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DEMANDING ACCOUNTABILITY:

THE ADMINISTRATION’S RECKLESS RELEASE OF

TERRORISTS FROM GUANTANAMO

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 7, 2016

Serial No. 114–203

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Lee Wolosky, Special Envoy for Guantanamo Closure, U.S. Department 

of State .................................................................................................................. 5

Mr. Paul M. Lewis, Special Envoy for Guantanamo Detention Closure, U.S. 

Department of Defense ........................................................................................ 13

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Lee Wolosky: Prepared statement ................................................................... 8

Mr. Paul M. Lewis: Prepared statement ................................................................ 15

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 48

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 49

The Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York: Material submitted for the record ............................................... 51

Written responses from Mr. Lee Wolosky to questions submitted for the 

record by: 

The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs .............. 55

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New Jersey ................................................................................... 56

(1)

DEMANDING ACCOUNTABILITY: 

THE ADMINISTRATION’S RECKLESS 

RELEASE OF TERRORISTS FROM 

GUANTANAMO 

THURSDAY, JULY 7, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o’clock a.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROYCE. This hearing will come to order. 

Today we welcome back the Obama administration’s top officials 

for closing the detention center at Guantanamo Bay. In March, 

these two gentlemen appeared before the committee to discuss the 

administration’s proposal to relocate the prison and its detainees to 

the continental United States, as well as the process of releasing 

individuals to foreign countries. 

Much of the news from that hearing surrounded Mr. Lewis’ revelation that, in his words, ‘‘unfortunately, there have been Americans that have died because of Guantanamo detainees.’’ And, indeed, last month the Washington Post reported that the administration believes that at least 12 detainees released from the Guantanamo facility have since attacked U.S. or allied forces in Afghanistan, killing about a half dozen Americans. 

That was startling enough. But it is particularly disturbing 

that—upon close examination—these witnesses made statements to 

the committee that are inconsistent with the documents and inconsistent with information that the administration has supplied the 

committee under the law. 

Specifically, the committee asked whether the Department of Defense ever knowingly transferred a detainee to a country that did 

not exhibit an ability to substantially mitigate the risk of recidivism or maintain custody or control of that individual. Mr. Lewis 

and Mr. Wolosky assured committee members that it had not. Yet 

numerous intelligence reports provided by the administration suggest that their answers were inaccurate: In fact, the Defense Department had done so on numerous occasions. 

The Secretary of State has the sole responsibility to negotiate 

transfers, including agreements to monitor released detainees. 

Under the law, Congress regularly receives information from the 

intelligence community on the return to terrorism rate of individVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:03 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\070716\20652 SHIRL
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uals released to foreign countries as well as assessments of a country’s ability to prevent terrorists from returning to the fight. 

Simply put, many countries just aren’t up to the job. And a diplomatic agreement to do the job isn’t worth the paper it is written 

on if a country does not have the resources, does not have the 

training to keep committed terrorists from returning to the battlefield. 

Yet the administration has sent Guantanamo terrorists to these 

countries anyway. To then deceive this committee and the American people is deeply disturbing, and when given the opportunity 

to correct the record for the committee, they ignored us. 

I appreciate that the administration finally responded on Tuesday. But it shouldn’t take the calling of a hearing to elicit a return 

letter, especially on something as consequential as this. This committee has an obligation to conduct oversight. While we have differences of opinion over Guantanamo policy, I don’t think anyone 

here finds the administration’s dismissiveness acceptable. 

And should anyone think the committee’s concerns are theoretical, and specifically I was pressing on these terrorists who had 

been transferred to Uruguay, it is not theoretical because now 

Jihad Diyab, who is an al-Qaeda-linked terrorist, was sent from 

Guantanamo to Uruguay in December 2014. 

We sounded the alarm about Uruguay’s lack of legal framework. 

We explained to you about the critical resources to prevent travel 

outside the country—that that was lacking in the case of Uruguay. 

And so what is the result? 

The result is last month, Jihad Diyab disappeared from Uruguay. 

His current whereabouts are unknown, and this was after Mr. 

Wolosky testified to us in March that ‘‘we are confident that the 

Government of Uruguay is taking appropriate steps to substantially mitigate the risk’’ of this former detainee and others sent to 

Uruguay. Yesterday, CNN, citing U.S. officials, reported that this 

terrorist was last spotted in Venezuela. He is believed to be headed 

back to Syria or Yemen. 

We have been awaiting answers to the committee’s inquiry. But 

while I’ve been patient, the President has been in a rush, seemingly willing to release Guantanamo terrorists to wherever he can. 

I wish we were not here today. Holding another Guantanamo 

hearing this week was not my intention. But he is loose and my 

patience has run out. 

And I now turn to the ranking member. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Wolosky and Mr. 

Lewis, welcome back and thank you for your service. 

Last time you gentlemen were here I made my views on the 

Guantanamo Prison pretty clear and I would ask that my opening 

statement from that hearing be included as part of the record of 

this hearing. 

Chairman ROYCE. Without objection. 

Mr. ENGEL. To recap, the prison should be closed. National security experts of both parties agree with me. In fact, I have a letter 

here from 36 retired generals and admirals calling for the prison’s 

closure and I ask that it be included in the record. 

The prison is a waste of money and a propaganda tool for terrorists. End of story, as far as the prison goes. There were, however, 

3

some issues raised about transferred detainees at the last hearing 

that deserve some follow up and I say transferred rather than released because there’s an extensive process that goes into removing 

a detainee from the prison and sending him to another country. 

It’s not as though they are just set loose. But it is important to 

know how exactly are we monitoring transferred detainees and assessing the risk they pose. Those are good questions. 

But because they deal with intelligence methods we can only discuss them in a closed classified setting. My understanding is that 

the administration offered to do just that and that offer was 

rebuffed. 

I hope that after this hearing in a few weeks or so we can have 

a closed classified setting to get answers to some questions that 

you are not really allowed to say here in open session. 

So why are we here? The title of today’s hearing is demanding 

accountability of the administration’s reckless release of terrorists 

from Guantanamo. 

Since we say reckless release, it sounds like people’s minds are 

made up and I want to make sure all the facts are on the table 

because I think there’s plenty of blame to go all around. I think the 

chairman raises legitimate issues but I do think there’s plenty of 

blame to go around. 

First, the vast majority of Guantanamo detainees were transferred out of the prison before President Obama took office. A total 

of 780 detainees have been held in Guantanamo. 

During the Bush administration, 500 were transferred out, compared to 159 detainees under President Obama. Secondly, let’s look 

at the number of transferred detainees who returned to the battlefield. The figure 30 percent gets thrown around a lot but what goes 

into that number? 

Turns out it includes the total number of transferred detainees 

that we know for sure have returned to the fight as well as those 

suspected of re-engagement over the entire life of the Guantanamo 

Prison 2001 to present. 

During the Bush years, 2001 to 2008, the rate of suspected and 

confirmed cases of re-engagement was actually higher than that, 35 

percent, with 21 percent of the cases confirmed and 14 percent suspected. 

So let me say that again. More than one-third of the terrorists 

that President Bush’s administration transferred may have returned to the fight. Now let’s contrast that with the Obama administration. 

Under President Obama, that number, again, totaling suspected 

and confirmed cases, drops to 13 percent. Eight percent suspected 

and just 5 percent confirmed. That 5 percent represents seven people. 

Now, I know one person escaping this is one person too much. 

But I just want to have a balanced hearing here because if we’ve 

already made up our minds and talking about the administration 

being reckless, it doesn’t seem to me like we are really here to 

learn anything more. 

I reiterate at most 13 percent of those transfers since January 

2009 have re-engaged compared to as much as 35 percent during 

the previous administration. The contrast is striking. But let’s not 

4

get lost in the numbers because this is perhaps the most important 

point. 

The transferred detainees who returned to the battlefield and 

killed Americans were let out during the Bush administration, not 

during the Obama administration. 

So if we are going to paint with a broad brush and say 30 percent of transferred detainees may be going back to the fight and 

killing Americans, we need to take the whole story and put it into 

perspective. The Bush administration racked up that average and 

then some. 

The Obama administration has helped to bring it back down. 

Thirdly, the administration’s closure plan would not transfer any 

person who does not meet the most stringent criteria. 

I’ve heard claims that the remaining detainees are the worst of 

the worst and the administration simply wants to turn them loose. 

That’s false. 

Twenty-nine of 79 remaining detainees are cleared for transfer. 

Among them are 22 Yemenis. The administration isn’t transferring 

them yet. As a matter of policy we transfer detainees to their home 

countries. But in the case of Yemen the government cannot provide 

adequate security assurances. 

So the administration has pumped the brakes out of an abundance of caution. We need to find countries that can provide adequate assurances before those 22 are transferred. 

That leaves 50. Some of these are really bad guys. Ten of them 

will stand trial. Another 40 are being legitimately held as prisoners 

of war. But under no circumstances, in my opinion, is the Obama 

administration simply opening the gate and releasing dangerous 

terrorists onto the street. 

Look, Guantanamo is a mess and it always has been. No one is 

blameless. Anyone can cherry pick single cases to paint a picture 

big or small, good or bad. But I think the facts and the statistics 

speak for themselves. 

And I think what we should do after this, instead of having the 

witnesses come and tell us that they can only tell us things in a 

classified briefing, is to spend our time with them after this hearing in a few weeks where we could be in a closed setting getting 

to the bottom of this matter. 

Now, the Foreign Affairs Committee obviously has oversight on 

this issue. The hearing last March and today’s hearing are the only 

two times that the committee has taken up this issue in the nearly 

15 years that Guantanamo Prison has been open. So since we have 

our top Guantanamo experts with us today, I hope you can give us 

your opinions on some interesting ideas we’ve recently heard about 

that prison. I am going to read you a few quotes. 

