US AIR FORCE

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES

USAF ACADEMY, COLORADO

Jeffrey D. McCausland

Conventional Arms Control 

and American Policy in the 

21St Century

67 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER

DECEMBER 2010
Conventional Arms Control

and American Policy

in the 21st Century

Jeffrey D. McCausland

INSS Occasional Paper 67

December 2010

USAF Institute for National Security Studies

USAF Academy, Colorado
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The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of 

the Air Force, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, 

or the US Government. The paper is approved for public release; 

distribution is unlimited.

*******

ABOUT THE AUTHOR: 

Jeffrey D. McCausland, Jr, PhD (Colonel, US Army, Retired), is a 

Visiting Professor of International Law and Diplomacy at the Penn 

State Dickinson School of Law and School of International Affairs. He 

holds a PhD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and is a 

West Point graduate. His military assignments included the Office of 

the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Army Staff; command of an 

artillery battalion during the Gulf War; Dean of the Army War 

College; and Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, National 

Security Council staff. Dr. McCausland is also a national security 

consultant for CBS radio and television as well as a Senior Fellow at 

both the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs and the 

Stockdale Center for Ethical Leadership at the Naval Academy. He has 

published and lectured broadly on national security affairs, NATO, the 

wars in Afghanistan/Iraq and leadership development.

Comments pertaining to this paper are invited; please forward to:

Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies

HQ USAFA/DFES

2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5L27

USAF Academy, CO 80840

phone: 719-333-2717

fax: 719-333-2716

email: inss@usafa.edu

Visit the Institute for National Security Studies home page at

http://www.usafa.edu/df/inss
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword vii

Introduction 1

Definition of Key Terms 4

A Brief History and Lessons Learned 7

 Lessons Learned 13

Existing Conventional Arms Control Agreements 17

 The Vienna Document 19

 The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 23

 Open Skies 34

 The Ottawa Treaty 36

 Arms Control in the Balkans—The Dayton Accords 39

The Special Case of the Treaty on Conventional Armed

 Forces in Europe 43

 Contributions of the CFE Treaty 45

 The Russian ―Suspension‖ of the CFE Treaty 48

 What Would Failure Mean? 51

 What Are the Options? 53

Conventional and Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control 56

 Conventional and Nuclear Forces and Arms Control 

During the Cold War 57

 The End of the Cold War—An Evolution in Forces 

and Policy 61

 Russian Conventional and Nuclear Forces 67

 Implications 73

The Future 77

 Recommendations 84

Endnotes 88
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FOREWORD

We are pleased to publish this sixty-seventh volume in the 

Occasional Paper series of the United States Air Force Institute for 

National Security Studies (INSS). While earlier Occasional Papers 

addressed a full range of national security issues, we have now 

determined that these Papers will be limited to those of most utility 

in the classroom in support of strategic security education. Selected 

INSS-sponsored papers dealing with significant national security 

issues will be posted online on our website as part of our Research 

Papers series, and the Occasional Papers will be both posted on the 

website and published in hard copy in limited numbers to support 

the education mission.

This paper by former Major General Robert E. Linhard 

Outstanding INSS Researcher Award winner Jeff McCausland was 

chartered by INSS to highlight the critical role of conventional arms 

control, specifically in Europe, as an integral component of strategic 

arms control positions adopted by the United States and Russia 

during and beyond the recent New START Treaty negotiations. 

Strategic security focuses on the total security calculus of the state, 

and conventional dimensions are integrally linked to decisions on 

the size and composition of nuclear arsenals. The conventional 

issues addressed here, and the Treaty on Conventional Armed 

Forces in Europe directly, played a role in the recent nuclear 

weapons reductions negotiations, and the conventional as well as 

the total nuclear balances will be central to the next round of 

strategic nuclear weapons reductions talks. Jeff McCausland 

provides a valuable primer and analysis of conventional arms 

control and its role in these broader decisions.

About the Institute

INSS is primarily sponsored by the Strategic Plans and Policy 

Division, Headquarters US Air Force (HQ USAF/A5XP), and the 

Dean of the Faculty, USAF Academy. Other sponsors and partners 

include the Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems 

and Concepts Office (DTRA/ASCO); the National Defense 

University‘s Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
viii

(CSWMD); the Army Environmental Policy Institute (AEPI); the 

Army Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO). 

The mission of the Institute is ―to promote national security 

research for the Department of Defense within the military 

academic community, to foster the development of strategic 

perspective within the United States Armed Forces, and to support 

national security discourse through outreach and education.‖ 

Its research focuses on the areas of greatest interest to our 

sponsors: strategic security; emerging and enduring national 

security issues; environmental security and sustainability; and the 

unique requirements of Twenty-First Century conflict.

INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various 

disciplines and across the military services to develop new ideas for 

defense policy making. To that end, the Institute develops topics, 

selects researchers from within the military academic community, 

and administers sponsored research. It reaches out to and partners 

with education and research organizations across and beyond the 

military academic community to bring broad focus to issues of 

national security interest. And it hosts workshops and facilitates the 

dissemination of information to a range of private and government 

organizations. In these ways, INSS facilitates valuable, costeffective research to meet the needs of our sponsors. We appreciate 

your interest in INSS and our research products.

JAMES M. SMITH

 Director
CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL AND AMERICAN 

POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Jeffrey D. McCausland

INTRODUCTION

Thucydides noted in his history of the Peloponnesian Wars that one

of the primary motivators of Athenian foreign policy was ―interests.‖1 

This remains as true in the 21st century as in ancient Greece. As a 

result modern policymakers would all agree that the national strategy of 

any country must be consistent with national interests and built on three 

variables. First, what are the "ends" of strategy or the goals the nation 

is trying to accomplish alone or in concert with friends and allies? 

Second, what are the "ways" or policies that are formulated in order to 

move the nation in the direction of a better future? Finally, what are 

the "means" or resources available to the government of any nation that 

can be devoted to securing these objectives, and how can they be 

husbanded in a fashion to maximize their potential?

Arms control is a ―way‖ or tool to accomplish strategic objectives 

or ―ends.‖ Throughout history national leaders have sought to 

negotiate arms control agreements with potential opponents that placed 

limits on the size of respective arsenals, military activities/operations, 

or an outright ban on particular weapon systems. These efforts sought 

to both reduce the possibility of conflict and limit destruction if war 

occurred. 

Thinking about arms control has continuously evolved and several 

key points are clear to modern policymakers. First, arms control can 

never be an ―end‖ or objective of policy. Consequently, an arms 

control accord is neither good nor bad when examined in isolation. 

Each treaty or agreement only has value as a policy "way" when there 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

2

are underlying security concerns that, if mitigated, might reduce the 

possibility of conflict or limit its consequences. This is why arms 

control agreements have rarely if ever been discussed or promulgated 

between countries that had friendly relations. It is also why some 

agreements have lapsed when security conditions changed. Second, at 

its very core any arms control agreement depends upon a ―harmony of 

interest‖ among the signatories. This ―harmony‖ is based on careful 

analysis by all potential parties that the benefits to be gained from 

entering an arms control regime outweigh the risks associated with 

reducing military forces and accepting a transparency regime that 

normally has included data exchanges and verification inspections. 

Third, it is often easy to dismiss the success of arms control, since we 

lose sight of its focus. A successful agreement is one that contributes 

to the prevention of conflict and enhances stability. But it is hard to 

correlate completely the cause and effect of policies and apply metrics 

against something that didn't happen. Consequently, it is important to 

remind ourselves that the level of transparency achieved by 

conventional arms control agreements in Europe (such as the Treaty on 

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe or the Vienna Document) is 

extraordinary when one considers the security situation twenty-five 

years ago. In many ways these agreements that will be discussed in 

greater detail have made the extraordinary routine.

With the advent of nuclear weapons at the end of World War II 

policymakers were confronted with perhaps the ultimate dilemma. War 

as a tool of national policy now appeared to many policymakers to be 

unthinkable since the destruction associated with a nuclear conflict 

might make it impossible to discern the victor from the vanquished. As 

East-West tensions mounted during the Cold War and nuclear arsenals 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

3

on both sides grew, policymakers sought new methods to reduce the 

possibility of a Third World War that could potentially imperil the 

planet. As a result arms control became a central policy tool, and both 

strategic nuclear as well as conventional arms control negotiations were 

conducted to reduce the possibility of conflict at any level that might 

escalate to central nuclear exchange. But even though ―conventional‖ 

and ―nuclear‖ arms control were conducted in separate forums the 

central link of reducing the possibility of conflict that might lead to an 

escalatory spiral remained. Furthermore, both sides made adjustments 

to their respective nuclear and conventional forces either to reflect 

changes by the other or to compensate for perceived inferiorities. 

This paper examines conventional arms control as an element of 

contemporary American foreign policy. This includes an examination 

of the following questions: First, what can we learn from the history of 

arms control that might be instructive as we consider the emerging 

security environment? Second, what is the state of current 

conventional arms control agreements/treaties and negotiations? This 

will include not only those agreements/treaties that the United States is 

a signatory to but also other arrangements (i.e. the Ottawa Treaty on the 

elimination of landmines) that the U.S. has decided not to sign. Third, 

what are the issues surrounding the current impasse over the Treaty on 

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) between the United 

States, Russian Federation, and other signatories? A close examination 

of the CFE Treaty is essential to any discussion of American 

conventional arms control policy since it is the largest and most 

important. Fourth, what is now the connection between ―nuclear‖ and 

―conventional‖ arms control? This is a particularly pressing question in 

the aftermath of the signing of the so-called ―New START Treaty‖ 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

4

between the United States and Russian Federation as well as the 

imperiled state of the CFE Treaty. Finally, this study will consider 

lessons learned as well as emerging arms control issues that may affect 

future conventional force postures and American foreign policy. 

DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMS

Definitions are fundamental in any analysis of arms control policy.2 

Arms Control is any legally or politically binding agreement between 

sovereign states which (1) provides transparency and predictability of 

military activities; (2) constrains or prohibits certain military 

operations; or (3) limits the holdings of military equipment and/or 

personnel. Overall arms control agreements that the United States is a 

signatory to place restraints on the use, possession, or size of 

conventional, biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. 

Transparency is the act of making known the organization, 

composition, activities, and holdings of a state‘s armed forces to 

include its budget and military doctrine. This is usually accomplished 

through notifications, exchanges of information, and military-tomilitary contacts. Predictability is the ability of a participating state 

based on transparency measures to understand the pattern of military 

activities of another state participating in the agreement. Many military 

experts might well argue that this aspect is essential in determining the 

value of any arms control agreement during a crisis. Constraints 

include restrictions on the frequency, size, duration, and location of 

military activities. Limits are ceilings or maximum levels of 

holdings/inventory of categories of military equipment or personnel 

that a participating state has committed itself not to exceed. These 

limits can be specified in terms of national, territorial (applying to 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

5

specified region that includes multiple states), or geographic locations. 

A military operation includes any military action or the carrying out 

of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative 

military mission. This includes conducting combat, movement into and 

within a theater, supply, and any other maneuvers required to achieve 

the objectives of a battle or campaign.3

It is also important to establish a clear distinction between "arms 

control" and "disarmament." "Arms control" (as suggested above) 

refers to agreements between two or more sovereign states to limit or 

reduce certain categories of weapons or military operations in order to 

diminish the possibility of conflict. Consequently, a fundamental tenet 

of arms control remains the principle of reciprocity. While an 

agreement may restrict military operational flexibility, these same 

restraints apply to all signatories. As a result all the military and 

intelligence organizations of the participating states receive a 

significant amount of information about the size, character, equipment, 

doctrine, and deployment of other nation‘s armed forces. This 

―intelligence‖ is part of each state‘s calculation of the ―value‖ of any 

accord. 

"Disarmament" is normally unilateral or imposed by a state or 

group on one or more states at the conclusion of a war. Costa Rica 

determined many years ago to unilaterally disband its army, and 

Ukraine announced it would not retain nuclear weapons when it 

became independent following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 

Examples of imposed disarmament include the limits imposed on 

Germany at the end of World War I and II, or the restrictions placed on 

Iraq by the United Nations at the conclusion of the Gulf War. This 

distinction is important. While an arms control regime is maintained by 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

6

a harmony of interests among the participants, disarmament often 

requires external pressure to ensure implementation and compliance. 

Some of the agreements discussed in this analysis (i.e., the Dayton 

Accords) may have a distinct disarmament context. In some cases the 

United States may actually seek to maintain such accords or even have 

the disarmament of a particular group as an objective of military 

operations. 

Furthermore, arms control does not occur in a policy vacuum. 

Though the focus of any negotiation is the details of the prospective 

agreement, the arms control process must always be consistent with the 

direction of national or alliance security strategy. Consequently, arms 

control is a political activity and cannot be divorced from other aspects 

of a nation's security or foreign policy. Domestic events, other issues 

between states, and the bureaucratic process of the participating parties 

have a direct bearing on how they are negotiated and complied with.

Finally, arms control is only one aspect of the relationship between 

states and may be affected by improvements or problems in other areas. 

During the Cold War arms control was placed in the context of the 

confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was 

viewed as a means to prevent conflict and assist in crisis management, 

but the possibility of the success or failure of any agreement or ongoing 

negotiation was often affected by other aspects of the overall 

relationship. This is important to remember as we consider existing 

agreements and the future within the framework of the emerging 

European and global security architecture. Careful consideration must 

be made of how existing agreements should be modified and what 

future accords are not only possible but also desirable in an 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

7

environment that may now place greater emphasis on cooperative 

security as a means to prevent conflict and deal with its aftermath.

A BRIEF HISTORY AND LESSONS LEARNED

The desire to use arms control to ―smother war with diplomacy‖ 

(Eugene Rostow‘s memorable phrase) has deep historical roots, but it 

became a central aspect of American policy as tensions mounted during 

the Cold War. With that in mind, the famous Western strategic 

thinkers, Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, observed in 1961 

that ―arms control is a promising, but still only dimly perceived, 

enlargement of the scope of our military strategy.‖4 In this regard, it is 

critical to consider arms control well within the wider context of the 

national security strategy of any state. This serves to remind us that the 

arms control process involves both competitive as well as cooperative 

dimensions. States have historically engaged in arms control to seek at 

a minimum to preserve (if not improve) their security. This section 

provides a brief history of arms control through the onset of the Mutual 

Balanced Force Reduction talks and initial meetings of Conference on 

Security and Cooperation in Europe or CSCE. Subsequent negotiations

that resulted in arms control treaties that are now in existence are 

discussed in detail in the subsequent section. 

A brief look at arms control history prior to the 1980‘s underscores 

the continuing truth that arms control has always been a tool used by 

states to improve their overall security. The earliest example of arms 

control appears to have occurred in during the reign of Ramses II in 

Egypt (1279 to 1213 BC). Ramses signed a ―non-aggression‖ treaty 

with Khetassar, ruler of Kheta. In roughly the fifth century BC the 

Spartan city state sent delegates to Athens to seek an agreement ―not 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

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only to abstain from building walls for herself, but also to have join...in 

throwing downed the remaining walls of the cities outside the 

Peloponnesus.‖5 While the Spartans argued that they were directing 

this measure against invasions by barbarians, in reality they were 

attempting to undermine the growing power of Athens while preserving 

their own clear advantage in land power should a conflict occur. 

Athenian leaders realized this, but wanted to buy time. Consequently, 

they agreed to negotiations while mobilizing the Athenian population 

to construct more walls as rapidly as possible. Modern students of 

arms control will easily recognize this tactic of using of arms control 

negotiations as a means to delay choices or reduce tensions without a 

real attempt to seek an agreement.6

Attempts have also been made throughout history to eliminate 

particular classes of weapons or establish norms. Still many of these 

proposals are replete with lingering issues of double standards. This 

has been an issue for many arms control negotiations in past and is still 

prevalent today. For example, in the 12th century, the Catholic Church 

attempted to ban the use of crossbows. Church leaders were quick to 

point out, however, that this ban was only by Christians against 

Christians. Crossbows could still be used against other civilizations.7

Most historians date the beginning of modern arms control to the 

Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. These were initially proposed 

by the Russian Czar Nicholas II, and many scholars believe he was 

motivated by a concern that has frequently propelled leaders to 

consider arms control as a policy option. Nicholas believed that 

Imperial Russia could not afford to continue to increase its spending on 

military armaments to keep pace with the other major powers of 

Europe. Scholars of the Cold War era might ascribe similar 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

9

motivations to Mikhail Gorbachev. These two conferences were 

noteworthy as they included non-European powers and addressed such 

things as limitations of armaments and defense budgets; prohibitions on 

the use of certain types of weapons or military practices; 

revisions/extensions of the laws of warfare; and institutions for 

mediation, arbitration, and other methods of preventing war.8 A third 

conference was planned but was overcome by the outbreak of World 

War I. 

In the war‘s aftermath, the Washington Naval Conference was 

convened in November 1922 in an attempt to prevent a naval arms race 

between the United States, Britain, and Japan. The resulting treaty 

placed limitations on the tonnage and armaments of battleships. The 

US and Britain were, however, permitted larger fleets than Japan as 

their navies possessed multi-ocean responsibilities. The glaring 

weakness in the agreement was its lack of verification provisions. 

Consequently, while the two leading naval powers economized in ship 

production during the 1920‘s and 1930‘s, the Imperial Japanese Navy 

built up to and secretly exceeded the treaty constraints.9 Historians 

have also argued that this agreement was focused too narrowly on one 

piece of technology and associated military capability. As a result it 

served to stimulate the development of other weapons—most notably 

the aircraft carrier and submarine.10 This would clearly not be the last 

example of an arms control agreement serving to focus ensuing 

weapons development. Japan renounced the agreement in 1934 

following its invasion of China in 1931 and as tensions mounted in 

Asia. 

During the Cold War the first attempts at serious constraints on 

conventional arms were the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

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Reductions (MBFR) that began in Vienna in January 1973. Many 

scholars have argued that both the United States and the Soviet Union 

were motivated by other concerns than solely seeking a reduction in 

armaments. The Soviets believed that these negotiations might serve to 

divide and weaken NATO. American President Richard Nixon wished 

to block an initiative by Senator Mike Mansfield to reduce unilaterally 

American forces from Europe. The President urged congressional 

leaders to oppose the so-called ―Mansfield Amendment‖ and not 

undermine his administration‘s ability to effectively negotiate with the 

Soviets in the MBFR talks. 

