://emergency.cdc.gov/masscasualties.
34

Emergency Medical 

Services System Response

Emergency Department 

Response

Surgical Department 

Response

Intensive Care Unit 

Response

Radiology Response

Blood Bank Response

Hospitalist Response

Administration Response

Drugs and Pharmaceutical 

Supplies

Nursing Care

Managing Surge Needs for Injuries:

Radiology Response

p u r p o s e

Within 2 hours of an explosion, operationalize radiology support for the initial treatment of 

300 injured patients and for ongoing care up to 72 hours. 

b a c k g r o u n d

The Madrid, Spain, terrorist bombings were used as a model to help develop solutions for 

managing rapid surge problems during a mass casualty event. 

On March 11, 2004, 10 explosions occurred almost simultaneously on commuter trains in 

Madrid, killing 177 people instantly and injuring more than 2,000. On that day, 966 patients 

were taken to 15 public community hospitals. More than 270 patients arrived at the closest 

facility between 8:00 a.m. and 10:30 a.m.

Federal resources should not be expected to arrive sooner than 72 hours from the time of 

the explosion. Resources can be delayed by the time taken to deploy them and by emergency 

personnel responding to multiple communities.

g o a l

To establish policies, procedures, and drills to improve radiology department preparedness for 

treating 300 patients injured from an explosion for up to 72 hours. 

r e q u i r e d r e s o u r c e s

Enough radiology personnel (radiologists, technicians, and support staff), equipment, and 

supplies to care for 300 injured patients. 

This document is a resource guide. Local needs, preferences, and capabilities of the 

affected communities may vary.

a s s u m p t i o n s

♦ Radiology services will be a critical component of the hospital response to a bombing.

♦ Many patients requiring radiology over a relatively short time period may lead to bottlenecks.

♦ At least one x-ray technician will be on-site, and additional technicians will need to be mobilized.

⊲
35

Updated In A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings | Challenges and Proposed Solutions

♦ Radiologist interpretation of images may not be available immediately, and the radiologist may 

not be available on-site.

♦ Most hospitals will be able to provide plain radiographic imaging but will not be fully equipped 

to address all radiological needs that will arise in an event of this magnitude (ability to do special 

imaging or ultrasound may be limited).

♦ A majority of the patients involved in a bombing will require some form of radiological evaluation. 

♦ Radiology staff will be familiar with the hospital disaster plan, their individual roles and 

responsibilities, and the roles and responsibilities of all essential departments.

a c t i o n s t e p s

1. Develop a radiology management plan.

Develop a management plan and call list for the radiology department to use during a mass casualty 

event. Enhanced radiology patient throughput will be essential in the initial evaluation and treatment 

of blast-injured patients. Each radiology department must develop a plan to ensure rapid turnaround 

of patient studies and interpretations.

2. Conduct drills.

Drills should call for radiologists to provide immediate (wet) readings of plain films and special 

studies. These readings will assist in rapidly evaluating and treating patients. The plan should also 

optimize and streamline radiology study protocols for use during a mass casualty event.

3. Put support in place to conduct ultrasounds.

When disaster patients arrive, an ultrasound technician 

will be available in the emergency department to perform 

an immediate focused abdominal sonography for trauma 

(FAST) exam. If an ultrasound technician is unavailable, then 

emergency physicians and trauma surgeons should be trained 

to conduct this exam.

4. Conduct an imaging equipment survey.

Evaluate the status of the equipment for multiple trauma 

patients and ensure adequate numbers of portable equipment. 

Radiology equipment is expensive and usually requires 

planning in advance for acquisition and installation. However, 

by evaluating how available equipment could be put to maximum use during a mass casualty event, a 

facility can improve patient throughput.

5. Include radiology systems in incident command system plan.

All aspects of patient throughput in the radiology department should be addressed in the hospital 

incident command system plan.
36

Computerized tomography (CT) should be available, including 

radiologist interpretation, within 1 hour of the event. 

6. Create radioactive contamination screening protocol.

The hospital should have a protocol and capability for screening and decontamination of radioactive 

contamination. This protocol needs to be coordinated with the overall hospital response. 

7. Ensure timely availability of equipment and readings.

Computerized tomography (CT) should be available, including radiologist interpretation, within 

1 hour of the event. The hospital should plan to have ultrasound available for bedside evaluation.

8. Plan for specialized studies and interventions.

Additional specialized studies and interventions may be required (arteriogram, interventional 

procedures, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)/magnetic resonance angiography (MRA), etc.) and 

may not be available on-site. Plans must be in place to obtain these studies at another institution or 

to transfer patients if necessary.

9. Create plan to read films.

Create a plan to ensure that each film is formally read and discrepancies with any initial readings are 

reported in a timely fashion.

e va l u a t i o n

♦ Where appropriate, the action steps listed above have been incorporated into evaluation drills. The 

institutional disaster preparedness plan should be updated based on each drill experience.

For more information, visit http://emergency.cdc.gov/masscasualties.
37

Updated In A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings | Challenges and Proposed Solutions

Emergency Medical 

Services System Response

Emergency Department 

Response

Surgical Department 

Response

Intensive Care Unit 

Response

Radiology Response

Blood Bank Response

Hospitalist Response

Administration Response

Drugs and Pharmaceutical 

Supplies

Nursing Care

Managing Surge Needs for Injuries:

Blood Bank Response

p u r p o s e

Within 4 hours of an event, respond in an organized manner to provide blood 

products for up to 300 injured patients and sustain support for up to 72 hours. 

b a c k g r o u n d

The Madrid, Spain, terrorist bombings were used as a model to help develop solutions 

for managing rapid surge problems during a mass casualty event. 

