OVERSIGHT OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 7, 2016 

Serial No. 114–67 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://www.house.gov/reform 


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OVERSIGHT OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 7, 2016 

Serial No. 114–67 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://www.house.gov/reform 


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(II) 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

ROD BLUM, Iowa 

JODY B. HICE, Georgia 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin 

WILL HURD, Texas 

GARY J. PALMER, Alabama 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MATT CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan 

TED LIEU, California 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands 

MARK DESAULNIER, California 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico 

JENNIFER HEMINGWAY, Staff Director 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

TRISTAN LEAVITT, Senior Counsel 

WILLIAM MARX, Clerk 


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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on July 7, 2016 ................................................................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

The Hon. James Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 5 

Mr. Steve Linick, Inspector General, Department of State, Accompanied by 

Ms. Jennifer Costello, Assistant Inspector General for Evaluations and 

Special Projects, Department of State 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 92 

Mr. I. Charles McCullough, III, Inspector General for the Intelligence Community, Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 92 

APPENDIX 

Sensitive Compartmented Information Nondisclosure Agreement, signed by 

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, submitted by Rep. Chaffetz ....... 122 

Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement, signed by Secretary of State 

Hillary Rodham Clinton, submitted by Rep. Chaffetz ...................................... 124 

A July 6, 2016 letter to the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee from Richard W. Painter, S. Walter Richey, Professor of Corporate 

Law at the University of Minnesota Law School, submitted by Rep. Lawrence ...................................................................................................................... 126

Two reports from the Office of Inspector General at the State Department, 

submitted by Rep. Chaffetz ................................................................................. 128 

a. ‘‘Evaluation of the Department of State’s FOIA Process for Requests 

Involving the Office of the Secretary’’ January 2016 .................................... 129 

b. ‘‘Office of the Secretary: Evaluation of Email Records Management 

and Cybersecurity Requirements’’ May 2016 ................................................. 157 

Series of memoranda from both the Department of State Inspector General 

and the ODNI Inspector General, submitted by Rep. Chaffetz ........................ 240 

Opening Statement submitted by Rep. Elijah E. Cummings ............................... 255 


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OVERSIGHT OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT 

Thursday, July 7, 2016 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in Room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jason Chaffetz [chairman of the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Chaffetz, Mica, Duncan, Jordan, 

Walberg, Amash, Gosar, DesJarlais, Gowdy, Farenthold, Lummis, 

Massie, Meadows, DeSantis, Mulvaney, Buck, Walker, Blum, Hice, 

Russell, Carter, Grothman, Hurd, Palmer, Cummings, Maloney, 

Norton, Clay, Lynch, Cooper, Connolly, Cartwright, Duckworth, 

Kelly, Lawrence, Lieu, Watson Coleman, Plaskett, DeSaulnier, 

Boyle, Welch, and Lujan Grisham. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform will come to order. 

Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess at 

any time. 

I want to thank Director Comey for being here and doing so on 

short notice. I have the greatest admiration for the FBI. My grandfather was a career FBI agent. 

I have got to tell you, I am here because we are mystified and 

confused by the fact pattern that you laid out and the conclusions 

that you reached. It seems that there are two standards, and there 

is no consequence for these types of activities and dealing in a careless way with classified information. It seems to a lot of us that the 

average Joe, the average American, that if they had done what you 

laid out in your statement, that they’d be in handcuffs and they 

might be on their way to jail, and they probably should, and I 

think there is a legitimate concern that there is a double standard. 

If your name isn’t Clinton or you’re not part of the powerful elite, 

that Lady Justice will act differently. It is a concern that Lady Justice will take off that blindfold and come to a different conclusion. 

Hillary Clinton created this mess. It wasn’t Republicans. It 

wasn’t anybody else. She made a very conscious decision. On the 

very day that she started her Senate confirmation, she set up and 

got a domain name and set up a system to avoid and bypass the 

safety, security, and the protocol of the State Department. 

Classified information is classified for a reason. It is classified because if it were to get out into the public, there are nefarious actors, nation-states, others that want to do harm to this country, 

and there are people who put their lives on the line protecting and 

serving our country, and when those communications are not seVerDate Sep 11 2014 14:35 Oct 12, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\21323.TXT APRIL

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cure, it puts their lives at jeopardy. This classified information is 

entrusted to very few, but there is such a duty and an obligation 

to protect that, to fall on your sword to protect that, and yet there 

doesn’t seem to be any consequence. 

You know, I was talking to Trey Gowdy, and he made a really 

good point with us yesterday. Mr. Gowdy said, you know, in your 

statement, Mr. Director, you mentioned that there was no precedent for this, but we believe that you have set a precedent, and it’s 

a dangerous one. The precedent is if you sloppily deal with classified information, if you are cavalier about it—and it wasn’t just an 

innocent mistake; this went on for years—that there is going to be 

no consequence. 

We are a different nation in the United States of America. We 

are self-critical. Most nations would never do this, but we do it in 

the spirit of making ourselves better. There will be all kinds of accusations about political this and political that. I have defended 

your integrity every step of the way. You are the definitive voice. 

I stand by that, but I am mystified, and I am confused, because you 

listen to your fact pattern and come to the conclusion that there 

is no consequence, I don’t know how to explain that. We will have 

constituents ask us. They’ll get mad. They will pound the—you 

know, they’re frustrated. They have seen this happen time and 

time again. I don’t know how to explain it, and I hope that, 

through this hearing, we can stick to the facts and understand this, 

because there does seem to be two standards. There does seem to 

be no consequence, and I want to understand that, and I want to 

be able to explain that to the person that’s sitting at home, and 

that is why we are here. 

And so I yield back. 

I now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Cummings. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Director Comey, thank you for being here today. 

I want to begin by commending you and the public servants at the 

FBI for the independent investigation you conducted. You had a 

thankless task. No matter what recommendation you made, you 

were sure to be criticized. There is no question that you were extremely thorough. In fact, some may even say you went too far in 

your investigation. But, of course, that was your job; that is your 

job. 

Secretary Clinton has acknowledged that she made a mistake in 

using a personal email account, and you explained on Tuesday that 

she and her colleagues at the State Department were extremely 

careless with their emails, but after conducting this exhaustive review, you determined that no reasonable prosecutor would bring a 

case based on this evidence, and you and the career staff recommended against prosecution. Based on the previous cases you 

examined, if prosecutors had gone forward, they would have been 

holding the Secretary to a different standard from everyone else. 

Amazingly—amazingly—some Republicans who were praising 

you just days ago for your independence, for your integrity, and 

your honesty instantly turned against you because your recommendation conflicted with the predetermined outcome they 

wanted. In their eyes, you had one job and one job only: to prosecute Hillary Clinton. 


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But you refused to do so, so now you are being summoned here 

to answer for your alleged transgressions, and in a sense, Mr. Director, you are on trial. 

Contrary to the claims of your critics, there is absolutely no evidence that you made your recommendation for political reasons, no 

evidence that you were bribed or coerced or influenced, no evidence 

that you came to your conclusion based upon anything but the facts 

and the law. I firmly believe that your decision was not based on 

convenience but on conviction. 

Today, House Republicans are doing what they always do, using 

taxpayers’ money to continue investigating claims that have already been debunked just to keep them in the headlines one more 

day. When they hear a political siren, they rush toward it over and 

over again, even if the evidence is not there. Exhibit A, Majority 

Leader Kevin McCarthy, who admitted on national television that 

Republicans established the Benghazi Select Committee to bring 

down Secretary Clinton’s poll numbers. I didn’t say that; McCarthy 

said it. The fact was confirmed by a Republican staffer on that 

committee who reported that he was fired in part for not going 

along with the hyper focus on Secretary Clinton. 

I give House Republicans credit. They certainly are not shy about 

what they are doing. They have turned political investigations into 

an art form. 

If our concerns here today are with the proper treatment of classified information, then we should start with the review of our previous hearing on General David Petraeus, who pled guilty last year 

to intentionally and knowingly compromising highly classified information. The problem is, Mr. Director, we never had that hearing. This committee ignored that breach of national security because it did not match the political goals of the House Republicans. 

If our concerns today were with finally addressing a broken classification system in which security levels are arbitrarily changed 

up and down, that would have been a legitimate goal, that would 

have been a valuable addition to reforming and improving our government. After all, we are the Government Reform Committee. 

We could have held hearings here on Zika, the Zika virus, preventing gun massacres like the one in Orlando, or a host of other 

topics that could actually save people’s lives, but that is not why 

we are here. That is not why our chairman called this emergency 

hearing 48 hours after you made your recommendation. 

Everyone knows what this committee is doing. Honestly, I would 

not be surprised—and I say this with all seriousness—I would not 

be surprised if, tomorrow, Republicans set up a new committee to 

spend $7 million plus on why the FBI failed to prosecute Hillary 

Clinton. 

Director Comey, let me conclude with this request. Even with all 

that I have said, I believe that there is a critical role for you today. 

I have listened carefully to the coverage on this issue, and I have 

heard people say as recently as this morning, 3 hours ago, that 

they were mystified by your decision. As a matter of fact, the chairman repeated it a minute ago. And so there is a perceived gap between the things you said on Tuesday and your recommendation. 

There is a gap, Mr. Director. So, in this moment—and this is a critical moment—I beg you to fill the gap, because when the gap is not 


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filled by you, it will be filled by others. Share with us, the American people, your process and your thinking; explain how you examined the evidence, the law, and the precedents; describe in clear 

terms how you and your team, career professionals, arrived at this 

decision. If you can do that today, if you can do that, that could 

go a long way toward people understanding your decision. 

Finally, I want to make it clear that I condemn these completely 

unwarranted political attacks against you. They have attacked you 

personally. They have attacked your integrity. They have impugned 

your professionalism. And they have even suggested that you were 

somehow bought and paid for because you made your recommendation based upon the law and the facts. 

I know you are used to working in the world of politics, but these 

attacks have been beyond the pale. So you do not deserve this. 

Your family does not deserve it. And the highly skilled and dedicated agents of the FBI do not deserve it. 

I honor your professionalism and your service to our country. 

And, again, even if it takes till hell freezes over, I beg you to close 

the gap, tell us what happened between what you found and your 

decision so that not only the members of this panel and this Congress will understand but so that Americans will understand. And 

if you do that, if you do that, then it will be all worth it today. 

With that, I yield back. 

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I think—hold on one second, with your indulgence. 

To the ranking member, of which I have the greatest respect, you 

asked for a hearing on General Petraeus and how that was dealt 

with; you got it. We will have one in this Oversight Committee. 

And the record will reflect that, in the Judiciary Committee, I repeatedly questioned Attorney General Holder, I repeatedly questioned the FBI Director about the disposition of that case, probably 

more than any Member in the House or Senate. And if you want 

a hearing, we will do that. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Will the gentlemen yield? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Yes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Number two, you complained that we 

haven’t done a hearing on Zika. The Oversight and Government 

Reform Committee, I believe, was the very first committee to actually do a hearing on Zika. That was chaired by Mr. Mica, and I am 

proud of the fact that we did a Zika hearing, and we did it first. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Will the gentleman yield? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Sure. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Can we have another one, because the problem 

is still there—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Absolutely. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. —big time. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Absolutely. 

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I would ask for a unanimous consent 

request that we put the date of the hearing in the record at this 

time that I chaired—thank you—on Zika. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Absolutely. 

[The information follows:] 


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The Subcommittee on Transportation and Public Assets held a 

hearing on February 24, 2016, titled, ‘‘The Zika Virus: Coordination 

of a Multi- Agency Response.’’ 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And the ranking member knows that we 

have held multiple hearings on the criminal justice and criminal 

justice reform. You asked for it. You are passionate about it. And 

we did do that as well. So to suggest we haven’t addressed some 

of those issues, I think, is inaccurate. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I don’t think I did that, Mr. Chairman, but, 

again, as late as yesterday, with the problem in Minnesota with an 

African American man being killed, I would like to have some hearings still on the criminal justice system. Thank you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Without objection. I am going to work with 

you on that—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. —as I have every step of the way. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Without objection, the chair is authorized 

to declare a recess at any time. We will hold the record open for 

5 legislative days for any members who would like to submit a 

written statement. 

We will now recognize our distinguished witness for our first 

panel. I am pleased to welcome the Honorable James Comey, the 

Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations. 

We welcome Director Comey, and thank you for being here. 

Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses are to be sworn before 

they testify. If you will please rise and raise and right hand. 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are 

about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 

truth. 

Mr. COMEY. I do. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

Let the record reflect that the witness answered in the affirmative. 

Mr. Comey, the floor is yours. You can take as long or as short 

as you would like. If you have any written statement that you 

would like to submit afterwards, we are happy to do that as well, 

and it will be made part of the record. The time is now yours. 

Director Comey, you are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES COMEY 

Mr. COMEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cummings, members 

of the committee. I am proud to be here today representing the people of the FBI, who did this investigation, as they do all their work, 

in a competent, honest, and independent way. I believe this investigation was conducted consistent with the highest traditions of the 

FBI. Our folks did it in an apolitical and professional way, including our recommendation as to the appropriate resolution of this 

case. 

As I said in my statement on Tuesday, I expected there would 

be significant public debate about this recommendation, and I am 

a big fan of transparency, so I welcome the conversation we are 


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going to have here today. And I do think a whole lot of folks have 

questions about, so why did we reach the conclusion we did, and 

what was our thinking? And I hope very much to get an opportunity to address that and to explain it. And I hope, at the end of 

day, people can disagree, can agree, but they will at least understand that the decision was made and the recommendation was 

made the way you would want it to be: by people who didn’t give 

a hoot about politics but who cared about, what are the facts, what 

is the law, and how have similar people, all people, been treated 

in the past? 

Maybe I could just say a few words at the beginning that would 

help frame how we think about this. There are two things that 

matter in a criminal investigation of a subject: What did the person 

do? And when they did that thing, what were they thinking? 

When you look at the hundred years plus of the Justice Department’s investigation and prosecution of the mishandling of classified information, those two questions are obviously present: What 

did the person do? Did they mishandle classified information? And 

when they did it, did they know they were doing something that 

was unlawful? That has been the characteristic of every charged 

criminal case involving the mishandling of classified information. I 

am happy to go through the cases in particular. 

In our system of law, there’s a thing called mens rea. It’s important to know what you did, but when you did it, this Latin phrase 

‘‘mens rea’’ means, what were you thinking? And we don’t want to 

put people in jail unless we prove that they knew they were doing 

something they shouldn’t do. That is the characteristic of all the 

prosecutions involving mishandling of classified information. 

There is a statute that was passed in 1917 that, on its face, 

makes it a crime, a felony, for someone to engage in gross negligence. So that would appear to say: Well, maybe in that circumstance, you don’t need to prove they knew they were doing 

something that was unlawful; maybe it’s enough to prove that they 

were just really, really careless, beyond a reasonable doubt. 

At the time Congress passed that statute in 1917, there was a 

lot of concern in the House and the Senate about whether that was 

going to violate the American tradition of requiring that, before 

you’re going to lock somebody up, you prove they knew they were 

doing something wrong, and so there was a lot of concern about it. 

The statute was passed. As best I can tell, the Department of Justice has used it once in the 99 years since, reflecting that same concern. I know, from 30 years with the Department of Justice, they 

have grave concerns about whether it’s appropriate to prosecute 

somebody for gross negligence, which is why they’ve done it once 

that I know of in a case involving espionage. 

And so when I look at the facts we gathered here, as I said, I 

see evidence of great carelessness, but I do not see evidence that 

is sufficient to establish that Secretary Clinton or those with whom 

she was corresponding both talked about classified information on 

email and knew, when they did it, they were doing something that 

was against the law, right? 

So, given that assessment of the facts and my understanding of 

the law, my conclusion was and remains no reasonable prosecutor 

would bring this case. No reasonable prosecutor would bring the 


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second case in a hundred years focused on gross negligence. And 

so I know that’s been a source of some confusion for folks. That’s 

just the way it is. I know the Department of Justice. I know no reasonable prosecutor would bring this case. I know a lot of my former 

friends are out there saying they would. I wonder where they were 

the last 40 years, because I’d like to see the cases they brought on 

gross negligence. Nobody would; nobody did. 

So my judgment was the appropriate resolution of this case was 

not with a criminal prosecution. As I said, folks can disagree about 

that, but I hope they know that view, not just my view but of my 

team, was honestly held, fairly investigated, and communicated 

with unusual transparency, because we know folks care about it. 

So I look forward to this conversation. I look forward to answering as many questions as I possibly can. I’ll stay as long as you 

need me to stay, because I believe transparency matters tremendously. And I thank you for the opportunity. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you, Director. I’m going to recognize 

myself here. 

Physically, where were Hillary Clinton’s servers? 

Mr. COMEY. The operational server was in the basement of her 

home in New York. The reason I’m answering it that way is because sometimes, after they were decommissioned, they were 

moved to other facilities, storage facilities, but the live device was 

always in the basement. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Was that an authorized or unauthorized location? 

Mr. COMEY. It was an unauthorized location for the transmitting 

of classified information. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Is it reasonable or unreasonable to expect 

Hillary Clinton would receive and send classified information? 

Mr. COMEY. As Secretary of State? Reasonable that the Secretary 

of State would encounter classified information in the course of the 

Secretary’s work. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Via email? 

Mr. COMEY. Sure, depending upon the nature of the system. To 

communicate classified information, it would have to be a classified-rated email system. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. But you did find more than 100 emails that 

were classified that had gone through that server, correct? 

Mr. COMEY. Right. Through an unclassified server, correct. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Yes. So Hillary Clinton did come to possess 

documents and materials containing classified information via 

email on these unsecured servers, correct? 

Mr. COMEY. That is correct. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Did Hillary Clinton lie? 

Mr. COMEY. To the FBI? We have no basis to conclude she lied 

to the FBI. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Did she lie to the public? 

Mr. COMEY. That’s a question I’m not qualified to answer. I can 

speak about what she said to the FBI. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Did Hillary Clinton lie under oath? 

Mr. COMEY. To the—not to the FBI, not in the case we were 

working. 


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Chairman CHAFFETZ. Did you review the documents where Congressman Jim Jordan asked her specifically, and she said, quote, 

‘‘There was nothing marked classified on my emails, either sent or 

received,’’ end quote? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t remember reviewing that particular testimony. I’m aware of that being said, though. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Did the FBI investigate her statements 

under oath on this topic? 

Mr. COMEY. Not to my knowledge. I don’t think there has been 

a referral from Congress. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Do you need a referral from Congress to investigate her statements under oath? 

Mr. COMEY. Sure do. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. You’ll have one. You’ll have one in the next 

few hours. 

Did Hillary Clinton break the law? 

Mr. COMEY. In connection with her use of the email server, my 

judgment is that she did not. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Did you—you’re just not able to prosecute 

it, or did Hillary Clinton break the law? 

Mr. COMEY. Well, I don’t want to give an overly lawyerly answer, 

but the question I always look at is, is there evidence that would 

establish beyond a reasonable doubt that somebody engaged in conduct that violated a criminal statute? And my judgment here is 

there is not. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The FBI does background checks. If Hillary 

Clinton applied for the job at the FBI, would the FBI give Hillary 

Clinton a security clearance? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t want to answer a hypothetical. The FBI has 

a robust process in which we adjudicate the suitability of people for 

employment in the Bureau. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Given the fact pattern you laid out less 

than 48 hours ago, would a person who had dealt with classified 

information like that, would that person be granted a security 

clearance at the FBI? 

Mr. COMEY. It would be a very important consideration in the 

suitability determination. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. You’re kind of making my point, Director. 

The point being, because I injected the word ‘‘Hillary Clinton,’’ you 

gave me a different answer, but if I came up to you and said that 

this person was extremely careless with classified information; the 

exposure to hostile actors; had used—despite warnings—created 

unnecessary burdens and exposure; if they said that they had one 

device and you found out that they had multiple devices; if there 

had been email chains with somebody like Jake Sullivan asking for 

classification changes, you’re telling me that the FBI would grant 

a security clearance to that person? 

Mr. COMEY. I’m not—I hope I’m giving a consistent—I’m not saying what the answer would be. I’m saying that would be an important consideration in a suitability determination for anybody. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And just—personally, I just think that 

sounds like a bit of a political answer, because I can’t imagine that 

the FBI would grant a security clearance to somebody with that 

fact pattern. Do you agree or disagree with that? 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. COMEY. I’ll say what I said before: again, it’s very hard to 

answer in a hypothetical. I’ll repeat it. It would be a very important consideration in a suitability determination. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Did Hillary Clinton do anything wrong? 

Mr. COMEY. What do you mean by ‘‘wrong’’? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I think it’s self-evident. 

Mr. COMEY. Well, I’m a lawyer. I’m an investigator. And I’m— 

I hope—a normal human being. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Do you really believe there should be no 

consequence for Hillary Clinton in how she dealt with this? 

Mr. COMEY. Well, I didn’t say—I hope folks remember what I 

said on Tuesday. I didn’t say there’s no consequence for someone 

who violates the rules regarding the handling of classified information. There are often very severe consequences in the FBI involving 

their employment, involving their pay, involving their clearances. 

That’s what I said on Tuesday. And I hope folks walk away understanding that, just because someone’s not prosecuted for mishandling classified information, that doesn’t mean, if you work in 

the FBI, there aren’t consequences for it. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So if Hillary Clinton or if anybody had 

worked at the FBI, under this fact pattern, what would you do to 

that person? 

Mr. COMEY. There would be a security review and an adjudication of their suitability, and a range of discipline could be imposed 

from termination to reprimand and, in between, suspensions, loss 

of clearance. So you could be walked out or you could—depending 

upon the nature of the facts, you could be reprimanded, but there 

is a robust process to handle that. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I’ve gone past my time. 

I yield back. 

I now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Cummings. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

Director Comey—and I want to thank you very much for being 

here today, especially on such short notice. You and your staff 

should be commended for the thorough and dedicated review you 

conducted. Unfortunately, some of my colleagues are now attacking 

you personally because your final recommendation conflicted with 

their preconceived political outcome in this case. 

Some have tried to argue that this case is far worse than the 

case of General David Petraeus, who was convicted in 2015 of 

knowingly and intentionally compromising highly classified information. In fact, one very vocal politician we all know said this, and 

I quote: ‘‘If she isn’t indicted, the only reason is because the Democrats are protecting her. She is being protected 100 percent, because you look at David—General Petraeus, you look at all the 

other people that did a fraction of what she did, but she has much 

worse judgment than he had, and she’s getting away with it, and 

it’s unfair to him,’’ end of quote. 

Director Comey, you were the Director of the FBI when General 

Petraeus pled guilty. Is that right? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. If I understand that case correctly, General 

Petraeus kept highly classified information in eight personal notebooks at his private residence. Is that correct? 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. COMEY. That is correct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. According to the filings in that case, this notebook included the identities of covert officers. They also included 

war strategy, intelligence capabilities, diplomatic discussions, 

quotes and deliberative discussions from high-level National Security Council meetings and discussions with the President. General 

Petraeus shared his information with his lover and then biographer. He was caught on audiotape telling her, and I quote, ‘‘I 

mean, they are highly classified, some of them. They don’t have it 

on—on it, but, I mean, there’s code word stuff in there,’’ end of 

quote. 

Director Comey, what did General Petraeus mean when he said 

he intentionally shared, quote, ‘‘code word’’ information with her? 

What does that mean? 

Mr. COMEY. The Petraeus case, to my mind, illustrates perfectly 

the kind of cases the Department of Justice is willing to prosecute. 

Even there, they prosecuted him for a misdemeanor. In that case, 

you had vast quantities of highly classified information, including 

special—sensitive compartmented information—that’s the reference 

to code words—a vast quantity of it, not only shared with someone 

without authority to have it, but we found it in a search warrant 

hidden under the insulation in his attic, and then he lied to us 

about it during the investigation. 

So you have obstruction of justice. You have intentional misconduct and a vast quantity of information. He admitted he knew 

that was the wrong thing to do. That is a perfect illustration of the 

kind of cases that get prosecuted. In my mind, it illustrates, importantly, the distinction to this case. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And General Petraeus did not admit to these 

facts when the FBI investigators first interviewed him. Did he? 

Mr. COMEY. No. He lied about it. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. But he did admit to these facts in a plea agreement. Is that correct? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Here’s what the Department filing said about 

General Petraeus, and I quote: ‘‘The acts taken by defendant David 

Howell Petraeus were in all respects knowing and deliberate and 

were not committed by mistake, accident, or other innocent reason,’’ end of quote. 

Is that an accurate summary, in your view, Director Comey? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. It actually leaves out an important part of the 

case, which is the obstruction of justice. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Was he charged with obstruction of justice? 

Mr. COMEY. No. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And why not? 

Mr. COMEY. A decision made by the leadership of the Department of Justice not to insist upon a plea to that felony. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So the question is, do you agree with the claim 

that General Petraeus, and I quote, ‘‘got in trouble for far less,’’ end 

of quote? 

Mr. COMEY. No. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Do you agree with that statement? 

Mr. COMEY. No. It’s the reverse. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And what do you mean by that? 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. COMEY. His conduct, to me, illustrates the categories of behavior that mark the prosecutions that are actually brought: clearly intentional conduct, knew what he was doing was a violation of 

the law, huge amounts of information that, even if you couldn’t 

prove he knew it, it raises the inference that he did it—right—an 

effort to obstruct justice. That combination of things makes it worthy of a prosecution, a misdemeanor prosecution but a prosecution 

nonetheless. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Sitting here today, do you stand by the FBI’s recommendation to prosecute General Petraeus? 

Mr. COMEY. Oh, yeah. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Do you stand by the FBI’s recommendation not 

to prosecute Hillary Clinton? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Director Comey, how many times have you testified before Congress about the General Petraeus case? Do you 

know? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t think I’ve ever testified—I don’t think I’ve 

testified about it at all. I don’t think so. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. With that, I would yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I have to check the record, but I believe I 

asked you a question about it at the time, but maybe not. 

Mr. COMEY. You could have. That’s why I was—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Yeah, yeah. 

Mr. COMEY. —squinching my face. It could have been at a Judiciary Committee hearing I was asked about it. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Yeah. 

We’ll now recognize the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. 

Gowdy, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GOWDY. Good morning, Director Comey. Secretary Clinton 

said she never sent or received any classified information over her 

private email. Was that true? 

Mr. COMEY. Our investigation found that there was classified information sent—— 

Mr. GOWDY. So it was not true? 

Mr. COMEY. Right. That’s what I said. 

Mr. GOWDY. Okay. Well, I’m looking for a little shorter answer 

so you and I are not here quite as long. 

Secretary Clinton said there was nothing marked classified on 

her emails either sent or received. Was that true? 

Mr. COMEY. That’s not true. There were a small number of portion markings on, I think, three of the documents. 

Mr. GOWDY. Secretary Clinton said: I did not email any classified 

material to anyone on my email. There is no classified material. 

Was that true? 

Mr. COMEY. No. There was classified material emailed. 

Mr. GOWDY. Secretary Clinton said she used just one device. Was 

that true? 

Mr. COMEY. She used multiple devices during the 4 years of her 

term as Secretary of State. 

Mr. GOWDY. Secretary Clinton said all work-related emails were 

returned to the State Department. Was that true? 

Mr. COMEY. No. We found work-related emails, thousands, that 

were not returned. 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. GOWDY. Secretary Clinton said neither she nor anyone else 

deleted work-related emails from her personal account. Was that 

true? 

Mr. COMEY. That’s a harder one to answer. We found traces of 

work-related emails on devices or in slack space, whether they 

were deleted or whether when a server was changed out, something happened to them. There’s no doubt that there were workrelated emails that were removed electronically from the email system. 

Mr. GOWDY. Secretary Clinton said her lawyers read every one 

of the emails and were overly inclusive. Did her lawyers read the 

email content individually? 

Mr. COMEY. No. 

Mr. GOWDY. Well, in the interests of time and because I have a 

plane to catch tomorrow afternoon, I’m not going to go through any 

more of the false statements, but I am going to ask you to put on 

your old hat. 

False exculpatory statements, they are used for what? 

Mr. COMEY. Well, either for a substantive prosecution or for evidence of intent in a criminal prosecution. 

Mr. GOWDY. Exactly. Intent and consciousness of guilt, right? Is 

that right? 

Mr. COMEY. Right. 

Mr. GOWDY. Consciousness of guilt and intent. 

Mr. COMEY. Uh-huh. 

Mr. GOWDY. In your old job, you would prove intent, as you just 

referenced, by showing the jury evidence of a complex scheme that 

was designed for the very purpose of concealing the public record, 

and you would be arguing, in addition to concealment, the destruction that you and I just talked about or certainly the failure to preserve, you would argue all of that under the heading of content— 

you would also—intent. 

You would also be arguing the pervasiveness of the scheme, 

when it started, when it ended, and the number of emails, whether 

they were originally classified or up classified. You would argue all 

of that under the heading of intent. 

You would also probably, under common scheme or plan, argue 

the burn bags of daily calendar entries or the missing daily calendar entries as a common scheme or plan to conceal. 

Two days ago, Director, you said a reasonable person in her position should have known a private email was no place to send and 

receive classified information. You’re right. An average person does 

know not to do that. This is no average person. This is a former 

First Lady, a former United States Senator, and a former Secretary 

of State that the President now contends is the most competent, 

qualified person to be president since Jefferson. He didn’t say that 

in 2008, but he says it now. She affirmatively rejected efforts to 

give her a State.gov account, she kept these private emails for almost 2 years, and only turned them over to Congress because we 

found out she had a private email account. 

So you have a rogue email system set up before she took the oath 

of office, thousands of what we now know to be classified emails, 

some of which were classified at the time, one of her more frequent 

email comrades was, in fact, hacked, and you don’t know whether 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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or not she was, and this scheme took place over a long period of 

time and resulted in the destruction of public records, and yet you 

say there is insufficient evidence of intent. You say she was extremely careless but not intentionally so. 

You and I both know intent is really difficult to prove. Very rarely do defendants announce: On this day, I intend to break this 

criminal code section. Just to put everyone on notice, I am going 

to break the law on this date. 

It never happens that way. You have to do it with circumstantial 

evidence, or if you’re Congress and you realize how difficult it is 

to prove specific intent, you will formulate a statute that allows for 

gross negligence. 

My time is out, but this is really important. You mentioned 

there’s no precedent for criminal prosecution. My fear is there still 

isn’t. There’s nothing to keep a future Secretary of State or President from this exact same email scheme or their staff. And my real 

fear is this—it’s what the chairman touched upon—this double 

track justice system that is, rightly or wrongly, perceived in this 

country that if you are a private in the Army and you email yourself classified information, you will be kicked out, but if you are 

Hillary Clinton and you seek a promotion to Commander in Chief, 

you will not be. 

So what I hope you can do today is help the average—the reasonable person you made reference to, the reasonable person understand why she appears to be treated differently than the rest of us 

would be. 

With that, I would yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. We’ll now recognize the gentlewoman from 

New York, Mrs. Maloney. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Director, thank you for your years of public service. You have distinguished yourself as the assistant U.S. attorney 

for both the Southern District of New York and the Eastern District of Virginia. That’s why you were appointed by President Bush 

to be the Deputy Attorney General at the Department of Justice 

and why President Obama appointed you as the Director of the FBI 

in 2013. 

Despite your impeccable reputation for independence and integrity, Republicans have turned on you with a vengeance immediately after you announced your recommendation not to pursue 

criminal charges against Secretary Clinton. Let me give you some 

examples. Representative Turner said, and I quote: ‘‘The investigation by the FBI is steeped in political bias,’’ end quote. 

Was your investigation steeped in political bias, yes or no? 

Mr. COMEY. No. It was steeped in no kind of bias. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you. The Speaker of the House, Paul 

Ryan, was even more critical. He accused you of not applying the 

law equally. He said your recommendation shows, and I quote, ‘‘the 

Clintons are living above the law. They’re being held to a different 

set of standards. That is clearly what this looks like,’’ end quote. 

How do you respond to his accusations that you held the Clintons 

to a different set of standards than anyone else? Did you hold them 

to a different standard or the same standard? 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. COMEY. It’s just not—it’s just not accurate. We try very hard 

to apply the same standard whether you’re rich or poor, white or 

black, old or young, famous or not known at all. 

I just hope folks will take the time to understand the other cases, 

because there’s a lot of confusion out there about what the facts 

were of the other cases that I understand lead good people, reasonable people, to have questions. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Senator Cruz also criticized you. He said that 

there are, and I quote, ‘‘serious concerns about the integrity of Director Comey’s decision.’’ He stated that you, quote, you ‘‘had rewritten a clearly worded Federal criminal statute.’’ 

Did you rewrite the law in any way or rewrite any statute? 

Mr. COMEY. No. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Now, I hesitate, I truly hesitate to mention the 

next one, but Donald Trump took these conspiracy theories to a totally new level. He said, and I quote: ‘‘It was no accident that 

charges were not recommended against Hillary the exact same day 

as President Obama campaigned with her for the first time.’’ 

So did you plan the timing of your announcement to help Secretary Clinton’s campaign event on Tuesday? 

Mr. COMEY. No. The timing was entirely my own. Nobody knew 

I was going to do it, including the press. I’m very proud of the way 

the FBI—nobody leaked that. We didn’t coordinate it, didn’t tell. 

Just not a consideration. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you. Mr. Trump also claimed that Secretary Clinton bribed the Attorney General with an extension of 

her job and I guess this somehow affected your decision. 

I know it’s a ridiculous question, but I have to ask it. Did you 

make your decision because of some kind of bribe to the Attorney 

General? 

Mr. COMEY. No. 

Mrs. MALONEY. I tell you, are you surprised, as I am, by the intensity of the attacks from the GOP on you after having made a 

decision, a thoughtful decision, an independent decision with the 

professional staff of the FBI? 

Mr. COMEY. I’m not surprised by the intense interest and debate. 

I predicted it. I think it’s important that we talk about these 

things. They inevitably become focused on individual people. That’s 

okay. We’ll just continue to have the conversation. 

Mrs. MALONEY. I believe that what we’re seeing today is that if 

the GOP does not like the results of an investigation or how it 

turns out—and we saw they originally were lauding you—the 

minute you made your announcement, they’re now attacking you, 

the same people. And now I predict they’ll be calling for more hearings, more investigations, all at the expense of the taxpayer, and 

they do this instead of working on what the American people really 

care about. They want Congress to focus on jobs, the environment, 

Homeland Security, the security of our Nation, affordable childcare, 

affordable college educations, and an economy that works and helps 

all people. 

I thank you for performing your job with distinction and the long 

history of your whole profession of integrity and independence. And 

thank you very much. My time has expired. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentlewoman. 


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We’ll now recognize the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Jordan, for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. JORDAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director, thank you for being with us. On Tuesday, you said any 

reasonable person in Secretary Clinton’s position should have 

known that an unclassified system was no place for these conversations. You said on Tuesday some of her emails bore classified markings, and you also said on Tuesday there were potential violations 

of the appropriate statutes. 

Now, I know a bunch of prosecutors back home would look at 

that fact pattern, look at that evidence, you even referenced in your 

opening statement, some of your prosecutor—friends in the prosecution business have been on TV and said they would have looked 

at that same evidence and they would have taken it to a grand 

jury, but on Tuesday, you said and, today, in your opening statement, you said no reasonable prosecutor would bring such a case. 

And then in your statement Tuesday, you cite factors that helped 

you make that decision and make that statement, and one of the 

factors you said was consider the context of a person’s actions. 

