THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Darryl Frierson, Petitioner, 

v. 

State of South Carolina, Respondent. 

Appellate Case No. 2016-001940 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 

Appeal from Richland County 

Clifton Newman, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 27801 

Heard March 29, 2018 – Filed May 23, 2018 

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED 

Appellate Defender Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of 

Columbia, for Petitioner. 

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant 

Attorney General James Clayton Mitchell, III, of 

Columbia, for Respondent. 

JUSTICE HEARN: Petitioner Darryl Frierson pled guilty to assault and battery of 

a high and aggravated nature, criminal conspiracy, kidnapping, and armed robbery 

for his role in masterminding a $9.8 million heist from an armored truck. He was 

sentenced to an aggregate term of thirty-five years in prison. Thereafter, he applied

for post-conviction relief (PCR), asserting he would not have pled guilty but instead 
 

 

 

 

 

would have proceeded to trial had his plea counsel adequately informed him of the 

possibility to suppress evidence gathered from law enforcement's warrantless 

placement of a mobile tracking device on his vehicle. The PCR court denied relief, 

and the court of appeals affirmed. Frierson v. State, 417 S.C. 287, 789 S.E.2d 762 

(Ct. App. 2016). We affirm as modified and take this opportunity to clarify the

correct standard to determine prejudice when a defendant seeks PCR after pleading 

guilty. 

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

Around midnight on May 10, 2007, Frierson and his co-worker, David Jones, 

were refueling their company's armored truck at a gas station outside of Columbia 

when several individuals overpowered them, forcing them back into the truck at gun

point. The attackers drove the truck to a nearby strawberry field, tied Jones up with 

duct tape, transferred the money to a get-away car, and fled, leaving Frierson and

Jones behind. Unlike Frierson, Jones was severely injured, but he was able to remove

the duct tape and walk to a night club where he called police. Frierson remained 

behind in the truck, claiming he was too injured to find help. Eventually, Jones and 

Frierson were transported to the hospital, where law enforcement arrived to speak 

with them. Investigators immediately became suspicious of Frierson as they noticed 

he appeared to have suffered no visible injuries whereas Jones was severely beaten. 

Thereafter, Frierson vividly described the details of the crime scene, even though the 

events occurred in the dark around midnight. After Frierson was released from the

hospital, he went to the police station, where police observed him through a twoway mirror naturally moving his arms despite wearing a sling and claiming his 

shoulder was injured. Frierson agreed to take a polygraph test, which he failed.

Believing the crime was an "inside job," law enforcement continued its surveillance 

of Frierson by placing a tracking device on the outside of his vehicle, which revealed

he was traveling extensively and shopping at a Florence mall. 

While police tracked Frierson's movements, more incriminating evidence was 

uncovered, including a blue latex glove found in Frierson's trash outside his home 

that matched a glove found inside the armored truck shortly after the robbery. Police 

talked to Paul Whitaker, another co-worker and close friend of Frierson, who 

subsequently confessed that he took part in the robbery and identified Frierson as 

the mastermind. Thereafter, police searched Whitaker's house and found a 

substantial amount of money and mall receipts belonging to Frierson. 

A few days later, pursuant to a valid arrest warrant, law enforcement officers 

used the tracking information to locate Frierson in Columbia, and they arrested him 

while he was driving with a friend, Domonique Blakney, who turned out to have 
 

 

been involved in the crime as well. Police searched the car and found several 

thousand dollars in cash. At the police station, investigators found pictures of bags 

of money on Blakney's cell phone, and he confessed that Frierson was the 

mastermind of the heist. Presented with Blakney's statements, Frierson subsequently 

confessed, as did the remaining co-conspirators. 