On March 11, 2004, 10 explosions occurred almost simultaneously on commuter 

trains in Madrid, killing 177 people instantly and injuring more than 2,000. On 

that day, 966 patients were taken to 15 public community hospitals. More than 270 

patients arrived at the closest facility between 8:00 a.m. and 10:30 a.m.

Federal resources should not be expected to arrive sooner than 72 hours from the time 

of the explosion. Resources can be delayed by the time taken to deploy them and by 

emergency personnel responding to multiple communities.

g o a l

During the first 4 hours of a disaster, ensure that appropriate blood products can 

be located, processed, and administered in a timely manner to admitted patients 

requiring treatment. Identify additional needs so 

that blood products can be collected, processed, and 

administered for up to 72 hours.

r e q u i r e d r e s o u r c e s

♦ American Association of Blood Banks (AABB) 

documents (including the Disaster Operations 

Handbook: Coordinating the Nation’s Blood Supply 

During Disasters and Biological Events32 and the 

Disaster Operations Handbook—Hospital Supplement: 

Coordinating the Nation’s Blood Supply During 

Disasters and Biological Events33).
38

♦ Disaster response plans for hospital and blood collection centers. 

♦ Laboratory personnel to collect, process, and distribute products.

♦ Transportation resources, diesel and unleaded fuel, and storage equipment (e.g., dry ice).

♦ Transfusion supplies.

♦ Massive transfusion protocol to include patient identification methods. Appropriate use of O 

negative blood only for women of childbearing age that satisfies blood bank requirements to move 

to type-specific blood.

♦ “Medical Needs Assessment for Blood” form.

♦ Quick reference card to be developed/updated for supplementing available resources. 

♦ Transportation plan to include alternative transportation modes. 

♦ Critical services restoration plan for blood collector to ensure it is on local priority restoration lists.

♦ Key contacts list maintained for all suppliers of blood products, including whole blood providers, 

to include multiple methods of communications.

♦ Emergency communications plan for blood provider and transfusion services that includes 

amateur radio and/or satellite phone.

♦ Disaster response plans for hospital transfusion services.

♦ Assessment of blood needs from all patient care disciplines provided to the incident management 

commander, transfusion service, and blood provider.

This document is a resource guide. Local needs, preferences, and capabilities of the 

affected communities may vary.

a s s u m p t i o n s

♦ Blood bank staff will be familiar with the hospital disaster plan, their individual roles and 

responsibilities, and the roles and responsibilities of all essential departments.

♦ Overall blood product inventory management within the United States should include a regional 

approach to communication among blood collection facilities and hospital transfusion services 

to ensure that federal regulations regarding blood product collection, testing, transport, and 

administration are followed during a disaster.

♦ The most difficult problems involve disruption or interference of the blood supply system. The 

following list describes these difficulties:

1. Historically, blood supply needs during disaster response have been met with the quantity of 

blood products available at that time.

2. Facilities currently maintain about a 3-day supply of blood products, which may need to be 

expanded to a 7-day supply.

3. Typically, fewer casualties require blood products than the total number of victims.

4. Local communities have limited sources of blood products.

5. If faced with a surge increase in demand, communities will need to have blood products 

transported from blood centers outside the local area.

⊲
39

Updated In A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings | Challenges and Proposed Solutions

♦ After a disaster, the public usually responds by volunteering to donate larger quantities of blood 

products than are needed:

1. An influx of blood donors could strain the ability of the blood supply system to collect and 

process those products.

2. When resources (personnel, equipment, and supplies) are unnecessarily applied to collecting 

and processing unneeded products, these resources cannot process and distribute available and 

urgently needed products.

♦ The media must continuously provide the community with reliable information about need and 

supply of blood products.

♦ Limited personnel have the training, education, and skills to process and administer blood 

products within treating facilities. The following should then be considered:

1. Additional qualified laboratory personnel may be needed to process requests for blood products.

2. Additional nursing personnel may be needed to administer blood products.

♦ Methods of transporting or transferring blood products from supplier to destination may be 

limited during a disaster.

♦ Commercial transport services (air and ground) may be limited because of the disaster.

♦ Federal, state, and local governments consider blood needs to be a critical element of the public 

health infrastructure in emergencies. 

♦ The AABB Interorganizational Task Force on Domestic Disasters and Acts of Terrorism, formed 

in January 2002, has developed a process to educate the community about donations and to 

facilitate collection, processing, and movement of blood products during a disaster:

1. This multi-organizational task force includes federal and national organizations.

2. Published references include a disaster operations handbook32 and a hospital supplement33

that specifically address these issues. These references include a flowchart outlining the process 

for involving AABB and appropriate national and federal organizations in response efforts to 

provide blood products during a disaster.

a c t i o n s t e p s

The following is an overview of the hospital transfusion service disaster response:

1. Hospital emergency incident management commander

♦ Delegates coordination of medical needs assessment for blood. The quantity of disaster-related 

hospital admissions is communicated to the hospital transfusion service.

♦ Ensures that the hospital security staff has approved blood provider access to the hospital for blood 

product deliveries.

♦ Determines if an alternate delivery point is required for blood deliveries as a result of the disaster. 

Once determined, this information is provided to the transfusion service and blood supplier.

