Appellant also argues that the district court erred in denying 

his other claims of ineffective assistance of Bloom, who was defense 

counsel at trial. To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner 

must demonstrate (a) that counsel's performance was deficient in that it 

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (b) resulting 

prejudice in that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 

errors, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Warden v. Lyons, 

100 Nev. 430, 432-33, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the test in 

Strickland). Both components of the inquiry must be shown, Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 697, and the petitioner must demonstrate the underlying facts 

by a preponderance of the evidence, Means, 120 Nev. at 1012, 103 P.3d at 

33. We give deference to the district court's factual findings regarding 

ineffective assistance of counsel but review the court's application of the 

law to those facts de novo. Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686, 120 P.3d 

1164, 1166 (2005). 

First, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing 

to investigate the victim's cosmetic surgery records. Appellant failed to 

demonstrate prejudice. Counsel testified that appellant had insisted on 

testifying to the surgeon's alleged comments at trial, and appellant 

testified that at the time of trial, he believed that the surgeon had in fact 

told him that the victim had nasal damage due to drug use. Appellant 

failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he would 

not have testified to his knowledge of the victim's drug-related nasal 

damage had he known the surgeon's notes did not reflect it. We therefore 

conclude that the district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Second, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to interview and secure early in the case the favorable testimony of 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

2 

z. - y. 
his coworkers, who, because of media coverage and the inflammatory 

actions of the victim's supporters, ceased contact with him upon his 

release from jail. Appellant failed to demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. 

Appellant failed to present any evidence to support his claims that his 

coworkers would have provided information favorable to the defense. 

Further, Bloom did not appear in the case until nine months after 

appellant was released on bond, well after the coworkers ceased contact. 

We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in denying this 

claim. 

Third, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for 

referring in opening statements to the expected testimony of three 

witnesses whom he failed to subpoena and/or call to testify. Appellant 

failed to demonstrate prejudice. Counsel's opening statements are not 

evidence on which the jury may base its verdict, Rodriguez v. State, 128 

Nev. , n.3, 273 P.3d 845, 848 n.3 (2012), and thus could not have 

affected the outcome at trial. Moreover, appellant failed to present 

evidence as to what E. Eisenmann and L. DeMeo would have testified to or 

how it would have affected the outcome at trial. Finally, the testimony 

that appellant claims Lt. Franks" could have offered was introduced 

through other expert witnesses. We therefore conclude that the district 

court did not err in denying this claim. 

'Appellant also claimed that the district court erred in not 

considering that appellant's decision to testify was informed by his belief 

that Franks would testify as counsel had represented in opening 

statements. This argument was not raised below, and we decline to 

address it in the first instance on appeal. Davis, 107 Nev. at 606, 817 P.2d 

at 1173. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

3 
Fourth, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to file a pretrial motion in limine to preclude the State from using 

the terms "murder," "victim," "crime scene," "assassination," and "mafia 

hit man" during trial. Appellant failed to demonstrate deficiency or 

prejudice. As to the first three terms, appellant's claim on appeal is 

contradicted by his claim below where he argued only that counsel was 

ineffective for not enforcing the motion that was filed and granted. See id. 

Further, because the law of this case is that appellant failed to 

demonstrate that the State engaged in "substantial and prejudicial 

misconduct" by the use of those words, Centofanti v. State, Docket No. 

44984 (Order of Affirmance, December 27, 2006); see Hall v. State,91 Nev. 

314, 316, 535 P.2d 797, 799 (1975), appellant failed to demonstrate a 

reasonable probability of a different outcome had the State not used them. 

As to "assassination" and "mafia hit man," appellant failed to demonstrate 

that counsel should or could have anticipated the use of such words and 

thus failed to demonstrate that counsel was unreasonable in not including 

them in his motion. We therefore conclude that the district court did not 

err in denying this claim. 

