Preventing Deaths and Injuries of

Fire Fighters using Risk Management

Principles at Structure Fires

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
This document is in the public domain and may be freely copied 

or reprinted.

DISCLAIMER

Mention of any company or product does not constitute endorsement by the National 

Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). In addition, citations to Web sites 

external to NIOSH do not constitute NIOSH endorsement of the sponsoring organizations 

or their programs or products. Furthermore, NIOSH is not responsible for the content of 

these Web sites.

ORDERING INFORMATION

To receive documents or other information about occupational safety and health topics, 

contact NIOSH at

1–800–CDC–INFO (1–800–232–4636)

TTY: 1–888–232–6348

E-mail: cdcinfo@cdc.gov

or visit the NIOSH Web site at www.cdc.gov/niosh

For a monthly update on news at NIOSH, subscribe to 

NIOSH eNews by visiting www.cdc.gov/niosh/eNews.

DHHS (NIOSH) Publication Number 2010–153

July 2010

Safer • Healthier • PeopleTM
 Preventing Deaths and Injuries of 

Fire Fighters using Risk Management 

 Principles at Structure Fires

WARNING!

Fire fighters are often killed or injured when fighting fires in abandoned, vacant, and 

unoccupied structures. These structures pose additional and sometimes unique 

risks due to the potential for fire fighters to encounter unexpected and unsafe 

building conditions such as dilapidation, decay, damage from previous fires and 

vandals, and other factors such as uncertain occupancy status. Risk management 

principles must be applied at all structure fires to ensure the appropriate strategy 

and tactics are used based on the fireground conditions encountered.

Fire fighters should take the following steps to 

minimize their risk of death and injury while fighting structure fires: 

 Report conditions and hazards encountered to your 

officer, incident commander, or incident safety officer.

 Recognize that maintaining your safety is a shared 

responsibility. Comply with your department’s standard operating procedures (SOPs) / standard operating guidelines (SOGs) and safety rules.

 Be constantly aware of your surroundings and 

changing conditions.

Fire departments (chief officers, company officers 

and policy makers) should take the following steps 

to protect fire fighters:

 Develop and enforce risk management plans, policies, and standard operating procedures and guidelines (SOPs/SOGs) for risk management.

 Train incident commanders, incident safety officers, 

and fire fighters in the fire department risk management plans and SOPs/SOGs for risk management.

 Develop and implement fi re department policies 

and SOPs/SOGs for emergency response and fi refi ghting activities in and around abandoned, vacant, 

or unoccupied structures.

— A thorough size-up and risk analysis should be 

performed before conducting operations in any 

burning structure. 
— Fire-fighting operations should be limited to defensive (exterior) strategy if the structure is judged to 

be unsafe and in any situation where the risks to 

fire fighter safety are excessive. 

— Offensive (interior attack) operations should only 

be considered when sufficient resources are on 

scene to conduct offensive operations with a 

reasonable degree of safety, including the ability to perform essential support functions (i.e., 

water supply, ventilation, lighting, utility control, 

accountability, rapid intervention teams).

— Additional size-ups and risk analyses should be 

performed before changing strategies, including 

any decision to conduct interior overhaul operations following a defensive fire attack.

 Have adequate resources available on scene to perform rapid intervention team (RIT) duties anytime 

personnel are operating at any structure fire.

 Inspect and preplan buildings within your jurisdiction. Note the type of construction, materials used, 

presence of trusses and/or lightweight construction 

in the roof and floor, type of occupancy, fuel load, 

exit routes, and other distinguishing characteristics.

 Enter preplan information into the dispatch computer so that when a fire is reported at a preplanned 

location, the critical information is provided to all 

responding units.

 Adopt and enforce a standard system of marking 

dangerous abandoned, derelict, and vacant buildings, based on a prefire assessment of their structural conditions and other risk factors, in cooperation 

with municipal agencies and local authorities such as 

local housing authorities. 

 Train fire fighters and officers to recognize the marking 

system and incorporate the information into their sizeup considerations. Additionally, local authorities should 

ensure programs are in place that provide for the demolition and removal of structures deemed unsafe by 

code enforcement.

 Make sure that the incident commander conducts 

an initial size-up of critical fireground factors before 

beginning fire-fighting efforts and continuously reviews and reevaluates these factors during all fireground operations. A 360-degree size-up should be 

conducted for all abandoned, vacant, or unoccupied structures.

 Ensure those in charge of fire incidents (e.g., incident 

commanders, chief officers, safety officers) are fully 

trained to fulfill their responsibilities and obligations in 

the execution of their duties.

 Educate the public on the need to have home fire 

drills and designated meeting places in the event of 

an emergency. The location of designated meeting 
places should be communicated to the fire department as a way to help confirm and verify building 

occupancy status.

Incident commanders (IC) and incident safety officers (ISO) should do the following:

 The IC should conduct an initial size-up of each incident weighing critical fireground factors (i.e., occupancy status; occupant survivability and rescue 

potential; vacant building markings or indicators; 

size, construction and use of the building; age and 

condition of the building; and the location, size, and 

extent of the fire in the building) against the department’s risk management profile to determine the 

initial incident strategy (offensive or defensive). The 

IC should develop an incident action plan before 

beginning firefighting efforts and continually review 

and reevaluate the factors and the risk management plan throughout the operation.

 The IC should use appropriate risk management criteria to decide whether an offensive or defensive 

strategy should be employed to attack a fire. The IC 

should attempt to determine whether the building is 

occupied or not. Signs to look for include vehicles in 

garage, driveway, or parked nearby; people at windows of apartment or office buildings calling for help 

indicates the possibility of other occupants as well; 

time of day; type of occupancy; and reports from 

occupants who have escaped the burning structure. 

Reports from neighbors and bystanders may also 

provide valuable information. 

 The IC should consider the number of fire fighters, 

the amount and type of apparatus and equipment 

available, and the stage of the fire when determining the type of fire attack.

 Follow departmental policies (risk management 

plans, SOPs/SOGs) for risk management.

 Establish, clearly mark, and monitor an exterior collapse zone at structure fires where there is a risk of 

collapse. 

 Use effective and universal evacuation signals when 

command personnel determine that all fire fighters 

should be evacuated from a burning building, as 

well as during the initiation of defensive operations 

and during overhaul and salvage operations. 

For additional information, see NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using 

Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires

[DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2010–153]. To request single copies of the Alert, contact NIOSH at

1–800–CDC–INFO (1–800–232–4636)

TTY: 1–888–232–6348

E-mail: cdcinfo@cdc.gov

or visit the NIOSH Web site at 

www.cdc.gov/niosh

For a monthly update on news at NIOSH, subscribe 

to NIOSH eNews by visiting www.cdc.gov/niosh/

eNews.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
 Prevención de muertes y lesiones de bomberos 

mediante el uso de principios de gestión de 

riesgos en incendios de estructuras

 ¡ADVERTENCIA!

 Es frecuente que los bomberos se lesionen o mueran al combatir los incendios en construcciones 

vacías, deshabitadas o abandonadas. Estas estructuras constituyen riesgos adicionales y a 

veces únicos debido a la posibilidad de que los bomberos se encuentren con edifi cios bajo 

condiciones inseguras e inesperadas como construcciones en ruinas, deterioradas, dañadas 

por incendios anteriores o vandalismo y otros factores, como la incertidumbre de no saber si 

están habitadas. Los principios de gestión de riesgos se deben aplicar para todos los incendios 

de estructuras con el fi n de garantizar el uso de tácticas y estrategias adecuadas de acuerdo 

a las condiciones encontradas en el lugar del incendio.

Los bomberos deben tomar los siguientes pasos 

para disminuir el riesgo de muerte y lesiones al 

combatir incendios de estructuras:

 Infórmele a su supervisor, al comandante 

encargado de la operación o al oficial encargado 

de la seguridad durante las operaciones, cuál es 

la situación y si existe algún peligro.

 Recuerde que mantenerse seguro es una 

responsabilidad compartida. Cumpla con los 

procedimientos y lineamientos operativos 

estándar y las normas de seguridad.

 Manténgase todo el tiempo alerta de sus 

alrededores y de las condiciones que manifiestan 

cambios.