♦ Determines if routine phone service will be interrupted during this disaster. If alternate 

communication methods are necessary, the incident management commander should inform the 

transfusion service of the alternative communications pathways that are available.
40

2. Hospital blood bank

♦ Hospital blood bank completes “Hospital Disaster Response Medical Needs Assessment for Blood.”

♦ Incident management commander provides information necessary to complete expected hospital 

admissions, security approval, alternate delivery points, and phone service status.

♦ To determine current available inventory of type O blood (both positive and negative) for 

nondisaster-related patients, planners may follow this list of steps: 

1. Determine one day’s worth of red blood cell inventory based upon historical usage.

2. Determine total O red blood cell inventory (both positive and negative).

3. Determine how many days of inventory are available by dividing the total O red blood cell 

inventory by one day’s worth of inventory. 

♦ Completed “Hospital Disaster Response Medical Needs Assessment for Blood” is provided to the 

primary blood supplier for the transfusion service. Only send the blood assessment to the primary 

blood supplier to prevent duplication of inventory data.

♦ Blood products reserved for nonemergent needs can be released for emergency utilization.

♦ Critical supplies are identified.

♦ Critical staff are identified. 

♦ Core critical staff should have capabilities in order to be augmented.

♦ Critical staff should be provided appropriate clearance for restricted access.

3. Hospital disaster plan

♦ The hospital/transfusion service disaster plan should include patient identification processes for 

mass casualties.

♦ The hospital/transfusion service disaster plan should include triggers for implementing massive 

transfusion protocols.

♦ The hospital’s disaster response plan should address the responsibility of determining if the 

hospital should cease routine transfusions until the disaster patient surge has passed.

♦ The emergency communications plan should include routine, emergency, and several backup lines 

of communication with the area blood provider.

If the hospital transfusion service is also a blood collector, the requirements of the blood provider included 

below should be addressed in the transfusion service’s disaster response plan.

4. Blood provider response and responsibilities

♦ Evaluate scope of disaster based upon information provided from emergency medical services for 

affected area(s) and from emergency management agencies (EMAs) at the local, state, and federal 

agencies that are involved with disaster management.

♦ If the immediate hospital area is considered a restricted area, determine if hospital security has 

approved blood deliveries.

♦ Determine the location of the central staging area or if an alternate delivery point is needed.

♦ Determine if the hospital’s phone service is affected by the disaster.
41

Updated In A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings | Challenges and Proposed Solutions

For immediate disaster-related casualty’s blood product transfusion 

support, determine the type O red blood cells estimated for all 

disaster-affected hospitals.

♦ From the emergency communications plan, identify the alternative communication options.

♦ Determine liquid and frozen blood product storage capacity at area transfusion services.

♦ Summarize blood assessment needs from the hospital transfusion services within the affected area.

♦ For immediate disaster-related casualty’s blood product transfusion support, determine the type O 

red blood cells estimated for all disaster-affected hospitals.

♦ Determine if local blood product inventories will support the transfusion needs of the casualties for

 1. the first 24 hours,

 2. days 1–10, and

 3. days 10–30. 

♦ If the blood provider has the advantage of forewarning (e.g., hurricane warnings), blood products 

will be pushed into the patient care areas based upon their storage capacity. If local blood product 

inventories are estimated to be insufficient, the closest blood providers are contacted for blood 

product transport.

♦ If these transfers are insufficient to support the transfusion needs in the affected areas, the blood 

collector(s) establishes which outside blood collector(s) to contact for coordination of blood 

product transfers into the disaster-affected area.

♦ AABB’s Interorganizational Task Force on Domestic Disasters and Acts of Terrorism is contacted if 

the disaster has national impact potential. The task force works to provide a consistent message to 

the blood community, blood donors, and the public.

♦ The blood provider can also contact the task force to coordinate the movement of blood if the 

normal means of product exchange is insufficient.

♦ Determine if area inventories are contaminated or potentially contaminated by the effects of 

the disaster.

♦ Determine if radiological agents are involved with the disaster.

♦ Alert staff related to collecting, processing, or storing bone marrow and stem cells of the potential 

for patient support.

♦ Determine if blood product inventories need to be transferred to hospitals that will be treating the 

disaster casualties.

♦ Determine if the transfusion service’s blood product storage is jeopardized. 

♦ Arrange for blood product transport containers if needed within the affected hospitals.

♦ Determine the effects of the disaster on the donor base.
42

5. Media relations

♦ To prevent an unnecessary response of persons wishing to donate blood, all blood-related media 

releases should be handled by the local blood provider. Consistent, accurate messages to the public 

regarding the need for blood donations is crucial for an adequate supply of blood during and in 

the days following a disaster.

♦ The AABB Interorganizational Task Force on Domestic Disasters and Acts of Terrorism has 

developed a process to educate the community about donations and how to collect, process, and 

move blood products during a disaster. This multi-organizational task force includes federal and 

national organizations.

e va l u a t i o n

♦ Request that hospitals and collection organizations participate in a local or regional exercise 

requiring administration of blood products within 4 hours of an event and up to 72 hours.

For more information, visit http://emergency.cdc.gov/masscasualties.
43

Updated In A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings | Challenges and Proposed Solutions

Emergency Medical 

Services System Response

Emergency Department 

Response

Surgical Department 

Response

Intensive Care Unit 

Response

Radiology Response

Blood Bank Response

Hospitalist Response

Administration Response

Drugs and Pharmaceutical 

Supplies

Nursing Care

Managing Surge Needs for Injuries:

Hospitalist Response*

p u r p o s e

Within 4 hours, leverage the knowledge and skills of hospitalists to treat 300 

patients injured from explosions and to sustain care for 72 hours.

b a c k g r o u n d

The Madrid, Spain, terrorist bombings were used as a model to help develop 

solutions for managing rapid surge problems during a mass casualty event. 

