Art of War Papers

Initiative Within the Philosophy of Auftragstaktik:

Determining Factors of the Understanding of Initiative

in the German Army, 1806-1955

Martin Sonnenberger, Lieutenant Colonel (GS) 

German Army

US Army Command and General Staff College Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Gen. von Kluck and staff, ca. Autumn 1914. Cover art is courtesy of the Library 

of Congress Prints & Photographs Online Catalog, Bain Collection, http://hdl.

loc.gov/loc.pnp/ggbain.18672.
Initiative Within the Philosophy of Auftragstaktik: 

Determining Factors of the Understanding of 

Initiative in the German Army, 1806-1955

Martin Sonnenberger, Lieutenant Colonel (GS), German Army

Diplom Kaufmann (univ), Universitat Bundeswehr, 

Munich, Germany

2013

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student 

author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army 

Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. 

(References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

US Army Command and General Staff College Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
iv

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Sonnenberger, Martin.

 Initiative within the philosophy of Auftragstaktik : determining 

factors of the understanding of initiative in the German Army, 1806-

1955 / by Martin Sonnenberger, Lieutenant Colonel (GS), German 

Army.

 pages cm

 Includes bibliographical references and index.

 ISBN 978-1-940804-18-7 (alk. paper)

 1. Command of troops. 2. Germany. Heer – Rules and practice. 3. 

Military art and science – Germany. 4. Military missions. 5. Tactics. I. 

Title. II. Title: Determining factors of the understanding of initiative in 

the German Army 1806-1955. 

 UB210.S67 2015

 355.3’3041094309034 – dc23

 2015003768

2015

Editor

Jennifer B. Fike

US Army Command and General Staff College Press 

publications cover a wide variety of military topics. 

The views expressed in this publication are those of the 

author(s) and not necessarily those of the Department of 

the Army or the Department of Defense. 

The seal of the US Army Command and General Staff 

College authenticates this document as an official publication of the 

US Army Command and General Staff College Press. It is prohibited 

to use this official seal on any republication without the express written 

permission of the US Army Command and General Staff College Press.
v

Abstract

Initiative Within the Philosophy of Auftragstaktik, Determining 

Factors of the Understanding of Initiative in the German Army, 1806-

1955, by LTC Martin Sonnenberger, 78 pages.

The philosophy of Auftragstaktik is aimed at initiative of subordinates within and outside of the scope provided by the commander’s 

intent. While acting within the intent, in general, does not cause problems, acting in alteration of or opposite to given orders regularly will. 

Deviating from orders within the philosophy of Auftragstaktik is justified by the grundlegende Lageänderung – fundamental change of situation, or if acting upon a higher responsibility to the unit.

In four, partly-overlapping phases, this thesis examines the factors 

determining the use of initiative while applying Auftragstaktik in the 

German military forces from 1806 until today.

1. The emergence of Auftragstaktik, from Clausewitz’s understanding of war to the total initiative of field commanders in Moltke’s age 

and World War I, 1806-1918.

2. Low tactical level initiative in the synchronized warfare of World 

War I, 1915-1918.

3. An army shaped for initiative versus detailed tactical control by 

Hitler, 1919-1945.

4. The ethical component of initiative – responsibility for the preservation of units to Innere Führung, 1941-1955.

Using doctrinal references and analysis of actions of commanders 

in the different wars, the thesis examines the influence of technological 

developments, culture, societal factors and political influences, as well 

as developments in warfare.

vii

Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to thank my thesis committee, Dr. Mark 

M. Hull, Dr. Jonathan M. House, and John A. Suprin, for their intensive 

support and the enlightening discussions that helped inform the scope 

and direction of this thesis.

This work would not be the same without the intellectual endeavor 

of the “Art of War Scholar Program” that provided many inspirations 

and the background for the analysis of both doctrine and the execution 

of operational art. I therefore thank the Ike Skelton Distinguished Chair 

for the Art of War, Dr. Dean A. Nowowiejski, the guest lecturers, and 

my fellow colleagues for outstanding seminars and discussions.

This work would not have been possible without the support of 

Ms. Kathleen M. Buker from the Combined Arms Research Library Archives who provided me with the rare and vulnerable copies of the aged 

German doctrine. Deep gratitude also goes to Ms. Karen Wallsmith for 

bringing this thesis into a readable form.

Last but not least I would like to thank the love of my life, my wife 

Simone, who joined me in our American adventure and who endured 

the varying moods that came along with writing this paper.

ix

Contents

Acknowledgements............................................................................ vii

Chapter 1

Introduction .......................................................................................1

Chapter 2 

The Emergence of Auftragstaktik, From Clausewitz’s

Understanding of War to the Total Initiative of Field 

Commanders in Moltke’s Age and World War I..............................11

Chapter 3

Low Tactical Level Initiative in the Synchronized Warfare of 

World War I......................................................................................35

Chapter 4

An Army Shaped for Initiative Versus Detailed Tactical 

Control By Hitler.............................................................................43

Chapter 5 

The Ethical Component of Initiative From Responsibility 

for the Preservation of Units to Innere Führung .............................61

Chapter 6

Conclusion .......................................................................................67

Bibliography .......................................................................................73

1

Chapter 1

Introduction

On October 12-13 [1806], the French bataillon carré swung to 

the left. With Lannes in lead, it contacted the Prussians over the Saale 

at Jena. By the morning of October 14, Napoleon had concentrated 

the better part of two full corps in a small bridgehead over the Saale, 

seized on Lannes’s initiative the night before. With Napoleon looking on, Lannes led off the attack in the morning against the Prussian 

right. Two divisions advanced abreast (Gazan on the left and Suchet 

on the right) and drove a wedge into Prussian positions. Augereau 

soon joined in to the left of Lannes. Ney arrived on the battlefield and, 

on his own initiative, wedged himself in between his fellow Marshals 

without orders. He impetuously made for some tense moments as his 

leading units outstripped the two flanking corps, but his neighbors 

soon fought their way up to his relief.

Things weren’t going well for the Prussians, but as the infantry 

of Major General von Grawert’s division arrived, it seemed as if Hohenlohe might yet save something of his day. In one of those moments 

seemingly invented to demonstrate the changeover from one military 

era to another, however, they deployed far too slowly for the attack. 

“Solemnly, as if on the parade ground,” they halted and formed line 

within range of the French skirmishers in front of the village of Vierzehnheiligen.

 – Robert Citino, The German Way of War1

Background

For modern warfare, the military revolution caused by the 

establishment of the citizen-soldier motivated by nationalism following 

the French Revolution liberated commanders from the restrictions under 

which they operated in the age of Cabinet Wars.2 The growth of armies 

to unprecedented sizes prohibited the exercise of centralized command 

and control from a single figure – the Feldherrnhügel epitomized by 

Frederick the Great of Prussia.3 Larger and more complex armies led 

to dispersing units into autonomous elements to avoid overstraining the 

available road infrastructure and permit logistical supply by foraging, 

thus imposing the need for decentralized execution.4 In Prussia, the 

“crushing defeat”5 at Jena and Auerstädt broke up the gerontocracy 

of state and army and permitted a fundamental transformation of the 

army by reformers led by Gerhard von Scharnhorst and August von 

Gneisenau. Army reform gave birth to both the development of a highly 
2

qualified corps of staff officers and the idea of a professional ethos 

aiming at “aptitude and eagerness for independent action”6 – namely, 

initiative.

The concept of initiative played a key role in developing the concept of Auftragstaktik in the Prussian and German armies.7

 The quick 

and decisive defeats of Austria in 1866 and France in 1870 led other 

armies to adopt it as as well. Auftragstaktik originated from an acceptance of the idea of decentralized execution based upon the mindset that 

commanders and soldiers who cannot be directly controlled have to act 

independently within their superior’s intent. The doctrinal concept was 

then further refined throughout the 19th Century; the term itself can be 

found from 1906 on.8 With the adoption of Doctrine 2015, the US Army 

explicitly introduced the philosophy of Mission Command, a derivative 

of Auftragstaktik intended to facilitate the development of leaders who 

“exercise disciplined initiative [to] create opportunity by taking action 

to develop the situation.”9

This work analyzes the historical understanding of tactical and 

operational initiative against the background of the current doctrinal 

framework of Auftragstaktik as defined by the Bundeswehr. As far as 

US doctrinal terms equate to the definition and understanding in the 

Bundeswehr concept of Auftragstaktik, they are used for ease of understanding. However, those terms must be understood within the overall 

concept of Auftragstaktik, not simply compared against the US Mission 

Command philosophy.

The aim of this work is to identify factors that historically have 

influenced or determined the acceptable limits of initiative during the 

application of Auftragstaktik in the Prussian and German armies over 

the last two centuries. Such a study serves discussions about the future use of Auftragstaktik and Mission Command, and will facilitate 

a clearer understanding by readers between acceptable deviation from 

guidance in pursuit of the higher commander’s intent, and destructive 

disobedience.

The philosophy of Auftragstaktik aims at fostering the initiative 

of subordinates within and outside the scope provided by the higher 

commander’s intent. In general, acting within that intent as authorized 

by trust and mutual understanding does not cause problems. However, 

acting in opposition to stated orders or changing them without good 

reason damages trust and inhibits common understanding. Deviating 

from orders is within the philosophy of Auftragstaktik justified by the 
3

grundlegende Lageänderung – a fundamental change in the situation, 

or if acting upon a higher responsibility.

Different historical examples suggest that one can assess the validity of deviating from orders only after the fact, based on the resulting 

tactical success or failure. If Auftragstaktik in the Bundeswehr enables 

and demands initiative, parameters must be put in place to qualify the 

acceptable degree of initiative before the fact rather than afterwards.

Frame of Reference

From the earliest depictions of humans using what had been hunting tools as weapons to fight each other in battles, men have sought to 

gain advantages through improved weapons (technology) and specific 

forms or techniques of application – what later became doctrine.10 What 

Geoffrey Parker describes as the five principles of the “Western way 

of war” perpetuated and increased the struggle for advantages through 

technological developments and the doctrinal role of the individual as a 

part of a larger military body.11

In On Flexibility, Israeli scholar Meir Finkel argues that attempts 

properly to identify future threats caused by a potential adversary’s efforts to gain a technological or doctrinal advantage prior to the outbreak 

of a conflict routinely fail.12 Thus, he suggests that a solution to countering technological and doctrinal surprise lies in the ability to react 

flexibly to the initial surprise.13 While his model aims at explaining how 

to develop a capability of change, in this context it serves the purpose of 

providing a logical background to the concept of initiative.

The model describes four flexibility strata:

1. Conceptual and doctrinal flexibility, an atmosphere that 

encourages lower-ranking commanders to challenge concepts and doctrine,

2. Organizational and technological flexibility, diversity 

and redundancy as well as technological versatility and 

changeability,

3. Flexibility in command and cognitive skills, consisting of 

mental flexibility and flexible command, and

4. Fast learning, including a rapid circulation of lessons.14

While the first two strata describe the development of an army before 

a conflict and the last one is aimed at learning either during or after a 
4

conflict, the third stratum describes the reaction to surprise caused by 

technological or doctrinal change during a conflict.

The stratum of cognitive skill and command and control flexibility thus describes the effect that different armies seek to achieve when 

planning meets the reality of warfare. Consequently, it constitutes an 

answer to the challenges Carl von Clausewitz described as resulting 

from the difficulties in gaining proper intelligence. Although outside of 

Finkel’s focus, it lends itself to an understanding of how to mitigate the 

effects of surprise from friction and chance.15

National derivations of Auftragstaktik or Mission Command as 

they are used by different armies result from distinct historical developments and habitual as well as deliberate adaptations of the idea that decentralized execution of operations best answers the above-mentioned 

challenges to military commanders. This work uses the Prusso-German 

concept of Auftragstaktik, the conceptual ancestor of the doctrine used 

today by many armies, as the comparative model for historical analysis.

Initiative

Finkel describes two elements in his third stratum: “Command flexibility [which] grants the commander the freedom to make on-the-spot 

decisions”16 and cognitive flexibility, referring to the trait of a military 

commander “to respond quickly to battlefield contingencies by improvising solutions that result in rapid recovery.”17 While cognitive flexibility is a function of the selection and education of officers, in the 

context of this study, command flexibility is defined by Auftragstaktik

doctrine and its contemporary interpretations.

Defining the term “initiative” sets up some challenges. German 

doctrine literally refers to initiative in the context of the US Army’s 

definition of operational initiative.18 Other terms used in this context 

are freedom in the way subordinate commanders execute their missions 

and/or deviate from published orders. In the absence of a German doctrinal definition, initiative within Finkel’s above-mentioned framework 

for purposes of this work will be understood as the actions resulting 

from the combination of both cognitive and command flexibility. This 

basic definition for initiative will be categorized and related to the other 

terms, as reflected in the German Army philosophy of Auftragstaktik, in 

the following section.

The basic definition also corresponds to the US Army’s definition of 

“individual initiative–[t]he willingness to act in the absence of orders, 

when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen 
5

opportunities or threats arise”19 and the description of “disciplined 

initiative, . . . action in absence of orders, when existing orders no longer 

fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise”20 as 

used in US Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, Mission 

Command.

Categories of Initiative

As indicated above, initiative in Bundeswehr doctrine is not explicitly defined, nor are the cases and circumstances in which it is to be 

executed narrowly prescribed. This condition results from its generally 

more descriptive character compared to US Army doctrine. A full comprehension of the character of Auftragstaktik can thus only be achieved 

by the study of doctrine combined with experience gained through 

military training and education. This section categorizes three different forms of initiative contained in the concept of Auftragstaktik. The 

three forms are determined by the conditions set for their execution; 

the degree of freedom in relation to the higher commander’s directive 

as represented by his intent; and the mission given to the subordinate.21

At its most basic level, initiative is the commander’s leeway to 

execute a mission on his own terms. Based on the higher commander’s intent, which depicts how the operation is to unfold in terms of a 

scheme of maneuver and which objectives are to be achieved, subordinate commanders analyze their mission and identify their essential 

contribution to the superior’s operation. Within this framework, Auftragstaktik grants subordinate commanders wide leeway over methods 

of execution, though the degree of freedom of action depends on the 

type of mission. 

Constituting a general rule (and a core element of Auftragstaktik), 

there are no preset conditions in the execution of this form of initiative, 

but it also remains constrained within the boundaries of the unit’s mission. Compared to the US system of mission command, similarities are 

visible. In practice, German orders tend to be limited to the bare minimum of tasks and one purpose per unit. The US system of assigning 

tasks, which each include detailed directives and a purpose, is much 

more prescriptive and restrictive.22

The second category of initiative is derived from the acknowledgement that the situation in a battle can change to such an extent that the 

changes may render a higher commander’s plan obsolete. The doctrinal 

requirement for this is a fundamental change in the situation, which

occurs when the conditions or assumptions on which the mission was 
6

based no longer exist. The concept of fundamental change in the situation also includes the necessity for rapid action and the inability to 

obtain or wait for the superior commander’s decision. If it becomes 

necessary to deviate from the mission, the higher commander’s intent 

remains the basis for subordinate commander’s decisions. Deviations 

from the mission have to be reported as soon as possible, and the acting 

commander will be held responsible accordingly.

While conducting an assessment of the situation during an operation, commanders have to determine whether a fundamental change in 

the situation has occurred; in other words, would the commander have 

given the same mission had he known how the situation would develop?

This form of initiative is bound to both the fundamental change 

in the situation and the inability to communicate with the higher commander based on either a time-critical reaction or the loss of communication. Nevertheless, it remains constrained by the higher commander’s intent. While the US Army acknowledges that commanders deviate 

from orders when those orders no longer fit the situation (a concept 

similar to the German fundamental change in situation), the search for 

and action upon exceptional information is no longer defined in ADRP 

6-0.23

The third form of initiative is based on a deeper insight into and an 

understanding of the respective unit’s situation. As we will see in the 

historical studies, this can consist of an extraordinary opportunity presenting itself, one outside the boldest imagination of the superior when 

he was formulating his intent. The other scenario is when a military 

action will only result in additional losses, which are out of proportion 

to the contribution to the success of the higher commander’s operation 

or which would result in the breakdown of a unit’s ability to fight as an 

organized body.

This latter possibility is not codified in doctrine but represents a 

logical extension of the concept of fundamental change in situation, as 

described above. As such it is bound to the professional understanding 

of an unfolding battle and the chances, risks, and limitations resulting 

from deviating from the higher commander’s intent. As with the second 

form of initiative, the situation has to require time-critical reaction and 

timely prior communication with the higher commander must be impossible. US Army doctrine does not encompass this form of initiative. 

However, the application of mission command in the absence of a clear 
7

concept is described in a sufficiently abstract manner to potentially allow for this third category of deviation from orders.

Additionally, no German soldier is legally or morally obligated to 

follow orders that represent a misdemeanor; indeed, German soldiers 

are obligated to disobey orders resulting in a criminal offense.24 As 

those are legal rules, acting under such legal circumstances is not considered to be initiative-based in the above-stated definition, and therefore this subject area is not discussed in this work.

Phasing Model

This thesis covers close to 200 years of philosophical evolution in 

the Prussian and German Armies. Changes to doctrine or in the officer 

corps’ collective understanding of Auftragstaktik in the four different 

armies of this time period did not always go hand-in-hand with the major political events; personalities and the conduct of warfare exercised 

greater influence. This suggests using a phased model to identify major 

developments in the field of initiative.

1. The emergence of Auftragstaktik, from Clausewitz’s understanding of war to the total initiative of field commanders in Moltke’s age and World War I, 1806-1918;

2. Low tactical level initiative in the synchronized warfare of 

World War I, 1915-1918;

3. An army shaped for initiative versus detailed tactical control by Hitler, 1919-1945; and

4. The ethical component of initiative–responsibility for the 

preservation of units to Innere Führung, 1941-1955.

As described above, initiative is a means to counter surprise or the 

unexpected. While the first form of initiative is supposed to constitute 

the normal interaction between different levels within the army, the 

latter two forms for the sake of coordination are bound to specific 

exceptional circumstances. Doctrine is aimed at informing the processes 

of planning and conducting operations in conditions that are either 

Category Degree of Freedom Conditions

1 Within Unit’s Mission None

2 Within Higher Commander’s Intent Fundamental Change in Situation

3 Within Professional Assessment Not Specified

Table 1. Overview of the Three Forms of Initiative. Source: Created by author.
8

known or can reasonably be anticipated. Countering exceptional and 

unexpected circumstances naturally cannot be described to a full extent. 