While no MBFR agreement was achieved, these talks did 

underscore the need to examine military ―capabilities‖ as opposed to 

particular pieces of armament. On 16 December 1975 the West tabled 

a proposal to reduce American tactical nuclear forces and withdraw 

29,000 soldiers in return for a Soviet withdrawal of 68,000 soldiers and 

1,700 tanks.11 This proposal clearly reflected the capabilities and 

associated strategies of both sides. NATO had almost from its onset 

depended on nuclear weapons to compensate for the Soviet Union‘s 

and Warsaw Pact‘s overwhelming numerical superiority in 

conventional forces. In addition to the continued development of 

American strategic nuclear forces the European members of NATO had

requested and accepted the deployment of thousands of tactical nuclear 

weapons on the continent. American policymakers viewed these 

weapons as part of the overall ―flexible response‖ strategy designed to 

give the President options if war broke out between NATO and the 

Warsaw Pact. Consequently, their deployment served to better link 

American forces deployed to European with the US central strategic 

response.
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

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This proposal reflects an important point that deserves further 

consideration for the future. Arms control agreements place limits on 

the numbers or size of particular weapons. But the total agreement (to 

include transparency arrangements or verification) is primarily focused 

on the military ―capabilities‖ of the states involved which is a much 

more subjective evaluation. While the quantity and quality of military 

hardware are important considerations, they are only part of the 

calculation of overall force capability. But the overall importance of 

―capability‖ was neither a new nor temporary phenomenon. Strategists 

had often commented that any analysis focused primarily on technology 

was too narrow. Furthermore, they have argued for decades that 

decisive technological breakthroughs while important are rare and often 

temporary.12 

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe or CSCE 

(later renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 

Europe or OSCE) convened in 1973. This negotiation was a Western 

concession to the Soviet Union in return for their participation in the 

MBFR talks, as it closely approximated an earlier Warsaw Pact request 

for a European-wide security conference. It also embodied the idea of 

detente that had been enunciated in the 1967 Harmel Report that placed 

political efforts on par with NATO military activities. Belgium Foreign 

Minister Pierre Harmel conducted this study for the alliance to examine 

the ―future tasks which face the Alliance, and its procedures for 

fulfilling them in order to strengthen the Alliance as a factor for durable 

peace.

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 The report‘s conclusions stressed that NATO had two main 

functions as an alliance. First, it sought to ―maintain adequate military 

strength and political solidarity to deter aggression‖ and defend the 

territory of member states if they were attacked. Second, the alliance 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

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also pursued the ―search for progress towards a more stable 

relationship‖ with the East in order to seek solutions to underlying 

political issues – most notably the division of Germany.14 The report 

concluded that NATO would consider both disarmament and arms 

control measures that might include balanced force reductions in order 

to enhance détente between East and West.15 This combination of 

strong defense with improved diplomatic relations with the nations of 

the Warsaw Pact was central to the overall détente approach. Though 

the effort was stalled by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, 

the Harmel Report paved the way for the Helsinki talks and the creation 

of the CSCE process.16

The 35 CSCE participating states signed the concluding document 

or Helsinki Final Act on 1 August 1975.17 This launched the so-called 

"CSCE process" that sought balanced progress in three areas: security; 

cooperation in science, economics, technology, and the environment; 

and human rights (often called "Baskets One, Two, and Three" 

respectively). Basket One resulted initially in modest agreements on 

"confidence- and security building measures" (CSBM's) that are also 

referred to as the ―Vienna Document.‖ CSBM's were designed to 

reduce the "dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or 

miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to 

apprehension."18 CSBM‘s were a significant shift from technical arms 

control focusing on reductions to an emphasis on transparency in 

military operations. The successful conclusion of this agreement was 

in many ways a compromise by the Soviet Union. The USSR had long 

insisted that restrictions on military activities could not be agreed upon 

until reductions had first taken place, while the Western position had 

always been to seek such CSBM's before reductions. 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

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The first of these CSBM‘s was a commitment to provide 21 days 

advance notification to all signatories of any military exercise involving 

more than 25,000 troops. It was agreed as part of the Helsinki Final 

Act in 1975. The measure also encouraged voluntary notification of 

smaller military training events, major military movements, and the 

invitation of observers to maneuvers. These provisions evolved by 1986

into the Stockholm Document and in 1990 became the initial Vienna 

Document. These agreements established mutually complementary 

confidence-building measures that included mandatory ground or aerial 

inspections of certain specified military activities. The 1990 agreement 

also sought to improve communications, contact between the various 

militaries of the nations involved, and verification. Thresholds were 

reduced subsequently and now include additional provisions that are 

discussed in detail in the next section. OSCE members also agreed to a 

Military Code of Conduct in 1994. This code reaffirmed the principles 

in the Helsinki Final Act and established norms regarding the role of 

armed forces in democratic societies.

Lessons Learned

A historian once remarked that ―history does not repeat itself, but it 

may rhyme....‖ This is a good admonition in any effort that seeks to 

glean insights from the past. While similar events throughout history 

may be instructive, the lessons learned have to be continually evaluated 

against the current context. Still several points from this historical 

background are worthy of enumeration.

Carl von Clausewitz observed that ―war is politics by other means‖ 

in his monumental work, On War. Consequently, arms control has 

been and continues to be a highly political process. Without the 

necessary political will on all sides, the process itself is less likely to be 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

14

productive, and will not come to closure. The MBFR talks that began 

in 1973 and stalemated in 1979, are an example. This stalemate 

occurred due to a lack of political will on both sides as well as the 

asymmetries of the respective military forces. The principle of 

establishing force ceilings at equal numbers was only accepted much 

later. Consequently, changes of position that go to the heart of a 

military‘s size and posture require the will of political leadership to 

take tough political decisions and the right political context. 

Second, the prospects for the successful conclusion of any arms 

control agreement are significantly affected by the state of change in 

military technology. States have at times attempted to use arms control 

as a means to slow down the development of certain weapon systems, 

slow their perceived growing inferiority with respect to a potential 

competitor, or focus efforts away from those areas where they believe 

they enjoy a comparative advantage. Negotiations are more likely to be 

started and more likely to succeed when military technology is 

perceived to be relatively stable, surprise-free and developing slowly. 

Periods of great technological uncertainty are normally not conducive 

to the negotiations of meaningful arms control agreements.19

Third, it is helpful, if not essential, to have a commonly agreed set 

of understandings about the boundary conditions for the negotiations at 

the onset of any negotiations. Having a mandate becomes more 

important when arms reductions are on the table and the stakes are 

higher in terms of force balance and levels. European arms control and 

confidence-building measure negotiations have commonly utilized 

agreed ―mandates‖ to set these boundary conditions, which can include 

the types of forces subject to negotiation, area of application, and 

standards for the negotiated measures. Sometimes painful to negotiate, 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

15

they have proven essential to keeping the negotiations on track and 

avoiding or ruling out proposals that are flatly unacceptable. They are 

also invaluable reference points as any agreement is reviewed or 

adapted. 

The use of mandates was developed later in the process of 

European arms control, and they paved the way for some of the more

complex agreements. The 1983 Madrid mandate, for example, 

specified that CSBMS would be militarily significant, politically 

binding, verifiable, and applicable to the whole of Europe. The 

mandate provided for negotiations that produced new measures in 

1986, when the Soviet Union accepted the notion of on-site inspection 

measures. In 1989 a mandate was agreed for the CFE negotiations, in 

which the objectives for the negotiations were specified (reductions to 

equal levels of forces), as well as the specific geographic boundaries 

and the types of forces that were to be included (land, but not naval).

Fourth, those nations whose interests are affected must have a full 

voice at the table. As a consequence, arms control is often referred to 

as indivisible. That is to say, the security interests of all states are 

equal. Still, in European multilateral negotiations, the United States, 

through NATO, played a leading role throughout the twentieth century. 

This role was a reflection not only of American political interests, but 

also the size of American forces present in Europe. This may, in fact, 

now be changing due to the dramatic reductions in US force presence 

in Europe and the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Fifth, multilateral arms control is far more difficult than bilateral 

negotiations, and conventional arms control has almost always been 

conducted with a number of players at the table. The historical 

experience in Europe suggests that frequently the most difficult 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

16

negotiations have been between allies in a negotiation, as the respective 

interests of even alliance members may diverge. Consequently, it is 

essential to create and maintain common allied positions during any 

negotiation. 

Once agreed alliance positions are achieved the search for the 

―harmony of interests‖ between the participating adversarial states and 

alliances begins. Again history demonstrates that differences have 

arisen across fora and on issues ranging from the intrusiveness of 

inspections and data requirements, to appropriate force levels. 

Currently, some have argued that Europe should commence a European 

wide security conference in order to address emerging issues and 

rationalize existing arms control agreements. While this might be 

useful, history suggests that the magnitude of such an undertaking 

cannot be minimized. 

Sixth, there exists a degree of connectivity between arms control 

agreements. It is essential that all participants strive for full 

implementation of existing agreements before negotiating new ones. 

Furthermore, the success of arms control as a tool of policy must be 

measured against the standard of improved security. At various points 

in European security negotiations, some European nations have 

appeared to want to pursue arms control for ―arms control‘s sake.‖ 

They have argued that the ―process‖ is more important than any 

specific outcome. At times, this attitude has risked taking the focus 

away from pressing for full implementation of agreements already 

approved. This position, if adopted by all, would undermine the very 

confidence that the agreements are intended to instill. 

Seventh, on-site observation and inspection are at the core of the 

success of arms control. The failure of the Washington Naval 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

17

Conference suggests to many that absent a comprehensive verification 

process any arms control agreement is doomed to failure. One of the 

important early breakthroughs in the CSBM negotiations was the 

provision for on-site inspection, to provide a means of verifying that the 

other side was complying with its agreements. This set forth a 

principle on which negotiators were able to build for developing later 

CSBMs and for subsequent conventional arms control negotiations. 

Finally, arms control is not without risks. Policymakers must 

consider to what extent the talks themselves may create problems in 

force design, defense strategy, and alliance politics. Some states will 

participate while others will not. Some weapons, modes of 

deployment, or geographic regions will be considered and others will 

be ignored. Such simplifications are necessary in order to make the 

problems associated with any negotiation manageable, but they also 

tend to distort military reality which is more a web of interactions than 

a matrix of weapons, operations, or nations.20 The failure of any 

negotiation or agreement can jeopardize other elements of the 

diplomatic relationships between nations. 

EXISTING CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL 

AGREEMENTS

The first phase of European conventional arms control, between 

1972 and the late 1980s, included (as previously mentioned) the 

initiation of the pan-European Conference on Security and Cooperation 

in Europe, as well as separate NATO-Warsaw Pact Mutual and 

Balanced Force Reduction talks, which, after stalling in 1979, officially 

ended in 1989. Although CSCE and MBFR efforts produced only 

modest measures, they helped lay the groundwork for the next phase of 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

18

cooperation by initiating a process for exchanging military data and 

creating some basic ―rules of the road‖ for subsequent negotiations.

The division of the CSCE talks into various discussion ―baskets‖ 

provided a means for participants simultaneously to pursue their 

respective political agendas. The Soviet Union sought a Europeanwide conference as a means to enhance its influence in Western 

Europe, legitimize existing borders in Central and East Europe, create a 

framework for controlling contacts between East and West, and gain 

greater access to Western technology and economic exchange. East 

Europeans sought more flexibility in their external relations and an 

enhancement of their political, cultural, and economic dialogue with 

the West. The Western European states, especially the Federal 

Republic of Germany, were also looking for ways to remove the 

barriers that divided Europe and ―unify‖ the continent. Through these 

talks, the United States also pressed the East on issues of human rights, 

democracy, and the rule of law.

The second phase of European arms control, in 1988–1992, 

coincided with the political transformation in Europe, which included 

the fall of the Berlin Wall, the unification of Germany, and the collapse 

of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. This phase began with 

mandate negotiations for the complex and politically difficult CFE 

Treaty, and it eventually included the Treaty‘s signature and entry-intoforce. The final agreement required the Soviet Union to make 

extensive asymmetrical cuts in major military equipment. The 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which had 

replaced CSCE, also promulgated a new generation of military 

confidence-building measures (CBMs) during this phase known as the 

Vienna Document.
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

19

Finally, from 1992 until the present, European negotiations have 

adapted the CFE Treaty to reflect the end of the Cold War, and, 

through the OSCE, produced new sets of regionally focused measures 

to deal with new tensions that emerged with the end of bloc-to-bloc 

confrontation. This third phase reflects a Europe that still values arms 

limitations and the assurance provided by its associated verification 

measures, but is also marked by a dramatically transformed set of 

political relationships and continued instability in some regions such as 

the Balkans and North Caucasus.

The Vienna Document

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe convened 

in 1973. This negotiation was a Western concession to the Soviet 

Union in return for their participation in the MBFR talks. It also 

embodied the idea of détente that had been enunciated in the Harmel 

Report that placed political efforts on par with NATO military 

activities. The 35 participants signed the concluding document or 

Helsinki Final Act on 1 August 1975.21 This launched the so-called 

"CSCE process" that sought balanced progress in three areas: security; 

cooperation in science, economics, technology, and the environment; 

and human rights (often called Baskets One, Two, and Three).

Basket One resulted initially in modest agreements on CSBM's. 

CSBM's were designed to reduce the "dangers of armed conflict and of 

misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities which could 

give rise to apprehension."22 CSBM‘s were a significant shift from 

technical arms control focusing on reductions to an emphasis on 

transparency in military operations. The successful conclusion of this 

agreement was in many ways a compromise by the Soviet Union. The 

USSR had long insisted that restrictions on military activities could not 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

20

be agreed upon until reductions had first taken place, while the Western 

position had always been to seek such CSBM's before reductions. 

The first of these was a commitment to provide 21 days advance 

notification to all signatories of any military exercise involving more 

than 25,000 troops. It also encouraged voluntary notification of smaller 

military training events, major military movements, and the invitation 

of observers to maneuvers. These provisions have evolved and the 

thresholds reduced subsequently and now include the following as 

described in the Vienna Document 1999:

Annual exchange of military information

Consultation regarding unusual military activities

Provisions for military contacts and cooperation

Prior notification for exercises

Observation of military activities

Exchange of annual calendars for military exercises

Compliance and verification measures

Direct communication network between capitals

Annual implementation assessment meetings

Stabilizing measures during crisis situations

Principles governing arms transfers

OSCE members also agreed to a Military Code of Conduct in 

1994. This code reaffirmed the principles in the Helsinki Final Act and 

established norms regarding the role of armed forces in democratic 

societies. The United States and its European allies formally cited 

Russia for violations of this code during its operations in Chechnya and 

requested observation of military activities there in accordance with the 

Vienna Document. Russia steadfastly resisted an observation but did 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

21

allow a very limited visit by the German military. Since 2001 Western 

states have not renewed requests for such visits. 

Though the Vienna Document was created largely to prevent 

conflict, it also served a role in crisis management during the Kosovo 

crisis in 1999. During this conflict NATO forces conducted airstrikes 

against the forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 

response to attacks by Belgrade‘s forces against the Albanian 

population living in Kosovo. In addition, the United States and its 

NATO partners positioned ground forces in both the Former Yugoslav 

Republic of Macedonia (FRYOM) as well as Albania that many 

perceived as a preparation for a ground offensive against Serbia. On 30

March 1999 Belarus requested clarification from the United States, 

Britain, France, and others about military operations in and around the 

former Yugoslavia consistent with Chapter 2 of the Vienna Document. 

These countries as well as the host states of Albania and Macedonia 

also provided required reports when NATO forces operating on their 

territory exceeded certain prescribed levels at the end of April. On 5 

May Russia formally notified all OSCE members of its intention to 

send observers to Macedonia and subsequently Albania to view the 

activities of NATO forces in these two countries under Chapter 8 of the 

Vienna Document. This was accepted on 6 May by the government of 

the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the inspections were 

conducted from 7 to 9 May. Inspections in Albania were conducted by 

Moscow from 16 to 19 May.23

NATO (largely at the insistence of the United States and General 

Wesley Clark, NATO Supreme Allied Commander) severely restricted 

the area the observers could enter in Macedonia. General Clark stated 

that he feared these observations would be a serious violation of NATO 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

22

operational security. He believed that ―...Russian observers could 

report sensitive locations back to the Serbs, who could then use their 

long-range rocket systems to strike us inside Macedonia.‖24 Moscow 

formally demarched the NATO countries for this as a violation of the 

Vienna Document and argued that access had been so limited that in 

reality the observation had in fact not occurred. 

The Macedonian observation also caused serious disagreements 

within NATO, as many European allies indicated their willingness to 

allow thorough observations. A German federal official publicly 

blamed the difficulties in Macedonia solely on the American military.25 

During the visit by Russian military observers in Albania it was clear 

that allied forces were directed to follow the instructions provided by 

their national capitals and comply with the provisions of the CSBMs as 

opposed to orders coming from SACEUR. As NATO forces grew to 

exceed an additional threshold established under the Vienna Document 

the Macedonian government invited all OSCE states to an observation 

of deployed forces on 7 June and this was conducted from 5 to 8 July. 

Clearly the role that the Vienna Document played during the 

Kosovo crisis had mixed results and left a number of questions 

unanswered. In the case of the observations, it did not fully achieve its 

purpose of eliminating tensions with countries that were not 

immediately involved in the crisis. This event also revealed a serious 

disagreement between the United States and its allies over the role of 

arms control as part of cooperative security. In its aftermath American 

policymakers have continued to argue that Vienna Document reporting 

and observations do not apply during periods of ―armed conflict.‖ 

Application of this revised policy will remain subject to interpretation, 

particularly absent a clear declaration of war or if applied to forces in 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

23

transit. These agreements also had no direct bearing on preventing the 

conflict between NATO and Serbia, since Belgrade was neither a 

signatory to the CFE Treaty nor an active OSCE member at that time 

and, therefore, not susceptible to the Vienna Document. Furthermore, 

some American experts have expressed a concern that signatories to the 

Vienna Document could request observation of American military air 

bases used by the US or its NATO allies in Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan 

under the terms of these agreements, since all of these Central Asian 

states are signatories.

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) 

The 22 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact signed the Treaty 

on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe on 19 November 1990. It 

established limits on the aggregate total of conventional military 

hardware for the two blocs, required substantial reductions in each 

nation‘s conventional arsenal, and created an intrusive regime of 

inspections and verification.

The talks commenced in January 1988. The agreed mandate for 

these negotiations established the goals of strengthening stability and 

security in Europe through a conventional force balance while seeking 

to eliminate the capability for surprise attack. The final agreement 

required alliance or "group" limitations on tanks, artillery, armored 

Table 1: CFE Alliance Equipment Limits

Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) Group Limit

Tanks 20,000

Artillery 20,000

Armored Combat Vehicles (ACV‘s) 30,000

Attack Helicopters 2,000

Combat Aircraft 6,800
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

24

combat vehicles, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters—known 

collectively as Treaty-Limited Equipment (TLE)—in an area stretching 

from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. Each bloc was allowed 

the numbers listed in Table 1.

