UNITED

STATES

CRYPTOLOGIC

HISTORY

Attack on a Sigint Collector,

the U.S.S. Liberty -fS-€OOr

'fntS f)6et:Jr.IEN'f e6N'fA:INS e6f)EW6Kf) r.1A:'fEKIA:L

Classified by NSA/CSSM 123-2

Review in April 2011

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 11-08-2006 pursuant to E.O.

12958, as amended. MDR 51712.
Contents of this publication should not be reproduced, or further disseminated

outside the U. S. Intelligence Community without the permission of the Director,

NSA/CSS. Inquiries about reproduction and dissemination should be directed to

the Office of Cryptologic Archives and History, T54.
i

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UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY

Special Series

Crisis Collection

Volume 1

Attack on a Sigint Collector,

the V.S.S. LilJerty-(S=€€6T

William D. Gerhard

Henry W. Millington

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE

1981

NO'f ItEtEASABLE 'fO fOItEIGN Nlt'fIONltLS

'fOP SECRET UMBRA

-- --- --- -~--------..................,...~
UNCLASSIFIED

Contents

Page

Foreword___________________________________________________________________________________ vii

Authors' Note_______________________________________________________________________________ ix

Chapter I POLITICAL-MILITARY BACKGROUND (U) _

Chapter II CONSIDERATIONS LEADING TO THE SHIP'S DEPLOYMENT (U) _

The Requirements for Intelligence (U) _

Technical Collection Factors (U) _

I Its ee8) ...

U.S. Intercept of VHF/UHF Communications {l,JL---------------------------------------- _

1 I(e eeSJ ----------------------------------------------- Airborne Collectors (U) - _

The Decision to Deploy the Liberty (U) _

5

5

6

6

10

10

11

12

~o 1. 4 . (c) Fo 1. 4 . (d)

Chapter III DEPLOYMENT TO THE MEDITERRANEAN (U) 15

U.S.S. Liberty's Modus Operandi (U) 15

Abidjan to Rota, 24-31 May 1967 (U) 17

Liberty at Rota, 31 May to 2 June 1967 (U)________________________________________________ 17

Air Force Security Service's Technical Processing Center (U)__________________________________ 18

Enroute to Operational Area Three (U) 19

Directions to Withdraw the Liberty (U) 21

Operational Area Three, 8 June (U) 23

Liberty's Processing Mission (U)___________________________________________________________ 23

Chapter IV THE ATTACK (U)______________________________________________________________ 25

Reconnaissance of the Liberty (U) 25

General Quarters Drill (U) 25

Air Attack Begins (U) 26

Torpedo-Boat Attack (U) 28

Post-Attack Reconnaissance (U)___________________________________________________________ 30

Sixth Fleet Reacts (U) 31

Washington Informed (U) 32

Israel Reports Error (U)__________________________________________________________________ 32

Johnson Informs Kosygin (U) 32

Liberly Recovers (U) 32

U.S. Naval Attache Helicopters to the Liberty (U) 34

Israeli Helicopter Conversations (U) 34

Liberty Licks Its Wounds (U) 35

Chapter V THE ISRAELI EXPLANATION (U)________________________________________________ 37

Chronology of Israeli Actions (U) 37

Israeli Prosecutor's Charges of Negligence (U) 38

Explanation Reexamined (U)______________________________________________________________ 40

Chapter V I RECOVERY AND INITIAL ASSESSMENT (U) 43

Medical Assistance (U)---------------____________________________________________________ 43

Commander, Sixth Fleet Arrives (U) 43

Replacement Inquiries (U) 43

UNCLASSIFIED iii
UNCLASSIFIED

Recovery of Sensitive Materials (U) _

Assistance to NSA Personnel (e eeO) _ Cleanup Continues (U) - _

Command Investigations Initiated (U) ---- - - - - --- _

Preparations at Malta (U) _

Blalock Returns Home (U) _

Liberty's Arrival at Malta (U) - _

Evacuation of Wilson (U) _

Clearing Damaged Areas (U) _

Damage Survey at Malta (U) -- _

JCS fact Finding Team's Interviews (U) _

Accounting for Classified Material (U) _

Joint Survey at Norfolk (U) _

Chapter V II THE INCIDENT UNDER REVIEW (U) _

The NSA Review and Reaction (U) _

The JCS Review (U) _

Congressional Review (U) _

Chapter V III A FINAL LOOK (U) _

Safety Estimates for Collection Missions of Mobile Platforms (U) _

Availability of Linguists (U) _

Communications Problems (U) _

File Reduction for Exposed Collectors (U) _

Unanswered Questions (U) _

Denouement (U) ~~~::-

Bibliography (U) -"';;::::...--------------

Illustrations (U)

Maps

I

~...."..",.,..........,...~~-:-:--~=-:":~=__'="""j<T8G(JQ IrsOeo.t ------..-....... --...l'iFl -....-...-....-...-....-...-....-...-....-.. ------------------------------_

EC-121 and C-130 Aircraft Collection Routes (e eeO) ~= _:...__ ...__ .........~~-------------

Projected Track of Liberty on 8 June (U) == --------

Photographs

U.S. S. Liberty (U) ..._... ... -- ... __ - ........."""'''';.:::::::............::::......-- _

Manual-morse PositionsI l<ELOOO) _ Sigint analystsI I(e ceo _ Liberty's Antenna Configuration (U) _

Liberty Docked in Rota, Spain (U) _

Dassault Mirage Jet Bomber (U) _

Scorched Starboard of Liberty (U) _

Damaged Gun Mount (U) _

u. S. S. Little Rock (U) _

U. S. S. America (U) _

F4 Phantom Fighter (U) _

U.S. S. Papago, Ocean Tug (U) _

Israeli Motor Torpedo Boat (U) .. _

Egyptian Ship, El-Kaeir (U) _

iv UNCLASSIFIED

Page

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48

51

51

52

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63EO 1. 4 . (c)

64 EO 1. 4. (d)

67

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26

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UNCLASSIFIED

Page

Liberty Arriving in Malta (V)___________________________________________________ __________ 40

V.S.S. Davis (V)___________________________________________________ _____________________ 42

Helicopter Evacuating Liberty's Wounded (V) 44

Vice Admiral Martin Visits Liberty (V) 45

Dish Antenna on Liberty (V) 46

Donald L. Blalock (V) 48

Liberty in Malta (V) 49

Inspection of Torpedo-Damaged Hull (V) 50

Navy Divers Recover Classified Debris (V) 51

Manual-morse Positions Destroyed (e ee6) 53

Sigint Equipment Ruined by Torpedo Blast €O 008) 54

Commander William L. McGonagle (V) 55

UNCLASSIFIED V

-------------------------- ~-~~~-
SEeRET

Foreword

(8 GGO) The Israeli attack on the U.S.S. Liberty some 14 years ago was, indeed, a

wrenching experience for U.S. Sigint agencies. The loss, particularly in the case of those Sigint

specialists who gave their lives or were wounded, was difficult to accept. The knowledge that the

tragedy resulted not only from Israeli miscalculation but also from faulty U. S. communications

practices was even more difficult to accept.

(8 060) The passage of time has made it possible for the authors to reexamine the Liberty

incident objectively and answer a number of persistent questions. The authors accordingly set

forth the technical rationale for the Liberty mission, the particulars of the Israeli miscalculation,

the details of the American communications failures, a narrative of the attack and of attempts

to minimize the compromise of cryptologic materials, and the lessons to be learned from the

event.

(6 660) Finally, this is also an account of the way the U.S. Sigint agencies organized

their response to requirements brought on by a crisis situation. As such, it has much to offer the

student of U.S. cryptologic operations.

(G 000) A word about the authors, who worked on this project part time after they had

retired. An experienced operations officer and research specialist, Mr. Gerhard headed the NSASCA Task Force that produced the Southeast Asia History Series, as well as the Special Research

Element that produced studies of Sigint crisis situations. Mr. Millington, who spent most of his

career in research and documentation activities, was for years in charge of the NSA Library.

Vincent J. Wilson, Jr.

Chief, Cryptologic History and Publications Staff

SEURET vii
UNCLASSIFIED

Authors' Note

Many people contributed to the completion of this history. The authors gratefully acknowledge

the efforts of members of the NSA History and Publications Staff who offered substantive

suggestions and labored over publication format and preparation - Vincent J. Wilson, Jr., Chief;

Henry Schorreck, Historian; Priscilla A. Pitts, Editor; and Joan M. Hall, Secretary. Robert D.

Farley, of the History Staff, spent many hours arranging for and conducting interviews of

personnel intimately associated with the Liberty incident. In turn, I I

painstakingly transcribed the interview tapes.

To Russell G. Fisher, Cryptologic Records Declassification Staff, we are indebted for his

security classification review.

Both Bob Rush, Electronic Security Command, and James Gilbert, Intelligence and Security

Command History Staff generously provided useful source materials from their collections.

foLo 86-36

!'

ii

William D. Gerhard f;

Henry W. Millington ! ~

8 December 1980 !

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UNCLASSIFIED ix
SECRET

Chapter I

Political-Military Background (U)

(V) A brief look at the Middle Eastern

situation during early 1967 is necessary for an appreciation of the mounting political and military tensions

that ultimately led to the U.S. decision to position

the V.S.S. Liberty in the eastern Mediterranean.

(U) Since the mid-1950s, the major world

powers had been keenly aware of and sensitive to the

buildup of tensions in the Middle East. Both the

Soviet Union and Communist China were quick to take

advantage of unsettled conditions there to extend their

own influence over governments wherever possible -

often competing with one another in this effort.

(U) By the end of the 19508 the Chinese

Communists had begun to assert themselves, especially

in Iraq and Syria. In May 1966, Syria's new president,

Nureddin el-Attassi, scoffed at waging a conventional

war against Israel and urged what he called a "people's

war of liberation," Chinese-Communist style. 1 The

head of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),

Ahmed Shukairy, also admitted to receiving Chinese

aid. PLO representatives had been sent to Vietnam

and communist China to observe communist guerrilla

techniques, and PLO troops were receiving arms from

Communist China. 2

(U) As for the Soviets, they had particular

cause for not wishing to see the Syrian Government

humiliated, defeated, and, perhaps, overthrown. The

increasingly radical Syrian Governments which had

assumed power since the beginning of 1966 had come

to rely more and more on Soviet military and economic

aid, to permit increasing numbers of Soviet advisers

to be stationed in the country, and all in all to offer

the most promising field for Soviet penetration and

influence in the Middle East. The Soviets genuinely

feared massive Israeli retaliation that might topple

the Syrian Government; they therefore spurred the

Egyptians on to vigorous counteraction, the full repercussions of which they could not foresee."

(U) The United States supported the

United Nations' efforts to maintain peace in the area

and, while championing the right of the State of Israel

to exist, urged restraint and respect for the rights of

all nations.

(U) Within the Arab world, President

Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic

(U.A.R.) sought to overcome opposition to his leadership by the monarchies of Saudi Arabia and Jordan."

In late January 1967, when U.A.R. aircraft bombed

Najran in Saudi Arabia, relations between the two

countries were further strained. In Yemen, the U.A.R.

supported the insurgents against the Royalists. Jordan,

trying to keep from becoming embroiled in IsraeliArab frictions, ordered in March a halt to Arab

infiltration into Israel through Jordanian territory as

well as a cessation of Palestine Liberation internal

agitation against the Jordanian Government.

(V) Between January and April 1967, the

Syrian-Israeli frontier was the scene of a series of

escalating clashes ranging from potshots at tractors to

exchanges of fire between tanks, artillery, and aircraft.

Both sides refused, at different times, to permit the

United Nations Mixed Armistice Commission to mark

the armistice line at disputed points and insisted on

farming and patrolling disputed areas. S

(8 GGO) On 7 April 1967, a Syrian-Israeli clash

escalated from an exchange of fire between tanks to

attacks by both Syrian and Israeli aircraft. By the

end of the day, Israeli planes had appeared over the

outskirts of Damascus and six Syrian planes had been

shot down. This event triggered a Sigint Readiness

"Alfa" called by NSA for Middle East targets. The

Alfa was terminated three days later."

(B-CCO) As the tempo of the civil war within

Yemen increased, V.A.R. aircraft dropped poison-gas

bombs on Yemeni Royalists on 22 April. Later that

month when the Yemeni Government imprisoned two

Americans from the Agency for International DevelIIANBtH ¥fA COftfHN~ CIIANNHI:iS ONI:iY SHCRHq:' 1
(U) The U.S.S. Liberty was commissioned in May 1945 as a victory ship and later converted into a technical research ship (December

1964). She had an overall length of 455 feet. a maximum speed of 18 knots with an allowable personnel complement of 9 officers and

151 enlisted men along with an additional 6 officers and 128 enlisted men from the Naval Security Group.

(Photograph courtesy of the Department of the Navy.)

(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED)
opment (AID),I I Ir------------- (~-ee~) From 11-14 May, UA.R. aircraft atItacked towns in Saudi Arabial I

(8-888) When on 14 May the D.A.R. placed

its air defense units on full alert and deployed its

tactical naval units, NSA expanded its Alfa to embrace

all Middle East targets. 9

(U) On 17 May, the D.A.R. requested

that the United Nations Emergency Force (DNEF)

withdraw from the Gaza Strip. The UN. complied,

and Nasser immediately began moving troops into the

Sinai. This decision by the D.A.R. government -

presumably encouraged by the Soviets and Syrians

- to move its armed forces up to the Sinai armistice

line thus reestablished the direct Egyptian-Israeli

military confrontation which had been the major

immediate cause of the 1956 war. 10

(8 GGO) Five days later on 23 May 1967, the

D.A.R. blockaded the Strait of Tiran, thereby closing

the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping and prohibiting

unescorted tankers of any flag from reaching the

Israeli port of Elat. This action reproduced another

element that had brought on the 1956 war. Because

Israel had repeatedly asserted that she would go to

war if the UA.R. blocked the Gulf, NSA raised its

Alfa to a Sigint Readiness "Bravo Crayon" for all

Middle East communications. II

(D) The D.A.R. blockade precipitated

quiet but full-scale mobilization by Israel. Arab forces

were repositioned, and on 30 May Egypt and Jordan

signed a five-year military alliance, completing Arab

encirclement of Israel. Shortly thereafter, Soviet naval

vessels entered the Mediterranean through the

Dardenelles. 12

(D) On 1 June, as pressure to open the

Strait of Tiran built within Israel, Moshe Dayan was

appointed Israeli Minister of Defense. The next day,

Friday, 2 June, the United States and the United

Kingdom issued a joint statement declaring the Gulf

of Aqaba an international waterway to which all states

were entitled free passage.

(D) The weekend of 3 and 4 June passed

uneventfully, but then lightning struck. On Monday,

5 June at approximately 0845 Middle East time, Israel

launched simultaneous air strikes against all forward

D.A.R. airfields on the Sinai and in the Suez Canal

Zone. While the bulk of the 40o-plane Israeli air force

concentrated on U.A.R. targets, the remaining Israeli

jets made coordinated attacks against airfields in

Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. Israeli raids against Arab air

bases continued throughout 5 June and by nightfall

SECRET

Israel had complete mastery of the sky having virtually

destroyed four Arab air forces. 13

(8m(J09)ummummF'orty-fiveulninutesmaftel' the la.unchiIlg

of the Israeli air offensive, Israeli troops started their

crushing ground attack against U.A.R. forces in the

Sinai. In the Gaza Strip, Israeli ground forces took

Rafah and Khan Yunus. Meanwhile tank columns

raced thirty miles west into the Sinai to capture Al

'Arish. With this rapid spread of hostilities, NSA

instituted a Si int Readiness Alfa to watch Soviet

'-- ..1moves.

(D) On Tuesday, 6 June, UA.R. President

Nasser, charging that D.S. and British planes had

intervened in the war on the side of Israel, closed the

Suez Canal to all shipping and severed diplomatic

relations with the US. In turn, the US. broke

diplomatic ties with Cairo.

(U) On the battlefield, Israeli tank columns advanced toward the Suez Canal on three major

fronts: through Al 'Arish toward Al Qantarah in the

north; through AbuUwayjilah along the central route

toward Ismailia; and to Al Qusaymah on the southern

route. Farther south, other columns advanced to Al

Kuntillah in the Sinai.

(D) Operating against the Jordanian

forces, Israeli troops captured the cites of Janin,

Qalqilyah, and Ram Allah and took the high ground

north of Jerusalem on 6 June.

(U) On 7 June, Israeli units swept across

the Sinai to advance within eighteen miles of the Suez

Canal in the north and reached toward the Mitla Pass

in the south. Other Israeli forces captured Ash Sharmah at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, breaking

the blockade at the Strait of Tiran. Also on the 7th,

Israel gained control of the Gaza Strip plus the West

Bank of the Jordan River. The Jordanian army and

accompanying Iraqi units were defeated.

(D) The United Nations called for a ceasefire. Israel accepted provided the other belligerents

complied. On 7 June, Jordan agreed to the cease-fire,

but the UA.R. rejected it. The following day (8 June),

however, both the D.A.R. and Syria accepted the

cease-fire. At approximately 1400 hours this same

date the US.S. Liberty was attacked.

(D) On 9 June, following an Israeli charge

that Syria had violated the cease-fire, Israeli troops

and armored forces smashed deep into Syria. By the

time both sides agreed, on 10 June, to observe the

UN. cease-fire, the entire southwestern corner of

Syria was in Israeli hands, including the Golan Heights

which dominated Israeli territory in the Jordan Valley

and around the Sea of Galilee.

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(8 eeO) On this same day, when the Soviet

representative to the U.N. threatened direct Soviet

intervention if the Security Council did not halt the

fighting, NSA extended Bravo "Crayon" to Soviet

L.._~ ....Jtargets. A cease-fire, negotiated by the U.N., finally went into effect and all

hostilities ceased at 1830 hours Mid-East time on

Saturday, 10 June 1967.

Notes

Source documents are in the "Crisis Collection" of the NSA History

Collection.

'(V) Theodore Draper. Israel and World Politics.

Viking Press, New York, 1968, p, 35.

'(V) Hal Kosut, editor. Israel and the Arabs: The

June 1967 War. Facts on File, New York, 1968, p. 32.

EO 1. 4 . (c)

l(U) Charle,.W;¥Ollt, "The Arab-Israeli War; How

it Began," Foreign.Atiairs, vol. 46, no. 2 (Jan 1968), p. 310.

'lUi The United Arab Republic was formed in 1958

with the union of Egypt and Syria and then dissolved in September

1961. Even though the union was dissolved, Egypt was still referred

to as the V.A.R. until 2 September 1971 when the name was

changed to the Arab Republic of Egypt. In this history V.A.R. is

used throughout to mean Egypt.

'(U) Ibid, p. 306.

'(e eee) NSA (P2), "Sigint Readiness Bravo Crayon

Critique," Serial: P2/00670, 10 July 1968, p. 8.

'(V) Ibid.

'(V) Ibid.

9(V) Ibid.

IO(V) Charles W. Yost, "The Arab-Israeli War; How

It Began," Foreign Affairs, vol. 46, no. 2 (Jan 1968), p. 319.

1'(8 SSe) NSA (P2), "Sigint Readiness Bravo Crayon

Critique," Serial: P2I00670, 10 July 1968, p. 8.

"(V) Ibid.

Il(V) Ibid, p. 9.

"(V) Ibid.

15(U) Ibid.

4 SBURBT II~BLB VIA OOMIN'f OH....NNBLS ONI.¥
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Chapter II

Considerations Leading to the Ship's Deployment (U)

(S GGQ) Looking back upon the Liberty incident today, Americans might well question why the

U.S. introduced an intelligence ship into a war theater

in which Americans were not direct participants and

expose that ship to the risk it did. The decision to

deploy, it should be noted, came before the Six Day

War erupted. It came after careful NSA consideration

of customer requirements for intelligence from this

troubled region, of technical factors which would

govern the collection of Middle East communications,

and of the need to develop technical Sigint data in

the event future U.S. involvement in Middle East

hostilities should bring a requirement to support U.S.

forces. The NSA decision to request the Liberty's

deployment on 23 May, the day it raised its Sigint

readiness condition to Bravo-Crayon, was, moreover,

only one of many actions taken to improve Sigint

collection, processing, and reporting in the critical

weeks before the Six Day War as the NSA action

office, G6, began a round-the-clock Sigint operation at

Fort Meade. I

The Requirements for Intelligence (U)

(8 Ceo) The long-standing Middle East tension

had produced a growing requirement from U.S. intelligence users for information on a number of military

(8 CeO) I

(CPS GGO) In late May-early June 1967, while

still focusing for the most part on the U.A.R. the

intelligence requirements took on a sense of urgency.

hltelligElnceusers define, of course, the

categories of information they need from Sigint, and

it is up to the Sigint specialists to translate their

requirements into meaningful, responsive collection

and processing actions. In so doing, these specialists

had to take into their calculations some I

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Technical Collection Factors (U)

(B eeo) u.s~ IcOllection of Middle East commumcahons had developed

over the years in response to intelligence requirements

arising out of one crisis situation after another. In

place at the time of the Six Day War ~d/the

deployment of the Liberty were ground-rsites and

airborne collectors for the Middle East communications which were likely to yield.atIeast a part of the

information specified in tl:le/requirements.

('1'8-006) AtU;Sr Iground

site~ ~rttercept positions, according to a postLiberty NsA review/ were on hand primarily for

Middle East communications. Almost one half of this

coverage was on communications of the U.A.R.

('t'B eOO) For collection of VHF and UHF communications, the U.S. depended

on USN and USAF mobile, airborne collectors.

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(~8 eeO) Intercept assignments as of 8 June

1967 at the U.S. stations illustrate the varied nature

of the collection missions.

1. 4. (c)

(C CCO) Intelligence and Security. Command

(INSCOM) manual-morse positionsI I

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(Figure is e"'1":l"2lli~WT'1l'1:l:-ee""

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Communicatibns (U)

(S 000) Since normal reception ofVHF/UHF

communications depends onaline-of-sight relationship

between receiver and transmitter

..... ... successful collection of VHF/UHF communications depended on intercept byl I sites

located near the transmitters and by airborne collectors which could fly orbits in their. vicinity. Close-in

intercept facilities located preferably within groundwave distance of transmitters were also a prerequisite

to effective intercept of low-powered HF

communications.

iSet- Sigint collectors had gradually increased their knowledge of Middle East VHF/UHF

communications. HF communications occasionally referred to other communications in the VHF/UHF

modes.I

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('f'S-eeO-f'W)

IThe U.S. also had USN and USAF airborne

"---"":":""----'

collectors who were experienced in flying orbits off the

coast of the U.A.R. and Israel.

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(~S 000 nF)

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IThe U.A.R. had used

U.S.S.R. military radio equipment from 1960, much

of which came with aircraft, tanks, and radars the

U.S.S.R. provided the U.A:R.I

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1"---- _ Electrical communications between

INSCOM detachments and their parent INSCOM

organization, the U.S. Army Communications Support

Unit, as well as their communications with NSA, were

via U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command

facilities, off-line, and encrypted on KL-7A equipment

using the Adonis system (KAK-199).

(~S 000)

Mobile airborne collectors in orbits off the coast ~~~ of the U.A.R. and Israel had somewhat greater

flexibility. 12

Airborne Collectors (U)

('I'S 000) The major part of the U.S. VHF/UHF

collection came from Navy EC-121 and Air Force C130 flights out of Athens on intercept missions largely

specified by NSA. Prior to 23 May, U.S. Airborne

Collection Reconnaissance Program (ACRP) C-130s

flew some eight sorties a month in the eastern MediterraQean,1 I I 'The EC121 aircraft were also flying about eight sorties a

month in the eastern Mediterranean for both Comint

and Elint intercept and another eight sorties a month

I I

(S-OOO' After 23 May, when NSA declared a

Sigint Readiness Bravo condition, C-130s flew daily

flights with NSA-specified intercept missions. The

requirement for daily flights resulted in a reduction of

sorties...1 pd the reassignment of one

C-130 I EC-121s also began daily,

and after the outbreak of war twice-daily, flights into

the eastern Mediterranean in direct support of the

U.S. Sixth Fleet. At NSA's suggestion, the U.S. Navy

rescheduled its flights so that they would complement

theC-130 flights, the C-130s flying during the morning

hours commencing at 0300Z and the EC-121 aircraft

departing at 08;;..;;.O;..;O;.;;;Z;.;.' ----,

(tpS 000)

'fOP SECRE'f UMBRA 11

EO 1. 4 . (c)
tFOP SB€RBtF Ul\IBRA

I

LEBANON"

,,;

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,

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330

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UNITED

31°

33°-t---~;::------+-r=........,~c.=,;,~--f------~'-------+-~----~

32°+----~-___jr_------_+_--____i._--_1--~~..!!..!.~=___+_++_----___1

~e eeo) After NSA declared a Sigint Readiness condition for the eastern Mediterranean, collection

flights of the EC-121 and C-130 aircraft were increased to once daily instead of the usual eight flights a

month.

(Figure is eBN-FfBBN'PMfJ eeB~

£01.4. (c)

producingComint responsive to requirements, partieularI I h y those re ating' to t e UAR. an to mere an d h t

shipping.I

......................

r14 ..............

r

13

The Decision to Deploy the Liberty (U)

ffset During May and early June 1967, the

U.Sc=JSi.gintorgllIlization performed moderately

well with its existing groundancl air collection in

12 tFOP SBCRBtF Ul\IBRA EO 1. 4 . (c)

EO 1. 4 . (d)
EO 1.4. (e) TOP SECRET UMBRA

('fse·?w)

L.. ...JThis kind of a response was, they

knew, unlikely with the then available collectiop

organization.

('f8 000) NSA considered the categories of Middle East communications for which the existing collection organization was either inadequate or for which

it offered small promise for sustained intercept.

Sigint

collection managers concluded that the then existing

collection organization would be able, at best, only to

make a moderate response to many of the intelligence

requirements in view of technical limitations in the

collection of VHF/UHF communications.

