AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF

A P U B L I C A T I O N O F T H E A F R I C A C E N T E R F O R S T R A T E G I C S T U D I E S

N O . 3 2 / A U G U S T 2 0 1 6

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The risk of Islamist extremism frequently focuses 

on Somalia and the violent actions of al Shabaab. Yet 

local adherents to extremist versions of Islam can now 

be found throughout East Africa. As a result, tensions both within Muslim communities and between 

certain Islamist groups and the broader society have 

been growing in the region in recent years.

These tensions have not emerged suddenly or 

spontaneously. Rather, they reflect an accumulation 

of pressure over decades. The genesis of this is largely 

the externally-driven diffusion of Salafist ideology from 

the Gulf States. Buoyed by the global oil boom and a 

desire to spread the ultraconservative Wahhabi version 

of Islam throughout the Muslim World, funding for 

mosques, madrassas, and Muslim youth and cultural 

centers began flowing into the region at greater levels 

in the 1980s and 1990s. Opportunities for East African 

youth to study in the Arab World steadily expanded. 

As these youth returned home, they brought with them 

more rigid and exclusivist interpretations of Islam. 

The expanding reach of Arab satellite television has 

reinforced and acculturated these interpretations to 

a wider audience. 

Islamist Extremism in East Africa

By Abdisaid Musse Ali-Koor

u While Islamist extremism in East Africa is often associated with al Shabaab and Somalia, it has been 

expanding to varying degrees throughout the region.

u Radical Islamist ideology has emerged only relatively recently in East Africa—imported from the Arab 

World—challenging long established norms of tolerance.

u Confronting Islamist extremism with heavy-handed or extrajudicial law enforcement is likely to 

backfire by inflaming real or perceived socioeconomic cleavages and exclusionist narratives used by 

violent extremist groups.

H I G H L I G H T S

The effect has been the emergence of an increasingly 

confrontational strain of Islam in East Africa. Salafist 

teachings, once seen as fringe, became mainstream. The 

number of Salafist mosques rose rapidly. In turn, it became increasingly unacceptable to have an open dialogue 

on the tenets of Islam (see box). Growing intolerance 

has fostered greater religious polarization. 

Over time, these tensions have turned violent. 

Attacks by militant Islamists against civilians in East 

Africa (outside of Somalia) rose from just a few in 2010 

to roughly 20 per year since then. The vast majority of 

these have been in Kenya. Most sensational was the 

days-long 2013 siege of the Westgate shopping complex 

in Nairobi, where militants caused more than 60 civilian 

deaths and left hundreds injured. Though al Shabaab 

claimed responsibility for the attack, experts agree that 

the attack required support from multiple local, Kenyan 

sympathizers. Al Shabaab committed an even deadlier 

attack the following year when Somali and Kenyan 

members of the group stormed the campus of Kenya’s 

Garissa University and killed 147 students. Al Shabaab 

has attempted to maximize the potential divisiveness of 

these attacks by singling out non-Muslims for execution. 
Abdisaid Ali is the Regional Political Advisor for the 

Office of the European Union Special Representative 

for the Horn of Africa with a specific focus on extreme 

violence. The views set out in this article are those of the 

author and do not necessarily reflect the official opinion 

of the European Union. 

2

The U.S. embassy in Uganda has regularly issued 

warnings of possible attacks since 2014. One of those 

alerts coincided with Ugandan forces foiling an imminent attack by a Kampala-based terror cell, arresting 19 

people and seizing explosives and suicide vests.2 Most 

memorably, Uganda suffered twin bombings in July 

2010 that killed 76 who had gathered at a restaurant 

and a rugby club in the capital to watch the World 

Cup final. Al Shabaab claimed responsibility but in 

2016 seven men from Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya 

were convicted of carrying out the attack. 

Connections between the region and the global 

jihad movement also appear to be growing. Tanzanian 

Defense Minister Hussein Ali Mwinyi has warned that 

increasing numbers of citizens were joining the Islamic 

State and al Shabaab. This reflects the growing attractiveness of the global brand of radical Islamists in 

East Africa. At some point, these East African recruits 

may return home, presenting a new security threat.

