T h e H o n o rab le Jo h n R
. P ad o v a, S en ior D ist ri ct Ju d g e o f th e U n it ed S tat es D ist ri ct C o u rt * for t he East er n D i s t r i ct of Penns y l vani a, s i t t i ng by des i gnat i on. NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STAT ES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIRC UI T
N o. 06- 3442

UN IT ED ST AT ES OF AME RICA

v. VIRGIL LEW IS WOL FE, a/k/a VI RGI L W OL FE Vir gil Lew is W olfe,

A ppe lla nt

O n Appe al f

ro m the U nit ed

S ta te s D istri ct

Co urt fo r the W es te rnD istri ct

of P en nsy lvania (D
. C. N o. 05- cr -0 0322 ) District Judge: Honorable A lan N. Bloch

____ ____ ____ Su bm itte d U nd er

Th ir d C ir cuit

L.A.R. 34 .1(a ) on F eb ru ar

y 7, 201 2 Befo re: SLOVITER an d VANASKIE, Circuit Judges , and PADOVA,

Se nio r D istric t J

udge * (F ile d: F eb ru ar

y 14, 201 2 )2 ____ ____ ____ ___ OP IN IO N O F T HE CO URT

____ ____ ____ ___ PADOVA, Se nio r D istric t J udge
. A ppe llant V ir gil L ew is W olf e w as fo und guil ty af

te r a tw o- da y

j ur y tr ia l of one
co unt of re ta lia tin g aga ins t and causi ng bodil y inj ur y to a f ed er al w itn es s, in vio la tio n of 18 U
. S. C. § 15 13( b) (2 ). H e w as se nte nc ed to 10 0 m on th s’ im

pr iso nm en t t o be followed by

a ter m of supervised release of t h ree y ears. W e have j urisdictio n over thi s a ppe al pur suant t o 28 U
. S. C. § 12 91 and 18 U
. S. C. § 37 42( a)
. W e af fi rm the convictio n and sentence. I. A s we w ri te pr im ar ily

f or the pa rt ie s, w ho are f

am ili ar w iththe f ac tua l c ont ex t and legal histo ry

of this case, we will set f orth onlyselect background facts. As part
o f an i n v es t i g at i o n o f a cra ck co ca i n e d i s t ri b u t i o n n et wo rk h ea d ed b y A p p el l an t ’s sister Mae W olfe, the Dr

ug Enforce m ent Adm inistration m ade con trolled purchases of dr ugs fr om Ma e, Ro na ld K

nox an d se ve ra l othe rs , le ad ing to the a rr es ts o f tw en ty ind ivi dua ls i n Apr il 2005
. S ev er al f ed er al ind ic tm en ts f

oll ow ed, inc lud ing one ag ai ns t Kno x. On May 17 , 20 05 , Kno x beg an co op erat in g wi th th e Gov ern m en t. On3

July 18, 200 5, Ma e al so a gr ee d to c oope ra te a ga ins t othe r m em be rs of the dr ug
co nspi ra cy . I n Ju ne 200 5, a ft er it w as kno w n th at

K nox w as c oopera ti ng wit h th e Governm ent against Mae, Appellant approached Knox’ s wife at a hot do g shop wher e she w orke d an d as ke d he r “ w ha t’ s [ K nox] sa y ing to the f

ed s? Wha t’ s th e fe ds a ski ng [K nox] ?” ( A pp. 148
. ) H e tol d her tha t Kn ox “ ne ed s to ta ke it li ke am an . H e ne ed s to k ee p hi s m out h sh ut and t ak e it lik e a m an . ” ( A pp. 14 8. ) L at er , on Augus t 28 , 2005 , w hil e K

nox w as sto ppe d at a gas sta tio n wi th his fa m ily in the c ar , A ppe llant
an d hi s br oth er

Joh n W olf

e ap pr oa ch ed

him , or de re d hi m

out of the c ar a nd i nto a
ne ar by a lle y , w he re the y

a ssa ult ed him
. Appe llant t old

K nox tha t he kn ew K

nox

“ wa s te l l i ng on hi s si st e r , t ha t [ K no x]
. . . w a s t e st i f

y i ng a ga i ns t he r . ” ( A pp. 101.) Following this incident, Appella n t and his broth er John wer e ar rested on state law
as sault c ha rg es . T he y

w er e la te r ind ic te d onaf ed er al c ha rg e of

r et al ia ting a ga ins t and causing bodi ly injury to a fe deral w itness, in violatio n of 18 U. S. C. § 151 3(b)(2). A ft er be ing tol d he w oul d be ind icted on feder al c ha rg es f or a ssa ult ing aw itn es s, A ppe llant m ad e sta te m en ts tha t “ he ’ s do ne w or se a nd f ac ed le ss t im e” a nd tha t “ he
w as onl y pr ote ct ing him se lf