Los departamentos de bomberos (supervisor 

principal, jefe del cuartel y responsables 

de formular reglamentos) deben tomar los 

siguientes pasos para proteger a los bomberos:

 Establecer planes de gestión de riesgos y hacer 

que se cumplan, al igual que con los reglamentos 

y los procedimientos y lineamientos operativos 

estándar establecidos para la gestión de riesgos.

 Capacitar a los comandantes encargados de 

la operación, los oficiales encargados de la 

seguridad y los bomberos sobre los planes 

de gestión de riesgos y los procedimientos y 

lineamientos operativos estándar establecidos 

para la gestión de riesgos.
 Crear e implementar los reglamentos del 

departamento de bomberos y los procedimientos 

y lineamientos operativos estándar que serán 

utilizados durante una emergencia y durante 

las actividades de extinción de incendios en 

estructuras vacías, deshabitadas o abandonadas. 

Se debe realizar detenidamente una evaluación 

y un análisis del riesgo antes de llevar a cabo 

operaciones en cualquier incedio de estructura. 

Las operaciones de los bomberos se deben 

limitar a las estrategias defensivas (exterior) 

si la estructura se considera poco segura y en 

cualquier situación donde los riesgos para la 

seguridad del bombero sean excesivamente 

altos. Las operaciones ofensivas (en el interior) 

solo se deben considerar cuando se cuente en el 

lugar con los recursos suficientes para llevarlas 

a cabo con un grado de seguridad razonable 

y se puedan realizar funciones esenciales de 

apoyo (es decir, suministro de agua, ventilación, 

iluminación, control de los servicios públicos, 

control del número de personas en el lugar, 

equipos de intervención rápida). Se deben realizar 

evaluaciones y análisis del riesgo adicionales 

antes de cambiar de estrategias, incluso antes de 

cualquier decisión de llevar a cabo operaciones 

de inspección en el interior después de una 

estrategia defensiva para extinguir el fuego.

 Contar con recursos adecuados en el lugar del 

incendio para que el equipo de intervención 

rápida pueda realizar sus tareas siempre que 

el personal esté operando en un incendio de 

estructuras. 

 Inspeccionar las edificaciones que se encuentren 

dentro de su jurisdicción y elaborar en forma 

anticipada un plan. Determinar el tipo de 

construcción, los materiales usados, la presencia 

de vigas o estructuras livianas en techos y 

pisos, si está o no habitada, si hay combustible 

almacenado, las salidas y otras características 

particulares.

 Ingresar la información del plan que se trazó por 

anticipado en la computadora del coordinador 

de la estación de bomberos, para que cuando se 

notifique un incendio en un sitio inspeccionado, 

que cuenta con un plan, se le pueda 

proporcionar a todas las unidades de respuesta 

la información crítica.

 Adoptar e imponer un sistema estándar 

para identificar los edificios desocupados, 

abandonados o en ruinas que esté basado en 

un diagnóstico previo de las condiciones de la 

estructura y de otros factores de riesgo. Esto 

se debe realizar en conjunto con las agencias 

municipales y autoridades locales tales como las 

autoridades locales de vivienda. 

 Capacitar a los bomberos y a los oficiales en 

la identificación de los sistemas de señales 

y en las formas de incorporar la información 

a sus evaluaciones realizadas. Además, las 

autoridades locales deben asegurarse de que 

se estén implementando los programas que 

prevén la demolición y remoción de estructuras 

consideradas inseguras bajo los reglamentos de 

construcción.

 Asegurarse de que el comandante encargado 

de la operación lleve a cabo una evaluación 

inicial de los factores críticos del sitio del 

incendio, antes de comenzar con los esfuerzos 

de extinción del fuego, y de que revise y revalúe 

constantemente estos factores durante todas las 

operaciones en el lugar del incendio. Se debe 

realizar una evaluación completa de todas las 

estructuras vacías, deshabitadas o abandonadas.

 Garantizar que las personas encargadas de los 

incendios (es decir comandantes encargados de 

la operación, supervisores principales, oficiales 

encargados de la seguridad, etc.) hayan recibido 

toda la capacitación necesaria para cumplir 

con sus responsabilidades y obligaciones en la 

ejecución de sus tareas.

 Educar al público sobre la necesidad de hacer 

simulacros de incendio en las casas y de 

designar lugares de encuentro en caso de una 

emergencia. Se le debe mostrar al departamento 
de bomberos el lugar designado de encuentro 

para ayudarle a verificar si hay ocupantes en el 

edificio.

Los comandantes encargados de la operación y 

los oficiales encargados de la seguridad deben 

tomar los siguientes pasos:

 Los comandantes encargados de la operación 

deben llevar a cabo una evaluación inicial de 

cada incidente considerando los factores críticos 

del lugar del incendio (como por ejemplo, saber 

si el edificio está ocupado o no; las posibilidades 

de rescatar con vida a los ocupantes; indicativos 

o señales de que el edificio está vacío; 

dimensiones; tipo de construcción, uso, edad 

y condiciones del edificio; sitio y extensión del 

fuego). La estrategia inicial (ofensiva o defensiva) 

que se determinará de la observación de estos 

factores se basará en los procedimientos 

del departamento de gestión de riesgos. Los 

comandantes encargados de la operación deben 

elaborar un plan de acción para el incidente 

antes de comenzar sus esfuerzos de extinción 

del fuego y revisar y revaluar constantemente, 

durante toda la operación, los factores y el plan 

de gestión de riesgos.

 Los comandantes encargados de la operación 

deben usar criterios adecuados de gestión de 

riesgos para decidir si emplearán una estrategia 

ofensiva o defensiva para combatir el fuego. 

También deben intentar determinar si el edificio 

está ocupado o desocupado. Algunos de los 

indicios que se deben buscar son coches en el 

garaje, en la entrada para coches o estacionados 

cerca del edificio; personas en las ventanas 

del departamento o edificio que estén pidiendo 

ayuda, hora del día, si está ocupado e informes 

de los ocupantes que hayan escapado la 

estructura en llamas. Los informes de los vecinos 

y de los testigos en el lugar también pueden 

proporcionar información valiosa. 

 Los comandantes encargados de la operación 

deben tener en cuenta la cantidad de bomberos, 

la cantidad y tipo de aparatos y equipos 

disponibles y la etapa del incendio cuando se 

determine el tipo de combate.

 Seguir las políticas del departamento (planes de 

gestión de riesgos, procedimientos operativos 

y lineamientos de operación estándares) sobre 

gestión de riesgos.

 Determinar, señalar claramente y vigilar la 

zona de derrumbe exterior de las estructuras 

incendiadas que puedan desplomarse. 

 Usar señales de evacuación universales y 

eficaces cuando el personal de comando 

determine que todos los bomberos deben 

evacuar el edificio en llamas, así como también 

durante el comienzo de las operaciones 

defensivas y durante las operaciones de 

evaluación y rescate. 

Para más información, consulte la Alerta de NIOSH: 

Prevención de muertes y lesiones de bomberos 

mediante el uso de principios de gestión de 

riesgos en incendios de estructuras (en inglés). 

[Publicación de No. 2010–153 de DHHS (NIOSH)]. 

Solicite copias gratuitas de esta Alerta escribiendo a:

1–800–CDC–INFO (1–800–232–4636)

TTY: 1–888–232–6348

Correo electrónico: cdcinfo@cdc.gov

o visite el sitio Web de NIOSH en 

www.cdc.gov/niosh

Para recibir boletines mensuales con actualizaciones 

de NIOSH, suscríbase a NIOSH eNews en www.cdc.

gov/niosh/eNews.

DEPARTAMENTO DE SALUD Y SERVICIOS HUMANOS 

Centros para el Control y la Prevención de Enfermedades 

Instituto Nacional para la Seguridad y Salud Ocupacional
Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires ix

ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations, listed in the order that they appear in the 

document are used:

SOPs/SOGs standard operating procedures / standard operating guidelines

RIT rapid intervention team

IC incident commander

ISO incident safety officer

NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

NFPA National Fire Protection Association

NFIRS National fire incident reporting system

IAFC International Association of Fire Chiefs

HVAC heating, ventilation and air conditioning

FDNY Fire Department of New York

USFA United States Fire Administration

IAAI International Association of Arson Investigators

ICC International Codes Council

BOCA Building Officals and Code Administration

ICBO International Conference of Building Officials

SBCCI Southern Building Code Congress International

IBC International Building Code

EMT Emergency Medical Technician

CPR cardio-pulmonary resuscitation

PARs personnel accountability reports

PASS personal alert safety system

1

Preventing Deaths and Injuries of 

Fire Fighters using Risk Management 

Principles at Structure Fires

WARNING!