Thereafter, plea counsel advised Frierson the placement of the tracking device 

without a warrant was likely permissible;1 however, plea counsel was unaware of 

section 17-30-140 of the South Carolina Code (2014).2 Frierson pled guilty and later 

sought PCR, arguing plea counsel failed to adequately inform him that he could have

moved to suppress the information garnered from the tracking device on 

constitutional grounds and based on section 17-30-140.3 Although Frierson testified 

he would not have pled and instead proceeded to trial, the PCR court found his 

testimony "wholly incredible." The court denied relief, finding counsel was not 

deficient because he sufficiently researched the legality of the warrantless placement 

of the device and concluding Frierson failed to establish prejudice, primarily based

on the court's credibility finding. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding there 

was overwhelming evidence that "the outcome of [Frierson's] case would have been 

no different had he chosen to proceed to trial." Frierson, 417 S.C. at 299, 789 S.E.2d 

1 Frierson pled guilty four years before the United States Supreme Court decided

United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012), holding the physical placement of a

monitoring device on a suspect's vehicle constituted a trespass on private property 

and therefore a search under the Fourth Amendment. At the time, plea counsel relied 

on United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), holding the use of a tracking device 

to monitor the location of a defendant traveling along public roadways did not invade 

any legitimate expectation of privacy and was not a "search" in violation of the

Fourth Amendment, and United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713 (1984), holding 

the placement of an electronic beeper in a container with the owner's consent did not

constitute a search because the buyer's privacy interests were not infringed when he 

received possession of the container. 

2 Section 17-30-140(A) states, "The Attorney General or any solicitor may make 

application to a judge of competent jurisdiction for an order authorizing or approving 

the installation and use of a mobile tracking device by the South Carolina Law 

Enforcement Division or any law enforcement entity of a political subdivision of 

this State.” 

3 Frierson actually discovered the existence of section 17-30-140 himself while 

researching his case in prison. 
 

 

 

at 768. We granted Frierson's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the court of 

appeals' opinion. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We defer to the PCR court's factual findings and will uphold them if supported 

by any evidence in the record. Smalls v. State, 422 S.C. 174, ___, 810 S.E.2d 836, 

839 (2018). Furthermore, we afford great deference to a PCR court's credibility 

findings. Goins v. State, 397 S.C. 568, 573, 726 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2012). Questions of law 

are reviewed de novo, and we will reverse the PCR court if its decision is controlled 

by an error of law. Jamison v. State, 410 S.C. 456, 465, 765 S.E.2d 123, 127 (2014).

LAW/ANALYSIS 

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant has the 

burden of proving "(1) counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance under 

prevailing professional norms; and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced 

the applicant's case." McKnight v. State, 378 S.C. 33, 40, 661 S.E.2d 354, 357 

(2008). In order to establish prejudice when challenging a guilty plea, a defendant

must prove "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the 

defendant would not have pled guilty, but would have gone to trial." Harden v. State, 

360 S.C. 405, 408, 602 S.E.2d 48, 49 (2004). The crux of the inquiry is whether 

counsel's ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process, not 

whether the defendant would have been successful had he gone to trial. Alexander 

v. State, 303 S.C. 539, 542, 402 S.E.2d 484, 485 (1991). As the United States

Supreme Court stated in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985), "[I]n order to 

satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement, the defendant must show there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pled guilty and would 

have insisted on going to trial." 

Because the prejudice inquiry in a case involving a guilty plea is so limited, it 

was error for the court of appeals to conduct an overwhelming evidence analysis in 

this case. See Smalls, 422 S.C. at ___, 810 S.E.2d at 843–47 (surveying cases that 

discuss overwhelming evidence—all of which involved a conviction obtained at 

trial). The court of appeals initially acknowledged the correct standard and affirmed 

the PCR court's determination that Frierson failed to prove prejudice––and we affirm

this decision. However, thereafter, the court proceeded to discuss how the outcome 

at trial would have been the same as Frierson's guilty plea due to the overwhelming 

evidence of guilt against him. The court of appeals exceeded the proper scope of the 

prejudice inquiry, and accordingly, we modify the portion of the court's opinion 

which addresses overwhelming evidence. We reiterate the prejudice analysis is 
 

limited to the outcome of the plea process—whether but for counsel's deficiency, the 

defendant would have declined to plead and instead proceeded to trial.

Despite the court of appeals' erroneous application of the standard of review,

it correctly deferred to the PCR court's finding that Frierson was not prejudiced.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM AS MODIFIED. 

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, FEW and JAMES, JJ., concur.