On March 11, 2004, 10 explosions occurred almost simultaneously on commuter 

trains in Madrid, killing 177 people instantly and injuring more than 2,000. On 

that day, 966 patients were taken to 15 public community hospitals. More than 270 

patients arrived at the closest facility between 8:00 a.m. and 10:30 a.m.

Federal resources should not be expected to arrive sooner than 72 hours from the 

time of the explosion. Resources can be delayed by the time taken to deploy them and 

by emergency personnel responding to multiple communities.

g o a l

Within 4 hours, surge staff, resources, and space will be available to treat at least 

300 patients injured in an explosion that require acute inpatient and intensive care 

for 72 hours.

r e q u i r e d r e s o u r c e s

♦ Supplies, equipment and staffing (physicians, nurses, technicians, 

and support staff) to support surge response efforts.

♦ Mechanism to implement disaster care protocols. Mechanism 

should include methods to rapidly step down suitable patients 

(for example, from intensive care unit to floor and from floor 

to elsewhere).

♦ Mechanism within individual hospitals for placing hospitalists into 

real-time roles, enabling them to allocate and ration resources, serve 

as advisors, and function as outreach arms of incident command. 

*Although the term hospitalist is used in this template, this category may include other attending physicians 

of multiple specialties as well as resident physicians and physician extenders/mid-level providers who are 

supervised by an attending physician.
44

This document is a resource guide. Local needs, preferences, and capabilities of the 

affected communities may vary.

a s s u m p t i o n s

♦ Effective clinical response to a bombing event with a surge of patients will require coordination 

and cooperation among multiple medical specialties.

♦ Hospitalists will be an integral component of identifying available hospital beds, discharging 

patients, caring for patients, and providing additional support during the response.

♦ Hospitalist staff will be familiar with the hospital disaster plan, their individual roles and 

responsibilities, and the roles and responsibilities of all essential departments.

a c t i o n s t e p s

1. Educate and train hospitalists regarding responsibilities for rapid discharge 

of patients. 

2. Educate and train hospitalists on other potential responsibilities during a 

surge event.

3. Develop a system for using just-in-time training protocols for hospitalists during 

a surge event. 

4. Develop protocol to implement tiered staffing for hospitalists.

5. Establish a responsibility with leadership positions. Incorporate ongoing 

responsibility into operations chief and medical branch director job descriptions 

to ensure uniform use of resources given the varied skills and knowledge of 

the hospitalists. 

6. Consider using a rapid response team model to access additional support 

and information.

e va l u a t i o n

♦ Conduct an exercise that tests the action steps. 

♦ Critique the exercise against the response plan.

♦ Revise policies and procedures based on the outcomes of the exercises. 

For more information, visit http://emergency.cdc.gov/masscasualties.

⊲
45

Updated In A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings | Challenges and Proposed Solutions

Emergency Medical 

Services System Response

Emergency Department 

Response

Surgical Department 

Response

Intensive Care Unit 

Response

Radiology Response

Blood Bank Response

Hospitalist Response

Administration 

Response

Drugs and Pharmaceutical 

Supplies

Nursing Care

Managing Surge Needs for Injuries:

Administration Response

p u r p o s e

Within 4 hours, mobilize additional administrative-related resources needed to 

treat 300 patients injured from an explosion and sustain care for 72 hours.

b a c k g r o u n d

The Madrid, Spain, terrorist bombings were used as a model to help develop 

solutions for managing rapid surge problems during a mass casualty event. 

On March 11, 2004, 10 explosions occurred almost simultaneously on commuter 

trains in Madrid, killing 177 people instantly and injuring more than 2,000. On 

that day, 966 patients were taken to 15 public community hospitals. More than 270 

patients arrived at the closest facility between 8:00 a.m. 

and 10:30 a.m.

Federal resources should not be expected to arrive 

sooner than 72 hours from the time of the explosion. 

Resources can be delayed by the time taken to deploy 

them and by emergency personnel responding to 

multiple communities.

g o a l

To organize and support response to influx of 300 

patients injured from an explosion for a 72-hour period. 

r e q u i r e d r e s o u r c e s

♦ Staff: To support the needs of patients, staff, and the general public, 

administrators will need to manage communications, acquire political support, 

interact with the media, address public inquiries, and manage internal systems 

and departments.

♦ Disaster response plans for the hospital should outline a disaster call schedule 

for administrators to ensure that appropriate numbers of administrative staff can 

be accessed.

♦ Transportation arrangements should be addressed as part of the disaster response 

plan to ensure that administrative staff can arrive at the hospital.
46

♦ Emergency communications plan for administrators should include amateur radio and/or 

satellite phone.

This document is a resource guide. Local needs, preferences, and capabilities of the 

affected communities may vary.

⊲

a s s u m p t i o n s

♦ Hospitals have a Hospital Incident Command System (HICS)-based emergency operations plan 

with appropriate staff training and resources.

♦ A medical response to a mass casualty event is comprehensive, community based, and coordinated.

♦ Legal and regulatory issues will be included in the hospital emergency preparedness plan: 

Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), Health Insurance Portability 

and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Federal Volunteer Protection Act, Good Samaritan Laws, labor 

laws, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations, and facility codes.

♦ Activation of the community emergency operations center (EOC and incident command system), 

including the hospital’s command center, is critical to success.