You may recognize them. I’ll give you a hint. It’s one of the candidates running for President. Here’s the first:

‘‘This morning I watched President Obama talking about 

Gitmo, Guantanamo Bay, which by the way we are keeping 

open and we are going to load it up with some bad dudes. 

We’re going to load it up.’’

And the second quote:

5

‘‘Torture works, okay, folks. Believe me, it works, and water 

boarding is your minor form. Some people say it is not actually 

torture. Let’s assume it is. But they ask me the question, what 

do you think of water boarding? Absolutely fine, but we should 

go much stronger than waterboarding. We should go much 

stronger because our country is in trouble.’’

So I just want to say that I read that because, you know, some 

people say they want to expand the Guantanamo Prison and torture. I can’t think of a worse proposal for our national security. 

These schemes would only harm us with their allies and provide 

ammunition to our adversaries. Mr. Wolosky, Mr. Lewis, at some 

point today maybe we can hear your views on what would happen 

if we went in that direction. 

Again, I hate doing tit for tats but I do think it is not really fair 

to blame the administration for all the frustrations we have about 

Guantanamo when we see that there were problems and wrong 

things done in the previous administration as well. So I look forward to listening to you and hearing your thoughts and thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

This morning we are pleased to be joined by Special Envoy Lee 

Wolosky, Special Envoy for Guantanamo Closure at the U.S. Department of State. Previously, Mr. Wolosky served as the Director 

for Transnational Threats on the National Security Council under 

President Clinton. 

And Mr. Paul Lewis is joining us. We are pleased that he is here, 

Special Envoy for Guantanamo Detention Closure at the U.S. Department of Defense. Previously, Mr. Lewis served as both the general counsel and the minority general counsel on the U.S. Armed 

Services Committee. Without objection, the witnesses’ full prepared 

statements will be made part of the record. 

Members will have 5 calendar days to submit any statements or 

questions or any extraneous material they might want to submit 

for the record and I’d like to remind everyone including our witnesses that willful misrepresentation or false statements by a witness is a criminal offense under 18 U.S. Code § 1001. 

Indeed, that is the case for all of our hearings and Special Envoy 

Wolosky, please summarize your remarks. 

STATEMENT OF MR. LEE WOLOSKY, SPECIAL ENVOY FOR 

GUANTANAMO CLOSURE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member Engel, distinguished members of the committee. Good 

morning. 

I appreciate your inviting me once again to appear before this 

committee. I look forward to continuing our discussion in closed 

session either later today as we have offered or as soon as possible 

so that we can have a fuller discussion of some of the classified topics we know are of interest to the committee. 

Altogether, a total of 779 detainees have passed through Guantanamo and of those 700 have departed. The vast majority of detainees transferred out of Guantanamo to other countries—some 532—

were transferred by the administration of George W. Bush. Under 

6

President Obama, a total of 159 detainees have been transferred. 

Today, 79 remain. 

President Bush acted to whittle the detainee population because 

he understood that, and I quote, ‘‘the detention facility had become 

a propaganda tool for our enemies and a distraction for our allies.’’ 

President Obama has continued detainee transfers for many of the 

same reasons. Of the 79 detainees detained at Guantanamo today, 

29 are currently approved for transfer. Detainees have been designated as approved for transfer during this administration 

through one of two rigorous interagency processes. 

First, soon after taking office, President Obama ordered the first 

ever comprehensive interagency review of all of the 242 detainees 

then in U.S. custody. 

In 2009 and 2010, the Guantanamo Review Task Force, sometimes also called the Executive Order Task Force, which was comprised of more than 60 national security professionals from across 

the government, assembled all reasonable available information 

relevant to determining an appropriate disposition for each detainee. 

Then, based on the task force’s recommendations, the Departments of Defense, State, Justice and Homeland Security, the Office 

of the Director for National Intelligence and the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff unanimously determined the appropriate disposition for each 

detainee: Transfer, referral for prosecution or continued law of war 

detention. 

Second, pursuant to Executive Order 13567, detainees who are 

not—who were not approved for transfer in 2009 and 2010 could 

be subject to additional review by the Periodic Review Board. 

The PRB is comprised of senior representatives from six agencies 

and departments. None of the PRB representatives are political appointees. 

Having described how Guantanamo detainees have been approved for transfer, I would now like to briefly describe the process 

for transferring detainees. 

Decisions regarding whether, when and where to transfer a detainee are the culmination of another rigorous interagency process. 

The Department of State leads diplomatic negotiations with foreign 

governments regarding the transfer of Guantanamo detainees. 

But we are typically joined in our discussions by senior career officials from the Departments of Defense, Justice and Homeland Security as well as those in the intelligence community and on the 

joint staff. Generally, transfer negotiations occur in two steps. 

First, the U.S. Government obtains or reconfirms a political commitment that the potential receiving country is willing in principle 

to resettle or repatriate detainees and to impose various measures 

that will substantially mitigate the threat the detainees may pose 

after transfer. 

Second, we engage in technical discussions with foreign officials 

responsible for implementing these measures. These technical discussions offer the opportunity to tailor the integration and security 

measures to specific circumstances under consideration, to share 

best practices from previous detainee transfers and perhaps most 

importantly to determine based on an individualized assessment of 

these specific circumstances whether the statutory standard in the 

7

NDAA governing the foreign transfer of Guantanamo detainees can 

be met. 

Once we conclude that our diplomatic negotiations will result in 

a security framework that we assess will substantially mitigate the 

threat a detainee may pose after transfer, the Secretary of Defense 

consults with the Secretaries of State, Homeland Security and the 

Attorney General, the Director of National Intelligence and the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the transfer. 

Only after the Secretary of Defense receives the views of those 

principals and only if he is satisfied that the requirements of the 

NDAA are satisfied does the Secretary of Defense sign and transmit a certification to the Congress conveying his intention to transfer detainees. 

Ladies and gentlemen of the committee, let me close by saying 

that although we would obviously prefer that no former detainees 

engage in terrorist or insurgent activity following his transfer, we 

believe that the low rate of confirmed re-engagement for detainees 

transferred since January 2009, under 5 percent, is testament to 

the rigorous interagency approach the administration has taken to 

both approving detainees for transfer and to negotiating and vetting detainee transfer frameworks. 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wolosky follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

Mr. Lewis. 

STATEMENT OF MR. PAUL M. LEWIS, SPECIAL ENVOY FOR 

GUANTANAMO DETENTION CLOSURE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE 

Mr. LEWIS. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, distinguished members of the committee, Representative Donovan, thank 

you for the opportunity to testify again regarding the administration’s Guantanamo detainee transfer process. 

Secretary Carter has approved the transfer of 43 detainees, 28 

of whom have been transferred this year. Secretary Hagel approved 

the transfer of 44 detainees. Secretary Panetta, 7, and Secretary 

Gates, 65. 

During this administration, 159 detainees have been transferred. 

Mr. Chairman, we understand the importance of this issue to you 

and this committee and we appreciate the attention you have given 

to it. 

As I stated in March at the outset, I’d like to reiterate one continuing fundamental point regarding this detention facility. The 

President and his National Security Committee have determined 

that closing this detention facility is a national security imperative. 

Imperative is a strong term. The President in his leadership of 

the national security team believe that the continued operation of 

the detention facility weakens our national security. 

Closing Guantanamo is about protecting the country, not weakening it. As you know, the importance in closing this detention facility is echoed by former President George W. Bush and a long list 

of former Secretaries of State, Secretaries of Defense, Joint Staff 

Chairmen, and other former military leaders. 

As Representative Engel noted, a letter was provided to the committee by former flag officers, including a former commandant of 

the Marine Corps. Transfers from Gitmo are in the national security interest of the United States and are conducted in a safe and 

responsible manner. 

On March 23, 2016, I testified before this committee. During that 

hearing, as the chairman noted, I was asked whether the Department of Defense had ever knowingly transferred a detainee to a 

country that did not exhibit an ability to substantially mitigate the 

risk or control the individual. 

In response to that question, I stated that the Department of Defense had not conducted such a transfer. I stand by my response. 

We have addressed your concerns, Mr. Chairman, in the letter 

that we sent to you this week and I, again, apologize for the late 

response. But I want to briefly highlight several points. 

Here’s our statutory framework: The 2016 NDAA requires that 

at least 30 days prior to any transfer and in addition to other requirements the Secretary of Defense certify to Congress that the 

receiving country has taken or agreed to take steps to substantially 

mitigate any risk that the individual could attempt to re-engage or 

otherwise threaten the United States. We have met that statutory 

requirement with each of our transfers. 

Prior to the transfer of any detainee to a foreign country, the 

United States Government receives security assurances from the 

14

receiving country regarding the actions that the receiving country 

has taken or agrees to take to substantially mitigate the risk. 

After the assurances are negotiated, the Secretary of Defense 

and his senior staff engage in a robust review process that considers many factors, including all of the intelligence that the government has regarding the threat posed by the individual detainee 

and the security assurances. 

Importantly, updated intelligence, medical, and compliance information is provided to each country regarding the detainees under 

consideration for the transfer. Many countries also take the opportunity to travel to Gitmo to interview transfer candidates. 

After full consideration of all this information, including a full 

and updated assessment from the intelligence community, the Secretary makes the determination to that I told you about earlier. 

As Secretary Carter has testified and Secretary Hagel testified, 

they take this responsibility very seriously. Secretary Carter has 

said he will not transfer a detainee that he does not believe is in 

the security interests of the United States to do so. 

These transfers have not been conducted in a vacuum, sir. Each 

transfer is formally notified to Congress and we regularly brief 

members and staff on transfers. 