Hence, analyzing doctrine alone will not suffice to meet the goal of this 

work. The analysis of the different phases will therefore also be based 

upon the manner of execution of operations, doctrinal documents, and 

publications of influential leaders, as well as the external framework of 

the armed forces in each of the four periods.
9

Notes

1. Robert M. Citino, The German Way of War, From the Thirty Years’ War to the 

Third Reich (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 116-117.

2. MacGregor Knox, “Mass Politics and Nationalism as Military Revolution: The 

French Revolution and After,” in The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050, ed. 

MacGregor Knox and Murray Williamson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 

2001), 58-66.

3. Knox, “Mass Politics and Nationalism as Military Revolution,” 60. The size 

of the armies Frederick the Great commanded for a single battle did not extend the 

approximately 60,000 men of the battle of Hohenfriedeberg in 1745. The average 

number of forces was between 20,000 (Mollwitz and Rossbach) and 37,000 

(Zorndorf). See Citino, The German Way of War, 37-91.

4. Peter Paret, “Napoleon and the Revolution in War,” in Makers of Modern 

Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ; 

Princeton University Press, 1986), 125.

5. Knox, “Mass Politics and Nationalism as Military Revolution,” 69.

6. Knox, “Mass Politics and Nationalism as Military Revolution,” 72.

7. From the German perspective, the armed forces in the different epochs and 

with the different political systems are seen as distinct. Therefore the term German 

armies between 1806 and 1955 incorporates the (imperial) German Army, the 

Reichswehr, the Army within the Wehrmacht, and (post World War II) the Heer within 

the Bundeswehr. The National People’s Army of eastern Germany was founded in 

1956 and is not part of the analysis within this thesis.

8. Hugo Friedrich Philipp Johann Freytag-Loringhoven, Das Exerzier-Reglement 

für die Infanterie vom 29. Mai 1906 Kriegsgeschichtlich Erläutert (Berlin: Ernst 

Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1906), 6.

9. US Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 

6-0, Mission Command (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 

2012), 1-1.

10. The detailed discussion of the development of early warfare from group 

hunting methods and ist tools to ancient armies with designated technology is far 

beyond the possibilities of this work. For a comprehensive portrait of the use of horses 

as an example for the technological struggle for advantages in warfare, back to 3200-

3100 BC, see Louis A. DiMarco, War Horse, A History of the Military Horse and 

Rider (Yardley, PA: Westholme Publishing, 2008).

11. The five principle foundations of the western way of war are reliance on 

superior technology, discipline, aim for decisive victory, ability to change but also to 

conserve military practices, and the power to finance those changes. Geoffrey Parker, 

ed., Cambridge Illustrated History, Warfare (New York: Cambridge University Press, 

1995), 1-6.

12. Meir Finkel, On Flexibility, Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal 

Surprise on the Battlefield (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 2.

13. Finkel, On Flexibility, 2.

14. Finkel, On Flexibility, 2-4.

15. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret 

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 117, 119-120.

16. Finkel, On Flexibility, 99.

17. Finkel, On Flexibility, 98.
10

18. US Department of the Army ADRP 1-02, Terms and Military Symbols, 

defines operational initiative as “[t]he setting or dictating the terms of action 

throughout an operation.”

19. US Department of the Army, ADRP 1-02, Terms and Military Symbols, 

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, November 2012): 1-20.

20. US Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0, 2-4.

21. For a comprehensive analysis of the concept of Auftragstaktik see Jochen 

Wittmann, Auftragstaktik – Just a Command Technique or the Core Pillar of 

Mastering the Military Operational Art? (Berlin, Germany: Carola Hartmann 

Miles–Verlag, 2012). Wittman in chapter 2.3.2 also describes three different “cases” 

describing the leeway of subordinate commanders, his model however lacks precision 

and detail, the reference to assigned and implied tasks does not reflect the concept of 

Auftragstaktik which is focused on the higher commander’s intent, the mission and the 

essential contribution or mission essential task to the higher commander’s concept of 

operations.

22. US Department of the Army, ADRP 6-0, 2-22.

23. While US Department of the Army, ADRP 6-0, 2-19 only states that 

“Commanders deviate from orders only when they are unlawful, risk the lives of 

Soldiers, or when orders no longer fit the situation,” the term exceptional information 

is not used. The concept of exceptional information as defined in FM 6-0 requires the 

staff and subordinate commanders to search for exceptional information, “information 

that would have answered one of the commander’s critical information requirements 

if the requirement for it had been foreseen and stated as a commander’s critical 

information requirement.” US Department of the Army, Field Manual 6-0, Mission 

Command (Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, September 2011), A-29. 

This concept aims at countering the same occasions as the fundamental change in 

situation concept, however it is in US doctrine not linked to initiative.

24. Soldatengesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 30. Mai 2005 

(BGBl. I S. 1482), das durch Artikel 6 des Gesetzes vom 11. Juni 2013 (BGBl. I S. 

1514) geändert worden ist: § 11.
11

Chapter 2

The Emergence of Auftragstaktik, from 

Clausewitz’s Understanding of War to the 

Total Initiative of Field Commanders in 

Moltke’s Age and World War I

In general, one does well to order no more than is absolutely necessary and to avoid planning beyond the situations one can foresee. 

These change very rapidly in war. Seldom will orders that anticipate 

far in advance and in detail succeed completely to execution. . .

The higher the authority, the shorter and more general will the 

orders be. The next lower command adds what further precision appears necessary. The detail of execution is left to the verbal order, to 

the command. Each thereby retains freedom of action and decision 

within his authority.1

 – Helmut Karl Bernhard von Moltke, 

Instructions for Large Unit Commanders (1869)

The spirit of the Prussian and later German officer corps in the 19th 

Century finds no better explanation than in the words of the greatest 

proponent of that spirit: von Moltke. His influence was so pervasive 

that the last decades of that century are known as “the age of Moltke.” 

The culture that Moltke personified was the direct result of the reform process born of the near-extinction of Prussia following Napoleon’s victory at Jena and Auerstädt. The change process in the Prussian 

Army included the creation of the General Staff, the introduction of 

higher education for officers, and changes in force structure, equipment, accession and retention of manpower, and many other aspects.2

The potential for change and the constraints placed on reform reflected 

the internal struggle between members of conservative and reactionary 

groups on one side and the reformers, most notably Gneisenau, Scharnhorst, and Hermann von Boyen, on the other.

Overshadowing the internal struggle in the armed forces was the 

conflict between King Frederick William IV and the democratic movement over constitutional rights and the form of government. The Prussian Army, viewed with suspicion by democrats since 1806, became 

a focus of the dispute during and after 1848 when its role as an instrument for the preservation of royal power became evident. This role 

inhibited the ability of the Prussian Army to professionalize until the 

German-Danish War of 1864 led to a general reconsideration of its role 
12

as an instrument of foreign policy. The war had a calming effect on the 

monarchy’s opponents in the parliament, the effect for which chancellor 

Otto von Bismarck had hoped.3 Against the backdrop of these epic conflicts, the doctrinal development of the army appears little more than a 

sideshow. In fact, it had an impact on Germany, Europe, and the world 

equal to the other two developments.

Initially, it was not Carl von Clausewitz, who held a purely administrative position at the Kriegsakademie, but Scharnhorst and Gneisenau 

who visualized and then created the General Staff. With this instrument 

they then promulgated the “technique of command, characterized by 

clear and comprehensive formulation of objective but always leaving 

room for individual initiative and freedom of action.”4 Clausewitz’s 

book On War formulated and preserved the underlying ideas and hence 

influenced the generation of officers who commanded in the wars from 

1866 and 1870 onwards.5 On War provides the theoretical framework 

for a Prussian understanding of warfare that started and shaped the process of doctrinal development. Its core concepts, including the battle of 

wills, friction, and insufficient knowledge about the situation and the 

resulting chaotic nature of the battlefield, planted the seeds for the idea 

of the creation of an army which more closely resembles a school of 

fish than a piece of well-engineered machinery.

Helmut von Moltke was himself a product of the change processes 

that shaped the command culture of the Army he took over in 1857. 

Commissioned into the Prussian Army in 1822, he attended the Kriegsakademie and served, as was typical for a General Staff officer, in a 

broad variety of positions, including military advisor to the army of the 

Ottoman Empire and high-level positions at the royal court.6

Moltke’s writings, most notably the 1869 Instructions for Large 

Unit Commanders and the 1888 Drill Regulations, which covered units 

up to the brigade, codified the Clausewitzian school of thought and influenced Prusso-German doctrine well beyond World War I. Hence they 

constitute a physical manifestation of the change process started with 

the reforms after 1806; it is from them that we derive the doctrinal concept of Auftragstaktik.

The reform process of the Prussian Army was shaped by Scharnhorst and later Gneisenau. In addition to the operational level need to 

move separately and concentrate at the decisive point, the increased 

firepower of both infantry and artillery required the breakup of the Normaltaktik, the classic linear form of employment of forces in closed 
13

formations. The process of doctrinal adaption at the tactical level, however, went less smoothly. The Chief of the Historical Department of the 

Great General Staff, Hugo Friedrich Philipp Johann von Freytag-Loringhoven, in 1906 complained about parade-addiction and retro-tactical 

developments during the long peacetime of the first half of the nineteenth century and even after the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian 

wars.7

The developments shown above are reflected in the structure and 

content of doctrine as it evolved after 1806. The 1812 Drill Regulations 

for the infantry, the capstone doctrine document developed largely by 

General Ludwig Yorck von Wartenburg, remained focused on battlefield employment of forces, drill style, from single soldier to brigade 

level.8 It did not differentiate between parade and battle drill, but introduced to the Prussian Army novelties such as skirmishers, new assault 

formations using infantry columns, and stressed combined arms with 

cavalry and artillery in a supporting role for the infantry.9 The chapter 

about skirmish tactics included recommendations about the need for 

low-level initiative and actions upon one’s own judgment of the situation.10 The manual states: “The soldier is in most cases on his own, 

no mechanistic formation guides his movement. An outstanding marksmanship, physical agility, judgment, ruse, boldness at the right place, 

and self-confidence have to be his qualities.”11

Despite a near doubling in size, the 1847 regulations represented 

a regression compared to its predecessor. It offered no innovations, 

confining its discussions to the employment of forces to prescriptive 

and mechanistic forms.12 The chapter about skirmish tactics remained 

unchanged until 1867.13 True evolution occurred only in 1876; the updates, based on the experiences of the Franco-Prussian War, renewed 

the emphasis on flexibility in maneuvers based on the increased firepower of both artillery and infantry.14 As a result of the more decentralized arrayal of forces, the independence of officers, non-commissioned 

officers, and soldiers in skirmish lines is stressed.15

All leaders of skirmishers must constantly observe the enemy 

and the terrain features, in order to determine how the skirmish 

line or a part of it can best advance towards the enemy, if and 

how an encirclement or a flanking attack can be executed, or a 

weakness of the enemy can be exploited.16
14

At the tactical level, the need to supplement the command word 

by an order was accepted, to allow for clarity about the purpose of a 

tactical action.17

The 1888 drill regulations distinguished for the first time between 

battle drill and parade drill. In another departure from the past, this version also devoted considerable space to discussions of fundamental realities of warfare and leadership in combat. They reflected Clausewitzian 

thinking as well as Moltke’s instructions for large unit commanders (as 

quoted at the beginning of this chapter) and extended these instructions 

to leaders at the lowest level, declaring autonomy to be fundamental 

to success in warfare.18 Drill provides discipline, morale, and the basic 

skills necessary for the employment of units according to the situation 

and necessities of the battle. Instead of being an end in itself, as in prior 

doctrine, drill was envisioned as a means for realistic – kriegsgemäße 

– exercises.19 Junior officers must position themselves and be willing 

to exercise initiative to exploit opportunities, while non-commissioned 

officers bore the responsibility for the employment of the soldiers of 

their squad.20 Battalion, regimental, and brigade commanders assigned 

missions to their subordinates but left the method of accomplishment to 

them while ensuring their understanding of the cohesive concept of the 

battle plan.21 The 1888 manual describes a prototype of the fundamentals of mission type orders stating:

[The battalion commander] executes the battle through missions he assigns to his companies. Only on the occasion of obvious misunderstandings or mistakes that could draw the battle 

in an unintended direction, the direct override in the platoons 

of single companies is due. . . His actions have to be aimed at 

retaining the common scheme of the companies. The companies 

for their part aim upon accomplishment of their missions also to 

the common scheme.22

The foreword of the 1888 regulation, signed by Emperor William II, 

underscores the importance of independence of thought and action by 

military leaders at all levels. It states the need not to restrict the leeway 

deliberately provided by the regulations, threatening offenders with 

enforced retirement. More specifically, the need to foster battlefield 

initiative is underlined by the king’s admonition that a breach of the 

rules of the regulation’s drill and parade elements should be punished. 

In contrast, the “mistaken understanding of part two [battle tactics] is to 

be corrected in an educating manner.”23 The 1888 regulations formally 
15

establish the philosophy of Auftragstaktik as a general rule for command 

and control at the tactical level.

The 1906 drill regulations continued the trend towards individualization of the soldier on the battlefield and independent action of smaller units. The company became the largest element of employment in 

drill.24 In addition to the autonomy of soldiers and leaders at all levels 

praised in the earlier doctrine, non-commissioned officers were now 

expected to assume the role of their superior officers if the situation 

demands.25 This version of the regulation explained Auftragstaktik, in 

a form comparable to that presented at the outset of this paper, in this 

way:

Orders (Anordnungen) given from rearward commands will 

easily be made obsolete by the events. Timely action is often 

only possible upon independent decision. Subordinate commanders must recognize at the same time that they are required 

to solve the tactical problem (Gefechtsaufgabe) as intended by 

the higher commander [emphasis in the original].26

 In selecting historical examples to support the principles of the 

1906 regulations, the Chief of the Historic Section of the Prussian General Staff, Hugo Friedrich Philipp Johann von Freytag-Loringhoven, 

focused mainly on the employment of forces under the circumstances 

of the technological developments of the late nineteenth century weapons and the new battle tactics. Auftragstaktik is described in a manner 

that makes it clear it was an established philosophy. The need for proper 

orders, which reflect the intent and coordinate the movements of cooperating units, is emphasized, as well as the need for precise reporting 

and proper communications.27

 The high demands put upon leaders as a result of tactical and 

technical developments in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, reflected in the above definition, leads seamlessly into a discussion of the 

concept of initiative. The 1906 regulation explained:

The foremost quality of a leader remains the willingness to 

take responsibility (Verantwortungsfreudigkeit). An officer 

would demonstrate faulty understanding of this concept, if one 

aimed at making arbitrary decisions without regard for his role 

in larger operations or by not precisely following given orders 

and letting a “know-it-all” manner take the place of obedience.

But in cases in which the subordinate has to say to himself that 

the originator of an order lacks the ability properly to direct 
16

execution, or where the order has been rendered obsolete by the 

events, it becomes an obligation of the subordinate not to obey 

or to alter the execution of orders received and report this to the 

superior. The full responsibility for not obeying the [original] 

order remains with him. . . 

All leaders have to constantly stay aware and inculcate in their 

subordinates the knowledge that forbearance and dereliction 

weigh more heavily than mistakes in the selection of an action [emphasis in the original].28

According to this edition, the independence of subordinate leaders is 

to be less clearly defined; the risk of mistaking caprice for initiative is 

pointed out even while on the other hand autonomy is seen as a prerequisite for success in battle.29 In a similar vein, the 1906 version for the 

Bavarian Army authorized by Prince Regent Luitpold includes a foreword that stresses the need for realistic battle drills and more leeway 

at lower echelons in the conduct of this training.30 Unlike the larger 

discussion of Auftragstaktik, Freytag-Loringhoven apparently did not 

consider initiative to be important enough to clarify it with historical 

examples. The necessity of a balance between independent action and 

synchronized operations is mentioned, but as a whole seems to have 

been less important than the new tactics countering the technological 

developments.

Operational Level Doctrine

The first doctrine for the conduct of operational level warfare 

was created by the 1869 Instructions for Large Unit Commanders. 

Reprinted in 1885 and 1910 with minor changes, the manual covered 

the echelons from division up to the field army, and its principles shaped 

the German Army’s understanding of the command of large units well 

into the 1930s.31 Drafted by junior General Staff officers, the writing 

process was closely monitored and the draft was in parts intensively 

edited by Moltke before it was submitted to the king.32 Examples of 

intensive editing are present in Chapter I – “General Remarks” – and 

Chapter VI – “Command and Control,” which point out the necessity 

for higher level commanders to concentrate on their function and not to 

interfere with their subordinates’ responsibilities by managing details, 

as the quote at the beginning of this chapter illustrates.33 While this 

aimed at creating command flexibility, Chapter I stresses Clausewitz’s 

friction when it states that officers will often face situations where, in 

the absence of orders, they have to act upon their own understanding 
17

of their superior’s intent, hence using cognitive flexibility. The manual 

describes the tension between initiative of commanders and the necessity 

for unified control over large units. While commanders at every level 

are obliged to restore the communications with their superior during 

periods of disruption, the manual points out that 

[t]here are many situations in which the officer must act according to his own judgment. It would be absurd if he waited for 

orders in moments where often no orders could be given. As 

a rule, however, his work is the most profitable for the whole 

when he carries out the will of his superior.34

The second chapter of the 1910 edition, “Leadership,” places responsibility for the unified effort of multiple field armies to the army 

commanders themselves. They are obliged to act within the intent of 

the supreme commander (oberste Feldherr). The manual postulates 

that only subordinates who permanently consider this framework can 

help overcoming the inherent difficulties of the control of mass armies. 

