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History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

and National Policy

1953 -1954

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History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Volume V

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

and National Policy

1953 -1954

Robert J. Watson r

Historical Division

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Washington, DC. 1986

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JUL 0 6 t987

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for public release and »ale; it«

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Watson, Robert J., 1920-

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953-1954.

(History of the joint Chiefs of Staff/Robert J. Watson; v. 5)

Includes index.

1. United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff—History. 2. United

States—Military policy. I. Title. H. Series: Watson, Robert J.,

1920- . History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; v. 5.

UA23.W366 1986 355.3'3O42'0973 86-4621

t t

Sto. k #008-000-00403-8

Price: $25.00

ft* «Afar by thr Supcrmwtwk'nt ul lX*un^n{» US Govwtuwnt PrtttUnjt Other

Wtohmgttr.. DC 2MÖ2
Foreword

Established during World War II to advise the President regarding the strategic direction of the armed forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

continued in existence after the war and, as military advisers and planners, have

played a significant role in the development of national policy. Knowledge of

JCS relations with the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense in the years since World War II is essential to an understanding

of their current work. An account of their activity in peacetime and during times

of crisis provides, moreover, an important series of chapters in the military

history of the United States. For these reasons, the joint Chiefs of Staff directed

that an official history be written for the record. Its value for instructional

purposes, for the orientation of officers newly assigned to the JCS organization,

and as a source of background information for staff studies will be readily

recognized.

The series, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, treats the activities of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff since the close of World War II. Because of the nature of the

activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the sensitivity of the sources, the

volumes of the series have been prepared in classified form. In recent years, the

initial four volumes, covering the years 1945-1951 and the Korean War, have

been reviewed and declassified. Since no funds were availabh» for publication,

these volumes were distributed in unclassified form within the Department of

Defense and copies were deposited with the National Archives and Records

Administration. Subsequently, they have been reproduced and published by a

private concern.

When this the fifth volume of the series Tfer Joint Chtefs of Staff ami Sattonal

Pu/tcy, covering the period 1953-1954, was declassified, funds were provided for

its official publication. Volume V describes JCS activities during the first two

years of the Eisenhower administration. It traces the role of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff in the formulation of the basic national security policies of those years, in

force planning and strategy development, and in the nascent area of arms control.

The volume also describes JCS participation in planning and operations in various areas of the world whtre the United States was involved, with the exception

of the Korean War—a subject covered in The Joint Chiefs of Staff end National

Potky, Volume HI, The favean War,

Volume V was completed and issued in classified version in 1970. It appears

here basically as completed in 1970 with minor editorial revisions and a f »w

excisions dictated by security considerations.

jd
A

Foreword

Robert). Watson, the author of the volume, earned a Ph.D. degree in history

from the University of Virginia. He served as a historian with the JCS Historical

Division from 1963 to 1976 and as Chief of the Division from 1977 until his

retirement in 1983.

This volume was reviewed for declassifiestion by the appropriate US Government departments and agencies and cleared for release. Although the text has

been declassified, some of the cited sources remain classified. The volume is an

official publication of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but, inasmuch as the text has not

been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it must be construed as descriptive

only and does not constitute the official position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on

any subject.

Washington, DC.

June 1986

WILLA.DJ. WEBB

Chief, Historical Division

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Vi

<»=«*ft«^3>^afci»cw*sw
Preface

The volume here presented was written between 1963 and 1970 on a

classified basis for use by the joint Chiefs of Staff and their staff officers. It is

now made available to the public for the first time« as originally written, in the

hope that it will prove valuable to students of recent US history and those

interested in the processes of formulating defense policy under the American

political system.

If the book has a single major theme, it is the redirection of US military

strategy and force planning during the first two years of the administration of

President Dwight D. Eisenhower. The New Look, as the revised military policy

was called, emphasized strategic retaliatory striking power (primarily atomic) at

the expense of conventional balanced forces and sought to maximize firepower

while reducing the numbers of men and units. The changes were justified both

on military grounds, as a modernization of strategy to reflect advancing

technology, and as a means of economizing on the size and cost of the military

establishment. Other important developments treated in the volume include

construction of an integrated air defense system for the North American continent; the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to include the

Federal Republic of Germany, and the beginning of that country's rearmament; the

introduction of guided missiles into the armory of US weapons, the enlargement

of the system of defense alliances aimed at preventing the spread of Sovietbacked communism; and the continuing search for some method of scaling back

or controlling the development of increasingly costly weapons of mass

destruction. In all of these developments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff played a key

role« providing a source of authoritative military advice. Of course their advice

was not always accepted, nor did they always speak with a single voice, since

their viewpoints were inevitably shaped by years of experience in their

respective Services.

Readers familiar with the present-day organization and operations of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff will note that the activities described in this volume reflect a

somewhat different organization and procedures, which dated in part from

World War tl «nd were given legal standing by the National Security Act of 194?

(with its 1949 amendments) During 1953-1954 the Joint Staff, which served the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, was appreciably smaller than at present. Essentially it

consisted of three component*: the Joint Strategic Hans Group, Joint Intelligence

Group, and Joint Logistics Hans Group At a higher organizational echelon were

three joint committees composed of Service representatives (such ^ the Joint

Strategic Plans Committee overseeing the work of the Joint Strategic Plan* Group).

vti

i
1

Preface

The Joint Chiefs of Staff normally assigneda task to one of the committees,

which in turn called on its corresponding Joint Staff group fora report. The

resulting paper passed to the joint committee for review, amendment, and

approval (or return with instructions for revision) before being submitted to the

Joint Chiefs of Staff. This system prevailed until 1958, when the present Joint

Staff with its integrated planning and operations sections was established.

Some relevant topics have been omitted from the volume or dealt with

summarily. Stringent security restrictions within the Executive Branch at the

time of writing precluded an account of the development of nuclear weapons

during 1953-1934 (though much of the information has now been declassified).

Little has been said of the Korean War since the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in

that conflict has been described in another volume in this series. Likewise,

changes in the organization of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of

Staff have been mentioned only in passing, since they too have been dealt with

in other studies prepared by the JCS Historical Division.

Since the book was completed numerous additional sources of relevant information have become available. The opening of records at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas, has provided an enormous mass of materials

bearing on policy decisions at the highest level and the relations of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff with the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National

Security Council. Documents published by the Department of State in the series

Foreign Relation* of the United States for the years 1952-1954 illuminate the role of

diplomatic considerations in national security policy. Additional memoirs by

participants have appeared, notably those of General of the Army Omar N.

Bradley and of Admiral Arthur W. Radford, successive Chairmen of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, there is alsoa voluminous secondary literature on the Eisenhower administration.

These additional sources afforda much more complete picture of the events

described in this volume. We now have, for example, details of the discussions

within the National Security Council that led to the key decisions of the Mew

Look- We have tixrords of meetings of the President with the Secretary of Defense

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, especially with their Chairman, Admiral Raaford.

We havea better understanding of matters that originally appeared somewhat

obscure. For example, we now know tha* »he President's decision in December

WM in favor of drastic miUtary cutbacks, as described in Chapter 3, was less

startling than it appeared on the basis of less complete evidence. So far as the

author knows, however, no information has come to light that throws into

question any of the major conclusions in the volume. The fact can be attributed

to the thoroughness ot JCS record-keeping, which makes it possible, in most

instances, to follow national security issues from inception to disposal through

use of JCS documents and records.

tn writing the volume, the author incurred many debts, which he is happy to

acknowledge. The project began under the supervision of the late WUber W.

Hoare, formerly Chief of the JCS Historical Division, who followed it with interest and encouragement and gave final approval to the completed manuscript.

Fellow historians in the Division, particularly Kenneth W. Condit and Byron

Vtti

1
Preface

Fairchild, were generous in offering sage counsel during the preparation of the

manuscript and in reviewing numerous chapter drafts. Kent S. Larson carried

out some of the research for Chapter 11. As Chief of the Histories Branch of the

Division, Vernon E. Davis exercised his matchless editorial skill in reviewing

and revising the manuscript. Anna M. Siney directed its preparation in printed

form for use by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For the published version, the author had the advantage of association with

Dr. Richard M. Leighton, who is currently preparing a history of the Office of

the Secretary of Defense from 1953 to 1956. He provided an authoritative source

of information on additional documentation, offered comments from a different

perspective, and called attention to various minor errors. Barbara C. Fleming and

Linda A. Fithian prepared the manuscript for publication. Finally, two individuals in particular must be singled out for special appreciation. Willard J. Webb,

Chief of the JCS Historical Division, saw the manuscript though the declassification process, edited and improved the entire volume (text, footnotes, and

headings), and supervised the endless details of publication. Colonel Donald W.

Williams, USA, Secretary of the joint Chiefs of Staff, secured approval for publication oi the volume and obtained the necessary funding. The author alone, of

coursr, is responsible for any errors of fact or interpretation that may have crept

into the volume.

Washington. DC.

June 1986

ROBERT J. WATSON

t\
Contents:

1. Basic National Security Policy, 1953 1

PoÜcy Issues at the Beginning of 1953 2

Early Decisions of the New Administration 3

A New Statement of National Security Policy:

NSC 153/1 9

Project Solarium 11

The New joint Chiefs of Staff and Their

Recommendations 14

A New Policy Directive: NSC 162/2 21

Military Strategy Reexamined: JCS 2101/113 26

Differences among the Joint Chiefs of Staff 32

The New Look and Its Interpretation 35

2. Basic National Security Policy, 1954 : 39

Framework of Policy Discussion in 1954 39

NSC 162/2 and the'FY 1956 Budget 42

JCS Appraisal of Free World Military Posture 42

First Budget Guidelines 44

JCS View» on Negotiations with the Soviets 45

Interim Policy Revision: NCS 5422/2 46

Policy Debate Continued 48

A Revised National Security Policy: NSC 5501 52

The Direction of Policy in 1954 55

3. Force Levels and Personnel Strengths 59

FY 1954 Goals under the Eisenhower

Administration 61

The JCS Interim Look tor FY 1955 63

The FY 1955 Budget: Impact of the New Look 67

FY 1956 flans and the Indochina Cnsis 70

The Issue of Support Force Recommendations 73

The Decision to Accelerate Retrenchment 73

Force Level* under the New Ceilings 76

FY 1956 Defense Budget. . . . 78

Force Level* and Strategy, 1953-1954 80

XJ
Contents

4. Strategic Planning, 1953-1954 89

The JCS Planning Program: Policy Memorandum 84 89

Planning at the Beginning of 1953 93

Progress of the Joint Strategic Capabilities

Pia» 94

Development of the Joint Strategic Objectives

Plan 97

The Joint Long-fonge Strategic Estimate 97

The Planning Program Reconsidered 98

The First Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan Completed 100

The Joint Mid-Range War Plan 101

The 1955-1956 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 103

Revision of the Planning Program 105

The JCS Planning Program: The First Two Years 106

5. Continental Air Defense Ill

Plans, Organization, and Forces for Air

Defense Ill

Legacy of the Truman Administration 116

The New Administration Confronts a Dilemma 119

Service and Continental US Defense Planning

Group Proposals 121

A New Policy for Continental Defense: NSC 159/4 125

Continental Defense and the FY 1955 Budget 130

Canada's Role in the Early Warning System 134

A Second Look at Continental Defense Plans 135

Command and Organizational Changes 137

The Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee 139

Northern Canada (Distant Early Warning] Line 141

Objectives for FY 1956. , . 144

Continental Defense at the End of 1954 145

6. Mobilization Planning 149

Allocation of Responsibilities !49

The Eisenhower Administration And the

Mobilization Base in 1953 150

The Joint Chiefs of Staff a*** Stockpile Policy . , 152

The Role of the Oiike ot Defense Mobilization 154

Mobilization [Planning as an Issue in 1954 155

Mobilization Policy at the End of 1954 158

Service Approaches to Mobilization; The Joint

Mid-Range War Flan 159

Mobilization Planning and the New Look ......... 161

Mi

" 111 1 n w 1 limit»»» m< ••
Contents

7. Manpower Mobilization: Organization of Reserve

Forces ; 163

Manpower Policy as a Problem 163

Proposals for Reform 165

Evolution of NSC 5420/3 169

Strength of the Reserve Forces 173

National Reserve Plan of 1955 174

8. Missions and Weapons \. 177

Service Roles and Missions under Review 177

Army-Air Force Disagreement over Guided

Missiles 179

Guided Missile Policy at DOD Level 182

A New Division of Missile Responsibilities 183

The Problem of the Medium-Range Missile 185

9. Disarmament and Atoms for Peace ; 187

Disarmament Opportunities in 1953 188

Operation Candor and Its Outcome 189

Sharing Information with US Allies 191

UN Pressure for a Disarmament Program 192

The UN Disarmament Subcommittee 193

The International Atomic Energy Agency 195

Toward a New Disarmament Policy 196

The jCS Approach to Disarmament 199

10. Military Assistance'. 201

FY 1954 Program 203

FY 1955 Program 209

Military Assistance and the New Look 212

Plans for FY 1956 216

Flexibility in Military Assistance:

NSC 5434/1 . 216

Military Assistance in Wartime 221

11. The Far East: Korea 223

The Korean Armistice and Associated Problems 223

Political Impasse 225

Relations with Syngman Rhee 227

Planning for Possible Action against the

Communists 228

The Question of US Redeployment 229

Strengthening South Korea's Forces 233

xiii
Contents

The Geneva Conference and Its Aftermath 236

President Rhee's Visit to the United States 238

Resumption of US Redeployment 239

South Korean Force Levels 241

Relations with South Korea at the End of 1954 243

12. the Far East: Indochina, Taiwan, Japan .' 247

US Far Eastern Policy, 1953-1954 248

The fndochina Crisis 251

The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 254

Taiwan: Chiang Kai-shek's Forces Unleashed 256

Military Aid for the Republic of China 257

Threat to the Offshore islands 261

Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic

of China 263

Crisis in the Taiwan Strait 265

The Problem of Japanese Rearmament 267

Agreements with Japan during 1954 274

Japanese Force Objectives for 1955 275

US Far Eastern Policy in Perspective 279

13. Western Europe, 1953 281

Plans for a European Defense Community 283

President Eisenhower's European Policy 284

Revision of NATO Force Goals, April 1953 285

Reorganization, Military and Civilian 288

The New Joint Chiefs of Staff and NATO

Problems 290

Diplomatic Efforts to Resolve the German

Problem 291

Spain and the Western Alliance . 294

The 1953 NATO Annual Review 297

14. Western Europe, 1954 . 303

T»ie Berlin Conference 303

Launching NATO's New Approach 304

Collapse of the European Defense Community 306

Effects on US Policy 309

Evolution of the New Approach 311

West Germany Joins NATO 313

Approval of the New Approach 316

NATO's Accomplishments. 1953-1954 . 320

15. The Middle East 323

US interests in the Middle East in 1952 323

Middle East Defense and the Problem of Egypt 326

xiv
Contents

Second Thoughts on the Middle East Defense

Organization 329

The Iranian Crisis and Its Resolution 332

The Zagros Mountain Line Concept . . 336

Military Assistance to the Middle East 340

The Role of Pakistan 343

Foundation of the Northern Tier Defense Line 345

16. , Latin America 349

Latin America and US Security 349

New Developments in 1953 351

Communist Foothold in Guatemala 353

Outcome of the Guatemalan Crisis 354

A Revised Latin American Policy: NSC 5432/1 356

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms 359

Nutes 363

Bibliographic Note 423

Index 425

Chart

Operation of Planning Cycle for Joint Strategic Objectives Plan and

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 92

Tables

1. Actual and Authorized US Military Strength: 31 December 1952 . . 59

2. Actual and Authorized US Force Levels: 31 December 1952 .... CO

3. Service Objectives for FYs 1956 and 1957. March 1954 70

4. JCS RecommenJations on Major Combat Forces for FYs 1955-1957:

January 1955 78

5. Projected Authorized Personnel Strengths of US Armed Forces:

FYs 1953-1957 81

6. Actual Personnel Strengths of US Armed Forces. 1952-195*» . . . 82

7. Projected Authorized Force Levels oi US Armed Forces: FYs

1953-1957 83

8. Actual Force Levels of US Armed Forces: 1952-1956 84

XV
Contents

9. DOD Budget Requests for New Obligational Authority and

Estimates of Expenditures: FYs 1954-1956 85

10. DOD Actual New Obligational Authority and Expenditures:

FYs 1953-1956 86

11. Actual and Projected US Continental-Defense Forces: 1952-1957 . 113

12. Actual Strength of National Guard and Reserve Forces: 30

June 1953 165

13. Status of Mutual Defense Assistance Program Appropriations

Allocated to DOD, FYs 1950-1953: 31 January 1953 202

14. Mutual Defense Assistance Program Funds: FY 1954 206

15. JCS Recommendation on Allocation of FY 1955 Mutual Defense

Assistance Program Funds: 5 March 1954 211

16. Recommendations for Mutual Defense Assistance Program Funds:

FYs 1955-1958 214

17. Force Goals Approved by North Atlantic Council at Lisbon:

February 1952 282

18. Force Goals Approved by North Atlantic Council: April 1953 . . . 287

19. Force Goals Approved by North Atlantic Council; December 1953 . 300

20. Force Goals Approved by North Atlantic Council: December 1954 . 318

21. Actual Forces Available to NATO: 1952-1954 319

xvi
History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

and National Policy

1953 -1954
1

Basic National Security Policy, 1953

As 1953 opened, it was almost a foregone conclusion that US national

security policy and military strategy were headed for a searching reexamination.

The victory of Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Republican candidate, in the 1952

Presidential election had brought about a change in party administration for the

first time in 20 years. It seemed unlikely that the new administration would

radically alter the foreign policy goals pursued by the outgoing administration of

President Harry S. Truman, which by now commanded wide bipartisan

support. But there were significant differences between the two parties concerning the means to be used in seeking these objectives and the importance to

be assigned, at the same time, to the domestic goals of tax reduction and

a balanced Federal budget. At the least, the new President, on the basis of his

campaign statements, could be expected to seek a new balance between these

two sets of goals.

Before the year was out, the international situation was to be altered

by important developments elsewhere in the world. These included the death of

Premier Josef V. Stalin of the Soviet Union on 5 March 1953 and his replacement by Georgi M. Malenkov; the conclusion of an armistice in Korea

on 27 July 1953, ending three years of warfare; and the explosion of the

first Soviet thermonuclear device on 12 August 1953, which made plain to all the

unexpectedly rapid growth in the military capabilities of the communist bloc.

Even had there been no change of administration, these events would have

compelled some review of policies and courses of action adopted several

years earlier.

The Eisenhower administration's reexamination of national security policy

occupied most of 1953. The process, and the changes in national strategy and

military force structure to which it led, became known, in the press and in

popular discussion, as the "New Look."*
JCS and National Poliqj

Policy Issues at the Beginning of 1953

Since the end of World War II, the United States had based its national

security policy on a conviction that the hostile and potentially aggressive

Stalin regime in Soviet Russia represented a danger to peace. Beginning in 1947,

the Truman administration had adopted a policy intended to restrain communism from spreading beyond those areas where its control had already been

consolidated. This goal was to be sought by maintaining a level of US military

force considered sufficient to deter aggression, and by building up the militarv,

political, and economic strength of friendly nations in Western Europe and the

eastern Mediterranean region. This policy, popularly known as "containment,"

had been officially approved in 1948 and reaffirmed at various times, most

recently in September 1952.

The assumption of possible communist aggression was at first judged not

to be incompatible with a stringent program of military economy. For

several years after World War II, defense budgets were held to levels that

prevented the Services from rebuilding their shrunken strengths as the Joint

Chiefs of Staff desired. But with the outbreak of war in Korea, the economy

program went into the discard. The Truman adminis.ration embarked upon

a massive and rapid expansion of the military force». Although the rate of

increase was slackened after the first year of fighting, by the end of 1952

the Army and Navy had almost reached their authorized force levels. The

Air Force, however, remained far below its objective of expansion to 143

wings, a level almost 50 percent above its current strength of 98 wings.2

Whether these force levels were adequate, in the fi.ee of rising Soviet and

Communist Chinese military strength, was a question that came before the

Truman administration in 1952. The President directed Secretary of Diate Dean

Acheson, Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett, and the Director for Mutual

Security, Mr. W. Averell Harriman, to examine the allocation of resources for all

programs connected with national security.3Since Mr. Trurran was about to go

out of office, it would be the task of his successor to consid*.' the results of this

review and, if necessary, to expand the budget for these programs. For the

purposes of the examination, the Joint Chiefs of Staff furnished an analysis of

military programs in which they concluded that these were inadequate to provide forces of the magnitude that would he required by 1954 1955. Without

going into detail, they made it clear that the Sentce*. were short of both manpower and materiel. They urged that, Ai the least, current force goals should be

attained as soon as possible.* When a draft of the completed report was sent the

Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment, they warned tntt any new programs that

might be undertaken should not be allowed to divert funds from existing ones.*1

The final report, NSC 141, was sent to President Truman on 19 January 1953,

just before his term ended. Its conclusion was ihat a selective increase in security

programs was needed. The most pressing requirement was for stronger continental Atxd civil defense. Economic and military aid programs should also be

enlarged, though on a selective basis. The costs of the recommended increases

were not indicated.6
1

Basic National Security Policy, 1953

Meanwhile, in December 1952, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had begun preparing a report on the status of Service programs as of the end of the

year, to be reviewed by the Secretary of Defense and then forwarded to

the National Security Council. Before it was completed, the new administration

took office and Mr. Lovett was replaced by President Eisenhower's appointee,

Charles E. Wilson. The final report, reviewed and revised by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, was sent to the Council on 6 March 1953.7

The burden of this report, NSC 142, was that US forces were barely adequate

for the present world situation and could not cope with any new crisis. Army

and Navy forces were fully committed; there was no strategic reserve. The Air

Force had insufficient offensive and tactical aircraft, but its gravest shortages

were in fighter interceptors and in aircraft control and warning facilities.

Some of these deficiencies were expected to be remedied under the budget for

fiscal year 1954 that President Truman, in one of his last official acts, sent to

Congress on 9 January 1953. it called for $41.3 billion in new obligational authority

for military programs, and estimated military expenditures at $45.5 billion. The

largest share of the new appropriations, $16.8 billion, would go to the Air Force,

to allow it to expand from 98 wings to 133 by July 1954.8The Navy would

increase its ships from 1 116 to 1,200; the Army would be maintained at its

current strength of 20 divisions Military manpower, which totaled 3,512,453 on

31 December 1952, would rise to 3,647,612 by the end of FY 1954/'

E«L»!y Decisions of the New Administration

With the inauguration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower on 20 January

1953, the membership of the National Security Council underwent a complete change. The incoming members soon found themselves confronted with a

call for higher defense spending (NSC 141) and a warning that US forces were

stretched dangerously thin (NSC 142).

How the new administration would respond to this situation was not clear.

Mr. Eisenhower entered office pledged to the same general foreign policies as

his predecessor: pursuit of world peace, continued resistance to the expansionist aims of communism, «nd support of US obligations to the United Nations

and the North Atlantic Treat)' Organization. These policies obviously required a

large and expensive military establishment. At the same time, during his campaign Mr. Eisenhower had taken a stand for drastic reduction of Federal expenditures and for a balancing of the Federal budget, though not at the expense of

safety In one of his major campaign speeches he said:

We must achieve both security and solvency. In fact, the foun.tation of

military strength is economic strength . . . the big spending is . . . the $60 billion

we pay for national security. Here ts where the largest savings can he made And

these savings must be made without reduction of defensive power That

ts exactly what I am now proposing.
JCS and National Policy

Reconciliation of "security" and "solvency/' he continued, could be

achieved by better management of the defense effort, notably by bringing

about real unification of the Services in order to reduce the enormous costs

of procuring and managing materiel. But all these steps would require an

overhauling of the defense machinery by a new administration that would

"call a halt to stop-and-stea planning" and would "plan for the future on

something more solid than yesterday's headlines." In another speech, he

described the principal issue at that of "finding a way of dealing with the

world in cooperation with all hce countries so that our boys may stay at

home . . . and not go off to foreign shores to protect our interests."10

Later events were to show that these statements contained the germ of some

of the important features of the New Look. But there was no trace in the

candidate's speeches of what was later to emerge as one of the key elements:

greater reliance upon atomic weapons, with their enormous firepower, to make

possible a reduction in conventional forces and a corresponding cut in costs.

This expedient had been adopted in 1952 by the Government of the United

Kingdom, when faced with a financial crisis that made expenditure reduction

imperative. The British Chiefs of Staff, who had formulated this strategy at the

request of Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, had tried in vain to persuade

their American colleagues to endorse it for adoption by NATO.11

In his first utterances as President, Mr. Eiseiuiower reaffirmed his belief that

security and solvency were two sides of the same coin—coequal elements of

national strength. "Our problem," he said on 2 February 1953 in his first State of

the Union message to Congress, "is to achieve adequate military strength within

the limits of endurable strain upon our economy. To amass military power

without regard to our economic capacity would be to defend ourselves against

one kind of disaster by inviting another." Similar statements were, of course,

common enough in American political life—notably in the annual Congressional

discussion of defense budgets. In their present context, however, the President's

words carried the implication that the previous administration had misjudged

the balance between security and solvency, and therefore that its military spending plins must be scrutinized with a view to reducing them. Such a reduction,

the President implied, could be achieved with no sacrifice of combat strength.

"Both military and economic objectives demand a single national military policy,

proper coordination of ou; arrr»ei< services, and effective consolidation of certain

logistics activities," he said, echoing his campaign statement*. "We must eliminate waste and duplication of effort in the armed services. We must realize

clearly that size alone is not sufficient."*2

The President's statements did not foreclose the possibility of selective

increases in security expenditures, such as NSC 141 had called for. Some of his

appointees, however, seemed to place solvency ahead o! security and took an

attitude highly unfavorable to any such increases. Mr. )u*eph M. Uodge, who

had been named Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and Mr George M.

Humphrey, the incoming Secretary of the Treasury, became the principal spokesmen for the primacy of expenditure reduction. They believed that every existing

Federal program should be scrutinized to see if it could be cut back or eliminated,

iiWli.Hi 1, Hi"'

.«;.-,..-*-.><«.-. •-.-.•.-.- -• ' - - •"' '
Basic National Security Poliqj, 1953

and that no new programs should be approved unless equivalent savings could

be achieved by reductions elsewhere.

The assault on President Truman's proposed FY 1954 budget, intended to

reduce the expected deficit of $9.922 billion, was not long delayed. On 3 February 1953 Budget Director Dodge notified all departments and agencies that it was

the President's policy to reduce both obligational authority and expenditures.

All governmental programs were therefore to be examined critically.14 Military

programs, which accounted for more than half of all expenditures, were not

exempt. On 7 February 1953 the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Roger M.

Kyes, directed the Service Secretaries to review the military budget to ascertain

where intelligent savings could be made.15

The Armed Forces Policy Council discussed Mr. Kyes' directive in light of the

requirements of the Korean War, for which the Truman budget had computed

ammunition requirements through 31 December 1953. On 10 February 1953 the

Council decided that the budget, when revised, should be expected to finance

ammunition procurement through 30 June 1954 and to provide for training and

equipping four additional South Korean divisions.16Presumably these larger

allowances would require compensating cuts elsewhere.

To adjust the somewhat conflicting goals of economy and national security was

a major task for the National Security Council. It was characteristic of Mr. Eisenhower that he was to make far more intensive use of this body than his predecessor.17

In the hope of improving the efficiency of the Council, the new President reorganized it in March 1953 and placed it under the direction of a newly

appointed Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Mr. Robert Cutler. The

Senior Staff was «»designated the Planning Board, with Mr. Cutfer as its chairman,

while the Council's professional staff was enlarged. Several months later an

Operations Coordinating Board was established to monitor the execution of

NSC decisions.l8These changes did not affect the Joint Chiefs of Staff; they were

represented on the Planning Board, as on the Senior Staff, by an adviser, while

their Chairman continued his advisory role in the Council.

Following the change of administration, the Council met on 29 January and 4

February 1953 and discussed national security poiicy, but reached no conclusions. lv In preparation for further discussion. Secretary Wilson asked the

Joint Chiefs of Staff for their views on NSC 141 and on the most recent policy

directive of the previous Council, NSC 13S3 (approved on 25 September 1952).^

In reply, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed the comments they had made on the

draft of NSC 141, and warned that, under existing fiscal limitations, the enlarged

programs for continental defense and foreign aid recommended tn NSC 141

would entail reductions in established programs. As for NSC 135/3, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff believed that its conclusions, asserting a twni to maintain and

augment VS and allied military strength, were valid ^nd should be confirmed.M

The Council resumed its consideration of policy on 18 February 1953 &nd at

the same time considered NSC 141 and NSC 142. The discussion quickly turned

to the costs of current policies. Mr. Dodge forecast increasing deficits for fiscal

years 1953 through 1955 evrn without the new programs called for by NSC 141,

&nd he saw no prospect of a balanced budget before 1958. These prediction*
$4.3 $94

1.9 4.0

6 b

10 10

JCS and National Policy

were enough to doom NSC 141, which received no further consideration,

although the Council apparently did not formally reject it.22

A week later, Mr. Dodge told the Council that, under present plans, military

expenditures for FY 1955 would probably total $44.0 billion. The Council called

on each department and agency to review the figures on which this prediction

was based. The members agreed also to appoint an ad hoc committee of outside

consultants to examine national security policies in relation to costs.23

On 4 March 1953 Mr. Dodge suggested a reduction of 10 percent ($7.8 billion)

in expenditures for FY 1954 and of $15 billion for FY 1955, in order to bring the

budget into balance by the latter year. He proposed to allocate most of the

reductions to national security programs in the following manner:

FY 1954 FY 1955

(S Mltorts)

Military program

Mutual security program

Othtrr national security programs

Non-NSC programs

The Council agreed that the Secretary of Defense and the Director for Mutual

Security should explore the effect of this suggestion.24

The suggested reductions, applied to the projected figures of $45.5 billion

and $44.0 billion for military expenditures would mean limits of $41.2 billion and

$346 billion, respectively/ for FYs 1954 and 1955. Deputy Secretary of Defense

Kyes allocated these provisional totals among the Services as follows:

FV 1954 rt 1955

Armv

Navy

Aw Fore*

InterUVp«ftmental

He directed each Military Department to determine the forces that could be

maintained with these expenditures. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were then to

review the findings of the Services and evaluate the capability of the reduced

forces to carry out commitments.**

The Army replied that it would be forced to reduce its division strength from

20 divisions to 12 by FY 1955. The Navy would be less adversely affected; it

would be abb to maintain ship strength at or near current levels, but existing

deficiencies in mine, anUsuhmannc, and amphibious lift capabilities would be

perpetuated The Air force would have to abandon all hope of expansion und to

reduce its strength to 79 wings by 1955 **

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that force redaction* of these magnitudes

would make it impossible to meet existing OHrunitments and hence would require

complete reexamination of US objectives and policies. Casting their argument in

i

($ h/lttm»)

SUV $132

U3 92

144 11 6

7 to

i
Basic National Security Policy, 1953

strong terms, they asserted that the imposition of the proposed expenditure

limits "would so increase the risk to the United States as to pose a grave threat to

the survival of our allies and the security of this nation."27Secretary Wilson sent

these conclusions to the National Security Council on 24 March 1953. He accepted

them as essentially correct, although he believed the Services had somewhat

overstated the effects of the proposed budget reductions upon their programs.28

At a meeting of the Council on 25 March, General of the Army Omar N.

Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, summarized the JCS views concerning the effects of the suggested expenditure reductions; then each of his

colleagues spoke for his own Service. Officially, the Council took no action

except to note the President's desire that the Secretary of Defense make a tentative estimate of the money that might be saved by reducing overhead and

duplication.29 But the arguments presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been

convincing; the attempt to balance the budget by FY 1955 was dropped.30

On 31, March 1953 the Council members met with "Seven Wise Men"—the

outside consultants who had been appointed in accordance with the decision of

25 February.31 They approved a statement of defense policy that would provide

the rationale for budget reductions (more modest in scale than those discussed

earlier).32It rested upon the basic assumption that "the survival of the free world

depends on the maintenance by the United States of a sound, strong economy."

To achieve this economic stability, it would be necessary to balance expenditures

with income "as rapidly as is consistent with continuing our leadership in the

free world." The goal of a balanced budget should be announced at once, though it

could be achieved only gradually. On the other hand, the United States would

continue to maintain armed forces sufficient to defend itself and its allies; to

contain Soviet expansion; and to deter the Soviets from aggressive war. The

following specific objectives and courses of action were to be emphasized, settlement of the war in Korea and of the communist rebellion in Indochina; protection of the continental United States; offshore procurement of military supplies,

as a means of assisting friendly nations; revision of mobilization plans to emphasize maintenance of production capacity rather than stockpiling of end-items;

reduction of overhead and of waste and duplication in the defense establishment;

and removal oi trade barriers. Less emphasis than before would be placed on

building up US and NATO forces to authorized goals by early fixed target dates.

To reach and maintain the force goals contemplated under present plans was

estimated to require annual outlays of $45 billion for the next three fiscal year»

and of $40 billion thereafter. These amounts were judged inconsistent with the

new policies. The Council therefore drew the outlines o! a new and smaller

military program, based on the departmental reviews carried out in response to

Mr. Kyes' directive of 7 February 1953.*1 This program abandoned specific target

dates for completing the military buildup. It was to be related to a floating,

rather than a specific, D-day The object would be to achieve, by FY 1956 or FY

1957, force level* of the following general order of magnitude: 13 Army divisions,

1,200 Navy ships, and 105 to 115 Air Force wings. The expected costs of this

program were: $43.2 billion, $40 billion, and $35 billion, respectively, for fiscal

years 1954, 1955, and I956> and $33 billion annually thereafter These figures

.
JCS and National Polio/

assumed an estimated $1 billion annual savings in overhead and dupl*<~ation.

The 1954 and 1955 totals included $2 billion for the Korean War and for expansion of the ROK Army. The appropriations request in the FY 1954 budget was to

be reduced by approximately $5 billion.

This statement of policies was referred to the NSC Planning Board to be

incorporated into a formal directive. The result was NSC 149/2, approved by the

Council on 28 April 1953 and by the President on 29 April.34In this paper, ihe

new approach to defense was summarized as follows:

The entire military program, including missions, forces and readiness levels,

will not be related to a specified" date for D-day readiness and will be reviewed

and modified from time to time as the result of periodic recommendations from

the joint Chiefs of Staff and in view of changing tactical, strategic, and economic

considerations throughout the world. In particular, all missions will be carefully

reviewed as rapidly as possible in order to determine whether or not there is any

overlapping wnich unnecessarily commits any of the services to responsibilities

which can better be served by another service or by a combination of services as

a result of changing capabilities, modernization or more effective planning. This

military program assumes a steady improvement in defense capabilities, with a

substantial base for full mobilization in the event of all-out war. It is a program

that should continue to be sound and livable [sic] over a period of years.

The guidelines for the new military program were now expressed in manpower limits rather than force levels. From their strengths as of 28 February

1953, the Army was to be reduced by 74,000 men and the Navy and Marine Corps

together bv 70,000 during FY 1954. The Air Force would be cut by 50,000 bv the

end of FY 1955.*

The effect of these decisions was to impose an end FY 1954 strength of

1,421,000 on the Army and of 975,236 for the Navy and Marine Corps.1* Together

with Secretary Wilson's later action in establishing a 1954 strength of 960,000 for

the Air Force, they would require the Services to reduce to 3,356,236 men by the

end of FY 1954, compared with 3,505,661 on 28 Februar)' 1953. Nevertheless,

according to NSC 149/1, it was expected that, through better utilization of

manpower, the Army and Navy would be able to retain approximately the same

numbers of major units and that the Air Force could achieve an important

increase in the number of combat wings. All the Services were to be provided

with modernized equipment that would increase their combat power.

In approving NSC 149/2, the Council agreed that the Department of Defense

would present to Congress a revised FY 1954 defense budget based on the new

program. For FY 1955, the Department, after further studies, would propose a

force structure compatible with the hoped-for expenditure limit of $40 billion.

The Council also directed the t*Uf\nin^ Board to draft a comprehensive directive

on national security policy that would supersede previous or,es stilt in effect

(NSC 2CV4, NSC WL and NSC 135/3)

The new approach reflected m NSC 14*2 was described to th** public in

statements by the President during the next few weeks. '"The essence of the

change is this," said Mr Eisenhower in a news conference on 30 April 1953 "We

reject »he tdea that we must build up to a maximum attainable strength tot some

Ö

':%
Basic National Security Policy, 1953

specific date theoretically fixed for a specified time in the future. Defense is not a

matter of maximum strength for a single date. It is a matter of adequate protection to be projected as far into the future as the actions and apparent purposes of

others may compel us."37 He repeated this conviction on 19 May in a radio

address in which he explained the basis for the revised FY 1954 budget that had

by then been sent to Congress. The object, he said, was to avoid both "the

indefinite continuance of a needlessly high rate of Federal spending" and "any

penny-wise, pound-foolish policy that could, through lack of needed strength,

cripple the cause of freedom."**

The rew budget called for $36 billion in new obligational authority and $43.2

billion in expenditures. Most of the reduction was at the expense of the Air

Force, which was cut from $16.8 to $11.7 billion in new obligational authority.

The Navy was reduced from $11.4 to $9.7 billion; the Army, however, was

increased from $12.1 to $13.7 billion, to meet the new Korean requirements.

Secretary Wilson outlined the new force goals for FY 1954 in testimony before

a House committee on 11 May 1953. The Army would maintain 20 divisions, but

would increase the number of antiaircraft battalions—its contribution to continental defer.se—from 113 to 117. The Navy would maintain about the same

number of warships.40The Air Force was expected to have 114 wings by the end

of 1954, and would continue to expand further. A strength of 120 wings had

been established as its interim goal; the final force objective was yet to be

determined.41

The Secretary explained, however, that these force levels were subject to

change after a new look at the entire defense picture to be undertaken later in

the year. "This will involve an intensive and detailed study oi all aspects of

defense—forces, missions, weapons, readiness levels, strategic plans, and so

forth," said Mr. Wilton, "and will provide the basis fur the fiscal year 1955

budget."42

A New Statement of National Security Policy: NSC 153/1

The C until'* new statement of national security policy was circulated in

draft to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment on 1 June 1953.° insofar as it

had military implications, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved it subject to minor

changes ** A revised version, NSC 153/1, was approved bv the Council on 9 June

1953 and by the President the next day.4* It was in Urge measure A restatement

of previously approved polices, though modified in the direction of NSC 149/2.

NSC 152/1 found two pnncipai threats to the survival oi fundamental values

and institutions oi the United States, as follows:

a The formidable power and aggressive pattcy of the communist world

led by the USSR

b The ser cms weakening oi the economy of the United States that may

result rrv m the cost of opposing the Soviet threat over a sustained

periot*

9

;

*
JCS and National Policy

The basic problem for the United States was to strike a balance between these

dangers. Of the two, the first must continue to receive primary consideration.

Nevertheless, sound fiscal policy might require the United States to assume

increased risks in relation to the Soviet threat.

The general objectives of US policy, according to NSC 153/1, were as follows:

a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

h.

To create and maintain sufficient strength, both military and nonmilitary, to provide for the security of the United States, assist in the

defense of vital areas of the free world, prevent or counter aggression,

deter general war, protect the continental United States, and provide

the basis for winning a general war if one should be forced on us.

To maintain a sound and strong US economy based on free enterprise.

To maintain free US political institutions supported by an ir»fo«~«»d

public opinion.

To strengthen the will and ability of other nations of the frte world,

individually and collectively, to deter or oppose communist aggression and achieve internal stability.

To prevent significant expansion of Soviet bloc power, even though

in certain casf?s measures to this end may be used by the Soviet bloc

as a pretext for war.

To delay and disrupt the consolidation of Soviet bloc power and influence, and eventually to reduce such power and influence to a point

which no longer constitutes a threat to our security, without unduly

risking a general war.

To establish an international system based on fieedom and justice as

contemplated in the Charter of the United Nations.

To continue in effect US objectives vis-a-vis the USSR in the event of

war. (These objectives had been set forth in NSC 20/4, and were repeated verbatim in NSC 153/1.)

Most of these objectives were long-established. The influence of NSC 149/2

was seen in the second, as well as in some of the courses of action proposed to

attain this and other objectives: reduction of Federal expenditures, lessened

dependence on stocks of finished end-items (as distinct from additional production facilites) in mobilization planning, and deemphasis of early target dates for

reaching NATO force levels.

The need to maintain the nation's strategic deterrent was stressed in connection with the first objective. The United States, said NSC 153/1, nust "develop

and maintain an offensive capability, particularly the capability to inflict massive

damage on Soviet warmaking capacity, at a level that the Soviets must regard as

an unacceptable risk in war." The implied primacy of retaliatory capability as

compared with other components of rr.litary strength was somewhat more

emphatic than in the most recent previous policy directive (NSC 135/3), which

had spoken merely of "the capability to inflict massive damage on the Soviet

warmaking capacity"

A few of the actions proposed by NSC 153/1 were wholly new. For example,

in connection with preventing Soviet expansion, it was stated that the United

States should be willing to undertake unilateral action, if necessary, against

"local communist aggression in key areas."

10
Basic National Security Policy, 1953

Project Solarium

NSC 153/1 was accurately described in its title as a restatement of national

security policy. For the most part, it reaffirmed objectives and methods

inherited from the previous administration, though with some changes in emphasis. For that reason, it could hardly satisfy the expectations of those of Mr.

Eisenhower's supporters who had hoped for radical departures in foreign policy.

Some adherents of his party had become impatient with the doctrine of containment and had urged instead a policy of liberation—an aggressive course of

action that would seek, by means short of military attack, to disrupt communist

regimes and bring about the release of the peoples living under their rule.46 At

one point in the 1952 campaign, John Foster Dulles had indicated that General

Eisenhower, if elected President, would abandon containment for a policy of

liberating captive nations by nonviolent means.47

A study intended to evaluate the containment policy in relation to possible

alternatives had been launched by the administration even before NSC 153/1

was approved. In May 1953, in a conference held in the sunroom (solarium) of

the White House, President Eisenhower and several of his advisers had agreed

that three possible national strategies should be carefully examined. Two of

these—at opposite ends of the spectrum—would be containment and liberation,

respectively. The third would be an intermediate course, in which the United

States would in effect draw a line around those regions vital to its interests and

would warn the Soviets that any violation of the line wOwid mean general war.

Each of these courses of action was to be analyzed by a task force of experts who

would plead the case for «t.48

The President placed this Solarium project (as it was called) under the direction of Lieutenant General H.A. Craig, USAF, the Commandant of the National

War College. It was to begin about 10 June 1953, and was expected to require

about six weeks. Hl^h level supervision was to be exercised by a committee of

the National Security Council, consisting of the Acting Secretary of State, General Walter Bedell Smith; the Director of Central Intelligence, Mi. Allen Dulles;

and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Mr. Robert

Cutler.4*

The task forces included both civilian and military personnel. The policy

alternatives to be examined were set forth as follows in the instructions issued to

the members:*0

Alternative A essentially the containment policy, as already set forth in NSC

153/1].

(1) To maintain over a sustained period armed forces to provide for the

security of the United States and to assist in the defense of vital areas of

the free world;

(2) To continue to assist in building up the economic and military strength

and cohesion of the free world; and

(3) Without materially increasing the risk of general war, to continue to exploit the vulnerabilities of the Soviets and their satellites by political,

ec momic and psychological measures.

11
JCS and National Policy

Alternative B [drawing the line].

(1) To complete the line now drawn in the NATO area and the Western

Pacific so as to form a continuous line around the Soviet bloc beyond

which the U.S. will not permit Soviet or satellite military forces to advance

without general war;

(2) To make clear to the Soviet rulers in an appropriate and unmistakable

way that the U.S. has established and is determined to carry out this

policy; and

(3) To reserve freedom of action, in the event of indigenous communist

seizure of power in countries on our side of the line, to take all measures

necessary to reestablish a situation compatible with the security interests

of the U.S. and its allies.

Alternative C (liberation!.

(1) To increase efforts to disturb and weaken the Soviet bloc and to accelerate

the consolidation and strengthening of the free world to enable it to assume the greater risks involved; and

(2) To create the maximum disruption and popular resistance throughout

the Soviet bloc.

The task forces rendered their reports to the National Security Council on 16

July 1953. Task Force A, under the chairmanship of Mr. George F. Kennan, took

the position that the strategy pursued by the United States so far was basically

sound and should be continued, with certain changes to make it bolder and

more flexible. It viewed the trend of international events as favorable, and asserted

that the United States "is today in a position to assume the strategic offensive in

its conflicts with Soviet Communism." This offensive, however, was to be limited to diplomatic initiatives and to cautious encouragement of stresses and

strains in the Soviet system.

Task Force A endorsed most of the objectives and courses of action in NSC

153/1. It placed special stress on the importance of strengthening and solidifying

the free world coalition, since collaboration among the free nations was "essential

to the successful pursuit of all our objectives with regard to Soviet power." The

task force considered the subject of continental defense, which was currently a

live issue before the Council, and recommended stronger defenses to reinforce

the US deterrent capacity.

The members of Task Force A acknowledged that their recommendations

would mean some initial increases in security costs but considered these well

within the nation's capabilities. "The United States can afford to survive," asserted

their report.

The report of Task Force B, which was headed by Major General James

McCormack, Jr., USAF, was based on the following premise: "The warning of

general war as the primary sanction against further Soviet-Bloc aggression, under

clearly defined circumstances, is the best means available for insuring the security of the United States, for the present and the foreseeable future." Under the

policy advocated by this group, the Ut ted States would make it plain that any

new communist aggression would result in war. In other words, the line beyond

which the United States would permit no further communist advance was to

take in alt areas not then under communist control. Such a policy was not wholly

incompatible with either of the other alternatives. It was, said Task Force B,

12
Basic National Security Policy, 7w

"proposed as a support, rather than as a substitute, for existing policies." It

would provide a single, clear-cut strategic concept, which would make possible

the most efficient and economic development of US forces (although it would

not necessarily lead to a reduction in expenditures).

The war envisioned by Task Force B, in case the communists crossed the line,

would be general as distinct from merely local; that is, one in which the United

States "would apply its full power—whenever, however, and wherever necessary to defeat the main enemy." This assumption did not necessarily mean that

bombs would "fall automatically on Moscow on H-hour"; whether or not they

did so would depend on the war plan in effect at the time. However, the policy

would "find its military basis solidly in the capabilities of atomic weapons." The

expression "massive retaliation" was not used in the report, but the concept

seemed clearly present.

Task Force B's report implied that the only alternative to its strategy was a

choice between continuing acceptance of Soviet pressures and aggressions and

confrontation with an endless succession of "costly small wars none of which

seems to lead anywhere except to another one." While admitting that the strategy was, in the final analysis, unilateral, the report foresaw a need for allies,

both to provide military bases and to supply additional forces along the periphery of the Soviet bloc.

Task Force C, under Vice Admiral R. L. Conolly, USN, urged "a positive

course of action designed to seize the strategic initiative and deliberately undertake the task of eliminating the Communist threat to the free world." Unlike

Task Force A, this group believed that the trend of events was running against

the United States and could only be reversed by dynamic, offensive political

action. Its report outlined a strategy in three phases. In the first, the United

States would complete its military buildup, construct the necessary covert

apparatus, and launch an economic, political, and diplomatic offensive against

the communist bloc. Successive stages would see attempts to detach the satellites from Soviet control, followed by an effort to disrupt the alliance between

the Soviet Union and Communist China.

The hope for success of this policy rested on the assumption that "the whole

enemy power stnrcure, dominated as it is by a dictatorial minority, is basically

unstable." Implementation would "involve the use of conceptions and techniques of international action—such as subversion, pressure, and threat of force—

previously foreign to us." However, Task Force C believed that "the adaptation

called for is probably within the power of our country to make."

Task Force C rejected any idea of preventive war or of an ultimatum to the

Soviet Union. It conceded, however, that its policy might increase the risk of

general war in the short run. The task force recognized also that most US allies

would draw back in terror from such a policy, but it believed that their estrangement would be overcome as successes created a climate v f victory.

The cost of this policy was estimated at $60 billion annually lor FYs WH and

1955, declining to $45 billion by FY 1958. The size of these figures practically

guanrr.teed that the policy would be rejected by the Council, although Task

Force C argued that they were not prohibitive.*1

13
JCS and National Policy

When the Council discussed the reports, the irreconcilable differences between

the recommendations of Task Forces A and C, and lesser degree of conflict

between those of A and B, soon became apparent. In preparation for further

discussion, the NSC staff prepared condensed versions of each report,52 which

were sent for comment to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services.53

The JCS Adviser to the Planning Board, Major General John K. Gerhart,

USAF, after studying the reports, characterized their proposals as a mixture of

approved objectives and courses of action with others that had been discontinued or rejected during past considerations. Careful study of the current validity of the reasons that in the past had caused rejection of similar proposals

seemed indicated, and for this purpose General Gerhart recommended referral

to the NSC Planning Board.54The Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted this suggestion to the Secretary of Defense on 28 July. They advised him that any changes in

national policy arising from the Solarium project would require intensive study

and proposed, as a first step, that six to eight weeks be allowed for the development of guidance for the members of the Planning Board by their parent departments and agencies.55

The Council, however, decided on 30 July 1953 to proceed at once with the

preparation of a new policy statement, to be drafted by the Planning Board with

the assistance of representatives of the task forces, which would incorporate

proposals from all three reports. Maintenance of US military strength, solidarity

with friendly nations, and assistance to the noncommunist world—goals stressed

by Task Force A—would continue as the central objectives of US policy. At the

same time, the new statement would specify those areas of the world in which a

Soviet advance would be considered a casus belli, as urged by Task Force B, and

vvo'Ud call for some of the aggressive actions recommended by Task Force C. But

there was to be no abrupt redirection of diplomatic or military policy. The Council thus in effect rejected the strategy of liberation."*

The Planning Board assigned the task to a special committee, the membership of which included the JCS Adviser, General Gerhart. Preparation of a first

draf: was to keep the special committee and the Planning Board occupied through

September 1953.

The New Joint Chiefs of Staff and Their Recommendations

Between the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and the election of 1952,

US foreign policy and military strategy had been intensely and publicly

debated. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had found themselves caught in this political

crossfire. Criticism of the Truman administration by prominent Republicans

had sometimes extended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the grounds that the

latter had become partisans of existing policies. The criticism usually focused on

the Chairman, General of the Army Omar N. Bradley. Senator Robert A. Taft,

one of the most influential spokesmen for his partv, believed thai General Bradley had stepped out of hts proper rote in publicly supporting the administration's

14
I

Basic National Security Policy, 1953

policies—which, in Senator Taft's view, overstressed Europe at the expense of

Asia and relied on a military strategy that placed too little emphasis on air-sea

power.57 During his campaign for the Republican presidential nomination, he

had promised to replace General Bradley if elected. After the election of Mr.

Eisenhower, Senator Taft and many others regarded the incumbent Chiefs of

Staff as a probable obstacle to large budget reduction, since they were identified

with the programs to be cut.

Fortuitously, the terms of the principal JCS members wore due to exr. ire in

mid-1953. All were completing at least four years in offi^ except Admiral

William M. Fechteier, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, whose tenure dated from

1951. Early in 1953, Senator Taft and other Republicans in Congress urged Mr.

Eisenhower to designate their successors immediately, in order that the n^w

appointees, before assuming office, would have an opportunity to take a new

ook at existing military programs with a view to possible budget reductions.58

President Eisenhower accepted this suggestion and decided upon a replacement of the incumbent joint Chiefs of Staff.59 On 7 May 1953 he nominated

General Nathan F. Twining (then Vice Chief of Staff, USAF) to succeed General

Vandenberg, who was ill and had announced plans to retire effective 30 June

1953.*° Several days later, the White House announced that Admiral Arthur W.

Radford, currently serving as Commander in Chief, Pacific, would succeed General Bradley as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and that General Matthew

B. Ridgway would leave his post as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe to

become Chief of Staff, US Army, in succession to General J. Lawton Collins. To

complete the sweep. Admiral Fechteler would not be reappointed for another

two-year term, but was to be replaced by Admiral Robert B. Carney, commander

of NATO forces in Southern Europe. General Twining would assume office on 1

July; the others, in mid-August. General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., continued as

Commandant of the Marine Corps (by legislation of June 1952 the Commandant

had co-equal status with the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when matters

of direct concern to the Marine Corps were under consideration).

The new appointees were the choice of Secretary of Defense Charles E.

Wilson, whD had been given a free hand by the President in selecting them."1

Senator Taft had also been consulted.62

The key appointment was that of the Chairman, Admiral Radford. His views

on strategy had been made known to the President-elect and to Mr. Wilson in

December 1952, in conferences held aboard the USS Helena while Mr. Eisenhower was en route home from his visit to Korea.M

In these discussions. Admiral Radford had expressed the view that US forces were committed in too many

parts of the world. It would be better to redeploy some of them to create a

strategic reserve in the continental United States, and to rely on other nations to

provide the first line of defense along the periphery of the communist world.

Moreover, he believed that US policy and strategy had underestimated the

importance of Asia. These views found a ready response among his hearers.64

Trie significance of the Radford appointment was increased by a reorganization o! the Department of Defense that was submitted to Congress by the President on 30 April 1953 and became effective two months later. The announced

15
JCS and National Policy

objectives of Reorganization Plan No. 6 were to strengthen civilian authority, to

reduce costs, and to improve joint planning. In general, it enhanced the authority of the Secretary of Defense at the expense of the Services. It created six new

Assistant Secretaries of Defense and a General Counsel, filling in the structure of

a full-scale executive department that would take over the work previously

performed by a congeries ot boards and committees (the Munitions Board, the

Research and Development Board, and others) on which the Services had been

represented. The reorganization plan also enlarged the power of the Chairman,

by making the selection of officers to serve on the Joint Staff, and their tenure,

subject to his approval, and by transferring to him, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff

as a body, the responsibility for "managing the Joint Staff and the Director

thereof."65

When the appointments were announced, Mr.Eisenhower warned against

expecting the new Joint Chiefs of Staff to introduce any abrupt or radical changes

in strategy'. 'The great facts that affect a so-called strategic situation and plan do

not change rapidly," he pointed out. "No strategic plan suitable to the United

States can be greatly different from any other, as long as it is based upon these

facts." But, he continued, there could be differences in methods and means.

Moreover, he promised that there would be "a new approach, a study that is

made without any real chains fastening to the past." At the same time, he

warmly praised the outgoing JCS members, with all of whom he had served

during his military career. He made it clear that they were being replaced because

Secretary Wilson had wanted an entirely new team, not because he was dissatisfied with their performance in office.6

*"

The President determined that the incoming JCS members should spend a

month or so in an intensive, full-time analysis of US military problems and

strategy while they were yet free from the manifold tasks trnt would descend

upon them as soon as they took the oath of offko ,7 The nature of the study that

he desired them to undertake was set forth in the following memorandum.

I wish the newly-appointed Chiefs of Staff, before assuming their official

duties, to examine the following matters:

(a) our strategic concepts and implementing plans.

(b) the roles and missions of the services,

(c) the composition and readiness, of our present forces,

(d) the development of new weapons and weapons systems, and resulting new advances in military tactics, and

(e) our military assistance programs.

! do not desire any elaborate staff exercise. As a result of this examination, I

should like a summarized statement of these officers' own views on these matters,

having in mind the elimination of overlapping in operations and administration,

and the urgent need tor a really austere basis in military preparation and

operations.

This examination should be made with due regard for the basic national

security policies stated in NSC 153/1. While i do not fix any arbitrary budgetary

or personnel limitations as a basis for this study, it should take into consideration our major national security programs for tne fiscal years 1954 and 1955. as

outlined in NSC 14V/2, Part II. With reference to our national policy expressed in

pars 8b and 20-25, NSC 153/1 [the paragraphs dealing with the maintenance of a

16
BASIC National Security Policy, 1953

sound and strong US economy through reductions in expenditures and in the

Federal deficit], the views of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the

Budget should be obtained.

Such an examination should provide a fresh view as to the best balance and

most effective use and deployment of our armed forces, under existing circumstances. What I am seeking is interim guidance to aid the Council in developing policies for the most effective employment of available national resources to

insure the defense of our country for the long pull which may lie ahead.

For the purpose of carrying on this examination together, wherever it may

take them, I want you to arrange the duties of these officers so that, beginning as

early as possible in July and pnor to undertaking the responsibilities of their new

offices, tney can give to the examination full-time uninterrupted attention, freed

of all other duties.68

President Eisenhower delivered this memorandum in person to the new Joint

Chiefs of Staff at a meeting at the White House about the middle of July 1953.ft9

The President's instructions left no doubt that he expected the new appointees

to recommend a military strategy that could be implemented with smaller forces

and would thus justify lower military budgets in the future. This fact was evident from the references to an "austere basis" of preparation and from the

portions of NSC 149/2 and NSC 153/1 that were cited. At the same time, the

President's explicit disavowal of ceilings left it uncertain how far the Joint Chiefs

of Staff should consider themselves obligated to remain within the expenditure

limits in NSC 149/2.

The stress on economy was reinforced in a later memorandum addressed to

the other appointees by General Twining, who had already assumed office. The

president, he pointed out, wished them to recommend forces that could be

"maintained and operated for an indefinite period without forcing such a financial burden on the country as to endanger a strong, sound U. S. economy." He

went Ofl to suggest a possible justification for force reductions. "I believe," he

wrote, " hat insufficient account has been taken of new weapons and their effect

on the composition and employment of our forces, particularly in the field of

atomic and thermonuclear weapons. Forces of a power never before known to

man are now available. I believe we should accept these weapons as accomplished facts and employ them more fully ourselves while preparing to cope

with them if they are used by the enemy." He left it to his readers to draw the

conclusion that the enormous firepower of these new weapons might justify

reductions in the number of men in uniform.70

Preparation of the study requested by the President kept the new appointees

occupied for the better part of a month/1Part of this time was spent in inspection trips to military installations,7

^ and another three days (23- 26 July 1953) at a

conference of high-ranking military and civilian officials at the US Marine Corps

base at Quantico, Virginia, where addresses w*ere given by the President, the

Secretary of Defense, and others, including General Bradley Ami Admiral

Radford/*

The new appointees finished their task during a cruise on the Chesapeake

Bay on 6-7 A'igust 1953 aboard the Sequoia, the official yacht assigned the Secretary of the Navy.7

* On 8 August 1953 they tendered their conclusions in a report

i:
JCS and National Policy

addressed to the Secretary of Defense.75The report represented the initial views

of Admiral Radford, General Ridgway, Admiral Carney, and General Twining

as incoming JCS members and was not a corporate position of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff.

The general conclusion was that US military strategy had thus far been essentially correct but that a redirection was now called for. The opening paragraph

set forth this view as follows:

A review of our military plans and their implementation since June 1950 must

result in the conclusion that in general they were sound and adequate. The

exceptions were generally the result of immediate pressures, inadequate

intelligence, or both. That these plans have served their purpose is a fact, since

we have successfully averted a general war. We do find ourselves, however,

militarily extended at this time with our existing armed forces so deployed or

committed that we have little strategic reserve. Our Armed Forces are of such a

size that augmentation of any magnitude could take place only after full scale

mobilization. Their roles and missions as stated in the functions paper are clear

and that document as now written provides reasonable workable guidance for

service programs. There is no rea/on to believe that our combat readiness or

overall military power will be materially increased in the immediate future by

the advent of new weapons or tactics except perhaps in the atomic field [a verv

important exception, the implications of which were not discussed in the report].

Any across the board reduction in the military budget would result in an almost

equal reduction in overall security.

With these words, the new Joint Chiefs of Staff ruled out any hope for

prompt, large-scale reduction in military expenditures. Nevertheless they believed

that it would be possible to attain a "satisfactory military position for the long

pull from a budgetary poin» , view/' Any such position must be one that would

remedy certain deficiencies in the US military situation, which they described as

follows:

Currently the most critical factors in the military aspects of our security are

air defense of our Continental U. S. vitals and our ability to retaliate swiftly and

powerfully ill the event we ATV attacked. These air defense* need bolstering to a

degree which can hold damage to nationally manageable proportions. A capability for swift and powerful retaliation is a deterrent and. in event of hostilities,

will blunt the enemy offensive and reduce his capabilities.

Our current military capabilities are inadequate to provide essential national

security and at the same time to meet our global military commitments. We ATV

over-extended.

We continue to place our major emphasis in the military field on peripheral

deployments overseas, to the neglect of our vitals in Continental United States

Our freedom of action is seriously curtailed, the exercise of initiative severely

limited.

Our statt of readiness for timeiy military reactior to full-scale armed aggression continues io deteriorate. We have used in World War tt and in the Korean

War practically our entire pool of trained military reservists, particularly

specialists. For any emergency short of general war, we shall now oe forced to

tne time-consuming procedure of training new personnel.

There seemed only one course of action that amid reverse this deterioration

IS
A

Bask National Security Policy, 1953

without seriously weakening the stability and durability of the national economy.

This course, they continued,

would reverse our present strategic policy. It would place in first priority the

essential military protection of our Continental U. S. vitals and the capability for

delivering swift and powerful retaliatory blows. Military commitments overseas—

that is to say, peripheral military commitments—would cease to have first claim

on our resources.

What (hey had in mind was a program of redeployment and reorientation of

US military forces. They did not describe this program in detail, nor did they

spell out its advantages. The implication, however, was that US forces brought

home from overseas could be used both to strengthen continental defense and to

create a strategic reserve that would restore flexibility to US strategy. Military

expenditures could then be reduced because it was cheaper to keep uniformed

men at home than to maintain them abroad; moreover, some of the forces

withdrawn from foreign oases might be disbanded, thus lessening the demand

on the nation's financial resources and manpower.

The new JCS appointees made it clear, however, that economy would be an

ultimate rather than an immediate reward. They saw no hope that the budget

could be balanced during the two years estimated to be requiied to accomplish

the program. Nor could they promise that their plan would result in smallei

military forces, since, as they pointed out, time had not permitted them to go

into the question of force levels.

But there was one serious potential danger in this course of action: its possible effect on public and official opinion in other countries. Ever since the North

Atlantic Treaty was signed in 19-W, the United States had been pushing its

Western European allies to c*,rry a bigger defense burden and to expand their

forces. How could it eonrnue to do so in the face of an announced intention to

withdraw some of its own forces from the continent? And what of the consequences of removing forces from the Far East, where the Korean War had ended

only a few weeks earlier?

The authors of the report faced squarely up to these questions. "Adoption of

this course of action," they admitted, "would involve a change in basic foreign

policy of fundamental «nd ür-reaehmg implications.' Therefore, they warned,

if adt^pted. these changes in our foreign policy Ami military deployments should

be made only after the most exhaustive consideration by the highest governmental officials, and dissemination of knowledge of the decision should be most

carefully controlled. Finally, implementing plans would have to be prepared on

a carefully phased schedule, carefully coordinated at home and abroad, and

given the mt*st effective security practicable

A well»conceived public information program was also necessary. Moreover,

it would be essential to define, and to make clear to othe* nations, the US

national objectives "in situations short of a general emergency "

Only the President was in a position to judge whether this policy should be

attempted in the face of perhaps irreparable diplomatic consequences. The new

JCS appointees therefore rvcommendec5 only that its possible effects be studied

19

4Mi«WKMcMV«(ani*AW<«nHUM««WN»eKiv>'»%--v
JCS and National Poliqf

by the National Security Council. They also submitted two other recommendations, as follows:

1. The United States should formulate a clear, positive policy with respect

to the use of atomic weapons, and should announce it publicly.

2. Military assistance should be dispensed with caution. "We should be

more discriminatory in extending any form of our aid or protection,"

they recommended, "and should require an appropriate contribution or

concession in return." What they had in mind was that aid should be

channeled principally to nations willing to build up their own indigenous

forces to offset the effects of US withdrawal.7"

Shortly after submitting this report, Admiral Radford, General Ridgway, and

Admiral Carney assumed their new positions and the turnover in JCS member

ship was accomplished.77The new Chairman held his first press conference on

26 August 1953, and told reporters that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were taking a

bng, hard look at security problems. "Cur review of U. S. strategic needs and

capabilities, which was ordered by President Eisenhower, is something that will

continue indefinitely" he said. He added that this review would not be influenced by economic considerations—a statement difficult to reconcile with others

that he was to make later.71*

On 27 August 1953 the newly installed Joint Chiefs of Staff appeared before

the National Securny Council to describe their proposed new "concept" (as the

Council members called it). They explained that they were not proposing that

the Uniled States withdraw from its alliances or abandon its foreign bases. They

listed some possible benefits of redeployment not touched on in their report,

reduction of friction between US troops and indigenous populations, lowering

of international tension, and assistance in recruiting career professionals who

might otherwise be discouraged by prospects of long overseas tours. At the

same time, they stressed the importance of convincing the Allies that the adoption of the concept did not stem from arts* conviction that the Soviet threat had

lessened; rather it was based on a desire to increase the mobility and readiness of

US forces, in the face of a danger that remained as great as ever.

All four oi the JCS members stressed that they had not been led to the

concept bv budgetary considerations alone, and that thev recognised the military danger of over-extension of fortes under present deployments Hut two

members. General Ridgway äi\d Admiral Carney, indicated that they had

approved the concept merely as a subject for further studv. which might show it

to be unacceptable. General Ridgway, who had only recently returned from

Europe, stressed the possible dangers to NATO unless the program were carried

out with great care. Admiral Carney bluntly characterized the program as the

best that could be devised under the indicated budgetary limitations, if enough

men md money were available, he said, it would be better to increase US forces

(rather than merely reshuffling themj to meet the need for continental defense

and »or a strategic reserve Doth he and General Ridgway warned that the LS

military deterrent must include adequate surface force*

The National Security Council tentatively approved Üw concept Secretary of

the Treasurv Humphrey was particularly outspoken in praising it, he saw it as a

. ..
Basic National Security Policy, 1953

means of reducing or holding down military expenditures and thus avoiding the

imposition of controls over the nation's economy. Secretary of State John Foster

Dulles, though sympathetic to the concept, nevertheless had reservations. He

warned th«it the United States could not alone match the Soviet bloc in military

strength, and that it was essential to avoid any action that would disrupt tree

world unity. In the end, the President and the Council agreed that Secretary

Dulles should analyze the possible diplomatic consequences of the concept before

the Joint Chiefs of Staff studied it further.79

Secretary Dulles reported his conclusion to the Council on 9 September 19S3.*

Judging by the Councils later actions, he evidently gave assurance that the

strain on US foreign relations would not be fatal. The way was thus open for the

National Security Council to adopt the new strategy. For the moment, however,

the Council took no action, pending the revision of national security policy that

was already in process.

A New Policy Directive: NSC 162/2

The Solarium Committee of the NSC Planning board, appointed

in response to the Council's decision of 30 July 1953. completed a draft

policy statement on 17 „^»ptember. When it was submitted to the Board, however,

disagreements quickly became apparent. On 30 September, after five fruitless

sessions, the Planning Hoard abandoned the effort to reach agreement And forwarded a split draft, NSC 162, to the Council."1

In NSC 162 the world situation was view-d as highly alarming. The paper took

note of the Soviets' mounting atomic capabilities, and assessed the Soviet regime

as essentially unchanged despite the passing o! Staltn, In broad terms, it set

forth US military requirements a massive retaliatory capacity, mobile I ^ces in

readiness, and an adequate And well-protected mobiluation base. The Treasury

and Budget representatives, however, felt that the danger of unsound tiscal

policies should virtually be equated with that presented by Soviet hostility and

military power. The majority view held that the United States could and should

pay whatever price was needed for safety

Those portions of the draft that dealt with military strategy clearly reflected

the concept put forward by the new Joint Chiefs of Staff, And may have been

inserted At the instigation of the jCS Adviser to the Board, General Gerhart, who

had served on the drafting committee. Thus NSC 162 advocated that the United

States use special" (i.e.. nuclear) weapons whenever required tor its security. It

also gave general sanction to redeployment of US forces, although here the

Planning Board split Some members admitted that redeployment might be

desirable, but urged further study of foreign political repercussions. Other*

favored an immediate decision to withdraw some US forces, coupled with an

attempt to persuade allied naiionf that this step was in their own interest*

NSC' 162 specified some of the aggressive action* a&ainst the «t-nvmunist bio«,

tltat the guideline-* had called for Genera] Gerhart, however, wtshed to go

21
JCS avd National Policy

farther in this direction than most others. For example, he urged deletion of a

paragraph renouncing aggiessive actions involving force against Soviet bloc

territory. Again, in a discussion of the possibility of negotiation, he wished to

stress the need to maintain pressure on the Soviets to induce them to negotiate.

The representatives of the Department of Defense and the Office of Defense

Mobilization joined him in upholding this hard line.

When Admiral Radford and his colleagues received NSC 162 for review,82

they sent it to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC), which criticized it

rather severely. "The principal themes running through the paper," observed the

Committee, with some exaggeration, "appear to be: (1) that we should pursue a

policv of inaction for fear of antagonizing the Soviets and of alienating our Allies;

and (2) that a balanced budget should take precedence over an adequate defense."

Nevertheless the Committee found NSC 162 generally acceptable, subject to

favorable resolution of the disputed portions.83

The joint Chiefs of Staff, however, withheld their endorsement. They told

the Secretary of Defense on 6 October 1953 that the five days allowed them for

studv of the military implications of NSC 162 had been insufficient and that, in

any event, a definitive evaluation would be possible only after the divergent

paragraphs had been resolved, since the matters at issue were basic to the

direction üt policy. Addressing themselves to the two principal issues, the joint

Chiefs of Staff made clear their conviction that national security should take

precedence over budgetary' considerations * .id that negotiations with the Soviet

leaders wea» unlikely to be productive unless the United States provided the

Soviets with an incentive to negotiate by seizing the initiative in the cold war.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that no action should be taken on NSC

162 until its implications had been carefully studied. However, they proposed a

number of detail«! changes to be incorporated in NSC 162 if an immediate

decision were judged necessary. The general effect of these changes would be to

stress the need for defense rather than economy.

One paragraph in NSC 162 had called for the United States to maintain a

"capability to inuVt massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power."

The joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that this be amended to statt* a heed for a

military posture that would include this capability This change had been suggested by Admiral Carnev.*4

The effect would be to emphasize tha? retaliatory

airpowri was only ot\^ element of offensive strength

Concerning the disputed issue oi redeployment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

expressed views that reflected the same differences of emphasii* that had already

become apparent during their presentation of the new concept. All favored a

positive statement that US forces were overextended, or maldeployed, but Admiral Carney And General Ridgway wished to ^dd the following carturn;

However, any ma&or withdrawal of United States forces from Europe or the

Far East would be interpreted as a diminution of United States interest m the

defense of those areas mci would serve to undermine the strength and cohesion

of the coalition unless it were phased with a corresponding increase m the

capabilities of indigenous forces to insure AT\ adequate defense.**
Basic National Security Policy, 1953

The National Security Council discussed NSC 162 on 7 October 1953 and sent

it back to the Planning Board, which prepared three successive revisions. The

last of these, NSC 162/1, was circulated for review on 19 October 1953.8* In this

version, the Treasury-Budget view of the relative importance of the economic

and the military threats was rejected. One issue was thus settled as the Joint

Chiefs of Staff desired. Their other recommendations, however, met with a

mixed reception. Thus the statement of military requirements called for "a strong

military posture, with emphasis on the capability of inflicting massive retaliatory

damage by offensive striking power." This was closer in spirit to the original in

NSC 162 than to the rewording sought by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. NSC 1621

also failed to go as far as they had wished in recommending aggressive actions

against the Soviet bloc. The disagreement over redeployment was settled by a

compromise, which asserted a need for some redeployment while warning of

possible adverse psychological effects in foreign countries if major forces were

withdrawn.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff referred NSC 162/1 to the Joint Strategic Survey

Committee, whose members decided that it would be inappropriate to repeat

earlier recommendations that had been rejected by the Council. They therefore

recommended only one minor change, in a paragraph that seemed to them

unduly pessimistic in evaluating the prospects of NATO."*7

Admiral Carney, however, look exception to the statement of military capabilities in NSC 162/1. He pointed out that the Planning Board's first tentative redraft

of NSC 162 (containing changes adopted by the Council on 7 October) had

accepted the amendment sougnt by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in which the US

military posture would include massive retaliatory capability The new statement,

calling for emphasis upon this capability, thus departed significantly from phraseology that had been approved by the Council.1

*

Accepting Admiral Carney's suggestion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended

to the Secretary of Defense on 27 October 1953 that the statement of military

capabilities be revised as they had urged in iheir comments on NSC 1&2 They

endorsed the change suggested by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee and

proposed several others of a minor nature Subject to these comments, thev

considered NSC 162.1 acceptable .**

The National Security Council discussed NSC \bl1 on 29 October, at AI\

important meeting attended bv the Joint Chiefs of Staff arui the Service Secretaries.

The members debated at some length the paragraph on retaliatory power.

Although the amendment sought by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was supported bv

Secretary Wilson, it was finally rejected President Eisenhower insisted trut it

was necessary to establish a priority among the elements of military power But

to make certain that this decision would not prejudge the results of the review of

strategy on which the Joint Chiefs of Statt were then engaged, the President

stipulated that the Sevretarv o* Defense might ask tor revision of this paragraph

if he found that its provisions, "when read m the context of the total policy

statement, operate to the disadvantage of the national security.,,iä0 As a further

hedge against overemphasis upon a single Service, Mr fcisenh .er ruled thai

23
JCS and National Policy

the phrase "offensive striking power" would be interpreted to include all offensive forces, including aircraft carriers.91 The other amendments sought by the

Joint Chiefs of Staff were accepted. The final version, approved by President

Eisenhower on 30 October, was issued as NSC 162/2.92

NSC 162/2 defined the basic problems of national security policy as follows:

a. To meet the Soviet threat to US security.

b, In doing so, to avoid seriously weakening the US economy or undermining our fundamental values and institutions.

Here the domestic danger was clearly subordinated to the foreign. Elsewhere,

NSC 162/2 characterized Soviet hostility toward the West, together with the

military power of the Soviets and their control of a formidable subversive

apparatus, as the primary threat to the United States. This threat remained

great, despite the more conciliatory attitude shown by the regime of Premier

Georgi M. Malenkov. But there was room for hope that pressures inside the

Soviet bloc, together with growing strength and unity of noncommunist countries,

might ultimately induce the Soviets to agree to a settlement, that would be

acceptable to the free world.

The requirements for defense agamst the Soviet threat were listed as:

a, Development and maintenance of:

(1) A strong milita y posture, with emphasis on the capability of inflicting

massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power;

(2) U.S. and allied forces in readiness to move rapialy initially to counter

aggression by Soviet bloc forces and to hold vital areas and lines of

communication; and

(3) A mobilization base, and its protection against crippling damage, adequate to insure victory in the event of general war.

b. Maintenance of a sound, strong and growing economy, capable of providing through the operation of tree institutions, the strength described in

a above over the long pull and of rapidly and effectively changing to full

mobilization.

i\ Maintenance of morale and free institutions and the willingness of the

U.S. people to support the measures necessary for national security.

NSC 1622 conceded the need for allies, without which the United States

could not, even at exorbitant cost, meet its defense needs. The strengths and

weaknesses of the free world coalition were appraised realistically, and the bases

for maintenance of a position of strength in each part of the world were set forth.

In Western Europe, thir, position should be based primarily on cooperation with

the United Kingdom, France, and West Germany; in the Far East, on existing

bilateral and multilateral agreements, pending more comprehensive regional

agreements; and in the Middle East, on support of the few stable countries there

(Turkey, Pakistan, and possibly Iran).

The importance of the uncommitted areas of the world was recognized.

"Constructive U. S. policies, not related solely to anti-communism," would be

required to create a sense of mutuality of interest with these regions. Both

neutral and allied coun'ries could be strengthened by policies aimed at stimulating trade and promoting the growth of under-developed nations.

24

1
Basic National Security Policy, 1953

Turning to economic considerations, NSC 162/2 stressed that security expenditures should not be allowed to "impair the basic soundness of the U.S. economy

by undermining incentives or by inflation." Nevertheless the United States must

"meet the necessary costs of the policies essential for its security." The Federal

Government should make a determined effort to bring expenditures into line

with revenues.

NSC 162/2 asserted that "the armed forces of the United States are overextended," but it admitted that major force withdrawals from Europe or the Far

East would imply a lessening of US interest in those areas and would thus

seriously undermine the strength and cohesion of the coalition. Hence, US

diplomacy must seek to convince allied nations that their best defense rested

upon their own efforts, coupled with a commitment by the United States to

strike back against aggression with its mobile reserves. The concept proposed by

the new Joint Chiefs of Staff thus received firm approval.

"In specific situations where a warning appears desirable and feasible as an

added deterrent," proclaimed NSC 162/2, "the United States should make clear

to the USSR and Communist China, in general terms or with reference to specific areas as the situation requires, its intention to react with military force

against any aggression by Soviet bloc armed forces." An attack on any of the

following would automatically involve the United States in war with the aggressor:

the NATO countries, West Germany, Berlin, Japan, the Philippines, Australia,

New Zealand, the American Republics, and the Republic of Korea. Certian other

regions (Indochina and Taiwan were cited as examples) were so important

strategically that an attack on them would probably compel the United States to

react with military force either locally at the point of attack or generally against

the military power of the aggressor. Moreover, the principle of collective security through the United Nations was to be supported "even in areas not of vital

strategic importance." But unlike NSC 153/1, NSC 162/2 did not suggest that tne

United States take unilateral action against aggression.

If hostilities occurred, the United States would "consider nuclear weapons to

be as available for use as other munitions." When these weapons had to be

delivered from bases on allied territory, however, advance consent would be

obtained from the countries involved. The United States would also seek the

understanding and approval of this policy by other nations.

Counterbalancing its emphasis on military preparedness, NSC 162/2 declared

that the possibility of negotiation with the communist bloc must be kept open.

The chances of successful negotiation would be greater if the United States and

its allies preserved their strength and unity and maintained enough retaliatory

power to inflict unacceptable damage upon the Soviet system in case of war.*3In

the absence of any such resolution of the cold war, the United States should seek

to reduce the capabilities of the communist powers through diplomatic, political,

economic, and covert measures intended to discredit Soviet prestige and ideology,

to undermine the strength of communist parties throughout the world and to

disrupt relations among the nations of the Soviet bloc.

The final paragraphs of NSC 162/2 faced up to the ominous threat of a world

25
JCS and National Policy

of proliferating nuclear weapons, a threat foreshadowed by the recent Soviet

thermonuclear explosion:

In the face of the developing Soviet threat, the broad aim of U. S. security

policies must be to create, prior to the achievement of mutual atomic plenty,

conditions under which the United States and the free world coalition are prepared to meet the Soviet-Communist threat with resolution ana to negotiate for

its alleviation under proper safeguards. The United States and its allies must

always seek to create aud sustain the hope and confidence of the free world in

the aoility of its basic idea^ and institutions not merely to oppose the communist

threat, but to provide a wuy of life superior to Communism.

The foregoing conclusions are valid only so long as the United States maintains a retaliatory capability that cannot be neutralized by a surprise Soviet

attack. Therefore, there must be continuing examination and periodic report to

the National Security Council in regard to the likelihood of such neutralization of

U. S. retaliatory capability.

Military Strategy Reexamined: JCS 2101/113

NSC 162/2 obviously had direct military implications, but their precise

nature remained to be determined. How far should force levels reflect the

emphasis on retaliatory capacity? How many and what kind of military units

should be redeployed from overseas, and how soon? These questions required

the new joint Chiefs of Staff to move from a consideration of broad national

strategy, such as they had dealt with in their initial study, to details of force

compositions and deployments.

In tact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already confronted some of these

questions. In September 1953, Secretary' Wilson had asked them to recommend

force levels to provide the basis for the FY 1955 budget. In reply, they had

submitted proposals on 2 October 1953 that would allow all three Services a

modest expansion, explaining that they knew of no justification for proposing

reductions. On the basis of these recommendations, Secretary Wilson and the

Assistant Secretary* of Defense (Comptroller) submitted a preliminary budget to

the National Security Council on 13 October 1953 calling for expenditures of $43

billion in FY 1955—slightly below the revised 1954 budget, but considerably

more than the target figure of $40 billion set in NSC 149/2.*4

Objections arose at once from Council members who had hoped for a sizable

reduction in FY 1955. Admiral Radford, who attended the meeting, was drawn

into the controversy. He explained that he and his colleagues could not conscientiously propose smaller force levels under existing conditions. But, he suggested, a

basis for reductions might be found if the National Security Council would give

the joint Chiefs of Staff a clear-cut authorization to base their plans on the

assumption that nuclear weapons would be used immediately in case of war.1*

The implication was that plans could then be drawn for only one kind of war

rather than for several (conventional and atomic, each limited or general).

Moreover, the increased firepower of nuclear weapons would justify reduction

26
A

BASIC National Security Policy, 1953

in the size of conventional forces. The Council took no action at that time, except

to direct Secretary Wilson to revise his budget estimates.

96

The problem was to finda military strategy that would justify smaller forces

in being, both for the coming fiscal year and for subsequent years (the long

haul). Secretary Wilson took the matter back to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The

outcome of this discussion was the following directive, ~'

u

J

( Secretary Wilson

addressed to Admiral Radford on 16 October 1953:

It is of urgent importance that we determine now the broad outline for the

size and composition of our armed forces for some years ahead in the light of

foreseeable developments in order to establisha sound basis for planning best to

meet the security requirements of the United States for the long pull ahead.

U.S. national policy, strategy and the considerations whicn lead to their

adoption are set forth in NSC 162 and related documents. Certain salient factors

are:

a. The Communist hierarchy, based on the power position of the USSR,

seeks to achieve world domination by any measures best calculated by

them to serve their aim.

b. The United States must provide for their [sic] own security and, in its

own interest, assist its allies in their security. This must include adequate defensive forces, particularly for the air defense of the continental

U. S., of our own striking forces and their bases, and for the protection of our essential sea and air communications.

c. We have entered an era where the quantity of atomic weapons and their

military application necessitatesa review of their impact on our strategy.

We shall assume that such weapons will be used in military operations

by U. S. forces engaged whenever it is of militarv advantage to do so.

d. The sound economy of the free world, particularly dependent upon that

of the United States, is an essential bulwark in the preservation of our

freedom and securitv.

I request that the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit to me not later than 15 December 195J their recommendations as to:

a. An outline military strategy for the United States to implement the national strategy of the U. S. set forth in NSC 162.

b. The size and composition of the armed forces for the fiscal vears 1955,

1956, and 1957 witha point of departure the end forces and personnel

strengths established within the FY 1954 budget, in the light of:

(1) feasible annual expenditures and new appropriations of funds for

maintenance of such forces. Guide lines should be obtained from current reports of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the

Budget.

(2) remunerative utilization of the qualified manpower that can be made

available.I estimate that this would be in the bracket 2,500,000 to

3,000,000 men on active duty in the military services.

(3) the necessity for adequate air defense of the continental U.S. within

the completely integrated militarv programs.

(4) the importance on maintaining tne readiness anc1 modernization of

equipment of the combatant forces to increase our capabilities and to

maintain the war potential of our industrial complex.

c. Reasonably attainable action the U. S. should take in the politico-military

field in modifying existing commitments or to enhance tne implementation of the strategy.

The facilities of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and of the Service Departments will be available to assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their studies.**

27

1
/CS and National Folicy

The third of Mr. Wilson's salient factors listed in this directive conveyed the

authority for use of nuclear weapons that Admiral Radford had requested. The

mention of continental defense reflected an NSC decision on 24 September 1953

to construct an enlarged and integrated air defense system.98The reference to

modification of commitments suggested that Secretary Wilson expected the Joint

Chief of Staff to base their plans on the concept that they had proposed two

months earlier.

It was also clear from the directive that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were expected

to recommend a smaller military establishment. No expenditure ceilings were

laid down, but the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Budget

could be expected to guide the Joint Chiefs of Staff toward the narrowest possible budgetary limits. Moreover, the manpower figures set forth by Mr. Wilson

were well behw the current uniformed strength of approximately three and a

half million.99 The end of the Korean War would of course reduce requirements

somewhat, but by itself it could hardly justify reductions of the required

magnitude. The difficulty was sure to be compounded by the simultaneous need

to find more men and money for continental defense.

At the suggestion of Admiral Radford, the Joint Chiefs of Staff set up a

special ad hoc committee to prepare a reply to Secretary Wilson's directive. It

was headed by the Director, Joint Staff, Lieutenant General Frank F. Everest,

USAF and included two other officers from each Service. ,0°

The committee's reply, submitted on 30 November 1953, constituted a plan

for carrying out the new concept. It recommended that some US forces be

withdrawn from overseas and regrouped to form a strategic reserve in the United

States. This step would regain strategic flexibility and at the same time make it

possible to reduce the size and cost of the military establishment. It should be

accompanied by a reorientation of strategy toward greater reliance on new

weapons, in order to exploit US technological superiority and to offset the

communists' advantage in manpower.

The committee assumed that all major US forces would soon be withdrawn

from Korea. It recommended that US troops be removed from Japan as Japanese

forces came into existence. Air and naval forces should remain in the Far East,

however, and should be armed with nuclear weapons. It was agreed that some

troops must remain in Europe, for political and psychological as well as military

reasons, but their number was a matter of dispute among the committee members.

The representatives of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force wished to set a

limit of three divisions by 1957—a 40 percent reduction from the five divisions

then in Europe. The Army members declined to propose a target figure; they

insisted that no troops should be withdrawn from Europe until the political

climate was known to be favorable for such a step.

An educational program would be needed to convince the allies that the new

strategy would enhance their security in the long run, and to persuade them to

furnish most of the ground forces for their own defense. The United States could

then adjust its NATO commitments as necessary. Foreign aid should be administered so as to encourage other countries to create forces that would complement

those of the United States.

2H

I
Basic National Security Policy, 1953

The report urged that force requirements for each area be continuously

reviewed in the light of US atomic capabilities. Apparently the implication was

that the void left by the departing US forces could be filled, in whole or in part,

by equipping the remaining forces with tactical atomic weapons. For the same

purpose, the creation of West German and Japanese forces should be expedited.

The committee did not recommend torce levels for FYs 1955 or 1956, but

sought to agree on a level-off figure to be attained by FY1957. The Navy, Marine

Corps, and Air Force members proposed an overall FY 1957 personnel strength

of 2.750 million—halfway between the upper and lower limits given by Secretary

Wilson. The Army members recommended 2.765 million. But the distribution of

the total among the Services was a matter of disagreement as shown by the

following tabulation in thousands:

Army Navy Marin?

Corps

Air Fon

Army recommendation 1,060 580 175 950

Navy-Marine Corps

recommendation 900 693 207 950

Air Force recommendation 950 630 170 1,000

The recommended force levels were as follows:

Army Navy Marine Corp* Air Forct

Dwi$kms Ships Divisions

and Wings

Wtn$s

Army recommendation 14 799 2 + 120

Navy-Manne Corp«

recommendation 12 1,093 3 l#

Air Force recommendation 12 901 3 - 137

The Army memfc i rs emphasized that their recommendations for their Service were an absolute minimum. Their willingness to accept even as few as 14

divisions was contingent upon the assumption that eight Japanese divisions

would be in existence by FY 1957 and that the world situation would make it

feasible to withdraw Army forces from the Far East.

Despite their divergency, ail the recommendations had one feature in

common. They would allow the Air Force to increase its force levels while

requiring reductions in the other Services.

The fiscal guidelines used by the committee consisted of Federal revenue

estimates for fiscal years 1954 through 1957, accompanied by estimated expenditures for each year for programs other than national security lul The remainder.

29

"■■"* ''-'
]CS and National Policy

minus the expected costs of the atomic energy and mutual security programs,

was the amount available for military expenditures. For FY 1957, this balance

amounted to $33.8 billion. In estimating the costs oftheirrecommended programs,

all the committee members kept within this figure except the representatives of

the Army, who priced their proposals at $34,235 billion.102

The Army members placed on record a protest against the manpower and

dollar guidelines. Under the committee's terms of reference, they said, these

had to be regarded as firm ceilings, but their acceptance as such required the

committee to make unduly optimistic assumptions and to take unacceptable

risks. The other Service members believed that the risks were acceptable.103

When the committee's report reached the JCS agenda, each Service Chief

upheld the position taken by his representatives on the committee. General

Twining endorsed the report without qualification as wholly compatible with

NSC 162/2.104 Admiral Carney, while not rejecting the committee's proposed

strategy, opposed any interpretation of it that would overemphasize strategic

bombing; General Shepherd, Commandant of the Marine Corps, called attention to those portions of NSC 162/2 that had qualified the emphasis on retaliatory

capacity. Both argued for a FY 1957 force structure that would provide balanced

forces capable of responding to a broad variety of contingencies.105 General

Ridgway, so far as is known, did not comment in writing, but his later actions

and statements indicated his firm support of the Army position.

In the end, after considerable discussion,106 all the Joint ChieiS of Staff accepted

the substance of the Everest Committee report. They resohed the dispute over

FY 1957 force levels on the basis of a slightly highe. manpower total—

2,815,000—which was large enough to provide each Service almost the full

strength sought by its representative on the committee.107In their f^r*Ttal agreement (JCS 2101/113, approved on 10 December 1953), they recommenced the

following objectives for FY 1957:

Service Personnel Strength

(thousands)

hint Ijrifl

Armv 1.000 14 divisions

Navy 650 1.030 »hip*

Marine Corps 1«*0 3 divisions

Air Force <>75 137 wing*

These figures required a reduction of almost 600,000 men from the current

total and a drastic reallocation of the remainder among the Services. The Army

would bear the brunt of the reduction, with a loss of almost a third oi its

manpower. The Navy and the Marine Corps would b» cut by approximately 15

percent and 20 percent, respectively. The Air Fora», on the other hand, would

increase by over 60,000 men.11* The force levels (the indicated number of major

units) were not intended as rigid limits; it was agreed that the Services would be

encouraged to exceed them (subject to prior }CS approval) if able to do so within

30
Basic National Security Policy, 1953

their limits of men and money. The costs of this military establishment in billions

of dollars were estimated as follows:

Army $ 7.387

Navy and Marine Corps 8.790

Air Force 14.100

Not allocated by Seivice 2.635

Total $32.912

The revised force structure was considered appropriate to implement the strategy proposed by the Everest Committee, which was endorsed by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff along with the reasoning behind it. Its elements were summarized in the following list of requirements for a military strategy to support NSC

162/2:

a. Changes in the present US deployments in some forward areas.

b. Emphasis upon the capability of inflicting massive damage upon the

USSR by our retaliatory striking power as the major deterrent to

aggression, and a vital element of any US strategy in the event of

general war.

c. An integrated and adequate continental defense system.

d. The provision of tactical atomic support for US or allied military forces

in general war or in a local aggression whenever the employment of

atomic weapons would be militarily advantageous.

e. The constitution, generally on US territory, of a strategic reserve with

a high degree of combat readiness to move rapidly to any threatened

area.

f. The maintenance of control over essential sea and air lines of

communication.

g. The maintenance of a mobilization base adequate to meet the requirements of a general war.

h. The maintenance of qualitative superiority of our armed forces.

As provided in JCS 2101/113, any withdrawal of US forces from Western

Europe must await the successful conduct of an educational program to win over

the aiiies ro the new strategy. It also accepted the necessity to retain some

ground forces in Western Europe even after 1957. The arbitrary assumption was

made that a maximum of six Army divisions would be available for peacetime

deployment overseas, but it was not specified how many of these would be

assigned to Europe.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed the proposals by the Everest Committee

that foreign aid be allocated so as to shape allied military' forces in the desired

direction, that force requirements be constantly reviewed in the light of nuclear

capabilities, and that the establishment of German and Japanese forces be

encouraged. These steps, along with the educational program, were listed as the

"reasonably attainable actions in the politico-military field" to which Mr. Wilson

had referred in his directive of 16 October. Apparently it was assumed that

:>i
JCS and National Policy

atomic weapons would be available in large quantity by FY 1957 and that suitable allied forces would be in existence, but these conditions were not stated as

assumptions.

Th Joint Chiefs of Staff sent these recommendations to the Secretary of

Defer.se on 11 December. In doing so, they cautioned Mr. Wilson that their

endorsement of the proposals was not unqualified. "This strategy and these

policies . . . reflect our agreed recommendations under the assumption that

present international tensions and threats remain approximately the same,"

they said. "Any material increase in danger or reduction in threat would require

complete new studies and estimates."110

Admiral Radford appeared before the National Security Council on 16 December and outlined the proposed strategy and force levels. At the same time, the

Acting Secretary of Defense, Mr. Kyes, submitted a revised FY 1955 budget

calling for substantially lower expenditures th^n in 1954, which was presented

as part of a three-year program for reaching the FY 1957 strengths proposed by

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Council and the President approved both the

military program in JCS 2101/113 and the proposed budget.111

With these actions, the administration's new look at the entire defense picture was complete. It remained only to apply the new strategy by adjusting force

structure and deployments. How this was done is described in later chapters.

Differences among the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Aalthough the Joint Chiefs of Staff had gone on record as approving JCS

2101 113, they had done so with varying degrees of enthusiasm and in

some cases with important mental reservations. Their conflicting opinions about

the wisdom of its conclusions became evident in comments, public or private,

made during the next tew months.

Admiral Radford, who was perhaps the major architect of the new strategy,

was wholehearted in his support of it. Even before it had been approved by the

Council, he praised it in a public speech as one that brought the military establishment into line with technological and other developments, and one that

could be supported indefinitely with minimum strain on the nation's economy.112

In hearings on the FY 1955 budget, he testified that the strategy on which it was

based as well as the budget itself, had his full endorsement.113

Admiral Radford's judgment was in some degree shaped by the fact that by

the end of 1953 he had come to accept the President's view that militarv and

economic security were coequal m importance. From this conviction, he drew

the conclusion that the Joint Chiefs of Staff must consider both of these objectives in drawing up their plans. "In this day and age." he said on 14 December

1953, in the speech already cited, "the militarv must be realistically concerned

about keeping our national economy strong as an indispensable bulwark of the

Free World. It is a most important facet of our na.ional security problems."m

Even more emphatic was a statement he made to the Senate Appropriations

Committee on 16 March 1954, tn defending the FY 1955 budget. "\ honestly felt

32

"*,: '
Basic National Security Policy, 1953

and still feel," he declared, "that the economic stability of the United States is a

great factor of military importance over the long pull. . . Without any reservation, I

subscribe to the theory that as military men ... we must take economic factors

into consideration."115This view went beyond mere acceptance of a decision by

the civilian authorities to impose ceilings on defense expenditures (a frequent

practice in American peacetime military planning). It seemed to imply that military planners should weigh cost considerations against other factors of military

importance in drawing up their requirements. In other words, military men,

rather than their civilian superiors, would bear the onus for a decision to limit

the size of the military establishment in order to minimize expenses.

General Twining also approved JCS 2101/113. Its stress on retaliatory capacity

and on air defense and the new balance of strength that it established among the

Services were wholly in accord with his views on strategy. Although it had cut

back the final Air Force goal from 143 to 137 wings, the difference resulted from

the elimination of six troop-carrier wings, a step that he viewed as in harmony

with the decision to reduce peripheral commitments. Like Admiral Radford, he

fully endorsed the new military program in testifying on the FY 1955 budget.116

The next year, when the FY 1956 budget had further accentuated the emphasis

on airpower, he restated his belief in the soundness of the New Look strategy,

which he believed had been confirmed by the trend of events.117

General Ridgway challenged some of the basic beliefs held by Admiral Radford

and General Twining. On military/ political, and moral grounds, he opposed

what he regarded as overemphasis on strategic airpower and mass bombing.118

General Ridgway rejected completely the idea that economic stability was a

factor of military importance. In his view, military men were without competence in economic matters and had no responsibility in this field except to keep

their requests within the broad area of reasonable appropriations; final decisions

on acceptable costs were the responsibility of the President and the Secretary of

Defense.119 He disputed the contention that improved weapons constituted a

reason for reducing military manpower, a view ruft forth by Admiral Radford

and others in defending the new force goals.l2° Rather, because of their greater

complexity, these weapons would require more men for operation and maintenance.121

In any case, he believed, it was most unwise to reduce forces at once

in anticipation oi weapons not yet available, or of German and Japanese forces

that had still to be raised and equipped.122

General Ridgway had made it clear to the National Security Council in August

1953 that he had approved the suggested redeployment program only as a

subject for further investigation. It is therefore not suprising that his assent to

JCS 2101 113 was a highly qualified one. Wh*n questioned by the House Committee on Appropriations m connection with the Army's FY 1955 budget, he

declared that the unanimous endorsement of the program by the joint Chiefs of

Staff was on the basis of stated assumptions and limitations.12J A year later,

during FY 1956 budget hearings, General Ridgway described the FY 1957 force

levels under the New Look program as the result of a directed verdict, following

from "fixed manpower and dollar ceilings . . . given the Joint Chiefs of Staff to

start with.*'124

33

*****»«»»-

•
JCS and National Policy

The assumptions referred to by General Ridgway were in part those clearly

set forth as such in JCS 2101/113 or in the accompanying memorandum to the

Secretary of Defense: that the world situation would not worsen and that Soviet

capabilities would not significantly increase before 1957. All the JCS members

had accepted these, but only General Ridgway called attention to them in his

public utterances. He had, moreover, conditioned his approval of JCS 2101/113

upon the further assumption that a Japanese army would be able to shoulder

some of the burden of Far Eastern defense by 1957.l25

Admiral Carney agreed with General Ridgway to a considerable extent. In

commenting first on the new JCS concept in August 1953, and then on the ad

hoc committee report that became JCS 2101/113, he made it clear that he opposed

over-emphasis on strategic airpower and remained convinced of a continuing

need for powerful surface forces. Moreover, again like the Army Chief of Staff,

he disputed the view that more powerful weapons justified cuts in manpower.126

But he was less alarmed than General Ridgway over the trend of events, perhaps

because JCS 2101/113 could be read as fully acknowledging the importance of

seapower in preserving the nation's security. He testified in 1954 that the Navy

understood and accepted the changes in force levels under the new program

and would do its utmost to assure the effective accomplishment of its mission.127

This willing compliance with a superior's adverse decision was in accord with

military ethics, but it fell short of the full endorsement given by General Twining

and Admiral Radford. However, Admiral Carney asserted without qualification

that the program had been unanimously approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.12"

Thus by the end of 1953, two rather well-defined viewpoints had emerged

within the Joint Chiefs of Staff—the product of deeply felt convictions about the

most effective strategy for the United States and the proper allocation of military

resources. The spokesmen for the surface forces—General Ridgway, Admiral

Carney, and General Shepherd—were generally pitted against General Twining,

whose conclusions were usually supported by Admiral Radford. But the depth

and intensity of this disagreement should not be exaggerated. On many matters

the Joint Chiefs of Staff found themselves in full agreement, while occasionally

they divided along other lines of cleavage

The actions of Admiral Radford and his colleagues during the first six months

of their tenure reflected the interplay of the two viewpoints described above. In

the initial concept that the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed in August 1953, the

views of Admiral Radford and Genera! twining prevailed, with the qualified

assent of their colleagues. The actions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff two months

later, when they sought to qualify the emphasis on strategic airpower in the

successive drafts of NSC 1622, evidently resulted from initiatives by Cieneral

Ridgway or Admiral Carney or both. The Radford-Twining position again domi

ruled the final strategy recommended in JC~ 2101 113. Nevertheless it should be

emphasized that this strategy was broad enough for interpretation m more than

one direction, according to which of the requirements were to be emphasized.

This fact doubtless made it easier for General Udgwav ^nd Admiral Carnev to

approve JCS 2101 113.

M
Basic National Security Poliqf, 7953

The New Look and Its Interpretation

That the Eisenhower administration was reexamining defense strategy had

been a matter of public knowledge s:;ice early 1953. Inevitably, the process

was described as taking a new look.,29The phrase came readily, the more so as it

had been in common use a few years earlier, though in a wholly different context—in reference to radically altered styles of women's dress introduced snortly

after World War II. To extend it from the activity to the results was equally

natural. By the end of the year the complex of related decisions by the Eisenhower administration concerning strategy, force levels, and defense budgets

had come to be collectively referred to as the "New Look."

This usage was exemplified by Admiral Radford on 14 December 1953 in a

speech before the National Press Club in Washington, D. C, which constituted

a public exposition of the decisions in JCS 2101/113 and of the reasons underlying them. Admiral Radford traced the New Look to the President's statement on

30 April 1953 concerning plans for the long-term pull. "Here," he said, "is the

real key to our planning." The New Look, he continued, "is aimed at providing

a sturdy military posture which can be maintained over an extended period of

uneasy peace, rather than peaking forces at greater costs for a particular period

of tension."

The strategy of the New Look frankly emphasized airpower. "Today, there is

no argument among military planners as to the importance oi airpower," said

Admiral Radford. And he promised that the United States would maintain a

national airpower superior to that of any other nation. But he used this phrase to

include not only the Air Force itself, but also Naval, Marine Corps, and Army

aviation, as well as the US aircraft industry and civil air transport system.

Moreover, airpower alone was not enough; the military establishment must be

balanced, although this goal did not require an equal three-way division of men

and money. The object was to be prepared both for "tremendous, vast retaliatory and counteroffensive blows in event of a global war" and also for "lesser

military actions short of all-out war." He took special note of continental detense,

which, he said, was increasingly important.

Admiral Radford told his hearers that the joint Chiefs of Staff had recently

submitted plans to assure mobile, versatile combat forces in readiness, plus an

adequate mobilization base, through FY 1V57. For reasons of economy there

would be fewer men in uniform than previously planned, but the effects of this

reduction would be offset by new weapons and new techniques—including

atomic weapons, which, he said, "have virtually achieved conventional status

within our Armed Forces."1**

Admiral Radford thus described the New Look as characterized by: general

reduction of expenditures, planning on a long-term bails, predominance of

airpower, stronger continental defense, fewer men in uniform. And more power

ful weapons ("bigger bang for a buck," in the words of another widely-used

phrase). Other important features, which he did not stress in this speech, were

partial disengagement abroad, creation of a central strategic reserve, And reli

ance on foreign countnes tor initiAl ground defense. All these provisions were to

15
]CS and National Policy

be found in the two governing directives of the New Look, NSC 162/2 and jCS

2101/113. In various combinations, these elements of the new strategy were

publicly expounded by administration spokesmen during the ensuing months.131

Some of these elements were already well established in defense planning,

but under the New Look they were interpreted or applied somewhat differently.

Thus the idea of the long haul—the need to maintain military strength for an

indefinite period—had long been recognized.132 But the Truman administration

had envisioned the long haul as beginning after its projected military buildup

had been accomplished. The new administration proposed to begin the long

haul at once.133Similarly, the importance of airpower had never been disputed;

it was regarded as an integral part of the military deterrent required for

containment. The new emphasis on airpower was relative rather than absolute;

the Air Force was actually to be slightly smaller than previously planned, but it

was to receive a much bigger slice of a shrinking budgetary pie.

Taken together, the individual elements of the New Look added up to an

important redirection in military planning. The change was less abrupt, however,

than the name might suggest.134Indeed, from one point of view, the New Look

might be regarded as an inevitable retrenchment after the end of the Korean War

and as a return to the normal peacetime practice of placing the military establishment under rigid expenditure limits.

Insofar as it provided a basis for reduced expenditures, the New Look met a

major need of the administration—a resolution of the conflict between security

and solvency. But it could also be justified on wholly military grounds: as a

means of regaining freedom of actioi .v US forces, as an improvement in the

capability of defending the American lomeland, and as an updating of strategy

and force structure to keep pace with advances in weapons technology. These

were legitimate military objectives. That they coincided with the desire for economy did not mean that they were necessarily mere rationalizations.

The convergence in the New Look of two sets of objectives—military and

economic—renders it difficult to appraise the influence of the joint Chiefs of

Staff in its formulation. But the evidence indicates that their role was secondary.

Even before his election, Mr Eisenhower was convinced of the importance of

economy, of planning tor the long haul, and of keeping the boys M home. The

strategic concept suggested by the new Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 19S3 fitted

neatly into the President's frame of thought. The arguments o'< Admiral Radtord

and General Twining furnished a basis for overriding the objections of General

Rtdgway At\\l Admiral Carney

When the general nature of the New Look became known outside the Executive Branch the disagreement among the joint Chiefs of Staff spread to the

public arena with magnified intensity A major stimulus to debate was a speech

by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to the Council of Foreign Relation* in

New York on 12 January H54 The way lo deter aggression,' said Mr Dulles

on this occasion, is for the free community to be !img and able to respond

vigoamsly at places amX with means of its own choosing."' The administration

had wished to regain for the Umted States the initiative in the cold war, and, in

order to do so, had taken «we basic policy decisions The Secretary described

36
Basic National Security Policy, 1953

the major decision in a manner that shewed how, in his view, the New Look met

the objective of flexibility while at the same time providing "a maximum deterrent at a bearable cost":

The basic decision was to depend primarily upon a ereat capacity to retaliate,

instantly, by means and at places of our choosing. Now the Department of

Defense ana the Joint Chiefs of Staff can shape our military establishment to fit

what is our policy, instead of having to try to be ready to meet the enemy's many

choices. That permits of a selection of military means instead of a multiplication

of means. As a result, it is now possible to get, and share, more basic security at

less cost.135

In itself, the threat of nuclear retaliation uttered by Mr. Dulles was not new.

The near-certainty of such action in case of Soviet invasion of Western Europe

had been a cornerstone of NATO strategy. But his words seemed to suggest that

it was now considered an appropriate reaction in a much wider range of

contingencies. No other contemporary' statement by an administration spokesman put such emphasis on the willingness to resort to this expedient.1

*

The Secretary's speech touched off a chorus of criticism from leading members of the Democratic Party. Fastening upon his remark about retaliating

instantly, the critics assailed the administration's New Look as placing too

much reliance upon a single method of warfare that would turn every conflict

into a nuclear holocaust, frighten the nation's allies and jeopardize Americas

moral standing. In reply, Mr. Dulles restated and elaborated upon the qualifications with which he had surrounded the doctrine of instant retaliation in his

speech. 'To deter aggression," he said, "it is important to have the flexibility

and the facilities which make various responses available."11

Admiral Kadford also publicly denied that the New Look strategy was onesided. An address he delivered on 9 March 1954 contained the following passage:

Our planning does not subscribe to the thinking that the ability to deliver

massive atomic retaliation is, by itself, adequate to meet all our security needs. It

is not correct to say we are reiving exclusively on one weapon, or one Service, or

that we are anticipating one \ir\d of war 1 believe that this Nation could be a

pnsoner of its own militarv posture it it had no capability, other than one to

deliver a massive atomic attack lV*

The controversy illustrated the remark made above, that the strategy in JCS

2101 113 allowed room tor different interpretations In practice, its application

would be determined by decisions on tone levels. For this reason, the critics

centered their tire upon the FV 1955 detense budget, which the administration

unveiled in January 1954 as the first step m carrying out the New Look. They

claimed that the proposed reduction of the Armv ^i\d Navy would make it

difficult, if a crisis arose, to take any effective military action short of all-out

nuclear bombing.1** But this viewpoint was rejected Hw military budget for

fiscal 19%. formulated by the administration M the end of 1954, continued the

trtnd ot development set m motion by the 1955 budget. And thus decisively

shaped the strategy of the New Lt»ok in the direction oi massive retaliation

37

■■■«WWWC1, WW&fc JMK

'
2

Basic National Security Policy, 1954

At the end of 1953 the Eisenhower administration hoped that it had settled

upon a national strategy that would be valid for some years to come—for the long

haul. But this hope soon vanished. Before 1954 was out, the administration was

compelled to reexamine both its overall security policy and its decisions regarding the size and structure of military forces. The first of these «examinations is

described in this chapter, the second in the succeeding one.

Framework of Policy Discussion in 1954

The reconsideration of strategy was compelled by developments abroad that

threatened to invalidate a basic assumption underlying the New Look Policv:

that the world situation would not change appreciably for the worse. In other

words, the impetus for policy discussion in 1954 was external, whereas in 1953 it

had been internal, springing from the desire of the administration to find a new

balance between security and solvency This changed context turned discussion

toward questions of ends rather than means. In 1953 the deliberations of the

National Security Council had in large measure concerned the instruments of

national policy, military forces and strategy. In contrast, in 1954 the major problem was to determine what foreign policy goals were attainable in a new international setting.

In the discussion of this problem, the principal rnle of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

was to point out possible military consequences of unwise choices among diplomatic objectives. In doing so, they could speak with a single voice, inspired by

concern that the US strategic position might deteriorate to indefensibility.

Nevertheless, within this broad area of agreement, the differing viewpoints

described in the preceding chapter emerged on several occasions.

In both 1953 and 1954 the Joint Chiefs of Staff found themselves ranged

against other elements in the National Security Council. In the previous year,

39
«*l

JCS and National Policy

these had been the spokesmen for fiscal conservatism: the Secretary of the

Treasury and the Director of the Budget. In 1954 the principal opponent was the

Secretary of State. But the opposition was not complete in either case. Just as the

advocates of economy in 1953 had found in Admiral Radford an ally among the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, so in 1954 Secretary Dulles was to find some support from

General Ridgway, the chief military advocate of a flexible national strategy.

Developments that shaped policy discussion in 1954 were two in number.

The first was the increasing capacity of the Soviet Union to strike directly at the

United States. The growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities had been recognized by

the Council in NSC 162/2. Paragraph 45 of that document had called for certain

actions to be taken before the achievement of "mutual atomic plenty/'1

This paragraph was written after the Soviet Union had successfully tested an

experimental thermonuclear device on 12 August 1953. Although this event did

not signify an immediate threat to the US margin of superiority, it had profound

effects on opinion in other countries, where it contributed to a growing fear of

atomic war and to a rising opposition to any acts that might conceivably lead to

hostilities. This fear was aggravated by US thermonuclear tests carried out in the

Pacific early in 1954. Technologically, the age of mutual atomic plenty remained

several years in the future; psychologically speaking, it had already begun by the

end of the year.2

This growing apprehension was directly related to the other development

referred to above: a loosening of solidarity between the United States and its

allies, and an increasing reluctance in other countries to support strong action,

under US leadership, in the face of threatened communist aggrandizement. Like

most trends, this one had grown slowly over a period of time, and its origin was

difficult to date precisely. NSC 135/3, approved by the National Security Council

in September 1952, had commented on the growth of defeatist neutralism among

noncommunist nations. A year later, NSC 162/2 pointed out that "allied opinion,

especially in Europe, b\ become less willing to follow US leadership." By 1954

the strains in the Western coalition had become still more apparent, partly as a

result of the skillful diplomacy of the Soviet government of Premier Georgi M.

Malenkov, who had adopted a more conciliatory tone in foreign relations than

his predecessor and dangled before the world the vague hope of a relaxation of

tensions. Since the USSR still showed no disposition to settle major issues on

terms acceptable to the West, US leaders believed that the need for free world

unity remained as great as ever. Bui the maintenance of solidarity was manifestly more difficult than in the days when Josef Stalin ruled in the Kremlin.

The lessening of allied cohesion was evident in the crisis over Indochina that

dominated international headlines throughout the first half of 1954. The cause of

this crisis was the progress of the communist-led Viet Minh rebels in their efforts

to overthrow French rule in Vietnam. As their revolt moved toward success, the

United States sought to rally its allies to support some form of military interven

tion to prevent complete communist victory. But the leaders of those nations

rejected the US lead and pinned their hopes on the possibility of a peaceful

settlement. Ultii lately the United States was compelled to acquiesce in an agreement that abandoned the northern half of Vietnam to communist rule.*

40

.
1

Basic National Security Policy, 1954

On the other side of the world, allied disunity appeared in the failure of the

proposed European Defense Community (EDC), which was intended to add

West German military resources to those of NATO. Successive French governments, inspired by fears of revived German militarism, repeatedly postponed

action on the EDC Treaty, which had been signed in 1952. Finally, in August

1954, the French National Assembly rejected the Treaty, in an action that Secretary of State Dulles characterized as a "shattering blow" to US policy.

Fortunately the trend of events during the last part of the year was less

unfavorable to the United States. In both Asia and Europe, the West was able to

salvage something out of the wreckage and to prevent the breakup of the coalition.

In Southeast Asia, the consolation prize took the form of the Manila Pact, or

Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, which bound the Western Big Three

with Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, and Pakistan ina defensive agreement intended to bar further communist advance in that part of

the world. In Europe, the objective of the EDC Treaty was attained in October

1954 through admission of West Germany to NATO.

4

These events—especially the Indochina crisis and its outcome—exposeda

deficiency in existing US policies. NSC 162/2 had recognized the possible need

for measures to block communist subversion in noncommunist countries. It had

mentioned Indochina among those areas that the United States might be forced

to defend militarily, but the threat envisioned in such cases was clear-cut aggression from outside. It was assumed that France could hold Indochina and thus provide a strong point for a Western position in Asia. For dealing with a communistled nationalist movement that could succeed without overt military aid from the

Soviet Union or China, NSC 162/2 provided little guidance. Moreover, its emphasis on the importance of collective security as an integral part of US strategy

implied that at least the major Western Allies would support any drastic measures proposed by the United States, as they had in Korea. Clearly it was essential for US policy-makers to do some hard thinking about how to meet such

situations in the future.

But it was equally necessary to think about certc»«n broader questions that

went to the heart of US policy as embodied in NSC 162/2. How could the United

States best use the time that remained before its effective monopoly of thermonuclear weapons disappeared? Even if the United States were able to maintain

some superiority after the onset of mutual atomic plenty, would its margin exert a deterrent effect after each side had become powerful enough to inflict fatal

damage on the other? Would the Soviets' arsenal of thermonuclear weapons—

their own nuclear shield—tempt them to indulge more freely in subversion or

local aggression? Would the growing allied fear of war inhibit American willingness to use nuclear weapons—the basis for the strategy of the New Look? These

questions came to the surface in the National Security Council in 1954.

41

r
JCS and National Policy

NSC 162/2 and the FY 1956 Budget

Early in 1954 the administration began looking ahead to the budget for fiscal

1956. At that time, the need to revise policy was not yet evident; it was expected that NSC 162/2, if supplemented with more detailed guidelines, would

suffice for preparation of the national security budget. Preparation of these guidelines was enlisted to the NSC Planning Board on 22 March 1954. They were to

be based on a sties of appraisals of political and economic trends in the noncommunist world for the period 1956-1959, prepared by the Department of State, the

Council of Economic Advisers, and other appropriate agencies, together with an

intelligence appraisal of the Soviet bloc by the Central Intelligence Agency. The

Department of Defense was to supply a forecast of the anticipated military

posture of the free world.5

The Planning Board established a special committee, headed by the Deputy

Executive Secretary of the Council, Mr. S. Everett Gleason, to draft the guidelines.6

In the first meeting, on 5 May 1954, the committee decided to ask the departments and agencies preparing the basic reports to submit preliminary proposals

for the guidelines. At the same time, foreseeing that NSC 162/2 might have to be

amended instead of merely supplemented, the members directed that each agency

suggest any appropriate revisions.7

JCS Appraisal of Free World Military Posture

Secretary Wilson called on the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the military appraisal

of free world prospects for which his Department had been asked. They replied on 21 May 1954." Since time was pressing, the Acting Secretary of Defense

forwarded their analysis at once to the Planning Board, without holding it up

for discussion within the Department.*

The Joint Chiets of Staff opened their appraisal with a recapitulation of the

force goals established in JCS 2101/113 and a pointed reminder that these* reflected

the international situation as of December 1953. They indicated that little progress had been made in meeting the strategic requirements laid out in JCS 2101/113.

How much progress could be expected by 1956-1959 depended partly on matters

beyond US control, such as the pace oi Soviet weapons development and the

extent to which the international situation would permit redeployment of US

forces (which had been suspended in view of the Indochina crisis). The military

capabilities of most of the rest of the noncommunist world, except for Western

Europe, were rated as generally low and the prospects for improvement were

poor.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that US national security policy "is

premised on the existence of strong collective st-rurity arrangements among the

anti-Communist nations. Fundamental to this concept," they continued, "is the

development and maintenance of solidarity on the part of our Allies to the point

where they will not only unite in the determination of measures vital to the

42
Basic National Security Policy, 1954

common security, but will support these measures when the need arises." But,

they asserted, in a reference to the Indochina crisis, recent developments showed

"that the firm foundation requisite to prompt and effective action in implementation of the concept of collective security has not yet been fully achieved."

The relative strengths of the Soviet and Western blocs were assessed. Both

the United States and the USSR. it was believed, would enter the era of atomic

plenty before 1959. The West would remain superior in nuclear weapons, but

the effectiveness of this margin would decline as the Soviets approached the

capability of inflicting critical damage on the United States and its allies.

Not content merely to forecast trends, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested

some actions to give the West a better military posture by 1956. A suitable

political framework for collective action against communist aggression was

essential. If the international situation continued to deteriorate, larger US military programs and budgets might be necessary. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the United States take steps to broaden its mobilization base, to

strengthen its offensive striking forces, and to plug the gaps in air defense. They

emphasized the importance of military assistance to friendly nations and warned

that any substantial reduction in its amount might compel a reexamination of US

military posture. Moreover, military contributions from West Germany and Japan

to the collective defense were essential.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also anticipated that the United States would be

faced increasingly with the problem of limited military aggression. They recommended that the United States rely on its allies to furnish most of the ground

forces required to deal with such situations. The United States should contribute

additional forces and material, as necessary, and should at the same time undertake a degree of national mobilization commensurate with the increased risk of

general war.

In a somber concluding paragraph, the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned that time

was running out for the United States to make use of its nuclear advantage—the

first of several such warnings they issued during 1954:

Increasing Soviet atomic capability will tend to diminish the Jcterrent effect of

United States atomic power against peripheral aggression. With respect to general war, the attainment of atomic plenty by both the United States and the

USSR could create a condition of mutual deterrence in which both sides would

be strongly inhibited from initiating general war. Under *uch circumstances, the

Soviets rrught well elect to pursue their ultimate ob*'ctive of world domination

through a succession of local aggressions, either overt or covert, all of which

could not be successfully opposedby the Allies thi ough localized counter-action,

without unacceptable commitment of resources. . . . This situation serves to

emphasize the time limitation, as recognized in paragraph 45 of NSC 162/2.

within which conditions must be created by the United States and the Free

World coalition such as to permit the Soviet^Communist threat to be met with

resolution, to the end that satisfactory and enduring arrangements for co-existence

can be established.

The final sentence implied that the allies could somehow be induced to

support any measures that the United States considered necessary to block

communist aggression. But the course of events during the Indochina crisis

43

. ■■,
JCS and National Policy

suggested that the United States might some day have to choose between maintaining solidarity with other nations and taking action in the face of allied

disapproval. Should such a situation arise, which principle of national policy

must be sacrificed? It could be assumed that, in the final analysis, the United

States would act alone if convinced that its survival was at stake. But the clearcut statement in NSC 153/1 of US willingness to act unilaterally had been left out

of NSC 162/2, which as a result was ambiguous on this issue. Its commitment to

collective security was unequivocal. Even in stating willingness to use nuclear

weapons, NSC 162/2 had provided that advance approval of other nations would

be sought. At the same time, a possible need to act without allied approval was

recognized, but not elaborated upon, in a statement that collective security

"does not imply the necessity to meet all desires of our allies."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had not discussed this possible conflict between

international obligations and national safety. Its implications were drawn out,

however, in comments on the JCS views prepared by representatives of the

Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM).10 The ODM spokesmen foresaw that the

attempt to maintain the Western alliance might undermine the strategy of the

New Look, which was based squarely upon the employment of nuclear weapons.

With the experience of Indochina in mind, they pointed out that other countries

were in effect demanding the right to veto the use of these weapons. It might be

impossible for the United States to retain allies on its own terms.

It followed that NSC 162/2 must be revised. The ODM representatives urged

that any such revision include a statement expressly reserving the US right to

use nuclear weapons in situations like the Indochina crisis. Otherwise, the United

States should at once drastically increase its spending for conventional forces.11

First Budget Guidelines

In NSC 5422, a draft of budgetary guidelines sent to the Council on 14 June

1954.12the Planning Board faced up to the inadequacies of NSC 162/2. Instead

of mere supplementary instructions for use in applying NSC \blf2, NSC 5422

contained recommendations for courses of action intended to meet problems

that had arisen, or had assumed new urgency, since NSC 162/2 was approved.

The nature of these problems was shown by the titles assigned the two principal

sections of NSC 5422: "Issues Posed by Nuclear Trends" and "Maintenance of

the Cohesion of the Free World." The paper recommended that the United

States take measures to improve its defenses, to deal with local aggression and

subversion, and to strengthen political and economic ties among noncommunist

nations. For the most part, the recommendations were broad in nature and did

not indicate the specific steps required.

NSC 5422 asserted flatly that the United States should be willing to take

whatever action seemed necessary in a crisis, including use oi nuclear weapons,

even if allied approval could not be obtained. It thus dealt squarely with the

problem cited by the Office of Defense Mobilization and removed the ambiguity

44

c

-,:^
Basic National Security Policy, 1954

that had suirounded this aspect of policy in NSC 162/2. But the Planning Board

members disputed whether unilateral action should be taken only as a last

resort, or whether the United States should exercise maximum freedom of action,

relying on its European allies to recognize that their own security interests required them to remain in alignment with the United States.

Another unresolved issue in NSC 5422 concerned disarmament. Some members of the Board wished to commit the United States to negotiations on this

subject; others asserted that any such discussions with the Soviet bloc were sure

to be fruitless, and pointed out that the whole subject of disarmament policy was

then under study.

Should general war occur, NSC 5422 stated, the United States must be able to

wage it with maximum prospect of victory. But whether the United States should

commit itself in advance to all-out use of nuclear weapons—in the face of the

prospect that the Soviet bloc would have achieved a nuclear balance by 1956-

1959—was a matter for dispute. Disagreement resulted also from the attempt by

some Board members to include in NSC 5422 a commitment to enlarge both

military forces in being and the mobilization base.

The Joint Strategic Survey Committee reviewed NSC 5422 and concluded

that it did not meet its intended purpose. Even if the conflicting views were

resolved, it would not provide adequate guidelines for developing security programs under NSC 162/2. Moreover, the Committee believed, it dwelt excessively

on the problems associated with increasing Soviet nuclear capabilities, the implications of which had been adequately considered in the formulation of NSC

162/2. Regarding the disputed viewpoints in NSC 5422, the Committee opposed

any mention of disarmament; asserted that NSC 162/2 had settled the Question

of using nuclear weapons; and favored an improved military posture.

The Committee's report drew dissenting comments from Admiral Carney

and General Ridgway, who disputed the assertion that the issue of nuclear

weapons in war had already been settled.14 The joint Chiefs of Staff took no

formal action, however. On 21 June 1954 they merely agreed to note the report

and the comments.15

JCS Vicwi on Negotiations with the Soviets

On one key issue in NSC 5422—the wisdom of negotiating with the Soviet

Union—the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already decided to send their views to

the Council. Apparently they were inspired to do so by the opening of a conference in Geneva on 26 Apnl 1954 to seek a solution to the Indochina c isis. This

meeting could be regarded as the result of an excessive eagerness to negotiate—a

hasty search for an immediate settlement before the military balance had been

redressed on the battlefield. On 30 April 1954 the Joint Chiefs of Staff called on

the Joint Strategic Survey Committee for a historical summary of US-Soviet

negotiations, together with policy recommendations. This report was completed

-»>
JCS and National Policy

on 9 June 1954; after amending it slightly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent it to

Secretary Wilson on 23 June.16

In this report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw the struggle against communism

as entering a precarious if not critical stage. They cited the long record of agreements broken by the Soviets and their satellites, and warned against assuming

good faith on the part of the Soviet government until it demonstrated a basic

change of attitude by specific actions, such as release of German and Japanese

prisoners of war, liberation of the satellites, or conclusion of peace treaties with

Germany and Austria. The USSR would never enter into meaningful negotiations until the West took positive actions to convince the Soviet rulers that their

present belligerent course endangered the safety of their regime.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked that their views be considered in the review of

disarmament policy then in progress. They summed up their conclusions as

follows:

a. Until the USSR, by positive action, demonstrates a basic change of attitude ... the United States should refrain from further attempts through

negotiations to arrive at agreements with the USSR on the subjects of disarmament, atomic energy or any other of the world issues, and should so

inform the USSR officially and repeatedly, publicly releasing each such

announcement.

b. The United States should recognize now, and should seek to persuade

its Allies, that time limitations dictate the necessity of confronting the

Soviets with unmistakable evidence of an unyielding determination to

halt further Communist expansion, and of convincing them that aggression will be met with counteraction which, inhe-entiy, will hold grave

risks to t».e maintenance of their regime;

c. The United States should take all reasonable measures to increase political

solidarity and staunch determination among its Allies, recognizing, however, that US security interests may reouire, on occasion, united States

action which not all of our Allies would endorse or be willing to join.

Interim Policy Revision: NSC 5422/2

The National Security Council began dicussing NSC 5422 on 24 June 1954.

Admiral Radford, who was present, distributed copies of the warning against

negotiation that he and his colleagues had sent to Secretary Wilson the day

before.17 But neither at this meeting nor in a subsequent discussion a week later

did the members show any disposition to accept the JCS viewpoint.1* Secretary

of State Dulles conceded the iogic of the JCS position, but insisted that, in the

face of the growing worldwide fear of nuclear war. it was unrealistic to believe

that the United States could retain its allies while pursuing a hard policy. The

other members agreed, and voted to commit the United States to explore the

pottfbfe*ty of disarmament. On the other hand, there was no disagreement that

the natuv. must be willing to act alone if necessary. The Council accepted the use

of strategic ..udear weapons in genera) war and left intact a paragraph asserting

that allied objections should not inhibit the use of nuclear weapons when neces46

■■ '
ft

Basic National Security Policy, 1954

sary for US security. The disagreement over the question of unilateral action was

resolved bya compromise that called on the United States to decide each case on

its own merits and to exercise its freedom of action only after carefully weighing

the dangers to allied solidarity.

Not surprisingly, the Council rejected the proposals to augment US military

strength, which ran counter to the administration's desire to economize. President Eisenhower conceded a possible need to spend more for some programs

but vetoed any across-the-board increase.

19

These decisions were incorporated in NSC 5422/1,a revised draft circulated

on 26 July 1954.

M The new version was again criticized by the joint Strategic

Survey Committee on much the same grounds as before. The Committee recommended that it be returned to the Planning Board for complete revision.21

Instead

of acting on this advice, the joint Chiefs of Staff merely advised Secretary Wilson

on4 August 1954 that NSC 5422/1 correctly identified many problems, but that it

provided little guidance in meeting them. If it were approved in its present form,

they said, the strength and composition of US forces would continue substantially unchanged, pending complete revision of NSC 162/2 and clarification of

worldwide military commitments.

22

The Council discussed NSC 5422/1 on5 August. The members voted to

withdraw for further revisiona section discussing mobilization policy. They

approved some changes in the ;est of the draft, including one that strengthened

the declaration of willingness to take unilateral action. The final version, NSC

5422/2, was issued on7 August 1954.

23

The rationale of NSC 5422/2 was set forth in the opening paragraph, which

pointed out that, since NSC 162/2 was adopted, there had been substantial

changes in estimates of current and future Soviet capabilities, while at the same

time, unity of action among the noncommunist nations had been increasingly

strained. This combination of unfavorable developments suggested that the communists would be increasingly tempted to try to expand their area of control

through penetration and subversion of other countries.

Growing stockpiles of increasingly destructive nuclear weapons were expected

to producea condition of mutual deterrence by 1959, according to NSC 5422/2.

To maintain and protect the nation's retaliatory striking force was therefore

urgent. But the United States should also continue to explore fully the possibility

of aa arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. Planning for general war

should assume that all available weapons would be used Since overseas bases

might become unavailable, for military or political reasons, if war broke out, the

United States should strive to make its forces self-sufficient as far as possible.

Confronting the problem of local, or limited, aggression, NSC S422

/

2 expressed

a hope that strategic airpower would act asa deterrent. Nevertheless the United

Slates should be prep^:<u u. defeat such aggression without resorting to general

war, by furnishing logistic support to indigenous forces and. if necessary, by

committing its mobile reserve. At the same time, the United States "must be

determined to take, unilaterally if necessay, whatever additional action its security requires, even to the extent of general war, and the Communists must be

convinced of this determination."

47

1
JCS and National Policy

Another danger—indeed, the immediate and most serious threat—was that

of piecemeal conquest by the communists, through "subversion, indirect

aggression, and the instigation or exploitation of civil wars . . . rather than direct

armed Aggression." It could only be met through a flexible combination of political,

psychological, economic and military actions, which should include the following:

politico-economic cooperation with underdeveloped nations, direct countermeasures (political, economic, or covert) to thwart communist efforts to seize power,

and military assistance—or, if necessary, outright milifc»-/ support—to friendly

nations in danger of communist insurrection.

The need for allies was reahumcJ in NSC 5422/2, but at the same time it was

admitted that the attainment of decisive collective action was growing more

difficult. The importance of shoring up alliances before atomic stalemate set in

was recognized in language borrowed in part from paragraph 45 of NSC 162/2.

While not neglecting Western Europe, the United States should increase its

attempts to create a position of strength in Asia, which was highly vulnerable to

the creeping expansion of communism. The uncommitted or underdeveloped

areas should be helped toward stability, but they should not be pressed to

become active allies of the United States.

NSC A22/2 recognized that the need to act in defense of US security interests

might sometimes be incompatible with the maintenance of collective security. It

was unequivocal in declaring that the United States should act alone if necessary.

But the recognition of this need was carefully balanced by qualifications that

recognized the dangers of unilateral action:

The U.S. should attempt to £ain maximum support from the free world, both

allies and uncommitted countries, for the collective measures necessary to prevent Communist expansion. As a broad rule of conduct, the U.S. should pursue

its objectives in such ways and by such means, including appropriate pressures,

persuasion, and compromise, as will maintain the cohesion of the alliances. The

U.S. should, however, act independently of its major allies when the ad":ntage

of achieving U.S. objectives by such action clearly outweighs the danger of

lasting damage to its alliances. In this connection, consideration should be given

to the likelihood that the initiation of action by the U.S. prior to allied acceptance

may bring about subsequent allied support. Allied reluctance to act should not

inhibit the U.S. (torn taking action, including the use of nuclear weapons, to

prevent Communist territorial gains when such action is clearly necessary to

U-S. secufity.

TK» final portion of NSC 5422/2 dealt with economic problems. It suggested

ways in which the progress of the underdeveloped areas might be assisted. It

recognized a need for foreign aid, both economic and military, but in diminishing volume.

Policy Debate Continued

fter bringing NSC 162/2 up to date through the medium of NSC 5422/2* the

^Council undertook to replace both these directives with a newer one atturwd

46

--W'.^

mmmmmmmmtm
Basic National Security Polity, 1954

to the international situation of the last half of 1954.

24 On 19 October 1954 Secretary Wilson, looking toward the approaching discussions in the Council, asked

the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend changes in NSC 162/2 and to suggest methods of implementing paragraph 45, which had urged a need to create suitable

conditions for negotiation with the Soviet bloc before the onset of atomic plenty.

He also requested them to recommend courses of action to meet the dangers of

limited or piecemeal aggression, against which NSC 5422/2 had warned.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had already learned of the impending policy review

and had anticipateda request for their advice. They sent Secretary Wilsona

statement of their views on3 November 1954.

26 While making no specific

recommendations, they asserted that the free world must take some sort of

action soon. Their views were based ona belief that the struggle with the

communist world was approachinga decisive stage. The military capabilities of

the Soviet bloc were growing, while neutralism and fear increasingly bedeviled

the noncommunist world.

The noncommunist world, if it takes positive and timely dynamic countermeasures, presently has ample resources to meet this situation, and with high

chance of maintaining world peace without sacrifice of either vital security interests or fundamental moral principles, or in the event of war being forced upon it,

of winning that war beyond any reasonable doubt. On the other hand, failure on

the part of the free world and particularly of the United States to take such

timely and dynamic action could, withina relatively short span of years, result

in the United States finding itself isolated from the rest of the free world and

thus placed in such jeopardy as to reduce its freedom of action to two alternatives— that of accommodation to Soviet designs or contesting such designs

under conditions not favorable to our success.

This general warning did not satisfy Secretary Wilson's request for advice on

certain specific questions. Hence the Joint Chiefs of Staff followed it with another

on 12 November 1954, in which they characterized NSC 162/2 as sound but

asserted that its application had been faulty. Instead of seizing the initiative, the

United States was still relying on reactive-type security measures thai had not

lessened the threat to the free world. The essence of their views lay in the

following paragraph:

The timely achievement of the broad objective of US security policy cannot be

brought about if the United States is required to defer to the counsel of the most

cautious among our Allies or if it is unwilling to undertake certain risks inherent

in the adoption of dynamic and positive security measures. In summary, it is the

view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the objective stated in paragraph 45 of NSC

162/2 remains valid but it is imperative that our bask security policy, when

revised, reflect throughout the greater urgency of the present situation, define

concretely the conditions which it is the Mm of our security policy to create, and

direct the formulation of courses of action designed to achieve the bask objective.

In the final analysis, the criterion as to each course of action to be adopted

should be determined by what best serves the interests of the United States.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not themselves suggest any changes in NSC

162?2, but asked that their views be made available to the National Security

49

i

i
JCS and National Policy

Council. Regarding Secretary Wilson's request for actions to meet limited aggression and piecemeal conquest, they suggested merely that the task of preparing

recommendations on these subjects be given to some agency of the National

Security Council, which could consider the problems in the light of all military,

political, and economic factors.27

These conclusions had the unanimous support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

But General Ridgway wished to go much farther and to recommend that the

new policy statement include proposals that would in effect reverse the strategy

of the New Look. In his view, national policy should unequivocally place security ahead of cost considerations and should reject retaliatory striking power as

the principal deterrent to aggression, relying instead upon a balanced and flexible military establishment.*8 His colleagues declined to approve these suggestions but did forward them with the agreed memorandum, as "Additional Views

of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army."

Secretary Wilson sent the basic JCS memorandum, but not General Ridgway's

separate proposals, to the National Security Council on 22 November 1954 with

his own approval and that of the Service Secretaries.2'' In the Council, their

viewpoint was opposed by Secretary of State Dulles, who believed that the

United States should adjust to the trend of world opinion instead of seeking to

reverse it, and should base its policy on recognition of the fact that total war

would be an incalculable disaster. Mr. Dulles did not dispute the need for

adequate military strength or for a policy of determined resistance to aggression.

Nevertheless, to retain the support of allies, the United States should forego

actions that appeared provocative, and, if hostilities occurred, should meet them

in a manner that "will not inevitably broaden them into total nuclear war."

Moreover, he was ready, under proper conditions, to negotiate with the communist nation?, concerning disarmament and other issues. Even if such negotiations

yielded no agreement, they would at least expose the falsity of the Soviets' peace

offensive. **

To the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, Secretary Dulles' views amounted

to a rejection of paragraph 45 of NSC 1622. The Committee believed that Secretary Dulles had overemphasised political ät the expense of military considerations;

had unreatistically assumed that use of nuclear weapons could be avoided in a

general war; and had evidenced a premature readiness to negotiate.*1

In criticising the JSSC comments, General Ridgway made it clear that, to a

large extent, he shared the outlook ot the Secretary of State. He did not regard

Mr. Dulles' view* as inconsistent with NSC 162/1. Rather than foreswearing all

attempts to negotiate, as the JSSC report appeared to suggest. General Ridgway

would direct attention to insuring that the nation was militarily powerful enough

to be able to negotiate from strength. aThe Joint Chiefs of Staff, however» took

no action on the Committee*s report and made no official comment on the views

of the Secretary of State.

The Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Allen Dulles, fully agreed with the

Secretary's assessment. "There ts throughout Europe." he warned the Council,

"an impatience to explore th* possibilities of 'coexistence' that will be increas*

SO
BASIC National Security Poliqf, 1954

ingly difficult to resist." Although the United States might ignore this attitude

for a time, a continuation of the Soviets' peace offensive could eventually force

the nation to participate in the search for a general settlement if it did not wish to

be diplomatically isolated. He offered no suggestions for coping with this

difficulty, but did propose a coordinated economic, military, and covert counteroffensive against the Soviets' subversive warfare.-0

The National Security Council took up the question of a revised national

security policy on 24 November 1954. The members directed the Planning Board

to prepare the draft of a new directive. They also considered, and referred to the

President, a suggestion for a special study, to be made by governmental or

private agencies, of ways in which, before the beginning of mutual nuclear

plenty, the unity of the free world might be increased and the Soviet bloc

divided and weakened.34

While awaiting the draft, the Council discussed the subject inconclusively on

3 December and again on 9 December. At the first of these meetings, General

Ridgway explained his dissenting views on national policy and strategy.35 On

the second occasion, the discussion turned to purely military matters. The President commented on the need to emphasize those elements of national defense

that were applicable to a general war: continental defense, improved weapons

(notably guided missiles), and the reserve forces and materiel needed immediately after hostilities began. But there was to be no overall increase in the armed

forces. At this same meeting, the President laid down new and lower manpower

limits for fiscal year 1956.te

The new draft, NSC 5440, was forwarded by the Planning Board on 13

December 1954.37It recognized the increase in Soviet bloc capabilities, foresaw a

condition of mutual deterrence, and emphasized the need to maintain strength

and unity in the noncommunist world and to pursue lines of action that would

encourage the Soviets to drop their expansionism. There was little trace of the

feeling of urgency that the |oint Chiefs of Staff had expressed. But some willingness tt accept the separate viewpoint upheld by General Ridgway appeared in

recognition of the need for conventional military forces to deal with local

aggression—a provision doubtless inspired by the recent Indochina crisis,

A conflict oi opinion between the hard line upheld by most of the joint Chiefs

of Staff And the softer approach of the Secretary oi State was apparent in NSC

5440. Thus in a discussion of the desirability of negotiations with the Soviet

Union, the jCS Adviser had advocated the inclusion of a warning that negotiation would probably be fruitless and dangerous until the USSR had given evidence of a basic change of attitude. The State Department member wanted the

draft to commit the United State* to an active strategy of negotiation thai would,

at the least, expose the hoüowness of the Soviets* peace offensive lie had also

urged a specific renunciation not only of preventive war, but of any actions that

might be considered provocative,

To the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff commented unfavorably

or» NSC M40 on grounds that it did not meet the cntrfia that the? h*d *e* forth

in their memorandum of 12 November. It did not define the conditions that the

United States should seek to create, nor did it stress the urgency of acting while

II
]CS and National Policy

the United States still retained its atomic superiority. Its proposal to encourage

favorable tendencies within the communist bloc, they said, would be ineffective

without the dynamic and timely action that they had proposed. Moreover, they

believed that it underrated the probability of armed aggression by the communists.*8

On 21 December 1954 the Council discussed NSC 5440 along with the JCS

comments. The members adopted a compromise version of the paragraph concerning negotiation,39 which was incorporated in a redraft, NSC 5440/1, completed by the Planning Board on 28 December.40

Since this version was otherwise little changed from NSC 5440, the Joint Chiefs of Staff merely reaffirmed

their comments on the latter.41

The Council worked over NSC 5440/1 on 5 January 1955 and put it into final

form, making numerous changes without altering its substance. The members

accepted the State Department position on most of the disputed issues, but

allowed the dissenting JCS views to appear as footnotes. The completed version,

NSC 5501, was approved by the President on 7 January 1955.u

A Revised National Security Policy: NSC 5501

In its estimate of the current world situation, NSC 5501 emphasized the growing peril in the era of approaching nuclear plenty. Soviet air-atomic capability was increasing rapidly, and tmght by 1963 (or even by i960) include intercontinental ballistic missiles. A condition of mutual deterrence was foreseen that

would make deliberate resort to war unlikely, but war might occur through

miscalculation; «Iso, the balance might be upset by a major Soviet technological

breakthrough. Nevertheless, despite the expected military and economic growth

of the communist bloc, the free world had the capacity (but not necessarily the

will) to mamtam enough strength to deter or defeat aggression. The Joint Chiefs

of Statt had wished this last statement amplified with a description of the type of

military strength that should be maintained »Of this purpose: "Sufficient conventional armed strength, including the capability of adequate <M\d timely reinforcement, along with US strategic nuclear stnking power."

Neither the USSR nor Communist China, according to NSC 5501, had modi^

tied its basic hostility toward the noneommunist world, especially the United

States. But the more flexible Soviet foreign policy was significant, though difficult to account for. It was even possible, though highly unlikely, that the Sovie's

wanted genuine arm» control. Hie Joint Chief* of Staff objected to this dt*tu>-

sion of the Soviet soft line on the ground* that it overempnasued the signiti

cane? of a mere change in tactics.

Whatever its motivation, the new Soviet approach nwn dangerous, according

to NSC 5501. »ince it would probably tempt the allies "to $o to further lengths

than the US will find prudent' m seeking a ba**s tot accommodation While

preaching coexistence, the communist nations would probably continue or Uticn

sity efforts to expand their hegemony without involving the main sources of

52
Basic National Security Polio/, 1954

communist power. This strategy would "probably present the free world with

its most serious challenge and greatest danger in the next few years."

In outlining a proposed national strategy, NSC 5501 set forth fundamental

considerations in the following terms:

The basic objective of US national security policy is to preserve the security of

the United States, and its fundamental values and institutions.

The basic threat to US security is posed by the hostile policies and power,

including growing nuclear power, of the Soviet-Communist bloc, with its international Communist apparatus.

The basic problem confronting the US is how, without undermining fundamental US values and institutions or seriously weakening the US economy, to

meet and ultimately to diminish this threat to US security.

Since military action to eliminate the communist threat was out of the question,

th only alternative was to attempt to influence the communist regimes in ways

tha. would encourage tendencies that led them to abandon expansionist policies.

This effort would require "a flexible combination of military, political, economic,

propaganda, and covert actions which enables the full exercise of US initiative."

If successfully carried out, it would offer the hope of a prolonged period of

armed truce, and ultimately a peaceful and orderly world environment. But

"failure resolutely to pursue this general strategy could, within a relatively short

span of years, place the US in great jeopardy." The last sentence was apparently

borrowed in part from the JCS memorandum of 3 November 1954 to Secretary

Wilson.

In dealing with military strategy, NSC 5501 recognized the importance of

nuclear retaliatory capacity, but, unlike NSC 162/2, stressed the fact that this

capacity was insufficient by itself. It held that the United States must have forces

over and above those assigned to NATO that could deter or defeat local

aggression, in concert with allied forces, in a manner designed to prevent limited hostilities from escalating into total nuclear war. Such forces "must be

properly balanced, sufficiently versatile, suitably deployed, highly mobile, and

equipped as appropriate with atomic capability, to perform these tasks; and

must also, along with those i ssigned tc NATO, be capable of discharging initial

tasks in the event oi general war."

This military policy assumed the support and cooperation of appropriate

major allies and certain ovher free world countries. The United States should

therefore take steps to strengthen the collective defense system, making use,

where appropriate, of the possibilities for collective action offered by the United

Nations. Military and economic assistance should also be continued, as necessary,

to dependable allied nations.

In two paragraphs the NSC essayed the difficult task of striking a balance

between the need to pursue national interests, on the one hand, and the maintenance of collective security, on the other—a balance that necessitated a precise

definition of the line between firmness and provocation vis:a-vis the Soviet

Union. The statement of policy on this subject was more careful and cautious,

and therefore more complex, than the corresponding portion of NSC 5422/2. It

was as follows:

53

>

.

1 h

1
JCS and National Policy

The ability to apply force selectively and flexibly will become increasingly

important in maintaining the morale and will of the free world to resist aggression.

As the fear of nuclear war grows, the United States and its allies must never

allow themselves to get into the position where they must choose between (a)

not responding to local aggression and (b) applying force in a way which our

own people or our allies would consider entails undue risk of nuclear devastation.

However, the United States cannot afford to preclude itself from using nuclear

weapons even in a local situation, if such use will bring the aggression to a swift

and positive cessation, and if, on a balance of political and military consideration,

such use will best advance US security interests. In the last analysis, if confronted by the choice of (a) acauiescing in Communist aggression or (b) taking

measures'risking either general war or loss of allied support, the United States

must be prepared to take these risks if necessary for its security.

The United States and its allies must reject the concept of preventive war or

acts intended to provoke war. Hence, the United States should attempt to make

clear, by word and conduct, that it is not our intention to provoke war. At the

same time the United States and its major allies must make clear their determination to oppose aggression despite risk of general war, and the United States

must mate clear its determination to prevail if general war eventuates.

NSC 5501 stressed the importance of the strength and cohesion of the free

world. It endorsed the measures proposed in NSC 5422/2 to block piecemeal

conquest. For countries threatened with communist subversion, the United States

should provide covert assistance, aid the development of internal security forces,

and take military or other action to thwart any threat of an immediate seizure of

powe". In the long run, it would be necessary to prove that the noncommunist

world could meet the basic needs and aspirations of its peoples. Toward this

end, the United States should take the lead in stimulating trade and economic

activity, and should provide financial, technical,and educational assistance to

underdeveloped areas (even while seeking to reduce the total amount of US

economic aid). But undue pressure should not be exerted to bring the underdeveloped nations into active alliance, and the United States should cooperate with

constructive nationalist and reform movements in those countries.

In a more aggressive vein, NSC 5501 called for a political strategy against the

communist bloc, to reduce the danger of aggression and to influence developments within the communist world in a favorable direction. It would be necessary,

while convincing the communist countries of the firmness and cohesion of the

free world, to persuade them that there were alternatives compatible with their

basic security interests and at the same time acceptable to the West. No actions

were suggested to attain these purposes, other than a willingness to negotiate

with the Soviet Union whenever it clearly appeared that US security interests

would be served thereby and to undertake discussions on specitic subjects with

Communist China.

The recommendation for a political strategy was an innovation in NSC 5501,

as was another for a coordinated counteroffensive ag».;nst Soviet subversion.

Together they replaced the more general provision in NSC 162/2 for selective,

positive actions to eliminate Soviet-communist control over any areas of the free

world.

54

-=t
Basic National Security Policy, 1954

The concluding paragraphs of NSC 5501 were largely a restatement of corresponding portions of NSC 162/2. The United States should maintain a strong

economy and seek to minimize Federal expenditures, though not at the expense

of national security. Internal security and civil defense programs, an informed

•public, an adequate mobilization base, and an effective intelligence system were

essential.43

The Direction of Policy in 1954

In adopting NSC 5501, the National Security Council maintained the basic

continuity in foreign policy that the Eisenhower administration, after briefly

considering alternatives, had reaffirmed in 1953. The broad objectives remained

as before: firm resistance to international communism (but without overt

provocation) and support of the nation's international obligations. The innovations introduced in NSC 5501 and its predecessor, NSC 5422/2, were essentially

changes in emphasis and did not alter these basic goals. In fact, in bowing to the

trend of world opinion and committing the United States to a general willingness to negotiate, the Council moved even farther from the aggressive policy of

liberation, which had been the most widely discussed alternative to containment.

But the Council was under no illusion that the cold war could be expected to end

soon. The declaration that the United States would if necessary intervene unilaterally in future situations like that in Indochina was a movement toward a

harder line, as were the proposals in NSC 5501 for countersubversive action and

for a political strategy against communism, vll these changes represented a

response, in one direction or another, to the changing world climate of opinion

or to the particular difficulties created or revealed by the crisis in Southeast Asia.

NSC 5501 also represented an innovation in another way. Though not so

intended at the time, it proved 10 be the first of a regulai series of directives

issued at the beginning of each year. Under the Truman administration, the

National Security Council had reexamined policies and objectives at irregular

intervals, as part of a process of appraising the adequacy of security programs.

Preparation of a comprehensive guide to basic national security policy (a phrase

apparently not used before 1953), to replace NSC papers issued over a period of

several years, had been undertaken by the Eisenhower administration. At first

it had been assumed that such comprehensive policy guidance would be valid for

more than a year. But beginning with the approval of NSC 5501, and continuing

throughout the rest of President Eisenhower's term, annual review and revision

of national security policy was standard practice.

The general policy of firmness that was restated in NSC 5501 had the full

support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As they made clear in their memorandum to

Secretary Wilson on 12 November 1954, they believed tha. the United States,

hobbled by allied timidity, had maintained a passive and ineffectual posture and

had failed to make use of the possibilities for a bolder course of action that were

inherent in NSC 162/2. In January 1954, Secretary Dulles had proclaimed as a

55
JCS and National Policy

major objective of the administration the seizure of the initiative in the cold war.

Without referring to this speech, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made it clear that, in

their view, this goal had not been attained.

Most of the JCS members viewed with deep disquiet the Council's move

toward negotiation. They believed that the United States and its allies should

first build a secure military and political position that would enable the West to

had from strength in discussions with the communist bloc. They viewed the

new approach by the Malenkov regime as a change in tactics rather than in

objectives. They recalled what leaders in some other nations seemed to forget:

the long Soviet record of broken promises.

The emphasis that the Joint Chiefs of Staff placed on unity between the

United States and its allies sprang from their recognition of the military importance of collective security. Although the strategy of the New Look stressed

protection of the homeland, it could in no sense be characterized as isolationist.

In fact, it made allies even more necessary than before, since it implied a partnership in which the United States and its allies would develop specialized military

establishments that complemented each other The prospect of future Indochinas underscored the importance of the allied contribution of ground forces if the

United States, as envisioned in JCS 2101/113, were to pull back most of its

troops.

But when the Joint Chiefs of Staff spoke of solidarity, they appeared to have

in mind the full acceptance by other countries of the policy that they themselves

advocated. How other countries were to be brought to accept this policy, and to

act upon it, was a political-diplomatic problem rather than a military one, although

the military implications of failure seemed clear, In such a matter the National

Security Council was naturally disposed to defer to the views of the Secretary of

State. From his intimate knowledge of the attitudes of allied leaders, Secretary

Dulles was convinced that an attempt to resist the pressure for negotiation on

disarmament and other matters would be unwise. As he saw it, the United

States had no choice but to explore the possibilities of negotiation, even if only to

expose the falsity of Soviet gestures.

Among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Ridgway al .>» ,c showed some sympathy for Secretary Dulles' views. The Army Chief of Stafi shared his colleagues'

conviction that the Soviet government had not changed its objectives,44as well

as their misgivings about the trend of allied opinion. He agreed that negotiation

must follow rather than precede the creation of strength, but he did not wish

to foreclose the possibility of any and all negotiation in the immediate future.

General Ridgway's openmindedness on the question of negotiation was wholly

consistent with his critical attitude toward massive retaliation; both followed

from his conviction that the United States needed military forces suitable for

purposes other than merely deterring or winning an all-out nuclear conflict. He

expressed this view in a letter to Secretary Wilson in June 1955, on the eve of his

retirement. "If military power is to support diplomacy effectively," he wrote, "it

must be real and apparent to all concerned, and it must be capable of being

applied promptly, selectively and with the degree of violence appropriate to the

occasion."45

56
Basic National Security Policy, 1954

From General Ridgway's point of view, NSC 5501 was a definite improvement upon NSC 162/2, which had deliberately placed emphasis upon retaliatory

striking power.46 Although NSC 5501 had reaffirmed the need for this component of military strength, it had also recognized the importance of conventional

forces that would enable the United States to resist limited aggression without

automatically triggering a nuclear exchange. Thus the Council responded to the

developing prospect of a nuclear stalemate, and, more immediately, to the success of the Indochinese Communists in winning a war without overt military

intervention by established communist regimes.

Had the policy in NSC 5501 been applied as written, it would have led the

Council and the Department of Defense, in planning the US military establishment, to stress those military requirements in JCS 2101/113 that were more

applicable to limited than to total war: a mobile strategic reserve (including

ample ground forces), sea and air transport capacity, and a readily expansible

mobilization base. But even as they were being approved by the Council, the

portions of NSC 5501 calling for stronger conventional forces were nullified by

the President's decisions regarding budgets and force levels for fiscal year 1956,

which are described in the following chapter.

57

I
3

Force Levels and Personnel Strengths

Immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in June 1950, the

administration of President Harry S. Truman had launched a massive build-up

of US armed strength. The increase had to be spread over a period of many

months, inasmuch as the effects of several years of stringent economy could not

at once be overcome, even by the large emergency appropriations voted by

Congress in 1950. After the first year of the war, however, the sense of urgency

diminished. Considerations of economy reasserted themselves in defense planning and led to the postponement of force goals hastily set during the dark days

of the Korean crisis.l

The personnel strengths and force levels attained by the Services at the end

of 1952, as compared with the ultimate objectives, are shown in Tabk»s 1 and 2.