, a nd h e w oul d do it ag ai n. ” ( A pp. 208
. ) A t tri al , the de fe nse c onc eded tha t Appe llant c au se d bo dil y inj ur y to K nox, but de nie d th at

he
ac te d w iththe int en t to r et al ia te a ga ins t K nox on a cc ount

of his c oope ra tio n w iththe Governm ent. The j ury convicted Appellant and his brother. Appellant w as sentenced4

to 1 00 m ont hs’ im

pr iso nm en t. II. T hr ee iss ue s a re be fo re us o n a ppe al
. Fi rs t, A ppe llant arg ue s th at the D istri ct

Co urt e rr ed in f

ai lin g to ins tr

uc t the j ur y on w itn es s bi as . Appe llant ar gue s tha t the ke y w itn es s, the vic tim K nox, ha d a
m oti ve to co lor his te sti m ony in favor of the G ove rn m en t be ca

use K nox ex pe ct ed

a
re duc ed se nte nc e in h is c as e if

he did so. T hus A ppe llant ar gue s, it w as e rr or f or the D istri ct Co urt t o gi ve onl y

age ne ra l w itn es s bia s / cr ed ibi lity j ur y ins tr uc tio n, a nd n ot gi ve th e m or e sp eci fic in st ru ct io n t ha t h e req ue st ed
. A t tri al , K

nox w as e xte nsi ve ly

c ro ss e xa m ine d on his ple a ag re em en t w iththe G ove rn m en t. Appe llant s ubm itt ed aj oin t se t of pr opos ed

j ur y ins tr uc tio ns w ithhis br ot he r, req ue st in g, int er ali a , a pr opos ed ins tr

uc tio n tha t “ E vid en ce that a wit ne ss is biased, prej udiced or host ile toward t h e De fend ants requires y ou to v iew that
w itn es se s’ [s ic ] te sti m ony w ith ca uti on, to w ei gh it wi th ca re an d subj ec t it to c los e and searchin g scrutiny .” (App. 48.) In its charge confer ence conducted before ins tr uc tin g th e j ur

y , the D istri ct Co urt gr an te d a de fe nse re que st to ch ar ge the j ur y on wit ne ss cred ib il it y , bu t d ecl in edto gi ve th e req ue st edin st ru ct io n on bi as . (Ap p. 2 30 .) Co unse l r ai se d no obj ec tio n to the se r uli ngs an d th er e w as no d is cu ss io n abou t the requested bias charge either during th e char ge confere nce or af ter the char ge wa s read5

to th e jury. As p art of i ts in st ru ct io ns , th e Co ur t t ol d t he jury th at , A n im porta nt p ar

t of [d et er m ini ng gui lt be y ond a re as ona ble doubt] w ill be m aking j udgm ents about th e testim ony of the w itnesses who testified in this c as e. Y ou shoul d dec ide w he the r y ou bel ie ve w ha t e ac h w itn es s ha d to sa y

a nd h ow im

porta nt tha t t es tim ony

w as . In m aking th at decision, I s u g g es t that y ou ask y ourself a fe w que sti ons: D id the w itn es s im

pr es s y ou a s ho ne st? D id the w itn es s ha ve a ny pa rt ic ular re as on n ot t o te ll the tr uth ? D id the w itn ess ha ve a pe rs ona l i nte re st i n th e out co m e of the case? (Ap p. 2 42 .) As Appellant never objected to the District Court’ s ruling o n his prop osed jury ins tr uc tio ns, nor

obj ec te d to or

e nga ge d th e Co urt i n di sc uss ionove r the de nia l of his requested instruction after the j ury charge w as re ad , we exerc ise plain error r eview
ove r A ppe llant’ s unpr es er ve d a rg um en t tha t the D istri ct Co urt i m pr ope rl y de nie d hi s
re que st f or abia s in str

