SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3199-19

FRATERNAL ORDER OF 

POLICE, LODGE NO. 164,

SUPERIOR OFFICERS

ASSOCIATION (a/w FOP

NEW JERSEY LABOR 

COUNSEL),

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

RUTGERS, THE STATE 

UNIVERSITY OF NEW 

JERSEY,

Defendant-Respondent.

_________________________

Submitted February 9, 2021 – Decided May 3, 2021

Before Judges Moynihan and Gummer.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. 

C-000194-19.

Markowitz and Richman, attorneys for appellant 

(Matthew D. Areman, on the briefs).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter, LLP, 

attorneys for respondent (James P. Lidon, of counsel 

and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 164, Superior Officers Association 

(FOP), the collective negotiations unit for Rutgers University Police Department 

(RUPD) lieutenants and sergeants, appeals from the trial court's order denying 

its motion to vacate an arbitrator's dismissal of a grievance concerning a written 

reprimand issued to a sergeant and granting her employer's, defendant Rutgers, 

the State University, cross-motion to dismiss plaintiff's verified complaint.

Plaintiff argues the trial court failed to review de novo the arbitrator's decision 

to reject plaintiff's procedural defense that defendant did not file its complaint 

against the sergeant within forty-five days of "the date on which the person filing 

the complaint obtained sufficient information to file the matter upon which the 

complaint is based" (commonly referred to as the 45-day Rule), N.J.S.A. 

40A:14-147,1and "erroneously reviewed [the arbitrator's] substantive 

arbitrability determination on an improperly heightened 'reasonable debatable' 

1

 The application of the statutory 45-day Rule by law enforcement agencies is 

explained in the Attorney General Guidelines governing "Internal Affairs Policy 

and Procedures" (the Guidelines). See New Jersey Office of the Attorney 

General, Internal Affairs Policy & Procedure (Nov. 2017), 

https://www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/agguide/internalaffairs2000v1_2.pdf.
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standard of review." Plaintiff also contends the arbitrator's decision must be 

vacated because it was procured by undue means, exceeded the arbitrator's 

authority and was contrary to law chiefly because the arbitrator "refus[ed] to

apply or otherwise accept" the 45-day Rule it contended was applicable under 

"the statutory mandates of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-181, N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147 and the 

. . . Guidelines[.]'" 

These arguments obfuscate the determinative issue in this case: the 

arbitrator's findings manifest defendant did not violate the 45-day Rule. 

Accordingly, reviewing de novo the trial court's denial of plaintiff's motion to 

vacate, Minkowitz v. Israeli, 433 N.J. Super. 111, 136 (App. Div. 2013), we 

affirm.

The "underlying facts in this matter" which the arbitrator found 

"undisputed," inform our decision. The incident that gave rise to the disciplinary 

action occurred on September 13, 2017. Defendant contended the sergeant 

improperly delayed her follow-up of a motor-vehicle pursuit by a subordinate 

officer under her supervision. Defendant's Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) 

conducted an investigation of the entire motor-vehicle-pursuit matter. The 

results of that investigation, which concluded on April 10, 2018, recommended 

disciplinary action against the sergeant. The RUPD Chief received the 
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investigation results and, on April 13, 2018,2authorized disciplinary action that 

resulted in a written letter of reprimand the sergeant received on May 10, 2018. 

Plaintiff argues the 45-day period to file the complaint should have 

commenced as early as September 14, 2017, when three RUPD lieutenants 

prepared a memorandum about the incident. Relying on the Guidelines 

provision that "[a]lthough the 45[-]day clock begins at the time the person who 

has the responsibility to file charges has sufficient information, an agency would 

have a difficult time justifying an extensive bureaucratic delay once any member 

of that agency has established sufficient information," New Jersey Office of the 

Attorney General, Internal Affairs Policy & Procedure, 18 (Nov. 2017), 

https://www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/agguide/internalaffairs2000v1_2.pdf, plaintiff 

contends "all of the documentary evidence presented at the arbitration hearing 

suggests that it was others who 'brought the charge' against" the sergeant, 

specifically identifying one of the lieutenants. We disagree.