Initiative is explained by means of a reference to the importance of 

tactical victories in relation to the general mission. For commanders of 

smaller units the “old rule of marching towards the sound of the guns”35

remains the perpetual guidance, while higher-level commanders must 

analyze the potential consequences of their decisions on the overall aim 

– outflanking, envelopment, and annihilation of the enemy.36

Overall, the doctrine written and influenced by Moltke sets the 

tone for the Prusso-German command philosophy of Auftragstaktik. It 

gave official sanction to the understanding of warfare as expressed by 

Clausewitz’s On War. It also offered solutions to the challenges resulting from the vastly growing geographic extension of the armies and the 

need to disperse those forces to avoid casualties based on the increased 

firepower of advanced weapons. His Instructions for Large Unit Commanders and the 1888 drill regulations formally expressed the mature 

understanding that both senior and junior officers have to act within the 

higher commander’s intent upon their judgment. Two different developments can be seen: first, the recognition of the requirement to empower leaders at the operational level with sufficient latitude to cope 

with the increased size of the army and the geographical expansion of 

the battlefield; and second, the evolution away from autonomously acting soldiers in skirmish lines to independence of action for leaders at all 

levels to allow for initiative.
18

Execution of Initiative

Prussians and Germans participated in several conflicts between 

1806 and World War I. The larger ones were the defeats of Napoleon 

following the battles of Leipzig in 1813 and Waterloo in 1815, the Austro-Prussian War in 1866, the Franco-Prussian War in 1870-1871, and 

World War I.37 The two campaigns against Napoleon were fought as 

part of a larger multinational coalition and took place at a time when 

the Prussian reforms were only partly in effect. Therefore, this section 

will analyze only the Danish War, the Austro-Prussian War, the Franco-Prussian War and those parts of World War I which included and 

maintained the capability for operational maneuver. In a first step, historic case studies selected as exemplary by the Prussian General Staff 

for publication in Volume 4 of Moltke’s Militärische Werke will be reviewed.38 After analyzing this official picture of Auftragstaktik, a subsequent inquiry will look other facets of the execution of initiative, which 

are not part of the official picture.

The Official Picture of Auftragstaktik

As an historical example to illustrate the findings of Moltke’s essay 

Zusammensetzung der Hauptquartiere-Wahl des Feldherrn-Freiheit des 

Handelns (Composition of Headquarters, Selection of the Commander, 

Freedom of Action), the General Staff selected the decisions of General 

Karl Friedrich von Steinmetz, commander of the Prusso-German First 

Army during the border battles of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870.39

Tasked to envelop and strike in the flank and rear of French forces fixed 

by Second Army, he was ordered on 3 August 1870 to cross the Saar 

River and concentrate at the right of Second Army. He was directed as 

follows:

Dilatory advance of the French justifies assumption that the 

Second Army can be concentrated on the 6th instant in front of 

the forest zone at Kaiserslautern. If rapid advance of enemy cannot be prevented, concentration of Second Army to take place 

behind the Lauter. Combined action of both armies in the battle intended; First Army from St. Wendel and Baumholder. His 

Majesty orders that First Army concentrates on the 4th against 

Tholey. Tomorrow Third Army crosses frontier at Weissenburg. 

General offensive intended.40

Instead of conducting this enveloping movement, Steinmetz moved directly against the French at Spicheren, thus blocking the advance routes 

reserved for the Second Army and separating its main body from the 
19

advance elements.41 Although this caused a logistical nightmare and ruined the plans for a Kesselschlacht – the “holy grail” of contemporary 

European military science – just inside the French border, Moltke’s 

analysis of actual events takes pains to explain that the royal command’s (hence Moltke’s) shift from general directives to explicit orders 

was required by the necessity of the combined advance of the armies 

that could only be coordinated by the king. The case study points out 

that such direct orders were only justified by the need to coordinate the 

movements of multiple armies, but that the freedom of execution of the 

orders by the army commanders was not to be limited.42 No judgment 

about the often-criticized Steinmetz can be found in Moltke’s critique, 

although the various occasions of explaining the concept of operations 

are stressed.43 In the days following Steinmetz’s independent action, 

Moltke ensured that the directions and roads assigned to the different 

armies would be ordered and changed only by royal command.44 The 

tendency to use whichever unoccupied road in sight, disregarding the 

traffic control measures in the process, seems to have been general behavior by commanders at all levels.

Describing the events surrounding the battle of Columbey-Nouilly 

(also known as Borny-Colombey) on 14 August 1870, the case study 

explains again the need to coordinate the operations of the First and 

Second Army. General Steinmetz’s now much more passive and cautious conduct of operations is described in a very balanced way. Steinmetz’s attempt to preserve his independence by hiding the position of 

his headquarters is the only point of obvious criticism.45 The intensive 

interaction between Second Army and the royal headquarters during 

and following the battle of Mars-la-Tour and Vionville in contrast is depicted as exemplary.46 It included direct tactical control of the different 

corps engaged in the battle – “[b]ecause of the gravity of the situation 

had become clear, his majesty the king decided to proceed to the battlefield with his entire staff early on August 17.”47 For the following 

pursuit the case study states: “All German armies received only general directives. The broad freedom of action, which previously could 

be granted only to the Third Army and which had to be more or less 

curtailed in the cases of the First and Second armies after 11 August, 

was restored.”48

The pursuit of the French toward Sedan and the conduct of operations in the following months are described more superficially as 

interplay between independent operations and “[d]irect orders from 

the royal headquarters [that] restricted the freedom of decision of the 
20

commanders only when the king’s views were not carried out, or when 

reports of enemy activities made direct intervention unavoidable.”49

There seems to have been no further friction between the royal headquarters and the subordinate commanders worth mentioning to explain 

nature of the command relationship.

To illustrate Moltke’s essay on battle – Die Schlacht – several historical examples were selected to exemplify his findings about the independence of leaders. The first case study briefly describes the advance 

of the Prussian I Corps under Prince Friedrich Karl during the 1864 

campaign against Denmark. On 2 February the corps had the mission 

to secure the eight-kilometer wide chokepoint between the Eckernförde 

inlet and the Schlei River in the disputed duchy of Schleswig.50 The 

advance was part of a flanking or enveloping movement against the 

Danish forces defending the main fortifications between the Schlei 

River and the North Sea. The crossing of the river would take place 

at either the fortified town of Missunde or further east at the village 

of Arnis.51 The corps had already reached the chokepoint by 0900 and 

Prince Friedrich Karl decided to advance toward Missunde to avoid 

having to secure the chokepoint against threats from two directions and 

based on an assumption that Danish forces might withdraw when confronted with an energetic surprise thrust.52 This would have allowed for 

an envelopment of the forces defending further west. The published 

analysis reads as follows: “[T]he undertaking against Missunde on that 

day failed; the crossing at Arnis was not accomplished until 6 February. Nevertheless, the decision arrived at independently demonstrates 

a correct appreciation of conditions and the enterprising spirit of the 

commanding general.”53 The extent of appreciation in this assessment 

(as of all historic case studies published by the General Staff) can only 

be identified with deep knowledge about the circumstances and discussions of the General Staff in those days. The example above affirms an 

appreciation for use of initiative by a corps commander engaging his 

next day’s objective prematurely, even though it resulted in a minor 

defeat and nearly 200 casualties. In fact, Moltke himself had written 

essays in December 1862, December 1863, and January 1864 which 

concluded that the river crossing at Missunde would be very difficult. 

In hindsight he later stated the crossing was impossible.54 Appreciating 

the initiative and independent action within the higher commander’s 

intent but against Moltke’s professional opinion increases the weight of 

this assessment and demonstrates the value the General Staff saw in it.
21

The second case study attached to the battle essay is the account of 

the unfolding battle of Königgrätz. On the evening of the 2 July 1866, 

patrols of the Prussian First Army had identified the positions of what 

they thought was a major portion of the Austrian Army at Königgrätz 

and the neighboring heights. The commander of First Army decided 

to maneuver his divisions into attack positions early the next morning, 

informing Second Army about the situation and his plan and asking for 

support by available units. The messenger to Second Army was dispatched at 2130 and shortly afterwards the commander’s aide-de-camp 

was sent to the royal headquarters where the king and Moltke were 

awakened and informed. Moltke assessed that they had the whole Austrian Army in front of them and that First Army, attacking alone, would 

not be successful. It was decided that First Army was to frontally fix the 

Austrians and that Second Army would attack the enemy’s right flank.55

The king’s aide-de-camp left the royal headquarters for First Army 

conveying that decision to its I Corps while passing its command post 

on the way.56 He reached First Army headquarters at 0400.57 Although 

the letter informing I Corps included permission to assemble the forces 

and individually advance before arrival of orders by his direct superior, 

I Corps’ commanding general, Albert Ferdinand von Bonin, decided 

to wait for these orders. As a result, the vanguard of First Army did 

not begin moving until 0930.58 In contrast to this hesitant behavior, the 

commander of 1st Guards Division, General Constantin von Alvensleben, was described as exercising initiative – marching to the sound of 

the guns without waiting for orders.59 He is described as a role model, 

along with the division commanders belonging to the VI Corps.60 The 

differences are obvious; while von Alvensleben was able to bring relief 

during the first crisis of the battle, when around noon the Prussian units 

fighting in the Swiepwald were on the verge of defeat, I Corps’ vanguard arrived just in time to contain the frantic attack of the Austrian reserve corps. By his actions von Alvensleben kept the withdrawal road to 

Königgrätz open.61 The hours lost by the hesitancy of von Bonin show 

the benefits of the fundamental rule to march to the sounds of the guns. 

Von Alvensleben’s conduct was effectively turned into state-approved 

command doctrine when William I conferred upon him Prussia’s highest decoration for bravery and valor, the Ordre Pour le Mérite.

The third historical example covers the battles on the frontier at the 

beginning of the Franco-Prussian War. The illustration concentrates on 

the decisions and operations of commanders at the corps and division 

level, leading towards the bloody battles and victories of Wörth and 
22

Spicheren. Two different principles of Prussian operational art are 

depicted as forming the motivation for the different commanders to 

exercise initiative while being exposed to an unclear enemy situation 

is attributed to two different principles of Prussian operational art: the 

aim to make or stay in contact with the adversary, and to concentrate 

forces for the battle – marching to the sound of the guns.62 The case 

study explains the reasons different commanders acted the way they 

did. It shows how opportunities were used, for example at the Saar 

River crossing, when an attack on the hills at Spicheren was necessary 

to extend that bridgehead to an appropriate depth.63 These actions are 

contrasted with the negative example of the behavior of the enemy 

commanders, a contrast Citino describes as “French passivity and 

. . . inexorable Prussian flanking maneuvers, which simply stretched 

the French line until it broke.”64 It is seemingly the stark contrast 

between the sometimes unimaginative approaches of the tactical level 

commanders, resulting in high casualties – at Spicheren, for example, 

the Prussians lost two men for every French casualty compared to a rate 

of four Austrians killed or wounded per Prussian casualty at Königgrätz 

– against Moltke’s praised operational level maneuver which created 

the background for the selection of this case study.65 The case study also 

fails to mention Moltke’s own criticism about the battles stated shortly 

after the war in his Overview about the Events from July 15th to August 

17th 1870.

66

This analysis of historical examples is far from complete in covering the publications written, selected or edited by Moltke or in his name 

by the military historical section of the General Staff. Still, one dominant theme is obvious: initiative based upon independent decisions of 

commanders was depicted as an important value in itself, even with 

disregard to the outcome of the action, as shown by the examples of 

Steinmetz and Prince Friedrich Karl. The aim of such historical examples illustrating Moltke’s essays was to foster initiative within the ranks 

without fear of judgments made in hindsight.

The final piece of official history to be analyzed in this context is 

the historic explanation of the 1906 drill manual by the Chief of the 

Historical Section, Freytag-Loringhoven. It provides historical examples for the different topics comprising Part Two of the manual, the 

battle.67 Auftragstaktik and initiative are not illustrated with distinct 

case studies, but they can be found described as side aspects of two 

historical examples. The author claimed that the execution of initiative 

was to be based on thorough assessment of the situation, which can 
23

only be achieved by officers whose understanding of combined warfare 

and operational concept of larger units occurs early in his career.68 To 

avoid arbitrary actions and initiative “beyond the right limits,” the aim 

of the case studies is to illustrate these two prerequisites.69 The first case 

study (depicting initiative) uses examples from the Russo-Japanese 

War of 1904-1905 to discuss dispersed formations and their effects on 

command and control, firepower, and protection against enemy fire. It 

describes the need for independent action by lower echelon leaders and 

individual soldiers, but stresses that the will to stay linked within the 

units and to the next higher echelon must be ingrained into soldiers and 

leaders at all levels.70 The second case study discusses the requirements 

for orders and the leeway of subordinates based on the example of the 

Battle of St. Privat on 18 August 1870. Evidence from this case study 

holds that orders should encompass adequate guidance, especially in 

terms of the intent or purpose of the operation, boundaries on the battlefield as well as communication and coordination.71 Subordinates are 

“never to lose sight of the common concept of the battle (gemeinsamen 

Gefechtszweck).”72 Without being specific about individual commander’s decisions during the battle, the case study is most likely referring to 

General Steinmetz’s premature frontal attack east of Gravelotte, which 

resulted in the unnecessary slaughter of the Prussian First Army before 

the decisive flanking attack of the Guard Corps and the Saxon Corps 

had even started.

Overall, the 1906 analysis is much more aware of the risks and 

limitations coming with independent actions of commanders at the 

different levels. While the need for dispersed formations is stressed, 

especially given the increased firepower available to commandersat

the beginning of the twentieth century, the author stressed the need to 

maintain communications between the echelons. Initiative is no longer 

depicted as a value in itself; its extent has to be shaped to the necessities 

and possibilities of the specific situation on the battlefield.

Additional Facets of the Execution of Initiative

Two additional facets of initiative have to be reviewed to complement the execution of initiative: the independent actions of soldiers, 

non-commissioned officers, and junior officers at the lowest tactical 

levels; and developments on the Western Front leading to the race to 

the sea, and the loss of operational level maneuver.

It is interesting that in contrast to the fact that the different doctrinal 

sources stressed the need for independent actions at the lowest level 
24

as early as 1812, there were no historical examples chosen to illustrate 

how this initiative should look. On a regular basis, sources covering the 

above-mentioned wars included accounts that battalions or regiments 

lost most or all of their officers during the battle. The increased precision of infantry weapons, which allowed for deliberate targeting of 

leaders, led some soldiers to downplay the physical danger of battle. 

As one enlisted Prussian soldier at Königgrätz sarcastically observed: 

“Nah, we’ll come out of this in fine shape. The dogs are aiming only 

at our first lieutenants.”73 Despite the commonplace nature of leader 

losses, reports that those high losses led to a breakdown of units are 

rare. Moltke wrote that during the battle of Spicheren, infantry brigades 

with losses of more than 20 percent and a single battalion with 33 percent casualties were still capable of attacking. Among all branches, out 

of the 6,909 casualties in that battle, 234 were officers.74 While representing less than 3 percent of the total casualties, it is a near-certainty 

that among those casualties, infantry company grade officers were most 

likely over-represented. Understood in that light, it very likely meant 

the near-extinction of junior officers in the front line battalions. Hence 

it seems to be safe to state that the efforts to engrain a spirit of taking 

the initiative in the absence of orders (or leaders) and train soldiers in a 

realistic way had been successful.

This apparent success may be why the General Staff considered didactic examples unnecessary in the 1887 or 1906 manuals. In addition, 

while regulations required officers to be educated, non-commissioned 

officers and soldiers of the rank-and-file possessed only basic education; while able to read and write, they were probably not too keen 

on reading professional texts and weren’t expected to have done so. 

Thus, initiative at the lowest tactical level remained limited in scope: 

a company with one platoon in the skirmish line was approximately 

150 steps wide and deep.75 Initiative would consist of soldiers utilizing 

the terrain in closest proximity, firing independently, keeping eye contact with the leaders, and moving in the assigned direction in line with 

the unit and continuing the assault or defense when the leaders were 

killed. Hence there was little in the way of the education of the common soldiery about which to write. In addition, acting independently 

per se threatened the cohesion and discipline of the army. Provided in 

carefully measured doses during training it was a successful technique, 

but written examples might have had the unintended consequence of 

dampening the devotion and discipline necessary to move over open 

terrain toward enemy lines while sustaining heavy casualties.
25

When World War I started, the German Army went to war with the 

mindset about initiative described in this chapter. It was combat-proven 

in the wars of 1864, 1866, 1870, and validated by the Imperial Japanese Army’s experience in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.76

The planned defense of East Prussia contained all the elements of initiative described in the historical examples from the Franco-Prussian 

War. The campaign plan foresaw luring the Russians, separated by the 

Masurian Lakes and the layout of their railway net, deep into East Prussia where each of the two Russian armies could be defeated in detail. 

The commander of I Corps, General Hermann von François, disregarded the orders issued by Eighth Army commander General Maximilian 

von Prittwitz to defend Königsberg, and decided instead to engage the 

Russian First Army, attacking north of the Masurian Lakes, directly at 

the border. He did not inform army headquarters of his intent beforehand, and fought a successful battle that only became known to the 

higher army when the corps artillery requested ammunition resupply.77

No consequences followed. Three days later the first major battle was 

fought at Gumbinnen, when in accordance with the campaign plan Russian General Rennenkampf’s First Army, attacking in the north, was 

first checked and then defeated the next day.78 General von Prittwitz, 

however, based on reports that the Second Russian Army under General 

Samsonov had crossed the border, lost his nerve and informed the Army 

High Command (Oberste Heeresleitung, OHL) in Koblenz that he had 

decided to break off the battle and had ordered a general withdrawal 

behind the Vistula River.79 This would have jeopardized not only the 

defense of East Prussia – with the united Russian armies being superior 

to the German forces available – but also the campaign plan for the 

Western Front, since the defense of eastern Germany and ultimately 

Berlin would have required the deployment of additional forces from 

the West. Von Prittwitz was relieved along with the chief of staff; Paul 

von Beneckendorff und von Hindenburg and his chief of staff Erich 

Ludendorff took over.

The general withdrawal was not executed; instead, all forces except 

a cavalry division were thrown at the Second Russian Army south of 

the Masurian Lakes. While the envelopment was developing and an 

initial attack into the Russian left flank was to take place, von François 

decided upon his own judgment to delay the attack. He had to be urged 

twice to attack by Ludendorff.80 What followed was a textbook example 

of operational art, the successful envelopment of an unaware enemy, 

disrupting the Second Russian Army. Subsequently the Russian First 
26

Army in the north was driven from East-Prussian soil, although the attempt to decisively defeat it failed. The scheme of independent operations continued on the eastern front for the remainder of the war, the 

sheer width of the terrain and the relatively smaller number of forces 

facilitating operational maneuver by both sides.

