IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2023 ND 1

Alonna Knorr f/k/a Alonna Knorr Norberg, Plaintiff and Appellant

 v.

Jon David Norberg, Defendant and Appellee

and

State of North Dakota, Statutory Real Party in Interest

No. 20220064

Appeal from the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, 

the Honorable Steven L. Marquart, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by VandeWalle, Justice.

Charles A. Stock, Crookston, MN, for plaintiff and appellant; submitted on 

brief.

Jon D. Norberg, self-represented, Maple Grove, MN, defendant and appellee; 

submitted on brief.

FILED 

IN THE OFFICE OF THE 

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT 

JANUARY 5, 2023 

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
1

Norberg v. Norberg

No. 20220064

VandeWalle, Justice.

Alonna Knorr, formerly known as Alonna Knorr Norberg, appealed from 

a money judgment entered in favor of Jon Norberg for Knorr’s share of unpaid 

expenses assigned to her under the divorce judgment. Knorr argued the district 

court erred by denying her motion to dismiss or vacate the order granting 

Norberg’s motion to amend the judgment because the parties had a global 

settlement agreement that resolved the issues in this case. In Knorr v. Norberg, 

2022 ND 139, 977 N.W.2d 711, we retained jurisdiction and remanded for the 

district court to consider the settlement agreement and for an explanation of 

the basis for its decision.

Our prior decision sets out the relevant facts and history, and we will not 

repeat that information. Knorr, 2022 ND 139, ¶¶ 2-5.

On remand, the district court considered the parties’ settlement 

agreement and again denied Knorr’s motion. The court stated Knorr had the 

burden of establishing sufficient grounds for relief under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) 

and she simply pointed to the settlement agreement. The court concluded the 

agreement alone was not sufficient to grant relief, explaining:

Knorr still needed to establish sufficient reasons for relief 

under Rule 60(b). A Rule 60(b) motion is not to be used to relieve a 

party from free, calculated, and deliberate choices. See, e.g., First 

Nat. Bank of Crosby v. Bjorgen, 389 N.W.2d 789, 796 (N.D. 1986).

If the parties had entered the Agreement before the entry of the 

Order, Knorr should have informed the Court of such in response 

to Norberg’s Motion. By failing to provide an explanation for why 

she chose not to respond and by failing to provide an explanation 

for why she chose to wait to inform the Court of the Agreement, 

Knorr failed to establish sufficient grounds to set aside the Order.

Moreover, nothing in the record established that the 

Agreement entitled Knorr to relief. Under the Agreement, Norberg 

was to withdraw his motion upon—the Agreement becoming 

“effective and fully enforceable”—being paid in full. (Ex. 1 to 

Motion, Docket No. 1572, pp. 3 & 6). If Norberg failed to do so, 
2

Knorr was permitted to use the Agreement to have the motion 

withdrawn. (Id. at p. 3). But nothing in the record (that the Court 

had at the time) indicates that the Agreement was fully 

enforceable and Knorr was permitted to enforce it. The one actual 

case she cites as additional proof is of no help. By failing to 

establish that the Agreement was enforceable, Knorr failed to 

establish that the issues raised in Norberg’s Motion had indeed 

been resolved.

The district court’s decision on a motion for relief from a judgment or 

order under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) is reviewed under the abuse of discretion 

standard. See Paulson v. Paulson, 2021 ND 32, ¶ 8, 955 N.W.2d 92. A court 

abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or 

unconscionable manner, it misinterprets or misapplies the law, or when its 

decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned 

determination. Id.

Knorr argues the district court abused its discretion by denying her 

motion. She claims the settlement agreement resolved the issues in this case; 

she supported her request for relief by quoting language in the agreement 

indicating the agreement was intended to dispose of Norberg’s motion for an 

amended judgment; and she cited other district court cases as additional proof 

that the settlement agreement was enforceable and operative and the parties 

were carrying out its terms. She asserts that the money judgment is for debts 

the parties expressly agreed were covered by the settlement agreement and 

that the record reflects that there is no dispute the parties reached the binding 

and enforceable agreement before the court entered its money judgment.

The district court provided two reasons for denying Knorr’s motion for 

relief. The first reason was the timeliness of the motion, stating Knorr should 

have informed the court about the settlement agreement in response to 

Norberg’s motion and she did not explain why she chose to wait to inform the 

court. We do not need to determine whether this first reason alone is sufficient, 

because the court also determined Knorr failed to establish that the settlement 

agreement is enforceable and that she is therefore entitled to relief.
3

The settlement agreement requires Knorr to pay Norberg $500,000 and 

states, “The terms of this Settlement Agreement do not become effective and 

fully enforceable until Norberg receives payment and assignment of NW 

Mutual payments [from Knorr].” The agreement also specifically addresses 

Norberg’s motion to amend the judgment and states, “Upon execution of this 

Agreement and being paid in full, Norberg shall withdraw his Motion in the 

District Court and Knorr shall not contest, in any way, Norberg’s move to 

Maple Grove, MN.” (Emphasis added). There is no evidence in the record that 

Knorr paid Norberg in full as required by the settlement agreement and that 

the agreement became effective and fully enforceable.

Knorr had the burden to establish sufficient grounds for relief under 

N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b). See Kukla v. Kukla, 2013 ND 192, ¶ 24, 838 N.W.2d 434.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying her motion. We affirm 

the judgment.

Jon J. Jensen, C.J.

Gerald W. VandeWalle

Daniel J. Crothers

Jerod E. Tufte

Kari M. Agotness, D.J.

The Honorable Kari M. Agotness, D.J., sitting in place of McEvers, J., 

disqualified.