10 -01 23 -ag

Publi c Ut ili tie

s M ainte nance

, I nc. v . Se cret

ary of Labor UNI TED S TATES CO URT O F AP PEALS F O R T H E S E C O N D C IR C U IT S UM M ARY OR DER R U L I N G S B Y S U M M A R Y OR D E R D O N OT HA V E P R E C E D E N T I A L E F FE CT . C I T A T I ON T O A S UM M ARY ORDE R F I L E D ON OR AF T E R J ANUARY 1 , 2 0 0 7 , I S P E RM I T T E D AND I S GOVE RNE D BY FED ERA L R U LE O F A PPELLA TE P R O C EDU R E 32. 1 A N D TH I S C O U R T’ S LO C A L RU LE 32 . 1. 1. W H EN C I TI N G A S U M M A R Y O R D ER I N A D O C U M E N T FI LED W I TH TH I S C O U R T, A PA R TY M U ST C I TE E I T HE R T HE FE D E R A L A P P E N D I X OR A N E L E C T R ON I C D A T A B A S E ( W I T H T HE N OT A T I ON “ S UM M ARY ORDE R” ) . A PA RT Y CI T I NG A S UM M ARY ORDER M US T S E RVE A COPY OF I T ON ANY PA R TY N O T REPR ESENTED BY CO U N SEL. 1 At a stated te rm of the United States Court of A ppeals for the Second C i rc u i t , held at the 2 Daniel Patric k Moy nihan United States C ourthouse, 500 P ear l Street, in the City of Ne w York, on 3 the 29 day

of Mar ch, two thousand e leven. th 4 5 PRES ENT: J OHN M. WAL KER, J R., 6 B ARRI NG TO N D . PA RK ER, 7 DEB RA ANN L I VI NGSTON

, 8 Circuit Judges . 9 10 11 PUBL I C UTI L I TI ES MAI NTENAN CE, I

NC., 12 Petitioner , 13 14 -v.- No. 10-0123-a g 15 16 SEC RET AR

Y O F L AB OR , 17 Respondent . 18 19 20 J OYCE J . SUN, Geor g oulis & Associates, PL L C, New Yor k, NY, for 21 Petitioner . 22 23 RONAL D J . GOTTL I EB, A ttorney , U.S. Depar tment of L abor, 24 Was hin g ton , D C ( M. Patr ic ia S mi th , S oli c ito r o f L a

bo r, Jose phM. 25 Woodward, Associate Solicitor for Occupational S afe ty and He alth, 26 Heather R. Philli ps, Counsel for Appe llate L itigation, on the brief ), 27 for Respondent . 28 292

1 UP ON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREB Y ORDE RED, ADJUD GED, A ND 2 DECREED that th e pe tit ion fo r r e vie w i s DE NI ED . 3 Petitioner Publi c Utilities Maintenance , Inc. (“PUMI ”) petitions this Court for re view of a 4 November

17, 2009, Dec ision a

nd Orde r of Administrative L aw Judge Covette Rooney (“the AL J ”) 5 of the Oc cupational Saf ety and He alth Revie w

Co mmissi on (“O SHRC”), which bec ame a final orde r 6 of OSH RC o n D e c e mbe r 3 1, 20 09 , w he n O SHR C dec lin e d to dir e c t it fo r r e vie w. Th e or de r u

ph e ld 7 a c itatio n is su e d b y

the Se c re tary of L a

bo r (“ the Se c re tary” ) to Pe tit ion e r fo r v iol a tio n o f 2 9 C. F .R. 8 § 1910.269( l)( 2) . On a pp e a l, Pe tit ion e r c la ims bo th that th e re le va nt r e g ulatio n d oe s n ot a

pp ly to i t 9 and that ce rtain finding s of the AL J wer e not supported by substantial evidence . W e as s u me the 10 pa

rt ie s’ fa mil iari ty wi th t he un de rl yingfa c ts, pr oc e dura l hi sto ry of the c a se , a