With the notice of each transfer we offer to brief congressional 

leadership and members and staff of all the national security committees. I appreciate the opportunity we have had to regularly brief 

you and your staff regarding these transfers. 

Briefly, I think it is important to put these recent transfer decisions on foreign policy context for this committee. Many countries 

in the international community want to close Gitmo and have 

stepped up to help us. 

Specifically, over 30 countries since 2009 have accepted for resettlement Guantanamo detainees that are not nationals of their 

country. 

Additionally, there is sustained support for our closure efforts 

from civil society organizations, both domestic and abroad, including the Organization for American States. Even the Vatican has expressed the support for our closure efforts. 

In summary, each transfer is only approved after careful scrutiny 

by the intensive interagency review process and the negotiation of 

the security assurances sufficient to substantially mitigate any 

threat. 

Finally, I’d like to take a moment to again recognize the military 

service members who conduct detention operations at Guantanamo. 

These men and women continue to have our deepest appreciation 

for their service and the professionalism they display each and 

every day on behalf of our Nation. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lewis follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Lewis. 

The last time you appeared before this committee we asked specific questions about the transfer of detainees to countries ill 

equipped to handle them. 

Specifically, we asked whether the Department of Defense ever 

transferred a detainee to a country that it knew was incapable of 

maintaining control of that individual and keeping him from returning to the battlefield. Mr. Lewis responded no, Mr. Wolosky 

stated that he was not aware of such an instance. 

Upon further review of your own intelligence assessments, those 

answers appear to be false. In fact, it appears that the administration has released dangerous terrorists to ill-equipped countries on 

numerous occasions. 

On May 16, I wrote to your departments asking you to correct 

the record. You did not. The committee asked the administration 

to halt all transfers until you explained your testimony. You did 

not. 

In fact, you completely ignored the letter until we called this 

hearing and that is why we are here today. And I am going to ask 

you several simple questions and I’d appreciate a simple yes or no 

answer. 

Mr. Lewis, Mr. Wolosky, in your roles do you have access to intelligence assessments of detainees and transfer countries? 

Mr. LEWIS. Yes. 

Chairman ROYCE. Do you review those intelligence assessments 

prior to the transfer of detainees to the custody of foreign governments? 

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WOLOSKY. We review the intelligence assessments that are 

material to the issue before us, which is whether to transfer a detainee to a specific country under certain circumstances in order to 

be able to meet the statutory standard. 

Chairman ROYCE. Right. And in my May 16th letter I referenced 

three intelligence reports submitted to Congress pursuant to Section 1023 of the National Defense Authorization Act, those reports 

are dated May 31, 2013, July 15, 2014, August 6, 2015. Are you 

familiar with the content of those reports? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Yes. 

Mr. LEWIS. Yes. 

Chairman ROYCE. Are you aware that those reports contains assessments of each country to which the Defense Department has 

transferred detainees? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Yes. 

Mr. LEWIS. Yes. 

Chairman ROYCE. And are you aware that those assessments indicate that some countries lack the ability to control those terrorists? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. We cannot by law discuss classified Defense Intelligence Agency assessments in this session, Mr. Chairman. We’re 

happy to do that in closed session. 

What I would point out to the committee is that in connection 

with each transfer we do rely on intelligence reporting that is 

broader than just DIA reporting and as I said it is tailored specifically to the issue of a transfer to a certain country at a particular 

23

point in time and is geared toward a determination or an analysis 

of whether the relevant statutory standard for transfers can be 

met. 

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Chairman, the reports you refer to are one of 

many reports we look at. We look at all source information from 

the intelligence community and as the Envoy has stated, the Secretary makes his determination looking at all the evidence that is 

available, the updated evidence, and in particular he makes his assessment after we overlay the security assurances to that country. 

So if the intelligence tells us that there may be a gap in capabilities that is what we negotiate the assurances for. So again, we look 

at those records, Mr. Chairman. But we look at a much broader 

array of records. 

Chairman ROYCE. I am going to explain to you, Mr. Lewis, that 

is not what you said here in March, all right. And in light of your 

familiarity with the intelligence reports and what is in those reports, I am just going to ask you again: Has the administration 

ever transferred a detainee to a country it knew was incapable of 

monitoring that individual or preventing him from traveling outside the country or otherwise keeping him from returning to the 

battlefield? 

Mr. LEWIS. Sir, since I’ve worked for Secretary Hagel and Secretary Carter, every transfer has met the statutory requirement 

and it is my understanding that the administration, prior to my 

coming, transfer pursuant to the process that Envoy Wolosky indicated and there are no transfers that I am aware of that did not 

meet the statutory requirement. 

Chairman ROYCE. I don’t think you can just wish away intelligence reports that raise grave concerns, reports that you chose to 

deny when asked about them in our last hearing. 

But if you’re now saying that the intelligence reports are—I assume the implication here—incomplete, then I have to say from 

what we can tell the President has made a political decision to 

close Guantanamo no matter what the cost to national security 

based upon our experience, based upon our discussions which go on 

for some considerable time now in terms of the warnings from us 

on this committee about the five individuals who were transferred 

to Uruguay and their subsequent conduct and now the fact that 

one of them has been released. 

That can be the only reason why these intelligence assessments 

are being pushed aside, in my judgement. And it appears that the 

assurances that you got from Uruguay didn’t account for anything. 

This fellow, Jihad Diyab, walked right out of Uruguay. We have 

no idea where he is, and if that country is telling you that they 

won’t prevent their travel, which is what I pointed out to you, then 

we’d better listen. 

If they are not going to prevent their travel then it is not a surprise what subsequently has occurred. So Mr. Wolosky, you have 

briefed this committee several times about Uruguay. You have told 

us repeatedly that the Government of Uruguay was capable of handling these terrorists. 

In fact, you testified on March 23rd that ‘‘we are confident, to 

your question, that the Government of Uruguay is taking appropriate steps to substantially mitigate the risk associated with each 

24

of the six detainees that have been transferred to its custody.’’ That 

turned out to be wrong, as I’ve pointed out. 

Jihad Diyab has now escaped. Now, the other point I would 

make out may make to you, and this also goes to some of the conversations he’s had, is that I am aware this was the third time he 

left Uruguay and nobody knows where he is. 

The media is reporting that he could be on his way to Syria or 

Yemen. And I would just like to ask: Why did you provide false assurances to Congress? Why did you mislead us about Uruguay’s capabilities? Because I made it very clear to you our concerns about 

Uruguay’s capabilities. They were pretty up front. 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Mr. Chairman, I strongly disagree with any suggestion that I misled this committee. In fact, I stand by my testimony from March in which I affirmed that Uruguay had committed 

to and is in fact taking steps to substantially mitigate the risk of 

the six detainees that were transferred to its custody in December 

2014. 

While we would have preferred that Mr. Diyab remained in Uruguay, if in fact he is not in Uruguay currently, until the expiration 

of the 2-year resettlement program that was the subject of the 

agreement reached with Uruguay and reached with him, frankly, 

the fact is is that the standard is not elimination of risk. 

It is mitigation of risk, and we never represented to this committee that there was a travel prohibition. 

What the President’s closure plan describes generally, and I cannot get into this forum—into the specific assurances provided by 

the Government of Uruguay, but what the President’s plan describes are travel restrictions. 

The President’s plan describes specifically the withholding of 

international travel documents. 

Now, there are a number of additional steps that we take and 

our partners take to restrict travel and to monitor travel. I cannot 

go into those in an open session. 

I am happy to describe them to you even in this specific context 

of Uruguay in a closed session. But I cannot do it here. 

Chairman ROYCE. But let me explain this simple fact to you. 

When a country tells you that they won’t prevent a terrorist from 

traveling then you had better listen if your intention is to release 

that terrorist into that country. 

But my time has expired. I will go to Mr. Eliot Engel of New 

York. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Lewis, let me start with you. In a hearing before this committee in March you discussed the issue of former Guantanamo detainees killing Americans. 

According to White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest, none of 

the former detainees who have gone through a screening process 

implemented by this administration in the 2009 have harmed 

Americans. 

To quote Mr. Earnest, from March of this year, and I quote him, 

‘‘No one who’s been released from prison at Guantanamo Bay on 

President Obama’s watch has been implicated in violence against 

Americans.’’

25

So I would like to ask both of you: How has the Obama administration changed the detainee transfer process from the process used 

before President Obama took office, or has he not changed it? 

I understand it is been changed. How have these changes helped 

prevent former detainees from harming Americans? So why don’t 

we start with you, Mr. Wolosky? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Sure. Thank you, Congressman Engel. Five hundred and thirty-two detainees from Guantanamo were released 

under the administration of George W. Bush. The fact is that we 

can’t tell you much about the circumstances under which they were 

released. 

We can speak to what our administration has done and what we 

understand to have been the process in the previous administration. 

So first, we engage in a rigorous interagency evidence-based 

process reliant predominantly on career government officials to determine first if a detainee may in principle be designated as approved for transfer. 

That’s the first step. This is an interagency process that includes 

many career professionals throughout the government and as I describe in my testimony in this administration there are actually 

two separate processes at various points in the administration to 

first determine whether in principle a detainee may be safely 

transferred, subject to security assurances. 

Second thing we do, very carefully, is we negotiate for detainees 

who have been approved for transfer specific security assurance 

packages consistent with local law in the places that we transfer 

these detainees to and after obtaining a political commitment from 

the country in question that under the circumstances in question 

the measures to be put in place by the country—monitoring, travel 

restrictions, information sharing, integration planning—will mitigate substantially the risk that that particular detainee may pose. 

That’s what we do, and what we have done, as I said in my opening statement, has reduced the re-engagement rate, the confirmed 

rate to under 5 percent. It’s much higher in the previous administration. 