(8 000) In the case of the airborne collectors,

the Sigint planners felt that the average orbit time of

the C-130s and EC-121s - about five hours on station

after allowing for time to and from orbit areas - was

too short for the sustained collection desired.

(U) Expansion of airborne collection was

a possibility, but additional aircraft in sufficient numbers would be difficult to obtain, and there was the

consideration of downtime for maintenance which/for

aircraft was greater than for othy Platforms.iS

(~S GGO ~lF) In the case of the sites, Sigint

planners considered their fixed locations and the

resulting confinement of their VHF/UHF intercept to

line-of-sight distances from those locations. They also

correctly anticipated that, in the event of war, certain

Arab countries would break diplomatic relations with

the U.S. and that,'

~~B 000) For consistent, close-in intercept, Sigint specialists decided that the assignment of a collection ship to work..offshore from the U.A.R. was in

order. It was/natural that they would decide upon

shipbomecollection. A technical research ship (TRS)

was, according to one estimate at the time, the

equivalent of 13 airborne collectors and, besides that,

was more economical to operate than the airborne

collectors.'? In addition to tasks such as sustained

collection as in the case of U.S.N.S. Muller

off the shore of Cuba

L- ----' the special ships were

prepared by design for quick reaction to exigencies of

one kind or another."

(8 000) Choice of a ship for the Mediterranean

narrowed between the U.S.N.S. ValdezI I

then near Gibraltar, and the Liberty in port at

Abidjan, Ivory C08:st~ NSA chose the Liberty because

she had superior speed (18 knots vs. 8 knots for

Valdez), because her VHF/UHF multichannel collection capability was better, and because she was, unlike

Valdez, at the beginning of a deployment;'? NSA

accordingly requested the Joint ChiefsofStaffiJoint

Reconnaissance Center (JCS/JRC) on 23 May 1967 to

divert the Liberty to the Mediterranean.

Notes

Source documents are in the "Crisis Collection" of the NSA History

Collection.

leu) NSA Staff, "Fact Sheet for DIRNSA," undated.

'(S Ssel NSA Staff, "Critique-Sigint Readiness Bravo

Crayon," 10 July 1968, pp, 31-47, hereafter cited "Critique-SRB

Crayon" and NSA Staff, "Report to the Director, NSA: U.S.S.

Liberty CAGTR-5), 23 May-8 June 1967," 12 June 1967, pp. 1-4,

hereafter cited "Report to the Director, NSA."

'cU) "Report to the Director, NSA," p. 1.

'es eee) Informal information from NSA Staff Officer,

Clarence Toomerl rSigintreIations{Jurie1980):

'CUI NSA Staff, "Operations Staff Summary," ca.

16 Jun 1967.

'CU) NSA (G62), "Briefing on 1967 Middle East

Crisis," undated document; "Report to the Director, NSA," Tab C.

EO 1.4. (e)

EO 1.4. (d)

EO 1. 4. (e)

EQ 1.4. (e)

EO 1.4. (d)

NOFORN TOP SECRET UMBRA 13

-------------------------~~~
'(UJ John R. Rasmuson, A History of Kagnew

Station and American Forces in Eritrea, 25 May 1973.

8(U) Kagnew Station, Office of Operations, Annual

Historical Report, FY 1967, vol, IT ; "CritiQue-SRB Crayon," pp,

11-12, 20.

9(UJ NSA Staff, "Operations Staff Summary," ca.

16 Jun 1967; "Critique-SRB Crayon," pp. 20, 37.

lO(UJ Electronic Security Command, History of the

6931st Security Group, 1 Jan-30 Jun 1967, pp. 8-9, 16, eo-sa, 78,

86, 92; "Critique-SRB Crayon," p. 21.

Il(UJ Julie Alger, "A Review of the Technical Research Ship Program, 1961-1969," 1 May 1970; Interview with Gene

Sheck, 11 Aug 1980, p. 5.

l"fet- U.S. Army Communications Support Unit,

Annual Historical Report, FY 1967, vol. I, 1 Oct 1967; (UJ

"CritiQue-SRB Crayon," pp. 12-14; (UJ "Report to the Director,

NSA," Tabs A and B.

14 CONPIBHN'fIAL

13(UJ NSA Staff, "Airborne Collection in the Middle

East," undated; NSA Staff, "Operations Staff Summary," ca. 16

Jun 1967; "Report to the Director, NSA," p, 2; "Critique-SRB

Crayon," pp. 17-18.

I4(UJ NSA Staff, "Operations Staff Summary," ca.

16 Jun 1967.

I5(UJ NSA Staff, "Fact Sheet for DffiNSA," undated; "Report to the Director, NSA," Tab A; "Critique-SRB

Crayon," pp. 16-17. Interview with Gene Sheck, 11 Aug 1980, p. 2.

l~ U.S. Army Communications Support Unit,

Annual Historical Report. FY 1967, vol. I; (UJ "Critique-SRB

Crayon," pp. 12-14.

lJ(UJ NSA Staff, "Fact Sheet for DffiNSA,"

undated.

I8(UJ Julie Alger, "A Review of the Technical Research Ship Program, 1961-1969," 1 May 1970.

I9(UJ "Critique-SRB Crayon," p. 18.
SH€RET SPOKE

Chapter III

Deployment to the Mediterranean (U)

i'S€t- With Sigint unit USN-855 on board,

the U.S.S. Liberty had been in operation for two years

and four months when NSA sent its message to the

JCS asking for deployment of the Liberty to the

Mediterranean. During this time it had undertaken I'",,".,ate mi"ion, off the ~,t ,oo,t 0; ::~'~J

had executed a number of difficult tasks locating IDew ,0mmunioatioD,j I

(C-CCO) Other US. Sigint ships at this time

included the U.S.S. Oxford and Jamestown in Southeast Asia, the US.S. Georgetown and Belmont in

South America, the US.N.S. Muller off Cuba, and

the U.S.N.S. Valdez enroute to the US. from the

Mediterranean. I

u.s.s. Ljhert.r~ Modus Operandi (U)

(U) us. reconnaissance operations came

under the purview of the J-3, Joint Chiefs of Staff. A

Deputy Director for Reconnaissance assisted the J-3

in the exercise of operational control over reconnaissance activities of the unified and specified commands.

The Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC) worked for

the Deputy Director for Reconnaissance and had

authority over U.S. reconnaissance operations. NSA

had a representative to the Joint Reconnaissance

Center, Mr. John Connell.

(U) In 1965 the JCS had given general

guidance on the conduct of technical research ship

(TRS) operations. Operational control of the ships was

to be effected by unified and specified commanders

"through the naval component commander to a specific

fleet or force commander." In May 1967, the US. S.

Liberty, an auxiliary general technical research ship

(AGTR) was operating under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic. The TRS commanding officer was Commander William L. McGonagle.

(8-CeO) The JCS also specified that technical

control of Sigint activities \Vasto be exercised by the

Director, NationafBecurity Agency via direct communication to the ships or through the Director, Naval

Security Group. A collection assignment, the JCS

stated further in its 1965 message, would take into

account technical factors as determined by NSA and

safety factors as determined by military operational

commanders.

(C-CCO) Liberty's Sigint detachment, USN-855,

therefore, came under the technical control of the

Director, NSA and under the management control of

the Director, Naval Security Group. On board the

Liberty, the Sigint detachment was known as the

"Research Department." Its space below decks was

compartmented with access permitted only to staff

having the proper clearances. Commanding officer of

the Research Department was Lieutenant Commander

David E. Lewis. The ship's Captain, Commander

McGonagle, had the clearances needed for access to

the Research Department, visited the department

daily, received briefings, and reviewed the "special

traffic" available there.

(C-CCO) Paddy E. Rhodes, during an interview,

described the area of the Liberty which housed USN855: "The research spaces had really three decks. On

the lowest deck we had a training room and a fan

room. The next deck was the R Branch (collection)

spaces, the 0 Branch (communications) spaces, and

processing and reporting. The one above it was T

Branch (other than morse signals)."

SECRET SPOKE 15

"11:0 1. 4 • (c)
- _~_o=---_··-

CONFIDENTIAL

(U) A small portion of the antenna configuration of the U.S.S. Liberty included:

(34) Discone antenna

(35) Monocone antenna

(36) ECM antenna

(41) VHF-receive antenna

(42) 35' whip antenna

(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED)

(11) Long-wire VLF/LF antenna

(12) ECM antenna

(27) 10' whip antenna

(32) ECM antenna

(33) ECM antenna

1€t' Typical of communications arrangements of the AGTR class, the Liberty had circuits for

the ship's command in one location and those for its

Sigint detachment in a separate location. Liberty's

naval communications station, which served the command, had a "receive" terminal for fleet broadcasts,

three circuits for on-line ship/shore radiotelephone and

voice communications, and one additional orderwire

full-duplex circuit. In a separate location, USN-855

had an on-line, full-duplex radiotelephone circuit, a

secure one-channel moon-relay system - technical

research ship special communications system

(TRSSCOMM) - and a "receive-only" terminal for

fleet broadcasts. In case of need several off-line encryption devices were also available.

(0 000) Sigint collection positions included one

for direction finding, 17 for radiotelephone, 20 for

manual morse, 7 for automatic morse, 7 for electronic

countermeasures, and 33 for non morse search and

development, the latter for frequencies both above

and below 30 Mhz.

(U) Perhaps the most visible technical

feature of the ship was its antennas, some 45 in all.

. (U) Not so visible was, however, the ship's

armament, which was minimal - four .50-caliber

machine guns, 2 forward and 2 aft, one Browning

automatic rifle, and a number of small arms.?

16 CONFIBBNHl..J. HAHln.J~ V:IA CO~HHT CIIAHHBJ;.S OHJ;.Y
Abidjan to Rota, 24-31 May 1967 (U)

(0 000) The TRS was at Abidjan, Ivory Coast,

at the end of May on its fifth African cruise when, in

response to NSA's message on 23 May, the JCS/JRC,

with approval of the Deputy Secretary of Defense,

directed movement of the ship to the eastern Mediterranean via Rota, Spain, and requested the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic to change operational control of the ship to the Commander-in-Chief, Europe

upon its arrival at Rota.:' At the time, the Liberty

was under the operational control of the Commander,

Service Squadron 8, a component of the Commanderin-Chief, Atlantic, and on 24 May the Commander,

Service Squadron 8 issued sailing orders to the Liberty,

with information copies to Commander, Sixth Fleet

and others, directing the ship to move at once to

Rota. 4 The Liberty departed Abidjan at 0530Z, 24

May, with estimated time of arrival in Rota, 31 May.s

Lihertyat Rota,

31 May to 2 June 1967 (U)

(V) When the Liberty arrived at Rota on

31 May, it came under the operational control of the

V.S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe (Gen. L.L. Lemnitzer) who turned over control to the Commander-inChief, U.S. Navy Europe." While delegating his control, General Lemnitzer still wanted operational information on the ship's progress and asked on 1 June

that situation reports (Sitreps) and planned intended

movement (Pim) reports from the Liberty arrive at

his headquarters daily and that any incidents be

reported as soon as possible in accordance with the

existing reconnaissance reporting instructions. 7

to-CCO) After taking control, Admiral John S.

McCain, Jr., Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy Europe,

directed the Liberty to send to his headquarters daily

Sitreps and position reports and in those reports to

include the Pim for the next 24 hours and any

comments on status of the ship. He directed the

Liberty to depart for the eastern Mediterranean when

ready, provided guidelines for its staying within international waters, and asked for adherence to established communications procedures for the region. NSA

also received the situation reports being required by

Commander-in-Chief, Europe and Commander-inChief, V.S. Navy Europe and used these, along with

ship positions given in Liberty's daily informal technical summaries, to plot on a routine basis the course

of the Liberty. 8

(U) At Rota, the Liberty prepared for its

deployment to the eastern Mediterranean, taking on.,

SHCRHT SPOKH

provisrons and fuel, acquiring the military documentation necessary for its assignment to Commander-inChief, U.S. Navy Europe and later to the U.S. Sixth

Fleet, and repairing its TRSSCOMM which had a

faulty hydraulic system.

Six Arabicl hinguists

joined USN-855 for the expected work on V.A.& and

I IcolIlmunications. Three of the Arab linguists, NSA civilians.Allen M. Blue, Donald L.Blalock, and Robert L. Wilson;weJ,'e among the specialists

who came on board at Rota, theremllining linguiste

being Naval Security Group specialists. ThtaNSA

linguists brought with them selected technical material, I IAssigriri:lent

of civilian linguists to work on board a U.S.Na.Vy ship

was not unusual. On TRS deployments along the

AfricanI !coastlines, civilian linguists had worked alongside the military linguists, who

at times were not available in sufficient number for

the missions at hand.

~C CCG) NSA action officers established a telecon with USN-855 (Lieutenant Commander D. E.

Lewis and his assistant, Lieutenant Maury H. Bennett) on 1 June in order to confirm the arrival of the

personnel, special equipment, and technical materials

needed in the eastern Mediterraneen." In order to

assist VSN-855's reporting and transcribing functions,

NSA had previously arranl(ed withI

(S-CCO) To facilitate the planning for USN855's collection mission, Sigint managers had designated five operational areas numbered west to east in

the eastern Mediterranean near the coastline of the

D.A.R., Israel, Lebanon, and Syria, each measuring

about 5Q-by-50 miles. In proposing the five operational

areas to the JCS, the Director, NSA had indicated

his preference, based on wave propagation analysis of

D.A.R. communications, for operational area three

(32:00-33:00N to 34:00E) if operational and safety

factors did not dictate otherwise. 10 With the territorial

limits established by Middle East countries in mind,

JCS subsequently directed the Commander-in-Chief,

Europe to deploy the Liberty to operational area three

with closest point of approach (CPA) to Algeria, Libya,

and the U.A.R. of 13 nautical miles during transit.

On arrival in operational area three, CPA was to be

12.5 nm to the U.A.R. and 6.5 nm to Israel. II Acting

upon the JCS message for Commander-in-Chief, Europe and after hearing from the Liberty that it had

SHCRHT SPOKB 17

"EO 1.4:1. (c)

I

!
SECRH'I'

(U) The Liberty docked in Rota, Spain, to be readied for deployment to the eastern

Mediterranean. In Rota, the operational control of the Liberty was turned over to the U.S.

Commander-in-Chief, Europe, who in turn delegated the control to Admiral John S. McCain,

Jr., Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy Europe.

(Photograph courtesy of Robert L. Wilson.)

(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED)

the intercept acquired directly from the airborne

on their return to base. At the time,

L- ..1 was processing the intercept of ths

airborne collectors with NSA performing the backup

processing on Arabic language materials and retainins:

full responsibility for processing of interceptedD

communications. Courier time for delivery of/tapes tr

was 72 hours.

completed repairs to the TRSSCOMM hydraulic system, Admiral McCain directed the Liberty to follow

the schedule prescribed by JCS. 12 The Liberty then

departed Rota on 2 June at 1230Z through the Strait

of Gibraltar on a course paralleling the North African

coastline.

Air Force Security Service's Technical

Processing Center (D)

(8 GGO) While the Liberty was enroute to Rota

from Abidjan, NSA was arranging with the Air Force

Security Service (AFSS), now the Electronic Security

Command, for more expeditious processing of Navy's

VQ-2 EC-121 and Air Force's C-130 intercept, which

had increased considerably from the now daily flights

off the Israeli and U.A.R. coastline. The objective was

to establish a technical processing center (TPC) for

18 SHCRH'f IIkNBLB ViA eOr.HN'f elIANNBLS ONL\' 1. 4. (c)
SECRET

Enroute to Operational Area Three (U)

·EO 1. 4 . (c)

and 33 other addressees including the Commander,

Sixth Fleet that as of 000lZ, 7 June, the Liberty

would be guarding the fleet broadcast from the Naval

Communications Station at Asmara, Ethiopia, which

served the eastern Mediterranean. In accordance with

customary communications procedures, the Liberty

would guard the fleetlJroadcast of the Naval Communications Station, Morocco, until it reached the

eastern Mediterranean.

(U) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy

Europe apprised Commander, Sixth Fleet, Vice Admiral William 1. Martin, on 3 June, that the Liberty's

mission was to conduct an "extended independent

surveillance operation in the eastern Mediterraneair'

and that Sixth Fleet might be called upon to provide

logistic and other support. 17

(U) With the outbreak of the war on 5

June, the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy Europe in

a message to the Commander, Sixth Fleet and others

took note of the movement of some 20 Soviet warships

with supporting vessels and an estimated 8 or 9 Soviet

submarines into the eastern Mediterranean and Aegean and, along with other guidance,instructed Vice

Admiral Martin to keep his ships arid aircraft at least

100 nm away from the coasts of Lebanon, Syria,

Israel, and the U.A.R. and at least 25 nm away from

Cyprus. 1M The Commander, Sixth Fleet directed his

units to comply later/that day.19 Neither the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy Europe nor the Commander, Sixth .Fleet directives included specific instructions to.the U.S.S. Liberty.

(0 GOO) Liberty was to the south of Italy when

the Six Day War broke out. With the war's inception,

the Liberty assumed a readiness condition, and USN855 began to keep abreast of events from NSA and

field site Sigint Readiness Crayon and other reports

on the Middle East situation and, of course, from its

own intercept. ,0 Members of the USN-855 felt some

apprehension as they approached what they now knew

to be a war zone; they appreciated perhaps more than

before the need for general quarters drills, but they

took comfort from their noncombatant status and, of

course, the visibility of the flag. One USN-855 survivor

recalls being told that" ... if anything were to happen

we were within ten minutes of air strike and help.

None of us were very worried.... "21

(0-000) While it was neither NSA's responsibility nor intention to adjudge the safety factors of

the Liberty's mission, in view of the outbreak of

hostilities, NSA's Gene Sheck and Dick Harvey did

te eeej When the TPC became operational on

1 June, the linguists, divided into four operational

shifts, processed the tapes as they were brought into

the TPC compound from the aircraft, and the analysts/reporters issued their contents with a minimum

of delay as Critics, Spots, electrigrams, or. in the

technical supplements to post-mission flight reports. 13

(8 GGO) On 29 May in a message to USN-855,

the Director, NSA had outlined the mission for the

Liberty during its voyage to the eastern Mediterranean, the changing geographical and hearability considerations to govern specific collection activity during

the trip. The Director, NSA designated USN-855

positions for search and development of Moroccan HF,

VHF, UHF, and radioprinter communications and

Algerian HF, VHF, and possible VHF multichannel

communications. USN-855 was to forward by electrical

transmission technical summaries of Moroccan and

Algerian communications to NSA, with information

copies going tol I

and courier delivery of tapes and traffic to NSA's

Middle East Office, G6. 14

(8-000) Liberty's move into the Mediterranean

proceeded according to plan. It reported that it

overtook and passed three Soviet ships during its

passage through the Strait of Gibraltar;'? Following

the North African coastline, its collection positions

were on the prescribed Algerian and Moroccan communications. Orientation and training for the main

objective, U.A.R. communications, detracted somewhat from performance on the secondary Algerian and

Moroccan assignments, but this was to be expected. 16

(U) At 1330Z, 2 June the Liberty informed the Navy Movement Report Office in London

I

is GOO) I

I

-

SECRET 19
'fOP SECRECf UMBRA

ask the NSA liaison officer to the JCS/JRC, Mr. J.

Connell, on 5 June if any consideration was being

given there to a change in the Liberty's operational

area. They reminded Connell that during the 1962

Cuban missile crisis five years earlier the V.S.S.

Oxford had been pulled back from the Havana area.

The NSA concern was for the technical collection

arrangements which would have to be adjusted if the

Liberty was to be withdrawn. The NSA liaison officer

discussed the matter with JRC's ship-movement officer

and then advised Sheck and Harvey that no action

was then under consideration. 22

(V) On 6 June, as it was passing between

Libya and Crete, the Liberty reported to Sixth Fleet

that its TRSSCOMM, which had had malfunctions in

its power supply and hydraulic systems on the trip

from Rota, was again operating satisfactorily and, in

reply to a Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy Europe

query concerning Pims not being received, provided

the date-time group of Pims previously sent.

VSN-855's communications on the 6th

to NSA were normal - its 24-hour summary for 5

June, its informal technical summary no. 3, a Spot

Ireport, its follow-up to I

and other reports all being received without communication difficulties. It was also in satisfactory communication wit~ lin this period. 23

(V) On this same day, 6 June, the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy Europe told the Com-l

mander, Sixth Fleet that the Liberty was to come

under his operational control at OOOl.Z, 7 June 1967

in order "to facilitate area command and control and

any possible requirement for protection during the

Middle East hostilities" and pointed \.out that the

Liberty's schedule might be revised for safety reasons

"as dictated by the local situation. ,,24 Liberty acknowledged the instructions concerning its operational con.

trol at 2036Z on the 6th. Liberty's commanding

officer, Commander McGonagle, also told\\ the Commander, Sixth Fleet that the ship was in a "Readiness

Condition Three-Modified" and reminded his superior

that the ship's "self-defense capability" was limited

to four .50-caliber machine guns and small arms.

(V) Three hours later the Commander,

Sixth Fleet cautioned its new charge by message to

"maintain a high state of vigilance against attack or

threat of attack" in view of the "unpredictability of

V.A.R. actions." He directed the Liberty to report by

Flash precedence any threatening actions orr any

diversion from schedule necessitated by ext~rnaf

threat" and to submit "reports of contact with ship$,

aircraft, and submarines which are unidentified, df

intelligence interest, or engage in harassment." Admiral Martin also instructed the Liberty to copy the

fleet broadcast and to use his fast carrier task force

(TF-60) tactical circuits if necessary." Liberty did not

receive, for one reason or another, this message. 26

(V) On 7 June at 0800Z the Liberty was

off the coast of the V.A.R. and approaching operational areas two and three. Despite the Immediate

Precedence assigned to the Liberty's Sitrep/Posit report at 0908Z, 7 June, giving its position at 0800Z at

33-06N 28-54E, it took, according to a JCS postmortem report, some fifteen and one-half hours for the

Liberty's position report to reach the Commander,

Sixth Fleet, the action addressee.r' Liberty was now

guarding the fleet broadcast of the Naval Communications Station, Asmara. On this day a number of

actions were under way to minimize the appearance of

U.S. involvement in the Middle East hostilities and

to change the Libert's 0 erational area.

(~SC)

In a message to the Commander, Sixth

Fleet, the JCS took note of new V.A.R. allegations,

possibly derived in JCS's opinion from the V.A.R.'s I Ito the effect that U. S. personnel

were in communication with Israel and were possibly

providing military assistance. Equally concerned about

the earlier U. A.R. allegations that U. S. aircraft had

participated in the Israeli air strikes against the

U.A.R., the JCS asked for assurance from Vice Admiral Martin that his aircraft were not within 200

miles of the U. A.R., Syria, or Israel and that there

were no Sixth Fleet communications or other contacts

with Israel. 19 The Commander, Sixth Fleet replied

negatively, observing only that radio voice circuits had

been established with the American Embassy in Tel

Aviv and that transmissions so far had only been for

testing purposes. 30

(8 eeO) Studying the successful Israeli drive

into V.A.R. territory, the Director, NSA decided that

the Liberty's opportunity for effective collection of

20 'FOP SECRB'F UM:BRA

EO 1. 4 . (c)
U.A.R. communications might best take place in

operational area two to the west of the originally

specified area three. The Director, NSA asked at

2104Z that the JCS/JRC change the Liberty's schedule

"to satisfy technical requirements." Since this request

reached the JCS/JRC as the latter was having second

thoughts about the Liberty, no action would be taken

on the NSA request.

Directions to Withdraw the Liherty (U)

(0 000) In view of the sensitivity regarding the

U.A.R. charges of U.S. complicity with Israel and

following a question from the US. Chief of Naval

Operations about the wisdom of Liberty's assignment

in the war zone;" the JCS/JRC made a new assessment

of the danger inherent in the Liberty's operations.

JRC considered the distance of the Liberty from the

Sixth Fleet, some 300 to 400 miles. After it learned

from NSA the degree to which the collection mission

would suffer if the ship's CPA was changed;" JRC

decided to accept the mission degradation. At the

time of these deliberations - 2300Z, 7 June - the

Liberty arrived on station in operational area three.

(U) In a message conveying the sense of

urgency then developing in the Pentagon staff, JCS

expressed concern in a message at 2230Z to Commander-in-Chief, Europe over the Middle East situation and stated that the JCS-directed operational area

for the Liberty was "for guidance only" and could be

"varied as local conditions dictate." JCS also instructed the Commander-in-Chief, Europe to change

CPA to the U.A.R. to 20 nm, to Israel 15 nm. 33

Although a copy of the message was to have gone to

the Liberty, it would not reach the ship prior to the

attack. The Department of Army Communications

Center in error sent it to the Naval Communications

Station in the Pacific. 34

(U) Further deliberation within the JCS/

JRC following discussions with the Chief of Naval

Operations, who was pressing for a 100-mile CPA for

the Liberty, now resulted in a JCS decision to move

the Liberty well off the hostile shoreline. Contributing

to the decision, as JRC's Captain Merriwell Vineyard

(USN) told NSA's JRC representative, John Connell,

late on the 7th, was the desire of General Wheeler,

Chairman, JCS, to support in any way the US.

position taken at the UN. in answer to U.A.R. charges

of complicity. U.S. Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg

had stated on the 6th to the Security Council that

"All Sixth Fleet aircraft are and have been several

hundred miles from the area of conflict."

(U) At 2350Z, one hour after the JCS had

given its instructions restricting the Liberty to the 15-

CONPIDENTIAL

20 nm CPA, JRC's Major Breedlove, skipping normal

Commander-in-Chief, Europe channels, on Yocom

called Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy Europe's command center to convey the JCS/JRC decision and to

direct that the Liberty be moved back to a CPA of

100 nm to the coasts of Israel, U. A.R., and Syria and

a CPA of 25 nm to Cyprus. He indicated to Lieutenant

E. L. Galavotti, the operations duty officer there, that

a confirming JCS message would follow. Breedlove

explained the urgency of the matter "because time

[was] getting short to where she will be in those

limits." Galavotti said he would go to Sixth Fleet right

away and had an appropriate message ready by

080001Z for release by his superiors to Sixth Fleet.