Now, typically, when I hear ‘‘context’’ in the course of a criminal 

investigation, it’s from the defense side, not the prosecution side; 

it’s at the end of the case, after there’s been a trial and a guilty 

verdict; and it’s during the sentencing phase, mitigating circumstances. That’s the context we typically think about, but you 

said it on the front end. You said ‘‘consider the context of the person’s actions,’’ and so I’m curious, what does ‘‘consider the context’’ 

mean? Because a lot of Americans are thinking just what the chairman talked about in his opening statement, that there are two 

standards, one for we the people and one for the politically connected. A lot of folks I get the privilege of representing back in 

Ohio think that when you said ‘‘consider the context,’’ they think 

that’s what Mr. Gowdy just talked about, the fact that she’s a 

former First Lady, former Secretary of State, former Senator, major 

party’s nominee for the highest office in the land, and, oh, by the 

way, her husband just met with the individual you work with at 

an airport in Arizona 5 days ago. 

So you said none of that influenced your decision, but tell us 

what ‘‘consider the context’’ means. 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. Thank you, Mr. Jordan. What I was trying to 

capture is the fact that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is 

always a judgment call, it is in every single case, and among the 

things you consider are, what was this person’s background? What 

was the circumstances of the offense? Were they drunk? Were they 

inflamed by passion? Was it somebody who had a sufficient level 

of education and training and experience that we can infer certain 

things from that, to consider the entire circumstances of the person’s offense conduct and background? I did not mean to consider 

political context. 

Mr. JORDAN. Okay. The entire circumstances, and Mr. Gowdy 

just talked about this scheme, remember what she did, right? She 

sets up this unique server arrangement. She alone controls it. On 

that server, on that email system are her personal emails, her 

work-related emails, Clinton Foundation information, and, now we 

know, classified information. This gets discovered. We find out this 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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arrangement exists. Then what happens? Her lawyers, her legal 

team decides which ones we get and which ones they get to keep. 

They made the sort on front end. And then we found out the ones 

that they kept and didn’t give to us, didn’t give to the American 

people, didn’t give to Congress, the ones they kept, they destroyed 

them. And you don’t have to take my word. I’ll take what you said 

on Tuesday. They deleted all emails that they did not return to the 

State Department, and the lawyers cleaned their devices in such a 

way as to preclude complete forensic recovery. Now, that sounds 

like a fancy way of saying they hid the evidence, right? And you 

just told Mr. Gowdy thousands of emails fell into those categories. 

Now, that seems to me to provide some context to what took place 

here. 

Did Secretary Clinton’s legal team—excuse me. Let me ask it 

this way. Did Secretary Clinton know her legal team deleted those 

emails that they kept from us? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t believe so. 

Mr. JORDAN. Did Secretary Clinton approve those emails being 

deleted? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t think there was any specific instruction or 

conversation between the Secretary and her lawyers about that. 

Mr. JORDAN. Did you ask that question? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. JORDAN. Did Secretary Clinton know that her lawyers 

cleaned devices in such a way as to preclude complete forensic recovery? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t believe that she did. 

Mr. JORDAN. Did you ask that question? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. JORDAN. Do you see how someone could view the context of 

what she did? Set up a private system. She alone controlled it. She 

kept everything on it. We now know from Ms. Abedin’s deposition 

that they did it for that very reason, so no one could see what was 

there, based on the deposition Ms. Abedin gave. And then when 

they got caught, they deleted what they had and they scrubbed 

their devices. 

Is that part of the context in evaluating this decision? 

Mr. COMEY. Sure. Sure. And understand what inferences can be 

drawn from that collection of facts, of course. 

Mr. JORDAN. All right. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

I’ll now recognize the gentlewoman from the District of Columbia, Ms. Norton, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Comey, I appreciate your conduct of this investigation in 

a nonpartisan way, in keeping with the sterling reputation, which 

has led Presidents of both parties to appoint you to highly placed 

law enforcement positions in our Federal Government. 

I want to say for the record that this hearing, where you call the 

prosecutor—and Mr. Comey stands in the place of the prosecutor, 

because the Attorney General has accepted entirely the FBI’s recommendations—where you call the prosecutor to give account for 

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ous questions of separation of powers. And, particularly, when 

you’re questioning the prosecutor’s decision with respect to the decision to prosecute or not a particular individual, it raises serious 

bill of attainder constitutional questions. 

These hearings are so often accusatory that they yield no guidance as to how to conduct business in the future, and that’s the 

way it looks. It looks as though that is how this hearing is going. 

Now, of course, now, everyone understands in the abstract why 

it is important for security reasons to use official government 

mail—or email rather than private accounts—private email if security matters are involved. Now, that’s a very broad, wide proposition. 

Now, there are no rules, so far as I know, requiring Members of 

Congress to use their—as to how they use their official email accounts, whether involving security or not. The chairman of this 

committee lists his personal account, for example, on his business 

card. I’m—no one says that’s wrong. I don’t know if it’s wrong or 

right, because there’s no guidance. Federal agency employees, 

Members of Congress often have secure information or at least sensitive information that shouldn’t be made public. Some of our Members are on the Intelligence Committee or the defense committee or 

even this committee and may have such matters. Some of these 

matters may concern national security issues, and—I don’t know— 

if something as sensitive as the itinerary if you’re going on a codel 

as to the route you are taking and where you will be, all of that 

could be on people’s personal emails. 

Of course, this is the legislative branch, and I spoke of the separation of powers, and I’m not indicating that there should be a governmentwide sense that is ordained from on high, but there ought 

to be rules that everybody understands, especially after the Clinton 

episode, about the use of personal email. So I’d like your insight 

for guidance as far as other Federal employees are concerned or 

even Members of Congress and their staff, because I think we could 

learn from this episode. 

So, strictly from a security standpoint, do you believe that Federal employees, staff, even Members of Congress, should attempt 

guidance on the issue of the use of personal emails versus some official form of communication? What should we learn from the process the Secretary has gone through? I’m sure there will be questions about how there was even confusion, for example, in the State 

Department, but what should we learn when it comes to our own 

use of email or the use of Federal employees on this question? 

Mr. COMEY. Can I answer, Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Sure. 

Mr. COMEY. The most important thing to learn is that an unclassified email system is no case for an email conversation about classified matters. And by that I mean either sending a document as 

an attachment over unclassified email that is classified or having 

a conversation about something that is a classified subject on an 

unclassified email system. That’s the focus of the concern. That’s 

the focus of this investigation. That it was also a personal email 

adds to the concern about the case because of the security 

vulnerabilities associated with a personal system, but the root of 

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ness that is classified. And so all of us should have access to, if we 

have access to classified information, classified communication systems. The FBI has three levels: unclassified system, a secret system, and a top secret system. You can email on all three, but you 

need to make sure you don’t email on the unclass system, even if 

that’s a government classified system, about matters that are classified. That’s the important lesson learned. Everybody ought to be 

aware of it. Everybody ought to be trained on it. We spend a lot 

of time training on it in the FBI to make sure folks are sensitive 

to the need to move a classified discussion, even if it doesn’t involve 

sending a document, to the appropriate forum. 

Ms. NORTON. Members of Congress included? 

Mr. COMEY. Of course. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. We’ll now recognize the gentleman from 

Florida, Mr. DeSantis, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Director, and the reason why that’s so important 

is because if top secret information is compromised, that could 

damage our national security, correct? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes, by definition. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And American lives are at stake in some instances, correct? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. DESANTIS. You mentioned a lot of people were upset that 

there were no consequences for Secretary Clinton, but in your 

statement, you did point out that administrative and security consequences would be appropriate if someone demonstrated extreme 

carelessness for classified information. 

So those consequences, that would include potentially termination of Federal employment? 

Mr. COMEY. Correct. 

Mr. DESANTIS. It could include revocation of security clearance? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And it could include ineligibility for future employment in national security positions, correct? 

Mr. COMEY. It could. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Now, would you as the FBI Director allow someone in the employ of your agency to work in a national security capacity if that person had demonstrated extreme carelessness in 

handling top secret info? 

Mr. COMEY. The best answer to that is we would look very closely at that in a suitability determination. It’s hard to answer in the 

abstract ‘‘yes’’ in all cases, ‘‘no’’ in all cases, but it would be a very 

important suitability scrub. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So there would be instances where someone could 

be extremely careless but still maintain confidence? I mean, we 

have a lot of people who are very competent in this country who 

would love to work for your agency, but yet it would be—potentially you would allow somebody to be extremely careless and continue on? 

Mr. COMEY. That’s the trouble with answering a hypothetical. I 

could imagine if it was a long time ago, and it was a small amount 

of conduct or something. That’s why it’s hard to say other than it 

would be a very important part of the—— 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. DESANTIS. Let’s just put it this way. Would being extremely 

careless in handling top secret information expose an employee of 

the FBI to potential termination? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Why shouldn’t U.S. officials use mobile devices 

when traveling to foreign countries, especially if they’re discussing 

classified or sensitive information? 

Mr. COMEY. Because the mobile device will transmit its signal 

across networks that are likely controlled or at least accessed by 

that hostile power. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And that’s the guidance that the FBI gives all officials when they’re traveling overseas. That’s still good guidance, 

correct? 

Mr. COMEY. That’s good guidance. 

Mr. DESANTIS. How did top secret information end up on the private server? Because your statement addressed Secretary Clinton. 

You did not address any of her aides in your statement. Attorney 

General Lynch exonerated everybody. That information just didn’t 

get there on its own, so how did it get there? Were you able to determine that? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. By people talking about a top secret subject in 

an email communication. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So it was—— 

Mr. COMEY. It’s not about forwarding a top secret document; it’s 

about having a conversation about a matter that is top secret. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And those were things that were originated by 

Secretary Clinton’s aides and then sent to her, which would obviously be in her server, but it was also included Secretary Clinton 

originating those emails, correct? 

Mr. COMEY. That’s correct. In most circumstances, it initiated 

with aides starting a conversation. In the one involving top secret 

information, Secretary Clinton, though, also not only received but 

also sent emails that talked about the same subject. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And of that top secret information that you found, 

would somebody who was sophisticated in those matters, should it 

have been obvious to them that that was very sensitive information? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So I guess my issue about knowledge of what 

you’re doing is in order for Secretary Clinton to have access to top 

secret/SCI information, didn’t she have to sign a form with the 

State Department acknowledging her duties and responsibilities 

under the law to safeguard this information? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. Anybody who gets access to SCI, sensitive compartmented information, would sign what’s called a read-in form 

that lays that out. I’m sure Members of Congress have seen the 

same thing. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And it stresses in that document and other training people would get that there are certain requirements to handling certain levels of information. For example, a top secret document, that can’t even be on your secret system at the FBI, correct? 

Mr. COMEY. Correct. 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. DESANTIS. So you have to follow certain guidelines. And I 

guess my question is, is she’s a very sophisticated person. She did 

execute that document, correct? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And her aides who were getting the classified information, they executed similar documents to get a security clearance, correct? 

Mr. COMEY. I believe so. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And she knowingly clearly set up her own private 

server in order to—well, actually, let me ask you that. Was the reason she set up her own private server, in your judgment, because 

she wanted to shield communications from Congress and from the 

public? 

Mr. COMEY. I can’t say that. Our best information is that she set 

it up as a matter of convenience. It was an already existing system 

that her husband had, and she decided to have a domain on that 

system. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So the question is, is very sophisticated—this is 

information that clearly anybody who had knowledge of security information would know that it would be classified—but I’m having 

a little bit of trouble to see, how would you not then know that that 

was something that was inappropriate to do? 

Mr. COMEY. Well, I just want to take one of your assumptions 

about sophistication. I don’t think that our investigation established that she was actually particularly sophisticated with respect 

to classified information and the levels and the treatment, and so 

far as we can tell—— 

Mr. DESANTIS. Isn’t she an original classification authority, 

though? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Good grief. Well, I appreciate you coming. And I 

yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. I ask unanimous 

consent to enter into the record two documents that Mr. DeSantis 

referred to. One is the Sensitive Compartmented Information Nondisclosure Agreement. The other one is the Classified Information 

Nondisclosure Agreement. Both signed by Hillary Rodham Clinton. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I now recognize the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Clay, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CLAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Director 

Comey, for being here today and for the professionals whom you 

lead at the FBI. Two years ago after my urgent request to thenformer Attorney General Eric Holder for an expedited Justice Department investigation into the tragic death of Michael Brown in 

Ferguson, Missouri, I witnessed firsthand the diligence, professionalism, and absolute integrity of your investigators. And I have 

no doubt that was the case in this matter as well. I did not think 

it was possible for the majority to exceed their unprecedented arrogant abuse of official channels and Federal funds that we have witnessed over the past 2 years as they have engaged in a partisan 

political witch hunt at taxpayer expense against Secretary Clinton. 

But I was wrong. This proceeding is just a sequel to that very 

bad act. And the taxpayers will get the bill. It is a new low, and 


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21 

it violates both House rules and the rules of this committee. So 

with apologies to you and the FBI for this blatantly partisan proceeding, let me return to the facts of this case as you have clearly 

outlined them. 

First question: Did Secretary Clinton or any member of her staff 

intentionally violate Federal law? 

Mr. COMEY. We did not develop clear evidence of that. 

Mr. CLAY. Did Secretary Clinton or any member of her staff attempt to obstruct your investigation? 

Mr. COMEY. We did not develop evidence of that. 

Mr. CLAY. In your opinion, do the mistakes Secretary Clinton has 

already apologized for and expressed regret for rise to a level that 

would be worthy of Federal prosecution? 

Mr. COMEY. As I said Tuesday, our judgment, not just mine, but 

the team’s judgment at the FBI, is that the Justice Department 

would not bring such a case. No Justice Department under any— 

whether Republican or Democrat administration. 

Mr. CLAY. Thank you for that response. I know the FBI pays particular attention to groups by training agents and local law enforcement officers and participating in local hate crime working groups. 

Is that right? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CLAY. Some of these organizations seem relatively harmless. 

But others appear to be very dangerous and growing. Some even 

promote genocide in their postings and rhetoric online. In your experience, how dangerous are these groups and have they incited violence in the past? 

Mr. COMEY. I think too hard to answer, Congressman, in the abstract. There are some groups that are dangerous. There are some 

groups that are exercising important protection—protected speech 

under the First Amendment. 

Mr. CLAY. Okay. Let me ask a more direct question. A gentleman 

named Andrew Anglin is the editor of a Web site called The Daily 

Stormer that is dedicated to the supremacy of the white race as 

well as attacking Jews, Muslims, and others. The Web site features 

numerous posts with the hashtag ‘‘white genocide’’ to protest what 

they contend is an effort to eliminate the white race. Are you familiar with this movement? 

Mr. COMEY. I’m not. 

Mr. CLAY. Okay. Well, this hashtag has been promoted all over 

social media by a growing number of white supremacists. For example, one Nazi sympathizer tweeted repeatedly using the handle 

@whitegenocidetm. Are you concerned as some groups are increasing their followers in this way, particularly if some of those followers in this way, particularly if some of those followers could become violent? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t know the particular enough to comment, Congressman. We are always concerned when people go beyond protected speech, which we do not investigate, to moving towards acts 

of violence. And so our duty is to figure out when have people 

walked outside the First Amendment protection and are looking to 

kill folks or hurt folks. But I don’t know enough to comment on the 

particular. 


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22 

Mr. CLAY. I see. Well, one of my biggest concerns is that certain 

public figures are actually promoting these dangerous groups even 

further. And as you may know, one of our most vocal candidates 

for President retweeted @whitegenocidetm. Three weeks later, he 

did it again. Two days after that, he retweeted a different user 

whose image also included the term ‘‘white genocide,’’ and that’s 

not even all of them. Director Comey, don’t these actions make it 

easier for these racist groups to recruit even more supporters? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t think I’m in a position to answer that in an 

intelligent way sitting here. 

Mr. CLAY. Well, I appreciate you trying. And thank you, Mr. Director, for your exceptional and principled service to our country. 

I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. We’ll now recognize the gentlewoman from Wyoming, Mrs. Lummis, for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Welcome, Director. And thank you so much for 

being here. My phone has been ringing off the hook in my Washington office, in my Wyoming office, from constituents who don’t 

understand how this conclusion was reached. So I appreciate your 

being here to help walk us through it. And here’s the issue that 

the people that are calling me from Wyoming are having. They 

have access to this statute. It’s Title 18 U.S. Code 1924. And I’m 

going to read you this statute. It says, ‘‘Whoever being an officer, 

employee, contractor, or consultant to the United States and by virtue of his office employment, position, or contract becomes possessed of documents or materials containing classified information 

of the United States knowingly removes such documents or materials without authority and with the intent to retain such documents or materials at an unauthorized location shall be fined 

under this title or imprisoned for not more than one year or both.’’ 

Armed with that information, they’re wondering how Hillary 

Clinton, who is also an attorney, and attorneys are frequently held 

to a higher standard of knowledge of the law, how this could not 

have come to her attention. She was the Secretary of State. Of 

course, the Secretary of State is going to become possessed of classified materials. Of course she was an attorney. She practiced with 

a prominent Arkansas law firm, the Rose Law Firm. She knew 

from her White House days with her husband, the President, that 

classified materials can be very dangerous if they get into the 

wrong hands. 

She had to have known about this statute because she had to 

have been briefed when she took over the job as the Secretary of 

State. So how, given that body of knowledge and experience, could 

this have happened in a way that could have potentially provided 

access by hackers to confidential information? 

Mr. COMEY. No, it’s a good question, a reasonable question. The 

protection we have as Americans is that the government in general, and in that statute in particular, has to prove before they can 

prosecute any of us, that we did this thing that’s forbidden by the 

law, and that when we did it, we knew we were doing something 

that was unlawful. We don’t have to know the code number, but 

that we knew we were doing something that was unlawful. That’s 

the protection we have. And it’s one I’ve worked for very hard. 

When I was in the private sector, I did a lot of work with the 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
23 

Chamber of Commerce to stop the criminalization of negligence in 

the United States. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. May I interrupt and suggest that this statute says 

‘‘knowingly removes such documents or materials without authority 

and with the intent to retain such documents or materials at an 

unauthorized location.’’ The intent here in the statute is to retain 

the documents at an unauthorized location. It’s not intent to pass 

them on to a terrorist, or to someone out in Internetland. It’s just 

the intent to retain the documents or materials at an unauthorized 

location. 

Mr. COMEY. It’s more than that, though. You’d have to show that 

and prove criminal intent, both by law, that’s the way the judge 

would instruct a jury, and practice at the Department of Justice. 

They have reserved that statute, even though it’s just a misdemeanor, for people who clearly knew they were breaking the law. 

And that’s the challenge. So should have known, must have known, 

had to know, does not get you there. You must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they knew they were engaged in something that 

was unlawful. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Okay. Then—— 

Mr. COMEY. That’s the challenge. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Then may I turn to her attorneys. Did all of Secretary Clinton’s attorneys have the requisite clearances at the time 

they received all of her emails, especially those that were classified 

at the time they were sent? 

Mr. COMEY. No. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. They destroyed, as has been noted, 30,000 emails 

of Secretary Clinton’s. Do you have 100 percent confidence that 

none of the 30,000 emails destroyed by Secretary Clinton’s attorneys was marked as classified? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t have 100 percent confidence. I’m reasonably 

confident some of them were classified. There were only three in 

the entire batch we found that bore any markings that indicated 

they were classified. So that’s less likely. But surely, it’s a reasonable assumption that some of the ones they deleted contained classified information. 

Mr. BLUM. Thank you, Director. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I 

yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Director 

Comey, for appearing here to help the committee with its work. Director Comey, Secretary Clinton’s certainly not the only Secretary 

of State to use a personal email account with information later 

identified as being classified. I just want to show you. This is a 

book that was written by former Secretary of State Colin Powell. 

And in his book, he says, ‘‘To complement the official State Department computer in my office, I installed a laptop computer and on 

a private line. My personal email account on a laptop allowed me 

direct access to anyone online. So I started shooting emails to my 

principal assistants, to individual ambassadors, and increasingly, 

to my foreign minister colleagues who like me were trying to bring 

their ministries into the one 186,000 miles per second world.’’ Were 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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you aware of this, that Secretary Colin Powell actually had a private server as well? 

Mr. COMEY. Not a private server. I think he used a commercial 

email account for State Department business. 

Mr. LYNCH. Private line, unprotected. 

Mr. COMEY. Correct. Not a State Department email system. 

Mr. LYNCH. Right. Right. He went rogue, so to speak. Right? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t know whether I’d say that. 

Mr. LYNCH. Yeah. All right. Okay. I’m not going to put words in 

your mouth. But do you think this was careless for him to do that, 

just to start—you know, get his own—he got his own system. He 

installed a laptop computer on a private line. ‘‘My personal email 

account was on a laptop and allowed me direct access to anyone, 

anyone online.’’ That’s his own statement. I’m just trying to compare Secretaries of State, because Secretary Powell’s never been 

here. As a matter of fact, when we asked him for his emails, unlike 

the 55,000 that we received from Secretary Clinton, he said, ‘‘I 

don’t have any to turn over.’’ This is a quote. This was on ABC’s 

This Week. He explained, ‘‘I don’t have anything to turn over. I 

didn’t keep a cache of them. I did not print them off. I do not have 

thousands of pages somewhere on my personal files.’’ But he was 

Secretary of State, and he operated, you know, on a private system. 

Were you aware of that? 

Mr. COMEY. Not at the time 15 years ago. But I am now. 

Mr. LYNCH. Yeah. Okay. So recently—well, back in October 2015, 

the State Department sent Secretary Powell a letter requesting 

that he contact his email provider, AOL, to determine whether any 

of his emails are still on the unclassified systems. Are you aware 

of that ongoing investigation? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t know of an investigation. I am—— 

Mr. LYNCH. Well, that request for information from former Secretary Powell. 

Mr. COMEY. Yes, I am. 

Mr. LYNCH. You’re aware of that. Are you surprised that he has 

never responded? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t know enough to comment. I don’t know exactly what conversation he had with the State Department. 

Mr. LYNCH. All right. I’m trying to look at the—you know, where 

we have a lot of comparisons in other cases. And there seems, like 

all the cases where prosecutions have gone forward, the subject of 

the investigation has demonstrated a clear intent to deliver classified information to a person or persons who were unauthorized to 

receive that. So if you look at the, you know, PFC Bradley Manning, now Chelsea Manning, that was a court martial. But he demonstrated a clear intent to publish that information, which was 

classified. Julian Assange, the WikiLeaks editor, I guess, and publisher. 

Again, a wide and deliberate attempt to publish classified information. General Petraeus, which we talked about earlier today, 

shared information with his biographer. And Jeffrey Sterling sending stuff to The New York Times. Former CIA officer Kiriakou, who 

was interested in writing a book, so he hung on to his information. 

And even former Director of the CIA, John Deutch, who retained 

classified information on a couple of servers, one in Belmont, MasVerDate Sep 11 2014 14:35 Oct 12, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\21323.TXT APRIL

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sachusetts, and one in Bethesda, Maryland. And that was after he 

became a private citizen. 

So in all those cases, there’s a clear intent. As you said before, 

you look at what people did and what they were thinking when 

they did that. And I would just ask you: Is there a clear distinction 

between what those people did and what Secretary Clinton did in 

her case? 

Mr. COMEY. In my view, yes. The Deutch case illustrates it perfectly. And he took huge amount of documents, almost all at the 

TS/SCI level, had them in hard copy at his house, had them on an 

unclassed system connected to the Internet, attempted to destroy 

some of them when he got caught. Admitted: I knew I wasn’t supposed to be doing this. So you have clear intent, huge amounts of 

documents, obstruction of justice, those are the kinds of cases that 

get prosecuted. That’s what I said when—I meant it when I said 

it. In my experience, which is three decades, no reasonable prosecutor would bring this case. I know that frustrates people. But 

that’s the way the law is. And that’s the way the practice is at the 

Department of Justice. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you for your testimony and for your service. 

I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you gentleman. 

We’ll now go to the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Meadows, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Comey, 

thank you. There has been much said today about criticizing you 

and your service. And I want to go on record that even though 

many of my constituents would love for me to criticize your service 

because of the conclusion you reached, never have I, nor will I, 

criticize your service. And we appreciate your service to this country and the integrity. So I’m going to focus on the things that you 

said, not the conclusion that you drew. 

And Congressman Trey Gowdy and I talked a little bit about 

this, but on February 4, 2016, Secretary Clinton, during a presidential debate said, ‘‘I never sent or received any classified material. They are retroactively classifying it,’’ closed quote. And so in 

your statement on July 5, you said that there were indeed 110 

emails, 52 email chains, which there was classified information on 

it at the time it was sent or received. So those two statements, both 

of them cannot be true. Is that correct? Your statement and her 

statement? 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. It’s not accurate to say that she did not send 

or receive—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. So she did not tell the truth during that presidential debate that she never sent or received classified information, and it was retroactively classified? 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. I don’t think that’s a question I should be answering what was in her head—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, either your statement’s not true or hers is 

not true. Both of them cannot be true. So is your statement true? 

Mr. COMEY. That I can speak to. My—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. Your statement is true. So the American 

people will have to judge with her statement not being true. So let 

me go on to another one. On October 22 she said, ‘‘There was nothVerDate Sep 11 2014 14:35 Oct 12, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\21323.TXT APRIL

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ing marked classified on emails either sent or received.’’ And in 

your statement you said, ‘‘A very small number of emails contained 

classified information bore markings indicating the presence of 

classified information at the time.’’ So she makes a statement that 

says there was no markings. You make a statement that there was. 

So her statement was not true. 

Mr. COMEY. Well, that one actually I have a little bit of insight 

into her statement, because we asked her about that. There were 

three documents that bore portion markings where you’re obligated, when something is classified, to put a marking on that paragraph. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Right. 

Mr. COMEY. And there were three that bore C in parens, which 

means that’s confidential classified—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. So a reasonable person who has been a Senator, 

a Secretary of State, a First Lady, wouldn’t a reasonable person 

know that that was a classified marking as a Secretary of State? 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. 

Mr. MEADOWS. A reasonable person. That’s all I’m asking. 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. Before this investigation I probably would 

have said yes. I’m not so sure. I don’t find it incredible—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Director Comey, come on. I mean, I’ve only been 

here a few years, and I understand the importance of those markings. So you’re suggesting that a long length of time that she had 

no idea what a classified marking would be? That’s your sworn testimony today? 

Mr. COMEY. No, no, not that she would have no idea what a classified marking would be. But it’s an interesting question as to 

whether she—this question about sophistication came up earlier. 

Whether she was actually sophisticated enough to understand what 

a C in parens mean. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So you’re saying this former Secretary of State is 

not sophisticated enough to understand a classified marking. 

Mr. COMEY. No. That’s not what I’m saying. 

Mr. MEADOWS. That’s a huge statement. 

Mr. COMEY. That’s not what I’m saying. You asked me did I assume that someone would know. Probably before this investigation, 

I would have. I’m not so sure of that answer any longer. I think 

it’s possible, possible, that she didn’t understand what a C meant 

when she saw it in the body of an email like that. 

Mr. MEADOWS. After years in the Senate, and Secretary of State? 

I mean, that’s hard for me and the American people to believe, Director Comey. And I’m not questioning your analysis of it, but 

wouldn’t a reasonable person think that someone who has the highest job of handling classified information understand that? 

Mr. COMEY. I think that’s a conclusion a reasonable person 

would draw. It may not be accurate. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So in that, let me go a little bit further. Because 

that last quote actually came on October 22, 2015, under sworn testimony before the Benghazi Committee. So if she gave sworn testimony that a reasonable person would suggest was not truthful, 

isn’t it a logical assumption that she may have misled Congress, 

and we need to look at that further? 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. COMEY. Well, the reasonable person test is not what you look 

at for perjury or false statements. But like I said, I can understand 

why people would ask that question. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. So let me, in the last little portion of 

this, in your 3–1/2 hour interview on Saturday, did she contradict 

some of these public statements in private? Because you said she 

didn’t lie to the FBI. But it’s apparent that she lied to the American people. So did she change her statements in that sworn testimony with you last Saturday? 

Mr. COMEY. I haven’t gone through that to parse that. I have—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Can you do that and get back to this committee? 

Because it’s important, I think, to the American people and to 

transparency. 

Mr. COMEY. I’m sure. And as the chairman and I have talked 

about, I’m sure the committee’s going to want to see documents in 

our investigation and whatnot, and we’ll work to give you whatever 

we can possibly give you under our law. But I haven’t done that 

analysis at this point. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Will you, and get that back to us? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The gentleman’s time has expired. And 

we’ll now recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Cooper, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Director 

Comey. I hate to see one of America’s most distinguished public 

servants pilloried before this committee. We’re all highly partisan 

here. We’re good back seat drivers. We’re all today apparently armchair prosecutors. And you stated the truth when you said that you 

didn’t know of anyone who would bring a case like this. And some 

of the prosecutors have had decades to do that. I hope that this 

committee’s effort is not intended to intimidate you or the FBI or 

law enforcement in general, or government employees. 

And I’m thankful at this moment that you have such a lifetime 

record of speaking truth to power. Because that’s very important. 

It’s also very important that apparently you’re a lifelong Republican. You’re just here to do your job, to state the facts. I think the 

key issue here is whether, in fact, there’s a double standard, where 

some Americans are being treated differently than others. And I 

think I can rely on my Republican colleagues to make sure that 

Hillary Clinton’s treated no better than anybody else. There should 

be some attention given to make sure that she’s not treated any 

worse than anybody else. 

I think we all know that we wouldn’t be having this hearing, especially on an emergency basis, unless she were running for President. My colleague from Massachusetts has just pointed out that 

previous Secretaries of State are not being called on the carpet, 

whether that be Condoleezza Rice or Colin Powell or others. 

But I think the grossest double standard here today is the fact 

that all the members of this committee, every Member of Congress, 

is not subject to the same law that Secretary Clinton was subject 

to. And as lawmakers, that means that we have exempted ourselves from the standard of other Federal employees. My colleague 

from D.C., Ms. Norton, referred to this. Why did we exempt ourselves from the same rules? Apparently our chairman lists his priVerDate Sep 11 2014 14:35 Oct 12, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\21323.TXT APRIL

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vate email account on his business card. We all have access to classified information. 

So I would like to challenge my Republican colleagues here 

today. Let’s work together and introduce legislation to make the 

same laws apply to us as apply to the executive branch and to Secretary Clinton. I would be happy to join in such legislation to make 

sure that we’re not being hypocritical on this panel, that we’re 

holding ourselves to the same standards as Secretary Clinton, and 

not trying to accuse her of things that we may be guilty of ourselves. 

I bet my colleagues would be the first to complain if, for example, 

emails were retroactively classified. That’s a situation that most 

people in public service would object to pretty strongly. How did 

you know at the time if you had no idea? So I think it’s very important if we want as Congress to have the trust of the American people to not be hypocritical, to uphold the same standards that we 

want to see upheld by others, and I’m just thankful at this moment 

in our history that we have someone like you who’s in charge of 

the FBI. Because too many things are highly politicized. And the 

last thing we should do is criminalize our political system. 

I didn’t see any of my Republican colleagues complain when 

former Governor Bob McDonald was exonerated by an 8–0 vote at 

the Supreme Court for having done certain things that I think 

most Americans would find highly objectionable. But our court, on 

a bipartisan, unanimous basis, exonerated him just a week or two 

ago. 

So I think this is a moment for committee members to reflect, to 

take a deep breath, to calm down and realize exactly what you 

said, that no reasonable prosecutor would have brought this case. 

And thank you for stating that so clearly and publicly. I yield back 

the balance of my time. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. COMEY. I yield to the ranking member. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Director, let me ask you this: First of all, I 

associate myself with everything the gentleman just said. You were 

talking about some markings a little bit earlier. Is that right? Can 

you describe what those markings are like? Markings on documents. I think you said there were three documents with certain 

markings on them—— 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. —that indicated classified. Go ahead. 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah, there were three emails that down in the body 

of the email, in the three different emails, there were paragraphs 

that, at the beginning of the paragraph, had a parenthesis, a capital C, and then a parenthesis. And that is a portion marking to 

indicate that—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. That paragraph. 

Mr. COMEY. —that paragraph is classified at the confidential 

level, which is the lowest level of classification. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And so out of the 30,000 documents, you found 

these three markings? Is that what you’re saying? 

Mr. COMEY. Three emails for C markings down in the body. None 

of the emails had headers, which is at the top of a document that 


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says it’s classified. Three had within the body the portion marking 

for C. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank the gentleman. I now recognize the 

gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Duncan, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Meadows mentioned one instance in which Secretary Clinton said that she did 

not mail any classified material to anyone. Actually, she said that 

several other times. But it is accurate, Director Comey, that you 

found at least 110 instances of when she had emailed classified material? 

Mr. COMEY. 110 that she either received or sent. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Right. And it also is accurate that, quote, ‘‘Clinton’s 

lawyers cleaned their devices in such a way as to preclude complete 

forensic recovery’’? 

Mr. COMEY. Correct. 

Mr. DUNCAN. And also when she said—when Secretary Clinton 

said that nothing she sent was marked classified, and you said, in 

your press conference, ‘‘but even if information is not marked classified in an email, particularly are participants who know or should 

know that the subject matter’s classified are still obligated to protect it.’’ Do you feel that Secretary Clinton knew, or should have 

known, that she was obligated to protect classified information? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. DUNCAN. With her legal background and her long experience 

in government. Also, she said at one point that she has directed all 

emails, work-related emails, to be forwarded to the State Department. Is it also accurate that you discovered thousands of other 

emails that were work-related other than the 30,000 that she submitted? 

Mr. COMEY. Correct. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Before I came to Congress, I spent several years as 

a criminal court judge. I presided over several hundred felony 

criminal cases. And I can assure you that I saw many cases where 

the evidence of criminal intent was flimsier than the evidence in 

this case. But do you realize that great numbers of people across 

this country felt that you presented such an incriminating case 

against Secretary Clinton in your press conference that they were 

very surprised or even shocked when you reached the conclusion to 

let her off? You doubt that great numbers feel that way? 

Mr. COMEY. No. I think so. And I understand the question. And 

I wanted to be as transparent as possible. We went at this very 

hard to see if we could make a case. And I wanted the American 

people to see what I honestly believed about the whole thing. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, do you understand, as the chairman said earlier, that great numbers of people feel now that there’s a one standard of justice for the Clintons and another for regular people? 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah, I’ve heard that a lot. It’s not true, but I’ve 

heard it a lot. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, even the ranking member who was here, who, 

of course as we understand, had to defend Secretary Clinton as 

strongly as possible, he almost begged you to explain the gap between the incriminating case that you presented and the conclusion 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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that was reached. Did that surprise you that he felt so strongly 

that there was this big gap? 

Mr. COMEY. No. Not at all. These—it’s a complicated matter. It 

involves understanding how the Department of Justice works 

across decades, house prosecutorial discretion is exercised. I get 

that folks see disconnection, especially when they see a statute that 

says ‘‘gross negligence.’’ Well, the Director just said she was extremely careless. So how is that not prosecutable? So it takes an 

understanding of what’s one on over the last 99 years. What’s the 

precedent? How do we treat these cases. I totally get people’s questions. And I think they’re in good faith. 

Mr. DUNCAN. We talked about gross negligence here. And you 

said that Secretary Clinton was extremely careless with this classified material, and how dangerous it could be, how threatening, 

even to people’s lives that it could be to disclose classified material. 

Do you agree that there is a very thin line between gross negligence and extreme carelessness? And would you explain to me 

what you consider to be that difference? 

