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i 

89–513 2015

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–120] 

RUSSIAN VIOLATIONS OF THE INF 

TREATY: AFTER DETECTION—WHAT? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 17, 2014 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TIM MORRISON, Counsel 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

ERIC SMITH, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2014 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, July 17, 2014, Russian Violations of the INF Treaty: After Detection—What? .......................................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, July 17, 2014 .......................................................................................... 25 

THURSDAY, JULY 17, 2014 

RUSSIAN VIOLATIONS OF THE INF TREATY: AFTER DETECTION— 

WHAT? 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Pifer, Ambassador Steven, Director, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, The Brookings Institution ...................................................................... 5 

Rademaker, Stephen G., Bipartisan Policy Center, National Security Project 

Advisor .................................................................................................................. 1 

Thomas, Jim, Vice President and Director of Studies, Center for Strategic 

and Budgetary Assessments ............................................................................... 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Pifer, Ambassador Steven ................................................................................ 53 

Rademaker, Stephen G. ................................................................................... 31 

Rogers, Hon. Mike ............................................................................................ 29 

Thomas, Jim ...................................................................................................... 41 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Brookings article by Ambassador Pifer .......................................................... 71 

Documents for the record submitted by Mr. Rogers ...................................... 74 

Letter with attachments submitted by Mr. Rogers ....................................... 124 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Cooper ........................................................................................................ 151 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 156 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 145 

Ms. Sanchez ...................................................................................................... 154 

(1) 

RUSSIAN VIOLATIONS OF THE INF TREATY: AFTER 

DETECTION—WHAT? 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Thursday, July 17, 2014. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:33 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. ROGERS. I call this hearing of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee to order. Thank you for being here today. 

We have a distinguished panel here today to talk about Russian 

violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [INF] Treaty 

and its consequences. I know you have all spent a good deal of time 

preparing your remarks. So it is my practice to try to get right to 

those and our questions for you. So I am just going to introduce 

my prepared statement for the record. 

Our witnesses today are Mr. Stephen Rademaker, national security project advisor, Bipartisan Policy Center; Mr. Jim Thomas, 

vice president and director of studies for Center of Strategic and 

Budgetary Assessments; and Ambassador Steven Pifer, director of 

Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative at The Brookings Institute. 

With that, I offer the floor to my colleague, the gentleman from 

Tennessee, who is a truly wonderful guy, but a supporter of a bad 

football team. Mr. Jim Cooper, Tennessee. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the Appendix on page 29.] 

Mr. COOPER. I thank the gentleman, my friend from Alabama. I 

welcome witnesses. I have no opening statement. I look forward to 

the testimony. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well now we will turn to our panel. I would like to 

ask you to summarize your prepared statements in 5 minutes. The 

full statement can be offered for the record. So without objection 

we will make that happen. 

Mr. Rademaker, please proceed with your remarks. 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN G. RADEMAKER, BIPARTISAN 

POLICY CENTER, NATIONAL SECURITY PROJECT ADVISOR 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Cooper. It is a pleasure to be here before you today. I do have 
2 

a prepared statement which I do not propose to read to you. I will 

just summarize it. And I have about 5 minutes, is that correct? 

I make a number of key points in my testimony. The first is that 

I do think the INF Treaty historically is a very important treaty. 

It is one that President Reagan achieved over an enormous amount 

of opposition. 

He had to withstand lots of criticism from peace activists who basically thought the United States should look the other way in the 

face of intermediate Russian—intermediate-range Russian missiles 

aimed at our forces and our allies in Europe. He didn’t look the 

other way. 

He met that threat with U.S. deployments to match the Russian 

deployments. And in the end his vision was vindicated because the 

Russians agreed to mutually eliminate that range of missiles on 

their side and on our side. 

And that was an important accomplishment. And that was very 

reassuring to our allies at the time who had in many cases serious 

domestic political opposition to the U.S. deployment in their countries of those missiles. 

One of the points I make is that this treaty today is frankly 

much more important to our allies than to us simply because the 

missiles of this range, the 500 to 5,500 kilometer range, deployed 

on Russian territory as—there are a few exceptions, but territorial 

exceptions or geographic exceptions, but as a general matter they 

can’t reach the United States. They can only reach the territory of 

our allies. So this is really more important to their security than 

ours. But they are our treaty allies, so their security matters to us. 

I think in the eyes of our allies it remains an important treaty. 

But the next point I make in my testimony is whether this treaty 

regime is likely to survive over the long term is open to serious 

question. 

We have to understand what this treaty does. It imposes an obligation on the United States and then four of the successor countries to the Soviet Union not to possess this class of missile. 

For the United States that is not an enormous problem. But for 

Russia, which is surrounded by other countries that are deploying 

missiles of that range, it is a big problem. And the Russians have 

made that clear consistently for a period of about 10 years. They 

made it clear to me personally when I was serving in the U.S. Government as the Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control. 

They feel this is an unfair treaty. Why should China be able to 

have these missiles and not them? Why should North Korea and 

Iran be able to have these kinds of missiles? 

One of the points I would make to them of course was that part 

of the reason that North Korea and Iran have these kinds of missiles is because Russia transferred to them the technology to 

produce them. But you know that is a historical irony at this point. 

And maybe the Russians in retrospect wish they hadn’t done that. 

But today they are worried about the threat of these missiles. 

And looking forward I guess I think over the long term there is 

little likelihood that Russia is going to remain inside this treaty regime. And I think the issue that we are here today to discuss is 

symptomatic of that. 
3 

Russia is not committed fundamentally to this treaty. Evidently 

they are testing missiles that would violate the treaty. And that 

testing is itself a violation of the treaty. And I would assume that 

is in preparation for eventual deployment and, if they intend to act 

consistent with the treaty, termination by them of the treaty. 

What do we do about this? Well, one of the points I make in the 

treaty is we shouldn’t do them any favors. We shouldn’t reward 

them for misbehavior. 

And I think for the United States to declare that we are pulling 

out of the treaty in response to what Russia has done would actually be welcomed in Moscow because I think they are wrestling 

with the question of how they terminate, how they get out from 

under this treaty. 

We shouldn’t make it any easier for them. We should force them 

to take the onus of that, take the international political and diplomatic hit for pulling out of the treaty. 

I do go on in some length in my testimony about how I think 

Russia’s attitude toward this treaty is symptomatic of their larger 

approach to arms control. I think the Obama administration would 

like the Russians to have a very different approach to arms control. 

The administration has a very ambitious arms control agenda. 

Unfortunately they don’t have a partner who shares that agenda. 

And I make that point at some length in my testimony. 

But we continue to face the question of what the United States 

should do in response to what Russia is doing if we are not going 

to terminate the treaty. And I lay—at the end of my testimony I 

lay out some suggestions. A couple of them are sort of conceptual 

in nature. 

You know the first one I would say is the Obama administration 

needs to stop worrying about its own arms control agenda. It needs 

to accept the reality of Russia. 

I mean Russia is not committed—Russia does not share President Obama’s vision of eliminating nuclear weapons from the face 

of the earth. They don’t—they are not particularly fond of arms 

control agreements. 

My sense, and it is only a sense, is that the Obama administration has not wanted to confront the violations that we are here to 

discuss because they are inconvenient from the perspective of trying to advance a broader arms control agenda. They might quarrel 

with that characterization, but I think actually that is a fair characterization. 

And one of my first suggestions is that they stop worrying about 

that, stop worrying about their arms control agenda and start worrying about protecting this treaty regime and holding Russia to its 

legal obligations. Because if we don’t do that, you know they will 

be tempted to violate other legal obligations. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rademaker can be found in the 

Appendix on page 31.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

Mr. Thomas, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 
4 

STATEMENT OF JIM THOMAS, VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF STUDIES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS 

Mr. THOMAS. Good morning, Chairman Rogers and Ranking 

Member Cooper and distinguished members of the committee. 

Thank you for inviting me to testify today. 

After more than 25 years in force, it is an appropriate time to 

take stock of the INF Treaty and assess its continuing relevance 

in a world where Russian compliance is in question, China is actively exploiting an intermediate-range missile gap, and Iran and 

North Korea continue to pursue nuclear weapons as well as longrange delivery means. 

Reports that Russia is circumventing and/or violating the INF 

Treaty suggest that it may be engaged in arms control ‘‘salami slicing’’ that is slowly undermining the INF Treaty through ambiguous 

infractions rather than exiting the treaty through outright abrogation. 

The United States cannot permit Moscow to make a soft exit 

from the INF Treaty while itself remaining a party to the treaty 

in good standing. It must ensure robust monitoring, verification, 

and compliance with the treaty as long as it remains in force. 

But the United States must also look beyond an era of 

Eurocentric bilateral U.S.-Russian arms control. It must adopt a 

more multilateral framework consistent with the strategic game of 

rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region. 

China should figure prominently in discussions about the future 

of the treaty. INF-class ballistic and cruise missiles have become 

a major pillar of China’s counter-intervention strategy to limit U.S. 

military freedom of action in the western Pacific. 

Beyond China a number of countries like Iran and North Korea 

have amassed small but growing inventories of ballistic and cruise 

missiles that would be proscribed if these nations were signatories 

themselves to the INF Treaty. 

To address these wider global concerns, the United States should 

consider undertaking a latter-day, dual-track approach, one that 

would attempt to update the treaty framework while simultaneously creating post INF military options to backstop diplomacy 

and hedge against the possibility that negotiations fail. 

First the United States should seek to multilateralize the restrictions of the treaty to eliminate or replace substantial limits on 

other countries’ intermediate-range missiles. Toward this end the 

United States should consult with allies most at risk from the missile forces of China, North Korea, and Iran, and enlist them to 

apply greater pressure on those states to join. 

If multilateralization proves unachievable, the United States 

might negotiate with Russia a treaty amendment to allow groundlaunched conventionally armed missiles with ranges up to 2,000 

kilometers outside Europe to balance the missile arsenals of potential adversaries in the Middle East and Asia. 

But ultimately, if the United States is neither able to ensure 

Russia’s compliance nor subsequently to multilateralize or amend 

the treaty, it may conclude that INF no longer serves its interests. 

Paradoxically, an American willingness to contemplate the possi-
5 

bility of withdraw may increase U.S. bargaining leverage in negotiating multilateralization or amendment. 

The United States should begin creating military options now to 

backstop diplomacy and ensure the United States can negotiate 

from a position of strength on Russian compliance, multilateralization and/or amendment of the treaty, while hedging against the 

failure of these efforts. 

Such options should make credible the prospect of swift U.S. deployments of intermediate-range missile forces to reduce the decision to deployment cycle. Toward that end, the United States 

should undertake consultations with allies and partners to explore 

contingency forward-basing options for conventionally armed intermediate-range missile forces. 

The Department of Defense should undertake studies to begin 

developing options for future INF-class missiles so that it could 

move quickly if a political decision were taken in the future to 

amend or withdraw from the treaty. 

In this context, the U.S. Army might consider developing and 

fielding a small sea-based, that is on barges or ships, intermediaterange missile force for experimentation and concept development 

that could later be adapted and brought to shore if the United 

States amended or left the treaty. 

In conclusion, suspected Russian violations of the INF Treaty 

come at a time of great strategic uncertainty for the United States 

on a global basis. While compliance issues must be swiftly addressed, the United States should also widen its aperture for evaluating the INF Treaty to ensure that it serves its broader global interests and security commitments. 

A treaty that bars two nations from pursuing certain militarily 

desirable classes of missiles, while not stopping other states, some 

of whom pose threats towards the United States and its allies overseas, from possessing them must be constantly reevaluated to determine the tipping point when the costs of arms control overtake 

its benefits. That day may be quickly approaching. 

Now is the time to begin contemplating a world beyond the INF 

Treaty, and taking appropriate precautionary steps. Paradoxically, 

doing so may offer the best course to preserving the viability of the 

treaty farther into the future. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thomas can be found in the Appendix on page 41.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

Ambassador, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR STEVEN PIFER, DIRECTOR, 

ARMS CONTROL AND NON–PROLIFERATION INITIATIVE, THE 

BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 

Ambassador PIFER. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cooper, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss Russian compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty, and how the United 

States should respond if it is determined that Russia has violated 

that agreement. With your permission I have submitted a statement for the record and will briefly summarize it now. 
6 

I should note at the outset that I do not have access to classified 

information regarding this question, nor do I have access to the 

U.S. Government’s deliberations. Absent concrete information, any 

discussion of U.S. policy response to a possible Russian treaty violation would invariably be somewhat hypothetical. 

The 1987 INF Treaty is a landmark arms control agreement. It 

banned an entire class of U.S. and Soviet land-based ballistic and 

cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. It 

resulted in the elimination of 2,692 U.S. and Soviet missiles as well 

as their associated launchers and other equipment. 

