Battlefield Atlas of 

Price’s Missouri 

Expedition of 1864

By

Charles D. Collins, Jr.

Combat Studies Institute Press

Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027
Major General Samuel Curtis picture courtesy of Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division 

Washington, D.C. 20540, located at http://www.loc.gov/pictures/resource/cwp.4a40393/.

Major General Sterling Price picture courtesy of National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior, 

located at http://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/civil_war_series/19/sec2.htm.
Battlefield Atlas of Price’s Missouri Expedition of 1864

By

Charles D. Collins, Jr.

Combat Studies Institute

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
iv

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Collins, Charles D., 1955- author.

 Battlefield Atlas of Price’s Missouri Expedition of 1864 / by Charles D. Collins, Jr.

 pages cm

 Includes bibliographical references and index.

 ISBN 978-1-940804-27-9 (alk. paper)

 1. Price’s Missouri Expedition, 1864. 2. Price, Sterling, 1809-1867. 3. United States--History--Civil War, 

1861-1865--Cavalry operations. 4. Missouri--History--Civil War, 1861-1865. 5. Kansas--History--Civil War, 1861-1865. 

I. Title. 

 E477.16.C64 2015

 977.8’03--dc23

 2015027368

2016

Editor

Jennifer B. Fike

Combat Studies Institute Press publications cover a variety of military history topics. The views 

expressed in this CSI Press publication are those of the author9s) and not necessarily those of the 

Department of the Army or the Department of Defense. A full list of CSI press publications is 

available at: http://usacac.army.mil/organizations/ide/csi.

The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document as an official publication 

of the CSI. It is prohibited to use the CSI’s official seal on any republication without the express 

written permission of the Director of CSI.
v

Foreword

The genesis for the publication of Battlefield Atlas of Price’s Missouri Expedition of 1864 goes back to 1985. Dr. Jerold 

E. Brown first developed the Battle of Westport as a staff ride for the Combat Studies Institute’s (CSI) curriculum at the US 

Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). The study of the Battle of Westport, Missouri, provided the college 

with the opportunity to visit a nearby Civil War battlefield. Dr. Brown also used the Westport staff ride as a “train the trainer” 

exercise in what later became the Military History Instruction Course (MHIC) to teach staff ride methodology. Subsequent 

CSI instructors expanded Dr. Brown’s original work into a full-length staff ride. Most notable were Dr. Curtis S. King and 

Mr. Gary W. Linhart, both CSI Historians. They formalized the instructor notes into a standardized staff ride walk book 

(instructor guide) and widened the scope of both the preliminary study and the field study portions. The new preliminary 

study provided an overview of all of Price’s Missouri Expedition of 1864 (7 September 1864 to 28 November 1864) and the 

revised field study focused on the three-day battle of Westport (21-23 October 1864). Over time, the Westport staff ride became very popular with ROTC programs, Reserve Component units, and the Active duty Army from the surrounding region. 

In 2006, Dr. King developed a staff ride for the Battle of Mine Creek, Kansas. Dr. King’s new staff ride basically told 

“the rest of the story” of the Price Raid, focusing on the Confederate retreat from the Westport area (23-25 October 1864) 

and the Union pursuit, the field study phase of the staff ride concluding at the site of the stunning Union victory at Mine 

Creek, Kansas (25 October 1864). The new staff ride proved to be as popular as the Westport staff ride among Army organizations. 

In 2013, the Westport and Mine Creek staff rides received renewed attention as Mr. Charles D. Collins, CSI Historian, 

combined and expanded the two staff rides into a US Army Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) elective 

culminating with a two-day staff ride on both battlefields. Concurrently, Mr. Collins also modified the elective into a twoday staff ride for CGSC’s Art of War Scholars Program with an increased emphasis on the operational level of war. 

Hundreds of students from ROTC programs in addition to Army Reserve and Active Component units have used the 

study of Price’s Missouri Expedition of 1864, and the two staff rides associated with the campaign, as leader development 

tools for their leaders. This atlas is intended to serve as an educational reference to further enhance the Westport and Mine 

Creek staff ride experience. The atlas provides a heavy dose of tactical detail but also directs significant focus on the operational level of war. Therefore, the staff rides associated with the 1864 Missouri Expedition are appropriate for Army leader 

development education and training at nearly all levels. The campaign provides a host of issues to be examined: campaign 

planning, deception, intelligence, leadership, logistics, reconnaissance (or lack thereof), soldier initiative, and many other 

areas relevant to the modern military professional. Additional issues, somewhat unique to Missouri in the American Civil 

War, are guerilla and counter-guerilla operations, operations in support of civil authorities, challenging local and state political considerations, and a resource constrained environment. Each of these issues is as relevant to us today as it was 150 years 

ago. In short, modern military professionals, for whom this atlas was written, will find a great deal to ponder and analyze 

when studying this campaign. CSI – The Past is Prologue!

vii

Acknowledgments

I wish to acknowledge the many people who made the publication of this work possible and thank them for their efforts. 

First, I would like to thank the historians who have researched and published great works on the events associated with 

Price’s Missouri Expedition of 1864. Without their efforts, the story of this less than well-known Civil War campaign may 

have been totally overlooked and forgotten. Additionally, without their detailed studies, my own efforts to provide an atlas 

for the campaign would not have been possible. The atlas’ bibliography shows the many publications used in my research. 

However, I would be remiss if I did not note some of the outstanding works I most especially depended upon. First, there 

was Mark Lause’s Price’s Lost Campaign. His study provides a detailed look at the beginning of the campaign, the Battle 

of Pilot Knob and the fight for Jefferson City. Howard Monnet’s Action Before Westport continues the story from Jefferson 

City to the environs of Kansas City. Mr. Monnet’s book, published in 1964, remains the best book on the three days of battle 

fought near Kansas City known collectively as the Battle of Westport. Mr. Lumir Buresh’s The Battle of Mine Creek looks at 

the retreat from Westport and has a thorough description and analysis of the six battles fought on 25 October 1864. The true 

heart of the atlas is “The War of Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies,” 

commonly referred to as “the Official Records.” It was a highly mobile campaign and most of the commanders waited until 

after the conclusion of the expedition to write their reports. Unfortunately, some commanders failed to submit their reports 

or they were lost to history. Many of the reports are lofty and exaggerate disproportionately any silver lining that can be 

found. Nevertheless, most of the reports are rich in detail and priceless to those researching the campaign. 

Second, I would also like to thank my colleagues at the Combat Studies Institute and the US Army Command and General Staff College. The institute’s leadership provided me with the opportunity to visit and walk all the battlefields noted in 

the atlas. LTC Matt Dale and Dr. Curtis King walked the grounds with me at Pilot Knob, Jefferson City, and Glasgow. Dr. 

King and Gary Linhart accompanied me many times to Westport and Mine Creek. A well-deserved thank you to Florian 

Waitl for graciously allowing me to make a six-hour detour to visit the grounds at Osage River, Charlot Farm, and Newtonia. I greatly value the ideas and insights they provided on these research trips. Without doubt, their contributions were extremely helpful. A special thanks to Dr. King, Mr. Ken Gott, and LTC Dale who served as my dependable sounding boards. 

Without their help, I could not have completed this project. Curt King patiently listened to my ramblings and then pointed 

me back in the right direction. Ken Gott, a true expert on the campaign, was an invaluable source of information, ideas, and 

sources. LTC Dale loves to study history and has a great interest in the Civil War campaigns fought west of the Mississippi 

River. He consistently offered good advice and, on more than one occasion, reeled me back from some tangents that exceeded the scope of the planned atlas. Additionally, recognition and appreciation goes to Mr. Kurt Ebaugh for his valuable 

help in analyzing the campaign at the operational level of war. I also express thanks to Mr. Kevin Kennedy, the Staff Ride 

Team Chief, for allocating the time to finish the project and gently nudging me along to get it done. Dr. Dean Nowowiejski, 

Director of CGSC’s Art of War Program, and his students provided numerous insights during the course of several Price’s 

Expedition Staff Rides. Additionally, Major David Lovett, CGSC Class of 2016, provided invaluable help based upon his 

research for his Masters thesis Leadership Study on the Battle of Little Blue, 21 October 1864.

Unfortunately, over the two years I intermittently worked on this project, I failed to record all the names of others who 

assisted me and sincerely beg their forgiveness. One notable oversight included the countless people of the Midwest whose 

friendliness warmed and highlighted my time spent researching their region. In one particular instance, while researching 

the battle fought at Charlot Farm, I struggled to learn the location of a particular historical wayside marker near the battlefield. Later in my studies, I discovered the location of the historical marker. It was in a truck stop parking lot in Deerfield, 

Missouri. I called the truck stop and a waitress took a picture of the marker and sent it to me. Thanks to the kindness of the 

waitress, the information on the historical marker proved to be very helpful. 

Third, with much appreciation, I acknowledge my editors. LTC Dale served as my first reader. He made the careful 

initial edit of my very rough first drafts and continually encouraged clarification and other needed improvements. Second, 

my wife Judy, helped me with the acknowledgments, the foreword, and the introduction. Third, Dr. Terry Beckenbaugh of 

the Department of Military History at the Command and General Staff College served as my second reader. He provided 

invaluable assistance in clarifying historical terms and additional grammatical corrections. Finally, Dr. Donald Wright, the 

Deputy Director of the Army Press, and Jennifer Fike, Combat Studies Institute editor, both diligently refined the final draft 

into a professional package for publication.
viii

Last, on a personal note, I offer my heartfelt thanks to my family for always supporting me through my many staff rides 

and research trips, not only to the Missouri Expedition battlefields, but to many other historical sites across our nation. Such 

great opportunities and experiences are hard for me to think of as “work.”

Charles D. Collins, Jr.

Historian, Combat Studies Institute
ix

Contents

Foreword..............................................................................................................................................................................v

Acknowledgments.............................................................................................................................................................vii

Introduction........................................................................................................................................................................xi

Part I. Missouri’s Divided Loyalties..................................................................................................................................1

Part II. Missouri’s Five Seasons: Spring, Summer, Fall, Price’s Raid, and Winter ...................................................13

4. Confederate Recruiters and Partisan Rangers..........................................................................................................15

5. Marmaduke’s Raids (1862-1863).............................................................................................................................19

6. Bushwhackers and General Order No. 11 ................................................................................................................21

7. Jo Shelby’s Raid (1863) ...........................................................................................................................................23

Part III. The Road to Saint Louis....................................................................................................................................25

8. The Difficulties of our Situation...............................................................................................................................27

9. The Union Command in the West ............................................................................................................................31

10. A Just and Holy Cause............................................................................................................................................35

11. The Invasion of Missouri .......................................................................................................................................37

12. The Army of Missouri ............................................................................................................................................39

13. The Department of Missouri ..................................................................................................................................41

14. The Decision to Attack Pilot Knob.........................................................................................................................43

15. The Battle of Pilot Knob.........................................................................................................................................45

16. The Gates of St. Louis............................................................................................................................................47

Part IV. Saint Louis to Lexington....................................................................................................................................51

17. Toward Jefferson City.............................................................................................................................................53

18. The Gasconade and Osage Rivers..........................................................................................................................55

19. Jefferson City..........................................................................................................................................................57

20. Boonville ................................................................................................................................................................59

21. Mobilizing the Kansas Militia................................................................................................................................61

22. Sedalia and Glasgow ..............................................................................................................................................63

23. The Battle of Glasgow............................................................................................................................................65

24. The Battle of Lexington..........................................................................................................................................67

Part V. The Battle of Westport.........................................................................................................................................69

25. Decision at the Little Blue River............................................................................................................................71

26. The Little Blue River Bridge573

27. The Lower Ford......................................................................................................................................................75

28. Blunt’s Attack.........................................................................................................................................................77

29. Shelby’s Attack.......................................................................................................................................................79

30. Price’s Plan.............................................................................................................................................................81

31. The Big Blue River.................................................................................................................................................83

32. Confederates Cross the Big Blue............................................................................................................................85

33. Melvin Grant’s Dilemma........................................................................................................................................87

34. The Fight at Mockbee Farm ...................................................................................................................................89

35. The Battle of Independence....................................................................................................................................91

36. The Night before Westport .....................................................................................................................................93

37. Daylight at Westport...............................................................................................................................................95

38. The Second Fight at Byram’s Ford.........................................................................................................................97

39. Philips’ Charge .......................................................................................................................................................99

40. Winslow’s First Assault........................................................................................................................................101
41. Bloody Hill Taken ................................................................................................................................................103

42. Curtis at Brush Creek ...........................................................................................................................................105

43. George Thoman’s Path .........................................................................................................................................107

44. McGhee’s Charge .................................................................................................................................................109

45. Shelby’s Stand at Wornall House ......................................................................................................................... 111

46. The Escape of the Wagon Train............................................................................................................................ 113

Part VI. The Battle of Mine Creek ................................................................................................................................ 117

47. Decision at the Thomas House............................................................................................................................. 119

48. Retreat and Pursuit ...............................................................................................................................................121

49. War Council at West Point....................................................................................................................................123

50. First Skirmish at the Mounds ...............................................................................................................................125

51. Curtis’ Decision and Price’s Estimate of the Situation.........................................................................................127

52. The Battle of the Mounds.....................................................................................................................................129

53. The Marais des Cygnes River...............................................................................................................................131

54. McNeil’s Hasty Attack .........................................................................................................................................133

55. Clark’s Line Withdraws........................................................................................................................................135

56. The Roads to Fort Scott........................................................................................................................................137

57. Marmaduke’s Dilemma ........................................................................................................................................139

58. Extending the Lines..............................................................................................................................................141

59. The Firefight.........................................................................................................................................................143

60. The 4th Iowa.........................................................................................................................................................147

61. The Confederate Line Breaks...............................................................................................................................149

62. Chaos at the Ford..................................................................................................................................................151

63. The Final Shots at Mine Creek.............................................................................................................................153

64. Fort Lincoln..........................................................................................................................................................155

65. The Union Attack at the Little Osage River.........................................................................................................157

66. The Union Victory at the Little Osage River........................................................................................................159

67. Across the Prairie to Douglas Ford.......................................................................................................................161

68. The Battle of Charlot’s Farm................................................................................................................................163

Part VII. The Second Battle of Newtonia and the Retreat..........................................................................................167

69. The Night of 25 October.......................................................................................................................................169

70. The Reteat.............................................................................................................................................................171

71. Opening Shots at the Second Battle of Newtonia ................................................................................................173

72. The Artillery Duel.................................................................................................................................................175

73. The Confederate Charge.......................................................................................................................................177

74. The Last Fight.......................................................................................................................................................179

75. Command Crisis...................................................................................................................................................181

76. The Retreat to the Arkansas River........................................................................................................................185

77. The End of the Campaign.....................................................................................................................................187

Appendices

Appendix A.................................................................................................................................................................193

Appendix B.................................................................................................................................................................197

Appendix C.................................................................................................................................................................201

Appendix D ................................................................................................................................................................205

Bibliography ....................................................................................................................................................................209

About the Author ............................................................................................................................................................213
xi

∗

These abbreviations are noted as an introduction to each major campaign within the records. Examples can be found in Series I, 

Volume III: Wilson Creek, pages 53-54; Lexington, page 171. Also in Series I, Volume VIII: Pea Ridge, pages 189-190; and Series I, 

Volume XLI, Part I: Price’s Missouri Expedition, pages 304-306.

Introduction

Battlefield Atlas of Price’s Missouri Expedition of 1864 is intended to serve as an educational reference for the Westport 

and Mine Creek staff rides. The Atlas is divided into seven parts. Part I, Missouri’s Divided Loyalties, and Part II, Missouri’s 

Five Seasons, provide an overview of Missouri’s history from the initial settlement of the Louisiana Purchase Territories 

through the opening years of the American Civil War. The remaining parts cover the Confederate plan, the Confederate 

movement into Missouri and the Union reaction, the Confederate retreat and Union pursuit into Kansas, and the final Confederate escape back into Arkansas. The atlas has a standard format with the map to left and the narrative to the right. Each 

narrative closes with two or more primary source vignettes. These vignettes provide an overview of the events shown on 

the map and discussed in the narrative from the perspective of persons who participated in the events. In most cases there 

are two vignettes with the first from a person loyal to the Union and the second from a person who supported the Southern 

cause. A few narratives have two or more vignettes from only the Union side. This was done to emphasize disagreements 

and struggles among senior leaders to establish a common course of action. Map 25, Decision at the Little Blue River, is a 

good example and the three vignettes emphasize the disagreement between Maj. Gen. Samuel Curtis and his subordinate, 

Maj. Gen. James Blunt on where to locate the Union defensive line. 

The War of Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies provides a standardized list of abbreviations for military rank in the American Civil War.

These Civil War era abbreviations are used throughout the atlas.∗1

Gov. Governor

Sen. Senator

Lieut. Gen. Lieutenant General

Maj. Gen. Major General

Brig. Gen. Brigadier General

Col. Colonel

Lieut. Col. Lieutenant Colonel

Maj. Major

Capt. Captain

Lieut. Lieutenant

Sergt. Sergeant

There were no standardized abbreviations for units in the American Civil War. However, Mark Boatner listed the most 

common abbreviations used in official correspondence in his The Civil War Dictionary (New York, NY: David McKay 

Company, 1959), xv-xvi. 

Echelons

Sec. Section

Co. Company

Btry. Battery

Bn. Battalion

Regt. Regiment

Brig. Brigade

Div. Division

Dist. District

Dept. Department
xii

Other abbreviations common to the campaigns in Missouri:

C.S.A. Confederate States of American 

KSM Kansas State Militia (Union)

MSG Missouri State Guard (Supported the Confederacy)

MSM Missouri State Militia (Union)

EMM Enrolled Missouri Militia (Union)

PEMM Provisional Enrolled Missouri Militia (Union)

Arty. Artillery

Cav. Cavalry

Dsmtd. Dismounted

Engr(s). Engineer, Engineers

Ft. Fort

Inf. Infantry

Lgt. Light

Mtd. Mounted

Mtn. How. Mountain Howitzer

U.S. United States

Vol (s). Volunteer, Volunteers

The atlas has two Map Keys. Map Key 1 shows terrain features. Most of these features should be easily recognized but 

are noted on the map key as a reference. Map Key 2 provides a guide for the units symbols represented on the maps.
xiii

xv
xvi
Part I

Missouri’s Divided Loyalties

1803-1862
2

Map 1.
3

1. Little Dixie

The people of Missouri experienced turbulent times long before Maj. Gen. Sterling Price’s 1864 Missouri Expedition. 

Missouri was one of the four Border States (others being Delaware, Kentucky, and Maryland) in the secession crisis of 

the 1860s. The term border means that it was a Slave State but shared borders with Free States. The designation of Border 

State also implies that the state’s loyalty was unevenly divided between the North and the South. In Missouri, a significant 

majority of the state’s population traced their roots back to the Slave States of the South but its major cities had significant 

concentrations of people who had recently emigrated from Europe or from the Free States of the North. Additionally the 

major cities were economically tied to the North through the rivers and railroads. In turn, the “Southerners” of the rural 

population were tied economically to the cities. In the American Civil War, the state’s divided loyalty generated a bitter 

guerrilla war within the larger war between the Union and the Confederacy. The guerrilla war and the immense animosity 

between the opposing sides in Missouri impacted how the war was fought in Missouri and directly contributed to why Price 

conducted his 1864 expedition into Missouri. The origins of guerrilla war can be traced back to the state’s early history. After 

the Louisiana Purchase of 1803, southern farmers and planters migrated into the region that later became Missouri. With 

them was the South’s “peculiar institution” of slavery. In less than 20 years, the territory met the conditions for statehood 

and in December 1818 the Missouri territorial legislature submitted a formal request for statehood. The request threatened 

the delicate balance within the Union between Slave and Free States. Then in 1820, the United States Congress passed legislation, known as the Missouri Compromise, which allowed Missouri’s admittance as a Slave Sate and balanced the Union 

with the entrance of Maine as a Free State. During the Antebellum period, a flood of southern immigrants transplanted the 

slave dependent economy onto the rich farmlands bordering the Missouri River. The area became known as “Little Dixie” 

and it was a microcosm of the South’s plantation society. In 1860, 75 percent of the state’s population had roots from Slave 

States. Nevertheless, the slave population peaked in 1830 at 18 percent and eventually dropped to less than 10 percent in 

1860. Most of these slaves were concentrated in the rural areas of “Little Dixie.” Ironically, most Missouri farmers owned 

no slaves. However, that did not mean they opposed the institution of slavery. Many felt freeing the slaves was an economic threat to rural Missouri. Up until the 1850s, the emigrant southerners of “Little Dixie” were the political and economic 

elites of the state. In Price’s 1864 Missouri Expedition, Maj. Gen. Price and two of his three division commander’s owned 

plantations in “Little Dixie” and were prominent slave holders in the state. The region also figured prominently in Price’s 

expedition. Many of the soldiers came from the small towns and rural farms in the region. So for Price’s Army, the expedition was the opportunity to go home.

In 1861, Price targeted “Little Dixie” in his strike against Lexington, Missouri. Thousands of recruits from the area 

joined his Army during the operations around Lexington. In 1864, he again hoped that the people of “Little Dixie” would 

welcome his men as liberators and flock to the “Southern Cause.” His objectives shifted over the course of the 1864 expedition but at one point, he hoped to occupy the state capital of Jefferson City which was a major town within “Little Dixie.” 

There, he planned to hold elections for a new Confederate State government. His movement into the region also resulted in 

several battles. Most of the expedition’s significant fights occurred within the boundaries of “Little Dixie.” The battles and 

skirmishes fought in “Little Dixie” include the following: Jefferson City, Glasgow, Lexington, Little Blue, Independence, 

Byram’s Ford, Bloody Hill, and Westport. 

Beginning in the 1840s, “Little Dixie” began to lose its political monopoly over the control of the state. Increasing 

migration from Europe and northern states changed the political landscape of the state. The overwhelming majority of the 

newcomers were opposed to the expansion of slavery. The uncompromising differences between the pro-slavery and the 

anti-slavery population contributed greatly to the question of organizing more territories west of Missouri. The Missouri 

Compromise of 1820 set Missouri’s southern border as the dividing line for slavery in the United States. All future states 

north of the Parallel 36°30′ north, except Missouri, would be Free States and all new states south of the line would permit 

slavery. However, later Congressional legislation, specifically the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, nullified the Missouri 

Compromise. Illinois Senator Stephen Douglas introduced the legislation as part of the organization of the Kansas and Nebraska territories in order to open up new farmlands and make way for a transcontinental railroad.

Additions to Douglas’ act allowed the residents of the new territories to decide whether or not to allow slavery – popular sovereignty. The Missourians occupied a peninsula of slavery surrounded on two sides by states opposed slavery. 

Missourians saw the rich river valley land in Kansas along the Missouri and Kansas Rivers as natural extensions for slave 

dependent farming, and the Kansas-Nebraska Act set the conditions for the possible extension of slavery into Kansas. Along 
4

the Missouri-Kansas border, anti-slavery “Free-Staters” or “Jay Hawkers” battled against pro-slavery “Border Ruffians” or 

“Bushwhackers” to decide the question of whether Kansas would enter the Union as a free or slave state. 

In the 1854 election of the Kansas Territorial delegates, less than half of the voters were Kansas residents, most were 

“Border Ruffians” who crossed over the border to participate in the election. In 1855, the pro-slavery element won the vote 

again when they dominated the election of the territorial legislature. In 1855, Kansas Territory had only 1,500 registered 

voters, nevertheless over 6,000 ballots were cast. Tragically, violence between the opposing groups was also common and 

the period between 1854 and 1861 came to be known by many names like Bleeding Kansas, Bloody Kansas, or the Border 

War. Many of the combatants in the 1864 expedition, both north and south, were active participants in the “Bleeding Kansas” period. Sterling Price, future Confederate Army commander, served as the governor of Missouri from 1853 to 1854. He 

offered no official recognition or support to the “Border Ruffians;” however, he took no actions to control the violence along 

the border. Joseph Shelby, a Confederate division commander in the expedition, was a leader among the “Border Ruffians” 

and led several raids into Kansas. James Lane, the US, senator of Kansas in 1864 was a prominent abolitionist and leader 

of the “Jay Hawkers.”1

Charles Jennison, a Union brigade commander at Westport, was a hero to the “Free-State” faction. The pro-slavery 

supporters considered him the most brutal of the “Jayhawkers.”2

 Kansas eventually entered the Union as a free state in January of 1861, just a few months before the opening shots fired on Fort Sumter by the Confederacy. The enmity the “Border 

War” period between the pro-slavery and the anti-slavery population of Missouri significantly influenced the behavior of 

partisan groups that fought to control the state during the American Civil War. By late 1860, the question of whether slavery 

would be allowed to expand into the territories was a major issue in upcoming presidential election and threatened to push 

the country to the brink of war. Missourians were divided into three distinct groups. First, there were the “Secessionists” 

who believed that Missouri belonged in the Confederacy. Among the “Secessionists” were the majority of the state’s social 

elite and political leaders of the state. The second group consisted of the “Unconditional Unionists.” They tended to have 

anti-slavery sentiments and believed secession was treason against the country. The “Unconditional Unionists” believed 

the United States should use any means necessary to preserve the Union. The business elites of the major cities along with 

the European and northern immigrants made up the majority of its followers. The overwhelming majority of Missourians 

were considered “Conditional Unionists.” They either supported the right to own slaves or were ambivalent to the issue. 

The “Conditional Unionists” wanted Missouri to remain in the Union because they were economically tied to the north by 

the railroads and river traffic. However, they did not support the use of force in preventing states from leaving the Union. 

They hoped for either a compromise to avoid war or to remain neutral if there was war. Most would not have participated in 

the war if given the choice. The nature of the fight in Missouri would force all to choose sides. Missouri was deeply divided 

before the first shot at Fort Sumter and the war itself would inflame those divisions into a chronic wound. 

Brig. Gen. Harney3

. As a citizen of Missouri, owing allegiance to the United States, and having interests in common with 

you, I feel it my duty as well as privilege to extend a warning voice to my fellow-citizens against the common dangers that 

threaten us, and to appeal to your patriotism and sense of justice to exert all your moral power to avert them... There are 

obligations and duties resting upon the people of Missouri under the Constitution and laws of the United States which are 

paramount, and which I trust you will carefully consider and weigh well before you will allow yourselves to be carried out of 

the Union under the form of yielding obedience to this military bill, which is clearly in violation of your duties as citizens of 

the United States. It must be apparent to every one who has taken a proper and unbiased view of the subject that, whatever 

may be the termination of the unfortunate condition of things in respect to the so-called Cotton States, Missouri must share 

the destiny of the Union. Her geographical position, her soil, productions, and, in short, all her material interests, point 

to this result. We cannot shut our eyes against this controlling fact. It is seen and its force is felt throughout the nation. So 

important is this regarded to the great interests of the country, that I venture to express the opinion that the whole power of 

the Government of the United States, if necessary, will be exerted to maintain Missouri in her present position in the Union.4

Governor Jackson5: I can only promise to bring to the post assigned to me an honest devotion to my State, the Constitution 

of the United States, and to that Union which the Constitution was designed to perpetuate . . . Missouri will not be found to 

shrink from the duty which her position upon the border imposes; her honor, her interests, and her sympathies point alike in 

one direction, and determine her to stand by the South.[A] State Convention should . . . be called immediately. Missouri is 

entitled to a voice in the settlement of the questions now pending in the country, and her position on these questions should 

be known . . . In this way the whole subject will be brought directly before the people at large, who will determine for themselves what is to be the ultimate action of the State.6

6

Map 2.
7

2. St. Louis in 18617

St. Louis was the largest city in Missouri and one of the largest cities west of the Mississippi. The city also sat astride 

two national lines of communication. First was the Mississippi River. Equally important was the Missouri River, the gateway to the American west. Col. Franz Sigel, an important Union leader in 1861 Missouri said, “Saint Louis, [is] the key to 

the Southwest.”8 In 1861, Claiborne Jackson, an ardent secessionist, became the Governor of Missouri. He called for a state 

constitutional convention to vote on secession. The convention representatives voted overwhelming (89 to one) to remain in 

the Union. Nevertheless, Jackson continued to lobby for Missouri to join the Confederacy. In April, he condemned President 

Lincoln’s call for volunteers and refused to comply. Then in late April, pro-Confederate elements seized the US Arsenal at 

Liberty, Missouri, and in early May they seized the US ordnance stores located in Kansas City area. Jackson also directed 

700 militiamen to establish Camp Jackson in St. Louis. Federal authorities saw the camp as a threat to the St. Louis Arsenal. 

The arsenal contained 38,000 muskets, 45 tons of powder, and 11 cannons. This was more than enough supplies to equip an 

army. Unconditional Unionists, led by US Congressman Francis Blair and US Army Capt. Nathaniel Lyon, countered the 

governor’s moves and took action to keep Missouri in the Union.9 They raised 10,000 volunteers, mostly German Americans, and secretly transferred the majority of the arsenal’s ordnance to Illinois. On 10 May, Capt. Lyon assembled 6,000 

volunteers and captured Camp Jackson. Angry civilian mobs hindered the volunteers’ attempt to march the prisoners back 

to the arsenal. The motivations of the mob were complex. Many were “secessionist,” some were “conditional unionist” who 

opposed the use of force, and others just distrusted the mostly German volunteers. Unfortunately, someone in the crowd 

fired on the volunteers and killed a German officer. The volunteers then fired into the crowd killing 28 people and wounding 

another 50. The next day, the mobs again attacked another volunteer unit. Lyon restored the peace by moving his German 

volunteers out of the city. He then used his few US Regulars to enforce a declaration of martial law. The two days of armed 

action and violence forced many of the “conditional unionists” who had hoped for compromise or neutrality to choose sides. 

The decision of whether Missouri would remain a state in the Union or join the Confederacy was still in doubt. 

President Lincoln: Whereas the laws of the United States have been for some time past and now are opposed and the 

execution thereof obstructed in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas 

by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings or by the powers vested in the 

marshals by law. Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States in virtue of the power in me vested by 

the Constitution and the laws, have thought fit to call forth, and hereby do call forth, the militia of the several States of the 

Union, to the aggregate number of 75,000, in order to suppress [the rebellion] and to cause the laws to be duly executed.10

Governor Jackson: Sir: Your dispatch of the 15th instant, making a call on Missouri for four regiments of men for immediate service, has been received. There can be, I apprehend, no doubt but the men are intended to form a part of the President’s 

army to make war upon the people of the seceded States. Your requisition, in my judgment, is illegal, unconstitutional, and 

revolutionary in its object, inhuman and diabolical, and cannot be complied with. Not one man will the State of Missouri 

furnish to carry on any such unholy crusade.11
8

Map 3. 
9

3. The Fight for Missouri12

Following the Camp Jackson Affair, the next nine months of the Civil War in Missouri were characterized by small 

field armies contending for the control of the state. Missouri was not officially part of the Confederacy and therefore had 

to take steps to create an army. The Missouri State General Assembly created the Missouri State Guard (MSG) as a prosecessionist force to resist a Federal invasion and to suppress the rebellion of the Unionists enrolled into Federal service. 

They also appointed Sterling Price as Maj. Gen. and commander of the MSG. Ironically, Price was previously a vocal 

“Conditional Unionist” and had voted against secession. However, he did not believe the Federals had the right to force 

Missouri to remain in the Union. Capt. Lyon’s actions in St. Louis pushed Price into the secessionist camp to defend the 

State of Missouri from “Unionist” aggression. Many of the same soldiers and officers of the MSG of 1861 who hoped to 

see Missouri as part of the Confederacy would still be with Price in the 1864 Missouri Expedition. Governor Jackson and 

Maj. Gen. Price recognized they needed time to organize and train the State Guard, and after some fruitless negotiations 

in St. Louis, they moved their forces to Jefferson City. Meanwhile, Congressman Blair and the newly promoted Brig. Gen. 

Nathaniel Lyon made plans to secure the remainder of the state for the Union. Lyon moved troops and artillery up the 

Missouri river toward Jefferson City by steamboat and another column of troops toward Springfield. Jackson decided not to 

defend the pro-Union Jefferson City (a high percentage being of German immigrants) and retreated up the Missouri River. 

On 17 June, Lyon attacked and defeated an MSG detachment at Boonville. In the fight Col. John Marmaduke, a future 

division commander in the 1864 expedition, commanded the MSG forces. Mr. Joseph (Jo) Shelby, another future division 

commander in the 1864 expedition, missed the fight because he was home recruiting a company of cavalry. That company 

would form the nucleus of his famous Iron Brigade at the Battle of Westport. The fight at Boonville, although no more than 

a large skirmish, was a significant engagement. Lyon’s victory secured St. Louis, Jefferson City, and the Missouri River for 

the “Unionist” cause. Lyon’s actions also isolated the resources of “Little Dixie,” denying it to the pro-southern forces, and 

forced them to retreat into the southwestern portion of the state.

At the same time that Brig. Gen. Lyon was moving toward Boonville, a second Union column commanded by Brig. 

Gen. Thomas Sweeny moved toward Springfield. Lyon directed Sweeny to secure Springfield, another pro-Union town, and 

to block the retreat of secessionist forces from central Missouri. After Boonville, Governor Jackson’s MSG retreated into 

the southwest corner of the state. Jackson’s forces received substantial reinforcements from the rural counties of Missouri 

during the retreat. The small farming counties contained few slaves but they tended to be sympathetic to the Confederacy in 

the secession crisis. On 5 July, Jackson’s 6,000 poorly trained and equipped MSG troops clashed with the advance elements 

of Sweeny’s column near Carthage. Col. Franz Sigel commanded 1,100 well drilled and equipped troops of the Union 

Army vanguard. Nevertheless, Jackson’s MSG with a significant numerical advantage defeated the small Union Army and 

forced it to retreat to Springfield. Two significant 1864 expedition participants fought at Carthage: Capt. Jo Shelby fought 

as a company commander in the MSG, and Brig. Gen. John Clark commanded a MSG brigade. After the fight at Carthage, 

Sigel retreated to Springfield where Brig. Gen. Lyon in the coming weeks concentrated 5,600 Union troops. He learned that 

a large Rebel force was assembling at Cassville and decided to attack in the hope of catching the Confederates before they 

were fully consolidated.

Meanwhile, Price consolidated his recruits and Jackson’s force at Cowskin Prairie and prepared to join with the 

Confederate States Army located across the state line in northwestern Arkansas. The Confederate government had placed 

Brig. Gen Ben McCulloch in command of northwest Arkansas. He had pieced together a small army with regiments from 

Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana. On 31 August, Price and McCulloch combined their forces, a total of 10,175 men, and 

initiated an advance on Springfield. The advance guards of the opposing armies clashed at Dug Springs. The MSG detachment 

at the head of the combined force ran away from the fight in the skirmish. The MSG’s embarrassing performance drove 

an emotional wedge between the Missourians and the Confederate troops. Maj. Gen. Price, with only a state commission 

from the governor of Missouri, yielded command to Brig. Gen. McCulloch to assure Confederate support. By 6 August, the 

Rebels were camped at Wilson’s Creek and planning an attack on Springfield. In Springfield, Lyon decided his best course 

of action was a surprise attack. Early morning on 10 August, the Union Army attacked the enemy encampment with two 

converging columns. Lyon’s bold attack nearly routed the southern forces. Nonetheless, the southern commanders rallied 

the troops and stabilized their positions. The Rebel counterattacks failed to break the Union line on Bloody Hill. However, 

on the northern flank, the southerners routed Sigel’s column and then concentrated their full force against Bloody Hill. Lyon 

was killed in the ongoing struggle for the hill and Maj. Samuel Sturgis took command of the Union Army. At about 1100, 

the Rebels withdrew to regroup and prepare another attack. Sturgis realized his men and ammunition were nearly exhausted 

and ordered a retreat to Springfield. McCulloch’s army was too disorganized to pursue. 
10

Several key leaders associated with the 1864 expedition fought at Wilson’s Creek. For the north, both Charles Blair and 

George Dietzler commanded Kansas regiments. Blair would command a brigade at Westport and Dietzler would command 

the Kansas State Militia. Additionally, Fredrick W. Benteen served as Union volunteer during the battle. He would also 

command a brigade at Westport and win fame at Mine Creek. Price, Clark, and Shelby all fought for the Rebels at Wilson’s 

Creek. 

The victory at Wilson’s Creek gave the Confederates control of southwestern Missouri and set the conditions to regain 

control of the state. Pro-southern hopes to gain control of the state were high. Brig. Gen. Ben McCulloch released the 

following proclamation:

To the People of Missouri: Having been called by the governor of your State to assist in driving the Federal forces 

out of the State and in restoring the people to their just rights, I have come among you simply with the view of 

making war upon our Northern foes, to drive them back, and give the oppressed of your State an opportunity of 

again standing up as freemen and uttering their true sentiments. You have been overrun and trampled upon by the 

mercenary hordes of the North. Your beautiful State has been nearly subjugated, but those sons of Missouri who 

have continued in arms, together with my force, came back upon the enemy, and we have gained over them a great 

and signal victory. Their general-in-chief is slain and many of their other general officers wounded; their army 

is in full fight, and now, if the true men of Missouri will rise up and rally around their standard, the State will be 

redeemed.13

Despite his words, Brig. Gen. McCulloch was hesitant to take action and see the state redeemed. The Confederate government 

had ordered him to defend Arkansas, Texas, and the Indian Territory, and those orders did not necessarily condone an 

invasion of Missouri. McCulloch did not believe that the MSG would be able to maintain control of the Missouri River 

Valley, and even if it did gain many new recruits, it had no means to equip and supply them. Additionally, he despised Price 

and wanted nothing more to do with a man he considered a pompous militia general. On the other hand, Price as a Missouri 

state general was not restricted by orders from Richmond. Furthermore, there was no functioning state government in 

Missouri to give him orders. He believed the triumph at Wilson’s Creek provided the opportunity to ignite a popular uprising 

and regain control of the state. It would also allow Price to pull recruits and resources from north of the Missouri River. With 

that belief, Price decided that the key to success was control of the strongly pro-secessionist counties in “Little Dixie,” and 

he designated Lexington as the objective of his advance. Governor Jackson agreed with Price but also needed the $900,000 

in the Lexington banks, money the MSG desperately needed. Price first moved west against Fort Scott to protect his western 

flank and then marched north toward Lexington. In his wake, pro-Union raiders from Kansas known as “Jayhawkers” raided 

farms and towns that provided supplies to Price. One of the most notorious incidents was the sacking of Osceola, Missouri. 

US Senator James Lane and his Jayhawker followers pillaged and burned the town after killing nine civilians. It was a 

disturbing foretaste of the bitter guerilla war that would engulf Missouri in the months to come. 

On 20 September, Price’s MSG captured the 3,500 soldier garrison of Lexington. The victor’s spoils included 3,000 

stands of infantry arms and ammunition, 750 horses, and $100,000 worth of commissary stores. Additionally, Price recovered 

money that the Union forces had confiscated from the banks, $15,000 of which had disappeared sometime during the siege, 

for a total of $885,000. Price returned the money to the Lexington banks. He then demanded that the banks provide the 

MSG with $37,000, the amount deposited by the Missouri Legislators at the start of the war to pay for the defense of the 

state.14 The Union situation, already in disarray after the loss at Wilson’s Creek, was now on the verge of panic. The Rebel 

victory disheartened the Missouri “Unionists” and bolstered the “Secessionists” by providing Price with temporary control 

of a portion of the Missouri River Valley. Price’s success did encourage a large numbers of volunteers to join with the State 

Guard but it did not incite a popular uprising against the Federal authorities in Missouri. Furthermore, Price could not equip 

or supply the new recruits and had to send many of them back home. Soon after the Rebel victory at Lexington, significant 

Union reinforcements maneuvered against Price. He recognized his army was in danger and decided to fall back to the 

Springfield area.

On Christmas Day of 1861, Brig. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis assumed command of the Union Army of the Southwest.15

His superiors ordered him to drive Price’s Missouri State Guard from the state and then protect Missouri from a potential 

Confederate invasion originating from Arkansas. Curtis advanced into southwestern Missouri and maneuvered Price’s army 

out of the state and into northwestern Arkansas. Price retreated into the Boston Mountains and joined with Brig. Gen. 

McCulloch’s Confederates near Fayetteville, Arkansas. On 4 March 1862, Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn assumed command of 

the combined Rebel force numbering 16,000 men and designated it as the Army of the West. Van Dorn led this army north, 

determined to invade Missouri and capture St Louis. Curtis, with only 10,500 Federal troops on hand, established a strong 

defensive position along Little Sugar Creek, blocking Van Dorn’s path into Missouri. On 7 March, Van Dorn recognized the 
11

strength of Curtis’ defensive line and boldly maneuvered around the Union western flank and attacked into the rear of the 

Federal line at Pea Ridge, Arkansas.

Curtis expected a frontal attack but hedged his bets by having one of his subordinates fell trees and set up other obstacles 

to slow any Confederate flanking maneuver on the Bentonville Detour. It surprised Curtis when Van Dorn attempted to reach 

the Federal rear via the detour. At Pea Ridge Curtis reoriented his forces 180 degrees from south to north to effectively meet 

the Confederate advance. It was an uncannily similar situation to his failure to consider a potentially similar Confederate 

maneuver at Westport just 31 months later where Curtis reoriented his defensive line 90 degrees to counter a Confederate 

flank attack. On the second day of fighting at Pea Ridge, Curtis again foreshadowed the artillery tactics he would employ at 

Westport. On the morning of 8 March, Curtis massed his artillery and heavily suppressed the Confederate line with a twohour artillery barrage. Union infantry attacks then broke the Confederate line and forced Van Dorn’s army to retreat. The 

Union victory at Pea Ridge changed the character of the fight to control Missouri. A Confederate Army would not threaten 

Missouri again until 1864. For the first nine months of the war, opposing field armies fought to control Missouri. In the next 

phase of the fight for Missouri, pro-southern forces would rely primarily on irregular forces and cavalry raids plunging the 

state into a bitter guerilla war. 

Lieut. Voelkner:

16 I had never believed that artillery was capable of such havoc... The sight was awful... I pray God may 

never have occasion to behold such another. Cannon balls and unexploded shells were lying thick over the ground. The trees 

were cut and splintered and torn in every direction. Everything gave ample proof of the horrors of war.17

Sergt. Watson:18 It was clear enough that there had been a shameful piece of bungling and mismanagement, and the 

discontent and clamor became general, and everyone was disgusted.

19
12

Notes

1. For additional information on James Lane see William E. Connelly, James Henry Lane: The “Grim Chieftain” of Kansas. 

(Topeka, KS: Crane & Company, 1970), and John Speer, Life of General James H. Lane (Garden City, KS: John Speer, Printer, 1897).

2. For additional information on Charles Jennison see Stephen Z. Starr, Jennison’s Jayhawkers: A Civil War Cavalry Regiment 

and Its Commander (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1993).

3. Brig. Gen. William S. Harney commanded the Army’s Department of the West at Jefferson Barracks in St. Louis in 1861. He 

was a southerner by birth but remained with the Union when his home state left the Union. 

4. The War of Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume III, 

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1888), 371-372. Brig. Gen. Harney Report. Brig. Gen. Harney was the commander of 

the Military Department of the West and responsible for Missouri. 

5. Gov. Claiborne Fox Jackson, an ardent secessionist, was the 15th Governor of Missouri.

6. The Civil War Muse, St. Louis in 1861. Accessed 16 March 2016. http://www.thecivilwarmuse.com/index.php?page=st-louisin-1861.

7. Map based on information from: William C. Winter, The Civil War in St. Louis (St. Louis: Missouri Historical Society Press, 

1995).

8. O.R., Series I, Volume III, part 1, 85-86. Col. Sigel Report. Col. Sigel took command of the Union forces after the retreat from 

Wilson’s Creek. 

9. Maj. William Bell, a Southerner, had secretly agreed to surrender the arsenal to the state. Sen. Blair had the war department 

replace Bell. However, the loyalty of the replacement, Maj. Peter Hagner, was also suspect. Blair then had Capt. Nathaniel Lyon, an 

outspoken abolitionist, placed in charge of the arsenal’s defense. 

10. O.R., Series III, Volume I, 67-68. Gov. Jackson Report.

11. O.R., Series III, Volume I, 82-83. Gov. Jackson Report.

12. Map and discussion based on information from: Time Life Books, Illustrated Atlas of the Civil War (Alexandria, VA: Time 

Life Books, 1998), 301 – 307; Wiley Britton, The Civil War on the Border. Volume 2 (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1899); Jay 

Monaghan, Civil War on the Western Border (Boston, MA: Little, Brown 1955).

13. O.R., Series I, Volume III, 109. Brig. Gen. McCulloch Report. Brig. Gen. Benjamin McCulloch commanded the Confederate 

forces at the Battle of Wilson’s Creek. 

14. Michael Gillespie, The Civil War Battle of Lexington, Missouri (Lone Jack, MO: By Author, 2007), 14.

15. The Department of Missouri divided its Field Armies into the Army of Southwest Missouri and the Army of Southeast 

Missouri.

16. Lieut. Henry Voelkner served with the 1st Missouri Flying Battery (Union).

17. William L. Shea, Pea Ridge (Chapel Hill, NC; University of NC Press, 1992), 252.

18. Sergt. William Watson served as a sergeant in the 3d Louisiana Infantry. He published Life in The Confederate Army in 1887. 

19. Shea, Pea Ridge, 259. Originally published in Life in The Confederate Army, 31.
Part II

Missouri’s Five Seasons

Spring, Summer, Fall, Price’s Raid, and Winter

1862-1863
14

Map 4.
15

4. Confederate Recruiters and Partisan Rangers1

Historian Paul Burrill Jenkins stated in his 1906 book, The Battle of Westport, that a common joke of the day was that 

in Missouri there were five seasons in the year, “spring, summer, fall, Price’s raid, and winter.”2

The joke may not be historically correct; Price is really only associated with the final and largest raid into Missouri, 

Price’s 1864 Missouri Expedition. However, it does accurately reflect the war in Missouri following the big battles of 1861 

and early 1862. The season of “Price’s raid” shows the important role that Sterling Price played throughout the war in rallying support for the southern cause in Missouri. Those who fought in Missouri, whether they supported the Union or the 

Confederacy, associated the name of Sterling Price with all the large cavalry raids into Missouri whether he participated 

in the raid or not. The “five seasons” also show the pattern of conflict in Missouri. In the spring, summer, and fall, partisan 

Rangers along with robbers and murders masquerading as pro-Union or pro-Confederate raiders fought a bitter guerilla war 

throughout Missouri. Beginning in late 1862, the Confederacy sent raids into Missouri to demonstrate a presence and keep 

the hope of a Confederate Missouri alive. In the winter, both sides significantly reduced the tempo of active operations and 

prepared for the next campaign season that following spring. The reality was that the Confederate commanders in Arkansas 

lacked the resources to recapture Missouri and their only means of continuing the fight for Missouri was through the conduct 

of cavalry raids. After the Union victory at Pea Ridge, the Confederate command transferred Maj. Gen. Van Dorn’s Army of 

the West across the Mississippi River to bolster their forces fighting in Tennessee.

