alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. ss.1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Solely for the
purposes of complying with, and the extent required by 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned certifies, in his capacity as the Chief Executive Officer of BlastGard International,
Inc., that, to his knowledge, the Quarterly Report of the company on Form 10-QSB for the period ended June 30, 2004, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the
information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the companys financial condition and results of operations.



|                                        
|----------------------------------------
|August 10, 2006                         
|                                        
|/s/ James F. Gordon                     
|James F. Gordon, Chief Executive Officer
NUMBER 13-19-00586-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG 

____________________________________________________________

VICTOR MANUEL QUIJANO, Appellant,

v.

MARIA EUGENIA AMAYA, Appellee.

____________________________________________________________

On appeal from the 138th District Court

of Cameron County, Texas.

____________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Benavides, Hinojosa, and Tijerina

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Tijerina

Appellant, Victor Manuel Quijano, appealed a judgment entered by the 138th 

District Court of Cameron County, Texas. On November 15, 2019, and on December 4, 

2019, the Clerk of this Court notified appellant, in accordance with Texas Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 42.3(c), that it would dismiss this appeal unless the $205.00 filing 
2

fee was paid. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(c). Appellant has neither responded to the 

notice from the Clerk nor paid the $205.00 filing fee. See TEX. R. APP. P. 5, 12.1(b).

The Court, having considered the documents on file and appellant’s failure to pay 

the filing fee, is of the opinion that the appeal should be dismissed. See id. 42.3(b),(c). 

Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED for want of prosecution.

JAIME TIJERINA,

Justice

Delivered and filed the 

16th day of January, 2020.
#### Charles A. Morse and Another v. Carolyn T. Kelsey.

Motion denied, with ten dollars costs. Present — Ingraham, P. J., McLaughlin, Laughlin, Clarke and Scott, JJ.
(No. 78-CC-0995

#### Travis L. Vannote, Claimant, *v.*State of Illinois, Respondent.

*Order filed June 28, 1978.*

Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In *Bargas v. State, 32*Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of *Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1,*we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was *297damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in *Bargas v. State, supra,*and *Doubling v. State, supra,*the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.
CS 314937-Q 04/30/2020

cdc.gov/coronavirus

Mambo unayopaswa kujua kuhusu COVID-19 

ili kujilinda mwenyewe na wengineo

Fahamu kuihusu COVID-19

• Virusi vya Corona (COVID-19) ni ugonjwa 

unaosababishwa na virusi ambavyo vinaweza 

kuenea kutoka kwa mtu mmoja hadi kwa 

mwingine.

• Virusi ambavyo husababishwa COVID-19 ni virusi 

vipya ambavyo vimeenea kote ulimwenguni. 

• Dalili za COVID-19 zinaweza kuwa tofauti kuanzia 

tulivu (au bila dalili) hadi kwa kuwa mgonjwa 

vibaya kabisa.

Fahamu jinsi COVID-19 husambazwa

• Unaweza kuambukizwa kwa kutangamana 

kwa karibu (kama futi 6 au upana wa mikono 

miwili) na mtu aliye na COVID-19. COVID-19 kwa 

kimsingi husambazwa kutoka kwa mtu mmoja 

hadi kwa mwingine.

• Unaweza kuambukizwa kutoka kwa vitone 

vidogo vya hewa ya kupumua pale ambapo mtu 

aliyeambukizwa amekohoa, kupiga chafya, au 

kuongea.

• Pia unaweza kuipata kwa kushika sakafu au kifaa 

ambacho kina virusi hivyo, na kisha kushika 

mdomo wako, mapua au macho.

Jilinde mwenyewe na wengineo 

kutokana na COVID-19

• Kwa sasa hakuna chanjo ya kinga dhidi ya 

COVID-19. Njia bora zaidi ya kujilinda ni 

kutojiweka wazi kwa virusi hivi vinavyosababisha 

COVID-19.