nd iss ue s o n a

pp e a l. 11 This Court “must affirm the Commission’s findings of f act if t h ey ar e ‘supported by 12 substantial evidence on the re cord c onsidered a s a whole.’ ” D.A. Collins Const. Co . v. Sec ’y of 13 Labor , 1 17 F .3 d 6 91 , 6 94 (2 d Ci r. 19 97 ) ( qu oti ng29 U. S.C. § 6 60 (a )) . “ [S]ubs tanti a l e vid e nc e is 14 more than a

mere scintilla. I t me ans such rele vant evidenc e as a r easona ble mind might ac cept a s 15 adequate to support a conc lusion.” Un i ve r s a l Ca mera Corp. v. NLRB , 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) 16 (q u o t i n g Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB , 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Mor eover , “[t] he Secr etar y ’s 17 int e rp re tatio ns of he r re g ulatio ns are . . . e nti tle d to ‘c on tr oll ing ’ de fe re nc e un less tho se 18 interpre tations are ‘ plainly err oneous or inconsistent with the re g ulation.’” In re Novartis W age and 19 Hour Liti

g. , 6 1 1 F. 3 d

1 4 1 , 1 5 3 (2 d

C i r. 2 0 1 0 ) ( qu o t i n g Auer v. R obbins , 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)). 20 I n particula

r, wh en “embodied in a citation,” the Sec reta

ry ’s interpre tation of her r egulations 21 “assumes a

form expressly

provided for

by Congr ess” a

nd there fore “is as m u ch an exercise of3

1 de le g a te d lawmakin g po we rs a s is the Se c re tary ’s pr omu lg a tio n o f a wo rk pla c e he a lthand

sa fe ty 2 standard.” Martin v. OSHRC , 499 U.S. 144, 157 (1991). The Secre tary ’s “les s fo rm al m eans of 3 interp re t i n g regulations prior to issui ng a citation,” like a g ency enfor ceme nt guide lines, are “not 4 entitled to the s ame defer ence ” as citations but “ar e st ill entitled to some weig ht on judicial review .” 5 Id. 6 Petitioner’s first c o nte nti o n is that its activities are not c overe d by 29 C.F.R. § 1910.269( l)(2) , 7 the re g ulatio n at is su e in t hi s case . T he re g ulatio n, wh ic h “ a pp lie s to wo rk

on e xpos e d li ve pa

rt s, 8 or nea

r enoug h to them, to ex pose t h e em p l oy ee to a ny hazard they

prese nt,” 29 C.F.R. § 9 1910.269( l), provides that “[t] he employ er s h all ensure that no employ ee a pproac hes or take s any 10 conductive obje ct closer to expos ed ene rg ized parts than” the “ minimum approach distance ” 11 (“MAD ”) — which is three f eet f o r wi res at the voltag e involved in this case — of the ene rg ized 12 part unless either the employ ee or the ener g ized part is properly insulated. See id. § 1910.269( l)(2) . 13 The re g ulation states, howeve r, t hat i t does not apply to “construc tion work, as def ined in § 1910.12 14 of this Part.” Id. § 1910.269(a) (1)( ii). Petiti oner c ontends that i t s wo rk painting elec trical 15 transmission towers fa l l s wi t h i n the re g ulatory definition of “c onstruction work” as “w ork for 16 construction, alter ation, and/or re pair, includingpainting a nd decor ating ,” id. § 1910.12. 17 The interpr etation of the r egulation advanc ed by the Secr etar

y of L abor in the c itation at issue 18 here is not plainly err oneous or inconsistent with § 1910.269( l)( 2) . Ind e e d, it is consis te nt w ith 19 OS HR C ’s l ong standing interpre tation of the re g ulatory definition of construc tion work as limited 20 to “ac tual construction wor k or to related act i v i t i es t h at are an integral a nd nece ssary

part of 21 construction wor

k. Activities that could be re g arde d as construction work should not be so re g arde d4

