Filed 3/28/24 P. v. Lerena CA2/5

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

PRECIOSA IRENE LERENA,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B324924

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. MA078159)

APPEAL from the Superior Court of the County of Los 

Angeles, Robert G. Chu, Judge. Affirmed, in part, and 

conditionally reversed and remanded with instructions.

Corey J. Robins, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Kim Aarons, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

I. INTRODUCTION

A jury found defendant Preciosa Lerena guilty of second 

degree murder, among other crimes resulting from a carjacking 

and subsequent reckless driving spree. On appeal, she raises 

challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, her sentence, and 

the juvenile court’s order transferring the case to the adult 

criminal court. We affirm, in part, and conditionally reverse, as 

explained in detail below.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Prosecution’s Case

1. Carjacking

On February 18, 2018, at approximately 2:20 p.m., Michael 

Dilworth, while parked in the lot of a Palmdale Walmart, saw 

defendant1 attempt to take Patricia Levins’s purse and then 

punch her multiple times in the face. He then observed 

defendant enter Levins’s white Toyota RAV4. Dilworth tried to 

grab the car’s door handle, but it was locked. Defendant reversed

the RAV4 into two other vehicles before she “took off” through the 

parking lot at over 20 miles per hour. Dilworth observed Levins 

at the scene bleeding from a cut on her face. The wind blew 

Levins’s blood onto Dilworth’s clothes and his car.

Following her encounter with defendant, Levins, who was 

63 at the time, had a laceration on her forehead. Levins’s

1 At the time she committed the February 18, 2018, offenses, 

defendant was 17 years old.
3

daughter took her to the hospital where she received treatment 

for her injuries, including sutures for the laceration, a CT scan,

and x-rays. Photographs taken after treatment showed bruising 

around her eyes, as well as on her forearm and wrist.

2. Pursuit and Collision

At approximately 2:34 p.m., a 911 dispatcher received a 

call2 reporting a vehicle driving erratically westbound on 

Avenue S. The caller stated that a female in a white Toyota 

RAV4 was driving “in and out of lanes” and “ran several [traffic 

signals].”

Shortly after 3:00 p.m. that afternoon, Kenny Ramirez was 

driving his truck westbound on Lake Elizabeth Road (Lake 

Elizabeth) in Palmdale when he noticed two cars behind him in 

the rearview mirror. One of the vehicles, a white RAV4, “seemed 

to be driving very erratic[ally], and the other one was just trying 

to get out of the way.” As Ramirez kept driving, he saw the 

RAV4 almost hit a pole at an intersection. When Ramirez 

attempted to make a left turn, the RAV4, which was still behind 

him, swerved around the left side of his truck into oncoming 

traffic and almost collided head on with another vehicle before 

swerving back in front of Ramirez and almost hitting him.

Ramirez called 9113 while following the RAV4 westbound 

on Lake Elizabeth as it continued “[d]riving very erratic[ally],” 

swerving from the left curb to the right curb of the two-lane road. 

2 An audio recording of the 911 call was played for the jury.

3 An audio recording of Ramirez’s 911 call was played for the 

jury.
4

During his conversation with the dispatcher, Ramirez reported 

that “she’s out of control”; “that girl is flying”; and “if she gets 

into an accident . . . this is gonna be a bad accident.” He also 

reported that the driver was reaching speeds of between 80 and 

100 miles per hour.

At some point, Ramirez saw the RAV4 pull over to the side 

of the road and park. He “parked right behind” it and exited his

truck. As he approached the RAV4, he observed defendant alone 

inside and told her, “‘You need to stop your vehicle. Turn it off.’” 

Defendant ignored Ramirez’s admonition, instead gave him “a 

blank stare,” and then started to reverse her vehicle.

Defendant executed a U-turn and sped off eastbound on 

Lake Elizabeth, back into town, at speeds of 75 to 90 miles per 

hour as Ramirez tried to follow behind for four to five minutes. 

As defendant neared town, she reached 100 miles per hour, after 

which Ramirez lost sight of her.

Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputy George Hanley and 

his partner were patrolling in their marked black and white 

Sheriff’s vehicle on the afternoon of February 18, 2018, when 

they received a call about a carjacking suspect. They activated 

their lights and siren and drove to the area where the suspect 

vehicle—a white Toyota RAV4—was last seen. Traveling north 

on Tierra Subida4, the deputies turned left to westbound Lake 

Elizabeth and, shortly after completing their turn, they saw the

4 Investigators determined that it was approximately four 

miles from the place where defendant executed the U-turn to the 

intersection at Lake Elizabeth and 10th Street West (10th 

Street). On the south side of the intersection with Lake 

Elizabeth, 10th Street becomes Tierra Subida Avenue (Tierra 

Subida). We therefore refer to that intersection as Lake 

Elizabeth and 10th Street/Tierra Subida.
5

RAV4 pass them going eastbound at approximately 95 to 100 

miles per hour.5 Deputy Hanley estimated that the deputies 

were between one-half and three-quarters of a mile west of the 

intersection at 10th Street/Tierra Subida when defendant passed 

them going back towards that location.

In an effort to pursue and stop the RAV4, the deputies 

executed a U-turn so that they were driving eastbound on Lake 

Elizabeth directly behind another marked patrol vehicle with its 

lights and sirens also activated. At that point, the RAV4 was 

about a quarter mile from the intersection at 10th Street/Tierra 

Subida. The RAV4 continued eastbound and, as it approached 

the intersection at 10th Street/Tierra Subida,

6 there were 

vehicles stopped in front of it in the eastbound lanes waiting for 

the signal. The RAV4 veered into the westbound traffic lanes, 

passed the vehicles stopped at the signal, and entered the 

intersection at 10th Street/Tierra Subida against a red light.

Matthew Newells was in his Ford Flex SUV, stopped in the 

left turn lane on northbound Tierra Subida. His wife, Christine 

Jackson Newells, and their three children were passengers in the 

car.7 Tevye was in the front passenger seat, Taviere was in the 

5 The speed limit on that portion of Lake Elizabeth was 55 

miles per hour, and it reduced to 50 miles per hour just before the 

10th Street/Tierra Subida intersection.

6 Deputy Hanley estimated that, from the time the deputies 

executed their U-turn, it took the RAV4 “seconds” to reach the 

intersection at 10th Street/Tierra Subida.

7 Because Matthew and his wife share the last name, we will 

refer to them by their first names. Their three children were one-
6

right-rear passenger seat, Matthew, Jr., was in the middle-rear

position in a car seat, and Christine was next to him in the leftrear passenger seat.

Matthew waited there for the left arrow to turn green so he 

could make the turn to westbound Lake Elizabeth. As he waited,

Matthew heard sirens and saw three patrol cars coming up 

behind him on his left. One of the cars pulled in front of 

Matthew’s SUV, and the deputy signaled for him to wait while 

the other two patrol cars entered the intersection and made the 

left turn to westbound Lake Elizabeth. The left arrow turned 

green while the deputy’s car was still in front of Matthew. When 

the deputy made a U-turn and followed the other two patrol cars 

westbound on Lake Elizabeth, Matthew waited at the signal for a 

moment.

With the left arrow still green, Matthew pulled out into the 

intersection to make the left turn. At that moment, he saw a 

white car coming toward him “like a flash . . . .” It collided with 

the SUV.

Deputy Hanley and his partner saw the collision between 

the RAV4 and the SUV. Upon reaching the scene, they observed 

other deputies rendering aid to the people in the SUV, so they 

approached the RAV4. Deputy Hanley’s partner “‘told 

[defendant] to show her hands,’” and she replied, “‘“Fuck you.”’” 

Deputy Hanley and his partner detained defendant at the scene.

When Deputy Mario Villalobos arrived at the scene of the 

collision, he was assigned to ride in an ambulance with defendant 

to the hospital. During the trip, he asked defendant for her name 

and date of birth. She gave him a false name and date of birth.

year-old Matthew Jr. N., 17-year old Tevye N., and 15-year old 

Taviere N.
7

3. Aftermath of the Collision

a. The Victims

Following the collision, Taviere and Matthew, Jr., were 

airlifted to the hospital and Tevye and Christine were 

transported there by ambulance. Matthew followed in a separate 

ambulance. He learned later at the hospital that Christine had 

died from her injuries.