Mr. COMEY. Sure, Judge—Congressman. As a former judge, you 

know there isn’t actually a great definition in the law of gross negligence. Some courts interpret it as close to willful, which means 

you know you’re doing something wrong. Others drop it lower. My 

term extremely careless is—I’m trying to be kind of an ordinary 

person. That’s a commonsense way of describing it sure looks real 

careless to me. The question of whether that amounts to gross negligence, frankly, is really not at the center of this, because when 

I look at the history of the prosecutions and see it’s been one case 

brought on a gross negligence theory, I know from 30 years, there’s 

no way anybody at the Department of Justice is bringing a case 

against John Doe or Hillary Clinton for the second time in 100 

years based on those facts. 

Mr. DUNCAN. You ended your statement to Congressman Cooper 

a while ago saying once again that no reasonable prosecutor could 

have brought this case. Yet you also mentioned earlier today that 

you’d seen several of your friends and other prosecutors who’ve 

said publicly, many across this country, that they would have been 

glad to prosecute this case. 

Mr. COMEY. I smile because they’re friends. And I haven’t talked 

to them. And I want to say: Guys, so where were you over the last 

40 years? Where were these cases? They just have not been 

brought. For reasons that I said earlier, it’s a good thing that the 

Department of Justice worries about prosecuting people for being 

careless. I don’t like it. As a citizen I want people to show they 

knew they were breaking the law, and then we’ll put you in jail. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Of course, you know many people have been prosecuted for gross negligence by the Federal Government, by the FBI. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. We’ll now recognize the gentleman from 

Virginia, Mr. Connolly, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. And welcome, Director Comey. And 

although our politics are different, I gather you’re a Republican. Is 

that correct? 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. COMEY. I have been a registered Republican for most of my 

adult life. I’m not registered any longer. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. We don’t register by party in Virginia. But many 

have suspected my politics as being Democratic. And I thank you 

for your integrity. As my colleague said, and I said in my opening 

statement, your career has been characterized as speaking truth to 

power. And you’re doing it again today. Just to set the context, Director Comey, not that you’re unaware of this. 

Today’s hearing is political theatre. There’s not even the pretense 

of trying to get at the truth. This is a desperate attempt under an 

extraordinary set of circumstances, an emergency hearing. I don’t 

know what the emergency is other than one side is about to nominate somebody who is a pathological narcissist who, you know, is 

talking about banning Muslims and Mexicans crossing the border 

who are all rapists and women who are pigs and terrified at the 

prospect of the consequences of that in the election. So let’s grab 

onto whatever we can to discredit or try to discredit the other 

nominee, punitive nominee. And you took away their only hope. 

And so the theater today is actually trying to discredit you. Subtlety in some cases. My friend from South Carolina uses big words 

like ‘‘exculpatory.’’ And kind of goes through what a prosecutor 

would do. The insinuation being you didn’t do your job. My friend 

from Wyoming is apparently flooded with citizens in her home 

State who are reading the statute that governs classification. Lot 

of time on their hands back there, I guess. But, yeah, this is all 

designed to discredit your finding. Now, the FBI interviewed Secretary Clinton. Is that correct? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Did she lie to the FBI in that interview? 

Mr. COMEY. I have no basis for concluding that she was untruthful with us. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And is it a crime to lie to the FBI? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes, it is. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. David Petraeus did lie to the FBI. 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And he prosecuted for that—well, could have 

been. 

Mr. COMEY. Could have been, was not for that—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. That’s always a judgment call. 

Mr. COMEY. Correct. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Was she evasive? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t think the agents assessed she was evasive. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. How many emails are we talking about, total 

universe, that were examined by your team? 

Mr. COMEY. Tens of thousands. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Tens of thousands. And how many are in a questionable category that maybe could have, should have been looked 

at more carefully because there could be some element of classification? Apparently, my friend from North Carolina assumes we’re all 

intimately familiar with the fact that if a C appears, it means a 

classification, though there seems to be some dispute about that because the State Department, as I understand it, has actually said 

some of those were improperly marked and shouldn’t have had the 

C. Are you aware of that? 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. So could it be that in her 100-trip, 4 years— 

100 overseas trips to 100 countries as Secretary of State trying to 

restore U.S. credibility that had been destroyed in the previous 8 

years overseas, and tens of thousands of email communications, not 

including phone calls and classified conversations in SCIFs and the 

like, that maybe the small percentage of emails, she didn’t pay as 

much attention to them as maybe in retrospect one would hope she 

would have. Is that a fair conclusion? Could that be a fair conclusion? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t usually deal in maybes. It’s possible. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, you do deal in distinguishing between willful and inadvertent. 

Mr. COMEY. Sure. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And in this case, you concluded it has to be in 

the latter category. It wasn’t willful. 

Mr. COMEY. We concluded there was not adequate evidence of 

willful conduct. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. So there’s no obfuscation here, unlike the 

Petraeus case. And there’s no evasion. There’s no lying. There’s no 

willful intent to compromise classified material, despite the insinuations of my friends on the other side of the aisle. And the only 

hope left in this political theatre is to discredit you and your team 

in the hopes that, therefore, you won’t have credibility and we can 

revisit this monstrous crime of using a private server, that server 

being the server of the former President of the United States that 

maybe Mrs. Clinton thought would be more secure than the leaky 

system at the State Department. I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. We now recognize the gentleman from 

Texas, Mr. Hurd, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HURD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I’m offended. I’m offended by my friends on the other side of the political 

aisle saying this is political theatre. This is not political theatre. 

For me, this is serious. I spent 9–1/2 years as an undercover officer 

in the CIA. I was the guy in the back alleys collecting intelligence, 

passing it to lawmakers. I’ve seen my friends killed. I’ve seen assets put themselves in harm’s way. And this is about protecting information, the most sensitive information the American government has. And I wish my colleagues would take this a little bit 

more seriously. 

Mr. Comey, Director Comey, excuse me, SAP, Special Access Program. You alluded to earlier that includes SCI information. Does 

SCI information include HUMINT and SIGINT? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. HURD. HUMINT and SIGINT. Human intelligence information collected from people that are putting themselves in harm’s 

way to give us information to drive foreign policy. Signals intelligence. Some of the most sensitive things to understand; what Al 

Qaeda is doing; what ISIS is doing. So the former Secretary of 

State had an unauthorized server, those are your words, in her 

basement, correct? 

Mr. COMEY. Correct. 

Mr. HURD. Who was protecting that information? Who was protecting that server? 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. COMEY. Well, not much. There was a number of different 

people who were assigned as administrators of the server. 

Mr. HURD. And at least seven email chains, or eight that was 

classified as TS/SCI. 

Mr. COMEY. Correct. 

Mr. HURD. So the former Secretary of State, one of the President’s most important advisors on foreign policy and national security, had a server in her basement that had information that was 

collected from our most sensitive assets, and it was not protected 

by anyone? And that’s not a crime? That’s outrageous. People are 

concerned. What does it take for someone to misuse classified information and get in trouble for it? 

Mr. COMEY. Well, it takes mishandling it and criminal intent. 

Mr. HURD. And so an unauthorized server in the basement is not 

mishandling? 

Mr. COMEY. Well, no, there is evidence of mishandling here. This 

whole investigation at the end focused on is there sufficient evidence of intent. 

Mr. HURD. Was this unanimous opinion within the FBI on your 

decision? 

Mr. COMEY. Well, the whole FBI wasn’t involved, but the team 

of agents, investigators, analysts, technologists, yes. 

Mr. HURD. Did you take into any consideration the impact that 

this precedence can set on our ability to collect intelligence overseas? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. My primary concern is the impact on what 

other employees might think in the Federal Government. 

Mr. HURD. And you don’t think this sends a message to other 

employees that if a former Secretary of State can have an unauthorized server in their basement that transmits top secret information, that that’s not a problem? 

Mr. COMEY. Oh, I worry very much about that. That’s why I 

talked about that in my statement, because an FBI employee might 

face severe discipline. And I want them to understand that those 

consequences are still going to be there. 

Mr. HURD. Director Comey, do you have a server in your basement? 

Mr. COMEY. I do not. 

Mr. HURD. Does anybody in the FBI have a server in their basement or in their house? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t know. 

Mr. HURD. Do you think it’s likely? 

Mr. COMEY. I think it’s unlikely. 

Mr. HURD. I would think so, too. I would think so, too. Because 

I’ve always been proud to serve alongside the men and women that 

you represent. So there was no dissenting opinion when you made 

this decision. It’s your job to be involved in counterintelligence as 

well? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. HURD. So that means protecting our secrets from foreign adversaries collecting them. Is that correct? 

Mr. COMEY. Correct. 

Mr. HURD. Did this activity you investigated make America’s secrets vulnerable to hostile elements? 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. HURD. Do you think that pattern of behavior would continue? 

Mr. COMEY. I’m sorry? 

Mr. HURD. Do you think that pattern of behavior would continue? 

Mr. COMEY. Would continue? 

Mr. HURD. By our former Secretary of State. 

Mr. COMEY. I’m not following you. You mean if we hadn’t—if this 

had not come to light, you mean? 

Mr. HURD. Right now, based on what we see, do you think there’s 

going to be other elements within the Federal Government that 

think it’s okay to have an unauthorized server in their basement? 

Mr. COMEY. Well, they better not. That’s one of the reasons I’m 

talking about—— 

Mr. HURD. So, but what is the ramifications of them doing that? 

You know, how is there going to be any consequences levered if it’s 

not being levered here? Because, indeed, you’re setting a precedent. 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. The precedent—I want people to understand, 

again, I only am responsible for the FBI, that there will be discipline from termination to reprimand and everything in between 

for people who mishandle classified information. 

Mr. HURD. Director Comey, I’m not a lawyer, and so I may misstate this. Is there such a thing as the case of first impression? And 

why was this not possibly one of those? 

Mr. COMEY. There is such a thing, which just means the first 

time you do something. The reason this isn’t one of those is that’s 

just not fair. That would be treating somebody differently because 

of their celebrity status, or because of some other factor doesn’t 

matter. We have to treat people—the bedrock of our system of justice, we treat people fairly. We treat them the same based on 

their—— 

Mr. HURD. And that person mishandling the most sensitive information that this government can collect is not fair—it’s not fair to 

punish someone who did that? 

Mr. COMEY. Not on these facts. It would be fair—if that person 

worked for me, it would be fair to have a robust disciplinary proceeding. It’s not fair to prosecute that person on these facts. 

Mr. HURD. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the time I do not have. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank the gentleman. We’ll now recognize 

the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Cartwright, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I’d like to open 

by acknowledging my colleague from North Carolina, Mr. Meadows, 

here he comes back in the room, for acknowledging your integrity, 

Director Comey. I think bipartisan sentiments like that are few 

and far between around here. And I appreciate Congressman 

Meadows’ remark. You are a man of integrity, Director Comey. It’s 

troubling to me that that remark from Congressman Meadows is 

not unanimous at this point. It used to be. Just weeks ago, our 

chairman, Representative Chaffetz, stated on national TV that Republicans, quote, ‘‘Believe in James Comey,’’ unquote. He said this, 

and I quote, ‘‘I do think that in all of the government, he is a man 

of integrity and honesty. His finger’s on the pulse of this. Nothing 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
35 

happens without him. And I think he is going to be the definitive 

person to make a determination or a recommendation.’’ 

But just hours after your actual recommendation came out, 

Chairman Chaffetz went on TV and accused you of making a, 

quote, ‘‘political calculation.’’ And then our Speaker of the House, 

weeks ago, referring to you, Director Comey, said, ‘‘I do believe that 

his integrity is unequalled. So you’re integrity—it was unanimous 

about your integrity before you came to your conclusion. But after, 

not so much. That’s troubling. And I want to give you a chance, Director Comey, how do you respond to that? How important to you 

is maintaining your integrity before the Nation? 

Mr. COMEY. I think the only two things I have in life that matter 

are the love of my family and friends and my integrity. So I care 

deeply about both. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. All right. Now, Director Comey, you discussed 

your team a little bit. And they deserve a lot of credit for all of the 

hard work and effort that went into this investigation. And I think 

you just said that they were unanimous. That everyone who looked 

at this agreed that no reasonable prosecutor would bring a case. 

Am I correct in that? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. How many people were on this team? 

Mr. COMEY. It changed at various times, but somewhere between 

15 and 20, and then we used a lot of other FBI folks to help from 

time to time. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. And how many hours were spent on this investigation? 

Mr. COMEY. We haven’t counted yet. They—I said to them they 

moved—they put 3 years of work into 12 calendar months. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. And how many pages of documents did the FBI 

review in this investigation? 

Mr. COMEY. Thousands and thousands and thousands. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. And the agents doing the document review, 

were they qualified or were they unqualified? 

Mr. COMEY. They were an all-star team. They are a great group 

of folks. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. How about Secretary Clinton? Did she agree to 

be interviewed? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Come in voluntarily without the need of a subpoena? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Was she interviewed? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Was she interviewed by experienced critical 

veteran agents and law enforcement officers, or by some kind of 

credulous gullible newbies doing their on-the-job training, Director? 

Mr. COMEY. She was interviewed by the kind of folks the American people would want doing the interview. Real pros. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. All right. You were asked about markings on 

a few documents. I have the manual here, Marking Classified National Security Information. And I don’t think you were given a full 

chance to talk about those three documents with the little Cs on 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
36 

them. Were they properly documented? Were they properly marked 

according to the manual? 

Mr. COMEY. No. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. According to the manual, and I ask unanimous 

consent to enter this into the record, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. According to the manual, if you’re going to 

classify something, there has to be a header on the document, 

right? 

Mr. COMEY. Correct. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Was there header on the three documents that 

we’ve discussed today that had the little C in the text someplace? 

Mr. COMEY. No. They were three emails. The C was in the body, 

in the text. But there was no header on the email or in the text. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. So if Secretary Clinton really were an expert 

at what’s classified and what’s not classified, and were following 

the manual, the absence of a header would tell her immediately 

that those three documents were not classified. Am I correct in 

that? 

Mr. COMEY. That would be a reasonable inference. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. All right. I thank you for your testimony, Director. I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. We’ll now recognize 

the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Buck, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BUCK. Good morning, Director Comey. 

Mr. COMEY. Good morning, sir. 

Mr. BUCK. Thank you for being here. I also respect your commitment to law and justice and your career. And the first question I 

want to ask you is this hearing unfair? Has it been unfair to you? 

Mr. COMEY. No. 

Mr. BUCK. Thank you. One purpose of security procedures for 

classified information is to prevent hostile nations from obtaining 

classified information. Is that fair? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. BUCK. And did hostile nations obtain classified information 

from Secretary Clinton’s servers? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t know. It’s possible. But we don’t have direct 

evidence of that. We couldn’t find direct evidence. 

Mr. BUCK. I want to, without making this a law school class, I 

want to try to get into intent. There are various levels of intent in 

the criminal law. Everything from knowingly and willfully doing 

something all the way down to strict liability. Would you agree 

with me on that? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. BUCK. And in Title 18, most of the criminal laws in Title 18 

have the words ‘‘knowingly’’ and ‘‘willfully’’ in them. And that is 

the standard typically that United States attorneys prosecute 

under. 

Mr. COMEY. Most do. Unlawfully, knowingly, and willfully is our 

standard formulation for charging a case. 

Mr. BUCK. And there are also a variety of others between the 

knowingly and willfully standard and the strict liability standard. 

And many, like environmental crimes, have a much lower standard 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
37 

because of the toxic materials that are at risk of harming individuals. Is that fair? 

Mr. COMEY. That’s correct. 

Mr. BUCK. Okay. Let’s talk about this particular statute, 18 

U.S.C. 1924. I take it we could all agree—or you and I can agree 

on a couple of the elements. She, Secretary Clinton, was an employee of the United States. 

Mr. COMEY. Correct. 

Mr. BUCK. And as the result of that employment, she received 

classified information. 

Mr. COMEY. Correct. 

Mr. BUCK. And there’s no doubt about those two elements. Now, 

I don’t know whether the next element is one element or two, but 

it talks about knowingly removes such materials without authority, 

and with the intent to retain such material at an unauthorized location. So I’m going to treat those as two separate parts of the intent element. 

First of all, do you see the word ‘‘willfully’’ anywhere in the statute? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t. 

Mr. BUCK. Okay. And that would indicate to you that there is a 

lower threshold for intent? 

Mr. COMEY. No, it wouldn’t. 

Mr. BUCK. Why? 

Mr. COMEY. Because we often, as I understand the Justice Department’s practice and judicial practice, will impute to any criminal statute at that level with a knowingly also requirement that 

you know that you’re involved in criminal activity of some sort. A 

general mens rea requirement. 

Mr. BUCK. And you would apply that same standard to environmental crimes? 

Mr. COMEY. No. If it specifically says it’s a negligence-based 

crime, I don’t think a judge would impute that. 

Mr. BUCK. But Congress specifically omitted the word ‘‘willfully’’ 

from this statute. And yet you are implying the world ‘‘willfully’’ in 

the statue. Is that fair? 

Mr. COMEY. That’s fair. 

Mr. BUCK. Okay. So what the statute does say is knowingly removes such materials without authority. Is it fair that she knew 

that she didn’t have authority to have this server in her basement? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. That’s true. 

Mr. BUCK. And she knew that she was receiving materials, classified information, in the emails that she received on her BlackBerry and other devices? 

Mr. COMEY. I can’t answer—I’m hesitating as a prosecutor because it’s always—to what level of proof? I do not believe there’s 

evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that she knew she was receiving classified information in violation of the requirements. 

Mr. BUCK. But that’s not my question. My question, in fairness, 

is did she know that she was receiving information on the servers 

at her location? 

Mr. COMEY. Oh, I’m sorry. Of course. Yes. She knew she was 

using her email system. 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. BUCK. And as Secretary of State, she also knew that she 

would be receiving classified information. 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. In general. 

Mr. BUCK. Okay. And did she then have the intent to retain such 

material at an unauthorized location? She retained the material 

that she received as Secretary of State at her server in her basement and that was unauthorized? 

Mr. COMEY. You’re asking me did she have the—and I’m going 

to ask you the burden of proof question in a second. But did she 

have the intent to retain classified information on the server, or 

just to retain any information on the server? 

Mr. BUCK. Well, we’ve already established that she knew, as Secretary of State, that she was going to receive classified information 

in her emails. And so did she retain such information that she received as Secretary of State on her servers in her basement? 

Mr. COMEY. She did, in fact. There is, in my view, not evidence 

beyond certainly probable cause. There’s not evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that she knew she was receiving classified information, or that she intended to retain it on her server. There’s evidence of that. But when I said there’s not clear evidence of intent, 

that’s what I meant. I could not, even if the Department of Justice 

would bring that case, I could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

those two elements. 

Mr. BUCK. Thank you very much. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank the gentleman. We’ll now go to the 

gentlewoman from Illinois, Ms. Duckworth, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. When I first entered Congress 3 years ago, like many freshman members, I, unlike 

many freshman members, I actually sought out this committee. I 

wanted to be on this committee because I wanted to tackle the 

challenges of good government, like working to eliminate improper 

payments or prevent wasteful programs, duplication. Before I 

joined Congress, I had the privilege of serving in the Army for 23 

years. And I, you know, and as I tackled those challenges and in 

the challenges of helping reduce veterans’ homelessness, I witnessed firsthand the real-world importance of improving and 

streamlining government operations. How even the best policies in 

the world will not work without proper implementation. 

And so when it comes to implementing true and lasting reforms 

that will make sure the electronic records and other records and 

the history of our great Nation are preserved for future generations, I’ve done my best to approach this goal seriously. I’m focused 

on making sure that our Nation sustains a long-term commitment 

to modernizing our Federal records keeping system, from improving the laws governing what needs to be collected, to ensuring our 

civil servants across government have the necessary tools to 

achieve what should be nonpartisan and a shared goal. 

With respect to examining the tough lessons learned from numerous recordkeeping incidents that our committee has dealt with, 

which transcend any one agency or any single administration, my 

mission is clear: Make sure that we here in Congress move beyond 

partisan politics and engage in the serious hard work of ensuring 

that the laws written in an era of pen and paper are overhauled 

to meet the digital challenges of the 21st century. 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
39 

Director Comey, the Office of Management and Budget and the 

National Archives and Records Administration released a memorandum known as the Managing Government Records Directive in 

2012. And this directive states, and I quote, ‘‘By December 31, 

2016, Federal agencies will manage both permanent and temporary 

email records in an accessible electronic format. Federal agencies 

must manage all email records in an electronic format. Email 

records must be retained in an appropriate electronic system that 

supports records management and litigation requirements which 

may include preservation-in-place models, including the capability 

to identify, retrieve, and retain the records as long as they are 

needed.’’ 

As a Director of a Bureau who deals with sensitive information 

on a daily basis, do you believe that this directive is necessary and 

attainable for agencies across the board within that 4-year timeframe from August 2012 to December 2016. 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t know enough to say both. I can say it’s certainly necessary. I don’t know whether it’s achievable. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Okay. Are you familiar with the Capstone Approach? That’s the Federal—it’s approach that says that Federal 

agencies should save all emails for select senior level employees, 

and that the emails of other employees would be archived for a 

temporary period set by the agency so that senior employees’ 

emails are kept forever and those by other lower level employees 

are actually archived for a short period, a shorter period. 

Mr. COMEY. I’m aware generally. I know what applies to me and 

when I was Deputy Attorney General in the Bush Administration. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Yes. In fact, I understand that the FBI is currently actively using this approach, according to the agency’s senior 

agency official for records—Office for Records Management fiscal 

year 2015 annual report. My understanding is the Capstone Approach is aimed at streamlining the recordkeeping process for 

emails and reducing the volume of records that an agency has to 

maintain. Nearly all agencies will be required to comprehensively 

modernize their approach to managing Federal records in the near 

future. As the head of a component agency, Director Comey, within 

the Department of Justice, which appears to be a leader in adopting the innovative Capstone Approach across the agency, would you 

agree that with respect to instituting foundational reforms that will 

strengthen records preservation, the Capstone Approach used by 

DOJ should be accelerated and wrote out across the Federal Government? 

Mr. COMEY. I think we’re doing it in a pretty good way. I don’t 

know—I’m not an expert enough to say whether everybody should 

do it the way we do it, honestly. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Are you satisfied with the way that you’re 

doing it? 

Mr. COMEY. I am, but I don’t want to sound overconfident, because I’m sure there’s a way we can do it better. But I think we’re 

doing it in a pretty good way. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Do you have any one person within the FBI 

that continually reviews the—your records keeping? And also do 

they report directly to you? As well as is there periodic review of 

how you’re implementing this process? 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. COMEY. Yes. We have an entire division devoted to records 

management. That assistant director reports up to the deputy director, who reports to me. We have—it’s an enormous operation, as 

you might imagine, requiring constant training. And so that’s what 

I mean when I say I think we’re doing it in a pretty good way. And 

we have record-marking tools, we prompt with dialogue boxes requiring employees to make a decision what’s the nature of this 

record you’re creating now and where should it be stored. So I 

think we’re doing it in a pretty good way. That’s why I say that. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Have you seen that in any of the other agencies that you have interacted with, or have you had a chance, an 

occasion to look at what some of the other agencies are doing with 

their sensitive and classified information? Are they following the 

same technique as you’re doing in the FBI? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t know enough to say, I personally. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Okay. 

I am out of time, but thank you. 

Mr. COMEY. Okay 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentlewoman. 

We’ll now recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Walberg, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WALBERG. I thank the chairman. 

And thank you, Director Comey, for being here. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. 

And, Director Comey, for making it very clear that you believe 

we’ve done this respectfully, with good intention. And I wish some 

of my colleagues that had instructed us on our intent were here. 

They have a great ability to understand intent better than, I guess, 

the Director of the FBI. 

But it is an intent that’s important here, that we understand we 

are Oversight and Government Reform Committee. And if indeed 

the tools aren’t there to make sure that our country is secure and 

that officials at the highest levels in our land don’t have the understanding on what it takes to keep our country secure, that we do 

the necessary government reform to put laws in place that will be 

effective and will meet the needs of distinguished agencies and important agencies like the FBI. 

So thank you, Mr. Chairman, for doing this hearing. It’s our responsibility to do oversight and reform as necessary. 

Going back, Director Comey, to paraphrase the Espionage Act, 

people in the Seventh District of Michigan understand it from this 

perspective and common sense, what it says, that whoever being 

entrusted with information related to national defense, through 

gross negligence permits the information to be removed from its 

proper place in violation of their trust, shall be fined or imprisoned 

under the statute. 

There doesn’t seem to be a double standard there. It doesn’t express intent. You’ve explained your understanding of why intent is 

needed, and we may agree or disagree on that, but the general public looking at that statute says it’s pretty clear. 

The question I would ask, Director Comey, what’s your definition 

of extremely careless, if you could go through that? 

Mr. COMEY. I intended it as a commonsense term. It’s kind of one 

those kind of you know it when you see it sort of things. Somebody 


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41 

who is—should know better, someone who is demonstrating a lack 

of care that strikes me as—there’s ordinary accidents and then 

there’s just real sloppiness. So I think of that as kind of real sloppiness. 

Mr. WALBERG. So you stated that you had found 110 emails on 

Secretary Clinton’s server that were classified at the time they 

were sent or received, yet Secretary Clinton has insisted for over 

a year publicly that she never sent or received any classified 

emails. 

The question I have from that, would it be difficult for any Cabinet-level official, and specifically any Cabinet official, let alone one 

who is a former White House resident or U.S. senator, to determine 

if information is classified? 

Mr. COMEY. Would it be difficult for them to—— 

Mr. WALBERG. Would it be difficult? 

Mr. COMEY. That’s hard to answer in the abstract. We’re trying 

to find the context in which they’re hearing it or seeing it. Obviously, if it’s marked, which is why we require markings, it’s easy. 

It’s just too hard to answer, because there are so many other situations you might encounter it. 

Mr. WALBERG. But with the training that we receive and certainly a Secretary of State would receive or someone who lives in 

the White House, that goes a little above and beyond just the commonsense individual out there trying to determine. Knowing that 

classified information will be brought and to remove to an unauthorized site ought to cause a bit of pause there, shouldn’t it? 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. And if you’re a government official, you should 

be attentive to it—— 

Mr. WALBERG. Absolutely. 

Mr. COMEY. —because you know that the matters you deal with 

could involve sensitive information. So sure. 

Mr. WALBERG. So Secretary Clinton’s revised statement that she 

never knowingly sent or received any classified information is probably also untrue? 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. I don’t want to comment on people’s public 

statements. We did not find evidence sufficient to establish that 

she knew she was sending classified information beyond a reasonable doubt to meet that—the intent standard. But like I said, I understand why people are confused by the whole discussion, I get 

that. But you know what would be a double standard? If she were 

prosecuted for gross negligence. 

Mr. WALBERG. But your statement on Tuesday said there is evidence to support a conclusion that any reasonable person in Secretary Clinton’s position should have known that an unclassified 

system was no place for that conversation. 

Mr. COMEY. I stand by that. 

Mr. WALBERG. And that’s very clear. 

Mr. COMEY. That’s the definition of carelessness, of negligence. 

Mr. WALBERG. Which happened—— 

Mr. COMEY. Oh, yeah. 

Mr. WALBERG. —as a result of our Secretary of State’s—former 

Secretary of State’s decisions. 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 


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Mr. WALBERG. Is it your statement, then, before this committee 

that Secretary Clinton should have known not to send classified 

material, and yet she did? 

Mr. COMEY. Well, certainly she should have known not to send 

classified information. As I said, that’s the definition of negligent. 

I think she was extremely careless, I think she was negligent. 

That, I could establish. What we can’t establish is that she acted 

with the necessary criminal intent. 

Mr. WALBERG. Do you believe that since the Department of Justice hasn’t used the statute Congress passed, it’s invalid? 

Mr. COMEY. No, I think they’re worried that it’s invalid, that it 

will be challenged on constitutional grounds, which is why they’ve 

used it extraordinarily sparingly in the decades. 

Mr. WALBERG. Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

We’ll now go to—we’ll now recognize Mr. Lieu of California for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

As I read some of my Republican colleagues’ press statements, 

and as I sit here today, I am reminded of that quote from ‘‘Macbeth’’: ‘‘full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.’’ 

I’ve heard some sound and fury today from members of the committee, and the reason they largely signify nothing is because of 

two fundamental truths that are self-evident. The first of which, 

none of the members of this committee can be objective on this 

issue. I can’t be objective. I’ve endorsed Hillary Clinton for President, as have the Democratic members of this committee. My Republican colleagues can’t be objective. They oppose Hillary Clinton 

for President. 

Which is why we have you. You are a nonpartisan, career public 

servant that has served our Nation with distinction and honor. And 

not only can you be objective, it is your job to be objective, to apply 

the law fairly and equally regardless of politics. 

I think it would be important for the American people to get a 

fuller appreciation of your public service. So let me ask you, before 

you were FBI Director, how many years did you serve as a Federal 

prosecutor? 

Mr. COMEY. I think 15. 

Mr. LIEU. For a period of time, you were at Columbia Law School 

as a scholar and you specialized in national security law. Is that 

correct? 

Mr. COMEY. Sometimes I fantasize I still am. 

Mr. LIEU. All right. Thank you. 

When you served in the Republican administration of President 

George W. Bush, you were then the second-highest ranking member of the Department of Justice. Is that right? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. President Bush appointed me to be U.S. Attorney in Manhattan and then the number two in the Department of 

Justice. 

Mr. LIEU. When you were confirmed for the FBI Director position, the vote was 93–1. Is that correct? 

Mr. COMEY. That’s correct. 

Mr. LIEU. With that strong bipartisan support, it’s not surprising 

that Senator Grassley, a Republican, said during your confirmaVerDate Sep 11 2014 14:35 Oct 12, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\21323.TXT APRIL

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tion, and I quote: ‘‘Director Comey has a reputation for applying 

the law fairly and equally regardless of politics.’’ 

In this case, did you apply the law fairly and equally regardless 

of politics? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. LIEU. Did you get any political interfere reasons from the 

White House? 

Mr. COMEY. None. 

Mr. LIEU. Did you get any political interference from the Hillary 

Clinton campaign? 

Mr. COMEY. None. 

Mr. LIEU. One of the reasons you’re appointed to a fixed term of 

10 years, a very long term, is to help insulate you from politics. 

Isn’t that right? 

Mr. COMEY. That’s correct. 

Mr. LIEU. The second fundamental truth today about this hearing is that none of the members of this committee have any idea 

what we’re talking about, because we have not reviewed the evidence personally in this case. 

When I served on Active Duty in the U.S. Air Force in the 1990s, 

one of my duties was a prosecutor. One of the first things I learned 

as a prosecutor is it is unprofessional and wrong to make allegations based on evidence that one has not reviewed. 

So let me ask you, has any member of this committee, to the best 

of your knowledge, reviewed the 30,000 emails at issue in this 

case? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t know. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. LIEU. Has any member of this committee sat through the 

multiple witness interviews that the FBI conducted in this case? 

Mr. COMEY. No. That I know. No. 

Mr. LIEU. Has any member of this committee received any special information about the files that you kept or other FBI agents 

kept on this case? 

Mr. COMEY. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. LIEU. Now let’s do a little bit of math here. One percent of 

30,000 emails would be 300 emails. Is that right? 

Mr. COMEY. I think that’s right. 

Mr. LIEU. Thirty emails would be one-tenth of 1 percent, and 

three emails would be 1 one hundredth of 1 percent of 30,000, 

right? 

Mr. COMEY. I think that’s right. 

Mr. LIEU. Okay. So of those three emails, 1 one hundredth of 1 

percent of 30,000, they bore these tiny little classified markings, 

which is, as you described, a C with parentheses, correct? 

Mr. COMEY. Correct. 

Mr. LIEU. It is certainly possible that a busy person who has sent 

and received over 30,000 emails just might miss this marking of a 

C with parentheses. It is possible, correct? 

Mr. COMEY. Correct. 

Mr. LIEU. Okay. So let me now just conclude by stating what 

some of my colleagues have, which is, there is just the strongest 

whiff of hypocrisy going on here. The American public might be interested in knowing that all Members of Congress receive security 

clearances just for being a Member of Congress. We get to have priVerDate Sep 11 2014 14:35 Oct 12, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\21323.TXT APRIL

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vate email servers, we get to have private email accounts, we can 

use multiple devices, we can take devices overseas. 

And really at the end of the day, when the American people look 

at this hearing, they need to ask themselves this question: Do they 

trust the biased, partisan politicians on this committee who are 

making statements based on evidence we have not reviewed, or do 

they trust the distinguished FBI Director? I would trust the FBI 

Director. 

I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

We’ll now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mica, for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director, how long did you investigate this matter? 

Mr. COMEY. Just about a year. 

Mr. MICA. A year. And do you believe you conducted a legitimate 

investigation? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MICA. And it was a legitimate subject that was something 

that you should look into, you had that responsibility. Is that correct? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. MICA. We have a responsibility to hear from you on the action that you took. This weekend—well, tomorrow we’ll go back to 

our districts, and we have to explain people, I’ll be at a couple of 

cafes where I see folks, in meetings, and they’re going to ask a lot 

of questions about what took place. 

Have you seen the Broadway production ‘‘Hamilton’’? 

Mr. COMEY. Not yet. I’m hoping to. 

Mr. MICA. I haven’t either, but I understand it won the choreography Tony Award. I think you and others know that. 

The problem I have in explaining to my constituents is what’s 

come down, it almost looks like choreography. Let me just go over 

it real quickly with you. 

Last Tuesday, not this week, 1 week ago, former President Clinton meets with the Attorney General in Phoenix. The next Friday, 

last Friday, Mrs. Lynch, the AG, says she is going to defer to the 

FBI on whatever you came up with. On Saturday morning, I saw 

the vans pull up, this is this past Saturday, and you questioned 

Secretary Clinton for 3 hours. Is that—I guess that’s correct? 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. Three and a half. 

Mr. MICA. Okay. And then on Tuesday morning, the morning 

after July Fourth, we watched in our office, I had my interns, I 

said, ‘‘Come in, we’ve got the FBI Director, let’s hear what he has 

to say,’’ we’re all kind of startled, and you basically said you were 

going to recommend not to prosecute, correct? 

Mr. COMEY. Uh-huh. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MICA. And then Tuesday, well, we had President Obama and 

Secretary Clinton arrive in Charlotte at 2 o’clock, and shortly 

thereafter we had the Attorney General is closing the case. 

This is rapid fire. I mean, now, my folks think that there’s something fishy about this. I’m not a conspiracy theorist, but there are 

a lot of questions on how this came down. I have questions about 

how this came down. 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Did you personally interview the Secretary on Saturday morning? 

Mr. COMEY. I didn’t personally, no. 

Mr. MICA. And how many agents did? 

Mr. COMEY. I think we had five or six in the room. 

Mr. MICA. Did you talk to all of those agents after the interview? 

Mr. COMEY. I did not speak to all of them, no. 

Mr. MICA. Did she testify or talk to them under oath? 

Mr. COMEY. No. 

Mr. MICA. She did not. Well, that’s a problem. But—— 

Mr. COMEY. It’s still a crime to lie to us. 

Mr. MICA. I know it is. Do you have a transcript of that— 

that—— 

Mr. COMEY. No. We don’t record our—— 

Mr. MICA. Do you have a 302, I guess it’s called, analysis? 

Mr. COMEY. I do. I don’t have it with me, but I do. 

Mr. MICA. Did you read it? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. MICA. You did. Can we get a copy of it since the case is 

closed? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t know the answer to that. 

Mr. MICA. I would like a copy of it provided to the committee. 