1 when they

are perf ormed solely

as par t of a nonc onstruction operation.” B. J. Hughes , 10 O.S.H. 2 Cas. (B NA) 1545, 1547 (OSHRC 1982). Thus, while painting perf ormed a s a par

t of a c onstruction 3 projec t would be consider ed construc tion, painting per formed as maintenanc e, as the AL J found wa s 4 true of the work pe rfo rm ed by Petitioner in this case, would not be. See G ulf States Util ities Co. , 5 12 O.S.H. Cas. (B NA) 1544, 1546- 47 (OSHRC 1985) (holding that the definition of construc tion 6 work for

this statutory

subpart does not include m ai n tenanc e wor k). While Petit ioner a sserts that 7 the lack of

an explicit re fer ence to pa inters in the regulatory history of this standa rd is indicative of 8 an under standing they would not be cove red by it, extending covera g e of this provision to employ ees 9 tasked with painting ener g ized elec trical powe r transmission fac iliti es is entirely consistent with the 10 conce rn expressed in the regulatory history that “[e]mpl oy ees pe rfor ming ope ration or maintena nce 11 w o r

k o ne l e c t r i c p o w e r

g e n e r a t i o n , t r an s m i s s i o n , o r d i s tr i b u t i o ni n s t a l l a t i o n s ar e n o ta d e qu a te ly 12 pr ote c te d b y

c ur re nt O SHAsta

nd ard s. ” Oc c up a tio na l Sa fe ty and He a lt h Adm inistr a tio n: E le c tr ic 13 Power Generation, Transmission, and Dist ribution; Electrica l Protective Equipment: Final Rule, 59 14 Fe d. Reg . 4320, 4320 (Jan. 31, 1994). 15 Petitioner also claims that an OS HA d irec tive, issued in 2003 to assist OS HA complianc e 16 pe rs onne l pe rf

or min g ins pe c tio ns a t po we r g e ne ratio n, tr ans mis sio n, and dis tr ibutio n f

a c ili tie s, 17 indicated that painting constituting “a complete r epaintingjob . . . on a major portion of a structure ” 18 s h o u ld b e c o n s id e r e d c o n s tr u c ti o n work. SeeOSHA Instruction, CPL2-1.38 (June 18, 2003). 19 Although the Secre tary corr ectly notes that the same section of the direc tive expressly makes c lear 20 that “maintena

nce pa inting” is c overe d by § 1910.269( l) ( 2 ) , t h e d i r e c t i v e d o e s c l e a r l y c l a s s i f y a 21 “complete repa inting job” a s construction. Howeve r, the interpre tation e mbodied in the Secre tary ’sPetitioner claims in its reply brief that the fac t that it also painted aer ial numbers on the 1 tow e rs sh ou ld m ake its wo rk the “ a lte ratio n” or

“ imp ro ve me nt” of

the tow e rs , s o a s to c on sti tut e construction wor

k. Howeve r, they

did not raise this issue in their openingbrief, see Connec ticut Bar Ass’n v. United States , 6 20 F .3 d 8 1, 91 n. 13 (2 d Ci r. 20 10 ) ( “ I ssu e s r a ise d f or the fi rs t ti me in a re ply brief a re g ener ally

deeme d waived.” ), nor did they do so in their Petition for Discre tionary

Review to OSHRC, see D .A. Collins Const. Co. , 117 F.3d at 694 (“[N]o obj ection that has not bee n urg ed bef ore the Commi ssion shall be considere d by the cour t, unless the failure or neg lect to urg e such obje ction shall be excused bec ause of extraordinary circ umstances.” ). As a r esult, we will not addre ss this arg ument here . 5 1 citation in this case is entitled to g reater de fer ence than the informa l interpretati o n offe red in the 2 direc tive. Se e Ma rti n , 499 U.S. at 157. Moreove r, the di re ct i ve, althoug h it supports P UMI ’s 3 position here, is itself inconsistent with ot h er agenc y authority more dire ctly