At the time of trial, Taviere was still suffering from 

complications of the injuries that he sustained during the 

accident.8 Among other issues, he had a plate and two screws in 

his back and surgeons needed to repair his aorta. Matthew

suffered “a contusion, a right adrenal hemorrhage[,] and 

fractures.” Tevye suffered a collapsed lung, and Matthew, Jr.

suffered trauma to his chest and experienced bleeding in his 

brain.

b. Investigation

On February 18, 2018, Deputy Scott Shean, a Sheriff’s 

traffic investigator, went to the scene of the collision at Lake 

Elizabeth and 10th Street/Tierra Subida. He arrived at 

approximately 3:15 p.m. and noted that all of the traffic signals 

at the intersection were functioning properly. Following his 

investigation, the deputy determined that “[t]he cause, the 

primary collision factor, [was] failing to stop at a red light with 

8 Taviere’s medical records showed that he suffered “multiple 

significant trauma, including multiple fractures, injuries to the 

spleen, kidney, liver, and bladder, and dissection of the aorta.”
8

an associated factor of unsafe speed given the present traffic 

conditions.”

On the evening of February 19, 2018, Deputy Theodor 

Baljet, a Sheriff’s homicide investigator assigned to investigate 

Christine’s death, went with his partner to the hospital to

interview defendant.9 During the interview, defendant told 

investigators that, earlier in the day, she was drinking straight 

from the bottle and drank “a good amount.”10 Afterwards, her 

“homies” dropped her near the Walmart. She decided to take the 

RAV4 because it was “just right there,” so she thought, “fuck it 

I’m just gonna take the car.” According to defendant, Levins 

fought her for the RAV4’s keys, so she hit her in the face.

Defendant, who did not have a driver’s license but had 

taught herself to drive,11 decided to drive the RAV4 to visit her 

“homies” and, because “there were no cars like that much in the 

way,” she decided to “drive fast.” She was “just driving all over,”

but then stopped; and that was when “the guy told [her] . . . like 

9 The video recording of the interview with defendant was 

played for the jury.

10 Defendant’s blood was drawn on the evening of the collision 

at 5:50 p.m. Chemical analysis showed no measurable blood 

alcohol content, but tests for cannabinoids and carboxy-THC were 

positive. A California Highway Patrol officer trained in drug 

recognition evaluated defendant at the hospital on the day of the 

collision at 8:15 p.m. and determined that defendant was not 

under the influence of drugs.

11 At the time defendant took the RAV4, she had not driven in 

three years.
9

stop the car.” She instead made the U-turn because, “if [she was]

gonna get busted, [she] might as well just waste the gas.”

According to defendant, she saw the deputies who were 

trying to stop her, but because “there wasn’t that much [traffic]”, 

she decided “fuck it” and continued driving. She admitted that

she should have stopped and that, before she collided with the 

SUV, the traffic signal was red. She also claimed that she did not 

“intentionally mean to crash into [the SUV]” and that she 

attempted to stop the RAV4 by putting her foot on the brake, but 

“it was not stopping.” At the conclusion of the interview, 

defendant said, “‘I fucked up. I fucked up bad because I injured 

people . . . .’”

Detective Aaron Percy, a Sheriff’s traffic collision and 

accident reconstruction investigator, retrieved the event data 

recorders (EDRs) from the RAV4 and the SUV. The report 

generated from the RAV4’s EDR showed that four seconds before 

the collision it was travelling 93 miles per hour and that, at the 

time of the collision, it was travelling at 83 miles per hour. The 

report also showed that, during that interval, “both . . . the gas 

pedal[] and the brake were being applied at the same time.” The 

EDR from the SUV showed that five seconds before the collision 

it had been at a stop and that, at the time of the collision, it was 

traveling at 16 miles per hour.