♦ Communication among hospitals, health systems, emergency medical services (EMS), EOC, and 

public health cannot be lost or interrupted.

♦ Hospitals, long-term care facilities, offices, and clinics have memoranda of understanding (MOU) 

to share resources. 

♦ The community’s EOC includes health care representatives.

♦ Patients who do not need acute care services should be treated at alternate care facilities.

♦ The hospital’s preparedness plan will include mechanisms for modifying admission, discharge, 

and procedure schedules. 

♦ Admissions that are not emergent will be deferred (develop criteria and put into policy).

♦ Operating room manager will be notified to defer or cancel inpatient and outpatient 

nonemergency surgeries.

♦ Intensive care specialist, hospitalist, or chief of staff’s designee will be incorporated into plan for 

discharging patients during emergency operations. (See template on Hospitalist Response.) Set up 

MOUs with receiving hospitals.

♦ Administrative staff will be familiar with the hospital disaster plan, their individual roles and 

responsibilities, and the roles and responsibilities of all essential departments.

Additional staffing issues that should be considered: 

♦ Have staff available to address the mental health of victims, families, and staff (i.e., psychiatrists, 

psychologists, licensed mental health practitioners, and volunteers).

♦ Employ workers trained by the American Red Cross, especially those who can provide mental 

health services.
47

Updated In A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings | Challenges and Proposed Solutions

♦ Provide child care services so that staff are free to attend to patients. 

♦ Compile a list of qualified translators for the disaster.

a c t i o n s t e p s

1. When an incident management system such as HICS is used, certain issues 

need careful consideration:

♦ Identification of all appropriate key stakeholders,

♦ Communication and coordination with local government,

♦ Mental health needs of the staff,

♦ Special needs population, and

♦ Security.

2. Control of the environment

♦ Consider the following about the external environment: 

1. The external environment will change rapidly during a large-scale mass casualty event. 

The hospital must be secured, and campus traffic must be controlled. Controlling the 

external environment includes clearing beds to accommodate incoming casualties, 

redirecting nonemergency patients to other resources, and managing the comings and 

goings of staff. The facility should have pre-identified locations for all emergency functions 

with appropriate signage.

2. Managing media relations can be challenging when trying to provide safe and effective care. 

The institution’s security and public affairs offices must work together and be in place before 

the media arrive. 

♦ Consider the following regarding the internal environment:

1. Develop a plan that identifies all physical beds available for care, including those in storage and 

those that can be rented on short notice.

2. Ensure placement of cots in rooms or hallways as required.

3. Make sure each department has a procedure for mass casualty care. The procedures need to 

be reviewed and accessible in the hospital command center.

4. Departments need to determine procedures for what will be done immediately (0 to 120 

minutes), intermediately (2 to 4 hours), and long term (4 to 24 hours).

5. Every department should have a current call list that identifies staff by their proximity to 

the hospital.

6. Make staff aware of where to park, where to report, how to respond, etc.

7. Ensure that plans apply staff to tasks with which they are most familiar and perform daily; 

do not change routine procedures.

8. Policies should be approved by a centralized committee that oversees the emergency operations 

and plans.
48

3. Activation of an incident management system 

HICS, a widely used incident management system for health care facilities, is known for providing 

a chain of command with the ability to effectively manage an incident, provide accountability of 

position functions, allow for a flexible response to specific emergencies, improve documentation of 

facility actions, provide a common language to facilitate outside assistance, and develop prioritized 

response checklists for senior leadership. Identifying the appropriate people to make decisions is 

pivotal in a fast-paced disaster like the bombings in Madrid. Little time is available for meetings and 

discussion about the appropriate use of support functions and personnel. Staff should be trained and 

drilled regularly to ingrain the difference between incident structure and normal operations.

4. Logistics and supplies 

Coordinating with key suppliers and maintaining current inventories throughout the health system 

will make ramping up the level of effort easier. When resources are limited, providers must be 

prepared to respond to care needs with the resources at hand. 

Logistics include but are not limited to patient transportation. For example, housing of evacuees and 

the walking wounded and their families is a function of the local emergency management program. 

Knowing the locations of designated shelters throughout the vicinity and transportation resources for 

low-acuity patients and their family members will hasten discharge planning and patient flow in acute 

care facilities. 

5. Alternate care sites 

A hospital’s ability to mobilize emergency care units and extend care to the community’s walking 

wounded enhances effectiveness. Triage systems are used to prioritize patients so that low-priority 

patients can be directed from the main hospital, allowing ambulances and hospital staff to focus on 

high-priority trauma patients in need of medical assistance. Alternate sites, like the ones used during 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, allow large health systems to facilitate triage and direct patients to 

appropriate sources of care.

6. Credentialing and privileges

The Joint Commission [TJC] emergency credentialing system must be tested within an organization 

before it is really needed. State Emergency Systems for Advance Registration of Volunteer Health 

Professionals (ESAR–VHP) reflect TJC requirements and provide a standardized set of verified 

credentials for volunteers who may be called to assist hospitals during emergency situations. 

Coordinating with key suppliers and maintaining current inventories 

throughout the health system will make ramping up the level of 

effort easier.
49

Updated In A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings | Challenges and Proposed Solutions

7. Patient tracking 

Successful patient tracking begins at the point a patient enters the health care system. When more 

time is spent identifying and tracking patients, the prospect of reimbursement for related costs is 

better. The ability to track patients, identify their supply consumption, and monitor bed use enables 

senior management to proactively meet the needs of health care providers on the front line. Patient 

tracking systems must be flexible enough to track patients through the health care system. 