Russia is a successor state to the Soviet Union. Recently questions have arisen about its compliance with the treaty. 

There appear to be two charges regarding Russian violations. Assertions that the Russian RS–26 ballistic missile violates the treaty 

appear to have no basis. 

Under the definitions of the START [Strategic Arms Reduction] 

Treaty, the New START Treaty, and the INF Treaty, the RS–26 is 

a permitted, but limited, ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile]. 

The reported R–500 cruise missile appears to be a more serious 

concern. But there is little hard information and open sources 

about it. 

A Russian violation of the INF Treaty would be a serious matter, 

as would any treaty violation. If Russia is producing, testing and/ 

or deploying new intermediate-range missiles, such weapons would, 

depending on their range and deployment location, pose a threat to 

U.S. allies in Europe and Asia, as well as to other countries such 

as China. They would threaten U.S. forward-based forces. Such 

missiles, however, likely would not have the range to reach the 

United States. 

Maintaining the INF Treaty remains in the U.S. interest. America’s allies greatly value the agreement. If the U.S. Government 

were to conclude that Russia has violated the treaty, it should 

press Russia to end the violation and come back into full compliance using both senior diplomatic channels and the special 

verification commission established by the treaty. 

Moreover, Washington should brief Russia’s neighbors, both in 

Europe and Asia, on the violation. The goal should be to 

multilateralize the issue. That is to have other countries, the ones 

that would be most directly threatened by a Russian intermediaterange missile, press Moscow on the question. 

Washington should strive to make this not just a U.S.-Russia 

issue, but a German-Russian, a Chinese-Russian, an Italian-Russian issue as well, and so on. 

If Russia has violated the INF Treaty, the United States should 

nevertheless continue to observe the treaty’s provisions, at least for 

the near term. U.S. withdrawal from the treaty would free Russia 

from any legal obligation to observe the treaty’s limits, and would 

bring no apparent advantage to the United States. 

At present the Pentagon has no plans for land-based intermediate-range missiles, so a U.S. withdrawal from the treaty would 

leave Russia free to deploy missiles for which the United States 

has no counterpart. Deploying new intermediate-range missiles 

would take time and impose a new burden on the stretched Defense Department budget. 
7 

Funding a new missile would require drawing funds from other 

accounts such as modernization of strategic nuclear forces, missile 

defense, or conventional weapons systems. Absent a specific priority military requirement for U.S. intermediate-range missiles, 

this would not appear to be a wise use of scarce resources. 

Moreover, even if the United States were to build intermediaterange missiles, they would pose a serious response to a Russian 

treaty violation only if deployed on the territory of U.S. allies in 

Europe or Asia close to Russia. But the prospects of NATO [North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization], Japan, or South Korea accepting 

and welcoming deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range missiles 

on their territory appears to be very low. 

Deploying such missiles in the continental United States, on the 

other hand, would make little sense as they could only hold targets 

at risk in the Western Hemisphere. 

While continuing to observe a treaty that another party is violating may seem counterintuitive, this is what the Reagan administration did during the 1980s following the discovery in 1983 of the 

Krasnoyarsk large-phased array radar. That radar was a clear violation of the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty. 

The Reagan administration nevertheless pressed the Soviets on 

the violation, but continued to observe the treaty. Moreover, the 

Reagan administration simultaneously continued to negotiate new 

arms control agreements with the Soviets, including the INF and 

START I Treaties. In 1990 the Soviets agreed to tear down the 

radar. 

Mr. Chairman, Representative Cooper, distinguished members of 

the committee, continuing to observe the INF Treaty while pressing 

the compliance issue with Russia and having others do so makes 

sense, at least for the foreseeable future. 

This does not mean that if Russia has wantonly violated the 

treaty the United States should continue to observe it indefinitely. 

But for now there is no compelling interest on the American part 

in withdrawal. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Pifer can be found in the 

Appendix on page 53.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank each and every one of you. We will now turn 

to questions, and I will start. 

If the New York Times report this past January is correct and 

the Russian INF violations began in 2008, what does this tell us 

about the very foundation of the reset with Russia, Mr. Thomas? 

Mr. THOMAS. Well, I think everyone here is troubled by the potential allegations of violations of the INF Treaty, which as all the 

panelists I think have made clear has even greater implications for 

America’s allies overseas than it does for ourselves directly. 

And I think that it also has to be connected with the—across the 

entire arms control agenda. So in terms of looking for new cuts in 

strategic arms, this is a factor that would also have to be taken 

into account. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Rademaker. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I think that report, if true, tells us two things 

about Russia. First, as I stated in my testimony, Russia has virtually no commitment to the INF Treaty. And in fact they appear 
8 

to be positioning themselves to get out from under it as they 

have—officials from President Putin on down have made clear that 

they are interested in doing. 

Second, and I elaborate on this in my testimony, I think it tells 

us about the fundamental Russian attitude towards arms control. 

They, in their security doctrine these days nuclear weapons are 

more important to them than ever because they see themselves 

surrounded by hostile countries. And they feel that on a conventional level they are not able to defend themselves. 

Mr. ROGERS. So your impression is there is no reset? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. In the arms control area I think that is right. 

The New START Treaty is sometimes held out as evidence that 

there is Russian interest in nuclear arms control. But you know my 

assessment of the New START Treaty was basically we agreed to 

legally obligate ourselves to reduce our strategic nuclear weapons 

deployments to the Russian level. 

Which you know we didn’t require Russia to make any reductions, we just reduced—required ourselves to reduce to their level. 

And you know they resisted taking that. 

They tried to precondition that on additional concessions from us 

in the area of missile defense and conventional global strike. So 

you know they will use arms control to advance their interests. But 

they don’t consider one of their interests nuclear weapons reductions. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. 

Should the U.S. be concerned about the new Russian missiles 

like the RS–26 Rubezh, which Russia had tested at intermediate 

range, but Russia is calling an ICBM? Or should we be content 

that Russia promises us that it will agree to count the missiles 

under the New START Treaty. Mr. Thomas. 

Mr. THOMAS. Well, I think as Ambassador Pifer acknowledged, 

the RS–26 may not in fact be a violation of the treaty. But it certainly should be of concern to the United States and its allies given 

the fact that it could be used at intermediate range and therefore 

would have greater responsiveness and shorter time of flight, and 

the threat that that could pose. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. 

Russia is said to be preparing to deploy this system in 2015 in 

Irkutsk, suggesting that for an intermediate-range missile the target is China. Now what does this do to claims that Russia is breaking out of the INF due to U.S. missile defense. Ambassador. 

Ambassador PIFER. Well, if the Russians were to deploy the RS– 

26 in Irkutsk, first of all it would be an ICBM because it was tested in excess of 5,500 kilometers. That could not reach the United 

States. But certainly I think a deployment in Irkutsk would suggest very clearly that it is aimed at China, and ought to be a concern first and foremost to the Chinese. 

I would make one other point about the RS–26 from just a U.S. 

point of view is of course the RS–26, every one that is deployed 

takes a space under the New START limit and takes a space that 

could be deployed by say an SS–27 or Bulava missile, which actually could reach all of the United States. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Rademaker. 
9 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Well, I know my two co-panelists have conceded 

that the RS–26 is not an INF-range missile, but rather an ICBM. 

I guess I would hesitate actually to reach that conclusion based on 

what we know. 

Apparently what we know is that they did fire that missile to a 

range of 5,800 kilometers, which is in excess of the 5,500 kilometer 

INF range. But I don’t feel that I know enough about the nature 

of that test to be able to say whether that turns it into an ICBM. 

You know the basic physics of missiles is that their range depends on a combination of the amount of thrust they can generate 

and the weight of the missile. And by adjusting the weight, if you 

reduce the weight you can make it go further. 

Mr. ROGERS. So you are saying that there is a loophole in the 

INF Treaty—— 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I mean I think there may well be in this case 

because you know the definition of a ground launch ballistic missile 

under the treaty is that it is capable of—that it is a weapons delivery vehicle. Now, if—you know if you take the warhead off of a 

missile, it will fly further than if it has a warhead on it. 

So it could be that this is a 5,500 kilometer range missile with 

a warhead. Remove the warhead, it will fly further. But an ICBM 

without a warhead, in my opinion, is not an ICBM. It is a projectile 

flying through the air, but it is not an ICBM. 

So I think my co-panelists may have rushed to a conclusion here 

that would require some further study before I would be willing to 

accept that—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Ambassador. 

Ambassador PIFER. Mr. Chairman, if I could say I think Mr. 

Rademaker is right on the physics. 

Although this is an issue that actually was assessed in the U.S. 

Government back in 1986 and 1987 when one of the questions we 

asked ourselves is if the Soviets sign the INF Treaty and get rid 

of all their SS–20 intermediate-range missiles, how would they 

cover time-urgent targets in Europe, for example air bases hosting 

American nuclear weapons. And the conclusion within the U.S. 

Government was they would take intercontinental ballistic missiles 

and fly those missiles to intermediate range. 

So this was sort of a scenario that was envisaged and was seen 

as something that they could do, and was not seen as a problem 

with the INF Treaty. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much. My time is expired. 

Chair recognizes the ranking member. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Is there an equivalent forum to this panel in Russia or China or 

another country that would allow the world to see the thinking of 

the foreign policy elites regarding intermediate nuclear forces? My 

guess is there is not, right? 

So the United States unilaterally by having hearings like this, although it is probably good for democracy, it might not be good for 

our foreign policy strength because, to the extent that you gentlemen would serve in future administrations, they would know how 

you feel about these issues. So right here is one hand tied behind 

our back to some extent. 
10 

Now, we celebrate our open process and we are not ready to give 

that up. But it is an interesting distinction because we oppose state 

capitalist regimes and authoritarian regimes who don’t have to go 

through these processes. 

Second, I think Ambassador Pifer made the point most clearly. 

This is essentially a European issue, and to some extent a Japanese issue because INF missiles can really only threaten those capitals. But that threat is truly startling. 

To have in Russia a weapon that is possibly designed to hit London or Paris or Rome or Berlin or Prague or Warsaw, that is truly 

a devastating thing to contemplate. And the fact that Europeans 

are not more engaged in this debate, because this is essentially a 

Reagan-era treaty for their benefit, is an amazing thing. 

And you would think that the peoples of Europe would rise up 

and say oh my God, not only is Putin a bad guy in other respects, 

but in regard to destroying our own nations. Why are Russian scientists working on things like this? 

Another issue that seems to be important is regardless of the 

physics of missiles, so many of these countries, especially like a 

North Korea or Iran, they are only in the INF space because they 

haven’t yet developed the science to do ICBMs. So this is kind of 

a poor man’s ICBM. 

And also there is this factor once you have an ICBM you can 

weight it appropriately so that it becomes an INF missile. So it is 

a little bit of a flexible category we are talking about here. 

But isn’t the fundamental issue that we are dealing with here is 

our precision-guided weapons are so advanced that a lot of these 

nuke issues are kind of poor man’s precision-guided weapons? Because they can’t lob a missile down a smokestack the way we can, 

or at least they haven’t been able to do that yet. They rely on these 

more old-fashioned, general purpose, more destructive—more 

broadly destructive weapons. 

So those are some of the issues that I am interested in. And the 

testimony, as excellent as it is, seems to skirt on many of these 

issues. So how do we deal with them more directly? 

Mr. THOMAS. Sir, if I might just respond on the case of the poor 

man’s ICBM. I think that is an accurate assessment as far as countries like Iran and North Korea go. But it may not be as true when 

thinking about China. 

China in fact does have increasingly accurate ICBMs. And it has 

developed a highly accurate, very sophisticated IRBM force. And so 

I think that really falls into a different category. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. And Mr. Cooper, commenting on the same 

point, you know I think I would prefer to look at our precision 

weapons from the opposite perspective, which is to the degree we 

develop them they enable us to rely less on nuclear weapons in our 

military planning. And I think most people consider that a positive 

development for us to rely less on nuclear weapons. 

And I guess I would suggest that most countries that are developing nuclear weapons are not doing it because of America’s precision weapons. It is for other reasons. And even if we were not developing precision conventional weapons I think their interest in 

nuclear weapons would remain undiminished. 
11 

Ambassador PIFER. Mr. Cooper, I would like to make three 

points. First of all, you are exactly right. I mean the reason the 

United States entered into the INF Treaty was to provide security 

for our allies, to protect them and remove a threat to them in form 

of the SS–20 missile. 

Why have they not been more public about concerns to this? My 

guess is they are waiting for the United States to come to some 

kind of a conclusion and at that point you know they may then 

speak up. 