Detective Rowell Quemuel conducted a vehicle inspection of 

the RAV4. According to the detective, “[e]verything appeared to 

be normal.” There was no damage to the brake lines or anything 

else to indicate that the brake system was faulty.
10

B. Defense Case

Defendant called one witness, a developmental 

psychologist, Elizabeth Cauffman. She was not a clinical 

psychologist, did not perform patient assessments, and did not 

evaluate defendant or review police reports or transcripts in this 

case. Therefore, she could not provide any insight as to 

defendant and could not address why she engaged in the conduct 

at issue in this case. Instead, she was a researcher who 

examined “how people develop and change over the life course.”

According to Dr. Cauffman, adolescence begins “as young 

as age 10 and extends out until age 25.” Around age 16 or 17, 

adolescents are “very similar” to adults in their “cognitive 

functioning.” But there is “a gap between cognitively what 

[adolescents know at that age] and emotionally what [they] can 

control.” Although their “cognitive system” is at an adult level, 

their “emotional system [is not] fully developed [until] into [their] 

late 20s.” That difference in development is “why adolescents 

may know the right behaviors and the right things to do but still 

perform or do things in the more risky or irresponsible way.” It 

explains “why you see risky behavior during adolescence.” 

Specifically, they engage in such behaviors because the frontal 

lobe of the brain, which controls impulsivity and long-term 

thinking, is the last part of the brain to develop and it does not 

fully develop until “about 25 years of age.”

Dr. Cauffman also examined the effect of substance abuse 

on emotional development in adolescents and determined that it 

slowed that development. Such abuse by adolescents caused

“more impulsivity” and “decreased inhibitory control.”
11

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In an amended information filed August 11, 2022,

12 the Los 

Angeles County District Attorney charged defendant in count 1 

with second degree murder in violation of Penal Code section 187, 

subdivision (a);13 in count 2 with vehicular manslaughter with 

gross negligence in violation of section 192, subdivision (c)(1); in 

count 4 with fleeing or eluding a pursuing police officer’s vehicle 

causing death in violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.3, 

subdivision (b); in count 8 with carjacking in violation of section 

215, subdivision (a); in counts 9 and 10 with hit and run causing 

property damage in violation of Vehicle Code section 20002, 

subdivision (a); and in count 13 with giving false information to a 

police officer in violation of Vehicle Code section 31.

The District Attorney further alleged as to count 4 that, in 

the commission of that crime, defendant inflicted great bodily 

injury on the five victims within the meaning of section 12022.7, 

subdivision (a) and as to count 8 that, in the commission of that 

crime, defendant inflicted great bodily injury of Levins, a person 

12 On February 21, 2018, the prosecution filed in the juvenile 

court a 17-count petition against defendant alleging, among other 

offenses, murder and manslaughter. On February 22, 2018, the 

prosecution filed a motion to transfer jurisdiction over defendant 

to the adult criminal court. On November 13, 2019, the juvenile 

court commenced a hearing on the prosecution’s motion to 

transfer defendant’s case to the adult criminal court. On 

January 30, 2020, the juvenile court entered an order granting 

the transfer motion.

13 All further references are to the Penal Code unless 

otherwise indicated.
12

over 60 years of age, within the meaning of section 1203.09, 

subdivision (a) and inflicted great bodily injury on Levins within 

the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a).

The jury found defendant guilty on all counts and found 

true the great bodily injury enhancement allegations, except the 

allegation as to count 8 under section 1203.09, subdivision (a), 

which it found not true.

On October 25, 2022, the trial court sentenced defendant on 

count 1 to a term of 15 years to life and on count 8 to a 

consecutive upper term sentence of nine years, plus three 

additional years under section 12022.7, subdivision (a), for an 

aggregate sentence of 27 years to life. The court also sentenced 

defendant on counts 9, 10, and 13 to three concurrent terms of 

180 days in county jail. And, the court imposed on count 2 an 

upper term sentence of six years, plus an additional three years 

under section 12022.7, subdivision (a), but stayed that sentence 

under section 654; and imposed on count 4 an upper term 

sentence of seven years, plus an additional three years under 

section 12022.7, subdivision (a), but also stayed execution of that 

sentence under section 654.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Substantial Evidence Challenges

Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in 

support of the jury’s findings on: (1) the great bodily injury 

allegation on count 8; (2) the “pursuing” peace officer element of 

count 4; (3) the intent to evade element of count 4; and (4) the 
13

implied malice element of count 1. We address each challenge 

below.