3

 The transfer included Maj. Gen. Price’s 

Missouri troops. The Confederate government officially enrolled Price and the Missouri State Guard into the Confederate 

Army. Some of the Missouri soldiers refused to enlist and elements of the MSG continued to serve in Arkansas and Missouri. Others deserted and returned to Missouri. Some of those gave up the fight and others joined with the various guerilla 

groups forming throughout the state to fight against what they saw as a Union occupation of their home. The decision to 

transfer Van Dorn’s army left Arkansas almost defenseless and virtually abandoned Missouri to the Union. Ironically, the 

Union command also shifted its priorities away from Missouri and Arkansas.

About one half of Brig. Gen. Samuel Curtis’ Army of the Southwest moved to eastern Arkansas. The Union command 

transferred the other half east of the Mississippi River to support the Union offense into the Tennessee and the Mississippi 

River Valleys. Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck, the senior Union commander in the west (which included responsibility for Missouri) wanted to focus on the conquest of Arkansas, Tennessee, and Mississippi. He believed the fight for Missouri was all 

but over. He stated in his second general order, “It is believed that the time will soon come when the rebellion in Missouri 

may be considered as terminated, and when even the partial and temporary military restraint which has been exercised in 

particular places may be entirely withdrawn.”4 However, the new Confederate commander in Arkansas, Maj. Gen. Thomas 

Hindman, was determined not only to defend Arkansas but to take the war back into Missouri. He wanted to divert Union resources away from Arkansas and back into Missouri. Hindman also wanted to maintain Confederate control of the war effort 

in Missouri. To accomplish his goal, he sent recruiters into Missouri to form partisan bands and reform units of the Missouri 

State Guard. The Union reaction was to label the guerrillas as robbers and murderers and subject to hanging if captured. The 

Confederate Congress attempted to protect the irregulars from summary execution with the passage of the Partisan Ranger 

Act (April 1862) which designated guerrilla formations as members of the Confederate Army. The Partisan Ranger Act did 

help with the recruiting effort but it did not protect the partisans from execution if captured. Federal authorities continued to 

view the guerrillas as criminals and over time, the irregular bands recognized no authority other than themselves. 

In the spring and summer of 1862, the Confederate recruiters in Missouri experienced significant success. Many times 

the recruiters created small armies that contested pro-Union forces for control of Missouri counties. With no significant 

Union forces in the state, Missouri had to look to its own defense. In early 1862, the state created the Missouri State Militia 

(MSM), a federally-funded state volunteer force. The MSM was a full-time force. It was composed primarily of cavalry 

regiments whose troops were uniformed and well-trained. Its initial purpose was to conduct offensive operations against the 

forces of the Confederate recruiters. Later they fought against guerrillas and opposed the large Confederate cavalry raids 

coming from Arkansas. The Missouri state government also established the Enrolled Missouri Militia (EMM) to serve as 

garrison forces for key locations throughout the state and allow the MSM to conduct offensive operations. The EMM was 

a part-time force which lacked uniforms and were only called to duty in times of emergency. The loyalties of the EMM 

were suspect at times. Therefore, the state also created the Provisional Enrolled Missouri Militia (PEMM). Authorities only 

enrolled reliable “Unionists” into the PEMM. It was a full-time force with the soldiers paid by the state but the Federal 

government outfitted and supplied the PEMM.
16

By the time of Price’s 1864 raid, the MSM and PEMM were seasoned veterans experienced in combating local guerrillas and Confederate cavalry raids, although they lacked experience in operating as large formations and fighting in major 

battles. Nevertheless, their regiments constituted three brigades of Maj. Gen. Pleasonton’s Provisional Cavalry Division and 

they fought well against Price’s Army in 1864

Through the summer of 1862, the Union militias battled the Confederate recruiters for control of the state. Some of the 

more successful Confederate recruiters were MSG Col. Jeremiah Cockrell, who raised a large force in the Jackson County 

area, and MSG Brig. Gen. Jeff Thompson, who commanded a brigade-size force in southeast Missouri.5

 His Union opponents called Thompson the Missouri Swamp Fox. In 1864, Thompson commanded Jo Shelby’s Iron Brigade at the Battle 

of Westport. Some of the fighting with the recruiters reached the level of small battles with several hundred participants 

on each side. In August, pro-southern forces almost achieved control of Jackson County at the battles of Independence and 

Lone Jack. That same month, Union forces finally secured northeastern Missouri with the defeat of a Rebel brigade that 

numbered more than 2,000 men at Kirksville but in the fall of 1862, Rebel victories at Newtonia and Clark’s Mill threatened 

Union control of southwest Missouri. Maj. Gen. Hindman was encouraged by these victories and decided to conduct an 

offense with his small Confederate Army.

His initial objective was to defeat each of the widely separated Union forces in Northwest Arkansas. However, the 

Federal commanders managed to unite their forces and defeat Hindman at the battle of Prairie Grove, Arkansas. At Prairie 

Grove, Federal Brig. Gen. James Blunt demonstrated the same aggressive nature and willingness to accept risk that he 

later demonstrated against Price in 1864. At Prairie Grove, his force was significantly outnumbered, yet he chose to attack 

rather than remain on the defense, just as he would at the fights at Little Blue and Brush Creek near Westport. By the end 

of December 1862, Union forces had defeated the Rebel recruiters and driven them from the state and the only remaining 

pro-Confederate forces in Missouri were the small guerrilla bands. In 1862, the Rebel leaders in Arkansas had maintained 

command and control over the recruiter forces serving in Missouri. However, they had little to no control over the guerrilla 

bands that continued to operate in Missouri. These bands had started forming soon after the start of the war. In 1863, they 

were the only remaining pro-southern forces still operating in Missouri. The guerrillas provided some support to the Confederate war effort by disrupting Union supply lines and threatening exposed Union garrisons and patrols. At times they served 

as scouts for large Confederate cavalry raids. In 1864, Price tried with little success to coordinate their activities to support 

his raid into Missouri. However, most of the guerrilla activities were characterized by ambushes and raids on individuals or 

families in rural areas. Much of the violence was of a vigilante nature and civilians, no matter which side they supported, 

faced beatings, looting, and murder. For many, the war was only an excuse to settle personal grudges. Ironically, the Union’s 

formation of the MSM, EEM, and PEMM, despite their successes, also contributed to the formation of the guerrilla groups. 

Missouri enrollment laws did not require Confederate sympathizers to enroll in the militia, but they did have to declare their 

sympathies, which subjected them to reprisals from Union sympathizers. Many with Southern loyalties who may have chosen to sit the war out instead joined with the guerrilla bands when they saw it was no longer possible to remain neutral. In 

1863, the level of guerrilla activity dramatically increased. Nonetheless, their activities did little to support the overall war 

effort and it could be debated that their activities actually hurt the wider efforts of the Confederacy. In turn, the Confederate 

Leaders would turn to large cavalry raids into Missouri as their only means of forcing the Union to divert resources to the 

fight for Missouri. 

Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck: Evidence has been received at these headquarters that Major General Sterling Price has issued 

commissions or licenses to certain bandits in this State, authorizing them to raise “guerrilla forces,” for the purpose of 

plunder and marauding. General Price ought to know that such a course is contrary to the rules of civilized warfare, and 

that every man who enlists in such an organization forfeits his life and becomes and outlaw. All persons are hereby warned 

that if they join any guerrilla band they will not, if captured, be treated as ordinary prisoners of war, but will be hung as 

robbers and murderers. Their lives shall atone for the barbarity of their general.6

Confederate War Department: An ACT to organize bands of partisan rangers. 

SECTION 1. The Congress of the Confederate States of America do enact, That the President be, and is hereby, authorized 

to commission such officers as he may deem proper with authority to form bands of partisan rangers, in companies, battalions or regiments, either as infantry or cavalry, the companies, battalions, or regiments to be composed each of such 

numbers as the President may approve. 

SECTION 2. Be it further enacted, That such partisan rangers, after being regularly received into service, shall be entitled 

to the same rations and quarters during their term of service, and be subject to the same regulations as other soldiers. 
17

SECTION 3. Be it further, enacted, That for any arms and munitions of war captured from the enemy by any body of partisan 

rangers and delivered to any quartermaster at such places as may be designated by a commanding general, the rangers 

shall be paid their full value in such manner as the Secretary of War may prescribe.

7
18

Map 5. 
19

5. Marmaduke’s Raids (1862-1863)8

Maj. Gen. Hindman’s defeat at Prairie Grove and the demoralization of his army seriously threatened his ability to 

defend Arkansas. He was concerned that the Union Army would advance towards Little Rock. To disrupt Union resources, 

he directed Brig. Gen. John Marmaduke to conduct a large cavalry raid into Missouri. On 31 December 1862, Marmaduke 

commenced his raid. He divided his 2,600 men into two columns for effective foraging and to confuse the Union forces as 

to his true objectives. His goal was to disrupt the key Union supply line between Rolla and Springfield. Marmaduke believed Springfield was more lightly defended than was actually the case, and decided to disregard his orders to avoid a major 

engagement. He failed to capture the town but did force the Union command to divert forces to Springfield. Meanwhile, 

his second column seized Hartville. Marmaduke reunited his forces at Marshfield and, after another skirmish at Hartville, 

decided to retreat back into Arkansas. Maj. Gen. Kirby Smith, the new Confederate commander of Trans-Mississippi Theater (all forces west of the Mississippi), then directed a second Missouri raid in the spring of 1863. His goal was to divert 

Union resources on both sides of the Mississippi River from their operations against Little Rock, Arkansas and Vicksburg, 

Mississippi. Marmaduke initiated his second raid on 18 April 1863. It was a large raid with a force of 5,000 men and eight 

guns. He planned to attack the Union garrison at Bloomfield, Missouri. However, the large Confederate wagon train of 

supplies slowed their advance and allowed the Federals to retreat to the heavily fortified Cape Girardeau before Rebel columns closed in on the town. Marmaduke decided to advance against Cape Girardeau but made no serious effort to attack the 

entrenchments and forts surrounding the town. He then retreated back to Arkansas. 

The raids were not spectacularly successful but they did divert some Union forces away from their offense into Arkansas. The raids also initiated a massive building program of additional Union fortifications in Missouri to protect strategic 

points from future raids which was a serious draw against valuable war resources. The most important lesson for both sides 

was the realization of how vulnerable Missouri was to a large-scale raid. 

Brig. Gen. Samuel Curtis: Dispatch of the 11th, via Sedalia, received. Your gallant and successful defense of Springfield 

has added to the glory of the 8th January. The troops and people of Springfield who participated in your efforts have given 

imperishable proof of their loyal devotion to our cause and country, and the State of Missouri will cherish your memory.9

Brig. Gen. John Marmaduke: I have the honor to submit the following report of the expedition under my command into 

Missouri, made in obedience to General Hindman’s order to move, if possible, rapidly, and strike the enemy in rear or flank, 

in order to withdraw the heavy masses (infantry, cavalry, and artillery), under Blunt, then moving toward the Arkansas River, back into Missouri... In conclusion, I think I may safely state that the object of the expedition was fully accomplished, and 

more. Blunt’s Army of the Frontier countermarched rapidly to save Springfield; a long chain of forts, strong in themselves, 

built at great expense and labor, which overawed and kept in subjection the country, were razed to the ground, and the heart 

of the people revived again at the presence of Confederate troops.10
20

Map 6. 
21

6. Bushwhackers and General Order No. 1111

Maj. Samuel Byers stated that, “Missouri was neither North or South; she was simply hell, for her people were cutting 

one another’s throat, and neighboring farmers killed each other and burned each other’s home.”12 His statement accurately 

reflects the situation following the defeat of the recruiters. The Confederacy had no organized force in the state. Instead, 

dozens of pro-Confederate guerrilla groups, known as “bushwhackers,” operated throughout Missouri. Most were little 

more than squads of young men who attacked pro-Union supporters both in Kansas and Missouri. Many were motivated 

by the “Jayhawker” raids into Missouri early in the war and their actions were little more than revenge for past grievances. 

One of the most prominent guerrilla chieftains in 1863 Missouri was William Quantrill. His actions in Jackson County and 

the surrounding counties typified many of the other guerrilla leaders in other parts of Missouri. The Confederacy attempted 

to legitimize his operations with a formal army commission to the rank of Capt. The Confederate government even tried 

at times to issue official written orders in an attempt to coordinate his activities, but for the most part Quantrill and other 

bushwhackers operated well outside of a formal chain of command. Their actions did little to promote the war aims of the 

Confederacy other than to fix significant Federal resources in attempts to curtail their activities. Capt. Quantrill’s raid on 

Lawrence, Kansas was the Bushwhackers’ most infamous act in the war. His force of approximately 400 fighters burned 

the town and may have executed as many as 150 to 180 men and boys.13 Quantrill was also responsible for the massacre 

near Baxter Springs, Kansas. There, he defeated a detachment escorting Maj. Gen. Blunt. Quantrill’s men killed most of 

the detachment (80 of about 100 personnel), including the military band, and Maj. Henry Curtis (son of Maj. Gen. Samuel 

Curtis). Many of the Union soldiers were executed after surrendering. Maj. Gen. Blunt was one of the few that managed to 

escape. The “Unionist” forces struggled throughout the war to find an effective policy for combating the guerrillas. One of 

their most tarnished acts was Brig. Gen. Thomas Ewing’s General Order No. 11. Soon after the raid on Lawrence, Ewing 

accused rural Missourians of supporting the “bushwhackers.” His order resulted in the forced expulsion of all rural residents 

in Jackson, Cass, Bates, and Vernon counties. Union forces then burned the homesteads to deny their use to Rebel guerillas. 

The unpopular order provided some protection to eastern Kansas but the guerrillas in Missouri just moved their operations 

away from the “Burnt District.” The actions of a few hundred guerrillas may of also given a false sense of hope to some 

Confederate leaders that Missouri was ripe for a popular uprising against Union forces in the state.

Maj. Gen. John Schofield: The border of Kansas and Missouri has been the scene of the most revolting hostilities... On 

the 19th of August, the brigades secretly assembled to the number of about 300, near the border of Kansas, marched rapidly 

upon the town of Lawrence, and attacked it at dawn of day... No resistance whatever was offered. The town was robbed and 

burned, and the unarmed people murdered in the most fiendish manner.14

Missouri Ballad: Come all you bold robbers and open your ears, Of Quantrill the Lion heart you quickly shall hear. With 

his band of bold raiders in double quick time, He came to lay Lawrence low, over the line.15
22

Map 7.
23

7. Jo Shelby’s Raid (1863)16

In the fall of 1863, the Confederate situation in the Trans-Mississippi was bleak. The Confederate defeat at Gettysburg 

and, more importantly, the surrender of Vicksburg ended any hope of direct assistance from the eastern half of the Confederacy. Union forces had captured Little Rock and then pushed the few remaining Confederate forces into southern Arkansas. 

Additionally, the raid on Lawrence emboldened the Union forces to track down and disperse most of the rebel partisan units 

operating in Missouri. Only a few die-hard groups continued to fight. Nevertheless, Col. Joseph Shelby proposed another 

raid into Missouri. Maj. Gen. Kirby Smith supported the concept and wanted Shelby to keep Union troops in Missouri occupied and unable to support further operations against Arkansas. He also wanted to encourage Confederate sympathizers 

in northern Arkansas and Missouri and hopefully raise recruits to replenish the depleted Rebel ranks. On 22 September, 

Shelby departed Arkadelphia, Arkansas, with 750 handpicked men and two cannons. In Missouri, 400 recruits joined his 

column. He captured a Union supply depot at Neosho, Missouri and then continued north. Next, he captured the small Union 

garrison at Greenfield and forced other garrisons at Stockton, Humansville, and Warsaw to disperse. Meanwhile, Union 

forces mobilized to track down and destroy Shelby’s raiders. Brig. Gen. Egbert Brown’s Union forces forced Shelby into 

a rearguard action at Boonville and then almost trapped him at Marshall, Missouri. However, Shelby’s raiders successfully 

broke contact and then retreated back to Arkansas. Shelby’s raid may have caused as much as $800,000 in damages and in 

recognition of his success the Confederacy promoted the daring Col. to Brig. Gen. The success of the raid did little to improve the Confederacy’s deteriorating situation in the Trans-Mississippi, however. Nevertheless, Shelby’s report confirmed 

the Confederate military leadership’s belief that the large-scale raids diverted Union resources away from other threatened 

areas of the Confederacy. Shelby’s report also encouraged the Missouri Confederate government in exile that there was hope 

an invasion or large raid would be greeted by the people of Missouri, who they now believed to be, “as a mass, true to the 

South.”

Brig. Gen. Egbert Brown17: The pursuit and fighting has been done by the Missouri State Militia and Enrolled Missouri 

Militia. I can only point to the result of their efforts as the best commentary on their gallantry and endurance. For the past 

three days they have followed and engaged the enemy night and day, in the rain, without subsistence, except that gathered 

by the wayside, or protection, from the storm... To the citizens of Sedalia and the country generally, and to the Enrolled 

Missouri Militia, who readily obeyed the call “to arms,” the State is in part indebted for the unsuccessful issue of the raid.

18

Col. Joseph Shelby: I have arrived safely with my entire command, increased about 600. I have fought five battles; had 

daily skirmishes; traveled 1,500 miles; captured and paroled 500 prisoners; destroyed 6 railroad bridges; torn up 30 miles 

of track; entered Boonville; marched to Marshall; met Generals Brown and Ewing there with 8,000 men; fought them six 

hours; lost 125 men; expended all my ammunition, and retreated in splendid order... I have traveled 1,500 miles, and found 

the people of Missouri, as a mass, true to the South and her institutions, yet needing the strong presence of a Confederate 

army to make them volunteer. The southern, southwestern, and some of the middle counties of Missouri are completely desolated. In many places for 40 miles not a single habitation is to be found.

19
24

Notes

1. Map and discussion based on information from William L. Shea, Fields of Blood – The Prairie Grove Campaign (Chapel Hill, 

NC: University of NC Press, 2009); James B. Martin, The Third War – Irregular Warfare on the Western Border 1862 -1865 (Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2012). 

2. Burrill Jenkins, The Battle of Westport (Kansas City, KS: Franklin Hudson Publishing Co., 1906), 36.

3. For additional information on Van Dorn see Robert G. Hartje, Van Dorn - The Life and Times of a Confederate General

(Norman, OK: Vanderbilt University Press, 1994).

4. The War of Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume VIII,

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1888), 612. General Orders #2, By the command of Maj. Gen. Halleck on 13 March 

1862. (Hereafter referred to as the O.R.)

5. For additional information on Jeff Thompson see M. Jeff Thompson, Civil War Reminiscences of General M. Jeff Thompson

(New York: Morningside Bookshop, 1988).

6. O.R., Series I, Volume VIII, General Orders #2, By the command of Maj. Gen. Halleck on 13 March 1862, 612. 

7. O.R., Series 4, Volume I, Part 1, 1095-96. 

8. Map and discussion based on information from James E. McGhee, Campaigning with Marmaduke: Narratives and Roster of 

the 8th Missouri Cavalry Regiment, CSA (Independence, MO: Two Trails Publishing, 2002); Stephen B. Oates, Confederate Cavalry 

West of the River (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1961); Albert A. Castel, A Frontier State at War: Kansas, 1861-1865 (Ithaca, 

NY: American Historical Association, Cornell University Press, 1958); Jerry Ponder, Major General John S. Marmaduke, CSA

(Mason, TX: Ponder Books, 1999).

9. O.R., Series 1, Volume 22, Part 1, 179. Curtis dispatch.

10. O.R., Series 1, Volume 22, Part 1, 195 and 198. Marmaduke Report. 

11. Map and discussion based on information from Donald L. Gimore, Civil War on the Missouri-Kansas Border (Gretna, LA: 

Pelican Publishing, 2008); O.S. Barton, Three Years with Quantrill: A True Story Told by His Scout John McCorkel (Norman, OK: 

University of Oklahoma Press, 1992).

12. Major S. H. M. Byers, With Fire and Sword (New York: The Neal Publishing Co., 1911), 14. Maj. Byers served with the 5th 

Iowa Volunteers in Missouri (1861-1862). 

13. The actual number of those executed is greatly debated and could have been significantly less.

14. O.R., Series 1, Volume 22, Part 1, 15. Maj. Gen. Schofield Report.

15. Charles J. Finger, Frontier Ballads (Carden City, NY; Doubleday, Page and Co., 1927), 64-67.

16 Map and discussion based on information from Oates, Confederate Cavalry West of the River; Castel, A Frontier State at 

War; Sean McLachlan, Ride Around Missouri – Shelby’s Great Raid 1863 (Oxford, UK; Osprey Publishing, 2011). For additional 

information on Joseph Shelby see Daniel O’Flaherty, General Jo Shelby: Undefeated Rebel (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North 

Carolina Press, 1954).

17. Brig. Gen. Brown commanded the District of Central Missouri in 1863.

18. O.R., Series 1, Volume 22, Part 1, 624 and 629. Brig. Gen. Brown 13 Oct Report and 28 Oct Report.

19. O.R., Series 1, Volume 22, Part 1, 670 and 678. Col. Shelby 22 Nov Report and 16 Nov Report.
Part III

The Road to Saint Louis

March to 3 October 1864
26

Map 8.
27

8. The Difficulties of our Situation1

The Red River Campaign (March to May 1864) may have been the last significant Confederate victory of the war. In the 

campaign, Lieut. Gen. Kirby Smith’s forces defeated the Union attempt to capture Shreveport, Louisiana.2

The Confederate success in the Red River Campaign created strategic challenges for the Confederacy. The victory freed 

forces for future operations, but the Trans-Mississippi lacked the resources to transition to the offense in the west and the 

defensive stance of the Union forces created the question of what to do with the limited resources available. Additionally, 

the Confederate failure to pursue and destroy the Union Army at the close of the Red River Campaign led to bitter enmity 

between Kirby Smith and Lieut. Gen. Richard Taylor (the Confederate tactical commander in the Red River Campaign). 

Taylor was Smith’s best field commander, and his reassignment to the east created the need for a new field commander 

for Confederate operations in the Trans-Mississippi. The Confederate victory in the Red River Campaign did not alter the 

desperate strategic situation the South faced in 1864. The year 1863 and the opening months of 1864 were hard times for 

the Confederacy. The fledging nation was unable to protect its borders. The Union Army occupied four of its eleven state 

capitals (seven of 14 if counting Missouri, Kentucky, and Arizona Territory). The Confederacy’s two most significant field 

armies were on the doorstep of defeat. The Army of Northern Virginia was fixed in the trenches surrounding Petersburg and 

Richmond in Virginia. The Army of Tennessee was locked into a fight to retain Atlanta, Georgia. In July 1864, Gen. Braxton 

Bragg, military advisor to President Jefferson Davis, recognized the seriousness of the situation and wanted to focus the 

South’s resources toward Virginia and Georgia. He believed any major operation west of the Mississippi was “too much 

for our limited means” to be successful. 3 Bragg believed, as did James Seddon, the Confederate Secretary of War, that “the 

best use for the troops in the Trans-Mississippi Department, if practicable, would be to operate (so far as to be spared) on 

this side [east] the river.” 4

Therefore, Bragg directed Kirby Smith to transfer his infantry to the eastern departments. Braxton Bragg was realistic in 

his assessment of the situation. However, the directive to transfer the troops was wholly impractical and nearly impossible 

to implement. It was impractical because of the individualist nature of the western troops. The Trans-Mississippi Confederate soldier had no sense of national loyalty. Their concerns were close to home, and they did not feel a responsibility to 

fight in Georgia and Virginia. The political leaders in Arkansas, Louisiana, and the exiled Missouri government supported 

and encouraged these views. Senator Augustus Garland of Confederate Arkansas stated, “Our troops here will not go. They 

will throw down their arms first.” 5 Regardless, the directive was almost impossible to execute because of the Union control 

of the Mississippi River. Federal gunboats patrolled the river and the Union Army controlled all the crossing points. It was 

possible for small units to steal across the river, but a crossing of major units was not viable and the Trans-Mississippi lacked 

the resources to force a crossing against Union opposition. 

Many different levels of political and military leadership generated the concept of a large expedition into Missouri as 

an alternative to the troop transfer to the east. Paramount were the aspirations of the exiled Confederate Missouri politicians 

who were “impatient for an advance into Missouri.”6 In 1863, the Trans-Mississippi Confederates executed three major cavalry raids into Missouri. The Confederacy conducted no raids during the first half of 1864 and the political leadership was 

concerned the pro-Southern supporters in Missouri would lose hope without a raid in 1864. Thomas Reynolds, Missouri’s 

Confederate governor-in-exile, suggested another raid into the state. He hoped for a general uprising against what he saw as 

a Union military occupation of his home state. However, he justified the raid with a more attainable goal of pulling Union 

resources away from Georgia and Virginia.7

 Lieut. Gen. Kirby Smith, the Confederate commander of Trans-Mississippi 

Theater, also supported the concept of an expedition into Missouri. As early as May 1864 and soon after the victory in 

the Red River Campaign, he contemplated how next to employ his limited resources. Attacks against New Orleans, Baton 

Rouge, or Vicksburg were all impractical due to the Federal Navy’s control of the Mississippi River. He considered an attack 

to regain control of Little Rock. However, even that goal was beyond the reach of the forces available. Smith considered 

complying with the directive to send his infantry divisions east across the Mississippi but quickly determined it could not be 

done. Consequently, he decided the only viable contribution he could make to the Southern war effort was a raid into northeastern Arkansas against the Federal supply lines or a larger expedition into Missouri. Smith reasoned that if he could not 

transfer resources east of the Mississippi River, then he would force the Union Army to transfer resources west of the river. 

Maj. Gen. Price encouraged Smith to go forward with the expedition into Missouri. Price claimed “that the Federals 

have but few reliable forces in the State, their garrisons being manned almost entirely with their State militia.”8

 Price was in 

fact partially correct. Federal authorities had moved most of the volunteer troops in Missouri to the east and the state now 

depended mostly on the militia for defense. However, he failed to appreciate that the Missouri State Militia, or MSM, were 
28

seasoned veterans. Price also assured Kirby Smith “the Confederate flag floats over nearly all the principal towns of North 

Missouri and large guerrilla parties are formed and operating in the southern portion of the State.”9 These claims proved to 

be overly optimistic. Guerrilla activity was rampant throughout much of the state, but a significant portion of Missouri’s 

population no longer supported the guerilla activity. The population just wanted to be left alone for the most part and they 

were not willing to rise up in revolt against Federal authorities and few openly flew the Confederate flag. Nevertheless, the 

Order of American Knights (OAK), a pro-Confederate organization in Missouri, convinced Price that thousands of loyal 

southerners would rally to the flag if he entered the state with a large army. Price estimated “not less than 30,000” men 

would join with his army when he returned to Missouri.10 Eventually, Kirby Smith received tepid support for the expedition 

from Richmond. Most, with the exceptions of Confederate Missouri political and military leaders, believed it was “larger in 

its aims than our resources may suffice to compass.”11 It appeared to be the only option worthy of consideration, however. 

There was also a belief that not only would the expedition pull Federal resources back into Missouri but it could possibly 

influence the upcoming national elections in the north.

Confederate leaders calculated that even a temporary occupation of St. Louis would help presidential candidate George 

McClellan (the Democratic Party’s Peace Candidate) unseat Lincoln and possibly improve the South’s hopes to negotiate a 

peace. Therefore, Kirby Smith moved forward with his plans to execute a major operation into Missouri. He initially wanted 

Lieut. Gen. Richard Taylor to plan and command the operation, but Taylor had transferred out of the department and was no 

longer available for the assignment. Reluctantly, Smith turned to Maj. Gen. Sterling Price. Price was a logical choice. He 

was popular with both the Missouri troops and the Southern sympathizers that remained in Missouri. His past performance 

as a division level commander, although not spectacular, did demonstrate a certain level of competence. However, Smith 

did not have good personal relationship with Price. He personally embraced little confidence in Price’s skills as senior commander and had stated, “he is good for nothing.”12

This Vignette has two Southern accounts. 

Captain and Aide-de-Camp Thomas Butler: By direction of General Bragg I forward to you from this point orders 

herewith inclosed, and in his name earnestly urge you to their prompt execution. I am also directed by the general to give 

you briefly a summary of the military situation on this side in order that you may yourself see the pressing necessity for the 

movement of your troops across the Mississippi River. At Petersburg General Lee has a formidable army in his front and 

in a position whence it can at all times seriously interrupt his communications south. Early, with his corps in the Valley, is 

meeting resistance, and his whole command is required there to protect and get out the grain and prevent an advance from 

that quarter. No troops can possibly be spared from Virginia for other points; and the sea- board is well nigh stripped, a few 

troops, hardly sufficient for its protection, remaining at Charleston. General Hood’s army (formerly Johnston’s) has retired 

to the immediate vicinity of Atlanta, and Sherman is threatening that place with an army superior in numbers and in fine 

condition. The Federal cavalry has cut the Atlanta and August and Atlanta and Montgomery Railroads, rendering the latter 

road inoperative for more than a month. Every available man in General Hood’s department has been sent to the front, 

including the operatives in the Government shops. Still more troops are urgently needed. By the withdrawal of our army 

across the Chattahoochee River all the territory west of that stream, including the whole State of Alabama, is left open to 

the inroads of the enemy. There is no force for its protection. In North Mississippi the enemy has retired, but his intentions 

are not yet developed. If he is re- enforced, as it is now supposed he will be, by troops from Arkansas he will be enabled to 

move forward and defeat our cavalry in his front; or he may send re- enforcements around to Sherman. Either event would 

tend greatly to increase the difficulties of our situation.13

Lieut. Gov. Thomas Reynolds:

14 When here in March last you expressed the opinion that the recovery of the Arkansas Valley ought to precede an advance to reoccupy our State. But could not a powerful diversion be made by cavalry alone without 

awaiting the recovery of Little Rock! Even if compelled to return, it might gain time for us in Georgia or avert an attack on 

Mobile by compelling the enemy to send large forces to Missouri. If successful in maintaining itself the cavalry might be 

re- enforced by infantry from Arkansas and by recruiting within our State. But the main point of view from which I suggest 

such an expedition is that it may take off some of the pressure on us in Virginia and Georgia.15

30

Map 9.
31

9. The Union Command in the West16

The Confederate victory in the Red River Campaign also had significant operational consequences for the Union war 

effort in Missouri and Kansas. Lieut. Gen. Ulysses Grant, the new commanding general of all Union Armies, decided upon 

a strategy that focused the war effort against the two remaining Confederate field armies in the east (Gen. Robert E. Lee’s 

Army of Northern Virginia and Gen. Joseph Johnston’s Army of Tennessee). He adopted a “let-alone policy” concerning the 

Trans-Mississippi. Grant saw the “vast territory of Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas” as isolated and of no noteworthy threat 

to the Union war effort. He believed the western Confederates lacked the resources for effective offensive operations and

wanted the Union forces west of the Mississippi to remain on the defense. Grant stated that over time “little more than onehalf” of the Confederate soldiers in the Trans-Mississippi would be available to threaten the Union’s control of Missouri and 

northern Arkansas.17 In other words, Grant assumed most of the western Rebels, with no perceived capability of executing 

an offensive campaign and no Union invasions to oppose, would just quit the war and go home. Unfortunately for the citizens of Missouri and Kansas loyal to the Union, his assumptions proved to be incorrect. The War Department, in response 

to the Union failure in the Red River Campaign, reorganized the Union command structure west of the Mississippi. The 

reorganization provided for better coordination between different departmental commands. 

Maj. Gen. Edward Canby assumed command of the newly created Military Division of Western Mississippi. The geographical division included the Departments of the Missouri, the Department of Arkansas (Arkansas and the Indian Territory), and the Department of the Gulf. The Department of the Gulf included the coastal regions along the Gulf of Mexico 

from Texas to Florida. Canby understood the impact of Grant’s policy on his command and recognized he must accomplish 

multiple missions with limited resources. Canby’s primary mission was the security of the Mississippi and Arkansas Rivers. Additionally, he was responsible for reintegrating Union-controlled territory back into the Union. A major challenge 

was the guerilla activity against river traffic on the Mississippi River and in Northern Arkansas. Additionally, there was the 

epidemic of guerilla war in Missouri. Canby also dealt with the constant threat of large Confederate raids crossing over the 

Arkansas River into Northern Arkansas or possibly continuing north into Missouri. Grant’s decision “to concentrate all the 

force possible against the Confederate armies in the field” (the east) meant that Missouri must look to its own defense and 

rely primarily on the state militia.18 The War Department also continued to pull resources from the west to support operations 

in the east. The most significant loss of forces occurred on 1 June 1864. The War Department renamed “The Detachment of 

the Army of the Tennessee” to “The Right Wing of the Sixteenth Corps” and ordered its transfer from Louisiana to report 

to the Department of Tennessee. It was a major loss of available veteran field forces for the Division of West Mississippi. 

Another major command west of the Mississippi was Maj. Gen. Samuel Curtis’ Department of Kansas.19 His command included Kansas, as well as Colorado and Nebraska Territories. Curtis, like Canby, reported directly to the War Department. 

President Lincoln had voiced his understanding of Grant’s strategy when he stated, “If a man can’t skin he must hold a leg 

while somebody else does.”20

Curtis recognized that his backcountry command would “hold a leg” with only minimal resources while major Union 

Armies east of the Mississippi won the war. Nevertheless, Curtis faced three simultaneous wars. They were the conflicts 

against the Plains Indians, the Border War, and the greater American Civil War. Curtis’s main priority was the ongoing fight 

with the Cheyenne Nation and other Plains Indian tribes. The Cheyenne posed a significant threat to the overland trails connecting the far west to Kansas and points further east. Recently, the conflicts between the Cheyenne and the United States 

Government had exploded into the Cheyenne War of 1864. Curtis’ second conflict was the festering “Border War” with the 

pro-Confederate guerillas raiding into to Kansas. The threat of guerilla raids had peaked in mid-1863 and had since declined. 

However, the guerillas still posed a threat and required Curtis to allocate resources to protect the Kansas border. The third 

war was the American Civil War and ironically it was Curtis’ lowest priority. In December of 1862, Union forces, which 

included a Kansas Division, defeated Maj. Gen. Thomas Hindman’s Confederate Army at the Battle of Prairie Grove. By 

September of 1863, Union forces had captured Fort Smith and Little Rock in Arkansas and the boundary between the Union 

and the Confederacy had moved south to the Arkansas River. In 1863, the Confederacy sent three large cavalry raids into 

Missouri (see Part II of this Atlas) but none of these threatened Kansas. Kansas provided a significant number of volunteers 

to support the Union War effort throughout the war. By mid-1863, however, the War Department had transferred most of 

the volunteer regiments in Kansas to other areas. Unlike Canby’s Division of West Mississippi, the Department of Kansas 

contained no brigade, division, or corps formations the War Department could transfer to the east, and Curtis managed to 

hold on to the few volunteer regiments still serving in his command. Kansas was still loyal to President Lincoln and the war 

effort, but the state’s political leadership believed the Confederate threat to Kansas was minimal and had begun to refocus 
32

their efforts toward western expansion. The Union high command had regulated the Division of West Mississippi and the 

Department of Kansas into low priority areas of operations.

Gen. Grant expected the commanders in the West to retain the territory currently occupied with minimal forces. The 

primary threat was believed to be guerillas and Indians operating against key infrastructure and lines of communication 

(LOC). There was the possibility of a Confederate cavalry raid but even this seemed less likely when the Confederates failed 

to execute any major raids in the first half of 1864. Grant’s “let-alone policy” may have had the unintended consequences of 

lulling the western Union commanders into believing the big war in the west was over. Maj. Gen. Canby’s key subordinates 

were thus potentially unprepared for a major Confederate offensive in the west. Maj. Gen. Frederick Steele, commander 

of the Department of Arkansas, positioned his forces to secure the Arkansas River as a LOC against Rebel guerillas and 

Confederate raids. He was not prepared to stop a major Confederate thrust across the river. Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans 

positioned his extremely limited resources in an effort to contain the rampant guerilla activity in Missouri and was unprepared to stop a Confederate drive into the state.21 In Kansas, Maj. Gen. Samuel Curtis was decisively engaged against the 

Indian threat to the Overland Trails and lacked the resources to protect Kansas from a major Confederate raid. In the fall of 

1864, the senior Union commanders west of the Mississippi found themselves in a situation that required them to adjust their 

understanding of “let-alone policy.” Additionally, they would have to reevaluate the effort and resources required to “hold 

a leg” and allocate their forces to counter the impending threat.

Both Vignettes are from the Northern Perspective

Maj. Gen. Rosecrans: A dispatch from “H.W. Halleck, major-general,” came through the Commercial office last night, 

ordering me to send the two regiments of 100-days’ men to Chicago. One of these regiments is at Rolla, guarding that important deport for two districts, while all our available cavalry is protecting the heavy trains, of 900 wagons, running from 

thence to Springfield. The other is distributed at Pilot Knob and the most important bridges on the important military railroad. I have no troops with which to replace them. All my cavalry force is operating against the numerous bands of rebels 

which have come up from Price’s army, and are now plundering, murdering, and robbing, as opportunity offers, through the 

southern, central, and northern part of the State, while the rebel forces occupy Arkansas, between us and General Steele, 

and there are such dangerous elements at work in our midst that those bridges and depots must be guarded to secure them. 

I sent these regiments out, and called on the Governor for two regiments of militia, to guard our depots and prisons here. In 

this condition, as we must replace the troops by some force, and as I see none available but militia, would it not be best to 

leave these troops here and order out militia at Chicago? Please carefully consider this and instruct me.22

Lieut. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant: My general plan now was to concentrate all the force possible against the Confederate 

armies in the field. There were but two such, as we have seen, east of the Mississippi River and facing north. The Army of 

Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee commanding, was on the south bank of the Rapidan, confronting the Army of the 

Potomac; the second, under General Joseph E. Johnston, was at Dalton, Georgia, opposed to Sherman who was still at 

Chattanooga. Beside these main armies the Confederates had to guard the Shenandoah Valley, a great storehouse to feed 

their armies from, and their line of communications from Richmond to Tennessee. [Nathan Bedford] Forrest, a brave and intrepid cavalry general, was in the West with a large force; making a larger command necessary to hold what we had gained 

in Middle and West Tennessee. We could not abandon any territory north of the line held by the enemy because it would lay 

the Northern States open to invasion.23

Note: “The line held by the enemy” includes the Arkansas River that was the dividing line between the Union control of 

northern Arkansas and the Confederate control of southern Arkansas.

34

Map 10. 
35

10. A Just and Holy Cause24

On 4 August 1864, Lieut. Gen. Kirby Smith issued orders for Price to gather all the cavalry in the District of Arkansas 

and to move into Missouri. Smith established two primary objectives for the expedition into Missouri. The first was to rally 

the loyal men of Missouri to the Confederate cause and enlist new recruits. Smith desperately needed men to fill out the 

depleted units in the resource-constrained Trans-Mississippi Department. The second objective was to capture St. Louis. 

Smith believed the capture of the city would encourage recruitment, provide valuable military supplies, and force the Union 

to commit significant resources to retake the city. There were also additional political objectives.

The Confederate lieutenant governor of Missouri, Thomas Reynolds, planned to accompany the expedition. The elected 

but exiled governor of Missouri, Claiborne Jackson, died of cancer in late 1862 leaving Reynolds as the senior elected official for Missouri. Reynolds planned to hold elections in St. Louis. He recognized Price’s potential for rallying Missourians 

to the Southern cause. However, he had little confidence in his capacity to command. Reynolds also personally distrusted 

Price and believed him to be “devious, insincere, petulant, and arrogant.”25

Kirby Smith recognized that Price would not be able to hold St. Louis for an extended time and thus directed a return 

route through Kansas and the Indian Territory. He wanted Price to sweep the country for military supplies of all kinds and 

destroy infrastructure valuable to the Union War effort. Smith was concerned, however, about the discipline of the Missourians, who were hardened by three years of guerrilla warfare. Smith, within the body of the order, reiterated to Price that the 

goal was to rally Missouri to the cause and not alienate them from the southern cause and he directed Price to restrain his 

men and avoid wanton acts of destruction. 

Maj. Gen. Rosecrans:26 From early in the spring it was known through the lodges of the O.A.K.’s and other rebel sources 

that Price intended a great invasion of this State, in which he expected the co-operation of that order and of rebels generally, 

and by which he hoped to obtain important military and political results... This department having been depleted of troops 

permission was obtained to raise volunteers to meet the exigencies of our situation.27

Lieut. Gen. Kirby Smith: You will make immediate arrangements for a movement into Missouri, with the entire cavalry 

force of your district. General Shelby should be instructed to have his command in Northeast Arkansas ready to move by 

the 20th instant... General Fagan will command the division composed of Cabell’s and Crawford’s brigades. These skeleton 

organizations are best adapted for an expedition in which a large addition to your force is expected. These weak brigades 

should be filled by the regiments raised in Missouri... You will scrupulously avoid all wanton acts of destruction and devastation, restrain your men, and impress upon them that their aim should be to secure success in a just and holy cause and 

not to gratify personal feeling and revenge. Rally the loyal men of Missouri, and remember that our great want is men, 

and that your object should be, if you cannot maintain yourself in that country, to bring as large an accession as possible 

to our force... Make Saint Louis the objective point of your movement, which, if rapidly made, will put you in possession 

of that place, its supplies, and military stores, and which will do more toward rallying Missouri to your standard than the 

possession of any other point. Should you be compelled to withdraw from the State, make your retreat through Kansas and 

the Indian Territory, sweeping that country of its mules, horses, cattle, and military supplies of all kinds.28
36

Map 11.
37

11. The Invasion of Missouri29

In late August 1864, Kirby Smith directed his infantry to conduct a feint toward Little Rock and Brig. Gen. Shelby’s 

cavalry was directed to disrupt Union supply lines in northeast Arkansas. This provided a sufficient diversion for Price to 

slip his force across the Arkansas River and avoid Maj. Gen. Frederick Steele’s Arkansas Army defensive line. On 17 September, Price rendezvoused with Shelby’s force at Pocahontas, Arkansas. Then on the 19th, the army crossed into Missouri 

in three division columns and moved north. It had been more than two years and a half years since Price walked upon the 

soil of his adopted state.

Meanwhile, Maj. Gen. Rosecrans prepared the Department of Missouri to meet the threat. On 3 September, he requested 

the use of Maj. Gen. Andrew Smith’s detachment of the XVI Corps, which was moving from Memphis to Tennessee. In 

turn, Federal authorities moved one of Smith’s divisions up river toward Cape Girardeau and eventually into the St. Louis 

area. At the same time, they moved Maj. Gen. Joseph Mower’s division and a brigade of cavalry into Arkansas to prevent 

a potential rendezvous between Price’s and Shelby’s forces. Additionally, Maj. Gen. Edward Canby, the commander of the 

Military Division of West Mississippi, shifted a division of the XIX Corps from Louisiana to the mouth of the White River 

to reinforce the Department of Arkansas. Unfortunately for the North, all the reinforcements arrived too late to prevent the 

Confederate concentration at Pocahontas. 

Maj. Gen. Steele:30 General Price has crossed the Arkansas at Dardanelle with a large cavalry force, variously estimated 

from 5,000 to 10,000... It was my opinion that he intended to join Shelby, who has about 5,000 armed, and operate on my 

communications... But Price’s soldiers all say they are going to Missouri... I cannot understand how they can subsist on the 

march to Missouri... I have just received re-enforcements from Memphis, and shall do all I can to keep Price out of Missouri. 

If troops had reached me sooner I could easily have defeated Price’s Missouri movements, if such are his plans. I have not 

cavalry enough to cope with him, and it is very doubtful if infantry can catch him.31

Maj. Gen. Price: Having determined to invade Missouri in three columns, Major-General Fagan, with his division, was 

ordered to march to Frederickstown, Mo., by the way of Martinsburg, Reeves’ Station, and Greenville. Major-General Marmaduke, with his division, was ordered to march to the vicinity of Fredericktown, to the right of the route to be followed by 

Fagan’s division, as above designated, varying from it from ten to thirty miles, or as nearly within those limits as might be 

practicable on account of roads and forage. Brigadier-General Shelby, with his command, was to march to the vicinity of 

Fredericktown by a route to the left of General Fagan’s, varying from it from ten to twenty miles as nearly as practicable 

on account of roads and forage. The headquarters to march with the center column... A map of the route to be followed was 

furnished each of the division commanders. The most stringent orders were issued against straggling and pillaging under 

the severest penalties, and the division commanders earnestly enjoined to use their utmost endeavors to have the order carried into effect in every particular and without delay.32
38

Map 12. 
39

12. The Army of Missouri33

Maj. Gen Price, in accordance with his orders, organized his army into three divisions under the command of Maj. Generals James Fagan, John Marmaduke, and Brig Gen. Joseph Shelby. Fagan’s division was the largest in the army with four 

brigades of Arkansas troops and two artillery batteries. Brig. Gen. William Cabell commanded the division’s one brigade of 

veteran troops. Marmaduke’s division contained only two brigades. However, one of his brigades was John Clark’s veteran 

Missouri troops along with two artillery batteries. Joseph Shelby, the junior division commander, had three brigades and 

one artillery battery split into two sections. Shelby’s men were all Missouri troops and included the best unit in the Army, 

the highly respected “Iron Brigade.”34 The Army consisted of approximately 13,000 mounted men, 14 artillery pieces, and a 

large wagon train of supplies. Nevertheless, the newly designated Army of Missouri was something of a paper tiger. About 

one quarter of his force was composed of untrained recruits forcibly drafted into Confederate service. Many lacked such basic equipment as canteens and cartridge boxes. Price also lacked sufficient military issue weapons for all his men and many 

later claimed that nearly 4,000 were unarmed. However, a better description for these men would be indifferently armed. 

The artillery was composed of all light-caliber guns. These were necessary for a fast moving cavalry column but lacking the 

power necessary against the fortifications protecting St. Louis and other key locations in Missouri. 

Maj. Gen. Washburn:35 I have just received advices from two different sources, both of which I deem reliable, that a big 

raid is on foot for Missouri, led by Price and Shelby. An escaped citizen from near Batesville, who left five days ago, says 

that they were preparing ten days’ rations there for 12,000 men when he left, and it was understood that Price, with Marmaduke and other forces, had crossed the Arkansas River, and were moving toward Missouri, and would be joined at Batesville 

by Shelby’s forces, about 4,000 strong. The other citizen, well known to me, was in Shelby’s camp ten days ago, just before 

he raided on the railroad, and he informs me that there is no doubt about the intention to invade Missouri at once. I shall 

send A.J. Smith’s division up river just as soon as transports arrive to carry him, which I hope will be in a day or two. He 

goes to Sherman, unless some emergency should require him elsewhere. He will have 6,000 men.36

Maj. Gen. Price: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF MISSOURI...Upon arriving at Pocahontas I immediately proceeded 

to organize the army, which was completed on the 18th, as follows: Fagan’s division, commanded by Major General J.F. 