uc tio n. F ed
. R. Cr im

P
. 30; se e Jone s v. U nit ed S ta te s, 527 U. S. 373, 388 (1999) (stating that “ a request for an instruction before the j ury retire s [does n o t ] preserve an obje ction to th e instruction actually given bythe court”); U nit ed S ta te s v. Ja ke , 281 F
. 3d 1 23, 131 -3 2 ( 3d C ir
. 200 2) ( hol din g that m er el y
re que sti ng an in str

uc tio n be fo re the j ur

y re tir es doe s not

pr es er ve a n is sue f

or appe al , absent any relevant coll oquy on the issue after the charge is deliv ered to af ford a cle ar oppo rtunity

for the tria l court to respond to the problem that counsel had identified).6

Pl ai n e rr or

r equir es asho w ing of “ er ro r” ; tha t is “ cl ear or obvi ous” ; tha t “ af fe ct [s ] the appellant’ s subs tantial rights” ins ofar a s it “ affe ct[s] the outcom e o f the district court pr oc ee din gs; a nd the e rr or se ri ousl y

a ff ec t[ s] the f

ai rn es s, inte gr ity

or pub lic
re put at ion of j udi ci al pr oc ee din gs. ” U nit ed St at es v. Br y an t, 655 F
. 3d 2 32, 251 ( 3d Ci r. 201 1) ( ci tin g U nit ed S ta te s v. M ar cu s, ___

U
. S. ___ , 130 S
. Ct
. 215 9, 216 2 (2 010) ). The D istri ct Co urt’ s instr uc tio n that the j ur

y shou ld con sid er w he the r an y
w itn es s ha d ape rs ona l i nte re st i n the out co m e of the c as e w as suf fi ci en t t o gu ide the j ur y ’ s de lib er at ion , a nd i ts d ec is io n not to s uppl em en t tha t i nstru ct ionw ith A ppe llant’ s r eque sted i nstru ct ionw as not pla inl y e rr one ous. S ee U nit ed

S ta te s v. Is aa c, 134 F
. 3d 1 99, 204 ( 3d C ir
. 199 8) ( hol din g th at w itn es s bi as ins tr

uc tio n is not
re qui re d, e spe ci al ly

w he n “ it ha s be enm ad e cl ear to the j ur y tha t i t i s pe rm itt ed

to d i s b e l i e v e t e s t i mo n y t o t h e e x t e n ti tf i n d s t h a tt h e t e s t i mo n y wa s d r i v e n mo r e b y a self-ser ving desire for leniency

than a s ense of d uty to tell the truth”; and notin g that this Court has never h eld that it is error pe r se for a trial court to refuse to give such a bias instruction even when r equested). Second, w e re view for plain e rror Appellant’ s unpreserved claim that the jury ins tr uc tio ns p er

m itt ed the j ur y to inf er int en t f ro m A ppe llant’ s si lenc e, in vio la tio n of his rights under the Fifth Am endm ent. De fining th e intent elem ent of 18 U. S. C. § 1 51 3( b) (2 ), th e tr ia l co ur t i ns tru ct edth e jury tha t,7 T o a ct w ithint en t m eans to ac t kn ow ing ly a nd w iththe unl aw fu l, spe ci fi c int en t t o r et al ia te ag ai nst a pe rs on f or inf orm at ionr el at ing to the com m issio n o r p o s sible comm issio n of a fe deral off ense given bythat person to a law e nforcem ent officer
. In te nt o rd inari ly

m ay not be pr ove d di re ct ly , be ca

use the re is n ot a w ay of f at hom ing or

sc ru tin iz ing the ope ra tio n of the hum anm ind
. H ow ev er , y ou m ay

inf er a de fe nda nt’ s inte nt f

ro m a ll of the sur ro undi ng ci rc um stanc es . Y ou m ay al so c onsi de r an y sta te m en ts m ade or om itted by a defe ndant, as well as all o ther fac ts and circum stances in evidence w hic h de m onstra te the de fe nda nt’ s st at e of m ind
. (App. 248 (em

phasis add ed)). T he Governm ent concedes that we rece ntly held that a pr es er ve d ob j ec tio n to thi s ty

