### IN THE COU RT OF APPEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JACK SON Ju ly 2 0, 200 4 S es sio n PAMELA D. VICKROY

v. PA THWA YS , IN C. , D YER SBU RG, TN , K IMBER LY BOY D, J. F ORE STLAM, M.D., METHODI ST HO SPIT ALS OF DYERSBURG , TN, COLEMAN FOS S, AD MIN ISTR ATO R, AN D WE STER N M ENT AL HEA LTH

INST ITUT E, BOLIV AR , T N
An Ap peal fromthe Cir cuit C ourt f or DyerCoun ty N o. 02- 71 R . Le e M oor e, Jr . , Ju dg e

N o. W2 003- 0262 0- C OA -R 3- C V - F ile d D ec em be r 30, 200 4

This c ase involves involuntary commitment to a me ntal instit ution. Paramedics we re c alled to the plaintiff’s home by her roommate, and she wa s broug ht involuntarilyto the hospital for evaluation. She wa s ad mitted to the emerg ency room and e x amined by the phy sician on duty . She was interviewe d by

a mental he alth clinician. Thephy sician then we nt off d u t y an d t h e def endant phy sician took cha

rg e. The defe ndant phy sician examined the patient’s c hart, re viewed thehistory taken by the prior phy sician and the mental health clinician, and then s igne d a form committi ng the plaintiff to a mental institution. The form stated that t h e def endant phy sician had e x amined the plaintiff, but the plaintiff wa s examined only by the prior phy sician, who wa s no longe r on duty . The plaintiff then sued the defe ndant phy sician for involuntarily committing her to a mental instituti on with o u t p e r s o n a ll y

e xa mi n in g h e r . T h e trial c o u rt g r a n te ds u mm ary ju d g me n t t o th e d e f

endant phy sician, classify ing the action as medical malpra ctice and finding that the plaintiff failed to offer competent ex p er t p ro of as r equire d under T.C.A. § 29- 26-115. We aff irm the g rant of summary judgme nt as to claims of medical malprac tice, and r ever se the g rant of summary judgme nt for the c la ims of ne g lig e nc e a ndfalseimp ri so nme nt, fi nd ing that T .C. A. § 36 -6- 40 2 r e qu ir e s th a t a ph y sic ia n o r d e sig nate d p ro fe ssi on a l w ho c omm its a patie nt t o a

me ntal in sti tutionmus t f ir st personally

examine the patient, rather than r elying e x clusively on medical r ecor ds or someone e lse’s e xami natio n o f the patie nt. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court is Aff irm ed in Par t and Reverse d in P art
H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J. , d e li v e r e dth e o p in io n o f th e Co u rt, inw h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S. and D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., joined.Su r pr i s i n g l y , t h e h os pi t al r ec or d doe s n ot i n cl u de a docu men t s i g n ed by B oy d s u mmar i zi n g t h e r es u l t s of 1 h e r in te rv ie w w ith V ic k ro y. -2- L o u i s R

. Lu c a s , M e mp h i s , f o r p l a i n t i f f P a m e l a D

. V i c kr o y. Marty R. Phi llips and Craig P. Sanders, J ackson, f or appe llee James Fore st-L am, M.D.

OP IN ION
The we ek of Fe bruary 4, 2001, Plaintiff/Appellant Pamela Vickr oy (“V ickroy ”) ha d been sic k for se veral day s, stay ing inside the apartment she share d with two roommates. On Fe bruary 4, 2001, one of the roommates called pol ice of fice rs to the apa

rtment bec ause V ickroy

ref used to come out of thebathr oom andthe y

we rec on c e rn e d f

or he r. Whe n th e of

fi c e rs arrive d, Vi c kr oy

sti ll r e fu se d to come out of the bathroom. Vickr oy ’s roommates r eporte d to the office rs that Vickr oy had bee n acting strang ely , and that she took medic ation for bipolar disorder. The office rs then called an ambulance and par amedics r esponded to the sc ene. O ne of the para m ed i cs convinc ed Vickr oy to leave the bathroom. When Vickroy cameout, she y elled ang rily at her roommate for

calling t h e poli ce and pointed at her . As a result, the paramedics took Vickroy to the emer g ency

room at Methodist Hospital in Dy ersbur g , Tenne ssee, to be e x amined.
Wh e nV ickroy

arrived at the hospital, the phy sician on duty , J oseph Cook, M.D. (“D r. Cook”), examined her and order ed lab work. Since Vickroy had bee n a patient at Pathway s of Tenne ssee, Inc. (“Pa th way s”), a

mental hea lth facility , Dr. Cook orde red a consultation with Pathway s. Pathway s sent to the hospital a crisis clinician, Kimberly Boy d, who i nterview ed Vickroy

. At some point, Dr. Cook signe d a hospital form that listed Vickr oy ’s diag nosis as influenza and discha rg ed her to her home. The form signe d off to De fendant/Appellee James For est-L am, M .D. (“Dr. F orest-L am”) , who took over a s the emer g ency

room phy sician whe n Dr. Cook le ft. Dr. Cook the n went off duty and lef t the ho sp ita l. Vickroy remained in the emer g ency room. When Dr. Forest-L am came on duty , he re viewed Vickroy ’s cha

rt and the information provided by the crisis clinician from P at hway s. The cha rt included the r esults of Dr. Cook’s phy sical examination of Vickroy , which noted her bipolar disorde r, all of her phy sical s y mptoms, said that her phy sical symptoms began five day s earlier, stated that Vickroy “assaulted her r oommate,” and chec ked the blanks on the form indicating that Vickroy was “orie nted x 3" and “mood/affec t nml.” The a dmission document completed by the par amedic w ho broug ht Vickroy

to the emer g ency

room stated t h at Vickr oy was “ depre ssed” and that she wa s arr ested and broug ht to the hospital after a “conf rontation.” A form signed by the Pathway s clinician Kimberly Boy d listed Vickroy ’s diag nosis as “B ipolar Disorde r NOS,” and showed he r as an active Pathway s patient taking lithium and other medic ations. Ba sed on this information, Dr. F orest-L am 1 signe d a “Ce rtificateof Ne ed for Emerg ency Admission Under Tenne ssee Code A nnotated Section 33-6-103( c)” to have Vic kroy transfe rre d to Western Mental Hea lth I nstitut e (“ Western”) in Bolivar, Tenne ssee. Theform stated: “ I , Jame s Forest-Lam , of t he County of Dye r , State of Tenne ssee, c ertifyT he num b ered pa ragraphs on t he fo rm d et ai l i ng what V i ckroy had rep o rt ed l y s ai d and t hat s he was heari ng 2

v oi ce s di d n ot a ppea r t o be i n D r . For es t

- La m’ s h an dwr i t i n g , a l t h ou g h t h e r ec or d doe s n ot s t at e wh at ot h er pe r s on or pe r s on s a s s i s t e d i n c om pl e t i n g t h e for m. -3- that I have personal l yexamined Vickroy, Pam on 2/4 , 2 00 1. ” Th e fo rm state d th a t, i n D r. F or e stL am’ s p ro fe s s i onal opinion, based on the e x amination and the information provided to him, Dr. F o r e s t