• Kaa nyumbani kadri ziadi iwezekanavyo na 

uepuke utangamano wa karibu na watu 

wengine.

• Vaa kitambaa cha usoni ambacho kinafunika 

mapua na mdomo wako katika maeneo ya 

umma.

• Safisha na uue viini kwenye sakafu zinazoguswa 

mara kwa mara.

• Osha mikono yako mara kwa mara kwa sabuni na 

maji kwa angalau sekunde 20, au tumia sanitaiza 

ya mikono yenye alcohol ambayo ina angalau 

asilimia 60 ya alcohol.

milk

Zingatia Kukaa mbali 

na wengine

• Fanya ununuzi wa mboga na 

dawa, kuona daktari, na kufanya 

shughuli za kibenki mtandaoni 

inapowezekana.

• Ikiwa ni lazima ujifikishe huko 

wewe kibinafsi, kaa angalau futi 

6 mbali na wengine na uue viini 

kwenye vifaa ambavyo ni lazima 

uvishike.

• Pokea bidhaa za kuagiza 

na vyakula vya kuagiza, na 

upunguze utangamano 

wako na wengineo kwa kadri 

iwezekanavyo. 

Zuia kusambaa kwa COVID-19 

ikiwa uko mgonjwa

• Kaa nyumbani ikiwa uko 

mgonjwa, isipokuwa iwe 

unaendea huduma ya matibabu.

• Epuka kutumia usafiri za umma, 

kushiriki usafiri, au teksi.

• Jitenge na watu wengine na 

wanyama walio nyumbani 

kwako. 

• Hakuna matibabu mahususi 

ya COVID-19, lakini unaweza 

kutafuta uuguzi wa kimatibabu ili 

kusaidia kupunguza dalili zako.

• Ikiwa unahitaji msaada wa 

kimatibabu, piga simu kabla.

Fahamu hatari zako za

kuwa mgonjwa vibaya zaidi

• Kila mtu yuko katika hatari ya

kupata COVID-19.

• Watu wazima waliokomaa na 

watu wa umri wowote ambao 

wana hali zingine za kimatibabu 

zinazowasumbua huenda 

wakawa katika hatari kubwa zaidi 

ya kuzidiwa na ugonjwa huu 

vibaya zaidi.
#### Frederick W. Krause *v.*Henry Curtis.

Pleading and *evidence—idhat is admitted by pleadings.*A plea in an action of replevin, setting up property in a third person and avowing for rent from him, admits the taking of the goods, and the only burden resting upon the plaintiff is to prove the goods are his, and not the property of such third person.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Henry Booth, Judge, presiding.

Mr. Thomas Shirley, for the appellant.

Mr. Stephen F. Brown, for the appellee.

Mr. Justice Breese

delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was replevin, in the Cook circuit court, in the *oepit*and *detinet,*for certain articles of furniture, with a count in trover for the same, claimed as the property of the plaintiff.

The pleas denied the taking and detaining, and set up property in Beinl, Boemer & Co., and avowing for rent due from them to Krause, one of the defendants, and as to the count in trover, not guilty.

Issues were made up on these pleas, and a verdict for plaintiff, on which the court rendered judgment, having denied a motion for a new trial. To reverse this judgment Krause appeals.

Some objections are raised to the action of the court in granting leave to appellee to file a declaration *de*novo, in allowing proceedings to be had thereon, and in ruling defendants to plead. All these were so much within the discretionary power of the court, we are not disposed to interfere with its exercise, under the circumstances.

It is objected by appellant, there was no proof the goods were taken on a distress warrant as the goods of Beinl, Boemer *451& Go., issued at tlie instance of appellant. These facts are alleged in appellants’ avowry, and stand admitted. ¡No proof is necessary of an admitted fact. On this admission, the only burden resting on appellee was to prove the goods were his property, and not the property of Beinl, Boemer *&*Co.

"Was it not true that Hayes held the warrant and acted on it in taking the goods by direction of Krause, it was quite easy to establish it by Krause himself, who was a competent witness. Curtis testified that Krause sold these goods at auction on a distress warrant.

We think the proof sufficient to sustain the verdict, and perceive no error in giving or refusing instructions. The judgment is affirmed.

*Judgment affirmed.*
#### Caroline F. Rupp, by Frederick Boyd Stevenson, Her Guardian ad Litem, Respondent, v. Richard C. Rupp, Appellant.

Motion denied, with ten dollars costs. Present —Jenks, P. J. Carr, Rich, Stapleton and Putnam, JJ.
### §812. Public-service licensee; regulations by State or by commission as to service, rates, charges, etc.

As a condition of the license, every licensee under this chapter which is a public-service corporation, or a person, association, or corporation owning or operating any project and developing, transmitting, or distributing power for sale or use in public service, shall abide by such reasonable regulation of the services to be rendered to customers or consumers of power, and of rates and charges of payment therefor, as may from time to time be prescribed by any duly constituted agency of the State in which the service is rendered or the rate charged. That in case of the development, transmission, or distribution, or use in public service of power by any licensee under this chapter or by its customer engaged in public service within a State which has not authorized and empowered a commission or other agency or agencies within said State to regulate and control the services to be rendered by such licensee or by its customer engaged in public service, or the rates and charges of payment therefor, or the amount or character of securities to be issued by any of said parties, it is agreed as a condition of such license that jurisdiction is conferred upon the commission, upon complaint of any person aggrieved or upon its own initiative, to exercise such regulation and control until such time as the State shall have provided a commission or other authority for such regulation and control: Provided, That the jurisdiction of the commission shall cease and determine as to each specific matter of regulation and control prescribed in this section as soon as the State shall have provided a commission or other authority for the regulation and control of that specific matter.

(June 10, 1920, ch. 285, pt. I, §19, 41 Stat. 1073; renumbered pt. I, Aug. 26, 1935, ch. 687, title II, §212, 49 Stat. 847.)
1... See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 2-08-290-CR

NO. 2-08-291-CR

NO. 2-08-292-CR

MCCLENDON MOODY APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

------------

FROM THE 213TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

------------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

------------

Appellant McClendon Moody entered open pleas of guilty to three

offenses—unauthorized use of a vehicle, burglary of a building, and possession

of four grams or more but less than 200 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver,

along with a plea of true to the deadly weapon allegation on the cocaine
2... 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967).

2

charge. He also signed judicial confessions to the three offenses as charged.

The trial court accepted Appellant’s pleas and convicted him of the three

offenses. The trial court also ordered a presentence investigation report (PSI).

After judicially noticing and reviewing the PSI and hearing the testimony of

Appellant, his mother, and his girlfriend of eleven years, the trial court

sentenced Appellant to two years’ confinement in a state jail facility for

unauthorized use of a vehicle and burglary of a building and fifteen years’

confinement in prison for the possession with intent to deliver offense, with all

the sentences to run concurrently. 

Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to

withdraw as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. In the brief, counsel

avers that, in his professional opinion, these appeals are frivolous. Counsel’s

brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California2 by presenting

a professional evaluation of the records demonstrating why there are no

arguable grounds for relief. Although Appellant was given an opportunity to file

a pro se brief, he has not done so.

After an appellant’s court-appointed counsel files a motion to withdraw

on the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of
3... See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991);

Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no

pet.).

4... See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351

(1988).

5... See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App.

2005).

3

Anders, this court is obligated to undertake an independent examination of the

record.3 Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

4

We have carefully reviewed counsel’s brief and the records. We agree

with counsel that these appeals are wholly frivolous and without merit; we find

nothing else in the records that arguably might support any appeal.5

Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s

judgments. 

PER CURIAM

PANEL: DAUPHINOT, MCCOY, and MEIER, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: September 17, 2009
----

Communication from the French Government concerning Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons (1)

(Notice regarding an application for an exclusive licence to prospect for oil and gas, designated ‘Permis de Mairy’)

(2006/C 56/05)

(Text with EEA relevance)

On 25 November 2005, Lundin International, a company with its registered office at Maclaunay, F-51210 Montmirail, and Madison Energy France S.C.S, a company with its registered office at 13/15 boulevard de la Madeleine, F-75001 Paris, jointly and severally applied for an exclusive five-year licence, designated ‘Permis de Mairy’, to prospect for oil and gas in an area covering some 444 km2 in the department of Marne.

The perimeter of the area covered by this licence is made up of the meridian and parallel arcs successively joining the points defined below by their geographical coordinates, the original meridian being that of Paris.

Submission of applications

The initial applicant and competing applicants must prove that they comply with the requirements for obtaining the licence, as specified in Articles 3, 4 and 5 of Decree No 95-427 of 19 April 1995, as amended, concerning mining rights.

Interested companies may, within ninety days of the publication of this notice, submit a competing application in accordance with the procedure summarised in the ‘Notice regarding the granting of mining rights for hydrocarbons in France’ published in Official Journal of the European Communities C 374 of 30.12.1994, p. 11, and established by Decree No 95-427 of 19 April 1995, as amended, concerning mining rights (Journal officiel de la République française, 22 April 1995).

Competing applications must be sent to the Minister responsible for mines at the address below. Decisions on the initial application and competing applications will be taken within two years of the date on which the French authorities received the initial application, i.e. by 30 June 2007 at the latest.

Conditions and requirements regarding performance of the activity and cessation thereof

Applicants are referred to Articles 79 and 79.1 of the Mining Code and to Decree No 95-696 of 9 May 1995, as amended, on the start of mining operations and the mining regulations (Journal officiel de la République française, 11 May 1995).

Further information can be obtained from the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Finance and Industry (Directorate-General for Energy and Raw Materials, Directorate for Energy and Mineral Resources, Bureau of Mining Legislation), 61, boulevard Vincent Auriol, Télédoc 133, F-75703 Paris Cedex 13, France, (telephone: (33) 144 97 23 02, fax: (33) 144 97 05 70).

The abovementioned laws and regulations can be consulted at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr

----

(1)OJ L 164, 30.6.1994, p. 3.

----
# C_2016208EN.01000101.xml

| 10.6.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 208/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.6.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 208/1

---

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

2013-2014 SESSION

Sittings of 21 to 24 October 2013

The Minutes of this session have been published in OJ C 32 E, 4.2.2014.

The Minutes of this session have been published in OJ C 32 E, 4.2.2014.

TEXTS ADOPTED

---
# EXHIBIT 10.57

# AMENDMENT TO HIBERNIA
CORPORATION 
LONG-TERM INCENTIVE
PLAN

THIS
AMENDMENT (the Amendment) to the Hibernia Corporation Long-Term Incentive Plan
(the Plan) is made as of the 26th day of February 2003.

# RECITALS

WHEREAS,
Hibernia Corporation, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of
Louisiana (the Company), maintains the Hibernia Corporation Long-Term
Incentive Plan, which Plan was first approved by the shareholders of the Company on
September 23, 1992; and

WHEREAS,
on April 29, 1997, the shareholders of the Company approved an amendment to the Plan
empowering the Board of Directors of the Company to amend the terms of the Plan, from time
to time, in its discretion; and

WHEREAS,
in accordance with the authority granted to the Board of Directors of the Company, the
Board (or a committee thereof) has reviewed the definition of Fair Market
Value contained in the Plan and determined that to reduce certain administrative
burdens in connection with the operation of the Plan, the definition should be revised to
relate to an opening sales price rather than to an average of the high and low sales
prices on that date of determination; and

WHEREAS,
on February 26, 2003, the Board of Directors approved an amendment to the Plan to provide
that the Fair Market Value of a Share (as defined in the Plan) as of a
specified date means the opening sales price of a share of Common Stock on such date.