On the Western Front, commanders of the seven German armies 

concentrated from north to south along the border enjoyed the same 

leeway as their counterpart in East Prussia. They were to follow a modified version of the so-called Schlieffen Plan – the basic idea was that 

the right wing (First, Second, and Third Army) would wheel into the 

French Army’s left flank and push it against Alsace, Lorraine, and the 

Swiss border.81 The difference between the east and the west was that 

the multi-army operation in the west required synchronization by OHL, 

whereas Eighth Army in East Prussia operated independently. Ignoring 

this need and the restrictions on independent action of subordinated 

commanders his uncle had imposed during the Franco-Prussian War,

the Chief of Staff of the High Command, Helmut Johannes Ludwig 

von Moltke (the younger), kept the headquarters initially in Berlin and 

moved it then to Koblenz and later Luxemburg.82 The subsequent positions were still too far behind the main thrust to allow for effective 

command and control. Molkte accepted the situation because by doing 

it this way he also sought to prevent the mercurial Emperor William II 

from intervening in daily operations. He left the coordination of the advance of First, Second, and Third Armies to the army commanders with 

at first informal and later formal authority in the hands of Second Army’s commander, General Karl von Bülow.83 This odd command structure led to repeated occasions on which the three armies would request 

from each other mutual support or flank protection, and occasions when 

the individual commanders had to weigh the needs for a combined approach against their individual army’s advance while lacking the information required to make a professional assessment.84 A decisive battle 

against the shattered French Fifth Army was prevented because of von 

Bülow’s inability to coordinate a combined approach of the three German armies.85 On the 27 August, Moltke restored the independence of 

Alexander von Kluck’s First Army, which as a result of the losses and 

the distance of 140 kilometers to its railhead was so exhausted that the 

plan to bypass Paris to the west was no longer realistic.86 The increased 

activity of the French and the British Expeditionary Force required close 

coordination of the advancing armies in this decisive phase, but OHL 

in Luxemburg had received no reports from First or Second Army on 
27

1 or 2 September. On the evening of the 2nd Moltke decided, based on 

suspicions, to change the concept of operations and have Second Army 

envelop the French between Verdun and Paris with First Army following as a flank protection. Meanwhile the commander of First Army, 

General von Kluck had – on his own – decided to change the direction 

of advance and conduct an attack into the western flank of Lanrezac’s 

French Fifth Army.87 Von Kluck informed OHL and his neighboring 

armies on 4 September and demanded to be kept informed about their 

operations.88 This change in direction of First Army blocked Second 

Army’s advance and opened the whole German advance to a flanking 

attack from the Paris area. Seeing that risk, Moltke issued an order to 

halt the First and Second Armies and secure the right flank, while Third 

Army was to move up to close a gap in the vicinity of Reims. While 

this order was issued, Third Army’s commander had decided for a day 

of rest on 5 September, a decision he stood by even when he received 

Moltke’s order and was informed that Second Army, his left neighbor, 

was advancing and thereby increasing the gap between the armies to 30 

kilometers.89 It was already too late when, on 5 September, the initial 

visit of Moltke’s emissary Lieutenant Colonel Richard Hentsch to First 

Army’s headquarters for the first time brought the information of the 

general situation together with the knowledge and plans of the commander on the ground. The French attack from Paris had already hit 

First Army’s IV Reserve Corps protecting the right flank.90 Still, the 

lack of the ability and will to communicate prevented a coordinated 

reaction by First and Second Armies, to say nothing of OHL.91 The outcome is well known: French and British forces were able to penetrate 

the gaps between the armies and threaten their flanks. On 9 September, 

Hentsch’s second visit led to von Moltke’s decision to break off the battle and withdraw to a defensive position above the Marne River. Having 

failed to execute the updated version of the Schlieffen Plan, the German 

Army and its opponents settled into static trench warfare characterized 

by an almost complete absence of large unit commander’s initiative 

until the final months of the war.

It is outside of the scope and purpose of this work to discuss the 

details and reasons for the development, which led to the failure of the 

German offensive. What is clear, however, is that the spirit of independent operations by large unit commanders still prevailed at the beginning of World War I. The specific conditions of the Eastern Front, where 

the replacement of Prittwitz by the strong command team of von Hindenburg and Ludendorff, prevented a catastrophe and helped overcome 
28

the difficulties caused by the very independent von François, allowed 

for successful independent operations. In the West, where the need for 

coordination was much greater, the problems arising from overly independent commanders became obvious, and Moltke proved unable to 

resolve them as his uncle had done in 1870.

Conclusion

This chapter has detailed the emergence of Auftragstaktik. Two different factors influenced its development at the tactical and operational 

levels. At the tactical level, the increasing accuracy and firepower of infantry weapons and artillery required the increased dispersal of assault 

formations from the linear tactics to open lines. This came at the price 

of degraded command and control by leaders at the lower tactical echelons. Hence the autonomous conduct of battle and the will to act upon 

one’s own judgment within the purpose of the operation and the higher 

commander’s intent had to be established. The discussion of doctrinal 

development depicted how initially the first category of initiative, the 

autonomy to decide how a mission is fulfilled, was established by 1876. 

The second category of initiative, the independent decision and action 

within the higher commander’s intent, can be found as early as 1888.

The growth of the armies and the increased geographical extension of the battlefield was already established in Napoleon’s time and 

required that commanders at the operational level maneuver independently and move to the sound of the guns for the concentration of 

the armies. The Prussian Army only belatedly introduced this principle with the development of the General Staff officer system and the 

1869 instructions for large unit commanders. Huge efforts were made 

to depict and explain the value of higher commander’s initiative and the 

need for them to make decisions upon their professional judgment, even 

in defiance of written orders, if in their estimate of the situation such 

a deviation was warranted. This cultural shift within the Prussian/German Army contributed in large measure to official acceptance of overly 

independent commanders (e.g, von Francois) who were unwilling to 

accept supporting roles in the battle and unlikely to accept interference 

in their operations by their own higher commands. The independence of 

those commanders lay outside of the initiative model introduced in the 

previous chapter. During the wars of the second half of the nineteenth 

century, fought without contiguous frontlines and the resulting threats 

to the flanks, the negative effects of such arbitrariness were less visible; 

as long as neighboring units would march towards the sound of the 

cannons, battle success was still possible. Moltke the Elder’s dominant 
29

personality counterbalanced any potential negative effects. The 1906 

manual and the historical examples illustrating it stressed the importance of senior commanders’ keeping the concept of operations in sight. 

Its text expresses all three categories of initiative.92 The independent 

commanders mentioned above would argue that all their decisions were 

based upon their professional assessments. The extent to which they, 

based upon incomplete information, created their own reality to justify 

decisions that could also have been made out of ambition or for other 

reasons, remains an open question.
30

Notes

1. Helmut Karl Bernhard von Moltke, “Aus den Verordnungen für die höheren 

Truppenführer vom 24. Juni 1869,” in Moltkes Militärische Werke, Zweiter Theil, Die 

Tätigkeit als Chef des Generalstabs im Frieden, ed. Preußischer Generalstab (Berlin, 

Germany: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1900), 178. Translation as in Daniel J. 

Hughes, ed., Moltke, On the Art of War, Selected Writings, trans. Daniel J Hughes and 

Harry Bell (New York: Random House, 1993), 184-185.

2. For a detailed description of the change process see Gordon A. Craig, The 

Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 

Chapter 2-4.

3. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 169-170.

4. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 63. Clausewitz himself became a 

victim of the struggle between conservative and reform forces in Prussia. Having for 

what seemed to him patriotic reason served in the Russian Army against Napoleon 

in 1812 he was seen as politically unreliable by King Friedrich Wilhelm III. His 

position as administrative director of the Kriegsakademie is often misunderstood as 

him influencing the officer education in the Prussian Army. His work On War, which 

he started writing in this time and which was published in 1832 after being edited by 

his wife, became famous only when Moltke named it as an important source for his 

successes in the wars. See Werner Hahlweg, ed. Vom Kriege, Hinterlassenes Werk 

des Generals Carl von Clausewitz (Bonn, Germany: Ferd. Dümmlers Verlag, 1980), 

29-34, 58.

5. Hahlweg, Vom Kriege, Hinterlassenes Werk des Generals Carl von Clausewitz, 

58.

6. Hughes, Moltke, On the Art of War, 2-3.

7. Freytag-Loringhoven, Das Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie vom 29. Mai 

1906, 3.

8. Preußisches Kriegsministerium, Exerzir-Regelement für die Infanterie 

der Königlich Preußischen Armee (Berlin: Georg Decker Königl. Geh. 

Oberhofbuchdrucker, 1812), v-xiv.

9. Citino, The German Way of War, 130.

10. Preußisches Kriegsministerium, Exerzir-Regelement für die Infanterie der 

Königlich Preußischen Armee, 1812, 103-104.

11. Preußisches Kriegsministerium, Exerzir-Regelement für die Infanterie der 

Königlich Preußischen Armee, 103.

12. Preußisches Kriegsministerium, Exerzir-Reglement für die Infanterie der 

Königlich Preußischen Armee, rev. 25 May 1867 (Berlin: Decker Königl. Geh. 

Oberhofbuchdrucker, 1847), III-XII; Freytag-Loringhoven, Das Exerzier-Reglement 

für die Infanterie vom 29. Mai 1906, 2-3.

13. Preußisches Kriegsministerium, Exerzir-Reglement für die Infanterie 

der Königlich Preußischen Armee, 1847, 154-164, compared to Preußisches 

Kriegsministerium, Exerzir-Regelement für die Infanterie der Königlich Preußischen 

Armee, 1812, 103-115.

14. The 1847 version of the regulations still enforced strict control about 

maneuvers with the exception of the skirmisher line; the changes until 1876 included 

columns down to the level of platoon split in half and sections to avoid the effects of 

enemy fire on closed formations. Preußisches Kriegsministerium, Exerzir-Reglement 

für die Infanterie der Königlich Preußischen Armee, 1847, 91-96.
31

15. Preußisches Kriegsministerium, Exerzir-Regelement für die Infanterie der 

Königlich Preußischen Armee, 137-138, 146, 150, 152-153.

16. Preußisches Kriegsministerium, Exerzir-Regelement für die Infanterie der 

Königlich Preußischen Armee, 146.

17. Preußisches Kriegsministerium, Exerzir-Regelement für die Infanterie der 

Königlich Preußischen Armee, 193-194 see also Freytag-Loringhoven, Das ExerzierReglement für die Infanterie vom 29. Mai 1906, 106-107.

18. Preußisches Kriegsministerium, Exerzir-Reglement für die Infanterie (signed 

1888) (Berlin, Germany: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1889), 109.

19. Preußisches Kriegsministerium, Exerzir-Regelement für die Infanterie, 89-91.

20. Preußisches Kriegsministerium, Exerzir-Regelement für die Infanterie, 109-

110.

21. Preußisches Kriegsministerium, Exerzir-Regelement für die Infanterie, 129-

130, 141.

22. Preußisches Kriegsministerium, Exerzir-Regelement für die Infanterie, 129-

130.

23. Preußisches Kriegsministerium, Exerzir-Regelement für die Infanterie, III.

24. Bayerisches Kriegsministerium, Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie

(Munich, 1906), V-VI. In 1906 Bavaria as a few other German states had still retained 

a war ministry, the Prussian Ministry of War however was the one dominating the 

development of the armed forces in the German Empire seeking interoperability of 

the different state contingents. Both the Bavarian and the Prussian 1906 ExerzierReglement are similar; the Bavarian version is cited here for the lack of the first 16 

pages in the Prussian document the author was able to review.

25. Preußisches Kriegsministerium, D.V.E. Nr. 130 Exerzier-Reglement für die 

Infanterie, including changes until August 1906 (Berlin, Germany: Ernst Siegfried 

Mittler und Sohn, 1906), 78.

26. Preußisches Kriegsministerium, D.V.E. Nr. 130 Exerzier-Reglement für die 

Infanterie, 126a.

27. Freytag-Loringhoven, Das Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie vom 29. 

Mai 1906, 105-106, 40-41.

28. Preußisches Kriegsministerium, D.V.E. Nr. 130 Exerzier-Reglement für die 

Infanterie, 90-91.

29. Preußisches Kriegsministerium, D.V.E. Nr. 130 Exerzier-Reglement für die 

Infanterie, 84.

30. Bayerisches Kriegsministerium, Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie

(Munich, Germany, 1906), IV.

31. Helmut Karl Bernhard von Moltke, “Aus den Verordnungen für die höheren 

Truppenführer vom 24. Juni 1869,” in Moltkes Militärische Werke, Zweiter Theil, 

Die Tätigkeit als Chef des Generalstabs im Frieden, ed. Preußischer Generalstab 

(Berlin, Germany: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1900), 175-176. Daniel J. 

Hughes, ed., Moltke, On the Art of War, Selected Writings, trans. Daniel J Hughes and 

Harry Bell (New York: Random House, 1993), 171-172. The 1910 edition, named 

essentials of higher troop command explicitly stated at the beginning of the manual 

that applicable parts written by field marshal Moltke had been retained. Deutsches 

Kriegsministerium, D.V.E. Nr. 53. Grundzüge der höheren Truppenführung, (Berlin: 

Reichsdruckerei, 1910), 4.

32. Moltke, Aus den Verordnungen für die höheren Truppenführer vom 24. Juni

1869, 167-169.
32

33. Moltke, Aus den Verordnungen für die höheren Truppenführer vom 24, 179-

181.

34. Moltke, Aus den Verordnungen für die höheren Truppenführer vom 24, 174. 

The 1910 version stated: “Where subordinate leaders wait for orders the opportunity 

of the circumstances will never be utilized.” Deutsches Kriegsministerium, D.V.E. Nr. 

53. Grundzüge der höheren Truppenführung, 13.

35. Deutsches Kriegsministerium, D.V.E. Nr. 53. Grundzüge der höheren 

Truppenführung, 17.

36. Deutsches Kriegsministerium, D.V.E. Nr. 53. Grundzüge der höheren 

Truppenführung, 16-18.

37. In addition to the above mentioned conflicts, Prussian troops were involved 

in the two wars fought over the control of the duchesses of Schleswig and Holstein 

against Denmark and troops of the German Empire were involved in colonial 

struggles, e.g., against the Boxer Movement in China.

38. Volume 4 of Moltke’s Militärische Werke was assembled and published 

by the military history section of the General Staff. Although there is no proof of 

Moltke’s personal involvement or his specific selection of historic case studies the 

work expresses the official history respectively the official thought of exemplary 

doctrinal behavior. Therefore they are specifically valuable for an analysis of the 

contemporary understanding of Auftragstaktik. For details see Hughes, Moltke, On the 

Art of War, 15-17.

39. Hughes, Moltke, On the Art of War, 76, 79-83.

40. Preußisches Kriegsministerium, Extracts from Moltke’s Military 

Correspondence Pertaining of the War of 1870-71, ed. Historical Section of the 

Prussian General Staff, Berlin 1896, translated by Harry Bell Ft Leavenworth, 

KS, CGSC Library, 1910. The order was transmitted from the Prussian Royal 

Headquarters to General Steinmetz’s First Army on the 3rd of August 1870, 11:00am.

41. Hughes, Moltke, On the Art of War, 79-80; Geoffrey Wawro, The FrancoPrussian War, The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871 (New York: Cambridge 

University Press, 2003), 108.

42. An analysis of the orders issued during the early stages shows that the 

change form directives to orders tended to result in directly tasking the corps 

level. Occasionally the orders were in addition to informing the respective army 

headquarters directly sent to the corps itself. It remains unclear whether this meant a 

direct command and control relationship to the royal headquarters or was a result of 

the limitations of telegraph and messenger communications.

43. Hughes, Moltke, On the Art of War, 79-80.

44. Preußisches Kriegsministerium, Extracts from Moltke’s Correspondence, No. 

112, No. 125, No. 127.

45. Hughes, Moltke, On the Art of War, 82-83. Steinmetz’s actions are 

inconclusive, while requesting to advance closer to Metz he rejected to push his 

advance guards up front and when one of his divisions engaged the withdrawing 

French at Columbey he ordered them to break off combat. This inconclusiveness 

however may have been caused by very ambiguous orders by Moltke, which stated 

that a close coordination with Second Army was necessary, the concentration was not 

to be executed before the positions of the French were known and a passage of First 

Army north or south of Metz was to be expected. See Preußisches Kriegsministerium, 

Extracts from Moltke’s Correspondence, No. 137; Wawro, The Franco-Prussian War, 

146-147.

46. Hughes, Moltke, On the Art of War, 83-84.
33

47. Preußisches Kriegsministerium, Extracts from Moltke’s Correspondence, No. 

177-180; Hughes, Moltke, On the Art of War, 84.

48. Hughes, Moltke, On the Art of War, 84.

49. Hughes, Moltke, On the Art of War, 87.

50. Hughes, Moltke, On the Art of War, 133.

51. Helmut Karl Bernhard von Moltke, “Kurze Übersicht des Feldzuges 1864 

gegen Dänemark,” in Moltkes Militärische Werke, Band III, Kriegsgeschichtliche 

Arbeiten, Zweiter Theil, edited by Preußischer Generalstab (Berlin, Germany: Ernst 

Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1899), 77-78.

52. Hughes, Moltke, On the Art of War, 134.

53. Hughes, Moltke, On the Art of War, 134.

54. Moltke, Kurze Übersicht des Feldzuges 1864, 78.

55. Gordon A. Craig, The Battle of Königgrätz, Prussia’s Victory over Austria 

1866 Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975), 84-86.

56. Hughes, Moltke, On the Art of War, 134.

57. Craig, The Battle of Königgrätz, 86.

58. Hughes, Moltke, On the Art of War, 134-135.

59. Thilo Krieg in his biography of General von Alvensleben shows that it 

was less the sound of the guns but more a request for support by 7th Division’s 

commander, General Eduard von Fransecky that led to the decision to advance. 

Von Alvensleben did however not wait for an order by his division commander. It 

is remarkable that he did so, when he just had received an order from his division 

commander to take defensive positions without further advancing. Thilo Krieg, 

Constantin von Alvensleben, General der Infanterie, Ein militärisches Lebensbild

(Berlin, Germany: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1903), 62-64.

60. Thilo Krieg, Constantin von Alvensleben, General der Infanterie, Ein 

militärisches Lebensbild, 135-136.

61. Craig, The Battle of Königgrätz, 109-110, 142, 149-151.

62. Wawro, The Franco-Prussian War, 117.

63. Hughes, Moltke, On the Art of War, 140-142.

64. Citino, The German Way of War, 178.

65. Wawro, The Franco-Prussian War, 119.

66. Shortly after the war, Moltke wrote an initial illustration of the early border 

battles in the first weeks of the Franco-Prussian War. Helmut Karl Bernhard von 

Moltke, “Kurze Darstellung der Ereignisse vom 15. Juli bis 17. August 1870,” in 

Moltkes Militärische Werke, Band III, Kriegsgeschichtliche Arbeiten, Zweiter Theil, 

edited by Preußischer Generalstab (Berlin, Germany: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und 

Sohn, 1899), 157-173.