Fire fighters are often killed or injured when fighting fires in abandoned, 

vacant, and unoccupied structures. These structures pose additional 

and sometimes unique risks due to the potential for fire fighters to 

encounter unexpected and unsafe building conditions such as dilapidation, decay, damage from previous fires and vandals, and other factors 

such as uncertain occupancy status. Risk management principles must 

be applied at all structure fires to ensure the appropriate strategy and 

tactics are used based on the fireground conditions encountered.

The National Institute for Occupational 

Safety and Health (NIOSH) requests assistance in preventing deaths and injuries of U.S. fire fighters working in or 

around burning structures. The mission 

of the U.S. fire service is to save lives 

and property. While it is recognized that 

fire fighting is an inherently hazardous 

occupation, established fire service 

risk management principles are based 

on the philosophy that greater risks will 

be assumed when there are lives to be 

saved and the level of acceptable risk 

to fire fighters is much lower when only 

property is at stake. Interior (inside a 

structure) offensive fire-fighting operations can increase the risk of traumatic injury and death to fire fighters from 

structural collapse, burns, and asphyxiation. Established risk management principles suggest that more caution should 

be exercised in abandoned, vacant, and 

unoccupied structures and in situations 

where there is no clear evidence indicating that people are trapped inside a 

structure and can be saved. When the 

incident commander (IC) has determined 

that there are no lives to save and the 

property can no longer be preserved 

through offensive operations, defensive 

tactics should be initiated in order to decrease the risk to fire fighters. 

This Alert describes 4 incidents that resulted in the deaths of 5 fire fighters 

and injuries to 10 others during operations in and around structures with considerable fire involvement where there 

were indications that the buildings were 

unoccupied. NIOSH recommends that 

fire departments review their occupational safety and health programs, risk 

management plans, training programs, 

and standard operating procedures 
2 Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires

and guidelines (SOPs/SOGs) to ensure 

that they include appropriate safe-work 

practices and policies to avoid the loss 

of fire fighters’ lives when civilian lives 

are not in immediate danger. 

NIOSH requests that the information in 

this Alert be brought to the attention of 

all U.S. fire departments and fire fighters. To bring the recommendations in this 

Alert to the attention of the fire service 

community, NIOSH requests help from 

fire commissioners, fire chiefs, state and 

local fire district administrators, state 

fire marshals, incident safety officers, 

trainers, fire investigators, unions, professional organizations, trade associations, insurance companies, and editors 

of trade journals and other publications.

BACKGROUND

Statistics

The National Fire Protection Association 

(NFPA) reported more than 500,000 structure fires each year between 1999 and 

2007 with the direct dollar losses in 2007 

alone totaling more than 10 billion dollars 

[Karter 2008]. The NFPA*

 also reported approximately 30,000 fires each year from 

2002 through 2005 in vacant buildings, defined as any building that was unoccupied 

and without a tenant, including but not limited to abandoned buildings [Ahrens 2009].

* The NFPA report Vacant Building Fires utilized data 

collected by the U.S. Fire Administration National 

Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS). NFIRS defines a vacant building as any building that is unoccupied and without a tenant. NFIRS does not distinguish between abandoned and vacant buildings. 

For additional information see: http://www.usfa.dhs.

gov/fireservice/nfirs/about.shtm. 

Based on statistics compiled by the NFPA, 

269 fire fighters died on the fireground 

at structure fires during the years 1998 

through 2008 [Fahy 2009]. Of these 269 

fire fighters, 171 were killed inside the fire 

structure: 92 died from asphyxiation, 34 

from burns, 25 from sudden cardiac death, 

15 from crushing injuries, and 5 from internal trauma [Fahy 2009].

NIOSH Investigation of 

Structure Fires

The NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program investigated 

84 trauma-related incidents at structure 

fires between January 1998 and December 

2008. In these incidents, 118 fire fighters 

died and 126 were injured. 

Sixty-two of the 84 incidents occurred at 

structures that were known or suspected to 

be unoccupied at the time fire fighters arrived (unoccupied is defined as any structure 

in which nobody was present at the time of 

the fire). In some instances, incident commanders and chief officers may not have 

had definitive evidence regarding occupancy status. These 62 incidents accounted for 

75% of the deaths (89 of 118) and 86% of 

the injuries (108 of 126) sustained during 

the 84 incidents investigated by NIOSH. Ten 

(11%) of the 89 fire fighters killed at unoccupied structures were operating within the 

collapse zones and were struck by falling debris. Of the 84 total incidents, 65 involved 

offensive fire-fighting tactics.

Fire Fighting Principles and 

Building Occupancy 

The mission of the fire service is to save 

lives and property from the threat of fire. 

In carrying out this mission, fire fighters are 
Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires 3

routinely exposed to certain known and predictable risks while conducting operations 

that are directed toward saving lives and 

property. Building occupancy status is just 

one variable that can impact incident management decisions at a structure fire. 

The International Association of Fire Chiefs 

(IAFC) suggests the following definitions to 

describe the occupancy status of buildings 

[Grorud 2009]:

 Abandoned (or derelict) refers to a 

structure that is not being used for any 

purpose and is not being maintained or 

preserved for some future use or occupancy. In many cases the building could 

be classified as a public nuisance awaiting demolition. A building in this condition 

typically has no value or negligible value.

 Vacant refers to a building that is not 

currently in use, but which could be used 

in the future. The term “vacant” could 

apply to a property that is for sale or 

rent, undergoing renovations, or empty 

of contents in the period between the 

departure of one tenant and the arrival 

of another tenant. A vacant structure has 

inherent property value, even though it 

may not contain valuable contents or human occupants.

 Unoccupied generally refers to a structure that is not occupied by any persons 

at the time an incident occurs. An unoccupied building could be used by a 

business that is temporarily closed (i.e., 

overnight or for a weekend). The term 

unoccupied could also apply to a building that is routinely or periodically occupied, but the occupants are not present 

at the time an incident occurs. A residential structure could be temporarily 

unoccupied because the residents are 

at work or on vacation. A building that 

is temporarily unoccupied has inherent 

property value as well as valuable contents.

 Evacuated refers to a building that was 

occupied (or could have been occupied) 

at the time an incident occurred; however, all the occupants have self-evacuated, 

have been assisted in evacuating, or 

have been rescued by fire fighters. At 

this point there is no possibility of saving 

the lives of any remaining occupants. A 

building that has been evacuated generally has inherent property value as well 

as valuable contents.

Only the category “abandoned (or derelict)” 

refers to a structure that is considered to 

have negligible property value. Structures that 

are described as “vacant,” “unoccupied,” or 

“evacuated” are all assumed to have property value. Accepted fire service risk management principles recognize that an offensive 

strategy (such as a fast attack on a room 

and contents fire) is often justified (e.g., to 

stop the spread of the fire in a structure or 

to protect adjacent structures) and may be 

employed after conducting a thorough risk 

management assessment in an attempt to 

save property where there are no human occupants to be saved [Grorud 2009]. 

Addressing Unsafe and Abandoned 

Structures

Abandoned buildings can and do pose numerous hazards to fire fighters’ health and 

safety. Hazards should be identified and 

warning placards affixed to entrance doorways or other openings to warn fire fighters of the potential dangers. Such hazards 

can be structural as the result of building 

deterioration or damage from previous fires. 