Fifth, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective because he 

filed a motion to dismiss that argued the wrong legal standard and then 

failed to obtain a pretrial ruling on the motion. Appellant failed to 

demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. Appellant failed to demonstrate that 

counsel was objectively unreasonable for arguing that the State failed to 

preserve the evidence rather than that it failed to collect evidence where 

the State photographed, collected, then released to the victim's relatives 

her purse, keys, Palm Pilot, and cell phone. Further, appellant failed to 

demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different outcome had counsel 

argued the allegedly correct standard where appellant presented no 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

4 
evidence of gross negligence or bad faith and questioned the State's failure 

to collect evidence on cross-examination of key witnesses. See Gordon v. 

State,121 Nev. 504, 509-10, 117 P.3d 214, 218 (2005). Finally, appellant 

failed to demonstrate that it was unreasonable for counsel to wait until 

the State sought to introduce the evidence before seeking a ruling on the 

motion or that an earlier ruling would have resulted in a different 

outcome. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in 

denying these claims. 

Sixth, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing 

to file a pretrial motion regarding the State's failure to collect blood 

spatter evidence on an exercise bike or to have an expert examine it. 

Appellant failed to demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. Appellant made 

no cogent argument in support of his assertion that counsel was 

objectively unreasonable in not filing such a pretrial motion nor that such 

a motion would have been successful. Cf. Kirksey v. State,112 Nev. 980, 

990, 923 P.2d 1102, 1109 (1996) (holding that petitioner did not 

demonstrate prejudice where he failed to demonstrate that a motion to 

suppress evidence would have succeeded); see also Maresca v. State, 103 

Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987) ("It is appellant's responsibility to 

present relevant authority and cogent argument; issues not so presented 

need not be addressed by this court."). A defense expert did examine 

photographs of the spatter on the bike, and appellant did not demonstrate 

that the spatter was still on the bike when Bloom was retained. Further, 

appellant presented no evidence of gross negligence or bad faith, and 

counsel did question the failure to collect the bike on cross-examination of 

key witnesses. See Gordon,121 Nev. at 509-10, 117 P.3d at 218. We 

therefore conclude that the district court did not err in denying these 

claims. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

5 
Seventh, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to properly investigate, document, or process shell casings that 

appellant found three to four months after the shooting. Appellant failed 

to demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. Appellant did not retain Bloom 

until several months after he found the casings and had already notified 

his prior counsel. Appellant made no cogent argument as to how counsel 

could be deficient for not acting on behalf of a stranger. Maresca, 103 Nev. 

at 673, 748 P.2d at 6. Further, the jury heard evidence from the defense 

ballistics expert as to how and where appellant found the casings and how 

it informed the expert's opinion. We therefore conclude that the district 

court did not err in denying this claim. 

Eighth, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to prevent the trial court's canvass of appellant regarding his 

agreement to a defense theory of self-defense. Appellant failed to 

demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. The district court asked only 

whether appellant agreed with counsel's tactic of admitting that appellant 

was the shooter, and appellant acknowledged that counsel objected to the 

canvass. There was never any question but that appellant was the 

shooter, and even assuming that the canvass procedure were improper, 

appellant failed to demonstrate that counsel was objectively unreasonable 

in not taking further action to prevent the canvass. Further, appellant's 

admission neither locked him into a self-defense theory at trial nor 

foreclosed a mens rea defense since the canvass was not admitted into 

evidence and the State's opening statements focused on its theory of the 

case and not on appellant's anticipated self-defense theory. We therefore 

conclude that the district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Ninth, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective in failing 

to file a petition for a writ of mandamus in this court to challenge the 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