I would like also for the last 30 days, any communications between you or any agent or any person in the FBI with the Attorney 

General or those in authority in the Department of Justice on this 

matter. Could you provide us with that? 

Mr. COMEY. We’ll provide you with whatever we can under the 

law and under our policy. It would actually be easy in my case. 

Mr. MICA. You see, the problem that I have, though, is I have 

to go back and report to people what took place. 

Mr. COMEY. Sure. 

Mr. MICA. Now, did you write the statement that you gave on 

Tuesday? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. MICA. You did. And did you write—and you said you didn’t 

talk to all of the agents. But all of the agents, did they meet with 

you? And then is that the group that said that we all vote to not 

recommend prosecution? 

Mr. COMEY. Well, yeah, I did not meet with all of the agents. I’ve 

met with—I guess I’ve met—I’ve with all of them at various times. 

Mr. MICA. But we’re getting the word that it was, like, unanimous out of every—out of FBI that we don’t prosecute. 

Mr. COMEY. What’s your question, Congressman? 

Mr. MICA. Well, again, I want to know who counseled you. You 

read their summary, okay. She was not under oath. And it appears—I mean, members have cited here where she lied or misled 

to Congress, which will lead now to the next step of our possibly 

giving you a referral on this matter. You’re aware of that? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. Someone mentioned that earlier. 

Mr. MICA. And that probably will happen. 

Thank you for shedding some light on what took place. 

Mr. COMEY. Can I, Mr. Chairman—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Sure. Go ahead. 

Mr. COMEY. —can I respond just very briefly? 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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I hope what you’ll tell the folks in the cafe is: Look me in the 

eye and listen to what I’m about to say. I did not coordinate that 

with anyone. The White House, the Department of Justice, nobody 

outside the FBI family had any idea what I was about to say. I say 

that under oath. I stand by that. There was no coordination. There 

was an insinuation in what you were saying that I don’t mean to 

get strong in responding, but I want to make sure I was definitive 

about that. 

Thank you, sir. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

We’ll now recognize the gentlewoman from the Virgin Islands, 

Ms. Plaskett, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. PLASKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all for being here. 

Director Comey, I would rather be here talking with you about 

the FBI’s investigations and their resources to those individuals 

who are acting under color of law who have apparently committed 

egregious violations in the killings that we’ve seen in the recent 

days. 

But instead, Mr. Chairman, I’m sitting here and I’ve listened patiently as a number of individuals have gone on national TV and 

made accusations against Director Comey, both directly and indirectly, because he recommended against prosecution based upon 

facts. 

I’ve listened just very recently here in this hearing as my esteemed colleague from Florida tries to insinuate the condensation 

of an investigation into 1 week that actually occurred over a much, 

much longer period of time, and using that condensation and conspiracy theory to say that there’s some orchestration. And that they 

have accused Mr. Director Comey of basing his decision on political 

considerations rather than facts. I’ve heard chuckles and laughter 

here in this hearing, and I don’t think there’s anything to be smiling or laughing about. 

Because I want to say something to those individuals who are 

chuckling and laughing and making attacks on Director Comey for 

doing his job: You have no idea who you’re talking about. Your accusations are completely off base, utterly offensive to us as American people. 

I know this because I’ve had the honor of working for Director 

Comey during my own service at the Department of Justice. From 

2002 to 2004, I served as senior counsel to the deputy attorney general. I worked with both the deputy attorney general, Larry 

Thompson, and Deputy Attorney General Jim Comey when he became deputy as a staff attorney. And I know from my own experiences that Director Comey is a man of impeccable integrity. 

There are very few times when you as an attorney or as an individual can work with individuals or a gentleman who is completely 

that, someone who is above the fray. Anyone who suggests or implies that he made his recommendations on anything but the facts 

simply does not know James Comey. 

We’ve used the term ‘‘no reasonable prosecutor.’’ Well, I know 

that James Comey doesn’t act as what a reasonable prosecutor 

would do, because he is the unyielding prosecutor, he is the prosVerDate Sep 11 2014 14:35 Oct 12, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\21323.TXT APRIL

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ecutor who does what is politically not expedient for himself, his 

staff, but for the law. 

And I’m not the only person in this hearing, in this committee, 

who has worked with Director Comey or for him. Representative 

Gowdy himself also commended Director Comey, and he said this, 

and I quote: ‘‘I used to work with him. I think Comey is doing exactly what you want. He’s doing a serious investigation behind 

closed doors, away from the media’s attention, and I’m going to 

trust him until I see a reason not to.’’ 

Representative Gowdy referred to Director Comey as honorable 

and apolitical. He said this is exactly what you want in law enforcement. Well, it’s exactly what you want in law enforcement 

until the decision is not the decision that you want. 

Director Comey, Chairman Chaffetz, as it was said by one of my 

colleagues, went on television and accused you of making, quote, ‘‘a 

political calculation.’’ He said that your recommendation was nothing more than, quote, ‘‘a political determination in the end.’’ 

I’m going to ask you, how do you respond to that? Were your actions in any way, shape, or form governed by political consideration? 

Mr. COMEY. No, not in any way. 

Ms. PLASKETT. And did anyone with Secretary Clinton’s campaign or the administration influence your recommendation for political reasons? 

Mr. COMEY. No. They didn’t influence it in any way. 

Ms. PLASKETT. I’m going to take you at your word, because I 

know, and those who will go through the record of your long tenure 

as a career prosecutor and they’ll look at examples, will see that 

you have taken decisions that have not been that which your supervisors, which the President, which others have wanted you to 

take. 

As a Federal prosecutor who believed that the facts must come 

above politics, I’m thankful that we have you. And, Director 

Comey, I want to thank you for your service to our country, and 

you have our support. 

We would like to see as much documents. And I’m grateful that 

you want to keep the transparency so that the American public can 

understand the difference between what they hear in the media 

and the elements of a crime necessary for criminal prosecution. 

Thank you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentlewoman. 

We’ll now recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Farenthold, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you very much, Director Comey. 

I want to talk a little bit about cybersecurity. The State Department’s inspector general report detailed instances of multiple attacks on Secretary Clinton’s computer as well as her replying to 

suspicious email from the personal account of the Undersecretary 

of State. 

Director, you said that hostile actors successfully gained access 

to the commercial email accounts of people Secretary Clinton regularly communicated with. In the case of the Romanian hacker, 

Guccifer, accessing Sidney Blumenthal’s account. And, you know, 

that’s been public for some time. 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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During your investigation, were there other people in the State 

Department or that regularly communicated with Secretary Clinton that you can confirm were successfully hacked? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. And were these folks that regularly communicated with the Secretary? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. And were you able to conclude definitively that 

the attempted hacks referenced in the IG report were not successful? 

Mr. COMEY. We were not able to conclude that they were successful. I think that’s the best way to say it. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. All right. So while you said that given the nature of Clinton’s server, you would be unlikely to see evidence one 

way or the other of whether or not it had been successfully hacked, 

how many unsuccessful attempts did you uncover? Did you find 

any there? 

Mr. COMEY. There were unsuccessful attempts. I don’t know the 

number off the top of my head. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Do you have an idea, were they from foreign 

governments? Where did they come from? 

Mr. COMEY. I want to be careful what I say in an open setting, 

and so I—we can give you that information, but I don’t want to 

give any foreign governments knowledge of what I know. So 

there—— 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. All right. But would you be so far as to say 

they probably weren’t American high school students fooling 

around? 

Mr. COMEY. Correct. It was not limited to—— 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. All right. 

Mr. COMEY. —criminal activity. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. During your investigation, did you or anyone 

in the FBI interview the hacker Guccifer? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. And he claimed he gained access to Sid 

Blumenthal’s email account and traced him back to Clinton’s private server. Can you confirm that Guccifer never gained access to 

her server? 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah, he did not. He admitted that was a lie. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. All right. Well, at least that’s good to hear. 

All right. Section 793 of Title 18 of the United States Code 

makes it a crime to allow classified information to be stolen 

through gross negligence. Were you to discover that hostile actors 

had actually gotten into Secretary Clinton’s email, would that have 

changed your recommendation with respect to prosecuting her? 

Mr. COMEY. Unlikely, although we didn’t consider that question, 

because we didn’t have those facts. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. All right. I want to go back to the question of 

intent real quick for just a second. I’m a recovering attorney, it’s 

been decades since I actually practiced law, but you kept referring 

to she had to know it was illegal to have the requisite criminal intent. I was always taught in law school, and I don’t know where 

this changed, that ignorance of the law was no excuse. If I’m driving along at 45 miles an hour and didn’t see the 35-mile-an-hour 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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speed limit, I was still intentionally speeding even though I didn’t 

know it. 

Now, I might not have had the requisite criminal intent if maybe 

my accelerator were jammed or something like that, but even 

though I didn’t know the law was 35, I was driving 45, I’m going 

to get a ticket and I’m probably going to be prosecuted for that. 

So how can you say ignorance of the law is an excuse in Mrs. 

Clinton’s case? 

Mr. COMEY. Well, the comparison to petty offenses, I don’t think 

is useful. But the question of ignorance of the law is no excuse. But 

here’s the distinction. You have to have general criminal intent. 

You don’t need to know what particular statute you’re violating, 

but you must be aware of the generally wrongful nature of your 

conduct. That’s what—— 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Now, so Congress, when they enacted that 

statute, said gross negligence. 

Mr. COMEY. Yep. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. That doesn’t say intent. So what are we going 

to have to enact to get you guys to prosecute something based on 

negligence or gross negligence? So are we going to have to add, 

‘‘And, oh, by the way, we don’t mean you—we really do mean you 

don’t have to have intent there’’? 

Mr. COMEY. Well, that’s a conversation for you all to have with 

the Department of Justice, but it would have to be something more 

than the statute enacted in 1917, because for 99 years they’ve been 

very worried about its constitutionality. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. All right. Well, I think that’s something this 

committee and Congress as a whole, the Judiciary Committee that 

Mr. Chaffetz and I also sit on, will be looking at it. 

And I was on television this morning, and I just want to relay 

a question that I received from a caller into that television commercial, and it’s just real simple. Why should any person follow the law 

if our leaders don’t? 

And we can argue about intent or not, but you laid out the fact 

that she basically broke the law but you couldn’t prove intent. 

Maybe I’m putting words in your mouth, but I do want to know 

why any person should follow the law if our leaders don’t have to. 

Maybe that’s rhetorical, but I’ll give you an opportunity to comment on that. 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. That’s a question I’m no more qualified to answer than any American citizen. It’s an important question. 

In terms of my work in my world, my folks would not be—one 

of my employees would not be prosecuted for this. They would face 

consequences for this. So the notion that it’s either prosecute or 

you walk around, you know, smiling all day long is just not true 

for those people who work for the government. The broader question is one for a democracy to answer, it’s not for me. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. And I guess the ultimate decision as to whether or not Mrs. Clinton works in government or not is not in—is in 

everybody’s hands. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. We’ll now recognize the gentleman from 

Pennsylvania, Mr. Boyle, for 5 minutes. 


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Mr. BOYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Director Comey, for appearing, especially on such 

short notice. 

I want to share with you actually something a friend of mine was 

expressing when watching your press conference 48 hours ago, and 

this is someone who’s not in any way political; in fact, probably 

typical of most American citizens today in being depressed about 

the remarkable level of cynicism we have in our government, but 

specifically those of us who are in government make decisions first 

and foremost because of the party hat we wear and not necessarily 

based on the facts and the evidence. 

And he texted me after watching your 15-minute presentation: 

Oh, it’s nice to see a real pro. You can tell that he would make the 

decision based on the facts and the evidence and not what party 

he wears. 

I think that’s so important if we’re ever going to get to a place 

in this country where we restore some of the faith that we had in 

government. If you looked at the poll numbers from the 1940s and 

1950s and you look at faith in government among the American 

public, and you look at those numbers today, the numbers today 

are anemic, they’re nowhere near the levels that they were decades 

ago. 

So for that, I want to say thank you. And I think that many citizens have the same impression. 

When I first met you a couple years ago at a weekend session 

in Colonial Williamsburg, you might remember that we had a discussion about my biggest concern, frankly, facing the security of 

the American people, and that is the possibility of a lone wolf terrorist, someone becoming self-radicalized and acting based on that. 

We had an exchange that I’ll keep private, but I think I can characterize that you share my concern. 

I’m just thinking, for the last 2–1/2 hours that we’ve been here, 

we’ve had the FBI Director, asking questions on this matter, when, 

frankly, I would have much rather your time spent dealing with 

the potential of lone wolf terrorists and other coordinated attacks 

that we face. 

But since this is the Oversight and Government Reform Committee, trying to find something that we can now take and possibly 

use in a systemic way, not just the celebrity of Secretary Clinton 

and the fact, because it involves her, let’s face it, that’s the reason 

why we’re here, but I want to try to take something out of this very 

expensive and long investigation and try to use it in a productive 

way toward reforming government that possibly we can get something good out of it. 

So toward that end, I’m really concerned about this issue of upclassification, because it seems as if, and I was not aware of this 

until the investigation, there is quite a strong discrepancy between 

not just former Secretary Clinton, but even former Secretary Powell, what he thinks should be classified, and then what is classified 

after the fact. And I think you—if I’m right, there were some 2,000 

emails that were up-classified? I was wondering if you could speak 

to that. 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. It actually was not a concept I was real familiar with before this. It’s the notion that something might not have 


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been classified at the time, but that in hindsight, as a government 

agency considers releasing it, they raise the classification level to 

protect it because it would—it’s a candid assessment of a foreign 

leader or something like that. 

I think it is largely a State Department thing, because their diplomats will often be conversing in an unclassified way, that when 

they look at releasing it in response to a FOIA request, they think 

it ought to be protected in some fashion. 

But, honestly, I kind of pushed those to the side. 

Mr. BOYLE. Right. 

Mr. COMEY. The important thing here was what was classified at 

the time, that’s what matters. 

Mr. BOYLE. Right. And that for a law enforcement official matters. But I’m just wondering if you could share with us any of your 

impressions about a system that exists where there is such gray 

area and discrepancy in what is classified and what’s not, and if 

you or your agents had any suggestions for us, either in Government Reform, or I happen to be on the Foreign Affairs Committee 

that has oversight of State Department. 

Do you believe that this is a matter that we should take up 

where there is such discrepancy on what’s classified, what’s not 

classified? I think of one example. Ambassador Ross put something 

in a book that wasn’t classified, and then it was up-classified after 

the book came out. But what good does that do us as a country in 

terms of trying to protect the intelligence of the United States. 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. I’m not an expert in this up-classification business, but I do suspect it would be a fertile ground for trying to figure out whether there are ways to do it in a more predictable, reliable way. 

Mr. BOYLE. Yeah. Well, thank you again for your service. 

And I yield back my time. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

We’ll now recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Hice, for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. HICE. Director Comey, your statement on Tuesday clearly 

showed that Secretary Clinton not only was extremely careless in 

handling classified information, but that also any reasonable person should have known better, and that also, in doing so, she put 

our national security at risk with her reckless behavior. 

So it seems to me that the American people are only left, based 

on your assessment, with just a few options. Either Secretary Clinton herself is not a reasonable person, or she is someone who purposefully, willfully exhibited disregard for the law, or she is someone who sees herself as above the law. 

And to muddy the water even further, after listening to you lay 

out the facts of the investigation, much of what you said directly 

contradicted her in previous statements that she had made. 

I think it’s all this compiled, putting the—connecting the dots 

that so many American people are irate, that after all of this there 

was not a recommendation for Secretary Clinton to be prosecuted. 

Now, I do greatly appreciate the fact that you came out with 

much more information on this than you would have in other cases, 

and I think that was the right the thing to do. Undeniably, this is 

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ously the subject of the investigation, former Secretary of State, 

former senator, and all those things that we have talked about, 

former first lady, and so forth. 

And in addition to this, her husband, who happens to be the 

former President of the United States, is meeting privately with 

the Attorney General right before all of this interview takes place. 

Obviously, this is very suspicious, just the optics of it all. And at 

the same time that you’re coming out, or more or less the same 

time that you are announcing the decision, Secretary Clinton is flying around in Air Force One with the President doing a campaign 

event. 

I mean, there’s nothing about this case that’s ordinary, there’s 

nothing about the subject that’s ordinary. 

So let me ask you this, Director: Did Secretary Clinton in fact, 

comply with the Department’s policies or the Federal Records Act? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t think so. I know you have the State inspector 

general here, who’s more of an expert on all the Department’s policies, but at least in some respects, no. 

Mr. HICE. So keeping the servers at home and all these types of 

things, obviously, is not in compliance with the Department’s policies? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. And I’ve read the inspector general’s report on 

that. That’s part of the reason I can answer that part with some 

confidence. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. And yet she said publicly that she fully complied. So there again is another issue. 

If you had the same set of facts but a different subject, a different individual involved, say, just an average, ordinary State Department employee or an anonymous contractor, what would have 

been the outcome? 

Mr. COMEY. I’m highly confident there would be no criminal prosecution no matter who it was. There would be some range of discipline. They might get fired, they might lose their clearance, they 

might get suspended for 30 days. There would be some discipline, 

maybe just a reprimand, I doubt it, I think it would be higher on 

the discipline spectrum, but some sort of discipline. 

Mr. HICE. So is it your opinion that there should likewise be 

some discipline in this case? 

Mr. COMEY. That’s not for me to say. I can talk about what 

would happen if it was a government employee under my responsibility. 

Mr. HICE. Well, then, what you’re laying out is that there is a 

double standard. For someone else, a different subject, an anonymous contractor or someone at the State Department, there would 

absolutely be discipline, but because of who the subject is, you’re 

not willing to say there should be discipline. So there’s—again, this 

whole issue, this is what the American people are so upset about. 

Let me say that, when you stated that no reasonable prosecutor 

would pursue this case, is that because the subject of this investigation was unique? 

Mr. COMEY. No. Huh-uh. There’s no double standard there. And 

there’s no double standard, either, in the sense that if it was John 

Doe, a former government employee, you’d be in the same boat. We 

wouldn’t have any reach on the guy. He wouldn’t be prosecuted. 


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Mr. HICE. But he would have some discipline? 

Mr. COMEY. Well, not if he had left government service. 

Mr. HICE. Had they lied about having servers, had they lied 

about sending and receiving classified emails, had they lied about 

not deleting those emails to the public, had they lied about not 

having any marked classified, the statements are clearly documented, and you’re saying that an average person would experience 

discipline, by your own words, but Secretary Clinton does not deserve to be disciplined? 

Mr. GOWDY. [Presiding.] The gentleman’s time has expired, but 

the Director may answer if he wants to. 

Mr. COMEY. An average employee still in government service 

would be subject to a disciplinary process. Now, if they’d left, you’d 

be in the same boat. 

Mr. GOWDY. The gentleman from Georgia yields back. 

The chair will now recognize the gentleman from Vermont, Mr. 

Welch. 

Mr. WELCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Director Comey. 

The prosecutor has really awesome power. The power to prosecute is the power to destroy and it has to be used with restraint. 

You obviously know that. You’re being asked to—you had to exercise that responsibility in the context of a very contested Presidential campaign, enormous political pressure. 

You had to do it once before. And I go back to that evening of 

March 10, 2004, when the question was whether a surveillance program authorized after 9/11 by President Bush was going to continue despite the fact that the Justice Department had come to an 

independent legal conclusion that it actually violated our constitutional rights. 

That’s a tough call, because America was insecure, the President 

was asserting his authority as Commander in Chief to take an action that was intended to protect the American people, but you and 

others in the Justice Department felt that, whatever that justification was, the Constitution came first and you were going to defend 

it. 

And as I understand it, you were on your way home and had to 

divert your drivers to go back to the hospital to be at the bedside 

of a very sick at that time Attorney General, and you had to stand 

in the way of the White House chief of staff and the White House 

counsel. 

I’m not sure that was a popular decision or one that you could 

have confidently thought would be a career booster, but I want to 

thank you for that. 

Fast forward, we’ve got this situation of a highly contested political campaign. And there is substantive concern it’s legitimate by 

Democrats and Republicans for independent political reasons, but 

you had to make a call that was based upon your view of the law, 

not your view of how it would affect the outcome of who would be 

the next Commander in Chief. 

Others have asked this for you, but I think I’m close to the end. 

I want to give you a chance to just answer, I think, the bottom line 

questions here. Had you, after your thorough investigation, found 

evidence that suggested that criminal conduct occurred, is there 


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anything, anything or anyone, that could have held you back from 

deciding to prosecute? 

Mr. COMEY. No. I mean, I don’t have the power to decide prosecution, but I’d have worked very hard to make sure that a righteous case was prosecuted. 

Mr. WELCH. And you would have make that recommendation to 

the Attorney General? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. WELCH. Was there any interference, implicit or explicit, from 

the President of the United States or anyone acting on his behalf 

to influence the outcome of your investigation and the recommendation that you made? 

Mr. COMEY. No. 

Mr. WELCH. Was there anyone in the Hillary Clinton campaign 

or Hillary Clinton herself who did anything, directly or indirectly, 

to attempt to influence the conclusion that you made to recommend 

no prosecution? 

Mr. COMEY. No. 

Mr. WELCH. At this moment, after having been through several 

hours of questioning, is there anything in the questions you’ve 

heard that would cause you to change the decision that you made? 

Mr. COMEY. No. I don’t—you know, I don’t love this, but it’s really important to do, and I understand the questions and concerns. 

I just want the American people to know, we really did this the 

right way. You can disagree with us, but you cannot fairly say we 

did it in any kind of political way. We don’t carry water for anybody. We’re trying to do what the right thing is. 

Mr. WELCH. Well, I very much appreciate that, and I very much 

appreciate that it takes strong people of independent judgment to 

make certain that we continue to be a Nation of laws. 

Mr. Chairman, just one final thing, and I’ll yield to Mr. Cummings. We’ve got a political debate where a lot of these issues that 

are going to be—that have been raised are going to be fought in 

the campaign, and we’ve got Secretary Clinton who’s going to have 

to defend what she did. She’s acknowledged it’s a mistake. We’ve 

got that great constitutional scholar, Mr. Trump, who’s going to be 

making his case about why this was wrong. But that’s politics, 

that’s not really having anything to do with the independence of 

prosecutorial discretion. 

Thank you, Director Comey. 

And I yield whatever additional time I have to Mr. Cummings. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I think the gentleman’s going to yield back. 

I’ve spoken with Mr. Cummings. 

We’ll now recognize the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Massie, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MASSIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Director Comey, for showing up and your willingness to be transparent and answer a lot of unanswered questions. 

A few hours before this hearing started I went onto social media 

and asked people to submit questions, and I’ve got over 500 questions, and I don’t think I’ll get to ask them all in these 5 minutes, 

but I’m sure you’ll be willing to answer them. 

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tween extremely careless and gross negligence. But in the process 

of this hearing, what I’m hearing you say is, that’s not what we— 

that’s not what your reluctance is based on, it’s not based on—the 

reluctance to prosecute, by the way. Your reluctance to recommend 

a prosecution or an indictment is not based on parsing those words, 

it’s based on your concern for this statute, with this statute, is that 

correct, from your opening statement? 

Mr. COMEY. It’s broader than that, actually, the statute, and it 

fits within a framework of fairness and also my understanding of 

what the Department of Justice has prosecuted over the last 50 

years. 

Mr. MASSIE. So when you say a reasonable prosecutor wouldn’t 

take this case, it’s not because you don’t think she made—that she 

lied in public or that maybe she was negligent, it’s because you 

have concern with the prosecutorial history of the statute? 

Mr. COMEY. And not just that statute, but also 1924, which is the 

misdemeanor. I also don’t see cases that were prosecuted on facts 

like these. So both, both 793 and 1924. 

Mr. MASSIE. But you did find one prosecution. And has it been 

overturned by the Supreme Court? 

Mr. COMEY. No. There was one time it was charged in an espionage case, and the guy ended up pleading guilty to a different offense, so it was never adjudicated. 

Mr. MASSIE. So, you know, so that your concern is with the negligence threshold, that you think it requires mens rea, or knowing 

the crime. But in all 50 States isn’t there a negligent homicide statute and aren’t people prosecuted for that all the time, and doesn’t 

the Supreme Court and all the courts below that uphold those prosecutions, just on the basis of negligence? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t know whether all 50 States. I think negligent 

homicide and manslaughter statutes are relatively common. 

Mr. MASSIE. Okay. So but don’t all 50 States have something like 

that, and aren’t those sustained in the upper courts, those convictions? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t know whether all 50 States have something 

like that. But, again, I think it’s very common and I think those 

are sustained. 

Mr. MASSIE. So don’t we have a history of—you know, you implied that the American judicial system doesn’t have a history of 

convicting somebody for negligence, but don’t we in other domains 

of justice? 

Mr. COMEY. We do. I know the Federal system best. There are 

very few in the Federal system. They’re mostly, as we talked about 

earlier, in the environmental and Food and Drug Administration 

area. 

Mr. MASSIE. Okay. Thank you. 

Now, I want to ask another question that’s come up here. You’ve 

basically related to us that this information, this top secret or classified information, got into these email chains because of conversations people were having, they were relating what they heard before in other settings. Is that correct? 

Mr. COMEY. No. Maybe in some cases, but it was people having 

an email conversation about a classified subject. 


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Mr. MASSIE. Okay. So they were having an email conversation, 

but how in this email conversation did this bore marking show up? 

Like, if they’re not sophisticated enough, as you said before, even 

Hillary Clinton wasn’t sophisticated enough to recognize a bore 

marking, the C with the parentheses for confidential or classified, 

how did—if they weren’t that sophisticated, how did they recreate 

that bore marking in their emails when they were having these 

discussions? 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. Somebody—a lot of what ended up on Secretary Clinton’s server were stuff that had been forwarded up a 

chain and gets to her from her staff, a lot of that forwarding, and 

then she comments sometimes on it. 

Someone down in the chain, in typing a paragraph that summarized something, put a portion marking, C—paren, C paren, on 

that paragraph. 

Mr. MASSIE. Can you—doesn’t it take a lot of intent to take a 

classified document from a setting that’s, you know, authorized and 

secure to one that’s not? Wouldn’t it require intent for somebody 

to recreate that classification marking in an unsecure setting? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t know. It’s possible, but also I could—— 

Mr. MASSIE. I mean, did they accidentally type open parentheses, 

C, close parentheses, and indent the paragraph? 

Mr. COMEY. Oh, no. You wouldn’t accidentally type that. 

Mr. MASSIE. Right. Someone—— 

Mr. COMEY. Right. 

Mr. MASSIE. Someone down the chain—— 

Mr. COMEY. Okay. 

Mr. MASSIE. So this is my question, is someone down the chain 

being investigated? Because they had the intent, clearly, if they 

had the sophistication, which Hillary Clinton, you insinuate, may 

have lacked, if they had the sophistication to know what this bore 

marking was, they had the—had to have the intent to recreate it 

or the intent to cut, copy, paste from a secure system to an unsecure system. Wouldn’t that be correct? 

Mr. COMEY. Potentially, but we’re not—there’s not an open criminal investigation of that person way down the chain at the State 

Department. 

Mr. MASSIE. Shouldn’t there be? 

Mr. COMEY. A criminal investigation? 

Mr. MASSIE. An investigation if there’s intent, which is what 

you—I mean, and I think you may be reasonable in requiring that 

threshold, but don’t we treat everybody the same, whether it’s at 

the top of the chain or the bottom of the chain? 

Mr. COMEY. Sure. You want to if the conduct is the same. But 

we did not criminally investigate whoever started that chain and 

put the C on those paragraphs, we didn’t. 

Mr. MASSIE. Okay. I would suggest maybe you might want to do 

that. 

And I will yield back to the chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

We’ll now recognize the gentlewoman from Michigan, Mrs. Lawrence, for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Director Comey, how many years have you been 

the Director? 


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Mr. COMEY. Two—well, 3 years. I know the exact date count, I 

think, at this point. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Okay. So how many cases have you investigated, approximately, that you had to render a decision? 

Mr. COMEY. The Bureau investigates tens of thousands of cases. 

The Director only gets involved in a very small number of them. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. So about how many? 

Mr. COMEY. I think I’ve been deeply involved in probably 10 to 

20. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Have you ever been called before Congress on 

any of those other decisions? 

Mr. COMEY. No, this is the first time. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Thank you. 

There are some Republicans who support you. Not surprisingly, 

they’re the ones who actually know you. 

And I have a letter here and I would like to enter into the record 

from Richard Painter, Mr. Chair. He was President Bush’s chief 

ethics lawyer. And may it be entered into the record? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. She’s asking unanimous consent. Without 

objection, so ordered. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Mr. Painter refers to Mr. Comey as a man of, 

and I quote, a man of the utmost integrity, who calls the shots as 

he saw them without regard to political affiliation or friendship. 

He states, and I quote: Throughout the FBI investigation of Secretary Clinton’s email server, I have been convinced that the Director would supervise the investigation with being impartial and 

strict adherence to the law, as well as prosecutorial precedent. 

He also adds: Although I’m aware of very few prosecutions for 

carelessness in handling classified information as opposed to intentional disclosure, I knew that the Director would recommend prosecution in any and all circumstances where it was warranted. I 

cannot think of someone better suited to handle such a politically 

sensitive investigation. 

Finally, and I quote: I urge all Members of the United States 

Congress to stop from inferring in specific decisions, particularly 

those involving political allies or opponents. During my tenure in 

the White House, there were very unfortunate allegation that powerful senators sought politically motivating firing of a United 

States Attorney. Whether or not such allegations were true, it is 

imperative, and I’m still quoting, that members of the Senate or 

the House never again conduct themselves in a manner where such 

interference could be suspected. 

And I want to be on the record, I wholeheartedly agree with Mr. 

Painter. 

Director, you have demonstrated yourself, you sat here and answered the questions. And I would never oppose to finding the answers to any situation that is directly related to Federal agencies 

which we on this committee are responsible for. But I want to be 

clear that Congress has no business—no business—interfering with 

these types of decisions that are coming in this—in your responsibility. 

These type of attacks are not only inappropriate, but they’re dangerous. They’re dangerous because they could have a chilling effect 

on the future investigations. 


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And I asked that question, how long have you been in this position and how many times have you made decisions and yet were 

not pulled in 24 hours before this committee? How many times? 

And then we say it’s not political. 

And you have said repeatedly, regardless of who it was, you conducted the investigation as required under your responsibility. And 

here you have Republicans who are saying you are an honorable 

man, and till this day, I have not heard any complaints of your 

judgment. 

So I sit here today as a Member of Congress on the record that 

the slippery slope that we’re seeing today in this hearing, I want 

every Member to be cautious of what we’re saying, that in America 

when we have investigations, that we will allow our own elected 

Congress and Senate to make this a political agenda to attack, but 

only if it’s in their agenda. This goes for Democrats and Republicans. We are not here to do that. 

Thank you, and I yield back my time. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentlewoman. 

We’ll now recognize the gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Blum. 

Mr. BLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Director Comey, for being here today, and thanks for 

hanging in there till every last question is answered. 

I’m not a lawyer. That’s the good news. I’m a career businessman. I’ve spent most of my career operating in the high-tech industry. And today I’ve heard words such as common sense, reasonable 

person, carelessness, judgment, or lack thereof. I like these words. 

I understand these words. I think the average American does as 

well. So I’d like to focus on that. 

Last Tuesday, Director Comey, you said, and I quote: ‘‘None of 

these emails should have been on any kind of an unclassified system, but their presence is especially concerning because all these 

emails were housed on unclassified personal servers not even supported by full-time security staff, like those found at agencies of the 

United States Government, or even with a commercial email service such as Gmail.’’ 

Director Comey, my small Iowa business doesn’t even use Gmail 

for our email, because it’s not secure enough. I know some security 

experts in the industry. I checked with them. The going rate to 

hack into somebody’s Gmail account, $129. For corporate emails, 

they can be hacked for $500 or less. If you want to hack into an 

IP address, it’s around $100. And I’m sure the FBI could probably 

do it cheaper. This is the going rate. 

Director Comey, are you implying in that statement that the private email servers of Secretary Clinton’s were perhaps less secure 

than a Gmail account that is used for free by a billion people 

around this planet? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. And I’m not looking to pick on Gmail. Their security is actually pretty good. The weakness is in the individual 

users. 

But, yes, Gmail has full-time security staff and thinks about 

patching and logging and protecting their systems in a way that 

was not the case here. 

Mr. BLUM. I’d like to ask you, what kind of judgment—we talked 

a lot about judgment today—does this decision to potentially exVerDate Sep 11 2014 14:35 Oct 12, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\21323.TXT APRIL

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pose to hackers classified information on an email service that’s 

less secure than Gmail—your words—what does that suggest to 

you? What type of judgment does that suggest to you? 

Mr. COMEY. It suggests the kind of carelessness that I talked 

about. 

Mr. BLUM. In August of last year, Secretary Clinton was asked 

by Ed Henry of Fox News whether she had wiped her entire server, 

meaning did she delete all the emails on her server. Her response: 

‘‘You mean with a cloth?’’ 

March of 2015, during a press conference, Secretary Clinton assured us her private email server was secure, saying the server 

was on private property guarded by the Secret Service. 

Now, this would be laughable if it wasn’t so serious. I know, you 

know, my constituents in eastern Iowa know you don’t need to be 

a cat burglar to hack into an email server and you don’t need a 

cloth to wipe a server clean. One would think that a former United 

States senator, one would think that a former secretary of state 

would know this as well. Would you agree with that statement? 

Mr. COMEY. You would think, although as I said before, one of 

the things I’ve learned in this case is that the Secretary may not 

have been as sophisticated as people assume. She didn’t have a 

computer in her office at the State Department, for example. So I 

don’t think—so I would assume the same thing about someone who 

had been a senator and a high-ranking official. I’m not sure it’s a 

fair assumption in this case. 

Mr. BLUM. In your opinion, Director Comey, did Secretary Clinton know that a server could, in fact, be wiped clean electronically 

and not with a cloth? 

Mr. COMEY. Well, I assume that—I don’t know. 

Mr. BLUM. Would you assume she knows that? 

Mr. COMEY. I would assume that it was a facetious comment 

about a cloth, but I don’t know. I don’t know in particular on that 

one. 

Mr. BLUM. Would you also assume, Director, that Secretary Clinton knew that a server could be wiped clean electronically, that it 

could be hacked electronically, not physically, you don’t need a cat 

burglar to hack a server? Would you assume—would it be reasonable to assume she knows that? 

Mr. COMEY. To some level it would be reasonable, to some level 

of understanding. 

Mr. BLUM. Then, once again, for someone who knew these things, 

or we assume to some level she knew these things, what kind of 

judgment does the decision to expose classified material on personal servers suggest to you, what type of judgment? 

Mr. COMEY. Well, again, it’s not my place to assess judgment. I 

talk in terms of a state of mind, negligence in particular. I think 

there was carelessness here, and in some circumstances extreme 

carelessness. 

Mr. BLUM. Was her server hacked? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t know. I can’t prove that it was hacked. 

Mr. BLUM. So that answer says to me it could have been hacked. 

Mr. COMEY. Sure. Yeah. 


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Mr. BLUM. And if it was hacked, potentially damaging material 

damaging to American secrets, damaging to American lives, could 

have been hacked. Could have been exposed, correct? 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. 

Mr. BLUM. Lives could have been put at risk if that server was 

indeed hacked? 

Mr. COMEY. I’m not prepared to say yes as to that last piece. 

That would require me going into in a way I can’t here the nature 

of the classified information. But there’s no doubt that it would 

have potentially exposed the information that was classified. The 

information was classified because it could damage the United 

States of America. 

Mr. BLUM. So it could have happened. The FBI just isn’t aware? 

Mr. COMEY. Correct. 

Mr. BLUM. Thank you very much. Thank you for being here. I 

yield back the time I do not have. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank the gentleman. I now recognize the 

gentlelady from New Jersey, Mrs. Watson Coleman, for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you. And thank you, Director. 

I’ve got a number of questions. So I’m going to, like, zip through 

these. 

Mr. COMEY. Okay. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. This is a question I’m going to ask and 

you, and may not even have the answer to it because you may not 

have known this. This is about the classification marking issue 

that you’ve been asked about earlier. According to the State Department, which addressed this issue yesterday, a spokesman said 

that the call sheets appear to bear classified markings. But this 

was actually a mistake. To quote, ‘‘Generally speaking, there’s a 

standard process for developing call sheets for the Secretary of 

State. Call sheets are often marked, but it’s not untypical at all for 

them to be marked at the confidential level prior to a decision by 

the Secretary that he or she will make that call. Oftentimes, once 

it is clear the Secretary intends to make a call, the Department 

will then consider the call sheet SBU, sensitive but unclassified, or 

unclassified altogether and then mark it appropriately, and then 

prepare it for the Secretary’s use and actually marking the call.’’ 

‘‘The classifications of a call sheet, therefore, is not necessarily 

fixed in time and staffers in the Secretary’s office who are involved 

in preparing and finalizing these call sheets, they understand that. 

Given this context, it appears that markings in the appropriate— 

in the documents raised in the media reports were no longer necessary or appropriate at the time. They were sent as an actual 

email. Those markings were human error. They didn’t need to be 

there.’’ Did you know this? 

Mr. COMEY. No. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Director. Can you tell 

me, based upon your information, has there been, and is there any 

evidence that our national security has been breached or at risk as 

a result of these emails, and their being on this server? Is there 

any evidence? 

Mr. COMEY. There’s no direct evidence of an intrusion. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you very much. I have to tell you 

that while I think that this should conclude this discussion, I know 


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we’re going to hear this issue ad nauseam. But I am concerned 

about another issue that I think really is resonating with the people in this country. 

And that issue has to do with experiences that we had just the 

last 2 days. Mr. Director, I want to bring this up for your consideration, because I want to ask you what can the FBI do—FBI do in 

this issue? This morning we woke up to another graphic and deeply 

disturbing video that actually brought me to tears when my staff 

played it for me wherein a Minnesota woman’s boyfriend was—has 

been shot as her young child set in the back seat after apparently 

telling the officer he was licensed to carry a weapon, he had it on 

him, and was going to reach for his identification. 

Just the other day there was an incident in Baton Rouge involving a Mr. Alton Sterling, an African American man who was shot 

while pinned to the ground by police officers in Baton Rouge. An 

interaction tape by two bystanders with cell phones captured this. 

So I think that we have got an issue here. An issue of real national security. And I want to ask you, Mr. Director, do we have 

an opportunity to direct our time and resources in your department 

to those issues? Is it not important that we say their names to remind people of the loss of a Tamir Rice, to an Eric Garner, to an 

Alton Sterling, to a John Crawford, III, to a Michael Brown, to a 

Walter Scott, and even a Sandra Bland? Deaths in the hands of police custody, or by police happening. Are these not happening at an 

alarming rate? And is this not a legitimate space for the FBI to be 

working in? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes, is the emphatic answer. Those are incredibly 

important matters. As you know, the FBI spends a lot of time on 

them because they—they’re very, very important. We have an investigation open on the Baton Rouge case. I was briefed this morning on the Minnesota case. And I would expect we’ll be involved in 

that as well. It’s an important part of our work. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Do you feel that you have the sufficient 

resources from the legal imperative to the funding to address these 

cases and what seems to be a disturbing pattern in our country 

today? 

Mr. COMEY. I’m a bad bureaucrat, but I believe I have sufficient 

resources and we are applying them against those situations. Because I believe the individual cases matter enormously, but also, 

the people’s confidence in law enforcement is one of the bedrocks 

of this great country of ours. So I have the resources, and we’re applying them. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. And, in addition, we believe that our 

law enforcement is, by and large, of high integrity and has the desire to keep us protected and safe. But when we find out that there 

are these occasions, and when there’s an indication that there’s a 

pattern that is taking place in this country, we have a responsibility to ensure that everyone in this country is safe. And simply 

because you’re a black man or a black woman does not make you 

a target. Thank you. I yield back my time. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank the gentlewoman. We’ll now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Walker. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Director 

Comey, for being here. A few things in this town that people agree 


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on both sides of the aisle. And one is your reputation. Reminded 

the passage in James, ‘‘Swift to hear, slow to speak, slow to wrath.’’ 

I am a little disappointed in some of the things that I’ve heard 

from my colleagues about some of the attacks on your character 

and your integrity. I haven’t heard those, and I hope that we have 

not experienced that. I also struggle with the change of heart that 

we’re hearing today. Because I have a list of elected officials who 

have questioned your investigation, even attacked it. In fact, the 

former President Clinton said this is a gain. In fact, just last Friday, Ms. Wasserman Schultz, Congresswoman Wasserman Schultz 

said Secretary Clinton is not the target of this investigation or 

whatever you want to call it. My question to you today is do you 

feel like this has been a Republican witch hunt? This hearing. 

Mr. COMEY. No. 

Mr. WALKER. Okay. Thank you for—— 

Mr. COMEY. No, I said at the beginning I understand people’s 

questions and interest. And I’m a huge fan of transparency. I think 

that’s what makes our democracy great. 

Mr. WALKER. I think those are one of the reasons of why you are 

so respected. To me, this hearing is about understanding and disseminating the facts, how you saw them, and how the American 

public sees them. And specifically, in the areas of where there was 

wrongdoing admitted under your investigation, where there was 

obviously breaking the law. But also some coverups. Did Congress 

ask you to pursue this investigation? 

Mr. COMEY. No. It was a referral from the inspector general of 

the intelligence community. 

Mr. WALKER. So it wasn’t Republicans either. Was it? 

Mr. COMEY. No. 

Mr. WALKER. How did you go about collecting the evidence? 

Mr. COMEY. We used the tools that we normally use in a criminal 

investigation. 

Mr. WALKER. Did or do you receive a congressional referral for 

all the information that you collected? 

Mr. COMEY. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. WALKER. Well, then one of the things that I’m struggling 

with, or that I would like to know specifically is, under oath, Ms. 

Clinton made these three comments that we now know are untrue 

in the Benghazi hearing. Number one, she’s turned over all her 

work-related emails; number two, telling the committee that her 

attorneys went through every single email; and then finally, and 

probably the one that continues to stick the most, there was, and 

I quote, ‘‘Nothing marked classified on my emails,’’ end quote. Now, 

earlier, when the chairman questioned you about this, you said 

something about needing a congressional referral recommendation. 

My question is, something of this magnitude, why or can you help 

me understand, why didn’t it rise to your investigation, or someone 

bringing that to your knowledge as far as saying this is a problem, 

here she is, again, Secretary Clinton lying under oath, specifically 

about our investigation? 

Mr. COMEY. Well, we, out of respect for the legislative branch 

being a separate branch, we do not commence investigations that 

focus on activities before Congress without Congress asking us to 

get involved. That’s a longstanding practice of the Department of 


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Justice and the FBI. So we don’t watch on TV and say: We ought 

to investigate that. You know, Joe Smith said this in front of the 

committee. It requires the committee to say: We think we have an 

issue here. Would you all take a look at it. 

Mr. WALKER. But with all due respect, if you had the Secretary 

Clinton, who is under oath speaking about your very investigation, 

and you talked about your wonderful staff, and certainly have no 

reason to deny that, why wouldn’t that rise to the level of suspicion? Here she is saying this under oath. I mean, lying under 

oath is a crime. Is it not? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. WALKER. And what’s the penalty on that? That’s considered 

perjury, right? 

Mr. COMEY. Perjury. It’s a felony. I forget the exact—it’s potentially years in prison. 

Mr. WALKER. But I don’t understand. Would you help me understand why somebody wouldn’t have tipped you off that she’s talking 

about the very specific case under oath that you’re investigating. 

Mr. COMEY. Well, there’s a difference between us being aware of 

testimony and us opening a criminal investigation for potential perjury. Again, it’s not this case in particular, but all cases. We don’t 

do that without a committee saying we think there was an issue 

in testimony given in this separate branch of the government. 

Mr. WALKER. You also mentioned earlier, and it’s been quoted 

several times that no reasonable prosecutor would move forward 

with some of the facts. Is there any room at all that somebody 

would differ a little bit on the opinion? I know that former United 

States Attorney General Michael Mukasey said would the illegal 

server disqualify her from ever holding any Federal office? So there 

are some people of high esteem that may differ, obviously not privy 

to the exact facts, but can you make any room—you said no reasonable person. Do you understand why the American people, or would 

you understand why other people may say that she has stepped 

across the line or broken enough law here that you would come to 

a different conclusion? 

Mr. COMEY. Sure. I respect different opinions. My only point is, 

and I said earlier I smile because those folks are my friends. I’ve 

worked with them for a long time. None of those guys in my position, I believe, knowing what I know, would think about it differently. But I also respect that they have a different view from the 

outside. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. I now recognize the 

gentleman from California, Mr. DeSaulnier. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director, I just 

want to thank you as others have and I know you don’t need this, 

but I think the American people clearly need to hear it. And you’ve 

done a wonderful job today. But there are moments in my political 

life and as an American I despair for the future of this country. Not 

often. But in those moments comes an individual like yourself either by providence or good fortune or by the framework of the U.S. 

Constitution, and I really believe you have served this country and 

all Americans well, irrespective of their party affiliation. 


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So really two questions. Two lines of questions, I should say. One 

is, and another colleague has brought this up. But you mentioned 

in just previous testimony about the bedrock and the importance 

of public confidence in public safety institutions, yours and all. So 

I just want to give you an opportunity, I think you have responded 

to this multiple times, but give you a little more opportunity, because I think it’s important for the American public to know that 

the system isn’t rigged, that there are people such as yourself, and 

the 15 individuals who worked on this case and others that do 

their job and believe in the Constitution of the United States. And 

if you have any further comments about comments that would say 

that the system’s rigged and Americans should give up on the system? 

Mr. COMEY. No, I—one of reasons I welcome this opportunity to 

have this conversation is I was raised by great parents who taught 

me you can’t care what other people think about you. Actually, in 

my business, I have to and deeply do, that people have confidence, 

that the system’s not fixed against black people, for rich people, for 

powerful people. It’s very, very important that the American people 

understand that there really are people that you pay for with your 

tax dollars who don’t give a rip about Democrats or Republicans or 

this or that, who care about finding out what is true. 

And I am lucky to lead an organization that is that way to its 

core. I get a 10-year term to ensure that I stay outside of politics. 

But in a way, it’s easy. I lead an organization that is resolutely 

apolitical. We are tough, aggressive people. If we can make a case, 

we’ll make a case. We do not care what the person’s stripes are or 

what their bank account looks like. 

And I worry very much when people doubt that. It’s the reason 

I did the press conference I did 2 days ago. I care about the FBI’s 

reputation. I care about the Justice Department. I care about the 

whole system deeply. And so I decided I’m going to do something 

no Director’s ever done before. I’m not going to tell the Attorney 

General or anybody else what I’m going to say, or even that I’m 

going to say it. They didn’t know, nor did the media know, until 

I walked out what I was going to talk about. 

And then I offered extraordinary transparency, which I’m sure 

confused and bugged a lot of people. It’s essential in this democracy 

that people see as much as they can so they can make their judgment. Again, you may—they may conclude I’m an idiot. I should 

reason differently. But what I hope they will not conclude is that 

I am a dishonest person. 

I am here trying to do the right thing in the right way. And I 

lead 36,000 people who have that as their spine. That’s what I 

want them to know. I don’t care that people agree or disagree. 

That’s what’s wonderful about our democracy. But at its core, you 

need to know there are good people trying to do the right thing all 

day long. And you pay for them, and we’ll never forget that. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. I appreciate that. And within the context of 

these are human institutions, pretty clear to me as a nonlawyer 

that you got a bright line in terms of your decision about pursuing 

prosecution. But you did spend an extended period of time talking 

about what I think I take from you as being fairly objective analysis of what was careless in terms of handling of it, either ascribed 


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to the former Secretary of State or to the Department. And you 

said, and I quote, during your comments, ‘‘While not the focus of 

our investigation, we also developed evidence that the security culture of the State Department in general and respect to the use of 

unclassified email systems in particular was generally lacking in 

the kind of care for classified information found elsewhere in the 

government.’’ That’s accurate. Isn’t it? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. So struggling with this, and this is in the context of this hearing, Oversight and State Department, and this 

committee, as to how do we go from here and be clearer about how 

the State Department, we’ll talk about this with the IG, and some 

of the comments that former Secretary Powell has made, including 

that the absurdity of the retroactive classification. And now we 

have 1,000 of these emails from Secretary Clinton that’s out in the 

public and are being spread even further. 

So there are other people involved. Sitting there, how does this 

committee go forward to make sure that the State Department can 

still function in the way it does with human beings and have conversations that are both transparent but also national security? 

What are the things we need to do to make sure that this doesn’t 

happen again? 

Mr. COMEY. Well, I think a good start—I think the reason the 

chairman has the IG from the State Department here is to start 

that conversation. The IG knows deeply the culture of a Department, and is far better equipped than I to say you ought to focus 

here, you ought to focus there to make it better. So I think that’s 

place to start. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Thank you, Mr. Director. I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. We’ll now recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. DesJarlais, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Director Comey, thank you for appearing so 

quickly on short notice. I think it’s really important that you’re 

here. Because of the way you laid out the case on Tuesday, there 

is a perception that you felt one way and then came to another conclusion. I, like many of my colleagues, put a post up back in my 

district and let them know you were coming. And in less than 24 

hours, I had 750 questions sent to ask you. 

So, again, thank you for being here. But a common theme, just 

to summarize, a lot of those concerns were that in this case, Clinton was above the law. That there was a double standard. And a 

lot of that was based on the way you presented your findings. Now, 

your team, you said you did not personally interview her on Saturday but your team did for about 3–1/2 hours, correct? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Okay. Do you know in reading the review or the 

summary, did they ask Hillary Clinton about her comment that she 

had never sent or received classified information over private 

email? 

Mr. COMEY. I think so. But I can’t—I can’t remember specifically. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Okay. 

Mr. COMEY. It’s a very long 302. I’d have to check. 


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Mr. DESJARLAIS. And we’ll get access to that. Do you know if 

they asked her when she said that there was nothing marked classified on my email sent or received? 

Mr. COMEY. Same answer. I’m not sure. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Okay. And so the same answer then when she 

said, ‘‘I did not email any classified material to anyone on my 

email. There is no classified material.’’ You don’t know whether 

they asked her that? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t know whether they asked her that question. 

The entire interview was going—was focused on so what did you 

know, what did you see, what is this document. That kind of thing. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Do you know if they asked her whether she 

stands by the fact that she said she just used one device and that 

was for her convenience? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t know. I know they established from talking 

to her she used many devices during here 4 years. So I don’t know 

whether they asked her specifically about that statement. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Okay. I guess my—— 

Mr. COMEY. That’s easy to check, though. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. I guess my point is, you’re trying to get inside 

the head of Hillary Clinton in this investigation and know whether 

there was intent. And so we all know what she told the people. 

That’s been well-documented. She said that she did not do those 

things, that she did not send or receive classified emails, that she 

used one server and one device for her convenience, and since then, 

I think even in your statement you recognize that those were not 

correct. Is that fair? 

Mr. COMEY. I really don’t want to get in the business of trying 

to parse and judge her public statements. And so I think I’ve tried 

to avoid doing that sitting here. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Why do you feel that’s important? 

Mr. COMEY. Because what matters to me is what did she say to 

the FBI. That’s obviously first and foremost for us. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Right. Honest people don’t need to lie. Is that 

right? 

Mr. COMEY. Honest people don’t need to lie? I hope not. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Okay. Well, in this case, for some reason, she 

felt the need to misrepresent what she had done with this server 

all throughout the investigation. And you guys, after a year, 

brought her in on Saturday. And in 3–1/2 hours, came out with the 

conclusion that she shouldn’t be prosecuted because there was no 

intent. Is that right? 

Mr. COMEY. No. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Okay. So I don’t want to put words in your 

mouth, but is it fair to say that your interpretation of Hillary Clinton’s handling of top secret information and classified documents 

was extremely careless? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. And is it fair to say that you said that you went 

on to define ‘‘extremely careless’’ that Hillary Clinton’s handling of 

top secret information was sloppy or represented sloppiness? 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. That’s another way of trying to express the 

same concept. 


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Mr. DESJARLAIS. Okay. And then just a few minutes ago, you 

also stated that you now believe that Hillary Clinton is not nearly 

as sophisticated as people thought. Is that correct? 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. I think that’s fair, actually. No, not as people 

thought, but as people would assume about somebody with that 

background. I’m sorry. I should be clear about this. Technically sophisticated. I’m not opining in other kinds of sophistication. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. All right. In the last minute, Director, I want 

to talk a little bit about precedent. Because I think my colleague, 

Trey Gowdy, made a great point that there still is really no precedence in terms of punishment for this type of behavior. Are you familiar with Brian Nishimura’s case? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Okay. He’s a Naval Reservist for those who 

don’t know. And he was prosecuted. What is the difference between 

his case and Hillary Clinton’s case in terms of extremely carelessness and gross negligence, because we’re dealing with statute 793, 

section (f), where it does not require intent. Is that correct? 

Mr. COMEY. I’m sorry. 793(f) is the gross negligence standard. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Right. And is that why Brian Nishimura was 

punished? 

Mr. COMEY. No. Nishimura was prosecuted under the misdemeanor statue 1924 on facts that are very different. If you want 

me to go through them, I’ll go through them, but very different 

that—— 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Okay. I think that there’s been a review of this 

case, and they’re very similar. And that’s why people feel that 

there’s a double standard. 

Mr. COMEY. What they’re reading in the media is not a complete 

accounting of the facts in that case. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Well, would you agree, then, with Representative Gowdy that there still is really no precedence for punishing 

someone like Hillary Clinton and she could really go in—potentially be elected President and do this again without fear of being 

punished? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t think I’m qualified to answer that question. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. My time’s expired. Thank you for your time. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank the gentleman. I now recognize the 

gentlewoman from New Mexico, Ms. Lujan Grisham. 

Ms. LUJAN GRISHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’ve had the 

benefit of when you’re last, or nearly last to really have both the 

benefit and then the question, the kinds of statements and the dialogue back and forth. And where I am settled at this point in time 

is in a couple of places. But particularly, I don’t think there’s any 

member in this committee or, quite frankly, any Member in Congress who doesn’t both want and expect that the FBI and the Department of Justice to be and to operate in a fair, unbiased, highly 

independent manner. Otherwise, you can’t appropriately uphold or 

enforce Federal law. And while we have all—this has been stated 

in a couple of different ways, I’m going to see if we can’t—I want 

to get direct answers. 

So, Mr. Comey, is there any evidence, given that that’s the standard that we all want, desire, and expect, to suggest that Hillary 

Clinton was not charged by the Department of Justice due to inapVerDate Sep 11 2014 14:35 Oct 12, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\21323.TXT APRIL

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propriate political influence, or due to her current or previous public positions? 

Mr. COMEY. Zero. And if there is such evidence, I’d love folks to 

show it to me. 

Ms. LUJAN GRISHAM. In that regard, was there a double standard? 

Mr. COMEY. No. In fact, I think my entire goal was to avoid a 

double standard, to avoid what sometimes prosecutors call celebrity 

hunting and doing something for a famous person that you would 

never do for an ordinary Joe or Jane. 

Ms. LUJAN GRISHAM. Thank you. And I really appreciate that 

you’re here today, and explaining the process in great detail, frankly, and I’ve—this committee works at getting specific detail about 

a variety of reviews, investigations, policies, concepts throughout 

Federal Government. And I think I can say that this committee 

often finds that we don’t get very much clarity or specific responses 

to the majority of questions that we ask. So I really appreciate 

that. And that in explaining that what led the FBI to conclude that 

Hillary Clinton should not be charged. 

Saying that, however, I’m still concerned, frankly, that the use 

of this hearing and some of the public statements made by elected 

officials accusing the Department of Justice of using a double 

standard without any evidence at all to support that statement, 

leaning on accusations of such, in fact, jeopardizes the very thing 

that we want the most, which is an apolitical and independent Department of Justice. And we have every right to ask these tough 

questions. 

And to be clear that the process that you use for everyone, including elected officials, works. And that there’s a responsibility 

not to substitute your own political preferences to the outcome of 

an independent and apolitical Department of Justice investigation 

on any level, whether it involves Hillary Clinton or anybody else. 

Do you agree with that general statement? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Ms. LUJAN GRISHAM. For me, that’s a really important ethical 

line that I believe should never be crossed. I worry that some of 

what we did today could be, frankly, interpreted as violating that 

very standard. And for that, I certainly want the American people 

and my constituents who are watching to understand that very important line, and to be sure that our responsibility is better served 

making sure that we do have, in fact, an independent body whose 

aim it is to bring about truth and justice and uphold the Federal 

law. And, sir, based on everything that you’ve said today, I don’t 

see any reason to disagree with your statements, your assessments, 

or the explanation of that process. 

With the little time I do have left, I do want to say that given 

that some of the classified material that we have both debated and 

talked about today can be classified later or up-classified, or that 

other agencies have different determinations of what constitutes 

classified and not. I do think that’s a process that warrants refining. And if something can come out of this hearing about making 

sure that we do something better in the future for everyone, not 

just appointed or elected officials, that that ought to be something 

that we do. 


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I’m often confused by some of the things that are clearly told to 

us in a classified briefing that appear to be different or already out 

in the public in some way. And I’m not sure who’s making those 

decisions. I honor my responsibility to the highest degree, but I 

think that’s a process that could use some significant refining, and 

that’s my only suggestion, sir. Thank you for being here today. 

Mr. COMEY. Thank you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank the gentlewoman. We’ll now recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Carter, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Director Comey, 

thank you for being here today. I appreciate it. I’m over here. And 

I’m going to be real quick and try to be succinct. I want to clarify 

some things that you said. And, look, I don’t want to go over everything that everybody’s been through today. I mean, we’ve had some 

great questions here that have asked you about you said this, she 

said that. Representative Gowdy made a great case of, you know, 

this is what she said under oath and publicly, and yet you dispute 

that and say, No, this is the case. But, look, I’ve just got a couple 

of questions. Okay? First of all, did I understand you correctly that 

your decision—that this decision was made within 3–1/2 hours of 

an interview and that was all? 

Mr. COMEY. No. We investigated for a year. 

Mr. CARTER. But you interviewed her for 3–1/2 hours last week 

and then came to the conclusion? 

Mr. COMEY. Correct. We interviewed her on Saturday for 3–1/2 

hours. The last step of a yearlong investigation. 

Mr. CARTER. Now, as I understand it, Hillary Clinton has testified that the servers that she used were always safe and secure. 

Yet you refute that and say, No, that is not the case at all. Were 

they ever secure? Were the servers that she were using, were they 

ever secure? 

Mr. COMEY. Well, the challenge, security’s not binary. It’s just 

degrees of security. It was less security than, one, at the State Department, or, as I said, even one at a private commercial provider, 

like a Gmail. 

Mr. CARTER. Well, let me ask you this: She’s got staff and she’s 

got people around her. Did they know she was doing this? Did they 

know that she was using these other devices? Did anybody ever 

bring it to her attention and say, Hey, you’re not supposed to be 

doing that? 

Mr. COMEY. I think a lot of people around the Secretary understood she have was using a private personal email setup. 

Mr. CARTER. Then why didn’t they say something? Don’t they 

have a responsibility as well? 

Mr. COMEY. That’s an important question that goes to the culture 

of the State Department that’s worth asking. 

Mr. CARTER. I mean, look, we all surround ourselves with good 

people and we depend on them to help us. I don’t understand— 

should they be held responsible for that, for not bring that to someone’s attention? If I see someone who’s breaking—who’s not following protocol, is it my responsibility to report them? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. CARTER. Well—— 


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Mr. COMEY. Especially when it comes to security matters. You 

have an obligation to report a security violation that you may witness, whether it’s involving you or one of your co-workers. But this 

is about so—— 

Mr. CARTER. What about Bryan Pagliano? Did he ever know? Do 

you know if he knew that she was not following proper protocol 

here? 

Mr. COMEY. He helped set it up. 

Mr. CARTER. He helped set it up. So obviously he knew. 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. Obviously, he knew that—— 

Mr. CARTER. Okay. Is anything going to be done to him? Any 

prosecution or any discipline, any—— 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t know about discipline, but there’s not going 

to be a prosecution of him. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. CARTER. I yield. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. My understanding, Director, is that you offered him immunity. Why did you offer him immunity, and what 

did you get for it? 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. That I have to—I’m not sure what I can talk 

about in open setting about that. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Well, he’s not going to be prosecuted. 

So—— 

Mr. COMEY. Right. But I want to be careful. I’m doing this 24 

hours after the investigation closed. I want to be thoughtful because we’re, as you know, big about the law, that I’m following the 

law about what I can disclose about that. So I’ll have to get back 

to you on that one. I don’t want to answer that off the cuff. 

Mr. CARTER. Director Comey, I am not a lawyer. I’m not an investigator. I’m a pharmacist. But I’m a citizen. And citizens are 

upset. I watched, with great interest, last—earlier this week when 

you laid out your case. And I’m telling you, you laid it out, bam, 

bam, bam. Here’s what she did wrong, wrong, wrong, wrong. And 

then all of a sudden, you used the word ‘‘however.’’ And it was like 

you could hear a gasp throughout the country of people saying, Oh, 

here we go again. Do you regret presenting it in a way like that? 

Mr. COMEY. No. And I’m highly—I think I didn’t use the word 

‘‘however.’’ I try never to use that in speaking. But I did lay it out, 

I thought, in the way that made sense and that I hoped was maximum transparency for people. 

Mr. CARTER. I’m sorry, but that’s the point. It didn’t make sense. 

The way you were laying it out it would have made sense and the 

way that the questions have been asked here and we’ve made all 

these points of where she was—obviously told lies under oath, that 

it would have been, Okay, we finally got one here. 

Mr. COMEY. I think it made sense. I just hope folks go back 

maybe with a cup of tea and open their minds and read my statement again carefully. But again, if you disagree, that’s okay. 

But—— 

Mr. CARTER. But when we—look, I’ve only been here 18 months. 

And I want to tell you, this inside-the-beltway mentality, no wonder people don’t trust us. 

Mr. COMEY. I have—I know who you’re talking about. I have no 

kind of inside-the-beltway mentality. 


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Mr. CARTER. But this is an example of what I’m talking about 

here. It just as a nonlawyer, as a noninvestigator, it would appear 

to me you have got a hell of a case. 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. And I’m telling you we don’t. And I hope people take the time to understand why. 

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank the gentleman. I will now recognize 

the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Gosar. Oh, let’s go ahead and go 

to the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Mulvaney, first. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Thank the gentleman. Director Comey, earlier 

today you heard a long list of statements that Mrs. Clinton has 

made previously, both to the public and to Congress that were not 

factually accurate. I think you went down the whole long list. 

When she met with you folks on Saturday last week, I take it she 

didn’t say the same things at that interview? 

Mr. COMEY. I’m not equipped sitting here without the 302 in 

front of me to answer in that broad—— 

Mr. MULVANEY. But it’s your testimony—— 

Mr. COMEY. I have no basis that—we do not have a basis for concluding she lied to the FBI. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Gotcha. Did anybody ask her on Saturday why 

she told you all one thing and told us another? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t know as I sit here. I mean, I’ll figure that 

out—— 

Mr. MULVANEY. Would that have been of interest to you in helping to establish intent? 

Mr. COMEY. It could have been, sure. 

Mr. MULVANEY. More importantly, I think, did anybody ask her 

why she set up the email system as she did in the first place? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. MULVANEY. And the answer was convenience? 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. It was already there. It was a system her husband had. And so she just jumped onto it. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Were you aware that just earlier this week, her 

assistant actually said it was for an entirely different reason? It 

was to keep emails from being accessible, and that it was for concealment purposes? And Huma Abedin was asked in her deposition 

why it was set up. And it was said to keep her personal emails 

from being accessible. The question, to whom. To anybody. Were 

you aware of that testimony? 

Mr. COMEY. Generally, yes. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Okay. So here’s sort of the summary I take from 

what we’ve done today, which is that over the course of the entire 

system, what she did, she intentionally set up a system. According 

to your testimony, your findings, she was careless regarding its 

technical security. I think you’ve said that even a basic free account, a Gmail account had better security than she had. And she 

did that, according to her own staffer’s sworn deposition for the 

purpose of preventing access to those emails. As a result of this, 

she exposed top secret information to potential hack by foreign actors. You’ve seen the emails, we have not. I think you’ve said earlier that the emails could be of the sort that would put national security at risk, and I think we had testimony earlier that got you 

acknowledge that it might even put our agents overseas at risk. 


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Mr. COMEY. Yeah. I don’t think I agree with that. But it’s still 

important. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Okay. All right. She kept all of that secret until 

after she left the State Department. She lied about it, or at least 

made untrue statements about it after it finally came to light. She, 

thereafter, ordered the destruction of evidence, evidence that was 

destroyed so thoroughly that you folks could not do an adequate recovery. Yet she receives no criminal penalty. So I guess this is my 

question to you: Are we to assume, as we sit here today, that if the 

next President of the United States does the exact same thing, on 

the day he or she is sworn into office, sets up a private email service for the purpose of concealing information from the public or 

from anybody, that as a result of that, potentially exposes national 

security level information to our enemies, lies about it, and then 

destroys the evidence during an investigation, that there will be no 

criminal charges if you’re the FBI Director against that person? 

Mr. COMEY. That’s not a question the FBI Director should answer. I mean—— 

Mr. MULVANEY. No, I’m asking if she does the exact same thing 

as President as she’s done today, your result will be the exact same 

as it was 48 hours ago. There will be no criminal findings, right? 

Mr. COMEY. If the facts were exactly the same? 

Mr. MULVANEY. Right. 

Mr. COMEY. And the law was exactly the same? 

Mr. MULVANEY. Right. 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. The result would be the same. 

Mr. MULVANEY. And I guess under the theory that if the law is 

to be equally applied to everybody, that if a White House staffer 

does the exact same thing for the exact same purpose and exposes 

the exact same risks, that there will be no criminal action against 

that person. There could be, as you’ve mentioned, administrative 

penalties. There are no administrative penalties, as I understand 

it, by the way, against the President. Correct? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t think so. But I’m not a—— 

Mr. MULVANEY. I don’t think there are either. I don’t think you 

can take away the President’s top security clearance. And I’m pretty sure you can’t fire the President because we’ve tried. Not only 

would a staffer not have any criminal charges brought against him, 

but I suppose a summer intern could do the exact same thing 

under the theory that we’re going to apply the law equally regardless of who the people are. My question to you is this: And it’s not 

a legal question. I guess it’s a commonsense, ordinary question that 

folks are asking me. From a national security standpoint, somebody who used to lecture on that, does that bother you? 

Mr. COMEY. The mishandling of classified information bothers 

me no matter what circumstance it occurs in. Because it has national security implications. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Does it bother you that the precedent that you 

are setting today may well lead to a circumstance where our top 

secret information continues to be exposed to our potential enemies? 

Mr. COMEY. No, in this sense. The precedent that I’m setting 

today is my absolute best effort to treat people fairly without regard to who they are. If that continues to be the record of the FBI 


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and the Justice Department, that’s what it should be. The rest of 

the implications in your question are beyond that. They’re important, but they’re not for the FBI to answer. We should aspire to be 

apolitical, facts and the law, treat Joe the same as Sally as Secretary so-and-so. That’s my goal. 

Mr. MULVANEY. If you had come to a different decision—by the 

way, I tend to agree with everything you’ve just said. If you had 

come to a different decision, do you think that would have a different precedential value that would keep our information more 

safe? 

Mr. COMEY. If we decided to recommend criminal charges here? 

Mr. MULVANEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t know. That’s a good question. I don’t know. 

I could argue it both ways. I guess I’m a lawyer, I can argue everything both ways. But I could argue that both ways. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Thank you, Director Comey. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank the gentleman. Now recognize the 

gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Gosar, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GOSAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Comey, 

for being here. My colleague alluded to Bryan Pagliano, the IT adviser. And were you made aware of the deal of immunity with him? 

Mr. COMEY. I am aware. 

Mr. GOSAR. Now that Attorney General Lynch has stated that 

there will be no charges, there’s many that suspect that he failed 

to answer questions in his congressional deposition, that he had 

something to hide. Why did your investigators at the DOJ decide 

it was necessary to offer Mr. Pagliano immunity? 

Mr. COMEY. As I said in response to the earlier question, I need 

to be more thoughtful about what I say about an immunity deal 

in public. It may be totally fine. I just don’t want to screw up because we’re doing this so quickly. In general, I can answer, because 

I’ve done it many times as a prosecutor. You make a grant of immunity in order to get information that you don’t think you could 

get otherwise. 

Mr. GOSAR. But you know that there may be something there in 

hindsight, right? You’re looking ahead because of the pertinent information this person possesses. 

Mr. COMEY. Right. You believe they have relevant information to 

the investigation. 

Mr. GOSAR. So did the investigators draft an interview report 

known as a 302 with Mr. Pagliano? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. GOSAR. Given the importance of this case, will you commit 

to voluntarily disclosing the 302s for review of Bryan Pagliano and 

other witnesses interviewed as part of your investigation? 

Mr. COMEY. I’ll commit to giving you everything I can possibly 

give you under the law, and to doing it as quickly as possible. That 

said, that means I got to go back and sort it out. For example, the 

302 of Secretary Clinton is classified at the TS/SCI level. So we got 

to sort through all that. But we’ll do it quickly. 

Mr. GOSAR. Yeah. I know you’ve done this, because you’ve done 

this for Lois Lerner and other cases. So we would expect that. 


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Now, Director Comey, Hillary Clinton testified before Congress 

and told the American people multiple times that she never 

emailed any classified information to anyone on her private email 

servers. Your investigation revealed 110 of Clinton’s emails, and 52 

email chains confined classified information. Clinton told the American people, and I quote, ‘‘The laws and regulations in effect when 

I was Secretary of State allowed me to use my email for work. This 

is undisputed,’’ end of quote. Your investigation revealed that that 

also wasn’t true. 

Clinton claimed she turned over all her work-related emails. 

Your investigation revealed that this wasn’t also true. Clinton 

claimed that there was no security breaches and her private servers had numerous safeguards. Your investigation revealed eight 

email chains on Clinton’s private servers containing top secret information. And that is was possible, quote, ‘‘hostile actors gained 

access to sensitive information.’’ Further, multiple people she 

emailed with regularity were hacked by hostile actors and her private servers were less secure than a Gmail account, making a security breach all the more likely. 

Director Comey, it’s a Federal crime, as you know, to mishandle 

classified information in a grossly negligent way. And you stated 

Clinton and her colleagues were extremely careless. Clinton has 

publicly stated she was well aware of the classification requirements, yet she broke the law anyway. Multiple people have been 

prosecuted for less. And there is a growing trend of abuses in senior level employees. The only difference between her and others is 

her total resistance to acknowledge her irresponsible behavior that 

jeopardized our national security and the American people. 

I think you should have recommended Clinton be prosecuted 

under section 793 or section 1024 of Title 18. If not, who? If not 

now, when? Your recommendation deprived the American people of 

the opportunity for justice in this matter. There shouldn’t be double 

standards for the Clintons, and they shouldn’t be above the law. 

With that, I’m going to yield the rest of my time to the gentleman 

from South Carolina, Mr. Gowdy. 

Mr. GOWDY. Thank you, Dr. Gosar. Director Comey, I want to go 

back to the issue of intent for just a second. We can disagree on 

whether or not it’s an element of the offense. Let’s assume, for the 

sake of argument, that you’re right and I’m wrong, and that it is 

an element of the offense. Secretary Clinton said that she was, 

quote, ‘‘Well aware of classification requirements.’’ Those are her 

words, not mine and not yours. So if she were, quote, ‘‘well aware 

of classification requirements,’’ how did that impact your analysis 

of her intent. Because I’ve heard you this morning describe her as 

being less than sophisticated. She disagrees with that. 

Mr. COMEY. Well, I was talking about technical sophistication. 

The question is—I would hope everybody who works in the government is aware of classification requirements. The question then is 

if you mishandle classified information, when you did that thing, 

did you know you were doing something that was unlawful. That’s 

the intent question. 

Mr. GOWDY. Well, you and I are going to have to get together 

some other time and discuss all the people we prosecuted who were 

unaware that they were breaking the law. There are lots of really 


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dumb defendants out there who don’t know that what they’re doing 

is against the law. But let’s go with what you say. 

Mr. COMEY. I disagree. You may have prosecuted a lot of those 

folks. I did not prosecute a lot of those folks—— 

Mr. GOWDY. Well, I was a gutter prosecutor and you were a 

white collar prosecutor. Trust me. There are lots of people who 

don’t know you can’t kill other people. Let me ask you this: On the 

issue of intent, you say it was convenience. Okay? You’re a really 

smart lawyer. If it were convenience, Director, she wouldn’t have 

waited 2 years to return the documents. And she wouldn’t have deleted them 4 years after they were created. So you can’t really believe that her intent was convenience when she never turned them 

over until Congress started asking for them. Could you? 

Mr. COMEY. You know, my focus, and I hope I made this 

clear.My focus was on what was the thinking around the classified 

information. I mean, it’s relevant why the system was set up and 

the thinking there. But she didn’t—I don’t understand her to be 

saying—well, I think I’ve said it already. But that’s my focus. 

Mr. GOWDY. So I know I’m out of time, but it just strikes me you 

are reading a specific intent element into a gross negligence statute. Not even general intent. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The gentleman’s time—— 

Mr. GOWDY. A specific intent—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. COMEY. Sorry. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The Director can answer. 

Mr. COMEY. I enjoy talking with him. The question you got to ask 

is so why is it that the Department of Justice, since 1917, has not 

used that gross negligence statute but charging it once in an espionage case. And whether their decision was smart or not, that is the 

record of fairness. And so you have to decide, do I treat this person 

against that record? And if I do, is that a fair thing to do, even if 

you’re not worried about the constitutionality of it? And my judgment is no reasonable prosecutor would do that. That would be celebrity hunting. That would be treating this person differently than 

John Doe. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Director, I want to follow up on that. Why 

did you do what you did? You know, my interpretation of what the 

FBI is supposed to be doing is come to a determination of the facts. 

And then turn it over to a prosecutor. You were a prosecutor. But 

you’re not a prosecutor now. 

Mr. COMEY. Right. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. It is unprecedented that an FBI Director 

gave the type of press conference that he did and took a position 

that an unreasonable prosecutor would only take this case forward. 

Why did you do that? 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. It’s a great question. The—everything I did 

would have been done privately in the normal course. We have 

great conversations between the FBI and prosecutors. We make 

recommendations. We argue back and forth. What I decided to do 

was offer transparency to the American people about the whys of 

that what I was going to do because I thought that was very, very 

important for their confidence in the system of justice. And within 

that, their confidence in the FBI. And I was very concerned if I 


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didn’t show that transparency, that in that lack of transparency 

people could say, Gees. What’s going on here? Something—you 

know, something seems squirrely here. And so I said I will do 

something unprecedented because I think this is an unprecedented 

situation. 

Now, the next Director who is criminally investigating one of the 

two candidates for President may find him or herself bound by my 

precedent. Okay. So if that happens in the next 100 years they’ll 

have to deal with what I did. So I decided it was worth doing. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Mr. Cummings. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Director, I have just one question. You know, 

I’ve been sitting here listening to this. And I really—this is something that bothered me in the Lois Lerner case, and it bothers me 

in this case. And I’m just wondering your opinion. Mrs. Lawrence 

had talked about this, the chilling effect of your having to come 

here and justify your decisions. And I know that you’ve been really 

nice, and you just explained why you did what you did, and I’m 

glad you’re doing it. But, you know, do you at all, and, I mean, taking off—I’m just talking about here you’ve got people making decisions and then being pulled here in the Congress to then say, okay, 

to be questioned about the decisions. At what point—or do you 

even think about it becoming a chilling effect? Because most people, you know, when their decision’s made, don’t get this kind of 

opportunity, as you well know. There are no statements. You know, 

they either get indicted or they’re not. 

So I noted you see this as a special case. And I wonder whether 

you agree with Mrs. Lawrence that we may be just going down a 

slippery slope. That’s all I want to ask. 

Mr. COMEY. And my honest answer is I don’t think so. As I— 

when I talked to the chairman, I agreed to come because I think 

the American people care deeply about this. There’s all kind of 

folks watching this at home or being told, Well, lots of other cases 

were prosecuted and she wasn’t. I want them to know that’s not 

true.And so I want to have this conversation. And I actually welcome the opportunity. Look, it’s a pain. I’ve had to go to the bathroom for about an hour, but it is really—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Don’t worry. We’re halfway done. So—— 

Mr. COMEY. It is really important to do. Because this is an unprecedented situation. Transparency is the absolute best thing for 

me and for democracy. 

And I realize, Mr. Chairman, my folks told me I screwed up one 

fact that I should fix. I was misremembering. In the Petraeus case, 

we didn’t find the notebooks in the attic, we found it in his desk. 

So I wanted to make sure I was fair to him about that. 

But I really don’t think so. I don’t think it has a chilling effect. 

Again, if there’s another presidential candidate being investigated 

by the FBI, maybe they’ll be bound by this. Lord willing, it’s not 

going to happen again. Certainly I have 2,619 days left in this job. 

I won’t happen on my term. But if does, I won’t be chilled. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank the gentleman. If we need a humanitarian break, just give me the cue, but—— 

Mr. COMEY. No. I feel like we’re almost done, though. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. We’re on the right trajectory, yes. 


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But we would like to recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. 

Palmer, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PALMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Comey, your 

statement on Tuesday indicated that Secretary Clinton and her colleagues send and received emails marked classified on an unsecured private email server that may or may not have been hacked 

by a foreign power. Are you aware that teenage hackers hacked the 

personal email accounts of CIA Director John Brennan, the Director of U.S. National Intelligence, James Clapper, and FBI Deputy 

Director Mark Giuliano? 

Mr. COMEY. I am intensely aware. They didn’t hack in the way 

we normally think of it, but that they, by trickery, got access to 

their accounts. 

Mr. PALMER. The point I want to make is that these were personal—commercially protected personal email accounts that contained no classified information. Yet Mrs. Clinton used her personal email, not a commercial account, on a server in her basement 

without even this basic protection, and transmitted classified information through that account. If teenagers in England were able to 

hack the personal email accounts of the Director of the CIA, the Director of U.S. National Intelligence, and the Deputy Director Of the 

FBI, does it concern you that sophisticated hackers or hackers 

working for foreign interests never attempted—I mean, does it 

seem reasonable that they never attempted, or were never successful in hacking Mrs. Clinton’s personal email accounts or one of her 

devices? 

Mr. COMEY. No. It concerns me a great deal. And that’s why we 

spent so much time to see if we could figure out—see fingerprints 

of that. 

Mr. PALMER. Well, you said in your statement regarding your 

recommendation not to prosecute, ‘‘To be clear, this is not to suggest that in similar circumstances, a person who engaged in this 

activity would face no consequences. To the contrary, these individuals are often subject to security or administrative sanctions, but 

that is not what we’re deciding here.’’ Do you stand by that? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. PALMER. Okay. I thought you would. You also said you could 

not prove intent. I don’t want to—I want to touch on a couple 

things here. One, a reasonable person would not have compromised 

classified information by keeping that information on inadequately 

secure private devices. In other words, such a person would be 

viewed as unreasonable and unsuitable for any position in our government that included any responsibility for handling and protecting classified information. Would you agree? 

Mr. COMEY. I would agree it would be negligent. I can’t prejudge 

a suitability determination, but it would definitely be stared at 

very hard. 

Mr. PALMER. Well, let me tell you why I bring this up. I sat here 

next to Mr. Hurd, who served our country valiantly. Put his life on 

the line. And I don’t know if you could sense the passion and intensity of his questions, because he knows people whose lives are on 

the line right now. And in regard to his questions, if someone, a 

U.S. intelligence agent had their mission compromised, or worse, 

had been killed or injured or captured because of the carelessness 


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of someone responsible for protecting classified information, would 

intent matter at that point? 

Mr. COMEY. In deciding whether to prosecute the person? Of 

course. But—yeah. That’s the answer. Of course it would. It 

would—the matter would be deadly serious. But the legal standards would be the same. 

Mr. PALMER. Well, what we’re dealing with in this hearing is not 

the lack of due diligence in handling routine government data or 

information, but the lack of due diligence by Secretary Clinton and 

her carelessness in handling classified information that could have 

compromised American national security, and as Mr. Hurd pointed 

out, the missions and personal safety of our intelligence agents. 

That troubles me greatly. 

And I think the issue here—and I do respect you. I have spoken 

in your defense many times, at this point, to my detriment. But I 

do believe that your answers are honest and factual. But based on 

your answers regarding Mrs. Clinton’s use of the email, and based 

on what we know, it seems to me that she is stunningly incompetent in her understanding of the basic technology of email, and 

stunningly incompetent in handling classified information. I mean, 

you should never associate the Secretary of State and classified information with the word ‘‘careless.’’ It doesn’t matter. I mean, we 

have to exercise the utmost due diligence. All of us in this committee do in handling this. You do in prosecuting cases. And I see 

that in what you’re trying to do. 

I just think we need to leave here with this understanding, that 

there’s more to this story than we know. If a foreign hacker got 

into this, I can assure you that they know what was in those 

emails that were deleted. They read them all. They know what is 

in the emails that we never received. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. We’ll now go to the 

gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Grothman, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Thank you. Thanks for coming on over to the 

Rayburn Building. As I understand it, your testimony today, is that 

you have not brought criminal charges against Hillary Clinton, in 

part, because you feel you can’t prove guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt, and in part, because she didn’t understand the laws with regard to emails and servers and that sort of thing. 

Question for you. When she erased these emails—or no, I digress 

for a second. You, however, did say that if somebody did this under 

you there would be consequences. If somebody did exactly what 

Mrs. Clinton did, but was one of your lieutenants or you think one 

of the lieutenants under the CIA or some other agency that deals 

with top secret documents, what would you do to those underlings? 

Mr. COMEY. I would make sure that they were adjudicated 

through a security disciplinary proceeding to figure out what are 

all the circumstances and then what punishment, discipline is appropriate. That could range from being terminated, to being reprimanded, and then a whole spectrum in between, suspension, loss 

of clearance. It’s a bunch of different options. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. But tomorrow, say one of your top two or 

three lieutenants you find out that they’ve had this separate server 

out there and they’re keeping secret documents, you know, flipping 


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them around. Do you think they should be fired? Not criminally 

charged, but fired? 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. I don’t think it’s appropriate to say. I think 

it should go—we have a very robust process. There ought to be a 

very intense suitability review of that person. Maybe there’s something we’re missing that would mitigate the punishment we would 

impose. But it would have to do through our system. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. Next question. Just for the listening audience here, at first when I hear about erasing emails, I think it’s 

like, you know, on my own phone where I might erase an auto insurance solicitation. The erasures here, however, were not just 

Mrs. Clinton pressing delete. Were they? There was a much greater 

effort made to make sure that these emails would never be recovered. Do you want to comment on what was done to erase the 

emails? 

Mr. COMEY. I think what you’re referring to is after her lawyers—her lawyers say, although I’m not able to verify this, there 

were 60,000 or so left at the end of 2014. They went through them 

in a way I described in my statement 2 days ago. And then they 

produced the ones that were work-related, and then they erased 

from their system the ones that were not work-related. That was 

done using technical tools basically to remove them from the servers to wipe them way. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. So in other words, the effort was not just 

Mrs. Clinton or somebody went delete, delete, delete. They went 

above and beyond that so that your top technical efforts could not— 

technical experts could not get back at these emails, correct? 

Mr. COMEY. Right. Not fully. We were able to by going—— 

Mr. GROTHMAN. You recovered a few. 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. We could go through the lawyers’ laptops and 

see some traces, but not fully—not fully recover them. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. Now, the information that I have, and you 

can correct me if I’m wrong, implies that these erasures were done 

in December of 2014 after the Benghazi scandal broke, after there 

were questions about the Clinton Foundation. Did you ever come 

across why she allowed these emails to sit out there, even for years 

after she stopped being Secretary of State but all of a sudden as 

these other scandals began to bubble up she felt, or her lawyers 

felt, that she had to erase them? 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. I think the way the process worked is she had 

emails that were just on her system. She actually had deleted 

some, I think, over time, as an ordinary user would. And then the 

State Department contacted her and other former Secretaries and 

said, We have a gap in our records. We need you to look and see 

if you have emails and give them back. She then tasked her lawyers to engage in this review process of that 60-some thousand and 

make that cut. And then was asked by her lawyers at the end, Do 

you want us to keep the personal emails? And she said, I have no 

use for them anymore. It’s then that they issued the direction that 

the technical people delete them. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Do you think Mrs. Clinton knew that the technical people were erasing these emails so that even your top technical experts could recover them? 


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Mr. COMEY. Based on my sense now of her technical sophistication, I don’t think so. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. You don’t think the lawyers told her that that’s 

what they were doing, erasing all these emails that everybody on 

this committee wanted to look at? 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. And I’m sure we’ve asked this and—— 

Mr. GROTHMAN. What type of lawyer wouldn’t tell their client 

they were doing that? But—— 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t think—I think our evidence—our investigation is they did not, that they asked her, Do you want to keep 

them, and they said no, and they said, Wipe them away. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. Now, as I understand it, the goal was just 

to erase personal emails, but you’ve recovered emails that wouldn’t 

be considered personal emails at all. 

Mr. COMEY. Correct. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. I know that you didn’t recover them, but 

based upon the emails that you recovered, presumably her lawyers 

or somebody was going well beyond personal emails, is it possible 

we’ll never be able to recover emails that dealt with the Clinton 

Foundation or dealt with the Benghazi scandal? Is it possible, because of what her lawyers did, that they were erasing things that 

were incriminating, maybe involving items that you yourself were 

not particularly investigating, but that these have now been destroyed forever? 

Mr. COMEY. I guess it’s possible. As I said in my statement on 

Tuesday, we did not find evidence to indicate that they did the erasure to conceal things of any sort. But it’s possible, as I said on 

Tuesday, that there are work-related emails that were in the batch 

that were deleted. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. I’m sorry. When you go to this length to make 

sure you can never recover the emails that are erased, wouldn’t you 

think the intent is to make sure nobody ever looks at them again? 

Why would—otherwise, would you just go—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. We’ll give the Director time if he wants to respond. 

Mr. COMEY. Sure. You know, I guess it’s a bit circular. You delete 

because you want to delete, but that—what I mean is we didn’t 

find any evidence of evil intent, an intent to obstruct justice there. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. You wouldn’t have been able to—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank—— 

Mr. GROTHMAN. —because you don’t know what was deleted, 

but—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

We’ll now recognize Mr. Russell of Oklahoma for 5 minutes. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Comey, thank you for your long service and your long 

suffering. I think we’re toward the end of the line here. 

I want to state for the record with regard to national security, 

I sleep a little easier at night knowing that you’re at the helm of 

the FBI. Thank you for your dedicated service and your integrity. 

Mr. COMEY. Thank you. 

Mr. RUSSELL. You have stated in your statement and also multiple times here that there should be consequences for the mishandling of state secrets. If I held a top secret/SCI in the Bureau— 


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and I did hold one when I was in the United States Army, in a career of service, I’ve handled classified information here—but if I 

held that in the FBI and you discovered that I mishandled state 

secrets on a private server in my basement, would I be trusted by 

the Bureau to further handle top secret/SCI information? 

Mr. COMEY. Maybe not. You would go immediately through a security process to review whether you should continue working for 

us, and if you do, what clearances you should retain. 

Mr. RUSSELL. If I violated the handling of state secrets in the 

FBI, would you consider me the best suitable candidate for promotion and higher responsibility? 

Mr. COMEY. It would be a serious concern, and we would stare 

at it very hard in a suitability review. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Although you have recommended to the Department of Justice that no criminal charges be brought to bear, are 

you recommending to the Department of Justice that there be no 

consequences for the mishandling of state secrets? 

Mr. COMEY. No. My recommendation was solely with respect to 

criminal charges. 

Mr. RUSSELL. What would you recommend? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t think it’s for me to recommend. 

Mr. RUSSELL. But you do—you’ve been very open and even stated 

why you felt that these were unique sets of circumstances that 

called for greater transparency. You do make recommendations 

routinely, as you’ve stated here today. We’re talking top secret/SCI 

information that’s been mishandled. You would take a dim view to 

that if I were an agent. What consequence—this is what the American people feel exasperated about. There seems to be no consequence. 

So in a case like this, if it’s not going to be criminal charges recommended, what are the American people to do to hold their officials accountable if maybe they shouldn’t be trusted for further promotion and higher responsibility? 

Mr. COMEY. And what I meant earlier is that’s not a question 

that the American people should put to the FBI Director. I can answer about the things within my remit, but that—I understand the 

question, but it’s not one for me to answer in my role. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Well, I hope it’s one that the American people answer in the future, because we do have a choice about those that 

would mishandle information. And while we’re all fallible human 

beings and we all make mistakes, in a case like this, I mean, for 

decades of my service in the Army infantry and handling top secret/SCI information and then as a Member of Congress, I mean, 

we know those responsibilities. 

Is it your view and others that have interviewed Mrs. Clinton 

that she would not have known what those responsibilities were? 

Mr. COMEY. No, I think, in a way, you would expect she understood the importance of protecting classified information. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Well, I would agree with that. And there has been 

a breach, and I think that the American people demand a consequence, that they demand an accountability. And I think it’s important, to uphold the form of our republican government, that we 

have a consequence. 

And with that, thank you for your appearance here today. 


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And I would like to yield the remainder of my time to Chairman 

Chaffetz. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. I think, if you yield back, 

through mutual agreement, Mr. Cummings and I have agreed that 

I do have about a dozen or so quick follow-up questions. You’ve 

been most generous with your time, but I would like to get through 

these last bit. 

Mr. COMEY. Okay. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And, again, we’ll do so with equal time. 

How did the Department of Justice—or how did the FBI view the 

incident in which Hillary Clinton instructed Jake Sullivan to take 

the markings off of a document that was to be sent to her? 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. We looked at that pretty closely. There was 

some problem with their secure fax machine. And there’s an email 

in which she says, in substance, take the headers off of it and send 

it as a nonpaper. 

As we’ve dug into that more deeply, we’ve come to learn that, at 

least there’s one view of it that is reasonable, that a nonpaper in 

State Department parlance means a document that contains things 

we could pass to another government. So essentially, take out anything that’s classified and send it to me. 

Now, it turned out that didn’t happen, because we actually found 

that the classified fax was then sent, but that’s our best understanding of what that was about. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So this was a classified fax? 

Mr. COMEY. Correct. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So Hillary Clinton sends to Jake Sullivan— 

let me go back. Jake Sullivan says: They say they had issues sending secure fax. They’re working on it. Hillary Clinton sends to Jake 

Sullivan: If they can’t, turn into nonpaper with no identifying heading and send nonsecure. 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So you’re telling me it’s a classified piece 

of information, she’s taking off the header, and she’s instructing 

them to send it in a nonsecure format. 

Mr. COMEY. Right. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Is that not intent? 

Mr. COMEY. Well, that actually caught my attention when I first 

saw it. And what she explained to us in her interview was, and 

other witnesses did as well, is what she meant by that is make it 

into a nonclassified document, that’s a what a nonpaper is in their 

world, and send it to us, because I just—I don’t need the classified 

stuff, I just need the—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Then why take off the heading? If it’s going 

to be turned into a nonclassified document, why take off the heading? 

Mr. COMEY. I assume because it would be nonclassified anymore, 

so you wouldn’t have a classified header on it, I think is what she 

said during her interview. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So she wanted to be technically correct? Is 

that what you’re saying? This is your—— 

Mr. COMEY. No. I think what she said during the interview is: 

I was telling him, in essence, send me an unclassified document, 

take the header off, turn it into a nonpaper. Which is a term I’d 


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never heard before, but I’m told by people I credit that in diplomatic circles, that means something we could pass to another government. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. You are very generous in your accepting of 

that. 

Let me ask you, Director, did any uncleared individuals receive 

any classified information over Hillary Clinton’s server? 

Mr. COMEY. Did any uncleared people receive classified information? I don’t think any of the correspondents on the classified 

emails were uncleared people. These were all people with clearances working, doing State Department business on the unclass 

system. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Did Mr. Pagliano have the requisite security clearance? 

Mr. COMEY. As I sit here today, I can’t remember. He was not 

a participant on the classified email exchanges, though. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. He was running the server. He set up the 

server. 

Mr. COMEY. That’s a different question. Well, I’m sorry. I misunderstood your question, then. 

Yeah. There’s no doubt that uncleared people had access to the 

server, because even after Pagliano, there were others who maintained the server who were private sector folks. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So there are hundreds of classified documents on these servers. How many people without a security clearance had access to that server? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t know the exact number as I sit here. It’s 

probably more than 2, less than 10. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And I appreciate your willingness to follow 

up with this. 

Did Secretary Clinton’s attorneys have the security clearances 

needed? 

Mr. COMEY. They did not. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Does that concern you? 

Mr. COMEY. Oh, yeah. Sure. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Is there any consequence to an attorney rifling through Secretary Clinton’s, Hillary Clinton’s emails without 

a security clearance? 

Mr. COMEY. Well, not necessarily criminal consequences, but 

there’s a great deal of concern about an uncleared person, not subject to the requirements we talked about in the read-in documents, 

potentially having access. That’s why it’s very, very important for 

us to recover everything we can back from attorneys. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So what’s the consequence? I mean, here 

Hillary Clinton gave direction to her attorneys without a security 

clearance to go through documents that were classified. 

Mr. COMEY. I think that’s what happened in fact. Whether that 

was the direction is a question I can’t answer sitting here. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. You’re parsing that one a little bit for me. 

Mr. COMEY. No, no. You were just asking me. I don’t—I don’t 

know—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. What’s the consequence? They don’t work 

for the government. We can’t fire them. 

Mr. COMEY. Right. 


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Chairman CHAFFETZ. So is there no criminal prosecution of those 

attorneys? Should they lose their bar license? What’s the consequence to them? 

Mr. COMEY. Well, if they acted with criminal intent or acted with 

some mal-intent. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. What you’re telling us is it doesn’t matter 

if you have a security clearance or not, because I may be innocent 

enough, hey, I’m just an attorney, I like the Secretary, I’m trying 

to help Hillary Clinton, I’m not trying to give it to the Chinese or 

the Russians, I’m just trying to help her. So there’s no intent? It 

doesn’t matter if these people have security clearances? 

Mr. COMEY. Of course it matters. That’s why I said—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. But there’s no consequence, Director. 

There’s no consequence. 

Mr. COMEY. Well, I don’t know what consequence you’d have in 

mind. Very—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Prosecute them. 

Mr. COMEY. An attorney for receiving from his client information 

that ends up being classified? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I asked you at the very beginning, does 

Hillary Clinton—is there a reasonable expectation that Hillary 

Clinton would send and receive hourly, if not daily, classified information? That’s reasonable to think that the Secretary of State 

would get classified information at every moment. She is not the 

head of Fish and Wildlife. 

So the idea that she would turn over her emails, her system, her 

server to, what it sounds like, up to 10 people without security 

clearances, and there’s no consequence. So why not do it again? 

Mr. COMEY. Well, that’s a question I don’t think you should put 

to me. You’re asking—I’m talking about my criminal investigation. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. But how can that—there’s no intent there? 

Does she not understand that these people don’t have security 

clearances? 

Mr. COMEY. Surely she understands at least some of them don’t 

have security clearances. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So she understands they don’t have security clearances and it’s reasonable to think she’s going to be getting 

classified information. Is that not intent, to provide a noncleared 

person access to classified information? 

Mr. COMEY. You’re mixing it up, though. I don’t think it’s reasonable to assume—mixing me up, sorry, it’s not your fault—that 

someone who is maintaining your server is reading your emails. In 

fact, I don’t think that’s the case here. 

There’s a separate thing, which is when she’s engaging counsel 

to comply with the State Department’s requests, are her lawyers 

then exposed to information that may be on there that’s classified. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Did they see any classified information? 

Did Hillary Clinton’s attorneys, without security clearances, see 

classified information? 

Mr. COMEY. As I sit here, I don’t know the answer to that. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. It has to be yes, Director. You came across 

110, and they said they went through all of them. 

Mr. COMEY. Well, they didn’t read them all, they just looked at 

headers. 


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Chairman CHAFFETZ. So their excuse is, ‘‘We saw the emails, but 

we didn’t read them’’? 

Mr. COMEY. No, I think I said this in my statement on Tuesday, 

they sorted the emails by using headers and search terms to try 

and find work-related emails. We read them all. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I know that you read them all. Do you 

think it’s reasonable or unreasonable to think that her attorneys, 

under her direction, did or did not read those emails? Because 

there were—let me go back to this. Yes or no, were there or were 

there not classified emails that her, that Hillary Clinton’s attorneys 

read? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t know whether they read them at the time. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Did Hillary Clinton give noncleared people 

access to classified information? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. Yes. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. What do you think her intent was? 

Mr. COMEY. I think then it was to get good legal representation 

and to make the production to the State Department. I think it 

would be a very tall order in that circumstance, I don’t see the evidence there to make a case that she was acting with criminal intent in her engagement with her lawyers. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And I guess I read criminal intent as the 

idea that you allow somebody without a security clearance access 

to classified information. Everybody knows that, Director. Everybody knows that. 

I’ve gone way past my time. Let me recognize Mr. Cummings for 

an equal amount of time. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Director, thank you for your patience. 

I want to clear up some things. I want to make sure I understand exactly what you testified to on the issue of whether Secretary Clinton sent or received emails that were marked as classified. 

On Tuesday, you stated, and I quote: ‘‘Only a very small number 

of the emails containing classified information bore markings’’— 

and I emphasize, bore markings—‘‘indicating the presence of classified information,’’ end of quote. Republicans have pounced on this 

statement as evidence that Secretary Clinton lied. But today we 

learned some significant new facts, and I hope the press listens to 

this. 

First, you clarified that you were talking about only 3 emails out 

of 30,000 your office reviewed. Is that right? 

Mr. COMEY. Three, yes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Three out of 30,000. Is that right? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. At least 30,000. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. At least 30,000. 

Second, you confirmed that these three emails were not properly 

marked as classified at the time based on Federal guidelines and 

manuals, they did not have a classification header, they did not list 

the original classifier, the agency, office of origin, reason for classification, or date for declassification. Instead, these emails included 

only a single, quote, ‘‘C,’’ parenthesis, end parenthesis, and then 

end of quotation mark, for confidential on one paragraph lower 

down in the text. Is that right? 

Mr. COMEY. Correct. 


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Mr. CUMMINGS. Third, you testified that based on these facts, it 

would have been a, quote, ‘‘reasonable inference’’ for Secretary 

Clinton to, quote, ‘‘immediately,’’ end of quote, conclude that these 

emails were not, in fact, classified. So that was also critical new information. 

But there’s one more critical fact, that these emails were not in 

fact—and that is this, Director, and to the press—these emails 

were not, in fact, classified. The State Department explained to us 

yesterday, they reported that these emails are not classified and 

that including the little C on these emails was a result of a human 

error. The bottom line is that those little C’s should not have been 

on those documents because they were not in fact classified. 

When Representative Watson Coleman asked you a few minutes 

ago about this, you testified that you had not been informed. And 

I understand that, I’m not beating up on you, I promise you. But 

can you tell us why, Director Comey, because I want—you know, 

because the Republicans are pouncing and saying that the Secretary lied, and so I want to make sure that we’re clear on this. 

Can you tell us why, Director Comey, did you consult—and we’re 

just curious—did you consult with the State Department about 

these 3 emails out of the more than 30,000, or did this just not 

come up? What happened there? 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. I’m not remembering for sure while I’m here. 

I’m highly confident we consulted with them and got their view on 

it. I don’t know about what happened yesterday, maybe that their 

view has changed or they found things out that we didn’t know. 

But I’m highly confident we consulted with them about it. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So this is totally different than what we understood yesterday. Today we learned that these emails were not in 

fact classified. They should not have been included—they should 

have not included those stray markings, they were not properly 

marked as classified, and the Director of the FBI believes it was 

reasonable for Secretary Clinton to assume that these documents 

were not classified. 

Chairman, you raised a question about whether Secretary Clinton’s attorneys had security clearances. It’s my understanding that 

they did. We can double-check that, but that is my understanding. 

We’ll double-check that. 

Going on, let me move to the next topic. You explained on Tuesday that you were providing, quote, ‘‘an update on the FBI’s investigation of Secretary Clinton’s use of a personal email system during her time as Secretary of State.’’ You explained that you received a referral on this matter from the inspector general of the 

intelligence community on July 6, 2016. Is that right. 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Today, tens of thousands of Secretary Clinton’s 

emails are publicly available on the State Department’s Web site. 

And our staff have been reviewing the emails that were retroactively determined to include classified information. 

Based on this review, it appears that these emails included more 

than 1,000 individuals who sent or received the information that 

is now redacted as classified. Let me make that clear. About 1,000 

people sent or received the same information that was contained in 


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Secretary Clinton’s emails and retroactively classified. Were you 

aware of that? 

Mr. COMEY. No. The number doesn’t surprise me, though. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Why not? 

Mr. COMEY. Because this was—they were doing the business of 

the State Department on this email system. So I don’t know how 

many thousands of people work at the State Department, but it 

doesn’t surprise me there would be lots of people on these chains. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And would you agree that we need—that something needs to be done with regard to this classification stuff, because things are classified, then they’re not classified, then they 

are retroactively classified. I mean, does that go into your consideration when looking at a case like this? 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. I don’t pay much attention to the up-classified 

stuff, because we’re focused on intent. So if someone classifies it 

later, it’s impossible that you formed intent around that, because 

it wasn’t classified at the time. I know that’s a process. I wasn’t 

familiar with it before this investigation, but I don’t spend a lot of 

time focused on it in the course of a criminal investigation. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I understand. We also reviewed who these people 

are, and they include a host of very experienced career diplomats 

with many years of experience. So let me ask you this. When you 

received this referral from the inspector general about Secretary 

Clinton’s emails, did you also receive any referrals for any of the 

other 1,000 people who sent and received those emails? Did you? 

Mr. COMEY. No. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I understand—— 

Mr. COMEY. Well, I should stop there. Within the scope of our investigation was a group of people closer to the Secretary. We looked 

at their conduct. I forget what the number is, four or five of them. 

But then the hundreds of others who may have been on the chains 

were not the subjects of the investigation. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Okay. I think I have 30 more seconds. 

I understand that Secretary Clinton is the only one running for 

President, but it does not make sense that she was singled out for 

a referral to the FBI. Do you agree with that? 

Mr. COMEY. No, I don’t—I don’t think I agree with that. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Okay. So you—so you—let’s go back to Colin 

Powell. Do you think you ought to look at his situation? Or 

Condoleezza Rice? 

Mr. COMEY. Well, there’s been no referral on them. I know only 

sort of at a superficial level their circumstances. This case strikes 

me as very different from those and not an inappropriate referral 

from the inspector general. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Very well. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

Who was Hillary Clinton emailing that was hacked? 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. I don’t want to say in an open forum. We can 

get you that information, but I don’t want to—again, I don’t want 

to give any hostile adversaries insight into who—what we figured 

out. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Fair enough. 

Mr. COMEY. So I know the names. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Understood. 


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Mr. COMEY. Yeah. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Was there any evidence of Hillary Clinton 

attempting to avoid compliance with the Freedom of Information 

Act? 

Mr. COMEY. That was not the subject of our criminal investigation, so I can’t answer that sitting here. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. It’s a violation of law, is it not? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. My understanding is there are civil statutes 

that apply to that. I don’t know of—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Let’s put the boundaries on this a little bit, 

what you didn’t look at. You didn’t look at whether or not there 

was an intention or the reality of noncompliance with the Freedom 

of Information Act? 

Mr. COMEY. Correct. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. You did not look at testimony that Hillary 

Clinton gave in the United States Congress, both the House and 

the Senate? 

Mr. COMEY. To see whether it was perjurious in some respect? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Yes. 

Mr. COMEY. No, we did not. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Did you review and look at those transcripts as to the intent of your recommendation? 

Mr. COMEY. I’m sure my folks did. I did not. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So—okay. And this is an important point, 

because I think those of us in Congress, knowing that you got a 

criminal referral from an inspector general, thought that you were 

also looking at whether or not Hillary Clinton had provided false 

testimony, which is a crime, to the Congress, but you didn’t look 

at that. 

Mr. COMEY. Correct. As I said, I’m confident my folks looked at 

the substance of the statements trying to understand the circumstances around the entire situation. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Can you confirm that? I just want to 

make—— 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah, we’ll confirm that. And also, again, maybe I’m 

missing this, but I don’t think we got a referral from congressional 

committees, a perjury referral. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. No. It was the inspector general that initiated this. 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Did the—the fact that Hillary Clinton refused to be interviewed by the inspector general, what did that say 

to you about intent? 

Mr. COMEY. Not, at least for our criminal investigation, not particularly germane. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Are you familiar—you’re familiar—there’s 

a Web site. I mean, lots of government agencies have Web sites. 

The State Department has a Web site, state.gov, and they have a 

YouTube site. Videos that are uploaded to a YouTube site, would 

those be considered Federal records? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t know. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So they’re paid for by Federal dollars, 

they’re maintained by Federal employees. Would that not be a Federal record? 


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Mr. COMEY. Yeah, I just don’t know. I’m sure there’s an expert 

who could answer that in 2 seconds, but I’m not that expert. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Okay. We’ve kept you here a long time. I 

want to follow up on that. 

Is the FBI still investigating Hillary Clinton’s aides? 

Mr. COMEY. No is the answer. The Department of Justice declined on all of those who were subjects communicating with her 

through that email system. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. What recommendations did you make 

about her aides? 

Mr. COMEY. Same. Same. We didn’t recommend that anybody be 

prosecuted on those facts. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And if you can help us understand who 

precisely had been ruled out for prosecution, that would be—— 

Mr. COMEY. Sure. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Did you look at the Clinton Foundation? 

Mr. COMEY. I’m not going to comment on the existence or nonexistence of any other investigations. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Was the Clinton Foundation tied into this 

investigation? 