The process of expansion was almost accomplished except for the Air Force,

which remained far short of its authorized strength of 143 wings. Completion of

the Air Force buildup, originally scheduled for FY 1953, w*s now programmed

for FY 1955.2

Table 1—Actual and Authorized US Military Strength: 31 December 1952

Strvwr

Army

N*vy

Marine Corp«

Air Force

Total

Actual

31 Orvrmrrr

1952*

1.523.152

802.452

229.245

957,453

3.512.4«

Authortztd

tvr 30 January

1953

!,544.000

800.000

246.354

1.016.800

3.607.154

Goal h>r

30 lunt

1954

1.538.000

800.000

248.612

1.061.000

3.647.612

* Exclude* USMA cadets «nd USNA midshipmen

Sounrs: NSC 142, 10 Feb 53, sec 1, pp 41-42 Budgrt of tkr US Cotvrnmtrtt. n 1954. p 563

59
JCS and National Polity

Table 2—Actual and Authorized US Force Levels: 31 December 1952

Service and Force

Actual

31 December

1952

Authorized for

30 June

1953

Goal for

30 June

1954

Ultimate

Objective

Army

Divisions*

Regiments and regimental

combat teams

20

18

113

401

432

833

283

1,116

3

3

39

21

23

83

15

98

20

18

113

410

433

843

287

1,130

3

3

41

26

23

90

16

106

20

18

(b)

408

4%

904

296

1,200

3

3

(b)

(b)

(b)

(b)

(b)

133

21

18

Antiaircraft battalions

Navy

Warships'

Other combatant ships'1

Total combatant ships

Other ships'

Total active »hips

Marine Corps

Divisions

Air wings

Air Force

Strategic wings

Air-defense wings

Tactical wings

Toial combat wings

Troop-carrier wings

Total wings

117

408

4%

904

2%

1,200

3

3

57

29

40

126

17

143

* Does not include training divisions.

b Not available

1

Includes earners (CVA-CVSCVE/CVL). battleships (BB), cruisers(CA/OXXAA/CAG), destroyers (DD/DDt DDRDL), and submarines (SS/SSQSSJCSSR/SSN).

d

Includes mine-warfare, patrol, and amphious-warfare ships

c Various auxiliaries.

' Air Force trooptarner group«, so referred to in NSC 142, were «-designated "wmgs" in 1953

For simplicity the term "wings" has been used.

Soune* NSC 142, 10 Feb 53, sec 1, pp 41-42; Budget *rf US Goivrnment. FV 1954, p. 563

In his budget for fiscal year 1934, President Truman requested new obligationai authority of $72.9 billion and estimated that Federal expenditures would

reach $78.6 billion. Of these amounts, military programs would accrant for

$41.3 billion and $45.5 billion, respectively. The Air Force would receive the

largest share of the defense dollar, $16.788 billion in new obligational authority

and $17.51 billion in estimated expenditures. The Army wou'd receive $12 12

billion in new obligational authority and $15.3 billion in estimated expenditures,

while the Navy (including the Marine Corps) would receive $11.381 billion in

new obligationai authority and $12 billion in estimated expenditures. Office of

:he Secretary of Defense and interservice costs would amount to $1.031 billion in

new obligational authority and $690 million in estimated expenditures.sThese
Force Levels and Personnel Strengths

sums represented the peak of defense spending under current plans. After FY

1954, according to President Truman's budget message to the Congress, military

expenditures should decline to an eventual level of some $35 billion to $40 billion

annually—enough to maintain the Services in a state of readiness.4

FY 1954 Goals under the Eisenhower Administration

As soon as the new administration took office, the Truman defense budget

was subjected to severe scrutiny, in accordance with orders issued in February 1953 by Budget Director Dodge and Deputy Secretary of Defense Kyes. As a

result of this «»examination, Secretary Wilson concluded that substantial reductions could be made with no effect on combat strength. Sizable amounts could

be saved by cutting the budget item for aircraft procurement, since a large

backlog of unobligated funds had built up from earlier appropriations. Downward adjustment of lead-time estimates for future procurement made it possible

to reduce funding requirements without cutting back planned increases in the

production of combat planes. Other economies could be achieved by adjusting

interrelated programs in which slippages had occurred, by cutting out nonessential construction projects, by reducing planned stockpiles of items readily

procurable from industry, and by cutbacks in both military and civilian manpower in the defense establishment. Offsetting these reductions (most of which

affected the Air Force) was a need to provide more funds for the Army to finance

operations in Korea through 30 June 1954 (six months longer than estimated in

the Truman budget) and to supply additional aid to the South Korean Army.

The net saving was about $5 billion in appropriations.5

In reducing military manpower, Secretary Wilson had at first projected a cut

of 250,000 men (entirely from noncombat units) in FY 1954. He soon found it

impracticable, however, to require the Air Force to absorb its share of this reduction (50,000 men) within this period, because large numbers of enlistments were

scheduled to expire in 1955. It was also apparent that the Army and Marine

Corps would require additional allowances to support their rotation policies in

Korea as long as fighting continued there.*1 The 250,000-man goal was therefore

modified.

Ihe reductions in money and manpower proposed by Secretary Wilson, after

being adopted by the National Security Council on 31 March 1953, were written

into NSC 149/2, the first of the new administration's policy directives, which the

President approved on 29 April. This paper committed the United States to the

goal of a balanced budget (though not at the expense of national security) and

abandoned fixed target dates for force level planning in favor of a so-called

floating D-day. It specified manpower reductions to be applied to the Service

personnel strengths as of 28 Februar)' W33, which were as follows: 1,495,000

Army, 802,936 Navy. 242,300 Marine Corps, and 965.425 Air Force—a total of

3.505,661.

From these strengths, the Services were to be reduced by 250,000 men.

61

"* ww».- -*■■■-
I

JCS and National Policy

distributed as follows: Army, 125,000; Navy and Marine Corps (combined),

75,000; Air Force, 50,000. The Air Force was given until the end of FY 1955 to

accomplish its reduction; the other Services were to carry out theirs during FY

1954. However, so long as the Korean War continued, the Army and Marine

Corps might retain, out of these reductions, 51,000 and 5,000 men, respectively,

to support their rotation policies. Thus the Army would drop to 1,421,000 men

and ihe Navy-Marine Corps to 975,236.

7

The Services were expected not only to absorb these reductions through

administrative economies, but at the same time to improve their overall combat

strength by modernizing their equipment. The objectives were to maintain täe

Army and Navy at about the same unit strength and to allow an important

increase in the number of combat wings in the Air Force.

These economies, according to NSC 149/2, should make it possible tc »educe

the appropriations request in the FY 1954 budget by $5 bi''ion and to bring down

expenditures to $43.2 billion. Moreover, it was hoped that expenditures could be

reduced to $40 billion in 1955 and $35 billion in 1956. But these figures were not

considered as ceilings.

8

NSC 149/2 directed the Department of Defense to revise the FY 1954 budget

to reflect the aoove decisions and to submita revised force structure for FY 1955.

Pending this revision, force levels currently planned for 30 June 1953 were to

remain valid, except that the Air Force might add additional combat units if able

to do so within its allotted manpower and money.

The guidelines in NSC 149/2 had been established without reference to the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had not been consulted after the Council's initial

request for their comments on proposals to balance the budget by 1955. They

learned of the proposed reductions on 27 April, just before NSC 149/2 was

approved. In the absence ofa detailed breakdown by Service, it was impossible

for them to evaluate the effects of the reductions involved. Consequently, when

General Vandenberg, acting as JCS Chairman, attended the Council meeting of

29 April at which NSC 149/2 was approved, he was in no position to protest or

otherwise comment on the new expenditure and manpower limits.

1

*

The revised FY 1954 budget was also drafted by Secretary Wilson's office and

the Military Departments, without the assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

10

It

was presented to Congress on7 May 1953

n

The most striking difference from

the original budget wasa reduction of $5 billion in Air Force funds The Air

Force was to receive $11 688 billion in new obtigatiunat authority and $15.1 billion

in estimated expenditures, The Navy (including Marine Corps) was to be cut

$1.7 billion in new obligational authority to $9.651 billion and to $11 billion in

estimated expenditures. The Army budget was not cut but instead received an

increase of $1.5 billion in new obligational authority to $13.671 billion and $16.5

billion in estimated expenditures. With the addition of $1.03 billion in new obligational authority for the office of the Secretary of Defense and interservice

items and $593 million in estimated expenditures, the total defense budget came

to $36.04 billion in new obligational authority and $43.193 billion in estimated

expenditures.

12

Under this budget approved manpower strengths (slightly adjusted from the

62
Force Levels and Personnel Strengths

figures in NSC 149/2) were 1.421 million for the Army, 745,066 for the Navy,

230,021 for the Marine Corps, and 960,000 for the Air Force—a total of 3,356,087.13

The total represented a reduction of approximately 150,000 as compared with 28

February 1953. In order to begin the cutback at once, the administration reduced

the authorized end strength for FY 1953 to 3,555,062.14

The revised FY 1954 budget and personnel strengths were translated into

force levels by the individual Services.15The Army and Navy found that they

would be unable to increase their cirrent unit strength, except that the Army

would organize four more antiaircraft battalions, for a total of 117. The Air Force,

nowever, would rise to 114 wings during FY 1954, and Secretary Wilson termed

this a very substantial increase in defending the new budget before Congress.

The interim goal for the Air Force, he revealed, was 120 wings; ihe final goal

would be determined after further study.16

The proposed reduction of $5 billion in Air Force appropriations aroused

considerable criticism in Congress and elsewhere. Testifying before the Senate

Appropriations Committee, General Vandenberg assailed the reduction for its

disruptive effect on Air Force programs. Secretary Wilson and his subordinates

insisted that combat power would not be affected and emphasized that the goal

of 143 wings had only been suspended, not abandoned.17In the end. Congress

not only accepted the reduction but cut the appropriation request still further, to

$34.474 biUion.18

The JCS Interim Look for FY 1955

Months before the revised FY 1954 budget went to Congress, the joint

Chiefs of Staff were already planning for FY 1955. Tentative force level

recommendations submitted by the joint Strategic Plans Committee on 6 March

1953 called for substantial increases, principally in antiaircraft battalions, radar

picket ships, and fighter aircraft for the coordinated air defense system that had

been proposed by President Truman. The Committee's report was split, with

some of the Services seeking larger increases than others were willing to

endorse.If

By the time fhe Joint Chiefs of Staff received this report, it had become clear

that the attitude of most of the members of the .National Security Council made it

useless to seek any general increase in Service strength for 1955. The Joint Chiefs

of Staff therefore rejected the report and told the joint Strategic Plans Committee

to draft two alternatives to be sent to the Secretary of Defense. One would urge

that the current FY 1954 force levels be adopted without change as 1955 goals;

the other would propose increases in continental defense forces only.*0

The Committee submitted the two drafts on 14 April 1953. The Joint Chiefs of

Stall deferred action on them pending the final decision of the National Security

Council on NSC 149/2.2tIts subsequent adoption, with reduced budgetary guidelines for FY 1955* seemed to foreclose any hope even of holding force goals at

current levels. Shortly thereafter, the administration announced that all the

h3
]CS and National Policy

members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would soon be replaced. On 4 June 1953

General Bradley and his lame duck colleagues decided to withdraw both drafts

and to leave to the Services the task of preparing preliminary plans for FY 1955.22

It was not certain, however, that the administration would enforce the $40

billion expenditure limit for FY 1955 mentioned in NSC 149/2. The size of the

reductions to be expected in the next year's budget was debated for several

months at high levels. Mr. Dodge, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and

Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey urged cutbacks for 1955 at least as great as

those carried out for 1954. Secretary of Defense Wilson, on the other hand,

believed that strategic planning should precede budgeting and that the new

Joint Chiefs of Staff should be allowed to complete their review of strategy

before any drastic reductions were ordered. President Eisenhower took a middle

position; he believed that cuts would be possible but on a smaller scale than

those envisioned by Dodge and Humphrey.23 On 6 August 1953 he laid down a

general requirement that all departments make substantial reductions in their

expenditure estimates and appropriations requests for FY 1955.2*

The conclusion of the Korean War spurred the drive for economy. On 26 July

1953, just before the armistice was signed, officials of the Department of Defense

attending a conference at Quantico, Virginia, predicted that the end of hostilities

would make it possible to reduce expenditures by as much as $1 billion during

the next fiscal year.25 On the other hand, the Soviet thermonuclear explosion of

12 August 1953 provided a justification for larger forces and, specifically, for the

expanded continental defense program that was then being discussed within the

administration.*6

The concept submitted to the President by the newly appointed Joint Chiefs

of Staff on 8 August 1953 was too broad and tentative to provide a basis for the

FY 1955 budget. Consequently, on 15 September the Armed Forces Policy Council asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit force level recommendations tor this

purpose, along with tentati\c plans for FYs 1956 and 1957. The Council also

agreed that it was essential to reduce the number and size of the support units

(those other than major combat forces), which accounted for over half of all

expenditures of the Department of Defense.'

7

Secretary Wilson embodied these decisions in a formal directive to the Joint

Chiefs of Statt on 16 September.** Two days later, the Assistant Secretary of

Defense (Comptroller), W. J. McNeil, described to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the

kmds of data requested for budget planning. They included the personnel

strength and the number of major combat units proposed for each Service, with

the recommended manning level for each unit (expressed as a percentage of

wartime personnel strength). The JCS recommendations were also to extend to

supporting units—those classified by the Army as Other Combat Forces and by

the other Services as Combat Support Forces.2* Army and Air Force Reserve and

National Guard units were to be included as well. Recommendations (if any) (or

changes in FY 1954 goals were also to be included. Actual strengths as of 30 June

1953 were to be shown for comparison.**

Initial recommendations were drafted by the Services and forwarded to the

Joint Strategic Plans Committee, which attempted to harmonize them, but withM

—
Force Levels and Personnel Strengths

out success. Both within and outside the Committee, the Services used different

guidelines in planning for FY1955. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps took the

position that, in principle, the manpower limits in NSC 149/2 should be followed,

with increases confined to continental defense forces. In practice, however,

these Services did not restrict their plans in this manner. Thus the Army and

Marine Corps assumed the continuation of the special authorizations of 51,000

and 5,000 men, respectively, for their Korean pipelines, which they viewed as

necessary so long as US forces remained in Korea. The Army and Navy added

allowances of 2,000 and 6,634 respectively for officer candidates (cadets and

midshipmen), who were not included in the NSC 149/2 strength figures. For the

Army, the result would be 1,423,000 men. Nevertheless, Army planners main*

tained that their Service could not meet its commitments with that strength.

They recommended 1,508,000 men for FY 1955, of whom 6,000 would be required

to provide an additional 13 antiaircraft battalions. They also urged that the final

FY 1954 manpower goal be raised to 1,540,000. The Army's divisional strength

under their plans would remain constant at 20 through 1955.

The Navy sought no increase in FY 1954, but proposed 767,700 men for FY

1955, which was 16,000 more than the approved 1954 figure (745,066) plus the

officer candidate allowance. The increase would go entirely for continental defense

forces: destroyer escorts, minesweepers, and patrol aircraft. The Marine Corps

assumed the continuation through FY 1955 of its -approved 1954 strength (230,021

men), and of its statutory three-division structure (a requirement laid down by

Congress in 1953).

The Air Force rejected both the FY 1955 personnel strength in NSC 149/2 and

the FY 1954 limit established by the Secretary of Defense. Its representatives

quoted from NSC 149/2 and from Secretary Wilson's statements to show that the

decisions of the National Security Council in April 1953 were intended merely as

temporary expedients. For 1954, they sought 975,000 men (15,000 more than

currently authorized) and 115 wings. For 7955, they recommended 1,002,000

men—enough to reach the interim goal of 120 wings.11 Of the proposed 1955

increase. 9,700 men would be used for additional continental defense forces

(four fighter wings and two AEW squadrons).iJ

The Service recommendations for FY 1955 added up to a total of 3,507.721

men. This was approximately 150.000 more than the actual strength at the end of

FY 1953-w

For FYs 1956 and 1957, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps proposed to use

their recommended FY 1955 figures temporarily, pending further studies after

revision of the current national security policy paper (NSC 153/1). The Air Force

estimated a requirement for 149 wings by 1956-1957, but, by assuming increases

in allied forces and accepting some risk, reduced this to 137 wings (123 combat

and 14 troop carrier), which would require 1,060,000 men. The Air Force thus

abandoned its 143-wing goal.**

The Joint Strategic Planning Committee passed these Service proposals to the

joint Chiefs öf Staff. Admiral Radford and hi* colleagues were of course aware

thai they ran counter to the administration's desire for lower expenditure in FY

1955. Nevertheless they did not feel justified in recommending smaller force

65

mmmmmammk
JCS and National Polity

levels than those sought by the Services. Accordingly, on 2 October 1953 they

forwarded the Service figures to Secretary Wilson with a recommendation that

he approve the major combat forces listed therein. They explained their position

as follows:

The major forces recommended for achievement in FY 1955 do not represent

any material chance from those developed in the formulation of previously

approved plans. Inhere has been no change in United States foreign commitments, no reduction in the threat to US national security, and no new decisions

at governmental level with regard to the use of atomic weapons. Therefore, no

major departure from these forces appears to be justified at this time.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that their recommendations were in consonance with NSC 149/2, except for those increases required for continental defense.

Nevertheless, they took note of the desire for economy and promised every

effort to meet force requirements within predicted manpower availabilities.

The joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that the major Army, Navy, and Marine

Corps combat units proposed for FY 1955 should be used as the basis for preliminary FY 1956 and FY 1957 plans. For the Air Force, they recommended 127 wings

for FY 1956 as a planning target in connection with long lead-time procurement.

They cited the proposed goal of 137 wings but took no position on it pending

comr v>n of their overall review of forces, which they asserted, was awaiting

'Verein decisions from higher authority"—presumably a reference to the fact

that the administration had not yet formally approved the strategic concept that

they had proposed in August.1

These recommendations were the product or what was later described as an

interim look by the joint Chiefs of Staff, * as distinct from the new look at the

entire defense picture of which Secretary Wilson had spoken earlier. Secretary

Wilson tentatively accepted them tor planning purpose.*/7 Using them as a

basis, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) prepared preliminary

estimates for FY 1955 of $35,273 billion in new obligational authority and 543.0

billion in expenditures.1* On 13 October 1953 Mr. McNeil and Secretary Wilson

submitted these to the National Security Council. Because the figures were only

slightly below those for 1934 and were appreciably higher than the $40 billion

expenditure target in NSC '.492. they aroused immediate opposition from some

of those present, notably Secretary Humphrey and Mr. Dodge

Admiral Radford was called upon io defend the force levels on which the

estimates were based. He explained why the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not felt frev

to reduce them. In particular, he stressed the absence of a firm policy regarding

the use of atomic weapons, which would make it possible to deliver equivalent

firepower with fewer men.

The National Security Council directed the Department of Defense to review

the estimates in the light of the discussion and submit them again for further

consideration. The clear expectation was that they would be revised downward

In other words, the Council had rejecteiJ the interim look program. **

66
Force Leivk and Personnel Strettgth*

The FY 1955 Budget: Impact of the New Look

Three days after this meeting, Secretary Wilson set in motion the study that

was to eventuate in JCS 2101/113, as already described. He told the joint

Chiefs of Staff to suggest a new military strategy *nd a force structure for fiscal

years 1955 through 1957. They were to base their proposals on the assumption

that nuclear weapons would be used whenever the iüiionei interest so required,

and at the same time they were to recognize the importance of maintaining a

sound economy, or, in other words, of holding defense costs to a minimum.40

The budget process, however, could not await the completion of this study.

Accordingly, on 16 October 1953, Secretary Wilson asked the Service Secretaries

to submit FY 1955 estimates by 5 December 1953. These were to be based on the

major combat forces recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with minimum

supporting forces. They were expected to reflect economies resulting from

increased efficiency and from the end of the war in Korea.41

In itself, this directive did not insure that the Services would hold their

requests to a level that the administration would regard as acceptable. Secretary

Wilson and his subordinates therefore sought a surer basis for reductions. On 23

October the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel, Dr.

lohn A. Hannah, in a memorandum to the Services, suggested that these figures

be used for planning purposes: 1.281 million for the Army, 670,tXX) for the Navy,

207,000 for the Marine Corps, and 970,000 for the Air Force—a total of 3.128

million.*1 These figures represented a reduction of approximately 10 percent in

the approved FY 1954 strength for all the Services except the Air Force, which

would be allowed a modest increase.41 Dr. Hannah expected that savings of as

much as SI billion might result.44Secretary Wilson suggested that the Services

make a real effort to meet the listed strengths.4* His use of this phraseology,

which fell short of a direct order, left the Services free to seek a reconsideration

of Dr. Hannah's proposal. General Ridgway opposed it strenuously, as did

Admiral Carney to a lesser degree.46

Secretary Wilson postponed a decision until almost the last minute. On 4

December J953 he authorized FY 1955 end strengths totalling 3,167,000 with

man-year averages of 3,225,500.4> On the following day he received Service

budget requests, prepared in response to his directive of 16 October, amounting

to $35.901 billion tn new obltgational authority—a figure even higher than that

rejected by the National Security Council on 13 October.48 Thereupon, on 11

December 1953, he issued new instructions reducing the man-year average

strength to 3.186 million, distributed as follows: 1.3 million for the Army. 706,000

for the Navy, 230,000 for the Maxine Corps, and 960,000 for the Air Force The

Services were directed tc submit proposals for beginning and trtd strength?;

adjusted to these averages.*' Following further discussions with the Services,

the administration finally approved FY 1955 itnd strengths as follows: 1. \b2 mil

lion for the Army. 682,000 for the Navy, 215,000 for the Marine Corps, and

97Ö,Üüö for the Air Force—a total of 3 022 million.*0 At the same time, the FY

1954 strength objective was reduced to 3,327.800.**

These FY 1955 strength objective* were regarded as stepping stones, so to

A
JCS and National Policy

speak, on the path toward the FY 1957 goal of 2.815 million approved in connection with the New Look.52 But if the goal was to be reached in three annual

strides, the first was to be by far the biggest; considerably more than a third of

the total planned shrinkage would occur under these 1955 plans. The cutback

would be particularly abrupt for the Army, w'uch had fared even worse than it

would have under the 10 percent proposal (the Navy and Marine Corps came

out somewhat better). This apportionment may perhaps have been influenced

by the Korean Armistice, which could be viewed as justifying immediate manpower savings.53

Secretary Wilson later testified that the Army would have been

cut by another 100,000 had it not been for the continuing uncertainty of the

Korean situation and the looming crisis in Indochina.54

On the basis of these decisions regarding personnel Strengths, the administration was able sharply to reduce the budget estimates submitted earlier by the

Services. The final military budget for FY 1955, as sent to Congress, was as

follows: $8,236 billion for the Army in new obligational authority and $10,198

billion in estimated expenditures; $9,882 billion for the Navy in new obligational

authority and $10,493 in estimated expenditures; $11,206 biilion for the Air Force

h new obligational authority and $16,209 billion in estimated expenditures.

With $1,669 billion in new obligational authority and $675 million in estimated

expenditures for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and interservice the total

defense budget was $30,993 billion in new obligational authority and $37,575

b llion in estimated expenditures.55

The National Security Council and tht President had approved the budget on

16 December 1953. Mr. Eisenhower ruled, however, that both the budget and

the FY 1957 New Look military program, which was approved at the same time,

would be "kept under continuous scrutiny in relation to world developments"

and that any Service might request review of its program if a change seemed

necessary.56

The iiscal and manpower Urn's established by the administration became

the bajis for force goals established by the individual Services. The Army proposed to reduce it.> division strength from 20 to 17 in FY 1955, to retain 18

regiments and regimental combat teams, and to increase its antiaircraft battalions to 122. The divisional reduction accorded with the views of General Ridgway,

who had wanted the number of combat units to reflect the manpower reduction;

Secretary Wilson had favored retention of the same number of divisions at

reduced strengths.57

The Navy would maintain 404 warships and 676 other vessels, a decline of 50

from the 1954 total. The Air Force would have 120 wings, 107 combat and 13

troop carriers.58 AP the Services would strengthen their air defense forces.59

The administration unveiled its FY 1955 budget as the first step in putting the

New Look into execution. It was, the President advised the Congress on 7

January 1954, ba.ed on a new military program unanimously recommended by

the joint Chiefs of Staff.00 Echoing the President, Secretary Wilson told the

House Appropriations Committee that the budget was the first phase of the

"carefully considered and unanimously agreed long-range plan of the JCS."61

Admiral Rad'ord implied the same thing in his testimony. The 1957 New Look

68

i
Force Levels and Personnel Strengths

manpower objectives, he explained, "are actually for planning purposes" and

"are not inflexible .... The only firm plans in attaining these ultimate goals are

those represented by the force levels on which the current annual budget is

based."62

The unanimously recommended program to which the President and the

Secretary of Defense referred was, of course, JCS 2101/11.\ althougha hasty

reading of their remarks might suggest that the budget itseL had the endorsement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.63 As both President Eisenho ver and Secretary

Wilson were doubtless aware, neither the budget nor its related personnel and

force levels had been submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration.

Secretary Wilson, however, apparently regarded General Ridgway's failure to

protest the final 1955 personnel ceilings as implying approval of them.

64

When the House Appropriations Committee opened hearings on the bi "iget,

each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was asked to verify the assertion that the

basic FY 1957 program had been unanimously approved. All did so, although

General Ridgway was careful to point out that the approval was conditioned on

certain assumptions.

65 Admiral Radford was also asked specifically for comments on the FY 1955 budget; he replied that it had his unqualified approval.66

In

hearings on the separate budgets, General Twining indicated his satisfaction

with that of the Air Force.

67 General Ridgway and Admiral Carney pointed out

that their Service*, would lose some combat manpower and would find their

materiel readiness impaired. But neither protested the budget, and Admiral

Carney expressed the belief that the Navy's overall comba

1

effectiveness would

increase asa result of new weapons and techniques to be introduced in 1955.*•

When the budget reached the Senate Appropriations Committee, Senator

Bumet R. Maybank of South Carolina, dit turned by rumorj of dissatisfaction

among Army officers, questioned General Ridgway closely about his attitude

toward the budget. Obviously reluctant to criticizea decision by his superiors,

the General sought to evadea direct answer to the question whether he was

satisfied with Army force levels under the budget. His stated position was that,

in accord with military discipline, he accepted the budget asa sound decision by

his lawfuls 4periors.

6y

The new bvdget, like the administration's earlier one for 1954, aroused

considerable criticism, though for different reasons. Previously, airpower enthusiasts had assailed the reduction of funds for the Air Force; now the cutback in

the Army and Navy became the focus of protest. Comments on this feature of

the budget tied in with criticism of ft.i doctrine of massive retaliation attributed

to Secretary of State Dulles, on the basis of his speech on 12 January 1954.

7J As

before, however, Congress remained unmoved by the criticism, and not only

declined to reverse the proposed reductions, but superimposed its own economy program on that of the administration. The final appropriations figure

enacted was $29.584 billion.

71

69 . . .
'

JCS and National Policy

FY 1956 Plans and the Indochina Crisis

The goals to be attained by FY 1957, established in JCS 2101/113 which set

forth the New Look strategy, were for US armed forces of 2.815 million in

manpower to comprise 14 Army divisions, 1,030 Navy ships, 3 Marine Corps

divisions, and 137 Air Force wings. The manpower strength was set at 1 million

for the Army, 650,000 for the Navy, 190,000 for the Marine Corps, and 975,000

for the Air Force. As soon as the JCS 2101/113 goals had been approved by the

Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Services to prepare

summary programs and budget estimates for fiscal years 1956 and 1957, planned

so as to reach the above figures on schedule (or earlier if possible). The force

goals set by JCS 2101/113 were to be used for planning purposes but might be

exceeded, subject to prior JCS approval in each case, if the excess units were

attainable within manpower and dollar limits.72

In their replies, submitted in March 1954, the Services proposed the goals set

out in Table 3. As the table shows, the Army, in preparing its plans, had wholly

departed from JCS 2101/113. Army planners maintained that the manpower

seals in JCS 2101/113 were based on assumed conditions that had not yet

materialized. "The Army should not be forced to program itself into a position of

inability to meet national commitments," ran their argument, "on the basis of

'arbitrary assumptions' to the effect that these commitments will be reduced."73

Most of the other Service objectives were in conformity with JCS 2101/113.

The Navy proposed to maintain an excess oftwo ships—1,032 instead of 1,030—but

to remain within its allotted manpower limit. The Navy's plans for FY 1956 also

allowed for two aircraft carriers temporarily retained in the active fleet, with the

President's approval, to meet the crisis in Indochina. For all practical purposes, the

Navy was proposing to reach its allotted ship strength a year ahead of the

schedule in JCS 2101/113. Similarly, the Air Force programmed its final manpower strength for attainment in FY 1956 instead of FY 1957. Its increase from

Table 3—Service Objectives for FYs 1956 and 1957: March 1954

Service

FY 1956

Strength Combat Force

FY 1957

Strength Combat Force

Army

Ntvy

Manne Corps

Air Force

Total Strength

•1.164.000

666.435

205.000

975.000

3,010.435

17 divisions

1.034 active

ships

3 divisions

127 wings

1.152.000

650.000

190.000

975.000

2,%7.000

17 divisions

1.032 active

ships

3 divisions

137 wings

'Army approved strength for FY 1955; includes 2.000 USMA cadets

Sources: JCS 1800/213, 2 Mar 54; JCS 1800/214. 10 Mar 54; JCS lÄKWIS. 11 Mar 54. JCS 1800/216,

11 Mar 54.

70
Force Levels and Personnel Strengths

127 to 137 wings during FY 1957 would be achieved by reducing the number of

men in headquarters, administrative, and support elements. The 137-wing total v ouki consist of 126 combat wings (three more than previously planned) and 11

of troop carriers. However, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps gave notice

that if the Army were to be exempted from the guidelines in JCS 2101/113, they

would wish to revise their programs.

The cost estimates submitted by the Services totalled $37.4 billion for 1956—

considerably more than the $32.8 billion that, according to JCS 2101/113, was

expected to be available. For FY 1957, the estimates were incomplete, and the

Services had not made it clear whether they applied to appropriations or to

expenditures.

74

The Joint Chiefs of Staff received these proposals for action on 29 April 1954

n

and discussed them on 10 May 1954, but reached no decision.

76 Four days later,

the Acting Secretary of Defense, Mr. Robert B. Anderson, asked the Joint Chiefs

of Staff to submit FY 1956 force and manning level recommendations, covering

both major combat forces and supporting units, by1 July.

77

Meanwhile events abroad threatened to undermine the assumptions of JCS

2101/113 and threw doubt on the wisdom of the force reductions planned for the

coming fiscal year. The deterioration of the French position in Indochina compelled the administration to suspend its plans to withdraw forces from the Far

East. In another part of the world, the uncertain prospect for French ratification

of the European Defense Community treaty casta shadow over hoyes that

NATO could count on the early addition of West German forces. Faced with

these developments, the administration perforce reconsidered its earlier

decisions. Secretary Wilson suggested on 26 April 1954 that it might be necessary to take a second new look. The next few months are obviously critical ones

in world affairs," he said, "and what happens in Europe and Asia during this

period may forcea soul-searching review of our specific policies, plans, objectives and expenditures."78

Admiral Carney saw the Far Eastern crisis as justifyinga request for more

manpower in FY 1955. He urged that the Navy's personnel strength be increased

to 733,916, sufficient to maintaina force of 1,131 ships. For the Marine Corps, he

asked an increase to 225,021.**

If the FY 1957 figures in JCS 2101/113 were no longer valid as objectives, and

if the approved strengths for FY 1955 were to be amended, there seemed no firm

basis for FY 1956 plans. The Joint Strategic Plans Committee, charged with

draftinga reply to Mr. Anderson's rtquest, figuratively threw up its collective

hands in despair. "At this time, there exist no beginning or end parameters

upon which FY 1956 forces and manning levels can be baied," asserted the

Committee on 29 June.

80

Further progress was impossible until the administration decided how far to

pursue its goal of economy in the face of the Far Eastern situation. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff had by now accepted the Army view that the cutback of manpower should be abandoned, or at least suspended. They discussed the issue

with the Secretary of Defense, who agreed with them. On 29 June 1954 Secretary

Wilson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff isettled upon the following personnel strengths

71

t

*

1

-j §-I1
JCS and National Policy

for FY 1956, to apply to both the beginning and the end of the fiscal year: 1.173

million for the Army, 682,000 for the Navy, 215,000 for the Marine Corps, and

975,000 for the Air Force. Under this plan, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps

would be continued without change from FY 1955 and the Air Force would reach

its final strength by FY 1956—a year earlier than originally planned.R1

Within these limits, the Army would attempt, to maintain "as near a twenty

division structure as is feasible," perhaps by reducing the strength of some

divisions. The Navy would maintain maximum operating strength, including its

current force of 14 attack carriers (CVAs), the backbone of the fleet's striking

power. The Air Force would raise its FY 1956 goal to 130 wings.

On 1 July 1954 the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked Secretary Wilson to confirm this

oral agreement, indicating that they would then tDrward the detailed recommendations requested by Mr. Anderson. At the same time, they called attention

to a pending proposal by the Army to increase its FY 1955 strength to 1,282,000.

They also informed the Secretary that they intended in December 1954 to review

the world situation and, if necessary, to submit new force level recommendations for FY 1957 to supersede those in JCS 2101/113.82

The Secretary of Defense tentatively confirmed these FY 1956 strengths and

force levels in writing on 15 July 1954. He also approved the JCS plan to review

FY 1957 levels in December. However, he disapproved the Army's request for

more manpower in 1955.83 Two weeks later he obtained the tentative approval of

the National Security Council and the President for the use of these figures in

budget planning.84

On 19 August the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended major combat forces for

FY 1956. For the Army they recommended 19 divisions, 12 regiments and regimental combat teams, and 136 antiaircraft battalions; for the Navy, 408 warships,

442 other combatant ships, and 281 other ships, for a total of 1,131 active ships;

for the Marine Corps, 3 divisions and 3 air wings; and for the Air Force, 119

combat wings and 11 troop-carrier wings, for a total of 130 wings. Under these

recommendations, the Army would retain its current division strength while

significantly increasing the number of antiaircraft batt^'or,. The Navy would

reach the ship strength that had earlier been sought by - . iral Carney for FY

1955 (1,131 vessels, 18 more than the existinr total). B< A Services, however,

would be forced to accept lower manning le/els for mo t units, and the Army

would reduce the number of its separate regiments and regimental combat

teams (RCTs) by one third"*

Secretary Wilson told the Joint Chiefs ol Staff on 17 September 1954 that he

would submit these recommendations, with his approval, to the National Security Council. Meanwhile, they were to be used in budget preparation.'*

The JCS objectives seemed to preclude any major budget reductions for FY

1956. Secretary Wilson apparently considered that the objectives of the 1953

economy drive had been accomplished; he was now willing to be guided wholly

by JCS estimates of military needs. But the goal of economy had not been

abandoned by the administration. On 23 July 1954 the Bureau of the Budget sent

the Secretary of Defense an outline of fiscal policies laid down by the President

for FY 1956, which called for continuing attempts to reduce expenditures and for

72
Force Levels and Personnel Strengths

reductions in appropriations requests as compared with FY 1955.8/A policy

conflict thus loomed upon the horizon; it could only be settled by the President.

The Issue of Support Force Recommendations

In sending Secretary Wilson their force goal recommendations on 19 August

1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had transmitted the Service proposals for supporting units. They had urged the Secretary to approve these as an order of

magnitude and to leave the military chief of each Service free to adjust them,

within approved personnel ceilings. Secretary Wilson, however, felt that he

needed the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the numbers and manning levels

of these units in appraising Service programs and budget requests. He insisted

also that the composition of support forces, when once approved, should oe

altered only with the prior approval of his office and of the cognizant Service

Secretary.88

That the Joint Chiefs of Staff should debate the need for each Army engineer

battalion, Navy fleet tow-target squadron, and Air Force photo mapping group

seemed hardly reasonable. Moreover, to require previous Departmental approval

at two levels for all adjustments would impose a hopelessly cumbersome

procedure. On 22 September the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed their Operations

Deputies to seek clarification of the reasons for these requirements from the

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).89

When the Operations Deputies conferred with Mr. McNeil, he readily agreed

that the requirement for Secretarial approval of changes should be dropped. But

he was less accommodating on the other issue, since, as he pointed out, support

forces accounted for over half of the Departmental budget. The Operations

Deputies rejoined that, given personnel and fiscal ceilings, the individual chiefs

had at obvious incentive to minimize support forces in order to maximize combat st ength. It was finally agreed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff ihould indicate

how tar down into the area of supporting forces they believed the) could extend

their consideration.1*

0

The Joint Chiefs of Staff t en advised Secretary Wilson that the-' could not

profitably go into this matter at all. The detailed and time-consuming ana /sis

that would be required was beyond the capacity of their organization. Moreover,

they deemed it inappropriate for them to concern themselves with the •iubject.

Advice concerning support forces, they said, should come from the Military

Departments, through the Secretaries.w Mr. Wilson made no reply and allowed

the matter to drop for the time being. y

The Decision to Accelerate Retrenchment

[ ervice budget estimates for FY 1956, based on the force levels tentatively

'approved by Mr. Wilson on 17 September, were sent to the Secretary's office

7^
JCS and National Policy

on 4 October 1954. They added up to $37,397 billion in new obligational authority.92 This figure, well above the amount in the FY1955 budget, violated the guidelines laid down by the Bureau of the Budget on 23 July 1954. Some reduction

could be anticipated when the estimates were reviewed in the Department of

Defense. But even Secretary Wilson was not certain that they could be cut below

the 1955 figure. On 30 November he predicted that the 1956 budget would call

for between $29 and $34 billion in new obligational authority, and that expenditures would amount to roughly $35 billion.93

On 3 December 1954 Admiral Radford summarized for the National Security

Council the force levels and personnel strengths tentatively approved for FY

1956. The Comptroller followed with a budget analysis that pointed to a substantial increase in military appropriations.*1 The Council noted and discussed these

presentations, but took no other action.95

The Council's tacit acceptance of the prospect of higher defense costs for FY

1956 contrasted sharply with its actions in October 1953, when it had rejected

preliminary 1955 estim *tes as excessive. The difference can be ascribed to the

alarming developments »t the Far East. In Indochina, the US retaliatory capacity

had not deterred the native communist rebels from an aggressive course, even

without overt aid from the Soviet Union or Communist China. The possible

repercussions of this crisis made ii appear dangerous to cut back US military

strength, especially in conventional forces—those most likely to be required if

the United States were forced to intervene in similar situations. Recognition of

this fact was to be reflected in NSC 5501, which was under discussion at this

time in the National Security Council, in the form of statements concerning the

need to enlarge conventional warfare capabilities.

All the signs were that the defense economy program had run its course.

Secretary Wilson announced on 7 December 1954 that the administration planned

no further cuts in defense spending unless there was a definite improvement in

the international situation. "We are getting close to the bottom," he said."*

Meanwhile the Joint Strategic Plans Committee had been working on the

preliminary FY 1957 recommendations that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had promised Mr. Wilson. The members were presented with a plan for an impressive

increase in the Army—the outgrowth of an earlier proposal to reorganize that

Service and to augment me number of combat divisions without increasing

manpower. Under this reorganization plan, five of the Army's six training divisions would be upgraded to combat status. They would become eligible for

overseas assignment in accordance with a new system that would involve the

rotation of complete divisions between foreign bases and the zone of the interior.

Divisions returning home would assume the task of training recruits; they would

spend two years thus engaged, followed by a year of combat training in preparation for reassignment overseas. Thus the number if combat divisions would rise

from 19 to 24. At the same timt*, to replace two National Guard divisions recently

birought home from Korea ät\d scheduled for early release to state control, the

Army would activate two new divisions by amalgamating existing units in the

Pacific Northwest and the Caribbean. lTiese would be divisions in name only,

however; their component units would remain at their current stations. General

74
- —* «— '

i

Force Levels and Personnel Strengths

Ridgway and Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens had presented this plan to

President Eisenhower in September 1954 and had obtained his approval.97

Of the 24 divisions, it was expected that, at any one time, five would be

occupied with recruit training. Three would be stationed in the Far East and one

would be required for the Western Hemisphere Reserve. The two new divisions

would be limited to static defensive missions in the theaters where they were

stationed. Thus only 13 divisions would be available to meet other commitments,

the most important of which involved NATO. The United States had indicated

to its NATO allies that it could make 17 divisions available for European defense

within six months after hostilities began. Although the other nations had not

formally accepted this offer, General Ridgway considered that the United States

was commited to provide 17 divisions, and that all of these must be in readiness

on D-day, since new divisions could not be raised and trained within six months.98

In view of these considerations, the Army member of ihe Joint Strategic Plans

Committee proposed a goal of 28 divisions by the end of FY 1957. This objective

would require 1,352,000 men—an increase oi 169,000 over the FY 1956 strength

approved by Secretary Wilson on 15 July 1954. In the Committee's report, JCS

1800/225, submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 30 November 1954, the Army

proposal received the approval of the Navy and the Marine Corps. The Army in

turn endorsed a Navy request for beginning and end strengths of 698,000 and

740,000 men in 1957, with an increase tc 16 attack carriers. The Air Force was

willing to endorse the carrier figure, but not the larger personnel strengths for

either the Army or the Navy. All the Services agreed that the Marine Corps and

Air Force should maintain their 1956 manpower strengths without change. The

Air Force goal of 137 wings was also reaffirmed.**

Without taking a forma! position on the report, the Joint Chief« of Staff

discussed it with the Secretary of Defense on the morning of 8 December. The

principal issue was the increase in the Army, which was defended by General

Ridgway. Secretary Wilson, >nstead of rendering a decision himself, evidently

decided that the question was important enough to require the attention of the

President.,üü

Accordingly, at a meeting at the White Mouse that afternoon, the Secretary

and Admiral Radford discussed the subject of force goals with the President.

Apparently Mr. Eisenhower became concerned at the prospect of an enlargement of the military establishment, in the face of his hopes for further reductions.

Perhaps the magnitude of the increase sought by the Army angered him. At any

rate, he seized the opportunity presented by this discussion to reactivate the

lagging economy drive. Rejecting the idea of augmenting the Army and Navy in

FY 1957, he not only reaffirmed the manpower objectives in JCS 2101/113 but

ruled that they must be achieved a year earlier than planned—by the end of FY

1956, with part of the reduction to be carried out in FY 1955.m

The President announced this decision to th? National Security Council on 9

December 1954. Me directed the Department oi Defense to be^tn moving M once

to reach the following strength limits by 30 June 1955, the end of FY 1955: 1.1

million for Che Army, 870,000 to» the Navy-Marine Corps, and 970,000 tor the

75
JCS and National Pcliqj

Air Force, a total of 2.94 million. At the same time he set a general target of 2.815

million for 30 June 1956, including 975,000 for the Air Force.102

In the light of what had gone before, the President's decision appeared

surprisingly abrupt.103 Secretary Wilson later ascribed it to the President's conviction that the stabilization of the situation in the Far East had made it safe to

proceed "as rapidly as we can" to the final manpower objectives of the New

Look.104

On 9 December 1954, Secretary Wilson allocated the FY 1956 total manpower

ceiling among the Services in the same manner as in JCS 2101/113:1.0 million for

the Army, 650,000 for the Navy, 190,000 for the Marine Corps, and 975,000 for

the Air Force. He directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to use these figures in preliminary planning for FY 1957.los

Despite President Eisenhower's ruling, however, the last word had not yet

been said on FY 1956 manpower. A year earlier, General Ridgway had accepted

the decision of the President and the Secretary as closing the issue of FY 1955

personnel strengths, and had seen his acceptance interpreted as concurrence.

Probably for this reason, he chose to appeal the President's decision of 8 December 1954. With some support, apparently, from Admiral Carney and General

Shepherd, he won the President's agreement to raise the 1956 ceiling by 35,000,

from 2.815 million to 2.850 million.u*

The revised ceiling was announced to the National Security Council on 5

January 1955.,u7 On the same day the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to divide the

additional 35,000 spaces as follows: 25,000 to the Army, 7,000 to the Navy, 3,000

to the Marine Corps, and none to the Air Force. The new end strengths for FY

1956 (30 June 1956) were 1.025 million ior the Army, 657,000 for the Navy,

193,000 for the Marine Corps, and 975,000 for the Air Force. They communicated

this agreement at once, by telephone, to Mr. McNeil, the Comptroller. On the

following day Secretary Wilson approved it.10**

Force Levels under the New Ceilings

After FY 1956 personnel strengths had been determined, Mr. Wilson insti»

tuted a new procedure. He turned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, instead of the

separate Services, for translation of the manpower figures into force levels. On 9

December 1954, after the President had announced his first decision to the

Council, Secretary Wilson asked them to indicate the changes in approved force

levels for FYs 1955 and 1956 that would be required under the new ceiling.Hw

In reply, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 22 December 1954 *ent Mr. Wilson an

outline of proposed major forces, dratted by the Services, which they had

accepted. Under these plans, the Army would have 20 d visions by the end of FY

1955. Two of these were the static divisions that had been activated to replace

the departing National Guard units; three others would be occupied in training

recruits, m accordance with the earlier decision to reduce the separate units

maintained for that purpose, Thus only 15 mobile divisions would remain for

76

——
Force Levels and Personnel Strengths

combat assignment. For FY 1956, the Army would shrink to 17 divisions, with

one static and two mobile divisions eliminated.110

The Navy planned to cut its ship strength to 1,063 in FY 1955 and 989 in FY

1956, but it would increase to 1,008 in FY 1957. The totals in each case would

include 15 attack carriers. Th'. Air Force goals remained unchanged: 121, 130,

and 137 wings for FYs 1955,1956, and 1957 respectively. The Marine Corps force

structure of three divisions and three air wings would likewise remain iniact.111

These recommendations were too sketchy to satisfy Secretary Wilson, who

wanted the Joint Chiefs of Staff to xtend their consideration to the numbers of

supporting and reserve units and to manning levels for all forces. He also asked

them to submit several alternative deployment plans.112

Before the Joint Chiefs of Staff could comply with this new request, the

President raised the FY 1956 manpower ceiling. Their reply accordingly took

account of the new ceiling. On 11 January the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded

proposals for fiscal years 1955, 1956, and 1957 that called for major combat forces

as shown in Table 4. As compared with the plans submitted on 22 December, the

Army now proposed to field one more static division in FY 1956.n3The Navy

would maintain a few more ships in each fiscal year114The major force structures of the Air Force and the Marine Corps had not been affected.

The Joint Cr iefs of Staff believed that this general composition of the major

forces was the best possible with the manpower available. That conclusion,

however, was based on an initial analysis; comments based on more careful

study would follow later. Whether cr not it was intended to apply also to the

accompanying proposals for supporting and reserve forces was unclear. Secretary Wilson apparently so interpreted it, since he did not pursue ibis issue.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also forwarded the force deployments planned byeach Service. They endorsed these as the best possible within the recommended

force levels and, in fact, as dictated by existing policy. "Deployments must be

predicated on strategic con -, pts which stem from approved United States policy

or other forms of commitment/' they declared "Unless alternate strategic con

cepts are evolved or unless there are assumptions of new or revised commitments not presently known, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are unable to recommend

any alternate deployments."MS

Secretary Wilson told the Joint Chiefs ot Staff on 18 January 1955 that the

proposed fore»? structures had his general approval. He did not renew his request

for alternative deployments. However, he specified that the proposed deploy«

ments, insofar as they involved changes, were not to be carried out without his

prior approval.11*

The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Wilson their final comments on 18

March 1955. They reaffirmed their earlier approval ot the prc>po*ed forces and

deployments, subject to continuing review of both. At the same time, they noted

that Generals Ridgway and Shepherd had called attention to the effects of prospective reductions in air and amphibious lift capacity, and promised to giv». this

question special study in the near future.u?

77
JCS and National Policy

Table 4—JCS Recommendations on Major Combat Forces for FYs

1955-1957: January 1955

Service and Force FY 1955 FY 1956 FY 1957

Army

Divisions

Mobile

Static

Training

Total divisions

Regiments/regimental comba;

teams

Antiaircraft battaUons

Navy

Warships*

Other combatant ships

Total combatant ships

Auxiliary ships

Total active ships

Mann«- Cr-»s

Divisions

Air wings

Air Force

Strategic wing*..

Air-defense wtrgs

Tactical wings

Total combat wings

Troop-carrier wings

Total wings ,

15

2

3

20

12

122

40n

800

266

1.066

3

3

$

2*>

m

13

121

13

2

3

18

11

136

405

363

768

233

1,001

.1

1

5,

12

it*

II

130

13

1

3

17

13

142

414

366

780

230

1.010

1

I

S4

V4

38

126

11

137

• Warship« include carriers (CVA CVSCV&CVU battleship» tWl. cruiser* (C ACLCtAA-CAC}

oWrovers (tH>t>Dfc PDRDU, «ml suhmannes (S&SSCi'SSfc^^aSSN) Other combatant ships

rntiuoV min**-wartaw. patrol, and amphihtrjs-wartare »hips

*#*n< Memo. JCS to S«*Def. U Ian 55. JCS 1800/234. 11 J*n 55

FY 1956 Debris« Budget

On 9 December 1954 Secretary Wilson had submitted to the National Security

Council a defense budget that called for S34.275 billion w new obtigatkmal

authonty md predicted that expenditure* would amount to $33.730 billion.MB

These estimate* were based on the manpower strengths tentatively approved in

Julv they were rendered obsolete by the new And ^mail^r manpower figures

announced by the President at the same meeting Revision of the estimates had

not been completed when the budget wis sent to Congress on 17 January 1955-

At that time, the request tor new obligationa! authority had been cut to S32,9

billion, A target of $34 trillion had been set for expenditures, but, as the Presi*

dent explained in his budget message, the reductions in Service programs that

would be necessary to reach this figure had not yet been worked out.11*

78
Force Levels and Personnel Strengths

The rationale for the President's budgetary decisions was explained in a letter

from President Eisenhower to Secretary Wilson on 5 January 1955, which was

made public. The primary objective, according to the President, was "to maintain the capability to deter an enemy from attack and to blunt that attack if it

comes—by a combination of effective retaliatory power and a continental defense

system of steadily increasing effectiveness. These two tasks logically demand

priority in all planning." To meet lesser hostile action, he said, "growing reliance

can be placed upon the forces now being built and strengthened in many areas

of the free world." He reasserted objectives already familiar in earlier statements

by administration spokesmen: to maximize technological innovation in order to

minimize military manpower, to plan ahead so as to avoid wasteful and expensive changes, and to preserve a strong and expanding economy in which military expenditures would not constitute an intolerable burden. At the same time,

he brought forward another justification for force reductions that had been

mentioned briefly in »onnection with the FY 1955 budget. Transport capacity

would limit the number of men who could be deployed early in a war; hence the

size of active forces could be correspondingly reduced and greater reliance could

bi placed on reserve«.;.120

In light of these considerations, said the President, professional military

competence and political statesmanship must combine to determine the minimum defensive structu re that should be supported by the nation. His recently

announced manpower decisions for Pi's 1955 and 1956 represented his own

response to the various requirements described above. At the same time, he

held out hope that the FY 1956 goal might be reduced further if the world

situation improved.121

The President described the FY 1956 military program as one that had been

"under development during the past two years/' and that was based on the

same philosophy as those for fiscal years 1954 and 1955. In other words, it was a

continuation of the New took. Admiral Radford also emphasized this point in

testimony before the House Appropriations Committee.123

The individual comments of the JCS members on the FY 1956 budget during

Congressional Hearings generally echoed those they had made a year earliei.

Admiral Hadford and General Twining endorsed the budget as submitted, with0 it qualifications.12

* General Ridgway indicated that the Army'* combat capability would be impaired, but he made clear that he was not challenging the

decisions of his lawful superiors.1** Admiral Carney departed somewhat from

his previous position by stressing that his acceptance was conditional. "\i the

New-took assumptions were to come true," he »aid, 'I believe the Navy could

live with these figures {on manpower and ship strength for 1956} very4 well. But

he warned that if condition* in the Far East continued to prevent redeployment

of ships to home waters, he might have to ask for a review of the budget.*2*

Congrev&toaal criticism of the administrations planned reductions was again

forthcoming Because Congress had passed under contro» of the Democratic

Party in the November 1954 election, the critics were now strong enough to force

a partial reversal of the a4ministration"s deci ons- The final appropnatiom

figure—$33.053 billion— was larger than »he President had requested. Congress

79
JCS and National Policy

added extra funds to maintain the Marine Corps at a strength of 215,000 and to

accelerate production of the B-52 intercontinental bomber for the Aw Force.126

Force Levels and Strategy, 1953-1954

Tstructure are summarized in Tables 5-10. Analysis of authorized and actual

military personnel strengths, force levels, and reduced defense appropriations

and expenditures supports the following conclusions:

1. The overall cost of the defense establishment declined by roughly 20-25

percent between FY 1953 and FY 1956.

2. Military manpower dwindled by 706,012, or over 20 percent, between 31

December 1952 and 30 June 1956.

3. The share of the defense dollar allotted to the Air Force declined in

FY 1954 but rose sharply thereafter while the Army's share dropped.

4. The ratio of the strength of the Air Force to that of the other Services

increased steadily between 1952 and 1955, although the Army still remained

the largest Service.

5. The combat strength of the Air Force (measu H in terms of the number of

wings) increased by almost one half between »952 and 1956, although the

number of troop carrier wings declined both relatively and absolutely.

6. The number of divisions and regiments/RCTs in the Army declined, but

the number of antiaircraft battalions—the Army's contribution to continental defense—increased.

7. The number of Navy warships—carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers,

and submarine*—remained almost constant; the total number of vessels,

however, dropped sharply.

All these trends illustrated certain features of the New Look already described:

curtailment of defense expenditures, decrease of military manpower, stress on

airpower and on continental defense, and reduction of surface forces.

The effect of these developments on the mihi^rv establishment as of the end

of 1954 was illuminated by a status report rendered by the joint Chiefs of Staff to

Secretary Wilson on 18 March 1955. It showed that many of the deficiencies

existing two years earlier were still present. As before. Army and Navy foa*es

were overextended, the mobilization base was inadequate; the Navy's ships

were becoming v,bsolete faster than they were being replaced; mine warfare and

antisubmarine capabilities were marginal at best; Reserve forces of a!« the Service* were below the desired state of readiness; no strategic reserve had as yet

been treated On the other hand, the Air Force was stronger in all combat

categone* (strategic, tactical, and air defense); tactical atomic weapons were

becoming available m ii»creasing quantities, aircraft control and warning facilities,

though still inadequate, had improved.*r

The changes in sue and strength of the Services, both relative and absolute,

during 1953 m4 1954 wrre decisive in shaping the strategy of the New look,

80

he major decisions taken in 1953 and 1954 in reshaping tru» US military force
Force Levels and Personnel Strengths

Table 5—Projected Authorized Personnel Strengths of US Armed Forces:

FYs 1953-1957

Date Total Army Navy Marine

Corps

Air Force

30 June 1953 (end FY 1953)

January 1953* 3,607,154

3.555.062

3.647,612

3.356,087

3,327.800

3,507.721

3.029.000

3.045.000

2.940.000

3,045,000

2,815.000

2.850,000

2.815,000

2,850.000

1,544,000

1.532.100

1,538,000

1,421,000

1,407,200

1,508,000

1.162.000

1.173,000

1.100,000

1.173.000

1.000,000

1.025.000

1,OWE),000

|,025.«K

800.000

792.9?0

800,000

745,066

740,600

767,700

602.000

682.000

665,000

682.000

650.000

657.000

650,000

657..00Ü

246.354

249.842

'48.Hi?

1,016,800

May 1953b

980,170

30 June 1954 (end FY 1954)

January 1953* ' rat non

May 1953d 230.021 Wrtftft)

January 1954* 225.000

230.021

215.000

215,000

205.000

215.000

190,000

193.000

190.000

!93,0dü

955,000

30 June 1955 (end FY 1955)

October 1953'

January 1954»

1,002,000

970,000

July 1954h,

January- 1955'

975.000

«70,000

30 June 1956 (end FY 1956)

July 19541 «75.000

December 1954k

January 19551

30 June 1957 (end FY 1957)

December 1953*

975,000

975,000

«75 000

January 1955" 975,000

SVwne*

" NSC 142. 10 Feb 53

* Revised budget FY 1954, MR Hearing*. IXJD \f>**vf**t*»** fm IM. pf> 324. 335

4 Truman *d«ur«»traüon budget r**jue*! at January 1953 ka F> 1954

4 Revised budget FY 1954, »*e b above

' Revived Ft 1V54 objective. MR Meanng*. QQQ Aupnfftmwm 1& 1*3S. p i!7

'jo* \woxn. 2Ckt 53

s

I iamhüwei admtfUktratitttt budget request o( January 1954 im FV H5$.

* K'S VK&m, 1 lui 54; HH t*f KS i**V222. 15 ful 54

s JC5 JÄÜÖ234, J1 Jan 55 Preatdc-nttal dlffCttVf »pectried 4 CumbtrMrd goal U& the Navy *M*J

Manne C&f*.

' JC$ M0Q3&. 1 Jttl 54, NM of JCS 180*222. 15 Jul 54

* JCS 180022ft. 9 D#c 54

1 NSC Act** 1293. 5 Jan 5

<*JC$2tOI'tt3. JOOae»

* jes ieam*. Mi» 55, H**, 4 jcs woran 19 «** s»

81
JCS and National Policy

which had originally allowed latitude for differing interpretations. The strategic

concept in JCS 2101/113 had laid down a comprehensive list of eight requirements,

but the administration's budgetary decisions emphasized two of these—retaliatory

airpower and continental defense—at the expense of the others.

In public statements, the President and other administration spokesmen often

qualified the emphasi;! on these two elements of military power by asserting that

they were insufficient by themselves. "Undue reliance on one weapon or preparation for only one kind of warfare simply invites an enemy to resort to another,"

said President Eisenhower, in his annual message to the Congress on 6 January

1955. "We must, therefore, keep in our armed forces balance and flexibility

adequate for our purposes and objectives."128 Admiral Radford spoke in a similar vein during the 1956 budget hearings: "It is important for us to have the

flexibility and facilities to respond in whatever manner appears to be to our

advantage under the circumstances existing at the time."129

This flexibility was to be provided by the strategic reserve called for in JCS

2101/113: a well-rounded force of all three arms, based on US territory but ready

for immediate deployment to meet any threat that exceeded the capability of

local defensive forces. Such a force could find a use in situations where (as in

Indochina) strategic airpower was, effectively speaking, useless. The National

Table 6—Actual Personnel Strengths of US Armed Forces: 1952-1956

Service

31 December 1952

Number* Percent

30 June 1953

Number Percent

30 June 1954

Number Percent

Army

Navy

Marine Corps

Air Forces

Total

1,523,152

802,453

229,245

957,603

3,512,453

42.4

22.8

6.5

27.3

100.0

1,533,815

794,440

249,219

977,593

3,555,067

43.1

22.4

7.0

27.5

100.0

1,404,596

725,720

223,868

947,918

3,302,104

42.5

22.0

6.8

28.7

100.0

Service

30 June 1955

Number Perant

30 June 1956

Number Percent

Army

Navy

Marine Corps

Air Force

Total

1,109,2%

660,695

205,170

959,946

2,935,107

37.8

22.5

7.0

32.7

100.0

1,025,778

669,925

200,780

909,958

2,806,441

36.5

23.9

7.2

32.4

100.0

* Does not include USMA cadets and USNA midshipmen; the other figures include them.

Source: Figures for 31 December 1952 are from NSC 142, 10 Feb 53; others are from Semiannual

Reports of the Secretary of Defense, January to June 1954, 1955, 1956, and 1957, respectively.

82
sIIu.

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S3
JCS and National Policy

Security Council had recognized this condition in NSC 5501, notably by including a prediction that "the ability to apply force selectively and flexibly will

become increasingly important."130

An implicit assumption in the strategy of the New Look, as it was conceived

in 1953, was that the strategic reserve would be constituted of military and naval

units withdrawn from overseas. Hence, when the Far Eastern crisis of 1954

interrupted this planned redeployment, the situation seemed to call for some

expansion of conventional forces—or, at the very least, for an end to their

curtailment—to provide the nucleus of the reserve. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had

Table 8—Actual Force Levels of US Armed Forces: 1952-1956

Service and Font

Army

Divisions

Regiments/regimental

combat team»

Antiaircraft battalions

31 December

1952*

Navy

Warships

Other combatant ships

Totalcombatant ships

Other ships

Total active »hips

Marine Coq»

Divisions

Air wm$s

20

18

113

401

432

833

283

1.116

30/unr

1953*

Air Force

Strategic wing*

Air-detense wings

Tactical wing»

Total combat wing*

Troop-cantot wing*

Total wing*

3*

2\

23

83

m

20

18

114

409

433

842

287

1.129

411,

2*

23

90' >

l**i|

106*-«

30 June

1954*

19

18

117

405

419

824

289

1.113

44

28

2?%

99' *

16

1151,

30 June

2955*

30)une

1956*

20

12

122

402

O

n

o

1.030

4o

2<*

33

108

13

121

18

10

133

404

o

C)

o

973

n

n

n

118

13

191

* Not available

Source*

* NSC 142. 10 Feb 53

* JCS 1800/209. 24 Sep S3

* JCS 18Ö0OJ1.5 Jan 55; JCS 1800034. 11 Jan 55; JCS 1800/235. 22 Jan 55; JCS 184*125. ,0 Aug 54

JCS 1800/231 and JCS 180OO34 omit Air Force statistic»

* OASD (CompttoÖer) Statistical Services Of, Srfcrtntf Man***» Swofe*. 29 Jan *?. p 27;

Semmmnml JU-port »* tae Secretary mi OefV**r. k***rylum 1955. pft 3-*

* i.m*r.nu*i Mi «f r*e Secretary el Oeferm. fumey-lvm 1956. pp 2-4

84

•
K

Force Levels and Personnel Strengths

accepted this conclusion in their preliminary plans for FY 1956, drafted in the

summer of 1954. But the administration, when faced with the costs involved,

had chosen instead to accept the risk attendant on postponement of the creation

of the strategic reserve.

Even had this reserve existed, its capacity for rapid deployment-^another

essential requirement for flexibility—was declining. On 30 June 1954 the Navy

had 223 amphibious vessels in service; by the end of FY 1956 it would have only

151. As a result, amphibious lift capability would decline from two divisions to

one and one-third. The Navy had chosen to make this reduction as an alternative to cutting back its combat forces.131

For similar reasons, the Air Force had reduced its projected troop carrier

capability, from 17 wings under fiiS original 143-wing plan to 11 under the new

137-wing goal. An Air Force statement of early 1955 offered the following rationale:

The Air Force accepts the fact that it will not be possible to build and maintain

an Air Force fully prepared for all of the tasks which several alternate strategies

for both limited and general war might require, and at the same time stay within

present and projected budget and personnel ceilings. However, the 1J7 Wing

Program is oriented primarily to the requirements for genera! war, and a degree

of nsk in regard to certain other tasks is accepted.132

Table 9—DOD Budget Requests for New Obligation*! Authority and

Estimates of Expenditures: FYs 1954-1956

(S billion*)

Budget Request and

Csttmale

New obugatkmal authority

Army

Navy4

Air Force

OSO and intenwmce

total

Ekpenditure*

Annv ....

Navy» ,,.„,

Air Fore*

05O aiui tntenwrrMce

Total

FY 1954 Qn$tn*l

Amount Percent

$12.120

It 3*1

16788

103

$41 320

$15300

12.000

17 510

590

294

27.5

406

2.5

100.0

337

264

3S6

13

$45400 1000

FY 1*54 Rextitd

Amount

$13671

9651

11.68»

1030

$36 040

$16.500

11000

15 100

593

$43 193

Percent

37.9

26«

324

2 9

1000

38.2

255

349

14

1000

FY 1955

Amount Percent

$ 8236

9882

11206

1.669

$30 993

$10198

10493

16 209

675

$37 575

26.6

319

361

54

100Ö

27 1

280

43 1

18

1000

FY 1956

Amount Percent

$ 7 303

8.937

14.536

2 123

$12 899

$ 8 850

9700

15600

1600

*$35 750

22.2

27.2

442

6.4

100.0

240

27.1

436

4.5

1000

• tndode* Marine Corp«.

* Ft 1956 expenditure etfimate *ubr«vt to reduction of $1 75 Niiion to be »Bocated later

&wrm: i**J$et of US GiWnMmti FY 1954. pp M6. M14 562; MR tieann^, £X >J»Ai?wfW*f«*j.

IFY! 1954. f»f» 309, 332. 335; Budget ot US Q**nmrnK Ft 1955. p M4Z Budget of US

G**rnm*mt. FY 1956, ftp M2$. M31

—
JCS and National Policy

The strength and force level decisions made during 1953 tnd J954 became the

basis for charges that the administration was overstressing nuclear striking power.

The same trend, continued into successive years, was eventually to make the

New Look virtually identical with massive retaliation in the public mind.133

In appraising the effects of this development as it had progressed by the end

of 1954, the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff differed widely. Admiral Radford

viewed it with general approval. In a statement prepared early in 1955, he held

that "the policies and actions which have shaped the development of our military forces thus far are substantially sound and should be continued." Echoing

the President, he stressed the primary importance of retaliatory aupower and

continental defense. He also reaffirmed his belief in the need for economy, or, as

he put it, "reasonable conservation of manpower, materiel, and money." He

admitted the absence of the strategic reserve but saw the remedy in redoubled

efforts to induce allied nations to create military forces that would complement

those of the United States. He believed that, as long as US strength was

maintained, the principal threats to peact would come from infiltration and

subversion in those areas best calculated by the communists to offer hope for

success. Such threats, in his view, were not likely to be reduced by mere increases

in the number of men in uniform. On the basis of these considerations, he

affirmed that the administration's FY 1956 manpower goals were adequate for

the foreseeable future.134

Table 10—DOD Actual New Obligational Authority and Expenditures:

FYs 1953-1956

(5 billions)

New Obitgatwnal

Authority, "id

Expenditure*

New obligation*! authority

Army

Navy*

Air KunOSO and intewervke

Total

Expenditure

Army ..»,

Navy*

Air Htot

OSD and tnterservit*

Total

TV 1953

Amount \Penrnt

$1X234

12652

20 595

.550

«7 031

$16605

116*0

15210

409

$43*64

2*1

26.9

43.B

12

100.0

379

26.5

34.7

9

100.0

FY 1954

Amount \Penient

$12937

9356

11409

.770

$34 474

$12910

11293

1566ft

464

$40 335

37.5

27.2

33 1

2,2

100.0

321

280

388

11

1000

FV 1955

Amount \Penent

$ 7.620

9777

1155*

629

$29 584

$ 8 899

9733

16407

494

«35 553

258

33.0

39.1

2.1

100.0

250

27.4

462

14

1000

Ft 1956

Amount \Penent

$ 7.330

9.542

15.479

.702

$33 053

$8.702

9744

16,749

596

$35 791

222

289

468

2.1

1000

243

27.2

46.8

17

1000

• Include« Marine Corp*

Sdnnw $tm*nnu*l Häfortt <* tht Srttrfary of tVfrwe, January June 1953, 1954. 1955, 1956

86

I i i
Force Levels and Personnel Strengths

General Twining also believed that the direction of US military policy was

soundly conceived. The decision to adopt the New Look, he considered, had

been supported and strengthened by recent developments, notably the prospect

that Japanese and West German contingents would soon join the military forces

of the noncommunist world. Nor did he overlook considerations of economy.

"Our national policy has placed stress on austerity of forces for the 'long pull,' "

he pointed out, "and, to my knowledge, there has been no change in the conditions which dictated the necessity for this economy in force." He recognized that

the strength and force levels approved for the Air Force contained an element of

risk but believed this acceptable.135

General Ridgway, on the other hand, saw US defense planning as increasingly divorced from international realities. He regarded a 28-division Army as

the minimum needed to meet the commitments into which the United States

had entered. "Present United States military forces cannot support fully America's

diplomacy," he asserted in a letter to Secretary Wilson in June 1955. "It is my

view," he continued, "that the commitments which the United States had pledged

create a positive requirement for an immediately available mobile joint military

force of hard hitting character in which the versatility of the whole is emphasized and the preponderance of any one part is deemphasized." At the same

time, he stressed another consideration that had been recognized in NSC 5501:

that the age of atomic plenty would create a condition of mutual deterrence that

would in turn increase the likelihood of small-scale aggressions not involving

nuclear weapons. The United States should therefore be prepared for small

perimeter wars in which nuclear weapons might not be used. After his retirement,

General Ridgway was to cam' his case to the public through the medium of the

press and thus to furnish new impetus to the debate over the New Look1**

Admiral Carney also apparently viewed the trend with a certain dismay. The

measure of his developing concern was the fact that, whereas he had told Congress early in 1954 that he accepted the FY 1955 budget without reservation, a

year later he made it plain that his acceptance of the FY 1956 budget was qualified.

But he evidently did not share the intensity of General Ridgway'» convictions.

These appraisals reflected the differing viewpoints of the members of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff that have been described earlier. The preconceptions and

assumptions that lay back of the conclusions oi each Service chief were deeply

felt throughout the respective Services and, as a consequence, pervaded the

subordinate planning agencies of the JCS organization. The effect of this condition on the development of strategic plans during 1953 is the subject of the

succeeding chapter

87
I

4

Strategic Planning, 1953-1954

In a broad sense, planning was the cardinal function of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, at least during peacetime. When Congress established the joint Chiefs of

Staff on a statutory basis in 1947, it listed the following tasks at the head of their

assigned responsibilities:

(1) to prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction of the

military forces;

(2) to prepare joint logistic plans and to assign to the military services logistic

responsibilities in accordance with such plans.l

Before W52, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discharged these responsibilities in a

rather unsystematic manner. Plans were developed for war contingencies,

intended to guide force deployments and mobilization during the first months of

conflict, but they were not prepared or revised on a regular schedule. Moreover,

they provided no guidance for any situation short of outright hostilities. Decisions concerning budgets, force levels, deployments, and mobilization had to be

made separately, with no overall guiding framework other than that existing in

the minds of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, or the President.2

The JCS Planning Program: Policy Memorandum S4

Asuggestion ihat planning be placed on a regular and systematic basis was

made by the Director oi the Joint Staff, Vice Admiral Arthur C Davis,

USN, in December I$49.% After considerable delay, perhaps occasioned by the

pressures of the Korean War, this suggestion eventuated in Memorandum of

Policy (MOP) No. »4, "Joint Program for Planning," apyrovsd by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff on 14 July 1952, This directive established a family of three plans,

applicable either to peace or to war, ituA designed to translate national policy

into long«, medium-, and short-range strategic objectives over a span e*tef*ding

ten years into the future.4

mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm
JCS and National Policy

The farthest ranging of the three was to be a Joint Long-Range Strategic

Estimate (JLRSE), which, as its title indicated, was not a plan in the strict sense

(though often referred to as such). It was to be a forecast of "the probable areas

of conflict, the outline of the type of war expected and the basic undertakings

required" during a five-year period beginning five years after the date of issuance

of the JLRSE. Although the description of the nature and purposes of the JLRSE

was somewhat vague, it was intended primarily as a guide for research and

development. It was expected to translate military strategy into objectives of

technical development; to establish a basis for assigning priorities to research

and development programs; and to evaluate the effects of research on military

strategy. Though necessarily broad in nature, it was at the same time to include

a year-by-year schedule, or forecast, of expected technological changes. It was to

be based upon requirements, but the nature and source of the requirements

were not specified.

Guidance for the mid-range period was to be provided by a Joint Strategic

Objectives Plan (JSOH< which would be based upon the assumption of a war

beginning on I July three years after the plan was approved. Thus the first JSOP,

which would presumably be issued in 1953, would have an assumed D-date of 1

July 1956. The JSOP would provide strategic concepts for war and for the period

preceding D-day, and would guide the development of the forces required under

these concepts. It was expected to provide the Services with a basis for preparing

their budget requests for the fiscal year immediately before D-day. It would also

guide the development of Service mobilisation plans; would aid in determining

requirements for military assistance to allies, both before and after D-day; &r\ti

would provide short-range guidance for weapons development. The JSOP was

to be developed in three sections, dealing respectively with: (l) peacetime or

conflict short of global war, (2) the first or emergency phase of a general war,

and (3) the additional forces and resources needed for the moHlisation base

before I>day, as well as US ^f\d allied mobilisation requirements through the

first 48 months of a general conflict.

Finally, there was to be a loint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), covering the

approaching fiscal year (the first day of which was to be assumed as D*day). It

would guide the disposition, employment, and support of existing forces. This

was the plan that would go into effect if war broke out. It was to follow the

format of the JSOP in providing guidance for three different contingencies—

peacetime (or limited war), and general war both in its early phases and through

it* first 48 months In this plan, and in the JSOP as well, it was assumed that

D-day ind M-day would coincide.

Both the JSCP ^r\ä the JSOP were to take cognisance of combined plans, such

as those of NATO, for the corresponding periods. They would also guide the

Joint Chiefs of Staff in reviewing such plans in the future.

The JLRSE and the JSOP were to contain logistic annexes that would indicate

the logistic and supporting actions for which the Service* were responsible. Pm

the same purpose, the JSCP was to have a separate, but accompanying, Joint

Logistic Plan.

The task of preparing the ptans was assigned to three committee* of the JCS
Strategie Planning

organization: the Joint Strategic Plans, Joint Logistics Plans, and Joint Intelligence Committees. In the organization as it stood in 1953, these committees

corresponded to the three groups of the Joint Staff anJconstituted an echelon

above the Joint Staff where its work was reviewed and passed upon before

submission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Strategic Plans Committee, for

instance, assigned tasks to the Joint Strategic Plans Group of the Joint Staff and

received its reports for consideration. The formal membership of each committee

consisted of four officers: one representative each from the Army, Navy, and Air

Force, usually of two-star rank and drawn, part-time, from the cognizant element of his Service staff, plus the Deputy Director who headed the corresponding Joint Staff Group. In addition, a representative of the Marine Coips attended

as a member whenever one of the committees considered an agenda item recognized as being of direct concern to that Service. This practice paralleled the

procedure adopted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves in 1952, when legislation assigned to the Commandant, USMC, a status co-equal with the other JCS

members when considering matters that directly concerned the Marine Corps.s

In the new planning program the Joint Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC) was

given primary responsibility for preparing plans. The other two committees

were to collaborate. In addition, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIQ was to

prepare intelligence estimates to serve as the basis for each plan, and the Joint

Logistics Plans Committee (JLPC) would draft the logistic plans and annexes.

The strategic concept of each plan was to have the concurrence of the Joint

Strategic Survey Committee.

A!* three plans were to be prepared or revised annually in accord with the

following schedule:

ran

/.Apt to/ Dtttt*

mm

fSOP

1 AugvtM \0 WfMt-mtvr*

M Dsrvwnbrf

The schedule was based on the function* and interrelationships of the various plans. The JSOP was expected to be guided by the forecast of trends in the

JLKSE; distribution of the latter on 30 September would allow nine months lor us

use in preparation of the former. The deadline of 30 June for the JSOP afforded

the Service* two years in which to prepare their supporting budgets for the fiscal

year that would begin two yearn after the JSOP was distributed And would tnd

on the assumed D-day. The JSCP was to be used by commanders of unified And

specified commands in pn*p*nn% their own plans; for this purpose the schedule

allowed them the six-month interval that lay between dissemination of the

approved JSCP and the plan's D-day.r

The necessary intelligence estimate* were to be Appmvvd by the Joint Intelligence Committee in time to allow the Joint Strategic Plans Committee four

months in which to complete each plan. The Joint Logistic Plan was to be

91
V2
Strategie Planning

approved withina month after its related JSCP; the logistic annexes to the JLRSE

and JSOP would be approved concurrently with the latter. The force levels in the

joCP were to be reviewed on1 January, or whenevera major change in forces

took place.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff expected that these carefully interrelated plans would

correlate peacetime and wartime strategy ira manner never before attempted.

They would furnisha basis for advice to th.? President, the Secretary of Defense,

and the National Security Council. They would provide guidance for US representatives in such international organizations as NATO and the UN Military

Staff Committee, and for agencies concerned with foreign aid programs. They

were expected to put an end to piecemeal or crisis planning and to providea

ready basis for solutions, through routine staff action, to otherwise timeconsuming problems.

Planning at the Beginning of 1953 At the time Policy Memorandum 84 was adopted, there was in effect

a Joint

Outline War Plan (JOWP), approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on7

December 1950, which assumeda four-year war between the United States and

the Soviet Union beginning on1 July 1954.A series ofshort-range plans had been

initiated in 1948 and periodically updated; the latest (Joint Outline Emergency'

War Plan, or JOEWP), fora D-day of1 January' 1952, was under consideration.

Both the JOWP and the JOEWP were based on the assumption of an initial

Soviet attack on Western Europe, during which the allies would be forced onto

the defensive but would seek to hold as much territory as possible while

launching nuclear air strikes at enemy forces and territory. It was anticipated that

at some point the communist onslaught would be halted and the allies would

launch their own land, sea, and air offensive against Soviet forces in Europe,

The JOWT foresaw the allied offensive as taking place through the North

German plain; the JOEWP did not attempt to forecast its locale. Both plans

assumed that atomic weapons would be used immediately by both sides.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had also approveda Joint Mobilization Plan, JCS

172547, related to the JOWT, but with D-day (which was also assumed as

M-day) advanced to1 July 1952aa result of the Korean crisis.* No Jong-ran^e

plan was in effect or under consideration.A plan «weringa war with the USSR

beginning on1 January 1957 had been submitted to the Joint Chiefs oi Staff on 19

December 1949, but it was withdrawn from consideration in 1951.

,ü

In order to bring these plans into phase with the new program, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, when they issued 1'olicy Memorandum S4, directed that the

jOWP be amended fora D-day <%I July 1955, to furnish mid-range guidance

pending completion of the first JSOP (with D-day 0(I July .956). The JOEWP

was to be updated to1 July 1952 and would remain in effect until1 July 1953,

when it would be superseded by the first JSCP At the same time, recognising

93

1
JCS and National Policy

that the JSCP would not be ready by 1 November 1952 as scheduled, they

extended to 1 March 1953 the deadline for its submission."

The joint Chiefs of Staff approved the revised JOEWP on 19 September

1952.l2 Meanwhile, they had called for the first JSOP by 1 January 1953, in order

that it might be used in mobilization planning.13 On 14 November 1952 they

decided that the jOWP would not be revised unless it proved necessary later to

update it as a basis for FY 1955 force level planning before the JSOP was

completed.14Implicit in these JCS decisions was an assumption that the guidance provided by the JSOP in future years would make a separate Joint Mobilization Plan no longer necessary.15

Preparation of ail three of the new pkrts was begun by the Joint Staff in

response to directives issued by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee on 5 August

1952. The Committee set deadlines that would allow two months for reviewing

and revising each draft before it was due to go to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When

the Joint Chiefs of Staff advanced the date of the JSOP to i January 1953, the

Committee accordingly called for a first draft by 20 November 195?.,ft But the

Joint Strategic Plans Group was unable to meet this schedule; the draft of the

JSOP was not ready until 13 February 1953. The JSCP was delayed even longer,

reaching the Committee on 2 March.,7By that time the deadlines for submitting

both plans to the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already passed.

As of 12 March 1953 the Joint Strategic Plans Committee had spent 37 hours

discussing the JSO* And had tentatively approved only 32 of its 140 pages. Since

this plan would In* needed soon as guidance for the unified commands. Major

General J. S. Bradley, USA, the Committee Chairman, suggested that it be given

priority over the JSOP.lft His suggestion was adopted, and the progress of the

JSCP soon outstripped that ot the JSOP.

Progress of the Joint Striegle Capabilities Plan

After the Committee began discussing the JSCP, the draft went through

three revisions in as many month*. Each version, redrafted by the Joint

Stau, had to be circulated for review to the Joint Intelligence Committee And the

Joint Logistics Plans Committee. **

During discussion in the Joint Strategic flans Committee, Service differences

of opinion made their appearance, In the launching of iht new planning program,

the eagerness of each Service for maximum advantage led ifc. representative» to

contend for unnecessarily detailed statements of objectives And tasks that would

reflect its own v*ews. The Committee was thus drawn into disputes that would

have been more appropriate in connection with the JSOP (where, m fact, they

were also to AppcAt)*3

After two months' discussion of the fourth draff, the members abandoned

the attempt to reach agreement. On 14 August they approved a draii. JCS

!&U,!$i, fhat incorporated conflicting versions of several ponums And thus

94
Strategie Planning

passed the disputes to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for resolution. By that time the

plan was already threatened with obsolescence, since it assumed a D-day of 1

July 1953.21

The basic disagreement was between the Air Force and the other Services

and concerned the degree of reliance to be placed upon nuclear retaliatory capacity in the design of US strategy. It appeared in the introductory appraisal of the

strengths of the allies and the Soviet bloc. The Air Force asserted that the US

superiority in atomic weapons could "serve to neutralize the Communist preponderance of ground forces" and "enable the Allies to hold large areas of Europe."

The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps believed that this superiority would suffice

only to assist in achieving those objectives.

In discussing pre-D-day strategy, the Air Force wished to emphasize the

need for a deterrent that would consist of "an offensive capability, particularly the

capability tt inflict massive damage on Soviet war-making capacity." Although

this language was borrowed verbatim from the current statement of national

security policy (NSC 153/1), the other Services were unwilling to commit the

United States to such a degree of reliance on nuclear weapons. They preferred to

speak of "a level of military readiness which will continuously confront the

Soviet Bloc with convincing evidence of. . . Allied capability."

Behind these verbal quibbles lay a strategic disagreement of real substance. It

found expression in other passages as well. The Air Forte contended that all

peacetime military plans should assign clear-cut priority to the development of

forces for D-day and to the provision of their logistic support for the first six

months of war, and should downgrade the importance of accumulating mobilization reserves needed after D plus six months. The Air Force also sought the

narrowest possible p'ltement of required naval capabilities—one that saw naval

forces as filling a largely passive role, the defense of shipping.

The war strategy proposed in JCS 1844/151 resembled that in the JOEWP.

During the initial, or emergency phase (defined as the first six months after

D-day), the allies would seek to defeat or arrest Soviet offensives and to launch

allied attacks as soon as possible. The Air Force envisioned "strategic air warfare

operations to create conditions . . . which would permit satisfactory accomplishment of Allied war objectives." The other Services, less hopeful of a quick and

easy victory, spoke of conducting "strategic air and naval offensives" which would

merely contribute to the creation of favorable conditions. Since the disagreement

involved the strategic concept for the initial phase, the Joint Strategic Survey

Committee had been consulted, and had concurred in the Army-Navy-Marine

Corps view.

For the f:r»*l section, which extended plans through D plus 48 months, the

Air Force and the other three Services submitted separate versions. Both envisioned a shift from defense to offense after the initial phas*1

. Both also agreed

that land operations would be necessary, and they outlined plans for an offensive through either north central or southeastern Europe, with the final choice to

be made after hostilities began. The Army-Navy-Marine Corps version set forth

the alternative campaign plans in somewhat more detail than that of the Air

95

I
I

JCS and National Policy

Force, which emphasized the difficulties of conductinga major ground offensive

against the Soviet Union and warned that it should not be attempted until

strategic bombing had inflicted critical damage upon the enemy.

The planned buildup and deployment of forces during the first 48 months of

war were set forth in force tabs prepared individually by each Service. Those of

the Navy were criticized by the Army and Air Force because they proposed to

divert certain forces from CINCFE to CINCPAC byD plus three months. The Air

Force also wished the Navy to list naval air units by type. There was no disagreement over the force tabs of the other Services.22

The Joint Logistics Plans Committee had warntd that the JSCP could not be

"fully logistically supported." Even without making allowances for enemy bomb

damage, the deficiencies in aircraft, construction facilities, petroleum, ammunition, and other items would make it impossible to meet the mobilization

and deployment schedules.

23 The Joint Strategic Plans Committee incorporated

these warnings in JCS 1844/151, but concluded that the plan was nevertheless

acceptable.

JCS 1844/151 came before the Joint Chiefs of Staff on9 September 1953.

Finding the disagreements too numerous to be readily resolved, they remanded

it to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee with orders to preparea brief summary

of the issues involved.

24

The Committee complied on 19 October 1953. Its statement described as

follows the conflicting views on strategy:

a. The over-all U.S. strategic concept for deterring aggression, defeating

local aggression, and providing the basis for winninga general war, should

place primary reliance on the ability to cope with eny military threat now

existing or which may develop. This concept necessitates maintenance of a tailored combination of combat ready forces of all Services during a long

period of tension, and in event of general war, the provision for the

mobilization of additional forces required, without placing pre-determined

emphasis on any one concept or type of operations. (This was the ArmyNavv-Manne Corps view.) - OR -

b. In developing an over-all strategic concept for deterring or winninga war,

and in the face of increasing Soviel atomic capability, particular emphasis

should be placed on our capability to conduct strategic air warfare with

the reasonable assurance that this capability, considered with the total

military strength of the United States, will providea dynamic deterrent to

war, and should war occur, that this capability, with the capabilities of

other forces, would produce favorable decisive action during the emergency phase of the war and thus provide the basis for attainment of

national objectives through exploitation. |Air Force view).

2

*

4

By the time this statement reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff, delays in the

JSOP and JLRSE had raised the possibility that the entire joint Program for

Planning might have to be revised. Hence, action on the JSCP was postponed. % .
Strategie Planning

Development of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan The draft JSOP that went to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee on 13 February 1953 was revised in March and again in June.26 Each version supported a broad strategy similar to that in the draft JSCP: maintenance of a deterrent

posture during the cold war,a holding operation immediately after D-day to

contain the Soviet assault, and eventually the initiation ofa major allied offensive,

includinga land attack through north central or southeastern Europe. Once

again, the Air Force member of the Committee differed with the representatives

of the other Services over the extent of reliance on nuclear striking power in

overall strategy, the assignment of priorities in mobilization planning, and the

scope to be assigned naval warfare capabilities.

The force tabs werea source of even more conflict than those of the JSCP.

The Army objected that the Navy's planned expansion was excessive (a view

concurred in by the Air Force) and was not phased with projected land operations,

and that the Air Force deployment plans exceeded capabilities and would not

provide adequate close support for troops. The Navy's proposal to operate its

own early-warning aircraft was criticized by the Air Force as an intrusion upon

the latter's responsibility. An ad hoc group appointed by the Joint Strategic

Plans Committee was unable to resolve these disagreements.

27

On 17 August 1953 the Committee distributed to holders of the drafta tabulation of the points at issue, to accompany the plan when it went to the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, and thus signifiei that the JSPC members had abandoned hope

of reaching agreement.

28 On 21 August the draft went to the Joint Logistics Plans

and Joint Intelligence Committees for review.

On 12 October 1953 the Director, Joint Staff, informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff

that the JSOP was "in final stages of Committee consideration and should be

completed in November."

2

"' By that time nearlya year would have elapsed since

the plan's originally scheduled submission date of1 January 1953.

The Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate In developing a JLRSE, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee was handicapped

by the ambiguity of Policy Memorandum 84 regarding its purpose. Though

referred to as an estimate, it was expected to embody decisions that would shape

the nature of US armed forces; hence in some degree it partook of the nature ofa

plan.

The three Groups of the Joint Staff, working with the Joint Advanced Study

Committee and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Development),

completeda draft JLRSE on 30 July 1953. It consisted ofa discussion of probable

trends in weapons development and their effect on warfare, with recommendations for the direction of weapons research. The forecast was general in nature

and made no attempt to meet the requirement posed in the terms of reference

*7

,#:r..- i
JCS and National Polity

for a year-by-year chronology of expected technical changes. Scheduled for submission by 1 May, the draft was three months late.30

The draft was rejected, however, by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee. The

members found themselves fundamentally at odds over the nature of the JLRSE.

On 7 August they appointed an ad hoc committee to prepare an outline for a

new estimate.31 Although this group agreed on a format, they too disagreed over

purpose and content. Some conceived the JLRSE as a purely technical guide for

research and development, others as a broader appraisal of political, social, and

other trends. The underlying question, said the ad hoc committee, was: "Does

strategy evolve from weapons, or do the weapons evolve from the strategy?"32

Choosing the second of these alternatives, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee issued a new directive on 24 August 1953 that interpreted broadly the role of

the JLRSE. The estimate was to be based on an appraisal of geographical, political,

economic, social, religious, scientific, technical, and military factors and trends.

It was to include a long-range strategic concept together with a description of the

forces required for its support. These requirements would then serve to orient

research and development programs. In other words, the JLRSE would guide

technological development instead of merely reflecting it.33

On 13 October 1953 the Joint Chiefs of Staff were advised that a new JLRSE

was in final stages of preparation and should be ready for committee review

before the end of the month. This forecast, however, was to prove no more

accurate than similar ones.34

The Planning Program Reconsidered

By October 1953 the Joint Program for Planning launched by the Joint Chiefs

of Staff in 1952 was fifteen months old. According to the original schedule,

all three plans should have been approved and disseminated and the second year

of the planning cycle should be well under way. Instead, the only visible fruits

were a JSCP, submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff but not yet acted upon, and

drafts of the JSOP and JLRSE in various stages of completion.

What had gone wrong? Lieutenant General Frank F. Everest, the Director,

Joint Staff, had begun an investigation of this question in July 1953. It was

apparent that a major reason for delay was the search for maximum advantage

by the Services, which led their representatives in the planning committees to

wrangle at length over phraseology and force tabs. Another reason was incomplete coordination among the groups and individuals involved, especially between

logisticians and strategic planners. Experience showed that approximately four

wireks were required, after force tabs became available, to complete a logistic

analysis."

Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also sought reasons for the breakdown of

the planning program. Admiral Carney saw the principal obstacle as poor coordination between strategic and logistic planners within each Service. He suggested

that the Join* Chiefs of Staff provide initial guidance for each plan, thus settling
I

Strategic Planning

in advance the basic issues—strategic concepts and force levels.

36 With the same

end in view, General Ridgway recommended that draft plans be submitted to

the Joint Chiefs of Staff in outline form for approval before being developed in

detail.

37

General Twining was more concerned with the status of the plans under

consideration than with the reform oi the planning process. At present, he

pointed out, the Services had no guidance for developing their plans. For example,

the Air Force, to meet its 1953 schedule, had been forced to issue its emergency

plan without waiting for approval of the JSCP. To complete the draft JSCP and

JSOP with their present target dates would throw the planning cycle hopelessly

askew. He therefore urged that the JSCP be completed witha new D-day of1

July 1954; interim short-range guidance could be provided by updating the JOEWP

force tabs to1 January 1954. The draft JSOP and JLRSE should be revised for

target dates of1 July 1957 and1 July 1959, respectively.

38

General Twining's suggestion that the JSCP be updated was adopted by the

Joint Chiefs of Staff on 24 November 1953. They seta deadline of1 January 1954

for distribution of the revised plan.

39 They took no action at that time, however,

to resolve the disputed issues, as they would have tod before revision could

begin. Nor did they act on the JSOP or the JLRSE.

In the weeks that followed, progress of the JSOP continued to lag. One

reason for delay was adoption ofa new statement of basic national security

policy (NSC 162/2), which required revision of the draft.

40

Meanwhile the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in response toa directive from Secretary

Wilson on 16 October 1953, had begun their search fora military strategy to

accompany NSC 162/2, and in so doing, were brought face to face with the issues

that had deadlocked the planning committees. The resulting statement, JCS

2101/113, had some of the characteristics ofa JSOP, and could serve some of the

same purposes. It was based upona planning date of1 July 1957, three years in

the future; it provided general budgetary guidance, in the form of force objectives attainable within the limits of the money expected to be available; and it set

fortha strategic concept for development and deployment of peacetime forces.

Its principal difference from the JSOP was that it assumed no outbreak of war

and thus furnished no guidance for wartime strategy or for mobilization.

General Twining was the first to suggest using JCS 2101/ 113 asa guide for

completing the JSOP.

41 Admiral Carney endorsed his suggestion.42 General Everest went still farther and proposed that the JSOP be abandoned in favor of a

mid-range war plan, which, in combination with JCS 2101/113, would provide all

necessary guidance for both war and peace. While this new plan was under

preparation, he suggested, the entire Joint Program for Planning should be

restudied.

43

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved General Everest's proposal on 10 February

1954. They specified that the new mid-range plan, like the JSOP, would assume a war of 48 months' duration The force levels in JCS 2101/113 would serve as the

basis for the plan, and the date ofI July 1957 would be assumed as both D-day

and M-day. Any disagreements arising in the drafting of the plan would be

referred to them promptly. At the same time, Poiky Memorandum 84 was to be

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JCS and National Policy

«examined by an appropriate committee. On 11 February 1954 the Joint Chiefs

of Staff referred these decisions to the three planning committees for action.44

Shortly thereafter the JLRSE was also abandoned. The Joint Strategic Plans

Group submitted a revised version on 1 February 1954,45 prepared in accordance

with the Joint Strategic Plans Committee's directive of 24 August 1953. Nevertheless the JSPC rejected it. The members agreed that they would prepare statements of their conception of the nature and purposes of the JLRSE, and would

use these as the basis for a fresh start. "It has been found impracticable .

develop a meaningful and acceptable JLRSE in strict conformance with the Joint

Program for Planning/' reported the Deputy Director for Strategic Plans on 9

March 1954. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted this decision.46

The First Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan Completed

After the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed on 24 November that the draft JSCP

should be updated, they were at first too busy to settle the disagreements

that stood in the way of its completion. On 16 December 1953 General Everest proposed to use JCS 2101/113 as a basis for settlement. He submitted revised versions of the disputed paragraphs of JCS 1844/151, using phraseology taken as far

as possible from JCS 2101/113 or oriented toward the goal of strategic flexibility

that had been proclaimed as desirable in that document.47

Most of General Everest's proposals proved acceptable to the Joint Chiefs of

Staff.48 A high-ranking inter-Service working group settled some of the other

areas of disagreement.4* On 12 January 1954 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved

these changes, resolved the remaining disputes, and sent JCS 1844/151 back to

the Joint Strategic Plans Committee for final revision.50

Since JCS 2101/113 was a broadly worded statement, which did not in itself

commit the United States to any single strategy, the result of borrowing language from it was to reject the extreme emphasis on airpower that the Air Force

had sought to include in the JSCP. Thus the key disagreement, involving the

strategic concept for the cold war, was settled by a statement that the United

States would seek to achieve its objectives by:

Minimizing the risk of Soviet aggression bv maintaining a strong security

posture, with emphasis upon offensive retaliatory strength and defensive

strength—this to be based upon a massive retaliatory capability, including the

necessary secure bases, an adequate continental defense system^ and bv combat

forces of'the United States and its Allies suitably deployed or capable of* immediate deployment to deter or counter aggression and to discharge required initial

tasks in the event of a general war. An important characteristic of this posture is

the strategic flexibility required to meet the broad retaliatory and counter offensive demands associated with a general war as well as the varied and recurrent

military requirements short of a war.

The first sentence combined the requirements for defense against the Soviet

threat, as stated in NSC 162/2, with those for a supporting military strategy

100

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Strategie Planning

outlined in JCS 2101/113. The second, which had been suggested by General

Ridgway, qualified the emphasis on airpower in NSC 162/2.

Elsewhere the Joint Chiefs of Staff substituted broad statements of objectives

or tasks, consonant with JCS 2101/113, for the needlessly detailed portions ofJCS

1844/151 that had occasioned disputes. In every case the the final version was

closer to the Army-Navy-Marine Corps views than to those of the Air Force.

Thus the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that the US superiority in atomic weapons

should serve to reduce, but not to eliminate, the Soviets' manpower advantage.

They specified that the United States, during the early phase of the war, would

"conduct offensive operations against the enemy, exploiting US capability to

inflict massive retaliatory damage," but no attempt was made to estimate how

far these operations alone would achieve US war objectives. They assigned no

mobilization priorities, and incorporated a broad rather than a narrowly defensive statement of naval capabilities. The Navy force tabs were approved as

submitted, with a stipulation that the allocation of forces between CINCFE and

CINCPAC would be reviewed after D-day. For the final section, outlining operations through D plus 48 months, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a version

drafted by General Everest that was close to the one proposed by the Army,

Navy, and Marine Corp?,51

The Joint Strategic Plans Group rewrote JCS 1844/151 to incorporate these

changes, at the same time revising the force tabs to reflect increases in continental defense forces that were now expected by 1 July 1954. The Joint Logistics

Plans Committee pointed out that the enlargement of these forces and the more

rapid expansion projected for them after D-day would aggravate the deficiencies

in transportation facilities and petroleum that had been cited in connection with

JCS 1844/151.M Despite these deficiencies, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

approved the plan on 31 March 1954. In final form, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for 1954-1955 was disseminated on 14 April 1954 as JCS 1844/156.

This plan, the first to be approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff under their new

planning system, contained an opening section dealing with strategy before

D-day. This strategy was intended to deter war or to lay the basis for victory if

war should come. The possibility of operations short of general war was

recognized, but no guidance was offered for such a contingency, except a prescription for mobile forces w&dy for deployment to me^t aggression in any part

of the world. The plan then set out detailed guidon e for general war with the

Soviet bloc based on the assumption that both adversaries would at once employ

nuclear weapons.*3

The Joint Mid-Range War Plan

The first draft of the Joint Mid-Range War Man (JMRWP) was completed by

the Joint Staff in May 1954. Reflecting recent advances by the United States

and the USSR in thermonuclear weaponry, it stressed the impact of nuclear

weapons on strategy and warned that there was no alternative to complete

101

W^Wi^^BMS! 1 * '
JCS and National Policy

preparations for nuclear warfare. Nevertheless the war strategy proposed in the

JMRWP was similar to that in the draft JSOP, except that no effort was made to

forecast the theater of land operations in Europe.

When the draft reached the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, the Army member objected to the use of JCS 2101/113, which had imposed on the Army an

eventual manpower limit of 1,000,000, as a basis for force tabs. He proposed

instead to use the figure of 1,152,000, for which the Army was currently seeking

JCS approval. The other members demurred, and the JSPC submitted the issue

to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 June 1954.55

Trie question of personnel strengths for FY 1957 was closely related to the

figuios set for FY 1956, which were then in a state of uncertainty owing to the

crisis in Indochina. On 10 June 1954 the Joint Chiefs of Staff postponed action

on the JMRWP pending a decision by the administration on the question of

redeployment from the Far East. After Secretary Wilson tentatively approved

strengths for FY 1956, the joint Chiefs of Staff decided that these would be used

temporarily as the D-day figures in the force tabs for the JMRWP.56

A new draft, prepared on this basis, was completed on 10 September 1954.

hut the Joint Logistics Plans Committee, after reviewing the mobilization schedules in the force tabs, concluded that they were too ambitious. Deficits in

petroleum, tankers, aircraft, and other material, such as had been cited in connection with earlier plans, were now expected to be acute because of the smaller

production base that was in prospect by 1957.57

The implications of this conclusion became a matter of dispute in the joint

Strategic Plans Committee. To the Air Force member, it seemed obvious that the

Army and Navy should trim down their plans to fit them to the anticipated FY

1957 mobilization base. The representatives of the other Services argued conversely that the base should be expanded to support their planned forces. Vnr ble

to reach agreement, the JSPC referred the matter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 25

September 1954.**

Here was the familiar strategic disagreement as it applied specifically to

mobilization plans. Should the Services assume a war fought essentially with the

forces in being on D-day, in which strategic airpower would predominate and

would perhaps determine the outcome? Or should they project a massive buildup,

over a period of many months, of land, sea, and air forces, like that carried out in

World War W? The Joint Chiefs of Staff could not settle the question and were

forced to send it to Secretary Wilson for decision on 25 October 1954. Each of the

Service Chiefs argued in support of the stand taken by his representative on the

Committee. Admiral Radford now for the first tune set forth his separate views,

in accordance with a recent directive from the Secretary of Defense prescribing

that the Chairman should do so whenever he differed from the other JCS

members.** As on many other subjects, his posttun was dose to that of General

Twining. War plans, he believed, should emphasize the importance of the force*

that existed on D-day or that could be mobilized rapidly thereafter. Accordingly,

he recommended approval of Service mobilization schedules extending only

through the first six months after D-day,*0

Secretary Wilson approved Admiral Radford'* recommendation and ordered

102
Strategie Planning

the JMRWP completed on that basis. His decision was announced in directives

on2 November and9 {December 1954, in which he laid down detailed instructions for FY 1957 mobilization planning. At the same time, while thus removing

one obstacle to the progress of the JMRWP, he inadvertently introduced another

by ordering it completed "in the light of the new NATO military concept."*

1

The Secretary's reference was toa revision of NATO strategy that had recently

been endorsed by the NATO Military Committee and was to receive final approval

from the North Atlantic Councila few days later. It was based on the assumption that general war would be almost certain to open with an exchange of

nuclear attacks that would probably be decisive, even if it did not terminate the

conflict.62 There was no outright conflict between the text of the NATO document and the draft JMRWP, but it was necessary to insure that the language

used in the latter was wholly compatible with the former. On 20 December 1954

the Joint Strategic Plans Committee ordered the draft JMRWP revised as necessary for this purpose.63 The resulting restatement of the strategic concept of the

JMRWP, approved by JSPC in February 1955, representeda change in phraseology rather than substance, but the effect was to delay the completion of the

plan.

64

At the same time, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, before revising the

force tabs in accord with Secretary Wilson's instructions, awaiteda final determination of personnel strengths and force levels for D-day (i.e., the end of FY

1957), in place of those temporarily adopted in July 1954. In December 1954

Secretary Wilson directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to use the FY 1956 personnel

stengths established by the President (originally 2,815,000 men, later raised to

2,850,000) in planning for 1957. Force levels based on these figures, bearing the

endorsement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were approved by the Secretary of

Defence on 18 January 1955.** Thereupon the Joint Strategic Plans Committee

completed action on the draft plan on 30 March 1955. On 15 April 1955, the Joint

Mid Range War Plan for1 July 1957 received formal JCS approval.

66

The 1955 1956 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan Under Policy Memorandum 84, a JSCP for 1 July 1955 was scheduled to reach

the Joint Chiefs of Staff byI November 1954. On9 July the Joint Strategic

Plans Committee directed the Joint Staff to begin developing the plan. In the

hope of preventing some of the delays encountered before, it ordered continu*

ing coordination among the three Joint Staff Groups.*

7 But the JSPC was powerless to prevent inter-Service disputes over strategy.

The first draft, completed on8 September 1951. resembled the 1954-1955

plan in substance.** As soon as it was sent to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee,

dashing viewpoints again became evident. In the anginal draft, the strategic

concept for the emergency phase of general war had been described in language

taken almost verbatim from the 1954-1955 JSCP. The Joint Strategic Plans

Committee, however, proposed to preface this brief statement with an estimate

103

1
JCS and National Policy

of the probable nature and duration of a general war. For this purpose, the

members turned to a study recently made for NATO, which embodied the new

NATO military concept referred to earlier. It had recently been approved by the

Joint Chiefs of Staff as JCS 2073/900. But the JSPC members disagreed over its

interpretation, though each stated his position, as far as possible, in language

taken from JCS 2073/900.

The Army member believed that general war might result either from a

massive nuclear assault by the Soviet Union or from escalation of a local clash in

which atomic weapons were not used at first. This assumption seemed at variance at least with the spirit of JCS 2073/900, which had virtually ruled out the

second contingency. The other Services agreed that general war would unquestionably open with an intensive exchange of nuclear weapons. Whether it was

probable that this initial phase would conclude the war, rendering further military operations unnecessary, was a matter of disagreement between the NavyMarine Corps and the Air Force. The JSPC referred these disputes to ehe Joint

Chiefs of Staff on 12 October 1954, asking that the deadline for completing the

plan be extended to 1 December.**

The Joint Chiefs of Staff acted immediately. Rejecting the Army view, they

sent the JSPC two versions of the disputed portion, one a compromise between

the Navy-Marine Corps and the Air Force positions, the other a longer statement consisting of four paragraphs taken almost verbatim from JCS 2073/900.

The choke between these versions was left to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee.

At the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff refused the request for an extended

deadline.70

The Joint Strategic ^*An$ Committee selected the longer version for application to the draft JSCP.71 However, since four paragraphs were thought too

lengthy for a strategic concept, the Committee, after consultation with the Joint

Strategic Survey Committee,73 distilled their essence into a shorter statement

that the initial phase of war would be characterized by an "intensive exchange of

atomic blows," the results ol which would determine the duration and outcome

of the subsequent phase.n

By the time this question was disposed of, the Joint Strategic Plans Commit^

tee had run into another: the cutoff date for the force tabs—that is. the length of

time for which deployment and mobilization plans should be projected. The

Army and Navy, following Policy Memorandum $4, prepared force tab« extending through D plus 48 months. The Air Force withheld its tabs while its representative argued that they should extend only through D plus 12. The question

was the same as that encountered by the JSPC during its work on the JMRWP:

whether or not to base war plans on the assumption of a long period of

mobilization.

Through the initiative of t ieutenant General Lemuel Mathrwson, Director of

the Joint Staff, the matter was settled on 26 October 1954 by thr Operations

Deputies, who authorised a compromise cutoff date of D plus 30 month Seemingly, therefore, the last obstacle to completion had been surmounted. A »econd

request by the JSPC iot extension of the deadline to 1 December was approved

by Admiral RaUford '*

104

» '
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Strategic Planning

One more dispute, however, was to prevent the Joint Strategic Plans Commi»-

tee from meeting this new submission date. The Air Force member objected to

the provision (carried over from the 1954-1955 jSCP) for alternative plans for an

offensive through either of two areas of Europe, north central or southeastern. The joint Strategic Plans Committee had to refer the matter to the

Joint Chiefs of Staff on 3 December 1954.nIt was readily settled when General

Twining accepted the substance of the other Services' position.*

The Joint Logistics Plans Group reviewed the draft and reported on 28 December that, as usual, the strategic planners were straining the limits of logistic

feasibility; the plan could not be fully supported. Nevertheless the Joint Strategic

Plans Committee published the plan in virtually final form on 21 January 1955,

without substantial revision.77 Alter further coordination and an amendment to

reflect the restatement of national policy in NSC 5501, it was submitted to the

Joint Chiefs of Staff on 2 March. They approved the Joint Strategic Capabilities

Plan for 1955-1956 on 30 March 1955.7*

Revision of the Planning Program

Overhaul of the planning process had been temporarily set aside while the

Joint Chiefs of Staff concentrated on the more pressing problem of getting

current plans back on schedule. In December 1933 the Joint Strategic Plans

Group had drafted a revision of Policy Memorandum 84 that reflected General

Everest's conclusions about the nature of the difficulties involved, but it was

never acted upon.7*

In September 1954 the three Groups of the Joint Staff submitted new proposals to improve planning. They recommended stronger coordinating authority

for the Director, Joint Staff, and promulgation ol a planning manual to prescribe

detailed procedures- They did not, however, propose major changes in the

plans themselves or in the scheduled dates of" submission And disserriination.ip

These proposed changes were rejected by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee.

At the same June, the JSPC members brought forward various suggestions of

their own, including widely divergent proposals regarding the time span to be

covered by each plan.*1 The results ol the discussions within the ISPC were

embodied by the Joint Strategic flans Croup in a new rtp<»% *Ut*4 15 December

1954, which rioted the following defects in the existing program:

1. The purpose and scope of the three plans were not dearly defined.

2. The JLRSE should not be conceived of as the sole source of research and

development guidance; the JSOP and JSCP should also serve this purpose.

X The three-year period between approval of the JSOr* and its assumed

M-day (or D-day) did not allow adequate time for procurement ol the

military equipment necessary under the plan.

4. The ten-year peäetd »panned by the JLRSE was insufficient to furnish

long-range guidance

The report recommended that the JLKSfc become effective eight years in the

105

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JCS and National Policy

future and cover a four-year period, giving it a total span of twelve years. Its

purpose would be to guide long-range military objectives, policies, and plans

(not m ?rely research and development). The JSOP should be oriented toward a

D-day four years in the future. The span to be covered by each JSOP and JSCP

should be determined separately in the annual preparation of each plan.82

After several revisions, this report was incorporated in a new planning directive approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 27 July 1955. It fixed the span of the

JSOP as three years; the next JSCP (with a D-day of 1 July 1956) was also to cover

a three-year period, but subsequent ones only two years. No changes were

made in the time schedules, except that the dates for submission and approval of

the JSOP were advanced to 1 April and 31 May respectively and an extra two

months were allowed for logistic analysis of the draft JSOP before it was sent to

the Joint Chiefs of Staff.*3

The JCS Planning Program: The First Two Years

The history of joint planning during 1953 and 1954 is largely a story of the

malfunctioning of the machinery devised in 1952. The schedule called for

the approval and dissemination me following plans by the end of 1954: two

Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimates, spanning a period from 1 July 1958 through

30 June 1964; two Joint Strategic Objectives Plans for D-days of 1 July 1956 and 1

July 1957; and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plans covering fiscal years 1954, 1955,

and 1956. Instead, the planning process had produced only a JSCP for FY 1955

(more than three months late) and drafts of a JSCP for FY 1956 and of a JMRWP

(corresponding to a JSOP) for ! July 1957, both several months from completion.

No JLRSE &&$usd even in draft, and none was in sight within the near future.

Some of the reasons for this unimpressive record should be clear from the

foregoing narrative. It was obvious that Policy Memorandum 84 was based on a

serious underestimate, stemming perhaps from inexperience, oi the length of

time required for the administrative routines involved in planning. These

included securing concurrence, at each stage of the process, among three different groups m committees and acquiring force tabs and other data from the

Services. Better coordination among elements of the JCS organization, if it did

not come with experience, might be attained by changes in procedures. Of

course, to the extent that the problem involved poor coordination within the

individual Services, it was beyond the power of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a

corporate body, to remedy*

A m0it fundamental reason, however, lay in the Service disagreements that

had produced time-consuming deadlocks in the planning committees. These

were another manifestation of the deep-rooted strategic disagreements, running

all the way up to the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves, that have been described in

previous chapters. Indeed, these conflicts were even sharper at the committee

level than among the Joint Chiefs of Suff; it was easier for the latter to agree on

• i

10*
Strategie Planning

broad statements of strategic principles than it was for their subordinates to

decide how such statements should be interpreted and applied.

The long delays resulting from Service differences of opinion laid the Joint

Chiefs of Staff open to allegations ot narrow outlook and of Service partiality.

Examples of such criticisms came from the two commissions headed by former

President Herbert Hoover that surveyed the operations of the Federal Government in 1948 and 1955. 'The Joint Chiefs have not yet mastered the art of

formulating effective, integrated strategic plans or of converting them into economical assignments of logistical responsibilities/' declared a committee headed

by Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt, which investigated the Defense Department for the

first Hoover Commission. The principal reasons, implied the committee, were

"the continuance of intense interservice rivalries" and the failure "to elevate

military thinking toa plane above individual service aims and ambitions."94

These words were written in 1948, before the Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted

their Joint Program for Planning. Seven years later, another Hoover Commission

made similar criticisms, noting that planning was now better integrated but that

the production of strategic and logistic plans was still being delayed by Service

differences. "Joint planning and guidance," pointed out the Commission's

investigators, "are inadequate except for the emergency use of present forces

and weapons currently in being." They recommendeda more complete study to

determine how the Joint Chiefs of Staff could be converted "froma trading post

to an objective group in which the national interest is paramount."*

5

Improvement in the JCS planning process had been one objective of President Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan No. 6 in 1953. This improvement, a* the

President saw it, had two aspects. First, civilian expertise (scientific, technical,

and economic) should be brought into the operation at an early stage. With this

end in view, he directed closer cooperation between tin* JCS organization and

other elements of the Department of Defense. Second, it was necessary to have

"plans based on the broadest conception of the over-all national interest rather

than the particular desires of the individual services." The new powers given the

Chairman, to manage the Joint Staff and to approve the choice of officers therefor.

were intended to produce this result."* "My objective," Mr. Eisenhower later

wrote, "was to take at least one step in divorcing the thinking and the outlook of

the members of the Joint Staff from those of their parent services And to center

their entire effort 0n national planning for the over-all common defense of the

nation and the West "^

These provtsiom of Reorganization Plan No,6 were amplified ina directive

issued by Secretary Wilson on 26 July 1954, which decreed that "the Joint Staff

work of each of the Chief* of Staff shall take priority over aH other duties."*

1

Even more pointedly, another paragraph of the directive read as follows;

Development of strategic »nd logistic plans will be based on the broadest

conception» of over-all national interest rather than the special desire* oia

particular service. Individuals, military and civilian, having to do with the acttvi»

tie* of the Joint Chief* of Staff, shall be selected with due regard for their

competency and ability to Nxdinate special service interests to the over-all

national interest.

107

i
JCS and National Policy

The wording of this paragraph suggested that it was intended to apply to the

Joint Committees as well as to the joint Staff. These committees, and not the

Joint Staff, were the principal locus of Service disagreements.

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that these exhortations to consider the

overall national interest were beside the point. Men with differing Service backgrounds, approaching the problems of national defense with viewpoints shaped

by a lifetime in a particular uniform, inevitably disagreed about the best way to

advance the national interest. Unanimity could hardly be expected; even during

World War II the Joint Chiefs of Staff had often disagreed. The rapid postwar

changes in military technology, with effects on warfare that had not yet been

assessed, and the military and diplomatic complexities of the cold war increased

the difficulty of agreement by several orders of magnitude. Rear Admiral T. J.

Hedding, USN, who became Deputy Director for Strategic Plans in 1954, described

the problem facing his planning officers *> follows:

The major problems encountered in the preparation of Joint Strategic Plans

do not stem from divergent Service views, as is generally felt, but rather from

the confused and fluid conditions of world bt-poUrity ... a id the lack of clear

and simple objectives. In wartime the military objective is rel tively simple, that

of winning the war. During peacetime, and particularly in the present, our

national objectives are not simple and clear.11*

Another stimulus to disagreement was budgetary pressure. That Urge military spending muted competition, by giving each Service enough to satisfy its

own estimate of its needs, had been demonstrated during the Korean War. The

acrimonious Service disputes of 1949 and early 1950, which owed much of *heir

intensity to President Truman's stringent budget ceilings, disappeared during

the conflict, but the shrinking budgets of the Eisenhower administration again

impelled the Services to compete for their respective shares. As Admiral Carney

had pointed out in d*scussmg the delays encountered in preparing the JSOP,

Policy Memo 84 had been drafted at a time %vhen the Services were expanding

and military budgets were rising; the difficulty of agreeing on attainable midrange objectives had therefore been underestimated.**

If the Services disagreed Irreconcilably over strategic choices ant! budgetary

allocations, it was the responsibility of civilian leadership to choose among the

alternatives Thus the Secretary of Defense was to be brought into the planning

process. Already in 1954 his intervention had been neeessary before the Joint

Chiefs of Staff could compete »he Joint Mid*Range War Plan.

Nevertheless it would be misleading to dwell exclusively on the failure* o!

the JCS planning machinery during 1953- 1954 or to overlook what was actually

accomplished. In JCS 2S0i/U3, and in the strategic concepts written into the

1954-1955 JSCP and its successor for 1955» 1956 that was near final approval at

the end of 1954, theJoint Chiefs ofStaff had set their seal of approval on the strategy

that was to prevail throughout the rest of the decade. The Army, Navy, and

Marine Corps agreed that retaliatory airpower would be given primacy, while

the Air Force accepted a rvttii for surface forces to meet contingencies other

than all-out nuclear war. There thus emerged a strategic consensus, or 'truce on

It»

MMHMPMM tan
Strategie Planning

the grand outlines of strategy."yi Ample scope remained for disputes over the

relative importance of the various elements of military power and the amount of

resources to be allocated to each, but these took place within a broad area of

bask agreement. However acrimonious the Service controversies of the 1950's,

they never quite reached the pitch of intensity of the disputes of 1949-1950,

which bd to Congressional intervention and cost several officials their positions.

10Q

*
tl

h

5

Continental Air Defense

The danger of a direct assault on the continental United States, regarded as

remote by most Americans before World War II, became a matter for active

concern as a result of the progress of military technology during that conflict.

After the development of the long-range bomber and the nuclear bomb, the

nation's safety could no longer be assured by a Navy powerful enough to prevent an enemy troop landing. The threat grew larger with the revelation of the

Soviet mastery of nuclear weapons technology in 1949, several years ahead of

US expectations, and of the existence of a Soviet bomber (the TU-4, similar to *he

US B-29) capable of reaching at least some targets in the United States on oneway missions or through refueling en route.

Preparations for meeting this evolving danger wpre at first made in a piecemeal manner. In 1953, however, certain developments forced the problem to

public attention and necessitate ' a new approach. The Eisenhower administration found itself compelled to come to grips with this problem at the same time

that it was subjecting overall military strategy to the New Look.1

Plans, Organization, and Forces for Air Defense

Anticipating a growing threat of air attack, the joint Chiefs of Staff in 1948

had set up the Continental United States Defense Planning Group

(CUSDPQ, the responsibilities of which were indicated by its title.2This Group

drafted a Basic Defense Plan, JCS 2086/1, which the Join» Chiefs of Staff approved

in 1951.3It assigned responsibility in general terms, leaving detailed planning to

subordinate commanders. Primary responsibility for air defense was assigned to

the Air Force, but the other Services were expected to contribute as necessary.

No unified command had been established for continental defense. JCS 2086/1

provided that in case of hostilities all defending forces would come under command of the Chief of Staff, US Air Force, but until the moment of attack the

defensive forces remained scattered among a number of commands. Within the

111

,
4

JCS and National Policy

zone of the interior, the most important commanders were the Commanding

Generals of the Air Defense Command, US Air Force, and of the Antiaircraft

Command, US Army. The approaches were guarded by forces assigned to unified commands: CINCLANT, CINCPAC, CINCNE, and CINCAL.4

Coordination of US air defenses with those of Canada was essential. The

most important coordinating agency was the Permanent Joint Board on Defense,

which had been established by the two nations in August 1940. It included

representatives of the Services of each country, as well as of the US Department

of State and The Canadian Department of External Affairs.5In 1946, through the

initiative of the Board, a Military Cooperation Committee was established for

direct working-level coordination between military authorities.6It became the

medium through which the Air Force commands of the two nations adjusted

their plans.7

Force levels for continental air defense had been established separately by

each Service, with the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but without reference

to any integrated plan. The forces in existence at the end of 1952 are shown in

Table 11. The principal component, of course, was supplied by the Air Force,

and consisted of a chain of radar stations and control centers backed up by a

force of fighter interceptor aircraft. The radar network in the continental United

States was made up of 79 stations, so located as to afford approximately one

hour's warning of air attack on important cities or military installations. There

were twenty additional stations in outlying regions: ten in Alaska, one each in

Greenland and Iceland, and eight in Canada (the last forming part of the PINE

TREE network being jointly constructed by the two countries).

These radar stations could detect aircraft at altitudes ranging from 5,000 to

45,000 feet above the terrain. For visual coverage at lower altitudes, the Air Force

had organized a volunteer Ground Observer Corps, with a planned strength of

500,000 persons, although it was almost 70 percent short of that goal at the end

of 1952.

The radar nets were tied in with 14 control centers, which would direct the

air battle in case of attack. The methods and equipment used at these centers

were already approaching obsolescence. Radar data was transmitted to the control centers by conventional human telling. Manual methods oi operations were

used for computing the tracks of hostile aircraft, assigning weapons, and vectoring fighter aircraft.

To distinguish potentially hostile from friendly aircraft, the Air Force restricted

authorized air traffic to fixed approach corridors and made use of advance knowledge of flight plans furnished by the Civil Aeronautics Administration. In

wartime, these methods would be supplemented by rigid control of traffic within

the United States and by interrogation of approaclvng aircraft with special radar

equipment (identification, friend or fee, or IFF).

The fighter interceptor force consisted of 45 squadrons (15 wings) oi aircraft/

of which 39 were based in the continental United States (Table 11). Only 20 of

these, however, were equipped with fuel-performance jet aircraft (F-89 and F-94,

able to operate day or night in any weather). Thirteen others were provided with

day-fighter jets; the other 11 had conventional (piston-engine) aircraft. All were

112

.

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j

Continental Air Defense

Table 11—Actual and Projected US Continental-Defense Forces: 1952-1957

Service and Type

Army

Regular Army antiaircraft

battalions

Continental United States*

Gun

Skysweeper

Nike

Total

Alaska

Gun

Skyswetper

Nike

Total

Greenland

Iceland

National Guard antiaircraft

battalions

Gun

Skysweeper

Total

Navy

Active ships

Patrol vessels, radar

picket (DER)J

Ocean radar station.

Liberty ships(YAGR)r....

Air units

AKW ASVV barrier

•quadrons'

Aircraft

Contiguous barrier (lighterthan-air) squadron**

Aircraft

Air Force

Fighter-interceptor

squadrons* Continental

United States

Alaska

Northeast Air Command1

Iceland

Total

Aircraft

Airborne early-warning wings

Squadrons*

Aircraft

Actual

31 December 1952

57

0

0

57

5

0

0

5

0

0

Yi

4

1

I

4

r

-

tl)

0

0

0

31 December 1953

55

5

1

hi

5

0

0

5

0

0

4

3

u»

t>l

1,333

0

1

10

31 December 1954

40

8

19

67

3

2

0

5

0

57

ft

1

i,yto

i

3

19

Objective

30 June

1955

34

13

32

TV

3

2

0

5

b

l +

0

24

Q

24

16

4

18

Q

D

6

1

68

1,700

1

4

40

30 June

1956

29

13

52

94

3

2

0

5

42

5

47

24

B

3

27

68

b

3

1

7»

l,«*50

2

•»

70

30 June

1957

26

13

6:

100

1

2

2

3

b

l +

l

l

45

5

SO

30

12

5

4>

1

4

70

b

4

1

*2

2.0*0

2

71)

113
JCS and National Policy

Table 11—Actual and Projected US Continental-Defense

Forces: 1952-1957—Continued

Actual Objective

Service and Type 31 Decem- 31 Decem- 31 Decem- 30 June 30 June 30 June

ber 1952 ber 1953 ber 1954 1955 1956 1957

Aircraft-control-and-waming

radar stations

Continental United States 79 79 83 87 n

129 n

161

Canada 8 28 33 33 36 42

Alaska 10 12 12 12 13 20

Greenland 1 2 3 3 3 3

Iceland 1 (j) 1 2 2 4

Total 99 »121 132 137 183 230

Control centers

Continental United States 11 11 12 12 16 16

Canada 1 4 4 5 5 5

Alaska 2 2 2 2 2

Total 14 17 18 19 23 23

Low-altitude radar stations0

Continental United States 0 0 0 0 108 192

Canada 0 0 0 0 12 33

Total 0 0 0 0 120 225

Early-warning radar stations

Mid-Canada Line 0 0 0

1 °

20 (1)

Northern-Canada (Distan

Early Warning) Line .... 0 0 0 0 50 (1)

* Loki rockets might be available for 10 gun battalions in FY1953; 2Talon battalions were planned

lor the end of FY 1959

h One gun battalion wa* to be converted to Nike by 30 June 1957, plus 2 Skysweeper batteries.

' One Skysweeper battalion; deployment subject to approval of Icelandic Government, not yet

obtained.

d Thirty-six planned by July 1958

* Sixteen planned by July 1958.

' Nine squadrons and 82 aircraft planned by July 1958.

* Two squadrons and 6 aircraft planned by July 1958.

h Two Tabs-missile interceptor squadrons planned by June 1958; 5 by June 1959

1 Northeast Air Command units based partly in Canada, partly in Greenland

1 Not available for 1953; presumably one fighter-interceptor «quadron and ow radar station were

in service there (as in 1952 and 1954). and totals should be adjusted accordingly

k

Includes one squadron in the Azores,

1 Not available

Include» Texas Towers, one by June 1956 and 5 by June 1957

* Twelve squadrons with 120 aircraft planned by FY 1959

* By FY 1958 there were 323 stations planned (266 tor Continental United States and 57 tor

Canada); by 1959. 423 stations

Smarts: NSC 142, 10 Feb 53. tor 1952 data; DOD Progress Report to NSC on Status of Military

Continental US Defense Programs as of 1 June 1954 for 1953 data; all other information

from POD Progress Report to NSC on Status of Military* Continental US Defense Programs as of 15 April 1955.

!!4
\

Continental Air Defense

armed with weapons of World War II vintage (20mm cannon or ,50-caliber machine

guns). Under an augmentation plan agreed upon by the Commanding General,

Air Defense Command, and other responsible commanders, fighter aircraft of

the USAF Tactical Air Command, Air Training Command, and Air National

Guard, as well as of the Navy and Marine Corps, would, if not otherwise

required, be placed at the disposal of the Air Defense Command in an emergency.

The Air Force planned to expand its radar network to 216 stations tj rY 1955.

Most of these would be within the United States, located along the coasts or ina

double perimeter around key installations. Others were programmed for Alaska,

Greenland, Iceland, and southern Canada, where they would afford some early

warning of aircraft approaching the United States from the northeast or northwest. But even after the entire network was completed, the approach route

through the vast and thinly settled north central part of Canada would remain

wide open to penetration.

The Air Force also planned to extend its warning system to seaward by

plaHng radar detection equipment aboard airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft of a special type (the RC-121, a modified version of the Lockheed

Constellation), which would operate up to 250 miles offshore. The first squadron

of ten planes was expected to be in service by 30 September 1954; five more

squadrons were to be added by the end of FY 1956. Their operation was to be

supplemented by specially equipped radar picket vessels (DERs, converted

destroyer escorts) provided by the Navy. Tentative plans (not yet officially

approved by the Chief of Naval Operations) called for 25 such ships, in order to

maintain 10 on station at all times. Two ships were already operating experimentally at the end of 1952.

The number of control centers was scheduled to increase to 25. Greatly

improved equipment, semi-automatic in nature, for transmission of data and for

computation of intercept problems, was under development, and was expected

to be available for experimental use by 1955.

The FY 1955 goal tor the fighter interceptor force was 69 squadrons (57 in the

continental United States), to be equipped with all-weather jet aircraft (F-86,

F-89, or F-94). Most would be armed with air-to-air rockets, althougha guided

missile (Falcon) was expected to be in production in limited numbers.

The Army's contribution to air defense as of 31 December 1952 consisted of

57 battalions of antiaircraft artillery, deployed around the United States according to plans prepared jointly with the Air Force. They were furnished with

40mm, 90mm, or 120mm weapons. Five other battalions were stationed in Alaska.

The ultimate goal for the continental United States was 68 battalions before the

end of FY 1954. During 1953 the 40mm guns were expected to be replaced bya

new, automatic 75mm weapon (Skysweeper).*A surface-to air missile (Nike)

was expected to go into service during FY 1954 and to be available by FY 1955 in

sufficient numbers to equip 40 battalions.

10

The Navy treated continental air defense as incidental to its missions of

controlling the seas and defending coasts, and had no forces specifically programmed for this task, though it was pvepärtä to contribute fighter aircraft to

the Air Defense Command when necessary. The Navy's principal concern w*s

115

•

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JCS and National Polio/

i

with the Soviet submarine fleet, which was not only a serious threat to shipping

but was, or soon would be, able to launch guided missiles against land targets.

The submarine menace was to be dealt with by combined hunter-killer teams of

aircraft and ships, plus defensive measures like convoy escort and control of

shipping. Recent technological advances had made it feasible, by using lowfrequency sound waves (LOFAR), to detect submarines at distances of several

hundred miles. The Navy planned to install a chain of nine LOFAR stations

along the Atlantic coast, from Nova Scotia southward. The first five were expected

to begin operating during FY 1955.

Recognizing the growing urgency of continental defense, the Navy had

established a special task group to test other means of warning against air,

missile, or submarine attack. The RC-121 AEW aircraft was a product of Naval

research. The Navy was also providing two experimental radar picket vessels for

the Air Force, as noted above, and was considering a plan to operate such ships

in conjunction with its own shorebased AEW aircraft to provide a combined

warning barrier against both air and submarine attack.11

Taken together, the forces available for defense against air attack were far too

small. As the Joint Chiefs of Staff told the Secretary of Defense early in 1953:

The U.S. is today vulnerable to direct attack of serious proportions and it is

expected that this threat will reach critical proportions by 1954 or 1955. Our

present capability to defend the U.S. is considered to be extremely limited. It has

been estimated that 65-85% of atomic bombs launched by the USSR can be

delivered on targets in the U.S. The defense against a low level attack by an

aggressor force is almost non-existent.12

Legacy of the Truman Administration

By themselves, these warning words by the Joint Chiefs of Staff might well

have been ignored or discounted, as others had been. But even before they

were writter advice from other sources had drawn the attention of President

Truman and his advisers to the subject of air defense. The issue was brought to a

head by scientists affixated with the Lincoln Laboratory, which had been set up

by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to study this subject for the Air

Force. In 1952 some of these scientists, joined with others in an informal Summer

Study Group, drew up a report in which they called attention to the progress of

Soviet weapons technology and recommended action to raise US defenses to a

new level of effectiveness. The most important such step that could be taken in

the immediate future, they believed, would be to construct a distant early

warning line of radar stations running from Greenland to northwestern Canada,

far enough north to afford from two to six hours' warning of aircraft approaching

the US border. It should be backed up by a second line farther southapproximately along the 54th paralie' of latitude, where Lie Canadian Government was already considering a radar chain—that would be used for tracking

and intercepting hostile aircraft after their approach had been detected. The

116
Continental Air Defense

Study Group believed Üiat both lines could be constructed at a cost of $370

million. The members urged that the more northerly line be constructed as soon

as possible. Plans should be prepared immediately, they believed, in order that

construction could begin when the weather became favorable in the summer of

1953.13

Within the Air Force, these proposals were opposed by some who feared that

crash construction of a defensive system would divert funds from other important programs. The report was therefore never officially approved, and its authors

turned to the National Security Resources Board to bring their conclusions before

the administration.14 On 24 September 1952 the Board's chairman, Mr. Jack

Gorrie, summarized the report for the National Security Council. The President

thereupon directed the Department of Defense to survey the cost and feasibility

of an early warning system.15 Three weeks later, after hearing a report by the

Department, President Truman instructed Mr. Gorrie and Secretary of Defense

Lovett to prepare specific proposalsfor consideration along with the 1954 budget.lb

At the same time, the President and his advisers pursued several other lines

of study of the air defense problem, beginning with the reexamination of national

security programs undertaken in September 1952 by the Secretaries of State and

Defense and the Director for Mutual Security. In connection with this review,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared a detailed description of existing continental

defense forces and of the increases planned by the Services. They indicated

various ways in which the forces cr»uld be further strengthened, at a cost of some

$10 billion above the $7 billion cost of existing programs. They recommended

that existing programs be completed as rapidly as possible, but that no new ones

be approved without further study.,7

The final report on security programs, which was sent to President Truman

on 19 January 1953. went beyond the cautious conclusions of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, It asserted flatly that present programs would not provide a minimum

acceptable continental defense, and that the nation should consider favorably

the expenditure of very substantial additional resources over the next few years

for the purpose1'

1 The issue was one for the incoming administration to resolve.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in commenting on this report before it was sent to

the President, had pointed out that it rated Soviet capabilities higher than they

had when they made t*ieir recommendations If the higher appraisal were to be

accepted, they agreed, then additional continental defense measures would be

needed, but these should not be allowed to jeopardize existing military

programs. **

Accurate assessment of Soviet strength was vital to a decision on this grave

issue. As early as August 1951, the National Security Council had instructed the

Director of Central intelligence, in collaboration with the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, to prepare a summary evaluation of the net capability of the USSR to injure the continental United States. This ttudy, completed in

October 1952, concluded that the Soviet Union could inflict serious but not

permanently crippling damage. But the Director of Central Intelligence General

Walter Bedell Smith, characterized his report as a limited initial effort—one that

117
JCS and National Policy

"falls far short of supplying the estimates essential to security planning." He

recommended that the Council authorize him to undertake a more detailed

study and to submit proposals for establishment of an agency to produce such

appraisals regularly in the future.20

The Join» Quefs of Staff did not question the value of such studies, but they

believed that tho Council's own staff should be responsible for preparing them.

If that body could not do so, they told the Secretary of Defense, then they

themselves should be assigned the task.21

President Truman settled the question by choosing a third alternative. On 19

January 1953 he established a Special Evaluation Subcommittee to prepare a

revised appraisal of Soviet net capabilities as of 1 July 1955. It was to be under

the chairmanship of Lieutenant General Idwal H. Edwards, USAF, and was to

report by 15 May 1953.uThe question of responsibility for future such studies

was left unsettled.

Another study group appointed by the Truman administration during its last

days consisted of a body of consultants chosen by Secretary of Defense Lovett in

December 1952 to survey the whole problem of continental defense. It was made

up of prominent scientists and engineers in industry and education, under the

leadership of Dr. Mervin J. Kelly, President of Bell Telephone Laboratories. The

members were asked to submit general recommendations for improved continental defense and specifically to study the possibilities of an improved warning system and us relation to other measures.23

Before going out of office President Truman settled one major issue in this

complex area of military planning. Insofar as it was in his power, he committed

the Department of Defense to the construction of an early warning system like

that recommended by the Lincoln Summer Study Group. He did so against the

advice of the joint Chiefs of Staff, who felt that action should be deferred until

Dr. Kelly's group had reported. They pointed out that the feasibility of the

proposed system remained to be proved; that it would constitute only one part

of a defensive complex that should be considered as a whole; that the estimated

construction cost of $1 billion could be spent in other ways that would produce

faster improvement; and that a line so far north could not provide unequivocal

warning, since it would not be backed up by a continuous tracking capability

that could distinguish real from spoof alarms.24

The President announced his decision in NSC 139, issued on 31 December

1952, in the following terms:

The estimated time scale on which the U. S. S. R. may possess sufficient

nuclear weapons to deliver heavily destructive attacks against the United States

indicates that we should plan to nave an effective system of air, sea, And Und

defenses ready no later wan December 31, 1955. Such a system of defenses

should include not only military measures, but also should include well organised programs of civilian defense, industrial security, and p*ans for rapid

rehabilitation of vita) facilities.

A key element in this system, according to NSC 139, was a radar screen that

would afford from three to six hours' warning. Accordingly, the Department of

Defense was to develop and install an early warning line as a matter of high

118
Continental Air Defense

urgency, and to complete it by 31 December 1955. Funds for developing equipment and for constructing test stations in the Far North had been included in

the FY 1953 budget, and tentatively in that for 1954.25

On 12 January 1953 Secretary of Defense Lovett told the Joint Chiefs of Staff

to prepare plans for an effective system of defense. A week later, in one of his

last actions, he directed them to submit plans for the establishment and operation of the early warning system, and made the Air Force responsible for conducting the test project.

The New Administration Confronts a Dilemma

Considering the circumstances, the Truman administration had gone about

as far as could reasonably be expected in launching an accelerated program

of continental defense. But the hard decisions—how much money to spend for

the purpose, and where the money was to come from—remained for President

Truman's successor. These problems were highly acute for an administration

that was committed to reduction of Federal expenditures.

The principal elements of the air defense problem had meanwhile become

known to the informed public. That Soviet military power was growing at an

unexpected rate and that prominent scientists believed that a real defense against

atomic attack was within reach were matters that could not be concealed.*7

Pressure by public opinion for action in this field might jeopardise the administration's hopes for defense economy.

The earliest policy pronouncements issued by the National Security Council

in 1953 called for increased emphasis on continental defense.* But they also

asserted the importance of economy. They cast no light on the crucial question:

whether the administration was willing to pay the enormous cost of an effective

defense.

It was hardly to be expected that the President would reach a decision without hearing from the Edwards Subcommittee or the Kelly Group. Pending reports

from these bodies, the administration allowed the research program for the

distant early warning line to proceed. The project required the cooperation of

Canada, since it called im two test stations in the northwestern part of thai

country, with another nearby on the coast of Alaska. US members of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense obtained informal approval from their Canadian

colleagues on 26 January 1953. The formal US approach through diplomatic

channels occurred four days later, Canada was **k&& to allow construction of

the two test station*, to participate in the research program, and to authorise

surveys to determine sites for permanent installations on Canadian soil. Agreement was received from Ottawa on 27 February 1953,**

The Ad Hoc Study Group under Dr. Kelly turned in its report on 11 May

1953. Its conclusion was that since no air defense could approach 100 percent

effectiveness, "there tan be no safety in the atomic age short ot the elimination

of war." Aecordingiy» it stressed the importance of a powerful offensive capability.

!W
—

JCS and National Policy

which, insofar as it deterred war, constituted a vital major part of the overall

defense system. Nevertheless, asserted the report, it was not only possible but

mandatory to improve the existing system substantially, and to bring about an

entirely new order of warning capability within two or three years. To this end,

the members submitted the following recommendations:

0)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

m

(7)

Responsibility for continental air defense should be centralized

under a single agency with broad authority.

There should be a comprehensive plan for air defense.

The existing control and warning system should be improved

immediately, using available equipment, by closing gaps and by

extending it to sea.

An early warning line, at a modest distance from US boundaries,

was the most rewarding first step toward an improved warning

system in being. It should be located as far north as possible while

remaining within range of backup facilities for tracking and

intercept. A distance of 400-600 miles, which would afford two

hours' warning of the approach of TU-4 aircraft, was suggested.

The report noted that the Canadian Government was already

investigating the possibility of a radar fence roughly along the

54th parallel (approximately 300 miles north of the US boundary).

Such a line would constitute a good start toward the system that

would ultimately be needed; hence the United States should

cooperate with Canada in installing it. It should be extended into

the oceans to insure against being outflanked, and should be tied

into the LOFAR submarine detection network.

Eventually the warning network should be pushed as far as possible from US borders. Preparations shouk) be made for selecting

sites and procuring equipment for a line in the far North, so that

construction could begin as soon as results of the Arctic test program justified a decision to proceed.

Certain problems required additional research. One of the most

important was the r^td for a fully automatic control sysiem, which

would include a ground electronic environment for tracking and

recording all flights, plus equipment for r»p%d transmission and

handling of data Such a system was already under study at the

Lincoln Laboratory, and should receive a high priority.**

A vigorous civil defense program should be established.Jt

The Evaluation Subcommittee under General Edwards completed its task

about the same time. The conclusions of its report, with comments by the Jomt

Chiefs of Stall. CIA. and other agencies, were discussed bv the National Security

Council m 4 June 1953.**

In drafting their report, the members of the Hdwards group had limited

themselves to turning the Soviet ability to *Um*^ß the continental United

State* and selected installations *w& fortes outside the United States "of major

importance to a U. S. air *iomk counteroffensive against the USSR during the

120

y.'.'ii ".. ii- .i !i
Continental Air Defense

initial phases of war/' This unauthorized revision of the Subcommittee's terms

of reference led the Jcint Chiefs of Staff to instruct their representative to refrain

from either concurring or noncurring in the report.33In their own comments to

the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff characterized the report

as a valuable contribution but pointed out that it provided only a segment of the

data necessary for planning for the overall security of the United States. In

particular they did not wish the assumptions made under the limited terms of

reference to be construed as representing the opinion of ths joint Chiefs of Staff

as to the manner in which the USSR would wage a war.34

Both the Special Evaluation Subcommittee and the Ad Hoc Study Group had

been appointed by the previous administration. It was perhaps natural for President Eisenhower and his advisers to want the problem to be studied by men of

their own selection, in the hope that further analysis and accumulation of data

might point more clearly to the proper decision.35 Accordingly, in May 1953 the

NSC Planning Board established a Continental Defense Committee to prepare a

complete report on existing and proposed continental defense programs and

their costs, and to recommend necessary changes. Lieutenant General Harold R.

Bull, USA (Ret,), a wartime associate of the President, who had served as the

CIA representative on the Edwards committee, was appointed chairman.36 The

Department of Defense was represented by Major General Frederic H. Smith,

Jr., USAF, who was appointed with the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.37

Other participating agencies were the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Federal Civil Defense Administration, and the Interdepartmental Committee on

Intelligence and Security.

The new committee was instructed to report by 15 July 1953. It was to consider the conclusions of the Ad Hoc Study Group and the Special Evaluation

Subcommittee. It was also to study organizational arrangements needed to insure

(1) action in the field of continental defense, and (2) preparation of periodic

evaluations of Soviet net capabilities to injure the United States.

Service and Continental US Defense Planning Group Proposals

While the Council was weighing the relative importance of stronger defenses and lower expenditures, the Joint Chiefs of Staff went ahead with

the tasks assigned them under NSC 139. On 22 January 1953 they directed the

Continental US Defense Planning Group to draft a plan for an early warning

system.*1 They passed to the Services the initial responsibility for preparing

defense plans, which were to be submitted in time to be reviewed by the Continental US Defense Planning Group and the Joint Chiefs of Staff before 1 August

1953**

The first plan to be completed was that of the Navy. It specified that the Navy

and Marine Corps would meet continental defense requirements "within the

limitations ol available forces and consistent with a continued ability to perform

other primary missions." The Navy's principal contribution to air defense would

121
-

t^.o^>ic-A*»Mi^A«4«*>*«^^

JCS and National Polio/

consist of special barriers at sea to detect the approach of aircraft as well as

submarines. These barriers would be formed by Naval aircraft equipped with

both airborne early warning and antisubmarine warfare (AEW/ASW) capabilities,

operating from shore bases in conjunction with radar picket vessels. Approaching enemy planes would be kept under radar surveillance until they were turned

over to shore radar or intercepted by fighter aircraft. It was expected that such

barriers could provide a 95 percent probability of detection of aircraft flying

between 500 and 30,000 feet.

A series of barriers was proposed in both oceans, ranging outward from near

the coasts, under the command of CINCLANT and CINCPAC Activation was a

matter for the future, since none of the special AEW/ASW aircraft and only a few

DERs were as yet available. Total requirements were estimated at three wings of

aircraft (133 planes) and 36 picket ships by 31 December 1955.40

The Air Force plan, submitted on 8 June 1953, was much more far-reaching

and detailed. It called for the immediate construction of a radar warning chain

across Canada, approximately along the 54th parallel, extending from Labrador

westward to British Columbia, then swinging northwestward along the Alcan

Highway to connect with the Alaskan radar system. This Southern Canada Line,

as it was called, should be extended seaward from Alaska to Hawaii and from

Newfoundland to the Azores by means of barriers made up, as in the Navy plan,

of AEW aircraft operating with DERs. The Navy would supply the ships; the Air

Force would furnish the planes and (through the Commanding General, Air

Defense Command) operate the entire system. A total of 90 aircraft (9 squadrons)

and 30 ships would be required to achieve 80 percent probability of detection of a

single TU-4 aircraft.

A second line, much farther north, should also be constructed if its feasibility

were proved. It would run from the north coast of Alaska eastward across the

mouth of Hudson Bay to southern Baffin Island. It might later be extended to

Greenland and connected with the Atlantic Ocean barrier.

The proposed seaward extensions of the existing radar control and warning

system41 were also incorporated into the Air Force plan. Force requirements for

this purpose had been reduced slightly: four squadrons of AEW aircraft and 20

radar picket vessels. The difference was to be made up by five specially constructed offshore radar stations (Texas Towers) in shoal waters.

On land, the control and warning network was to be strengthened by adding

approximately 30 radar stations to those already programmed. In addition, to

provide low-altitude coverage, 325 specially designed radars, of a type then

under development, would be required. Until these became available, the Ground

Observer Corps would be continued.

Identification of aircraft was to be improved by the acquisition of IFF equipment and of special (Consolan) radio beacon transmitters to guide incoming

aircraft along flight corridors. An integrated, semiautomatic controlsystem, linked

with radar stations, would also be required; however, the plan did not indicate

how much of this system, if any, would be available by 31 December 1955.

The fighter interceptor force would rise to 75 squadrons in the continental

United States—almost one-third more than the current objective of 57 squadrons.42

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Some of these planes v/ould be armed witha new air-to-air rocket, carrying an

atomic warhead, that was expected to be available in small numbers by 1955.

The Air Force also proposed to deploy 20 fixed defense units armed with

Talos,a surface-to-air defensive missile developed by the Navy. They would

supplementthe 110 Army antiaircraft battalions called for in the plan, the composition of which was as follows:

47

20

20

23

Nike

Loki (a rocket weapon then under development)

Skysweeper

Gun (90mm and 120mm)

In addition, the plan called for 90 gun battalions to be supplied on D-day by

National Guard units called to active duty*

1

The Army's continental defense plan seta goal of 150 antiaircraft battalions,

of the following compositions:

61 Nike

20 Loki

18 Skysweeper

51 Gun

All of these would be Regular Army units. Their number would be reduced,

however, to the extent that National Guard battalions could be brougnt up to the

desired degree of readiness, that is, capable of going into action with 3-6 hours'

warning.*

4

The Air Force plan became the basis for the early warning system outlined by

the Continental US Defense Planning Group on 30 June 1953. Under the CUSDPG

plan, the Southern Canada Line was to be constructed at once At its extremities,

it would be tied ii\ with the existing faciltii*:-« tn Alaska and in NewfoundlandLabrador, which tn turn would be connected with seaward extensions The

design of these extensions incorporated some features of the Navy's barrier

proposals. Thus tone requirements lor DERs were stated as 36 vessels, presumably to make full use of all the ships programmed by the Navy. The Air Force

would provide AEW aircraft, but the bamer? themselves would be under operational control of ONCt-ANT ikt\d CiNCPAC The CUSDPG plan also endorsed

the construction ofa more northerly tine, subject to proof of its feasibility.**

Taken together, these four plans contained two discrepancies that must be

adjusted before they could be fitted together intoa comprehensive program

One involved the different antiaircraft forte requirements esttnutJ bv the Army

and the Air Force- 150 battalions as against HO. Discussions between these

Services, under CUSDPG auspices, failed to eliminate the difference ** A bmader disagreement was the on^ between the Navy and the Air Force

concerning the competition and operation of early warning lines at sea Ine

points at issue were as follows;

(1) The Air Force planned two sets of oceanic barriers, one operating

withina few hundred miles of the coast, contiguous with the

123

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JCS and National Policy

existing radar svstem and considered as within the combat zone,

in Air Force terminology; the other farther out in the North Atlantic and North Pacific, tied to the proposed early warning line and

forming part of the warning zone. The Navy envisioned several

sets of barriers at varying distances from shore, all serving the

dual purpose of detecting either aircraft or submarines, and each

capable of continuous tracking of enemy aircraft until the latter

came within range of the shore radar system, so that there was no

need to extend the latter to sea.

(2) The Air Force believed that all radar systems, including their

extensions to seaward, should be under its operational control.

The Navy considered that the command of warning facilities at

sea was a Naval responsibilty.

(3) The Air Force proposed to furnish AEW planes; the Navy believed

that it should supply all forces (aircraft as well as ships) operating

on or over the oceans.

(4) The Air Force plan called for 130 early warning aircraft and 50

radar picket ships; that of the Navy, for 133 aircraft and 36 ships.

When the Navy's continental defense plan first reached the joint Chiefs of

Staff, General Vandenberg had noted that it made no provision for extension of

the control and warning system and asked that the Joint Chiefs of Staff withhold

approval until all the Service plans could be examined.47 Admiral Fechteler, in

reply, asserted that his plan would meet all requirements for radar coverage of

seaward approaches with smaller forces than the Air Force had called for.48

General Vandenberg, however, insisted that two separate sets of barriers were

needed.49

The Continental US Defense Planning Group, after reviewing both plans,

supported the Air Force. The members concluded that the Navy proposal to

combine air and submarine warning facilities underestimated the probability of a

large-scaL air attack.50

The issue came to the fore when the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the early

warning plan drafted by the Continental US Defense Planning Group. Admiral

Fechteler generally approved it, and thus in effect agreed that the barriers proposed in the Navy plan should indeed become the seaward extensions of the

Southern Canada Line. But he insisted that they should serve both air and

submarine defense, and should be under naval command.Sl General Twining

removed one point of disagreement when he agreed to yield control of these

barriers to CINCLANT and CINCPAC; however, he still believed that his Service must provide the aircraft for them.52

During the JCS discussion of the CUSDPG plan the Army Chief of Staff,

General Collins, agreed with General Twining that the Air Force should furnish

aircraft for the sea barriers. It was clear that the matter must go to the Secretary

of Defense for resolution. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the

Continental US Defense Planning Group to draft an appropriate memorandum

to the Secretary, asking for a ruling on this question. At the same time, they

124

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Continental Air Defense

scrutinized the plan itself and concluded that the force requirements might be

excessive in light of current budgetary pressures. The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent

the plan back to the Group with instructions to consider alternative sea barriers

that would require smaller forces.53

The revised plan reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 20 July 1953. It computed force requirements for barriers extending from Argentia only 500 miles, or

less than halfway to the Azores, and 1,500 miles from Kodiak (about two-thirds

of the distance to Hawaii). Another alternative examined was a Pacific line that

would run along the Aleutians as far as Adak and thence southward for 600

miles. All these proposals would substantially reduce force requirements; the

most economical combination would require only 32 aircraft and 16 vessels. On

the other hand, a box-type barrier in the Pacific (examined by the Group at the

express direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), in which AEW aircraft would

operate along three sides of a rectangle off the coast, would require 84 aircraft

and 32 DERs for the Pacific alone. The Group did not recommend a choice

among these alternatives.54

On 29 July 1953 the Joint Chiefs of Staff referred to the Secretary of Defense

the dispute over the provision of aircraft, explaining the different operational

concepts from which the two Service positions stemmed. Subsequently they

discussed the question with Secretaries Wilson and Kyes.55 Characteristically,

Mr. Wilson, before rendering a decision, asked the Services to indicate the costs

of their respective proposals. When these estimates were assembled, those of

the Navy proved to be substantially lower for both operation and maintenance.

The Air Force argued, however, that the apparent economy of the Navy figures

was illusory, since the Navy plan was operationally unsound; it would require

AEW aircraft to leave the barrier in order to maintain continuous surveillance of

each radar contact.'*

It does not appear that the cost figures were ever sent to the Secretary of

Defense. The issue was laid aside for the moment and was ultimately settled by

the joint Chiefs of Staff on the basis of their interpretation of the National

Security Council's later decision on continental defense policy.

The Service disagreements prevented the formulation of a comprehensive

plan of the kind requested in January 1953 by Secretary Lovett. On 5 August

1953 CUSDPG sent the Joint Chiefs of Staff a draft of such a plan, almost as

broad in its provisions as JCS 2086/1, which it was designed to supersede. The

outgoing Joint Chiefs of Staff took no action on it, and their successors decided

two months later to drop it from their agenda.57 An integrated plan was eventually to emerge, but it was never formally embodied in a single document.

A New Policy for Continental Defense: NSC 159/4

The basic issue before the administration remained unresolved throughout

the summer of 1953. The National Security Council withheld a decision

pending the report of the Continental Defense Committee of the Planning Board.

125
JCS and National Policy

The President decided also to appoint a panel of outside consultants—his own

version of the Kelly Group—to review this report.58

The Committee's report was circulated on 22 July 1953 as NSC 159. It asserted

emphatically the need for prompt action in this field:

The present continental defense programs are not now adequate either to

Brevent, neutralise or seriously deter the military or covert attacks which the

fSSR is capable o. launching, nor are they adequate to ensure the continuity of

government, the continuity of production or the protection of the industrial

mobilization base rind millions of citizens in our great and exposed metropolitan

centers. This condition constitutes an unacceptable risk to our nation's survival.

We are convinced that the nation must act now with speed and energy, using

such of our resources as are available, to meet thepotential threat, even though

the threat may not materialize for several years.

The Committee had examined the Service plans, and it endorsed the enlarged

force goals proposed therein. Its report classified the programs in these plans

according to the degree of their urgency, along with other, nonmilitary measures essential to survival. It assigned the highest priority to the following three

programs, which required immediate action:

The Southern Canada early warning system, including its seaward extensions.

Seaward extension of contiguous radar coverage, i.e., of the existing radar

control and warning system.

Emergency plans and preparations to insure continuity of essential functions

of government.

Thus, by implication, the Committee approved the Air Force plan for two sets of

radar barriers at sea. However, the report took note of the disagreement between

the Air Force and the Navy, as well as that between the Army and the Air Force,

and assumed that these would be resolved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In a second order of priority, the Committee placed the following:

Completion of the LOFAR submarine detection system.

Completion and installation of the experimental semiautomatic "Lincoln

Transition System" for data handling and intercept control.

"Gap-filler" radars for low-altitude surveillance.

Increase of fighter interceptor forces.

Improved identification capability.

Installation of the northern Canada early warning line (if it proved practicable).

Plans and preparations for civil defense.

Various otner nonmilitary measures: a program for preventing clandestine

introduction and detonation of atomic weapons; development o? a device to

detect fissionable material; processing of cases of "known subversives" for detention in an emergency; dispersal of essential industrial and governmental

installations.

Certain other programs, said the Committee, should also receive additional

support. These included harbor defense, coastal escorts and antisubmarine patrol,

civil defense, and internal security.