Gutted interiors also increase the amount 

of exposed flammable materials and contain open pathways for rapid flame spread. 
4 Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires

Structural hazards can occur when building 

owners or salvage workers remove components of the building such as supporting 

walls, doors, railings, windows, electric wiring, utility pipes, etc. Abandoned materials such as wood, paper, and flammable or 

hazardous substances, as well as collapse 

hazards, constitute additional dangers fire 

fighters may encounter. Collapse hazards 

can be chimney tops, parapet walls, slate 

and tile roof shingles, metal and wood fire 

escapes, HVAC or other mechanical equipment, solar electrical collectors and cells, 

advertising signs, and entrance canopies. A 

warning placard may be a 12-inch-square 

piece of metal painted reflective yellow so 

that it reflects light in the dark and indicates 

to fire fighters that hazards exist inside the 

building. Figure 1 illustrates symbols used 

on warning placards developed and used by 

the New York City Fire Department [NIOSH 

1999, FDNY 2009]. Note: The checkbox 

with one slash indicates the building is vacant 

and there are interior hazards that fire fighters need to be aware of. The checkbox with 

an X in it indicates the building is seriously 

compromised and fire fighters should not enter, but rather initiate an exterior attack.

Fire departments should work with Federal, 

State, and local authorities to develop and 

implement a strategy to identify, mark, secure, and where possible demolish unsafe 

structures within their jurisdictions. The IAAI / 

USFA Abandoned Building Project, conducted by the International Association of Arson 

Investigators and the US Fire Administration 

[IAAI / USFA 2006] is one example of a program that can be utilized to aid fire fighter 

safety and health by identifying, marking, 

and removing unsafe structures. The Abandoned Building Project Toolbox can be found 

at the Web site http://www.interfire.org/features/AbandonedBuildingProjectToolBox.asp. 

The toolbox contains the Abandoned Building 

Project report Managing Vacant and Abandoned Properties in Your Community and other reference materials. This report includes 

recommendations on how fire departments 

can work with governmental authorities to 

reduce the public safety hazard created by 

unsafe and abandoned buildings. A number 

of locations across the country have developed laws and regulations that address the 

public safety hazards created by vacant and 

abandoned buildings. Examples are the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Abandoned or 

Dangerous Building Regulations 780 CMR 

and 527 CMR [Commonwealth of Massachusetts 2008] and the City of Cincinnati 

Vacated Building Maintenance License [Cincinnati Municipal Code 1101–77].

Determining Safer Tactics for 

Fire Fighting

The incident commander, with input from the 

assigned incident safety officer, is responsible for evaluating conditions at a structure 

fire and determining safe tactics for fighting 

the fire. To accomplish this, the incident 

commander should use a standardized strategic decision-making model. First, the incident commander should size up the critical 

fireground factors [Phoenix Fire Department 

2009]. The incident commander must make 

Figure 1. Warning placard used to identify hazards in vacant buildings.

Vacant – Normal Stability at time of marking

Vacant – Interior hazards exist to such a degree that interior 

operations may be conducted only after examination, 

and with extreme caution

Vacant – Every effort must be made to conduct operations from 

the exterior. When absolutely necessary to enter the 

building, adhere to the following:

A. Approval by officer in command is required 

B. Examination must be conducted before unit is 

committed

C. Operating force and interior operational time to 

be kept to a minimum
Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires 5

a determination that offensive (interior) operations may be conducted without exceeding a reasonable degree of risk to fire fighters 

before ordering an offensive attack and must 

be prepared to discontinue the offensive attack if the risk evaluation changes during the 

fire fighting operation. A full range of factors 

must be considered in making the risk evaluation, including (but not limited to):

 Presence of occupants in the building

 A realistic evaluation of occupant survivability and rescue potential

 Size, construction, and use of the building

 Age and condition of the building

 Nature and value of building contents

 Location and extent of the fire within the 

building

 Adjacent exposures (structures)

 Fire involvement or compromise of the 

building’s structural components

 A realistic evaluation of the ability to execute a successful offensive fire attack 

with the resources that are available 

[Phoenix Fire Department 2009].

These fireground factors must be weighed 

against the risk management plan. There is 

absolute recognition of the fact that fire fighters are routinely exposed to certain known 

and predictable risks while conducting operations that are directed toward saving property. The incident commander is responsible 

for recognizing and evaluating those risks 

and determining whether the level of risk is 

acceptable or unacceptable. However, risks 

taken to save property should always be lesser than those to save lives [Grorud 2009]. 

Risks to fire fighters versus gains in saving 

lives and property must always be considered 

when deciding whether to use an offensive 

or defensive attack. An offensive fire attack

is one that normally includes interior operations that take the attack to the fire. It is 

aimed at extinguishing the fire and preventing fire extension. A defensive fire attack is 

one in which operations are conducted at a 

safe distance from a structure (outside the 

structure and collapse zone†

) and may focus 

on containing the fire rather than extinguishing it. Special hazards such as the risk of 

explosion may require an even larger safety 

zone. The incident commander should routinely evaluate and reevaluate conditions and 

radio progress reports in reaching objectives 

to dispatch and on-scene fire fighters. This 

process allows the incident commander to 

determine whether to continue or revise the 

strategy and attack plans. Failure to revise 

an inappropriate or outdated attack plan is 

likely to result in an elevated risk of death 

or injury to fire fighters [NFPA 2007]. All offensive strategy incident action plans should 

be based on adequate support work (water 

supply, ventilation, lighting, utility control, accountability, RIT, etc.) to insure safe operating conditions on the interior. 

Offensive operations should not commence 

or be performed unless they can be safely 

performed by the personnel available at the 

scene and within the fire department’s established safety procedures and SOPs. Incident command should be established by the 

deployed supervisory chief officer outside of 

the hazard area for the overall coordination 

and direction of the interior operation. An 

incident safety officer should be present to 

assist the IC and to ensure that the health 

and safety system is established before the 

† NIOSH recommends that a collapse zone be equal 

to the height of the building plus allowance for scattering debris—usually, at least 11⁄2 times the height 

of the building [NIOSH 1999a; NIOSH 2005b; Fire 

Fighter’s Handbook 2000; IFSTA 2008].
6 Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires

interior attack. Interior operations require 

the establishment of an uninterrupted water 

supply to provide an effective water flow for 

at least one attack line and one backup line. 

For interior operations, adequate ventilation 

(either horizontal or vertical) is required to 

minimize the risk of thermal insult to interior 

forces as well as to improve interior tenability, survivability, and visibility [Phoenix Fire 

Department 2009]. And for the safety of all 

personnel on the scene, interior operations 

should not commence or continue to be 

performed without personnel accountability 

in place or without the availability of an onscene Rapid Intervention Team. The above 

tasks are key components of an offensive 

strategy in any building whether occupied or 

not [Klaene and Sanders 2000, Duffy 2009]. 

According to NFPA 1500 §A.8.3.3 [NFPA 

2007], “the acceptable level of risk is directly related to the potential to save lives 

or property. Where there is no potential to 

save lives, the risk to the fire department 

members should be evaluated in proportion to the ability to save property of value. When there is no ability to save lives or 

property, there is no justification to expose 

fire department members to any avoidable 

risk, and defensive fire suppression operations are the appropriate strategy [NFPA 

2007].” Retired New York City Deputy Fire 

Chief Vincent Dunn states the following: 

“When no other person’s life is in danger, 

the life of the firefighter has a higher priority 

than fire containment” [Dunn 1992]. Chief 

Dunn also states “The protection of life is 

the highest goal of the fire service...When 

a life is clearly threatened, there is no risk 

too great. At most fires, however, lives are 

not clearly endangered. At most fires, then, 

the priority of firefighting is the protection of 

the fire fighters’ lives.” In general terms, the 

risk management plan must consider the 

following: (1) risk nothing for what is already 

lost—choose defensive operations; (2) extend limited risk in a calculated way to protect savable property—consider offensive 

operations; (3) and extend very calculated 

risk to protect savable lives—consider offensive operations [IAFC 2009].

CURRENT STANDARDS

National Fire Protection 

Association (NFPA) 

The NFPA is a standards development organization that develops and publishes consensus codes, standards, recommended practices, and guides for protecting fire fighters 

and civilians from fire-related injuries and 

deaths. The following NFPA standards address building construction and fire fighter 

safety related to performing offensive and 

defensive fire-fighting activities, including operations involving unoccupied structures:

 NFPA 220, Standard on Types of Building 

Construction, defines types of building 

construction based on the combustibility 

and the fire resistance rating of a building’s structural elements [NFPA 2006]. 

The standard also specifies methods of 

classifying types of construction and fire 

resistance ratings.

 NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health 

Program, specifies (1) the minimum requirements for a fire department’s occupational safety and health program; 

(2) the safety procedures for members 

involved in rescue, fire suppression, and 

related activities; and (3) the integration 

of risk management into regular functions 

of the incident commander [NFPA 2007]. 

NFPA 1500, Chapter 4.2, identifies information that should be included in each 
Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires 7

department’s risk management plan, including risk identification, risk evaluation, 

establishment of priorities, risk control 

techniques, and risk management monitoring. Annex A, Section 8, also includes 

guidelines for the incident commander to 

consider when evaluating risk versus gain. 

 NFPA 1521, Standard for Fire Department Safety Officer, defines the minimum 

requirements for the assignment, duties, 

and responsibilities of a safety and health 

officer and incident safety officer related 

to organizations providing rescue, fire 

suppression, emergency medical, and 

hazmat (hazardous materials) operations 

[NFPA 2008a].

 NFPA 1561, Standard on Fire Department Incident Management System, defines the essential elements of an incident 

management system [NFPA 2008b].

 NFPA 1710, Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression 

Operations, Emergency Medical Operations and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments, defines 

the minimum criteria addressing the effectiveness and efficiency of the career 

public fire suppression operations, emergency medical service, and special operations delivery in protecting the citizens 

of the jurisdiction and the occupational 

safety and health of fire department employees [NFPA 2010a]. 

 NFPA 1720, Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression 

Operations, Emergency Medical Operations and Special Operations to the Public by Volunteer Fire Departments, defines 

the minimum level of service, deployment capabilities, and staffing levels for 

substantially volunteer fire departments 

[NFPA 2010b].

 NFPA 5000, Building Construction and 

Safety Code, provides code criteria for 

new construction, building rehabilitation, 

and safety enforcement [NFPA 2009].

International Code Council (ICC)

The ICC is a standard development organization that develops and publishes consensus building safety and fire prevention 

codes. The ICC was established in 1994 

as a nonprofit organization dedicated to 

developing a single set of comprehensive 

and coordinated model construction codes. 

The ICC was founded by the joint efforts of 

the Building Officials and Code Administrators (BOCA) International, the International 

Conference of Building Officials (ICBO), and 

the Southern Building Code Congress International (SBCCI). The ICC provides for one 

consistent set of building and construction 

requirements throughout the United States. 

The ICC maintains the International Building Code or IBC. The International Building 

Code addresses design and installation of 

building systems with requirements that 

focus on performance. The IBC is updated 

every 3 years. The following ICC standards 

address building construction:

International Building Code covers all buildings except detached one- and two-family 

dwellings and townhouses not more than 

3 stories in height [ICC 2009a].

International Residential Code establishes 

minimum regulations for one- and two-family 

dwellings and townhouses up to three stories 

[ICC 2009b].

International Fire Code includes regulations 

governing the safeguarding of life and 

property from all types of fire and explosion 

hazards [ICC 2009c].
8 Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires

CASE REPORTS

The following case reports describe incidents 

involving fire fighter injuries and deaths that 

occurred during offensive attacks at fires in 

structures known or suspected to be unoccupied at the time of the incident (in some 

instances, incident commanders and chief officers may not have had definitive evidence regarding occupancy status). These cases represent situations in which the fire involvement 

suggested considerable risk to fire fighters. 

The incidents were investigated through the 

NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and 

Prevention Program [www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/].

Case 1

On February 19, 2005, a 39-year-old male 

career fire captain died after being trapped 

by the partial collapse of the roof on a vacant, one-story, wood frame dwelling. The 

50-year-old house was abandoned, in a dilapidated condition, and known by residents 

in the area to be a “crack house” at the 

time of the incident. 

Crews arriving on the scene could see fire 

venting through the roof at the rear of the 

house, with some fire fighters reporting that 

flames were well above the roofline. The victim was the captain on the first-arriving engine crew, which was assigned to perform a 

“fast attack”: They were to take a hoseline 

into the house, locate the seat of the fire, 

and begin to extinguish it. Thermal imaging 

cameras were available on scene but not 

used to locate the seat of the fire. The incident commander walked to the C-D corner 

of the burning house to size up the situation 

and determined that roof ventilation was not 

feasible because of the fire venting through 

the roof.

The victim and a fire fighter advanced the 

initial attack line through the front entrance 

and made their way toward the rear of the 

house. Conditions deteriorated rapidly as 

they advanced toward the rear. The fast 

attack crew had just begun to direct water 

onto the burning ceiling in the kitchen and 

den areas when the roof at the rear of the 

structure collapsed, trapping the captain 

under burning debris. 

The collapse pushed fire toward the front 

of the house. Soot and combustible dust 

particles suspended in the air were quickly 

ignited along with combustible gases, sending a fireball rolling toward the front of the 

structure. Before the collapse, two other 

crews had entered through the front. The 

rapidly deteriorating conditions following the 

collapse quickly engulfed the other crews 

with fire, and five fire fighters received burns 

requiring medical attention. The victim was 

pronounced dead on the scene by medical 

examiners [NIOSH 2005a]. The dilapidated 

condition of the abandoned structure, fire 

venting through the roof upon arrival, and 

deteriorating conditions encountered by the 

advancing interior crews as the fire escalated were all factors suggesting a more defensive strategy was in order.

Case 2

On September 30, 2002, a 50-year-old 

male career captain (the victim) died when 
Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires 9

a parapet wall collapsed on him at an auto 

body shop fire. At 0204 hours, the fire department was dispatched to a garage fire. 

At 0207 hours, an engine arrived on the 

scene and the captain (initial incident commander) advised the other responding units 

and Central Dispatch that the structure was 

“a strand steel building” that was “fully involved.” Two of the windows on the B-side 

had self-vented and heavy fire was showing. 

Flames were emitting from underneath the 

eaves with heavy smoke above the building. 

A gate to the motor vehicle storage area 

was forced open and the first-arriving crew 

advanced a 13⁄4-inch hand line to allow the 

crews to attack the fire from the B-side of 

the building. As additional crews arrived, 

they worked to knock out windows for ventilation and forced open the front door. At 

0210 hours, a battalion chief arrived on 

scene, did a 360-degree drive-around and 

assumed incident command. The original 

incident commander ordered the victim and 

another fire fighter to begin an attack on the 

building’s A-side. The fire fighter advanced a 

hand line through the front door and down 

the hallway approximately 5 feet while the 

victim stayed at the door. The incident commander announced on the radio that the 

operation was going to be defensive, and 

for all fire fighters to get out of the building. 

At approximately 0212 hours, the fire fighter, who was on the line inside the building, 

exited and began pulling the line toward 

the B-side of the building. The victim and 

a lieutenant were standing in front of the 

building when the roof, parapet wall, and 

overhanging façade collapsed. The parapet 

wall and façade fell forward, landing on top 

of the victim. Fire fighters told NIOSH investigators that they had little to no warning of 

the impending collapse. The lieutenant was 

knocked to the ground and suffered a broken leg and an emergency medical technician (EMT) suffered a fractured wrist. The 

incident commander was also knocked to 

the ground and received minor injuries. 

Rescuers removed the victim from the debris, initiated cardiopulmonary resuscitation 

(CPR) and transported the victim to an area 

hospital where he was later pronounced 

dead at 0300 hours [NIOSH 2002]. The 

date and time of dispatch (early Monday 

morning, 0204 hours), type of occupancy 

(auto body shop), fully involved structure 

with fire rolling up the eaves, and locked 

doors were all factors indicating the structure was likely to be unoccupied and that 

a defensive operation was in order. While 

the incident commander radioed that the 

operation was going to be defensive, a collapse zone was not identified, and some fire 

fighters including the victim and injured fire 

fighters remained within the collapse zone. 

Case 3

On May 3, 2002, two male, 38-year-old career fire fighters died while performing offensive operations at a two-story commercial 

structure fire. The structure was vacant, and 

all businesses in the building had previously 

been closed. Burglar bars and gates were 

installed and locked on all windows and 

doors of this structure. Many windows were 

boarded over. The initial responding crews 

had to force entry to the ground floor, where 
10 Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires

they encountered light gray smoke. Incident 

command sized-up the structure and determined the fire was located on the ground 

level. During the initial fire attack, several 

fire fighters noted that there were holes in 

the ceiling of the first floor, and they noted 

embers and fire when ceiling tile was pulled. 