Some fourteen minutes after calling Commander-inChief, U. S. Navy Europe, Breedlove called the Commander-in-Chief, Europe JRC watch officer, informing

him of the verbal request to NAVEUR and telling him

that NAVEUR had promised to take action. 35

(U) Within the Commander-in-Chief, U.S.

Navy Europe command center, an unfortunate delay

took place, however, in relaying this JCS/JRC instruction to the Sixth Fleet for action. Mindful that this

directive had skipped channels and was only verbal,

Galavotti's superior, Captain M. J. Hanley, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Navy Europe, directed that

the message to Sixth Fleet not be released until the

date-time group of the JCS confirming message was at

hand. NAVEUR policy allowed for acceptance of oral

instructions from higher headquarters to move ships

and aircraft only if given by flag or general officers or

if firm evidence of a message directive were provided

- for example, the date-time group of a confirming

message. Instead of releasing the message, Captain

Hanley told the NAVEUR command center duty

officer, Commander C. G. Jorgensen, to apprise Commander-in-Chief, Europe of the matter and ask that

headquarters to obtain the date-time group of the

confirming JCS message. Jorgensen then called the

US. European Command's (EUCOM) command duty

officer at 080030Z, who indicated he would check and

call back. The JCS confirming message, JCS 08011 OZ

was, of course, not yet released at the time of the

call. Its transmission by the Department of Army

Communications Center in the Pentagon to Commander-in-Chief, Europe was at 080211Z. 36

(U) Not hearing from the higher headquarters, Commander Jorgensen repeated his call at

0325Z on 8 June to check again on the status of the

action and again asked EUCOM to obtain a date-time

group, this time speaking with a duty officer in the

JRC section of EUCOM, Lieutenant Colonel C. K.

Russell. European Command's delay of three hours in

HAN"BLE VIA C01fHN'f CHANNELS ONLY COKPIDENTIAL 21
The Liberty would not receive the critical message in

time.

preparations on board the D.S.S. America for a press

conference relating to the U.A.R. charges of V.S.

complicity with Israel in the prosecution of the war

and to Sixth Fleet's need to transmit other traffic of

equal or higher precedence.r" Meanwhile Liberty was,

of course, already in its operational area. Its position

at 080800Z was within 30 nm of 31-45N 33-30E in

area three.

(V) When it rains, it pours, and there

would be even further delays in the attempts to get

the word to the Liberty.

(V) JCS's investigating team, the U.S.

Navy Court of Inquiry, and later a congressional staff

gave close attention to the Sixth Fleet message to the

Liberty, following the status of the message in the

critical hours before it came under attack. Essentially,

the findings were these:

UNCLASSIFIED

responding to NAVEUR had resulted from its assumption, based on Breedlove's call from the JCS/JRC,

that NAVEUR was already taking action. 37 Shortly

thereafter, Russell was able to give Jorgensen the

required JCS date-time group, the message having

just arrived in the EVCOM JRC duty officer's hands,

but this was about the same time as NAVEUR's

information copy of JCS 080110Z, the confirming

message, arrived in the NAVEUR command center

itself - the time, 0325Z, 8 June. A precious four

hours had gone by since Major Breedlove's call.

(V) Commander Jorgensen then asked for

a telecon with Sixth Fleet's staff duty officer and at

080355Z was experiencing difficulties in establishing

contact because of atmospheric conditions. He then

had his radio operator contact Sixth Fleet lAy single

sideband radio and request the telecon as soon as

possible. The two-way telecon with Sixth Fleet began

at 080410Z.

(D) When the Sixth Fleet staff duty officer

told Jorgensen his command did not have JCS 080110Z

as yet (the Army Communications Center, Pentagon,

having misrouted this message to Hawaii), Jorgensen

passed it to him three times before gaining an acknowledgement at 080440Z from the Sixth Fleet's duty

officer, who was having difficulty in hearing NAVEUR.

Jorgensen then sent a confirming message: "From

CINCNAVEDR Command Duty Officer to COMSIXTHFLT Duty Officer. Be advised that JCS 0801lOZ

FORAC. Official msg follows."

(V) Ironically, the Sixth Fleet's duty officer then indicated to Jorgensen that Sixth Fleet did

not hold reference (a) on the critical JCS message and

asked for a copy. Since NAVEUR also was without a

copy of the referenced message, despite both NAVEUR

and Sixth Fleet's having been designated for information copies (JCS 7337/072230Z), Jorgensen would

obtain it from Commander-in-Chief, Europe and later,

on obtaining a copy, outline to the Sixth Fleet's duty

officer its contents which had, by that time, been

overtaken by events.

(D) From 080440Z June 67 it became the

Commander, Sixth Fleet's responsibility to direct the

Liberty to a safer area of operations than the one in

which she was then steering. Vice Admiral Martin's

message to the Liberty, directing it not to approach

the coast of the D.A.R., Syria, or Israel closer than

100 nm, went out some four and one-half hours later,

at 080917Z, the delay in this case being attributed to

22 UNCLASSIFIED

Time

0630Z, 8 June

0917Z

1035Z

1050Z

1510Z

1525Z

Status

Sixth Fleet Staff Duty Officer had

message ready for release by Assistant

Chief of Staff (Operations).

Message released with Immediate

Precedence.

Message transmitted to the Naval

Communications Station, Morocco,

for relay to the Liberty, the delays

owing to the transmission of equal or

higher precedence messages. Unaware

that the Liberty, pursuant to its instructions, was now guarding the fleet

broadcast of the Naval Communications Station, Asmara, the Sixth

Fleet routing clerk erred in sending

this message to Morocco.

Message received at the Naval Communications Station, Morocco, and

passed over Defense Communications

System to DCS station, Asmara.

Through error, the Asmara DCS station sent the message to the Naval

Communications Station, Greece, at

1238Z. The latter sent it back to the

Asmara DCS station.

Asmara DCS station delivered the

message to the Naval Communications Station.

Naval Communications Station, Asmara, put the message on its fleet

broadcast.
DIRNSA msg to VSN-855, 292201Z May 1967.

Liberty msg, 022108Z Jun 1967.

(U) The action messages directing withdrawal of the Liberty to a CPA of 100 nm were three

in number: JCS OBOllOZ, Sixth Fleet OB0917Z referred

to in the foregoing, and Commander-in-Chief, Europe's

080625Z to NAVEUR confirming informal exchanges

giving action on the JCS message to NAVEUR. Information copies of the JCS and the CINCEUR action

messages were to have gone to the U.S.S. Liberty,

and it is, of course, entirely possible that timely

receipt of these might have triggered a withdrawal

action on the part of the Liberty's Commander MeGonagle. But the same unkind fate guarding the action

messages was also looking after the information copies.

These too ran into communications problems of one

kind or another, and the Liberty would not receive

them. 39

Operational Area Three, 8 June (U)

(8 eeO) Once on station off Port Said in operational area three, USN-855 employed its collection

nositions orimarilv to develon U.A.R.I

Icommunications I

i'Sf3t- The Liberty had no specific assignment to intercept Israeli communications while it was

in operational area three. Omission of this tasking

was, in part, owing to the lack of Hebrew linguists.

But on the morning of 8 June its VHF search positions

did produce three tapes of Israeli air traffic. The

contents were, as determined later, routine operational

messages. As a by-product of searching for U.A.R.

communications in the Sinai, USN-855 also identified

some 22 frequencies as Israeli, but again there was

nothing relatable in any way to the forthcoming

attack."

SECRET SPOKE

Lihertys Processing Mission (U)

(8 eeO) On station in operational area three,

USN-855's processing and reporting constituted a

complex undertaking. It was to provide daily technical

summaries for use by other collectors and NSA,

enabling them to remain up to date on the Liberty's

operation. Upon completion of its deployment, USN-

~W.. to ;:~Vide t,allie and unpwe"..d tap" tOI

(e eeO) The war had changed the status of the

U.A.R. 's Armed Forces and had diminished significantly the Liberty's opportunity to collect the specified

communications. Much of the U.A.R. 's Air Force no

longer existed, its Army was in disarray, and communications had declined accordingly.

Notes

Sounedowmentsare'nthe"CrisisCollection"oftheNSAHistt;l,.y

Cullett/ofL

I (V) Julie Alger, "A Review of the Technical Research Ship Program, 1961-1969," 1 May 1970.

'(8-886) Source documents used for information on

Liberty's mode of operation include: NSA Station Facilities Book -

V.S.S. Liberty (VSN-855); (V) NSA OPINS No. 2855, Manual of

U.S. Sigint Operations, 12 Mar 1965; (V) JCS message cite no.

5838, 052235Z Nov 65; and (U) NSA oral history interview with

Terry L. McFarland on 23 Jun 1980.

'(V) JCS msg cite no. 6499, 291602Z May 1967.

4(V) COMSERVRON 8 msg, 240020Z May 1967.

'(V) Liberty msg, 241732Z May 1967.

6(V) USCINCEUR msg, 300932Z May 1967.

'(U) VSCINCEUR msg 010035Z Jun 1967.

'(V) NSA Staff, "Informal Paper on Liberty's Communications," 22 Jun 1967; NSA oral history interview with Gene

Sheck on 11 Aug 1980.

2(8 886) Source documents relating to Liberty's preparations at Rota include: DIRNSA msg to NSAEUR Office, Germany,

26 May 1967; DIRNSA msg to VSN-855, 252317Z May 1967; and

DIRNSA msg, 232133Z May 1967.

10(V) DIRNSA msg to JCS/JRC, 292013Z May 1967.

"(V) JCS msg cite no. 6724, 011545Z Jun 1967.

12(V) Liberty msg to CINCNAVEUR, 021132Z Jun

1967; CINCNAVEUR msg, 020717Z Jun 1967.

"(V) Source documents used in discussion of the Air

Force's TPC include: ESC, History of the 6931st Security Group,

1 Jan-3D Jun 1967; NSA Staff, "Operations Staff Summary," ca.

16 Jun 1967; NSA Staff, "Airborne Collection in the Middle East,"

undated; NSA Staff (062), "Briefing on the 1967 Middle East

Crisis," undated.

I4(V)

15(V)

SECRET SPOKE 23

EO 1. 4 . (c)

EO 1. 4 . (d)

"EO 1.4. (c)
CONFIDENTIAL

'"(U) NSA oral history interview, Terry L. McFarland, 23 Jun 1980.

"(U) CINCUSNAVEUR msg 031016Z Jun 1967.

"(U) CINCUSNAVEUR msgs, 051352 and 051850Z

Jun 1967.

'"(U) COMSIXTHFLT msg, 052015 Jun 1967.

,o(U) NSA oral history interview, Robert L. Wilson,

6 May 1980; DIRNSA msg to USN-855, 252317Z May 1967.

"(U) NSA 'oral history interviews with Robert L.

Wilson on 6 May 1980 and with Paddy E. Rhodes on 13 June 1980.

"(U) NSA Staff, "Report to the Director," 12 Jun

1967; House Appropriations Committee Surveys and Investigations

Staff, A Report to the Committee on Appropriations - U.S. House

of Representatives on the Effectiveness of the Worldwide Communications Systems and Networks of the Department of Defense,

vol. I, p. iv, "U.S.S. Liberty Incident," December 1967.

2'(U) NSA Staff, "Informal Paper on Liberty's

Communications," 22 Jun 1967.

24(U) CINCNAVEUR msg to Sixth Fleet, Liberty,

and others, 061357Z Jun 1967.

"(U) COMSIXTHFLT msg to Liberty and others,

062349Z Jun 1967.

'"(U) MG J. R. Russ, USA, "Report of the JCS Fact

Finding Team-U.S.S. Liberty Incident, 8 Jun 1967," p. 17. Hereafter cited as the Russ Report.

"(U) Russ Report, p. 18.

"(U) NSA Staff (G62), "Briefing on the 1967 Middle

East Crisis," undated.

'"(U) JCS msg cite no. 7239, 070259Z Jun 1967.

'o(U) COMSIXTHFLT msgs to JCS, 070626Z and

071503Z Jun 1967.

"(U) Russ Report, p. 19.

"(U) NSA Staff, "Report to the Director," 12 Jun

1967, chronology section.

"(U) JCS msg cite no. 7337 to CINCEUR with information copy to Liberty, 072230Z Jun 1967.

"(U) Russ Report, pp. 35, 36.

"(U) Russ Report, p. 23; NAVEUR Contingency

Watch Team, "Memorandum-U.S.S. Liberty Incident," 12 Jun

1967; NSA Staff, "U.S.S. Liberty-Chronology, 23 May-8 Jun."

'"(U) Russ Report, p. 23 and Tab 2 to Annex D.

37(U) Ibid, p. 24.

'"(U) Ibid, pp. 26-27.

39(U) Detailed information on the communications

delays is in the Russ Report and also in the House Appropriations

Committee report cited in footnote 22.

40(U) DIRNSA msg to USN-855, 022333Z Jun 1967.

4I(S SSQ) NSA Staff, "Note for the Director, Sigint

Reflection of Liberty Incident," 27 Jun 1967; (U) NSA Staff,

"Questions by Gen. Carroll, Director, DIA - Answers Provided by

G Group/PM," 27 Jun 1967.

4l(S SSQ) DIRNSA msg to USN-855, 022333Z Jun 1967;

NSA Staff, "Critique-SRB Crayon," 10 Jul 1968.

24 eONFIDBNCfIAL II/..NB"bB ';1/.. GOMIN'I' GlIl.rNNB"bS ON"bY
CONPfDENTIAL

Chapter IV

The Attack (U)

(U) Thursday morning, 8 June 1967, found

the Liberty cruising slowly in international waters on

station as directed. At approximately 0830 hours (local

time), the Liberty notified the Commander, Sixth

Fleet that her position for the next 24 hours would be

within 30 nautical miles of coordinates 31-45N and

33-30E.I The sea was calm and the clear sky permitted

visibility of ten miles; a light breeze ruffled the

Liberty's ensign. 2

(U) Liberty's projected course for that day

was to proceed to a point 13 nautical miles from the

U.A.R. coast at 31-27.2N, 34-00E (Point Alpha),

thence to 31-22.3N, 33-42E (Point Bravo), thence to

31-31N, 33-00E (Point Charlie) retracing this track

until new orders were received. Normal steaming speed

was to be five knots and typical steaming colors (which

indicated conditions were normal) were flown.3 A

"condition of readiness three, modified" was set; i.e.,

a normal steaming watch, except that one man was

stationed at each of the forward two .50-caliber

machine guns, numbers 51 and 52. Lookouts on the

bridge were designated to man machine guns 53 and

54 just aft of the bridge, in the event of a surprise air

or surface attack."

(U) At about 0930 hours, it was possible

to visually sight the minaret at Al 'Arish on the

U.A.R. coast. This was used as a navigational aid and

the ship's position was verified as being within its

operating limits. There were no other conspicuous or

outstanding navigational features in the area."

Reconnaissance of the Liberty (U)

(U) Shortly before 0900 hours (Iocal time),

two delta-wing, single-engine jet aircraft orbited the

Liberty three times at 31-27N, 34-00E. The planes'

altitude was estimated at 5,000 feet, at a distance of

approximately two miles. Liberty notified the Commander, Sixth Fleet and others of this reconnaissance,

stating that identification was unknown and that no

amplifying report would be submitted. 6

(U) Later in the morning, at 1056 hours,

an aircraft similar to an American flying boxcar

crossed astern of the Liberty at a distance of about

three to five miles. The plane circled the ship around

the starboard side, proceeded forward of the ship and

headed back toward the Sinai peninsula. This reconnaissance was repeated at approximately 30-minute

intervals. It was impossible to see any identifying

markings on the aircraft. The plane never approached

the Liberty in a provocative manner and made no

attempt to signal the ship. Nor did the Liberty

attempt to signal it. 7 Subsequent investigations of the

attack on the Liberty identified the aircraft as a

French-built Noratlas NORD 2501, piloted by Israeli

Air Force.

-tet" Though this plane was unidentified,

the thoughts of Robert L. Wilson (one of three NSA

civilians aboard the Liberty) must have been shared

by his shipmates. Wilson remembered thinking when

he saw the plane, that "it must be Israeli because

what else is flying out here at this point in the war

and also it's coming from the direction of Israel and

it's going back to Israel, so it was obvious that it was

Israeli. I didn't think much of it. They were just out

there checking us out. That's what I would do tOO.,,8

(V) Being sensitive to its exposed and

unprotected position, the Liberty reported to the

Naval Security Station Command, at approximately

1100 hours, that she had destroyed all superseded

May publications (e.g. crypto documents) and intended

to destroy all irregularly superseded material daily

because of the "current situation and shallow water in

operating area.""

General Quarters Drill (U)

(V) After the lunch hour, at 1310 hours,

the Liberty's crew was exercised at general quarters

for drill purposes for a mandatory noncompetitive

exercise to train the crew in chemical-attack procedures. This was a routine activity, part of the ship's

€ONFIDfiN'fIAL 25

-~ -- -- ---------
SECRE'f

(U) The Dassault Mirage jet bomber of the type which attacked the Liberty on 8 June.

(Photograph courtesy of Jane's All the World's Aircraft.)

(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED)

training program established by the Commander, Service Force, Atlantic Fleet, and was not related to her

mission in the eastern Mediterranean. The drill was

performed satisfactorily and the ship returned to her

"modified condition three" at 1345. LO

(U) Following the general quarters drill,

the Liberty's Commanding Officer, Commander William L. McGonagle, fixed her position by radar as

being 25.5 nautical miles from the minaret at Al

'Arish, which was to the southeast (bearing 1420 true.)

Air Attack Begins (U)

(8 000) Amidships below deck, the Liberty's

Research Department (the Sigint collection, processing, and reporting area) resumed normal operations.

Robert L. Wilson was in the analysis/reporting area

together with the other civilians, Allen M. Blue and

Donald L. Blalock, plus the Marine linguists. Things

had been slow and Wilson considered going up on deck

to do some sunbathing but changed his mind. Communications Technician (CT) Terry L. McFarland,

seated at his manual-morse osition

That far below deck it was diffi- L..- ---I

cult for anyone to hear much of what was happening

topside.

(U) During the general quarters (GQ)

drill, Lieutenant James G. O'Connor (Assistant Technical Operations Officer of the Research Department)

had been officer of the deck on the bridge. At the

conclusion of the drill, he went up to the 04 level

(above the bridge) to see if he could locate the

approaching airplanes that had been picked up on

radar by the lookouts. It was 1400 hours. From the

starboard wing of the bridge, Commander McGonagle

observed a single jet aircraft that appeared similar, if

not identical, to those that had been sighted earlier

in the day and about which a sighting report had been

submitted. The relative bearing of this plane was

about 1350 , its position angle was about 450-500 , its

elevation approximately 7,000 feet, and it was approximately five to six miles from the ship. It appeared to

McGonagle that the plane was traveling parallel to,

and in the same direction as the Liberty. With his

binoculars trained on the aircraft, the Commander

was unaware of a second plane swooping in from the

port side to launch a rocket directed toward the

bridge. When the rocket exploded two levels below the

bridge, McGonagle ordered the general alarm to be

sounded.

(U) CT3 Paddy E. (Dusty) Rhodes was

headed below decks from his GQ station, damage

control detail. At the end of the GQ drill, the

Commander had ordered the whaleboat engine tested

and, when Dusty heard a muffled explosion, he

thought, "Those damned deck apes blew that boat up

and I've got to go back up and fight the fire."

Simultaneously, Dusty heard the general quarters

alarm. Scampering back up the ladder, he could smell

burning powder and started "dogging down" doors

when a rocket tore through a bulkhead to his right

ripping steel all about.

26 SHURHr:P IIANBI:JB ViA COMIN" CIIANNBI:JS ONI:J\"

EO 1. 4 . (c)
(U) Down in the Research Department,

Terry McFarland, wearing his headphones, was vaguely aware of flickers of light coming through the

bulkhead. He didn't realize that these were armorpiercing tracer bullets slicing through the Liberty's

skin. The "flickers" were accompanied by a strange

noise that sounded to Terry like chains being pulled

across the bottom of the ship. Next, he saw Seaman

"Red" Addington race down the ladder from above

with blood running down his right leg from a wound in

the knee. "Somebody's up there shootin' at us," said

Red. Nobody spoke, but Terry could see the fear in

the faces about him. Someone ordered the men to

perform emergency destruction, and they turned to

dumping classified material in the weighted, white

canvas bags specially made for this purpose. Robert,

CONFIDENTIAL

L. Wilson went up to the second deck from the

processing and reporting (P&R) spaces to empty safes

on that upper level.

(0 eeS) Hearing the general quarters alarm,

CT3 Clyde W. Way ran from the mess deck to his

station in the T-Branch spaces one deck above the R

Branch. Way plugged in his radio receivers and heard

nothing; he called the R2 area only to learn that their

reception had also gone dead.

(U) Topside, one level above the main

deck, the exploding rocket had started a blazing fire

in two 55-gallon gasoline drums stowed below the

bridge on the port side. McGonagle quickly ordered

his Executive Officer, Lieutenant Commander Philip

M. Armstrong, to go down and release the gasoline

cans. Lieutenant O'Connor joined the Exec. Just as

(U) Starboard side of the Liberty, scorched by fire from exploding rockets that were launched by the

Israeli attack aircraft.

(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED)

I12tNBtJE ViA COMlN'f CII2tNNELS ONLY CONfIDENTIAL 1:1
--------_._--~-------_.............._......._---------------------

UNCLASSIFIED

both reached the top of the ladder to proceed down,

a bomb hit near the whaleboat on the starboard side,

immediately aft of the bridge. Armstrong and O'Connor

were thrown back onto the bridge and other personnel

in the pilot-house were blown from their feet. McGonagle grabbed the engine order annunciator and

rang up all head flank speed - an order for maximum

speed. At the same time, he ordered Lieutenant

Maurice H. Bennett to report to the Chief of Naval

Operations (CNO) via the high-command radio circuit

(hicom) that the Liberty was under attack by unidentified jet aircraft and required immediate assistance.

This Flash message, giving the Liberty's position as

33-25E, 31-23N, was received by the aircraft carrier

V.S.S. Saratoga (CVA-60) and relayed to Commander,

V.S. Naval Forces Europe; Commander, Sixth Fleet;

and Commander, Task Force 60 (CTF 60).ll Liberty's

transmission was not made without difficulty. During

the attack and intermittently thereafter, the hicom

voice circuit was subjected to loud jamming regardless

of frequency. This electronic interference was described as a steady carrier without modulation.'?

(V) After being blown back onto the bridge

floor, Lieutentant O'Connor realized he had no feeling

in his body from the waist down. To get out of the

way, he dragged himself into the combat information

center (CIC) behind the bridge, where several others

had also sought safety. Lying face down, O'Connor

soon noticed that there was a lot of blood on the floor

and then realized it was his. About this time, Ensign

O'Malley stepped into the CIC and helped stop

O'Connor's bleeding by stuffing a T-shirt into the holes

in his back.

(V) A few moments after the bomb blast

on the starboard side, Commander McGonagle was hit

by flying shrapnel and knocked off his feet, but, though

shaken up, he remained on the bridge, totally in

command.

(V) For the next five or six minutes, aircraft made criss-cross attacks on the Liberty at about

one-minute intervals, hitting her with rockets and

machine-gun fire. A final count entered into the Court

of Inquiry's record, showed 821 separate hits on the

ship's hull and superstructure. The attacking aircraft

were later identified as French-built Dassault Mirage

jet fighters whose armament consisted of two 30mm

cannon, two 1,000-pound bombs, and four rocket pods

(18 rockets each).

(V) During the first or second strafing run,

the ship's public-address system, the electrically powered intercom system, and most sound-powered phone

circuits were severed or destroyed.

28 UNCLASSIFIED

(V) In the first minutes of the air attack

the Liberty suffered a complete loss of external communications because of badly damaged radio transmitting equipments and antenna systems. In spite of

this, emergency restoration of hicom voice capability

was completed within minutes. All U.S.S. Liberty

communications immediately thereafter were via the

hicom voice network."

(V) The coordinated strafing, rocket, and

incendiary air attacks created three major fires topside

that covered large areas of the Liberty with flames

and heavy smoke. Eight men were killed or died of

injuries received during the air attack: two killed or

mortally wounded on the bridge, two killed at machine

gun 51, one killed at machine gun 52, one died from

wounds received on the main deck starboard side, and

two died of wounds received on the 01 level portside.

Throughout the topside area, 75 men had been

wounded by shrapnel and shock of exploding rockets.

(V) During this period, the Liberty gradually built up speed from five knots; her exact speed

was not known but it is doubtful that she exceeded 11

or 12 knots while under attack.

Torpedo-Boat Attack (U)

(V) At about 1424 hours, look-outs sighted

three high-speed boats approaching the Liberty from

the northeast on a relative bearing of approximately

1350 at a distance of about 15 miles. The boats

appeared to be in a wedge-type formation, spaced

about 150 to 200 yards apart, and closing in a torpedolaunch attitude at an estimated speed of 27 to 30

knots. Commander McGonagle ordered a sailor from

the bridge to man the starboard gun and take the

boats under fire. Using the hicom circuit, the Liberty's

radioman reported the approach of the torpedo boats.

This was received and relayed by the V. S. S. Saratoga

to Commander-in-Chief, V.S. Navy Europe and to the

Commander, Sixth Fleet. 14

(V) It was then that the Commander noticed that the Liberty's American flag had been shot

down. He immediately ordered a signalman to hoist

the "holiday ensign" - the largest flag aboard (approximately 7 x 13 feet) - from the yardarm, the

normal flag halyard having been destroyed. There was

smoke from the burning whaleboat and other topside

fires in the vicinity of the bridge.

(V) Commander McGonagle passed the

word, "Stand by for torpedo attack." He held his

course, since turning away from the boats would bring

the ship closer to land, and turning toward them would

-----------------------------------
swing the ship broadside toward the attackers, giving

them a larger target.