- L a mc e rt i f

i e dth a tV i c kr o y: 1. I s me ntally

ill a s sh ow n b y

thefo llo wi ng fa c ts andre a so ns : Clie nt s tate s sh e is thinking about hurti ng herself bec ause she c an not take it any more. Client stat es she c an no t re m e m b e r i

f s h e t r i e d to h u r t h e r

s e l f to d ay . C l i e n t s ta t e s s h e h as a p as t history of suicide attempts. Cli ent tried to hurt her r o o mm a t e tonight, but doesn’t reme mber

. 2

. p o s es an im mediate likelihood of serious harm bec ause of the mental illness as sh ow n b y thefo llo wi ng re a so ns : Client stat es she doesn’t reme mber if she t ried to hurt herself or anyone else. Client s ta te s s h e h a s b e e n th in k in g a b o u t h u r ti n g h e r s e lf b e c a u s e s h e c a n n o t t

a ke it any more. Client’s mood ke eps changi n g . Client assaul ted her roommate tonight, but doesn’t rem embe r . 3. nee d s care, training or treatment because of the me tal illness as shown by the fo llo wi ng fa c ts andre a so ns : Clie nt i s h e ar ing v oic e s. Clie nt s tates she c an no t m ake ou t wh at t he v oic e s a re saying. Client stat es she has not bee n eating nor s l ee p ing. Cli ent has not been compliant with her medications

. 4. all ava i l ab l e less drastic alternatives to placeme nt in a hospital or treatment resour ce a

re unsuitable to mee t the nee d s o f t he per son as shown by the following fa c ts andre a so ns : Client is r efusing to sign herself i n voluntary. Client has not been compliant with her medications

. Dr . F or e st- L a m th e re fo rec on c lud e d th a t V ic kr oy po se d an im me diate lik e lih oo d o f s e ri ou s h arm to he rs e lf a ndo th e r s . O n th i s b a s i s , D r . F o r e s t

- L a ms i g n e dth e C e rt i f i c a t e o f N e e di n v o l u n t ar ily 2 committing Vickr oy

to Western.
Vi c kr oy wa s the n take n to the Dy e rs bu rg sh e ri ff ’s of fi c e , wh e re sh ewa s sh a c kle d to a c hair for thre e hours. The rea fter, a police office r drove her to Western in B olivar, Tenne ssee. Upon ar rival at Western, Vickr oy

was e x amined ag ain and he ld fo r fu rt h er evaluation. She wa s relea sed on Fe bruary 14, 2002.
After Vickroy was re lease d from Western, she filed a g rievance w ith Pathway s and complained to Methodist Hospital. Vickroy exchang ed email corre spondence with the Administrator-4-

of the Hospital, Coleman F oss ( “F oss”), in which shemaintained that she ne ver thre atene d suicide and soug ht to meet with Dr. F orest-L am to ask him “why he sent me to Bolivar w ithout so m uch as introducing himself to me.” F oss responded to Vic kroy ’s re quest by sending her an email stating that he ha d s po ke n w ithDr . F or e st- L a m, w ho a sk e d F os s “ to c on ve y thefo llo wi ng :”
He unde rstands y our fr

ustration but once a

statement has be en made and witnessed by auth oriti e s th a t so me on e is c on sid e ri ng takin g dra sti c a c tio n ( i.e ., su ic ide ) h e is c omp e lle d to fo llo w thr ou g h o n th e or der f or int e rn me nt.
I realiz e that y ou y ourself said y ou did not make such a statement but apparently he was informed that y ou did and followed throug h acc ording ly . He a lso indicated that he fe lt that there wa s nothing moreto discuss on the matter.
Af te r r e c e ivi ng thi s r e sp on se , V ic kr oy fi le d th is l a ws uit

. Vi c kroy fi led su it a g a ins t Pathw a y s, Inc .; Kimb e rl y B oy d; J. F or e st- L a m M. D. ; Me tho dis t Hospitals of Dy ersbur g ; Coleman Foss, Administrator; and Western Me ntal Hea lth Institut e. In the initial complaint, Vickroy asserted t hat t he defendants wer e neglig ent and that she suffer ed “phy sical a nde motion a l di str e ss an d h a [d] be e n d e prive d o f h e r l ibe rty wi tho ut j us t c aus e .” As to D r. F or e stL am, Vickr oy

alleg ed:
The De fendant, J . For est-L am, M.D. neve r “pe rsonally ” ex amined the Plaintiff. He did not make any

personal judgment a s to her condition and sig ned a f alse c ertification causing Plaintiff to be transporte d to Western State Mental Hospital in Bolivar , Tenne ssee a g ainst her will and without proper cause . The a ctions of Dr. F orest-L am and of Me thodist Hospit al, Dy ersbur g wer e neg lige n t and caused serious emotional distress and unlawf

ul restraint on the liberty

of the Plaintiff her ein.
Shere qu e ste d an in

jun c tio n to re mov e a ll re po rt s re latin g to this inc ide nt f ro m he r m e dic a l r e c or ds , and soug ht compensatory damag es in the amount of $3,500,000 and punit ive damage s in the amount of $1,000,000.
Discovery

ensued. Subseque ntly , Vickroy voluntarily

dismiss ed the c laim ag ainst Western. Pathw a y s andB oy d w e reg rante d s umm ary jud g me nt b a se d o n Path way s’ immun ity a s a g ov e rn me ntal e nti ty

a ndB oy d’ s st a tus a s a

Pathw a y s e mp l o ye e . T h e re maini ng de fe nd a nts , M e tho dis t Hospital, Foss, and Dr. For est-L am filed motions for summary judgme nt based on Vic kroy ’s failure to provide medical experts by the dea dline established in the sche duling or der.
I n an orde r date d J uly

25, 2003, the trial co u rt ex t en d ed the dea dline from the pr evious scheduling order

and ordered V ickroy

to file any

aff idavits in response to the motions for summary judgme nt by

Aug ust 22, 2003. I n response , Vickroy provided an aff idavit f rom one expert, Daniel Me nk e s, M. D. I n th e a ff idavit , D r. Me nk e s in dic a te d th a t heis a me dic a l school pr of

e sso r i n Memphis, that he had not y et h ad an o pportunity to prepa re an expert opinion report, and that Dr.T e n n e sse e C o d e A n n o ta te d S e c tio n 2 9 -2 6 -1 1 5 (a ) - (b ) sta te s: 3 a) In a m al prac t i ce act i on, t he cl ai mant sh al l ha ve t he bur den of provi ng by ev i dence as provi ded b y s ub sect i o n (b): (1) T h e r ec og n i ze d s t an dar d of a cc ept abl e pr ofes s i on al pr ac t i ce i n t h e pr ofes s i on a n d t he special t y t hereo f , if

a ny , that t he d efend ant practi ces i n t he co m m uni t y i n whi ch t he d efend ant pr ac t i ce s or i n a s i mi l ar c ommun i t y a t t h e t i me t h e al l eg ed i n j u r y or w r on g f

u l a ct i on oc cu r r ed; (2 ) T h a t th e d e fen d a n t ac te d w ith le ss th a n o r fa iled to a c t with o rd ina ry a n d re a so n a b le c a re in ac cor dan ce w i t h s u ch s t an dar d; a n d ( 3) As a pr ox i ma t e r e s u l t of t h e de fe n da n t ' s n e g l i g e n t a c t or om i s s i on , t h e pl a i n t i f f s u f fe r ed inj u rie s w h ic h w o u ld no t o the rw ise ha v e o c c u rr e d