The growing violence of Islamist extremists has 

generated a strong response from security actors in 

East Africa. At times, these operations are conducted 

indiscriminately, however. The Kenyan government’s 

Operation Usalama Watch, for example, resulted in 

the incarceration of an estimated 4,000 people, the 

majority without charge. Largely conducted in regions 

with sizable Somali Muslim populations, the impression of many in these communities was that they were 

being unjustly punished for the acts of a handful of 

extremists.3 The result may be more support for violent 

Islamist groups. Interviews with Kenyan-born members of violent Islamist groups found that 65 percent 

of respondents pointed to Kenya’s counterterrorism 

policy as the primary factor that motivated them to 

join their violent campaign.4

In short, radical Islamist ideology has been spreading throughout East African communities—bringing 

with it greater societal polarization and violence. Further escalation is not inevitable, however. The region 

has a long tradition of inter-religious harmony. Nonetheless, experience demonstrates that radical Islamist 

ideology can be very difficult to counter once it takes 

root in a society. It is vital for East African governments 

and citizens, therefore, to understand both the external 

and domestic drivers of these extremist ideologies, so 

that the process of radicalization can be interrupted 

before it cements itself within local communities and 

grows increasingly violent. 

Local, smaller-scale attacks have also increased 

in regularity. Bus stations, bars, shops, churches, and 

even moderate mosques and imams have been targeted. 

Some of these attacks have been attributed to the 

Muslim Youth Center (MYC), a Nairobi-based group 

that has lauded Islamic militant activities. MYC, which 

began using the name al Hijra in 2012, has also supported al Shabaab with fundraising and recruitment 

and was allegedly linked to the Westgate attack. In 

Mombasa, violent street clashes between followers of 

militant Islamist clerics and the police have erupted 

at various times. 

In Tanzania, Sheikh Ponda Issa Ponda and his 

group Jumuiya ya Taasisi za Kiislam (“Community 

of Muslim Organizations”) have been charged with 

inciting riots and burning churches in Dar es Salaam. 

Tanzania is also home to the al Shabaab-linked Ansaar 

Muslim Youth Center (AMYC).1 

Q U E S T I O N I N G T H E N A T U R E O F 

A P O S T A S Y I N I S L A M

In 2014, Abdisaid Abdi Ismail published a 

book questioning whether the death penalty for 

apostasy was just in Islam. In doing so he joined a 

growing stream of Muslim scholars rejecting the 

use of Islamic tenets as a political tool to support 

violent movements. The response was dramatic. 

He himself was labeled an apostate, received 

death threats, and was kicked out of hotels in 

Kenya and Uganda. Some East African clergy 

called for his book to be burned. Their protests 

ultimately led to the book being removed from 

Kenyan bookstands—despite more than 80 percent of Kenyans being Christian and just over 10 

percent being Muslim. His experience reveals the 

extent to which moderate voices and open debate 

on the teachings of Islam are being suppressed—

reinforcing more rigid interpretations of Islam in 

East Africa.
3

THE EVOLUTION OF ISLAM IN EAST 

AFRICA

Muslims have lived in East Africa for generations. 

Trade and cultural exchanges between East Africa and 

the Arab World are centuries old. These links predate 

European colonization and retain substantial social and 

economic influence. Precise numbers are not fully known 

but Muslims seem to comprise between 10 and 15 percent 

of the population in Kenya and Uganda and some 35-40 

percent of the Tanzanian population. 

There has never been a uniform Islamic community 

in East Africa. Rituals, celebrations, and theological interpretations vary across the region. Most East African Muslims subscribe to Sunni interpretations of Islam, though 

there are also Shi’ia communities and members of the 

Ahmadiyya sect. Sufism, often described as a “mystical” 

interpretation of Islam that includes the veneration of 

saints, is also common. Some Muslim communities have 

absorbed practices and rituals from traditional African beliefs, including attributing spiritual significance to sacred 

objects. Despite these differences, religious communities 

in the region, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, have 

historically tended to coexist peacefully and overlook 

any differences in theology or religious practice. 