Mr. COMEY. I’m not going to answer that. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The server that was set up in her home 

was originally set up by, you said, former President Bill Clinton. 

Mr. COMEY. Correct. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Do you know who paid for that? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t, sitting here. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Okay. I’ll allow some equal time now for 

my colleague and friend, Mr. Cummings. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I’m going to yield 2 minutes to—of my 3.43—to 

Mr. Lynch. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Director. We’re talking about hacking. And so on this committee we’re very much interested in cybersecurity and we review a lot of the major hacks that are going on. 

So just recently, and I would say in the last 18 months, we’ve had 

a major hack, February of 2016, at the Department of Homeland 

Security and the FBI. We had a hacking group, the SITE Intelligence Group, reported that a group called Crackers With Attitude 

had hacked 9,000 employees’ data from the Department of Homeland Security, including names, email addresses, locations, telephone numbers; also 20,000 FBI workers. 

We had another hack—direct evidence, obviously, of those—another hack at OPM of 4.2 million current and former Federal Government employees. Their information had been stolen, including 

Social Security numbers, which were not redacted. 

We had IRS in May 2015, millions—no, I’m sorry, 200,000 attempted and 100,000 were successful. We had—the State Department announced a breach of its computer systems after an infiltration forced the agency to temporarily shut down its classification 

system. We had the United States Postal Service, 800,000 postal 

employees, 2.9 million customers. 

The White House, The Washington Post reported back in—this 

is back in 2014—that the White House computer was hacked. The 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. I’m on another 

committee for Financial Service. We had Verizon. UCLA Health 


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Systems, thousands and thousands and thousands of employees. 

Anthem HealthCare. Sony Pictures. Staples. Home Depot. 

JPMorgan. It gets into the millions. Community Health Systems. 

Target. TJX. 

So all these we have direct evidence, millions and millions and 

millions of people, their accounts being hacked. Any direct evidence 

that Hillary Clinton’s emails were hacked? 

Mr. COMEY. No. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay. I have no further questions. I yield back. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Director, we are about at the end. I’m going 

to do a concluding statement and then I think the chairman will. 

I want to, first of all, I want to go back to something that Mrs. 

Watson Coleman said a little earlier. As an African American man 

in this country, 66 years old, moving towards the twilight of my 

life, we cannot allow Black men to continue to be slaughtered. 

This morning I woke up to my wife literally crying watching the 

tape of this guy, Alton Sterling, in Baton Rouge. And then she 

looked at the one, Philando Castile, near Minneapolis. And I hope 

you watched them. There’s something wrong with this picture. 

And don’t get me wrong. I am all for, I’ve supported police, I am 

a lawyer, and I know how important police are, and I know there’s 

so many great folks. 

But, Mr. Director, if you do nothing else in your 2,000-plus days 

left, you have got to help us get ahold of this issue. It is so painful, 

I can’t even begin to tell you. 

And so I don’t want—I’ve been fortunate in my life. I’ve been 

very fortunate that I have not been harmed by the police. But I’ve 

been stopped 50 million times. 

Now, with regard to this hearing, I want to thank you again. You 

know, as I listened to you, you said something that I will never forget, and for some reason it gave me a chill. You said there are two 

things that are most important to me, two things. You said: My 

family and my reputation. My family and my reputation. 

And I don’t know whether your family’s watching this, but I hope 

that they are as proud of you as I am, because you are the epitome 

of what a public servant is all about, sacrificing over and over and 

over again, trying to do the right thing, sometimes coming under 

ridicule, but yet still doing the right thing. And so I hope that they 

are proud of you. 

The second thing is that no matter what has happened in this 

hearing, I hope that you know that your reputation is still intact. 

And so I conclude by summarizing that I think some of our—of 

some of our key findings today. First, the Director testified that his 

entire team of 15 to 20 FBI investigators unanimously agreed on 

the recommendation not to prosecute Secretary Clinton. 

Second, Director Comey made crystal clear that Republican 

claims and some of the talking heads’ claims of bias are completely 

false. He testified that he would treat John Doe the same way he 

would treat Hillary Clinton, that he was very forceful on that 

point. 

Third, on the claim that Secretary Clinton sent or received 

emails that were marked as classified, that claim has now been significantly undercut. Those documents were not classified and those 

markings were not proper. 


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Finally, Republicans have repeatedly cried foul about a double 

standard when it comes to Secretary Clinton’s emails, but Director 

Comey testified that the real double standard would have been to 

prosecute her with this completely inadequate evidence. 

Again, Director, I thank you, but I thank somebody else. I 

thank—and having practiced law for many years and having dealt 

with the FBI on many cases, I want to thank the people who work 

with you. Because it’s not just—it’s not just—this is not just about 

you. 

Mr. COMEY. No. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. This is not just about Secretary Clinton. When 

we are addressing you, there are a whole cadre of people who give 

their blood, their sweat, and their tears to protect us as Americans. 

And I just want to thank them, because sometimes I think they are 

forgotten, unseen, unnoticed, unappreciated, and unapplauded. But 

today I applaud them and I thank you. 

Thank you very much, and I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And I thank the gentleman. 

And I concur with the idea that every FBI agent I have ever met 

has just been above reproach, and they make us proud. And they 

work hard, they put their lives on the line, they serve overseas, 

they serve domestically. Can’t thank them enough for what they 

do, and I hope that is part of the message that we carry back. 

I cannot thank you personally enough, you on a personal level, 

for your accessibility, your ability to get on the phone with me the 

same day that you make your announcement, and then in rapid 

fire when I said to you, ‘‘What day is best, we’re going to have to 

do this, so which day is best for you?’’ and you said Thursday, and 

here we are and doing it. I can’t thank you enough. 

I wish all of the government employees would have that attitude 

and approach, I really do, and I can’t thank you enough. I look forward to working with you and your staff as we move forward in 

getting this documentation, things that you can’t share publicly, 

and others. 

It is the intention of the committee to—I had told Mr. Cummings 

here that we would come back after votes. Votes have been pushed 

back now a bit. So what I’d like to do is to go into recess for 5 minutes and then we will start with our second panel. 

The committee stands in recess till 5 minutes from now. 

Thank you again, Director Comey. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The Oversight and Government Reform 

Committee will reconvene and we will now recognize our second 

panel of witnesses. 

I’m pleased to welcome the Honorable Steve Linick, inspector 

general of the United States Department of State. 

Mr. Linick, it is our understanding that you are accompanied by 

Ms. Jennifer Costello, assistant inspector general for the Office of 

Evaluations and Special Projects, whose expertise may be needed 

during questioning. So we will also ask that she be sworn in during 

this time too. 

We also welcome the Honorable Charles McCullough, III, inspector general of the intelligence community at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 


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We thank you for being here. We thank you for your patience. 

It has been a long afternoon. But you’ve done some exceptionally 

significant and important work, and we want to hear it and understand it and digest it and ask questions about it. 

So pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses are to be sworn before they testify. And as I said, we will also swear in Ms. Costello. 

If you will please rise and raise your right hands. 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are 

about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 

the truth? 

Thank you. 

Let the record reflect that all three of the witnesses did answer 

in the affirmative. 

Inspector General Linick and Inspector General McCullough, you 

are both welcome to make oral remarks. We’ll be very generous 

with the time. And your entire written statement and extraneous 

materials will be entered into the record as you so wish. 

But let’s now go to Mr. Linick and recognize him. 

STATEMENTS OF MR. STEVE LINICK, MS. JENNIFER 

COSTELLO, AND MR. I. CHARLES MCCULLOUGH, III. 

Mr. LINICK. Thank you, Chairman Chaffetz. I’m pleased to be 

here to testify about our report on records management and cybersecurity at the Department of State. I have no opening statements, 

and therefore am prepared to answer any questions the committee 

has about the report and any other matters. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you, Mr. Linick. 

Mr. McCullough, we’ll now recognize you for as much time as 

you’d like. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Thank you, Chairman Chaffetz. It’s—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. If you could both bring those microphones, 

and it’s a little uncomfortable, but bring them right up there. There 

we go. Thank you. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. It’s a pleasure to be here, and I’m here—I 

don’t have an opening statement either, so in the interests of time, 

I’m here to answer your questions, and I’m very happy to be here 

for you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

I’ll now recognize myself first. 

I need you to summarize your findings as to what is happening 

and not happening with classified information. And, Mr. 

McCullough, my understanding is a referral was given that kicked 

off this whole process. Why did you make that referral? What was 

it that you were seeing that you think warranted an investigation? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. We were—Chairman, we were assisting—I 

had been asked to assist IG Linick in a review of classification 

issues and other issues at the State Department. He requested my 

office to help because of our expertise with classification matters. 

And during our assistance with his particular review he was doing, 

we reviewed 300 documents that had already been released in the 

FOIA process for former Secretary Clinton’s emails. 

We saw some classified material, one classified document that 

had been released that wasn’t properly redacted. My inspectors noticed a second document that was classified but was properly reVerDate Sep 11 2014 14:35 Oct 12, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00098 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\21323.TXT APRIL

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dacted. So we knew that in this sample of 300 that had already 

been published, that there were classified documents in this set of 

emails. 

So also during our review, looking at essentially the internal controls of the email processing at the State Department, again, the 

role that we played was to look at the controls to determine whether or not the controls were sufficient to spot intelligence community 

equities in classified information. 

So we had talked to some people there and were hearing from— 

we heard from senior management officials that there were—they 

had perused the documents, and they were under the impression, 

one in particular, that there was a good deal of classified information in these documents yet to be processed, these 30,000 documents. 

They also commented to us that they didn’t feel as though they 

had the personnel there, that there was a deficiency with the personnel in terms of having the appropriate number of people, appropriately cleared people, people with the appropriate expertise to review these documents. 

So I was looking at that. So we have—we have documents that 

are already published, already processed through a FOIA. One was 

not properly redacted and it was classified. And I’m being told by 

the State Department information management people that they 

have concerns that there’s a good deal of classified information in 

this set of documents. 

And on top of that, I was advised by Mr. Linick’s office that this 

whole set of emails was present on a thumb drive in Secretary 

Clinton’s attorney’s office. We knew nothing about the clearances 

for counsel or for the law firm. And I was also advised that this 

set of documents previously resided on a private server, which at 

that point in time was with a private company. 

So as an IG, I was facing a situation where I had classified information, it appeared to me, outside the care, custody, and control 

of the U.S. Government. 

In the intelligence community what you do when that happens 

is you tell the security component of the agency who owns that information. In this case, I told the agencies who owned the information, I also told the ODNI’s security component, the NCSC, and I 

was advised to go directly to the FBI with a referral with respect 

to my referral to them. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So these emails, which are supposedly all 

of Hillary Clinton’s emails, they were sitting in a secure or nonsecure facility at her attorney’s office? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. I don’t know anything about the security of 

the facility at the attorney’s office. I think—I had heard at that 

point in time that there was a safe there, and I think that it was 

represented—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. But it’s not a cleared—not cleared by the 

United States Government? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Not to my knowledge. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Mr. Linick, what was your finding here? 

Mr. LINICK. Well, we were not involved in any of the classification determinations. I mean, our role in this was to look at the 


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FOIA process. We were asked jointly to look at the FOIA process, 

whether improvements could be made. 

And we made a number of recommendations to the Department 

to make sure that classified information wasn’t inadvertently released in the context of doing the review for FOIA. That was our 

role in this. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Hillary Clinton had this convenient email 

arrangement with herself. Have you ever seen anything like that? 

Were there people that expressed concerns about that? And what 

happened when these people expressed concerns? 

Mr. LINICK. Well, as we reported in our evaluation report, we did 

interview a couple of individuals who were in the Office of the Secretary, the computer division, SES/IRM, who said that they approached the then-director of that particular office and expressed 

concerns both about the server and about whether or not her 

emails were being properly preserved under the Federal Records 

Act. 

And that individual, the director of SES/IRM, informed those individuals that it had been approved by Legal and not to mention 

it again. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. What does that mean, ‘‘not mention it 

again’’? How did you read that? 

Mr. LINICK. You know, I can only report—I can only report what 

the witnesses told us. We were not able to interview the individual—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Why not? 

Mr. LINICK. I’m sorry, I didn’t hear the question. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Why not? Why didn’t you interview him? 

Mr. LINICK. Well, we asked to interview him, but he declined to 

interview with us. So we were not able to get the benefit of his perspective on it. So I’m really unable to interpret what that means, 

other than just present the facts. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And were you able to interview Hillary 

Clinton? 

Mr. LINICK. We were not. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Why not? 

Mr. LINICK. Well, we asked to interview Secretary Clinton. We 

interviewed all of the Secretaries. We looked at five Secretaries of 

State, going back to Madeleine Albright. And, through counsel, she 

declined to meet with us. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Did she indicate a reason why she would 

refuse to meet with the inspector general? 

Mr. LINICK. Her counsel informed our staff that she had—that 

all of the information about the email was on the FAQ sheet published by her campaign. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So they directed you to the campaign? 

Mr. LINICK. To the FAQ sheet. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. At the campaign? 

Mr. LINICK. On the Web site, yes. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The campaign Web site? 

Mr. LINICK. I will have to check that. I’m not sure exactly what 

Web site it was. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Well, it’s an important point, so please 

check that. 


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Mr. LINICK. Okay. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I have gone over my time. 

Let me recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts for 7 minutes in equal time, Mr. Lynch. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The chairman asked—I want to follow up on that question. The 

chairman asked, have you ever seen anything like this before? And 

I think, in the fullness of your response, I would say you have. 

As you indicated, you investigated, you reviewed the records of 

five Secretaries of State. And here is part of your report. It says 

here that your report identified more than 90 department employees under Secretary Powell and Secretary Rice who used personal 

email accounts for official business. 

And I will quote your report. The report says exactly this. It 

says, ‘‘OIG reviewed the Department email accounts of senior department employees who served on the immediate staffs of Secretary Powell and Secretary Rice between 2001 and 2008. Within 

these accounts, OIG identified more than 90 department employees 

who periodically used personal email accounts to conduct official 

business, though OIG could not quantity the frequency of this use.’’ 

So I know this is sort of the second part of this hearing, but that 

would have been good information to have at the first one. 

Also, Inspector General Linick, in May, you issued a report on 

the management of email records by the Secretaries of State, and 

your review found that Secretary Powell used a personal email account for official business. 

As a matter of fact, in his book, he lays it out. I’m not going to 

repeat it again, but there’s an interesting section here where, you 

know, he’d get a little frustrated with the State Department system, and he installed a laptop computer on a private line and just 

started emailing folks. And, again, Secretary Powell has later admitted to deleting all of his emails. 

So we got 55,000 emails from Hillary Clinton. How many did we 

get from Secretary Powell? 

Mr. LINICK. I’m not aware of any from Secretary Powell. 

Mr. LYNCH. That would be zero. 

Mr. LINICK. I believe that’s the case. 

Mr. LYNCH. Yeah. Okay. 

Mr. LINICK. Yes, he did use an aol.com account to transmit 

email. 

Mr. LYNCH. Now, this is the—now, get this. So Secretary Powell 

is testifying before the United Nations Security Council, telling 

them they got—that there are weapons of mass destruction and we 

need to go into Iraq. At that time, he is using a personal email system. And he has deleted everything that he had in that file, so we 

have nothing. And Hillary Clinton is getting investigated. 

You know, it just—let me ask you, have you followed up with 

that and tried to get any information from Secretary Powell? 

Mr. LINICK. Well, we haven’t. The Department, though, has 

asked for information from Secretary Powell, and I don’t believe 

they have received it yet. But you will have to ask the Department 

about that. 

Mr. LYNCH. When did they—do you have any knowledge of when 

they asked? 


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Mr. LINICK. You know, I’d have to—it’s in our report, the exact 

date. I don’t have it off the top of my head. 

Mr. LYNCH. I do. October 21, 2015. 

Mr. LINICK. Perfect. 

Mr. LYNCH. The State Department sent Secretary Powell a letter 

requesting that he contact his email provider, AOL, to determine 

whether any of his emails could still be retrieved. Is that right? 

Mr. LINICK. That’s right. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay. 

And, in your report, you note that, as of May 2016, the Department has not received a response from Secretary Powell or his representative. Is that still correct? 

Mr. LINICK. To the best of my knowledge, that’s correct. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay. So we got nothing there. What are we doing 

about that? 

Mr. LINICK. I mean, it’s up to the Department to get that information pursuant to NARA regulations. They are on the hook to recover records that are lost from the State Department, and, 

through that letter, they’re trying to fulfill that obligation. 

Mr. LYNCH. So there’s a huge gap. 

We got the goose egg from Condoleezza Rice too. She gave us 

nothing, in terms of emails. So we have 8 years of silence from the 

Secretaries of State. 

Mr. LINICK. Well, the difference with—we don’t—Condoleezza 

Rice, we believe, wasn’t using email to conduct State Department 

business. 

Mr. LYNCH. But her staff were. 

Mr. LINICK. Yes. 

Mr. LYNCH. She’s got a bunch of staffers—— 

Mr. LINICK. Yes. 

Mr. LYNCH. And she served in 2001. This was not 1901. So there 

were emails. She acts like there were no emails in 2001. There 

were. We just don’t have any, not from her. 

Mr. LINICK. We did find that her staff—— 

Mr. LYNCH. I just think there’s a double standard going on here. 

People have talked about a double standard all day. How come 

these folks gave us the goose egg? We got zero, We got silence for 

8 years from our Secretaries of State, and no one is going after 

them. They don’t get subpoenaed up here. I haven’t seen them at 

these hearings. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. LYNCH. The gentleman will yield, yeah, sure. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The inspector general was able to interview 

them and talked to them, and they did look at them. 

Mr. LYNCH. And they got nothing. They got the—they got the, 

you know, ‘‘Talk to the hand.’’ That’s what they got. They got zero. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Would the gentleman yield? 

No, he said that she did not use email. 

Mr. LYNCH. They just told—but they never subpoenaed or anything. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. But if you ask Mr. Linick what happened 

with her aides, I’d like him to answer that question. 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. LINICK. So we did talk to Secretaries Rice and Powell and 

all the other Secretaries. Secretary Rice told us that she didn’t use 

email—— 

Mr. LYNCH. And you just take that at face value? 

Mr. LINICK. Well, we actually tested that. We looked at archives. 

We didn’t find—I mean, we tried to corroborate that. We did not 

find any evidence that she used—— 

Mr. LYNCH. What about her immediate staff? 

Mr. LINICK. Well, we did conclude that her immediate staff used 

email to conduct official business. 

Mr. LYNCH. Yeah. 

Mr. LINICK. So, we did. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay. So, you know, that’s interesting. Do we have 

their emails? 

Mr. LINICK. I’d have to check on that. I do know that we, in the 

course of our work, we bumped into a number of emails that—classified emails that staff sent to personal accounts. And we did write 

up a memo describing that and providing that to the Department 

and asking the Department to take appropriate action and make 

sure any of the archives—you know, the archives didn’t have classified email in them. 

So we did take—same thing with Secretary Powell when we 

found the two classified emails that were sent to him. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay. 

Mr. McCullough, what do you think about this? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. With regard to? 

Mr. LYNCH. The lack of response by Secretary Powell, 4 years, 

and then getting zero from Condoleezza Rice as well. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. My office’s role here was extraordinarily narrow. When we came in, IG Linick’s office was doing this review. It 

was limited to the past five Secretaries. We don’t have the resources. The tasking, I believe, from Congress—— 

Mr. LYNCH. We just spent $7 million investigating Secretary 

Clinton. We don’t have the resources to, you know, to—— 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. I’m talking about my office. The tasking from 

Congress was to determine whether classified information—one of 

the taskings that I believe Steve received was to determine whether classified information had traversed nongovernmental systems 

at the State Department. His office had scoped that down to the 

five past Secretaries. 

When I came in, we thought it was the easiest thing and, quite 

frankly, we thought it would be the fastest thing to do, since they 

already had 30,000 documents they were processing for a FOIA, to 

determine whether or not they had sufficient internal controls in 

place to spot, identify classified information, identify classified equities. 

Mr. LYNCH. Can we subpoena AOL and just say, you know, this 

was a private account that the Secretary of State during a very important part of our country’s history—and we want those emails, 

go get them, rather than just waiting for—and, look, I have great 

admiration for Secretary Powell. I do. But, still, that’s information, 

in fairness, that we should have. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. I’m trying to explain that our—my office’s 

role and my role in the review was narrowly tailored to determine 


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whether or not classified information—we didn’t have—my office 

doesn’t have the resources to determine, with the thousands of employees at the State Department, who was trafficking in classified 

information on personal systems and who was not. 

He already had 30,000 documents right there that were going 

over that—— 

Mr. LYNCH. You mean Secretary Clinton’s documents? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. That’s correct—that were going through a 

FOIA process. So, from an IG perspective—and it was more efficient for us—we thought we would look at the processes being used 

by the FOIA managers at the State Department. And we made recommendations to them that—— 

Mr. LYNCH. Did you recommend that we go after Secretary Powell? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. No. The recommendations we made were— 

first of all, they asked us, can you please give us—these are the 

people who were actually doing the review. They felt as though 

they didn’t have sufficient expertise there to spot intelligence equities. And so we recommended that they include intelligence people 

for this type of FOIA review, this particular FOIA review. 

We also recommended that they get on—they were doing this review on a Secret-level system, a SIPRNet-level system, and because 

we had been told by some of the State officials that they thought 

there was a good deal of classified information in the emails, we 

recommended that they perform this processing on a Top Secret/ 

SCI-level system, a JWICS-level system. 

Mr. LYNCH. But that went all over—that went completely around 

Secretary Powell’s information, because he was giving us nothing. 

They had only Secretary Clinton’s stuff, so they—this review of five 

Secretaries of State was heavily focused on Secretary Clinton because of the complete absence of any other information. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. I would have to defer to IG Linick with respect to any of the other Secretaries in terms of the availability of 

emails on personal systems. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay. 

I’ll yield back. I’m way over time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

I now recognize the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Gowdy, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GOWDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Inspector General Linick, did you desire to interview Secretary 

Clinton as part of your investigation? 

Mr. LINICK. Yes, we did. 

Mr. GOWDY. And were you able to do so? 

Mr. LINICK. No, we were not. 

Mr. GOWDY. And how was it communicated to you that you were 

not going to be able to do so? 

Mr. LINICK. Through her counsel. David Kendall had sent a letter to one of the team leaders on the report. 

Mr. GOWDY. Is that letter available for Congress to inspect? 

Mr. LINICK. You know, I’ll go back and check, but I’ll have to get 

back to you on that. I mean, it certainly exists. Whether if it’s legal 

to provide it to you, sure. 


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Mr. GOWDY. Well, let’s do this then. Let’s fast-forward and let’s 

assume that you were able to interview her. Why did you seek to 

interview her? And what questions, specifically, would you have 

asked? 

Mr. LINICK. Well, we were—the focus of our report was not about 

classified information. The focus of our report was how the Department over the past 20 years addressed records preservation and cybersecurity. 

And, you know, we were looking at—we were looking at whether 

or not—there was a rule the Department issued in 2005 requiring 

that employees use departmental systems. She used a nondepartmental system, her server, to conduct official government business. 

And we wanted to ask her questions about that—whether she had 

approval, who approved it, and so forth. 

We also—so we wanted to get her perspective on those issues, 

among others. 

Mr. GOWDY. So let me see if I have this right. The inspector general for the State Department wanted to interview a former Secretary of State. 

Mr. LINICK. That’s correct. 

Mr. GOWDY. And that request was declined. 

Mr. LINICK. Yes. 

Mr. GOWDY. Well, at first blush, it sounds like your question was 

a reasonable one. You want to make sure that the information is 

safeguarded and protected and archived consistent with law. So I 

wonder why you weren’t able to interview her. Were you given a 

reason? 

Mr. LINICK. Just the reason that I articulated before. Other than 

that, I would be speculating. 

Mr. GOWDY. What other questions—and if you need to ask any 

of the wonderful folks with you—what other questions would you 

have sought to ask the former Secretary of State? 

Mr. LINICK. Well, we also looked at records preservation. And the 

rules required a certain—that she print and file her emails and 

that she, you know, make sure that they’re part of the agency recordkeeping system. We wanted—we would’ve asked her about that. 

We would’ve asked her about some of the attempts to hack her 

system, at least as expressed by her—some of her staff, which we 

have identified in our report. We probably would’ve asked her 

about that. 

So those are the kinds of things, her state of mind and so forth. 

Mr. GOWDY. I don’t think you were in the room for Director 

Comey’s testimony, and I don’t know whether or not you had access 

to it in the back. 

Are you familiar with his testimony that convenience was one of 

the intentions the former Secretary had in having this unusual 

email arrangement with herself? 

Mr. LINICK. No, I don’t recall that. But I did watch parts of the 

testimony. 

Mr. GOWDY. All right. He did cite convenience as one of the factors. 

Do you know when her emails were returned to the State Department? 


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Mr. LINICK. They were returned 21 months after she left the Department. 

Mr. GOWDY. What was going on the second month after she left 

that made it inconvenient to return them then? 

Mr. LINICK. I wouldn’t be able to comment on that. 

Mr. GOWDY. How about the fourth month? 

Mr. LINICK. Again, I just don’t know. 

Mr. GOWDY. How about the 1-year anniversary? 

Mr. LINICK. Same answer. 

Mr. GOWDY. Do you know what possibly could have inspired her 

to begin searching for those records? 

Mr. LINICK. Well, she did receive a request from the Department 

to return records in accordance with their obligations under the 

Federal Records Act, and there are regulations. 

Mr. GOWDY. But that obligation didn’t manifest itself 21 months 

later. That obligation was present the day she left office. 

Mr. LINICK. And one of our findings was, along with Secretary 

Powell, that both of them failed to surrender their records, their 

personal records containing government business when they left 

the Department, thus depriving the Department of having those 

records as part of the agency recordkeeping system. 

Mr. GOWDY. And I assume you probably would’ve asked former 

Secretary had you had an opportunity to do so why it took 21 

months to return public records. 

And just so there’s no—I mean, nobody likes Congress. I get that. 

We’re not sympathetic. But there are FOIA requests that would’ve 

been received by the State Department during that time period, 

right? 

Mr. LINICK. Possibly. 

Mr. GOWDY. How would those FOIA requests have been responded to and complied with if they didn’t even have the records? 

Mr. LINICK. Well, sir, as we identified in our previous report on 

FOIA, it would’ve been difficult if the records are not part of the 

agency recordkeeping system to respond to FOIA. 

Mr. GOWDY. I’m out of time, but I know the chairman will give 

me one more question since he’s given a lot more than one more 

question to other folks. 

I want you to assume an absurd hypothetical, that the Secretary 

of State has exclusive use of personal email and that she is corresponding with someone who also uses personal email. Are you 

with me? 

Mr. LINICK. I’m with you. 

Mr. GOWDY. How in the world is the State Department ever 

going to capture that email? 

Mr. LINICK. It would be—and this is something we addressed in 

our FOIA report. It would be—it would be difficult because—— 

Mr. GOWDY. It’d be a challenge, wouldn’t it? 

Mr. LINICK. It would, because only records under the agency’s 

control are subject to FOIA. So, in other words, the Department 

wouldn’t be able to reach in, necessarily, to a private account. So 

it—— 

Mr. GOWDY. Well, you wouldn’t even know about it, would you? 

If it’s personal-to-personal, how would you know about it? 

Mr. LINICK. You wouldn’t know about it. 


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Mr. GOWDY. All right. 

Well, I’m barely out of time. I thank the chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

I will now recognize Mr. Cummings for 7 minutes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Inspector General Linick and Inspector General 

McCullough, on March 9, 2016, seven committee ranking members 

of the United States Congress from the House and the Senate sent 

you a letter. I signed this letter, along with the ranking members 

of both the Senate and the House Intelligence Committees, the 

House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee, and the House Armed Services Committee, and the 

Senate Judiciary Committee. 

Are you both familiar with the letter? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Are you, Mr. Linick? 

Mr. LINICK. Yes, I am. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. The letter asked you 13 questions. To date, neither of you has answered one single one of those questions. Why 

is that? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. We have responded to the letter, and, in the 

response to the letter, that has led to several individual Member 

meetings, and we have offered Member meetings to all the Members who had concerns so that we could address them. And the 

Member meetings I have had directly addressed those questions. 

And so, again, I would re-extend that offer to you, Ranking Member Cummings. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, let me, let me, let me—on May 16, 2016, 

Mr. McCullough, you provided a response that was written in such 

a way that it was overclassified, at the Secret level. 

Was it really necessary to classify your response that way? And 

why did you write a response that could be publicly—why didn’t 

you just do one that could be publicly available? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. It wasn’t overclassified, Ranking Member 

Cummings. There was a lot of concern by Members who did not 

have access to certain of the emails. And I wanted to make sure 

that anyone receiving and reading that letter would understand 

that, if I was coming to brief, I wouldn’t be able to brief on the one 

set of emails that are ORCON with one of the agencies. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. 

Now, Mr. Linick, you responded on May 25, 2016. You had a 

short letter too. 

Mr. LINICK. I did. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Wow. Like Mr. McCullough’s letter, it failed to 

answer any of the specific questions from the ranking members. 

You both received followup letters, again posing the same 13 

questions. Neither of you responded to those letters. 

And so I guess your answer is the same. Did you all talk to each 

other about how you all were going to coordinate and not respond 

to Members of Congress, ranking members at that? 

Mr. LINICK. Well, the underlying issue in those letters was accusing our office of bias. And I think we responded in our letter that 

we conduct ourselves with the highest integrity, and I could vouch 

for my staff. We are obviously focused on where the facts lead, 


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we’re independent, and we’ve worked very competently on our reports. 

And I think our recent report, the evaluation on records preservation and cybersecurity, speaks for itself. No one has contested or 

challenged our findings or recommendations. And, in fact, the State 

Department has accepted the findings and recommendations. 

And we explained that in the letter. We explained that we have 

had bipartisan contacts with the Congress. So—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, let me ask you some questions, because I’m 

going to run out of time. 

Other than through official press statements, have you or anyone 

in your office, with the knowledge of the office, provided any information regarding the review of Secretary of State Clinton’s emails 

to the news media? 

Mr. LINICK. Well, we, like every other IG office, have a press office. And when we get press inquiries, we respond to them. We respond to them appropriately. We would never—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So the answer is yes. 

Mr. LINICK. —we would never release—well, of course, just like 

every other IG office. If someone asks about our findings or is misinterpreting, you know, what we’re doing, we’ll respond to it. 

But we have never released any confidential information or have 

been inappropriate. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Okay. 

Have you or your offices given any information, written or oral, 

regarding the review to the Republican congressional Members or 

staff that your offices have not made available simultaneously to 

the Democratic congressional Members or staff? 

Mr. LINICK. No. We are bipartisan, always. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. We’ve been bipartisan, bicameral—— 

Mr. LINICK. Absolutely. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. —at every step with our congressional notifications. 

I believe there was a blip on one occasion. It was unintentional, 

where one side—and I think there was a briefing where the Members or the staffers had requested the other side not be there. We 

briefed one side, and then offered the exact same briefing to the 

other. 

But, otherwise, we’ve made every attempt to be bipartisan and 

bicameral with all of our reporting and all of our briefings. We’ve 

done a number of briefings. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. The letter says, and I quote—this is the same 

letter that we sent you. It says, ‘‘Last week, a potential whistleblower in the office of the State Department inspector general publicly accused the office of having an anti-Clinton bias.’’ 

What are the policies and procedures for employees of your offices to report concerns regarding ongoing investigations, including 

concerns of bias within your offices? 

Mr. Linick? 

Mr. LINICK. Well we’re—if there are any issues about conflicts of 

interest, we would—I mean, as a matter of—as a matter of course, 

we would take action if there was an issue. 

But let me just say that I’ve been—prior to my having become 

an IG for the last 6 years, I was a career prosecutor for 16 years. 


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And the principles of integrity and honesty are of utmost importance to me and to my work. 

So, you know, these allegations are entirely unfounded. Our work 

speaks for itself. And we will follow the facts wherever they lead, 

and partisan politics has no bearing on what we’re doing. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, this committee has a reputation for going 

after people who interfere with whistleblowers. And that’s why I 

have to ask you. This was a whistleblower who—— 

Mr. LINICK. An anonymous whistleblower. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, he publicly accused the office. 

Mr. LINICK. It was anonymous. We have no idea who or what. 

But these are unfounded allegations. This was before our report 

was issued. I think our report speaks for itself. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Let me ask you this—did you have a response to 

that, Mr. McCullough? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. I would echo—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And do it briefly, because I’ve got one more question. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. I would echo IG Linick’s response. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Tell me something. What happens when you all 

disagree on things that should be classified? 

One of the things that bothers me about this whole thing is this 

retroactive classification. I mean, people on this committee may 

have committed a crime—I’m just telling you—by releasing things 

that were made retroactively classified. I mean, how do we deal 

with that? What can we do to try to clear that up? 

And what happens when you all disagree with each other? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. So in terms of when our departments or 

whether when we disagree as IGs? 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yeah, I mean—yeah, when you disagree as IGs. 

In other words—in other words, your departments—one of your departments says there is something that should be classified, the 

other one says it shouldn’t, didn’t deserve that kind of classification. I mean, what happens then? Is there an arbitrator or whatever? Because this stuff leads to crimes, as you well know. 

Mr. LINICK. Well, we don’t make classification determinations. 

We don’t—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, what can we do to help with that? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. So, as IGs, we don’t make classification determinations. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Right. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. You’re talking about when a department disagrees with another department. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. That happened in this case. So you had the 

State Department—and I did hear Director Comey’s testimony with 

respect to this up-classification. And that was relative—despite my 

years in the Federal Government, that was a relatively new term 

to me. I think that is a fairly common occurrence, a fairly common 

occurrence in the State Department. 

What I can say is that the emails that we reported to Congress 

in the congressional notification, we focused on those. Those were 

not up-classified, sir. Those were classified when they were sent 

and when they were received. So we were focusing on those. 


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Now, if there’s—there is a disagreement, and I think what you’re 

getting to is there was this parallel reporting issue where I believe 

there was an email or two, the State Department thought that they 

had received it from a different source. What I can tell you there 

is the agency that we dealt with and facilitated the classification 

on that, that’s one of the agencies who completed declarations for 

us. And they disagreed with the supposition that the information 

came from a parallel source. They believe that that information— 

they are the information owner for that information. 

Some of it was very specific. I can’t get into why it was their information in an open forum here. But some of the information was 

specific enough to tell where it would’ve come from. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Are you all going to answer the 13 questions? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. I think we’ll get together—if you’re not satisfied with where we are right now—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. No, I’m not satisfied. I’m not. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. —we will come and brief you in person, if you 

like, or—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes, I would. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. —I will get together—yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you. I appreciate it. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Okay. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And just as we recognize Mr. Meadows, I 

think what the committee should look at, in a bipartisan way—if 

we do it right, we do it together and do it united and do it unanimous if we can. I am very intrigued by what Senator Patrick Moynihan did about 20 years ago. Because, in a bipartisan way, they 

issued a report about classification. And it was done so—and, basically, the synopsis was: Everything is overclassified, and if everything is classified, then nothing is classified. 

And I do agree and concur with the gentleman from Maryland 

here, my friend, that the consistency, the human error, the problems that this creates, with the mass amount of data and information and the millions of people that have classified clearance, it 

does create a problem. And I think a bipartisan commission, something similar to what Senator Moynihan spearheaded 20-plus—20 

years ago or so, is something that we should look at. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. That’s a good idea, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I’d ask unanimous consent to enter into the 

record the two inspector general reports that are under discussion 

today. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. We’ll now recognize the gentleman from 

North Carolina, Mr. Meadows. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Linick, let me come to you, and feel free to have Ms. Costello 

jump in if she can illuminate the answer better. 