Bloc limitations for NATO and the former Warsaw Pact were 

further restrained by a series of five geographic nested zones for land 

based TLE. Limitations on helicopters and attack aircraft applied to the 

entire area of application due to their ability to reposition rapidly. This 

zonal approach was a derivative of the mandate‘s intent to reduce the 

possibility of surprise attack by precluding excessive force 

concentrations by either side. Subsequent national limits for each treaty 

signatory were determined in negotiations among the members of the 

two organizations. The successor states of the Soviet Union (within the 

area of application) determined their respective limits from the total 

allocated to the Soviet Union in May 1992. 

New negotiations focusing on personnel strength of armed forces 

began after the signing of the treaty. This resulted in the Concluding 

Act of the Negotiations on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed 

Forces in Europe (referred to as the CFE-1A agreement). It was signed 

on 6 July 1992 and established limits of the personnel strength of 

military forces with the exception of sea-based naval units, internal 

security forces, or those assigned to UN duties. CFE-1A (unlike the 

CFE Treaty) is a politically binding arrangement as opposed to a 

legally binding treaty. It provided that the ceilings announced by each 

signatory would take effect 40 months after entry into force and further 

contained provisions for information exchange, notification, and 

verification. 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

25

Area 4.4 Area 4.3 Area 4.2 Area 5.1

CFE Area of Application

Chart 1: CFE “Nesting” 26 

i

 

i The CFE Treaty‘s ―area of application‖ is divided into four nested zones. 

The term ―nesting‖ refers to the fact that, beginning with the states in the 

center, each successive zone subsumes all of the preceding zone, plus 

adjacent states and military districts. Cumulative limits are assigned on the 

holdings of treaty-limited ground equipment in each zone, permitting the 

movement of forces away from, but not toward, the central region of 

Europe (Area 4.4). to address concerns about potential force 

concentrations on the rim areas, known as the ―flanks,‖ the treaty assigned 

separate, unitary sublimits there.

The numbers for the areas refer to articles in the CFE Treaty. Area 4.4 is 

the area shaded in red – Benelux, Germany, Denmark, Poland, the Czech 

Republic, Slovakia and Hungary – and has the strictest sublimits. Area 4.3 

includes the states in Area 4.4 plus the area shaded in orange: the United 

Kingdom, France, Italy, Kaliningrad, Belarus and most of Ukraine (the 

Baltic states were covered as part of the USSR, but they never signed the 

CFE Treaty). Area 4.2 comprises of Area 4.3 plus the area shaded in 

green: Portugal, Spain, and parts of Russia and Kazakhstan. Area 5.1 

comprises the flank areas. Area 4.1 is the entire region, from the Atlantic 

to the Urals.
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

26

Though the reduction agreement was signed in 1990, 

implementation was delayed until 1992 by the end of the Warsaw Pact, 

demise of the Soviet Union, and problems associated with Soviet TLE. 

Despite this delay, a total of over 58,000 pieces of TLE were destroyed 

and approximately 2,700 inspections conducted to insure compliance 

by November 1995 (the end of the implementation period).27 The 

Russian Federation had the greatest burden for destruction—roughly 20 

per cent of this total. By the end of 2000, over 70,000 pieces of TLE 

had been destroyed and 3,500 inspections conducted.28 Curiously, 

though the CFE Treaty resulted in large-scale reductions in equipment 

by both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the residual forces of both were 

overall of a higher quality. This resulted from the ―cascading‖ of 

equipment within each group. Countries were allowed to destroy older 

equipment and accept newer replacements from other members of their 

respective alliance as part of overall reductions.29 Despite these facts, 

many experts believe the inspection regime may have contributed more 

to reducing tensions than was accomplished by the actual reductions. 

Full and final compliance with the CFE Treaty was endangered in

late 1995 due to Russian insistence that it could not comply with limits 

on its forces in the so-called flank zone—an area that includes both the 

Leningrad and North Caucasus Military Districts. As early as 

September 1993, Russian President Boris Yeltsin sent a letter to 

Western leaders saying that ―the cessation of the existence of the 

USSR, the adaptation of the Treaty to a new composition of 

membership—the dramatic development of several local conflicts and 

the large-scale withdrawal of our troops to the Russian interior‖ have 

created an entirely new situation. ―In these circumstances,‖ Yeltsin 

continued, ―the flank limitations acquire a unilateral and discriminatory 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

27

character for Russia.‖30 A final compromise was achieved at the first 

Review Conference (May 1996) that permitted Russia higher force 

levels in the flank zone, established a May 1999 deadline for Moscow 

to meet these adjusted levels, and reduced the overall size of the flank 

zone.

31

 Despite this effort the flank ―problem‖ has continued to be an 

issue of concern particularly in the eyes of Russian policymakers. It 

was exacerbated by Russian military operations in Chechnya (which is 

in the flank region), and Moscow‘s desire to maintain influence over 

the North Caucasus states. 

The West indicated its willingness to consider additional 

adjustments to the treaty during the 1996 Review Conference. Actual 

discussions began in the winter of 1997 and progressed slowly 

throughout the next year. As spring 1999 arrived it was clear that 

adaptation would be affected by ongoing developments in European 

security. In this regard the period from 12 March through 24 April 

1999 was a watershed in NATO history due to four significant events. 

First, on 12 March three new nations (Czech Republic, Hungary, and 

Poland) entered the Alliance. From the Russian perspective an 

adjusted CFE Treaty provided legal assurances about the size and 

deployment of NATO forces critical to Moscow‘s assessment of 

regional security.32 Consequently, while treaty modifications were 

warranted based on the dramatic change that had occurred since 1990, 

the enlargement process gave this effort an additional resonance. 

Second, the Alliance began the bombing of Yugoslavia on 26 March 

due to the crisis in Kosovo. Third, on 30 March the states participating 

in the negotiations to adapt the CFE Treaty reached a major political 

agreement despite the ongoing hostilities.33 This was particularly 

noteworthy as Moscow had severed or suspended its other political ties 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

28

with NATO (such as the NATO-Russia Council) once hostilities 

began. Furthermore, these ongoing negotiations were focused on the 

conventional force balance in Central Europe during the first actual 

conflict involving all NATO members and the largest air campaign in 

Europe since World War II. Finally, NATO had also issued its new 

Strategic Concept during the Washington Summit that was held 23-24 

April. 

On 19 November 1999 (the ninth anniversary of the CFE Treaty) 

the 30 national leaders of signatory states signed an adapted treaty.34 It 

confirmed a new structure based on a system of national and territorial 

ceilings to replace the zonal approach as well as bloc limits. This 

adjustment was a clear reflection of the greater multilateral character of 

the emerging security environment. The adapted treaty further noted 

that the presence of foreign forces on any state‘s territory was only 

allowed consistent with the principle of ―host nation consent.‖ This 

was critical to newly independent democracies throughout Eastern 

Europe and the former USSR. 

NATO also declared unilateral limitations on force deployments 

early in the enlargement process. The Alliance announced that it saw 

no need to station significant forces permanently on the territory of new 

members. This acknowledged the emerging security situation and 

attempted to ease Russian disquiet. Still the new members (Hungary, 

Czech Republic, and Poland) were concerned that the Alliance goal of 

military sufficiency could be undermined. They worried that should 

they be threatened in the future, NATO would not be able to come to 

their aid without violating the treaty. Consequently, NATO negotiated 

operational flexibilities such as the right to deploy equipment 

temporarily on the territory of an ally during a crisis. 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

29

The accord also made changes to the flank regime in order to 

reconcile this portion of the original treaty to a revised structure. It 

noted that the existing flank regime remained legally binding on all 

parties but allowed Russia modest force increases in this area. Moscow 

also began bilateral discussions on the reduction of its forces from 

Georgia and withdrawal from Moldova consistent with the principle of 

host nation consent. Finally, the adapted agreement concluded key 

verification enhancements and contained important national statements. 

For example, Russia pledged to restrain its force levels adjacent to the 

Baltic Republics and Poland. Overall the United States accepted a 

reduction of over 45% in the amount of ground TLE it was authorized 

to have in the region. While this would appear to be a significant 

reduction, in reality American forces deployed in Europe had 

undergone enormous cuts in the period following the end of the Cold 

War. As a result, the United States could accept these adjusted force 

levels without having to make any additional reductions. Finally, each 

state accepted a moderate increase in its annual inspection requirements 

and commitments to pursue continued reductions. 

The final negotiations and eventual ratification were complicated 

by Russia‘s failure to meet the revised flank totals agreed at the Review 

Conference by the June 1999 deadline.35 While Moscow remained 

within its overall national limits for all categories of TLE, it exceeded 

its allocation in the North Caucasus area significantly. This was further 

exacerbated as hostilities recommenced in Chechnya in October 1999. 

Moscow did, however, formally announce its deployment to the region 

in excess of treaty limits to meet the emerging crisis that demonstrated 

some commitment to the agreement.36 Russian failure to comply with 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

30

treaty provisions, coupled with its continued presence in Georgia and 

Moldova, made final ratification of the adapted treaty problematic. 

President William Clinton announced at the conclusion of the summit 

that he would not submit the agreement for ratification by the Senate 

until Russia had fully complied.37 All NATO members supported this 

action, and Senator Jesse Helms (then Chairman of the Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee) forwarded two letters to President Clinton 

recommending strongly against signing the adapted agreement or 

submitting it for ratification due to continued Russian noncompliance.38

 This continued to be the position of the United States 

and its NATO partners for the ensuing decade. 

Russia‘s inability or unwillingness to resolve these issues 

continued in 2001. This issue was raised during the Review 

Conference (28 May 2001) by the United States as well as Georgia and 

other Caucasus states. Some observers believed that due to the 

uncertain situation in Chechnya, Russian military leaders resisted 

complying with force limitations that might have to be violated 

subsequently if hostilities escalated. Russia‘s continued presence in 

Georgia (roughly 7000 troops deployed on two bases) beyond the 1 

August 2001 deadline they had announced indicated a desire to 

maintain influence over the Georgian government and contribute to 

securing their border with Chechnya. Some experts also believe the 

Russian military was concerned that NATO or some other third party 

might occupy these bases if they were vacated. These apprehensions 

and the overall question of Russian and foreign troop presence more 

generally in Georgia has continued to take on greater significance. 

Following the attacks of September 11th, 2001, the United States 

deployed small military forces to Georgia to train and equip local units 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

31

to combat a growing terrorist threat in that country. Military-to-military 

cooperation between the United States and Georgia has continued to 

expand to include the deployment of a brigade of Georgian troops to 

Iraq.39

Final ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty would institute a new 

system of national and territorial ceilings consistent with post-Cold 

War geography. It would also establish the concept of ―host nation 

consent‖ as legally binding on all signatories while seeking to reduce 

Russian anxiety over its conventional inferiority. Still, Western 

military planners would have to contend with the fact that the adapted 

treaty could subject forces deployed to NATO territory or in transit 

through Europe to additional potential inspections and associated 

transparency measures. These new requirements would permit 

inspections of 20 percent of ―objects of verification.‖ This would 

include military equipment down to regimental level as well as any 

additional Treaty-Limited Equipment in storage, repair, or reduction 

locations. In addition, all signatories are required to submit annual and 

quarterly reports of their equipment allocations and locations in the 

treaty area of application. Any changes that exceeded 30 tanks/ACVs 

or 10 artillery weapons on the territory of any state must also be 

reported. Any increase of 18 or more combat aircraft or attack 

helicopters in a country‘s holdings throughout the entire area of

application must also be reported to all signatories. Issues of 

transparency for American forward-deployed forces in Europe and 

those transiting the continent have assumed a greater saliency due to 

the fact that power projection has been a key mission since the end of 

the Cold War, and this requirement received renewed emphasis 

following the attacks of September 11th.
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

32

Obviously, the treaty in its current or adapted form must be 

consistent with the decisions NATO leaders take on enlargement. 

Clearly the adapted treaty is more in line with an enlarged NATO and 

the altered geography of Europe following the collapse of the Soviet 

Union. It allows for accession and this could have positive 

ramifications for both the Baltic and Balkan regions. Lithuania, Latvia, 

and Estonia announced they were not party to CFE upon regaining their 

independence in 1991. This was primarily an issue of sovereignty as 

Baltic leaders argued that they were neither signatories to the original 

agreement nor successor states to the Soviet Union. Consequently, 

they were unwilling to participate in the Tashkent Conference that 

negotiated residual national ceilings from the entitlements of the USSR. 

It seems logical that their accession to an adapted CFE regime could 

underscore their respective sovereignty, offer additional security 

reassurances, and be clearly consistent with their entry into NATO. 

The Baltic States have all carefully analyzed the impact of accession 

and conducted thorough discussions with the Alliance.40 In the 

Balkans the arms control agreements that were derived from the 

requirements in the Dayton Accords were modeled after CFE and the 

Vienna Document in order to afford these states the opportunity to 

accede to the CFE Treaty at a future date. Now that Slovenia and 

Croatia are NATO members they could also accede to the CFE Treaty 

once the adapted agreement enters into force. 

Finally, questions continue to be raised in the Joint Consultative 

Group (JCG) in Vienna over whether new weapons technologies 

should be included in the categories of military equipment limited by 

CFE. The JCG consists of representatives of all signatories to the 

agreement. Under the terms of the agreement this body reviews and 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

33

monitors the execution of the treaty. In its current form the CFE Treaty 

provides clear technological advantages to the United States and the 

West in general. The limitations are solely ―quantitative‖ and not 

―qualitative‖ in character. As a result, the oldest tank in the inventory 

of any of the former Soviet states is counted as the equivalent of the 

most modern tank in the NATO arsenal. This could change in the 

future, however. For example, some European arms control experts 

believe that remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) or drones should be 

included in the category of combat aircraft limited by the treaty. This 

issue arose in the JCG during the fall of 2000. This attempt to include 

the armed RPVs under the category of ―combat aircraft‖ resulted in an 

angry public letter at the time from Senator Helms to President Clinton 

that such an examination was ―premature‖ and potentially inconsistent 

with US national security. 

It is very likely that the Russian Federation or even some European 

states will continue to raise this issue as the wars in Afghanistan and 

Iraq continue since the RQ-1 Predator has been armed with Hellfire 

missiles and used to attack various targets in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan.41 Some experts have even suggested that unmanned aerial 

vehicles equipped with both sensors and missiles have emerged as the 

leading ―transformational‖ weapon system. There are also reports that 

the United States has now dropped more ordnance from drones on 

Pakistan than the total number of bombs it dropped on Serbia and 

Kosovo in 1999. As a result of the success of drone attacks, Secretary 

of Defense Rumsfeld requested additional funding for the procurement 

of drone aircraft in 2002, and drone acquisition funding has increased 

steadily in every subsequent defense budget request.42 Recently, it was 

reported that President Barack Obama‘s administration is seeking to 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

34

expand the number of drone attacks in Pakistan. Since January 2008, 

80 missile attacks from drones have killed more than 400 enemy 

fighters.43 Still at this point the use of drones as ―attack‖ aircraft is 

reported to be under the control of the Central Intelligence Agency and, 

consequently, not subject to treaty restrictions until they become part of 

deployed military formations.44

Open Skies

The Treaty on Open Skies was proposed by then President George 

H.W. Bush in 1989, though the idea had been discussed during the 

Eisenhower administration in 1955. The members of NATO and the 

former Warsaw Pact signed the treaty in Helsinki on 24 March 1992. 

Following the demise of the Soviet Union the governments of the 

Russian Federation, Belarus, Georgia, and Ukraine acknowledged their 

support for the agreement and submitted it for review and a vote of 

ratification by their respective parliaments. The treaty was scheduled 

to enter into force 60 days after the last state deposited its instruments 

of ratification. The United States ratified Open Skies in 1993, but the 

treaty languished in parliamentary committees in Belarus and Russia. 

These last two signatories finally ratified it, and they deposited their 

instruments of ratification in November 2001. As a result the treaty 

entered into force on 1 January 2002.

Open Skies is of unlimited duration and the United States has no 

right of refusal to overhead flights allowed under the treaty. The 

agreement covers the national territory of all signatories, including 

territorial waters and islands. The treaty has four primary objectives.45 

First, it seeks to promote greater openness and transparency of military 

activities. Second, the treaty is designed to improve the monitoring of 

current and future arms control arrangements. Third, Open Skies is 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

35

intended to strengthen the capacity of crisis prevention and crisis 

management. Finally, it provides aerial observation based on equity 

and effectiveness for all signatories. 

Each participating state has the right to conduct, and the obligation 

to receive, flights over its territory based on an established quota.46 

The United States has a quota of 42 over flights per year; however, 

during the initial three years only 31 were permitted in any single year. 

Any signatory to the treaty may receive the data that results from any 

flight. Such flights are to be conducted by unarmed fixed-wing 

observation aircraft. They are authorized to carry still and video 

cameras, infrared scanning devices, and side-looking radars. Since 

signing the agreement many countries have developed appropriate 

aircraft in accordance with the limitations in the treaty. Numerous 

―practice flights‖ over the territory of participating states have also 

been conducted in order to insure all were fully prepared for 

implementation. Of these ―practices,‖ 54 involved American territory, 

and 30 of these efforts were joint trial flights that included foreign 

participation. During the hostilities in Kosovo, for example, Ukraine 

requested to conduct a ―practice‖ Open Skies flight over Italy. 

Obviously, this caused significant anxiety among NATO military 

planners since Italian airfields were some of the principal bases used to 

conduct air attacks against Serbia. Fortunately, the flight was cancelled 

at the last moment due to problems with the Ukrainian aircraft.

The treaty also provided that for the initial six months after it 

entered into force any OSCE member could apply for accession This 

expanded the area of application enormously and included countries in 

areas with unique security problems such as the Baltic States, the 

Balkans, and Cyprus. After 1 July 2002, any country could request to 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

36

accede to the treaty. Still, no country can accede to this agreement if 

any existing signatory objects. 

The treaty finally entered into force on January 1, 2002. All of the 

treaty‘s initial 27 signatories have ratified the accord and are now 

states-parties. Since the treaty entered into force, Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, 

and Sweden have also become states-parties. Russia conducted the 

first observation flight under the treaty in August 2002, while the 

United States carried out its first official flight in December 2002.47

Obviously, the Open Skies Treaty has the potential to provide 

significant transparency of American military forces and operations on 

US soil as well as the territory of any member state. This could even 

include, for example, a location such as the island of Diego Garcia 

(British island territory) which has played an important role in the 

conflict in Afghanistan, forces preparing for deployment in the United 

States or abroad, as well as formations enroute to a foreign destination. 

