NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

UMAR SHUGA QURESHI, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 23-0153 PRPC

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2013-427046-001

The Honorable Michael C. Blair, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix

By Robert E. Prather

Counsel for Respondent

Umar Shuga Qureshi, Tucson

Petitioner

FILED 11-28-2023
STATE v. QURESHI

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s decision, in which Presiding 

Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Umar Shuga Qureshi petitions for review of the superior 

court’s order denying his post-conviction relief (“PCR”) petition filed under 

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 32. We grant review but deny 

relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Qureshi was in a car accident that injured another driver. As 

a result, in 2013, a grand jury indicted Qureshi on one count of aggravated 

assault, a dangerous offense. A jury found Qureshi guilty as charged with 

aggravating factors. The superior court sentenced Qureshi to ten years in 

prison, and Qureshi appealed.

¶3 Before Qureshi’s conviction, he caused another car accident,

this time leading to a child’s death. Thus, in 2014, a grand jury indicted 

Qureshi on one manslaughter count and two endangerment counts, all 

dangerous offenses. A jury found Qureshi guilty as charged with 

aggravating factors. The superior court sentenced him to concurrent 

sentences of four and a half years’ imprisonment for each endangerment 

count and twenty years’ imprisonment for the manslaughter count. The 

court ordered the manslaughter and endangerment sentences to run 

consecutively to the aggravated-assault sentence. Qureshi appealed.

¶4 This court consolidated Qureshi’s appeals. State v. Qureshi, 1

CA-CR 19-0536, 1 CA-CR 19-0537, 2020 WL 6495078, at *2, ¶ 10 (Ariz. App. 

Nov. 5, 2020) (mem. decision). On appeal, Qureshi argued the superior 

court erred by denying his request to represent himself in the proceedings

for the 2014 charges. Id. at *2, ¶ 11. This court held that the superior court 

did not abuse its discretion because there was sufficient evidence that 

Qureshi could not represent himself competently. Id. at *2, *3, ¶¶ 11, 14.

¶5 In the appeal, Qureshi also argued the superior court erred by 

failing to disqualify the entire Maricopa County Attorney’s Office from his 

cases. Qureshi, 1 CA-CR 19-0536, 1 CA-CR 19-0537, at *5, ¶ 25. During a 
STATE v. QURESHI

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3

pretrial status conference for both cases, the prosecutor made a derogatory 

comment about Qureshi to his counsel. Id. at ¶ 26. The County Attorney’s 

Office removed the prosecutor from the cases and replaced him with other 

attorneys from the office. Id. The superior court declined to disqualify the 

entire office, id. at ¶ 27, and this court found no abuse of discretion, id. at *6, 

¶ 30. This court affirmed Qureshi’s convictions and sentences. Id. at *6, ¶ 31. 

The Arizona Supreme Court denied Qureshi’s petition for review. State v. 

Qureshi, CR-20-0382-PR (Ariz. Nov. 29, 2021).

¶6 After the appeal, Qureshi submitted a PCR notice, and his 

PCR counsel submitted a notice finding no colorable claims. Qureshi filed

a pro se PCR petition. He re-argued that the superior court erred by denying 

his request to represent himself during the proceedings for the 2014 

charges. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a) (A defendant may assert in a PCR that 

his “conviction was obtained, or the sentence was imposed, in violation of 

the United States or Arizona constitutions[.]”); Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 

164, 170-71, 178 (2008) (recognizing a constitutional right to proceed 

without counsel, though this right is not absolute). And he stated appellate 

counsel failed to address in the opening brief that he could have raised a 

“sudden passion” defense during the aggravation phase of the trial if he 

were allowed to represent himself.

¶7 Qureshi also raised a vindictive prosecution claim in his PCR 

petition. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a); State v. Mieg, 225 Ariz. 445, 448, ¶ 12 

(App. 2010) (Vindictive prosecution may violate due process.). He asserted 

the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office retaliated against him after he 

submitted a notice of intent to file a defamation suit for the prosecutor’s 

derogatory statement. To support his claim, he presented a letter from a 

Maricopa County claims manager requesting his social media account 

information to investigate the defamation allegations. Qureshi claimed

counsel failed to raise this issue in his appeal.

¶8 The superior court denied Qureshi’s PCR petition and the 

requested evidentiary hearing. First, the superior court found that 

Qureshi’s claim that he was denied the right to represent himself was 

precluded because it “was specifically addressed and rejected by the Court 

of Appeals.” See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2). The court also found the 

vindictive prosecution claim could be precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(2) 

because it stemmed from the prosecutor’s derogatory statement that led to 

his removal, an issue adjudicated on appeal. In the alternative, the 

vindictive prosecution claim was precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(3) because 

it “arose from an issue that was raisable on appeal.” The superior court 

rejected Qureshi’s “tangential remarks about issues allegedly not raised in 
STATE v. QURESHI

Decision of the Court

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his opening brief on appeal” because he did not raise an appellate counsel 

ineffective assistance claim and failed to produce evidence supporting such 

a claim.