applicable to the 4 questi o n b e f

o r e u s . T h u s , a p u

b li c ly av a il a

b le o p in io n le tt e r f

r o m O SH A ’ s D ir e c to r a te of 5 Construction, issued on May 11, 1999, expressly addre sses the questi on whether painting a power 6 pole is maintenanc e or c onstruction, stating that such work is ma intenance , even if perf ormed at ten 7 to twenty

y ear intervals, as in this case . See L e tte r fr om Rus se ll B . Swa ns on , Di re c tor , D ir e c tor a te 8 of Con str uc tio n, to J. N ig e l E lli s ( May 11 , 1 99 9) . Ind e e d, des pi te th e posit ion it t ake s in

thi s 9 proce eding , PUMI ’s own safe ty g uidelines requir ed its employ ees to c omply with § 1910.269( l)(2) . 10 Under

these c ircumstance s, we c annot say that the S ecr etar y ’s i nterpre tation of her own regulation 11 is plainly

err oneous or inconsistent with the re g ulation. 1 12 Petitioner nex t as s erts that the AL J ’s conc lusion that ithad construc tive knowledg e of the 13 vio lativ e c on dit ion , a n e le me nt o f t

he Se c re tary ’s pr im a fa c ie case of a violation, see N.Y . State Elec. 14 & G a s Co r

p . v . S e c ’ yof Labor , 8 8 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 1996), was not supported by substantial 15 evidenc e. An e mploy er’ s knowledge o r constructive knowledg e of a violative condition can be 16 “ satis fi e d b y

pr oof eit her th at th e e mpl oy e r a c tua lly kn e w, or ‘w iththe e xer c ise of

re a so na ble6

1 diligenc e, could ha ve known of t he presence of t he viol ative condition.’” Id. (q u o t i n g Pr ideOi l W e ll 2 Serv. , 1 5 O.S. H. Ca s. (B NA ) 180 9, 18 14 (O .S. H. R.C . 1 99 2) ). In f ind ingthat Pe tit ion e r c ou ld, wi th 3 the exercise of

rea sonable dilig ence , have known of the violative c ondition, the AL J relied o n the 4 following fac ts: (1) that althoug h Petitioner was aw are that the tower on which the a ccide nt occur red 5 posed a spe cial dang er due to the close proximit y of ene rg ized parts to the tower frame to be painted, 6 the company ’s supervisors did not themselves me asure the distance s betwee n the fra me and the 7 ener g ized parts to de termine how close to the ener g ized lines its employ ees w ould be working , (2) 8 th a t t

h e c o mp an y

in s te a d g av e th e w o r

k e r s o nth e d ay

o f th e a c c id e n t o n ly

a g e n e r a l i n s tr

u c ti on 9 reg ardingthe MAD re quirement and relied on them to de termine if the tower was safe to paint, and 10 (3) that despite the fac t that Petiti oner’ s own safe ty plan ca lled for a

safe ty observe r to monitor eac h 11 tow e r b e ing pa int e d, on the da y of the a c c ide nt a

sin g le fo re man w a s r e sp on sib le fo r m on ito ri ngbo th 12 tow e rs . 13 Petitioner does not seriously challeng e any of t he factual findings on which the conclusion 14 that it failed to exercise r easona ble di lige nce was based. I t asserts first that the g overnme nt failed 15 to demonstrate befor e the AL J that the ac cident victim, Carlos Mejia, ca me too near

to the ener g ized 16 wi re s, arguin g tha t th is a lle g e d f

a ilure wa s a lso re le va

nt t o w he the r t

he Se cretar

y ha d s ho wn

its 17 knowledg e of the violative condition. Howeve r, it admitted that Mejia suffe red a n elec trical shock 18 while painting the tower , and there was testimony that the elec tricity

at the voltag e of the wires at 19 issue here could jump at most one to two inches — far less than the minimum approa ch distance of 20 three fee t. I t was also the i nitial conclusion of both Mejia’s project manag er a nd his forema