This has changed for some communities in recent 

decades as a result of the growing influence of Salafist 

ideology. A small but growing number of Muslims 

have adopted more exclusivist interpretations of their 

religion, thereby changing their relationship with other 

Muslims, with other faiths, and with the state. The 

radical view of a global struggle for Islam is by no 

means pervasive but it is very much present in a way 

it was not before.5

One channel by which this shift has occurred is 

through education. Lacking other opportunities for 

schooling, Muslim families in marginalized areas rely 

on madrassas, or Islamic schools. Over the last several 

decades, these madrassas have been the beneficiaries 

of growing streams of funding from centers of religious 

education based in Arab countries. In the process, these 

students have been steadily exposed to the cultural 

and religious identity of their sponsors. 

Opportunities for tertiary education have also 

expanded. While college degrees in the West continue to be viewed as most prestigious, following the 

2001 World Trade Center attacks Western countries 

raised immigration hurdles. At the same time, opportunities for study and religious scholarship in the 

Arab world were ramping up. This trend has continued 

and has been accelerating since 2010 (see figure 1). 

Out of practicality, many East African Muslims turned 

to these opportunities and became exposed to more 

fundamentalist versions of Islam. 

Another vehicle through which interpretations 

of Islam in East Africa were shifted was through access to media in the Arab world. The expansion in 

the number and geographic reach of Arab satellite 

TV stations in the 1990s and 2000s brought Arab 

cultural norms into East Africa to a wider audience 

and on a daily basis. This fostered more conservative interpretations of Islam regarding dress, the role 

of women, and differentiated relationships between 

Muslims and non-Muslims. 

Source: UNESCO

F I G U R E 1 . E A S T A F R I C A N S T U D E N T S E N R O L L E D A B R O A D , 2 0 1 0 - 2 0 1 4
4

The traction of such ideas is evident in the expanding popularity and influence of extremist clerics. 

Salafism, which had been a fringe off-shoot of Islam 

in East Africa in the 1990s, has become mainstream 

today. A leading proponent in Kenya was the preacher 

Abou Rogo Mohammed, who for over a decade denigrated non-Muslims, criticized moderate Muslims, and 

instructed followers to forsake interreligious dialogue, to 

abstain from politics, and to boycott elections. In one 

sermon Rogo deemed an attack on a church that killed 

17 people as “just retribution” for Christian encroachment on Muslim lands. Rogo, who was closely affiliated 

with the militant Islamist group al Hijra and other 

conservative Islamic schools, separately proclaimed that 

“in this country we [Muslims] live amongst infidels.”6

Rogo’s ideology has persisted since his death in 2012. 

Tapes and DVDs of his and others’ incendiary sermons 

are still traded throughout the region.

In Tanzania, extremist clerics now aggressively 

challenge the authority of more moderate Islamic organizations and incite protests and clashes with authorities 

under questionable pretenses. Sheikh Ponda has also 

challenged moderate Islamic groups such as Baraza 

Kuu la Waislam Tanzania (Bakwata), a quasi-state 

Islamic body. He and his followers have called for 

boycotts of state censuses and the removal of education officials whom they claim discriminate against 

Islamic schools.7 Ponda’s network, which has been 

active since the 1990s, includes hundreds of mosques 

and dozens of Islamic schools across Tanzania. Extremist interpretations of Islam and notions of a religious 

divide and persecution by the state have crept into 

the sermons of other Tanzanian Islamic preachers as 

well.8 As in Kenya, such rhetoric has come with an 

uptick in attacks, including against foreigners and 

Christian leaders.9 

EXTERNAL INFLUENCES

A major contributing factor to East Africa’s shift 

toward extremist Islam is the influence of well-funded 

foreign Islamist groups. This includes so-called Wahhabi organizations whose sponsorship of educational 

and religious activities has been fueled by the wealth 

of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other oil-rich Gulf. Unlike 

East Africa’s historical tradition of infusing religious 

customs with local traditions, Wahhabism is an extremely conservative interpretation of the Koran. It 

forbids most aspects of modern education, requires 

strict dress codes, abides by ancient traditions of social 

relations, and disregards many basic human rights, 

particularly for women. While Wahhabism does not 

on principle denounce other faiths, many Wahhabi 

preachers do not tolerate other viewpoints. Even other 

interpretations of Islam, such as Sufism, are considered 

heretical and offensive to Wahhabis.10 In effect, the 

version of Islam that is being imported to East Africa 

is rooted within a particular Arab cultural identity.11

This is very different from the Islamic traditions that 

have evolved in other Muslim countries like Malaysia 

or Indonesia.