These measures would provide an acceptable degree of readiness by about

1956, assuming that the Services reached their goals by 31 December 1955. But

126
Continental Air Defense

the Committee doubted that the general public understood the nature of the

threat clearly enough to support the necessary expenditures. Hence, its report

urged efforts to increase public understanding

The Committee estimated that its recommended programs would cost a total

of $34.9 billion by FY 1960. In contrast, expenditures in the FY 1954 budget for

continental defense were estimated at $4.3 billion, a figure that, projected through

the next six years, would total $25.8 billion. In other words, the additional

programs would require $9.1 billion.60

The Joint Chiefs of Staff greeted the Committee report with mixed feelings.

Though on record as favoring stronger defenses, they feared that the Council

might be stampeded into hasty action that would throw the military establishment out of balance. They told Secretary Wilson that the threat of air attack had

been taken into account when existing military programs were devised. Any

actions contemplated on the basis of NSC 159, they asserted, should first be

evaluated in relation to these programs.

Commenting on the priorities assigned by the Committee, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff pointed out that the value of the early warning system depended upon

improved aircraft identification, and hence that the latter program should be

placed in the highest category. They urged also that priorities should be used

only as a general guide to bring programs into balance, and should not be

interpreted so rigidly as to deprive lower ranking programs o

(

necessary funds.61

These were the conclusions of the outgoing JCS group, headed by General

Bradley. They were presented to the Council on 6 August 1953, together with

the Committee's report. The Council postponed a decision pending comments

by the newly appointed Joint Chiefs of Staff. The members decided that these

comments should be submitted by 1 September 1953, and should extend to the

following specific subjects:

0)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

An integrated military program.

The priorities, size, and timing of the various programs.

Security programs, other than continental defense, that might be

reduced or eliminated if the critical elements of the continental

defense program were adopted.

A review of the entire Air Force program in the light of new

weapons developments since this program was planned.

The effect upon the composition of US forces of the projected

increases in allied forces.

The Council also directed the Planning Board to revise NSC 159 as necessary

to reflect the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the President's panel of

civilian consultants.62

Before these decisions could be carried out, the news of a Soviet thermonuclear test, released on 12 August 1953, altered the problem. It provided a strong

argument for those within the administration who favored immediate action on

a large scale. The Office of Defense Mobilization became the principal advocate

of a crash defense program to be financed by supplemental appropriations during FY 1954.*

127

•
JCS and National Policy

Among the general public, also, the intensity of discussion was heightened.

"Now that we know that the Soviets have achieved a thermonuclear explosion,"

wrote two of the scientists who had been associated with the Lincoln project,

"the defense of our homes, our cities, and our lives is given a new and awful

urgency."64 Admiral Radford, asked by reporters about the significance of this

event, asserted on 26 August 1953 that it had been foreseen and would not

change over-all strategic plans, but that it did call for a review of certain

programs.65

In submitting to the President and the Secretary of Defense their initial recommendations on military strategy, the incoming Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed

continental air defense along with retaliatory air power as the two "most critical

factors in the military aspects of our security." They urged that defenses be

strengthened "to a degree which can hold damage to nationally manageable

proportions," and cited the deployment of large US forces overseas as evidence

of "neglect of our vitals in Continental United States."66

These statements suggested that the new Joint Chiefs of Staff might be highly

receptive to plans for prompt and drastic increases in continental defense forces.

Nevertheless, in their comments prepared in response to the NSC decision of 6

August 1953, they revealed, like their predecessors, a go-slow attitude—a desire

to avoid overstress on this one aspect of military security. They emphasized the

value (defensive as well as offensive) of strategic airpower, and showed little

evidence of increased concern over the recent Soviet weapons test. As they

expressed themselves:

In evaluation of our defensive capability, consideration must be given to the

threat which our combat-ready forces, both offensive and defensive, pose to an

enemy who may contemplate a surprise aggressive move. The combat-ready

counterthreat and an effective system of world-wide alliances are significant

factors in continental defense .... An aggressor nation will be far more deterred

by evidence that we have the offensive potential and the mobility capable of

dealing it decisive blows than by the excellence of our defenses.

While observing that continental defense could be substantially improved at

modest additional cost, they cautioned that it should not be increased beyond the

point of diminishing marginal utility. They agreed on the importance of an

informed public, but stressed that any program of public education should not

generate excessive alarm on the subject. With these reservations, the new Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that they

were in general agreement with NSC 159. Concerning the specific subjects raised

by the Council, they commented as follows:

(1) The proposals in NSC 159 would add up to an integrated military

program that would meet minimum requirements with the least

possible adverse effect on other programs.

(2) The priorities and timing of programs in NSC 159 were generally

appropriate, except that aircraft identification should be placed

in the highest category. The size of the programs would be deter128
#r

Continental Air Defense

mined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff after further study, in the light

of the total resources available for national security.

(3) No programs could be eliminated if a continental defense program were approved; all were parts of a broad strategic concept

for deterring and opposing communist aggression.

(4) The Air Force program had been prepared with full consideration

of the impact of new weapons developments. All Service plans

would be constantly reviewed in the light of further developments.

(5) Planned increases in Allied forces would be relatively small and

would still leave these forces below minimum required levels;

hence they would provide no basis for reducing US forces.67

The JCS recommendations apparently influenced NSC 159/3, the revised

continental defense paper circulated by the Planning Board on 16 September

1953. The opening paragraph emphasized that continental defense was only one

within an integrated complex of offensive and defensive elements, each of which

had its proper role in the defense of the vitals of America. Nonetheless it was

concluded that continental defense, having been neglected in recent years, was

clearly inadequate. The draft took note of the Soviet thermonuclear explosion,

which was seen as requiring a revaluation of relative strengths and as placing a

premium on improved defenses. The programs recommended in NSC 159 were

endorsed by the Planning Board, but, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended, aircraft identification was placed in the first category.68

NSC 159/3 considered the problem of continental defense in relation to the

budget. It suggested that, in light of what was now known about Soviet weapons technology, some military commitments might be reduced in order to make

more money available for continental defense. Otherwise it would be necessary

to enlarge the defense budget.

Cost estimates had been revised downward in NSC 159/3. Two alternatives

had been considered by the Planning Board, one assuming continuation of the

present goal of 57 fighter-interceptor squadrons, the other the 75 squadrons

proposed in the *ir Force continental defense plan. NSC 159/3 estimated the

cost of these alternatives as follows (in billions):

Additional to Develop

FY1954 FY1955 to Readiness btvel

S3.789 $4,389 $7,280

S3.795 $4,554 $8,386

Minimum

Maximum

These totals included the costs of development and installations, but not of continuing operations.*9

The Joint Chiefs of Staff characterized NSC 159/3 as militarily sound so long

as its implementation did not detract from offensive capability They recommended that it not be approved until they had completed their new look at

strategy.70

The Council members discussed NSC 159/3 on 24 September 1953. They

129

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JCS and National Policy

heard the views of the President's civilian consultants, who generally endorsed

the paper but stipulated that increased continental defense expenditures should

not be allowed to compromise the policy of budget reduction.71 The Council

then approved NSC 159/3 with minor amendments, and with the stipulation that

the following actions would be taken by the dates indicated:

(1) Before 15 November, a more precise definition by the Department of Defense of the following programs and their phasing, and the identification

of the portion of the Defense Department effort and costs related to these

programs: (a) seaward extensions of the Southern Canadian early warning system, (b) fighter interceptor forces, (c) antiaircraft forces. [These, as

NSC 159/3 had indicated, were programs for which force requirements

were still under study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff].

(?.) Before 1 December, determination by the Council of the manner of financing the recommended integrated programs for continental defense in FY

1954 and future years, in proper relation to the over-all budget and taking into account FY 1955 budget submissions by the departments and

agencies.72

The President approved this decision. The amended version of the Planning

Board paper, NSC 159/4, was issued on 25 September 1953.^

Continental Defense and the FY 1955 Budg

The military programs approved in NSC 159/4 were drawn from the Service

continental defense plans. The Council's approval was general and did not

extend to the force goals proposed in these plans. It was left to the Department

of Defense to determine force objectives in connection with the FY 1955 budget.

Planning for this budget had begun on 16 September 1953 with a formal

request by Secretary Wilson to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for force recommendations.74 The proposals forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Services for

this purpose departed in some respects from the objectives in the continental

defense plans. Thus the Air Force requested an increase of only one wing (three

squadrons) in the number of fighter interceptors, which would increase the total

of such wings from 28 in FY 1954 to 29 by the end of FY 1955. How many of these

would be assigned to the continental United States was not indicated.75 On the

other hand, the final goal was raised to 27 wings (81 squadrons) for the continental United States, as part of the 137-wing program for FY 1957. The Air Force also

proposed two more AEW squadrons for FY 1955.

The Army sought 130 antiaircraft.battalions, an increase of 13 over the FY

1954 goal. Of these, 84 would be in the continental United States. These objectives,

however, had been computed without reference to the Army's continental defense

plan, and must be raised if the latter were approved.

The Navy proposed to attain its full complement of 36 destroyer-escort picket

vessels by the end of 1955, and accordingly sought funds for converting 24 in the

FY 1955 budget, since 12 others had already been funded. The Navy also planned

to procure the first three squadrons (27 planes) of AEW/ASW aircraft.7,>

130

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IWW^.^WWnS»»?"«»*»*^

Continental Air Defense

The Service proposals were sent to Secretary Wilson on 2 October 1953 with

the endorsement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.77 They became the basis for tentative budget estimates that were turned down by the National Security Council

on 13 October 1953. The Council's action had the effect of determining the

manner of financing the programs in NSC 159/4. Clearly there was to be no

increase in the defense budget, and these programs must be paid for out of

savings in other military expenditures. Moreover, it was equally evident that

there could now be no thought of meeting all force objectives by 31 December

1955, the target date in the Service continental defense plans.

Meanwhile the Council's action on NSC 159/4 had imposed a new task on the

Joint Chiefs of Staff: preparing a more precise definition of three important

programs (seaward extension of the early warning line, fighter interceptors, and

antiaircraft forces). In developing the necessary information for the Council, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff were forced to fix on new objectives for these programs for

the FY 1955 budget and at the same time to come to grips with the discrepancies

among the Service continental defense plans. As Admiral Radford pointed out

to his colleagues, NSC 159/4 might be regarded as having settled the important

question of whether or not to plan for two separate types of ocean barriers, but

the priority between the two types, as forces became available that could be

assigned for either purpose, remained to be determined.78

For preliminary definitions of the three programs in which the Council was

interested, the Joint Chiefs of Staff turned to the appropriate Services.79 The

replies showed some effect of budgetary pressure. The Navy, in defining the

program for the early warning barriers, now proposed to spread the conversion

of the remaining 24 radar picket vessels in equal increments over the next four

years. On the other hand, the Navy now sought 35 instead of 27 AEW/ASW

aircraft for FY 1955, and had raised Ihe ultimate objective to 150, a figure that

would suffice to keep 108 planes in operation at all times. These force requirements assumed the full barriers originally proposed by the Continental US

Defense Planning Group—from Argentia to the Azores and from Kodiak to

Pearl Harbor. The barriers were to operate in close coordination with the existing

control and warning network and with its contiguous seaward extensions (to

which the Navy had now dropped its opposition).*0

The Air Force definition of the fighter interceptor program indicated a reduction of the objective to 69 squadrons (23 wings), to be achieved by FY 1958. The

FY 1955 goal was 19 wings. Beginning in 1956, these aircraft were to be augmented with pilotless interceptors, or guided missiles. §I

The Army defined the antiaircraft program as requiring 150 batteries, but set

the end of FY 1956 as the target date instead of 31 December 1955 ^ Intermediate

goals for 1954 and 1955 were 70 and 107 battalions. The possibility of using

National Guard units to meet some of these requirements was still under study.

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed these Service proposals. General

Twining accepted the Army antiaircraft force figures in return for a promise by

the Army that, if possible, up to 50 battalions would be provided from National

Guard sources. He also raised no objection to the Navy plans, thus tacitly agreeing that the Navy should furnish its own aircraft for the early warning barriers.

131
JCS and National Policy

The Joint Chiefs of Staff thereupon informed Secretary Wilson on 21 November

that they had approved the Service force goals. They estimated the costs of these

alternatives as follows (in billions):

FY1954 FY 1955

Antiaircraft battalions

Fighter interceptors

Seaward extensions

Total

$1,265 $1,478

1.443 1495

.035 .205

$2,743 $3,178

The Joint Chiefs of Staff promised Mr. Wilson that they would make every

effort to meet the priority schedule in NSC 159/4. But, they warned, continental

defense should not take preclusive priority over essential offensive programs.84

Before this information reached the Secretary, it had become evident that it

would be impossible to complete a full report on these programs by 15 November,

as the Council had wished. The President therefore authorized a delay in its

submission, but at the same time directed the Department of Defense to submit

a broader report of progress on all the military programs listed in NSC 159/4 in

the two highest priority classes.85

Preparation of this report also fell to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Their draft, sent

to Secretary Wilson on 21 November 1953, reflected further changes, partly in

response to budget limits. Thus the Army had indicated that it would probably

be necessary to cut back the antiaircraft program to 66, 79, and 100 battalions for

fiscal years 1954, 1955, and 1956 respectively, although the ultimate goal of 150

battalions was still desired. The existence of an offshore extension of the radar

warning and control system was no longer in doubt, but the assignment of

forces for the purpose remained a matter of dispute. The Air Force had asked the

Navy temporarily to supply DERs, and ultimately to replace these with 16 new

ships especially designed for the mission. The Navy, however, had earmarked

its DERs for the early warning barriers. It had countered with a proposal to

supply four converted Liberty ships (YAGRs) and two lighter-than-air patrol

craft in each fiscal year from 1955 through 1958. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had not

yet settled the issue, but they had agreed that they themselves would assign

DERs as they became available, and that the contiguous radar extension would

be given the same emphasis as the early warning system.

The Air Force was also seeking funds in the FY 1955 budget for two AEW

squadrons, for aU five proposed Texas Towers, and for major elements of other

programs, as follows: ConsoUn homing beacon transmitters for aircraft identification, initial equipment for the Lincoln semi-automatic control system, purchase of 125 of a projected total of 323 low-altitude (gap-filler) radars, and continuation of the Arctic test program. The Navy proposed to complete the procurement of equipment for the LOFAR network.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved all these proposals.** Admiral Radford

summarized them for uNc National Security Council on 23 November 1953 in a

general report of the status of the military programs called for in NSC 159/4,8?

Most of the issues between the Air Force and the Navy had by now been

132

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Continental Air Defense

settled. It was accepted that there would be two sets of radar barriers in ocean

waters, one contiguous with the existing control and warning net of the Air

Defense Command, the other connected to the early warning system and commanded by C1NCLANT and ONCPAC The Navy would furnish all ships needed

for both systems and would be allowed to operate its own aircraft for the early

warning barriers. Naval forces operating as part of the extension of the control

and warning system would remain under naval command, but would operate

under the direction of the Air Defense Command. These agreements were

formalized ina memorandum signed by General Twining and Admiral Carney.

88

The sole remaining issue—the number and type of ships to be furnished by the

Navy—was relatively minor and could be settled when the vessels became

available.

The force objectives approved by the joint Chiefs of Staff were incorporated

in the FY 1955 budget. The Navy received funds for six radar picket ships, four

ocean radar station vessels (YAGRs), and 35 AEW/ASW aircraft. The Air Force

was authorized 19 fighter wings and two more AEW squadrons, while the

approval of its 137-wing goal enabled it to advance to FY 1957 the target date for

its full complement of 23 fighter wings. The Air Force budget also provided for

the entire Texas Tower program, for 125 gap-filler radars, and for the desired

components of the Consolan, or Multiple Corridor, identification system and of

the Lincoln control system. The Army was allowed 79 Regular Army antiaircraft

battalions for the continental United States.

09

Military expenditures for continental defense in the FY 1955 budget were

estimated in billions of dollars as follows:

Anturn r-»tt lofcrs

Fighter interceptor forte*

Air iwumi a«*J warning system

SrawanJ c*trn>u>p. of contiguous

radar twerage

Sc4vvAtÜ t-»!rfh«'!i vt *mHt\hltm

K jtnjd* early wammfc *y*trm

riarbor defen*e

AnrtK tr«t program

1UIAK *y*tem

Southern Canada rartv warning

*y*trrt (Un4 portion)

Total

$1 434

1.243

314

0<*

.030

013

010

005

$3 1*

The totals for fiscal years 1953 And 1951 had been $2,422 billion and $2,939

biiiion, respectively.• The increase ov^r 1954 was relatively small, but *ppe*r$

striking when contrasted with the drastic reduction in overall military spending,

from $43 billion in FY 1954 to less than S3« billion in FY 1955.*

1 This fiscal

accomplishment was made possible by the dttp cuts in other forces And in

personnel strengths that have been described in Chapter 3. In sending the

budget to Congress, President Eisenhower dr?w particular attention to it* provf

*wn for string** **r defense*.**

133

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JCS and National Policy

Canada's Role in the Early Warning System All US discussions about the desirability of an early warning system had

tacitly assumed that Canada would allow construction of the line on her

soil. After the approval of NSC 159/4, however, formal Canadian assent became

necessary. To insure Canadian collaboration in the project, the US Government

made use ofa new working-level liaison agency, the Joint Military Study Group.

The establishment of this body had been stipulated by the Canadian Government in agreeing to the Arctic test program proposed by the United States in

January 1953. Its mission would be to evaluate the results of the tests and to

prepare appropriate recommendations.

93 The United States Government approved this proposal on recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chief

of Staff, USAF, was empowered to appoint the chairman and other members of

the US delegation.

94

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the CUSDPG early warning plan,

they questioned certain parts of it, as described previously, but not the basic

proposal fora radar screen across Canada. Accepting this part as being tacitly

approved, the Continental US Defense Planning Group recommended on 24

September 1953 that the United States, through the Military Study Group, seek

immediate Canadian approval. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed and issued the

necessary instructions to the US members of the Group.

95

After considering the recommendations of its scientific advisers, the Military

Study Group agreed on8 October that an early warning line was needed but

proposeda location slightly farther north (the 55th, rather than the 54th parallel),

in order to afford more warning time and to move the system beyond the area of

heavy air traffic. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted this change. The next step

was to approach Canada through the Permanent Joint Board on Defense.

96

Discussions in the Board were followed by conversations in Washington

between high-level military and diplomatic representatives in both governments.

The Canadian spokesmen indicated that they fully accepted the need fora

warning line along the 55th parallel and that they had already made preliminary

site surveys. Formal agreement was reached on6 November, when the Canadian Ambassador announced that his government was willing to proceed with

the construction of the line, subject toa cost-sharing agreement to be worked out

later. He recommended that the two Air Forces select the final locations for the

component stations and that the Joint Military Study Group determine specifications for equipment.97 These proposals were acceptable to the United States. On 8 December 1953 the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued the necessary instructions to

General Twining to initiate cooperation with Canada in these matters.**

The Military Study Group recommended on 18 December 1953 that responsibility for selecting equipment be shifted to the two Air Forces, since they would

be the ultimate users. The Group set forth the following requirements for the

system:a probability of at least 95 percent detection of single aircraft from

ground level to 65,000 feet altitude; ability to distinguish between inbound and

outbound aircraft, and between one plane and several in tight formation; ability

to determine approximate height of targets; anda high reliability of identification.

131

I
mwMcuM*sin*va«t twmaaWB

Continental Air Defense

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved these suggestions and took note of General

Twining's expressed intention to initiate immediate engineering studies, in

cooperation with the Royal Canadian Air Force, for selection of equipment."

The basic decisions concerning the Mid-Canada Line (as it was later called)

had now been made. A public announcement was in order, since the construction of the line could not be concealed. A press release drafted by the Canadian

Chiefs of Staff, reviewed and approved by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff,100 was

issued by the two nations on 8 April 1954. It announced that both governments

had agreed on the need for a radar system generally to the north of settled

territory in Canada and that the task of selecting sites was well advanced.101 The

expected date of completion was not indicated in the announcement; however,

the two countries hoped to have it in operation by December 1956.102

A Second Look at Continental Defense Plans

The presentation by the Department of Defense to the National Security

Council concerning the three programs mentioned in the Council's decision

on NSC 159/4, after repeated postponement, was finally submitted on 14 January

1954.103 The Council noted that the Department was still analyzing the costs of

continental defense and agreed that, after this process had been completed,

NSC 159/4 would be reviewed and revised.104

A revision of NSC 159/4, designated NSC 5408, was circulated by the Planning Board on 11 February 1954. The principal change was that fighter interceptor and antiaircraft forces were now elevated to the highest priority. It was also

made clear that increased emphasis on continental defense was not to jeopardize

the objective of a balanced budget.105

The Joint Chiefs of Staff found NSC 5408 acceptable.106 The National Security

Council adopted it, with minor amendments, on 17 February 1954. The members also voted to require periodic reports of progress on continental defenses

beginning in June 1954. The President approved the revised version on 24 February 1954.107

The Council had thus in effect reaffirmed the policy set forth in NSC 159/4.

Within a few months, however, the members were forced to reexamine it and to

consider the possibility of a more urgent approach to continental defense. Suggestions for such a change came from another consultant to the Council, Mr.

Robert C. Sprague. In 1953, as a consequence of Congressional alarm stemming

from the Soviet thermonuclear test, Mr. Sprague had been named by the Senate

Armed Services Committee to investigate US air defenses,108 After completing

his investigation, Mr. Sprague recommended several steps for improvement,

including more vigorous research, augmented readiness and armament for fighter

aircraft, and improved launching facilities to speed up the rate of fire of Nike

missiles.109 Secretary Wilson submitted these suggestions to the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, who found that, insofar as they were practicable they were already in

progress or under consideration.110

135

r

^^B^t^a^anmmmmmmmmammmmmmm mmmm «LMJO*'
JCS and National Policy

In May 1954 President Eisenhower asked Mr. Sprague to act as an adviser to

the Council, principally to work with the Planning Board in reviewing the progress reports required in connection with NSC 5408.111 While serving in this

capacity, Mr. Sprague found it advisable to revise his earlier report to reflect new

and more alarming estimates of Soviet capabilities, which seemed to call for an

immediate US response. Working from the assumption that by 1 July 1957 the

USSR would be able to strike with jet bombers carrying as many as 80 tenmegaton and 400 sixty-kiloton bombs,112 Mr. Sprague, in a report on 1 July 1954,

recommended that the National Security Council determine the percentage of

kill thai US defenses must be able to attain in order to hold damage within

acceptable limits, and that the Department of Defense then determine the forces

and weapons needed to attain this percentage. Meanwhile, he believed, the

increased threat should be met by accelerating the expansion of the radar net,

the construction of the two early warning lines, and the increase in fighter

interceptors and in antiaircraft forces, as well as by some of the measures he had

recommended earlier.u3

At the same meeting, spokesmen for the Services presented summaries of

their first semiannual progress reports on continental defense. The Air Force

representative touched on the development of the nuclear-armed air-to-air rocket,

which had slipped so badly that its introduction had been rescheduled for 1958.

The potentialities of this weapon (having a kill probability of two, and thus able

greatly to increase the proportion of enemy bombers destroyed by a given number of fighter aircraft) impressed Mr. Sprague. In a memorandum written immediately after the meeting, he urged that the development of this weapon be

placed ahead of all other programs.1 u

The Council had by then begun considering guidelines for FY 1956 budget

planning under NSC 162-2. This fact made it timely to review continental defense

policy. The first draft of the guidelines, NSC 3422, was discussed at the 1 July

meeting. The National Security Council directed the Department of Defense to

study Mr. Sprague's recommendations and to suggest policy changes, if

necessary, at the same time that the Planning Board brought in a revision of NSC*

5422.m"

Secretary Wilson passed the recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

who pronounced them generally valid. But, they poirv. ,i out, the feasibility of

accelerating continental defense programs was a matter to be determined by the

Department oi Defense in the light of the money, manpower, md production

capacity available. They rejected the suggestion of an overriding priority for the

atomic rocket, which was only one element of an interdependent defensive

complex u* Mr. Wilson forwarded these conclusions to the National Security

Council with his concurrence.n?

The Council discussed the subject again on 2** July 1^54 Mr. Sprague appeared

at this meeting and urged greater speed m constructing the Distant Early Warn

ing Une And its Pacific extension And m procuring low-altitude radarv These

programs, he believed, should be substantially completed by July 1^37, when

most others were scheduled for completion a* The National Security Council

took no action At the time.51"'

136

i..
Continental Air Defense

NSC 5422 had called for execution of active and passive continental defense

programs, but had attached no special degree of urgency to the subject. When it

was rewritten, the special committee that prepared the revision (NSC 5422/1)

recommended that the programs in NSC 5408 be speeded up if such action

proved feasible. Some members, reflecting Mr. Sprague's viewpoint, had sought

also to include specific target dates for certain programs. They had been opposed

by the Defense and JCS spokesmen in the Planning Board.120

When the Council members discussed NSC 5422/1 on 5 August 1954, they

adopted a paragraph calling for acceleration of continental defense programs as

far as was feasible and operationally desirable, but set no target dates.121 Thus,

as the Joint Chiefs of Staff had desired, the Department of Defense was left free

to determine what action, if any, should be taken. The Council members called

for the next progress report on NSC 5408 by 15 November instead of 15

December—early enough to allow them to order a faster pace of development (if

suJ. seemed desirable) in connection with the FY 1956 budget.122

Command and Organizational Changes

Considering the importance of continental defense, it was somewl.at anomalous that there was no unity of command or coordination of planning for

this function below the JCS level. Suggestions for a unified continental defense

command had often been made, and were renewed in 1953. The Kelly Group

called for a "real centralized authority charged with viewing, as a whole, the defens*» of the continent against air attack, and seeing to it that the efforts of all Service*, are in Hep/'1

*

3

In October 1953. commenting on a suggestion by Admiral

Carney that the Continental US Defense Planning Group be absorbed into the

Joint Staff, General Ridgway urged upon his colleagues the need of creating an

agency that would combine responsibility for both planning and execution in

this field - in other words, a joint air defense command.

i:

*

Rather surprisingly, opposition came from the Air Force, where General

twining adopted as his own the conclusions of a studv completed in December

1953 The authors of this study agreed that it was desirable to bring the function

under more immediate cognisance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but they held that

neither of the two established types of JCS command was applicable. A unified

command, with the usual component command echelon inserted below the

commander, would deprive him of direct operational control of the forces. A

specified, or single-Service, command was op^r\ to the obvious objection that

the mission involved all the Service». The existing arrangement, based cm agreements between the Commander. Air Defense Command, and other responsible

officers, constituted a satisfactory working solution Atvd shiHild be left unchanged

better cognizance of the function by the Joint Chiefs of Staff could readily be

accomplished through periodic reports rendered by the Air Force.*25

Admiral Radtord emphatically disagreed, Jrle believed that xhif time had come

to place air defense under centralized command. Hi» views were as follow»;

137
JCS and National Policy

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are charged by law with responsibilities regarding

the establishment of unified commands in strategic areas when such unified

commands are in the interest of national security. In an era when enemy capabilities to inflict massive dirnage on the continental United States by surprise air

attack are rapidly increasing, I consider that there is no doubt whatsoever as to

the duty of tne Joint Chiefs of Staff to establish a suitable "joint" command. I use

the word "joint" advisedly because I realize that the terms of reference that may

be issued to the commander may not exactly fit the presently agreed definition

of a "unified" command. Nevertheless/ the command will be composed of forces

of each of the services and provide for the coordinated accomplishment of functions of each of the services for the air defense of the United States.

The new command, in his opinion, should be given to a general officer of the

Air Force, and should embrace all air and antiaircraft forces regularly assigned to

defense of the United States, radar stations within continental US borders, and

naval forces assigned to contiguous radar coverage. Early warning facilities

should, as presently planned, be under unified commands (CINCAL, CINCNE,

CINCLANT, and CINCPAC), but their operation should be responsive to the

needs of the joint air defense commander.126

Admiral Radford's colleagues approved these recommendations on 22 January 1954.127

The Joint Strategic Plans Committee embodied them in a set of terms

of reference for the new command, and proposed that the position be given to

the Commander, Air Defense Command, US Air Force. On 22 March 1954 the

Joint Chiefs of Staff referred these plans for comment to the Commander, Air

Defense Command, General Benjamin W. Chidlaw, USAF128

Instead of commenting on the JCS proposals, General Chidlaw countered

with his own draft, which would confer on him somewhat greater authority'. It

would allow him to determine when to take command of the augmentation

forces from other commands and Services and to exercise authori' through

subordinate joint commands rather than through Service channels. General

Chidlaw admitted that his proposals might appear strange to those unfamiliar

with the requirements of the task, which was a functional mission carried out on

a geographical basis. He urged, however, that they be approved at once so that

he might proceed with the still-unfinished task of drawing up a comprehensive

plan for air defense. His plans received the full endorsement of General

Twining.129

There followed considerable discussion centering upon General Chidlaw's

proposals, to which the other Services objected because of the authority envisioned for the new commander.110 At length on 16 July 1954 the Joint Chiefs of

Staff approved a version that gave General Chidlaw essentially what he had

sought. It directed the establishment of the Continental Air Defense Command

(CONAD) as a joint command (the terms unified and specified were intentionally avoided), for which the Department of the Air Force was to serve as executive agent. The position was to be held by the commander of the existing Air

Defense Command, whose headquarters at Ent Air Force Base, Colorado, was

additionally designated as headquarters of CONAD. Initially, the command was

to consist of the Air Defense Command, USAF; the Antiaircraft Command, US

138

•
Continental Air Defense

Army; and a Naval command (to be established later) comprising the ships of

the contiguous radar systems.

The Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command (CINCONAD)

was to exercise operational control over all forces made available for the purpose

by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was to prepare, and submit for JCS approval,

plans for air defense and for early warning systems and procedures. He would

conduct liaison with appropriate US, Canadian, and Mexican authorities. He

would assume operational control of augmentation forces when he believed

there existed an imminent threat of air attack. CINCONAD would retain this

control until he believed the forces could be safely released; however, the parent

commanders might appeal the question of release to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Subordinate joint commands were to be superimposed upon the existing Air

Force command structure. Each command in the United States, down to air

division level was to be additionally designated as a joint headquarters.131

On 26 July 1954 the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary Wilson of their

decision. Four days later he approved it and confirmed the appointment of the

Air Force as executive agent. Accordingly, by formal directive to the Services on

2 August 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff officially established the Continental Air

Defense Command, effective 1 September 1954, and appointed General Chidlaw

as Commander in Chief.132

Months before the new command was established, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

had agreed that the Continental United States Defense Planning Group was no

longer needed. On 29 January 1954 they directed that, effective 1 February, the

Group would be abolished and its functions and personnel transferred to the

Joint Strategic Plans Group.133

The Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee

When the Continental Defense Committee of the NSC Planning Board was

appointed in May 1953, it was directed to devise organizational machinery

needed to enable the Council to oversee the development of continental defense.

In its report, NSC 159, the Committee concluded that the Operations Coordinating Board, the formation of which was pending, could serve as a supervisory

body. For periodic evaluation of net Soviet capacity, the Committee recommended the establishment of a permanent subcommittee composed of the Chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence. This

suggestion had come from the new Director. Mr. Allen Dulles.134

When the Committee submitted NSC 159 to the Council, President Eisenhower referred this part of it to the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization,

Dr. Arthur S. Flemming, for further study.13S The outcome of this process was a

set of proposals drafted by the Planning Board, based on recommendations from

Dr. Flemming's office, that was sent to the Council on 9 April 1954. The Board

concluded that continuing action in continental defense could be insured by

139

,
JCS and National Policy

requiring responsible agencies to submit semiannual progress reports to the

Council. For periodic reappraisal of Soviet capability, most Board members

favored the establishment of a standing two-man subcommittee, to which other

members would be added as necessary on an ad hoc basis, such as the heads of

the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Federal Civil

Defense Administration, and the Atomic Energy Commission. But the JCS

adviser, supported by the Defense, Treasury, and FOA members of the Board,

believed the Department of Defense should be responsible for preparing such

studies.136

The question at issue here had come up in October 1952 without being

resolved. Soviet net capability was, of course, the difference between two other

quantities, the Soviets' gross offensive capacity and the defensive strength of the

United States. Who should perform the subtraction to derive this difference?

One alternative would require highly classified information about US forces and

weapons to be disclosed to persons outside the Department of Defense; the

other would mean that equally sensitive intelligence information regarding the

Soviet Union must be released outside the Central Intelligence Agency. The

Joint Chiefs of Staff firmly supported the position taken by their adviser in the

Board. The establishment of a special committee, they believed, would require

detailed operating plans to be divulged to persons having no need to know, and

would infringe upon their own responsibilities and those of the National Security Council.137

Before the Council discussed the matter, Admiral Radford and Mr. Allen

Dulles attempted to compose their differences in a conference that merely made

it dear how far apart they were. The Director of Central Intelligence contended

that responsibility for estimates of Soviet capabilities had been conferred upon

him by law. No information would be needlessly endangered under his proposal,

Mr. Dulles maintained; the subcommittee would require only estimates of the

effectiveness of US forces, not details of war plans. Moreover, he feared that

appraisals emanating from the Department of Defense might be colored for

budgetary or other reasons. Admiral Radford viewed the process of evaluation

as a conventional problem in military operational planning. In this view, the

Central Intelligence Agency was analogous to the intelligence section of a

commander's staff, and should feed data to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (the equivalent of an operations section) to be evaluated in relation to US capabilities.

Admiral Radford also reminded Mr. Dulles that the Secretary of Defense had his

own statutory responsibilities to consider.138

After considering the subject on 13 May 1954, the National Security Council

postponed a decision on the question of machinery for evaluation, while approving the Planning Board's other proposals.139 On 9 June 1954 Admiral Radford

and Mr. Dulles appeared before the Council and set forth their opposing views.

President Eisenhower then settled the issue through a compromise. He ordered

the establisniRcnt. on a trial basis, of the subcommittee sought by Mr. Dulles,

but named Admiral Radford as its chairman. The two members were to prepare

their own terms of reference and were to be aided by a staff with a director of

140

\

a '
Continental Air Defense

their own choosing. The President specified that there was to be no unnecessary

disclosure of war plans or of intelligence methods or sources.

140

In accord with this decision, Admiral Radford and Mr. Dulles submitted

terms of reference, modeled on those given the Edwards Subcommittee in 1953,

which called fora report covering the period through1 July 1957 to be submitted

by1 November 1954. The Council approved these terms on 24 June.

141

On4 November 1954 Admiral Radford and Mr. Dulles submitted their findings to the Council. The members of that body found no reason to order any

change in continental defense programs, but approved the subcommittee's recommendation that a permanent procedure be established to insure a new evaluation at least annually. The nature of this procedure was left for future determination.142

1

Northern Canada (Distant Early Warning) Line The Arctic test program was conducted by the Western Electric Company

undera contract with the Air Research and Development Command of the

US Air Force. By the middle of 1954 the results showed that it was feasible to

operate radar warning stations at high latitudes. Engineers of the company, in

consultation with US and Canadian Air Force and Navy officers, had selected

tentative sites fora line all the way across Canada.

143

On the basis of these findings, the US-Canadian Military Study Group on3

June 1954 recommended the construction of an early line across the more northern portions of North America, in order to keep defenses abreast of expected

Soviet technological progress. The members pointed out that the value of this

line would be "directly related to the effectiveness with which it is extended to

cover flanking approach routes," thus in effect recommending that, like the

Mid-Canada Line, it should be thrust out into the oceans.

144 On

9 July the Joint

Chiefs of Staff instructed the US members of the Permanent Joint Board on

Defense to seek the agreement of their Canadian colleagues to the construction

of the line.

145

Meanwhile, on 30 June 1954, the Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff

Committee, General Charles Foulkes, had notified Admiral Radford that the

Canadian Government would construct the Mid-Canada Line at its own expense.

Admiral Radford, in reply, promised that the United States would erect the

seaward extensions progressively, and told General Foulkes that the question of

the far northern line would soon be raised within the Permanent Joint Board.

146

In acknowledging this reply, General Foulkes wrote that his Government

was already convinced of the need for the northern line, and hence that no

Board action was needed. At the same time, he pointed out that, under current

plans, all radar lines in eastern Canada—the PINE TREE chain, the Mid-Canada

Line, and the Atlantic extension of the latter—would converge on the coasts of

Labrador and Newfoundland, and thus would afford little or no early warning

to the important military installations there. He suggested that the northern tip

141

!

i
JCS and National Policy

of the Atlantic barrier might be pushed forward to Greenland (presumably in

connection with the construction of the northern line).

147

Admiral Carney, commenting on this latter proposal, objected that it was

impracticable to operatea continuous barrier out of Greenland, and that it would

be expensive and wasteful to relocate the Atlantic barrier.

148 His colleagues

concurred and instructed the US members of the Military Study Group that, if

the subject came up, they should oppose any change in plans for the Atlantic

extension but should not object toa study of the possibility of additional sea

barriers.

149

On2 September 1954 the Canadian Government formally agreed to the establishment of a Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line across the most northerly

practicable part of North America. The agreement was without prejudice to the

extent of Canadian participation and was subject to review after costs and other

details had been studied. At the same time, the Canadian note expressed serious

concern over the fact that the proposed seaward wing of this line would give

insufficient early warning of aircraft approaching from the northeast. It urged

study of an alternative route that would allowa greater margin of safety for

Labrador and Newfoundland.

150

Five days later, Ottawa submitteda draft ofa

proposed joint announcement of the agreement, which includeda statement

that the line would be linked with seaward extensions to be established by the

United States on both flanks of the continent.

151

It was not dear how the Canadian Government had formed the impression

that the United States was committed to extension of the northern line. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff, in commenting on the Canadian proposals, warned Secretary

Wilson that the United States should not be trapped into accepting this inference.

The joint announcement should state merely that portions of the complete warning and control system would be extended to seaward. As for the problem of

early warning for Labrador and Newfoundland, they pointed out that "the

flexibility afforded by the use of mobile AEW forces, and continued improvement in radar performance will allow wide latitude in selecting the {final) line of

radar coverage."

152

This JCS advice was accepted at higher levels of the US Government. The

announcement, released by the two countries on 27 Septembei 1954, had been

amended as the Joint Chiefs of Staff desired.

153 But the question of ultimate

seaward extension remained. The Military Study Group had recently reaffirmed

the "importance and necessity of. . . compatible extensions to any land-based

distant early warning line" and had recommended that planning for this purpose begin at once. On 20 September 1954 General Twining told his colleagues

that he shared these views; he urgeda joint Air Force-Navy study of the feasibility of such extensions. He reported also that he had established, in cooperation

with the Royal Canadian Air Force,a committee to define military characteristics

for the DEW Line. This committee had recommended thata location study group

be established to choose final station sites. General Twining asked that the Navy

provide officers to serve on this group.

154

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the conclusions of the Military Study

Group, but, taking note of reservations expressed by Admiral Camey, they took

142 . '
Continental Air Defense

care to make it clear that they were not committing themselves to seaward

extension of the DEW Line. A firm decision on that question, they indicated,

awaited further study. At the same time, they approved the studies recommended by General Twining and directed the Navy to participate.155

The Location Study Group was established with representatives of the Navies

and Air Forces of both countries and of appropriate civil departments of the

Canadian Government. The members reported their conclusions on 12 November 1954. They recommended a route lying for the most part between the Arctic

Circle and latitude 70°. It extended from northwestern Alaska (Cape Lisburne)

along the coast of mainland Canada to the east side of Baffin Island (Cape Dyer),

thence across Davis Strait to the west coast of Greenland (Holsteinborg). The

western end of the line should be strung southward around Alaska to join the

Kodiak-Hawaii barrier already programmed for the Mid-Canada Line. The eastem end would also have to be pushed beyond Holsteinborg (probably by extending it eastward across Greenland, a more practicable alternative than running it

south along the coast). It might also be connected with the Argentia-Azores line.156

This plan was sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 28 December 1954, bearing

the endorsement of the Military Study Group and of General Twining.157 At

Admiral Carney's suggestion, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 14 January

1955 approved the proposed route only as far as Cape Dyer, as they felt that it

might eventually prove better to swing the line southward to northern Labrador,

and thus to link it with the Argentia-Azores barrier, than to extend it to

Greenland.158 They informed the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee at once of

their decision. Shortly thereafter, their Canadian colleagues accepted the plan

with the same reservation concerning the eastern terminus of the route.159

The USAF-RCAF Military Characteristics Committee submitted its report on

7 September 1954. It was based on the assumptions that by 1957 the Soviet

Union would have enough high-performance jet bombers to conduct 'large

scale operations with atomic and thermonuclear weapons against all critical

target areas in North America,"160 and might be in possession of intercontinental

missiles by 1965. The Committee therefore specified very high standards for the

distant early warning system: a detection capability of 100 percent at altitudes up

to 100,000 feet (high enough to detect guided missiles), beginning at 200 feet

elevation over land and at water level over the oceans, plus a system reliability of

100 percent. But, recognizing that these goals were beyond the present state of

the art, the Committee proposed slightly lower standards to be attained as soon

as possible: a 95-98 percent detection probability up to 65,000 feet (maximum

altitude for aircraft) and 95 percent system reliability Even these objectives were

not at once attainable, but it was urgently necessary to begin at once, using the

best equipment available, in order to install a line by mid-1957.1M

General Twining endorsed these proposals, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff took

no action on them at the moment, possibly for a reason pointed out by General

Ridgway: the construction of a line meeting these requirement-» might be financially infeasible and the costs should first be carefully studied.1

** Meanwhile the

Canadian Chiefs of Staff had proposed certain amendments that, without altering the high detection probability and system reliability percentages, would

143
-

]CS and National Policy

amend the statement of desired characteristics to reflect a more realistic acceptance of limitations (such as by specifying maximum practicable ability to identify targets and to indicate position, speed, and direction of flight).163

The US Navy had meanwhile conducted its own study of the possibility of

extending the DEW Line to seaward by using aircraft and DERs. Its conclusions

were that such barriers could be operated with an 80 percent detection capability

up to 55,000 feet, with a 95 percent system reliability. In sending these results to

the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 December 1954, Admiral Carney described them as

indicative of what might be accomplished and where improvement was needed.

He believed, however, that no decision should be made at that time on final

military characteristics for the DEW Line. Instead, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should

approve characteristics that could be attained by mid-1958:95-98 percent detection capability at 55,000 feet and 95 percent reliability.164

General Twining believed that these suggestions would degrade the capability of the DEW Line. The standards recommended by the Military Characteristic*

Committee, he urged, should be approved for planning purposes, even though

they might later have to be revised in light of what was technologically attainable.

He restated his conviction mat seaward extensions of the DEW Line, having the

same capabilities as the land portion, were needed. He found in NSC 5408 an

intent that the United States would provide them.165

Admiral Carney was willing to approve the military characteristics submitted

by the committee with this recognition of their tentative nature. As for the

seaward extensions, he agreed that they were essential but pointed out that

ships and aircraft need not necessarily be employed for the purpose; it might be

cheaper and more efficient to use the islands lying between North America and

Europe.166

With this discussion concluded, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were able on 17

December 1954 to approve the proposed military characteristics (including the

changes suggested by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff), subject to possible later

amendment.167 The Canadians subsequently accepted the same version1*

11

These agreements between the military planners of the two countries were

paralleled by others at the diplomatic level. By the end of 1954 the two Governments had agreed to go ahead with the construction of !he DEW Line. The

United States would pay the cost and supervise the process, as the Canadians

were doing with the Mid-Canada Line.1

Objectives for FY 19S6

The Service continental defense programs moved ahead in 1954 faster than

expected. Secretary Wilson's second semi-annual progress report to the

National Security Council in November 1954 indicated that the Navy now planned

to complete its Pacific air-sea barrier by June 1958, a full year ahead of the

original schedule, and to expand the Atlantic LOFAR system and to construct a

second such network in the Pacific bv March 1958. The Air Force believed that

144
I *^vvM«wiW-i>«^'W*«wWn.tnWn,W^

Continental Air Defense

rockets with atomic warheads would be available before the end of calendar

1957.170

The enlarged objectives proposed by the Services were approved in the FY

1956 budget. Without referring the matter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,171 Secretary

Wilson and the President authorized another increase in continental defense

spending, offsetting it, as before, by economizing elsewhere in the military

establishment. Much of this increase resulted from the decision to construct the

DEW Line, for which 50 of the proposed 75 stations were to be funded in FY

1956. But existing programs were also expanded. Thus the Navy obtained

approval for three more LOFAR stations in the Atlantic and for seven in the

Pacific (extending from British Columbia to Southern California and Pearl Harbor),

and for 12 destroyer escort picket ships-—twice the 1955 figure. The Air Force

was authorized ten more fighter interceptor squadrons and three of AEW aircraft,

while the overall goals for these programs were raised to 70 and 12 squadrons

respectively. The Army, still building toward its goal of 150 antiaircraft battalions,

was allowed 95 active Army units (52 armed with Nike missiles) and 47 in the

National Guard.172

For all military continental defense programs, the administration requested

the following amounts in billions of dollars for FY 1956. $.938 for the Army, $.399

for the Navy, and $1,982 for the Air Force.173President Eisenhower's budget

presentation to Congress laid even more stress on continental defense than that

of the previous year. The President cited recent major strides in this field: introduction of Nike missiles, establishment of the new Continental Air Defense

Command, and expansion of radar warning facilities. At the same time, he

noted that these measures would inevitably mean higher costs.174

Continental Defense at the End of 1954

The increase in air defense forces between December 1952 and December

1954 is summarised in Table 11 (pages 113-114). Nearly all forces expanded,

witl: the most important increases taking place in fighter interceptor squadrons

and antiaircraft battalions. The results of this growth were not in themselves

impressive; in many cases the increases were little or no greater than had been

expected in 1952, before the New Look brought greater emphasis on continental

defense. More important was the fact that the force goals accepted as final in

1952 had been superseded by others toward which the Services were still building,

as shown in Table 11.

The table does not, of course, reflect qualitative improvements. The following were ttu* most significant achieved by early 1955: the nearly complete conversion of fighu squadrons to all-weather jets **meä with rockets (the few remaining piston-engme aircraft would be superseded by July 1955); introduction of

new radar equipment with higher altitude range; improved equipment and procedures at control centers, pending the completion of the new system developed

by the Lincoln Laboratory (now called Semi-Automatic Ground Environment or

145

m
I1

JCS and National Polity

SAGE), for which the first two centers were under construction; and the beginning of contiguous seaward radar coverage, making use of AEW aircraft, in both

oceans. Further improvements were in the offing, such as the first supersonic

all-weather fighter (the F-102); the NikeB antiaircraft missile, with an atomic

warhead anda range of 80,000 feet; and another promising missile, Hawk,

designed for low altitude defense. These lines of progress had to some degree

been offset by slippages, as in the progress of the Falcon air-to-air rocket, which

was not expected to be available for another year.

175

The new force goals in effect at the end of 1954 were the product ofa different

approach to the problem. It was now recognized that continental defense constituted a dearcut mission, dependent for its successful accomplishment upon a

complex interrelationship of elements of all three Services. In other words, continental defense had emerged as a separate strategic program. The principal step

in this development had come in September 1953 with the approval of NSC

159/4, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff described as constituting an integrated

military program. The budgets for FYs 1955 and 1956 carried this program into

actuality. The establishment ofa unified command, CONAD, constituted another

recognition of the nature and importance of the continental defense function.

The expansion of continental defense forces and goals during 1953 and 1954

stands in marked contrast to the simultaneous reduction in the overall size of the

military establishment—a reduction dictated, in the final analysis, by the desire

for economy. This desire, to be sure, had by no means been absent from the

administration's approach to continent*! defense. The abandonment of the target date of 31 December 1955 established in NSC 139 was doubtless based in

large part on budgetary considerations, as was the rejection of proposals fora

crash program. But the need to apply more money and effort to this purpose

was recognized as clear and compelling. Improvement of continental defense

consequently becamea cardinal feature of the New Look.

The role of the Eisenhower administration in presiding over the expansion of

continental defense forces in 1953 and 1954 was in large parta chronological

accident. There is little doubt that Mr. Truman, had he remained in office, would

have made similar decisions, as his action in issuing NSC 139 attests. On the

other hand, it is certain that emphasis on continental defense was particularly

congenial to the mental outlook that produced the New took, since one aspect

of this attitude wasa conviction that the nation must look more carefully to the

protection of her own vitals. As Admiral Radford said in 19S5:

The continental United States is the heartland and the primary source of free

world strength. . . . The continental U.S.; its industry ana institutions, must be

reasonably secure asa base of operations against any likely enemy or combinationofenemies . , . TbeUS. . . , shouWemjpruuuzefoiwsforcontme^

and instant offensive retaliation plus other forms of military assistance to back

up and support our Allies.

m

"Forces for continental defense and instant offensive retaliation"—here was

the New Look ina nutshell. There was no inconsistency in this dual emphasis;

the two sets of forces were complementary—the sword and the shield. Indeed it

146

Ü
Continental Air Defense

could be argued that a stronger defense would increase the deterrent effect of

letaliatory airpower, as President Eisenhower asserted early in 1953.177

The new emphasis given continental defense in 1953 and 1954 did not owe its

inception to the joint Chiefs of Staff. It was triggered by pressure applied by

civilians associated with the Air Force establishment—pressure that was transmitted to the Services through NSC 139, issued against the advice of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. General Bradley and his colleagues favored stronger defenses,

but they believed that increases should be properly phased with other elements

of military strength. In a period of declining military budgets, in prospect even

in 1952, the allocation of resources between continental defense and other

programs, in the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was a matter for careful

professional military judgment.

These views were shared by the new Joint Chiefs of Staff who took office in

1953. "We v ant to see continental defense programming continue on an orderly

basis, with phased increases in forces and facilities," said Admiral Radford in

December 1953.t7n Despite their divergent views on other matters, all four of the

new JCS members could agree in opposing overemphasis on continental defense:

Admiral Radford and General Twining, who probably feared diversion of

resources from strategic airpower (since even complementary forces must compete with one another for hinds when budgets are limited), as well as General

Ridgway and Admiral Carney, the advocates on principle of a balanced military

establishment. Insofar as the size of continental defense forces was an issue, it

was one that cut across all the Services rather than one that divided one Service

from another.l7H

The program adopted by the administration in NSC 159/4 conformed with

the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While providing for general increases in all

forces, it left the Department of Defense free to adjust objectives and schedules.

How far the administration's decision was actually influenced by the Joint Chiefs

of Staff is a question that cannot be answered. Military and economic objectives

converged at this point, since an all-out air defense program would be more

costly than the phased increases to which Admiral Radford referred.

The question of the command structure for continental defense was left

entirely to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Radford led the way toward an

arrangement responsive to the nature of the mission. His leadership in this

regard was the more striking in that he had to overcome the opposition of the

Air Force, which had primary interest tn this field.

Another matter on which the Joint Chiefs ot Staff agreed was that the increases

attained by the end of 1954 were inadequate. The present capability of the

continental defense system is improving," they told Secretary Wilson in March

1955. "but at this time does not provide an acceptable destruction probability

against attacks which the USSR is capable of launching."180 The warning was

similar to that penned by their predecessors two years earlier.

An acceptable destruction probability was the goal of the complex and intricate defense system that had been undertaken in 1953. But already there was a

disquieting prospect that this goal might be beyond reach. It was entirely possible that even after everything was finished—after the last vacuum tube had been

147
]CS and National Poliqj

slipped into place in the last radar station on the lonely Arctic tundra, and the

last of the Lincoln Laboratory's SAGE computers had hummed into watchful

activity at the control centers—the entire system might turn out to be no more

than a staggeringly expensive technological curiosity, of little or no military

value.

This frightening possibility sprang from the unexplored potentialities of the

intercontinental ballistic missile, the development of which was as safely predictable by 1954 as anything could be in the realm of military prophecy. Already the

Joint Chiefs of Staff had found it necessary to stipulate that the Distant Early

Warning Line must incorporate a capacity to detect missiles. But whether it was

possible to do so was by no means certain. "Intercontinental ballistic missiles . . .

will likely be of such performance that presently feasible warning lines will be

ineffective against them," concluded a Navy study of the early warning problem

in 1954.181 And even if they could be detected, how could they be destroyed

before impact?

The question opened up an entirely new dimension in the problem of air

defense. The military commentator for the New York Times, Hanson W. Baldwin,

predicted in November 1954 that the intercontinental missile would mean "the

ultimate, and perhaps the final, triumph of the offense at the very time we are

strengthening the defense." He saw a massive civil defense program as the only

answer to the danger.182 Such gloomy prophecies of an ultimate weapon might

or might not prove to be true. In any case, no better illustration could be cited of

the difficulties of military planning in an age of continuing revolutionary technological change.

148

i
6

Mobilization Planning

The task of mobilization planning was inherent in the legally assigned

responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for preparing strategic and logistic

plans. Given the nature of the process, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could

furnish only general guidance to the Services; it was for the latter to prepare

detailed plans for moving their forces toa war footing and to compile lists of the

huge numbers of items that would be necessary to carry on hostilities.

1

1

Allocation of Responsibilities In the area of mobilization, planning was complicated by the fact that military

preparations had to be synchronized with other plans for marshalling the

nation's economic resources in wartime, which wasa task for civilian leadership.

During the Truman administration, high-level coordination of military and civilian mobilization planning was accomplished through the National Security

Resources Board,a cabinet-level committee created by the National Security Act

of 1947.

2 Actual supervision was the task of the Office of Defense Mobilization,

established by Executive Order during the Korean War. Withfin the Department

of Defense, the Munitions Board (another product of the 1947 Act, descended

from an earlier body, the Army-Navy Munitions Board), an inter-Service committee with a civilian chairman, was responsible for totaling and adjusting the

separate Service mobilization requirements as part of its mission of coordinating

Service procurement. The Munitions Board also managed the national stockpile

of strategic and critical materials, in consultation with appropriate civilian agencies and under guidance from the National Security Resources Board.5

President Eisenhower viewed this wide diffusion of responsibility as undesirable and, soon after his accession, moved to bring mobilization planning under

tighter central control. Under Reorganization Plan No. 3, announced on2 Apni

1953 and effective on 12 June, the National Security Resources Board was

149

,

.^F
JCS ami National Policy

abolished; its functions were given to an enlarged and strengthened Office of

Defense Mobilization, which also took over from the Munitions Board the task of

stockpile administration.4Soon after, under Reorganization Plan No. 6, the Munitions Board was also abolished and its responsibilities transferred to a new

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply and Logistics.

Before 1953 the inadequacies of the JCS planning process, as described in

Chapter 4, prevented any regular, orderly flow of guidance to the Services in

connection with mobilization planning. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had, however,

issued a Joint Mobilization Plan, JCS 1725/47, dating originally from 1950 but

often amended thereafter. It was based on the current mid-range war plan

(JOWP) described earlier, with a D-day (assumed to coincide with M-day) of 1

July 1952. The Services had used this plan to compute their mobilization requirements for a three-year period, fiscal years 1952 through 1954. But when this

process was completed in 1952, the Service estimates added up to a total of $535

billion in hard goods, a figure that, according to the Munitions Board, exceeded

by at least S213 billion the anticipated output of these items.*

When asked by Secretary of Defense Lovett to scale down this inflated total,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff simply discarded the Service estimates and adopted a

new approach. Obtaining estimates from the Munitions Board of maximum hard

goods delivery capabilities for a three-year war (with D-day advanced to 1 July

1953), the Joint Chiefs of Staff allocated this capacity among the Services, and the

latter then developed detailed requirements within their fixed limits. This

Mobilization Production Program was intended as an interim program pending

the completion of the first Joint Strategic Objectives Plan.* The same method,

working backward from capabilities to requirements, was continued m Secretary

Wilson's administration, under the supervision of the Oftice of Defense

Mobilization/

Under the Joint Program fur Planning, the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan was

expected to obviate the need for joint mobilization plans as such. It would

indicate the forces expected to be mobilized during the first 4# months ot a

general war, and would thus become the basis for budgetary decisions necessarv

to provide an adequate mobilization base by D-day, Service requirements developed in conformity with the JSOP were to be reviewed bv the Joint Cruets of

Staff And tested for feasibility by the Munitions Board. The findings of this test

would be applied m preparing mobilization schedules for the related JSt P.* The

process should have become operative in 1954, in Connection with plans for the

F*Y 1956 budget. But its inception was rendered impossible when the Joint Chief*

of Staff proved unable to agree on a JSOP

The Eisenhower Administration and the Mobilization Base in 1953

Mobilization requirements represented money invested to meet An emergency that might never ciCCUf. As such, they constituted a natural target

for the economy dmr undertaken by the fcisenhower administration as soon as

150
Mobilization Planning

it took office. "A thorough review of existing {mobilization! plans and programs

was initiated during the last half of fiscal year 1953," reported Secretary Wilson,

"in order to determine the most effective means for the maintenance of an adequate

mobilization base at minimum cost."9

Under the Truman administration, mobilization plans had stressed expansion of productive potential in preference to the accumulation of large stores of

finished goods ready for immediate issue on M-day.10The new administration

pushed this emphasis a step further. The United States should "increase emphasis on . . . maintenance of defense production plant capacity in the United States,

in lieu of large reserve stocks of end-items," declared the National Security

Council in the policy statement approved on 31 March 1953." The same recommendation appeared in NSC 149/2 and NSC 153/1, which the Council approved

later in 1953.

The application of this policy enabled the administration to recompute at a

lower figure the mobilization requirements in the original FY 1954 budget. The

smaller requirements were justified on several grounds: that the original ones

could not be satisfied "within the time contemplated and within the concept of a

reasonable balance between Federal expenditures and revenues"; that slower

acquisition oi reserve stocks would keep production lines in operation, and thus

ready for acceleration in ca*e of need, over a longer span of time; and that, in an

age of rapid change, large stocks of equipment were subject to obsolescence.'*

How much money was thus saved was not indicated in available records, but

the amount was probably small in comparison with the $5 billion reduction in

aircraft procurement funds made in the 1954 budget, as described in Chapter 3.

But even while reducing the projected size of M-day stockpiles, the administration also undertook to narrow the production base available for mobilization

The previous administration had spread military procurement among as manv

manufacturing plants as possible, to cut losses in case of atomic attack and to

maintain a large number of production lines This practice resulted in higher

unit costs of production, and therefore drew the opposition of Secretary Wilson,

who undertook to concentrate production in fewer plants in order to reduce

costs Such a course of action had been suggested in April 1**53 by General

Bradley, in i memorandum prepared at the request of Deputy Secretary Kyes, as

one of several ways of reducing the defense budget.11

The policy of concentrating production meant the cancellation of some

contracts, an action tiiat produced some criticism when it became known. In

defending the policy Secretary Wilson charged the previous administration

with overrxpandmg the mobilization base. But he reeogm/ed the nerd for the

Federal Government tt» finance the establishment of certain additional type* of

productive capacity that were m short supply.u

Concentration of production mädt^ the mobilization base more vulnerable ti>

attack. and thus ran counter to the stress on continental defense in the New

Look NSC 15*!». the report of the Continental Defense Committee of the flan

nmg Board, which has been described earlier, recommended a program fi*r

continuity of industry among the defense measures to be assigned second priority

NSC 159 4, approved bv the National Security Council m September 1**53. down

151
JCS and National Policy

graded continuity of industry to third priority, and denned it as including dispersion of productive capacity, provision of standby facilities, and stockpiling of

finished goods.

The importance of an adequate and well-protected mobilization base was

recognized in NSC 162/2, which the National Security Council approved on 29

October 1953. This directive recommended the following actions, characterizing

them asa state of limited defense mobilization:

(1) Developing and maintaining production plant capacity, dispersed witha

view to rninimizing destruction by enemy attack and capable of rapid

expansion or prompt conversion to essential wartime output.

(2) Creating and maintaining minimum essential reserve stocks of selected

end-items, so located as to support promptly and effectively the war

effort in areas of probable commitment until war production and shipping capacity reaches the required wartime levels.

(3) Maintaining stockpiling programs, ?.nd providing additional production

facilities, for those materials the shortage of which would affect critically

essential defense programs; meanwhile reducing the rates of other stockpile materials.15

The FY 1955 budget, however, revealed no trace of any heightened sense of

urgency in mobilization planning. The policies applied to the previous budget—

minimum buildup of reserve stocks and concentration of production—were again

carried out. The end of the Korean War provideda further opportunity for

savings, since materiel in the Korean pipeline could now be counted toward

D-day requirements. As in other budgetary programs, the Army was most

adversely affected.

16

In formulating and applying these policies, the administration did not consult the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The subject was, after all, close to one in which

Secretary Wilson was an acknowledged expert—production planning. But the

effects of these decisions, as they were being felt at the end of 1953, werea

matter of concern to Admiral Radford and his colleagues. In their appraisal of

the anticipated military posture of the free world for 1956-1959, which they

prepared for the NSC Planning Board in connection with the 1956 budget, they

warned that:

The decreased level of production activity resulting from reduced military

expenditures forecast during this period [1956-1959] is expected to narrow the

mobilization base in the nine military hard goods fields oelow that which is

considered adequate to supporta general war. . . . The sharp reduction in production lines results in extending the already existing long-lead times. A resumption and re-emphasis of an industrial preparedness program in the nine military

hard goods fields would significantly improve our mobilization base.

17 I A n essential

-T-Liion ofa!

152

*

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Stockpile Policy n essential aspect of mobilization planning was the acquisition and reten-

-TTLdon ofa supply of those vital raw materials that the nation could not . -
Mobilization Planning

provide out of its own resources in wartime. A program for stockpiling strategic

and critical materials; first undertaken in 1939, was given statutory permanence

after World War II. A law enacted in 1946 made the Military Departments and

the Department of the Interior responsible for determining the kinds and quantities of materials to be acquired. After the passage of the National Security Act of

1947, the Munitions Board became the medium through which the Services

discharged their responsibilities for stockpiling, while the National Security

Resources Board played a rather ill-defined supervisory role.

From its inception, the stockpile program suffered from confusion of responsibilities and from pressures exerted by those who wished to see it used as a

weapon for foreign economic policy or as a means of assisting domestic producers.

At the end of 1952 the goals of this program remained far from attainment.18

In setting objectives for the stockpile, the Munitions Board relied upon the

Joint Chiefs of Staff for advice about the probable nature of a future war. The

most important question was the expected duration of the conflict. In 1944 the

Army-Navy Munitions Board, looking ahead to a postwar stockpile program,

had assumed for the purpose that another war would last five years, or, in other

words, that a five years' supply of each material must be kept on hand.19Subsequently the Joint Chiefs of Staff had periodically restated this assumption in

advising the Munitions Board.20

In December 1952 the Munitions Board routinely asked the Joint Chiefs of

Staff to review their previous guidance. The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded a

reply containing the assumption that a war would be of more than one year's

duration. They did not indicate, however, whether this statement was intended

to supersede the five-year assumption. If the latter were no longer valid, then

stockpile objectives could be sharply reduced and the program could be regarded

as practically complete. The Munitions Board was obliged to ask the Joint Chiefs

of Staff for clarification.21

The Joint Strategic Survey Committee recommended that the Joint Chiefs of

Staff reaffirm the five-year assumption.22 General Vandenberg, however, proposed that the stockpile objective be reduced to three years. Current war plans,

he pointed out, projected force tabs through only four years, and assumed,

moreover, that the allies would be able to shift to the offensive by the second

year, thus reducing the enemy's capability to interfere with allied shipping and

production.23

Rejecting both of these suggestions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a

four-year assumption, partly to bring stockpile policy into harmony with the

48-month mobilization schedules projected in strategic plans, partly in expectation that funds for stockpiling would be reduced.24 They so advised the Munitions Board on 25 May 1953, while making it clear that they were not attempting

to predict the actual duration of a conflict.25Shortly thereafter the Office of

Defense Mobilization took over administration of the stockpile and adopted the

four-year assumption.26

153
1CS and National Polio/

The Role of the Office of Defense Mobilization

The enlarged Office of Defense Mobilization established by Reorganization

Plan No. 3 was placed under the direction of Dr. Arthur S. Flemming. He

inherited the seat on the National Security Council formerly held by the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. During 1953 and 1954 Dr.

Flemming's office emerged as an active participant in discussions of national

security policy.

To discharge its responsibility for coordinating mobilization plans, the Office

of Defense Mobilization in September 1953 drafted a set of guiding assumptions

about the probable nature of a future emergency. After being seen and informally approved by Admiral Radford,27

it was sent to the Planning Board, and

thence to the National Security Council on 13 November 1953 as NSC 172.28

NSC 172 assumed that there would be continuing tensions, but no war,

during 1954 and 1955. If war did occur, it might be without warning and would

undoubtedly include nuclear attack on the United States. Nevertheless, US

industry, through its adaptability and ingenuity, was expected to survive and to

recover sufficiently to meet wartime requirements. The Office of Defense Mobilization thus rejected the possibility of a war so destructive in its early phases as to

render useless any plans for mobilization after D-day.

The probable duration of a future war was a matter of disagreement in NSC

172. The ODM representative on the Planning Board recommended an assumption of four years, in line with the most recent JCS stockpile guidance. The

Department of Defense believed that this matter should be left to the Council to

decide.29

When NSC 172 reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they offered no comment on

the question of the expected duration of hostilities, but suggested changes in

passages that, in their view, seemed to understate the probability of advance

warning of attack and to overestimate the amount of damage to to be expected.

They recommended that final action on NSC 172 be deferred until they had

completed their review of strategy and forces.30

Overruling this recommendation, the National Security Council approved

the policy statement on 19 November 1953, with the understanding that it would

be reviewed early in 1954. In the final version (NSC 172/1), the four-year assumption was approved, but few of the detailed changes sought by the Joint Chiefs of

Staff were adopted.31

On 17 March 1954 the Planning Board circulated NSC 5414, a redraft of NSC

172/1 intended to be applicable through FY 1957. It incorporated a decision by

President Eisenhower, announced to the Council on 8 January 1954, that, in the

event of any aggression requiring an increase in armed strength, the United

States would proceed at once to general mobilization.32 NSC 5414 also included a

warning that the Soviet bloc might try to reach its obj*?ctives by local aggression

requiring either US logistic support or outright intervention. Further, it noted

that the USSR might attain an ICBM capability within a decade. These passages

had been inserted at the urging of the Office of Defense Mobilization; some of

the other members of the Planning Board believed they should be deleted.33

154

, '-i"'r *'*->'
Mobilization Planning

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed NSC 5414, they took exception to the

prediction concerning Soviet ICBM capability. "Intelligence does not support

the estimate that the USSR will have a ballistic missile of the necessary range

during the period," they told the Secretary of Defense.34 The Council, however,

approved a slightly revised version, NSC 5414/1, that included this portion as

well as the warning regarding local aggression. The assumption of a four-year

war was retained, but an important exception was made: stockpile requirements

were again to be based on a five-year assumption.35

This latter action divorced stockpile planning from other aspects of military

strategy. It was probably induced by domestic considerations, since its effect

would be to increase the requirements for strategic and critical materials and

thus to benefit their producers.36 The Joint Chiefs of Staff remained convinced

that from the military point of view only a four-year stockpile was required.

They reaffirmed this opinion in Jury 1954, in answer to an ODM request for

guidance.37

Mobilization Planning as an Issue in 1954

The administrations approach to mobilization planning, as it was exemplified in the budgets for fiscal years 1954 and 1955, was called into question

when planning began for FY 1956. The Office of Defense Mobilization took the

lead in seeking a poiicv that would emphasize the need for a large and well-protected mobilization base, regardless of the cost. Representatives of that office

reviewed the military forecast contributed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as part of

the 1956 budget preparations. They drew the attention of the National Security

Council to the ICS remarks atVnxt the shrinking mobilization base and urged the

expenditure oi whatever was necessarv to reverse this trend.38

V5C 3422. which provided guidelines for FY 1956 budget planning, included

an annex in which the Office of Defense Mobilization proposed a set of assumptions to guide national mobilization planning policy. Two of the assumptions

were that in case oi war. mzdczr weapons would be used against the United

States in a manner that would be crippling, but not decisive, and that damage of

more than a substantial character would be inflicted upon US industry Pursuing

diese assumptions ai the direction in which they seemed to lead, the Office of

Defense Mobilization Questioned the budgetary policies adopted for fiscal years

I9y% and 1953. The situation seemed to call for larger, instead of smaller, reserves

of endüems and for eiüenw measuresto expandand protect industrial capacity—

even at She ore* of hsghex oulkys-**

fhufrdbh at the mstigation of the same office, the ten of NSC 5422 devoted

oonsäderaHr more attention So mobilization than any of the 1953 policy

dfeenlires.*3is asserted that the mnhflfration base was stronger than ever before

m p mil, hat warned that, under current plans, available productive capacity IQBM ilaiMM snd mohfeyaaon reserve stocks would deteriorate through

155

5»
JCS and National Policy

obsolescence. It also noted the geographic concentration of the nation's industrial plant.

But the Planning Board disagreed about what, if anything, should be done to

correct these conditions. Some members called for immediate action of the kind

suggested in NSC 159/4 and NSC 5408: acquisition of more mobilization reserves

and production facilities and creation of new plant capacity in safer areas. Others believed that existing programs were sound and that no action was needed

except to protect newly created facilities through dispersal or duplication.41

The Joint Strategic Survey Committee, in commenting on NSC 5422, opposed

the enlargement of the mobilization base, on the grounds that it would be ''too

costly to be in proper balance with the achievement of other security objectives."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, did not transmit these comments to the

Council.42

When the Council discussed NSC 5422, the members showed little interest in

mobilization policies that would entail larger costs. President Eisenhower pronounced himself in favor of a sensible dispersal program, apparently meaning

the proper geographic distribution of new facilities as they were established, a program that could be carried out gradually at little or no extra expense. Secretary

of the Treasury Humphrey warned against locating new production capacity in

uneconomic areas. Secretary Wilson believed that the objectives of economy

and safety could both be met.43

In the next version, NSC 5422/1, the prospective decline in the output of

military hard goods under current budgetary policies was shown concretely in

terms of dollar values. At the same time, a new demand on US supply capacity

after M-day was cited: the requirements of allied nations. Nevertheless, in keeping with the Council's thinking, NSC 5422/1 called for a mobilization policy

generally within the framework of NSC 162/2, and thus rejected any crash

increases in reserves or production capacity. But it provided that this policy

should be related to increases in Soviet capabilities.44

The Council considered NSC 5422/1 on 5 August 1954 and decided that the

mobilization section should be rewritten by the Office of Defense Mobilization in

collaboration with the Department of Defense, the Bureau of the Budget, and

the Foreign Operations Administration.45The rest of the paper was amended

and approved as NSC 5422/2.40

The revised section on mobilization, completed on 5 October 1954, clearly

showed the influence of the Office of Defense Mobilization. It warned that even

the reduced output figures expected for FY 1957 were based on optimistic

assumptions: maximum output of new weapons and no enemy bomb damage. It

drew attention to_s fundamental deficiency in all mobilization planning thus

far—the absence otjoint estimates of requirements, owing to the lack of joint war

plans. Until such estimates became available, and until the estimated requirements for support of allies could be added, it would be impossible to make

certain that the mobilization base was adequate, as NSC 162/2 declared it must

be.

The Office of Defense Mobilization had wished the draft to recognize the

need for increased expenditures to meet growing Soviet strength. Accelerated

156
VI

Mobilization Planning

dispersal of production capacity, faster buildup of reserves, better maintenance

of standby production facilities, and studies of current output rates in relation to

M-day requirements were called for, in the ODM view. Representatives of the

Bureau of the Budget and the Department of Defense were satisfied with existing policy.47

The draft was reviewed for the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Joint Logistics

Flans Committee, which submitteda split report. The Air Force member supported the Defense-Budget point of view; those from the other Services urged

approval of the ODM proposals.

48

Before the Joint Chiefs of Staff acted on this report, Admiral Carney suggested some changes in the draft, principally one that would stipulate that any

increased expenditures for the mobilization base should be in addition to those

needed to support the active forces. This suggestion was approved by General

Ridgway and General Twining. The latter reversed the position taken by his

representative in the Committee.

49 Consequently, on 21 October 1954 the Joint

Chiefs of Staff senta report to the Secretary of Defense that unanimously upheld

the ODM view that specific actions to improve the mobilization base were

needed.

50

Secretary Wilson forwarded the JCS comments to the National Security Council

on 25 October, although he did not wholly agree with them. "This isa very

complicated problem," he wrote, "andI am not in complete agreement with the

assumptions that were made nor the conclusions that were drawn from them.A

great deal more work will have to be done on this problem."51

The Council discussed mobilization policy on 26 October 1954, ranging into

related subjects like military strategy in general and the probable extent of bomb

damage in case of war. The members finally agreed tentatively to approve the

ODM proposals, subject to reconsideration after receipt of the impending report

of the Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee52 and ofa special report on the

status of the mobilization base to be prepared by the Department of Defense and

the Office of Defense Mobilization.

53

The statement approved by the Council was issued as Part III of NSC 5422/2.

It recommended that the United States take the following actions:

a. Accelerate measures for dispersal to safer areas of important production

capacity and, where that is infeasible, provide alternative production

sources in safer areas insofar as practicable.

b. Detect, and remedy, such gaps as exist in the mobilization base and in

mobilization reserves, taking into account probable damage to productive

capacity from enemy action.

c. Accelerate measures to maintain, ina condition which will permit rapid

reactivation or reconversion to war output, the greatly increased capacity

in industrial plants, machine tools, and production equipment built up

since Korea.

d. Undertake on an urgent basis studies to determine whether current military hard goods production ("hot lines") can be maintained at a level

which will meet the full-phased post-M-day requirements minus (1) postM-day production capabilities (obtainable th' ough conversion or reactivation) and (2) mobilization reserves.54

157
JCS and National Policy

After hearing the report of the Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee on

4 November 1954 and the joint DOD-ODM presentation on the status of the

mobilization base on 1 December, the National Security Council evidently decided

that no immediate action was called for. At the latter meeting, however, the

President decided that another presentation would be prepared after completion

of an approved military plan (probably a reference to the JMRVVP, which was

then nearing completion). This second review, said the President, should take

into account the wartime logistic needs of allied nations and the possibility of

enemy bomb damage—factors essential to a determination of the adequacy of

the mobilization base.55

By this time the Council had begun discussion of a policy directive to supersede NSC 162/2. The outcome of this process was NSC 5501, discussed in Chapter

2. Its treatment of mobilization was brief, and was limited to a recommendation

for a mobilization base related to an approved war plan, with realistic allowances for bomb damage and for support of the allies.56 Whether or not this

generalized statement was intended to supersede the approval of specific courses

of action in NCS 5422/2 was not indicated.

Mobilization Policy at the End of 19S4

Within the Department of Defense the NSC decision of 26 October 1954

generated a new directive on military procurement that recognized the

importance of dispersal of production facilities.57Secretary Wilson's directive of 7

December 1954 required »he Military Departments to review their procurement

plans with the obje» ive of spreading production as widely as possible. He

described the rationale for the new policy as follows:

Current and future purchases are to encourage, when not contrary to the

public interest, the development of multiple sources of supply as well as geographical dispersal of orders as a precaution against aerial attack. At the same

time, experienced management and trained labor groups essential to defense are

to be maintained wherever possible. The implementation of these policies should

keep a maximum number of plants in military production, thereby providing

facilities that can be rapidly accelerated to full capacity on relatively short notice.»

Thus Secretary Wilson reversed his earlier policy of concentrated procurement.

The effect of the change could not at once be felt. But some influence of the NSC

action of 26 October was immediately apparent in the FY 1956 budget, notably in

the allocation of more funds for upkeep of reserve production facilities. On the

other hand, money for procurement of end items was again held to a minimum.5**

The budget reflected Secretary Wilson's belief that mobilization goals had

nearly been attained. "With the size of the armed forces leveling off and with war

reserve goals being reached," he reported at the end of FY 1955, "demands tend

to approximate the replacement rates for worn out and obsolete equipment."

The principal need now was to maintain an effective mobilization base at an

economical cost.60

158

!
Mobilization Planning

Secretary Wilson here displayed a complacency that was not shared by the

Joint Chiefs of Staff. "The mobilization base to support a general war is

inadequate/' they warned on 18 March 1955. The Army's mobilization reserve

stocks would not suffice to meet combined US and allied requirements if war

broke out; the Navy's wartime capacity was being reduced by the need to mothball an increasing number of ships, since existing schedules for wartime reactivation were already at the highest possible rate.61 At the same time, in submitting

recommendations for FY 1956 force levels, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that all

US mobilization plans were deficient in that they made no provision to meet the

requirements of allies.62

Service Approaches to Mobilization:

The Joint Mid-Range War Plan

The strategic disagreement among the Services was reflected in joint discussions of mobilization planning. It appeared in connection with the drafting

of the Joint Strategic Objectives and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plans early in 1953.

The Air Force planner on the Joint Strategic Plans Committee assumed thai any

general war would be fought principally with forces in being on D-day and that

strategic airpower would probably be decisive. He therefore wished both plans

to assign priority to the development of the forces and resources needed between

D-day and D plus six months. The other Service representatives objected that to

make no provision for longer range mobilization would be to gamble the nation's

safety on a single strategic concept.*3 A year later, the same conflict was apparent when the Joint Logistics Plans Committee discussed tl.e mobilization policy

section of NSC 5422/2. The Air Force representative, aligning himself with the

Defense-Budget viewpoint, believed that it was useless to spend more money to

provide a larger mobilization base.

In all three of these instances, General Twining declined to press the issue

raised by his representatives at lower levels. But when the controversy appeared

in connection with the Joint Mid-Range War Plan, General Twining took a firm

stand and a deadlock resulted in the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The first draft of the JMRVVP was completed in September 1954. By that time

the prospective decline in the mobilization base by 1 July 1957 (the D-day assumed

in the plan) made it clear that the ambitious mobilization schedules projected by

the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps could not be carried out. Should these

Services adjust their mobilization plans to the smaller base, or should the latter

be enlarged? This was the question that could not be settled either by the Joint

Strategic Plans Committee or by the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves.

In referring the issue to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff set

forth clearly the two contrasting strategic views as they related to mobilization

policy. General Ridgway, Admiral Carney, and General Shepherd, in line with

their advocacy of a flexible strategy, believed that mobilization plans should aim

at the establishment of a base broad enough to provide alternative means of

159
JCS and Natiotial Policy

waging war after D-day. General Twining, on the other hand, believed that the

mobilization base should emphasize "peacetime combat-ready forces-ir being,"

and should not be designed to support a buildup of forces like that earned out in

World War II. He asserted, moreover, that the other Services (unlike the Air

Force) had unrealistically ignored both the probability of enemy bomb damage

and the need to supply the allies, two considerations that would mean a mobilization base even bigger than the one they envisioned.

General Twining found an ally in Admiral Radford, who favored a base no

larger than would be needed to support the forces proposed in the JMRWP for

deployment during the first six months of war—those needed "to absorb the

initial shock, to deliver our own atomic offensive, and to form the nucleus for

such expanded offensives as may be then plainly necessary." The mobilization

base should be adjusted to allow for probable bomb damage, but not for allied

support requirements, which could only be estimated after war began. The

Services, in Admiral Radford's view, should be allowed to develop plans extending beyond the first six months, but these plans should not be used as a basis for

appropriation requests, except for critical end items with a long procurement

'ead-time.**4

Secretary Wilson's decision took the form of a comprehensive directive governing Service mobilization planning in general. "The best foreseeable resolution of this problem," he ruled, "lies generally in consonance with the remarks

and recommendations made by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." The

mobilization base sought by the Army and Navy, he pointed out, might be

"greater than our present economy can or will support." Accordingly, he issued

the following instructions:

(1) Mobilization requirements were to be predicated upon the assumption of a general war in which nuclear weapons would be used by

both sides from the outset.

(2) The date of 1 July 1957 would be assumed as both M-day and

D-day.

(3) Each Service would use the forces that it could generate within six

months after M-day as the basis for its mobilization planning.

(4) Mobilization plans would assume a total input of a little over 7.8

million personnel by M-day plus six months (including active

forces, Reserves, and Selective Service intake). This total was to

be allocated as follows: 3.7 million to the Army, 2.1 million to the

Navy, 470,000 to the Marine Corps, 1.4 million to the Air Force,

and 170,000 to the Coast Guard.

(5) The Department of Defense would prepare recommendations covering allowances for enemy bomb damage and for aid to allies.

(6) The Services would submit recommendations for special allowances regarding long lead-time items that could not be provided

within the six-month period after D-day.

(7) The Services would continue to develop mobilization plans extending to D plus 36 months, but would not use them for appropriations requests without the approval of the Secretary of Defense.65

160
H fcM>tffir "«*«* »»•

Mobilization Planning

In supplementary instructions on 9 December 1954, Secretary Wilson explained

that the M-day-plus-six-months (or D-day-plus-six-months) rule would be used

to compute requirements for end items as a basis for appropriation requests in

the FY 1957 budget. For this purpose, forces for D plus six months were to be

projected through D plus 36 months without increase. Plans governing mobilization production and raw material acquisition, on the other hand, were to be

based upon the larger forces available by D plus 24 months, again carried through

to D plus 36 months (but no authorization was given to base appropriations

requests on these figures). Mobilization plans were to be closely cross-checked

with the JMRWP. They were to be completed without allowance for bomb damage or allied aid; subsequently they would be modified when his office furnished

guidance concerning these factors.66

If these instructions were carried out the United States would for the first

time achieve unified mobilization planning, adjusted to a specific strategic concept (which might or might not prove correct). Service plans would be fitted into

a joint war plan that would provide a basis for a clear-cut determination of the

adequacy of the mobilization base and, if necessary, for budgetary actions to

expand it. The results of this process, however, would not be apparent for

another year or so, when the FY 1957 budget was drawn up.

Mobilization Planning and the New Look

Secretary Wilson's decision on the JMRWP was in agreement with the strategy of the New Look and the assumptions on which it was based. If these

assumptions were correct, it was useless to base plans on the expectation that

the nation would again be able to summon large numbers of men to the colors

and to provide their equipment after the beginning of hostilities, as had happened in World War II. In effect, the same decision (not to prepare for a large

post-D-day mobilization) had been made earlier in connection with the budgets

for fiscal years 1954, 1955, and 1956, although the motive in these cases was a

desire for economy.

Thus from one point of view, the mobilization policy of the administration in

1953 and 1954 could be defended as consistent with a military strategy. But it

could be attacked from another direction, on the grounds that it failed to follow

out the implications of that strategy. If all future wars were to involve nuclear

weapons at the outset, why should any long-range mobilization planning be

undertaken at all? The answer to this question, in President Eisenhower's mind,

was that a successful continental defense program would make industrial

mobilization feasible even in the atomic age. In a letter to Secretary Wilson on 5

January 1955,67he listed retaliatory offensive power and continental defense as

the most important capabilities to be maintained. "Thus we will assure," he

wrote, "that our industrial capacity can continue throughout a war to produce

the gigantic amounts of equipment and supplies required. We can never be

defeated so long as our relative superiority in productive capacity is sustained."68

161

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JCS and National Policy

This belief was not unreasonable in the age before the intercontinental missile.

Since no one knew just how far a future war would differ from those of the

recent past, it was prudent for the administration to hedge its bets to some

extent, instead of staking the nation's survival on the assumption of a war

lasting only a few weeks.

The strategy of the New Look dictated a small rather than a large mobilization base, but there remained room for disagreement over its exact size. Here the

requirements of strategy' and of economy diverged to some degree. National

security seemed to call for the quickest possible completion of inventories of end

items, ready for immediate issue in case of attack, and for prompt (and necessarily expensive) measures to disperse production facilities. The Office of Defense

Mobilization had drawn this conclusion and had contended for a corresponding

course of action, but with only limited success. As in other aspects of military

policy, the administration modified the dictates of strategy to hold down

expenditures.

In the entire process of mobilization planning during 1953 and 1934, the loin!

Chiefs of Staff played a surprisingly minor role. The absence of a regular planning program before 1953, and then the Service disagreements that obstructed

the preparation of a joint Strategic Objectives Plan, prevented them from fulfilling their mission of laying down a master strategic plan that would guide Service

mobilization plans and budgets. In 1955 the Hoover Commission commented

adversely on the lack of guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for this purpose.**

Despite their differences on strategy, however, the JCS members agreed in

expressing concern over the effect of budget decisions on mobilization plans at

the end of 1954. They disagreed over what constituted an adequate mobilization

base, but the joint Chiefs of Staff were united in the conviction that the United

States did not possess one at that time.

i

j

I

";

:

>I

]

162

;

I
7

Manpower Mobilization: Organization of

Reserve Forces

As a strategy that emphasized the importance of the first few months of war,

the New Look led naturally to a concern for the size and quality of the Service

Reserve forces—the reserves that would be called to the colors on D-day (or

M-day) to expand the nation's fighting forces. If these forces were to be of any

value, they must be thoroughly trained during peacetime and kept at the highest peak of effectiveness. "We fully recognize," said Admiral Radford to the

House Appropriations Committee, early in 1954, "the unfeasibility of relying in

the future on long periods of time in which to mobilize our available manpower.

Therefore, an essential part of the New Look includes plans and studies for

attaining an improved state of readiness of our Reserve forces to meet today's

requirements for rapid mobilization."1

Manpower Policy as a Problem

But the administration's interest in the question of Reserve organization had

other sources as well, it was part of a broad interest in military manpower

problems—an interest that predated the evolution of the New Look. In one of

his campaign speeches, Mr. Eisenhower had promised to appoint a committee

to investigate the defense establishment and to extend its mandate to the subject

of manpower policy, in order to find the "fairest, most economical way" of

meeting the needs of the Services.2Some months later. Task Force A of the

Solarium project pointed out that manpower was one of the nation's scarce

resources and accordingly had to be wisely managed. Its recommendation for a

national manpower policy, to assure trained men for both military* and civilian

purposes, was repeated in NSC 162/2 ät\d NSC 5501. *

The most pressing aspect of the military manpower problem, which confronted the administration as soon as it took office, was the increasing difficulty

163

1

ämamäammm

;•
fCS and National Policy

of the Services in retaining their hard core of career professionals.4In February

1953 the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged Secretary Wilson to appoint a committee to

investigate the causes of this condition.5The President, in announcing Reorganization Plan No. 6, promised a broader study "of the problems of attracting and

holding competent career personnel—civilian and military—in the f epartment

of Defense."6

This difficulty, while of intense concern to the administration, had little

interest for the general public. A more pervasive problem was the feeling of

dissatisfaction, shared by many persons from the President downwards, with

the operation of the current system for insuring selective military service, and

specifically with those features that were intended to supply manpower for the

inactive Service Reserve forces. As of the beginning of 1953 this system was

embodied in two laws, as follows:

1. The Universal Military Training and Sen>ice Act of 1951 (PL 51, 82d Congress,

19 Jr _ 1951) required all males between the ages of 18 and 26 to register

for aiitary service. Under the selective service provisions of the law,

those over the age of 18,/2 were liable for induction for two years of

active duty and six years' service with the Reserves. At the same time,

the Act, as indicated by its title, provided for the eventual establishment

of a system of universal service, in which those who did not enter the

active forces would be inducted into a National Security Training Corps

for six months, and, on their release, would be obligated for seven and

one-half years of Reserve service. The six-month training was to be conducted by the Services, under the supervision of a National Security

Training Commission composed of three civilian and two military

members.

2. The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 (PL 476, 82d Congress, 9 July 1952)

divided the Service Reserves into three categories: Ready, Standby, and

Retired. The first class could be mobilized by Presidential order, the

other two only by Congressional action. Inductees released from active

duty were automatically assigned to the Ready Reserve (a provision that

effectively nullified the size limit t\' 1.500,000 men placed on this group

by another section of the law). Aft-r three years of satisfactory participation in training programs, such men might request transfer to the Standby

category.

The full effect of these laws had not yet been evaluated, but it was already

clear that, taken together, they were both unfair and ineffective in their operation.

Only those who were caught by the draft incurred any reserve obligation; others

escaped altogether. Thus the men who provided most of the strength of the

active forces subsequently had to shoulder the burden of manning the Reset ves.

In a future crisis, therefore, they would necessarily be called upon again—just

as, during the Korean emergency, men who had fought through World War It

had had to be recalled to service. The National Security Training Program, ü

carried out, would in time have distributed the burden of military service »n an

equitable manner, but its execution was impossible m tight of the manpower

demands of the active forces during the Korean War.7

164

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Idanpower Mobilization

The nominal strength of the Reserves was misleading; th*re was no guarantee that those legally obligated for service would enroll in organized units or

maintain their proficiency through training. The prospect of transfer to the

Standby Reserve provided them an incentive to do so, but at the expense of the

effectiveness of the Ready Reserve, which would thus lose its best-trained men.

It was becoming evident, moreover, that this incentive was not enough. Large

numbers of returning veteran» simply ignored their reserve obligation.8

The total strength of the Reserves (including the National Guard) as of 30

June 1953 is shown in Table 12. Of the total figure of 2,0%,033, some 1,749,208,

or 80 percent, were nominally members of the Ready Reserve, but only 575,377

were qualified for drill pay status by virtue of participation in training.9

The President launched his attack on the deficiencies of the existing Reserve

system on 23 July 1953. In announcing appointments to three vacant positions

on the National Security Training Commission, he promised to ask the Commission to seek a remedy for a situation that, as he pointed out, "requires our

soldier of today also to carry the future national defense burden ahe ad of the

man who has received no training, has done no service, and has as mmed no

re««rve obligation."10True to his promise, on 1 August 1953 he instructed the

Commission to prepare a report on the inequities of the current system, the

feasibility of operating a training program for nonveteran reservists while continuing induction of men for active service, and the effects of such a training program on the organization of the Reserve forces. He also directed the Office of

Defense Mobilization to ascertain whether the manpower pool sufficed to meet

simultaneously the needs of the active forces» the Reserves, and the civilian

economy.11

Proposals for Reform

The report of the National Security Training Commission» submitted on

1 December 1953. documented the hardships worked on many veterans of

World War 11 who had been recalled in the Korean crisis just asthey were launching

Table 12—Actual Strength of National Guard and Reserve Forces. *) June 1953

$*rvxr Tote/ Nttcwwf

Cm*

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Army

Navy ........... ........

M*r»#Corj*

Air Fort»

Tetd

1.07*825

7S.435

277.?**

0

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7S.455

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War $*mMK*mi Kn**i «4 ffe 5«tm*rv ** t**twx. /«Mr* fca Imme t*$4. pf *»* %3A

165

^ -

1

-'
—„~»~--- •-• » ' ■■■ -'-

JCS and National Polio/

their careers. It urged that the six-month training program proposed in the 1951

law be put into effect, beginning on 1 January 1955 with an initial increment of

100,000 trainees chosen by lot from those who had registered for selective service.

Such a program, gradually expanded to become truly universal, would eventually impose a reserve obligation on almost every American male.

The Commission foresaw that, when the entire national manpower supply

was subject to recall for military service in time of crisis, mobilization of reservists would have to be carefully regulated to prevent disruption of the economy.

Hence, its report urged that the recall of those reservists not needed at once (i.e.,

the Standby Reserve) be taken out of the hands of the Services and assigned to

the Selective Service System, which would conduct the operation on the basis of

overall national manpower needs. The size of the Ready Reserve should be

closely adjusted to Service mobilization plans, and the men and units in this

category should be in a high state of training.12

The substance of this plan had been revealed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 20

November 1953. At that time, the Commission, while not overlooking the equity

argument, had stressed the military value of a large pool of non-veterans with

six months' training. The Joint Chiefs of Staff took no serious objection to the

plan, but Admiral Radford warned that they might be unable to support it if it

created an additional demand upon limited funds. The Air Force spokesman

(General T. D. White, Vice Chief of Staff, who attended in place of General

Twining), though he did not oppose the plan, made it clear that his Service was

interesf?d primarily in the provision of trained men for D-day and only secondarily in tiie mobilization of manpower after war began.13

The Office of Defense Mobilization completed its study of the manpower

pool on 18 December 1953.uIt corroborated the conclusion of the National

Security Training Commission that a six-month reserve training program could

be carried out without depleting the supply of men for active service. The Director of Defense Mobilization, Dr. Flemming, forwarded the ODM study to the

President on 6 January 1954, but recommended that the NSTC training plan be

postponed until the National Security Council, with the assistance of the Department of Defense, could determine the proper size and method of organization of

the Reserves15President Eisenhower thereupon directed the Department of

Defense and the Office of Defense Mobilization to draw up a new organization

plan for Reserve forces.16

On 13 January 1954 Secretary Wilson established a task force to draft the

plan. It was headed by Major General Walter W. Wensinger, USMC, and included

general and flag officers from each of the other Services and the Coast Guard.

On 4 February 1954 he asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to give the task force their

recommendations on the subject of Reserve organization.17

In their reply on 5 March 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed the importance of having combat-ready reserves in view of the unsettled state of the

world. They did not suggest strength figures for these forces, urging only that

they be adjusted to joint war plans. The immediately callable portion should be

large enough for initial wartime tasks, and its recall should be under Service

control They did not favor, but were willing to accept, civilian control of the

166
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Manpower Mobilization

mobilization of the selectively callable. They opposed the inception of any universal training program until the size and composition of the Reserves had been

settled.18

The plan submitted by General Wensinger's task force in March 1954 accepted

some of these recommendations. It provided for the replacement of the existing

Ready and Standby Reserve classes by others that would serve comparable

functions but would be constituted on a different basis. Reservists destined for

immediate mobilization, to meet the manpower needs of the Services for the first

six months after M-day, would be subject to recall by the Services (under Presidential or Congressional authorization) and would accordingly be styled the

Service Callable Reserve. This class would be subdivided into First Line and

Auxiliary Reserves, on the basis of the degree of training required of members.

Men who, for any reason, were not eligible for immediate mobilization would

comprise the second class, to be known as the Selectively Callable Reserve. Only

Congress would have authority to order their recall. Mobilization of men in this

group would be on an individual basis, the decision in each case to be made by

some suitable civilian agency in consultation with the Services.

The total eight-year military obligation (active and reserve) would be retained.

Men emerging from the active forces with less than 21 months' service therein

would spend the remainder of their time in the First Line Reserve. Those with

longer periods of active service could transfer to the Auxiliary Reserve after six

years of combined active and reserve service. Veterans who had served in combat,

however, would be allowed to go directly to the Selectively Callable Reserve if

they desired.

The task force recommended a strength of 3,005,894 for the Service Callable

Reserve, distributed as follow«»: 1,692,235 Army; 774,059 Navy; 200,000 Marine

Corps; 300,000 Air Force; and 39,600 Coast Guard. The strength of the Selectively Callable Reserve had to be expressed in terms of the desired yield from the

selective process, which was 709,751.

These figures had been prepared by the individual Services on the basis of

their own mobilization plans and of the roles envisioned therein for their Reserves.

For the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, the Service Callable Reserve would

serve approximately to double their strength after M-day. The Air Force, on the

other hand, planned a relatively small Reserve kept at a state of readiness that

would enable it to swing into action within a few weeks. The Air Force and the

Army would mobilize most of their reservists in units; the Navy and Marine

Corps, which employed units only for training purposes, would call up reservists as individuals.

The task force considered the anomalous position of the National Guard (and

Air National Guard), which had to serve two masters, the states and the Federal

Government. Its report endorsed the plans of the Army and Air Force to consider

the Guard as an integral part of their Service Callable Reserves.

The plan frankly placed military needs ahead of equity, and hence assumed

that men with extended active service would continue to constitute the hard core

of the Reserves. Nevertheless it provided for use of "non-prior-service" personnel (estimated at 206,150 annually) to fill up the ranks. To this end, the task force

167
JCS and National Policy

proposed to allow men without active service to enlist directly in the Reserves/

to be given 30 days' training before assignment to a unit. If the number of such

volunteers proved insufficient, the deficiency should be made up by inducting

men through selective service.19

The task force had not attempted to estimate the cost of its plan. The office of

the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) estimated that it would require

$7.6 billion in new obligational authority during the first year, FY 1955, and

slightly less thereafter, for personnel, equipment, and facilities.20

When Secretary Wilson sent the task force report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

for review,21the Joint Strategic Plans Committee drafted a reply that would have

constituted an unqualified endorsement of it.22 But most of the JCS members

had reservations. Admiral Radford believed that the status of the National Guard

needed further study.23 General Twining feared that direct enlistment of nonprior-service personnel into the Reserves, by opening a relatively easy way for

young men to discharge their military obligation, would jeopardize recruiting

for the active forces. He also believed that the strength figures were excessive.24

General Ridgway, on the other hand, objected that the plan did not sufficiently

emphasize the use of non-prior-service personnel and would therefore perpetuate inequity; moreover, he believed that it should prescribe a uniform training

program for Reserve volunteers, to keep them from flowing toward Services

with less exacting requirements.25 General Shepherd wished the problem of

costs to be carefully considered; he feared that the plan might be financed at the

expense of the active forces.26

In the light of these reservations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that the plan

required further analysis. They so advised Secretary Wilson on 9 April 1954,

indicating at the same time that they approved most of it. However, they noted

that the personnel figures were unilateral in origin, and urged that establishment

of strength goals be postponed until the Joint Mid-Range War Plan had been

completed.27

On 15 April the Joint Chiefs of Staff appointed an Ad hoc committee to study

the task force proposals more carefully.28In a report submitted on 28 April, this

committee concluded that direct enlistment or induction of non-prior-service

personnel into the Reserves would not disrupt Service recruiting efforts if the

numbers of such enlistees were carefully i 'gulated by the Secretary of Defense.

The training of such recruits should be identical with that given men entering

the active forces.

The committee asserted that the Departments of the Army and the Air Force

already possessed sufficient authority over the training and administration of

the National Guard and Air National Guard. Control over the assignment of

personnel thereto, however, was a complex legal question, which should be

studied by the Attorney General. The members agreed that the Services should

cede the authority to call enlisted men of the Selectively Callable Reserve but

should retain control over officers in this category.

Analysis of the cost estimates prepared by the Comptroller's office convinced

the committee that they were unrealistic and were based on excessively high

its

'
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Manpower Mobilization

equipment standards. Hence, the task force plan should not be approved until

the costs could be restudied.29

Ihe Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed these conclusions and sent them to Secretary Wilson on 6 May 1954.30 The Secretary took no action on them. Plans were

already under way to put the task force proposals into effect.

Evolution of NSC 5420/3

Apian for reorganizing the Reserves was completed in the Office of the

Secretary of Defense and sent to the Office of Defense Mobilization on 14

May 1954. It was practically identical with the task force proposals except for small

increases in strength objectives (reflecting enlarged requirements expressed by

the Air Force). The strength figures were presented as the ultimate, rather than

the immediate goal, and as subject to possible revision. The estimated requirements for non-prior-service personnel for the first year had been reduced to

104,800. No cost estimates were included.

The Director of Defense Mobilization, Dr. Flemming, forwarded the plan to

the National Security Council, together with one for mobilizing the Selectively

Callable Reserve worked out by his office in collaboration with the Departments

of Defense and Labor and the Selective Service System. He proposed that the

Council determine at once the size and organization of the Reserves, postponing

consideration of procurement and training. The combined plans were placed on

the Council's agenda as NSC 5420.31

The Reserve organization plan drew heavy fire from the National Security

Training Commission, because its provisions relied too heavily on veterans;

from the Department of Labor, because it did not spell out a curriculum for

Reserve enlistees; and from the Director of Selective Service, who, though in

sympathy with its objectives, believed that these should be sought at once,

insofar as possible, by making use of existing legislative authority.32 More important were the comments of the Director of Defense Mobilization, who suggested

a new method for insuring equity of servi .e. He foresaw that, in future years, as

the size of the active forces levelled off and the number of militarily eligible

males increased, larger numbers of men would escape military service. The

number of non-prior-service personnel to be taken into the Reserves under the

Defense Department plan was too small to use up this surplus. Accepting these

figures as based on military requirements, he did not suggest enlarging them.

Instead, he proposed to run men through the active forces at a faster rate,

perhaps by reducing their terms of service.33

Since the Joint Chiefs of Siaff had already expressed their views on the

substance of NSC 5420 (in the form of the report of General Wensinger's task

force), they directed their comments at these criticisms, with which they

disagreed. The NSTC views, they pointed out, contravened the guidance given

the task force, which had stressed national security over equity. The remarks of

--

169
.

is

h

JCS and National Polity

the Department of Labor impressed them as extending beyond the competence

of that agency, while the suggestions of the Director of Selective Service, they

said, were unworkable and would disrupt Service programs.34 While expressing

sympathy for Dr. Flemming's objective in seeking to bring more men into the

Services, they declined to endorse his proposals, which were based largely on

nonmilitary considerations.35

When NSC 5420 was discussed by the Council on 17 June 1954, it was again

criticized as inequitable. The members referred it to the Department of Defense

and the Office of Defense Mobilization, with instructions to rewrite it so as to

assure military service by all eligible men and to include provisions for stronger

Federal control of the National Guard.36

The result of this effort was NSC 5420/1, sent to the Council on 26 July 1954.

This paper laid heavy emphasis on equity of service, which was believed to be

essential for public support of a compulsory reserve system. Under NSC 5420/1,

all qualified young men would be required to serve in the armed forces, by

enlistment or induction. At the same time, the quality of the Reserve forces was

to be maintained. The Service Callable Reserve was to consist entirely of men

with previous active duty ("prior-service personnel"). Volunteers would be

accepted in the Reserves, but they would not be exempt from serving a minimum period (the length of which was not specified) in the active forces.

A key provision in NSC 5420/1 was that the untapped pool of militarily

eligible men would be maintained at a constant figure of approximately 750,000

men. Regulation of the level of this reservoir of manpower was apparently

conceived of as a device to insure universal service. In other words, so long as

the level did not rise above this figure, the outflow of men to the Services, by

enlistment or induction, would equal the annual input of men reaching military

age; there would be no surplus overflow of men who escaped service altogether.37

The drafters of NSC 5420/1 had calculated that, with the stabilization of the

active forces at a strength of approximately 3,000,000 men, the manpower pool

would rise from its current size of 740,000 to approximately 1,670,000 by the end

of FY 1961 unless some controls were applied. Continued decline in Service

reeniistment rates would slow down the increase by drawing down more men

from the reservoir. Low enlistment rates were undesirable for a number of

reasons, and measures should be taken to arrest the decline. Assuming the

enlistment rate could be stabilized, there were several ways to run men through

the Services at a faster pace and thus to maintain the level of the reservoir. The

most desirable methods would be to restrict the number of four-year volunteers

(requiring the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps to accept inductees) or to

prerelease men from the active forces to the Reserves. An alternative—a general

reduction in the length of inducted service from 24 to 16 months- was rejected

Still another possible way of controlling the level of the manpower pool

would be to initiate a training program for non-prior-service personnel. A sixmonth program involving 156,000 men per year from 1955 through 1960, it was

believed, would serve the purpose. On completion of their training, these men

would be assigned to the Selectively Callable Reserve. But this method involved

serious disadvantages. The Services would incur a heavy cost in training these

170

*
Manpower Mobilization

future reservists and would reap little benefit in return. Moreover, the program

would be grossly unfair; it would offer a favored few an opportunity to escape

the rigors of a full term of active duty and subsequently, as members of the

Selectively Callable Reserve, to avoid the liability for immediate recall.

NSC 5420/1 also proposed to divorce the National Guard from all responsibility to the states, on the grounds that it could not successfully serve two masters.

The Guard should become a wholly Federal organization, serving as the principal reserve component of the Army and the Air Force. To provide it with a

nucleus of experienced veterans, men with reserve obligations should be assigned

to it involuntarily, and the necessary legislative authority should be sought for

this purpose. The states should be allowed to raise their own militias to meet

their special requirements.38 The Council approved NSC 5420/1 on 29 July and

directed the Department of Defense and the Office of Defense Mobilization to

incorporate it into a revised program, with cost estimates.39

The revision, NSC 5420/2, was completed in September 1954. In this version,

the ceiling on the untapped manpower pool, needed to insure universal service,

had been recomputed at 1,000,000 men. Pre-release of personnel or shortening

of terms of service were again recommended as methods to maintain this level.

The 750,000 figure now appeared as a minimum, to be maintained in order to

guarantee the availability of r».2r»nower for rapid expansion of the military forces

if general war broke out.

The plan to allow non-prior-service personnel to enlist directly in the Reserves,

borrowed from NSC 5420, had been reinserted. Such volunteers would, however,

remain subject to induction for service with the active forces, and there was no

provision for a separate training program for them.

The division of the Service Callable Reserve into two classes was dropped.

The length of time that individuals would spend in this category, before being

allowed to transfer to the Selectively Callable Reserve, would be determined by

the Services under guidelines promulgated by the Secretary of Defense. Those in

the Service Callable Reserve would be required to participate in training programs.

Failure to do so was to be made a punishable offense under the Uniform Code of

Military justice, and might subject offenders to recall to active duty for up to 12

months.

Cost estimates for the program were well below those submitted earlier. For

FY 1956 (now the earliest time when the plan could be implemented), $4. $ billion

in new obligational authority would be required. The amount would increase

during the next two years, but would drop to $4.0 billion by FY 1959.m

The plan to speed up the flow of men through the Services was alarming to

th#» Joint Chiefs of Staff. Such a practice, they told Secretary Wilson on 8 October

1954, was dangerous and expensive and would reduce combat capabilityMoreover, it was difficult to reconcile with the concern expressed in NSC 5420/2

over the declining reenlistment rate. The whole question of equity, they believr>d,

should be reconsidered. They opposed the recall of individual.; to active duty as

a punitive measure. They pointed out that the program, if approved, would

require an increase in the budget. Subject to these reservations, and to some

171

•*-
.

JCS and National Policy

proposed minor changes, they considered NSC 5420/2 as suitable for initiating

legislation to improve the readiness of the Reserve forces 4l

Officials of OSD then prepared a revision of NSC 5420/2 dated 14 October

1954 and sent it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a note that it embodied most of

the changes suggested by them. The suggestion for pre-releasing personnel

from the Services had now been dropped, although the alternative of shorter

terms of enlistment was retained. The status of non-prior-service Reserve enlistees was more carefully regulated. At the discretion of the Service concerned,

such enlistees might be given initial recruit training and then placed in a Reserve

status, remaining exempt from induction for two years' active service so long as

they met training requirements. If they were not assigned to this special Reserve

program, they would remain subject to induction. The Secretary of Defense

would prescribe quotas and other conditions governing the program.42

This version of NSC 5420/2 was not formally reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of

Staff but was circulated for comment to the Joint Staff. On 26 October 1954 the

Director, Lieutenant General Lemuel Mathewson, transmitted a number of criticisms to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. "The proposed equity of military

service would, if implemented, eventually reduce the combat capability of the

armed forces to an unacceptable degree." wrote General Mathewson. The goal

should be equal obligation, not equality in actual service. The provision to allow

enlistment directly into Reserve forces was potentially disruptive for the Services.

Unless carefully controlled by the Secretary of Defense, it would open an avenue

of escape for large numbers of men that would jeopardize the ability of the Air

Force and the Navy to continue to operate on a basis of four-year enlistments.43

In another draft completed on 4 November, OSD officials undertook to remove

some of these objections. Enlistment in the Reserves was to be allowed only for

individuals under the age of 19. Such volunteers would, at the discretion of the

Service that they had chosen, incur a total obligation of either eight or ten years.

Those who assumed the eight-year obligation would be liable for induction for

two years' active duty, to be followed as usual by six years in the Reserves. The

ten-year group would undergo a six-month training period and would then be

assigned to Reserve forces for nine and one-half years. Thus, it was hoped, the

burden between the two groups would be approximately equal. The number of

men entering the Reserves directly would follow quotas set by the Secretary of

Defense. If these quotas were not met through volunteers, the Selective Service

System would be called upon to indu-* men as necessary. There was to be no

change in periods of enlistment for activ • service or in the 24-month induction

period,

N**w cost estimates for this program (for pay and training, but excluding new

equipment and facilities) were $1.3 billion in new obhgationai authority (NOA)

and $1.2 billion in expenditures for FY 1956, with increases to $15 and $1.4

billion, respectively, by 1959. By contrast, the FY 1955 budget had allocated

approximately $700 million for the same purpose*.44

The Armed Forces Policy Council approved this program, with some

reservationr., on 9 November 1954.** The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, submitted their own comments, in which they again stressed the danger that the

172
Manpower Mobilization

program might adversely affect recruitment for the active forces unless carefully

regulated by the Secretary of Defense. It should be made clear, they said, that

national security took precedence over equity in all plans for military manpower

procurement.46

Ignoring these comments, OSD and ODM officials drew up another draft,

essentially unchanged except that the means of enforcing training obligations

were left for later determination and the pay and training costs had been

«estimated at higher figures (beginning with $1.7 billion in NOA and $1.6

billion in expenditures for FY 1956). This version, NSC 5420/3, after adoption by

the National Security Council, was to become the basis of the legislation sent to

Congress.47

Strength of the Reserve Forces

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended on 9 April 1954 that the size of

the Reserves be determined only after completion of the JMRWP. On 14

May 1954 the Acting Secretary of Defense, Mr. Anderson, approved this suggestion and asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend strength figures, based on

the JMRWP, by 1 July 1954.48

Delay in completion of the JMRWP prevented the Joint Chiefs of Staff from

meeting this deadline. On 19 August 1954, when they sent Secretary Wilson

recommendations for the size and strength of the active forces for FY 1956, they

included proposals for the Reserves, prepared by the Services, and suggested

that these be used temporarily for planning purposes.49 Mr. Wilson, however,

repeated the request for strength figures based on the JMRWP, which he said,

would be needed by 15 October 1954 so that the new program could be completed in time for the next Congress.5

*' Meanwhile, he continued to use the

figures in NSC 5420.5l

The draft JMRWP that was completed in September 1954 provided a basis for

a decision on the size of the Service Callable Reserve. The Service controversy

over the mobilization schedules in this plan has been described in an earlier

chapter. The Air Force criticized as excessive and infeasible the ultimate objectives set by the other Services. This criticism did not. however, apply to the

schedules covering the first six months of hostilities, which were not at issue.

Accepting these schedules as drawn up by the Services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

on 13 October 1954 recommended to Secretary Wilson the following strengths

for the Service Callable Reserve:

Servier

Army

N*vy

Manne Corps

Air Force

$trtn$th

1.692.255

756,000

2Ö3.S22

264.000

Tot») 2.916,057

173
JCS and National Policy

The Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that these figures were subject to change,

since they themselves had not yet approved the JMRWP.52

These strengths were incorporated into the 14 October and 4 November

redrafts of NSC 5420/2, along with an estimate of 39,600 for the Coast Guard.53In

commenting on the second of these drafts, the Joint Chiefs of Staff again reminded

the Secretary of Defense that the figures had not been validated. Nevertheless

they were adopted in NSC 5420/3, where they appeared as an ultimate goal to be

achieved by the end of FY 1959, starting from an estimated strength of 2.3

million in FY 1956.54

National Reserve Plan of 1955

NSC 5420/3 was presented to the National Security Council on 15 November

1954 by Mr. Carter L. Burgess, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel, assisted by the Deputy Secretary, Mr. Anderson. The

speakers stressed the objective of insuring military service from all qualified

young men and explained that the six-month reserve training program was

expected to serve this purpose. It was now believed that 100,000 trainees annually would keep the manpower pool at the proper size and thus insure universal

service. They placed less emphasis on the other aspect of equity—lessening the

burden on men who had served full tours of active duty. However, they indicated that a shorter period of service in the Service Callable Reserve would be

required of such men.

Members of the Selectively Callable Reserve would be subject to administrative penalties for nonparticipation in training, but the Uniform Code of Military

Justice would not be invoked for the purpose. Details of training would be

worked out by the Services.

The program had been projected over a four-year period, and would be

reexamined at the end of that time. It was to be accompanied by other actions

intended to improve the Reserves: wider dissemination of knowledge of

obligations, improvement in training curricula, and better pay for reservists as

well as for regulars. These measures, it was hoped, would make the Service

Callable Reserve actually ready in the sense of being able to go into action

immediately after D-day.

The National Security Council and the President approved the program,

subject to later decisions on the budget, with the understanding that it would be

continually reviewed in relation to programs for the active forces and for the

mobilization base.**

On 6 December 1954 Admiral Radford and Secretary Wilson discussed the

size and cost of the program with the President. They approved a schedule for

reaching the planned strength by FY J959. as well as goals for the number of

reservists to bi? in drill and pay status (beginning with 1.1 million in FY !*»56 and

rising to 2.2 million by FY 1959)*

174
Manpower Mobilization

The necessary legislation was prepared under the direction of Mr. Burgess'

office. It introduced one improvement over NSC 5420/3: the awkward terms

Service Callable and Selectively Callable, used for the principal Reserve categories,

were dropped in favor of the existing terms Ready and Standby, respectively.

57

Secretary Wilson announced the new Reserve plan to the press on 17 December 1954, relating it to the administration's military economy program. "Strong

Reserve Forces," he said, "will make it possible to maintain the Active Forces at

levels that will impose the least burden on the national economy and still provide for military strength as it may be needed." Later, however, the Secretary

made it clear that cuts in military manpower that had been announced for FY

1956 were not contingent upon Congressional action on the Reserve plan.

58

When Congress convened in January 1955, the administration submitted its

National Reserve Plan as one part ofa larger program for general improvement

in military manpower policies. Other parts included extension of authority for

induction under selective service (then scheduled to expire on1 July 1955) and

improved career incentives for regulars. Ina special message to Congress, President Eisenhower stressed the importance of the Reserve plan as a means of

strengthening the nation's defensive posture, and only secondarily asa way to

equalize military obligations.

59

All the members of the Joint Cruets of Staff testified in support of the bill,

though in terms that reflected their concern with different aspects of the Reserve

problem. Admiral Radford emphasized the importance of the provision authorizing quota control of the numbers of men enlisting directly in the Reserves.

Admiral Carney and General Twining also stressed this feature, but went so far

as to express doubt that it would serve to protect the Services' attempts to recruit

regulars. General Ridgway spoke of the value ot the plan in providing trained

men for the Reserves and in assuring fulfillment of military obligations by all

eligible young men. General Shepherd limited his testimony toa general

endorsement.*

0

But an impressive array of military and civilian testimony in support of the

legislation did not prevent Congress from altering it drastically before approving

it. The final Reserve Forces Act of 1955 allowed enlistment in the Reserves for

men under age 19, but did not authorize induction for this purpose. It specified

the duration of training for such men as from three to six months, and authorized pay of $50 per month (the administration had asked $30). It limited their

total military obligation to eight years, though at the same time reducing to six

years that of men who served two or more years on active duty. The statutory

limit of 1.5 million on the Ready Reserve was abolished, but the administration's

strength objective (2.9 million) was written into the Uw «Aa new limit, and it

was provided that not more than 1.0 tniltion could be called to active duty at one

time without Congressional approval. No authority was granted to assign obligated reservists to the National Guard, ot to authorize the states to organize

separate militias.

Needless to say, these changes in the administration's plan were owing to

political forces having no relation to military objectives: Congressional fears of

175

-£-

i
JCS and National Policy

constituents' reactions, the established institutional status of the National Guard,

and the traditional American hostility to universal military service. The President and the Secretary of Defense regarded the final version of the bill as gravely

defective, especially in two respects. Without authority to induct men into the

Reserve forces, it was doubtful that the Department of Defense could bring these

forces up to their strength goals or achieve the aim of insuring that all qualified

men served in one way or another. Moreover, it would be difficult to raise

National Guard units to an adequate level of proficiency unless prior-service

personnel could be assigned to them. Thus both the military and nonmilitary

objectives of the plan—greater effectiveness and more equitable service—had

been jeopardized.61

The new Reserve plan reflected the usual desire of the administration to meet

two objectives, military and economic. If carried out as planned, it would have

enlarged the pool of trained manpower and would in part have offset the effects

of reductions in active forces, which were more expensive to maintain, man-forman, than reservists. Of course, improvement of the Reserve forces required

that more money be spent on them, and the administration accepted this

necessity. But economy prevailed over military effectiveness when personnel

strengths taken from the joint Mid-Range War Plan, which assumed an M-day

of 1 July 1957, became goals that were not to be achieved until FY 1959.

Like most of the military innovations introduced in 1953 and 1954, the reorganization of the Reserves did not originate *vith the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Its inception

can be traced, through the Office of Defense Management and the National

Security Training Commission, to the President himself. The Joint Chiefs of Staff

were influential, however, in shaping it in a direction that they desired. They

were able to secure the inclusion oi provisions to protect the sources of recruitment for active forces and the abandonment of radical proposals that would

have in some measure subordinated the quality of military forces to a nonmilitary objective, the equal distribution of obligations.

In the discussion of this plan in its various stages, the continuing disagreement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over strategy was less important than anothethat cut across their membership in a different direction. The difference of opinion was apparent in their comments on the original task force proposals and in

their Congressional testimony. Genera! Twining &n<i Admiral Carney, as spokesmen for Services that increasingly thought of themselves as technically oriented,

were concerned primarily with protecting their supply of professional specialists.

Distribution of the burden of military service was of secondary importance, and

they had little interest in proposals to increase the flow of men into the Reserves

for this purpu»r. Admiral Radford generally Aliened himself with this view.

General Ridgway's outlook on these problems showed evidence of the Army's

long-standing advocacy of universal military training, and, perhaps more

importantly, uf the relatively greater reliance of his Service on Reserve forces.*5

\?6
8

Missions and Weapons

Unification had been the great goal of the reorganization of the US military

establishment at the end of World War H. The National Security Act of 1947 had

proclaimed the intent of Congress to provide for the authoritative coordination

and unified direction of the Services, their operation under unified control, and

their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces.1

The word unification meant, among other things, an efficient sharing of

functions among the Services to insure that none of them wasted resources or

energies on a task that was being, or properly should be, performed by some

other Service. This goal, which could not be wholly achieved by legislative fiat,

was sought by the first Secretary of Defense, James V. Forrestal, in discussions

with the joint Chiefs of Staff. The outcome was the Key West Agreement,

approved by President Truman in 1*H8, which listed in some detail the functions

of each of the Services and of the joint Chiefs of Staff.2 Unfortunately its provisions were not sufficiently clear or detailed to preclude Service disputes, most

notably a controversy between the Navy and the Air Force, concerning responsibilities in the application of air power, that rent the political scene in 1949 and

1950.

Service Roles and Missions under Review

Some believed also that the Key West Agreement, at least as it was applied in

practice, was defkient in another way, for it seemed to allow opportunity for the Services to multiply their tasks for their own aggrandizement, in

disregard of the principle oi unification. The conviction that the Services

were engaged in numerous overlapping activities was responsible for a multitude of public complaint* about waste and duplicatko in the military

establishment.' If this belief were true, it followed that a careful revision of

Service mn^ons could generate substantial savings with no loss of combat

177

i >
JCS and National Policy

strength. President Eisenhower and some of his advisers held this conviction when they took office. "I knew from experience," Mr. Eisenhower later

wrote, referring to the time of his accession, "that there was much duplication among the three services in research and development, in procurement,

and even in roles and missi(.-.c -these last always at least partly selfassigned."4

In line with this belief the new President, in his first State of the

Union message, demanded proper coordination of the Services and elimination of duplication of effort.5

This conviction was reflected in NSC 1:49/2, in which the National Security

Council decided that Service missions would be reviewed as rapidly as possible

to reveal any overlapping and to ascertain whether they needed to be changed

asa result of changing capabilities, modernization, or more effective planning.

6

Bui despite the need for haste implied in this statement, no action was taken at

once. The question of individual Service responsibilities was entirely ignored in

President Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan No.6 for the Department of Defense,

sent to Congress on 30 April 1953.

7

The committee that drafted this plan had declared that the Secretary of Defense

should have authority to clarify the roles and missions of the Services, but it had

not indicated in what respects clarification was needed. Its final recommendations dealt with the relationships among the Secretary of Defense, *he Service

Secretaries, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with the status and powers of the

JCS Chairman.* Neither the committee's report nor the reorganization plan suggested any changes in Service missions.

The task of reviewing Service roles and missions was given the incoming

Joint Chiefs of Staff a» part of their survey of military problems before they

assumed office. When they wrote their findings, they quickly disposed of the

view that any change was needed. The existing directive on this subject, they

said, was clear and provided reasonable, workable guidance.''

The administration accepted this conclusion; nothing more was said about

revising Service missions. But since Reorganization Han No.6 had altered the

functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it necessitated amendment of certain parts

of the Key West Agreement.

1

" To one member of the newly appointed Joint

Chiefs of Staff, this routine revision seemed Jo offer an opportunity to introduce

other changes in the Key West Agreement that he considered desirable—change*

that would indeed have altered the responsibilities of the Services. General

Kidgway, along with his colleagues, had signed the report to the Secretary of

Defense, with its statement that no *ueh changes were needed. Nevertheless, in a memorandum circulated to the other JCS members on 14 August 1953» he

criticized the Key West Agreement on the grounds that it wa» ambiguous »nd

inconsistent and that it had failed to integrate the Services intoa balanced

military team. He submitteda revised draft intended to remedy those defects,

which would At the same time tev* tettled several controversies over Service

missions, growing out of the Korean War» ina manner favorable to the ArmyThus it would have given the Army the right to establish requirements lor

atrcraft and amphibious vessels to be provided by the other Service«; to exercise

operational control over tactical air power supporting ground troops; and to

17* •
Missions and Weapons

acquire and operate such aircraft as were essential to land operations.11 His draft

received no support from the other JCS members, however, and was soon

withdrawn from consideration.12

A new version of the Key West Agreement, consonant with Reorganization

Plan No. 6, was circulated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 1953. They

approved it with a few suggested changes, which were incorporated in the final

directive issued by Secretary Wilson on 1 October 1953.n

Army-Air Force Disagreement over Guided Missiles

The administration had thus reaffirmed the adequacy of the Key West Agreement as a guide to Service responsibilities. But no general directive, however carefully written, could be so phrased as to forestall disagreements in its

application to specific tasks or capabilities.

Of these disagreements, one arising between tne Army ana the Air Force

received the most intensive and time-consuming attention during 1953-1954. It

concerned the responsibility for developing and operating guided missiles. The

issue became acute because these weapons were now moving from the drawing

board and assembly line to the fighting forces in the field. The Army began

deploying its Nike antiaircraft missiles in 1953. About the same time, the Army

introduced Corporal, a surface-to-surface missile, as well as Honest lohn, which

was usually included in lists of missile projects, though it was actually a free

rocket. In FY 1955 the Navy introduced Terrier (surface-to-air), Regulus (surfaceto-surface), and Sparrow (air-to-air) missiles, and the Air Force. Falcon (air-toair) and Matador (surface-to-surface).1

*

The original Key West Agreement and its 1953 revision made the Army

responsible for providing all forces for combat operations on land and the Air

Force for supplying close combat and logistic«) air support, while both Serviee*

were required to contribute forces for air defense.** There was no basis for

conflict over control of the force* needed for these tasks so long as the two

Services employed wholly different weapons—the gun Af\%i the airplane. But the

development of the missile carried the seed?» of dissension, Should the new

v-eapon be regarded as a self-pn>pelled artillery shell or as an aircraft without a

Pilot? Either viewpoint could be defended. In the early years of missik

development, projects were readily separable by function, but as the state of the

ar» advanced and the range At\d maneuverability of missiles increased, it became

harder to disentangle functional responsibilities.

The Navy stood somewhat apa*t from this Army-Air Force dispute. Its special requirements for weapons suitable for launching at sea. either from ships or

from carrier-based aircraft, were no! contested by the other Services

The incipient controversy had hardly been visible in 1949r when the Joint

Chiefs of Staff allocated missile responsibilities among the Services The wording of their directive was so *>road that it was almost as open to diverse interpretation as the Key West Agreement itself. Missiles were grouped into four general

17V
JCS and National Polio/

categories. Two of these—surface-to-surface (SSM) and surface-to-air (SAM)—

were open to all three Services. Responsibility for such weapons was laid down

on the basis of relationship to existing weapons. Thus missiles that would

supplement, extend the capabilities of, or replace artillery were assigned to the

Army and Navy, while those that would similarly supplement or extend aircraft

were given to the Navy and the Air Force. Missiles of the air-to-surface (ASM)

and air-to-air (AAM) types were made the province of the Air Force and the

Navy. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff specified that any missile developed by

a Service would be made available to any other Service that could show a need

for it. A periodic JCS review of missile projects would forestall any unnecessary

duplication.16

In 1951 General Vandenberg had sought to impose narrow limits on the

Army's missile program. He recommended that the Army be restricted to surfaceto-surface missiles to be used within the combat zone of opposing armies, which

he defined as within 50-75 miles on both sides of the line of contact. In other

words, Army missiles would be held to a maximun range of 150 miles. His

proposals for surface-to-air (antiaircraft) missiles were even more sweeping. The

Air Force, he believed, should have entire responsibility for these, leaving to the

Army only predicted-fire weapons; that is, artillery or free rockets. General

Collins had objected that these proposals would violate the fundamental command principle that every commander should have control of all the means

needed to carry out his mission. He had argued that missiles were more analogous to artillery than to aircraft.17

General Vandenberg's recommendations had been made in connection with

an attempt by the Guided Missiles Interdepartmental Operational Requirements

Group (GMIORG), a three-man committee set up by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in

1950, to draw up an overall master plan for missile development and production.

General Vandenberg had intended his proposals to be reflected in the plan, but

the Joint Chiefs of Staff took no action on them. Accordingly, the Air Force

member of the Group refused to endorse the draft prepared by the other

members, arguing that the issues raised by his Chief should be settled first.18

Again the Joint Chiefs of Staff declined to resolve the question. The Army was

left free to proceed with its projects.

The conflict had been dormant for over a year when it was stirred to life in

January 1953. At that time, the Army asked the Department of Defense for

permission to purchase from the Navy some Regulus (surface-to-surface) missiles,

to assist in evaluation of a similar Army missile under development (Hermes)

and to provide an interim tactical missile capability. The request was passed

successively to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the Guided Missiles Interdepartmental Operational Requirements Group. The Army and Navy members of the

latter recommended approval. The Air Force member opposed the request on

the grounds that his Service was responsible for furnishing all weapons (both

manned aircraft and guided missiles) needed both for close combat air support

and for interdiction of combat areas. This position appeared even more extreme

than that taken by General Vandenberg in 1951; it implied that the Army should

be wholly excluded from the development of tactical surface-to-surface missiles.w

180

.
Missions and Weapons

The Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves could not agree on the question and

referred it back to the Fecretary of Defense on3 June 1953. General Collins,

supported by Admiral Fechteler, justified the request on the grounds that the

Army must have missiles under its own control in order to accomplish its mission.

Sensing his vulnerability to charges of wasteful duplication, General Collins

argued that the Army's experience with Regulus would providea basis for

evaluating similar missiles under development and perhaps for eliminating some.

General Vandenberg supported the position taken by his representative in the

Group, and asserted that Regulus, witha maximum range of 500 miles, could in

no sense be regarded as an extension of artillery.

20

Secretary Wilson referred the problem to his adviser on this subject, Mr. K.

T. Keller.

21 The tetter's reply was based wholly on the status of the Regulus

program. Since Regulus was not yet ready for issue to operating forces, he

decided, it would be premature to authorize the Army to purchase it at that

time. If the Army wished to evaluate Regulus, it could do so by participating in

the Navy's test program. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred in this short-range

solution, which evaded the basic issue of Service responsibilities.

22 Presumably

Secretary Wilson accepted this advice, although his decision is not documented

in available records.

The question of responsibilities had emerged again in May 1953, when the

Guided Missiles Interdepartmental Operational Requirements Group drafteda

new schedule of missile programs and requirements. The Group's report took

note of the Army-Air Force dispute but made no attempt to resolve it. The plan

proposed by the Group included outlines of programs submitted unilaterally by

each Service, with comments by each member on the programs of the other

Services. The Air Force member alleged that these programs reflecteda large

amount of wasteful duplication—the result, he said, of differing interpretations

of the JCS directive, which was itself "out of date and too general in nature." On

the question of Service responsibilities, he maintained that the Air Force was

responsible for providing the forces needed for air defense and for tactical air

support of troops. Apparently he did not interpret this sweeping statement to

mean that the Army should at once be directed to drop all work on missiles that

might serve these missions. He did, however, claim for his Service the responsibility for stating the requirements for all such force». On this basis, he felt free to

recommend that the Army's Nike program be sharply cut back and reexamined

in light of other weapons (i.e., those of the Air Force) that were expected to

become available. He also recommended that Hermes, which was expected ultimately to attain a 500-mile range, be discontinued or turned over to the Air

Force, which had similar projects under way. Missiles with sucha range, he

asserted, could be employed for interdiction of enemy land forces, close support

of friendly forces, or air defense operations—all of which were Air Force missions.

The Army member rejoined that the Air Force position would eliminate the

Army entirely from the development of surface-to-surface missiles except those

of the anti-tank, anti-pillbox type. He pointed out that the Nike program had

already been approved by the joint Chiefs of Starf and the Secretary of Defense.

He denied that Hermes duplicated Air Force projects. While agreeing that wasteful

181 i
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duplication should be eliminated, he warned that it was dangerous to cancel any

apparently competitive missile programs until the superiority of one to all the

others had been demonstrated beyond doubt. He maintained that the Air Force

interpretation of missile responsibilities violated the JCS directive on the subject,

and that it was inappropriate to attempt to challenge this directive through the

medium of the annual report of the Group. In the latter view he was supported

by the Navy member, who contended further that all missile programs listed in

the draft report were in conformity with JCS guidance.

23

The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the Group's report on9 June 1953.

Finding themselves unable to agree, they decided to reconsider the subject ina

special meeting after each member had submitteda statement of his views on

the proper division of missile responsibilities.

24

The statement prepared by General Twining receded somewhat from the

position taken by his GMIORG representative. He suggesteda new method of

assigning responsibilities, which would allow the Army to develop surface-tosurface missiles "the employment of which must be closely coordinated and

integrated with conventional artillery and the fire and movement of the supported ground forces," while the Air Force would develop those used to interdict enemy land forces, to isolate the battlefield, and to gain air supremacy. As

for antiaircraft missiles, General Twining would allow the Army those needed as

organic equipment by Army units for their own defense; however, the Air Force

should be responsible for those designed for defense of the United States and

other land areas.

25

General Collins' statenrint quoted from the Key West Agreement and from

the National Security Act of 1947 to justify the contention that the Army should

control all ground-launched missiles needed primarily for land combat. Ina 1949

law that had authorized the Secretary of the Army to procure guided missiles, he

founda positive assertion by Congress that such weapons were vital to the

Army. Surface-to-surface missiles should be regarded asa logical extension of

artillery; the same kind of problems were involved in their use, and the training

of operating personnel was sin ilar in both instances. Future battlefields, he

predicted, would be poorly defined and would embrace targets many miles

behind the enemy's rear; hence the range of Army missiles could not be arbitrarily restricted. As for surface-to-air missiles, he maintained that these complemented antiaircraft guns and rockets, all of which must be integrated to provide

an adequate defense against aircraft.

26

The issue was still hanging fire when the membership of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff changed in August 1953. The special meeting to reconsider the subject was

apparently never held; the new JCS members had to grapple with more immediate problems, and the question of missile responsibility dragged into 1954.

Guided Missile Policy at DOD Level i

mpetus for resolution of the problem was eventually tc come froma higher

level. The question of waste and duplication in missile development was of

182

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Missions and Weapons

course of intense interest to Secretary Wilson and his staff. It was discussed by

the Armed Forces Policy Council on 16 June 1953. The members agreed that no

promising new project should be abandoned, but that every effort should be

made to eliminate duplication and that, insofar as possible, a single missile of

each type should be standardized for use by all Services. Secretary Wilson directed

the Secretary of the Air Force, Mr. Harold E. Talbott, to organize a study group

to analyze the Service missile programs. Secretary Talbott delegated this task to

Mr. Trevor Gardner, his Special Assistant for Research and Development.27

Seven months later, on 24 January 1954, Mr. Gardner's Study Group on

Guided Missiles turned in its report. The Group approved all current missile

programs, and thus by implication rejected the Air Force charges of wasteful

duplication. The report did, however, suggest a number of changes in the overall missile effort, such as reexamination of requirements in light of expected

higher-yield atomic weapons and initiation of programs for low-altitude air

defense weapons and for an anti-missile missile.28 The Armed Forces Policy

Council approved the report and directed the Assistant Secretary of Defense

(Research and Development) to see that it was carried out.29

A New Division of Missile Responsibilities

None of the Study Group's recommendations required action by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. However, its report had noted that the unsettled dispute

over tactical and air defense weapons had a major bearing on missile programs.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development, Mr. Donald

A. Quarles, drew this comment to Admiral Radford's attention on 18 February

1954.30 Admiral Radford responded that the question was "now in the process of

resolution within the Joint Chiefs of Staff"31—a somewhat misleading statement,

inasmuch as it implied that a decision might be forthcoming momentarily.

Two months later Mr. Quarles again found it necessary to prod the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. Proposed programs, he pointed out, could not be evaluated

without considering Service roles and missions. Better coordination between his

office and the Joint Chiefs of Staff seemed to him to be called for. As an example,

he cited recent proposals submitted separately by the Army and the Air Force for

a ground-to-air missile with an atomic warhead. "This is a frankly competitive

situation in which the two departments, by developing an equipment capability,

seek to stake out a claim for a Mission responsibility," he wrote. "We believe

that junsdictional issues of this kind lead to duplicative development. This would

be avoided if the Mission responsiblity could be settled first." He suggested that

the Joint Chiefs of Staff consult with him before a decision was reached on such

potentially competitive projects.32

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a brief reply on 25 June 1954, agreed that it was

their responsibility to decide conflicts over mission responsibilities. Any difficulties involving roles and missions in the missile Held should be referred to them

for advice.53

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Meanwhile, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had at last moved to settle the

long-standing issue between the Army and the Air Force. On2 June 1954 they

agreed to establish an ad hoc committee to drafta new directive on guided

missile responsibilities.

34 The three members of this committee (formally

appointed on 28 June 1954) were instructed to use the 1949 directive asa point of

departure, since it was based on the sound premise that missile responsibility

should follow assigned Service functions. But where functions appeared to

overlap—wherea task might be performed in two or more ways, ora single

weapon could accomplish more than one task—assignment of responsibilities

must be predicated on additional factors. Here, of course, lay the key problem.

The committee was given no guidance in this matter and was left to determine

for itself the additional factors to be considered.

35

On 26 July 1954 the ad hoc committee submitted the draft ofa new directive

on ihe subject. It left unchanged the responsibilities for air-to-air and air-tosurface missiles, which were to remain with the Air Force and the Navy. It

proposed to make the Air Force formally responsible for "very long-range surfaceto-surface guided missiles of the intercontinental type"—an important matter on

which the previous JCS directive had been silent. On the points at issue between

the Air Force and the Army, the committee succeeded in narrowing the basis ot

disagreement but not in eliminating it. The members agreed thai the Army

should develop surface-to-surface missiles for use against "tactical targets of

interest to the ground force commander" (though the Air Force member wished

to stipulate that these targets must be on the battlefield). They agreed further

that the Air Force would develop surface-to-surface missiles required by its

assigned functions, but that it would be most profitable if the Air Force concentrated on manned aircraft rather than on missiles for the task of close support.

This concession by the Air Force was matched by the Army member in an

agreement that for some time into the future, support from tactical aircraft

would be more efficient than that from ground-launched missiles.

The committee failed to finda basis for agreement on antiaircraft missiles.

The Army and Navy members suggested that the Army be responsible for

missiles employed to defend specific areas or installations, and the Air Force for

those that were designed to replace manned fighter interceptors in blanket defense

of large areas. The Air Force member wished to restrict the Army to missiles

witha maximum horizontal range of 25 nautical miles at expected aircraft flight

altitudes (this was the actual range of Nike, which was already in use). He

denied that his Service desired to take over the function that had traditionally

been performed by the Army antiaircraft units, but admitted that it planned

eventually to deploy its own antiaircraft missiles, perhaps eliminating manned

interceptors entirely.

36

The Joint Chiefs of Staff experienced no little difficulty in thrashing out an

agreement on the issues left unresolved by the committee.

17 An acceptable basis

for agreement was finally worked out bya special two-man committee consisting of Generals Charles L. Bolte, USA. and Thomas D. White, USAF. It allowed

the Army to develop antiaircraft missiles with horizontal ranges up to 50 nautical

miles, which were to be sited for defense of specified geographical areas, cities,

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W^/J^^.^-^ffc^<ffl1W(W«wai^»w»^^,HtfJ«*WMWl.trliaM^.UlWMWtn<

Missions and Weapons

or vital installations, while the Air Force would develop missiles with greater

ranges which should be deployed for blanket defense over wide areas. The

Aimy would be allowed surtace-to-surface missiles for use against tactical targets within the zone of Army combat operations, a rather elastic phrase that was

left conveniently undefined.38

All these decisions were collected into a draft directive that the Joint Chiefs of

Staff sent to the Secretary of Defense on 9 September 1954. On 13 November

1954 the Acting Secretary, Mr. Anderson, approved it.39

The Problem of the Medium-Range Missile

The new directive in effect left the Army free to develop tactical missiles of

any desired range. It has been pointed out that the Army was thinking in

terms of ranges up to 500 miles, on the grounds that in future conflicts the zone of

combat operations would embrace targets several hundred miles behind the

enemy front. This was about the expected range of Matador, the Air Force

missile that was comparable to the Army's Hermes. At the same time the Air

Force had been made responsible for (and had begun developing) missiles with

intercontinental ranges—those measured in thousands of miles. But none of the

Services had any plans for missiles with ranges intermediate between these two

limits. For that reason, the new directive made no assignment of Service responsibility for medium-range missiles.40

This lacuna in US missile programs received attention as a result of cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom. In June 1954 Secretary

Wilson and Mr. Duncan Sandys, Minister of Supply in Her Majesty's Government, agreed that the long-standing military collaboration between the two

nations should extend to the missile field. They agreed tentatively that technical

information on the subject would be interchanged freely and that design and

production of missiles would be coordinated so as to produce missiles that

would be interchangeable, or at least functionally similar. This agreement was

submitted for comment to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who approved it subject to

certain restrictions intended to protect the most sensitive information. On 12

Augunt 1954 the British Government accepted these restrictions and the agreement became effective.41

One item of the agreement emphasized the special importance of developing

both long- and medium-range missiles as soon as possible. With this end in

view, the United Kingdom agreed to undertake the development of a weapon in

the 1,500-mile range. By implication, the United States would bear principal

responsibility for the intercontinental missile.

Calling Admiral Radford's attention to this part of the agreement, Assistant

Secretary of Defense Quarles suggested on 12 August 1954 that it would be well

to establish a single channel for liaison with the British on the medium-range

missile. He asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend the assignment of this

task to some one of the Services and also to clarify the responsibility for the

185

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JCS and National Policy

development cf missiles of this general type. At present, he pointed out, there

seemed to be a number of such projects under way: Corporal, Redstone, Snark,

Navaho, and Atlas.42

The Joint Chiefs of Staff received this communication while they were still

debating the general question of missile responsibilities, and they laid it aside

until after their new directive had been issued in November. Admittedly that

directive, during the final stage of its preparation, might have had written into it

a precise definition of responsibilities for medium-range missile development,

but an attempt to treat the subject would have raised further inter-Service

contention. The extent of the Service differences was revealed when the Guided

Missiles Interdepartmental Operational Requirements Group sought to draft a

reply to Mr. Quarles later in November. The Air Force representative interpreted

the recent directive as assigning to his Service the responsibility for research on

medium-range missiles, and be believed this interpretation should be made

explicit by a JCS agreement. The other two members denied this interpretation

and believed that it would be premature at that time to make any formal assignment of responsibility for the task. On the question of technical liaison with the

British, the Navy member lined up with the Air Force in urging that the latter

Service be given this mission. The Army member considered that his Service

should be so designated because the success of its Corporal and Redstone programs had given the Army a fund of technical knowledge in the medium-range

missile field.43

The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that the Air Force should be made responsible for liaison, and so informed Mr. Quarles on 10 December 1954. As for the five

projects he had cited, they merely referred him to the outline of responsibilities

in their recent directive.44 However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff assigned no responsibility at that time for developing medium-range missiles, omitting all reference

to the subject in their reply to the Assistant Secretary.

This decision was reasonable under the circumstances. To force the issue at

that time would have uncovered an irreconcilable difference of professional

opinion that could be settled only by a largely arbitrary decision of higher

authority. In avoiding this for the present, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff left

the door open for future disputes on the subject, brought on a few years later

when the Army's missile research projects strained against the battlefield limitation and forced reconsideration of the division of responsibilities between the

Army and Air Force.

186

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9

Disarmament and Atoms for Peace

The hope of international disarmament in a peaceful world had helped to

sustain the morale of the peoples of the United States and other allied nations

during World War II. It soon withered, however, in the frigid atmosphere of the

cold war. Even a more limited goal—international control of the newly released

power of the atom—proved beyond attainment in a world divided into two

hostile blocs. Nevertheless, all nations felt obliged to profess interest in arms

control, and the subject remained under discussion in the United Nations as

well as within the US Government.

In UN debates, the United States adhered to a position laid down in July 1951

in NSC 112, which set forth the following basic principles of US disarmament

policy:

1. The first step in any attempt to regulate armaments must be an international agreement embracing at least general principles, if not specific

details.

2. International control of atomic energy was not to be considered separately,

but must be dealt with in connection with the regulation of conventional

armaments.

3. Control of the atom must be based on a plan at least as effective as that

approved by the UN General Assembly in 1948, which provided for a

control agency with adequate enforcement authority.

On the basis of these principles, NSC 112 proposed a step-by-step program

of regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments

beginning with a system of disclosure and verification of information.*

The UN General Assembly had approved these principles in January 1952

and had set up a Disarmament Commission to draft a treaty for the purpose.

This Cofwnission met several times in 1952, but made no progress toward it*

goal. The Soviet Union continued to insist upon its own approach to disarmament,

which envisioned immediate prohibition of atomic weapons (but with no means

for enforcement) uxd a percentage reduction in the armed forces of all major

powers. The Soviet Woe also seized every opportunity during 1952 to repeat tts

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unfounded (but nonetheless psychologically effective) charge that the United

Nations Command in Korea had resorted to bacteriological warfare.2

Disarmament Opportunities in 1953

President Eisenhower, though he had spent almost all of his adult life in a

military uniform, was nonetheless as firmly committed to the goal of arms

reduction as was his predecessor. He pledged himself to this objective in his

inaugural address. At the moment of his accession, however, there seemed no

occasion for new US initiatives in this direction. On 18 February 1953 the National

Security Council agreed merely to explore the possibility of submitting some

new proposal in the General Assembly when it convened the following

September.3

Almost immediately, however, two events brought the subject of arms control to the NSC agenda. The more pressing of these was the death of josef Stalin,

Premier of the Soviet Union, on 4 March 1953. The passing of the aged dictator,

who had been a fixture on the international scene for a generation, seemed to

oner, a new opportunity. There was room for hope that he might be succeeded

by a leadership genuinely interested in seeking a reduction of international

tension and receptive to a new approach to disarmament. In any case, the

station in the Soviet Union was Silely to remain fluid for some time, and it was

essential for the United States to seize any opportunity to shape developments

in a favorable manner.

The administration was quick to recognize the possibilities. On 11 March the

National Security Council agreed that Stalin's death presented "an opportunity

for the assertion of world leadership by President Eisenhower in the interests of

security, peace, and a higher standard of living for all peoples." The President's

Special Assistant for Cold War Operations, Mr. C. D. Jackson was directed to

draft a suitable speech for this purpose,4

The result was President Eisenhower's address on "The Chance for Peace,"

delivered before the American Society of Newspaper Editors on 16 April 1953.

which was intended to make clear of the nation's desire for a peaceful world and to

create an opportunity for US-Soviet rapprochement on the subject of disarmament and other problems. The President called on the new leadership of the

Soviet Union to settle the issues standing in the way of peace, and at the same

time to "proceed concurrently with the next great work—the reduction of the

burden of armaments now weighing upo'i the world." He promised that the

United States would welcome And ent**r into the most solemn agreements for

limiting armaments and for control of atomic energy, unfortunately, the

President's Mpp^i^l brought no response from Moscow.

The second event having an impact on US disarmament polio- was a report

submitted early in 1953 by a panel of consultants that had been appointed by

Secretary of State Dean Acheson in April 1952. Dr. J Robert Oppenheimer

served as chairman; other members were Dr. Vannevar Bush, Mr. John S. Dickey,

,-

"■■»
Disarmament

Mr. Allen W. Dulles, and Mr. Joseph E. Johnson. Their report was an impressive

document: sober, closely reasoned, aptly phrased, and infused with a recognition at once of the importance of the goal and of the difficulties in the way of its

realization. The member2 concluded that any attempt to draft detailed blueprints of general arms regulation would be dangerous and misleading. They

recommended instead the following:

(1) The United States should adopt a policy of candor toward the

American people, by revealing fully the nature of the dangers

engendered by the atomic arms race.

(2) This policy should be extended to allied nations. The United States

should discuss freely with them the problems and dangers posed

by the use of atomic weapons, in order to strengthen the unity

and cohesion of the non-Soviet world.

(3) Arms regulation was closely related to continental defense; the

two were complementary methods of achieving the goal of safety

against the danger of a surprise knockout blow. Hence, greatly

intensified efforts of continental defense were essential.

(4) Discussion of disarmament in the United Nations should be

minimized, since the practice had now become unproductive and

even misleading.

(5) A real effort should be made to find ways of communicating with

the rulers of the Soviet Union on the range of questions posed by

the arms race. Admittedly, serious negotiation seemed unlikely at

that time, but the lesser act of genuine communication could do

no harm and might have real value1*

These recommendations were approved by the National Security Council on

25 February 1953. The Council's Senior Staff (soon to be renamed the Planning

Board) was told to suggest ways of translating them into action7As a result, the

first two recommendations became the basis of ptograms apprised by the Council

in the next few months. Action on the third recommendation, regarding Continental defense, was already under way, with results that have been described

earlier. The fourth recommendation had to be dropped in the face of pressure

from other nations for continuing UN discussion; the fifth was a matter for

long-range diplomatic activity over a period of time,

Operation Candor and Its Outcome

Following the Council4* direction, the Planning Board on 8 May 1953 outlined a course of action for implementing the pobcv of candor. Its objective

would be "to secure support of the American people for necessary governmental

actions which would rest on an adequate understanding of the realities of the

situation"—a very timely goal if it became necetsary to undertake an expensive

continental defense program, as then seemed likely. The Planning Board recom»

1*19

.
JCS and National Policy

mended the release of general information about current and future US and

Soviet nuclear capabilities.8

The Board's plan was submitted for comment to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who

generally approved it. Most of the JCS members believed that its execution

should be postponed until the panel's other recommendations had been considered in detail; General Vandenberg, however, wanted it implemented at once.9

The President and the National Security Council decided on 27 May 1953 to

proceed immediately with "Operation Candor." The Psychological Strategy

Board, headed by Mr. Jackson, was placed in charge of the program, which was

to be initiated with a speech by the President.10In succeeding weeks, Mr. Jackson discussed various drafts of a suitable speech with other governmental officials.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff named the Chief of the Armed Forces Special Weapons

Project, Major General A. R Luedecke to represent them in these discussions.

but made dear that they wished to review the final speech before delivery.Il

In the course of the discussions, Operation Candor underwent a change in

concept. Instead of a means of rallying the American people to support unpopular measures by disclosing disagreeable facts about nuclear weaponry, it was

turned into a kind of seminar designed to instruct the public on the international

situation in general. A plan prepared by the Psychological Strategy Board, tentatively approved by the Council on 30 July 1953, called for a series of talks by the

President and other officials on various aspects of the cold war. Admiral Radford

was scheduled for an address on "The Threat to the United States"12

A draft of an initial speech for delivtry by the President was sent to the Joint

Chiefs of Staff for comment on 3 September 1953. Entitled "The Safety of the

Republic," it consisted of a general description of the international scene, with

emphasis on the alarming nature of the atomic arms race, but it ended with a

promise that the United States would maintain military superiority while continuing the search for effective approaches to disarmament.13 The Joint Chiefs of

Staff criticised the text as too vague in some respects and as implying ttv! the

United States would never use nuclear weapons under any circumstances.1*

These comments became academic when the President discarded this draft

and adopted yet another approach. He decided upon an address that would

close on a hopeful note instead of dwelling on the terrifying aspects of the

current situation. It would call upon those powers that lud mastered the technology of atomic fission to contribute radioactive material to be used for constructive purposes—electric power production, medical treatment md research, and

the like.1*

From this decision emerged Mr. Eisenhower's proposal for an International

Atomic Energy Agency, to be established under United Nations auspices, whkh

would receive contributions of fissionable materials and allocate them among

the nations of the world according to need. Details of the plan were worked out

by the President in consultations with Mr. Jackson and with the Chairman of the

Atomic Energy Commission, Rear Admiral Lewis L. Strauss. The Joint Chief* of

Staff were not formally consult' d AM had no opportunity to review the speech

in which the plan was unveil* d before the UN General Assembly on 8 December

1953 The subsequent history of the proposal is describrd in a later section.

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Disarmament

Sharing Information with US Allies

After Operation Candor had been launched, the Planning Board turned its

attention to the second of the Oppenheime. panel's recommendations, for

an exchange of information with other nations. The subject was timely in view of

the possibility, already under discussion, that NATO's strategy might be reoriented to emphasize nuclear weapons.

The Planning Board first undertook to define the purpose of the proposed

exchange of informaticn—a matter on which the Oppenheimer panel had been

somewhat vague. According to a statement tentatively approved by the Board,

the objectives would be to facilitate interallied defense planning to prevent

undue fear and timidity that might hamper US freedom of action in a crisis, and

to stimulate cooperation in weapons research and development. This statement

was sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment on 1 July 1953.,6

The Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed a few changes, but added some comments

that went to the heart of the problem raised by the suggested progran . "It can

be stated almost categorically," they asserted, "that the rate of leakage to the

Soviet Union of atomic information disclosed to allied nations will be very high."

Hence, any program of disclosure should be carried out slowly and cautiously,

with frequent periods ot inactivity during winch the situation would be carefully

assessed. Moreover, it should exclude technical information about atomic weapons and precise figures on the size of the US and Soviet stockpiles.,7

Without further reference to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Planning Board

drew up a detailed plan of disclosure ot information and sent it to the National

Security Council on 23 November 1953. Under this plan, the United States

would make availab!? information on the following subjects: effects of weapons;

tactical and strategic use of atomic weapons in US plans, and the probable

results of their usr; Soviet atomic capabilities; techniques of defense against

atomic attack; and scientificmd technical information on atomic energy in general.

The United States would »of, however, disseminate information concerning the

manufacture or design of weapons, nor reveal its «*wn capabilities or its plans for

deployment of atomic weapons. These testrietions seemed to reflect the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Moreover, the Board included the JCS warning

about the probable rate of leakage of shared knowledge, though at the same time

pointing out that the proposed program would exclude the most sensitive

information. la any event said the Board, the United States could not hold back

the spread of knowledge of nuclear technology.m

The President ^nd the Council approved the program with some additional

restriction*, on 3 December 1953. and designated the Chairman of the Atomic

Energy Gwnmtssion to coordinate itl* A necessary preliminary was amendment

of the Atomic Energy Act of l*k>, t «ruch closely restricted the dissemination of

information. Legislation for this purpose was prepared by the administration

^nd was passed by Congress, in a slightly altered form, in 1954. It authorized the

Department of Defense, with tin» approval of the President, to enter into agreements for exchange of atomic information with other nations or with regional

defense organization». **

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JCS and National Policy

UN Pressure for a Disarmament Program

Although the Oppenheimer panel had recommended that the United States

minimize the discussion of disarmament in the United Nations, US

representatives in that organization could hardly avoid talking about the subject

if others insisted upon doing so. Pressure in the United Nations for continuing

study was evidenced by a resolution approved by the General Assembly on 8

April 1953, directing trie Disarmament Commission to continue its search for

comprehensive and coordinated plans for arms control.21

The administration was compelled to acknowledge this situation. 'There is

ev*ry indication/' remarked the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International

Security Affairs, Mr. Frank C. Nash, in a memorandum addressed to the Serwces on 1 September 1953, "that recent events have stimulated undeniable

pressures both at home and abroad for additional effort toward realizing an

acceptable and effective world disarmament program." It was essential, he

observed, that the United States have a plan ready for submission if and when

conditions were ripe. The NSC Planning Board had already voted in favor of a

review of basic US disarmament policy.