And that is why I would recommend that if the U.S. Government 

concludes that the treaty has been violated that a major focus 

should be briefing allies, we want to have Chancellor Merkel raising this with Mr. Putin. We want to have President Xi raising this 

with Mr. Putin. 

We want to have—you know this is an issue that concerns the 

allies first and foremost. And rather than making it just a bilateral 

issue we are going to make this a multilateral question. 

And then finally just a general observation. I think you have 

seen over the last several years the Russian doctrine evolve to 

slightly greater reliance on nuclear weapons. In part because they 

see the advances of the American military has made with precision-guided conventional weapons on missile defense. 

And I think their perception is that that gap is not growing. That 

gap is perhaps even increasing. So unfortunately over the last few 

years they have come to place greater reliance on nuclear weapons 

systems. 

Mr. COOPER. Well, on the European question we are pushing our 

allies to increase their defense spending to 2 percent of their GDPs 

[gross domestic products]. We are not probably going to succeed in 

that. So this is a very important issue to highlight for Angela 

Merkel and other European leaders to get their heads more in the 

game. 

So I would not only encourage full NATO briefings, but also ways 

to engage the general public because the world was transfixed by 

sporting events like the World Cup. They are not focusing on Mr. 

Putin and his scientists, you know developing weapons that would 

target their cities, which is a pretty devastating thing. 

It is one thing to invade Crimea. It is another thing to target 

London, Paris, Rome, Berlin, cities like that, because that is the 

true implication of these weapons. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. If I could just comment. 

First, Mr. Cooper, I agree with what Ambassador Pifer said 

about the importance of engaging our allies in this. And I guess 

one of the things that was troubling to me when I read the New 

York Times story was that according to that story the Obama administration concluded in late 2011 that there was a likely treaty 

violation and yet they didn’t brief our NATO allies on it until January of 2014. 

So they let more than 2 years go by before briefing our allies. 

And it is a mystery to me why they would have waited that long 

given that I think we all agree that it is pretty important to engage 

our allies in a campaign of diplomatic pressure on the Russians to 

cease these violations. 
12 

Second, on your comments about the threat to our allies from 

these missiles, I would like to inject into the discussion the fact 

that we also need to be mindful of the Russian tactical nuclear 

weapons that are deployed in Europe. But you know the numbers 

are classified, but I think most estimates are that Russia has about 

a 10-to-1 advantage over NATO in terms of the number of tactical 

nuclear weapons. 

And you combine that with evidently movement toward the deployment of these types of missiles, which could deliver those tactical nuclear weapons, and I agree with you entirely, our allies 

should be much more alarmed than they are. 

Mr. COOPER. I know my other colleagues have questions and they 

have rung the bells for votes. So I should yield the balance of my 

time. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the gentleman. 

Chair now recognizes the gentleman from—not Arkansas, Arizona, Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am not from Arkansas, that is for sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, you know General Breedlove said that a weapons 

capability that violates the INF and that is introduced into the 

greater European landmass is absolutely a tool that will have to be 

dealt with. And he said I will not judge how the alliance will 

choose to act. But I will say that they will have to consider what 

to do about it. 

It is a question that cannot go unanswered. That is his basic 

point here. And if you will grant me just a little diplomatic immunity here, Mr. Chairman, we have witnessed this President ignore 

the green movement in Iran. We have witnessed him, it appears 

now, be entering into an agreement with Iran that will have a protected protocol for them to enrich uranium. 

We have witnessed him take the side of the Muslim Brotherhood 

in Egypt. We have, we witnessed the President set a faulty red line 

in Syria and failed to secure the embassy in Benghazi on the 11th 

anniversary of 9/11. 

We have witnessed him fail to secure a status of forces agreement in Iraq, which is in the midst of falling now in the hands of 

ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria], one of the most deadly terrorist groups we have seen in years. And we are now witnessing 

him, seeing our most vital and cherished ally, Israel, feeling abandoned and alone in the world under attack. 

Mr. COOPER. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FRANKS. So my question is, is this administration going to 

call what Russia is doing now a violation of the INF? Do you think 

that they will stand up and say it is a violation? 

And if they do, will they inform the Congress of that fact and the 

American people and our Article 5 NATO allies before they inform 

Russia? Will they stand up in this situation? Or will they do as 

they have done in the litany I have just outlined? Mr. Rademaker. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Congressman, I think the answer at the moment is we don’t know. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well you see, I wouldn’t be shocked. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I hope they will. Again, according to the New 

York Times they concluded there was a likely violation in 2011. 
13 

There have been two Arms Control Compliance Reports submitted 

to the Congress since then, neither of which has mentioned this 

issue. 

Another one was due on April 15th of this year. It may be forthcoming soon. And I think that will be an interesting test of the 

question you ask, whether they are prepared to confront this in the 

forthcoming Arms Control Compliance Report. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, let me put the question to the entire panel 

here. Is there anyone on the panel that would say that they believe 

that the Russians have violated the INF or have not? Mr. 

Rademaker, do you believe that the Russians at this point have in 

fact violated the INF? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Well, I think you know I am like the other panelists here. I do not have access to classified information so I have 

to rely on what has been in the news media. 

Assuming what I have read in the news media is true, yes, it 

sounds like a violation, frankly a material breach of the obligations 

that Russia has under the INF Treaty. 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Thomas, what do you think? Has Russia violated the INF? 

Mr. THOMAS. Sorry. Based on what has been reported already in 

Western reports already, as well as even within Russia’s own 

media, there are good reasons to believe that Russia may indeed 

have violated the INF Treaty. 

Mr. FRANKS. Ambassador, what is your perspective? 

Ambassador PIFER. At this point, not having access to classified 

information, I do not know. Based on what I have seen in open 

sources I do not believe the RS–26 is a violation of the INF Treaty. 

There is a much more serious concern, apparently, about the cruise 

missile question. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I think it is, in my judgment, obvious that the 

Russians have violated the INF. And I would hope this President, 

even given his newfound flexibility after the election, would face 

that directly and bring this to the American people and inform 

Russia and stand up. 

Because these treaties, if there is to be any hope for treaties, if 

we do not abide by them and we do not hold each other accountable 

then the treaty is not worth the paper it is written on. And I think 

it is a big issue, Mr. Chairman. And I hope the President would 

consider the sentiments here. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

Chair now recognizes another member who is not from Arkansas, 

and my colleague, Mr. Lamborn from Colorado. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank you all for being here. This is a very important issue, 

and I appreciate the perspective each one of you brings to this 

panel and this important discussion. 

Mr. Rademaker, you said in your testimony as well as in your 

written statement that even though we had made gestures to the 

Soviet Union through New START, pretty much unilateral because 

we only came down to the level they were already at for the most 

part, that it hasn’t been reciprocated. And they have no interest in 

really going beyond that. 
14 

I am concerned that like you said here, the President has called 

for a further unilateral—what appears to be a unilateral reduction 

in our strategic forces. Are you concerned about the unilateral aspect of the U.S. further reduction, or a reduction even if it is reciprocated by the Russians given that there are other countries not 

being included like China? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Yes, Congressman. I comment on that in my 

prepared testimony. 

As you know, President Obama in his Berlin speech last year 

called for a further one-third reduction in deployed U.S. strategic 

nuclear forces. He indicated in the speech that he hoped to negotiate that with Russia. 

And he had in fact dispatched his national security advisor to 

Moscow to try and commence that kind of conversation. The Russians, by all indications, were not interested in his initiative. 

One of the points I make in my testimony is I think there has 

been some ambiguity about whether, at the end of the day, President Obama would be prepared to try to implement that one-third 

reduction unilaterally even if Russia did not undertake to make the 

same reduction. And I think the current moment would be a good 

one to eliminate any hope that they may have in Moscow that 

President Obama would do such a thing. 

The combination of what Russia has done in Crimea with the 

violations of the INF Treaty that we are here discussing today, to 

me that provides a useful occasion to close the door to the hope 

that the Russians may have that because of his deep commitment 

to eliminating nuclear weapons President Obama might unilaterally—— 

Mr. LAMBORN. Mr. Rademaker, if our administration had clear 

vision I think that that would be the case. But you listen to the 

litany that Mr. Franks recited. 

And I think this administration and the President in particular 

have rose-colored glasses on. They are overly optimistic about how 

their—how the U.S. example is going to be so compelling that other 

countries will follow it. And yet that hasn’t been the case. Would 

you agree with that? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Basically yes. I mean I think President Obama 

deeply believes that nuclear weapons are a threat to humanity and 

he would like it to be part of his legacy to abolish them, or at least 

take dramatic action in the direction of abolishing them. And I 

think it is a source of great frustration to him that the Russians 

aren’t interested in joining him in that effort. 

You know I feel his pain. But you know we can’t wish the Russians to be different than they are. Maybe one day they will be different. But under the current government they have their priorities 

and it is evident what they are. 

So I wish he would be clearer because I think the Russians—the 

Russians, I dealt with them a lot in the arms control context. They 

look for weakness and seek to exploit it. And I think they detect 

President Obama’s personal desire to do this. And you know why 

should they negotiate reductions with us if they think America is 

going to give them—give unilateral reductions in exchange for 

nothing? 
15 

So step back and wait for President Obama and his passion to 

eliminate these weapons from the face of the earth to move unilaterally. I mean for Russia, from a pure national interest point of 

view, not sharing President Obama’s enthusiasm for eliminating 

these weapons, that would be a huge progress for them. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. And for any one of you, real quickly 

here, given the fact that China is more powerful than ever and 

growing more powerful, including on the strategic level, should we 

continue in the former mode of just bilateral negotiations with us 

and Russia where China is left out? Or should we include them in 

any future arms control agreements? Any one of you. Ambassador. 

Ambassador PIFER. Yes, sir. I think at current point now if you 

look at the total U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, each of these 

countries is probably about 10 times the size, actually more than 

10 times the size of the nuclear arsenals of any third country, including China. So at some point if the U.S. and Russia continue to 

come down you have got to bring in third countries. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Or if they continue to come up. 

Ambassador PIFER. Or if they continue to come up, correct. But 

I think there is still—it would be room for at least one more U.S.- 

Russia reduction before you had to get a more complicated issue of 

third countries. 

If I could come back briefly to the President’s proposal in Berlin, 

as I understood the Pentagon is that the Pentagon view was that 

the United States could reduce deployed strategic warheads by 

about one-third from the 1,550 limit without regard to a Russian 

reduction. 

However, every administration comment I have seen publicly 

since last June a year ago has been that they are talking about a 

reciprocal reduction. And my guess is that with the recent turn in 

U.S.-Russian events, I would be astonished that there is any expectation in Moscow of a U.S. unilateral nuclear reduction at this 

point. 

Mr. LAMBORN. I hope you are right. Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you all. We have been called for votes. We 

are only going to have two votes. So we are going to recess briefly 

while we run over and hit those two votes. We should be back in 

about 20 minutes, if you will hang around. 

Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. ROGERS. The hearing is now back—called back to order. We 

do have another member here. 

I appreciate you all waiting around. I know that is awful aggravating when they call us for votes and—in the middle of a hearing. 

But it is what it is. But this has been a very informative process, 

and I really appreciate you being here. 

The ranking member has brought to my attention that the rules 

require that members are not allowed to refer to other members or 

the President in derogatory ways during these questions. So we 

would ask everybody to adhere to that and maintain a certain decorum in here. 

I would like to recognize the ranking member on that issue for 

a moment. 
16 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I checked with the parliamentarian during the votes and he pointed out that clause 2(k) 

section 4 of rule XI requires that committees be operated according 

to the order and decorum of the House. And I think when members 

ask the chair for immunity in anticipation of out of bounds comments they are about to make, and I just heard another member 

eagerly anticipate what he called a rant. 

That doesn’t sound like even the members themselves are operating—know they are operating out of bounds of order and decorum. So I would ask the chair to enforce the rules of the House. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

Chair now recognizes the gentleman—— 

Mr. TURNER. Just a second. Mr. Chairman, I have an inquiry. 

If the ranking member is complaining about members saying 

things about a member, and does so by saying something about another member, is that a violation? 

Mr. COOPER. I think the House rules talk about naming members 

by name—— 

Mr. TURNER. So if we do it—— 

Mr. COOPER [continuing]. The President by name. 

Mr. TURNER. If we do it without maybe saying their name. Okay. 

Great. Well, now that we have that down we will make certain we 

follow that. Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. Chair now recognizes my friend and colleague, the 

gentleman from Ohio, the former chairman of this subcommittee, 

Mr. Turner, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. Pifer, thank you for your language that you have used today. 

It is very informative, and it is very specific. And I want to go back 

to your language. 

A few members ago you were asked the question of whether or 

not Russia was in violation. You first carefully said that you do not 

have access to classified material. And I appreciate that distinction. 

And then secondly you said that you do have concerns. And that 

I think is a very careful statement considering the lack of access. 

So it is not saying that there is not a violation. It is not saying 

there is. But it is saying there are concerns. And that would be accurate. Right? Okay. 

Mr. Pifer, you are considered an expert on arms control. You are 

director of Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative for The 

Brookings Institution. 

Expert, expertise is based upon knowledge. And I appreciate that 

you have said that you don’t have access to classified information. 

And so that does, to some extent, limit your expertise or your 

knowledge. And you cite that you were looking to open sources. 

So, for you to be asked a question are they or are they not, you 

have carefully not concluded. Because I mean you would agree with 

me, right, that if you actually concluded whether or not Russia was 

or was not, it would be just frivolous speculation. Is that correct? 

Ambassador PIFER. At this point as I said I think that there is 

enough information in open sources about the RS–26 ballistic missile that my own conclusion is that it is consistent with the definition of an ICBM. 
17 

But what I have seen in open sources regarding the cruise missile question, which I gather to be the more serious issue, there is 

not yet enough detail to come to a conclusion. But certainly if the 

Russians are testing, producing, or deploying a missile within the 

range band of INF, that would be a violation. 

Mr. TURNER. But you would agree for you to go further and actually conclude would be a frivolous speculation. It would not be the 

careful language that you have had, the frivolous speculation. Correct? 

Ambassador PIFER. I am not comfortable making that conclusion 

because I don’t have the access to information. That is correct. 

Mr. TURNER. So if you did conclude it would just be frivolous. We 

wouldn’t be able to use the information. We wouldn’t be able to 

conclude anything from the information. 

Ambassador PIFER. If I reached that conclusion now based on 

what I know it would be speculative. 

Mr. TURNER. Right. 

A year ago on July 2013 you wrote a blog criticizing our chairman saying, ‘‘Allegations of Russian Intermediate-Range Nuclear 

Forces Treaty Violations—Where’s the beef?’’ 

Your conclusions today are different than your conclusions in this 

July 2013 op-ed, are they not? 

Ambassador PIFER. That article in July was focused on the question of the RS–26 ballistic missile. 

Mr. TURNER. Well did your—you are raising issues, though, 

about what the chairman has said. And there is no statement in 

here as to a limitation of what—of which missile he is talking of. 

He has raised concerns about possible Russian treaty violations. 

And you say in there he doesn’t specify what the violation was. So 

you can’t—your article is not just on that missile. It is on the issue 

of Buck McKeon having concerns. 

Ambassador PIFER. The concern that I raised in that article was 

at the time the public speculation out there was focused on the ballistic missile, not the cruise missile. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, you can’t say that. It says right here that he 

did not specify what the violation was. So you can’t say that is 

what it was. I mean in your article—let me put this in the record. 

I will put this in the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 71.] 

Mr. TURNER. I have a question for you about your conclusion. 

You cite NASIC [National Air and Space Intelligence Center] in 

here, which thank you for citing NASIC. They are in my district. 

But I will note from your statement that you don’t get classified 

briefings from NASIC. 

You have here though that our chairman is—this is a critical 

compliance assessment you say based on facts and evidence, not on 

allegations that border on frivolous. You say that our chairman is 

being frivolous in having concerns in July 2013 that there may be 

treaty violations. But yet today you say you have concerns. Do you 

want to retract this statement about our chairman? 

Ambassador PIFER. The article that I wrote a year ago was focused on reports out that were focused on the ballistic missile, the 

RS–26. 
18 

Mr. TURNER. That is not what this article says. And again we 

will put it in the record. You are criticizing the chairman. And you 

say that he does not specify what the violation was. And then you 

say his concerns are frivolous. You can’t be saying what his concerns are because you cite in the article that you don’t know what 

they are. 

But the thing that I find really interesting is that you don’t have 

access to any classified information and you know he does. I mean 

you don’t know what he knows. But yet you felt the need to write 

this op-ed. 

So I want to ask you. Surely, because you don’t have access to 

classified information, you probably picked up the phone and called 

someone just to check with them before you went on this rant in 

calling our chairman frivolous. I would like to know, who did you 

call in the State Department to just check in on this? 

Ambassador PIFER. Congressman, I wrote that article on the 

basis of stories at the time that were focused on the RS–26 ballistic 

missile. 

Mr. TURNER. Did you call anyone at the State Department and 

say, hey, this letter was a concern. Is anybody working on this? Is 

there anything I should know? 

Ambassador PIFER. I did make one call to somebody—— 

Mr. TURNER. Who did you call? 

Ambassador PIFER. I called—— 

Mr. TURNER. And you are in front of Congress, so this is one of 

the ones where you get to be truthful. Who did you call? 

Ambassador PIFER. I called the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

State, Congressman, and said here is an argument I plan to make. 

Mr. TURNER. Name? 

Ambassador PIFER. Is it a dumb argument? 

Mr. TURNER. Care to give us—you gave us the title. 

Ambassador PIFER. It was Deputy Assistant Secretary Rose. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you so much. 

Ambassador PIFER. Frank Rose. 

Mr. TURNER. All right. He misled you, unfortunately. 

Ambassador PIFER. No, because again the conversation I had 

with him was specifically on the RS–26 issue. 

Mr. ROGERS. The gentleman’s time is expired. We are going to 

have another round in just a minute so we will get back to that. 

Chair now recognizes himself for questions. 

How long should the U.S. continue to unilaterally be bound by 

the INF Treaty? We are at present apparently the only party complying with the treaty. Do we let this drag on for 6 years? In some 

ways it already, reportedly, is—has drug on too long. What do you 

think, Mr. Rademaker? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Mr. Chairman, I say in my statement that I 

don’t think we should respond to what we know Russia to have 

done at this point by pulling out of the treaty. I think from a Russian perspective that would be more of a reward than a punishment. 

Because from my personal dealings with them I know that they 

would very much like to get out from under the treaty. And so I 

think they would welcome a U.S. decision to withdraw because that 

would obviate the need for them to withdraw. 
19 

That said, I suppose we do—we need to be mindful of what they 

are doing. We need to pay close attention. And it could be that at 

some point they step across a line that does jeopardize our security. 

And at that point of course we would have to take measures that 

might include withdrawing from the treaty and deploying countermeasures either in the area of missile defense or our own INFrange missiles. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, on that point, you know you were a lawyer, 

as I understand it, with the State Department. How would you define a difference between a violation and a material breach and the 

consequences of each? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Okay. Well, Mr. Chairman, the international 

law on that question is set forth in Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. And I can just read you what it 

says. It says ‘‘a material breach of a treaty consists in the violation 

of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty.’’ 

So you know I think the difference between a material breach 

and—let me put it this way. A violation—the difference between a 

violation that is a material breach and a violation that is not a material breach is that one that is a material breach is one that violates a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or 

purpose of the treaty. 

And so then you would have to look at what is the object and 

purpose of the treaty to determine what a material breach might 

be. I think the object and purpose of the INF Treaty is fundamentally to forbid the parties to possess or test INF-range missiles. 

The allegation in the New York Times article was that Russia 

has tested an INF-range treaty. So if that allegation were true, I 

think that would rise at the level of a material breach. 

Now I guess I should distinguish between reaching an internal 

legal conclusion that there has been a material breach and a decision to declare to the world or confront the other side with the accusation of a material breach. If the allegations in the New York 

Times story are true, I think as a legal matter there is a material 

breach. 

What we choose to do on the basis of that information is up to 

us. Again, I mean there is relevant international law on this. Just 

because there has been a material breach does not automatically 

terminate the treaty. It gives the victim of the breach the right to 

terminate the treaty, but it doesn’t automatically terminate it. 

In other words, it creates a situation where the treaty becomes 

voidable, but not necessarily void. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much. 

Chair now recognizes the ranking member for any additional 

questions he may have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

At some point in the questioning the issue came up about when 

the current administration knew about a possible violation of the 

INF Treaty and what we should have done to notify our allies 

about it. 

It is sometimes true, perhaps not always true that our means of 

detecting a violation is secret. And by revealing the knowledge that 
20 

we have, we might compromise sources and methods. And of course 

no one wants to do that, right? 

So since none of the witnesses have been able to have access to 

classified information we don’t really know the answer to the question of when revealing a treaty violation might compromise our intelligence gathering. So it might be a little bit hasty to presume 

that immediately on suspecting a violation we should have immediately made it a big issue. So sometimes the only exercise people 

get is jumping to conclusions. 

Now it is—I don’t want to jump to conclusions either. But it— 

just like I pointed out earlier that we are the only country that 

really has open forums on discussions like this. So that puts us at 

a disadvantage. 

So let’s not put ourselves at further disadvantage by establishing 

a de facto requirement that as soon as you learn something you tell 

everything you know. That would be silly because hopefully the 

purpose of hearings like this is to strengthen America, not to weaken America. And I sometimes worry that by exposing internal divisions, some of which are purely political, that we have the unintended consequence of aiding our enemies, not strengthening our 

own cause. 

I noted in Mr. Pifer’s testimony that he pointed out that it would 

be useful for the current administration to revive the Special 

Verification Commission, which apparently hasn’t even met since 

2007, and that might be a useful way. Can you tell me the composition of that commission and what purpose reinvigorating them 

might serve? 

Ambassador PIFER. Well, I think in terms of the U.S. engagement with the Russians on this issue there are two levels. One is 

the political channels, including at the Cabinet level, Secretary 

Kerry, Secretary Hagel, with their Russian counterparts. 

But the INF Treaty specifically established the Special 

Verification Commission. And one of its defined purposes in the 

treaty was to address issues or questions about compliance. So that 

would be where you would get into the technical level questions 

where you want to explore the alleged violation. Ask the Russians 

what is going on and try to get their explanation of it. 

Mr. COOPER. Who are the members of the Special Verification 

Commission, just Russians and Americans? It is not—does it have 

European representation? 

Ambassador PIFER. It is a U.S.-Russian commission, which I 

think—and this I am uncertain. The Belarusians, Kazakhstanis, 

and Ukrainians I think also have participation on the Russian side. 

This was a fact that when the Soviet Union collapsed you had INF 

systems in different countries. 

I believe two countries, Turkmenistan and I think Uzbekistan, 

basically said we won’t play. They only had one INF site that was 

eliminated on their territory. And then those other four countries, 

though, assumed the Russian obligations. So it is the U.S. on one 

side of the table, and then the Russians, Kazakhs, Belarusians, and 

Ukrainians on the other. 

Typically I think what the United States does though is that 

when there is this kind of group meets, if there are issues of impor-
21 

tance then we typically brief the allies. There are set up channels 

at NATO to do that. 

But I think you are correct. I think it actually has not met since 

2003. 

Mr. COOPER. Oh, really, that long a period of time? 

Ambassador PIFER. Well, the treaty basically—all of the reductions in the treaty were accomplished by 1991. All of the treaty inspections ended in 2001. So I think the mechanism remains there. 

It is an indefinite mechanism as the treaty is indefinite. But neither side over the last 11 years has called to use it. And I think 

in this case if there are the sorts of concerns that are suggested 

in the New York Times, it would be appropriate to activate that 

mechanism. 

Mr. COOPER. One other aspect of the INF Treaty that hasn’t been 

illuminated in this hearing is that it authorizes some pretty intrusive inspection mechanisms—inspection mechanisms that we apparently found very helpful in terms of inspecting Russian sites 

and talking with scientists and things like that. 

Are those still in place? You noted somewhere in your article, I 

think June 9, 2014, that in one location they were still in full force, 

but perhaps others had atrophied. Are we still under the INF Treaty conducting these on-site intrusive inspections? 

Ambassador PIFER. No, sir. The INF inspections were—in the 

treaty were to continue for 13 years after entry into force. So the 

last INF inspections ended in 2001. 

Mr. COOPER. Well, there was one site, I am sure I won’t pronounce the Russian—it seemed like out of habit we still had a presence, Votkinsk. 

Ambassador PIFER. Sir, that would be Votkinsk. What happened 

is we had a presence under the INF Treaty at Votkinsk. But we 

also had a presence under START I at Votkinsk. 

Mr. COOPER. So it is under the START I? 

Ambassador PIFER. Right. And the START I Treaty expired in 

2009, yes. 

Mr. COOPER. So our folks are there today, or no longer there? 

Ambassador PIFER. They left in 2009. 

Mr. COOPER. Got you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Franks, 

for 5 more minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman I 

would just try to make a couple points here. 

Senator Kerry recently stated if we are going to have treaties 

with people we have got to adhere to them. We are not going to 

pass another treaty in the U.S. Senate if our colleagues are sitting 

up here knowing somebody is cheating. 