. ( b) N o pe r s on i n a h ea l t h c ar e p rof ess i on r equ i r i n g l i ce n s u r e u n der t h e l aw s of t h i s s t at e s h al l be compe t en t t o tes t i fy i n a n y c ou r t of l aw t o e s t abl i s h t h e f ac t s r equ i r ed t o be e s t abl i s h ed by su b se c tio n (a ), u n le ss th e p e rs o n w a s lice n se d to p ra c tice in the sta te o r a c o n tigu o u s b o rd e rin g sta te a p ro fes sio n o r sp e c ia lty w h ic h w o u ld m a k e the p e rs o n ' s e x p e rt tes tim o n y re le v a n t t o the issu e s in t he cas e a nd ha d pract i ced t hi s prof es s i on or s peci al t y i n one ( 1) of t hes e s t at es dur i ng t he y ear p reced i ng t he d at e t hat t he al l eged i njury o r wro ngf ul act o ccurred. T hi s rul e shal l ap p l y t o exp ert wi t n es s es t es t i f

y i n g for t h e def

en dan t a s r ebu t t al w i t ness es. T he cou r t ma y w ai v e t h i s s u bs ec t i on whe n i t det er mi nes t hat t he appropri at e wi t nes s es ot her wi s e woul d not be av ai l abl e.

T E NN
. C O D E A NN
. § 29

- 2 6

- 1 1 5 (a)- (b) (20 0 1 ). -5- For est-L am’s ac t of signing Vickroy ’s commitment paper s without having p er s o n al ly conducte d a phy sical and me ntal examination of her was “a violation of the community standards of

best medica l prac tice in the State of Te nnessee .” On September

30, 2003, a hea

ring was he ld on the motions for summary judgme nt. At the hearing, thedefe ndants cha rac terized Vickroy ’s cause of action as medical malpractice . They arg ued that Vickroy

did not meet the burde n of producing a competent medical expert under Te nnesseeCode Annotated Sec tio n 29-26-115 beca use the a ffidavit of D r. Menke s did not establish that he was 3 familiar with the standa

rd of c arefor e merg ency

room phy sicians in Dy er County , and also did not establish causation of Vickroy ’s injury

. Vickro y ar gued that no expert testimony was ne eded be causeTenne ssee Code A nnotated Section 33-6-404 e stablished as a matter of law that the standa rd of c arerequire d the phy sician who ord ers a patie nt c omm itt e d to a

me ntal in sti tutionto h a vefi rs t pe rs on a lly e xami ne d th e patie nt. Se c tio n 3 3- 6- 40 4 s tate s: IF (1)( A) a licensed phy sician, psy cholog ist, or desig nated pr ofessional take s a per son int o c us tod y

un de r S e c tio n 3 3- 6- 40 2; O R-6-

(B ) a pe rson is broug ht to such a phy sician, psy cholog ist, or desig nated pr ofessional for e x amination under this sec tion,
THEN (2) the physician, psyc hologist, or designated professional shall i mmediatelyexam ine the person and dec ide whether the pe rson is subject to admission t o a h o s p ital or treatment resource under Sec tion 33-6-403, AND (3) (A) I F (I ) the pe rson is not subject to admission, THEN (ii) t h e p h y s ic ian , p s y c h o lo g is t, o r d e s ig n a te dp r o f

e s s io n a l s h a ll r e le a s e th e p e r s on, AND (B ) IF ( I ) the pe rson is subjec t to admission, THEN ( ii) the ph y sic ian , p sy c ho log ist

, or designated professional shall complete a certificate of ne ed for suc h em ergency diagnosis, evaluat i o n, and treatment showing the factual foundati on for the conclusions on eac h item of Section 33-6- 403, AN D (ii i) the ph y sic ian, ps y c ho log ist , or desig nated pr ofessional shall assess the person' s clinical nee ds and nee d for phy sical re straint or vehic le sec urity and determine the mode of transportation to the ho sp ita l in c on su ltatio n with the mand a tory pr e -s c re e nin g a g e nt, oth e r me ntal he a lth profe ssional familiar with the per son, or a knowle dg eablefamily member. Tenn. Code Ann. § 33- 6-404 (2001) (empha sis added)

. Vickroy noted t hat her claim i s not based on a theory of medical malprac tice. Rather , her c ause of action is based on the undisputed evidenc e that Dr . F ore st- L a m si g ne d th e c e rtif ic a te of ne e d c aus ing he r t o b e c omm itt e d anddidno t pe rs on a lly examine her in violation of Section 33-6-404. In this sit uation, she asserted, the medic al malpra ctice statutes areinapplicable, and expert testimony reg arding a standard of car e is unne cessa ry to prove he r c a se . T he re fo re , Vick roy arg ue d, su mma ry jud g me nt s ho uldno t beg rante d to thede fe nd a nts based on alleg ed def

iciencie s in Dr. Menke s’ af fidavit.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court g rante d summary judgme nt in fav o r o f t he Hospital, Foss, and D r. F orest-L am. The trial court consider ed Vickr oy ’s claim as onebased on medical malpr actice , and conse quently held that she wa s require d to submitexpert test i m ony that comported w ith the require ments of Section 29-26-115 to support he r claim. On that premise, the trial court c oncluded that Dr. Menkes’ aff idavit w as not suf

ficient in that it did notestablish that Dr. M e n k e s w a s f

a m i l i ar w i th th e s t a n d ar do f

c ar e i n D ye r s b u r g , T e n n e s s e e o r a s i m i l ar c o m m u n i t y. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 26-115(a )(1) . Further, the tria l court s tated that Dr . Menkes’ aff idavit was silent on the issue of ca u s ation and, ther efor e, failed to establish causation as is required unde r Se ct i o n 2 9 -26-115( a)( 3). F inding, ther efor e, that Vickr oy failed to produc e a c ompetent expert as require d by