1. Standard of Review

“When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence for a jury finding, we review the entire record in the 

light most favorable to the judgment of the trial court. We 

evaluate whether substantial evidence, defined as reasonable and 

credible evidence of solid value, has been disclosed, permitting 

the trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

[Citation.] ‘“The standard of review is the same in cases in which 

the prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence.”’ 

[Citation.] [¶] We review the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting convictions and enhancements using the same

standard, presuming ‘“every fact in support of the judgment the 

trier of fact could have reasonably deduced from the evidence.”’ 

[Citation.]” (People v. Vargas (2020) 9 Cal.5th 793, 820.) “We do 

not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a witness’s credibility. 

[Citation.]” (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1129.)

2. Evidence of Great Bodily Injury—Count 8

Defendant contends that the evidence of Levin’s injuries 

was insufficient to establish that she suffered great bodily injury 

within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a). According 

to defendant “the short, shallow laceration of less than one inch 

that required four stiches with some minor bruising did not 

constitute [great bodily injury].”
14

Section 12022.7, subdivision (a) imposes a three-year 

sentence enhancement for any person who intentionally and 

personally inflicts “great bodily injury” in the commission or 

attempted commission of a felony. Subdivision (f) defines great 

bodily injury as constituting “a significant or substantial physical 

injury.” “[T]o be significant or substantial the injury need not be 

so grave as to cause the victim ‘“permanent,” “prolonged,” or 

“protracted”’ bodily damage. [Citation.]” (People v. Cross (2008) 

45 Cal.4th 58, 64.)

Here, the evidence showed that the then 63-year-old Levins 

was repeatedly punched by defendant in an effort to obtain the 

keys to the RAV4. That assault left Levins with a laceration on 

her forehead that required sutures, as well as bruising under her 

eyes, on her arms, and on her wrists. Her injuries were described 

by Dilworth—who not only saw blood on her face at the scene, but 

also had her blood on his clothes and his car—and Levins’s 

daughter, who confirmed the severity of her mother’s injuries as 

shown in photos taken at the hospital. Medical records and 

photographs taken at the hospital before and after she was 

examined and treated corroborated the nature and extent of her 

injuries. Viewed in a light most favorable to the jury’s finding, 

that evidence supported a reasonable inference that Levins

suffered significant and substantial physical injuries. (See, e.g., 

People v. Clay (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 433, 459–460 [sufficient 

evidence of great bodily injury; victims suffered head wounds 

inflicted by a pistol, requiring three to seven stitches]; People v.

Saez (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1189 [sufficient evidence of 

great bodily injury as “many of the victim’s injuries were to her 

head”].) It was therefore sufficient to support the true finding on 

the great bodily injury allegation on count 8.
15

3. Evidence of Initiation of Pursuit—Count 4

Defendant maintains that there was insufficient evidence 

that the deputies initiated a pursuit before the collision within 

the meaning Vehicle Code section 2800.3. As she views the trial 

evidence, the prosecution failed to show that the deputies were 

ever behind defendant with their lights and sirens activated.

A violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.3 requires a 

showing of the elements of the offense of fleeing or eluding a 

pursuing police officer as set forth in Vehicle Code section 2800.1. 

(People v. Jones (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 663, 667.) In addition to 

showing willful flight from or an attempt to elude “a pursuing 

peace officer’s motor vehicle” (Veh. Code, § 2800.1), that statute 

further “requires four distinct elements, each of which must be 

present: (1) a red light, (2) a siren, (3) a distinctively marked 

vehicle, and (4) a peace officer in a distinctive uniform” (People v. 

Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1008). Proof of those additional 

elements is necessary “‘to ascertain whether a person fleeing is 

on reasonable notice that pursuit is by a peace officer.’” (Ibid.)