mmommemommirgror.:,11.1immtmaximmornmemunes - 

6 
disqualification of Albregts as trial counsel, resulting in the violation of 

appellant's right to counsel of his choice. Appellant failed to demonstrate 

deficiency or prejudice. Appellant did not provide this court with any of 

the pleadings that led to Albregts' disqualification and thus did not 

demonstrate that counsel was deficient in not challenging the district 

court's ruling or that there was a reasonable probability of success had he 

done so. Cf. Kirksey, 112 Nev. at 990, 923 P.2d at 1109. Further, 

appellant did not demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that 

Albregts was his counsel of choice. Counsel testified that appellant 

specifically said he did not want Albregts to represent him and, although 

appellant denied making that statement, he did admit that he never 

specifically requested to have Albregts reinstated. We therefore conclude 

that the district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Tenth, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing 

to object to prosecutorial misconduct, create a record at the close of trial 

when the State had not called Albregts as a witness, and seek to have 

Albregts reinstated. Appellant failed to demonstrate deficiency or 

prejudice. Because appellant did not provide this court with any of the 

pleadings that led to Albregts' disqualification, he did not demonstrate by 

a preponderance of the evidence that the prosecutor engaged in 

misconduct and thus that counsel was deficient in not objecting to it. 

Further, appellant does not specify how or why counsel could have created 

a better record or how creating a better record or having Albregts 

reinstated after the close of evidence would have changed the outcome of 

trial. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in denying 

these claims. 

Eleventh, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to obtain a ruling on his motion in limine to exclude from trial any 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

7 

4{,-rragerEVISIMEMPNv . _ - 
8 

afri &ME 

evidence from the sale of appellant's California property and that had 

counsel done so, Albregts would not have been disqualified. Appellant 

failed to demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. He presented no evidence 

that such a motion had been filed or what it contained, nor did he present 

cogent argument as to whether the motion would have been successful. 

Id.; Maresca,103 Nev. at 673, 748 P.2d at 6. Moreover, as Albregts had 

already been disqualified when Bloom appeared in the case, appellant 

failed to demonstrate that any inaction of counsel led to the 

disqualification. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err 

in denying this claim. 

Twelfth, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to present evidence at trial to corroborate his version of the events 

of December 1, 2000, and December 5, 2000. Appellant failed to 

demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. Appellant did not produce the 

allegedly corroborating evidence and thus failed to demonstrate by a 

preponderance of the evidence that it supported his version of events. 

Further, the State did not challenge appellant's version of events that led 

up to the December 5 incident. We therefore conclude that the district 

court did not err in denying these claims. 

Thirteenth, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for 

choosing to present self-defense as appellant's primary defense. Appellant 

failed to demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. Counsel testified that he 

focused on self-defense because it was what appellant had said happened 

and counsel did not believe the evidence supported any lesser-included 

offenses. Appellant failed to demonstrate the "extraordinary 

circumstances" necessary to challenge this tactical decision. Doleman v. 

State,112 Nev. 843, 848, 921 P.2d 278, 280-81 (1996). Moreover, 

appellant presented no evidence at his evidentiary hearing that any other 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

• . 
. - 

. 

defense would have been more viable. We therefore conclude that the 

district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Fourteenth, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for 

not determining what notes and pictures were given to the State in 

violation of the attorney-client privilege and then preventing the State 

from using them. Appellant failed to demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. 

Appellant presented no evidence to support his claim that counsel failed to 

determine what notes and pictures were turned over to the State. 

Further, counsel testified that the pictures had been provided to and used 

by a defense expert so that the State would have been provided the 

pictures as part of discovery regardless. Finally, appellant did not 

demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the State used either 

the notes or pictures. We therefore conclude that the district court did not 

err in denying these claims. 