We believe that that reflects the fact that the things that I just 

described simply weren’t done in the previous administration. But 

that is what we have done. Thank you. 

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Engel, it is a more rigorous process. The process 

in the previous administration was only DoD—primarily only DoD, 

as Envoy Wolosky has said, this is interagency. 

When the Obama administration took office there were about 240 

detainees at Gitmo. We took a fresh look for over a year at all 

those detainees and decided three categories—those that could be 

eligible for transfer with appropriate security assurances to the 

proper country, those that they wanted to refer for prosecution to 

take a look at prosecution, and those that merited continued law 

of war detention. 

I say it is more rigorous because as Lee said, there’s a broader 

group of career professionals and some political but primarily career professionals, intelligence folks, career prosecutors, who looked 

at these cases. 

26

They also looked at a broader array of evidence. They looked at 

all the evidence that the USG possessed whereas the previous process was primarily DoD evidence. 

And then as we know, Congress weighed in. We now have the 

statutory overlay for all transfers. So the bottom line is, as Lee 

said, it is a much more rigorous and intensive process. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. You know, I think it is important to put 

it into context because, look, even one prisoner escaping is one prisoner too much. So we are not going to say that anything is foolproof. 

Nothing is foolproof. But I think that if we look and see what the 

administration has done and the safeguards that they have tried 

to put in, I feel that we are absolutely doing our best and in fact 

it is a big improvement than the previous administration. 

So let me ask you this. We’ve heard a lot about the challenges 

of closing Guantanamo. It is true that some former detainees have 

re-engaged. I know the chairman is very upset about it and so am 

I. 

But can you help put those cases into context? What are the 

costs of keeping this facility open and how would halting the transfer of cleared detainees affect terrorist recruitment and propaganda 

and coalition efforts to degrade and defeat terrorist organizations? 

Mr. LEWIS. Sir, there are three costs. It’s primarily—it drains our 

expenses, it is wildly, wildly expensive. We can do it cheaper in the 

United States. 

More importantly, for this committee, our allies want us to close 

Gitmo. It hurts us with the international community. In my previous testimony and in my opening statement I outlined indications 

in which members of the previous administration at the Department of State said Gitmo hurt us and I believe it is a propaganda 

and recruiting tool. President Bush said that. Many others have 

said that. 

The bottom fundamental point is we want to protect the country 

and the national security leadership of this administration, President Bush and many people in his administration, numerous Secretaries of Defense, numerous Secretaries of State, the prior military 

officials that we talked about including a commandant in the Marine Corps, have said the cost of Gitmo outweighs the benefit. 

It hurts us. It hurts us with the international community. It 

hurts us with our taxpayer money and it is a recruiting tool. The 

President has made this decision and the national security community leadership has made this decision. Lee? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Sure. Thank you. First, I agree with the Special 

Envoy’s comments and I do feel compelled just to address this notion of terrorists escaping and prisoners escaping and things of that 

sort. 

Just to remind the committee that the individuals that we are 

talking about were held in law-of-war detention by the United 

States. They were lawfully held under law-of-war detention. 

But they weren’t convicted of crimes. When we transfer them to 

foreign countries we transfer them subject to security assurances 

such as travel restrictions. This is what this administration does. 

The previous administration did not do this. 

27

There are a large number of detainees of the 532 transferred in 

the previous administration, certainly, that weren’t even subject to 

the travel restrictions that we put in place on these individuals. 

But, again, just want to make sure that we are getting the terminology right because escaping connotes incarceration. When we 

transfer individuals who the U.S. Government writ large has concluded may be transferred subject to security assurances they are 

transferred subject to those security assurances and at that point 

they are not prisoners. They are former detainees under supervision. 

Mr. ENGEL. I will stop now because I know my time has run out. 

But I wanted to—you know, the thing that irks the chairman and, 

in fact, frankly, irks all of us is the fact that this person was sent 

to Uruguay, and Uruguay, apparently doesn’t have the ability to 

monitor this person who now has left the country. Just briefly, 

could you talk a little bit about the case or do you need to do it 

in a classified setting? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. On the issue of foreign countries’ surveillance capabilities, I would need to discuss that with you in closed session 

and I welcome the opportunity to do so so that you may be informed about what those capabilities are and what they aren’t and 

how they were used and applied in this instance. 

Mr. LEWIS. I echo the Envoy’s comments. We would appreciate 

the opportunity to discuss this in detail. What I can tell you is we 

talked to the Uruguayan authorities on a regular basis. We regularly review intelligence. We regularly look at this and Secretary 

Hagel, who you know is a very forceful, careful, deliberate person, 

signed the congressional notification saying he felt that Uruguay 

could substantially mitigate any threat by this detainee. Again, we 

are happy to discuss this in closed session. 

Mr. ENGEL. I would like to do that in closed session. So I am sure 

we’ll make arrangements to do that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. We’ll make arrangements to do that. At the 

same time, at the end of the day, the Uruguayans gave them the 

travel cards. Gave them the travel card to travel. At the end of the 

day, he walked right out of there three times and this time nobody 

can locate him to get him back into custody and he’s an al-Qaedalinked terrorist. Anyway, I’ll go to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Chairman Royce, for 

calling this hearing and for continuing to demand transparency 

and accountability from the administration regarding its plans for 

naval station Guantanamo Bay and the detention center. 

As you point out, Mr. Chairman, the administration has not been 

forthcoming with the American people about the release of dangerous terrorists to various nations. The reality is that the situation is far different than what we’ve been told. 

So I continue to ask myself why does a nation like Uruguay, why 

does a nation like Ghana, why does a nation like Senegal, as so 

many others, why would they want to take in these dangerous terrorists unless they believe that the benefits outweigh the risk? Unless the administration convinced them that the benefits outweighed the risk. 

And not only that, we are talking about a high-risk, high-threat 

individual and that person has experience in evading authorities, 

28

will conduct operations, going to nations that have limited intelligence that do not possess the most sophisticated monitoring system. 

That was obvious with the Uruguay transfer. And we are to believe that the terrorists will not use that to their advantage? That 

they will be properly overseen? It would probably take them just 

1 day to realize how lax the security is in Uruguay, for example. 

So it is not a surprise, I think, to any of us that one of these individuals managed to flee Uruguay, where we now know that his 

movement was not required to be restricted, to Brazil and from 

there from who knows. 

As the chairman said, he may be en route to Syria or there already. So I would ask you if it is possible to get a yes or no answer, 

has the administration promised any of these countries, whether it 

is Uruguay, Ghana, Senegal, whatever, cash for taking in these individuals and if so how much, how often, and to which countries? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Congresswoman, we have provided de minimis resettlement assistance to certain countries to support expenditures 

such as language training, vocational training, things of that sort. 

That is fully disclosed to the Congress in the congressional notifications that you receive. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And if you could refresh my memory for Uruguay, for example, how much would that country have gotten for 

language and to the other——

Mr. WOLOSKY. I can’t tell you off the top of my head but we are 

happy to provide that information to you supplementally. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I will get the notification—refresh my memory. Has the administration offered any other favorable agreements 

or offered to support these countries on other related matters in exchange and if so what kind of exchanges? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Nothing financial beyond what is in the congressional notifications. Anything related is a broad category. 

I can say generally in open session that many of our partners do 

view a detainee transfer as an opportunity to deepen security and 

counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation with the United 

States. We generally welcome that and we look to facilitate that interest where it exists. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And has the administration provided military equipment or military training in exchange for taking in a detainee and if so to what extent and to which governments? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. No, not to my knowledge. Paul? 

Mr. LEWIS. Ma’am, that is something we’d have to talk about in 

a closed session. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Like night vision goggles or something like 

that? 

Mr. LEWIS. Again, the negotiation of the security assurances is 

very detailed and complex and to discuss any specifics I’d have to 

talk to you about that in a closed session and we are happy to do 

so. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Has the administration provided intelligence 

equipment or training or promised or offered intelligence sharing 

to any government in exchange for accepting a detainee and if so 

to what extent and which governments? 

29

Mr. WOLOSKY. We would have to talk about intelligence matters 

in closed session. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. So it seems to me that the absence of any of 

these agreements wouldn’t need to be discussed in a classified setting. So, I mean, unless you say no to these questions I think it 

would be fair to assume that at least some of this has been happening, is happening. 

Is it the intent of the Obama administration to continue to release all but a handful of the most dangerous detainees in order 

to then say to Congress, well, why keep Gitmo open when we have 

such few detainees there? As if President Obama had not had anything to do with clearing out the number of detainees in the first 

place. 

Mr. WOLOSKY. We intend to continue essentially the policy of the 

previous administration to transfer detainees that we conclude may 

be safely and responsibly transferred outside the custody of the 

United States in accordance with applicable law. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Would it be fair to say that from now until 

the end of this Presidency that we would be seeing more and more 

detainees being released—five, 12, two—until there’s just a handful 

and say hey, look at all this wasted money for just a handful of 

folks, when you’re the ones pushing them out? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. We have 29 detainees who are approved for transfer and our intention is to work to transfer those individuals subject to security assurances. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Well, as you know, there’s a 

great deal of resistance about having them come to the United 

States. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. 

We go to Mr. Brad Sherman of California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. I would like to comment on this over the 

next 5 minutes and I’ll probably offend both political parties. The 

prior administration did release more terrorists than the current 

administration. 

More of those released by the prior administration have been 

caught fighting us on the battlefield. The fact is, much as we like 

to fight as Democrats and Republicans, the policy has been the 

same in both administrations. 

House them only in Guantanamo because we don’t have the political guts to house them here in the United States and release as 

many as possible—far too many, far too quickly, and massively understate the costs of the release. 