67. Freytag-Loringhoven, Das Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie vom 29. 

Mai 1906, VII-XII.

68. Freytag-Loringhoven, Das Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie vom 29, 

257.

69. Freytag-Loringhoven, Das Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie vom 29, 

106, 257.

70. Freytag-Loringhoven, Das Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie vom 29, 

42-44.

71. Freytag-Loringhoven, Das Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie vom 29, 

105-106.

72. Freytag-Loringhoven, Das Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie vom 29, 

106.
34

73. Max Jähns, “Die Schlacht von Königgrätz,” Leipzig, 1876, quoted in Craig, 

The Battle of Königgrätz, 110.

74. Moltke, Kurze Darstellung der Ereignisse vom 15. Juli bis 17. August 1870, 

186.

75. The Prussian doctrine stated that the main body of a company or the support 

element of a skirmish line would march 150 steps behind the line. The width of a 

company depended on the number of platoons skirmishing. That would in general 

be one platoon of 25 soldiers at a distance of 5 to 6 steps each. See Preußisches 

Kriegsministerium, Exerzir-Reglement für die Infanterie der Königlich Preußischen 

Armee, 1847, 68-69.

76. Freytag-Loringhoven, Das Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie vom 29. 

Mai 1906, 7-8.

77. John Sweetman, Tannenberg1914 (London: Cassel & Co,, 2002), 73-74. The 

plan to attack the deploying Russian forces as a shaping operation already close to the 

border to create a favorable force ratio had been intensively discussed. François was a 

proponent for this early attack although it has to remain open, whether his motivation 

was to prevent giving up East-Prussian territory and whether he had thought through 

the effects on the whole defense plan. See Dennis E. Showalter, Tannenberg, Clash of 

Empires (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1991), 155-156.

78. Sweetman, Tannenberg 1914, 83.

79. Sweetman, Tannenberg 1914, 83-86.

80. Sweetman, Tannenberg 1914, 116.

81. Holger H. Herwig, The Marne, 1914, The Opening of World War I and the 

Battle That Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2009), 40-44.

82. See pages 22-24.

83. Herwig, The Marne, 1914, 120-122.

84. Herwig, The Marne, 151, 161, 218.

85. Herwig, The Marne, 189-190.

86. Herwig, The Marne, 218-220.

87. Herwig, The Marne, 220-221. Although Kluck’s decision is often criticized, 

one has to consider that this course of action had successfully been gamed in the case 

study Freytag II during the 1905 Staff Ride West. Kluck’s chief of staff, then Major 

Kuhl, had participated in this staff ride, which was presided by Schlieffen himself. 

Ibid., 222.

89. Herwig, The Marne, 222-223.

89. Herwig, The Marne, 235-237.

90. Herwig, The Marne, 238-241.

91. Herwig, The Marne, 246, 248-250, 254.

92. See table on page 7 of this thesis.
35

Chapter 3

Low Tactical Level Initiative in the Synchronized 

Warfare of World War I

While I was expeditiously carrying out the preparations for the 

attack, ordering the machine-gun platoons into position, and organizing assault squads, the order came from the rear: “Württemberg 

Mountain Battalion withdraws” . . . The battalion order to withdraw 

resulted in all units of the Rommel detachment marching back to 

Mount Cragonza, except for the hundred riflemen and six heavy machine-gun crews who remained with me. I debated breaking off the 

engagement and returning to Mount Cragonza.

No! The battalion order was given without knowledge of the situation on the south slopes of the Matajur. Unfinished business remained. . . . We ventured to attack in spite of our ridiculously small 

numbers.

 – Erwin Rommel, Infantry Attacks1

Popular perceptions of World War I are dominated by images of 

the Western Front – the horrific positional warfare characterized from 

October 1914 to March 1914 by the total inability of either side to maneuver at the operational level. The loss of operational flexibility resulted directly from the increasing importance of firepower, machine-guns, 

and artillery compared to maneuver, the combined effects of which 

enforced a close coordination between the infantry and its supporting 

arms. Under such conditions the complex, precisely coordinated fire 

plans executed by immobile heavy-caliber artillery stifled initiative of 

infantry formations. Cavalry, the other maneuver arm, was useless in 

this context, playing almost no role on the Western Front.

However, this is not the whole story. On the Eastern Front, the density of forces and the vast space allowed for operational level movements throughout the war, leading to a series of more or less successful envelopment attempts from the Łódź campaign in late 1914 to the 

Kerensky-Offensive of 1917.2 Those battles were fought based on the 

doctrinal background and mindset described in chapter two of this work 

(the selected phases overlap) and will therefore not further be analyzed.

At the tactical level, synchronized methodical battle dominated 

warfare in the trenches. The exercise of initiative remained an ideal, 

though often an unrealized one. Tactical innovations, the result of 

attempts by both Allied and German forces to break the stalemate, 
36

eventually restored initiative to a dominant position with the techniques 

of deep defense and “storm trooper” tactics.

Doctrine Discussion

With the new realities at the Western Front, the prewar doctrine had 

become inappropriate by December 1914. The 1906 drill regulations 

had pointed out that the infantry had to “herd its inherent urge for offensive advance. . . Forward on the enemy, may it cost what it costs!”3

Utilization of the terrain was described on a single page; the defense 

was seen as subordinate to the offense.4 The defense being by definition 

a yielding of initiative to an opponent, the German Army (like all of its 

contemporaries) proved culturally resistant to either engaging in defensive operations or yielding ground once gained. To prevent a potential 

loss of terrain, in the first months of the war the forward trenches were 

packed with large numbers of soldiers, which resulted in high losses 

during the intensive Allied preparatory artillery barrages.5 In light of 

this, the OHL modified tactical doctrine on two occasions. In the winter 

of 1916-1917, a new defensive doctrine espousing the defense-in-depth 

concept was promulgated; in the following winter the offensive doctrine was updated to incorporate recognition of the “empty battlefield.”6

Defense-in-Depth

When Erich Ludendorff became the chief of staff (Erster Quartiermeistergeneral) of OHL on 20 August 1916, he undertook intensive 

efforts to monitor the tactical developments at the front and within two 

weeks ordered the adoption of the defensive doctrine.7 Prior to this decision, Colonel Fritz von Lossberg had determined that a report or order 

between front line and a division headquarters under battle conditions 

would take between eight and ten hours to travel one way. Such a delay 

rendered reports and orders irrelevant given the speed with which the 

tactical situation changed. Lossberg concluded that poor communication links thus required giving full freedom of action to lower levels to 

facilitate effective reaction to changed conditions. Hence frontline battalion commanders received the autonomy to react to enemy attacks in 

their sector without waiting for guidance; their regimental commanders’ 

roles were reduced to providing support and reinforcements. Divisions 

received comparable authority within their sectors. Reinforcements fell 

under the command of the respective frontline unit, without regard for 

the commander’s rank.8 Based upon the experiences and reports of different units and a French document captured in 1915, the Grundsätze 

für die Abwehrschlacht im Stellungskrieg (Principles of Command in 
37

the Defensive Battle in Position Warfare) were developed.9 The defense-in-depth concept stressed a flexible reaction to enemy attacks:

For the troops the following is applicable for the battle: . . . 

The defender is not bound to one place; instead he is justified 

to fight in a mobile manner in the battle zone, which means 

to attack or withdraw whatever is required. . . For tactical 

action best suiting the concept of battle a certain level of leeway has to remain with the leader – also the mid-level leader 

[emphasis in the original]. This is applicable to all branches. 

The conduct of battle according to this concept requires a great 

deal of initiative.10

Frontline battalion commanders received the authority to withdraw 

forces from the outpost zone under pressure of a general attack, to order 

counterattacks on their own authority, and to order to the front other 

battalions in their sector as reinforcements.11 Low-level leaders and individual soldiers in the outpost zone were to independently shift from 

their trenches to strongholds to engage an attacking enemy from flanks 

or rear and conduct local counterthrusts (Gegenstöße) to expel enemy 

forces from the battle zone.12 The field manual accordingly stated: “The 

strength, in the offensive defense too, does not lie in the masses of 

troops but in the skillful employment [of forces at hand], especially in 

the coordination of different weapons and the speed and energy of the 

action. Leadership – down to the squad leader – plays a crucial role.”13

“Storm Trooper” Tactics

The modification of the offensive doctrine was less groundbreaking. 

”Storm trooper” tactics combined the traditional offensive spirit and 

willingness to sacrifice of the German Army with increased training 

on newly-developed weapons, improved coordination of infantry 

and artillery, and the concept of deep operations. The concept paper, 

published on 1 January 1918 as Der Angriff im Stellungskrieg (The 

Attack in Positional Warfare), became the blueprint for the German 

offensives of 1918. As with the changes to defensive doctrine, a captured 

French analytical paper contributed to the development process, as 

well as German units’ best practices.14 The fundamental idea of “Storm 

Trooper” tactics was the deep penetration of the enemy defenses whose 

ultimate aim was to set the conditions fo an operational breakthrough. 

Instead of destroying enemy forces in situ, attacks now should disrupt 

the enemy’s defensive framework, bypass strongholds, and maintain 

constant pressure on a withdrawing enemy by the assault units while 
38

follow-on forces reduced strongholds and provide flank protection. The 

manual states:

The surprised enemy must not be allowed to reconstitute. His 

countermeasures have to be neutralized through a rapid advance 

of the attack. The assault has to be executed quickly, based on 

the knowledge that the protection of flank and rear and fire support will be provided from behind. The danger that the momentum of the attack will be lost is great. Premature culmination 

has to be overcome through the energy of the leaders up front. 

. . . Everything depends upon the quick and independent 

actions of all involved, based on the concept of operations as 

well as the follow-up of artillery and ammunition supplies

[emphasis in the original].15

For the assaulting infantry, small unit initiative was crucial, while artillery support was centralized, precise and of short duration aimed at 

neutralizing enemy defense efforts instead of destroying them.16 The 

advantage of having the ability to choose the time and place of the attack and plan for details loosened restraints on independent action.17

The German answer to the static environment of the Western Front 

by 1916-1917 is as remarkable as it was counterintuitive and contrary to the Allied approach of centralizing command, more detailed 

and complicated fire support plans, and subordinating the infantry to 

its support weapons. The spirit of initiative within the Prusso-German 

Army retained its premier value within doctrine while the increased 

effectiveness of heavy weapons required ever-closer coordination of 

maneuvering infantry and its support weapons. This allowed for timely 

reactions and the avoidance of devastating enemy firepower in defense 

and offense.

Execution of Initiative

The doctrinal discussion shows that the new and unexpected nature of combat at the Western Front led to a development of doctrine 

based upon analyzing the experiences and good practices of units on the 

ground. This inductive way of adapting doctrine naturally leads to less 

exciting findings in the review of the conduct of operations.

In his book Infantry Attacks, then-Lieutenant Erwin Rommel 

describes the conduct of operations at the platoon to battalion level. 

In his accounts about trench warfare in the Argonne and the High 

Vosges, the factors affecting frontline practices that influenced later 

changes to doctrine are traceable. He describes the difficulties of 
39

proceeding against the massive firepower of machine-guns, sustaining 

the momentum of an attack, and defending newly-seized terrain against 

enemy counterattacks when the enemy’s artillery fire sealed off the 

attackers from reinforcements and resupplies.18 In his subsequent 

discussion of events from mid-1915 onward, the use of terrain through 

infiltration and distinguishing between assault or storm squads, detailing 

of specific elements to seal off flanks and reduce strongholds bypassed 

by the former, handle prisoners, and provide resupply in ammunition 

or entrenching tools constitute the measures to overcome the beforementioned challenges.19 The quotation at the beginning of this chapter 

shows that the elements of “Storm Trooper” tactics developed for 

trench warfare applied equally to mountain warfare, where the freedom 

to maneuver had not been restrained to the same extent. For the defense, 

Rommel’s narrative depicts the need to avoid enemy artillery and 

especially heavy mortar fire through thinning out the first lines and 

allowing for flexibility in the search for cover.20

In All Quiet on the Western Front, Erich Maria Remarque describes 

the discipline required to halt soldiers after their fighting withdrawal 

from the outpost zone, stop and then fight to defend at the main line of 

resistance to eventually clear the outpost zone in a counterthrust.21 The 

chaotic nature of the elastic defense made the fire team or squad the 

principal tactical element carrying the fight from strongholds in flank 

or rear of the enemy advance.22 Lieutenant General Wilhelm von Balck 

stressed that the initiative to withdraw from the outpost zone should 

not generally be delegated to the troops because this tended to lead to a 

backwards surge before a true picture of the enemy’s intentions could 

become clear.23 Well-exercised initiative, on the other hand, stopped attacks of superior forces, if counter-thrusts by small units threatened its 

flanks. He describes examples where small fire teams of one leader and 

two to three riflemen caught up to 200 prisoners through unexpected 

counter-thrusts.24

With Germany suffering from the consequences of the deadlock of 

attritional warfare on the Western Front, the idea to extend the successful techniques of offensive warfare from the tactical to the operational 

level was logical. The 1918 offensives in the end failed for a number of 

reasons, including a lack of operational movement, supply capabilities, 

and resources. Gains based on random success of the attacking units at 

the tactical level, all operating upon initiative to keep up the drive of the 

attack, led to the need to man and defend large pieces of terrain absent 

of operational or strategic significance.25
40

Conclusion

The creation of specific defensive and offensive doctrine for trench 

warfare does not constitute a general adoption of the understanding of 

Auftragstaktik similar to the developments described in chapter two. 

The fundamental understanding of initiative and independent actions 

of commanders remained unchanged. They were applied to the new 

circumstances of warfare at the Western Front to benefit from its advantages when avoiding the effects of enemy firepower became crucial. 

The leeway of junior commanders and individual soldiers to flexibly 

change positions within a defined zone to avoid the preparatory fires 

and defend based on their own initiative clearly demonstrates that in 

the Prusso-German Army there existed already in 1914-1915 a common 

understanding of category one initiative. The question, whether independent counterthrusts were an integrated element of the defense and 

thus also part of the category one leeway, or whether they constituted an 

independent action within the higher commander’s intent, is debatable. 

Assault or “Storm Trooper” units initiated attacks based upon detailed 

intelligence and planning. The freedom to operate as deemed necessary 

to overcome unexpected enemy strongholds or fields of fire, based upon 

the understanding that the forward commander has the best insight into 

the changing situation, reflected the concept of the second category of 

initiative. Finally, the example of Rommel in mountain warfare quoted at the beginning of this chapter indicates that the spirit to act upon 

professional knowledge outside or against given orders remained intact 

culturally within the army. It further shows that this third category of 

initiative, previously only visible with large unit commanders, had by 

1916 become ingrained into junior officers’ understanding of their freedom of action.
41

Notes

1. Erwin Rommel, Infantry Attacks (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2009), 223.

2. Citino, The German Way of War, 234.

3. Bayerisches Kriegsministerium, Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie, 81.

4. Bayerisches Kriegsministerium, Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie, 91-

92,112.

5. Timothy T. Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German 

Tactical Doctrine during the First World War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies 

Institute, 1981), 10.

6. Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine, 4.

7. Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine, 11-12.

8. David T. Zabecki, “Defense in-Depth,” in The Encyclopedia of World 

War I, A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (Santa 

Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2005), 342-343; Oberste Heeresleitung,“Die Abwehr 

im Stellungskriege,” in Urkunden der Obersten Heeresleitung über ihre Tätigkeit 

1916/1918, ed. Erich Ludendorff (Berlin: E.S. Mittler und Sohn, 1921), 608-609.

9. Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine, 13-14.

10. “Die Abwehr im Stellungskriege,” 607.

11. Zabecki, Defense in-Depth, 343.

12. Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine, 15-16; “Die Abwehr im Stellungskriege“, 

618.

13. “Die Abwehr im Stellungskriege,” 619.

14. Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine, 34.

15. “Der Angriff im Stellungskriege,” 642.

16. Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine, 36-40.

17. “Der Angriff im Stellungskriege,” 645.

18. Rommel, Infantry Attacks, 57-59.

19. Rommel, Infantry Attacks, 66, 72.

20. Rommel, Infantry Attacks, 64, 69.

21. Erich Maria Remarque, Im Westen nichts Neues (Cologne, Germany: 

Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1959), 106-110.

22. Remarque, Im Westen nichts Neues, 248-249.

23. Wilhelm Balck, Entwicklung der Taktik im Weltkriege (Berlin, Germany: 

Verlag von R. Eisenschmidt, 1922), 269. The book was published after the war, 

therefore it serves a dual role in this thesis. The historical examples serve the 

understanding of the execution of initiative during the war while his recommendations 

have influence on the developments in the interwar period, which will be covered in 

the next chapter.

24. Balck, Entwicklung der Taktik im Weltkriege, 277.

25. Williamson A. Murray, “The West at War 1914-18,” in The Cambridge 

Illustrated History of Warfare, The Triumph of the West, ed. Geoffrey Parker (New 

York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 291.

43

Chapter 4

An Army Shaped for Initiative Versus 

Detailed Tactical Control By Hitler

Ideally LT Delica, who was senior on the ground, should have 

taken charge. His glider, however, had landed a fair way to the south 

and his squad was busy dealing with its target position, a 75mm-gun 

casemate. Unable to contact [LT] Witzig or Delica, SGT Helmut 

Wenzel of fourth squad took command and established headquarters 

for Sturmgruppe Granit inside the machine-gun casemate, which his 

men had captured minutes earlier. SGT Wenzel . . . was fully familiar 

with the mission and continued with the plan. He had his radioman 

establish contact with [his company commander CPT] Koch in order to inform the overall commander when his men had taken their 

main objectives, as well as to gain situational awareness as to the 

whereabouts of the relieving troops. Meanwhile, the other squads had 

landed in proximity to their targets and set about dealing with them. 

As Witzig described it, “they didn’t need to ask questions. They had 

their orders, and they did them.1

 – Nicholas A. Murray, 

“Capturing Eben-Emael, The Key to the Low Countries”

Despite shortfalls in planning, resourcing, and execution, the 1918 

German offensives in the West proved the potentially decisive power of 

the maneuver aspect of deep operations based on well-executed combined arms warfare. They also laid bare the limits of contemporary operational mobility and reach. The same can be said for the Allies’ use of 

massed tanks in the offensive at Cambrai late the previous year. However, following the Armistice and ratification of the peace treaty, all 

the former belligerents’ military institutions shifted from battle-driven 

innovation to survival in an atmosphere of fiscal austerity for all things 

military. Even more ominous for military planners, a wave of pacifism 

and an international movement for disarmament gained strength in 

years immediately following the Armistice. 