Fifteenth, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for 

calling Dr. Eisele as an expert at trial because his report contradicted the 

defense theory of the case. Appellant failed to demonstrate deficiency or 

prejudice. Appellant failed to provide Dr. Eisele's report and thus failed to 

demonstrate the facts underlying his claim by a preponderance of the 

evidence. Further, Dr. Eisele's trial testimony indicated only that his 

notes contained a 2001 comment that it would be difficult to present this 

case as the victim having attacked appellant but that, after reviewing all 

of the evidence, he had changed his mind. We therefore conclude that the 

district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Sixteenth, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to determine the extent to which appellant was prejudiced by being 

coerced into signing an order to cremate the victim's body. Appellant 

failed to demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. Appellant did not state what 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

9 
investigation counsel should have undertaken to determine the prejudice, 

what the results of that investigation would have been, or what counsel 

should have done with those results. Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185, 192, 

87 P.3d 533, 538 (2004). Further, appellant did not demonstrate that he 

in any way waived his right to remain silent simply by signing the 

cremation order. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err 

in denying this claim. 

Seventeenth, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to object to the testimony of Detective Thowsen on the grounds that 

it was a comment on appellant's post-arrest silence and because it was 

improperly withheld from discovery. Appellant failed to demonstrate 

deficiency or prejudice. The witness testified that when he arrived on the 

crime scene, he observed appellant in the back of a police car with his 

head turned towards and nodding at a man who the witness believed was 

appellant's counsel. Appellant claims that the discovery provided by the 

State did not include this observation and thus was a violation of Nevada's 

discovery statutes and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Appellant 

cites to no authority to support his claim that the witness's observation 

amounted to an impermissible comment on post-arrest silence or that the 

State must document and turn over every observation or conversation it 

has with potential witnesses. Maresca, 103 Nev. at 673, 748 P.2d at 6. 

Further, appellant did not argue let alone demonstrate that the 

observation was favorable to him and thus did not demonstrate that his 

constitutional rights were violated. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; Mazzan v. 

Warden, 116 Nev. 48, 66, 993 P.2d 25, 36 (2000). We therefore conclude 

that the district court did not err in denying these claims. 

Eighteenth, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to object to the State's untimely disclosure of the transcripts of 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

10 

ck 
Vf. 

ED 11 

previous interviews of F.S., S. Smith, and A. Atwood as violations of 

Nevada discovery statutes and Brady.Appellant failed to demonstrate 

deficiency or prejudice. Appellant's claim as to F.S. is belied by the record 

because counsel did object and the district court gave counsel additional 

time to review the transcripts before questioning the witness. Appellant 

failed to state what further objection would have achieved. As to the other 

two witnesses, appellant did not allege or demonstrate that counsel 

requested the transcripts so as to trigger statutory disclosure 

requirements. NRS 174.235(1). Further, appellant did not demonstrate a 

Bradyviolation. The State ultimately turned over the transcripts, and 

appellant neither alleged specific facts nor provided evidence that the 

transcripts contained information favorable to the defense. Brady,373 

U.S. at 87; Mazzan,116 Nev. at 66, 993 P.2d at 36. We therefore conclude 

that the district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Nineteenth, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to adequately cross-examine witnesses F.S. and S. Smith, including 

impeaching them with prior inconsistent statements, and for failing to 

object to improper comments. Appellant failed to demonstrate deficiency 

or prejudice. Appellant's claim is belied by the record to the extent 

counsel cross-examined F.S. about prior inconsistent statements regarding 

a gun and his initial failure to relate that he heard appellant threaten to 

kill the victim. Appellant failed to identify any other inconsistent 

statements for either witness, present any evidence indicating that 

counsel's cross-examination was objectively unreasonable, or identify the 

improper comments to which counsel should have objected. We therefore 

conclude that the district court did not err in denying these claims. 

Twentieth, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to request an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

11 
testimony of A. Atwood was more prejudicial than probative. Appellant 

failed to demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. Appellant made no cogent 

argument to support his claim that her testimony was more prejudicial 

than probative. Maresca, 103 Nev. at 673, 748 P.2d at 6. We therefore 

conclude that the district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Twenty-first, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to impeach T. Miller with previous testimony and/or statements 

and for failing to move for a full evidentiary hearing on her alleged 

misconduct. Appellant failed to demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. 