8. Identification of gaps 

♦ Ensure coordination between on-scene management and available community resources so that 

specific facilities are not overloaded. 

♦ Communication among facilities at clinical and administrative levels is essential.

9. Identification of additional sources of community support

Additional sources of support can include local shelters, locally developed stockpiles, community 

pharmacies, drug wholesalers/warehouses, public health authorities, etc. Access to these resources 

will be important if the event displaces a large number of residents due to contamination, property 

damage, utility failure, etc.

10. Establishment of communication and relationships

♦ Develop communications with local emergency management.

♦ Establish communications with local, regional, and state hospitals.

♦ Establish regular schedules to drill every aspect of a response to ensure that all staff understand 

their roles.

♦ Evaluate the drills, and modify plans based on after-action reports.

♦ Drill the new plan.

14. An ethics panel should be convened as necessary to develop disaster policies, 

especially regarding alterations to standards of care in disasters.

e va l u a t i o n

♦ Plan, conduct, and evaluate facility-wide drills. The evaluation should identify stressors on clinical 

and administrative activities. 

♦ Plan, conduct, and evaluate community-wide drills. The evaluation should identify stressors on 

clinical and administrative activities.

For more information, visit http://emergency.cdc.gov/masscasualties.
50

Emergency Medical 

Services System Response

Emergency Department 

Response

Surgical Department 

Response

Intensive Care Unit 

Response

Radiology Response

Blood Bank Response

Hospitalist Response

Administration Response

Drugs and 

Pharmaceutical 

Supplies

Nursing Care

Managing Surge Needs for Injuries:

Drugs and Pharmaceutical Supplies

p u r p o s e

Within 4 hours of an explosion, acquire the additional drugs and pharmaceutical supplies 

needed to treat 300 injured patients for up to 72 hours.

b a c k g r o u n d

The Madrid, Spain, terrorist bombings were used as a model to help develop solutions for managing 

rapid surge problems during a mass casualty event. 

On March 11, 2004, 10 explosions occurred almost simultaneously on commuter trains in Madrid, 

killing 177 people instantly and injuring more than 2,000. On that day, 966 patients were taken to 

15 public community hospitals. More than 270 patients arrived at the closest facility between 8:00 

a.m. and 10:30 a.m.

Federal resources should not be expected to arrive sooner than 72 hours from the time of the 

explosion. Resources can be delayed by the time taken to deploy them and by emergency personnel 

responding to multiple communities.

g o a l

Within 4 hours of an explosion, mobilize appropriate and adequate drugs and pharmaceutical 

supplies to treat 300 injured patients for up to 72 hours. 

r e q u i r e d r e s o u r c e s

♦ Readily available pediatric dosing charts, including color-coded tapes.

♦ Quick reference card to be developed/updated for supplementing available 

resources.

♦ The list below includes therapeutic categories, route of administration, and 

recommended drugs or pharmaceutical supplies. For simplicity, purchase 

and stockpile a single or limited number of drugs from each therapeutic 

category. Limiting the types of medications available should better enable 

prescription and dosing by care providers with little or no prior experience 

with the drug. 

1. Analgesics:

by mouth (PO): hydrocodone/acetaminophen (one strength—5/500); 

intravenous (IV): morphine;
51

Updated In A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings | Challenges and Proposed Solutions

2. Anxiolytics: 

PO and IV: lorazepam;

3. Antipsychotics:

PO and IV: haloperidol;

4. Antibiotics, broad spectrum with low allergy risk: 

PO and IV: ciprofloxacin;

5. Intravenous fluids:

normal saline and dextrose 5% water (D5W); alternative methods for intravenous access such 

as interosseous; 

6. Drugs for intubation:

IV: etomidate, succinylcholine, and vecuronium;

7. Burn care agents:

topical: silver sulfadiazine, bacitracin;

8. Ears, nose, and throat (ENT) meds for tympanic membrane perforation:

neomycin, polymyxin B, and hydrocortisone otic suspension,

9. Ocular meds:

proparacaine ophthalmic ointment, erythromycin ophthalmic ointment;

10. Tetanus toxoid vaccine; and

11. Other medications:

penicillin, cephalosporin, vancomycin, metronidazole, clindamycin, anti-emetics 

(e.g., ondansetron hydrochloride [HCl]), albuterol.

This document is a resource guide. Local needs, preferences, and capabilities of the 

affected communities may vary.

a s s u m p t i o n s

♦ A demand for certain pharmaceuticals may follow a bombing event with multiple casualties. 

♦ Pharmaceutical staff will be familiar with the hospital disaster plan, their individual roles and 

responsibilities, and the roles and responsibilities of all essential departments.

a c t i o n s t e p s

1. Establish community medical leaders.

Identify community medical leadership and a committee to address near-term solutions. 

Discussions and subsequent decisions should include emergency medical services (EMS), 

emergency medicine, trauma surgery, hospital pharmacy (PharmD), blood bank, hospital leadership, 

hospital nursing, emergency management, public health, and law enforcement (regarding transport 

of pharmaceuticals).

 

2. Create an inventory of drugs.

Create an inventory of drugs and quantities available at points of care (prehospital and hospital). Assuming 

at least 4 hospitals and 10 ambulances will be involved in the response, the committee should delegate 

a point person to contact hospital pharmacists and EMS leadership and inquire about inventory. 

⊲
52

3. Identify gaps.

Identify gaps between drugs in stock and the goal (within 4 hours of an event, acquire appropriate 

and adequate drugs to treat 300 patients for up to 72 hours).