We are told that it is wrong to keep them there for the duration 

of the war because the war has lasted too long. That is their fault. 

They waged war against America and no, we never guaranteed 

them that the war would be short. The purpose of incarcerating 

POWs is not only to keep them off the battlefield but to deter their 

comrades. 

When we tell the terrorists around the world if you get caught 

you’ll get released while the war is still going on, we encourage 

their recruitment. 

Now, we are told that there are only 12 identified circumstances 

when Americans have died because of this release. That is such a 

30

massive undercount. First of all, when we release somebody and 

they rejoin the battlefield, do they send us a report? 

Are they listed on LinkedIn? New status, rejoined the terrorist 

movement? And then when one of them at least—when an American dies on the battlefield do we get a report from the terrorists, 

here’s a list of the people who killed him—here’s a list of the people 

who provided them with logistics—here are the people that provided the recruiting—here are the people that provided the financing? 

So I would—unless we are certain that one of these released people is being monitored and is not doing anything to help the terrorists we have to assume that they are waging war against us as 

they did before and the cost of release is also the incredible concessions—Ileana Ros-Lehtinen brought this to our attention. 

All the winks, all the nods. Every country in the world, especially 

small countries, no. Take one detainee. The President of the United 

States is personally indebted to you and when you’ve got a fishing 

concern or if you’re seeking something from the United States now 

or later, the answer is yes. We’ll never get an accounting of that 

because you can’t account for the winks and the nods. 

Now, we are told that Gitmo is a—that we get a tremendous 

propaganda advantage if Gitmo is closed. Of course, we only partially closed it. 

We have no propaganda advantage. It’s still a symbol the other 

side can use as long as it is open with one detainee. But we could 

bring these prisoners to the United States. That does not enhance 

their legal status. 

The Supreme Court has ruled in the Boumediene case and the 

Hamdan case that they have just as many legal rights there as 

they would here. 

But we—here’s an America where we accepted nuclear bases in 

our States knowing that they were targets for the Soviet Union and 

now we can’t even accept a prisoner and we whip up all this fury. 

We have 443 convicted terrorists in American prisons right now. 

I’ll ask our witnesses to raise their hands if they are aware of any 

of those that escaped. I see no hands going up. I am not aware and 

I’ve researched this. 

We’ve got Moussaoui, we’ve got Tsarnaev, we got the shoe bomber, the underwear bomber, the World Trade Center in 1993 bombers, the Oklahoma City bomber, and the Unabomber, and we are 

trying to bring to the United States El Chapo, who escaped Mexican prisons twice. 

We can incarcerate people here and obtain the political advantage that we are told can be achieved by shutting down Gitmo. But 

instead we constantly vote on ways to not do it. If the legal rights 

of these POWs in the United States is too great if they are on U.S. 

soil, that is the fault of Congress. We can pass laws identifying 

that these are POWs. 

They’re nonuniformed enemy combatants and entitled to less protection than those who would wear uniforms fighting against us. So 

we’ve got a lot of dead Americans as a result of this catch and release program. 

We’ve got one party who says we can’t house them here, although we are able to house terrorists here in our prisons, and 

31

we’ve got another political party so anxious to shut things down 

that we massively understate the cost of releasing, and I yield 

back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. Issa of California. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I would just like to bring us up to speed in one area. Is it true 

that under current law, closing Guantanamo is prohibited? This 

isn’t a trick question. 

Mr. WOLOSKY. I don’t think that current law prohibits closing 

Guantanamo. I think that what current law prohibits is the expenditure of money to move detainees at Guantanamo into the 

United States. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. So under current law you can close Guantanamo 

by releasing the prisoners. You just can’t bring them here. That’s 

your assessment? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. I believe the current law prohibits detainees from 

being brought into the United States. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. So the reason that you both have titles that say 

Special Envoy for Guantanamo Closure is because your job is to 

close Guantanamo. Is that right? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Sir, that is correct. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. So now I just—I got a yes and that is far 

enough. 

Mr. LEWIS. Sir, my title is Guantanamo Detention Closure. We’re 

not closing the naval facility. 

Mr. ISSA. No, I understand that the President who loves Chavez—or loves the Castros enough to open up relations—has not decided to give back what we have in perpetuity. So we’ll leave that 

aside. 

Your job is to close the detention. You are working toward that. 

I just want to ask one or two fairly simple questions. 

It’s been said many times on both sides of the dais that President 

George W. Bush’s administration released more prisoners actually 

than you inherited, right? He released more than you have? 

Mr. LEWIS. Yes. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. And during that time it has been discovered and 

during this administration it has been discovered and made public 

that in fact some released by the Bush administration went back 

and killed Americans on the battlefield in Afghanistan and other 

places. Is that correct? 

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ISSA. So George W. Bush released more prisoners, attempted 

to vet them, was wrong. They went back, they killed Americans on 

the battlefield and we know it and the public knows it, right? 

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. So George W. Bush’s failures are now very public. They released people who went back and killed Americans on 

the battlefield. Okay. Like Mr. Sherman, that is not necessarily 

with my party. 

This President has released many additional people who have returned to Afghanistan. Are you prepared to say that none of them 

killed Americans? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. You’re talking about Guantanamo detainees——

32

Mr. ISSA. Guantanamo. 

Mr. WOLOSKY [continuing]. Returned to Afghanistan in 2009? 

Mr. ISSA. Guantanamo detainees released after 2009 who in fact 

went back and killed Americans. 

Mr. WOLOSKY. The assessment of the intelligence community is 

that no detainees released since 2009 during this administration 

are responsible for the deaths of Americans. 

Mr. ISSA. So your public statement is that no detainees released 

by this administration have killed Americans on the battlefield as 

of today? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Correct. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. I just want to make sure I have it on the record 

because I don’t believe it. But you can say it and you’re under oath 

and I believe it that you believe it. 

So I just want to make sure we understand. We’re sitting here 

and somehow President George W. Bush early on, releasing the 

less dangerous, the easier to vet, the less likely to be a hardened 

criminal terrorist—terrorists, not criminals—they were released. 

They killed Americans. You’re releasing people, they are not killing 

Americans. How do you account for that? Is this rehabilitation that 

you’ve done? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Sir, there are a lot of factual predicates embodied 

in your question that would require some correction. 

Mr. ISSA. Well, President Bush released people. They killed 

Americans. You released people. They didn’t kill Americans on the 

battlefield. How do you account for that difference that you’ve said 

under oath? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. As I indicated in my testimony submitted for the 

record, we have put in place procedures that are comprehensive, 

they are rigorous, they are interagency in nature and we believe 

that, as a result, those procedures have contributed to the very 

substantial reduction in the re-engagement rates seen between 

both administrations. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. Well, let’s do that. You’ve used procedures that 

have limited re-engagement. But it hasn’t eliminated re-engagement, correct? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. That’s correct. 

Mr. ISSA. So you’ve released people after 2009. They have re-engaged. They’re back on the battlefield attempting to kill Americans, 

right? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. It is not correct to say that anyone who has reengaged under the definitions used by the intelligence community 

for confirmed or suspected re-engagement is back on the battlefield. 

Again, I am happy to talk or, better yet, the intelligence community can speak to the committee about the standards that are used. 

But it is an overstatement to say that an individual, for instance, 

who has been suspected of re-engagement is on the battlefield seeking to do harm to coalition forces. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. But I just—you know, it is just one of these 

things that I think in a very public—it is not—this is not something that needs to be privately discussed. It’s something—now, 

Madam Chair, if I can have 30 more seconds. My predecessors did. 

People that were released under Bush re-engaged and killed 

Americans. You’ll have us believe in a public environment that alVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:03 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\070716\20652 SHIRL
33

though people released under this administration were more hardened criminals—these were the people that were in fact not released under Bush because he thought they were too dangerous. 

They’ve been released. You’re saying in a public forum that they 

re-engaged but you’re saying nobody died. 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Sir, again, it is incorrect to assume that individuals released under Bush are less dangerous or more dangerous 

than released during this administration. 

Again, this would require a rather long discussion about why, for 

instance, the overwhelming preponderance of the detainees who 

were approved for transfer or who remain in Guantanamo today 

are from Yemen. 

So it is just simply not correct to make blanket assessments 

about who is more or who is less dangerous or, frankly, what the 

procedures—you keep talking about vetting done by the Bush administration. 

Again, we are not aware of the type of vetting that was done in 

that administration. So, again, there are a lot of premises embedded in your question. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Issa. 

Mr. Duncan of South Carolina I am sure will follow through. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Do you need some more time, the gentleman from 

California? 

Mr. ISSA. Thirty more seconds. 

Mr. DUNCAN. You’re yielded 30 seconds. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you. I just want to understand. We have heard 

endlessly that the Bush administration released people and they 

went back on the battlefield and President George W. Bush and his 

administration have to live with the fact that they thought these 

people could be safely released back to Qatar and to other countries 

and in some cases they were wrong. 

But you continued to work toward closure by release back to 

these countries, Yemen being a particular area of concern, and I 

just want to make sure the American public hears in an open session that you believe that you have been flawless in that no Americans have died because of people released on this President’s watch 

and you’ve said that. 

So I want to thank the gentleman that was very kind to let me 

recap. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, and thanks for your approach to everything, Chairman Issa. 

I first off want to apologize to the lady with the Department of 

State for coming across abrasive about another issue and I thank 

you for your help on that other matter. 

We have established the fact that one of the Uruguayan Six has 

disappeared. We’ve also established the fact, I think, that there are 

certain requirements and parameters that must be met before detainees are transferred to a third country. 

Uruguay told us—well, first off, Uruguayan law prevented intelligence monitoring and mitigation and former President Mutica 

said publicly that his government would place no restrictions on 

the movements of the six detainees that were released to Uruguay. 