n that 21 Me

jia ha d c on ta c te d o r c ame wi thi n th e MA D o f t he wi re on

the da y of the a c c ide nt. This evidenceThe Sec reta ry does cor rec tly note, howeve r, that while Petitioner sug g ests that de- 2 e ne rg izin g the tow e r b e fo re pa int ingit h e re wo uld have be e n in fe a sib le , it s o wn sit e -s pe c if

ic sa fe ty pla n p ro vid e s th a t be fo re a

tow e r i s p a int e d a

fo re man a

nd c re w w ill “ c on du c t a documented a ssessment to determine if pa inting ca n be ac complished without encroa chingon the MAD. When structure s pose a c oncer n, they will be noted, and pa inted at such time as the line can be taken out of se rvice .” 7 1 is c le arl y

su ff ic ie nt f or a re a so na ble pe rs on

to a c c e pt a s a de qu a te to su pp or t the c on c lus ion

that Me jia 2 c ame wi thi n thre e fe e t of the e ne rg ize d to we r p art . 3 Petitioner also asser ts more broa dly

that t h e ALJ ’s conclusion that it had construc tive 4 knowledg e improper ly seeks to fa

ult it either for having its employ ees paint any part of a n ener g ized 5 elec trical tra

nsmissi on tower when one pa rt of the towe r is too near to an energ ized line or for not 6 havingtaken “safe ty measure s beyond those that are rea sonable a nd fea sible,” N.Y

. State Elec. &Gas 7 Corp. , 88 F.3d at 103. Here , howeve r, neither the AL J nor the Sec reta ry before us cla ims that 8 Petit io n e r

s h o u ld h av e p r o h ib it e d

it s e mp lo y e e s f

r o m p a inti n g th e to w e r

a lt o g e th e r . Rath e r , the y

2 9 argue that in fa ct it could have taken other rea sonable a nd fea sible measure s that would have a lerted 10 it to the violative condition at issue. 11 As the AL J noted in this case , OSHRC has previously indicated that “ rea sonable dilig ence ” 12 for the pur

poses of c o n s tr uctive knowledg e involves, amongother fa ctors, an e mploy er’ s “oblig ation 13 to inspect the work a rea , to anticipate ha zards to which employ ees ma y be exposed, an d t o take 14 measure s to preve nt the occurre nce.” North L anding Const. Co. , 19 O.S.H. Cas. (B NA) 1465, 1472 15 (O . S . H. R . C . 2 0 0 1 ) ( qu o t i n g Frank Swidzinski Co. , 9 O. S.H . Ca s. (B NA ) 1 23 0, 12 33 (O .S. H. R.C . 16 19 81 )) . H e re , th e tow e r o n w hic h the inj ur y oc c ur re d pos e d a spe c ia l dan g e r, g ive n th e pa rt ic ula rl y 17 close proximit y

of ene rg ized parts to the t ower frame beingpainted. De spite Petiti oner’ s contention,8

1 there was substantial evide nce f or the AL J ’s finding that, in spite of this spec ial dang er, the fore man 2 on the da y of the a c c ide nt g ave on ly a g e ne ra l in str

uc tio n to the wo rk e rs to b e c are fu l and to a vo id 3 g etting too ne ar the wires, without spec ifi cally mentioning the thr ee- foot minimum approa ch 4 distance r equire ment. Whil e the f orema n testified that he mentioned the specific three -foot distance 5 on the da

y of the a c c ide nt, the AL J c or re c tly no te d that the tw o o the r p a int e rs wh o te sti fi e d s imp ly 6 indicated that MAD had been disc ussed. Moreove r, eve n if Petitioner’s fore man had mentioned the 7 three -foot re quirement spec ifically , the employ ees w ere still in the position o f as s essi ng for 8 the mse lve s w hat pa rt s o f t he tow e rs we re too c los e to the e ne rg ize d p art s to be pa int e d s a fe ly , w ith 9 no me a suri ngde vic e s to a id i n th e ir a sse ssm e nt. As the Se c re tary no te s, PUM I ’s sa fe ty