4. Locate drug sources.

Identify potential sources of drugs in the community other than current prehospital and hospital 

supplies (e.g., locally developed stockpiles, community pharmacies, drug wholesalers/warehouses, 

private physician offices). Identification of additional sources should consider daily and routine needs 

of the community. 

5. Develop relationships outside the community.

Develop relationships with leadership outside of the immediate community. Discussion with this 

leadership could include requests for a snapshot inventory of drugs and establishment of mutual aid 

agreements to rapidly acquire drugs. 

6. Assess drugs available in the community.

Calculate total drug supplies available in the community by adding prehospital + hospital + 

community pharmacies + drug wholesalers/warehouses + physicians’ offices (through medical society). 

7. If the drug supply is deemed insufficient to care for 300 patients for up to 72 

hours, develop a plan for intercommunity mutual aid or rationing. 

8. Create plan for rapidly obtaining drugs.

Develop a plan to rapidly acquire drugs from additional sources and deliver products to points of 

care. This plan should include communications between point(s) of care and additional sources, 

mutual aid agreements with additional community sources, transport of drugs, and documentation 

for reimbursement.

9. Develop a detailed pharmaceutical list and recommended inventory based on 

hospital surge capability. 

e va l u a t i o n

♦ Plan, conduct, and evaluate a community-wide drill. The evaluation should include measurements 

of quantity and names of drugs and pharmaceutical supplies acquired, distributed, and 

administered; time when drill started; time drugs were acquired from distribution points; duration 

of transport; time of distribution to points of care; and time of administration to patients.

♦ Refine plan based on drill experience.

For more information, visit http://emergency.cdc.gov/masscasualties.
53

Updated In A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings | Challenges and Proposed Solutions

Emergency Medical 

Services System Response

Emergency Department 

Response

Surgical Department 

Response

Intensive Care Unit 

Response

Radiology Response

Blood Bank Response

Hospitalist Response

Administration Response

Drugs and Pharmaceutical 

Supplies

Nursing Care

Managing Surge Needs for Injuries:

Nursing Care

p u r p o s e

To accommodate the additional nursing resources required in a community 

following a terrorist bomb explosion and to treat 300 injured patients for up to 

72 hours. 

b a c k g r o u n d

The Madrid, Spain, terrorist bombings were used as a model to help develop 

solutions for managing rapid surge problems during a mass casualty event. 

On March 11, 2004, 10 explosions occurred almost simultaneously on commuter 

trains in Madrid, killing 177 people instantly and injuring more than 2,000. On 

that day, 966 patients were taken to 15 public community hospitals. More than 270 

patients arrived at the closest facility between 8:00 a.m. and 10:30 a.m.

Federal resources should not be expected to arrive sooner than 72 hours from the 

time of the explosion. Resources can be delayed by the time taken to deploy them 

and by emergency personnel responding to multiple communities.

g o a l

Mobilize the appropriate number of facilities and beds, nursing staff, and resources 

required to treat 300 injured patients for up to 72 hours.

r e q u i r e d r e s o u r c e s

Staff: A disaster plan should be devised, and staff should be trained and drilled to 

ensure that appropriate nursing staff levels will be available during an event. The plan 

should include a call-back schedule (ensuring that staff with appropriate experience 

in emergency medicine, surgery, and intensive care are available) and a mechanism 

for notifying staff and activating the plan, credentialing volunteers, and ensuring the 

safety and welfare of staff responding. 

This document is a resource guide. Local needs, preferences, and 

capabilities of the affected communities may vary.

⊲
54

a s s u m p t i o n s

♦ Nursing personnel are essential to ensure an effective response to a bombing, including patient 

care, patient tracking and information management, and logistical support.

♦ Most nurses are not familiar with treating the injuries resulting from bomb blasts.

♦ Nurses will be expected to take care of patient populations, including pediatric patients, whom 

they are not familiar with treating. 

♦ Nursing staff will be familiar with the hospital disaster plan, their individual roles and 

responsibilities, and the roles and responsibilities of all essential departments.

a c t i o n s t e p s

1. Develop a plan for rapid expansion of nursing staff.

2. Have protocols in place for tiered staffing.

3. Implement just-in-time nursing training materials about bomb blast injuries.

4. Implement just-in-time training materials about pediatric trauma and 

bombing injuries.

5. Develop mechanisms for rapid deployment of nurses with pediatrics expertise.

6. Train nurses to accommodate and treat a rapid influx of patients. 

7. Implement rapid patient discharge for 

patients who can go home or be quickly 

transferred to long-term care. 

8. Maintain notification list of staff. 

Every department should have a current 

list that identifies staff by their proximity to 

the hospital. 

9. Maintain a centralized database with 

staff competency skills, such as Advanced 

Cardiac Life Support® (ACLS), Trauma Nurse 

Core Course (TNCC), Emergency Nurse 

Pediatric Course (ENPC), and Pediatric 

Advanced Life Support (PALS). Identify who is 

competent to care for critically ill patients. 
55

Updated In A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings | Challenges and Proposed Solutions

10. Consider utilizing a rapid response team model to access additional 

nursing support.

e va l u a t i o n

♦ Hospitals/health systems should plan and execute a drill with emergency medical services (EMS) 

at least once a year. The drill should include objectives to accommodate 300 patients with beds, 

staffing, and resources. 

♦ Critique the completed drill, write a summary report, and share findings with participants. 