Still, the American intelligence community has provided an assessment 

that Open Skies is manageable if timely and accurate notifications of 

over flights are provided and training is conducted by US forces to 

increase their awareness levels.

The Ottawa Treaty

The Ottawa Treaty establishes a global ban on anti-personnel 

landmines (APL). The so-called ―Ottawa process‖ reflected a feeling 

by some states and non-governmental organizations that insufficient 

attention was being paid to the problem of landmines. This resulted in 

a ―fast track‖ arms control approach led by Canada and a coalition of 

non-governmental organizations (NGO‘s). The umbrella organization 

for this effort was the International Campaign to Ban Landmines 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

37

(ICBL) that consisted of six NGO‘s that had launched an effort for a 

global ban on anti-personnel landmines beginning in 1992.48

In 1996 a conference of 70 countries and 50 NGOs took place in 

Ottawa. Participants agreed to sign a treaty the following year in order 

to ban all anti-personnel landmines by 2000. The Convention on the 

Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of AntiPersonnel Mines and Their Destruction is commonly referred to as the 

Ottawa Treaty and was signed in 1997. It entered into force in March 

1999. By June 2001, 140 countries had signed the agreement and over 

100 had ratified it. All NATO members, with the exception of the 

United States and Turkey, are signatories to this agreement. While the 

treaty prohibits states from possessing anti-personnel landmines, it 

places no restraints on anti-tank mines or their associated handling 

devices. As of September 10, 2009, there are 156 States Parties to the 

Treaty. Thirty-seven countries have not signed the treaty. The most 

notable countries not to sign include the People‘s Republic of China, 

United States of America, India, and Russia.49

Obviously, supporters of the agreement would argue that it has 

significant strengths. The treaty and associated publicity have 

galvanized attention to a problem that they believe is of global 

significance. This was particularly important for states that had not 

been affected by previous conventions limiting APL such as Cambodia, 

Mozambique, Bosnia, and Croatia. Since it entered into force 

enormous stockpiles of mines have been destroyed. According to the 

ICBL over 20 million mines have been destroyed from the arsenals of 

over 50 countries. Several NATO countries to include Britain, France, 

and Germany have completely destroyed all of their anti-personnel 

landmine stockpiles.50
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38

The agreement does, however, have significant weaknesses. Most 

notable is the fact that the largest military powers—the United States, 

Russia, and China—are not signatories to the agreement. American 

opposition to the Ottawa Treaty is in large measure due to US security 

responsibilities, particularly on the Korean peninsula. Anti-personnel 

landmines play a crucial role in the defense of South Korea and its 

capital of Seoul that lies only 27 miles from the Demilitarized Zone that 

separates North from South Korea. Due to the deployment of massive 

North Korean conventional forces along the DMZ American military 

planners rely on pre-planned and emplaced minefields to counter and 

slow any possible North Korean offensive. The Clinton administration 

stated that the United States would seek to find suitable alternatives to 

current anti-personnel landmines and mixed anti-tank systems by 2006. 

In 1999, $23.2 million dollars was appropriated for research on 

alternatives and an additional $38.1 million dollars was included in the 

fiscal year 2000 proposal. In addition, the United States has destroyed 

over 3.3 million non-self-destructing mines since 1996, but not those 

emplaced in Korea. The Bush administration conducted a review of 

American landmine policy. In its aftermath, Administration officials 

stated that the United States would not sign the Ottawa Treaty under 

any circumstances but would continue research on alternatives.

The Ottawa Treaty has several key provisions in addition to each 

signatory‘s commitment never to use anti-personnel mines. Each also 

agrees never to ―develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain, 

or transfer, directly or indirectly antipersonnel mines.‖ Furthermore, 

the treaty prohibits assisting, encouraging, or inducing any activity 

prohibited under the convention. This has caused serious problems for 

NATO military planners. At the time of its signing the United States 
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39

stockpiled mines in five NATO countries: Norway, Germany, Italy, 

Spain, and the United Kingdom. A strict legal interpretation of the 

treaty might suggest that the 17 signatory states from NATO could not 

cooperate with or assist the United States or Turkey (which has also not 

signed the Ottawa Treaty) to plan for the use of such weapons during a 

combined operation or to allow such stockpiles on their territory.51

In June 1998, French Minister of Defense Morin declared that his 

nation would ―unreservedly enforce the Ottawa Treaty.‖ He added, 

―France will prohibit the planned or actual use of anti-personnel mines 

in any military operation whatsoever by its military personnel. 

Furthermore, France will refuse to agree to rules of engagement in any 

military operation calling for the use of anti-personnel landmines.‖52 

Even Great Britain (arguably America‘s closest ally) noted that being 

on opposite sides with Washington on this issue caused a ―profound 

operational problem for the Alliance.‖53 As a result, the United States 

removed its APL stockpiles from the territory of its allies. Though 

several states appended memorandum when signing the Ottawa Treaty 

which would allow them to conduct military operations with ―nonsignatories,‖ the planning for the use of these weapons has been 

restricted during all NATO combined exercises, training, and computer 

models. It was also reported that several European nations expressed 

concern that the United States might use APL during the conflict in 

Kosovo, and it has likely been a question during operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. 

Arms Control in the Balkans—The Dayton Accords 

The Dayton Accords were signed in November 1995, ending the 

conflict in Bosnia. Annex 1A of the agreement included ambitious 

arms control and confidence-building proposals for the signatories to 
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40

be negotiated under the auspices of the Organization for Security 

Cooperation in Europe. Under Article II states agreed to commence 

immediately negotiations on confidence- and security building 

measures. They also agreed (Article III) to restrictions on the 

importation of light arms for 90 days and heavier weapons for 180 

days, and (under Article IV) to begin negotiations to establish reduced 

levels of armament and military manpower. Article IV also established 

a deadline of 11 June 1996 to achieve compliance with this agreement. 

Finally, the agreement called for subsequent negotiations (Article V) 

with the goal of establishing a regional balance in and around the 

former Yugoslavia. 

Surprisingly, the parties achieved agreement on a package of 

Confidence- and Security Building Measures by 26 January 1996. The 

accord used existing CSBMs contained in the Vienna Document as a 

model, and these measures were effective upon signature.54 All of the 

states of the former Yugoslavia were also subject to the CSBMs listed 

in Vienna Documents as well as the Military Code of Conduct upon 

achieving membership in the OSCE. Eventually this applied to all 

parties with the exception of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 

Belgrade‘s OSCE membership was suspended in July 1992 as the war 

in the region intensified and not restored until the demise of the 

Milosevic government in 2000.

While success in achieving an agreement on confidence-building 

measures was significant, final settlement of the Article IV reduction 

accord proceeded slowly. If the states parties failed to agree by the 

established deadline, the Dayton agreement established limits based on 

population that would automatically apply. The allocation for Bosnia 

and Herzegovina was further subdivided between the component 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

41

entities (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika 

Srpska). Consequently, the arms control process could not occur in 

isolation. Success for this negotiation was dependent upon the 

outcome in other areas of the accord and the emerging political climate 

between the former warring parties. Failure of the NATO 

Implementation Force (IFOR), for example, to implement the physical 

movement of forces required, or a breach in the agreement to conduct 

elections, would have made these negotiations moot. As a result, 

though these agreements placed no restraints on the peacekeeping 

force, IFOR became involved in the actual implementation and 

maintenance of these agreements much to the chagrin of many 

European and American military leaders. IFOR continued to be the 

best source of information on the size and disposition of the three 

armies that remained in the Bosnian Federation (Bosniak, Croat, and 

Serb) as well as conducting supervision of any military training 

exercises by these forces. In many ways the arms control agreements in 

the Balkans suggested a new approach that moved from using arms 

control as a tool for conflict prevention (as during the Cold War) to 

becoming a tool for post-conflict resolution. 

During these discussions a serious disagreement existed among the 

Contact Group (representatives from United States, United Kingdom, 

France, Germany, Russia, and Special Representative of the EU) over 

the American plan to assist in the training and re-equipping of Croatian 

and Muslim forces for the Federation Army.55 European participants 

argued that this effort could potentially undermine the negotiations and 

was akin to pouring ―gasoline on smoking embers.‖ American 

negotiators argued that Bosnian Muslim leaders would have refused 

any treaty until ―train and equip‖ was well underway. Furthermore, 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

42

continued US congressional support for the overall effort was 

dependent upon ―leveling the military playing field‖ among the various 

protagonists. Consequently, Washington was successful in using ―train 

and equip‖ as leverage to force particularly the Sarajevo government to 

fulfill certain political obligations. This divergence between the United 

States and its allies demonstrated not only a differing approach to 

cooperative security in this case, but also the beginning of a more 

united European security perspective. This development has continued 

with the advent of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI).

An agreement was achieved in the final moments prior to the 

deadline in June 1996. The parties eventually accepted the default 

ratios described in Article IV. They also made ―politically binding‖ 

pledges to reduce military manpower not unlike CFE-1A.56 These 

troop reductions were, however, more a reflection of economic 

necessity than strict military analysis. Furthermore, while this had great 

political significance, the verification and definition of actual military 

manpower levels (particularly in states with large paramilitary forces) 

are virtually impossible. Implementation proceeded slowly with 

widespread complaints by all about cheating and the costs associated 

with destruction. These efforts as well as the preceding negotiations 

also underscored some of the essential coordination difficulties based 

on the structure of the Dayton Accords that required cooperation 

between the OSCE, European Union, and the UN. This caused a 

certain degree of friction between OSCE representatives that were 

involved in the verification of arms control agreements and IFOR who 

had intelligence and oversight of the forces remaining in Bosnia as 

previously mentioned.
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All parties held a Review Conference in June 1998 following the 

verification of reductions. At this meeting the states parties declared 

the agreements successfully implemented and began discussions for an 

Article V mandate.57 Article V prescribed that the OSCE should assist 

the parties to achieve the goal of "establishing a regional balance in and 

around the former Yugoslavia" and included states (i.e., Hungary and 

Romania) that had not been directly involved in the wars in 

Yugoslavia.58 No agreement, however, was achieved due to the onset 

of hostilities in Kosovo and the desire by some Balkan states to 

eventually accede to CFE. With the entry into NATO of several states 

from the Balkans and the possibility at least of the adapted CFE Treaty 

entering into force, American planners need to consider whether or not 

they wish this region to be part of the CFE area of application. If 

countries accede to the treaty, it would place additional restrictions on 

the size of American forces that could operate in the Balkans and 

subject them to additional transparency measures. Russian military 

experts have complained, for example, that American and NATO 

forces in Kosovo were not limited or subject to any transparency 

measures.

THE SPECIAL CASE OF THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL 

ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE

The objectives of the negotiation shall be to strengthen 

stability and security in Europe through the establishment of a 

stable and secure balance of conventional armed forces, which 

include conventional armaments and equipment, at lower 

levels; the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and 

security; and the elimination, as a matter of priority, of the 

capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large 

scale offensive action.59

--Agreed Mandate for the negotiations on the Treaty 

on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)
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The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) 

remains the largest and, therefore, the most important conventional 

arms control treaty ever negotiated. The following map shows the 

signatories to the treaty. 

Chart 2: Map of CFE and Non-CFE countries in Europe60

The European non-CFE states (shown in white) are concentrated in 

two areas with the exception of Malta, Cyprus and Ireland. One area 

lies in the North East of Europe and consists of the Baltic States, 

Sweden, and Finland and the second area is in the South East of Europe 

(Austria and Switzerland are considered a part of Central Europe.) As 

earlier discussed, the Adapted CFE Treaty would allow these states to 

enter the agreement and shift the focus from blocs to national totals. 

Still, at this moment the future of this accord has been placed at risk by 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

45

the Russian Federation‘s decision to suspend its participation in the 

agreement.

Contributions of the CFE Treaty

The CFE Treaty has long been referred to as the ―cornerstone of 

European security.‖ But in light the dramatic changes in European 

security architecture that have occurred since 1990, many wonder if it 

will continue to be the case and, if so, for how much longer? 

Obviously this question looms large in the aftermath of the Russian 

suspension and subsequent conflict between Georgia and the Russian 

Federation in August 2008. Can this agreement assist in reestablishing 

a sense of cooperative security, or has its credibility and utility been 

undermined permanently?

Many diplomats and military leaders believe the treaty continues to 

be of vital importance to European security. Some argue, however, that 

its vitality is dependent upon all states parties accepting the following: 

(1) the 1990 CFE treaty, with its 1996 flank adjustments, must continue 

to be fully implemented; and (2) the 1999 Adapted Treaty must be 

brought into force. Only upon that foundation can the CFE statesparties take a forward-looking approach to any additional changes that 

must be made to continue to ensure the Treaty‘s viability.

In retrospect the agreement can only be truly evaluated against the 

backdrop of changes in European security. Oddly, the treaty was 

signed to prevent or at least reduce the likelihood of conflict between 

NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Shortly after it was signed, the Warsaw 

Pact and the Soviet Union both disappeared. Consequently, the true 

value of the treaty must be considered in the context of the dramatic 

transition that ensued. In fact, some have argued that the ―cornerstone‖ 

metaphor is misplaced. The CFE Treaty has not been a static 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

46

agreement. Europe has weathered many changes, and the treaty has 

been successfully adapted to accommodate those developments.

The treaty clearly proved important in assuaging concerns about 

German reunification and provided transparency during the withdrawal 

of massive Soviet forces from Eastern Europe. These withdrawals 

occurred following the signing of the Treaty on the German 

Reunification (12 September 1990) by the Federal Republic, German 

Democratic Republic (East Germany), France, the United Kingdom, the 

Soviet Union, and the United States.61 This agreement also contained 

significant additional restraints on military operations. Germany 

agreed to deploy only territorial units that were not integrated in the 

NATO command structure on the territory of the former East Germany. 

Bonn further agreed that no foreign troops would be stationed in its 

eastern states or ―carry out any other military activity there‖ while the 

withdrawal of Soviet forces was ongoing. Finally, the reunification 

treaty also specified that ―foreign armed forces and nuclear weapons or 

their carriers will not be stationed in that part of Germany or deployed 

there‖ though Germany did insist on the ability to interpret the precise 

meaning of ―deployed.‖62

In terms of the actual reductions of military equipment associated 

with the implementation of the original treaty, the numbers are truly 

impressive. Over 69,000 Cold War era battle tanks, combat aircraft, 

and other pieces of military equipment have been destroyed in the now 

30 countries stretching from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains. In 

many ways the treaty changed the face of European security by 

―establishing new, cooperative political-military relationships.‖63 More 

than 5,500 on-site inspections have been conducted, creating a new 

sense of political-military cooperation and openness. 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

47

The true value of the treaty and the associated transparency 

measures was also demonstrated during the various conflicts in the 

Balkans. Short-notice inspections in accordance with CFE were 

conducted of United States forces in Germany by Russian inspectors as 

the American troops prepared to depart for Bosnia in 1995. As a result 

these military operations were conducted without a significant increase 

in tensions. The Dayton Accords that ended the initial conflict in the 

former Yugoslavia in 1996 also contained an annex that established a 

―CFE-like‖ agreement between the contending states. The treaty was 

crafted to be nearly identical to the CFE Treaty in terms of limits, 

definitions, transparency measures, etc. All of the Balkan states 

participating in this agreement have expressed a desire to accede to the 

full CFE Treaty at some point in the future. 

The Russian Federation also requested so-called ―challenge 

inspections‖ of NATO airbases in Italy and Hungary during the conflict 

in Kosovo in late May 1999 under the provisions of the CFE Treaty. 

This included the NATO base at Aviano, Italy, one of the primary 

facilities in mounting the air campaign against Serbia. While this was 

difficult given the circumstances of an ongoing air offensive, NATO 

accepted these requests as legally binding under the treaty, and military 

officials complied appropriately. Many observers believe this helped 

allay to some degree Russian concerns about US force deployments 

during this crisis. 

In fact, many experts believe the overall inspection regime may 

have contributed more to the reduction of tensions and crisis prevention 

during this dramatic transition in European security than the actual 

reductions. Some argue that the agreement‘s greatest value may be the 

entire CFE system that encourages confidence through transparency. 
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48

In the final analysis, the existing treaty (as well as the adapted 

agreement) provides a forum for the major European states to debate, 

agree, and maintain a set of rules about conventional military power on 

the continent that is critical to overall stability.64

The Russian “Suspension” of the CFE Treaty

On 12 December 2007, the Russian Federation officially 

announced that it would no longer be bound by the restrictions of the 

1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and suspended 

its participation.65 Moscow took this action due to the fact that the 22 

NATO members bound by the 1990 agreement had not ratified the 

1999 Adapted Treaty by that date. This was not a surprise. During the 

June 2007 extraordinary conference Russia provided a detailed list of 

the ―negative effects‖ of the conduct of NATO states.66 These included 

overall NATO force levels, the flank limits, and other unspecified 

demands for additional transparency. In addition to these concerns, it 

was clear that Prime Minister Putin and Russian leaders in general were 

angry over a series of issues, including NATO enlargement, the 

independence of Kosovo, and plans to install American anti-ballistic 

missiles on Polish territory. Nonetheless, Moscow reassured the other 

treaty signatories that it did not intend to dramatically increase its force 

levels in the territory adjacent to their borders. Russia has apparently 

continued to abide by that decision. Russian President Medvedev 

underscored Russia‘s seriousness about its Treaty concerns when he 

described the existing agreement as both ―unfair‖ and ―non-viable.‖ At 

the same time Russian leaders have been quick to describe the 

contributions made by the treaty as valuable and further acknowledge 

the spirit of both trust and cooperation that it has engendered. 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

49

In terms of ratification, NATO members have argued since the 

1999 Istanbul Summit that their ratification remained contingent upon 

Russia complying with obligations it freely accepted when the Adapted 

CFE Treaty was signed. The most contentious is the full removal of all 

Russian military forces from the territory of the former Soviet republics 

of Georgia and Moldova. Russia has adamantly resisted this linkage 

and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has publicly argued that 

―there is no legal link‖ between the Adapted CFE Treaty and these 

commitments.67 

Consequently, the Treaty is beginning to unravel. Russia has not 

provided data as part of the bi-annual data exchange since it suspended 

participation in 2007. Nor has Russia provided required information on 

changes to the location of ground treaty limited equipment, and it is no 

longer accepting (nor participating in) the Treaty‘s routine and 

challenge inspection regime. The implications of this situation for the 

future health of the CFE Treaty are serious. Although other parties 

continue to implement the treaty in full, a situation in which Russia is 

not implementing core treaty provisions cannot be sustained forever. 