pe of ins tr uc tio n, pe rm itt ing the j ur y to co nsi de r an y statem ents “ m ade or om itted” by the defendant, vio lated the defendant’ s rights un der the F if th A m en dm en t a nd w as not ha rm le ss. Se e U nit ed S ta te s v. W al le r, 654 F
. 3d 430, 435 , 438 -3 9 ( 3d C ir
. 201 1) ( hol din g th at the Su pr em e Cou rt de ci sio n in D oy le v. O hio, 426 U.S . 610, 619 (1976), th at the prosecutor m ay not cause the j ury

to draw
anim pe rm iss ibl e inf

er en ce of gui lt ba se d onthe de fe nda nt’ s po st- Mi randaw ar nin gs sil en ce , ne ce ssari ly

im pli es tha t the tr ia l cour

t m ay not ins tr

uc t the j ur y to do s o)
. T he G ove rn m e n tc o n t e n d s , h o w e v e r , t h a tu n d e r ap l a i n e rr o r

r e v i e w , A p p e l l a n tc a nnot show that the error affe cted the outcom e of his trial. W e ar e constrained to agree. U nli ke the sit

ua tio n pr es en te d inW al le r, w he re w e fo und tha t the w hol ly ci rc um stanti al e vid en ce sup portin g th e int en t ele m en t w as “ sim ply not the kin d of
over whe lm in g e vid en ce of gui lt tha t w oul d r ea dil y

le ad us t o f ind tha t the ‘ gui lty verdict ac t u al l y rendered in this trial wa s surely unattributabl e to the err or,’ ” id. a t8

439 (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U .S
. 275, 279 (1993)), here the ev i dence establishi ng Appellant’ s intent to harm Mr. Knox because of his status as a f ederal witness wa s subs t antial. C ontrary to Appellant’ s assertion that the on ly evidence presented on the issu e of re taliatory intent was the biased testim ony of Mr. Knox that A ppe llant a ssa

ult ed him be ca use he “ w as te lli ng o n hi s si ste r, ” the G ove rn m en t a lso pr es en te d th e te sti m ony of Mr s. K nox tha t A ppe llant m ad e sim ilar thr ea ts to h er pr ior to the a ct ua l a ssa ult a nd w ar ne d he r tha t he r husb an d ne ed ed to ke ep his m out h sh ut ab out the dr ug c onsp ir ac y

a nd t ak e it lik e a m an . T he j ur y al so he ar d th e te sti m ony of la w e nf or ce m en t of

fi ce rs tha t Appe llant sta te d tha t he ha d do ne w or se a nd tha t he
w as pr ote ct ing him se lf an d wou ld do it aga in. T hus, w e con cl ude tha t the e rr one ous j ur y ins tr uc tio n di d no t a ff

ec t the out co m e of

the tr ia l. Fi na lly , A ppe llant a sse rt s th at the D istri ct

Co urt er red in n ot c onsi de ri ng a do wnwar d v ari an ce b as edup on th e st a t u to ry sen te nc in g fa ct or s, s ee 1 8 U.S.C. § 3553 (b), because, he contends, the Court wa s not aw are it had the autho rity to vary from the Guidelines range if it disagreed with the policy behind the care er c rim inal G uid el ine
. T his iss ue is al so m er itl es s. A ppe llant d id n ot s ee k a va ri an ce f ro m the a dvi sor

y G uid el ine s ba se d up on a policy disagreem ent; rather, he sough t a downw ard d e pa r t ur e f r om the car eer offender Guidelines range to the non-career offender range b y objec ting that the presentence9

inv es tig at ionr ep ort ove r- re pr es en te d the se ri ousn es s of his c ri m ina l hi sto ry . ( A pp. 328- 329. ) I n de ny ing A ppe llant’ s ob j ec tio n, the D istri ct Co urt sta te d tha t “ re ga rd le ss of whether De fendant’ s request is treated as one for a departure or a v ariance , neither i s wa rr a n t e di n t h i s c a s e . ” ( A p p . 5 ) B e c au s e A p p e l l a n tn e v e r a s k e df o r ap o l i c yb a s e dv a r i a n c e , th e D i s t r i c t C o u rt r e c o g n i z e dt h a tt h e Gu i d e l i n e s r a n g e wa s a d v i s o ry,
re co gni ze d al so tha t it co uld va ry fr om the care er of fe nde r G uid el ine if warra nte d,
an d g av e co ns id erat io n t o t he § 3 55 3( a) fac to rs , th is ch al le ng e al so fai ls
. III
. Fo r the f or eg oin g r ea sons , w e w ill a ff irm the j udgm en t of

the D istri ct

Co urt.