(U) When Robert L. Wilson heard the

torpedo attack warning, he remembered one of the

seamen telling him to sit on the floor and brace his

feet against the wall.

(U) In the processing and reporting area,

CT Terry McFarland was told to "tuck pant legs into

your socks, button top collar, get rid of loose material,

and lie flat on floor and hold your head in your hands

to protect your face."

(0) When the motor torpedo boats were

approximately a mile away, the center boat was seen

flashing a signal. light. Because of smoke and flames

in the direction from which the boats were approaching, Commander McGonagle could not read the signals,

but he saw what he believed to be an Israeli flag. As

the air attack had knocked out the Liberty's starboard

signal light, he attempted to signal with a hand-held

Aldis lamp. This may not have been powerful enough

to penetrate the smoke pouring from the fires started

by the attackers. Believing that the air attack might

have been in error, Commander McGonagle quickly

shouted to the starboard forward gun to withhold fire.

The gunner fired a short burst at the motor torpedo

boats before he understood the CO's order. At the

same time, though unattended, the after gun on the

starboard side opened fire: flames from the burning

whaleboat had ignited bullets in the gun and in the

(U) During the attack, severe damage was

done to one of the two forward area 50-caliber

gun mounts.

rre eee) Photograph courtesy of Robert L. Wilson, NSA.l

(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED)

CONFIDENTIAL

ammunition box, causing the gun to fire in the

direction of the attacking boats.

(U) At this time, the motor torpedo boats

opened fire with their gun mounts, killing the Liberty's

helmsman. In a matter of seconds one torpedo crossed

astern of the ship at about 25 yards. The time was

then 1434 hours. A minute later, a second torpedo

struck the ship on the starboard side, just forward of

the bridge and a few feet below the water line. Again,

using the hicom net, the Liberty broadcast that the

ship had been torpedoed and was listing badly. The

Saratoga picked up the transmission and relayed it to

the Commander-in-Chief, V.S. Navy Europe and to

the Commander, Sixth Fleet. 15

(U) To Lieutenant O'Connor, lying on the

floor of the combat information center, the torpedo's

deafening explosion seemed to lift the ship right out

of the water, and when it settled back he thought it

was going to roll over.

(V) In the Research Department where

the torpedo struck, everything went black; oil and

debris were everywhere. Water rushed in and equipment fell over Terry McFarland, but he managed to

keep clear and make his way in the darkness to the

ladder to go topside. When he got out there was about

a foot and a half of air space left.

(U) CT Clyde W. Way was in T-Branch

spaces above the processing and reporting area. With

the explosion below, all equipment fell to the floor and

smoke poured from the P&R hatch. Way started

pulling men out as they came up the ladder. There

was no panic. A Marine went down the ladder to help

locate men possibly trapped in the water. As the water

rose in the Research Department, Lieutenant Maurice

Bennett realized that he had to close the hatch to

contain the flooding. Attempts to contact the Marine

who had gone back failed, and Lieutenant Bennett

reluctantly and sorrowfully ordered the hatch closed.

McFarland and Way then went topside to help fight

fires and attend the wounded.

(U) The torpedo explosion had torn a hole

in the side of the ship that extended from a few feet

above the water line to below the turn of the bilge. It

was shaped like a tear-drop, and was 39 feet across at

its widest point. Its immediate effect was to flood all

compartments on two decks below the water line, from

frame 53 to frame 66. These frames supported watertight bulkheads, and marked the location of the

Liberty's Research Department and store rooms.

Twenty-five men died in these spaces some from the

blast, others drowned.

(U) The torpedo hit did not start a major

fire, probably because of the immediate flooding of the

HANDLE ViA e6M1N'f etlANNELS 6NLY CONFIDENTIAL 29
UNCLASSIFIED

!

LEBANON"

,.;

,,----.) \

,

) ISRAEL y

(',,---J"

")

"

J 0 R,.O A,./N

.. .:l

ISRAEL )

REPUBLIC

33°

ARAB

32°

UNITED

31°

32°"+--------+-------+---------1L--~~!l.!.!~_+_tt_----___1

(U) The projected track of the Uherty on the day of attack.

(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED)

I

'1!

affected area, but the Liberty immediately listed nine

degrees to starboard. Power and steering control were

lost temporarily and the ship came dead in the water.

The time was 1440 hours.

(D) The three torpedo boats also stopped

and then milled around astern of the Liberty at a

range of approximately 500 to 800 yards. One of the

boats signaled by flashing light, in English, "Do you

require assistance?" Not being able to signal by light,

Commander McGonagle ordered a signalman to hoist

the international flag signal for "not under command,"

meaning that the ship was maneuvering with difficulty

and that they should keep clear. One of the torpedo

boats was identified by a hull number of 204-17. All

boats retired toward shore at 1505 hours. The attacking torpedo boats were later identified as French-built

motor torpedeo boats of the Israeli Ayah class. These

were 62-ton craft, capable of 42 knots, with a crew of

15 and armament consisting of one 40mm cannon,

four 20mm cannon, and two torpedos.

Post-Attack Reconnaissance (U)

(D) At about 1515 hours, two helicopters

approached the Liberty and circled around the ship at

a distance of about 100 yards. The Star of David

insignia was clearly visible. One of the helicopters was

numbered 04 or 04, the other 08 or 08. The helicopters departed, returned, and departed again.

(D) Commander McGonagle designated the

mess decks as a casualty collection station, and the

wounded were taken there by repair party personnel

and other crew members able to assist.

(D) Reports received from damage control

central indicated that the flooding was under control.

30 UNCLASSIFIED

----~~- ~-
Power was restored to the bridge at 1520 hours, but

steering control could not be regained from the bridge,

making it necessary to give rudder orders by telephone

to men in the "after steering" compartment, and for

some time they operated the ship's heavy rudder by

hand.

(D) At 1536 hours, the Israeli torpedo

boats again approached the Liberty from the starboard, at a range of five miles. During the next hour

and a quarter, the boats returned toward the ship

several times before disappearing over the horizon

without further signal or action.

(D) Communications were restored at

about 1600 hours, and Commander McGonagle dictated a message to Lieutenant Bennett providing

additional information concerning the attack by unidentified aircraft and the fact that the torpedo boats

had been identified as Israeli. A preliminary estimate

of the number of dead and casualties, as well as the

condition of the ship, was also provided. Transmission

of this message was delayed because shipboard emergency measures demanded immediate attention to

preserve the safety and stability of the ship and

minimize new casualties.

(D) Fifteen minutes later two unidentified

jet aircraft approached the Liberty from the starboard

side and reconnoitered from a distance before disappearing from the scene.

UNCLASSIFIED

Sixth Fleet Reacts (U)

(D) Aboard his flagship, the guided-missile

light cruiser U.S. S. Little Rock (CLG-4), the Commander, Sixth Fleet received (from the Saratoga) the

Liberty's messages about the air and torpedo boat

attacks. At 1450 hours, fifty minutes after the attack

began, he ordered the aircraft carrier U.S. S. America

(CVA-66) to launch four armed A-4 Skyhawks and the

carrier U.S.S. Saratoga (CVA-60) to launch four

armed A-1 attack planes to defend the Liberty. The

America was also directed to provide fighter cover and

tanker aircraft to refuel the fighters, if necessary. 16

At this time, the Sixth Fleet was located south of

Crete, approximately 450 miles west of the Liberty.

(D) At 1516 hours, Commander, Task

Force 60, implemented Sixth Fleet's directive and

instructed his carrier pilots to "destroy or drive off

any attackers who are clearly making attacks on the

Liberty. Remain over international waters. Defend

yourself if attacked." 17

(U) On the heels of this action, at 1520

hours, the Commander, Sixth Fleet, informed U. S.

Commander-in-Chief, Europe (CINCEUR) of the attack and aircraft being deployed to defend the Liberty.

It was estimated that the first aircraft would be on

the scene at 1715 hours."

(U) U.S.S. Little Rock, a guided missile light cruiser and the flagship of the Commander. Sixth

Fleet.

(Photograph courtesy of the Department of the Navy.)

(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED)

UNCLASSIFIED 31
UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Following this, at 1549 hours, the

Commander, Sixth Fleet relayed to the Chief of Naval

Operations (CNO) and the Commander-in-Chief, U.S.

Navy Europe, (CINCUSNAVEUR) his message of

instruction to the carriers concerning the use of force

and observance of Israeli and Egyptian territorial

limits. 19

(U) Commander, Task Force 63, reacting

to the Liberty's plight, sent a message to Sixth Fleet

at 1610 hours recommending that fleet ocean tug

U.S.S. Papago (ATF-160) of the Abnaki class be

diverted to proceed at maximum speed to assist the

Liberty.

Washington Informed (U)

(U) An hour and eleven minutes after the

Liberty was attacked, the National Military Command

Center (NMCC) in the Pentagon was phoned by

CINCEUR and told of the situation as known. At 0915

hours (DST), 8 June, NMCC phoned the NSA Sigint

Command Center to notify NSA of the attack. 20

(U) At the White House, President Lyndon B. Johnson was busy telephoning cabinet members

and congressional leaders when he was interrupted at

0949 hours (DST) by Walt Rostow, his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, and told that "the

Liberty, has been torpedoed in the Mediterranean.

The ship is located 60-100 miles north of Egypt.

Reconnaissance aircraft are out from the 6th fleet .

... no knowledge of the submarine or surface vessel

which committed this act....shall keep you informed.Y"

(U) Rostow phoned again at 1014 hours to

advise the President that the Liberty was "listing

badly to starboard. The Saratoga has launched 4-A4's

and 4-A1's.... ,>22

Israel Reports Error (U)

CU) In Tel Aviv, Israel, the U.S. Naval

Attache, Commander E. C. Castle, was called to the

Foreign Liaison Office, Israel Defence Force at approximately 1600 hours (local time) and told that Israeli

air and sea forces had attacked the Liberty in error.

Immediately the U. S. Defense Attache office sent a

Flash message to advise the White House, Department

of State, and others of this development. 23

Johnson Informs Kosygin (U)

CU) The message was received by the

White House, NMCC, and other members of the U.S.

military and intelligence community at 1045 hours

32 UNCLASSIFIED

CDST). Walt Rostow informed the President and

immediately drafted a "hot line" message to the

Kremlin. President Johnson approved the following

text which was sent to Chairman Kosygin at 1117

hours (DST):

We have just learned that U.S.S. Liberty, an auxiliary ship,

has apparently been torpedoed by Israel forces in error off Port

Said. We have instructed our carrier, Saratoga now in the

Mediterranean to dispatch aircraft to the scene to investigate.

We wish you to know that investigation is the sole purpose of

this flight of aircraft, and hope that you will take appropriate

steps to see that proper parties are informed. We have passed

this message to Chernyakov but feel that you should know of

this development urgently. 24

The message was received in Moscow at 1124 hours

CDST).25 At 1210 hours Kosygin replied by "hot line"

that he had passed the message to President Nasser

of Egypt. 26 Thereafter instructions were issued by JCS

and Commander, Sixth Fleet to withdraw the aircraft

launched to defend the Liberty. By 1849 hours Sixth

Fleet reported all planes recalled and accounted for. 27

(U) Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance

notified the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy Europe,

by phone at 1700 hours that all news releases on the

Liberty affair would be made at the Washington level

- no releases were to be made aboard ships. This

information was relayed to the Commander, Sixth

Fleet. 28

Libert}' Recovers (U)

CU) Unaware of what was happening at

fleet headquarters or in Washington and Tel Aviv, the

Liberty was struggling to regain full engine power and

to reach deeper water. The gyro compass was out but

the pilot-house magnetic compass appeared to be

working.

(U) The ship remained at general quarters

while the crew effected post-attack emergency measures. Sixth Fleet was notified that the Liberty had

carried out the emergency destruction of all crypto

publications and key cards. Her only means of communication remained the hicom circuits. 29

(U) Liberty's medical officer, Lieutenant

Richard F. Kiepfer, Medical Corps, USN, performed

one major operation and gave emergency treatment to

wounded men as best he could. He manned the main

battle dressing station, together with one hospital

corpsman, while the other corpsman operated a secondary station in the forward part of the ship. Both

stations were flooded with seriously injured men and

for a time there was little opportunity to do more than

give first aid. Bleeding was stopped, men were given
(V) The V.S.S. America was ordered by the Commander, Sixth Fleet to launch four Skyhawks to

defend the Liberty.

(Photograph courtesy of the Department of the Navy.)

(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED)
SH€RH'f SPOKE

morphine for pain and treated for shock, and those

with lung wounds were treated to ease breathing.

(U) At 1750 hours, Sixth Fleet advised the

Liberty that destroyers were on the way at maximum

speed and that the Liberty was to proceed on a course

of 340 0

magnetic until 100 miles from present position,

then turn 2700 magnetic.

u.s. Naval Attache Helicopters to

the Lihert)' (U)

(U) Back in Tel Aviv, the Israeli Foreign

Liaison Office was arranging for a helicopter to fly

Commander Castle, U.S. Naval Attache, to the Liberty so that he might communicate with its commanding officer. The helicopter left Dov Hoss (now SdeDov) airfield on the northern side of Tel Aviv at 1810

hours and proceeded directly to the Liberty. By 1835

hours, the Israeli Sikorsky helicopter, carrying Commander Castle, was over the ship hovering at approximately 30 feet from bridge level. Lettering on the

tail of the helicopter was SA32K and on the fuselage

were the numerals 06 or D6. The helicopter had

neither an electric megaphone nor hand-held signal

light with which to communicate with the Liberty.3o

(U) Wearing civilian clothes, Commander

Castle could not convey his identity to the bridge of

Liberty but by visual means indicated that he wished

to be lowered aboard the ship. At first, Commander

McGonagle prepared to receive the attache but, considering the obstructions in the forecastle area, signaled a wave-off to the transfer attempt. Simultaneously, the helicopter pilot said he could not make the

transfer because of the Liberty's speed. A few minutes

later an impromptu package weighted with an orange

was dropped from the helicopter onto the forecastle.

Inside the package was a message written on a calling

card of "Commander Ernest Carl Castle, United

States Navy, Naval Attache for Air, Embassy of the

United States of America, Tel Aviv." On the back of

the card was written, "Have you casualties?" Using an

Aldis lamp, the Liberty attempted for ten to fifteen

minutes, to reply to this message with "affirmative

casualties." It was not clear to those on the ship that

the reply was understood. Castle, however, had received the message but was uncertain as to whether

the number flashed was four or forty. The bodies of

three crew members had not yet been removed from

the forecastle and must have been observed by those

in the helicopter. With the waning light and approach

of dusk the helicopter departed the ship at approximately 1900 hours."

(U) Shortly thereafter, at 1915 hours, the

Liberty transmitted to CNO a post-attack situation

report. 32

Israeli Helicopter Conversations (U)

fS€T Back at NSA, within an hour of

learning that the Liberty had been torpedoed, the

Director, NSA sent a message to alII Iintercept sites requesting a special search of all communications that might reflect the attack or reaction.V No

EO 1. 4 . (c)

(U) The America also was ordered to dispatch F4 Phantom fighters, like this one, to provide cover for

the Skyhawks.

(Photograph courtesy of the Department of the Navy.)

(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED)

34 SH€RH'f SPOKH
SECRET SrOKE

"'-1r

.~

,. ~------ .......

(V) V.S.S. PapaJ{o, ocean tug of the Sixth Fleet, was sent to aid the Libertyand was used to recover

classified material adrift from the torpedo hole in the Liberty's hull.

(Photograph courtesy of the Department of the Navy.)

(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED)

communications of the attacking aircraft or torpedo

boats were available. However, one of the airborne

platforms operating from Athens, had collected voice

conversations between two Israeli helicopter pilots and

the control tower at Hazor Airfield (near Tel Aviv).

Control told helicopter 815 at 1431 hours that" there

is a warship there which we attacked. The men jumped

into the water from it. You will try to rescue them."

Although there were other references to a search for

the men in the water, no personnel from the Liberty

had jumped overboard. At 1434 hours, the control

tower told helicopter 815 that the ship was Egyptian

and that he could return home. At 1510 hours, the

controller asked 815 to identify the nationality of any

survivors. Subsequently, the helicopter pilot reported

seeing an American flag on the ship. In another portion

ofthe conversation, the pilot of helicopter 815 reported

that number GTR 5 was written on the ship's side

and that behind the ship were several uninflated life

boats. At 1521 hours the helicopters were instructed

to return home. 34

Liherty Licks Its Wounds (U)

(U) As darkness settled over the Liberty,

Commander McGonagle remained on the bridge, still

suffering from the loss of blood and experiencing a

great deal of pain from his wounds. By remaining on

the bridge, McGonagle believed his presence there

would give reassurance to the crew. The Liberty's

doctor, Lieutenant Kiepfer, had seen McGonagle on

the bridge but made no effort to get him below to a

battle dressing station. In Lieutenant Kiepher's words,

The Commanding Officer at that time was like a rock upon

which the rest of the men supported themselves. To know that

he was on the bridge grievously wounded, yet having the conn

and helm and ... calling every change of course, was the thing

that told the men "we're going to live." When I went to the

bridge and saw this, I should say that I knew that I could only

insult this man by suggesting that he be taken below for

treatment of his wounds. I didn't even suggest it. 15

(U) The attack had demanded the very

best from the Liberty's crew and they had responded

exceptionally well. Damage control competence minimized Liberty's structural wounds and kept her afloat.

The engineering crew under Lieutenant George Golden

maintained power to the engines so that the Liberty

could move away from dangerous shoals in the attack

area and head toward the Sixth Fleet. The medical

officer and his two corpsmen needed help and they got

it. In Kiepfer's words,

Any time we needed one volunteer, we'd get ten. If anything

had to be done ... there were hands everywhere. When we

SHeRE,£, SPOKE 35
Notes

U.S.S. Liberty msg OB0634Z Jun 1967.

U.S.S. Liberty, "Ship Weather Observation

CONfiDENTIAL

asked for two pints of blood for transfusion, we had people on

the adjoining tables who were saying, "If you need some, I have

this type." These were people already wounded. 36

NSA civilian, Robert L. Wilson, remembered, too,

that surprisingly there was no panic. When the men

were ordered to do something, they did it. Everyone

was kept busy. Though some were obviously scared to

death, there was simply no panic; nobody ran rampant

through the ship. No one slept much that night.

Helping the wounded became everyone's job - even

those with no medical training. Men learned to dress

wounds or do stitches. In some cases to quiet a man,

he was given a bottle of rum to drown his pain. With

the lengthening hours of darkness, deepening depression and shock caused some men to break down and

succumb to the fears they had been able to restrain

during the attack and immediately thereafter. 37

(U) Alone, battered, and scarred but unvanquished, the Liberty steamed steadily on throughout the night toward a rendezvous with Sixth Fleet

destroyers. Three musters were taken to identify the

dead, the seriously injured, and those who were

missing. Casualty messages were completed as quickly

as possible and necessary message notifications sent.

Source documents are in the "Crisis Collection" of the NSA History

Collection.

I(U)

'(U)

Sheet," 8 Jun 1967.

'(U) CINCUSNAVEUR msg 151003Z Jun 1967.

4(U) U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry 7816~7; Liberty

Incident, 8 Jun 1967; Record of Proceedings.

StU) Ibid.

'(U) U.S.S. Liberty msg OB0742Z Jun 1967.

'(U) U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry 7816~7; Liberty

Incident, 8 Jun 1967; Record of Proceedings.

'(U) Robert L. Wilson, oral interview transcript, 6

May 1980.

'(U) U.S.S. Liberty msg OB0B56Z Jun 1967.

IO(U) U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry 7816~7; Liberty

Incident, 8 Jun 1967; Record of Proceedings.

"(U) U.S.S. Saratoga msg OB1235Z Jun 1967.

"(U) U.S. Naval Court of Inquiry 7816~7; Liberty

Incident, 8 Jun 1967; Record of Proceedings.

13(U) MG J.R. Russ, USA, JCS. "Report of the Fact

Finding Team, U.S.S. Liberty Incident, 8 Jun 1967", p. 39.

(Hereafter cited as the Russ Report.)

l4(U) U.S.S. Saratoga msg OB1237Z Jun 1967.

15(U) U.S.S. Saratoga msg OBl254Z Jun 1967.

16(U) COMSIXTHFLT msg OBl25OZ Jun 1967.

"(U) CTF 60 msg OB1316Z Jun 1967.

"(U) COMSIXTHFLT msg OB132OZ Jun 1967.

"(U) COMSIXTHFLT msg OB1349Z Jun 1967.

'o(U) National Military Command Center, "Memorandum for the Record, 1530 EDT, 8 Jun 1967 and NSA Senior

Operations Officer Log, 0730-1530, 8 Jun 1967.

"(U) The White House Daily Diary, 8 Jun 1967,

9:49 a.m. telephone call from Walt Rostow, p. 2, and the White

House Memorandum to the President from W. W. Rostow, 9:50

a.m., 8 Jun 1967.

"(U) The White House Daily Diary, 8 Jun 1967,

10:14 a.m, telephone call from Walt Rostow. p. 3, and Memorandum

to the President from W.W. Rostow, 10:15 a.m., 8 Jun 1967.

23(U) Other addressees for U.S. Defense Attache

Office, Tel Aviv, msg OS1414Z Jun 1967, were: OSD, CNO, JCS,

Sixth Fleet, and NAVEUR. USDAO, Tel Aviv msg 151615Z Jun

1967.

'4(U) Yurij Nikolaevich Chernyakov was MinisterCounselor at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., from 1965

to 1969. He often substituted for the Ambassador.

"(U) The White House Daily Diary, 8 Jun 1967, p.

3 and "hot line" msg to Chairman Kosygin fom President Johnson,

8 Jun 1967,11:17 a.m.

"(U) The White House Daily Diary, 8 Jun 1967, p.

6.

"(U) JCS msg 081529Z Jun 1967, and COMSIXTHFLT msg OB1649Z Jun 1967.

"(U) CINCUSNAVEUR msg OB1517Z Jun 1967.

19(U) COMSIXTHFLT msg OS1514Z Jun 1967.

'o(U) USDAO, Tel Aviv msg 151615Z Jun 1967.

"(U) U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry 7816~7; Liberty

Incident, 8 Jun 1967; Record of Proceedings.

"(U) U.S.S. Liberty msg OS1715Z Jun 1967.

B(U) DffiNSA msg OB1356Z Jun 1967.

34(S SSe) Srin} pro~uct reports: 2r:r::::JR23.67

OB2015Z Jun 1967; 2 ... 24~7, O9OB31Z!Jun 1967; 20

Q27~7, 091422Z Jun 1967.

'(U) U,S. Navy Court of-Inquiry 7816~7; Liberty

Incident, 8 Jun 1967; Record ofProceedings.

"(U) Ibid.

"CU) .. Oral interview. transcripts: Robert L. Wilson,

6 May 1980; CTC ClydeW. Way, 6.Jun 1980; and eTC Terry L.

McFarland, 23 June 1980.

36 CONPIDENTIAL

EO 1.4. (c)

IIANBhB ViA eOl\HN'f eIIANNB~S OH~Y

P.L. 86-36
CONFIDENTIAL

Chapter V

The Israeli Explanation (U)

The classification of paragraphs in this chapter which derive

from the statement of the Israeli Defence Forces Court of Inquiry

results from a government of Israel request to the Department of

State that the information "be treated on a restricted and confidential basis."

fSt- The Israeli Defence Forces Court of

Inquiry into the U.S.S. Liberty incident presented its

findings to the Military Advocate General who recommended that a preliminary judicial inquiry be held

to determine if there was any individual or individuals

against whom any charges should be brought. The

examining judge was Lieutenant Colonel Yishaya

Yerushalmi. He gave his decision under date of 21

July 1967. From the report of that decision comes the

following Israeli account and explanation of the attack

on the Liberty'

Chronology of Israeli Actions (U)

At 0600 hours (local time) on 8 June

1967, an Israeli aircraft, with a naval observer on

board, located a ship 70 miles west of Tel Aviv. On

the basis of this information, Israeli Navy Headquarters marked the object in red (meaning an unidentified

target) on the combat information center plot table.

At about 0900 hours, another Israeli

plane reported sighting a ship 20 miles north of AI

'Arish, The pilot reported that the ship was "coloured

gray, very bulky, and the bridge amidships." The ship

was then identified by the Israelis as a supply vessel

of the American Navy; thereupon, the marking on the

combat information center plot table was changed to

green (a neutral ship).

1€1- Later that morning at 1055 hours, the

Naval Liaison Officer at Israeli Air Force Headquarters

reported to the Acting Chief of Naval Operations at

Navy Headquarters that the ship sighted earlier was

"an electromagnetic audio-surveillance ship of the

U.S. Navy, named Liberty, whose marking was G.T.R.-

5." Upon receiving this data, the Acting Chief of

Naval Operations ordered the target erased from the

combat information center plot table because he had

no current information as to its location. Thus from

this moment on (approximately 1100 hours) the Liberty no longer appeared on the combat information

center plot table at Israeli Navy Headquarters.

-f€t Between 1100 and 1200 hours, Navy

Headquarters received reports that Al 'Arish (occupied

by Israeli ground troops) was being shelled from the

sea. These reports came from two separate sources,

the Air-Ground-Support Officer and the Israeli Southern Command. At 1205 hours, the Head of the Naval

Department ordered three torpedo boats of the division

at Ashdod to proceed toward Al 'Arish to locate the

target. Air Force Headquarters was advised of this

navy action and it was agreed that, when the torpedo

boats located the target, aircraft would be dispatched.

Accordingly, the commander of the torpedo boat

division was ordered to establish radio contact with

the aircraft as soon as they appeared over the target.

(U) The torpedo boats located an unidentified target at 1341 hours 20 miles north of AI 'Arish

and reported that it was moving toward Port Said at

a speed of 30 knots. A few minutes later, the torpedo

boat division commander reported that the target,

then 17 miles from him, was moving at 28 knots, and

since he could not overtake it, he requested the

dispatch of aircraft towards it. This was done; the

aircraft executed a run over the ship (Liberty) in an

attempt to identify it but saw no flag or other

identification mark. They did, however, report to

headquarters that the ship was painted gray and two

guns were situated in the bow. On the assumption

that the ship was an enemy target, Air Force Headquarters gave the aircraft an order to attack.