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated Section 29-26- 115, the trial court g rante d summary judgme nt to the Hospital, Foss, and D r. F orest-L am. On Oc tober 13, 2003, the trial court ente red an orderV i ck ro y did no t ap p ea l t he d i sm i ssal of any o f t he o t he r d efen d an t s. 4
-7- c on sis te nt w ithits or a l ruli ng . V ic kr oy no w app e a ls the g rant of su mma ry jud g me nt to Dr . F or e stL a m. 4 On appe al, Vickr o y arg ues that the trial c ourt err ed in g ranting summary judgme nt to Dr. F or e st- L a m ba se d o n th e ina de qu a c y of Dr . M e nk e s’ a ff

idavit

. She arg ue s, a s sh e did in the tria l c ou rt , that her c ause of

action is not based on a

theory of m edica l malprac tice. Rather, her claim is based on the alleg ation that Dr. F orest-L am violated Te nnesseeCode Annotated Sec tio n 3 3-6-404, and her causeof ac tion, therefor e, is based on the ories of or dinary neg lige nce, e motio nal distress, and unlaw ful restraint of her liberty . Vickroy arg ues that Dr. Menkes’ aff idavit is not require d to comport with the require men t s o f Section 29-26- 115, beca use Section 33-6- 404 sets the standar d of ca re f or an emer g ency

room phy sician in any locale in Tenne ssee; therefor e, Dr. Menkes was not require d to be familiar with the standa

rd of c arein Dy ersbur g , Tenne ssee. Ou r r e vie w o f the tria l c ou rt ’s g rant o f sum mary jud g me nt i s de novo onthere c or d b e fo rethi s Court. Wa rre n v . Es tat

e of Kir k , 954 S.W .2d 722, 723 (Tenn. 1997) . A motion for su m mary judgme nt should be g rante d when the movant demo n s t ra t es t h at t hereareno g enuine issues of mate ri a l f a c t a ndthat th e mov ing pa rty is en tit le d to judg me nt as a matte r of la w. Te nn . R. Civ . P. 56.04. The party moving for summary judgme nt be ars the bur den of de monstrating that no ge nuine issue of material fac t exi sts. Bain v . W e lls , 936 S.W .2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997)

. At the outset, we notethat Vickroy ’s claim ag ainst Dr. F orest-L am is p remised on he r interpre tation of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 33-6- 404 reg arding the ce rtificate of nee d, the document re quired by

the State to be executed by a “phy sician, psy cholog ist or desig nated profe ssional” for an emer g ency commitment to a mental instit ution. Vickroy construes Sec tion 33-6- 40 4 a s re qu iring a ph y sic ia n wh o pe rs on a lly e xec ute s the c e rtif ic a te , he re Dr

. F or e st- L a m, to ha ve fi rs t personally

perf ormed a phy sical examination of the patient befor e signing such a certificate of need, a ndno t pe rm itt ing him

to r e ly ona ph y sic a l e xam in ation o f thepatie nt b y a no the r p hy sic ian. It is undisputed that a phy sical ex amination of t he patient is require d under the statute, and in this case , Vickroy was in fa ct examined by Dr. C o o k , the emer g ency room phy sician on duty prior to Dr. F or e st- L a m. D r. F or e st- L a m r e vie we d th e re su lts of Dr . Co ok ’s e xami natio n o f V ic kr oy prior to sig nin g thec e rtif

ic a te of ne e d. Dr

. F or e st- L a m did no t, ho we ve r, pe rs on a lly e xami neVi c kr oy . T hu s, a s a th r e s h o l di s s u e , w e m u s ta d d r e s s w h e th e r th e s t a tu t e i s i n t e n d e dt o r e q u i r e th a tth e s a me phy sician perform the pe rsonal examination and sig n the ce rtificateof nee d.
I n this case, weseek to c onstrue the f ollowing portion of Section 33-6-404:

. . .( 2) theph y sic ia n, ps y c ho log ist, o r d e sig nate d p ro fe ssi on a l sh a ll i mme diate ly examine the person and decidewhether the per son is subject to admission to a hospital or treatment resourc e under Section 33-6-403, and
* * *Se e 2000 T E NN
. P UB
. A CTS 947. 5

T e n n e sse e C o d e A n n o ta te d S e c tio n 3 3 -6 -1 0 1 inc o rp o ra te s ru le s fro m c h a p te r 4 into c h a p te r 6 . T h e sta tute 6
rea d s:
S e rv ic e s to p e rs o n s w ith m e n ta l i llne ss a n d se rio u s e m o tio n a l d istur b a n c e a re go v e rn e d ge n e ra lly b y this tit le , i n c lud ing c h a p te rs 1 -4 , 7 , 8 a n d 9 . T E NN
. C O D E A NN
. § 33

- 6

- 1 0 1 (20 0 1 ). -8- (3)( B) if (i) the pe rso n is subject to admission, then (ii) the phy sician, psy cholog ist, or desig nated pr ofessional shall complete a certificate of nee d for suc h emer g ency

diag nosis, e v al u at ion and treatment. . . . Tennesse e Code Annotated Section 33-6-404( 2) and ( 3)(B )(i) and (ii).
Th e us e of

“ the ” pr e c e din g theph ra se “ ph y sic ian, ps y c ho log ist or de sig nate d p ro fe ssi on a l” in b oth su bs e c tio ns (2 ) and(3 ) i nd ic a te s th a t th e same “ ph y sic ian, ps y c ho log ist , o r d e sig nate d p ro fe ssi on a l” is ex pecte d to examine the person, dec ide whethe r the pe rson should be admitted for treatment, and also complete the certificate of need. Despite this lang uag e, Dr . For est-L am arg ues t hat t he purpose of t he st atute is mere ly to make c e rt a in that a me dic a l pr of e ssi on a l e xami ne s thepatie nt p ri or to an in vo lun tary

c omm itm e nt, that it is not necessa

ry that the same medical professional who sig ns the ce rtificateof nee d also perf orm the re qu ir e d e xami natio n. I n o ther wo rds , Dr. F or e st- L a m arg ue s th a t th e lang ua g e in thestatut e is ambig uous or unclear. “When t he wor ds of a statute a re ambiguous or w hen it is just notclea r what the leg islature had in mind, courts may look be y ond a statute’s text for reliable g uides to the statute’s meaning .” Be ll

s o ut h T e le c o mmunic a tio ns

, I nc . v . G re er , 9 72 S.W .2d 663, 673 (Tenn. 1997)

. Statutory interpre tation may

include a r eview of

leg is l at ive history

and an analy sis of the statute’s terms in the context of the entire statute. Id.
The title of the Code in whic h Section 33-6-404 is included, Title 33, was signific antly revised in 2000. The audio rec ording s of the consolidation of T i t l e 3 3 b y the Tenne ssee Senate and the

5 Tenne ssee Houseof Repre sentatives yield littl e usef ul information on the leg islative intent reg arding the issue at b ar . H o w e v e r , a r e v ie w o f th e o th e r c h ap te r s in T it le 3 3 is il lu mi n a ti n g r e g ar d ing the int e nd e d c on str

uc tio n o f S e c tio n 3 3- 6- 40 4. Te nn e sse e Cod e An no tate d § 33 -4 -1 08 , state s: 6 (a ) Ac e rtif

ic a te of ne e d f or c omm itm e nt f

or c area ndtr e a tme nt o f a

pe rs onwi th me ntal il lne ss, se ri ou s e motion a l distu rb a nc e , or d e ve lop me ntal di sa bil ity is n ot v a lid for any purpose unless it is based on per sonal observation and examination of the person madeby

the profe ssional not more than three(3) day s prior to the making of the ce rtificate . The c ertificate sh al l state the fa cts and re asoning on which the opinions and conclusion ar e base d. (b) The exe cution of a certi ficate conc erning the me ntal condition of a person by a profe ssi on al w ho ha s no t pe rso na lly ob se rv e d an d exam ine d the pe rso n is a Cla ss E felony.In re M ic h e lle J
. co nsol i d at ed t wo unrel at ed res p o nd ent s, M i chel l e and Sam

. A l t ho ugh bo t h cases were 7
a p p e a le d o n the sa m e sta tuto ry g ro u n d s, the fac ts re la ting to S a m ’s co m m itm e n t ar e m o re re le v a n t t o the a n a lysis. T h e re sp o n d e n ts’ l a st na m e s w e re o m itt e d to p ro te c t t h e ir p riv a c y.

T he releva nt st atute st ates: 8 N o res p o nd ent m ay b e fo und s ub ject t o i nvo l unt ary ad m i ss i o n unl ess at l east one psy chi at ri st , cl i ni cal s o ci al wo rker, o r cl i ni cal psy cho l o gi st who has exam i ned hi m t est i f i es i n pe rs o n at t he heari ng. T he res p o nd ent m ay waive t he re q u ire m e n t o f t h e tes tim o n y su b je c t t o the a p p ro v a l o f t h e c o u rt.

4 0 5 ILC S 5 / 3

- 8 0 7 (W est 20 0 0 ). -9- T EN N
. C ODE A NN
. § 33-4-108 ( emphasis adde d). Thus, in thi s s t at ute, the Te nnesseeleg islature criminalized the signing of a certificate of need by a prof essional who had not pe rsonally observe d and examined the patient. Clea rly the leg islative expectation was that the involuntary commitment of a patient must be done by a prof essional who has e x amined the patient, and not based only on the state me nts a ndob se rv a tio ns of oth e rs . A similar statute in I llinois was a ddresse d by the I llinois Supreme Court in In re Michelle J. , 808 N.E.2d 987 (Ill. 2004). I n Mic he lle , the State of Illinois (“State” ) involuntarily committed the 7 responde nt Sam S. (“Sam”). Id. at 989. At a late r hea ring , the State attempted to extend the commitment under section 3-807 of the Illinois Mental He alth and De velopmental Disabilities Code 8 (the “ Code”). Id. I n the c omm itm e nt pr oc e e din g s, the State pr e se nte d one wi tne ss, a ps y c ho log ist , to testify about Sam’s continui n g mental illness. Id. at 990. The te stify ing psy cholog ist had not personally

examined Sam, but ins tead r elied on the examinations of Sam byanother psy cholog ist and a clinica l soc i al wo rk er. Id. B oththetria l c ou rt a ndtheint e rm e diate app e llate c ou rt ha d u ph e ld Sam’s involuntary commitment ba sed on this psy cholog ist’s te stimony , observing that “a p ersona l interview w ith the [ patient] prior to a hearing for involuntary commitment is ‘hig hly desirous,’ but [finding] that such an interview i s n o t ab s o l u tely require d by

the Code where . . . theexpert has examined the [ patient’s] medical recor ds . . .” Id. The I llinois Supreme Court reve rsed, stating that “[e]x amining a person’ s medical r ecor ds . . . is not the same as examining the pe rson, which is what the statute spec ifies.” Id. at 991-992. It commented:
I f t h e G e n e r a l A s s e mb ly

th o u g h t th a t r e v ie w in g a r e s p o n d e n t’ s me d ic a l c h arts and interviewing other staf

f member s we re an adequate substitute for an a ctual e xa mi n a ti o n , it

c o u ldh a v e in cluded suc h lan g u a g e inth e s tatu te

. It d idn o t. We cannot r ewrite a statute unde r the g uise of statutory construction or de part f

ro m the plain lang uag e of a st atute byrea ding into it exceptions, lim itations, or conditions not expressed by

the leg islature.
The Mic he lle c ou rt

we nt o n to no te that “ [b]e c aus e inv olu nta ry a dmi nis trati on of

me ntal he a lth se rv ic e s impli c a te s fu nd a me ntal lib e rty int e re sts , statut e s g ov e rn ing the app lic ablepr oc e du re s sh ou ld be construe d narr owly .” Id

. at9 9 2 (c i t i n g In re Bar ba ra H. , 702 N.E.2d 555 (Ill. 1998)). We find the re asoning in Mic he lle co n v i n ci n g.O b vi o usl y , t he m ed i cal pro fess i o nal who s i gns t he cert i f i cat e o f need can, and m o st l i kel y m ust , rel y on t he 9 sta te m e n ts a n d o b se rv a tio n s o f o the rs in the m e d ic a l ch a rt, in a d d iti o n to his p e rs o n a l ex a m ina tio n o f t h e p a tien t.

P art i cul arl y i n l i ght of T enness ee C o d e A nno t at ed Sec t i o n 33

- 4

- 1 0 8 , i t i s unl i kel y t hat t he st and ard o f care 10
wo ul d pe rmit a phys i ci an t o s i gn t he cert i f i cat e o f need wi t ho ut havi ng pe rs o nal l y exam i ned t he p ers o n be i ng co m m i t t ed

. D r. Fo res t

- La m dis p ut es t hi s, ci t i ng H o lt e x re l W a lk e r v . C ity o f M e m p h is , No. W 20 00

- 00 91 3- COAR 3

- C V , 20 0 1 W L 8 4 6 0 8 1 (T enn. C t

. A p p . Jul y 20 , 20 0 1 ). I n H o lt , t h e pl ai n t i f f a l l eg ed t h at h i s mot h er w ou l d n ot -10- Thus, even if the lang uag e in Sec tion 33- 6-404 is de emed ambig uous, we find t h at o ther provisions in the same title, as well as pe rsuasive c asela w, conf irm that the corr ect co n s truction of the statute re qu i re s t h at the medica l professional who sig ns the ce rtificateof nee d for involuntary commitment mustfirst personally e xami n eth ep erson to be committed. There fore , Vickroy is corre ct 9 in her a ssertion that Section 33-6-404 pr o h i b i t s a “phy sician, psy cholog ist, or desig nated profe ssional” from c ommitt ing a person without first conduc ting a persona l examination.
Dr. F orest-L am maintains that, reg ard l es s o f the stricture s of Section 33-6-404, V ickroy ’s claims ag ainst Dr. F orest-L am must be classified as medical malpractice , subject t o the expert proof re qu ir e me nts se t f

orth i n Te nn e sse e Cod e An no tate d § 29 -2 6- 11 5. I f s o, Dr . F or e st- L a m c on te nd s, Dr . M e nk e s’ a ff

idavit falls we ll s ho rt

of thestatut ory

re qu ir e me nts in that it

do e s n ot s tate that heis familiar with the a

pplicable st an d ar d o f ca re f or an e merg ency

phy sician in Dy ersbur g or a similar community

and also doe s not state that Dr. F orest-L am’s act i ons werethe proxim ate c ause of Vi c kr oy ’s inj urie s. Vickroy arg ues that her

claim is not a malprac tice claim in w hich the issue is the propriety of the def endant phy sician’s medic al judg ment. Rather, V i ckroy arg ues that Section 33-6- 404 establishes the standa

rd of c are and no expert proof is neede d to prove that Dr. F orest-L am did not meet this s t an d ar d

. T h ere fore , we must asce rtain if, and theextent to which, Vickroy ’s cause of a c tio n a g a ins t D r. F or e st- L a m is a me dic a l malpr a c tic e c laim su bje c t to thee xpe rt pr oo f r e qu ir e me nts of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated Section 29-26- 115.
I n h e r c omp la int , V ic kr oy re c ou nts the e ve nts of F e br ua ry 4, 20 01 . Sh e a sse rt s th a t D r. F or e stL am fa lsely

certified in the ce rtificateof nee d that he had per sonally examined Vickroy , and that he ma de no pe rs on a l ju dg me nt a bo ut h e r c on dition be fo re c aus ing he r t o b e inv olu nta ri ly tr a ns po rt e d to Western without pr oper cause . She alleg es that Dr. F orest-L am’s ac tions “wereneg lige nt and caused serious emotional distres s an d unlawful re straint on the liberty of” V ickroy . Vickroy

soug ht compensatory and punit ive damage s for her “phy sical and e motional dist ress” and the de privation of h e r l i b e rty. To thee xten t th a t V ic kr oy ’s c laim is bas ed on a the ory of me dic a l malpr a c tic e , it

mus t f a il based on the inadequa cy

of Dr. Me nkes’ a ffidavit. Vickr oy arg ues that, if this case w ereconstrued a s a me dic a l ma lpr a c tic e a c tio n, sh e ne e d n ot c omp ly wi th there qu ir e me nt o f S e c tio n 2 9- 26 -1 15 to produceevidenc e of the standard of car e in t he community beca use Section 33-6- 404 establishes the statut ory stan da rdof c arefo r the e nti restate . We ne e d n ot d e c idethat is su e , b e c aus e Me nk e s’ aff idavit clearly

fails to establish causation in a medical malpra ctice c ontext

. Section 29-26- 10h a v e d ie d if p a ra m e d ic s h a d tra n sp o rte d he r to the ho sp ital in th e ir fi rs t ru n to the d e c e d e n t’s ho m e . Id. a t *2 . A Stat e regul at i o n pro vi d ed t hat a pa t i ent ove r age f i f t y - f i ve wi t h res p i rat o ry dis ease “ shoul d be t rans p o rt ed ” und er t he d e stina tio n ru le s. Id. at * 7

. T he p l ai nt i f f did no t present exp ert t est i m o ny on t he p aram ed i cs’ s t and ard o f care, but rat her r el i ed on t he regul at i o n, argui ng t hat i t est ab l i shed t hat t he p aram ed i cs were r eq ui red t o t rans p o rt t he d eced ent o n the fi rs t ru n , ev e n w h e re sh e re fus e d su c h tra n sp o rt. Id. T he C our t not ed t hat t he r egu l at i on di d not s t at e t hat su c h a p a tien t m u stbe t r ans po r t ed ev en i f s he r ef us es , an d ob s er ved t hat t he para med i cs ’ f i el d op er at i ons manu al o u tli n e d a lter n a te p ro c e d u re s w h e n su c h a p a tien t re fus e s tra n sp o rt. Id. T he C o urt fo und t hat t he d efend ant s’ exp ert t es t i mo ny was un r ef

ut ed t hat t he para med i c c ann ot force a c om pet ent pat i ent i n s uch ci r cums t anc es t o be t r ans po r t ed to the ho sp ital, un d e r th e a p p lica b le sta n d a rd o f ca re . Id. at * 7. I n c ont r as t , i n t hi s ca s e, t he s t at ut e c l ear l y mandat es t h at t h e ph y s i ci an s i g n i n g t h e ce r t i f i ca t e of n ee d m u stpe r s on al l y e x ami n e t h e per s on t o be i n v ol u n t ar i l y c ommi t t ed, i ndeed maki ng i t a f

el ony for a phy s i ci an t o s i gn s uch a c er t i f i cat e of ne ed wi t hout ha vi ng per s onal l y per formed s uch an exam i nat i o n. -11- 11 5 ( a ) ( 3 ) r e q u ir e s th a t a

p lain ti f f s h o w b y e xp e rt t e s ti mo n y

th a t h is in

ju rie s w e r e th e p h y sician’s brea ch of the standard of

car e was “a proxi mate result of the defe ndant’s neg lige nt a ct or omission.” T EN N
. C ODE A NN . § 29 -2 6- 11 5( a )( 3) (2 00 1) . A s th e tria l c ou rt no te d, “ Dr . M e nk e s’ a ff idavit is completely

silent on the issue of causation.” There fore , we must conclude that the tria l court did not err in g ranting Dr. For est-L am’s motion for summary judgme nt insofar a s Vickroy ’s cause of a ction ag ainst Dr. F orest-L am is based on a theory of medical malprac tice.
Howeve r, Vickory ’s cause of a ction aga inst Dr. For est-L am is not lim ited to claims arising out of alleg ed medical malprac tice. As stated a bove, in the September

30, 2003 hearin g on the motions for summary

judgme nt, Vickroy

arg ued that Section 33-6- 40 4 e s ta b li s h e s th es tandar d of ca

re a ndno e xpe rt

pr oo f i s n e e de d to pr ov e that D r. F or e st- L a m di d n ot m e e t th is s tand ard . We a g re e wi th the g ener al re asoning of thi s s t atement but cla rify that the statute establishes a standard of

conduct for any person qualified to sign a certificate of

need f or i nvoluntary commitment. “The standard of conduct e x pecte d of a r easona ble per son may

be pre scribed in a

statute and, c onsequently , a violation of the statute may

be dee med to be neg lige nce pe r se.” Cook ex rel. Uithoven v. S pinn aker’s of Rivergate, Inc. , 8 78 S.W. 2d93 4, 93 7 ( Te nn . 1 99 4) In a n e g lig e nc e pe r s e a c tio n, theplaintif f mus t show that the “statute violated was desig ned to impose a duty or prohibit and ac t for the be nefit of the public. (citations omi tted) It must also be established that the injured pa rty was within the cla ss of persons that the statute wa s meant to protec t.” Id. at 937. Vickroy arg ues that her damag es arise from Dr. F orest-L am’s violation of the commitment statute. Thus, in essence , Vickroy states a c laim of neg lige nce pe r se. On the portion of Vic kroy ’s claim for deprivation of l i b er t y , t h e Tennessee caseof Boaz v. Taylor , 1986 WL

1154 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 1986), is instructive. I n Boaz , plaintiff Anita B oaz (“B oaz”) sued de fendant W. D. Tay lor, M.D. (“ Dr. Tay lor”) f or neg lige nt diag nosis and the tort of false imprisonment. Id. a t *1

. Dr . T a y lor dia g no se d B oa z as be ing se ve re ly de pr e sse d andsu ic idal. Ba sed on this diag nosis, Dr. Taylor signe d an eme rg ency commitment certi fi cateand had B oaz committed to Northwest Tenne ssee Me ntal Health Center. Id. Boa z allege d that her c onfinement wa s unlawful be cause , although s h e had be en suicidal prior to the commitment, she was not suicidal atT en n es s ee Code An n ot at ed Se ct i on 33- 603 s t at ed: 11

P erso ns p o ssessi ng a li ke l i ho o d o f serio us ha rm - C usto d y and ho sp i t ali za t i o n p ro ce d ure s. ( a) Any s t at e, coun t y , or muni ci pal off i cer au t hor i zed t o m ake ar r es t s i n T enn es s ee or a ny l i cen s ed p hysi cian wh o ha s rea so n to b eli ev e that an i nd i vid ua l i s m en t all y i l l an d , b ec au se o f t his i l l ne ss, p o sse sse s a li k e liho o d o f ser io u s h a rm if he is no t i m m e d ia te ly d e ta ine d m a y, w itho u t a w a rr a n t, t ak e s u ch i n di v i du al i n t o c u s t ody

. T h e ph r as e ' l i k el i h ood of s er i ou s h ar m, for t h i s s ec t i on me an s ( 1) a s u bs t an t i al r i s k of

ph y s i ca l h ar m t o t h e per s on h i ms el f a s ma n i fes t ed by e v i den ce of t h r ea t s of , or at t emp t s at , s ui ci de or s er i ous bod i l y ha r m; or ( 2) a s ubs t ant i al r i s k of phy s i cal ha r m t o ot her p ers o ns as manif

est ed by evi d ence o f

hom i ci d al or o t her vi o l ent be havi o r or evi d ence t hat other s a r e pl a c e d i n r e a s on a bl e f e a r of v i ol e n t be h a v i or a n d s e r i ou s ph y s i c a l h a r m t o t h e m.
T en n es s ee Code An n ot at ed Se ct i on 33- 603 ( 1977)

. T h i s s t at u t e i s s i mi l ar t o c u r r en t s t at u t es T en n es s ee Code Ann ot at ed Se ct i on s 33- 6- 402 a n d 403.

-12- the time of the commit ment as re quired by the statute in eff

ect at the time, Tennesse e Code Annotated § 33-603. Id. at *3.

11
Dr. Tay lor filed a motion for summary judgme nt and provided expert testimonyin support of his moti ons. Id. at *1. No medical expert testimonywas produc ed by the plaintiff in re sponse. Id. I nstead, B oaz attempted to amend he r complaint t o d el ete the alleg ations of medical malprac tice, leaving intact the alleg ations of fa lse imprisonment. Id. Boa z filed the aff idavits of herse lf and he r husband, denying that she was suicida l at the t ime of the c ommitm ent, and r elying on Sec tion 33-603. Id. The trial court dism issed the complaint based on B oaz’ failureto file expert testimonyin support of her c laims. Id. On appe al, in analy zing the claim for fa lse imprisonment, the Boaz court stated that a “w rong ful commitment ag ainst one’s will constitutes the t ort of false imprisonment.” Id. at *2. The Boaz court observed:
The Court would be c orre ct in g ranting a partial summary judgme nt as t o the medica l malprac tice counts as there wer e no countervailing me dical af fidavits filed re g arding the se c ou nts a s w ou ld b e re quire d to de fe a t th e motionin this c a se . . . . As to plaintif f’ s f a lseimp ri so nme nt c laim, ho we ve r, weho ld n o e xpe rt me dic a l a ff

idavit s wer e nec e s s ary

to a v o ids u mm ary

ju d g me n t. A n y

lay p e r s o n c a n b e g u il ty

o f the offe nse. Since a me d ic a l d e g r e e is n o t a p r e r e q u is it e to b e g u il ty o f th e o f f e n s e , me dical opinion proof is not nece ssary to establish the claim and medical opinion proof is not re qu ir e d to re fu te it. Or din ary fa c ts w ill do thejob . T he or e tic a lly on e c ou ld be g uil ty of m edical malprac tice and false imprisonment, but, one may proce ed on one the ory independe nt of the other.
Id. The c ourt noted that the statute, Sec tion 33-603, provided “that others than doctors may take one into custody . The c riteria f or such a ction is the same u n d er t h e statute whethe r the pa rty taking another into custody is a doctor or not.” Id. at *3. The Boaz court found that it was undisputed thatA d esigna t ed p ro fessio na l i s d efi ne d i n T .C .A

. § 3 3

- 5

- 4 2 7 (b ) as: 12
(b) If a pe rs o n: ( 1) I s a qu al i f

i ed men t al h ea l t h pr ofes s i on al u n der § 33- 1- 101; (2) Is l i censed or cert i f i ed t o practi ce i n t he st at e i f requi red f o r t he d i sci p l i ne; and ( 3) Sa t i s f ac t or i l y c ompl et es a t r ai n i n g pr og r am appr ov ed an d pr ov i ded by t h e depa r t men t on e m e rg e n c y c o m m itm e n t cr iter ia a n d p ro c e d u re s; the c o m m issio n e r m a y d e sig n a te the p e rs o n to t ak e an y a ct i on a u t h or i ze d a n d pe r for m a n y du t y i mpos ed on a ph y s i ci an by §§ 33- 6- 401 - 33- 6- 406 t o t h e ex t en t s u ch du t i es a r e wi t h i n t h e s cope of pr ac t i ce of

t h e pr ofes s i on i n w h i ch t h e per s on i s l i ce n s ed or c er t i f

i ed.
T

. C

. A

. § 3 3

- 6

- 4 2 7 (b) (20 0 1 ).

T .C .A

. § 3 9

- 1 3

- 3 0 2 st ates: 13
( a) A p er s on comm i t s t he offens e of fal s e i mp r i s onment wh o knowi ng l y r emo ves or conf i nes a n o the r u n la w fully so a s to inte rfe re su b sta n tially w ith the o the r’s lib e rty. (b) Fals e i m p ri sonm ent i s a C l ass A m i sdem eano r.
T

. C

. A

. § 3 9

- 1 3

- 3 0 2 (20 0 3 ). -13- Boa z had told Dr. Taylor that she was thinking of killing her non- exis tent “twin sister,” and held that this would constitut e an e x pression of suicida l intent, just ifying D r. Ta y l or’s a ctions. Id. Onthi s basis, the g rant of summary judgme nt to Dr. Taylor was a ffirme d. Id. at *4.
As in Boaz , th e statut e a t is su e , Se c tio n 3 3- 6- 40 4, auth orize s n ot o nly a ph y si cia n, bu t a lso a “ ps y c ho log ist

or de sig nate d p ro fe ssi on a l” to e xec utea c e rtif ic a te of ne e d c omm itting a pe rs onto 12 a mental instit ution suc h as Western. As discussed above, a prer equisite is that the per s o n signing the ce rtificateof nee d must first hav e ex am i n ed the pe rson to be committed. This is mandated whether the per son signing the certificate of need is a phy sician or not. The ref ore, theclaim is not one base d on medical malpr actice , and expert testimony is not ne cessa ry to establish a claim for

relief

. Boaz , 1986 WL

1154 at *2.
I n the instant case , Vickroy ’s complaint alleg ed that Dr. F orest-L am committed a wr ong ful act by committing her

to Western without having f irst personally

examined her, a s requi red by Section 33-6-404. In essenc e, Vickroy alleg es that Dr. F orest-L am sig ned the c ertificate of ne ed committing he r to W este rnwi tho ut l e g a l auth ority to d o s o, wh ic h w e c on str uea s a c laim f or false imp ri so nme nt. See Baines v. Brady , 265 P.2d 194, 197 (Cal. 1953) (“ Phy sical inconve nienceand 13 mental suffe ring following upon a false arr est areproper elements of damag e. Thetrier of fac ts has c on sid e ra bledis c re tio n inde te rm ini ng th e amou nt o f d a ma g e s w he retheill e g a l r e str a int is acc ompanied by

circ umstances c ausing humiliation, s hame and public disgr ace .”) Although V ickroy

did n o t state a c laim for violation of the c onstitut ional require ment of proce dural due proce ss, c asela w on such a c laim is informative on the issue of damag es. Se e Sta te of Tenn . V

. Phill ips , 9 68 S.W. 2d87 4, 87 9 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 96 ) ( “ inv olu nta ry c omm itm e nt t oFo r examp l e, V i ckroy al l eges as pa rt of her i njuri es a “ l o ss of ab i l i t y t o pa rt i ci p at e i n m eani ngf ul 14 t her apeut i c r el at i ons hi p due t o m i s t r us t of t he psy chi at r i c s y s t em, r es ul t i ng i n t he i nabi l i t y t o ob t ai n pr op er tre a tm e n t.”

Si n ce t h e r ema i n i n g n eg l i g en ce pe r s e an d fal s e i mpr i s on men t c l ai ms a g ai n s t D r . For es t

- La m a r e n ot 15

m e d ic a l m a lp ra c tice c la im s, T e n n e sse e C o d e A n n o ta te d § 2 9 -2 6 -1 1 5 w o u ld no t b e a p p lica b le to the se issu e s. See Pee t e v. She lby Count

y H eal t h Car e Cor

p. , 93 8 S.W

. 2 d 69 3 , 69 6 (T enn. C t

. A p p . 19 9 6 ).

-14- a mental institution constit utes a de privation of l iberty that invokes the consti tutional protec tion of pr oc e du ral du e pr oc e ss. ” ). Th e Un ite d State s Sup re me Cou rt dis c us se d the iss ue of dama g e s inthi s context in Car

y v . P iph us , 98 S.Ct . 1042 (1978). In Carey , a public school princ ipal observe d what h e th o u g h t w a s a s tu d e n t s mo k in g ma rij u a n a o n c a mp u s . Id. at 1045-46. Thestudent denied the c ha rg e bu t wa s ne ve rt

he le ss g ive n a tw e nty -d a y su sp e ns ion ba se d on the a lle g a tio n of theprinc ipal. Id. at 1045. The student and his mother filed suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, char g i n g that, by g iving the stude nt a leng thy suspension without any adjudicative hearing, the principal ha d suspended the student without due proce ss of law in violation of the F ourtee nth Amendment. The Court stated that a plaintiff may

have a causeof ac tion based on emotional distress fr om the mere denial of the due proce ss itself. Id. at 1052. The Court c ompare d this type of damag e to damag e re sultin g from the hu mil iatio n o f d isc ri min a tio n, or that of “ hu mil iatio n anddis tr e ss c aus e d b y un la wf ul ar re sts , sear ches, and seizures.” Id. at 1053, n.22.
The interme diate appe llate court in Carey ha d h e ld that the stu de nt wo uld no t bee nti tle d to rec over damag es for

injuries cause d by the suspension if it were shown that the student would have been suspe nd ed ev en i f a p roper hearing ha d been he ld, because in that ca se, the failure to ac cord proce dural due proce ss could not be viewe d as the c ause of the suspension. Id. a t 10 50 . T heSup re me Court ag ree d with this hol ding. Id. The Carey Court went on to hold that the student may be entitled to rec over damag es for the denial of due proc ess itself, eve n if the suspension prove d justified. The Court noted that “a pur

pose of pr ocedur al due pr ocess is to conve y to the individual a fee ling that the g overnme nt has dea lt with himfairly , as we ll as to m i n i m i z e t he risk of mistaken de privations of protec ted intere sts.” Id. at 1051. Consequently , the Court he ld that thestudent should be g iven the opportunity

to produce evidenc e of me ntal and emotional distress ca used by the denial of

proce dural due proc ess itself. Id. at 1052.
I n this case, Vic kroy

claims that Dr. F orest-L am’s neg lige nce c aus ed h er p h y sical and emotional distress, as we ll as loss of liberty . As in Carey , even if Dr. Fo rest-L am would have c omm itt e d V ic kr oy ha d he e xami ne d he r, sh e may sti ll b e a wa

rd e d d a ma g e s a

ri sin g ou t of

Dr . F or e stL am’s failure to examine h er b ef o re sig ning thecertificate of need c ommitt ing he r to Western for evaluation. All other issues raised on appe al ar e pre termitted.

14
I n sum, the trial court’s g rant of summary judgme nt in favor of Dr. For est-L am i s af fi rmed as to Vickroy ’s claims of medic al malpra ctice. The g rant of summary judgme nt is rever sed as to any re ma ini ng c la ims , in c lud ing c la ims of ne g lig e nc e pe r s e a ndfalseimp ri so nme nt. 15-15-

The de cision of the trial court is affirme d in pa rt and reve rsed in part, as se t forth above , and the cause is remanded for further proce eding s not inconsistent with t his Opinion. Cos ts of this appeal area sse sse d a g a ins t D e fe nd a nt/Ap pe lle e Jame s F or e st- L a m, M. D. , fo r wh ic h e xec uti onmay iss ue if n e c e s s a ry.

___________________________________ HOLL Y M. KIRBY, JUDGE