I guess the first thing I would do, Mr. Rademaker, Mr. Thomas, 

and Ambassador, would you—do you agree with the Senator’s perspective? Do you agree with his position? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. You are referring to the recorded comments of 

Senator Kerry when—— 

Mr. FRANKS. Yes. 
22 

Mr. RADEMAKER [continuing]. When we found this at the Foreign 

Relations Committee? He is certainly more expert on what the Senate is prepared to do—— 

Mr. FRANKS. I am not asking for his expertise. I am asking for 

yours. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. You know I think I agree with his observations. 

Mr. FRANKS. Okay. Mr. Thomas. 

Mr. THOMAS. I think we clearly have an interest in ensuring adherence to the treaties that we have entered, and making sure as 

long as they are enforced. 

Mr. FRANKS. I don’t mean to be redundant here, but Mr. Ambassador, do you think that it is important that we adhere to them 

and—— 

Ambassador PIFER. No, adherence to the treaty is absolutely important. Although I would point out in the past that although there 

have at times been questions about Russian or Soviet observance 

of the ABM treaty, the Reagan administration went ahead and concluded additional treaties. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, in response to the Soviet Union’s violation of 

that AMB missile treaty, 23 members of the House of Representatives, led by Les Aspin, Harry Reid, and Barney Frank, that is not 

exactly the conservative opportunity society, wrote that violations 

of the ABM treaty went to ‘‘the heart of arms control process. And 

adherence to existing treaties is a necessity in order for future 

agreements to be possible. And that if this problem is not resolved 

in a satisfactory matter it will have serious consequences for the 

future of arms control and the arms control process.’’ 

You all think that the majority leader of the Senate at that time 

was correct when he wrote that letter? And is that a standard that 

should apply today? 

I am just trying to be real basic here. I am not trying to over— 

you know, but the bottom line is, it is not a small issue. If we don’t 

adhere to our treaties, if we don’t enforce them, you know. And I 

just am convinced that we are in the process of demonstrating that 

we are willing to stick by a treaty and let our potential opponents 

go their own way. And I think that has profound implications. 

I am afraid that this administration is doing for vacillation and 

provocative weakness what Stonehenge did for rocks. And I am 

concerned that this is sending a message that the world over, and 

that it is at the heart of some of the instability in the world. 

If we don’t have a clear, clarion message that America is a faithful partner to a treaty and requires people to be faithful to them, 

then not only is the treaty process vitiated, but ultimately the 

whole attitude of the world is you can’t depend on America. 

You know we had the agreement with the Ukraine that if they 

would give up their nuclear weapons that America would protect 

their sovereignty, their physical sovereignty. Russia said the same 

thing. 

Now, Russia might have sort of abrogated that, but we did too. 

And this President didn’t even apply some of the sanctions that he 

could have, much less military response. 

And the entire glue of an alliance that holds it together is that 

you believe that you can count on your partners. You can count on 

your allies to be there when you need them. And I am afraid that 
23 

we are just sending this message that America is no longer really 

going to be a committed partner. 

So I am hoping, I am hoping that the three of you in this discussion today will elevate this issue. Because in my judgment there 

is no doubt that the Russians have abrogated this treaty. And if 

we have no response, it is not good news for our children and future generations. 

And I hope if nothing else comes from this committee that we— 

this particular hearing, that we somehow tell the world that there 

is still an America that you can count on. And right now that is 

not what the world thinks. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. I want to thank the witnesses for being here. I do want to announce that today Chairman 

Poe and I have sent a letter to Secretary Kerry to tend to this issue 

and start looking at what we should do about these violations. 

Thank all of you. I know it takes a lot of time to prepare for 

these things, and I appreciate your attendance here today. It has 

been very helpful. 

And with that, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

JULY 17, 2014 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JULY 17, 2014 

(145) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. How important is it that the U.S. shows the Russian Federation that 

they cannot profit from this violation? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. It’s pretty clear that the Russian Federation vehemently dislikes 

U.S. missile defenses and plans for more missile defenses. Is that leverage in this 

case? How so? 

a. If Aegis Ashore can defend against these capabilities, with ‘‘minor’’ modifications according to the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, should we be sure 

that capability is deployed in Romania and Poland? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. It’s pretty clear that the Russian Federation vehemently dislikes 

U.S. prompt global strike systems planning and development. Is that leverage in 

this case? 

a. Please describe the role of these systems in Asia. 

b. Please describe why you understand DOD wants these systems and has a military requirement for them. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. If the Administration knew about the INF violation since 2008, was 

it obligated to advise Congress of it at the earliest opportunity? Could there be a 

good reason to decide not to share that information with the Senate at the time? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. If the Administration has decided to call the INF violation a ‘‘violation’’ does the Administration owe it to the Congress to advise the Congress before 

it informs Russia? Does it have an obligation to share this determination with our 

Article V NATO allies before Russia? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. In a report appearing on the Daily Beast website, it was reported 

that, while serving as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, thenSenator John Kerry held a classified hearing of his committee on Russia’s INF violations. He is reported to have stated: 

‘‘If we’re going to have treaties with people, we’ve got to adhere to them . . . We’re 

not going to pass another treaty in the U.S. Senate if our colleagues are sitting up 

here knowing somebody is cheating.’’ 

Do you agree with Senator Kerry’s position? 

a. In response to the Soviet Union’s violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 

23 members of the House of Representatives, led by Les Aspin, Harry Reid, and 

Barney Frank, wrote that violations of the ABM treaty went ‘‘to the heart of the 

arms control process’’ and that ‘‘adherence to existing treaties is a necessity in order 

for future agreements to be possible’’ and that ‘‘[i]f this problem is not resolved in 

a satisfactory manner, it will have serious consequences for the future of the arms 

control process’’. 

Was the current majority leader of the Senate correct when he wrote that letter? 

Is that the standard that should apply today? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. How long should the U.S. continue to unilaterally be bound by the 

INF treaty? We are at present, apparently, the only party complying with the treaty. Do we let this drag on for 6 years—in some ways it already, reportedly, has (according to the New York Times)—like the Russian violations of CFE did? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. What are the benefits and risks of seeking to ‘‘multilateralize’’ the 

INF treaty? What are the odds China is willing to eliminate its hundreds of intermediate-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles? 

a. Is there a risk to going down this road? Can we be diplomatically out-maneuvered by the Russians? Does it risk making their violation look legitimate? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Is the INF treaty still relevant for today’s security environment? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 
146 

Mr. ROGERS. What about other violations? Russia is known not to be complying 

with the CTBT. Do we need to resolve that too? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Russia is seeking U.S. support for new aircraft and sensors under 

the Open Skies treaty. But, Russia isn’t complying with that treaty; should we approve those new aircraft and sensors if Russia isn’t in compliance? Should we use 

this treaty, which Russia clearly values, as leverage to obtain Russian compliance 

with INF? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Russia got the U.S. to agree to unilateral reductions, while Russia 

is actually building up its nuclear forces under New START. Do we need to let Russia know that continued U.S. compliance with New START cannot be assured if 

Russia is going to violate INF and threaten our allies? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Should the U.S. be concerned about new Russian missiles, like the 

RS–26 Rubezh, which Russia has tested at intermediate-range, but, Russia is calling an ICBM? Or should we be content that Russia promises us it will agree to 

count that missile under New START? 

a. Russia is said to be preparing to deploy this system in 2015 in Irkutsk, suggestion that, for an intermediate range missile, the target is China. What does this do 

to claims that Russia is breaking out of INF due to U.S. missile defense? 

b. Do you believe that there is a loophole in New START and INF allowing Russia 

to develop an IRBM but to call it an ICBM? 

c. If this was known during New START ratification, is there any reason to allow 

Russia to negotiate in this loophole? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Should our allies feel safe and secure because they are promising 

to count these intermediate range missiles as ICBMs? Why or why not? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Are ground-launched intermediate range ballistic missiles and cruise 

missiles different than submarine-launched, or air-launched, missiles of the same 

type and range? How? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. If you believe in arms control, shouldn’t you be the most committed 

to seeing this treaty enforced? To punishing cheating and violations in all forms? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. What are some political and economic consequences that the President and Congress should impose? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Why is Russia developing and deploying a new ground-launched 

cruise missile in violation of the INF Treaty? What are the military and/or geopolitical benefits for Russia derived from this new intermediate-range missile? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. How important is the continuation of the INF treaty to U.S. interests? What would be the positive and/or negative impact from its demise? Would 

there be a significant impact on PGS and other planned or existing programs? On 

balance, should we walk away from the treaty? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Would any of our allies feel sufficiently threatened to take compensatory action or would they assume that is solely the responsibility of the U.S.? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. The INF treaty is the only treaty the U.S. has ratified that has 

eliminated whole types and classes of nuclear weapons. What is the impact to President Obama’s legacy if this treaty is ‘‘broken’’ on his watch? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. How important is it that the U.S. shows the Russian Federation that 

they cannot profit from this violation? 

Mr. THOMAS. It is very important that Russia comply with its treaty obligations. 

Failure on the part of Russia to do so in the case of the INF Treaty calls into question the credibility of its other treaty commitments, as well as the wisdom of entering into any future arms control agreements with it. A muted response to a violation 

of the INF Treaty on the part of the U.S. could embolden Russia to further violate 

the Treaty or assume that it can similarly violate other arms control agreements 

with impunity and potentially endanger the prospects for continued strategic stability. 

Mr. ROGERS. It’s pretty clear that the Russian Federation vehemently dislikes 

U.S. missile defenses and plans for more missile defenses. Is that leverage in this 

case? How so? 
147 

a. If Aegis Ashore can defend against these capabilities, with ‘‘minor’’ modifications according to the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, should we be sure 

that capability is deployed in Romania and Poland? 

Mr. THOMAS. U.S. plans for enhancing the defense of CONUS, its field forces and 

facilities in Europe, as well as protecting NATO allies from ballistic missile attack 

should move ahead irrespective of Russian compliance or non-compliance with the 

INF Treaty. ‘‘Leverage’’ implies that a certain capability or action is conditional on 

something else. Pursuit of enhanced missile defense capabilities should be unconditional. 

a. I believe that Aegis Ashore should be deployed in Romania and Poland irrespective of the status of the INF Treaty or any potential capability modifications. 

Mr. ROGERS. It’s pretty clear that the Russian Federation vehemently dislikes 

U.S. prompt global strike systems planning and development. Is that leverage in 

this case? 

a. Please describe the role of these systems in Asia. 

b. Please describe why you understand DOD wants these systems and has a military requirement for them. 

Mr. THOMAS. Again, we should make decisions about Prompt Strike on the merits 

of the program, rather than viewing the capability as a bargaining chip vis-a`-vis 

Russia regarding the INF Treaty. At the same time, demonstrating that the United 

States has credible military options to pursue should the INF Treaty no longer be 

in force may backstop diplomatic efforts to bring Russian back into compliance and/ 

or modify the Treaty in the future. That would require initiating significant research and development efforts to ensure that the United States has a capability 

it would be able to deploy should the treaty end up being abrogated. 

a. IRBM-class systems could play a very important role in Asia to symmetrically 

counter China’s extant, large arsenal of same-class systems. 

b. From the Unclassified version of the Joint Staff Report on Conventional Prompt 

Global Strike, ‘‘[Conventional Prompt Global Strike] systems could be employed to 

strike globally, precisely, and rapidly with lethal kinetic effects against high-payoff, 

time-sensitive targets in denied and/or geographically isolated areas when other 

forces are not available, not responsive enough, or not preferred.’’ These conditions 

could exist when required to strike targets in one or more theaters simultaneously, 

there is limited or no military presence in a region, and/or anti-access/area-denial 

systems pose high risks projecting conventional U.S. forces into those theaters. 

Prompt, extended-range strike systems could mitigate these risks and complicate 

potential adversaries’ planning. They could play a crucial role, moreover, in deterring multiple countries simultaneously. 

Mr. ROGERS. If the Administration knew about the INF violation since 2008, was 

it obligated to advise Congress of it at the earliest opportunity? Could there be a 

good reason to decide not to share that information with the Senate at the time? 

Mr. THOMAS. I am not privy to the Administration’s thinking on compliance issues 

or the considerations that might have influenced the timing of its most recent report 

submission and declaration of a Russian INF Treaty violation. My understanding 

is that the Congress requires the submission of a compliance report on an annual 

basis. Current and previous administrations have spotty records on the timely submission of compliance reports, but good governance would suggest they should provide the basic facts in a timely manner that would inform Congressional deliberations, not limited to the INF Treaty. 

Mr. ROGERS. If the Administration has decided to call the INF violation a ‘‘violation’’ does the Administration owe it to the Congress to advise the Congress before 

it informs Russia? Does it have an obligation to share this determination with our 

Article V NATO allies before Russia? 