During the first stage of the attack

the aircraft strafed the ship with cannon and machine

guns and during the second stage dropped bombs on

it which caused fires and smoke aboard the ship. As

CONFIDENTIAL 37
CONFIDENTIAL

(U) Israeli motor torpedo boat of the class which attacked the Liberty:.

(Photograph courtesy of Jane's Fighting Ships.)

(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED)

the torpedo boats drew near, the aircraft were ordered

to leave the target. During the last run, a low-flying

aircraft reported to headquarters that it saw the

marking "CPR-5" on the ship's hull.

Upon receipt of this information about

the ship's marking, the Naval Operations Branch, at

approximately 1420 hours, ordered the torpedo boat

division commander not to attack inasmuch as the

aircraft may have possibly identified the target incorrectly. The division commander was ordered to approach the ship in order to establish visual contact

and to identify it. He reported that the ship appeared

to be a merchant or supply vessel and that when he

signalled the ship and requested its identification the

ship replied with a signal meaning "identify yourself

first." At the same time, the division commander was

consulting a book on the identification of Arab Navies

and making comparisons with the target before him.

He concluded that the target was an Egyptian supply

ship named El-Kasir, Simultaneously, the commander

of another of the torpedo boats informed the division

commander that he, too, thought the ship was the EIKasir. Therefore, at 1436 hours, the division commander authorized the torpedo attack to begin. Only

after a torpedo struck the ship and one of the torpedo

boats approached it from the other side were the

markings"CTR-5" noticed on the hull. Then the order

was given to cease the attack.

38 eONPIDHNTIAL

i€t Throughout the contact, no Israeli

plane or torpedo boat saw an American or any other

flag on the ship. It was only an Israeli helicopter, sent

after the attack to render assistance - if necessary

- that noticed a small American flag flying over the

ship. At this time, the vessel was finally identified "as

an audio-surveillance ship of the U.S. Navy."

Israeli Prosecutor's Charges of

Negligence (D)

i€t" Based on the foregoing account, the

Israeli Chief Military Prosecutor submitted a number

of charges of negligence to the examining judge of the

Preliminary Inquiry. The examining judge was then to

decide whether or not there was sufficient prima facie

evidence to justify bringing the accused to trial for

negligence.

fflT Given below are the charges brought

by the Chief Military Prosecutor together with the

judge's findings.

t€t 1. Charge: The first charge related to

the failure of the Acting Chief of Naval Operations to

report to the Head of the Naval Department that the

American ship, Liberty, was seen in the morning hours

of the day of the incident sailing in the vicinity of the

Israeli coast.
Finding: Though the Head of the

Naval Department testified that he did not know of

the Liberty's presence in the area on the day of the

incident, the Officer of the Watch at Navy Headquarters testified that the Head of the Naval Department

was on the Navy Command Bridge when the Commanding Officer of the Navy ordered the marking (on

the combat information center plot table) of the

American supply ship changed to green (indicating a

neutral vessel). Since the Acting Chief of Naval

Operations was an eyewitness to the event, he concluded that the Head of the Naval Department did

know about the presence of an American supply ship

in the area. In view of this, the examining judge found

no negligence on the part of the accused.

2. Charge: That the Acting Chief of

Naval Operations failed to report to the Head of the

Naval Department that the hull markings on the ship

.observed by one of the attacking aircraft were similar

to those on the Liberty.

Finding: Witnesses testified that

when the Naval Liaison Officer at the Air Force

Headquarters telephoned the Naval Command Bridge

about the hull markings and their similarity to those

of the Liberty, the officer to whom he spoke repeated

the message in a loud voice so that it was heard by all

present on the Command Bridge including the Head

of the Naval Department. The examining judge stated,

therefore, that there was thus no reason to repeat to

the Head of the Naval Department a fact that had

been audibly announced to those present. The charge

was dismissed.

1'67- 3. Charge: That the Naval Liaison

Officer at the Air Force Headquarters was negligent

by not reporting to the Air Force the information

about the presence of the Liberty in the area.

Finding: The examining judge considered this charge unfounded. The responsibility for

the defense of Israel against enemy naval actions rests

solely with the Navy. Even though Air Force Headquarters ordered the aircraft to attack, it was really

an order issued by the Navy, passed on through Air

Force Headquarters. The Naval Liaison Officer at the

Air Force Headquarters was entitled to assume that

the decision to attack was made after considering this

report about the Liberty. There was no reason to feed

the Air Force with information and considerations

that did not concern it.

4. Charge: That the Naval Department's order not to attack the ship (the Liberty), "for

fear of error and out of uncertainty with regard to the

true identity of the ship," was not delivered to the

torpedo boat division.

eONFIDENTIAL

Finding: Though the torpedo boat

division commander claimed he never received the

message not to attack, the deputy commander of the

boat testified that he had received the message and

passed it on to the division commander. The examining

judge believed that, in the heat of battle, it was

possible that the message escaped the awareness of

the division commander and, in any event, there was

insufficient evidence to commit any accused person to

trial.

5. Charge: That it was negligence to

give the order to attack a warship without previously

establishing, beyond doubt, its national identity and

without taking into account the presence of the American ship, Liberty, in the vicinity of the coast of

Israel.

Finding: To the examining judge,

there was no doubt that the dominant factors in the

initial attack decision were the speed and course of

the target. Those in command were entitled to assume

that the reported speed (28 knots) of the ship was

correct, within the usual limits of reasonable error of

10-15 percent, relying upon the existing means of

determining the speed of the target. It was, therefore,

concluded that this was a military vessel, and since

the Liberty was classed as a cargo ship, there was no

reason for surmising, in view of the speed, that the

target could possibly be the ship, Liberty. If one adds

to this other factors such as the report of the shelling

of the Al 'Arish coast for hours on end, the ship's

course toward Port Said, the aircraft report that the

target was a warship and carried no naval or other

identification marks, and the ship's location close to

shore in a battle zone, the cumulative effect negates

any presumption whatsoever of a connection between

the American supply ship and the target discovered

by the torpedo boats. Thus, the examining judge

concluded that the assumption it was an enemy ship

was reasonable and that the order given to the aircraft

to attack was justified.

6. Charge: That it was negligent to

order the torpedo boat to attack the ship upon an

unfounded presumption that it was an Egyptian warship, and this as a consequence of not taking reasonable steps to make proper identification.

Finding: The examining judge considered it noteworthy that the identification of the

target as the El- Kasir was made both by the division

commander and the commander of a second torpedo

boat. Upon examining photos of the two ships, he was

satisfied that a likeness existed between them, and

that an error of identification was possible, especially

when the identification was made while the ship was

eONFIDENCfIAL 39
CONFIDENTIAL

\

(U) U.S.S. Libert)' was mistaken by the Israelis for this Egyptian ship, EI-Kasir.

(Photograph courtesy of Jane's Fighting Ships.}

(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED)

clouded in smoke. The Chief Military Prosecutor

argued that this identification was unreasonable because it was inconceivable to think that this auxiliary

ship El- Kasir could shell the Al 'Arish coast or that

she could move at a speed of 28 knots. In reply, the

examining judge said that it seemed reasonable to him

that the El- Kasir might have been part of the vessels

that shelled the coast and failed to get away from the

area or that the ship had come to assist in the

evacuation of Egyptian soldiers struggling away from

areas occupied by Israeli forces. Further, the judge

said that there was no doubt that the Liberty's refusal

to identify herself to the torpedo boats contributed

largely to the error of identification.

(U) In summation, the judge concluded

that in all the circumstances of the case the conduct

of the naval officers concerned in the Liberty incident

could not be considered unreasonable to an extent

which would justify committal for trial.

Explanation Reexamined (U)

(U) Reexamination of Israel's explanation

of why its air and naval forces attacked the Liberty

reveals egregious errors in both command judgments

and operational procedures.

The incident is doubly tragic when it

is realized that three hours before the attack occurred,

Israeli Navy Headquarters was made aware of the

(U) U.S.S. Libert,y arriving in Malta after the attack.

(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED)

40 CONFIDH~q:'IAL
Liberty's presence, including exact name, ship type',

and hull number. The first error in responsible military

operations came when the Liberty's identity was totally

erased at 1100 hours from the combat information

center plot table at Naval Headquarters because no

exact location for her was known after 0900 hours on

8 June.

ter The next sin of omission was the

Israeli Navy's failure to share with the Air Force full

details about the Liberty's presence off the Al •Arish

coast. This combat parochialism was almost certainly

a factor contributing to the attack on the Liberty -

the examining judge's opinion to the contrary. Even

the Israeli examining judge alluded to such possibility

when he said:

Indeed, whoever peruses the ample evidence presented to me,

may conceivably draw some lesson regarding the relations

between the two arms of the Israel Defence Forces, which

were involved in the incident, and the operational procedures

in time of war....

In spite of the fact that the Israeli Atr

Force did not have all the information about the

Liberty that was available to the Navy, the pilots of

the attacking planes were at fault for failing to make

positive identification of the Liberty before attacking

the ship. Though the pilots testified to the contrary,

every official interview of numerous Liberty crewmen

gave consistent evidence that indeed the Liberty was

flying an American flag - and, further, the weather

conditions were ideal to assure its easy observance and

identification. These circumstances - prior identification of the Liberty and easy visibility of the American flag - prompted the Department of State to

inform the Israeli Government that

the later military attack by Israeli aircraft on the U.S.S.

Liberty is quite literally incomprehensible. AB a minimum,

the attack must be condemned as an act of military recklessness reflecting wanton disregard for human life. 2

In the chain of mistakes, the next one

occurred when the division commander of the attacking

torpedo boats failed to hear his deputy tell him that

Naval Headquarters had ordered the boats not to

attack for fear of having mistaken the ship's identity.

The Israeli examining judge exonerated the comCONfIDENTIAL

mander because he believed it quite possible that the

message "escaped the awareness of the division commander in the heat of battle."

tet The final error was the identification

of the Liberty as the Egyptian supply ship El- Kasir,

The fact that two separate torpedo boat commanders

made the same false identification only raises the

question of the veracity of both commanders. The ElKasir was approximately one-quarter of the Liberty's

tonnage, about one-half its length, and offered a

radically different silhouette. To claim that the Liberty

closely resembled the El-Kasir was most illogical.

(U) The Department of State expressed

its view of the torpedo attack in these words:

The subsequent attack by Israeli torpedo boats, substantially

after the vessel was or should have been identified by Israeli

military forces, manifests the same reckless disregard for

human life. The silhouette and conduct of V.S.S. Liberty

readily distinguished it from any vessel that could have been

considered hostile....It could and should have been scrutinized

visually at close range before torpedos were fired....The

Vnited States Government expects the Government of Israel

also to take the disciplinary measures which international

law requires in the event of wrongful conduct by the military

personnel of a State... [and] to issue instructions necessary to

ensure that United States personnel and property will not

again be endangered by the wrongful actions of Israeli

military personnel. J

(U) When NSA's Deputy Director read the

decision of the Israeli Defence Forces Preliminary

Inquiry, he summed up his personal feelings on the

subject by calling it "a nice whitewash.:"

Notes

Source documents are in the "Crisis Collection" of the NSA History

Collection.

'(V) Israel Defence Forces, Preliminary Inquiry File

1/67, 21 July 1967. Forwarded to Director, NSA under cover of

Department of State (lNR) Memo, 22 August 1967.

2(U) Department of State Telegram No. 210139, to

the V.S. Embassy, Tel Aviv, 11 June 1967.

'(V) Ibid.

'(V) A penned long-hand comment by Louis W.

Tordella, Deputy Director, NSA, 26 August 1967, attached to the

copy of the Israel Defence Forces Preliminary Inquiry (cited in

footnote 1).

CONFIDHNCfIAL 41
(V) V.S.S. Dayis, one of the two destroyers to reach the Liherty, runs a line to the stricken ship. The Dayis assumed all

communications functions for the Liherty.

«e eel'll - Photograph courtesy of Robert L. Wilson, NSA.)

(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED)

~---------------
CONfIDEN'fIAL

Chapter VI

Recovery and Initial Assessment (U)

(V) Sixteen and one-half hours after the

Liberty was attacked, V.S. assistance finally reached

her. At 0625 hours (local time) on 8 June, the

destroyers V.S.S. Davis (DD-937) and V.S.S. Massey

(DD-778) rendezvoused with the ship at 33-0IN, 31-

59E, a position 420 miles east-southeast of Soudha

Bay, Crete. The carrier, V.S.S. America, was still 138

miles from the Liberty, closing at 30 knots.'

Medical Assistance (U)

(V) The Commander of Destroyer Squadron Twelve, Captain H. G. Leahy, and other personnel

from the Davis and Massey immediately boarded the

Liberty to assist in controlling damage and in treating

the injured. Only after this transfer did Commander

McGonagle relinquish his watch on the bridge. He was

exhausted and in danger of having his wounds become

infected. Temporary command of the Liberty was

assumed by the Operations Officer of Destroyer Squadron Twelve. Upon completion of a medical assessment,

the Commander, Sixth Fleet was advised that the

Liberty was ready to transfer 15 seriously wounded

and 9 dead to the America when its helicopters

arrived. The possibility of anyone being alive in the

flooded spaces was deemed unlikely. Bulkheads were

firm and the flooding contained, so that the Liberty

was completely mobile to 10 knots. The Davis assumed

all communications functions for the Liberty. Further,

Sixth Fleet was advised that, upon arrival of the fleet

ocean tug, V.S.S. Papago, the destroyer Massey could

return to fleet duties. 2

(V) While Liberty's on-board needs were

being tended to, two boats from the destroyers

searched the area around the Liberty for two hours

looking for classified papers that might be washing out

from the pear-shaped, gaping hole in the flooded

Research Department spaces; no classified items were

recovered. 3

(V) At approximately 0915 hours, all ships

got under way and headed toward the carrier America

at 10 knots. By 1030 hours, two helicopters from the

America reached the Liberty and began evacuating

the seriously wounded back to the carrier. One hour

later, the America rendezvoused with the Liberty.

Thereafter, the group of ships set a course for Soudha

Bay, Crete, some 300 miles away.

Commander, Sixth Fleet Arrives (U)

(V) Later that afternoon, Vice Admiral

William 1. Martin, Commander, Sixth Fleet, boarded

the Liberty for one hour to visit its captain and crew

and to personally survey the damages sustained. Following his visit, Vice Admiral Martin recommended to

the Commander-in-Chief, V.S. Navy Europe, Admiral

John S. McCain, Jr., that the Liberty proceed direct

to Malta for dry docking rather than to Soudha Bay

first because of the primary necessity to protect the

cryptomaterial and equipment. Admiral McCain gave

his approval. 4

(V) Also visiting the Liberty during the

late afternoon of the 9th was Captain Russell Arthur,

Sixth Fleet Maintenance Officer, who reported to the

V. S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe the following corrective actions: "established water-tight boundaries at

frames 52 and 78 and at second-deck level and made

repairs to gyro, engine-order telegraph, rudder-angle

indicator, fathometer, sound-powered phones and

bridge-steering control." The Liberty's crew was augmented as necessary, and accompanied by the tug

Papago; and the destroyer, Davis, she proceeded

toward Malta at 10 knots. 5

Replacement Inquiries (U)

(6 660) A possible replacement for the Liberty

was already being considered. At approximately 1300

hours, the Director, Naval Security Group Europe

sent a message t0L] u .uuu ItlIeAmeficaarid I the Little Rock requesting the

status of Arabic linguists (civilian and military) aboard

the Liberty for possible transfer to the V.S.S. Bel-

··EO 1. 4. (c)

IIANBf:;H VIA COMlNJ' CIiANNHf:;S ONf:;Y CONfIDEN'fIAL 43
eONflf)EN'fIAL

(U) Helicopter from the U.S.S. America lowers a litter to receive the Liberty's wounded. The

helicopter took the wounded hack to America, which was several miles away.

He ee8) Photograph courtesy of Robert L. Wilson, NSA.)

(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED) 'EO 1.4. (c)

mont, another technical research ship just.arrivedjn

Norfolk, Viriginia, for re?airs,6Threehours later, at

1555, I Ireplied to this inquiry. The only

remaining Arabic linguist aboard the Liberty was

Robert L. Wilson (NSA civilian); all others were

wounded (and evacuated), killed, or missing.I I

also forwarded Lieutenant Bennett's request that a

team from the Naval Security Group Europe meet the

Liberty when she docked at Malta to assist in evaluation of compromise of cryptomaterials and preparation of reports. 7

Recovery of Sensitive Materials (U)

CU) Mounting concern over the possible

loss of sensitive documents drifting out of the Liberty's

ruptured Research Department's operations space

prompted NAVEURtodirect Sixth Fleet on 9 June to

do whatever is feaeible to keep any Soviet ships out of Liberty's

wake....maintain observation of Liberty's wake and if possible

find-out what sort of documents are being lost in the wake.... take

whatever steps may be reasonable and appropriate to reduce

possibility of compromise, noting that a compromise could have

both political and technical aspects.'

(U) Liberty's escorts reacted quickly and

most effectively to minimize the uncontrollable loss of

sensitive materials. Though a Soviet guided-missile

destroyer (DDG 626/4) of the Kildin class remained

in the vicinity of the Liberty between 1320 and 1600

hours on the 9th, she was kept under constant surveillance and did not stop or recover anything. The

Davis, Massey, or Papago trailed in Liberty's wakeconstantly to recover papers adrift. The first night,

44 CONFIDENTIAL I1AN9I:.E ,q,\ COMIN'f ClUNNEI:.8 ONI:.¥
CONFIDHN'IAL

(0 GGO) At NSA. when it was learned (through

Navy personnel channels) that its employees Donald

L. Blalock and Allen M. Blue were listed among

Liberty's casualties. steps were taken to obtain more

definite information and to notify next of kin. Late on

the night of 8-9 June, the Chief and Deputy Chief,

NSA Civilian Personnel (Messrs. William M. Holleran

and Albert W. Ulino) drove to the Silver Spring home

of Allen Blue's wife, Patsy, to notify her that Allen

was missing in action.'?

(C CCO) On 10 June, the Director, NSA sent

a message to NSA Europe directing that a representative be sent to meet the Liberty at Malta to provide

maximum assistance and guidance in respect to NSA

personnel, local liaison, and informational reporting to

NSA. The Director. NSA directed NSA Europe to

arrange for Robert L. Wilson's transportation home

by quickest means and to relay messages for his wife.

All appropriate assistance was to be given to Donald

L. Blalock in arranging for his return to the U. S.

Information copies of the message were sent to Senior

U. S. Liaison Officer, London and to the Director,

Naval Security Group Europe. 13

Assistance to NSA Per~onnel (C CeO)

(U) As the Liberty steamed westward on

10 June, Commander McGonagle had the shrapnel

removed from his leg and was resting comfortably.

With adequate provisions of food, fuel, and water on

board ship to reach Malta, there was concern about

crew morale and Sixth Fleet was requested to have a

helicopter pick up the Liberty's outgoing mail as soon

Cleanup Continues (U)

the Papago picked up one classified item ten miles

behind Libert-y,'

(0 CCO) Enroute to Malta, the Papago continued to take exceptional measures to recover materials.

Always in Liberty's wake, she used boat hooks and

crab nets to pick up floating material. Lights were

rigged on Papago's bridge wing so that visibility at

night was even better than during the day. When

material could not be recovered, Papago ran over it

with her propeller and then backed down over it to

shred the paper into small pieces. Although some

paper with typing on it did not disintegrate in nine

hours when placed in water by Papago'e CO, it was

believed that ocean-wave action would have caused the

fanfold paper (which was in multimessage blank

lengths) to ball up and sink or at least not be easily

visible. Total materials recovered by the Papago

weighed eight pounds; highest classification was secret

codeword I to

(U) In Washington. after the general details of the attack on the Liberty had been absorbed,

there was. quite naturally, a clamor for specific

information about casualties - their names and

extent of injuries. The Liberty forwarded the best

information obtainable, but data about those missing

was elusive. During the Israeli attack and immediately

thereafter. the Liberty conducted no search for personnel because none had been reported overboard and

she was trying to clear the area as soon as possible.

On 10 June. the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe

notified JCS that the Liberty's flooded compartment

could not be opened to account for missing personnel

until the ship was drydocked. To do otherwise would

risk further flooding and peril the ship and the lives

of the survivors who were taking the crippled vessel to

port.!'

(D) VADM William I. Martin (right). Commander of Sixth Fleet. visited the Liherty on

the afternoon of 9 June.

((g ggQ) Photograph courtesy of Robert L. Wilson. NSA.)

(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED)

IIANBbB ViA eO'P.HN'f eIIANNBbS ON:b¥ eONFIDBNCfIAL 45

EO 1. 4 . (c)
COf\PIDEf\TIAL

(U) Liberty's forward dish antenna after the strafing attack by Israeli jets.

HEl ElElS) - Photograph courtesy of Robert L. Wilson, NSA.)

(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED)

46 CONPIDENTIAL IIANBLH YIA CO:r.IIN'f CIIANNHLS ONL\'

1
Preparations at Malta (U)

After Rear Admiral Renken left Norfor his TG 100.3 (Public Affairs) was

as possible and at the same time deliver mail addressed

to the ship's company. 14 The Liberty continued cleanup operations aboard ship as well as the grisly task of

accounting for personnel that were missing. On 11

June, the Papago recovered one body floating six miles

astern of the Liberty; another person previously reported missing was now confirmed dead after recovery

aboard ship. 15

Command Investigations Initiated (U)

(U) While the Liberty limped steadily toward Malta under the watchful protection of the Davis

and Papago, U.S. military commands in the Pentagon

and in Europe were feverishly arranging for the

drydocking of the ship plus full-scale investigations of

the events and circumstances surrounding the attack

itself. The Joint Chiefs of Staff appointed a factfinding team on 9 June and initiated plans for the

team to visit, in turn, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S.

Navy Europe; U. S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe;

Commander, Sixth Fleet; and the U.S.S. Liberty,"

(U) On the 10th, after conferring with the

Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy Europe, the U.S.

Commander-in-Chief, Europe recommended to JCS

that a Navy Court of Inquiry be established. In his

message to JCS, CINCEUR gave his rationale for this

action as follows:

Have reviewed available data with respect to Liberty with

CINCUSNAVEUR in general frame of chronology before accidental attack, during attack and subsequent thereto. We both

have many very pertinent and as yet unanswered questions as

we appreciate Washington has. At the same time, [it] must be

recognized [that] crew members of Liberty from whom answers

must be gotten are at point of exhaustion, suffering from

wounds and shock, dead or missing. It simply does not make

sense, legally or otherwise, to initiate barrage of uncorrelated

questioning via long-haul communications at this time. Obviously facts must be developed involving actions and judgments

of crew, Liberty command and chain of command, and also

legal base must be established for possible claims against

government of Israel. Therefore, I strongly endorse establishment of Court of Inquiry by Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy

Europe, as proper procedure... although it may be somewhat

time-consuming and create impatience among those who desire

more rapid answers.

JCS gave immediate concurrence and on 11 June, the

Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy Europe convened the

court in London with directions to proceed promptly

to the Mediterranean and board the Liberty at sea as

soon as possible. 17

(U) In Israel, too, high-level investigations

were being considered. On 13 June, the Israeli Defence

Force Chief of Staff, General Rabin, appointed an

official Court of Inquiry to examine the Liberty

incident. 18

SHCRH't'

(U) To provide for the handling of the

Liberty when she arrived at Malta, Admiral McCain,

activated Task Force (TF) 100, effective 12 June,

under the command of Rear Admiral Henry A. Renken, Commander, Service Force Atlantic Fleet stationed in Norfolk, Virginia. CTF 100 was charged

with:

1. Supervising the drydocking, removal, and shipment of remains of personnel killed in action;

2. Preventing disclosure of classified information

and material to unauthorized personnel; and

3. Readying the Liberty for repair by Commander, Service Force Sixth Fleet.

These functions were expected to be completed within

two days after Liberty's expected arrival in Malta on

13 June. Subordinate task group commanders were

instructed to be prepared to report in person to Rear

Admiral Renken at the U. S. Embassy in Malta by

noon, 12 June. 19

(U) Of the eight subordinate task groups

that comprised Task Force 100, the Director, Naval

Security Group Europe was directed to provide personnel for TG 10004, (Security); this group was to assume

responsibility for all materials requiring special handling, including their removal from the Liberty, transfer to secure storage, and continuous security at all

times. 20

(G GGO) Captain Carl M. Smith, Director, Naval Security Group Atlantic, was designated Commander, TG 100.4; other TG 100.4 personnel were

Commander E. H. Platzek; Lieutenant Commander

Benjamin M. Bishop; Lieutenant Philip G. Firestone,

USNR; Lieutenant R. H. Lee; Lieutenant M. H.

Bennett (from the Sigint component aboard the Liberty); and CTC Alfred J. Pawlinkowski. Additionally,

NSA Europe named Lieutenant Colonel Robert T.

Green, USAF and Clarence R. Klumfoot (NSA security

officer) to assist TG 100.4 as necessary. II Of this

group, Bishop, Firestone, and Pawlinkowski were further designated to assist Lieutenant Bennett, as he

had requested, with the evaluation of security compromise and preparation of required reports. 22

(8 GGO) To assist TG 100.6 (Communications)

with its services, the Director Naval Securit Grou

Europe also arranged

for TF 100 inasmuch as the communications guardship

provided by Sixth Fleet to the Task Force lacked the

capability. 23

(U)

folk, guidance

1. 4. (c)

EO 1. 4 . (d)

IIANBI::E ViA COflfHN'f CIIANNEI::S ONI::Y

---------------------

SHCRH't' 47
eONPIDHNCfIAL

cO 000) NSA civilian, Donald L. Blalock, was

a member of the Sigint unit aboard the

Liberty. Slightly wounded, he was evacuated

to the America with the rest of the Liberty's

wounded.

