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IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs September 8, 2021

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. G’WAYNE WILLIAMS

Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lauderdale County

No. 9984 Joe H. Walker, III, Judge

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No. W2020-01608-CCA-R3-CD

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A Lauderdale County jury convicted the Defendant, G’Wayne Williams, of numerous 

sexual offenses. State v. G’wayne Kennedy Williams a/k/a Kenney Williams, No. W2018-

00924-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 211546, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App, at Jackson, Jan. 14, 2020). 

The trial court imposed a sixty-four-year sentence. Id. On appeal, this court vacated and 

dismissed fifteen of the Defendant’s convictions and concluded that the trial court had 

improperly merged a number of the Defendant’s convictions. We remanded the case for 

entry of corrected judgments and resentencing where applicable and affirmed the 

Defendant’s remaining convictions. Id. On remand, the trial court dismissed the relevant 

convictions, merged the additional relevant convictions, and resentenced the Defendant on 

twelve of the convictions. The trial court concluded that it had lost jurisdiction as to the 

Defendant’s remaining convictions affirmed on appeal. On this second appeal, the 

Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in finding it had lost jurisdiction on the 

convictions affirmed by this court. He further contends his sentence is excessive. After a 

thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CAMILLE R. 

MCMULLEN and J. ROSS DYER, JJ., joined.

Timothy J. Gudmundson, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the appellant, G’Wayne Williams.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Samantha L. Simpson, Assistant 

Attorney General; Mark E. Davidson, District Attorney General; and Julie K. Pillow, 

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Facts 

12/01/2021
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This case arises from the Defendant’s repeated rape of the victim, his minor stepson, 

between 2012 and 2015. Based on this conduct, a Lauderdale County grand jury indicted 

the Defendant for four counts of rape; four counts of aggravated statutory rape; four counts 

of statutory rape by an authority figure; four counts of sexual battery by an authority figure; 

forty-five counts of incest; forty-one counts of rape of a child; forty-one counts of 

aggravated sexual battery; and two counts of violating the requirements of the sex offender 

registry. Williams, 2020 WL 211546, at *1. 

A. Trial and Initial Sentencing

In the interest of brevity, we quote only the victim’s direct testimony at trial, as 

summarized by this court on appeal:

[The victim] J.M. testified that his date of birth was December 14, 

2001, and that at the time of trial he was age fifteen. His mother, A.M., 

married the Defendant in Wisconsin when J.M. was in third or fourth grade. 

J.M. stated that the Defendant wore a black ankle bracelet in Wisconsin, that 

the family moved to Tennessee before J.M. started fifth grade, and that the 

Defendant did not wear the ankle bracelet in Tennessee. J.M. said that the 

Defendant’s behavior changed once he stopped wearing the ankle bracelet. 

Specifically, in Wisconsin, the Defendant was “nice, kind, he was nice to 

[A.M., and they] used to go fishing[.]” Once the Defendant got the ankle 

bracelet off, it “was like [he] just changed bodies.” The Defendant told J.M. 

that he wore the ankle bracelet for “[h]is heart[,]” although J.M. “[knew] 

different[ly] now[.]”

The family initially lived in a house on Main Street in Ripley, 

Tennessee, for about one year, then on College Street for one year, and finally 

on Spring Street for one or two years before J.M. moved to Chicago with his 

biological father. A.M., J.M.’s three sisters, and the Defendant lived with 

J.M. at those locations in Tennessee. At some point when the family lived 

on Spring Street, the Defendant and A.M. argued, and the Defendant moved 

into a trailer with [the Defendant’s brother].

J.M. went to the Defendant’s trailer “[a] lot” to play video games, 

sometimes accompanied by three of his friends. J.M. spent the night at the 

trailer and had clothes there. J.M. stated that on January 16, 2015, he had a 

meeting at school with the principal, A.M., and some teachers regarding 

whether he would be sent to an alternative school for “acting out.” J.M. 

acknowledged that he had been acting out, and he stated that he was angry 

due to “[t]hings that [were] going on at home. Don’t know really why I was 

. . . taking my anger out on everybody else.” J.M. clarified that he referred 
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to “[t]he things with [the Defendant].” J.M. stated that at the meeting, he 

said that the Defendant “was touching” him. After he made this statement, 

A.M. stayed in the room; the teachers left; and a police officer came into the 

room. J.M. did not remember where A.M. went while the police officer 

spoke to him.

J.M. testified that he did not tell A.M. about the abuse because he was 

“afraid.” He said, though, that he told A.M. about an instance in which he 

and the Defendant watched pornography together when J.M. was in fourth 

grade.