34

Later, we had their chief intelligence officer proudly inform the 

U.S. Embassy that these Uruguayan Six—the Gitmo Six—would 

not be restricted in any way and that he was not authorized to conduct monitoring or surveillance. 

But if we go back to the requirements that have been talked 

about numerous times here this morning, surveillance and monitoring and some assurances were part of the deal. 

So America needs to understand that one of the six detainees 

captured on the battlefield, al-Qaeda operatives captured either in 

Tora Bora or Afghanistan, has disappeared. Uruguay, Brazil, 

United States at this point have no idea where this individual is. 

Now, this individual that we are talking about, Jihad Diyab, is 

a forger. He was responsible for forging documents, passports, travel documents for al-Qaeda terrorists. He’s now disappeared into 

Brazil. 

So let’s take it to the 30,000-foot level and think about Brazil in 

general. We’ve got an area in Brazil and Paraguay known as the 

tri-border region. A lot of folks are transiting through Latin America through an area known as the tri-border region. 

They’re coming to South America, to that area, often times on 

fake passports—not necessarily forged passports, they are just 

passports that don’t belong to them. And they are exchanging those 

documents in that region for other false documents and trying to 

transit through Latin America to get to America, to get to the 

United States. 

Case in point—five Syrians traveled to the tri-border region in 

Brazil on fake Israeli passports. The hypocrisy of that, I think is 

alarming, that Syrians traveled to the tri-border region on fake 

Israeli passports, exchanged those documents for somewhere 

around $25,000 for fake Greek passports that they used to travel 

to Honduras. 

Apprehended in an airport in Honduras trying to come to the 

United States on fake Greek passports. So now we have a Gitmo 

detainee forger for al-Qaeda has escaped, disappeared, whatever 

you want to call it, into Brazil possibly to the tri-border region to 

assist others from the battlefield. 

ISIS operatives, possibly, coming to that area, exchanging documents, getting new forged documents or fake documents to possibly 

travel to the United States of America. But let’s take it another 

step. There’s a huge event getting ready to happen in Brazil known 

as the Olympics and that is a heck of a terrorist target, folks. 

So we’ve got an al-Qaeda operative who is a forger, who has escaped in Brazil or disappeared in Brazil who has the ability to 

forge documents and he’s in a country that is getting ready to host 

the Olympics. 

I hope our counterterrorism efforts in Brazil, working with our 

allies there, are full bore. 

So I am going to ask, now that this gentleman has escaped—he’s 

gone missing, rather—is the Obama administration concerned 

about that? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Sir, as I indicated previously, it would have been 

our preference that all six of the detainees transferred to Uruguay, 

stayed in Uruguay. 

35

Mr. DUNCAN. You’ve stated that. I asked you a question. Is the 

Obama administration concerned over Jihad Diyab’s disappearance? Yes or no. 

Mr. WOLOSKY. As I said, I would have preferred that he stayed 

in Uruguay with the five other detainees through the end of the 

program, which was for another few months until December 2014. 

If you’re asking me what concerns me, frankly, it is the 532 who 

were transferred during the previous administration. Without 

the——

Mr. DUNCAN. We have established the fact that we all wished he 

would have stayed in Uruguay and would be right there with the 

other five. What I am asking you is the Obama administration concerned that he has disappeared? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. And I believe I’ve answered your question. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Lewis. 

Mr. LEWIS. Sir, we are closely——

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. Knowing what you know now, will you publicly repudiate the Sloan letter about the Uruguayan concerns so 

the Uruguayan Government, who this administration tricked, I 

think, about these people, can finally begin monitoring and controlling the remaining five detainees? Will you repudiate the Sloan letter? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. We stand by the Sloan letter and we stand by the 

representations that we made to the Government of Uruguay at 

the time of the transfer. 

In fact, I believe that the Uruguayans told you, Congressman, 

when you visited, that they believed the United States had provided accurate information about each of the detainees transferred 

to their custody. 

Mr. DUNCAN. They did, and that contradicted some previous 

statements they had made publicly. So——

Mr. WOLOSKY. Why do you think that is? 

Mr. DUNCAN. I am sorry? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Why do you think that is? 

Mr. DUNCAN. We can go back through all of this. 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Why would they say one thing to you and another 

thing privately? 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Duncan, could you yield for a minute? 

Mr. DUNCAN. I can. 

Chairman ROYCE. I did want to put something in perspective for 

our witnesses here and it has to do with why the chairman of the 

Western Subcommittee would be upset here. And the fact is that 

the chief of intelligence in Uruguay explained to our committee, 

gave us the information that they were not allowed to monitor or 

surveille these six terrorists and the decision you made was to 

transfer them anyway. 

He made that observation to this committee prior to the transfer. 

You made the decision to transfer these six despite our warnings. 

The second point that is upsetting to him is that the intelligence 

chief was then dismissed from his position after warning us of that 

and subsequently warning us that they were casing—that they 

were outside our Embassy after their release and, again, that they 

were not allowed to monitor or surveille. 

36

Now we find ourselves in the situation—despite Jeff Duncan’s 

admonitions and concerns and despite what we brought up at the 

prior hearing—we find ourselves in the situation where one of 

these six terrorists has indeed been able to walk out of Uruguay 

and no one knows where he is but we do know his attitude and this 

is the reason for our concern. 

But I thank Mr. Duncan for his trips and his work on behalf of 

the committee. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I want to thank the chairman for helping clarify 

that. The pattern is clear. We have been asking about these Gitmo 

Six and about the Uruguayans’ ability to monitor them for a long 

time now and we have raised concern about events such as what 

we’ve witnessed in the last 60 days where one of the six has just 

disappeared who was an al-Qaeda terrorist. 

There’s no doubt about it. He was a forger. And we are supposed 

to tell these countries that these weren’t terrorists, they weren’t 

engaged in attacking or hurting our allies or our United States 

military in any way. Very clear that he was. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go to Mr. Matt Salmon of Arizona. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Last time you were here, Mr. Lewis, you testified that Americans 

have been killed and I am going to piggyback on Mr. Issa and Mr. 

Duncan’s questions. 

You subsequently notified the committee that those deaths occurred in Afghanistan by as many as 14 former detainees all who 

were released by the Bush administration and I’d just like to ask 

a few questions about that. 

How many Americans were killed? Were they U.S. servicemen 

and -women, civilians or both? What are their names and where 

are they from? 

Mr. LEWIS. Sir, it is our understanding that there are 14 and I 

can get you the specifics on that. I believe we’ve—the intelligence 

community can get you those specific details. But the number is 14. 

Many of the incidents were in large-scale firefights in a war zone. 

So we can’t always distinguish whether Americans were killed by 

former detainees or other participants. But the intelligence community can get you the specific details that you asked for, sir. 

Mr. SALMON. Okay. And just to recap the specifics, I’d like to 

know whether they were servicemen or servicewomen or civilians 

or both and I’d like to know what their names are and where they 

are from. Those are the things I’d like and you can provide or get 

me all of that? 

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SALMON. That’ll be very, very helpful. And then just to piggyback on some of the other questions, knowing that there were casualties associated with those detainees to Afghanistan, you then as 

an administration decided then it was okay to still release detainees to Afghanistan? Is that correct? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. It may have been correct at the moment. I can assure you that each detainee transferred to Afghanistan or, frankly, 

anywhere else is subject to the review of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff and I can tell you that the State Department would 

37

not concur in any transfer of a detainee to Afghanistan over the objection of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Mr. SALMON. Well, prior to releasing detainees to Afghanistan, 

did the intelligence community assess that the Government of Afghanistan was incapable of maintaining custody and control of 

these individuals? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. The standard isn’t maintaining custody and control because they are not transferred into custody. The standard is 

substantially mitigating the threat that they may pose and, again, 

these are determinations that would have been made in conjunction with and subject to the consultation with the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff if in fact they occurred in this administration. 

I believe that there have been. 

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, Congressman, there have been transfers to Afghanistan and as Envoy Wolosky says, we do consult with the field 

commanders in Afghanistan prior to any transfer and, again, those 

transfers have been made under the statutory standard that any 

threat is going to be substantially mitigated by the host nation. So 

it is better to talk about this in a closed setting, sir. 

Mr. SALMON. But you did state for the record that one of your 

criteria for releasing them to Afghanistan was not monitoring. 

That’s not a concern. You didn’t care whether they were able to 

monitor or not? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. We can’t speak to specific security assurances 

with specific countries in an open session. But what I can say is 

that any transfer to Afghanistan would have involved the consultation and concurrence of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

That’s certainly what we do in all transfers, particularly in a 

place like Afghanistan. We at the State Department currently 

would not consent to any transfer to a place like Afghanistan unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurs in the transfer. 

Mr. SALMON. Well, Afghanistan is an active war zone and it is 

also one of the most corrupt countries in the world, and so I guess 

what a lot of us would like to better understand is if monitoring 

isn’t part of the decision and making sure that their whereabouts 

are readily ascertained, I guess a lot of us wonder why that isn’t 

one of the criteria. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Weber. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Envoy Wolosky, is that how you’re saying that? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. You said that the standard was not the elimination of risk but a mitigation of risk in your earlier comments. 

Was that true under the prior administration as well? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. I don’t believe so. 

Mr. WEBER. So you all came in—the current administration came 

in with that in 2009, basically? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Actually, the Congress came in with that. It’s 

written into the NDAA. It’s a piece of legislation passed by the 

Congress and signed into law by President Obama. 

Mr. WEBER. So that was the standard that you used? That’s pretty shocking what Congressman Duncan revealed, that we were told 

38

that Uruguay was not going to be able to monitor these guys’ travel. There were six terrorists and I am not knowledgeable or privy 

to who they were. These were not the five that was released in exchange for Bergdahl. Is that correct? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Correct. 