At some point, this state of affairs will cause other states parties to 

begin re-evaluating their own treaty participation. If that becomes the 

case, the treaty will truly cease to be viable. This will have unforeseen 

implications not only for the ability to deal with other issues on the 

bilateral and European security agenda, but also possibly with respect 

to the defense postures among the states parties as well as other arms 

control agreements. Even President Medvedev, in his speech, seemed 

to have indicated his preference for avoiding the treaty‘s ―complete and 

final collapse.‖
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In response to Moscow‘s suspension of treaty participation, NATO 

members published a ―parallel actions package‖ in March 2008 in an 

attempt to avoid the treaty‘s demise. NATO‘s statement on the 

package notes that, ―NATO allies will move forward on ratification of 

the Adapted CFE Treaty in parallel with implementation of specific, 

agreed steps by the Russian Federation to resolve outstanding issues 

related to Russian forces/facilities in the Republic of Moldova and 

Georgia.‖68 The package represented a serious shift in the NATO 

position, as it called for NATO countries to begin the ratification 

process (which in some countries such as the United States might take 

several months) while Russia commenced its withdrawals. Once 

Russian forces had been removed from Georgia and Moldova, NATO 

countries would strive to complete ratification of the Adapted Treaty 

quickly. NATO members also pledged to address many Russian 

security concerns once the Adapted Treaty was in place. For example, 

all new NATO members that are not treaty signatories (Slovenia, 

Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) have agreed to accede. NATO 

also announced that following final ratification it would be willing to 

discuss Russian concerns about future weapon ceilings and limitations 

placed on Moscow in the ―flank zones‖ that border Turkey, Norway, 

and the Baltic Republics.69 

Unfortunately, the negotiations made little to no progress. They 

have now been largely undermined by the deteriorating relations 

between NATO countries and the Russian Federation in the aftermath 

of the conflict in Georgia. In fact, one expert observed that the 

Russian-Georgian War violated the principles contained in both OSCE 

documents as well as the preamble to the CFE Treaty. These 

documents call for states parties to refrain from ―the threat or use of 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

51

force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 

State,‖ as well as the commitment to peaceful cooperation and the 

prevention of military conflict anywhere on the European continent.70 

This situation has been further complicated by the Moscow‘s 

subsequent decision to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia as 

independent nations. 

What Would Failure Mean?

Russian leaders have been increasingly critical of the treaty for 

several years and suggested that it may actually perpetuate adversarial 

relationships. In July 2007 Prime Minister Putin suggested that the 

agreement contradicted reality, and Foreign Minister Lavrov said the 

regime was ―hopelessly outdated, the adherence to which makes no 

sense and means one has no self-respect‖.71 But this opinion is not 

shared by most treaty members and security experts. A group of 

distinguished Western diplomats, military leaders, and academics 

prepared a letter in 2008 that argued that the collapse of the CFE Treaty 

would ―...undermine co-operative security in Europe and lead to new 

dividing lines and confrontations.‖72 

Obviously, the potential demise of the CFE Treaty or ―cornerstone 

of European security‖ would beg several serious questions. What 

would be the impact in future if the flow of routinely provided 

information on conventional equipment, inspections to verify that 

information, and constraints on the levels of that equipment were to 

disappear? What would Russian and Western perspectives be on a 

situation in which there were no limits at all on the level or the location 

of conventional weapons deployments or the overall force levels of 

treaty signatories? What would the European security picture look like 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

52

if the habits of cooperation developed through the CFE Treaty were 

undone? 

Sadly, it is not too far-fetched to imagine that this could cause a 

dramatic realignment of European security. The loss of information 

and undermining of predictability would set the stage for historic 

animosities to resurface and lingering crises to potentially worsen. For 

example, there have been suggestions that Azerbaijan is counting on 

the failure of the treaty to provide it an opportunity to increase its 

military forces. Such a development would clearly exacerbate tensions 

between Azerbaijan and Armenia. These two countries remain 

embroiled in a long-simmering conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.73 

This struggle has resulted in over 15,000 casualties since 1988 and over 

800,000 Armenian and Azeri refugees. Furthermore, Russia would 

also lose any transparency over the military forces of existing or future 

new members of the NATO alliance as well as the deployment of 

NATO forces on the territory of new members. Finally, the Baltic 

republics would not be allowed to accede to the existing agreement 

and, consequently, there would be no mechanism to affect transparency 

about military forces on their territory.

Many believe these developments might encourage an expansion in 

military forces or damage to other agreements. For example, some 

experts believe Russia might reconsider its participation in the 

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in an effort to 

improve its security posture. Russian President Putin threatened such 

action in a statement in February 2007. Loss of CFE would also 

remove a valuable crisis management tool from the security 

architecture and damage arms control as an instrument to enhance 

overall European stability. In this regard, Balkan observers believe the 
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53

demise of the CFE Treaty might mean an end to the arms control 

arrangements contained in the Dayton Accords. Obviously, such a 

development could contribute to renewed violence in that troubled 

region.

The demise of this agreement could also have a serious impact on 

other important aspects of European security. Moscow and 

Washington have periodically had serious disagreements over the past 

decade and their bilateral relations have at times been worse than any 

time since the end of the Cold War.74 Despite the fact that the new 

administration of President Barack Obama has called for hitting the 

―reset button‖ in their relations, serious issues remain that may be 

affected by how the CFE imbroglio is resolved. For example, CFE‘s 

collapse could undermine the cooperative European security structures 

that have been built over the last fifteen-plus years. These efforts 

include the NATO-Russia Council, the OSCE, and prospects for 

building or enhancing future cooperation in other areas. Finally, if CFE

is abandoned, its benefits would be difficult if not impossible to 

replace. It is hard to imagine how to build new arrangements if there is 

no foundation remaining upon which to construct them. Beyond that, if 

CFE is no longer a viable agreement, and the confidence-building 

aspects of the regime are destroyed completely, over time it is entirely 

possible that some states parties will seek alternative arrangements that 

will replace the security benefits they now derive from the treaty. 

What Are the Options? 

As we look to the future, Russian and NATO strategists must 

carefully consider the deadlock over the CFE Treaty and how 

conventional arms control can help reestablish a sense of cooperative 

security in the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian conflict. Michael 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

54

Wyganowski, a former Polish diplomat who headed Poland‘s 

delegation to the CFE Treaty negotiations in 1999, underscored the 

importance of the CFE Treaty following the conflict between Russia 

and Georgia in August 2008. He observed that the accord was being 

relegated further to the sidelines by a conflict that actually underscored 

the importance of limiting conventional arms holdings.75 

With respect to the future of the CFE Treaty, there appear to be in 

principle three possible options. The first option would be the status 

quo: Russia continues its suspension, and efforts to resolve these 

issues remain deadlocked. In this scenario, the treaty over time will 

collapse. Other states parties are unlikely to continue to implement a 

treaty while Russia continues to avoid its treaty obligations. 

The second option is that NATO agrees to address Russian CFE 

demands and ratifies the Adapted Treaty despite the continued presence 

of Russian forces in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Moldova. This is 

also unlikely to happen. In July 2007 (one year prior to the RussianGeorgian War) the United States Senate passed Resolution 278. This 

document reaffirmed the Senate‘s support for the treaty, described the 

Russian suspension as ―regrettable,‖ and further warned that this was a 

―step that will unnecessarily heighten tensions in Europe.‖ In this 

environment it is very unlikely that the Obama administration would 

seek Senate ratification of the adapted treaty absent Russian 

compliance with the Istanbul commitments. 

The third option is to take the framework endorsed by NATO in 

the form of the parallel actions package and work the details 

conscientiously. In this package NATO shifted its position on 

ratification, suggesting that countries can move forward with the 

ratification process in parallel with final resolution and implementation 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

55

of the Istanbul commitments, as well as movement on other aspects of a 

package. But this requires some resolution of the outstanding issues 

between Russia and both Moldova and Georgia. Even if Western states 

were to agree to Russian demands and ratify the treaty, the agreement 

cannot enter into force without the support of these two states, and both 

remain most directly affected by the unrealized commitments made in 

Istanbul a decade ago. The Russian delegation has provided its 

comments on the NATO Parallel Action Plan, but no real progress has 

been made to resolve the existing impasse.

Clearly, a number of the core Russian concerns can best be 

addressed not by abandoning CFE, but through entry into force of the 

Adapted Treaty. The Adapted Treaty provides the means through 

which Russia can ensure predictability in the levels and locations of 

NATO forces, as well as a means of inspecting these forces against the 

information that NATO provides. Consequently, a decision by 

Moscow to move in the direction of compromise would not be based on 

altruism, but rather on a careful calculation of Russian national interest. 

Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov seemed to reflect this in remarks at 

the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on 24 September 2008. 

He observed, ―the only thing we want internationally is cooperation on 

the basis of full equality and mutual benefit.‖76 Still it is unclear 

whether all of the Russian concerns can be resolved within the context 

of the CFE Treaty, and Moscow has also pushed for a new PanEuropean Security agreement that would include arms control as an 

essential component. Consequently, it would seem more likely that 

resolution of the disagreement over the CFE Treaty might be a valuable 

precursor that would allow for serious negotiations on a number of 

European security issues to occur. 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

56

A Western arms control expert once remarked that he felt like he 

was watching 300 years of European hostilities unfold during the 

course of CFE negotiations. Critics of this process are frequently 

captivated by the technical details of definitions, counting rules, 

stabilizing measures, and inspection regimes, and often overlook the 

connection between these points and larger security issues. Still while 

the ―devil may lie in the details,‖ this accord is rooted in the collective 

attempt of over 30 sovereign states to improve their respective security. 

Consequently, historical antagonisms have an impact as well as 

contributing to the agreement‘s enduring value, as Europe seeks a new 

architecture based on cooperative security. 

With the rising threat of transnational issues such as nuclear 

proliferation and terrorism, the fate of conventional weapons in Europe 

may not top the priority agenda of NATO or Russian leadership. But 

while the original purpose of the treaty—to reduce the risk of conflict 

and short-warning attacks between two blocs—may be a thing of the 

past, the CFE Treaty continues to contribute to Europe's security in 

crucial ways. Perhaps most importantly, the transparency and 

predictability that it provides serve as an important stabilizing element, 

as European relationships continue to evolve and military forces are 

modernized.

CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ARMS 

CONTROL

The integration of nuclear and conventional forces was a key 

aspect of both the Western and Soviet military strategies throughout the 

Cold War, and this was reflected in subsequent arms control strategies. 

US strategy focused at its core on ―deterrence.‖ The end states or goals 

of this strategy were clear—deterring Soviet aggression and assuring 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

57

allies of American support. The military component focused on raising 

perceived costs for the Soviet Union and its allies by communicating a 

capability and a willingness to respond. In theory, at least, any 

deterrent strategy like this consists of two parts: (1) the material means 

(military weaponry and formations) which will be used to inflict pain 

on that attacker, and (2) the demonstrated resolve (announced policy) 

to do so if certain closely held values are threatened or violated.77 

Consequently, future American policy with respect to its conventional 

and nuclear forces deployed in Europe as well as arms control efforts 

must acknowledge the past as well as current requirements. 

Conventional and Nuclear Forces and Arms Control during the 

Cold War

Almost from the onset of this struggle, however, the NATO allies 

were confronted by the overwhelming conventional superiority 

deployed by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. In the 1950‘s 

Washington responded to this threat through a strategy of ―massive 

retaliation.‖ The American monopoly in nuclear weapons provided 

credibility for this approach. The Soviets would have to calculate that 

any conventional attack on Western Europe would involve American 

forces from the onset and, consequently, NATO would threaten a 

response that could include US and British strategic nuclear weapons. 

American resolve to extend its nuclear guarantee over the NATO allies 

was underscored by conventional and nuclear force postures as well as 

official pronouncements by American leaders. For example, Secretary 

of State John Foster Dulles (who served throughout the administration 

of President Eisenhower) declared that American defense strategy 

depended ―primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate instantly, by 

means and at places of our choosing.‖78
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―Massive Retaliation‖ was formally adopted as NATO strategy 

14/2 in December 1956. By that point, however, it had become 

increasingly clear that the United States was placing greater and greater 

reliance on nuclear weapons to deter an attack on Europe. The first 

series of so-called ―tactical‖ or ―non-strategic‖ nuclear weapons had 

been developed and deployed to meet this emerging requirement. This 

arsenal included ―missiles, rockets, and artillery capable of striking 

only those targets in the general region of the battlefield‖79 as well as 

longer range weapons (missiles and bombs delivered by tactical 

aircraft) that when launched from the NATO territory could strike 

targets throughout the continent. This strategy and the role of these 

forces were further communicated in alliance policy. The NATO 

Council announced in December 1954 that military commanders were 

authorized to plan for the use of nuclear weapons in a defensive war 

regardless of which side had actually used them initially.80

By the late 1950‘s, the ability of the United States to reassure it 

allies of its steadfast intention to come to their assistance as well as the 

overall credibility of its strategy were being rapidly undermined. The 

Soviet Union continued to improve its nuclear and conventional forces 

as well as conveying an increasing capability to hold the American 

homeland at risk. This fear was perhaps best summarized in a seminal 

article entitled, ―The Delicate Balance of Terror‖ published by Albert 

Wohlstetter in Foreign Affairs in 1959.81 European fears that the 

United States was ―decoupling‖ from Europe were further intensified 

by the publication of General Maxwell Taylor‘s book, The Uncertain 

Trumpet, in 1959 as well as Senate confirmation hearings for the new 

Secretary of State, Christian Herter. Both men proclaimed publicly that 

given the strategic situation at that moment they could not foresee any 
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American president authorizing the use of nuclear weapons except in 

the direct defense of the American homeland. 82

It was under this atmosphere of increased European concern about 

American policy that the administration of President John Kennedy 

took office in 1961. Under the leadership of Defense Secretary Robert 

McNamara the new administration sought to replace ―massive 

retaliation‖ with a new strategy that would offer the president the 

maximum number of policy options during a time of crisis or war. This 

new approach also sought to reinforce ―extended deterrence‖ in the 

eyes of our European allies as well as the Soviet Union. The new 

strategy would be summed up by its title—―Flexible Response.‖ It was 

formally adopted as NATO Strategy 14/3 in December 1967 and 

remained agreed alliance policy until the end of the Cold War. Over 

time three interlocking elements of military forces were designed to 

provide the military capability for this new strategy. These were 

eventually referred to as the ―NATO Triad.‖ They were communicated 

to allied governments and potential adversaries in NATO publications 

as consisting of ―conventional forces strong enough to sustain stalwart 

resistance in forward areas; tactical nuclear forces to support 

conventional defense, and to present the aggressor the risk of escalation 

to all-out nuclear war; and strategic nuclear forces which provide the 

ultimate sanction for the whole deterrent strategy.‖83

Secretary McNamara recognized the close connection between 

conventional and nuclear forces and the announced strategy. He firmly 

believed that there was a place for the growing arsenal of tactical 

nuclear weapons as well as improvements in NATO‘s conventional 

capabilities within the context of the Flexible Response strategy.84 He 

argued that the United States had to ―improve our tactical nuclear 
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capability to deal with an attack where the opponent employs them 

first, or an attack by conventional forces which puts Europe in danger 

of being overrun.85 As a result, the stockpile of about 2,500 nonstrategic nuclear warheads in Europe grew to about 3,500 during the 

Kennedy administration. 

The United States altered the size, structure, and orientation of its 

conventional and military forces in Europe throughout the Cold War in 

an effort to maintain an ―extended nuclear deterrent.‖ It would make 

similar adjustments with its forces deployed in Asia. The number of 

non-strategic nuclear weapons rose to more than 7,000 by the middle of 

the 1970‘s and then declined to below 6,000 by the end of 1980‘s.86 

Reductions occurred as the United States and its allies determined that 

they could maintain the deterrent with fewer weapons. This often 

occurred during modernizations of the stockpile. For example, when 

the NATO allies made the very controversial decision to accept 

American intermediate range nuclear weapons on their soil in the early 

1980‘s, they also decided to remove 1,000 older warheads. In 1983, 

the alliance announced the Montebello Decision which included both 

an agreement on nuclear modernization as well as the reduction of 

1,400 non-strategic nuclear weapons.87

Also during the 1970‘s the United States incorporated both 

conventional and nuclear weapons in its newly emerging arms control 

strategy. On 16 December 1975 US Ambassador Resor announced a 

new proposal known as Option III at the ongoing Mutual and Balanced 

Force Reduction Talks in Vienna. The United States and its NATO 

partners proposed a reduction of 1000 unspecified US tactical nuclear 

weapons and 29,000 soldiers from Central Europe in return for a Soviet 

reduction of a five-division tank army consisting of 68,000 soldiers and 
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1700 tanks.88 The Soviets countered with proposals that included a 

combination Russian conventional and nuclear forces, but the talks 

bogged down. In 1979, the United States removed Option III from the 

negotiations as a viable proposal. 

The United States would also continue to deal with the inherent 

contradiction of its extended deterrent strategy. How could 

Washington develop conventional and nuclear forces coupled with 

announced policy that together were sufficient to ―deter‖ the Soviet 

Union while at the same time ―reassuring‖ its European allies? The 

risk of uncontrolled escalation remained as long as non-strategic 

nuclear weapons were physically present in large numbers in Central 

Europe and distributed widely among allied forces. This dilemma was 

captured in a seminal article entitled ―Deterrence and Reassurance‖ that 

was written by Sir Michael Howard, the distinguished British academic 

and historian, in Foreign Affairs in 1982. Howard observed that the 

objective of a deterrent strategy is to ―persuade an adversary that the 

costs to him of seeking a military solution to his own political problems 

will far outweigh the benefits.‖ At the same time the objective of 

reassurance is ―to persuade one‘s own people, and those of one‘s allies, 

that the benefits of military action or preparation for it will outweigh 

the costs.‖ Consequently, Howard argued that large-scale conventional 

warfare which could include escalation was at odds with reassurance 

because ―limited nuclear options do not look very attractive if we are 

likely to be one of them ourselves.‖89

The End of the Cold War—An Evolution in Forces and Policy

As the Cold War came to an end strategies as well as force 

structures evolved quickly. Arms control would play a unique and 

important role that involved both conventional and nuclear weaponry. 
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In 1987 the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Intermediate 

Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty that eliminated a significant number of 

nonstrategic nuclear weapons. These included land-based ballistic and 

cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The 

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was signed in 

November 1990, roughly one year after the fall of the Berlin Wall and 

one month after the reunification of Germany. While the CFE Treaty 

was focused solely on significant reductions in conventional forces, it 

also reduced the number of tactical aircraft and artillery which were 

capable of delivering non-strategic nuclear weapons.