J.M. testified that on January 15, 2015, he was at the Defendant’s 

trailer with his friends and [the Defendant’s brother]. [The Defendant’s 

brother] left to visit his girlfriend. J.M. and his friends played video games 

on an Xbox. J.M.’s friends were picked up by their mother. J.M. went to the 

“back bedroom” to retrieve “the game box” and the Defendant followed him. 

The Defendant told J.M. to pull down his pants; the Defendant pulled down 

his own pants; the Defendant applied a lubricant to his penis and sat on the 

bed; and the Defendant told J.M. to “sit on” his penis. J.M. faced away from 

the Defendant and did as he was told; the Defendant ejaculated. The 

Defendant told J.M. to put his mouth on the Defendant’s penis, and J.M. 

complied. The Defendant told J.M. “to get in a dog position” on the bed; 

J.M. complied; and the Defendant anally penetrated J.M. with his penis 

before ejaculating into a towel. When asked “how long this had been going 

on,” J.M. estimated five years. J.M. stated that “things” also happened at the 

Spring Street, College Street, and Main Street houses.

J.M. testified that on one occasion in the Spring Street house, the 

Defendant went to an upstairs closet, applied petroleum jelly to his penis, 

came into J.M.’s bedroom, and anally penetrated J.M. J.M. was positioned 

with his back on the floor with his legs over his head. On another occasion 

at the Spring Street house, the Defendant told J.M. to put his mouth on the 

Defendant’s penis while they were in J.M.’s bedroom. On yet another 

occasion at the Spring Street house in the basement, the Defendant took “two 

covers down [and] put them on the floor” and applied “another grease to his 

penis”; the Defendant anally penetrated J.M; the Defendant put his mouth on 

J.M’s penis and told J.M. to put his mouth on the Defendant’s penis; and J.M. 

put his mouth on the Defendant’s penis.

J.M. testified that when the family lived on College Street, the house 

was small and they shared bedrooms. A.M. worked delivering food to 

elderly people, and the Defendant had a key to A.M.’s workplace. When no 
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one else was in the building, the Defendant took J.M. to A.M.’s workplace’s 

reception area, applied cocoa butter to his penis, and told J.M. to “sit on it.”

J.M. testified that when the family lived on Main Street, on one 

occasion, A.M. was doing J.M.’s sister’s hair in a front room when the 

Defendant took J.M. into A.M.’s bedroom. The door was closed; the 

Defendant did not apply lubricant to his penis and told J.M. to sit on it; and 

the Defendant anally penetrated J.M. as the Defendant sat on the bed. The 

Defendant did not undress, and J.M. had his pants pulled down in the back. 

On another occasion, A.M. and J.M.’s sisters went to church, but the 

Defendant told A.M. falsely that J.M. had thrown up so that the Defendant 

and J.M. would stay home. In the front room of the house, the Defendant 

anally penetrated J.M. without using lubricant. J.M. was in “a dog position” 

with “one leg . . . off the couch[.]” J.M. stated that generally, “either . . . 

somebody [was] home and [the Defendant] would tell me to come into the 

room and lock – I mean, not lock the door – close the door, or they would be 

gone to church.” One time, the Defendant told A.M. that they needed milk 

to get her to leave the house, but J.M.’s sister remained in the house.

J.M. testified that it “d[id]n’t feel right” when the Defendant anally 

penetrated him and that it sometimes hurt. J.M. stated that after the meeting 

at his school, he told his teachers, family members, a friend, a doctor, a foster 

parent, a person at the “Carl Perkins Center,” a police officer, and a social 

worker what the Defendant had done to him. J.M. also testified in a 

preliminary hearing. J.M. affirmed that he was telling the truth and stated 

that when he was living with his father in Chicago, [the Defendant’s brother]

called him and said, “Why did you tell, and couldn’t [you have] told any 

other of our family members.” J.M. said that the Defendant sent letters to 

A.M. and that [the Defendant’s brother] signed them and claimed to have 

authored them.

Williams, at *7. Based upon the evidence presented at trial, the jury convicted the 

Defendant as charged: four counts of rape; four counts of aggravated statutory rape; four 

counts of statutory rape by an authority figure; four counts of sexual battery by an authority 

figure; forty-five counts of incest; forty-one counts of rape of a child; forty-one counts of 

aggravated sexual battery; and two counts of violating the requirements of the sex offender 

registry. Id. at *17. After merger, the remaining convictions reflected three convictions 

for rape (Class B felony), eight convictions for rape of a child (Class A felony), and two 

counts of violating the sex offender registry (Class E felony). Id. 