pla n it se lf 10 called f

or its forema

n and painting cre w to a ssess and document whether a tower could be pa inted 11 without encroa ching on the MAD. Her e, no such asse ssment was per formed, e ven thoug h one bea m 12 of the tow e r c ame so c los e to a n e ne rg ize d lo op on

the tow e r that it sim

ply c ou ld not

be pa int e d in 13 its entirety without violating the MAD re quirement a nd another

came within fifty -eig ht inches of the 14 same loop. 15 F ina lly , w e have no te d in the pa st that, “ [d]e pe nd ingupon the c ir c ums tanc e s, c los e 16 supervision may

or may not be re asonably

nece ssary

to attain compliance with sa fety rules.” N . Y. 17 State Elec. &Gas Corp. , 88 F.3d at 109. Here , g iven the cle ar da ng ers of the work in which 18 Petitioner was eng ag ed — with a painting protocol that would put its employ ees ne ar or within the 19 MAD in the cour se of pa inting the towe r at issue — Petitioner’s safe t y p l an i t s el f ca lled for a n 20 observe r for eac h tower on which a cre w was working . At the t ime this acc ident occur red, how ever , 21 not only

was ther e a sing le observe r for cre ws working on two towers, the de signated observe r wa sAs we ha ve noted, the de fense involves an inquiry into the adequa cy

of an e mploy er’ s 3 sa fe ty po lic y that ov e rl a

ps to s ome de g re e wi th t

he c on str uc tiv e kn ow le dg e inq

uir y pe rf or me d in a sse ssi ngthe Se c re tary ’s pr im a fa c ie case of a violation. See N.Y . State Elec. &Gas Corp. , 88 F.3d at 106. 9 1 himself tidy ing up his truc k instead of obse rving either te am. Under these c ircumstance s, the AL J ’s 2 finding that the Secr etar y of L abor ha d established Petitioner’s c onstructive knowledg e of the 3 violation of OSHA’s re g ulatory standard is supporte d by

substantial evidence . 4 PUMI ’s final c ontention is that even if it is found t o have had constructive knowledg e of the 5 br e a c h o f O SHA ’s MA D stand ard s, it sho uld have be e n fou nd to h ave e sta

bli sh e d it s e nti tle me nt t o 6 the a ff

ir mativ e de fe ns e of

un pr e ve nta ble e mpl oy e e mis c on duct. Th is de fe ns e ha s f our e le me nts . 7 “[A]n employ er must prove that (1) it e stablished work rules to pr event the violation; (2) these rule s 8 we re a de qu a te ly

c omm un ic a te d to the e mpl oy e e s; ( 3) it t oo k s te ps to dis c ov e r vio latio ns ; and (4 ) i t 9 eff ectively enfor ced the rules whe n infrac tions were disc overe d.” D.A. Collins Const. Co. , 117 F.3d 10 at 695 (footnote omitted). The employ er bear s the burde n of makingout this defense. See id. The 11 AL J fo u nd that while Petitioner had wor k rules desig ned to pre vent its painters fr om encr oaching 12 u p o nt h e M A D , i tf

a i l e d t o i mp l e m e n tth e s e r

u l e s e f f e c t i v e l y. 3 13 Pe tit ion e r n ote s that it do e s have wo rk ru le s a dd re sse d to M AD re qu ir e me nts and that th e se 14 rules we re c ommunicated to its employ ees, c laims which the Secr etar y does not contest ex cept a s 15 to the form this communication took on the day of the acc ident. Wit h respe ct to its im plementation 16 of these w ork rules, Petitioner a lso asserts that it took reasona ble s teps to monitor for unsaf e wor king 17 conditions, citing the twic e-a -we ek visits made to the job site by its project supervisor, its industry 18 c e rt if

ic a tio ns and

e xce lle nt p ri or

sa fe ty reco rd, a

nd the high e xpe ri e nc e le ve l of the vic timin t

hisPetitioner also asser ts that Mejia had bee n desig nated a “Competent Person,” such that 4 under the site-spec ific saf ety plan, he wa s responsible not just for identifying a nd addre ssing hazards but also for