In the conduct of this review, it was expected that a prominent role would be

played by the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments (RAC), a threeman body appointed in March 1952 to draw up plans and policies relating to

arms control, consisting of the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. Mr. Nash accordingly instructed the

Services to appoint representatives to constitute an ad hoc military subcommittee of the RAC, which would be under the chairmanship of the senior military

representative on the RAC staff.22

The Planning Board had meanwhile considered the possibility of a new US

proposal on disarmament for the forthcoming General Assembly session, as

required by the Council's decision of 18 February 1953. It concluded that little

progress could be expected until basic political questions, such as the status of

Germany, of Austria, and of Korea, had been settled between the East and the

West. Moreover, concluded the Board, (echoing the Oppenheimer panel's view),

any serious negotiations with the Soviet Union on disarmament, if they took

pfac: at all, would probably occur outside the United Nations. Nevertheless it

was advisable for the United States to continue to demonstrate to the world its

abiding desire for compre oensive and safeguarded disarmament, especially in

light of emotions aroused on the one hand by the peace offensive undertaken by

the new Soviet rulers and on the other hand by the Soviet thermonuclear

explosion. The Board concluded, therefore, that in the approaching General

Assembly the United States should summarue its previous efforts in this field,

but should submit no substantive proposals other than to reaffirm in «ome

manner President Eisenhower's remarks on disarmament in his speech of 16

April.23 The National Security Council adopted these recommendations on 9

September 1953.24

The NSC decision was reflected in the speech of Secretary of State Dulles to

the General Assemb»y on 17 September 1953, in which eJioing the President's

192
Disarmament

address of 16 April, he urged that study of disarmament be pressed concurrently

with the search for solution of other problems. He cited previous US disarmament proposals but indicated that his country was not inflexibly committed to

them and would be glad to consider other plans.25 The General Assembly

embarked upon another futile discussion of the subject, which served only to

make dear once again the conflicting positions of the two power blocs.26

Nevertheless, the UN session saw two noteworthy developments. The first

was a resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 28 November 1953, which

directed the Disarmament Commission to establish a subcommittee to conduct

further discussions in private. The second was President Eisenhower's address

on 8 December 1953, already described, proposing an International Atomic Energy

Agency—a substantive proposal of major importance. These iwo developments

dominated discussion of disarmament within the administration during the next

few months.

The UN Disarmament Subcommittee

In accord with instructions from the General Assembly, the UN Disarmament

Commission on 19 April 1954 established a subcommittee composed of

representatives of the three major Western Powers, the Soviet Union, and Canada,

which was directed to meet in London the following month.27 The US delegation

included representatives of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy

Commission and two military officers named by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at

Secretary Wilson's request: Colonel W. A. Stevens, USA, and Commander John

M. Alford, USN.2*

In preparation for the meeting, representatives of the State and Defense

Departments drafted two position papers outlining proposals to be submitted by

the United States. Both were sent to the Joint Chiefs of Swaff for comment. The

first dealt with the relationship between the phases of a comprehensive disarmament program such as that envisioned in NSC 112. It concluded that the

establishment of an international control agency under the United Nations must

be the first step.2* The second set forth the status, functions, and method of

operations of such an agency.30

Before the Joint Chiefs of Staff could comment on these drafts, they were

confronted by a new and significant proposal that originated outside the United

States. On 2 April 1954 Prime Minister Jawaharial Nehru, of India, speaking to

the Indian Parliament about the dangers of nuclear war, urged that the great

powers conclude a standstill agreement to discontinue tests of nuclear weapons

at once, pending progress toward elimination of such devices. Six days later

India's UN Representative asked the Secretary-General to plare this suggestion

before the Disarmament Commission.31

The administration quickly recognized that the United States could reap a

political advantage by accepting this proposal. The impact would be greatest if

such an announcement could be made during the opening meeting of the sub193

.
. . _ . . . ..- .

JCS and National Policy

committee of the Disarmament Commission. On 16 April 1954, therefore, Secretary Wilson asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their comments on a priority

basis.32

The Joint Chiefs of Staff turned a cold eye on Mr. Nehru's suggestion. They

pointed out to Secretary Wilson on 30 April that acceptance would violate the

accepted principle that international control of atomic energy should await the

adoption of a comprehensive and enforceable plan. Moreover, acquiescence on

this issue would probably lead to pressure for further piecemeal concessions in

the same direction. But the heart of their argument was that a test moratorium

would bring far-reaching and permanent military disadvantages outweighing

any transitory political gain. Their reasoning on this point was as follows:

It is believed that the United States has, at present, an indeterminate advantage over the USSR with respect to the technical status of thermonuclear weapons development. While a moratorium on tests of such weapons might, at first

thought, appear to maintain this advantage, a moratorium would not prevent

the Soviets from advancing their theoretical studies so as to approach the present stage of development in the United States. The advantage which the United

States is believed now to hold might then readily be neutralized should the

USSR elect to violate or abrogate the moratorium agreement and conduct proof

tests of their theoretical studies.33

As for the other draft papers that had been sent them for comment, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff judged them to be in conformity with established US policy and

therefore acceptable. They went on to add, however, that they opposed any

disarmament negotiations. It was, they believed,

most unrealistic ... to expect that any agreement which might be obtained vis-avis the USSR would be other than to the serious disadvantage of the security

interests of the United States. The Soviets have a long record of violating the

international agreements they have signed. They would use any agreement on

disarmament to enhance their own power position with respect to the United

States.34

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not explain why they had decided to go on

record in opposing negotiations. Apparently, however, they were moved to this

action by the opening of the Geneva Conference on 26 April 1954 and by what

they considered overeagemess on the part of the United Kingdom and France to

seek a political settlement in Indochina. On 30 April 1954 they had asked the

Joint Strategic Survey Committee to prepare a historical summary of previous

negotiations with the Soviet Union. This report became the basis for a memorandum that the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent to the Secretary of Defense on 23 June

1954, in connection with current NSC discussion of basic national security policy.

In this memorandum they urged that the United States refrain from attempts to

reach agreements with the USSR on disarmament or other issues until the Soviets had demonstrated a basic change of attitude through specific acts, such as

release of remaining prisoners from World War II or conclusion of peace treaties

with Germany and Austria. They urged also that the United States seek to

194

1
Disarmament

persuade its allies of the need to confront the Soviets with "unmistakable evidence of an unyielding determination to halt further Communist expansion."35

The question of a test ban came up in the National Security Council on 6 May

1954. The Council directed the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, with the assistance of the Director of

Central Intelligence, to examine the subject.36 Hearing of this development, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff asked Secretary Wilson to make certain that their views on

the subject were communicated without delay to the President and the National

Security Council.37 On 16 May Deputy Secretary Kyes assured the Joint Chiefs of

Staff that this action had been taken and stated that he agreed with their views.38

At a meeting of the National Security Council on 23 June 1954, Secretary

Wilson, Secretary Dulles, and Admiral Strauss unanimously recommended that

the United States not agree at that time to a moratorium on testing. The Council

approved this position.39

As matters turned out, the test moratorium never reached the agenda of the

UN Disarmament Subcommittee, and the United States was spared the embarrassment of publicly opposing it. When the Subcommittee met, the US plan for

an international control authority was rejected by the Soviet delegation. With US

support, the British and French delegations submitted a planned schedule of

arms reduction intended as a compromise between previous Western and Soviet

positions; it called for simultaneous agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons

and to reduce conventional forces, starting with a freeze on military manpower

and expenditures at their 31 December 1953 levels. This plan was also unacceptable to the Soviets. The parent Disarmament Commission, expressing disappointment at the Subcommittee's failure to agree, referred these proposals to the

General Assembly, along with India's plea for a nuclear test ban.

When the General Assembly session opened in September 1954, however, it

appeared that the Disarmament Subcommittee meeting might not have been

wholly fruitless after all. Unexpectedly reversing its position, the Soviet Government now indicated a willingness to accept the Anglo-French plan, and thus to

abandon its long-standing insistence on immediate prohibition of nuclear weapons as the first step toward disarmament. The Soviet representative in the Disarmament Subcommittee joined his Western colleagues in sponsoring a resolution,

which the General Assembly unanimously approved, asking the Disarmament

Commission to reconvene the Subcommittee. This evidence of a more cooperative attitude was to be reinforced to some degree by the position taken by the

Soviet Government on President Eisenhower's atoms for peace plan."11

The International Atomic Energy Agency

President Eisenhower's plan for international cooperation in peaceful nuclear

technology, as presented to the United Nations on 8 December 1953. was

general in nature. A c-t&tfed p»an of implementation, worked out principally by

195

fmmmm
.*.—

JCS and National Policy

representatives of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission,

was sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment in January 1954.42

In evaluating the draft plan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff took the position that the

establishment of the projected International Atomic Energy Agency should not:

(1) serve to increase any nation's military capability, (2) result in any decrease in

US atomic capability relative to that of the USSR; (3) introduce any departure

from the established US policy that international control of atomic energy must

be considered in relation to the regulation of other forms of military power; or

(4) preclude bilateral or multilateral agreements outside the framework of the

new agency. In light of these criteria, the Joint Chiefs of Staff judged the plan

acceptable. Their conclusions were approved by Secretary Wilson.43 A later,

slightly revised version was similarly endorsed.44

The United States had already opened negotiations with other major powers

looking toward the establishment of the new agency. The Soviet response was

discouraging; it amounted to a refusal to cooperate unless the United States first

agreed to an immediate ban on all nuclear weapons.45 Nevertheless the United

States went ahead with its plans. On 12 August 1954 the National Security

Council approved the projected International Atomic Energy Agency as part of a

wider scheme for peaceful nuclear collaboration, both multilateral and bilateral,

that was intended to take advantage of the liberalizing provisions of the amended

Atomic Energy Act (then nearing final passage). Other elements of this plan

were a proposal for an international technical conference on atomic energy, to be

held under UN auspices, and offers by the United States to assist other nations

n nuclear engineering and in the application of atomic energy to biology and

medicine.46The plan had been approved earlier by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.47

The principal features of the US atoms for peace plan were outlined to the

UN General Assembly by Secretary Dulles on 23 September 1954. On 5 November the US Representative, Henry Cabot Lodge, described them in detail. The

Assembly endorsed then, on 4 December 1954 in a resolution that expressed

hope for immediate establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency

and authorized the proposed technical conference. The Soviet Government had

meanwhile reconsidered its earlier opposition and now indicated willingness to

cooperate in these plans. The Soviet representative in the Assembly voted in

favor of the resolution, making the decision unanimous.48

Toward a New Disarmament Policy

On 9 September 1953 the National Security Council had voted for a fulldress review of the disarmament policy embodied in NSC 112, to be conducted as a matter of urgency by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the

Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.*' More than a year was to elapse

before this review was completed. During this interval, the Council devoted

some attention to disarmament as an aspect of bask national security policy.

NSC 162/2, approved in October 1953, declared that the United States should

196
Disarmament

"promptly determine what it would accept as an adequate system of armament

control. . . and on what basis the United States would be prepared to negotiate

to obtain it/' Another paragraph provided that the United States should keep

open the possibility of negotiating agreements on arms control or other issues.50

During the policy debates of 1954, which have been described in Chapter 2,

disarmament emerged as a major issue. The first draft policy paper of that year,

NSC 5422, contained alternative and widely divergent paragraphs on the subject.

One of these, presumably reflecting the views of the Department of State, was

noteworthy in its suggestion that the United States abandon its demand for a

comprehensive disarmament plan and accept a gradual approach, beginning

with a prohibition of nuclear weapons alone. The paragraph read as follows:

The U. S. should explore fully the possibility of reaching a practicable arrangement for the limitation of armaments with the USSR. Such an arrangement

would be a more certain and economical method of meeting the threat posed by

the growing Soviet nuclear capabilities than any other course of action discussed

in this paper. The U.S. should therefore continue to reexamine its position on

disarmament, especially (1) whether a system of safeguards can be devised entailing less risk for U.S. security than no limitation of armaments and (2) whether

the U. S. should be willing to agree to effective nuclear disarmament in the

absence of conventional disarmament.

Opposed to this view was another one holding dill the question of disarmament should not be treated in NSC 5422, since it was already under separate

study, and that the Soviet production of fissionable materials had already proceeded so far that it was doubtful that any safe and enforceable arms control

arrangement could be achieved "so long as the Soviet regime and objectives

remain substantially as they are today."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not comment on NSC 5422, but there was no

doubt that the second of the above versions was closer to their views. On 23 June

1954, as already described, they recommended to the Secretary of Defense that

tl*e United States eschew all negotiations with the Soviet Union until the Soviets

demonstrated a change in methods and objectives. Secretary Wilson apparently

made no formal comment on the views expressed in this JCS memorandum. On

24 June, however. Admiral Radford distributed copies of it to members of the

National Security Council.M The Council rejected the JCS position and voted in

favor of negotiations on disarmament, but refused to endorse any immediate

reversal in the basic US policy. NSC 5422/2, approved by the Council on 7

August 1954, contained the following carefully qualified paragraph on disarmament:

Despite serious question whether any safe and enforceable * -stem can be

achieved in the foreseeable future, the U. S. should neverthel«^^ continue to

explore fully the possibility of reaching apracticable arran^em nt for the limitation of armaments with the USSR. The U.S. should therefore continue to reexamine its position on disarmament especially fa) whether a promising climate for

effective disarmament negotiations can be developed, (b) whether a system of

safeguards can be devised entailing less risk for U.S. security than no limitation

of armaments, and (c) whether, if a safe and enforceable system for assuring

197

,
JCS and National Policy

effective nuclear disarmament, which might be acceptable to the USSR, can be

devised, the U. S. would be willing to accept it in the absence of conventional

disarmament. Meanwhile, the United States should continue to refuse to accept

nuclear disarmament except as part of general disarmament.

53

In the drafting of the paper that became NSC 5501, the disagreement between

the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff became even clearer. In the

initial draft, NSC 5440, the Department of State urged the inclusion ofa paragraph calling for the use of negotiation as a tactic that would place the Soviet

Union on the defensive before the rest of the world if it rejected US proposals.

Specifically, in the State Department view, the United States should "put forward and seek agreement on proposals which, if accepted, would reduce the

magnitude of the Soviet-Communist threat (such as an acceptable plan for limitation oi armaments with adequate safeguards)." The Joint Chiefs of Staff, standing firm on their previously expressed views, believed that it would be not only

fruitless, but perhaps even hazardous, to attempt to negotiate any issues, including disarmament, until the Soviets had given evidence of a changed attitude.54

In this instance, the Department of State was overruled. As finally approved,

NSC 5501 contained onlya brief statement that the United States "should be

ready to negotiate with the USSR whenever it clearly appears that U.S. security

interests will be served thereby."

55 The subject of disarmament was not

mentioned.

In thus sidestepping the issue, the National Security Council doubtless wished

to await the results of the policy review that it had set in motion in September

1953. By the end of 1954 this process had been completed. The details are

obscure, but two divergent positions, upheld respectively by the Department of

Defense and the Department of State, had emerged. They agreed on two points:

(1) no disarmament plan should rely sotely on Soviet good faith, and (2) merely

to stand pat on support of the 1948 UN plan for control of atomic energy would

involve an unacceptable risk ana would be construed as hypocritical by allied

countries. Otherwise, they were in total disagreement. The Department ol

Defense maintained that there was no possibility whatever that the Soviet regime,

as it then existed, would agree toa disarmament plan acceptable to the United

States. Even an attempt to test Soviet intentions through negotiations would

subject the United States to pressure to accept some plan that might jeopardize

the nation's security. Any partial disarmament scheme, limiting the production

or stockpiling o( atomic weapons, would place the United States ata disadvantage because of the Soviet Union's larger conventional forces. The United States

should therefore continue to insist ona comprehensive and enforceable system,

embracing both atomic and conventional weapons, asa preliminary to any action

in the field of disarmament. This position was clearly in accord with the expressed

views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and it may be assumed that they were influential in securing its approval at the departmental level

The Department of State position was based on the belief that continuing

Soviet advances in nuclear capabilities would bring the USSR to effective, if not

to actual, atomic parity by approximately 1957-1959.A realistic arms control

arrangement, therefore, would actually contribute to US security insofar as it

198

-
Disarmament

arrested the dangerous nuclear arms race. While agreeing that Soviet good faith

should not be assumed, the State Department was willing to explore the possibility

that the Soviets might be genuinely alarmed by the prospect of continuing

nuclear weapons competition and would be willing to cooperate in ending the

race. The State Department representatives therefore believed that the time had

come for a 'undamental policy change. They now favored a willingness to proceed toward disarmament by stages, beginning with agreements on the least

controversial aspects, in place of the previous US insistence on a comprehensive

overall plan. Moreover, they no longer considered that reduction of conventional

weapons should necessarily accompany reduction of nuclear arms, although

they agreed that the former goal should be aggressively sought.56

The special committee that had been set up by the Council in September

1953, consisting of the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the

Atomic Energy Commission, was unable to resolve this disagreement.57 The

matter therefore went to the National Security Council for resolution on 10

February 1955. The Council resorted to a famiiiar expedient—a call for more

study. The members agreed that the President should appoint an individual of

outstanding qualifications as his special representative to make another review

of arms control policy on a full-time basis. Pending receipt of his findings, the

United States should continue to support the position it had taken in the United

Nations, but without prejudice to possible later changes.58

The outcome of this recommendation was the appointment of Mr. Harold E.

Stassen as President Eisenhower's special assistant on disarmament problems,

which was announced to the press on 19 March 1955.5"* His appointment set the

stage for another try at breaking the long stalemate—one in which the more

conciliatory attitude demonstrated by the Soviets in the 1954 General Assembly

would be put to the test.

The ]CS Approach to Disarmament

The question of disarmament did not occupy a major proportion of the time

expended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff during 1953- 1954. Their principal role

was to evaluate proposals originating outside the military establishment. Their

comments on these various plans showed no evidence of hostility to disarmament per te, such as would be in keeping with a stereotyped view of the

"military mind." They didt however, reveal a constant concern lest the United

States compromise its security by advancing hastily into ÜJ-considered and unenforceable disarmament schemes that would place the nation at a disadvantage in

dealing with unscrupulous opponents. Such concern was, of course, entirely

proper on their part. On several occasions in 1954, however, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff went farther And urged that the United States refuse even to discuss disarmament unless the Soviet Union first gave convincing evidence of a lessened

hostility toward the free world.

199
JCS and National Policy

The administration, guided by a view of the national interest that transcended

purely military considerations, rejected this sweeping JCS recommendation.

Whatever the chances of real disarmament, the hopes and terrors associated

with the subject in the minds of people around the globe made it essential for the

United States to eschew any behavior that might make it appear as an obstructionist in the search for an end to the arms race.

wmmmmtmgm
10

Military Assistance

The policy of granting military assistance to friendly nations that was adopted

by the United States shortly after World War II had its antecedents in the lendlease program enacted during that conflict, and, still earlier, in the military

training missions sent to various Latin American countries from time to time.

More immediately, the policy responded to the shattered condition of much of

the world at the end of the war and to the posture of truculent menace adopted

by the Soviet Union and reflected in the behavior of communist parties around

the globe—notably in Greece, where armed rebellion raged for several years. For

the United States to share its resources with war-devastated countries, in order

both to rebuild their economies and to strengthen their military defenses, was a

move dictated by self-interest as well as humanitarianism.1

By the end o( the Truman administration the United States found itself

launched upon a comprehensive program of military, economic, and technical

aid that included, but was not limited to, the nations that had suffered devastation in World War II. Concern for the safety and stability of the Western Hemisphere had dictated the inclusion of many latin American countries on the list of

recipients of US assistance. Also included were certain of the underdeveloped

regions of the globe, where, it was feared, continuing poverty would offer fertile

ground for the growth of communist totalitarianism. The continuation of this

program under President Truman's successor established it as a fixed element in

US foreign policy for a number of years to come.

The separate aid programs authorized by Congress immediately after World

War II had been brought together and given a common legislative basis in the

Mutual Defense Assistance Act of IW. This law was supplemented by the

Mutual Security Act of 195!, the first of an annual series of similarly titled

statutes. It set up a Mutual Security Agency to supervise both military And

economic aid, defined ihe responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense and other

officials in connection with the program, and specified the conditions unuer

which foreign nations were eligible.2

Administrative machinery to supervise the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) soon took shape. A team of US advisers, usually styled the

201
JCS and National Policy

"Military Assistance Advisory Group" (MAAG), was accredited to each recipient country. Each was headed by an officer nominated by the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. These groups, in cooperation with military authorities of their host nations,

supervised the dissemination and use of US aid and prepared recommendations

concerning further required assistance. On the basis of these recommendations,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff annually prepared force bases to guide the overall

program: lists of the numbers of units for which the United States would furnish

support, in the form of materiel (end items) and training assistance. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff also defined general policies to govern the scale of equipment to

be supplied to foreign forces. The JCS recommendations, after approval by the

Secretary of Defense, were transmitted to the Service Departments, which prepared the detailed lists of military hardware to be supplied each nation and the

schedules for the training to be given foreign military nationals under the MDA

program.

The initial decisions by the administration regarding the scope of each year's

aid program were then submitted to Congress. The exigencies of the legislative

schedule generally made it necessary for the administration to go to Congress

with a preliminary "one-line" estimate for the entire program before the details

had been worked out. The proposed allocation of this total, by area or individual

country, would be spelled out during hearings. The successive Mutual Security

Acts specified the dollar value of the assistance authorized for each country or

group of countries, but actual appropriations were made separately by later

legislation. Congress usually took full advantage of the double opportunity this

offered to cut back the request submitted by the administration. After the legislative process was completed, allocation of the amounts actually made available

could proceed. Fund limitations, whether imposed by the administration or by

Table 13—Status of Mutual Defense Assistance Program Appropriations

Allocated to DOD, FYs 1950-1953: 31 January 1*53

<$ trilfam**

htw A'iUxalcJ CtHttmitfet ONtftf«! i itvndrj

.\ "itWit ft-n-n»! Amount Pmtnt Amount fctxmt A**.*un! Prrttnt

t fwopg ui m* 790 &*S?9 n.* **4?»i 79* S3 9*7? 793

11 War £**t and

A*r*c* • i >*> 91 te*3ü M 1023» M 4M0 90

;u - A«U and

ftdlc ■■ \MU 1.9 14344 iij i**l »I M*l n*

IV < UfmAmcTK'4 Ö.Ö54S 04 0-47J 04 J4t? 0 3 00> 0 1

1**1 $142911 1000 »U.SB3 lÖttO $H«I00 itvo SS0424 tooo

* frw ml** u* th# Mutual Vcurm A«-t o« i*M agtpc«sng t&aä* tö *I>C^K gcograph* *****

w cfr ijfttff*sj fftiOT thr t*gfc&l»!it*t m |9S3 but t tmtinurd ii\ i**e in OOO tfc* Wftffl!»

Wr* DMA OAJSD iiSAJ T*W*. * M* VV CCS 0*2 <*22-4f>> *#c I*.

202

i
Military assistance

Congress, usually took the form of reduced scales of equipment for recipient

nations, not of smaller force bases.

President Eisenhower's reorganization of the Executive Branch during the

early months of his administration extended to the machinery of foreign aid. The

Mutual Security Agency was renamed the Foreign Operations Administration

(FOA) and was given certain responsibilities in connection with economic and

technical assistance that had formerly been the province of the Secretary of

State. Mr. Harold E. Stassen was named Director of the FOA. The responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not affected

by this change.9

At the beginning of 1953 the Mutual Defense Assistance Program was in its

fourth fiscal year. (See Table 13.) Appropriations for the purpose had totaled

more that $14 billion, of which almost 80 percent had been allocated to Western

Europe—a reflection of the importance of NATO in US policy and strategy.

FY 1954 Program

Initial plans for military assistance for fiscal 1954 were drawn up while President Truman was in office. On 30 Octobei 1952 the joint Chiefs of Staff sent

the Secretary of Defense a list of recommended force bases for recipient countries to be used in calculating gross materiel and training requirements for the

1954 program. They included the following countries in their list, grouping them

according to a geographic classification set up by the various titles (sections) of

the Mutual Security Act of 1951.

Title I Western £«nw

European NATO countries

West Germany

Titte U Near test

Greece

Turkey

Iran

Yugoslavia

Title III Mm and Paafu'

Nationalist China (Taiwan)

indochina

Philippines

Thailand

South Korea

Ft» Title i countries, the Joint Chiefs of Stall drew attention to the force

objective for calendar 1955 under discussion in NATO (a* listed in a document

then under review, MRGJ2) These goals, said the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should

Title IV latin America

Argentina

Brazil

Chile

Colombia

Cuba

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

Mexico

Peru

Uruguay

Venezuela

Other

Austria

Japan

203
JCS end National Policy

be used temporarily in planning the FY 1954 MDA program for the NATO

countries. The final program would be based on long-range (planning) goals

approved by the North Atlantic Council for achievement in calendar 1956. Action

by the Council was at that time expected to be taken in December 1952, in

connection with the 1952 Annual Review. The Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that

if the Council failed to act in time, they would prepare suitable force bases for

the FY 1954 MDAP.

For the other nations on the list, the Joint Chiefs of Staff set forth recommended force bases, consisting principally of major combat forces: army

divisions, naval combat vessels, and air force fighter, bomber, and transport

squadron*. Determination of supporting forces was left to the Services.

The countries listed under Titles II and III were ones to which the United

States was already furnishing military aid. Indochina referred to French forces

fighting the Viet Minh rebels in that part of the world, as well as to the three

Associated States: Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

Title IV countries on the JCS list consisted of those assigned missions under

the mid-range hemisphere defense plan that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved

in 1951.4Four of these nations—Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Mexico,

and Venezuela—were not yet eligible for aid, since they had not entered into

bilateral agreements, as required by law.

In the Other category, the Joint Chiefs of Staff included a group of nations

whose participation in the FY 1954 MDA program was a mar*er of some doubt.

Austria was still under four-power occupation and obviously could not contract

a bilateral agreement so long as that condition continued. The occupation of

Japan had been formally ended by the peace treaty of 1951, but the complex

problem of Japanese rearmament had not yet been resolved, and negotiations

for a military aid agreement were not to begin for some months. * Discussions

with Spain had started, but no agreement had yet been forthcoming on the

amount of aid to be furnished in return for the base rights being sought by the

United States* Materiel asfistance to South Korea was currently being supplied

under Service budgets; the MDA program provided only for training. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff supplied force bases for that country against the contingency that

the war in Korea might end in time to allow South Korea to be brought fullv into

the FY 1954 MDAP

The Joint Chiefs of Staff made clear that they did not intend to imply that the

United States should fill all deficiencies in equipment for the recommended

forces. Moreover, the capacity of recipient nations to support the indicated

forces had not been fully evaluated. Under the criteria laid down by the Joint

Chiefs of Statf* the United States would supply equipment to the indicated

forces at rates somewhat more austere than the approved scales for equipping

US units, Spare parts and ammunition would be provided in the amount of one

year's supply at peacetime rates, plus three months supply at NATO or US

combat rates. Program adjustment* necessitated by fund limitations should take

the form of reductions in vets of equipment rather than in the number of units

to be equipped. Common- u items, having both military and civilian application.

204
/

Military Assistance

would not normally be supplied under the MDA program, nor would assistance

be furnished to the NATO infrastructure program.7

In approving the JCS recommendations on 26 November 1952, Secretary of

Defense Lovett stipulated that the exclusion of infrastructure would be understood to mean that no end items would be provided for that purpose. However,

he added, beginning in FY1954 the US contribution to the NATO infrastructure

program, which had formerly been included in the budget for DOD public

works, would be transferred to the mutual security budget. The Department of

Defense would also, in accordance with a ruling by the Director for Mutual

Security, assume responsibility for providing common-use items for support of

French forces and their allies in Indochina, and perhaps also for Nationalist

China.»

Preparation of the final FY 1954 MDAP by the administration proceeded

without further reference to the joint Chiefs of Staff. In his last budget message,

President Truman asked Congress for $7.6 billion in new obligational authority

for the entire mutual security program, embracing both military and economictechnical aid. This was $1.1 billion above the amount appropriated for th preceding year. The President forecast expenditures of $7.559 billion for m tual

security in 1954.*

Mr. Truman did not indicate the distribution oi these one-line estimates

among the various forms of assistance. On 24 January 1953 Mr. W.J. McNeil, as

Acting Secretary of Defense, told the Joint Chiefs of Stafi that $5.668 billion in

new obligational authority had been tentatively earmarked tor military assistance.

Of this amount, $.749 oillion would be set aside for various special purposes: the

NATO infrastructure program, administrative expenses, and shipping charges

(packing, crating, handling, and transportation, or PCH&T). Thus $4.919 billion

would be available for materiel and training programs for individual countries.

He asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend a broad geographic distribution

of this sum. *°

Replying on 17 February 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that

$3.0278 billion be allocated to Western Europe; the rest should be divided almost

equally between the Near East and the Far East, with a small amount ($16,2

million) for Utin America." (See Table 14.)

The JCS recommendations were never put into effect, since Mr. McNeil's

tentative allocation became obsolete when President Truman's program was

discarded by the new administration. It was notable, however, that the Joint

Chiefs of Staff had proposed tu .assign only 61.6 percent of the funds to Europe,

as compared with almost 80 percent in previous years. The difference was a

measure of Europe's military and political recovery, to whkh US aid had materi*

alry contributed.

The budget review undertaken by the Eisenhower administration soon after

its accession extended to the mutual security ptvgrtm. In analyzing fiscal trends

for the National Security Council on 24 Februaiy 1953, Mr. Joseph M. Dodge, the

new Director of the Bureau c4 the Budget, forecast mutual security expenditures

of $7.4 HUion in FY 1954 (»lightly below the Truman estimate), with an increase

20$

">

LJJJ.!'".L
****'

JCS and National Policy

to $8.0 billion in FY 1955 if current plans were followed. Not until FY 1956 could

he foresee a decline, to $6.5 billion, with a further drop to $3.0 billion by FY

1958.12

A week later, Mr. Dodge suggested to the Council that mutual security

expenditures be reduced to $5.5 billion in FY 1954 and to $4.0 billion in FY 1955.

The Council directed Secretary Wilson and Mr. Stassen to examine the consequences of these reductions.13

If these reductions were made, according to a plan sent the Joint Chiefs of

Staff by Deputy Secretary Kyes on 10 March 1953, $4.3 billion would be allotted

for military assistance in FY 1954 and $3.1 billion in FY 1955. These figures would

include defense support (economic aid contributing only indirectly to military

strength), infrastructure, and administrative costs. For materiel and training

programs for individual countries, only $3.5 billion and $2.9 billion, respectively,

would be available during the two fiscal years. It appeared that expenditures of

these amounts would require no new appropriations, since considerable money

remained on hand from previous years. Secretary Kyes asked the Joint Chiefs of

Staff to comment on the effect of these reductions on US national security

policies.14

The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied on 19 March 1953 that the contemplated

restrictions would make it impossible for the United States to meet the commitments it had made to other countries. Moreover, failure to appropriate any new

Table 14—Mutual Defense Assistance Program Funds: FY 1954

($ billions)

Total Europe Near East Asia and Latin

and Africa Pacific America

Per- Per- Per- Per- PerDecision Amount cent Amount cent Amount cent Amount cent Amount cent

JCS recommendation,

17 February 1953 ..... *S4.9190 100.0 S3 0278 616 t

"$9029 18.4 $.9721 20.0 $.0162 0.0

JCS recommendation,

1 May 1953 *32890 100.0 41.9012 57.8 l

6027 18.3 776t> 236 .0085 0.3

Eisenhower administration program ....

u

3.5422 100.0 «tu» 59.7 t

3974 11.2 1.013* 28.6 .0188 0.5

Congressional

appropriations d

3.ia» 100.0 1.8600 58.5 .2700 8 5 1.Ü350 32.5 .0150 0.5

DOD allocations.

7 August 1953 «2 9207 100.0 16342 559 X377 11.6 9287 318 .0201 0.7

'Excludes NATO infrastructure, shipping, and administration.

'include* Spain and Yugoslavia.

'Spain included with Europe; Yugoslavia with Near East and Africa.

''includes NATO infrastructure, shipping, and administration.

Sources: JCS 2099/269. 14 Feb 53; JCS 2099185, 30 Apr 53; JCS 2099/305, 10 Aug 55 Hearings.

S. Com on Foreign Relations. Mutual Srcuntu Act of 1953, 83d Cong, 1st sess. pp.

33-35.; Mutual Security Appropruttton Act. fY 1954 (PL 218. 7 Aug 53).

206

.
Military Assistance

funds for FYs 1954 or 1955 would have serious effects in later years. Accordingly,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the proposed limits militarily unacceptable.

Secretary Wilson sent these views to the National Security Council without

comment.15

Both the Director for Mutual Security and the Department of State had also

submitted unfavorable assessments of the effects of the proposed reductions.16

On 25 March 1953 the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented their

objections to the proposed limits on the mutual security program before the

National Security Council. Without abandoning the goal of economy, the Council then rejected the drastic fiscal limits that had been proposed, both for the

mutual security program and for US defense expenditures.17

A month later the Council approved NSC 149/2, which endorsed the mutual

security program as indispensable and set forth expenditure targets considerably less restrictive than those considered earlier. The guiding principles of the

program, according to this document, should include: qualitative improvement

of weapons; reduction of the need for assistance, by means of suitable foreign

economic policies (greater reliance on private capital and on offshore procurement,

and expansion of trade); and a leveling off of the size of NATO forces, with an

improvement in their combat capability to be obtained by distributing to them a

portion of the US stockpile of critical end items. The new aid policy would also

be more selective than before, concentrating on the nations considered most

important.

Expenditure goals laid down in NSC 149/2 for the mutual security program

were $6.3 billion for FY 1954 and $6.5 billion for FY 1955. For 1954, not over $5.8

billion in new obligational authority would be requested: $3.925 billion for the

MDA program proper (end items and training for individual countries), $1.625

billion for defense support and for economic and technical assistance, and $250

million for a special new weapons vrogram to be controlled by the President.

After FY 1955, according to NSC 149/2, it was expected that both expenditures

and appropriations would gradually decline to about $3-$4 billion annually—

enough to provide for maintenance and replacement costs.l8

Deputy 5*cretary Kyes told the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 29 April 1953 that the

actual amount to be requested for the FY 1954 MDA program would be $3.922

billion, of which $633 million would be earmarked for NATO infrastructure,

administration, and other special purposes, leaving $3.289 billion available for

individual country programs. He asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend a

division by geographic area.19In reply, they recommended $1,901.2 million for

Western Europe (including Spain), $776.6 million for the Far East, $602.7 miiiion

for the Near East and Yugoslavia, and $8.5 million for Latin America. Within a

considerably lower total figure, the proportional allotments did not differ greatly

from those in the JCS recommendations of 17 February 1953, standing at somewhat under 60 percent for Europe, 23 percent for the Far East, 18 percent for the

Near East, and a negligible amount for Latin America.20

Influences other than the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were apparent in

the apportionment that the administration finally used in presenting the program to Congress. The request for new obligational authority was broken down

207

i» "
JCS and National Poliqj

as follows: $2,112.1 million to Europe (60 percent), $1,013.9 million to the Far

East (28 percent), $397.4 million to the Middle East (11 percent), and $18.8

million for Latin America (less than 1 percent). These amounts totaled $3,542.2

million. Another $482.3 million for infrastructure and other special purposes

brought the total for the MDA program to $4,024.5 million.

A sum of $995 million was proposed for so-called mutual defense financing.

It included a special $400 million program for the forces of France and the three

Associated States in Indochina, $300 million for defense support and economic

assistance to Europe, $95 million for defense support in Taiwan and Indochina,

and $200 million to finance military production for NATO in the United Kingdom and France. The special weapons program referred to in NSC 149/2 added

another $250 million; it was intended to finance nonnuclear weapons for NATO,

under authorization by the President, after completion of SHAPE requirements

studies. Economic and .echnical assistance programs amounting to $559.2 million brought the total request to $5,828.7 million, slightly over the target set in

NSC 149/2.21

President Eisenhower sent this program to Congress on 5 May 1953, accompanied by a special message stressing its importance and terming it the result of

"a careful determination of our essential needs." Seeking to forestall criticism of

the size of the request, the President declared unequivocally that "this amount

of money judiciously spent abroad will add much more to our Nation's ultimate

security in the world than would an even greater amount spent merely to increase

the size of our own military forces in being."22

Despite the President's plea, however, Congress appropriated only $4,531.5

million in new funds. Of this amount, $3,180 million was allotted for the MDA

program, of which $1,035 million was earmarked for the Far East. For Western

Europe, the amount was $1,860 million, one-half of which was to go to the

European Defense Community or its member nations. (See Table 14.) A sum of

$874 million was allowed for mutual defense financing; it included the full $400

million asked by the administration for the Indochina war. The special weapons

program was cut to $50 million, while economic and technical assistance totaled

$427.5 million.23

The funds appropriated by Congress for the MDA program had to be adjusted

by the Department of Defense to allow for shipping and administrative costs and

for the NATO infrastructure program. These deductions were partially offset by

reappropriation of unobligated funds from earlier years that Congress had

included in the 1953 legislation. The net amount available for materiel and training programs was $2,920.7 million. On 7 August 1953 Assistant Secretary Nash

sent the Joint Chiefs of Staff the following geographic breakdown of this amount:

$1,634.2 million for Europe; $337.7 million for the Near East; $928.7 million for

Asia and the Pacific; and $20.1 million for Latin America.

Mr. Nash asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit revised force bases, reflecting this fund allocation, to be used by the Military Departments in preparing

final country programs. He directed them to include West Germany, on the

assumption that that nation would become eligible during fiscal 1954, but not

206

1
Military Assistance

South Korea, for which, as before, only limited training assistance would be

provided under MDAP.24

The force bases that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended on 13 August 1953

were characterized by them as the optimum obtainable to support current US

strategy. Their recommendations for Western Europe were based on the provisional 1954 objectives that had been approved by the North Atlantic Council in

April 1953,25 with some changes, principally in naval and air force units. Otherwise the JCS recommendations differed in detail, but not significantly in

substance, from those submitted on 30 October 1952. Objectives for Japan had

been sharply reduced, in recognition of the political impossibility of a large

rearmament effort in that nation in 1954, and South Korea was omitted, as

directed. The only other major reductions were in Yugoslav and Spanish ground

forces. There were no large increases except in Nationalist Chinese naval strength,

from 53 to 82 vessels.26

FY 1955 Program

Planning for fiscal 1955 had meanwhile been under way for some months.

Acting Secretary Kyes on 20 April 1953 had sent the Joint Chiefs of Staff a set

of assumptions to be followed in drawing up force bases and other guidance for

the 1955 program. The most important instruction was that, beginning in FY

1955, the United States would supply equipment only for those units that the

recipient nations could thereafter maintain without further assistance. Exceptions might be made for Greece, Turkey, Nationalist China, and Indochina.

Other assumptions were that the wars in Korea and Indochina would continue

at approximately their present leveis, the European Defense Community Treaty

would be ratified by 1 September 1953, and the Diet of Japan would authorize an

expansion of that nation's forces early in 1954.27

Replying on 8 July 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended force bases

for FY 1955 generally somewhat larger than those that they were to submit a

month later for FY 1954. Their recommendations for the NATO nations they

characterized as temporary and subject to change in light of later action by the

North Atlantic Council, which had not yet adopted objectives for 1955. Moreover,

warned the Joint Chiefs of Staff, their proposed NATO force bases were insufficient to meet requirements; they represented only the best current US military

estimate of the land forces that each country would have in being by 1956 and of

air and naval forces by 1957.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff again included South Korea in their list, since it now

appeared that hostilities in that country would soon end. Additional Middle

Eastern countries, not theretofore granted military aid, were also on their listEgypt, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, The

inclusion of these countries reflected a new plan for Middle Eastern collective

security being prepared by the Eisenhower administration.20

209
JCS and National Policy

In preparing their guidance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had modified Mr. Kyes'

restriction on support of forces that could not be maintained without further US

aid. To appraise the ability and willingness of other countries to maintain forces,

they pointed out, was beyond their purview. Furthermore, in order to protect

investments already made, they believed that it would be advisable to provide as

much aid as was necessary to maintain the effectiveness of all those forces

equipped under previous programs. Their proposed FY 1955 force bases had

been drawn up in accordance with this belief.29

Secretary Wilson approved the JCS recommendations on 5 August 1953,

subject to a few changes.30Subsequently, on 2C January 1954, at his request, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff listed for inclusion certain additional units, as recommended

by MAAGs in various countries, that constituted exceptions to the guidelines

that had been laid down for 1955.31

A preliminary budget estimate for the FY 1955 MDA program was prepared

in the Department of Defense and submitted to the National Security Council on

13 October 1953, along with an initial estimate for the US military budget. As

described in an earlier chapter, the Council demurred at the size of these projected figures and directed that revised estimates be submitted on 29 October.32

At the latter meeting, the Council noted a report by Mr. Stassen that it had been

possible to reduce estimated FY 1955 military aid expenditures to $4.5 billion, or

$500 million less than previously expected.33

By January 1954 the administration had decided to ask Congress for $3,510

million in new obligational authority for the mutual security program for FY

1955. This was a reduction of nearly 40 percent from the request made the

previous year, for the FY 1954 program; in fact, it was a full $1 billion below the

sum actually appropriated for FY 1954. Of the $3,510 million contemplated for

FY 1955, $2,500 million would be for military assistance, divided as follows:34

MDA materiel and training program»,

NATO infrastructure, administration

and shipping costs $1,541.8

Contributions to NATO operating

costs 8.2

Common us« programs for Taiwan

Indochina, and Yugoslavia 75.0

Defense production. United Kingdom

and France 75.0

Indochina force support 800 0

I

In the Department of Defense, the $1,541.8 million figure was tentatively

distributed so as to allow $1,144.5 million for materiel and training programs.

On 26 January 1954 Secretary Wilson asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide

new force bases adjusted to this amount.3*

In a reply on 5 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested only slight reductions in the force bases they had listed on 8 July 1953, leaving it to the Services to

make the necessary economies in country programs. They recommended that

$511.2 million, or almost half the total, be allocated to the Far East and most of

the remainder to Europe (see Table 15). Although the Secretary had asked them

210

i ii i
Military Assistance

Table 15—JCS Recommendation on Allocation of FY 1955 Mutual

Defense Assistance Program Funds:5 March 1954

($ millions)

Area Amount Percent

Europe*

Near East*

$474.4

150.9

511.2

8.0

$1.144.5

41.4

13.2

Asia and Pacific 44.7

latin America, 0.7

Total 100.0

* Includes Spain and Yugoslavia. b Greece, Turkey, Iran.

Source: JCS 2099/359, 26 Feb 54.

to provide force bases for Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Pakistan, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff had declined to do so. Among Middle Eastern countries, only Greece,

Turkey, and Iran should receive military assistance at present, they believed.

They pointed out that money appropriated fora larger Middle Eastern aid program in FY 1954 had not yet been obligated. They did follow Secretary Wilson's

guidance, however, in adding Haiti, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua as

prospective Latin American recipients.

3

*

The Joint Chiefs of Staff made clear that, in their opinion, the ceiling of

SI, 144.5 miüion for materiel and training programs was loo restrictive. An additional $355 million should be provided, for the NATO countries, Yugoslavia,

and Japan. They also drew attention to the possibility of emergency requirements arising from the situation in Indochina and recommended that a special

reserve fund be established for this.

37

Secretary Wilson made no formal reply to

these recommendations.

President Eisenhower had meanwhile included the $3,510 million appropriation request in the budget that he sent to Congress on 21 January 1954.M As the

legislative delineations began, the administration madea token reduction in the

total request but increased to $2,748.4 million the portion assigned to military

purposes Of this figure, $1,580 million would be for the MDA program, NATO

infrastructure, and administration—an increase of $435.5 million that bettered

the additional $355 million the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended.

To simplify administration of the program, it was proposed that MDAP

funds be appropriated ina lump sum, not allocated by geographic area. However,

the Secretary of Defense, under the proposed legislation, would insure that the

equipment, materials, and services furnished to each area would not exceed in

value the total of the funds previously made available plus the following amounts:

$617.5 million for Europe; $181.2 million for the Near Ilast, Africa, and South

Asia; $5318.6 million for the Far East and Pacific, and $13 million for Latin

America.

5

*

When Congress demurred at accepting this program, President Eisenhower

senta special message in which he stressed its importance and at the same time

211

i

>I

1
JCS and National Policy

reduced the request by less than 2 percent, to $3,448.2 million.40 His pier, met

with some success. The final appropriation, though less than he had asked, was

larger than some of the figures that had been discussed in Congress. An initial

reduction was applied in the authorizing legislation, the Mutual Security Act of

1954. The final appropriations act provided $2,210.8 million for military and

$570.7 million for economic and technical aid. Of the former, $1,192.7 was for

MDA and related purposes (including $100 million earmarked for NATO

infrastructure) and $1,018.1 for supporting programs, direct and indirect. The

area limitations proposed by the administration were approved.41

Within OSD, the available funds were allocated without further referral to

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Service Departments were directed to adjust their

programs to fit the reduced amount, using the force goals and criteria already

laid down by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and making use of the estimated $450

million worth of assets available as a result of the cease-fire in Indochina. Reporting this action to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 22 October 1954, Vice Admiral

Davis, deputy to Assistant Secretary Nash, informed them that the funds available had been reduced still further by the need to set aside reserves for various

purposes, principally to cover possible losses resulting from more stringent fund

obligation requirements that had been written into another recent law.42 As soon

as the exact amount of available funds became known, he said, the Joint Chiefs

of Staff would be asked to recommend the forces that should be supported with

them.43It does not appear, however, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were ever

further consulted regarding the disposition of the FY 1955 aid funds.

Military Assistance and the New Look

The administration's action in reducing the funds requested for foreign aid in

the FY 1955 budget was in accordance with national policy as set forth in

NSC 162/2. In that document, approved in October 1953, the National Security

Council conceded that military and economic aid was needed but urged policies

that would stimulate international trade and economic progress and thereby

reduce the requirement for US assistance. Other provisions of NSC 162/2 indicated that military and economic aid should be applied more selectively, with

preference given to key nations best able to use it. In Western Europe, the

nations designated were the United Kingdom, France, and West Germany; in

the Far East, Japan; in the Middle East, Turkey, Pakistan, and perhaps Iran.44

A more careful—and, by implication, a more limited—application of military

assistance was also contemplated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff when setting forth

the basic strategy of the New Look, in JCS 2101/113 in December 1953. "U.S.

foreign aid should be meted out to our allies with discr-nination," they said, "in

order to help them to generate and maintain reasoa ,e and attainable military

forces which can best complement the U S. contribution."45 A fiscal forecast

accompanying JCS 2101/113 indicated that the amount of new funds available for

212

•
ri

Military Assistance

the MDA program was expected to level off at $2 billion per year starting in FY

1955, with expenditures declining to the same amount by FY 1958.46

Later in December the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to appoint a special

committee to study the military assistance program and develop recommendations for the period through FY 1958.47 The instructions given the new committee set forth its mission as follows:

To re-examine the present mutual defense assistance programs and to recommend the amount and distribution by countries of MDA funds required for fiscal

years 1955 through 1958 to provide allied force bases which will effectively

support the strategy visualized in JCS 2101/113.

The members were to assume that the funds available for military assistance

would decline by FY 1958 to a level that would suffice only to maintain the forces

of certain countries essential to US strategy. They were not, however, to be

bound by the fiscal estimates in JCS 2101/113. They were to review the FY 1955

force levels recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 July 1953. They were

also to study existing bilateral and multila.eral agreements to ascertain whether

changes were needed.48

The committee submitted its report on 26 March 1954. In JCS 2099/368 the

members set forth in detail their recommended force bases, for each of the four

years, FY 1955 through FY 1958, for the following countries:

Title I

Belgium

Denmark

France

Italy

Luxembourg

Netherlands

Norway

Portugal

United Kingdom

Austria

Spain

Yugoslavia

Western Germany

Title U

Greece

Turkey

Iran

Pakistan

Title III

Nationalist China (Taiwan)

Indochina

Thailand

Philippines

Japan

Korea

Title IV

Brazil

Chile

Colombia

Cuba

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

Haiti

Peru

Uruguay

Nicaragua

El Salvador

Honduras

213
*\

JCS and National Poliqj

The committee recommended force goals for FY 1955 differing in a few details

from those proposed earlier by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in July 1953 and March

1954. For most countries, the 1955 figures were projected through 1958 without

change, since the committee's program was intended after FY 1955 to provide

only qualitative improvements, in the form of modernized equipment, maintenance, war reserves of ammunition, and training. Force increases between 1955

and 1958 were recommended, however, for the following nations: West Germany and Japan, which were just beginning their military buildup; Pakistan, on

which the administration was now focusing its hopes for the establishment of a

Middle Eastern defensive alliance; and Yugoslavia, which would need additional ground forces if it was to defend the Ljubljana gateway into northern Italy

against Soviet-satellite attack for an appreciable period.

In its funding recommendations the committee accepted as fixed the FY 1955

ceiling of $1,144 million imposed earlier by Secretary Wilson. For FY 1956, the

members proposed an extraordinarily large increase to $2,981.2 million, principally for the benefit of West Germany and Japan. (See Table 16). Thereafter,

costs would decline sharply, to $2,255.5 million and $1,655.0 million for FYs 1957

and 1958, according to the Navy-Air Force view. The Army and Marine Corps

members favored an additional $200 million in FY 1957 and $300 million in FY

Table 16—Recommendations for Mutual Defense Assistance

Program Funds: FYs 1955-1958

(S biUion$)

Recommendation

Special committee

recommendation.

26 March 1954

FY 1955

FY 1956

FY1957

FY1958

JCS recommendation.

17 June 1954

FY1955

FY 1956

FY 1957

FY 1958

Total

Amount

$1 1440

29812

b

2 2555

116550

1.1440

•*2 8876

d

16B3

Percent

100.0

1000

100.0

1000

100.0

1000

1000

100.0

lurope*

Amount

$4742

1.2046

.6712

2762

4742

1 1110

6095

2345

PIT

cent [Amount

41 A

40*

29.7

167

41 4

38.5

278

14.5

Near East

and Africa

$1507

4424

4665

4286

1507

d

4424

d

.46fc5

d

4286

Per

cent [Amount

132

149

20.7

259

132

15.3

212

26 6

Asm and

Pacific \Latin America

$5111

13257

1 1097

.9423

5111

13257

1 1097

9423

Percent

447

444

49.2

56.9

447

45.9

50.6

584

Amount

$.0080

.0085

0081

0079

.0080

0085

0081

0079

Per

cent

0.7

0.3

0 4

0.5

07

0.3

04

0.5

* Include» Spain and Yugoslavia.

b Exclude» $200 million recommended by Army (or war-reserve equipment.

' Exclude» $300 million recommended by Army for war-reserve equipment

a Exclude» $197 million recommended by Army lor Turkey and Pakistan, FY* 1956-1958

So««**. JCS 2099/368. 26 Mar 54 (original and «mended version*).

214

i'i ii m
Military Assistance

1958 to pay for war reserve stocks of critical items of ground combat equipment,

under US control, at strategic points in Europe, the Far East, and the Middle

East. The Navy and Air Force members of the committee objected that the US

Services did not yet have adequate war reserves for their own use; they noted,

also, that the entire question of wartime assistance to allies was receiving separate study.

The committee stressed that all of the cost estimates were at minimum levels

and probably lower than desirable. The recommended force levels had been

based on austere programs aimed at the best estimate of reasonable and attainable forces which can be maintained over a period of time. They did not represent

the current military requ.ements to meet the threat. Moreover, warned the

committee, any new multilateral defense arrangements, like those for the Middle East or the Pacific that were then under consideration, might require major

changes in cost estimates. A further assumption underlying the committee's

program was that the buildup of West German and Japanese forces would be

completed by 1958. If this assumption proved erroneous, said the committee,

additional funds would have to be provided after 1958 for those countries.49

During preliminary consideration of the committee report, Admiral Carney

objected to the proposal for increased aid to Yugoslavia, on grounds that he

termed other than purely military. He pointed to the continuing possibility of a

Yugoslav rapprochement with the Soviet Union, particularly if Tito should pass

from the scene. Also, Yugoslavia's intransigence in her quarrel with Italy over

the status of Trieste should be taken into account, as well as the adverse Italian

reaction that might be expected if US military aid shipments to Yugoslavia were

enlarged. On 10 May 1954 the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to return JCS 2099/368

to the special committee for revision. It should contemplate no increase in Yugoslav force bases, and no provision for reserves of war equipment should be

included.50

As the work of revision proceeded, the special committee received an additional assignment: to study ways of building flexibility into the military aid

program. Resulting from an NSC decision of 4 Februar)' 1954, to be described in

more detail later, this task delayed the submission until June.**

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the report, with some additional changes,

on 16 June. Its cost estimates for fiscal years 1956 through 1958 were $2,887.6

million, $2.193.8 million, and $1,613.3 million, respectively. (See Table 16). With

regard to Yugoslavia it was recommended that military assistance be subjected

to close scrutiny at yearly intervals and the amount increased or decreased

according to the politico-military conditions prevailing at that time. The Joint

Chiefs of S äff forwarded the approved report to Secretary Wilson on 17 June

1954, recommending that it be considered as an initial estimate of minimum

requirements for military assistance for fiscal years 1955 through 1958. ^

215
JCS and National Poliqj

Plans for FY 1956

Even before JCS 2099/368 received final approval, it had furnished a basis for

planning the MDA program for FY 1956. The Joint Chiefs of Staff drew up

tentative guidelines for this program and sent them to Secretary Wilson on 19

May 1954. They adopted the 1956 force bafJS in JCS 2099/368 with a few changes.

The proposed increase for Yugoslavia was eliminated and three additional countries were included: Egypt, Ethiopia, and Iraq. South Korea was listed, but

Austria was omitted. The Secretary of Defense approved the JCS recommendations on 15 July 1954.53

The subsequent development of the FY 1956 military assistance budget, during the last half of 1954, proceeded without further reference to the Joint Chiefs

of Staff.*4 The FY 1956 budget, sent to Congress by President Eisenhower on

January 1955, called for $3,530 million in new obligat onal authority for the

mutual security program—slightly more than the amount that had been requested

for FY 1955. But whereas the budget for that year had allocated $2,500 million for

military purposes, the corresponding 1956 request was only $2,030 million,of

which $1,400 million would be for the MDA program, infrastructure, and administrative costs, and $630 million for direct forces support.55

In contrast, as already

pointed out, the four-year program that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had sent to

Secretary Wilson in June 1954 had called for $2,887.6 million in military assistance for FY 1956. It was clear that the goal of economy had been placed ahead of

the JCS estimates of military needs.

Flexibility in Military Assistance: NSC $434/1

During 1953 and much of 1954, massive adjustments within the military

assistance program had been made to meet the Indochina crisis. Money

and supplies were diverted from various programs and placed at the disposal of

the French forces in Vietnam. It was probably the hope of averting such disruptive changes in the future that led the National Security Council, on 4 February

1954. to call for a report on "a flexible program of providing U.S. military assistance to foreign nations in accordance with the availability of end items and

relative priority among recipient nations/' The report was to be prepared by the

Department of Defense in cooperation with the Foreign Operations Administra»

tion and the Bureau of the Budget.54"

Acting Secretary of Defense Kyes referred this decision to Mr. H. Struve

Mensel. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, instructing him to prepare a draft report that would take account of the current JCS

review of the military assistance program,57 While awaiting the receipt of this

report, administration officials proceeded to institute some changes in tht cumbersome pnKedures involved in carrying out the MDAP In March 1954. at the

direction of the President, Mr. Dodge, Director of the Bureau of the Budget,

appointed a committee consisting of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Under

216
Military Assistance

Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Foreign

Operations, with himself as chairman. The members agreed to recommend that

the Department of Defense have more autonomy in administering military aid.

Appropriated funds should be allocated to the Department by the President, not

by the Director of Foreign Operations. The latter official should continue to

coordinate military assistance with other forms of aid, but should not supervise

or direct it.wThese recommendations were subsequently put into effect by an

Executive Order issued on 6 November 1954.w

On 8 June 1954 Assistant Secretary Hensel asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to

make available by 15 June the results of their review of the MDAP, since the

Planning Board was about to undertake the study called for by the Council on 4

February.60 The JCS special committee on military assistance thereupon amended

its report, JCS 2099/368, to include a consideration of the objective of flexibility.

The members noted that their proposed four-year program was designed to

provide the minimum forces necessary to support the strategy set forth in JCS

2101/113, on the assumption "that present international tensions and threats

remain approximately the same." No program based on minimum requirements,

they concluded, could be "sufficiently flexible to provide for significant changes

in world conditions or emergency requirements of any magnitude." Deletion of

items approved for one program to meet an emergency requirement in some

other area might serve as a fiscal stopgap, but the original requirements would

remain valid and must eventually be met, The best way of attaining flexibility,

according to the committee, would be to provide a contingency fund.*1

The Joint Chiefs of Staff incorporated these conclusions in the report on

military assistance requirements for FYs 1955-1958 that they sent to the Secretary

of Defense on 17 June 1954.*2 The proposal for a contingency fund was one that

they had already made to the Secretary on 5 March in connection with their

recommendations for the FY 1955 MDAP, as noted earlier. Also, in submitting

proposals for FY 1956 on 19 May 1954, they had protested against the diversion

of fund» from other programs for the war in Indochina, calling it a practice that

"has had the effect of hindering the achievement of our world-wide long-range

strategic objective»."*'*

In replying on 15 July 1954 to the JCS memorandum of 19 May, Secretary

Wilson undertook to try to avoid abrupt changes in MDA programs. But he

rejected the suggestion of a contingency fund, believing that Congress would

nevtt approve the provision oi money for other than immediately citable needs.

In the future, said the Secretary, requirements for Indochina would be met by

giving them first priority in the development of the MDA program ^n6, if

necessary, by asking for a deficiency appropriation.*4 The cessation of the

IndochinVse hostilities, however, rendered these expedients unnecessary.

The JCS projection of MDAP requirement* on a four-year basis was given

consideration in a study of the problem of flexibility in military assistance that

was completed in July 1954, presumably by personnel in «he office of Assistant

Secretary Hensel. This study reviewed in detail the administrative and legislative procedures involved in the MDA program. It was noted that the worldwide

program amounted to the sum of individual country programs, whkh were

217

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JCS and National Policy

based upon a number of screenings of requirements estimated tor each country.

The MAAGs, the US area commanders, the Military Departments, and the Department of Defense all reviewed each country program to eliminate excessive

requests. The Foreign Operations Administration, the Department of State, and

the Bureau of the Budget reviewed the overall program for compatibility with

economic, fiscal, and foreign policy. Further revisions were often made necessary by Congressional fund reductions. Additional disruptive changes occurred

when it became necessary to divert materiel from one country to another to meet

changed conditions. Moreover, priority directives governing deliveries to recipient countries, established by the Department of Defense on recommendation of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "have not always been in consonance with current

world conditions," it was asserted.

To make the program more responsive to changing requirements, it was

recommended that the force bases submitted by the joint Chiefs of Staff for FYs

1955-1958 be approved as the basis for a long-range program. Deficiencies remaining in the equipment of these forces, after careful screening, should be developed and accepted as a master mutual defense assistance program, to be implemented in annual increments. All assets of the worldwide program should be

regarded as a pool, from which deliveries could be made according to priorities

that would be revised as necessary in response to changing world conditions.

Thus equipment could be readily diverted from one area or country to another.

Admittedly, however, only a limited and temporary degree of flexibility would

be gained, since the diversions would eventually have to be replaced.

Turning to other aspects of the problem, the authors of the study noted that

transfers of aid between countries had been rendered difficult by the practice of

making appropriations by geographic area. The legislation then before Congress,

providing for a lump-sum appropriation for the entire MDAP, was expected to

obviate this difficulty. It was pointed out also that the insertion of the Foreign

Operations Administration between the Department of Defense and the

President, together with the excessive degree of supervision exercised by the

Director of FOA over the MDAP, caused unnecessary complication. Funds apportioned for military assistance had sometimes been diverted to other types of aid.

The proposals agreed upon by the ad hoc committee headed by Mr. Dodge

would simplify ihis situation It was recommended that funds be assigned directly

to the Secretary of Defense» as early in each fiscal year as practicable, and not be

subsequently withdrawn except to meet extreme emerge »tries. The President

should withhold a reserve (amounting to from 10 to 25 percent of the total of

MDA funds) to meet such unforeseen needs.

Secretary Wilson forwarded the study and the accompanying recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 28 July 1954. He noted that the Department of

State» the Bureau of the Budget, And the Departments of the Army and Air Force

had concurred. The Foreign Operations Administration had taken exception to

the proposals to restrict the transfer of funds between military and nonmilitary

programs, ^n4 the Department of the Navy considered that the objective of

flexibility could be attained by procedural changes less drastic than those proposed in the study.**

21*
Military Assistance

l

In comments they provided the Secretary of Defense on 11 August 1954, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed doubt that the proposed changes in programming

and distribution would result in overall benefit to the military aspects of the

program. They stressed that the desired end-product was combat effective units,

tailored to the particular conditions in each country. In their view, the pooling

procedure implied a deemphasis of carefully devised individual country

programs. The flexibility that it provided would be at the expense of orderly

progress toward planned military objectives.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff found the expected simplification of procedures to be

largely illusory; the annual increments of the worldwide program, like the separate country programs currently used for programming, would still have to be

reviewed and adjusted to comply with congressional ceilings. While concurring

in principle with the reservation of a portion of MDAP funds for contingency

purposes, they believed that this reserve should be under control of the Secretary of Defense and not subject to encroachment by other agencies concerned

with foreign aid. The Joint Chief« of Staff recommended a number of amendments and additions to the wording of the proposed procedures that would

have changed their thrust considerably.**

The Secretary's response to these JCS views is not indicated in available

records. It seems likely, however, that the JCS opposition was influential in

causing the study to be laid aside. In its original form, it never reached the

agenda of the National Security Council, and the objective of flexibility was

ultimately sought by other methods involving less drastic changes. Meanwhile

Congress made its own contribution to the goal in ?he Mutual Security Act of

1954, which ordered the Foreign Operations Administiati»?n abolished, effective

30 June 1953.

In a memorandum to the President on 30 August 1954, the Special Assistant

for National Security, Mr. Robert Cutler, described tfv? problem of flexibility as

embracing two aspects. One was the need fur organization and procedures that

would simplify the administration of military assistance; this need would be met

by the forthcoming executive order, already described. The other was for periodic reviews of the MDA program to keep it responsive to changing needs. He

urged that the I*lanning Board be directed to devise a method of conducting

these reviews. On 2 September the National Security Council noted that President Eisenhower had approved these suggestions.*^

The basis for such a method already existed in the form of regular status

reports on the mutual security program that were prepared semiannually for the

Council by the Department of Defense and the Foreign Operation» Administration, The Planning Board, in its study of the problem (NSC 5434). rwommended

that these reports be modified to include information concerning the fotktwing:

current force goals for •ecipient nations, priorities governing allocation of end

items, unexpended funds, and deliver)' rates in relation to program objectives.

Such reports, under the plan suggested by the Board, would be screened by a

special committee representing the Departments of State and Defense and the

Foreign Operations Administration. This committee would draw attention to

any disparities between plans and objectives or to other matters indicating a

219

inuii n»il»i wwm
JCS and National Policy

need for program changes. Its findings would be reviewed by the Planning

Board and would then go to the Council for decision. Also, a current statement

of priorities for the allocation of military end items was to be submitted by the

Secretary of Defense to the Council for consideration and recommendation to

the President.68

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed NSC 5434, they took exception only

to the provision regarding the statement of priorities. They believed that the

Secretary of Defense should have authority to implement this statement without

prior approval by the Council or the President, and that NSC 5434 should therefore be reworded to specify merely that he would report his suggested priorities.69

The Council, however, disregarded this suggestion when it approved the Planning Board study in an amended form, NSC 5434/1, on 14 October. The only

change made by the Council was to delete the proposal for a special committee,

leaving the Planning Board solely responsible for reviewing the status reports

and for recommending changes. The procedures incorporated into NSC 5434/1,

allowing for frequent review and adjustment of the MDA program, might be

expected to meet the need for flexibility that had been cited in the NSC decision

of 4 February.70

Allocation of military materiel was at that time governed by a statement of

priorities that had been approved by the Secretary of Defense in August 1952. It

assigned first priority to forces fighting in Korea and was now hopelessly out of

date.71 At the suggestion of General Ridgway, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had

adopted an amended version in August 1954. It specified that US military equipment would be allocated in the following order:

First priority, US and allied torces engaged in active combat operations

short of general war.

Second priority, US forces deployed or being maintained in readiness for

immediate combat operations on the outbreak of hostilities; forces designated for defense of the continental United States and Canada.

Third priority, US forces maintained in a state of operational readiness for

deployment by D plus 30 days; forces of other NATO countries, and those of

West Germany, scheduled for deployment by D plus 30; forces of the Republic of Korea, Japan, Nationalist China, Pakistan, Yugoslavia; Spanish air

defense forces; UN forces deployed in the Far East Command.

Fourth priority, US forces designated for deployment between D plus 30

days and D plus 6 months; all MDA programs not included in previous

priority classes.

Fifth priority, other US forces.

It was specified, however, that the word priority was to be interpreted to mean

an indication of relative importance; it was not to be used in an exclusive and

final sense.72

Secretary Wilson approved this new statement on 29 October 1954. On 6

December, in accordance with NSC 5434/1, he circulated it to the National Security Council with a note that it had been concurred in by the Department of State

and the Foreign Operations Administration.73

220
Military Assistance

Military Assistance in Wartime The military assistance program was not designed to carry recipient nations

thougha major war. JCS guidance for fiscal years 1954, 1955, and 1956, as

approved by the Secretary of Defense, specified that the United States would

furnish at mosta three months' supply, at wartime consumption rates, of end

items, spare parts, and ammunition for other nations. But it was obvious that in

another major conflict, as in World War II, allied countries would be forced to

draw on US resources. The JCS planning program, as outlined in Memorandum

of Policy 84, authorized the inclusion of allied requirements in the mobilization

preparations to be made under the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan.

On 19 February 1953 Secretary Wilson had pointed out to the Joint Chiefs of

Staff that the question of wartime military aid required some advance thought.

He asked them to preparea study of the means of providing such assistance and

of the changes in the existing MDA program that would be required to adapt it

to war.

74

For reasons not indicated in available sources, the Joint Chiefs of Staff took

no action on this request for some months. In November 1953 General Ridgway

brought upa somewhat different aspect of the subject. There should be, he

declared, an orderly national planning procedure for deciding upon the amount

of US assistance to be rendered in wartime and the resulting adjustments needed

before D-day in the US mobilization base.

75

The outline of sucha procedure, based on General Ridgway's suggestions,

was submitted by the Joint Logistics Plans Committee in February 1954. The

basic consideration, accepted by the Committed on the basis of available estimates of wartime requirements and production, was that it would be impossible

for the United States to meet all the logistic deficiencies of its allies after D-day. It

was not feasible, politically or economically, either to enlarge stockpiles of end

items or to broaden the production base to the degree required. It followed,

therefore, that the allies must expand their own mobilization bases, under plans

carefully coordinated with those of the United States. For the development of

such plans, the first requirement was to determine the magnitude of the

requirements. The Committee proposed that the Military Departments prepare

lists of combat critical items, in amounts needed to support the forces listed in

the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, together with estimates of available supplies

(present and programmed) of those items from all sources, US and foreign. These

lists would be reviewed successively by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. The latter would determine the maximum extent of US assistance to be rendered after D-day. It would then be possible to determine how

much the other nations would need to expand their mobilization bases in

peacetime. MDAP assistance would be made available to finance this expansion,

under agreements to be worked out with the allies.

76

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this plan on 26 February 1954 and submitted it to Secretary Wilson. At the same time, they directed the Services to prepare the necessary lists of critical equipment and send them to the MAAGs and

221

::-: M>'*
JCS and National Policy

the commanders of appropriate unified commands, who would prepare estimates of foreign wartime production rates for those items.77

On 4 March 1954 the Joint Strategic Plans Committee submitted a study

responsive to Secretary Wilson's request of 19 February 1953. The Committee

pointed out that the organization of NATO's supply system, for both peace and

war, was then under intensive examination by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and

SHAPE, and that until these studies were completed it would be impossible to

make firm recommendations on wartime assistance. Meanwhile, the Committee

submitted some broad and general proposals regarding responsibilities for the

wartime program, which amounted to continuation of the existing allocation of

duties among the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Military

Departments. However, it was not practicable, according to the Committee, to

determine in advance how the MDA program should be modified after D-day,

because the situation in wartime would be wholly different. The Joint Chiefs of

Staff sent these conclusions to Secretary Wilson on 16 March.78

Although Secretary Wilson did not reply to either of these JCS proposals,

some of his actions reflected their influence. On 20 August 1954 he urged upon

the Secretary of State the importance of coordinated US-allied mobilization planning and suggested a diplomatic approach to other nations for the development

of the necessary plans. "In such an approach," he wrote, "it should be made

clear to our allies that the United States would be hard pressed to satisfy its own

estimated post D-day requirements and that their national plans must be based

on maximum utilization of their indigenous industrial potential and resources."79

On 5 August the National Security Council had adopted NSC 5422/2, which,

in affirming a need for military assistance, declared that the United States should

"determine the extent to which the national interest requires that post D-day

military aid requirements of our allies be included in national security programs."*"0 When Secretary Wilson asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their recommendations on this matter,81

they replied on 5 October 1954 that they did not

believe valid recommendations could be developed until the Military Services

had compiled lists of requirements for and supplies of critical items, in accordance with the JCS memorandum of 26 February 1954. At present, they reported,

preparation of these lists was proceeding on the basis of information being sent

in by the unified commands and the MAAGs. Secretary Wilson accepted this

reply.82

The process set in motion by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 26 February 1954 had

not been completed when the year drew to a close. In December 1954, when

Secretary Wilson laid down guidance for FY 1957 mobilization planning in connection with the Joint Mid-Range War Plan, he was obliged to instruct the Joint

Chiefs of Staff to ignore wartime requirements of allies in completing the plan.

Modifications would be made later after the extent of US assistance to be furnished after D-day had been determined.83

I

222

I !
11

The Far East: Korea

At the beginning of 1953 the war in Korea, pitting the forces of the United

Nations Command against the armies of North Korea and Communist China

was in its third year. Since the middle of 1951 the battle line had been stabilized

near the 38th parallel, the political boundary between North and South Korea.

The armies struggled inconclusively to improve their positions while their representatives negotiated for an armistice. After dragging on for months without

result, these negotiations were suspended in 1952 and then resumed early in

1953. The resumption reflected, in part, a changed situation, including the new

administration in the United States and a relaxation of rigidity in the communist

world following the death of Josef Stalin.

The Korean Armistice and Associated Problems

Several more months of haggling ensued before the war was finally ended by

an Armistice Agreement that took effect on 27 July 1953. Under its terms,

the military commanders of the two armies recognized the existing front as a demarcation line and agreed to withdraw their forces two kilometers therefrom. A

Military Armistice Commission and a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

were established to ensure observance of these terms. A supplementary agreement dealt at length with the exchange of prisoners of war, one of the major

issues involved in the negotiations.

This agreement was not intended as a permanent settlement. By one of its

provisions, the military commanders agreed to recommend to their governments that a political conference be held within three months, "to settle through

negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the

peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc."1

Because the agreement had been almost two years in preparation, the United

States had had time to prepare for the problems that it would bring. Two policy

223

'%.
.^-" ..

JCS and National Policy

papers, NSC 154/1 and NSC 157/1, adopted by the National Security Council on

2 July 1953,2looked ahead to the postarmistice situation in the Far East. The first

of these set forth a course of action to be followed pending a fundamental

review and reassessment of US policy in Asia. The basic assumption was that

the conclusion of an armistice would not indicate that Communist China had

abandoned either its basic objectives or its willingness to pursue them by armed

force. It followed that the United States should continue to withhold recognition

from the Peking regime and to oppose its admission to the United Nations. UN

military strength in Korea was to be maintained, and an effort would be made to

induce other countries to bear a larger share of the military burden. The Republic

of Korea would receive continuing military and economic assistance, and would

be given security guarantees similar to those already extended to the Philippines,

Australia, and New Zealand.3

The other Council directive, NSC 157/1, laid down the US objective in the

political settlement that was expected to follow the end of the war. This goal was

a unified and neutralized Korea, oriented toward the West, under a government

substantially unchanged from that oi the existing Republic of Korea. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff had opposed this objective, arguing that it would be better to give

vigorous support to the Republic of Korea, in the hope eventually of creating a

united Korea not committed to neutralization. The National Security Council,

however, rejected the JCS views. As finally adopted, NSC 157/1 included a

statement that the loss of the US military position in Korea resulting from neutralization would not be critical, and that it was doubtful whether Korea should

be defended in case of general war.4

But even while declaring a neutralized Korea desirable, the Eisenhower

administration hedged its bets by concluding a mutual defense treaty with the

govejrment of President Syngman Rhee oi: South Korea. This treaty resulted

from u trip to Korea by Secretary Dulles in August 1953, intended to win Rhee's

support for the armistice. Rhee, the strong-willed patriarch of his country, whose

patriotism had been tested by years of exile while japan ruled his homeland, had

hoped that the war begun by the communists would end in the liberation of the

North from totalitarian rule. An arrangement that left his country in its divided

state seemed to him (and to many other South Koreans) a poor recompense for

the loss of thousands of Korean lives.

There was real danger that his dissatisfaction might find vent in some rash

action. Shortly before the armistice, Rhee had almost upset the delicate negotiations over prisoner repatriation by ordering the release of thousands of North

Korean captives who did not wish to return to communist rule. His public

statements made no secret of his desire ultimately to reunite his country, by

force if necessary.5In the months to come, apprehension engendered by Rhee's

intractable and impetuous nature was to loom large in the deliberations of President Eisenhower and his advisers. Though nominally a US ally, and utterly

dependent on the United States, Rhee scorned the role of puppet, pursuing his

own vision of his nation's goals.

The mutual defense treaty that was initialled (though not yet formally signed)

by the two countries in August 1953 offered the South Korean President the

224
I

Far East: Korea

prospect ofa permanent US alliance, since it was to remain in force indefinitely

unless terminated by one of the parties. It stipulated that both nations would act

to meet the common danger if either were attacked, and that the United States

might station forces in South Korea as determined by mutual agreement.

6

Sucha

treaty was incompatible witha neutralized Korea, but it could serve asa bargaining counter in negotiations with the communists over the future of the country.

If no settlement were reached, the treaty would afford an opportunity for the

United States to retain forces in Korea as part of its military position in the Far

East.

Ina joint statement announcing the conclusion of the treaty, Secretary Dulles

indicated further support for President Rhee's objectives. He promised that at

the forthcoming political conference the Unitrd States would seek the peaceful

unification of Korea undera free government. If it became clear, after the conference had been in session for 90 days, that this goal was beyond reach, then both

nations would "be prepared to makea concurrent withdrawal from the

conference" and would consult further regarding Korea's unification. President

Rhee, on his part, agreed to leave his country's armed forces under the UN

Command until the mutual defense treaty became effective and to make no

attempt to unite Korea by military means while the conference was in session.

7

I

Political Impasse The Armistice Agreement had called for

a political conference by 27 October

1953, but its terms left room for disagreement over the nature and scope of

the conference. In the weeks that followed the end of hostilities, this disagreement

wrecked any chances th.it might have existed fora political settlement in Korea.

The communist nations contended fora roundtable conference at which all Far

Eastern issues would be discussed. The United States, supported somewhat

reluctantly by its allies, soughta smaller meeting with an agenda limited to the

subject of Korea. These positions could not be compromised, and the year closed

with no conference in prospect.*

During the fruitless debates on this matter, the United States and South

Korea formally signed their mutual defense treaty on1 October 1953.* In announcing this action, Secretary Dulles pointed out that the treaty could not become

effective until approved by the US Senate, and tactfully reminded South Korea

of its promise, made two months earlier, to leave its forces under UN control. He

added that the treaty would not be construed as prejudicing or prejudginga

settlement of the Korean problem.

10

Faced with the prospect ofa continuing stalemate in Korea, the United States

had to recast its plans. The immediate question was: what wonld Syngman Rhee

do? He had foresworn rash action for the duration of the conference, but suppose no conference was to take place? As early as 3 September 1953, Assistant

Secretary of Defense Frank C. Nash notified the National Security Council that

the Department oi Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff needed guidance to

225 I
JCS and National Policy

cover the possibility that the hot-headed South Korean leader might order his

forces to march northward in a crusade to reunite the divided nation under his

11 sway

The NSC Planning Board accordingly dratted NSC 167, which suggested

courses of action applicable to this contingency.12 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, when

they reviewed this paper, remarked that there was no wholly satisfactory response

to such a development, and thai every effort should therefore be made to prevent it. Emphatically rejecting one suggested alternative — that the United States

actually cooperate with Rhee in an attack — they proposed the following actions,

which represented a combination of the other alternatives in NSC 167:

1. Inform Rhee that, if he renewed hostilities, UN forces would offer no

support, all economic aid would cease, and the UN Commander would

take all measures necessary to avoid the involvement of his forces (but no

threat of withdrawal should be made).

2. Make attempts to obtain, overtly or covertly, advance knowledge of Rhee's

intention to take such action, and to prevent his orders from being issued

or from reaching commanders in the field (going so far, if necessary, as

seizing and detaining key South Korean officials).

3. Take measures to reduce the probability that field commanders would

obey such orders.

4. If the Rhee government nonetheless did launch an attack, end all economic and military assistance, evacuate US civilians, and notify the Communist powers that the UN forces would abide by the armistice (but

would defend themselves if attacked).1*

On 29 October 1953 the Council approved these recommendations as an

interim position, pending a revision of NSC 167 by the Departments of State and

Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. The Council also decided upon

two other actions:

1. If Rhee inquired about the possibility of a UN withdrawal from Korea, he

was to be told merely that, if he failed to cooperate, the UN Commander

would decide his own course of action.

2. Every effort was to be made to obtain from Rhee a commitment not to

take unilateral military action; if he refused to give it, then the United

States would take the position that it would act independently, without

disclosing to him its intentions.

The Secretaries of State and Defense were directed to draft a message inform

ing the UN Commander of these imerim decisions. At the same time, the Plan

ning Board was requested to prepare a new statement of policy toward Korea

On 31 October, the requisite message was sent to the Commander in Chief

United Nations Command (General John E. Hull. USA, who was also Com

mander in Chief, US Far East Command), informing him of these decisions.u

The revision of NSC 167, drafted in accordance with the Council's decision,

was circulated on 2 November 1953 as NSC 167/1. Among other new provisions,

it suggested that the UN Command take military measures, if necessary, to block

offensive action by Republic of Korea (ROK) forces.1*

The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed NSC 167/1 with certain reservations !* The

226

•
Far East: Korea

Council tentatively approved it on 5 November after incorporating minor changes

recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make it clear that any actions taken

by the United States would be on behalf of the United Nations. Other changes

sought by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were left for discussion between the State and

Defense Departments.17

On 6 November the Joint Chiefs of Staff met with State Department representatives and reached agreement concerning their two remaining objections to

NSC 167/1. The more important one involved the possibility of renewed hostilities with the communists. NSC 167/1 had recommended that, in case of unilateral action by Rhee, the communists be warned that UN forces would not support South Korea but would defend themselves if attacked, and moreover, that

the UN counteraction would not be confined to Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff

had pointed out that this latter statement would commit UN forces to an attack

on China if the communists, while reacting to South Korean action, became

engaged in any way with UN forces. The conferees agreed to delete this portion

of NSC 167/1. In turn, the Joint Chiefs of Staff dropped their other objection,

which, upon examination, could be regarded as involving phraseology rather

than substance.18Following these actions, the President approved the amended

paper as NSC 167/2.19

The provisions of NSC 167/2 were written into NSC 170, a new Korean policy

statement drafted by the Planning Board. In this paper, the desirability of a

unified and neutral Korea under an independent and representative government,

was reaffirmed, as well as the US determination to defend Korea against any

mack.20

The prospect of a neutral Korea was no more palatable to the new members

* »v Joini Chiefs of Staff in November 1953 than it had been to their predecessors a Jew months earlier. In a memorandum to Secretary Wilson on 17 November,

they argued that, at the least, neutralization should not operate to deny the

United States the right to assist Korea in developing the forces needed to defend

herself.21 The National Security Council approved NSC 170 on 19 November,

but, in deference to the JCS view, stipulated that the United States should be

allowed to provide economic and military aid to Korea as part of any settlement.22

Relations with Syngman Rhee

To approach the South Korean President, asking him for a ptcmise to continue observing the armistice and warning him of dire consequences if

he should fail to do so. was a task that was considered too delicate for the

ordinary channels of diplomacy. The mission was assigned to Vice President Richard M. Nixon, who would journey to Seoul to deliver a personal

letter from President Eisenhower.

As finally drafted, this letter, though diplomatically worded, made it clear

that the United States would not violate the armistice directly or indirectly, or

connive at anv violation bv South Korea. It warned that, should such a violation

227
JCS and National Policy

occur, the sole US concern would be to insure the safety of the forces of the UN

Command. Moreover, President Eisenhower could not conscientiously ask the

Senate to consent to the mutual defense treaty, or the Congress to appropriate

funds for Korean relief, unless he had explicit confirmation that Rhee's government contemplated no new military ventures.

Secretary of State Dulles, in instructions prepared for the Vice President,

asked Mr. Nixon to discuss frankly with Rhee his inflammatory public statements

threatening a crusade to liberate North Korea. At the same time, the Vice

President was to assure Rhee of the US desire to see Korea united by peaceful means and to assist in economic reconstruction of the country.23

In a three-day trip to South Korea (12-15 November 1953),24the Vice President obtained assurances from President Rhee that were regarded as satisfactory.25

A month later, on 16 December 1953, Rhee pjblfdy promised to allow any

Korean peace conference a period of 90 days to unify his country before taking

action.26 He thus removed the danger that he might use the continuing political

deadlock as a pretext for aggression. These assurances were regarded by the

administration as justifying the ratification of the mutual defense treaty.

Accordingly, the treaty was sent to the US Senate and ratified in February 1954.27

Planning for Possible Action against the Communists

While keeping a wary eye on Syngman Rhee, the United States could not

ignore the possibility of renewed hostilities with the communists. This

contingency had been considered even before the armistice was concluded, in

May 1953 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended to the National Security

Council that, if the armistice negotiations broke down, the United States should

not limit its actions to Korea but should conduct air and naval operations directly

against China and Manchuria, accompanied by a "coordinated offensive to seize

a position generally at the waist of Korea." The Council noted and discussed

these recommendations but took no formal action.28

On the day the armistice was signed, the United States and the fifteen other

nations participating in the defense of South Korea issued a public warning

against any breach of the armistice. The consequences of such a violation, according to the statement, "would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be

possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea."^

When the National Security Council discussed Korean policy on 29 October

1953, as described above, the members directed the Joint Chiefs oi Staff, with the

assistance of the State Department, to review their plans for dealing with new

communist aggression.vThe Joint Strategic Plans Committee initiated this review,

but proved unable to agree. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps members

believed that the broad plan of May 1953 for a coordinated offensive should be

retained, with specific provision for employment of nuclear weapons for the

purpose. The Air Force member believed that this plan should be discarded in

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Far East: Korea

favor of a massive strategic and tactical nuclear attack against the territories of

North Korea and Communist China.31

The Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted the Air Force view. In a memorandum to

Secretary Wilson on 27 November 1953, they noted that the kind of offensive

envisioned in the earlier plan would require from nine to twelve months to build

up the necessary forces. Moreover, if the communists attacked again, the objective should be not merely to repel the invaders but to "create conditions which

will lead to a unified, independent Korea aligned with the West." For this

purpose, there should be large-scale air operations against targets in China,

Manchuria, and North Korea, employing nuclear weapons, to be followed by

land, sea, and air attacks to destroy hostile forces in Korea. These tasks, they

pointed out, could be carried out at once with available forces. But certain

preparatory actions would be necessary beforehand, notably an authorization by

the President to use nuclear weapons at once.32

Since the National Security Council had directed that the Department of State

be consulted, Assistant Secretary Nash discussed this memorandum with Secretary Dulles on 2 December 1953. Mr. Dulles was dubious of the feasibility of

destroying communist capabilities by "scattering a few A bombs around." He

would prefer operations of more limited scope, specifically intended to cripple

forces operating in Korea, though not necessarily limited to targets in that

country.

At a meeting of the Council the following day, Admiral Radford presented

the JCS proposals. Secretary Dulles objected that the military operations they

contemplated would probably touch off Soviet intervention and would not be

supported by other nations. He suggested more restricted alternatives, such as a

naval blockade of China or a seizure of Hainan Island. The Council directed

Secretary Dulles and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to compose their differences and

prepare a new statement.34

Accordingly, on 18 December the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the Secretary of

Defense a new statement that obviously reflected the views of the Secretary of

State, It proposed a nuclear air offensive limited to targets that were located in

Korea or that contributed directly to operations in that country, with other

operations against enemy forces in Korea.35 This statement was revised again

after consultation with the Department of State. In this form it was approved by

the National Security Council on £ January 1954, with the proviso that it be

reviewed periodically.3*Thus US policy contemplated nuclei r (but not necessarily general) war to defend Korea.

The Question of US Redeployment

The Korean War had tied down a major portion of US coiahat forces, At the

time of the armistice, seven of the Army's 20 divisions were in Korea and

another in Japan. One of the three Marine divisions was in Korea; another was

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JCS and National Policy

shipped to Japan soon afterwards, in accordance with a decision made before

the armistice. 7 The requirements of the Far Eastern Theater thus constituted the

principal reason for the dangerous overextension of US military forces that was

stressed in the report written by the new group of joint Chiefs of Staff shortly

before assuming office in mid-August 1953.38

To remove US troops immediately after the armistice, while the situation

remained uncertain, was out of the question. On 11 August 1953 the Commander

in Chief US Far East Command (C1NCFE), General Mark W. Clark, USA recommended that no major US forces be withdrawn from Korea until a political

settlement had been reached. However, he asked permission to return to Japan

the 24th Infantry Division, which had been s*nl to Korea as a reinforcement

during the final month of hostilities, and to retain its equipment in Korea for

issue to the ROK Army.59 The Joint Chiefs of Staff disapproved this request,

considering it inadvisable to weaken US strength in Korea at that time.40 They

instructed General Clark that plans should be based on the assumption that

there would be no substantial redeployment of US forces before 1 July 1954.4l

Three months later General Clark's successor, General John E. Hull, again

asked permission to move the 24th Division.42 General Ridgway endorsed the

request.43 The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved it in principle, but, fearing that any

weakening of US forces in Korea would increase the difficulty of controlling

Syngman Rhee, ordered the movement postponed to allow time to judge Rhee's

reaction to current US efforts to restrain him.44

General Ridgway had meanwhile urged upon his colleagues a general regroup

ing of forces in the Far East. The existing deployment, he asserted, was

"strategically faulty for peace, faulty for resumption of full scale operations in

the Korean area, and dangerous in the event of general war." Forces should be

redeployed in accordance with an overall strategic plan (which did not then

exist) intended to guide the conduct of hostilities in Korea if war broke out anew.

But, he added, any withdrawal of forces from Korea should be accompanied by

an announcement that the United Slate» fully intended to defend South Korea if

necessity arose4*

After considering a JSSC report on the subject, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

forwarded a memorandum to Secretary' Wilson on 17 November !#53 that

reflected General Ridgway's views. "The continued deployment of U.&. forces

in Korea on the present scale," they declared," is faulty to the point of involving

serious risk." Since the stalemate in Korea seemed likely to continue indefinitely,

US forces in the Far East should be redeployed with a view to nvuntaining

readiness for either renewed hostilities in Korea or general war with the Soviet

bloc. They noted that redeployment of US forces had received general approval

in NSC 162/2. But. they continued, it would be a political «Me** for the UN

countries to withdraw their forces without a corresponding action by the

communists. They therefore recommended that an agreement be sought for a

phased withdrawal on both sides, under terms that would allow the United

States to retain an enlarged military advisory group in South Korea The objective

(subject to consultation with the UN allies) should be to reduce UN force» to one

corps of three divisions (two US plus ont composite UN division), with tactical

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Far East: Korea

air and naval units. This reduction should be accompanied by a proclamation of

US determination to defend Korea. It might be followed by other withdrawals

after initial results had been appraised.46

The JCS recommendations were reflected in NSC 170/1, in which the redeployment of US forces from Korea at the earliest feasible date was approved in

principle.47Several weeks later, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved their

New Look strategy directive, JCS 2101/113, they assumed that the deployment of

major US forces in Korea would be terminated in the near future.

The specific question—how many divisions to remove from Korea, and how

soon—came before the National Security Council on 3 December 1953. The

member* derided that two divisions should be withdrawn about 1 March 1954;

then, if the stalemate continued, the United States would seek the consent of its

UN allies for a further reduction to the three-division limit proposed by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff.49

The execution of this decision was a delicate matter in view of the state of

relations with Syngman Rhee at that moment. Within the administration, it was

regarded as a matter for very sensitive handling. The President referred it to the

Operations Coordinating Board for careful coordination of its timing and

implementation.wSubsequently, in discussions between OCB and the Secretary

of Defense, it was agreed that the withdrawal of the two divisions would not be

carried out or publicly announced until Rhee had been notified of the plan.51

Admiral Radford, who was planning a trip to the far East, was appointed to bear

the tidings.*2 Before his departure. Admiral Radford collaborated with the other

JCS member» and with Secretary Dulles in drafting a statement on the impending redeployment to be issued by the President.**

On 26 December 1953, after Admiral Radford had reached Seoul and had an

opportunity to inform the South Korean leader of the decision,*4 President Eisenhower announced that two divisions would soon be withdrawn from Korea and

returned to the United States. At the same time, turn ever, he made it clear that

the United States would resist any new aggression in Korea and would retain

appropriate military forces in the Far East.**

The Department of the Army drew up a redeployment schedule that did not

square with this announcement. Under its plan, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff

approved and (submitted to Secretary Wilson on 31 December, two divisions (the

24th And 25th) would be withdrawn from Korea before the end of R 1954, but

neither would return to the continental United States: the first would go to

japan, the second to Hawaii. One regimental combat team would return to the

United States during this period; two National Guard divisions (40th and 45th)

would follow it during the first quarter of FY 1955 **

Secretary Wilson on 13 January 1954 approved the shift of the 24th Division

to Japan but vetoed the rr*t of this pUrx. insisting that two divisions must return

to continentaJ United States before the end of the fiscal year He suggested that

the two National < Juard divisions be selected for this purpose And released to

state control*7

Since the Army plan now had to be revised, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a

suggestion by O^n^tikl Ridgway that a general plan of redeployment, embracing

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JCS and National Policy

all the Services, be drawn up.58 Meanwhile the Army agreed to carry out Secretary Wilson's suggestion that the 40th and 45th Divisions be brought home and

released to their respective states.59

The Services submitted their tentative redeployment schedules shortly

thereafter.60 The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent them to the Joint Strategic Plans

Committee for study. They also obtained the advice of CINCFE on these plans

and on various problems involved in redeployment, such as the disposition of

UN units and the proper size of the final, residual US forces in Korea.61

On 1 April 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a comprehensive plan

drafted by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee and sent it to Secretary Wilson. It

called for the withdrawal of the following forces from the Far East:

Army: Four divisions (in addition to the 40th and 45th) to be redeployed from Köre« by December 1954. One would be the 24th,

already scheduled for transfer to Japan. Of the remaining three,

one would go to Hawaii and the other two to the continental

United States.

Navy: One battleship, two aircraft carriers, eight destroyers, and two

patrol aircraft squadrons to be withdrawn from the Western

Pacific by 10 April 1951; twelve additional destroyers by 1 July

1954. (Their future disposition was not specified.)

Marine Corps: One division to be returned to the zone of the interior between

July and September 1955.

Air Force: One troop carrier wing (medium) to be returned to the Zl by

September 1954; rotation of one SAC fighter wing to the Far East

to be discontinued by June 1954; two fighter bomber, one light

bomber, and one and one-third fighter interceptor wings to be

returned to the United States between July 1954 and June 1955,

subject to further review; three medium bomber wings to be

withdrawn to the United States to be re-equipped with jet aircraft (date unspecified); offsetting the effects of th«s latter move,

one SAC bomber wing, with atomic capability, to be maintained

on rotation to the Far East.

This plan would reduce US ground strength in Korea to the desired goal of

two divisions (one Army and one Marine). The Joint Chiefs of Staff urged that it

be approved promptly in order that the Army and Navy might regroup their

forces to adjust to the drastic manpower reductions scheduled for those Services.

At the same time, they tendered advice to Secretary Wilton on certain related

matters* some of which, they admitted, were beyond the purview of the military.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff urged an effort to induce other UN nations to retain

their present forces in Korea. Discussions of this subject, they believed, should

be conducted directly with the governments involved, not in the UN organiza*

turn, which included many neutralist or hostile countries. If the others insisted

upon removing their forces, their withdrawals should be carefully phased with

US redeployment. The Commander in Chief, UN Command (CINCUNQ should

retain command of all US, UN, and South Korean forces. Should President Rhee

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Far East: Korea

i

refuse to accept such an arrangement, it would be better to withdraw US forces

entirely, they believed, than to accepta separate command for South Korean

troops.62

By the time this plan reached Secretary Wilson, the situation in the Far East

had materially altered. The developing crisis in Indochina made it unsafe to

withdraw major US forces from the periphery of Asia. On6 April 1954, Mr.

Wilson told the National Security Council that he was deferring all major redeployments from Korea until 1 June 1954.63 The following day he formally notified

the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries of this decision. All redeployment of US forces from the Far East would be suspended, with the exception of

the two National Guard divisions already ordered returned to the United States

and of minor Naval forces (one battleship and four destroyers). Planning for

future withdrawals would continue, but no announcements would be made.

64

Subsequently, at the request of General Twining, Secretary Wilson modified this

decision to authorize the withdrawal of one medium bomber wing.65

The situation was no better on1 June 1954. At that time the Joint Chiefs of

SH? iuid the Secretary that the approved redeployments had been or were being

effected, but they recommended that no others be scheduled. The deteriorating

international situation and the need to support US diplomacy during the Geneva

Conference, they declared, made it necessary to retain existing forces in the Far

East for an indeterminate time.

66 I

Strengthening South Korea's Forces Acomplete withdrawal of US units from South Korea would be possible if

that country's own forces were strong enough to defend the nation alone.

Sucha level of military strength was, of course, beyond South Korea's capabilities.

Buta more limited objective—to provide the Republic of Korea with the maximum strength attainable with its limited population and resources—was a longestablished US goal. Its accomplishment depended upon aid from the United

States, which was thus ina position to prescribe the limits of South Korea's

military expansion.

In 1952, while the Korean War was still in progress, President Trurtvn had

approveda modest increase in the ROK Army from 10 to 12 divisions: he had

withheld decision ona recommendation by General Clark fora further increase

to 20 divisions. President Ei*enhower, soon after his accession successively

rmed the ceiling to 14 divisions, then to 16, tnd finally, in May l'^53, to the full

20. leaving it to General Oarx's discretion to activate the last four. He also

authorized smaller increases in the other services. The ROK personnel ceilings

approved by President Eisenhower were 655,00 for the Army, 10,900 for the

Navy, 2X500 for the Marine Corps, and 9,000 for the Air Force-a total oi

697,500.^

When Secretary Dulles visited Seoulm August 1953, he WAS accompanied by

Secretary oi the Armv Robert T. Stevens, who discussed South Korea's military

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JCS and National Policy

needs with Admiral Sohn Won II, Minister of Defense in the Rhee government.

Admiral Sohn presented a plan for a major increase in his country's forces. He

wished the last four ROK divisions to be activated immediately and all 20 to be

reorganized and reequipped to provide them with the same firepower as US

divisions. The South Korean Air Force, under his plan, would be expanded from

a single fighter wing (three squadrons) to six wings of fighter-bombers and two

of light bombers, with supporting units; the US Air Force would turn over all its

aircraft, equipment, and installations in Korea. The ROK Navy would acquire 31

more ships: 16 destroyer escorts, six destroyers, four minesweepers, and five

auxiliaries, plus enough landing craft for lifting a full division.

Privately considering these goals utterly impractical, Secretary Stevens agreed

tc transmit them to his superiors in Washington. The administration, however,

took no immediate action.68

Indeed, there was at the time some doubt whether it would be feasible to

reach the approved goal of 20 divisions. General Ridgway pointed out several

difficulties to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There was insufficient equipment available in Korea for the last four divisions, and the Armistice Agreement forbade

the importation of war material except on a replacement basis; hence the only

source would be equipment left behind by departing US units. Moreover, the

requirements of the expanding Japanese National Safety Force must be considered. General Ridgway noted that the 20-division goal had been approved

while the war was still in progress and that it should now be reexamined.

Meanwhile, he suggested, CINCFE should be directed to organize cadres for the

final four ROK divisions.69 The Joint Chiefs of Staff at once approved these

suggestions and sent the necessary instructions to CINCFE.70

After considering a study of the problem by their planning committees, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff decided on 6 October 1953 that the 20-division objective was

valid. They authorized CINCFE to equip two additional ROK divisions, at his

discretion, when equipment from departing US units became available The

remaining two divisions were to be maintained on a cadre basis until the question of redeployment of US forces had been determined.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff rejected any increase in the other ROK services

except the Navy. They approved a recommendation by COMNAVFE and CINCFE

that the personnel ceiling of the ROK Navy be raised to 15,000 and its ship

strength by 27 vessels; 16 landing craft, two destroyer escorts, four smaller

escort vessels, and five auxiliaries. This increase would bring the ROK Navy to a

total of 83 ships, as compared with its current strength of 56. Since this recommended increase required the approval of higher authority, the Joint Chiefs of

staff passed it to Secretary Wilson on 6 October 1953 and received his approval

on 24 November.71

In October 1953 Defense Minister Sohn, in two letters to Secretary Wilson,

sought approval of the larger force goals presented to Secretary Stevens two

months earlier. For some reason, it was not until 23 December 1953 that Secretary Wilson referred this request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment. At the

same time he sent a temporizing reply to Admiral Sohn, assuring him that the

United States was very interested in strengthening the ROK forces but referring

234

i
Far East: Korea

tactfully to problems involved in maintaining the complex equipment that would

be required to expand the Navy and the Air Force.72

Admiral Sohn then turned to Admiral Radford, with whom he had established a cordial relationship during the latter's recent visit to Korea. In a letter on

6 January 1954, he voiced the hope that the United States would give speedy and

favorable consideration to his recent request to Secretary Wilson. Admiral Radford

replied noncommittally on 18 January that the request was still under study.73

The decision to bring home the 40th and 45th Divisions promised to release

enough equipment to bring the ROK Army up to its full authorized strength. On

15 February 1954, therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a request by

General Hull to use the equipment left by these departing units for the last two

South Korean divisions.74 The formation of these divisions was announced publicly on 28 February 1954.75

But the realization of this goal no longer satisfied South Korea's rulers. On 22

January 1954 Prime Minister Paik Too Chin, in a letter to Secretary Stevens, had

asked for aid in organizing no less than 15-20 additional divisions, making no

secret of the fact that these were wanted for attack rather than for defense. At

the same time, he cited this proposed expansion in his nation's Army to justify

the earlier requests for increases in the Air Force and Navy.76

This audacious proposal was discussed by the National Security Council on

17 February 1954. President Eisenhower asked the Department of Defense to

study it.77 Acting Secretary Anderson accordingly directed the Joint Chiefs of

Staff to consider it in their study, not yet completed, of the request submitted by

Admiral Sohn in October 1953.78

As a result of this study, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded on 31 March 1954

that all plans for further expansion of ROK forces should be rejected. Forces

larger than those already planned, they observed, could not be maintained by

South Korean manpower and economic resources, and could only be supplied

by depleting US reserves of equipment. Instead of enlargement, they recommended some qualitative improvements within approved manpower ceilings.

The reorganization of the ROK Army into a field army on the US model, with

army and corps headquarters, which was already under way, should continue.

The Navy would be adequate when its authorized goal was reached; the Marine

Corps should be reorganized and consolidated into a division in place of various

smaller units. They rejected a suggestion by CINCFE that the ROK Air Force be

given an additional fighter bomber wing; instead, they proposed that its existing

wing be reequipped with jet fighters (in place of obsolete, propeller-driven F-51s)

and that an effective tactical control organization be established.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also suggested that, subject to further study, it might

prove feasible to establish a reserve program for the South Korean Armed Forces.

Such a program, they pointed out, might eventually justify reductions in the

active forces of the nation.7''

Secretary Wilson sent these conclusions to the National Security Council. He

approved the JCS views on the proper size of the ROK forces; if there were to be

further expansion, he pointed out, it must be justified on political rather than

military grounds. He added, however, that the suggestions for qualitative

235
uI

]CS and National Policy

improvements and fora reserve program required further study of costs and

other problems involved.

80

President Eisenhower had already advised Syngman Rhee that the request

for additional Army divisions would probably be rejected. Ina message on 20

March 1954, he expressed the tentative conclusion that it would "dangerously

overtax the human and material resources of your country."81

President Rhee nevertheless found in this message some hope that his request

would ultimately be approved. He renewed it ina letter to Admiral Radford on1

April 1954. If his Army were doubled ii» strength and given commensurate air

and naval support, he asserted, all UN forces in Korea could be withdrawn and

South Korean forces could take full responsibility for defending the nation. He

suggested that General James A. Van Fleet, former commander of the US Eighth

Army, be dispatched to Korea to supervise the training of the new divisions.

Admiral Radford referred this letter to the National Security Council.

82

The Council discussed the subject on 13 April 1954. The members seized

upon the proposed visit of General Van Fleet, adapting it toa different purpose.

They decided that he should go to South Korea to determine the proper size and

composition of that country's armed forces and the possibility of establishinga

reserve program. Pending receipt of his findings, they tentatively approved the

conclusions reached by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 31 March.

83

Accordingly, on 26 April Secretary Wilson issued formal instructions to General Van Fleet for the conduct of a survey of US military assistance programs in

the Far East. Besides visiting South Korea for the specific purposes mentioned

above, he would also survey Japan and Nationalist China, and other countries

that might be indicated later. He should project his recommendations through

FY 1957.

M General Van Fleet undertook the mission as

a special representative of

the ^resident, with personal rank of ambassador. i he Joint Strategic Plans Committee had meanwhile studied the possibility of ä reserve program for the Republic of Korea and had tentatively decided on 15

Ap/il that it was impracticable, because the Republic of Korea lacked the necessary manpower (especially officers) and equipment.85 The Joint Chiefs of Staff,

however, told Secretary Wilson on 23 April 1954 that they would make no

comments on the proposed reserve program until after General Van Fleet

returned.

8

*

The Geneva Conference and its Aftermath The search for a political settlement of the status of Korea was temporarily

abandoned after the collapse of negotiations fora conference in December

1953.A renewed effort in 1954 owed its origin to developments in Europe. In

January and February 1954 the foreign ministers of the Big Four met in Berlin to

consider questions related to Germany and Austria. During the conference,

Foreign Minister Molotov of the Soviet Union seized the opportunity to present

anew the Soviet suggestion fora round-table conference, to include Communist

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Far East: Korea

China, for discussion of Far Eastern problems. The developing crisis in Indochina,

which by now far overshadowed the Korean problem, made this suggestion a

timely one. The other three nations accepted the Soviet proposal, and the conference was scheduled for 26 April 1954 in Geneva, Switzerland.87

It was necessary to win President Rhee's assent to participate in this new

search for a Korean solution. In the course of correspondence with President

Eisenhower, the South Korean leader asked for assurances that the United States

did not intend to allow the conference to drag on beyond the 90-day deadline

that he had laid down in his previous statements.88 On 19 April he announced

that he had received satisfactory assurances and would participate in the Geneva

Conference. Rhee added the hope that if and when the conference had failed,

the United States would "join with us in employing other means to drive the

enemy from our land."89

Of several position papers for the conference sent them for review, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff commented on only two. A plan for Korean unification, providing

for internationally supervised elections for a constituent body that would draft a

new constitution, was considered acceptable by them.90 Of more immediate

interest, from the JCS viewpoint, was a joint State-Defense paper calling for

withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea, under international supervision, within

12 months after a new government was set up. This plan was to be introduced

only after agreement on unification had been reached. The Joint Chiefs of Staff

approved this paper subject to certain changes. If no agreement could be reached

on unification, they believed, the United States should not only abstain from

introducing any proposal to withdraw foreign forces, but should decline to

consider the subject at all. If allied countries strenuously objected to such a

stance, they should be told, as a last resort, that the United States was willing to

discuss with them the question of force withdrawals after the conference.91

The Geneva Conference is best remembered for the agreement on Indochina

that it produced, as described in the next chapter. The discussions on Korea

were fruitless. The communist powers urged immediate unification by fusion of

the existing governments of North and South Korea, to be followed by elections,

which were to be free of outside interference. When this plan was rejected by the

Western Powers, the communists suggested another under which elections would

be supervised by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission established by

the Armistice Agreement. The ineffectiveness of this body had already been

demonstrated to the satisfaction of the United States and its allies. Agreement

thus proved impossible, and negotiations on the Korean issue were broken off.92

With this development, there emerged once again the vexing question of

Syngman Rhee's intentions. This matter was already under study in the

administration. General Ridgway had passed to his colleagues a suggestion by

CINCFE that the United States seek from Rhee, before the Mutual Defense

Treaty formally took effect, a commitment to leave his forces under UN

command.93The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed this suggestion and referred it to

the Secretary of Defense, who in turn submitted it to the Secretary of State with

his concurrence on 5 June 1954 *

Secretary Dulle* disapproved the proposal, fearing that a request to Rhee for

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JCS and National Policy

such a pledge might be countered with a demand for compensating concessions.95

But he was very much aware of the problem. A few days earlier he had asked

Secretary Wilson to consider what action the United Nations Command should

take if Rhee actually did withdraw his forces from its control. He offered the

amateur suggestion that logistic support of ROK forces be terminated. What was

needed, he believed, was something dramatic to emphasize the consequences

of such a withdrawal for the South Korean forces.96

Referring this request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Wilson passed

along to Mr. Dulles, as an interim reply, a lengthy analysis of the political and

military situation in South Korea transmitted by GNCFE on 11 June 1954. General Hull feared that President Rhee would take the position that he had cooperated with the United States in seeking to unify Korea through negotiation and

that the United States was therefore obligated to support him in unifying the

country by force. Although he would probably not take drastic unilateral action

without first consulting the United States, he was unlikely to accept indefinitely

the divison of Korea. It would be desirable to divert his attention from a possible

attack on North Korea to more constructive, long-range developments, such as

an alliance among the noncommunist nations of Asia. As for the possibility that

Rhee might pull his forces out of the UN Command, General Hull reported that

contingency plans had been prepared for this event. An appropriate response by

the United States, he believed, would be io speed the withdrawal of US forces.

General Hull therefore recommended that the decision to suspend redeployment be reconsidered.97

On 21 July 1954 the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted their reply to Secretary

Dulles' letter of 7 June. They saw no need for dramatic measures, believing that

Rhee had already been made aware of the serious consequences of unilateral

action. They agreed with CINCFE's analysis of the situation and his forecast of

Rhee's probable actions. They remained convinced that it would be desirable to

seek a commitment from Rhee before the Mutual Defense Treaty went into

effect/*

President Rhee's Visit to the United States

By the time these comments from the Joint Chiefs oi Staff were available, the

administration had decided upon a different approach. President Rhee was

to be invited to the United States for an official visit. President Eisenhower

announced on 14 July 1954 that the South Korean President would come to

Washington on 26 July.** While he did not elaborate on the purpose of the visit,

there can be little doubt that the invitation had stemmed from a desire to conciliate Rhee and to dissuade him from any action injurious to US interests.

In preparation for a general discussion of US-South Korean military problems.

Acting Secretary Anderson on 16 July asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their

advice on the following subjects: (1) the question of redeployment of US forces

from Korea; (2) the augmentation of the forces of South Korea; and (3) the

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•

I
Far East: Korea

relation between the UN Command and ROK forces.100 Replying on 22 July, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff proffered the following aa vice:

1. The FY 1956 ceilings for US forces approved on 15 July 1954 101 would

require withdrawal of some forces from the Far East. Therefore, the

redeployment schedule that they had submitted on 1 April 1954 should

be approved.

2. As they had stated earlier, currently authorized force goals were adequate and were the largest that the Republic of Korea could support.

3. Their views on command relationships had been set forth in connection

with their redeployment plan. The UN Commander should retain full

command over all forces, including those of South Korea, so long as he

was responsible for the security of that nation. An attempt should be

made to induce Rhee to reaffirm his agreement to leave his forces under

UN Command; he should be told that US support and assistance for his

forces would be withdrawn if he removed them.102

How far these recommendations entered into the discussions between the

two Presidents is unknown. In any case, the talks apparently had little immediate result. Publicly, at least, President Rhee made no promises during his fourday visit in Washington. Indeed, in addressing a joint session of Congress on

28 July, he asked the United States to furnish air and naval support for an

invasion of the Chinese mainland by an army of two million South Korean and

Nationalist Chinese troops, though he later partially retracted this request with

an explanation that he did not wish the United States to go to war immediately

with Communist China.103 The communique issued by the two Presidents on 30

July said merely that they had had a fruitful and cordial exchange of views; it

reaffirmed their intention to achieve a unified, democratic, and independent

Korea.104 The actual results of the visit did not become evident until later, after

continued discussions at lower levels.

Resumption of US Redeployment

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended on 22 July 1954 that the United

States resume the withdrawal of its forces from Korea, the crisis in Indochina had eased. The Geneva Conference on Far Eastern problems had produced an armistice agreement that ended the war between French forces and

communist rebels in Vietnam and thus removed the immediate danger of a wider

conflict in the Far East.10*

In a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries on

26 July 1954. Mr. Wilson suggested that tr>* troop movements recommended in

the JCS redeployment plan of t April 1954 be -ompleted by the end of the year.

At the same time, he proposed to modify this plan by leaving both Marine

divisions in the Far East. The First would remain in Ko.-*a; the Third would shift

239
JCS and National Policy

from Japan to Okinawa (except for one of its regimental combat teams, which

would move to Hawaii).106

Secretary Wilson'9 plan was approved by the Armed Forces Policy Council

on 27 July. At the same time, the Policy Council approved minor changes in the

Air Force redeployment plan; only one medium bombardment wing was to be

withdrawn, and the SAC fighter wing was to be maintained on rotation. The

number of ships to be withdrawn was not specified; the conferees decided only

that four attack carriers (CVAs), with appropriate supporting vessels, would be

maintained in Far Eastern waters.107

Secretary Wilson submitted these plans to the National Security Council on

28 July 1954. The Council approved them subject to appropriate diplomatic

preparations by the Secretary of State, and with the requirement that the timing

and announcement of the various movements would be coordinated between

the State and Defense Departments.108

On 12 August Mr. Wilson informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service

Secretaries that other countries had been notified and that the NSC decision

should now be carried out.109 The Joint Chiefs of Staff accordingly drafted a

schedule for completing the redeployment of Army divisions by the end of

calendar year 1954 and of Air Force units by the end of FY 1955, and sent it to the

Services and CINCFE for action. At the same time, they again requested, and

this time obtained, Secretary Wilson's approval to terminate the rotation of the

SAC fighter wing in the Far East.110

Once these movements had been completed, only two US division—one

Army, the other Marine—would remain in Korea. Thus the objective set by the

Joint Chiefs of Staff in November 1953 would be reached. A UN presence would

be maintained by the composite British Commonwealth division, which still

remained in Korea, and by minor units from other nations.111 The air wing

attached to the First Marine Division, plus nine Air Force combat and three troop

carrier wings, would provide tactical air support.112

In a directive to General Hull on 6 October 1954, redefining his responsibilities as CINCFE, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized him to adjust the size of US

forces in Japan and Okinawa as redeployments were carried out. However, any

movement from Japan of RCTs or larger units would require advance notification to them.113 At the same time, they also issued new instructions to him as

C1NCUNC (replacing those transmitted on 10 July 1951). CINCUNCs new mission was to comply with the terms of the Armistice Agreement and to maintain

his forces in a state of combat readiness.114

Before the redeployment plan had been fully executed, however. Secretary

Wilson modified it further. On 9 December 1954 he ordered the First Marine

Division brought home from Korea and replaced by one of the two Army divisions in Japan. This decision seems to have been the Secretary's own, and was

apparently not referred to the Joint Chiefs ofStaff for consideration. The intention,

according to an explanation released later, was to free the First Marine Division

from its static, defensive mission in Korea and to add its strength to the mobile

strategic reserve based in the United States.115 The result would be a net reduc240
Far Eaat: Korea

tion of US strength in the Far East; there would remain three Army divisions,

plus one Marine division, less one of its component RCTs.

Secretary Wilson wished this decision carried out as promptly as the

transportation available in the Pacific allowed. At the same time, he asked the

Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider possible further withdrawals from Korea and

Japan, in the light of prospective reductions in overall Army and Marine Corps

strength.116

The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted an interim reply on 31 December 1954.

They agreed that the time had come to appraise the results of the redeployments

accomplished thus far, in the light of the possibility, which had been foreseen a

year earlier, of reducing forces in Korea below the initial two-division goal. They

promised to make such an appraisal and to submit their findings. As for immediate plans, they recommended that the First Marine Air Wing be withdrawn from

Korea along with the First Division and its component units divided among

Japan, Hawaii, and the continental United States. To offset this loss in tactical air

power, they recommended that one of the two fighter bomber wings scheduled

for withdrawal in 1955 be retained in the Far East at least to the end of the

calendar year. Secretary Wilson approved these recommendations.117

Earlier, on 29 December 1954, Secretary Wilson, in discussing projected force

levels for FYs 1956 and 1957, asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend

one or more deployment plans for the same period.11B The resulting plan adopted

by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and submitted to the Secretary on 11 January 1955

called for a reduction of Army forces in the Far East to only two divisions by FY

1956, in keeping with the smaller size planned for the Army. It envisioned minor

reductions in Air Force units there, and suggested that one of the Navy's four

attack aircraft carriers might be withdrawn. Secretary Wilson approved the plan

with the stipulation that any movement of forces necessary to put it into effect

would require his advance authorization in each instance.119

South Korean Force Levels

The question of the ultimate size of South Korea's armed forces had been left

in abeyance pending General Van Fleet's survey of that nation's military

needs and resources. The General's mission took him to Japan, Formosa, and the

Philippines as well as to Korea. He returned to Washington on 15 July 1954.12°

Meanwhile, on 29 June, General Hull submitted his own proposals. He recommended that the ROK Army be reorganized into 30 divisions, of which nine

would be active and 21 reserve, and that the strength of each division be reduced

from 15,000 to 10,000. He also recommended the establishment of Air Force and

Navy reserve organizations, and repeated his earlier proposal that the Air Force

be expanded to two fighter wings. l

General Van Fleet's recommendations, submitted on 23 July 1954, duplicated

some of those of C1NCFE. He called for an Army composed of both regular and

241

- - - • •- ■■•--•--^
JCS and National Polity

reserve divisions, totaling 30 in number, and for the creation of Navy and Air

Force reserves. However, under his plan, 24 Army divisions would be on a

regular basis and only six reserve. The increase from 20 to 24 active divisions

would take up the slack left by the impending departure of four US divisions. He

recommended some reduction in the strength of divisional artillery and the

elimination of some support units. The ROK Air Force, he believed, should be

allowed a somewhat larger personnel ceiling (15,000), and its conversion to jet

aircraft should be accelerated. He saw no need for changes in the force goals

already established for the ROK Air Force, Navy, or Marine Corps.122

The Joint Strategic Plans Committee reviewed both sets of proposals and

drafted a different version that included some features from each. The members

approved CINCFE's plans for the Army, rejected his proposal to double the

fighter strength of the Air Force, and recommended new personnel ceilings

totaling 718,500 men, as compared with the currently authorized 702,500.123

Insofar as these proposals called for the establishment of reserve forces for

the Republic of Korea, they were compatible with the JCS recommendations

submitted on 31 March 1954. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had, however, opposed

any enlargement of South Korean active forces beyond the goals already approved

by the administration.

President Rhee's visit to Washington in July 1954 afforded an opportunity for

a review of these goals, and of the proposals of CINCFE and of General Van

Fleet, by officials of both nations. Admiral Sohn and high ranking officers of the

ROK Army and Air Force, who accompanied Rhee, conferred with Secretary

Wilson, Admiral Radford, Generals Hull and Van Fleet, and other military and

civilian representatives of the Services and of the Department of Defense. The

South Korean Ambassador to the United States, You Chan Yang, took part in

these conferences, as did representatives of the Department of State.124 Out of

the discussions there emerged a plan for an expansion and reorganization of the

ROK military establishment, adopted as part of an agreement that was not

limited to military questions but embraced the major points at issue between the

two governments.

The terms of this agreement were recorded in an Agreed Minute drawn up

by the US participants after the conversations. The Republic of Korea agreed to

"cooperate with the United States in its efforts to unify Korea," and thus in

effect foreswore resort to violence for this purpose. Moreover, South Korean

forces were to remain "under the operational control of the UN Command while

that Command has responsibilities for the defense of the Republic of Korea."

This was the pledge that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had long been seeking.

On its part, the United States promised to defend South Korea in case of

unprovoked attack; to support Korean unification by all peaceful means; and to

provide economic and military assistance for FY 1955 up to a maximum of $700

million, or more than $100 million above the amount previously planned. The

United States would also support a strengthened military establishment for

South Korea, including a reserve system, and would retain in Korea, for an

unspecified period, the equivalent of one UN corps with supporting units.

242
Far East: Korea

Personnel ceilings for the ROK forces for FY1955 were established as follows:

661,000 for the Army, 15,000 for the Navy, 27,500 for the Marine Corps, and

16,500 for the Air Force—a total of 720,000. Minor adjustments within this total

might be made by the South Korean government after discussions with

CINCUNC

After FY 1955, these strengths would be reduced as trained men, released

from active service, became available to activate the reserve system. A goal of ten

reserve divisions was established, to be attained by the end of calendar 1955.

The United States would assist in training and organizing them, under plans to

be worked out by CINCUNC. There was no mention of reserve organizations for

the other services. General Van Fleet's recommendations for reduction in artillery and support units were to be carried out.

The ROK Navy was to continue building toward its approved goal of 79

vessels.125 The United States would furnish ships on loan if necessary. There

was to be no expansion of the ROK Air Force, but the United States would equip

it with jet aircraft by the end of FY 1956. Finally, the entire South Korean military

budget was to be subject to continuing joint review by the Republic of Korea and

by CINCUNC in order to produce the most effective forces at minimum cost.126

The Agreed Minute was accepted by the National Security Council on 9

September 1954 and President Eisenhower approved it the following day.12/

Secretary Wilson then sent it to the joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries,

pointing out that it represented the US understanding of the agreements reached

and had yet to be approved by the Government of South Korea. The US position,

he explained, was that all the agreements constituted a single package; if South

Korea failed to sign the Agreed Minute, the United States would not be obligated to provide any specific amount of aid or to support any particular force

goals. Plans for augmenting the ROK forces along the lines indicated in the

Agreed Minute were to be prepared, but were not to be executed until South

Korea had signed it.12* At the same time, he referred General Van Fleet's report

to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment.1**

Replying on 3 November 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff observed that the

Agreed Minute incorporated desirable features of both the Van Fleet report and

the CINCFE plan. If accepted by the Republic of Korea, it would constitute a

reasonable basis for augmenting that nation's forces during 1955. The establishment of reserve forces and the modernization of the Navy And Air Force, they

believed, were especially commendable element* of the plan.1** On 4 November

they instructed CINCFE to draw up plans for carrying out the provisions of the

Agreed Minute.111

Relations with South Korea at the End of 1954

The last word had not yet been said, however; the Agreed Minute had still to

be approved by President Rhee. That he would do so was by no means

certain. The aged Korean leader, along with many of his countrymen, remained

243

'•'*'-

<t^***w*mmMMmmmK0HHMBmnttltRjli
]CS and National Policy

dissatisfied with the prospects for unification. Their concern was exacerbated by

the psychological effects of US troop withdrawals and by a feeling that the

United States was providing too little aid to South Korea and too much to

Korea's erstwhile master, Japan, which, with US assistance, was regaining its

economic and military strength. "Relations between the U. S. and the ROK have

worsened substantially since President Rhee's return to Seoul from the U. S. in

August," reported a working group of the Operations Coordinating Board in

October 1954. This deterioration was reflected principally in strident antiAmerican propaganda emanating from South Korea's government. It took a

more serious turn when the Republic of Korea refused to make South Korean

currency available to the UN Command to meet local requirements, except at a

grossly overvalued rate of exchange.132

US Ambassador Ellis O. Briggs submitted the text of the Agreed Minute to

President Rhee in October. Rhee asked changes in wording that would eliminate

the commitment to peaceful means in pursuing unification, but as told that the

United States would accept no substantive changes, whereupon he agreed to

give the matter further study.133

Fearing that Rhee's final decision might be unfavorable. Ambassador Briggs

consulted with General Hull and with Mr. Tyler Wood, representative of the

Foreign Operations Administration. They drew up a tentative list of measures

designed to apply increasing pressure to the Rhee government to insure its

cooperation. This program, which General Hull referred to General Ridgway on

8 November, would begin with suspension of economic aid and extend to removal

of all US and UN military forces, including the military advisory group. General

Ridgway referred the plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.13*

Fortunately, the alarm passed; the Government of South Korea accepted the

Agreed Minute. The text was initialed by representatives of both nations in

Seoul on 17 November 1954, while at the same time the Mutual Defense Treaty

was placed in effect by the exchange of instruments of ratification in Washington.

In the final text, the reference to peaceful means was deleted, but in a formal

note, accepted by South Korea, the United States made clear its commitment to

this approach. The currency controversy was disposed of, since the Agreed

Minute fixed an acceptable rate of exchange.

On 18 November 1954 Acting Secretary Anderson officially notified the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Agreed Minute had been

signed and that its provisions regarding South Korean force goals were to be

carried out.13*

The one remaining question was: would the South Korean government live

up to the terms of this agreement? The answer seemed to I* affirmative, as the

Operations Coordinating Board, on the basis of six weeks' observation, reported

at the end of the year. The Board foresaw that friction with South Korea would

probably continue, principally over the question of unification. But the danger oi

violent or intemperate action by President Rhee no longer loomed so large as it

once had.13*

Now, at the end of 1954, the United States had apparently passed the most

difficult period in its relations with its unpredictable ally. The continuing uncer244
Far East: Korea

tainty with regard to President Rhee's possible actions had magnified the problem of liquidating the Korean War. Other complications were introduced by the

inability to reach formal agreement with the communists on the future status of

Korea and the new crisis that arose in Asia in 1954. Only after it had become

evident that the de facto settlement created by the Armistice Agreement was

likely to endure indefinitely was it safe to undertake a large-scale withdrawal of

US forces from the Far East.

Such a withdrawal had been sought by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but it did not

yield the result they desired. They had pointed out in 1953 that US forces were

stretched too thin and could only recover freedom of action if regrouped to

provide a mobile strategic reserve. But instead of using for this purpose the

forces brought home from the Far East, the administration applied them toward

a reduction in the size of the military establishment. The five Army divisions

returning from Korea under the redeployment plans approved in 1954 would

produce a total of twelve divisions stationed in the Western Hemisphere by the

end of FY 1955, as compared with seven two years earlier.137 On paper, this was

an impressive addition, but it meant little, if any, increase in effective strength,

since three of the twelve divisions would be little more than cadres for recruit

training and two others would be static divisions with their component units

scattered among several locations. The means for creating a strategic reserve

were therefore not available, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out to Secretary

Wilson early in 1955. The goal of flexibility, proclaimed as one of the objectives

of the New Look, had yet to be attained.138

245

„^ai^_^_^__^_^_^;- 'v ^.^■■^vt^.^ggfftfiMiWIWIW
12

The Far East: Indochina/ Taiwan, Japan

The Korean War was by no means the only Far Eastern problem that confronted the Eisenhower administration at the moment of its accession.1 A host of

difficulties, largely the legacy of World War II, was visible in that part of the

globe. Japan, long the dominant power of the region, had collapsed in 1945.

Four years later the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China, burdened

by its own ineptitude and exhausted after years of struggle with the Japanese

invaders, was driven to refuge in Taiwan by the advancing armies of the Chinese Communists led by Mao Tse-tung. Communist China and the Soviet Union

now loomed as the most powerful nations of the Far East.

At the same time, the nations of Western Europe were losing their influence

in Asia. Already the Dutch had departed from Indonesia and the British from

Burma. The United Kingdom retained a foothold in Malaya, as did France in

Indochina, but both nations were struggling with rebellious communist movements aimed at their expulsion.

The maintenance of a balance of power in the Far East depended on US

forces, which had moved westward across the Pacific in World War II, forcing

the Japanese back within the borders of their own islands. American forces now

stood guard in Japan and Okinawa, no longer by right of conquest but under

agreement with the former enemy. The Republic of the Philippines provided

another locus of US military power; the United States had retained base rights in

the new nation after granting tt independence in 1946. The gap between Okinawa and the Philippines wa> partly filled by the friendly Chinese Nationalist

regime that controlled Taiwan. Farther south (beyond the sprawling territories

o( the Republic of Indonesia, which had a neutralist government), the Commonwealth nations of Australia and New Zealand constituted stable, dependable

allies, linked to the United States by the ANZUS Treaty of 1951.

President Truman and his administration had become convinced that the

United States had an essential interest in this chain of islands off the Asian

coast. This conviction had been aifirmed in 1951 in NSC I&5, which dealt with

Far Eastern polio* The long-range US goals in Asia proclaimed in this directive

were to develop the region economically, to insure its political stability, and to

247
JCS and National Policy

prevent its domination by the communist powers. Toward this end, the United

States would provide assistance to friendly nations and would resist the hostile

Chinese Communist regime in Peking, politically, diplomatically, and, if

necessary, militarily. The Nationalist regime of President Chiang Kai-shek would

be recognized as the only legitimate Chinese government. Ultimately, according

to NSC 48/5, it was hoped that the existing rulers of mainland China could be

detached from their alliance with the Soviet Union or replaced by others less

hostile toward the West.2

US Far Eastern Policy, 1953-1954

The US stake in Asia concerned President Eisenhower no less than his

predecessor. One of his first actions, announced on 2 February 1953, wac

the removal of restrictions on Chinese Nationalist attacks against the communistheld mainland, an action described in more detail below. A comprehensive

review of Far Eastern policy was an early matter for NSC attention in the new

administration.

In preparation for this review, the Planning Board drafted NSC 148, a revised

statement of Far Eastern policy. NSC 148 was noteworthy for its statement that

the United States should retain its "off-shore defense positions (Japan, Ryukyus,

Formosa (Taiwan], Philippines, Australia and New Zealand), even at the grave

risk of general war." This statement went beyond NSC 48/5, which had stated

only that the United States should maintain the security of these positions. The

commitment to defend Taiwan was separately affirmed in NSC 146, drafted at the

same time, which dealt with Nationalist China.3

NSC 148 contained estimates of the cost of the aid programs needed to attain

US Far Eastern objectives. For FY 1953 the figure was $1-277 billion, as compared

with $1,292 bUlion in FY 1951 and $1,200 billion in FY 1952. For FY 1954 the

estimate was far higher: $1,385 billion exclusive of South Korea, which would

require from $15 billion to $4.2 billion, depending on various alternative courses

of military action then under consideration. Alarmed at these prospective costs,

the National Security Council voted on 8 April 1953 to defer action on NSC 148

pending review of the figures* Thereafter NSC 148 disappeared from the NSC

agenda, and more than a year was to elapse before the Council again discussed

Far Eastern po icy as a whole. The subject received some attention in NSC 162/2,

which reaffirmed the importance of the "off-shore island chain" and warned

against any major withdrawal of forces from either the Far East ot EuropeNSC 146, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved, * was also considered

briefly by the Council on 8 April 1953 and deferred for later action.*' In slightly

amended form, as NSC 146/2, it was adopted by the National Security Council

on 5 November 1953 7 NSC 146/2 stated that the United States wouid defend

Taiwan at the risk of war. It provided also that the United States would continue to develop the military capabilities of Chiang Kai-*hek'a forces, for defensive purposes and for such offensive actions as might be in the VS interest.

248
Far East: Inaochina, Taiwan, Japan

Nationalist raids against communist territory and commerce were to be encouraged, but US forces were not to be committed for the purpose. Covert

assistance would be furnished the Nationalists in their liaison with and logistical support of guerrillas on the mainland.8

On the same date,5 November 1953, the Council also approved NSC 166/1,

dealing with Communist China. In this policy paper, two possible courses of

action toward the Peking regime were considered and rejected: an attempt to

win friendship by concessions, and military action by US forces, or by those of

the Nationalists with US support. The selected alternative wasa policy of restraining military action by Communist China, using armed force if necessary., while

seeking to reduce that nation's relative power in various ways, as by providing

military and economic aid to other nations or perhaps by promoting collective

defense arrangements. In approving NSC 166/1, the Council adopted an amendment suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make clear the US commitment to

support Nationalist China.

9

The National Security Council had approved NSC 146/2 despite the misgivings of some members over the volume and cost of aid envisioned for the

Chinese Nationalists in current and projected mutual defense assistance

programs. The Council was torn betweena desire to assist Chiang Kai-shek's

forces and an urge to reduce the amount of money spent on military assistance.

Following further discussion of these alternatives, the National Security Council

on4 February 1954 asked the Department of Defense to review the missions

envisioned for the Nationalists. At the same time, ehe Council called on the

Department to suggest ways of developinga position of military strength in the

Far East.

10

This request was passed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who replied on9 April

1954. They pointed out that the creation ofa strong position required the formulation of a comprehensive policy that would view the Far East as a single strategic entity. They recommended a pooling of the strength of the noncommunist

countries ina regional defense arrangement, v/ith an integrated military

command, which would be supported by the United States and possibly other

Western nations. Until such an organization could be established, bilateral or

multilateral treaties among noncommunist Asian nations should be encouraged.

In any regional organization, Japan must playa key role, according to the

Joint Chiefs of Staff. They therefore recommended that the United States provide continuing assistance in developing Japanese armed forces, which were

increasing very slowly, and that US influence be exerted to induce other Asian

nations to overcome their fear ofa rearmed Japan.

11

This memorandum was placed on the NSC agenda as NSC 5416. Adoptinga

suggestion by Secretary Wilson, the Council referred it to the Planning Board

fora comprehensive statement of policy on the subject.

l2 There it was pigeonholed and eventually laid aside, apparently because the attention of the Council

was absorbed by the Indochina crisis that developed in the spring of 1954.

This crisis is described in more detail below. It ended on 21 July 1954 with an

agreement under which France lost her foothold in Southeast Asia. This radical

alteration in the Far Eastern political and military situation spurred the National

249

mHI i
JCS and National Policy

Security Council to a new reexamination of policies for that part of the globe. On

22 July the NSC members called on the Planning Board for a report on the

subject.13

In reply, the Board circulated NSC 5429, which suggested a security treaty

linking the Southeast Asian countries with the Western Powers, Australia, and

New Zealand—a plan that was already under consideration and was soon to

eventuate in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). This arrangement, according to NSC 5429, should be tied in with another embracing the

Philippines, Japan, Nationalist China, and South Korea.

On the crucial issue of Communist China, the Planning Board submitted four

alternative lines of action in NSC 5429, leaving it to the Council to choose among

them. They ranged from an attempt to placate the Peking government to a

militant policy that would barely stop short of overt attack.14

The Joint Chiefs of Staff criticized NSC 5429 on the grounds that it did not

constitute that comprehensive policy, embracing the Far East as a strategic entity,

for which they had argued in their memorandum of 9 April 1954.15 The Council

nevertheless adopted it, with some changes, as NSC 5429/2. The members

voted for an intermediate course of action toward Communist China that called

for the United States to reduce that nation's power in Asia "even at the risk of,

but without deliberately provoking war." Any overt act of belligerency on the

part of China would be resisted forcibly. In case of covert invasion or subversion,

according to NSC 5429/2, the United States might decide to intervene with

military force if requested by a legitimate local government, but any such decision would be preceded by a request for Congressional approval. These decisions were temporary, pending review of policy toward Communist China within

approximately a month.16

Meanwhile, as described earlier, General James A. Van Fleet had completed

his mission to the Far East. On his return, in addition to making recommendations concerning the individual countries that he had visited, he submitted

conclusions on the Far East as a whole. His general view was alarming. Communist China, he predicted, would regard its victory at the Geneva Conference as

but a first installment, and would press on toward its objective of controlling all

Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and ultimately all of Southeast Asia. Only

vigorous US leadership, he felt sure, could reverse the declining fortunes of

noncommunist Asia.

Like the Joint Chiefs of Staff a few months earlier, General Van Fleet saw

noncommunist Asia as virtually indefensible except through collective security.

He endorsed the JCS proposal for a comprehensive security pact. He recommended that the two LJS commands having responsibilities for Asia, CINCFE

and CINCPAC, be merged, and that a central office be created, analogous to the

US mission to NATO, to provide liaison with the proposed Asian alliance.17

The National Security Council reviewed these recommendations on 28 October 1954, but apparently gave them little consideration. The Council tentatively

approved a recommendation by Secretary of State Dulles that US policy in the

Far East be guided by a desire to avoid offering provocation to Communist

China and that the United States conclude a mutual defense treaty with National250

1 »
Far East: Indochina, Taiwan, Japan

ist China under terms that would scrupulously avoid any encouragement to

Chiang to attack the mainland. This decision, which was opposed by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, amounted to a rejection of the more positive measures recommended in General Van Fleet's report.18

On 2 November the Council reaffirmed this decision and directed the Planning Board to submit a revised statement of Far Eastern policy. The ultimate

result of this action was NSC 5429/5, which the Council adopted on 21 December 1954, except for a few paragraphs that were left for later action.19 The general

posture defined in this paper—a willingness to defend the nation's vital interests

"at the risk of but without being provocative of war"—reflected the cautious

approach that had been recommended by Secretary Dulles. The United States

would continue to protect the offshore island chain, and would retain forces in

the Far East as evidence of its intention to do so. NSC 5429/5 specified also that

the United States would continue to support the Chinese Nationalists, but it laid

down careful qualifications regarding the conditions under which the United

States would defend Taiwan or would reply to hostile actions against US ships

in waters around Taiwan. The principal innovation in NSC 5429/5 was a statement that the United States would act to prevent Indonesia from falling into

hostile hands. Thus, in effect, Indonesia was incorporated into the offshore

island chain.

The Indochina Crisis

The National Security Council had made it clear, in the policy papers adopted

in 1953 and 1954, that the United States would fight to maintain its position

in the Western Pacific. Whether it would do so to maintain a foothold for itself, or

for its allies, on the mainland of Asia was a question that had to be faced by the

Council in connection with the Indochina crisis of 1954. The war scare engendered by this crisis had passed away by the end of the year, but while it lasted it

profoundly affected discussions of national policy, strategy, and force levels by

the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The danger of a conflict in Indochina grew out of a revolt against French rule

in Vietnam that had begun in 1946. French forces, aided by those loyal to the

native Vietnamese government, sought without success to put down the rebellious Viet Minh (communist) guerrillas. By the end of 1952 the military situation

appeared stalemated. In reality, the chances of French victory were declining, as

the French people slackened in their willingness to continue the long struggle.20

The United States viewed sympathetically the French attempt to prevent

Vietnam from falling under communist rule. NSC 124/2, approved by the National

Security Council and the President in June 1952, provided that the United States

would furnish military assistance to French and loyal Vietnamese forces, but

would not commit its own forces unless Communist China entered the struggle.

In that case, the United States would intervene with naval ar-d air forces, provided it could obtain the approval of its major allies or of the United Nations.21

251
JCS and National Polio/

President Eisenhower continued this policy of aid without involvement.

Throughout 1953 and early 1954, his administration provided additional aid in

the form of cash or military equipment—principally aircraft, for which the French

forces had a particular need. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved these grants of

assistance, though usually with some reluctance inspired by evidence of the

ineptitude of French commanders in using their material resources. Simultaneously the administration pressed the French Government to improve its political strategy by making it clear to the people of Indochina that the French objective was self-government for the region rather tnan restoration of colonial rule.

Neither aid nor exhortation sufficed to prevent the French military position

from deteriorating. In November 1953 French forces seized an isolated position

at Dien Bien Phu, in northwestern Vietnam, confident that, in case of necessity,

it could be supplied by air. Soon it became apparent that the French command

had seriously miscalculated. The occupying troops were invested by Viet Minn

forces equipped with effective antiaircraft artillery. The outpost soon assumed a

political and psychological importance far beyond its military value. Meanwhile,

morale in the French homeland sagged further; voices were heard demanding

negotiations to end the war.

The problem of the weakening of French resolve was considered in NSC

5405, which the National Security Council approved on 14 January 1954.22In this

paper, the Council declared that, from the US viewpoint, there was no satisfactory alternative to French military victory, and that the United States should

make every effort to prevent France from ending the war on terms inconsistent

with US objectives. Negotiations for a ceasefire would be highly undesirable,

according to NSC 5405, until the French military position had improved. If

France did enter into discussions with her enemies, the United States should

insist on being consulted.23

On 25 January 1954 a conference of the foreign ministers of the three major

Western Powers and the Soviet Union opened in Berlin. Out of this meeting

came an agreement to hold a conference on Far Eastern problems at Geneva to

begin on 26 April. There was no doubt that the agenda of this conference would

include Indochina. Unless the French military situation could be retrieved, the

outcome of the conference might prove disastrous to the US position in Asia.

NSC 124/2 and NSC 5404 had contained provisions to meet the possibility

that the United States might participate in the defense of Indochina, but only as

a consequence of overt Chinese intervention. That the Viet Minh might alone

prove strong enough to force a French withdrawal, and that the United States

might be compelled to act with its own forces tc prevent such a contingency, had

been considered as early as June 1953. The Joint Strategic Plans Committee had

prepared a report that stressed the harmful consequences of the loss of Indochina and recommended that any US intervention, if it were undertaken, should

be on a scale large enough to insure success. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had taken

no action on this report except to note its contents, but its conclusions were

considered by the Planning Board in December 1953 in connection with the

development of NSC 177, the paper that became NSC 5405.

The Council considered the possibility of US intervention on 8 January 1954.

252
Far East: Indochina, Taiwan, Japan

Admiral Radford suggested a strike by US aircraft if the French faced defeat at

Dien Bien Phu. President Eisenhower left open the possibility of such action, but

he ruled out any use of US ground forces. In the end, the Council took no rction

except to instruct the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency

to consider means of aiding the French short of outright military intervention.24

The ultimate result, after several weeks of discussion, was another transfusion

of US aid in the form of aircraft and, still later, of maintenance personnel.

In preparation for the Geneva Conference, Secretary Dulles asked the Joint

Chiefs of Staff for military advice on the situation in Indochina. They replied that

there was no acceptable alternative to continuation of the war until a satisfactory

settlement could be obtained. They recommended that the Council consider the

possibility of US military intervention, alone or in concert with other nations.

The National Security Council discussed this recommendation on 25 March

1954. President Eisenhower laid down four conditions that must be met before

he would approve any US military action in Indochina. There must be, he said:

(1) a request for help from the Associated States of Indochina; (2) approval by the

United Nations; (3) cooperation of major US allies; and (4) prior Congressional

approval. The Council directed the Planning Board to prepare a report on the

possibility of US intervention.25

On 31 March, as the situation grew more critical at Dien Bien Phu, Admiral

Radford asked his JCS colleagues whether they favored an immediate offer of

assistance by US Naval Air and/or Air Force units. They all were opposed and

Admiral Radford, alone, supported such an offer. Several days later, the Service

Chiefs and the Commandant of the Marine Corps elaborated their positions.

General Ridgway was emphatic in his opposition, largely on the grounds that

such intervention would greatly increase the risk of general war. Admiral Carney and General Shepherd doubted that such assistance to the French would be

decisive. General Twining would give qualified support to US naval and air

intervention provided that the French granted sovereignty to the Associated

States, trained and organized indigenous forces under indigenous leadership,

accepted US command of air and naval elements under a French theater

commander, and accepted US leadership in troop training and in the use of

combat forces. Since it appeared unlikely that General Twining's conditions

would be met, Admiral Radford remained the only JCS member to favor US air

and naval intervention in Vietnam.26

Meanwhile, when the NSC Planning Board submitted its report, it did not

attempt to answer the question of whether or not to intervene. It merely recommended that the Council render a prompt decision, and set forth various actions

to be taken if intervention were decided upon: consultation with Congress,

preparations for mobilization, and establishment of a regional military and political

alliance linking the Western Big Three with the independent countries of Southeast Asia. When the Council discussed this report on 6 April 1954, the members

evidenced a reluctance to face the crucial question of military intervention.

Secretary Dulles reported that he had found little support for such a step on the

part of allied nations. The discussion swung to the proposal for a regional

alliance, which was already beginning to appear as an alternative to military

253

"~—-^n
JCS and National Polio/

intervention as a means of strengthening the West's bargaining position. In the

end, the Council decided that the United States should press this project while

seeking to obtain British support for US objectives in the Far East.27

During the next few weeks it became evident that the United Kingdom

would not cooperate in military action in Vietnam, at least until an effort had

been made to settle the conflict at Geneva. Discussions between Secretary Dulles

and the British Government, and conversations in London between Admiral

Radford and the British Chiefs of Staff, made this clear. Thus, one of the conditions for US intervention, as defined by President Eisenhower, did not obtain.

Secretary Dulles so informed Congressional leaders on 5 May, and the issue was

thus settled for all intents and purposes.

The opening of the Geneva Conference on 26 April 1954 did not at once end

the fighting. Hostilities continued even after the defenders of Dien Bien Phu

capitulated on 7 May. Three months of bargaining elapsed before a settlement

emerged, embodied in a set of agreements signed on 21 July 1954. Under its

terms, the hostile forces in Vietnam were to be regrouped on either side of a

demarcation line running along the 17th parallel—Viet Minh forces to the north,

those of the French Union to the south. There was to be a general election in

1956 to choose a government for the entire country. Cambodia and Laos, which

had also been the scene of hostilities, were included in the settlement. International commissions were to supervise the execution of the agreements.28

With these agreements, the Indochina crisis of 1954 receded into history. It

was not apparent at the time that the settlement had laid the groundwork for

greater difficulties in Vietnam in later years.

The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

In voting tentative approval on 6 April 1954 for a regional security organization in Southeast Asia, the National Security Council had planned that it

would include the United States, United Kingdom, France, Australia, New

Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines. The Associated States of Indochina—

Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos—had also been envisioned as potential members,

but their participation became impossible under the terms of the Geneva

settlement.

The projected organization took shape as a result of Anglo-American

cooperation. In June 1954 Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden conferred in Washington with President Eisenhower. The

conferees agreed that they would press forward with plans for collective defense

in Southeast Asia regardless of the outcome of the Geneva Conference, which

was still in progress. Immediately aftt r this meeting, the two governments established a Joint Study Group on Southeast Asia. The US membership was headed

by Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith. The Department of Defense

provided representatives, but none were drawn from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.**

In six meetings held between 7 and 17 July, the members of this group agreed

254

Ä*4*
K

Far East: Indochina, Taiwan, Japan

on most of the provisions of a collective security treaty for Southeast Asia. There

was some disagreement between the two parties over the membership of the

proposed organization. The British team urged that, before the treaty was

negotiated, an attempt should be made to obtain the participation, or at least the

acquiescence, of the members of the so-called "Colombo Plan"—India, Pakistan,

Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesia. The US view was that the organization should

be brought into being as soon as possible and that any attempt to obtain the

cooperation of these nations would only delay its inception.30

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the draft security treaty, although they

pointed out to the Secretary of Defense that the organization envisioned therein

would not meet the need for a larger Asian alliance such as they had recommended in their memorandum of 9 April. They warned that the United States

should make no commitment to provide military or economic assistance to the

organization or to deploy forces in support of it. They suggested also that the

Japanese Government be kept informed of the negotiations.31

Details of the proposed new organization were worked out in a conference

held in Manila in September. The prospective list of members was enlarged to

take in Pakistan, which accepted an invitation to attend, but the other Colombo

Plan members were not included. The final Southeast Asia Collective Defense

Treaty, signed on 8 September 1954, was essentially similar to the original US

draft. The signatories were the Western Big Three, Australia, New Zealand, and

three purely Asian nations: Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines. The parties pledged themselves to maintain and develop their capacity "to resist armed

attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without."

They agreed that, in case of armed attack in the treaty area, each member would

"act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."

If the territory, sovereignty, or political independence of any member were

threatened in any way other than by armed attack, the parties would consult on

the measures to be taken. The treaty area was defined as including Southeast

Asia, the entire territory of the Asian jgnatories, and the Southwest Pacific

south of latitude 21 degrees, 30 minuter north, a boundary that excluded Taiwan ard Hong Kong. A council was to be established to consider ways of

implementing the treaty. A protocol stipulated that the treaty provisions relating

to action in case of armed attack or other threat would be applicable also to

Cambodia, Laos, and ihe southern half of Vietnam. By a separate Pacific Charter,

signed at the same time, the eight member nations proclaimed their intention to

resist any attempt "to subvert their freedom or to destroy their sovereignty or

territorial integrity' and to cooperate in economic, social, and cultural matters.32

The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization created by the Manila Pact fell short

of the wieer Asian regional defense arrangement that the Joint Chiefs of Staff

had desired. Whether or not it would turn out to be the nucleus of a more

comprehensive organization remained to be determined by future events.

255
JCS and National Polio/

Taiwan: Chiang Kai-shek's Forces Unleashed

The island of Taiwan, lying approximately 100 miles off the coast of China,

had provided a refuge for Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist forces when

they fled the mainland after their defeat in 1949. The retention of this island in

friendly hands was a matter of great concern to the United States. Shortly after

the Korean War broke out, President Truman had ordered the US Seventh Fleet

to take Taiwan under its protection, and at the same time to prevent Chiang's

forces from launching attacks against the mainland.

By the beginning of 1953 Chiang's shattered forces had been reorganized

and, with US assistance, had grown much stronger. The survival of the Nationalist

regime no longer seemed precarious. Some of President Eisenhower's supporters contended that President Truman's order served as a mantle of protection for

the communists. They urged that the Nationalist forces be unleashed and left

tree to strike against the mainland as opportunity offered.33

Giving heed to these opinions, President Eisenhower lost no time in amending the 1950 order. On 2 February 1953, in his State of the Union address, he

declared that there was "no longer any logic or sense in a condition that required

the United States Navy to assume defensive responsibilities on behalf of the

Chinese Communists." Therefore, he announced, he was issuing instructions

"that the Seventh Fleet no longer be employed to shield Communist China."

But, he added, "this order implies no aggressive intent on our part."34

It soon became clear, however, that the new administration had no intention

of supporting any adventurist policy on the part of Chiang. The US Ambassador

in Taiwan, Mr. Karl Rankin, in notifying Chiang in advance of the President's

impending announcement, asked for and received an oral promise that the

Nationalists would undertake no significant attacks on communist territory without consulting the United States, through the chief of the US MAAG in Taipei.

The National Security Council decided on 8 April 1953 that CINCPAC should be

instructed to obtain a formal written promise on this matter, and that delivery of

jet aircraft en route to Taiwan under the mutual aid program would be suspended until Chiang complied. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had anticipated the

Council's action and had already instructed CINCPAC to cooperate with the

Ambassador in seeking the necessary assurance.35

On 23 April 1953 Ambassador Rankin received a note verbale containing the

required promise. The Nationalist Government agreed to consult the United

States before undertaking any offensive operations against the Chinese mainland that would "radically alter the pattern or tempo of the operations hitherto

undertaken." The meaning of the latter phrase was to be determined jointly by

the head of the US MAAG and the Chief of the Nationalist General Staff, General Chow Chih-jou.3

* Five days later General Vandenberg, speaking for the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the National Security Council that, in light of this

promise, aircraft shipments to Taiwan had been resumed.17

These actions left Chiang Kai-shek almost as securely leashed as before. His

only gain, if such it was, had been to move from a blanket prohibition against

256
Far East: Indochina, Taiwan, Japan

offensive action to a requirement to obtain US permission in advance of any such

step.

Military Aid for the Republic of China

The Nationalist forces were relatively small in comparison to those actually

or potentially available to the Chinese Communists, but they were of

considerable value in view of the general military weakness of noncommunist

Asia. Recognizing this fact, President Truman, with approval of Congress, had

initiated a program of military assistance to Chiang's government and had dispatched a Military Assistance Advisory Group to the island.38

At the beginning of 1953 Chiang Kai-shek had at his disposal an army made

up of 28 infantry divisions and four armored groups (12 battalions); a navy of 86

vessels; a marine corps of two brigades; and an air force consisting of four

groups of ftgher bombers, two of bombers, and two of transport aircraft, plus

one photographic reconnaissance squadron (a total of 8

!

/3 groups, or 25

.squadrons). The strength of these forces totalled approximately 478,400 men, of

which 375,000 were in the Army. These figures did not include the Combined

Service Force, a unified logistics command, nor did it include guerrillas and

irregulars. The entire military establishment was under the direction of the

Ministry of National Defense, which had its own joint military staff headed by

General Chow Chih-jou.39

The Nationalist forces were in process of being reorganized, consolidated,

and reequipped to make them more formidable even though somewhat smaller.

The US mutual defense assistance program for Nationalist China was designed

to facilitate this process. As a basis for the MDA program for FY 1954, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff in August 1953 recommended 21 infantry divisions (291,000 men),

82 ships, and an air force of the same size as then existing (25 squadrons) but

including six squadrons of fighter aircraft in place of an equivalent number of

bombers. For FY 1955 the joint Chiefs of Staff recommended the addition of ten

more vessels (patrol craft) for the navy and a squadron of all-weather interceptors for the air force. The Nationalists' own force objectives for FY 1954, which

included units not receiving MDAP support, were a 340,000-man army and a

navy of 206 vessels, of which 112 would be small landing craft (LCM/LCVP).40

NSC 146, the policy statement on Nationalist China drafted by the Planning

Board in March 1953, specified that military aid to the Nationalists would continue beyond FY 1954. A revised version NSC 146/1, set forth in some detail the

objectives of the assistance program. The intention was to develop forces that

would be able to undertake more effective raids against the Communist mainland;

would continue to represent a threat to Communist China and add significantly

to the strategic reserves potentially available to the free wcrld in the Far East;

would have an increased capability for the defense of Taiwan; and, if provided

with US air, naval, and logistic support, would be able to initiate Urge-scale

257

.. • >
JCS and National Policy

amphibious operations. By implication, then, these were the missions envisioned for Nationalist forces in US strategy. The costs of the aid program were

estimated in NSC 146/1 at $427.4 million, $345.8 million, and $311.7 million for

fiscal years 1954, 1955, and 1956 respectively—a total of over a billion dollars, as

compared with only $578.6 million for fiscal years 1951 through 1953.41

These cost figures drew attack when the National Security Council discussed

NSC 146/1 on 5 November 1953. Members of the Council, who less than a month

earlier had demurred at the projected size of the US military budget, were in no

mood to accept without question the idea of placing such sums at the disposal of

a foreign government. Some doubted that Chiang's forces were of any value.

President Eisenhower believed that it was desirable to strengthen the Nationalists' air and naval forces, but he criticized the existing aid program as based on

the fixed D-day concept discarded by his administration.42

Although the Council adopted NSC 146/1 (in a somewhat amended version,

NSC 146/2), it did so with the stipulation that the Department of Defense would

review the Taiwan aid program.43Secretary Wilson accordingly asked the Joint

Chiefs of Staff to submit new recommendations for Nationalist force levels.44

The Joint Chiefs of Staff studied the matter over the next two months. They

consulted CINCPAC, Admiral Felix B. Stump, and Major General William C.

Chase, USA, Chief of the MAAG on Taiwan, and considered two reports by

the Joint Strategic Plans Committee.45 Contrary to the hopes of the members of

the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that a larger,

and hence a more expensive, aid program was needed for Nationalist China.

They so advised Secretary Wilson on 18 January 1954. For the Nationalist army,

they proposed that the MDAP force basis be increased to 357,000 by inclusion of

various higher headquarters and technical services. They recommended 212

ships (including small landing craft) for the navy and an increase to three brigades (or the marine corps. All these objectives should be achieved by the end of

FY 1955 (or FY 1956 at the latest). For the air force, they recommended an

additional squadron of ail-weather fighters during FY 1956 (producing a total of

26 squadrons and 562 aircraft) and complete modernization, with jets and modern transports, by the end of FY 1957.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff foresaw that the administration might be unwilling

to allocate the funds necessary to support these forces. In that case, they

recommended, the missions envisioned for the Nationalists in NSC 146/2 should

be revised to adapt them to whatever forces couid be supported with the money

that was available.**

In transmitting the JCS proposals to the National Security Council. Secretary

Wilson explained that tentative guidelines for the FY 1955 and FY 1956 military

aid programs made it unlikely that money would be available to meet the JCS

goals for Nationalist China. He urged a review of the missions of Nationalist

forces.47 The Council accordingly decided on 4 February 1954 that the Department of Defense should review the relevant paragraph of NSC 14&2 and reconsider Nationalist force levels.4

* Referring this decision to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

on 12 February, Secretary Wilson suggested that they consider the possibility of

258
Far East: Indochina, Taiwan, Japan

a stretch-out of their proposed force goals or a diversion of money from other

programs.49

The review of Chinese Nationalist force goals was accomplished as part of a

broad reexamination of the entire MDA program in light of the New Look. The

Joint Chiefs of Staff in December 1953 had appointed an ad hoc committee to

make this reexamination. In a report submitted on 26 March 1954, embracing

recommendations for the MDA program through FY 1958, the committee proposed that the FY 1954 goals for Nationalist China, as approved by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff in August 1953 for the MDA program, be projected through FY

1958 with only minor changes. An aid program tied to these objectives, with a

scale of equipment tor Nationalist forces somewhat lower than originally planned,

would cost $494.9 million for the four years 1955-1958, according to the committee's estimate.50

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the committee's recommendations for

Nationalist China and included them without change in an amended version of

the report that they sent to the Secretary of Defense, with their approval, on 17

June 1954.5I Earlier, on 19 May, they had adopted the committee's proposed

Nationalist force bases in their recommendations for the FY 1956 MDA program,

which Secretary Wilson approved on 15 July 1954.52

On 27 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Wilson a memorandum

intended as the basis for an official response to the Council's request of 4 Februar)' 1954 for a review of Nationalist force levels. They characterized the ad hoc

committee's program for Nationalist China as the best attainable under the

circumstances, but asserted that the larger forces they had recommended in

January' 1954 were essential for accomplishment of the missions stated in NSC

146/2. They opposed any change in these missions or any diversion of funds

from other programs.*3

Before the Secretary of Defense acted on these recommendations, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff were called upon to evaluate two other proposals regarding the

size of Nationalist forces. Both had been devised by the Nationalist Government,

and both called for increases. In 1953 the Ministry of National Defense in Taipei

had drafted a proposal referred to as the "Kai Plan," which was intended to

enable Nationalist forces to undertake limited offensives against the mainland. It

called for an army of 41 divisions, an air force of 33 squadrons, and a navy

strengthened by the addition of 118 landing craft. All these objectives were to be

achieved by the end of calendar year 1955, at a cost (according to the Nationalists'

own estimate) of $1.344 billion, over and above the aid program already requested

for FY 1955.

Admiral Radford had seen this plan when he visited Taiwan in December

1953. The following month Foreign Minister George K. C. Yeh sent him a revised

copy, asking that it be passed on to President Eisenhower** Another copy was

forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff bv General Chase, who pronounced it

completely infeasible because of its cost and of the inflationary effects it would

have on Taiwan's economy. Admiral Stump concurred in this judgment.M

Pending execution of this plan, the Nationalists proposed to reorganize their

259
JCS and National Policy

28-division army into 24 divisions. They asked the United States to provide

support for all of these units, although the current MDA program was based on

only 21 divisions.56Foreign Minister Yen, seeking Adrmral Radford's approval

of this extra assistance, justified the request on the grounds that to reduce the

army below 24 divisions would adversel7 affect morale, since it would create an

impression that the Nationalist Government had abandoned hope of returning

to the mainland. The 24 divisions would be maintained at only 82 percent of

authorized strength, he continued, and hence there would be little or no increase

in manpower as compared with the 21 divisions currently projected.57

Admiral Radford referred the request to the Office of Military Assistance in

OSD. The reply prepared in that office was to the effect that no funds were

available to equip three more divisions. The head of the office, Vice Admiral

Arthur C. Davis, in returning this answer, pointed out that the 24 divisions need

not have full equipment, and he urged that the plan be approved.58 But General

Chase, whom Admiral Radford consulted, believed it was tactically unsound to

distribute 21 sets of divisional equipment among 24 divisions. He had already

told Chiang, he said, that he was agreeable to the 24-division plan provided that

no additional US aid was required.59

Admiral Radford then sent a tactful reply to Foreign Minister Yeh, expressing

interest in the plan but noting General Chase's reservations. He suggested that it

and the more ambitious Kai Plan be submitted to General Van Fleet, who would

visit Taiwan in the near future.*0

These exchanges had consumed the first half of 1954. In mid-July the 24-

division reorganization scheme and the Kai ?lan were formally referred to the

Joint Chiefs of Staff.**1 The Joint Strategic Plans Committee pointed out that both

envisioned forces larger than those thought necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to Nationalist forces under NSC 146/2. No consideration should

be given to the support of Nationalist forces larger than those recommended in

March 1954 by the JCS ad hoc committee on military assistance.*2

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved these conclusions on 17 September. Without formally consulting Secretary Wilson, they informed Admiral Stump and

General Chase that they had noted the two plans and contemplated no changes

in the approved force bases for FYs 1955 and 1956.*3

General Van Fleet had meanwhile completed his survey of Chinese Nationalist military forces and submitted proposals of his own. He recommended 24

divisions, but suggested that half of them be skeletonized during peacetime He

proposed that the Nationalist navy be limited to 83 ships and the air force be

reduced to 14 squadrons. In his view, Nationalist China and other noncommunist nations cf Asia should rely on the United States to furnish most of the naval

and air forces in the Far East.64

Secretary Wilson had as yet taken no official action on Chinese Nationalist

force levels, except to approve those that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended as part of the FY 1956 MDA program. On 21 September 1954 he asked

the Joint Chiefs of Staff again to review Nationalist objectives in light of General

Van Fleet's conclusions. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unable to comply tor

some months, and there was no further discussion of the subject during 1954.

260
far East: Indochina, Taiwan, Japan

The attention of the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff was

drawn toa dangerous situation developing in the Taiwan Strait, which was to

occupy much of their attention in the succeeding months.

Threat to the Offshore Islands WThen Chiang Kai-shek and his forces withdrew to Taiwan in 1949, they

were able to retain control of three small groups of islands lying withina

few miles of the mainland. These were the Tachen, the Matsu, and the Quemoy

(also called Kinmen or Chinmen) Islands. The first of these lies approximately

200 miles north of Taiwan's northern tip; the other two are located in the Taiwan

Strait, opposite the west coast of Taiwan. Collectively, they were often referred

to as the offshore islands.*

6 Despite their minuscule size (the largest, Quemoy, is

about 11 miles long),&

;

r proximity to the mainland made them useful for

intelligence collection,f -. rada

r

installations, and for launching raids against the

mainland.

67

These islands were not under US protection. In 1952 the Joint Chiefs of Staff

and the Department of State had agreed that the United States would encourage

the Nationalists to defend thtm, butw juld not commit its own forces for the

purpose.

6

* This policy was not altered by President Eisenhower's decision of2

February 1953 regarding the Taiwan Strait, and was, in fact, made explicit in

NSC 146/2. On the other hand, another small archipelago, the Penghu (or

Pescadores), approximately 30 miles west of Taiwan, was considered essential to

the security of Taiwan, according to NSC 146/2, and would be defended by the

united States.

6

*

Admiral Radford, while serving as CINCPAC, had sought without success to

persuade the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the offshore islands were integral to

Taiwan's defense, He continued to put forth this view after he became Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His colleagues, however, would go so far onW as to

agree that these islands were important to US security and to include in the US

aid program enough landing and patrol craft to enaUe Chiang to strengthen

their defenses.*

The Nationalist Government also desired the United States to extend its

protection to the offshore islands. In March and April 1954 *he Nationalist Ministry of National Defense warned of a possible attack w\ these istends and asked

the United States to assist in their defense if necessary.

Tt

The administration

took no action at that time, but the matter reached the agenda of the National

Security Council on 27 May. when the Director of Central Intelligence declared

that the Tachens were in danger of attack, President Eisenhower authorised

elements of the US Seventh Fleet during their regular patrol of Taiwanese waters.

I to pay friendly visits to these islands/^

As 1954 advanced, the threat to the offshore islands assumed more substance

In August 1954, Foreign Minister Chou En-lai of Communist China declared that

Taiwan should be liberated as an exercise of China's sovereignty/"* !t could be

261

mr*m.
JCS and National Policy

assumed that Mberation would be preceded by an attack on the islands near the

mainland. On 24 August Secretary of State Dulles declared that the United

States would be justified in defending some of the offshore islands. He did not

indicate which ones he had in mind.74

Exactly what the United States should do if the offshore islands were attacked

became an issue in the National Security Council on 18 August 1954. The members called on the Department of Defense for a report on th»s question.75 Acting

Secretary Anderson referred the matter to the joint Chiefs of Staff, who in turn

passed it to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee.76

In a report submitted on 31 August, the Committee concluded that the

offshore islands were not essential to the defense of Taiwan but that the political

and psychological effects of their loss would be highly detrimental to the US

strategic position. The members therefore urged that the United States aid the

Nationalists to prevent the loss of certain selected offshore islands, which they

did not name. This recommendation was approved by Admiral Radford, Admiral Carney, and General Twining, with the stipulation that any US assistance in

defending the islands should be limited to air and naval action. It was opposed

by General Ridgway, who believed that the islands were militarily unimportant

to the United States and that the political and psychological considerations were

beyond the purview of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These views were sent to Secretary Wilson on 7 September 1954.n

On the following day the issue assumed immediate relevance. Communist

artillery on the mainland began shelling the Quemoy Islands. For a time it was

feared thai an invasion mij;ht be impending. S*.»cretary Dulles, then in Manila to

assist in the conclusion of the Southeast Asia Treaty, cabled his view that Quemoy should be defended it possible and asked the advice of the Department of

Defense.n

As a result, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were called upon for another report,

which they submitted on I! September. Once again they split. The majority

(including General Shepherd in this instance) believed that Quemoy, though not

essential to the defense of Taiwan, should and COUlc be defended with US air

and naval help, provided the responsible US commander were given freedom of

action to strike when and where necessary. General Ridgway denied any military value to Quemoy, and warned that a successful defence would require US

troops—at least a full division/"*

Admiral Radford presented the views of the JCS members to the National

Security Council on 12 September at a meeting held in Denver, where the President was vacationing. Secretary Dulles was present, having returned from Manila.

Perhaps as a result of his discussions with other representatives at Manila,

he now threw his weight against military' action. Instead, the Secretary suggested that ;he offshore islands be neutralised under a UN declaration, an^ that

the Unitec States explore this possibility with Nationalist China and other friendly

powers. President Eisenhower favored this suggestion and asked him to investigate its possibility m On 6 October 1954 Secretary Dulles reported to th* Council

that the neutralization plan appeared feasible.*1

262
Far East: Indochina, Taiwan, Japan

Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China

The principal obstacle to neutralization of the offshore islands was likely to

be the objection of the Chinese Nationalists, to whom such a step would

probably appear as a retreat in the face of communist aggression. But it was

possible that the United States might win Chiang Kai-shek's consent by offering

at the same time to enter into a mutual defense treaty. The Nationalist Government had been seeking such a pact since the conclusion of a similar one between

the United States and South Korea in August 1953. Secretary of State Dulles had

opposed it, however, on the grounds that it might involve the United States in

hostilities with Communist China.82

The offer of a mutual defense treaty as a quid pro quo for Chiang's acceptance

of the neutralization proposal was suggested by President Eisenhower. Rep, »rting this fact to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Dulles indicated his impression that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already approved the conclusion of such a

treaty. However, when Secretary Wilson sought their advice, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff decided on 13 October that, from a military viewpoint, the status quo in

relations with the Nationalists was preferable to a formal security pact.83

This advice was not taken; the administration proceeded with plans for a

mutual security treaty. The subject came up for discussion in the National Security Council on 28 October 1954. Secretary Dulles presented his views with

regard to the treaty and its relation to US strategic policy in the Far East. He

pointed out that the US intention had always been to defend the nation's interests without provoking war. "We want peace," he said, "so long as this does not

involve the sacrifice of our vital interests or fundamental moral principles." The

actions taken by the United States since 1951, he continued, reflected this general approach: the conclusion of defensive treaties with Australia, New Zealand,

lapan, and South Korea; the termination of the Korean War; and the acceptance

of the Geneva settlement in Indochina as the alternative to unilateral US

intervention. Turning to US policy toward the two Chinas, he found it essentially sound but in need of some revision. He therefore submitted the following

specific recommendations:

1. The United States should conclude a mutual security treaty with the

Nationalists, covering Taiwan and the Pescadores but not the offshore

islands. Such a treaty would provide a sounder legal basis for the US

commitment to defend Taiwan, which now rested solely upon President

Truman's 1950 order to the Seventh Fleet.

2. This treaty should be strictly defensive in nature. "It would not be consistent with our basic policy of non-provocation of war," said Mr. Dulles,

"were the United States to commit itself to the defense of Formosa, thus

making it a 'privileged sanctuary,' while it was used, directly or indirectly,

for offensive operations against the Chicoms."

3. The immediate threat to the offshore islands should be reterred to the

United Nations, without prejudice to the question of the ultimate disposition of these islands.84

263

;
JCS and National Policy

The Secretary's emphasis on the defensive nature of the treaty aroused the

concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who were present at the meeting. Despite

their opposition, the President tentatively approved Mr. Dulles' recommendations, subject to reconsideration at a special meeting on 2 November, at which

time the JCS views would receive a fuller hearing.85

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, or at least the majority of them, viewed this action

as an ill-considered alteration of the policy embodied in NSC 162/2—a policy,

they recalled, that had sought to recapture for the United States the initiative in

the struggle with the communist world. They foresaw disastrous effects on the

morale of the Nationalist forces if hopes of returning to the mainland were

thwarted by the proposed treaty. Over the next few days, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff exerted themselves in preparing for the next NSC meeting, at which they

hoped for a reversal of the President's decision.86

In the end, their effort failed. The National Security Council heard the views

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 2 November 1954, then reaffirmed the decision of

28 October.87 This action was in keeping with others taken by the Council about

the same time, when the members rebuffed the desire of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

für a more forcefully worded statement of basic national security policy.88

A draft of the mutual security treaty was sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for

comment on 10 November. By its terms, each nation would agree that an armed

attack on the territories of either party would endanger its own peace and safety.

The territories of the Republic of China were defined as including Taiwan, the

Penghu, and such other territories as might be determined by mutual agreement.

By an attached exchange of notes, the Nationalists would agree that any use of

force on their part, other than emergency defensive action, would be a matter of

joint agreement. In other words, the United States would be consulted before

any offensive was launched.89

The Joint Chiefs of Staff offered no objection to the treaty except for one

article that specified that US forces stationed in and around Taiwan would be

for purposes of defense. Feeling that such language would amount to an invitation to the communists to seize the offshore islands, they preferred to say "for

the purposes of this treaty."90

Before these comments could reach the Department of State, Secretary Dulles

and Foreign Minister Yeh, who had come to Washington for the purpose, signed

the treaty on 2 December 1954. The final text was identical with that sent the

Joint Chiefs of Staff.91 Nonetheless, Secretary Wilson forwarded the JCS views to

the Department of State on 20 December. Secretary Dulles, in a reply on 5

January 1955, apologized for the premature signature of the treaty; he had thought

that the Department of Defense had already given informal approval. However,

he felt that no harm had been done; the phrase questioned by the Joint Chiefs of

Staff could be construed to provide as much latitude as was required in deploying US forces.93

264

P
Far East: Indochina, Taiwan, Japan

Crisis in the Taiwan Strait

1

/-"

The substance of the NSC decisions of 28 October and2 November 1954 was

written into NSC 5429/5, which provided that the United States would seek

to preserve the status of the offshore islands through UN action and would encourage the Nationalists to defend these islands (even to the extent of providing

military assistance for the purpose), but would not commit US forces. No assistance or encouragement was to be given the Nationalists to engage in offensive

actions, "except in response to Chinese Communist provocation judged adequate in each case by the President."

The same provision appeared in NSC 5441,a revised policy paper on Nationalist China prepared by the Planning Board in December 1954. The Joint Chiefs

of Staff found NSC 5441 acceptable.

94 Before the Council could act on it, however,

a new alarm arose that called for another reconsideration of policy.

On 10 January 1955, Communist Chinese bombers struck heavily at the Tachen

islands and inflicted severe damage. The Nationalists at once proposed to attack

the mainland in reprisal. Theretofore the US commanders in the theater—

CINCPAC and the Chief of the MAAG—could have authorized such action, but

under NSC 5429/5 the request had to be referred to the President. Admiral

Stump forwarded it with his endorsement and witha recommendation that

Chiang's forces be granted more leeway in case of future attacks from the mainland. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this recommendation, and the President

showed himself sympathetic to it.95

The National Security Council considered the matter on 13 January 1955. The

members adopteda carefully worded revision of the relevant paragraph of NSC

5429/5 that would allow the Nationalists more freedom without granting them

carte blanche to assume the offensive. It specified that the United States should

not

agree to Chinese Nationalist offensive actions against mainland Communist

Gnna, except under circumstances approved by the President [but should] agree

to Chinese Nationalist actions against Communist China which are prompt and

clear retaliation againsta Chinese Communist attack; provided such retaliation

is against targets of military significance which meet U.S. criteria as to feasibility

and chance of success and which are selected with due consideration for the

undesirability of provoking further Chinese Communist reaction against Formosa [Taiwan] and the Pescadores [Penghu].*6

At the same time, the Council incorporateda similar statement into NSC 5441,

then adopted it as NSC 5503.

97

The Council did not specify who was to determine whethera proposed

Nationalist action met the new criteria. Doubtless with the approval of the

President, Admiral Carney invested Admiral Stump with this authority.

98 By

that time the planned retaliation for the attack of 10 January 1955 had lost all

value.

The new policy was soon put to the test. On 18 January the Chinese

Communists, aftera preliminary air and artillery assault, landed troops on

265

MÜÜÜI
4i

JCS and National Policy

Ichiang, an islet west of the Tachens. The small garrison there was soon

overwhelmed. Nationalist forces struck back with air attacks against ships in

nearby mainland ports. At the same time, however, the Nationalists foresaw

that they would be unable by their own efforts to prevent the communists from

moving on to seize the Tachens. They asked the United States to lend assistance

from the Seventh Fleet to defend those islands,

The National Security Council rejected this plea on 21 January 1955. The

members decided that the United States would not defend the Tachen Islands,

but would assist the Nationalists in evacuating and redeploying the garrison

there. At the same time, in an important change of policy, the Council decided

that Quemoy and Matsu would be defended against attacks that were believed to

presage an assault upon Taiwan and the Penghu. The President would seek

Congressional approval for this policy in the form ofa joint resolution granting

him freedom of action in defending Taiwan and the Penghu. The Council reaffirmed the conviction that the entire question of the offshore islands should be

turned over to the United Nations." A resolution drafted in accord with the Council's decision was sent to Congress on 24 January 1955. It would authorize the President

to employ the armed forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the

specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa (Taiwan] and the Pescadores [Penghu] against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and

protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly

hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or

appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

It was to expire when the President determined that the peace and security or

the area were reasonably assured. In sending the resolution to Congress, Mr.

Eisenhowerw lined of the possibility of an attack ^i\ Taiwan in the near future,

but at the same time hinted at the impending evacuation of the Tachens. The

United States, he said, should be ready to assist Chiang Kai-shek's government

to redeploy and consolidate its forces, some of which were scattered throughout the smaller offshore islands as a result of historical rather than military

reasons.

100

Congressional action was swift. The House of Representatives approved the

resolution on 24 January and the Senate on 28 January.

101 Two weeks later, with

the protection and assistance of the US Seventh Fleet, the Tachen garrison,

consisting of both guerrillas and regulars, was evacuated, and the islands were

promptly seized by communist forces.

102

In succeeding weeks the crisis eased. The threat to Quemoy and Matsu failed

to materialize, and the President had no occasion to use the authority granted

him by the Congressional resolution. Meanwhile the UN Security Council, at

US instigation, sought to arrangea formal cease-fire in the Taiwan Strait—an

effort that was opposed by the Soviet Union and was contemptuously rejected

by Communist China.

103

26ü
Far East: Indochina, Taiwan, Japan

The Problem of Japanese Rearmament The state of war between the United States and Japan had been ended by

a

peace treaty signed on8 September 1951. At the same time, the two nations

concludeda mutual security treaty by which the United States received permission to retain forces in Japan and promised in return to defend that nation.104

The mutual security treaty underscored the strategic importance of Japan in

US thinking. In NSC 125/2, approved on7 August 1952, the National Security

Council declared that the United States would fight to prevent Japanese territory

from passing into hostile hands. The general objective of US policy toward

Japan, according to NSC 125/2, was to createa stable, prosperous nation capable

ultimately of defending itself.

105

In approving NSC 125/2, President Truman directed the appropriate departments to prepare a program for carrying it out. A draft of this program was

circulated on 30 March 1953. After endorsement by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and

revision by «.he National Security Council, it was approved in June as NSC

125/6.

l06

It set forth various actions intended to strengthen Japan's attachment to

the Western alliance, such as assistance for Japanese trade relations and removal

of sources of friction between Japan and other countries. Action along these

lines was undertaken by the Eisenhower administration during the next few

months.

107

Another action called for in NSC 125/6—one that had behind ita history of

interdepartmental controversy—was the return of the Amami Islands, in the

northern part of the Ryukyu chain, to Japanese rule. The treaty of peace with

Japan had authorized the United States to administer the Ryukyus pending the

establishment ofa UN trusteeship, which did not materialize. The Department

of State had adopted the position that the United States should hand back the

Amamis, which had especially close ties with Japan, asa gesture of good will.

The Department of Defense opposed this plan on the grounds that US security

interests required retention of all the Ryukyus in US hands.

11

* The National

Security Council tentatively adopted the State Department recommendation on

25 June 1953, witha stipulation fora subsequent review before implementation,

which, however, was never held. Secretary of State Dulles visited Tokyo in

August 1953 and announced the decision.

lw

As finally stated in NSC 125/6, the US intention to relinquish civil administration over the Amami group was "subject to agreement with Japan on U. S.

military rights in this group." The desired rights were defined by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff to include unlimited access to the islands and freedom to construct any military installations considered essential to defense of the US base at

Okinawa.

no

In the formal transfer agreement, signed on 24 December 1953,

Japan recognized that the Amami Islands borea unique relationship to Far

Eastern defense and agreed to give consideration to those requirements that th?

United States believed necessary to preserve, strengthen and facilitate the defense

of the remaining islands of the Ryukyu group.

1u

Actions such as these could be expected to exert favorable influence on

267 III • i
JCS and National Policy

Japanese public and official opinion and thus to contribute toward the US objective of a Japan friendly to the West. But another objective of US policy, affirmed

in both NSC 125/2 and NSC 125/6, was far more difficult to attain. This was the

creation of a Japanese capacity for self-defense. The obstacle to attainment of this

objective was in large part a US creation. In the early days of the postwar

occupation of Japan, the United States had given its blessing to a new Japanese

constitution intended to forestall permanently any revival of militarism. It provided that Japan would "forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation"

and that "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be

maintained."112

The harsh light of the cold war soon revealed the unwisdom of this sweeping renunciation. Interpreted strictly, the Japanese constitution presented the

United States with the choice of retaining its forces in Japan indefinitely or

abandoning that nation to the tender mercies of her Soviet and Chinese Communist neighbors. To amend these provisions, in the state of Japanese public opinion after World War II, was out of the question. It was necessary to find a

loophole in the constitution as written. However unequivocal the language of

that document, it could hardly be construed as forbidding the maintenance of

forces needed to maintain order inside the country. The creat'jn of land and sea

forces disguised as police was a subterfuge that had already been used by the

Soviet Union in her East German satellite.

With US assistance, Japan's pro-Western government established a National

Police Reserve, with a strength of 75,000 men. In 1952, the organization was

renamed National Safety Force; it was enlarged to 110,000 men, and a Maritime,

or Coastal, Safety Force was established, 7,500 strong. Both were placed under

the direction of a newly cieated National Safety Agency. The United States

supplied equipment on a loan basis, since Japan had not yet established her

eligibility for grants of military assistance.113

The joint Chiefs of Staff anticipated that the nascent Japanese forces would

be expanded to enable Japan to assume a rightful share of her own defense

responsibilities, and that Japan would soon be made eligible for US military aid.

In submitting recommendations in October 1952 for the FY 1954 Mutual Defense

Assistance Program, :!"? Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a Japanese ground

force of 300,000 men in ten divisions, a naval force of 75 vessels and 12 antisubmarine patrol aircraft, and an air force of 27 squadrons.114 The ten-division goal

was written into NSC 125/2. The US objectives had not, however, been formally

discussed with the Japanese Government.

The air force question was particularly sensitive, since it would be difficult to

argue that aircraft were needed for internal security. In October 1952, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff suggested to CINCFE, General Mark W. Clark, that the time had

come to approach the government of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida regarding

the establishment of a Japanese air force. General Clark concurred after consulting Ambassador Robert D. Murphy.115

The Joint Chiefs of Staff then drafted instructions to General Clark to discuss

with the Japanese Government the general subject of Japanese rearmament, and

specifically the question of an air force. On 9 January 1953 they submitted these

268
"• ..,". ■■■V,-.. -.. -.:--.rv-:}-»---V..W.-:->'.~;..^-.'.^V.'*U.--. •. -. - : . ■■

Far East: Indochina, Taiwan, Japan

instructions to the Secretary of Defense for approval.116 The Secretary in turn

passed them to the Department of State for coordination. Soon after the change

of administration, the Secretary of State asked that the JCS instructions be

amended to authorize General Clark, in conjunction with the Ambassador, to

introduce the subject of a formal military assistance agreement if the occasion

appeared propitious. The Joint Chiefs of Staff dispatched the amended instructions to General Clark on 10 March 1953.n?

Several months passed before General Clark and Ambassador John M.

Allison, who replaced Ambassador Murphy in May 1953, judged it propitious to

approach the Japanese Government. The political climate in the country was

unfavorable to rearmament. Elections to the Diet in April 1953 had strengthened

the parties opposed to such a course. 1W Two months later, when the Director of

the National Safety Agency, Mr. Tokutaro Kimura, admitted that he was considering a five-year plan to increase the National Safety Force to 200,000 men, so

much criticism ensued that Mr, Kimura was constrained to insist that he had

been misquoted by the press.119

The military assistance agreement proved the least difficult of the matters in

question. Negotiations for this purpose formally began in Tokyo on 15 July 1953,

after the Japanese Government asked and received assurances that such an

agreement would not require Japan to send troops abroad or to subordinate

economic stability to rearmament.120 Meanwhile General Clark had told the

Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Deputy Director of the National Safety Agency had

tentatively agreed to discuss the question of Japanese air defense. But General

Clark believed it inadvisable at that time to bring up the question ot a separate

air force.121

While awaiting the outcome of negotiations in Tokyo, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

began a study of ultimate force goals for Japan. In May 1953 Secretary Wilson

asked them for recommendations on this matter, and also for comment on the

possibility of an early increase in the National Safety Force beyond its authorized

strength of four divisions—a matter of immediate importance in pl*nn»ng the FY

1954 mutual security program.122 Dealing first with the second r* these requests,

the Joint Strategic Plans Committee submitted a split report on 29 June. The

Army member recommended that the United States seek an increase in the

National Safety Force to six divisions in FY 1954. The other members thought

that this question should be considered only in connection with overall Japanese

force goals.123

The Joint Chiefs of Staff sought the advice of General Clark, whose reply

gave his assessment that the present Japanese Government was weak and evasive concerning its responsibilities for defense. He believed, and the Ambassador agret that it might accept a small increase in FY 1954, but warned that the

decision vvouid be based on local considerations and political intangibles,,24 The

Joint Chiefs of Staff left the matter in abeyance and turned to th* problem of the

Japanese military establishment as a whole.

Massive increases in the infant Japanese military services had meanwhile

been proposed by US planners On 25 May 1953, the Chief of Naval Operations

submitted a plan designed to convert the Coastal Safety Force into an effective

269
Mi

JCS and National Policy

navy in all but name. He recommendeda fleet of four light aircraft carriers, three

antiaircraft cruisers, 105 destroyers or destroyer escorts, 50 large minesweepers,

and unspecified numbers of small minesweeping and patrol craft and of coastal

submarines for training, plus 10 ASW patrol squadrons of 12 aircraft each.

125

Several weeks later, CINCFE proposed that the National Safety Force be increased

to 348,000 men in 15 risions, plusa reserve of approximately 73,000. This

increase would be accompanied bya major reorganization; the divisions, then

organized ona US model with an authorized strength of 15,200, would be cut

back to 12,022 each and streamlined to fit them for their defensive mission.

126

Recommendations drafted by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, sent to the

Joint Chiefs of Staff on1 August 1953, endorsed both of these plans for the

existing safety forces. At the same time, the Committee recommended an Air

Safety Force of 36 squadrons (771 aircraft), to be composed of 27 squadrons of

fighters, fighter bombers, and light bombers; three of tactical reconnaissance

aircraft; and six of transports. The objective for the ground force should be

reached by1 October 1956; the goals for the other services by the end of FY 1960.

The question of an immediate increase in the National Safety Force was

unimportant, in the Committee's view. The US objective should be to induce

the Japanese to commit themselves to the ultimate goals listed in the JSPC

report.

127

While this report was on the JCS agenda, Secretary of State Dulles made his

trip to Tokyo, in the course of which he undertook to induce the Japanese

Government to adopta faster pace of rearmament. According to press reports,

he pointed to South Korea, where the government had set its sights ona force of

20 divisions although its population was less thana quarter of Japan's. Prime

Minister Yoshida, however, insisted that it was impossible at that time for Japan

to raise more than four divisions.

128

The Joint Chiefs of Staff took account of Mr. Dulles' fruitless appeal when

they reviewed the JSPC proposals. Since the Japanese were unable or unwilling

at that time to move beyond four divisions, was it desirable for the United States

to press for an ultimate goal of 15 divisions instead of ten? Another troubling

aspect of the JSPC report was the inclusion of cruisers and carriers in the Coastal

Safety Force. What effect would this have upon opinion in neighboring countries with memories of recent Japanese aggression?

In sending the JSPC report to CINCFE for review on 14 August 1953, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff asked particularly for his comment on these two matters. At the

same time, they stressed that Japanese force goals must be realistic in terms of

costs and support capabilities. Pending their final decision, they authorized

CINCFE to use, as planning targets, their earlier figures for land and air forces

(ten divisions and 27 squadrons), and for the naval force, 279 ships of various

types, plus 8,000 tons of small craft and seven patrol squadrons.

Two months later General John t. Hull, USA, who had replaced General

Clark as CINCFE, gave his views. He endorsed the goals for the land and air

forces, which he believed could be attained by 195d. He opposed inclusion of

carriers or cruisers in the naval force, but recommended addition of several

types not included in the JSPC report (LSTs, minelayers, and supply ships), as

270
Far East: Indochina, Taiwan, Japan

well as allowance for variation in the relative numbers of destroyers and destroyer

escorts. These goals, he believed, represented the minimum required to defend

Japan after US forces were withdrawn. 13°

The Japanese Government had meanwhile been proceeding with its own

plans for expanding it forces. The political climate for rearmament improved in

September 1953, when Prime Minister Yoshida and the leader of the second

largest pro-Western party, Mr. Mamoru Shigemitsu, announced that they had

reached agreement that Japan's forces should be strengthened and that legislative authority should be sought (without a constitutional amendment) for the

maintenance of forces for defense against external as well as internal attack.131

The National Safety Agency plan, the existence of which had been injudiciously revealed to the press a few months earlier, was made available to CINCFE

in September 1953 before the Japanese Government officially approved it.132

Under this plan, the National Safety Force would rise to a uniformed strength of

200,000 men, consisting of ten divisions (of two different sizes, containing 12,000

and 9,000 men respectively), an airborne regiment, and tank and artillery groups,

plus an antiaircraft force of 13,000 men. The Coastal Safety Force would consist

of 188 vessels—including 18 frigates and 50 small landing craft lent by the United

States in 1952—totalling 141,200 tons, with a manpower strength of 35,500. No

cruisers or carriers were envisioned for this force. The Air Safety Force, with a

complement of 39,560 men, would include 695 combat and transport aircraft

(including 139 ASW patrol planes) and 624 others: helicopters, trainers, and light

reconnaissance and liaison. The number of units was not specified. The total

uniformed strength would be 275,060 personnel.

All targets were to be reached by 31 March 1959, which would be the end of

the Japanese fiscal year (JFY) 1958. During the first year (1954), the National

Safety Force would increase to 130,000 and the Coastal Safety Force to 17,000,

and the air force would be established with 9,320 men, though it would not

acquire combat aircraft in appreciable numbers until 1955.

The total cost of the program was estimated at 1,382.9 billion yen

(approximately $3.7 billion at current exchange rates).133 Of this amount, Japan

would contribute 837 billion yen; the rest, it was assumed, would be provided by

the United States under the MDA program. The total share paid by the United

States, however, would be increased as a result of a substantial indirect US

contribution. An administrative agreement between the United States and Japan,

signed in 1952 to supplement the mutual security treaty, had provided that

Japan would furnish facilities, areas and rights of way needed by US forces in

that country (compensating owners and suppliers as necessary), and would also

make a direct contribution of Japanese currency in the amount of $155 million for

the purchase of transportation and other services and supplies by US forces.1**

The Japanese plan assumed that Japan's contribution under this agreement woulu

be sharply reduced from the current figure of 62 billion yen.13*

From a US viewpoint, two objections to the National Safety Agency plan

(perhaps somewhat contradictory) could be envisioned. The force goals were far

too tow—the total manpower was below that recommended in 1952 by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff for the National Safety Force alone—and the costs to the United

271

-^^^^^^^w
JCS and National Policy

States would be considerable. Anticipating US resistance, Prime Minister Yoshida

in October 1953 sent a special envoy, Mr. Hayato Ikeda, a former Minister of

Finance, to Washington to discuss the plan with administration officials.

In the course of these discussions, Mr. Ikeda explained that the plan was

based on the assumption that US air and naval forces would remain in Japan

indefinitely. It could not be put into execution without US assistance, he

continued, but no amendment of the Japanese constitution would be required.

Members of the joint Staff, who participated in the talks, criticized the plan as

inadequate. Mr. Ikeda indicated in reply that larger force goals would require

very careful preparation of public opinion, as well as additional US assistance.136

In the end, the conferees agreed only that stronger Japanese defense forces

were called for and that US assistance for this purpose would be necessary.

Specific agreement on details was postponed pending further discussions to be

held in Tokyo. The United States also undertook to withdraw its forces from

Japan "as the Japanese forces develop the capability to defend their country."137

During the Washington discussions, Secretary Wilson had sent a resume of

the plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asking their opinion whether, if carried out,

it would permit the complete withdrawal of US forces. The loint Chiefs of Staff

replied on 24 November 1953 that it would at best allow only a partial withdrawal.13

*

During a tour of the Far East Command in October 1953, General Ridgway

received from Prime Minister Yoshida a full copy of the plan, with a letter

indicating that the government now planned some increase in the stated

objectives. General Ridgway left the plan with General Hull, who, after studying

it, decided that it was inadequate. In December 1953 General Ridgway sent the

plan and the Yoshida letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommending that they

be studied by a JCS committee.13*

Some indication of the size of the increases that the Prime Minister had in

mind emerged early in December 1953, when Ambassador Allison began negotiations in Tokyo aimed at reaching agreement in connection with the formulation

of the Japanese budget for the fiscal year beginning 1 April 1954. The Japanese

were now thinking of a Coastal Safety Force of 150,000 tons and an air force of

1,500 planes They expected to spend between 87 and 92 billion yen for their

armed forces—an impressive increase over the 61.4 billion in the current year. A

planned contribution of 57 billion yen to US forces under the terms of the

administrative agreement would bring the total defense budget to 144-149 billion yen.

Ambassador Allison advised the State Department that he considered it useless to try to persuade the Japanese to accept the ultimate force goals that the

United States desired. Rather the objective should be to obtain ehe largest possible increases in the immediate fuSure. He suggested that the United States press

for additions of 50,000 men to the National Safety Force during each of the next

two fiscal years, instead of the 20,000 called for under the Japanese plan.

Alternatively, »he United States might accept increases of 30,000 in JFY 1954 and

40,000 in JFY 1955 in exchange for an agreement to enter into arrangements im

combined planning. General Hull concurred in this opinion140

272
Far East: Indochina, Taiwan, Japan

The Japanese five-year plan, the views of Ambassador Allison and General

Hull, and the Japanese attitude as revealed during negotiations were considered

by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee in the revised recommendations on Japanese force levels that they submitted on 17 December 1953. The JSPC members

modified their earlier proposals in the direction suggested by General Hull in

October. As for the current negotiations, they recommended adoption of the

smaller personnel increases mentioned by Mr. Allison, but urged larger air and

naval goals. They recommended that ships for the Maritime Safety Force be

constructed in Japan as far as possible, with US financial assistance if necessary.

(The original Japanese plan had called for the addition of 27,800 tons of naval

strength during JFY 1954, with 20,750 tons to be supplied by the Uiuted States

and only 7,050 tons constructed in Japan.) However, for training purposes, they

suggested that the United Status provide eight vessels on loan: two destroyers,

two destroyer escorts, one submarine, and three minesweepers.141

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the JSPC recommendations on 21 December 1953 and forwarded them to the Secretary of Defense.142 On 29 December

Assistant Secretary Nash notified »ne Joint Chiefs of Staff that they had been

approved. He enclosed a copy of the State Department's instructions to Ambassador Allison directing him and General Hull to press the negotiations to a

conclusion, obtaining the best possible Japanese program for the coming year.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff at once notified GNCFE of the approved force goals.I43

These goals may be recapitulated as follows:

National Safety Force: 348,000 men in 15 divisions and 40 AAA

battalions, plus a reserve of 57,400 men for combat and 15,456 for service

units (total 72,856).

Coastal Safety Force: 30 destroyers, 75 destroyer escorts (with allowance, however, tc: variations in the relative numbers of these two), 50

large mine-sweepers, 4 minelayers, 2 LSTs, 3 "supply mother" ships; a

large number of small ASW, minesweeping, ana patrol craft; a small

number of submarines for training purposes; all in addition to the 18

frigates and 50 LSSLs already transferred under the 1952 agreement; plus

10 ASW patrol squadrons (120 aircraft).

Air Safety Force: 36 squadrons with 771 aircraft as follows:

Type t* Atfcntfl fyuadfzvto Amts

e

i

§

3

m

m

ISO

%

*

r ighlrr*-tntrfirptor

AD-wv*th*f mt*Wptof

rtgtiUff b* »rm>r r

Transport

The Air Safety Force was also to include a radar surveillance At\4 control

system. No recommendations had been made cortceming the personnel strength

of either this m the Coastal Safety Force.

.

273
JCS and National Policy

Agreements with Japan during 1954

As Ambassador Allison had recommended, the United States made no effort

at that time to induce the Japanese Government to commit itself to these

targets. Japanese planners continued to be guided by their five-year plan, which

was modified from time to time.144 The immediate focus of US attention was the

JFY 1954 defense program.

When negotiations on this subject were concluded, the United States found

itself obliged to accept considerably less than it had hoped for. By an understanding reached in January 1954, and completed by an exchange of notes on 6 April

1954, it was agreed that the National Safety Force would increase to 130,000 men

and six divisions by 31 March 1955, exactly as called for in the Japanese five-year

plan. In addition, a reserve force of 15,000 was to be established. The 1954

objective for the Coastal Safety Force was set at 16,000 men, and the United

States agreed to provide ASW aircraft for its air arm. The Air Safety Force would

be activated during 1954, with an initial complement of 6,000 men and a headquarters and training schools.145

In settling for less than a full loaf, the United States bowed to the exigencies

of the Japanese budgetary situation. Prime Minister Yoshida considered it essential to hold the budget below a trillion yen in order to combat inflation. He

succeeded in doing so by a very narrow margin even while increasing defense

spending. The final budget called for 137.3 billion yen in defense appropriations—

lower than Ambassador Allison's earlier forecast, though larger than the amount

for JFY 1953. Of this sum, 788 billion was for Japan's own forces and 58.5 billion

for her contribution to US forces.146 The United States had agreed that Japan's

payment under the administrative agreement would be reduced by $7 million.147

At exchange rates then prevailing, this amounted to 2.5 billion yen, and would

result in a payment of 53.3 billion yen as compared with tru current figure of

55.8 billion. Various other Japanese contributions would bring the total to 55.8

billion.

Negotiations for a mutual security agreement were successfully concluded

on 8 March 1954. The United States agreed to provide military assistance, while

Japan promised to develop her military strength as fully as possible, with due

regard for her economic stability.14* Anticipahng the agreement, the United

States had allotted $$0.7 million to Japan in the FY 1954 mutual security

program.14* A Military Assistance Advisory Group, Japan, was established.

headed by Major General Gerald J. Higgins, USA, who was nominated by the

Joint Chiefs of Staff on recommendation of General Ridgway.1^

Besides furnishing grant aid, the United States also agreed on 14 May 1954 to

tefid Japan two destroyers and two destroyer escorts tor a five-year penod1M

This agreement was a disappointment to the Japanese Government, which had

asked for an outright grant, rather than a loan, of 17 vessels.

A possibly hopeful augury for the future, from ^he US point of view, could be

discerned in the willingness of the Japanese Diet to sanction the military e*pansion plans of the YosJuda government. A law passed by the Diet on 2 June 1954

put the Japanese military forces on a more secure legal basis. The Safety Forces

274
Far East: Indochina, Taiwan, Japan

were renamed Self-Defense Forces, and the creation of an Air Self-Defense Force

was approved. The government's manpower objectives for JFY 1954 were written into law as authorized strengths of the respective forces. The National Safety

Agency became the National Defense Agency.A Joint Staff Council—a counterpart of tn* US Joint Chiefs of Staff—was established.152

There can be little doubt that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were disappointed with

the outcome of the negotiations.

153 They had regarded the early rearmament of

Japan as an integral part of the strategy of the New Look. In April 1954 they

made it clear that Japanese military self-sufficiency was essential to the establishment of a position of strength in the Far East. At the rate of increase provided in Japan's 1954 budget, there was no foreseeable prospect that Japan

would be able to stand on her own feet fora long time.

i

Japanese Force Objectives for 1955 From a US viewpoint, the Japanese had promised disappointingly littie for

1954, but their performance was to prove even less adequate. An economic

recession forced the government to cut back military expenditures to 132.8 billion yen, 4.5 billion below the budget estimate.154 Announcing this decision on

20 July 1954, Mr. Kimura, head of the National Defense Agency, commented on

the disappointing US response to Japan's request for ships, which, he declared,

would make it necessary to revise the planned balance of forces.

i5s

At the same time, several developments foreclosed any hope that Japanese

public opinion could be induced to support the scale of rearmament desired by

the United States. In March 1954a Japanese fisherman becamea casualty of

radioactive fallout from US hydrogen bomb tests in the Pacific Ocean. The

psychological impact in Japan was extreme, in view of that country's experience

with atomic bombing in World War II. Political trends also tooka turn for the

worse. Prime Minister Yoshida's administration ran into increasing opposition,

partly inspired by his alleged partiality toward the United States. In deference to

his critics, he found it advisable to postponea visit to the United States that he

had scheduled for June 1954.

|S

*

The Aii hoc committee on mutual aid appointed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff> to

whkh reference has already been made, drafteda long-range pn>gram earlv in

1954 that included th* Japanese force objectives the Joint Chiefs of Staff had

recommended in December 1953. The committee proposed to spread the attainment over a four-year period, FYs !9$$-195*. at an estimated cost of $2,026 5

million. This program was included ir\ the Amended version of the committee

report that the Joint Chiefs of Staff sen* to th* Secretary of Defense on I? June

I$54.

m

For FY 1956, the goals in this program were six divisions, 220 ships, Atxd

12 Mt squadrons. However, in submitting »ecommendations for the FY 1956

MDA program on 19 May 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff increased to 240 the

number of recommended Japanese ships. Th* increase was principally in patrol

craft and minesweepers.

m

275
]CS and National Polity

Whether or not these American plans would be favorably received in Tokyo

was uncertain But there was no doubt of the intention of the Japanese Government to continue the buildup of its forces. A news despatch from Tokyo in

October 1954 reported that the National Defense Agency planned to increase the

Ground Force by 20,000 and to double the Air Force in JFY 1955. The A> icy's

tentative budget request for this purpose, according to this account, w^uld be

95.2 billion yen, an increase of 16.4 billion over the 1954 budget, but Japanese

officials hoped that most or all of this increase would be offset by a reduction in

Japan's support payments to US forces.159

Secretary Wilson had already asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to suggest 1955

force goals for Japan for use in forthcoming negotiations with that country.160

Before they could reply, the situation was altered by Prime Minister Yoshida's

decision to make his planned visit to the United States in November 1954. It was

expected that he would bring up the subject of US support for expansion of

Japanese forces in 1955.

Preparations for this probability brought out a disagreement between the

State and Defense Departments. The former believed that the United States

should agree to underwrite the entire increase in Japan's 1955 defense budget,

by accepting an equivalent reduction in Japanese support payments. The Department of Defense recommended that the United States, before accepting any

such reduction, should first insist upon at least a partial restoration of the cut in

Japan's 1954 defense budget, which represented a failure to comply fully with

the terms of the April 1954 agreement.1*

11

The Defense position received firm support from C1NCFE in a message to the

Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 November 1954. General Hull had seen the tentative

Japanese defense budget for 1955, and he characterised it as inadequate and

excessively dependent upon US assistance. Instead of footing the entire bill tor

Japanese force increases, the United States should provide Japan with an incentive to enlarge its own contribution. One method of doing so, he suggested,

would be to fix a base amount and then oiler to reduce the Japanese support

payment by hall the difference between this figure ^nd the appropriation. For

example, since the tentative budget figure was 95.2 billion yen, the base might

be 90 billion, producing a reduction of 2.6 billion—approximately the same

amount as the previous year—in the support payment. A minimum acceptable

base would be 76.3 billion yen, the amount of Japan's contribution to her twn defense in JFY 1954: in other words, the 78.8 billion tn the budget less a 25 billion

reduction in the support payment.tsC

The Joint Chiefs of Staft approved General Hull's suggested cost*shartng

formula in their recommendations to Secretary Wilson in connection with Pnmc

Minister Yosruda's visit. They urged that any US budgetary support be conditioned upon fulfillment of the April 1954 agreement and also upon Japan s

agreement to acquire land necessary to expand the runway* at US air bases in

Japan, a matter on which General Hull had reported failure to receive satisfaction from the Japanese Government. The Joint Chiefs of Staft road* no reconv

rnendabons for JFY 1955 iorce objectives, merely reaffirming t'i\t ultimate goals

in theif mx*fnmendation* of 21 December 1953. *** Subsequently, at Genera!

276

£ ••'••:
•1

Far East: Indochina, Taiivan, Japan

Ridgway's suggestion, they recommendeda base figure of 85 billion yen for

computing the US share of the Japanese budget.

164

By the time the JCS views reached Secretary Wilson, Premier Yoshida had

already arrived in the United States. Apparently there was little or no discussion

of the JFY 1955 defense budget during his three-day visit, which ended on 10

November 1954. The only visible result wasa US promise to continue economic

aid to Japan.

165 It was not until 10 December 1954 that Secretary Wilson forwarded to the Secretary of State the JCS recommendations on the forthcoming

Japanese budget,

166 presumably for use in negotiations that were about to begin

in Tokyo.

Ambassador Allison, ina message to Washington on 15 December, confirmed that the Japanese National Defense Agency was seeking 95.2 billion yen

for the fiscal year beginning1 April 1955, and that the Agency hoped that the

United States would accepta reduction in support payments large enough to

keep the total military budget from exceeding the JFY 1954 figure of 137.3 billion.

The Ambassador approved General Hull's base figure formula but doubted that

Japan would accepta 90-billion-yen base. Alternatively, he suggested either 78.8

billion, the amount of the 1954 NDA appropriation, or 73.8 billion, derived by

assuming that the 50-50 formula haJ been in effect in JFY 1954 (the United States

had then accepteda reduction of 2.5 billion, or half the difference between 78.8

and 73.8). He recommended also that the United States press for restoration of

the 4.5 billion cut from the 1954 budget—a valuable bargaining point even though

it was probably unattainable.

167

After obtaining the concurrence of the Department of Defense, Secretary

Dulles approved Ambassador Allison's proposed approach to the negotiations

but instructed him to usea base figure no lower than 85 billion yen (the amount

recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff).

168 But

a preliminary conversation

with the Minister of Finance convinced Ambassador Allison that this figure was

unrealistic. The Minister stressed that the budget must again be held belowa

trillion yen and that problems of unemployment, housing, and the effects ofa

flood in 1953 would require more money for welfare measures.

169

Political developments in Japan had meanwhile complicated the problem.

Prime Minister Yoshida resigned early in December 1954 and was replaced by

Ichiro Hatoyama, who, as the price of his confirmation, promised to hold new

elections early in 1955.

170

Probably owing to the resulting uncertainty, formal

negotiations on the defense budget were postponed for several weeks. When

Admiral Radford visited Tokyj early in January 1955, he apparently did not

discuss the subject extensively.

m

Not until2 February 1955 did Ambassador Allison and General Hull formally

present the initial US negotiating position. The United States would share all

expenses above 90 billion yen if the Japanese Government would appropriate

the 95.2 billion requested by the National Defense Agency. The Japanese made

no formal reply at the moment, but unofficial indications convinced the Ambassador that neither this government nor any other that might emerge from the

elections (which had been set for 27 February) would accept this position. Even

277
JCS and National Policy

the minimum 85-billion yen base seemed unlikely to be attained, in his view,

and he therefore recommended that it be reconsidered.172

This recommendation was passed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who agreed on

25 March 1955 that the 85 billion figure was unrealistic and that 76.3 billion, the

lowest figure mentioned by General Hull, should be regarded as the new US

rninimum.173 Presumably this conclusion was relayed to the Ambassador, but it

apparently had no effect upon the outcome of the negotiations. Settlement was

to be reached on a wholly different basis and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not

consulted thereafter.

The negotiations proved unexpectedly difficult; some weeks of hard bargaining were necessary.l7A The US position was weakened by the fact that in 1954 the

United States had itself urged upon Japan the importance of deflation and a

balanced budget.175 When an agreement was finally concluded, the United States

yielded on nearly every point. The final defense budget adopted by the Hatoyama

Government totalled i32.8 billion yen (about $369 million). The portion for Japan's

own forces was 86.8 billion yen, or $241 million. This was 8 billion yen above the

previous budget, and sufficed to provide 20,000 more men for the Ground

Self-Defense Force, 8,700 additional tons of shipping, and about 200 aircraft, of

which approximately 40 would be of combat types. But the United States agreed

to accept a reduction of approximately 17.8 billion yen—$49 million—in the

amount payable under the administrative agreement. In other words, the United

States would provide budgetary support amounting to more than twice the size

of the budget increase. The base figure formula for splitting the increase had

been discarded. The amount of the Japanese payment for this purpose would be

$106 million, or 38 billion yen. Japan agreed, however, to pay the United States 8

billion yen ($22 million) in compensation for the costs of extending air base

runways and renting certain facilities that the US forces required.176

The force goals in the JFY 1955 budget were adjusted to a revised version of

the NDA five-year plan that became necessary when the Agency failed to obtain

the full amount of its budget request. The completion date for the plan was

moved back to 31 March 1962 (the end of the Japanese fiscal year 1961) and the

strength objectives for all the armed force? were reduced somewhat. The new

goals were: for the Ground Force, 180,000 men in six divisions and four regimental combat teams; for the Maritime Force, 33,548 men, with 203 ships totalling

120,700 tons; for the Air Force, 42,985 men (including a 7,000-man antiaircraft

component, formerly envisioned as part of the Ground Force) and 1,284 aircraft.177

As a part of the overall agreement for JFY 1955, the United States agreed to

supply approximately $42 million to Japan in mutual defense assistance for the

coming fiscal year, and in addition, to furnish two squadrons of F-86 aircraft and

two destroyer escorts.17* Earlier, on 18 January 1955, the United States had

agreed to lend Japan one submarine and seven minesweepers under the terms

of the 1954 loan agreement.17*

Viewing the outcome of the negotiations, the United States could have little

grounds for satisfaction. Perhaps the only gain was the fact that the JFY 1955

defense tnidget showed an increase as compared with 1954. In other words, the

278
Far East: Indochina, Taiwan, Japan

momentum of Japanese rearmament, however inadequate in US eyes, had at

least not been lost.

US Far Eastern Policy in Perspective

Caution is the word that characterizes the Far Eastern policy of the Eisenhower administration in its first two years. All the administration's major

decisions fitted this characterization: the continuation of restrictions on military

action by Nationalist China, the refusal to pledge force to defend Chinese

Nationalist holdings near the mainland, the acceptance of communist victory in

Indochina when the political conditions for military intervention were unfavorable, and the acquiescence in the slow pace of rearmament decided upon by

Japan's leaders. The same approach had been adopted toward South Korea, in

the restraints placed on Syngman Rhee, as described earlier.

The administration's essentially defensive approach led it to accept the prospect of some territorial gains by communist forces. As a military man, President

Eisenhower was doubtless alert to the danger of trying to hold an exposed

forward position without prospect of adequate support or reinforcement. In

Indochina in 1954, and in the Taiwan Strait in 1955, the administration prudently withdrew to more tenable positions. But the Southeast Asia pact, the

mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China, and the Congressional resolution on Taiwan attested to US .letermination not to be budged from its second

lines of defense.

The treaty with the Chinese Nationalists placed the United States in formal

alliance with all the members of the vital offshore island chain. The agreements

with these nations, together with the newly created Southeast Asia Treaty

Organization, formed a network of relationships that in some degree answered

the purpose of the more comprehensive Asian-Pacific alliance recommended by

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This arrangement—a kind of rar Eastern NATO—had

been endorsed by General Van Fleet, but the administration had shown little

interest in it.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff apparently saw eye to eye with the administration

except for a period during the latter part of 1954 when policy toward China was

under review. On this occasion, Admiral Radford, the principal JCS advocate of

a more militant policy (who had unsuccessfully urged intervention in Indochina

a few months earlier), was able to carry most of his colleagues with him in

recommending that the United States defend the Nationalist-held offshore islands.

On this issue, as on many others, General Ridgway stood in opposition to his

colleagues. He found a powerful ally in Secretary Dulles, whose counsel of

restraint was heeded by the National Security Coun.il. It is noteworthy, however,

that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were united in wanting to avoia involvement in a

land war in Asia; even the proponents of intervention envisioned the use of air

and naval forces alone.

279
13

Western Europe, 1953

The experience of World War II convinced many Americans that the fate of

their nation was inextricably intertwined with that of Western Europe. This

conviction, combined with alarm over the defenseless state of the European

democracies after the war, led the United States to cooperate in 1949 in the

establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was intended to

deter or repel any attack from the east. The original members of NATO were

twelve: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the

Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Two other countries, Greece and Turkey, joined NATO in 1952. During the first

three years of its existence, NATO evolved its governing political structure and

its machinery for military collaboration and set up an integrated command

headed by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR).1

The defense plans of NATO were based upon the assumption that its forces

would make a stand as far to the east as possible in order to defend the territory

of all the NATO members and the resources of West Germany. The United

States recognized this forward strategy as an optimum objective.2

To provide forces to sustain this strategy required the member nations to

mount a sizable rearmament effort while carrying on the rebuilding of their

war-damaged economies. At a meeting held in Lisbon in February 1952 the

North Atlantic Council had set its sights on a force of nearly 100 divisions,

backed up with appropriate naval and air forces, to be reached over a period of

several years. These forces were to be contributed by the twelve original members,

since Greece and Turkey had not yet been admitted to NATO. The force schedules adopted at the Lisbon meeting are tabulated in Table 17.

The confrontation between East and West had led the erstwhile allies of

World War II to set aside their wartime conviction that Germany must thereafter

be kept disarmed. The Soviet Union organized the German Democratic Republic

in its occupation zone and created an army, navy, and air force in the guise of

police forces. The Western Powers, in turn, laid plans to rearm the Federal

Republic of Germany, which had been created by fusion of the US, Brirsh, and

281

^^TT5R^!^^^^W 1 ■■'
f

JCS and National Polio/

Table 17—Force Goals Approved by North Atlantic Council at Lisbon:

February 1952

Year

United

States

1952, firm

commitment*

M-day

M-day plus

30 days

M-day plus

180 days

1953, provisional

goald

M-day

M-day plus

30 days

M-day plus

180da>s

1954, planning goald

M-day

M-day plus

30 days

M-day plus

180 days

Beyond 1954,

militarily

desirable

M-day

M-day plus

30 days

Beyond M-day

plus 30 days

M-day plus

ISOdays

Army Divisions

Other

^Countries

it)

7\

it)

9%

(c)

6%

9»/,

13%

(c)

19V3

46

(c)

25

582/3

(c)

27

66

(c)

39V,

86'/,

92'%

(c)

Total

25

532/3

(c)

302/3

66!/j

(c)

332/,

772/,

(c)

46!/s

(0

(c)

Navy Ships

United

States

Other

\Countries

357

(c)

589

357

(c)

599

358

it)

609

to

(c)

(0

(c)

365

(c)

1,032

419

(c)

1,323

491

(c)

1,664

(c)

(c)

(C)

(c)

Total United

States

722

(c)

1,621

776

(c)

1.922

849

(c)

2,273

1,395

(c)

(c)

3,003

Air Force Aircraft

Other

Countries

695

(c)

(c)

1,125

(0

(c)

1,515

it)

(c)

1.515

(c)

it)

(C)

3,372

(c)

(c)

5.301

(c)

(c)

7,292

(c)

(c)

7,507

<c)

(c)

(<)

Total

4,067

(c)

(c)

6,426

(c)

(c)

8,807

(c)

(c)

»9,316

(c)

(0

(C)

* Excludes Greece and Turkey, which had acceded to NATO just before the Lisbon meeting, as

well a» West Germany.

b

Fraction refers to regiments or regimental combat teams.

1 Not available.

J The proposed 1953 and 1954 goals for West Germany used at Lisbon have been omitted from

this table.

* The total include« 2 divisions for M-day plus 30 days not allocated by country.

' The total of 126-2/3 to 136-2/3 includes 20 to 30 divisions beyond M-day plus 30 days

* Includes 294 aircraft not allocated by country.

Sourtr. Off of NAT Affairs. OASD(ISA). Outline of NATO Force Goals as Accepted at the Lisbon

Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. February 23,1952. n d . CCS 092 Western Europe

(3-12-48) BP pt 14.

282
Western Europe, 1953

French occupation zones. At Lisbon, the North Atlantic Council approved force

goals for West Germany of an army of six divisions and an air force of 579 aircraft

by the end of 1953, both of which were expected to double in size within a year,

plus a navy of 229 vessels by 1954.3

Plans for a European Defense Community

To guard against the possibility of a resurgence of militarism in a rearmed

West Germany, the nations of Western Europe drafted a plan for an international army in which German forces would comprise only one element. This

plan was embodied in a treaty signed in May 1952 by France, West Germany,

Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The signatories agreed to

establish a European Defense Community (EDC), which would have its own

army, composed of division-size units retaining their national identities but

under an integrated high command. This army was to be placed at the disposal

of NATO, and its organization, equipment, and training were to be supervised

by SACEUR. A protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty bound the NATO members

to defend the territory of the EDC countries.4

In agreeing to the EDC treaty, however, the leaders of the signatory countries outpaced the support of public and parliamentary opinion. None of the six

nations had ratified the treaty by the end of 1952. The principal obstacle was

France, where opponents were numerous and vocal, inspired largely by traditional apprehensions about Germany.5

This delay in establishing EDC impaired NATO's prospects. It was symptomatic of a general slackening of military effort in Europe that became evident in

1952. The sense of urgency that had prevailed a few years earlier had dissipated.

To an increasing degree, rearmament was subordinated to other objectives.6

At the end of 1952 the M-day goals set at the Lisbon meeting had been

substantially achieved insofar as they involved ground and naval forces. But

there was a shortage of approximately 10 percent in the number of aircraft (3,661

as compared with a goal of 4,067), and of 15 pe»*cent in the number of divisions

expected to be available by M plus 30 days (45 divisions instead of 532/3).7In the

light of declining public and official support for rearmament in European

countries, the prospects for making up these shortfalls appeared uncertain at

best, and the chance of reaching the much more ambitious long-range goals set

at Lisbon seemed even less.

One reason (or rationalization) for complacency was particularly significant

for future developments on both sides of the Atlantic. Early in 1953, General

Bradley told a Congressional committee that the slowdown in Europe's defense

efforts could be partially attributed to the dangerous hope that nuclear weapons

alone would suffice to win a war."

283

'
]CS and National Polity

President Eisenhower's European Policy General Eisenhower's tour of duty as SACEUR, along with his earlier

e

v

perience in leading the reconquest of Europe in World War II, had left him

keenly aware of the importance of Western Europe to the safety of the United

States. As an ardent partisan of European unity, he observed with dismay, at the

moment of his accession, the faltering prospects for ratification of the EDC

treaty, which he regarded asa vitalstep toward military and political cooperation.

9

Even before he took office, he directed two of his appointees—John Foster

Dulles, Secretary of State, and Harold E. Stassen, Director of Mutual Security—to

tour Europe to survey political trends and to ascertain requirements for US

assistance.

10

In his earliest speeches after taking office, President Eisenhower

stressed the importance of the political and economic unity of Western Europe

and promised that the United States would try to further these goals.

11

The new administration's commitment to Atlantic solidarity was stressed in

policy statements adopted in 1953 by the National Security Council. NSC 153/1

asserteda need to support and strengthen the NATO countries and to extend

economic and military aid to free nations.

12 NSC 162/2 contained

a statement

that the United States could not meet its defense needs, even at exorbitant cost,

without the support of allies. Another portion of NSC 162/2 drew attention, to

the importance, psychological as well as military, of the presence of US troops in

Europe.

13

Not long after his accession, the new President receiveda letter from the

Permanent US Representative in the North Atlantic Council, Mr. William H.

Draper, who was seriously concerned about the prospects for NATO. "The

military requirements in land, sea, and air forces for adequate NATO defense,"

wrote Ambassador Draper on8 March 1953, "are so far above the presently

foreseeable buildup that the need for some alternative solution is sure to be

raised in the North Atlantic Council during the next few months." He forwarded a lengthy analysts prepared by his staff, which considered and rejected

two possibilities: (1) to continue pursuit of the Lisbon goals, in the face of

evidence that they were unattainable; and (2) to redefine NATO's mission to fit

available forces—i.e., to reduce the size of the area to be defended. Only one

alternative was left: to find some other strategy or force structure, or both, that

could fulfill the mission ata lower cost. Ambassador Draper suggested that such

a solution might be found by "a top level evaluation of our overall strategy," to

be carried out by "a few of our best and most experienced civilian and military

brains."

14

President Eisenhower, in replying to the Ambassador's letter, indicated doubt

that NATO's immediate plans could be significantly altered. Warning of the

temptation to seek new and cheap solutions, he continued: 1 quite agree with you that new weapons and new methods may—in the long

run—brinp, about some fundamental changes that will tend to outmode what

we 9txt now trying to do. But what we are presently trying to do seems to me to

be absolutely essential to the meeting of me immediate threat ...I am quite

Li

284
Western Europe, 1953

sure that the adoption, at this moment, of a different defense policy could not

lessen the need for the very modest number of military units that we are now

striving to produce in Western Europe.15

Ambassador Draper's letter was referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who

submitted an interim reply on 20 May 1953. They indicated that the President's

reply constituted an appropriate statement of current NATO policy and that

they would study the problem further.16

Another aspect of the problem of European defense that required attention

was the possibility that the EDC treaty might not be ratified. It was essential to

consider other ways of bringing West Germany into the Atlantic coalition. On 14

January 1953 Vice Admiral Arthur C. Davis, USN, General Bradley's deputy in

the NATO Standing Group, urged the Joint Chiefs of Staff to suggest alternatives.17 After discussing the matter with Secretary Dulles and examining two

reports by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee,18the Joint Chiefs of Staff told

Admiral Davis on 20 March 1953 that it was the responsibility of the political

elements of the government to determine the method by which West Germany

was to be rearmed. At the same time, they stressed that a German contribution

to Western defense was needed as soon as possible.19

!

Revision of NATO Force Goals, April 1953

One of the decisions reached by the North Atlantic Council at Lisbon in

February 1952 had been that NATO's force requirements would be reviewed each year. This annual review soon evolved into something resembling an international budget planning process. It was set in motion by the

International Staff of the NATO Secretariat, which circulated a questionnaire to member governments asking information about their defense plans

and the forces that they expected to make available to NATO. At the same

time, NATO commanders submitted estimates of their requirements. The

International Staff, assisted by the Annual Review Commitee of the North

Atlantic Council, then drafted preliminary force objectives, harmonizing

requirements with availabilities as nearly as possible, and circulated these

proposals to member governments for comment. The final decision on

force goals for the ensuing two or three years was the prerogative of the

North Atlantic Council, These decisions were rendered in ministerial meetings of the Council—gatherings of cabinet-level representatives, as distinct

from the delegates who sat in Paris in permanent session.20

The 1952 Annual Review was not complete when the year ended, and the

North Atlantic Council therefore scheduled a mmistenal meeting for April 1953

at which force goals would be approved.21 Thus the Eisenhower administration,

even before completing its review of the US military budget for FY 1954. had to

decide in time for this meeting how many forces it was willing to promise to

NATO. At the s*me time, it was necessary to prepare comments on the tentative

force goals proposed by the International Staff.

285

'M

:.,;*
]CS and National Policy

Initial US recommendations regarding NATO's force objectives had been

drafted by a special ad hoc annual review committee established by the Secretary of Defense (later given standing status as the Defense Annual Review

Team, or DART). Membership of the committee included representatives from

OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Services. Following review and comment by the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, the proposals drafted by the committee had been approved

in October 1952 as the initial US negotiating position in connection with the 1952

Annual Review. The US proposals, along with those of other countries, were

considered by the International Staff in drafting force goals for submission to the

Council. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had another opportunity to influence the

process through the guidance they issued to the US Representative in the

Standing Group, who proffered military advice to the International Staff during the process.

The proposals drawn up by the International Staff were sent to the Joint

Chiefs of Staff for comment on 23 March 1953. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that, although the final US position on the Annual Review was still under

development, it appeared that the recommendations of the International Staff

"are generally in accord with U. S. estimates of forces feasible of accomplishment under existing political and economic limitations." The force goals, though

too low, nevertheless represented progress toward requirements.

The administration's final recommendations, covering calendar years 1953

and 1954, differed in some respects from those drafted by the International

Staff.23 The principal difference concerned the US aircraft contribution, which

the International Staff proposed to boost to 1,628 by December 1954. The United

States had already indicated that it might not be able to meet the Lisbon goal of

1,515 planes, because of a lag in production of medium bombers.24The administration accordingly proposed 1,510 aircraft, although even this figure was dependent upon the ending of hostilities in Korea and on the continuation of the

143-wing Air Force program, which was then in doubt25

Another incipient disagreement involved the size of the US Army contribution.

At Lisbon, the Council had asked for six full US divisions (with two additional

regiments or regimental combat teams) by 1954. Since this was an M-day figure,

all six divisions must be in place before hostilities began. Five (four infantry and

one armored) were already in Europe; the sixth, under plans prepared in 1952,

was to be another armored division from the strategic reserve in the United

States when the hostilities in Korea ended. But by early 1953, budgetary limitations cast doubt on the advisability of sending this unit.2

*

To default on this goal, which represented an appreciable proportion of the

total US troop strength in NATO, would set r, **?ry poor example for the other

member countries. Secretary Wilson's Assistant 'or International Security Affairs,

Frank C Nash, therefore urged that thr United States provisionally accept the

six-division figure subject to further study of the policy problems involved.*7The

administration accepted this recommendation.

The North Atlantic Council met in ministerial session in ?*fi$ between 23 and

25 April 1953. The US delegation included Secretaries Dulles, WHson, and

Humphrey; Mr. Stassen, Director of Mutual Security; and General Bradley, Chair286

i .. i m
I

Western Europe, 1953

man of the joint Chiefs of Staff.28The Council approved force goals that varied

somewhat from both the US proposals and those of the International Staff. More

important, the approved force goals represented a retreat from the Lisbon

objectives. In army strength, the big reduction was in the goals for M plus 30

days—the forces to be put in the field after hostilities began. Newly added Greek

and Turkish forces brought the totals well above the Lisbon figures, but these

forces would be needed to defend their homelands. The Council overrode US

objections and approved a goal of 1,628 aircraft for 1954; however, the overall

aircraft totals for both 1953 and 1954 were at least 15 percent below the Lisbon

goals even after the inclusion of Greece and Turkey. Thus the Council bowed to

political and economic realities. Naval objectives were also reduced, although

the reduction was offset, on paper at least, by introducing a new category of

forces—those earmarked for NATO but remaining under national command.

(See Table 18.) The Council made no effort to plan beyond 1954.29

On the advice of General Bradley and General Ridgway, the United States

accepted theCouncil's decisions, including the 1954 aircraft goal. To do otherwise,

Table 18—Force Goals Approved by North Atlantic Council:

April 1953

1953 1954

Font Firm Commitment Provtuonal Goal

M-4ay

30<fcy*

M-ä*v Sl-Jav Plui

50 day*

Army divtstona

UniUNJ Sutc* «5*/, *% 6% 1%

Wc^T-rn Eurof*

and C«n*U »*', m* 24-'* 54

l.fmrjiui!jrkrv .... Ö

1

'. 41 23% Wh

TttUl dtvtftkms 53l

, W% 55 m%

N*vy ship**

NATO utmnwnii .. mi 1.640 732 urn

\4tkm4Uumm4ftd .. HO 4*) m 54*»

TouJship« «23 2,130 *m 1310

Ait ft*«* atra4ft

ImwJMahf» 911 «) \.m m

Wotrrn l;un»pf

*ndC*n*i4 iOW **> 3.103 <« >

Qv«cv*ft4TufWy .. 507 <e) m to

!"«**! äiftyati 5.432 i<) r,w M

* FfMttoft» r*irf to frjjtmcm* of f*£inic«ui u»mH»r taun*

* ttatkd n by «ouncry m* a*«tL**>k% figure* trtriud* TurWy K»t net <>w*. tot *»h*.h ton-* goals

ttfff Mdff Jtfudv

* Nut «V4iiaNr

SAW IC$ 287*5*t 10 Jun 53

287
/CS and National Policy

as Secretary Wilson told the joint Chiefs of Staff after the meeting, "might well

have resulted ina setback in European defense plans of serious proportions/'

Moreover, the 1953 review would provide an opportunity to reconsider the

provisional 1954 objectives.

30

The lower force goals approved by the Council were in harmony with the

Eisenhower administration's concept of planning for the long haul, which meant

levelling off forces at or near their current strengths. To introduce this concept

into NATO planning wasa declared objective of administration policy. NSC

149, which the National Security Council had approved in March 1953, had

recommended decreased emphasis on "expansion of NATO forces to previously

projected goals by early fixed target dates."31 Speaking to the North Atlantic

Council, Secretary Wilson explained the long haul objectives, which, he said,

demandeda reasonably stabilized level of effort and of defense expenditures.

He urged the other countries to follow the US lead by revising their defense

plans so as to spread expendituresc era longer period, without lowering their

military capabilities. Such revisions should, he said, take into account "new

weapons and methods of defense which may also produce, in many instances,

desirable economies."

32

These suggestions must have been congenial to many of the other NATO

governments, some of which were already proceeding in these directions. The

communique issued after the meeting described the Council's acceptance of this

viewpoint in terms that could have been (and perhaps were) written by Secretary Wilson himself: "It was agreed that the development of sound national

economies and the increase of military forces should be pursued concurrently."

33

The Council also approveda resolution calling attention to the paramount importance of the establishment of the European Defense Community.34

Reorganization, Military and Civilian The first few months of the Eisenhower administration saw important

changes in NATO's high command and in the US machinery for liaison

with the Organization. When the new President decided upona wholesale

replacement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he selected two appointees from NATO

posts: General Ridgway (SACEUR) to be Chief of Staff, US Army, and Admiral

Carney, then Commander in Chief, Allied Forces. Southern Europe (CING

SOUTH), as Chief of Naval Operations. Genera! Ridgway was replaced as

SACEUR by his Chief of Staff. General Alfred M. Gruenther. while Admiral

Carney traded positions with the outgoing Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral

William M. Fechteler*

Before his departure from SHAH*, General Ridgway set in motiona major

alteration in NATO's command structure: the establishment ofa separate command for the central theater, paralleling those already established for northern

and southern Europe and the Mediterranean. Hitherto SACEUR had exercised

direct command in the center. Under General Ridgway'* plan, the new position

I
Western Europe, 1953

of Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Center (CINCCENTER) would be conferred upon Marshal Alphonse-Pierre Juin of France, who at that time commanded the land forces in that theater. At the same time, General Ridgway

proposed to grant some command authority to SACEUR's Air Deputy (whose

role thus far had been essentially that ofa staff adviser), while continuing to

allow theater commanders to control their own air power through component

commanders.

General Ridgway's original plan provided that CINCCENTER would weara

second hat as comniander of the land forces in his theater. At the suggestion of

British and French officers with whom he discussed his plan, he modified it to

providea separate component command for the ground forces. But he rejecteda

suggestion by General Vandenberg, made when the plan was submitted informally to the joint Chiefs of Staff, that the Air Deputy be given command over all

NATO air forces; sucha step, he felt, would in effect createa second Supreme

Allied Commander. On 12 February 1953 General Ridgway submitted his revised

plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

36

General Bradley discussed the plan with President Eisenhower, who approved

it, subject at first to the reinsertion, for reasons of economy, of the original

provision to combine the two commands, CINCCENTER and COMLANDCENT.17 But when the British membet of the Standing Group held out for

separation of these two, the President yielded on the issue.

3

" The Standing

Group approved the plan on5 june and the Military Committee on 30 June** On

19 August 2953, Marshal juin formally assumed his new position a^ CINCCENTER. In an accompanying reshuffle. General Lauris Norstad, USAF, formerly commander of Allied Air Forces in Central Europe, assumed the position

of Air Deputy to SACEUR40

When General Ridgway became Chief of Staff, US Army, his predecessor.

General |, Lawton Collins, was appointed the US representative in both the

NATO Military Committee and the Standing Group. Theretofore General Bradley had performed these duties while serving as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,

but President Eisenhower wanted the Chaira\*n kept free of such commitments

in order to concentrate on his JCS duties. ** In his new capacity, General Collins

was directly responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was authorized to attend

JCS meetings at whkh NATO matters were discussed. He was also to serve as

principal military adviser to the Secretary of Defense at ministerial meetings of

the North Atlantic Council.**

The principal civilian contact between the administration Atvd NATO headquarters in Paris had been the office of the US Special Representative in Europe,

who vetvtd ** the permanent US member of the Council ind was responsible to

the Director for Mutual Security. This position was abolished by Reorganization

Plan No. 7, effective1 August 1953. liaison with NATO was henceforth to be

channeled througha newly established United State» Mission to the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization And European Regional Organizations, responsible

to the Secretary o4 State **

The new mission included representatives of the Department of Defense,

Department of the Treasury, and Foreign Operations Administration (formerly ! i

mim säum ^^^^^^w
JCS and National Policy

Mutual Security Agency). Its head was authorized to obtain military advice from

the Commander in Chief, United States European Command (USCINCEUR), or

from other officers designated by the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. Mr. John C. Hughes was named to head the mission, while Mr. Tracy S,

Voorhees became the Defense Representative.44

Thr. New Joint Chiefs of Staff and NATO Problems

In a letter to the President on 5 June 1953, the outgoing Special Representative in Europe, Mr. Draper, again urged a reevaluation of NATO strategy. In

his view, two questions called for study by the newly appointed Joint Chiefs of

Staff: (1) whether the countries of NATO could and would be willing and able to

provide military forces that would suffice to deter or defeat aggression; and (2)

whether the best possible use was being made of the military forces already

available.45

The President passed this letter to the incoming Joint Chiefs of Staff,46 who in

turn referred it to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee while they went about

their more pressing task of reassessing overall US strategy. When they reported

their conclusions to Secretary Wilson on 8 August 1953, they made no direct

mention of NATO. But they were clearly thinking of US commitments under the

North Atlantic Treaty when they warned that their suggested redeployment of

US forces "would involve a change in basic foreign policy of fundamental and

far-reaching implications." General Ridgway elaborated on these implications

when the National Security Council discussed the JCS conclusions on 27 August

1953. A general withdrawal of US forces to the Western Hemisphere, he declared,

would be a catastrophe. He admitted that US forces were overextended but

argued that the remedy for this condition was to enlarge and strengthen the

forces in the continental United States. General Ridgway also warned that any

revelation that the United States was considering withdrawal from Europe would

have highly damaging repercussions in NATO.47

The Joint Strategic Survey Committee had meanwhile drafted a reply to Mr.

Draper's letter that offered li'tle hope of a major reduction in force requirements.

Political considerations, the Committee pointed out, made it impossible to contemplate reducing the area to be defended by NATO forces, while tentative

studies by SACEUR suggested that the introduction of nuclear weapons, insofar

as it affected the size of forces, would if anything increase them, principally

because more aircraft would be needed. The Committee concluded that the

resources presently available "are being put to the best use and are being invested

in the best weapons, and the employment of forces is being planned under the

best strategy." The members could only recommend tnat the United States spur

the wavering members of NATO to greater efforts and push for early German

rearmament.4*

General Ridgway and Admiral Carney approved the Committee's report,**

but General Twining challenged it on several points. He believed that the Euro290

•ji •

.

h-4
Western Europe, 1353

pean nations were already close to their maximum defense expenditures and

that it was unrealistic to suppose that US pressure could induce them to spend

more, especially when the United States was itself economizing. If current force

requirements were unattainable, then the present strategy, upon which they

were based, could not be described as the best. General Twining did not prescribe a solution for these difficulties; he merely sugge..;»d that the Joint Chiefs

of Staff withhold recommendations on NATO strategy pending further study.50

In the end, the Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted a middle course. In a memorandum to Secretary Wilson on 11 September, they expressed their general agreement with those parts of Mr. Draper's letter that were within the purview of the

military, and set forth the following additional comments, in which they endorsed

current NATO strategic plans while recognizing a need for reexamination:

a. The retention of NATO Europe as U.S. allies in opposing extension of

Soviet-led Communist aggression (by either armed force or subversion)

continues to be of vital importance to the military security of the United

States.

b. There is at present no justification, on a military basis, for any lessening of

the efforts of NATO European nations to increase their defensive

capabilities.

c. It is impracticable, within the present framework of NATO strategic

planning, to reduce substantially the area to be defended in Western

Europe.

d. The early availability of combat effective German units and of German

productive capacity is essential.

e. The resources presently being made available for NATO European defense

are currently being utilized so as to conform to sound strategic and tactical

plans for Western European defense insofar as is politically possible.

f. These plans and the resources and weapons for their implementation are

under continuing review and analysis by the Joint Oiiefs of Staff to

determine:

(1) What, if any, changes to strengthen our strategic concepts need be

made, and

(2) What, if any, alterations need be made in the allocations of resources

to new weapons and to the various types of forces, which would enhance the overall effectiveness of our military force structure.

g. The increasing Soviet atomic capability and the tendency of our NATO

European allies to waver in the pursuit of NATO objectives accentuate the

urgency of the time element in gaining Allied objectives in the cold war.51

The first of these conclusions was perhaps the most important. The new Joint

Chiefs of Staff had now set their seal of approval upon the view that the freedom

of Western Europe was essential to the safety of the United States. In this

regard, they saw eye to eye with their predecessors.

Diplomatic Efforts to Resolve the German Problem

'o some extent, the lessened willingness of the European nations to expand

their defense efforts in 1952 resulted from a hope that the cold war could be

291
^V^Ä*»«(l4v«M«fil«i««»«4i»«».Bn

JCS and National Policy

liquidated, or at least some of its causes removed, through negotiation. That

hope was stimulated by the accession of Premier Malenkov in the Soviet Union,

whose regime seemed to wear a less forbidding aspect than that of the Stalin era.

''rime MinisterWinston Churchill of the United Kingdom, whose anticommunism

was beyond question, was among those who urged that the intentions of the

Malenkov government be tested in negotiations. President Eisenhower remained

somewhat skeptical of the chances for success but was willing to cooperate with

his British and French allies in opening diplomatic conversations with the

Soviets.52

Among the many points of contention between the East and West, the status

of Germany stood high on the list. Unable to agree, after their victory in World

War H, on the disposition of their common enemy, the Western Powers and the

Soviet Union had gone their separate ways in administering their occupation

zones. Eight years after World War II had ended, Eastern and Western troops

still faced one another across the line that separated East and West Germany.

The willingness of the Malenkov regime to end the cold war could be ascertained from its attitude toward the German problem. In July 1953 the governments of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom agreed to invite the

Soviet Union to attend a conference to discuss the future of Germany and of

Austria, which also remained under four-power occupation.53

This development required reevaluation of US policy toward the European

Defense Community. If the German Federal Republic were to be replaced by, or

absorbed into, a new regime representing both Germanies, the status of treaties

to which it was a party would be thrown into doubt. Moreover, it was not likely

that the Soviet Union would agree to a settlement that would leave Germany

free to join a military coalition directed against the communist world.

The National Security Council had already foreseen this problem. In a speech

on 16 April 1953,54 President Eisenhower had urged settlement of outstanding

issues between East and West, and specifically those relating to Germany and

Austria. Discussing the possible results of this speech on 28 April, the Council

directed the Planning Board to prepare a report on US policy toward Germany.55

The Department of State thereupon prepared several successive drafts that were

discussed by the Board.56 At the same time, another draft was prepared in OSD

and was sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 23 July 1953.57 There were no major

differences in viewpoint between the State and Defense Departments. Both

agreed that a united, democratic Germany was desirable; that it should be oriented toward the West, politically if not militarily; and that, pending German

unification, it was important to proceed with the military and political integration of West Germany into Western Europe.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the Defense draft on 30 July 1953. They

told Secretary Wilson that the reunification of Germany—provided that it was

rearmed and oriented toward the West—would be so advantageous that it should

for the moment take precedence over the immediate objective, i.e., the creation

of the European Defense Community. But, they warned, the negotiations for

German unification should not "be prolonged so as to delay unduly nor to lead

292
'«ft-MOfUWAwrfwavw.,,«,, .

Western Europe, 1953

to an impasse which would defer indefinitely the attainment of an adequate

German contribution in military forces and armaments/'58

The Planning Board combined the State and Defense drafts into a single

paper, which was endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff59 and, with some changes,

was adopted by the National Security Council on 13 August 1953, as NSC 160/1.

The declared objective of US policy in this paper was the integration ofGermany—

preferably the whole country, or, failing that, the Federal Republic—with the

West. The United States should promptly develop a plan for reunification of

Germany under democratic rule. Meanwhile, it should continue to press for

Franco-German rapprochement and for the ratification of EDC, and should continue to do so after the failure of any four-power talks (a forecast that was to

prove accurate). If the ratification of the EDC treaty did rot appear imminent

within a reasonable period, other possible courses of action should be considered,

including bilateral discussions of rearmament with the West German government.60

Looking toward the approaching four power negotiations, the Department

of State began drafting its proposals covering the means of reuniting Germany,

the nature of restrictions to be placed on German armed forces, and the kind of

guarantees needed to insure against German aggression. Position papers on

these topics were evaluated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as being militarily

acceptable.61

At the request of Assistant Secretary Nash, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also

discussed the military problems that would be presented by German unification.

There would remain a need, they said, for a German force of about the size

contemplated in the EDC plan: 12 divisions, 1,300 aircraft, and 300 naval vessels.

As this force came into being, US and UK occupation forces could be withdrawn

and redeployed to other parts of Europe, provided that the Soviet Union offered

compensatory concessions. If a reunited Germany were aligned with the West, it

would greatly strengthen NATO's position; a more forward strategy could be

adopted, they believed, within two years after full-scale German rearmament

began. If it were not so aligned, then NATO's present strategy would become

infeasible and must be revised.62

In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were called upon to evaluate two proposals for the demilitarization of Central Europe as part of an all-embracing European security system to accompany German reunification. One proposal, put

forth by the Belgian Government, called for a demilitarized zone consisting of

that part of Germany between the Elbe and the Oder-Neisse; the other, submitted by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of the German Federal Republic, envisioned a zone extending from the Elbe all the way to the Vistula and southward

to Trieste. Under both plans, the demilitarized zone would be kept free of all

troops, and occupation forces would be withdrawn from all of Germany, although

EDC forces would be allowed to remain.63

The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered both proposals acceptable, subject to (1) a

firm and acceptable definition of the demilitarized zone that would avoid future

controversy, and (2) a plan for a buildup of German forces in phase with removal

293

ÜSH5SSMPMH

*:
JCS and National Policy

of allied occupation troops. The Adenauer proposal was preferable to them,

probably because it included a provision that Soviet forces would withdraw from

all the East European countries. Tne Belgian plan, under which the USSR would

remove its troops only from Germany and Poland, represented approximately

the lower limit of military acceptability. But the Jomt Chiefs of Staff added a

warning: "Any agreement which would preclude Germany from rearming and

aligning itself with the West would be militarily unacceptable."64

The difficulty that the Western Powers encountered in bringing the Soviet

Union to the conference table quickly dampened the hope that the cold war

could be ended in the near fuiure. The Soviets sought a conference that would

discuss Asian as well as European problems and would include Communist

Chin, among the participants. After diplomatic exchanges covering a period of

several months, the four major powers finally agreed in December 1953 to convene a conference of foreign ministers in Berlin early in the following year. The

Western Powers agreed that the Soviet Union would at that time be free to state

its views concerning the desirability of a later conference including Communist

China."

Spain and the Western Alliance

The addition of six German divisions to NATO's forces by the end of 1953,

which the North Atlantic Council had hopefully projected at its 1952 Lisbon

meeting, failed to take place because of the continuing delay in the establishment of the European Defense Community. But this disappointment was in

some degree offset by arrangements made between the United States and Spain

in 1953, which offered hope of an improvement in the overall defensive position

of Western Europe.

The strategic importance of Spain followed from her commanding position at

the entrance to the Mediterranean, her long common borders with two NATO

members (France and Portugal), and her possession of a mountainous northern

barrier along which allied forces might rally if driven out of France.6* Although

Spain's value to Western defense was obvious, her inclusion in NATO was

politically and psychologically impossible. The nation was under the dictatorial

rule of Generalissimo Francisco Franco, who had seized power through a civil

war with the aid of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Although Franco had kept

his nation neutral during World War II, he was widely believed to be sympathetic to the aims and methods of the Axis Powers during that conflict. After the

war, the moral obloquy surrounding the Franco regime made it unthinkable for

the members of NATO to ally themselves formally with Spain.

The US military assistance program, however, offered a way of making Spain

a de fml0 partner in Western defense without concluding a formal alliance. The

United States could supply aid in return for the right to station air and naval

forces on Spanish soil and in Spanish waters. The resulting improventent in

Spain's forces would represent a gain for the West, since it could be assumed

294

" -
Western Europe, 1953

I

that Spain would fight on the side of her European neighbors if war broke out.

Moreover, the arrangement could take the form ofa bilateral mutual assistance

agreement having the status of an executive agreement, which need not be

submitted to the US Senate.

The decision to develop Spain's military potential in the interests of European collective security was made by President Truman in 1951,67 Congress

promptly approved the policy and appropriated $125 million for military,

economic, and technical assistance for Spain for fiscal years 1952 and 1953.68

Negotiations between the United States and Spain, involving base rights in

exchange for material aid, began in 1952.

69 But progress proved to be slow. The

Spanish negotiators asked that the United States commit itself to supply substantial assistance over a period of several years. Their insistence brought the discussion to an impasse early in 1953. The Department of State referred the matter to

the National Security Council.

70

The cost of an aid program that, it was believed, would satisfy the Spaniards

was estimated at $465 million. When the Council and the President considered

the matter on 13 May 1953, they directed the Secretary of Defense to determine

whether base rights in Spain were important enoughtj justify these costs. If he

decided in the affirmative, he would so advise the Se- »vtary of State, who would

proceed with the negotiations after discussion with appropriate Congressional

committees.

71

Secretary Wilson reported on 19 May 1953 that, in his opinion, air and naval

facilities in Spain were of urgent importance to US security. Apparently he did

not formally consult the Joint Chiefs of Staff before reaching this decision. The

Council noted his report on 20 May 1953.

n

Negotiations were then resumed and culminated in three agreements signed

on 26 September 1953, under which the United States was authorized to develop

and use military facilities in Spain, the location and nature of which were to be

determined later in return for military, economic, and technical assistance.

73 Trie

amount of this aid was not stipulated in the agreements. The United States had,

however, informally promised (subject to Congressional approval) to supply the

full $465 million (of which $350 million would be for military assistance) over the

next four years.

74

For the first increment of military assistance,a total of $141 million was

available from appropriation* for FY 1954 and prior years. On 17 September, just

before the agreements were signed. Secretary Wilson asked the joint Chiefs of

Staff to recommenda division of these funds among the Services.

75

The )oint Chiefs of Staff agreed on 17 November 1953 that Spain's air defense

forces should be given priority in the allocation of US aid. Next in >rder of

importance were the ground forces destined for immediate wartime deplt yment

to the Pyrenees and the naval and other forces that would be needed co protect

naval bases and ports.

7

* In line with this decision, they told Secretary Wilson on

13 January 1954 that $56.4 million, approximately 40 percent of the available

funds, should be allocated to the Air Force MDA Program for Spain. The remainder should be evenly divided between the Army and Navy. They proposed that

the United States provide suppot. for one Spanish infantry division, two AAA

295

l
JCS and National Policy

regiments, and three interceptor (day) fighter squadrons; for construction of

four coastal minesweepers; and for modernization of 18 other vessels (destroyers,

gunboats, minesweepers, and minelayers). The Secretary of Defense approved

these recommendations on 18 February.

77

Administration of the agreements with Spain involved political complications that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had faced even before the negotiations were

concluded. The tasks involved in the MDA Prograrn-^etermination of requirements for Spanish forces and supervision of the distribution of US materielcould be carried out by a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), as in

other countries. The nucleus of this organization already existed in the form ofa

Joint US Military Group (JUSMG), established to develop initial requirements

and to advise the US negotiators. JUSMG was headed by an officer nominated

by the Chief of Staff, US Air Force, who had served as the executive agent of the

Joiit Chiefs of Staff in connection with the Spanish negotiations.

But there remained the task of overseeing the construction of the US bases to

V« established in Spain. Administrative simplicitywould be served by assigning

this responsibility to the MAAG, as General Vandenberg recommended in January 1953. On the other hand, elsewhere in Europe base construction was a

responsibility of USC1NCEUR, who headeda command for which the Chief of

Staff, Army, was the executive agent. General Collins urged that USClNCEUR's

authority in this field be extended to Spain. USCINCEUR. however, wore another

hat as SACEUR, and hence his involvement in Spain might offend the other

members of NATO. The Department of State therefore interposed an objection

to the Collins recommendation.

78

Somewhat reluctantly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted the view of the

Department of State and agreed that the MAAG should be responsible for base

construction. They incorporated this decision into terms of reference for the

MAAG that they submitted to the Secretary of Defense on 22 April 1953. In

effect, this arrangement would assign the responsibility to the Air Force, which

would continue to serve ta ex**curive agent for the Spanish aid program and to

nominate the chief of the MAAG. The Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasized that this

assignment of functions should be temporary; USCINCEUR should be made

responsible for supervising both the MDA program and the construction of

bases n% soon ^$ the political situation would permit.

79

Secretary Wilson approved this plan in principle,"

0

«»ui it was later modified

in that two separate organizations were established:a Military Assistance Advisory Group for the MDA Program and a Joint United States Military Group to

supervise construction. Both were to be headed by the same Aü* Force officer.*

1

Establishment of the two groups was announced by the Department of the Air

Force onb November 1953**

2%

i j",-;

_.l:?
W&Z-mr^mHwv»

1

Western Europe, 1953

The 1953 NATO Annual Review

The NATO force goals that the North Atlantic Council had approved in April

1953 were scheduled to be revised later in the year in connection with the

1953 Annual Review. In laying down instructions to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on

this subject, Secretary of Defense Wilson made it clear that economy was to be a

major goal and th?fthe transition to long haul planning was expected to be

completed. The object, he said in a memorandum of 8 June 1953,

must be to obtain a proper balance between required military support of U. S.

and allied forces in Europe and the need for economies in the money and

manpower that must be allotted to that effort. Achievement of such a balance

should permit completion of agreed force goals. . . and a retention of these units

in Europe on a stable basis for an extended period of time.83

But the budget reductions planned by the administration cast doubt on the

possibility even of reaching agreed force goals. On 16 July 1953 the Joint Chiefs

of Staff advised the Secretary that, although the Army could meet its 1953

objectives, it would be unable to enlarge its NATO forces before 1956, and even

then would remain one division short of the M-plus-30-days goal of eight full

divisions. The prospective Air Force shortfall was even greater. That Service—

hardest hit by the reductions in the FY 1954 budget—now promised only 794

and 885 aircraft for 1953 and 1954, respectively, and foresaw an actual decline to

871 in 1956. The Navy, by cutting back its shore establishment and support

units, would be able to meet its 1954 goals. 426 ships for D-day and 735 by D

plus 180 days, with 319 and 514 of these totals, respectively, under NATO

command.*4

The Secretary of State and the Director for Mutual Security indicated to

Secretary Wilson their alarm over any downward revision in US goals. Mr

V/ilson accordingly discussed the problem with officials of the Army and the Air

Force. As a result of these discussions, the Army agreed to make a maximum

effort to meet the M-plus-30-days goal of eight complete divisions by 1954. This

figure, however, would include the additional armored division uV.i had at first

been planned as part of the M-4ay complement. The Air Force discovered that,

with the Korean War ended, its approved 1953 and 1954 goals could be met.

with some adjustment of types within the total.**

These decisions appeared in the final recommendations that the Joint Chiefs

of Staff sent Secretary Wilson on 13 August 1953 for transmission to the International Staff. The Army now projected eight divisions by M plus 30 days. The Air

Force promised 1,628 aircraft, but with a larger proportion of noncombat aircraft

than originally planned, three wings of troop carriers being substituted for two

of fighter bombers. Moreover, 466 aircraft, or almost a third of the total, were to

be based in the Umttd States, although some of them would be mainUined on

rotation to Europe.**

For NATO as a whote, the Defense Annual Review Team recommended that

the force goals adopted in April 1953 be postponed or abandoned. Thus, under

itT. proposals, ground force objectives would be reduced to 47% M-day dm297
JCS and National Policy

sions for 1954, with an increase to 60 by 1956. For naval forces under NATO

command, the suggested goal was 699, to be reached by 1956, in contrast with

the 1954 figure of 732 approved by the Council in April. Aircraft strength for

1954 was to be cut to 6,767; it would rise to 8,494 by 1956, but of these 2,469

would be under national command. The Review Team admitted that its proposed 1956 forces were too small to meet requirements, but it defended them as

representing "the probable maximum in conventional forces which can be

achieved by NATO nations under present political and economic conditions/'

These proposals were endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.87

To some degree, the effects of these reductions in numerical strength might

be counterbalanced by improved weapons that were becoming available. Notable among these was the new 280-mm cannon, capable of firing nuclear as well

as conventional ammunition, developed by the US Army. General Ridgway,

before he left SACEUR, had asked that five battalions of 280-mm artillery- be

assigned to Europe. The Joint Chiefs cf Staff approved this request after obtaining assurance from the Department of State »>at there would be no official

objections from European governments and no adverse effects on public opinion

if these weapons were deployed.8*

The North Atlantic Council had scheduled a ministerial meeting for December 1953 to take action on the 1953 Annual Review. In preparation for the

meeting, Secretary Wilson on 30 September asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to

review the current strategic concept and to suggest revisions to adapt it to the

forces considered realistically feasible by 1956. He lorwarded proposals submitted by the United Kingdom, the substance of which was that NATO should

accept the virtual impossibility of majcr increases and concentrate on maintaining the minimum force needed to deter aggression.1

*

9

Secretary Wilson's request was passed to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee,

which, in a report dated 16 October 1953, revealed a difference of opinion concerning the feasibility of the forward strategy. The Army and Navy members

believed that such a strategy could be implemented if force goals were met and if

NATO forces were given an integrated atomic capability. The Air Force member

contended that such a strategy "could not be successfully implemented under

conditions which presently obtain." All the JSPC members agreed, however,

that it was essential to pursue the attainment of stated force requirements pending a revaluation of NATO strategy.*0

Without attempting to settle ih* issue that had divided the Committee, the

Jtint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary Wilson on 22 Oct»*her 1953 that time did

not permit a complete reappraisal of NATO strategy. The 1953 Annual Review

should therefore be considered an interim process pending a thorough study of

force requirements in relation to new weapons, which should be undertaken by

the Standing Group before the 1954 Review.*'

The British proposals were studied by a State-Defense working group that

included Assistant Secretary Nash and an adviser designated by the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, CokmeJ W.R, GoodncK USA.*5 The members of this body decided that

the British views were compatible with those of the United States and should be

discussed further by the two governments. However, like the Joint Chiefs of

298

■■■'..

HW^WPWSF
Western Europe, 1953

Staff, they believed that a full reassessment of NATO strategy should be deferred

until the following year.93 Their conclusions were considered by the Joint Chiefs

of Staff to be suitable, with minor corrections as a basis for discussion with the

United Kingdom.94

On 10 December 1953 President Eisenhower and the National Security Council discussed the forthcoming meeting of the North Atlantic Council. They agreed

that the Department of State would conduct confidential discussions with allied

governments regarding the redeployment of US forces, but that no public statement would be made on this subject without the President's approval, and that

there would be no public discussion of the effects of new weapons on strategy or

deployment.95

Secretaries Dulles, Wilson, and Humphrey again headed the US delegation

to the North Atlantic Council when it met in Paris between 14-16 December

1953. None of the Joint Chiefs of Staff attended; the principal military representative was General Collins.*6

The Secretary of State used the meeting as an opportunity to proclaim publicly the importance that the United States attached to the EDC treaty. In his

view, as explained at a news conference, EDC was primarily valuable for its

political importance. He saw it as a means of insuring harmony between France

and Germany and thus of ending the suicidal strife that had plagued Europe for

so long. "In essence, that is the European policy which we are trying *o cooperate with, and we earnestly hope that that policy will be brought to a successful

condusion." he said. "If, contrary to our hopes and beliefs, it should not happen

that way." continued Secretary Dulles, in what was to become another of his

memorable phrases, "it would force from the United States an agonizing reappraisal of its foreign policies."*7

At the meeting, the Council reduced the goals it had approved eight months

earlier and abandoned those established at Lisbon in 1952. (See Table 19.) Objectives for land forces for 1954 were cut to 47 */j M-day divisions (of which 18 were

Greek and Turkish), with a further reduction to 47 for 1956. A US aircraft

contribution of 1,628 was approved for 1954 but the overall total was reduced to

6,72$ aircraft. Only in naval forces did the Council anticipate that the earlier 1954

goal would be substantially achieved.1*

Secretary Wilson, in a statement before the Council, implied some doubt that

the United States would be able to meet its obligation of eight Army divisions by

M plus 30 days; he promised only that his country would try to do so as far as

practicable. On the other hand, he announced that the Air Force now planned to

station more aircraft in Europe than expected, and to send two Matador missile

squadrons to Europe in 1954 and two more in 1955.**

The Secretary again stressed the k>ng haul."We should get accustomed to

thinking in long-range terms/* he zatä. "We still have many unresolved que*

tion* it\ our relations with the Soviets* And this condition setms likely to continue for an extended period of time" More significantly, he K**ht to lay the

groundwork for a redirection of NATO strategy. Tfce administration, he declared,

planned to seek legislative authorisation to provide other countries with information about nuclear weapons "In 0rdtr that NATO military plans may reflect

299
*

]CS and National Policy

Table l*-Force Goal. Approved by North Atlantic Council:

December 1953

Font

Army divisions

United States

Other

Total

divisions

Navy Ships

NATO command

United States

Other

National command

United States

Other

Combined NATO

and national

command

United States

Other

Total »hip»

Air Fore«

squadron»

and aircraft

United State*

Squadron*

Aircraft

Other

Squadron»

Aircraft

Total

fttfuadron»

Total aircraft

1954

Firm Commitment

M-day

•5s/,

41*/,

47'/,

319

308

93

256

412

564

976

77

1,628

270',

SJÜü

6.72»

M-doy

Plus

30 Days

93'/,

102V:»

514

877

184

784

m

1.661

2,359

<b>

(b)

(b)

m

(b)

1955

Provisional Coal

M-dcy

5

s

/,

42

48

319

331

93

275

412

606

1.018

7?

1.628

304

5,754

m

7.382

M-doy

Plus

30 Days

95

104

514

927

184

870

698

1.797

2.495

m

(bl

tb)

<b)

(bi

1956

Planning Coal

M-day

5

s

/,

41

47

319

^1

93

282

412

:13

1.035

77

1,628

311

5,856

388

'.484

M-day

Plus

30 Days

8

s

/,

95*/,

104'/,

514

966

184

901

698

1.867

2.565

tb)

tb)

tb)

Ibi

(bl

« fraction» refer to re^ment* **4 r*#mrntai combat team*

* Not *v*ü*bW

*— USHOUAKT. «PM «- NATO »<« A«.«! fcrtw «l*""»»*^DttSI*

w«Mf«< e««*» *•««• «"«**>

300
K

Western Europe, 1953

these new capabilities to the fullest extent possible," he continued, "effective

procedures for their use must be devised promptly.. . . New weapons are always

costly, but they will result in a greater military potential for all of NATO."100

Secretary Wilson's views seemed to be reflected in a lengthy resolution enacted

by the Council to guide the 1954 Annual Review. One section of this resolution

agreed that "it will be necessary for member countries to support over a long

period of time forces which, by their balance, quality, and efficiency ot armament,

will be a major factor in deterring aggression." Another directed that the 1954

Review would be based on the assumption that, from 1955 through 1957, defense

expenditures would be at approximately the present level. Most important was

the following portion of the resolution, which invited the NATO Military

Committee:

(a) To keep under continuous review, within the framework of the agreed

strategic concept, the size and nature of the forces required to defend the

NATO area, taking account of developments in military technology, Soviet

capabilities, and the overall strategic situation, in order to provide general

Guidance to NATO defense planning;

o press on with their reassessment of the most effective pattern of military strength for the next few vears within the resources which it is

anticipated may be made available.101

The substance of this resolution was reported to the press in the communique released after the meeting, which noted that the 1953 goals had been substantially met. At the same time, the announcement made it clear that NATO

had been wholly converted to the long haul concept, as the latter was interpreted by the Eisenhower administration. "The Atlantic Community," it was

asserted, "must ... be prepared to keep in being over a period of years forces

and weapons . . , which member countries can afford while at the same time

maintaining and strengthening their economic and social structures"103

By the terms of its resolution, the North Atlantic Council set NATO along the

path that the administration was already taking in connection with US strategy.

A reassessment of force structure in the light of limited available resources and

of the progress of military technology was the process that had led to the New

look. It was not difficult to forecast that the outcome of the NATO review would

be similar. Occurring largely in 1954, the developments that followed from the

Council's action are treated in the next chapter.

301
1

14

Western Europe, 1954

In 1953 the Western Powers had initiated diplomatic approaches that, if

successful, would result in a liquidation of the major European problems left

over from World War II—the status of Germany and Austria—and, perhaps,

lead to a settlement of the cold war. The United States had participated in these

actions with a reluctance that stemmed from doubts of the sincerity of the

Soviets' professed desire for peace. Diplomatic exchanges between the Soviet

Union and the Western Powers had eventuated in an agreement to hold a

conference of foreign ministers to discuss Germany and Austria.

The Berlin Conference

The opening of the conference was set for 25 January 1954 in Berlin. Before it

began, disputes over the precise locations for the meeting augured poorly

for the prospects of success. It was finally agreed to alternate the meeting site

between the Western and Eastern sectors t>i the divided city.1

On the appointed day, Secretary of State Dulles and the Foreign Ministers of

the father three major powers—Georges tüdault of France, Anthony Eden of the

United Kingdom, and Vyacheslav M- Molotov oi the Soviet Union-Assembled

in the former German capital. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had been invited to send

^n observer but had declined, asking only that they be kept informed of developments of interest to them.2

Hop» for agreement aid not long survive the opening of the meeting. On

the key issue, the unification of Germany, the Western Powers proposed free

elections, to be followed by a national convention and the formation of a German government. Rejecting this plan. Forei^i Minister Molotov urged immediate establishment of an all-German government through fusion of the existing

regimes in East and West German with elections to follow later. He insisted

tha thy new state must be peace-U, >g and must not enter any coalition ot

303
JCS and National Poliqj

military alliance. He also put forth a plan for a fifty-year collective security

treaty, admittedly intended as a substitute for the EDC treaty. The West found it

unacceptable.

When the conferees realized that agreement on Germany was impossible,

they turned to Austria, with no better results. The Soviet Union sought conditions in any Austrian settlement that, to Western eyes, looked like pretexts for

indefinitely maintaining Soviet troops in that country.

The sole accomplishment of the meeting was an agreement to hold another

conference at Geneva to discuss Far Eastern problems. It was this Geneva Conference that finally ended the war in Indochina, as described in Chapter 12.'

The outcome of the Berlin Conference removed all doubt that the division of

Europe into hostile Eastern and Western blocs would continue for the foreseeable future. Plainly it was necessary for the Western allies to continue their efforts

to strengthen NATO and to rearm West CcrnnanyLaunching NATO's New Approach

The North Atlantic Council in December 1953 had virtually abandoned any

hope of a massive increase in forces and had ordered a review of strategy

and force structure that would take account of advancing weapons technology.

It was reasonable to conclude that one result of this restudy would be a decision

to incorporate tactical nuclear weapons into NATO's strategic planning. Such a

decision would require revision of the tight US legal restrictions on the dissemination of knowledge of nuclear weapons and their effect». Secretary Wilson had

promised the Council in December that these restrictions would be relaxed. The

promise was carried out in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which authorized the

President ^s\d the Secretary of Defense to enter into bilateral or multilateral

agreements for exchange of nucleaf information with other nuclear nations*

Hut the introductio»i of nuclear weapons into thr NATO arsenal would raise

a number of difficult questions. For example, who would control the use of the

new weapons? Would SACEUR be allowed to order their use? If so. would he do

so on receipt of intelligence warning of probable attack, or must he wait lor overt

action by an enemy? Or would he be required to refer the question to his civilian

superiors in the North Atlantic Council, with a consequent deiav that might be

fatal?

Another prospective difficulty was the possible effect on public opinion in

Europe. Knowledge thai NATO planned to conduct nuclear wartare on land

must inevitably leak out. The result might be a public outcry that governments

could not ignore.

A; a special ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council im 23 Aprii

1951. held in connection with the Geneva Conference on Far Eastern problems,

Secretary of State Dulles m*&t a statement that was dearly intended to prepare

the leaders of the European NATO countries to accept a nuclear strategy rie

stressed the great disparity in conventional m&tary strength between the West

301

in i vv*
Western Europe, 1954

and the Soviet bloc. Nuclear weapons, he asserted, provided the only opportunity to close this gap and constituted the sole justification for NATO's recent

decision to level off the buildup in numerical strength. To abjure the use of these

weapons, continued Secretary Dulles, would amount to self-imposed military

inferiority, which would invite war instead of deterring it. The forces of NATO

must be free to regard nuclear weapons as conventional and to use them as

military advantage dictated. The Council took no formal action on the matter at

that time.5

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had already been brought face to face with some of

the difficulties inherent in a nuclear strategy. Early in 1954, the French and

Italian members of the Military Committee commented on the probability that

US troops in NATO would eventually be extensively armed with nuclear weapons and that the conventional component of NATO's forces would by itself

become too weak to offer effective resistance to an invader. When that day

arrived, they pointed out, the other members of NATO would lie wholly at the

mercy of the Unifed States, which retained in its own hands the power to decide

when or whether to use nuclear arms.6

The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to study

this matter. Reporting on 27 May 1954, the Committee members observed that

"the problem consists of a number of related components which should be viewed

as a whole in seeking a basis for the timely application of the combined Allied

military resources, particularly tactical atomic resources, with the greatest

effectiveness." To provide such a basis, it would be necessary for the United

States and the other NATO nations, before hostilities began, to work out agreements covering the following subjects:

(1) US operating rights in foreign territories (i.e., the right to use bases for

units equipped with nuclear weapons; authority for overflights by aircraft

or missiles carrying nuclear weapons; authority for introduction and movement of US atomic units intended to support NATO).

(2) Exchange of nuclear information between the United States and its allies.

(3) The kind of measures to be taken after a warning (before overt attack).

(4) The role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy.

The United States should at once seek a comprehensive agreement, according to the committee, under which all necessary US operating rights would be

"granted by the single decision by which each NATO Government commits its armed

forces to action." Moreover, NATO commanders should be authorized in advance

to carry out in full the provisions of approved defense plans, without reference

to higher authority7

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved these conclusions and sent them to the

Secretary of Defense on 11 June 1954.8 Mr. Wilson took no immediate action.

The strategic review ordered by the North Atlantic Council in December 1953

awaited the conclusion of studies of FY 1957 force requirements by the major

NATO commanders: SACEUR and his naval counterpart, the Supreme Allied

Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), and the separate command for the English

Channel. These studies were completed in July 1954.9 Although they cannot

305
JCS and National Polio/

now be located, it appears that the studies concluded that nuclear weapons

would inevitably be used in any future war; that the initial phase of such a

conflict would in large measure be decisive; and that war plans must be amended

to reflect these facts.10 General Collins, the US representative in the Standing

Group, sent these studies to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicating that they would

become the basis of a draft report on NATO strategy to be prepared by the

Standing Group. Comments by the three Standing Group member nations would

be incorporated into a revised version of this report, which General Collins

hoped would be ready for circulation to the Military Representatives Committee

by 1 October. Thence it would go to the Military Committee, which was expected

to act on it by the end of November.11

The Standing Group draft, SG 241/3, was sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on

13 August 1954. This paper was based on a forecast that a future war would

probably be decided in the first few days or weeks by an intensive exchange of

nuclear weapons. The conclusion followed that NATO, instead of planning to

mobilize maximum strength after D-day, should concentrate on maintaining

combat-ready forces in being, equipped with nuclear arms. General Collins, in

forwarding it, informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he himself had drafted

several of the paragraphs. He had followed as far as possible the language of the

JCS memorandum of 11 June 1954 to the Secretary of Defense regarding the role

of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy, which has been described above.12

Meanwhile Secretary Wilson had decided it was time to take up with Secretary Dulles the issues that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had raised in that memorandum. On 16 August he sent a copy to tne Secretary of State, noting that

considerable psychological conditioning of the other NATO countries would be

needed to obtain the kind of agreements the Joint Chiefs of Staff desired. The

new approach studies recently prepared by the NATO commanders might lay

the basis for a suitable approach, since they showed "the absolute necessity for

'normalized' use of atomic weapons in the defense of Western Europe."13

On 26 August 1954 Actir; Secretary Anderson told the Joint Chiefs of Staff

that their recommendations were under discussion. But, he continued, JCS action

on SG 241/3 was a necessary prerequisite to negotiations with other countries.u

In other words, the United States must be equipped with an expert opinion from

its highest military authorities that the immediate use of nuclear weapons in war

was essential to the defense of Europe

Collapse of the European Defense Community

Tust at this juncture, plans were disrupted by the final repudiation of the

I European Defense Community, on which so many hopes had been pinned.

The consequences of this development were serious, and potentially disastrous,

for Western politico-military cooperation.

Ostensibly, the EDC treaty had made progress early in 1954. Three signatories—the Netherlands, Belgium, and West Germany—ratified it.15 The North

306

,.,

.
Western Europe, 1954

Atlantic Council, in its ministerial meeting in April 1954, welcomed these developments and again affirmed the importance of EDC16

But these ratifications would count for nothing unless France could be induced

to follow suit. In that country, opposition appeared to intensify as time went on.

None of the successive French governments that held office during 1953 had

ventured to submit the treaty to the National Assembly. The prospect of diplomatic discussions with the Soviet Union provided one pretext for postponement,

since EDC would become unnecessary if an East-West accommodation could be

reached. But the failure of the Berlin Conference did nothing to placate French

opponents of the treaty, who includeda number of influential men in the Assembly and elsewhere in public life. Notable among these was General Charles de

Gaulle, not then in power but possessed of considerable personal prestige.A

particularly startling development was criticism of EDC by Marshal Juin on 30

March 1954—criticism that cost the Marshal his position with the French Army,

though not his NATO post as CINCCENTER.

17

In part, French objection to the EDC treaty was based on the fact that it ran

for 50 years, while the* North Atlantic Pact would expire after 20 years. Thus as

early as 1969, US and British forces might depart the Continent, leaving an

unwilling France in an unequal partnership witha dominant Germany. This

prospect seemed to justify French requests for additional guarantees from the

United States and United Kingdom. On 13 April 1954 the United Kingdom

signed an agreement pledging close cooperation with the EDC signatories.

Simultaneously the British government publicly declared it had no intention to

withdraw from the Continent so long as European security was threatened from

any direction and that it regarded NATO as of indefinite duration. President

Eisenhower gavea similar guarantee on 16 April 1954.

18

The President's statement—like that made by Secretary Dulles in Paris four

months earlier—indicated the great importance the administration attached to

EDC. This interest was shared by Congress, which attempted to apply leverage

through its control of foreign aid funds. The Mutual Security Act of 1953 had

specified that 50 percent of the equipment and materials made available to

European countries should go to the European Defense Community or to countries which become members thereof.,g The corresponding Act of 1954 provided

that aid programmed for EDC signatories for FYs 1954 and 1955 was to be

delivered only to those that had ratified the treaty and were participating in

"collective defense programs ina manner satisfactory to the United States as

determined by the President."20

The endless reshuffling of French governments brought Pierre Mendes-France

to the premiership in June 1954. His publicly expressed attitude toward EDC

was ambiguous. After an abortive effort to drafta compromise that would satisfy

both the proponents and the foes of the treaty, he laid before the French Assembly a new set of proposals to water down the effectiveness of EDC by allowing

membersa limited right of veto. This action not only failed to appease the critics

at home but alarmed the other prospective member countries.

21

During these months, the Joint Chiefs o» Staff had never wavered in their

conviction that German military and economic strength was an essential compo307

*
JCS and National Policy

nent of an adequate European defensive alignment. The new JCS members

believed this as emphatically as the old. Even General Twining, the principal

opponent of a land-based strategy, shared this conviction, or at least acquiesced

in it. The New Look increased the importance of the German contribution, since

troops from that country might take up the slack if US forces were to be

withdrawn. In their New Look strategy paper, JCS 2101/113, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff declared that "the full German potential for creating and maintaining military forces must be utilized."22 Early in 1954, in appraising the prospects for the

remainder of the decade, they declared: "A satisfactory Free World military

posture will be dependent in large measure on ... the early establishment of

German and Japanese forces .... Positive measures should be taken in order to

attain at an early date a German military contribution to the Free World military

posture, preferably through ratification ofEDC; otherwise by alternative means. '

/23

It was becoming increasingly clear that the time had come to think of alternative means. On 22 June 1954 Secretary Wilson reminded the Joint Chiefs of Staff

that planning along this line had been recommended in NSC 160/1. "It is

understood," he wrote, "that this requirement had been suspended by the

President in view of the delicacy of the matter but that such a suspension is not

now interpreted as precluding planning within the Defense and State Departments." He accordingly asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their views.24

The JCS reply listed only two possible alternatives: (1) full NATO membership for West Germany; or (2) independent rearming of that country by the

United States and the United Kingdom. The former course was preferable; the

threat of the latter might be used to induce France to ratify the EDC treaty or to

accept Germany in NATO. If neither could be attained, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

said, then the United States should reappraise its basic policy toward Western

Europe and NATO.25

The Departments of Defense and State discussed the JCS views over the next

few weeks but reached no conclusions. They also considered ways in which the

US and British Governments might undertake to rearm Germany on their own

initiative if the French Parliament failed to ratify EDC at its current session.26

A similar process of reexamination was under way in London. A possibility

under consideration by the British Government was that France might be induced

to accept West Germany in NATO if some of the restrictions on German arms

and armament written into the EDC treaty were transferred to NATO.27

The French Assembly opened debate on the EDC treaty, at long last, on 28

August 1954. By that time, there was little doubt about the outcome. The end

came two days later, when the Assembly voted to adjourn debate on this subject

sine die.2* The European Defense Community was dead—and also, it seemed at

the time, the bright dream of Franco-German military and political reconciliation.

308

i

f"f "
Western Europe, 1954 I

Effects on US Policy President Eisenhower lost no time in characterizing the failure of the EDC

pioject asa serious setback for the West.

29

Secretary Dulles, ina press release on 31 August 1954, spoke of it as a saddening event, which imposed on the

United States the obligation to reappraise its foreign policies. At the same time,

however, he indicated that the US reaction would be temperate and that the reappraisal might not be so agonizing as he had indicated earlier. As he said:

We need not feel that the European idea is dead .... There is still much on

which to build, and those foundations should not be shaken by any abrupt or

any ill-considered action of our own .... [The] tragedy would be compounded if

the United States was ... led to conclude that it must turn toa course of narrow

nationalism. ... we shall be governed by the realization that we cannot in

isolation find safety for ourselves.

The Secretary concluded witha call fora ministerial meeting of the North

Atlantic Council to discuss alternatives to EDC.

M

Within the administration, plans to meet the new situation were developed

on two levels. At the higher one, the National Security Council reviewed basic

policy toward Western Europe and adopteda statement on the subject on 24

September 1954. The Council recommended that the United States seek promptly

to associate the German Federal Republic with the West by bringing abouta

restoration of its sovereignty, its admission to NATO, and the beginning of its

rearmament. Other objectives should be to seek to reverse divisive trends in

Western Europe and to foster all practical measures fora greater degree of

integration of Western Europe. The Secretary of State was asked to report by 28

October 1954 whether or not he considered these objectives attainable; if he did

not, others would be considered.

31

Meanwhile the Joint Chiefs of Staff were discussing the French action as it

affected military strategy.

32 On 10 September Deputy Secretary Anderson asked

them to reappraise US military policy in Western Europe and to indicate the

adjustments in US and NATO military plans that would be needed under varying degrees of French opposition to, or noncooperation with, alternative plans to

rearm Germany.

33

A week earlier he had asked them to submit by 15 Octobera

comprehensive plan for West German rearmament, adaptable to any political

framework that might ultimately be agreed upon.

34

Before they could comply with these requests, the Joint Chiefs of Staff found

themselves obligated to provide Secretary Dulles with an authoritative opinion

on West Germany's military value. The Secretary of State was preparing fora

trip to Bonn and London on 16 September, as part of the diplomatic efforts then

under way to repair the damage done by the French Assembly.

35 On 15 September 1954 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a statement, the substance of which

was conveyed in the following sentences: A German contribution is essential. The United States should seek

a German

contribution.. . . preferably with the concurrence of the French and British but if

this cannot be obtained we should be willing to go as far as makinga bilateral

309

4 ,-*'
JCS and National Poliqj

agreement with the Gentians....A really sound defense of Europe depends on

an adequate contribution from both Germany and France as well as the smaller

nations. Failure to obtain French cooperation fora German contribution at this

time will therefore requirea basic change in NATO commitments and structure

but this should not deter the United States from working out the best possible

arrangements with Western Germany in our own interests as well as the interests of a free Europe.36

The Joint Strategic Survey Committee had by then drafteda tentative reappraisal of military policy in Europe. The Committee upheld the validity of the

basic premise of US strategy in Europe, the assumption that collective defense

was essential in order to deny Western Europe to the Soviets. An optimum

defense required collaboration of both France and Germany, but if it became

necessary to choose between them, the latter, with its larger military potential,

was to be preferred. The best method of integrating West Germany into European defense would be to admit her to NATO, but any politically acceptable

solution that would producea German army of about twelve divisions could be

suitable. If France remained obdurate, the United States and other allies should

proceed independently to rearm Germany. Should France go so far as to withdraw from NATO, a forward defense of West Germany 'hould be organized,

with lines of communication based on the ports of the Low Countries. Ifa

majority of NATO countries would not support German rearmament, the United

States and the United Kingdom should rearm their occupation zones in

cooperation. The Committee concluded, however, with words of caution:

It would be futile and injudicious for the United States to undertake the

unilateral rearmament of West Germany. Only asa last resort and in recognition

ofa complete bankruptcy of our European policy should the United States withdraw her forces from Europe ana adopt a peripheral strategy.37

What to do in case of French noncooperation was considered in more detail

by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee. The substance of the Committee's report

was that the degree of adjustment in strategy would depend on the nature and

intensity of French opposition. Under the worst conceivable case—French withdrawal from NATO and adoption of all possible means of obstruction short of

open hostility-—US policy toward NATO would have to be completely reappraised.36

The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent these two reports back to the Committees to be

combined into one.

39 The result was

a split in the Joint Strategic Plans Committee.

The Navy and the Air Force members supported the view of the Joint Strategic

Survey Committee that the United States should if necessary proceed with German rearmament, in concert with other NATO nations, in the face of French

disapproval. The Army member believed thata tenable defensive position in

Western Europe was all but impossible without France, and that there was consequently no alternative to persistence in the attempt to enlist French cooperation.40

Discarding the abortive efforts of the Committees, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on

22 September 1954 referred the Secretory of Defense to their statement of 15

September, which had emphasized the importance of both France and West

Germany while suggesting the possibility ofa bilateral agreement with the latter.

310

i
1

Western Europe, 1954

They suggested that, if the support of other NATO nations could be obtained, it

might be possible to reorient NATO strategy to make greater use of naval and air

bases in the United Kingdom and Spain, while rearming West Germany with no

restrictions on the size of her armed forces or her rate of war production. If other

countries would not agree,a joint rearmament of the British and US zones

should be undertaken. The possibility that the United Kingdom might not cooperate was not considered. The Joint Chiefs of Staff said nothing about the possibility of withdrawal from Europe.41

Secretary Wilson sent these conclusions to the National Security Council

with his approval.

42 By that time, however, the outlines of

a solution to the

Franco-German problem were beginning to emerge. The eventual admission of

West Germany to NATO, with the assent of France, obviated any need for the

revision in US policy and strategy that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had suggested.

Evolution of the New Approach The defeat of the EDC treaty jeopardized the Standing Group's schedule for

processing SG 241/3, the draft report on NATO strategy. When the Joint

Chiefs o( Staff considered this paper on3 September 1954, Admiral Radford

pointed out that it assumed the existence of German forces and therefore could

not be evaluated until the status of West Germany had been settled. Evidently

agreeing with him, his colleagues took no formal action at that time.

43

But action could not be put off indefinitely. The Standing Group was scheduled to meet in Paris with the Council on 15 September 1954 for preliminary

discussion of SG 241/3 and the commanders' capabilities studies. Representatives of the State and Defense Departments, discussing plans for this meeting,

agreed that General Collins, as Chairman of the Standing Group, should

announce that the review of strategy was not yet complete but that there could

be no doubt of the need to reach approved force goals or to obtaina German

contribution. Then, donning his other hat as the US representative in the Group,

General Collins would report that, although the US Joint Chiefs of Staff planned

to reserve formal comment on SG 241/3 until after the German question had

been settled, the United States would not object to the informal circulation ofa

revised version to the Military Representatives Committee.

44 The Joint Chiefs of

Staff took note of this State-Defense agreement on 10 September, while agreeing

that it did not relieve them of their responsibility for taking an official position on

SG 241/3.

45

General Collins followed his instructions at the joint Standing Group-Council

meeting on 15 September. In answer to questions, he gavea

r

his opinion thata

final version of SG 241/3, with definitive conclusions on ATO strategy and

forces, could be ready for submission to the Council in December if the German

question could be settled by 15 November.46

The Joint Strategic Plans Committee studied SG 241/3 for the Joint Chiefs of

Staff and submitteda split report on 10 September 1954. The Army, Navy, and

311

»
I

/CS and National Policy

Marine Corps members believed that it overemphasized the probable effectiveness of nuclear weapons and misrepresented the conclusions of the capabilities

studies. This contention was denied by the Air Force member, who commented

incidentally thata German army, though politically and psychologically valuable,

was not militarily essential for the defense of Western Europe.47

Instead of acting on the JSPC report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 24 September

1954 approveda revised version of SG 241/3 and sent it to the Secretary of

Defense asa statement of their views (necessarilya tentative one, since the

status of Germany was still unsettled). Apparently they did not significantly

alter the original SG 241/3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted the principal

assumption, that nuclear weapons would inevitably be used in war, and the

resulting conclusion, that NATO plans should stress forces in being.

48

Secretary Wilson sent this paper to Secretary Dulles on 27 September 1954

and recommended that it be used asa basis for developinga US position, in

preparation for the next Council meeting, on the role of nuclear weapons in

NATO strategy. He proposed to recall General Gruenther, the Supreme Allied

Commander, to obtain his views on the subject.49

The State Department approved the JCS paper subject to several minor

changes and to the right to make further suggestions later if it so desired.

50 The

Standing Group then drafted another version, IPT 178/15, that incorporated the

comments of the French and British Chiefs of Staff. General Collins sent this to

the Joint Chiefs of Staff on5 October 1954, expressing the opinion that its

differences from the JCS draft were matters of wording rather than substance.

51

The Joint Chiefs of Staff took no immediate action, perhaps awaiting developments on the German problem, which was nearing solution.

On6 October 1954 General Gruenther conferred in Washington with representatives of the Defense and State Departments. The conferees agreed that the

United States should seek to developa nuclear capability in the NATO alliance.

Accordingly, at the December Council meeting the United States should push

for approval ofa final version of SG 241/3, which would commit NATO toa

nuclear strategy. There should be no effort at that time to induce the other

members to commit themselves to the use of nuclear weapons in war or to grant

operating rights for nuclear-armed US forces. But the United States should draft a formal agreement for sharing nuclear information, under the terms of the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and submit it to the North Atlantic Council, in order

to get it before Congress as early as possible in 1955.

K

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their memorandum of 11 June 1954, had argued

the immediate necessity of obtaining precisely the kind of commitments from

other countries that were ruled out under the agreement reached at this

conference. It was therefore with some reluctance that they approved this

agreement. They did so because they accepted the governing influence of political considerations in this matter.53

Armed with the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretaries Wilson

and Dulles, accompanied by Admiral Radford and General Collins, submitted

their plans to the President on3 November 1954. They summarized the content

312 'v

'£
A

Western Europe, 1954

of the revised Standing Group strategy paper (IPT 178/15), emphasizing its conclusion that Soviet aggression could be deterred or defeated only if nuclear

weapons could be used immediately in case of hostilities. They believed that the

current political climate made it unwise to press the North Atlantic Council to

authorize the use of these weapons. But the Council's approval of IPT 178/15

was a necessary first step. To obtain this approval, they explained, it would be

necessary for the United States to promise its allies that its forces in NATO

would be fully equipped with atomic weapons. If other countries raised

objections, the United States should be ready to assure them that it had no

thought of preventive war and that it was willing to explore bona fide disarmament proposals. A formal agreement for release of nuclear information should

be presented at the meeting, but the question of US operating rights was not to

be raised until later.

The effect of the new nuclear strategic concept on force structure was not yet

clear, the advisers told the President, but there was little hope that it would

reduce costs. It might require a considerable change in the Military Assistance

Program (for example, to finance stronger air defense), and the administration

should be ready to assure other countries that it would attempt to persuade

Congress to accept these changes.

President Eisenhower approved these proposals and agreed to consult with

Congress as necessary to carry them out. Admiral Radford entered one caveat:

the United States should not give the impression that it was willing to assume

the entire burden of reequipping the forces of NATO nations to fit the new

strategic concept. The President made it clear that no such action was intended;

all that was contemplated was a reorientation of military assistance to develop

the kind of forces that would be needed.54

West Germany Joins NATO

By the time these decisions were made, the Western Powers had at last

accomplished what had for a time appeared impossible; they had settled

the delicate German question in a way that satisfied everyone. The hero of this

success story was Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Her

Majesty's Government. His solution was to bring West Germany into NATO

with accompanying restrictions modeled after those in EDC.

The key to this solution was provided by the Brussels Treaty, signed in

March 1948 by France, the United Kingdom, and the Benelux countries. It had

established a Western European Union for mutual defense and politico-economic

cooperation, which had become the nucleus for the NATO alliance established the next year. In French eyes the Brussels Treaty combined some of the

advantages of the EDC and the North Atlantic Treaty, like the former, it had a

duration of 50 years, and like the latter, it included the United Kingdom. To

enlarge the Western European Union to admit West Germany-^and Italy as

313

• . mm
JCS and National Policy

well, in order to complete the absorption of the old EDC—would thus establish

Franco-German cooperation on a basis that omitted some of the objectionable

features (as France saw them) of the EDC. All the members of the Union could

accept restrictions on their military forces that would keep West Germany from

feeling that it had been singled out for invidious treatment. At the same time, a

Germany thus subjected to suitable controls became, for France, an acceptable

member of NATO.

The outlines of this solution were worked out by Anthony Eden, with assistance from Secretary Dulles, in a hasty tour of European capitals in September

1954. The first. suit of this activity was an agreement by the United Kingdom,

the United States, and Canada, plus the six signatories of the EDC treaty, to

meet in London on 28 September 1954 to discuss the details of the projected

settlement.55

On 21 September Mr. Hensel officially notified the joint Chiefs of Staff that

this conference would be held. He forwarded some proposals made by Premier

Mendes-France concerning limitations on German arms production and other

matters.56 The joint Chiefs of Staff replied on 22 September that they would

agree to any politically feasible arrangement that resulted in a German military

establishment about as large as that envisioned under EDC, but they warned

that German arms production should not be too narrowly restricted. Any US

guarantee given the revised Brussels Treaty Organization, they felt, should be

general in nature, like that given by President Eisenhower to EDC in April 1954;

there should be no promise to maintain any specific minimum force.5

Meeting in London between 28 September and 3 October 1954, the representatives of the nine nations agreed that West Germany and Italy would be invited

to accede to the Brussels Treaty and that the former would be offered membership in NATO at the next meeting of the North Atlantic Council. The signatories

of the Brussels Treaty would contribute forces to NATO as requested by that

organization; the size of these forces was not t be increased without unanimous

consent of all signatories. Production of armaments by the members of the

Brussels Treaty Organization was to be internationally supervised. The United

Kingdom promised to maintain, on the mainland of Europe, its present strength

(four divisions plus a tactical air force), or whatever SACEUR regarded as the

equivalent, and never to withdraw these forces without the consent of a majority

of members of the Western European Union.

France, the United Kingdom, and the United States declared their intention

to liquidate the last vestiges of the occupation regime in West Germany as soon

a^ the necessary instruments could be drafted for the purpose. On its part. West

Germany promised to observe the principles of the UN Charter and to refrain

from any action inconsistent with the strictly defensive character of the Brussels

Treaty and the North Atlantic Pact. It also foreswore recourse to force in reunifying its territories and agreed never to manufacture atomic, biological or chemical weapons.

The rearmament of West Germany wss to be regulated by proposals to be

drawn up later and approved by the North Atlantic Council. The size and gen314
I

Western Europe, 1954

eral character of the German NATO contingent would follow the provisions of

the EDC treaty.

AU forces of NATO countries stationed on the continent of Europe were to

be placed under SACEUR except those exempted by NATO as suitable for national

command. The national contingents under SACEUR were to be integrated as far

as possible consistent with military efficiency. SACEUR was given increased

authority to regulate the arrangements for logistic support of his forces.

56

A special meeting of the North Atlantic Council, held in Paris between 19 and

2% October 1954, put the finishing touches on this complex arrangement. The

Council approved protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty that (1) invited the

Federal Republic of Germany to accede, (2) formally ended the occupation regime,

and (3) decreed that the maximum size of the forces to be placed under SACEUR

by France and Germany would be the same as in the EDC treaty. Appropriate

protocols to the Brussels Treaty were also adopted.A lengthy resolution adopted

by the Council spelled out details of SACEUR's extended authority in the field of

logistics.

59

It remained only to have these protocols ratified by the national parliaments.

There was to be one more flurry of alarm in this connection in December 1954,

whena preliminary vote in the French Assembly suggested that that body might

yet reject them. But the fears proved groundless; the protocols were approved

ona final vote.

60

This happy outcome obviated the need for any agonizing reappraisal of US

policy. On 28 October 1954 the National Security Council accepted the German

problem as settled and decided to require no further discussion of European

policy.*

1

The results also $^'t relevance to the plan for German rearmament that the

joint Chiefs of Staff, in response to Mr. Anderson's request, submitted on 13

October 1954. They proposeda West German military force of the following size

and composition: an army of 12 divisions, organized into one field army and

four corps with supporting elements, all to follow US models;a navy comprised

of 311 vessels(motor torpedo boats, escort and harbor patrol ships, minesweepers,

minelayers, and landing craft), with an air arm of 30 (to be increased later to 200)

aircraft; and an air force with 1,326 aircraft (600 fighter-bombers, 108 fighterreconnaissance, 450 day-fighters, 72 all-weather fighters, ^nd 96 transports). The

totals in each case were identical with those proposed under the EDC treaty. The

rearmament and training of these forces, said the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should be

undertaken 9» soon as possible. Overall training responsibility was ;o be assigned

to USCINCEU& who might further delegate it to his component commanders

and toa military assistance advisory group to be established for Germany.

Detailed schedules of training and action *nd lists of required facilities, prepared

by the US Services, were included with the JCS plans*

2

Despite the JCS desire for haste, some weeks were still to elapse before the

plan could be put into effect. The final political settlement left it to the North

Atlantic Council to regulate German rearmament. On 28 December 1954, after

the Council had gone on record witha statement stressing the need for West

315 i
;- 1 i k 1 • 1

JCS and National Policy

German forces, Assistant Secretary Hensel approved tht JCS proposals for planning purposes.63

Secretary Wilson had already approveda JCS recommendation

for the establishment ofa MAAG for West Germany, to be headed by an Army

General.64

Approval of the New Approach After the political stalemate was broken, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were able to

take official action on IPT 178/15, the draft paper on NATO strategy. They

completed their review of it on5 November 1954. They considered that it was in

harmony with their guidance, although in certain passages they preferred the

wording that they had suggested earlier in their redraft of SG 241/3.**

After undergoing approval by the Military Representatives Committee, IPT

178/15, now retitled MC 48, was placed on the agenda fora meeting of the

Military Committee on 22 November. The US Representative in the Standing

Group, in sending MC 48 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assured them that its

provisions reflecteda general acceptance of their comments on IPT 178/15; he

recommended approval.*

6

Since General Collins had recently been givena new assignment as President

Eisenhower's special representative in South Vietnam,

67 Admiral Radfotd

planned to represent the United States at the 22 November meeting of the

Military Committee, which was to be held in Washington, Possibly for that

reason, the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared no written comments on MC 48. Before

the meeting. Admiral Radford received formal instructions from Mr. Hensel's

office. He was directed to uphold the general policy approved by the President

on3 November, while avoiding, insofar as possible, any discussion of political

complications.

6

*

The committee met as scheduled and approved MC 48, witha few changes

that Admiral Radford considered acceptable in the light of US guidance.** The

way was thus clear for the paper to go to the North Atlantic Council for final

action.**

The dispostion of MC 48 was the principal item on the agenda for the ministerial meeting of the Council scheduled for December 1954. There seemed no

prospect of maior changes in force goals, buta was certain that any reconsideration of this subject would involve downward revisions. Thus for 1955, country

submissions tabulated by the International Staff ^ddt4 up to 44 army divisions

for M*4ay. 99 forM plus 30 days, and 6,894 aircraft—figures that were appreciably smaller than ttw provisional 1955 goals adopted in December 1953. The

United States recommended figures that were in some cases slightly higher

(e.g., 102

3

i% divisions byM plus 30 days and 6,991 aircraft), though still below

the earlier objectives.

71

For its part, the United States, despite the economy program being carried

out by the adiruniitration, was able to promise NATO slightly higher naval Atvd

air forces than had been planned earlier and to maintain Army strength in

316
iI

Western Europe, 1954

Europe at substantially its existing level. In October 1954,a long-standing dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia over the status of the border territory of

Trieste was settled, and it became possible to withdraw the US and British

occupation troops there.

72 President Eisenhower thereupon directed that the US

force, which totaled one regiment, or one-third ofa division, be returned to the

United States, except fora small contingent that was to be shifted to Austria.

73

The US commitment to NATO, in which the Trieste occupation force had been

counted, was accordingly reduced to5

2

/3 divisions on M-day and8

2

/j onM

plus 30 days.The administration believed that this loss in manpower would be

effectively offset by the new weapons being deployed to Europe: 280-mm artillery with nuclear capability and Corporal guided missiles and Honest John

rockets, both of which were becoming available.

74

In preparation for the ministerial meeting, Secretary Wilson, Secretary Dulles,

and Admiral Radford met with the President on8 December 1934 and discussed

the prospects for MC 48. They agreed that, regardless of the Council's decision,

the United States must retain the freedom to use nuclear weapons if its own

forces were threatened, and that it would be injudicious to push the Council

toward any specific commitment other than that implicit in the approval of MC

48. The President expressed the conviction that, upon reflection, the other NATO

governments would realize that the power to order use of nuclear weapons

could not be held exclusively by the Council and that the Supreme Allied Commander must be left some latitude to make the decision in an emergency.79

When the North Atlantic Council convened, Admiral Radford attended in

place of General Collins, while Deputy Secretary Anderson represented Secretary Wilson.7* Already it had become known to the press that the principal

question to be decided at the meeting was the role of nuclear weapons in NATO

strategy,

77 Certain preparatory actions had been taken by the United States to

obtaina favorable ckdsion. General Cruenther, the Supreme Allied Commander,

in briefings given the Permanent Council Representatives and the Military

Committee, had asserted that nuclear weapons were essential for executing the

forward strategy. The United States had submitted to the Permanent Council the

draft of an agreement for sharing of information concerning these weapons.

n

With the way thus prtp&ttd, the Council approved MC <8 on 1? December

1954- In doing so, however, the members made it clear that they were not

thereby surrendering the right of their governments to determine whether or

not nuclear weapon* would actually be used. The United States accepted tnis

reservation; in fact, the US delegation assisted those of Frame and the United

Kingdom in drafting the resolution on this subject, which was al-.to approved in

advance by Admiral Radford and General Gruenther. It read a» follows:

The Council approves the report MC 48 asa basis for defense planning and

preparations by the NATO military authorities, noting that this approval does

not involve the delegation of the responsibility of government* for putting plans

into action in the event of hostilities.*

Turning to force goals, the Council, *$ expected, approved the smaller objectives proposed by the International Staff for the next three years. (See Table 20.)

317

—-
h

JCS and National Policy

Table 20—Force Goals Approved by North Atlantic Council:

December 1954

Font

1955

Firm Commitment

1956

Provisional Coal

1957

Planning Coat

M-day M-day

Piu*

30 Days

M-day M-day

30Days

M-day M-day

Plus

30 Days

Army divisions

United

States «

Other

Total

divisions

Navy Ships

NATO command

United Stetes

Other

Nshorul

command *

Total ships

Air f-orce

»quadrons and

aircraft *

Umted State«

Squadron« ...

Aircraft

Other

Squadron* ....

Aircraft

Total

aujuadfun»

Touiamraii

* 5%

38:/,

44

428

336

316

1.080

75

1,630

273

5,2*4

* 6,924

8*/,

90V,

99

•^3

924

743

2.420

m

<4>

td>

(4)

(4)

5*/,

37V,

43

426

348

320

1,096

75

1.630

293

5.597

368

7.227

90V,

99

753

96*

794

2.515

(4)

(4)

(4)

t4>

id)

(4)

5

s

/»

38%

44%

428

355

323

1,106

75

MB)

30b

5.753

»1

?.3«3

8%

90V,

99

753

997

80b

2,556

m

(4>

(4)

(4i

id)

id)

* Fraction* refer to regiments and regimental <omhat team*

* threatdown W country t** avaäsfcte

* Included both N'ATO and naitonal command farce*

* K<M available

* Source p\** total as *.< ***. ^Mjav*Wv a ty^ograph* *5 emw

Store* USKOOAKt. ~ttef**t on NATO 1*54 Annual ****** ftu» tsrae» «nd profe*«»»

Affecting th* 1VS5 Annual Rev*** tfhe »tue SooM, 2 jan *5, Pr* It». H*M_ CAP

Subergt»***

."**\
Western Europe, 1954

At the same time, the Council was confronted by a report from the SecretaryGeneral that even the firm gcols for 1954 had not been met; ground forces, for

example, were one and one-third divisions short of the M-day objective.80(See

Table 21.) Taking note of this fact, and of the abandonment of the 1955 and 1956

objectives approved a year earlier, the Council noted that it would be necessary

for some countries (which were not specified) "to allocate resources for defense

Table 21—Actual Forces Available to NATO: 1952-1954

r

Force

31 December 1952 31 December 1053 31 December 1954

M-day M-day

Plus

30 Days

M-day M-day

Plus

30 Days

M-day M-day

Plus

30 Days

Army divisions

United States

Western Europe

and Canada 19%

2!

46'/,

6%

38V,

30

75

5%

23%

17/,

47

6%

48%

41V,

97%

5%

23%

17 ty

46/,

8%

51%

Greece and Turkey

Total divisions

38%

99'/,

D-day D-day

Plus

180 Days

D-day D-day

Plus

180 Days

D-day D-day

Plus

ISO Days

Navy Ships

United States 357

363

69

789

760

2.901

408

4.069

589

1,053

97

1,739

(b)

<b)

(b)

(b)

426

427

90

943

866

3.474

461

4,801

735

1.308

117

2,160

(b)

(b)

(b)

(b)

428

521

86

1,035

1.628

3.936

653

6.217

753

Western Europe

and Canada 1.447

Greece and Turkey

Total ships

119

2,319

Air Force aircraft

United States (b)

Western Europe

and Canada (b)

Greece and Turkey

Total aircraft

(b)

(b)

* Fractions refer to regiments or regimental combat teams.

b Not available

Source. Table» 1 to IV with Memo, Dir Economic and International Security Estimates Div,

OASD (Comptroller) to Capt C C. Kirkpatrick, USN, CJCS Staff Group, "NATO

Force Goals Attained 1951 through 1954 and Projections through 1957," 4 Mar 55,

OQCS File 092.2 NATO 1955

319

■■■
1 ^, V'ä '^row^^^^v^?**^^

Western Europe, 1954

its new strategic concept. SACEUR apparently formulated the concept in his

1954 requirements studies. Secretaries Wilson and Dulles laid the groundwork

for its approval by their remarks to the North Atlantic Council in Decemb^3

and April 1954.

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not playeda major role in initiating tne

concept, they interposed no objection to it. Ata lower level, the Army member

of the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, during the discussion of the 1955-1956

JSCP that was under development in 1954, had in effect urged the rejection of

the basic assumption in MC 48: that general war would begin witha nuclear

exchange and should not be expected to grow out ofa clash between conventional forces.83 But General Ridgway did not press the issue and joined his

colleagues in approving the paper. Criticism of MC 48 from high-level Army

sources was not to appear for several years. The reason is perhaps to be found in

the fact thata coherent Army doctrine of limited war, asa contingency requiring

special preparation in US and NATO defense plans, was only beginning to

emerge.

84

Another major development in Western European defense during 1953-1954

was the integration of West Germany into the Atlantic alliance. This was an

impressive accomplishment, especially in the light of the circumstances in which

it took place. The political framework of EDC that had been painstakingly constructed through months of negotiation was swept away in an instant and had to

be rebuilt, ona more substantial foundation, ina few weeks' time. The principal

credit for the outcome accrued to the British Government. The United States

contributed by supporting the British initiative and, ina purely negative way, by

avoiding any hasty or ill-conceived word or deed that might have split NATO

beyond repair.

Such influence as the Joint Chiefs of Staff had in this situation was exerted in

the direction of moderation, and thus perhaps contributed to the successful

settlement. Neither the old nor the new Joint Chiefs of Staff had ever wavered in

their conviction of the need to bring German power and productive capacity into

the Western alliance. If forced to choose between France and Germany (a contingency that might well have arisen in September 1954), they would have chosen

Germany, because it was more populous, more productive, more stable politically,

and potentially stronger on the battlefield. Nevertheless they made it clear that

they wished to avoid sucha painful choice at almost any cost. Nor did the Joint

Chiefs of Staff ever give serious consideration, even in the darkest days after the

failure of EDC, toa withdrawal of US forces from the Continent. Thus they

demonstrated their full commitment to the principle of collective security.

£

321 . ! , . ' v, i I r
15

The Middle East

A major conviction underlying President Truman's foreign policy was that

the Middle East was of cardinal importance to the security of the United States

and the other Western nations.1 The military assistance program launched by

the Truman administration stemmed in part from a desire to keep this region out

of Soviet hands. Greece, the victim of a communist-inspired civil war, and

Turkey, upon which the Soviet Union had made intermittent demands for territorial concessions, received aid in 1947. Three years later assistance was extended

to Iran, which had been subjected to constant threats since the failure of the

Soviets to retain a foothold in that country at the end of World War II. The

inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO in 1952 offered hope of further strengthening of the security of the region and lessened the danger that NATO's right

flank might be turned by a Soviet breakthrough into the Mediterranean.

US Interests in the Middle East in 1952

It seemed obvious that the security of the Middle East could be greatly enhanced if the individual nations could be induced to cooperate in some sort of

regional defense association analogous to NATO. The Truman administration

had entertained the hope of establishing a Middle East Defense Organization,

beginning with a framework consisting of the United States, United Kingdom,

France, and Turkey, into which the other Middle Eastern countries would be

fitted. The establishment of such an organization had been declared a goal of US

policy in NSC 129/1, which the President approved in April 1V"»2.2

The creation of such an organization, however, faced formidable political

obstacles. Middle Eastern governments, with a few exceptions, were highly

unstable and uncertain of their bases of support. Their policies necessarily

reflected a profound hostility toward the West that was felt by many peoples

throughout the region, particularly those of Arabic origin. This feeling, which
JCS and National Policy

had deep historical roots, had recently been reinforced by the establishment of

the state of Israel, which enjoyed at least the moral support of the Western

powers. The creation of this new nation had been attended by the flight of

numerous Arabic refugees from areas that passed under Israeli rule. The plight

of these unfortunates enhanced the resentment stemming from Israel's victory

in the Arab-Israeli War of 1948.

Compounding the difficulty of establishing the Middle East Defense Organization were two bitter disputes in which the United Kingdom was involved—

one with Egypt, the other with Iran. The points at issue in the British-Egyptian

controversy were the status of the Sudan, formerly ruled jointly by the two

nations but now claimed by Egypt, and the future of the important military base

at Suez, which the British considered vital to defense of the Canal. The presence

of British troops at this base, allowed by the terms of the treaty granting Egypt

independence, had become a major irritant. The United Kingdom was willing to

remove its troops, but only if given suitable guarantees that the base and its

facilities would be maintained in operating condition and would be made available for use in time of war. British insistence on these points had led to increased

tension, which erupted into violent anti-Western riots in Cairo early in 1952.

Several months later, the inept government of King Farouk was overthrown by a

military junta headed by General Mohammed Naguib. It was not immediately

apparent what effect this development would have upon the prospects for

settlement.

In Iran, the bone of contention was the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian

Oil Company without compensation, a step decreed in 1951 by the government

of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh. Though not himself a communist,

Mossadegh enjoyed the support of communists as well as of extreme nationalists.

His seizure of the British-owned oil installations had cut production to a trickle

and deprived Iran of the oil revenues that were vital to her economy. The United

States sought in vain to mediate the dispute, which grew steadily more

acrimonious. Diplomatic relations between Iran and the United Kingdom were

sev*j«?d in October 1952. Iran's attitude toward the United States also became

less friendly, although the United States continued to maintain an ambassador

in Tehran. The US military aid program was not formally ended; the MAAG

remained in Iran, as did the separate military missions to the Iranian Army and

the Gendarmerie.*

These disputes were the more serious for the United States in that US national

policy and strategy recognized the Middle East as primarily a British sphere of

operations. Under the joint Outline Emergency War Plan of 1952, defense of the

region was left to Turkish and British troops, plus whatever forces might be

furnished by the Arab states. There were no provisions for deploying US troops

to the Middle East. British plans were based on the concept of the inner ring, a

natural defense line near the Mediterranean coast, running along the Taurus

Mountains in southern Turkey, then curving southward through Aleppo to the

Jordan Rift and the Gulf of Aqaba Retention of this line would make it possible

to hold the Cairo-Suez area and to support Turkey. The British also planned if

possible to hold the Persian Gulf oil areas in isolation.4

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i
... , ..':

Middle East

The long British disputes with Egypt and Iran, together with the general

military and economic weakness of the United Kingdom, seemed to point toward

a larger role for the United States in the Middle East. NSC 129/1 had included a

statement that the United States should take an increased share of responsibility

toward the area, concerting its actions as far as possible with the United Kingdom,

and, where appropriate, with France and Turkey as well.5

A prerequisite to the enlargement of the US role was a careful study of the

military problems inherent in Middle Eastern defense—an estimate of what was

needed in comparison with what was available. At the request of the Department of State,6

the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared an estimate that was presented

orally by General Bradley on 18 November 1952 to the Deputy Secretary of

Defense. In the JCS view, a forward defense, along a line running from southeastern Turkey along the Zagros Mountains to the mouth of the Persian Gulf,

would require 19 divisions, 1,200 combat aircraft, and eight destroyers with

supporting escort vessels and minesweepers. There were available, however,

only 12 divisions: ten Turkish, one British (stationed in Egypt), and the equivalent of a division in smaller units from Jordan and Iraq. The deficiency in combat

aircraft was even greater. Only the 136 aircraft of the British Middle East Air

Force could be counted on, although they could be increased to approximately

250 by D plus four months, and carrier-based aircraft could provide some support.

Naval forces were adequate except for a deficiency in coastal minesweepers.

Under the most optimistic assumptions, it appeared that the D-day deficit could

be reduced to one division and 580 aircraft by 1955.7

These estimates were f reliminary and subject to revision in the light of

further study. In October 1952, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee had been

instructed to make a careful determination of the requirements for a forward

defense of the Middle East (one that would embrace more territory than the

British inner ring plan) and of the prospects for retaining access in wartime to

some of the oil resources of the region.* The JSPC report completing this study

did not appear until a full year had passed.

The British were willing—perhaps eager—to see the United States shoulder

part of the burden. In 1952 the British Chiefs of Staff had suggested to their US

counterparts a combined study of the defense of the Persian Gulf oil regions.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied on 6 February that, in their view, such a study

should be a part of a larger one dealing with the entire Middle East. As soon as

they had completed their own exploratory studies of this subject, they said, they

would approach thejr British colleagues with a view to a combined planning

effort.*

To gain the support of Middle Eastern countries for Western objectives the

chief means available appeared to be effective use of the US mutual security

program When the FY 1954 budget was under discussion in the latter part of

1952, representatives of the Department of State expressed the conviction that a

program of grant military assistance to those countries (other than Turkey and

Iran, which were already recipients) was necessary to attain US objectives. The

Department recommended a sum of $100 million to be allocated to the Arab

states, Israel, and Pakistan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, when asked for comment

325

*ÜÜ «MMOMMMMMSNaH
JCS and National Polio/

on this proposal, endorsed it on 5 November 1952, while pointing out that the

urgency of the Department of State request had precluded careful consideration.10

In a separate memorandum, they set forth the military rationale for their views.

The Middle East, they pointed out, was of strategic military importance. US aid

should be used to secure military rights and facilities, to improve indigenous

forces, and to strengthen internal security and political stability. Authorization

of the program should not await the completion of regional defense plans, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff believed. They cautioned that US aid should be designed to

draw recipients closer together without stimulating adverse reactions in neighboring countries—a consideration that applied particularly to the question of

assistance to Israel and Pakistar. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended also

that the $100 million not be provided by diversion from other programs.11

Whether this recommendation was approved for inclusion in the FY 1954

budget is not indicated in available records. President Truman, in asking Congress for $7.6 billion in new obligational authority for the mutual security program for FY 1954, gave no regional breakdown of the total.

Middle East Defense and the Problem of Egypt

Plans for the establishment of the Middle Eastern Defense Organization had

recognized the cardinal importance of Egypt, the most important and influential of the Arab nations. Unless Egypt could be persuaded to fall into line,

her Arabic neighbors were not likely to associate themselves with the West.