Mr. THOMAS. Informing the Congress and U.S. Allies of any determination of a 

treaty violation would be prudent as it would foster a unified, coordinated response 

and increase the pressure that could be applied to resolve the violation swiftly and 

bring all Parties into compliance. 

Mr. ROGERS. In a report appearing on the Daily Beast website, it was reported 

that, while serving as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, thenSenator John Kerry held a classified hearing of his committee on Russia’s INF violations. He is reported to have stated: 

‘‘If we’re going to have treaties with people, we’ve got to adhere to them . . . We’re 

not going to pass another treaty in the U.S. Senate if our colleagues are sitting up 

here knowing somebody is cheating.’’ 

Do you agree with Senator Kerry’s position? 

a. In response to the Soviet Union’s violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 

23 members of the House of Representatives, led by Les Aspin, Harry Reid, and 

Barney Frank, wrote that violations of the ABM treaty went ‘‘to the heart of the 
148 

arms control process’’ and that ‘‘adherence to existing treaties is a necessity in order 

for future agreements to be possible’’ and that ‘‘[i]f this problem is not resolved in 

a satisfactory manner, it will have serious consequences for the future of the arms 

control process’’. 

Was the current majority leader of the Senate correct when he wrote that letter? 

Is that the standard that should apply today? 

Mr. THOMAS. Yes. 

a. Yes, adherence to existing arms control agreements should weigh heavily in 

contemplating future arms control initiatives, since it speaks fundamentally to the 

necessary political underpinnings of any such arrangement. 

Mr. ROGERS. How long should the U.S. continue to unilaterally be bound by the 

INF treaty? We are at present, apparently, the only party complying with the treaty. Do we let this drag on for 6 years—in some ways it already, reportedly, has (according to the New York Times)—like the Russian violations of CFE did? 

Mr. THOMAS. Russian violation of the INF Treaty comes at a time of great strategic uncertainty. While compliance issues must be swiftly addressed, the United 

States should also evaluate the INF Treaty in broader, global context. A treaty that 

bars two countries from pursuing certain classes of missiles, while imposing no restriction on other states—some of which pose serious threats towards the United 

States and its allies—doing the same, must be constantly re-evaluated to determine 

the tipping point when the costs of arms control overtake the benefits. That day is 

quickly approaching. The United States must look beyond the INF Treaty and begin 

taking appropriate precautionary steps. Paradoxically, doing so may offer the best 

course to preserving the viability of the treaty farther into the future. 

Mr. ROGERS. What are the benefits and risks of seeking to ‘‘multilateralize’’ the 

INF treaty? What are the odds China is willing to eliminate its hundreds of intermediate-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles? 

a. Is there a risk to going down this road? Can we be diplomatically out-maneuvered by the Russians? Does it risk making their violation look legitimate? 

Mr. THOMAS. Multilateralizing the treaty, assuming all signatories would come 

into full compliance and eliminate their INF-class weapons, would, in theory, be the 

best option to safeguard the viability of the treaty much farther into the future. Absent efforts to multilateralize or otherwise amend it, the treaty will increasingly be 

at odds with broader U.S. and allied interests. Conventional wisdom holds that 

China would never be willing to sign onto the treaty and eliminate its inventory of 

intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles. This is reminiscent of conventional 

wisdom that preceded the original INF Treaty in the 1980s. Many felt that Russia 

would never eliminate its intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles. However, 

in the face of a determined effort by the United States to develop and field INFclass systems and the willingness of European allies for host forward-based systems, 

Russia returned to the negotiations that quickly led to the Treaty’s endgame. Similarly, if China faced a credible prospect of neighboring countries and/or the United 

States developing and eventually deploying such systems, it too might be highly 

incentivized to become of signatory. 

a. The issues should be addressed sequentially. Ideally, the United States and 

Russia should satisfactorily resolve the issues surrounding Russian violation of the 

INF Treaty before taking on the issue of multilateralization. 

Mr. ROGERS. Is the INF treaty still relevant for today’s security environment? 

Mr. THOMAS. Suspected Russian violations of the INF Treaty come at a time of 

great strategic uncertainty. While compliance issues must be swiftly addressed, the 

United States should also evaluate the INF Treaty in broader, global context. A 

treaty that bars two countries from pursuing certain classes of missiles, while imposing no restriction on other states—some of which pose serious threats towards 

the United States and its allies—doing the same, must be constantly re-evaluated 

to determine the tipping point when the costs of arms control overtake the benefits. 

That day is quickly approaching. The United States must look beyond the INF Treaty and begin taking appropriate precautionary steps. Paradoxically, doing so may 

offer the best course to preserving the viability of the treaty farther into the future. 

Mr. ROGERS. What about other violations? Russia is known not to be complying 

with the CTBT. Do we need to resolve that too? 

Mr. THOMAS. In general, turning a blind eye to any treaty violation might encourage further violations. All allegations of treaty violations should be carefully and 

fully investigated and resolved. 

Mr. ROGERS. Russia is seeking U.S. support for new aircraft and sensors under 

the Open Skies treaty. But, Russia isn’t complying with that treaty; should we approve those new aircraft and sensors if Russia isn’t in compliance? Should we use 

this treaty, which Russia clearly values, as leverage to obtain Russian compliance 

with INF? 
149 

Mr. THOMAS. I am unfamiliar with these specific Open Skies issues, but consistent 

with my earlier answers I believe non-compliance issues are always serious matters 

that should logically be resolved prior to undertaking new initiatives under existing 

agreements or contemplating new arms control agreements. 

Mr. ROGERS. Russia got the U.S. to agree to unilateral reductions, while Russia 

is actually building up its nuclear forces under New START. Do we need to let Russia know that continued U.S. compliance with New START cannot be assured if 

Russia is going to violate INF and threaten our allies? 

Mr. THOMAS. I would expect the United States, just as I would expect Russia or 

any other signatory, to honor binding treaty commitments. 

INF violations should be considered carefully and factored into consideration of 

any future arms control initiatives involving Russia. 

Mr. ROGERS. Should the U.S. be concerned about new Russian missiles, like the 

RS–26 Rubezh, which Russia has tested at intermediate-range, but, Russia is calling an ICBM? Or should we be content that Russia promises us it will agree to 

count that missile under New START? 

a. Russia is said to be preparing to deploy this system in 2015 in Irkutsk, suggestion that, for an intermediate range missile, the target is China. What does this do 

to claims that Russia is breaking out of INF due to U.S. missile defense? 

b. Do you believe that there is a loophole in New START and INF allowing Russia 

to develop an IRBM but to call it an ICBM? 

c. If this was known during New START ratification, is there any reason to allow 

Russia to negotiate in this loophole? 

Mr. THOMAS. The development of systems such as the RS–26 at the seam between 

the INF Treaty and New START should be of concern to the United States and its 

allies. Ballistic missiles launched from Russia would obviously have shorter time of 

flight to targets in Europe than in North America thereby reducing warning time 

and the opportunities to engage them, which would diminish strategic stability. 

a. If Russia does indeed deploy intermediate-range missiles to operating areas 

from which they could range China, it would suggest it views the PRC as a military 

threat. This is likely only one of a variety of factors that would weigh in any Russian decision to exit the treaty, which suggests U.S. missile defense deployments are 

possibly a pretext more than a reason for Russian dissatisfaction with the Treaty. 

b. There is no safeguard in New START that would preclude a country from firing 

an ICBM at less than continental ranges. 

c. One of the pitfalls of arms control agreements is that they may have unforeseen 

(or at least not widely appreciated or publicized) consequences. 

Mr. ROGERS. Should our allies feel safe and secure because they are promising 

to count these intermediate range missiles as ICBMs? Why or why not? 

Mr. THOMAS. Our allies should be concerned about any capabilities that could be 

deployed and used to target them for short-warning nuclear attack. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are ground-launched intermediate range ballistic missiles and cruise 

missiles different than submarine-launched, or air-launched, missiles of the same 

type and range? How? 

Mr. THOMAS. Ground-based missile systems have several advantages over submarine and air-launched missile platforms. First, ground-based missile platforms do 

not need to be as sophisticated as their airborne and undersea counterparts. This 

reduces their cost significantly, allowing far greater numbers to be constructed at 

similar cost. Second, ground-based systems have survivability advantages. Fixedplacement systems can be hardened, while mobile systems can quickly relocate after 

firing and thus present targeting challenges. Third, ground-based systems are easier 

to develop with partner states, which facilitates burden sharing. Together, these factors suggest that the proliferation of ground-based intermediate-range missile systems are an effective way to hold adversary targets at risk, imposing steep costs 

for relatively less investment compared to airborne and undersea systems. 

Mr. ROGERS. If you believe in arms control, shouldn’t you be the most committed 

to seeing this treaty enforced? To punishing cheating and violations in all forms? 

Mr. THOMAS. The failure to enforce arms control agreements erodes confidence in 

arms control as a viable national security instrument. It is difficult to see why the 

United States should pursue future arms control initiatives with a party that is violating existing agreements. 

Mr. ROGERS. What are some political and economic consequences that the President and Congress should impose? 

Mr. THOMAS. There is a range of political and economic steps that could be taken 

to impose costs on Russia for non-compliance, but they will be most effective with 

the support and active participation of like-minded nations. Russian violations of 

the INF Treaty pose an even greater threat to allies overseas than they do to the 

United States. Ideally, U.S. allies would take a far more prominent role in con-
150 

fronting Russia. The United States should therefore endeavor to ensure that it 

maintains, and where necessary strengthens, its strategic solidarity with its allies 

around the world. 

Mr. ROGERS. Why is Russia developing and deploying a new ground-launched 

cruise missile in violation of the INF Treaty? What are the military and/or geopolitical benefits for Russia derived from this new intermediate-range missile? 

Mr. THOMAS. Providing means of delivery for either a conventional or nuclear 

warhead, an intermediate-range GLCM would have benefits for Russia in terms of 

greater accuracy, flight path/survivability, and covert deployment. 

Mr. ROGERS. How important is the continuation of the INF treaty to U.S. interests? What would be the positive and/or negative impact from its demise? Would 

there be a significant impact on PGS and other planned or existing programs? On 

balance, should we walk away from the treaty? 

Mr. THOMAS. Continuation of the INF Treaty would be important to safeguard 

U.S. interests insofar as it encompasses additional countries possessing INF-class 

systems worldwide. The demise of the treaty could have a positive outcome should 

it allow the United States to develop INF-class conventional missiles, should the 

United States choose to field them in significant numbers, and should allies and 

partners agree to host forward-based systems. 

The major downside of exiting the treaty would be the risk of horizontal and 

vertical proliferation of the same systems in ways that could threaten our allies. 

Paradoxically, the best ways to bolster the U.S. negotiating position to amend the 

treaty, or to hedge against the treaty’s demise, are the same: to develop credible 

IRBM and GLCM options. Before abandoning the treaty, the United States would 

be well-served to attempt to adapt and modify the treaty, including in ways to ensure the adherence of all parties to the amended requirements, in ways that suit 

U.S. interests. Backstopping such a negotiating effort, the Department of Defense 

should pursue research and development options that would make far more credible 

the threat of the United States fielding a robust intermediate-range missile force 

if the treaty lapsed. 

Mr. ROGERS. Would any of our allies feel sufficiently threatened to take compensatory action or would they assume that is solely the responsibility of the U.S.? 

Mr. THOMAS. Our allies’ interests are at risk with the Russian INF violation. This 

is not just an issue for the United States. Indeed, NATO Secretary General Fogh 

Rasmussen said on July 30 that ‘‘[the INF Treaty] remains a key element of EuroAtlantic security—one that benefits our mutual security and must be preserved.’’ 

U.S. allies beyond Europe should also give the issues surrounding intermediaterange weapons greater attention, as it affects the security and interests of allies in 

multiple theaters. 

One possibility is that in the future, even if the United States remained bound 

by the Treaty, its allies and partners which are not parties to the Treaty could independently develop, test and deploy INF-proscribed systems. One of the United 

States’ distinct advantages over its rivals is its portfolio of alliances. Were U.S. allies and partners to field IRBMs and GLCMs while Russia and the United States 

remained parties to the Treaty, this could disadvantage Russia and create a favorable asymmetry for the United States. 

Mr. ROGERS. The INF treaty is the only treaty the U.S. has ratified that has 

eliminated whole types and classes of nuclear weapons. What is the impact to President Obama’s legacy if this treaty is ‘‘broken’’ on his watch? 

Mr. THOMAS. Irrespective of the historical legacy of the INF Treaty, if it is broken 

due to Russian violations, Moscow should bear the fully responsibility for the treaty’s demise. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you now believe you were misled by Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of State Frank Rose when he counseled you to write an article that has been proven 

to be at least misleading, and in reality inaccurate; and which Mr. Rose knew (or 

at least should have known) at the time to be inaccurate? 