As crews battled the fire, it spread to the 

second story, with smoke, fire and heat significantly increasing approximately 10–12 

minutes after the fire dispatch.

During the first scheduled member accountability roll call conducted 10 minutes into 

the incident, a fire fighter who had been 

conducting a primary search and checking 

for fire extension on the second floor was 

identified to be missing. After the roll call, 

another fire fighter who had been working 

on the second floor (Victim 1) immediately 

re-entered the structure to search for the 

missing fire fighter (Victim 2) as part of a 

search-and-rescue team. Shortly after reentering, Victim 1 became lost and radioed 

Mayday several times. 

After extensive searches for the missing fire 

fighters, both were found, removed from 

the structure, and given medical attention 

on the scene. They were then transported 

by emergency medical services to a local 

hospital. Victim 1 was pronounced dead on 

arrival and Victim 2 died the following day 

[NIOSH 2003]. The boarded-over windows, 

secured burglar bars, and locked doors were 

indicators that the building was likely to be 

vacant. Because evidence suggested that 

the fire fighting operations were to save 

property rather than civilian lives, and because the fire was deep-seated and efforts 

to extinguish the fire were not effective, a 

more defensive strategy was prudent. 

Case 4

On April 8, 2004, a 71-year-old male volunteer chief was fatally injured and two fire 

fighters were injured by a collapsing church 

façade. The church was locked and unoccupied. 

The victim had arrived at the scene of the 

fire 1 minute after the first alarm and approximately 15 minutes before the collapse. 

He assumed incident command and immediately performed a 360-degree size-up of 

the scene. Fire fighters forced entry through 

the front of the structure, since all doors 

were closed and locked. They began an offensive, interior attack. As conditions worsened, the chief walked toward the front door 

and shouted to the fire fighters to evacuate 

the structure. Two fire fighters were injured 

when they exited from the doorway as the 

collapse occurred. The chief was fatally injured when he was struck by bricks and burning debris that fell from the outward collapse 

of the brick façade. He was transported by 

helicopter to a hospital and later transferred 

to a rehabilitation center where he remained 

until August 1, 2004, when he died from 

his injuries [NIOSH 2006]. The day of the 

week and the time (Thursday, 1030 hours) 

and locked doors were indicators that the 

church was likely to be unoccupied. While 
Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires 11

the incident commander (victim) made the 

decision to switch to defensive operations, 

the fire had compromised the church’s 

structural integrity before the order to begin 

evacuating was given.

CONCLUSIONS

Results of these NIOSH investigations suggest that fire departments, incident commanders, incident safety officers, and fire 

fighters may not fully consider information 

related to building occupancy, structural 

integrity, and fire involvement before entering structures to initiate interior operations 

and while performing offensive operations. 

NIOSH investigators have investigated other 

cases in which fire crews entered and remained in high-risk fire situations when it 

was known or there were clear indications 

that no occupants needed to be rescued 

and deteriorating conditions warranted a 

change to more defensive strategies.

Fire departments should review or develop 

occupational safety programs, risk management plans, and SOPs/SOGs to ensure that 

they include appropriate safe work practices 

and policies to avoid the loss of fire fighters’ 

lives in unsafe or unoccupied buildings. The 

top priority at all fire scenes should be saving and preserving lives—both civilian lives 

and the lives of all fire fighters at the scene. 

The incident commander, with input from 

the incident safety officer, is responsible 

for evaluating conditions at a structure fire 

and determining tactics for fighting the fire. 

Risks to fire fighters’ lives must be balanced 

against gains when deciding whether to use 

an offensive or defensive attack. When no 

lives are at risk, the incident commander 

must carefully evaluate and limit the exposure of the fire fighters to the risk of death 

or injury at all types of occupancy status, 

including abandoned, vacant, unoccupied, 

and evacuated. The challenge for the incident commander is to recognize when the 

level of risk becomes excessive and to call 

for a defensive strategy in situations where 

no lives are at risk.

RECOMMENDATIONS

NIOSH recommends that fire fighters, fire 

departments, incident commanders, and incident safety officers take the following actions to minimize the risk of fire fighter injury 

and death when performing firefighting operations in abandoned or vacant structures 

and structures that are known or suspected 

to be unoccupied or evacuated. 

Fire fighters should do the following:

 Report conditions and hazards encountered to your officer, incident 

commander, or incident safety officer. 

 Recognize that maintaining your safety is a shared responsibility. Comply 
12 Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires

with your department’s SOPs and 

safety rules.

— Wear the appropriate personal protective clothing and equipment for 

the task at hand. Maintain crew discipline, avoid obvious safety hazards, 

avoid unnecessary risk taking and 

encourage your crew members to do 

the same.

 Be constantly aware of your surroundings and changing fire conditions.

— When operating in an unoccupied 

building, NO RISK is worth your life 

or injury. Risk nothing for what is already lost; extend limited risk in a 

calculated way to protect savable 

property; and extend very calculated 

risk to protect savable lives [NFPA 

2007; IAFC 2009]. 

Fire departments should do the following:

 Develop and enforce risk management plans, policies, and SOPs/SOGs 

for risk management [Cook 1998]. 

— Make sure that risk management 

plans and SOPs/SOGs are appropriate for your department and take 

into account your department’s capabilities and limitations. 

— Place all risk management plans and 

SOPs/SOGs in writing.

— Assure that risk management plans 

and SOPs/SOGs are officially endorsed and enforced by the department.

 Train incident commanders, incident 

safety officers, and fire fighters in 

the fire department risk management 

plans and SOPs/SOGs for risk management [Cook 1998; NFPA 2007].

— Train incident commanders, incident 

safety officers, and fire fighters on 

how to size up all types of structures 

including abandoned, vacant, and 

unsafe structures. Training should 

include how to integrate the size-up 

into risk management decisions.

 Develop and implement fire department policies and SOPs/SOGs for 

emergency response and fire-fighting 

activities in and around abandoned, 

vacant, or unoccupied structures. 

— No offensive interior attacks should 

be made in any structure without a 

thorough size-up and adequate staffing, resources, and support capability (i.e., water supply, ventilation, 

lighting, utility control, accountability, rapid intervention team). A defensive strategy should be employed in 

unsafe structures and at any structure fire when on-scene staffing, resources, and support capability are 

insufficient for a safe offensive response [Phoenix 2009]. Additional 

size-ups and risk analyses should be 

performed whenever changing strategies, including moving to interior 

overhaul operations.

— Abandoned and vacant buildings 

should be known in advance, based 

on preplanning and knowledge of local jurisdictions. 

 Maintain up-to-date preplan information and enter it into the dispatcher’s 

computer so that when a fire is reported at preplanned locations, the dispatcher can provide responding crews 

with critical information [Dunn 1992; 

NIOSH 1999b]. 

— Include the age of the structure, 

structural integrity, the type of roof 
Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires 13

structure and supports (i.e., lightweight trusses, bowstring trusses, 

and heavy timber construction), the 

type of interior support structures 

(i.e., floor trusses, wooden I-joists, 

and support columns), the type of 

materials used in the structure (i.e., 

wood, steel, plastics, foam, or materials that produce toxic gases when 

subjected to heat), storage of flammable or toxic materials, the amount 

of load on roof structures that could 

weaken the supports (e.g., heavy 

heating and cooling units), water 

supply, and the presence of automatic sprinkler systems. 

 Have adequate resources available on 

scene to perform rapid intervention 

team (RIT) duties anytime personnel 

are operating at any structure fire. 

 Conduct personnel accountability reports (PARs) on a regular basis [Fannon 2009].

 Inspect and preplan buildings within 

your jurisdiction. Note the type of construction, materials used, presence 

of trusses and other lightweight construction in the roof and floor, type of 

occupancy, fuel load, exit routes, and 

other distinguishing characteristics 

[Brannigan 1999; Klaene and Sanders 

2000; NIOSH 2005b]. 

— Check the structural integrity of walls, 

roofs, and floors. 

— Share this information with other departments who provide mutual-aid 

response in the same area.

 Adopt and enforce a standard system 

of marking dangerous abandoned, 

derelict, and vacant buildings, based 

on a prefire assessment of their structural conditions and other risk factors, 

in cooperation with municipal agencies and local authorities such as local housing authorities [NIOSH 2005; 

IAAI/USFA 2006; Commonwealth of 

Massachusetts 2008; FDNY 2009].

— Fire departments should train fire 

fighters and officers to recognize the 

marking system and incorporate it 

into their size-up considerations. In 

addition, local authorities should ensure programs are in place that provide for the demolition and removal 

of structures deemed unsafe by code 

enforcement.

 Make sure that the incident commander conducts an initial size-up of 

critical fireground factors before beginning fire-fighting efforts and continuously reviews and reevaluates 

these factors during all fireground 

operations.

— A 360-degree size-up should be conducted for all abandoned, vacant, or unoccupied structures.

— Determine whether the building is 

likely to be occupied. People at windows of apartment or office buildings 

calling for help indicates the possibility of other occupants as well; windows and doors boarded up indicate 

a structure is not in normal use; vehicles in garage, driveway or parked 

nearby may indicate the presence of 

persons inside; time of day and type 

of occupancy (many businesses are 

closed during evening and nighttime 

hours); and reports from neighbors, 

by-standers and occupants who 

have escaped the burning structure 

may also provide reliable information 

[Richman, 1986].
14 Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires

— Get clear reports from occupants, 

neighbors and by-standers.

— Consider using a thermal imaging 

camera as part of the size-up operation to help locate fires from the 

exterior and in concealed spaces 

[NIOSH 2005b].

— Consider the type of building when determining (1) the number of fire fighters, support officers, and the amount 

of apparatus and equipment needed 

to control the blaze, (2) the most effective point of attack for extinguishing 

the fire, (3) the most effective method 

of venting heat and smoke, and (4) 

the nature of the attack (offensive or 

defensive) [NIOSH 2005b]. 

— Evaluate the type of structure (residential, commercial, institutional), 

time of day, type of occupancy, contents of the structure, hazards, and 

exposures [NIOSH 2005b]. 

— Pay close attention to the conditions 

outside the structure, monitor the 

roof, and check on interior conditions [Dunn 1996; NIOSH 1999a].

— If preplan information is not available, try to determine the type of 

construction, age of the building, 

and modifications or additions to 

help assess structural stability [Dunn 

1996].

— Plan for search and rescue operations before an emergency occurs in 

case a fire fighter becomes trapped 

[NIOSH 2005b].

 Ensure those in charge of fire incidents (i.e., incident commanders, 

chief officers, safety officers, etc.) 

are fully trained to fulfill their responsibilities and obligations in the 

execution of their duties [Klaene and 

Sanders 2000].

 Educate the public on the need to 

have home fire drills and designated 

meeting places in the event of an 

emergency. The location of designated meeting places should be communicated to the fire department as a 

way to help confirm and verify building occupancy status [Carey 2009].

Incident commanders (IC) and incident 

safety officers (ISO) should do the 

following:

 The IC should conduct an initial sizeup of each incident weighing critical 

fireground factors (i.e., occupancy 

status; occupant survivability and rescue potential; vacant building markings or indicators; size, construction, 

and use of the building; age and condition of the building; and the location, size, and extent of the fire in the 

building [Smith 2002]) against the department’s risk management profile to 

determine the initial incident strategy 

(offensive or defensive). The IC should 

develop an incident action plan before beginning firefighting efforts, and 

continually review and reevaluate the 

factors and the risk management plan 

throughout the operation.

 The IC should use appropriate risk 

management criteria to decide whether an offensive or defensive strategy 

should be employed to attack a fire 

[Klaene and Sanders 2000]. The IC 

should attempt to determine whether 

the building is occupied or not. Signs 

to look for include vehicles in garage, 

driveway, or parked nearby; people at 

windows of apartment or office buildings calling for help; time of day; type 
Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires 15

of occupancy; and reports from occupants who have escaped the burning 

structure. Reports from neighbors 

and bystanders may also provide 

valuable information.

 Use a defensive operation when the 

fireground conditions suggest the 

following: 

— The risk to fire fighters’ lives and 

safety outweighs the possible benefit 

of an offensive attack.

— A building is structurally unsound.

— No lives need to be saved and the 

property is lost [Brannigan 1999; 

Dunn 2001].

 The IC should consider the number of 

fire fighters, the amount and type of 

apparatus and equipment available, 

and the stage of the fire when determining the type of fire attack.

— Ensure that sufficient staff are available for the type and extent of the 

selected fire attack.

— Ensure the availability of adequate resources, such as a rapid intervention 

team (RIT), backup hose lines, and 

emergency medical services (EMS) 

personnel.

 Follow departmental policies (risk 

management plans, SOPs/SOGs) for 

risk management [Cook 1998].

 Establish, clearly mark, and monitor 

an exterior collapse zone at structure fires where there is a risk of collapse [Fire Fighter’s Handbook 2000; 

NIOSH 2006]: 

— If a size-up determines that structural integrity is questionable, establish 

a collapse zone (an area around and 

away from a structure where debris 

might land if the structure fails).

— Make the collapse zone equal to the 

height of the building plus an additional allowance for debris scatter. At 

a minimum, it should equal 11⁄2 times 

the height of the building. [Note: this 

is not always practical in urban areas 

with high-rise structures, but the collapse zone should be considered.]

— Take into consideration the fact that 

the collapse zone may move as the 

fire spreads.

— Consider the collapse zone when 

placing apparatus close to the burning structure and when locating staging and rehab areas. Consider placement of master streams, portable 

deluge nozzles, and aerial platforms 

at building corners and operate 

from a flanking position to reduce 

fire fighter exposure to the collapse 

zone [Dunn 1998; 1992; 1999]. 

Also consider using unstaffed ground 

monitors to reduce the risk of placing 

personnel in exposed positions [Klaene and Sanders 2000].

— Consider all manual fire-suppression 

activities within the collapse zone to 

be an offensive attack. No personnel 

should operate in offensive positions 

during a defensive attack.

— When explosion hazards are present, 

collapse zones should be expanded.

 Use effective and universal evacuation signals when command personnel determine that all fire fighters 

should be evacuated from a burning 

building, as well as during the initiation of defensive operations and during overhaul and salvage operations 

[Smith 2002; NIOSH 1999a]. 
16 Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires

— Examples include air-horn blasts, radio evacuation tones, and emergency signaling functions incorporated 

into personal alert safety systems or 

PASS systems.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The principal contributors to this Alert were 

Robert E. Koedam, M.S., U.S. Department 

of Energy (formerly with NIOSH); Timothy R. 

Merinar, M.S., NIOSH, Division of Safety Research; and Steven Proudfoot, National Science Foundation (formerly with NIOSH). Anne 

Hamilton, Susan Afanuh, and Cathy Rotunda 

edited the document. Gino Fazio performed 

desktop design and publishing. The authors 

thank the following individuals for providing 

expert technical reviews of document drafts: 

Matt Chibarro, Occupational Safety and 

Health Administration; Deputy Chief William 

Goldfeder, Loveland-Symmes Fire Department and the International Association of 

Fire Chiefs; Robert Solomon and Rita Fahy, 

National Fire Protection Association; Ken 

Farmer, Ken Kuntz, and Robert Neale, U.S. 

Fire Administration; Gordon Routely; and 

Richard Duffy, International Association of 

Fire Fighters.

NIOSH would also like to thank the 58 individuals and organizations who submitted written comments to Public Docket NIOSH-141 

during the public comment period January 9–

March 9, 2009. These comments are greatly 

appreciated and helped to focus this Alert on 

the need to follow adopted risk management 

principles at all structure fires and especially 

at fires in abandoned, vacant, and unoccupied 

structures where there are no lives to save. 

Please direct any comments, questions, or 

requests for additional information to the 

following:

Dr. Nancy A. Stout 

Director, Division of Safety Research 

National Institute for Occupational Safety 

 and Health 

1095 Willowdale Road 

Morgantown, WV 26505–2888

Telephone: 304–285–5894; or call 

1–800–CDC–INFO (1–800–232–4636) 

TTY: 1–888–232–6348 

E-mail: cdcinfo@cdc.gov

We greatly appreciate your assistance in 

protecting the health of U.S. fire fighters. 