Hospital administrators should incorporate findings of the summary report in disaster plan 

revisions. Any deficiencies should be tested in subsequent drills. 

♦ Planning and conducting a drill will require considerable financial commitment. Exercises must 

be done in conjunction with state or county/city emergency management agency staff having the 

resources to conduct drills.

For more information, visit http://emergency.cdc.gov/masscasualties.
56

Acknowledgments 

and Special Thanks

a c k n o w l e d g m e n t s

CDC ‘s Injury Center would like to thank the members of the expert panels who contributed to the 

content of this report.

Isaac Ashkenazi, MD, MPA, MSC, MNS

Harvard School of Public Health

Bob Bailey, MA

McKing Consulting

Philip Barie, MD, MBA

Weill Cornell Medical College

Palmer Bessey, MD, FACS

Cornell University

Sanjeev Bhoi, MD

All India Institute of Medical Sciences

Paul Biddinger, MD

Massachusetts General Hospital

Barbara Bissett, PhD, MS

WakeMed Health and Hospitals

Stephen Cantrill, MD

Denver Health Medical Center

Tim Collins, BBA

Baylor Regional Medical Center at Grapevine

Drew Dawson

National Transportation Safety Administration

Scott Deitchman, MD

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

Theodore Delbridge, MD, MPH

East Carolina University

Aparna Deshpenda, MS, DNB

Seth G.S. Medical College and King Edward 

Memorial Hospital

Alexander Duncan, MD

Emory University Hospital

James Enders, MPH

National Center for Injury Prevention 

and Control, CDC

Henry Falk, MD, MPH

National Center for Environmental Health/

ATSDR, CDC

Lisa Garbarino

National Center for Injury Prevention 

and Control, CDC

Marshall Gardner

American College of Emergency Physicians

James Geiling, MD

Dartmouth Medical School

Kevin Gerold, DO, JD, MA(Ed)

Johns Hopkins School of Medicine

John Hammond

Southern Nevada Health District
57

Joe Henderson, MPA

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

Diana Jester

American College of Emergency Physicians

Mitchell Jewett, RN

Emergency Nurses Associations

Mark Johnson, MPA

Alaska Department of Health & Social Services

Rashid Jooma, MBBS, FRCS

Government of Pakistan Ministry of Health

Christopher Kang, MD, FACEP

Madigan Army Medical Center

Daniel Kaniewski, MA

George Washington University

Arthur Kellermann, MD, MPH, FACEP

Emory University

Robert M. Kellman, MD

State University of New York

Kellie Kerr

Carter Bloodcare

Jon Krohmer, MD

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

David Lehmann, MD, PhD

State University of New York

Patricia Lengahan, RN, MS, CEN, FANN

The Nebraska Medical Center

Monica Leonard, MPH

National Center for Environmental Health CDC

Jackie Levy, RN, MBA

University Medical Center for Southern Nevada

Simon Lewis, MBA

Metropolitan Police Service, New Scotland Yard

Julie Madden, MA

National Center for Environmental Health, CDC

Eric Mahoney, MD

Boston Medical Center

Ed McGinley

American College of Emergency Physicians

LTC John McManus, MD, MCR, FACEP

US Army Institute of Surgical Research

Norman McSwain, MD, FACS

Tulane University School of Medicine

Wayne Meredith, MD, FACS

Wake Forest University

Stuart Mirvis, MD

University of Maryland, Radiology & Shock 

Treatment

LCDR J. Morris, MPH

Health Resources and Services Administration, 

HHS

Brent Myers, MD

Wake County Department of Emergency Medical 

Services

Deborah Mulligan, MD

Nova Southeastern University

Robert Novelline, MD

Harvard Medical School

Richard Orr, MD

Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh

Thomas A. Peters, MBA, MHA

Texas University Health Systems

Updated In A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings | Challenges and Proposed Solutions
58

Sally Phillips, RN, PhD

Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, HHS

Jean Randolph, RN, MPA

National Center for Preparedness, Detection, and 

Control of Infectious Disease, CDC

Edward Racht, MD

University of Texas-Southwest Medical Center

Richard Sattin, MD

Medical College of Georgia

Paul Schmidt, MD

University of South Florida

John Seggerson

McKing Consulting

Rich Serino

Department of Homeland Security

Cynthia Singh, MS

American College of Emergency Physicians

Christopher Sproule, MS, BA

Las Vegas Fire & Rescue

Jason Stein, MS

Emory University

Ruth Ann Steinbrecher, MPH

American Medical Association

Italo Subbarao, DO, MBA

American Medical Association

Preethu Thomas

Baylor Department of Public Safety

Tracy Thomson, RN

University Medical Center, Las Vegas

Freando Turegano, MD, PhD

University General Hospital Gregorio 

Maranon, Spain

Pascal Udekwu, MBBS

WakeMed Health and Hospitals

Ian Wedmore, MD

Madigan Army Medical Center

Gam Wijetunge

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Janet Williams, MD, FACEP

University of Rochester

Joseph Zalkin, BS, HS

Wake County Department of Emergency 

Medical Services

s p e c i a l t h a n k s

The CDC National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, Division of Injury Response 

(DIR) would like to extend a special thanks to the following individuals for their contributions 

to the publication. 

Michael R. Lionbarger, MPH, University of Georgia

Terica D. Scott, MA, DIR (Intaset Technologies)

Paula S. Peters, MPH, CHES, DIR
59

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www.emergency.cdc.gov/masscasualties

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

CENTERS	FOR	DISEASE	CONTROL	AND	PREVENTION