Mr. WEBER. Is it fair to say that in the Bush administration 

didn’t they attempt to try to release what was assessed to be the 

lower level risk combatants at first? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. I can’t speak to that. I don’t know what their 

process was. 

Mr. WEBER. Is it fair to say in the current administration, that 

you chose to release the lower risk first and held the worse to the 

last? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. The worst we are not releasing. We’re only releasing or transferring subject to security assurances those individuals 

who have been designated as approved for transfer by the six agencies and departments of the government that are responsible for 

those decisions. 

Mr. WEBER. But common sense would probably dictate that the 

Bush administration followed those same guidelines? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. I don’t think that that is a fair assumption, respectfully. One reason why it is not a fair assumption is for years 

we haven’t released Yemeni detainees who in many cases are lowlevel fighters, if that, because of the circumstances in Yemen. 

So currently many of the detainees who remain in Guantanamo 

and who are approved for transfer are from Yemen and that could 

reflect more their nationality than their risk profile. 

Mr. WEBER. That goes to the risk profile and I am sure, too. 

Now, the five that were exchanged for Bergdahl are they—any of 

those back on the battlefield? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. No. I am just going to defer to my colleague from 

the DoD to speak to that transfer because it was an anomalous 

transfer, as you know, negotiated by the Department of Defense as 

a prisoner exchange. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Mr. WOLOSKY. I am confident he will say no when he turns 

around. 

Mr. WEBER. All right. Well, his time has passed. I am going to 

move to the next question. So there are countries who take—who 

the administration negotiates with and we have a disagreement 

about whether or not they actually will monitor them or not. 

What number of countries do we look at for transferring these 

combatants to? Is it 6, 8, 26? How many countries are involved? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. We can get you the numbers but I believe we’ve 

transferred detainees in this administration to, what, 30 or 40 

countries? 

Mr. LEWIS. We’ve resettled to 30 and then 9 repatriations back 

to their own country. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. So 30 countries. Are you monitoring? Are you 

able to track? You talked about—earlier in your comments you 

spoke with career government officials in making those assessments and those determinations. Career government officials on 

the United States side or on the prospective country side or both? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. I was referring to the U.S. side. 

39

Mr. WEBER. U.S. side. Okay. So of those 30 countries where we 

are sending people whether or not they can monitor them effectively or not and you said you’re getting feedback—we called it—

I think it was information sharing. Is that in real time? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. It can be. 

Mr. WEBER. It can be. But is it? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. In some circumstances that I am aware of it is in 

basically real time. 

Mr. WEBER. Was it in real time on the guy from Uruguay that 

got loose? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. We can discuss that in closed session. I would 

welcome the opportunity to do that today if you would like to, sir. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Okay. Of those 30 countries are you able to 

track in real time and even in retrospect are you able to track and 

say okay, this country did a good job of keeping up with their combatants, this country didn’t, this country was okay, this country 

was lousy? Is there a scale of rating those countries and their abilities? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. I am not aware of a scale. Certainly, the case——

Mr. WEBER. So how do you know going forward in the future? If 

a country doesn’t do a good job, how do you say well, we’ll give that 

country another one or two or three? How do you determine that? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. By their record. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, that would be a scale, wouldn’t it? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. I don’t think so. It would be specific to the performance of a particular country—their monitoring, their information sharing with the United States. If we are not satisfied with 

the results on a previous transfer we wouldn’t transfer a new one 

to that same place. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Well, that makes sense. And then of the discussion you had with Mr. Duncan and Mr. Issa, you talked about 

the—those released under the previous administration, Bush, and 

there was 530, I think, released, and how many is under the current administration? 

Mr. LEWIS. 159. 

Mr. WEBER. 159. So I don’t think that you and Issa agreed on 

the fact that somehow Bush released the good ones and Obama released the bad ones. Is that a fair statement? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. That’s correct. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Would you say they were roughly equal? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. It’s impossible to generalize. Each case is different. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, that——

Mr. WOLOSKY. What I was trying to do was to push back against 

the suggestion that Bush released the easy ones and we only have 

the hard ones. 

Mr. WEBER. Right. But it is safe to say without——

Mr. WOLOSKY. It is not an accurate characterization. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, without the specifics you can’t accurately know 

that. But in general, a reasonable person might make that kind of 

assumption? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. We are all about talking about specifics, not generalizations. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Fair enough. 

40

Mr. WOLOSKY. That is why we are here. It is why we have requested the opportunity——

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Mr. WOLOSKY [continuing]. To speak with you in closed session 

because, frankly, a lot of what is said——

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Well, I am running out of time. 

Mr. WOLOSKY [continuing]. Including about Uruguay is just inaccurate and I am happy to tell you if you’re interested in learning 

the facts about why some of what was said——

Mr. WEBER. Let me—let me—we’ll come back to that, Mr. 

Wolosky. 

Mr. WOLOSKY [continuing]. In this hearing was inaccurate. 

Mr. WEBER. Mr. Wolosky, I am out of time. 

Mr. WOLOSKY. I am happy to speak to it. 

Mr. WEBER. Mr. Wolosky, I am out of time. Let me just say 

thank you for being forthright but we are on a time limit. I’ve got 

two quick questions. 

Mr. LEWIS. Sir, can I make—can I make comment, though? 

Mr. WEBER. Yes, sir. You may. 

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There are 29 detainees 

that are currently eligible for transfer who we believe we can 

transfer safely and responsibly if we get security assurances——

Mr. WEBER. Can I make a suggestion? 

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WEBER. Don’t send them to Uruguay. 

Mr. LEWIS. Sir, many of them are Yemenis. That’s why they are 

there. 

Mr. WEBER. Mr. Wolosky, back to you. 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. WEBER. You’re welcome. At the end of the Uruguay program, 

you mentioned earlier that the guy got 3—2 months——

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. Your last question. 

Mr. WEBER. All right. Two months early. Tell, for the committee’s sake, what would an additional 2 months have done, in your 

opinion? Would it have rehabilitated that combatant? What would 

that have done? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. This individual, Diyab, frankly, was a problem 

from the moment he landed in Uruguay and I’ll tell you that and 

be up front about it. His resettlement was difficult. 

He did not seem to want to participate in the opportunities that 

were being afforded to him by the government. 

Mr. WEBER. Should we have had snap back sanctions in place, 

to use another term bantered around? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. We are not repopulating Guantanamo. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go to Mr. Joe Wilson of South Carolina. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Chairman Royce, and thank you for 

your leadership on this issue, and it is so important. I’ve had the 

opportunity to visit Guantanamo twice to see the personnel there, 

the professionalism of our military. And it is the place where terrorists should be. 

In my home State of South Carolina, we’ve learned a lesson. 

There was one terrorist at the Navy brig in Charleston. He’s had 

a consequence. 

41

He’s attracted more terrorists to come to the community and 

threaten attacks on the facility, putting schools at risk, neighborhoods in the immediate neighborhood at risk. It’s utterly absurd 

the thought of bringing them to the United States in any way or 

releasing them, and it is interesting you say Yemen. 

You release people to Yemen, which was supposed to be an example of great success by this administration of establishing a stable 

country and within days of releasing and pardoning terrorists the 

country collapsed. 

And it would be interesting to know, what did happen to the persons who have been released to Yemen previously? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. We do not release individuals to Yemen. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, you had previously released before the collapse of the country. But there is a consistency here which is not 

good and the consistency is we have an administration that has 

dismissed ISIS as a JV—junior varsity. 

These are the same people after the announcement of junior varsity they committed mass murder in Jakarta, in Brussels, in Paris, 

in Orlando, in San Bernardino. We know the mass murder, this 

week, in Baghdad and in Kabul. 

Over and over again, there’s been a dismissal of threats to American families. Additionally, it is incredible too this administration 

is very consistent by reaching a dangerous Iranian nuclear deal, 

providing tens of billions of dollars to a state sponsor of terrorism. 

Just last week, the funding that has been provided by Iran to 

Hamas there have been rocket attacks on Sderot in Israel. Again, 

it is extraordinary to ignore this. 

And then we come to pardoning and returning terrorists to go 

back on the battlefield. This is inconceivable and it is also quite illogical. 

As you talk about a recruiting tool, a recruiting tool is releasing 

people—not being serious about detaining people who have every 

intent to kill American families. 

And it is really interesting to me that they don’t use the argument that it is a deterrent or it is a recruiting tool to have prisons 

within the United States. Of course, it is a deterrent. 

If people know they are going to be incarcerated they are less 

likely to commit a crime or kill American families. And I am really 

grateful that even CNN yesterday reported that U.S. officials have 

said the 44-year-old Abu Wa’el Diyab, a Syrian national, went off 

the radar several weeks ago in Uruguay where he was resettled in 

2014, not prior to 2009. 

And so Uruguay’s Interior Minister told CNN that Diyab was 

considered a refugee by the government and as such he would not 

need permission from Uruguayan authorities to leave the country. 

They said he would only need permission from the foreign country he wished to enter per an agreement with U.S. that enabled the 

release of Gitmo detainees to Uruguay. 

And there is a truth from CNN that I hope you look at and will 

reconsider that you are doing and that is that the disappearance 

could provide fuel for opponents of efforts to close the detention facility at Guantanamo, especially if Diyab is found to be attempting 

to join a terrorist group. 

42

Of the 676 detainees released from the detention facility as of 

January, 118 have returned to the fight. An additional 86 are suspected of returning. 

A recidivism rate of nearly one out of three released, according 

to a recent report from the administration’s Office of Director of 

National Intelligence. 

By releasing and pardoning these people, American families are 

at risk around the world and I just hope that you will reconsider 

what you’re doing. 