John Howard, M.D.

Director, 

National Institute for Occupational 

Safety and Health

Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention

REFERENCES

Ahrens M [2009]. Vacant Building Fires. 

Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association.

Brannigan FL [1999]. Building construction 

for the fire service. 3rd ed. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association.

Carey W [2009]. Written comments to 

NIOSH Docket # 141. March 9, 2009.

City of Cincinnati [2006]. Vacant Building 

Maintenance License Ordinance. Cincinnati 

Municipal Code 1101–77. March 2006. 

http://www.ci.cincinnati.oh.us/cdap/pages/-34608-/. Date accessed: February 2010. 
Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires 17

Commonwealth of Massachusetts [2008]. 

Abandoned or Dangerous Building Regulations 780 CMR and 527 CMR. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Executive Office 

of Public Safety and Security. Memorandum 

to All Heads of Fire Departments. February 

1, 2008. http://www.mass.gov/Eeops/docs/

dfs/osfm/advisories/2008/020108_abandoned_dangerous_building_regs.pdf. Date 

accessed: February 2010.

Cook J [1998]. Standard operating procedures and guidelines. Saddle Brook, NJ: Fire 

Engineering Books and Videos.

Duffy R [2009]. Email of October 13 from 

Richard Duffy, International Association of Fire 

Fighters, AFL-CIO-CLC, to Timothy Merinar, Division of Safety Research, National Institute 

for Occupational Safety and Health, Centers 

for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

Dunn V [1988]. Collapse of burning buildings. Saddle Brook, NJ: Fire Engineering 

Books and Videos.

Dunn V [1992]. Safety and survival on the 

fireground. Saddle Brook, NJ: Fire Engineering Books and Videos.

Dunn V [1996]. Systems analysis size-up: 

Part 1. Firehouse Oct:18–21

Dunn V [1999]. Command and control of 

fires and emergencies. Saddle Brook, NJ: 

Fire Engineering Books and Videos.

Dunn V [2001]. The deadly lightweight 

truss. Firehouse Jan:16–20.

Fahy R [2009]. Email of August 19 from Rita 

Fahy, Fire Analysis and Research Division, 

National Fire Protection Association, to Timothy Merinar, Division of Safety Research, 

National Institute for Occupational Safety 

and Health, Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and 

Human Services. 

Fannon J [2009]. Written comments to 

NIOSH Docket # 141. March 2, 2009.

FDNY [2009]. New York City Fire Department Firefighting Procedures: Operations 

in Vacant Buildings. New York City Fire Department. New York, New York. Email of July 

27, 2009 from John Salka, Battalion Chief, 

FDNY, to Timothy Merinar, Division of Safety 

Research, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of 

Health and Human Services. 

Fire Fighter’s Handbook [2000]. Essentials 

of fire fighting and emergency response. 

New York: Delmar Publishers.

Grorud LJ [2009]. Written comments to 

NIOSH Public Docket # 141. March 3, 2009.

Karter MJ [2008]. Fire Loss in the United 

States 2007. August 2008. Quincy, MA: 

National Fire Protection Association.

Klaene B, Sanders R [2000]. Structural firefighting. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association.

IAAI / USFA [2006]. Abandoned Buildings 

Project: Managing Vacant and Abandoned 

Properties in Your Community. 2006 Revision. International Association of Arson Investigators / US Fire Administration joint report. http://www.interfire.org/features/pdfs/

Background%20Paper_2006.pdf. Date accessed: February 2010.

IAFC [2009]. Rules of Engagement for 

Structural Firefighting, Increasing Firefighter 

Survival. Draft manuscript developed by the 

Safety, Health and Survival Section, International Association of Fire Chiefs. Fairfax, VA. 

March 2009.
18 Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires

ICC [2009a]. International Building Code, 

2009 Revision. Washington DC. International Code Council.

ICC [2009b]. International Residential 

Code, 2009 Revision. Washington DC. International Code Council.

ICC [2009c]. International Fire Code, 2009 

Revision. Washington DC. International 

Code Council

IFSTA [2008]. Essentials of Fire Fighting 

and Fire Department Operations, 5th Edition. The International Fire Service Training 

Association. Fire Protection Publications, 

Oklahoma State University, Stillwater TX.

NFPA [2006]. NFPA 220: standard on types 

of building construction. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association.

NFPA [2007] NFPA 1500: standard on fire 

department occupational safety and health 

program. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association.

NFPA [2008a]. NFPA 1521: standard for 

fire department safety officer. Quincy, MA: 

National Fire Protection Association.

NFPA [2008b]. NFPA 1561: standard on fire 

department incident management system. 

Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association.

NFPA [2009]. NFPA 5000: Building Construction and Safety Code. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association.

NFPA [2010a]. NFPA 1710: Standard for 

the Organization and Deployment of Fire 

Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations and Special Operations to the 

Public by Career Fire Departments. Quincy, 

MA: National Fire Protection Association.

NFPA [2010b]. NFPA 1720: Standard for 

the Organization and Deployment of Fire 

Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations and Special Operations to the 

Public by Volunteer Fire Departments. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association.

NIOSH [1999a]. NIOSH Alert: request for assistance in preventing injuries and deaths of 

fire fighters due to structural collapse. Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health 

and Human Services, Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention, National Institute 

for Occupational Safety and Health, DHHS 

(NIOSH) Publication No. 99–146.

NIOSH [1999b]. Six Career Fire Fighters Killed 

in Cold-Storage and Warehouse Building 

Fire—Massachusetts. Morgantown, WV: U.S. 

Department of Health and Human Services, 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 

National Institute for Occupational Safety and 

Health, Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE) Report No. 99F–47.

NIOSH [2002]. Parapet Wall Collapse at 

Auto Body Shop Claims Life of Career Captain and Injures Career Lieutenant and Emergency Medical Technician—Indiana. Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health 

and Human Services, Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention, National Institute 

for Occupational Safety and Health, Fatality 

Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE) 

Report No. 2002–44.

NIOSH [2003]. Two career fire fighters die 

in four-alarm fire at two-story brick structure—Missouri. Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 

National Institute for Occupational Safety 

and Health, Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE) Report No. 2002–20.

NIOSH [2005a]. Career fire captain dies 

when trapped by partial roof collapse in a 

vacant house fire—Texas. Morgantown, 

WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires 19

Services, Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE) Report 

No. 2005–09.

NIOSH [2005b]. NIOSH Alert: preventing injuries and deaths of fire fighters due to truss 

system failures. Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 

National Institute for Occupational Safety 

and Health, DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 

2005–132. 

NIOSH [2006]. Volunteer chief dies and two 

fire fighters are injured by a collapsing church 

façade—Tennessee. Morgantown, WV: U.S. 

Department of Health and Human Services, 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 

National Institute for Occupational Safety 

and Health, Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE) Report No. 2004–37.

Phoenix Fire Department [2009]. Written 

comments to NIOSH Docket # 141. March 

9, 2009.

Richman H [1986]. Truck Company Fireground Operations, 2nd Edition. National 

Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts.

Smith J [2002]. Strategic and tactical considerations on the fireground. Upper Saddle 

River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

USFA [2009]. United States Fire Administration website—Fire Statistics. http://www.

usfa.dhs.gov/statistics/national/all_structures.shtm. Date accessed: February 2010.
20 Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires

NOTES
Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires 21

NOTES
to NIOSH 

For a monthly update on news at NIOSH, subscribeor visit the NIOSH Web site at www.cdc.gov/nioshE-mail: cdcinfo@cdc.govTTY: 1–888–232–63481–800–CDC–INFO (1–800–232–4636)health topics, contact NIOSH atmore information about occupational safety andTo receive NIOSH documents or forthrough research and prevention.Safety and health at work for all peopleDelivering on the Nation’s promise:Cincinnati, Ohio 45225–19984676 Columbia ParkwayNational Institute for Occupational Safety and HealthCenters for Disease Control and PreventionDEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

eNews by visiting www.cdc.gov/niosh/eNews

SAFERDHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2010–153

• HEALTHIER • PEOPLETM