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       [NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
                 United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit





No. 98-1795

                         DAVID T. VEALE,

                      Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                v.

                  KEENE PUBLISHING CORPORATION,

                      Defendants, Appellees.



           APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

         [Hon. Shane Devine, Senior U.S. District Judge]
                                 



                              Before

                      Stahl, Circuit Judge,
                Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
                   and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
     David T. Veale on brief pro se.
     




May 11, 1999




                                
                                
            Per Curiam.  We affirm the judgment of the district
  court for essentially the reasons stated in the Report and
  Recommendation of the magistrate judge and in the Order of the
  district judge.  We add only the following comments regarding
  appellant's attempt to set out a claim under 42 U.S.C. � 1983.
            Appellant does not dispute that, to be timely, he was
  required to have filed his complaint by March 2, 1998.  See
  N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. � 508:4.  Thus, unless the limitations
  period was tolled, the March 11, 1998 complaint was late. 
  Arguably, � 508:10 may provide tolling in the instant
  situation.  However, the tolling rule set out in � 508:10 only
  applies to the defendants named in the first action.  Rowe v.
  Deere, 533 A.2d 375, 378 (N.H. 1987).  The only defendant named
  in the first action was the Keene Publishing Corp.
            As a result, the � 1983 claim raised in the instant
  case is timely only as to the publishing company; the complaint
  is not timely as to the public entities appellant listed as
  defendants in his amended complaint.  The question then becomes
  whether appellant can file the second action with a new claim
  against Keene Publishing Corp.   i.e., a � 1983 claim based on
  a conspiracy between public officials and the publishing
  company.  However, as well as limiting � 508:10 to the same
  parties, the New Hampshire Supreme Court appears to have
  limited the section to the same cause.  See Milford Quarry &
  Construction Co. v. Boston & M. R.R., 151 A. 336, 338 (N.H.
  1930); Milford Q. & C. Co. v. Boston & M. R.R., 97 A. 982, 983
  
                               -2-
  (N.H. 1916).  Arguably, then, appellant could not add the �
  1983 claim to the original action for libel.
            In any event, appellant has not alleged enough to
  state a � 1983 conspiracy between the police and the publishing
  company.  "[T]he acts of a private party are fairly
  attributable to the state. . . [only] when the private party
  acted in concert with state actors."  Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,
  457 U.S. 830, 838 n.6 (1982).  Because appellant's allegation
  of conspiracy is completely "bald and conclusory," as well as
  lacking "sufficient factual detail," it is not enough to make
  the publishing company a state actor for purposes of � 1983. 
  See Malachowski v. City of Keene, 787 F.2d 704, 711 (1st Cir.
  1986) (per curiam).
            Second, even if the conspiracy allegations were
  deemed sufficient at the pleading stage, it is plain that
  appellant could not set out a cause of action for libel under
  � 1983.  Such a claim requires that a plaintiff show "stigma
  plus."  See Pendleton v. City of Haverhill, 156 F.3d 57, 62-63
  (1st Cir. 1998).  That is, "a violation of constitutional
  proportions under a 'stigma plus' theory exists only if, and to
  the extent that, the opportunities [a plaintiff] lost are
  government benefits denied as a result of governmental action." 
  Id. at 63.  Appellant was in business for himself as a
  landscaper and logger so cannot allege that he lost a
  government job as a result of the alleged defamatory statement. 
  The other injury about which appellant complains   harm to his
  personal and business reputation   does not involve government
  benefits.
            Affirmed.
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