(te"'e'etT) - Photograph courtesy of Robert L. Wilson, NSA.)

(Figure is (('jlh' lDZt. rhZ ((('j)

compiled and radioed for delivery to him as he passed

through Rota, Spain, enroute to Malta. TG 100.3's

mission was to satisfy the legitimate interests of

newsmen without compromise of classified information,

unwarranted interference with operations, or invasion

of individual rights of privacy. Further, it was directed

that all public affairs activities be conducted with the

aim of maintaining the credibility of the official

announcements regarding the mission of U.S. S. Liberty; i.e., she was a communications research ship

that was diverted from her research assignment to

provide improved communication-relay links with the

several U. S. embassies around the entire Mediterranean during the current troubles. 24

(U) Specific ground rules were set forth

for press coverage of Liberty's arrival in Malta.

Newsmen were not to be permitted in the immediate

vicinity of the dockyard while the Liberty entered the

dock, unless CTF 100 was satisfied that the torpedo

hole was adequately covered; while the drydock was

pumped out, regardless of covering; and after the dock

was pumped out, until all remains were removed and

classified matter safeguarded. If newsmen asked about

these restrictions, they were to be told that the actions

were being taken primarily out of consideration of

families of missing personnel, since remains may be in

the exposed compartment and visible to photographers; and because communications spaces normally

contain classified equipment and are closed to the

public, since it must be assumed that some classified

equipment is exposed. Additionally, no interviews of

the officers or crew of the Liberty were to be granted

until authorized by Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy

Europe, after completion of the Court of Inquiry. If

queried by the press about the reason for such policy,

the security officer (TG 100.4) was to say that these

men are potential witnesses before the Court of Inquiry

and it is the desire of the convening authority and the

President of the Court that recollections of witnesses

remain as fresh as possible and not be influenced in

any way by outside discussions. The doctrine of

security at the source was to be followed at all times

and there was to be no censorship of newsmen's

material. 25

(U) Upon arriving at Malta, Rear Admiral

Renken met with his task group commanders and

American embassy officials on Tuesday, 13 June, to

complete plans for docking operations, which would

commence on Liberty's arrival - then estimated at

about 2300 hours that night. 26

Blalock Returns Home (U)

(e eeO) That same afternoon, NSA civilian,

Donald L. Blalock (earlier evacuated from the Liberty

to the U. S. S. America with minor shrapnel wounds)

was released from America's medical department and

flown to Athens. There he was met by NSA Europe

representative, Charles Cowardin, who arranged for

Blalock's travel to the United States. Blalock arrived

at Washington National Airport the following day. 27

Liberty's Arrival at Malta (U)

(0 000) Liberty's arrival in Malta was delayed

until 0630 hours, 14 June. Precautionary safety measures had required additional shoring of damaged

bulkheads and her speed was reduced. Divers from the

Papago immediately began an underwater inspection

of the ship's hull to determine whether or not changes

in the keel blocks would be necessary before drydocking

could begin. The keel was found to be straight and

undamaged. At 1400 hours the Liberty entered the

drydock; by 1530 hours a canvas net had been tied

across the damaged side of the ship and screens had

48 eONPIDHNCfIAL IIANBfJH VIA GOMIN'f GIIANNHfJ8 ONfJ¥
(Photograph courtesy of the Department of the Navy.)

(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED)

(U) The Uberty arrived in Malta on 14 June. The torpedo hole is visible just above the water line. and the ship is riddled

with holes from the rocket fire.
(U) At the drydock in Malta, workmen inspect the torpedo-damaged hull of

comparison to the huge pieces of twisted metal, the workmen appear very small.

(Photograph courtesy of the Department of the Navy.)

(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED)

the Liberty. In
been installed across all drydock drains. During the

pump down, navy swimmers and men in a rubber raft

picked up oil-covered paper as it floated out of the

ship. When the drydock was completely drained, a

thorough search of the entire drydock and each drain

screen was conducted by indoctrinated Naval Security

Group personnel. NSA Europe personnel, sent to

Malta, witnessed all drainage operations. 28

Evacuation of Wilson (D)

(C 000) Earlier, as soon as the Liberty entered

Malta, NSA Europe personnel boarded the ship to see

NSA civilian Robert L. Wilson. When Wilson said he

did not wish to stay aboard any longer, he was quickly

ushered to the U.S. Consulate in Valletta for a short

debriefing. Immediately thereafter, accompanied by

CONPIDENTIAL

Lieutenant Colonel Green (from the NSA Europe

staff), he returned home. Later Wilson learned that

his wife had been continually informed by NSA personnel of what was going on from the time the whole

incident began; they had even offered to have someone

stay with her. 29

Clearing Damaged Areas (D)

(U) In Malta the search for and removal

of bodies began at 1830 hours on the 14th and

continued until approximately midnight, by which

time the remains of 20 men, including Allen Blue, had

been recovered. Bodies of the remaining five missing

men were presumed lost at sea enroute to Malta.

Liberty's death toll stood at 34.

(G eOO) Clearance of the damaged area continued. Prior to opening the hatch leading down to the

(U) Navy divers Gilbert Damelio, John P. Highfill, and Daniel McDuffie recover classified debris

adrift as the pump-down operations continue on the Liberty in Malta.

(Photograph courtesy of the Department of the Navy.)

(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED)

ttANtlLE VIA e6~HN'f eIIANNfitJS ONtJ\' CONFIDENTIAL 51
eONFIDENTIAI.

Research Department space, a guard was posted and

all personnel were required to log in when authorized

access. Crews of indoctrinated personnel began removing all classified equipment and documents to a secure

space one deck above the damaged area. This recovery

process proved to be very slow because the classified

equipment and material was mixed with the mass of

twisted wreckage. Of course, no repair to the ship's

side could begin until the damaged area was freed of

all classified papers and equipment. By 19 June, all

classified matter (including 168 large canvas bags) had

been stowed under guard in a secure space aboard the

Liberty.3D

(V) On the afternoon of Thursday, 15

June, newsmen and photographers were given a rigidly

controlled tour of Liberty's topside area plus several

compartments on the lower decks, near the point of

impact, from which all classified equipment had been

removed. Later that afternoon, Task Force 100 was

officially dissolved. Some task force personnel remained

with the Liberty, however, to help wind up administrative, public affairs, and supply matters. The Sixth

Fleet Maintenance Officer also remained to supervise

Libert y's repairs."

Damage Survey at Malta (U)

eC CC6) In Washington, the Naval Ships Engineering Center was coordinating a visit to the Liberty

to survey damage in order to expedite repairs to the

ship's electronic system; it was recommended that the

inspection team include contractor personnel plus NSA

and NSG people. 32 Thus, Eugene Sheck, Comint

Collection (Mobile) Management, K12, and Lieutenant Allan Deprey, VSN, Sigint Engineering (Mobile

and Space), K32, in company with representatives of

the Naval Security Group, Naval Ships Engineering

Center, and contractor respresentatives of Ling-TemcoVought (LTV) and the FTM Systems Company visited

the Liberty on 19-21 June. Their findings confirmed

the massive damage to the Sigint electronic

configuration.

eo CC6) With the exception of the TRSSCOM

system antenna, all antennas were either destroyed,

damaged, or burned to some degree; almost complete

replacement of the antenna system would be required.

In Research Room no. 1, equipment not completely

destroyed by the torpedo explosion had been totally

submerged in heavy oil and salt water for six days,

rendering it beyond salvage. The processing and reporting spaces, transcribing positions, maintenance

shop and cryptographic room were severely damaged;

all equipment was either destroyed by the explosion or

removed from the spaces at Malta because of extensive

damage. In the Research Department and non-morse

search and development areas on the second deck,

very little outward damage was noticeable. However,

the shifting of the racks and breaks in the air

conditioning ducts indicated considerable shock damage; each and every piece of gear would require

complete checks. Additionally, internal wiring and

patching facilities between all research spaces would

have to be checked. From the initial inspection, it was

obvious that considerable replacement of internal

wiring would be required. Preliminary, informal estimates made by the engineers inspecting the Liberty

indicated that the cost to reconfigure the platform

would range between four and six million dollars. 33

JCS Fact Finding Team's

Interviews (U)

(V) While the Liberty was being cleansed

and surveyed in the Malta shipyard, the Navy and

JCS investigative bodies were busily interviewing appropriate personnel aboard the Liberty and at various

European command headquarters.

(G GGO) Headed by Major General Joseph R.

Russ, VSA, the JCS Fact Finding Team arrived in

London on Tuesday morning, 13 June and spent most

of the day at Commander-in-Chief, V.S. Navy Europe

Headquarters interviewing Admiral John S. McCain,

Jr., and members of his staff. Late that afternoon,

the team flew to Stuttgart to talk with V.S. European

Command personnel involved in the Liberty incident.

The following day's interviews also included one with

Brigadier General William Keller, Chief, NSA Europe.

Points covered in the talk with Keller were:

1. Explanation of the mechanics involved for

tasking in satisfaction of both national and theater

consumer intelligence requirements;

2. Technical reports issued by the Liberty (the

JCS Team was provided a copy of Liberty's reports

from 2 through 8 June); and

3. Adequacy of Criticomm service to EVCOM in

handling of the Mid-East crisis. No unusual delays

were experienced and pertinent Sigint product was

received by J-2 EVCOM on a timely basis.

Both the JCS team and J-3 EVCOM appeared satisfied with General Keller's explanations. 34

(V) On 15 June, the team spent two hours

visiting Vice Admiral William 1. Martin, Commanderin-Chief, Sixth Fleet, and staff aboard his flagship,

the U. S. S. Little Rock. The team arrived in Malta at

1815 hours on the 15th and departed for London at

52 CONFIDENTIAL ItAN8LH ViA COfltllNtf eIIANNB~8 ON~Y

1
CONFIDIH\'fIAL

(0 000, In the Sigint spaces, several manual-morse positions were destroyed by the torpedo

blast, as reported by the inspection team sent to Malta. This team was composed of personnel

from NSA, NSG, and contractors from Ling-Temco-Vought and FTM Systems Company.

(Photograph courtesy of the NSNNSG inspection team.)

(Figure is eaNfi'Il'EIi 'fi AL=eeaj

IIAN8LE VIA eOMIN'f ellANNHLS ONL\T CONFIDHN'fIAL 53
CONFIDENTIAL

0700 hours the next morning. At Malta, Major General

Russ and his team visited the Liberty and also spoke

with Rear Admiral I. C. Kidd, President of the Naval

Court of Inquiry. The JCS team returned to Washington in the early evening of 18 June.

Accounting for Classified Material (U)

(C CCO) Though activities aboard the Liberty

immediately upon arrival at Malta had centered on

readying the ship for repair, the requirement to

account for all on-board classified material had not

been overlooked. Not only had many classified documents been lost, but the records and inventories of

sensitive materials and registered publications carried

aboard ship had also been destroyed. To reconstruct

Liberty's list of holdings, the Director, NSA requested

appropriate field station and NSA elements to compile

detailed lists of all technical support materials that

had been forwarded to the Liberty.35

(U) In Malta, Liberty personnel attempted

to make an inventory of registered publications but

found it to be fragmentary at best. The registered

publications vault and cryptospaces were completely

destroyed by the torpedo attack. In spite of the fact

that, just before the attack, most registered publications had been put in weighted canvas bags, it was

discovered that these bags were torn apart by the

blast of the torpedo explosion; no bags remained

intact. Further, those publications that were recovered

were unusable: they were either soaked in oil and salt

water or damaged by the blast. None could be page

checked for completeness. All paper and metal residue

from the damaged area were placed in canvas bags

and secured in locked spaces aboard ship under twentyfour-hour guard. 36

EO 1. 4 . (c)

cC CeO) The NSA/NSG inspection team reported that the equipment in this Sigint space had been

totally ruined by the torpedo blast.

(Photograph courtesy of the NSA/NSG inspection team.)

(Figure is eBUFIBBN'fiAf: eeB)

54 CONFIDHN'fIAL I1ANBLH VIA e6MINT eIlANNHLS ONI:JY
CONFIDENTIAL

(U) The Captain of the Liberty, CDR William L. McGonagle, surveys the damage done below the

bridge from the rockets fired by the Israeli aircraft.

(Photograph courtesy of the Department of the Navy.)

(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED)

(U) After Liberty personnel had completed

this action, Captain Carl M. Smith (who had been

TG 100.4 commander) informed the Director, Naval

Security Group that

despite [the] fact that all classified material cannot be accurately

accounted for and loss at scene [is] unknown, [am] confident that

possibility of compromise is reasonably unlikely while Liberty

[was] en route [to] Malta and zero thereafter. It was a timeconsuming task under difficult conditions but thoroughness of all

has resulted in maintenance of highest degree of security integrity.

All can take justifiable pride in dedication, willingness, and high

morale of those participating in the salvage operation. 37

Joint Survey at Norfolk (U)

(U) Recognizing that the Liberty had had

extensive reserve, on-board cryptographic keying materials that might require replacement Navy-wide and

DoD-wide, the Chief of Naval Operations proposed

that a joint survey team meet the Liberty when she

returned to Norfolk and take a sampling of the residue

to determine whether a sorting operation was possible,

and to make recommendations for further actions or

disposition of material. The survey team membership

would be drawn from the Naval Security Group, Naval

Intelligence Center, and NSA. 38

(e CeO) NSA representatives to this team

were: Billy Durham, Operations, Comsec Status,

(S 13); Benjamin G. Cwalina, Security, Research Division, (M55); and Lieutenant John T. McTighe, USN,

Operations Staff, (G04). On 31 July, these three

traveled to Norfolk, Virginia, and hoarded the Liberty,

just returned from Malta. There they were joined by

other members of the survey team, principally NSG

personnel. Following a brief tour of the ship, the team

was taken below decks to the Research Operations

spaces, where the canvas bags of residue were piled.

Sailors from the Liberty's Sigint complement, dressed

in rubber overalls and gloves, selected about six or

seven bags at random from the grimy, oily 160-plus

total and, one by one, opened each and dumped its

KANDt! ViA e6I\HN'f eUANNHtS 6NM' CONFIDENTIAL 55
CONPIDENTIAL

contents on the floor in front of the survey team. It

was not a pretty sight and had malodorous qualities

resulting from the combination of oil, brackish sea

water, burned metal, paper, and pieces of human

flesh. The team immediately agreed that it would be

impossible to make a page-by-page check of the bags'

contents. From looking at this sampling, the survey

team concluded that:

1. Eighty percent of the material was unidentifiable;

2. Some of the material was definitely discernible,

readable, and classified; and

3. Some of the classified material was identifiable, in part, by short titles and cover markings or

name-plate designations; e.g.; large bound volumes or

books.

The team recommended that:

1. No attempt be made to conduct a detailed bagby-bag search for the sole purpose of identifying

classified material;

2. The Commanding Officer of the Liberty be

authorized to destroy the bagged material held on

board; and

3. Prior to the process of burning, an effort be

made to empty each bag at the incinerator to determine the possible existence of identifiable registered

publications and that each such complete publication

be accounted for prior to its destruction. 39

(U) CNO concurred with the survey team's

recommendations and authorized destruction as requested. At the Director, NSA's request, all remaining

Comsec material (excluding that in canvas bags)

aboard the Liberty at the time of attack was segregated and forwarded to NSA for inspection;"

(0 000' With this command approval, Liberty's CO arranged for appropriately cleared personnel

to fill a trailer with bagged residue and burn it at the

Norfolk incinerator. A list of documents identified in

the burning process was forwarded to CNO. At NSA,

M55 determined that there was only minimal security

damage and no compromise had occurred.

(0 000) Though incinerator flames consumed

the last bits and pieces of oil-soaked residue from the

assault on the Liberty these ashes did not mark the

end of the train of events set in motion on 8 June

1967. The Israeli attack had already taken the lives

of 34 Americans - 25 from the Siginit unit, including

Allen Blue, and 9 of the Liberty's crew - and touched

those of scores more. The investigations then under

way would affect even more people.

Notes

Source documents are in the "Crisis Collection" of the NSA

History Collection.

I(V) COMSIXTHFLT msg 090513Z Jun 1967.

'(V) Commander, Task Group (CTG) 60.5 msg'

090758Z Jun 1967.

'(V) Commander, Task Group 60.5 msg 092119Z

Jun 1967.

4(V) CINCVSNAVEUR msg 100025Z Jun 1967.

'(U) COMSIXTHFLT msg 0923-7Z Jun 1967.

:i~: IDmNAY1~;gG~~:5~~~~~~~8ZJunuI9li7'EO 1.4. (

8(V) CINCVSNAVEUR msg 091459Z Jun 1967.

'(V) CTG 60.5 mag 092119Z Jun 1967.

10(V) DIRNAVSECGRVEUR msg 191358Z Jun 1967.

II(V) VSCINCEUR msg 101105Z Jun 1967.

12(V) DIRNSA msg 091345Z Jun 1967.

13(V) DIRNSA msg 101718Z Jun 1967.

14(V) CTG 60.5 msg 101750Z Jun 1967.

I'(V) V.S. Navy Court of Inquiry 7816-67; Liberty

Incident, 8 Jun 1967; Record of Proceedings.

16(V) Joint Chiefs of Staffmsg cite no. 7642, 102140Z

Jun 1967.

17(V) VSCINCEUR msg 101045Z Jun 1967, and

CINCVSNAVEUR msg 111311Z Jun 1967.

18(V) V.S. Defense Attache' Office, Tel Aviv meg

131335Z Jun 1967.

I'(V) CINCVSNAVEUR msg 111031Z Jun 1967.

20(V) Ibid.

2I(V) DIRNAVSECGRVEUR msg 111931Z Jun 1967.

22(V) DIRNAVSECGRVEUR meg 091814Z Jun 1967.

"(V) DIRNAVSECGRVEUR meg 111442Z Jun 1967.

24(V) CINCVSNAVEUR meg 120950Z Jun 1967.

"(V) Ibid.

26(V) Commander, Task Force (CTF) 100 meg

130934Z Jun 1967.

27(V) DIRNAVSECGRV meg 131706Z Jun 1967 and

NSAEVR msg 140829Z Jun 1967.

"(V) CTF 100 meg 150200Z Jun 1967 and NSAEVR

msg 161530Z Jun 1967.

"(V) Robert L. Wilson, oral interview transcript, 6

May 1980.

lO(V) DIRNAVSECGRVEUR meg 191326Z Jun 1967.

ll(V) CTF 100 msg 150200Z Jun1967.

"(V) NAVSHIPENGCTR msg 141551Z Jun 1967.

33(V) NSA; K12, K32 Trip Report (by Eugene Sheck

and Lt. Deprey), 27 Jun 1967.

"(V) NSA; D1 msg for Gen. Carter through NSA

Rep NORAD, circa 21 Jun 1967.

"(V) NSAj Status of Operations Actions Relative to

Sigint Readiness Bravo/Crayon, Report no. 13, 9-10 Jun 1967.

36(V) V.S.S. Liberty msg 200735Z Jun 1967.

37(V) DIRNAVSECGRVEUR meg 191326Z Jun 1967.

"(V) CNO msg 142227Z Jun 1967.

"(V) V.S.S. Liberty msg 021630Z Aug 1967 and

Benjamin G. Cwalina, oral interview transcript, 9 May 1980.

40(V) DIRNSA msg 081648Z Aug 1967 and CNO meg

102136Z Aug 1967.

56 CONPIDENTIAL IIA:NBI:JH ViA: €Or.HN'f €II:ANNHf<S ONI:JY
SECRE'f

Chapter VII

The Incident under Review (U)

(U) Following the attack on the Liberty,

both the Executive and the Legislative Branches set

about ascertaining the basic facts surrounding the

incident. Other than the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry

and the cursory Israeli Board of Inquiry immediately

after the event, reviews went forward under the

auspices of the House Appropriations Committee, the

JCS, and NSA. In addition, a Special Committee of

the National Security Council elicited information to

answer the Administration's questions on the incident.

The NSA Review and Reaction (U)

(U) The eighth of June proved to be a

busy day for NSA's directorate. Having received a

Critic message on the Liberty's dilemma, Brigadier

General John Morrison of NSA's Production Organization, notified the directorate of the event at about

0900 hours, Washington time. Some 45 minutes later,

the directorate learned that the attack had been by

the Israelis.

(6 660) Immediate concern was for the safety

of the personnel and the security of the materials on

board. During the day urgent requests went out from

NSA to the National Military Command Center

(NMCC), other offices in the Pentagon, and the

Bureau of Naval Personnel to ascertain if the names

of any of the three NSA civilians on board appeared

on the casualty list. Both General Marshall S. Carter

and Dr. Louis W. Tordella became aware that the

ship was in shallow water, 35-40 fathoms. And they

knew, of course, that the ship held technical materials

which would reveal the mission of the ship and that

it had electronic equipment which would compromise

U. S. success in demultiplexing VHF and UHF multichannel communications. Accordingly, Dr. Tordella

asked JRC's Captain Merriwell W. Vineyard, USN, to

have all documents on board the Liberty burned and

all equipment saved, if possible. General Carter was

prepared to recommend all necessary action to insure

the security of the technical material and equipment,

should the ship go under but, in discussions with the

JRC, ruled out the deliberate scuttling of the ship

since its presence in shallow water made compromise

of materials and equipment a distinct possibility.

(0 000) Other concerns were for the reassignment of the Liberty's intercept mission to other

collectors,1 lin the

face of the inevitable attention the press would. give

to this incident, and for developing a core of information for the expected questions the Agency would

receive from DoD and other officials.

(8-000) As the eighth of June wore on, the

NSA staff considered wa s to reassi Liberty's mission.

'-- ...... Should.the

as a belligerent,

ment of .certain

..... ---' Finally, /they considered

redeployment of the U.S.S. Belmont, scheduled for

refitting at Norfolk at about that-time. Only the last

mentioned seemed promising in consideration of the

Liberty's VHF/UHF mission, but full approval for

assignment of the Belmont would not be forthcoming.

They also confirmed that.the U.S. airborne collection

flights out of Athens would continue without

interruption.

(0 00r-0....;..) Th--,e .NSA directorate examined Liberty'~ Ilf there should be questions about

the civilians on board, what should be said? Dr.

'EO 1. 4 . (c)

IIANBtJH ViA €OMlN'f €IIANNBI:aS ONI:aY SECRET 57
P.L.

86-36

SHCRH'I'

Tordella discussed this matter with Rear Admiral

Ralph E. Cook. the Director Naval Securitv Group.

I This stated that the L:-:-:--"""":""---~~-~~ Liberty's presence off Port Said was "to assure communications for the U.S. Government posts in the

Middle East and to assist in relaying information

concerning the evacuation of U.S. dependents and

other citizens from the Arab-Israeli war area." As was

its custom, NSA's staff worked closely with the Pentagon's Public Information Office and referred all

public queries NSA received to that Pentagon Office.

(0 000) There was, finally, on that long day of

8 June, the need to establish quickly a core of

information on the incident to prepare for the many

questions being asked and decisions to be made.

Already the Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, had called General Carter asking for "precise

information" on the ship's complement, the number

of civilians, the meaning of "AGTR" which appeared

on the ship's hull, and other matters which he felt

would be needed for a public release. Discussions also

took place with White House staff members Patrick

Coyne and Bromley Smith, who elicited details on the

incident.

(0 000) To take care of this need for information, General Carter established in his outer office

a Temporary Mid-East Information Group consisting

QLtllree~rSA.in~ivi~uals~ Mr. Walter Deeley of the

Production Organization andl land Lieutenant Commander Edward Koczak, USN, of the

Director's staff. The main function of this group was

to gather information on the event and to anticipate

the numerous questions to be directed to NSA over

the coming weeks.

(8 000) With timely help from agency components, the group assembled basic data on the ship

itself, on U.S. I Icoverage of Middle East

communications; on operational and technical responsibilities, and on the technical rationale for the

mission; it also compiled /a chronology of events and a

compendium of key documents and messages. Assembling the information in a large red notebook entitled

"Report to the DirectorNSA - U.S.S. Liberty (AGTR5), 23 May-8 June 1967," the group presented the

completed report to the Director on 12 June - rather

respectable staff work in view of the timeliness and

EO 1.4. (c)

quality-of"the report. NSA was then in a position to

give copies of this comprehensive report to the JCS

Fact Finding Team and to the Special Committee of

the National Security Council (NSC).

(0 660) Directed as it was to develop a core of

information on the event, the NSA group did not seek

to identify remedies for faulty procedures or, for that

matter, to make any recommendations at all. Major

responsibility for that fell to the JCS and others. The

group did have to field searching questions being asked

the Agency by others.

(6 660) The JCS Fact Finding Team was asking specific questions such as these:

• Does NSA receive and plot situation reports? Does

it keep the track?

• Why was an Opscomm circuit not established

between NSA and the Liberty?

• Were there any communications problems during

transit in the Mediterranean?

• Did NSA fail to receive any technical summaries,

product, or other communications from the Liberty,

nonreceipt of which would have been indicative of

communications difficulties?

• Was there any departure from normal command

relationships in the handling of the Liberty's cruise?

(0 600) And Patrick Coyne of the National

Security Council's Special Committee asked broad

questions such as these:

• What information was received from the Liberty

from the time it arrived on station until the incident?

• Were there any Sigint reflections of the Israeli

attack?

• Would we receive all of our Sigint holdings relating

to the incident?

(U) Although questions remained which

would require answers, the work of the NSA group was

essentially complete by the middle of June 1967. I

The JeS Review (U)

(U) On 9 June, immediately after the

Liberty incident the JCS fielded a five-man team from

its organization, all with the necessary clearances, to

examine communications and control aspects of the

event. Senior member of the JCS team was Major

General Joseph R. Russ, USA. Other team members

were Rear Admiral Francis J. Fitzpatrick, USN;

Colonel William A. Garrett, USAF; Captain William

D. Owen, USN; and Major Harlan E. Priddle, USAF.

(U) In spelling out the terms of reference

for the team, Lieutenant General B. E. Spivy, Director

of the Joint Staff, asked the team to examine the

58 SHCRH'I'

EO 1.4. (c)

==~~~~_EO 1.4. (d)

IIA:NBI.B ¥fA: eOMIN'I' eIIANNBI.S ONI.¥
means employed in issuing operational directives of

the JCS to the V.S.S. Liberty and the specific orders

to the Liberty between 1 June and 8 June 1967, and

to identify and develop information on conflicting

directives, delays in message traffic, and nonreceipt of

orders. The team was to report its findings, along with

recommendations, to the JCS.