In common with most revolutionary governments, the Naguib regime in

Egypt displayed strongly nationalist tendencies. Nonetheless its attitude toward

the United Kingdom proved more moderate than might have been expected. By

the end of 1952 agreement was near on one of the points at issue, the status of

the Sudan. A formal settlement, giving the Sudanese the right to determine their

own future, was signed on 12 February 1953.12

The Suez base question was more complex and had aroused powerful emotions in both countries. Nevertheless there seemed hope that it too might be

liquidated by the new regime in the near future. Soon after his accession, General Naguib indicated that, when this dispute was settled, he would be willing to

participate in the Middle East Defense Organization. In return, he asked for US

economic and military assistance. Encouraged by this attitude, the United States

began discussing an aid program. Following conversations with the IS military

attache in Cairo, Egyptian officials drew up a list of items of military equipment

that they desired. Meanwhile »he US and British governments agreed t>> prepare

and present to Egypt a package settlement that would include a grant of US

assistance. Reporting these developments on 21 November 1952, th* Department of State asked the Department of Defense to undertake a study of the

problems involved in preparing a program of military aid for Egypt.u

Deputy Secretary of Defense William C. Foster at once instructed the Departments of the Army and the Air Force to select, from the list prepared by the

326

"
Middle East

Egyptians, items totalling $10 million in value that might be made available for

shipment by approximately 1 March 1953. At the same time, he requested the

Joint Chiefs of Staff to comment on the advisability of going ahead with this

emergency aid program for Egypt and to prepare the broader study for which

the Department of State had asked.14

Replying on 16 December 1952 to the immediate question raised by Mr.

Foster, the Joint Chiefs of Staff commented that the emergency program would

divert funds needed for other countries, would have little military value in light

of the weakness of Egypt's forces, and would probably generate similar requests

from other Middle Eastern countries. Nevertheless, recognizing the strategic

importance of Egypt and the elements of urgency in the Egyptian situation, they

concluded that the plan would be justified if the Department of State considered

it politically essential and if Egypt were required to reimburse the United States

insofar as possible.15

Deputy Secretary Foster transmitted these views to the Department of State,

with his endorsement, on 29 December 1952. In fact, the Department of State

had already gone on record with an opinion that military assistance to Egypt was

indispensable for the settlement of the dispute with the United Kingdom, and

had agreed that the program for Egypt should be a combination of reimbursable

and grant assistance.16

The administration accepted the desirability of immediate assistance to Egypt

and upheld this view during discussions with the British Government, which

took place in London between 31 December 1952 and 7 January 1953. The US

position was that immediate approval of Egypt's plea for military aid would

maintain Naguib's confidence in the Western Powers and would create a favorable climate for subsequent tripartite talks. The British believed that assistance

should be offered only as a bargaining counter during negotiations. They feared

that arms furnished Egypt might be turned against British forces if the dispute

were not settled; also, like the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they foresaw pressure from

other Arab governments and from Israel for similar assistance.

On other matters, the two governments found their views in harmony. The

United States approved a British memorandum on Middle Eastern strategy,

which had been reviewed informally by the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the

conference. The strategic concept set forth in this document called for resistance

to Soviet invasion "at the earliest possible moment on the frontiers between Iraq

and Persia." British plans envisioned deployment along this line of one British

and two Iraqi divisions, plus two brigades of the Arab Legion, on D-day, with

seven more divisions—British, New Zealand, Australian, and South African—by

D plus 12 months. The projected deployment of aircraft was 192 on D-day and

294 by D plus six months.

The British paper also specified that the Suez base was essential for the

defense of the Middle East and must be available for use in vartime. Moreover,

support of the base would require certain facilities—ports, transportation,

communications, and labor suppjy—that were to be found only in Egypt.

Therefore, any settlement with Egypt must include provision for Egyptian membership in the Middle East Defense Organization.

327

i
JCS and National Policy

The two parties agreed that the Organization should include, besides the

United States, United Kingdom, and Egypt, the following countries: Iraq,

Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, France, Turkey, Australia,

New Zealand, and South Africa. The last five had already indicated willingness

to cooperate. Participation of Pakistan would also be desirable. The tasks of the

organization would be to draw up defense plans, to assist member states in

training their forces, and to coordinate requests by Middle Eastern members

for arms and equipment from Western countries. Organizational machinery

would initially be limited to a planning group and a military representatives

committee; a full command structure might evolve later.

The settlement to be offered Egypt would comprise phased withdrawal of

British forces, Egyptian control of the Suez base area, maintenance of base

facilities in operating condition, participation of Egypt in the Middle East Defense

Organization and military and economic assistance from the United States. On

the issue of base maintenance, three options were drafted, to allow flexibility in

the negotiations. The most desirable, from the US-British viewpoint, would limit

Egypt's responsibility to overall supervision of the base; the United Kingdom

would perform active maintenance and would be allowed to station up to 7,000

Army and RAF personnel in Egypt for this purpose. Under this plan, it was

expected that the base could be maintained in condition for immediate use on

D-day. A second alternative would yield to the Egyptians the responsibility for

maintenance, with a smaller (but unspecified) number of British supervisory and

technical personnel remaining to assist—an arrangement that would require a

60-day reactivation period before the base would be serviceable. Both of these

options would include a joint Anglo-Egyptian air defense organization, with

some RAF fighter squadrons stationed in Egypt. The least satisfactory option, to

be accepted as a last resort, called for complete British withdrawal from the base,

subject to the right to make periodic inspections.17

These agreements had still to be approved at the highest level of government.

President Truman considered one aspect of the Egyptian problem on 7 January

1953. Following discussions with the Secretary of State and the Director for

Mutual Security, the President decided not to declare Egypt eligible for grant

military assistance at thai time. Whether or not he was influenced by British

opposition in this matter is not indicated in available sources. The decision did

not rule out the possibility of reimbursable aid; in fact, the President approved

the making of allocations to Egypt on that basis.18

The US-British agreements were forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 22

January 1953.w On 12 February they told the Secretary of Defense that they

concurred in the agreed positions and supported the US view concerning the

immediate release of military aid to Egypt. The Joint Chiefs of Staff drew attention to the proposal to include Pakistan in the Middle East Defense Organization.

Pakistan and Turkey, they pointed out, appeared tc be the only Middle Eastern

countries that could provide forces strong enough to be of major significance in

case of global war. They recognized, however, that any announcement of

Pakistan's proposed membership might create critical problems with respect to

India, in view of the bitter lndo-Pakistani disagreement over the status of Kashmir.

328
Middle East

Such problems would have military as well as political implications. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff therefore asked to be given an opportunity to make further comment whenever it was proposed to approach Pakistan formally regarding the

Middle East Defense Organization.20

Earlier, on 23 January 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had sent the Secretary of

Defense their comments concerning the problems involved in preparing a program of military aid for Egypt, which the State Department had requested on 21

November 1952. They pointed out that a Middle East Defense Organization

could not be established without the voluntary and wholehearted cooperation

of the Arab nations, and that the key to such cooperation was Egypt. But the

question of aid to Egypt was only one part of the general problem of Middle

Eastern defense—a problem that should be attacked in two steps. The first step

would be to grant token allocations of military aid in order to create a politicomilitary climate favorable to a defense organization. The emergency aid program under consideration for Egypt and the larger $100 million program projected for the Middle East as a whole in FY 1954 could both be regarded as parts

of this first phase. After suitable conditions had been created, the United States

could move toward integrated military assistance for the entire region, tied to a

comprehensive plan and a collective defense arrangement.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff foresaw that any aid program for the Middle East

would be beset with problems stemming from the mutual jealousies and hostilities of the countries of that region. Aid to one nation would invite demands from

others, which it might not be in the US interest to approve. In particular, Israel

could be expected to ask assistance to offset that given her Arab neighbors. It

would be unwise to supply assistance to Israel; to do so would undermine

efforts to win the cooperation of the Arabs. But Israel would be entitled to

guarantees that US aid would not be misused by the Arab states for aggressive

purposes.21

Second Thoughts on the Middle East Defense Organization

The Anjlo-Egyptian dispute and the related problem of a defense organization were among the issues that President Eisenhower inherited on his accession. In Middle Eastern policy, as in other matters, the new administration

eventually struck out in a different direction, but only after careful consideration,

avoiding a hasty or abrupt policy change.

At first it appeared that th? President intended to proceed with the emergency aid program for Egypt. Partially reversing a decision by his predecessor,

he authorized training assistance (on a non-reimbursable basts) for Egypt under

the MDAP.22 But he went no farther in this direction, and the program was

eventually laid aside.

President Eisenhower also gave general approval to the package deal with

Egypt that had been drawn up at the London conference.13 He confirmed this

approval in discussions with Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, who came to

329

. --fi^wammamm
n

JCS and National Policy

Washington in March 1953. The President did not, however, agree to the British

suggestion fora joint US-UK approach to Egypt, which he feared might offend

Naguib. The United Kingdom accordingly opened negotiations on its own, while

the President merely indicated to the Egyptian Government his desire for an

early settlement. But this approach failed; Egypt refused to meet the British

conditions for troop withdrawal, and the negotiations broke down. The efforts

of the United States to mediate proved futile, and the year dosed with no

agreement in sight.

24

Again moving to carry outa tentative decision reached earlier, the new

administration proceeded with the $100 million Middle Eastern aid program that

had been proposed. Acting Secretary of Defense Kyes told the joint Chiefs of

Staff that this program would be included in the $3,289 million that had been

authorized for the FY 1954 MDAP in NSC 149/2. Two weeks later Secretary

Wilson asked the joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend force bases to guide the

allocation of the $100 million.

25

In preparing their recommendations, the joint Chiefs of Staff had first to

determine which countries should be included. They decided that the program

should embrace Pakistan, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon,

and Ethiopia, and so advised the Secretary of Defense on 23 June. The first two

countries on this list, for which the largest force bases were proposed, would

presumably receive most of the money, although the Joint Chiefs of Staff made

no recommendations as to how it should be divided. For Pakistan, they recommended four infantry divisions, an armored brigade, 15 naval vessels, and a

composite air squadron. Recommendations for Egypt werea training center,

two infantry divisions, an armored brigade, 27 ships, anda fighter squadron.

Infantry units of division size were proposed for Ethiopia, Iraq, and Jordan, and

smaller ones for the other countries. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended light

naval forces for Ethiopia, Iraq, and Syria, anda composite air squadron for Saudi

Arabia. Contingent force bases for Israel, to be included in the program if necessary to obtain Congressional approval, consisted of one infantry division and 26

vessels.

2

*

In including Ethiopia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were ret\wrnmending the continuation of an aid program that had already been approved. Ethiopia had not been

considereda candidate for membership in the Middle East Defense Organization, but the United States had sought permission *o continue operating military

facilities in Eritrea, which was about to pass from British to Ethiopian sovereignty.

Ethiopia in return had asked sufficient military aid to equip one division. Funds

for this purpose (approximately $5 million) were available from prior appropriations for Title I! countries, and the Department of State supported the

Ethiopian request. In the light of these considerations, the Joint Chief» of Staff

on 21 April 1953 had added their endorsement, reversing the opposition that

they had expresseda year earlier.

27

On 17 August 1953 Secretary Wilson approved the force bases recommended

by the J»*nt Chiefs of Staff for the new Middle Eastern program.

2

* But before the

money was allocated, the entire US poiky toward the Middle East, and the

related question of military aid, came under reexamination.

330

nji iiw i jii
Middle East

The stimulus for this redirection of policy was a three-week observation tour

of the Middle East undertaken by Secretary of State Dulles in May 1953.N On his

return, the Secretary rendered a public report of his findings in a radio and

television address on 1 June 1953. It was high time, he said, that the United

States paid greater attention to the Near East and South Asia. He summarized

the situation in each country, indicating the many problems faced by the peoples

of those regions as their societies moved into the modern age. On the subject of

collective defense, Secretary Dulles made the following highly significant remarks:

A Middle East Defense Organization is a future rather than an immediate

possibility. Many of the Arab League countries are so engrossed with their

quarrels with Israel or with Great Britain or France that they pay little heed to the

menace of Soviet communism. However, there is more concern where the Soviet

Union is near. In general, the northern tier of nations shows awareness of the

danger.

there is a vague desire to have a collective security system. But no such

system can be imposed from without. It should be designed and grow from

within out of a sense of common destiny and common danger.

While awaiting the formal creation of a security association, the United States

can usefully help strengthen the interrelated defense of those countries which

want strength, not as against each other or the West, but to resist the common

threat to aff free peoples.30

The Secretary did not indicate the nations that he regarded as constituting

the northern tier. When he presented his views to the National Security Council

on I June, he identified them as Pakistan, Iran. Syria, and Turkey" He

told his fellow members that the United States should concentrate upon building

a defense upon these nations, and that the proposed Middle East Defense Organization, centered upon Egypt and the other Arab states, was not a realistic basis

for present planning.M

The Council took no immediate action on Secretary Dulles' remarks, but

several weeks later the members and the President approved a revised Middle

Eastern policy paper, NSC 155/1. that made no mention of the Middle East

Defense Organization and thus by implication downgraded its importance as a

policy objective.** The course of action outlined in NSC l$£l called for the

United States to take the lead in bringing the countries of the area into an

organization in which the Western powers would participate. It would first be

necessary, however, to create the political basis for such an organization. When

its establishment became feasible, the United States should, according to NSC

15V1, seek to secure the participation of any Asian and African states that could

"contribute to the security and stability of the Near East/' Meanwhile, the United

States should develop secretly plans hf the defense of the area with the United

Kingdom, Turkey, and such others as may be desirable. Military assistance to

certain key states was also desirable, but it should be limited to those "who are

most keenly aware of the threat of Soviet Russia and who are geographically

located to stand in the way of possible Soviet agressioo In this regard, special

consideration should be given to Turkey, Iraq. Syria, Iran, 3knd Pakistan." The

influence of Secretary Dulles' view* seemed apparent in this passage.

531
JCS and National Po/icy

Before NSC 155/1 was approved, the Secretory of State had sought the opinion of the Department of Defense concerning the feasibility a defense organization in the Middle East. His own view, expressed in a letter to Secretory Wilson

on 26 June, was that it was unrealistic to continue to act on the tacit assumption

that the Arab nations would eventually cooperate with the West. It would be

better, he believed, to develop plansfor Middle Eastern defense through informal,

unpublidztti arrangements, such as those currently in effect for consultation

between NATO's Southern Europe command and the UK Middle East Land

Forces.*4

The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied on 11 August 1953 that they still considered

that the participation of the Arab states in a defense organization was essential.

But in view of the obstacles to Arab cooperation—the continuing stalemate

between the United Kingdom and Egypt, the discouraging results of exploratory

approaches to other Arab states, and the lack of progress toward a settlement

between the Arabs and Israel—they agreed that existing arrangements for informal planning were "the most suitable that are feasible of achievement at this

time." These arrangements currently took two forms: (1) the discussions involving CINCSOUTH, to which Secretary Dulles had referred, and (2) planning

within the JCS organization, looking toward eventual integration of US plans

with those of the United Kingdom, Turkey, and other powers, as appropriate.33

Acting Secretary Kyes sent these views to Secretary Dulles with his concurrence on 26 August.3

* It was clear, therefore, that the Department of Defense

was not bound to the concept of a formal organization and was willing to

consider other arrangements.

The President and the Council moved a step closer to the northern tier

concept (and sway from the Middle East Defense Organization) in October 1953

when they approved NSC 16Z'2. which dealt with overall US national security

policy. The relevant paragraph in NSC 162/2 read as follows:

In the Middle East, a strong regional grouping is not now feasible. In order to

assure during peace time for the United Mates and its allies the resources

(especially oil) and the strategic positions of the area and their denial to the

Soviet bloc, the United States should build on Turkey, Pakistan, and if possible,

Iran, and assist in achieving stability in the Middle feast by political actions and

limited military and economic assistance, and technical assistance, to other countries in the area.3r

The Iranian Crisis and Its Resolution

Secretary Dulles had included Iran among the foundation stones of his proposed new defensive wall but there was no hope of Iran's participation so

long as the regime el Prime Minister Mossadegh continued on it* present course.

Indeed, there was danger that Mossadegh might drift into alliance, implicit or

explicit, with the communist powers. Such a development would extend Soviet

power to the shores 0I the Persian Gulf, place the Iranian oil resources at the

disposal of the USSR, and open Turkey and Iraq to invasion from the east.

What course of action should the United States pursue in Iran? The Shah.

m

I ij'"
Middle East

Mohammed Reza Pahlevi, was a man of moderate views and pro-Western

sympathies, but his powers were limited. Military intervention by the Western

Powers might prove hazardous in light of a 1921 treaty of friendship between

Iran and the Soviet Union, under which each party promised never to allow the

presence in its territory of forces hostile to the other signatory.

The Truman administration had determined that the independence of Iran

was of critical importance to the United States, and had so stated in NSC 136/1,

approved in November 1952. AU possible influence was to be exerted to keep

Iran from falling under communist control. The United States would continue to

seek a settlement of the oil controversy. When agreement was reached, the

United States would assist Iran in restarting production and in finding markets,

and would provide interim budgetary aid if necessary. Current programs of

military, economic, and technical assistance would be continued in the hope that

they might help to maintain stability. Plans would be developed "for the eventual inclusion of Iran in any regional defense arrangements which may be developed in the Middle East if such inclusion should later prove feasible."

Should the communists seize power in any part of Iran, according to NSC

136/1, the United States should assist a noncommunist government, with military support if necessary. Plans should be developed at once, in concert with the

United Kingdom and perhaps others, for specific measures to take in such an

eventuality. If events moved so swiftly that no non-communist government had

opportunity to request aid, the US position would be determined in the light of

the situation at the time. Every attempt would be made to develop localized

centers of resistance and to harass, undermine, and if possible, to bring about

the overthrow of the communist government.1*

To draw up the contingency plans referred to in NSC 136/1, an ad hoc

committee representing the Departments of State and Defense and the Central

Intelligence Agency was established. The Joint Chiefs of Staff nominated Colonel E. A. Montgomery, USMC. to serve on this committee.**

Military courses of action to cope with a communist seizure of power in all or

part of Iran had been drawn up by the Joint Chiefs of Staff even before NSC

136/1 was approved. They included shows of force by aircraft flights over Iran, if

requested by a friendly government there, and various steps to prevent extension of communist power beyond Iran's borders: additional arms aid t$ Middle

Eastern countries, deployment of US/ F units to southern Turkev and deployment of one US division (reinforced), with supporting air and naval forces, to

the vicinity of Basra. Iraq, at the head of the Persian Gulf*0

Following the approval of NSC 13&1, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that

plans should be developed to carry out these courses of action. CINCSAC and

GNCNELM should pttpätt plans for conducting shows of force, using SAC

aircraft from the United Kingdom or North Africa, or carrier aircraft from the

Mediterranean. Recommendation of units to be deployed to southern Turkey or

to the Basra area should be submitted by the Chief of Staff, Air Force, and

CtNCNELM- The Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves would keep under continuous

review the question of providing additional military aid to other Middle East

countries at

333
JCS and National Polio/

Proposals responsive to this JCS decision were received by mid-April. The

Joint Chiefs of Staff approved them in June 1953, but they advised the Secretary

of Defense that any further detailed military planning should await the discussions with the British Government that had been called for in NSC 136/1 .*

The prospect that contingency plans might soon have to be implemented had

meanwhile been enhanced by developments in Iran during the first half of 1953.

The situation grew worse; the economic decline continued and gave rise to

political strains. The coalition of nationalists and communists that supported

Mossadegh began to crack. The Prime Minister, in response, turned increasingly

to dictatorial methods. In so doing, he brought the crisis toa head and forceda

showdown with the Shah.

Early in August th« Prime Minister announceda plan to dissolve the parliament (Majlis). He obtained an endorsement of this decision by means of a

plebiscite. When he announced the dissolution, the Shah dismissed him and

appointed General Fazlollah Zahedi In his stead. But Mossadegh defied this

order, with apparent success. The Shah, seemingly the loser in the struggle, fled

to Rome.

The reversal of fortunes was sudden and violent. On 18-19 August elements

loyal to the Shah rose in revolt and overthrew the Mossadegh regime. Ge ?ral

Zahedi, who had been in hiding, emerged and took over the government.

Mossadegh was imprisoned on 20 August. Several days later the Shah returned

to triumph. Finding the treasury almost bankrupt, the new government at once

asked for and received emergency financial assistance from the United States.

43

The turn of events in Iran came justa few days after Admiral Radford And his

newly appointed coüeagues had assumed office. The news of the uprising reached

Washington early on the morning of 19 August.*

4 At that time,

a favorable

outcome was by no means assured; there might ensuea long struggle in which.

as foreseen in NSC 136/1,a friendly government in Iran might ask for help in

resisting violence from the communists And their nationalist allies. The courses

oi action contemplated thus far by the Joint Chiefs pi Staff—a show of force in

the air Anda strengthening of the will of Iran's neighbors—would hardly suffice

to meet sucha situation.

Foreseeinga need for possible US military action. Admiral Radford instructed

the Joint Staff to consider the subject at once*

3 The Joint Staff accordingly drew

upa list of forces that might be made available for action in Iran or in the Persian

Gulf within periods of time ranging froma week to two month*. The Joint

Chief» of Statf reviewed this list on 20 August And instructed the Joint Strategic

flans Committee to pntpAnta study of course* oi action in support ofa noncommunist Iranian government.4*

On 25 August the JSPC submitteda revised list of avaikbie units and recommended that CtNCNELM be instructed lo prepare a plan for deploying forces to

Iran to restore otder And to protect oil producing facilities, The Joint Chiefs of

Stall approved this recommendation and sent the neeessarv instructions to

C1NCNFXM on 26 August 19S3*

CfNCNELM'f draii pUn was forwarded less than three week» later. ** The

loim Chiefs of Staff approved it early in December, subject to crrtain amendments,

334

1

I
Middle East

and the final version was disseminated in March 1954 as CINCNELM Oplan

207-54, "A U.S. Joint Plan for Operations in the Middle East."49 It provided that

Air Force and Marine units from Europe and the Mediterranean would seize and

secure Abadan and Tehran within the first seven days; thereafter the main

ground forces would be airlifted to these areas to assist in maintaining law and

order. These ground forces might consist of an Army division from Europe or

the Third Marine Division diverted from FECOM. The stabilization of the situation in Iran under the control of the Zahedi regime, however, removed implementation of this plan from active consideration.

With the installation of a friendly regime in Tehran, it became possible for the

first time to contemplate the incorporation or Iran into a collective defense

arrangement. The fact was recognized in NSC 175, which the Planning Board

submitted to the National Security Council in December 1953. The Board foresaw that Iran might be willing to enter into military cooperation within a year or

two if the oil controversy were settled soon and a pro-Western government

continued in power. A long-range program of improving Iran's armed forces

was recommended, related to the progress made toward effective regional defense

plans.

In an appended staff study, the Planning Board discussed Iran's military

security and other problems facing the country. It was noted that Iran constituted a blocking position from which to oppose any Soviet move toward Turkey,

Pakistan, the Persian Gulf, or the Suez Canal, and that it would provide valuable

bases for attacks against the Soviet Union in case of war. Discussing prospects

for regional defense, the Board concluded that Turkey, Iraq, and Pakistan were

capable of contributing significant forces if provided with equipment from outside sources. The judgment of the US Ambassador to Iran was cited that cooperation of Iran and Iraq in regional defense would depend upon the receipt of firm

commitments from the United States to provide military aid.50

The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered NSC 175 acceptable subject ;o several

changes. At the same time, they pointed out that the authors of the staff study

had underemphasized the difficulty of the problems involved in defending Iran.

That nation's own forces were not strong enough alone to block a Soviet move

against Turkey or Pakistan, and the mountainous terrain and lack of communications in the Middle East would make it extremely difficult to support Iran. As for

the prospects for regional association, political and religious differences might

make it difficult for Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran to cooperate, while Iraq would

probably maintain a position of benevolent neutrality. Turkey's commitments to

NATO, moreover, would inhibit the diversion of her forces to assist Iran.

Pakistan's armed forces were of limited effectiveness for any purpose other than

defense of the homeland. The Iranian forces were weak, and their improvement

would require considerable time.5'

The National Security Council adopted NSC 175 on 30 December 1953 with

minor changes, including most of those recommended by the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. However, the members instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reconsider

their comments on the difficulties of regional defense cooperation, apparently

335

i> m«UIMM*MBN«NMMI|KMNIMlHPMafiMMM0 " W$«

--F
JCS and National Polio/

believing them somewhat exaggerated. Following approval by the President,

NSC 175 was disseminated early in January 1954 as NSC 5402.52

After considering the Council's instructions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised

the Secretary of Defense that, in their opinion, the comments that they had

expressed earlier had "served their purpose in highlighting the difficulties which

can be expected to be encountered in forming an effective Middle East Regional

Defense Organization." Accordingly, they did not propose to forward a revised

version.53 The Secretary accepted this decision.

The Zagros Mountain Line Concept

The outcome in Iran seemed likely to influence the Joint Chiefs of Staff in

their determination of a strategic concept for the Middle East and its oil reserves—a matter that had been under study by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee since October 1952. A forward defense, along a line running through

Turkey and Iran, would become more practicable if Iranian troops could be

counted on to man some of the bastions. Needless to say, such a strategic concept

would dovetail neatly with Secretary Dulles' suggested association of the northern nations.

Developments in Pakistan also were relevant to the JCS studies of Middle

Eastern defense. General Mohammed Ayub Khan, Commander in Chief of the

Pakistani Army, became convinced of the need to establish a defense line running from his country through Iran into Turkey, with support from Iraq—*n

arrangement that would require a degree of military cooperation among the four

nations concerned. He expressed this view to US officials and to representatives

of the Turkish General Staff.54In September 1953 General Khan visited the

United States at the invitation of the Secretary of the Army. On this trip, he

renewed an earlier suggestion that the United States enter into bilateral military

cooperation with Pakistan, and indicated that his country was willing to offer

the use of military bases.55

It was not difficult to foresee that the United States would accept this offer.

On 7 October 1953, soon after General Ayub's visit to Washington, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff gave the Joint Strategic Plans Committee a new assignment: to

reexamine the US military position with regard to security arrangements for the

Middle East (including the Middle East Defense Organization) and to submit

comments and recommendations, with particular reference to the possible alignment of Pakistan with other countries in Middle Eastern defense.56

On 13 October 1953 the Joint Chiefs of Stoff received from the Committee the

study of Middle Eastern defense that had been in preparation for a full year. The

purpose of this study, JCS 1887/70, was to develop a strategic concept and an

estimate of force requirements (1) for a defense of the Middle East in mid-1956 as

far to the north and east as practicable, and (2) for defending and holding at least

one oil-producing complex in time of war. The Committee made the assumption

336
u

Middle East

that Turkish forces would succeed in defending their eastern flank, in the vicinity of Lake Van, and would block all ground approaches through eastern Turkey

into Syria and Iraq. The Committee then examined three possible defensive

concepts, as follows:

I. To defend along the high ground in northwestern Iran, froma point on

the Turkish-Iranian border just north of Lake Urmia eastward along the

southern shore of the Caspian Sea (the Elburz Mountains), then curving

southward to the Great Salt Desert in north central Iran. This was the

northernmost line of defense that could be considered practicable.

II. To defend along the line of the Zagros Mountains, extending froma

point near the junction of Turkey, Iraq, and Iran to the head of the

Persian Gulf. This was similar to, though somewhat shorter than, the

defense line envisioned in the JCS briefing presented to the Deputy

Secretary of Defense in November 1952. It constituted the southernmost natural boundary that would provide protection for all the Middle

Eastern oil region.

III. To concentrate forces around Mosul-Kirkuk, Baghdad, and Basra, maximizing the enemy's difficulties in crossing the Zagros Mountains by

ground delaying action and air interdiction, and undertaking mobile

operations to destroy Soviet forces debouching into the Tigris-Euphrates

valley.

The Contrnittee noted that the defense of Pakistan would be desirable in any

case, in order to posea threat to the flank of Soviet forces attacking into Iran and

to bar the gate to the Indian subcontinent. However, the protection of Pakistan

was not essential to the defense of the Middle East, and hence the Committee

did not go into the matter in detail.

Assessing the method of defense and the force requirements under each

concept, the jSPC members concluded that Concept II—the Zagros Mountain

line—wa» the best, and that Concept III should be retained as an alternative.

ConceptI seemed impracticable owing to political complications and the difficulties of providing logistic support.

Force requirements for Concept II were estimated at four divisions and 1,100

aircraft on D-day, rising to 10 divisions and 1,250 aircraft byD plus 60 days.

Naval requirements were one destroyer squadron, 20 escort vessels, 25 minesweepers, one antisubmarine patrol squadron, and various auxiliaries.

The Committee studied the prospects for holding each of the four major oil

complexes of the Middle East, located respectively in the vicinity of MosulKirkuk (Iraq), Abadan (Iran), Kuwait, and Dhahran-Bahrein-Qatar. Any one ol

these was capable of exporting enough crude petroleum to eliminate or substantially to reduce the allied wartime deficit, which was estimated at approximately

677,000 barrels per day for the first six months of hostilities. In each case, the

critical factor would be adequate air power. "Successful air operations," the

Committee pointed out, "can drastically restrict the freedom of action of enemy

ground forces practically anywhere in the Middle East, where major enemy

337

i
JCS and National Policy

forces can not be concealed from aerial observation during daylight hours." The

members concluded that the most advantageous course would be to defend the

Kuwait complex, which produced 800,000 barrels per day. Its defense would

require 6V

3 divisions. If these forces were not available, the next best course

would be to retain Dhahran-Bahrein-Qatar, which could be held with 4V

3 divisions and had a daily output of 663,000 barrels.

These conclusions had the unanimous support of all the members of the

Committee. But the question of the further disposition of the Committee's report

wasa matter of dispute. The Army member of the JSPC believed that the report

was not fully responsive to all JCS requirements. He felt that certain matters

required further study, notably the indigenous military potential of the Middle

East and the cost to the United States of developing the forces of the countries of

that region. The members of the other Services believed that the report, when

approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would providea suitable basis for immediately initiating combined planning studies with British and Turkish planners.57

The Joint Chiefs of Staff in effect adopted the Army position that further

study was needed before entering into bilateral or trilateral talks. On2 November they sent JCS 1887/70 to CINCNELM, Admiral Jerauld Wright, USN, asking

him to submit his comments on it and his recommendations concerning the

position to be upheld when the United States entered into staff talks with the

United Kingdom and Turkey. At the same time, they instructed the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to prepare a study of US military objectives in the Middle

East and of specific areas in that region that were of critical importance to the

United States.

58

Two days later the Committee completed its study of Middle Eastern regional

defense and of the role of Pakistan, in accordance with the JCS instructions of7

October. In this report, the JSPC members gavea strong boost to the northern

tier concept. The security of the Middle East, they concluded, was at least

initially dependent upon an effective arrangement for cooperation among Turkey,

Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq. In view of recent developments in the area, as well as

the evident infeasihility of the Middle East Defense Organization, the United

States would be just;.'.«,d in encouraging these four countries to initiate efforts to

forma planning association for coordinated defense of the Middle East.

59

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this report on 13 November, but in the

views that they transmitted to the Secretary of Defense the next day they stated

the conclusion in less positive terms. They suggested merely that the time might

be propitious for encouraging an association among the four northern nations.

Such an arrangement, they continued,

would visualize an association of indigenous forces under an indigenous command advantageously located with relation to the current threat. It would also

provide for the evolutionary growth ofa defense organization which could

logically develop in time to include other Middle East countries, India and

Afghanistan. Not only would the foundation be laid ina strategic area, but there

would be no dependence upona satisfactory resolution of the Anglo-Egyptian

and Arab-Israeli differences.

They recognized that India and Afghanistan would object strenuously to

338 - V
Middle East

such an organization if direct US military aid to Pakistan were involved. But,

they believed, a satisfactory solution could be found if some method of indirect

aid could be devised. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that these views be

transmitted to the Secretary of State.60

Further evolution of a strategic concept for the Middle East awaited recommendations from CINCNELM, which were transmitted on 22 January 1954.

While Admiral Wright accepted the JCS concept—to defend along the Zagros

Mountains—as militarily desirable, he doubted that it could be implemented

even by 1956, owing to the potential political difficulties and the length of time

required to develop indigenous forces. As a practical alternative, he pointed to

British plans for combining defense of the inner ring with a forward strategy

under which the Taurus Mountain line would be extended eastward through

southern Turkey to Mosul, Iraq. "This is an approach which could be implemented with some degree of success," wrote Admiral Wright. If combined with

another plan to hold the Dhahran-Bahrein-Qatar oil complex, it would provide

an acceptable alternative until the time when a defense along the Zagros line

would become feasible. He recommended further that the United States develop

a military aid program for the Middle East as soon as possible and determine

what US forces it was prepared to contribute to Middle Eastern defense before

entering into talks with the British and Turks.

These comments had been coordinated with USCINCEUR, CINCUSAREUR,

and CINCUSAFE, who generally agreed with CINCNELM's views. USCINCEUR

and CINCUSAREUR, however, stressed the danger that would result if any

forces were diverted from NATO to defend the Middle East. CINCUSAFE drew

attention to the political and logistic difficulties involved in any Middle Eastern

defense and recommended exploration of the feasibility of an initial buildup of

air forces in Greece, Turkey, Crete, and Cyprus, using existing SHAPE airfields

in those areas. All these comments, including those of CINCNELM. were referred

to the JSPC for study.61

On 18 March 1954 the Joint Strategic Plans Committee submitted its report on

critical objectives and areas in the Middle East, as directed by the Joint Chiefs of

Staff on 2 November 1953. This report constituted a warning that allied capabilities in the Middle East were insufficient. In the amended form in which the Joint

Chiefs of Staff approved it on 6 April, the JSPC report set forth the following

areas to be defended: (1) the NATO right flank, (2) air base sites, (3) the

Turkish Straits, (4) the Eastern Mediterranean, (5) the Cairo-Suez-Aden area,

(6) the Persian Gulf and contiguous oil-producing areas. All these objectives

could be secured if the allies could retain Turkey and hold the Zagros Mountain

line. But there was at present no prospect of doing so, except perhaps through

exploitation of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the allies would not be able to

export oil from any Middle Eastern oil complex in the face of significant

interference.

Consideration of these facts pointed to an immediate need to: (1) develop

plans for the defense of the area with the United Kingdom, Turkey, and possibly

other nations, as prescribed in NSC 155/1; (2) develop US plans to provide naval

and air support to British and Egyptian forces in defense of the Cairo-Suez area;

339
i

JCS and National Policy

(3) continue to develop US plans to provide naval and air support, including

atomic operations, to defend Turkey and other important base areas; (4) seek the

development of an arrangement for defense of the Persian Gulf oil areas, making

maximum use of indigenous forces; and (5) seek to obtain transit and base rights

in the Middle East, where required. In the long run, the object should be to

"encourage the development ofa regional defense organization capable of conducting the ground defense of the line of the Zagros Mountains utilizing indigenous ground forces."62

With this action, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the Zagros Mountain

concept proposed earlier by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee. The regional

defense organization mentioned in the JCS decision, which would providea

politico-military basis for defense along the Zagros line, could hardly be other

than Secretary Dulles's association of the northern tier states. At the same time,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff had accepted CINCNELM's view that the Zagros strategy could not be implemented at that time, although they had not approved

CINCNELM's recommended alternative. The implication was that it would be

the task of the proposed trilateral staff talks to devise an alternative or to finda

way of implementing the Zagros plan.

This implication was accepted by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee when it

reviewed Admiral Wright's comments on JCS 1887/70. The members concluded

that the time had come to approach the United Kingdom and Turkey to draw up

plans for defense of the Zagros Mountain passes and of other critical areas.

CINCNELM should be designated to represent the United States at these talks.

The Committee offered no comment on Admiral Wright's suggestion for an

alternative plan.

63

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved these views. On 21 June 1954 they notified

the British Chiefs of Staff that they believed that it would be profitable to make

military planning studies at that time for defense of the Middle East. They

recommended that these studies be carried out in two phases. The first would be

US-UK-Turkish discussions to determinea concept of operations fora defense

along the Zagros line, with estimates of required forces and recommendations

for making up deficits. Plans should also be developed to secure Turkey's south

and east flanks. The second phase would bea bilateral US-UK study ofa concept

of operations and estimates fora deferse "so far to the north and east as to

secure the Cairo-Suez-Aden areas, at least one major oil producing complex

preferably in the Persian Gulf area, and the Turkish south flank" CINCNELM

would be authorized to make arrangements with British and Turkish authorities

for the conduct of these discussions

M

Military Assistance to the Middle East Further determination of a strategy for the Middle East awaited

a reply from

the British Chiefs of Staff. Meanwhile, however, the allocation of FY 1954

340 . - I
Middle East

t

funds for Middle Eastern military assistance provided an opportunity to advance

US strategic objectives in this region.

The administration had requested $100 million for a Middle Eastern MDA

Program, but Congress had allowed only $30 million. Initial plans for allocating

the Congressional appropriation were made at a conference in Cairo on 28-29

August, attended by US diplomatic representatives in the Middle East and by

officials of the Departments of State and Defense. The conferees agreed that $10

million should go to Iraq, where the government appeared, alert to the Soviet

threat and was planning to expand its forces. An equal amount was proposed

for Syria, not for any military reason but in order to induce that country to

cooperate in resettling Palestinian refugees. Saudi Arabia, which had been tentatively promised aid in return for base rights at Dhahran, should receive $5

million. The remaining $5 million should be used to initiate small programs for

Jordan and Lebanon and to finance infrastructure projects for Israel (airport and

harbor facilities that would be militarily useful without being provocative to

Israel's neighbors).

The conferees recognized that the meager sum authorized by Congress would

not meet all requirements. For example, it might be desirable to furnish additional aid to Iran to encourage the new Zahedi regime, and to initiate aid to

Pakistan, whose government was already giving evidence of its cooperative

attitude. Moreover, relations between Egypt and the United Kingdom had taken

a turn for the better; if an early agreement were forthcoming, the US promise of

aid to Egypt must be redeemed. To meet these additional requirements, the

conferees suggested use of a special reserve of $50 million that had been set

aside from the FY 1953 appropriation for Title II countries.

Secretary Dulles sent these conclusions to Secretary Wilson on 8 September

1953. urging that the Department of Defense act promptly to allocate the $30

million as recommended at the conference. After further study, the Department

of State also recommended that money be allocated for Egypt and Pakistan. OSD

representatives thereupon tentatively agreed, with the concurrence of the Bureau

of the Budget and the Foreign Operations Administration, that an additional $50

million in FY 1953 funds would be made available. Of this amount, approximately $25 million would be set aside for Egypt and $15-525 million for Pakistan.**

These plans had been shaped primarily by political rather than military

considerations. On 16 October 1953, Secretary Wilson asked the Joint Chiefs of

Staff for their recommendations concerning the allocation of up to $80 million in

aid to the Middle East. He also sought their advice regarding the advisability of a

Presidential declaration that Iraq, Syria, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Pakistan

were eligible for military assistance.**

After study, the Joint Chiefs of Staff replied on 11 December. They affirmed

that it was desirable to encourage Pakistan's closer alignment with the West by

granting aid, accepting the likelihood of an adverse reaction in India They

recommended that Pakistan, Lebanon, and Iraq be declared eligible for grant

military assistance. Conversely, they thought it would serve no useful military

purpose to include Syria, Israel, and Jordan at that time, since allocation to

341

■■ *n# .«KMMWMS*"*/»
JCS and National Policy

these three nations from the limited funds available would dissipate the military

effort beyond the point of profitable returns.

Gauging the importance of Middle Eastern requirements against others in

the worldwide MDAP effort, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended against the

transfer of any funds to supplement the $30 million currently appropriated for

military aid in the Middle East. 'The transfer of funds, already inadequate for

the support of vital military programs, to a purpose of lesser military value is

considered inadvisable." Limiting the first-phase program for the Middle East to

the $30 million immediately available, they recommended the following apportionment, which necessarily involved a marked reduction in the $25 million

tentatively allocated to Egypt:

Country

Egypt

Pakistan

Iran

Iraq

Saudi Arabia

Lebanon

Ethiopia

Allocation

($ millions)

$ 8.0

10.5

3.0

2.5

5.0

0.5

0.5

The joint Chiefs of Staff closed their reply of 11 December to the Secretary of

Defense with a reference to the memorandum of 14 November 1953 in which

they had indicated interest in a US undertaking to encourage Pakistan, Turkey,

Iran and possibly Iraq in the formation of a planning association for the defense

of the Middle East. Should that policy line be formally adopted, "the Joint Chiefs

of Staff may consider additional funds necessary to develop the defense capabilities of these four countries in implementation of this proposal."67

Assistant Secretary Nash forwarded the JCS recommendations to the Department of State on 4 January 1954. He noted that they represented the desirable

military point of view.

However, for reasons as previously outlined by the Department of State, it is

recognized that a sum of approximately $50 million, in addition to the $30

million appropriated . . . , will be required to implement effectively the political

aspects of the first phase military aid to the Middle East.

Accordingly, he proposed the following distribution:

Country

Pakistan

Iran

Iraq

Saudi Arabia

Ubanon

Ethiopia

Allocation

($ million*)

S230

200

190

10.0

50

05

05

342
Middle East

As compared to the JCS recommendations, this would restore the amounts

previously considered for Egypt and Pakistan and notably increase the allocations to Iraq and Iran. The omission of Jordan, Syria, and Israel, however,

accorded with the advice ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secretary Nash had read the

political guidance from the Department of State as already committing the United

States to encouraging erection ofa northern tier defense organization. His proposed distribution, he said, placed emphasis on implementation of the concept.

He recommended that Lebanon and Iraq be declared eligible for grant aid;a

similar recommendation regarding Pakistan had already been made.

60

The distribution proposed by Mr. Nash was modified by later developments.

Iran and Ethiopia had already established their eligibility, and the tentative

allocations made to them were confirmed.

69 Of the five possible recipients of the

remaining $60.5 million, Saudi Arabia was dropped from consideration in January 1954 when its government declined an offer to conclude a military assistance

agreement. The money earmarked for that country accordingly became available

for other requirements.

70

On 26 January 1954 Secretary Wilson told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that programs for Pakistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Egypt would be initiated in FY 1955. The

Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, recommended that no FY 1955 funds be used for

those countries. The ceiling of $1,144.5 million that had been set for the worldwide MDAP, they pointed out, was not sufficient to meet other, higher priority

requirements; moreover, the money set aside for the Middle East from FY 1953

and FY 1954 appropriations had not yet been obligated.

71

Secretary Wilson accepted this recommendation with respect to FY 1955, but

the Joint Chiefs of Staff did include Pakistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Egypt in the list

of countries lor which they prepared force bases to guide MDA programming in

the following year, FY 1956.

n

The Role of Pakistan That a large share of funds for the Middle Eastern MDA Program would go to

Pakistan wasa matter that was not in doubt at the beginning of 1954. US officials had been quick to appreciate the military value of cooperation with that

country. As early as November 1953 it wasa matter of public knowledge that the

United States was considering an agreement along the lines suggested by the

Pakistanis, involving base rights in exchange for US aid.

71

Pakistan had also begun conversations with Turkey witha view to military

cooperation. The outcome was an agreement signed by the two nations on2

April providing for an exchange of military information anda study of the

possibilities of joint defense, as well as cooperation in the political, economic,

and cultural spheres. From the US viewpoint, this linking of hands by the two

countries at the ends of the northern tier w?-\a happy development. Particularly

significant wasa provision in the agreement allowing adherence by other countries whose participation might be thought useful.74

343 >
JCS and National PoHof

On 19 February 1954 Acting Secretary of Defense Kyes directed the Military

Departments to organize a joint military survey team to proceed to Pakistan and

study that country's requirements. The mission of the team might be extended

to include Egypt and Iraq, he indicated if the political climate in those countries

proved favorable.75 Brigadier General Harry F. Meyers, USA, was appointed to

head the team.76

On 25 February President Eisenhower publicly announced that Pakistan had

asked for grant military assistance and that the request would be approved

subject to conclusion of a bilateral agreement. He stressed that the purposes of

US aid would be to strengthen the defense of the Middle East and to foster

cooperation among the states of that area. At the same time, the President

assured Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India that the aid program for

Pakistan was in no way directed against India and that a request from his

country for similar assistance would be considered favorably.77

The decision to aid Pakistan was made formal by the President and the

National Security Council on 4 March 1954 in NSC 5409. According to his paper,

the United States should "encourage Pakistan's participation in any defense

association which is judged to serve the interests of the United States," and

should "give special consideration to Pakistan in providing military assistance

... in view of Pakistan's attitude and key position among the countries of South

Asia with respect to military collaboration with the West." A financial appendix

to NSC 5409 indicated that $20 million had been tentatively earmarked for aid to

Pakistan, to be expended in equal amounts in fiscal years 1955 and 1956.78

The joint Military Survey Team returned from Pakistan and submitted its

findings on 18 May 1954. The members recommended an aid program totaling

$29.5 million, to be financed out of the $80 million already earmarked for the

Middle East, The tentative OSD allocation for Pakistan had allowed only $20

million, but there was now available the $5 million that had been proposed roi

Saudi Arabia and the $500,000 for Lebanon. The Department of State had recommended that no aid be granted the latter country until a decision was reached

concerning assistance to its larger neighbor, Syria. The rest of the additional

funds for Pakistan, under the Survey Team plan, would be provided by reducing Egypt's share to $21 million.

The program recommended by the Survey Team would support four infantry

divisions, one armored brigade, 12 ships, and six air squadrons: three fighter

bomber, one fighter interceptor, one light bomber, and one transport. Forces of

this size, it was believed, could deter or successfully delay a Soviet attack on the

scale to be expected during a global war. They would not, however, enable

Pakistan to contribute to the defense of areas beyond its borders7*

The force bases proposed by the Survey Team differed in some details from

those that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended in June 1953, which had called

for 15 ships and only one air squadron. On 17 June 1954 Secretary Wilson asked

the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reexamine their recommendations in light of the

Survey Team report.'10

Force bases for Pakistan had already come under JCS reconsideration, in

connection with the four-year projection of MDAP requirements drafted by a

344

.
Middle East

special JCS committee and submitted during March 1954. This survey had proposed four infantry divisions, an armored brigade, 14 ships, and four air squadrons for Pakistan, all to be achieved by FY 1958. But when the joint Chiefs of

Staff returned the report for revision to reduce the force bases proposed for

Yugoslavia, the Army member of the special committee had wished to apply

part of the resulting savings to increase Pakistan's objectives to seven infantry

and two armored divisions. The representatives of the other Services had objected

that the force requirements for Pakistan were unrelated to the size of the Yugoslav program. This divergency was stul unresolved on 17 June,- when the Secretary of Defense requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider the joint Military

Survey Team Report on Pakistan.81

In their reply on 28 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred in the forces

proposed tor Pakistan in the Survey Team report, after amending it to add an

armored division, over and above the armored brigade that had been recommended in the report. The activation of this additional division had been given

the highest priority by the Pakistani Government, and the Survey Team had

commented that Pakistan's economy could support it. In its report, however,

the Team had not gone beyond the earlier JCS recommendation of one armored

brigade.82

The larger force bases recommended for Pakistan by the Joint Chiefs of Staff

were approved at higher levels in the Department of Defense, together with the

amount of money called for in the Survey Team report, $29.5 million. A bilateral

agreement of the type required by US law had been signed on 19 May 1954.83

Foundation of the Northern Tier Defense Line

Pakistan thus joined her neighbors, Iran and Turkey, as a participant in the

Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Shortly before, Iraq, the fourth member of the northern tier, had also decided to participate, apparently on its own

initiative. Breaking away from the neutralist policy followed by most w the Arab

nations, Iraq's Prime Minister Muhammad Fadhil al-Jamali announced in February 1954 that he would ask assistance from the West. A bilateral aid agreement

between the United States and Iraq was signed on 21 April 1954,** OSD officials

earmarked $10.9 million for Iraq as the first step in a four-year program expected

to total roughly $33 million. Its size was related to the force bases of two infantry

divisions that the joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended in connection with the

FY 1956 MDAP **

NSC 5428, a new Middle Eastern policy paper approved by the President in

July 1954, committed the United States explicitly to the northern tier concept.

The recent pact between Turkey and Pakistan was viewed as the first step

toward the creation of an organization of northern tier nations. Adherence of

Iran and Iraq could be anticipated if their political climates continued to improve.

NSC 5428 specified that military assistance would be channeled primarily to

those four countries and, when appropriate, to Egypt. Moreover, Egypt should

345

iHBWBIi "i. -i mtmm —*mm
JCS and National Policy

be assured that it was an object of continuing interest and should be allowed to

join in regional defense plans if its government so requested. The participation

of other Arab states was to be neither encouraged nor discouraged. Politicomilitary conversations with the United Kingdom regarding the development of

the northern tier concept should be conducted in the near future. In these

conversations, the United States should emphasize that the proposed regional

arrangement would be wholly indigenous, with no formal links to the collective

defense organization of the Western Powers except through Turkey.86

Soon after the adoption of NSC 5428, the prospects for a northern tier defense

association improved further when Iran's long dispute with the United Kingdom was settled. Under an agreement announced on 5 August 1954, an international consortium of oil companies would produce and distribute Iranian oil.

Iran would receive 50 percent of the profits from these operations, and would

pay compensation to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.87

Another encouraging development took place in December 1954, when Shah

Mohammed Reza Pahlevi paid a state visit to President Eisenhower. On this

occasion, the Shah an;;c. iced that Iran had decided to abandon its traditional

neutrality and to cooperate with the nations of the free world. US officials

replied by expressing a hope that Iran would join Turkey, Pakistan, and Iraq in a

defense association and by promising continued assistance in developing Iran's

forces to enable them to assist in the defense of the Zagros line.88

Following the Shah's visit, the NSC Planning Board drew up a revised

statement of policy toward Iran that was approved by the President and the

Council in January 1955 as NSC 5504. This paper recommended that the United

States assist in developing Iran's armed forces to enable them to make a useful

contribution to Middle East defense—an objective that would admittedly "require

a long-term program involving US. expenditures substantially in excess of

present levels." The Joint Chiefs of Staff had endorsed NSC 5504, but had

warned that any increase in the Iranian program must be carefully weighed

against other claims on the limited MDAP funds available and should await a

more careful definition of Iran's military role after completion of the forthcoming

US-UK-Turkish staff talks.8*

The controversy between the United Kingdom and Egypt was also resolved

in 1954. This development was in part the result of a change of government in

Cairo. President Naguib was ousted and was succeeded by Colonel Gamal Abdel

Nasser, who, at this stage of his career, showed himself to be reasonable and

willing to compromise. A settlement, announced in July and formally signed on

19 October, required the United Kingdom to remove its troops from Egypt

within 20 months but allowed British civilian technicians to remain in order to

keep the Suez installations in working order. British forces would be allowed to

use the base in the event of an armed attack by an outs.de power on any of the

Arab states or on Turkey*

Officials in Washington were destined to disappointment however, in their

hopes that this settlement would be followed by Egypt's military cooperation

with the West. President Eisenhower made the necessary deteraunation that

346
Middle East

Egypt was eligible for military assistance. The State Department opened negotiations for a bilateral agreement with Egypt, and preparations were begun to send

a survey team to that country.91 But these plans lapsed when the Government of

Egypt decided not to accept US aid. Egyptian officials declared that the political

situation in their country made it impossible for them to sign an agreement of

the type that was required by US legislation.92

Adoption of a strategy tied to the northern tier concept awaited the conclusion of trilateral talks, such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff had suggested to their

British colleagues on 21 June 1954. In the period July through early November,

the US and British Chiefs of Staff negotiated back and forth over the procedures

for the talks and discussed the possibility of widening the talks to include additional northern-tier countries. In the end they agreed to begin informal talks on a

tripartite basis to address operational planning only.93

On 17 November 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized Admiral John H.

Cassidy, who had replaced Admiral Wright as CINCNELM, to initiate arrangements for talks with representatives of the United Kingdom and Turkey. As

guidance for the forthcoming discussions, they drew attention to the JCS decision of 6 April 1954 regarding critical US objectives in the Middle East. Late in

December Admiral Cassidy informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the first

meeting would be held in London on 18 January 1955.^

The stage was now set for the development of a realistic military strategy for

the Middle East. The futile effort to build a defense around Egypt had been

abandoned. A strategy tied to the northern tier would take advantage of the

excellent defense terrain along the southwestern boundary of the Soviet Union

and of the willingness of the countries of that region to cooperate with a minimum of prodding from the West. The preparations made during 1954 were soon

to eventuate in the Baghdad Pact and its attendant military organization—visible

results of a process set in motion by Secretary of State Dulles in the spring of

1953.

U7
16

Latin America

Following World War H, the energies and resources of the United States were

absorbed primarily in efforts' • repair the war-damaged economies of nations in

Western Europe and the Far £ast and in erecting alliances and maintaining the

military strength to counter threats to the security of the free world. These

purposes kept the attention of US policy-makers focused for the most part on

areas well removed from the Western Hemisphere, as they looked to the containment of communist aggression at such critical points as Korea, the Taiwan

Strait, and Berlin. In these circumstances, hemisphere defense, though in an

ultimate sense vital to US security, was a goal pursued with less urgency and

with a lesser commitment of resources.

Latin America and US Security

The development o( collective security arrangements for the defense of the

Western Hemisphere nevertheless remained a US policy objective, building

on the Inter-American Treat)* of Reciprocal Assistance signed at Rio de Janeiro in

1947, Material progress toward this goal remained slight, however, SO long a*

the US program of grant military aid encompassed only the NATO And Far

Eastern countries that st-emed directly menaced by communist expansion Once

the initial US policy of making surplus World War II equipment available to

Latin America had run out, the nations to the south generally found themselves

lacking sufficient dollars to purchase arms in the United States They turned

increasingly to European suppliers, who offered attractive credit terms And barter arrangements. This practice ran counter to !he US desire to see the equipment of the armed forces of the Western Hemisphere nations standardized

along US lines Moreover it lessened the effectiveness of the military training

missions that the Unit+d States continued to provide to various South And Central American countries.*

319

—
jCS and National Policy

In support of the policy on military collaboration with Latin America contained in NSC 56/2, which President Truman had approved in May 1950, the

joint Chiefs of Staff early in 1951 drew up a mid-range plan for hemisphere

defense, with an assumed D-day of 1 July 1954. The plan provided that each

nation would defend its own territory and, if capable, would also contribute

forces to guard bases and lines of communication that were essential to the

security of South and Central America as a whole. Eleven Latin American nations

would be asked to contribute to these common defensive tasks: Argentina,

Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru,

Uruguay, and Venezuela. The forces required from these nations consisted of

infantry units of regimental or smaller size, light naval patrol vessels plus a few

cruisers and destroyers, and squadrons of fighter, bomber or reconnaissance

aircraft. The plan recognized that the nations in question could not be expected

to meet these requirements without US assistance.2

Accepting this concept, the Truman administration undertook to initiate a

modest program of grant military aid to the nations named in the JCS plan. The

Congress endorsed the decision by making provision for Latin American countries in the Mutual Security Act of 1951. During 1952 negotiations for bilateral

MDA agreements were opened with ten of the eleven Latin nations that had

been assigned tasks in the JCS hemisphere defense plan. The exception was

Argentina, where the long-standing differences between the United States and

the government of President Juan Peron precluded military collaboration. Argentina was included, however, in the forward planning; the Joint Chiefs of Staff

listed it among the countries for which they recommended force bases for the FY

1954 MDAP 3

The opening of negotiations excited the anti-US feelings prevalent in some

quarters in the countries involved. The guarantees sought by the United States

in return for its assistance were assailed as infringements upon national

sovereignty. Only in Mexico, however, was the opposition strong enough to

prevent the conclusion of an agreement, though the negotiations with Venezuela were suspended for other reasons. The United State*, signed bilateral agreements with Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay during

1952, and actual shipments of aid were begun. An agreement with the Dominican Republic was concluded in March 1953.4

The texts of these bilateral agreements were virtually identical Their major

provisions included the commitment by the United States in Article I to furnish

military equipment and services that were to be used exclusively for hemisphere

defense. The other contracting government undertook to make the full contribution to the defensive strength of the free world permitted by its resources and to

facilitate the production and transfer to the Government of the United States of

strategic raw materials. Article VIII, intended by the United States to discourage

trade with the communist bloc, specified that the Latin American signatory

would cooperate in "measures designed to control trade with nations which

threaten the security of the Western Hemisphere."5

350
Latin America

New Developments in 1953 These beginning moves toward the erection of

a more effective collective

defense for the hemisphere were in train when the new administration took

office in Washington in January 1953. President Dwight D. Eisenhower hada

ready sympathy for the feeling existing in the Latin countries that their problems

and interests had been receiving less than their deserved attention from the

United States. He suspected, as well, that some resentment had been engendered by a tendency on the part of US officials to take the supporting role of the

Latin American nations for granted and to assume that they would automatically

stand by the United States on critical world issues. Besides seeking to strengthen

US relations with the other American Republics through various exercises in

personal diplomacy, the new President selected his brother, Dr. Milton Eisenhower, as his adviser on Latin America problems and sent him on a fact-finding

tour. On his return in November 1953, Dr. Eisenhower submitteda number of

recommendations that were later to have an influence on US policy.

6

Earlier, on 18 March 1953, the new President and the National Security

Council had adopted the first general policy directive for Latin America, NSC

144/1, comparable to those written for other regions of the globe.

7 They approved

the following objectives: maintenance of hemisphere solidarity; orderly political

and economic development of Latin America; collective defense against external

aggression, through the development of indigenous military forces and bases;

reduction or elimination of internal communist subversion; adequate production

of raw materials essential to US security; and support by Latin America for

collective action in defense of other parts of the free world. These objectives

would be sought in various ways: by making full use of the Organization of

American States, avoiding any appearance of unilateral US action; by evidencing

greater consideration of Latin American problems at high levels of government;

and by stimulating the economic development of the Latin countries through

loans, expansion of trade, and direct assistance. In the military sphere, NSC

144/1 recommended continuance of measures already under way: combined

planning through the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) and the Joint

Mexican-US and Brazil-US Military Commissions, provision of training assistance to Latin American countries, and continued attempts to standardize the

organization, training, doctrine, and equipment of military forces along US lines.

With regard specifically to hemisphere defense and US military assistance,

NSC 144/1 contained the following paragraphs:

11. The United States should encourage acceptance of the concept that each

of the Latin American states is responsible for maximizing its contribution to:

The internal security of its own territory.

The defense of its own territory ....

The allied defense effort, including participation in combined operations within the hemisphere and support of collective actions in other

theaters by forces beyond the requirements of hemisphere security.

In support of the courses of action in paragraph 11, the United States

should provide military assistance to Latin America consistent with the

351

a.

b.

c.

12.

I
JCS and National Policy

I

agreed plans of the Inter-American Defense Board and other bilateral or

multilateral military agreements to which the United States isa party.

US military assistance should be designed to reduce toa minimum the

diversion of US forces for the maintenance of hemisphere security; and

in determining the type of military assistance to be provided each nation,

consideration should be given to its role in hemisphere defense.

In approving NSC 144/1, President Eisenhower stipulated that his approval

did not extend to any specific program of military or economic assistance for

Latin America. These programs would be subject to review in the light of the

relative importance of programs for that region as opposed to others, and of the

general objective of balancing the Federal budget.

8

The implication that funds

for Latin American assistance might be reduced was borne out when the administration asked only $18.8 million for Western Hemisphere nations in the MDAP

budget for FY 1954—considerably less than had been sought in previous years,

though significantly more than the $8.5 million recommended by the Joint Chiefs

of Staff. As usual Congress applieda further reduction and appropriated only

$15 million.

9

NSC 144/1 prescribed that the United States should assume primary responsibility for military operations in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and the

Caribbean Sea, with particular attention to the air and sea approaches to the

Panama Canal. "At the appropriate time," it read, the United States "should

seek from other American states acceptance of US military control of the defense

of these areas."

10

In this connection the Joint Chiefs of Staff in May 1953 considered the question of command arrangements and concluded that only the basic

principles could be developed at that time. Application of the principles must

await the completion of agreements between the United States and the other

countries. These agreements should provide that forces contributed by Latin

American states for use in hemisphere defense, outside their national boundaries and in areas of responsibility of commands established by the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, would have their own unit commanders but would serve under overall

US command. They would provide liaison officers for duty with the staff of the

appropriate US commander. "Except as may be specifically agreed otherwise,

Latin American officers should not exercise overall command or command of

United States forces."

11

In September 1953 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approveda revised mid-term war

plan for the Western Hemisphere that was intended also to serve as an

emergency, or capabilities, plan. They adjusted the D-day to1 July 1956 to

conform to the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan then in preparation, made revisions in estimates of force requirements, and assigned a mission to an additional

country, Haiti, which was called upon to patrol its own territorial waters and

thus to assist in the defense of the Windward Passage.

12

Several months later,

when Haiti submitteda request for US aid (after having been refused on previous occasions), the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that it be approved in

order to enable that country to play the role envisioned for it in the new war

plan.

13

The administration accepted this recommendation.

352
Latin America

Communist Foothold in Guatemala

The JCS hemisphere defense plans were aimed at meeting the kind of external attacks that were deemed within Soviet capabilities: submarine attacks,

raids by minor forces, mining of harbors, or covert action aimed at sabotage and

the creation of internal disorder. Neither the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor other

agencies of government had prepared plans to cover the possibility that the

communists might seize control of any part of Latin America without the benefit

of direct foreign intervention.

But this was precisely the possibility that was becoming a reality at the

beginning of 1953. The locale of this development was Guatemala, where Jacobo

Arbenz Guzman had taken office as President in March 1951. Though Arbenz, a

military officer, was not a communist himself, his attitude toward communism

was ambiguous, to say the least. That he enjoyed the support of the Communist

Party was beyond doubt. In return, he extended a benevolent toleration that

enabled the communists increasingly to move into positions of leadership in

various sectors of Guatemalan society, beginning with the labor movement.

Stronger evidence of the hold of the communists over official policy appeared in

April 1953, when they were able to induce the Arbenz government to withdraw

from an association of the Central American States, charging that a proposal to

study the influence of communism in the area constituted interference in the

domestic affairs of Guatemala.14

President Eisenhower, as he later wrote, found the Guatemalan problem

waiting for him when he entered the White House.15It was one of the matters

that he and the Council attempted to deal with by drawing up the policy statement that appeared in March as NSC 144/1. Two of the provisions of that

document were that the United States should encourage "individual and collective action against internal subversive activities by communists and other anti-US

elements," and should seek to promote the development of "responsible, democratic labor leadership in Latin America capable of taking the initiative away

from communists." It seemed doubtful, however, that such general prescriptions could succeed in arresting, much less in reversing, the drift toward complete communist rule in Guatemala.

Should the communists consolidate their control over that country, it would

be necessary to look toward the possibility that they might seek to expand,

particularly at the expense of their less populous neighbors to the south—El

Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. On 9 April 1953, Secretary of State Dulles

suggested to Secretary Wilson that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be asked to assign

hemisphere defense missions to these three nations in order to qualify them for

military aid and thus to stiffen their willingness to resist pressure from Guatemala.

He promised that his Department would support a request to Congress for any

necessary extra funds.16

The joint Chiefs of Staff tentatively decided that it would be impossible to

develop missions of significant military value for these nations. Before transmitting this conclusion to the Secretary of Defense, however, they decided to consult the Department of State to ascertain the urgency of the political considera353

•mm
]CS and National Policy

tions involved in this issue. Following these consultations the Joint Chiefs of

Staff agreed, presumably at the urging of the State Department, to develop a

mission for Nicaragua but not for the two smaller countries.1" Accordingly, on 7

July 1953 they concluded that Nicaragua's mission should be to contribute one

infantry battalion to the Caribbean Mobile Reserve. They directed that this

designation be included in the next revision of the mid-term war plan for defense

of Latin America.18

Some weeks later the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency

advised Secretary Wilson that there was an over-riding requirement for inclusion of El Salvador and Honduras in the military aid program.19 The Joint Chiefs

of Staff thereupon developed missions for these two nations calling for one

infantry battalion apiece. They advised Secretary Wilson to concur in a joint

recommendation with Secretary Dulles that the President find El Salvador,

Honduras, and Nicaragua eligible for aid. President Eisenhower issued a declaration to this effect on 9 December 1953.20

It was as important to keep weapons out of the hands of the Guatemalan

forces as it was to make them available to Guatemala's vulnerable neighbors.

The Guatemalan government, not yet fully committed to a pro-communist foreign policy and still maintaining diplomatic relations with the other countries of

the Western Hemisphere, had made a number of efforts to purchase US military

equipment, most recently in October 1953. In each case, the US reply was that

Guatemala was not eligible to purchase military equipment from the Department of Defense. Purchases from commercial arms suppliers were blocked by

refusal to issue export licenses.21

Outcome of the Guatemalan Crisis

During 1953 the communists in Guatemala continued to make progress. By

the beginning of 1954 they had gained virtual control of one of the departments as a result of their penetration of the agencies concerned with agrarian

reform, and they were making considerable headway in others. Their success

was aided by the ineptitude of the noncommunist parties of both left and right.

The officer corps remained the principal center of anticommunist sentiment, but

President Arbenz was exerting himself to insure the loyalty of its members by

according various economic benefits and other favors ö

The Inter-American Conference, the supreme governing body of the Organization of American States, held its tenth session in Caracas, Venezuela, during

March 1954. The United States used the occasion to mobilize support against

communism, in the face of Guatemalan opposition to including the subject on

the agenda. With some difficulty, the US delegation succeeded in obtaining the

approval of a Declaration of Solidarity, which condemned "the activities of the

international communist movement as constituting intervention in American

affairs," and declared that "the domination or control of the political institutions

of any American State by the international communist movement, extending to

354
!

Latin America

this Hemisphere the political system of an extra-continental power, would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American

States." It was recommended that special attention be given by each of the

American governments to "measures to require disclosure of the identity, activities and sources of funds of those who are spreading propaganda of the international communist movement or who travel in the interests of that movement."23

Such measures would at best prevent the spread of the communist infection;

they could not remove its source.

In the weeks after the Caracas Conference, the situation in Guatemala moved

toward a climax. Early in May, employees of the United Fruit Company in

neighboring Honduras went on strike. Unrest spread rapidly, and within a few

days the strike had become general. There was reason to believe that Guatemalan communists were busily exploiting the strike, if indeed they had not instigated it. Moreover, intelligence pointed to the possibility that Guatemala might

take advantage of the situation to attack Honduras, covertly or openly.24

Another alarming development followed soon after. On 17 May 1954 the

Department of State announced that an important consignment of weapons,

shipped from a communist bloc port, had recently reached Guatemala. The

Foreign Minister of Guatemala subsequently confirmed this action and defended

it on the grounds that the United States had committed an act of aggression by

refusing to sell weapons to his nation.25

The immediate US response to these events was to speed the dispatch of

military assistance to Guatemala's neighbors. Nicaragua's eligibility for US aid

had been established when a bilateral agreement was signed on 23 April 1954.26

A negotiating team went to Honduras on 15 May; an agreement was signed five

days later. Arms shipments to both countries began before the end of the month.

If Guatemala actually attacked Honduras, the United States would be obligated to come to the defense of the victim in accordance with Article 3 of the

Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947. Secretary of State Dulles

told the National Security Council on 13 May that the United States should be

prepared for a possible request from Honduras for such support.27 On 27 May

the President approved NSC 5419/1, which declared that the United States should

respond favorably to any request from an OAS member for aid against an attack

from Guatemala, and should take steps to insure that other OAS members were

prepared for collective action. At the suggestion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it

was stipulated that the United States would take unilateral action only as a last

resort. The Council also noted that the President had authorized the US Navy to

halt, on the high seas off the Guatemalan coast, vessels suspected of carrying

munitions of war destined for Guatemala.28

To prepare contingency plans for action in support of the Inter-American

Treaty was a JCS responsibility. CINCARIB had drawn up Oplan 3-53, which

provided for dispatch of a joint task force, drawn from the forces under his

command or from the Western Hemisphere Reserve, to protect the oil fields of

Venezuela and the nearby Dutch and British island possessions (Curacao, Aruba,

and Trinidad). The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided on 29 June 1954 that this plan

should be modified for application to Central America, making use of an Army

355

i
JCS and National Policy

or Marine RCT in addition to the forces already listed. On the following day they

instructed CINCARIB, through the Chief of Staff, US Army, to draw up a detailed

plan along these lines.29

By the time these actions were taken, the crisis in Guatemala was well on its

way to solution. Elements hostile to the Arbenz regime had gathered across the

border in Honduras under the leadership of an exile, Colonel Carlos Castillo

Armas. Fearing an invasion from these forces, Arbenz and his communist supporters turned increasingly to dictatorial and terrorist methods to insure internal

security. On 18 June, the forces of Colonel Castillo Armas crossed the border.

They enjoyed material assistance as well as moral support from the United

States. At one point, President Eisenhower, notified that the invaders had lost

two of the three aircraft in their air force, agreed that the United States would

replace these losses in order to prevent the invasion from collapsing.30

A brief civil war ensued, during which the Guatemalan government appealed

for aid to the United Nations and the Organization of American States. The latter

organization agreed to send a team to investigate the situation, but before it

could do so, the Arbenz regime had collapsed owing to the refusal of Army

leaders to support it. Arbenz and his principal followers fled; power passed into

the hands of another military leader who negotiated a settlement with the

Insurgents. On 8 July 1954, Castillo Armas became the head of a new governing

junta.31

The United States lost no time in extending diplomatic recognition to the new

regime and in lending more tangible support. Secretary Dulles announced that

the United States would provide economic assistance in order to a alleviate the

basic conditions that had provided Guatemalan communists with their opportunities. Guatemala was also declared eligible for reimbursable military aid.32

A Revised Latin American Policy: NSC 5432/1

The close call of the Guatemalan affair pointed the way to a revision of US

policy to avoid similar developments in the future. In this connection, renewed attention was given to the report of Dr. Milton Eisenhower, which had

suggested a number of ways of promoting economic progress in Latin America.

If successful, these measures could be expected to lessen the willingness of the

peoples of that region to turn toward Marxist totalitarianism.

In August 1954 the NSC Planning Board drafted NSC 5432, a revised statement of Latin American policy, in which the influence of the recent Guatemalan

crisis was apparent. "Realizing the increasing importance of helping Latin America

to reverse those trends which offer opportunities for Communist penetration,"

declared the Board in NSC 5432, "the US should give greater emphasis than

heretofore to its Latin American programs in order to safeguard and strengthen

the security of the Hemisphere." To assist the stability and economic development of the Latin nations, the United States should adopt long-range measures

to stimulate trade, aid the financing of economic development projects, and

356
Latin America

expand its program of technical cooperation in Latin America--all measures that

had been included among Dr. Eisenhower's recommendations. "Individual and

collective action against Communist or other anti-U.S. subversion or intervention in any American state" should be encouraged through consultation, exchange

of information, and other means. In military matters, the Board recommended

renewed efforts to promote standardization of Latin American forces along US

lines, by offering more favorable terms for purchase of weapons (including

credit) as well as faster deliveries, possibly through assigning higher priorities to

the American Republics. It was suggested also that increased numbers of Latin

military personnel undergo training in US Armed Forces schools.33

The Joint Chiefs of Staff took exception to some of these proposals when they

gave NSC 5432 their general endorsement. They opposed adjustment of priorities to accelerate delivery of equipment to Latin American recipients. Priorities,

they pointed out, should be determined solely by world-wide strategic requirements and not used as an administrative device to speed deliveries. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff did not favor increasing the quotas of Latin personnel at US

military schools, which were already operating at maximun capacity.34

On 2 September 1954 the National Security Council and the President adopted

an amended version, NSC 5432/1, which deleted the suggestion of higher priorities for Latin America but retained the proposal for larger training quotas.35 A

new provision called for fostering closer relations between Latin American and

US military personnel. The purpose was to increase the understanding of, and

orientation toward, US objectives on the part of the Latin American military,

recognizing that the military establishments of most Latin American states played

influential role in government

NSC 5432/1 sanctioned the continuation of grant military aid to Latin America,

repeating the provisions of NSC 144/1 on this subject without change. The

current recipients of US assistance included the two recently approved Central

American countries, Honduras and Nicaragua, as well as the eight nations established as eligible in 1952 or 1953: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican

Republic, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay. The participation of El Salvador and

Haiti had been approved, but those countries had not signed bilateral agreements by the end of 1954.

The administration decided that the new noncommunist government of Guatemala should also be included in the MDA program. Stressing the great importance of this move, Secretary of State Dulles on 27 October 1954 requested that

necessary actions within the responsibility of the Department of Defense be

taken promptly. In passing this request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in November,

Secretary Wilson wrote: "It is apparent that political considerations will dictate

the initiation of a military assistance program for Guatemala." Already he had

directed the Chairman of the US Delegation to the 1ADB to organize and conduct

a survey of Guatemala's military needs and capabilities.36

Reporting on 26 November, the survey team recommended that the United

States supply assistance to Guatemala in the form of material for one infantry

battalion, with supporting ordnance, signal, and transport units. Up to four

propeller-driven fighter aircraft should be furnished, under reimbursable aid,

357
JCS and National Policy

since established policy forbade grant aid to air forces of nations too small to

support complete air units.37

The Joint Chiefs of Staff on 22 December 1954 approved the proposed infantry battalion but not the support units, which they regarded as unnecessary and

out of line with what was provided for other Central American countries. They

noted that Guatemala had already obtained three F-51 fighter aircraft under

reimbursable aid. Pointing out to Secretary Wilson that the tasks Guatemala's

military forces could perform in furtherance of hemisphere defense were of

negligible value, they repeated his observation that the recommendations were

being dictated by overriding political considerations. The JCS conclusions were

forwarded to the Department of State, but it was not until 18 June 1955 that a

bilateral agreement was signed that made Guatemala eligible for grant aid.38

For the nations already participating in the military assistance program, the

force bases proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in October 1952 were accepted

as valid throughout 1953 and 1954, with minor amendments. The most important change, involving a matter of policy, related to Colombia. Alone among the

nations of Latin America, Colombia had contributed forces, consisting of a battalion of infantry, to the UN Command in Korea. In October 1954, when this unit

was about to return home, Colombian authorities asked that it be allowed to

retain the equipment that had been furnished by the United States. Although

established policy forbade such retention, General Ridgway recommended that

the request be approved for political and psychological as well as military reasons.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred and recommended that the battalion be

added to the Colombian MDAP force bases. Secretary Wilson approved the JCS

recommendations, with the stipulation that his decision was not to be considered as setting a precedent in connection with other withdrawals from Korea.39

In the course of the military assistance program for Latin America from its

inception through 30 September 1954 a total of $110.4 million in grant aid had

been furnished. Nearly half this sum, however, represented the value assigned

to certain World War II lend-lease ships whose title had been transferred to

Brazil. Through FY 1954, and as projected for later years, the military aid funds

allotted to Latin America constituted less than 1 percent of the annual worldwide program. *°

The increased assistance to Latin America being contemplated by the Eisenhower administration under the provisions of NSC 5432/1 lay mainly in the

economic and technical fields. Nevertheless, the entire Latin American MDA

program was also under scrutiny at the end of 1954. The State Department had

suggested the possibility of another approach to Argentina, and requests for

additional aid had been received from Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia. On

10 December 1954 Secretary Wilson asked the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

concerning these questions. At the same time, he directed them to conduct a

general reappraisal of military objectives and programs in Latin America with

special regard to the effect of new and increased programs in the area on the

world-wide MDA program. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had not completed this

study when the year drew to a close.41

358

I
AAA

AAM

AEW

AFPC

AFSWP

ANZUS

ASD

ASM

ASW

CINCAL

CINCARIB

CINCCENTER

CINCFE

CINCLANT

CINCNE

CINCNELM

CINCONAD

CINCPAC

CINCSOUTH

CINCUNC

CINCUSAFE

CINCUSAREUR

CJCS

COMLANDCENT

COMNAVFE

CONAD

CUSDPG

CVA

DART

DCI

DER

DEW

DJS

List of Abbreviations

and Acronyms

Antiaircraft artillery

Air-to-air missile

Airborne early warning

Armed Forces Policy Council

Armed Forces Special Weapons Project

Australia, New Zealand, and the United States

Assistant Secretary of Defense

Air-to-surface missile

Antisubmarine warfare

Commander in Chief, Alaska

Commander in Chief, Caribbean

Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Center (NATO)

Commander in Chief, Far East

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

Commander in Chief, Northeast

Commander in Chief, Eastern Atlantic and

Mediterranean

Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense

Command

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe

(NATO)

Commander in Chief, United Nations Command

Commander in Chief, US Air Forces in Europe

Commander in Chief, US Army, Europe

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commander, Land Forces, Center (NATO)

Commander, US Naval Forces, Far East

Continental Air Defense Command

Continental United States Defense

Planning Group

Attack aircraft carrier

Defense Annual Review Team

Director of Central intelligence

Radar picket escort ship

Distant early warning

Director, Joint Staff

359
^

List of Abbreviations

EDC European Defense Community

FOA Foreign Operations Administration

FY Fiscal Year ! GMIORG Guided Missiles Interdepartmental

Operational Requirements Group | IADB Inter-American Defense Board

IFF Identification, friend or foe \ ISA International Security Affairs

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JFY Japanese Fiscal Year

Jic Joint Intelligence Committee

JLPC Joint Logistics Plans Committee

JLRSE Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate

JMRWP Joint Mid-Range War Plan

JOEWP Joint Outline Emergency War Plan

JOWP Joint Outline War Plan

JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

JSOP Joint Strategic Objectives Plan

JSPC Joint Strategic Plans Committee j JSSC Joint Strategic Survey Committee

JUSMG Joint United States Military Group

LOFAR Low-frequency acquisition and ranging

MAAG Military Assistance Advisory Group

MDA Mutual Defense Assistance

MDAP Mutual Defense Assistance Program

MEDO Middle East Defense Organization

1 MOP Memorandum of Policy 1 NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization i NDA National Defense Agency (Japan) 1 NIE National Intelligence Estimate i NSA National Safety Agency (Japan)

NSC National Security Council i NSRB National Security Resources Board I NSTC National Security Training Commission

OCB Operations Coordinating Board

ODM Office of Defense Mobilization | OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PCH&T i Packing, crating, handling, and

transportation

j PJBD Permanent Joint Board on Defense (Canada-US)

PSB Psychological Strategy Board

£•

360 I
RAC

RAF

RBCOS

RCT

ROK

SACEUR

SACLANT

SAGE

SAM

SEATO

SHAPE

SNIE

SRE

SSM

USCINCEUR

USRO

YAGR

Z!

Executive Committee on Regulation of

Armaments

RoyaJ Air Force

Representatives of the British Chiefs

of Staff

Regimental combat team

Republic of Korea

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (NATO)

Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (NATO)

Semi-automatic ground environment

Surface-to-air missile

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers,

Europe

Special National Intelligence Estimate

Special Representative in Europe

Surface-to-surface missile

Commander in Chief, US European Command

United States Mission to the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization and

European Regional Organization

Miscellaneous auxiliary ship radar

Zone of the interior

List of Abbreviations

1

361

i
Notes

Chapter 1. Basic National Security Policy, 1953

1. This chapter considers the New Look in relation to national policy and military strategy. Its

effects on the size and structure of the US Armed Services are discussed more fully in Ch. 3,

although of course the two aspects cannot be wholly separated.

2. The policy decisions of the Truman administration were embodied in the following papers:

NSC 20/4, 23 Nov 48; NSC 68 and 68/1 through 68/4. Apr-Dec 50; NSC 114/1 through 1140, Jul 51 -jun

52; NSC 135/3, 25 Sep 52. Their contents are conveniently summarized in JCS Hist Div, "Positions

and Actions of the joint Chiefs of Staff Relative to Basic National Security Policy, September 1947 to

March 1956," 4 Apr 56, pp. 1-28 (hereafter cited as "Positions and Actions of the JCS") Fur actual

and planned Service force levels as of the end of 1952. see Table 2.

3. "Positions and Actions of the |CS," p. 33.

4. Memo, JCS to SecDef, ""<-examination of Programs for National Security," 10 Nov 52, JCS

2101/79, CCS 381 US 0-31-5rssc 22. This memo dealt with programs for "offensive »hiking power"

and "general military reserve." By another, dated 20 Nov 52, the JCS discussed continental defense

programs. See Ch. 5.

5. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Re-e*amination of Programs for National Security," 12 Jan 53, JCS

2101/84. CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 23.

6 NSC 141, 19 Jan 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50), BP pt 6

7 "Positions and Actions of the JCS". pp 4CM1 NSC 142. IFeb 531, CCS 381 US (1-3150) BP pt 8

Memo. ExecSccy, NSC, to NSC, "Status of VniUe4 State» Programs for National Security as of

December 31, 1*52." 6 Mar 53, same file, sec 25

8 These figu/es include troop carrier groups, which were usually counted a» wings and, beginning in 1953. were actually so designated See Ch. 3, For the time period of this volume, the fiscal

year used by the US Government ru\ from I July to 30 June. Hence FY 1954 covered the period 1

July 1953 to» June 1954

9. TV lluJgft of the Umini Suin Govtrnmtnt fvt the ft**/ Yatr Lndmg fune M), 1954 (1953), pp M14.

562, 5*3, 648 (hereafter ctted a* Budget of the U$, Ft 1954) The Dec 52 strength figure» are from NSC

142 See Ch 3 for a fuller JmuMsun of torce level» under the FY 54 budget

10 Except for the la»t one. all the quotations are from a »peech on 25 Sep 52 devoted entirely to

national defense The exception te tnm\ one given on 16 Sep 52 For text» of these »perches, »ee NY

Tunes, 26 Sep 52- 12. 17 Sep 52. 24 Mr Eisenhower's own statement of hi» view» on defense

planning (it least as thev had evolved later) will be found in hi* book, KUnJtt'e frn Changt. JiSJ-195»

(19»3). pp 446-451

Special attention should be drawn to the article by Ctcnn H Snyder, "The New took of 1953. ' in

Warner R. Schilling. Paul Y llammond. tn4 GJenn H Snyder. Sintfrey. rVffic», *#d Defente Bujgrt*

(1962) (hereafter ctted a» Snyder, "New took") It cover» much the unw ground a» thi» chapter

Based principally on interview* with military and civilian ofhetai» who held office m 1953, Snyder'»

work i» thorough and genera3y accurate, but since he did not have acce*» to the classified document»,

ht» acctMint need» correction at certain point* A eomprehen**ve collection of contemporary nesvspa

per 4i*d magazine article* tracing the evolution of the New took, insofar as it became known to the

pre»*, wt8 be found m W Barton teach, fkr Nnr t*4 (Air Command *f*4 Staff College. Maxwell

AFB. Ala., 1954)

11 Snvtkf. 'New took, pp 3**-3*9 Charie» J V Murphy, A New Mrai^v for NATO/'

t#i*m (jan 53) pp AMI Roger Miisman, "NATO The Developing Strategic Context." in Uau»

K***r, ed . NATO awf Amrt**n Strvnry (1959). p 26. Column by loaeph and Stewart Ahwp, 2» Feb

54, reproduced in teach. The Sew lad. p 257

12 P**i* ffcjsew «* ffcr Presale,«» <* tk* limit* Stem*. t*w**r D le**bx**r. 195.* (1960). p 17

(hereahser crted l# t**H* Aqww. twmh*vrr. i*&i} See also a similar statement made by the President

at a new* ctmlereAce, 19 Mar 53, m **f. p 11?

U tlr. Dodge to Humphrey. 13 r*b 53, and reply. Humphrey to Dodge, 16 hrb *3. End» to

Memo. EwcSecy, NSC to NSC. "Renew of Basar National Security Pet*.**," 19 feb 53, CCS 391 US

(1-31 SO» sec 24 Illustrative of Mr l-frrnhower"» concern far economy was fo* action m mviüng these

363

'%.
Notes to Pages 5-8

officials to participate in the deliberations of the National Security Council; Eisenhower, Mandate for

Onnge, pp. 13M32, 447.

14. Mr. Dodge's directive is reproduced in Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1954,

H. Com on Appropriations, 83d Cong, 1st sess, pp. 2-3 (hereafter cited as H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1954).

15. Memo, ActgSecDef to SecA. SecN, SecAF, 7 Feb 53, JCS 1800198,16 Feb 53, CCS 370 (8-19-45)

sec 39. Reprinted in Hearings, Study of Airpower, S. Com on Armed Services, 84th Cong, 2d sess. vol

II, p. 1627.

16. Memo, SecDef to SecA et al., "Budget— Assumptions and Factors to be Used in Reappraising

F Y 1954 Budgets," 10 Feb 53, ]CS 1800/198, 16 Feb 53, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 39.

17. In slightly more than five years of the existence of NSC during President Truman's tenure of

office t>- record shows 699 official actions and 128 meetings, contrasted with 592 actions and 101

meetings during Mr. Eisenhower's first two years alone. On the operation of the Council under

President Eisenhower, see Robert Cutler, "The Development of the National Security Council,"

foreign Affairs, Apr 56, pp. 441-458, and Dillon Anderson, 'The President and National Security,"

Atlantic Monthly, Jan 56, pp. 42-46. Cutler and Anderson served successively as President Eisenhower's

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

18. For the reorganization of the Council in March 1953, see Public Papers, Eisenhower, 1953, pp.

120-121. and Exec. Order 10483, 2 Sep 53, which created the Operations Coordinating Board

19. NSC Action Nos. 701, 29 Jan 53. and 705, 4 Feb 53

20. Memo. SecDef to JCS et al., "US Programs for National Security." 6 Feb 53, JCS 2101/89.9 Feb

53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 24.

21. Memo. JCS to SecDef. "U.S. Program for National Security." 12 Feb 53, JCS 2101*2, same file.

22. NSC Action No 720. 19 Feb 53 Memo, ExecSecy, NSC. to NSC. "Budget Outlook Based on

Programs for Previous Administration," 17 Feb 53, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 40.

23 NSC Action No 726, 25 Feb 53. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC. to NSC. "Cost of National Security

Programs." 24 Feb 53. CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 24.

24. Memo. ExecSecy, NSC, to NSC. "Budget Considerations Bearing on the NSC Review of Basic

National Security Policies." 5 Mar 53, CCS 370 (8-19-45} sec W. NSC Action No 730. 4 Mar 53

25 Memo, DepSecDef to SecA et al., 9 Mar 53. JCS 1800/200. 10 Mar 53. CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 40

Under the Truman budget, Arrrv expenditures would be $15.3 billion. Navy $12.0 billion, and Air

Force $17.5 billion, with the rest interdepartmental (see Ch 3). Hence Mr. Kyes's allocation would

have the most adverse effect upon the Air Force.

Various document» relating to force ievei planning and budgeting in 1953 and 1954 «rv »umnurued in JCS Hist Div, Summary of Policy and Budgetary Considerations Relating to Force Levels tor

Fiscal Year» 1955-1957 "

26. The Service replies to Mr Kyes's memo of 9 Mar 53 are reproduced as Ends B. C, and D to JCS

1800201. 18 Mar 53. CCS 370 (8-19-45) BP pt 5

27. Memo. JCS to SecDef. "Effect of Approaching a Balanced Budget in FY 1954 and Achieving a

Balanced Budget in FY 1955." 19 Mar 53, JCS 1800/201, same fu>. sec 40

28. Memo, SecDef to ExecSecy, NSC. "Review til National Security Programs.' 24 Mar 5L. Encl to

Memo. ExecSecy, NSC. to NSC. "Review of Bask National Secunty Policies The Military Program."

24 Mar 53, CCS 381 US (131-50) sec 25

29 NSC Action No 752 25 .Mar 53

30 H Hrgs. DODApprermtHiif* 195*. p 471 (statement by Mr W } McNeil. ASO(ComptroUer).

11 May 53) Also statement by SecDef Wilson to Senate Committee, 8 Jun 53. Hrgs on U.R. 5%¥.

Department of Defense ApproprMwm* for 1954, S Com on Appropriation». 83d Cong. 1st •***< pp

539*540 (hereafter cited as S Hrgs, DOD Apprvprmfoms for 1954)

31 These consultant» represented bustnes», education, labor, and the pre»* Their name* were

-Mtnounced on II Mar 53 in a pre*» release stating that they would consult w«h the Council on

"griuraJ term» relating to it» policies and program*." .*> Times, 12 Mar 53, 22 (See ah«* the White

House announcement of 23 .Mar 53. placing this announcement in contest a» part o4 a »ewe* of

measures intended to "strengthen <tnd improve the operations of the National Security Council." in

PwWx Paper* usenktmrr. 1953, pp I2&122 ) Ewept for mention of the« presence at the 31 Mar

meeting.. *v*»UK- source» do no* indicate their relations with the Council

32 NSC 149. 3 APT 53, CCS 381 US (1-31 50} »ec 25 The official NSC record doe» not mention the

31 Mar meeting, the »numbered sequence «f formal action* run* from No 754. 25 ,V*t. to No 755. 3

Apr

33 The proce** by wroch »he C&ttftctf * reduced e*pendmt*e figure« were reached i* described in

Ch 3 The Joint Ottef* of Staff did not participate tn it

34 NSC Action No 776. 28 Apr 5* NSC I**« 29 Apr 53. CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 25

»JcHI

-
Notes to Pages 8-17

35. The basis for the selection of these objectives is described in Ch. 3.

36. Service strengths as of 28 Feb 53 were: Army, 1,495,000; Navy, 802,936; Marine Corps, 242,300;

Air Force, 965,425. See Ch. 3.

37. Public Papers, Eisenhower, 1953, p. 242.

38. Ibid., pp. 306-316.

39. See Ch. 3 for details of the reduced budget.

40. The Navy had 1,116 active ships on 31 Dec 52 and was authorized 1,130 for the end of FY 53.

See Ch. 3.

41. Previously the Air Force had been building toward a goal of 143 wings. See Ch. 3.

42. H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1954, pp. 315-3^9.

43. NSC 153, 1 Jun 53, JCS 2101/93, 4 Jun 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 26.

44. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Restatement of Basic National Security rc>licy," 5 Jun 53, JCS 2101/93;

Memo, MG Gerhart to JCS, "NSC 153, Restatement of Basic National Security Policy," 8 Jun 53; same

tile.

45. NSC Action No. 811, 9 Jun 53. NSC 153/1, 10 Jun 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 26.

46. See James Burnham, Containment or Liberation (1952), which argues the case for the latter

alternative.

47. NY Times, 28 Aug 52, 12.

48. Snyder, "New Look," pp. 407-409. Charles J.V. Murphy, "The Eisenhower Shift," Fortune

(Mar 56), p. 232.

49. Memo, Pres to CJCS, "Project Solarium," 20 May 53, CCS 381 (1-31-50) sec 26.

50. The actual instructions given the task forces have not been found. The summary given here is

from Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to NSC, "Project Solarium," 22 Jul 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 27.

According to Snyder, "New Look," p. 408, and Murphy, "The Eisenhower Shift." p. 232, the

instructions were drafted by a committee headed by one of the President's informal advisers, LTG

James H. Doolittle, USAF (Ret.), then a vice president of Shell Oil Co.

51. Rpts, Task Forces A, B, and C of Project Solarium, to NSC, "A Course of Action Which the

United States Might Presently or in the Future 'Jnüertake with Respect to the Soviet Power Bloc—

Alternatives A, B, C," 16 Jul 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) BP pt 9.

52. NSC Action No. 853,16 Jul 53. Memo, Exe-.Secy, NSC, to NSC, "Project Solarium," 22 Jul 53,

JCS 2101/97, 13 Aug 53, CCN 381 US (1-31-50) ?ec 27.

53. Memo, AsstSecDefflSA) to SecA et al, "Project Solarium," 24 Jul 53, JCS 2101/95, 28 Jul 53,

same file.

54. DM-47-53 to GEN Bradley et al., 28 Jul 53. same file.

55. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Project Solarium," 28 Jul 53, JCS 2101/95, same file.

56. NSC Action No. 868, 30 Jul 53, recorded the decision to prepare a new statement but did not

indicate the Council's views on the direction of policy, which have to be inferred from the guidelines

furnished the Special Committee of the Planning Board. The latter may be seen in the attachment to

Memo, Secy, AFPC, to SecA et al., "'Solarium' Decision of the Armed Forces Policy Council, July 28,

1953," 17 Aug 53, JCS 2101/100, 24 Aug 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 28.

57. For Senator Tart's views, see his book, A Foreign Policy for Americans (1951). An excellent

analysis of the conflicting views of Taft and Bradley is given in Peter F. Witteried, "The Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff: An Evolving Institution" (unpublished MA. thesis, University of V' -^inia,

1964), pp 48-55.

58. Snyder, "New Look." pp. 4>0-4U. NY Times. 7 Apr 53, 21; 22 Apr 53, 1.

59. With the exception of the Commandant, USMC, General Lemuel C. Shepherd, whose statutory four-year term would not expire until 31 Dec 1955.

60. NT Times, • May 53. 1.

61. See SecD« testimony. 1 Feb 55, Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1956, H.

Com on Appropriations, 84th Cong, 1st sess, pp. 72-73 (hereafter cited as H. Hrgs, DOD Appropna

twns?.- 1956).

12. NY Times, 15 May 53, 3.

63. Ibtd., 7. 8. and 9 Dec 52 (p. 1 in each case). Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. %.

64. Robert J. Donovan, Eistnhowe*: The Inside Start (1956), pp. 17-19.

65. Text of Reorganization Plan No. 6 in NT Times, 1 May 53,8. The President's message transmitting the plan to Congress is in Pubin Papers, Eisenhourr. 1953. pp. 225-238.

66 Pubtk Papers. Eisenhower 1953, pp. 293-294

67. M. T>o. SpecAsst to the Pres, Robert Cutler, to SecDef. 25 Jun 53. |CS Hist Div. Files.

68. Memo. Pres to SecDef. 1 Jul 53. JCS Hist. Div Files

69. Tru* meeting is described in Snyder. "New Look.*' p 413. and in Matthew B fcdgway. Soldier

The Memom of Matthew B Ridgway (1956). pp. 266-267. Snyde/s account is the more complete, and is

365

mm ' 1um.
Notes to Pages 17-23

presumably based on interviews with several of those who were present. Neither mentions the date,

but it can be fixed within a few days. The NY Times, 13 Jul 53, 3, recorded the arrival of Ridgway and

Radford in Washington on 12 July 1953 for "top-level briefing and conferences/' and reported that

Carney was scheduled to arrive the next day.

70. Memo, GEN Twining to ADM Radford, GEN Ridgway, and ADM Carney, 20 Jul 53, JCS Hist.

Div. Files.

71. Snyder, "New Look," pp. 413-414, gives an account, presumably accurate, of the members

working together in a conference room near the Chairman's office, with no assistants except a single

aide who provided pencils, paper, and coffee.

72. Ridgway, Soldier, p. 267. Ridgway's recollection was that most of the month was occupied by

these trips, which according to his account, were undertaken in accord with specific oral instructions

given by the President.

73. "Defense Progress—A Team Responsibility," Rpt of Secretaries' Conference, Marine Corps

Schools, Quantico, Va., 23-26 Jul 53, OCJCS File 337 (19 Feb 54), Quantico Conference 23-26 July,

1953. According to Snyder "New Look," p. 413, the President told the Joint Chiefs of Staff during

this conference that he wanted only unanimous recommendations from them, not "split" papers.

This statement does not appear in the brief summary of the President's address in the report cited

here.

74. Snyder, "New Look," pp. 413-414. Murphy, "The Eisenhower Shift," pp. 232-234.

75. Memo, ADM Radford, GEN Ridgway, ADM Carney, and GEN Twining to SecDef, 8 Aug 53,

JCS Hist. Div. Files. The summary of this report in Snyder, "New Look," p. 414, is generally

accurate. Ridgway, Soldier, pp. 268-269, describes the conclusions that he himself reached as a result

of this study, but not those submitted collectively to the Secretary of Defense.

76. This interpretation was given later by ADM Radford. See Memo for Record by R{obert]

Qutlerj, 1 Sep 53, recording an interview in which Radford furnished supplementary comments on

the 8 Aug report, JCS Hist. Div. Files.

77. Radford and Ridgway were sworn in on 15 August 1953 and Carney on 17 August. NY Times,

16 Aug 53.. 1; 18 Aug 53, 10. GEN Bradley, the outgoing Chairman, attended his last NSC meeting on

13 August 1933 and received appreciative tributes from Secretary Wilson and other Council members.

NSC Action No. 879, 13 Aug 53.

78. Radford'* press conference of 27 August is described in NY Times, 27 Aug 53, 1. The verbatim

quotations are from the prepared statement made by him on this occasion, as reproduced in Arthur

W. Radford, "The Collected Writings of Arthur W. Radford" (n.d), vol. I, p. 221.

79. Memo by R|obert) C|utlerl, "August 2763 NSC Meeting," 1 Sep 53, JCS Hist. Div. Files. The

official record of this meeting is brief and not very informative, except that it adds that the President

characterized the concept as a "crystallized and clarified statement or this Administration's understanding of our national security objectives since World War II." NSC Action No. 889, 27 Aug 53.

(For further documentation of the 27 August 1953 NSC meeting and consideration of the report of

the JCS appointees, see Dept of State, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1952-1954, vol. 11, National

Security Affairs (1984), pp. 443-457.)

80. NSC Action No. 898. 9 Sep 53.

81. Record of Mtgs, NSC PB, 22, 23, 28, 29. 30 Sep 53, CCS 334 NSC (9-25-47) sec 12. Memo«,

ExecSecv, NSC, to NSC PB. "Review of Basic National Security Policy," 18, 25. and 28 Sep 53, CCS

381 US (1-31-50) sec 29. NSC 162. 30 Sep 53, JCS 2101/104, 1 Oct 53,'same file.

82. Memo, SecDef to SecA et al., "Review of Basic National Security Policy (NSC 162)," 1 Oct 53,

JCS 2101/104, 1 Oct 53, same file.

83. JCS 2101/105, 3 Oct 53, same file.

84. Memo, CNO to JCS, "JCS 2101/105—Report by the NSC Planning Board on 'Review of Basic

Natioral Security Policy'," Ser 000249P35. 5 Oct 53, same file, sec 30.

85. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Review of Basic National Security Policy (NSC 162)." 6 Oct 53. JCS

2101/105. same file.

86. NSC Action No 926. 7 Oct 53. Record of Mtg, NSC PB, 19 Oct 53, CCS 334 (9-25-47) sec 12.

Memo«. ExecSecy, NSC, to NSC PB. "Review of Basic National Security Policy." 8 Oct, 15 Oct 53;

NSC Staff Draft, "Review of Basic National Security Policy. Courses of Action," 12 Oct 53; NSC

162/1. 19 Oct 53. JCS 2101/106. 21 Oct 53; CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 30.

87. JCS 2101/107, 23 Oct 53. same file. The wording to which the JSSC objected H*d resulted from

partial incorporation of one of the changes in NSC 162 su^ested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

88. Memo, CNO to JCS. "JCS 2101/107—NSC 162/1. Review of Bask National Security Policy," 26

Oct 53. Ser 000270P35. CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 30.

89. Memo. JCS to SecDef. "Review of Basic National Security Policy (NSC 1621)." 27 Oct 53. JCS

2101/107. same file.

366
Notes to Pages 23-30

90. NSC Action No. 944,29 Oct 53. Snyder, "New Look," p. 437, note 90. Snyder's account states

the issue accurately but is confused about the particular words in dispute—a not unnatural error in

an account based upon recollections rather than documents.

91. This ruling by the President is not mentioned in the official record of the meeting. ADM

Carney cited it to his colleagues on 18 Jan 54, pointing out that some staff officers appeared to be

unaware of the President's pronouncement.A JCS Info Memo was subsequently circulated to clarify

the matter. Memo, CNO to JCS, "Interpretation of the phrase 'offensive striking power' as appearing

in NSC 162/2—Basic National Security Policy," 18 Jan 54; SM-49-54 to ADM Radford, GEN Twining,

and GEN Ridgway, 21 Jan 54; CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 33. JCS Info Memo 922,10 Feb 54, same file,

sec 35.

92. NSC 162/2, 30 Oct 53, same file, sec 31.

93. The words "unacceptable damage" had been inserted on the recommendation of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. NSC 162, in the corresponding paragraph, had spoken of "destruction" of the Soviet

system. The Joint Chiefs of Staff took exception to the "false impression that air power can destroy

the Soviet system."

94. See below, Ch. 3.

95. As of 13 Oct 53, the Council had approveda provision in NSC 162 that the United States

"should use special weapons whenever they are required by the national security." This was less

emphatic than the final statement on the subject in NSC 162/2, and was evidently weaker than ADM

Radford wished. (Note, however, that JCS strategic plans all assumed immediate use of nuclear

weapons on the outbreak of general war; see below, Ch. 4.)

96. This account of the 13 Oct 53 NSC meeting is from Snyder,"New Look," pp. 426-427. The

official account merely states that Wilson and McNeil presented preliminary budget estimates, based

on JCS force levels, and that the Council directed them to submit new estimates "reviewed and

coordinated" in the light of the discussion. It records Radford's presence at the meeting, but does

not indicate what part he played. (NSC Action No. 930,13 Oct 53.) Snyder's account is corroborated

to some extent by the SecDef directive of 16 Oct 53, described below, which authorized the Joint

Chiefs of Staff to base their plans on the assumption of immediate use of nuclear weapons.

97. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 16 Oct 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 30. The discussions with SecDef

that preceded the issuance of this directive are referred to in CM-33-53 to JCS, 16 Oct 53, JCS 2101/108,

26 Oct 53, same file.

98. See below, Ch. 5.

99. These figures were based on the expected numbers of men in the 18-20 age bracket over the

next few years, and on the assumption that Congress would continue to authorize selective service,

although the current law was then scheduled to expire *t the end of FY 55. See ADM Radford's

testimony on this point before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 21 Jun 56, in Hearings,

Study of Airpower, S. Com on Armed Services, 84th Cong, 2d sess, vol. II, p. 1449.

100. JCS 2101/108, 26 Oct 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 30. Besides LTG Everest, the committee

consisted of one rear admiral; one major general, USA; two brigadier generate, USAF and USMC;

one captain, USN; two colonels, USAF and USMC; and one lieutenant colonel, USA.

101. The committee's report ascribed these estimates to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

According to Snyder, "New Look," p. 441, they came originally from the Council of Economic

Advisers, the Department of the Treasury, and the Bureau of the Budget, all of which furnished

economists who worked with the committee.

102. According to GEN Ridgway's later testimony, the dollar limit accounted for the use of

manpower totals well below Secretary Wilson's upper limit of 3,000,000. Speaking of the 2,815,000

figure eventually agreed upon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he said, "We could have hada substantially higher figure . . . had the dollar ceiling been higher." Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1957, H. Com on Appropriations. 84th Cong, 2d sess, p. 610 (hereafter cited as H. Hrgs,

DOD Appropriations for 1957).

103. JCS 2101/111, 30 Nov 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) BP pt 10.

104. CSAFM 87-53 to JCS,2 Dec 53, same file, sec 32.

105. JCS 2101/112,7 Dec 53; Memo, CMC to JCS. "JCS 2101/111."5 Dec 53, Ser 0007A33953; same

file.

106. ADM Carney spoke of "extensive discussions" that had already taken place, in JCS 2101/112,

7 Dec 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 32. Other evidence of the JCS debate is furnished bya redraft of

part of the Everest Committee Report prepared at ADM Radford's behest; SM-1895-5J to CJCS,7 Dec

53, same file.

107. According to Snyder, "New Look." p. 442, Secretary Wilson authorized this strength after

being told by ADM Radford that it would enable the JCS to reach agreement.

367 . • . 1

yt

1
Notes to Pages 30-35

108. Service personnel strengths as of 31 Dec 53 were as follows: Army, 1,481,177; Navy, 765,269;

Marine Corps, 243,800; Air Force, 912,537; total 3,402,783. Semi-Annual Rtport of the Secretary of

Defense, 1 Jul-31 Dec 1953 (1954), p. 52.

109. JCS 2101/113, 10 Dec 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 32.

110. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Military Strategy and Posture," 9 Dec 53, JCS 2101/113, same file. The

cover sheet of JCS 2101/113 indicates that the memo was actually forwarded on 11 Dec 53.

111. NSC Action No. 987,16 Dec 53. F„r the revised budget and its related FY 55 force levels, see

Ch. 3.

112. Speech before the National Press Club, 14 Dec 53. Radford, "Collected Writings", vol. I, pp.

34, 37-38. This speech is discussed further in the next section.

113. Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriationsfor 1955, H. Com on Appropriations, 83d Cong,

2d sess, p. 119 (hereafter cited as H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1955).

114. Radford, "Collected Writings", vol. I, p. 37.

115. Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1955, S. Com on Appropriations, 83d Cong,

2d sess (hereafter cited as S. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1955).

lib. CSAFM-87-53 to JCS, 2 Dec 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 32. Hearings, Department of the Air

Force Appropriations for 1955, H. Com on Appropriations, 83d Cong, 2d sess, p. 81 (hereafter cited as

H. Hrgs, DAF Appropriations for 1955).

117. See Ch. 3.

118. Ridgway, Soldier, pp. 274-275, 289-290, 311-313.

119. Ibid., pp. 271-272.

120. This view was implicit in ADM Radford's remarks to the Council on 13 Oct about the

potential for economy through use of atomic weapons, and in his remarks on 14 Dec 53 (see page 35)

that new weapons would counterbalance force reductions. A clearer statement of it was given

by the President in his 1954 State of the Union message. The use of tactical nuclear weapons, he said,

"creates new relationships between men and materials"; these, in turn, "permit economies in the

use of men." Public Papersofthe Presidents ofthe United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954 (I960), p. 11.

See also a similar statement by Secretary Wilson, in H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1955, p. 2.

121. Ridgway, Soldier, p. 296.

122. Ibid., pp. 290-291.

123. He3rings, Department of the Army Appropriations for 1955, H. Com on Appropriations, 83d

Cong, 2d sess, p. 51 (hereafter cited as H. Hrgs, DA Appropriations for 1955).

124. Hearings, Department of the Army Appropriations for 1956, H. Com on Appropriations, 84th

Cong, 1st sess, p. 78 (hereafter d»«^ as H. Hrgs, DA Appropriations for 1956). Still later, in 1956, after

his published articles had stirred a controversy over the origin of the New Look, Ridgway repeated

these statements (H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1957, pp. 610, 619).

125. In his 1956 testimony, Ridgway described the "stated assumptions" underlying the New

Look program as follows: "that there would be no substantial deterioration in the world situation, as

well as a whole lot of others relating to Western Europe, Korea, and the Far East, and the growth of

the Japanese force." H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1957, p. 610. His memory played him false in

convincing him that these assumptions were "stated." True, one of them— the establishment of a

Japanese force—had been stipulated by the Army members o' the Everest Committee as a condition

of their acceptance of a 14-division army, but this stipulation had been left out of JCS 2101/113.

Evidently Ridgway also understood some of the politico-military actions recommended in JCS 2101/113

as "assumptions" in the traditional military sense. (Snyder, "New Look," pp. 442443,453, 514-515.)

126. The CNO stated his view on this matter in a radio interview on 27 Nov 53; NY Times. 28 Nov

53, 8. Ironically, in his comments on the Everest Committee report, ADM Carney had turned this

argument against the Air Force in the following passage: "The stressing of quality rather than

quantity is particularly important in the held of military aviation .... The tremendously increased

yields becoming available from weapons makes it possible to deliver equivalent fire power with

fewer airplane» and fewer weapons .... There does not appear to be any military justification for a

constant increase in the numbers of airplanes designed solely for the delivery of weapons of mass

destruction"; JCS 2101/112, 7 Dec 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 32

127. Hearings. Department of the Navy Appropnattom for 1955, H. Com on Appropriations. 83d

Cong, 2d sess, p 38 (hereafter cited as H. Hrgs, DN Appropriation* for 1955).

128. ft**., p. 45.

129. Secretary Wilson's use of this phrase to a Congressfe^nal commitiee in May 1953 has been

mentioned earlier. Senator Taft had called for a "new look" at the Truman military program on 6

April (NY Time*. 7 Apr 53. 21). Numerous other examples could be cited from contemporary press

accounts.

130. Radford. "Collected Writings." vol I, pp 33-39

368

•

.x~~uj.juuiim
Notes to Pages 36-42 i

131. For examples of statements on the subject, see President Eisenhower's State of the Union

message to Congress on7 Jan 54 and his message accompanying the FY 55 budget on 21 Jan 54, both

in Public Papers, Eisenhower, 1954, pp. 10-11, 117-119; also Secretary Wilson's statement opening

House hearings on the FY 1955 budget, 15 Mar 54, H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1955, pp. 2-14.

For an excellent summary of statements by Administration leaders describing the new strategy, see

Snyder, "New Look," pp. 463-485.

132. For example, NSC 20/4, 23 Nov 48, had spoken of the need to "developa level of military

readiness which can be maintained as long as necessary," while NSC 135/3, 25 Sep 52, had set forth

the objective of developing and sustaining "for as long as may be necessary" the military strength

needed to prevent or wina war. Note also President Truman's prediction in his last budget message

that after 1954, military expenditures would decline to "the level required to keep our armed forces

ina state of readiness" (see Ch. 3).

133. Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politks (1961), p. 68.

134. President Eisenhower later commented that "the tag 'New Look' probably suggested to many

mindsa picture ofa far more radical change in the composition of our armed forces than was truiy

the case." Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 449. Ina press conference on 17 Mar 54, the President

remarked, "I just don't like this expression [New Look] because it doesn't mean much to me." Public

Papers, Eisenhower, 1954, p. 330. As Snyder points out ("New Look," pp. 485, 495), public statements

by administration spokesmen alternately stressed or minimized the novelty of the New Look,

depending on whether the speakers wished to present it asa radical improvement upon the strategy

of the previous administration or asa natural evolution to meet changed conditions.

135. John Foster Dulles, "The Evolution of Foreign Policy," Dept of State Bulletin, (25 Jan 54), pp.

107-110. Similar statements about the importance of striking power ready for immediate, large-scale

counterattack had been made previously by Mr. Dulles on various occasions including the conference aboard the Helena in Dec 52. Snyder, "New Look,' pp. 390-391; Donovan, Eisenhower: The

Inside Story, p. 18.

136. President Eisenhower, in his messages to Congress in Jan 54 on the State of the Union and

the FY 55 budget, and Secretary Wilson, before the House Appropriations Committee (H. Hrgs,

DOD Appropriations for 1955, pp. 2-14), had referred in general terms to the possible use of nuclear

weapons in case of aggression, but neither spoke of "instant" or "massive" retaliation. ADM Radford's

remark in his speech of 14 Dec 53 before the National Press Club about preparation for "retaliatory

a.id counteroffensive blows," was equally broad and, in its context, did not carry the impact of

Secretary Dulles'» words.

137. Prominent critics of Secretary Dulies's speech included Messrs. Chester Bowles, Dean Acheson,

and Adlai E. Stevenson. Mr. Dulles replied ina press conference on 16 March 1954 and in an article

in Foreign Affairs (Apr 54), from which the quoted sentence is taken. These criticisms, and the

Secretary's replies, are reprinted in Herbert L. Marx. Jr., ed., Defense and National Security (1955), pp.

64-103. The controversy in the press and in Congress is amply documented in Leach, New LookGeneral summaries may be found in Richard P. Stebbins. 7V Unite/. States in World Affairs. 1953

(1955), pp 357-364. 370-372, and The United State* in World Affairs, 19M (1955), pp 52-58. which are

particularly informative on the diplomatic repercussions of the prospective redeployment of US

forces.

138. Address before Economic Club of New York. Radford, "Collected Writings," vol. I,p 75.

139. See, for example, the statements by Messrs. Stevenson and Bowles, in Marx, Defense and

National Security, pp. 80-81, 86-87.

Chapter 2. Basic National Security Policy, 19M

1. NSC 162/2, 30 Oct 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) tec 31

2. Stebbini. United State*m World Affairs, 1954. pp. 1-2, 51-52

3. The Indochina crisis of 1954 is described more fully in Ch. 12. 4 Stebbins. United State* in World Affair*. 1954, pp 1-13. 1C2-261 5 Memo. ExeeSecy. NSC. to NSC PB. Vevthprntni of Guideline* Under NSC 1623 fo. FY

1956." 22 Mar 54, JCS 210U129. 31 Mar 54, CCS 381 US (1-31-90) sec 36.

6. Record of Mtg, NSC PB. 26 Apr 54, CCS 334 NSC 025-47) sec 15 Other member* weit the

State, Defense. Treasury, and FOA members of the Planning Board and the ClA -sivisei

7. Record ol Mtg, Special Com on Guideline». NSC PB.5 May 54, CCS 334 NSC {9-25-47) sec 15

8. Memo, SecPef to jCS. "Estimate of the Military Posture Throughout the Free W«rkl rY 193*

through FY 1959," 30 Mar 54. JCS 2101/129. 31 Mar 54, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 3* Memo, JCS »«

SecDef. same sub), 21 May 54, )CS 2101/134. same nie, sec 39

369

_i

s
1 Notes to Pages 42-51

9. Memo, ActgSecDef to ExecSecy, NSC, "Development of Guidelines Under NSC 162/2 for FY

1956," 25 May 54, \nn2 to NSC 5422, 14 Jun 54, same file, sec 40.

10. The Office of Defense Mobilization, created in 1950, had been enlarged in 1953 and given

broad new powers to supervise all mobilization planning, military and civilian. At that time it

absorbed the functions of the National Security Resources Board, and the Director, ODM, assumed

the seat on the National Security Council previously held by the Chairman, NSRB. See Ch. 6.

11. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to NSC PB. "Guidelines Under NSC 162/2 for FY 1956: Comments by

ODM on Defense and FOA Submissions,"3 Jun 54, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 39.

12. NSC 5422,14 Jun 54, same file, sec 40. The number NSC 5422 was assigned according toa new

system adopted by the Council in 1954, under which NSC papers were given four-digit numbers

beginning with the last two digits of the current year.

13. JCS 2101/139, 19 Jun 54, CCS US (1-31-50) sec 40.

14. JCS 2101/140, 23 Jun 54; JCS 2101/142, 2) Jun 54; same file, sec 41.

15. Dec On JCS 2101/139, 29 Jun 54, same We, sec 40.

16. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Negotiations with the Soviet Bloc," 23 Jun 54, JCS 2101/136, CCS 381

US (1-31-50) sec 41.

17. Memo for Record, Paul M. Kearney, OCJQ.\ "Negotiations within [sic] the Soviet Bloc," 25

Jun 54, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 41.

18. NSC Action Nos. 1165 and 1169, 24 Jun and1 Jul 54.

19. Memo, DepExecSecy, NSC, to Subcom on Guidelines, "Guidelines under NSC 162/2 for FY

1956,"7 Jul 54, Special Assistant to JCS for NSC Affairs File, "NSC 5422—Tentative Guidelines

Under NSC 162/2 for FY 1956."

20. NSC 5422'1, 26 Jul 54, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 43. The revision was prepared bya special

subcommittee that included the JCS Adviser.

21. JCS 2101/150, 31 Jul 54, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 43.

22. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Guidelines Under NSC 162/2 for FY 1956 (NSC 5422/i),"4 Aug 54, Dec

On JCS 2101/150, same file.

23. NSC 54? '?,7 Aug 54, same file, sec 44. The section dealing wi»h mobilization was later issued

separately. See Ch. 6.

24. The earliest known evidence of this decision is furnished by an agenda showing that the

Planning Board was scheduled to review NSC 162/2 on 29 Sep 54. (NSC Tentative Agenda for6 Sep-1

Oct 54,8 Sep 54, CCS 334 NSC (9-25-47) sec 16). The first formal Council action in this regard wasa

decision of 22 Oct 54 that each member and adviser would submita statement of recommended

policy changes for consideration in advance of the meeting if 18 Nov 54; NSC Action No. 1251, 22

Oct 54.

25. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Review of Basic National Security Policy (NSC 162/2 and NSC 5422/2),"

18 Oct 54, JCS 2101/161, 19 Oct S4, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 46.

26. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Basic United States Security Policy,"3 Nov 54, JCS 2101/167, same file,

sec 47. Before receiving the SecDef memo of 18 Oct 54, the JCS had directed JSSC to drafta statement

of views for submission to NSC. JSSC produced two successive drafts during October; both were

rejected, for reasons not indicated in available records. (JCS 2101/160,18 Oct 54, same file, sec 46. JCS

21C1/163, 26 Oct 54, same file, sec 47.) The version finally approved and dispatched wasa shorter

draft submitted by GEN Ridgway.

27 Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Review of Basic National Security Policy (NSC 162/2 and NSC 5422/2),"

12 Nov 54, JCS 2101/171, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 47.

28. JCS 2101/170, 12 Nov 54, same file.

29. Memo, ExecSecy. NSC, to NSC. "Review of Basic National Security Policy.' 22 Nov 54. same

file, sec 48.

30. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to NSC. "Review of Basic National Security Policy," 17 Nov 54, JCS

2101/172. 18 Nov 54, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 48.

31. JCS 2!0M73, 21 Nov 54, same file

32. Memo by CSA. "Review of Basic National Security Policy." 22 Nov 54, same file

33. Memo. ExecSecy, NSC, lo NSC. "Review of Bask National Security Policy," 18 Nov 54. same

fik.

34 NSC Action No 1272. 24 Nov 54.

35 NSC Action No !279.3 Dec 54

36 NSC Action No. 1286.9 Dec 54. For details of the President'» decision on manpower, see Ch

3

37 NSC 5440, 13 Dec 54. CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 48 It had been drafted bva special committee

that included the JCS Adviser Record of Mtg. NSC PB. 24 Nov 54. CCS B4 NSC (9-25-47) sec 16A

370
Notes to Pages 52-64

38. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5440)," 17 Dec 54, JCS 2101/180,

CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 49.

39. NSC Action No. 1290, 21 Dec 54.

40. NSC 5440/1, 28 Dec 54, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 49.

41. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Basic National Security Policy—NSC 5440 and NSC 5440/1," 30 Dec 54,

JCS 2101/184; Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to NSC, "Basic National Security Policy," 3 Jan 55; same file,

sec 50.

42. NSC Action No. 1293, 5 Jan 55. NSC 5501, 7 Jan 55, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 50.

43. NSC 5501, 7 Jan 55, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 50.

44. Cf. his skeptical remarks about the Soviet "peace offensive." Ridgway, Soldier, pp. 308-310.

45. Ridgway, Soldier, p. 328.

46. GEN Maxwell D. Taylor, who succeeded GEN Ridgway as Chief of Staff, US Army, later

praised NSC 5501 (though without identifying it as such) as representing "a most encouraging trend

away from reliance on Massive Retaliation" and as "authoritative guidance in support of a more

flexible strategy." Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (1960), p. 27.

Chapter 3. Force Levels and Personnel Strengths

1. "Positions and Actions of the JCS," pp. 9-26.

2. Testimony of GEN Vandenberg, S. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1954, p. 273.

3. Budget of the US, FY 1954, pp. M6, M14, 562. The figures exclude funds for stockpiling, atomic

energy, and mutual security. Marine Corps funds are of course included under the Navy.

4. Ibid., p. M13.

5. The process by which the revised FY 1954 budget was formulated was described by Secy

Wilson, DepSecDef Kyes, and ASD(Comptroller) McNeil, during H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for

1954, especially pp. 317, 387-391, 403-404,426. A shorter description by SecDef is found in Hearings,

Study of Airpower, S. Com on Armed Services, 84th Cong, 2d sess, vol. II, pp. 16301637 (hereafter

cited as Study of Airpower). See also Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, }an l-\un 30, 1953

(1953), pp. 4-6.

6. S. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1954, pp. 460-461.

7. The manpower limits in NSC 149/2 took the place of the force level goals originally approved by

the Council on 31 Mar 53. An earlier draft (NSC 149/1) had provided for the full reduction of 250,000

in FY 1954 that Secretary Wilson had at first planned. The personnel figures in NSC 149/2 excluded

officer candidates (US Military Academy cadets, US Naval Academy midshipmen, and Naval aviation cadets). NSC 149/2 said nothing about Air Force strength for FY 1954, but by separate action,

Secretary Wilson established a limit of 960,000.

8. Statement by SecDef in S. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1954, pp. 569-570.

9. Statements by GEN Vandenberg in S. Hrgs. DOD Appropriations for 1954, pp. 317-318, 341.

According to GEN Vandenberg, the Joint Chiefs of Staff met on 27 April and discussed the proposed

expenditure revisions, but could take no action. No record of this JCS meeting has been found.

10. Statements by Secretary Wilson and GEN Bradley, H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations fur 1954, pp.

387-389

11. NY Tim«, 8 May 53. 1.

12. H. Hrgs. DOD Appropriations for 1954, pp. 309. 324, 335

13 Ibid.. p. 415.

14. tbui. See Table 5 for a Service breakdown of the revised FY 1953 authorized stnr,gth.

15. For this operation as carried out in the Air Force, see S. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1954, pp.

319. 341-342. The procedure in the other Services was undoubtedly similar.

16. H. Hrgs. DOD Appropriations for 1954, pp. 316-319. See Table 7 for comparison of force levels

under the original and the revised FY 1954 budgets. The Air Force had 103 wing» as of March 1953.

17. S. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1954. pp. 218-278- The controversy is summarized in Snvder.

"Neu ' >ok," pp. 397-399.

18. * Table 10

19 SM 164-53 to JSPC 26 Jan 53, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 39 JCS 1800/199. 6 Mar 53. same file, sec

40. One point of contention was an Air Force proposal for 153 wings.

20. SM-*U-53 to JSPC. 20 Mar 53, CCS 370 (8-. *-45) sec 41.

21 JCS 1800/202. 14 Apr 53; JCS 1800004. 26 May 53; same file

22. N/H of JCS 18007202. 5 Jun 53. same file

371

^•*ww*v**a***m&wwMmn*WUrmmiWWmmilL*im*. —
Notes to Pages 64-67

23. Snyder, "New Look," pp. 416-418; Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside Story, pp. 56-59; column by

Joseph and Stewart Alsop,2 Sep 53, reproduced in Leach, The New Look, p. 73.

24. Public Papers, Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 563-564. Secretary Wilson read this directive to the Armed

Forces Policy Council on 11 August. (AFPC Advice of Action, "Fiscal Matters- Expenditures," 11

Aug 53, Army Files, G-3 110 (2 Sep 53), Case 278.)

25. NY Times, 27 Jul 53, :

26. See Ch. 5.

27. AFPC Advice of Action, "Budget—Force Levels for FY 1955," 16 Sep 53, JCS 1800/206, 17 Sep

53, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 42. The Armed Forces Policy Council (AFPC), consisting of the members of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of the Military Departments under the chairmanship of

the Secretary of Defense, was created by statute to advise the Secretary on matters of broad policy

relating to the armed forces.

28. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 16 Sep 53, JCS 1800/206, 17 Sep 53, same file.

29. The units so designated included engineer, reconnaissance, artillery, missile, and various

other battalions in the Army and Marine Corps, and specialized air squadrons of the Navy, Marine

Corps, and Air Force (transport, weather, reconnaissance, target-towing, refueling, air rescue, etc.).

30. Memo, ASD(Comptroller) to CJCS, 18 Sep 53, JCS 1800/208, 21 Sep 53, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec

42.

31. As the Joint Chiefs of Staff later pointed out, this proposal representeda speed-up in reaching

the 120-wing goal, attainment of which was at that time set for FY 1956. Memo, JCS to SecDef,

"Budget Request for Fiscal Year 1955,"2 Oct 53, JCS 1800/211, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 43.

32. Three of the fighter squadrons (to be assigned to the Tactical Air Command) would be obtained

by redeployment from overseas and thus represented no increase in overall military strength. See

Ch. 5.

33. See Tables1 and 5.

34. JCS 1800/209, 24 Sep 53, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 43. The "actual" FY 1953 force-level figures in

this report are the source of those given in Table 8.

35. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Budget Request for Fiscal Year 1955,"2 Oct 53, JCS 1800/211, same file.

36. The phrase was used by ADM Radford ina speech on2 Dec 1953; Radford, "Collected

Writings." vol. 1, pp 24-25.

37. No record of Secretary Wilson's approval of the JZS recommendations has been found. The

record of the NSC meeting of 13 Oct 53, however, describes the budget estimates presented at that

time as based on major combat forces proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (NSC Action No. 930,13

Oct 53.) On8 October, the Secretary of Defense authorized the use of the personnel strengths and

supporting forces sought by the Services (which were not covered by the JCS recommendations) in

preparing the budget, although he noted that there were "possibilities for great savings in this area."

At the same time, he ruled that the budget would not include any costs of expanding the Air Force to

137 wings. (Mernos, SecDef to ASD<Comptroller). "Budget Request for Fiscal Year 1955" and "Basis

of Preliminary Budget Estimate for FY 55." both dated8 Oct 53, JCS 18007212, 10 Oct 53. CCS 37Ü

(8-19-45) sec 43.)

38. "Estimated New Obugationai Authority and Expenditures for Fiscal 1955, Based on JCS Force

Recommendations of2 October 1953."9 Oct 53. OCJCS File, New Look Documents. The gross

requirement for obligation»! authority was $40.650 billion; the smaller figure was arrived at by

deducting $5.377 billion available from prior years. The expenditure estimate was broken down by

Service a» follows: Air Force. $17.5 billion; Army, $129 billion; Navy, $12.0 btUkm; interdepartmental

$600 million

39 NSC Action No 930. 13 Oct 53 Snvder. "New Look." pp 42M27

40 Memo. SecDef to QCS. 16 Oct 53. CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 30

41 Memo, SecDef to SecA, SecN, and SeeAF. 16 Oct 53. printed in Study of Atrycuxr. voJ II. pp

16421644

42. Memo, ASD (MAP) to AwtSecA (M4rRF). AsatSecN (Manpower), and A**tSecAF (Management), "FY 1955 Manpower Program». Guidance and Instruction» tor Review ol." 23 Oct 53. CCS

320.2 (M-45) sec 17.

43. A» compared with the currently authorized FY I9$4 strength» (see Table 5), the Army would

lose 140,000. the Navy 75.066. and the Mwine Corp« 23,021. or almost exactly 10 percent in each

case The Air Force would increase bv 10.000

44 NY Time». 26 Nov 53. 27

45 Memo«. SecDef to SecA. "Fiscal 1955 Armv Strength." and to SecN, "Fiacal 1955 Navy and

Marine Corp» Strength." both dated 29 Oct 53. CCS 3202 (5-1-45) *#c 17

46. On the coritroveny between Wilton and Rklgway o^tt thi» issue, uet Snyder. "New Look."

pp 445-44». and Rtdgway. $*Wirr, pp. 272. 2U6-291 On Carney» position, »ee Snyder. "New Look,"

372

\
*

Notes to Pages 67-69

pp. 449-450. The plan was not officially submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment, but,

according to Snyder ("New Look/' p. 446), was discussed by them on several occasions, and was

defended by Rad ford.

47. Memos, SecDef to each Service Secretary, "Fiscal Year 1955 Personnel Strength,"4 Dec 53,

OQCS File, 111 Budget 1953.

48. Study of Airpower, vol. II, p. 1631. The total included S795 million for OSD and interservice

activities.

49. Memo, SecDef to SecA, SecN, and SecAF, "Budgetary Military Strengths for FY 1955," 11 Dec

53; Memos, ASD (MAP) to each Service Secretary, "Budgetary Military Strength for Fiscal Year

1955," 11 Dec 53; CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 44.

50. These are the figures released during budget hearings early in 1954. They exclude 2,000 USMA

cadets and 6,900 USNA midshipmen and Naval aviation cadets. (H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for

i955, p. 117; H. Hrgs, DA Appropriations for 1955, p. 51; H. Hrgs, DN Appropriations for 1955, p. 44.)

The date of their adoption is unknown, but it is assumed they had been decided upon in time to

serve as the basis for the FY 1955 budget that was approved by NSC on 16 Dec 53.

The Army strength was increased early in 1954 to absorb 8,700 1954 ROTC graduates who had

been promised active duty. (H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1955, pp. 265, 270; S. Hrgs. DOD

Appropriations for 1955, pp. 55, 60, 404-405.)

51. For the revised 1954 objectives, see Table 5, taken from H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1955,

p. 117.

52. See GEN Ridgway's testimony in 1955 and 1956 that the Army's FY 1955 figure was set by

"extrapolating backward" from the New Look goals for 1957. (H. Hrgs, DA Appropriations for 1956, p.

78; H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1957, pp. 599-600.) See also the statements by administration

officials, cited later on in this chapter, relating the 1955 strengths to the New Look.

Snyder, "New Look," pp. 451, 455, refers to Service strength figures for 1955 and 1956.. "prepared

by Admiral Radford and General Everest, with assistance from the Office of the Comptroller," which

were submitted to Secretary Wilson on9 Dec 53. No such documents have been found in connection

with this study. Ridgway'« !956 testimony, cited here, makes it dear that the final 1955 ngures were

not discussed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff before being approved.

53. According to Snyder, "New Look." p. 455, the final 1955 Army figure c*n be ascribed to the

President's belief thata reduction of only 10 percent did not fully reflect the effects of the Korean

truce. The statement is plausible but is not directly corroborated by evidence examined for this

volume. Ina news conference on2 Dec 53, President Eisenhower was asked for his views on the

proposed 10 percent cut, which had been discussed in the press. He declined to specify any desirable

percentage reduction but asserted that the Armistice offered opportunities for "savings all the way

along the line." (Public Papers, tuathower. 1953, p. 809.)

54. Hearings, Sundry Leguktton Affeetmg the Naval ana Military tstabttshment». J355.H Com on

Armed Services. 84th Cong, 1st se*s. p. 216 (hereafter cited as H. Hrgs. Sundry Legtslatum. 1955).

55. TV Budget of the United States Government for the Focal Year Fndmg fune 30. 1955 (1954).p M42

(hereafter cited a» Budget of the US FY 1954). Of the planned expenditures. S3.198 Httkm was tor

continental defense (see Ch. 5).

56 NSC Action No 987. 16 Dec 53

57 Snyder. "New look/ pp. 455-456. Sidgwav Soldier, pp 286.287

58. 1955 force goals fromH Hrgs. DQP Approprmtums for 1955,p life The Air Force later

discovered that it could organit* 121 wings within its allotted manpower strength (see Table 6).

59 For the increases tn cofttinental-defense forces under the the 1955 budget, »re Ch 5.

60 Put** Paper*. Kaenhowr. 1954.p 12

61 H. Hrgs. POP Appreprmttom for 1955. pp. 6. 13

6Z tod.p 120

63 This was the interpretation placed bv GEN Ridgway upon President Eisenhower» »taten»«:»«

of7 Jan 54 (Ridgway. Soldmr, pp 2*M»')

64 See the Secretary of Defense's statement» to the House Appropriation» Committee. 24 Jan

1956, contrasting the action» of the JCS in connection with the budgets for 1955 and for 1.36 (H

Hrg», DOD Appvf»i*tiem for 195". pp 128-129) The misunderstanding between Secretary Wuson

and GEN Ridgway over the extent of the latter» 'acceptance" ol )CS 2101113 and of the FY 1955

budget is conveniently »ummarued in Snyder. "New Look." pp 486491

65. Tht» testimony is described more fulh/ in Ch.1

66.H Hrgs. POP ApproprwhL«* tor 1955,p 138 Foe ADM Radioed» ui*|ttahned »tatement that

the New Look program had the full endorsement pi ail k3 member», •** thai<p 119

67 H. Hrg», DAT Approprmtton» for 1955, pp 8|-*2 "

373
Notes to Pages 69-75

68. H. Hrgs, DA Appropriationsfor 1955, pp. 44-45, 54; H. Hrgs, DN Appropriationsfor 1955, pp. 19,

39-42, 45.

69. S. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1955, pp. 43-44.

70. See Ch. 1. In the Congressional hearings, the principal critic was Representative Robert L. F.

Sikes, Democrat of Florida, whose questioning of witnesses elicited admissions that the effect of the

reduced 1955 Army strength would not be offset by better weapons or by improvements in mobility.

See H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriationsfor 1955, pp. 106-108; H. Hrgs, DA Appropriationsfor 1955, pp. 38-40,

53-61.

71. See Table 10.

72. SM-1936-53 to CSA, CNO, CSAF, and CMC, 17 Dec 53, JCS 2101/114, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec

32.

73. JCS 1800/215, 11 Mar 54, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 45.

74. The Service programs submitted in response to JCS directive of 17 Dec 53 appeared as JCS

1800/213 (Marine Corps), JCS 1800/214 (Navy), JCS 1800/215 (Army), and JCS 1800/216 (Air Force);

dated 2, 10, 11 and 11 Mar 54; CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 45.

75. JCS 1800/221, 29 Apr 54, same file, BP pt 5.

76. JCS 1849/123, 29 Jun 54 (par 4), CCS 320.2 (5-1-45) sec 20.

77. Memo. Actg SecDef to CJCS. Forces and Manning Levels for Fiscal Year 1956," 14 May 54, JCS

1849/118, 19 May 54. same file, sec 19.

78. NY Times, 27 Apr 54, 1. See also ibid.. 10 May 54, 1, for a report that the administration was

considering an increase in the FY 1955 defense budget.

79. JCS 2101/135, 8 Jun 54, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 39. General Shepherd, by a separate memo,

supported the requested increase in Marine Corps strength. (JCS 2101/137, 15 Jun 54, same file, sec

40.)

80. JCS 1849/123. 29 Jun 54. CCS 320.2 (5-1-45) sec 20.

81. The Army figure represented a rounding off of the FY 1955 budgetary strength (1.164,000.

including USMA cadets) after modification to include 8,700 ROTC graduates. It is not clear why

officer candidates should have been included in the Army's figure but not in that for the Navy.

Sources do not always indicate whether or not personnel strengths under discussion include cadets

and midjhipmen.

82. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Recommended Basis for Guidelines for the Preparation of Service

Budgets for FY 1956.'' 1 Jul 54. JCS 1800/222, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 46.

83 N/H of JCS 1800/222, 15 Jul 54, same file

84. Memo. SecDef to ExecSeev, NSC. "Force and Manning Levels for FY 1956.'' 28 Jul 54. same

file NSC Action No 1190. 29 Jul 54

85 Memo. JCS to SecDef. "Force* and Mannmg Levels for FY 1956/* 19 Aug 54. JCS 1849/125.

CCS 320 2 (5-1-45) sec 21 See Table 7 for actual force levels as of 10 Jun 54

86 Memo. SecDef to CJCS. "Forces and Manning Levels for Fiscal Year 1956/ 17 Sep 54. JCS

1849/127. 20 Sep 54. CCS 320.2 (5-1-45) sec 21.

87 Ltr. Dir BOB to SecDef. 23 Jul 54. JCS 1800/223, 5 Aug 54. CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 46

88 Memo, JCS to SecDef, Force* ami Manning Levels for FY 1956." 1*» Aug 54, JCS 1849/125.

Memo. SecDef to CJCS. same *ubj. 17 Sep 54. 1CS 1849/127. 20 Sep 54; CCS 3202 (5-1-45) sec 21

89 SM-Ä4Ö-54 to JSPC 23 Sep 54. same file, »ec 22

90 JCS 184*130. 27 Sep 54. CCS 320 2 (5-1-45) sec 22 The date ol the meeting is not indicated

9! Memo, JCS to SrcDef. Force* and Manning Level* for Fiscal Year 1956/ 13 Oct 54, JCS

1849/134. *»me file, »ec 23

92. äridy <4 Atrpmvr, vol II. p 1631

93 NY Tm**, I Pec 54. I

H The amount o* the FY 1956 r*tunate* presented at this meeting & not indicated in th* official

record, but they must have bven cio»e to the %ure« submitted an 9 December by Secretary Wilson,

tthkn called for 534 275 billton in new obb^atiunal authority. almo*t 54 iwUttm ovvt the FY 1955

budget (NSC Action No 1287, «Dee54.)

95 NSC Aci»on No 1280, 3 De 54

96 NY Km*. * Dee 54, 23

97 Amy Nary-Air fene f<mn*l. 24 Jul H. p 1429. 28 Aug 54. p 1569; .VY Tm<*, 29 Sep 54. 1; 30

Srt* %i 14

9« NU of JCS 1SÜO/225. 6 Apr 55, CCS 370 (8*1*45) stt 47

99 JCS 1800/225. 30 Nov 54. same file In mparafa rom*ponde*we. ADM Carney defended uV

Navy** pfi*p0*ta tncne**e ** nee****ry to meet additional cootmtaMritfe for continental detente,

anasobmanne warfare, and antarctic opkira'äon. a* well a* fa maintain current readin«-** lewl» and

to continue eustm« deployment* (JCS 1800227. a Dec 54. CCS 370 / '«-IS) «re 4? )

374
I

Notes to Pages 75-77

100. Memo for ADM Radford. signed "W" (probably COL Leroy H. Watson, USAF, Exec to

CJCS), 2 Feb 55; Memo for ADM Radford (unsigned but evidently prepared by COL Watson or

someone else on ADM Radford's staff), 3 Feb 55 (giving chronology of events in connection with JCS

1800/225); OCJCS File, 111 Budget 1955. N/H of JCS 1800/225, 6 Apr 55, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 47.

101. Tabulation entitled "Personnel Strengths," 8 Dec 54 (listing end FY 1955 and FY 1956 figures

"approved on December 8/54"), End to informal memo, "Bob" (Cutler) to "Raddy" (Radford), n. d.,

indicated the figures were being sent to allow Radford and Wilson to verify them before the NSC

meeting of 9 December. (OCJCS Files, 111 Budget 1954.) The 1955 figures coincide with those

announced to NSC on 9 December, except that the Navy-Marine Corps strength is given as 877,000

and the total as 2,947,000. It is impossible to say whether this difference results from error or from a

change made between 8 and 9 December. For FY 1956, the tabulation shows figures identical with

those in JCS 2101/113 except that separate figures are not given for the Navy and the Marine Corps.

102. NSC Action No. 1286, 9 Dec 54. During the subsequent JCS consideration the combined

Navy-Marine Corps figure of 870,000 was listed as 665,000 Navy and 205,000 Marine Corps.

103. On the impact ot the decision when it became known, see an article in Army-Naiy-Air Force

Journal, 18 Dec 54, p. 453, which characterized it as a "surprising last-minute military budget reversal"

and as puzzling to "legislative leaders at the Capitol" in view of Wilson's recent statements. GEN

Ridgway later testified that Army budget estimates for FY 1956. based on the strength approved

earlier (1,173,000), were practically complete and had to be extensively revised when the President

announced the reduction; H. Hrgs, DA Appropriation* for 1956, pp. 25-26.

104. H. Hrgs, Sundry Legislation, 1955. p. 216. NY Times, 21 Dec 54, 1.

105. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Force-, and Manning Levels for Fiscal Years 1955. 1956 and 1957," 9

Dec 54. JCS 1800/228, 9 Dec 54 JCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 47. These figures excluded cadets and

midshipmen.

106. Statement by SecDef to House Appropriations Committee, 31 Jan 56; H. Hrgs, IX)D Approprt

ations for 1957, pp. 128-129. Secretary Wilson described the Service positions as follow«: "the Air

Force was completely satisfied with their personnel ceiling and had no objection at all. The Navy and

the Marine Corps would have liked to have a few more people. The Army wanted to have a much

bigg*' force, as expressed by General Ridgway." His stai.ment, which apparently telescopes the

two Presidential decisions, does not indicate the date of this second decision, nor is it clear whether

or not a second meeting was held at the White Hott*? for me purpose. In his book, Mandate for

Change, pp 452-453. Mr. Eisenhower describe* an "important" meeting held in his office "in early

December 1954." attended by Secretary Wilson. Deputy Secretary Anderson, and all the Joint Chief*

of Staff except Radford. at which he explained his > ;tw% on defense and heard objection* from

General Ridgway Perhaps the revised manpower limit was authorized at thi» meeting, although the

account doe* not indicate what decisions, if any. were reached.

Secretary Wilson'* rect^ction. tn the statement cited here, wa* that he had received "split"

papers from the Joint Chief* of Staff regarding FY 1956 strength* He wa» probably referring to JCS

11*1*225, which actually dealt with FY 1957

107 NSC Action No 129.*. 5 Jan 55

10*. Memo for Record by Secy. JCS. "force* and Manning Level* for Fiscal Year 1956," 5 Jan 55;

Memo, SecDef to SecA. SecN, and SecAF, "Approved Hnd Strength* tot Fi*cal Year 1956," 6 Jan 55.

JCS 1300/232. 6 Jan 55; CCS 370 (8-19-45) *ec 4»

109 Memo, SeeOet to JCS- "Force* And Manning Level» tor Fiscal Year» 1955. 195* and 1957, 9

Pec 54. JCS IÜOLV22S. 9 Dec 54, same «e, *ec 47

110 On the »tarn« of the training and static division* at the «nd of 1954. see remark» by GEN

Ridgwav to Hou*e Armed Service* Committee. 31 Jan H. in H Hrg», $»ndrv LtguUtton 1955. p 349

til Memo. JCS to SecDef. Force* and Manning Level* for Fiscal Years 1955. 1956. and IW." 22

Dec 54, JCS ÜÜ0/229, CCS 370 f>|«M5) sec 4*

111 Memo. SecDef to JCS. 'Command and Organizational Structure of U S Forces, Force and

Manning Level»." 29 Dec 54. JO 1ÄHV230, 30 Dec 54, same mV The request for alternative deployment» wa* }u*ttfied on the basis ai the "raptdly changing international natation' -presumably a

reference to fhe Quctnoy-Matsu crtsi*. described in Ch 12

1} 3. The two *tai»c division* would have manning level* ranging from 70 percent to 79 percent, »»

compared with ÄÄ to 100 percent for the mobile division» and wrdy 40 percent or les» (etcfuding

trainees) for the training divtwon*

114 The number of attack tamrr*. however, remained unchanged li in each fiscal year

115 Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Command and Otganuahorsl Structure Of IS Forces. Force» and

Manning Level*/ 11 tan 55 JCS 1*0234. CCS 3?D (IM9-IS) »ex 4*

116 H H of JCS 1*0234 19 Jan 55. »ame file

117 Memo. JCS to SectV*. 'Command and < Vganuatfcmal Strucfurr of US Force*. F«r*e* and

375
Notes to Page* 78-87

Manning Levels/' 18 Mar 55, JCS 1800/237, same file, sec 51. For the views of the Army and Marine

Corps on the question of transport capacity, see JCS 1800/235, 22 Jan 55, same file, sec 50.

118. NSC Action No. 1287, 9 Dec 54.

119. The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30. 1956 (1955), pp.

M28, M31 (hereafter referred to as Budget of the US, FY1956). See TaWe 9 for the amounts allocated

each Service in the 1956 budget.

120. Secretary Wilson had touched on this point in testifying on the FY 1955 budget. In view of

limitations on transport capacity, he said, "there is not much use in having more men on active duty

than you could move by the time you could move them by calling in your Reserves." H. Hrgs, DOD

Appropriations for 2955, p. 63.

121. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955 (1959), pp. 2-6

(hereafter cited as Public Papers, Eisenhower, 1955). This letter was in reply to one from Secretary

Wilson on 3 Jan 55. "I have found so much value in the views underlying your decisions as to the

personnel strengths of the armed services," Mr. Wilson had written, "that I wonder if you would

give me the gist of them in written form." {Ibid,, p. 6.) In his reply, the President announced that he

was directing the release of both letters in the interest of an informed dtizenry.

122. H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1956, p. 152.

123. Ibid., p. 150. Hearings, Department of the Air Force Appropriations for 1956. H. Com on

Appropriations, 84th Cong, 1st sess, p. 108 (hereafter cited as H. Hrgs, DAF Appropriations for 1956).

124. H. Hrgs, DA Appropriations for 1956, pp. 23-26, 29, 35, 37, 44; Hearings, Department of Defense

Appropriations for 1956, S. Com on Appropriations, 84th Cong. 1st sess, pp. 206, 220 (hereafter cited

as S. Hrgs, DOD Appropnatiom for 1956).

125. Hearings, Department of the Navy Appropriations for 1956, H. Com on Appropriations, 84th

Cong, 1st sess, pp. 186-187 (hereafter cited as H. Hrgs, DN Appropnatwns for 1956).

126. See Table 10. Secretary Wilson later impounded the extra Marine Corps appropriation. (NY

Times. 15 jul 55, 1)

127. Memo, JCS to SecDef, The Status of U. S. Programs for National Securitv as of 31 December

1954." 18 Mar 55. JCS 2101/190. CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 52.

128. Public Papers. Eisenhower. 1955. p. 12.

129. H Hrgs. DOD Appropnatiom for 1956, p 165

130 Discussed in Ch. 2.

131 JCS 1800/737, 18 Mar 55. CCS 370 (8-19-45) BP pt 6 The figures on amphibious vessels and lift

capacity are drawn from JCS 1800/134, U Jan 55. »am« file, »ec 49

132 JCS 1800/237. 18 Mar 55, CCS 370 (8-19-45) BP pt 6

133 See Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, pp 4-5, 17. where the two phrases are treated as

synonymous

134 "Views of the Chairman. Joint Chief» of Staff on Ma^or Forces and Manning Level Planning

Goal» for Fiscal Year 1957.' n d . End E to N Tf of JCS 1800/225. e» Apr 55. CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 47

This statement w«s prepared pursuant to a JCS agreement on 15 Pec 54 regarding the disposition of

the recornmendation* in JCS 1800/225, which had been overtaken by the Secretary of Defense

directive of 9 December 1954 on force level» (JCS 18Ö0/228); each JCS member was to submit view» to

be published with the notice that JCS 1800-225 wa» being withdrawn from consideration (SM-1075-54

to JCS, Ifc Dec 54, same tile) The five statement» comprise the several enclosures to N/H of JCS

1800225, 6 *.pr 55 In End* 8 and D, ADM Carney and CEN Shepherd merely affirmed their support

of the Navy and Manne Corp* strength* proposed in JCS 1801/225 In End A, CEN Ridgway

jumnururd the arguments he had presented to the Secretary of Defense on 8 December tvM a*

alreadv recounted GEN twrning* view* were tn End C

135 tm ot JCS 18ÖÜ225. 6 Apr 53. CCS 370 (8-1*45) **C 17

13o The letter to the Secretary of Defense. 27 June 1955. i» printed m full m fudgway, Jw&fir*. pp

323-332 Even before the Appearance of hi» boo*. GEN Ridgway had presented hi» case in a senet of

si» article«, My Battle» in War and Peace," published in the Safunfey f.tew*«* fW between 21

January and 25 February 195* The tuntroversiai statement» made in the fir« two artide*. treating hi*

service a» Cruet of Staff, led the House Com*natee i» Appropriation*, in hearing» on the FY 1957

budget, to question GEN R»dgw«y extensively abu « the origin* of the New too», and the e%tent to

whldi it reflected the veto of me JCS (H iif$*. IX>0 Afr*v?n*tKmi jm W7. pp 559 ff >

376
Notes to Pages 89-97

Chapter 4. Strategie Planning, 1953-1954

1. National Security Act of 1947 (PL 253, 80th Cong, 26 Jul 47). Statements identical in substance,

dii.'*ring only in grammatical form, were contained in the 1949 amendments to the Act (PL 216, 81st

Cong. 10 Aug 49).

2. JCS 2089/3, 6 Jun 52, CCS 381 (11-29-49) stc 3.

3. JCS 2069, 2 Dec 49, same file, sec 1.

4. JCS MOP 84, 14 Jul 52, same file, sec 3. The intended purposes and interrelationships of the

three plans were explained in detail by JSPC in JCS 2089/3, 6 Jun 52, same file.

5. PL 416, 82d Cong. 28 Jun 52.

6. Since the JURSE was not, strictly speaking, a plan, it would be noted, rather than approved, by

the JCS.

7. The chart on p. 92 (based on the more detailed ones enclosed with JCS 2089/3 and JCS MOP 84)

illustrates how the planning process was intended to operate insofar as the JSOP and the JSCP were

concerned. The two plans would not fall into phase with one another before 1956. The JSCP to be

approved on 1 January of that year would reflect capabilities determined by the FY 1956 budget,

which would be based on the first JSOP to be issued on 1 July 1953.

8. JCS 2143/6, 7 Dec 50, CCS 381 (1-26-50) BP pt 1. JCS 1844/126. 2 Jul 52. CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) BP

pt6.

9. Dec On JCS 1725/47, 20 Jan 50. CCS 004.04 (11-4-46) BP pt IB

10. JCS 1920/5. 19 Dec 49; N/H of JCS 1920/5, 13 Feb 51; CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) BP pt 3.

11 Dec On JCS 2089/3, 21 Jul 52. JCS MOP 84, 14 Jul 52; CCS 381 (11-29-19) sec 3.

12. Dec on JCS 1844/126, 19 Sep 52. CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) 3P pt 6

13. Dec On JCS 1725/192. 11 Sep 52. CCS 004.04 (11-4-46) sec 50 Under the original schedule, the

JSOP wot .Id not have been due until 1 May 1953.

14 N/H of JCS 2143/25, 20 Nov 52. CCS 381 (1-26-50) sec 17

15. This point was made by JSPC in the body of the report from which JCS MOP 84 was derived,

but it was not stated among the formal conclusions that the JCS subsequently approved; JCS 2089/3.

6 Jun 52. CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 3

16. The JSPC directives were: for the JSCP. JSPC 877/219/0, 5 Aug 52. CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 3; for

the JSOP. JSPC 887/19/D. 5 Aug 52. superseded bv JSPC 887/22/D. 18 Sep 52. same file; for JLRSF.

JSPC 89S/6/D, 5 Aug 52, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) »ec M

17 JSPC 887/25, 13 Feb 53. JSPC 877<245. 2 Mar 53; CCS 381 (1129-49) BP pt 1

18. Memo. Chmn JSPC to MC H B Thatcher, USAF, «t a/., JSCP and JSOP/ 13 Mar 53. same

file, sec 4

19 JSPC 877/245. 2 Mar 53, same file. BP pt 1 JSPC 877*249, 17 Apr 53, JSPC 877251. I May 53,

JSPC 877/252, 5 Jun 53 same file. BP pt 2

20 As the Deputy- Director lor Strategic Plan». RADM C R Brown, USN, later expressed it "Each

Servke* aruiety over its own interests was such that, during the development of the short-range

fA*n. many problems were introduced which reailv belonged in the mid-range plan " Presentation

by RAUM Brown, -Development el the Joint Strategic Plan |**|. 11 Feb 54. JCS Hist Div Füe.

1954-1955 Speeches, Lecture*. Statemei ts

21 JCS 184* 151. 14 Aug 53. CCS 381 (11 -29-49) BP pt 3 The JSPC had alreadv begun work at\ a

JSCP for 1 Jul 54. SPCM 36K53 to JIG. 3 Aug 53, »am* hie. *ec 8

22. Two additional minor issues in the draft ».rte (I) whether the JSCP should mdude escerpt*

from NATO plans (a* desired by the Army, Navy and Marine Corps) to assist US commander* m

drafting their supporting plans; *n4 (2) whether pUmt for »upport to alhed nations after D-day

should specify priority to European nations (a proposal advanced by the Army. Air Force, and

Marine Corps)

23, JLPC 44718. 26 Jun 53. CCS 381 (U-?M9) BP pt 3 This report treated The logistic implication» of the Joini Strategic Capabilities Plan for a War Beginning tm or after 1 July 1953 . it was

separate from the Joint Logistic Plan associated with the JSCP The JLPC completed work &t\ the Joint

Logistkc Plan in September tOxrig to JLPC «*W„ :4 Sep 53. CCS 381 (II ?M9) «* *)

24 SM>1«0MB to JSPC. JLPC. »ad JIC \0 Sep 53 some für

25 JCS 184*152. 19 Oct 53, same file, m 10

26 JSPC 887*25, 13 Feb 53 same tile BP pt 1 JSPC 8*726. 1*7 Mar 53 **mr f»V. *ec 5 JSpC «73?,

4 Jun 53. same file, see 7

27 SPCM'325-53 to JSPC r> May 53, *»me für. »ec ft The qur*$un ^ re*pon*ihditv Ux providing

early warnmg airc oft was currently under dispute between the Navy and the Air Force in connected with continental defer .«r pfems See Ch 5

It. Comg to JSPC mrrtf. 17 Aug 53. CCS 3Si (1129-49) sec 7

377

.^
Notes to Pages 97-103

29. DM-60-53 to JCS, 12 Oct 53, same fite, sec 9.

30. JSPC 8957, 30 Jul 53, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) sec 69.

31. JSPC 893/8/D, 7 Aug 53, same file.

32. JSPC 895«, 13 Aug 53, same file.

33. JSPC 895/KVD, 24 Aug 53, same file

34. DM-60-53 to JCS, 12 Oct 53, CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 9.

35. IM.

36. JCS 2089/7, 12 Oct 53, CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 9.

37. Memo, CSA to CJCS, CSAF, and CNO, "Joint Program for Planning," 10 Oct 53, same file« sec

10.