¶9 Qureshi petitioned for this court’s review. We have 

jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 13-4239(C) and Rule 33.16(a)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶10 We review the superior court’s decision to deny 

post-conviction relief for an abuse of discretion, State v. Reed, 252 Ariz. 236, 

238, ¶ 6 (App. 2021), and we will affirm the superior court if the decision 

“is legally correct for any reason.” State v. Roseberry, 237 Ariz. 507, 508, ¶ 7 

(2015).

¶11 Generally, a defendant is precluded from relief under Rule

32.1(a) if the claim was “finally adjudicated on the merits in an appeal” or 

was waived on appeal. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2), (3). After the court

identifies precluded and untimely claims, and if no remaining claims entitle 

the defendant to relief, “the court must summarily dismiss the petition.” 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.11(a).

¶12 We agree with the superior court that Qureshi’s challenge to 

the denial of his request to represent himself was “finally adjudicated on 

the merits in an appeal” and thus precluded. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2). 

Also, because Qureshi could have raised the vindictive prosecution claim 

on appeal, it is waived and precluded. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3).

Qureshi does not challenge the superior court’s preclusion findings in his 

review petition.

¶13 Qureshi insists he made an ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim in his PCR petition. He asserts he made “crystal clear” that appellate 

counsel was “insufficient” by failing to offer certain facts in his opening 

brief. The superior court did not abuse its discretion by finding that 

Qureshi’s remarks about appellate counsel were “tangential.” But Qureshi 

did note his appellate counsel failed to raise issues, and the appellate briefs 

did not discuss the vindictive prosecution claim or the “sudden passion” 

defense. Thus, we will consider whether Qureshi stated a colorable claim of 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Whether Qureshi’s appellate 

counsel was ineffective is a mixed question of fact and law, and we review

the superior court’s legal conclusions de novo. State v. Macias, 249 Ariz. 335, 

340, ¶ 16 (App. 2020).
STATE v. QURESHI

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¶14 A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only on 

colorable claims. State v. Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. 59, 63 (1993). A colorable 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is “one that, if the allegations are 

true, might have changed the outcome.” Id. To state a colorable ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim, “a defendant must show both that counsel’s 

performance fell below objectively reasonable standards and that this 

deficiency prejudiced the defendant.” State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, 567, 

¶ 21 (2006) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).

¶15 There is a strong presumption that the appellate counsel 

provided effective assistance. Bennett, 213 Ariz. at 567, ¶ 22. Appellate 

counsel reviews the record and is responsible for “selecting the most 

promising issues to raise on appeal.” Id. Generally, counsel is not ineffective 

for “selecting some issues and rejecting others” unless the defendant can 

overcome the presumption and show that counsel ignored issues stronger 

than those selected for appeal. Id. (quoting State v. Herrera, 183 Ariz. 642, 

647 (App. 1995)). The “strategic decision to ‘winnow out weaker arguments 

on appeal and focus on’ those more likely to prevail is an acceptable 

exercise of professional judgment.” State v. Febles, 210 Ariz. 589, 596, ¶ 20 

(App. 2005) (quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1983)) (cleaned 

up).

¶16 Qureshi argues several facts that his counsel should have 

raised or disputed on appeal for his self-representation claim, including 

that the superior court judge was biased and that Qureshi wanted to raise

a “sudden passion” defense during the trial’s aggravation phase. But 

Qureshi fails to overcome the presumption that counsel used professional 

judgment to select the strongest arguments for the appeal and reject those

unlikely to prevail. See Bennett, 213 Ariz. at 567, ¶ 22. Qureshi also fails to 

explain how his outcome on appeal might have been different. 

Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. at 63. He argues that the superior court would have 

given him a lesser sentence had he presented the “sudden passion” 

mitigation evidence. But such an argument is irrelevant to the issue of how 

that would have changed this court’s conclusion that the superior court did 

not err by declining Qureshi’s request to represent himself.

¶17 Qureshi also asserts his counsel failed to raise a vindictive 

prosecution claim on appeal. He claims appellate counsel should have 

argued that the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office retaliated against him 

by requesting his social media account information. But the Maricopa 

County claims manager requested his account information in response to 

Qureshi’s notice of intent to sue the County for defamation, not his criminal 

charges. Appellate counsel was within its professional discretion to decline 
STATE v. QURESHI

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6

to raise this argument on appeal. See Febles, 210 Ariz. at 596, ¶ 20; see also 

Macias, 249 Ariz. at 341, ¶ 21 (“Appellate counsel did not render ineffective 

assistance by selecting more viable issues to press on appeal.”).

¶18 Qureshi did not provide evidence that the appellate counsel’s 

failure to raise other issues fell below objectively reasonable standards or 

that counsel did not select the most promising issues. See Bennett, 213 Ariz. 

at 567, ¶¶ 21, 22. Nor did Qureshi provide evidence from which the court 

could conclude the outcome of his appeal might have been different had 

counsel raised the other issues. See id. at ¶ 21.

¶19 Because Qureshi failed to state a colorable claim, the superior 

court did not err by denying the petition and the request for an evidentiary 

hearing.

CONCLUSION

¶20 We grant review but deny relief.