This was followed in 1991 and 1992 by further reductions in nonstrategic nuclear weapons by both the United States and Soviet Union 

in sequential ―Presidential Nuclear Initiatives‖ (PNI). President 

George H.W. Bush first promised the unilateral removal of all landbased tactical nuclear weapons with a range under 300 miles from 

overseas bases and American surface ships, submarines, and naval 

aircraft. The PNI included not only nuclear weapons deployed to 

Europe but South Korea as well. It was followed in late 1991 by a 

NATO announcement to reduce by ―about half the number of nuclear 

weapons for nuclear-capable aircraft based in Europe.‖90 In response 

President Gorbachev announced in October 1991 that the Soviet Union 

―would destroy all nuclear artillery ammunition and warheads for 

tactical missiles; remove warheads for nuclear anti-aircraft missiles, 

and destroy some of them, destroy all nuclear landmines; and remove 

all naval non-strategic nuclear weapons from submarines, surface ships, 

and ground-based naval aircraft, destroying some of them.‖91 

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russian President 

Yeltsin amplified on this unilateral declaration and announced that 
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Russia would destroy all war-heads for short-range missiles, artillery, 

and atomic demolition munitions. He further declared the removal of 

one-third of all non-strategic nuclear warheads from Russian ships as 

well as reductions in warheads for air defense interceptors and those 

delivered by short-range attack aircraft.92 In addition to promising to 

remove substantial numbers of nuclear weapons from forward-based 

units, both the United States and the Russian Federation cancelled a 

variety of nuclear modernization programs and reduced the number of 

ballistic missile submarines on patrol. This all occurred as the initial 

START Treaty was being prepared for signature. Many experts believe 

these efforts in reciprocal arms control paved the way for the START II 

Treaty that was signed in January 1993. This agreement reduced 

strategic nuclear weapons on both sides from 6,000 to a range between 

3,000 and 3,500.93 

Alliance declaratory policies were also shifting from a nearly 40 

year emphasis on deterrence towards a new concept of ―cooperative 

security.‖ This is perhaps best defined as ―a commitment to regulate 

the size, technical composition, investment patterns, and operational 

practices of all military forces by mutual consent for mutual benefit.‖94 

The NATO Russia Charter (also known as the Founding Act) signed in 

Paris in 1997 seemed consistent with this approach. The Charter 

affirmed that ―Russia and NATO do not consider each other as 

adversaries‖ and further confirmed the importance of the CFE Treaty as 

well as its adaptation. It also called for ―reciprocal exchanges, as 

appropriate, on nuclear weapons issues, including doctrines and 

strategy of Russia and NATO.‖95 Finally, the Founding Act included 

elements that were reminiscent of Michael Howard‘s discussion of 

―reassurance‖ as an element of policy. In this case the NATO members 
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attempted to ―reassure‖ the Russian Federation of their intentions 

through this new declaration of policy with respect to their forces. The 

Alliance announced in the Charter that the NATO members ―have no 

intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the 

territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of 

NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy—and do not foresee any 

future need to do so.‖96

This was followed in 1999 with the announcement of the NATO 

new Strategic Concept which would replace NATO Strategy 14/3. 

This document followed the same general direction in alliance 

declaratory policy. The Strategic Concept notes that ―a strong, stable 

and enduring partnership between NATO and Russia is essential to 

achieve lasting stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.‖97 It further 

underscored the importance of arms control and particularly the CFE 

Treaty as elements of the Alliance‘s overall strategy. Still, a balance 

had to be struck between arms control and the desire to reduce forces 

while at the same time maintaining security. The concept affirmed the 

collective desire ―to enhance security and stability at the lowest 

possible level of forces consistent with the Alliance's ability to provide 

for collective defense and to fulfill the full range of its missions.‖98

Consequently, it called for an appropriate mix of modern nuclear and 

conventional forces based in Europe. Some observers might find this 

document contradictory as it stresses cooperation but also reiterates that 

―nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of 

aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable‖ and 

consequently remained ―essential to preserve peace.‖ Thus, 

conventional forces and non-strategic nuclear forces would play a 

reduced yet still important role in NATO security policy. They would 
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65

remain part of a residual deterrent requirement to a wide range of 

potential aggressors and also serve as an important element of alliance 

cohesion.99 The Strategic Concept is being reviewed again and a 

revised concept will be announced sometime in 2010.

In addition to the reductions brought about by the INF Treaty and 

the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, conventional forces for NATO and 

the Russian Federation would also be dramatically reduced. Many of 

these reductions would be unilateral and beyond the legal requirements 

of any treaty. Table 2 shows the percentage of the authorized 

equipment under the CFE Treaty that NATO members maintain in their 

forces at three different points—at the treaty‘s entry into force (EIF), at 

the end of 1999, and as of July 2009. As one can see, NATO members 

only deploy roughly half of the conventional equipment that they are 

authorized. The United States, for example, is authorized to deploy 

4,006 tanks in Europe and currently maintains only 91.100 Table 3 is a 

similar chart that shows the percentage of authorized equipment 

deployed in Russian forces. These two tables confirm that in addition 

to negotiated reductions in conventional forces, both NATO and Russia 

have unilaterally decreased their conventional forces beyond their 

respective treaty obligations. Russian totals are thru 2007 which is the 

last data provided by Moscow.

It is also reported that the United States has reduced the number of 

facilities that it maintains for the storage of non-strategic nuclear 

weapons by over 75 percent. The Strategic Security Blog that is 

maintained by the Federation of American Scientists concludes that the 

United States today keeps a total of between 150 and 240 non-strategic 

nuclear weapons in Europe—a huge reduction when compared to the 

7,000 that were deployed to Europe 30 years ago, or even the levels 
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announced following the PNI‘s.101 The German coalition government 

that was elected in September 2009 announced as part of its ―coalition 

treaty‖ that it would seek as an explicit policy goal the withdrawal of 

all nuclear weapons from German territory. This is the first time that a 

NATO government has publicly urged the removal of American 

nuclear weapons from its territory. It could trigger a wide-ranging 

debate within the Alliance about the future of its nuclear policies.102 

German Chancellor Angela Merkl of the CDU Party and Foreign 

Minister Guido Westerwelle from the partner Free Democratic Party 

Table 2: Percentage of NATO Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE)

at entry into force (EIF), 1999 and 2009ii

TLE Item EIF 1999 2009

Tanks 126 69 48

Artillery 108 72 60

Armored Combat Vehicles 114 71 60

Attack Helicopters 84 59 49

Combat Aircraft 77 61 45

Table 3: Percentage of Russian Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE)

at entry into force (EIF), 1999 and 2009

TLE Item EIF 1999 2007

Tanks 146 88 80

Artillery 130 100 94

Armored Combat Vehicles 169 91 88

Attack Helicopters 113 87 52

Combat Aircraft 135 84 58

 

ii Data for Tables 2 and 3 from Dorn Crawford, Conventional Armed 

Forces in Europe (CFE)—A Review and Update of Key Treaty Elements 

(Washington, DC: US Department of State, 2009), pp. 20-30.
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further announced that tactical nuclear weapons and their role in 

NATO defense planning would be discussed with NATO 

representatives during the ongoing discussions to revise the Alliance‘s 

Strategic Concept. 

Russian Conventional and Nuclear Forces

Having considered the developments in NATO‘s conventional and 

nuclear forces, arms control, and announced policy, it is important to 

consider the largest non-NATO European military power—the Russian 

Federation. Ten years ago, many Western analysts argued that the 

Russian military was on the verge of dissolution. Having undergone 

the turmoil brought about by the end of the Soviet Union and removal 

of forces from Eastern Europe, the Russian army appeared almost on 

the verge of collapse. American and Russian specialists warned of an 

impending military calamity (such as implosion, mutiny, or coup) if 

trends continued.103

The nadir for the Russian Army may have occurred during the 

Kosovo crisis, in the spring of 1999, when the army was able to move 

an airborne battalion to the airfield in Pristina but was unable to 

reinforce and sustain it. As a result, Moscow was ultimately forced to 

withdraw these forces in humiliation. The Russian Army was more 

successful during the Second Chechen War, but this ―success‖ came at 

a great price in terms of casualties and destroyed equipment. It further 

demonstrated that while the Russian military could, over time, subdue 

an insurgency, it was beset by widespread internal problems and would 

be unable to sustain large military forces beyond Russia‘s borders. At 

the official conclusion of counter-terrorism operations in Chechnya in 
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April 2009 the Army was left with a veteran force, but one largely 

schooled in counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism rather than the 

conduct of large conventional military operations. 

There is no doubt that the Russian Army has recovered somewhat 

from its weakened condition at the start of this decade. It is capable of 

defending the nation‘s borders and conducting limited offensive 

operations along its periphery, as the world witnessed during the 

Russian-Georgia conflict in 2008. Still, even though Russia defeated 

Georgian forces quickly, there were serious logistical and command 

and control issues during this war.104 There was frequently no radio 

communications between units, and Russian officers were forced at 

times to use the mobile telephones of Russian journalists in order to 

establish contact with their headquarters.105 

Clearly, the Russian Army is confronted by a number of problems. 

Russia inherited a large conventional arsenal from the Soviet Union, 

but according to a recent study only 10 percent of the weapons are 

properly maintained. In March 2009, Defense Minister Anatoliy 

Serdyukov estimated that only 10 percent of weapons available to 

Russian forces were ―modern.‖ Russia still maintains the world‘s 

largest force of main battle tanks, with over 23,000, which is more than 

all NATO countries combined. Still, about 80 percent of these 

weapons were produced in the 1960‘s and 1970‘s. The remaining 20 

percent consist of the T80 which was commissioned in the late 1970‘s 

and the T90 which went into production in 1993. Still, it is believed 

Russian maintains fewer than 300 T90s which are their most modern 

tanks. Flight hours for the pilots of combat aircraft have also been 

dramatically reduced for economic reasons.106 In October 2008, the 

Russian leadership announced plans for a significant modernization of 
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its military that included a large increase in funding. In the first half of 

2009, however, the budget deficit resulting from the global economic 

slowdown resulted in cuts in defense spending, and the defense 

industry was hit hard due to restrictions on credit. As a result, by late 

2009 the Sukhoi aerospace firm declared it was running at a loss, and it 

is reported that a number of defense plants were on the brink of 

closure.107

Manning the force remains a challenge for Russia due to 

widespread health problems, demographics, and the reduction in the 

draft commitment to one year. Corruption and waste are rampant, and 

some observers believe nearly half the defense budget may be lost as a 

consequence. There is an ongoing budget competition between the 

strategic nuclear forces, the ground forces, and the navy for 

modernization funds. Many observers believe that the strategic nuclear 

forces may receive greater priority for resources that are in increasingly 

short supply due to the ongoing economic difficulties. 

As mentioned above, in terms of treaty-limited equipment as 

defined by the CFE Treaty, the Russians have reduced their tanks and 

artillery significantly, though these reductions have not been as rapid 

and as deep as in many other European countries (See Tables 2 and 3). 

Most experts agree they are currently below their CFE authorizations in

tanks and artillery while maintaining their ACV total at a slightly 

higher level. They have further reduced their attack helicopters by one 

half and their combat aircraft by one third. These forces may, however, 

have been merely repositioned east of the Ural Mountains which would 

place them outside the treaty‘s area of application. Finally, it is 

important to remember that while Western analysts are fixated on 

Russian forces in Europe; Russia must also be concerned with its 
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capabilities in the Far East. In this regard there is evidence that 

Russian military leaders are concerned by the growing size and 

sophistication of Chinese conventional and nuclear forces.

Consequently, the majority of experts agree the Russian Army is at 

least a decade away from developing the capability to pose a largescale conventional threat in Europe. The leadership of the ground 

forces speaks frequently about modernization, a new military doctrine, 

and a shift away from the traditional emphasis on large mechanized 

divisions in favor of smaller independent brigade formations. The 

Ministry of Defense has announced a goal of deploying 50 to 60 of 

these brigades, but today could probably only muster a half dozen. The 

recent ZAPAD2009 military exercise demonstrated some potential but 

was still a relatively small exercise (only about 6,000 Russian troops 

participated), will only be conducted every two years, and was clearly 

tied to political objectives of showing improved relations between 

Russia and Belarus.108 

Curiously, Russia finds itself in a position not dissimilar to that of 

NATO in the early 1960‘s, as Russian leaders speak frequently about 

their perceived conventional inferiority with respect to NATO. In 

many ways, Moscow‘s situation is further complicated by the enormous 

length of Russia‘s borders that must be secured, as well as continuing 

unrest in the North Caucasus. The experts participating in the 

Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United 

States noted in their report that as Russian conventional capabilities 

eroded Moscow placed increasing emphasis on ―nuclear weapons 

generally, and on tactical nuclear weapons in particular.‖109 As the 

membership of NATO increased, Russian military writers frequently 

discussed the possibility of wars along their borders that might 
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specifically involve Russian populations living outside their national 

boundaries (frequently referred to as the ―near abroad‖). They have 

further stated that Moscow would not hesitate to use tactical nuclear 

weapons in such instances. Clearly these declarations reflect both 

military thinking as well as a deterrent strategy.

There is no precise idea of the extent of the Russian non-strategic 

nuclear arsenal. The Soviet Union had developed a vast arsenal of nonstrategic weapons in response to NATO‘s efforts during the 1960‘s and 

1970‘s. Victor Mikhailov, Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, once 

commented that the Soviet Union had produced 45,000 nuclear 

warheads during the Cold War. It is clear from the START 

negotiations that approximately 12,000 of these were strategic 

warheads which would imply that over 30,000 of these warheads were 

for non-strategic systems.110 These weapons were subsequently 

transferred to the control of the Russian military when the Soviet Union 

disappeared. In 2005, Gunnar Arbman and Charles Thorton stated in 

an extensive analysis of Russian tactical nuclear weapons that Russia 

maintained a total stockpile of 8,000 of such weapons with over 3,000 

in operational units (the balance being in central storage facilities).111 

Former Defense Secretaries William Perry and James Schlesinger 

acknowledge a similar number in the final report of the Congressional 

Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States that was 

released in the spring of 2009. The commission reports that the 

Russian Federation currently maintains 3,800 non-strategic nuclear 

weapons in operational units and 5,100 either in reserve or awaiting 

dismantlement.112

Clearly Soviet military planners during the Cold War developed 

wartime contingencies for the use of such weapons on the battlefield in 
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support of Soviet maneuver forces and against NATO targets in depth. 

Soviet military journals were replete with articles that discussed the 

doctrinal and force structure implications. Leading Soviet military 

theoreticians, such as General A. A. Sidorenko and Marshal V. D. 

Sokolovskiy, discussed the close integration of conventional and 

nuclear weapons in their writings.113

Consequently, it should not be surprising that Russian military and 

political leaders should place renewed emphasis on these weapons in 

light of their perceived conventional inferiority. In 1993, Russia 

announced that it was rejecting the Soviet Union‘s ―no-first use‖ of 

nuclear weapons pledge. Moscow indicated that it ―viewed nuclear 

weapons as a central feature in its military and security strategies.‖ As 

the Russian economy continued to weaken during the 1990‘s, 

additional reports emerged that suggested more Russian military and 

political leaders were arguing that Russia‘s growing conventional 

inferiority demanded increased reliance on nuclear weapons.114 In the 

aftermath of the Kosovo crisis it was reported that Russia had moved 

tactical nuclear weapons to Kaliningrad in violation of a 1991 

commitment not to deploy such weapons to the Baltic region. This 

action was likely in response to perceived humiliation suffered by the 

Russian military following its withdrawal from Pristina. It also likely 

indicated that Moscow had few other policy alternatives to demonstrate 

its concerns and demonstrate its power.115 It was also reported in 1999 

that then President Boris Yeltsin and the Kremlin Security Council 

decided Russia ―should develop and deploy tactical, as well as strategic 

nuclear weapons.‖ Vladimir Putin, who chaired the Council at that 

time, subsequently stated that Yeltsin had endorsed ―a blueprint for the 

development of non-strategic nuclear forces.‖116 This was followed in 
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2000 by the publication of a new military doctrine which stated that 

Russian forces could use nuclear weapons ―in response to large-scale 

aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the 

national security of the Russian Federation.‖117 President Putin 

publicly endorsed the new doctrine and went so far as to refer to 

nuclear deterrence forces as ―the main foundation of Russia‘s national 

security.‖118

Implications

There is no doubt that during the past decade the United States and 

Russia have had and continue to have serious disagreements. These 

have included Kosovo, NATO enlargement, planned deployment of air 

defense weapons to Eastern Europe, and the 2008 war between Russia 

and Georgia. Still, even at the most difficult moment, Washington and 

Moscow do not view themselves in the same adversarial fashion as the 

United States and Soviet Union did during the Cold War. Despite this 

fact, the Russian maintenance of a large non-strategic nuclear stockpile 

that, so far at least, they have refused to discuss, is cause for grave 

concern. There is always the possibility that these weapons could be 

used in a crisis or that their mere presence might encourage escalation. 

Many believe that a greater concern is that Russia‘s lax control 

over these weapons, which are stored at numerous sites, could result in 

nuclear accidents, theft by terrorist organizations, or proliferation to 

third parties.119 As former Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton 

Carter observed in a 1998 article in Foreign Affairs, ―The danger of 

weapons of mass destruction being used against America and its allies 

is greater now than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis of 

1962.‖120 These concerns have persisted despite the fact that there has 

been no public evidence or reports from any Western source about an 
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incident concerning the loss, theft, or sale of Russian non-strategic 

nuclear weapons. The United States Congress has also shown its 

concern about the potential risks associated with this large stockpile of 

Russian weapons. The FY2006 Defense Authorization Act contained 

two provisions calling for further study of these systems and the threats 

they might pose. The Act directed that the Secretary of Defense submit 

a report describing whether increased transparency and further 

reductions in American and Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons 

would be in the national security interest of the United States. A 

second provision mandated that the Secretary of Energy submit a report 

to Congress on what steps the United States might undertake to bring 

about greater accountability with respect to Russian non-strategic 

nuclear weapons. Furthermore, a bill before the United States 

Congress to ensure the implementation of the 9/11 Commission Report 

recommendations included provisions that required the Secretary of 

Defense to submit an additional report on American efforts to 

encourage Moscow to supply a detailed accounting of these weapons. 