38. JCS 2089/8, 12 Nov 53, same file.

39. Dec On JCS 2089/8, 24 Nov 53. same file.

40. SPGM-390-53 to JSPC. 27 Nov 53, same file.

41. JCS 2089/9, 27 Jan 54, CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 11.

42. JCS 2089/10. 8 Feb 54. same file.

43. DM-10 54 to JCS. 9 Feb 54, same file.

44. JCS 2089/1 i, 11 Feb 54; SM-133*54 to JSPC, JLPC, and J1C. 11 Feb 54; same file

45. JSPC 895/11. 1 Feb 54. CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) sec 70.

46. SPSM-5-54 to JSPC. 26 Feb 54; N/H of JSPC 895/11. 3 Mar 54; same file Memo, DepDir for

Strategic Plans to DJS, "Status of the Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate (JLRSE)," 9 Mar 54. CCS

381 (11-29-49) sec 12.

47 DM-75-53 to JCS, 16 Dec 53; SM-1937-53 to JCS. 17 Dec 53; same file, sec 10

48. CSAFM-106-53 to JCS, 21 Dec 53; Memo. CNO to JCS, "Bask Issues Underlying the Divergent

View» in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan—1 July 1954." Ser 0001249P30, 22 Dec 53; Marine Corp»

FUmsv on DM-75-53. 22 Dec 53; Memo bv CSA, "Proposal for Resolving Divergencies in the Joint

Strategic Capabilities Plan." nd. (31 Dec 53J; CCS 381 (11-29-49) set 10

49 DM-77-53 to JCS. 28 Dec 53. SM-196Ö-3 to VADM M 8 Cardner ft d.. 30 Dec 53; CM-J9-54 to

Gardner et a/, 12 Jan 54; same file.

50 Dee On JCS 1844/151, 13 Jan 54. »ame file, BP pt 3

51. The JCS decided to include excerpt» from NATO j^ui» in the JSCP. In doing so, they overrode

the advice of the Director. Joint Staff, who had believed that their inclusion was inconsistent with

flesibilitv The JCS declined to specifv preference for European nation» in support to allies after

D-dav

52 JSPC 877262. 13 Feb 54, CCS 381 (U*2*M9) a* M. J€$ 1*4* 155. 22 M*r 54, CCS 381 (11-29-49)

sec 12.

53 Dec On JCS 1844/155, 2 Apr 54. same Hie JCS 1844156, 14 Apr 54. SM 374 54 to CSA rt *i. 27

Apr 54, same file. BP pt 5 Substantive discussion trf the guidance for general war ha» been deleted

brcau»e the plan remains classified

54 JSPC 88729, U Mav 54, CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 13

55 JCS 214328, 1 Jun 54. »ame file

56 SM^flA M to JCS. 23 Jul 54, Memo. DJS to JCS, "Oeveloprneni oi the Joint Mid-Range W*r

Plan tor 1 July 1957." 28 Jul 54, Dec On JO 2H)$». 30 Jul H CCS 381 (t1-2*4«) sec 15 pt I Nil ol

}C S 208» 11 30 Jut 54, «ame Hie. set 11 The decision» made with regard to forte level» are treatrd ui

Ch 3

57 JSPC 887 30. 10 Sep 54. KH of JSPC »87 30. 2,3 Sep S4< CCS 381 (11-29-4*) »e< 10 TV

administration * de \*to*\* concerning the tur o! the mobduation production base <uv described in

Ch 6

58 JCS 214131, >S Srp 54, CCS 361 (}l<$Mf) BP p* fr

59 OOP Directive 5158 1. 2* Jul 54. JCS 147*50. »Jul 54 CCS 370 (8-i«~45) *cc 4e The puff«»*

at the directive **•*» to tt*tpfoment and amplify Recwgamafttion Plan No <*tnsol«r A* the U'.in affected

the JCS Some of it» other provisions are dt*cu*aed later in this chapter

60 Memo. JCS to SecDef Joint M*d-R*ogr War flan for I July 1957. 25 Oct 54, JCS 31*131. CO

3»l cii ^-4^) sec 1* The »dea of u**ng the Dplus6 month* whedufo» *% the has*» for * dectoao*ran

be creditrd to the Air Fot*v pisrmer in the JSPC'c who had ch*rac«en*ed thei* a» providmg "an

acceptable »tacting K**t* for proceeding wtth the mobdiaaaon pU^rung cvcie» ' 14owe*-er. thr long

statement ai Air Force view» m the memo to the Secretary of Defeat* d«J not incorporate this

particular wggrstion merely «arguing the case tor plan* that would »tres* the initial afoeuc phase*"

oi war

11, Memo, SecDei to SecA rt «f.. fom? MKJ fLmgr W* Plan for 1 Juh 1957 2 Nov 54, JCS

214133.3 Nov 54. CCS 381 (11 -29-4*} *ec 17 Memo*, Serf*! to SecA r* *f. Additional Guidance o«

Joint Mid-Range War Plan foe 1 Jul* I957~ and '"^splaÄaiory Note* for and P-ocedttfc tn <uein*et*ee»

37«
Notes to Pages 103-111

with the Joint Mid-Range War Plan for 1 July 1957," 9 Dec 54, JCS 2143/34, 10 Dec 54, same file, sec

18. See Ch. 6 for a further account of the content of these directives. The "new NATO military

concept" was introduced in one of the 9 December memos, in a passing reference to actions that

must be taken before the 2 November directive could be implemented.

62. This new approach strategy is described further in Ch. 14.

63. JSPC 887/33/D, 20 Dec 54, CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 18.

64. PM-30-55 to JSSC, 17 Feb 55, same file, sec 19.

65. Discussed in Ch. 3.

66. JCS 2143/35, 30 Mar 55; Dec On JCS 2143/35, 15 Apr 55; CCS 381 (11-29-49) BP pt 8A.

67. JSPC 877/265/D, 9 Jul 54, same file, sec 15 pt 1.

68. JSCP 877/266, 8 Sep 54, same file, BP pt 6A.

69. JCS 1844/172, 12 Oct 54, same file, sec 16.

70. Dec On JCS 1844/172, 14 Oct 54, same file.

71. N/H of JSPC 877/266, 19 Oct 54, same file, BP pt 6A.

72. SPSM-34-54 to JSPC, 18 Nov 54, same file, sec 17.

73. N/H of JSPC 977/266, 3 Jan 55, same file, BP pt 6A.

74. Memo, DJS to CJCS, "Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, 1 July 1955 -1 July 1956, Status Report,"

26 Oct 54 (marked "Approved" by ADM Radford), CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 17.

N, 75. JCS 1844/173, 3 Dec 54, same file, sec 18.

\ 76. CSAFM-257-54 to JCS, 14 Dec 54; Dec On JCS 1844/173, 21 Dec 54, CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 18.

77. JLPC 447/40. 28 Dec 54; JSPC 877/277, 21 Jan 55; CCS 381 (11-29-49) BP pt 7.

78. SPGM-14-55 to JSPC, 3 Feb 55» same file, sec 19. JCS 1844/178, 2 Mar 55; Dec On JCS 1844/178,

\ 30 Mar 55; same file, BP pt 8.

79. JSPC 947/4, 18 Dec 53; withdrawn by N/H of JSPC 947/4, 5 Jan 54; same file, sec 10.

80. JSPC 947/7, 16 Sep 54, same file, sec 18.

81. JSPC 947/8/D, 8 Oct 54, same file, sec 16. SPSM-30-54 to JSPC, 20 Oct 54; SPSM-33-54 to JSPC, 8

Nov 54; same file, sec 17. JSPC 947/9/P, 30 Nov 54; JSPC 947/10, 3 Dec 54; same file, sec 18.

82. JSPC 947/11, 15 Dec 54, CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 18.

83. JSPC 947/12, 22 Apr 55; JSPC 947/14, 10 Jun 55, same file, sec 22. JCS 2089/12, 13 Jul 55; Dec On

JCS 2089/12. 27 Jul 55; same file, sec 23. JCS MOP 84 (1st Rev), 27 Jul 55, same file, sec 24.

84. Committee on the National Security Organization, National Security Organization, A Report with

Recommendations, prepared for the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch o» the

Government (1949), pp. 3, 37-38. Elsewhere, however, the committee showed awareness that the

problem might be deeper; note its reference to "sincere and deeply held differences over strategictheory and tactical method" that "cannot and should not be removed by fiat" (p. 53).

85. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch uf the Government (Hoover Commission),

"Defense Procurement: The Vital Roles of the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of

Staff," in Ftve Staff Papers Prepared for the Task Font on Procurement (1955), vol. 1, passim, especially pp

A-31, A-36, A-45, A-68, and A-69.

86. Public Papers, Eisenhower, 7953, pp. 234-237.

87. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 448.

88. DOD Directive 5158.1. 26 Jul 54, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 46.

89. Presentation by RADM R. J. Hedding, USN. to 1CAF, "Joint Strategic War Planning," 15 Nov

54, JCS Hist Div File, Speeches, No. 37. A political scientist has expressed the point even more

clearly: "The origin of the doctrinal disputes among the services lies i<n the difficulty of the problems

to which they are addressed and in the fact that the available tools of analysis cannot yield determinate solutions to them." Warner R. Schilling, "The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950," in

Schilling, Hammond, and SnvUer, Strategy. Politics, and Defense Budgets, p. 226.

90. JCS 2089/10, 8 Feb 54, CCS Ü8i (11-29-49) sec 11.

91. Huntington, Common Defense, p 409.

Chapter 5. Continental Air Defense

1. The problem of continental air defense was the subject of extensive public discussion in 1953

and 1954 (as well as in subsequent years), and the principal steps taken by the administration

became a matter of general knowledge This fact has furnished students of political science with an

opportunity to study the subject as a case history in strategic decision-making. Two such description* of the process ttv: Huntington, Ihr Common Defense: Strategic Programs m Natumal Politu-s. pp.

326-341, and Steven R Rivkin. "The Decision-Making Process lor National Defense Policy"

379
*

•-.

\

Notes to Pages 111-118

(unpublished honors thesis, Harvard University, 1958), pp. 115-170. While these writers have been

misled in some r doects by lack of access to classified documents, their accounts are accurate in the

main, and both are useful as guides to contemporary newspaper and magazine articles illustrative of

the climate of national opinion within which the administration's decisions took shape. For general

summaries of the evolution of continental defense from the end of World War II, see North American Air Defense Command, "Seventeen Years of Air Defense" (Historical Reference Paper No. 9, 1

Jun 1963), and Anonymous, "Air Defense of North America," Air Force Magazine, Aug 57, pp.

251-259.

2. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "A Planning Headquarters for the Defense of the Continental United

States," 8 Apr 48, JCS 1259/62, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 7.

3. JCS 2086/1, 5 Apr 50; Dec On JCS 2086/1, 29 Oct 51; same file, BP pt 1A.

4. The commander with responsibilities to the southward, CINCARIB, played no role in continental air defense planning, since the possibility of attack from the south was discounted.

5. For the estalishment of this Board, and for some information about its status after World War II,

see Stanley W. Dziuban, Military Relations Betxoeen the United States and Canada, 1939-1945, United

States Army in World War II (1959), pp. 22-26, 334-338, 374-375. For the Board's membership in 1952,

see US Government Organization Manual, 1952-53, p. 557. The Chairman of the US delegation in 1952

was MG Guy H. Henry, USA (Ret.); the Air Force was represented by MG Robert L. Walsh, the

Director of CUSDPG.

6. Dziuban, op. cit, p. 336.

7. NORAD, "Sev«»nte*>:i Years of Air Defense," p. 62.

8. The normal complement of a fighter-interceptor squadron was 25 planes.

9. In tabulations of AA forces, Skysweeper units were not classified as gun battalions (see Table

H).

10. The original version of the Nike was later referred to as Nike-Ajax, to distinguish it from more

advanced models (Nike-Hercules, Nike-Zeus).

11. The information concerning continental defense forces and objectives as of 31 December 1952

is taken principally from NSC 142, (Feb 53), CCS 381 US (1-31-50) BP pt 8, supplemented by the

following: JCS 2101/80, 14 Nov 52, same file, BP pt 5; NORAD, "Seventeen Years of Air Defense";

L. H. Buss, "U. S. Air Defense in the Northeast, 1940-1957," and Thomas A. Sturm, "Air Defense of

Alaska, 1940-1957" (Hq, CONAD, Historical Reference Papers Nos. 1 and 2, respectively, 1957). For

details of the PINE TPEE radar chain, see JCS 1899/16, 12 Feb 51; JCS 1899/17, 13 Feb 51; CCS 413.44

(7-1-48) sec 3.

12. Memo, JCS to SecDef. "Status of U.S. Programs for National Security as of 31 Dec 52," 12 Feb

53, JCS 2101/91, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 24.

13. Lincoln Laboratory, Massachusetts institute of Technology, Summer Study Group, 1952, "Final

Report," 1 Feb 53; copy in Hq AFSC The substance of the report was presented to officials of the

Department of Defense on 28-29 August 1952. The nature of the Study Group's recommendations

soon became generally known even though the report itself was not officially released. For unclassified summaries of its contents, see Huntington, Common Defense, pp. 329-330; Joseph and Stewart

Alsop. The Reporter's Trade, pp. 59-61; Rivkin, Decision-Making Process, pp. 125-128; Anonymous,

"The Hidden Struggle for the H-Comb," Fortune, May 53, p. 230, NY Times, 16 Mar 53. 1.

14. Huntington, Common Defense, p. 330; \tr Force Magazine. Aug 57, p. 257.

15. NSC Action No. 673, 24 Sep 52.

16. NSC Action No. 678, 14 Oct 52.

17. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Re-examination of Programs for National Security," 20 Nov 52, JCS

2101/80. CCS 381 US (1-31-50) »cc 22.

18 NSC 141. 19 Jan 53. same file. BP pt 6

19 Memo. JCS to SecDef, "Re-examinahon of U S. Programs for National Security." 12 Jan 53.

JCS 2101/84. same file, sec 23.

20 NSC Action Nos. 519. 1 Aug 51. and 543. 30 Aug 51. Memo. DC! to ExecSecy, NSC. "A Project

to Provide a More Adequate Basis for Planning for the Security of the United States." 14 Oct 53. JCS

190234. 28 Oct 52, CCS 371.2 US (3-30-48) sec 9.

21. Memo. JCS to SecDef, "A Project to Provide a More Adequate Basis for Planning for the

Security of the United States," 21 Nov 52, JCS 1902/36. same für, sec 10

22. NSC Action No 699. 16 Jan 53. NSC 140. 19 Jan 53. CCS 371 2 US (3-30-48) sec 10 LTG

Edwards was at that time Commandant of the Air University, though scheduled (or retirrment in a

few weeks. The JCS named the Director. CUSDPG. a» their representative, and appointed officers to

provide working level liaison between the Subcommittee and the Se-vices (SM-139-53 to ExecSecy.

NSC. 26 Jan 53; SM-149-53 to Dir V.USDPC, 26 Jan 53; same file ) Other members represented the

380

•
.. . -. ..'.

Notes tu Pages 118-121

\

\

" *

Central Intelligence Agency, the InterdepartmentalIntelligence Conference, and the Interdepartmental

Committee on Internal Security.

23. The appointment of this ad hoc study group and its initial membership were announced in

Memo, SecDef to SecA etal, ''Ad Hoc Study Group on Continental Defense," 4 Dec 52, JCS1902/38,

8 Dec 52, CCS 371.2 US (3-30-48) sec 10. The group's secretary was MG James McCormack, Jr., USAF,

who later headed Task Force B of the Solarium project.

24. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Early Warning System," 22 Dec 52, JCS 1899/22, CCS 413.44 (7-1-48)

sec 3.

25. NSC 139,31 Dec 52, same file, sec 4. The basic decision had actually been reached in November 1952 when it was agreed that the Air Force would contract with the Western Electric Company (a

subsidiary of the Bell System) to construct the line, and that part of the work would be subcontracted

to the Lincoln Laboratory. (Ltr, SecDef to C.F. Craig, President, American Telephone and Telegraph

Co., 1 Dec 52, same file, sec 3.)

26. Memo, SecDef to SecA et al, "An Early Warning System," 12 Jan 53, JCS 1899/24, 15 Jan 53;

Memo, SecDef to SecA et al., "Responsibility for Implementation of Earlv Warning System," 19 Jan

53, JCS 1899/25, 21 Jan 53; CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 4.

27. On the discussion of continental defense during the early part of 1953, see Huntington, Common

Defense, pp. 330-332, 336-337, and Rivkin, Decision-Making Process, pp. 137,142-143, and newspaper

references cited in these works. The columnists Joseph and Stewart Alsop played a major role in

stimulating discussion (see references in Huntington, loc. cit., and the Alsops' later account of the

controversy in their book, The Reporter's Trade, pp. 59-63). The report of the "Oppenheimer Panel" in

the spring of 1953, which recommended stronger continental defense and a policy of "candor"

concerning the dangers of atomic warfare, also served as a stimulus when its contents became

generally known. See Ch. 9.

28. NSC 149, 3 Apr 53; NSC 149/2, 29 Apr 53; CCS 381 US (1-31-50; sec 25. NSC 153/1, 10 Jun 53;

same fill, sec 26.

29. Ltr. ActgSecState to Canadian Amb, 30 Jan 53, JCS 1899/31, 6 May 53, CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec

5. Ltr, Canadian Amb to SecState, 27 Feb 53, JCS 1899/28, 3 Apr 53, same file, sec 4. All three of the

proposed test sites were north of the Arctic Circle.

30. This was the system later referred to as the "Lincoln Transitional System," and still later as

SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment

31. A Report and Recommendation to the Secretary of Defense by the Ad Hoc Study Group on

Continental Defense. 11 May 53, CCS 373.24 (9-8-49) BP pt 2. The letter of transmittal to SecDef

(referring to an earlier presentation to Deputy SecDef Kyes) is dated 11 May 53. An unclassified

summary of the recommendations was released later (see NY Times, 4 Jun 53, 4). The report was

apparently never transmitted to tht> National Security Council.

32. NSC Action No. 804, 5 jun 53. The Evaluation Subcommittee's report was disseminated as

NSC 140/1, 18 May 53. OASD(lSA) Retired Files.

33. JCS 1902/43, 12 May 53; SM-974-53 to Dir, CUSDPG. 13 May 53; CCS 371.2 US (3-30-48) sec 12.

MG Robert M. Webster, USAF, had by then succeeded MG Walsh as Dir, CUSDPG, and hence as the

JCS representative on the Subcommittee.

34. SM-1096-53 to ExecSecy, NSC. 29 May 53. JCS 1902/46, CCS 371.2 US (3-30-48) sec 12.

35. On the use of study groups as a means of delaying or evading a choice between policy

objectives, and the application of this device to the continental defense problem in 1953. see

Huntington, Common Defense, pp. 289-290, 330. As he observes, the report of the Lincoln Summer

Study Group "received such extensive consideration that it almost became a classic case of a proposal which was studied to death." The reported alignment in the administration for and against

enlarged air defense is indicated in tW , p. 331, where it is asserted that Vice President Nixon,

Secretary Dulles, and Harold Stassen (Mutual Security Administrator) were in favor, while Secretaries Humphrey and Wilson and Budget Director Dodge were opposed.

36 Record of Mtg», NSC PB. 6 May and 22 May 53. CCS 334 NSC (9-25-47) sec 10. The Committees

membership and terms of reference are given in its report. NSC 159, 22 Jul 53. JCS PB Adv F»ie "NSC

159. 159/2-Continental Defense "

37. SM-1109-53 to JCS, 2 Jun 53. CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 24. A Department of Defense committee

was established to advise General Smith, and the JCS named the Deputy Director. CUSDPG. to

represent them on this group. Memo. ASD(ISA) to SecA et al., "Establishment of Department of

Defense Committee . .." 4 Jun 53. JCS 1902/47. 12 Jur S3; Memo, DJS to SecDef. "NSC Planning

Board Committee on Continental Defense." 12 Jun 53. JCS 1902/47; CCS 371 2 US (3-30-48) sec 12

38 SM-124-53 to CUSDPG, 22 Jan 53. CCS 413 44 (7-1-48) sec 4

39 SM-5U-53 toCSA rt al., 11 Mar 53, JCS 1899/26. same Hie It was expected shat the plans would
Notes to Pages 122-129

I

subsequently be updated each year and projected to a readiness date in harmony with the D-day of

the applicable JSOP.

40. Memo, CNO to Distribution List, "U. S. Naval Basic Defense Plan for Continental United

States (NBDP 1-53)," 30 Mar 53, CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) BP pt 1.

41. These were later informally designated by the convenient phrase, "seaward extensions of

contiguous radar coverage," as distinct from "seaward extensions of the early warning system."

42. The plan did not indicate the number of squadrons to be deployed in other areas (Alaska,

Canada, Greenland, or Iceland).

43. Air Force Plan for the Defense of the Continental United States Against Air Attack, 31 December 1955 (DOCONUSAA), 8 Jun 53, CCS 413.44 (7-1 18) BP pt 1.

44. Memo by CSA, "Department of the Army Plan for Defense of the Continental US, 31 Dec 55,"

[16 Jun 53], CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 5.

45. JCS 1899/39, 30 Jun 53, same file, sec 6.

46. JCS 1899/43, 22 Jul 53, same file.

47. JCS 1899/30, 30 Apr 53, same file, sec 5.

48. JCS 1899/32, 25 May 53, same file.

49. JCS 1899/33, 29 May 53, same file.

50. JCS 1899/40, 11 Jul 53, same file, sec 6.

51. JCS 1899/41, 13 Jul 53, same file.

52. JCS 1899/47, 27 Jul 53, same file, sec 7.

53. SM-1364-53 to CUSDPG, 15 Jul 53, same file, sec 6. For a statement by GEN Twining of his

somewhat different impression of the tenor of the JCS agreement on the subject, see JCS 1899/48, 27

Jul 53, CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 7.

54. JCS 1899/42, 20 Jul 53, same file, sec 6. GEN Twining, in his position cited ii. the previous note,

had pointed out that the box barrier had already been rejected by the Air Force owing to its excessive

force requirements.

55. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Service Divergencies with Respect to the Joint Outline Plan for Early

Warning," 29 Jul 53, JCS 1899/51; Memo. ON. B(radley) to GEN Everest, 29 Jul 53; CSAFM-7-53 to

JCS, 6 Aug 53; CCS 413.44 (7-18-48) sec 7.

56. JCS 1899/59, 17 Sep 53; JCS 1899/60. 18 Sep 53; same file.

57 JCS 1899/53, 5 Aug 53. CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 25. Dec On JCS 1899/66. 14 Oct 53, same file,

sec 28

58. NSC Action No. 846, 9 Jul 53 On 23 July Mr. Cutler, with the President's approval, told the

Council that continental defense would be discussed on 6 August but that n<> action would be taken

until both the consultants and the new Joint Chiefs of Staff had tendered their advice. (NSC Action

No 855, 23 Jul 53.)

59. The quotation is trom paragraph 11 of p. 4 of the "Memorandum for the Special Assistant to

the President" that constituted the introductory portion of NSC 159.

60. NSC 159. 22 Jul 53, JCS PB Adv File "NSC 159. 159/2—Continental Defense." A convenient

summary of the scattered and somewhat confusing cost data in NSC 159 is given in Memo, ExecSecv.

NSC. to NSC. "Continental Defense.' 4 Aug 53, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 25 The Committee's

recommendations concerning organizational arrangements, which led to the appointment of th<. Net

Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee in 1954- ATV treated later in the chapter.

61. Memo. JCS to SecDef. "NSC 159, Continental Defense." 4 Aug 53. JCS 1899 52, CCS 381 US

(5-23-46) sec 25. These comments were circulated to the Council as NSC 159/2, 1 Sep 53. same file, sec

26

62. NSC Action No. 873, 6 Aug 53

63 Memo. ExecSecy. NSC, to NSC PB, "Continental Defense." 4 Aug 53. CCS 381 US (5-23-46)

sec 25 A statement dratted by ODM representatives on 24 Aug 53 urged that these programs be

implemented "at wartime tempo " (Memo. EtecSecy, NSC. to NSC PB. "Continental Defense," 27

Aug 53, same file, sec 26.)

64 James R KUUan. Jr.. and A G Hill. "For a Continental Defense." Allantu Monthly. (Nov

1953). p. 37 For a contemporary newspaper summary of the debate, see also articles by John C

Norm in Washington Post. V Sep 53, 3. and Hanson W Baldwin in NY T»iws, 8 Nov 53. *e< 4. 4.

See also: Hanson W. Baldwin. "Is There a Defense Against the H-Bomb?" NY Tima Stegazmt. 18 Oct

53. pp 7 if. Charle« J V Murphy. "The US a» a Bombing Target, F&iune, (Nov 1953), pp 118 ff.

Rivkm. ÜtctiwnSUkwii Pmrs*. pp 146-148

65. Radford. "Collected Wntings.' vol. 1, p 221

66 SeeCh I.

67 Memo. JCS to SecDef. " Continental Defense." 28 Aug 53. JCS 1899/57. CCS 381 US (5-23-46)

sec 26

382

I ! ' '
A

Notes to Pages 129-132

68. One nonmilitary program (detection of fissionable material) was also raised to this classification.

The lowest ranking programs were now divided into two categories, one to be "strengthened and

further developed," the other (which included harbor defense and coastal antisubmarine patrol) to

be "continued generally along present lines."

69. NSC 159/3, 16 Sep 53, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 27.

70. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "NSC 159/3, Continental Defense," 22 Sep 53, JCS 1899/63, same file.

71. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to NSC "Continental Defense," 25 Sep 53, same file, sec 28. The group

of consultants was headed by James B. Black, President, Pacific Gas and Electric Co.; the other

members were Dr. Alan Gregg (Vice President, Rockefeller Foundation), David J. McDonald

(President, United Steel Workers of America), Arthur W. Page (former Vice President, American

Telephone and Telegraph Co.), and Dr. James Phinney Baxter III (President, Williams College);

Memo, SpecAsst to Pres (Cutler) to CJCS, 17 Sep 53, OCJCS File 381 Continental Defense, 1953.

72. NSC Action No. 915, 24 Sep 53.

73. NSC 159/4, 25 Sep 53, CCS 381 US (5-23-4t>) sec 28. The cost estimates in NSC 159/3 were

omitted from NSC 159/4. Subsequent directives in 1953 (NSC 162/2 and JCS 2101/113) contributed

nothing to the decision on continental defense, which they merely listed in routine fashion as one of

the "requirements" of an adequate military posture. (Secondary writers, probably misled by informants relying on memory, have sometimes dated the key decision on continental defense in Oct

1953, in connection with the Council's action on NSC 162/2; see, e.g., Huntington, Common Defense,

pp. 334. 338.)

74. See Ch 3.

75. The Air Force also proposed to redeploy three wings (9 squadrons) of day fighters of the

Tactical Air Force to the United States as part of a reduction of its overseas tactical forces. These

would become part of the augmentation forces to be placed at the disposal of Air Defense Command

in case of emergency, and thus represented a potential accession to continental air defense strength.

Subsequent Air Force tabulations of continental defense forces sometimes included day fighter units

of the Tactical Air Force Thev have been disregarded in this study.

76. JCS 1800/209, 24 Sep 53. CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 43. The Army and Navy had included these

objectives in the preliminary requests sent to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee in March 1953; the

Air Force had at that time proposed even larger forces, as part of an abortive plan to expand to 153

wings. The JSPC had disagreed over the Air Force proposals and over the Navy's acquisition of

AEW/ASW aircraft, which could be interpreted as infringing upon Air Force responsibilities. (JCS

1800/199, 6 Mar 53, same tile, sec 40.)

77. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Budget Request for Fiscal Year 1955,'' 2 Oct 53, JCS 1800/211, same tile,

sec 43.

78. CM-34-53 to JCS. 16 Oct 53, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 29.

79. JCS 1899/71, 2 Nov 53. same file.

80. JCS 1899/74, 13 Nov 53, same file, sec 30. Six DERs were already in commission, and six more

had been funded in the FY 1954 budget

II. JCS 1899/77. 17 Nov 53, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 30. All units were to be deployed within

continental United States, the number proposed for assignment to nearby regions (Alaska, Canada,

Greenland, and Iceland) was not indicated.

82. This slippage resulted from lagging production of Nike ground control equipment, rather than

from budget ceilings; JCS 1899/82. 21 Nov 53. CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 31.

83. JCS 1899/75. 17 Nov 33. same tile, sec 30.

84. Memo. JCS to SecDef. "Continental Defense—NSC 1594." 21 Nov 53, JCS 189982. same tile,

sec 31. This memo replaced another sent three days earlier, in which the JCS had drawn Mr

Wilsons attention to the disagreement (not yet settled) between the Army and the Air Force over the

number of antiaiictaft battalions. (Memo. )CS to SecDef. "Continental Defense — NSC 159-4." 18 Nov

53, JCS 1899/78, same fUe, sec 30.)

85. Memo, SecDef to JCS. "Continental Defense—NSC 159/4," 3 Nov 53, JCS 189972, 5 Nov 53.

same file, sec 29. The programs (nine in number) may here be recapitulated as follows: in category 1.

Southern Canada early warning system (including seaward extensions), extension of contiguous

radar coverage, and methods of aircraft identification; in category 2. Northern Canada early warning

line, semiautomatic control system, gap-filler radars. LOFAR system, fighter tnterc-yptors. and antiaircraft forces.

86. Memo. JCS to SecDef, "Implementation of the Department of Defense's Responsibility in

Programs for Continental Defense," 21 Nov 53. JCS 1899/76. CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 31

87 NSC Action No 966-d. 23 Nov 53 CM-39-53, "Oral Presentation by CJCS »or SecDef to NSC in

Response to Mr Cutler s Request of 28 October." 23 Nov 53, JCS PB Adv File. NSC 1593, 159,4—

Continental Defense

383
Notes to Pages 133-135

88. JCS 1899/97, 15 Jan 54, CCS 381 US (5-23-16) sec 34.

89. Final FY 1955 budget objectives are as indicated in JCS 1899/92, 1899/93, and 1899/94, 7 Jan 54,

(forwarded to JCS by Army, Air Force, and Navy respectively, in reply to SecDef request for more

detailed "definition" of the three programs mentioned in the Council's action on NSC 159/4), same

file, sec 33; and in OSD, "Department of Defense Progress Report to National Security Council on

Status of Military Continental U.S. Defense Programs as of 1 June 1954," 25 Jun 54 (copy in JCS PB

Adv File, NSC 5408—Progress Reports; cited hereafter as DOD Progress Rpt, 1 Jun 54). The tabulation of 30 Jun 55 objectives in Table 11 reflects later changes (e.g., an increase in fighter interceptors

to 58 squadrons, or 19 V-, wings), as well as the effect of previous budgetary actions, such as DERs

authorized in earlier years.

90. Figures from NSC 5408, 3 Feb 54, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 37. The various programs are

readily identifiable with individual Services except the seaward extension of contiguous radar coverage,

which presumably includes expenditures by both Air Force and Navy. Requests for new obligational

authority apparently totalled $2.373 billion. The exact figures were not declassified, but Mr. Wilson

told the House Appropriations Committee that "close to 10 percent" of DOD expenditures in FY

1955 would be for continental defense. H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1955, p. 86.

91. See Table 6.

92. Public Papers, Eisenhower, 1954, pp. 12, 119-120.

93. Ltr, Canadian Amb to SecState, 27 Feb 53, JCS 1899/28, 3 Apr 53. CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 4.

94. SM-772-53 to SecDef, 10 Apr 53, Dec On JCS 1899/28, same file. Memo, ActgSecDef to JCS, 4

May 53, JCS 1899/31, 6 May 53, same file, sec 5.

95. JCS 1899/64, 24 Sep 53; Dec On JCS 1899/64, 26 Sep 53, same file, sec 7. SM-1655-53 to CSAF, 26

Sep 53, same file, sec 8.

96. JCS 1899/69, 20 Oct 53; SM-1734-53 to Chm, US Sec PJBD. 20 Oct 53, JCS 1899/69; same tile, sec

8.

97. For the 6 November 1953 meeting, see correspondence reproduced in JCS 1899/81, 20 Nov 53,

same file. GEN Ridgway represented the JCS at this meeting. For an earlier discussion on 20 October

1953, at which ADM Radford was present, see Memo, COL Leroy H. Watson, jr., USAF (Exec to

CJCS) to CSA, 4 Nov 53, OCJCS File 381 Continental Defense. 1953. The Chairman of the Canadian

Chiefs of Staff Committee, LTG Charles Foulkes, attended both meetings.

98 Dec On JCS 1899/81, 9 Dec 53; SM-1914-53 to CSAF, 9 Dec 53; CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 8.

99. JCS 1899/95, 7 Jan 54; Dec On JCS 1899/95, 8 Jan 54; same hie.

100. CM-76-54 to Secv JCS, I Apr 54; SM-293-54 to JCS, 2 Apr 54; OCJCS FUe 381 Continental

Defense (Jan-May 54).

101. DOD Press Release No. 306-54. 8 Apr 54.

102. DOD Progress Rpt. 1 Jun 54 p. 14.

103. In preparing the final presentation. Secretary Wilson asked JCS for additional detailed

information, in a format prescribed bv the NSC Staff. (Memo. SecDef to JCS, "Continental Defense,"

21 Dec 53. JCS 1899/90. 23 Dec 53. CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 33.) The JCS relayed the Service replies to

SecDef on 11 January 1954. (Memo. JCS to SecDef, "Continental Defense," 11 Jan 54. JCS 1899/96,

same file, sec 34.)

104. NSC Action No. 1010, 14 Jan 54.

105. NSC 5408, 3 Feb 54. CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 37.

106 They agreed on 15 February 1954 that, instead of sending Secy Wilson their comments on

NSC 5408 in the usual fashion, they would merely ask their Special Assistant for NSC Affairs to

request the Planning Board to make one minor change (concerning the recommendations for improved

identification procedures) (Dec On JCS 1899/105, 15 Feb 54. same file.) This change was *»mong

those approved by the Council on 17 February 1954.

107. NSC Action No 1041. 17 Feb 54 Memo, ExecSecv, NSC, "Continental Defense.' 24 Feb 54,

CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 37 The changes made by the Council in approving NSC 5408 were

trat smitted as corrected pages for u .elusion in existing copies.

108. NY Times, 11 Oct 53, 1. Mr. Sprague headed an electronics manufacturing company in

Massachusetts, a state represented in the Senate by the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

Sen. Leverett Saltonstall.

109. No copy of Mr. Sprague's report has been found. A summary of his oral presentation to the

Senate Armed Services Committee or. 16-17 January IV54 (at which ADM Radford and Secy Wilson

wen? present) is given in Memo for Record end to CM-55-54 to JCS. "Mr Sprague's Report . . ," I]

Feb 54. OCJCS File 381 Continental Defense (Jan-May 54).

110 Memo. SecUH to JCS, "Certain Recomrnendations re Continental Defense.' II Mav 54. JCS

1899/112. 14 May 54, CCS 381 US (5-23-16) sec 40 Neither the memo nor its enclosure identified the

source of these "certain retwnmendahons.'' but the JSPC recognized them as emanating from Mr

384
Notes to Pages 136-139

Sprague's report. (Memo, jCS to SecDef, "Recommendations Regarding Continental Defense," 10

jan 54, JCS 1899/116, same file, sec 41.)

111. Memo, SpecAsst to Pres (Cutler) to SecDef, "Progress Reports on Continental Defense (NSC

5408)," 22 May 54, OCJCS File 381 Continental Defense (Jan-May 54).

112. in contrast, the CIA in October 1952 had credited the USSR with not more than 100 bombs of

approximately 20 kilotons each. ("Net Capability of the USSR to Injure the Continental US," 6 Oct

52, JCS 1902/34, 28 Oct 52, CCS 371.2 US (3-30-48) sec 9.) Even the intelligence estimate used in the

preparation of NSC 5422 had forecast a Soviet stockpile totalling the equivalent of only 25 megatons

by 1957. (NSC 5422, 14 Jun 54 (para 2, p. 2), CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 40; data repeated in NSC

5422/2, 7 Aug 54 (App A, para 2, p. 13), same file, sec 44.)

113. Mr. Sprague's assumptions and recommendations (though not his complete report) were

enclosed with Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to NSC, "Continental Defense," 1 Jui 54, JCS 1899/129, 9 Jul

54, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 42. The substance of this report had been presented orally to Sen.

Saltonstall and several other members of the Senate Armed Services Committee on 22 June 1954.

ADM Radford, who was present, took exception to some of Mr. Sprague's assumptions, pointing

out that they were based on information that had not been fully evaluated. In an obvious attempt to

dissuade the Senators from hasty action, he urged that the continental defense program be kept in

balance with others and pointed out that the principal obstacle to faster progress was not money, but

trained manpower. (Memo, CJCS to SecDef, "Briefing of a Select Group of the Senate Armed

Services Committee by Mr. Robert C. Sprague," 23 Jun 54, OCJCS File 381 Continental Defense

(Jun-Dec 54).)

114. Memo Sprague to Cutler. "Continental Defense," 1 Jul 54. JCS 1899/130. 9 Jul 54. CCS 381 US

(5-23-46) sec 42.

115. NSC Action No. 1166, 1 Jul 54.

116. Memo, |CS to SecDef, "Continental Defense—Guidelines Under NSC 162/2 for FY 1956," 16

Jul 54, JCS 1899/131, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 43.

117. Memo. SecDef to ExecSecv, NSC, "Continental Defense—Guidelines Under NSC 162/2 for

FY 1956," 19 Jul 54, same file.

118. For a summary of Mr. Sprague's recommendations on 29 July 1954, see his subsequent Rpt,

Sprague to NSC, "Continental Defense." 24 Nov 54. JCS 1IW/176, 7 Dec 54. CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec

53. The program target dates in effect as of mid-1954 are indicated in DOD Progress Rpt, 1 Jun 54.

The reason for Mr. Sprague's concern about the early warning line is not apparent; its completion

had already been set for December 1956. The Pacific extension would not be completed before July

1959, since the Navy proposed to assign its first DERs and AEW/ASW aircraft to the Atlantic barrier

The Air Force planned to budget for the last of its gap-filler radars in FY 1957.

119. NSC Action No. 1187, 29 Jul 54

120. NSC 5422/1, 26 Jul 54. CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 43.

121. NSC 5422/2. 7 Aug 54. same file, sec 44 The President ruled that this paragraph would apply

also to the rocket with atomic warhead, even though the latter was not mentioned tn NSC 5408.

122. NSC Action No. 1194. 5 Au$ 54.

123. A Report and Recommendation to the Secretary of Defense bv the Ad Hoc Studv Group on

Conhnental Defense. 11 May 53. CCS 373 24 (9-8-49) BP pt 2.

124 JCS 2044/18. 13 Oct 53. CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 29 JCS 2044/20. 21 Nov 53. same file, sec 31

125 JCS 1899/89. 16 Dec 53. CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 45

126 CM-4754 to JCS, 15 Jan 54. same file.

127. JCS 1899/100, 25 Jan 54 CCS 381 (124-42) »ec 46

128. JCS 1899/106. 12 Mar 54. Dei On JCS 1899.106. 22 Mar 54; SM-245-54 to CSAF. 22 Mar 54;

SM-246-54 to CSA and CNO, 22 Mar 54; same für. sec 47 A »put within JSPC over the wording of the

draft foreshadowed later Service disagreements over the authority to he given to the new commander

The Army member sought to spell out in some detail the limits of this authority The JCS rejected this

attempt and voted for a broad and general statement of functions

129 JCS 1899/115. 28 May 54. CCS 381 (124-42) sec 48

130 The discussion can be followed in JCS 1899 122. 22 Jun 54 (setting forth view* ol CNO). and

tn the fallowing, all in the same file, sec 49: JCS 1899124. 24 Jun 54 (view» of CSA). JCS 1899126, 26

Jun 54 (appointment of ad hoc committee to review the draft); JCS 1899/128, 1 Jul 54 (report of ad hoc

committee); sM-621-54 to Op»Dep*. 6 Jul 54. and SM-639-54 to JCS, 14 Jul 54 (recording tentative

agreement» reached a» of those date») Even the tide of the new commwd became a matter of

di»pute; GEN Chidlaw suggested "US Air Defense Command (USAD),' but ADM Carney objected

that this would imply worldwide responsibilities, and instead recommended "Continental US Air

Defense Command" (CONAD), which was later adopted

131 JCS 1899/133. 19 Jul 54. CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 49

132 Memo, JCS to SecDef. 'Command Arrangements for Continental Air Defense. 26 )ul 54. JCS

385

.
Notes to Pages 139-144

1899/135; Memo, SecDef to SecA et «I., same subj, 30 Jul 54; SM-688-54 to CSA et al., 2 Aug 54; same

file, sec 50. A public announcement was released on 3 August 1954; NY Times, 4 Aug 54, 7.

133. Dec On JCS 2044/21, 6 Feb 54, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 35. SM-78-54 to CSA et al, 29 Jan 54,

same file, sec 36.

134. NSC 159, 22 Jul 53, JCS PB Adv File "NSC 159,159/2—Continental Defense." Memo, ExecSecy,

NSC, to PB, "Organization for Continental Defense," 19 Mar 54, same file, sec 38.

135. NSC Action No. 873, 6 Aug 53.

136. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to NSC, "Organizational Arrangements for Continental Defense," 9

Apr 54. JCS 1899/110, 14 Apr 54, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 39.

137. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Organizational Arrangements for Continental Defense," 23 Apr 54,

JCS 1899/111, same file.

138. Memo for Record, 5 May 54 (unsigned; apparently prepared in office of GEN Gerhart),

recording conference between Radford and Dulles, same date; JCS PB Adv File, NSC 5408—Correspondence Regarding Through, December 1955. The discussion ended inconclusively, with an

agreement that ADM Radford would refer the matter back to JCS and SecDef and that a delay

would be sought in discussion of the problem by NSC. Whether further discussion took place is

unknown. At the request of the SecDef, however, the NSC on 6 May postponed consideration of

the subject until its next meeting. (NSC Action No. 1108, 6 May 54.)

139. NSC Action No. 1113, 13 May 54.

140. NSC Action No 1150, 9 Jun 54.

141. NSC 5423. 23 Jun 54, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 42. NSC Action No. 1164, 24 Jun 54.

142. NSC Action No. 1260, 4 Nov 54. No copy of the Subcommittee's report has been found.

143. DOD Progress Rpt, 1 Jun 54, p. 17.

144. JCS 1899/125, 29 Jun 54, CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 8.

145. Dec On JCS 1899/125, 9 Jul 54; SM-630-54 to Chm, US Sec. PJBD, 9 Jul 54; same file.

146. Ltr. Chm. Canadian Chiefs of Staff, to CJCS, 30 Jun 54, and reply, 8 Jul 54, JCS 1899/134, 21

Jul 54, same file.

147. Ltr. Chm. Canadian Chiefs >f Staff to CJCS, 14 Jul 54. JCS 1899/134. 21 Jul 54. same file.

148 )CS 1899/137. 29 Jul 54. same We.

149. SM-685-54 to Chm. US Sec. MSG, 2 Aug 54; CSAFM-160-54 to JCS, 30 Jul 54; same tile.

150. Canadian Embassy Note No 580, 2 Sep 54. JCS 1899/149. 15 Sep 54. same file The Canadian

note confirmed oral statements made to US representatives on 20 Aug 54.

151. Canadian Embassy. "Draft Text of a Possible Joint Announcement . . . Concerning the Distant Early Warning Line," 7 Sep 54. JCS 1899/152. 17 Sep 54. CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 8.

152. Memo, JCS to SecDef. "Canadian-United States Distant Earlv Warning Line," 22 Sep 54. JCS

1899/155, same file, sec V.

153. Text of |oint press release in OCJCS File 381 Continental Defense (Jun-Dec 54) NY 7imes, 28

Sep 54, 1 As the announcement pointed out. the agreement covered only »he need for the line; the

precise location and the responsibilities lor construction and lor financing remained to be worked out

154 JCS 189*156, 22 Sep 54. CCS 413.44 (71 4«) sec 9

155 Memo. CNO to JCS, "Canada United States Early Warning Systems," 5 Ort 54, Ser 00010ÜP6O.

Dec On JCS 1899 15*. 7 Oct 54; SM-882-54 to CNO and CSAF, 7 Oct 54; same file

156 First Report of the Location Study Croup, Distant Earlv Warning (DF.W) Croup, 12 Nov 54,

JO 1899 179, 30 Dec 54. CCS 413 44 (7-1-415) sec 10

157 JCS 1899 179. 30 Dev 54, same til«-

158 Dec On JCS 1899'1?9. J4 J4n 55; Memo. CNO to JCS. Report on the Location Study Croup,

Distant Early Warning Group." n d.. Ser ÜÜ21P60 same file

159 SM-30-55 to Chm. Canadian Chiefs of Staff. 14 Jan 55, JCS 1899 179, N 11 of JCS 1899 179, 8

Mar 55 same file

1*0 Fmphast» supplied

It»! Rpt of USAFRCAF MUitan Characteristic* Committee DEW Croup. 7 Sep 54. JCS 189*157,

29 Sep 54. CCS 413 44 (7-1-48) *ec 9

162 JCS 189*157. 29 Sep 54; Memo by CSA, Report of USAF-RCAF Military Characteristic»

Committee DEW Group ' (5 Ort 54L same tile

163 JCS 189*177. 17 Dec 54. same file

164 JCS 1899 175. 6 Dec 54. same file

165 JCS 189* 177. 17 Dec 54. »ante fUr

166 JCS 189*178. 17 Dec 54, **mc file

167 SMlÜftlM to Chm Canadian Cruet* til Staff. 17 Dec 54. JCS 189*177 *ame Me

!6ft Memo. Chm. Canadian Joint Staff, to Secy JCS, CJS 263-4, Report of ISAFRCAF Militarv

Oiaractrrotkc» Committee—-DEW Group,' 19 Jan 55, JCS 189*182. 26 Jan 55, uiw file, set 10 One

386

MM—
K

Notes to Pages 144-150

further amendment was processed. (SM-160-55 to Chm, Canadian Chiefs of Staff, 2 Mar 55, )CS

1899/190; N/H of JCS 1899/190, 20 Apr 55; same file.)

169. NY Times, 20 Nov 54,1. The )CS were not consulted in the preparation of this press release or

in the negotiations that preceded it. See draft of release (with earlier version transmitted by Canadian Embassy), with attached memo for ADM Radford from (COL) C.E. H(utchin), of his staff, 15

Nov 54, indicating it was being sent for information only, in OCJCS File 381 Continental Defer..*?

(Jun-Dec 54).

170. These highlights from the DOD Progress Report of 1 Nov 54 (not found) were summarized in

a report by Mr. :?prague on 24 Nov 54. (Rpt, Sprague to NSC, "Continental Defense," 24 Nov 54, JCS

1899/176, 7 Dec 54, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 53.)

171. Mr. Wilson did of course ask the JCS to recommend major forces for FY 1956, but not

specifically those for continental defense. For the manner in which the FY 1956 budget was finally

settled, see Ch. 3.

172. Information on FY 1956 budget programs taken from OSD, "Department of Defense Progress

Report to National Security Council on Status of Military Continental U.S. Defense Programs as of 15

April 1955," 3 Jun 55, copy in JCS PB Adv File, NSC 5408—Progress Reports; cited hereafter as DOD

Statu« Rpt. 15 Apr 55.

173. Figures furnished by DOD to House Appropriations Committee, printed in H. Hrgs, DOD

Appropriations for 1956, pp. 394-395. They are described, rather ambiguously, as the amounts

"programmed" for continental defense; the context suggests that they refer to new obligational

authority rather than expenditures. The same source gives $2.373 billion for FY 1955 ($.903 billion

for Army, $.222 billion for Navy, and $1.248 billion for Air Force). This total figure should be

compared with the $3.198 billion given earlier in this chapter for continental defense items in the FY

1955 budget, taken from NSC 5408; the latter figure is clearly identified as an expenditure estimate.

174. Public Papers, Eisenhower, 1955, pp. 12, 91, 116-117. The House Appropriations Committee, in

conducting hearings on the military budget, paid special attention tu continental defense and took

testimony from GEN Chidlaw and other responsible officer». (H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1956,

pp. 378-427.)

175 DOD Progress Rpt. 15 Apr 55.

176 N/H of JCS 1800/225, 6 Apr 55, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 47

177. Public Papers, Ltsenhower. J95J. p. 18.

178 Radford, "Collected Writings," vol I, p. 37

179. For the conflict within the Air Force on this issue (pitting continental defense advocates

against those who favored all-out concentration on offensive strength), see Huntington, Common

Defense, p. 328, and Rivkin, Deetston*Making Process, pp 130-132 The offensive viewpoint i» exemplified in James R Shepley and Clay Blair, Jr, TV Hydrogen B*mt> (1954), pp 182»186. where the report

of the Lincoln Summer Study Group is interpreted as a deliberate attempt to influence US strategy by

diverting funds from the Strategic Air Command

180 Memo, JCS to SecDet, The Status of US Program* for National Security a* of 31 December

1954," 18 Mar 55. JCS 210t<i90. CCS 3»! US (1-31-50) sec 52.

181 JCS 1899 175, 6 Dec 54, CCS 413.44 (7-1-18) sec 9

182 m Times. 24 Nov 54. 10.

Chapter 6. Mobilization Planning

I " MobUuahon planning ' is u*ed <n this chapter tn its usual sense, as relating m*mh to the

provision of materiel for wartime use. rather than to the »pea*! problem» of mobilizing manpower

which are considered in Ch 7

2. The Chairman of the Board at that time was Mr Jack tiorne, other members Here the Secretaries of State, Treasury. Defense. Interior, Agriculture. Commetve. and Labor

3 far the function* »tvi composition of these agemse« in J9$2. see US Cxttrmmmt t*»s*mi*r*w»

Mammt, 1952 5.1, pp «HP, 67-71. 120. 125

4 PuM* P*per*. Ltsenhouxr. 1953. pp 142-146

5 JCS 172547. 2 Aug 49: Dec Cm JCS 172*47, 20 Jin 50. CCS ÄH 04 (11*44*) m I» Memu.

SeeOrf to JCS, * Mob*U*ation Retirement*.' 2* Aug 5:.. JCS I7JWI0, 2fr Aug 52. same hie. see 4*

CM-18M io ADM Radford et ü . 27 Jul 53. OCJCS Nfe 3m01 (1953 S6|

o fnd to CM-18-53 to ADM Radford et ä„ 2? Jul 53 OqCS Pile 37001 {1953-5*) JCS 1725 m, 9

Sep 52. CCS 004 04 CU-4*4ft) see SO SM 22*1-52 to Chm Munition* 8d. 1 CM SL JCS 17251*. samr

fue; sec 52 SM-277552 to Chm Munition» &d. 5 Dee 52. JCS 1725201t same tile, me 54 As «plained

387
j>

Notes to Pages 150-155

more fully in Ch. 4, in adopting this program the JCS advanced to1 January 1953 the deadline for

submission of the draft JSOP.

7. Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense,1 fan-30 }ur 53, p. 44.

8. JCS MOP 84, 14 Jul 52; JCS 2089/3,6 Jun 52; CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 3.

9. Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense,1 fan-30 fun 53, p. 42.

10. San-annual Report of the Secretary of Defense,I ful-31 Dec 52, p. 6. H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations

for 1954, p. 44. Memo, OepSecDef to SecA el al, "Provision for Mobilization Base." 16 Jan 53, JCS

17>5/212, 16 Jan 53. CCS 004.04 (11-4-46) sec 58.

11. NSC 149,3 Apr 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 25.

12. H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1954, p. 217, 353, 381. 445 Semiannual Report of the Setrrtary of

Defense,I fan-30 fun S3, p. 43.

13. Memo. CJCS to OepSecDef. "Force Levels for 1954 Budget, 13 Apr 53. OCJCS File1i1 Budget

(1953).

14. For these aspects of Secretary Wilson's policies, see his statements during FY 1954 budget

hearings, in S. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1954. pp. 22-24. and H. Hrgs. DOD Appropriations for

1954, pp. 353. 381; Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense,I fan-30 )un 53. pp. 42-44: "Defense

and Strategy," Fortune. Jun 53, p. 90.

15. NSC '162/2. 30 Oct 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 31.

16. For mobilization policy in the FY 1955 budget see: Memo, SecDef to SecA, SecN. and SecAF.

16 Oct 53. printed in Study of Atrpower. vol. II. pp. 1642-1644. H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1955.

pp. 10, 34, 110-113. 225. 243-244. 345-346. H. Hrgs. DA Appropriations for 1955. pp. 3-4. 14, 28-29, 45.

59-60. 255-256. 1037-1040.

17 Memo. )CS to SecDef. "Estimate of the Militärs Posture Throughout the Free World. FY 1956

Through FY 1959." 21 May 54, JCS 2101/134. CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 39 The "nine military hard t*.oods fields" were: aircraft, guided missiles, ships, combat vehicles, noncombat vehicle», weapons,

ammunition, electronics, and others. {JCS 1725/192.9 Sep 52, CCS 004.04 (11-4-46) sec 50 JCS

1725 20!. 26 Nov 52. same file, sec 54.)

18 On the origin of the stockpiling prcgram and it» history through 1952, see Glenn H. Snyder,

Stockpiling Strategic Material* Polttx* anä Hatumal Detenu (1966). pp 1188

19 For the origin of the five-year stockpile assumption, see Snyder. Stockpiling Straften Material*,

p 223. and ODM interoffice memo of 20 Apr 54, reprtnt xi in Hearing», Inquiry into the Strategy and

Oithal Material Stockffr* of the Untied State*. 19*2.S Com on Armed Service», 87th Cong, id *e»*

(hereafter cited a»5 Stockpile Hr**. l>k>2). voi U.p \H vt

2C JCS 62*16. 27 Apr 53, CCS 400 23 (12-15-43) sec7

2I Memo. Chm Munition* Bd to JCS. "Strategic Guidance acui Premise» tor Use in Calculation» of

National Stockpile Requirement» and Objective*/ 18 Dec 52. JCS 62*13. 20 Dec 52, SM-57353t

Chm Munition» Bd. 17 Mar 53. JCS 62614, Memo. Vice Chm Munition» Bd to JCS Nation«!

Stockpile Program." 23 Mar S3. JCS *26.T5. 26 Mar 53. CCS 400 23 (12-15-43) **c 7.

22 JCS fe2ty 16» 2? Apr 53. «me hk

23 Memo. CSAF to JCS. "National Stockpik Program."5 May 53. same file

24 SM 929*53 to JSSC6 V'av 53, same file

25 SM-t048-53 to Chm Munitions &d. 25 May 53, JO» 626/17. «mr file

2* See ODM tnterofrke memo.9 Feh 54. t|uotodm> >t**kj*ur rtr$*. 1$** voi IIp 3834

27 Memo, ASOtS*L} to CJCS2 Sep 53.w er*t Memo. Ott ODM to Member». Defense ktobdw«

«on Board. 13 Aug 53; Memo. QCS to ASD(S4»U. "Defense MebUttatio« A»umpbon» and Ubj«

tive* tor FY 1954 and FY 1*55.8 Sep 53. OQCS FHk 370 01 (1953-5*)

2* Memo. |se<5ecy, NSC to PB. "Dokmm MobiU/Ji*tem Assumption» and (-tn«vtives. 2* Sep

53. CCS 0O4 04 (11-4*4*) see 63 NSC 172, 13 Ho^ 53. same file see *4

29 The origin*! ODM draft had p*«po*ed to *.«w»wa five ye*r wot the reason tor the change t»

n& indicatedm avsikhie *our*e*

30 Memo, JCS to Sa*f3ef. "NSC 172, Interim De«en«e MobdiÄanon Planning Assumption»." 1ft

Nt* 53, JCS 1725 234. CCS 004 04 (11 -4-l*> «**M

31 NSC Action No tft& 19 Nov 5J NSC 1721. 20 Nov 51 CCS 004 04 (11-14*) *et 6*

35 NSC Actto« N<* 1004. »Jan 54 The decision wa* rendered durmga d4*cu*a*on of potsiHe new

hooti&ae* in Korea

33. NSC 5414. 17 Mar 54, Ct*> 004 04 fH-4-ftJMm«

34 Memo. JCS to SccCH TVknse Mob&tattor« Plannm* A**wmp«uft», 31 Mat 54 fCS 1725/2.50,

same til*~ se< »9

35 NSC Action No 11GD. 29 Apr 54 NSC 541*1. 30 Apr 54. CCS 004 04 (II 4-46) «% 7f3

3» The m^srnce of noamiliUfY con»»d*-r*&oft*m shaping **o«kptfe pdinr during i«5>|«54»

d*m'Hbedm ietyder. V;vif*s*< <(**$ct*: Majjmfe, pp 191 221 Thev sjecuned U*ge*v frx*s the

m i
Notes to Pages 155-161

effect* of the Korean truce in reducing the demand for certain minerals produced in the United

States. (Snyder's account of the JCS role in the determination of stockpile polio-, on pp. 223-225, is

unreliable.)

The NSC policy directives drafted in 1954. NSC 5422/2 and NSC 5501. said nothing about the

stockpile program except to recommend that it not be manipulated for the purpose of assisting

underdeveloped nations.

37. Memo. ODM to JCS. 12 Mar 54, JCS 626/18, 19 Mar 54; Memo, JCS to SecDef. 'National

Stockpile Program," 9 Jul 54, JCS 626/20, CCS 400.23 (12-15-43) sec 8.

38. Memo, ExecSecy. NS"". to PB, "Guidelines Under NSC 162/2 for FY 1956: Comments by ODM

on Defense and FOA Submii «ions," 3 Jun 54, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 39.

39. NSC 5422. 14 Jun 54. same file, sec 40.

40. ODM representatives had participated actively in the drafting of NSC 5422. See Record of Mtg,

NSC PB. 9 Jun 54. CCS 334 NSC (9-25-47) sec 15A. at which the Board discussed drafts prepared by

ODM and others.

41. NSC 5422, Sec IV. paragraphs 34-44. The support for the two views is not indicated, but the

positions are those that, in connection with NSC 5422/2, were later to be upheld by the ODM. on the

one hand, and the DOD and BOB on the other

42. JCS 2101/139, 19 Jun 54; Dec On JCS 2101/139. 29 Jun 54; CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 40

43. "Summary of Points on NSC 5422." 6 Jul 54, end to Memo, DepExecScw. NSC, to Subcom on

Guidelines, "Guidelines under NSC 162/2 for FY 1956." 7 Jul 54. SpecAsst to JCS for NSC Affairs File.

"NSC 5422—Tentative Guidelines Under NSC 162/2 for FY 1956."

44. NSC 5422/1, 26 Jul 54, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 43. As recounted in Ch 2. the JCS reviewed

NSC 5422/1 but suggested tu> changes.

45 NSC Action No 1194. 5 Aug 54

46 NSC 5422/2. 7 Aug 54. CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 44

47. Memo. ExecSecy, NSC, to NSC, Guidelines (or Mobilization." 5 Oct 54. JCS 2101156, 6 Oct

54. same tile sec 46.

48. JCS 2101/157. 9 Oct 54, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 46.

49. JCS 2101/158. 14 Oct 54; Memo bv CSA. "Cuidetincs tor Mobiluation,' n.tl.; CSAFM-21754 to

JCS, 20 Oct 54; same file

50 Memo, JCS to SecDef. Guidelines lor Mobilisation." 21 Oct 54, JCS 2101162. same tile

51 Memo, SecDef to ExecSecy. NSC. "Guidelines lor Mobiluafton." 25 Oct 54, end to Memo.

ExecSecv. NSC, to NSC. same sub), 25 Oct 54. SpecAsst to JCS tor NSC Affairs File. "NSC 5422-1 «ml

NSC 5422/2."

52 Discussed in Ch 5

53 NSC Action No 1254. 26 Oct 54 Memo. ExecSecv. NSC. to NSC. Guideline* tor Mobduatic«."

27 Ort 54. NU of JCS 2101 154, 2 Nev 54. CCS 381 US (13150) sec 44

54 The phraseology of these proposal» (more concise than «n the original ODM draft) had been

suggested bv ADM Camev and recommended by the JCS in Memo, JCS to SecDef. 'Guideline» tor

Mobüvation. 21 Oct 54. JCS 2101 162. tamr tile, set 46

55 NSC Action No 1277, | Ow 54

56 NSC 5501. 7 iJktt 55, CCS 381 US (I 31-50) sec 50

57 DOD Directive 3005 3. ? Dec 54. CCS 004 04 (11-4-46) sec 72

58 i#m*npntal Ktfpprf of ihr <wrrr**ry of tirkns*. I Ian 30 /a« 55. p. 34

59 for mebUttatien programs, in the FY 195* budget, »ec 5 Hrgs. DOD Appfxsfntttt&n h* 1*%*,

pp 177. 209, 782, and H Urg». PA. Affrvftntttem ft* 195*. pp 6. 1*15. «**<W. 185 187

60 $€mmn*ml Ktt**t of the &t?rt*ry 4 i Vfrw. ? J*a 30 /a* S5. p. 34.

61 Memo, JCS to SecDef, The Status of U 5 Program* tor NaaorwU Security a* of 31 tfecembrr

1954. ~ 18 Mai 55. JCS 2101190. CCS 381 US (1*31 W> MK 52

62 Memo, JCS to SecDef. "Command *nd Ofganteaöon»* Structure et US Force», faree* and

Manmng te***s," 18 Mar 55. JCS 1800237. CCS 370 18-19-45) *ec 51

63. ror full discussion, see Ch 4

64 Memo, JCS to SecDef Joint Mid Range War Han to* 1 July 1957 25 v)ct 54. JCS 214*31, CCS

381 (U?M9)*ec 1?

63 Memo. SecDef to SecA tf a/.. Joint Mid Range W*r flan tor 1 )uiv 1*57. 2 No* 54. JCS

2143/13. 3 Nev 54. same tile

66 Memo. SecDef to SecA ft d , Additional Guidance «*i Jem* Mid Rang« WAT FUm tor 1 Jury

1957* * Dec 54. Memo. SecDef to SecA rt a/, '£*ft*4natory Sole* to* **d Procedure ai Ctmmcttm

with the Joint Mid Range W** Pun tor 1 July 1957/ 9 Dec 54. ends to K > 214344. 10 Dec 54. *ame

tile

6? Treated more ruth m Cfc 3

»

1

-****«&„ .,.^.~«. ..-. ....~,^.—,«.
Notes to Pages 161-168

68, PuWir Papers, Eisenhower. 1955, p. 3. In a similar vein, in a press conference on 15 December

1954, the President remarked that, if a fatally destructive attack could be prevented, "then, as has

been traditionally the case, the economy, the great industrial power, of the United States can

unquestionably be decisive again." (PuWic Papers. Eisenhower, 1954. p. 1107.)

69. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission),

"Translation of Logistics Programs into Procurement Requirements," in Five Staff Papers Prepared for

the Task Force on Procurement (1955), vol. I, pp. B-10-11, B-26, B-65

Chapter 7. Manpower Mobilization: Organization of

Reserve Forces

1. H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1955, p. 122. Similarly, in defining the New Look in December

1953, ADM Radford had promised that it would include "a better planning of reserve components. '

Radford, "Collected Writings." vol. 1. p. 39.

2 NY Times, 26 Sep 52, 12. The promise found fulfillment in the appointment of the Rockefeller

Committee, which, however, confined its attention to organizational matters, its report giving birth

to Reorganization Plan No. 6. alreadv described

3 Rpt, Task Force A of Project Solarium to NSC, 16 jut 53. CCS 381 US (1-31-50) BP pt 9 NSC

1622. paragraphs 10. 2«. and NSC 5501, paragraph 57.

4 See Secretary Wilson's remarks to the House Appropriations Committee on this subject on 24

February 1*»53. in H Hrgs, DOP Appropriation* for 1954, pp 17, 3«M0.

* Memo, )CS to SecDef, "The Future of the Military Services as a Career That Will Attract Capable

Personnel." 20 Feb S3. CCS 320 2 (5-1-45) sec 16

b PttWk Popen- Umbwr. 1953. p. 233

7 Universal Military training. Foundation of Lndurm$ National Strength. First Report to Congress by

the National Security Training Commtsson (Oct 1951), p. 36

H See appraisal of the effect* of the 1952 law by the Reserve Force» Polio* Board (an advisory body

Created bv that law) in it* report» tor 30 June 1953 and 30 June 1954, in Semiannual Reports of the

Secretary of t)efen*e, 1 fan 30 fun 53. pp t^-72. and 1 fan SO fun 54. pp. M-t*> On nonpartictpahon of

veteran», see remark* bv SecOef dunng FY l**55 budget hearing*, m H Hrg*. IMJD Appropriations for

1955. pp \m-l(»

** Fi-.ure* from Sem annual Rrrvrf of the Secretary of tMense, fan fun 54, pp «4, 333

!0 :'uNx Papery 'ismhower 1953. pp 514-515 New appointee» were Mr }uUu» Och* Adler

(Chairman*. Mr Warren Atherto«, an4 Ot Karl T Ct*mpton The two incumbent» w«re ITC»

Raymond S MtUm, ISA (Ret ) ami ADM Tboma* C Karuuud, USN (Ret )

11 The President» k-ner* to the Chairman, NSlC and the Dir, ODM, both dated 1 Augu»t 1VS3.

arc reproduced in NSTC. 20th cVwfwry MmuUfttrn A Report to the President on a Re*enx Font* Trailing

Program, I tW 53. arvj in ODM, Stanpoioer Rooutxe* fyr Htttßtti Stxunty. e> Jan "*4

12 NSTC. ?ink Centkiy Mmutemen

15 Statement of the \atiotv!Security training Commt»%ion to the hunt Chief» of Staff," 20Nov

Ö, CCS 3*1 US (5-23-46) »** 31 SMl«S0-53 to JCS. 24 Nov 53, *a«w foe. »ev 32

14 the study had rven Conducted b* a 'Committee on Manpower Re»««fve» loir National

Security, headed b> Mr Lawrentz A Appier. Pnrwdent of the American Managrtt'uent A»»**iat»m

1* 1*1>M. .\imt\*yr? Rrxtunci fat \*fjo*wi Saunt*

If See »umman i«f tetter Irom Pre» to l*t Flemnung.. I la« 54 in Rpt to ^eitV* In Ta*k Forte on

Reserve Mofcuuation Requirement» Mar 54. p 5 CCS 520 2 (Vl-45» BP pt 2

I? Mrm-. SreiVi to I«. >, 4 Feb 54. K5 1Ä4*UÖ. * Feb 54 tts 320 2 (M-4S) *rv 17

I* Memo. )CS to SntVt ''Proposed Studv on Re*erve Fuicr»." 5 Mar M Jt, S 184** HI, »ame hie

*rx IS The <ium»v e»pre»**om tmmedtaJrh caüabie re»ervr At*l "«eirt-ttveh callable re»erve"

were m>t «nginat with the HV they had been u*ed bv the tHrr\tor. ODM. tn hi» report to the

ftvaadtffM on fc )*rtuarv 1**S4

1<* R|M to Sr<Def K ta»k Fone w\ ifor*cfxv Mi4>tl«atK?n Rnjuirrfiient» Mar 54 CCS 130 2

15-1-15) »Ppt I

20 Mem» ASi>(l omptfoiie** u> ASl*M4sP). v o*i* ^ Re*r»v^ l*H>gttt\> Sei For'.h in Wcmmget

Rrpun." 23 SUt H. KS 1M%117. 10 Ap# 54, CCS ISO 2 {% I ***) »«^ I«

|| Mrmo Se*t>pf to K^ Re»rrve KtobOwat»^ Krqwemctii*. I* Mar H HS l*** U2 l^ Mai

54, tajBm hi* •<% Ifi

32 HS 1*4*113 |i Mat S4 *ame tue

23 CM ?254 to 14;N t*.it*tx£ et *t 22 Ma» H C C^ 320 2 (5-1-45) mm I*

m
Notes to Pages 168-173

i

s

24. CSAFM-65-54 to JCS, 23 Mar 54, same file.

25. Memo, CSA to JCS, "Reserve Mobilization Requirements," [24 Mar 54], same file.

26. JCS 1849/114, 29 Mar 54, same file.

27. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Reserve Mobilization Requirements,"9 Apr 54, JCS 1849/115, same

file.

28. SM-340-54 to MG Bryan L. Milburn et al, 15 Apr 54, JCS 1849/115, same file.

29. JCS 1849/117, 30 Apr 54, same file, sec 19.

30. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Reserve Mobilization Requirements,"6 May 54, JCS 1849/117, same

file. The Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed (as had the ad hoc committee) over proposals to allocate

non-prior-service personnel among the Services. The Air Force and Marine Corps endorsed the

Army view that this procedure should employ the same quality standards then in force for distribution of other inductees; the Navy objected that it would thus be forced to take too many men in the

lowest r.ental group. The Navy position was ultimately rejected.

31. I\SC 5420, 25 May 54, JCS 1849/119, 26 May 54, CCS 320.2 (5-1-45) sec 19.

32. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to NSC, "Reserve Mobilization Requirements,"2 Jun 54, JCS 1849/120,

4 Jun "A, same file. The NSTC also objected to the cumbersome terms "Service Callable Reserve" and

"Sele rtively Callable Reserve," and suggested that these categories be designated by the existing

terms, "Ready" and "Standby" Reserve. This suggestion was ultimately adopted in the administration's proposed legislation.

33. Memo, Dir, ODM to Spec Asst to the Pres, Robert Cutler, "Department of Defense Report on

Reserve Mobilization Requirements,"9 Jun 54, JCS 1849/122, 10 Jun 54, CCS 320.2 (5-1-45) sec 20.

34. In making this comment the JCS apparently were thinking ofa proposal by the Director of

Selective Service thata little-known provision in the Universal Military Training and Service Act,

allowing release of men from active duty if they volunteered for service in an organized reserve unit,

be employed to begin at oncea training program for non-prior-service personnel.

35. Memo, JCS to SecDef. Reserve Mobilization Requirements," 15 Jun 54, JCS 1849/121, CCS

320.2 (5-1-45) sec 20.

36. NSC Action No. 1161, 17 Jun 54

37. The reasoning on this point was not clearlv stated in NSC 5420/1, but was made explicit later in

NSC 542072.

38. NSC 5420/1, 26 Jul 54, CCS 320.2 (5-1-45) sec 21. The JCS decided that no comment on NSC

5420/1 was necessary'. (Memo, ExecSecv, JCS, to Secv JCS, 27 Jul 54, same file)

39. NSC Action No 1188. 29 Jul 54 '

40. NSC 5420/2, 20 Sep 54, JCS 1849/128, 20 Sep 54, CCS 320.2 (5-1-45) sec 21.

41. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Militarv Manpower Programs—Reserve Mobilization Requirements

(NSC 5420/2)."8 Oct 54, JCS 1849/132, same file, sec 23.

42. Memo. Dep ASD (MAP), to Secv. JCS, |20 Oct 54), CCS 320.2 (5-1-45) sec 23.

43 DM-64-54 to DepASD(M&P). 26 Oct 54. same file

44. Memo, ExecSev», NSC, to NSC PB, "Reserve Mobilization Requirements,"5 Nov 54; Memo,

SecDef to JCS, "Reserve Forces Program (NSC 54202 of November 4, 1^54)"9 Nov 54. JCS 1849/135,

9 Nov 54, %ame file.

45. AFPC Advice of Action. "Militarv Manpower Programs (NSC 54202)." 1Ü Nov 54, JCS 1849 138,

18 Nov 54, same file, sec 24

46 Memo, JCS to SecDef. "Reserve Forces Program (NSC 54202 of4 November 1954)." 12 Nov

54, JCS 1849 136, CCS 320.2 (5-1-45) sec 24

47 NSC 54203, 12 No« 54, JCS 184« 137. 12 Nov 54, same file NSC 54203 was ongmally regarded

asa summary interim statement p* idmga complete re.ision of NSC 5420/2 (which, however, was

never prepared) The Secretary of Intense on 22 December 1954 acknowledged the JCS comment*

on the4 November 1954 ver*»on of NSC 54202 and undertook to include some of their suggested

correction* in the next revision. He rejected the JCS view that equity should be subordinated to

nation«! secunty. however, pointing out that the NSC decision of 17 June 1954 had assigned equal

importance to the two factor* (N/H of JCS 1849/1V». 27 Dec 54, same file)

48. Memo, ActgSecDef to CJCS. Forces and Manning Level* for Fiscal Year 1956. 15 Mav 54. JCS

1849/118. 19 Mav 54, CO 3202 (5-1-45) set 19

49. Memo, JCS to SecDef. "Forces and Manning Levels for FT 1956," 19 Aug 54, JCS 184«* 125.

CCS 320.2 (5-1-45) sec 21 The reserve force proposals totaled 3.516.334 men. there was no indication

how many of these would be needed for initial mobilization requirement*,ie. for the Service

Callable Reserve.

50 Memo, SecDef to CJCS, "Fortes and Manning Level* for Fiscal Year 195ft." 17 Sep 54. JCS

1849 '.27. 20 Sep 54. CCS 3202 (5-11-45) sec 21

391 .
Notes to Pages 173-178

\

51. These figures (3,055,894 for the Service Callable Reserve 759,751 for the Selectively Callable

Reserve) appeared in the first draft of NSC 5420/2, prepared in September 1954.

52. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Minimum Service Callable Reserve' Force Mobilization Requirements,"

13 Oct 54, JCS 1849/133, CCS 320.2 (5-1-45) sec 23. The figures did not quite conform to the definition

of the Service Callable Reserve as forces to be available byD plus6 months, since 124,426 men of the

Army Reserve would be mobilized duringD plus7 months andD plus8 months, and 4,742 of the

Marine Corps Reserve betweenD plus6 andD plus 12 months. These minor discrepancies, however,

were ignored. The Army planned to mobilize 37 divisions, 18 regiments, 143 AA battalions, and 158

FA battalions; the Air Force would call up 51 major combat wings. Navy and Marine Corps reservists

would be called as individuals.

53. The JCS had made no recommendations concerning the Selectively Callable Reserve. For this

category, NSC 5420/2 repeated the earlier estimate of 759,751 (excluding the Coast Guard). NSC

5420/3 contained no strength estimates for this component.

54. The figures were subsequently reduced slightly toa total of approximately 2,910,000 (excluding

the Coast Guard), as tht result ofa reduction of the Navy goal to 623,000, which was only partly

offset by increases in the Marine Corps and Air Force. The estimated FY 1956 beginning strength

presumably represented the expected strength of iHe existing "Ready Reserve" after it had been

screened to eliminate those not available for prompt recall The nominal strength of this component,

which had stood at 2,096,033 as of 30 June 1953, increasnd to 2,211,541 on 30 June 1954 and to

2,705,359a year later. Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense,1 Jan-30 }un 55, pp. 68-69.

55. Draft for presentation of NSC 5420/3 by Mr. Burgess and others, 15 Nov 54, JCS PB Adv File,

NSC 5420—Reserve Mobilization Requirements. NSC Action No. 1269, 15 Nov 54.

56. Memo, COL B. H. Rowden, USAF (JLPG) to CAPT Joseph W. Callahan, USN, "Reserve

MobUization Requirements Program,"7 Dec 54, CCS 320.2 (5-1-45) sec 24.

57. The text of the legislation proposed to Congress is printed in H. Hrgs, Sundry Legislation, 1955,

pp. 1244-1250.

58. Army-Navu-Air Force Journal, 25 Dec 54, p. 498.

59. Public Papers, Eiscnhouvr, 1955, pp. 72-84.

60. H. Hrgs, Sundry Legislation. 1955, pp. 1278-1280, 1299-1300, 1328-1330, 135" !358.

61. The final law was PL 305, 84th Cong,9 Aug 55. President Eisenhower signed it, but at the

same time criticized it and indicated his intention to ask prompt amendment to remedy the two

deficiencies. See NY Times, 10 Aug 55, 1. For the DOD position, see Semiannual Report of the Secretary

of Defense.1 }an-M) fun 55, pp. 21-22 The provision of major interest to most members of the

JCS—quota control by the Secretary of Defense over Reserve enlistees—was included in the law.

62. By early 1955 the reduction of Army strength had left that Service dependent upon its Reserves

to meet its wartime commitment to NATO (17 divisions byD plus six months). (Memo, JCS to SecDef,

"Command and Organizational Structure of U.S. Forces; Forces and Manning Levels," 18 Mar 55,

JCS 1800/237, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 51.)

Chapter 8. Missions and Weapons

1. The-»*.' phrase* appeared in the "Declaration of Policy" (Section 2) of the Act (PL 253, 80th Cong,

2b Jui 47) and in the 194

1

* Amendments (PL 216, 8lst Cong, 10 Aug 49)

2. The Key West Agreement may be found In JCS 1478/23, 26 Apr 48, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 8, and

in venous unclassified sources. 3 For example» of such complaint» (uttered during 1948, in connection with the budget for FY

1950), see Schilling, The Politics ot National Defense: Fiscal 1950." pp. 107-U4.

4. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 447 5 PuNu Papers. Ewnkewtr, 1953, p. 17. 6 NSC 1492. 29 Apr 53. CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 25 7 D.scussed more tully in Ch. 1. 8 Report cf (he Rockefeller Committee on Dejvrtment of Men* Organistton, 11 Apr 53 Pnnted for use

of the5 Com on Armed Services, 83d Cong, 1st sets (1953)

9. Memo. ADM Radford. GEN Ridgway, ADM Carney, and GEN Twining to SecDef.8 Aug 53,

OCJCS File. New Look Documents

10 Reorganization Plan No6 removed the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the command line, which

would now run trom the Secretary ot Defense through the Service Secretaries to the unified arJ

specified commands. Service Departments designated by the Secretary of Defense, rathe than

military Cruets named by the Joint Chiefs ot Staff, would henceforth serve as executive agents for

392
MKntngautÄiiM

Notes to Pages 179-183

these commands. Revision of the Key West Agreement to reflect these provisions of Reorganization

Plan No. 6 had begun under the old Chiefs, who had appointed a committee of four officers to work

with the Secretary of Defense in this task. (Memo, Actg SecDef to JCS, "Revision of the Key West

Agreement," 2 Jul 53, JCS 1977/17, 8 Jul 53; SM-1285-53 to SecDef, 3 Jul 53; CCS 337 (4-2-49).)

11. JCS 1478/44, 29 Aug 53, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 42. The Service mission questions arising from

ihe Korean War had not yet reached the JCS agenda. They are treated in volume VI of this series, The

Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1955-1956.

12. N/H of JCS 1478/44, 3 Sep 53, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 42. GEN Twining was the only JCS member

to place on record his view of GEN Ridgway's proposal; he believed that the Key West Agreement

was a "sound, workable document" requiring no change. (CSAFM-22-53 to JCS, 1 Sep 53, same file.)

13. CM-21-53 to GEN Twining et a/., 27 Aug 53; Memos, JCS to SecDef, "Reorganization Plan No.

6— Revision of the Key West Agreement," 3 and 17 Sep 53, ends to JCS 1478/45, 18 Sep 53; CCS 337

(4-2-49). "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," 1 Oct 53, and "Changes

Made in Key West Agreement by October 1, 1953, Revision," JCS 1478/48, 21 Jan 54, CCS 370

(8-19-45) sec 44. Later published as DOD Directive 5100.1, 16 Mar 54, same file, sec 45.

14. Semiannual Reports of the Secretary of Defense, 1 Jan-30 fun 54, p. 4; 1 Jan-30 jun 55, pp. 5-6.

15. The relevant passages, in both the 1948 Agreement and the 1953 revision, are Sec IV, paragraphs,

Al, A2, and A6 (Army), and Sec VI, paragraphs, A5 and A7 (Air Force).

16. JCS 1620/12, 17 Nov 49, CCS 334 Guided Missiles Cmte (1-16-45) sec 3.

17. JCS 1620/42, 30 Oct 51; JCS 1620/44, 13 Nov 51; same file, sec 7.

18. JCS 1620/46, 5 Dec 51, same file, BP pt 2.

19. Memo, DepSecDef to JCS, "Army Procurement of Regulus Guided Missiles and Auxiliary

Equipments," 19 Jan 53, JCS 1620/71, 23 Jan 53; JCS 1620/72, 28 Apr 53; CCS 334 Guided Missiles

Cmte (1-16-45) sec 10. A subsidiary disagreement concerned the status and capability of Regulus as

compared with Matador, the Air Force's tactical SSM that was also under development. The Army

and Navy members of GMIORG contended that Regulus was better, cheaper, and in a more advanced

state of development. The Air Force member denied these assertions, though he maintained that

they were irrelevant to the principal issues, which was that of Service responsibility for the missions

involved.

20. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Army Procurement of Regulus Guided Missiles and Auxiliary

Equipments," 3 Jun 53, Dec On JCS 1620/72, CCS 334 Guided Missiles Cmte (1-16-45) sec 10.

21. Mr. Keller held the position of Director of Guided Missiles in the Office of the Secretary of

Defense. The position was abolished on 12 November 1953, as part of a reorganization in which

authority to approve missile programs was J.ek-gated to the Secretaries of the Military Departments.

(Memo, SecDef to SecA, SecN. and SecAF, "Administration of Guided Missile Programs," 12 Nov

53, JCS 1620/82, 15 Dec 53, same hi«?.)

22. Memo, Director of Guided Missiles (K. T. Keller) to SecDef, "Army Procurement of Regulus

Guided Missiles and Auxiliary Equipments." 26 Jun 53, JCS 1620/78, 19 Aug 53; Memo, JCS to

SecDef, same subj, 18 Sep 53, JCS 162079; same file.

23 JCS 1620/73, 19 May 53, CCS 334 Guided Missiles Cmte (1-16-45) BP pi 2.

24. For the decision at this 9 June 1953 meeting, see Memo, DJS to CJCS, "Guided Missiles," 17

Jun 53 (summarizing the meeting for GEN Bradley, who was evidently not present) CCS 334 Guided

Missiles Cmte (1-16-45) sec 10, and JCS 162077,' 6 Aug 53, same file, sec 11. ADM Fechteler had

already placed his views on record; he upheld the position taken by Ihe Navy member of the

GMIORG and recommended that the JCS «ppmve all the Service pmgrams, for planning purposes,

as the best estimates then available (JCS 1620/74. 29 May 53, and Memo, CNO to JCS. "JCS 162074;

Suggested Revisions to." V Jun 53, Ser ÜU025P51. same file, sec 10.)

25 JCS 162075. 22 Jun 53. samv file

26. )CS 162076. 22 Jul 53. saim file, sec 11

27. JCS Hist Div, "Chronology of Significant Events and Decisions Relating to the U.S. Missile

and Earth Satellite Development Program», May 1942 Through October 1957." 22 Nov 57. p 30

(hereafter cited a» "Chronology, Missile and Satellite Programs"). A reference to this AFPC meeting

is made in AFPC Advice of Action. "Guided Missiles," 29 Jan 54, OCJCS File 471 (Guided Missiles)

(1954).

28. "Chronology. Missile and Satellite Programs." p. 34 (citing the Study Group report from DOD

sources; no copy has been found in )CS records). The Study Group did not consider long-range

missiles, but established for this purpose a separate Strategic Missiles Evaluation Committee, headed

by the well-known mathematician. Dr. John Von Neumann. This group reviewed the three longrange missile programs then under way in the Air Force (Snark and Navaho, both of the "pilotless

aircraft" type, and Atlas, a truly ballistic missile). It recommended that all phases of the Atlas

program be centralized under the direction of a single development group and be accelerated with

393
Notes to Pages 183-188

the objective of providing an operational long-range missile within six to eight years. ("Recommendations of the Strategic Missiles Evaluation Committee," 10 Feb 54, RW008-4, end to Memo,

ASD(R&D) to CJCS, "Report Entitled Recommendations . . . ," 10 Mar 54, OCJCS File 471 (Guided

Missiles) (1954) (summarized in "Chronology, Missile and Satellite Programs," pp. 34-35). These

proposals led to the establishment of the Western Development Division of the Air Research and

Development Command on 1 July 1954, and ultimately to the successful production of Atlas, the first

US intercontinental ballistic missile. See Ernest G. Schwiebert, A History of the U. S. Air Force Ballistic

Missiles (19v-4, 19(6), especially pp. 71-73, 75-76, 78 If.

29. AFPC Ad'ice of Action, "Guided Missiles," 29 Jan 54, OCJCS File 471 (Guided Missiles)

(1954).

30. Memo, ASD(R&D) to CJCS, 18 Feb 54, JCS 1620/85, 5 Mar 54, CCS 334 Guided Missiles Cmte

(1-16-45) sec 11.

31. CM-61-54 to ASD(R&D), 24 Feb 54, JCS 1620/85, 5 Mar 54, same file.

32. Memo, ASD(R&D) to CJCS, "Research and Development vs. Roles and Missions," 16 Apr 54,

JCS 1620/86, 27 Apr 54, same file.

33. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Research and Development vs. Roles and Missions," 25 Jun 54, Dec

On JCS 1620/89, ss.ne file, sec 12.

34. CM-96-54 to GEN Twining et al., 7 Jun 54, CCS 334 Guided Missiles Cmte (1-16-45) sec 12.

35. SM-593-54 to MG Samuel R. Brentnall, USAF, MG Harry McK. Roper, USA, and RADM John

H. Sides, USN, 28 Jun 54, JCS 1620/90, 28 Jun 54, same tile.

36. JCS 1620/91, 26 Jul 54, same file.

37. The course of the JCS consideration mav be traced through the following documents: SM-737-54

to JCS, 19 Aug 54 SM-742-54 to Ad Hoc Com, 21 Aug 54; JCS 1620/94, 2

r Aug 54; CCS 334 Guided

Missiles Cmte (1-.6-45) sec 12.

38. JCS 1620/95. 30 Aug 54, same file.

39. Memo, JCS to SecDef. "Assignment of Responsibilities for Guided Missiles," 9 Sep 54, JCS

1620/95; N/H of JCS 1620/95, 18 Nov 54; same file.

40. The absence of missiles with a medium range (i. e., up to 3,500 miles) had been noted by the

Strategic Missiles Evaluation Committee, which had recommended that the Air Force develop such a

project. "Chronology, Missile and Satellite Programs," p. 35.

41. Memo, ASD(R&D) to SecA et al., "U.S.-U.K. Discussions on Closer Technical Cooperation—

Guided Missiles and Associated Electronics," 10 Jun 54. and "Memorandum of Discussions on

Closer Cooperation between the United States and Great Britain in Regard to Guided Missiles and

Associated Electronics," 12 Jun 54, JCS 927/182, 6 Jul 54, CCS 350.05 (3-16-44) sec 36. Memo, JCS to

SecDef, "US.-U.K.. Discussions on Closer Techn'cal Cooperation—Guided Missiles and Associated

Electronics," 28 |ul 54, JCS 927/183; Memo, ASD(RAD) to SecA et al.. "Memorandum of Discussions

Between the United States Secretary of Defense and the British Minister of Supply, in Washington,

June 9th-12th 1954," 3 Aug 54, JCS 927189. 9 Aug 54, same file, sec 37. Memo, ASD(R&D) to SecA et

al., "Memorandum of Discussions . . . in Washington, Jure9th-12th 1954," 17 Aug 54. JCS927/195,

30 Aug 54, same file, sec 38.

42 Memo, ASDfR&D) to CJCS. "Roles and Missions—Ballistic Missiles," 12 Aug 54, JCS 1620/93.

23 Aug 54, CCS 334 Guided Missile« Cmte (1-16-45) sec 12. Mr Quarles's memo implied more

contusion than actually existed in the five projects that he cifed Corporal and Redstone (both Army

missiles) had raises of only 75 and 150 miles respectively, while the other three were Air Force

weapons with "intercontinental" ranges

43 JCS 1620 101, 29 Nov 54, CCS 334 Guided Missiles Cmte (1-16-45) set 13

44 Memo, JCS to SecDef. "Roles and Missions—Ballistic Missiles," 10 Dec 54. Dei On JCS 1620/101.

same file

Chapter 9. Disarmament and Atoms for Peace

l NSC 112, 6 Jul 51, JCS PB Adv File» For a summary ot the arms-cuntrol debate after World War

II and of the role of the JCS therein, see JCS Hi»! Dtv. "Extended Chronology of Significant fcvents

Relating to Disarmament" (Revised Version). 18 )an 60, pp 116 (hereafter cited a* "Disarmament

Chronology").

?. "Disarmament Chronology," pp 14-16 Memo. USeeStale to ExecSeev. NSC, "Second Progress

Report on NSC 112 ." 1«* Jan 53. CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 42. Richard P. Slebbms. The Untied State* m

World Attain. 19Ü2 (1953). pp 3139. 2*tÜ-283. 331-332

3. NSC Action No. 717. IN Feb 53

4 NSC Action No 734. il Mar 53

394

.
Ai

Notes to Pages 188-194

5. Text of the President's speech in Public Papers, Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 179-188. For the reaction in

Moscow and elsewhere, see Stebbins, United States in World Affairs, 7953, pp. 130-132. There is no

evidence that the speech was submitted to the JCS for review.

6. Rpt of Panel of Consultants on Disarmame it, Dept of State, "Armaments and American Policy,

1953/' Jan 53, JCS 1731/74,5 Mar 53, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 43. Part of the Panel's conclusions were

repeated in an article by Dr. Oppenheimer, "Atomic Weapons and American Policy," Foreign Affairs,

(Jul 53), pp. 525-535. See also Gertrude Samuels, "A Plea for 'Candor' ü'oout the Atom," NY Times

Magazine, 21 Jun 53, pp.8 ff. (reporting an interview with Dr. Oppenheimer).

7. NSC Action No. 725, 25 Feb 53.

8. NSC 151,8 May 53, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 43.

9. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "NSC 151, Armaments and American Policy," 22 May 53, JCS 1731/75,

same file.

10. NSC Action No. 799, 27 May 53.

11. Memo, ASD(ISA) to JCS, "NSC 151, Armaments and American Policy,"4 Jan 53; SM-1125-53

to GEN Luedecke,4 Jun 53; Memo. Chief AFSWP to DJS, "Summary of Action to Date Regarding

Recommendation1 of NSC 151 (the Policy of 'Candor')," 17 Aug 53; CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 44.

12. Memo, Chm, PSE to NSC, 23 Jul 53, end to Memo by ExecSecy, NSC, to NSC, "Armaments

and American Policy," 28 Jul 53, same file. NSC Action No. 869, 30 Jul 53.

13. Memo, ASD(ISA) to JCS, "Draft Presidential Speech on Atomic Energy,"3 Sep 53, JCS 1731/79,8

Sep 53, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 44.

14. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Draft Presidential Speech on Atomic Energy," 16 Sep 53, JCS 1731/81;

N/H of JCS 1731/81,5 Nov 53; same file, sec 45.

15. Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside Story, pp. 185-186; Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 252.

Both sources make it clear that the idea originated with the President himself.

16. Memo, ActgSecDef to JCS, "Armaments and American Pol cy," 1.' il 53. JCS 1731/77,2 Jul 53,

CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 44.

17. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Armaments and American Policy," i> Jul 53, JCS 173178, same file.

18. NSC 151/1, 23 Nov 53, JCS PB Adv File, "NSC151 —ArmamenS and American Policy."

19. NSC Action No. 974,3 Dec 53. NSC 151/2,4 Dec 53. JCS PB Adv File. "NSC 151—Armaments

and American Policy."

20. PL 703, 83d Cong, 30 Aug 54.

21. Yearbook of the United Nations. 1953 (1954), pp. 261-262.

22. Memo. ASD(1SA) to USecA, USecN. and USecAF, "Disarmament Policy Development,"1 Sep

53, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 44

23. NSC 1121.1 Sep 53, same file.

24 NSC Action No*. 899-a. 899-b.¥ Sep 53

25. Dept of State Bulletin, (28 Sep 53), pp 403-408. The substance of Mr. Dulles's speech had been

approved in advance by the Council; NSC Action No 9W, 17 Sep 53.

26. Stebbins. Unit«/ States in World Affairs. 1953. pp 401-404; Dept ot State Bulletin, (14 Dec 53),

pp 829-838.

27. Yearbook of the United Nation*. 1954 (1<*55), p. 10

28 Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Defense Representation at Disarmament Conference," 2^ Apr 54. and

Memo. JCS to SecDef. same subj.3 May 54, ends to JCS 1731**, 13 May 54; Memo, SecDef to JCS.

same *ubj. 11 May 54; CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 47

29. Memo, DepSecDet to JCS, "Request for Comments on Disarmament Polio- Paper," 12 Apr 54.

and DAC D-9 3, Relationship Between Principal Aspects ofa Comprehensive Program tor Regulation.

Limitation, and Balanced Reduction ot All Armed Forces and Armaments," 23 Dec 53. JCS 1731V2,

16 Apr 54, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 47.

30. Memo. ASD(ISA) to JCS, "Request tor Comments on Disarmament Policy Paper, lb Apr 54,

and DAC D-3d, "Methods of Implementing and Enforcing the Disarmament Programme ," 13

Apr 54. JCS 173193. 19 Apr 54. same file

31 Extracts from Mr. Nehru* speech ot2 April 1954, and the letter from India's UN Representative to the Secretary-General dated 8 April 1V54, are printed in th***mummt ami Setunfit. A Cotlti-tum

of CkrumtnH, 191955, 5. Com on Foreign Relations. 84th Cong, 2d »ess. pp 24*-249

32 Memo. SecDef to JCS. 'Request for Recommendation* on* Proposal fora Moratonum on

Future Testing of Nudear Weapons, 16 Apr 54, JCS 1731*4, 20 Apr 54, CCS 092 (4 14-45) sec 47

33. Memo, JCS to SecDef. "A Proposal fora Moratonum on Future Testing *»< Nudear Weapons,"

XI Apr 54. JCS 1731'97. same tile

34 Memo. }CS to SecDef, "Methods of Implementing and Enforcing the Disarmament Programme (DAC D-3d)," 3 May 54, JCS 1731"%; Memo. JCS to SecDef. Relationship Between Principal Aspect* of a Comprehensive Program tor Regulation. Limitation, and Balanced Reduction of all

395

Jii

■■

RstffttifrMamMVfllMpsiMIWVMWHI mew!m*:E

imm&*-
rAA

Notes to Pages 195-199

Armed Forces and Armaments (DAC D-9/3),"3 May 54, JCS 1731/97; CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 47. The

quoted oassage occurs in both documents.

35. JCS 2101/136,9 Jun 54, and Dec On, 23 Jun 54, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 39. Memo, JCS to

SecDef, "Negotiations with the Soviet Bloc," 23 Jun 54, JCS 2101/136, same file, sec 41. This memo

has been quoted in Chapter 2, and is discussed again later in this chapter.

36. NSC Action No. 1106,6 May 54.

37. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "A Proposal fora Moratorium on Future Testing of Nuclear Weapons,"

10 May 54, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 47.

38. N/H of JCS 1731/98, 21 May 54, same file.

39. NSC Action No. 1162, 23 Jun 54.

40. On the meeting of the Subcommittee, see Stebbins, United States in World Affairs, 1954, pp.

418-421, and Dept of State Publication 5581, The Record on Disarmament: Report of U.S. Deputy Representative to Disarmament Commission on London Meeting of Subcommittee of Five and on Disarmament Commission Meeting—July 1954 (1954). The US working paper on an international control organ (nearly

identical with the one submitted to the JCS for comment) and the Anglo-French proposal on phasing

and timing ofa disarmament program are printed in Disarmament and Security,A Collection of Documents,

1919-55, pp. 325-333. Excerpts from these and from the Subcommittee's report are printed in Peter V.

Curl, ed.. Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954 (1955), pp. 449-459.

41. On the 1954 General Assembly session, see Stebbins, United States in World Affairs, 1954, pp.

424-425, and Curl, Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954. pp. 459-462 (texts of draft Soviet

resolution and of the one adopted bv the Assembly, with unanimous backing of the great powers, on 4 November 1954).

42. JCS 1731/86, 15 Jan 54, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 46. An earlier draft was already under study

following referral bv Memo, ASD(1SA) to JCS, "Implementation of the President's December 8th

Speech," 30 Dec 53," JCS 1731/84. 31 Dec 53, same fUe, sec 45.

43. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "A Suggested Basis for ..the President's Proposal, 'Atomic Power for

Peace," 20 Jan 54, JCS 1731/88; N/H of JCS 1731/88,4 Feb 54; same file, sec 46.

44. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "International Atomic Energy Agency," 18 Feb 54, JCS 1731/89. 19 Feb

54; Memo. JCS to SecDef. same subj. 26 Feb 54, JCS 1731/90; N/H of JCS 1731/90, 12 Mar 54; CCS 092

(4-14-45) sec 47. This version, further amended in the light of comments from Canada and the United

Kingdom, was submitted to the Soviet Union on 19 March 1954. (Memo, ASD(ISA) to JCS,

"International Atomic Energy Agency," 23 Mar 54, JCS 1731/91, 29 Mar 54, same file)

45. See US-Soviet diplomatic correspondence on this subject, Jan-Jul 54, reprinted in Dept of State

Bulletin, (4 Oct 54). pp 478-486

46 NSC Action No 1202. 12 Aug 54 NSC 5431/1. 13 Aug 54, JCS PB Adv Files

47 Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Cooperation with Other Nations in the Peaceful Use» of Atomic

Energy—NSC 5431." 10 Aug 54, filed with NSC 54311 in JCS PB Adv FUe».

46 Stebbins, United States in World Attain. 1954. pp. 421-423, 425-431. Dept of State Bulletin*,4 Oct

54, pp. 486-489, 15 Nov 54, pp 733-734. 742-750; 29 Nov 54, pp 828-836, 13 Dec 54. pp. 918-921.

49 NSC Action No 899-c.9 Sep 53

50 NSC 1622. pars 14c. 42b.

51 NSC 5422. 14 Jun 54, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 40 The disputed paragraphs were No 13 in one

version. No 10 in the other

52 Memo for Record. PaulM Kearnev. Negotiation* within |swj the Soviet Bloc." 25 Jun 54.

CCS 381 US (1-31-50)«* 41

53. NSC 5422/2 (par 8),7 Aug 54. *ame tile, sec 44

54 NSC 5440 (par 47), 13 Dec 54. same file. *ec 48

55 NSC 5501 (par 49).7 Jan 35. same file. MC 5?

56A summary of the respective positions of the State and Defense Departments, as th**y had

emerged bv the end of 1954 in Planning Board discuss» ms, was virculated bv Memo, A<tg fc*ecS*vv.

NSC, to NSC. "U S. Policy on Control of Armanvnts." 10 Dec 54. JCS 1731 109. 15 Dec 54. CO. mi

(4*14-45) sec 49. For an earlier »tage in the evolution of the rvtense view, see Memo. Asst to SecDef

(Atomic Energy) to EsecSecy. NSC, "Synopsis of Oepartm?nt of DeJens**» Working Group Review

of NSC 112,

M 24 Nov 54. encl to Memo. Efttdtecy, NSC to NSC PB. 'Regulation. Limitation And

Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armament*," 26 Nov 54, same fib?

57 The final positions of Defense and State, a* »et »arthm draft menu»* for NSC" dated 25 January

*nd7 February 1955 rrspectjvelv. appear a* attachment* to Memo, A**t to SrtOrf tAHwtc Energy)

to SecA et *1 . "Review of NSC 112. 25 Frb 55. »am* hie. set 50

58 NSC Action No 1328, 10 Fe* 55

59NV Ttnm 20 MM 55,1

\

3*96
*

'

Notes to Pages 201-210

Chapter 10. Military Assistance

1. A convenient summary of the evolution of the US military assistance program can be found in

Harold A. Hovey, United States Military Assistance: A Study of Practices (1965), pp. 3-10.

2. These two laws were PL 329, 81st Cong, 6 Oct 49, and PL 165, 82d Cong, 10 Oct 51. Besides

grant military aid, Congress also authorized contracts for the sale of military equipment to nations

able to pay for it. The amount of such reimbursable aid was small during 1953-54, and the subject has

been disregarded in this chapter.

3. Reorganization Plan No. 7, 1 Jun 53, and executive Order 10458, same date, CCS 092 (8-22-46)

sec 91. Executive Order 1J476, 1 Aug 53, same file, sec 94. Public Papers, Eisenhcnver, 1953, pp.

342-354.

4. See Ch. 16

5. See Ch. 12.

6. See Ch. 13.

7. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "MDA Program for Fiscal Year 1954/' 30 Oct 52. JCS 2099/242, CCS 092

(8-22-46) sec 83.

8. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "MDA Program for Fiscal Year 1954," 26 Nov 52, JCS 2099/259, 2 Dec 52,

same file, sec 84.

9. Budget of the US, FY 1954, p. M19.

10. Memo, ActgSecDef to JCS, "Mutual Defense Assistance Program tor Fiscal Year 1954," 24 Jan

53, JCS 2099/267, 28 Jan 53, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 85.

11. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Mutual Defense Assistance Program for Fiscal Year 1954," 17 Feb 53,

JCS 2099/269, same file, sec 86.

12. Memo, ExecSecv, NSC, to NSC, "Cost of National Security Programs," 24 Feb 53, CCS 381 US

(1-31-50) sec 24.

13. Memo, ExecSecv, NSC, to NSC, "Budget Considerations Bearing on the NSC Review of Basic

National Security Policies." 5 Mar 53. CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 40. NSC Action No. 730. 4 Mar 53.

14. Memo. DepS*»cDei to JCS, "Proposed Expenditure Limitations, Mutual Security Program," 10

Mar 53, JCS 2099/273, 11 Mar 53, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 86.

15. Memo, JCS to SecDef. "Proposed Expenditure Limitations, Mutual Security Program," 19 Mar

53, JCS 2099/274, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 87 Memo. ExecSecv, NSC, to NSC. "Review of Basic

National Security Policies: The Mutual Security' Program." 24 Mar 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 25

16. Memo, Dir for Mutual Security to NSC, "Review of Natton.il Security Policies—Report of the

Director for Mutual Security Pursuant to NSC Actun 730-c," 17 Mar 53. CCS 381 (1-31-50). BP pt 8.

NSC Action No. 747, 18 Mar 53.

17 NSC Action No. 752. 25 Mar 53

18. NSC 149/2. 29 Apr 53. CCS 381 US (1-31-50) see 25.

W. Memo, ActgSecDef to JCS, "Program Guidance. Mutual Defense Assistance l*rogram. Ft

1954," 29 Apr 53. JCS 2099/284, 29 Apr 53, CCS 092 (8-22-46) »ec 89

20. Memo, JCS to SecDef. Program Guidance. Mutual Defense Assistance Program. FY 1954/ 1

May 53, JCS 2099/285. same tile See Table 14

21. The Elsenhower administration'» revised FY 1954 mutual security pn>gram as presented to

Congres* t* tabulated in Hearings. Mutual Security Act %i 1953, S Com on Foreign Relations, 83d

Cong, 1st se*s. pp 33-35 For explanation of the significance of some of the item*, see testimony of

Mr Stassen in Hearing» on H R 5710, Mutual Snunry Art l.it<n*»?tt. H Com on Foreign Alfairs. 83d

Cong, 1st *e*a, pp 150*151

22 PwW* Paper*. Ittrnhewr. 1953, pp 256-259

23 The two piece« of legislation involved in this Congressional MUOU were the Mutual Security

Act o» 1953 (PL 118. 834 Cong, 16 Jut 53). and the Mutual Secunty Appropriation» Act. 1954 (PI. 2}s

&3d Cong, 7 Aug 53) The amount* listed are as given in the latter Act

24 Memo. ASDftSA) to ICS. Mutual Defense Assistance Program tur FY 1954." 7 Aug 53, JCS

2099,305. 10 Aug 53, CCS 092 (8-22.46) «fc 94

25 See Ch 13

26 Memo JCS to SecDef. "Mutual Defense Assistance Program tor FY 1954 13 Aug W JCS

2fl**307. CCS 092 (8-22-46) see 95

27 Memo. ActgSecDef to JCS. T¥ 1955 Mutual Assistance Program 20 Aw *3, JCS 209*282. 24

Apr 53. same Hie. sei 89

2» See Ch 15

29 Memo, JCS to SecDef. MDA Programming Guidance tin FY 19*5/ 8 Jul 53. JC5 20*rjfl£)r

CCS 092 (8-2246) sec 93

39?

mmmm
h

Notes to Pages 210-216

30. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "MDA Program Guidance for FY 1955," 5 Aug 53, JCS 2099/304, 7 Aug

53, same We, sec 94.

31. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "MDA Programming Guidance for FY 1955," 7 Dec 53, JCS 2099/335, 10

Dec 53, same file, sec 101. Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 20 Jan 54, JCS 2099/347, same file, sec 103.

32. NSC Action No. 930, 13 Oct 53; discussed more fully in Ch. 1. The amount of the FY 1955

MDAP estimate is not indicated in available records. A preliminary estimate of $4.77 billion (whether

new obligational authority or expenditures is not clear) is mentioned in JCS 2099/350, 29 Jan 54, CCS

092 (8-22-46) sec 104. It is not certain, however, that this was the one presented to the NSC on 13

October 1953.

33. NSC Action No. 945-c, 29 Oct 53.

34. Memo, Dir, FOA, to ASD(ISA) et a!., "FY 1955 Mutual Security Program—Guidelines and

Assumptions for Preparation of the Program to be Submitted to the Congress," 11 Jan 54, CCS 092

(8-22-46) sec 102.

35. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Mutual Defense Assistance Program for Fiscal Year 1955," 26 Jan 54,

JCS 2099/350, 29 Jan 54, same file, sec 104.

36. The policy considerations underlying these additions to the Latin American program are

discusseu in Ch. 16.

37. Memo, JCS to SecDef. "Mutual Defense Assistance Program for Fiscal Year 1955," 5 Mar 54,

JCS 2099/359, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 108.

38. Public Papers, Eisenhower, 1954, pp. 120-121. 136.

39. Hearings, Mutual Security Act of 1954. H. Com on Foreign Affairs, 83d Cong, 2d sess, pp. 27-41

(U.R. 9678). For reconciliation of the amounts given in H.R. 9678 with the figure of SI,580 million

mentioned in the hearings as the total for the MDAP. see Hearings. Mutual Seiunty Act of 1954, S

Com on Foreign Relations, 83d Cong, 2d sess, p. 180.

43. Public Papers, Eisenhouvr. 1954. pp 590-594.

41. The Mutual Security Act of 1954, PL 665. 83d Cong, 26 Aug 54. The Mutual Security Appropriation* Act of 1955, PL 778'. 83d Cong, 3 Sep 54

42 Thu was the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1955 (PL 663. 83d Cong, 26 Aug 54). The

relevant portion was Section 1311.

43 Memo. Dep ASD(ISA) to JCS, "FY 1955 MDA Materiel and Training Programs." 22 Oct 54. JCS

2099'428. 28 Oct 54. CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 122

44. NSC 162Z 30 Oct 53. CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 31

45. JCS 2101/113, 10 Dec 53. same file, sec 32

46 An earlier draft of the paper contained a more extensive analysis of prospective MDA fund*

<ind made dear that the estimate* with JCS 2101 113 did not include the cost of equipping Japanese or

Korean Force* |CS 2101 111. 30 Nov 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) see 32. BP pt 10.

47 SM-1954-53 to MC Paul D Adam*. USA. RADM Victor D Long. USN. and BC John J. OTiara.

USAF. 24 Dec 33, CCS 092 {8-22-46) set 102 A Manne Corp* member (BG Thoma» A Womham) was

added later Those appointed were, in fact, the *emor Service member* of another committee that

had been in existence tor several year», though »till referred to a* the Ad Hoc Committee on

Program* for Military Assistance

48 SM-136-34 to MG Paul D Adam* et «f., U Feb 54, CCS 092 (»• 22-46) «c 105

49 JCS 209*36*. 26 Mar 54, CCS 092 (S-22-46) BP pt 19

30 JCS 2099 376. 12 May 54. SM 44954 to MG Paul D Adam» et d 12 May 54; same für, sec 111

51 JCS 2099 382. * Jun 54. same Hie. «e 113 Corrig to JCS 2099 368 j l )un 54. At^ 3d Comg to

JC* 209*3«.. 14 Jan 54, **me file. Sp pt 19

52 Dec On JCS 20993*8, 17 jun 54. CCS 092 (8-22*46) BP pt 19 Memo. JCS to SeeÜel, "MDA

Program* tor FY 1955-195« VVh*h Will Support U S M^ury Strategy." 17 Ju« 54, K$ 2099^68.

*ame file. *ec 114

3.1 Memo, JCS to SecDef. 'MDA Programming Guidance tor FY 1956/ 19 May 54. JCS 209*274,

CCS 0*2 (S-22-46) *** 112 Memo, SecDef to JCS, same *ub). 15 Ju! 54. JCS 20*KK», 21 J«l 54. wme

file, sec Il6

54 Mr Sta**m presented budget estimate» for the FY J956 mutual »ecurtty program to the

\4funi4i Security Council early in December (NSC Action No S2süc. 3 Dec 54) The «mount* are not

indicated, but thev wrrr probably clc*»e to. or perhap» tdrftbcai with, thoaw presented to C ongre**

the following month

55 P*Nk Nprr*. it*e*th>#i*r. 195:». p 123

56 NSC Action No 1029-«. 4 Feb 54

57 Memo AetgSecOei hi JCS and ASDtlSA). A Heubie Program ol Providing U S Military

Aw»tatue to Foreign Nation* (NSC Action No t029<), 1 Mat 54. JCS 2PW*5, 8 Mar 54. CCS 092

18-22-46) *e< 1ÜS

398

MMMMMMPMMM
Notes to Pages 217-225

t

58. Memo, Actg ExecSecy, NSC, to NSC, "Foreign Military Assistance," 30 Aug 54. JCS 2099/415,

2 Sep 54, same file, sec 118.

59. Executive Order 10575,6 Nov 54.

60. Memo, ASD(1SA) to JCS, "A Flexible Program of Providing U. S. Military Assistance to Foreign Nations (NSC Action No. 1029-c)," 8 Jun 54, JCS 2099/382, 9 Jun 54, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 113.

61. 3d Corrg to JCS 2099/368, 14 Jun 54, same file, BP pt 19.

62. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "MDA Programs for FY 1955-1958 Which Will Support U. S. Military

Strategy," 17 Jun 54, JCS 2099/368, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 114.

63. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "MDA Programming Guidance for FY 1956," 19 May 54, JCS 2099/274,

same file, sec 112.

64. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "MDA Programming Guidance for FY 1956," 15 Jul 54, JCS 2099/398, 21

Jul 54, same file, sec 116.

65. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Flexible MDA Program," 28 Jul 54, JCS 2099/400, 29 Jul 54, CCS 092

(8-22-46) sec 117.

66. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Flexible Mutual Defense Assistance Program," 11 Aug 54. JCS 2099/405,

same file.

67. Memo, Actg ExecSecy, NSC, to NSC, "Foreign Military Assistance," 30 Aug 54, JCS 2099/415.

2 Sep 54, same file, sec 118. NSC Action No. 1210,2 Sep 54.

68. NSC 5434, 28 Sep 54, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 120.

69. Memo. JCS to SecDef, "Procedures for Periodic NSC Review of Military Assistance Program

(NSC 5434),"5 Oct 54, JCS 2099/424. same file, sec 121.

70. NSC Action No. 1241, 14 Oct 54. NSC 5434/1, 18 Oct 54, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 121.

71. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Statement of Priorities." 2! Aug J2, JCS 2099/227. same file, sec 79.

72. JCS 2099/384. 16 Jun 54, same file. see 114 Memo. JCS to SecDef, "Statement of Priorities, ' 31

Aug 54. JCS 2099/409, same file, sec 118

73 N/H of JCS 2099/409,1 Nov 54, same file NSC 5439, 10 Dec 54, JCS 2099,445, 14 Dec 54. »ame

file, sec 124.

74. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Futvre Wartime Military Assistance to Allied Nations," 19 Feb 53, JCS

2099/270, 20 Feb 53, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 86

75. JCS 2099/328. 24 Nov 53, same file, sec 100.

76. JCS 2099/356, 17 Feb 54, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 106

77 Memo. JCS to SecDef. "Foat-D-Dav Military Aid to Allies, ' 26 Feb 54, JCS 2099356, SM-182-54

to CSA, CNO. and CSAF, 26 Feb 54; **n\e file, MC 107

78 Memo. JCS to SecDef. "Future Wartime Military Assistance to Allied Nations." 16 Mar 54. JCS

209*361, same file, see 109

79 Ltr, SecDef to SecState. 20 Aug 54. JCS 2099410. 25 Aug 54, *tmv tile, sec 118 Supporting

material* make tt clear that this lettrr owed its origin partly to the JCS memo« of 26 February and 16

March 54 and partly to the recent appointment ofa NATO Defense Production Committee, which

provideda timely opportunity to raise the »ubfect.

80 NSC M22&? Aug 54. JCS 2101 151. 13 Aug 54. CCS 381 US (1-31-50) »et 44

81 Memo. SecDef to SecA rt at, Post D-Day Military A*d Retjuirement* of Allies, 16 Aug 54.

JCS 209*408. 18 Aug 54. CCS 0*2 (8-22-46) a* Hi

«2 Menu». JCS lo SecDef, To*tt>Pav Mihtan Aid Requirement* uf Alhe*.5 0*1 54. JCS

2099 420. same tue. *e< 121 though not directly »fated. SecDef atteptancr »»a» tmphatm Memo.

Dep ASD(S&U to DJS. »arm* »ubj. 21 Oct 54. tAtne file

10 Memo. SecDef to SecA <i */. "iUpianatorv Note» for *tvS Procedurem Connection *-tth the

Joint Mid-Range Plan for1 July 1*57."V Pec 54. JCS 214*34. 10 Pec 54. CCS 381 (U-2*M7) ** 18

Chapter II. The Far East: Korea

1 the text o* the AraUiUce Agreement may he found in Dept oi State &»&*;«. (3 Aug 53). pp

132-140 For detailed coverage of the JCS role »n the Korea« War ätid the negunaöan of the JV$J

4rmt*t»ce. see fame*P Schnabel *t%ä RobertJ Watson, tkt H*t*r> <* t/W fam Qud <* >«# fht join:

Ck*H c4 $*£ aW &*t*m*i PW»>„ vol. 111. H* *>«*« Wm (1978) 2 NSC Actfc*i No« R3J. *34. 2 Jul 53 3 NSC 1541. 7 Jul S3 JCS 1*8 Adv hie» 4 NSC 157 1, 7 Jul 5.1, Memo. JCS «o SecprC NSC 157. ü

S C*jecevr wuh Re*pett to Kvr**

FoBoMng an Arm*««.' 30 jun 53. JCS lTW3$i; CCS 3Ä321 Korea (3 19-45) wc 132 3 StrMnn* UmtAt S*#*e* m Vierid Aflu*. 1953. pp 226-229. 236-23? 6 Dept of State &*&*««. (17 Aug 53). P 204

&9 '
*

Notes to Pages 225-229

I

7. Ibid., pp. 203-204.

8. Stebbins, United States in World Affairs. 1953, pp. 238-246, 389-394.

9. NY Times. 2 Oct 5s, 4.

10. Dept of State Bulletin, (12 Oct 53), pp. 484-485.

11. Memo, ASD(1SA) to ExecSecv, NSC, "United States Policy in the Event or a Failure of the

Korean Political Conference," 3 See 53, JCS 1776/389,11 Sep 53, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-1945) »ec 136.

12. No copy of NSC 167 was found in JCS files. It was circulated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as JCS

1776/397, 23 Oct 53, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) BP pt 8, with a note that all copies were to be

destroyed when NSC action was completed. A State Department draft, en which NSC 167 may have

been based, appears as end to Merno, ExecSecy, NSC, to NSC PB, "United States Courses of Action

in the Event of Breakdown of tl> F >lirical Conference on Korea," 5 C ct 53, same file, sec 137. (NSC

167. 22 Oct 53, with omission et .-• nex D, is printed in Dept of State, Foreign Relations of the United

States, 1952-1954, vol. XV, Korea <1**4), pp. 15*6-1557.)

13. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "United States Co»»rs*s of Action in Korea in tho Absence of an

Acceptable Political Settlement (NSC 167)," 27 Oct 53, JCS 1776399, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec

139.

14. NSC Action Nos. 949-a, 949-b, 949-c, 949-f, 29 Oct 53. The nature of the courses of action

approved at this meeting is not indicated in the official record but appears in the message of 31

October 1953. (Msg, JCS 951671 to CINCFE, 31 Oct 53, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-l9-*5) sec 139.) The

typed original of this message bears the notation "Approved by Mr. Dulles, Mr Wilson, and the

JCS."

15. Draft, "Courses of Action in Korea," 2 Nov 53, JCS 1776/401, 3 Nov 53 (late.- circulated as NSC

167/1); N/H of JCS 1776/401, 4 Nov 53; CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 139. (NSC 16?% 2 Nov 53, with

deletions is printed in foreign Rekhcm of the United States, 1952-1954, vol. XV, Korea, pp. 1583-1584.)

16. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Courses of Action in Korea . . . ," 4 Nov 53, JCS 1776/401, same für.

17. NSC Action No. 954, 5 Nov 53.

18. N/H of JCS 1776/401, 9 Nov 53, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 139.

If. See Note appended to NSC Action 954. 5 Nov 53. (NSC 167/2, 6 .\\;v 53, with deletions, ts

pns&d in Foreign Relatwas of the United States. 1952-1954. vol. XV, Kor^t, pp 1598-1599.)

2D. NSC ITlt 9 Nov 53 (with Annex A, containing same ol the mort sensitive provisions, given

»eparate distribution). JCS PB Adv files.

21. Memo. JCS to SecDef, "NSC 170—U S Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea," 17 Nov

53. JCS ir/MOA, CC5 383.21 Korea r> 19-45} »ec 141.

22. NSC Action No 964. 19 Nov S3. NSC 170/1. 20 Nov 53. JCS PB Adv files

23. Urs; SecState to Vice Pres. 4 Nov 53. Pres to Rhee. 4 Nov 53; JCS 1776/403. 10 Nov 53, CCS

VO 21 Korea (3-1945) set 140

24 NY Tuwe*. 13 Nov 53. 3. 15 Nov 53. 3.

25 A draft h» a later letter Iron» the President to Rhee. dated 19 March 1954. referred to a letter

from Rhee dated It» November 1953 at\4 to Rhee» statements to Ntson, on the basts of which the US

President had recommended ratification of the mutual defense treaty, OCJCS File 091 Korea (Jan-Apr

54) Thi* reference was omitted from the letter when sent as Msg. State 74» to Seoul, 20 Mar 54. CCS

J8J 21 Konra (3-19-45) ate 147

26 V> Trow*, 16 Dec 53. I

27 Dept of State. Unaed Satfr* Trvofte» **d Other tnietmtktml Atrtrmtnto. V. 1954. part X pp

236*23?«

2* Memo. JCS to SecDrf. Vouisr» of Action m Connection wtfh the Situation in Korea (Analysis)."

m May S& JCS 1776372. CCS 3(0 21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 129 NSC Action No 794-a. 20 May 53

>> The te%t at this "Joint Policy Drdarauon Comeming the Korean Armistice." a» published m

the Thaafie» *«*rf Lkket InttrtuttKn*! Ad* Si»**, N*x VSt fDrpt of State Publication $179). may be found

m CCS 3*Y2i Korea (3*19*4$) *c 134

39 NSC A*tion No <H*4. 29 Oct 53

3t JCS 1776405. 14 Nov 53. CCS 3*3 21 Korea (3 19~*S> »ec 14«

32 Memo, JCS to SecOef. ~U S Courw» «f Action m Korea. 27 Nov 53. P* On JCS 1776405,

same hie. «et 142

33 Memo. Spec Asst to JCS tor NSC Affairs tu UCS. 2 tie* 53 JCS PS Adv |%. NSC 170-U S

Objective» »nä Courses of Action »n Korea

31 NSC Act**. No* »72 a, 972b. 3 Dec 53 ro* the ********* of Mf Duties » statements, see JCS

1776411 16 P*c 53. CCS 3*3 21 Korea (>l*-45) sec 1*3

35 Memo, JCS to SecDef. "Analysts of PWMW« Courses of Action in Korea. 15 Dec S3, JO

1776415, u»r hie

44»
Notes to Pages 229-233

36. NSC Action No. 1004, 8 Jan 54. The history of the JCS memo of 18 December 1953 is summarized in JCS 1776/426, 25 Jan 54, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 145. Following consultation with

State Dept officials, the JCS sent a revised version to the Secretary of Defense on 7 January 1954; this

was the paper approved by NSC on 8 January. It was subsequently withdrawn and is not found in

JCS files. It is printed in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, vol. XV, Korea, pp. 1700-1703.

37. The US Army divisions in Korea at the time of the armistice were the 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 24th, 25th,

40th, and 45th Infantry (the last two National Guard) and the 1st Marine Division; the 1st Cavalry

Division was in Japan. Walter G. Hermes, Truer Tent and Fighting Front, United States Army in the

Korean War (1966), pp. 57, 202, 472. For the movement of the 3rd Marine Division to Japan in August

1953, see NY Times, 16 Aug 53, 3; AFPC Advice of Action, "Korea—Status of Combat Units," 28 Jul

53. CCS 381 Far East (11-28-50) sec 18; Kenneth W. Condit and Edwin T. TumbUdh, Hold High the

Torch: A Htstory of the 4th Marines (Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Hq, USMC, 1960), pp. 366-368.

38. Memo, ADM Radford, GEN Ridgway, ADM Carney, and GEN Twining to SecDef, 8 Aug 53,

OCJCS File, New Look Documents. For full discussion, see Ch 1

39. Msg, CINCUNC CX 64325 to DEPTAR, 11 Aug 53, DA IN 295784. CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45)

sec 134.

40. Msg, JCS 946025 to CINCFE. 14 Aug 53, same file.

41 Msg, JCS 946220 to CINCFE, 17 Aug 53. same file.

42. Msg, CINCUNC CX 65855 to DEPTAR, 5 Nov 53, DA IN 18993, same tile, sec 140

43 Memo by CSA. "Redeployment of 24th Infantry Division from Korea to Japan," (5 Nov 53),

CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 140

44. Msg, DA 952121 to CINCUNC. 6 Nov 53, same file.

45 JCS 1776096, 23 Oct 53. CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 139

46 Memo, JCS to SecDef. "Review of U S. Policies in Korea," 17 Nov 53. JCS 1776407, same file,

sec 141.

47. NSC 170/1. 20 Nov 53. JCS 1776/411, 27 Nov 53. same file, sec 142.

48 JCS 2101/113, 10 Dec 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 32

49 NSC Action No 972-d, 3 Dec 53.

50. Memo, SecDef to SecA et a/., "Redeployment of Two U. 5, Divisions from Korea," 10 Dec 53,

JCS 1776/414, 15 Dec 53. CCS 38321 Korea (3-19-45) sec 143

51. Memo for Record, Asat to SecDef (Special Ops), "Redeployment of Two U. S. Divisions from

Korea," 18 Dec 53. same file

52 Memo, Spec A*st to Pre* (Cutler) to Chm. OCB. 17 Dec 53. OCJCS File 091 Korea (1953)

53 See Memo, CJCS to SecState, 11 Dec 53; Memo. SecState to SecDef and CJCS. 17 Dec 53;

Memo. DCSA (Plans and Research) to SecDef. 18 Dec 53; Memo. CNO to SecDef, 18 Dec 53; same

file.

54 Radford conferred with Rhee on 24 December 1953 «nd presumably gave this information at

that time, although there was no public indication of the nature of the discussion. {NY Time*. 25 Dec

53.4)

55 PuHu. Papers. LoHnhtntrr. 1953, pp Koo-HM The information that the two divisions would be

bri/ught hack to the United States was apparently added by the President Himself, it was not m any

of the preb«unary draft*.

V» Memo bv CSA. "Far East Command Redeployment Schedule Through First Quarter FixaJ

Yea» I9>i, (30 Dec S3) Memo. JCS to SecDef. some sub*. 31 Dec 53. JCS 1776418. CCS 383 21 Korea

(3-19-45) sec 143

57 Memo, SecDef to JCS Redeployment of Army Uruis from Korea." 13 Jan 54, JCS 177*420. 19

Jan 54, same file *ec 144

5* Memo by CSA. "Joint Planning G*i*dance for U- S Far East Command Redeployments through

Fiscal Year 1*55 " (20 Jan 54J; Memo for Record. Secv, JCS. Redeployment of Units from Korea. 21

Jan 54 CCS 383 21 Korea (3-19-45) ajc 144

59. M*g, DA 955914 to CGAfff (ADV). 21 Jan 54, CCS 381 Far Fa« (U>2*-50) sec I*» For a public

annotmcement, see NY 7»**rs, 24 Jan 54. 4.

60 See JCS 2147*3, 2S» |an 54, JCS 2147V5 3 Feb 54. and JCS 2I479&. 5 Feb 54 for the Army,

Navy, and Air Force plan«, respectively, CCS 381 Far East (1128-50) sec 19

61 SM 15*54 to JSPC. 18 Feb 54. M**. JCS 957207 to CINCFE. 17 Feb 54. M**. CINCUNC CX

67284 to DKPTAR. 4 Mar 54. DA IN 42416 »Atnt ftle

62 Memo, JCS to SecDef. "Redeployment of Force* from the Fa* fan! WitUrn Pacthc Area, i

Apr 54. JCS 2147 103. same tü>. sec 20

63 NSC Action No i087*d. 6 Apr 54

64. Memo. SecDef to SecA ef *l. "Redeployment* of V S rotte» from Korea i J the Far Fan." 7

Apr 54. JCS 1776.456. 9 Apr 54, CCS 3*3 21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 150

401
Notes to Pages 233-238

I

65. JCS 2147/106, 13 Apr 54; Memo, JCS to 5ecDef, "Redeployment of U. S. Forces from Korea and

the Far East," 14 Apr 54, JCS 2147/106; N/H of JCS 2147/106, 21 Apr 54; CCS 381 Far East (11-28-50)

sec 20.

66. Memo, JCS »o SecDef, "Force Requirements for the FECOM-Westem Pacific Area,"1 Jun 54,

JCS 2147/107, same file.

67. Hermes. Truce Tent and Fighttnx Front, pp. 210-214. 340-345. 357-361. 439-441. As of 31 July

1953, the actual strength of ROK ground forces (including ROK Marine Corps personnel under

operational control of the US Army) totaled 590,911 {ibid., p. 513). Comparable figures for the other

ROK Services have not been found.

68. Memo. SecA to SecDef. "Report on the Dulles Mission to Korea," 22 Aug 53, CCS 383.21

Korea (3-19-45) sec 135.

69. JCS 1776/383. 20 Aug 53. same file.

70. SM-1538-53 to JSPC and JLPC. 21 Aug 53; Msg, JCS 946437 to CINCFE, 20 Aug 53; same file

71. Dec On JCS 1776/391,7 Oct 53; Msg, JCS 949720 to CINCFE.6 Oct 53; Memo. JCS to SecDef,

"Ultimate Goal for the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy."6 Oct 53, JCS 1776/391; NW of JCS 1776091,

3 Dec 53; same file, sec 137.

72 Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Recommendations ot the Korean Minister of Defense Concerning

Expansion of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces," 23 Dec 53, JCS 1776/417, 30 Dec 53. same file, sec

143.

73 Ltr, CJCS to MinDef ROK, 18 Jan 54, and Ltr, MinDef ROK to CJCS,6 Jan 54. JCS 1776/424, 22

Jan 54, same tile, sec 144.

74. Msg, CGAFFE FM 903994 to DEPTAR.6 Feb 54. DA IN 37728; Memo bv CSA. "Development

of Republic of Korea Army," (12 Feb 54j; Msg. JCS 957040 to CINCFE. 15 Feb 54; same file, sec 145.

75. NY Time*.I Mar 54. 5.

76 Ltr. Pnme Minister Paik to SecA, 22 Jan 54, CCS 383 21 Korea (3-W-45) sec 144

77. NSC Action No 1043, 17 Feb 54

78 Memo, ActgSecDef to JCS. Augmentation of ROK Armed Forces." 24 Feb 54, JCS 177644U.1

Mar 54, CCS 383 21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 146

79 Memo. JCS to SecDef, "Recommendation* of the Korean Minister of Defense Concerning

fcxpansion ot ihe Republic ot Korea Armed Force*." 31 Mar 54. JCS 1776/447, same file, sec 148.

80 Memo. SecDef to ExecSeev, NSC, "Expansion of Republic ot Korea Armed Focce*."2 Apr 54,

same file, src 1*9.

81 Msg, State 748 to Seoul, 20 Mar 54, same hie, set 147 This message wasa reply to one from

Rhee to Pie*ident Eisenhower, which a*ked US aid in reunifying Korea by tore* il necessary—a

request that Eisenhower emphatically rejected.

82 CM-82 54 to SecState and SecDet.9 Apr 54. JCS Pti Adv rile. NSC 170—U5 Objective* and

Courses of Action in Korea

83 NSC

1 Action No 1092. 13 Apr 54

84 t.tr. SecDef to Van Fleet. 26 Apr 54. JCS 1776 464.

3 May 54. CCS 383 21 KoreaO 1<M5) *rv

152

85m

JCS 1776458. I* Apr 54. %*mv file. **c 150

Memo. JCS to SecDet, Augmentation of ROK Armed forte*--Reserve Forte». 23 Apr 54.

Dec On ICS 1776 458. CCS 3832 Korea (3-l*4Si set 1*0

87 Stebtens. United State*m W*U Ajfmn. MM. pp llo*ltt< 212-215

88 Msg, S*MU1 9*1 to SecSlate8 Apr 54, CCS 383 21 Korea (3-19-45) »et H9

89M Tim»,W Apr 54, 1.3

90 Dralt. United State* Proposal lor Reumiitat*on of Korea. 27 Mar 54. CK D-4b. JCS 1776448. 2*

Mar 54. CCS 383 21 Korea< 3-19-45) me 14» M*rno, JCS to SecDef Draft Utuird State* Proposal . 2 Apr 54. JO 177*430, »aine tue. m 149

«*l Draft. Withdrawal ot Fotrtgn Force* from Korea, 27 M*r 54, UK DH*V- JCS 1776-44« 29 Mar 54.

umt Hk. sex 14« Mem«. JCS to SeeOei, 'Withdrawal of foreign Forte* tr«m Korea ."*3 Apr 54.

JCS 1776451. *sme hie. set 149

92 Stebbms. tf«tfrtf >i*rr*m \S\»id Aßan 1*5*. f>f 232-235

*3 Msg. CINCFE CN68127 to mrtAM. 23 MavM DA IN «m* JCS 17764«» 2» Mav 54, CCS

Sttf 21 Korea (3-1* 45} tec 152

**4 Memo. JC*> JO SrcDel. ' Realfirmation of pre-wdent Rhee* C&tmtmvtf* to tjeave ROK Force*

Vnätr the United Nations C«Mrunartd." 2* Mav 54. JCS 1776 468NH oi K* 177*4*8.W Jun 54.

u»r rue

95 Ur, SecState to SecDef. 18 fun 54. JC* 177M74 2» Jun 54, »ame fur *ee 153

96 Ut, SecState to SecPet.7 Jun 54. JCS 177*47©. 23 jun 54 »*me We, MK 152

402 .
Notes to Pages 238-243

97. Memo, SecDef to jCS, "Possible Unilateral Action by President Rhee ..." 22 jun 54, and Ltr,

SecDef to SecSute, same date, JCS 1776/470, 23 jun 54; Msg, CINCFE to DEPTAR, C-68364, 11 Jun

54, DA IN 64586; CCS 363.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 152.

98. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Possible Withdrawal of ROK Forces from UN Command," 21 Jul 54,

JCS 1776/475. same hie, sec 154.

99. Public Papers, Eisenhower, 1954, p. 629.

100. Memo, ActgSecDef to JCS, "Preparation of U. S. Position Papers in Connection with President Rhee's Visit to This Country," 16 Jul 54, JCS 1776/478. 16 Jul 54. CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec

153.

101. SeeCh. 3.

102. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Preparation of U. S. Position Paper \stc) in Connection with President

Rhee's Visit to the United States." 22 jul 54. JCS 1776/479, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 154

103. NY Times, 29 Jul 54, 1. 2; 31 Jul 54. 2.

104. PuWic Papers. Eisenhower, 1954. p. 674.

105. Stebbins, United Slates in World Affairs, 1954, pp. 248-254.

106. Memo, SecDef to SecA et al.. "Redeployment of Forces from the Far East—Western Pacific

Area," 26 Jul 54. CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 46.

107. AFPC Advice of Action, "Redeployment ol Forces from the Far East— Western Pacific Areas,"

30 Jul 54, same file.

108. Memo, SecDef to ExecSecy, NSC, "Redeployment of Forces f.-om the Für East—Western

Pacific Area and Forces and Manning Levels tor Fiscal Year 1956," 28 Jul 54, sum- file. NSC." Action

No. 1189, 29 Jul 54.

109 N/H of JCS 2147/103, 17 Aug 54, CCS 381 Far East (V 28-50) sec 20

110. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Redeployment from the !ar East—Western Pacific Area," 26 Aug M,

JCS 2147 112; Msg, JCS 966825 to CINCFE, 26 A- yi. and SM-756-54 to CSA et al., 26 Aug 54, JCS

2147 112; N H of JCS 2147112, 10 Sep 54; *-..,e file, sec 22.

Ill For UN units remaining in Kon» , see NY Times. IV Aug 54. I (news story announcing the

forthcoming withdrawal ol 4 US *~.ty divisions)

112. The USAF unit» that would remain in Korea after the planned redeployment are listed in

AFPC Advice of Action, "Redeployment of Forces from the Far East—Western Pacific Areas," 30 tut

54, CCS 370 (8-10-45) sec 46

113 Msg. JCS 968907 to CINCFE. 6 Urt 54, CCS 383 2! Korea < 3-19-45) *ee 158

114 Msg, JCS 968900 to CINCFE, 6 Oct 54. same file

115. NY Times, 21 Dec 54, 1 The withdrawal of this division and an accompanying explanation

were announced in connection with the decisions on FY l

i

*f>e> personnel strengths, which arr discussed in Ch 3

116 Memo. SecDef to JCS. "Redeployment of Forces from the Far East— Western Pacific Area,' 9

Dec 54, JCS 2147118, 9 Dec 54. CCS .181 Far East (U-2B-W) set 24

117 Memo. JCS to SecDef. Redeployment of Forces from the Far East— Western Pacific Area.

II Dec 54. JCS 2147 123, same tile, sec 25 NT! of JCS 2147 123. 14 Jan 5*. same file, see 24

II» Memo, SecDef to JCS. "Command *nd Organizational Structure of V 5 Forces Forte and

Manning Level»," 29 Dec 54. JCS IHO023O. 30 Dec 54. CCS 370 (*-I«M5) sec 48

119 Memo JCS to SecDef. "Command *rwi Organizational Structure ai V '■■ Forces. Forces At\\i

Manning LeveU. J! Jan 55, JO 1800234 Mi *>! JO 1HU0 234. P* Jan S5, same file. I« 49

120 S) Ttmr». 16 Jul 54, 3*

121 Memo. CINCFE to CJCS KOK Armed Forces' ** Jun H, JCS S77«v4~. 14 Jul 54, CCS

383 21 Korea (3 19~4*> BP pt »

122 Report of Ambassador James A Van Flee«, Korea,' 23 Jul 54. same file (later issued as Ch

IX of the complete Van Fleet Report, a copy ol which is m CCS 381 Fa* East ttL2B-50) BP pt 2 .»

S23 JCS I77«*49t, 26 Aug 54, CCS 3*3 21 Korea t>!<M5i m 156

124 USD Minutes, Meeting of the Military Subsummittee re Visit of South Korean President

Svngman Rhee." 27 and 28 Juf 54. CCS 337 f>t<M0| »p pi 4

125 this figure apparently rrpfescftted thv established goal itf 53 lea» four vessel* transferred to

the ROK Coast Cuard see JCS 1776477. 14 Jul 54 (AppC paragraph 2a) CCS 3»3 2! Ko*ea (3 |9 43)

BP pi*

12* Agreed Minute Between the t*overnments of the United States *nd Repufifit of K-.'tr* Based

on the Conference tietd Between President Eisenhower *tu& President Rne*- At^i Tlieu Adc-tser« in

Washington. Juh 27 30. P*54. ' JCS 1776,49* lf> Sep 54. CCS 3*3 21 Kofea iM<*-45) sec 157 Also m

Dept of Stale JWlrfn», f2* Nov S4).pp »10*11

127 NSC Action No 1217.9vr>54

•

*»

..., .——».^,w^y^t-nfl!^^ tjjMHHg mmmmmmmmm
A

Notes to Pages 243-251

128. Memo, SecDef to SecA et ei, "Proposed Agreed Minute Between the United States and Korea

Based on Recent US-Korean Conferences/' 17 Sep 54. JCS 1776/499. 27 Sep 54, CCS 383.21 Korea

(3-19-45) sec 157.

129. Memo, SecDef to SecA et al., "Report of Ambassador James A. Van Fleet on Korea," 17 Sep

54. JCS 1776/498, 20 Sep 54. same file.

130. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "ROK Armed Forces." 3 Nov 54. JCS 1776/503. same file, sec 159.

131. Msg, JCS 970452 to C1NCFE, 4 Nov 54. CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) w 159.

132. Memo. Exec Officer, OCB, to OCB, "Current US-ROK Relations." 11 Oct 54. same file, sec

158. See also Stebbins. United States in World Affairs. 1954. p. 275.

133 Msg. Seoul 509 to State. 29 Oct 54. CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 159.

134. Msg. C1NCUNC C-70208 to DEFTAR. 8 Nov 54, DA IN 97246; JCS 177^508, 16 Nov 54; same

file.

135 1st N/H of JCS 1776/499, 19 Nov 54, same file, sec 157 For the exchange of instruments of

ratification, see SY Times, 18 Nov 54. 5.

136. Memo, OCB to ExecSecy, NSC, "Progress Report on NSC 170/1 (Korea)," 30 Dec 54. JCS

1776/513. 5 Jan 55, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) (2) sec 1

137. For the planned deployment of divisions, see Memo. JCS to SecDef, "Command and Organizational Stucture of U S Forces, Forces and Manning Levels." 11 Jan 55. JCS 1800/234, CCS 370

(8-19-15) sec 49. For the deployment as of 31 December 1952, see NSC 142. |Feb 53), CCS 381 US

(1-31-50) BP pt 8.

138. Memo. ICS to SecDef, "The Status of U. S Programs for National Security a» of 31 December

1954." 18 Mar 55. JCS 2101/190. CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 52. See aJso Ch. 3.

Chapter 12. The Far East: Indochina, Taiwan, Japan

1 As used m NSC pohcy papers, the Far East" embraced China. Japan. Southeast Asia (Indochina,

the Malay Peninsula, Thailand, and Burma), and the island nations of the Western Pacific (Japan, the

Philippine». Indonesia. Australia, and New Zealand) It excluded India. Pakistan, xd Ceylon,

which, with Afghanistan and Nepal, were coJlectivelv referred to as "South Asia "

2 NSC 48/5. 17 Mav 51. CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sei 14

3. NSC 148. 6 Apr 53. JCS 1992216. 17 Apr 53. same file, set 40 NSC 146. 27 Mar 53. CCS 381

Formosa (11-8-48) sec 10

4 NSC Action No 758. 8 Apr 53

.V Menu». JCS to SecDef. "NSC 146, U S CH>*ect>ve* and Courses of Action with Respect to

Formosa .md the National Government ot China." 7 Apr 53. JC5 196667. CCS 381 Formosa (11 6-48)

sec 10

b NSC Action No 760-b. 8 Apr 53

7 NSC Arten No »53. 5 Nov 53

8 NSC 1462. 6 Nov 53. JCS 196674. 12 Nov 53. CCS 3*1 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 12

9 NSC Action No "»52, 5 Nov 53 NSC 1661. 6 Nov S3. JCS 211861. 12 Nov 53. Memo. JCS to

SevDet. NSC 166—U S Pubcv Toward Communist China. 3 Nov 53, JCS 211860; CCS 092 Asia

(6-25-48>sec 48

10 NSC Action No 1029. 4 Feb 54 The event* leading to this decision are treated m greater detail

Uter in this chapter

11 Memo. JCS to SecDet United Mates Strategy ft« tXr^-etoptng a position at Miiitarv Strength

m trw f*t fcast (NSC Action No KC^b). * Apr 54. JCS 1776452. CCS 383 21 Korea (3-19-45) sec »50

12 NSC 5416. 10 Apr 54. same hie NSC Action Nu 109J. 13 Apr 54

13 NSC Action No 1186-b. 22 Jul 54

|| NSC 5429. 4 A«g M. CCS 092 Asia (6.25-48) »ec 77,

15 Memo JtS to SecDet. "Review o* U %. pobcy m the ¥*t East NSC 5429. It Ao* 54. JCS

19*2 37b. same tue see 7<*

I* NSC Action No. IXH, 12 Au* 54. !20fc. 18 Au* 54 NSC 54>2, 20 A»$ 54. CCS 092 As«

i>25-4«i see 81

17 Report at the \ *t\ Hret Mission i» the far £**t 2* April-7 August l«*54. JO Sep H, CCS *!

fat Ka*{ (11 as-SCO HP p* 2 kepurts net the individual count««-*. *uh*ruti*d sepetateh. were inewpo

rated a« chapters in the hnai report thai deakng with South Korea has been described in Ö» 11. the

ones kx ?&+**?- at%d japan are described late» *n this chapter

18 this decision und the JCS position JX tTtmnectsun thctr-srith s» treated mow fuSy later in lH»s

chapter

404
r

Notes to Pages 251-259

19. NSC Action Nos. 1292, 21 Dec 54; 1295, 5 Jan 55. NSC 5429/5, 22 Dec 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48)

sec 90. The evolution of NSC 5429/5 is described in JCS Hist Div, "History of the Formosan Situation,"

15 Sep 55, pp. 259-264; hereafter cited as "History, Formosan Situation."

20. Except where other sources are cited, this section of the chapter is drawn entirely from JCS

Hist Div, The History of the joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam: History of the Indochina Incident.

1940-1954 (1971). Chapters I-X of this detailed study trace the Vietnamese war from its beginnings

through 1952; Chapters XI-XII1 narrate developments in 1953 and early 1954 to the eve of the

settlement at Geneva, which is described in Chapters XIV and XV.

21. NSC 124/2, 25 Jun 52, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 31.

22. NSC Action No. 1011, 14 Jan 54.

23. NSC 5405, 16 Jan 54, JCS 1992/272, 20 Jan 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 55.

24. NSC Action No. 1005-d, 8 Jan 54.

25. NSC Action No. 1074, 25 Mar 54.

26. Memo JCS to SecDef, "Indochina Situation," 31 Mar 54; Memo, CSA to CJCS et al., 2 Apr 54;

Memo, CNO to CJCS et al, "U.S. Intervention in Indochina," 2 Apr 54; Memo, CSAF to CJCS et al,

"Indochina Situation," 2 Apr 54; Memo, CMC to CJCS et al, 2 Apr 54; OCJCS File. 091 Indochina

(Apr 54).

27. NSC Action No. 1086, 6 Apr 54.

28. Besides the account of the Geneva settlement in "History of the Indochina Incident," Ch. XV

(extremely thorough in describing the US position during the negotiations), mention should be

made of Stebbins, United States in World Affairs, 1954, which gives a concise but comprehensive

summary of the international diplomacy involved (pp. 238-249) and a convenient resume of the

terms of the a-mistice agreements (pp. 249-254).

29. Dept of State Bulletin, (12 Jul 54), p. 49. JCS 1992/360, 22 Jul 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 75.

30. Report of the Joint UK-US Study Croup on Southeast Asia, 17 Jul 54, JCS 1992/360, 22 Jul 54,

same file.

31. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Report of Joint UK-US Study Group on Southeast Asia," 13 Aug 54,

JCS 1992/375, same file, sec 80.

32. Text of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and the Pacific Charter in Dept of State

Bulletin, (20 Sep 54), pp. 393-3%. For a general summary of the treaty and the Manila Conference,

see Stebbins, United States in World Affairs, 1954, pp. 257-261.

33. Stebbins, United States in World Affairs, 1953, pp. 23-25.

34. PuNic Papers. Eisenhower. 1953, pp. 16-17.

35. "History of the Formosan Situation," pp. 134, 139-140. NSC Action No. 760-a, 8 Apr 53.

36. The contents of this note are summarized in Msg, CHMAAG Formosa to CINCPAC, 120814Z

Sep 54, «addressed CINCPAC to CNO as 122151Z Sep 54, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 15.

37. NSC Action No. 774, 28 Apr 53.

38. For the origin of the US military aid program in Taiwan, see "History of the Formosan

Situation." pp. 37-42. 45-47, 62-65.

39 Ltr. CHMAAG to AG, DA. "Brief Estimate of the Chinese Nationalist Armed Forces." 7 Feb

53, MGCG 322. CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 10.

40. The FY 1954 MDAP force bases were the final JCS recommendations submitted after Congress

had completed appropriations for that fiscal year. (Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Mutual Defense Assistance Program for FY 1954," 13 Aug 54. JCS 2099/307. CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 95.) Preliminary JCS

recommendations tor FY 1955 were submitted in Memo, JCS to SecDef, "MDA Programming Guidance for FY 1955," 15 Jul 53. ICS 2099/300. same file, sec 93. Nationalist objectives are listed on pp.

401 -407 of End B to JCS 1966/76, 10 Dei 53. CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 12.

41 .*SC 146/1, 28 Oct 53. CCS 381 Fonaosa (11-8-48) sec 11.

42. This discussion is summarized in End B to JCS 1966/76, 10 Dec 53. same file, sec 12.

43 NSC Action No. 953. 5 Nov 53

44. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Review of Chinese Nationalist Force Levels." 18 Nov 53. JCS 1966/75,

18 Nov 53. CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 12.

45. Trw volution of the JCS recommendations on Nationalist Chinese force levels is summarized

in "History of the Formosan Situation," pp. 169-175.

46. Memo. JCS to S*cDef, "Review of Chinese Nationalist Force Levels." 18 Jan 54. JCS 1966-79,

CCS 381 Fotroo»- (114-48) MC 13.

47 Memo, SecDef to ExecSecv. NSC. "Review of Chinese Nationalist Force Levels," 26 Jan 54,

JCS 1966/80. 2 Feb 54, same file.

48 NSC Action No 1029, 4 Feb 54

49. Memo. SecDef to JCS. ASDfComptrotler). and ASDflSA). "Reconsideration of the Chinese

Nationalist Force Levels ." 12 Feb 54. JCS 1966/81. 15 Feb 54. CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 13

405

.
Notes to Pages 259-263

50. JCS 2099/368, 26 Mar 54, CCS 092 (8-22-46) BP pt 19 (pp. 2738, 2755, and 2763 describe the aid

program proposed for Taiwan). The committee's report is treated in full in Ch. 10.

51. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "MDA Programs for FY 1955-1958 Which Will .Support US Military

Strategy," 17 jun 54, JCS 2099/368, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 114.

52. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "MDA Programming Guidance for FY 1956," 19 May 54, JCS 2099/274,

same file, sec 112. Memo, SecDef to JCS. same subj, 15 Jul 54, JCS 2099/398, 21 Jul 54, same file, sec

116.

53. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Reconsideration of Chinese Nationalist Force Levels," 27 Jul 54, JCS

1966/85, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 14.

54. Ltr, Yeh to CJCS,4 Jan 54, OCJCS File, 091 China (Jan-Aug 54).

55. Ltr, CHMAAG to TAG, "Chinese Proposal for Augmented Forces, NGRC 'Kai Plan'," 20 Feb

54, with 1st Endorsement bv CINCPAC, 13 Apr 54, JCS 1966/83,14 Jul 54, CCS 381 Formosa (11-9-48)

sec 14.

56. "History of the Formosan Situation," pp. 189-190.

57. Ltr, Yeh to CJCS, 23 Mar 54, OCJCS FUe, 091 China (Jan-Aug 54).

58. Memo, VADM Davis to CJCS,9 Apr 54, w/encl. Memo, COL James G. Anding (Dep Dir,

OMA) to VADM Davis, "Comments on MDA Program for NGRC,"9 Apr 54, same file.

59. Msg, JCS 959864 to CHMAAG Formosa, 13 Apr 54; Msg, CHMAAG Formosa MG 6891 to

DEPTAR (for ADM Radford), 16 Apr 54; same file.

60. Ltr, CJCS to Yeh,4 May 54, same file.

61. JCS 1966/84, 20 Jul 54; JCS 1966/83, 14 Jul 54, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 14.

62. JCS 1966/86, 31 Aug 54, same file, sec 15.

63. Dec On JCS 1966/86, 17 Sep 54; Msg, JCS 967938 to CINCPAC and CHMAAG Formosa, 17 Sep

54, JCS 1966/86; same tue.

64. "Report of the Van Fleet Mission to the Far East, 26 April-7 August 1954," Ch. X. "Formosa,"

CCS 381 Far East (11-28-50) BP pt2 (hereafter cited as "Rpt of Van Fleet Mission"). The final report

was dated 30 September 1954; ChapterX had been issued earlier under the date 25 August 1954, but

was apparently not available to, or at least was not considered by, the JCS in preparing JCS 1966'86,

cited in the previous note.

65. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Chinese Nationalist Force Levels," 21 Sep 54, JCS 1966/88, 22 Sep 54,

CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 15.

66. These small islands must of course be distinguished from the "offshore island chain" referred

to in NSC policy papers, which meant those major islands considered essential to US security,

including Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines.

67.A convenient description of these islands can be found in "History of the Formosan Situation,"

pp 10-11

68. Ibid.. pp. 146-147.

&t. NSC 146/2.6 Nov 53, JCS 1966/74. 12 Nov 53. CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 12.

70. "History of the .'ormosan Situation," pp. 147-161.

71 Und., pp. 183-It*.

72. NSC Action No 1136. 27 May 54 The official report of this action spoke of the Tachen> as

constituting "an integral part of the defense of Formosa." This statement was amendeda week later;

the words "closely related to" were substituted for the phrase "an integral part of." NSC Action No.

1146,3 Jun 54

73. .VV Times. 14 Aug 54. 1.

74 Ibid.. 25 Aug 54, 1.

75 NSC Action 1206-f, 18 Aug 54

76 Memo, Actg SecDef to JCS, "U.S. Policy Regarding Off-Shore Islands Held bv Chinese Nationalist Forces—NSC Action No 1206-f," 25 Aug 54, JCS 211867, 26 Aug M, CCS 381 Far East (11-28-50)

see 22

77. JCS 2118/69. 31 Au* 54; Memo, JCS to SecDef. "US Policy Regarding Offshore Islands Held

by Chinese Nationalist Fore«—NSC Action 1206-f,"2 Sep 54 (forwarded

7

Sep 54), JCS 2118-69; CCS

381 Far East (11-28-50) see 22. GEN Shepherd did not e*pre** an opinion

78 "History of the Formosan Situation," pp. 213-216

7V. Memo, JCS to SecDef. "US Polio- Regarding Off-Shore Island» Held bv Chinese Nationalist

Forces, NSC Action 1206-f/- 11 Sep 54. OCJCS File 091 China (Sep 54)

80. "History of the lormovm Situation," pp 222-223 The tr^vni of actions taken at thi* NSC

meeting (No* 1223. 1224. and 1225) WAS later withdrawn and was not located.

SI. NSC Action No 1234.6 Oct 54

82 "Rpt of Van Fleet Mtatton," Ch I,p 2. paragraph 4h, Ch XJV\ paragraph IA4 'History of the

Formosan Situation,"p 234 Stebbm*. Umitd $iat& in WWW Affair*. 1954.p 278

406 .
Notes to Pages 263-268

83. Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 8 Oct 54, OCJCS Füe 091 China (Oct-Dec 54). JCS T966/91. 22 Oct 54,

CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 15.

84. A copy of the paper read by Mr. Dulles on 28 October 54 is iound in OCJCS File 091 China

(Oct-Pec 54). Although it bears no signature, title, or date, its identity is indicated by its content and

by references to the NSC meeting of 28 Oct 54 found in other documents.

85. NSC Action No. 1258, 28 Oct 54.

86. "History of the Formosan Situation," pp. 242-246. Memo, jSSC to JCS, "United States Policies

in Relation to China (ChiNats and ChiComs)," 29 Oct 54; AideMemoire by CNO, 29 Oct 54; Memo,

Actg CSAF to CJCS, 29 Oct 54; Memo, CMC to JCS, "Poper Read by Secretary of State Dulles at NSC

Meeting 28 October 1954," 29 Oct 54; Memo, "Comments by Admiral Arthur Radford ... on a

Report by the Secretary of State on US. Policies in Relation to China," 29 Oct 54; Memo, CJCS to

SecDef, 29 Oct 54; OCJCS File 091 China (Oct-Dec 54). The impression created by the documentary

record is one of almost feverish activity. The documents speak of a JCS meeting with Secretary

Dulles scheduled for 29 October, but. JCS files do not indicate whether it was actually held. (For a

record of this 29 October 1954 meeting, see Memo,of Conversation by COL A.J. Goodpaster, printed

in Dept of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, vol. XIV, China and Japan (1985), pp.

814-816.)

87. NSC Actions Nos. 1259-b, 1259-c, 2 Nov 54.

88. See Ch. 2.

89. Memo, ASD(ISA) to JCS, "Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic

of China," 10 Nov 54, JCS 2118/71, 16 Nov 54, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 16.

90. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of

China," 1 Dec 54, JCS 211873, same file.

91. Dept of State Bulletin, (13 Dec 54), p. 899.

92. Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 20 Dec 54, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 16.

93. N/H of JCS 2118/73. 24 Jan 55, same file.

94. NSC 5441, 28 Dec 54, same file. Memo, JCS to SecDef. "U.S. Policy Toward Formosa and the

Government of the Republic of China—NSC 5441," 6 Jan 55, JCS 1966793, same file, sec 17.

95. "History of the Formosan Situation," pp. 265-272.

96. NSC Action No. 1302, 13 Jan 55. NSC 5429/5, 22 Dec 54 (with revised p. 5), JCS 1992/429, 27

Dec 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 90.

97. NSC Action No. 1301, 13 Jan 55. NSC 5503. 15 Jan 55, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 17.

98. "History of the Formosan Situation," p. 271.

99. NSC Action No. 1312, 21 Jan 55.

100. The text of the resolution is found in NY Times, 25 Jan 55, 3. For the President's accompanying message, see Public Papers. Eisenhower, 1955, pp. 207-211.

101. NY Times. 26 Jan 55. 1; 29 Jan 55. 1.

102. "History of the Formosan Situation," pp. 289-305.

103. Hollis VV Barber. The United Stales in World Affairs. 1955. (1957). pp. 91-92.

104. For these treaties, see Dept of State. United State» Treaties and Other international Agreements.

Ill, 1952, part 3, pp. 3169-3191, 3329-3332.

105. NSC 125/2. 7 Aug 52. CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec 14

106 NSC 125/4, 30 Mar 53; Memo, JCS lo SecDef. "NSC 1254—United States Objectives and

Course» ot Action with Respect to Japan." 7 Apr 53. JCS 218079; same file, sec 15 NSC Action No»

761. 8 Apr 53; 823, 25 Jun 53. NSC 125*, 29 Jun 53, same file, sec 16.

107. Stebbm», United States in World Affairs, 1953, pp. 263-269.

108. Memo. ExecSecv, NSC. to NSC. "The Japanese Treatv Islands." 15 jun 53. CCS 383 21 PDA

(1-12-45) sec 5.

109. NSC Action No 824, 25 Jun 53 Dept of State Bulletin. (17 Aug 53), p. 208

110 NSC 1256. 29 Jun 53. CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec 16 Memo. JCS to SecDef. "Military

Requirements in the Amami Island Group," 16 Oct 53. JCS 2I80Y83, same file, sec 17

111. Dept ot State. Treaties and Other International Agreements, IV. 1953, part 2, pp 2912-2917. 2935.

2938-2939

112. Text ot Japanese constitution of 1946 is in Report of Government Section. Supreme Commander tor the Allied Powers. Political Reorientation ot japan. September 1945 to September t'MH. (n d).

Appendix, pp 670-677. The quotation» are from article» 9 and 10. p. 671.

113. Stebbtm, United States in World Affairs, 1952, pp. 216-217; ,VY Times. IfcOct 52 4 13 Nov 52. 1.

7. "Progreift Report, end to NSC 125-5, 28 Apr 53. CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec 16.

114 Memo. JCS to SecDef. "MDA Program for Fiscal Year 1954." 30 Oct 52. JCS 2099.242. CCS 092

(8-22-46) sec 83 Nearly identical goal» had been adopted as early a» December 1951 (Memo. JCS to

407

• .
u

Notes to Pages 268-274

SecDef, "High-Level State Defense Mission on Japanese Defense Forces," 12 Dec 51, JCS 1380/127,

CCS 383.21 Japan (3-13-45) sec 27).

115. Msg, JCS 920166 to CINCFE,3 Oct 52, JCS 1380/150,3 Oct 52; Msg, CINCFE CX 58128 to

DEPTAR (for JCS), 31 Oct 52, DA IN 202341; CCS 383.21 Japan (3-13-45) sec 31.

116. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Japanese Defense Forces,"9 Jan 53, JCS 1380/155, same file, sec 32.

117. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Japanese Defense Force," 28 Feb 53, JCS 1380/157,4 Mar 53; Msg, JCS

933381 to CINCFE, 10 Mar 53, JCS 1380/157; same file, sec 33.

118. Stebbins, United States in World Affairs, 1953, pp. 263-264.

119. Msf„ Tokyo 3869 t« State, 11 Jun 53, DA IN 276704, CCS 383.21 Japan (3-13-45) sec 33. NY

Times, 16 Jan 53,7.

120. NY Times,1 Jul 53, 3; 15 Jul 53, 4.

121 Msg,ClNCFE CX 63468 to DEPTAR (for JCS)3 Jul 53, DA IN 283875, CCS 383.21 Japan

(3-13-45) sec 34.

122 Memo, SecDef to JCS, 18 May 53, JCS 1380/159, 20 May 53; Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Japanese

Defense Forces," 23 May 53, JCS 1380/160, 26 May 53; same file, sec 33.

123. JCS 1380/166, 29 Jun 53, CCS 383.21 Japan (3-13-45) sec 33.

124. Msg, JCS 942915 to CINCFE,2 Jul 53; Msg, CINCFE CX 63528 to DEPTAR (for JCS),7 Jul 53,

DA IN 284872; Msg, CINCFE CX 63843 to DEPTAR (for JCS), 20 Jul 53; same file, sec 34.

125. JCS 1380/161, 27 May 53, same file, sec 33.

?26. Revised Final Force Plan, National Safety Force Program (no date or signature; evidently

prepared by CINCFE), CCS 383.21 Japan (3-13-45) BP pt 2. JCS 1380/164, 15 Jun S3, same file, sec 33.

127. JCS 1380/1691 Aug 53, same file, sec 35.

128. NY Times, 10 Aug 53, 1.

129. SM-1517-53 to CINCFE, 14 Aug 53, JCS 1380/170, CCS 383.21 Japan (3-13-45) sec 36.

130. Ltr, CINCFE to CJCS, "Japanese Force Goals," 28 Oct 53, JCS 1380/172,9 Nov 53, same file.

131. Stebbins, United States in World Affairs. 1953, p. 265; NY Times, 28 Sep 53, 1.

132. Msg, CINCFE CX 65264 to DEPTAR (for JCS), 30 Sep 53, DA IN 9127, CCS 383.21 Japan

(3-13-45) sec 36.

133. fhe value of the yen in 1953 was approximately $0.0027, i.e., there were roughly 370 yen per

dollar.

134. For the administrative agreement o! 28 February 1952, see Dept of State, Treaties and Other

International Agreements, III, 1952, part 3, pp. 3341-3362. The provisions cited in the text were contained in Article XXV.

135. At prevailing exchange rates, $155 million amounted to approximately 57 billion yen, but

various other contributions made by Japan in JFY 1953 raised the total to 62.0 billion fcr that year. See

breakdown of Japanese deiense appropnations attached to Ltr, Japanese Amb to CJCS,6 Apr 55,

OCJCS File 091 Japan (1953-May 1957), and budget tabulation in TabH to "Rpt of Van Fleet Mission,"

Ch. XI, "Japan."

136 Details of this discussion are summarizedm Msg, DA 951151 to CINCFE, 24 Oct 53, CCS

383.21 Japan (3-13-45) sec 36.

137 For text of joint statement released 30 October 19*3, set« Dept of State Bulletin. (9 Nov 53), pp.

637-638.

138 Memo, SecDef to JCS. "Development of Japanese Defense Forces,"9 Oct 53. JCS 1380/171. 13

Oct 53, Memo. JCS to SecDef. "Development of Japanese Defense Forces," 24 Nov 53, JCS 1380173;

CCS 383 21 Japan (3-13-45) sec 36

139 JCS 1380175, 18 Dec 53. same file, sec 37.

140 Msgs; Tokyo 1415 to State.7 Dec 53, DA IN 26970; Tokyo 1433 to State,9 Dec 53, DA IN

27436; CINCFE C-66419 to DEPFAR (for JCS),9 Dec 53. DA IN 27302, CCS 383.21 Japan (3-13-45) sec

37.

141 JCS 1380176. 17 Dec 53. same file

142 Memo. JCS to SecDef, "Japanese Defense Forces." 21 Dec 53. JCS 1380/176, same file.

143 Memo. ASDflSA) to JCS. "Japanese Defense Forces." 29 Dec 53. JCS 1380/177.6 Jan 54; Msg,

JCS 954933 to CINCFE, 29 Dec 53; CCS 383 21 Japan (3-13-45) sec 37 The JCS, in this message,

reduced to seven the number of ships recommended for loan to the Japanese in JFY 1954. eliminating

one of the three minesweeper*

144 General Van Fleet, after returning twm his mission to Japan in mid-1954, reported that the

Japanese plan had been revised in March 1954 and now called fora ground force of approximately

200,000 by the end of JFY 1957, organized into6 divisions ana4 RCTs. plusa naval force of 217 »hips

(156.000 tons) and an air force of 35 squadrons "Rpt of Van Fleet Mission." Ch. XI. "Japan," pp. IM,

US. IM0.

145 The text of the agreement on Japanese force goals for 1954 has not been found, but its

408 . i• *

j . - *
Notes to Pages 274-278

A I

substance is reported in OCB Progress Report on NSC 125/2 and NSC 125/6, 27 Oct 54, CCS 092

Japan (12-12-50) sec 18; also in JCS 1380/194, 29 Oct 54, CCS 383.21 Japan (3*13-45) sec 41.

146. NY Tim«,9 Jan 54, 3; 10 Jan 54, 1;5 Mar 54, 4. "Apt of Van Fleet Mission," Ch. XI, "Japan,"

Tab H. In dollar amounts, the total defense budget was approximately $381 million, with $220

million for the Japanese forces (the value of the yen having risen slightly to $0.0028, or 357 per

dollar).

147. This agreement was made by an exchange of notes on6 April 1954, which was released to the

public. (Dept of State, Treaties and Other International Agreements, V, 1954, part 1, pp. 742-748.)

148. See text of agreement and related statements in Dept of State Bulletin, (5 Apr 54), pp. 518-522.

149. OCB Progress Report on NSC 125/2 and NSC 125/6, 27 Oct 54, CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec

18.

150. JCS 1380/174,3 Dec 53, CCS 383.21 Japan (3-13-45) sec 36. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Designation of

a Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Japan," 18 Mar 54, same file, sec 38. NY Times,2

May 54, 27.

151. Dept of State, Treaties and Other International Agreements, V, 1954, part 1, pp. 1014-1018. Ltr,

Amb Allison to CJCS,1 Mar 54, OCJCS File 091 Japan (1953-May 1957).

152. OCB Progress Report on NSC 125/2 and 125/6, 27 Oct 54, CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec 18. NY

Times,3 Jun 54, 4. "Rpt of Van Fleet Mission," Ch. XI, "Japan," pp. 11-2- II-4, 11-12.

153. No evidence of JCS reaction has been found in available records.

154. Msg, Tokyo 1403 to State. 15 Dec 54, DA IN 105364, CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec 19.

155. NY Times, 21 Jul 54. 7.

156. Stebbins. United States in World Affairs, 1954, pp. 292-295.

157. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "MDA Programs for FY 1955-1958 Which WU1 Support U.S. Military

Strategy," 17 Jun 54, JCS 2099/368, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 114. Minor changes were made by the

committee in the Japanese air force objectives that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended, and

the total number of naval vessels, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not specified in their December

1953 recommendations, was set at 421.

158. Memo. JCS to SecDef. "MDA Programming Guidance for FY 1956," 19 May 54. JCS 2099/374,

CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 112.

159. NY Times, 25 Oct 54, 8.

160. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Formal Talks with Japanese Regarding Defense and Related Matters,"

23 Sep 54, JCS 1380/191, 24 Sep 54, CCS 383.21 Japan (3-13-45) sec 40.

161. Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to JCS, "U.S. Position Paper on Defense Measures for Conversations

with Prime Minister Yoshida." 25 Oct 54. JCS 1380/193, 28 Oct 54. same file, sec 41.

162. Msg,ClNCFE-C-70136toDEPTAR,I Nov 54. DA IN 95631, CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec 19

163 Memo, JCS to SecDef. "Formal Talks with Japanese Regarding Defense and Related Matters,"5

Nov 54. JCS 1380/194; Memo. JCS to SecDef. "U. S. Position Paper on Defense Measures for Conversations with Prime Minister Yoshida," 5 Nov S4. JCS 13801%, CCS 383.21 Japan (3-13-45) MC 4i

164. NU of JCS 1380/194. 10 Nov 54; N'H of JCS 1380/196. 10 Nov 54; same til".

165. NY Times.8 Nov 54, I; Public Papers. Lisenhourr. 1954. pp. 1042-1044

166. Ltr, SecDef to SecState. 10 Dei 54. CCS 383 21 Japan (3-13-45) sec 42 N/H of JCS 1380194. 14

Dec 54, s,me file, sec 41

167. Msg, Tokvo 1403 to State. 15 Dec 54. DA IN 105364; GEN Hull associated himself with these

views in Msg, CTNCFE to DEPTAR. 71040.7 Jan 55. DA IN 109481, CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec 19

168 Msg. State 1271 to Tokvo. 24 Dec 54. DA IN 107303, CCS 383 21 Japan (3-13-45) sec 42

169 Msg, Tokvo 1555 to State. 31 Dec 54. DA IN 108406. CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec 19.

170 NY Times',7 Dec 54, 1; 10 Dec 54.1

171 ttnd.,5 Jan 55, 3. The only official account of Admiral RadKmi* visit that ha» been found in

the records examined for this study is in Msg, Tokyo 1605 to Stale.6 Jan 55. OCJCS Kile 091 Japan

(1953-May 1957). It describesa courtesy call by Admiral Radferd, General Hull, and Ambassador

Allison on Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigeniitsu Their discussion dealt chiefly with the statu» of

war criminals.

172 Memo. Dep ASDftSA) to JCS, "Japanese Defense Force Budget for Japan Fiscal Year 1955."8

Mar 55, JCS 1380/201, 10 Mar 55. CCS 383 21 Japan (3-13-45) sec 43 The position of ASD(ISA) was

then held by Mr.H Strove Mensel, who was at that time in Tokyo attempting to induce the Japanese

to spend more for defense. (NY Times,6 Mar 55. 1)

173 Memo. JCS to SecDef, "Japanese Defense Force Budget tor Japan Fiscal Year 1955." 25 Mar

55. JCS 1380/202. CCS 383 21 Japan (3-13-45) sec 43

174. For evidence of the extent of disagreement, net NY Time».6 Mar 55. I;4 Apr 55, I.

175 This fact had been notedm Ltr. Actg As*tSeeState(FE) to ASD(!SA). 28 Feb 55, JCS 1380201.

10 Mar 55. CCS 3H3 21 Japan (3-13-45) sec 43

409 . ; .
I

Notes to Pages 278-286

176. The budget figures are taken from NY Times, 19 Apr 55, 4, and OCB "Progress Report on

U. S. Policy Toward Japan (NSC 5516/1)/* 19 Oct 55, CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec 21. The force and

personnel objectives are from the Progress Report and from Ltr, Japanese Amb to CJCS,6 Apr 55,

OCJCS File 091 Japan (1953-May 1957). The date of the agreement is not indicated. The NY Times

reported that the JFY 1955 budget would be used in future years as the "base figure" in Japanese

rearmament planning; the reporter, Robert Trumbull, understood this to meana promise that

future defense budgets would not be allowed to fall below the 1955 amount. However, the term

"base figure" as used in US discussions had not been so interpreted.

177. Ltr, Japanese Amb to CJCS,6 Apr 55, (enclosing tables showing revised force plan and

projected JFY 1955 budget as well as those of earlier years tor comparison), OCJCS File 091 Japan

(1953-Mav 1957).

178. NY Times, 20 Apr 55, 3.

179. Dept of State, Treaties and Other International Agreements, VI, 1955, part 1, pp. 14-15.

Chapter 13. Western Europe, 1953

1.A convenient summary of the organization and early history of NATO can be found in Lord

Ismav. NATO. The First Five Years, 1949-1954 (1954), pp. 1-81.

2. JCS 21436,7 Dec 50, CCS 381 (1-26-50) BPpt 1. JCS 1844/126,2 Jul 52, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) BP

pt 6. JCS 1844/156, 14 Apr 54, CCS 381 (11-29-49) BP pt 5.

3. Off of NAT Affairs. OASD(ISA), "Outline of NATO Force Goals as Accepted at the Lisbon

Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, February 23, 1952." n.d, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)

BP pt 14.

4. The text of the EDC treaty and related documents can be found in SRE Special Publication,

F.urofvan Defense Community Treaty (Paris, 26 Jan 53), same file, BP pt 20.

5. Stebbtns, Untied States in World Affairs, 1952, pp. 392-400

6. und., pp. 385-438 (Ch. 8, aptly entitled "NATO in the Doldrums").

7. Compare Table 17 with Table 21. (Greek and Turkish forces in Table 21 should be excluded l,i

this comparison since they were not counted in the Lisbon goals.)

8. NY Times, 10 Jan 53,1

9. Eisenhower, Mandate tor Omngc, pp 13*-140

10 rW Time*, 14 Jan 53, 1. Their trip was made between 30 Jan and9 Feb S3. See Stebbtns. United

Slate* in World Affairs. 1953. p. 479, Eisenhower, Mandate tor Changt, p. 140.

11 PuWu Papers. Itsenhourt. 1953, pp 6. 14-15.

12 NSC 1531. 10 Jun 53. CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 26

13 NSC 162/2. 30 Oct 53. same file, sec 31

14 Ltr. Amb WÜUam H. Draper. Jr.. to Pre*.8 Mar 53. JCS 2073550,7 Apr 53. CCS 092 Western

Europe (V12-48) sec 211

15. Ltr, Pre* ta Draper. 16 Mar 53, JCS 2073550,7 Apr 53. same file

16 Menu», |CS to SecDef, "Strengthening the Military Force* and Defense Posture oi the Atlantic

Community," 20 May 53. JCS 2073 570, same tile, »ec 220.

17 JCS 21247V, 15 Jan 53, CCS 092 Germany (M-4*) set 14

18 JCS 212483. 1«* Feb 53, »»me file and JCS 2124 84.6 Mar 53. same rüe. set 15 The first of these

retefs to Ji»cu»*tum on 28 January 1953 by the JCS with SeeState, Director of Mutual Security, and

Ihre«.tor of Central Intelligence

I* SM*0*-53i

u US Rep. Standing Group, 20 .Mar 53. JCS 2124*4. CCS 0*2 Germany (5*4-4*) *ev

15

20 The origin and general nature of the Annual Review are described in Ismav. NATO, pp 8**7

21 Ihi. . p 1*3

22 SM'761-53 u> US Rep. Standing Group.* Apr 53. JCS 207.V553. CCS 0*2 Western Europe

(3-12-48) »ec 212 The evolution of the International Staff proposals >» summarised in JCS 2073353.8

Apt 53. same file

23 Ihr US proposal* and those of the International Staff can be found tabulated in Memo, Dir,

Off ot NAT Affairs, O.ASDHSAlUS Position on 1*53 ^rui 1*54 NATO Force Goal* for the 1*52

Annuai Review, 11 Apr 53, CCS W2 Western Europe t> 12-*») sec 214 Vh* extent to which the tinai

US position was shaped by JCS recommendation* cannot he determined from the evidence available

24 "Outline of NATO Force Goals as Acctpttd at the Lisbon Meeting .'nd. Off oi NAT

Affairs OAStXISAL CCS 0*2 Western Europe (3-12-48) BP pt 14

25 Memo. Act* SrcAF to SecOef, 13 Apr 53 end to Memo. SecLVf to JCS. NATO 1*53 and 1*54

Force Goal* .'"8 Jun 5V same hie, »ec 222

410

4-.-r
^

Notes to Pages 286-292

26. Ibid.

27. Memo, Nash to SecDef, "United States Forces Assigned or Earmarked for NATO,"6 Apr 53.

CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 211. Mr. Nash's original title, "Assistant to the Secretary" was

changed to "Assistant Secretary" under the President's Reorganization Plan No.6 of 1953. He and

his successor, Mr. H. Struve Hensel, were the principal channel of JCS contact with OSD in the

discussion of NATO matters during this period.

28. The list of US delegates is given in Dept of State Bulletin. (4 May 53), p. 662.

29. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "NATO 1953 and 1954 Force Goals Resulting from the 1952 Annual

Review,"8 Jun 53, JCS 2073/581, 10 Jun 53, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 223.

30. Ibid.

31. NSC 149,3 Apr 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 25.

32. "Statement by Secretary Wilson (at NAC Meeting) Concerning Production and Delivery of

Equipment," n.d., end to Memo, SecDef to JCS, "NATO 1953 and 1954 Force Goals . . . ,"8 Jun 53,

CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 222.

33. Dept of State Bulletin, (11 May 53), pp. 673-674.

34. Ibid., pp. 674-675.

35. NY Times, 13 May 53, 1; 26 May 53, 12.

36. The evolution of this plan may be traced in Memo for Record, Secy, JCS, "Proposed Reorganization of SACEUR's Center Command," 15 Jan 53, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 1%, and

Memo, SACEUR to CJCS, "Command Structure, Allied Command Europe," 12 Feb 53, same file, sec

201. GEN Ridgway wrote that his predecessor, GEN Eisenhower, during the latter part of his tenure

as SACEUR, had been preparing to recommend substantially the same organizational changes.

37. Memo, O. N. B(radlev) to Dep US Rep, Standing Group, "Reorganisation of SACEUR's Center Command/' 30 Mar 53, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 209.

38. JCS 1868/458, 30 Apr 53, same file, sec 217. Memo. GEN M.B Ridgway to CJCS. 20 Mav 53,

N/H of JCS 1868/459, 28 Mav 53, same file, sec 218 SM-1074-53 to US Rep, Standing Group. 27 Mav

53, JCS 1868/459, same file, sec 221.

39. JCS 1868/462.8 Jun 53. same file, sec 222 JCS 1868/464,3 Jul 53, same file, sec 225 The decision

had been announced publicly on9 June; NY Times, 10 Jun 53, 14.

40. Umav. NATO,p 74; NY Times. 20 Aug 53, 7.

41. Memo, SecDef to Pre«, 26 Mav 53, JCS 186&474, 18 Aug 5.>, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-4«)

sec 233. NY Times. 28 May 53,1

42. Memo. JCS to SecDef, "Guidance lor the United States Representative to the Military Committee and to the Standing Group oi the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," 20 Aug 53, JCS 1868/470,

CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 234.NH of JCS 1868/470, 21 Oct 53. same file, sec 231

43 PuNu Payers, Etsenhourr. 1953, pp 342-354

44 Dept ot State Bulletin. (13 Jul 53),p 48 NY Times.2 Jun 53, 25 Memo. ASD(ISA) to JCS,

Appointment of Mr TracyS Voorhees ."27 Aug 53, OCJCS File 0922 North Atlantic Treaty

(Aug-Dec 53)

45 Ltr. Draper to Pre-».5 Jun 53. JCS 2073597.7 Jul 53, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 226

A copy ofa new and broader study of NATO's problems (military, political, and economic) was

transmitted with this letter and <*r\ be tound in JCS PB Adv Files, NSC 54331—Immediate US

Policy Toward Europe

46. Memo, SecDef to JCS, Certain European Issues Affecting the United States.' 17 Jul 53, JCS

2073/605. 21 Jul 53. CCS 092 Western fcurope (3-1? *8) sec 22«

47 Memo, ADM Radford, GEN Ridgway.A

rM Camev.

. nd GEN Twining to SecDef,8 Aug 53,

Memo by RJobertJ C{utler|, "August 2753 NSC Meeting.1 Sep 53. OCJCS File. New Look

Document*

48 JCS 2073.630. 24 AUJJ 53, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) MC 234

49. Memo by CSA. '.Certain European Issues Attectmg the United States," |27 Aug 53), same tile.

MC 235 JCS 207*640.8 Sep 53, same hie. set 237

50 JCS 2073/633. 31 Aug 53. same file, sec 23«»

51 Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Certain European Issue» Affecting the United State». 11 Sep 53. JCS

2073634. CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) see 238

52 Stebbin», United States in Wtrid AH*m. 1953. pp 122-1V»

53 thui, pp 186-188

54 Treated more fully in Ch $,

55 NSC Action No 777, 2« Apr 53.

56 ft* these drafts, see the several Memo». t;*ecSecy. NSC. to NSC PB. 29 May, 24 Jun. ft Jul, and

27 Jul 53. CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec 15 and 16

411 <
Notes to Pages 292-297

57. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Draft of a Proposed United States Position with Respect to Germany/'

23 Jul 53. JCS 2124/86, 24 Jul 53, same file, sec 16.

58. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Draft of a Proposed United States Position with Respect to Germany,"

30 Jul 53, JCS 2124/87, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec 16.

59. NSC 160, 4 Aug 53; Memo, JCS to SecDef, "NSC 160, United States Position with Respect to

Germany," 11 Aug 53, JCS 2124/89; same file, sec 17.

60. NSC Action No. 881, 13 Aug 53. NSC 160/1, 17 Aug 53, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) BP pt 2A.

61. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "United States Position with Respect to German Unification," 18 Sep

53, JCS 2124/106, same file, sec 19.

62. Memo ASD(ISA) to JCS, "U. S. Position with Respect to German Unification," 3 Sep 53, JCS

2124/93 10 Sep 53, same file, sec 17. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Proposed European Security System,"

30 Sep 53, JCS 2124/110, same file, sec 20.

63. Memo, SecDef to JCS. "Proposed European Security System," 23 Sep 53, JCS 2124/107, 23 Sep

53, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec 19. A map showing the extent of the proposed demilitarized zone

appears as appendix to JCS 2124/108, 24 Sep 53, same file.

64. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Proposed European Security System," 30 Sep 53, JCS 2124/110, same

file, sec 20.

65. Stebbins, United States in World Affairs.1953, pp. 382-387, 425-428.

66. JCS 1844/126. 2 Jul 52, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) PB pt 6.

67. NSC 72/6, 27 Jun 51, CCS 092 Spain (4-19-46) sec 5.

68. Mutual Security Appropriation Act, 1952; Mutual Security Act of 1952; Supplementary Appropriation Act, 1953; PLs 249, 400, and 547; 82d Cong; 31 Oct 51. 20 Jun 52. and 15 Jul 52.

69 Stebbins, United States in World Affairs. 1952. pp. 95, 421-422.

70. Memo, ExecSecy. NSC, to MSC, "Negotiations with Spain," 11 May 53. CCS 092 Spain

(4-19-46) sec 14. Additional information about the course of the negotiations is given in Memo,

ActgSecState to ExecSecy. NSC, "Third Progress Report on "United States Policy Toward Spain'

. . . ," 15 Feb 54. same file, sec 15

71. NSC Action No. 786. 13 May 53.

72. Memo. ExecSecy. NSC, to NSC. "Negotiations with Spain." 19 May 53. CCS 092 Spain

(4-19-46) sec 14. NSC Action No. 795, 20 May 53.

73. Stebbins, United States in World Affairs. 1953, pp. 208-209 Dept of State Bulletin. (5 Oct 53). pp.

235-244

74. NSC Staff Studv. "U S Polio/ Toward Spain" (paragraph 46). part of NSC 5418/1. 9 Jun 54,

CCS 092 Spain (4-19-46) sec 16

75 Memo. SecDef to JCS. "MDA Materiel Programs for Spam," 17 Sep 53, JCS 2099 313. 22 Sep

53. CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 97

76 JCS 182195. 29 Sep 53; Dec On JCS 1*21/96. 17 Nov 53; CCS 092 Spain (4-19-46) sec 14.

77 Memo. JCS to SecDef, "Mutual Defense Assistance Programs for Spain," 13 Jan 54, JCS

20W342. N H of JCS 2099 342. 26 Feb 54. CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 102

78. These considerations may be followed through JCS 1821 88, 30 jan 53; JCS 18211*9, 26 Feb 53;

JCS 1821-90. 3 Mar 53; CCS 092 Spain (4-19-46) sec 13

79. Memo. JCS tu SecDef, Terms oi Reference for the Military Assistance Advisory Group Spain."

22 Apr 53. JCS 1821^2. same file

80 Memo tor Record, ASD(ISA), "Organization for United States Military Activities in Spain,'* 15

Aug 53. same file, see 14

81 Memo. Aetg SecDef to Set. AF. "Responsibility tor all U S. Military Activities in Spam, for the

Constructton of the Bases, and for the Supervision ol the MAAG. " 2 Sep 53. JCS 1821 "94, 24 Sep 53.

CCS 092 Spain (4-19-46) sec 14

82 AF GO No 43. 6 Nov 53. same file

83 Memo. SecDef to JCS. "NATO 1953 and 1954 Force Goal* Resulting from the 1952 Annual

Review, 8 Jun 53. JCS 2073^81. 10 Jun 53. CCS 092 Western Euro»* (3-12-48) sec 223

84. Memo. JCS to SecDef. "Policy Aspect* of the United State» Reply ft the NATO Annual Review

Questionnaire." 16 Jul 53. JCS 2073XH>. same file, sec 227 SM-1446-53 to SecDef. 28 Jul 53. JCS

2073.603, same Hk. BP pt 25

The Army, in listing its goals, set forth its ultimate objective» (to tv achieved at an unspecified time

after M-day) as 16 '» divisions for 1953 and 17 V, by 1954 Her*x General Ridgway's statement in

December 1954 that the Army was obligated to NATO for 17 divisions; see Ch. 4

85 Memo. SecDef to JCS rr •)., V S Forces Assigned or Earmarked «or NATO." 7 Aug 53, JCS

2073,619, 8 Aug 53. CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 232

86 Memo. JCS to SecDef. "U S. Forces Assigned at Earmarked for North Atlantic Treaty

O/ganiration/' 13 Aug 53. JCS 2073*622. same file, BP pt 26A

412

■■
Notes to Pages 298-305

87. USRO/DART, "Recommended Position on Defense Aspects of the 1953 NATO Annual Review

(The White Book)," 15 Nov 53, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) BP pt 28. Memo, JCS to SecDef,

"Estimates of NATO Forces 1954-1957," 27 Nov 53, JCS 2073/711, same file, sec 252.

88. Memos, SACEUR to CJCS, "Deployment of 280-mm Gun Battalions to USAREUR" and

"Possible Political Complications in Deployment of 280-mm Gun Battalions to Europe," 13 Jun 53,

JCS 2073585.17 Jun 53, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 224. Memo, JCS to SecDef. "Deployment

of 280-mm Gun Battalions to U. S. Army, Europe (USAREUR)," 3 Jul 53, JCS 2073/589, same file, sec

225. Memo, ASD(ISA) to JCS, "Shipment of 280-mm Gun Battalions to Europe," 12 Aug 53, JCS

2073/628, 19 Aug 53, same file, sec 233.

89. Memo, SecDef to CJCS "U. S. Guidance for the 1953 Annual Review," 30 Sep 53, JCS 2073/658,

6 Oct 53, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 242. The memo refers to a meeting on 25 September

1953 attended by CJCS, SecState, and others, »t which ADM Radford undertook to secure the JCS

views on NATO strategy.

90. JCS 2073/671, 16 Oct 53. CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 245.

91. Memo, JCS to SecDjf, "U. S. Guidance for the 1953 Annual Review," 22 Oct 53. JCS 2073/671.

same file.

92. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Department of Defense Participation in Intergovernmental Working

Croup for United States-United Kingdom Discussions," 30 Oct 53, same file, sec 247. JCS 2073/695,

17 Nov 53. same file, sec 250

93. Memo. ASD(ISA) to JCS, "NATO Annual Review 1954." 19 Nov 53. JCS 2073/700, 20 Nov 53,

same file, sec 251.

94. Memo. JCS to SecDef. "NATO Annual Review 1954." 24 Nov 53. JCS 2073/701, same file, sec

251A.

95. NSC Action Nos. 977, 981, 10 Dec 53.

96. US delegates Art listed in Dept of State Bulletin, (21 Dec 53), p. 855.

97. NY Times, 15 Dec 53. 14. Secretary Dulles also used the words "agonizing reappraisal" in his

formal statement during the NAC meeting; USRO/DART, "Report on NATO 1953 Annual Review

and Resulting Problems Affecting the 1954 Annual Review (The Blue Book)." 15 Feb 54, CCS 092

Western Europe (3-12-48) BP Pt 29 (hereafter cited as 1953 Blue Book)

98. 1953 Blue Book. Pt I. sees B and D. CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-42) BP pt 29

99. Although Secretary Wilson gave no figures, his reference apparently was to the fact that the

Air Force now proposed to retain only 346 aircraft in the United States instead of the 466 expected

earlier. His statement to the Council was largely based on material supplied htm bv Memo, JCS to

SecDef, "Estimates of NATO Forces 1954-1957," 27 Nov 53, JCS 2073/711, CCS 092 Western Europe

(3-12-48) sec 252.

100 Text of the SecDef statement to NAC. 15 Dec 53. is in OC JCS File 092.2 NATO (Aug-Dec 53);

also in 1953 Blue Book, Pt I, mC

101 "Resolution on the 1954 Annual Review and Related Problems," approved bv NAC on 15

Dec 53; 1953 Blue Book, Pt II. sec A

102 Text »it Ismay, NATO, pp 197-199

Chapter 14. Western Europe, 1954

1 Stebhins. UmtfU Stole* m Wartd Afyttn, 1954. pp 115- lb

2 Memo. ASD(ISA) to JCS, "Military Participation in Berlin Foreign Ministers Meeung, 1954," ?

Jan 54, Memo. JCS to SecDef. »ame *ubj, 12 Jan 54; CCS 33'/ (4-19*50) well.

3 SeeCh. 12. Stebbtns, Umted State* in W„»rW Affrm. !*M, pp 114-126

4 PL 703. 83d Cong, 30 Aug 54

5. Secretary Dulles * statement to 23 April 1954 NAC meeting i* reproduced in USIIO DART.

Report on the NATO 1954 Annual Revtrw plu» Facto»** and Problem» Affecting the 1955 Annual

Review (The 1°54 Blue ft. *)." 2 Jan 55, Pt KM. OSO Subn>j?i»try Dept of State Butletm, (3 May 54),

pp. 6*8, 670

t> The*e comment» are summarized m JCS 2073/S23, 27 M*v 54. CCS 092 Western Europe

(3*12-48) MC 283

7 JCS 207**23, 27 May 54. **me file

* Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Use of Atomic Weapon*." II Jun 54. JCS 20V3.823. »ame file sei 2*5

9 For receipt of the SACLANT, SACEUR, And CHANCOM »tudie* by JCS, <ee JCS 207**43. 6 Jul

54, CCS 092 We*tem Europe (3-12-4*) sec 2*8. JCS 2073**4«. 20 Jul 54, *nd JCS 23734». 21 Jul 54.

same file, see 2*9

413
Notes to Pages 306-311

10. This was the gist of the SACEUR study as reported in the press; NY Times, 25 Jul 54, 1; 14 Aug

54, 2. See also Robert E. Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (1962), pp. 105-109, for a summary of

this study, and for excerpts from public statements by NATO commanders (some dating back to

1952) indicating that they foresaw eventual use of tactical nuclear weapons.

11. JCS 2073/848. 20 jul 54, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 289.

12- JCS 2073/869, 17 Aug 54, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 293. The draft, SG 241/3,

cannot now be located. Its general tenor may be inferred from GEN Collins's statements and from

the following: JCS 2073/887, 10 Sep 54, same file, sec 297; OASD(ISA), Transcript of State-Defense

Conference with SACEUR on New Approach Atomic Planning, 6 Oct 54, same file, BP pt 2.

13. Ltr. SecDef to SecState, 16 Aug 54, JCS 2073/870, 19 Aug 54, same file, sec 294. The designation

"New Approach" (corresponding to the New Look in connection with US strategy) seems to have

originated with Secretary Wilson, but apparently never passed into genera! use.

14. Memo, AetgSecDef to JCS, "Use of Atomic Weapons," 26 Aug 54, JCS 2073/877, 27 Aug 54,

CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 295.

15. Stebbins, United States in World Affairs, 1954, p. 133.

16. Fc 'ext of communique of meeting of 23 Apr 54, see Ismay, NATO, pp. 199-200.

17. Sit.-wins. United Stair. World Affairs, 1953, pp. 158-160, 442-443. and United States in World

Affairs, 1*54. pp. 132-134.

18. Stebbins, United States in World Affairs. 1954, pp. 135-136; Public Papers. Eisenhower, 1954, pp.

400-402.

19. PL 118, 83d Cong, 16 Jul 53.

20. PL 665, 83d Cong, 26 Aug 54.

21. Stebbins, United States in World Affairs, 1954, pp 139-149.

22. JCS 2101/113. 10 Dec 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-5") sec 32.

23 Memo, JO? to SecDef, "Estimate of the Military Posture Throughout the Free World, FY 1956

Through FY 1959." 21 May 54.. JCS 2101/134, same file, sec 39

24 Memo, SecDef to JCS. "EDC Alternative Planning," 22 Jun 54. JCS 2124/118, 22 Jun 54, CCS

092 Germanv (5-4-49) sec 22.

25 Memo, JCS to SecDef, "EDC Alternative Planning," 25 Jun 54, JCS 2124/119. same file.

26 Ltr*. Dir. Off of Foreign Mil Affairs. OASD(lSA), to DepUSecState, 8 Jul and 16 Aug 54;

Memo. DepASDOSA) to JCS, "EDC Alternative Planning," 17 Aug 54. JCS 2124/!21. 18 Aug 54; same

file

27 DepASDUSA) sent this proposal to the JCS on 24 Aug 54. but thev took no action on it; JCS

2124,123. 25 Aug 54, same tile.

28 Stebbins. United States in World Affair*. 1954, pp. 147-150; NY Times, 31 Aug 54, 1

29 PuNu Pafrrs. Eisenhower, 1954. p 789 (speech given on 30 Aug 54)

30 Dept of State bulletin, (13 Sep 54), pp 363-364

31 NSC. Action No 1227, 24 Sep 54 NSC 54331. 25 Sep 54; copy m file* of JCS PB Adv, where the

earlier version. NSC 5433, 16 Sep 54. containing the dissenting view* of the JCS Adviser, is also to be

found. For the |CS comments on NSC 5433, see Memo. JCS to SecDef. "Immediate United States

Policy tow :rd F.un>pe~~NSC 5433," 22 Sep 54, JCS 2124132, CCS 092 Germanv (5-4-49) sec 25.

32 SM-788-54 to JSSC. 3 Sep 54. CCS 092 Germany (5-4-4*) sec 23.

33 Memo. DepSecLVi to JCS, "Strategic Issue» Contnmtmg the U S In Europe," 10 Sep 54, JCS

2124 126, 10 Sep 54. same file

34 Memo. Actg SecDef to |CS, "Military Program for the Rearmarr.ent of West Germanv." 2 Sep

54. HS 2124124. 7 Sep 54. same file

35 Stebbtns, Untied State* m World Affair*. 1954. p 154

.16 "JCS Agreed Statement Submitted to the Secretary of Defense as of Possible Use to the

Secretary of State." 15 Sep 54, enti to Not* to Control Dtv. 17 Sep 54. CCS 092 Germanv <M-4?) see

24 JCS 2124:35. 22 Sep 54, same file, sec 25

3? JCS 2124 127. 14 Sep 54, CCS 0*2 Germany (5-4-49) see 23

» JCS 2124179, 16 Sep 54. ame tue.

39 SM-*S23-54 to JSSC. JSPC. »rxä JLPC 17 Sep 54. %amr hie. see 24

40 JCS 2124 133. 22 Sep 54. same file, sec 25

4i Memo, JCS tw SecDef. "Strategic Issue* Confronting the V S tn Europe.' 22 Sep 54, JCS

2124135, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec 25

42 Memo. lUeeSeev. NSC*, to NSC Immediate U S Policy Toward Europe. 23 Sep 54, same

hie

43 CM-U0-54 to JCS. 7 Sep 54. CCS 092 We*tem Eumpe (3424t) set 296

44 Memo. ASDflSA) to JCS. Use of Atomic Weapon». 13 Sep 54. JCS 2073/391. 15 Sep 54. %tnw

ttk. MC 29»

414
Notes to Pages 3U-316

45. N/H of JCS 2073/887, 10 Sep 54, same file, sec 297.

46. Msg, Paris POLTO 434 to State, 16 Sep 54, summarizes developments at this meeting; same

file, sec 298.

47. JCS 2073/887, 10 Sep 54, same file, sec 297.

48. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "NATO Capabilities Studies," 24 Sep 54, JCS 2073/900, same file, sec

3H0. The enclosed SG 241/3 (JCS Revision) was titled "The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military

Strength for the Next Few Years." Since the original version of SG 241/3 is not available, the full

effect of the JCS revision cannot be determined.

49. Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 27 Sep 54, JCS 2073/908, 6 Oct 54, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)

sec 302.

50. Memo, DepASD(ISA) to JCS and US Rep, Standing Group, "Report to the North Atlantic

Council on NATO Capabilities Studies," 11 Oct 54. JCS 20737918. 14 Oct 54, san* hie, sec 305.

51. JCS 2073/909, 7 Oct 54, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) see 303. No copy of 1PT 178/15

appears in the records, but the differences between it and SG 241/3 (JCS Revision) are indicated in

detail in JCS 2073/930, 2 Nov 54, same file, sec 309. Subsequent changes in 1PT 178/15 can be traced

bv means of JCS 2073/951. 19 Nov 54. same file, sec 313. and JCS 2073/965, 30 Nov 54, same file, sec

315.

52. OASD(lSA) Transcript of State Defense Conference with SACEUR on New Approach Atomic

Planning, 6 Oct 54. CCS 092 Wesiern Europe (3-12-48) BP pt 32. The Defense participants included

Mr. Hensel. ASD(!SA). his Deputy, VADM Davis, and the principal assistant of CJCS. RADM G. W.

Anderson. Jr.

53. Memo, ASD(1SA) to JCS, "U. S. Action on NATO Capabilities Studies ... in Support of NATO

Forces." 8 Oct 54. JCS 2073/917, 12 Oct 54, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 304 Memo. JCS to

SecDef, same subj, 22 Oct 54. JCS 2073/921. same file «ec 308.

54. Memo. Staff Secy, White House to SecState. SecDef. and CJCS, 4 Nov 54. and Memo, SecState

and SecDef to Pres, "Recommended U S. Position on NATO Nuclear Strategy," 3 Nov 54. JCS

2073/942. 8 Nov 54; Msg, DEF 970612 to USNMR Paris, 6 Nov 54; CCS 0*2 Western Europe (.V12-48)

sec 310.

55. Stebbtns. United State* m World Affair*. 1954. pp. 150-154.

56. Memo. ASD(1SA) to JCS. "Preparation for the 9-Power Conference in London," 21 Sep 54. JCS

2124131. 21 Sep 54. CCS 092 Germany (5-1-49) >ec 24.

57 Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Preparations for the «Power Conference in London," 22 Sep 54, JCS

2124134, same file, sec 25.

58. For the Nine-Power Conference in London, see Stebbtns, United States m Wi>rld Affair*. 1954,

pp 154-160. The document* emanating from the conference are printed in Dept of State Bulletin. (11

Oct 54). pp 515-528

59 Stebbms. United State* m World Affair*. 1954. pp lbu-163; Dept of Slate Bulletin. (15 Nov S4).

pp 719-733.

feu. Stebbm*. United State* m World Affair*. 1954. pp 178-181

61. NSC Action No 1255. 28 Oct 54

62. Memo. JCS to SeeOef. "Military Program for the Rearmament of West Germany," 13 Oct 54.

JCS 2124142, CCS W2 Germany (5-4-49) *ec 28

t»3 N H ol JC^S 2124142. 31 Dec 54, *ame file, sec 27

M Memo. JCS to SecDef, "Military A»*i*tance Advisory Group, Germany." 2** Sep 54. JCS

209*419, CCS 092 (8-22-46) *ec 120 Memo. SecDef to JCS. Mutual Defense Assistance Program tor

the Federal RepuN* uf Germany." 27 Oct 54, JCS 20W42**. 2** Oct 54. *ame file *cc 122

65 Memo. JCS to SecOeL "Report to the North Atlantic Council on NATO Ca|*abUitte* Studie*.

5 Nov 54. JCS 2073430, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 310

efc JCS 2073*51. 19 Nov 54. same file, sec 313

67 NSC Action No 125**, 2 Nov 54 S\ Time*. 4 Nov 54. 7

68 Memo. DepASDti&A) to CJCS. "Position for Military Committee Meeting, 19 .\W U. OCTCS

File 092 2 NATO (Aug-Pee 54)

m JCS 2073.9*5. 30 Nov 54. CCS 0*2 Wertem Europe (3 124«) sec 313

70 NATO Document MC 4». "The Moai Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength tat the NrM

Few Year»." (Nov 54J, NATO hies MC 48 ha» not been deciasattird and »uhstantivc di»cus*ion of

the document ha» been deleted from thi» volume

71. Recommendations prepared by the tntetnatkmai Stall (*ub*euuent'v adopted bv NAC) and

the US recommenda&om are tabulated in the T954 Blue Book.' 2 Jan 55, Pt 18, C*SD Subees»trv

(hereafter cited a» 1«*54 Blue Book) The JCS had endorsed the US recommendation*, with certain

comment* (Memo. JCS to SecOrf, "NATO Forces for 1V55-1«***, 3 Dec 54. JCS 2073**8, CCS 0*2

Western Europe (3-12-48) »ec 316) for the nutiai recewmendations submitted earlier bv JCS. «er

415

i
Notes to Pages 317-328

Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Reply to Section A. NATO Annual Review Questionnaire, 1954,'' 17 Aug 54,

JCS 2073/840, same file, sec 293.

72. Stebbins. United States in World Affairs, 1954. p. 188.

73. NSC Action No. 1261, 9 Nov 54.

74. 1954 Blue Book, Pt II, sec M.

75. Memo, Staff Secy, White House to SecState. SecDef, and CJCS, 8 Dec 54. OCJCS File 092.2

NATO (Aug-Dec 54). The memo summarizes the principal views *nd actions of the President on the

matters considered at the meeting at 1400 on 8 December.

76. NY Times. 14 Dec 54. 11; 16 Dec 54. 1.

77. Ibid., 14 Dec 54, 1; 15 Dec 54. 8; 16 Dec 54. 11.

78. 1954 Blue Book. Pts I and l-C-14.

79. Msg, USRO Paris. DEFTO 363, to OSD, 17 Dec 54. CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 319

1954 Blue Book. Pt I

80. See extracts from the Secretary-General's report, 10 Dec 54. in 1954 Blue Book, Pt l-C-5.

81. The Council's revolution covering the subjects is reproduced in 1954 Blue Book, Pt l-A.

82. Dept oi State Buiirttn, (3 Jan 55), pp. 10-12.

83. See Ch. 4.

84. For an example of this cnticism, see James M. Gavin, War and Peace in the Spur«* Age (1958), p

152. For the evolution of the Army doctnne of limited war, see Huntington, The Common Defense, pp.

345-347.

Chapter 15. The Middle East

I In this chapter "Middle Fast" relers to that part of thr world extending trom Fgypt and Turkey

eastward through Iran as was the practice in K s documents of the period Fventually Pakistan was

included in the JCS consideration of Middle Fast strategy This JCS usage was at variance with thai of

the NSC and the Department ot State, u :"ith applied the designation "Near Fa&l" to the Ara** States

and Israel. In addition, in discussions oi .he MDA program, Greece was sometimes considered a

Near Eastern country; it was listed with I'urkev and Iran in Title tl of the Mutual Security Acts of 1951

and 1952

2. NSC 129 I. 24 Apr 52. CCS 0*2 Palestine (5-3-46) HP NSC 129 I used «he term "Middle East

Command, but it was later concluded that this might imph ar\ arrangement imposed fnwn the

outside Hence the designation "Middle East I Vtense Organization ' was adopted to *\otd possible

utfense to liw governments ot the region

3 For the situation in the Middle East at the rnd of 1952 an4 the historical background, see

Siebten». United States M» Wwid Affair*. 1952 (1953). pp 228-241. George lenc*ow*ki. Jlu Middle Fas/

in World Affair* (3rd ed . 1962). pp 205-214, 488 502. John C Campbell Defense ot the Middle last

l'n*Um* of AmetuaR Foluy (1958) pp 2*4». feA-64

4 JCS 1*44. 126, 2 Jul 52. CCS 381 CSSK (3 2-4*> 8P pt 6 For the meaning ot inner rmg as used

in British planning. *ee JCS 1844. $56. 14 Apr M. CCS 381 (U-29-49) »V pt 5

5 NSC 1>1. 24 Apr 52. CCS CW2 Palestine (5-3-46) UP

6 Ltr. SecState to SetDet. 4 Nov 52. JCS 171444. 12 Nov 52. CCS i»2 Iran (4-23-48) arc 7

? JCS 1887 61. 2* Nov 52. CCS 38 J EMMFA (U-l*-47) sec 13

« f>ev O« JCS im? 5* I? CM 52 SM-2443 52 to JSPt. I? k Vt 52. same nie »es 12

V SM-2*0-53 to the Representative» of the British Chief» irf ^utt (WCOS) a Feb 53. JCS im? 64

same tUe. »ec 14.

Id Memo. JCS to SevDef UXWMard Aid u* ihe Mid tie Ea*j Area." 5 Nov 52. JCS 1887 **>. same

!de, »ev 12

II Memo. JCS to SeclM MiliUrv A****Urvc* n> »he MiOdie Fast. 5 Nov 52. JCS 20W253. t.\ S

m (^22-4*) sec »3

12 Pete* V CurF ed . D*xi***rni* c* A*aen&* tvm$i Kei*tx>*tt 1*5,3 (1954) pp 35? 3*1

13 It? fVpSev^:ate fu S*vFM. 21 Nov 5: fc'S 2IÖM0, 4 Dec 52. CCS «7 (2 20-50) »es 5

24 Memo tVpSvctVt !o JCS. Militan Aid tor Egypt. 3 Pec 52. JCS 210530. 4 Dec 52. same t&

J5 Memo JCS to SectVt "Military A*i to* Egypt. 16 Pre 52 ft'S 2105 31 same file

1« Urs tJypSeclVf to Senate, 2« Pec 12. SecState to SevPet 11 F*r 52, JCS 2105 32. 12 Jan 53

»arm- tsk. »e<c 6

\" I it estate to SevFvt 1» Jan 5X JC S 2Hft 34. 23 Jan 53, CCS %37 £ 2C%50) sec 6

1» Mrttu>. SfWCA*Pl to SecStale to* Mutual ScvuntV Aiw.r* to MC Octfge H C*lm*Sed PSD.

A-ranf MHlttfy A*d for Egypt i5 Jan S3 K-S 21 öS35. 28 Jan 53 »ame hie

4Mb
Notes to Pages 328-335

19. Memo, Actg SecDef to JCS, "United States-United Kingdom Talks ... on Defense Negotiations with Egypt," 22 Jan 53, JCS 2105/34, 23 Jan 53, same file.

20. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "United States-United Kingdom Talks . .. ," 12 Feb 53. JCS 2105/36,

same file, sec 7.

21. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Military Aid for Egypt," 23 Jan 53, JCS 2105/33. CCS 337 (2-20-50) sec 6.

22. JCS 2099/276, 24 Mar 53. CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 87.

23. NSC Action No. 722, 24 Feb 53.

24. A rather full account of these negotiations is given in Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pp

150-159.

25. Memo. Actg SecDef to JCS. "Program Guidance, Mutual Deiense Assistance Program, FY

1954," 29 Apr 53, JCS 2099/284. 29 Apr 53, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 89. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Force

Bases for the Middle East Area." 13 Mav 53, JCS 2099/290, 16 May 53, same file, sec 90

26. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Force Bases for the Middle East Area," 23 Jun 53. JCS 2099/296. same

file, sec 92.

27. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Eligibility of Ethiopia for Grant Military Assistance." 10 Apr 53, JCS

2099/278, 11 Apr 53; Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj. 21 Apr 53, JCS 2099-281; CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec

88 OMA. OASD0SA). "Department of Defense Operations Under the Mutual Security Program.

July 1953." show* that the S5 million Ethiopian MDA program had bv that date been approved; same

file, BP pt 19.

28 Memo, SecDef to JCS. "Force Bases in the Middle East Area." 17 Aug 53. JCS 2099/308, 20 Aug

53, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 96.

29. .VV Ttme*. 10 Mav 53. 4; 30 Mav 53, 1 Dept of State Bulletin. (18 Mav 53). p 71)7; (8 |un 53), p

804

30. Dept of State Bulletin. (15 Jun 53), pp 831-835.

31 Secretary Dulles did not mention Afghanistan, which, despite its strategic location (separating

the Soviet Union from West Pakistan, with a long common border with Iran) was never sertoustv

considered for membership in a northern tier defensive organization Presumably Afghanistan was

excluded owing to its military and economic weakness and its unfnendiv relations with Pakistan.

32 NSC Action No 801. I Jun 53

33 NSC Action No 843. <* Jui 53 NSC 1551. 14 Jul 53. CCS 092 Palestine (5-3-46) sei. 15 The JCS

had endorsed the new statement as wntten (Memo, JCS to SecDef. "NSC? 155, US Objectives and

Policies with Respect to the Near East." 23 Jun 5.1. Dec On JCS 1887 66. »ame file )

34 Ltr. SecState to SecDef. 26 Jun 53, JCS 1887 67. 16 Jul 53, CCS 381 fcMMEA (11-19-47) set 15

35 Memo. JCS to SecDef, "Defense Arrangements for the Middle East," 11 Aug 53, JCS 1887 68.

v4 mr file

36 Nil of JCS 1887 68, 31 Aug 53. »ame tux

37 NSC" 1622. 30 Oct 53. JCS 2101 110. 9 Nov 53. CCS 381 US (1-31-50) we 31

38 NSC 1361. 20 Nov 52. CCS W2 Iran (4-23-48) *ec 8

Ji Memo, Actg SecDef to JCS. Iran." 22 Jan 53, MM* 137-53 to IXr. Exec Of* of SecDef. 23 Jan 53.

CCS 092 Iran (4-23-48) *ec 8 Terms of reference fee the JCS representative ot\ the ad hot committee

were approved later (Dec Cm JCS 171450. !** Jun 53. »ame füe )

40 Mem.» JO to SectVf, Iran." 31 Ort 52 JCS 171442, CCS 0¥2 Iran (4-23-48) sec 7

41 Dec On JCS 171446, 26 Jan 53. same file, ft* 8

42 JCS 171447 6 Apr 53, JCS 171448. 16 Apr 53. Memo. JC^i to SecDef. Iran. 19 Jun 53. JCS

171449 CCS 0*2 If*« (4 23-48) sec 7

43 Um/ow*ki. Mfaüir |j*r w? tS&U Aff$tn, pp 21>2!6 N\ ttmr*. 17. 20. and23 Auft. 2and feSep

IS (p 1 in each t«»er In subsequent yea*v a number of account» have indicated clandestine US

«•mouragemem. *up|x>rt. and direction M the overthrow o< Mohammed Mo***4egh See Kouhullah

K Kama/am. fnr« » *«*«•*** Fvi*y. lHhl9T$ (1*75), pf> 24*-250, and Kermit Rooaeveii. C***k**P*p.

the Struggle far the L\yntrvi at Intn j1979) Kotnrvrtt ireounts a meeting on 25 June IS»53 whefe the

Secretary ol State approved support tot an effort to overthrow Mossadegh Among tho*e listed a»

attending were Secretary of De6?ft*e Wilioc. and a military aide but no member ot thr point chief» of

StafJ Ofhciai rrcurd» tryrdl nv mdicatioft at JCS involvement m the«* activities

44 M»g. CIA to JCS et *i . 1*154*/ Aug 53. DA IN 3*ti*, CCS OW Iran (4 23-1») «ec 9

45 04-18-I3 to C5AI\ CSA. *t\4 CNO, 1* Aug 53. »ame hie

4* CM 20-53 to CSA*. CSA. ***d CK0, 20 A«g 53, SM-153^53 to JSPC. 21 Aug 53. *ame ftfe

4? Ms*, JCS »46«59 hi CINCNEtM <t M . 2» Aug 53. JCS 171451, »ame &k

4ft KS 171452. 22 Sep 53. CCS »*2 »ran 14-23-4*) «K * CLNCNU M OpUn 207 53 (Draft), * Sep

53. CCS 0»2 lf*n (4 23^*8) BP pt 1»

4» Dec Cm JCS 17141» * De< 53. NII ol JCS 171455. 23 Mar 54 »ame füe »ec 10 CtNCNfcUM

Opian 2Ö7 54. 1 feb 54. «me fde ÖP f* 2

'

417

.-..• -.-.- ■■:-.- .•.---.-

"

Wn*w«a^
Notes to Pages 335-345

50. NSC 175. 21 Dec 53. JCS 1714/53. 22 Dec 53, CCS 092 Iran (4-23-48) sec 11.

51. Memo, JCS to SecDef. "NSC 175—United States Policy Toward Iran," 29 Dec 53, JCS 1714/57,

same file. Wnether the Secretary of Defense formally expressed an opinion on these JCS view» is not

indicated in available records.

52. NSC Action No. 998, 30 Dec 53 NSC 5402, 2 Jan 54, CCS 092 Iran (4-23-48) sec 11

53. Memo. JCS to SecDef. "Annex to NSC 175. U.S. Policy Toward Iran." 29 Jan 54. JCS 1714/59,

same file, sec 12.

54. JCS 1887/73, 4 Nov 53. CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 16.

55. Study of "United States Policy with Respect to Pakistan." 23 Sep 53, apparently prepared by

Joint Staff for ADM .^adford in connection with Avub visit; Memo. Henrv A. Bvroade to SecState, 30

Sep 53; OQCS File 091 Pakistan 1953-55.

56. Memo. RADM G. W Anderson, Jr.. OCJCS. to DJS. 2 Oct 53, same file SM-1689-53 to JSPC, 7

Od 53. CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 13

57 JCS 1887/70. 13 Od 53. CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) BP pt 1A.

58. SM-1765-53 to CINCNELM. 2 Nov 53; SM-1767-53 to JSPC, 2 Nov 53; same file, sec 16

59 JCS 188773. 4 Nov 53, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-1*47) sec 16

60. Memo, JCS to SecDef. "Security Arrangements for the M«ddle East," 14 Nov 53, JCS 188773,

same file, sec 17 No evidence has been found that the Secretary of Detensr took any formal action

on the JCS view»

61 JCS 188774. 12 Feb 54. CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 17

62 JCS 188775. 18 Mar 54, Dec On JCS 188775, 6 Apr 54, same file

63 JCS 1887 8t). 27 Ma. 34, CCS 381 EMMEA (1119-47) sec 18

64 SM-571-54 to RBCOS. 12 Jun 54. JCS 1887 80, same file The JSPC had proposed that US-UK

discussions precede the trilateral talks-—a suggestion that wa» later made bv the British Chiefs of

Staff

65 Memo, SecDef to JCS. "Crant Military Assistance to the Middle East." 16 Oct 53. JCS 2099 J\%

21 Ott *>3. Memo. ASD<ISA) to JCS. "Military Assistance for fcgvpt. Pakistan, and Syria." 1«* Oct 53.

CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 98

66 Memo. SecDef to JCS, Grant Military Assistance to the Middle East.' It» Ort 53, JCS 2099 319

21 Od 53, same hie

67 Memo, JCS to SecDef. Crant Military Assistance to the Middle East. 11 Dec S3. JC^> 209*332.

same file. se«. 101

68 Ltr. ASD(!SA) to SecState. 4 Jan 54. JCS 209*343. 8 Jan 54. CCS 092 (8-22-46) »re 102 la,

ASD(iSA) to SecState, 27 Nov 53, same file, sec 100

*>*<> See tabulation in App A to Memo, BG f larrv f Meyers. USA. to SecA Joint Military Survey

Team Report on Pakistan IN May 54 CCS 381 EMMEA (11 -1*47) BP pt 2 (cited hereafter as Joint

Military Survey learn Rpt im Pakistan)

70 I.X B Prof-re** Report i»n NSC 155 1, 1» Jui 54. CCS 0M? Palestme OV46) sec 16

71 Menu«, SecDef to fCS, Mutual IVfensr A*~»*tatue Program h* Hscal Year 1955. 26 Jan 54

JCS 209*350. 29 Jan 54 CCS 0*2 (8-22-4*1 sec 104 Memo. JCS ti> SeilVt same subj, *• Mar H, JCS

2159V VW mm* file, set 108

72 the PY 19*5 MDAP contained no fund* for Middle lästern countries t*tt\cr than Ureete.

luikey. and Iran. Joint Military Van« Irani Kpl on Pakistan Memo JC"S to Sect VI. MDA Vn>

grammtng Guidance tot FY i*5e>. ' W May 54. JC S IIWM 274, CCS 0*2 ($-22-4*» *ec 112

73 \Y fane», 2 Nov 53 2. 17 Nov S3, l

74 Stebbins. Uxtint Mar« m i\J*U A3j*W 1*5-4 ff 32.VJ24

75 Memo. Actjt SecDef to SeiA SevN. Atui SrcAr. Mutual tVtense Assistance PfttgrwiS tot the

M*4die East l<* ft* M. JCS SOWWfrl, 3 Mar 54. CCS 0*2 (8-22-4*1 s« 108

76 Jotnl Military Survev leam Kpt on Pakistan

77 .VY ?>me». 2* Feb M I Mfo P*?*'> gignMw*. f*Vt pp 254-2«»

7* NSC 540* 19 Feb 54. K~S IfUHBR. 24 reb *4 i CS 0*: AM >*-254S> set 5» NSC Ad*»« No

1052. 4 Mar 54

TV Joint Military Survev I ram Hpt on Pakistan

80 Memo SerfM to JCS Mutual Defense Assistance Prtrgtan-. f-af Pakistan l* lun H fC S

20** j«7. t» Jun 54. CCS Oü* r*-22*4») so 114

ftl HS 20»* **. > Ma? 54 same file. 81' pt P* Mcnw JCS to So Dei. MCA Prx^iatm fc* f\

»v*5-!»5* »Vh«n Will Support V 5 Mibtarv Sifategy 17 Jun S JCS JTJWJ». %*tn* tue. so U4

CHhef » fWKll o* the repcKt oi the spo^al ivntunittee 9(r treated in CYi 10

S2 Memo. JC^S to SoDe*. Mutual IVfensr Assistance Pro^rasn k* Pakistan 2» J«i M HS

>tw >*7 (CS 0*2 ;S 22 46) so It* Joint Mdiury Sunn Tea«-. Kpt on Pakistan

418
Notes to Pages 345-353

83. OCB Special Status Report on Pakistan, 10 Sep 54, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 19. Dept of

State, Treaties and Other International Agreements, V, 1954, part 1, pp. 852-858.

84. Stebbins, United States m World Affairs, 1954, pp. 343-344. Dept of State, Treaties and Other

International Agreements, V, 19t \, part 3, pp. 2496-25CJ.

85. NSC 5428, 23 Jul 54 (Financial Appendix), JCS 1837/86, 30 Jul 54, CCS 092 Palestine (5-3-46) BP

pt 1. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "MDA Programming Guidance for FY 1956," 19 May 54, JCS 2099/274,

CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 112.

86. NSC Action No. 1184, 22 Jul 54. NSC 5428, 23 Jul 54, JCS 1887/86, 30 Jul 54, CCS 092 Palestine

(5-3-46) BP pt 1. The JCS had indicated their concurrence with NSC 5428 in Memo, JCS to SecDef,

"United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East," 13 Jul 54, JCS 1887/84, same

file, sec 16.

87. Lenczowski, Middle East in World Affairs, pp. 216-217. Stebbins, United States in World Affairs,

1954, pp. 333-336.

88. NSC 5504, 15 Jan 55, JCS 1714/79, 19 Jan 55, CCS 092 Iran (4-23-48) sec 15.

89. Ibid. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "United States Policy Toward Iran," 7 Jan 55, JCS 1714/78, CCS 092

Iran (4-23-48) sec 15.

90. Lenczowski, Middle East in World Affairs, pp. 507-510; Stebbins, United States in World Affairs,

1954, pp. 339-341; Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 427.

91. Memo, DepASD(lSA) to USecA, USecN, and USecAF, "Military Survey Team for Egypt," 24

Aug 54, JCS 2105/37, 31 Aug 54, CCS 337 (2-20-50) sec 7.

92. N/H of JCS 2105/37, 14 Sep 54, same file. OCB Progress Report on NSC 5428, 10 Mar 55, CCS

092 Palestine (5-3-46) sec 18.

93. Memo, BJSM to Secy, JCS. "Coordination in Middle East Defense Planning," 17 Jul 54, JCS

1887/85, 21 Jul 54; Memo, RBCOS to CJCS, "Co-ordination of Middle East Planning," 26 Jul 54, JCS

1887/87, 3 Aug 54; CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 18. SM-753-54 to RBCOS, 25 Aug 54, JCS 1887/88;

Memo, RBCOS to CJCS, "Co-ordination in the Middle East Defense Planning," 8 Oct 54, JCS

1887/92, 11 Oct 54; SM-996-54 to RBCOS, 17 Nov 54, JCS 1887/93; N/H of JCS 1887/93, 7 Dec 54; same

file, sec 19.

94. SM-997-54 to CINCNELM, 17 Nov 54, JCS 1887/93; Msg, C1NCNELM to CNO, 281631Z Dec

54; CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 19.

Chapter 16. Latin America

1. JCS Hist Div, "Latin America and United States Military Assistance," (1960^ pp. 17-19.

2. JCS 1976/47, 16 Mar 51; Dec On JCS 1976/47, 19 Mar 51; CCS 381 Western Hemisphere (3-22-48)

sec 7. NSC 56/2, 18 May 50, same file, sec 2.

3. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "MDA Program for Fiscal Year 1954," 30 Oct 52. JCS 2099/242, CCS 092

(8-22-46) sec 83.

4. Sixth and Seventh Progress Reports on NSC 56/2, 18 Mar 52 and 14 Oct 53. CCS 381 Western

Hemisphere (3-22-48) sec 13 Stebbins, United Statea in World Affairs. 1952. pp. 264-266.

5. For a typical example, see the bilateral agreement signed with Ecuador on 20 Feb 52, in Dept of

State, Treaties and Other International Agreement*. Ill, 1952, part 3, pp 4162-4167.

6. hisenhower. Mandate f^r Change, pp 149. 240-241 For Dr. Eisenhower's report, see Dept of

State bulletin. (13 Nov 53), pp. 695-717.

7 NSC Action No 746-a, 18 Mar 53. NSC 144T, 18 Mar 53, CCS 381 Western Hemisphere

(3-22-48) sec 14. The JCS had indicated their general agreement with the paper in Memo, JCS to

SecDef, "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America," 11 Mar 53,

JCS 197677, same file

8. NSC Action No 746-b, 18 Mar 53 N H of JCS 1976/76, 23 Mar 53. CCS 381 Western Hemisphere

(3-22-48) sec 14.

9 See Table 14

10 NSC" 144/1, 18 Mar 53. CCS 381 Western Hemisphere (3-22-48) sec 14

11 Dec On JCS 1976/79. 6 May 53. same file, sec 15

12 Dec On JCS 1976*5. 14 Sep 53, same file, set 16

13 Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Eligibility ol Haiti tor Grant Military Assistant ," 30 Oct 53, JCS

20*w 323, 3 Nov 53, CCS 092 (8-22-46) set. 98. Memo. JCS to SecDef. same sub|. 15 Dei 53, JCS

2099/333. same file, sec 101.

14. Ronald M Schneider, Communism in Guatemala, 1944-1954 (1^59), pp 32-39, 294-2V5 Su-bbms.

United State* in World Affairs, 1953, pp 333-336.

419

.
*

Notes to Pages 353-358

15. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 421.

16. Ltr, SecState to SecDef,9 Apr 53, JCS 2099/286,6 May 53, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 90.

17. Dec On JCS 2099/289, 19 May 53; N/H of JCS 2099/28*,3 Jun 53; same file. Memo, JCS to

SecDef, "Eligibility of El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua to Receive Grant Military Assistance," 3 Jun 53, JCS 2099/289, same file, sec 91.

18. Dec On JCS 2099/298,7 Jul 53, same file, sec 92.

19. Memo, Asst to SecDef to JCS, "Grant Military Assistance for El Saivad- Honduras," 21

Oct 53, JCS 2099/321, 22 Oct 53, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 98.

20. Memo, JCS to SecDef. "Eligibility of Nicaragua to Receive Grant Military A. stance." 24 Oct

53, JCS 2099/320, same file. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Grant Military Assistance for El Salvador and

Honduras," 14 Nov 53, JCS 2099/325, same file, sec 99. Memo, Dir OMA, OASD(ISA), to Chief,

Foreign Aid Div, G-4, DA, et al., "Eligibility of the Governments of Nicaragua . . . Limited Grant

Military Assistance," 23 Dec 53, same file, sec 102.

21. Second Progress Report on NSC 144/1,20 Nov 53, CCS 381 Western Hemisphere (3-22-48) sec 16.

22. Schneider, Communism in Guatemala, pp. 37-43, 49-50.

23. Stebbins, United States in World Affairs, 1954, pp. 370-377; Peter V. Curl, ed., Documents on

American Foreign Relations, 1954 (1955), pp. 412-414; Schneider, Communism in Guatemala, pp. 296-297.

24. Stebbins, United States in World Affairs, 1954, p. 381. DDIM-12-54 to CJCS, 13 May 54, CCS 381

Western Hemisphere (3-22-48) sec 19.

25. NY Times, 18 May 54, 1; 22 May 54, 1.

26. Dept of State Bulletin, (3 May 54), p. 692; Stebbins, United States in World Affairs, 1954, p. 381.

Memo, Chmn, US Del, IADB, to Dir, OMA, OASD(ISA), "Bilateral Military Negotiations with the

Government of Honduras,"4 Jun 54, JCS 1976/107, 22 Jun 54, CCS 381 Western Hemisphere

(3-22-48) sec 20.

27. NSC Action No. 1122-b, 13 May 54.

28. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "NSC 5419—US Polio' in the Event of Guatemalan Aggression in Latin

America," 26 May 54, JCS 1976/102, CCS 381 Western Hemisphere (3-22-48) sec 19. NSC 5419/1,

28 May 54, JCS 1976/104,7 Jun 54. same file, sec 20. NSC Action No. 1135, 27 May 54.

29. Dec On JCS 1976/105, 30 Jun 54, CCS 381 Western Hemisphere (3-22-48) sec 20. Memo, JCS

to SecDef, "Plan for Military Support of lnter-Amencan Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance," 30 Jun 54,

JCS 1976/105; SM-6Ü8-54 to CSA, 30 Jun 54; same file, sec 21.

30. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pp. 435-436. There isa considerable body of evidence (though

it has not been officially confirmed) that the US role in the affair was not limited to this action and

that the Central Intelligence Agency assisted from the outset in planning and conducting the invasion of the Castillo Armas forces. See, for example: David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible

Government (1964), pp 165-183, w'iich givesa lengthy and detailed account, citing partial corroborahon in the form of testimony bv-'ore a Senate subcommittee in 1961, given by the man who was the

US Ambassador to Honduras in 1954; and Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala (1982), pp

133-143 and 161-168, which relies upon interviews with former CIA officials who were involved in

the operation. Sources examined in the preparation of this volume furnish no evidence that the Joint

Chiefs of Staff took any part in the invasion planning.

31 Schneider, Communism in Guatemala, pp. 305-306. 309-313 Stebbins, United States in World

Attain. 1954, pp. 381-387.

32 Dept of State Bulletin, (26 Jul 54), p. 118; Stebbins, United States in World Affairs, 1954, pp

387-389 Ltr, SecState to SecDel, 27 Oct 54, JCS 2099 437, 26 Nov 54. CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 123.

33 NSC 5432, 18 Aug 54. JCS 1976 118, 24 Aug 54. CCS 381 Western Hemisphere (3-22-48) sec 22

34 Memo. JCS to SecDef. US Policy Toward Uttn Amenca (NSC 5432)," 31 Aug 54, JCS 1976119.

sann- file.

35 NSC Action No 1209.2 Sep 54 NSC 54321,3 Sep 54. JCS 1976/121, 13 Sep 54. CCS 381

Western Hemisphere (3-22-48) sec 22

36 Memo. SecDef to JCS, "Military Assistance Program for Guatemala." 24 Nov 54, JCS 2099347,

2b Nov 54. CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 123.

37 Memo, Chm. US Del, IADB, to ASDUSA) et al.. Report of Military Survey—Guatemala." 26

Nov 54, JCS 2099 439,J Pre 54, same file

38 Memo. JCS to SecDef. Military Assistance Program for Guatemala." 22 Dec 54. JCS 2099 443;

N/H of JCS 2099,443, 14 Jan 55. same file, sec 124 Dept of State, Treaties and Other International

Agreement*. VI. 1955. part 2, pp 2107-2118

39 JCS 1976123. 18 Oct 54; Nil of JCS 197M23. 25 Oct 54 CCS 381 Western Hemisphere

(3-22-48) sec 22 Memo, JCS to SecDef. "Retention by the Colombian Infantry Battalion of US

Equipment." 19 Oct 54. JCS 1976 123, same file, sec 23.

40 OCB Progre*» Report on NSC 5432 1. 27 Dec 54. CCS 381 Western Hemisphere (3-22-48) sec

420
Notes to Page 358

23. For comparison of the MDAP funds committed to Latin America with the much larger allotments

made to other areas, see Ch. 10.

41. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Military Assistance Programs for Latin America," 10 Dec 54, JCS

2099/446, 16 Dec 54, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 124.

1

'

'

421

•

i

—____ 1
I

Bibliographic Note

This volume is based primarily upon official documents contained in the

Joint Master Files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in files maintained by the Office

of the Chairman, JCS. Both the Joint Master Files and the Chairman's files are

comprehensive and well organized. They contain not only documents of the

Joint Chiefs of Stuff but aiso those of the Secretary of Defense, his office,

the Department of State, and the National Security Council. Both sets of files for

the years 1953-1954 have been reviewed for declassiftcation and transferred tothe

National Archives and Records Administration where they are deposited in

the Military Reference Branch as Records Group 218, Records of the Office of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Not all documents in those files have been declassified.

The Joint Master Files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for 1953-1954 are organized

under a Dewey decimal, chronological system adopted during World War II and

continued through 1958. This system employs such designations as CCS 092

(8-22-46) sec 40 and CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 23. (CCS, a file designation

assigned early in World War II and continued into the 1950s, refers to the

Combined Chiefs of Staff of which the Joint Chiefs of Staff were the US members

during and immediately after World War II.) The files of the Office of the Chairman for the period of the volume (those of both General Bradley and Admiral

Radford) also use a Dewey decimal system with a separate set of files for each

chairman.

The NATO documents furnished the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1953-1954 were

not included in the Joint Master Files, but were maintained separately in the JCS

Subregistry. After several years, the Subregistry routinely destroyed them. Copies of the destroyed documents were still available, however, through the US

Central Registry maintained by the Department ot the Army. The Central Registry has since destroyed all NATO documents for the years 1953-1955, though

some are available on microfilm. NATO documents of the period not on microfilm are retained in the files of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

(SHAPE), Mons, Belgium, without declassification.

Although source material for this volume was found primarily in the JCS file

collections, research also extended to the records of the Office of the Secretary of

Defense and the military Services. Another valuable source was the reference

collection of the JCS Historical Division and various special historical studies

prepared by the Division. Congressional hearings and other Congressional

documents of the period were useful in tracing the ultimate outcome of various

issues that concerned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In the footnote citations of the volume, the file location is the last element

given. When several documents are cited in the same footnote, all those in a

423

*&"* ^

.
h

Bibliographic Note

single sentence are to be found in the file location given at the end of that

sentence. The term "same file/' rather than "ibid," was the style prescribed at

the time of writing for repeated, successive references to a long file designation.

Some documents are cited without file designations. These include types that

were widely distributed and that may be located without resort to JCS files,

such as DOD Directives, National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and Special

National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs), and Records of NSC Action.

424

"' %i€
Index

Abadan, Iran: 335, 337

Acheson, Dean: 2, 188

Adak Island: 125

Aden, Yemen: 339, 340

Adenauer, Chancellor Konrad: 293, 294

Afghanistan: 338

Agreed Minute (ROK-US): 242, 243. See also

Korea, Republic of, unification of

Air Defense Command: 112, 115, 122, 133, 137,

138

Air Force, Canadian: 134, 135, 141, 142

Air Force, US: 2, 3, 6 -9, 35, 64. 69, 70, 71, 80, 85,

87, 91, 108, 171, 177. Set also Continental

defense; Force levels, US

appropriations: 60, 61, 62, 63

Chief of Staff: 111. 134, 296, 333. See also

Twining, General Nathan F.. USAF;

Vandenberg. General Hovt S., USAF

and DEW line: 143-44

FY 1955 force level: 67, 68, 130 132

FY 1956 force level: 65, 66, 72, 131

FY 1957 force level: 29, 65, 66, 72, 75

and JCS 1844151:95-96

and JCS 2099 368: 212-13

and JCS 2101 113: 30

and JMRWP: 159-60

and JSCP (1954-55): 101-03

and JSCP (1955*56): 104-05

manpower cuts in: 62, 63, 65

missile policy: 180-82

NATO revised force goals 297, 2«W

reserve strength: 64, 167, 170. 172. 173

Spanish aid policy: 295 96

on unified air defense command. 137 -39

and US Korean policy: 228 29. 232, 240

Air National Guard 115. 123, 167, 168

Air Research and Development Command: 141

Aircraft See a/so ttuin-utuat atnratt itoijpttfiOft*

airborne earlv warning (AKW) 65. 115. I It»,

121. 122 123 25. 130, 131. 132, 133, Ü2. 146

control and warning facilities 3 See a/**'

Continental defense

Airpower 22. 34. 128

and JSCP 100

and New Look 35, 36. 80, 82

and NSC 54222 47

Alaska 112, 115. 122. 123. 125. 131. 143

Akan Highway 122

Aleppo. Syria 324

Aleutian Islands: 125

Alford, Commander John M., USN: 193

Allies: 7, 13, 19, 20, 22, 28, 90

and information sharing: 191, 304, 305, 312,

317

JCS views of: 42-44, 45, 46

joint planning with US: 221-22

loosened solidanty with US: 40-41

and NATO: 304

NSC views of: 46-47

relations with Soviet Union: 292

and self-defense: 5, 25, 28. 31. See also

NSC 135/3

Allison, John M.: 269, 272. 273. 274. 277

Amami Islands: 267

Anderson, Robert B: 71. 72, 173. 174, 195, 235.

238, 262, 306, 309, 315, 317

Anglo-Iranian Oil Company: 324, 346

Antiaircraft Command: U2, 138

Antiaircraft weapons: 115, 123

Antisubmarine warfare (ASW): 122, 130, 131.

See u/so Aircraft, airborne earlv warning

ANZUS Treaty (1951): 247

Aqaba. Gulf of: 324

Arab League countries: 331

Arab Legion: 327

Arab State*: 325. 346

Arab-Uraeli War (1948): 324

Arctic: 120. 132, 134, 141. 148

Arctic Circle: 143

Argenha 1?5. 131

Argentina 125. 131. 143. 203. 204, 350 See al^

Latm Amenta

Armav Col Castillo 356

Armed Forte» Policy Council 5, 64, 172. 183. 240

Armed Force» Reserve Act (1952) 164

Armed Force» Special Weapons Project. l<*0

Arnu»tite Agreement, Korean War Srr Korean

War. Armi*l:ce Agreement

Arm» control .Vr i>i*arrnament

Army. French. 307

Armv Iranian: 324

Army. Republic of Korea 8 227. 230

torte goal» 241 42

manpower »trength of 233. 235. 242, 243

Army. US 2. 3. 6 9, 28. 31. 35. 61, t4. 65. 6**.

70 71. 80, «*J. 108, 171 S<Y a/x> Continental

defense. Force levels. US

appropriation* h0. 62

425
Index

Army, US: (continued)

Chief of Staff: 15, 34, 124, 296, 356. See also

Collins, General J. Lawton, USA; Ridgway,

General Matthew B., USA

FY 1955 force level: 6, 47, 68, 72, 130, 132

FY 1956 force level: 65, 66, 72, 131

FY 1957 force level: 29, 66, 72, 75

40th Infantry Division: 231, 232, 235

45th Infanh-v Division: 231, 232, 235

and JCS 1844/151: 95-96

and JCS 2099/366; 212

and |CS 2101/113: 30 37, 102

and jMRWP: 159-60

and JSCP (1954-55): 101 -03

and JSCP (1955-»): 104 05

and JSCP: 97

Korean policy: 228, 231, 232, 239-40

manpower cuts in: 62, 63, 71

missile policy: 180-82

NATO Lisbon force goals: 286, 297, 299

and NSC 149/2: 65, 66

redeployments from Korea. See

Redeployments, US

reorganization of: 74

24th Infantry Division: 230

Armv-Naw Munitions Hoard 149, 151

Aruba: 355

Asia: 15, 41, 48. 71, 208, 224, 238, 245. 247, 248.

249. 250. 252. 257. 279. See also tndin hina.

Southeast Asu

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); 2r».

64. 66, 73. 74, 76, 168 See a/so McNeil. VV J

Assistant Secretary- of Defense (International

Secunty Affairs) 192. 216, 286

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and

Personnel): 67. 174

Assistant Secretary ot Defense (Research and

Development) 97. 183

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Supply and

Logistics) 150

Associated States 204. 208, 253. See a/*t»

Camtx>dia. l-aos. Vietnam

Aelantu Ocean 122. 124 142, 352

Atlas missile 186

Atomic Energy Act (I«*46): Iff, I»**

Atomic Energy Commission 140, 190. IV!. 192.

193, 195. 1%, |9*

Atomic weapons Sor Nuclear weapons

Attack aircraft earner (C VA) 72. 240

Attorney General 168

Australia 25 41. 224, 247, 248. 250. 254,

255. 263. 327. 328

Austria 46 192. 1«*4. 203. 213. 216. 2>. 2*2 303

A/ore» Islands 122. 125. 131. 143

»-29 aircraft HI

B 52 amraft 80

Baffin Island 122. 143

Baghüad Pact 347

Baldwin, Hanson. W.. 148

Basic national security policy, US

in 1953: 1, 9, 39, 55. See also JCS 2101/113;

NSC 153/1; NSC 162/2; Solarium project

in 1954: 39, 49. See also NSC 162/2; NSC 5422/2;

NSC 5501

Basra, Iraq: 333, 337

Belgium: 213, 281, 293, 294, 306

Bell Telephone Laboratories: 118

Benelux countries: 313

Berlin: 25, 303, 349

Berlin Conference: 236, 252, 303-04, 307

Bidault, Georges: 303

Big Four: 236

Bolte, General Charles L., USA: 184

Bradley, Maj. Gen. J.S., USA: 94

Bradley, General of the Army Omar N: 7, 14,

15, 17, 64, 127, 147, 151, 283, 286, 287, 325

Brazil: 203, 213, 349, 350, 357, 358. See also Latin

America

Brazil-US Military Commission, joint: 351

Briggs, Ellis O.: 244

British Chiefs of Staff: 4, 312, 325, 340, 347

Bi.tish Columbia: 122, 145

Briton Middle East Air Force: 325

Brussels Treaty: 313, 314, 315

Brussels Treaty Organization: 314

Budget, balanced: 1. 3, 5, 6. 7. 19, 22, 62. 135.

352

Budget, defense

and continental defense: 130 33

combined projection (FY 1953-57): 86

combined projection t*-'Y 1954 56) 85

FY 1953: 119

FY 1954: 3, 5, 7, 8. 9. 13, 60. 62, 119. 127. 151.

161. 285. 325

FY 1955 6. 7. 13, 32, 33, 37, 63. M, 67, 68. 146.

152. 161, 210 12

FY 1956 7. 33, 37, 60. 72. 78, 136, 137. !46. 158.

161

m 1957 7. 33

FY 1958 13

Bureau ot the Budget 21. 23, 72. 74, 76, 157. 216

218, 341

Burgess. Carter 1. 174, 175

Burma 247, 255

Bush. Dr Vannevar 188

Cairo, Egypt 324, 326. 339 340, 341 Wo

Cambodia 204. 250, 254. 255

Caruda 112. 115. 116, 119. 120, 122. 142. 193.

220. 281. 314

aiul DFW line 142 44

role in rarlv warning system 134 35

Canadian Chief» of Statf 141. 143 144

Canadian Department of F\temal Affairs 112

Cape Dyer ***

Cape Inhume 143

C aracas Ctmfereme 154, 355

426
Index

!

Caribbean Mobile Reserve: 354

Caribbean Sea: 74, 352

Carney, Admiral Robert B., USN: 15, 18, 20, 22,

34, 36, 45, 67, 76, 147, 288

on Chinese offshore islands: 262, 265

on early warning line: 142-43, 144

on Everest Committee: 30

on FY 1955 budget: 69, 71, 72, 87

on FY 1956 budget: 79, 87

on JCS 2099/368: 215

on JCS 2101/113: 34, 99

on JMRWP (1954): 159

on manpower cuts: 34

on MOP No. 84: 98, 108

on NATO strategy: 290

on NSC 162/1: 23'

on NSC 5422/2: 157

on reserves: 175, 176

on Vietnam: 253

Caspian Sea: 337

Cassidy, Admiral JohnH, USN: 347

Central America: 349, 350, 355, 357, 358. Set also

individual nations; Latin America

Central American States association: 353

Central Europe, demilitarization of: 293-94. See

also Europe

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): 42, 120, 121.

140, 226, 253, 333, 354

Ceylon: 255

Chairman, Canadian Chiefs of Staff: 141, 143

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff: 5, 7, 15. 20, 102,

107, 178, 261. See also Bradley, General of

the Armv Omar N.; Radford. Admiral

Arthur VV., USN

"The Chance for Peace" address (Eisenhower):

188

Chase, Maj. Gen. WilliamC , USA: 258, 259, 260

Chiang Kai-shek, President: 248, 249, 251, 256.

257, 258. 260. 261. 263. Ste also China,

Republic of; Taiwan

Chidlaw, Oneral Benimm VV.. USAF: 138

Chief, Nationalist General Statt (Republic ot

China): 256

Chief of Naval Operations See Navy. US. Chief

of Naval Operation«

Chief of Staff. US Air Force See Air Force, US.

Chief of Staff

Chief oi Staff. US Army S«r Army. US. Chief

of Staff

Chief» oi Staff (British) 4, 312. 340. 347

Chiefs of Staff (Canadian) 141. 143. 144

Chief* of Stall (French) 312

Chile: 203. 21J. 350. 357

China. People's Republic of 2. \X 25. 41. 52.

54. 74. 223. 229, 22V, 236 -37. 239, 247, 248.

249, 250, 251, 236, 262, 263. 266. 26». 294

China Republic at 203. 205. 208 10. 213. 220.

236. 23«. 241, 247-50. 251. 256, 279 Steal*

NSC 146. NSC 1461. NSC" 1462, NSC 1661,

Taiwan

Combined Service Vorer 257

China Republic of: (continued)

force level, 1953: 257, 259

military aid for: 257-60

Ministry of National Defense: 257, 259, 261

and mutual defense treaty with US: 263-64,

279

and offshore islands: 261-62, 265-66

Chinman Islands. See Quemoy Islands

Chou En-lai: 261

Chow Chih-jou, General: 256-257

Churchill, Prime Minister Winston S.: 4, 254, 292

Civil Aeronautics Administration: 112

Civil defense: 2, 55, 121, 140, 148

Clark, General Mark W„ USA: 230, 233, 268, 269

Coast Guard, US: 160, 174

Cold war: 22, 25, 36, 55, 56, 47, 100, 108, 190,

268, 291, 292, 294, 303

Collective security: 41. See al<-o Latin America;

Middle East; Military assistance program;

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO); NSC 162/2'

Collins, General J. Lawton, USA: 15, 124, 180,

181, 289, 2%, 299, 306, 311, 312, 316, 317

Colombia: 203, 213, 350, 357, 358. See also Latin

America

Colombo Plan: 255. See also Southeast Asia

Treaty Organization (SEATO)

Combat Service Forces: 64

Commandant, US Marine Corps. See Marine

Corps, US, Commandant

Commandant, National War College: 11

Commander, Land Forces, Center

(COMLANDCENT), NATO: 289

Commander, US Naval Forces, Far East

(COMNAVFE): 234

Commander in Chief. Alaska (CINCAL): 112,

138

Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Center

(CTNCCENTER), NATO: 289. 307

Commander in Chief, Allied Forces. Southern

Europe (C1NCSOUTH). NATO: 288, 332

Commander in Chief. Atlantic (C.NCLANT);

112, 122. 123. 138

Commander in Chief. Caribbean (CINCARIB):

355

Commander in Chief. Continental Air Defense

Command (CINCONAD) 112. 115. 122,

137. 138. I3v

Commanderm Chief. Eastern Atlantic and

Mediterranean (ClNCNFLM) 333. 334. 335.

338. 339, 340, 347

Commander in Chief. Far East (C1NCFF) 96,101

and Korea 226. 232. 234 35. 237. 240. 241,

242, 250. 268. 270. 271, 273. 276

Commander in Chtri, Northeast (CTNC NE):

112. 138

Commander in Chief. Pscifu (CINCPAC) 15.

•c, 101, 112. 122. 1Z3. 138. 250, 256. 258.

261. 265

Comma.vier In Chief, Strategic Air Command

(C1NC5AC) 333

427 .
Index

Jf*

Commander in Chief, UN Command

(CINCUNC): 226, 232, 240, 243

Commander in Chief, US Air Forces in Europe

(C1NCUSAFE): 339

Commander in Chief, US Army, Europe

(CINCUSAREUR): 339

Commander in Chief, US European Command

(USCINCEUR): 290, 2%, 315, 339

Commonwealth countries: 240

Communism: 2, 3, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 26, 40,

47, 48, 54, 55, 201, 224, 247, 248, 323, 331,

333, 349, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357

Communist bloc. Set Soviet bloc

Communist China. See China, People's

Republic of

Congress, US: 3. 4, 8, 9, 15, 59, 63, 68, 69, 79,

133, 135, 145, 167, 175, 176, 177, 178, 182,

201, 228, 239, 250, 253, 254, 257, 266, 279,

283,307

and MDAP: 202-03, 205. 207, 208, 210, 211,

212, 216, 217, 219, 313, 341, 352, 353

Conolly. Vice Admiral R.L., USN: 13

Consolan transmitter: 122, 132, 133

Containment: 2, 7, 11. 36, 55

Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD).

138, 145, 146

Continental defense: 2. 7. 12. 18, 19, 20, 27, 28,

31. 51, 63, 64, 65, 66, 79, 101, 111 -48. Stt

also NSC 139; NSC 141; NSC 15*4; NSC 162

Air Force plan tor: 111-12. 115, 117. 119,

122-25, 126. 129. 133

Armv plan for: 115, 123. I2f». 130, 133

civilian pressure for: 147

and disarmament; 18*

a», end of 1954 145 48

force levels for: 112 lb

in FY 1953 budget. 133

in FY l*f4 budget: 133

inFY 1*55 budget 130 33

in FY 1956 budget 144 45

JCS view ul (early i*»3r 116

Marine Corps and: 121

Navy plan tor 115 lh. 121 22, 123 25. I2t>.

133. 144 45

and the New Look 35, 80. 82. 145. 14*. 151

plans tor 22. 28. 43. Ill, 121 25

radar network tor 112. 115. life-I«*. 120 25.

134 35

Summer Study recommendation» for 120

And unified command concept 137 S9

Continental United State» Defense Planning

Croup (CUSDPC) 111, 121-25 131, 134

137. 139

Conventional force* 4. 27. 44. 51. 57, 74. *4. I*»

CYrporal missile 17* 186. M7

Council of Ecotiomu, Adviser» 42

Counc*! of Foreign Relation» 36

Covert activities 15, 48, 51. *4, 249. 353

Craig.U Cen MA. L'SAFU

Crete X39

Cuba 203. 213. 350. 357 *r ***» Latin America

Curacao: 355

Cutler, Robert: 5, 219

Cyprus: 339

Davis, Vice Admiral Arthur C, USN: 89, 212,

260, 285

Davis Strait: 143

Declaration of Solidarity, Inter-American

Conference: 354-55

Defense Annual Review Team (DART): 286,

297-98

Defense budget. $ee Budget, defense

de Gaulle, General Charles: 307

Department of Defense: 8, 22, 57, 62, 64, 66, 74,

75, 107, 117, 118, 121, 130, 132, 136, 140,

147. 154, 156, 157, 160, 166, 169, 171, 178,

181, 191. 193. 254

and aid to Egypt: 326

and aid to Spain: 295

and crisis in Iran: 333

and the Far East: 249

and German problem. 292, 308

and Japan: 267, 276

and Korea: 226, 235, 240, 242

and Latin American policy: 354, 357

and Middle East policy 332, 341, 345

and Nationalist China 258, 262

and NATO: 289, 312

and Vietnam: 253

Department of the Interior: 153

Department of Labor 169. 170

Department of State: 42, 51, 112, 1*3. 1%. 197,

207. 218, 219, 220. 227. 228. 22^. 240. 261.

2*4. 29*. 308, 312

and aid to Egypt: 326. 327. 329. .34"

and aid to Latin Arnenca 354, 358

and aid to Middle East 330. 341. 344

and aid to Spain 2*5

and crisism Iran. 333

and German problem: 2*2

and Japanese rearmament 276

Department of the Treasury 2t, 23. 2H*

Deputy Director for Strategic Plan» 100, 108

Detrrrence 2. 7. 10. 12. 18, 20. 37. 4L 43. 51.

52. 87. *5, 96. 147 .Wai*> Nutleaf weapon».

Retaliatory capability

Dhahran. Saudi Arabia 341

Dhahran-Bahrein-Oatar <>d complex 337. 339

Dukev. JohnS 188

LVn Bien Phu. North Vietnam 252, »% 254

Director. Bureau of the Budget 17, 2», 40. 64.

205, 21*

Director of Central Intelligence Nnr Dulles,

Allen

LY»rectof of Foreign l>perat»on» 217

Director. Joint Statt <<y joint Staff, Director

Director for Mutual Security 2. 6, 117. 205. 207.

2S4 2R9. 2*7. 32»

Lhsarmam^nt 45, 4fc. 47 50. 56 Sera/*. NSC 112.

428
Index

Disarmament: (continued)

NSC 162/2; NSC 5422

basic principles of: 187, 192, 313

DOD vs Department of State on: 198-99

1953 report on: 188-89

UN and: 192-196

Disarmament Commission, UN: 187, 192,

193-95

Disarmament Subcommittee, UN: 193-95

Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line: 136,

142-44,' 145, 148. See also Continental

defense, radar network for

Dodge, Joseph M : 4, 5, 6. 64, 66, 205, 206, 216,

218

Dominican Republic: 203, 204, 213, 350, 357.

See also Latin America

Draper, William H. 284, 285, 290, 291

Dulles, Allen: II, 50, 117, 139, 140, 189, 195, 261.

See also Central Intelligence Agencv (CIA)

Dulles, John Foster 11, 21. 36-37, 41, 50, 55, 56

and disarmament 192-93, 195, 196

and the European Defense Community: 299,

307. 309

and flexible foreign posture: 40

»nd IPT 178/15 (NATO): 312-13

Atvi Japanese rearmament 267. 270

and Latin American aid 353, 356, 357

and MC 48 (NATO) 317

and negotiations: 56

and NSC" 5422: 46

and retaliation 37, 69

and SC 241 3 (NATO) 312

and US Far East pohev: 250 - 51. 253, 254, 2*2.

263 64. 267. 26^

and US Korean polio 224-25, 22«, 22», 231.

232. 237 38

and US Middle Fast polio 331 32 33*. 340,

341. 347

East heran 103

La»i Germany Ser (.iermanv Dem«xratic

Repubik

Fberstadt Ferdinand 10?

Ecuador 203. 213, 350 357, 358 Strafe» Uftn

America

Men, Anthony 254, 303. 311 314. 3#>

F.dward». Lt On Idwai H , USAE II« 120

Fdwards group 5*v Speviai F valuation

Subcommittee. NSC

Lgypt 20«*. 211. 216. 324. 325, 34Ü. 344

and MkJdie East defense 326 2*. 331, 332.

339

US aid for 32fc 2v, 330. 341 47

Eisenhower. fV**kieni Dwight t). 1. 3. «11 16,

17, 20r 36, 47. n, 121. 12**, 13ü. 17», 346,

351 Vr ilm Eisenhower administration

and Aid to Egypt 346 47

ami continental defense 135. 1.36, 13», 145. 161

defense ponctfH 9. 51

Eisenhower, President Dwight D.:

(continued)

and disarmament: 188, 190, 192, 195, 196, 199

and economic austerity: 16-17

European policy of: 284-85, 292, 299, 307,

314, 317

and the Far East. 248

and flexible armed forces. 82

and FY 1955 budget: 64, 68

and FY 1956 budget: 79

Korean policy: 227, 231, 233, 235, 237, 243

and )CS 2101.113: 69, 75

and Latin America: 351 -56

,ind Malenkov: 292

manpower policy of: 51. 163, 165-66

and military assistance: 208, 211 - 12. 216, 219

and mobilization planning: 149. 150, 154, 156,

158

and NATO reorganization: 2fl^

and Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee: 140-41

and the New Look: 68

and Reserves: 166, 174. 175. 176

and retaliation: 23. 161

and Taiwan. 256, 25«, 259. 261. 262, 266

and Vietnam: 252, 253. 254

Eisenhower. Dr Milton 351. 356, 357

Eisenhower administration

and August 1953 view by JCS 17-20

and continental defense 111, 133, 144 48. 161

early decisions of 3-9

and economy: 3 4, .16, 39. 71. 72. IDS. 119

and the Far East 247. 249

foreign policy goals o! 39. 55

and long-haul planning. 288

and Mobilization Base (1953) 150 52

mobilization polio* of 161 t»2

and mutual security: 205

and NATO annual review 55

and NATO revised force goals 28S 88. 320

Af\ii the New Look 35

and overall security polio 39

polio toward Japan 2fc7

polio toward Korea 224

poko toward Middle fast 209. _\> JO,

34* 47

Mix- River: 293

tihufz Mountain* 337

I! Salvador 211, 213. 353. 354. 357 £r* afe,

Latin America

English Channel 305

Eritrea. Ethiopia 330

Ethiopia 309. 216. 330. 342 Sev d* Middle Fast

Furope 15. 2». 4L 50. 71, *5, «7, 102, It», 2t«.

207. 208. 210. 215. 23*. 248. 2*4. 2*7. 29*.

306. 314. 315. 117, 33*V .V*.^ tnJn-*!**-:

tuttt&tt*. North Atlantic treaty Organization

(NATCH; .V'ewerw Kurupr

Luropean LVfense Community (EDO 4L 71.

208. 2*1. 288. >92. 2*4 W». 3i:V 314. 321

vwikpstfof 306 08. HI

42*
Index

European Defense Community (EDC):

(continued)

European Defense Community Treaty: 41,

209. 283. 285. 304, 306, 308/311. 314, 315

Everest, Lt. Gen. Frank F., USAF: 28, 98, 99,

100, 101, 105

Everest Committee: 28-31

Executive Committee on Regulations of

Armaments (RAC). UN: 192, 199

F-51 aircraft: 235. 358

F-86 aircraft: 115-278

F-89 aircraft: 112, 115

F-94 aircraft: 112, 115

F-102 aircraft: 146

Falcon missile: 115. 146, 179

Far East: 19, 24. 29. 34. 71. 74. 75. 76, 84. 102.

205. 207. 208. 210, 212. 215. 224. 225. 230.

231. 232, 233, 236, 237, 239. 240, 241. 247.

250. 254. 260. 349

funding for 248. 157

far hast Command (FFCOM) 220, 226. 272. 335

Farouk. King of Egypt: 324

Fechteler, Admiral WUham M . USN. 15. 124.

181. 2*9. 288

Federal Civil Defense Administration 121. 140

Federal Republic of Germany 5<v Germany.

Federal Republic of

Flrmminfc. Dr. Arthur S 139, 154, 166. 16*, 170

Floating D-day concept 7 H, fti

Forte levels, mm-US .Str the inJiVbiual tuittott*

FY IW&> 58 213 14. 218

Japanese 2r#. 270. 271. 272, 275. 278

NATO 281 82

Smith Korean 241 43

|L»ne level». US &v a.'*» NSC 142, NSC 14*2

n 1*52 5* HI

FY 1*53 80. S3. 12*

F* 1*54 2. V 6 8. 9. h3. 64. 65, 80, 83. 146

F3 l**5 1 3. o. 8. »5. ft», 76 77. 80. »3. *4

126. 146

FV 1*56 7 2* 64 7«. 77. SO. «3. 146 15»*.241

Fl 1*57 7. 2*. 30. 64. 65. 75. 7«, 77. (O, IU3.

24 i

iftorasf t4 Air Forve 30 11 Vr rtto Air Forte

US and KS2J01 !13 «a*

ariii «uikcar strategy 8*>

j« p»*ts%var Korea 241

reduction oi IT

feduitfa.*« of tArrnvj X?- 3J

reduction ol (Manne CtXft», Na\y> 30 3!

Forns« aid 2,5. 2s 2* 31 4* *3 2H5, 307

Foreign tiperafcon* Admmtsüanoa (KM) 140.

156, 2m. 21*. 21». 21V 220. 244 2**. 341

Vr al»T Mutual Seewrty Ajgetw

Foreign pobrv. US 3. 14 -KV *!%? fci»enh**wef

admifttstrauon. Truman administration.

I o*mo*a $*r China RrpuM* ol. Taiwan

FofTestaJ James V 177

Foster, William C: 326, 327

Foulkes, General Charles: 141

France: 24, 40, 41, 71, 194, 204, 205, 208, 210,

212, 213, 216, 247, 254, 281, 283, 286. 292,

294, 299, 305, 307, 311. 314, 315. 317, 321,

323. 325, 328. 331

and German rearmament: 308, 309, 310

and Vietnam: 251. 253

Franco, Generalissimo Francisco: 294

French Army: 307

French Chiefs of Staff: 312

French National Assembly: 41. 307

French Union. SVr Vietnam

"Gap-filler" radar: 126, 132. 1X3

Gardner, Trevor: 183

General Counsel (Department of Defense): 16

Geneva Conference: 45. 194, 233, 236-38. 239.

250, 252, 153, 254. 263, 304

CJerhart, Ma( Gen John K , USAF: 14, 2!

Germany. Democratic Republic of: 268, 281, 2*2

Germany. Federal Republic of: 31, XI. 41, 46,

192. 194. 203. 208, 212, 213. 214, 220. 236.

281. 2*8, 299. 303. 306, 307, 321

admission into NATO: 41. 285, 308, 309 HI.

313- It», 321

forces ol 28. 31. 33, 41, 71. 87, 283. 292

Nazism in 2*4

rearmament of 281, 283. 2**), 292. 293. 304.

307. 308, 309. 311, 113 16. 321

reunification 2*2, 2*3, 3tt>

Gleason. S Fveret! 42

Goodrich. Col W R , USA 2*8

Gome, }atk 117

Great Salt Desert 337

Greece 203 20*. 211. 281. 287, 29*. .123. 33*

Greenland 112 115. lift. 122. 142, 143

(. iround tWnrf Corps 112. 122

Gruenttur t>nera! Altred M . USA 288, 312.

317

Guatamaia 353 56 Snr a/*1t-atin Amerua

Guhied Vlissiie» -Vr Mtssdes guided

Guided Mi*sde> Interdepartmental l>pera«jona!

Rn^uiiemcnU Croup (CNUORC4 18Ö |f|-,

I«2, IS©

Gu/man. Fremden! Jacob?» Arbem 353. 354, 356

llama« Island 22*

ft«!! 21 i 213 352 357

Hannah pr John A «7

llamman. W AvereU 2

Fiatovartta. fnmr Minister khiio 277

flaw*« 122. 125. 143. 131. 232, 240

I lawk mtssde 146

Urdilmg Rear .M-tufal t |., USN 10»

Hensri. H Struve 21*. 21". 314. 316

I Erases misssle 180 81, 185

4.10
Index

Higgins, Maj. Gen. Gerald J., USA: 274

Honduras: 211, 213, 353, 354, 355. 356, 357

Hong Kong: 255

Hoover, President Herbert: 107

Hoover Commission: 107, 162

House Committee on Appropriations: 33, 68, 79,

163. See also Congress, US

Hughes. John C: 290

Hull. General John E., USA: 226. 230, 235. 238,

241. 242. 244. 270. 272, 273

and Japanese defense cost-sharing. 276-78

Humphrey. George M 4. 20, 64, 66, 156, 286.

299

IPT 178/15 (NATO): 312-13. 316

Iceland: 112. 115, 281

Ichtang Island: 266

Ikeda. Hayato. 272

India. 193, 195. 255, 328, 338. 341. 344

Indochina: 7. 44, 55. 56. 57. 71. 74. 82, 194, 203,

204, 205. 208. 209, 210, 213, 217, 237, 247.

252. 263. 279. 303

crisis in: 40, 41, 42. 51, 70, 102. i!6, 233. 239.

251, 254 See also Vietnam

Indonesia: 247. 251. 255. See also NSC 5429 5

Intelligence: 55

Inter-American Conference 354 Set aln>

Organization ot American State» (OASl

Inter-Amenean Defence Board 352. 357

Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance

(1947): 349, 355

Intercontinental ballistic mi»stle (ICBM): 52. 143.

148. 154. 155, 162

Interdepartmental Committee t>n Intelligence

^nd Secunty: 121

Interdepartmental Committee on Internal

Security: 117, 140

Intrrdepartlhentai intelligente Conference: 117,

140

International Atomic Fn*«gy Agency 190. 1**3

1*6

Iran 24. 201 21». 212. 213. 324. 325 327. 331

332. 335. m m. 341, 342. 34*. 346

Army 324

ertat» m 332 36

Gendarmerie 324

Irau, 209. 211, 216, 325. 327, 330. V33, 337. 33»

Hl, H2 343, 34* 34»

Ut*r\ 324 Itf. 326, 327. «9 330. 331, 332. 341

Italy 213. 214. 215. 281, 2*3 .»5. 113. 317

JCS 1725,47 93, 150

JCS EM4.151 *4 srt 100

JCS 18441$* (JStT 1*54 55* 101 S*r *6k> Joan«

Strategy CapabUiüe» Plan (J5CP)

JCS 188771» 13*. 340

JCS 2073900- 104

JCS 2086/1 (Dasic Defense Plan): 111, lö

JCS 2099/368: 213-14, 217-18, 221

JCS 2101/113: 30, 32-34, 42, 56. 67, 69, 70, 71,

82. 99, 100, 101. 102, 108, 217, 231, 308

Jackson. CD.: 188. 190

al-Jamali, Prime Minister Muhammed Fadhil. 345

Japan: 25, 28, 29, 31, 33, 34, 46, 87, 203, 212, 213,

214, 220, 229, 230. 231, 232. 236, 240, 241,

247, 248, 249, 250. 255. 263, 267, 269. 270,

272, 276. 277

Air Safety Force: 270. 271, 273, 274

Air Self-Defense Force. 275

defense cost-sharing with US. 276-78

Diet: 209, 269, 274

Joint Staff Council: 275

Maritime (Coastal) Safety Force. 268-70, 271,

272, 273, 274, 278

Minister of Finance: 277

Mutual security treaty (US-Japan): 267, 269.

271, 274

National Defense Agency: 275. 277 See al*>

Japan, National Safety Agency

National Police Reserve: 268

National Safety Agency 268, 269, 271

National Safety For»: 268. 269, 270. 271. 273.

274

rearmament of: 204, 209. 24**. 2*7 73. 275.

276. 278 79

Sell-Defense Forces: 275. 278

Johnson, Joseph t : 189

Joint Advanced Study Committee V7

Joint Bra/il-US Military Commission 351

Joint Chiet» of Staff (JCS) 2. 3 5. 6, 15. 22 23,

27 28. 32. 33. 35, 3* 50. 65. 67, 89. 177

Advisor to NSC Planning Board 21 5cr ato

Gerhart, Ma( Gen John K . USAF

and aid to Vietnam 252

and a balanced budget: 19

At\*S bt»k national seamtv policy 9. 49

and change m Strategie polio l**, 20, 36

and collective »ecurttv 42 44. 56, 32»

and continental defense 117. 120. ;24 -25.

126, 127. 128. 134. 14»

At\iS cri*t» Mt Iran 333 36

*n<\ deadlock over JMRWP. 15** bl

and disarmament 190, 1*3. 1*4. 1«»5, l«*6. I

4

»

\W 200

duties o* #>. 149. 177

and economic austerity IS. 11, 22

netd rvetest Committee rep«« 30

and Far la*t polity «i 249 |}

and force level» 1*. 26. 64. 71. 72, 77 7$, 85.

anä force rrducffcm e» 7

and totetg« pobcv dire*.tton U953) 15. 19

:t9 40

and n 5V55 budget 6\. 131

*r*4 F> !«5* budget 79. 155

otui German reunification StZ. 8*3 *4

ifunal repeat to President Eje**>ho*tf*r 17 20

aiHi Japan 2*7. 269 271 275 276. 277

431
Index

Joint Chief» of Staff (JCS): (continued)

and JOEWP. 94

and JSCP (1954-55): 100-01. S« also JCS

1844/156

and JSCP (1955-56): 103-05

and Korean policy: 225. 228. 229. 230. 232-36.

237, 238-39, 240, 241. 242, 245

and Latin American policy: 350. 352. 353, 355,

358

manpower policy. 164. 166. 168

and MOAP: 202'~05. 208-09. 210-12.

216- 19, 221 -22. See also JCS 2099.368

military appraisal (1954). 42

and military deficiencies: 18, 80

and mobtluaiton: 162

and MOP No, 84: 89. 98- 100, 221. Srr al*>

Joint Program for Planning

and National Reserve Plan of 1955: 175-76

and NATO force levels: 286-88, 297, 298

And NATO reorganization: 289 90

and NATO strategy: 290 91, 298 99, 305. 306

and negotiation» with Soviet Union: 45-4ft,

I'M 95

And 1953 planning 89. 90. 91, 93

*nd Northern Canada Line (DEW) 141. 142

And NSC 135 3 5

•ind NSC J4e» 248

and NSC 14*2 62. nft

and NSC 15V 128 >V

and Nst I5w -i j>

and NSC 15*4 131. 132. 135, 147

and NSC 162 22

and NSC lft2 I 23

and NSC 1622 4* 50, 55. 264

and NSC 1661 249

and NSC 1*7 1 226 27

and NSC' 170 227

And NSC' ITttl 231

and NSC 17> |54

and NSC 1721 |54

and NSC 54ÜS 135

and NSC 5420 169 70

and NSC 54202 1?1 73

and NSC *422 19?

and NSC 5422 1 47

and NSC 54222 157

And NSC 542* 250

and NH 5434 21V 20

and NSCr 543*1: 220

*t\d NSC 544Ö W

and tmcfet* »trategv 2ft. 43. UU

*nd RepuNu **r (IUTM 25*. *». >«ü. 2ftI. 2ft2.

2ft4

and rr*efvem } *»»?. \&t. !?! 72. 17.1 74.

17ft

«nd SEAtO 254 55

and Servne ;!i«^.:-,-. 177 TV

and Si, 241 3 (NATO! 311

and »hanng t#iif*rm*tfc)n wtfh aUtr* MM, W$

And Salamim pn*jr* t 14

*nd Sp*ni*h »d 2*5 *&

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS): (continued)

and stockpile policy: 152-53

and strategic analysis (1953) 16. 17-20, 64, 66

and strategic assessment (1954): 42-44, 152

and strategic assessment (1956-59): 152

and strategic planning: 89-109

and US military stratgy: 18

and US strategic position. 1954: 39

views of. end of 1953: 42-44

Joint Intelligence Committee (IIC): 91 -94. 97

Joint Logistic Plan 90-9!

Joint logistics Plans Committee (JLPC): 91, 94.

96. 97, 157. 159, 221

Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate (JLRSE): 90,

91. 93. 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 105, 106

Jinnt Mexican-US Military Commission: 351

Joint Mid-Range War Plan (JMRWP): 101-03,

106. 108, 158, 159 61. 168. 173. 174. 176,

222. .150, 352

Joint Military Study Group (Canada-US): 134,

141. 142

Joint Military Survey Team to Pakistan: 344-45

lomt Mobilization Plan 93, 84 Serai** JCS

1725/47

Joint Outline Emergency War l*lan (JOEWP): 93.

9i. 95, 324

Joint Outline War Plan (JOWP) 93. 150

Joint Program for Planning: 89 93

Joint Staff Ift. *0. V7. 101, 108. 272. 28ft

Director. 28. «v. 98. w. iup. KM. 104, Kb. 172

S*r d/x> Davt». Vice Admiral Arthur C .

I SN. Everest. Lt Gen Frank J- , USAE

Mathewson, It Gen Lemuel, USA

foutt Strategic Plans Group: 91. 94. 100, 105 139

Joint Staff Council (Japan) 275

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSC V} 90, v„\

*3. 94 'ft. *6\ 9*. 105 Of'. 150, 15*. 352

IV54 55 100 01. 103 10»

1V55 5fe 103 05. 108. 321

Joint Strategu ObfVCttV** llan (JSOP) v«. VI

V2 V4. 9ft, *7 w »a5 0ft 150 159. Jto.

221. 352

Joint Stfatrgu Plan» Committee {JSPC l fe3. oA

65, 71. 74. 75. V|. *f I5v. 16* 228. 232. 242.

258. 2VS. 310. 321

and Japanese »tratrgV 36*. 270. 273

*nd JLJCSr V7 *B

*nd JMRWp 109-03

oiul JSCP n »

1*54 55 \0ü 01

[955 Sb {01 05

md JSOP v?

And Middtr fca*t -»trategv .125. 334. .«ft 3?

33t 33V. 3*i

And SC 24! 3 (NATO) 311 13

afui unified Ait drfcn.*e i.i*ft\mAn4 13ft

lo*nf ^«ateg» Surrey C«»mmiriee sjSSt r 22 23,

45. 47. 5«. VI. *5. 104, 153. 15ft. i*4. 130,

2*2. 28.5, 2*0. .*». 310

Unm Studv Ctxtup nn South?»»! A»*a 254

Mm US Miiiian Gruttp (Jl/SMCj jft Spain -9ft
Index

Jordan: 209, 324, 325, 328, 330, 341, 343

Juin, Marshal Alphonse-Pierre: 289, 307

Kai Plan: 159. 260

Kashmir: 328

Kelly, Marvin J: 118, 119

Kelly Croup. See Summer Study Group

Kennan. George F: 12

Key West Agreement: 177. 178. 179, 182

Khar.,Cer»efai Mohammed Ayub: 336

Kimura. Tokutaro: 269, 275

Kmmen Islands. See Quemov islands

Kodiak, Alaska: 125, 131, 143

Korea, North: 223. 228, 229, 237

Korea, Republic of: 1, 2, 5. 25, 41, 59, 61. 65, 74.

93, 157, 188, 192, 203. 204. 209, 216. 220.

223. 224, 22/, 228. 232, 239, 243. 250, 263.

286. 349, 358 See ala> Rhee. President

'-.mgman

Agreed Minute (US-ROK) 242. 243

Air »orce: 234. 235. 243

Army: 61

force levels: 233-36. 118 39. 241 43

Mannr Corp* 242

Mutual LVfense Treaty (US-ROK) 224 25.

228. 244

Naw 234. 235

nuclear weapon* in 22**

redeployment of US force« from 22** 33, 23o

»»-41. 245

relation* with US, 1954 243 45

unification of; 224, 226. 227. IN. 137. 242

US poucv toward 230, 231, 237

Korean War 2. 5. 7. 14. 18, If 2». 3* e>2 M

67. 89. 108. 152, 164. lb*. 17».. 204. 20*. 223

24V 256 2A3. 2*7

Arau*nvr Agreement I. 64. 6*. 221, 225 22?

22*. 234 23?, 240. 245

Military Ar«u»tur i ommts*ion. 203

Kremlin 40

Kuwait 337 338

Kve«, Ruger MS 6. V. M. 125. 15J 1*5. 20*.

207. 20». 216, 330. U4

UbraJor 122 11V I4i, 142

L*kaj Umua; 337

landing CxafV Mevnani/ed (t£M) 257. 270

L*o*. 204. »0, 254. 255

Uli» AmenVa 2iU 205. 207. 2V». 21 »34«* 5!.

3** 58 Vf *«'*. inrfijtirfiirtf «a?****

imj-HfUft»«1 vi l*u*trmaia sn 353 56

US pofccv fctfwofd 34* 5*

Lebanon 209, 211 32». 130. 341 342. 343. 34*

tend leas«' pfogiam 201. 35s

labrr*tfcm poi*> US U. 14. 55

Uswcsfa Ub»**twrv lie !20 12». 14»

Lincoln Transition System: 126, 132, 133, 148

S«Ya/*t> Lincoln Laboratory; Semi-Automatic

Ground Environment (SAGE)

Lisbon force goals. NATO 281 - 88. 297. 299,

310. 318

Ljubljana gateway: 214

Location Study Group (Canada-US): 143

Lodge, Henry Cabot: 106

Loki missile: 113

London: 193, 309, 314, 317, 329, 347

Lovert, Robert A: 1 3, 117, 118, 150, 205

Low Countries: 310

Low «frequency acquisition and ranging

(LOFAR): 116, 120, 126, IJI i44, \&

Luedecke. Maj. Gen. AR: '.90

Luxembourg: 213. 281, 283

MC 48 (NATO) 31b. 317. 320

McCormack. Maj Gen jamev |r., USAF. 12

McNeil. VV ) 64, 66, 73. 76, 2t)5

Majlis. Ivan: 334

Malava: 247

Malenkov, Ceorgi Ml. 24. 40. 5b. 292

Manchuria 228. 229

Manila Pact 41. 255

Manpower. US military 3, 27. 28. 30, 34. 61. BO

FV 1952 5«, 82

F\ 1953 57 HI

ft |953 75 "1, 79

ft 1956 72. 7P 79. K6. 102 103. i7^

FY 1957 69. 70 76. 102

limit* on 2. 8

problem» ID policy 16.3 &5

reduction* m !^ c! f«2. 63

reduction», in I9S5 t*7

Mao tse-tung 247

Manne Corp* is n IS, 17 2s 35 r»V 70. 71. B0.

9J, UH* Ser u'w Continental detente Force

level*. US. Navv. US

appropriation». 1*M nO. ö2

Commandant 15. 91 153 S<e thtt shepherd

General Lemuel C Jr USMC

f u»t Air Wing 241

Firrt Divfanan: 239. 240. 2*1

F3 lv*5 f,me level »7. 6«

F3 195© farce lorl 65. «»6. 7J

r3 1957 tone le%el 2

s* *5 **. 72. 75

and fcS 1*44! 51 *5 «fe

and K"S 30« 368 212

**4 KS 2101 U3 Jn

and fMKWP 159 **?

«id P*r U954 55, 5tiJ t *

*r*4 p5Cf |$«M 5*V !0t 'jb

and |SOf 9*

manpower tuf» m fe2 6J

and NSC 14*2 65

f«-*rrv<c *t*en$j!h 167. 170

and US Korean fMdWV 21« 232 23* 40

433
Index

>

Massachusetts Institute of Technolog}': 116

Matador missile: 179, 185, 299

Mathewson, Lt. Gen. Lemuel, USA: 104, 172

Matsu Island: 261, 266

Maybank, Burnet R.: 69

Mediterranean Sea: 2, 294, 322, 324,333,335, 339

Memorandum of Policy (MOP) No. 84: 89-93,

96, 97, 98-100, 104, 105-06, 108, 221. See

also Joint Program for Planning

Mendes-France, Pierre: 307, 314

Mexican-US Military Commission, Joint: 351

Mexico: 139, 203. 204, 350

Meyers, Brig. Gen. Harry F., USA: 344

Mid-Cmada Line: 135, 141, 143, 144

Middle East: 208, 209, 211, 212, 214, 215, 323,416.

See also individual nations; Near Fast

defense concept for: 336-40, 345-47

JSPC study of: 336-38

US aid to: 326-29

US interests in: 323-26

Middle East Defense Organization: 323, 324,

326, 327, 329, 330, 331, 332, 336, 338

Military Armistice Commission, Korea: 213

Military assistance program: 16, 20, 43, 53, 90,

216- 19, 236, 274, 295. See also entries under

geographic areas and individual nations

FY 1954: 203-09, 258, 325

FY 1955:209-12,217, 258

FY 1955-58: 214, 217, 242

FY 1956: 216, 217, 258, 260

and the New Look: 212-15, 259

in wartime: 221-22

Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG):

202, 210, 218, 221-22, 230. 256, 257, 258,

265

in Iran: 324

in l.ip.tn: 274

in Spain: 2%

in West Germany: 316

Military Cooperation Committee (Canada-US):

112

Military Representatives Committee, NATO:

306, 311, 316

Missiles, guided: 51. 115, 131, 143, 182

air-to-air (AAM): 115. 146. 17V, 180, 184

air-to-surtace (AFM) 180, 184

antiaircraft: U5. 123. 145, J46, 179, 181. 1R3,

184-85

anti-missile missile: 183

Army-Air Force dispute over: 179 82, 183- 86

intercontinental: 184-85

medium-range: 179. 185 86

surface-to-air (SAM); 179. 180, 181. 182, 184

suriace-to-surface (5SM): 179, 180. 181, 182,

184, 185, 299. 317

Mobilization planning 90, M4, 97. 99, 102 03.

104, 149 62

tvse: 7, 18, 20, 21, 24. 31, 35, 43, 45, 55 57.

80. 102

FY 1956 budget 155-58

and ICS: 162

Mobilization planning: (continued)

and JCS 2101/113: 102

and New Look: 161-62

1953: 150-52, 155-56, 160, 221

1954: 155-59

US-allied planning: 221 -22

Mobilization Production Program: 150

Molotov, Vyacheslav M.: 236, 303

Montgomery, Col. E.A., USMC: 333

Mosel, Iraq: 337, 339

Mossadegh, Prime Minister Mohammed: 324,

332, 334

Munitions Board (Department of Defense): 16,

149, 150, 153

Murphy, Robert D.: 268

"Mutual atomic plenty": 40, 43, 49, 51, 52, 87

Mutual Defense Assistance Act (1949): 201

Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP):

201, 202, 203, 257, 258, 295, 296, 329, 341

flexibility in: 216-20

FY 1954: 203-09, 257, 258, 268, 295, 296, 326,

329, 330, 350, 351, 358

FY 1955: 209-12, 257, 258, 278, 343

FY 1955-58: 213-16, 259. See also JCS

2099/368

FY 1956: 216, 258, 343, 345

for Latin America: 350, 357, 358

for the Middle East: 340-43, 344-45, 346

Mutual Defense Treaty (US-Republic of China):

263-64, 279

Mutual Defense Treaty (US-Republic of Korea):

224-25, 228, 238,'244, 263

Mutual Security Act (1951). 201, 203, 204, 350.

See also JCS 2099/368

Mutual Security Act (1953): 307

Mutual Security Act (1954): 212, 219, 307

Mutual Security Agency: 201, 203. See also

Foreign Operations Auministr .on (FOA)

NSC 20 4:8

NSC 48/5: 247, 248

NSC 56/2: 350

NSC «8/2:8

NSC 112: 187, 193, 196

NSC 124/2: 251, 252

NSC 125/2: 267, 268

NSC 125/6: 267

NSC 129/1: 323, 325

NSC 135/3: 5. 8, 10. 40

NSC 136/1: 333, 334

NSC 139: 118-19. 121. 146. 147

NSC 141:2, 3. 4-6

NSC 142: 3,5

NSC 1441: 351-52, 353, 357

NSC" 146: 248, 257

NSC 146/1: 257

NSC 146/2: 248, 249, 258, 259. 261

NSC 148: 248

NSC 149: 288

434
Index

NSC 149/2: 8, 9, 16, 17, 63, 151, 178

and balanced budget: 61

and FY 1955 budget: 26, 66

influence on NSC 153/1: 10

and mutual security program: 207, 208, 330

and reductions in money and manpower: 61,

62, 63, 64. 65, 371

NSC 153/1: 9-10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 151. See also

NSC 149/2

and Eisenhower study: 16-17, 18, 19

and NATO: 284

and US policy objectives: 10, 95

and US unilateral action: 10, 25, 44

NSC 154/1: 224

NSC 155/1: 331, 332, 339-40

NSC 157/1: 224

NSC 159: 126, 127, 128, 129

NSC 159/3: 129-30

NSC 159/4: 130, 131-32, 134, 135, 146. 147, 151,

156

NSC 160/1: 293, 308

NSC 162: 21-23, 25

and Communist bloc: 21-22

and continental defense: 27, 28

military strategy: 21

and Soviet capability: 40

world assessment in: 21

NSC 162/1:23

NSC 162/2: 24-26, 42, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51,

99, 152, 196-97, 212, 264

and collective security: 25, 41, 48

and communist subversion: 24, 41, 47, 152

and defense requirements: 24

and disarmament: 196-97

and Everest Committee report: 30-31

and the Far East: 248, 264

and force levels: 24, 26

andFY 1956 budget: 41, 136

influence of General Ridgway and Admiral

Carney on: 34

and manpower policy: 163

and the Middle East: 332

and military assistance. 212

and mobilization: 156, 158

and "mutual atomic plenty": 26

and negotiations with Soviet Union: 25, 49

and neutrals: 24

and the New Look: 36

and NSC 5422: 44-45

and nuclear monopoly: 41

and nuclear proliferation: 25-26, 43. 45

and nuclear retaliation: 25-26

and reaction to Soviet aggression: 25, 44, 100

and redeployment: 25, 230

and sound economy: 25

and underdeveloped nations: 24

NSC 166/1: 249

NSC 167: 226

NSC 167/1:226-27

NSC 167/2: 227

NSC 170: 227

NSC 170/1: 231

NSC 172: 154

NSC 172/1: 154

NSC 175: 335, 336

NSC 177; 252

NSC 5402: 336

NSC 5404: 252

NSC 5405: 252

NSC 5408: 135-37, 144, 156

NSC 5409: 344

NSC 5414: 154, 155

NSC 5414/1: 155

NSC 5416: 249

NSC 5419/1: 355

NSC 5420: 169, 171, 173

NSC 5420/1: 170

NSC 5420/2: 171, 172, 174

NSC 5420/3: 173, 174, 175

NSC 5422: 44, 46-47, 136, 137, 197. See also

NSC 162/2

and disarmament: 197

and mobilization planning, FY 1956: 155-56

and negotiations: 45, 46

NSC 5422/1: 47, 156

and mobilization policy 47, 156

and unilateral action: 47-48

NSC 5422/2: 47-48, 157-58, 197-98, 222

and disarmament. 197

and military assistance: 222

and mobilization: 156-58, 159

NSC 5428: 345, 346

NSC 5429: 250

NSC 5429/2: 250

NSC 54295: 251, 265

NSC 5432: 356

NSC 5432,'1: 357, 358. See also NSC 144,1

NSC 5434: 219

NSC 5434/1: 220

NSC 5440: 51, 52, 198

NSC 5440/1: 52

NSC 5441: 265

NSC 5501: 52-55, 74, 84

and aid to underdeveloped countries: 54

as basic national security strategy: 53

and collective defenses: 53

and deterrence: 87

and JCS 2101 113: 57

and JSCF (1955-56): 105

and manpower policy: 163

and mobilization: 158

and negotiations with the Soviet Union: 54,

198

and NSC 1622: 53, 54, 55

and NSC 5422/2: 53-54

strategy toward Communist Woe: 54, 55

NSC 5504: 346

Naguib. General Mohammed: 324. 326, 327,

346

Nash. Frank G : 192, 208. 212. 225. 229, 273.

286, 293. 298, 343

Nasser, Col. Gamel Abdel: 346

435
Index

National Guard, US: 64, 74, 76, 123, 131, 145,

165, 167, 168, 171, 175, 176, 231, 233, 235

National Reserve Plan (1955): 175-76

National Security Act (1947): 149, 153, 177, 182

National Security Council (NSC): 3, 5, 7, 11,

12, 13, 14, 20, 26, 27, 33, 39, 40, 41, 50,

61, 63, 65, 66, 67, 72, 93, 125, 127

and aid to Spain: 295

and continental defense: 121, 125.. 140

Continental Defense Committee, NSC

Planning Board: 121, 125-27, 139, 158

and disarmament: 188, 189, 190, 192, 1%,

198, 199

and early warning system: 117, 119, 120, 121

and economy: 119

and FY 1956 budget: 74, 144-45

and German problem: 315

and information sharing: 191

and Korean policy: 225, 228, 229, 231, 233,

235-36, 243. See also NSC 167; NSC

167/1

and Latin America: 355

and MDAP: 210, 212, 216, 219

and mutual security: 2U5, 207

and NATO annual review: 55

and NATO fore goals: 299

Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee:

140, 157, 158

and nuclear test moratorium: 195

Operations Coordinating Board. 5, 139, 231,

244

Planning Board: 5, 8, 14. 21, 23, 42, 44, 45,

47, 51, 121, 125, 129. 130, 135-37, 139,

152, 154, 156, 189, 191. 192, 217. 219, 220,

226, 248. 249, 250. 253, 257, 265, 292. 335,

346, 356-57

Psychological Strategy Bo»rd: 190

jnd reserves 166, 169

and revised national secuntv policv: 51

and SEA IO: 254

Senior Statt: 5, 189

and Southeast Asia: 249-50, 251, 2S2

and Soviet capability: 139-41

Special Evaluation Subcommittee: 118 !19,

120-21, 141

and Taiwan: 256. 25«. 261 62. 26t-6o

National Security Resources Board: 117, 149,

153. 154

National Secunty Training Commission: 164,

165. 166, 169, 176

National Secunty Training Corps 164

National Secunty Training Program: 164

Nationalist China See China. Republic ot

Navaho missile: 186

Navy. Canadian: 141

Navv, US: 2. 3. 6-9. 28, 34. 35. 65, 69, 70, 71.

80, 85, 91, 108. 177

appropriation. FY 1954: 60. 62

Chief of Naval Operations: 15, 115. 269 See

»ho Carney. Admiral Robert B , USN;

f-echteler. Admiral William M . USN

Navy, US: (continued)

and DEW line: 144

FY 1955 force level: 37, 67, 68, 130, 132

FY 1956 force level: 65, 66, 72

FY 1957 force level: 29, 65, 66, 72, 75

and JCS 1844/151: 95-96

and JCS 2099/368: 212-13

and JMRWP: 159-60

and JSCP (1954-55): 101-03

and JSCP (1955-56): 104-05

and JSOP: 97

and Korean policy: 228, 232, 233

and Latin America: 355

manpower cuts in: 62, 63

and missile policy: 180-82

and NATO revised force goals: 297

and NSC 149/2 65, 66

reserve strength: 167, 170, 172

Seventh Fleet: 256, 261, 263, 266

Near East: 205, 207, 208, 211, 331. See also

Middle East

Nehru, Prime Minister Jawaharlal: 193-94,

344

Neisse River: 293

Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee,

NSC: 140, 157, 158

Netherlands: 213, 281, 283, 306

Neutral countries: 24, 40. See also NSC 135/3

Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

(Korea Armistice): 223, 237

Newfoundland: 122, 123, 141, 142

New Look: 1, 4, 9, 32, 33, 35-36, 50, 56, 68,

70, 76, 79, 80, 111, 151, 245, 301

and deterrence: 37

and Germany: 308

and Japanese rearmament: 275. See a/*>

Japan, rearmament of

and JCS 2101/113: 36. 70, 231

and military assistance: 212-15, 259

and mobilization planning: 161-62

and NSC 1622: 36

and nuclear weapons: 2H

origin of phrase: 35, 369

and retaliation: 37, 86

and security vi solvency": 36

and strategic reserve: 35, 80, 84

strategy of: 35

and US manpower levels: 28, 163

and Western alliance: 44, 320

New Zealand. 25, 4), 224, 247, 250, 254, 255.

263. 327. 328

Nicaragua. 211, 213, 353 354. 257

Nike missile: 115, 123. 145. 146, 179, 181, 184

Nuon, Vice President Richard M. 227-28

Norstad. General Launs, USAF: 289

North Africa. 333

North America 141. 142. See *J/M» Continental

defense

North Atlantic Council: 103, 204, 209, 281, 283.

284. 286. 287. 288, 295, 299, 301. 304. 309.

312, 314, 315, 317. 321

436
Index

North Atlantic Council Annual Review

Committee: 285

North Atlantic Treaty: 313, 314, 315

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): 3,

4, 7. 10, 12, 15, 19, 20, 23, 25, 28, 37, 41,

53, 71, 250, 281, 296, 307, 313, 323, ZZ9

accomplishments of, 1952-54: 320-21

Annual Review, 1952: 204, 285

Annual Review, 1953: 297-301

Annual Review, 1954: 318, 319

and European Defense Community: 283

and German problem: 293, 308-11

International Staff: 285, 286, 297, 317

Lisbon force goals: 281-88, 310, 318

and MDAP: 203-04, 205, 207, 208, 209, 210,

211, 220, 222, 349

Military Committee: 103, 289, 301, 305, 306,

316

and military organization: 288

and nuclear weapons: 191, 304-06, 311-13,

317, 320

Permanent Council: 317

and planning: 90, 93

Standing Group: 285, 286, 289, 298, 306, 311,

312, 316

strategy in Western Europe: 37, 75, 103, 104,

203.204,299,311

North Korea: 22, 228, 229, 237

Northern Canada Line: 141-44. See also

Distant Earlv Warning (DEW) Line

Norway: 213. 281

Nova Scotia: 116

Nuclear balance: 25, 26, 40, 4L 43, 49, 51. 52,

87

Nuclear weapons: 1, 4, 13. 17, 18, 20. 21.

25-31, 40, 42. 45, 50, 54, 66, 67, 80. 87,

93. 95, 101-02. 108, HI. 123, 136. 143,

145. 183, 187, 190, 198, 275, 290

intercontinental ballistic missiles: 52. 143.

14-, 154, 155. 162

and JSCP(1955-56): 105

in the Middle East: 340

moratorium on testing of: 193-94

and NATO strategy: 191, 304 06 311 - 13.

317, 320

and NSC 5422: 46

and NSC 5422 2. 47

and NSC 5501. 54

possible use in Korea: 229

Soviet explosion of: 1. 26, 40. 64, 127. 128,

135, 143. 192, 194

280-mm cannon: 298. 317

Oder Rjver: 293

Office of Defense Mobtluation (ODM) 22. 44.

121, 127, 139. 140, 150. 153, 154 55. 156.

157, 162. 165, 166, 169, 171, 173

Office of Military Assistance (Department ot

Defense): 260

Office of the Secretary of Defense: 28, 68, 169,

172, 173, 176, 212, 260, 286, 292, 341, 344,

345

Okinawa: 240, 247, 267

Operation Candor: 190, 191

Operations Coordinating Board, NSC: 5, 139,

231, 244

Oppenheimer, Dr. J. Robert: 188, 191, 192

Organization of American States (OAS): 351,

355, 356

Pacific Charter. See Southeast Asia Collective

Defense Treaty

Pahlevi, Shah Mohammed Reza: 333, 334, 346

Paik Too Chin, Prime Minister: 235

Pakistan: 24, 41, 209, 211, 212, 213, 214, 220,

255, 325, 326, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 335,

336, 337, 338, 341, 342, 343-45, 346

Palestine: 341

Panama Canal: 352

Paris: 28t!, 299, 307, 315

Pearl Harbor: 131, 145

Peking: 224 248, 249, 250

Penghu Islands: 261, 264, 266

Permanent joint Hoard on Defense

(Canada-US): 112, 119, 134. 141

Peron, President Juan: 350

Persian Gulf: 324, 325, 332, 333, 335, 337, 340

Peru: 203, 213, 350, 357, 358

Pescadores Island«. See Penghu Islands

Philippines, Republic of: 25, 4L 203, 213, 241,

247, 249, 250, 254, 255, 262

Pl\t TREK network: 112, 141

Planning. 33. 66, 89

contingency: 89

long-range: 90, 91, 97 98, 105 06. See <i/s*»

joint Long-Range Stratgic Estimate

(jLRSE)

short-range: 89. See alu» joint Outline

Emergency War Plan (JOEWP); joint

Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)

strategic: 4. 24. 27, 35, 36. 64. 68. 89 109,

288, 299, 301

Planning Board. NSC" See National Security

Council. Planning Board

Poland: 294

Portugal: 213, 281, 294

President ot the United States See Eisenhower.

President Dwight D , Truman, President

Harry S

Prisoners of war: 46, 223

Psychological Strategy Board, NSC: 190

Public opinion: 19. 119, 128. 304. 306. 320

Ouantico. Virginia: 17. 64

Quarto, Donald A 183, 185. 18*

Qtiemov Islands: 261. 262. 266

437
n

Index

Radar picket escort ship (DER): 115, 116, 122,

125, 132, 144

Radford, Admiral Arthur W., USN: 15, 17, 18,

20, 34, 35-36, 65, 104, 128, 152, 154, 334

as advocate of economy: 40, 147, 166

appointment to JCS: 15

and disarmament: 190, 197

and flexible armed forces: 82

and FY 1955 budget: 26, 32-33, 66, 69

and FY 1956 budget: 74, 79, 86

and IPT 178/15 (NATO): 313

and JCS 2101/113: 32, 35

andJMRWP: 102-03, 160

and MC 48 (NATO): 316, 317

and Mid-Canada Line: 141

and missile policy: 183, 185-86

and New Look: 35, 37, 68, 79, 86, 146-47,

163

and NSC 159/4: 132

and NSC 5422: 46

and nuclear weapons: 26, 28, 66

and Republic of China: 259, 260, 261, 279

and Soviet capability: 140

and unified air defense command: 137-38

and US policy on japan: 277

and US policy on Korea: 229, 231, 235, 236,

242

and US reserve strength. 168, 174, 175, 176

and Vietnam: 253, 254

and West Germany: 231

Rankin, Karl: 256

Readiness, US forces. It», 18, 21, 61

Redeployments, US. 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,

28, 29. 33. 42

And Korean War: 229 33, 234, 236, 238,

239 41

and New Look: 36, K4

Regimental combat team (RCT): 72, 231. 240.

241, 356

Regulus missjle: 179, 180. 181

Reorganization Plan No. 3: 14V. 154

Reorganization Plan No 6. 16, 107 08. 164.

17H. 17V

Reorganization Plan No 7: 28V

Republic ot China. Srt" China. Republic of;

Tawtan

Republic of Korea (ROK) See Korea. Republic

of

Republic ot the Philippine* Sei- Philippines,

Repuhlic of

Research and development: VH, 191 $<Y */&)

Technology

Research and Development Board (Department

ol Defense): 16

Redstone missile: 186

Retaliatory c.ir ibility. US: 10. 13, 18. IV, 22.

23 25. 30, 31. f>V. TV. 100 101. 128, Vf

dm NSC \t£. NSC 1622. Nuclear weapons

Air Force view 95 %. 108

Armv view: 95, 100 101. 108

Manne Corps view 95« 108

Retaliatory capability, US: (continued)

Navy view: 95, 101, 108

and New Look: 35, 37, 69, 82, 86, 147

and NSC 5501: 53, 57

Rhee, President Syngman: 224, 228, 245, 279.

See also Korea, Republic of

and Agreed Minute (US-ROK): 243-44

and NSC 167: 226

and NSC 167/1: 227

and US-Korea mutual defense treaty: 225,

227-28, 237, 238

and US redeployment: 230, 231, 236

visit to US: 238-39, 242

Ridgway, General Matthew B., USA: 15, 18,

20, 34, 36, 45, 50, 67, 75, 76, 77, 147,

288, 298, 321

as advocate of flexible national strategy: 40

and Chinese offshore islands: 262, 279

and DEW line: 143

and dissenting views of national policy: 51

and FY 1955 budget: 69

and FY 1956 budget: 79

and japan: 272, 274, 276-77

and JCS 2101/113: 33, 34

and JMRWP, 1954. 159

and Key West Agreement: 178-79

and Korea: 230, 231-32, 234, 244

and Latin American aid: 358

and military assistance: 221

and MOP No. 84: 99

and national strategy: 40, 51, 56-57

and NATO force goals: 287

and NATO reorganization: 288-89

and negotiations on disarmament: 56

and New Look: 33, 50, 87

and NSC 166/2: 50. 101

and NSC 54222: 1*7

and NSC 54341. 220

and NSC 5501: 57. 58

and reserves: 168, 175. 176

and retaliation: 56 57

and unified air defense command: 137

and US force n*dep!oyment: 33, 290

and Vietnam: 253

Roles and missions Str Key West Agreement

Royal Air Force (RAF): 328

Rvukvus Islands 240, 247. 248. 267

SG 2413 (NATO) 306, 311. 312, 316

Sandys, Duncan: 185

Saudi Arabia: 209, 328, 341. 342. 344

Secretary of the Air Force: 183

Secretary of the Army 336

Secretary of Defense: 3. 6. 14. 16 18. 23, 33,

34. 63. ft*. 70-72, 75, 89, V3, 102 03,

116. 117, 124, 125, 128. 140. 155. 157. 15V.

168. 171. 172, 176 78. 181. 185. 1V2,

194. 196, 197. 19V. 201 03. 211. 216 IV,

220 22. 226. 237. 25V. 263. 273. 275. 28V,

438 . #'.
Index

Secretary of Defense: (continued)

304, 328-30, 338, 353. See also Lovett,

Robert A.; Wilson, Charles E.

Secretary of the Navy: 17

Secretary of State:.50, 56, 117. 192, 1%, 199,

203, 226, 237, 240, 289, 299, 328. See also

Acheson, Dean; Dulles, John Foster

Secretary of the Treasury: 4, 17, 28, 40, 64,

216. See also Humphrey, George M.

Selective Service System: 166, 169, 170, 172

Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE):

145-46, 148

Senate Appropriations Committee: 32, 63, 69.

See also Congress, US

Senior Staff (NSC): 5, 189

Seoul: 227. 231, 233, 244

Sequoia: 17

"Seven Wise Men": 6, 7

Seventh Fleet, US. 256, 261, 263, 266

Shepherd, General Lemuel C, Jr., USMC: 15,

16, 17

and Chinese offshore islands: 262

and FY 1957 force levels: 30

and JMRWP, 1954: 159

and NSC 162/2: 30

and reserves: 168, 175

and Vietnam: 253

Shigemitsu, Prime Minister Mamoru: 271

Smith, Maj. Gen. Frederic H , USAF: 121

Smith, General Walter Bedell, USA: 11, 117,

254

Snark missile: 186

Sohn Won 11, Admiral: 234-35. 242

Solanum project: 11-14, 163

Solanum Special Committee: 21

South Africa: 327, 328

South America: 349, 350 Set alw Latin

America

South Korea. See Korea, Republic of

South Vietnam: 316

Southeast Asia: 41, 55. 249-55

Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty 41.

255, 262

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SFATO)

250, 254-55, 279

Southern Camda Line 122. 123, 124. 12b

See abü Continental defense, radar

network tor

Southern Furope. J5

Southwest Pacific: 255

Soviet bloc 1, 10. 12. 13. 21. 22. 24. 25, 42. 43.

45. 49, 51. 95. 101, 154, 187-88

Soviet Union 1. 2. 9. 10. U. 13, 21. 25, 27, 31.

40. 4L 43. 46. 47. 52, 74. 93. %. 101. 117,

118. 120, 121, 126, 136. 143. 147. 154, 155.

188. 194. 196. 197. 198. 215. 229. 236. 247.

251. 266, 268. 281, 294, 323, 327. 332. 347

and Berlin conference: 303-04

and disarmament: 187-89. 192 94, 197. 199

expanded influence: 7. 10, 51. 195, 291. 331,

332

Soviet Union: (continued)

and German problem: 294

negotiations with: 22, 25, 45, 197, 198, 307

nuclear capability of: 21, 40, 43, 45, 47, 52,

117-18, 120, 136, 143, 190, 197, 291

periodic appraisals of: 118, 140-41

Spain: 203, 204, 207, 209, 213, 220

Joint US Military Group (JUSMG): 2%

and NATO: 294-96

US military assistance to: 295-%

Sparrow missile. 179

Special Assistant to the President for Cold War

Operations: 188

Special Assistant to the President for National

Security Affairs: 5, 11, 219

Special Evaluation Subcommittee, NSC: 118,

119, 120-21, 141

Sprague, Robert C: 135. 136, 137

Stalin, Premier Josef V.: 1, 2, 21, 40, 188. 223, 292

Standing Group, NATO. See North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO), Standing

Group

Stassen, Harold E.: 199. 203, 206, 210. 284, 286

State of the Union message: 4, 178, 256

Stevens, Robert T . 75, 233-34, 235

Stevens, Col. W. A., USA: 193

Stockpiling: 7, 10. See also Joint Chiefs of Staff,

and stockpile policy

Strategic Air Command (SAC): 232. 240

Strategic planning. See Joint Program for

Planning; Planning

Strategic reserve: 3. 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 31, 57,

82. 240. 245. See also JCS 2101 113

and New Look: 35. 80, 84-85

Strauss, Rear Admiral Lewis L , USN. 190, 195

Study Group on Guided Missiles. 183

Stump. Admiral Felix B , USN; 25fc. 259, 265

Submannes: 353 See also Antisubmarine warfare

(ASW); Continental defense

Subversion: 13. 41, 44, 48, 51, 54. 255

Sudan: 324, 326

Suez: 324, 326. 327, 328. 329. 340, 346

Sue/ Canal. 324. 335

Summer Study Group (1*»52): lib 17. 118.

119 20, 121. 12b

Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic

(SACLANT). NATO 305

Supreme Allied Commander, Furope

(SACEUR). NATO. 15, 281, 2H3, 284, 288,

289, 290, 296. 298, 304, 305, 314. 315, 317. 321

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers. Furope

(SHAPE); 208. 222. 288. X39

Syna 209, 328. 330. 331, 341. 344

TU-4 aircraft (Soviet): 111, 120, 122

Lachen Islands 261, 265. 266

Tart. Robert A 14. 15

Taiwan 203, 247. 248. 255. 256 57. 259 261.

263, 264, 265. 266. 279 See al>o NSC 146/2.

439
Index

Taiwan: (continued)

NSC 5429/5; China, Republic of

Taiwan Strait: 261, 279, 349

Taiwan Strait crisis: 265-66

Talbott, Harold E.: 183

Taurus Mountains: 324, 339

Technology

Soviet': 129, 141

US: 28, 36, 79, 97-98, 108, 111, 116, 190,

301, 304. 320

Terrier missile: 179

Texas Towers: 122, 132, 133

Thailand: 203, 213, 254, 255

Tigris River: 337

Tito, Marshal Josip: 215

Trieste, Italy: 215, 293, 317

Trinidad: 355

Truman, President Harry S: 1, 59, 60, 63,

116- 18, 146, 177, 205, 233, 247, 259, 263,

267, 295, 323, 326, 328, 350

Truman administration: 2, 14, 36, 55, 59, 108

and continental defense: 116-19

?nd economy: 2

Far Eastern policy: 247

Latin American policy: 350

Middle Eastern policy: 323

military assistance: 201, 203

and military buildup: 59

and mobilization planning: 149, 151

study groups during: 116-20

Turkey: 24, 203, 209, 211, 212, 213, 281, 287, 299,

323, 324, 325, 328, 331, 332, 336. 338, 339,

340, 342. 343, 345-47

Twining, General Nathan P., USAF: 15, 18. 30,

34, 36, 147, It*. 182, 233

and Chinese offshore islands: 262

and DEW line policy: 124, 135, 142 44

and FY 1955 budget 69, 131

and FY 1956 budget: 79

and JO> 2101 113 33, 99

andJMRWP 102, 159 60

and ISCP (1*55 56) 105

and MOP No 84: 99

and NATO: 291, 309

and the New Look 33, 87

and NSC 5422 2 157

and unmed defense command 137 38

and US reserves 168. 175 76

Uniform Code of Military Justice 171. 174

United Kingdom 4, 24. 185-86, 193. 194, 208.

210 212. 213. 247. 255. 281, 2*>2. *», 303.

307. 309, 311. 313. 314. 317, 321. 323

in the Middle East 124. 325. 326. 327. 328,

.330-33. 338. 339, 341. 346. 347

Middle East Und Force* of: 332

and Vietnam 254

United Nation» 3, 10. 53. 187. 189. 190, 198. 220.

251. 253. 356

440

United Nations: (continued)

Charter: 314

Command (Korea): 188, 223, 225, 226, 228,

232, 238, 239, 240, 242, 243, 244, 358

and disarmament: 192-%, 199

Disarmament Commission: 187, 192, 193-95

Disarmament Subcommittee: 193-95

General Assembly: 187, 188, 190, 192, 193,

195, 1%, 199

and Japan: 267

and Korea: 224, 227, 230-31, 232, 242

Military Staff Committee: 93

Secretary-General: 193

United States. See also Eisenhower

administration; Truman administration

in the Far East, 1953-54: 248-51, 263

Latin American policy: 349-52

in the Middle East: 323, 326-29. 330

in NATO: 281, 292, 297. 316

and northern tier policy: 331, 332, 345-47

policy toward Japan: 267. See a/so NSC 125/2

as SEATO member. 254

and Southeast Asia: 251-54

and West Germany: 314

United States Mission to the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization and European Regional

Organizations: 289

Universal Military Training and Service Act

(1951): 164

Uruguay: 203, 213. 350, 357

USAF-RCAF Military Characteristics

Committee: 143, 144

USSR See Soviet Union

\At\ Fleet. General James A . USA 236, 241 42,

243

and US Far Eastern policy. 250 51, 260. 279

Vandenberg. General Hoyt S , USAF: 15, 62. 63,

124, 153. 180, 181, 190, 256, 289, 296

Venezuela 203. 204. 350, 354. 355

Viet Minn 40, 204, 251, 252, 254

Vietnam: 40. 204, 216. 239. 250. 252. 253, 254,

255 Sera/*»Indochina, NSC 124/2. NSC 5405

Vistula River 293

Voorhee*. Tracv S : 290

War plans $** Planning

Weapons, antiaircraft 115, 123

Weapon», nuclear See Nuclear weapon*

Wenwnger. Maj (.en Walter W . USMC: 166.

167

West Berlin 303

West Germany See Germany. Federal Republic

of • Western Electric Company 141

Western Europe 2. 19. 24. 37. 42. 48. 93. 203.

205. 207, 208. 209. 247. 312. 349

.

%^ ,"'
Index

Western Europe: (continued)

and EDC: 283

Eisenhower administration policy toward:

284-85, 309, 320

JCS recommendations: 290-91

in 1953:281-97

in 1954: 303-20

rearmament of: 283

Western European Union: 313, 314

Western Hemisphere: 245. 290, 349. 350, 352, 354

Western Hemisphere Reserve: 75, 355

Western Powers: 193, 237, 250, 252, 253, 281,

292, 294, 303, 313, 327, 331, 346

White, General Thomas D., USAF: 166, 184

White House: 353

Wilson, Charles E.: 3, 5, 8, 9, 15, JJ, 26, 27, 29,

32, 42, 46, 49, 50, 53, 55, 56, 61, 63-66,

67-69, 71, 75, 76, 150, 193. 195, 1%,

214-17, 221-22

and aid to Spain: 295-%

and continental defense: 125, 127, 135

and Far East policy: 249

and FY 1955 budget: 130-31

and FY 1956 budget: 74. 78, 136

and IPT 17815 (NATO): 312-13

and Japan: 272, 276-77

and JCS 2101 113: 67, 72, 99

and Key West Agreement: 179

and Korea: 229, 230. 232-34, 238. 240 42. 245

and Latin Amenca: 353. 357, 3*>8

Wilson, Charles E.: (continued)

and MC 48 (NATO): 317

and Middle East aid: 330, 341

and military assistance program: 206. 207, 210

and missile program: 181

and NATO: 288, 297, 299, 304, 306, 320

and Reorganization Plan No. 6: 107-08, 164

and Republic of China: 258, 259, 263, 264

and US reserves: 166, 168, 169, 173-75

Windward Passage: 352

Wood, Tyler: 244

World War II: 2, 18, 35, 102, 108, 111, 115, 153,

160, 161, 164, 165, 177, 187, 194, 201, 221,

247,268, 275, 281,284,292,303, 323,349, 358

Wright, Admiral Jerauld, USN: 338, 339, 340, 347

Veh, George: 259, 260, 264

Yemen: 328

Voshida, Prime Minister Shigeru: 268, 272, 274,

275, 276, 277

You Chan Yang: 242

Yugoslavia: 203. 207, 209. 210, 213. 214, 215, 216,

220. 317. 345

Zagro«. Mountains defense line: 325. 336-40

Zahedi. General Fa/lollah: 334, 335. 341

441

'

1