Fagan, was composed of Brigadier General W. L. Cabell’s brigade, Colonel Slemons’ brigade, Colonel McCray’s brigade, 

Colonel Dobbin’s brigade, Colonels Lyles’ and Rogan’s commands, and Captain Anderson’s battalion. Marmaduke’s division, commanded by Major General J.S. Marmaduke, was composed of Brigadier General John B. Clark, Jr.’s, brigade, 

Colonel Freeman’s brigade, Colonel Kitchen’s regiment, and Lieutenant Colonel R. C. Wood’s battalion. Shelby’s division, 

commanded by Brigadier General J.O. Shelby, consisted of Colonel Shanks’ brigade, Colonel Jackman’s brigade, and Colonel Coleman’s command... I entered Missouri with nearly 12,000 men, of whom 8,000 were armed, and fourteen pieces of 

artillery.37
40

Map 13. 
41

13. The Department of Missouri38

The Department of Missouri was unprepared for a major Confederate incursion into the state. Maj. Gen. Rosecrans had 

fewer than 10,000 troops available and these were dispersed throughout the state to guard against guerrilla activity and to 

counter the seasonal cavalry raids. Rosecrans was aware that Price planned to move north but was unsure of his objective. 

As late as 22 September, he was unaware that a Confederate Army was moving toward St. Louis. His correspondence with 

Maj. Gen. Samuel Curtis, the commander of the Department of Kansas stated, “Our information does not yet warrant much 

southward movement to meet Price, whose line of movement is not yet developed.”39 Rosecrans organized the defense of 

the state into five districts. The District of St. Louis, which was the objective of Price’s expedition, was divided into three 

sub-districts. Each sub-district contained garrisons responsible for key infrastructure and major population centers. The St. 

Louis District, commanded by Brig. Gen. Ewing (under Federal authority), had approximately 3,000 troops to guard and 

patrol its area of responsibility. Most of these troops were Missouri State Militia (MSM), well-trained and disciplined veterans. However, the MSM experience was primarily in conducting counter-guerilla operations and lacked more conventional 

“big-battle” experience.

Brig. Gen. Edward Pike (under State Authority) commanded another 550 Enrolled Missouri Militia (EMM) deployed 

throughout the area in small garrisons. These troops were part-time soldiers and lacked formal training, equipment, and experience but were well suited to counter-guerrilla operations. The other four districts in Missouri had similar organizations 

and contained smaller garrisons than the St. Louis District. In the path of the Confederate invasion, Maj. James Wilson 

commanded the 3d Sub-District of Saint Louis. He was responsible for securing the lead mines at Pilot Knob. His poor 

situational awareness of Price’s location and direction of movement was probably indicative of most of the Union commanders in Missouri at the time. Neither the department commander nor any of his subordinates had yet determined where 

to concentrate forces to halt Price. Maj. Wilson was unaware of the large force descending upon his small garrison of only 

150 men. Brig. Gen. Shelby’s division had passed through Patterson on the 22d, and was currently less than 30 miles south 

of Fredericktown. 

Maj. Wilson: (23 Sept.) Citizens report Shelby, with 8,000 men, on the Whitewater, twenty miles from Fredericktown, yesterday. I cannot believe the report to be true.

Brig. Gen. Ewing: What scouting parties have you out and where?

Maj. Wilson: I have small scouting parties on all the roads leading from this place.40

Brig. Gen. Shelby: I reached Patterson early to-day [22 Sept] and found about seventy-five Federal cavalry in the place 

who were charged by Colonel Elliott; 14 killed and several wounded... I only traveled ten miles to-day, consequent upon my 

being so much in advance of the main body. I would respectfully ask permission to make a forced march to-morrow upon 

Fredericktown to prevent the removal of the stores there. If this should be granted you will please inform me by courier; 

otherwise I will not reach that town until day after to-morrow. The Federals from Patterson went in that direction. I shall 

burn the fort here, with all the barracks and stables, together with a large number of tents left standing. They have evidently 

heard of our approach. I captured the telegraph apparatus at this post, and have secured the battery, magnets, and everything necessary to open communication at any point. Let me know where you will camp tomorrow night.41
42

Map 14.
43

14. The Decision to Attack Pilot Knob42

On 24 September, Price’s Army approached Fredericktown, and Maj. Gen. Rosecrans finally accepted there was a clear 

threat to St. Louis. Rosecrans ordered Brig. Gen. Ewing to concentrate his forces at Pilot Knob and Cape Girardeau. Ewing 

took one brigade of the newly arrived XVI Corps and moved south along the Iron Mountain Railroad and posted the troops 

to strengthen garrisons along the route. On the 25th, Ewing continued south to Pilot Knob with a portion of one regiment. 

Maj. Wilson had collected all the available troops in his sub-district and now had slightly fewer than 1,500 men.43 By the 

25th, Price had concentrated most of his Army at Fredericktown. At this point, he was less than 90 miles south of St. Louis. 

However, he received word that “Federal General A.J. Smith was encamped about 10 miles from Saint Louis with his corps, 

composed of about 8,000 infantry, on the Saint Louis and Iron Mountain Railroad.”44

Price now started having doubts about the possibility of success in attacking Missouri’s largest city. Shelby’s scouts also 

reported that the Union garrison at Pilot Knob numbered approximately 1,500. Shelby recommended the Army of Missouri 

push on to St. Louis. Maj. Gen. Fagan recommended the neutralizing the threat to the Confederate flank before moving to 

the north. Price accepted Fagan’s advice and decided to attack the enemy forces in the vicinity of Pilot Knob. He was reluctant to leave a sizeable enemy garrison to his rear. His reasoning was probably much more complex. He probably hoped 

for an easy victory to boost the men’s morale and encourage recruitment. The next morning, Price directed Shelby to move 

north and cut the Iron Mountain Railroad, Ewing’s line of communication to St. Louis. He then moved his other divisions 

toward Arcadia. Fagan’s advance guard skirmished with Wilson’s Union troops at Shut-In Gap, a little more than four miles 

from Pilot Knob. The Confederates seized the gap and pushed on to Arcadia. Ewing reinforced Wilson’s detachment and 

forced the Rebels to fall back. Fagan, now supported by Marmaduke, counterattacked and drove the Federals back to Arcadia. On the 27th, the Confederates renewed the fight and pushed Wilson’s detachment back and captured the gap between 

Pilot Knob and Shepherd’s Mountain.

Brig. Gen. Ewing: Our pickets and scouts driven in here one hour ago on the Fredericktown road by a rebel force certainly 

200 or 300 strong. I have re-enforced with one piece of artillery, and a desultory firing is going on a mile east of this and 

two and a half miles from the fort. I do not wish to bring on a general engagement out there if the whole rebel force is really 

at hand, because it is certainly 3,000 to 5,000 strong... I think I can hold the fort against 5,000 cavalry, and shall stand fast 

until I learn more as to Price.45

Maj. Gen. Price: On the morning of the 26th, being rejoined by Major-General Marmaduke’s division, I proceeded at an 

early hour with Fagan’s and Marmaduke’s divisions in the direction of Ironton and Pilot Knob, at the same time sending forward a portion of Fagan’s division to take and hold a difficult pass in that direction between two mountains within three or 

four miles of Ironton. This was effected rapidly and with success... That evening Major-General Fagan drove in the Federal 

pickets at Arcadia and took position before the town for the night. The next morning he drove the enemy from Arcadia, where 

they abandoned a very strong position, through Ironton, where he also took a strong fort in the most gallant and brilliant 

manner. The enemy took refuge behind their fortifications at Pilot Knob.46
44

Map 15.
45

15. The Battle of Pilot Knob47

On 27 September, Price planned a simultaneous assault from several directions to overrun Fort Davidson.48 However, 

Price’s failure to properly coordinate the attacks allowed the guns of Fort Davidson to mass against each assault individually.49 Clark’s brigade out of Marmaduke’s Division, attacked over Shepherd Mountain. Meanwhile, Fagan’s brigades failed 

to advance simultaneously. One brigade crossed over the summit of Pilot Knob while another skirted around the north side 

of the knob and Cabell’s Brigade attacked through a valley. A hail of cannon and musket fire from the fort stopped most of 

the attacks. Only a few of the attackers managed to get into the moat, only to find the earthworks were too steep to climb. 

Price, not finding the easy victory he anticipated, called off the assaults and prepared to renew the attack the next day. Ewing held a council that night and planned an escape. Sometime after midnight, the Union soldiers evacuated the fort and 

slipped undetected through the Confederate lines. A rearguard exploded the powder magazine and later joined the retreat. 

The Confederates occupied the fort on the morning of the 28th. It was a hollow victory and a serious setback for Price. 

Ewing had delayed Price’s advance toward St. Louis for several days and inflicted serious losses on the attacking brigades. 

Exact Confederate casualties are unknown but it is believed to have been approximately 1,000 dead and wounded. Union 

casualties were about 200.

Brig. Gen. Ewing: The division on Shepherd’s Mountain was Marmaduke’s... moved rapidly down to the assault his line 

greatly broken by the rugged and steep descent, and by our fire, which told with marked effect upon them. On reaching 

the plain the most of the assaulting force took cover in the deep bed of the creek, from which they opened and kept up an 

incessant fire. About 100 ventured on to the assault but fell or were driven back before they reached the ditch. Almost simultaneously with the movement of Marmaduke’s division, that of General Fagan moved over Pilot Knob in stronger force, and 

less disturbed by our fire sweeping back in disorder or cutting off our companies which held the town and part of the mountain sides. His lines were greatly broken by the houses and fences of the skirt of the town, but were hastily reformed by him 

and by General Cabell, who led the assault, and swept upon the plain in handsome style, yelling and on the double-quick. 

We opened on them when at 600 yards from the fort with musketry from the ramparts and from the long line of the north 

rifle-pits, and with canister from seven pieces of artillery. They rushed on most gallantly, but were broken, confused, and 

swept down by our rapid and well-directed fire until the advance reached the ditch, when the attacking forces fled in dismay, 

leaving apparently almost half their comrades dead or wounded on the plain.50

Maj. Gen. Price: About 2 p.m., when a charge was ordered and made in the most gallant manner, officers and men vying 

with each other in both divisions of unsurpassed bravery, charging up nearly to the muzzles of the enemy’s cannon. Where 

all acted as heroes it seems almost invidious to make any exception, but I must be allowed to call attention to the courage 

and gallantry of Brigadier-General Cabell in leading his men to the assault, having his horse killed under him within forty 

yards of the fort. But the information I had received in regard to the strength of the fortifications proved totally incorrect. 

Our troops were repulsed, and it being too late to renew the assault they were withdrawn beyond the reach of the enemy’s 

guns and preparations were made for a renewal of the assault on the next day.51
46

Map 16. 
47

16. The Gates of St. Louis52

On 28 September, Brig. Gen. Ewing continued the retreat toward Rolla. Price was slow to organize the pursuit and 

Marmaduke and Shelby did not pursue until about noon. Ewing’s troops, mostly infantry supported by light artillery, fought 

a skillful delay action along the narrow valleys and did not allow the faster moving Confederate cavalry to get past them. 

At about sundown on the 29th, Ewing arrived in Leasburg. He halted his exhausted command and constructed earthworks.

The next morning, Marmaduke and Shelby appraised the entrenchments and decided against an attack. They then turned 

their commands to the north to rejoin Price’s advance toward St. Louis. Meanwhile, Price moved Fagan’s division toward 

St. Louis. On the 29th, a detachment burned railroad depots at De Soto and near Franklin.

By the next day, Price had his entire Army within striking distance of St. Louis. On 1 October, the army briefly occupied 

Franklin, which was less than 40 miles from the center of St. Louis. However, it appears that Price had already decided not 

to test the city’s defenses. Ironically, St. Louis was not the formidable fortress Price imagined. Rosecrans had one division 

of Smith’s XVI Corps defending along the Meramec River and maybe another 1,500 troops in the city. Most of the city 

troops were Enrolled Missouri Militia. The city had not experienced any significant threat since 1862. Its militia rolls were 

woefully out of date and the militia were lacking any kind of combat experience. Nevertheless, Price recognized, based upon 

his Pilot Knob experience, that the defenses were possibly more than his Army could handle. On the 1st, The Confederates 

occupied the town of Washington on the Missouri River. The river blocked the Confederates from any further movement 

to the north. Price now had three choices: turn to the east and attack St. Louis, retrace his route and return to Arkansas, or 

turn to the west and capture the Missouri Capital at Jefferson City. The capital did not have the rich supplies of war material 

that were available in St. Louis, but it did offer the opportunity to accomplish the political goal of holding an election in a 

major Missouri city. By 3 October, Union scouts were reporting, “he is undoubtedly gone toward Jefferson City.”53 Meanwhile, Rosecrans moved troops to oppose the Confederate incursion into Missouri. Brig. Gen. John Sanborn reinforced the 

important railroad town of Rolla with troops from the District of Southwest Missouri and Brig. Gen. John Brown started to 

concentrate his District of Central Missouri troops at the state capital. 

Maj. Gen. Curtis: As the enemy at Washington, on the Missouri, had reached the turning point of his northern movement 

(crossing the Missouri not being rational), leaving most of our Federal forces in his rear and right flank, his movement 

westward toward my department seemed inevitable. General Rosecrans was re-enforced by troops under General Mower, 

General Smith, and 100-days’ regiments from Illinois, but all these being on the other side of Price the greater the number 

the more certain and expeditious would be the movement toward my department. The crisis as to the direction of the enemy’s 

movement occurred about the 2nd of October.54

Maj. Gen. Price: ...receiving information that the Federal force in Saint Louis far exceeded my own two to one, and knowing the city to be strongly fortified, I determined to move as fast as possible on Jefferson City, destroying the railroad as I 

went, with a hope to be able to capture that city with its troops and munitions of war.55
48

Notes

1. Map and discussion based on information from: US War Department. Atlas to accompany the Official Records of the Union 

and Confederate Armies (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1891 – 1895) (Platte 170); Neil Kagan and Stephen G. 

Hyslop, Atlas of the Civil War: A Comprehensive Guide to the Tactics and Terrain of Battle (Washington, DC: National Geographic, 

2009).

2. For additional information on Kirby Smith see Joseph H. Park, General Edmund Kirby Smith, C.S.A. (Baton Rouge, LA: 

Louisiana State University Press, 1954).

3. The War of Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume XXXVIII, 

part II, 1022-23. Bragg correspondence with Jefferson Davis. (Hereafter referred to as the O.R.)

4. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part II, 1022-1023. Secretary of War, J. A. Seldon, correspondence with Jefferson Davis.

5. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part II, 1048. Garland correspondence with Jefferson Davis.

6. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part II, 1011-1012. Gov. Reynolds to Price. 

7. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part II, 1011-1012. Gov. Reynolds to Price. 

8. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part II, 1023. Price correspondence with Kirby Smith.

9. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part II, 1023. Price correspondence with Kirby Smith.

10. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part II, 1023. Price correspondence with Kirby Smith.

11. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part II, 1023. Secretary of War, J. Seldon correspondence with Braxton Bragg.

12. Albert Castel, General Sterling Price (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1996), 202.

13. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part II, 1029-1030. Bragg correspondence with Kirby Smith.

14. Missouri’s Confederate governor-in-exile.

15. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part II, 1011-1012. Gov. Reynolds to Price. 

16. Map and discussion based on information from: Frank J. Welcher, The Union Army, 1861-1865, Organizations and 

Operations, Vol II, The Western Theater (Indianapolis, IN; Indiana University Press, 1993). 

17. O.R., Series I, Volume XXXVIII, part I, 2. Grant’s General Report of 1865.

18. U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant (New York: Charles L. Webster, 1885), 364-367, 368-370, 371-372, 372-373.

19. Also in the west were the Departments of New Mexico, the Pacific, and the Northwest. These Departments plays no 

significant role in the 1864 Missouri Expedition.

20. Don Fehrenbacher, The Recollected Words of Abraham Lincoln (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 180.

21. For additional information on William Rosecrans see William M. Lamers, The Edge of Glory: A Biography of General 

William S. Rosecrans (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1961).

22. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part II, 60.

23. Grant, Personal Memoirs, 364-367, 368-370, 371-372, 372-373.

24. Map and discussion based on information from: Howard Monnett, Action Before Westport (Kansas City, MO: Westport 

Historical Society, 1964)

25. Albert Castel, General Sterling Price (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1996), 166.

26. Maj. Gen. Rosecrans commanded the Department of Missouri.

27. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part I, 307. Rosecrans’ report on the Missouri Expedition.

28. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part I, 729. Gen. Kirby Smith’s order to Maj. Gen. Price. 

29. Map and discussion based on information from: Mark A. Lause, Price’s Lost Campaign, The 1864 Invasion of Missouri 

(Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2011). 

30. Maj. Gen. Frederick Steele commanded the Union Department of Arkansas.

31. O.R., Series 1, Volume 41, Part III, 143. Maj. Gen. Steele correspondence with Maj. Gen. Rosecrans (10 Sept 1864).

32. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part I, 627. Price’ Official Report of the Missouri Expedition. 

33. Map and discussion based on information from Lause, Price’s Lost Campaign.

34. Prior to his promotion to division commander, Shelby had commanded the Iron Brigade. 

35. Maj. Gen. C. C. Washburn commanded the District of West Tennessee and was located at Memphis. 

36. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part III, 27. 

37. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part I, 627. Price’ Official Report of the Missouri Expedition. 

38. Map and discussion based on information from Lause, Price’s Lost Campaign; Welcher, The Union Army, 1861-1865, 

39. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part III, 311. 

40. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part III, 322. Correspondence between Maj. Wilson at Pilot Knob with Brig. Gen. Ewing at St. 

Louis. (23 Sept 1864).

41. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part III, 951-952. Shelby correspondence with Price (22 September 1864).

42. Map and discussion based on information from Lause, Price’s Lost Campaign; Walter E. Busch, Fort Davidson and the Battle 

of Pilot Knob (Charleston, SC; History Press, 2010); Scott Sallee, “Missouri One Last Time,” Blue & Gray Magazine, June 1991, 10-

62; Cyrus A. Peterson and Joseph M. Hanson, Pilot Knob, The Thermopylae of the West (New York: The Neale Publishing Co., 1914); 

Bryce A Suderow and R. Scott House, The Battle of Pilot Knob: Thunder in Arcadia Valley (Cape Girardeau, MO: Southeast Missouri 

State University Press, 2014).
49

43. By 26 September, Ewing had approximately 1447 soldiers and volunteer citizens at Pilot Knob from the following commands: 

the 14th Iowa Infantry (142), the 47th Missouri Infantry (500), Company F of the 50th Missouri Infantry (80), Battery H of the 2d 

Missouri Light Artillery (134--6 guns), the 3d Missouri State Militia Cavalry (347), Company L of the 2d Missouri State Militia 

Cavalry (44), Company G of the 1st Missouri State Militia Infantry, (serving as artillery, 58--7 guns) plus a number of white and black 

civilian volunteers.

44. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part I, 629. Price’s Official Report.

45. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part III, 384. Ewing correspondence with Rosecrans (26 September, 1530).

46. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part I, 628-629. Price’s Official Report.

47. Map and discussion based on information from Lause, Price’s Lost Campaign; Busch, Fort Davidson and the Battle of Pilot 

Knob; Sallee, “Missouri One Last Time.”

48. Fort Davidson was a hexagonal earth work surrounded by a dry moat. The fort had a rifle pit extending north (190 yards) and 

another to the south (150 yards) accessed by sally ports (tunnels). The fort sat in a valley between three mountains: Pilot Knob (east), 

Shepherd (south), and Cedar Hill (north). The fort contained a significant amount of artillery: four 32 pound siege guns, three 24 

pound howitzers and six 3-inch ordnance rifles. In the center of the fort was a buried powder magazine.

49. Confederates at Pilot Knob. Fagan’s Division (1,700+) was composed of Cabell’s Brigade of 6 Arkansas Regiments, Slemon’s 

Brigade of 4 Arkansas Regiments, Dobbin’s Brigade of 3 Arkansas Regiments, McCray’s Brigade of 2 Arkansas Regiments and the 

15th Missouri Cavalry, and 3 unattached Arkansas Regiments totaling 300 men. Marmaduke’s Division (3700+) was composed of 

Clark’s Brigade of 7 Missouri Regiments, Freeman’s Brigade of 2 Arkansas and 1 Missouri Regiments, and Slayback’s Detachment of 

Missouri Cavalry.

50. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part I, 448. Ewing’s Official Report.

51. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part I, 628. Price’s Official Report.

52. Map and discussion based on information from: Lause, Price’s Lost Campaign; Busch, Fort Davidson and the Battle of Pilot 

Knob; Sallee, “Missouri One Last Time.”

53. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part III, 582. Col. Lewis Merrill correspondence with Rosecrans (3 Oct 1864).

54. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part I, 466. Curtis’s Official Report.

55. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part I, 630. Price’s Official Report.

Part IV

Saint Louis to Lexington

3 to 19 October 1864
52

Map 17. 
53

17. Toward Jefferson City1

After turning away from St. Louis, the Army of Missouri moved at a leisurely pace toward the state capital. Price 

seemed to let the cumbersome wagon train dictate his rate of march. The train, originally about 300 wagons, grew to over 

500 wagons. Most were filled with the fruits of the Army’s foraging and pillaging. Officially, Price tried to control rampant 

looting of his soldiers. However, the Army had no line of supply and needed to forage in order to survive. The end result 

was that most of the towns the Confederates “liberated” along the road to Jefferson City were sacked and pillaged to supply 

his army. Federal authorities ordered the local militias to concentrate at Jefferson City. Therefore, most of the towns along 

the Rebel line of advance surrendered without a fight. Some, like the small town of Hermann, offered token resistance. 

Tragically, the Rebels also executed several Missouri citizens. Some were known to be prominent “Union men,” others were 

German immigrants (hated by some Rebels), and at least one man was murdered because he wore blue pants. The Confederates also executed Maj. James Wilson and five other soldiers captured at Pilot Knob.

Meanwhile, Maj. Gen. Rosecrans concentrated his forces at Kirkwood. He remained unconvinced that Price was moving on Jefferson City. He worried that the Confederates might still move against St. Louis or more likely, turn south toward 

Rolla. As late as 4 October, his indecision left Brig. Generals Clinton Fisk and John Brown with fewer than 5,000 men to defend the capital and half of these were the untrained and ill-equipped Enrolled Missouri Militia (EMM). Nevertheless, Fisk 

and Brown put their men to work and prepared the city to withstand an assault or siege. Fortunately for the Union Cause, 

Brig. Gen. John McNeil at Rolla believed Price was “pushing for Jefferson City.” Rosecrans had ordered him to defend 

Rolla before the Confederates cut the telegraph line. On his own accord, McNeil decided to move his and Brig. Gen. John 

Sanborn’s troops to Rolla. McNeil’s decision put almost 3,000 good troops along with six field guns on the road to Jefferson 

City. The question remained to be answered on whether they would arrive in time to save the capital. 

Brig. Gen. McNeil:2

 On the evening of the 3d I became convinced that General Price was pushing for Jefferson City. All 

communication with Saint Louis being cut off, I was compelled to act in the premises without consultation with headquarters. It also became known to me that one prominent object of the raid on the part of the enemy was the capture of the political capital of the State and the installation of Thomas C. Reynolds as the constitutional Governor of Missouri, and the 

inauguration of a civil government, that, with the assistance of this rebel army of occupation, would be enabled to arouse 

the latent spirit of rebellion which still unfortunately existed in the minds of many citizens of Missouri. Determined if in 

my power to foil this rebel scheme, I marched from Rolla for Jefferson City on the morning of the 4th of October, 1864... I 

had previously directed General Sanborn, then in camp at Cuba, to join me at Vienna and proceed with me to the rescue of 

Jefferson City.3

Brig. Gen. Shelby: I moved with my division on through Saint Clair, Union, Mount Sterling, and Linn... Through this and 

other sections of the country traversed by the army the wise and just policy of General Price was fruitful of the most happy 

results. The German element, largely preponderating, had been taught that Confederate soldiers killed, burned, and destroyed with vengeance swift as it was merciless, sparing neither age nor sex, and exacting a dark retribution of blood from 

the citizens and non-combatants.4
54

Map 18. 
55

18. The Gasconade and Osage Rivers5

The experience of the 34th Enrolled Missouri Militia (EMM) responsible for the Gasconade River railroad (RR) Bridge, 

highlights the confusion within the Department of Missouri and the numerous small and isolated detachments of militiamen 

guarding various towns and key infrastructure. Capt. Charles Eitzen along with two small companies had no clear orders 

on what was expected of his 150 men. He was not sure if he was to secure the bridge intact or burn it to deny use by the 

enemy. On 4 October, Eitzen’s militia abandoned the bridge and melted away when thousands of Confederates closed in on 

the small detachment. Ironically, the Confederate advance elements arrived early the next morning and burned the bridge 

as the main Rebel Army planned to cross the river further to the south. That same day, the Confederates skirmished with 

EMM units at the Osage River RR Bridge. On the 6th, the Union reinforcements from Rolla arrived in Jefferson City and 

immediately advanced east to defend the Osage River crossings. 

Brig. Gen. McNeil deployed his and Sanborn’s brigade along an eight mile front to defend several crossing sites. Shelby’s division fixed the Union defenders at Prince’s and Bolton’s Ford and then made the main attack across at Castle Rock 

Ford. McNeil and Sanborn fought a stubborn rearguard fight back to Moreau Creek. In the fighting, Union fire mortally 

wounded Col. David Shanks, who was the commander of Shelby’s Iron Brigade. That night, the Confederates camped within a few miles of the state capital. The defenders of the Gasconade and Osage Rivers had hoped in vain that the Union forces 

in the St. Louis area would march to the rescue. However, there was very little westward movement from these units. Maj. 

Gen. Rosecrans had concentrated one division of the XVI Corps and elements of the St. Louis EMM at Kirksville. However, 

Maj. Gen. Smith, commander of the XVI Corps, was reluctant to begin the pursuit without his other division. Brig. Gen 

Mower’s division had just recently arrived at Cape Girardeau after having completed a difficult march from the Arkansas 

River and it would take time for them to come forward. 

Maj. Mullins: I sent word to Colonel Philips advising him of the situation [He was defending Bolton’s Ford on the Osage 

River]; that the enemy seemed to be bringing up a large force and was also swinging around to flank us, and consequently 

asked for immediate support, I maintained this position from fifteen to twenty-five minutes, a brisk skirmish being kept up 

all the while, when the enemy moved up in overwhelming numbers, attacking in front and on both flanks. No support having 

arrived and being unable to resist the attack my command was compelled to fall back.6

Brig. Gen. Shelby: I reconnoitered the ford warily, showing no force whatever, and found about one regiment drawn up 

to dispute farther progress, while movements in the rear told that more were coming up. I dismounted Shanks’ and Smith’s 

regiments, deployed them along the bank, sheltered by heavy timber; held Elliott and Williams well in hand for a dash, and 

stationed my battery at splendid range. When all these arrangements were completed, a terrible fire of infantry and artillery 

swept the other bank, swept the opposing squadrons, swept the face of the bluff beyond, and drove everything for shelter 

to the woods. Now Elliott and Williams dashed away at the charge; the infantry waded after. The swift and beautiful water 

was torn into foam-flakes that hurried and danced away to the sea, while the ringing shout of a thousand voices told that 

the ford was won.7
56

Map 19. 
57

19. Jefferson City8

On 7 October, the Confederates moved onto the heights overlooking Jefferson City and its fortifications. Brig. Gen. 

Brown, commanding the District of Central Missouri and the ad hoc city garrison, had “repaired the two partially constructed forts, built three substantial new ones” and constructed “nearly three miles of entrenchments, palisades, rifle-pits, [and] 

chevaux-de-frise [obstacles].”9 Price’s forces examined the fortifications and exchanged some fire with the garrison but then 

withdrew from the front of the city into a bivouac. Price’s spies informed him that there were 15,000 troops defending the 

city. The Federals actually numbered only about 7,000, many of them being green militia and citizen volunteers. Price remembered the Pilot Knob setback and was reluctant to order an assault. He consulted his division commanders and decided 

to bypass the city and move toward Boonville. 

Price decided that the capture of a major city and holding of elections were no longer possible. The invasion of Missouri 

had failed. Price now altered the objectives of the expedition to that of a large-scale raid. His objective was now Kansas and 

he planned, in accordance with Smith’s orders, to make his “retreat through Kansas and the Indian Territory, sweeping that 

country of its mules, horses, cattle, and military supplies of all kinds.”10 He also hoped to recruit more men in the pro-Confederate region of “Little Dixie.” He ordered Shelby to assume the lead and move as soon as possible. On 8 October, the 

Army of Missouri formed in full view of the city as if to attack but then withdrew and departed to the west. 

Brig. Gen. Fisk: The major-general commanding telegraphed me on the 6th to assume command of the combined forces 

at Jefferson City. I immediately organized the force into four brigades, under General Brown, McNeil, and Sanborn, and 

Colonel Franklin W. Hickox, Enrolled Missouri Militia. The effective strength of the fragments of commands thus hastily 

thrown together from different districts of the department, including Enrolled Missouri Militia and loyal citizens, was, of 

officers and men, 7,200. Generals McNeil and Sanborn, who had for many days been in immediate proximity to the enemy, 

informed me that Price’s army numbered not less than 20,000 men, and that he could put 15,000 well appointed veterans 

and more than twenty pieces of artillery into action... At daylight on the morning of the 8th he appeared in force in front of 

McNeil, but withdrew before advancing near our earth-works. As the enemy retired and a reconnaissance to the Moreau 

revealed the fact that his entire army had passed to our right, the mounted troops of Sanborn’s brigade were thrown upon 

his rear, killing many and capturing a large number of men and arms. At 8 a.m. all the mounted troops of the command were 

ordered in pursuit of the enemy with five days’ field rations in their haversacks and 140 rounds of ammunition. The capital 

of the State had been saved...11

Maj. Gen. Price: I had received positive information that the enemy were 12,000 strong in the city, and that 3,000 more had 

arrived on the opposite bank of the river by the North Missouri Railroad before I withdrew my troops to the encampment 

selected, whereupon I gave immediate instructions to Brigadier-General Shelby to send a sufficient force to burn the bridges 

and destroy the railroad on the west of Jefferson City in the direction of California, the county seat of Moniteau County, and 

after consultation with my general officers I determined not to attack the enemy’s intrenchments {sic}, as they outnumbered 

me nearly two to one and were strongly fortified but to move my command in the direction of Kansas, as instructed in my 

original orders, hoping to be able to capture a sufficient number of arms to arm my unarmed men at Boonville, Sedalia, 

Lexington, and Independence...12
58

Map 20.
59

20. Boonville13

To the east and west, Union forces mobilized against Price. On 8 October, Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton arrived in Jefferson City and assumed command of all forces at Jefferson City. He immediately organized a pursuit against Price. That 

day, Brig. Gen. Sanborn followed after the Confederates with the cavalry and the following day harassed the Confederate 

rearguard near Russellville. Simultaneously, Maj. Gen. Fisk moved an infantry force up the Missouri River on steamboats 

in an effort to reinforce Lexington. About 100 miles to the east, Rosecrans finally ordered Maj. Gen. Smith to move the XVI 

Corps and his cavalry brigade to Jefferson City to join in the pursuit. 

In Kansas, Maj. Gen. Samuel Curtis (Commander of the Department of Kansas) continued to urge Governor Thomas 

Carney to mobilize the Kansas State Militia (KSM) for the defense of the state. On 9 October, Brig. Gen Shelby and the 

Confederate advance guard moved into Boonville. The small town was the heart of the strong pro-slavery region of “Little 

Dixie.” The next day, the citizens of Boonville provided a warm welcome to a full parade by the Confederate Army. Recruiters added over 1,200 new men to the Army’s rolls from the region over the next several days. Among the new recruits 

was Capt. William Anderson, known as “Bloody Bill Anderson,” and his guerrilla band. Recently, Anderson’s guerrilla’s 

had been very active in northern Missouri and had all but shut down traffic along the Missouri River and northern Missouri 

railroads. Price sent the notorious “Bushwhacker” north to operate against the Northern Missouri Railroad and detailed 

other guerrilla bands to act as scouts. 

Maj. Gen. Curtis: I request that you issue the call. Let the militia turn out. If not needed they will, of course, be discharged. 

Their call and collection would enable us at least to give an impetus to Price’s departure. In your prompt responses to my 

requests heretofore I am sure we have saved the State from desolation; let us do it now... they seem moving steadily westward. Delay is ruinous.14

Maj. Gen. Price: The next day I accordingly took up my line of march in the direction of Kansas, and upon leaving Jefferson 

City was followed by General McNeil, who made an attack upon my rear guard (Fagan’s division), but was easily repulsed. 

Brigadier-General Shelby, who with his division constituted my advance, reached California on the 8th... Pushing rapidly 

on to Boonville... I followed on with the divisions of Major-General Fagan and Marmaduke, and encamped on the night of 

the 8th fourteen miles from Jefferson City, and on the 9th marched through and beyond California, making twenty-six miles. 

On the 10th I arrived at Boonville with the rest of the command. My reception was enthusiastic in the extreme. Old and 

young, men, women, and children, vied in their salutations and in ministering to the wants and comforts of my wearied and 

war-worn soldiers... Captain Anderson, who reported to me that day with a company of about 100 men, was immediately 

sent to destroy the North Missouri Railroad. At the same time Quantrill was sent with the men under his command to destroy 

the Hannibal and Saint Joseph Railroad, to prevent the enemy, if possible, from throwing their forces in my front from Saint 

Louis.15
60

Map 21.
61

21. Mobilizing the Kansas Militia16

Governor Thomas Carney was slow to recognize Price’s threat against Kansas. Since 1862, the closest big battles occurred far to the south in Arkansas. The sack of Lawrence happened in August 1863 and the infamous Order No. 11 had 

pushed the guerrilla war away from the Kansas border. The Indians in central Kansas posed some threat to the state but only 

to those living on the frontier. Many Kansans saw no need for involvement in Missouri’s problem with Price or the bigger 

issue of the American Civil War. Carney, a Republican, was far more concerned with the upcoming election against Samuel 

Crawford, a Radical Republican.17 Crawford had the backing of Senator James Lane, another Radical Republican, and Carney’s reelection was not assured. Also, Maj. Gen. Curtis was a Lane supporter, and Carney believed the militia mobilization 

was a political ploy to influence the election. Therefore, the governor paid little heed to Maj. Gen. Curtis’ initial calls for 

mobilization of the militia in mid-September. 

Nevertheless, Price’s westward movement in the first week of October made the threat to Kansas apparent to all. Gen. 

Curtis had about 7,000 volunteer troops scattered across Kansas, the Territories of Colorado and Nebraska, and the Indian 

Territories. His department was currently involved in the Cheyenne War of 1864 and only a fraction of his troops could be 

spared to fight the Confederates.18 Curtis needed the Kansas State Militia (KSM) in order to mount a credible defense of 

the state and continued to pressure the state for help. In early October, Carney’s fears of political mischief intensified when 

Curtis recalled Maj. Gen. James Blunt from operations against the Cheyenne and placed him in command of the District of 

South Kansas. Blunt was an outspoken supporter of the Lane faction. Carney believed it was a maneuver to place Blunt in 

command of the KSM. On 9 October, Governor Carney finally relented and agreed to the mobilization with the condition 

that most of the militia would assume garrison duties to free up the volunteers for operations against the Confederates and 

Maj. Gen. George Deitzler would command the militia.19 The next day, Deitzler established his headquarters in Olathe, KS 

and directed the KSM to assemble at Shawnee Town, KS. 

Maj. Gen. Curtis: The rebel forces under General Price have made a farther advance westward, crossing the Gasconade, 

and are now at the railroad bridge on the Osage, about fifteen miles below Jefferson City. Large Federal forces about Saint 

Louis and below tend to drive him toward Kansas. Other motives also will induce his fiendish followers to seek spoils and 

vengeance in this State. To prevent this and join in efforts to expel these invaders from the country I desire that you will call 

out the entire militia force.20

Gov. Carney: Kansans, rally! You will do so, as you have always promptly done when your soil has been invaded. The call 

this time will come to you louder and stronger because you know the foe will seek to glut his vengeance upon you. Meet him, 

then, at the threshold and strike boldly; strike as one man against him. Let all business be suspended. The work to be done 

now is to protect the State against marauder and murderer. Until this is accomplished we must lead a soldier’s life and do a 

soldier’s duty. Men of Kansas, rally! One blow, one earnest, united blow will foil the invader and save you. Who will falter? 

Who is not ready to meet the peril? Who will not defend his home and the State? To arms then! To arms, and the tended field 

until the rebel foe shall be baffled and beaten back!21
62

Map 22.
63

22. Sedalia and Glasgow22

On 13 October, Maj. Gen. Curtis designated the assembling Kansas forces as the Army of the Border. He appointed Maj. 

Gen. Deitzler’s Kansas State Militia (KSM) as the left wing and Maj. Gen. Blunt’s force as the right wing. To the east, Gen. 

Sanborn, after several days of continuous action against the Confederate rearguard, decided to rest his forces at California, 

MO. On 14 October, Sanborn resumed the pursuit. The next day, Rosecrans moved 1st Div. of the XVI Corps and Winslow’s 

cavalry by boat to Jefferson City to join with the 3d Div. of the XVI Corps. Between the two Union forces, Price recognized 

the threat of the gathering Kansas forces and decided to resume the westward movement toward Kansas. The needs of Confederate Army far outweighed the resources of the small town of Boonville and the departure was probably as welcome to 

the town’s citizens as its arrival a few days earlier.

That night Price obtained information that a large cache of weapons and other military supplies were stored in Glasgow. 

On 14 October, Price decided to send Brig. Gen. John Clark to capture the town and the supplies stored there. Simultaneously, Price sent Brig. Gen. M. Jeff Thompson against Sedalia. Thompson had assumed command of the “Iron Brigade” 

after the death of Col. Shanks. The next day, Thompson captured the small garrison at Sedalia after a brief fight. He paroled 

the prisoners and then plundered the town for supplies. Thompson, then in accordance with his orders, moved to rejoin the 

main army as it moved toward Marshal. Sixty miles to the north, Brig. Gen. John Clark fought a pitched battle to capture 

the town of Glasgow. 

Brig. Gen. Sanborn: Hence all my movements after the enemy left Boonville were made with the view of holding the enemy 

in or near Saline County until the Kansas troops were organized and on the border, and Winslow’s brigade of cavalry and 

General A. J. Smith’s command of infantry and artillery should be within striking distance. I therefore moved my command, 

with the exception of a small force under Captain Turley, which was ordered to follow the enemy’s trail by Nebo Church, 

through Georgetown up the Georgetown and Lexington road to Cook’s Store, arriving at this point at 3 p. m. on the 15th day 

of October, with the view of resisting the advance of the enemy, and attacking his flanks if he should advance immediately.23

Maj. Gen. Price: I moved that evening [12 October] from Boonville to Chouteau Springs on my proposed route, a distance 

of eleven miles, having recruited at Boonville between 1,200 and 1,500 men, mostly unarmed. That night receiving information that there was a large number of arms (amounting to 5,000 stored in the City Hall at Glasgow, I sent Brigadier-General 

Clark, of Marmaduke’s division, with his own brigade and 500 of Jackman’s brigade, with orders to cross the river at Arrow 

Rock and attack the place the next morning at daylight and capture it...[Also] ordered Brigadier General M. Jeff. Thompson, 

then commanding Shelby’s old brigade, to take with him a force of not less than 800 or 1,000 men and one section of artillery by Longwood, and from thence to Sedalia, to attack the Federal force at that place if he should deem it advisable and 

prudent. This order was promptly and completely carried out by Brigadier-General Thompson. The place, though strongly 

fortified and well garrisoned, was carried by a bold and daring assault and fell into our hands with over 200 prisoners, who 

were paroled, several hundred stand of arms, many pistols, and several wagon loads of goods suitable to soldiers.24
64

Map 23.
65

23. The Battle of Glasgow25

On 15 October, two Confederate brigades crossed the Missouri River and moved toward Glasgow. Just before dawn, 

Shelby’s artillery opened fire from the west side of the Missouri River. The plans for a coordinated attack fell into disarray 

when troops under General Clark experienced difficulty getting over the river. After a two-hour delay, Clark’s force of 1,800 

men advanced on Glasgow. The 800 defenders fought valiantly and grudgingly gave up ground but were gradually forced 

back into the center of the town.26 At approximately 1330 and with no hope of victory, Col. Chester Harding, the Union 

Commander, made the decision to surrender. The Rebel victory at Glasgow provided Price with 1,200 badly needed rifles 

and a large shipment of military overcoats. The victory was also a significant boost to the Army’s morale after the costly 

defeat at Pilot Knob.

Col. Chester Harding. At 5 o’clock on the morning of the 15th the enemy opened upon the town with two pieces... from the 

opposite bank of the river. At the same time a scout came in and reported 900 men advancing from Keytesville... The enemy 

deployed on the slope facing the creek south of the town under and in front of two field pieces which were placed in position 

on the crest of the heights. I sent Major B.K. Davis, of the Forty-third Missouri Volunteers, with three companies of that 

regiment, to hold the bank of the creek from the bridge on the Fayette road down toward Captain Mayo... Captain Steinmetz, with a citizen company was ordered to take ground between Davis and Mayo... The troops along the creek resisted the 

passage of it manfully, but soon had to be ordered back, as the enemy’s force was so great that he was enabled not only to 

pass around both flanks, but to pour through the long intervals which necessarily existed in the line... The line of defense, 

to which we fell back from the creek, had for its right an elevation in town, around the crest of which some slight rifle-pits, 

had been constructed and for its left a brick school-house... The retreat to this line was very slow, every possible opportunity 

being taken to retard the enemy’s progress... Every available shelter was taken by the enemy, and he cautiously and slowly 

but constantly, advanced his skirmishers to points nearer to us, and when he had established them at any position closed 

upon them until he had a heavy force within from thirty to fifty yards of us all along our line and partly around our right. 

By noon I had become convinced that I could not hold the place if the enemy chose to make an assault... At 1.30 o’clock I 

surrendered on the terms that the garrison should march out with its arms and colors; officers to retain their horses, sidearms, and private property; the men to retain what private property they had belonging to them; persons and private of 

citizens to be respected.27

Brig. Gen. John B. Clark, Jr. After several shots from Pratt’s artillery... both commands advanced to the attack in a spirited manner and soon drove the enemy within his works, which were constructed upon a commanding hill in the heart of 

the town, from which the poured a destructive fire of small-arms in our ranks; but nothing daunted, they advanced under 

cover of houses, fences, and other obstructions to within a short distance of his works, preferring to force his surrender by 

a continuous fire from sharpshooters rather than take him by assault. After a fire on small-arms and artillery for two hours 

Colonel Harding, commanding Federal forces, sent out a flag desiring to know what terms would be granted to him in case 

he surrendered.28
66

Map 24.
67

24. The Battle of Lexington29

Maj. Gen. Blunt organized his command as the Provisional Cavalry Division of the Army of the Border and pushed 

forward into Missouri. Some of his militia mutinied and tried to return to Kansas. Blunt arrested the officers involved in the 

mutiny and marched the militia back to Hickman Mills, MO. Blunt hoped to cooperate with Brig. Gen. Sanborn and trap the 

Confederates between their forces. On 16 October, he moved forward to Pleasant Hill and then on to Holden, MO on the 

17th. By the 18th, he had occupied Lexington and received word that Price was only 20 miles to the east at Waverly. He also 

learned that Sanborn was near Crook’s Store, too far to the southeast to cooperate against Price (Sanborn was actually much 

farther to the south at Blackwater). Equally disappointing was a dispatch received from Maj. Gen. Curtis informing him, 

“that in consequence of the embarrassments thrown in his way by the Governor of Kansas and others relative to moving the 

militia out of the State, no re-enforcements could be sent to me.”30

Nevertheless, Blunt chose to delay Price at Lexington as long as possible and buy time for the Department of Missouri 

forces to close the distance. On 15 October, the Confederates passed through Marshall and then halted two days to wait for 

Clark’s and Thompson’s Brigades to rejoin the army. Price now recognized the danger of being caught between the two 

forces. He believed Sanborn’s pursuit force was at the town of Crook’s Store and received word that Kansas troops were 

moving east to block his advance. Price made the decision to move quickly toward Waverly and then on to Lexington. On 

the 19th, the Army of Missouri moved toward Lexington in three division columns. At about 1400, Shelby’s Division struck 

the Union picket line approximately one mile east of Lexington. Blunt, with only 2,000 men and eight small mountain howitzers, was drastically outnumbered. Nonetheless, the Federals made a strong stand and only fell back when Price committed 

Fagan and Marmaduke to the fight. Blunt continued to hold firm until early evening and then withdrew having accomplished 

his objective, “to develop his [Price’s] force and movements and accomplish the object of a reconnaissance.”31

Col. Moonlight: ... it fell to the lot of the Second Brigade to picket the road leading south, and on which Price was advancing. Captain Green, Company B, Eleventh commanded the picket on the Warrensburg road, composed of his own company 

and Company A, Sixteenth. Captain Palmer, Company A, Eleventh, commanded the picket on the Dover road, composed 

of his own company and Company F, Eleventh. I am particular in mentioning these facts, because much credit is due these 

companies for maintaining their position and holding the rebel advance in check as long as they did. When, at the battle of 

Lexington, on the 19th, a retreat was ordered, the Second Brigade was in the advance and a portion of it dismounted, so that 

it fell to our lot to cover the retreat.32

Maj. Gen. Price: At daybreak on the morning of the 19th I moved from Waverly in the direction of Lexington, Brigadier-General Shelby’s division in the advance, and having received information that General Blunt, Lane, and Jennison, 

with between 3,000 and 4,000 Federals..., were at Lexington, and fearing that they might make a junction with McNeil and 

A. J. Smith, who were at Sedalia and Salt Fork, I made a flank movement to the left after crossing the Tabo, so as to intercept their line of march. The advance, under Shelby, met them about 2 p.m., and a battle immediately ensued. For a time 

the Federals fought well and resisted strenuously, but finally giving way, they were pressed by our troops, driven well past 

Lexington, and pursued on the road to Independence until night put an end to the combat.33
68

Notes

1. Map and discussion based on information from Mark A. Lause, Price’s Lost Campaign, The 1864 Invasion of Missouri 

(Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2011); Scott Sallee, “Missouri One Last Time,” Blue & Gray Magazine, June 1991, 

10-62.

2. Brig. Gen. John McNeil commanded the District of Rolla. His field force was designated the 2d Brigade of the Provisional 

Cavalry Division, Department of Missouri.

3. The War of Rebellion: A Compilation of the O.R., Series I, Volume XLII, part I, 375. McNeil’s Report. 

4. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part I, 653. Brig Joe Shelby’s report.

5. Map and discussion based on information from Lause, Price’s Lost Campaign; Sallee, “Missouri One Last Time.”

6. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part I, 362. Maj. Mullins’ report. Major Alexander Mullins commanded the First Missouri State 

Militia Cavalry. 

7. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part I, 654. Brig Joe Shelby’s report.

8. Map and discussion based on information from: Lause, Price’s Lost Campaign; Sallee, “Missouri One Last Time.”

9. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, 345. Brown Report. Brig. Gen. Egbert Brown commanded the District of Central Missouri. 

10. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part I, 729. Gen. Kirby Smith’s order to Maj. Gen. Price. 

11. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, 419-420. Fisk Report. Brig. Gen. Clinton Fisk commanded the District of North Missouri and 

assumed command of the Union garrison at Jefferson City.

12. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, 632. Price Report.

13. Map and discussion based on information from Sallee, “Missouri One Last Time;” Richard S. Brownlee, Gray Ghost of the 

Confederacy: Guerilla Warfare in the West, 1861-1865 (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1958); Albert E. Castel, 

Bloody Bill Anderson: The Short, Savage Life of a Civil War Guerrilla (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2006). 

14. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part 1, 468. Curtis message to Gov. Carney, 8 Ocotber.

15. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part 1, 631-632. Price Report.

16. Map and discussion based on information from: Howard Monnett, Action Before Westport (Kansas City, MO: Westport 

Historical Society, 1964); O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part 1.

17. For additional information on Samuel Crawford see Mark A Plummer. Frontier Governor: Samuel J. Crawford of Kansas

(Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas, 1971).

18. See C.D. Collins, The Cheyenne War Atlas. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), Map 15.

19. During Price’s Expedition, Deitzler commanded 10,000 Kansas State Militia units in the Army of the Border.

20. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part 1, 468. Maj. Gen. Curtis Report.

21. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part 1, 468-469. Governor Thomas Carney’s proclamation to the people of KS.

22. Map and discussion based on information from Monnett, Action Before Westport; Sallee, “Missouri One Last Time;” O.R., 

Series I, Volume XLI, part 1.

23. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part 1, 388. Sanborn’s Report.

24. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part 1, Price Report, 632.

25. Map and discussion based on information from Sallee, “Missouri One Last Time;” O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part 1.

26. O.R.,Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, Capt. Holloway Report, 430. The force at Glasgow consisted of six companies of 43d 

Missouri Infantry, detachment of Companies B and M, 9th Cavalry (MSM); detachment of 13th Missouri Cavalry: detachment 

Fourth Provisional Regiment Enrolled Missouri Militia, and two companies of citizen militia, numbering in the aggregate about 550, 

indifferently armed, and under the command of Colonel Chester Harding, Jr., 43d Missouri Infantry (most other sources indicate 

approximately 800 defenders). The St. Louis Missouri Democrat, Nov. 2, 1864, p. 2 col. 5 gives details on Hunter’s command which 

consisted of 40 men of company M, 9th MSM, 42 men of company M, 2d MSM, and several men on the 17th Illinois cavalry, and was 

ably assisted by Lieut. Eldridge, 17th Illinois cavalry, Lieutenants Wilcox, Decker, and Berkahills, 8th MSM cavalry.

27. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, Col. Harding Report, 437-439.

28. Col. Thompson Report, 666.

29. Map and discussion based on information from Sallee, “Missouri One Last Time;” O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part 1.

30. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part 1, 573. Blunt Report.

31. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part 1, 574. Blunt Report.

32. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part 1, 591. Col. Thomas Moonlight’s Report. Moonlight commanded the 2d Brigade of the 

Provisional Cavalry Division of the Army of the Border.
Part V

The Battle of Westport

20 to 23 October 1864
70

Map 25.
71

25. Decision at the Little Blue River1

Maj. Gen. Blunt delayed the Confederate advance a full day at Lexington and then withdrew before being overwhelmed 

by growing numbers of Rebel troops. He moved west on the Independence Road with Col. Moonlight’s brigade covering 

the movement. Moonlight conducted a fighting withdrawal to the west and did not break contact with the enemy until dusk. 

Fortunately for Moonlight, the Confederates paused their pursuit at dark and went into camp to rest their forces. Blunt 

continued the retreat until approximately 0200 on the 20th and halted his division east of the Little Blue River. He intended 

to fight again and asked that ammunition and reinforcements be sent forward toward the Little Blue. However, Maj. Gen. 

Curtis hurried a message forward ordering Blunt to continue the retreat to Independence and leave only a rearguard at the 

Little Blue. That evening, Blunt again recommended the Little Blue River as “the place to make the fight” and urged Curtis 

to personally come forward and make his own assessment. Even so, Curtis was forced to overrule his subordinate because of 

ongoing problems with the governor of Kansas. Governor Carney refused to allow the Kansas State Militia (KSM) to move 

any further east into Missouri than the Big Blue River. Curtis directed Blunt to leave a small rearguard at the Little Blue 

River and fall back with the remainder of his force. Blunt decided to leave elements of Col. Moonlight’s brigade, directing 

them to resist the Confederate advance as long as possible.

All vignettes here are from the Northern perspective.

Maj. Gen. Blunt: I shall fall back west of the Little Blue and halt at the first good position that I can find forage, and wait 

orders. Subsistence and ammunition must be sent forward to me without delay... Much depends now on our prompt action 

and concentration with Rosecrans’ forces. There can be no necessity for troops north of the Kansas River. Leavenworth is 

in no danger, unless Price advances on this line... I consider it of the highest importance that we mass our forces on a line 

south of Price’s position, and then it matters little whether he (Price) moves east or west, we can cut him up; while, on the 

other hand if our forces are divided, and with the kind of forces we have on the border, we cannot successfully resist his 

columns unless Rosecrans attacks him vigorously in the rear, and he will make his retreat through Kansas. I make these 

suggestions for your consideration.2

Maj. Gen. Curtis: GENERAL: I have no time to explain. Your forces must take position here, ... The militia will not go 

farther forward, and the Big Blue must be our main line for battle... Leave two howitzers, and, say, 400 men at the Little 

Blue, and come back yourself with the remainder. Probably Moonlight better be left in command of that point, not to fight a 

battle, but to delay the rebel approach and fall back to our main force. I will now be able to bring forward to Kansas City a 

respectable force. We must pick our battle line, where we can have united councils as well as a strong position. This we are 

securing at the Big Blue and elsewhere....3

Maj. Gen. Blunt: My command is in camp on west side of the [Little] Blue, in a strong position-that I can defend this line 

against a largely superior force... This is the place to make the fight, if the enemy advance in force on this line. I would 

suggest that you come down and examine this position if you have time.4
72

Map 26.
73

26. The Little Blue River Bridge5

Col. Moonlight’s men constructed hasty field works and abattis along the roads and fords. By the morning of 21 October, Moonlight was prepared to fight on the Little Blue River. His small force consisted of only the 11th Kansas and a 

mountain howitzer battery. He placed Maj. Martin Anderson with two companies and the mountain howitzer battery near 

the covered bridge on the Lexington-Independence Road. Capt. James Greer’s I Company watched the ford one mile north 

of the bridge and Capt. Joel Huntoon’s H Company was responsible for the ford south of the bridge. A small skirmish line 

was placed a mile to the front and the remaining companies were held in reserve on the high ground to the west. On the 

night of 19 October, the Army of Missouri remained at Lexington and advanced to Fire Prairie Creek on the next day. On 

21 October, Brig. Gen. Clark’s Brigade of Marmaduke’s Division led the advance. At approximately 0700, Clark’s advance 

guard ran into the Union skirmish line a mile east of the Little Blue River and forced them back to the river. Clark committed additional forces and pressed forward to capture the bridge. He also dispatched units to the north and south in search 

of alternate crossing sites. The 11th Kansas, armed with 15-shot Henry Rifles, poured a heavy fire into the attacking rebels 

and stalled Clark’s attack. Maj. Anderson, with his skirmishers safely back on the west side of the river, directed his troops 

to push a wagonload of burning hay onto the bridge to deny its capture. To the north, Col. Robert Lawther (10th Missouri-CSA) reported the lower (downstream) crossing clear and Gen. Clark shifted the entire brigade to the north crossing. 

Moonlight recognized the threat to his flanks and directed most units to withdraw and establish a new defensive line on the 

ridge overlooking the lower crossing. 

Capt. Palmer:6 October 20th, was spent by our command in abattis work, felling trees, trying to block the road, hoping 

to delay the enemy as long as possible at the Little Blue. About nine A.M., October 21st, the enemy appeared. I had been a 

wake for a few minutes and was trying to sew up a big rent in my pants, which I got riding through the brush. I had to jump 

for my horse and see that my men were promptly in line of battle – had no time to put on my pants – threw them across my 

saddle and went into the fight. It was a sorry fight. They kept us busy for an hour or so, trying to prevent their crossing of 

the Little Blue River. Under a sharp fire, we ran a wagon load of hay onto the bridge and set it on fire. All to no particular 

effect, so far as stopping the enemy. We soon felt the enemy on our right and the sting of their bullets. We had to hustle to 

the rear, which we did in good order. 7

Col. Clark: My brigade being in advance, Captain Stallard’s escort (Marmaduke’s advance guard), came upon the enemy’s 

pickets one mile from the bridge on Little Blue on the Lexington and Independence road. Stallard soon drove them across 

the bridge, which they burned to prevent a rapid pursuit. Under instructions from General Marmaduke I sent Burbridge’s 

regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Preston in command) to secure the ford one mile above the bridge, and Colonel Lawther with 

his regiment to secure the ford one-half mile below, who soon reported the lower crossing clear, the enemy retiring toward 

Independence.8
74

Map 27.
75

27. The Lower Ford

At about 1000, Col. Moonlight established a new defensive line near the Lawson Moore House. The house was located 

on the high ground overlooking the lower ford.9 Moonlight observed the 10th Missouri (C.S.A.) advancing forward unsupported and decided to counterattack. His aggressive action threatened the Confederate bridgehead and may have influenced 

Col. Clark to commit his units in a piecemeal manner in an attempt to regain the initiative. Clark deployed his regiments into 

the fight from the march and the resulting fight seesawed back and forth from the lower ford to the house on the high ground. 

Fresh Confederate regiments would attack up the slope until the Union artillery stalled their attack. The Kansas troopers 

then counterattacked and drove them back down the slope. As soon as Clark passed another regiment over the ford, the 

attack-retreat pattern would repeat itself. Private James Campbell (14th Missouri, Clark’s Brigade) stated, “The Union boys 

had dismounted and were fighting on foot and came out from their well concealed positions and fought us on the blue grass 

ridges with but little protection and came within 30 yards of our line where both sides fought like demons.”10 Maj. Gen. Marmaduke was in the thick of the battle and in the course of the fight had two horses shot out from under him. He recognized 

the need for help and sent word to Maj. Gen. Price asking for Shelby’s Division to come forward in support. Price concurred 

and committed Brig. Gen. Shelby to the fight. Sometime around 1100, Moonlight observed Shelby’s division moving to 

support Clark’s Brigade. He also saw the remainder of Blunt’s division coming up from Independence. Moonlight decided he could not hold his position against the Confederate reinforcements and that he had fulfilled his mission to delay the 

Confederates on the Little Blue. He ordered his unit to fall back and link up with Blunt’s Division at the Little Blue Church. 

Col. Moonlight: We slowly began to drive the enemy back over the ground again, dismounting every man for the purpose 

of shelter behind some walls, fences, and houses, some of which were then held by the enemy, who, after a vigorous assault, 

were dislodged, thus affording us an advantage which accounts for the few killed and wounded on our side, compared with 

the enemy, who suffered terribly. The Eleventh Regiment here behaved like old veterans, and gave renewed proof of their 

fighting qualities, driving an enemy greatly their superior in numbers to the very ground occupied in the morning.11

Col. Clark: [I] found that Colonel Lawther had indiscreetly attacked a very heavy force of the enemy posted behind some 

stone fencing which ran at right angles to the road and afforded complete protection against small-arms. He was driven 

back and in his turn assailed by the enemy, when I arrived with Greene’s regiment... Owing to the difficulties of crossing 

at the ford Greene’s regiment fought at great odds unsupported, but they contested every inch of ground with stubbornness 

until the arrival of Wood’s battalion, when the enemy gave way, but receiving re-enforcements drove us again to our original 

position. We were almost out of ammunition and the day seemed lost, but Kitchen’s regiment, including Davies’ battalion 

(Davies’ absence from his regiment not accounted for), came up at this moment in as gallant style as veteran infantry and 

turned the tide of success, the enemy breaking and falling back toward his first position. A part of Shelby’s division (Gordon’s regiment, I believe) joined on the left of Kitchen and pushed hotly after the enemy, who, taking position behind the rock 

fencing spoken of, stubbornly contested the advance of Marmaduke’s and Shelby’s divisions...12
76

Map 28.
77

28. Blunt’s Attack

Maj. Gen. Blunt spent the previous night in Independence, urging Maj. Gen. Curtis to defend on the Little Blue River. 

However, Curtis was still constrained by the Kansas Militia’s refusal to move east of the Big Blue River. Sometime earlier 

that morning, Curtis relented and allowed Blunt to move back to the Little Blue River with his volunteer units. At about 

0900, Blunt departed Independence and joined with Moonlight near the Salem Church. By 1100, Blunt had formed his division along the ridge line overlooking the Little Blue River valley. He saw Shelby’s Division coming up behind Marmaduke’s 

Division. Blunt observed an opportunity to attack Shelby’s lead brigade before Price could coordinate the movement of the 

two divisions. He ordered the attack and forced Shelby back about a half mile. It appears that Marmaduke’s division, weary 

from the morning fight and out of ammunition, allowed Shelby to bear the brunt of the fight. Shelby continued to push units 

across the river and eventually his large division started to overlap both Union flanks. Blunt had approximately 2,800 men 

fighting as dismounted cavalry with every fourth man holding a horse and about 2,100 on the firing line. Shelby had approximately 3,000 mounted infantry fighting dismounted. He may have had as many as 2,800 men on the firing line with only a 

few hundred guards remaining with the horses on the east side of the river. Additionally, several hundred of Marmaduke’s 

men may have supported the attack. Sometime after 1200, the Union attack culminated and Blunt slowly pulled back to the 

ridge. He established his line near the church. The Confederates continued to test the Union defensive line. Blunt’s small 

division had the advantage of holding the high ground and equally important had 15 artillery pieces, whereas Shelby had 

only four guns. The heavy Union artillery fire momentarily halted the Southern advance.

Maj. Gen. Blunt: Early on the morning of the 21st, I was directed to move with all the volunteer force back to the Little 

Blue, and just as the command had commenced to move I received a dispatch from Colonel Moonlight informing me that 

the enemy were advancing in force; that he had burned the bridge, and was engaging their advance. The command was now 

pressed forward as rapidly as possible, but on arriving upon the field I found that the small force under Colonel Moonlight, 

although making a stubborn resistance, had been forced back by superior numbers, and we had lost the strong position on 

the west side of the Little Blue, before alluded to, and where I had hoped to have held Price in check until General Rosecrans’ forces came up on his rear, had circumstances have permitted me to remain there, as I had suggested the day previous. 

As soon as the troops could be got into position, a gallant attempt was made to push back the enemy and retake the ground 

we had lost, when their line was driven back nearly a mile, but the vastly superior numbers of the enemy enabling them to 

push forward heavy flanking columns on my right and left, compelled me to fall back.13

Brig. Gen. Thompson: On the 21st we moved in the center of the column, Marmaduke’s division in front. On approaching 

the Little Blue River the enemy was found in position to dispute our passage. We were ordered to the left of Marmaduke’s 

division, and having dismounted we soon forced the crossing in our front, and following the enemy from position to position, 

several of which were very strong and well defended, we drove him toward the town of Independence. I met General Marmaduke several times during this day’s fighting, but his troops were so far to our right that I made no movement in immediate 

co-operation with them.14
78

Map 29.
79

29. Shelby’s Attack

Blunt established his defensive line near the church. On the Confederate side, Price left the tactical control of the fighting 

to Shelby. Shelby advanced Thompson’s veteran brigade up the slope toward the church but Union artillery fire stalled the 

attack. Shelby extended his line to the north with Col. Jackman’s Brigade. Jackman’s men were mostly recent recruits and 

failed to aggressively advance against the Union line. However, Jackman did send one mounted regiment west on the lower 

ford road attempting to outflank the Union line. At about 1300, Maj. Gen. Curtis arrived on the battlefield. He noted the Confederate move around the Union flank and shifted McLain’s Battery, plus two mountain howitzers, to protect the flank.15 The 

artillery slowed the Confederate flanking maneuver. However, the reduced artillery fire against the main Confederate attack, 

allowed Shelby to push more units forward in the center and on both flanks. In time, the Confederates occupied the ground 

around the Lawson Moore House and brought effective fire against McLain’s Battery. Maj. Robert Hunt, Blunt’s artillery 

chief, shifted two more howitzers from the 11th Kansas Battery to support McLain’s Battery. The additional guns stabilized 

the situation on the Union north flank but again lessened the fire against the Confederate main attack in the center. Shelby 

exploited the opportunity and pressed the main attack forward. He also maneuvered units to threaten the Union southern 

flank. Sometime after 1400, Curtis and Blunt made the mutual decision to withdraw. In the confusion, the Kansas cavalry 

on the northern flank left McLain’s Battery unsupported and the Confederates threatened to capture the battery. Moonlight’s 

11th Kansas, which had started withdrawing, turned and launched a mounted charge against the Confederates and bought 

time for the guns to withdraw. During the withdrawal towards Independence, Blunt twice ordered the men to dismount and 

delay the Confederate advance. By 1600, the Union troops were back in Independence.

Captain Palmer: The rebel advance was within 400 or 500 yards of the battery. Quick work must be done to save the guns, 

worth a thousand men to us. Colonel Moonlight. . . came galloping down the line to my company. . . . He ordered me to 

countermarch and charge the enemy with my eighty-eight men in a column of eight front. We charged down the road, passing 

the Little Blue church... I saw ahead of me a brick house, just where the road turned from a northerly course straight east, a 

stone fence dead ahead of us... The rebel cavalry fell back, but a line of infantry occupied the house and were down behind 

the fence. . . As we reached the brow of the hill, a thought flashed through my mind that the first line, in which I was riding, 

with seven soldiers to my left, would be shot as soon as we came in sight. I clutched the pommel of my saddle and threw 

myself almost flat on the horse. The volley of bullets came as I expected. I felt my horse going down, swung my feet clear of 

the stirrups, and fell on my horse’s neck, unhurt.16

Brig. Gen. Shelby: I dismounted my entire command, except Lieutenant-Colonel Nichols’ regiment, of Jackman’ brigade, 

and crossed Little Blue by wading... I threw forward Thompson’s brigade swiftly on the left, Jackman’s supporting, and the 

fight opened fast and furious. The enemy held a strong position behind hastily constructed works of logs and earth, stone 

fences, and deep hollows and ravines. My division fought splendidly. From stand to stand the Federals were driven... Sending the cavalry regiment of Lieutenant-Colonel Nichols upon their left flank, which made a brilliant and desperate charge, 

and pressing forward immediately in front, the enemy was driven clearly from the field.17
80

Map 30.
81

30. Price’s Plan18

The night of 21 October, Maj. Gen. Price’s Army of the Missouri camped in and around Independence. The Confederates were in a precarious position. Maj. Gen. Curtis’ Army of the Border was heavily entrenched on the west bank of the Big 

Blue River and blocked the main roads leading into Kansas City. The Kansas troops had fought hard at Lexington, again at 

the Little Blue River and would most likely fight hard to hold the line at the Big Blue River. Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton’s 

Provisional Cavalry Division, the Army of the Department of Missouri, was closing in on the rear of the Confederate Army. 

To date, Pleasonton’s cavalrymen had executed a cautious pursuit and not demonstrated an overly aggressive willingness 

to close with the Confederates. Maj. Gen. A.J. Smith’s XVI Corps was well behind the Union cavalry and presented no immediate danger. Price may have viewed the Missouri troops as a manageable threat and concentrated his efforts against the 

Union troops blocking his move into Kansas. Price had no intention of advancing down the Kansas City Road into Curtis’ 

entrenchments but instead was “determined to advance on the Santa Fe road.”19 He ordered Shelby to feint against the main 

crossing and then force a crossing south of the Kansas City Road. Fagan’s Division escorted the wagon train with orders to 

advance toward Little Santa Fe. Finally, Marmaduke’s Division constituted the rear guard with orders to delay Maj. Gen. 

Pleasonton’s Division. Historians can only speculate at Price’s intent for the plan of attack. Price probably intended to turn 

southwest toward Kansas with Shelby penetrating Curtis’ defensive line. After creating a hole in the Union line, Marmaduke 

would delay the Union pursuit while Shelby held the northern shoulder of the penetration. Simultaneously, Fagan and the 

wagon train would move to the southwest and continue the retreat. On the other hand, he might have envisioned the opportunity to achieve a larger goal. Price may have planned to take advantage of interior lines of operation to hold Pleasonton 

at the Big Blue River while maneuvering against the outflanked Army of the Border. A defeat of Curtis’ Army would have 

allowed Price to turn his full force against Pleasonton before XVI Corps arrived on the field. A Confederate victory would 

have provided the opportunity to continue the retreat into an almost defenseless Kansas. He could have then fulfilled a 

portion of his orders to “make your retreat through Kansas... sweeping that country of its mules, horses, cattle, and military 

supplies of all kinds.” 20 Albert Castel, Price’s biographer, provided another possible explanation. He stated, “quite likely he 

[Price] had not yet made up his mind on the matter but was waiting for developments to clarify the situation.”21

Senator Lane:22 We learned from prisoners and other sources that Price with his entire army, estimated at 35,000 men, was 

upon us, intent upon the capture of Kansas City and Leavenworth, and the devastation of our State.23

Maj. Gen. Price: I encamped that night in Independence, having marched twenty-six miles, the troops being engaged with 

the enemy most of the time and driving them before them... On the morning of the 22nd I left Independence. The enemy had 

fallen back to Big Blue, on the Kansas City road, to a position strong by nature and strengthened by fortifications, upon 

which all their art had been exhausted, and where they had been joined by General Curtis and his forces, thus increasing 

Blunt’s army to between 6,000 and 8,000 men. Receiving this information I determined to advance on the Santa Fe road 

which had been obstructed by felling trees.24
82

Map 31.
83

31. The Big Blue River25

On the night of 21 October, Maj. Gen. Blunt left a small security force in contact with the Rebels and withdrew the 

majority of his forces to the defensive line on the Big Blue River. Maj. Gen. Curtis positioned the Army of the Border along 

the river and occupied every known ford from its mouth to the vicinity of Hickman’s Mill, a distance of about 15 miles. His 

intent was to trap and destroy the Confederate Army between his Army and Pleasonton’s pursuing forces. He expected the 

Confederates to continue their advance along the Kansas City road. Curtis established his main defensive position blocking 

the Kansas City Road with the majority of Maj. Gen. Deitzler’s Kansas State Militia (KSM) and Col. Blair’s 3d Brigade of 

Blunt’s Division. Curtis obstructed the crossing site and heavily fortified the high ground overlooking the crossing. Curtis 

sent Blunt’s Provisional Cavalry Division south to guard the other known crossing sites and prevent a Confederate flanking 

movement. Blunt’s units did not get into position until the morning of the 22d. Far to the south at Russell’s Ford, Brig. Gen. 

Melvin Grant commanded a detachment of the KSM guarding the Army’s right flank.26 About 0900, Brig. Gen. Shelby 

initiated his attack on Curtis’ line. Col. Jackman’s Brigade cautiously advanced against the Union skirmish line, which was 

covering the approaches to the main crossings. Curtis quickly realized Jackman’s attack was nothing more than a feint and 

soon after 0900 sent a message to Brig. Gen. Grant at Russell’s Ford, “Price is making very feeble demonstrations in front. 

Look out for your position. Send scouts on road to Pleasant Hill and also toward Independence, to see if Price is moving toward my flank. Send me reports every 30 minutes.”27 Simultaneously, Shelby probed to the south with Thompson’s Brigade 

searching for an alternate crossing. Around 1100, he made the decision to force a crossing at Byram’s Ford. 

Maj. Gen. Curtis: At the close of the contest of the 21st, near Independence, I ordered all of General Blunt’s and detached 

troops to move back and join the forces at the Big Blue... I divided the forces, distributing them so as to form a line more or 

less continuous, according to danger from the Missouri River, to the crossing of the Blue, near Hickman Mills, a distance 

of fifteen or sixteen miles. Roads on the west side were convenient for concentrating these forces, and with the immense 

display of abatis and other field-works... I was ready to receive the enemy on the 22d. I assigned General Blunt to the command of the right wing, including all south of the road, and to General Deitzler the left wing, which includes all north of it. 

Militia, volunteers, artillery... amounting, altogether, to about 15,000, were thus arranged, resolved to check or defeat the 

long continued progress of Price’s army of 30,000... On my arrival at the Big Blue I telegraphed you as to my conflict at 

the Little Blue and my designs for the 22d, and also telegraphed General Rosecrans as follows:... I am confident I can stop 

Price at this crossing, and hope you will come up in his rear and left... He cannot get out by Hickman Mills. If you can get 

that position we will bag Price, if I succeed, as I hope to do. My losses have been considerable, but my troops are in good 

order, and ready to make a stand at this place.28

Brig. Gen. Shelby: I ordered Colonel Jackman on the morning of the 22d to move out on the Kansas City road and engage 

the enemy skirmishing with my pickets; then crossing the Big Blue and facing the enemy on the right, engaged them to cover 

the crossing and passing of the train. Sending General Thompson with his entire brigade, expect Gordon’s regiment, to force 

the Federals back to Westport.29
84

Map 32.
85

32. Confederates Cross the Big Blue30

On the morning of 22 October, Col. Jennison’s reinforced brigade defended the Byram’s Ford crossing of the Big Blue 

River. The night before, the 4th KSM (part of Brig. Gen. Melvin Grant’s detachment) blocked the ford with felled trees 

and obstructions along the banks. Jennison’s brigade arrived at about 0900 and immediately went to work to challenge any 

Confederate passage over river. He sent a mounted detachment to the east side of the river to provide early warning and then 

arrayed his brigade in depth to defend the crossing. Jennison positioned one section of mountain howitzers at the ford along 

with strong skirmish line of dismounted cavalrymen and placed the balance of the brigade on the high ground to the west. 

At about 1100, his screen line on the east side of the river identified the oncoming Confederates and the Union troops braced 

for the attack. Over a period of three hours, Thompson’s Brigade made repeated unsuccessful attacks to force a crossing. 

At about 1500, the Confederates finally forced Jennison to fall back when they outflanked the Union defenses by crossing a 

unit over nearby Hinkle’s Ford, a local farmer’s crossing. The Union commanders had not known about Hinkle’s Ford and 

had not defended the crossing. During the fight, Maj. Gen. Blunt rushed Moonlight’s brigade to the area to support Jennison. 

However, Moonlight failed to arrive in time to support the defense. Blunt withdrew both brigades towards Westport to establish a new defensive line. Shelby sent Thompson’s brigade to pursue the retreating Union forces and to protect the north 

flank of the Confederate penetration.

Col. Charles Jennison: On the morning of the 22d I was ordered with the brigade to Byram’s Crossing of the Big Blue, 

some eight miles from its encampment of the night previous. Arriving there we were joined by a detachment of Kansas State 

Militia, of Colonel [McLain’s?] command, which rendered valuable assistance in obstructing the ford of the river by felling 

timber, &c. About 11 a. m. the enemy’s advance made its appearance at the ford, attacking our outposts and attempting to 

force a crossing. The ford was so effectually obstructed, however, and in its condition wholly impassable for artillery, that 

for some hours little progress was made, the attacking party being repulsed each time it appeared in the front, which was 

defended by a strong skirmish line, securely posted, and one section of howitzer battery... At this point the First Brigade 

held the enemy effectually in check, notwithstanding his great superiority of numbers, until about 3 p. m., when it became 

evident that he had succeeded in crossing considerable bodies, both above and below, and was rapidly flanking us both on 

the right and left. Upon this intelligence it was determined to retire in the direction of Westport or Kansas City, toward which 

it was evident the efforts of the enemy were directed. Our lines at the ford having been forced back, the rebels succeeded in 

crossing a considerable force of dismounted cavalry, a portion of which was employed in removing obstructions in the river, 

while the others were deployed on either side of the road, and advanced toward us.31

Brig. Gen. M. Jeff Thompson: We soon reached the point indicated and found that the enemy had obstructed the crossing 

by felling trees, and were disposed to dispute our passage. A portion of the brigade were dismounted, and in the face of the 

enemy waded the stream and made a lodgment upon the west bank. Others soon followed, and we drove the enemy so fast 

that the axes they had used to fell the trees were left by them, and they were speedily put to use in opening a road for our 

artillery and the train to cross.32
86

Map 33.
87

33. Melvin Grant’s Dilemma

South of Byram’s Ford, Brig. Gen. Melvin Grant, commanding the KSM brigade at Russell’s Ford, acted in accordance 

with his orders and sent scouting parties out to determine Price’s intentions. Unfortunately, he dispersed and lost control of 

his command in the execution of those orders. Later in the day, he learned of the heavy fighting at Byram’s Ford and tried 

to send units to support Jennison’s Brigade. Regrettably for Grant, Brig. Gen. Thompson had sent Col. Frank Gordon’s 

5th Missouri (C.S.A.) to guard the Confederate left flank and to scout for a river crossing between Byram’s and Russell’s 

Fords. This unit scattered Grant’s piecemeal efforts to reinforce Byram’s Ford. Over time, Grant recognized that his command was in danger of being cut off from other Union forces to the north. Therefore, he decided there was insufficient time 

to concentrate his scattered brigade and sent orders for all units to independently move toward Westport. Sometime after 

1500, Col. Jackman’s Brigade rejoined Shelby’s Division at Byram’s Ford. Shelby was unaware of the disorganized state 

of Grant’s command and assumed a large Union force blocked the route to Little Santa Fe. He believed Grant’s force posed 

a significant threat to the Confederate wagon train and ordered Jackman’s Brigade south to secure the southern flank of the 

bridgehead and open the road to the south. Shelby also ordered Thompson to fall back from Westport and reinforce the attack to the south. Jackman’s Brigade and Grant’s forces collided at Mockbee’s Farm. 

Maj. Gen. Deitzler: He (Jennison) was re-enforced by a portion of the militia which had become detached from General 

Grant’s command at Hickman Mills. A strong detachment of the enemy moved up the Blue under cover of the timber and 

attacked General Grant, throwing his command into some confusion.33

Brig. Gen. Shelby: I held Gordon to watch the left, now being demonstrated upon, until Jackman came up... Gordon also 

soon became engaged with forces outnumbering him three to one but fought them manfully until Jackman came up... I sent 

orders to Thompson to hurry to my assistance.34
88

Map 34.
89

34. The Fight at Mockbee Farm35

Grant’s force consisted of several Kansas Militia regiments including one howitzer of the Topeka Battery. However, 

Grant’s brigade moved back to Westport as individual regiments and not as a cohesive brigade. It was the 2d Kansas State 

Militia Regiment and the lone artillery piece that found Col. Gordon’s 5th Missouri (C.S.A.) blocking the road at Mockbee 

Farm. Several other Kansas militia detachments appear to have been in the area but they did not participate in the fighting. 

The 2d KSM, about 300 men, formed a line blocking the road. The Kansas militia fought hard, defeating two attacks from 

Gordon’s regiment and the lead elements of Jackman’s Brigade. Quartermaster Samuel Reader stated the fighting was, 

“Hot enough for anybody.”36 Nevertheless, the Confederate brigade regrouped and Quartermaster Reader saw, “the rebels, 

coming in a long line, yelling.”37 The third Confederate charge overran the Kansas regiment. Union losses were 30 killed, 

50 wounded, 102 captured and the loss of the lone howitzer. Among the captured was Samuel Reader. Grant’s remaining 

Kansas militia forces retreated toward Olathe, Kansas. The Confederates had broken Curtis’s defensive line and opened the 

road to Little Santa Fe. 

First Sergt. Bonebrake:38 We waited until about noon and no sign of Price’s train (the unit’s morning recon to Hickman’s 

Mill). We started on our return to Hickman Mills Crossing, where we met an order to return to Westport. We were hardly 

on the move when we met a messenger on a foaming horse, saying Shelby had crossed at a lower ford and would cut us off 

unless we hastened. We remounted and put our horses in a gallop. When we passed from the valley to the highland, we saw 

coming from the northeast a long line of cavalry, which proved to be Shelby’s men. We were completely cut off from Westport. 

We halted opposite the farmhouse. On our right was an open field. We formed in line of battle in the field, with the cannon in 

the public road. The long line of the enemy marched up to our front and formed in line. The contest was about to commence 

between a brigade of soldiers, Shelby’s men, the flower of the Confederate Western Army, and about 300 Militia, composed 

of lawyers, doctors, preachers, farmers, and others, some of whom had never fired a gun... The musketry fire was opened 

all along the line. Shelby attempted to flank our position by sending a body of troops to our left. This maneuver was checked 

by a free discharge of canister shot. After the battle had been on about a half an hour, we noticed by the formation and the 

bugle calls that the enemy were preparing to charge. Up to this there was but little damage. With the usual “Rebel yell,” the 

charge came, and the enemy rode right over us. At the opening of the fight we were dismounted and our horses were held in 

the rear. We scattered like sheep, every man for himself, each running for his horse.39

Col. Jackman: Soon after crossing over the Big Blue I overtook and reported to General Shelby. I was directed by the 

general to move forward rapidly to the assistance of Colonel Gordon, who was being pressed by the enemy. I moved briskly 

across the prairie and soon came in sight of this force... The enemy having fallen back to the cover of some small timber and 

in the rear their artillery, which was playing upon us, I ordered a charge and the whole command swept forward in gallant 

style, driving the Federals, utterly routed and demoralized, from their shelter. Our losses during the day was slight... Lieut. 

Col. Nichols and Schnable had their horses killed. My horse was severely wounded.40
90

Map 35.
91

35. The Battle of Independence

On 20 October, Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton assumed command of the Provisional Cavalry Division near Dunksburg, 

Missouri. Prior to the 20th, the division tentatively pursued the Confederates. Earlier, Brig. Gen. Sanborn (acting division 

commander) had decided not to pressure the slow moving Rebels. He recognized that Curtis needed time to mobilize the 

Kansas Militia and the XVI Corps needed the opportunity to catch up. However, the situation changed after the Battle of 

Lexington. Pleasonton identified the need to rapidly close on the Confederates and cooperate with Curtis who was entrenched along the Big Blue River. The next day, the division passed through Lexington and then crossed over the Little 

Blue River on the 22d. Brig. Gen. John McNeil’s brigade was in the lead as it approached Independence. Maj. Gen. Fagan 

was unprepared for the rapid advance of the Union cavalry. McNeil’s men charged into the town and mauled a brigade of 

Fagan’s division. Pleasonton committed Sanborn’s Brigade to support McNeil and by late afternoon, the Union troops had 

pushed through Independence. The Union drive slowed when it came up against Marmaduke’s Division on the west side 

of the town. Marmaduke’s mission was to hold Pleasonton until the Confederate Army pushed aside Curtis’s forces and 

the wagon train moved out of harm’s way. Pleasonton committed Brig. Gen. Egbert Brown’s and Col. Edward Winslow’s 

Brigades into the pursuit. Brown pushed the Confederates southwest until dark and then Winslow’s veteran brigade passed 

through and continued the pursuit until 2230. One of Marmaduke’s brigade commanders stated it was “a long and never to 

be forgotten night” and that “our loss was heavy.”41 Marmaduke’s Division was exhausted and hit hard. Nevertheless, it had 

delayed the Union advance and allowed the wagon train to move over the Big Blue River. On the Union side, Pleasonton 

was concerned that he had heard nothing from Curtis. He was unsure if Curtis’ Army had survived the day of fighting. He 

sent a request to Rosecrans and asked that Smith’s infantry (XVI Corps) be sent to his support instead of marching toward 

Hickman Mills. Pleasonton intended to continue the pursuit at daylight and wanted the Missouri formations concentrated 

and in supporting distance of each other.

Maj. Gen. Pleasonton: On the 22d of October my advance came up with the enemy’s rear guard at the little blue. The 

bridge was destroyed over that stream, but by means of a temporary bridge, hastily constructed, and a ford..., the command 

was soon crossed. McNeil’s brigade had the advance, and soon engaged the enemy, followed by Sanborn’s brigade, and 

this force soon pressed them back upon Independence, and beyond that town, where by a vigorous charge... two guns were 

captured from the enemy. The pursuit was continued, and Brown’s and Winslow’s brigades coming up they were thrown to 

the front... [I] determined to push them all night.42

Brig. Gen. Cabell: Early on the morning of the 22d, I was ordered to move back and attack the enemy, who had driven in 

our pickets. I drove him back, and left him in full retreat. I returned to Independence and had a heavy skirmish with a column 

of the enemy... I repulsed them and moved my command at once, in order to get through the city before another attack could 

be made on me. Just as I was coming out of the city the enemy struck me in the flank, charging down several streets, and cut 

off 200 or 300 of my men and captured two pieces of artillery. I escaped by jumping over a piece of artillery and running 

through the passage of a double log cabin and jumping the yard fence... I rode to my command, which was then in the road, 

faced them to the rear, checked and drove the enemy, enabling my scattered men to rejoin their regiments.43
92

Map 36.
93

36. The Night before Westport

On 21 October, Price may have held some hope of seizing Kansas City. However, he probably reassessed his options 

after the heavy fighting on the 22nd. Curtis’ Army of the Border had not collapsed after the Confederates turned the Union 

flank at Byram’s Ford and Pleasonton’s Division had shown a level of aggressiveness previously unseen. Fagan’s best brigade had sustained heavy casualties in the fighting, and the wagon train barely escaped to the west side of the Big Blue River. Therefore, Price decided his primary goal was the safety of his wagon train currently camped in the vicinity of Byram’s 

Ford. He ordered the train to move at daylight toward Hickman Mills and then on to Little Santa Fe. Two full brigades 

escorted the train. It was a clear indication that the Army would move southwest into Kansas and not northwest toward 

Fort Leavenworth. Price positioned Marmaduke at Byram’s Ford with orders to delay Pleasonton’s advance. He directed 

Shelby and Fagan, camped near Mockbee Farm, to move their divisions toward Westport at dawn and attack Curtis. Again, 

historians can only speculate at Price’s intent for the attack. Most of Fagan’s division moved to protect Marmaduke’s north 

flank and Shelby’s small division lacked the combat power to defeat Curtis’s Army. More than likely it was nothing more 

than a spoiling attack to protect Marmaduke’s rear and cover the move of the wagon train to the south. To the north, Curtis 

also reassessed the developing situation. His initial orders focused on establishing a new defensive line. However, sometime 

during the night he decided to attack at dawn. He ordered Blunt’s division to take position along Brush Creek and throughout 

the night, his staff worked to reposition Deitzler’s Kansas militia to support a Federal attack. To the east, Pleasonton was 

unsure of Curtis’ situation but was determined to renew the pursuit at daylight. Pleasonton recognized that the diversion of 

the XVI Corps to Independence, left the Confederate escape to the south uncovered. Therefore, he ordered McNeil to move 

south through the night and take position at Hickman Mills to block any attempt by the Confederates to move south.

Maj. Gen. Curtis: Night closing the battle..., I ordered my troops under cover of the darkness to concentrate within the 

lines of fieldworks that inclosed Kansas City... I replenished exhausted stores and secured my weary soldiers a few hours’ 

repose... But in view of to-morrow my officers were put to a new test of their powers of endurance. The enemy had halted 

south of Westport..., where he could either turn my new right flank, which rested on Turkey Creek, or attack in front at his 

leisure. I therefore determined to renew the offensive on his own grounds with my main force... [A] scout from his cavalry 

advance reported General Pleasonton at Independence... I directed Generals Blunt and Deitzler to personally supervise 

preparations and have the troops to commence moving at 3 o’clock in the morning, and all of my staff not then engaged 

locating the troops for the night were also directed to assist in notifying and replenishing the militia for the proposed attack 

of the enemy at daylight the next morning... The officers all heartily united and labored most of the night in efforts to have 

everything ready for a united, powerful attack on the rebel camp at daylight.44

Maj. Gen. Price: On the morning of the 23d I took up my line of march, and in a short time discovered the enemy in position on the prairie. The train had been sent forward on the Fort Scott road. I had instructed Major-General Marmaduke to 

resist the advance of the enemy, who was in his rear... Brigadier-General Shelby immediately attacked the enemy, assisted 

by Major-General Fagan with two brigades of Arkansas troops.45
94

Map 37.
95

37. Daylight at Westport

Daylight found the three armies only partially prepared for battle. Most of Maj. Gen. Curtis’ Army of the Border was 

still on the road to Westport and only Blunt’s cavalry division was prepared to attack. To the east, Maj. Gen. Pleasonton’s 

cavalry division was the only element of the Army of the Department of Missouri available for the fight. The XVI Infantry 

Corps would not reach the Big Blue River until that evening. His own plan to attack at daylight failed to materialize. Additionally, his bold attempt to cut off the Confederate escape to the south was in jeopardy when McNeil stopped to rest his 

brigade several miles short of his planned objective. Price’s Army of Missouri also struggled to meet the order to attack at 

daylight. Marmaduke’s Division at Byram’s Ford was ready for battle. However, Shelby was slow and did not depart his 

camp until “about 8 o’clock” and Fagan’s Division did not move until after 0900.46 Blunt decided not to wait for the Union 

Army to concentrate. Instead, he opted for a spoiling attack to buy time for the Kansas troops to get into position. Sometime 

after daylight, his units crossed over Brush Creek and moved up the bluff. He then formed a line of battle on the plateau and 

advanced south toward the Wornall House and the opening shots of the day occurred somewhere north of the house. Shelby 

and Fagan steadily pushed Blunt’s small Union division back toward Westport. Shelby reported that he’d forced the Union 

troops back, “Inch by inch and foot by foot, they gave way before my steady onset. Regiment met regiment and opposing 

batteries draped the scene in clouds of dense and sable smoke.”47 Blunt made one final stand at the timber line on the south 

side of Brush Creek. The fighting lasted a little more than an hour and by 0930 Blunt had pulled back to the north side of 

Brush Creek. There he joined with the arriving Kansas Militia. Shelby was unable to follow up on his success due to a lack 

of ammunition and took up defensive positions along the stone fence at the top of the bluff. Col. Thompson, his lead brigade 

commander, was disappointed and stated, “[if I had not] had to wait for more ammunition, I believe that I could have taken 

Westport.”48 Meanwhile to the east, at Byram’s Ford, Pleasonton initiated his attack at about 0900. 

Col. Jackman: The morning of the 23d... my command, by direction of Brigadier-General Shelby, was moved out in line of 

battle in concert with General Thompson’s to meet the enemy advancing from Westport. A severe fight soon ensued, which 

resulted in a temporary success to him. Our forces, however, soon rallied, and turning drove him from the field.49

Maj. Gen. Blunt: All of the night of the 22d was occupied in getting ammunition and subsistence to my command, with 

the view of commencing the attack upon the enemy at daylight... Daylight on the morning of the 23rd revealed the enemy 

in force on the open prairie directly south of Westport and about two miles distant. [At]daylight my whole command was in 

motion, moving in column through Westport and across Brush Creek, and soon after sunrise the First, Second, and Fourth 

Brigades were deployed into line of battle on the south side of the timber skirting Brush Creek, where Shelby’s division, of 

Price’s army, was advancing upon my line. Skirmishers were thrown forward and the engagement with small-arms and artillery soon became general. My advance line being hard pressed I ordered Colonel C. W. Blair to advance with the Sixth and 

Tenth Regiments State Militia, to support the right of my line and guard my right flank, which order was executed with great 

promptness. Time being required to get the militia arriving from Kansas City dismounted and in position, and the consent in 

front being severe and unequal, I directed my advance line to fall back to the north side of Brush Creek.50
96

Map 38.
97

38. The Second Fight at Byram’s Ford51

Maj. Gen. Marmaduke defended the ford with Freeman’s Brigade forward on the river’s west bank, and Clark’s Brigade 

deployed on the high ground, known as Potato Hill, to the west of the ford. The division had not pulled back to the west 

side of the river until 0200 that morning and had little time to prepare defenses. However, the Confederates did extend and 

improve the abattis at the ford and along the banks. They also erected hasty fortifications with “piles of rails.”52 Maj. Gen. 

Pleasonton had three of his cavalry brigades available for the attack. His intent was to force a crossing as quickly as possible 

so that he could unite with Curtis’ force near Westport. The night of 22 October, Pleasonton ordered Brig. Gen. Brown’s 

Brigade to pass through Winslow’s Brigade and to execute an assault on Byram’s Ford “at daybreak.” However, Brown 

had difficulty throughout the night in replenishing his ammunition and the narrow road made it difficult to pass Winslow. 

Consequently, it was approximately 0815 before Brown was ready to initiate the attack. Pleasonton rode forward and was 

furious that no attack had been made. He arrested Brown and put Col. John Philips in charge of the brigade. He then directed 

Winslow to take tactical control of the crossing with his and Philips’ Brigade. Pleasonton and most of the artillery and the 

division reserve (Sanborn’s Brigade) remained on the high ground east of the ford. Around 0900, the artillery opened fire 

on the Confederate artillery and on the dismounted cavalry defending on the riverbank. Philips dismounted the 7th Missouri 

State Militia and advanced toward the river to the south of the ford. Winslow’s Brigade supported the attack with a heavy 

skirmish line north of the ford. Initially, Confederate fire stopped both brigades from pushing over the river. At about 300 

yards north of the ford, a battalion of the 4th Iowa Cavalry found a covered route down a ravine and crossed to the west 

bank. The Iowa troopers poured an enfilading fire into Freeman’s Brigade. The success north of the ford presented Philips 

with the opportunity to renew the attack south of the ford. He reformed his brigade and its second attack cleared the Confederates from the west bank. Marmaduke ordered his forward brigade to withdraw and reform behind the Confederate line 

on Potato Hill. The Federals had a foothold but they still needed to sweep the Southerners from the hill in order to move to 

the aid of Curtis’ Army of the Border.

Maj. Gen. Pleasonton: The Brigadier General E.B. Brown was ordered to move his brigade forward and attack the enemy 

at daybreak and keep pressing him vigorously, as we would be supported. Not finding any attack being made I went to the 

front and found Brown’s brigade on the road in no proper condition for attacking, nor were any preparations being made to 

do so, as far as I could perceive. Colonel Philips, of the Seventh Missouri State Militia, was therefore placed in command of 

the brigade, and this brigade, with Winslow’s, were ordered immediately into action, with Sanborn’s brigade supporting.53

Capt. Johnson:54 I was ordered to form the regiment at sunrise on the bank of Big Blue River as infantry. After being in 

position about half an hour the enemy appeared in sight and opened fire on us from small-arms, compelling us, owing to the 

formation of the creek, to leave our position, they being enabled to fire on us from the right flank and rear. We fell back one 

mile and a half in good order to a skirt of timber at the edge of a small prairie.55
98

Map 39.
99

39. Philips’ Charge

Philips’ Brigade crossed over the river and formed a strong skirmish line south of the road. Pleasonton had seized the 

west bank but still faced the formidable task of taking Potato Hill. On the range of hills was Marmaduke’s second brigade 

commanded by Brig. Gen. John Clark.56 Clark’s Brigade was larger than Freeman’s and composed of veteran troops. He 

formed the brigade with a reinforced skirmish line along a rocky escarpment and positioned the main line on top of the ridge 

line. On the ridge line, Clark placed a battery on the south end of the line and another near the center of the line. Just below 

the top of the ridge and along the road, there was a log house occupied by Rebel sharp shooters. Col. Winslow needed time 

to bring his brigade online with Philip’s men. He ordered Philips to mount his brigade and charge the hill. The hasty attack 

might not break the Confederate line but at a minimum, it would cover the deployment of Winslow’s Brigade over the ford. 