The provisions of the Treaty of Versailles reduced the German 

Army, now renamed the Reichswehr, to 100,000 soldiers (93,000 

men and 7,000 officers). Furthermore, this “army” was forbidden to 

possess modern weapons and was designed to be capable only of border 

security and internal control operations.2 The task of demobilizing and 

reorganizing the old Imperial Army and establishing the Reichswehr

went to General Hans von Seeckt, who became the chairman of the 
44

Commission for the Peacetime Army Organization and subsequently 

the chief of the Truppenamt, the successor organization to the treatybanned General Staff.3

 Born into a noble Pomeranian family in 1866, 

Von Seeckt received a liberal education rather than that of a cadet. 

Enrolled into the Emperor Alexander Guard Regiment as an officeraspirant in 1885, he was commissioned in 1887 and selected for the 

General Staff course at the Kriegsakademie in 1893. Broadly educated 

and well-travelled, he was highly regarded in the General Staff Corps 

and rose steadily through the ranks.4 During World War I, von Seeckt 

served initially as chief of staff at the army and army group level, saw 

maneuver warfare on the Western Front in 1914, and subsequently 

transferred to the Eastern Front. He made his reputation by successfully 

planning and executing major offensives, and countering enemy 

offensives, through mobile defense.5 Although confronted with the 

gigantic tasks of downsizing an army while simultaneously defeating 

a communist uprising, on 1 December 1919 (after only one week as 

chief of the Truppenamt) he ordered a comprehensive study “to put the 

experience of the war in a broad light and collect this experience while 

the impressions won on the battlefield are still fresh and the experienced 

officers are still in leading positions.”6

The results of this comprehensive study provided the basis for a 

thorough review of doctrine that led to a new capstone document, Army 

Regulation 487 Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen (Command and Combat Employment of the Combined Arms).7

 Part One of 

the manual was published in 1921 and addressed the fundamentals of 

combined arms warfare; Part Two, consisting of specific chapters on 

aerial and armored warfare, communications, and logistics, was issued 

in 1923.8 It remained in force unchanged for ten years; even then, the 

1933 Truppenführung (Troop Leading) manual’s principal difference 

from von Seekt’s doctrine lay in the incorporation of emerging potentials caused by the rapid technological advancements.9

These doctrinal innovations resulted directly from the experience 

by all armies of the horrific attritional warfare in the trench systems 

of World War I. The multiple efforts to avoid such slaughters through 

decisive maneuver warfare centered around technological means and 

their application in warfare, with discussions about the role of tanks and 

the best form of air warfare as the most prominent topics. For this work 

those discussions are relevant only to a very limited degree, because the 

German approach to doctrinal change viewed technological instruments 
45

not as ends in themselves but as means towards the execution of 

concepts in the art of war.10

The 1921 Command and Combat Employment of the Combined 

Arms

Publication of Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen marked the German Army’s transition into modern doctrine. No longer was 

the capstone doctrine predominantly an infantry manual with little reference to the supporting arms. The structure of the manual was fundamentally different from its predecessors, addressing the fundamentals 

of combined warfare first and integrating the modern means of warfare 

in its second part.11 Subsequently, more detailed manuals for the different arms were issued.12 Interestingly, the manual was not restricted to 

the capabilities and arms permitted to Germany under the restrictions 

of the Treaty of Versailles; in his introduction to the manual, von Seeckt 

instead explicitly stated that the knowledge and doctrinal understanding 

of modern weapon systems was paramount, disregarding the fact that 

such weaponry might or might not be available to the Reichswehr in the 

next conflict.13

The various aspects of Auftragstaktik were now more prominent, 

covered in the first chapter compared to being relegated to the latter 

portions of the 1888 and 1906 manuals. The fundamentals of Auftragstaktik are not changed: 

The foremost quality of a leader remains the willingness to take 

responsibility. All leaders must constantly stay aware and inculcate in their subordinates the awareness that forbearance and 

dereliction weigh heavier than making a mistake in the selection of an action.14

This quotation can be found word-for-word in the 1906 regulations; 

the section included in previous doctrine that warns against the risk of 

arbitrariness is omitted.15 Instead, the description of when and why to 

deviate from orders is covered and explained in more detail:

The mission [emphasis in the original] designates the objective 

to achieve. The leader may not lose sight of it.

The situation [emphasis in the original] will seldom be clear 

enough to provide a detailed insight into the enemy disposition. 

Uncertainty is the general rule of war. . . 

Based upon mission and situation the decision [emphasis in the 

original] is developed. If the mission does not suffice as a basis 
46

for friendly action rendered insufficient by the development of 

events the [new] decision has to account for those developments.

Full responsibility for not executing or altering a mission remains with the leader. At all times he must act within the framework of the whole (im Rahmen des Ganzens). . . . 

No deviation is to be made from a decision taken without 

a grave reason [emphasis in the original]. In the vicissitudes 

of war inflexible adherence to a decision can be a mistake. It 

is the art of command to identify when a new decision must be 

made.16

As we see at this point, the concept of Auftragstaktik is assumed to be 

well understood within the army, and the changes between the 1906 and 

1921 manual are marginal. The fact that the potential for risk-taking to 

deviate into arbitrariness is omitted seems to indicate that the execution 

of initiative during World War I was not accompanied by the negative 

side effects that could be seen, for example, in the Franco-Prussian War. 

Reasons that this did not occur include perhaps better communications 

or a more professional officer corps.

1933 Truppenführung – Troop Leadership

Truppenführung, written under the auspices of Generals Ludwig 

Beck, Werner von Fritsch, and Otto von Stülpnagel, updated consideration of the incorporation of modern weapons in the Führung und 

Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen according to contemporary levels of 

technological development achieved by 1933.17 More significant from 

the perspective of this paper, however, was the new “Introduction,” 

whose fifteen highly philosophical paragraphs set the manual’s tone.18

The Introduction’s paragraphs constitute a précis of German understanding of warfare and doctrinal writing of the preceding 100 years. 

They restate Clausewitz’s fundamentals about the human aspect of warfare, friction, and the principle of the German art of war, the aim for the 

decisive annihilation of the enemy.19 The paragraph about leadership is 

again (as in the 1921 Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen) 

nearly a word-for-word copy from the 1906 manual:

Every leader in all situations must exert, without evasion 

of responsibility, his whole personality. Willingness to take 

responsibility is the foremost quality of a leader. It should not 

be aimed at making arbitrary decisions with disregard of the 
47

whole or not precisely following given orders and let a “knowall” manner take the place of obedience. Autonomy may not 

become arbitrariness. Autonomy however, utilized within the 

right limits, is the basis of great successes.20

The employment of soldiers and weapon systems in open, dispersed 

formations, which had become a rule rather than an exception during 

World War I and in the interwar period, led to an increased emphasis on 

the individual soldier’s autonomy. The manual states: “The emptiness of 

the battlefield (Leere des Schlachtfeldes) requires independently thinking and acting fighters, who exploit every situation well considered, 

decisively and boldly, deeply convinced that success depends on each 

individual.”21 Comparing Truppenführung with its predecessor manuals’ respective sections, one sees that its description of autonomy turns 

back to the limitations of independence. The 1906 drill regulations had 

stressed the risk that an independent leader might go too far; the 1921 

manual made no clear reference to this risk, but Truppenführung resurrected the danger of arrogance and arbitrariness.22 The necessity to 

actively develop the situation – again a draw from the 1906 manual – is 

extended from “all leaders”23 down to every soldier:

From the youngest soldier upwards, independent employment 

of all spiritual, intellectual and physical power is stipulated. Only in this way will the full capabilities of the troops be 

brought into effect in common action. . . . Everyone, the highest leader as well as the youngest soldier has constantly to 

stay aware that forbearance and dereliction weigh heavier 

than making a mistake in the selection of an action [emphasis in the original].24

The fact that autonomy and proactive action is described in two of the 

fifteen paragraphs of the introduction depicts the importance given to 

the topic.

Section 2 – leadership – of Truppenführung describes the concept 

of Auftragstaktik in similar but more precise terms than the 1921 manual:

The mission [emphasis in the original] designates the objective 

to achieve. The subordinate may not lose sight of it. A mission 

that contains multiple tasks easily distracts from the essential 

(Hauptsache) [italics indicate substantial addition to 1921 manual].
48

Uncertainty about the situation [emphasis in the original] is the 

general rule. Seldom can a detailed insight into the enemy disposition be won. . . 

Based upon mission and situation the decision is developed. If 

the mission does not suffice as a basis for friendly action or has 

been rendered insufficient by the development of events, the 

[new] decision has to account for those developments. Whoever 

changes a mission or does not accomplish it has to report this

[italics indicate substantial addition to 1921 manual] and takes 

sole responsibility for the results. At all times he has to act within the framework of the whole. . . . 

No deviation is to be made from a decision taken without a 

grave reason. In the vicissitudes of war inflexible adherence to 

a decision can be a mistake. It is the art of command to identify 

in time, when and under which circumstances a new decision is 

required.

The leader has to allow for freedom of action of his subordinates as long as this does not endanger his intent. However, he 

may not leave decisions he himself is responsible for, to them.25

The changes to its predecessor seem to indicate that during the 12 years 

of training in the Reichswehr orders developed into detailed voluminous works restraining the subordinates’ freedom of action. A reason 

for that may have been the practice to intensively train leaders for planning two levels above their actual position to allow for an expansion of 

the officer corps, once the limitations of the Treaty of Versailles could 

be reversed or ignored. The rule to report deviations from a given mission seems to reflect the growing capabilities of command and control, 

specifically the rise of radio communications – identified early by the 

Reichswehr as an enabling function for mobile warfare.

Overall, Truppenführung did not introduce fundamentally new aspects of Auftragstaktik. As shown above, its fundamental philosophy 

was emphasized and prominently depicted in the introductory section 

of the manual. As a specific aspect, the requirement for individual soldiers’ independent action was stressed more intensively. In addition, the 

manual seems to address leadership developments that emerged during 

the intensive interwar training of the Reichswehr.
49

Execution of Initiative

Although Auftragstaktik and initiative of the Reichswehr were a 

philosophy encompassing all levels of leadership, the executions of it 

were nevertheless subject to different circumstances or environmental 

factors. Initially, the division as the maneuver element of the corps 

constituted the boundary between the tactical and operational level, 

especially in the case of the tank divisions. They were meant to operate 

freely and accomplish tasks in support of the achievement of operational 

level objectives. Later, during World War II, the sparse forces available 

for extensive sections of the front often meant that this task fell to 

Kampfgruppen – ad hoc battlegroups of different available units.

Tactical Level

The accounts of autonomous and aggressive execution of initiative 

of German soldiers and low-level leaders in World War II are legion. 

The Combat Studies Institute publication 16 Cases of Mission Command alone describes three cases of exemplary leadership and initiative 

during the opening days of the campaign at the Western Front in 1940.26

The dependence of the success of the campaign in the West in 1940 upon 

the success of low-level leaders seizing key terrain shows the fragility 

and risk of its operational plan. Junior officers and non-commissioned 

officers gained the respect of their opponents through aggressive and 

proactive execution of initiative in absence of orders or if the changing 

situation required deviations from the mission.27 Dirk Oetting describes 

a case study which may be more illustrative than better-known stories 

of the campaigns against Belgium, Holland, and France: a mountain 

infantry staff sergeant and his platoon had been tasked to protect the 

flank of their battalion during the battles in the Caucasus Mountains 

in the Soviet Union in 1942. When the attack of the battalion stalled 

against strong Soviet defenses, the sergeant decided to deviate from 

his mission, bypass the enemy positions, and attack into the rear of the 

enemy. Splitting up his forces under the command of squad leaders and 

extending the few soldiers of the assault squad over extensive terrain, 

he relied upon the autonomous actions of his subordinates.28

Not only during offensive operations, but also in the defensive operations of the war, Wehrmacht low-level leadership prevailed. The containment of the Allied bridgehead after the Normandy landing in 1944 

was substantially based upon small Wehrmacht detachments defending 

actively in the dispersed engagements of northern France’s bocage.

29

Lieutenant Colonel Werner von Raesfeld commanded a Kampfgruppe
50

in the attempt to counter the Soviet winter offensive at the Eastern Front 

in 1941-1942. He asserts that the “homogeneous education of leaders of 

all ranks towards autonomy proved itself: Through creative action and 

the willingness to take responsibility within their given missions they 

contributed essentially to the reestablishment of a solid frontline.”30

Lieutenant Colonel von Raesfeld himself, when confronted with superior Soviet forces decided to defensively break contact with the enemy. 

He states:

The battlegroup, which had fulfilled its mission to prevent an 

outflanking maneuver against the corps for some days, was now 

threatened with encirclement. Against the necessary withdrawal 

stood a Führerbefehl that prohibited any retrograde movement 

under the threat of punishment by court martial. The Russian 

breakthrough had made my mission obsolete. I therefore saw 

it, under analogous development of my mission [emphasis 

added], as my obligation to preserve the battlegroup by leading 

it back through the last gap. I thereby was aware that I was acting against the Führerbefehl, but after fulfilling my [tactical] 

mission it was my human duty to prevent further loss of life

[emphasis added].31

This example depicts a tactical level commander facing the fundamental 

struggle between professional judgment and a given order.32 As World 

War II progressed, commanders were more frequently confronted with 

missions that were no longer sustainable with forces and resources and 

bore the risk of being annihilated without substantial gains.

These examples provide only an overview of German World War II 

initiative at the tactical level. In his study Fighting Power, Martin van 

Creveld also points out how mission-type orders, freedom of action, 

mutual trust, and the willingness to assume responsibility contributed 

to a high combat effectiveness of the Wehrmacht.

33

Operational Level

The execution of initiative at the operational level on the Western 

Front is closely connected to pre-war discussions about tank doctrine 

and the operational concept itself. The Sichelschnitt concept developed 

by General Erich von Manstein was built upon surprise and a quick decisive thrust through the difficult terrain of the Ardennes and across the 

Meuse River. It was risky, and the traditionalists within the Wehrmacht

leadership were highly skeptical about its success and doubted his underlying assumptions about the capabilities of the new tank weapon.34
51

General Heinz Guderian was a proponent of the massed use of tanks 

within combined fighting teams, the panzer divisions. For him, successful command during the operation was also a way of proving the 

theories about the employment of tanks he had proposed earlier.

The Sichelschnitt operation proceeded as planned. Attacking on 10 

August 1940, Guderian’s XIX Corps had passed through the Ardennes 

within three days and on the next day – relying on air support of historic 

dimensions – crossed the Meuse River, thus avoiding the need for 

extensive artillery support which would have cost one to two additional 

days due to the constraints of the road network in the Ardennes. On 

14 August and while the bridgehead on the west bank of the river still 

was not secured, Guderian attacked further westwards without prior 

approval of his superior, General Paul Ludwig Ewald von Kleist.35 On 

15 August, von Kleist ordered a halt to the offensive to allow for the 

infantry to catch up. Guderian ignored this and on 17 August, when 

personally confronted with that order by von Kleist, asked to be removed 

from his position. Kleist accepted the insubordinate challenge, although 

the tactical situation forced him to change his mind shortly thereafter. 

Reinstalled in his position only hours later, Guderian was ordered to 

keep his command post at his current position and only employ strong 

reconnaissance elements. He disregarded this order again, commanding 

forward and connected to his command post by cable line so that his 

advance was kept hidden from German signal intelligence.36 General 

Erwin Rommel, commanding 7th Panzer Division in General Hermann 

Hoth’s corps, attacked on Guderian’s right flank. Tasked to clear the 

eastern bank of the Meuse River, he decided on 13 August to cross the 

river upon his own initiative, which was successful. On the next day, 

Rommel’s division was ordered to reinforce and secure the bridgehead 

that was still endangered by the possibility of French counterattacks.37

Instead, Rommel attacked with the forces available during the next two 

days, opened a narrow path 120 kilometers deep into the French rear, 

disregarding the threat to his own flanks and rear, and lost communications 

with his superiors despite the fact that the division was spread out over 

a large distance. The thrust ended up 40 kilometers deep in the rear area 

of the French Ninth Army Corps, leading to its disruption.38 Although 

this example certainly shows a maximum of independent action by a 

commander, Oetting points out that the success justified the Rommel’s 

action. Furthermore, independent action and seizing opportunities were 

generally seen as an essential factor of success and therefore commonly 

encouraged or at least accepted within certain limits.39
52

The acceptance of the autonomous decisions of commanders was 

abruptly withdrawn and an inflexible system imposed when Hitler 

issued a Führerbefehl on 16 December 1941. Hitler’s order forbade all 

retrograde movements, threatening disobedience with immediate court 

martial. The order constitutes the end point of a process of the disruption 

of the relationship between Hitler on one side and the Wehrmacht

generals on the other. Hitler claimed that “[t]he army generals had totally 

lost their nerves. They were confronted for the first time with a war 

crisis while they had only won victories until then.”40 When analyzing 

the cases of commanders disobeying or criticizing this order, one must 

understand the context. Attempts to interpret the actions that will follow 

in this section as resistance against Hitler are false. The commanders 

named in the following cases strongly believed in obedience to the Nazi 

government as part of their profession even if they were not believers 

in the cause of the war. Nevertheless, they identified a responsibility 

towards their troops as part of their professional ethos, as we have 

already seen in the case of Lieutenant Colonel von Raesfeld.41

On 30 November 1941 there was a crisis on the Eastern Front. The 

First Panzer Army had seized the town of Rostov-on-Don, but a successful Soviet counterattack threatened the army’s overextended lines, 

and it requested the permission to withdraw and consolidate. Hitler denied the request and ordered the army to hold its ground. Field Marshall 

Gerd von Rundstedt, commanding Army Group South, reported that 

he could not execute this order and requested a change of the order or 

his dismissal. Hitler removed him from his position but had to accept 

the withdrawal, which was inevitable.42 On 17 December, one day after 

Hitler had issued his Führerbefehl, General Heinz Guderian – always 

highly praised and liked by Hitler – reported that he would not hold 

ground if his unit was threatened with destruction. When he received 

the Führerbefehl two days later, he reported to his higher command: 

“I am willing to receive these orders and put them in the file. I will 

not further distribute them [to subordinate units], even if in danger of 

facing a court martial.”43 Guderian travelled to Hitler to convince him 

to rescind the Führerbefehl. His army’s war diary documents his view 

of Hitler’s order:

The result of a rigid interpretation will unavoidably be cauldrons and with those the destruction of the force therein, which 

due to the lack of reserves cannot be relieved or received upon a 

breakthrough. The result can furthermore be the destruction of 

the army before the arrival of the announced reinforcements. . . 
53

Fully aware of my responsibility I therefore want to point out 

the results of a rigid and verbatim execution of the Führerbefehl 

and request to be allowed to interpret it in the sense of the before mentioned [more flexible and terrain utilizing] manner.44

Guderian’s request was denied, and he, too, was relieved from 

his position on 26 December 1941. Other generals followed their 

professional ethos and countered the Führerbefehl, which would have 

meant senseless death to thousands of soldiers: Otto-Wilhelm Förster 

(IV Corps); Lieutenant General Eccard Graf von Gablenz, (XXVII 

Corps); and Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb (Army Group 

North). They all requested dismissal because they could not take 

it upon themselves to order troops to hold ground without sufficient 

resources against overwhelming odds. Colonel-General Erich Hoepner, 

commander Fourth Panzer Army, was sacked and expelled from the 

Wehrmacht when he disobeyed the order and withdrew his forces. 45

More tragic was the fate of Lieutenant General Hans Graf von 

Sponeck, tasked to secure the eastern portion of the Crimean Peninsula with the city Kerch to protect the rear of General von Manstein’s 

Eleventh Army during the siege of Sevastopol. Two Soviet armies with 

strong naval support conducted amphibious landings on 26 December 

1941 to relieve the Sevastopol garrison.46 The two Red Army divisions 

and a naval infantry brigade were superior to the encircling German 

units, but the Germans were able to contain the initial landings and 

reduce some of the beachheads in the vicinity of Kerch. Nevertheless, 

Graf Sponeck requested on 26 December and again on 28 December to 

take his forces back to the isthmus of Parpatsch, a move that would allow for a more dense defensive line for his 46th Infantry Division.47 Von 

Manstein denied both requests; after the war he stated that at the time he 

assumed that withdrawing from the peninsula would lead to a situation 

with which the army would be unable to cope.48 On 29 December the 

Soviets conducted an additional landing with four divisions in Feodosia, in the south of the peninsula, which the defending German engineer 

battalion and its supporting units had no chance of containing. Graf 

Sponeck, realizing the danger of encirclement and aware of the threat 

to the rear of the whole Eleventh Army, decided to immediately break 

off the battle and withdraw to the isthmus to establish a new defensive 

line. He informed von Manstein, who ordered a halt to all rearward 

movements. However, this order was not received at Graf Sponeck’s 

command post. He was relieved from his command by von Manstein 

and later sentenced to death by a military tribunal presided over by 
54

Hermann Göring.49 Hitler reduced the death penalty to a six-year prison 

sentence; Graf Sponeck was nevertheless put to death by order of Heinrich Himmler in the wake of the failed 20 July 1944 plot against Hitler. 

This occurred despite the fact that Graf Sponeck was still imprisoned 

and could not have taken part in the conspiracy.50

The assessment of Graf Sponeck’s case is clear: the process and 

the harsh sentence combined with the fact that the pardon by Hitler 

was arranged prior to the court martial show that an example was to be 

made of Graf Sponeck to enforce the Führerbefehl.

51 Ironically, Graf 

Sponeck’s command had not been issued with the order at the time he 

made his decision.52 The fact that the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, Reichsmarschall Göring, presided over a special senate of the 

Reichskriegsgericht – instead of an experienced Army general – underlines the political nature of the case.53 In addition, Lieutenant General 

Walther von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, serving as a judge, was informed by 

Göring about the death penalty (and pardon) prior to the hearing but not 

told about the facts of the case.54 The trial does seem to have been quick, 

but followed the legal formalities. Von Manstein claimed that he and 

the Eleventh Army commander did not know about the date of the trial, 

nor had they been asked to provide their assessment of Graf Sponeck’s 

actions.55 Another factor highlighting the political nature of the process 

may also have been that Graf Sponeck was one of the officers who 

spoke as a character witness for General Werner von Fritsch during his 

court martial in 1938.56 The presiding judge had been Göring then also; 

he had harshly cut off the honorable but risky attempt by Graf Sponeck 

to unmask the political conspiracy against the senior Wehrmacht generals. 57

The professional correctness of Graf Sponeck’s decision to 

withdraw his forces is quite clear, too. Although von Manstein claimed 

that his order to hold was correct, his reasoning for it is contradictory. 

Not only did he give two different reasons to hold the peninsula, but also 

argued that the reinforcements, Romanian units (the different sources 

suggest a maximum of two brigades), would have been sufficient to 

counter the Soviet landing at Feodosia. On the other hand he claims 

not to have trusted the Romanians’ combat effectiveness and spirit, 

a suspicion proven by subsequent events.58 The detailed analysis of 

Eberhard Einbeck, who served as Graf Sponeck’s Ia (G3 or operations 

officer) and was therefore directly involved in the decision-making, 

provides great detail in terms of personnel and equipment numbers, 

and the horrible Russian weather conditions that make the decision 
55

from a professional standpoint of the author of this thesis absolutely 

reasonable.59 The Romanian Prime Minister Ion Antonescu and General 

Alfred Jodl came to the same judgment.60 The only point of criticism 

is the fact that the radio link between von Manstein’s army and the 

units on the Kerch peninsula was broken during the hours after Graf 

Sponeck’s report about his decision to withdraw. Von Manstein claims 

that this was caused deliberately to avoid receiving another order to hold 

the peninsula.61 Einbeck provides several other reasonable causes: the 

telephone connection was disturbed when the switchboard in the Soviet 

beachhead in Feodosia was destroyed; the weather conditions made 

the radio links unreliable; and Graf Sponeck’s command post did not 

have sufficient radio equipment to allow for an integration of the mobile 

command post that was used by Graf Sponeck while on the move over 

a distance of about 100 kilometers.62 Von Manstein himself summarized 

the principle at stake: “The case of Graf Sponeck depicts the tragedy of 

the conflict between the obligation of obedience and the assessment of 

operational necessities inherent to being a higher commander. . . [The 

dismissal] did not happen because he had acted on his own authority. I 

have myself had to act often enough against operational directives even 

of Hitler, to concede to my subordinates the right to act on their own 

authority if required.”63

For the question of the limits of obedience, the legal review of Graf 

Sponeck’s defense lawyer is instructive. His written pleading started 

with some general comments about the limits of the obligation of obedience, based upon historical cases and the military law. It then states: 

“The defendant acted with no impunity, if he after thorough examination assessed that the order given no longer fitted to the situation and in 

its place substituted his own decision that fit into the operational intent 

of his superior known to him.”64 Based on this thesis three questions 

had to be examined:

1. What was the situation when the defendant received the 

denial of the withdrawal?

2. How had the situation changed when he decided to deviate 

from the order?

3. Could he assume that his own decision would fit into the 

general operational idea of his army commander?65

Von Manstein’s statement and the scheme of Graf Sponeck’s defense 

lawyer probably provide the best summary of the dilemma senior commanders in the Wehrmacht faced during the rest of World War II. The 
56

depicted examples, however, have to be quantified; for each of the 

examples mentioned above there were also senior commanders who 

avoided conflict with Hitler, in order not to endanger their career, out 

of timidity, or because they were believers in Nazi ideology. The most 

prominent example may be Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus, who suffered with the whole Sixth Army in the cauldron of Stalingrad instead 

of disobeying Hitler’s order and attempting to break out.

Conclusion

Auftragstaktik as a proven concept was carried from the end of 

World War I through the Interwar Period well into World War II. The 

combination of Auftragstaktik and the concept of breakthrough into 

deep operations that had prevailed during the 1918 offenses and the 

integration of the emerging capabilities of modern weapons into it 

were the main focus of doctrinal change and training efforts in the Reichswehr. The developments in terms of the understanding of initiative 

were less groundbreaking – the need for autonomous action was explicitly extended down to the single soldier. The everlasting risk of overly 

independent leaders remains a topic reflected with changing effort within the two pieces of capstone doctrine of this period. The 1933 Truppenführung names two topics of contemporary relevance today, missions 

that encompass so many tasks that they do not provide focus and overly 

detailed orders that restrain the subordinate’s level of leeway.

The execution of initiative consists of three major topics: at the 

lower tactical level junior leaders down to squad and fire team level 

earned the high respect of their Allied counterparts through adaptive, 

aggressive, and autonomous actions, which seized opportunities and 

contributed to the high combat effectiveness Martin van Creveld describes in his comparative study.

At the operational level, the agility of German offensive operations, 

against which neither of the Allies had means, initially led to great 

successes of the Wehrmacht. The capabilities of the armored divisions 

– in fact combined fighting teams – not countered by equivalent units 

on the French, British, and Soviet side allowed for deep penetrations 

and encirclements that were successful in decisively defeating the 

Allies’ large infantry formations. The ability to create a clear main 

effort and thus massive superiority enabled the deliberate selection of 

the place of a breakthrough, compared to the 1918 offensives where the 

tactical success could not be linked to operational level objectives. The 
57

examples depict that the categories one and two of initiative were deeply 

ingrained into the soldier’s and leader’s understanding of initiative.

When the war on the Eastern Front could not be won in a single 

stroke in 1941, it became more and more clear that German resources 

were not sufficient for the extended land mass and the Soviet ability 

to mobilize its population. Commanders at the operational level and 

tactical leaders operating outside of a contiguous front subsequently 

faced missions that were overambitious for the forces and resources 

available. Hitler’s Führerbefehl, restricting the withdrawal of forces in 

opposition to long-standing doctrine and the tradition of Auftragstaktik,

set up a conflict between obeying orders and losing soldiers and units 

without gains. The manual Truppenführung states the following about 

the issue of breaking contact:

An engagement can be broken off after its purpose has been 

achieved; when the circumstances require the use of units at 

another position where their redeployment seems more advantageous; when continuing the engagement may not lead to success; or when defeat can be avoided only by breaking contact.

The breaking of contact can be deliberate or forced, and executed on the decision of either the immediate commander or the 

next higher commander. Subordinate units should be informed 

of the reasons for a deliberate break in contact.66

The actions of the commanders breaking contact against Hitler’s order 

therefore fell into accordance with doctrine and the professional understanding of the category three initiative. Comparing the citation from 

the manual and the legal scheme Lieutenant General Graf Sponeck’s 

defense lawyer used on one hand, and the statement of Lieutenant Colonel von Raesfeld explaining his motive on the other, we see that the category three initiative consisted of two elements.67 First, the professional 

doctrinal understanding to make independent decisions based upon the 

development of the situation, and second the ethical element of the profession to preserve subordinate soldiers’ lives if possible.
58

Notes

1. Nicholas A. Murray, “Capturing Eben-Emael: The Key to the Low Countries,” 

in 16 Cases of Mission Command, ed. Donald P. Wright (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 

Combat Studies Institute Press, 2013), 147.

2. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 367-368.

3. James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, Hans von Seeckt and German 

Military Reform (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 29.

4. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, Hans von Seeckt and German Military 

Reform, 25-26.

5. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, Hans von Seeckt and German Military 

Reform, 26-28.

6. Hans von Seeckt to Truppenamt et al., December 1, 1919, BA/MA, RH 

2/2275, quoted in Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, 37.

7. German Truppenamt, D. V. Pl. Nr. 487., Führung und Gefecht der 

verbundenen Waffen (F. u. G.) (Charlottenburg, Germany: Verlag Offene Worte, 

1921). James Corum in The Roots of Blitzkrieg, 37, translates the title as Leadership 

and Battle with Combined Arms, the content however reflects leadership to a lesser 

degree than the mission command warfighting function and philosophy.

8. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, 39.

9. Bruce Condell and David T. Zabecki, ed., On the German Art of War, 

Truppenführung (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 3.

10. For a comprehensive discussion of these topics see Williamson Murray and 

Allan R. Millet, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (New York: Cambridge 

University Press, 1996).

11. German Truppenamt, Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen, III-IV.

12. Condell and Zabecki, On the German Art of War, 10.

13. German Truppenamt, Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen, 3-4.

14. German Truppenamt, Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen, 7.

15. See page 15 of this thesis.

16. German Truppenamt, Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen, 9.

17. Condell and Zabecki, On the German Art of War, 3. Like its predecessor, the 

manual is not constrained to the capabilities available at the time of its publication 

but assumes an army unrestrained by resources and international treaties. German 

Truppenamt, H. Dv. 300/1, Truppenführung (T.F.), E.G. Mittler & Sohn, Berlin, 

Germany, 1933: II.

18. Condell and Zabecki, On the German Art of War, 3.

19. German Truppenamt, Truppenführung, 1-5.

20. German Truppenamt, Truppenführung, 2-3.

21. German Truppenamt, Truppenführung, 3.

22. See page 19 for the 1906 drill regulations and page 56-57 for the 1921 

Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen.

23. Preußisches Kriegsministerium, Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie, 91.

24. German Truppenamt, Truppenführung, 5.

25. German Truppenamt, Truppenführung, 10-11.

26. Donald P. Wright, ed., 16 Cases of Mission Command (Fort Leavenworth, 

KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2013).

27. Dirk W. Oetting, Auftragstaktik: Geschichte und Gegenwart einer 

Führungskonzeption (Frankfurt am Main/ Bonn, Germany: Verlag, 1993), 205-206.
59

28. Oetting, Auftragstaktik: Geschichte und Gegenwart einer 

Führungskonzeption, 209.

29. Examples for small unit battles against superior allied forces can be found in 

Max Hastings, Overlord, D-Day and the Battle for Normandy (New York: Simon and 

Schuster, 1984), 170-172, 179-181, 183-185.

30. Werner von Raesfeld, “Führung durch Auftrag oder durch bindenden Befehl,” 

in Wehrkunde, 1960, Heft 4: 167, quoted in Oetting, Auftragstaktik, 210.

31. Raesfeld, “Führung durch Auftrag oder durch bindenden Befehl,” quoted in 

Oetting, Auftragstaktik, 210-211.

32. See page 52 of this thesis.

33. Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power, German Military Performance, 1914-

1945 (study submitted to the Department of Defense, Washington, DC, 1980), 189-

199.

34. Oetting, Auftragstaktik, 194-195.

35. Oetting, Auftragstaktik, 197-198.

36. Oetting, Auftragstaktik, 199-200.

37. Oetting, Auftragstaktik, 201.

38. Oetting, Auftragstaktik, 202-203.

39. Oetting, Auftragstaktik, 203-204.

40. Josef Goebbels, Tagebuch (03/31/45), Part II, Vol. 15: 648-649, quoted in 

Johannes Hürter, Hitlers Heerführer, Die Deutschen Oberbefehlshaber im Krieg gegen 

die Sowjetunion, 1941/42 (Munich, Germany: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 

2007), 332.

41. See page 50 of this thesis.

42. Oetting, Auftragstaktik, 213.

43. Heinz Guderian, “War Diary Army Group Center, H.Gr.Kdo.Mitte, KTB Ia, 

19.12.1941,” quoted in Hürter, Hitlers Heerführer, 329.

44. Heinz Guderian, “War Diary 2nd Panzer Army, ” quoted in Oetting, 

Auftragstaktik, 214.

45. Oetting, Auftragstaktik, 215.

46. David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House, When Titans Clashed, How the Red 

Army Stopped Hitler (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 94.

47. Oetting, Auftragstaktik, 230.

48. Erich von Manstein, Verlorene Siege (Bonn, Germany, Athenäum Verlag, 

1955), 241; Eberhard Einbeck, Das Exempel Graf Sponeck, Ein Beitrag zum Thema 

Hitler und seine Generale (Bremen, Germany: Carl Schünemann Verlag, 1970), 21. 

Mungo Melvin claims that the reasoning for von Manstein’s decision was that the 

Kertsch peninsula, once evacuated, would have to be taken back by a major offensive. 

Mungo Melvin, Manstein, Hitler’s Greatest General (New York: Thomas Dunne 

Books, 2010), 250. 

49. Von Manstein, Verlorene Siege, 241; Melvin, Manstein, 249-251; Oetting, 

Auftragstaktik, 230-231.

50. Von Manstein, Verlorene Siege, 245; Oetting, Auftragstaktik, 232.

51. Oetting, Auftragstaktik, 232; Einbeck, Das Exempel Graf Sponeck, 34, 53-57.

52. Oetting, Auftragstaktik, 233.

53. Norbert Haase, “Aus der Praxis des Reichskriegsgerichts, Neue Dokumente 

zur Militärgerichtsbarkeit im Zweiten Weltkrieg,” in Vierteljahreshefte zur 

Zeitgeschichte, ed. Karl Dietrich Bracher, Hans Peter Schwarz, 39. Jahrgang, 1991, 3. 

Heft/Juli: 285.

54. Einbeck, Das Exempel Graf Sponeck, 39.
60

55. Einbeck, Das Exempel Graf Sponeck, 40-45; von Manstein, Verlorene Siege, 

244.

56. Harold C. Deutsch, Hitler and his Generals, The Hidden Crisis, JanuaryJune 1938 (Ann Arbor, MI: Edwards Brothers, 1974), 335; Einbeck, Das Exempel 

Graf Sponeck, 8-9. General Fritsch had during the so called Blomberg-Fritsch affair 

been accused of homosexual behavior, which in those days was against German 

military law, and forced to retire from his position as Commander-in-Chief of the 

Army as part of a political plot to increase the influence of the Nazi party over the 

Wehrmacht.

57. Deutsch, Hitler and his Generals, 346-347.

58. Von Manstein, Verlorene Siege, 241-242. The Romanian forces most likely 

consisted of a cavalry brigade with one motorized regiment and a mountain brigade. 

As soon as the Red Army attacked with tanks out of the beachhead, the Romanian 

units panicked. Einbeck, Das Exempel Graf Sponeck, 30.

59. Einbeck, Das Exempel Graf Sponeck, 22-25.

60. Einbeck, Das Exempel Graf Sponeck, 35-36.

61. Von Manstein, Verlorene Siege, 245.

62. Einbeck, Das Exempel Graf Sponeck, 27-29.

63. Von Manstein, Verlorene Siege, 244. Von Manstein claims that Graf Sponeck 

had a psychological condition that would at that time no longer enable him to 

command under the stress of the difficult situation the troops faced on the Eastern 

Front in the winter of 1941-1942. Einbeck on page 26 denies that Graf Sponeck had 

lost his nerve. Manstein had planned to transfer him to a position similar to his at an 

army corps in a calmer section of the front. Einbeck, Das Exempel Graf Sponeck, 

33. To von Manstein’s credit it also has to be said that he tried to secure a pardon for 

Graf Sponeck after the court martial which von Manstein had thought would prove 

that Graf Sponeck had acted appropriately. He also persuaded the personnel office 

of the army to pay Graf Sponeck’s family the full pension according to his rank. 