Appellant did not identify any previous testimony or statements with 

which counsel should have impeached the witness. Further, the trial 

court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury to address the 

witness's actions and determined that appellant's offer of proof did not 

indicate misconduct. Appellant did not state what additional information 

would have been brought forth in a "full evidentiary hearing" or how it 

would have affected either the district court's ruling or the outcome of 

trial. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in denying 

these claims. 

Twenty-second, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective 

for failing to contemporaneously object to the admission of the many 

hearsay statements made by the victim, thereby failing to preserve them 

for appeal. Appellant failed to demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. 

Appellant acknowledged that counsel filed a pretrial motion to preclude 

such hearsay, and the record reflects that the district court allowed its 

admission for limited purposes. Contemporaneous objections are not 

necessary to preserve an issue for appeal where, as here, there is no 

allegation that the issue was inadequately briefed or that the district 

court's pretrial ruling was not definitive. Richmond v. State, 118 Nev. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

12 

,:i1ZAVEMENWINNEMIONEMEar: 'MT.T.riAkBFF671M 
924, 932, 59 P.3d 1249, 1254 (2002). We therefore conclude that the 

district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Twenty-third, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective 

for failing to object to Sgt. Winslow's testimony regarding his observations 

of the events surrounding December 5, 2000, when the district court had 

ruled that such evidence was inadmissible. Appellant failed to 

demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. Appellant admitted below that the 

district court had specifically allowed the witness's observations. To the 

extent appellant's claim is in reference to the witness's conclusions and 

conversation with the victim, the district court initially excluded them but 

later ruled they were admissible, a ruling to which counsel stated a 

continuing objection. Seeid. We therefore conclude that the district court 

did not err in denying this claim. 

Twenty-fourth, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective 

for failing to file a motion in limine to preclude the admission of evidence 

regarding a call appellant placed to a counseling hotline, for not objecting 

to the information as privileged, and for not preparing to cross-examine 

the therapist. Appellant failed to demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. 

Counsel objected to the therapist's testimony as privileged and, after a 

mid-trial hearing, the district court largely overruled the objection. 

Appellant did not demonstrate how a motion in limine would have 

changed the outcome of the ruling or of trial. Further, appellant did not 

state what else counsel could have done to cross-examine the therapist or 

how it would have affected the outcome at trial. We therefore conclude 

that the district court did not err in denying these claims. 

Twenty-fifth, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to object to a juror wearing an inappropriate shirt and to two jurors 

who slept intermittently throughout trial. Appellant failed to demonstrate 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

13 
deficiency or prejudice. Counsel testified that he did not observe the shirt 

or the sleeping jurors, and appellant failed to demonstrate that counsel's 

failure to observe the alleged misconduct was itself unreasonable. 

Notably, appellant did not allege that he himself had observed the alleged 

misconduct. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in 

denying this claim. 

Twenty-sixth, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective 

for failing to seek to enforce a pretrial ruling excluding from trial evidence 

of appellant's alleged smear campaign against the victim. Appellant failed 

to demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. Appellant provided neither an 

order nor a transcript of the oral ruling evidencing the trial court's 

exclusion of any such reference. The district court minutes indicate only 

that the court did not "believe" the evidence would come in during the 

State's case-in-chief but rather that it could come in during crossexamination if appellant testified. Even if this oral pronouncement were 

in fact an order excluding the reference, appellant testified, so the 

evidence would have come in on cross-examination, and appellant 

therefore failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different 

outcome had counsel objected during the State's opening arguments or 

case-in-chief. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in 

denying this claim. 