Foreign-sponsored East African Muslim groups have 

had a presence in East Africa since the mid-20th century, 

but have expanded significantly since the 1970s.12 One 

estimate pegged funding from Saudi Arabia at $1 million per year on Islamic institutions in Zanzibar alone.13

The aims of the foreign funding are diffuse, going to 

social centers, madrassas, primary, secondary, and tertiary 

educational institutions, and to humanitarian and social 

programs. Many investments are large and multiyear. 

The Kuwait-based Africa Muslims Agency is a prime 

example.14 It has operations across the continent, including in Kenya, Malawi, Madagascar, Uganda, and 

Zimbabwe. One such operation benefits from a 33-year 

agreement it signed in 1998 with a Saudi financier and 

the Zanzibari government to operate a university that 

has so far produced over 1,200 graduates.15 

Not all beneficiaries of these funds are strictly Wahhabi or conservative to begin with. Some schools, social 

centers, and humanitarian outreach programs mix Wahhabi materials and programs with secular activities to 

reach a broader audience. In Kenya, the Saudi government has for decades provided financial support and 

scholarships to the Kisauni College of Islamic Studies 

in Mombasa, where Abou Rogo Mohammed studied.16 

Likely dozens and potentially hundreds of madrassas and 

primary and secondary schools in Kenya have been built 

and underwritten in a similar manner. 

Some activities supported by these foreign Islamic 

groups are laudable. They have sponsored medical care 

and provided aid during disasters, similar to other faithbased and secular organizations. However, these humanitarian activities are not entirely benign, since many of 

these Islamic groups will integrate proselytization into all 

their activities or will require that participants abide by 

strict, conservative customs to access funds or benefits.17

Some groups do have links to militant Islamist 

organizations. The Saudi-funded Al Haramain Islamic 
5

Foundation, for example, which had a large presence 

in refugee camps and supported many madrassas in East 

Africa, including some linked to AMYC, was closed and 

expelled from Kenya and Tanzania for such links.18 The 

Revival of Islamic Heritage Society, a Kuwaiti nongovernmental organization, was likewise found to have been 

providing financial and material support to al Qaedalinked organizations, including al Shabaab’s predecessor, 

Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI). Notably, AIAI’s Somali 

leaders were largely educated in the Middle East.19

Whether universities or bare-bones madrassas, 

educational institutions have obvious strategic value 

in shaping the beliefs of youth. Some of these schools 

do provide valuable instruction in math, sciences, and 

more. However, they also inculcate a rigid interpretation 

of Islam that is exclusionary and emphasizes da’wa, or 

the further proselytization of this brand of Islam. The 

curriculum also sometimes follows a principle called 

“Islamization of knowledge” developed in an effort to 

reconcile fundamentalist Islamic ethics into the disciplines of law, banking, and finance, among others. Over 

time, students absorb very definitive ideas of what is 

and what is not Islamic and who is and who is not a 

Muslim—and are encouraged to actively advance these 

same views.20 This is a recipe for confrontation, even 

if the programs that initially promoted such views did 

not advocate violence. 

This growing influence of extremist Islam in East 

Africa has mostly been limited to particular neighborhoods, cities, or regions. But those effects have been 

cumulative and compounding, leading an increasing 

number of groups in the region to adopt progressively 

more aggressive and confrontational missions. The growth 

of networks that may be sympathetic to violent extremism lays the groundwork for the local collaboration that 

has been seen or suspected in deadly al Shabaab attacks 

in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.