Einbeck, Das Exempel Graf Sponeck, 60. His account in his book however seems to 

be primarily driven by the aim to explain his decisions and actions to a post-World 

War II audience.

64. Einbeck, Das Exempel Graf Sponeck, 42.

65. Einbeck, Das Exempel Graf Sponeck, 42.

66. Condell and Zabecki, On the German Art of War, 137.

67. See pages 38 and 43 of this thesis.
61

Chapter 5

The Ethical Component of Initiative From Responsibility 

for the Preservation of Units to Innere Führung

We have to understand that we cannot allow for technocracy in 

our armed forces, but that we must make it our first priority to reflect 

on the ethical foundations of our actions.

This means especially that we have to translate the consequences of such thoughts into the every-day problems for the individual 

soldier, if Innere Führung1 is to be an understandable concept for the 

soldier.2

 – from Innere Führung, A High Demand for the 

Practice, by General Wolfgang Schneiderhan,

14th Inspector General of the Bundeswehr 

The decision for German Wiederbewaffnung (re-armament) as 

a result of the Cold War in Europe and the hot war in Korea created 

a unique challenge for the planners of a new German army. On one 

hand, the need for rapid re-creation of a German military required the 

utilization of former Wehrmacht personnel; on the other, the army of the 

new democracy had to take great pains to ensure such recalled personnel 

had no association with Nazi ideology. The fact that the Reichswehr had 

failed to oppose Hitler’s subversion of the republican constitution under 

Weimar meant that the new force would not perpetuate the old custom, 

whereby soldiers were banned from political participation through 

membership in parties or exercising the right to vote. Instead, members 

of the Adenauer government stipulated that the future soldier would not 

just retain his citizen rights but be expected to exercise them. Soldiers 

(both short-term conscript and long-service professional) would be 

educated to understand their roles as active defenders of democracy 

against external and internal foes.3 This led naturally to another 

evolution of the German command philosophy. This iteration aimed not 

at countering technological or tactical developments but at expanding 

the freedom of soldiers and leaders at all levels to act according to 

the dictates of their consciences. This stage of development can only 

be fully understood against the background of the involvement of 

the Wehrmacht in war crimes during World War II, especially on the 

Eastern Front. The lost war of 1939-1945 had a fundamentally different 

impact upon the German population than, for example, the defeat by 

Napoleon in 1806 or the loss of World War I. The complicity of ordinary 
62

Germans with crimes against humanity under the Nazi regime made 

adherence to ethical principles an imperative objective of all actions of 

the Federal Republic of Germany. Nevertheless, in 1950, just five years 

after the capitulation, when initial planning for a German contribution 

to the defense of Western Europe started, the majority of the population 

rejected any such action. Connections to the Kaiserheer, Reichswehr, 

and Wehrmacht were, in most respects, neither desirable nor practical.

Auftragstaktik is a value-neutral concept. In the newly-resurrected 

Federal Army, doctrine became subordinated to the overarching philosophy of Innere Führung. Bundeswehr Joint Service Regulation ZDv 

10/1, Innere Führung establishes its primacy over all other concepts by 

stating:

Respecting and protecting human dignity are an obligation 

of the German state and thus the Bundeswehr [emphasis in 

the original]. This obligation is at once the ethical justification 

for and a limitation of military service. Values based on human dignity are also the foundation for the principles of Innere 

Führung and thus for legal norms within the Bundeswehr as 

well as the structure of its internal order.4

It further describes the underlying principles and elements of the philosophy:

Through Innere Führung, the values and norms of the Basic 

Law are perpetuated within the Bundeswehr [emphasis in 

the original]. It embodies the principles of freedom, democracy, 

and the rule of law in the armed forces. Its guiding principle is 

the “citizen in uniform.”

Innere Führung thus ensures a maximum of military effectiveness and guarantees a maximum of freedom and rights 

for soldiers [emphasis in the original] in the framework of our 

free democratic basic order.

The principles of Innere Führung are based on ethical, legal, 

political, and social foundations and meet military demands

[emphasis in the original]. These foundations and demands 

shape the concept of Innere Führung and its areas of application.5

In this system, the application of the principle of Auftragstaktik by leaders and individual soldiers is one of eight criteria for Innere Führung, 

constituting a leadership style that best conforms with the principle of 
63

the “citizen in uniform.”6 The manual underlines the positive effects 

of shared responsibility and the active participation of subordinates on 

motivation, job satisfaction and operational readiness.7 Discipline is to 

be achieved out of insight instead of external pressure.8

The basic concept of Auftragstaktik, to provide an understanding 

of the reasoning for a mission through conveying the purpose and the 

overall scheme, expands under Innere Führung by the requirement to 

also provide subordinates with the necessity of a mission, especially 

under stress.9 With this, soldiers “will be able and prepared to act out 

of conviction in accordance with the mission, and will take into consideration wider objectives.”10 The change of warfare in Europe in the 

atomic and then nuclear ages necessitated increased independence of 

action by soldiers at all levels. Disrupted command structures, widespread physical devastation, and civilian casualties caused by the use 

of nuclear weapons against populated areas – the likely reality in nuclear war – would fundamentally affect the German soldier’s motives 

to fight. The broadened principles of Auftragstaktik would provide the 

soldier not only with the capability to autonomously fight in this environment but also the motivation.11

Overall, the establishment of Innere Führung constituted a necessary precondition for the integration of German armed forces into the 

Western European defense structure so soon after the war. By grafting 

Innere Führung onto Auftragstaktik, an established command philosophy, creators of the Bundeswehr provided an ethical foundation for the 

actions of soldiers and leaders previously lacking in German military 

doctrine. Innere Führung also amplified the positive effects of Auftragstaktik as a leadership and management method, providing commitment 

and motivation for soldiers led by means of a surprisingly modern command philosophy.

Conclusion

The adaptation of German command philosophy conducted prior 

to the foundation of the Bundeswehr differes from those that happened 

in the periods described in the earlier chapters of the work. The Bundeswehr built upon the established understanding of Auftragstaktik and 

the three categories of initiative that had been established in the one and 

a half centuries since the battles of Jena and Auerstädt. Therefore the 

adaptation addressed the three different qualities added to the philosophy instead of fundamentally altering the basic concept.
64

Most prominently, Innere Führung officially established the ethical 

dimension of actions of German soldiers and leaders representing 

the post-World War II democratic German state. Breaking with the 

Wehrmacht as an institution, the Bundeswehr honored only those 

officers of the Wehrmacht who had acted upon ethical principles and 

not those who only won tactical engagements. This shift was made 

obvious when the Bundeswehr Luftwaffe stated on its webpage:

Count Sponeck in life was always trying to ingrain into his soldiers spirit and discipline. He subordinated the Diktat of unconditional obedience to his conscience and his responsibility 

towards his soldiers. For this he gave his life. To honor him a 

memorial stone has been set up in the Sponeck Barracks in Germersheim . . . It includes a quotation of Field Marshal Moltke 

that appropriately characterizes Sponeck’s actions: “Obedience 

is a principle. But the man stands above the principle.”12

By these actions and by means of many others both great and small did 

the leaders of the new German defense forces live up to the example 

shown by all too few commanders during World War II, and thus did 

ethical leadership become an official principle of the Bundeswehr.

Auftragstaktik – as the fundamental leadership style applied in the 

daily work within the Bundeswehr – is the second quality added. It 

provides a modern way of interaction between superiors and subordinates thus creating commitment and active participation throughout the 

ranks. It is therefore a motivational factor contributing to the role of the 

Bundeswehr as a competitive employer.

Last but not least, the realities of life in a potential frontline state 

in a nuclear war dictated the nature and role of Innere Führung. It ably 

complements the established principle of giving an explanation for a 

mission to subordinates in order to provide a motive to fight for freedom and democracy despite the almost certain devastation in such a 

war.
65

Notes

1. The term Innere Führung cannot properly be translated into English. The 

literal translation would be “internal direction,” but the concept covers the whole 

spectrum of leadership development and civic education in addition to providing an 

individual ethical guidance.

2. Wolfgang Schneiderhan, Generalinspekteur (senior uniformed officer) of 

the German Armed Forces, in a speech on the occasion of a scientific conference 

at the Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr with the topic “Innere Führung: A High 

Demand for the Practice,” June 20, 2003, in Gesellschaft, Militär, Krieg und Frieden 

im Denken von Wolf Graf von Baudissin ed. Martin Kutz (Baden-Baden, Germany: 

Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2004), 180.

3. Karl Diefenbach, “Staatsbürger in Uniform, Ausgangspunkt und Ziel 

der Inneren Führung,” in Reader Sicherheitspolitik, Die Bundeswehr vor neuen 

Herausforderungen, ed. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, FüS I 4, Dieter 

Buchholtz (Bonn, Germany: 1998), 20.

4. German Federal Minister of Defense, Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1, 

Innere Führung (Leadership Development and Civic Education) (Bonn, Germany: 

2008), para. 305.

5. German Federal Minister of Defense, Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1, 

Innere Führung, para 301-303.

6. German Federal Minister of Defense, Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1, 

Innere Führung, para 316, 613.

7. German Federal Minister of Defense, Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1, 

Innere Führung, para 612.

8. Helmut R. Hammerich, “Kerniger Kommiss oder Weiche Welle? Baudissin 

und die kriegsnahe Ausbildung in der Bundeswehr,” in Wolf Graf von Baudissin, 

1907-1993, Modernisierer zwischen totalitärer Herrschaft und freiheitlicher Ordnung, 

ed. Rudolf J. Schlaffer and Wolfgang Schmidt (Munich, Germany: Oldenbourg 

Wissenschaftsverlag, 2007), 130.

9. Hammerich, “Kerniger Kommiss oder Weiche Welle?“ paragraph 614.

10. Hammerich, “Kerniger Kommiss oder Weiche Welle?“ paragraph 614.

11. Hammerich, “Kerniger Kommiss oder Weiche Welle?“ 129-130.

12. Luftwaffe web page, quoted in Loretana de Libero, “Tradition 

und Traditionsverständnis der Deutschen Luftwaffe,” in Tradition und 

Traditionsverständnis der Deutschen Luftwaffe, Geschichte, Gegenwart, Perspektiven, 

ed. Heiner Möllers (Potsdam, Germany: Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, 2012), 

17.

67

Chapter 6

Conclusion

The aim of this work was to identify factors that historically have 

influenced or determined the acceptable extent of initiative during the 

application of Auftragstaktik in the Prussian and German armies over 

the last two centuries. I believe that parameters must be in place before 

the fact to specify the accepted degree of initiative rather than afterwards. Identifying these factors and parameters should serve discussions about the future utility of Auftragstaktik and Mission Command, 

and specifically, Auftragstaktik used as the basis for Mission Command.

Parameters for the Limits of Initiative

The problem set of knowing before the fact if a decision upon one’s 

own authority would be seen as appropriate execution of initiative or 

disruptive disobedience did not emerge until the concept of Auftragstaktik had been fully established by the end of Moltke’s age. During 

the 19th century in the Prussian and German Armies, exercise of initiative by operational level commanders was seen as an objective with 

innate value, regardless of the outcome of an action. As long as a commander showed proactive leadership and élan, his actions were justified. A supporting factor for this judgment, which can be found most 

clearly in the editions of Moltke’s writings published by the General 

Staff at the turn of the 20th Century, was the fact that commanders who 

aggressively went after the enemy could trust their neighboring units 

would join them and hence ensure success. The contrast of reluctant 

French commanders unwilling to act independently in 1870 justified 

this Prussian virtue.

The selected historical examples of the later periods highlight the 

difficulty of identifying universal parameters. Before the 1950s the only 

enduring truth for a commander acting independently was that success 

justifies all measures. When contrasting the execution of the Schlieffen 

Plan with Guderian’s and Rommel’s successes in 1940, one cannot 

fail to ask oneself how today’s judgment would look had a French 

counterattack cut off the dangerously exposed supply lines of those two 

German commanders. For tactical level initiative of categories one and 

two – restrained to independently accomplish the mission or support the 

higher commander’s intent respectively – the problem of identifying 

parameters does not seem to be difficult. It remains unknown however, 

how many cases of subordinates misjudging the situation or not 
68

understanding the higher commander’s intent exist for each known 

account of exemplary initiative.

The cases of the German generals dismissed from their positions 

and in some cases court-martialed for not obeying the 1941 Führerbefehl demonstrate the end result of a complete breakdown of trust between political leadership and the military. Although unsuccessful, the 

defense used by Graf Sponeck’s legal team documents the professional 

understanding of the limits of initiative at that time.

Factors Influencing the Extent of Initiative

Several factors were instrumental in the development of Auftragstaktik. It began with societal factors leading to mass armies of unprecedented size requiring decentralized execution by higher commanders 

who had to march separated and then concentrate in time for the battle. 

In parallel, the increased accuracy and firepower of both infantry and 

artillery weapons – a technological factor carrying through to World 

War I – led to the introduction of increasingly dispersed tactical formations on the battlefield. This encouraged low-level tactical initiative 

due to the need to fire weapons at one’s own rhythm and to utilize the 

terrain independently. The necessary autonomy at the level of squads 

and fire teams meant a certain degree of independence was unavoidable – at least in situations where communications technology was relatively inefficient. An interesting interdependence developed between 

the cultural attraction of the German Army towards initiative and the 

capability of operational level maneuver. Due to the cultural disposition of the German Army, tactics based upon initiative were selected 

as the answer to the stalemate at the World War I Western Front. This 

led to the reemergence of the capability of operational level maneuver 

in 1918, which then reinforced the predisposition towards initiative, allowing for the exploitation of opportunities at an unprecedented level, 

proving the value of both concepts. The professional, ethical element 

underpinning initiative was temporarily suppressed during World War 

II but allowed for the re-founding of German armed forces under the 

auspices of a democratic and ethical foundation during the Cold War.

A Holistic Approach to Auftragstaktik

When writing a historical paper with the aspiration to not only describe the past but contribute to current discussions, one must ask what 

those contributions should be. This paper shows that Auftragstaktik in 

the Prussian and German armies resulted from a long developmental 

process and that it consists of several facets. It is not within the scope of 
69

this paper to elaborate on the challenges to the application of Auftragstaktik in armies underpinned by other command philosophies. A good 

source for the interested reader is the work of the Israeli scholar Shamir 

Eitan, Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in 

the US, British and Israeli Armies. There are, however, some recommendations from a German perspective.

Auftragstaktik is the result of both random and deliberate developments during the last two centuries of German history. In its current 

form it is an all-encompassing command philosophy that informs critical aspects of service in the Bundeswehr. The adherence to this principle 

guarantees that individual soldiers and leaders at every level are trained 

and educated in the spirit and at the required level of understanding to 

allow for mutual trust in the abilities of fellow soldiers. It also enables 

those soldiers to search for, identify, and exploit opportunities to gain 

and maintain the initiative. The establishment of the General Staff as 

an instrument to create the professional foundation for Auftragstaktik

at the operational level serves as an example for this, as well as the 

training and education emphasized during the Interwar Period. In both 

cases the prerequisites for successful execution of initiative were laid 

during peacetime.

Auftragstaktik is grounded upon an ethical foundation of positive 

allowances and expectations instead of regulations that restrict behavior to severe professional norms. This implies a priori trust in the “citizen in uniform” or candidate for officer or non-commissioned officer 

positions. Jörg Muth’s Command Culture, Officer Education in the US 

Army and the German Armed Forces, 1901-1940, and the Consequences for World War II describes the circumstances of this kind of education very well. The Prussian practice of treating officer cadets as mature 

and responsible beings engendered in them the self-confidence required 

for them to act autonomously upon firm ethical judgment.

The paper has also shown that the development of Auftragstaktik

was determined by the realities the Prussian and German armies faced. 

It remains therefore necessary to keep sight not only of the different aspects of Auftragstaktik but also of the environment, the socio-political 

developments within and around an army and the doctrinal and technological developments on the battlefield. Rommel’s unplanned deep 

thrust in May 1940, for example, is hard to imagine happening in 2015 

given the current requirements to provide 48 hours advance synchronization of the airspace.
70

Therefore, although having come into being in a piecemeal fashion, Auftragstaktik is a philosophy that is directly applicable only in 

the environment of the German Army. Its roots lie in a Clausewitzian 

understanding of warfare and it is nested in a culture of mutual trust 

and tolerance for mistakes. It requires proficient leaders with a strong 

ethical compass who command through a decision-making process that 

emphasizes understanding of the problem rather than the perfection of a 

solution accounting for all eventualities. While this philosophy, if holistically applied, creates adaptive leaders and thus the flexibility in command and cognitive skills Meir Finkel describes as one requirement for 

the ability to counter surprise, the question of whether selective implementation in absence of the described prerequisites can be successful 

remains at least debatable.

The Future of Auftragstaktik

Is Auftragstaktik compatible with integrated command and control 

systems that provide the opportunity to link the individual soldier or 

tank crew to the theater commander? Does it have a future where a live 

video feed of the helmet-mounted camera and the capabilities of surveillance systems provide the illusion of shared situational awareness 

across all echelons? The last decade of Coalition operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan that allowed commanders to focus on those few subordinate elements in contact with the enemy indicates that centralized 

control can work well. The increased joint integration at lower levels 

increases the benefits of preplanned operations that can be supported intensively by joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 

and fires.

When they next face a near-peer adversary, Western armies could 

be forced to restrict the use of their command and control systems to 

avoid detection. Cyber warfare could disrupt friendly networks, forcing 

the armed forces to use less sophisticated systems. On the other hand, 

it is debatable whether network-enabled centralized command would 

work once the majority of subordinate units are engaged with the enemy. In such a scenario the best commander and the best staff might be 

overwhelmed by the sheer amount of information. How sophisticated is 

the situational awareness provided by a video stream?

Other aspects of Auftragstaktik demand attention when considering 

its future role. How can armed forces develop leaders instead of managers or administrators if they never allow junior leaders to act with 

autonomy? How can they compete with other employers if service in 
71

the armed forces requires new officers to curb their initiative, repress 

independent thought, and does not require the use of the own intellectual capabilities? Auftragstaktik as an overarching command philosophy 

which provides the opportunity to develop a military that has sustainable access to adequate human resources and is capable of coping

73

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