(0-006) The JCS team visited NSA, other

Washington-area principals, and concerned military

staffs and commands in Europe and the Mediterranean. On 10 June, as the team began its fact-finding

mission, General Carter called General Russ and

offered the total cooperation of NSA and followed

through on this offer by making as much information

available to him as required, although General Russ

had already decided not to concentrate on sensitive

(that is, special intelligence) matters.

(V) As the work of the fact-finding team

was drawing to a close, General Russ provided on 18

June a preliminary report to the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle Wheeler, VSA.

He apprised the Chairman of the four messages from

higher headquarters on 7/8 June to subordinate commands designed to change the Liberty's CPA, receipt

of which by Liberty "would undoubtedly have resulted

in the ship's being a greater distance from the scene

of action.... " Despite the Liberty's having been either

an action or an information addressee on each of these

messages, General Russ's team found no evidence that

the ship received anyone of them. Nor did his team

find, for that matter, any evidence of conflicting

directives governing the Liberty's operation. General

Russ also made note of the irregular procedure JCS

itself had adopted in bypassing Commander-in-Chief,

Europe when it passed verbal instructions to Commander-in-Chief, V.S. Navy Europe, and he recounted

the reasons for delays at NAVEUR and Sixth Fleet in

translating the JCS directive into action.

(V) By 20 June the JCS Fact Finding

Team had completed its work, had prepared its report,

and had made its recommendations to the JCS. Of

the 17 recommendations made, 9 concerned the missions, functions, operational responsibilities, and operational control/technical tasking and guidance matters; the other 8 related to communications, traffic

management, methods, facilities, and availability of

trained personnel. In reviewing and commenting on

the report's recommendations for the JCS, the J3 and

J6/JCS reserved follow-on action for the first category

of recommendations to the Joint Staff but assigned

responsibilities to various other agencies for study and

implementation actions in the second category of

recommendations. NSA drew assignments on three

eONFIDIU"qJIAL

recommendations dealing with emphasis on dedicated

command-and-control circuitry rather than on

common-user circuitry, with measures to improve fleet

control communications via communications satellite

technology, and with the amalgamation of NATO and

V.S. military communications.

(0 OOQ) Other than the three recommendations

on which it participated as an action agency, NSA

was concerned about some of the other findings in the

report. One recommendation was, for example, that

"procedures governing the control of surveillance platforms be made more definitive with respect to technical research ships to insure that "artificial barriers

between operational elements of staffs and NSNNaval

Security Group" owing to security considerations be

eliminated "in order to improve the value and timely

utilization of the Sigint products at all major command

echelons." Insofar as NSA was concerned, this recommendation was off the mark since Sigint product

already went directly to all commands and not through

NSNNaval Security Group staffs. NSA commented

formally on this point in a letter to Major General

G.B. Pickett, Vice Director for Operations (J-3); in

its commentary on the Russ report for the JCS, the

J-3 discounted this recommendation.

(V) When copies of the JCS Fact Finding

Team's report reached NSA at the end of June,

General Carter instructed the chief of his telecommunications organization, Colonel Leslie J. Bolstridge,

VSAF, to review the report in minute detail with a

view to "correcting our procedures wherever we can

profit from this debacle of military communications."

Since the Russ report primarily dealt with commandand-control communications, the Russ recommendations had only marginal pertinence to NSA's own

communications. 2

Congressional Review (U)

(V) Following a hearing focusing on the

JCS messages which failed to reach the Liberty, the

House Appropriations Committee on 14 August 1967

directed its Surveys and Investigations staff to examine

the effectiveness of the DoD worldwide communications

system. The staff studied the delays and nondelivery

of messages originated on 7 and 8 June directing the

withdrawal of the Liberty as a springboard to its

broader review of DoD's worldwide communications.

The staff produced a two-volume report for the chairman of the congressional committee. Volume I reviewed the communications problems in the Liberty

incident, volume II the worldwide communications

systems and networks of the DoD.

IIANBI:JH l.t"lA C6~HN'f CIIANNEI:JS 6NI:JY CONFIDENTIAL 59
UNCLASSIFIED

(U) In its work, the Surveys and Investigations staff interviewed JCS, NSA, Naval Communications Command, Department of Army Communications Center, and JCS Message Center personnel in

the Washington area and most of the military commands and communications centers in the Pacific and

European regions which had been involved with Liberty's communications in one way or another.

(U) Essentially the staff covered the same

ground that General Russ's team plowed earlier. They

worked their way through all the communications

errors made during the attempts to withdraw the

Liberty on 7/8 June. The staff was somewhat more

critical than the JCS Fact Finding Team of the failure

to deliver to the Liberty the information copies of the

JCS and CINCEUR messages directing withdrawal

(JCS 080110Z June 67 and CINCEUR 080625Z June

67). Specifically, they wanted to know if a typical

commander would take action on an information copy

of this kind from a higher command before receiving

the implementing message of his immediate superior.

They tested the matter with unnamed U.S. Navy

officials who had commanded both large and small

naval vessels and learned, according to the report,

that there would have been no question that if the

Liberty had received the information copies, "the

Captain of the Liberty would have moved within

minutes without waiting for an implementing order."

(U) In its volume II, the congressional

staff took full note of the breakdown of the precedence

system in communications and drew upon 000-

provided information for the Middle East crisis. Of

some 452 high-precedence, (Flash and Immediate)

crisis-related 000 messages, only 22 percent of the

Flash and 30 percent of the Immediate messages

actually met established precedence criteria.

(U) Part of the' delay in transmitting the

Immediate-precedence Sixth Fleet withdrawal message

to the Liberty, it will be recalled, was owing to the

urgency of equal or higher precedence (that is, Flash)

messages. During the crisis, originators assigned Immediate precedence to messages on subjects such as

these: enlisted men reassignments, hospital-patient

reports unrelated to the crisis, friendly ship locations

and movements, setting up of press conferences,

60 UNCLASSIFIED

changes in reporting formats, U. S. military sales

policies, and reorganization of Army Reserve units. In

contrast, actual instructions called for assignment of

Immediate precedence to "situations which gravely

affect the security of national/allied forces or populace,

and which require immediate delivery to the addressees" - for example, amplifying reports of initial

enemy contact, reports of unusual major movements

of military forces of foreign powers during peacetime

or during strained relations, attack orders, and urgent

intelligence messages.

(U) While the congressional staff directed

most of its attention to 000 command communications, it also took note of Criticomm which, they found

functioned throughout the crisis relatively free of

problems. The staff was aware of steps NSA took to

keep Criticomm free of the overburdening traffic

common in crisis situations, particularly an 8 June

action in which NSA directed the curtailment of

electrical forwarding of all routine reports so that

crisis-related traffic could flow expeditiously. 3

Notes

Source documents are in the "Crisis Collection" of the NSA History

Collection.

leu) (C) - LTG Marshall S. Carter, Memorandum for

the Record, 8 June 1967; Dr. Louis W. Tordella, Memorandum,

"Directorate's Temporary Mid-East Information Group," 8 June

1967; Walter G. Deeley, Memorandum for the D/Dffi, "U.S.S.

Liberty," 14 June 1967; NSA Staff, "Report to the Director, NSA,"

12 June 1967; and DffiNSA letter to MG J. R. Russ, (JCS Fact

Finding Team), 12 June 1967.

'(U) The Russ Report; NSA Director, handwritten

notes, 8 and 10 June 1967; JCS/J-3, "Note by the Secretaries to

the JCS on U.S.S. Liberty Incident," JCS no. 2308/378, 24 June

1967; Joint Command and Control Requirements Group, Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Fact Finding Team," 18 June

1967; Walter G. Deeley, letter to Vice Director for Operations (J3), 29 June 1967.

J(U) House Appropriations Committee Surveys and

Investigations Staff, A Report to the Committee on Appropriations

- U.S. House of Representatives on the Effectiveness of the

Worldwide Communications Systems and Networks of the DoD,

U.S.S. Liberty Incident, vol. I pp. 48-50. vol. II, pp. 75-76.
eONFIDHN'FIAL

Chapter VIII

A Final Look (U)

(0 000) Perhaps the Liberty has undergone

scrutiny long enough. First the Israeli Court of Inquiry

examined the event, exculpation of Israeli nationals

apparently not being hindmost in the court's calculations. Then the U. S. Navy Court of Inquiry studied

the incident. The JCS review actively sought to

identify faulty procedures and practices for corrective

action. The NSA review was essentially fact-finding in

nature. And the House Appropriations Committee

review, made as it was without all the information

available to the JCS team, nonetheless reconstructed

many of the basic findings of that team and sought to

use them as a mirror in which to observe problem

areas in DoD's worldwide communications. Despite the

official scrutiny, it is still necessary to comment briefly

on a few subjects of interest and concern to cryptologic

organizations.

Safety Estimates for Collection Missions

of Mobile Platforms (U) \

t€7 One principal area of concern was the

manner in which safety factors were adjudged. Prior

to the Liberty incident, commanders did not essentially regard mobile collectors as integral components

of their commands. After all, JCS/JRC assigned the

schedules and routes, the platforms existed to satisfy

"national intelligence" and - as they may have

thought - not their own intelligence requirements,

and NSA was on the sidelines as a major interested

party. As General Russ learned, commanders accordingly felt some uncertainty as to their specific responsibilities in supporting these platforms. The General

reasoned therefrom, and so stated in his report, that

commanders must have adequate knowledge of a ship's

mission if they are to control and support it effectively.

(U) JCS/JRC looked to the unified and

specified commands to provide for the safety of the

mobile collectors. The regional commands were in close

touch with political and military conditions in which

the platforms operated and were, JCS/JRC believed,

in the best position to evaluate safety factors. I

(C CCQ) ,. In the Liberty incident, the Commander, Sixth Fleet, was responsible for the safety of

the ship. But Vice Admiral Martin was not in a

position to evaluate the expected intelligence gain or

assign degrees of importance to the expected intelligence gain in terms of changing risk factors. Judgment

on the value of the intelligence to be gained could

come only from DoD-level intelligence agencies - and,

in the case of the Liberty, particularly from NSA.

(0 000) In the aftermath of the incident, there

was indeed some soul searching on this point within

NSA. The head of NSA's Temporary Mid-East Information Group told Dr. Tordella in mid-June that he

believed NSA could not really absolve itself totally

from the safety considerations. He believed that NSA

may have to demonstrate "that the need is not

established frivolously" and questioned whether or not

the intelligence requirements against which NSA

worked at the time were really of such a compelling

nature as to justify using the special operational areas

in the Middle East which NSA designated. 2

(0 000) One has to pose this question. Had

NSA sent a message to the JCS/JRC on 5 June, the

day war broke out, and stated simply that the agency

which initiated the mission in the first place, NSA,

now believed the risk to its cryptologic materials and

personnel outweighed its estimate of technical and

intelligence benefits to be derived, would there have

been more expeditious action by JCS/JRC to cut the

mission short? NSA may have drawn a mild rebuke

for presuming to evaluate safety factors. But the

hypothetical NSA message might have added to the

position the CNO was taking at about this time to

increase the ship's CPA, and it might have stimulated

JCS/JRC action earlier than 080110Z.

(0 000) On 8 June NSA was, however, of a

totally different mind. Since it did not want to lose

IIANBbH ".tIA COflfHN'f CIIANNHbS ONbl' eONFIDHN'fIAL 61
'fOP SECRE'f

the coverage it had planned for the Middle East, it

sent a message to the JCS/JRC proposing assignment

of the U.S.S. Belmont to the eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean as soon as possible after that ship's expected

arrival at Norfolk on the next day." The Director,

NSA later withdrew this request in the face of

reluctance on the part of the Commander-in-Chief,

Atlantic" and reevaluation of the CPA constraints on

mission effectiveness.

(6 660) In reflecting on the Liberty/Pueblo

incidents in an oral history interview, General Marshall S. Carter said

as a result of both of those traumatic experiences, we have

reviewed our procedures and found there was little change

needed in NSA-JCS relationships, but there were some changes

needed in the chain of command supervision and monitoring...

of just where the ship is, and what it is doing, 'and was it

necessary.

(6 660) As it turned out, the Liberty incident

- and some six months later the Pueblo seizure -

brought about some modification in the JCS/JRC

procedures for weighing risk vs. intelligence-gain factors. Instead of relying entirely on military assessments, the new procedures took into account

intelligence-agency information relating to potential

risk. 5 Just prior to the Pueblo's capture, NSA had

apprised the JCS of Sigint from North Korean communications portending difficulties for the Pueblo.

(U) NSA should not yield or should yield

grudgingly to others, this review would suggest, in

safety evaluations of missions involving large holdings

of Sigint materials, equipment, and personnel.

Availability of Linguists (U)(C-CCOI-

(6 660) Looking back on the Liberty incident,

one perhaps should fault the cryptologic organization

for not assuring the presence on board of qualified

Hebrew linguists for on-station examination of Israeli

voice communications uncovered in the intercept from

the nonmorse search and development mission and for

not even having a token mission on Israeli voice

communications. It turned out that Hebrew language

tapes produced by USN-855 from the search and

development mission on the morning of 8 June did not

contain information on the forthcoming Israeli attack,

but NSA did not learn this until it had received these

tapes and had processed them several days after the

event. For all NSA and USN-855 knew at the time,

information on Israeli intentions towards the ship

might well have been on those tapes.

(6 660) Hebrew linguists were, to be sure, in

short supply. In sending three Hebrew linguists to fill

out the staff of the U. S. Air Force Security Service's

EO 1. 4 . (c I

technical processing center at I INSA had sent

to the field all but one of its Hebrew linguists. Prior

to the Liberty's arrival at Rota, Spain, the Naval

Security Group had inventoried its available linguists

in order to select Arab linguists for assignment to

USN-855. One of the selectees, it turned out, carried

the classification "Special Arabic" - in reality,

Hebrew- and assignment of that individual was by

accident rather than by design. USN-855 did not use

him as a Hebrew linguist.

(U) As in other situations - the lack of

Vietnamese linguists during the Vietnam period, for

example - this lack of Hebrew linguists showed that

the linguist talent pool available to U. S. cryptologic

agencies for employment in crisis conditions was not

always adequate. 6

Communications Problems (D)

(U) Errors made in the handling of communications accounted, in some measure, for the

Liberty tragedy. Studied in great detail by the JCS

Fact Finding Team and reviewed by the staff of the

House Appropriations Committee, the communications

problems posed a challenge for the JCS and for DoD

agencies in the immediate post-Liberty period.

(U) NSA was not the DoD action office for

correcting faulty communications procedures, but it

was indeed a very interested party to corrective actions

stimulated by the Russ Report. Doing what he could,

General Carter called Army Chief of Staff, General

Harold K Johnson, about the considerable number of

mishandled messages in the Department of Army's

communications center in the Pentagon, particularly

those coming to NSA, and on 3 July provided General

Johnson's staff with examples of message mishandling

during the Liberty incident. Department of Army's

response was positive, and soon thereafter its Communications Staff added page monitors on its circuits

to NSA to check assignment of address groups. Errors

diminished from some 40 to 7 a day out of an average

daily total of 1,000 transmissions. General Carter also

insisted, as noted earlier, that his staff examine the

Russ Report recommendations relating to DoD communications for any possible application to NSA's

Criticomm network. 7

File Reduction for Exposed Collectors (U)

('f'S 660 nF) The Six Day War and the Liberty

incident created conditions in which Sigint personnel

had to take fast action to prevent loss of their

documentation and e ui ment.

L.- ..... while dealing successfully with

62 'fOP SECRE'f IIhNHLB ¥I.... 60l\HN'I' UIIMlNB1.8 ONl.Y NOFORN EO 1. 4 . (c I
the problem, did encounter difficulties because of the

time required to destroy records and neutralize equipment. In its report on emergency destruction of Sigint

documentation and equipment I I

recommended reduction to the absolute minimum of

detachment files as one measure to facilitate the

destruction. The report stated:

Technical documents, operational aids, etc., should be limited

to those required to carry out the mission; files held and

containing information that mayor may not be needed at some

future date should be eliminated. The library of training

manuals ought to be limited to those covering items of equipment in use at the detachment; anyone who cannot read a

TEXTA card can be taught without the use of a TEXTA

Manual; a Traffic Analyst's Handbook is not needed where

there are no traffic analysts, nor is a cryptographic textbook

where there is no cryPtanalysis,:.a;:c.::;;co;;.:m:;Jp;;.:l,::is.::h.::;;ed:;,._' ...,

The cryptologic holdin s of

were small in comparison with those held by the

Liberty.

('T'S-CCO) After the Liberty incident, a review of

USN-855's cryptologic documentary holdings showed

that the Sigint unit held technical reports such-as

TEXTA, Techins (Technical Lnstructione), tasking

records of all kinds, Informal Technical Notes, and

Comint Technical Rep():rtsf6rl IMiddle

Eastern,I Icountries, and the U.S.S.R. -

documents which would have made possible, granted

a serious compromise, a country-by-country index to

the Sigint success achieved by the U. S. for the

countries concerned. The Sigint unit also held collection management records recapitulating intercept assignments by case notation at U.S. Sigintsites worldwide. In addition, USN-855 held much/of the Musso

(Manual of U.S. Sigint Operations) library spelling

out Sigint policy and procedures. It held numerous

records denoting I // I

I IAndjt heldthen current S.. igint product for L...;..~""':':""';':" JMiddleEastern countries, and the

U.S.S.R.

(S OCO) USN-855 had received this comprehensive documentation primarily from NSA's collection

management, telecommunications, and G Group offices, Naval Security Group Headquarters, and U.S.

I IUSN~855was;ifiaSerise,NSA in microcosm. 9

(G GGO) Asked if the ship had too much Sigint

documentation and equipment, one USN-855 survivor

commented,

Entirely too much. There is no way emergency destruction

could be carried out unless you were given... two day's notice

that you're going to get hit. And usually you're not given any

notice. 10

(G GGO) Casual examination of document listings reveals, of course, countless records which were

TOP SB€RBT

not specific to USN-855's eastern Mediterranean mission, records which could have remained behind at

Rota. This same judgment would probably not apply,

on the other hand, to on-board Sigint equipment,

virtually all of which was essential to the mission.

f€t- The Liberty's experience, together with

the Pueblo capture, led to some emphasis on file

reduction and on measures to facilitate destruction of

cryptologic materials and equipment. The incidents

pointed up, as no others had done before.the need for

scaling the distribution of technical documentation to

specific and minimal levels necessary for execution of

tasks, and following the incidents some moderationin

the supply of documentation\Vasi:n,evide~ce.

(U) .........Asadirect resu1toft~~Libe~tyincidentand at General Carter's-urging, NSNs Communications SecurityOrganizatiofi revised, for example, its physical security doctrine (l{AG-lD) to limit

keyiIlgmaterials)nnormal circumstances to a fourmonth's su,pply and to curtail possession of those

materials to that which was clearly essential to mission

requirements. II Theincidents also gave impetus to the

use of alternative means for technical support, such

as Opscomrnequipment for teletype exchanges on

specific technical problems. And a small amount of

water-soluble paper came into use for technical documentation subject to possible loss at sea. But measures

such as these did not solve the problem in its entirety.

(U) (C-CCOI_ In the 19708 NSA initiated two projects to examine the use of technical-support materials

by exposed sites, Projectsl// I

The latter did not get beyond.the-survey stage. Under

Projectl INSA considered the use of microfilm

to reduce the size of files and examined techniques for

fast microfilm/fische destruction, but failed to win

addptioIl,because of disinterest and general disinclination to use microform. Size of files and time factors

in the destruction process continue as problems to this

time.12

(0 000) The Liberty and Pueblo incidents

should serve to remind cryptologicmanagersofth~

need to exercise restraintjntllellseQLSiginLequip"

ment and documentation in high-risk areas.

Unanswered Questions (U)

(U) A persistent question relating to the

Liberty incident is whether or not the Israeli forces

which attacked the ship knew that it was American.

Several authors and not a few of the Liberty's crewmen

and USN-855 staff are convinced that they did. Their

belief derived from consideration of the long time the

Israelis had the ship under surveillance prior to the

EO 1. 4 . (c I

·P.L. 86-36

EO 1. 4 . (c I

EO 1. 4 . (d I

ItA:NDL! "itA: e6M1N'f eHA:NN!LS 6NLY N6f6ltN TOP SECRET 63
SECRET EO 1. 4 . (c)

attack, the visibility of the flag, and the intensity of

the attack itself.

(O-CCO) Speculation as to Israeli motivation

varied. Some believed that Israel expected that the

complete destruction of the ship and killing of the

personnel would lead the U.S. to blame the U.A.R.

for the incident and bring the U.S. into the war on

the side of Israel. Ironically, even though the Liberty

had no specific mission against Israeli communications,

others felt Israeli forces wanted the ship and men out

of the way in order to deny the U.S. any Sigint on

Israel's preparations to attack.Syria - an attack the

U.S. might try to prevent.

(8 COO) Authors of .the several books now in

print about the Liberty.' whether members. of the

Liberty's complement or/ not, have not had access to I Ii Sigint reports on the Israeli

helicopter pilot voice communications, nor have they

had access to the confidential Israeli Government's

explanation given to the U. S. Department of State.

(O-OeO) In part because of the press speculation

at the time, President Johnson directed the Director

of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, to prepare a

report by 13 June, five days after the attack, assessing

the Israeli intentions. The CIA assessment drew heavily upon the Sigint reports referred to above. While

these reports revealed some confusion on the part of

the pilots concerning the nationality of the ship, they

tended to rule out any thesis that the Israeli Navy

and Air Force deliberately attacked a ship they knew

to be American.

Denouement (U)

(U) On 11 June 1968, exactly one year

and three days after the attack on the Liberty, her

commanding officer, Captain William Loren MeGonagle (promoted after the attack), was presented

the Congressional Medal of Honor by the Secretary of

the Navy for gallantry and courage displayed during

Liberty's hours of trial. Following that award, the

Presidential Unit Citation was conferred upon the

Liberty and crew on 14 June 1968 at Portsmouth,

Virginia.

(0 GGO) Scores of individual decorations

(Bronze Star, Silver Star., etc.) were given to crew

members, and 170 Purple Hearts were earned by

Liberty's complement, including two NSA civilians,

Donald L. Blalock and Allen M. Blue (the latter,

posthumously).

(U) Claims against the government of Israel for compensation concerning deaths and injuries

of U.S. personnel and damage to the Liberty were

initiated by the Department of State. In May 1968,

Israel paid the U.S. Government $3,323,500 as full

payment on behalf of the families of the 34 men killed

in the attack. 13 Eleven months later, Israel paid

$3,566,457 in compensation to the men who had been

wounded. 14 The U. S. claim of $7,644,146 for material

damage to the Liberty itself was not settled until 18

December 1980 when Israel agreed to pay $6 million.

(U) After returning to Norfolk in July

1967, the Liberty languished there while NSA tried

unsuccessfully to obtain DoD budgetary approval to

restore her to Sigint operational status; the proposed

budget figure was $10,200,000. When this effort failed,

the Liberty was decommissioned on 28 June 1968. In

1970 the ship was turned over to the Maritime

Administration and sold for scrap for $101,666.66. In

1973 the ship came to an ignominious end as she was

cut up in Baltimore's Curtis Bay shipyard.

(U) There was one aspect of the Liberty

tragedy which should not go unnoted. This was its

adverse and lingering affect on the Liberty's survivors.

Oral interviews with USN-855 personnel some 13 years

after the event, show that time has not healed all the

scars." Apart from bitterness toward the Israeli Government, there still remains dismay that the U.S.

Government or Sixth Fleet did not come to Liberty's

aid in timely fashion.

(U) The contributions of technical research ships to this nation's Sigint production also

should not go unnoted. These were unique in their

time, often irreplaceable, often unheralded. That the

TRS program came to an end in 1969 was not for lack

of competence and dedication of the men who served

or for lack of NSA's appreciation for their contributions, but rather for budgetary considerations by the

Department of Defense.

Notes

Source documents are in the "Crisis Collection" of the NSA History

Collection.

'(V) The Russ Report, pp 9-10; Richard Harvey

interview, 16 Jul 1980.

'(V) Walter Deeley, Memorandum for the

D!DIR - "V.S.S. Liberty," 14 Jun 1967.

'(V) DIRNSA msg to JCS/JRC, 081503Z Jun 1967.

\V) CINCLANT msg to JCS, 121414Z Jun 1967.

5(V) Interview with Gene Sheck, 11 Aug 1980.

'(e-ee6) NSA Staff, "Critique-Sigint Readiness Bravo

Crayon," pp. 24, 29.

'(V) NSA Staff, Memorandum for the Record,

"Telephone Conversation with Mr. Morton A. Brill, aCCE, 5 Jul

1967; NSA, Tl Memo, "Missent Traffic from RVEPCR," 14 Jul

1967.

64 SECRET IIANBI:lH faA CO!'fHN'f CIIANNHI:lS ONI:lY
'lfer u.s. Army Communications Support Unit, Annual History Report, FY 1967, vol. I, 1 Oct 1967.

'(U) NSA Staff (P04) Memorandum to DffiNSA,

"Classified "Material Aboard U.S.S. Liberty (USN-855)," 11 Jun

1967. Enclosures to the memorandum consist of a 160-page listing

of documents known to have been given to USN-855 by NSA and

NAVSECGRU elements.

]o(U) Interview with Paddy E. Rhodes, 13 Jun 1980.

"(U) ADC Memorandum to DffiNSA, "Cryptographic Holdings of U.S.S. Liberty," 2 Oct 1967; DffiNSA memoCONPIDHN'fIAL

randum to ADC, "Cryptographic Holdings of U.S.S. Liberty," 17

Aug 1967.