The following occurred at the Defendant’s initial sentencing hearing: 
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The trial court found that the Defendant was convicted in 1991 of 

sexual battery in Wisconsin and “received a conviction of first degree sexual 

assault of a child,” for which he had received a twelve-year sentence, to be 

served consecutively to another sentence he was serving. In 1990, the 

Defendant was convicted of “possession or receiving or selling” a stolen 

vehicle, for which he received thirty months [of] probation. In 1989, he was 

convicted of sexual assault, for which received a three-year sentence, to be 

served in confinement for ninety days and the remainder on probation. That 

court ordered the Defendant not to have contact with juveniles. The 

Defendant’s prior sex offenses involved his twelve-year-old niece and an 

eight-year-old “female friend.”

The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twelve years each for the 

rape convictions in Counts 1, 6, and 11 as a Range II, multiple offender, 

which carried statutory 100% service. The court ordered concurrent service 

of the sentences. The court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-five years 

each for the rape of a child convictions in Counts 48, 51, 54, 57, 60, and 69. 

The court noted that the statute mandated a Range II sentence regardless of 

the Defendant’s range classification. The court ordered the rape of a child 

sentences to run concurrently with one another and consecutively to Counts 

1, 6, and 11. The court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-five years each 

for the rape of a child convictions in Counts 105 and 108. The court ordered 

the sentences to run concurrently with one another and consecutively to 

Counts 48, 51, 54, 57, 60, and 69. The court sentenced the Defendant to two 

years for each of the sex offender registry convictions in Counts 144 and 145, 

to run concurrently with one another but consecutively to all other counts. 

The court stated that the Defendant was not eligible for probation or 

community corrections.

The trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

Defendant was an offender with a record “of criminal activity of abusing 

children, worse than abusing children. It is extensive. He’s a dangerous 

offender who indicates [ ] little or no regard for the rights of children or the 

ability of children to remain free from his type of being a predator.” The 

court also found that consecutive sentencing was reasonably related to the 

severity of the offenses committed and served to protect the public or society, 

“especially children, from further criminal activity by someone who has 

resorted to the same kind of conduct in the past, served a penitentiary 

sentence, released, and immediately takes it back up[.]” The court stated that 

the sentences were “congruent with the general principles of sentencing” and 

that the Defendant had been convicted of two or more offenses involving 

sexual abuse of a minor. The court considered “aggravated circumstances 

arising from the relationship between the [D]efendant and the victim; and 
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that the timespan of the [D]efendant’s undetected sexual activity, the nature 

and scope of the sexual activity, and the extent of the residual, physical, and 

mental damage to the victim was severe[.]” The Defendant’s total effective 

sentence was sixty-four years.

Id. at *17-18 (footnotes omitted). 

B. First Appeal and Remand

During his first appeal to this court, the Defendant argued, relevant here, that the 

evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for rape and rape of a child and that 

the trial court erred in its application of “certain enhancement factors” in sentencing and 

imposed an excessive sentence. Id. at *18. 

In our opinion, this court concluded that, relative to the rape of a child, aggravated 

sexual battery, and incest convictions in Counts 48-62, the State had not carried its burden 

of proving its election beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at *24. We also concluded that the 

victim’s age was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt relative to the rape of a child and 

aggravated sexual battery convictions in Counts 48, 50, 51, 53, 54, 56, 57, 59, 60, and 62, 

and that as a result the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. Id. We 

therefore dismissed and vacated the Defendant’s convictions in Counts 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 

53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, and 62 and remanded the case to the trial court for 

resentencing in light of those reversals. Id. Additionally, although raised by neither party, 

this court concluded that the trial court had improperly merged some of the Defendant’s 

convictions, id. at *29, stating the following:

We conclude that the trial court improperly merged aggravated 

statutory rape (Counts 2, 7, and 12), statutory rape by an authority figure 

(Counts 3, 8, and 13), sexual battery by an authority figure (Counts 4, 9, and 

14), and incest (Counts 5, 10, and 15) into the rape convictions (Counts 1, 6, 

and 11). Each of these respective convictions require elements pertaining to 

the victim’s and the defendant's ages and relationship (kinship or a position 

of trust) that rape does not; similarly, they do not require proof of nonconsent.