NOW,
THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises set forth above, and effective as of the date
first above written, the Plan shall be and hereby is amended as follows:

# PLAN AMENDMENT

1.       
          Section 2(k) of the Plan is hereby amended by deleting the current Section 2(k)
          and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

| | Fair
Market Value of a Share as of a specified date means the opening sales price of a
share of Common Stock as reported on the New York Stock Exchange Composite Transactions
reporting system on that date or, if no sales occurred on that date, on the immediately
preceding date on which there were such sales.
| | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2.       
          On and after the date hereof, each reference in the Plan to this
          Plan, hereunder, herein or words of like import
          shall mean and be a reference to the Plan as amended hereby.

IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the Board of Directors has caused this Amendment to be executed as of the
month, day and year first above written.



HIBERNIA CORPORATION




By: /s/ J. Herbert Boydstun
J. Herbert Boydstun
President and Chief Executive Officer
#### William M. Torrance, Appellant, v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, Appellee.

Gen. No. 15,410.

*Verdicts—when not disturbed as against the evidence.*A verdict will not be set aside on review as against the evidence unless clearly and manifestly against its weight.

Assumpsit. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook- county; the Hon. Beet M. Smith, Judge, presiding.

Heard in this court at the March term, 1909.

Affirmed.

Opinion filed November 28, 1910.

O. R. Barnett and P. H. Truman, for appellant.

Calhoun, Lyford & Sheean and V. W. Foster, for appellee; John G. Drennan and E. W. Rawlins, of counsel.

Mr. Justice Holdom

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an action for alleged breach of a contract of employment between plaintiff, a civil engineer, and the defendant railroad company, the duration of which, plaintiff claims, was two years. After entering upon the employment the defendant, as plaintiff claims, in *41violation of the terras of the contract and before its expiration by efflux of time, discharged him. For the time which plaintiff actually worked for defendant he was paid at the contract rate less $25, for which amount plaintiff on a trial before the court had judgment and now prosecutes this appeal because the judgment, he claims, should have been for $450.

The only question raised for our decision is whether the evidence establishes plaintiff’s contention that the term of his contract of employment was for the period of two years. ■

Without reciting all the documents offered, but treating them all as in the record, regardless of the rulings of the trial judge touching their materiality, suffice it to say that taking them as a whole they fail to establish the employment of plaintiff for any definite time. The only reference in the correspondence to time is in the letter of Bainbridge to plaintiff of April 6, 1903, in which the writer says: “I am looking for a man to take charge of an important bridge during construction in the field, a job that will last two years.” We think that what is intended by the words *“a*job that will last two years,” taking the precedent reference, with which it must be read, it being in the same sentence, is, by interpretation, the time contemplated to be taken in constructing the bridge, and not the duration of the contemplated employment of plaintiff.

Plaintiff made a written application to defendant for employment, in which nothing was said about the duration of the employment. If this application was accepted it constituted the contract. If, as plaintiff contends, it was not accepted and the contract was by correspondence between Bamberg and plaintiff, confirmed by Parkhurst, defendant’s engineer of bridges and buildings, that correspondence does not make a contract.

The judgment of the Superior Court being without error is affirmed.

*Affirmed.*
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Before the

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Washington, D.C. 20549

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS RULINGS

Release No. 6816/February 22, 2021

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING

File No. 3-20220

In the Matter of :

:

ROSEDALE ASSET MANAGEMENT, LLC, f/k/a : ORDER

PRINCETON ADVISORY WEALTH MANAGEMENT, LLC : 

The Securities and Exchange Commission instituted this proceeding with an Order 

Instituting Proceedings, pursuant to Section 203(k) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, on 

February 5, 2021. A prehearing conference will be held by telephone on Thursday, March 4, 

2021, at 11:00 a.m. EST (10:00 a.m. CST), a date and time convenient to the parties. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

/S/ Carol Fox Foelak 

Carol Fox Foelak

Administrative Law Judge

Served by email on both parties