Contrary to defendant’s assertion, there was sufficient 

evidence to show that defendant was on reasonable notice that 

she was being pursued by the deputies’ police vehicles. Deputy 

Hanley testified that he and his partner were in their marked 

patrol car, with its lights and sirens activated, when they saw 

defendant going in the opposite direction at 95 to 100 miles per 

hour. They immediately executed a U-turn behind another 

marked police vehicle with its lights and sirens activated and the 

two cars began to follow defendant. They were at that point 

about a quarter mile from the intersection with 10th 
16

Street/Tierra Subida and in close enough proximity for Deputy 

Hanley to see defendant run the red light at the intersection, and 

collide with the SUV.

In addition, during her interview at the hospital with 

investigators, defendant admitted that she saw the deputies who 

were trying to stop her and that she nevertheless decided to 

continue driving. She also admitted that she should have 

stopped for the deputies and that she instead ran the red light at 

the intersection just prior to the collision. The jury’s finding that 

defendant was fleeing a pursuing peace officer’s vehicle prior to 

the collision was therefore supported by substantial evidence.

4. Evidence of Intent to Evade—Count 4

Defendant also argues that there was insufficient evidence 

on count 4 to show that: (1) she had the specific intent to flee 

from or elude the deputies and (2) her conduct in fleeing from or 

eluding deputies was the proximate cause of Christine’s death. 

According to defendant, there was no evidence that her 

admittedly dangerous driving before the pursuit changed during 

the brief period of time that deputies were behind her and, 

similarly, no evidence that, in attempting to flee from or elude 

the deputies, she took any action inconsistent with her prior 

erratic conduct that caused Christine’s death.

“The elements of the crime of flight from pursuing officer 

proximately causing death under Vehicle Code section 2800.3 are 

willful flight or attempt to elude a peace officer proximately 

causing death. More specifically, . . . to find a defendant guilty of 

that crime, the People [must] prove that a peace officer was 

pursuing the defendant and the defendant was driving a vehicle,
17

intended to evade the peace officer, while driving willfully fled 

from or tried to elude the pursuing officer, and in doing so caused 

the death of someone else.” (People v. Campbell (2023) 98 

Cal.App.5th 350, 387, fn. omitted.)

The evidence here showed that defendant began driving in 

an erratic and dangerous manner almost from the outset of the 

carjacking. But, as noted above, it also showed that once 

defendant made the U-turn to eastbound Lake Elizabeth and saw 

the deputies’ vehicles with lights and sirens activated, she knew 

they were trying to stop her, but she refused to stop. Instead, she 

decided to continue driving at speeds in excess of 90 miles per 

hour. Then, as she approached the intersection with 10th 

Street/Tierra Subida with the deputies in pursuit, she 

encountered traffic directly ahead of her in the eastbound lanes 

waiting for the signal. Without slowing, she maneuvered into the 

westbound lanes, saw the red light signal, ignored it, and 

proceeded into the intersection at a high rate of speed. That 

conduct was sufficient to support a reasonable inference that, 

with the specific intent to evade the pursing deputies, defendant 

attempted to elude them by maneuvering into traffic lanes 

reserved for oncoming vehicles and then running a red light.

That same evidence also demonstrated that defendant’s 

conduct in fleeing the pursuit, that is, entering opposing traffic 

lanes and running the red light at the intersection at a high rate 

of speed, caused Christine’s death.

5. Evidence on Implied Malice—Count 1

Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to 

support the jury’s finding on the second degree murder charge 
18

(count 1), that she acted with the requisite implied malice. She 

claims that there is no evidence that she was subjectively aware 

her actions were dangerous to human life or that she acted with 

conscious disregard for human life, as opposed to acting with 

gross negligence.

“Malice is implied when the killing is proximately caused 

by ‘“an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to 

life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows 

that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with

conscious disregard for life.”’ [Citation.] In short, implied malice

requires a defendant’s awareness of engaging in conduct that

endangers the life of another—no more, and no less.” (People v. 

Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143.)

“‘Implied malice is determined by examining the 

defendant’s subjective mental state to see if [the defendant] 

appreciated the risk of [the defendant’s] actions. [Citations.] 