Twenty-seventh, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective 

for failing to challenge as a prior bad act the admissibility of appellant's 

employment records and his termination from employment for allegedly 

violating his employer's firearms policy. Appellant failed to demonstrate 

deficiency or prejudice. Appellant provided no cogent argument nor 

evidence that the challenged evidence constituted prior bad acts that could 

only be admitted after a hearing pursuant to Petrocelli v. State, 101 Nev. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

,4',7#,VED• 

14 

•• :T•.- • :• • •-••-•-••••::,::•::'.'1-,..'-'--.4.4.J=Itki:Viargia0;141 
46, 51-52, 692, P.2d 503, 507-08 (1985) (requiring a hearing before 

introducing evidence of collateral offenses). Maresca,103 Nev. at 673, 748 

P.2d at 6. Further, the record demonstrates that counsel successfully 

objected to the State's attempt to elicit the grounds for appellant's 

termination. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in 

denying this claim. 

Twenty-eighth, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective 

for failing to secure the attendance at trial of several potential witnesses 

for the defense, including R. Dominguez's grandmother; M. Stephenson; 

appellant's neighbor, Herb; Dr. Calixco; Nurse Kruger; and A. Pearson. 

Appellant failed to demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. Appellant did not 

present any evidence that any of the witnesses were available for trial or 

would have provided testimony favorable to the defense. We therefore 

conclude that the district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Twenty-ninth, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective 

for not effectively using the victim's criminal history to demonstrate her 

propensity for violence. Appellant failed to demonstrate deficiency or 

prejudice. Appellant did not provide this court with a copy of the victim's 

criminal records and presented no evidence beyond what was testified to 

at trial to support his claims that they demonstrated a propensity for 

violence. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in 

denying this claim. 

Thirtieth, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for not 

following up on his challenge to the validity of the search warrant. 

Appellant failed to demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. Appellant failed 

to present any evidence to support his claim that the search warrant was 

invalid and thus that counsel was ineffective in failing to pursue a 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

15 

•ZEW.MIN 
challenge to it. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in 

denying this claim. 

Thirty-first, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to use for the benefit of his criminal defense the discovery 

provisions from the guardianship proceedings for his and the victim's son. 

Appellant failed to demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. Appellant 

presented no evidence to demonstrate what the results of using the familycourt discovery provisions would have been. Cf. Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 

185, 192, 87 P.3d 533, 538 (2004) (upholding the denial of an ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim because appellant did not demonstrate what a 

more thorough investigation would have revealed). Further, appellant 

presented no evidence to support his claim that the file of his son's 

guardian ad litem contained information favorable to appellant's criminal 

defense. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in 

denying this claim. 

Thirty-second, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective 

for failing to be available during the seven-day post-trial period during 

which a motion for new trial could have been filed. Appellant failed to 

demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. Appellant admitted that he and 

counsel discussed his options immediately after the verdict was returned 

and before counsel left for vacation. Further, although appellant faults 

counsel for not filing a motion for new trial based on juror misconduct, he 

presented no evidence that counsel was made aware of or could have 

reasonably discovered the alleged misconduct within the seven-day period 

had counsel made himself available. We therefore conclude that the 

district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Finally, appellant claims that the cumulative effect of the 

errors violated his constitutional rights. Appellant cited this court's 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

16 
Hardesty 

PeraLA 

Parraguirre 

J. 

J. 

standard on direct review for cumulative-error analysis, see Big Pond v. 

State,101 Nev. 1, 3, 692 P.2d 1288, 1289 (1985), but provided no analysis 

to support his claim. We therefore conclude that the district court did not 

err in denying this claim. 

For the foregoing reasons, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 2 

cc: Hon. Elissa F. Cadish, District Judge 

Nguyen & Lay 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

2The district court dismissed appellant's first five grounds in his 

petition as procedurally barred pursuant to NRS 34.810(1)(b) because they 

could have been raised on direct appeal. Appellant does not challenge this 

ruling on appeal and has thus abandoned the claims. 

Appellant correctly states that the district court erred in not making 

specific findings of fact to support its summary conclusion that appellant 

failed to demonstrate prejudice for thirty-two claims. SeeNRS 34.830(1). 

We nevertheless affirm the district court's decision for the reasons 

discussed herein. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

17