SOCIOECONOMIC GRIEVANCES

While the extremist Islamist ideology taking hold 

in East Africa is imported from elsewhere, exacerbating 

factors play a role in how meaningfully such ideology 

resonates upon exposure. For instance, despite terrorists 

exhibiting varying levels of wealth, education, zealousness, and experience, socioeconomic marginalization fuels 

the credibility and dispersal of extremist narratives. In 

East Africa, perceptions of unequal socioeconomic status 

and some ill-advised state actions have nudged Muslims 

toward more conservative tendencies and enabled “us 

versus them” narratives to resonate. 

East African Muslims do have legitimate grievances. 

Youth unemployment in Kenya’s Muslim-dominated 

Coast and North Eastern Provinces are 40-50 percent 

higher than the national average.21 Rates of primary and 

secondary school completion and attendance, meanwhile, tend to be lower in Muslim counties, probably 

because there are fewer schools and teachers per student 

in the two coastal provinces than in other parts of Kenya. 

Similar patterns can be seen in Tanzania. The youth 

unemployment rate in the overwhelmingly Muslim island 

of Zanzibar has been about 17 percent in recent years,22

almost twice the national average of 9 percent.23 Also, 

the primarily Muslim coastal areas often have poorly 

defined property rights, hindering economic opportunities 

and paving the way for occasional land seizures by the 

government or large, non-local businesses.

Public opinion surveys depict a less divisive portrait 

at national levels. One survey of Kenyans showed that 

about half of Muslim respondents perceived their living 

conditions as the same or better than others. In comparison, about two-thirds of Christian respondents felt 

the same way. Still, this reflects Muslim sentiment that 

roughly matches the rest of Kenyan society—a perspective that has persisted for a number of years according to 

earlier survey rounds in 2008 and 2011.24 In Tanzania, 

53 percent of Muslims surveyed perceived their living 

conditions as the same or better than other Tanzanians. 

Christians answered identically. Such results likely reflect 

the long history of harmonious interfaith relations in 

the region and the continuing resilience of such bonds 

when viewed at a nationwide level. 

The challenge of Islamic extremism is often a more 

local phenomenon. Perceptions of religious discrimina-

“the version of Islam that is being 

imported to East Africa is rooted 

within a particular Arab cultural 

identity”

“This growing influence of extremist 

Islam in East Africa has mostly been 

limited to particular neighborhoods 

... but those effects have been 

cumulative and compounding”
6

tion are higher in particular areas where divisive and 

exclusionary Islamic narratives have been present and 

circulating longer, such as Mombasa, Zanzibar, Tanga, 

and sections of Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. Accordingly, East African Muslims who subscribe to extremist 

interpretations of Islam remain a small (though vocal) 

minority. Yet the growth of this minority reflects and 

perpetuates a steady erosion of East African resilience 

in the face of the extremist Islamist ideology that has 

been coursing the region.

Claims that Muslims are deliberately denied economic, educational, and other opportunities relative to 

their non-Muslim compatriots have become common 

within the region’s Muslim communities, moderate and 

extremist alike.25 For many Muslims, particularly youth, 

such inequality validates the divisive messages of fundamentalist Islamic centers, madrassas, and mosques. 

GOVERNMENT ACTIONS THAT ALIENATE

East African governments have pursued legal action against various Muslim leaders in recent years in an 

attempt to isolate suspected extremists. Unfortunately, 

many of these judicial efforts have failed, further reinforcing a sense that the government is unfairly persecuting 

Muslims. For instance, when Sheikh Ponda was tried 

for inciting riots in Tanzania in October 2012, poorly 

framed charges and a weak investigation led only to 

a short, suspended sentence. Ponda was later charged 

again with inciting Muslims in Zanzibar and Morogoro 

to strike and riot. Yet, after 2 years of litigation he was 

acquitted for lack of evidence. Even then, prosecutors 

announced their intent to raise the twice-lost case to 

Tanzania’s High Court. In Kenya, Sheikh Mohammed 

Dor was charged with incitement after allegations that he 

intended to fund a coastal separatist group. Prosecutors 

soon altered the charges, a judge then postponed the 

trial, and eventually the state dropped its case entirely. 