Ambassador PIFER. Mr. Rose did not mislead me, and I do not believe that my 

July 16, 2013 article, ‘‘Allegations of Russian Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 

Treaty Violations—Where’s the Beef?,’’ was misleading or inaccurate. I wrote 

‘‘Where’s the Beef’’ after reading news articles in late June and the first half of July 

2013 that asserted that the Russian Yars-M ballistic missile (also referred to as the 

RS–26) was a violation of the INF Treaty. 

The articles—see, for example, Bill Gertz’s ‘‘Russian Aggression: Putin Violating 

Nuclear Missile Treaty’’ in the June 25, 2013 Washington Free Beacon—asserted 

that the Yars-M/RS–26 was a violation of the INF Treaty because it had been tested 

to a range of 2000 kilometers, whereas the INF Treaty bans all ground-launched 

ballistic missiles with ranges between 500 and 5500 kilometers. The Yars-M/RS–26, 

however, had also been tested to a range of 5800 kilometers. 
151 

The 2010 New START Treaty, as the 1991 START I Treaty, defines an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) as ‘‘a land-based missile with a range in excess of 

5500 kilometers,’’ while the INF Treaty bans ground-launched ballistic missiles with 

ranges ‘‘in excess of 500 kilometers’’ but ‘‘not in excess of 5500 kilometers.’’ My assessment thus was that, because the Yars-M/RS–26 had flown in excess of 5500 kilometers, it was a permitted ICBM, not a ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic missile. 

That seemed straightforward to me. When writing ‘‘Where’s the Beef?,’’ I contacted Mr. Rose and asked whether my assessment of the Yars-M/RS–26 was correct. He confirmed that my understanding that the Yars-M/RS–26 was a permitted 

ICBM was consistent with the U.S. government’s view. 

That is the assessment reflected in ‘‘Where’s the Beef?’’ That article dealt solely 

with the allegation regarding the Yars-M/RS–26 ballistic missile. At the time when 

I wrote the article, I was not aware of U.S. government concerns about the Russian 

test of a ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missile. 

Mr. ROGERS. If the article focused on the RS–26 as you say, do you think it was 

incumbent upon DAS Frank Rose to tell you there were other INF violations that 

were of concern so that you did not write such allegations were ‘‘frivolous,’’ when 

it turns out they are quite substantial, and were substantial at the time, as DAS 

Frank Rose knew (or at least should have known)? 

Ambassador PIFER. The ‘‘Where’s the Beef?’’ article clearly addresses only the allegation that the Yars-M/RS–26 ballistic missile was a violation of the INF Treaty. 

That was the only allegation of a Russian INF Treaty violation of which I was 

aware when I wrote the article, and my question to Mr. Rose dealt solely with the 

Yars-M/RS–26 ballistic missile. 

Had Mr. Rose volunteered information about the cruise missile concern, I certainly would have been interested. However, given what I understand to be the classified level at which information regarding the cruise missile issue was held at the 

time, it would have been a serious breach of security regulations for him to share 

it with me. 

Mr. ROGERS. Why is the article still up on the Brookings web page? In the name 

of intellectual and academic honesty, shouldn’t it be rescinded and taken down (or 

at a minimum updated/corrected)? 

Ambassador PIFER. The ‘‘Where’s the Beef?’’ article clearly addresses only the allegation that the Yars-M/RS–26 ballistic missile was a violation of the INF Treaty. 

I believe that the article’s conclusion that the Yars-M/RS–26 is a permitted ICBM, 

not a ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic missile, remains valid and that 

this allegation of a violation has no basis in the treaty. 

The New York Times carried a story by Michael Gordon on January 29, 2014, 

‘‘U.S. Says Russia Tested Missile, Despite Treaty,’’ which revealed the U.S. government’s concern that Russia had tested a ground-launched intermediate-range cruise 

missile in violation of the INF Treaty. My articles subsequent to that (which are 

posted on the Brookings web-page) draw a distinction between the allegation regarding the Yars-M/RS–26 ballistic missile and the reported violation by the testing of 

a ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missile. See, for example, ‘‘The Moscow Missile Mystery: Is Russia Actually Violating the INF Treaty?’’ in Foreign Policy, January 31, 2014 and ‘‘Don’t Scrap the INF Treaty’’ in The National Interest, 

June 9, 2014. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER 

Mr. COOPER. How did the administration deal with the ABM Treaty violations, 

and what was the outcome? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. COOPER. How did the administration deal with the ABM Treaty violations, 

and what was the outcome? 

Mr. THOMAS. Following the Reagan administration’s discovery that the Soviet 

Union’s large phased-array radar at Krasnoyarsk violated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic 

Missile Treaty, the administration decided not allow that violation to affect its 

broader arms control agenda, even as U.S. and Soviet officials worked to resolve the 

violation. Ultimately, under enormous pressure, the Soviet Union granted U.S. inspectors access to Krasnoyarsk enabling them to establish beyond doubt that it constituted an ABM Treaty violation, which the Soviets finally acknowledged. Had the 

entire arms control process been halted, the United States and Soviet Union would 

not have entered into the INF Treaty a few years later. Some have said that the 

United States should bear this incident in mind when considering how the INF 

Treaty violation should affect the broader arms control agenda. Others might argue 
152 

that the situation is different today and requires a different approach. Whereas 

broad trends in the mid-1980s suggested a thawing in Soviet-U.S. relations, the opposite appears to be occurring at the present time. 

Mr. COOPER. Is the INF treaty of enduring significance, militarily or otherwise, 

to the United States, Russia or NATO and its members? Why? 

Ambassador PIFER. The INF Treaty was a landmark arms control agreement, resulting in the elimination of nearly 2700 U.S. and Soviet missiles, their launchers 

and other associated equipment. It dramatically reduced the nuclear threat to 

American allies in Europe and Asia and was warmly welcomed by those allies, as 

well as by other states. 

The INF Treaty continues to be in the security interest of the United States and 

its allies, as it constrains the Russian nuclear threat. This is particularly the case 

as there are no plans and, as far as I know, no serious U.S. military requirement 

for ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic or cruise missiles. (U.S. strategic 

nuclear forces, U.S. dual-capable aircraft and nuclear bombs deployed in Europe, 

and the ability to forward deploy U.S. dual-capable aircraft and nuclear bombs to 

the Western Pacific currently provide the nuclear umbrella to U.S. allies in Europe 

and Asia.) 

Were the INF Treaty to cease to be in force, I would expect U.S. allies in Europe 

and Asia to be concerned that Russia would then be free to build without any constraint ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles that could 

directly threaten their territory. Such missiles would also pose a direct threat to 

U.S. forces deployed forward in Europe and Asia. 

At several points over the past decade, senior Russian officials have publicly questioned whether continued adherence to the INF Treaty was in Russia’s interest. 

They have noted that the treaty’s ban applies only to Russia and the United States 

(actually, it also applies to Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine). They have expressed 

concern that other countries near Russia possess or are developing intermediaterange missiles. Russia thus may hold a different view of the significance of the INF 

Treaty than do the United States and U.S. allies. 

Mr. COOPER. If Russia is found to be in violation of the INF treaty in the upcoming report, what should the U.S. do? 

a. What are our options for bringing Russia back into compliance with the treaty? 

[Question #51, for cross-reference.} 

Ambassador PIFER. The U.S. government has concluded that Russia violated the 

INF Treaty by testing a prohibited ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missile. This is a serious matter. The U.S. government should take several measures 

in response, with the objective of having Russia return to full compliance with the 

treaty: 

First, the administration should use opportunities in diplomatic channels, including meetings at the cabinet/ministerial-level, to raise the question with Russian officials and press them to resolve U.S. concerns and come back into full compliance 

with the treaty. 

Second, the administration should contact Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and 

Ukraine and convene a meeting of the Special Verification Commission, established 

by the INF Treaty in part as a venue for addressing INF compliance issues. 

Third, U.S. officials should brief NATO allies, Asian allies (particularly Japan and 

South Korea) and other interested countries, including China and India, about U.S. 

concerns. Were Russia to deploy a new ground-launched intermediate-range cruise 

missile, it would pose a direct threat to countries in Europe and Asia. This should 

not remain just a bilateral U.S.-Russian issue; Washington should do what it can 

to make this a question between the Russian government and its neighbors—the 

states that would be directly threatened were Russia to deploy new intermediaterange missiles. 

Fourth, the Pentagon could consider a feasibility study on possible new U.S. 

ground-launched intermediate-range missiles. Given budget pressures and the current lack of a defined priority military requirement, there would be little sense in 

proceeding to develop or acquire such missiles. However, the prospect of a future 

Pershing III or new ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missile might remind Moscow of the value of the INF Treaty. 

While pursuing these steps, it would be in the U.S. interest to continue to observe 

the INF Treaty. Although at some later date it might be appropriate to consider 

withdrawal, for example, if Russia deployed intermediate-range missiles, at this 

point there are sound reasons for continuing to adhere to the treaty: 

First, if Washington withdrew from the treaty, it could be seen as responsible for 

ending the agreement. Moscow would certainly prefer that Washington initiate 

withdrawal and take the political heat for ending the treaty, and it would do everything in its power to place the blame on the United States. 
153 

Second, a U.S. withdrawal that ended the treaty would leave Russia free to test, 

produce and deploy ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles 

without constraint. That would increase the threat to and raise concern on the part 

of U.S. allies. 

Third, at present, the Pentagon has no plans for ground-launched intermediaterange ballistic or cruise missiles. A U.S. withdrawal from the treaty would leave 

Russia free to deploy missiles for which the United States has no counterpart. 

Developing new U.S. intermediate-range missiles would take time and would impose a new burden on an already stretched Pentagon budget. It would draw funds 

from other defense accounts, such as the modernization of strategic nuclear forces, 

missile defense or new conventional weapons systems. 

Fourth, even if the United States were to build new ground-launched intermediate-range missiles, it is not clear where it would deploy them. Those missiles 

would pose a serious response to a Russian treaty violation only if deployed in Europe, Japan or South Korea, but it is unlikely that any of those allies would welcome the prospect of hosting such missiles. Deploying intermediate-range missiles 

in the continental United States would make little sense, as they could only hold 

targets in the Western Hemisphere at risk. 

Mr. COOPER. How did the administration deal with the ABM Treaty violations, 

and what was the outcome? 

Ambassador PIFER. (I understand this to refer to the Reagan and George H. W. 

Bush administrations.) 

The Reagan administration had several concerns regarding Soviet compliance 

with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and its 1974 protocol. The primary concern dealt with Soviet construction of a large-phased array radar near 

Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia. 

The ABM Treaty and its protocol limited the United States and Soviet Union each 

to one ABM interceptor deployment area. In order to ensure that large phased-array 

radars (LPARs) located outside deployment areas would be used for permitted early 

warning purposes but not for battle management (i.e., guiding ABM interceptors to 

their targets), the treaty required that LPARs outside of the deployment areas be 

located on the periphery of a country’s territory and oriented outward. 

In 1983, the U.S. intelligence community detected construction of an LPAR at 

Krasnoyarsk. The radar was more than 800 kilometers (500 miles) from the Russian-Mongolian border and, instead of being oriented outward—i.e., toward the 

south—it faced to the east, over a broad expanse of Soviet territory. 

The Reagan administration judged that the radar constituted a violation of the 

ABM Treaty. U.S. officials raised the radar at the fall 1983 session of the Standing 

Consultative Commission, the body established by the ABM Treaty to address, 

among other issues, questions about treaty compliance. 

The Soviets asserted that the Krasnoyarsk LPAR would be used for space-tracking purposes, an implausible claim given that few space orbits would pass through 

the radar’s field of view. However, the LPAR did have an excellent view of the attack corridor for U.S. submarine-launched ballistic missiles flying out of the northern Pacific Ocean to targets in the central Soviet Union. The radar plugged a gap 

in the Soviets’ early warning radar coverage; to gain the same early warning coverage without violating the ABM Treaty, the Soviets would have had to build two 

LPARs in the Soviet Far East. 

A January 1984 White House report to Congress assessed that the Krasnoyarsk 

LPAR ‘‘constitutes a violation of legal obligations under the Anti-Ballistic Missile 

Treaty of 1972 in that in its associated siting, orientation and capability, it is prohibited by this Treaty.’’ U.S. officials continued to press the Soviets on the radar. 

The Reagan administration later considered declaring the radar a ‘‘material 

breach’’ of the ABM Treaty, a term that would have provided stronger grounds for 

withdrawal from the treaty. But Washington did not withdraw. 

In 1989, the Soviets conceded that the radar was a ‘‘technical’’ violation of the 

ABM Treaty in that its location was inconsistent with the treaty’s requirements. 