We note, however, that sexual battery by an authority figure is a 

lesser-included offense of statutory rape by an authority figure. Two 

differences exist in the elements of these offenses—proof of sexual contact 

versus sexual penetration and proof of the defendant’s being at least four 

years older than the victim. Relative to the degree of sexual contact, pursuant 

to part (b) of our supreme court’s analysis in State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 

466-67 (Tenn. 1999), an offense is a lesser-included offense if the only 

distinguishing elements establish, in relevant part, “a different mental state 
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indicating a lesser kind of culpability . . . [or] a less serious risk of harm to 

the same person[.]” Proof of sexual contact involves a less serious risk of 

harm than sexual penetration. See, e.g., State v. Howard, 504 S.W.3d 260, 

274 (Tenn. 2016) (discussing in the context of rape of a child and aggravated 

sexual battery that sexual contact involved a less serious risk of harm and a 

lesser degree of culpability than sexual penetration). The only remaining 

distinguishing element between the offenses is proof of the defendant’s age 

in statutory rape by an authority figure. Because each offense does not 

contain a distinct element from the other, they should have been merged to 

reflect three counts of statutory rape by an authority figure. Therefore, we 

remand for corrected judgments reflecting the merger of Counts 4, 9, and 14 

into Counts 3, 8, and 13, respectively, and separate sentencing on Counts 2, 

3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, and 15.

Likewise, the trial court erred by merging the incest convictions in 

Counts 49, 52, 55, 58, 61, 70, 106, and 109 into the rape of a child convictions 

in Counts 48, 51, 54, 57, 60, 69, 105, and 108, respectively. Incest requires 

proof of a familial relationship and does not require proof of the victim’s age. 

However, because the State’s elected dates were not proven in relation to 

Counts 49, 52, 55, and 61, as discussed above, these convictions have been 

reversed and dismissed. We therefore remand for sentencing on the 

remaining incest convictions in Counts 70, 106, and 109.

The Defendant’s convictions as revised herein will reflect the 

following: three counts of rape (Counts 1, 6, and 11); three counts of 

aggravated statutory rape (Counts 2, 7, and 12); three counts of statutory rape 

by an authority figure (Counts 3, 8, and 13); six counts of incest (Counts 5, 

10, 15, 70, 106, and 109); three counts of rape of a child (Counts 69, 105, 

108); and two counts of violating the sex offender registry (Counts 144 and 

145). None of these convictions should be merged. We remand the 

convictions for resentencing.

.

Id. at *31. Based on these conclusions, this court reversed and dismissed fifteen of the 

Defendant’s convictions for insufficient evidence and remanded to the trial court for 

resentencing “for the entry of judgments reflecting separate convictions in Counts 2, 3, 5, 

7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15, 70, 106, and 109, and for the entry of corrected judgments reflecting 

the merger of Counts 4, 9, and 14 into Counts 3, 8, and 13, respectively.” Id. This court 

affirmed the trial court’s judgments in all other respects. Id.

C. Resentencing

On remand, the trial court held a hearing and heard brief arguments from the parties, 

following which it entered a corrected judgment form for each of the dismissed 
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convictions. The trial court also entered corrected judgments merging “Count 4 into Court 

3, Count 9 into Count 8, Count 14 into Count 13.” As for resentencing, the trial court 

proposed that the Defendant be sentenced to the minimum within-range sentence, and that 

the sentences run concurrently, which would not change the Defendant’s sentence.

The trial court addressed the Defendant’s “overall” sentence, stating that it had “lost 

jurisdiction” on the convictions not addressed by this court as “needing correcting, 

resentencing, or merging.” The trial court resentenced the Defendant as follows:

So in Count 2, the Court sentences the defendant to 4 years concurrent with 

Count 1 through 15. In Count 3 to 12 years concurrent with Count 1 through 

15. In Count 5 to 6 years concurrent with Count 1 through 15. In Count 7, 4 

years concurrent to Count 1 through 15. In Count 8, 12 years for Count 1 

through 15. In Count 10 to 6 years in Counts 1 through 15. Count 12 to 4 

years in Counts 1 through 15. In Count 13 to 12 years concurrent with Counts 

1 through 15. In Count 15 to 6 years concurrent with Counts 1 through 15 

or 14. In Count 70, the defendant is sentenced to 6 years concurrent with 

Count 69, which is one of the sentences which he’s actually serving. But 

consecutive to Counts 1, 6, and 11. Again -- and in Count 106, concurrent 

with Count 105, which is a sentence for which he’s actually serving and 

consecutive to Counts 1 through 15 and Count 69. And for Counts 109, 

concurrent with Count 108. Again, a sentence that he’s actually serving. 108 

and 105 are concurrent to one another and consecutive to Counts 1 through 

15 and Count 69. That’s a 6-year sentence.

The trial court stated that the net effect of the resentencing did not change the Defendant’s 

total effective sentence and that it did not have jurisdiction to address the remaining counts 

that had been affirmed by this court on appeal. It is from these judgments that the 

Defendant now appeals.