On March of 2015, Secretary Clinton publicly said, and I quote, 

‘‘I opted for convenience to use my personal email account, which 

was allowed by the State Department,’’ close quote. She went further to say, ‘‘The laws and regulations in effect when I was Secretary of State allowed me to use my email for work. That is undisputed,’’ close quote. 

Are those accurate statements? 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. LINICK. Well, I’m—I hesitate to comment on public statements, but I will say that our report shows that—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, we’re in a public forum now, and, obviously, 

a lot’s been said about it. Are those accurate or not? 

Mr. LINICK. Well, I can tell you our report said that she didn’t 

have approval from senior officials at the Department, and we don’t 

believe it was permitted, both under the rules and none of the officials, the senior officials who were there at the time, gave her approval or were even aware that she had a server, according to 

them. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So let me see if I can digest that long answer into 

a very short, concise statement. It is not an accurate statement. 

Mr. LINICK. Again, she didn’t have approval. So—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. 

So, Ms. Costello, would she have required approval in order to 

be able to use a personal email, according to regulations? Would 

she have required that kind of approval? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Ms. Costello, we have to—I need you to 

bring your chair up and sit next to Mr. Linick, if you would, because we need to be able to capture that for our recording purposes. 

She was sworn. 

Ms. COSTELLO. I was. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Yes. 

Ms. COSTELLO. Can you hear me? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Yes. 

Ms. COSTELLO. Okay. 

So, in order to exclusively use personal email for official business, Secretary Clinton would have required approval. 

The reason we know this is because the officials we interviewed 

at the Department, both in the Office of Diplomatic Security and 

the Office of Information Resource Management, told us that. And 

in telling us that, they were relying on a department policy that 

was put in place in 2005, which says that day-to-day operations 

must be conducted—I’m paraphrasing, but must be conducted on 

authorized information systems. 

And so the implication there is any exclusive use would be a dayto-day operation and shouldn’t occur without approval. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So that created a red flag for your investigative 

team. 

Ms. COSTELLO. As we reviewed the policies that were in place by 

the Department, yes. It was something that we considered very 

carefully in evaluating the evidence that we obtained. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So her statement that this is undisputed would 

not be accurate. So I won’t make you make a reference to the rest 

of it, but obviously it’s disputed if we’re disputing it here today. 

Ms. COSTELLO. I would say that, in relying on the interviews that 

we conducted with the officials at the Department who would be 

the people responsible for implementing these policies, the answer 

is, yes, it’s disputed. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So they would dispute it. 

Ms. COSTELLO. They did. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. And they did, all right, for the record. 


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So let me go on a little bit further. Because who—so you mentioned who had the obligation. I guess, how difficult would it be to 

comply with the law, the Federal Records Act, if you are using your 

personal email account? What would you have to do? 

Ms. COSTELLO. Well, I want to draw a distinction here, because 

what we were just talking about were the cybersecurity provisions 

at the Department, and now we’ve switched a little bit—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. But to Federal records, wouldn’t she have had to 

have printed out those emails and kept those to be in full compliance with the regulation? 

Ms. COSTELLO. Yes. During her tenure, folks in the Office of the 

Secretary, in order to comply with email records preservation and 

management policies at the Department, needed to print and file 

those emails. Now, you can—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. So, out of the 30,000 emails that we’ve had testimony earlier today, how many printed copies of emails—of her 

emails did you find? 

Ms. COSTELLO. I don’t know. But I can say that we did find, as 

we reviewed other folks’ emails and hard-copy files, we did find 

some examples of Secretary—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. So in more than a thousand printed? 

Ms. COSTELLO. I’m sorry, I can’t hazard a guess on that. I really 

don’t know. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. So can we get copies of all those printed 

emails through FOIA or through subpoena? 

Mr. LINICK. Well, those—those emails—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Because that’s the whole reason for the Federal 

Records Act, is so it would be—so you’re suggesting that there is 

a universe of printed-out emails that we can find. 

Ms. COSTELLO. To the extent that other folks who Secretary Clinton emailed did go ahead and print and file—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Oh, so you’re saying she didn’t print any of them 

out. 

Ms. COSTELLO. Right, but they do exist. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Oh, okay. That’s a big difference. So she made no 

printed copies in order to comply with the law. That was somebody 

else perhaps printing it out and she happens to be communicating 

with them. 

Ms. COSTELLO. Correct. And I’m sorry if I wasn’t clear before. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. No, that’s good. 

Ms. COSTELLO. What—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. I’m out of time. 

Ms. COSTELLO. —I’m saying is that they exist in the Department. 

A few here and there do. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. 

I will yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

And I think the point that certainly Mr. Gowdy was making is, 

if those emails on a private server were mailed to somebody else 

who is not involved in the government, then there is no printedout copy as required. 

We’ll now go to Mr. Walberg of Michigan. 

Mr. WALBERG. I thank the chairman. 

And thanks to the panel for being here. 


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Mr. McCullough, what is the significance of special access programs? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. It is the highest level of sensitivity in terms 

of classification information in the Federal Government. 

Mr. WALBERG. The highest level, so beyond classified, Secret—— 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. It’s the most sensitive information the government has, sir. 

Mr. WALBERG. How does that classification then relate to the 

other categories classified as information such as Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret? In other words, why is it determined to be 

the most sensitive? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. So you have several levels of confidentiality 

classification in the Federal Government. You’re starting with Confidential. That’s the parenthesis, C, close parenthesis. That’s the 

lowest level of classification. You go up there from the—to the Secret level, and then you go to the Top Secret level. 

And then each of those levels may have handling caveats that 

are trigraphs, such as ORCON, SCI, and what you’re asking about 

is SAP. So the SAP information would be characterized as the most 

sensitive—among the most sensitive information that we have in 

the government in terms of classification. 

Now, you classify things based upon the relative likelihood of 

damage to the national security if the information happens to be 

released. That’s an assessment that each person makes in OCA. 

That’s an original classifying authority. They make that assessment when they do classify something. I’m talking about original 

classification. 

Mr. WALBERG. Okay. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Now, derivative classification, you’re just taking it straight from the OCA’s classification and carrying it over. 

You don’t question whether or not the OCA was correct in calling 

it Secret, SI; you bring it over. 

Mr. WALBERG. Okay. 

On January 19, 2016, you wrote to the chairman of the Senate 

Intelligence Committee—or Intelligence and Foreign Relations 

Committees, saying that the State Department subsequently announced later, as a result of that letter, that it would withhold 

seven email chains because they referenced materials on special access programs. 

In your letter, you said you had not received a declaration from 

a second intelligence community element as of that time. Did you 

ever receive one? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir. That intel element provided their 

declaration—I believe two declarations directly to the Congress via 

their own IG, via their agency IG. 

Mr. WALBERG. Is it your experience that senior government officials are often unaware of the significance of special access program designations? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. No, sir. That’s not my experience. 

Mr. WALBERG. So it’s a normal and expected understanding—— 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Absolutely. 

Mr. WALBERG. —that senior officials should have. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Absolutely. 


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Mr. WALBERG. Let me ask both of you then, have either of you 

in your careers ever seen a situation before where special access 

program information was discussed over unclassified systems? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. No. I can’t recall—I’ve had a fairly extensive 

career in the IG world. I was an FBI agent for 10 years, I was the 

head of investigations at the NSA for 8, and I have been the IC 

IG for about 5. I can’t recall a situation where I have come across 

this particular situation, no. 

Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Linick? 

Mr. LINICK. Well, I haven’t, but I haven’t been in this—I haven’t 

really been working in this space, in terms of, you know, I don’t 

have a lot of opportunity to assess whether others are disclosing 

special access information. But I haven’t seen it in my career. 

Mr. WALBERG. What repercussions, Mr. McCullough, come 

from—— 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Well—and I’ll just qualify my answer. That’s 

not to say it hasn’t happened. We do get—in the intel community, 

when you’re dealing with intel information every day, especially for 

the agencies we call the big six, the purely intel agencies, we have 

employees who are dealing with only classified information all the 

time, and so there are issues we run into. 

And in terms of the consequence for that, I couldn’t prejudge 

what a consequence would be in terms of a security process or an 

administrative—a misconduct process. But it certainly would be 

something where the security elements for the intelligence agencies 

would look at readjudicating the clearance, and it would be a significant factor in the readjudication. 

But it’s a case-by-case basis for these types of things. There are 

a lot of factors involved. 

Mr. WALBERG. But there would be repercussions, undoubtedly, as 

a result of—— 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Yes. There would be consequences, yes. 

Mr. WALBERG. Okay. Thank you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. WALBERG. I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I’d ask unanimous consent to enter into the 

record a series of memoranda from both the Department of State 

inspector general and the ODNI inspector general. 

And, without objection, so ordered. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. We’ll now recognize the gentleman from 

Georgia, Mr. Carter, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here. 

Mr. Linick, in May of 2016, you submitted a report on the Secretary of State’s email records management. And you referred to 

two separate incidents in 2011 in which then-Secretary Clinton’s 

private email server was targeted in hacking attack attempts. 

In January of 2011, there were two instances where a non-State 

Department employee notified Clinton’s deputy chief of staff that 

he had to shut down her server because he believed someone was 

trying to hack in. The next day, then-Secretary Clinton’s deputy 

chief of staff for operations, Huma Abedin, told senior staff not to 

email sensitive information over Clinton’s server. 

Is that true? 


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Mr. LINICK. That’s what we reported, and that’s contained in the 

documents we reviewed. 

Mr. CARTER. Okay. 

On May 13, 2011, after two of Secretary Clinton’s immediate 

staff discussed Clinton’s concern that someone was hacking into 

her email after she received a suspicious link, Secretary Clinton received another email with a suspicious link from an under secretary. She replied to the email directly, asking if the under secretary had really sent that email, since she was worried about 

opening it. 

Is this best practices? Is this the way you’re supposed to—you 

know, I’m no expert on the Internet or anything, but my kids always told me, no, don’t open it. 

Mr. LINICK. Well, I can’t speak to what’s best practices in that 

community. I mean, I think I probably would—— 

Mr. CARTER. But is that the way you should respond to a suspicious email, especially after you’ve already had staff warning you 

that someone may be hacking into it and that you’re concerned 

that it’s being hacked into? 

Mr. LINICK. Well, what we reported is that, under State Department rules, you’re supposed to report when you believe you’ve been 

hacked. And that was where they fell short. They didn’t report 

those. 

Mr. CARTER. So they did not report. Even though Ms. Clinton believed that she was being attempted to be hacked into, she did not 

follow State Department rules and report it. 

Mr. LINICK. That’s correct. 

Mr. CARTER. This is Hillary Clinton we’re talking about, the Secretary of State? 

Mr. LINICK. That’s right. 

Mr. CARTER. That’s the one? Okay. I just want to make sure. 

By responding to that email, do you think that Secretary Clinton 

may have allowed an attacker to—a hacker to gain access to her 

emails? 

Mr. LINICK. I really would have no knowledge and ability to answer that question, whether she may have allowed an attacker. Obviously, it’s a risk. And that’s why it’s required to be reported, because of the risk. It’s a risk. 

Mr. CARTER. I was about to say, that’s why we have the policy 

in place. 

Mr. LINICK. It’s a risk. 

Mr. CARTER. Sure, it’s a risk. 

Mr. LINICK. Yeah. 

Mr. CARTER. And I guess that’s where we get the ‘‘extremely 

careless,’’ whatever it was. 

Anyway, Mr. Linick, at any time during your investigation, did 

you see evidence—and this is important. Please hang with me here, 

okay? At any time during your investigation, did you see evidence 

of Clinton’s staff knowing that her server, the server, was unsecure 

yet they still sent sensitive information over it? 

Mr. LINICK. I’m not able to say that. We know from the records— 

we were not able to interview a number of folks, but we know from 

email records that there was discussions about the server. Whether 


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they knew it was secure or unsecure, I don’t have any evidence 

about that. 

Mr. CARTER. No evidence about it. 

Mr. Linick, if Hillary Clinton’s private email server was as secure as she has time and again assured us that it was, saying it 

was safe and secure, then why would her staff be so concerned? 

I mean, you stated in your report, her staff showed a concern, 

don’t use—don’t open this email, don’t use this, because we think 

you’re being hacked into. Yet we have been told by her that it was 

perfectly safe and secure. Isn’t that true? 

Mr. LINICK. We weren’t able to interview her staff, so I’m not 

able to comment on what they were thinking at the time. 

Mr. CARTER. You know, I think, Mr. Linick, that it’s pretty clear 

that the Secretary actively jeopardized the network and national 

security, as well. I think any rational person would understand 

that this is what happened. 

I hope that you’ll continue to investigate this. And I hope that 

you will report back to Congress any information that you might 

get. 

Mr. Chairman, I’ll yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

We’ll now recognize the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. 

Grothman, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Yeah, I’d like to follow up a little bit more on 

these emails, okay? 

I mean, you guys were investigating the Benghazi thing. A subpoena was issued for the Benghazi documents. Could that have included documents that were emails that she sent or received on her 

private server? 

Mr. LINICK. We didn’t investigate Benghazi. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Oh, I’m sorry, I’m sorry. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Yeah, we weren’t involved in Benghazi either. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Right, right, right. But do you believe on her private email there could have been documents related to Benghazi? 

Mr. LINICK. I would be speculating. I don’t have an answer for 

that. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Is it possible? It’s her private email. 

Mr. LINICK. Again, that wasn’t part—I—— 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. Let me put it this way. 

Mr. LINICK. I don’t know. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. With regard to freedom of information, you have 

determined that there is no question that she had work emails on 

her private server, right? 

Mr. LINICK. Yes, that’s true. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. That’s incontrovertible, okay? If she had work 

emails on there, whatever they were about—might have been about 

Benghazi, might have been about the Clinton Foundation and, you 

know, whatever’s going on there that maybe wasn’t right—how 

long was she supposed to hold on to the emails, the work emails, 

after she left her office? 

Mr. LINICK. Well, as we stated in our report, the rules require 

that she surrender official records upon her departure. The same 

rules applied to Powell, as well. And so, at that time, when she left 


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the Department, those emails should’ve gone back into the agency 

recordkeeping system. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. She didn’t surrender them. But if she 

would’ve surrendered them, how long would they have held on 

though those emails, work-related emails related to the Secretary 

of State? Let’s say she did the right thing. She leaves office on 

whatever it was, January of 2013; how long would those emails be 

held by the government? 

Mr. LINICK. Well, that—I don’t know the answer to that question. That’s unclear. I mean, one of the things in our report was— 

we stated is that they didn’t do such a great job preserving emails 

at that time. And so their systems that were in place weren’t—— 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Give—— 

Mr. LINICK. So I don’t have an answer to that question, because 

it’s not clear to me how long they would’ve been preserved. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. I’ll ask you both, because I think the answer 

should be obvious. 

Maybe the departments weren’t doing the right things, but if you 

get a freedom-of-information request, say, for something that happened 2 years ago, these agencies are supposed to have it, right? 

Are you guys subject to freedom of information? 

Mr. LINICK. Oh, sure. They’re supposed to maintain—— 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Right. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Right. So if I ask you guys a freedom-of-information request on something you guys were doing 2–1/2 years ago, 

you’d be able to pull that up for me, couldn’t you? 

Mr. LINICK. Well, again, so long as the record is—— 

Mr. GROTHMAN. You should be able to—— 

Mr. LINICK. —in the agency’s possession. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. —right? Assuming somebody didn’t screw up. 

Mr. LINICK. Some records are disposed of—I mean, there are 

timeframes. But—— 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Minutiae. But most things, you would be able to 

find things that you worked on 2–1/2 years ago, right? 

Mr. LINICK. You would hope. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Otherwise, why even have a Freedom of Information Act? 

Okay. I guess what I’m getting to, not only did she not turn them 

over, as you’re saying she should have—correct?—but if she wasn’t 

going to turn them over, wouldn’t it have more prudent to hold on 

to them? 

Mr. LINICK. I’m not sure I follow you. What—— 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. If I want to know something that was 

going on in the Secretary of State’s office in 2012 and I made a 

freedom-of-information request, the first thing they would do is 

look at the records that they are holding on to, right? 

And if Mrs. Clinton did not turn over the records as she was supposed to under law, we might contact her and say, ‘‘Hey, Mrs. Clinton, we have a freedom of information request here. Do you have 

any records dealing with the year 2012?’’ Right? Isn’t that what 

you think would happen? 

Mr. LINICK. I don’t know. I mean, possibly. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Kind of frustrating here. 


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Do you think it was right for her to dispose of these records? This 

is when she was still Secretary of State. Would it have been right 

for her to erase work-related emails? 

Mr. LINICK. Well, if they count as Federal records, she’s supposed 

to make them part of an agency recordkeeping system. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Right. 

Mr. LINICK. That’s clear. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Right. 

Mr. LINICK. So, if she didn’t turn over records that are part of 

the agency recordkeeping system, then she would be violating State 

Department rules requiring her to do so. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. And if she would’ve, they would still be available, unlike being erased by her lawyers, right? 

Mr. LINICK. So I don’t—— 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Assuming somebody didn’t screw up in the State 

Department. 

Mr. LINICK. Well, I don’t know if they would’ve been maintained 

because we found systemic issues with records preservation. So 

it’s—I can’t tell you for sure—— 

Mr. GROTHMAN. They should’ve been maintained. I’ll put it that 

way. 

Mr. LINICK. Absolutely. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Absolutely. So, absolutely, if somebody makes an 

open-records request, be it about the Clinton Foundation, be it 

about Benghazi, whatever, in the year 2014, the State Department 

should’ve been able to say, here are the emails related to that, 

right? 

Mr. LINICK. Sure. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Absolutely. And they didn’t and couldn’t because 

they were erased by Secretary Clinton. 

Mr. LINICK. I don’t know if they were erased, but the bottom line 

is there were, you know, 50,000 pages—— 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Well, we heard—— 

Mr. LINICK. —of emails that were not returned to the Department. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. We heard when the FBI testified that tens of 

thousands of emails were erased. So I think we can assume—and 

some of those they were able to retrieve; we know they were workrelated. 

So I guess that’s the point, was something wrong done there. To 

erase work-related emails so, as a result, a freedom-of-information 

request cannot be fulfilled, is there something wrong with that, 

very wrong with that? 

Mr. LINICK. Well, again, in they’re agency records, they should 

be part of the agency recordkeeping system. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. In other words, work-related emails. 

Mr. LINICK. Well, they’d have to fall within the definition of an 

agency record, which is anything that documents the, you know, 

deliberations, the agency transactions, those kinds of things, not 

personal matters or not logistical matters. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Right. Work-related. 

Mr. LINICK. Work-related. Correct. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. So when the FBI testifies, as they did, like, an 

hour ago, that they found work-related emails that had been 


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erased, there was something clearly wrong there, because those 

emails should’ve been available in case somebody was making a 

freedom-of-information request. 

Mr. LINICK. They should have been surrendered to the Department when she left. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Surrendered, and they should have been available. 

Mr. LINICK. Right. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Thank you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

A couple quick more questions, and then we’re getting near the 

end here. 

Ms. Costello, electronic records fall under—electronic records fall 

under the jurisdiction of the Federal Records Act, correct? 

Ms. COSTELLO. Yes, they do. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Mr. Linick, do you believe—I’m going to 

ask you both questions, so go ahead and stay. 

Does this include—so electronic records fall under the jurisdiction of the Federal Records Act, right, Mr. Linick? 

Mr. LINICK. So long as they contain work-related materials, yes. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Does this include video? 

Mr. LINICK. Well, if you’re—if you’re asking about the videotape, 

the separate issue, I mean, that’s something we’re looking at, and 

we’re really not able to comment on it at this time. I mean, that’s 

an ongoing matter, whether videos are records. But we’re looking 

at that issue. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Let’s get—is this relating to the 8 minutes—— 

Mr. LINICK. Right. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. —of deleted videos? 

Mr. LINICK. Right. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So the inspector general is doing an investigation. 

Mr. LINICK. Well, we’re looking—where we’ve done it—we’ve 

started a preliminary review, and we’re looking into that matter at 

this point. We have not opened a full-blown investigation, but we 

are looking to see, sort of, what the issues are, and we have interviewed some people. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Well, we also have jurisdiction, and we 

would like to know. So my question is, if the electronic record is 

video, is it treated differently than if it’s text? 

Mr. LINICK. I’m not able to answer that question. I mean, that’s 

beyond the scope—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Why not? 

Mr. LINICK. Because I just—I don’t have an answer for you. 

Again, we’re sort of in the middle of looking at those issues. It’s not 

part of the report that we issued. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Right. 

Mr. LINICK. And I can only talk about what my work supports. 

But I wouldn’t want to venture a guess if—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So if the personnel are paid by the Federal 

Government, the hardware is paid by the Federal Government, the 

software is paid for by the Federal Government, if somebody were 


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to tamper with that information, is that a violation of the Federal 

Records Act? 

Mr. LINICK. I mean, a Federal record can be contained on any 

medium. So, potentially, it could be a record, potentially. In the 

case you’re talking about, there’s a transcript and a video, and it’s 

unclear which is the Federal record, so that’s why I’m hesitating 

here. But a Federal record can be on any—it could be on a napkin. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Could they both be? 

Mr. LINICK. Again, I’m not—I’m not sure, and I don’t want to 

guess—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. When will you give us that answer? 

Mr. LINICK. Well, we’re working on it. So we’ll—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. No, but I want to know what’s reasonable 

to know when you’re going to get back to us on an answer on that. 

Mr. LINICK. You know, I will talk with my staff who’s doing that 

work and get back to you and let you know sort of where we are. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. You’ll get back to me when? 

Mr. LINICK. I’m happy to get back to you as soon as I get back 

to the office and let you know you know sort of what’s going on. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. By the end of the week? Is that fair? 

Mr. LINICK. Sure. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. That’s tomorrow. 

Mr. LINICK. Sure. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. That would be most helpful. 

And I do think—it’s a very—it’s affecting the Federal record, and 

I think you need to look very closely at that. It’s something we’re 

looking at, and we need your input and your professionalism in 

saying—to me, it’s pretty clear. These are all records, whether 

they’re video, transcript. There may be photos. Certainly, if you are 

involved in law enforcement, the more of that you have, the better 

the situation. 

And we do this differently than most countries. We do preserve 

records, and we do allow the public to access this information because they paid for it. It’s their government. That’s what the Freedom of Information Act is all about. And when things are there and 

then deleted on purpose, then there’s a cloud of mystery that needs 

to be rectified. And I look forward to hearing back from you. 

The emails, the classified Hillary Clinton emails, can you provide 

us those classified emails? 

Mr. LINICK. Well, we didn’t look at the classified emails. So that 

wasn’t part of our review. I mean, maybe Mr. McCullough can answer that question. I’m—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Mr. McCullough? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Certainly, I can provide you what—and I believe we have provided Congress with everything that we had. We 

can certainly—it’s over in Senate security. We provided it to SSCI, 

I believe, and HPSCI also. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Can you provide this committee in a secure 

format the classified emails? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. I can to a certain extent. I cannot provide a 

certain segment of—because the agency that owns the information 

for these emails has limited the distribution on those. So they’re 

characterizing them as ORCON. So we have—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Explain what ‘‘ORCON’’ is. 


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Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Originator control. So I can’t—I can’t give 

them to even Congress without getting the agency’s permission to 

provide them. So they have been provided—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Which agency? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. I can’t say that here in an open hearing, sir. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So you can’t even tell me which agency 

won’t allow us, as Members of Congress, to see something that Hillary Clinton allowed somebody without a security clearance in a 

nonprotected format to see? That’s correct? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. This is the segment of emails—this is why my 

letter back to Ranking Member Cummings had to be classified, because people would like to see this segment of emails. And this has 

been an issue not just with you and your committee but with several Members at this point. 

So we have gone back to the agency that is involved several 

times, and I can—we can certainly do that again and ask permission. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Can you generally tell me, is it because 

they are so sensitive about signals intelligence? Human intelligence? What—— 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. We shouldn’t get into the content of these 

emails in an open hearing. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Okay. I don’t want to violate that, but the 

concern is it has already been violated, and it was violated by Hillary Clinton. And it was her choice. She set it up, and she created 

this problem, and she created this mess. We shouldn’t have to go 

through this, but she did that. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. This is the—this is the segment of emails 

that I had to have people in my office read in to particular programs to even see these emails. We didn’t possess the required 

clearances and compartments. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So even the inspector general for ODNI 

didn’t have the requisite security clearance. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. That’s right. That’s correct. They’d have to 

get read-ins for them. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Wow, wow, wow, wow. Unbelievable. What 

a mess. 

I’ll yield back. The gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Cummings. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. A while back, and it has been a good while, when 

we had the stimulus program, back in 2009, I guess, Mr. Devaney, 

who was, I think, in charge of it, he said something I’ll never forget. He said—you know, we were talking about how do you control 

the money and make sure that nobody does anything wrong. He 

said: I’d rather do things upfront so that people never commit an 

offense than to have them commit an offense and then they’re in 

trouble. 

And I’m trying to figure out—I’ve got to tell you, this whole thing 

of classification really bothers me, and it bothers me because I 

think it’s so unfair. I think, I mean, somebody is going to classify 

something later on, you all just—I mean, your offices—I mean, 

well, Intelligence and State disagree. 

As a matter of fact, I was looking at something where there was 

a disagreement between State and the Intelligence a while back, 


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and Senator Corker had sent a letter, wrote a letter to the State 

Department about one of these disputes last year. 

And the State Department responded in September, and I quote: 

‘‘Your letter focused on an email chain that someone within the intelligence community claims should have been redacted as secret. 

Our experience is that this process may in some instances result 

in the IC wrongly assuming that information in the emails originated with the IC, when it may instead have been based upon 

other sources, given the wide range of context maintained by State 

Department officials,’’ end of quote. 

So, you know, I just—I’m wondering what your offices can do, if 

anything, it may be out of your jurisdiction, but going back to what 

Mr. Devaney said back then, is how do we make sure that people 

are not stepping into violations that they don’t even know. I mean, 

am I missing something? 

I mean, and this is serious stuff, man. You’ve got the FBI Director, the Department of Justice, and people can’t even agree. I’m not 

saying you should agree. But when you tell me—and I’m going to 

harp on this because I saw it in the Benghazi Committee. You 

know, you say I’m going to—you committed a crime or you did 

something wrong when something was upgraded later. What’s that 

about? Can you all help me? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. There are a couple of issues in there, Mr. 

Cummings. The first, in terms of the ‘‘upgraded later,’’ again, the 

emails we were concerned about were not those that were upgraded. I believe that’s—it’s not just—it’s not unique to the State 

Department, but that seems to be a fairly common—when the 

State Department is processing a FOIA, they upgrade things before 

they’re released. 

And so that’s one subset, one bucket of emails, and that’s separate from the emails we’re talking about, it’s separate from the 

emails, I believe, Director Comey is talking about when he says 

there were 110. I believe that those were classified when they were 

created and sent and received. So those weren’t about being upgraded. 

I think—I’ve heard the term used ‘‘retroactive classification.’’ 

Whatever you want to call it, that is being done with some emails. 

But the emails that were the concern, I believe, in this case, were 

the emails that were classified when they were born essentially, 

when they were created. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. But they aren’t marked, right? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Other than those that you discussed with Director Comey earlier. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Three, three, three, three. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Right. I know of none that were marked that 

we looked at. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. See, that’s—that’s what—that’s part of what I’m 

talking about. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Right. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. They’ve got it all out in the press, oh, Hillary 

Clinton lied because she—and then we come to find out there were 

three that had markings of a ‘‘C,’’ and it was the wrong marking. 

So basically, 3 out of 30,000-plus. You see how—— 


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Mr. MCCULLOUGH. But to your question about what can we do 

about over classification, of course, in the intelligence world transparency and classification and secrecy tend to be competing equities. There are civil liberties, protections, offices, and privacy officers. 

We have done as IGs over the past several years reports under 

the Reducing Over-Classification Act. Each IG would have done one 

of those for their department or agency. And the IGs now, I think, 

if they haven’t finished yet, will be in the process of doing a statutory follow-up—this was mandated from Congress—on reducing 

over-classification. So each IG is doing a review of its department 

or agency having to do with overclassification. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, I want to—I want to—I hope that the IG 

bill helps you all, I hope that helps, because we worked very hard 

on that bill, because we want you all to be effective and efficient. 

And, again, I want to thank you and your staffs for your service. 

We really appreciate all that you all do. 

Thank you very much, and thank you for being here. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Thank you. 

Mr. LINICK. Thank you. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And I’m going to follow up on my 13 questions. 

All right? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir. We’ll be there to brief you in person. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I’m looking forward to it. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you. 

I too want to thank you for your service and your willingness to 

help the committee. 

Just in closing, after all this, you know, the long investigation of 

Secretary Clinton, are we approaching—I mean, technology now 

has allowed us to have full-spectrum surveillance of people in government, so that every word, every thought, every conversation, it’s 

gone beyond just capturing official records. 

But, you know, it’s actually—I think we’re at a point where it 

has a chilling effect, where you can’t even have normal discourse 

anymore. You’ve got to leave your office and have a conversation 

in the hallway, and you’ve got to make sure that other person 

leaves their cell phone aside. 

I just think it’s driving a lot of conversations underground. And, 

you know, I realize we’re on the Oversight Committee and we want 

to make sure that we have a certain level of transparency, but I 

also think that, you know, I think a lot of people in government 

will think twice. 

First of all, people will think twice about serving in government, 

and then people in government will take great pains to make sure 

that their thoughts, the open discourse, are not ever recorded because you’re going to have a committee like this subpoenaing you 

and getting every single phone call you ever made and every email 

you ever made. 

It’s not good. It’s not—this is not a good result. And, you know, 

I know inquiring minds want to know, but it just makes it very difficult for a government to function and it makes—and it has an imVerDate Sep 11 2014 14:35 Oct 12, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00123 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\21323.TXT APRIL

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plication for the public too, because, you know, people call up— 

we’ve exempted ourselves, by the way, Congress, for good reason. 

But, you know, the public has to interact with us. And so those 

phone calls, those emails back and forth, people petitioning their 

government, that’s all subject to surveillance as well. You know, I 

just think we’ve reached the tipping point here, and I’m just curious if you think about that at all. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir. One aspect and one area where we 

think about that has to do so with whistleblower communications. 

So as IGs, we deal with the public a lot also. Many of them are 

current or former government employees or contractors, and so we 

have, over the past couple of years, had to balance that out too, the 

need for security, the need for counterintelligence, which is sacrosanct. We have to protect secrets. 

On the other hand, we have to have people feel comfortable as 

whistleblowers to come to an IG and make a complaint about a 

law, rule, or regulation. 

So I share your concern there, and that is something—I chair the 

Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum. It’s all 17 intel 

agencies. And it’s something that our forum has had a lot of discussion about, frankly. 

But we feel as though we’ve at this point struck a manageable, 

livable balance with the agencies and management so that people 

can feel comfortable coming to an IG and complaining to us without fear of their communications being used against them. And if 

they are, then we have reprisal statutes. 

Mr. LYNCH. Yeah. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. And as Mr. Cummings said, this act is going 

to help strengthen us also, and so we investigate reprisal when 

that does happen. 

Mr. LYNCH. No, I mean, you see it in the pushback. State Department has a, you know, a culture where, you know, all these 

people—going back to Condoleezza Rice and Secretary Powell, Secretary Clinton—people using private communication devices, that’s 

all to get out from underneath this, you know, constant surveillance. 

So I don’t know. At some point we’ve got to just try to strike that 

right balance. Sometimes it’s difficult. 

I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

I want to thank our witnesses here today. I want to thank the 

inspector general community in general. You’ve got a lot of good 

men and women who poured their heart and soul in a lot of their 

work, you know. My biggest fear is that we don’t read it, digest it, 

and then act on it. But we’re committed to doing that as much as 

possible. 

Your looking under the hood, your recommendations, your findings, they’re pivotal for us to do our jobs here in Congress, and I 

just want to thank those men and women. I hope you carry that 

message back to each of your organizations. 

I also want to personally thank the three of you for spinning on 

a dime and being here so swiftly. We did do this around the FBI 

Director’s availability. When I spoke with him on the phone on 

Tuesday, I asked him which day would be most convenient and he 


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said Thursday. So that’s why we ended up on Thursday, and we 

all spun around that and you did as well. And so I thank you for 

the swift manner in which you made yourselves available and the 

interaction you have had with the committee. 

I do want to make sure we follow up on Mr. Cummings’ questions and requests. And I do, Mr. Linick, really, and Ms. Costello, 

want to make sure that we get that information about electronic 

records as it relates to videos and those types of things. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Again, I thank you for being here. It has 

been a good, long day, but fruitful and important work. The committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:04 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 


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AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 54 here 21323.054
176 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 55 here 21323.055
177 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 56 here 21323.056
178 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 57 here 21323.057
179 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 58 here 21323.058
180 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 59 here 21323.059
181 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 60 here 21323.060
182 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 61 here 21323.061
183 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 62 here 21323.062
184 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 63 here 21323.063
185 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 64 here 21323.064
186 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 65 here 21323.065
187 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 66 here 21323.066
188 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 67 here 21323.067
189 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 68 here 21323.068
190 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 69 here 21323.069
191 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 70 here 21323.070
192 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 71 here 21323.071
193 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 72 here 21323.072
194 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 73 here 21323.073
195 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 74 here 21323.074
196 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 75 here 21323.075
197 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 76 here 21323.076
198 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 77 here 21323.077
199 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 78 here 21323.078
200 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 79 here 21323.079
201 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 80 here 21323.080
202 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 81 here 21323.081
203 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 82 here 21323.082
204 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 83 here 21323.083
205 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 84 here 21323.084
206 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 85 here 21323.085
207 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 86 here 21323.086
208 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 87 here 21323.087
209 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 88 here 21323.088
210 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 89 here 21323.089
211 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 90 here 21323.090
212 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 91 here 21323.091
213 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 92 here 21323.092
214 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 93 here 21323.093
215 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 94 here 21323.094
216 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 95 here 21323.095
217 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 96 here 21323.096
218 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 97 here 21323.097
219 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 98 here 21323.098
220 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 99 here 21323.099
221 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 100 here 21323.100
222 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 101 here 21323.101
223 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 102 here 21323.102
224 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 103 here 21323.103
225 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 104 here 21323.104
226 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 105 here 21323.105
227 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 106 here 21323.106
228 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 107 here 21323.107
229 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 108 here 21323.108
230 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 109 here 21323.109
231 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 110 here 21323.110
232 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 111 here 21323.111
233 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 112 here 21323.112
234 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 113 here 21323.113
235 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 114 here 21323.114
236 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 115 here 21323.115
237 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 116 here 21323.116
238 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 117 here 21323.117
239 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 118 here 21323.118
240 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 119 here 21323.119
241 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 120 here 21323.120
242 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 121 here 21323.121
243 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 122 here 21323.122
244 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 123 here 21323.123
245 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 124 here 21323.124
246 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 125 here 21323.125
247 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 126 here 21323.126
248 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 127 here 21323.127
249 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 128 here 21323.128
250 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 129 here 21323.129
251 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 130 here 21323.130
252 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 131 here 21323.131
253 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 132 here 21323.132
254 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 133 here 21323.133
255 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 134 here 21323.134
256 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 135 here 21323.135
257 

Æ 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 136 here 21323.136