Prominent Muslim leaders in Kenya and Tanzania have also been detained by security agents without 

charge. Some have been mysteriously assassinated. Allegations of police-sponsored death squads that target 

radical Muslim leaders have been circulating widely for 

years. One incident attributed to such a squad is the 

death of Abou Mohammed Rogo, who was killed in 

a drive-by shooting in Mombasa in August 2012. In 

his vehicle were his father and daughter as well as his 

wife, who was injured. A little over a year later and just 

weeks after the Westgate mall attack in Nairobi, Rogo’s 

successor Sheikh Ibrahim Ismail and three others were 

killed in another drive-by shooting in October 2013. 

Ismail’s successor, Sheikh Abubakar Shariff, known as 

Makaburi, was killed in April 2014, just 2 days after the 

police’s anti-terror unit linked him to al Hijra attacks 

in Mombasa the previous month.

Muslims for Human Rights, a Kenyan advocacy 

group, has claimed that police and prosecutors may be 

turning to extrajudicial measures due to their inability to 

conduct proper investigations or prosecutions of suspected 

Islamic extremists. That narrative has only strengthened 

over time. Human Rights Watch reported that, from 2014 

to 2016, Kenyan security forces “forcibly disappeared” 

at least 34 people during counterterrorism operations 

in Nairobi and the northeast, and in at least 11 cases 

dead bodies were found of people who had recently been 

arrested by government authorities. One of Kenya’s top 

investigative journalists has claimed that the numbers 

were even higher, saying that he has uncovered 1,500 

extrajudicial killings of citizens by the police since 2009.26

Similar charges have unfolded in Tanzania. In 

October 2012, Sheikh Farid Hadi Ahmed, the head 

of the Uamsho Islamic group, which advocates for an 

autonomous Zanzibar under Islamic law, went missing. 

Uamsho leaders called for the police to investigate. Supporters launched demonstrations, some deadly. Ahmed 

reappeared after 4 days and claimed that he had been 

abducted by police officers. He was promptly arrested by 

police and held without bail for months under a provision of the National Security Act. A judge ultimately 

dismissed several district-level charges against Ahmed 

since prosecutors failed to furnish any evidence against 

him. However, charges of incitement and conspiratorial involvement in his own kidnapping remained in 

place. Prosecutors then blocked Ahmed’s ability to file 

for bail or even to enter a plea. After taking his case to 

Tanzania’s High Court, Ahmed was eventually granted 

bail in 2014 after 17 months in jail. Six months later, 

he was rearrested on terrorism charges. 

Beyond the specifics of this or other cases, the lack 

of transparency and pattern of haphazard arrests, bail 

policies, and prosecutions have made many Muslims 

suspicious of political leaders and state institutions. Combined with a sense that they have been economically 

marginalized, many are increasingly disinclined to work 

through existing governance structures in order to right 

perceived wrongs. As a result, extremist and exclusivist 

Islamic narratives can seem more compelling. 
7

REVERSING THE SPREAD OF EXTREMISM

This review has shown that the drivers of Islamist 

extremism in East Africa are both external and internal. 

A framework for redressing this threat, therefore, will 

require a series of actions on both levels. 

Counter external influences and emphasize domestic traditions of tolerance. Destabilizing, exclusivist 

Islamist narratives—a relatively recent import—have 

begun to erode a long history of tolerance in East Africa. 

Governments and civil society groups need to counter 

these by capitalizing on and strengthening the region’s 

much longer history of religious diversity and tolerance. 

This will take genuine and patient engagement on behalf 

of political leaders as well as indirect efforts to support 

more interreligious dialogue that yields constructive and 

tangible benefits for participants. 

As part of reinforcing indigenous, tolerant traditions, 

governments will have to address funding by foreign, 

conservative Islamic entities. This will require adopting 

transparent and consistent means to regulate the funding sources, sectarian rhetoric, and militant leanings of 

religious groups. Groups that promote violence or open 

confrontation should clearly be banned and prosecuted. 