providing supervision for towe r climbing work. How ever , the evidenc e they c ite fo r t his c la im i nd ic a te s o nly

that Me jia c ou ld have be en desig nated a s a Competent Person by Petitioner’s Project Mana g er, not that he in fac t had bee n. Fur thermore , if Mejia did in fac t have su pe rv iso ry re sp on sib ili ty

to m on ito r p a int ingon

the tow e r o n w hic h h e wa s in jur e d, his c on str uc tiv e kn ow le dg e of

his ow n v iol a tio n o f t

he MA D r e qu ir e me nt w ou ld b e imp uta ble to Petitioner, see N.Y

. State Elec. &Gas Corp. , 88 F.3d at 110, and his failure to enforc e the wor k rules re lated to these r equire ments would permit an infe renc e that the r ules had not bee n adequately

enfor ced, see D .A. Collins Const. Co. , 117 F.3d at 695. 10 1 case . These c ircumstance s, it sugg ests, rende red c onstant supervision of Mejia unnecessa ry , as an 2 employ ee “ n e e d

n o t b e s u

p e r v is e d e v e r y s e c o n d , e s p e c ia ll y

a s th e e mp lo y e e b e c o me s mor e 3 experience d and aware of proper saf ety proce dures.” Gen. Dynamics Corp., Quincy Shipbuilding 4 Div. v. OSHRC , 599 F.2d 453, 459 ( 1st Cir. 1979). 5 The AL J did not, however , fault Petitioner for not providing c onstant supervision. Rather, 6 the AL J found that PUMIfailed to provide a re asonable level of supe rvision give n the dang er of the 7 work involved a

nd the ea se with which Mejia c ould inadverte ntly approa ch too nea

r to an e nerg ized 8 part of th e to w e r in th e ar e a in w h ic h h e w a s w o r k in g . Wh il e Pe ti ti o n e r c la im s th a t d e le g a ti o nof 9 re sp on sib ili ty

to M e jia to i de nti fy

da ng e rs him se lf

wa s a pp rop ri ate and

ind e e d w a s amon g his 10 responsibilities as cre w leade r, this argument ag ain ig nores the fac t that the site-spec ific saf ety plan 11 called f

or the fore man and cre w to pe rfor m a documented a ssessment of the towe r tog ether , which 12 was not done he re. Moreove r, it is unclear h o w M ej i a’ s ex perie nce or his status as cre w leade r 4 13 would help him avoid violating the MAD requirement, where the conce rn is not that he might f org et 14 or ig no re his tr a ini ngbut r a the r t hat he wa s pa int ing an are a of the tow e r i n w hic h e ve n th e sli g hte st 15 ina dv e rt e nt m ov e me nt c ou ld br ing him wi thi n the min imum a pp ro a c h dis tanc e of an e ne rg ize d p art .11

1 Fur

ther, a s alrea dy noted, he was doing so without the monitoring of a saf ety observe r re quired by 2 the site-spec ific s af ety plan. While Petit ioner a lso argues that it did enforc e its work rule s upon 3 discoveringviolations, including once imposing discipline on Mejia himself, the past enf orce ment 4 of some wor

k rules does not a lter the fa ct that the i m p l em en t ation of the rule related to MAD 5 standards w as seve rely flawe d on the day

of the a ccide nt here . There was thus substantial evidenc e 6 su pp or tin g the c on c lus ion

that Pe tit ion e r’ s sa fe ty

pla n w a s n ot a de qu a te ly imp le me nte d in thi s c a se 7 a nd

a s a r e s u l ti tf

a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s hi t s e n t i t l e m e n tt o ana f f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e o f unpr e ve nta

ble 8 e mpl oy e e mis c on du c t. 9 We have c onsidere d all of Petitioner’s re maining a rguments and find them to be without 10 m e r i t . F o r

t h e f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s , t h e p e t i t i o nf o r r e v i e w i s h e r e b y DE NI ED . 11 12 FOR THE COURT: 13 Catherine O ’Ha g an Wolfe, Clerk 14