It further provided $5 million for the United States to assist Russia in 

completing this inventory.121 More recently, in October 2008 Secretary 

of Defense Robert Gates stated his concerns that the Russians were 

unable to maintain an accurate inventory of these nuclear weapons at a 

number of locations and, as a consequence, these sites could be 

potential targets for a rogue state or terrorist group.122 Russian officials 

responded to the reported comments by the Secretary of Defense with a 

public statement that all Russian nuclear weapons were secured in wellguarded facilities and that Gates‘ concerns were unfounded. 

This situation clearly begs the question: What should US policy be 

towards this issue? In 1997, American President Bill Clinton and 
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Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a framework agreement that 

stated both countries would address measure related to these weapons 

in a potential future START Treaty, but this framework was never fully 

implemented.123 The so-called ―New START‖ agreement between 

Moscow and Russia that reduces the permissible number of Russian 

and U.S.-deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 on strategic delivery 

systems could present an opportunity as well as a requirement. The 

Russian Foreign Ministry has stated that this new treaty should become 

―another milestone in disarmament and nonproliferation‖ and further 

mark a ―transition to a higher level of interaction between Russia and 

the United States reaffirming the common goals of the two countries in 

the promotion of mutual and global security.‖124 Consequently, it 

would now seem to be a requirement to include tactical nuclear 

weapons in either a future nuclear arms negotiations or a parallel 

forum. Senior American policymakers have already indicated their 

desire to insure that these weapons are part of any future arms control 

discussions with the Russian Federation based on the reduced levels of 

strategic nuclear warheads mandated by ―New START.‖ 

Any such negotiations will be difficult for a number of reasons. 

First, as previously noted this arsenal includes battlefield weapons that 

could be employed in support of ground forces as well as longer range 

weapons that could be launched from the NATO territory and strike 

targets throughout the continent. A definition for such weapons are at 

best very imprecise, and little consensus exists on this among 

policymakers in Washington or Moscow. Are these weapons defined 

by yield, range of delivery, targets, or ownership? Are they 

qualitatively different from strategic nuclear weapons? Obviously, this 

lack of an agreed definition would complicate counting rules and 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

76

verification methods which are in essence the core of any future 

agreement.125 

Second, the United States must also carefully define its goals and 

objectives for such a negotiation. In contemporary American defense 

planning, a careful balance must be maintained between arms control 

and fulfilling military requirements to provide security for the United 

States and its allies. The 2002 US National Military Strategy notes, for 

example, that 

Nuclear capabilities continue to play an important role in 

deterrence by providing military options to deter a range of 

threats, including the use of WMD/E and large-scale 

conventional forces. Additionally, the extension of a credible 

nuclear deterrent to allies has been an important 

nonproliferation tool that has removed incentives for allies to 

develop and deploy nuclear forces.126 

Any US approach must carefully consider the implications for 

alliance security guarantees as they apply to both old and new NATO 

members as well as allies in Asia. In light of the announcement by the 

German government that it will seek the removal of all American 

nuclear weapons from its territory, this will be a topic that will be 

actively discussed during the ongoing negotiations for a new NATO 

Strategic Concept. It is widely believed the Germans will seek to either 

initiate a new set of negotiations with the Russian Federation that is 

specifically focused on non-strategic nuclear weapons, or insure they 

are included in any future START process. Still, some states may 

perceive that American non-strategic nuclear weapons are important to 

underscore the continuing validity of extended deterrence and alliance 

cohesion.

Finally, what would be the appropriate forum for any negotiation 

on non-strategic nuclear weapons? Since the American arsenal now 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

77

includes only a few hundred weapons while the Russian arsenal is 

likely ten to fifty times this amount, it will be difficult to articulate the 

modalities for a negotiated reduction by Moscow. It is possible that 

these discussions might also need to involve both the French and 

British who are in the process of modernizing their own nuclear forces. 

Their arsenals can no longer be ignored in future discussion given the 

likely reductions in American and Russian strategic nuclear weapons. 

Finally, could other reassurances be provided Moscow that might result 

in reciprocal unilateral reductions with accompanying transparency 

measures not unlike what the world witnessed with the Presidential 

Nuclear Initiatives in the early 1990‘s? 

THE FUTURE

As we consider the way ahead it may be useful to examine the 

thoughts of Hans Morgenthau, one of the most celebrated scholars of 

international relations in the 20th century. Morgenthau observed the 

following three points when considering diplomacy and state policy. 

First, diplomacy must be rescued from crusading spirits. Second, 

diplomacy must look at the political scene from the point of view of 

other nations. Third, the objective of foreign policy must be defined in 

terms of national interests and supported by adequate power.127 

Morgenthau‘s words remind us of the essential fact that arms control 

remains a ―means‖ that nations employ to seek desired end states 

consistent with their respective national interests. In its broadest sense 

arms control refers to all forms of military cooperation between 

potential enemies in an effort to insure greater international stability. 

Consequently, Hedley Bull, one of early arms control theorists, 

described arms control as ―cooperation between antagonistic pairs of 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

78

states in the military field, whether this cooperation is founded upon 

interests that are exclusively those to the cooperating states themselves 

or on interests that are more widely shared.‖128

Some American policymakers and military officers might find it 

odd to discuss arms control at this moment. The United States has been

at war for over eight years, and it sadly appears very likely that 

American military forces will likely be engaged in hostile action in 

several regions of the world for the foreseeable future. Still this 

discussion of arms control as a policy tool remains essential for a 

number of reasons. 

The Bush administration placed little emphasis on arms control 

during its eight years in office. With the arrival of the Obama 

administration, however, it now appears arms control will take on a 

renewed interest as a tool of American foreign policy. President 

Obama has articulated a concerted effort to renew America‘s image 

abroad, reinvigorate alliances, and create new partnerships. Part of this 

has been brought about by certain impending policy realities as well as 

the new administration‘s own stated goals. The president clearly 

articulated this during his speech in Prague on 5 April 2009. During 

this address he stated his determination to ―pursue constructive 

relations with Russia on issues of common concern‖ as well as stating 

his determination to seek the future elimination of nuclear weapons. 

As a result the Obama administration established a large arms control 

agenda during its initial year in office. It immediately sought to finalize 

a new START agreement with the Russian Federation that was 

eventually signed in April 2010. President Obama also took a leading 

role during the Review Conference for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

Treaty (NPT) in May, and hosted a Global Summit on Nuclear 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

79

Security. Finally, the Obama administration stated its clear intent to 

seek final ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 

by the United States Senate during its first term in office in the 

National Security Strategy that was also released in May 2010. 129

Clearly, arms control will continue to be a critical factor in United 

States relations with the Russian Federation. A renewed relationship 

with Russia is important based on the number of issues that demand 

American-Russian cooperation. Conventional arms control and, in 

particular, a resolution to the current impasse over the CFE Treaty, can

contribute to a renewed strategic relationship between America and 

Russia that reduces the possibility for confrontation and finds new 

areas for cooperation. Both sides must carefully consider the major 

areas of cooperation where long-term bilateral interests clearly overlap 

on issues such as Iran, international terrorism, North Korea, energy, 

nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and stability in 

Europe.130 

Obviously, the Obama administration must carefully synergize this 

effort with its European partners. In the aftermath of the war between 

Russia and Georgia, the United States and its NATO allies must avoid 

emotional rhetoric and rely on careful analysis in their collective 

relations with Moscow. Every effort needs to be made to discover if

common interests still exist with Russia that can lead to agreements 

concerning the implementation of the Adapted CFE Treaty. Success in 

this effort could assuage some of Moscow‘s concerns about perceived 

conventional threats and set a basis for future discussions that involved 

the large Russian non-strategic nuclear stockpile. Such an approach 

must remain consistent with agreed allied policy or seek to alter it. 

NATO members agreed in the Strategic Concept in 1999 that arms 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

80

control has ―...a major role in the achievement of the Alliance‘s 

security and objectives in future.‖131 It will be important how NATO 

members deal with this question of an agreed alliance arms control 

―strategy‖ in the ongoing negotiations for a revised Strategic Concept. 

In determining the proper role for conventional arms control in the 

emerging European security environment a new paradigm may truly be 

in order. Traditional approaches to security that emphasize ―collective 

defense‖ or ―collective security‖ now appear to be inappropriate. 

Policymakers may need to adopt the approach of ―cooperative security‖ 

that seeks to introduce measures that reduce the risk of war, mitigate 

the consequences should conflict occur, and establish measures that 

assist in conflict resolution while forestalling reoccurrence. Such 

measures may not necessarily be directed against any specific state or 

coalition.132 These efforts have now shifted in Europe, from 

challenging the status quo to "locking it in place." Corresponding 

deterrence strategies are less focused on deterring a specific adversary, 

and more concerned with deterring a "condition." They also seek to 

facilitate conflict resolution and the continued development of 

European security architecture. This evolution will undoubtedly 

include further refinement of the European security identity and its 

relationship to NATO in future.

Some might argue that even a revised NATO Strategic Concept is 

no longer relevant in light of the war on terrorism. In fact, little if any 

reference is made to ―terrorism‖ in the existing document, or in the 

series of recommendations provided NATO Secretary General 

Rasmussen by the so-called ―group of experts‖.133 Still, the ultimate 

determination of the role (if any) for arms control has longer-term 

strategic implications for the United States as it considers whether or 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

81

not it must depend on multilateral approaches to conflict. As David 

Gompert and Dick Kugler have observed, ―as long as we choose not to 

depend on Allies, we will fail to make joint preparations needed to 

ensure effective coalition operations.‖134 Furthermore, Eliot Cohen has 

noted that a smaller military, ―...will have to concede that some 

missions are simply too big for it to handle alone. Indeed, one of the 

chief strategic choices that the United States faces is that between 

unilateral and multilateral capabilities.‖135 The frustrations that some 

American leaders have at times ascribed to arms control activities were 

in many ways irritation with the realities of working within an alliance.

It must also be recognized that arms control will at times restrict 

future military operations in size, character, or transparency, as well as 

being a reference point for future force development. This is inherent 

in its very definition. As a result, American military and political 

leaders must be fully acquainted with the details of existing agreements 

and carefully analyze the role of arms control as part of national 

security strategy. In this regard certain realities cannot be ignored. 

Existing treaties and agreements must be adhered to until such time as 

the Congress or Executive abrogates American participation or 

negotiates appropriate adjustments. Article VI of the Constitution 

reminds us that ―all Treaties made, or which shall be made under the 

Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the Land.‖ 

If the United States as a matter of policy should do otherwise it will 

exacerbate real or imagined concerns about American ―unilateralism,‖ 

undercut American credibility around the world, and complicate its 

relationships with friends and allies. If the United States determines 

after careful review that a treaty should be abrogated or changed 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

82

markedly, it must initiate that process to include action by the Senate as 

well as consultations with allies and other treaty signatories. 

Such restrictions and a renewed emphasis on arms control in 

general may cause disquiet for some security experts. Contemporary 

American military officers have little knowledge of conventional arms 

control and would likely view the CFE Treaty as irrelevant. They 

would probably argue that changes to the existing treaty regime or 

expansion in confidence-building measures are unnecessary 

distractions while the nation is at war. This view is short-sighted. 

While American military requirements in Europe as measured in the 

number of troops and equipment were reduced, American security 

commitments have actually increased. In the Cold War‘s aftermath 

succeeding US administrations supported the expansion of NATO from 

16 to 28 countries. Consequently, Washington has now significantly 

extended its Article V commitments as described in the NATO Treaty 

to come to the aid of any alliance member that is attacked. 

The collapse of the CFE Treaty regime, for example, could result 

in greater demands being placed on American security commitments in 

Europe. NATO member states (particularly those newly admitted 

countries along the periphery of the Russian Federation) would press 

NATO planners to explain how, absent legal constraints on Russian 

forces, existing contingency plans could be executed if these countries 

were threatened. There would be expanded demands for military 

exercises to demonstrate NATO‘s capabilities and resolve. There 

might also be additional requests for US infrastructure on the soil of 

allies to facilitate future operations and underscore America‘s 

commitment. It might become a supporting argument for a more rapid 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

83

admission of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO, expanding American 

commitments even further. 

This may also imply taking a longer view of European as well as 

global security. In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11th and 

the onset of the efforts to combat violent extremism, America finds 

itself involved in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The latter conflict has 

now lasted longer than the US involvement in World Wars I and II 

combined, and it is now the longest conflict the United States has ever 

fought. The associated operational tempo has stretched American 

ground forces to the breaking point with little relief in sight. As a 

result, Europe, the military focal point during the Cold War, has now 

become an ―economy of force operation‖ for the United States, as 

attention is focused on achieving success on battlefields in South and 

Southwest Asia. Even a flawed and imperfect CFE Treaty undergirds 

for the United States this ―economy of force‖ operation whereby 

American planners could anticipate relatively limited force 

requirements in the European theater as they focus on the ongoing 

conflicts in the Middle East. Given its military priorities elsewhere, the 

US government should seek to avoid a situation in which expanded 

NATO security commitments create additional military requirements at 

a time when the US military can ill afford to respond.

In its relations with Russia as well as its European allies, the 

United States may well seek to test two hypotheses through the 

―means‖ of arms control and other tools of diplomacy. First, can 

Europe now assume a greater responsibility for its own security and 

reduce its reliance on the United States? This would appear to be 

particularly pressing given the recent passage of the constitution for the 

European Union coupled with America‘s involvement in multiple 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

84

conflicts and its increasing focus on Asia. Second, can Russia establish 

a ―normal‖ relationship with the United States and the other nations of 

Europe so that concerns over security are replaced by strategies of 

cooperation? This would, over time, make arms control less important 

between Russia and the rest of Europe but would still retain arms 

control as an important instrument of policy in those areas of Europe 

(such as the Balkans and North Caucasus) that have experienced recent 

conflicts. 

Finally, it is also important to consider that though arms control as 

a tool of policy was central to European security for the past 40 years, it 

is not uniquely ―European.‖ The lessons that have been learned from 

this experience might have application in other parts of the world that 

are beset by rising security concerns. One need only consider the 

Golan Heights, Korean Peninsula, or the Pakistani-Indian border areas 

to find locations where large military formations are poised.136 Clearly, 

Pakistan is critical to contemporary American security interests in 

Afghanistan and South Asia, as reiterated by President Obama in his 

speech at West Point on 1 December 2009.137 Long-term stability in 

Pakistan can only be achieved through a reduction in the long-term 

confrontation between India and Pakistan—one that has led to several 

wars and that requires both countries to devote precious resources to 

defense that might better be devoted to pressing domestic requirements. 

Conventional arms control could play a future role in reducing tensions 

between these two protagonists. 

Recommendations

As American policymakers consider how to deal with challenges 

and opportunities inherent in arms control as a tool for the emerging 

security environment, the following recommendations are appropriate:
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

85

Arms control expertise must be more widely available, both 

in NATO and nationally, to ensure that such expertise can be 

deployed at all levels of military command. For example, US 

Central Command (currently involved in hostilities in 

Afghanistan) has no resident arms control expertise even 

though some of the agreements discussed here (such as the 

Vienna Document and the Open Skies Treaty) could affect 

ongoing operations.

Clearly American policymakers must carefully consider the 

restrictions such measures enforce on American forces, but 

they must also understand that these agreements provide the 

United States a wealth of intelligence, mechanisms for crisis 

management, and contributions to conflict resolution. 

Policymakers and military planners must understand that in 

most cases these agreements are not ―static‖ but are actually 

―dynamic.‖ As currently designed they have and will 

continue to change or evolve in content and membership. For 

example, several states have argued for additions to the 

weapons restrained under the CFE Treaty. It is likely that 

some will propose that remotely piloted vehicles, such as 

those that now play a larger and larger role in American 

operations in South Asia, be included as ―combat aircraft‖ 

under the definitions used in the CFE Treaty. If this occurred 

it would restrict their overall number in the treaty area of 

application consistent with the number of attack aircraft 

allowed by the agreement, and subject any transiting Europe 

to inspection. 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

86

Advance generic planning should be undertaken by the United 

States and all NATO allies to shorten the political decisionmaking process and ensure appropriate and timely execution 

of Vienna Document activities relating to any unusual buildup of NATO forces during periods of increased tension or 

crisis. 

The application of arms control responsibilities should be 

included in the scenarios of command post and field training 

exercises. Planners should either include an arms control 

annex to operations orders or integrate such considerations 

more carefully throughout the planning process. 

Compliance with arms control responsibilities needs higher 

visibility within NATO and American military commands. 

Commanders should not be surprised to learn that their 

planned operations may be affected by treaty commitments. 

Military leaders must consider that compliance with legal 

obligations and political responsibilities is not incompatible 

with operational security and force protection requirements. 

In fact, such efforts may assist in preventing conflict or 

limiting the scale of a conflict in terms of scale or number of 

participants.

The level of experience in arms control issues—particularly for 

American military officers—has atrophied in the past decade, 

and a dramatic reduction has occurred in the number of 

officers assigned duties relating to arms control on the Joint 

Staff and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This is 

further complicated by the rapid turnover of officers on the 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

87

Joint Staff in comparison to their civilian counterparts in the 

State Department and the intelligence community. This must 

be reversed. 

There is a growing need for immediate military advice and 

expertise at State, CIA, and the National Security Council in 

order to deal with the emerging arms control agenda, and 

quickly assess the impact of arms control inspections on 

current and planned military operations. Furthermore, such 

expertise is required in order to carefully analyze potential 

changes to existing agreements, as well as the impact of the 

implementation of new treaties.

Many noted historians have argued that the immediate cause of 

World War I in 1914 was the decision by European leaders to begin 

mobilizing their armies. This caused a chain reaction as potential 

adversaries reacted to avoid being vulnerable to attack. It is impossible 

to calculate whether arms control arrangements such as those discussed 

might have provided sufficient restraint at these tense moments and 

precluded conflict. Still, arms control arrangements potentially offer 

transparency mechanisms, force limits, and reassurances that might

serve to reduce tensions between potential protagonists during a crisis. 

Furthermore, should conflict occur such measures might serve to 

confine the conflict in terms of geography or weaponry, and contribute 

to post-conflict resolution. This is not an issue of altruism but rather 

the search for an appropriate balance that continues the use of arms 

control for these purposes within a security environment that has 

dramatically changed since September 11th, 2001. 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

88

The current war is unique in US history in many ways. It is global 

in character and has uncertain objectives. The capture of a capital, 

destruction of an army or fleet, or occupation of specific territory will 

not define ultimate victory. American territory is directly threatened 

for the first time since the Civil War, and the risks are enormous due to 

the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. Consequently, our 

strategy for dealing with this conflict must be comprehensive in nature 

and integrate all of the tools available to a great power (military, 

economic, and diplomatic) in a fashion that will be unprecedented. 