They argued that the radar was for early warning purposes (likely true, though that 

did not make the radar compliant with the letter of the treaty). In 1990, the Soviets 

agreed to dismantle the radar—seven years after the U.S. intelligence community 

first detected it. 

Over the seven years between the discovery of the Krasnoyarsk radar’s construction and the Soviet decision to dismantle it, the Reagan and George H. W. Bush 

administrations continued to observe the ABM Treaty, even as they raised their concerns about the radar and its compliance with the treaty. They also continued to 

observe other arms control agreements. The Reagan administration, which considered the 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II (SALT II) ‘‘fatally flawed,’’ observed a policy of not undercutting that unratified treaty until late 1986. 
154 

Moreover, the Reagan administration also continued to negotiate new nuclear 

arms control agreements with the Soviets. The Reagan administration concluded the 

INF Treaty in 1987. It made major progress on the START I Treaty, reaching agreement on the levels of strategic forces to be allowed each side. The George H. W. 

Bush administration completed and signed START I in 1991. 

Mr. COOPER. Why should we abide by the Treaty if Russia is unwilling? 

Ambassador PIFER. If Russia proceeds to violate the INF Treaty by deploying 

ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic and/or cruise missiles, it may make little sense for the United States to continue to abide by its terms. The current public 

charge is that Russia violated the treaty by testing a prohibited ground-launched 

cruise missile. The U.S. government has not charged, at least not publically, that 

Russia has deployed such missiles. 

Any violation of a treaty needs to be taken seriously. Given that continued application of the INF Treaty is in the security interest of the United States and its allies, the U.S. government’s goal now should be to get Russia back into full compliance with the treaty. I have outlined in my response to QFR #51 recommendations 

as to steps that Washington should take to achieve this. 

If the United States were now to withdraw from the INF Treaty, it could have 

several effects, all negative for the United States. Washington rather than Moscow 

could bear the political costs of ending the treaty. A U.S. withdrawal that ended the 

treaty would leave Russia free to test, produce and deploy intermediate-range missiles without constraint. As the Pentagon has no plans for land-based intermediaterange ballistic or cruise missiles, a U.S. withdrawal from the treaty would leave 

Russia free to deploy missiles for which the United States has no counterpart. Even 

were the United States to build a counterpart, it is not clear it could deploy such 

missiles within range of Russia. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ 

Ms. SANCHEZ. If there were no INF Treaty, would we deploy intermediate-based 

land systems in Europe, and would the NATO allies support such a deployment? 

And, if there were no INF Treaty, would we deploy land-based systems in Asia, or 

are sea-based systems sufficient to meet our growing needs there? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Why is it taking us so long to determine what Russia is doing, and 

whether or not it is in compliance with the treaty? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What might Russia do if it were no longer bound by the INF Treaty? What might they develop and deploy if they were totally freed from the limits? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Are our allies paying attention to this issue, how have NATO countries responded? How would that affect U.S. and allied security (in both Europe and 

Asia)? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. SANCHEZ. If there were no INF Treaty, would we deploy intermediate-based 

land systems in Europe, and would the NATO allies support such a deployment? 

And, if there were no INF Treaty, would we deploy land-based systems in Asia, or 

are sea-based systems sufficient to meet our growing needs there? 

Mr. THOMAS. In the 1980’s, in response to Russia’s build up of IRBMs and 

GLCMs, NATO allies supported the development and deployment of U.S. IRBMs 

and GLCMs in Europe. Paradoxically, it was their deployment that ultimately drove 

the Soviet Union back to the negotiating table, resulting in the 1987 INF Treaty 

that eliminate all ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500–5,500 km. If 

Russia were to again develop and deploy intermediate range missile systems that 

could threaten European allies, it stands to reason that U.S. allies might again welcome and host U.S. land-based intermediate- range systems in response. 

In Asia, the principle missile threat to our allies comes not from Russia but from 

China, which has already deployed hundreds of intermediate-range missiles that 

can hold allied territory at risk. Those countries might similarly welcome conventionally armed intermediate-range missiles that could have a stabilizing effect on 

the regional military balance. 

Sea-based systems, given the inherent payload limitations of submarines and surface combatants, are unlikely to be able to fully meet our growing needs for conventional strike capacity in the Asia-Pacific theater. Nevertheless, sea-launched and 

air-launched long-range conventional strike systems—both standoff and penetrating—remain essential as part of an appropriate mix of capabilities for deterrence. 
155 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What might Russia do if it were no longer bound by the INF Treaty? What might they develop and deploy if they were totally freed from the limits? 

Mr. THOMAS. Unconstrained by the INF Treaty, Russia could build up and deploy 

large numbers of intermediate-range missiles to hold at risk targets both in Europe 

and in Asia. Interestingly, a sizable deployment of Russian missiles into its Far 

East would likely be of greatest concern to China. Thus, the demise of the INF Treaty could create a ‘‘double jeopardy’’ problem for China. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Are our allies paying attention to this issue, how have NATO countries responded? How would that affect U.S. and allied security (in both Europe and 

Asia)? 

Mr. THOMAS. NATO is alive to the Russian INF Treaty violation. As NATO Secretary General Fogh Rasmussen said on July 30, ‘‘Russia should work constructively 

to resolve this critical Treaty issue and preserve the viability of the INF Treaty by 

returning to full compliance in a verifiable manner.’’ In Asia, to date, I am not 

aware of any public response by our allies. Given that they also have clear interests 

at stake, they should also weigh in on the issue. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. If there were no INF Treaty, would we deploy intermediate-based 

land systems in Europe, and would the NATO allies support such a deployment? 

And, if there were no INF Treaty, would we deploy land-based systems in Asia, or 

are sea-based systems sufficient to meet our growing needs there? 

Ambassador PIFER. As far as I am aware, the Pentagon does not have an identified military requirement for a new ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic or 

cruise missile. Were there to be no INF Treaty, it would be prudent, before building 

such missiles, for the U.S. government to determine the military requirement and 

also to ascertain whether allies in Europe or Asia would be prepared to host such 

missiles. If based in the continental United States, intermediate-range missiles 

could only hold at risk targets in the Western Hemisphere; there does not appear 

to be a military requirement for that. 

My assessment is that it would not be easy to find allies willing to host U.S. 

ground-launched intermediate-range missiles on their territory. 

U.S. deployment of INF missiles (Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles) to Europe in the 1980s was a key factor in motivating Moscow to agree to ban 

intermediate-range missiles. But deployment in Europe was by no means guaranteed; in the end, it proved a close thing. Some U.S. officials at the time feared that 

deployment could tear NATO apart. 

Today, it is not clear that any NATO members would be eager to host such missiles, especially if they were nuclear-armed. Those allies most likely to offer to accept U.S. intermediate-range missiles would be in Central Europe. Deployment 

there, however, would put the missiles in places where they would be more vulnerable to a preemptive strike. Such deployments would also be hugely provocative to 

Moscow—and would probably be opposed by some NATO members. 

I do not believe the United States would find takers for ground-launched intermediate-range missiles in Asia, either. Japan would worry about the effect of such 

deployments on its relationship with Russia and, in any case, would not accept nuclear-armed missiles. South Korea is building its own missiles to hold targets in 

North Korea at risk and would fear that deployment of U.S. missiles on its territory 

would disrupt its warming relations with China. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Why is it taking us so long to determine what Russia is doing, and 

whether or not it is in compliance with the treaty? 

Ambassador PIFER. I have not been a part of the U.S. government process regarding Russia’s INF Treaty violation and do not know why it took until July to reach 

a compliance judgment. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What might Russia do if it were no longer bound by the INF Treaty? What might they develop and deploy if they were totally freed from the limits? 

Ambassador PIFER. I believe that, if Russia were no longer bound by the INF 

Treaty, the Russians would give serious consideration to building and deploying intermediate-range ballistic and/or cruise missiles. Senior Russian officials over the 

past decade have publicly questioned whether continued adherence to the INF Treaty was in Russia’s interest. They have noted that other countries—countries closer 

(in most cases, much closer) to Russia than to the United States—possess or are 

developing intermediate-range missiles, which the INF Treaty bans Russia from 

having. 

Were Russia to be freed from the INF Treaty’s limits, some Russian officials 

would almost certainly argue for developing and deploying intermediate-range missiles to counter those deployed or being developed by third countries. Some Russian 

officials might also see new intermediate-range missiles as having utility in politically intimidating U.S. allies in Europe or Asia, just as the Soviets used the SS– 

20 in the early 1980s. 
156 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Are our allies paying attention to this issue, how have NATO countries responded? How would that affect U.S. and allied security (in both Europe and 

Asia)? 

Ambassador PIFER. Following release of the State Department’s compliance report 

on July 29, the NATO Secretary General released a statement on July 30 in which 

he said that the United States had briefed NATO on its determination regarding 

Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty, termed the treaty a ‘‘key element of Euro-Atlantic security,’’ and called on Russia to work constructively to resolve the issue and 

return to full treaty compliance. 

The Polish foreign ministry also released a statement on July 30 that noted that 

the INF Treaty ‘‘is one of the foundations of the arms control and nuclear disarmament regime,’’ said that ‘‘its undermining would represent a serious challenge to 

Europe’s security,’’ and called on Russia to explain the issue and return to observance of the treaty. The statement also noted Poland’s intention to consult with 

NATO allies on the issue. 

The September 4–5 NATO summit declaration stated that ‘‘it is of paramount importance that disarmament and non-proliferation commitments under existing treaties are honored, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, 

which is a crucial element of Euro-Atlantic security. In that regard, Allies call on 

Russia to preserve the viability of the INF Treaty through ensuring full and 

verifiable compliance.’’ 

As noted in my response to QFR #51, I believe the United States should engage 

allies in Europe and Asia (and others, such as China) on this issue with the objective of multilateralizing the question. Rather than leaving this as just a U.S.-Russia 

issue, Washington should seek to mobilize other countries—particularly those states 

in Europe and Asia that would be directly threatened were Russia to build new intermediate-range missiles—to make their concerns known directly to Moscow. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Do you believe the U.S. has adequate verification measures in 

place to detect cheating of nuclear arms control agreements? Is verification important? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Do you believe the U.S. has adequate verification measures in 

place to detect cheating of nuclear arms control agreements? Is verification important? 

Mr. THOMAS. Verification is absolutely crucial. When it comes to the INF Treaty, 

once the weapons were verified to have been destroyed, verification monitoring was 

curtailed. One lesson from the INF Treaty experience is the need for continued inspections and monitoring to detect testing or reconstitution of programs after systems have been eliminated. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What is the significance of a violation of that treaty? Please define, as you understand it, the difference between a treaty ‘‘violation’’ and a ‘‘material breach’’? 

Ambassador PIFER. I understand the difference between ‘‘violation’’ and ‘‘material 

breach’’ to be as follows: 

‘‘Violation’’ refers to any activity that is inconsistent with a treaty’s requirements 

and obligations. A violation can be major or minor. For example, the 1991 START 

I Treaty limited the United States and Soviet Union (later Russia) each to no more 

than 1600 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers after December 5, 2001. 

Had Russia after that date deployed 2000 ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, that 

would have constituted a major violation of the treaty. START I’s Conversion and 

Elimination Protocol required that ICBM silos, if eliminated by explosion, have the 

top six meters of their headworks destroyed. If a side had destroyed only the top 

five meters of the headworks, that would have constituted a violation, though it almost certainly would have rendered the silo inoperable, thus achieving the treaty’s 

purpose. 

‘‘Material breach’’ refers to a major violation of a treaty provision(s) that is core 

to the purpose of the treaty. Material breach would normally be invoked by a party 

to the treaty in preparation for withdrawing from the treaty or suspending it. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Do you believe the U.S. has adequate verification measures in 

place to detect cheating of nuclear arms control agreements? Is verification important? 

Ambassador PIFER. Verification is critical to any arms control agreement. It is my 

understanding that, before signing an arms control treaty, the U.S. Intelligence 
157 

Community conducts a review to ensure that the verification and monitoring measures are appropriate to the agreement. 

This does not mean that the United States has—or needs to have—the capability 

to detect every violation of an agreement. Doing so would require extremely intrusive monitoring measures that likely would not prove acceptable to the Russian or 

U.S. militaries. 

I support the standard of ‘‘effective verification’’ articulated by Ambassador Paul 

Nitze in the 1980s. Ambassador Nitze called a treaty effectively verifiable as long 

as ‘‘if the other side moves beyond the limits of the treaty in a militarily significant 

way, we would be able to detect such violation in time to respond effectively, and 

thereby deny the other side the benefit of the violation.’’ The focus is not on detecting every violation but on detecting those that are militarily significant and doing 

so in time to ensure an adequate response so that U.S. security is not degraded. 

Æ