The person filing the complaint—the Chief—was not presented with the 

results of the IAB investigation until three days before he had authorized the 

complaint. It would have been imprudent to base discipline on a preliminary 

2

 The arbitrator's decision fixes this date as April 13, 2019. In that the sergeant 

received the reprimand on May 10, 2018, it is obvious the date should have been 

April 13, 2018.
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memorandum prepared the day after the actionable conduct. Indeed, an officer 

subject to discipline after a cursory investigation would likely challenge the 

sufficiency of the inquiry. "After considering all of the evidence and arguments 

advanced by the parties," the arbitrator concluded:

The fact that a memorandum about the underlying 

incident was prepared by three [RUPD] lieutenants on 

September 14, 2017[,] did not preclude the Department 

from embarking on a more detailed investigation of the 

incident thereafter through the Department's [IAB]. 

The record evidence establishes that while [the 

sergeant] was not a primary subject of the investigation, 

her conduct also became a collateral issue in the matter. 

Thus, "sufficient information" was garnered only after a full investigation was 

complete. See N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147. 

The Guidelines, which plaintiff argues establish, in part, defendant's duty 

under the 45-day Rule, stress "that there [be] no delay between the conclusion 

of the [internal affairs] investigation by the assigned investigator and the 

decision to file charges by the person who has that responsibility." New Jersey 

Office of the Attorney General, Internal Affairs Policy & Procedure, 18 (Nov. 

2017), https://www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/agguide/internalaffairs2000v1_2.pdf. That 

tenet was not violated here where the reprimand was issued within forty-five 

days after the IAB investigation concluded. As the arbitrator determined, "[t]he 
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incident was thoroughly investigated and the results are sufficient for 

[defendant] to meet its burden of proving just cause on the merits." 

Our determination obviates the need to address plaintiff's other claims of 

error. We, nevertheless, determine the 45-day Rule did not apply to the 

sergeant's disciplinary complaint.

In 1997, the New Jersey Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 40A:14-181,

requiring the incorporation of the Guidelines, first published in 1991, into law 

enforcement agencies' own internal affairs guidelines. N.J.S.A. 40A:14-181. In 

2015, that statute was amended to include police agencies such as the RUPD:

Every law enforcement agency, including a police 

department of an institution of higher education 

established pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-4.2, shall adopt 

and implement guidelines which shall be consistent 

with the guidelines governing the "Internal Affairs 

Policy and Procedures" of the Police Management 

Manual promulgated by the Police Bureau of the 

Division of Criminal Justice in the Department of Law 

and Public Safety, and shall be consistent with any 

tenure or civil service laws, and shall not supersede any 

existing contractual agreements.

[Ibid.]

Notably, the statute provided that its requirement "shall not supersede any 

existing contractual agreements." Ibid.
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The collective negotiated agreement between plaintiff and defendant in 

effect at the time of the disciplinary matter commenced on July 1, 2014—a year 

prior to the amendment to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-181—and ran through June 30, 2019. 

The agreement did not provide for a 45-day Rule procedure. In fact, the 

arbitrator found "there was record testimony acknowledging that the '45[-]day 

[R]ule' was not included in the parties' [a]greement, as well as record evidence 

of negotiations history for the current [a]greement wherein [plaintiff] 

unsuccessfully sought to include the '45[-]day [R]ule' as part of the 

[a]greement." The mandate to include the 45-day Rule did not, therefore, impact 

the agreement in effect at the time the sergeant was disciplined, and defendant 

was not required to file a complaint within those time parameters, though it did.

We see no reason to disturb the arbitrator's conclusion that defendant did 

not violate procedures so as to require the reprimand to be rescinded. This is 

not a case "[w]here the arbitrator[] exceeded or so imperfectly executed [her]

powers that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted 

was not made."

3 N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(d). Thus, the trial court did not err in denying 

3

 Plaintiff concedes none of the other statutory bases for vacating the award are 

implicated. 
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plaintiff's motion to vacate the arbitrator's award and defendant's cross-motion 

to dismiss plaintiff's verified complaint. 

To the extent not addressed, we determine plaintiff's remaining 

arguments, including those related to the arbitrator's interpretation of the 

contract, to be without sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R. 2:11-

3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.