Arms control remains a valuable tool in America‘s diplomatic efforts 

that is both in concert with US allies in this struggle, and consistent 

with an approach of cooperative security. 

ENDNOTES

 

1 Charles Robinson, Greek and Roman Historians, (New York: Holt, 

Rinehart, and Winston, Inc, 1957), p. 71.

2 Michael Miggins, Political Affairs Division, NATO Headquarters, 

Brussels, Belgium, ―Verification and Implementation Coordination Section 

(VICS),‖ lecture presented at the NATO School, Oberammergau, 

Germany, Spring 2000. 

3

Joint Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, (Washington: United States Joint Staff 

Headquarters, April 2001), p. 309.

4 Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control

(Washington: Permagon-Brassey, 1985, initially published in 1961), p. 1. 

5 Robert H. Strassler, ed. The Landmark Thucydides (New York: The Free 

Press, 1996), pp. 49-50. 

6 Michael O. Wheeler, ―A History of Arms Control,‖ in Jeffrey A. Larsen, 

ed., Arms Control – Cooperative Security in a Changing Environment

(Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p. 19.
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

89

 

7

Ibid. 

8

Ibid, p.20. 

9

Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. (New York: 

Random House, 1987), p. 301. 

10 Martin Creveld. Technology and War. (New York: The Free Press, 

1991), p. 212. 

11 John G. Keliher. The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force 

Reductions. (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), p. 67. 

12 Thomas Schelling. Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University 

Press, 1966), p. 234. See also: Martin van Creveld, Command in War.

13 See http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_26700.htm. Also 

examine US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, ―North Atlantic 

Council Communiqué December 14, 1967,‖ Documents on Disarmament, 

1967 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 676-677.

14 Ibid. 

15 Ibid. 

16 John Fry, The Helsinki Process – Negotiating Security and Cooperation 

in Europe. (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1993), pp. 4-

5. 

17 Richard Schifter, ―The Conference on Security and Cooperation in 

Europe: Ancient History or New Opportunities?‖ The Washington 

Quarterly (Autumn, 1993), p. 123.

18 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and 

Disarmament Agreements (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 

1990), p. 319-320.

19 Joseph Kruzel, ―From Rush-Bagot to START: the Lessons of Arms 

Control,‖ The Washington Quarterly, Volume 30, Number 1, Spring 1986, 

pp. 195-197.

20 Ibid, p. 214. 

21 Richard Schifter. ―The Conference on Security and Cooperation in 

Europe: Ancient History or New Opportunities?‖ The Washington 

Quarterly. (Autumn, 1993), p. 123.
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

90

 

22 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Arms Control and 

Disarmament Agreements. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 

1990). pp. 319-320.

23 Lynn Hansen,―Conventional Arms Control – Has It a Future?‖ paper 

delivered at DTRA 8th Annual International Conference on Controlling 

Arms, Norfolk, Virginia, 2 June 1999, p. 7.

24 General Wesley K. Clark. Waging Modern War. (New York: Public 

Affairs, 2001), pp. 293-294.

25 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, ―The Kosvo Crisis Is Straining 

Europeans,‖ 19 May 1999, p. 9. See also: Christopher Donnelly, ―Russia 

After Primakov,‖ paper delivered at the Finnish National Defense College, 

10 June 1999, p.4.

26 Dorn Crawford, Conventional Armed Force in Europe (CFE) – A Review 

and Update of Key Treaty Elements (Washington, DC: US Department of 

State, March 2010), p. 6.

27 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. ―Final Document 

of the First Conference to Review Operations of the CFE Treaty.‖ (Vienna: 

OSCE, 1996), p. 2.

28 Department of Defense. Strengthening Transatlantic Security – A U.S. 

Strategy for the 21st Century (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 

Office, 2000), p. 41. 

29 Jeffrey D. McCausland, ―Europe,‖ in Larsen, Arms Control, p. 205. 

30 Wolfgang Zellner, ―Can This Treaty Be Saved? Breaking the Stalemate 

on Conventional Forces in Europe,‖ Arms Control Today, September 2009, 

p. 2. 

31 Dr. Lynn Davis. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and 

International Security Policy, Testimony before the Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee, Subcommittee on European Affairs, 29 April 1997.

32 Dr.Michael Mandelbaum, The Dawn of Peace in Europe (New York: 

Twentieth Century Fund, 1996), pp. 61-63. See also: Frederick 

Hammersen, ―The Disquieting Voice of Russian Resentment,‖ Parameters,

Vol. XXVIII, No. 2 (Summer 1998), pp. 39-55.
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

91

 

33 US Department of State, ―Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional 

Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Decision of the Joint Consultative 

Group on Treaty Adaptation,‖ (Washington: Government Printing Office, 6 

April 1999). See also: Wayne Boese, ―CFE Parties Outline Adapted 

Treaty; Limits to Allow NATO Growth,‖ Arms Control Today, March 

1999, p. 28.

34 Office of the White House Press Secretary, ―Adaptation of the Treaty on 

Conventional Armed Forces In Europe (CFE),‖ (Istanbul, Turkey: 19 

November 1999).

35 Wayne Boese. ―Russian Compliance with CFE Flank Limit in Doubt.‖ 

Arms Control Today. July 1999. p. 46.

36 Bill Gertz, ―Russia Tells U.S. It Will Violate Arms Pact.‖ Washington 

Times. 7 October 1999:, p. A1.

37 Office of the White House Press Secretary, ―Statement by the President,‖ 

The White House, Washington, D.C., 19 November 1999.

38 ―CFE Adapted at OSCE Summit in Istanbul,‖ Arms Control Today, 

November 1999, p. 23.

39 Sharon LaFraniere. ―U.S. Military in Georgia Rankles Russia.‖ 

Washington Post. 28 February 2002, p. A16.

40 Klaus Bolving. Baltic CFE Membership. (Copenhagen: Danish Institute 

of International Affairs, 2001). 

41 ―War‘s Surprises Force U.S. to Shift Military and Political Strategy.‖

New York Times. 8 November 2001, p. B5.

42 Vernon Loeb. ―New Weapon Systems Are Budget Winners.‖ 

Washington Post. 8 February 2002, p. A29. 

43 Scott Shane, ―CIA Expanding Drone Assaults Inside Pakistan, New York 

Times, 4 December 2009, p. A1

44 Ibid. 

45 Allen B. Williams. ―Treaty on Open Skies.‖ Briefing prepared by 

Science Applications International Corporation. 10 September 1992.
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

92

 

46 Jeffrey A. Larsen and Gregory J. Rattray, eds. Arms Control Toward the 

21st Century. (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996). See 

also: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Treaty on Open Skies.

(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992.)

47 Daryl Kimball and Jeffrey Abramson. ―The Open Skies Treaty at a 

Glance,‖ Arms Control Association. October 2007. Web. 14 September 

2009, at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/openskies. 

48 The National Committee on American Foreign Policy. ―Landmines: 

Clearing the Way.‖ (New York: Huntington Associates, 2001.)

49 International Campaign to Ban Landmines. States Parties. Web. 4 

October 2009, at 

http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Universal/MBT/States-Parties. 

50 The National Committee on American Foreign Policy. ―Landmines: 

Clearing the Way.‖

51 Bernard Brown. ―NATO Hits a Land Mine.‖ American Foreign Policy 

Interests. (New York: National Committee on American Foreign Policy, 

February 2000), p. 1.

52 Ibid. p. 2. 

53 Paul Bowers, Tom Dodd and Tim Youngs. Research Paper 98/74: The 

Landmines Bill. (London: British House of Commons Library, 1998), p. 

27. 

54 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. OSCE Press 

Release, ‖Parties Sign Agreement on Confidence and Security Building 

Measures for Bosnia and Herzegovina.‖ 26 January 1996.

55 Bryan Bender. ―Alliance‘s Bosnian Train and Equip Project Will 

Resume.‖ Jane’s Defence Weekly. 17 June 1998. p. 22.

56 Michael O‘Hanlon. ―Arms Control and Military Stability in the 

Balkans.‖ Arms Control Today. August 1996. p. 5.

57 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. ―Regional 

Stability: Article V of Annex 1B of the General Framework for Peace in 

Bosnia and Herzegovina.‖ 13 November 1998.

58 Ibid. 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

93

 

59 Dorn Crawford. ―Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): A 

Review and Update of Key Treaty Elements.‖ Arms Control Bureau, US 

Department of State. (Washington D.C. January 2004), p. 5.

60 Source of the map: Dorn Crawford, ―Conventional Armed Forces in 

Europe (CFE): A Review and Update of Key Treaty Elements,‖ Arms 

Control Bureau, US Department of State, Washington D.C. January 2004, 

p. 5. 

61 ―Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany,‖ NATO 

Review, No. 5 (October 1990), pp. 30-32.

62 Ibid. 

63 US Department of State. ―Fact Sheet -- Treaty on Conventional Armed 

Forces in Europe (CFE): Key Facts About the Current Treaty and 

Agreement on Adaptation.‖ (Washington: Department of State 2009.)

64 Sherman Garnett. The CFE Flank Agreement. (Washington: The 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997), p. 1.

65 Zdzislaw Lachowski. ―The CFE Treaty One Year After Its Suspension: A 

Forlorn Treaty?‖ SIPRI Policy Brief, January 2009, p. 1. 

66 Ibid, p. 4. 

67 Wade Boese. ―Russia Unflinching on CFE Treaty Suspension.‖ Arms 

Control Today. May 2008. 

68 NATO, ―NAC Statement on CFE,‖ (2008)047, March 28, 2008, at 

www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-047e.html.

69 Ibid.

70 Lachowski. p. 5.

71 Mark A. Smith, Russia and CFE (Shriveham, England: United Kingdom 

Defense Academy, 25 April 2010), p. 4. 

72 ―Western Appeal  ̳Bring the Adapted CFE Treaty Into Force‘ gets 

support from Russia,‖ available at 

http://www.hsfk.de/Newsdetail.25.0.html?&L=1&tx_ttnews[backPid]=8&t

x_ttnews[pointer]=6&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=574&cHash=5acd8d3a5d&no_c

ache=1&sword_list[0]=cfe

73 Lachowski, p. 6. 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

94

 

74 Dmitri Trenin. ―Thinking Strategically About Russia,‖ Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace, December 2008. p. 1. 

75 Wade Boese. ―Georgian Conflict Clouds Future Arms Pacts.‖ Arms 

Control Today. September 2008. 

76 Lecture by Sergey V. Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Russian 

Federation, at the Council on Foreign Relations, 24 September 2008. 

Available at: 

http://www.cfr.org/publication/17384/conversation%20with%20sergey%20

lavrov.html. 

77 Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. ed., Politics and the International System. (New 

York: S.B. Lippincott Company, 1969), p. 152. See also William W. 

Kaufman, ―The Requirements of Deterrence,‖ in Bernard F. Halloran, ed., 

Essays on Arms Control and National Security (Washington: US Arms 

Control and Disarmament Agency, 1986), p. 25. 

78 M.W. Kanzelberger, American Nuclear Strategy: A Selective Analytic 

Survey of Threat Concepts for Deterrence and Compellance. 

(Washington: Rand Corporation, 1979), p. 7. 

79 U.S. Department of Defense. Report of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 26.

80 Wolfram Hanrieder. West German Foreign Policy, 1949-1963.

(Stanford, California: University Press, 1967), p. 44. 

81 Albert Wohlstetter, ―The Delicate Balance of Terror,‖ Foreign Affairs,

January 1959, pp. 211-234. 

82 William Cromwell, Norman Forman, and Josef Joffe. Political Problems 

of the Atlantic Alliance. (Brussels: College of Europe, 1969), p. 409. 

83 NATO Information Service. NATO Handbook. (Brussels: NATO 

Information Service, 1975), p. 17. 

84 William Van Cleve, ―The Tactical Nuclear Weapons Debate‖, in Richard 

G. Head, ed. American Defense Policy. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 

University Press, 1965), p. 94. 

85 Ibid. 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

95

 

86 CSIS Nuclear Strategy Study Group. Toward a Nuclear Peace: The 

Future of Nuclear Weapons in U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy. 

(Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993), p. 27.

87 Amy F. Woolf, ―Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons,‖ Congressional 

Research Service Report for Congress, 10 August 2009, p. 7.

88 Keliher, pp. 99 and 147. 

89 Michael Howard, ―Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 

1980‘s,‖ Foreign Affairs, Winter 1982/83. For a further discussion see: 

Ashton Carter, John Steinbruner, and Charles Zraket, editors. Managing 

Nuclear Operations. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 

468-469. 

90 Taylor Bolz, editor. In the Eyes of the Experts – Analysis and Comments 

on America’s Strategic Posture. (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace, 

2009), p. 281.

91 Ibid.

92 Ibid. 

93 Forrest E. Waller, Jr. ―New Directions in Strategic Nuclear Arms 

Control,‖ in Jeffrey A. Larsen and James J. Wirtz, eds. Arms Control and 

Cooperative Security (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 

2009), p. 103.

94 Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry and John D. Steinbrunner. A New 

Concept of Cooperative Security. (Washington: Brookings Institution 

Press, 1992), p. 6.

95 ―Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between 

the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, signed 

in Paris, 27 May 1997.‖ Available at: 

http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/founding.html. 

96 Ibid. 

97 ―The Alliance‘s Strategic Concept,‖ April 24, 1999, paragraph 36. 

Available at: www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm. 

98 Ibid.
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

96

 

99 Ibid. See also Woolf, p. 12. 

100 Dorn Crawford. Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) – A 

Review and Update of Key Treaty Elements. (Washington: U.S. 

Department of State, June 2008), pp. 8-28.

101 Oliver Meier, ―German Nuclear Stance Stirs Debate‖, Arms Control 

Association, December 2009, p. 2. 

102 Ibid. 

103 Stuart Goldman. Russian Conventional Armed Forces: On the Verge of 

Collapse? (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 1997). 

104 International Institute for Strategic Studies. Strategic Survey 2009 – the 

Annual Review of World Affairs. (London: Routledge, Taylor, and Francis 

Group, 2009), p. 207.

105 Christian Lowe, ―Georgian War Shows Russian Army Strong but 

Flawed,‖ Reuters, 20 August 2009. 

106 Margarete Klein. Russia’s Military Capabilities – ―Great Power‖ 

Ambitions and Reality. (Berlin; Stiftung Wissenshaft und Politik, October 

2009), pp. 6-10. 

107 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2009, p.

209.

108 Discussions with senior experts at the Foreign Military Studies Office, 

US Army Combined Arms Center, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. 

109 Bolz, p. 278. 

110 Rose Gottmoeller, ―Preface,‖ in Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kurt J. 

Klingenberger, eds. Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons –

Obstacles and Opportunities. (Washington: Library of Congress, 2001), p. 

xi. 

111 Gunnar Arbman and Charles Thorton. Russia’s Tactical Nuclear 

Weapons. (Stockholm: Swedish Defense Research Agency, 2005), p. 7.

112 William J. Perry, Chairman and James R. Schlesinger, Vice Chairman. 

America’s Strategic Posture – the Final Report of the Congressional 

Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. (Washington: 
McCausland—Conventional Arms Control

97

 

U.S. Institute of Peace, 2009), p. 111. See also Robert S. Norris and Hans 

M. Kristensen, ―Nuclear Notebook, Russian Nuclear Forces, 2009,‖ 

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 65, Number 3 (May-June 2009), 

pp. 55-64. 

113 For a thorough analysis see General A. A. Sidorenko. The Offensive,

translated by the US Air Force (Washington: Department of the Air Force, 

1970) and Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy, translated by Harriet F. Scott, Soviet 

Military Strategy (New York: Crane, Russak, and Company, Inc, 1975). 

114 Dr. Alexander A. Pikayev, ―After Yugoslavia: Shifting Russian 

Priorities on Arms Control and Non-Proliferation,‖ presentation at the 

North Atlantic Council, 8 June 1999,p. 12. See also Richard F. Staar, The 

New Military in Russia (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Proceedings, 

1996), pp. 29-37, 192.

115 PhilippC. Bleek, ―Moscow Reportedly Moves Tactical Nuclear Arms to 

Baltics,‖ Arms Control Today, January 2001, p. 33.

116 Bolz, p. 282. 

117 Woolf, pp. 15-16. 

118 Bolz, p. 282. For a further discussion see Woolf, p. 15. 

119 John A. Nagl, ―Arms Control in the Year 2025,‖ in Larsen, Arms 

Control, p. 333. 

120 Ashton Carter, John Deutch, and Philip Zelikow, ―Catastrophic 

Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger,‖ Foreign Affairs 

(November/December 1998), p. 81. 

121 Woolf, p. 3. 

122 Walter Pincus, ―Gates Suggests New Arms Deal With Russia,‖ 

Washington Post, 29 October 2008, p. A9. 

123 Woolf, p. 2. 

124 Cliffor Levy, ―Arms Treaty With Russia Will Expire, But Not Talks,‖ 

New York Times, 5 December 2009, p. A8. 
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125 James M. Smith, ―Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control: 

Implications for the United States Air Force‖, in Larsen and Klingenberger, 

Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons, pp. 250-251. 

126 Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Military Strategy of the United 

States – A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow. (Washington: 

Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004), p. 12. 

127 Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson. Politics Among Nations. 6th 

edition. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985.) p. 165.

128 Hedley Bull. The Control o fthe Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms 

Control in the Missile Age. (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. xxxv. 

129 Office of the White House Press Secretary. ―Remarks by President 

Barack Obama at Hradcany Square, Czech Republic,‖ 5 April 2009, Web. 

29 September 2009, at 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-PresidentBarack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/. President Barack Obama, 

National Security Strategy (Washington: The White House. 2010), pp. 23-

24.

130 David C. Speedie. ―U.S.-Russia Relations: Under Stress, and In Need of 

Care.‖ Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affaris. n.d. Web. 18 

October 2009, at 

http://cceia.org/resources/articles_papers_reports/0005.html. 14 November 

2009.

131 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,

Press Communique NAC S(99)65, 1999, p. 10.

132 Jeffrey A. Larsen, ―An Introduction to Arms Control,‖ in Larsen and 

Wirz, Arms Control and Cooperative Security, p. 3. 

133 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO 2020: Assured Security; 

Dyanmic Engagement – Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of 

Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO (Brussels, Belgium: NATO, 

17 May 2010).

134 As quoted in James P. Thomas, Adelphi 333: The Military Challenges 

of Transatlantic Coalitions, (London: International Institute for Strategic 

Studies), May 2000, pp. 29-31. 
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135 Ibid. 

136 Ibid. 

137 Office of the White House Press Secretary, ―Remarks by the President 

in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan,‖ 1 December 2009, delivered at the United States Military 

Academy at West Point. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-andpakistan
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