Malice may be found even if the act results in a death that is 

accidental. [Citation.] It is unnecessary that implied malice be 

proven by an admission or other direct evidence of the 

defendant’s mental state; like all other elements of a crime, 

implied malice may be proven by circumstantial evidence.’

[Citation.]

“. . . [The requirement of ] . . . conscious disregard for the

danger to life distinguishes implied malice from gross negligence, 

which involves ‘the exercise of so slight a degree of care as to 

raise a presumption of conscious indifference to the 

consequences.’ [Citation.] ‘Phrased in everyday language, the 

state of mind of a person who acts with conscious disregard for 

life is, “I know my conduct is dangerous to others, but I don’t care 

if someone is hurt or killed.” The state of mind of the person who 
19

acts with conscious indifference to the consequences is simply, “I 

don’t care what happens.”’ [Citation.] The standard for implied

malice is subjective and requires the defendant appreciate the 

risk involved.” (People v. Murphy (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 713, 

726.)

The trial evidence here showed that defendant—who had 

no formal driver’s training and knew on the day of the collision 

that she had not driven in three years—nevertheless decided that 

afternoon to take the RAV4 and “drive fast”. Two eye witnesses 

independently reported her driving “erratically,” “moving . . . all 

over the road,” “in and out of lanes,” and “out of control” at speeds 

between 80 and 100 miles per hour. Ramirez described her 

passing cars on the wrong side of the road and almost colliding 

with at least two other vehicles and a pole. He was so concerned 

about her driving, that he told the 911 operator, if she was 

involved in an accident, it was “gonna be a bad accident.”

At some point, defendant pulled over to the side of the road 

and parked, long enough for Ramirez to approach her car and tell 

her to stop driving and turn off her engine. Instead of heeding 

Ramirez’s admonition, defendant executed a U-turn and headed 

back toward town at over 90 miles an hour, in disregard for the 

risk to others. Before she reached the intersection with 10th 

Street/Tierra Subida, defendant passed deputies heading in the 

opposite direction and knew they were trying to stop her. She 

ignored their lights and sirens, thinking “fuck it”, and continued 

toward the intersection at over 90 miles per hour, well in excess 

of the posted 50 miles per hour speed limit. Then, when she 

encountered traffic stopped in front of her as she neared the 

intersection, she did not slow down, choosing instead to veer into 

the opposing westbound traffic lanes. Finally, she admittedly 
20

saw that the light controlling access to the intersection was red, 

but decided to ignore that signal and enter the intersection at an 

excessive speed, braking ineffectively and too late to avoid the 

collision. (See e.g. People v. Moore (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 937, 

940.)

That evidence supported a reasonable inference that 

defendant was aware her conduct endangered the lives of others 

and that she nevertheless proceeded to act in disregard for 

human life. The jury’s finding of implied malice was therefore 

based on substantial evidence.

B. Great Bodily Injury Enhancement on Counts 2 and 4

Defendant contends that the trial court erred by applying 

the great bodily injury enhancement under section 12022.7, 

subdivision (a) to her convictions on count 2 for vehicular 

manslaughter and count 4 for fleeing or eluding a pursuing peace 

officer in violation of section 2800.3. According to defendant, 

because great bodily injury is an element of the offenses charged 

in both counts, the enhancements were unauthorized under 

section 12022.7, subdivision (g)—which expressly prohibits 

application of the subdivision (a) enhancement to an underlying 

offense, if “[great bodily injury] is an element of the offense.”

Even if we were to assume, without deciding, that the trial 

court erred by imposing the section 12022.7, subdivision (a) 

enhancements on the sentences for counts 2 and 4, we would 

nevertheless conclude that reversal is not warranted because any 

such error was rendered harmless by the court’s orders staying 

enforcement of the sentences on those counts pursuant to section 

654. The purpose of the section 12022.7, subdivision (g) 
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prohibition is to avoid double punishment for the same conduct, 

that is, causing great bodily injury in the commission of an 

offense. (See People v. Cook (2015) 60 Cal.4th 922, 930 

[acknowledging that section 12022.7, subdivision (g) is intended 

to avoid “‘dual punishment’”].) The section 654 stays on 

enforcement were based on similar grounds and therefore 

accomplished the same result. (See People v. Liu (1996) 46 

Cal.App.4th 1119, 1135 [“The purpose of section 654 is to prevent 

multiple punishment for a single act or omission . . .”].) 

Therefore, because there are no challenges (or at least no 

meritorious challenges) to the other custodial components of 

defendant’s sentence, she cannot demonstrate the prejudice 

required for reversal. (See People v. Brockman (1936) 15 

Cal.App.2d 256, 258 [“If error arose in the decisions and 

judgments[,] it was rendered harmless by the act of the court in 

ordering the two sentences to be served concurrently”].)

C. Resentencing on Counts 2, 4, and 8—Senate Bill No. 567

Defendant also contends that the matter should be 

remanded for resentencing in light of the “retroactive”

amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b) implemented by 

Senate Bill No. 567 (2020–2021 Reg. Sess.; Stats. 2021, ch. 731, 

§ 1.3). The Attorney General agrees that the Senate Bill No. 567 

amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b) are “retroactive in 

[defendant’s] case” but contends, among other things, that 

defendant forfeited her Senate Bill No. 567 challenges to her

upper term sentences on counts 2, 4, and 8 by failing to raise 

those issues with the trial court.
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We agree with the Attorney General that defendant 

forfeited her challenges to her upper term sentences under the 

amendments implemented by Senate Bill No. 567. Those 

amendments to section 1170 became effective January 1, 2022, 

and defendant was not sentenced until October 25, 2022. 

Defendant therefore was obligated to raise her objection in the 

trial court in order to preserve her argument on appeal. (See 

People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1113.)

Defendant contends, in the alternative, that if her trial 

counsel failed to preserve her Senate Bill No. 567 sentencing 

issues, she received ineffective assistance of counsel. But, other 

than citing Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, she 

does not adequately develop her argument or articulate how she 

was prejudiced by her trial counsel’s inaction. (See Holden v. 

City of San Diego (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 404, 418–419; People v. 

Ham (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 768, 783, disapproved on other grounds 

in People v. Compton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 55, 60, fn. 3.) We therefore 

do not address her argument further.

D. Reversal for New Transfer Hearing—Assembly Bill 

No. 2361

Defendant’s final contention is that she is entitled to a

conditional reversal and remand of the matter for a new transfer 

hearing pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 2361’s amendments to 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 (section 707) which 

became effective after defendant’s transfer hearing and 

conviction and sentencing in this case. The Attorney General 

agrees that Assembly Bill No. 2361 applies to this case and that 
23

it requires conditional reversal and remand for a new transfer 

hearing.

“Effective January 1, 2023, the Legislature amended

section 707, adding the following language: ‘In order to find that 

the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal 

jurisdiction, the court shall find by clear and convincing evidence 

that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the 

jurisdiction of the juvenile court.’ (§ 707, subd.(a)(3), as amended 

by Stats. 2022, ch. 330, § 1.) This changed the finding a juvenile 

court must make before ordering a transfer in two ways: 

(1) raising the standard of proof and (2) requiring a new specific 

finding regarding amenability to rehabilitation.” (In re S.S.

(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1284.)

We agree that Assembly Bill No. 2361 applies to 

defendant’s case, that she is entitled to its ameliorative benefits, 

and that conditional reversal and remand thus are warranted for 

the limited purpose of conducting a new transfer hearing under 

the requirements of that enactment. We will therefore 

conditionally reverse the judgment of conviction and remand the 

matter to the trial court with instructions.
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V. DISPOSITION

The judgment of conviction is conditionally reversed and 

remanded to the juvenile court for a new hearing under section 

707, as amended, to determine whether that court would have 

transferred the case to the criminal court under the current law. 

If the juvenile court determines that it would not have 

transferred the case under the current law, it shall treat 

defendant’s convictions as juvenile adjudications and order an 

appropriate disposition in light of this opinion. If the juvenile 

court determines that it would have transferred the case to the 

criminal court under current law, the judgment of conviction 

shall be reinstated.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KIM, J.

We concur:

BAKER, Acting P. J. LEE, J.

 Judge of the San Bernardino Superior Court, assigned by 

the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.