"(U) Interview with Richmond D. Snow, 21 Aug

1980.

"(U) U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 17 Jun

1968, p. 799.

"(U) U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 2 Jun

1969, p. 473.

"(U) The Liberty's Captain, William L. McGonagle, now retired, was invited to be interviewed but declined,

stating he had refused all other such requests.

UONFIDHN'fIAL 65
UNCLASSIFIED

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Citations are unclassified unless otherwise indicated at the beginning of the

reference. Example: (C-CCO) Smith, John. Sigint Aspects of the War in the East.

NSA, 1980. (TSC)

The first security classification, C-CCO, is for the citation itself; the second, TSC,

is the classification of the document. Documents appearing in this bibliography are

available in the Office of Cryptologic Archives and History, T54.

Books and Articles on the Six Day War and the U.S.S. Liherty

Draper, Theodore. Israel and World Politics. New York: Viking Press, 1968.

Ennes, James M. Assault on the Liberty. New York: Random House, 1979.

Kosut, Hal, editor. "Israel and the Arabs: The June 1967 War," Facts on File, New York, 1968.

Pearson, Anthony. Conspiracy of Silence. London: Quartet Books, 1978.

Yost, Charles W. "The Arab-Israeli War; How It Began," Foreign Affairs, vol. 46, no. 2, January 1968.

Cryptologic Histories

Electronic Security Command. History of the 6910th Security Wing, 1 January - 30 June 1967. ('i?S eeO)

Electronic Security Command. History of the 6931st Security Group, 1 January - 30 June 1967. (~S-CCO)

Electronic Security Command. History of the 6948th Security Squadron, 1 January - 30 June 1967. ('i?S eeO)

Kagnew Station, Office of Operations. Annual Historical Report, FY 1967, vol. n. ('T'S eeO)

Rasmuson, John R. A History of Kagneui Station and American Forces in Eritrea, 25 May 1973. (U)

U.S. Army Communications Support Unit. Annual Historical Report, FY 1967, vol. I, 1 October 1967. t~S·CCO)

Investigative Reviews of Liberty Incident

House Appropriations Committee Surveys and Investigations Staff. A Report to the Committee on Appropriations

- U.S. House of Representatives on the Effectiveness of the Worldwide Communications Systems and Networks

of the Department of Defense, vola, I and II.

Israel Defence Forces. Preliminary Inquiry File 1/67, 21 July 1967. (U)

NSA Staff. "Report to the Director, NSA - U.S.S. Liberty (AGTR~5), 23 May - 8 June 1967," 12 June 1967.

Russ, Joseph R. MG, USA. "Report of the JCS Fact Finding Team - U.S.S. Liberty Incident, 8 June 1967."~

Seulliti,e)

U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry 7816-67; Liberty Incident, 8 June 1967; Record of Proceedings.

Oral History

Carter, Marshall S., LTG, USA. Interview, January 1969. (C-CCO)

Connell, John. Interview, 15 September 1980. fSt'

Cwalina, Benjamin G. Interview, 9 May 1980.

Fossett, Birchard C., CDR, USN. Interview, 22 May 1980. (S eeO)

UNCLASSIFIED 67
UNCLASSIFIED

Harvey, Richard. Interview, 16 July 1980. ffSeT

Hickman, Richard W. Interview, 30 April 1980. (S-CCO)

McFarland, Terry L., CTC. Interview, 23 June 1980. (8660)

O'Connor, James G., CDR, USN. Interview, 22 May 1980. (8 eeO)

Rhodes, Paddy E., CTC. Interview, 13 June 1980. (8 eeO)

Sheck, Eugene. Interview, 11 August 1980. fCPS€t

Way, Clyde W., CTC. Interview, 6 June 1980. ('PSC)

Wilson, Robert L. Interview, 6 May 1980. (8 660)

Messages

(Listed by Date/Time Group.)

CINCLANT. 121414Z Jun 67. t6t

CNO. 142227Z Jun 67. tst

102136Z Aug 67. tst

COMSERVRON 8. 240020Z May 67. 1'6t

COMSIXTHFLT. 052015Z Jun 67. tst

062349Z Jun 67. ter

070626Z Jun 67. t6t

071503Z Jun 67. tst

081250Z Jun 67. tcr

081320Z Jun 67. (U)

081349Z Jun 67. ieT

081514Z Jun 67.~

081649Z Jun 67.

090513Z Jun 67.

0923-7Z Jun 67. i€T

CTF 60. 081316Z Jun 67.

CTF 100. 130934Z Jun 67.

150200Z Jun 67.~

CTG 60.5. 090758Z Jun 67.

092119Z Jun 67.~

101750Z Jun 67.

DIRNAVSECGRU. 131706Z Jun 67. (8 eeO)

DIRNAVSECGRUEUR. 091058Z Jun 67. (6660)

091814Z Jun 67. (8660)

111442Z Jun 67. (8 eeO)

111931Z Jun 67.~

191326Z Jun 67. (8 6eO)

191358Z Jun 67.

68 UNCLASSIFIED

EO 1. 4 . (c)

EO 1. 4 . (d)
UNCLASSIFIED

DIRNSA. 231729Z May 67.

232133Z May 67. (8 000)

252317Z May 67.

2--6Z May 67. iS€'7

270006Z May 67. (8 000)

292013Z May 67.

292201Z May 67. iSet

022333Z Jun 67.~

072104Z Jun 67. iSt

081356Z Jun 67. ('t'8 000)

081503Z Jun 67. (8 000)

091345Z Jun 67. i€T

101718Z Jun 67. (8 060)

ca. 21-Z Jun 67. ffS+

081648Z Aug 67.

JCS. 052235Z Nov 65.

291602Z May 67.

011545Z Jun 67. ts+

070259Z Jun 67. ts+

072230Z Jun 67.

080110Z Jun 67.~

081529Z Jun 67.~

102140Z Jun 67.~

NAVSHIPENGCTR. 141551Z Jun 67.~

NSAEUR. 140829Z Jun 67. iSt

161530Z Jun 67. (0 660)

State, Department of. Message no. 200139 to American Embassy, Tel Aviv, 11 June 1967. f€t

TF 60.5. 090758Z Jun 67. f€t

USCINCEUR. 300932Z May 67.

010035Z Jun 67. tst

020717Z Jun 67. iSt

1Q1045Z Jun 67. fST

101105Z Jun 67.~

USCINCNAVEUR. 311750Z May 67.~

011305Z Jun 67.

020717Z Jun 67.~

031016Z Jun 67.

051352Z Jun 67. tat

051850Z Jun 67.

061357Z Jun 67.

081517Z Jun 67. tet

091459Z Jun 67.

100025Z Jun 67. fet

111031Z Jun 67. i'8t

111311Z Jun 67. ffl?

120950Z Jun 67. tst

151003Z Jun 67.

UNCLASSIFIED 69
UNCLASSIFIED

VSDAO, Tel Aviv. 081414Z Jun 67. +et

131335Z Jun 67.~

151615Z Jun 67. (8 ?tF)

VSN-446. 091355Z Jun 67. (8 GGO)

V.S.S. Liberty. 241732Z May 67.

021132Z Jun 67.~

021330Z Jun 67.

022108Z Jun 67.~

061844Z Jun 67.

062036Z Jun 67. i€'T

080634Z Jun 67. fflT

080742Z Jun 67.~

080856Z Jun 67. #It

081715Z Jun 67. (V)

200735Z Jun 67. (S-Cfty~'t'e)

021630Z Aug 67.~

U.S.S. Saratoga. 081235Z Jun 67. (V)

081237Z Jun 67. (V)

081254Z Jun 67. (V)

Memoranda, Letters, Bulletins, Reports, and Briefing

Alger, Julie. "A Review of the Technical Research Ship Program, 1961-1969," 1 May 1970. ('f'~e)

Deeley, Walter G. Memorandum for the Deputy Director. "V.S.S. Liberty," 14 June 1967. (S eee)

Deeley, Walter G. Letter to the Vice Director for Operations (J3), 29 June 1967.

JCS/Joint Staff: J3. JCS cite no. 2308/378, "Note by the Secretaries to the JCS on V.S.S. Liberty Incident," 24

June 1967. (CPS Se:neil:he)

Joint Command and Control Requirements Group. Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, "Fact Finding Team," 18 June 1967. -fBt

National Military Command Center: NSA Senior Operations Officer Log, 0730-1530, 8 June 1967.

Memorandum for the Record, 1530 EDT, 8 June 1967. f'f'St

NSA: Director. Handwritten note to D1, 8 June 1967. (V)

Director. Memorandum for the Record, 8 June 1967.

Director. Handwritten note circulated to senior staff, 10 June 1967. (V)

Director. Letter to MG J. R. Russ, VSA, 12 June 1967.i€t

Director. Memorandum to ADC, "Cryptographic Holdings of V.S.S. Liberty," 17 August 1967.~

Deputy Director. Memorandum for the Record, "V.S.S. Liberty," 8 June 1967. ts€t'

Deputy Director. Memorandum, "Directorate's Temporary Mid-East Information Group," 8 June 1967.

Deputy Director. Memorandum for the Record, "Inquiry from House Appropriations Committee Regarding

V.S.S. Liberty," 20 June 1967.

Deputy Director. Penned, long-hand comment, 26 August 1967, attached to copy of Israeli Defence Force

Preliminary Inquiry File 1/67, 21 July 1967. (V)

NSA Staff. Informal paper, "Airborne Collection in Middle East," undated - ca. 1967.

NSA Staff. Memorandum for the Director, NSA, "Classified Material Aboard V.S.S. Liberty (VSN-855),"

11 June 1967. ('T'S eeo UP)

70 UNCLASSIFIED
CONffflHNftAL

(6 660) NSA Staff. "Critique - Sigint Readiness Bravo Crayon," 10 July 1968. ('f'SC-!,P)

NSA Staff. ADC Memorandum to the Director, NSA, "Cryptographic Holdings of U.S.S. Liberty," 2

October 1967. -t6t

NSA Staff. "Fact Sheet for DIRNSA," undated - ca. 1967. (8 660)

NSA Staff. "Informal Paper on Liberty's Communications," 22 June 1967.-f8€t

NSA Staff. T1 Memorandum, "Missent Traffic from RUEPCR," 14 July 1967. (U)

NSA Staff. "Operations Staff Summary," ca. 16 June 1967.

NSA Staff. "Questions by General Carroll, Director, DIA - Answers Provided by G Group/P04," 27

June 1967. f'PS€t

(6 660) NSA Staff. Note for the Director, "Sigint Reflections of Liberty Incident," 27 June 1967. fS€t-

(C CCO) NSA Staff. "Status of Operations Actions Relative to Sigint Readiness Bravo/Crayon," Report no. 13,

9-10 June 1967. ('f'S eOO)

NSA Staff. Memorandum for the Record, "Telephone Conversation with Mr. Morton A. Brill, OCCE,"

5 July 1967. (U)

NSA Staff. "Trip Report of Eugene Sheck and LT Deprey," 27 June 1967. (S-CCO)

NSA Staff. "U.S.S. Liberty - Chronology, 23 May - 8 June."iS'CtNSA, G62. "Briefing on the 1967 Middle East Crisis," undated. ffBe)-

State, Department of. Memorandum to the Director'; NSA, 22 August 1967. (0 8eftlliei,e)

Bulletin, 17 June 1968. (U)

Bulletin, 2 June 1969. (U)

USNAVEUR Contingency Watch Team. Memorandum, "U.S.S. Liberty Incident," 12 June 1967. (VQ\JQ)

U.S.S. Liberty. "Ship Weather Observation Sheet," 8 June 1967. (U)

White House. Daily Diary, 8 June 1967. (U)

Sigint and Technical Reports

OPINS No. 2855, Manual of U.S. Sigint Operations, 12 March 1965. (8 eCO)

(C-eeel) Sigint Reports: 2[I]R23-67' 082015~Ju.n67·±S€t

2 R24-61;090B31Z Jun 67. fS€t2 R27-67, 091422Z Jun 67. i'S€T

(0 000) "Station Facilities Book - U.S.S. Liberty (USN-855)," 31 December 1966. (8 66Q)

P.L.

86-36

II2\NBI:':B YU eOl\HN'f €IUNNHIlS ONIlY

EO

1. 4. (c)

CONFIDENTI....1. 71
SHCRET

INDEX

Addington, "Red," 27

AGTR, auxiliary general technical research ship.

See U.S.S. Liberty

Air Force Security Service. See also Sigint units

establishment of Technical Processing

Centerl 118=19

Al 'Arish, 3,25,37,39

Algeria

1 119

Armstrong, LCDR Philip M., 27-28

Arthur, CAPT Russell, 43

Bennett, LT Maurice H., 17, 28-29, 31, 44, 47

Bishop, LCDR Benjamin M., 47

Blalock, Donald L., 17, 26, 45, 48, 64

Blue, Allen M., 17, 26, 45, 64

Bolstridge, Col Leslie J., 59

Breedlove, Maj, 21-22

C-130 flights. See Sigint collection, airborne

Carter, LTG Marshall S., 57-58, 62

Castle, CDR Ernest C., 32, 34

Central Intelligence Agency

assessment of Israeli intentions, 64

Chernyakov, Yurij Niklolaevich, 32

CINCEUR. See U.S. Commander-in-Chief,

Europe; see also Lemnitzer, GEN L.L.

CINCLANT. See Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic

CINCUSNAVEUR. See U.S. Naval Forces Europe;

see also McCain, ADM John S., Jr.

Collection. See Sigint collection

Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic

reluctance to use U.S.S. Belmont. 62

responsibility for Liberty, 15, 17

Commander, Service Squadron 8, 17

COMSERFORSIXTHFLT, Commander, Service

Forces, Sixth Fleet. See Arthur, CAPT Russell

COMSIXTHFLT. See U.S. Sixth Fleet; see also

Martin, VADM William I.

Connell, John, 15, 20-21

Cook, RADM Ralph E., 58

Cowardin, Charles, 48

Coyne, Patrick, 58

CPA, closest point of approach. See U.S.S. Liberty,

navigational restrictions

Cryptanalysis. See Sigint processing and reporting

Cwalina, Benjamin G., 55

Cyprus

navigational restrictions for, 19, 21

Dayan, Moshe, 3

Deeley, Walter, 58

Defense ..C()IIIDlU.nicatioIls..~ystem, 22

Department of Army Communications Center.

Pentagon

communications errors, 21-22

Deprey, LT Allan, 52

Doorman, Project. See National Security Agency,

Projects Doorman and Lifeblood

Durham, Billy, 55

EC-121 flights. See Sigint collection, airborne

el-Attassi, Nureddin, 1c=J

Electronic Security Command. See Air Force

Security Service

El-Kasir, 38-41

EUCOM, European Command. See U.S. Commanderin-Chief, Europe; see also Lemnitzer,

GEN L.L.

European Security Region. See Air Force Security

Service

Firestone, LT Philip G., 47

Fitzpatrick, RADM Francis J., 58

FI'M Systems Company, 52-53

Galavotti, LT E. L., 21

Garrett, Col William A., 58

Golan Heights, 3

Goldberg, Arthur J., 21

Golden, LT George, 35

Green, Lt Col Robert T., 47

Gulf of Aqaba, 3, 5, 23

Hanley, CAPT M. J., Jr., 21

Harvey, Dick, 19-20

Helms, Richard, 64

Holleran, William M., 45

··EO 1. 4 . (c)

EO 1. 4 . (c)

EO 1. 4 . (d)

SECRET 73
SECRET

INSCOMM, Intelligence and Security Command.

See Army Security Agency

Intelligence requirements

Middle East tensions, 5

Six Day War, 5

Iraq

1 1

involvement in Six Day War, 3

1 1

Lee, LT R. H., 47

Lemnitzer, GEN L. L., 17. See also U.S. Commanderin-Chief, Europe

Lewis, LCDR David E., 15, 17

Libya

navigational restrictions for, 17

I I

Lifeblood, Project. See National Security Agency,

Projects Doorman and Lifeblood

Ling-Temco-Vought (LTV), 52"'::53

Linguists. See Sigint processing and reporting

EO 1. 4 . Ie)

EO 1. 4 . Id)

Marti:ri,VADMWilliaIlll.~2~,22,43, 45, 61

McCain, ADM John S., Jr;,17",18,43,47,52

McFa,I'land.CTGTerryL., 26=27,29 ";'EO 1. 4 . Ie)

McGonagle, CDR William L.

actions during and immediately after attack, 26-31

Congressional Medalof Honor award, 64

enroutetoellstern Mediterranean, 15, 20, 23

McNamara, Robert S., 58

McTighe, LT John T., 55

Morocco

1 119

Morrison, Brig Gen John, 57

NSA Europe and Liberty, 17, 47, 52

Projects Doorman and Lifebl~

reaction to Israeli Preliminary Inquiry, 41

reactions to Six Day War,5 P. L . 86 - 3 6

relations with Joint Reconnaissance Center, 15,

19:::21

role in safety evaluations, 15, 19, 61-62

technical control and support of TRS program, 15,

17, 21

Temporary Mid-East Information Group, 58, 61

National Security Council

Special Committee and Liberty, 57-58

NavalComeeunicatinnaStation

Asmara, 19-20, 22

Greece, 22

Morocco, 19, 22

Naval Security Group, Europe

communications assistance to Task Group 100.6, 47

staff of Task Group 100.4, 47

technical research ships, 43-44

Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 1, 3

National Military Command Center (NMCC), 32

National Security Agency

actions taken as result of attack, 32, 34, 45, 52,

54-58

coordination with JCS Fact Finding Team, 58-59

I I

involvement in Six Day War, 3

Israeli Defence Forces Court of Inquiry

proceedings, 37-40, 47

military attack on the Liberty, 26-29, 37-40

navigational restrictions for, 19-22

1 -----'

Klumfoot, Clarence R., 47

Koczak, LCDR Edward, 58

jVg;", Alekse' N.

Liberty, 32

involvement in Six Day War, 3

relations with PLO, 1

relations with U.A.R., 1

Leahy, CAPT H. G., 43

Lebanon

navigational restrictions for, 19

I I

Johnson, GEN Harold K, 62

Johnson, Lyndon B.

advised of attack, 32

requests CIA assessment, 64

Joint Reconnaissance Center. See U.S. Joint Chiefs

of Staff

Jordan

I I

Israel

acknowledgement of error of attack, 32

compensation paid for attack, 64

Department of State reaction to attack, 41

I I

:E4gnew.Station··I'--"""":''::'""" _

Keller, BG William, 52

Kidd, RADM I. C., 54

Kiepfer, LT Richard F., ~2,35

I I

'EO 1. 4. Ie)

74 SECRET IIANBtiH ·,'iA CO!'tflN'f CIIANNELS ONLY
!ED 1.4. Ie)

BEeRHT

EO 1. 4 . Ie)

EO 1. 4 . Id)

"",,,,,.,.

EO 1. 4 . Ie)

Syria

I..,.........,...--.....,....,..."'"':':":"""-=--=-:--~ involvement in Six Day War, 1, 3

navigational restrictions observed by U.S., 19-20

relations with Peoples Republic of China, 1

USN-8M. See U.S.S. Liberty

USN-856D

Six Day War

intelligence requirements generated by, 5

resume of, 1-4

U. S. navigational restrictions resulting from, 19

Smith, Bromley, 58

Smith, CAPT Carl M.,47, 55

(Pivy'LTGB.li:" 58

691Oth Securitv Winlr.1

6931st Security GrouPik

6948th Security Squadron

1

///

1. 4. Ie)

EO 1. 4 . I d)

USN-446J

\\\

VHF/UHF, 6, 10-13

I I

O'Connor, LT James G., 26-29

O'Malley, ENS., 28

Owen, CAPT William D., 58

Renken, RADM Henry A., 47-48

Rhodes, CT3 Paddy E. (Dusty), 15, 26

Rostow, Walt, 32

Russ, MG Joseph R., 52, 54,58--60

Russell, LTC C. K., 21

linguists, 17, 19, 23, 62

NSA as backup processor, 18

technical reporting by Liberty, 23

Liberty's collection equipment, 16-17

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 1

Pawlinkowski, CTC Alfred J., 47

Pickett, MG G. B., 59

Platzek, CDR E. H., 47

Precedence assignment in message traffic, 22

Priddle, Maj Harlan E., 58

Sigint communications, 18-19

Saudi Arabia

conflict with U.A.R., 1,/3

I I

Security measures

file reduction at exposed sites, 62--63

minimizing compromise of Liberty's records, 43-45,

48, 51-52, 54-56

rules for press coverage and interviews,48

surveillance of Soviet destroyers, 44

Sheck, Eugene, 19-20, 52

Shukairy, Ahmed, 1

Sigint alerts

Sigint Readiness Alfa, Middle East, 1

Sigint Readiness Bravo Crayon, 3-5, 11, 19

Sigint collection

1airborne , 11-13, 18

1..."..,....,. _

Sigint processing and reporting

I ITechnicalProcessingCentet, 18:;;;19

Comint on Liberty attack, 34-35

I I

HA~9I.E \qA €OMlN~ CIIANNBtlS ONtly SHCRHT 75
SECRET

·EO 1.4. (c)

relations with U.S.S.R., 1, 3

I I

IL.:----:-------~.."."........- involvement in Six Day War, 3

navigational restrictions observed by U.S., 19-22

relations with Jordan, 1

relations with U.S., 3

relations with U.S. S.R., 1, 3

rivalry with Saudi Arabia, 1, 3

I

Syria (continued)

I

United States

AID personnel in Yemen imprisoned, 1-3

relations with U.A.R., 3

support of Israel, 1

U. S. Army Communications Support Unit.1 I i 1..- _

U.S. Chief, Naval Operations (CNO)

Norfolk survey team, 55-56

recommends withdrawal of Liberty, 21

U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe

actions subsequent to Liberty attack, 31, 45, 47

actions to withdraw Liberty, 21

JCS Fact Finding Team's visit, 52

operational control of Liberty, 17

U. S. Congress, House of Representatives,

Appropriations Committee

reviews communications problems during Liberty

incident, 59~0

Yemen actions, 1-2

United Nations

actions during Six Day War, 3-4

Middle East peace-keeping attempts,

I I

reviews DOD message precedence usage, 60

U.S. Department of State

criticizes Israeli attack, 41

U.S. European Command. See U.S. Commander-inChief, Europe

Technical Processing Center (TPC)I 118::~~, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff

62 actions-subsequent to Liberty attack, 32

Technical research ship special communicationsrllrectioDlltoLibf!.rty, 17

system (TRSSCOMM!, 1..6- 18... Fact FindingTeaU).~47tl>2,54, 58-59, 61 Joint Reconnaissance Center;J5,17, 20

reaction to Six Day War, 20 .... "',.

safety evaluations, 61~2 EO 1. 4 . (c)

U.S. Naval SecllritYGroup,58-59,62 U·~·NaVYjEurope

actions subsequent to i"iberty attack, 28-29, 32

activation of TF 100~ 47

communicationsdifficulty with Liberty, 20

convenes.Naval Court of Inquiry, 47

involvement in actions to withdraw Liberty, 21-23

JCS Fact Finding Team's visit, 52

navigational restrictions, 19

operational control of Liberty, 17-18, 20

U.S. Navy Ships Engineering Center, 52

U.S. Navy Task Force 60, 28

U.S. Navy Task Force 63, 32

U.S. Navy Task Force 100, 47-48, 52

U.S. Navy Task Group 100.3, 47-48

U.S. Navy Task Group 100.4, 47-48

U.S. Navy Task Group 100.6, 47

U.S.N.S MU l..l..er See Sigint unitsl U.S.N.S. Valdez. See Sigint units

U.S. S. America, 31,33.4~ 44,48~---

U.S.S. Belmont, 15, 43-44, 57, 62

u.S.S.···Davisi···42~44,··47

U.S.S. Georgetown, 15

U.S.S. Jamestown, 15. See Sigint units I U.S.S.~ibf!rty '------

armament of, 16

attack on 26-30

attempts to withdraw, 21-23

awards for, 64

communications of, 16-17, 19-20

damaged equipment assessment, 52-54

deployment to eastern Mediterranean, 15, 17-22

Israeli post-attack reconnaissance, 30--31

JCS Fact Finding Team's visit, 54

navigational restrictions, 17, 19, 21-22

operational control of, 15, 17, 20, 22

post-attack document disposition, 32

press coverage, 48, 52

rationale for eastern Mediterranean

deployment, 5, 12-13

I{moo, Albert W., 45 I

United Arab Republic (U.A.R.)

charges of U.S.-u. K complicity with Israel in

Six Day War, 3, 20

76 SE€RE'f'
U.S. S. Liberty (continued)

safety factors, consideration of, 19-20, 61-62

Sigint mission of, 15-17, 19, 23

Sixth Fleet rescue operation, 43-47

USN Attache in Tel Aviv as intermediary, 34

U.S.S. Little Rock, 31, 43, 52

U.S.S. Massey, 43-44

U.S.S. Oxford, 15-20

U.S.S. Papago, 32, 35, 43-45, 47-48

U.S.S. Saratoga, 28-29, 31-32

U.S. Sixth Fleet

actions taken in reaction to attack, 28-29, 31-32,

34

indications of possible hostile intent, 20

JCS Fact Finding Team's visit, 52

navigational restrictions, 19-20, 31

operational control of Liberty, 17, 19-20

Sigint direct support of, 11

SHeREi'

U.S.S.R.

relations with Middle Eastern countries, 1, 3

I I

Six Day War involvement, 4, 19

Vance, Cyrus, 32

Vineyard, CAPT Merriwell W., 21

Way, CT3 Clyde W., 27, 29

Wheeler, LTG Earle G., 21, 59

Wilson, Robert L., 17, 25-27, 29, 36, 44, 51

Yrmen

U.A.R. intervention, 1

Yerushalmi, Lt Col Yishaya, 37

EO 1. 4 . (c)

EO 1. 4 . (c)

TS-Jun 81-53-3475 IIANBI:iH YIA eOl\HN'I' eIIANNIH~8 ON~¥ SHeRBT 77