And then I am really grateful, in the Washington Post, Gordon 

England, the former Secretary of the Navy—and he’s an extraordinary public servant. He is a person of the highest integrity. 

He has warned that the process of releasing—the early process 

did work but that what’s being done is that there were 200 detainees when he departed, none have been approved for release. Under 

the President, more than half have been released. 

None of the low-risk, according to vigorous vetting, he has conducted during the Bush administration—statements by the country 

or the White House are misleading at best. And so I hope you will 

really reconsider and understand that we are in a global war on 

terrorism. 

This is not an academic exercise of deterrence or incarceration, 

and I yield my time. 

Chairman ROYCE. Okay. We go to Mr. Dana Rohrabacher of California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you. Do any of you, either of you, 

know of cases—do you believe that Americans at Gitmo were involved with criminal mistreatment of the detainees? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. I am not aware of that. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So but the President has made it a national security imperative that we close Gitmo and this, we are 

told, that he has to close Gitmo because it has such a bad reputation. But yet from what you just said we know that those charges 

are not true. Is that right? 

We have a propaganda campaign going on by the enemies of the 

United States and detractors of the United States against us, 

claiming that there was some kind of major criminal mistreatment 

of prisoners in Guantanamo and neither one of you know of an example of that or the fact is if there was one or two instances it certainly didn’t reflect what was going on in Guantanamo, correct? 

Mr. LEWIS. Sir, the issue is wrongfully so. There are many people 

around the world in many countries who think that there were 

things that went wrong at Gitmo. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Mr. LEWIS. We don’t believe that there were but they perceive 

that it happened. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, let me correct it. Not only did a lot of 

people think that but there are people who hate our country who 

are promoting that knowing it is not true. 

Let’s get this in your mind. This isn’t nice American politics. This 

isn’t a criminal matter, although the President would like to think 

of these terrorists as being American criminals, Americans who 

have made a criminal act. 

43

This is people who hate our way of life, they are engaged in an 

organized effort to terrorize Western civilization by murdering 

large numbers of noncombatants. 

Mr. LEWIS. Sir, many of our——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. This is what we are trying to do. We are trying to handle this and what we get is a President who makes a national security imperative to give in to those people who propagandize and by doing that add some sort of credibility to whom? 

To the charge that our people who are working in Guantanamo 

are a bunch of ghouls who are torturing these people. I totally—

yeah, there may be one or two instances where somebody lost their 

temper or did something wrong. 

But by and large, you know and we know that the prisoners in 

Guantanamo have been treated extraordinarily well. The President, by making it a national security imperative, has basically 

demonstrated that the propaganda, by people who hate us, will 

succeed and it will be seen and is seen as a sign of weakness by 

terrorists all over the world. 

This very act that we are talking about is encouraging those people who will murder noncombatants, especially Americans. Let’s 

get back to the number of 532 released by Bush. 

Now, among those I know, for example, a lot of people were 

picked up. The Uighurs from Afghanistan had been picked up. 

They were in Afghanistan at the time of our operations. There were 

a lot of situations like that. 

Obama has released 159. I think it is a bit disconcerting, again, 

when this administration insists on treating these terrorists and 

those involved in terrorist activities as nothing more than criminals. 

You know, they are nothing more than like criminals would be 

in the United States. That’s why, perhaps, the President finds it 

impossible to say the words ‘‘radical Islamic terrorist’’ because that 

is different than just some criminal who had committed an act of 

violence or murder in the United States. 

And by doing so, again, seeing as a weakness, the President is 

actually encouraging terrorists around the world to take advantage 

of this weakness, take advantage of the fact we are willing to retreat if you just have a propaganda campaign. 

I am glad to hear that we actually are suggesting that our guys 

didn’t commit all sorts of horrible acts against these people. But of 

the 159 that were released—that have been released, what is disconcerting is when I hear that we don’t have proof and it is been 

determined that this number of people have not—these people 

haven’t committed any of these other acts after they’ve been released. 

I, like Mr. Issa, find that totally—it is absurd, it is so bad. The 

fact is that we—if we are waiting for evidence to prove before we 

can say well, we think it is probable that they have been involved 

because we know what kind of people they are, that is one thing. 

But what we are being told is unless we have overwhelming evidence that they have killed Americans or killed other innocent people, we are going to assume that they haven’t. 

Well, this is a way—this is not watching out for the security interests of the people of the United States. This is projecting weakVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:03 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\070716\20652 SHIRL
44

ness. This is going to make sure that more Americans die if by 

nothing else giving in and having the President of the United 

States insisting on treating terrorists as if they are American 

criminals, which will do nothing but encourage terrorism overseas. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman ROYCE. I thank the gentleman. We go to Mike 

McCaul, chairman of the Homeland Security Committee. Mike 

McCaul of Texas. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, the President campaigned on a promise to close Guantanamo. Is it fair to say that that campaign promise will not be fulfilled? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. It’s difficult to say. As you know, we are asking 

the Congress to reconsider its position on bringing a small number 

of detainees into the United States where, as you know, our Federal—as you know, better than most, Congressman, our Federal 

prison system has a 100-percent success rate in safely incarcerating over 400 convicted terrorists. 

Mr. MCCAUL. So but the current plan is to process 29 transfers 

out of Gitmo, which would leave—I think there are 79 detainees. 

That would leave 50, I guess, at Guantanamo, right? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. That’s correct. You know, there are 10 that are in 

some phase of the military commission process and are being prosecuted or serving sentences. 

The Periodic Review Board process is ongoing so it is possible 

that the number of detainees who were approved for transfer will 

increase. But your round numbers are generally correct. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I’ve been down there. I saw Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, evil incarnate. So the 50 remaining—is it your intention to—

we passed in the Congress under the National Defense Authorization bill an express prohibition against bringing these detainees 

into the United States. 

This administration will honor that legal restraint, correct? It 

will follow the law. 

Mr. WOLOSKY. As the President has said, his intention right 

now—his goal is to work with the Congress to change the law. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Okay. What is the status of the trial of Khalid 

Sheikh Mohammed? 

Mr. LEWIS. It’s in the motions phase, sir. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Why is this taking so long? I was a Federal prosecutor. This has been, you know, since 9/11. 

Mr. LEWIS. Sir, I am a former Federal prosecutor as well. Other 

people are better placed to answer your question. But broadly, 

what I’ll tell you is it is a new process so everything is new. 

There’s no precedent. There are a bunch of very good defense 

counsels and the judge is being careful and deliberative. We have 

a very good chief prosecutor, General Martins, who’s trying very 

hard. But it is just, you know, the law—to do the law carefully, as 

you know, sir, is a careful process. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Right. And I know defense counsel is filing a lot 

of motions. Pretty nice courtroom down there. There are 50 detainees that will be left. How many of those will be facing military 

trials? 

45

Mr. LEWIS. Right now, as Envoy Wolosky said, there are seven 

that are in the motions phase. The 9/11 five, the alleged Cole 

bomber and then one more al-Qaeda leader. There are three in the 

sentencing phase, and we are continually looking at the others to 

see if there can be a case. But I am not in best place to tell you 

where we’d be. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Getting back to those who you plan to release, we 

know 13 released have been implicated in attacks against the 

United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan, not a good number. 

Let me ask you this question. Has the administration ever refused to send detainees to a country because it could not provide 

adequate security? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Absolutely. There are many countries that we look 

at that we ultimately determined are not suitable for this. 

Mr. MCCAUL. You mentioned a lot of these detainees you want 

to transfer out are Yemenis. Yemen is a failed state, in my judgement, and it is in a really bad state of affairs. 

You have the Houthis down there, Iranian forces. You have alQaeda in the Arabian Peninsula still plotting external operations 

against the United States. Can you tell me definitively you’ll not 

be sending these detainees to Yemen? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Yes. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Okay. That’s a very good answer. What country 

would most likely receive them? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. I’d prefer to talk to you in closed session about 

that. I mean, what I will say, as you know, generally we prefer repatriations to resettlements because of cultural affinities, language 

skills, family connections. In this case, you know, that is not going 

to be possible for Yemen. So we are looking at other alternatives. 

Mr. MCCAUL. The last question—the Saudis have a pretty good 

deradicalization program. Have you considered that? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Yes. In fact, we transferred a number of Yemenis, 

I believe, nine to Saudi Arabia in April. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Okay. I see my time has expired. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. Thank you. 

I want to get back to the issue of what you told this committee 

in March, just in closing here. We asked specific questions about 

the transfer of detainees to countries ill-equipped to handle them 

and specifically we asked whether the Department of Defense ever 

transferred a detainee to a country that it knew was incapable of 

maintaining control of that individual and keeping him from returning to the battlefield. 

And Mr. Lewis responded no and Mr. Wolosky stated that he was 

not aware of such an instance. Your written response to the committee’s letter, though, sent just this week states that the law 

doesn’t prohibit us from sending detainees to countries that have 

partially derogatory intelligence assessments. 

Now, partially derogatory in common terms means can’t contain 

or at least are seriously challenged in containing those terrorists. 

So why didn’t you cite the law instead of suggesting to the committee that detainees were not being transferred to countries that 

were incapable of maintaining control of them when it is so clear 

that they are? 

46

That’s the point I wanted to make. That is why this seemed to 

me like misleading the committee. And while I appreciate the witnesses’ willingness to speak to us in a classified setting, which we’ll 

take advantage of, that can’t hide the fact that these issues can 

and have been discussed very productively here today. 

As you can see, we have serious concerns about this policy and 

we’ll continue the conversation. 

But I do want to thank the witnesses and thank the members 

of the committee. The committee is adjourned. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE ELIOT L. ENGEL, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK


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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE ELIOT L. ENGEL, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK


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