Philips reasoned, “The situation of the ground was such as to confine the movements of the cavalry to the road, which rendered the immediate execution of this order, in any other formation than that of column of fours, an impossibility.”57 Philips 

kept most of his brigade dismounted to provide covering fire while the 1st MSM conducted a mounted charge up the road in 

a column of fours. The cavalry charged up the road twice but each time, according to the Official Record, “A storm of bullets 

and shell” defeated their efforts.58 During the attacks, Winslow moved his brigade over the river and formed a dismounted 

line north of the road and decided a coordinated attack by both brigades was needed to break the Confederate line. 

Col. Philips:59 Pleasonton reprimanded Brown severely for not attacking sooner. Arrested him and sent him to rear of brigade. Put me in command of brigade. Ordered me to press vigorously forward, charge enemy and drive him from the river. 

The 7th thrown into action. 4th urged to ford mounted. Cannonading heavy. Shells falling all around me. Lt. Combs, “C” 

Co., shot in bowels, dying. Pressed 4th across, brought up 1st. Fighting fierce. Tried to charge hill with 1st, couldn’t make 

it. Pleasonton, it seemed, wanted to get me killed and the Missouri State Militia destroyed.60

Brig. Gen. Clark: Freeman’s brigade, met him first, my brigade being formed in his rear 500 yards. He contended manfully 

for the crossing of the Big Blue, but was forced back after having repulsed the enemy several times. Falling back through 

my brigade the enemy came upon me in the full enthusiasm of pursuit.61
100

Map 40.
101

40. Winslow’s First Assault62

At about 1100, Col. Winslow renewed the Federal attack. Philips’ Brigade was on the left and Winslow’s Brigade was 

on the right. The cavalry troopers in both brigades fought in a dismounted skirmish line with every fourth man holding the 

horses to the rear. The battle line may have extended slightly more than half of a mile along the open ground leading up to 

the rocky escarpment and the hill above. The Confederates held the high ground with good fields of fire and had a significant 

terrain advantage. However, the Union had a considerable numerical advantage. Winslow’s two brigades contained six regiments and a battalion with approximately 2,800 men. Clark’s Confederates had six regiments and one battalion with perhaps 

1,300 men altogether. A few of Freeman’s Brigade, numbering about 1,000 men, may have been in the battle line but most 

appear to have formed a mounted battle line behind Clark’s brigade. The Union advantage in numbers was further multiplied 

by better weapons resulting in a significant firepower advantage. Most of the Union soldiers had either repeating carbines 

or breech loading weapons. The Confederates may have had some breech loaders, but they had very few repeating weapons 

and most still had the slower firing muzzle-loading weapons. The two sides were evenly matched in quality. Winslow’s 

troops were experienced and battle-hardened volunteers. Philips’ Missouri State Militia troops were also steady and dependable troops with years of experience fighting guerillas. Likewise, Clark’s soldiers were some of the best in Price’s Army. 

The Union engaged in an intense firefight with the Confederates along the rocky escarpment and those on the hill. Then both 

Union brigades surged forward toward the escarpment. The Union line closed on the rocks and attempted to scamper up the 

12 to 20 foot ledge against severe fire. However, the assault failed and the Union line fell back to the meadow. During the 

fighting, Pleasonton brought Sanborn’s relatively fresh brigade forward to support the attack if needed.

Col. Winslow: I advanced upon the main position of the enemy. Their line was formed in the edge of a long piece of timber, 

just on the brow of the rising ground, while in front was a fine open stretch of clearing descending gradually to the river. 

When within 400 yards of the enemy I directed the line to advance rapidly and drive them from the timber. This was well 

commenced only, when the whole line gave way under the fire of the enemy and retreated in disorder to the reserve.63

Brig. Gen. Clark: My brigade contended nobly with the foe for two hours and strewed the open field in our front with his 

dead...64
102

Map 41.
103

41. Bloody Hill Taken

Winslow and Philips rallied their men and charged again. The second assault displaced the Confederate skirmish line 

from off the rocky escarpment and continued the advance up the hill. Marmaduke ordered his two artillery batteries to withdraw and reposition with Freeman’s reserve line. The sight of the artillery pulling back emboldened the Union soldiers and 

they continued to press forward. About this time, Rebel fire wounded Col. Winslow in the leg and his brigade attack hesitated briefly. However, Lieut. Col. Frederick Benteen, commanding the 10th Missouri (U.S.), rallied the men and continued up 

the hill. Several Union units claimed credit for breaking the Confederate line. Both the 10th Missouri (U.S.) and 4th Iowa 

claimed to have broken the line with their determined frontal assaults. It is more likely that the threat of Capt. Dee’s battalion 

of the 4th Iowa assaulting around the northern flank of the Confederate line and elements of Philips’ Brigade pushing up a 

wooded ravine on the Confederate southern flank, encouraged the Confederates to withdraw. At the top of hill, the Union 

brigades stopped to reform and bring forward their mounts. Meanwhile, Pleasonton brought forward the artillery and Brig. 

Gen. John Sanborn’s Brigade. Marmaduke made another brief stand with Freeman’s Brigade. However, the sight of fresh 

Union troops and artillery coming forward convinced him it was time to retreat. Pleasonton ordered Sanborn’s Brigade into 

a pursuit and chased the Confederates down the Harrisonville Road. By noon, Pleasonton had opened the way for the Army 

of the Department of Missouri to join forces with Curtis’ Army of the Border. All the participants, both north and south, 

agreed that it had been a fierce fight. Several of the Confederate regimental commanders stated so in their reports. Lieut. 

Col. J. F. Davies, Davies Missouri BN, recalled, “We had a short and bloody fight and were compelled to fall back.”65 Col. 

Robert Lawther, 10th Missouri (C.S.A.), remembered, “[We] fought them stubbornly.”66 Capt. Johnson of the 3d Missouri 

(C.S.A.) wrote, “We remained in our position until every gun was discharged and every cartridge expended.”67 The Union 

commander that day, Maj. Gen. Pleasonton, concurred with his opponents and insisted it was, “a very obstinate battle.”68 The 

slopes of Potato Hill and the meadow below it were strewn with Union dead and wounded. Philips’ and Winslow’s Brigades 

suffered approximately 200 casualties in the fight. Confederate casualties were probably about the same. In time, historians 

would change the name of the peacefully named Potato Hill to the more warlike Bloody Hill. 

Col. Winslow: I succeeded in reforming the broken detachment. I again ordered an advance with the Third and Fourth Iowa 

Regiments closely supporting. This time we reached the woods, and after a short, spirited resistance from the enemy drove 

them out of position with some loss.69

Brig. Gen. Clark: Our ammunition exhausted, we were forced to leave the field again to the enemy, our dead in his hands. 

The booming of Fagan’s and Shelby’s guns were heard all time in the direction of Westport heavily engaging the enemy.70
104

Map 42. 
105

42. Curtis at Brush Creek

Less than three miles to the west, at the same time as Pleasonton’s Division battled against Marmaduke’s Division for 

control of Bloody Hill, an equally severe fight raged between the other wing of Price’s Army and Curtis’ Army of the Border. 

Around 0730, Maj. Gen. Curtis arrived in Westport and soon after that met with Blunt to plan the next attack. As the morning went by, Maj. Gen. Dietzler’s KSM regiments and batteries arrived in the Westport area. At first, the militia units were 

absorbed into Blunt’s brigades but as time went by, they formed a separate command in the vicinity of Blair’s Brigade. Curtis, Blunt, and Dietzler spent the next couple of hours organizing the attack. Curtis also had the artillery keep up a constant 

bombardment of the Confederate line atop the bluff. Additionally, the Union Army skirmished aggressively to the front. Col. 

Ford, on the Army’s left flank, was notably insistent on applying pressure to the Confederate line. He reported, “I sent part 

of the Second Colorado Cavalry, on foot, as skirmishers through the woods. The 12th Kansas State Militia were also sent 

into the woods on foot, doing good service.”71 At about 1100, Curtis decided that with most of the KSM now available, the 

conditions were present for a coordinated attack. He sent out the orders and moved forward to personally lead the advance. 

On the Army’s west flank, Col. Blair believed, “the enemy was attempting to flank our position on the right” and he ordered 

his brigade to advance in order to force the Confederates back up the hill.72 Curtis acted to support Blair’s maneuver and 

immediately sent word for a general advance. Maj. Gen. Blunt controlled the left wing and Maj. Gen. Dietzler commanded 

the right wing. The somewhat disjointed Army attack passed over the creek but was unable to push all the way to the top of 

the high ground south of Brush Creek. On the high ground, Shelby’s Confederate line was firmly positioned behind a stone 

fence at the top of bluff. A major challenge for the Union Army was that the attack masked their own supporting artillery that 

was firing from the north side of Brush Creek. Furthermore, the guns were unable to advance through the timber bordering 

Brush Creek to support the attack. Most of the Union units fell back to the north side of the creek to regroup. However, some 

units may have remained on the south side of the creek and skirmished with the Confederates. Meanwhile, Curtis struggled 

to find a way to re-energize the attack and seize the high ground. 

Maj. Gen. Curtis: McLain’s battery was on the brow of the north bank of Brush Creek and near the road, Dodge’s (Ninth 

Wisconsin) battery to his right. We also had about twenty other pieces of artillery, mostly mountain howitzers, with cavalry, 

taking position as their supporting squadrons came into line. Meantime continued firing was kept up by skirmishers and 

artillery on both sides, with but little damage to either. After taking the positions named on opposite sides of Brush Creek, 

about 11 o’clock I went myself to the right of our lines, and led the militia forward as skirmishers. I tried to get through the 

timber with Dodge’s battery and two little howitzers of my escort, but the roads were not favorable and I left the farther 

movement of the right to Colonel Blair.73

Maj. Gen. Price: ...they resisted most stubbornly and contested every point of the approach.74
106

Map 43.
107

43. George Thoman’s Path75

George Thoman, a local farmer, provided the solution to seizing the high ground south of Brush Creek. Mr. Thoman 

was angry with the Confederates because they had stolen a horse and food from his nearby farm. He had gone into the 

Union lines to get help in regaining his stolen property. In his meeting with Curtis, he informed the Union commander of a 

pathway that was not only suitable for artillery but also provided a route around the Confederate flank. Curtis sent word for 

the Army to resume the attack along the entire front. Again, the Army’s artillery supported the attack from the north side of 

Brush Creek. In the attack, Curtis took two guns from Blair’s artillery and he took Capt. Dodge’s 9th Wisconsin Battery up 

the slope behind Blair’s Brigade.76 Farmer Thoman served as the guide and led the way. Curtis stated in his report, “I was 

directed by an old man, a Missouri patriot of seventy five years, through a narrow defile to Brush Creek with Dodge’s battery and other forces.”77 The route initially followed the wooded defile cut by Swan Creek (today’s Rockwell Lane) where it 

flowed into Brush Creek and then skirted to the southwest along a local farm path (today’s Sunset Drive). Shelby lacked the 

troops to cover all the approaches. His best troops, Clark’s Brigade, blocked Wornall Lane and elements of Fagan’s division 

extended the line to the east. The aggressive skirmishing of Ford’s Brigade earlier in the day may have led Shelby to believe 

the main Union threat was oriented along the Wornall Lane approach. In the west, Shelby positioned Jackman’s Brigade to 

extend the line around to the Bent House. Jackman’s line was little more than a thin skirmish line. It was those skirmishers 

that opposed Blair’s advance. Blair stated, “A heavy fire was here opened on us from a cornfield which stretched from our 

right front, and which seemed filled with skirmishers, and from a large brick house in an orchard just beyond in which a party of sharpshooters was stationed.”78 Nevertheless, Blair’s men along with Curtis’ escort company (G, 11th Kansas Cavalry) 

soon “drove the enemy from the cornfield and house.”79 Curtis positioned the guns near the Bent House and brought fire 

upon the left and rear of Shelby’s main line. Shelby threatened by Blunt’s Brigades advancing up the hill and Blair’s brigade 

on his flank, ordered his line back to the next ridge line. 

Capt. Hinton:80 Colonel Blair... moved into the dense timber to the right, twice the length of his line, and pushed it steadily 

forward. The 19th Regiment, which had been formed and dismounted to the rear of the main force, was moved by a road further to the right, and as the militia emerged from the timber, formed on Colonel Blair’s right. General Curtis himself joined 

this movement, encouraging the militia by his presence. Dodge’s Battery with two howitzers were piloted through a narrow 

defile to a point where the guns could be admirably placed, by a venerable patriot of seventy five, who was upon the field 

ready to do his humble share of the work. The right of the line commenced immediate demonstrations upon the enemy who 

were posted along the forces [fences] to their front. Skirmishers filled the field, poured a destructive fire from the fences and 

from a large brick house in the orchard just beyond. The right of the brigade was sent forward to clear the house.81

Col. Jackman: About 12 o’clock I received an order from General Shelby to fall back across the prairie to the point where 

the gun was captured the evening before and report to General Fagan, who was in pressing need.82
108

Map 44.
109

44. McGhee’s Charge

Blunt moved forward quickly and occupied the heights abandoned by the Confederates. Curtis and Blunt halted the 

brigades at the edge of the plateau and quickly joined together the right and left wings of the Army. They brought forward 

the volunteer artillery along with several militia batteries and positioned about 30 guns along the line. The concentrated fire 

of the Union guns quickly overwhelmed the Confederate artillery of less than eight guns. Blunt stated, “the artillery of my 

division being served with excellent effect, punishing the enemy severely.”83 Curtis could hear the fight raging at Byram’s 

Ford and was anxious to continue the advance to join with Pleasonton. He ordered the line to advance. McLain’s Colorado 

Battery maneuvered forward along Wornall Lane and brought effective fire onto the Confederate line. Lieut. Caleb Bursal 

stated, “We were doing such execution that they made a desperate charge on us.”84 The battery may have outpaced the Union 

line and Col. James McGhee, who was from from Dobbin’s Brigade of Fagan’s Division, saw the opportunity to either capture the battery or put it out of action. Col. Jennison observed the threat as McGhee’s Arkansas Cavalry charged the guns and 

ordered Company E of the 15th Kansas Cavalry to counterattack.85 Company E and the battery’s escort defeated the attacking Confederates in a swirling cavalry melee. McGhee was wounded in the hand-to-hand fighting and his regiment suffered 

devastating losses of 25 killed and wounded and around 100 prisoners. The Union line continued to advance and pushed the 

Confederates back to the vicinity of the Wornall House. Curtis stated in his report that, “the enemy was soon overpowered, 

and after a violent and desperate struggle fell back to another elevation on the broad prairie and operated their artillery and 

cavalry to their utmost ability in a vain attempt to check our general movement.”86 Shelby was desperate to delay the Union 

advance and buy time for the Confederate Army to escape the closing pincers of Curtis from the north and Pleasonton from 

the east. At the Wornall House, he positioned his two brigades and Dobbins’ Brigade from Fagan’s Division along a line of 

east-west stone fences to make another stand. 

Col. Jennison: ...soon the order was received for a general advance along the entire line, which was obeyed with the utmost 

alacrity. The First Brigade, with a detachment of the Second Colorado and McLain’s (Colorado) battery, took position on 

the right of the road, commencing an impetuous attack upon the rebels, who were rallying for a charge upon the battery, one 

section of which was posted directly in the road. Hardly had we taken position when the enemy charged in column upon the 

guns the road, which were supported by the Second Colorado, the First Brigade being to the right in front as they advanced, 

Company E, Fifteenth Kansas Volunteer Cavalry, forming the left of the brigade line and deployed as skirmishers. Seeing 

that a desperate effort was required to save the battery I immediately rallied Company E and led in person a charge upon 

the flank of the rebel column, a movement which was entirely successful, though a desperate hand-to-hand contest ensued, 

after maintaining which for a short time the enemy withdrew in disorder toward his main lines southward. In this action 

especial praise is due to officers and men engaged and more particularly to Captain Curtis Johnson, commanding Company 

E, Fifteenth, which was alone in the charge... we succeeded in killing and wounding a large number of the rebels, and taking 

nearly 100 prisoners.87

Brig. Gen. Thompson: About this time that gallant charge in column down the road was made by McGhee’s regiment of 

Arkansas troops which resulted so disastrously to the brave men who made it.88
110

Map 45.
111

45. Shelby’s Stand at Wornall House

Maj. Gen. Price had remained with Shelby throughout the morning. Sometime before noon, he received word that the 

wagon train was in danger and he moved south to personally look to its safety. At his departure, he left orders for Shelby, 

Fagan, and Marmaduke to hold the enemy at bay as long as possible and then to fall back onto the wagon train. Shelby’s 

position at the Wornall House was precarious and his stand was short-lived. Fagan had already moved two of his brigades 

east to support Marmaduke. Soon after their departure, Shelby received word that Marmaduke was defeated and falling 

back. He immediately sent Jackman south to find and protect the wagon train. This left Shelby with only Thompson’s and 

Dobbin’s brigades to hold the Wornall House line. The situation worsened when Shelby received word that Fagan was in 

danger of being overrun and the prairie “was dark with Federals.”89 Shelby diverted Jackman, along with what little artillery 

he had remaining, to Fagan’s assistance. Jackman and Fagan made a valiant effort but were soon pushed aside by Pleasonton’s victorious Union cavalry. Meanwhile, Curtis continued to advance toward the Wornall House. He was determined 

to trap Shelby between his army and Pleasonton’s division. Fortuitously, Jennison’s brigade charged the Confederate line 

just as Pleasonton maneuvered Sanborn’s brigade artillery against Shelby’s flank. Thompson’s normally rock-steady “Iron 

Brigade” collapsed and he stated, “The stampede seemed to become contagious and soon the whole command was in wild 

disorder with the enemy charging at our heels.” Thompson went on to say, “It was impossible to rally the men as a body.” 90

As the Confederates fled to the south, Shelby tried desperately to rally his command and slow the Union pursuit. 

Maj. Gen. Blunt: At 12 o’clock the center of their line gave way, and what then commenced as a retreat of the rebel forces 

soon became a complete rout, their broken lines flying in disorder, with my cavalry and artillery in rapid pursuit. After the 

rout and pursuit had continued for nearly two miles, I came in sight of the forces of General Pleasonton on my left, with his 

lines formed at right angle with mine, and a portion of Price’s command, which he had been engaging during the day, was 

still confronting him. When within about 800 yards of the left of the rebel line, and when they were about to charge General 

Pleasonton’s line, twenty pieces of artillery of my command poured a raking fire into their flank, which threw them into 

confusion and stampeded them, with the main column of the retreating enemy.91

Maj. Gen. Price: Major-General Marmaduke, who was to my right and rear, being attacked with great fierceness by an 

overwhelming force of the enemy after a most strenuous resistance, his ammunition being exhausted, had to fall back before 

the foe. Being at that time near Westport, and in full view of Generals Fagan and Shelby and their commands, I received 

information that my train, which was in front and on the right of the Fort Scott road, was threatened by the enemy, some 

2,000 or 2,500 strong, who were moving on a line parallel to the Fort Scott road. I immediately sent the information to 

Major-General Fagan and Brigadier-General Shelby, and directed them to fall back to the train as soon as they could do 

so with safety, which I would attempt to defend until they arrived... Brigadier General Shelby in attempting to obey my 

instructions was attacked in the flank and his command thrown into some confusion.92
112

Map 46.
113

46. The Escape of the Wagon Train

A mile south of the Wornall House, Shelby rallied his shaken division and set up another defensive line. Shelby’s final 

stand against the combined forces of Curtis and Pleasonton was not enough to stop the Union pursuit but the stand did delay 

the Union troops for a bit and allowed Fagan’s and Marmaduke’s shattered commands to escape. Shelby then broke contact 

and moved south to rejoin the retreating Army. In the south, Brig. Gen. McNeil failed to block the retreat of the wagon 

train. His orders required him to be in Hickman Mills by daylight. However, he did not arrive until late morning. South of 

Russell’s Ford, McNeil had discovered Price’s wagon train moving south. He cautiously skirmished with the train’s escort 

throughout the morning. He recognized he was significantly outnumbered by the train’s escort but he drastically overestimated the combat power of the Confederate units guarding the wagon train. More than half of the wagon train’s escort was 

indifferently armed recruits and unarmed refugees. At about 1300, McNeil decided to advance against the train. It was too 

late by that time. Price had arrived to organize the defense of the wagon train and move it to safety. Price deployed Cabell’s 

brigade as skirmishers and supported them with Tyler’s brigade of mostly indifferently armed recruits. Additionally, the 

Confederates fired the prairie grass to cover their withdrawal and mask the true state of their force. McNeil failed to recognize the ruse and allowed the wagon train to escape. At about 1430, the Union commanders met at the Thomas Farm to 

congratulate each other and Curtis stated, “Our success is glorious.”93 Both sides were exhausted after several days of continuous fighting. Soon after the meeting started, the Union pursuit ground to a halt. The Union had won a significant victory. 

Private John Hart of the 11th Kansas succinctly summed up the day’s fight in his memoirs: “Whipped by the Johnnies in the 

morning and in turn they were whipped by us to a showdown and were on the retreat.”94 Nevertheless they allowed Price’s 

Army to escape. The official casualty reports for the three days of fighting (both North and South) totaled 240 killed, 868 

wounded, and 437 captured for a grand casualty total of 1,545. However, many units failed to report their losses. Historian 

Howard Monnett estimates the total casualties for the three days are closer to 3,500 killed, wounded, and missing.95

Brig. Gen. McNeil: At daybreak a heavy firing commenced on my right and in the direction of Westport. I moved on toward 

Hickman Mills, expecting to be able to strike Price’s flank, moving cautiously about four miles, firing having ceased for 

some time, when suddenly I found myself in contact with the entire force of the enemy. I at once formed my brigade in line, 

advanced my skirmishers, and opened on their column with a section of Captain Montgomery’s battery... The enemy had 

formed their line of three lines deep and actually surrounded me on three sides. My skirmishers...most gallantly pressed 

up to the main line of the enemy’s center. In the meantime he had placed batteries in three different locations and opened 

a well-directed cross-fire upon Montgomery; I was consequently compelled to move him some 400 yards to the left, recall 

my skirmish line, and occupy the new position. I determined to hold this position at all hazards, in hopes that the remaining 

brigades would come up. Toward night the enemy retired.96

Maj. Gen. Price: I immediately pushed forward to the front of the train with my escort and there formed in line of battle the 

unarmed men, which were present to the number of several thousand, throwing my escort and the whole number of armed 

men of Tyler’s brigade, formed as skirmishers..., to the front of the enemy, and directing Brigadier-General Cabell, who 

arrived soon after, to hold the crossing of the creek on my left, sending forward at the same time for a portion of Colonel 

McCray’s brigade, which was in advance of the train, and on his approach forming him in line of battle on the left flank of 

the enemy, which caused the enemy to fall back a considerable distance on the prairie.97
114

Notes

1. Map and discussion based on information from O.R. Atlas, Map Plates 152 and 161.

2. The War of Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (hereafter referred to as the 

O.R.), Series I, Volume XLI, part IV, 144-145. Blunt correspondence with Curtis, 20 Oct, 0800.

3. O.R., Volume XLI, Part IV, 144-145. Curtis correspondence with Blunt, 20 Oct, 0800+.

4. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part IV, 145-146. Blunt correspondence with Curtis, 20 Oct, 2200.

5. Map and discussion based on information from the unit positions and actions based upon the reports in the O.R. I based the 

location of the river bridge and the details of the lower ford road on the research of Major David Lovett (CGSC Class of 2016). He 

and Mr. Mike Calvert (a Battle of Little Blue historian) located a collection of sketches that accompany a late 1800s survey of roads 

in Jackson County. Major Lovett is working on a Master’s thesis entitled, “Leadership Study on the Battle of Little Blue, 21 October 

1864.”)

6. Captain Palmer commanded A Company, 11th Kansas Cavalry during the fighting at Lexington and Westport. 

7. Captain H.E. Palmer, Price’s Raid, My Collections of Stirring Events Which Happened Forty Years Ago. Collections of the 

Kansas State Historical Society, 1905-1906, Vol IX., 439. Copy with CSI collection.

8. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 682. Col. Clark’s Report.

9. The Lawson Moore House still stands today and is a key landmark in the Battle of the Little Blue. Lawson Moore, a prosperous 

slave owner, built this antebellum home in 1856. In 1863, the infamous Order Number 11 forced Lawson out of his home. Moonlight’s 

men used the stone fences of the Moore plantation during their fight with Clark’s brigade. Latter in the fight Shelby’s Confederates 

used the stone fences as cover in their fight with Blunt’s division. The Confederates used the house as a field hospital after the fight. 

10. Howard Monnett, Action Before Westport (Kansas City, MO: Westport Historical Society, 1964), 65.

11. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 592. Col. Moonlight’s Report.

12. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 682-683. Col. Clark’s Report.

13. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 574. Maj. Gen. Blunt’s Report.

14. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 666. Brig. Gen. Thompson’s Report.

15. Captain W.D. McLain’s Independent Colorado Battery consisted of six rifled field-pieces and was the best artillery unit in 

Curtis’s small army. The two mountain howitzers were part of Curtis’ personal escort. 

16. Monnett, Action Before Westport, 63- 64.

17. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 657. Brig. Gen. Shelby’s Report.

18. Map and discussion based on information from the O.R. Atlas, Map Plate 66.

19. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 478-479. Maj. Gen. Price’s Report.

20. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part II, 1040-1041. Smith’s order to Price.

21. Albert Castel, General Sterling Price (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1968), 230-231.

22. The Honorable James H. Lane was a United States Senator from the state of Kansas. He served as a volunteer aide-de-camp 

on Maj. Gen. Curtis’s staff.

23. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 569. Senator Lane Report.

24. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 478-479. Maj. Gen. Price’s Report.

25. Map and discussion based on information from a USGS map of the area.

26. Brig. Gen. Melvin S. Grant was a civilian shop-keeper from Leavenworth, Kansas. He had little to no field experience and the 

upcoming fight was his baptism of fire as a Brig. Gen. and brigade commander. 

27. O .R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 4, 192. Correspondence Curtis to Grant.

28. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 478-479. Maj. Gen. Curtis Report.

29. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 658. Brig. Gen. Shelby Report.

30. Map and discussion based on information from the O.R. Atlas, Map Plate 66; Daniel Smith, Interpretive and Development 

Plan for Byram’s Ford Big Blue Battlefield (Overland Park, KS: Monnett Battle of Westport Fund, 2005); Battle of Westport Visitor 

Center, Self-Guided Tour Guide (Kansas City, MO); Monnett, Action Before Westport. 

31. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, Col. Jennison Report, 584.

32. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 666. Col. Thompson Report.

33.O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 616. Maj. Gen. Deitzler Report

34. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 658. Brig. Gen. Shelby Report.

35. Map and discussion based on information from a sketch map found in Fred Lee, Gettysburg of the West: The Battle of 

Westport (Independence, MO: Two Trails Publishing, 1996) 29. 

36. Samuel Reader, The Civil War Diary of Samuel J. Reader (Kansas City, MO: Monnett Battle of Westport Fund. 1982) 11.

37. Reader, Civil War Diary, 11.

38. P. I. Bonebrake was the First Sergeant of Company G, Second Regiment, Kansas State Militia. 

39. Fred Lee, The Battle of Westport (Kansas City, MO: Westport Historical Society, 1982) 33-34.

40. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 675.Col. Jackman’s Report.

41. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 683. Brig. Gen. Clark’s Report.

42. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 636.Maj. Gen. Pleasonton’s Report.
115

43. Report of Gen. W. L. Cabell’s Brigade, Fort Worth Library Digital Archives at http://cdm16084.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/

collection/p16084coll8/id/785 and CSI Westport files.

44. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 484-485. Maj. Gen. Curtis Report.

45. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 635. Maj. Gen. Price Report.

46. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 658. Brig. Gen. Shelby Report.

47. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 658. Brig. Gen. Shelby Report.

48. Monnett, Action Before Westport, 101. 

49. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 676. Col. Jackman Report.

50. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 575-576. Maj. Gen. Blunt Report.

51.Map and discussion based on information from unit reports in the O.R.

52. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 33441. Maj. Benjamin Jones Report. Maj. Jones, commander of the Third Iowa Cavalry 

stated: “My command was dismounted and formed line on the right and in front of the enemy, who were posted across an open field 

behind piles of rails in the woods.”

53. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 341. Maj. Gen. Pleasonton Report.

54. Captain Benjamin Johnson commanded Greene’s Regiment of Freeman’s Brigade. (Greene was wounded at the Battle of 

Little Blue).

55. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 693. Capt. Johnson Report. 

56. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 350-351. Col. Philips Report. 

57. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 351. Col. Philips Report.

58. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 351. Col. Philips Report.

59. Col. John F. Philips was the commander of the 7th Missouri State Militia Cavalry, and acting commander of the 1st Brigade, 

of Maj. Gen. Pleasonton’s Provisional Cavalry Division.

60. Lee, 41. Col. Philips Diary.

61. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 684. Brig. Gen. Clark Report. 

62. Map and discussion based on information from the O.R. Atlas, Map Plate 66; Smith, Interpretive and Development Plan for 

Byram’s Ford Big Blue Battlefield; Battle of Westport Visitor Center, Self-Guided Tour Guide; Monnett, Action Before Westport. 

63. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 328. Col. Winslow Report. 

64. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 684. Brig. Gen. Clark Report.

65. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 696. Lieut. Col. Davies Report.

66. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 699. Col. Lawther Report.

67. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 693. Capt. Johnson Report.

68. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 337. Maj. Gen. Pleasonton Report.

69. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 328. Col. Winslow Report..

70. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 684. Brig. Gen. Clark Report. 

71. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 609. Col. Ford Report.

72. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 598-599. Col. Blair Report.

73. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 485. Maj. Gen. Curtis Report.

74. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 635. Maj. Gen. Price Report.

75.Map and discussion based on information from the O.R. and Richard Hinton, Rebel Invasion Of Missouri And Kansas And The 

Campaign Of The Army Of The Border Against General Sterling Price In October And November 1864 (Ottawa, KS: Kansas Heritage 

Press, 1865 – reprint 1994).

76. Curtis’ escort also contained 2x Mountain Howitzers. He may have had as many as 9-10 guns.

77. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 486. Maj. Gen. Curtis Report. Thoman was only 45 at the time. Curtis either mistook his 

age or possibly thought the old man story sounded better. Lee, Gettysburg of the West, 63.

78. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 599. Col. Blair’s Report.

79. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 599. Col. Blair’s Report. 

80. Richard Hinton was a captain in the 2d Kansas Volunteers (Colored) and served as an Aide-de-Camps on Maj. Gen. 

Curtis’staff.

81. Hinton, Rebel Invasion Of Missouri, 160.

82. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 676. Col. Jackman Report.

83. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 576. Maj. Gen. Blunt Report.

84. Bryce Suderow, “McLain’s Battery and Price’s 1864 Invasion: A Letter from Lt. Caleb S. Burdsal, Jr.,” Kansas Historical 

Quarterly, Volume VI, Number One, Spring 1983, 44. Lieut. Bursal commanded a section in McLain’s Battery.

85. Many of the long serving Confederate units from Arkansas and Missouri did not have numerical designations, but were 

instead known by their original commanding officers name.

86. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 486. Maj. Gen. Curtis Report.

87. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 585-586. Col. Jennison Report.

88. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 667. Brig. Gen. Thompson Report.

89. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 658. Brig. Gen. Shelby Report.

90. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 667-668. Brig. Gen. Thompson Report.
116

91. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 576. Maj. Gen. Blunt Report.

92. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 635-636. Maj. Gen. Price Report.

93. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part IV, 208. Maj. Gen Curtis telegram (1305) to Maj. Gen. Halleck. 

94. John Hart, “Recollections of that fight,” The Kansas City Star Magazine (Kansas City, MO: Kansas City Star), 11. John Hart 

was a private in the 11th Kansas Cavalry.

95. Monnett, Action Before Westport, 124.

96. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 372. Brig. Gen. McNeil Report.

97. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 635-636. Maj. Gen. Price Report.
Part VI

The Battle of Mine Creek

24 to 25 October 1864
118

Map 47.
119

47. Decision at the Thomas House1

At the Thomas farmhouse, the Union commanders switched their discussion from one of congratulations for the hard 

fought victory to the need to pursue the enemy. Maj. Gen. Curtis stated, “A vigorous pursuit was necessary,” to protect 

Kansas and prevent the capture of the Army supply depot at Fort Scott.2

 However, other leaders’ arguments for and against 

the pursuit were numerous and varied. Nevertheless, the commanders reached a decision late in the afternoon and Curtis 

sent a telegram to Maj. Gen. Halleck in Washington stating, “The pursuit will be renewed at daylight.”3 Curtis suspended 

martial law for the Kansas counties north of the Kansas River and sent most the Kansas State Militia home. He retained the 

militia from counties still threatened by the Confederates. Maj. Gen. Rosecrans remained in Independence and relinquished 

responsibility for the pursuit to Curtis. He also allowed Curtis to assume tactical control of Maj. Gen. Pleasonton’s Cavalry 

Division. Curtis, therefore, reorganized the Army of the Border into two cavalry divisions; Maj. Gen. Blunt commanded the 

1st Division and Maj. Gen. Pleasonton commanded the 2d Division. Curtis ordered the divisions to regroup in the vicinity of 

Little Santa Fe and to be prepared to march at daylight. Col. Jennison’s Brigade was already near Little Santa Fe. Jennison 

had pressed the Confederate rearguard until sunset and the 2d Colorado (attached to Jennison’s Brigade) was in contact with 

the Confederates where the Line Road crossed the Big Blue River. Most of the other brigades assembled near the small town 

that evening. The only exception was Col. Moonlight’s Brigade. Curtis ordered Moonlight to find a position on the Rebel 

flank and screen the Kansas border. The Army’s orders directed Blunt to resume the pursuit at daylight and for Pleasonton 

to follow in support. Blunt’s brigades had slightly fewer days of continuous operations than Pleasonton’s Missouri troops 

and Pleasonton’s men and horses desperately needed the few extra hours of rest. Additionally, Blunt’s troops were highly 

motivated to get on the move because many of their homes and families were in the path of Price’s retreat. To the south, Maj. 

Gen. Price’s Army of Missouri was exhausted and demoralized. Brig. Gen. Shelby organized a rearguard at the Big Blue 

River with elements of all three divisions to check Jennison’s aggressive pursuit. Sometime after sunset, Shelby moved the 

rearguard south to join the wagon train. About 20 miles south of Little Santa Fe, the wagon train and its escort straggled into 

a camp on the middle fork of the Grand River. The disorganized elements of Fagan’s and Marmaduke’s Divisions rested and 

regrouped all along the route. Price was in a desperate situation and the only hope of saving his command was to continue 

the retreat. He ordered the army to resume the retreat at daylight. 

Maj. Gen. Curtis: The enemy is in full retreat and much demoralized. He moves directly south on and near the Line road. 

General Pleasonton united his forces with mine at 2 o’clock. Our losses are inconsiderable. We lost one gun yesterday and 

took one to-day. The pursuit will be renewed at daylight. After four days’ obstinate fighting the men and horses are much 

exhausted and must have a little rest.4

Maj. Gen. Price: Brigadier-General Shelby in attempting to obey my instructions was attacked in the flank and his command thrown into some confusion, but rallied, repulsed the enemy, and rejoined me that evening, as did also Major-General 

Fagan. I encamped that night on the Middle Fork of Grand River, having marched twenty-four miles and the troops having 

been engaged with the enemy nearly all day.5
120

Map 48.
121

48. Retreat and Pursuit

On the morning of 24 October, the Confederate commanders regrouped their exhausted and disorganized units. Price 

wanted to be on the move by daylight. It was probably closer to 0900 before the Army marched south on the Military Road. 

Brig. Gen. Thompson stated, “On the morning of the 24th, we lost several hours in getting the train untangled in forming the 

brigades for in the confusion of the night before, men and wagons, artillery and refugees, were so mixed that it was nearly 

impossible to untangle them.”6 Some of the Confederate senior leaders and most of the men had “a feeling of personal hostility” toward “the enormous and useless wagon train which had been the principal cause of their discomfiture and losses.”7

They wanted to make a swift retreat and recommended abandoning most of the wagons. Price was reluctant to heed their 

advice. The wagons hauled supplies captured during the expedition. These supplies were the “fruits of their labor” and represented one of the few tangible successes achieved by the Confederates.8

 Therefore, the Army plodded south at the rate of 

an oxen hauled wagon. The Union commanders also failed to move at daylight. Blunt reported he moved out at 0600 but it 

may have been closer to 0800. The Union troopers found the trail easy to follow. The Rebels littered the route with discarded equipment. To the east, Maj. Gen. Rosecrans sent the footsore XVI Corps southwest from Independence towards Little 

Santa Fe to support the pursuit. To the west, Moonlight shadowed the Confederates, and near Coldwater Grove, saw the 

opportunity to harass the Confederate column. A long range skirmish produced no casualties but did highlight the predicament the Confederates faced. They were moving through the infamous “burnt district.” The open prairie, abandoned fields, 

and burned homesteads offered no opportunity for foraging. The Confederate command faced a significant dilemma. The 

force needed to disperse and forage but the aggressive Union pursuit imposed a need to concentrate in order to safeguard the 

force. At about dusk, Blunt’s Division halted for the evening at the abandoned town of West Point, Missouri. He had moved 

about 45 miles. The Confederates managed only about 35 miles that day. Late in the day, they crossed over into Kansas and 

looted supplies from the nearby homesteads. Shelby’s adjutant stated, “Haystacks, houses, barns, produce, crops, and farming implements were consumed before the march of his squadrons and what the flames spared, the bullet finished,” and that 

the Rebels soothed, “the wounds of Missouri by stabbing the breast of Kansas.”9

 The Army bivouacked near Trading Post, 

Kansas with units on both sides of the Marais des Cygnes River. 

Col. Ford: The morning of the 24th, I started on the Line road in the pursuit of the rebel army... Reached West Point at dark, 

where a halt was made... I was ordered to wait until Major-General Pleasonton’s division passed to the front.10

Maj. Edwards:11 Under his [Price] unmilitary management, numerous wagons which the soldiers believed to contain untold wealth of plunder by staff officers and dead-heads, had dangerously augmented his train, so that it numbered over five 

hundred vehicles, and, shockingly controlled and conducted, often stretched out eight or ten miles in length. Marched in the 

center of the army, flanked, preceded or followed by a rabble of dead-heads, stragglers and stolen negroes on stolen horses, 

leading broken down chargers, it gave to the army the appearance of a Calmuch horde. The real fighting soldiers..., scarcely 

disguised their apprehension that the odious train would occasion disaster to the army, and they were plainly reluctant to 

shed their blood to save the plunder it convey.12
122

Map 49.
123

49. War Council at West Point13

At the Federal camp at West Point, the Union commanders gathered to discuss the situation and decide upon a course 

of action. Blunt’s advance guard, a battalion of the 2d Colorado, was miles to the front and in contact with the Confederate 

rearguard near Trading Post, Kansas. Maj. Gen. Blunt wanted to move that night around the Confederate western flank and 

cut off Price’s Army from the south while Pleasonton attacked from the north. Curtis rejected Blunt’s proposal. He was 

reluctant to separate his forces and was concerned that Blunt’s small division lacked the combat power to block the entire 

Confederate Army. Blunt next suggested that the entire army make the turning movement. Curtis recognized the difficulty of 

a night movement and river crossing and again rejected the plan. Brig. Gen. Sanborn recommended the pursuit be continued 

through the night. Curtis decided upon a frontal advance toward Trading Post. He directed Pleasonton’s Division to take the 

lead and attack immediately. Pleasonton, exhausted and sick from the day’s march, ordered Brig. Gen. Sanborn to assume 

tactical command of the division and resume the advance. Supposedly, Blunt having been rebuffed twice and now placed 

in a supporting role, withdrew in a sullen mood. To the east, Col. Moonlight recognized that the Rebels were closing on 

Trading Post and from there could threaten Mound City. He decided to march through the night towards the Paola road and 

then south to Mound City. At West Point, Pleasonton’s brigades passed through the town and moved toward Trading Post. 

Lieut. Col. Philips’ recounted, “Marched all day on old military road without halting. Men almost exhausted with fatigue. 

Passed through Finneysville and West Point, towns only that were. Overtook Pleasonton and Curtis at a branch in the night, 

enjoying a sumptuous supper. It made my hungry palate dilate but got nothing to eat.”14

All vignettes here are from the Northern perspective.

Maj. Gen. Blunt: I proposed that we should leave a few squadrons of cavalry to make a feint on their rear, while, with the 

main column, we should pass to the right, cross the Osage river four miles above trading post, pass entirely around their 

flank, and before daylight in the morning have our line of battle formed in their front, our right resting on the Osage below 

them, and our left on the same stream above them, while the enemy would be in the sack formed by the course or bend of 

the river. Understanding well the topography of the country, I felt assured that this movement could be made with complete 

safety and success, and would result in the capture of Price’s entire army with but little loss to us. General Pleasanton seconded this proposition... but General Curtis disagreed with me, and decided that we should follow up and attack their rear.15

Maj. Gen. Curtis: We halted to kill some of these near West Point when night overtook us. After about two hours’ rest and 

refreshment, mainly on fresh beef without salt or bread, I ordered the march resumed, General Pleasonton’s division alternating in taking the advance, and at 8 o’clock it moved on cautiously, the night being very dark and rainy. About 1 a. m. 

of the 25th General Sanborn, in the extreme advance, halted, sending back intelligence of his arrival near the Marais des 

Cygnes (pronounced in the country Mary de Zene), where the enemy was in great force.16
124

Map 50.
125

50. First Skirmish at the Mounds17

After the war council, Brig. Gen. Sanborn moved his brigade and the 4th Iowa toward Trading Post. The rest of Pleasonton’s Division followed behind them. Near Trading Post, Sanborn deployed units just to the north of where the road passed 

between two large mounds. The 4th Iowa was to the right of the road and two of Sanborn’s regiments to the left. The 4th 

Iowa was not aware of the 2d Colorado’s forward position and briefly fired upon them. Fortunately, the 2d Colorado quickly 

identified themselves as friends and the firing stopped. Sanborn then advanced his line and skirmished with the Confederate skirmishers deployed at the base of the mounds. Maj. Gen. Fagan’s Division served as the Confederate rearguard at 

the mounds and was positioned to protect the Confederate camp at Trading Post. Fagan posted elements of Col. William 

Slemons’ Brigade on the west mound and Brig. Gen. William Cabell’s Brigade on the east mound. Two small guns in the 

gap supported the defense. A heavy rain, with thunder and lightning, discouraged the Union troops from pressing the attack 

and both sides suffered only minor casualties. Sanborn remained uncertain of the enemy strength. Additionally, fatigue, 

darkness, and rain tested the general’s determination to continue the attack. Sometime after 2200, he made the decision 

to cancel the night attack and resume the attack at first light. Sanborn withdrew most of his troops about a half mile to the 

north. Maj. William Plumb’s 6th MSM remained in contact with the Confederates and “skirmished with them until day.”18

In the Confederate camp, Brig. Gen. Cabell reported the action with the enemy and recommended an immediate withdrawal 

over the river.

Brig. Gen. Sanborn: My advanced reached this point a little after midnight [probably much earlier] and immediately 

commenced skirmishing with the enemy. The road leading to the Trading Post, on the Marais des cygnes, passes through a 

gap between two high mounds about half a mile from the river, each from one-half to a mile in length. Colonel J. J. Gravely, 

Eighth Cavalry Missouri State Militia with his own regiment and the Sixth Cavalry Missouri State Militia, Major William 

Plumb commanding, was ordered to advance until the position of the enemy should be fully developed. The night was dark 

and it was raining heavily. Colonel Gravely advanced gallantly with his command and the enemy opened musketry fire from 

the gap. The line was deployed as skirmishers and advanced gallantly with his command and the enemy opened musketry 

fire from the gap. The line was deployed as skirmishers and advanced toward the base of the mounds. The enemy opened a 

line of fire from the foot, sides, and summits of the mounds and the intervening gap, and in an instant the clamor and noise 

of many voices indicated that we were near the position of the enemy. My ignorance of the topography of the country, the 

impenetrable darkness and incessant rain, induced me to postpone a general attack until 4 o’clock in the morning.19

Brig. Gen. Cabell: ...we camped near the Marais de Cygne, after marching over twenty-four miles. I was in the rear and 

whole brigade in line of battle at the gap of the Bald Prairie hills and on top of the hills during the night. The enemy made 

several attempts to drive my men from the top of the mountains and break my lines. After making several attempts to break 

though, and failing in every attempt... fighting until 2 o’clock.20
126

Maps 51A and 51B.
127

51. Curtis’ Decision and Price’s Estimate of the Situation

At West Point, Maj. Gen. Curtis learned of Sanborn’s decision to delay the attack at about 0100 the next morning. Cols. 

Blair and Crawford urged Curtis not to wait for daylight. They wanted Curtis to adopt Blunt’s earlier idea for a turning 

movement. Blair’s troops were from the area and they were anxious to get into the fight and protect their homes. Crawford 

may also have wanted more Kansas participation in the upcoming battle to support his campaign for the governor. Curtis 

recognized that it was only a few hours until daylight and decided against a difficult night movement around the Confederate flank. He was determined to stay with the original plan of a frontal attack down the Military Road. At 0300, he sent 

orders for Sanborn to attack no later than first light and that the rest of the Army would follow in support. Unfortunately 

for the Confederates, Maj. Gen. Price misread the enemy situation at the mounds and the earlier action at Coldwater Grove. 

His scouts failed to identify the large Union encampment at West Point, and overestimated the size of Moonlight’s Brigade 

operating on the flank. Most of the fighting at the mounds was little more than desultory skirmishing, and despite Cabell’s 

reports, Price believed there was no significant enemy force to his rear. He decided that the fighting at the mounds was little 

more than harassment and reasoned that the Union force threatening Cabell was intended to draw his attention away from 

the Union main effort against his western flank. Price decided the urgent need was to pass the Army over the Marais des 

Cygnes River and move south before the Union forces blocked the road to Fort Scott. Ironically, his faulty estimate of the 

Union plan was the course of action suggested by Maj. Gen. Blunt and rejected by the Union Army commander. 

Capt. Hinton:21 General Curtis, whose object was to press the foe, at least to keep him aroused and in a state of activity, so 

as to complete the breaking down of his forces from exhaustion.22

Maj. Gen. Price: During the night I received information from Major-General Marmaduke, who was placed in charge of 

the approaches in front, that the enemy were threatening his pickets, and upon consultation with Major-General Marmaduke 

we were both of opinion that the enemy were marching upon our right by Mound City on a road parallel to the one on which 

we were. We were strengthened in that belief by a dispatch which had been captured from the commanding Federal officer 

at that place to his scouts, stationed near our then encampment, stating that he would be largely re-enforced that night, and 

that he wanted a sharp lookout [kept] for my army, and to give him the earliest information of the route on which I would 

travel and the direction. I also received at a late hour at night information from some new recruits who joined me, and who 

had traveled fifteen miles on the route I had traveled, that there was no enemy in my rear. On the morning of the 25th I resumed my march in the same direction as before, and I considered from the information I had received the night before, and 

I considered from the information I had received the night before that if I should encounter the enemy it would be in my front 

or on my right flank. Brigadier-General Shelby’s division composed the advance, Major-General Fagan and Marmaduke’s 

divisions composed the rear guard.23
128

Map 52.
129

52. The Battle of the Mounds

Early on the morning of the 25th, Price issued orders and organized the divisions to protect the force. He directed Shelby, with his best division, to take the lead toward Fort Scott. Price was confident in Shelby’s ability to push forward rapidly 

and capture the needed supplies at Fort Scott or, if necessary, break through a Union blocking force. Fagan’s large division 

would fall back from the mounds and move south with the trains. Fagan’s mission was to protect the Army’s western flank, 

and, if needed, support the rearguard. Marmaduke’s small division was responsible for the rearguard. Price and Marmaduke 

decided not to defend the mounds and positioned the rearguard on the south side of the Marais des Cygnes River. As the 

sun rose, the majority of the Army was over the river and only stragglers remained at Trading Post. At daylight, Maj. Gen. 

Marmaduke assumed responsibility for the rearguard south of the Marais des Cygnes River. The Confederates also left a 

weak skirmish line on the mounds to screen the last of the units in the move south. To the north, Sanborn brought forward 

two batteries of artillery and issued orders for his daylight attack. He also sent a battalion from Benteen’s Brigade to guard 

a ford upstream. The Union commanders examined the terrain and were understandably concerned about assaulting the 

high ground. Nevertheless, they prepared their units for a dismounted assault. The 2d Colorado attacked before daylight and 

drove back the thin Rebel skirmish line. A few of the Coloradans may have reached the Marais des Cygnes River before falling back. The main attack advanced at daylight. The 4th Iowa exploited the success of the 2d Colorado and easily captured 

the west mound. The 6th and 8th MSM experienced more difficulty against the east mound, probably slowed more by the 

difficult terrain than the ineffective fire of the few remaining Confederates. Sanborn, elated by his success, committed the 

2d Arkansas (U.S.), and the 3d Iowa and 10th Missouri (U.S.) from Benteen’s Brigade to a mounted pursuit of the retreating 

Confederates. 

Brig. Gen. Sanborn: Colonel Gravely was ordered to advance and occupy the summits of the two mounds and the intervening gap without delay, and Captains Thurber and Montgomery were ordered to open fire with all their guns at 16 degrees 

elevation, bearing across the right end of the mound on our left through the gap, the mound and gap being now just visible 

through the receding darkness. The Fourth Iowa Cavalry gained the mound on our right without serious opposition, but 

Colonel Gravely met with strong resistance in his advance toward the crest of the mound on our left. The enemy’s line extended the entire length of this mound, and as our line advanced it opened a rapid but ill-directed fire. The line formed by 

the Sixth and Eighth Cavalry Missouri State Militia, almost crawling upon the ground by reason of the abrupt assent, moved 

steadily forward until within a few yards of the enemy, when a loud cheer from our line, followed by one or two sharp volleys 

of musketry, proclaimed the position gained... General Pleasonton was now upon the ground and ordered me to advance my 

line to the Marais des Cygnes and cross the river as soon as possible.24

Brig. Gen. Cabell: Being in the rear the previous day, and in line of battle all night, facing the enemy, and fighting until 2 

o’clock, General Marmaduke was ordered to relieve me with his division... He made an opening and I marched my command through and left him to bring up the rear.25
130

Map 53.
131

53. The Marais des Cygnes River

The river and its fords are significant to the next phase of the fighting. The Fort Scott/Military Road passed through the 

small town of Trading Post and then continued south. The old ford crossed the river at the town and provided access to a 

secondary road to Mound City. However, the main road crossed at a new ford located one mile south of town. Within about 

an hour after daylight, the 2d Arkansas (U.S.) led the mounted pursuit and pressed forward to the main ford over the Marais 

des Cygnes River. The Union cavalry passed through the abandoned Confederate camp, capturing about 100 stragglers, 

numerous abandoned animals, and about 30 derelict wagons. Later, McNeil’s and Blunt’s men hung some of the prisoners 

in retaliation for the wanton destruction upon Kansas farms and alleged violations against the female residents of Trading 

Post. The 2d Arkansas (U.S.) moved quickly and seized two small guns abandoned by the Confederates in their retreat.26

Their pursuit stalled when they found, “the ford of the stream, interrupted by an abatis on the opposite bank” and “the ford 

occupied” by Marmaduke’s men.27 The Confederates had positioned a significant skirmish line amid the trees and bushes on 

the opposite bank to slow the Union pursuit. From the top of the eastern mound, Sanborn observed the stalled pursuit and developed a plan to re-energize the attack. He directed the 2d Arkansas (U.S.) to fix Confederate attention on the ford, and for 

the 7th PEMM to outflank the Confederate defense. The 7th PEMM dismounted about 400 yards above the ford and crossed 

over the river. Unfortunately, Sanborn and the militiamen were unaware of the old ford located at Trading Post. Nonetheless, 

the 7th PEMM crossed over the river. The militia’s commander stated, “We were then thrown out as skirmishers on the right 

of the brigade, driving the enemy from the creek bottom.”28 The flank attack was a success and the Confederates at the ford 

abandoned their position and withdrew. 

Brig. Gen. Sanborn: General Pleasonton was now upon the ground and ordered me to advance my line to the Marais des 

Cygnes and cross the river as soon as possible. Their order was immediately executed, and in a few moments my command 

occupied the ground just abandoned by the enemy, who left one piece of artillery and many wagons, horses, mules cattle, 

sheep, cooking utensils, &c. Colonel Phelps, Second Arkansas Cavalry, was directed to take the advanced and move forward as rapidly as possible. He soon reached the river and found the enemy busily engaged felling trees across the road on 

the opposite side. The Seventh Provisional Enrolled Missouri Militia was at once dismounted and thrown across the river, 

about 400 yards above the ford, and ordered to advance as skirmishes down the river till it should reach the ford. Colonel 

Phelps at the same time advanced, under a heavy musketry fire, and the enemy was driven from his position opposite the 

ford, where he had felled but two trees of moderate size across the road.29

Brig. Gen. Clark: Before I had gone a mile from the encampment (on the Marais des Cygnes) of the night before, I received 

an order from General Marmaduke to form my brigade in line of battle, as the enemy had again appeared in our rear.30
132

Map 54.
133

54. McNeil’s Hasty Attack

The 2d Arkansas (U.S.), followed by the battalion of the 2d Colorado, crossed over the ford on their mounts and resumed the pursuit. At about a half mile beyond the ford, Confederate skirmishers hiding in the tall grass briefly delayed the 

pursuit. Col. John Phelps, the commanding officer of the 2d Arkansas (U.S.), ordered a charge and forced the skirmishers 

back to their main line. Brig. Gen. Clark had formed the Confederate defensive line approximately one mile from the ford. 

Capt. Hinton stated that the line was “facing to north, and strengthened by three guns, two rifled and one small smooth-bore, 

its right resting on a timbered ravine, running from the main stream.” He further detailed, “The left rested upon a small 

knoll on the summit of which was a log cabin.”31 This line consisted of four units with a reserve line of two units further to 

the south. Hynson’s Texas Battery, with two Parrot rifles and a 6-pounder field gun, supported Clark’s forward line. Phelps’ 

small regiment, only 200 men strong, charged the Confederate brigade. The dismounted PEMM units tried to support the 

charge with fire but were too far back to provide effective support. The battalion of the 2d Colorado, possibly delayed by the 

muddy roads, failed to come forward and support the hasty attack. It was a brave attempt, but Clark’s heavy defensive fire 

forced the 2d Arkansas (U.S.) to fall back. Generals Curtis, Pleasonton, and Sanborn observed the charge and sent word for 

the forward units to halt while additional forces moved forward to support the attack. The Union commanders wanted to get 

artillery forward to support the attack. Unfortunately, the rains and the retreat of thousands of Confederate cavalrymen and 

hundreds of wagons had turned the roads into an almost impassable quagmire. Over the next hour, Pleasonton and Sanborn 

struggled to get units into position and organize a deliberate attack against the Confederate line. Clark’s Brigade bought the 

valuable time needed by the Rebel wagon train to escape. 

Col. Phelps:32 The enemy in front formed in line of battle. The regiment, at most 200 strong, moved up and formed immediately; the Second Colorado having crossed the creek shortly afterward came up also and formed on the left and to the rear 

of the Second Arkansas, who galloped immediately to the charge. The line of skirmishers of the enemy were sent flying to 

their line of battle, when the artillery, opening upon the Second Arkansas with fury, checked their advance and compelled 

them to reform their line, which they did under, fire, while the Second Colorado, unmoved and behind cover, never pretended to offer a support, which might have won for that regiment glorious results, and which the skirmishers of Gravely, 

though dismounted, attempted to give, but it was too late. Two hundred men alone could not do what an hour afterward, at 

the crossing of the Osage, three brigades succeeded in accomplishing and these won laurels and elicited praise for their 

gallantry. They earned it nobly.33

Lieut. Col. Davies:34 25th, this day the enemy attacked us about 9 o’clock, but Pratt’s [Hynson’s] battery did such good 

execution that the enemy were compelled to fall back.35
134

Map 55.
135

55. Clark’s Line Withdraws

Sometime around 0900, Curtis sent word for the lead brigade to attack. Pleasonton asked for a delay to get his division 

and supporting artillery into position. However, Curtis was frustrated with the delay, and he directed Sanborn to attack with 

his brigade. The 2d Arkansas (U.S.) and the 2d Colorado conducted a mounted charge toward the Confederate line. The units 

on both flanks supported with dismounted fire. Sanborn stated his brigade, “charged the enemy’s position and had forced 

them to yield.”36 On the Confederate line, one of Clark’s regimental commanders stated, “He again attacked us in force. 

After a short engagement the command on our right, being flanked by the enemy, gave way”37 Clark ordered the withdrawal 

before his units became heavily engaged. They were fighting mounted, which made reloading the muzzle-loaded weapons 

difficult. Additionally, Clark could see the rest of Pleasonton’s division deploying to support the attack and probably wanted to form the entire brigade again before making another attempt at delaying the pursuit. In the retreat, Hynson’s Texas 

Battery, because of a lack of ammunition, abandoned the 6-pounder field gun. Clark reformed his forward units behind the 

reserve line. He recognized there was little he could do against a full division but he maintained a bold front and hoped to 

buy time for the Rebel wagon train to escape to the south. He kept his units mounted and had no intention of becoming decisively engaged. To the north, Maj. Gen. Pleasonton finally managed to deploy his division and had one section of artillery 

forward to support his attack. Lieut. Col. Frederick Benteen’s Brigade arrived on the field and took position in the center of 

the line. Brig. Gen. Sanborn’s Brigade was on the left. Sanborn’s Brigade had done “most of the work” that morning and was 

probably nearing exhaustion.38 Col. John Philips’ Brigade moved into position on the Union right. Pleasonton issued discretionary orders to both Benteen and Philips as they came onto the field to charge the enemy if the opportunity presented itself. 

The Union had approximately 3,500 troopers with two or three rifled guns in support. Brig. Gen. Clark had maybe 1,200 

Confederate troopers with two rifled guns. Clark was not only significantly outnumbered, his left flank was also overlapped 

by the much longer Union line. Pleasonton recognized the Confederate weak flank and committed Philip’s Brigade against 

their left. Clark recognized the risk of remaining in his position and ordered the brigade to retire. It was close to 1000 and 

the Confederate rearguard had held the Union pursuit on the Marais des Cygnes River for about five hours. 

Col. Philips: Sanborn’s and Benteen’s brigades were in advance of mine, the former already skirmishing with the enemy, 

driving him through Trading Post to the Marais des Cygnes, where he resisted stubbornly. At this point I was ordered to take 

the advance and charge the enemy then formed in open prairie. Passing the two brigades in advance of me I soon came in 

view of the enemy. Lieutenant-Colonel Lazear, holding the advance of the brigade, was ordered forward with instructions to 

attack fiercely. The remainder of my command was advanced in squadron columns, supporting Lazear. The enemy withdrew 

on our approach. We pursued them at the gallop for three miles, pressing him so closely as to compel him to form.

39

Lieut. Bennett:40 General Clark formed his brigade into a line of battle... As soon as General Fagan retired to the rear the 

Federals came charging and seemed determined to break our lines. Our artillery opened on them and caused them to break 

their lines. We fell back and formed a new line. New lines were formed and abandoned as the Federals advanced upon us.41
136

Map 56.
137

56. The Roads to Fort Scott42

After the fight at the Marais des Cygnes River, Pleasonton ordered his brigades to continue the pursuit. The trail of the 

large Confederate wagon train remained easy to follow and the Union brigades moved out in close pursuit of the Rebel 

rearguard. Generals Curtis and Pleasonton did not accompany the lead brigades. Price’s wagon train had a head start of 

several hours, and the Union generals probably did not anticipate a general engagement in the next few hours. Brig. Gen. 

Sanborn also dropped out of the pursuit. He stated in his report, “My brigade having been on duty all night and engaged all 

the morning without anything for horses or men to eat, by permission of the general commanding I fell to the rear to feed for 

a few moments.”43 Philips’ Brigade now led the pursuit and Benteen followed. Several miles to the south, the road forked to 

the west, south, and east. The western fork was the road to Mound City, to the south there were two parallel roads leading 

to Fort Scott, and the old Military Road or Wire Road, angled east before turning south to Fort Scott. Philips took the Main 

Fort Scott Road and followed after the retreating Confederates. He was only about 800 yards behind Col. Colton Greene’s 

3d Missouri (C.S.A.), the Rebel rearguard. Greene stated in his report he was, “followed by the enemy, who seemed to take 

his gait from ours but never came in gunshot range.” 44 Benteen turned onto the Fort Scott Branch Road. The branch road rejoined the main road about a mile before Mine Creek. Several miles south, Price’s advance guard paused to rest at the Little 

Osage River. The trail of the Confederate main column experienced a delay crossing over Mine Creek and part of the wagon 

train remained north of the creek. Price was unaware of the close pursuit and still believed the major threat was to the west. 

The fighting at the Mounds and Marais des Cygnes River was not the only fighting the morning of 25 October. Moonlight’s 

Brigade maneuvered along the western flank of the Union pursuit and screened against a deeper Confederate incursion into 

Kansas. At about 0200, Moonlight arrived in Mound City after marching all night. His brigade of about 1,000 men and five 

mountain howitzers, reinforced the town’s small garrison just in time to save the town from a Confederate attack. Shortly 

after dawn, Moonlight’s 1,300 men easily defeated an attack by approximately 600 Confederates. Soon after the skirmish, 

another 300 Kansas militiamen arrived from Paola to reinforce Mound City. Moonlight left 550 men at Mound City and 

moved south toward Fort Scott with his brigade. Later in the morning, the Confederate cavalry made another attempt to 

capture the town but were again defeated by the Union garrison. These engagements supported Price’s belief that the bulk 

of the Union Army was on his west flank, not to his rear in close pursuit.

Col. Moonlight: Seeing from the route the enemy was taking he must necessarily camp about the Trading Post and that 

Mound City was danger of being destroyed I pushed on, marching all night, a distance of sixty-five miles; arrived there at 

2 a. m. on the 25th. Early in the morning the enemy made his appearance but was quickly driven back and the town saved. 

About this time I received an order from General Blunt to make for Fort Scott and hold it at all hazards, so that no time was 

lost, after procuring some rations for my starving command, in striking for that place.45

Maj. Gen. Price: On reaching Little Osage River I sent forward a direction to Brigadier-General Shelby to fall back to my 

position in rear of Jackman’s brigade for the purpose of attacking and capturing Fort Scott.46
138

Map 57.
139

57. Marmaduke’s Dilemma47

At about 1030, just minutes ahead of his rearguard brigade, Maj. Gen. Marmaduke arrived on the low ridge overlooking 

Mine Creek. He planned to establish a strong defensive position on the south side of the creek to delay the Union pursuit. Instead, he found the crossing blocked by a host of units waiting to cross over the creek. Most of the Army and the wagon train 

had already crossed at the main ford. The ford had a solid rock bottom and was initially an adequate crossing site. However, 

the crossing of thousands of horses and hundreds of wagons had destroyed the main ford’s outlet and also the secondary 

fords. The roads leading out of the creek valley were hopelessly muddy and each wagon had to be pushed up the southern 

bank and the slope on the south side of the creek. Marmaduke observed that most of Maj. Gen. Fagan’s division was across 

the creek but that Fagan’s largest and best unit, Cabell’s Brigade, and some of the division artillery remained north of the 

ford. Additionally, there were hundreds of wagons belonging to the refugees following behind the Army and awaiting their 

turn to cross. Marmaduke had only minutes to make a decision. The Army was obligated to defend the refugees but most 

important was the preservation of the division’s and Fagan’s artillery and their ammunition wagons. Marmaduke ordered 

Col. Thomas Freeman to position his brigade astride the main road to protect the ford and cover the crossing of the ammunition wagons. He sent word to Brig. Gen. Clark that upon his arrival he was to extend the division line to the east. He sent 

a request to Fagan asking for Cabell’s Brigade to deploy on Freeman’s left. Marmaduke then made the decision to keep his 

units mounted. The majority of the Rebel soldiers were armed with muzzle-loading weapons that were difficult to fire and 

reload from horseback. Nevertheless, Marmaduke had observed his subordinate’s delaying action at the Marais des Cygnes 

River. In the delay, Clark’s units remained mounted and still forced a delay of several hours upon the Union forces. Clark’s 

imposing lines of Confederate cavalrymen at the Marais des Cygnes River encouraged Pleasonton to deploy his full division 

to force the Confederate withdrawal. Maj. Gen. Marmaduke reasoned that the sight of a full Confederate division would 

force the Union commander to pause again. Additionally, Marmaduke recognized the threat to the Confederate Army had 

radically changed. Earlier in the day, both he and Price believed the main threat to the Confederate Army would come from 

the west. The fighting at the Marais des Cygnes River and the current situation confirmed that the most dangerous threat was 

to the rear. Therefore, Marmaduke sent a message to Price informing him of the changed situation and requested assistance.

Capt. Hinton: In the meanwhile the advance brigades moved rapidly across the open prairie. Soon the timber of Mine 

Creek, about five miles south-east of Mound City, came in sight.48

Pvt. Darr:49 We then came to a stream in our front that was entirely blocked, at every point where it was possible to cross, 

by wagons and teams belonging to refuges who were noncombatants, fleeing from the Federals.50
140

Map 58.
141

58. Extending the Lines

Within minutes, several more brigades moved into position on the north bank of Mine Creek. The first was Brig. Gen. 

Clark’s Brigade of veteran Confederates. Clark galloped onto the field from the north. He fought briefly from the ridge 

north Mine Creek and then fell back toward the creek.51 Col. Colton Green stated that the Confederate line, “formed some 

300 yards north of Mine Creek.”52 At the main defensive line, Clark hastily deployed his men to the right of Freeman’s 

Brigade with skirmishers deployed forward along the Mound City road. Just minutes behind Clark, Philips’ Union brigade 

crossed over the low ridge north of the Confederate line. Philips was surprised to see thousands of Rebel cavalrymen with 

supporting artillery deployed in line and additional forces coming forward to support them. Philips reacted by pausing just 

as Marmaduke hoped. For the moment, Marmaduke’s gamble had succeeded and prompted the Union forces to rein in the 

pursuit. Almost simultaneously, Cabell’s Brigade galloped into position to extend the Confederate left. The majority of Fagan’s division crossed over the creek and moved forward to further lengthen the line to the west. Cabell stated in his report, 

“I went to General Marmaduke’s assistance as rapidly as I could, forming regiments into action as fast as I could... firing 

as I came up.”53 On the Union front, Philips observed Benteen’s Brigade coming up behind him, so he deployed his small 

brigade west of the Fort Scott Road. His decision not only left room for Benteen on the east of road, it also positioned his 

brigade to contest the Confederate reinforcements coming forward on the west end of the line. Philips then pushed skirmishers forward to drive back the Rebel skirmishers and a messenger north to inform Pleasonton that he and Benteen would need 

immediate reinforcements. Philips feared the Confederates would turn his west flank so he ordered the 4th MSM to deploy 

one of its squadrons in extended order to protect the flank. 

Col. Philips: He took position on the open prairie with Mine Creek, a tributary of the Osage, in his immediate rear. Lazear’s 

command was well up and in position. The remainder of the brigade, advancing in parallel columns, was easily and quickly 

fronted into line. The enemy was formed at 600 yards distance in treble lines and in overwhelming force. My ground was 

high and commanding. Here the whole rebel army and train were in full view... The scene was grand; the work before us of 

fearful import. An aide was sent to inform the major-general commanding that Price’s army was in my immediate front and 

that I confronted him with my little command in line of battle. The enemy’s vastly superior numbers enabled him to outflank 

me, which he evidently intended to do, by his movements. To meet this I was compelled to extend my line to the right by 

opening files and swinging off one squadron some sixty yards. I had no reserve force; the enemy had eight guns in position, 

which he now began to use. As yet no artillery had come to my assistance, it having been delayed at the Marais des Cygnes 

by obstructions placed there by the enemy.54

Brig. Gen. Clark: We came suddenly upon the trains halted, the delay occasioned by a deep ravine, the enemy not more 

than 500 yards in our rear. There was no time to make any but the most rapid dispositions for battle. To attempt to dismount 

and send the horses to the rear was inevitable destruction, as the enemy in the confusion would have been upon us. There 

was no alternative but to abandon the train or to fight on horseback. In the hurried consultation between Generals Fagan 

and Marmaduke I understood this to be the view taken of the emergency. It was determined not to dismount, which met with 

my approbation.55
142

Map 59.
143

59. The Firefight

Both sides paused to dress their lines and decide upon their next action. To the north, Col. Philips deployed about 1,400 

men west of the Fort Scott Road. Lieut. Col. Benteen was coming up fast on the east side of the road with another 1,200 men. 

At this point there wasn’t any Union artillery on the battlefield. In the Confederate line, Generals Marmaduke and Fagan deployed approximately 6,400 men north of the creek, supported by eight artillery pieces.56 Marmaduke’s Division was astride 

the Fort Scott Road and extended the line to the east. Fagan’s Division was behind Marmaduke’s left and extended the line 

to the west. Fagan left another 750 men south of the creek in a reserve line. Unfortunately for the Confederates, all the units 

deployed hastily and “There was no time to make any but the most rapid dispositions for battle.”57 The brigade formations 

lacked uniformity. Some were deployed with the regiments on line with three ranks and others with the troops in lines six 

deep. Cabell wanted to charge the Union line and deployed the brigade with his regiments in squadron columns. These 

units may have been as many as 10 lines deep. Marmaduke was aware that another force was coming up fast to strengthen 

the Union line. He was also concerned that the balance of the Union Army would soon arrive on the field. During the brief 

pause, both sides engaged in a furious long-range firefight. The Confederate artillery opened fire on Philips’ line. With no 

artillery to counter the fire, Philips men held their position with “good discipline and great gallantry.”58 Col. Chas. Blair, one 

of Maj. Gen. Curtis’ staff officers, was forward with Philips’ Brigade. He stated, “The enemy’s artillery was playing on this 

line with fearful effect and we had nothing but musketry to reply but the men were steady and self-possessed and perfectly 

easy under the fire.”59 It was not a one-sided firefight. A soldier in Cabell’s Brigade noted, “The enemy poured a continued 

and deadly fire into our hastily formed ranks.”60 Brig. Gen. Cabell also noted the intensity of the firefight and reported, “As 

fast as our lines were formed, the enemy, armed with Henry rifles, forming in front of Marmaduke’s and my brigades, poured 

a rapid and scathing fire into our commands, which far exceeded any firing we could do from my muzzle-loading Enfield 

rifles.61 Cabell canceled his plan to charge. He based his decision upon both the sight of additional Union forces coming 

onto the field and the scathing Union fire. The firefight lasted less than 30 minutes but for those on the field, “it seemed a 

long time.”62

At about 1100, Lieut. Col. Benteen’s Brigade of veteran troops crested the northern ridge above Mine Creek. Numerous Army and division staff officers were forward with Philips’ Brigade. Col. Blair recollected, “I passed along the whole 

line and met your gallant staff officers everywhere, counseling, encouraging, exhorting, and commanding, and the tenor of 

the whole was, charge!”63 He went on to state, “It was evident that our only safety was in a successful charge by which we 

might capture the guns.”64 Capt. Hinton, another staff officer, claimed it was staff officers who “galloped to the left to inform 

Colonel Benteen of the position of affairs on the right, and desire him to press forward with a view to charge.”65 Therefore, 

Benteen was well informed on the situation. Nevertheless, it still must have been an intimidating sight when he looked down 

into the valley and observed thousands of Confederate Cavalrymen deployed in the valley. His brigade moved onto the battlefield in a column of regiments. Maj. Gen. Marmaduke had gambled that the imposing sight of the two divisions would 

force the Union commanders to pause and take the time needed to deploy and then bring their units forward for a deliberate 

attack. At the Marais des Cygnes River, Marmaduke observed the Union generals’ methodical deployment against rear 

guard brigade. The Confederate commander probably expected to see the Union commanders again take the time needed 

to deploy for a division attack. Unfortunately for Marmaduke, neither Generals Pleasonton nor Curtis were forward on the 

battlefield to impose the measured approached seen earlier in the day. Benteen lacked experience above the regimental level. 

He had been a brigade commander for only a few days since the wounding of Col. Winslow. To date, all of his experience as 

a brigade commander was to attack, and the Rebels retreated. He had seen the enemy retreat at Bloody Hill, Westport, and 

the Marais des Cygnes River. In the pursuit he saw the discarded and abandoned equipment of a demoralized and defeated 

army. Just an hour earlier, Benteen observed the Confederate rearguard turn and run before his unit could get into action, 

and the last order he had received was “to charge the enemy whenever the opportunity offered.”66 The overabundance of 

division and Army staff officers on the field offered advice and recommendations, but Benteen was the commander and 

only he could make the decision. In a matter of moments, he saw an opportunity and chose to attack. He focused on the 

brigade fight and he gave little thought to the need to plan, organize and execute a division attack, and his only attempt at 

coordination was a message to Col. Philips asking him to “charge with me, for God’s sake.” Additionally, Benteen may 

have believed his division and Army commander were nearby and organizing support. It will never be known how much 

deliberate thought Benteen put into his decision. He may have considered the charge was necessary before the enemy could 

improve upon their poor deployment or before they themselves charged the heavily outnumbered Union line. Benteen may 

have reasoned that only the front rank of the densely packed Confederates could fire and then not be able to reload their 

clumsy weapons while mounted. On the other hand, his decision could have been nothing more than the observation of the 
144

enemy’s “fatal blunder” in the positioning of their artillery. The guns were less than 1,000 yards to the front and would only 

have the opportunity to fire one or two shots before his cavalrymen closed with them. The cavalryman’s desire to capture 

enemy guns may have been the primary motive. Whatever the reason, Benteen was responsible for making the decision, and 

he did not hesitate. It was more happenstance than planning that placed Benteen’s Brigade at Mine Creek. Nonetheless, it 

was the best unit for the “work” of “fearful import” that needed to be done.67 The brigade’s regiments had served together 

for months and had considerable battle experience in Mississippi and Tennessee. The regiments had fought together in both 

the Vicksburg Campaign and the Tupelo Campaign. The troopers were well armed with sabers, and revolvers. Additionally, the regiments were armed with first-class carbines. Both the 4th Iowa and the 10th Missouri (U.S.) had the seven-shot 

Spencer repeating carbines.68 The other regiments were armed with various types of breech loading carbines. The brigade’s 

firepower far exceeded that of Clark’s Confederate brigade, deployed to their front. All of Benteen’s regimental commanders 

were aggressive and competent. In short, it was a veteran unit, and they were anxious to take the fight to the enemy. Benteen 

formed the brigade, positioned behind a low ridge, into a column of regiments with each regiment in line. The brigade was 

eight ranks deep and lead regiment had a frontage of about 200 yards. It was a textbook cavalry formation with Lieut. Col 

Benteen on the front right of the first line. At about 300 yards from the Confederate line, Benteen ordered the charge sounded 

and the brigade surged forward at the gallop. To the west, Philips recalled his dismounted skirmish line and charged forward 

to support Benteen. Lieut. Col. Bazel Lazear, one of Philips’ regimental commanders, recalled, “In a very few minutes the 

force on my left came up at a charge, and as soon as their lines, or as I think two columns of squadrons, was in line with me, 

I ordered the charge and advanced under a heavy fire of artillery and small-arms to within 200 to 300 yards.”69 Benteen’s and 

Philips’ 2,600 Union troopers moved down the gentle slope against approximately 6,300 Confederates cavalrymen. Benteen 

initiated the charge in accordance with the cavalry manual. At first, the brigade moved down the hill at a walk. He yelled out 

the commands: draw sabers, attention to charge, forward, and march! Each command was relayed to the regiments by more 

than 50 buglers. A short distance down the ridge, Benteen ordered the brigade into trot and then quickly signaled the charge. 

Lieut. Col. Benteen: Three short miles were scarcely accomplished when one of the advanced skirmishers galloped back 

and reported that the enemy was only a few hundred yards ahead in line of battle, in large force, and with eight pieces of 

artillery. About the same time Major Hunt, of General Curtis’ staff, came up and told me the enemy’s exact position, stating 

that there was a brigade already in position in his front, but too weak to begin the attack. I at once determined to form on the 

left of this brigade, especially as a few more paces brought us in view of the line of rebels; seeing the position in which he 

had his artillery, I immediately surmised that the rebel commander had committed a fatal blunder, and resolved to capture 

it. I sent an officer to the commanding officer of the brigade on my right with the information that I was going to charge, 

and a request for him to charge with me, for God’s sake, and at the same time formed my command in column of regiments 

in the same manner I had formed them for marching, and immediately sounded the charge.70

Brig. Gen. Clark: Skirmishing had already begun, the artillery in action, when the Federal force (I should judge 6,000 or 

7,000) made a furious charge on the right and left flank.71

146

Map 60.
147

60. The 4th Iowa

At approximately 200 yards from the enemy line, Benteen’s charge abruptly halted when the 10th Missouri (U.S.) refused to close with the enemy. Perhaps they expected the Rebels to break and run, or maybe the enemy artillery and rifle fire 

unnerved them. Benteen stated in his report, “The fire of the enemy was now so hot that for a moment a moment it staggered 

even my own gallant regiment.”72 Needless to say, the 115 men in the first rank of 10th Missouri (U.S) had second thoughts 

about charging into thousands of Confederates. The other regiments in the column crowded forward and there was considerable confusion and disorganization in the brigade. Benteen rode to the front of the regiment, brandishing his saber and cursing at the troopers, but the regiment refused to advance. Maj. Abial Pierce, commanding the 4th Iowa, feared, “a perfect rout 

of our line appeared to be almost certain.”73 On the western flank, Col. Philips, seeing the halt of Benteen’s Brigade, ordered 

his brigade to halt as well and deployed dismounted skirmishers to front. The hesitation of the Union charge, which could 

have resulted in disaster, lasted only a few minutes. In that time the Federals were vulnerable to a counterattack, but the 

Confederate leaders failed to seize the initiative. The Union attack had unsettled the Rebel cavalrymen. The “fatal blunder” 

was not just the artillery with limited fields of fire; it was also the organization of Confederate line. There were more than 

6,000 men north of Mine Creek, but their haphazard deployment resulted in less than 2,000 horsemen on the front line. The 

front rank troopers could clearly see the breathtaking sight of 2,500 Union cavalry bearing down on them with sabers and 

pistols. Most of the Rebels were armed with clumsy muzzle loaders and had little chance of reloading their weapons. The 

Confederate leadership estimated the Union attack at 6,000 or more men. Private Darr, one of Cabell’s soldiers, believed the 

enemy numbered about 18,000.74 It was Maj. Abial R. Pierce, the acting commander of the 4th Iowa, who saved the Union 

attack. Most of the 4th Iowa’s companies had stalled behind the shaken 10th Missouri (U.S.). Pierce immediately moved to 

the left flank of his regiment and ordered the unit to form a column of fours to the left. He then swung them around the left 

flank of the stalled 10th Missouri (U.S.). As soon as he cleared the left flank of the 10th Missouri (U.S.), Pierce charged into 

the Confederate line. The three rightmost companies of the 4th Iowa seem to have actually passed through the 10th Missouri 

and charged in a column of fours just to Pierce’s right. The two left companies overlapped the 10th Missouri’s line and did 

not get caught up in the stalled attack. They charged ahead of the rest of the regiment and quickly came to the realization that 

they were charging the Confederate line alone. The two companies of about 90 men swung to the east away from the fight, 

but then saw Pierce’s maneuver and swung back to the south to rejoin the regiment. The 3d Iowa angled to the brigade’s right 

and also pushed through the stationary 10th Missouri with the combined 4th Missouri (U.S.)/7th Indiana following behind 

them. Finally, the 10th Missouri, emboldened by the other units, reformed and charged forward. 

Sergt. Maj. Scott:75 Major Pierce... resolved upon an extraordinary step. He left the right and galloped to the left of the 

regiment, which projected beyond the left of the line of the Tenth Missouri, perhaps as much as the length of two companies, 

which were therefore immediately in front of the enemy’s right. He instantly ordered a charge of his own regiment, and led 

it himself in a dash at the enemy’s right.76

Brig. Gen. Clark: The Federal force (I should judge 6,000 or 7,000) made a furious charge.77
148

Map 61.
149

61. The Confederate Line Breaks

Benteen’s Brigade slammed into Clark’s Confederates. The 4th Iowa hit the 4th Missouri (C.S.A.) almost simultaneously from the front and flank. A Confederate regimental commander stated, “My men were armed with long infantry rifles 

which were unable to load on horseback and consequently were unable to oppose successfully the Federal charge, but broke 

and fled in the wildest confusion.”78 The 3d Iowa and 10th Missouri (U.S.) struck the front of Clark’s line, while the 4th 

Iowa turned into the Confederate right flank. The commander of the 4th Iowa stated, “We pressed them so close that I cut 

eight rebels from their horses with my own saber.”79 In a matter of moments, Clark’s line collapsed and the men “gave way 

in hopeless confusion.” 80 Brig. Gen. Clark went on to say, “Every effort was made by appeals and threats to retrieve the rout, 

but it swept in an irresistible mass ungovernable.”81 On the Union right flank, Col. Philips conformed to the maneuver of 

Benteen’s Brigade. As soon as he observed Benteen’s units going forward he ordered his units to mount, and the brigade resumed its charge. His dismounted firing had already severely disrupted the Confederate line. The 1st MSM charged toward 

Freeman’s Brigade with pistols firing. Most of Freeman’s men were new recruits and pardoned deserters, and who broke 

before the charge struck home. Their panicky retreat swept up the right three regiments in Cabell’s line deployed behind 

Freeman. Harris’ battery was left exposed and lost two guns while crews pulled two other guns back toward the creek.82 In 

turn, the 7th and 4th MSM charged into the Cabell’s left most units and drove them back. Col. Philips briefly summarized 

the success of his brigade in his report: “With pistol we dashed into his disorganized ranks and the scene of death was as 

terrible as the victory was speedy and glorious.”83 The total collapse of the Confederate right and center demoralized the 

Confederate left flank. The brigades of Slemmons and Dobbins do not appear to have been heavily engaged, but were caught 

up in the general panic and quickly retreated toward the creek. One exception was a section of artillery commanded by 

Lieut. J. Zimmerman who kept his guns in the fight. He covered the withdrawal of the Confederate left until he was forced 

to abandon the guns join in the retreat. 

Lieut. Col Lazear:84 After a sharp action of some minutes the enemy began to give way on their extreme left; at the same 

time a move from their right, which I supposed was to support their left, but in a moment I noticed one of their battle-flags, 

which was immediately in my front, begin to move to the rear. I ordered my command to get ready to move forward, the most 

of them being dismounted on account of being armed with long guns. In the meantime the Fourth and Seventh Regiments 

Cavalry Missouri State Militia, on my right, were pressing down on the enemy, and in advance of my line; the force on my 

left had rallied and were bearing down on the left. A general charge was made, resulting in the capture of a number of guns, 

a large lot of horses and prisoners.85

Col. Greene: The enemy was seen to deploy from behind the left of his line in heavy column of attack, completely turning 

our right. Suddenly the first and second lines gave way, and rushing in great disorder ran over and broke the eight right 

companies of my regiment. The same wild panic seemed to seize everything. I wheeled my remaining company (B) to the 

right and opened on the flank of the enemy’s column until two of Williams’ guns were borne to the rear, when after every 

exertion, seeing the impossibility of staying this panic-stricken mob, I ordered Captain Polk (Company B) to withdraw as 

best he could be done.86
150

Map 62.
151

62. Chaos at the Ford

The Union forces pushed through the disorganized Confederates and captured the main ford. The fight, from the beginning of Benteen’s charge to the cheers of victory, spanned merely 15 or 20 minutes. The Union cheers heightened the 

panic of the Rebels trapped on the north side of the creek. Thousands of Confederates attempted to cross at the fords behind 

Fagan’s line. A large number of the frantic Southerners facilitated their escape by throwing away their guns. Col. Greene 

stated, “Over two-thirds of the arms were lost in the rout.”87 Private Darr recalled, “The stream was everywhere full of men 

and horses... trying to make their escape and the Federals trying just as hard to capture or kill them.”88 Marmaduke and 

Cabell tried desperately to rally their shaken soldiers. They did manage to rally a few companies, but could not restore the 

situation. In the confusion, Marmaduke tried to correct the actions of a 3d Iowa trooper and was promptly taken prisoner. 

Cabell rallied a few men around him and tried to break through to the south, but he was captured by an officer of the 7th 

MSM when his attempt to jump his horse over the creek failed. Then in the chaos, Cabell managed to escape twice before 

his final capture by a sergeant from the 3d Iowa. In addition to the two generals, Philips’ and Benteen’s men captured three 

colonels and numerous other field grade officers. Meanwhile the fighting continued along the creek banks and spilled over 

onto the slopes south of Mine Creek. A few additional forces arrived to reinforce Benteen’s and Philips’ Brigades, including 

a section of artillery. The artillery commander stated, “We opened fire with the entire battery, breaking their lines first on the 

right, then on the left, then right center, when they formed column and retreated.”89 Unfortunately, some of the artillery fire 

fell onto friendly forces during the chaos of the fight, with Major Pierce later reporting, “We advanced so far into the enemy’s ranks that Major-General Pleasonton ordered our own battery to shell us, thinking we were the retreating enemy, and 

my men were obliged to scatter to avoid being cut to pieces by our own shells.”90 Fortunately, Brig. Gen. Sanborn arrived 

on the field and ordered the artillery to cease fire. 

Col. Philips: Major-General Marmaduke, Brigadier-General Cabell, some colonels, several line officers, four guns, one 

stand of colors, and a large number of prisoners were captured by this brigade. The ground in our front was strewn with the 

enemy’s dead, dying, and wounded. Every gun the enemy pointed at us fell into our hands. Our advantage was followed up 

as energetically as possible, making the rout complete. This successful charge produced great consternation and demoralization among the enemy, as evidenced by his rapid flight, the destruction of much of his train, the disgorging and scattering 

of his ill-gotten plunder.91

Brig. Gen. Cabell: I had but thirty men left of my brigade, and my artillery captured. The flag bearer of Gordon’s Arkansas 

Regiment stood up on his horse, at my command, and waved his regimental flag in defiance. I then told these thirty men to 

follow me, and we charged through the enemy’s lines..., hoping that we could cross the creek below... The enemy seemed 

to know our purpose, and a small squad followed several of us... A lieutenant of the 7th Missouri Cavalry, with three men 

followed me. I attempted to jump the creek, which had high banks. In jumping, my horse got his forefeet on the opposite bank 

and his hind feet in the creek, and then fell over me. I was soon up and lieutenant and three men demanded my surrender, 

and ordered me to go to the rear.92
152

Map 63.
153

63. The Final Shots at Mine Creek93

During the fight, Generals Curtis and Pleasonton arrived on the battlefield. They immediately sent messengers to the rear 

to hasten additional forces forward and directed Benteen and Philips to cross over the creek and resume the pursuit. South of 

the creek, Maj. Gen. Fagan tried to reorganize Confederate forces fleeing the battlefield and delay the Union pursuit. In short 

order, Benteen and Philips moved their brigades over the creek and pursued the retreating Rebels. About a mile south of the 

main ford, a Confederate skirmish line delayed Benteen’s forward units along a small tree line. Benteen ordered the 4th Iowa 

to dismount and push the Rebels up the ridge. Near the McAuley Farm, Fagan organized another defensive line along the 

top of the ridge. Philips moved his brigade into position to attack Fagan’s line. The Confederates’ morale was broken and 

Fagan could not rally them for another fight. As Philips moved forward the Rebels quickly withdrew to the south. Benteen 

and Philips again reorganized their brigades and planned to resume the pursuit, but Maj. Gen. Pleasonton sent orders for 

them to hold their position. Pleasonton wanted to bring additional forces to the front to continue the fight. Regrettably, those 

additional forces were slow to arrive. Brig. Gen. Sanborn’s exhausted troops arrived as the fighting came to a close; they 

had been in the fight since 0300 with only one short break after the fighting at the Marais de Cygnes. Pleasonton wanted 

to get Brig. Gen. McNeil Brigade into the fight and sent several messengers to encourage the tardy brigade to hurry along. 

Nonetheless, McNeil failed to get his brigade over the Marais des Cygnes River in a timely manner and Maj. Gen. Blunt 

also failed to move his division forward. Blunt claimed that McNeil’s Brigade blocked all the roads and crossings over the 

river. The end result was that the fighting died away and the Union pause granted the defeated Confederates valuable time to 

escape to the south. In the immediate area of the battlefield the Confederate losses were staggering. Historian Lumir Buresh 

estimated the Confederate dead at 260. He estimated another 300 as wounded and Union records show 600 captured. In addition the two divisions lost eight field guns and hundreds of firearms. Union records are more accurate and they showed far 

fewer casualties; Benteen and Philips had eight killed, 80 wounded, and two missing. Sadly, some of the Confederate dead 

were the result of battlefield executions. Some of the Union troops shot Rebels caught with any portion of a Union uniform; 

it was the legacy of a bitter border war that had raged across Missouri and Kansas for more than three years. 

Col. Philips: A number of prisoners taken in this fight were dressed in our uniform, and in obedience to existing orders from 

department headquarters, and the usages of war, they were executed instantly, while those taken in Confederate uniform 

were recognized and treated as prisoners of war. The number of prisoners exceeded 400.94

Col. Lawther:95 The Federals attacked our rear guard..., and a general engagement was the result, which resulted unfavorable to us. I lost in the engagement four officers wounded and seven captured by the enemy, nine men killed, 17 wounded, 

and 58 captured.96
154

Map 64.
155

64. Fort Lincoln97

Eight miles to the south of Mine Creek, Maj. Gen. Price rested at the crossing of the Little Osage River with elements 

of Brig. Gen. Shelby’s Division and the wagon train. He was unaware of the disaster at Mine Creek. He planned to send 

Shelby south to the capture Fort Scott and its valuable supplies. However, events to the west and news of the fight at Mine 

Creek forced a change to the plan. Just before noon, the flank guard of the Shelby’s division captured and pillaged the small 

town of Fort Lincoln moments before Col. Moonlight’s Union Brigade arrived in the area. Capt. A. McCoy, commanding 

the small Confederate flank guard of 150 men, immediately sent word of the large Union force moving against the flank of 

the Rebel Army and asked for reinforcements. Price canceled the planned attack against Fort Scott and sent Thompson’s Brigade to reinforce McCoy and to protect the Army’s flank. At Fort Lincoln, Moonlight cautiously skirmished with McCoy’s 

detachment but withdrew when he saw the Rebel reinforcements coming up at about 1230. Moonlight decided that his priority was to reinforce the Fort Scott garrison and pulled back from Fort Lincoln. He then detoured to the west and resumed 

his march toward Fort Scott. Meanwhile, Price had received word on the engagement at Mine Creek and sent word to Shelby 

to send all available units north to help Marmaduke and Fagan. Price himself moved north to assess the situation and soon 

discovered the magnitude of the disaster that had befallen his Army. Price redirected Shelby to defend the road crossing over 

the Little Osage River. Thompson moved his brigade to the Little Osage River where he learned “of the disasters of the past 

few hours,” and saw the remnants of the Confederate rearguard retreating pell-mell to the south. 98 He recognized that the 

Union pursuit would soon be upon him and began making arrangements to defend the crossing. 

Col. Moonlight: About this time I received an order from General Blunt to make for Fort Scott and hold it at all hazards, so 

that no time was lost, after procuring some rations for my starving command, in striking for that place. At Fort Lincoln the 

enemy had possession and disputed our passage. After vainly trying to dislodge him I moved off by the right flank, leaving 

a battalion to engage his attention until the command crossed the stream above.99

Maj. Gen. Price: I immediately mounted my horse and rode back at a gallop, and after passing the rear of the train I met 

the divisions of Major-Generals Fagan and Marmaduke retreating in utter and indescribable confusion, many of them 

having thrown away their arms. They were deaf to all entreaties or commands, and in vain were all efforts to rally them. 

From them I received the information that Major-General Marmaduke, Brigadier-General Cabell, and Colonel Slemons, 

commanding brigade, had been captured, with 300 or 400 of their men and all their artillery... Major-General Fagan and 

several of his officers, who had there joined me, assisted me in trying to rally the armed men, without success. I then ordered 

Brigadier-General Shelby to hold the enemy, who were pressing their success hotly and fiercely, in check if possible at the 

crossing of the Osage until the train could be placed in safety.100
156

Map 65.
157

65. The Union Attack at the Little Osage River101

At about 1300, Thompson arrived at the Little Osage River. Shelby and Thompson positioned the units in three lines just 

to the south of the river. The two Confederate generals ordered their units to fight mounted. They did not intend to retain the 

river crossing very long; their only goal was to delay the Union pursuit. All told, Thompson had his brigade plus Williams’ 

Missouri Cavalry of Jackman’s Brigade, about 2,000 troops with no artillery support. Sometime before 1400, Marmaduke’s 

and Fagan’s panic-stricken troops passed through the lines and hurried to the south. Thompson must have worried that the 

disorderly retreat of the other brigades would demoralize his men. Also, because of the lay of the ground, being mostly a 

prairie country the troops of both armies were in full view. The lone Confederate brigade was able to observe with some 

trepidation the movement of a full Union Division toward their position. Despite the “great panorama,” Pleasonton’s Division was almost as disorganized as the retreating units of Marmaduke and Fagan. Pleasonton halted the division and formed 

a line of battle on the slopes leading down into the river valley. Philips’ Brigade was on the right, the 2d Kansas Battalion 

(Maj. Gen. Curtis’ Escort) was in the center, Sanborn’s small brigade was on the left, and McNeil’s Brigade was coming 

up fast on the far left. Pleasonton ordered Benteen’s Brigade, which was resting near Mine Creek, to come forward as soon 

as possible. Pleasonton had about 3,200 men. Like the Confederates, the Union forces had no artillery on the battlefield. 

Sometime before 1400, Pleasonton ordered the division to advance. The 2d Arkansas (U.S.) and the 2d Kansas moved ahead 

as an advanced guard and pushed the Rebel skirmish line back from the timber along the river. Pleasonton then ordered the 

division to charge and all the units surged ahead the best they could. Philips’ and Sanborn’s Brigades stalled at the steep 

banks of river line. McNeil’s Brigade charged over the ford in column formation. The 5th MSM dismounted on the far side 

of the river and pressed forward on foot. The dismounted skirmishers forced back Thompson’s first line and dismantled the 

rail fence surrounding a corn field to allow other units to pass through. The remainder of McNeil’s Brigade charged forward 

on their mounts through the holes in the fence and along the road. At that point Thompson ordered his lead units to fall back 

behind the second line. 

Brig. Gen. McNeil: I got engaged with the enemy, directly after crossing the Marmiton [Little Osage], who were strongly 

posted in a large corn-field and in the edge of the timber skirting the prairie. The Fifth Missouri State Militia dismounted 

and most gallantly charged, throwing down the fence in the face of a severe fire, while the balance of the brigade charged 

on horseback. The enemy were completely routed, scattering in disorder, throwing away their arms and leaving many of 

their killed and wounded.102

Brig. Gen. Thompson: We were ordered to dispute the passage of the enemy and delay his approach. The dispositions were 

made under your direction, and we quietly awaited him. The party left at the ford were flanked on both sides and retired 

without firing a shot, and soon the enemy appeared on the south side of the stream. Our first line, composed of Elliott’s and 

Williams’ regiments, coolly witnessed the formations and advance of the enemy, and when within range commenced firing. 

The impossibility of loading Enfield rifles on horseback now became apparent again, for after one discharge the horses 

became excited, and when the enemy charged, which they soon did, there was nothing to do but retreat.103
158

Map 66.
159

66. The Union Victory at the Little Osage River

Thompson planned for the second line to reserve their fire and let the first line pass back through them. McNeil’s charge 

pressed closely upon the withdrawing soldiers of the first line and Thompson’s second line fired before the passage was 

complete. The Confederates in the second line then panicked and joined with the first line in a hasty dash back through 

the third line. McNeil’s Brigade, now supported by the lead elements of Sanborn’s Brigade, reformed and charged again. 

Thompson managed to steady his third line despite the disorganized withdrawal of the forward lines. Additionally, the third 

line was in a good defensive position along a small creek. This time, the Confederates fought well and delayed McNeil and 

Sanborn’s Brigades for some fifteen or twenty minutes. Philips’ and Benteen’s Brigades crossed the river and threatened to 

turn Thompson left flank which finally forced Thompson’s withdrawal. Shelby and Thompson rallied a remnant of the brigade and formed a fourth line. They positioned the soldiers on a small hill about a half mile south of their previous position. 

McNeil and Sanborn charge again. However, the Union horses were exhausted. McNeil’s troopers had galloped ten miles 

just to get into the fight. The Union cavalry brigades could barely coax their tired steeds above a walk. It was the fatigue of 

the Union force that eventually saved the Confederate Brigade from annihilation; McNeil and Sanborn could not close fast 

enough to force the Confederates into close combat. Thompson fired a volley at the oncoming Union line and then withdrew again. By this time, Thompson’s Brigade had lost all unit organization and the officers could only rally small groups 

of soldiers into making brief defensive stands. The fighting lasted a little more than an hour. Both sides reported only minor 

casualties. 

Brig. Gen. Sanborn: The brigade charged the enemy concealed in the timber in the most gallant manner; drove him across 

the Little Osage and through the timber, where we halted and reformed the line. Three full lines of the enemy were visible 

within rifle-range, and the command became so eager for the fray that it seemed impossible to restrain them, and the entire 

brigade charged the enemy again, without any orders, and drove him fully four miles, killed and wounding many, capturing 

a number of prisoners.104

Brig. Gen. Thompson: The men held their horses well in hand and could have been controlled, but upon approaching our 

second line it commenced firing before we reached it and broke before we passed through. There was a third line formed by 

Erwin’s regiment that had the advantage of a ditch, which covered the road, and had it not been for the check that he gave 

the enemy very many of the brigade would have been killed or captured. We soon passed out of immediate danger, and the 

men formed again very readily, although all regimental organization was lost... I watched the manner closely that I may 

hereafter, should necessity require it, know how to control men in a stampede. All ran, yet none were frightened, and as there 

was no discipline I found a quiet voice and ordinary remark attracted more attention than the vehement language and orders 

that some use. Our lines were formed and broken several times this day, but our loss was small. Each colonel retained a part 

of his command about him, but the brigade was not formed together after the first line was broken. I was with one line and 

then with another, and came off field with Colonel Elliott after night had set in.105
160

Map 67.
161

67. Across the Prairie to Douglas Ford106

While Thompson’s Brigade slowed the Union pursuit at the Little Osage, Price’s Army continued its retreat to the south. 

Several miles north of Fort Scott, Price abandoned his hope of capturing the Union supply depot and turned the column to 

the southeast, along secondary roads leading to Douglas Ford on the Marmaton River about ten miles east of Fort Scott. 

At the ford, the river was about hundred feet wide, but the crossing had a good rocky bottom. However, both the approach 

and exit banks were steep, and it was a difficult crossing for heavy wagons. For the third time this day the long wagon train 

stalled the retreat at a water crossing, and Price’s Confederates were again forced to make a stand to save the burdensome 

wagons. Price ordered Brig. Gen. Shelby to take command of the remnants of the Army and delay the Union pursuit until 

the wagons could cross over the river. Shelby deployed his first line about six miles northwest of the ford. The line was 

comprised of elements of all three divisions. He posted Thompson’s Brigade (Shelby’s own Division) on the left, Dobbin’s 

Brigade (Fagan’s Division) in the center, and Clark’s Brigade (Marmaduke’s Division) was on the right. Col. Greene commanded the remaining 400 men of Clark’s decimated brigade. On the far right in the woods, Shelby concealed a detachment 

of Tyler’s Brigade (Unattached). The second line consisted of remainder of Marmaduke’s division, now commanded by Col. 

Clark, and the balance of Fagan’s Division and Tyler’s Brigade. Jackman’s Brigade (Shelby’s Division) remained with the 

wagons and herded them over the river. Shelby supposedly had 8,000 men on the field. However, because of the shattered 

state of Fagan’s and Marmaduke’s Division, the actual number was probably considerably less. Additionally, most of the 

men were demoralized and Tyler’s large brigade was indifferently armed. Shelby elected to have his men remain mounted. 

He probably had little choice in the decision. It had been a hard day for the Confederate Army, and most of the soldiers were 

unwilling to separate themselves from their horses. Most of the Rebel soldiers were primarily concerned with escaping the 

Union pursuit, not fighting a pitched battle. Meanwhile, the Union pursuit followed haphazardly in the wake of the retreating Confederates. Pleasonton and his division were exhausted by a full day of pursuit and fighting. He failed to keep the 

brigades within supporting distance of each other, and Philips and Sanborn’s Brigades fell behind. McNeil’s and Benteen’s 

weary soldiers remained in the chase as best as they could and sometime after 1530 found Shelby’s first defensive line. 

McNeil deployed approximately 800 yards from the Confederates. His brigade had about 1,500 men and was desperately 

outnumbered. Nevertheless, McNeil’s troops were highly motivated by their success at the Little Osage and he believed the 

Confederates were on the verge of collapsing. He sent messengers to the rear asking for support and ordered the brigade to 

advance. 

Brig. Gen. McNeil: I continued the pursuit through the prairie for several miles, and finally about 3.30 brought their entire 

force to bay near Shiloh Creek.107

Brig. Gen. Shelby: the advancing Federals, flushed with success and clamorous for more victims. I knew from the beginning that I could do nothing but resist their advance, delay them as much as possible, and depend on energy and night for 

the rest.108
162

Map 68.
163

68. The Battle of Charlot’s Farm109

McNeil’s Brigade advanced at a slow pace; it was all the tired horses could manage. Nonetheless, the sight of the determined Union advance shook the morale of the Confederates and many of the Rebel units were on the verge of melting 

away to the rear. Shelby ordered Tyler’s Brigade to charge the Union flank to delay the Union attack. Tyler’s troops had yet 

to be seriously engaged in the day’s fighting and were enthusiastic to get into battle. McNeil’s men defeated the charge with 

small arms fire and forced Tyler to withdraw, but in turn McNeil’s advance was stalled. At this time, Benteen’s Brigade and 

a section each of 12-pounder mountain howitzers and 3-inch rifled guns arrived. McNeil ordered both brigades forward and 

Shelby again slowed the Union advance with a series of aggressive feints. The Union regiments responded to each feint 

with dismounted carbine fire to defeat the Confederate charges. McNeil’s hesitant advance ground to halt 300 yards from 

the enemy and the troops dismounted to bring long-range fire upon the Confederate line. On the Confederate left, most of 

Thompson’s men, demoralized by the heavy fighting at the Osage River, retreated out of the fight. Maj. Pierce, commanding 

the 4th Iowa, sensed the opportunity to break the Confederate line and attempted to charge, but the exhausted horses refused 

to gallop. Shelby saw the threat and ordered Jackman’s Brigade forward to stiffen the Confederate line. Jackman’s Brigade 

passed through Thompson’s retreating brigade, and forced the Iowans to withdraw. Both sides then contended themselves 

with a long-range firefight. At dusk, Shelby ordered the first line to pull back behind his reserve line. McNeil’s and Benteen’s 

Brigades were too exhausted to follow the Confederate withdrawal and the fight sputtered to a halt. The Union casualties 

were light. Confederate casualties were more substantial and totaled 25 men killed and approximately 50 wounded. The 

25th of October had been a day of difficult movements and hard fighting beginning at about 0300, and both sides were relieved to see the fighting come to end. 

Brig. Gen. McNeil: I formed both brigades into a double line of battle. Price’s entire army formed and resolved themselves 

into a quadruple line, about 800 yards in front, and notwithstanding their line was made four deep, they outflanked me both 

to the right and to the left. I endeavored to charge and was gallantly supported in the effort by Colonel Benteen, but the 

utmost exertions of officers and men could not move the horses to a trot or a gallop. I steadily advanced in line at a walk 

toward the enemy, who continued to retire.110

Brig. Gen. Shelby: Slowly, slowly my old brigade was melting away... All that men could do had been done. For five 

days and nights Thompson’s and Slayback’s commands had fought and marched and marched and fought, and now, under 

concentrated and accumulated fire of heavy odds, the left of General Thompson’s brigade reeled back over the prairie, the 

Federals following with furious yells; but the right, under Colonel Elliott, met the advancing wave and broke their front 

line in every direction by charging furiously the rear of the enemy pressing hard after the left of Thompson’s brigade. Now 

Colonel Jackman, who had done his duty well in another part of the field, came rushing up to avenge his fallen comrades. 

Going into line at a gallop, and opening ranks to let the retreating brigade through, he charged down upon the rushing 

enemy like a thunderbolt, driving them back and scattering their front line badly. This charge saved us, and the day’s work 

done. The Federals halted, reformed their lines, brought up artillery, and fired away at long range. Very slowly the army 

moved away without molestation.111
164

Notes

1. Map and discussion based on information from several maps in O.R. Atlas, Plates 66 - 1 & 2 and Plate 161. 

2. The War of Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 491. 

Maj. Gen Curtis Report. Hereafter referred to as the O.R.

3. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part IV, 208. Maj. Gen Curtis telegram (1730) to Maj. Gen. Halleck.

4. O.R. ,Series I, Volume XLI, Part IV, 208. Maj. Gen Curtis telegram (1730) to Maj. Gen. Halleck. 

5. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 636. Maj. Gen. Price Report.

6. Lumir Buresh, The Battle of Mine Creek (Kansas City, MO: The Lowell Press, 1977). 

7. Howard Monnett, Action Before Westport (Kansas City, MO: Westport Historical Society, 1964), 128-129 (originally from Clement A. 

Evans ed., Confederate Military History, Vol. IX, “Missouri,”) 191-192.

8. Dr. Dean Nowowiejski, the Ike Skelton Distinguished Chair for the Art of War, coined the phrase the “fruits of their labor” during the 

execution of a Price’s Raid staff ride for the Art of War scholars. 

9. John Edwards, Shelby and His Men (Cincinnati, OH: Miami Printing and Publishing, 1867), 447.

10. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 609. Col. Ford’s Report. 

11. Major John Edwards served as Brig. Gen. Shelby’s adjutant during Price’s Missouri Campaign.

12. Edwards, Shelby and His Men, 471.

13. Map and discussion based on information from several maps in O.R. Atlas, Plates 66 – 1 &2 and Plate 161. 

14. Buresh, The Battle of Mine Creek, 67. Finneysville was a small farming community about 10 miles north of West Point.

15. James Blunt, “General Blunt’s Account of His Civil War Experiences,” The Kansas Historical Quarterly, Volume I, No. 3, May 

1932, 260-261. 

16. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 493. Maj. Gen. Curtis Report. 

17.Map and discussion based on information from a current USCGS map and the O.R. The road network is based upon O.R. Map plates 

66 and 161. I used a 1906 Map of Linn County for the additional secondary roads (map in the CSI files). 

18. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 409. Maj. William Plumb, 6th MSM Report. 

19. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 390. Brig. Gen. Sanborn Report. 

20. Report of Gen. W. L. Cabell’s Brigade, 11-12, Fort Leavenworth Library Digital Archives at http://cdm16084.contentdm.oclc.org/

cdm/ref/collection/p16084coll8/id/785 and CSI Westport files.

21. Richard Hinton was a captain in the 2d Kansas Volunteers (Colored) and served as an Aides-de-Camp on Maj. Gen. Curtis’ staff.

22. Richard Hinton, Rebel Invasion of Missouri and Kansas and the Campaign of the Army of the Border Against General Sterling Price 

in October and November 1864 (Ottawa, KS: Kansas Heritage Press, 1865 – reprint 1994), 194.

23. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 636. Maj. Gen. Price Report.

24. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 390-391. Brig. Gen. Sanborn Report. 

25. Report of Gen. W. L. Cabell’s Brigade. 11-12. 

26. These guns were the two-pounder Woodruff guns captured by the Confederates at Pilot Knob. The two-pounder guns were not very 

effective field guns. The average field gun in both armies fired shot weighing 10 to 12 pounds. It appears that one gun was captured near the 

mounds and the other near the ford. Maj. Gen. Rosecrans later awarded one of the guns to the 2d AR as a trophy. However, there is no record 

of either of the guns being used by the Union forces in their continued pursuit of Price.

27. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 404. Col. John Phelps. 

28. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 411. Maj. William Mitchell.

29. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 391. Brig. Gen. Sanborn Report. 

30. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 684. Brig. Gen. Clark Report. 

31. Hinton, Rebel Invasion of Missouri and Kansas, 203.

32. Col. John Phelps commanded the 2d Arkansas Cavalry (Union).

33. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 391. Brig. Gen. Sanborn Report. 

34. Lieut. Col. Davies commanded the 7th Missouri Cavalry in Clark’s Brigade.

35. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 696. Lieut. Col. Davies Report. 

36. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 391. Brig. Gen. Sanborn Report. 

37. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 696. Lieut. Col. Davies Report. 

38. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 494. Maj. Gen. Curtis Report. 

39. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 351-352. Colonel Philips Report. 

40. Lieutenant John Bennett serve in Company D, 8th Missouri Cavalry Regiment, Clark’s Brigade.

41. James McGhee, Campaigning with Marmaduke (Independence, MO: Two Trail Publishing, 2002), 26. 

42. Map and discussion based on information from the map on the Mine Creek Battlefield Foundation multi-fold historical pamphlet 

(Mine Creek Visitor Center).

43. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 391. Brig. Gen. Sanborn Report. 

44. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 691. Col. Greene’s Report. 

45. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 594. Col. Moonlight Report. 

46. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 636-637.Maj. Gen. Price Report. 
165

47. Map and discussion (for the Battle of Mine Creek Maps) based on information from Buresh, The Battle of Mine Creek; Jeffery D. 

Stalnaker, The Battle of Mine Creek (Charleston, SC; History Press, 2011); Mine Creek Battlefield Foundation multi-fold historical pamphlet 

(Mine Creek Visitor Center); Kip Lindberg, “Chaos Itself: The Battle of Mine Creek.” North & South Vol. 1, #6: 74-85.

48. Hinton, Rebel Invasion of Missouri and Kansas, 206.

49. John C. Darr, Private, Company E, Gordon’s Regiment Arkansas Cavalry, Cabell’s Brigade

50. John C. Darr, “Price’s Raid into Missouri,” Confederate Veteran, Volume XI (Nashville, TN: 1903), 361.

51. William Lees, Archaeology of the Mine Creek Civil War Battlefield (Topeka, KS: Kansas State Historical Society, 1998), 47-49. The 

study shows that Confederate artillery fired from the ridge north of Hwy 52.

52. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 691. Col. Greene Report.

53. Report of Gen. W. L. Cabell’s Brigade. 12. 

54. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 353. Col. Philips Report. 

55. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 684. Brig. Gen. Clark Report. 

56. The Confederate artillery consisted of: On the right, Hynson’s Texas Battery (2x 10pd Parrott guns); in the center, Harris’ Missouri 

Battery (2x 10pd Parrott guns and 1x 6pd smoothbore); also in the center was 1 gun from Hughey’s Arkansas Battery; and on the left was one 

section of Blocker’s Arkansas Battery under Lt. J.V. Zimmerman (likely 2x 6pd smoothbores).

57. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 684. Brig. Gen. Clark Report.

58. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 495. Maj. Gen. Curtis Report. 

59. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 602-603. Col. Blair Report. 

60. Darr, “Price’s Raid into Missouri,” 361.

61. Report of Gen. W. L. Cabell’s Brigade. 12. 

62. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 602-603. Col. Blair Report. 

63. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 603. Col. Blair Report. 

64. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 603. Col. Blair Report.

65. Hinton, Rebel Invasion of Missouri and Kansas, 209.

66. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 332. Lieut. Col. Benteen Report. 

67. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 353. Col. Philips Report. 

68. (4th IA), Buresh, The Battle of Mine Creek, 106; (10th MO) Charles Mills, Harvest of Barren Regrets, The Army Career of Frederick 

William Benteen (Glendale, CA: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1985), 79.

69. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 361. Lieut. Col. Lazear Report. Lieut. Col. Lazear commanded the 1st MSM at Mine Creek. 

70. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 332. Lieut. Col. Benteen Report. 

71. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 684. Brig. Gen. Clark Report. 

72. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 332. Lieut. Col. Benteen Report. 

73. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 336. Maj. Pierce Report. For additional information on Maj. Pierce and the 4th Iowa Cavalry see 

Lyman B. Pierce, History of the 2d Iowa Cavalry (Burlington, IA: Hawk-Eye Steam Book and Job Printing Establishment,1865) and William 

F. Scott, The Story of a Cavalry Regiment: The Career of the Fourth Iowa Veteran Volunteers (Iowa City, IA: Camp Pope Bookshop, 1992).

74. Darr, “Price’s Raid into Missouri,” 361.

75. William Forse Scott was the 4th Iowa’s regimental sergeant major. 

76. Buresh, The Battle of Mine Creek, 117. 

77. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 684. Brig. Gen. Clark Report. 

78. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 694. Col. Burbidge Report. 

79. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 336. Maj. Pierce Report. 

80. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 684. Brig. Gen. Clark Report. 

81. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 684. Brig. Gen. Clark Report. 

82. One on the lost guns was from Hughey’s Arkansas Btry which was fighting with Harris’ Btry.

83. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 352. Col. Philips Report. 

84. Lieut. Col. Lazear commanded the 1st MSM at Mine Creek. .

85. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 361. Lieut. Col. Lazear Report. 

86. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 691. Col. Greene Report. 

87. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 691. Col. Greene Report. 

88. Darr, “Price’s Raid into Missouri,” 361.

89. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 461. Capt. William Montgomery Report. 

90. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 336. Maj. Pierce Report.

91. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 352. Col. Philips Report. 

92. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 594. Col. Moonlight Report. 

93. Map and discussion based on information from a USGS map of the area and in sketch in Buresh, The Battle of Mine Creek, 139.

94. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 352. Col. Philips Report. 

95. Col. Robert Lawther commanded the 10th Missouri Cavalry, Clark’s Brigade, Marmaduke’s Division. 

96. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 698. Col. Lawther Report. 

97. Map and discussion based on information from a USGS map of the area and the O.R.

98. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 668. Brig. Gen. Thompson Report. 
166

99. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 594. Col. Moonlight Report. 

100. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 637. Maj. Gen. Price Report. 

101.Map and discussion based on information from a 1906 Linn County map and the sketch in the official records (Platte 66 -8). The 

Fort Scott Road and farm fields are my best estimate on their likely locations. I based the unit positions on the O.R. reports and the narrative 

in Buresh, The Battle of Mine Creek. 

102. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 372. Brig. Gen McNeil Report. 

103. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 668. Brig. Gen. Thompson Report. 

104. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 392. Brig. Gen. Sanborn Report. 

105. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 668-669. Brig. Gen. Thompson Report.

106. Map and discussion based on a USGS map for the base map and then based the roads on O.R. Map Plate 161. The location actual 

location of Douglas Ford is known. It was identified by a local Fort Scott historian and documented in the Nevada Daily Mail Paper (11 April 

1996). The location of the battlefield has not been specifically identified. Most sources say it was approximately 6 miles NW of the ford and 6 

miles east of Fort Scott. The area I have chosen is my best guess based on the descriptions of the creeks and hills on the battlefield. 

107. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 372. Brig. Gen. McNeil Report. 

108. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 660. Brig. Gen. Shelby Report. 

109.Map and discussion based on a USGS map for the base map. I based the unit locations and actions on the reports in the O.R., and 

Plate 66 in the O.R. maps.

110.O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 373. Brig. Gen. McNeil Report. 

111. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 660-661. Brig. Gen. Shelby Report. 
Part VII

The Second Battle of Newtonia and the Retreat

25 October 1864 to 2 June 1865
168

Map 69.
169

69. The Night of 25 October1

On 25 October, the fighting at Charlot’s Farm ended at sundown. Maj. Gen. Curtis wanted to continue the fight or at least 

set the conditions for an early morning pursuit but he failed to impose his will upon his exhausted Army. Maj. Gen. Pleasonton believed Fort Scott was only two miles to the west. He decided, despite Curtis’ protests, to move Philips’ and Sanborn’s 

Brigades there to replenish supplies and rest. Maj. Gen. Blunt’s Division arrived about this time and he fell in behind Pleasonton on the road to Fort Scott. A fatigued Curtis failed to coordinate a night attack with Blunt’s relatively fresh division or 

position them for an early morning pursuit. McNeil’s and Benteen’s tired soldiers collapsed on the ground where the day’s 

fighting ended and hoped that Pleasonton would send provisions from Fort Scott. Price’s Confederates were equally weary. 

They were in a desperate situation with about half the Army on the north bank of the river waiting for the wagons to cross 

over the ford. The last of the wagons did not complete the crossing until about midnight. Sometime that night, Price reached 

the conclusion that the “enormous and useless” wagon train was “the principal cause of their discomfiture and losses.”2 He 

recognized the Army needed to make a rapid retreat the next morning and finally decided to abandon and burn most of the 

wagons. He then ordered the Army to be ready to continue the retreat at 0200. 

Maj. Gen. Curtis: General Pleasonton told me that his troops were exhausted, and he was going to Fort Scott to rest and 

secure supplies. He was told, in my presence, it was only two or two miles and a half to Fort Scott, whereas in point of fact 

it must have been six. I protested against leaving McNeil and against any loss of distance in the march. I insisted on lying 

down on the grass and the advance to the right, and such was the cravings of hunger and the desire for rest, it seemed impossible to stop this movement to a place where both could be supplied. I sent word to General Blunt to hurry forward his 

division to support McNeil, but night soon came on, the battle ceased, and the lights of the burning prairie and the enemy’s 

burning wagon train near the timber of the Marmiton was all that appeared of the two contending armies.3

Maj. Gen. Price: The army will march to-morrow at 2 a. m. in the following order: First, Major-General Fagan’s division; 

second, army and ordnance train; third, Major-General Marmaduke’s division; fourth, Brigadier-General Shelby’s division. 

Major-General Fagan will detach a brigade to march on the right flank of the train. Colonel Tyler’s brigade will march 

on the right flank of the train in rear of the brigade of Major-General Fagan’s division. The army train, with the following 

exceptions, will be parked under directions of division commanders and burnt before leaving camp: First, one-half the army 

headquarters wagons; second, there is allowed to each division headquarters one wagon, with ambulance for commanding 

officer; third, one wagon for brigade headquarters; fourth, one wagon for each brigade; fifth, one medical wagon for each 

division; sixth, all the ordnance wagons absolutely required; seventh, all the ambulances and carriages (except buggies, 

which are to be burnt) will be turned over to the division quartermaster for the use of the division quartermaster for the use 

of the division surgeon, to be used only for conveying the sick and wounded; eighth, all the serviceable stock to be retained 

by the division and brigade quartermasters for use as may be required; ninth, no enlisted man under any circumstances to 

have a led horse.4
170

Map 70.
171

70. The Reteat5

At 0200 on 26 October, Price retreated south toward Carthage, Missouri, where he planned to obtain supplies. That 

night, the Confederates arrived at Carthage and Price allowed his men to rest. Late the next morning, the Army marched 

about 20 miles and camped on Shoal Creek. On the 28th, the Army passed through Newtonia and chased a small Union 

garrison out of town. Newtonia had a flour mill and was a good place to camp. Price decided to rest and refit his Army there 

for a couple of days. His rearguard reported no contact with Union forces on the 26th, 27th, or 28th, and Price concluded 

that the Union Army had abandoned the pursuit. The Union Army was slow to resume the pursuit. A major factor in the 

delay was the fatigue of the Union Army. However, the senior Union generals also had different understanding of Grant’s 

“let-alone policy.” 6 Pleasonton wired Maj. Gen. Rosecrans, “Price’s Army is routed.” Pleasonton also informed Rosecrans, 

“I shall pursue no further.”7 He wanted the Missouri Brigades returned to their home districts. Maj. Gen. Curtis remained determined to pursue and destroy Price’s Army. In short, Curtis had no intention of returning to the “let-alone policy” until he 

destroyed the offensive capability of the Confederate forces in the Trans-Mississippi and removed all future threats to Kansas. Pleasonton reluctantly acquiesced with the caveat that he personally was too ill to continue and that Brig. Gen. Sanborn 

would assume command of the division and remain in the pursuit. Maj. Gen. Blunt’s Division departed Fort Scott at noon 

on 26 October. McNeil’s Brigade fell in behind Blunt and Sanborn followed later that afternoon. Benteen’s Brigade did not 

depart Fort Scott until the next morning. The night of the 26th, the Union Army camped near Shanghai, Missouri. Early the 

next morning, Blunt resumed the pursuit and arrived in Carthage at about 1330. Col. Ford’s Brigade led the march the next 

morning and about 1,000 observed Price’s rearguard departing their Shoal Creek camp site. Col. Ford hastened his march 

and about 1,400 crested the ridge north of Newtonia. Back at Fort Scott, Pleasonton retained control of Col. Philips’ Brigade 

to watch over the Confederate prisoners from Mine Creek. On 28 October, Pleasonton along with Philips’ Brigade and the 

prisoners, departed Fort Scott and moved toward Warrensburg, Missouri. They had no further participation in the pursuit. 

Maj. Gen. Curtis: Although our joint commands are much broken and weary, after a few hours’ sleep and a careful reflection I feel still more duty and obligation I expressed to you last night of continuing the pursuit and assaults upon Price and 

his forces until we destroy him or get him beyond the Arkansas River and our command stationed at Fort Gibson and Fort 

Smith, [both garrisons in the Dept. of AR] which are liable to be overwhelmed by his numbers, are relieved and secure from 

his forces.8

Maj. Gen. Price: We marched over beautiful prairie roads, a distance of fifty-six miles, and encamped at Carthage, on 

Spring River... On the next morning at 9 o’clock, after giving the men and animals time to rest and feed, I resumed my line 

of march and encamped on Shoal Creek, a distance of twenty-two miles... No enemy having appeared the morale of the 

troops had considerably improved. On the morning of the 28th I resumed my line of march in the direction of Newtonia, 

Brigadier-General Shelby in advance, Major-Generals Fagan’s and Marmaduke’s divisions (the latter now commanded by 

Brigadier-General Clark) in the rear. On approaching Newtonia the advance of our forces was discovered by the Federal 

garrison, who commenced a retreat.9
172

Map 71.
173

71. Opening Shots at the Second Battle of Newtonia10

At about 1400, the Confederate rearguard formed near a cornfield to contest the Union attack. On the Union side, Ford 

positioned McLain’s battery on the ridge and opened fire on the Rebels. As he prepared the brigade to advance against the 

enemy, Brig. Gen. Blunt moved to the front and ordered a charge. The Union forces, “under the cover of the fire of the 

First Colorado Battery, posted upon the bluff... swept across the plain at a gallop until within musket-range of the enemy’s 

line.”11 Blunt had seized the initiative but he had drastically underestimated the size of the enemy force on the field. Blunt 

believed his attack only faced the Confederate rearguard and was “convinced of their intention to avoid a fight, if possible.”12

He also mistakenly believed the balance of Curtis’ Army was coming up behind him to support the charge. Nevertheless, 

Ford’s Brigade easily cleared the Rebel rearguard to the south toward the Confederate Camp. Fortunately for Blunt, Col. 

Jennison’s Brigade, temporarily commanded by Lieut. Col. Hoyt, moved up to support Blunt’s attack and brought with them 

a section of mountain howitzers. Blunt’s force then consisted of two small brigades and numbered approximately 1,000 

men. In the Confederate camp, Thompson’s Brigade had only recently returned to their camp after a hesitant response to a 

false alarm. The thunder of the Union artillery fire and the rearguard’s hasty retreat dispelled any thoughts of another false 

alarm. The aggressive Union attack had caught the Confederates by surprise and they had no time to collect and saddle the 

horses. However, Shelby ordered his division to form a dismounted battle line. The Southerners emerged from the camp and 

saw the Union brigades charging to the south. Both sides raced across the prairie to take up positions along the rail fences 

bordering the fields of Thomas McLain’s Farm. 

Col. Ford: I then pressed rapidly forward, and, upon reaching Granby, ascertained that they had just passed through and 

that Price’s whole army was doubtless at Newtonia, distant five miles. The advance soon reported that the enemy’s train was 

in sight and but few men visible. I hurried forward at a gallop, and when within two miles of the town saw the rear of the 

rebel train entering the woods beyond town on the Cassville road. The battery was immediately planted on the bluffs and 

commenced throwing shell, while the Sixteenth Kansas Cavalry and Second Colorado Cavalry were formed in two lines and 

ordered to charge down toward the enemy’s train, the charge being led by the major-general commanding First Division in 

person. We advanced at a gallop, with skirmishers in front, until we came upon the main body of the enemy, who was formed 

three lines deep and the front line dismounted.13

Brig. Gen. Thompson: We had been in camp but a few hours when our scouts reported that the main body of the enemy 

were approaching on the same road we had come. I was ordered to form the brigade on foot and proceed to meet them. I did 

so, and advanced into the prairie to a fence we were directed to form on; but soon we were notified that it was a false alarm 

and returned to our camps. We had scarcely commenced the ordinary duties of camp when we were again ordered out, and 

proceeding to the same place found the enemy drawn up before us on the opposite side of the small field.14
174

Map 72.
175

72. The Artillery Duel

At Thomas McLain’s farm, enclosed farm fields that were about 500 yards wide, separated the two forces. On the Union 

side, Blunt ordered McLain’s Battery of four 3-inch ordnance rifles off the hill to a position behind the center of the Union 

line. Hoyt positioned a mountain howitzer section of two guns at the rail fence. Shelby also brought artillery forward and 

positioned Collins’ Missouri Battery of two 10-pound Parrott Rifles on the Confederate right. The Leavenworth Daily Conservative stated, “The Battery which had been left with the 2d Brigade had remained on the hill, was now pressed forward. 

The battle opened fierce and furious. The enemy [Confederates] opened with three [two] guns. Their range was better than 

ours and the shells exploded in most dangerous proximity.”15 Initially, the two Confederate guns dominated the duel against 

the six Union guns. Blunt had positioned Capt. McLain’s battery behind the Union line and the Coloradans failed to find the 

range to the Rebel guns. They fired over the Confederate line and most of the shots went into Price’s camp. It was the small 

mountain howitzers that actually contested the Confederate guns. Col. Jennison later proudly reported that his mountain 

howitzers, “commencing a spirited and determined fire at a range of about 500 yards, the howitzers, under Sergeant Patterson, doing more efficient execution than at any previous action during the campaign.” 16 Nevertheless, Shelby’s accurate 

artillery fire disrupted the Union line. A Colorado trooper noted soon after the fight, “the rebels had planted a battery in their 

rear that was throwing shell with considerable precision into the midst of our troops but notwithstanding the fierce storm of 

leaden hail from the enemy’s guns, that thinned our ranks and stilled the pulsations of many a noble heart-they stood, firm 

and undaunted.”17 Despite the success of his artillery, Shelby recognized that the numerically superior Union guns would 

eventually overwhelm his small battery. Therefore, Shelby decided to take advantage of his superior numbers and attack. 

His battle line, Thompson’s and Jackman’s Brigades, overlapped the Union flanks. The actual strength of Shelby’s force 

is not known. Blunt estimated the Confederate strength at about 2,000. At Westport the two Confederate brigades fielded 

approximately 3,000 soldiers. However, at Newtonia, the remnants of the once proud division probably numbered between 

1,500 and 2,000. In this fight, the majority Confederates fought dismounted, although, Shelby did maintain two small detachments of mounted troopers on each flank. 

Maj. Gen. Blunt: I now ordered forward the First Colorado Battery, which, with a section of howitzers attached to the 

Fifteenth Kansas Cavalry, poured a destructive fire into the enemy’s ranks. It soon became evident that I was engaging all 

the available force of Price’s army, which outnumbered me.18

Brig. Gen. Shelby: Dismounting every man of my division, I formed my line of battle just in time to meet the onset. Jackman held the right and protected two pieces of Collins’ artillery, which opened immediately with good effect. Thompson and 

Slayback were on the left, and I sent a good detachment under Major Gordon to watch well my extreme left flank.19
176

Map 73.
177

73. The Confederate Charge

Shelby ordered Thompson and Jackman to charge across the field. The Confederates charged “forward with a loud and 

ringing cheer.”20 Thompson’s Brigade, with assistance from Jackman, gradually drove the Union line back and soon crossed 

over the fence on the northern edge of the field. Thompson continued the advance and used his mounted detachments to 

threaten the Union flanks. The fire of Patterson’s small mountain howitzers checked the Rebel advance against the Union 

right flank. One Union officer noted that, “the integrity of our line was as much ensured by the skill and energy of Sergeant 

Patterson and his light artillery.”21 However, the Rebel cavalry on Thompson’s right swung around the Union left flank. 

Blunt ordered the entire Union line to fall back and reform near Ritchey’s cornfield. McLain’s Battery quickly limbered and 

moved to the rear. The sight of the Union artillery retiring caused a near panic in the Union line and a few men in 15th and 

16th Kansas fled to the rear. The Confederates, emboldened by the perceived Union retreat, pressed forward with renewed 

determination. The Leavenworth Daily Conservative stated, “The enemy’s small arms fire was reserved as they pressed forward, which they did steadily until it told with serious effect. Our line fell back twice, fighting desperately.”22 Blunt reformed 

his line near Richey’s Cornfield and the renewed Union fire temporarily stopped the Confederate advance. A Union trooper 

noted, “When the order to fire was given, the long line of curling smoke, the rattling, cracking, crashing of the carbines in 

the hands of our men, that hurled leaden messengers of death into the ranks of the foe, and the deep thunder tones of our 

batteries, that belched forth shot and shell-spoke fall many traitor’s doom, and served to check their impetuous advance, and 

cause them to fall back in confusion but only to return to the charge with increased numbers and greater determination.”23

Shelby reorganized the Confederate line and advanced forward again to turn the Union left. Blunt worried that many of his 

units were running low on ammunition and was concerned he could not stop another attack. He ordered McLain’s Battery 

to reposition itself on the ridge northwest of Newtonia, and was about to order a general withdrawal when General Sanborn 

arrived to reinforce the hard-pressed Union line.

Maj. Gen. Blunt: A large force compelled me to fall back about 500 yards from my first line, which was done in good order, 

and the line reformed in the face of a terrific fire. The enemy pressed forward their center, but were promptly checked by the 

canister from the First Colorado Battery. It was now near sundown, and my command had been engaged near two hours and 

their ammunition nearly exhausted, while a large force of the enemy were pressing under cover of a corn-field around my left 

flank, and my force being too small to extend my line in that direction, I was about to direct my line to fall back and take position on the bluff, when very unexpectedly the brigade of General Sanborn, of General Pleasonton’s command, came up.24

Brig. Gen. Thompson: The firing commenced immediately, and in a few minutes our line bravely crossed the fence and 

advanced upon the enemy, crossing the field under a hot fire of artillery and small-arms, and drove the enemy into the open 

prairie. Not stopping at this second fence an instant, we advanced into the prairie and continued to drive the enemy, never 

letting them form to charge, which they endeavored to do. There was some mounted men on our right, but no supports near 

our rear, and I halted the line after we had advanced so far that we were exposed to flanking... While crossing the second 

fence in the advance the brave Colonel Smith leaped upon it to cheer his men on, and he was wounded in three places at 

the instant.25
178

Map 74.
179

74. The Last Fight

Near sundown, Maj. Gen. Curtis arrived on the battlefield with Brig. Gen. Sanborn’s Brigade and a section of artillery. 

Curtis helped to rally the Union line and later reported, “McLain’s battery, badly cut up, was falling back for safety under 

orders and some stragglers also, for the first time in this campaign, were ordered to face about and return to the support of 

our comrades.”26 Meanwhile, Blunt ordered Sanborn’s Brigade to occupy the left of the line and directed them to attack 

through the cornfield. Sanborn advanced his brigade forward “as fast as they could dismount and form.” His brigade crossed 

over the stone wall and into the field. The arrival of the reinforcements and Sanborn’s determined attack encouraged the 

entire Union line to renew the attack. The entire line surged forward and, “a triumphant cheer from the line announced that 

the enemy had turned and was falling back.”27 Shelby then recognized the futility of continuing the battle. The Union artillery now had eight guns on the field against two Confederate guns. They also had a fresh brigade in the fight and potentially 

more brigades approaching. Therefore, Shelby ordered a general withdrawal. About that time, a detachment of troops from 

Fagan’s division arrived, but it was too little and too late and the Rebels withdrew back into the Indian Creek woods. The 

opposing forces were exhausted and welcomed nightfall. Curtis and Blunt mutually agreed to resume the pursuit at daylight, 

and did not interfere with the Confederates retreat. Overtime, the participants greatly exaggerated the casualties sustained 

in the small battle and some reports show the Union losses at 400 killed or wounded with the total Confederate casualties 

at 250. However, the 5 November 1864 issue of the Leavenworth Daily Conservative accounted for only 18 killed and 95 

wounded in the Union force and the total Confederate casualties at less than 200.28 Both sides claimed victory at this second 

battle of Newtonia.29 Curtis described the battle as a “brilliant affair” where the enemy was “conquered and routed.”30 Blunt 

reported that the Rebels “abandoned the field and retreated rapidly under cover of the night.”31 On the other hand, Price 

stated, “Blunt was repulsed and driven across the prairie three miles with heavy loss.”32 Shelby’s report claimed, “Another 

beautiful victory had crowned the Confederate arms.”33 Shelby had fought a successful delaying action and at least temporarily saved the disintegrating Confederate Army from the Union pursuit. However, his tactical success did nothing to 

improve Maj. Gen. Price’s deteriorating situation. At best, the Second Battle of Newtonia was a draw. It proved to be the 

last battle in the campaign.

Col. Phelps: The brigade arrived at Newtonia, unexpected but most welcome. Blunt had there engaged the enemy, and was 

being signally defeated; his forces badly cut up and without ammunition were giving way, while the enemy, pouring in re-enforcements, were determined to pursue their advantage and reap it as [fast as] possible. But the arrival of the Third Brigade 

changed the aspect of affairs. In a moment the regiments were dismounted and thrown in line toward the most threatened 

point. Steadily they kept advancing; at their approach the enemy’s artillery was withdrawn and soon after their cavalry, 

heedless of the bugle that called to the charge, filed off by platoons, and left the historical field of Newtonia in Federal 

hands. The brigade remained in line until 9 p.m., amid the darkness. Thus in thirty-six hours they marched 104 miles and by 

their unexpected appearance turned a defeat into a victory.34

Maj. Gen. Price: This was the last we saw of the enemy.35
180

Map 75.
181

75. Command Crisis36

After the fight at Newtonia, Maj. Gen. Curtis wanted to resume the pursuit the next day. He ordered the divisions to 

be prepared to move out at 0300 on the 29th but there was “An honest difference of opinion” between Curtis and the senior leadership of the Missouri formations on the necessity of continuing the pursuit.37 Furthermore, Curtis stated that he 

occupied, “a debatable position as to my authority over troops.”38 He was constantly challenged by “General Rosecrans’ 

commanders” that they had “ever since we formed a junction, expressed a conviction that they had done enough.”39 Curtis shared with Maj. Gen. Halleck (Grant’s Chief of Staff) that he used, “argument, expostulation, and... the prerogatives 

of my rank” to hold the troops together and maintain the pursuit.40 These troublesome military relations between Curtis’ 

Department of Kansas and Maj. Gen. Rosecrans’ Department of Missouri continued to delay the pursuit. A full month of 

active campaigning had considerably worn down Rosecrans’ cavalry brigades. Rosecrans believed Price’s Army was completely defeated and no longer posed a threat to Missouri. He and his senior commanders assumed, “Price will be pursued 

by general starvation across the river, a most formidable enemy to him.”41 Rosecrans’ further thought that Price’s Army 

would disintegrate from desertions if left alone to its retreat. He, along with Maj. Gen. Pleasonton, saw no need to continue 

the pursuit and wanted the Missouri State Militia troops returned to their home districts. Additionally, Rosecrans received a 

telegram on 27 October from General-in-Chief Ulysses S. Grant directing, “What troops are not actually in pursuit of Price, 

or required to guard public stores in Missouri, should be brought to Saint Louis and prepared to assist General Thomas in 

West Tennessee.”42 Further complicating the situation, Maj. Gen. Canby, commander of The Division of West Mississippi 

and Rosecrans’ immediate superior, ordered Rosecrans, “to pursue with all his available force to the Arkansas River, or at 

least till Price encounters Steele and Reynolds.”43 Rosecrans decided that his orders to send troops to reinforce Maj. Gen. 

Thomas in Tennessee superseded Canby’s instructions to pursue Price. Therefore, he decided to end the Department of Missouri’s participation in the pursuit and recalled the Missouri Brigades. He sent instructions to Pleasonton to return Generals 

Sanborn’s and McNeil’s brigades of militia to their home districts and set the conditions for transferring the “Volunteers” 

troops to Tennessee. Rosecrans then directed Col. Benteen’s “Volunteer” brigade to remain with Maj. Gen. Curtis’ Army 

of the Border and continue in the pursuit of Price. On the morning of 29 October, Generals Sanborn and McNeil received 

a dispatch from Pleasonton instructing them of Rosecrans’ orders to return to their home districts. They informed Curtis 

and immediately departed for Springfield and Rolla. A disappointed and frustrated Curtis decided to cancel the pursuit. He 

informed Maj. Gen. Halleck that his one remaining division was insufficient force to continue the pursuit and that he would 

return his units to their home districts in Kansas.

At about midnight on the 29th, Curtis received word from Halleck to continue the pursuit. He interpreted that the “dispatch clearly overruled General Rosecrans’ order of the 27th... and justified... immediate exertions to recall the troops of 

General Rosecrans to the pursuit.”44 At 0100 on 30 October, Curtis recalled the Missouri brigades and ordered all units to 

concentrate at Cassville, Missouri. That same morning, Curtis wired Maj. Gen. Halleck of his determination to pursue and 

destroy Price’s Army. In the telegram, he stated, “The necessity of pushing Price’s forces beyond the Arkansas is so obvious, 

I have not hesitated to disregard department lines and act only in view of results which seem to involve the safety of our little 

garrisons in front, and the future peace of the inhabitants of Missouri, Kansas, and Arkansas.”45 Unfortunately for Curtis, 

the exhausted and worn out Missouri brigades had marched at a prompt pace toward their home districts and it would take 

time for them to receive the new orders and additional time to rejoin the pursuit. Price was unaware of the confusion in the 

Union command. Nevertheless, it was an almost miraculous reprieve for the already desperate Confederates. The Union 

command had inadvertently allowed Price a two-day head start to escape the pursuit. Accordingly, Price force-marched his 

Army toward the safety of the Arkansas River while the Union command decided on a course of action.

All vignettes here are from the Northern perspective.

Lieut. Gen. Grant (27 Oct 1864): Now that Price is on the retreat without the probability of his bringing up again, Rosecrans should forward all the troops he can to General Thomas. This ought to be done without delay. He has 6,000 or 8,000 

troops around Saint Louis, and within a few hours travel of it, that can start at once.46

Maj. Gen. Rosecrans (27 Oct 1864): Send Generals Sanborn and McNeil to the headquarters of their respective districts 

– the first to Springfield and the second to Rolla.47

Maj. Gen. Pleasonton (27 Oct 1864): Major-General Rosecrans has just telegraphed me instructions from Warrensburg 

to send Generals Sanborn’s and McNeil’s brigades to their respective districts at Springfield and Rolla, and to conduct the 
182

remaining brigades with the captured prisoners and property of their commands to Warrensburg. I shall therefore start 

to-morrow morning to execute these orders.48

Maj. Gen. Halleck (28 Oct 1864): General Grant thinks you [Rosecrans] can and ought to send troops to assist General 

Thomas. The latter wishes that any you can spare should go up the Tennessee River, if possible, as far as Eastport, under 

convoy of gun-boats. Communicate with him at Nashville.49

Maj. Gen. Curtis (29 Oct 1864): After our victory last night I started the troops at 3 o’clock this a. m. in farther pursuit 

of Price, General McNeil in advance, when orders from General Rosecrans, through General Pleasonton, were received, 

taking General McNeil to Rolla and General Sanborn to Springfield... I am left with only the fragment of my own regular 

volunteers, not exceeding 1,000 fit for duty, and deeming it improper to continue a pursuit in another department, suspended 

by its proper commander, I shall return by slow marches to my own department command.

50

Col. Benteen (29 Oct 1864): I have learned from couriers that you [Maj. Gen. Curtis] had left there and en route for 

Newtonia; that the commands of Generals McNeil and Sanborn had gone toward Springfield. My command is nearly worn 

down; can scarcely get many of the horses along. I wish to know in writing whether I shall join you, as directed by orderly 

yesterday, or whether I shall return, via Springfield, to Saint Louis, thence to Memphis, where the brigade I have the honor 

to command belongs.51

Maj. Gen. Halleck (29 Oct 1864): Lieutenant-General Grant desires that Price be pursued to the Arkansas River, or at 

least until he encounters General Steele or General Reynolds.52

Maj. Gen. Curtis (30 Oct 1864): Dispatches just received from Lieutenant-General Grant require me to continue the pursuit of Price to the Arkansas River. You [Sanborn, McNeil, and Philips] will therefore proceed forthwith to Cassville, by the 

nearest and best route, reporting to me at that place. This countermands all orders received by you from Generals Rosecrans 

and Pleasonton, concerning a retrograde movement.53

Maj. Gen. Curtis (30 Oct 1864): “Dispatches just received from Lieutenant-General Grant require me to continue the 

pursuit of Price to the Arkansas River. You [Lieut. Col. Benteen] will, therefore, proceed forthwith to Cassville by the nearest and best route, reporting to me with your command at that place. As long as horses can stand on their feet they must be 

considered fit for duty.”54

Brig. Gen. Sanborn (30 Oct 1864): General Curtis has just dispatched that he is directed by Lieutenant-General Grant 

to pursue the enemy to the Arkansas, and orders me to send my force to Cassville at once. I do not think General Curtis’s 

order is legitimate under the circumstances. What is your desire or orders in the case? I am getting prisoners fast here and 

I think doing more than I can possibly do in the pursuit. Most of the stock sent farther in pursuit will be a total loss to the 

Government. Price will be pursued by General Starvation across the river - a most formidable enemy to him.55

Maj. Gen. Halleck (31 Oct 1864): “The orders of General Grant and General Canby are that the pursuit must be continued to the Arkansas River, or until you [Rosecrans] meet the forces of Generals Steele and Reynolds. These orders must be 

obeyed.”56

Maj. Gen. Rosecrans (31 Oct 1864): “Your dispatch says that you repeat the orders. The commanding general can be 

assured that it is not necessary to repeat orders to me in order to have them obeyed. The preliminary order was given immediately on the receipt of your first orders and the details arranged yesterday.”57

Maj. Bond (31 Oct 1864): “The general commanding [Rosecrans] directs that you [Sanborn] move at once with your 

command to Cassville and open communications with General Curtis.”58

184

Map 76.
185

76. The Retreat to the Arkansas River

On 30 October, Curtis resumed the pursuit. He initially moved slowly to allow time for the Missouri brigades to rejoin 

the effort. On 1 November, Benteen joined with Curtis near Keetsville (today’s Washburn). However, the other Missouri 

Brigades responded with less alacrity and never managed to rejoin the pursuit. Meanwhile, Price struggled to hold his 

exhausted and demoralized Army together. He contended with rough terrain, bad weather, and a lack of resources. On 1 

November, the Confederate army limped into Cane Hill, Arkansas and acquired a modest resupply of food. Fagan asked 

permission to assist Rebel guerillas in an attack against the Union garrison at Fayetteville. Along with a detachment of Shelby’s men, Fagan moved to Fayetteville but failed to capture the Union entrenchments. On 3 November, Fagan learned of the 

approach of Curtis’ Army and abandoned the half-hearted effort against Fayetteville. Price rested his men at Cane Hill for 

several days. However, the failure at Fayetteville and the word that Union Army had resumed the pursuit all but destroyed 

what remained of the Confederate morale. Most of the Arkansas conscripts deserted and Price disbanded the brigades of 

Freeman, Dobbin, and McCray. He also released Jackman’s Brigade and Slayback’s Battalion on a temporary furlough. 

Price learned that the Union garrisons at Little Rock and Fort Smith had been heavily reinforced. He decided to avoid the 

Union garrisons by moving through the Indian Territory. He wanted to cross the Arkansas River west of Fort Smith. Curtis 

doggedly followed behind the retreating Confederates, capturing and paroling (with the promise that they will not take 

up arms again against the captors) hundreds of Rebel stragglers along his route. On 3 November, Halleck clarified Curtis’ 

authority and stated in an official order, “The Secretary of War directs that you assume command of all troops belonging to 

the Department of the Missouri and now serving on the western border of that State and pursue Price toward the Arkansas 

River.”59 Unfortunately, the order did not reach the appropriate senior commanders in time to influence the operation. On 7 

November, the pitiful remnants Price’s Army, only five seriously understrength brigades, remained and crossed the Arkansas 

River at Pheasant Ford. The next morning, Curtis arrived at the crossing site and acknowledged that Price had escaped into 

Confederate Territory. He decided to abandon the pursuit and send his units back to their home districts. 

Maj. Gen. Curtis: ...resumed the march early on the 8th... Colonel Harrison [Department of Arkansas Troops] now had 

the advance and pushed forward with great vigor to the timber, far in our advance, which proved to be the timber skirting 

the Arkansas River. A few of the rebel rear guard were driven beyond the stream, and bringing up McLain’s battery, we 

shelled the timber on the south side. Some of our troops crossed over and exchanged a few shots as they supposed with the 

last of Price’s army. Our work was accomplished, and the shout that went up from the Army of the Border and the roar of 

our cannon resounded through the gloomy forests of the Arkansas, carrying to the camp of the starving enemy beyond our 

parting farewell.60

Brig. Gen. Shelby: Our retreat was continued to Cane Hill unmolested and undisturbed. At Cane Hill, in the midst of a 

pelting snow-storm, I furnished a detail of 500 men, under Colonel Elliott, and Collins’ battery, to report to General Fagan 

for an attack upon Fayetteville. He complimented them for their gallantry and courage, and they rejoined me the next day 

after making the fight. With as much rapidity and comfort as possible the march was continued to the Arkansas River.61
186

Map 77.
187

77. The End of the Campaign

After crossing the Arkansas River, Price’s Army retreated south through Indian Territory. In the territory, Maj. John 

Edwards stated, “the horrors of defeat, hunger, and the pestilence” consumed the Army.62 Col. Colton Greene recalled, “the 

severest privations and sufferings during the march through the Indian Territory.” He also remembered, “for twenty-five 

days our animals were without forage,” and “the loss in animals was very heavy.”63 On 10 November, Price furloughed 

Cabell’s and Slemmons’ brigades to return to their home districts. The next day, he released the remnants of Thompson’s 

Brigade to recuperate on the Canadian River. On 15 November, Price ordered Maj. Gen. Fagan to establish a headquarters 

at Washington, Arkansas and reconstitute his disbanded division. Thirteen days later, Shelby and Thompson rejoined what 

remained of the once proud Army of Missouri at Clarksville, Texas. Price’s remaining force numbered less than 3,000 and 

consisted primarily of Shelby’s old brigade (Thompson), Clark’s Brigade, and Tyler’s Brigade. Then, on 2 December, Price 

shifted his headquarters to Laynesport, Arkansas, and the expedition officially ended. In his official report, Maj. Gen. Price 

claimed the results of “my operations in Missouri are of the most gratifying character.” His commander, General Kirby 

Smith, stated in his report, “The movement of General Price accomplished all the objects for which it was inaugurated by 

me.”64 He also claimed, “A concentration of the enemy’s forces in Missouri was compelled; of his soldiers were employed 

there, and troops en route for Sherman’s army were diverted from that destination and sent to operate in that State.” 65 Both 

Price and Smith were excessively optimistic in their reports. Price failed to capture either St. Louis or Jefferson City. The 

people of Missouri staged no popular uprising against “the mercenary hordes of the North” and held no elections to inaugurate a new Confederate Governor.66 Price claimed, “Missouri property to the amount of $10,000,000 in value” was destroyed 

by his men.67 However, the vast capabilities of the Union quickly rebuilt the destroyed railroads and bridges. Price did bring 

back into Confederate Arkansas at least 5,000 new recruits. However, most were untrained and unarmed, and they were poor 

compensation for the almost irreparable damage done to Cabell’s, Thompson’s, and Clark’s veteran cavalry brigades. Maj. 

Gen. John Magruder, commander of the Confederate District of Arkansas, stated, “General Price’s army is totally demoralized” and was practically unarmed “with fewer arms by 5,000 or 6,000 stand than he took with him.”68 Price acknowledged 

Magruder’s assessment and reported his command was, “much exhausted, not one-half of them mounted, nor over a third 

armed.”69 At the strategic level, Price’s operation accomplished little in an effort to alter the desperate strategic situation 

of the Confederacy. Most of the Union forces that participated in the campaign came from Missouri and Kansas, and they 

were not slated for reassignment to the east. Union authorities did divert two infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade of 

the XVI Corps away from operations in Tennessee to reinforce Missouri. However, the temporary diversion of assets had 

little impact on the large Union armies fighting in Tennessee, Georgia, and Virginia. Maj. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman captured Atlanta in early September a few weeks before Price moved into Missouri. Operations in Missouri may have 

slightly delayed Sherman’s decision to march to the sea. He wanted Maj. Gen. Andrew Smith’s hard marching XVI Corps 

to reinforce Maj. Gen. George Thomas’ forces in Tennessee before he departed. Nevertheless, he departed for Savannah 

on 15 November 1864, and the XVI Corps arrived in time to participate the battles around Nashville (15-16 December, 

1864). In Louisiana, Maj. Gen. Edward Canby’s decision to reinforce Arkansas with the 2d Division, XIX Corps may have 

contributed to the delayed capture of Mobile, Alabama by a few months. The eastern newspapers barely mentioned Price’s 

Expedition and the operation had no effect on the Federal National elections. The electorate overwhelmingly voted for the 

reelection of Abraham Lincoln and ended any hope the Confederacy had for a negotiated settlement. Ironically, the Confederate operation significantly influenced the local elections in Missouri and Kansas against those with Southern sympathies. 

The Radical Republicans in both states took control of the state governments. Those same pro-Union sympathies worked 

against the Rebel guerillas in Missouri, who recognized that most Missouri citizens now supported the Union. The guerillas 

lost hope in a Confederate Missouri and their activities greatly diminished. After Price’s failure, the citizens of Missouri 

and Kansas primarily read about the war being fought in Georgia and Virginia. The war had moved away from their homes. 

However, the fruits of victory were not kind to the senior Union commanders in the campaign. Lieut. Gen. Grant transferred Maj. Gen. Steele, the commander of the Department of Arkansas, to Texas. He blamed Steele for allowing the Confederates to cross over the Arkansas River into Missouri, and again for allowing the Rebels to escape back over the Arkansas 

River to safety. Grant relieved Maj. Gen. Rosecrans, the commander of the Department of Missouri, for supposedly allowing a Confederate Army to rampage through Missouri and then escape into Arkansas. Grant’s personal dislike of Rosecrans 

probably influenced the decision. Even Maj. Gen. Curtis failed to see any honors from the campaign. Curtis, more than his 

peers, campaigned against Price to ensure the “future peace of the inhabitants of Missouri, Kansas, and Arkansas.”70 His 

determination contributed greatly to the destruction of the offensive capability of the Confederate Trans-Mississippi and did 
188

bring peace to Missouri and Kansas. Nevertheless, Grant reorganized the commands west of the Mississippi and transferred 

Curtis to the Department of the Northwest. 

Generals Kirby Smith’s and Sterling Price’s goals for the Missouri Expedition proved to be “larger in its aims than our 

resources may suffice to compass.”71 Price’s bold invasion of Missouri, his “just and holy cause,” stalled very early in its 

course at the walls of Fort Davidson – the Battle of Pilot Knob. 72 There, the Union defenders bought the time needed to save 

St. Louis. Price’s costly and hollow victory at Pilot Knob convinced him to turn away from St. Louis. Price then failed to 

move rapidly against Jefferson City and his almost lethargic movement to the west doomed any hope of taking the Missouri 

capital. His decision to bypass Jefferson City transformed the invasion into a raid. The Confederates’ hope of a successful 

raid into Kansas died at Westport. Maj. Edwards, Shelby’s Adjutant, stated, “Westport was the turning point in the expedition... up to this time nothing of consequence had been accomplished, after it were the horrors of defeat.”73 After Westport, 

the raid transitioned into a retreat with the limited goal of returning to Arkansas with immense wagon train of captured and 

pillaged supplies. The Union victory at Mine Creek destroyed even the limited goal of returning to Arkansas with the “fruits 

of their labor.” After the Confederate disaster at Mine Creek, the retreat transitioned into little more than a rout. Curtis had 

the opportunity to completely destroy Price’s Army of Missouri at Charlot’s Farm and again at Newtonia. However, “An 

honest difference of opinion,” between Curtis and “General Rosecrans’ commanders” prevented the Union from achieving a 

decisive battlefield victory and the destruction of Price’s Army.74 Curtis’ failure to destroy Price’s Army in one last climatic 

battle destined the “short but eventful campaign” to quickly fade from the public view in 1864 and to be almost lost from 

history of the American Civil War.75

Maj. Gen. Curtis: The object of this organization and campaign is accomplished. The rebel army under General Sterling 

Price has been confronted, beaten in several conflicts, pursued and driven over 350 miles, from the Missouri to the Arkansas. This has been the work of fourteen days. Your marches have been incessant, sometimes for days and nights, in rain 

and snow, and generally on short rations, gathered from the herds lost by the enemy. Your privations, toil, and gallantry 

deserve the highest commendation, and the success of the campaign in which you have so gloriously participated, most of 

you from the beginning to the end, must entitle you to the thanks of your Government and the gratitude of the loyal people 

of our country. Your losses are considerable, but nothing in comparison with those of the enemy, who admits of a loss in 

killed, wounded, and missing of 8,000 or 10,000. All his cannon, too, a large portion of his small-arms, his vast wagon train 

loaded with spoils, and herds of cattle and horses, have been left, burned, and scattered, in the way of your pursuit. His army 

of 20,000 or 30,000 is converted into an unarmed, disorganized mob, destitute of everything, starving with hunger and far 

from supplies. Their condition is indeed so desperate as to excite pity rather than exultation. But the greatest achievement 

of this campaign is the driving a desperate class of vagrant associates of rebels so far from your homes and the State you 

defend. Besides this your stern resistance and close pursuit saved the towns and garrisons of Kansas City, Olathe, Paola, 

Fort Scott, Fayetteville, Fort Gibson, and Fort Smith, and the valuable public stores of those places, besides checking ulterior purposes of slaughter and desolation contemplated by the invasion of Kansas. But it would tarnish the brilliancy of your 

achievements to claim this for yourselves alone without acknowledging with gratitude the share borne in the brunt of the 

contest by the troops of Missouri and the militia of Kansas, who shared our dangers, and because of their greater numbers, 

especially deserve more of the honors due to the conflicts of the 24th, 25th, and 28th of October. But to you, including the 

brigade of Colonel Benteen, who have shared in most of these battles and continued throughout the long weary pursuit to 

the dark and turbid waters of the Arkansas, where your guns thundered in the rear of the starving, terrified enemy, must be 

accorded the special commendation of the commanding general and the generous approval of your country... The pursuit of 

Price in 1864, and the battles of Lexington, Little Blue, Big Blue, Westport, Marais des Cygnes, Osage, Charlot, and Newtonia will be borne on the banners of regiments who shared in them, and the States of Missouri, Iowa, Kansas, Colorado, 

Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Arkansas may glory in the achievements of their sons in this short but eventful campaign.76

Maj. Gen. Price: In conclusion, permit me to add that in my opinion the results flowing from my operations in Missouri 

are of the most gratifying character. I marched 1,434 miles; fought forty-three battles and skirmishes; captured and paroled 

over 3,000 Federal officers and men; captured 18 pieces of artillery, 3,000 stand of small-arms, 16 stand of colors that 

were brought out by me (besides many others that were captured and afterward destroyed by our troops who took them), 

at least 3,000 overcoats, large quantities of blankets, shoes, and ready-made clothing for soldiers, a great many wagons 

and teams, large numbers of horses, great quantities of subsistence and ordnance stores. I destroyed miles upon miles of 

railroad, burning the depots and bridges; and taking this into calculation, I do not think I go beyond the truth when I state 

that I destroyed in the late expedition to Missouri property to the amount of $10,000,000 in value. On the other hand, I lost 

10 pieces of artillery, 2 stand of colors, 1,000 small-arms, while I do not think I lost 1,000 prisoners, including the wounded 

left in their hands and others than recruits on their way to join me, some of whom may have been captured by the enemy. I 

brought with me at least 5,000 new recruits, and they are still arriving in large numbers daily within our lines, who bring 
the cheering intelligence that there are more on their way to the army. After I passed the German settlements in Missouri my 

march was an ovation. The people thronged around us and welcomed us with open hearts and hands. Recruits flocked to our 

flag in such numbers as to threaten to become a burden instead of a benefit, as they were mostly unarmed. In some counties 

the question was not who should go to the army, but who should stay at home. I am satisfied that could I have remained in 

Missouri this winter the army would have been increased 50,000 men.77
190

Notes

1. Map and discussion based on information from the O.R; Larry Wood, The Two Civil War Battles of Newtonia (Charleston, SC: 

History Press, 2010).

2. Howard Monnett, Action Before Westport (Kansas City, MO: Westport Historical Society, 1964), 128-129 (originally from 

Clement A. Evans ed., Confederate Military History, Vol. IX, “Missouri,”), 191-192.

3. The War of Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume XLI, Part 

I, 502. Maj. Gen. Curtis Report. Hereafter referred to as the O.R.

4. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part IV, 1013-14. GENERAL ORDERS, HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF MISSOURI, Numbers 22. 

Camp Numbers 52, October 25, 1864. Maj. Gen. Price Report.

5. Map and discussion based on information from O.R. Atlas, Map Plate 160 and 161.

6. O.R., Series I, Volume XXXVIII, Part I, 2. Grant’s General Report of 1865.

7. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part IV, 274. Maj. Gen. Pleasonton dispatch to Maj. Gen. Rosecrans (dated 26 Oct).

8. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 339. Copy of Curtis dispatch to Pleasonton in Maj. Gen. Pleasonton’s Report.

9. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 637. Maj. Gen. Price Report. http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/records/list.cfm

10. Map and discussion based on information from the National Register of Historic Places for the Second Battle of Newtonia 

Site. (NRNE007) dated October 1990. Unit placement based upon the same document, plus the O.R., and Larry Wood, The Two Civil 

War Battles of Newtonia (Charleston, SC: History Press, 2010).

11. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 577. Maj. Gen. Blunt Report.

12. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 577. Maj. Gen. Blunt Report.

13. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 609-610. Col. Ford Report.

14. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 669. Brig. Gen. Thompson Report.

15. Leavenworth Daily Conservative, Nov. 5, 1864, p. 2 col. 1-5, http://www.history-sites.com/cgi-bin/bbs62x/mocwmb/arch_

config.pl?md=read;id=4366.

16. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 587-588. Brig. Gen. Sanborn Report.

17. Wood, The Two Civil War Battles of Newtonia, 125.

18. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 577. Maj. Gen. Blunt Report.

19. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 661. Brig. Gen. Shelby Report.

20. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 661. Brig. Gen. Shelby Report.

21. Richard Hinton, Rebel Invasion Of Missouri And Kansas And The Campaign Of The Army Of The Border Against General 

Sterling Price In October And November 1864 (Ottawa, KS: Kansas Heritage Press, 1865 – reprint 1994), 268.

22. Leavenworth Daily Conservative, Nov. 5, 1864, p. 2 col. 1-5, http://www.history-sites.com/cgi-bin/bbs62x/mocwmb/arch_

config.pl?md=read;id=4366.

23. Wood, The Two Civil War Battles of Newtonia, 125.

24. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 577-578. Maj. Gen. Blunt Report.

25. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 669. Brig. Gen. Thompson Report.

26. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 508. Maj. Gen. Curtis Report.

27. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 392. Brig. Gen. Sanborn Report.

28. Leavenworth Daily Conservative, Nov. 5, 1864, p. 2 col. 1-5. 

29. The First Battle of Newtonia was fought on 30 September 1862. In the small battle, the 1st Brigade of the Department of 

Kansas fought against a Confederate Indian Brigade. The battle was a Confederate victory. 

30. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 508. Maj. Gen. Curtis Report.

31. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 577-578. Maj. Gen. Blunt Report.

32. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 637-638. Maj. Gen. Price Report.

33. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 661. Brig. Gen. Shelby Report.

34. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 405. Col. Phelps.

35. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 637-638. Maj. Gen. Price Report.

36. Map and discussion based on information from: the O.R; Wood, The Two Civil War Battles of Newtonia.

37. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 513. Maj. Gen. Curtis Report.

38. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part IV, 330-331. Maj. Gen. Curtis telegram (30 Oct) to Maj. Gen. Halleck.

39. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part IV, 330-331. Maj. Gen. Curtis telegram (30 Oct) to Maj. Gen. Halleck.

40. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part IV, 330-331. Maj. Gen. Curtis telegram (30 Oct) to Maj. Gen. Halleck.

41. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part IV, 334. Brig. Sanborn telegram to Maj. Gen. Rosecrans.

42. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part IV, 274. Maj. Gen. Halleck telegram to Maj. Gen. Rosecrans.

43. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part IV, 263. Maj. Gen. Halleck telegram to Lieut. Gen. Grant (27 Oct).

44. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 511. Maj. Gen. Curtis Report.

45. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part IV, 330-331. Maj. Gen. Curtis telegram (30 Oct) to Maj. Gen. Halleck.

46. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part IV, 263. Liuet. Gen. Grant telegram (27 Oct) to Maj. Gen. Halleck.
191

47. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part IV, 277. Maj. Gen. Rosecrans telegram (27 Oct) to Maj. Gen. Pleasonton. Actual message 

sent and signed by Rosecrans’ chief of staff, Co. John V Du Bois. 

48. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part IV, 287. Maj. Gen. Pleasonton telegram to Maj. Gen. Curtis.

49. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part IV, 297. Maj. Gen. Halleck telegram to Maj. Gen. Rosecrans (28 Oct).

50. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 511. Maj. Gen. Curtis Report.

51. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part IV, 318-319. Lieut. Col. Benteen dispatch to Maj. Gen. Curtis telegram (29 Oct).

52. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 511. Maj. Gen. Halleck telegram to Maj. Gen. Curtis.

53. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 511. Maj. Gen. Curtis Report.

54. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part IV, 333. Maj. Gen. Curtis dispatch to Lieut. Col. Benteen (30 Oct).

55. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part IV, 334. Brig. Gen. Sanborn telegram to Maj. Gen. Rosecrans.

56. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part IV, 343. Maj. Gen. Halleck telegram to Maj. Gen. Rosecrans.

57. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part IV, 343. Maj. Gen. Rosecrans telegram to Maj. Gen. Halleck.

58. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part IV, 351. Maj. Frank Bond (Maj. Gen. Rosecrans Aide-de-Camp) telegram to Brig. Gen. 

Sanborn.

59. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part IV, 420. Maj. Gen. Halleck telegram (3 Nov) to Maj. Gen. Curtis.

60. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 516-517. Maj. Gen. Curtis Report.

61. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 661. Brig. Gen. Shelby Report.

62. John Edwards, Shelby and His Men (Cincinnati, OH: Miami Printing and Publishing, 1867), 384.

63. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 692. Col. Greene Report.

64. O.R., Series I, Volume XLVIII, Part I, 1428. Gen. Kirby Smith Report.

65. O.R., Series I, Volume XLVIII, Part I, 1428. Gen. Kirby Smith Report.

66. O.R., Series I, Volume III, Brig. Gen. McCulloch description of the Union forces in Missouri.

67. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 640. Maj. Gen. Price Report.

68. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part IV, 1052 & 1098. Maj. Gen. Magruder correspondence with Confederate War Department. 

69. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part IV, 1077. Maj. Gen. Price correspondence with Magruder. 

70. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part IV, 330-331. Maj. Gen. Curtis telegram (30 Oct) to Maj. Gen. Halleck.

71. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part II, 1023. Secretary of War, J. Seldon correspondence with Braxton Bragg.

72. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 729. Gen. Kirby Smith’s order to Maj. Gen. Price. 

73. Edwards, Shelby and His Men, 465, 482-484.

74. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 513. Maj. Gen. Curtis Report, and O.R.,Series I, Volume XLI, Part IV, 330-331. Maj. Gen. 

Curtis telegram (30 Oct) to Maj. Gen. Halleck.

75. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 517-518. Maj. Gen. Curtis Report.

76. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 517-518. Maj. Gen. Curtis Report.

77. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, 640. Maj. Gen. Price Report.

193

Appendix A1

Organization of the Army of Missouri

(Confederate States of America)

Maj. Gen. Sterling Price

1st Missouri Division (Marmaduke’s Division)

Maj. Gen. John S. Marmaduke (captured)

Brig. Gen. John B. Clark, Jr.

Escort

Company D, 5th Missouri Cavalry: Capt. D. R. Stallard

Advance (Scouting Company): Capt. Page

Clark’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. John B. Clark, Jr.; Col. Colton Green 

3d Missouri Cavalry Regiment: Col. Colton Greene

4th Missouri Cavalry Regiment: Col. John Q. Burbridge

7th Missouri Cavalry Regiment: Col. Solomon Kitchen

8th Missouri Cavalry Regiment: Col. William L. Jeffers

10th Missouri Cavalry Regiment: Col. Robert R. Lawther

14th Missouri Cavalry Battalion: Lieut. Col. Robert C. Wood

Davies’ (Missouri) Cavalry Battalion: Lieut. Col. J. F. Davies2

Freeman’s Brigade: Col. Thomas R. Freeman

Freeman’s (Missouri) Cavalry Regiment: Lieut. Col. Joseph R. Love

Fristoe’s (Missouri) Cavalry Regiment: Col. Edward T. Fristoe

Ford’s (Arkansas) Cavalry Battalion: Lieut. Col. Barney Ford

Hynson’s (Texas) Battery: Capt. H. C. Hynson – three guns

Harris’ (Missouri) Battery: Lieut. T. J. Williams – two guns

Engineer Company, Capt. James T. Rogane
194

3d Missouri Division (Shelby’s Division)

Brig. Gen. Joseph O. Shelby

Advance (Scouts): Capt. A. C. McCoy

Shelby’s Iron Brigade / Thompson’s Brigade: Col. David Shanks (KIA) / Brigadier Gen. M. Jeff Thompson

5th Missouri Cavalry Regiment: Col. B. Frank Gordon

11th Missouri Cavalry Regiment: Col. Moses W. Smith

12th Missouri Cavalry Regiment: Lieut. Col. W. H. Erwin

Elliott’s (Missouri) Cavalry Regiment (also called 1st): Col. Benjamin Elliott

Slayback’s (Missouri) Cavalry Battalion: Lieut. Col. Alonzo W. Slayback3

Johnson’s Cavalry Battalion: Maj. Rector Johnson

Crisp’s Cavalry Battalion: Lieut. Col. John T. Crisp

Collin’s (2d Missouri) Battery (one section): Capt. Richard A. Collins – two guns

Jackman’s Brigade: Col. Sidney D. Jackman

Jackman’s (Missouri) Cavalry Regiment: Lieut. Col. C. H. Nichols4

Hunter’s (Missouri) Cavalry Regiment: Col. DeWitt C. Hunter

William’s (Missouri) Cavalry Battalion: Lieut. Col. D. A. Williams5

Schnable’s (Missouri) Cavalry Battalion: Lieut. Col. John A. Schnable6

Collin’s (2d Missouri) Battery (one section): Lieut. Jacob D. Connor

Tyler’s Brigade: Col. Charles H. Tyler

Coffee’s (Missouri) Cavalry Regiment: Col. John T. Coffee

Perkin’s (Missouri) Cavalry Regiment: Col. Caleb Perkins7

Searcy’s (Missouri) Cavalry Regiment: Col. James J. Searcy8

Unattached

46th Arkansas Infantry Regiment (mounted): Col. W. O. Coleman

Capt. William’s Regiment of Armed Recruits: Capt. Williams9
195

1st Arkansas Division (Fagan’s Division)

Maj. Gen. James F. Fagan

1st Arkansas Brigade (Cabell’s Brigade): Brigadier Gen. William L. Cabell (captured); Lieut. Col. A. V. Reiff

Monroe’s (1st Arkansas) Cavalry Regiment: Col. James C. Monroe

Morgan’s (2d Arkansas) Cavalry Regiment: Col. Thomas J. Morgan

Gordon’s (4th Arkansas) Cavalry Regiment: Col. Anderson Gordon

Hill’s (7th Arkansas) Cavalry Regiment: Col. John F. Hill / Maj. J. L. Adams

Gunter’s (Arkansas) Cavalry Battalion: Lieut. Col. Thomas M. Gunter

Harrell’s (17th Arkansas) Cavalry Battalion: Lieut. Col. John M. Harrell

Witherspoon’s (13th Arkansas) Cavalry Battalion: Maj. J. L. Witherspoon

Hughey’s (Arkansas) Battery: Capt. W. M. Hughey – two guns

2d Arkansas Brigade (Slemmons’ Brigade): Col. W. F. Slemmons (captured); Col. William A. Crawford

2d Arkansas Cavalry Regiment: Lieut. Col. T. W. Jackman

Crawford’s (10th Arkansas) Cavalry Regiment: Col. William A. Crawford10

Carlton’s (Arkansas) Cavalry Regiment: Lieut. Col. R. H. Thompson11

Wright’s (12th Arkansas) Cavalry Regiment: Col. John C. Wright

Dobbin’s Brigade: Col. Archibald S. Dobbin

Dobbin’s (Arkansas) Cavalry Regiment: Maj. Samuel Corley

McGhee’s (Arkansas) Mounted Infantry Regiment: Lieut. Col. Jessup Grider12

Witt’s (10th Arkansas) Cavalry V: Col. A. R. Witt*

Blocher’s (Arkansas) Battery (one section): Lieut. J. V. Zimmerman – two guns

McCray’s Brigade: Col. Thomas H. McCray

45th Arkansas Infantry Regiment (mounted): Col. Milton D. Baber (captured)13

47th Arkansas Infantry Regiment (mounted): Col. Lee Crandell14

45th Missouri Cavalry Regiment: Col. Timothy Reves15

Unattached

Lyles’ (23d Arkansas) Cavalry Regiment: Col. Oliver P. Lyles

Rogan’s (30th Arkansas) Mounted Infantry Regiment: Col. James W. Rogan

Anderson’s (Arkansas) Cavalry Battalion: Capt. William L. Anderson
196

Notes

1. The order of battle was derived from the Official Records and several secondary sources (primarily Buresh, Gott, and Monnett). 

A comprehensive order of battle chart is extremely difficult to make for Sterling Price’s Missouri Expedition. Record keeping for 

the Confederates was spotty at best and the personnel returns for the period are either nonexistent or rather haphazardly done. 

Additionally, the influx of the thousands of Confederate recruits and their subsequent losses are nearly impossible to calculate. 

2. Unit formed the summer of 1864.

3. Unit formed the summer of 1864.

4. Unit formed the summer of 1864.

5. Unit formed the summer of 1864.

6. Partisan unit.

7. Unit formed the summer of 1864

8. Unit formed the summer of 1864.

9. Unit formed the fall of 1864.

10. Unit formed the summer of 1864.

11. Unit formed the summer of 1864.

12. Unit formed the summer of 1864.

13. Unit formed the fall of 1864.

14. Unit formed the summer of 1864.

15. Unit formed the summer of 1864.
197

Appendix B1

Organization of the Army of the Department of Missouri

(United States of America)

Maj. Gen. William. S. Rosecrans

Provisional Cavalry Division (Pleasonton’s Division)

Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton2

Col. Nelson Cole (Chief of Artillery)

First Brigade: Brigadier Gen. Egbert Brown3

1st Missouri State Militia Regiment (mounted): Lieut. Col. Bazel F. Lazear

4th Missouri State Militia Regiment (mounted): Maj. George W. Kelly

7th Missouri State Militia Regiment (mounted): Lieut. Col. T. T. Crittenden

1st Iowa Cavalry: Maj. John McDermott4

Second Brigade: Brigadier Gen. John McNeil

2d Missouri Cavalry Regiment (detachment): Capt. George M. Houston

13th Missouri Cavalry Regiment: Col. E. C. Catherwood

7th Kansas Cavalry Regiment: Maj. F. M. Malone

17th Illinois Cavalry Regiment: Col. John L. Beveridge

3d Missouri State Militia Regiment (mounted): Lieut. Col. H. M. Matthews

5th Missouri State Militia Regiment (mounted): Lieut. Col. J. A. Epstein

9th Missouri State Militia Regiment (mounted): Lieut. Col. D. M. Draper

Battery B, 2d Missouri Light Artillery – two guns

5th Missouri State Militia Battery - four guns (Mountain howitzers)

Third Brigade: Brigadier Gen. John B. Sanborn

2d Arkansas Cavalry Regiment: Col. John E. Phelps

6th Missouri State Militia (mounted): Maj. William Plumb

8th Missouri State Militia (mounted): Col. J. J. Gravely

6th Provisional Enrolled Missouri Militia: Col. John F. McMahon

7th Provisional Enrolled Missouri Militia: Maj. W. B. Mitchell

Battery H, 2d Missouri Light Artillery: Capt. William C. F. Montgomery – two guns

Battery L, 2d Missouri Light Artillery: Capt. Charles H. Thurber – four guns

Fourth Brigade: Col. E. F. Winslow (WIA) / Lieut. Col. Frederick F. Benteen

3d Iowa Cavalry Regiment: Maj. Benjamin F. Jones

4th Iowa Cavalry Regiment: Maj. Abiel R. Pierce

10th Missouri Cavalry Regiment: Lieut. Col. Frederick F. Benteen / Maj. William H. Lusk

7th Indiana Cavalry Regiment and 4th Missouri Cavalry Regiment: combined detachment under Maj. S.E.W. 

Simonson 

Unassigned:

2d New Jersey Cavalry Regiment (detachment): Capt. Michael Gallagher

19th Pennsylvania Cavalry Regiment (detachment): unknown 
198

16th Army Corps (Detachment)

Maj. Gen. A.J. Smith 

1st Division

Col. Joseph J. Woods

First Brigade: Col. Lucius F. Hubbard

12th Iowa Infantry Regiment

47th Illinois Infantry Regiment

5th Minnesota Infantry Regiment

7th Minnesota Infantry Regiment

9th Minnesota Infantry Regiment

10th Minnesota Infantry Regiment

8th Wisconsin Infantry Regiment

Third Brigade: Col. Sylvester G. Hill

35th Iowa Infantry Regiment

33d Missouri Infantry Regiment

Battery G, 2d Illinois Light Artillery

2d Division

Col. David Moore

First Brigade: Col. T. J. Kinney 

58th Illinois Infantry Regiment

119th Illinois Infantry Regiment

89th Indiana Infantry Regiment

Second Brigade: Col. James I. Gilbert

14th Iowa Infantry Regiment: 

27th Iowa Infantry Regiment

32d Iowa Infantry Regiment

24th Missouri Infantry Regiment

Third Brigade: Col. Edward H. Wolfe 

49th Illinois Infantry Regiment: Col. P. Pease

117th Illinois Infantry Regiment: Lieut. Col. J. Merriam

52d Indiana Infantry Regiment: Capt. Eli Mattocks

178th New York Infantry Regiment: Capt. John B. Gandolfo

Battery, 3d Indiana Light Artillery

Battery, 9th Indiana Light Artillery
199

Notes

1. The order of battle was derived from the Official Records and several secondary source (primarily Gott and Monnett). A 

comprehensive order of battle chart is extremely difficult to make for Sterling Price’s Missouri Expedition. For the Union it is difficult 

due to the constant detaching and attaching of units. 

2. Brigadier General John B. Sanborn served as acting commander of the division several times during the course of the 

campaign.

3. Colonel John F. Philips served as the acting field commander for the actions around Jefferson City and assumed command on 

23 October 1864 when Brown was relieved of command and arrested.

4. Sometime before the action at Byram’s Ford the 1st Iowa was reassigned as the escort unit for Major General Rosecrans.

201

Appendix C1

Organization of the Army of the Border

10-23 October 1864

(United States of America)

Maj. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis

Escort

Company G, 11th Kansas Cavalry Regiment: Capt. C. L. Gove

Company H, 15th Kansas Cavalry

Battery: Lieut. Edward Gill – 2 mountain howitzers

2d Kansas Cavalry Battalion: Maj. Henry Hopkins2

First Provisional Cavalry Division (Blunt’s Division)

Maj. Gen. James G. Blunt

Escort

Company E, 14th Kansas Militia Cavalry Regiment: Lieut. William B. Clark

First Brigade: Col. Charles R. Jennison

15th Kansas Cavalry Regiment: Lieut. Col. George H. Hoyt

3d Wisconsin Cavalry Regiment (five companies): Capt. Carpenter 

Foster’s Battalion, Provisional Enrolled Missouri Militia: Capt. George Grover

15th Kansas Mountain Howitzer Battery: Second Lieut. H. L. Barker – 5 guns

Second Brigade: Col. Thomas Moonlight

11th Kansas Cavalry Regiment (nine companies): Lieut. Col. P. B. Plumb

5th Kansas Cavalry Regiment (Companies L and M): Capt. James H. Young

16th Kansas Cavalry Regiment (Companies A and D): Lieut. Col. Sam Walker

11th Kansas Mountain Howitzer Battery – four guns

Third Brigade: Col. Charles W. Blair

4th Kansas Militia Cavalry Regiment (mounted): Col. W.D. McCain

19th Kansas Militia Cavalry Regiment (mounted): Col. A.C. Hogan

24th Kansas Militia Cavalry Regiment (mounted - detachment): Lieut. Col. George Eaves

Right Section, 2d Kansas State Militia (Douglas Battery) Artillery: 

Lieut. Patrick H. Minor – two guns3

Battery, 9th Wisconsin Light Artillery: Capt. J. H. Dodge – 6 guns

Fourth Brigade: Col. James H. Ford

2d Colorado Cavalry Regiment: Maj. J. Nelson (KIA) / Maj. J. A. Pritchard

16th Kansas Cavalry Regiment (detachment): Maj. James Ketner

McLain’s Independent Colorado Battery: Capt. W. D. McLain’s – 6 guns
202

Kansas State Militia (Deitzler’s Division)4

Maj. Gen. George W. Deitzler

Olathe District Brigade: Brigadier Gen. Melvin Grant

15th Kansas Militia (BN): Maj. Laing

21st Kansas Militia: Col. Sandy Lowe

2d Kansas Militia (mounted): Col. George W. Veale

Topeka Battery (2d Kansas Militia): Capt. Ross Burnes – one gun

Paola District Brigade: Brigadier Gen. W. H. M. Fishback5

5th Kansas Militia Cavalry Regiment (mounted): Col. G. A. Colton

6th Kansas Militia Cavalry Regiment (mounted): Col. James Montgomery

10th Kansas Militia Cavalry Regiment (mounted): Col. William Pennock

Brigade assignment unknown:6

1st Kansas Militia: Col. Charles H. Robison

2d Kansas Militia (Colored): Capt. James L. Rafferty

7th Kansas Militia: Col. Peter McFarland

9th Kansas Militia: Col. Frank M. Tracy

12th Kansas Militia: Col. L. S. Treat

13th Kansas Militia: Col. Alexander S. Johnson

14th Kansas Militia: Col. William Gordon

18th Kansas Militia: Col. Matthew Quigg

20th Kansas Militia: Col. J. B. Hubbell

22d Kansas Militia: Col William Weer 

Independent Colored (Douglas) Battery: Capt. H. Ford Douglas– four guns7

Zesch’s Battery, Kansas Militia Light Artillery: Capt. Gustavus Zesch – two guns

Unattached

Kansas City Home Guards: Col. Kersey Coates
203

Notes

1. The order of battle was derived from the Official Records and several secondary source (primarily Gott and Monnett). A 

comprehensive order of battle chart is extremely difficult to make for Sterling Price’s Missouri Expedition. For the Union it is difficult 

due to the constant detaching and attaching of units.

2. Scouts and liaison unit.

3. This unit at times under the control of Brigadier General Fishback’s Militia Brigade.

4. Unfortunately the O.R. provides very little detail on the brigade organization of the KSM. The organization show below is my 

best estimate of their order of battle.

5. These units at times were under the control of Colonel Charles W. Blair (3d Brigade, Blunt’s Division). Brig. Gen. Fishback 

refers to two guns supporting his brigade. It is not clear if this was Lieutenant Minor’s right section or another section of guns.

6. Two other districts mobilized brigades. The Atchison district under Brigadier General Byron Sherry and the Mound City district 

under Brigadier General S. N. Wood.

7. Two additional guns are with Lieutenant Minor’s right section. The remainder of the battery (4 guns) under Captain Douglas 

may not have been deployed with the Army of the Border.

205

Appendix D1

Organization of the Army of the Border

24 October – 7 November 1864

(United States of America)

Maj. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis

Escort

Company G, 11th Kansas Cavalry Regiment: Capt. C. L. Gove

Company H, 15th Kansas Cavalry

Battery: Lieut. Edward Gill – two mountain howitzers

2d Kansas Cavalry Battalion: Maj. Henry Hopkins2

First Provisional Cavalry Division (Blunt’s Division)

Maj. Gen. James G. Blunt

Escort

Company E, 14th Kansas Militia Cavalry Regiment: Lieut. William B. Clark

First Brigade: Col. Charles R. Jennison

15th Kansas Cavalry Regiment: Lieut. Col. George H. Hoyt

3d Wisconsin Cavalry Regiment (five companies): Lieut. J. B. Pond 

Foster’s Battalion, Provisional Enrolled Missouri Militia: Capt. George Grover

15th Kansas Mountain Howitzer Battery: Second Lieut. H. L. Barker – 5 guns

Second Brigade: Col. Thomas Moonlight

11th Kansas Cavalry Regiment (nine companies): Lieut. Col. P. B. Plumb

5th Kansas Cavalry Regiment (Companies L and M): Capt. James H. Young

16th Kansas Cavalry Regiment (Companies A and D): Lieut. Col. Sam Walker

11th Kansas Militia Cavalry Regiment (mounted): Col. A. J. Mitchell

11th Kansas Mountain Howitzer Battery – four guns

Third Brigade: Col. Charles W. Blair

6th Kansas Militia Cavalry Regiment (mounted): Col. James Montgomery

24th Kansas Militia Cavalry Regiment (mounted - detachment): Lieut. Col. George Eaves

Right Section, 2d Kansas State Militia (Douglas Battery) Artillery: 

Lieut. Patrick H. Minor – two guns3

Battery, 9th Wisconsin Light Artillery: Capt. J. H. Dodge – six guns

Fourth Brigade: Col. James H. Ford

2d Colorado Cavalry Regiment: Maj. J. A. Pritchard

16th Kansas Cavalry Regiment (detachment): Maj. James Ketner

McLain’s Independent Colorado Battery: Capt. W. D. McLain’s – six guns
206

Second Provisional Cavalry Division (Pleasonton’s Division)

Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton4

Col. Nelson Cole (Chief of Artillery)

Escort

Company A, 11th Kansas Cavalry Regiment: Capt. Henry E. Palmer

First Brigade: Col. John F. Philips 

1st Missouri State Militia Regiment (mounted): Lieut. Col. Bazel F. Lazear

4th Missouri State Militia Regiment (mounted): Maj. George W. Kelly

7th Missouri State Militia Regiment (mounted): Lieut. Col. T. T. Crittenden

Second Brigade: Brigadier Gen. John McNeil

2d Missouri Cavalry Regiment (detachment): Capt. George M. Houston

13th Missouri Cavalry Regiment: Col. E. C. Catherwood

7th Kansas Cavalry Regiment: Maj. F. M. Malone

17th Illinois Cavalry Regiment: Col. John L. Beveridge

3d Missouri State Militia Regiment (mounted): Lieut. Col. H. M. Matthews

5th Missouri State Militia Regiment (mounted): Lieut. Col. J. A. Epstein

9th Missouri State Militia Regiment (mounted): Lieut. Col. D. M. Draper

Battery B, 2d Missouri Light Artillery – two guns

5th Missouri State Militia Battery - four guns (Mountain howitzers)

Third Brigade: Brigadier Gen. John B. Sanborn

2d Arkansas Cavalry Regiment: Col. John E. Phelps

6th Missouri State Militia (mounted): Maj. William Plumb

8th Missouri State Militia (mounted): Col. J. J. Gravely

6th Provisional Enrolled Missouri Militia: Col. John F. McMahon

7th Provisional Enrolled Missouri Militia: Maj. W. B. Mitchell

Battery H, 2d Missouri Light Artillery: Capt. William C. F. Montgomery – 2 guns

Battery L, 2d Missouri Light Artillery: Capt. Charles H. Thurber – 4 guns

Fourth Brigade: Lieut. Col. Frederick F. Benteen

3d Iowa Cavalry Regiment: Maj. Benjamin F. Jones

4th Iowa Cavalry Regiment: Maj. Abiel R. Pierce

10th Missouri Cavalry Regiment: Maj. William H. Lusk

7th Indiana Cavalry Regiment and 4th Missouri Cavalry Regiment: combined detachment under Maj. S.E.W. 

Simonson 

Unassigned:

2d New Jersey Cavalry Regiment (detachment): Capt. Michael Gallagher5
207

Notes

1. The order of battle was derived from the Official Records and several secondary source (primarily Gott and Monnett). A 

comprehensive order of battle chart is extremely difficult to make for Sterling Price’s Missouri Expedition. For the Union it is difficult 

due to the constant detaching and attaching of units.

2. Scouts and liaison unit.

3. This unit may have been released back to its home district after the Battle of Westport.

4. Brigadier General John B. Sanborn served as acting commander of the division several times during the course of the 

campaign.

5. This unit may have joined with the 4th Brigade after the Battle of Mine Creek.

209

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213

About the Author

Mr. Charles D. Collins, Jr. is an assistant professor of history at the Combat Studies Institute. He is the author of numerous courses including: The Sioux Wars and Cheyenne Wars courses, Operation Anaconda Virtual Staff Ride, and the 

Price’s 1864 Missouri Expedition Staff Ride. He received a B.A. in History from Southwest Missouri State University and 

a master’s of military arts and sciences (MMAS) in History from the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas. While on active duty, Mr. Collins served in various armor and cavalry assignments. He retired from 

the Army in 1996. Mr. Collins’ published works include: The Corps of Discovery: Staff Ride Handbook for the Lewis and 

Clark Expedition; The Atlas of the Sioux Wars, 2d Edition; The Cheyenne Wars Atlas; The Staff Ride Handbook and Atlas, 

Battle of White Bird Canyon, 17 June 1877; and numerous articles on a wide variety of military topics.


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