However, blanket criminalization of conservative Islamic groups should be avoided as this will likely spur 

more support for violent movements. Rather, a policy 

of tolerance with a clear prohibition against violence 

and divisiveness should be pursued. 

Improve political inclusion of Muslim communities. Political leaders should acknowledge that Muslims 

have some legitimate claims of marginalization, whether 

by design or neglect. This alone will send a powerful 

message to Muslim constituencies and may spark a sense 

of trust in collaboration and reform. Leaders should also 

expand engagement with Muslim communities, including those that may have experienced some radicalization 

but have not advocated violence.

When security improved in Kenya’s northeast in 

the latter half of 2015 it was credited to the regional 

coordinator Mohamud Ali Saleh, a former ambassador to 

Saudi Arabia who had been named to the post after the 

Garissa University attack. The subsequent reduction in 

terrorism observed in this region stemmed not from more 

robust enforcement, but rather as a result of Saleh’s skills 

as an interlocutor between the government and local 

communities, which resulted in improved community 

policing and intelligence tip-offs. 

Invest in citizens economically and institutionally. 

Socioeconomic inequalities must be transparently addressed so they are minimized as legitimate grievances. 

Programs should target inequality of education, income, 

and opportunity, regardless of whether the root cause 

is truly religious discrimination or in fact a symptom of 

regional, urban, or rural dynamics. Programs could aim 

to boost employment levels in Muslim-majority areas. 

Strengthening and clarifying property codes and land 

rights would also help. Muslims in coastal East Africa who 

hold tenuous land rights to their homes and businesses 

fear exploitation and expropriation by the government 

or large businesses. Strengthened property rights may 

ease religious tensions and allow for the growth and 

political engagement of a successful Muslim middle class. 

Education is also key. Muslim-dominated regions 

of East Africa lag behind in the number and quality of 

schools and teacher-to-student ratios. Politically, even 

small, quick improvements to existing facilities in these 

regions could build goodwill. Longer term, more Muslim youth should be targeted for scholarships to balance 

the effects from external ideological influences. Such 

educational opportunities will also enable them to fill 

subsequent leadership roles in the broader society, facilitating greater integration. 

Practice due process. Governments must also 

understand that perceptions matter when countering 

radical ideology. Individuals who stir others to violence 

are certainly a threat to stability. However, if the public 

does not believe that legal processes are being followed, 

then police actions can further fuel support for radicals 

and their messages. Adhering to the law reinforces its 

value in the minds (and actions) of these marginalized 

communities, both as a source of protection and as a 

demarcation of illegality.

Governments should thus avoid expansive legal 

actions that have a weak basis or are likely to fail in 

court. Instead, they should focus on improving law 

enforcement procedures, evidence collection, and 

building prosecutorial capacity. When authorities do 

not have sufficient grounds to prosecute incendiary 

Muslim leaders or entities, arrests will only be perceived as harassment and counterproductively burnish 

extremists’ claims of victimization. 

“The situation calls for rebuilding 

and cultivating East African resilience 

in the face of radical messages and 

violent behavior”
8

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) supports United States 

foreign and security policies by strengthening the strategic capacity 

of African states to identify and resolve security challenges in ways 

that promote civil-military cooperation, respect for democratic 

values, and safeguard human rights. Toward these aims, ACSS is 

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international military and civilian leaders and articulating African 

perspectives to U.S. policymakers.

The Africa Security Briefs series presents research and analysis 

by ACSS experts and outside scholars with the aim of advancing 

understanding of African security issues. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of ACSS, 

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AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

http://www.africacenter.org

AFRICA CENTER FOR 

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Extrajudicial police action must also stop immediately. The government should instead support transparent, credible investigations by independent experts to 

evaluate claims that Islamic leaders were killed by anyone 

connected to the state or political leadership. Making 

these findings public may rebuild some element of trust 

in the government. 

In aggregate, these efforts should not myopically 

focus on particular individuals who may come and go 

irrespective of the wider resonance of their views. Instead, they must delegitimize the ideology of violent 

extremism itself.

NOTES

1 “Al Shabaab in Somalia still a threat to peace in spite of decline – UN,” defenceWeb, August 14, 2012. 

2 Thomson Reuters, “Uganda arrests 19 tied to suspected terror 

attack plot,” CBC News, September 14, 2014.

3 Ryan Cummings, “Al-Shabaab and the Exploitation of Kenya’s 

Religious Divide,” IPI Global Observatory, December 2014. 

4 Anneli Botha, “Radicalisation in Kenya: Recruitment to 

al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council,” ISS Paper 265, 

September 2014. 

5 Terje Østebø, “Islamic Militancy in Africa,” Africa Security 

Brief No. 23 (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, November 2012), 4. 

Chanfi Ahmed, “Networks of Islamic NGOs in Sub-Saharan Africa: 

Bilal Muslim Mission, African Muslim Agency (Direct Aid), and alHaramayn,” Journal of East African Studies 3, no. 3 (November 2009), 

426-437. Ioannis Gatsiounis, “After Al-Shabaab,” Current Trends in 

Islamist Ideology 14 (December 2012).

6 David Ochami, “How fiery cleric Rogo developed, propagated 

extremism,” The Standard, September 2, 2012.

7 Anne Robi, “Muslim Clerics Call for New Census Team,” 

Tanzania Daily News, June 4, 2012.

8 Ahmed, 430-431. “Muslim clerics warned against hate sermons,” The Citizen, January 7, 2013.

9 Andre LeSage, The Rising Terrorist Threat in Tanzania: Domestic 

Islamist Militancy and Regional Threats, Strategic Forum No. 288 

(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, September 2014). 

10 “Interview: Vali Nasr,” PBS “Frontline” Web site, available 

at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saudi/interviews/

nasr.html>.

11 Ben Hubbard, “A Saudi Morals Enforcer Called for a More 

Liberal Islam. Then the Death Threats Began,” The New York Times, 

July 10, 2016.

12 Gatsiounis, 74.

13 Katrina Manson, “Extremism on the rise in Zanzibar,” 

Financial Times, December 28, 2012.

14 Ahmed, 427.

15 “Africa Muslim Agency Sets Up College in Zanzibar,” 

Panafrican News Agency, July 26, 1998.

16 Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation, Africa Briefing No. 85 

(Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, January 2012), 5, 11.

17 Ahmed, 434-435. 

18 Patrick Mayoyo, “Kenya Muslims Say No to US School 

Funds,” The East African, February 23, 2004. “Treasury Announces 

Joint Action with Saudi Arabia Against Four Branches of Al-Haramain 

In The Fight Against Terrorist Financing,” U.S. Department of the 

Treasury press release, January 22, 2004.

19 “Kuwaiti Charity Designated for Bankrolling al Qaida 

Network,” U.S. Department of the Treasury press release, June 13, 

2008.

20 Joseph Krauss and Megan Lindow, “Islamic Universities 

Spread through Africa,” Chronicle of Higher Education 52, no. 44 (July 

2007), 33-37.

21 Kenya’s Youth Employment Challenge, UNDP Discussion Paper 

(New York: United Nations Development Programme, January 2013), 

64.

22 Issa Yussuf, “Zanzibar Pushes to Curb Unemployment,” 

Tanzania Daily News, November 24, 2014. 

23 Tanzania Mainland Integrated Labour Force Survey 2014: 

Analytical Report, Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics (2015), 83.

24 See “Economy: Personal Economic Conditions: Your living 

conditions vs. others,” under Afrobarometer Round 5 (2010-2012): 

Kenya and Afrobarometer Round 4 (2008-2009): Kenya, Afrobarometer: 

Online Analysis. 

25 Liat Shetret, Matthew Schwartz, and Danielle Cotter, 

Mapping Perceptions of Violent Extremism: Pilot Study of Community 

Attitudes in Kenya and Somaliland (New York: Center on Global 

Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2013).

26 Mohammed Ali and Seamus Mirodan, “Killing Kenya: People 

& Power investigates allegations that Kenya’s police are involved in 

extra judicial killings,” Al Jazeera, September 23, 2015.