II. Analysis

On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in finding it had lost 

jurisdiction on the convictions affirmed by this court. He further contends his sentence is 

excessive. We respectfully disagree.

A. Jurisdiction

The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in its determination that it lacked 

the jurisdiction to resentence the Defendant, in light of his fewer convictions than at the 

initial sentencing hearing. The State responds that the trial court properly concluded it did 

not have jurisdiction to resentence the Defendant as to his convictions affirmed by this 

court in the initial appeal. We agree with the State.
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It is long settled that “a trial court’s judgment becomes final thirty days after its 

entry unless a timely notice of appeal or a specified post-trial motion is filed.” State v. 

Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a) and (c); 

State v. Moore, 814 S.W.2d 381, 382 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)). “The jurisdiction of the 

Court of Criminal Appeals attaches upon the filing of the notice of appeal and, therefore, 

the trial court loses jurisdiction.” Id. (citations omitted). Once the trial court loses 

jurisdiction, it generally has no power to amend its judgment. Id. (citing Moore, 814 

S.W.2d at 382). Such is the case here. This court, in its opinion on the Defendant’s first 

appeal, affirmed all of the Defendant’s convictions save those we explicitly remanded for 

dismissal, merger, or resentencing. The convictions we affirmed on appeal were within 

the jurisdiction of this court alone, as the trial court lost its jurisdiction when they became 

final and/or were appealed to this court, and, without further action by this court, the trial 

court had no jurisdiction to amend. Id.; see also State v. Green, 106 S.W.3d 646, 648-49 

(Tenn. 2002). Accordingly, the trial court was without jurisdiction to take any action on 

the Defendant’s convictions, other than those expressly dismissed or remanded for further 

action by this court. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

B. Sentencing

The Defendant also contends that his total effective sentence is excessive. He 

contends that we should review his sentence de novo with no presumption of correctness. 

The State replies that the trial court properly sentenced the Defendant to a within-range

sentence and that it did not abuse its discretion in doing so. The State points out that the 

trial court was limited to its previous sentencing decisions that were affirmed by this court. 

We agree with the State.

“[S]entences imposed by the trial court within the appropriate statutory range are to 

be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard with a ‘presumption of reasonableness.’” 

State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. 2012). A finding of abuse of discretion “‘reflects that 

the trial court’s logic and reasoning was improper when viewed in light of the factual 

circumstances and relevant legal principles involved in a particular case.’” State v. Shaffer, 

45 S.W.3d 553, 555 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting State v. Moore, 6 S.W.3d 235, 242 (Tenn. 

1999)). To find an abuse of discretion, the record must be void of any substantial evidence 

that would support the trial court’s decision. Id. at 554-55; State v. Grear, 568 S.W.2d 

285, 286 (Tenn. 1978); State v. Delp, 614 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). The 

reviewing court should uphold the sentence “so long as it is within the appropriate range 

and the record demonstrates that the sentence is otherwise in compliance with the purposes 

and principles listed by statute.” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 709-10. So long as the trial court 

sentences within the appropriate range and properly applies the purposes and principles of 

the Sentencing Act, its decision will be granted a presumption of reasonableness. Id. at 

707. 
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We would note that the only sentences available for our reconsideration are those 

for which the Defendant was resentenced on remand, as the remainder of his sentences 

became “law of the case” when the convictions were affirmed by this court on appeal. See 

Rouse v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 300 F.3d 711, 715 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that the law 

of the case doctrine, which generally prevents reconsideration of claims that have been 

decided at a previous stage in the same litigation); see also Memphis Publ’g Co. v. Tenn. 

Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Bd., 975 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Tenn. 1998) 

(recognizing that the law of the case doctrine “is a longstanding discretionary rule of 

judicial practice which is based on the common sense recognition that issues previously 

litigated and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction ordinarily need not be revisited”).

As to the Defendant’s sentences for which he was resentenced by the trial court 

upon remand, the trial court simply imposed the within-range minimum sentence 

applicable to the Defendant’s convictions. We note the lengthy consideration undertaken 

by the trial court at the Defendant’s initial sentencing, identifying the purposes and 

principles of sentencing in light of the Defendant’s criminal behavior and the grave nature 

of his offenses, as well as his weighty criminal history. Abiding by these considerations, 

the trial court imposed the minimum sentence upon remand. We conclude that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion when it did so, and the Defendant is not entitled to relief 

on this issue.

III. Conclusion

In accordance with the aforementioned reasoning and authorities, we affirm the 

judgments of the trial court. 

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ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE