Learning from Darfur

Building a Net-Capable African Force

to Stop Mass Killing

David C. Gompert, Courtney Richardson, 

Richard L. Kugler, and Clifford H. Bernath 

 Center for Technology and National Security Policy 

July 2005 
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official 

policy or position of The National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the 

U.S. Government. All information and sources for this paper were drawn from 

unclassified materials. 

David C. Gompert is a Distinguished Research Professor at the Center for Technology and 

National Security Policy, National Defense University. Prior to this position, he was the Senior

Advisor for National Security and Defense at the Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraq. Mr. 

Gompert has held senior positions at the State Department, the National Security Council, the 

RAND Corporation, and in the information technology industry. He has published extensively on

international affairs, national security policy, and information technology. Mr. Gompert holds a 

Master of Public Affairs degree from the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, and a 

Bachelor of Science degree in engineering from the United States Naval Academy. 

Courtney Richardson is a Research Associate at the Center for Technology and National

Security Policy, National Defense University, where she focuses on network-centric warfare

issues. She has previously worked at Jane’s in London, and volunteered with the United Nations 

Information Center in Washington, DC. She has a MA in Security Policy Studies from the Elliott 

School of International Affairs at the George Washington University and a BSc in International

Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science. 

Clifford H. Bernath is the Senior Fellow at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, National 

Defense University. He is developing programs that help U.S. officials better understand African

issues and help African officials better understand U.S. policies and programs in Africa. Prior to 

his arrival at the ACSS, he was the Director of Conflict Prevention and Resolution at Refugees 

International, an advocacy NGO that generates humanitarian assistance and protection and works 

to end the conditions that create population displacements. His focus at Refugees International

was to study ways to improve UN peacekeeping missions as a means of shortening or preventing

armed conflicts that cause population displacements and human rights abuses. He served for 21 

years in the U.S. Army, including a tour as an Infantry officer in Vietnam. He also worked in the 

Pentagon in a variety of career civil assignments, including Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary

of Defense for Public Affairs and Director of the American Forces Information Service. 

Richard L. Kugler is a Distinguished Research Professor at the Center for Technology and 

National Security Policy, National Defense University. His specialty is U.S. defense strategy, 

global security affairs, and NATO. He advises senior echelons of the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, the Joint Staff, and the interagency community. He is the author of multiple books, 

journal articles, and official studies on U.S. defense strategy and programs as well as NATO and 

global security affairs. Dr. Kugler has his doctorate from the Massachusetts Institute of 

Technology. 

Defense & Technology Papers are published by the National Defense University Center for Technology and 

National Security Policy, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC. CTNSP publications are available online at 

http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/publications.html.

ii
Contents

Executive Summary.........................................................................................................v 

I. Introduction: The New Power to Protect .......................................................................1 

 Another Tragedy ...................................................................................................1 

Creating the Power to Protect ...............................................................................3 

African Means and Western Will ...........................................................................5 

Darfur as a Test Case ...........................................................................................8 

II. The Darfur Situation.....................................................................................................9 

 The Area .............................................................................................................10 

 The Killing Forces ...............................................................................................10 

 Capabilities and Tactics ......................................................................................11 

 The International Response ................................................................................13 

III. Net-Capable Model for Forcible Humanitarian Intervention ......................................15 

 The Operational Challenge .................................................................................15 

 Net-Capable Combat Forces...............................................................................16 

Is Networking Really Necessary?........................................................................18 

General Shape and Mission of an African Humanitarian Intervention Force.......19 

Prospects for Operational Success .....................................................................20 

 The Intelligence Challenge..................................................................................23 

IV. A Humanitarian Combat Force for Africa..................................................................26 

What Force Could Have Prevented the Darfur Killings? .....................................26 

 A Hypothetical AU Force.....................................................................................28 

 External Support Required..................................................................................28 

Terrain Coverage and Operational Requirements...............................................30 

 A Hypothetical Operation ....................................................................................32 

What Could Go Wrong? ......................................................................................34 

V. Getting There.............................................................................................................35

 Setting the Goal ..................................................................................................35 

Existing African Capacity and AU Initiatives........................................................36 

External Military Capacity-Building Efforts in Africa.............................................38 

Building on Current African and External Efforts.................................................39 

VI. Policy Issues.............................................................................................................44 

Mandating Forcible Intervention and Adequate Rules of Engagement ...............44 

AU Acceptance of Foreign Intelligence ...............................................................46 

U.S. Willingness to Share Technology and Intelligence ......................................47 

Non-African Troops with African Units ................................................................48 

Providing Africans with Capabilities that Could be Misused................................49 

Command and Control ........................................................................................50 

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations ...................................................................51 

iii
iv
Executive Summary 

 

Once again, the world is faced with a mass-killing situation—U.S. leaders have called it 

“genocide.” And again, like Rwanda in 1994 and so many other cases, the international 

response to Darfur’s plight has been humanitarian assistance, condemnation, demands for

the killing to stop, and a peacekeeping force with neither the means nor the mandate to

defeat the killers. This response has neither convinced nor forced Janjaweed militiamen 

or their patrons in the Sudanese government to stop their assault on defenseless civilians. 

Even though the chance for action to prevent mass killing in Darfur has come and gone, 

we can learn from this tragedy what it will take to back up the pledge of “never again.”

The international community lacks a standing combat force to conduct decisive, 

forcible humanitarian interventions in such situations. Such a force must be capable of 

quickly reaching and establishing itself in a killing area with sufficient information and

capability to stop the blood-letting and create an environment conducive to traditional 

peacekeeping, stabilization, and reconstruction. While the United States and several other 

Western1

 nations have such capabilities, Darfur has shown once again that they lack 

sufficient incentive to intervene decisively—which, in any case, most Africans would not 

prefer. At the same time, although a number of African nations have the will to stop the 

killing, they lack the combat capabilities, especially for collective action. 

The purpose of this report is to explore one particularly promising model of a

combat force to intervene in Africa to stop mass killings and other atrocities. Its

conclusion is that networking concepts and technologies, which proved effective in 

defeating al Qaeda in Afghanistan and in toppling Saddam Hussein in Iraq can be applied 

by Africans with intensive external help to field a capability for forcible humanitarian

intervention. This study explores (a) what capabilities are needed to stop killing in

situations like Rwanda and Darfur; (b) whether selective African forces have the potential 

to become “net-capable”; and (c) what external support would be needed to this end. To 

be clear, although the study uses Darfur as an example, we are not advocating 

deployment of net-capable African force to Darfur because no such capability currently

exists, and it could not be created in time to stop today’s killings. 

The principal building-blocks of net-capable combat forces are: high-quality

combat and special operations forces; deployable sensors and other intelligence sources; 

high-speed data links to fuse and disseminate intelligence products; command and control 

nodes; ground mobility; logistics support for small light forces; rotary- and fixed-wing air 

for mobility and strike; and precision weapons. Well-trained forces with these capabilities

can be smaller and lighter and require less logistical support than traditional forces. They 

can move to and throughout a theater of operations by air, which permits a rapid response 

to warnings. Because they can receive and make good use of intelligence about where 

 1 Throughout this volume, we will frequently refer to “the West” and “Western countries.” As many

readers will understand, these terms are used often—and are used here by us—as short-hand for the loose 

community of advanced democratic states, whether geographically Western or not. By suggesting

“Western” support for African efforts to build multilateral forces, we mean to include the democracies of 

Europe, North America, and East Asia, but not to exclude others able and willing to help. Africa needs and

deserves support from all able and willing members of the international community. 

v
killing is occurring or imminent, deploy swiftly by air, and receive prompt reinforcement,

including precision air-strikes, net-capable forces could cover more territory with greater

effectiveness and less risk than traditional forces. 

This combination of speed, awareness, survivability, supportability, 

connectedness, and lethality would enable such forces to deter or stop mass killings early;

find and destroy killing forces and their means of support, as warranted; and create 

favorable conditions for follow-on peacekeeping forces. 

The hypotheses of this study are: (1) that well-prepared net-capable African 

combat forces, with the right operational and intelligence support from Western 

militaries, could intervene decisively to defeat mass-killing forces under most plausible 

conditions; and (2) that the creation of such forces is possible in a matter of years, 

provided African and key partner countries put their minds to it, commit resources, and

cooperate closely. These hypotheses are tested by examining operational challenges that 

often arise in mass-killing situations. Analysis of the Darfur case suggests that if such a 

force existed and had Western support, it could have stopped or greatly reduced the 

killing. 

The key to developing an African humanitarian intervention force is a partnership

between advanced democratic nations that have the intelligence, air capabilities, and 

networking tools needed by the force, and African nations that have the troops and the 

will to take on this mission. (Commercial firms could provide some surveillance and 

logistics support, though direct assistance from Western governments is preferable.) Our 

model for cooperation envisions a timeline with heavy Western operational involvement

initially, diminishing as African capabilities grow as a result of Western assistance. 

This report does not offer net-capable forces as a panacea. It discusses the 

logistical, tactical, procedural, and technological hurdles that would face net-capable 

African intervention forces, including dangers they might encounter in operations. It also 

highlights a host of policy issues that have to be tackled, including intelligence-sharing, 

participation of Western forces on the ground, command and control, and ensuring that 

no African state abuses such enhanced intervention capabilities. 

At this time, the United States and other Western nations seem to support the 

AU’s philosophy of “African solutions to African problems.” U.S. economic programs

like the African Growth and Opportunity Act are directed toward that end, as are military

support programs, such as the Global Peace Operations Initiative and the African 

Contingency Operations Training and Assistance. The European Union, the United 

Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and others are also extending relevant assistance to 

Africa. The cooperation we are suggesting to help build a net-capable AU combat force is 

consistent with the emerging strategy of building African capacity to improve security.

The creation of an African capability for forcible humanitarian intervention should 

supplement and complement current efforts, not come at their expense. 

Africans are already working together through the AU and African regional 

groupings to develop peacekeeping forces to lend stability to weak and war-torn states. A 

net-capable combat force for humanitarian intervention could be an added element of the 

multilateral African Standby Force that is being established. 

Global support for the new-found determination of Africans must not become a

way to shift responsibility to end mass killing entirely to African shoulders. Rather, this is 

an opportunity for the advanced democracies and Africans together, to live up to a 

vi
universal responsibility by acquiring better tools. With the Darfur killings and inadequate 

international response still raw, but also a growing belief the Africans deserve all the 

support needed to stop mass killings, there could not be a better moment for Western and 

African governments to consider creating the means to prevent future Darfurs. 

Humankind’s most promising technology can be used to help end this dreadful and 

inexcusable scourge. 

vii
viii
I. Introduction: The New Power to Protect 

Another Tragedy

 

The United Nations (UN) has called Darfur "the world's worst humanitarian crisis."1 According 

to UN estimates, there are 1.65 million internally displaced persons in Sudan’s Darfur province 

and another 200,000 Darfur refugees in neighboring Chad—the results of unrelenting attacks on 

the people of Darfur by militia and forces of the Sudanese government. According to a 

Washington Post article, “Some outside analysts suggest more than 400,000 have been killed or 

perished from disease or malnutrition since the violence began in February 2003.”2

Since late 2002, villages throughout Darfur have been methodically attacked and 

destroyed, as shown on the U.S. State Department map in figure 1. Men, women, and children 

have been tortured and slaughtered. Women and girls have been abducted and raped. Possessions 

have been plundered. The region and its people have been devastated. 

The UN International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur found that: 

Government forces and militias conducted indiscriminate attacks, including killing of civilians, 

torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, 

pillaging and forced displacement, throughout Darfur. These acts were conducted on a 

widespread and systematic basis, and therefore may amount to crimes against humanity. It is clear 

from the Commission’s findings that most attacks were deliberately and indiscriminately directed 

against civilians.3

By the prevailing international norms of the 21st Century, such treatment of human 

beings cannot be considered a Sudanese domestic affair. Sovereignty cannot be respected when it 

is used to shield systematic atrocities intended to maintain control over a population. In fact, the 

mass killings in Darfur have attracted considerable international condemnation. Then-U.S. 

Secretary of State Colin Powell and President George W. Bush have proclaimed the situation 

“genocide,”4

 and the UN has called it a “crime against humanity.”5 The world community has 

denounced the government of Sudan and called for those involved to be held accountable for 

their misdeeds.6

 

 

1

 Mohammed Ali Said, “Two years on, UN still at odds over ‘world’s worst humanitarian crisis’,” Agence France 

Presse, February 25, 2005. 2

 Colum Lynch, “Lack of Access Muddies Death Toll in Darfur: Estimates Vary Widely as Sudan Stalls U.N. Effort 

for Regional Mortality Study,” The Washington Post, February 8, 2005, A20. 3

 International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to 

the United Nation Secretary-General: UN Document S/2005/60 (Geneva: Office of the United Nations High 

Commissioner for Human Rights, January 2005), 3. 

4

 Jin VandeHei and Nell Henderson, “Bust to Boost Efforts to Assist Africans,” The Washington Post, June 11, 

2005, A13. 

5

In this paper, we will use the term “mass killing,” instead of “genocide,” to describe the situations in which forcible 

humanitarian intervention may be justified. We do this for several reasons: first, to avoid semantic and legal debate 

over whether genocide has occurred; second, because the growing body of international law on the legitimacy of 

forcible intervention does not in fact treat genocide as the only trigger; third, because the authors believe that mass 

killing may well justify forcible intervention, regardless of how diplomats, lawyers, and spokespeople choose to 

describe that killing. 

6

 Emma Thomasson, “Suspected War Crimes In Darfur to Be Probed,” The Washington Post, June 7, 2005, A19. 
 

Figure 1. Sudan (Darfur)—Chad Border Region: Confirmed Damaged and Destroyed Villages as

of January 19, 20057

 7

 Humanitarian Relief Unit, U.S. Department of State, Sudan (Darfur)—Chad Border Region: Confirmed Damaged

and Destroyed Villages, 19 January 2005, accessed at <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/JHEN66SU7G?OpenDocument>. 

2
 

But the killings and crimes have continued—through all the news coverage, 

deliberations, appeals for action, and calls for accountability. While the origins of the tragedy are 

complex, the reason it has persisted is simple: There has been no security force on the ground in 

Darfur with the capability and authority to do whatever it takes to stop the killers.

8

 While one

hopes that international action will yet limit further killing in Darfur, this study is about building 

the means to intervene early and decisively so that no more Darfurs need occur.

Creating the Power to Protect

In its report on The Power to Protect,

9

 Refugees International, an independent nongovernmental organization dedicated to helping embattled and uprooted peoples like those of 

Darfur, examined what sorts of intervention forces could stop such mass killing and

displacement. Noting recent advances in Western military concepts and capabilities that exploit 

information technology, The Power to Protect sought to determine whether and how these

advances “can enhance the military’s ability to be deployed quickly, capably and with fewer 

soldiers and therefore with fewer risks and costs to prevent mass killings of civilian populations

and, to the degree that this type of force is available, whether leaders will be more likely to 

decide in favor of combat interventions to stop mass killings.”10

The new factor in considering how to stop mass killing is the advent of “net-centric” 

(also called “network-centric” and “net-capable”) military forces, endowed with information 

networks that offer unprecedented battle-space knowledge and permit flexible and distributed yet

integrated operations. According to the U.S. Defense Department: 

Network-centric warfare is an emerging theory of war in the Information Age. It is also a concept

that, at the highest level, constitutes the military’s response to the Information Age. The term

network-centric warfare broadly describes the combination of strategies, emerging tactics,

techniques, and procedures, and organizations that a fully or even a partially networked force can

employ to create a decisive warfighting advantage.11

All else being equal, forces that incorporate information technology and organize in 

networks to exploit that technology tend to be faster, better informed, more agile, and more

precise and economical in their effects than ordinary ones—not only in large-scale and highintensity combat but across a wide spectrum of contingencies. Although they have not been used 

for such a purpose, net-capable intervention forces of modest size and high quality should be 

able to stop and, if necessary, tactically defeat the types of forces associated with most African 

mass killings, provided they have sufficiently liberal rules of engagement and timely access to 

relevant information (e.g., enemy location, movement, and capabilities, and exact whereabouts

of friendly forces). Units of a networked force can team up in flexible, advantageous ways. If a

small unit were to encounter unexpected trouble, it could use the network to call for speedy 

 8

 There are, of course, international personnel in Darfur providing humanitarian relief, but this work, while crucial, 

is aimed at easing the effects, not at stopping the acts of mass killing. AU forces in Darfur have neither the mandate 

nor the means to stop the killing. 9

 Clifford H. Bernath and David C. Gompert, The Power to Protect—Using New Military Capabilities to Stop Mass 

Killings (Washington, DC: Refugees International, 2003). 10 Ibid., 7. 11 The Office of the Secretary of Defense, The Implementation of Net-Centric Warfare (Washington, DC: Office of

the Secretary of Defense, January 5, 2005). 

3
 

reinforcement and direct air strikes on targets. Air and ground firepower available from other 

units, not just of the unit directly engaged, could be directed promptly and precisely at any part

of the enemy’s forces and logistics base. 

Such forces (described in detail later in this report) would consist of light but well-armed

air-mobile ground units and supporting precision-strike air power able to respond promptly to 

tactical warnings and to find and defeat killing forces decisively. Thanks to networking, the 

combination of superior, shared “battle-space awareness,” the ability of units to collaborate

across any distance, and the ability to have precise effects multiplies the combat effectiveness of

such forces, and reduces their risk of being overwhelmed. Being small and light, they can deploy 

swiftly with little warning and only light support requirements into remote areas. With such 

advantages, intervention forces may be able to end the killing, defeat and disarm killing forces,

and set safe conditions for humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, and reconstruction. 

Developing net-capable forces is no substitute for the basic training and equipping that 

are the underpinnings of any competent military. Unless efforts to strengthen basic African 

military capabilities go forward, introducing networking concepts will be fruitless. At the same

time, properly trained and equipped forces that are also net-capable could have considerable 

advantages in operations demanding quick intervention to stop widespread mass killing. 

Military concepts and capabilities based on networking are not science fiction. They are 

increasingly prominent in the U.S. military and several other Western militaries that have begun 

transforming themselves. They were employed successfully, albeit in quite different

circumstances, by U.S. forces in the opening combat phases of the interventions in both

Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom) and Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom). These

capabilities could lower costs and risks of international humanitarian intervention in Africa and

elsewhere. Yet, it is far from certain that Western countries will be any more inclined use force

to stop mass killing in the future than they have been in the past. 

What has not been adequately explored is whether African militaries, with the help of the 

advanced democracies, can tap this same new potential and take the lead in stopping the mass

killing of Africans. The principal reason to turn to the Africans themselves is the growing 

evidence that they are willing, even determined, to accept greater responsibility under regional 

auspices to stop mass killing. This begs the central questions of this study: Can African militaries

form multilateral net-capable forces to do the job? Broadly speaking, the surprisingly rapid 

global spread of information know-how in general and the speed with which determined nonU.S. militaries are acquiring the skills to use the technology suggest that creation of a netcapable African humanitarian intervention force is not unrealistic, provided the United States and

other advanced democracies provide critical help.

Net-capable forces are qualitatively different from traditional forces in that they are

designed, structured, and employed to exploit high-speed data links. Networking—the power of 

shared awareness, the ability of dispersed forces to have concentrated effects, and the

substitution of information for mass—is its organizing principle. However, this does not mean 

that forces that are only partially trained and outfitted for net-centric operations are no better than

those with none of the right training or equipment. It is not all or nothing. As forces begin to 

benefit from enhanced information sharing, their speed, awareness, effectiveness, survivability, 

and supportability will all improve; this is evident from the way U.S. forces have steadily 

improved in operations as they have become more networked (i.e., from Kosovo to Afghanistan 

to Iraq). The implication of this is significant: African forces could improve in the course of

becoming net-capable, not only after completing a lengthy metamorphosis. That said, the goal is 

4
 

not to equip traditional forces with better communications but to transform the way they 

organize, operate, and even think in order to take advantage of the new technology concepts. 

With this background in mind, the central questions analyzed in this study are: 

• Can networking concepts and capabilities be applied to enable African militaries to 

intervene multilaterally, quickly, forcefully, and capably to stop mass killings and pave

the way for peacekeeping, stabilization, and reconstruction? 

• If so, how can such capabilities be created? 

• What Western assistance is required to enable African forces to incorporate and employ 

networked capabilities?

 

African Means and Western Will

 

Unless a serious effort is made to create operationally effective and politically practical 

forcible intervention capabilities and options, Darfur will not be the last case of unchecked mass 

killing. The potential for political, economic, tribal and ethnic strife and state failure in large 

swathes of West, Central and East Africa implies more mass killing ahead.12 The international 

“responsibility to protect”13 and “right to protect,” both now widely accepted, are not being 

matched by a “power to protect.”14 

Generally speaking, the decision to protect—that is, to intervene to stop mass killing—is 

based on a combination of political will and military means. These two factors are 

interdependent. Having better means to intervene can decrease the costs and risks and thus

strengthen the will to do so; having the will to stop mass killing can motivate efforts to acquire 

the means. But Darfur demonstrates, yet again, that the advanced Western nations are short on

will and the Africans are short on means. Although the United States and a number of its allies 

have armed forces capable of stopping mass killing in places like Darfur, they are reluctant to do 

so after weighing the risks against national interests. As this is written, only a handful of Western 

military advisors are in Darfur helping an African Union (AU) peacekeeping force.15 For its part,

the AU peacekeeping force has been too little and too late. Operationally and politically, any

practical solution will have to include some combination of increasing African capabilities to

intervene and increasing Western will, if not to intervene then to step up support for African 

capabilities. 

As already observed, the advanced democratic nations could use their own emerging netcapable forces to intervene to defeat those committing mass killings, with relatively few 

casualties and little risk. One might think that these new capabilities could improve prospects for 

success to the point where intervention could be justified to Western publics, especially if 

accompanied by a heightened appreciation that Africa matters and that violence in Africa is more 

than a moral concern. 

 12 World Bank, World Bank Group Work in Low-Income Countries under Stress: A Task Force Report,

(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2002). 26 of the World Bank’s 48 designated Low-Income Countries Under Stress 

are in sub-Saharan Africa. 13 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Research, 

Bibliography, Background Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention

and State Sovereignty (Ottawa, ON: International Development Research Centre, 2001). 14 Treatment of the responsibility to protect and the right to protect are summarized in Bernath and Gompert. 15 There are large numbers of international personnel in Darfur providing humanitarian relief; but this work, while 

crucial, is aimed at the easing the effects, and not stopping the acts of killing. 

5
 

In fact, Africa is of growing importance to the advanced democracies, and their 

awareness of that importance is growing. U.S. national security policy recognizes the threat that 

failed and failing states pose to the war on terrorism. In recent Senate testimony, Director of 

Central Intelligence Porter J. Goss said “In Africa, chronic instability will continue to hamper 

counter-terrorism efforts and pose heavy humanitarian and peacekeeping burdens.”16 Western 

countries also have economic interests in Africa. For example, according to U.S. Department of 

Energy projections, 15% of U.S. oil imports come from Africa.17 In recent years, American and 

European assistance to Africa has grown significantly, and both British Prime Minister Blair and 

President Bush are calling for still greater efforts.18 Blair has made support for Africa a top 

priority of the UK presidency of the European Union.19 

Even so, it is unrealistic to count on the combination of growing interest in Africa and 

declining military risks because of new technology to tip the decision-scales of Western 

governments in favor of using force to stop mass killing in Africa. Increased international aid 

and capacity-building in Africa suggest an aversion, not a predisposition, to intervening directly. 

The United States and its allies have been unwilling to commit combat troops to Darfur, just as 

they declined to do in Rwanda a decade earlier. The problems with a purely “Western option” 

are more political than operational and technical: 

• The political threshold for military intervention, by the United States at least, may be 

rising because of the difficulties encountered by U.S. forces in Iraq. 

• African and Western nations alike favor an “African solutions to African problems” 

approach. 

• The few advanced democratic nations that are sometimes willing to intervene, such as the

UK and France, once colonized Africa, and their motives are suspected, fairly or unfairly, 

of serving those nations’ national interests rather than saving lives. 

• Unless there is a follow-on peacekeeping force and a nation-building mission to come in 

after a military intervention, there may be no way out for the intervention force. No 

Western country will risk getting stuck in a sub-Saharan quagmire. 

Although improved military intervention capabilities and a heightened sense of Africa’s 

importance have not led to a willingness in the West to use force when mass killing occurs, they

should at least foster greater efforts to help Africans create their own intervention force and to 

provide vital operational support to that force. 

For their part, African states have demonstrated a greater willingness to commit African 

forces to African peacekeeping missions. Africans are not just “talking the talk” of African 

solutions to African problems. Recent examples are the Economic Community of West African 

States (ECOWAS) deployments in Liberia, the AU initiatives to establish an African Standby 

Force (ASF), and even the small but growing AU ceasefire-monitoring force in Darfur itself. 

However, as we shall address, combat intervention is far more demanding and dangerous than 

 16 Porter J. Goss, “Global Intelligence Challenges 2005: Meeting Long-Term Challenges with a Long-Term

Strategy,” Testimony to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 16, 2005, available at 

<http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2004/Goss_testimony_02162005.html>. 17 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future With Non-Government Experts, 

December 2000, available at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/globaltrends2015/>. 18 David Froomkin, “The Blair Bush Project,” www.washingtonpost.com, 7 June, 2005, available at

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/blog/2005/06/07/BL2005060700709.html> . 

19 Prime Minister’s EU Presidency press conference, July 1, 2005, available at <http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page7782.asp>. 

6
 

peacekeeping. While African states appear to have the will to intervene forcibly to stop mass 

killings, they lack the means—the technology, intelligence-collection, equipment, transport, 

organization, doctrine, tactics and training—to do so decisively. 

Current efforts by the United States and its allies to improve African military capacity, 

though commendable, are not targeted on the goal of enhanced expeditionary combat 

capabilities, which is what it will take to stop mass killing by force. Rather, these efforts are

meant to enhance African peacekeeping forces with capabilities more relevant to permissive (UN

Chapter 6) or semi-permissive (UN Chapter 7) conditions than to non-permissive intervention. 

Peacekeeping forces are ordinarily used when the parties to a conflict have agreed to stop

fighting and to accept an international presence. Peacekeepers are not meant or equipped to enter 

an area forcibly or to take offensive action aimed at destroying the capability of a local force to

conduct large-scale killing. They are normally lightly armed for self-protection are not geared to 

call in air strikes if in danger of being overrun. 

On balance, developing African multilateral humanitarian combat intervention 

capabilities with international support is a more promising option than counting on the West

alone. A foundation for this is already being built with AU initiatives and external assistance

programs aimed at beefing up African peacekeeping capabilities; now it is time to create a “highend” force. The opportunity to do this now exists, thanks to the applicability of network-based 

capabilities to this military mission and to the potential of African forces, with help, to acquire 

such capabilities. 

Because the responsibility to protect is a universal principle, the rest of the international 

community must not regard the newfound African will and potential to intervene against killing

forces as a chance to shift this burden entirely to African shoulders. Instead, by helping to create

an African intervention force and supporting it operationally, the advanced democracies should 

step up to their inescapable responsibilities. Mass killing in Africa is no more an exclusively 

African problem than ethnic cleansing in the 1990s in Bosnia was an exclusively European 

problem. 

To some, the idea of equipping African military forces to conduct network-based 

operations may seem a bridge too far. After all, African militaries are among the least advanced 

and funded in the world, and even advanced Western forces are struggling with the new concepts 

and capabilities in the process of transformation. 

In considering what it would take to create a capable African combat force that could 

utilize the power of information; we see no “show stoppers.” Rather, the principal hypotheses of 

this study are that: 

• Well-prepared, net-capable African combat forces with the right operational and

intelligence support from Western militaries can intervene decisively to defeat masskilling forces under most conditions. 

• The creation of such capabilities is possible, provided African and Western countries and 

multilateral institutions put their minds to it, commit resources, and cooperate closely. 

 

We will test these hypotheses using Darfur as an analytical case. They hinge on a 

judgment that the potential of selective African armed forces to absorb new concepts and 

capabilities and use them skillfully is greater than is widely recognized. That judgment, in turn,

rests on a broader appreciation of how rapidly and well people and organizations in general are

able to exploit the power of information, provided they have a strong motivation to do so. In the 

case of Africa, we can already see such motivation at work in the determination with which they

7
 

are accepting responsibility to tackle African security problems. In the short time since the 

defunct Organization of African Unity was replaced by the more ambitious and vigorous AU, 

one can see considerable and growing African will, which can be applied to developing the 

means to stop mass killing. 

 

Darfur as a Test Case

 

Although the international community has failed to protect many thousands of human

beings already slain there, Darfur could serve as a turning point by illuminating a practical path 

toward having an African capability to protect Africans. The methodology of this study is to 

posit capabilities of a hypothetical African combat intervention force, along with key Western 

assistance, that could have stopped the Darfur killings early and decisively. With such a 

Western-AU partnership as the goal, the study analyzes the feasibility, pitfalls, requisite

investments, time-line, and policies required to build and use this type of force to stop mass

killings. 

“Forcible humanitarian intervention”—our term for what the force must be able to do—

should be seen along a spectrum of military and non-military actions that can be brought to bear 

against governments and combatants that will not, or cannot, protect their populations, or that 

may be the cause of mass killings.20 Our focus is on the killing “spike” of a crisis and the combat 

phase of an intervention to eliminate or flatten that spike. We recognize the importance but do 

not analyze other aspects of humanitarian intervention such as preventative diplomacy, stability

operations (e.g., peacekeeping), restoration of the rule of law, and post-war reconstruction, all of 

which require different military and political assets—and must precede, parallel, and follow any 

forcible humanitarian intervention.21 

Forcible humanitarian intervention is not an alternative to peacekeeping but may be 

needed to pave the way for peacekeepers. If the slaughter of large numbers of noncombatants is 

happening or imminent, the objective of military intervention is not to preserve peace and order 

but to enforce an end to the killing.22 Rarely will intervention to stop mass killing be enough to 

eliminate the conditions that have led to such savagery. Nor will it obviate the need for timely 

diplomacy to avoid such conditions. Thus, building and using a humanitarian combat force 

cannot be viewed in a vacuum or counted upon to solve deeper issues that lead to mass killings 

or difficult challenges that follow them. However, these are not reasons to fail to take direct

action against mass killing, let alone to fail to create the military capability for direct action. 

Not every situation involving mass killing will lend itself to armed intervention. 

Conditions and complexities may present prohibitive costs and risks even for a high-end force.

 20 Bernath and Gompert, 6. 21Nor does it look at humanitarian interventions for purposes other than to stop mass killing, such as responses to

famines and coping with refugee flows. 22 It is important to re-emphasize that, while this report focuses on combat interventions to stop mass killings, such

interventions must be closely and seamlessly linked to follow-on peacekeeping forces and related activities. As we 

have seen in Iraq, and as was discussed in Bernath and Gompert, The Power to Protect, 24-25, the forces required to

engage in and win in combat are not necessarily trained, configured or equipped to maintain a peace and help a

country build the infrastructure needed for long-term stability and growth. Without the latter type of force, there is 

no exit strategy for the former because—in the absence of eliminating the underlying causes of a conflict—the 

killing is likely to resume if the combat intervention force is withdrawn in the absence of a long-term follow-on

commitment. 

8
 

However, this does not argue against having the capability that provides the option of forcible

action for those cases where it is feasible and necessary. 

Throughout, we will use language associated with the use of force that may make

diplomats cringe. The surest way to end mass killing is to stop it physically; the killers must be 

faced by superior fighting capabilities and, if need be, made to experience deadly force, which

they typically do not encounter while they are killing civilians or facing peacekeepers. Of course, 

this requires rules of engagement aimed at mission success, not at minimizing force—a political 

question to which we will return. There may be a preference to refer to forcible humanitarian 

intervention as a type of “peace operation” or “stability operation.” We have no objection to such 

euphemisms as long as they do not obfuscate the need for fighting forces that may have to 

overcome armed resistance when entering a recalcitrant state and, once there, find and defeat the 

perpetrators of mass killing. Our preferred term is “Humanitarian Combat Force,” with the

understanding that it is designed and prepared to intervene forcibly and to prevail in combat

operations. 

As controversial as any aspect of humanitarian intervention is whether to treat as a 

requirement the consent of the sovereign state on whose territory mass killing occurs. There are, 

of course, many advantages in having such consent, and AU members will be hesitant to act 

without it. But it cannot be essential. While we will return to this later, we will make three points

for now: 

• Any government that conducts, condones, or cannot control mass killing on its territory

should not—and by standards of evolving international law, does not—enjoy absolute 

protections and prerogatives of sovereignty. 

• The consent, perhaps even the cooperation, of such a government is far more likely to be 

secured if it knows that intervention will occur with or without consent. 

• There is, in any case, a need for capabilities to provide the option of forcible intervention

when consent is forthcoming. 

We will proceed by first describing Darfur, our main test case. Then we will explain in 

more detail the capabilities and advantages of networked combat intervention forces. At that 

point, we will suggest a hypothetical African Humanitarian Combat Force, within the ASF, that 

could stop mass killing, using the Darfur case. Then we will tackle policy obstacles and suggest 

programmatic steps. We conclude with specific recommendations. 

II. The Darfur Situation 

 

The causes and the effects of the killings in Darfur have been well documented by news media, 

the UN, and humanitarian organizations. This report focuses only on the conditions in Darfur 

that help evaluate the military capabilities needed to intervene in such a case.

9
 

The Area

 

The Darfur region in the western part of the Sudan comprises approximately 250,000 

square kilometers and has an estimated population of 6 million persons. Sudan is considered a 

Least Developed Country (LDC), and ranks 139 in the 2004 United Nations Development

Program’s (UNDP) Human Development Index.23 There is no national road grid to speak of, and 

large parts of Sudan are agricultural, pastoral, or barren.24 The majority of the population lives in 

small villages and hamlets, often composed of only a few hundred families. Individual 

allegiances are still heavily determined by tribal affiliations. 

The Killing Forces

 

From the perspective of the Darfur population—and according to UN reports—all of the

parties to the conflict are “killing” forces. All prey on and to some degree target the civilian 

population. Although the Sudanese government denies complicity, the January 2005 “Report of

the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General,”25

proves the contrary. According to that report, the combatants include: 

The Sudanese Armed Forces. The army numbers approximately 200,000 in strength, although its 

logistical capacity was designed for an army of 60,000.26 Support, in particular air support, 

therefore goes primarily to priority areas and is re-deployed only after those areas have calmed 

down. The central command and control of armed forces operations are therefore imperative. 

Janjaweed. Up to six brigades have been identified, totaling an estimated 20,000 fighters.27 The 

Janjaweed are of Arab descent, many with military experience. Although some dress in civilian 

clothing, most wear khaki uniforms similar to those of the Sudanese military.28 The Janjaweed

are not organized in one single coherent structure, and the Commission identified three main 

categories of Janjaweed actors, determined according to their type of affiliation with the 

Government of Sudan.29

• Militias that are only loosely affiliated with the government but have received weapons 

and other supplies from Khartoum. These militias are thought to operate primarily under 

a tribal management structure. They are thought to undertake attacks at the request of 

State authorities, but are suspected by the Commission of sometimes also acting on their 

own initiative to undertake small scale actions to loot property for personal gain. 

• Militias that are organized in paramilitary structures and in parallel to regular forces, 

including groups known as “the Strike Force,” the Mujahedeen, or the Fursan (the 

horsemen). Some of these may be headed by officers in the regular army while also

 23United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse

World (New York: United Nations Human Development Report Offices, 2004), 141. 24 Ibid., paragraph 78, 27. 25 International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur. 26 Ibid., paragraph 78, 27. 27 Human Rights Watch, Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western Sudan, 

16, no. 6(A), (New York: Human Rights Watch, May 2004). 28 Ibid. 

29 International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, paragraph 99, 33-34. 

10
 

controlled by senior tribal leaders. While militias in this category are thought to operate 

within a defined command structure, they do not have any legal basis. 

• Members of the Popular Defense Forces (PDF) and Border Intelligence who have a 

legislative basis under Sudanese law. The PDF provides arms, uniforms, and training to

mobilized civilians, who are then integrated into the regular army command and normally 

wear the same uniform as they unit they are fighting with. 

Rebel Movement Groups. These groups formed in opposition to the government and 

government-supported groups listed above. Nominally, they seek to protect the lives, rights, and 

lands of the non-Arab populations under attack. However, there are documented instances of 

their own complicity in attacking those same populations. 

• The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) 

• The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 

• National Movement for Reconstruction/Reform and Development (NMRD) 

• Korbaj, which means “whip” in Arabic, is supposedly composed of members of Arab 

tribes 

• Al Shahamah, which in Arabic means “The Nobility Movement” 

• Sudanese National Movement for the Eradication of Marginalization. 

 

Capabilities and Tactics

 

The capabilities and tactics of these killing forces can best be described by using three 

actual examples, extracted from the United Nations International Commission of Inquiry on 

Darfur report: 

 

Anka Village, North Darfur.30 About 0900 on or about 17 or 18 February 2004 the village of 

Barey, situated about 5 kilometers from the village of Anka, was attacked by a combined force of

government soldiers and Janjaweed. A witness from Barey then alerted the villagers of Anka of a

possible imminent attack. 

About 1700 on the same day, witnesses from Anka observed between 300 and 400 

Janjaweed on foot and another 100 on camels and horses advancing towards Anka from the

direction of Barey. The attackers were described as wearing the same khaki uniforms as the

government soldiers and were armed with Kalashnikovs, G3s, and rocket-propelled grenades 

(RPGs). 

Witnesses observed more than 20 vehicles behind the Janjaweed forces, including four 

heavy trucks and eighteen Toyota pickup vehicles. Some of the vehicles were green and others

were navy blue. The pickups had Dushkas (12.7mm tripod-mounted machine guns) fitted onto 

the back, and one had a Hound rocket-launcher system, which was used to fire rockets into and 

across the village. The trucks carried government armed forces and were later used to transport 

looted property from the village. 

According to witnesses, villagers fled in a northerly direction, towards a wooded area 

about 5 kilometers from the village. Before the Janjaweed entered the village, the government 

armed forces bombed the area around the village with Antonov aircraft. One aircraft circled the

village while the other one bombed. The first one was colored white and had a black underside, 

 30 Ibid., 66-67. 

11
 

while the second one was completely white. The bombing lasted for about two hours, during 

which time 20 to 35 bombs were dropped around the outskirts of the village. A hospital building 

was hit during the bombardment. 

After the bombing, the Janjaweed and government soldiers moved in and looted the 

village including bedding, clothes and livestock. Remaining buildings were then destroyed by 

burning. Janjaweed also fired RPGs into the village from the top of the hill overlooking Anka. 

The bombing of the areas around the village appears to have been conducted to facilitate the 

looting and destruction by Janjaweed and government armed forces. 

According to witnesses, approximately 30 SLM/A members were present in the village at 

the time of the attack, apparently to defend the village following the announcement of the 

imminent attack. 15 civilians were killed in Anka as a result of shrapnel injuries during and after 

the attack. 8 others were wounded. While some have recovered, others reportedly are disabled as

a result of their injuries. At the time of the report, the village was totally deserted. 

 

Shoba, Kabkabya.31 The first attack began at 0830 on 2 April 2001, a market day. Arab militia 

reportedly attacked Shoba West and Shoba Karika with the intention of looting animals. 

However, 15 people were killed and 9 were wounded in the attack. Approximately 55 Arab 

militia, wearing camouflage green uniforms and armed with AK47s, G3s, and RPGs, attacked

the villages on horses and camels. The leader and several other attackers were known to the 

victims and were reported to the police station nearby. The police investigated the incident and 

arrested four suspected perpetrators, who were still in the village at the time. According to 

witnesses, no rebels were present in the village either at the time of the attack or at any other

time. 

Approximately 100 Arab militia attacked Shoba West and Shoba Karika from the north 

in a second incident on 28 April, 2002. The perpetrators of the second attack matched the profile 

of those responsible for the first attack. They were led this time by two senior leaders of the Arab 

militia. 24 people were killed during the attack and another 23 were injured. 338 houses were

burned, and the north and east of the village were completely destroyed. Property belonging to 

villagers, including all livestock, food, and medicine, was looted. 

According to witnesses, the attack took place from 0415 until about 0930, when 

government forces arrived. Villagers identified the perpetrators, who were about 500 meters 

from the village with the looted goods. However, the government soldiers reportedly refused to 

pursue them and one officer told a witness that he was under instructions not to pursue the 

attackers. Government armed forces later confiscated the villagers’ weapons. Afterwards, the 

Minister of Interior visited the area, together with the Walis of the three Darfur states, to appraise 

the situation and later sent food and support to rebuild the village. 

A third attack took place from 0500 to 1800 on 25 July, 2003, this time on Shoba East 

and Shoba West. According to reports, the attack was led by the two senior Janjaweed leaders 

and involved approximately 400 Janjaweed and government armed forces using camels, horses 

and Land Cruisers armed with Dushkas. The villages were totally destroyed during the attack 

and 42 people were killed and 10 injured. All moveable property in the villages was looted. 

 

Adwa.32 According to witnesses, at 0600 on 23 November 2004, government armed forces in 

complicity with Janjaweed launched an attack on Adwa. Rebel forces reportedly held a base on 

 31 Ibid., 67-68. 32 Ibid., 68-69. 

12
 

top of the mountains near Adwa, and a battle between government soldiers and rebel forces 

ensued. Two helicopter gunships and an Antonov were used during the attack, possibly for 

reconnaissance purposes. Ground forces used various weapons including AK47, G3, G4 assault 

rifles, RPG7, machine guns, and Dushkas mounted on vehicles. According to witness reports,

civilians including women, children, and elderly persons were targeted during the attack. Many 

were forced to flee to a nearby mountain, where they remained for several days. 

There are reports that government and Janjaweed armed forces instructed women not to 

flee and told them that they were not targets. However, some women were captured and detained 

by the attackers for two days. Men were summarily shot, as was anyone who attempted to 

escape. Young girls were taken by the attackers to another location, and many were raped in the 

presence of other women. The attackers looted the village. While in the mountains, several of the 

victims reportedly were shot by government soldiers and Janjaweed. Many people were killed 

and more than 100 were injured. Following the attack, representatives of an international 

organization searched the village and found several injured women and children, whom they 

escorted to hospital. They also found the bodies of between 20 and 30 civilians who had been 

killed during the attack, including women and children. All of the victims were reportedly from 

Adwa and belonged to the Fur tribe. It is also alleged that many bodies are still to be found in the 

mountains. 

By way of recap, the equipment used by the killing forces includes: 

• Aircraft (helicopter gunships and Antonovs) w/bombs and machine guns 

• Light weapons and machine guns (AK47s, G3 and G4 assault rifles, and Dushka 12.7mm 

machine guns mounted on vehicles) 

• Rocket-Propelled Grenade Launchers 

• Land Cruisers, camels, and horses. 

 Tactics include: 

• Cutting off phone services in areas about to be attacked 

• Aerial attacks on villages followed by ground assaults 

• Targeting (killing) villagers as they flee 

• Systematic looting of belongings 

• Systematic destruction of villages 

• Systematic human rights abuses, including murder of unarmed civilians, kidnapping, 

slavery, torture, and rape. 

The International Response

 

The UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief 

Coordinator Jan Egeland called the Darfur situation "ethnic cleansing" in April 2004.33 On the 

tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated that action

in Darfur could "mean a continuum of steps, which may include military action."

34 UN Security

Council Resolution 1591 strongly condemned all human rights and international humanitarian 

law violations, and UN Security Council Resolution 1556 levied a vague threat of sanctions. The 

 33United Nations News Centre, Sudan: Envoy warns of ethnic cleansing as Security Council calls for ceasefire, 

April 2, 2004, available at <http://www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewsID=10307&Cr=sudan&Cr1=#>. 34 Associate Spokesman for the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Highlights of the Noon Briefing, April 7,

2004, available at <http://www.un.org/News/ossg/hilites/hilites_arch_view.asp?HighID=15>. 

13
 

International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur reported to the Secretary-General that the 

government and militias were systematically abusing civilians in Darfur, but did not call the 

abuse genocide.35 The UN is a keen supporter of the fledgling peace-operation abilities of the 

Africa Union, facilitating planning, logistics and meetings for the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), 

and the Secretary-General has used his good offices to push for resolution of the crisis.36

Washington has provided more than $97m to support the AU ceasefire monitoring 

mission in Darfur, including $75m appropriated from the U.S. Congress in FY2005 and an 

additional $50m as part of the FY2005 Supplemental Budget, and $138m and food aid for

humanitarian needs in the Darfur crisis.37

The AMIS Protection Force that monitors the Darfur crisis was originally meant to have 

3,320 troops by the end of May 2005. As of April 2005, AMIS had a 1,695-strong Protection 

Force and approximately 450 military observers. The Protection Force comes from Nigeria (391

troops), Rwanda (392 troops), The Gambia (196 troops), Senegal (196 troops), Kenya (35 

military police), and South Africa (285 troops).38 In April 2005, the AU Peace and Security

Council announced the decision to enlarge AMIS to 7,700 personnel by the end of September 

2005.39 The additional personnel will be drawn from Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, and South 

Africa,40 though it is still unclear whether the troops will require further training. 

In support of the ambitious AU plans, both NATO and the EU agreed in June 2005 to 

provide military, logistical and planning support for AMIS. NATO and the EU will have separate 

coordinating cells within the AU mission, based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Each cell will have a 

small staff of military officers that will liaise with one another to avoid duplication of effort in

airlift, planning, and logistics. The organizations set a 1 July,2005 target date to start troop 

airlifts. Under the NATO banner, the United States has agreed to provide airlift for Rwandan 

troops; under the EU banner, France will provide airlift to Senegalese troops. Canada has

committed 25 transport helicopters and 100 armored personnel carriers. Most importantly, 

NATO and EU efforts will be under AU leadership.41 

The most proactive elements of the AMIS mandate enable it to provide a “visible military 

presence by patrolling and establishment of temporary outposts in order to deter uncontrolled 

armed groups from committing hostile acts against the population.” However, AMIS’ mandate is

only to protect civilians it encounters under “imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, 

within resources and capabilities.”42 The AU force is lacking in speed, firepower, air support, 

 35 International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur. 36 United Nations Secretary-General’s Press Release, “We are not moving fast enough to deal with the appalling

situation in Darfur,” SG/SM/9751 AFR/1120, March 7, 2005.; Mohammed Ali Saeed, “Annan arrives in Sudan for 

Darfur talks,” Agence France-Presse, May 27, 2005, available at 

<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EVIU-6CSGAB?OpenDocument>; Reuters, “Annan visits 

burned-out town in Darfur,” May 28, 2005, available at <http://msnbc.msn.com/id/8017766/>. 37 Sudan Desk Officer, U.S. Department of State, interview by author, Washington, DC, June 16, 2005. 38 Information supplied by COL Michael Smith, USA (Ret.), former U.S. Advisor to the African Union for Darfur

Crisis Planning, June 24, 2005. 

39 African Union Peace and Security Council, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in the 

Darfur region of the Sudan, PSC/PR/2(XXVIII), April 28, 2005, available at 

<http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/centorg/PSC/2005/28rep.pdf>, 28, paragraph 114. 40 Judy Dempsey, “NATO agrees to lend its help in Darfur,” International Herald Tribune, June 9, 2005. 41 Ibid.; ISN Security Watch, “NATO, EU agree to help AU in Darfur,” June 10, 2005. 42 African Union Peace and Security Council, Communiqué of the 17th Meeting, PSC/PR/Comm.(XVII), October 20,

2004, available at < http://www.africa-union.org/News_Events/Communiqu%C3%A9s/

Communiqu%C3%A9%20_Eng%2020%20oct%202004.pdf>, 2, paragraph 6.. 

14
 

communications, and intelligence—qualities that net-capable forces can bring to bear.43 Lacking

these capabilities, it is much too small to create a “visible presence” in such a vast area. 

Nonetheless, AMIS is performing competently and has begun to head off some attacks and 

permit some villagers to return home. Evidently, the Janjaweed do not attack if an AU unit has 

reached the village first, which gives some indication of the limits of the killers’ capability and 

willingness to fight.44 This provides a glimpse of what is possible if the Africans and the West 

commit to creating an effective AU combat intervention force with Western operational support. 

III. Net-Capable Model for Forcible Humanitarian Intervention

The Operational Challenge

 

The military capability to intervene forcibly to stop mass killing should be shaped to meet 

the operational challenges commonly posed by such contingencies. Generally speaking, 

situations in Africa such as Darfur, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Cote d’Ivoire can be 

characterized as follows: 

Large numbers of defenseless civilians killed over wide areas. While sometimes concentrated,

mass killings tend to be geographically distributed. They may occur in a relatively short period

of time, as in Rwanda, or over a longer period of time, as in Darfur. Warning time and the

chance of reaching the scene of killing in time to stop it vary accordingly.

Killing forces lacking in serious combat capability, discipline, and a will to fight well-trained,

well-equipped military forces. While they may be ideological and fanatical, they are more often 

motivated by material rewards, revenge, or criminal tendencies, and to be agitated by

unscrupulous leaders. 

Government complicity (or, at best, inability to stop the killing). While the killing may be 

perpetrated by rebel forces, as in Sierra Leone, or result from a general collapse of authority, as 

in Eastern Congo, it is as likely to be orchestrated, supported, or condoned by the national 

government, as it was in Rwanda and is in Darfur. 

Alliances of convenience. In most cases, the killing forces comprise multiple armed factions—

some of which may be backed by neighboring countries—with differing strategic goals. Often, 

alliances among these groups change over time. 

Underdeveloped infrastructure. Because mass killing tends to occur in poor regions, countries, 

and areas, there are usually few and poor roads, airfields, railways, ports, and communications 

networks. 

 43 African Union Peace and Security Council, Report of the Chairperson, 11, paragraph 43 details efforts to curb the 

shortages. 44 Ken Bacon, Shannon Meehan and Eileen Shields-West, “Sudan: African Union Peace Monitors Creating Pockets 

of Security in Darfur,” RI Bulletin (Washington, DC: Refugees International, February 25, 2005); African Union 

Peace and Security Council, Report of the Chairperson, 7, paragraph 25. 

15
 

Killing locations not routinely covered by international intelligence collection. The United States 

possesses most of the world’s technical intelligence sensors and concentrates them on regions

where it has or may use large-scale military power or faces threats to vital interests or allies. 

Accordingly, it does not keep them trained on Africa. 

 

These conditions make it difficult and potentially risky for traditional armed forces to 

intervene effectively to stop killing, which helps explain the inhibitions to mounting such 

operations. Lack of intelligence coverage, government complicity, fluid alliances, large

geographic areas, and poor transportation infrastructure and communications networks all favor 

the killing forces. They can attack quickly with minimal weapons—because their targets are 

mostly unarmed civilians—and without fear of detection. In short, even unprofessional killing 

forces are able to commit mass murder because they can exploit and operate within an 

information vacuum. Even when peacekeeping missions are established within the country, the 

killing sprees often are so sudden, scattered, and unpredictable that the killers are done and gone 

by the time peacekeepers arrive. 

Yet, these challenges are not as forbidding when faced by forces enabled by the power of 

information and the concept of networking. Operation Enduring Freedom—the U.S. military

intervention in Afghanistan following the 9/11 terrorist attack on the United States—showed 

what small, mobile, well-trained forces, endowed with situational awareness and networked with 

precision-strike air power can do against a scattered and elusive enemy in difficult terrain. True, 

those were U.S. special operations forces (SOF) and strike aircraft. Yet, the Al Qaeda forces they 

defeated were far more capable and fierce than typical African killing forces, most of which have 

neither the skill nor the will to fight professional troops, especially if backed by precision air

power. 

The point is not that conditions in Darfur resemble conditions in Afghanistan, for they do 

not. Rather, it is that net-capable forces can reach and operate effectively in remote and 

unimproved areas, that substantial intelligence assets can be brought to bear quickly, that 

dispersed irregular forces, if found and isolated—an important “if”—can be defeated by highquality regular forces, especially if ground and air power are integrated via data links. With the 

right preparation, equipment, and support, forces less sophisticated than American SOF—e.g., 

high-quality African troops—should be able to defeat the likes of Sudan’s camel-mounted 

Janjaweed. 

 

Net-Capable Combat Forces

 

The principal building-blocks of net-capable combat forces are: high-quality combat and 

special operations forces (SOF); deployable sensors and other intelligence sources; high-speed 

data links to gather, fuse and disseminate intelligence products; command and control nodes; 

ground mobility; logistics support for small light forces; rotary- and fixed-wing air for mobility 

and strike; and precision weapons. Why are such forces with such capabilities so advantageous? 

By enhancing both shared awareness and connectivity for collaboration among units, 

superior information capabilities can reduce the size and weight (e.g. armor) of a military force

required for a given mission. Reduced size and weight, in turn, permit greater mobility and 

speed. Speed can be further enhanced by greater knowledge of the battlefield, enemy forces, and 

friendly forces, thanks to sensors accessible through the network. At the same time, networked 

forces need not be spatially concentrated to collaborate and concentrate their effects; indeed,

16
 

dispersed but integrated forces can be more effective than massed forces, whether in responding 

to a distributed enemy or a concentrated one. Against larger and heavier forces, dispersed

networked forces can call on other mobile forces on the network. In sum, by enhancing both 

awareness and collaboration, networked forces can be light, dispersed, quick, and survivable—a 

potent combination for dealing with sudden and dispersed killings across a wide area. 

Because net-capable forces can be comparatively small and light, they have a smaller 

footprint—heavy gear, support personnel, command and control apparatus, logistics vehicles, 

and stocks—than traditional forces. Therefore, they can more easily be deployed to the zone of 

killing by air. This permits a rapid international response—assuming timely political decisions

are made—and the chance to deter or otherwise prevent killings before they have gotten very far. 

With such forces, the risks, costs, casualties, collateral damage, and duration of intervention 

could be lowered, and confidence in success could be raised. In some cases, given the nature of 

many of the killing forces in Africa, the timely deployment of a highly capable, highly lethal

military force may deter killers who choose flight over fight. All these factors could incline 

political leaders to take action based on humanitarian concern and international responsibility, 

even in the absence of direct national strategic or material interests. 

As important as the composition of the force is the way it operates. In keeping with 

network concepts, every unit or individual of the force is able and expected to collect and share 

all relevant information available anywhere on the network—i.e., among all sensors and other 

units (which themselves serve as sensors). In addition any unit can collaborate via the network

with any other unit, whether ground-to-ground, ground-to-air, or air-to-air. Because their 

logistics systems are also networked, such forces can get the ammunition, fuel, water, food and 

parts they need when they need it, rather than having to lug supplies around with them. 

Decisionmaking authority can be decentralized to exploit distributed information, 

enhance agility, and shorten reaction time while still keeping top commanders informed of the

course of the operations in whatever detail they need. Plans can and should provide broad 

latitude for local initiative and adjustment, offering flexibility that is crucial in the confused, 

cloudy, and shifting circumstances that often surround mass killing. Similarly, the elements of 

the force can be modular, enabling them to be augmented, reconfigured, or reduced as the 

conditions of the contingency warrant. Net-capable forces are more easily tailored, sized, 

packaged, and modified than ordinary forces. 

For all the advantages of net-capable forces, the transition to them is inherently difficult. 

The U.S. military has been transforming itself for a decade or longer and still has a distance to go 

before it is thoroughly networked in its structures, capabilities, command and control, and skills. 

As with the information-network revolution in any human sector or endeavor, the technology is 

the easy part. Far harder to overcome are institutional resistance, ingrained doctrine, culture, and

tradition and experience that make full exploitation of the technology difficult. The greatest

obstacle of all in Africa may be the legacy of centralized decisionmaking—the predilection of 

top commanders to control—that defeats the very purpose of networking and discourages the 

initiative and accountability at lower ranks that enables a networked force to function with 

agility. It takes a combination of determined leadership and a new generation lacking in 

sympathy for the status quo to clear these obstacles from the path. Unless and until this occurs,

the effectiveness of an African humanitarian intervention force will fall short of its potential. 

Yet, without underestimating these obstacles, it would be a mistake to think that African 

military establishments cannot make the necessary changes. Because security problems persist in

much of Africa, a growing number of African military establishments are taking the quality, 

17
 

readiness, and preparation of their forces seriously. More and more African officers have been 

exposed to American, British, and other Western concepts, standards, and information 

technology. Nevertheless, it will take intensive training, education, exercise, leadership 

development, and exposure to Western militaries that are going through the same process. 

 

Is Networking Really Necessary? 

As we have noted, there are significant efforts underway by Western powers to increase 

African traditional peacekeeping capacity in terms of military training (tactical training, 

professional military education, civil-military relations, professionalism, doctrine development,

logistics, etc.) and equipment. These efforts are still needed. The addition of net-centric training 

and equipment the ability to deploy lighter, more agile, more inter-connected, and more lethal 

forces will help Africans address their growing need not only to keep peace, but to forcibly

intervene to stop mass killings and make a peace possible. 

It might be feared that investing in the creation of a net-capable African force would 

delay the day when humanitarian intervention could stop mass killing. This is wrong for two 

reasons. First, as noted earlier, forces undergoing transformation to exploit information 

technology improve throughout the process, not only at the end of it. Provided that operating 

doctrines and plans are revised to incorporate networking principles, investments in linking 

sensors, forces, and command nodes can begin to pay dividends right away. Indeed, favoring 

platforms, weapons, and traditional training over information, connectivity, and net-centric

concepts of operations is less likely to produce early results. There is nothing to be gained and 

precious time to be lost by withholding the benefits of information networking from selected 

African combat units until they have mastered previous stages of military doctrine. 

Second, traditional forces, even if strengthened, may not be able to respond effectively to 

the operational conditions associated with mass killing. Compared to net-capable forces, 

traditional forces lack shared and detailed battle-space awareness, speed, and the ability to 

operate in a distributed, interconnected, and collaborative way. They cannot disperse to protect 

remote populations with confidence in immediate support from other units on the network. Unnetworked ground and air units cannot team up as easily to deter or overcome enemy forces or 

adjust to unforeseen or changing circumstances. 

Being less aware and agile, traditional forces have to be substantially larger and heavier 

than net-capable ones to accomplish the same mission. One net-capable brigade-size force, for

example, might have the combat equivalence of several conventional brigades. At least one of

the conventional brigades would have to be heavily armored; the others might be traditional 

infantry with artillery and other heavy equipment. Logistic support for such a force would have

to be much larger, and the entire force and its support train would be much slower than a 

networked force—slow to get to the country in crisis, slow to respond to tactical warning of 

impending killing, and slow to adjust as conditions warrant. Size and weight would hinder if not 

preclude air-lift and air-assault. Network inadequacies would limit coordination with precision 

air strikes. 

The concept of operations for a traditional force would be quite different from that of a 

network-centric force. Because a traditional force cannot readily rely on widely dispersed and

networked SOF, UAVs, and other intelligence sensors, it might have to dispatch intelligence

units across the countryside to get even a limited view of what was happening. Even then, main 

fighting units would not be able to pull information in real time from these intelligence units.

18
 

The headquarters would not have a complete, all-source, and timely picture of the operational 

situation across the countryside; its information about both enemy and friendly forces could be 

days old—far longer than the time it takes for killing forces to enter a village and slay or chase 

away the population. 

Lacking actionable information and the means to react and move swiftly, and being 

required to concentrate forces to concentrate firepower, a traditional force might have to be

massed at central locations—secure but unresponsive. The lack of agility, survivability, and

ability to share firepower compared to a networked force would drive up the size and weight and 

thus reduce the mobility of the force required, with little hope of being able to reach villages

ahead of the killing forces. An alternative would be to spread the force thinly throughout the 

province to create a visible presence in hopes of deterring attack, but this would amount to 

stationing disconnected and potentially vulnerable units at long distances from each other and

from their support. 

A third alternative for using traditional forces is to deploy them on such a massive scale

(e.g., several divisions) that they provide a credible and survivable presence throughout an 

expansive killing zone. Organizing such a huge African regional combat force is surely less 

realistic than creating a small, high-quality, net-capable one. Moreover, planning an operation,

assembling the force and logistics, and deploying could take many months, if it were not out of 

the question for political and resource reasons. In any case, whether concentrated (thus

unresponsive), dispersed (thus vulnerable), or massive (thus unrealistic), a traditional force might 

not present an adequate deterrent to the killers, who could avoid unfavorable engagements and 

attack when and where they wished, or complete their killing before an intervention. Nor could 

the traditional force track and strike bands of killers. 

The point is not merely that traditional forces would not be as good as net-capable ones in 

such operations, but that the former might not succeed at all and could face high casualties and

other costs. 

 

General Shape and Mission of an African Humanitarian Intervention Force 

 

The key to successful humanitarian intervention is to maximize the force’s awareness and 

agility, not its size and weight. Thus, well-prepared, light, mobile, net-capable African 

humanitarian intervention forces—with air power and other operational support from advanced 

Western nations—offer the best chance to stop mass killing in African countries. This 

proposition demands, among other things: 

• that these forces operate under a mandate that allows them tactically to engage and defeat 

killing forces, if that is what it takes, and even to initiate action against those forces if it 

advances the mission of stopping mass killings of civilians; 

• that they are composed of the most capable African forces available; and 

• that they are given access to information networks that improve situational awareness and

permit flexible teaming. 

 

The importance of being able and authorized to take the battle to the killers cannot be 

overstated. As British forces showed in Sierra Leone, a strategy of seeking, attacking, and

bloodying a killing force can have dramatic salutary effects—setting conditions for restoration of

security, reconstruction, and eventual reconciliation. Intervention to stop large-scale killing could

prove highly violent or not, depending on the situation and the reaction of those doing the killing. 

19
 

In Kosovo, intervention came in the form of weeks of unrelenting NATO air strikes on Serbian 

targets. In Croatia, ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs ended when the Croatian army regrouped and 

went on the offensive. In Bosnia, a European-led UN Protection Force was unable for several 

years to stop ethnic cleansing and killing until NATO began bombing Serb forces. In Rwanda, 

the killing abated only when the rebel Tutsi army closed in on the capital. In all five cases, 

confronting the killers with superior forces was both necessary and sufficient to stop the 

atrocities. In the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), UN forces have been permitted 

to strike back hard against militias that attacked peacekeepers, with salutary effects. 

Perhaps the prospect of having to face well-armed, networked, high-quality combat

forces would deter would-be killers or compel them to abandon their campaign. As it is today, 

those who commit such outrages know they have little danger of being stopped, much less 

attacked. Indeed, the surest way to avoid losses while carrying out a humanitarian intervention is 

to convince the killing force to avoid combat. 

Of course, it may be that nothing short of fighting the killers will work. While

intervention to stop large-scale political killing may not require or resemble all-out warfare,

killing is more likely to be stopped if the killers know that intervention forces have the ability, 

will, mandate, and rules of engagement to defeat and eliminate them. Those who commit mass 

slaughter are less ready to fight than to kill—and may be less ready to kill if they face being 

killed. They may have no combat capability to speak of, since it takes none to kill unarmed 

civilians. Only by intervening with superior combat forces can a humanitarian intervention force 

be assured of success, either by intimidating the killers into submission or flight or by defeating 

them. 

 

Prospects for Operational Success

 

Although networking concepts and capabilities have been employed in combat (against al 

Qaeda, the Taliban and Saddam Hussein’s forces), they have not been used for forcible 

humanitarian interventions with a primary mission of stopping mass killing, which presents quite 

a different set of operational challenges. Nevertheless, it is possible to make qualitative

analytical judgments about how a net-capable humanitarian intervention force should fare in

those circumstances. This can be done by deconstructing actual occurrences of mass killing into 

operational challenges and examining how well forces with such capabilities would perform 

against those challenges.

By this method, The Power to Protect analyzed killing situations in Rwanda, Sierra

Leone, East Timor, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Cote d’Ivoire, using a 

common set of criteria to assess the difficulty each would have posed to a net-capable military

intervention force.45 Those results were compared with a similar breakdown of the conditions

faced by U.S. networked forces in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom, taking into 

account the differences in the two types of operations. (The most important criteria are those in 

figure 2.) That analysis indicated that there usually is enough strategic warning to mount an 

intervention and that killing forces, if engaged, can be defeated by combat forces with networkbased capabilities.46 Although sudden, sporadic, scattered killing and dispersed killing forces 

 45 This analysis was based in part on visits to some of the areas, opinions of military and civilian experts who served 

in some of the areas, and independent research. This was not a scientific survey based on statistical analysis. The 

results reflect “collective wisdom” based on research and interviews. 46Bernath and Gompert, 18-22. 

20
 

present operational problems, these can, in the analysis, be overcome by net-capable forces

supported by advanced sensors, operating in small mobile units, capable of quick response on 

tactical warning, and with networked reinforcements readily available. Of course, air transport 

and precision-strike assets are essential enablers. 

 

Strategic Warning Are there observable conditions that gave 

early warning to the international 

community of the danger of large-scale 

political killing? 

Tactical Warning Was information available to indicate that

killing had begun or was imminent? 

Clarity of Combatants Is it possible to distinguish combatants 

from one another and from noncombatants? 

Clarity of Killing Group(s) Is significant killing being done by more 

than one force against more than one 

group?

Clarity of Victims Is it clear who was being killed 

(combatants, noncombatants, ethnic 

groups, etc.)?

Killing Force Capabilities Are the killing forces well trained and 

equipped?

Resolve of Killing Force Is their motivation strong enough that they 

are willing to risk death in battle to achieve 

their goals?

Allies of Killing Force Can the killers expect reinforcement from

another force? If so, how capable is that 

force?

Disbursement of Killing Force To what extent is the killing 

concentrated/dispersed? 

Friendly Forces Is there a capable, friendly local military 

force (not engaged in killing itself) that 

could facilitate an intervention?

Status of Noncombatants Is there a separate capacity to provide 

concurrent humanitarian relief (so that the 

intervening force can concentrate on

fighting the killers)? 

Operational Accessibility & Logistics How accessible is the theater (e.g., distant, 

land-locked) and how difficult are logistics 

for intervening force?

Terrain How difficult is the terrain (e.g., 

mountainous, vegetation, urban)?

Figure 2. Operational Criteria 

21
 

The analysis also revealed potential difficulties even for net-capable forces in forcible 

humanitarian interventions, among them: 

• Inaccessible areas 

• Unfavorable terrain 

• Poor visibility 

• Difficulty in distinguishing the killing force(s) and identifying external parties who 

provide direct and indirect support to the killing forces 

• Lack of capable friendly local forces

• Lack of parallel humanitarian relief capacity. 

As previously noted, however, difficult access and terrain should be less of a problem for 

net-capable intervention forces than for traditional forces, because the former forces are smaller, 

lighter, and require less logistic support.47 Such forces are more easily airlifted to distant and/or

land-locked countries with poor infrastructure.48 Once there, they have greater mobility in

mountains, jungle, and even urban terrain. The effectiveness of the force could be impaired if 

terrain, location, and infrastructure do not permit fixed-wing air-transport and strike operations. 

Although poor visibility would not necessarily stop net-capable intervention forces, it 

could present difficulties for surveillance and reinforcement. The difficulty of seeing through 

forest canopy would not only militate against effective intervention—because of the need for 

swift response on warning—but also increase risks that intervening forces will be engaged by 

larger-than-expected enemy forces. Although they are linked to supporting firepower, small light 

forces, even with sufficient awareness, can be ambushed and possibly overrun before air strikes

or ground reinforcements arrive. Hours and minutes can be precious when a small force is caught

against a larger and heavier force, even if the latter is of lower quality with less sophisticated 

weapons. While most cases of large-scale killing have not involved the kinds of forces that could 

pose a threat to small but able, networked, combat forces, the danger cannot be excluded. 

This danger argues for ensuring that intervention forces are top-notch fighting troops who 

can hold their own if help is delayed.49 It also suggests the need for rules of engagement that 

permit preemptive strikes on killing forces when they are exposed, as well as retaliatory strikes

against killing forces that attack intervention forces. It must be clear that any force—regardless

of origin, sponsorship, or motivation— that interferes with the multilateral humanitarian mission 

becomes fair game. 

Humanitarian intervention forces cannot count on having local allies. In Kosovo and 

Afghanistan, U.S. and coalition forces were able to rely on local forces (the Kosovo Liberation 

Army and Northern Alliance, respectively) to smoke out enemy forces, making air strikes more 

effective. Although potential allies may be available in some situations of large-scale killing (as

the Tutsi rebel army was in Rwanda), intervening forces cannot count on them. Alignment with 

one side may imply that the intervention is not intended merely to save lives. Therefore, the

intervention force should be sized to stop the killing on its own, though reinforcement plans

ought to be agreed in advance. 

One problem not easily overcome, even by net-capable forces, is that killing is often not 

the work of a single armed group against a single unarmed group. Different forces could be

 47 Think of the dramatic difference in approach and effectiveness between small networked U.S. forces in

Afghanistan and a huge traditional Soviet army there 20 years earlier. 48 This depends on the range, capacity, and required runway length and conditions of the transport aircraft. 49 This requirement underscores the need for current efforts to improve basic combat skills to continue. 

22
 

killing different groups of innocents believed to be sympathetic to the other side, which has been 

the case in Eastern DRC and Cote d’Ivoire. Moreover, the killers might not be forces at all but 

instead civilians or undisciplined militia (as in East Timor and Rwanda). Net-based

improvements in awareness and precision, although dramatic, may not be sufficient if killers are

indistinguishable from those being killed. At the same time, networked forces can be more

responsive than traditional forces to fluid and ambiguous local conditions, provided that 

decisionmaking authority has been distributed adequately along with information throughout the 

network. One of the great virtues of networking, in all fields, is that it encourages discretionary

action by individuals “on the edge” who are face-to-face with reality. This goes for humanitarian

intervention forces sent to confront elusive killers in shifting and murky situations. 

In any case, situational murkiness is not a legitimate excuse for inaction. It is both an 

operational and moral imperative that a humanitarian intervention force sent to stop killing of 

civilian populations be authorized and expected to stop killing by any group. Several different 

groups, whether allied or opposing, may threaten innocent people, and the threat can change 

from one phase of the conflict to the next. Even though the intervention may be ordered with one

killing force in mind, the mission of protecting people should be constant, even if different

killers appear. The mission of the force is to stop the killing, not to support one faction over

another. This goes for government forces, militia, rebels, foreign forces, or any other group. A 

net-capable force is both better informed and more flexible in the face of fluid conditions. 

Finally, the absence of parallel humanitarian-relief missions can mean that uprooted 

people may suffer and die, even though they have been protected from killing forces. For every 

person killed outright in Darfur, about thirty have been displaced and depend on international

relief for survival. To be militarily effective, an intervention force cannot be diverted by relief

demands. Moreover, combat forces are not equipped or trained to handle the particular set of 

tasks involved in providing large-scale humanitarian care. Conversely, as the replacement of UN

by NATO forces in Bosnia showed, humanitarian relief is far more effective once killing forces 

are defeated or neutralized. 

In sum, mass-killing episodes can be complex and confusing, and there should be no 

assumption or implication that forcible humanitarian intervention by mobile, net-capable, combat 

forces, even with advanced intelligence, can be made risk-free and certain of success in every 

instance. Leaders contemplating intervention to stop mass killing must expect some casualties 

among the forces they send and some uncertainty about quick victory. Nevertheless, net-capable 

forces and operations have distinct advantages over large hierarchical ones that lack of speed, 

awareness, and flexibility. Nearly every one of the conditions that may militate against 

successful intervention can be more readily overcome by net-capable forces than by traditional 

ones. In particular, the occurrence of widespread killing by dispersed and mobile killing forces 

over wide expanses of unimproved and remote territory virtually demands the exploitation of 

information technology and the application of network operating principles. Thus, although 

network-based concepts and capabilities were not originally designed with the goal of stopping 

mass killing in mind, they appear to be well suited to such circumstances and such a mission. 

The Intelligence Challenge

 

One of the biggest challenges is the reliance of net-capable intervention forces on timely, 

accurate, abundant, and usable intelligence. Indeed, in the murky circumstances that often 

23
 

accompany mass-killing, intelligence is vital for net-capable forces—and their ability to exploit 

intelligence is what sets them apart from traditional forces. 

Operations will often be characterized by urgency and by the difficulty of distinguishing 

killers from victims or bystanders. Intelligence is needed to provide strategic and tactical 

warning, to improve combat preparations, and to illuminate actual operations. Knowing the 

location, capabilities, and movement of a killing force can improve the effectiveness and reduce 

the vulnerability of intervening troops. Conversely, poor intelligence could be the Achilles Heel 

of any effort to stop large-scale killing. 

The challenge is to be able to scan wide geographic areas for signs of trouble, to detect 

preparations or other warning signs of large-scale killing, and to conduct surveillance on a crisis 

area as long as necessary. While this is a tall order, there are a variety of ways to perform these 

tasks: satellite photo-reconnaissance (including commercially available satellite imagery), 

manned or unmanned airborne surveillance, ground sensors, interception of communications, 

and, of course, old-fashioned but often indispensable human intelligence (HUMINT). The 

challenge in Africa is that the intelligence assets needed to ensure success belong to Western

nations and are not concentrated in that part of the world. That poses significant problems: 

Problem 1: Availability of Intelligence Sensors. Violence-prone parts of sub-Saharan 

Africa are not normally covered by U.S. satellites and intelligence-gathering systems (though 

some imagery may be available commercially). This affects both the likelihood of early warning 

and the ability to support military intervention. There is no question that light, quick-response 

units cannot reach potential killing fields in time, and without danger of being overwhelmed, 

unless they have accurate, current, actionable intelligence, whatever the source. 

Of course, once a decision has been made to support a forcible humanitarian intervention, 

from that point on the region in question should become a higher priority for technical 

intelligence assets. Satellite imagery, communications intercept capabilities, and airborne

surveillance platforms can be redirected with flexibility and speed—assuming they are not 

committed to even higher priorities. This does not mean the full panoply of U.S. and allied

intelligence assets needs to be focused on the crisis area. One of the most important aspects of

IT-based transformation is the growing capability of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that can 

be deployed quickly and in large numbers. 

We will return toward the end of this study to the policy question of whether and under 

what conditions the United States should be prepared to share information technology and 

operational intelligence to an African intervention force. 

 Problem 2: Lack of Human Intelligence Sources. The effectiveness of most technical 

means of intelligence gathering can be diminished by the effects of weather, terrain, other natural 

obstacles, and deception. For example, UAVs and satellites cannot see through dense canopy to 

determine whether killing is taking place or killing forces are gathering. For these reasons,

HUMINT is almost always required (and in any case always useful). Moreover, by its patient

and interactive nature, it is more likely to reveal intentions to resort to large-scale killing. 

But the killing situations we find in Africa make it unlikely that trained HUMINT 

operators will be on the ground prior to a combat intervention. There would be little time to 

effectively deploy them. In most cases, news of impending or ongoing attacks against civilians is 

likely to come from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations and the

media. These are ad hoc sources of information that do not have the strategic and dedicated 

capabilities of HUMINT operators. 

24
 

In addition, NGOs, international organizations, and media are, to varying degrees, 

inhibited from passing what might be construed, and undoubtedly would be used, as intelligence 

by combat forces. Yet, this information barrier need not be absolute. If it is not just an AUsanctioned force, but an actual AU force, other international organizations may (should) be less 

reluctant to share information. In addition, some type of international information centers—in

which international organizations, force officers, NGOs, media, local inhabitants, and others—

could aid in exchange of information about killings and other factors affecting their missions. In 

fact, this type of information sharing already exists in many conflict areas under the auspices of 

the UN Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs. One and all would have both a selfinterest and a larger humanitarian interest in receiving and providing information that could save 

innocent lives. Although NGOs strive to be neutral in conflict areas—both for their protection 

and to allow them to better serve needy populations—NGOs we talked to indicate few qualms

about sharing tactical information informally to help stop mass killing. 

Problem 3: Making Good Use of Information. Whether in receiving intelligence, sharing 

intelligence, or collaborating with friendly units, net-capable forces depend vitally on the ability

of their personnel to use information systems. At present, only the United States and certain 

other Western countries are capable of creating and managing advanced information systems and 

networks for use in military expeditionary operations. However, there is no reason why forces of 

other countries cannot use them effectively, with Western help. As the unexpectedly rapid 

worldwide spread of the Internet shows, it is not necessary to be able to invent, make, control, or 

even understand information systems to be able to use them proficiently. 

A larger problem than gaining technical proficiency is that African military 

establishments are very hierarchical—the antithesis of information-rich organizations. One of the 

underpinnings of networked warfare is the concept of distributing information and 

decisionmaking to the lowest levels of operation that can exploit that information. In its purest 

form, the squad leader in an armored personnel carrier should be able transmit information to the

network for use by everyone else on the net. But more importantly, he should be able access the 

network for the most critical decisions—to open fire or not, to remain in place or withdraw. 

U.S. military doctrine calls for centralized planning and decentralized execution. 

Increasingly, fluid and confusing circumstances in unfamiliar contingencies demand flexibility

and ad hoc decisionmaking, which makes distributed authority ever more important. In addition, 

such conditions require unplanned, horizontal—“peer-to-peer”— collaboration without reference 

to higher authority (because there may not be time). Networked operations require and permit 

reduced reliance on hierarchical and centralized control. However, most African militaries are 

not structured, conditioned, or educated to function this way. With them, decisionmaking 

authority is centralized and hierarchical. The adoption and successful use of network-based 

assets will require not only training for African forces but also a change in leadership skills and

doctrine from senior levels on down through the junior officer and enlisted ranks. 

25
 

IV. A Humanitarian Response Combat Force for Africa 

What Force Could Have Prevented the Darfur Killings?

 

Thus far, we have described the need for forcible humanitarian interventions and 

generally how net-capable forces can be better adapted to these types of missions than 

conventional forces can. We have pointed out that networking is not a panacea; net-capable 

forces still face significant challenges. But, in examining factors common to interventions in 

Africa and elsewhere, it is clear that net-capable forces have distinct advantages in terms of size, 

mobility, lethality, speed, and survivability that lend themselves to success in forcible 

humanitarian interventions. 

We have also outlined the military situation in Darfur, including the capabilities and 

tactics of the killing forces. The next step, then, is to apply the aforementioned analysis of 

intervention factors to the case of Darfur. In figure 3, indicates that a factor favors the

Intervention Forces. For example, on the question of strategic warning, there was sufficient 

warning of the Darfur killings to allow an intervening force to deploy in time to stop it. 

means the factor would favor the killing forces. indicates that a factor does not 

clearly favor one side or the other. 

The comparison indicates that an intervening combat force would have had little trouble 

stopping killings by the Janjaweed if it could have tracked and engaged them. The killers lack

skill, strong motivation, and capabilities, and with decent intelligence it is not very difficult to

distinguish them from their civilian targets. There was ample strategic warning, and there could 

be ample tactical warning, if good sensors were available and information shared—a significant 

but not insurmountable challenge for a Western-augmented, net-capable African force in Darfur. 

Dispersed killings and killing forces present major challenges, albeit more easily met by airmobile net-capable forces. Similarly, although access would be a problem, net-capable forces 

would have less difficulty than large, heavy, slow ones reaching and operating throughout this 

vast undeveloped area. 

On balance, it seems reasonable to expect that a fast, light, lethal, well-trained, and wellled African combat force, operating in distributed, interconnected, and collaborative fashion, 

could have been more forward deployed and dispersed to strategic points throughout Darfur, 

better able to obtain intelligence on Janjaweed movements and intentions, mobile enough to 

move quickly to areas of potential or ongoing killings, and stop or deter mass killing, provided 

the force could get deep into Darfur, receive ample intelligence, and be backed up by precision 

air-strikes if trapped, ambushed, or confronted by Sudanese military units. Western support 

would be indispensable; with it, decisive success would be feasible. 

26
 

Range of Other Cases Darfur 

Strategic 

Warning 

Were the preconditions apparent? 

Tactical Warning Was the outbreak known? 

Clarity of 

Combatants 

Can combatants be distinguished 

from non-combatants and from one 

another? 

Clarity of Killing Is the killing going mainly in one 

direction? 

Skill of Killing 

Force 

Are the killers a trained, cohesive, 

combat-proven military force? 

Motivation of

Killing Force 

Is the killing force’s motivation 

strong enough to accept substantial 

risk? 

Capabilities of 

Killing Force 

How large, well-equipped, wellsupported and well-commanded is 

the killing force? 

Availability of 

Reinforcements 

for the Killing 

Force 

Are capable forces able and willing 

to counter-intervene? 

Concentration of 

the Killing Force 

Are the forces deployed in a few 

large areas or dispersed throughout 

the countryside? 

Concentration 

of Killing 

Are killings taking place in large 

numbers but in a few locations, or is 

there widespread killing? 

Availability of 

Friendly Forces 

Is there a capable, friendly force that 

can be coordinated with the 

intervention? 

Terrain To what extent does the terrain affect 

insertion, maneuver, and 

engagement? Might it permit 

ambush? 

Accessibility What is the ease or difficulty of 

getting troops/logistics to the area? 

Humanitarian

Relief 

Infrastructure 

Is there a humanitarian relief 

infrastructure that can begin 

operations as soon as fighting has 

ended? 

Figure 3. Comparison of Operational Challenges 

27
 

A Hypothetical AU Force

 

With this assessment in mind, the next step is to get more specific in illustrating a multilateral 

combat force with the capabilities to intervene forcibly to defeat killing forces in a situation like

Darfur. In identifying required capabilities, the best place to start is with operational tasks that 

must be accomplished. Broadly stated, an African humanitarian intervention force would need 

to: 

• Acquire and analyze all-source intelligence on current conditions and the capabilities and 

intentions of the killing forces 

• Deploy swiftly from base operating areas to sites where killings are taking place, entering 

by force if necessary 

• Disaggregate into combat-response units that are deployed quickly strategically and able, 

upon tactical warning, to be deployed to threatened population centers 

• Defend threatened populations by deterring or defeating killing forces 

• Maneuver to interdict, engage, pursue, and destroy killing forces 

• Respond swiftly to calls for support or reinforcement 

• Re-deploy as needs shift 

• Provide security until peacekeeping forces arrive

• Sustain combat operations for a month or longer. 

 

With the Darfur case of mass killing in mind, such a mission would require a brigadeplus combined ground-air force consisting of: 

• A deployable brigade headquarters and several mobile battalion headquarters 

• Two battalions of light, mobile infantry equipped with rifles, machine guns, mortars, light 

artillery, air defense missiles, armored personnel carriers, Humvees, and small trucks 

• One battalion of air-mechanized armor, with light tanks and mobile mortars/artillery 

• From one to several companies of SOF 

• Flexible (e.g., short- or crude-runway-capable) air transport, fixed- and rotary-wing 

gunships, and precision-strike aircraft 

• Military police, intelligence, medical support, logistics, engineering, civil administration, 

and information operations. 

A bigger AU force can be fielded by creating five maneuver battalions, rather than three

battalions. A brigade of five battalions might have four light infantry and one air mechanized 

battalion, or three of the former and two of the latter. 

External Support Required

 

While the ground forces in our model would be African, critical information, mobility, 

logistics, planning and advisory support, precision-strike aircraft, and possibly SOF would, for

some time, have to come from Western countries. In addition to the United States, some of the 

more advanced net-capable militaries include the UK, Canada, France, Netherlands, Sweden, 

Denmark, and Australia—though a number of others, including Germany and Italy, are now

planning to transform their forces in the same general direction. Most of these countries are 

currently contributing to African peacekeeping capacity-building, so it would be a matter of 

28
 

expanding or adjusting that support to include forcible intervention combat capabilities, rather 

than starting anew. 

Western countries, acting in concert, would need to provide training in network-based 

operations and tactics, including the use of information systems and exploitation of information. 

Africans themselves, augmented by existing Western training and equipment programs, should

be expected to provide good basic training in individual and unit military skills. Additional 

Western training is needed to concentrate on forging networked capabilities and operating 

concepts, e.g., in exploiting information and air-ground integration. This net-centric training can 

and should be integrated into existing African training and equipment programs. In addition, 

Western countries would need to provide radios, cellular systems, laptop computers, displays, 

weapons systems, vehicles and other light but high-grade equipment—and the related training 

needed to use these assets. Whether this would include transfers of fixed- and/or rotary-wing 

transport aircraft would depend on the Africans’ ability to maintain and employ them effectively, 

and on whether Western countries can be counted on to contribute needed air power. Given its 

modest size, the goal should be for the African force to have transport capacity to move itself to 

and around the killing zones within a decade. 

The West can provide superior tactical aircraft for air control, close-air support, and 

precision strike. It would not take much—a squadron or two. In the absence of local airstrips, 

several NATO countries have aircraft carriers.50 A few AU members have combat aircraft, 

though precision-strike capabilities are years away. All things considered, reliance on Western

combat air power would be unavoidable for the foreseeable future. Such support could be crucial 

in situations like Darfur—to keep away the Sudanese air force, back up AU forces in trouble, and 

hit Janjaweed out of reach of African ground forces. A few well-placed strikes on Janjaweed, 

their sources of support, and their backers might even dissuade them from further fighting or

killing. 

Even as the Africans improve their air-strike capabilities, there is a strategic reason to 

involve Western air power. An African intervention force is more likely to succeed if it is the 

only serious combat force in the killing zone. Therefore, it is crucial to keep at bay the army of 

the regime, assuming it is complicit. AU consensus in support of intervention is more likely to 

hold if it does not become necessary to engage in hostilities with the forces of a fellow member, 

however odious and complicit. Western air power was indispensable in neutralizing Serbian

forces in Bosnia and Kosovo, and equally indispensable in protecting the Kurds from mass

killing at the hands of the Iraqi Army after the First Gulf War. Western air cover for an African

intervention may be vital. 

In addition to air support, Western C4ISR—command, control, communications, 

computing, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance—would be a key to success. For now, 

the United States would have to provide the bulk of the strategic and tactical intelligence and 

networking capability. In time, Europeans may be able to augment or substitute for American 

support. Communications, obviously crucial for networked operations, would be provided via the

U.S. Global Information Grid (GIG) and deployable, mobile systems, which are now a priority

among Western expeditionary forces. Western logistics support and management will also be

essential, though, again, small and light forces are more easily supported than large and heavy 

ones. 

 50 At present, the only country that is sure to have aircraft carriers capable of operating aircraft with enough range to

reach significantly beyond the African coast is the United States. 

29
 

Since the Balkan wars of the 1990s, commercial firms have appeared that are capable of 

providing logistics support, advisors, transport, and even air-surveillance. This represents an

option in the event that Western government support is not available. For example, an AU force 

could acquire overhead intelligence information commercially. While such practical alternatives

should not be dismissed, they do not relieve the West and the rest of the international community 

of responsibility to partner with Africa to stop mass killing. Moreover, the more complex and 

dangerous conditions might be, the more important it would be that Western support be official, 

not commercial. 

Finally, and potentially most controversial, Western countries might need to provide 

advisors and possibly some soldiers on the ground. At a minimum, a small number of advisors 

could be vital in command and logistics management centers. A more difficult question is 

whether Western SOF should accompany African quick-response units or operate on their own 

to pass intelligence, direct air strikes, or even engage some killing groups. At the end of the day, 

the presence of Western advisors or fighters is a policy issue, which we will take up in the next

section. 

Western support for the hypothetical AU force might consist of: 

• sensors and information networks for intelligence, combat C2, and logistics 

• a company of SOF, with UAVs, for establishing intelligence coverage over key parts 

of the province and for advising African officers in quick-response units 

• a squadron of multi-purpose, precision-strike aircraft (e.g., F-16s) for airspace control 

and ground attack 

• attack helicopters and gunships (e.g., AC-130s) for support of ground troops 

• air-cargo and troop transports (e.g., C-130s) and utility/cargo/lift helicopters 

• C4ISR aircraft for air and ground surveillance, communications, and C2 

• augmentation of such government support by commercial firms, as appropriate. 

 

Western operational involvement along these lines would also have strategic advantages. 

The AU and African force contributors could be more certain of success at acceptable costs if 

Western military establishments were engaged and their governments committed. Once involved,

Western countries—certainly the United States—are unlikely to allow a forcible humanitarian 

operation to fail and have the strategic depth (of resources and military capabilities) to succeed.

By the same token, killing forces and complicit government forces are less likely to resist an AU 

force if they know that Western strength, experience, and determination lie behind it. In addition,

the provision of essential Western support (e.g., US C4ISR) lends added assurance that no 

African country or grouping could abuse a role in an AU intervention force for selfish gains. In

sum, Western operational support can be a major confidence builder. 

Terrain Coverage and Operational Requirements

 

Assuming it had such Western advisory, intelligence, and air support, could a netcapable, brigade-sized, AU force get the job done in an area as big as Darfur? The answer is that 

it probably could do so—if properly equipped with information networks, helicopters, and other 

mobile equipment —but it might be stretched thin by the sheer size of the territory and the farflung location of many villages. In an area as big as Darfur, a brigade of five combat battalions 

would be better than one of only three combat battalions, but the smaller brigade might be able to 

do the job if properly trained, equipped, and used. We will look at both. 

30
 

The size of the Darfur terrain matters in determining force-to-space ratios and resulting 

mobility requirements. Darfur can be thought of as a square of roughly 200x200 miles.51 If the

AU brigade has three combat battalions, each one will be required to cover an area equivalent to 

a square of about 115x115 miles. Assuming the battalion is centrally located, this means that its

response units might need to move quickly to distances of up to 58 miles for individual 

contingencies. If the brigade has five battalions, each battalion will have to cover a square of 

90x90 miles and will be required to deploy to a distance of up to 45 miles for individual 

contingencies. Such distances could be covered by truck in 2-3 hours or more. Helicopters could 

arrive on the scene within 20-30 minutes of take-off. Thus, a helicopter-equipped AU force could 

handle the requirements for terrain coverage arising in Darfur. 

The required size of the AU force also is influenced by the number of contingencies 

likely to be encountered and their simultaneity. Thus far, Janjaweed attacks on individual 

villages have ranged in size from about 100 to 400 fighters. An AU response unit of platoon-size, 

if backed by air support and artillery, should be able to handle an enemy force at the low end of 

that range. A response unit of company size (250 troops), with air support, should be able to 

handle an enemy of 400 troops. In the event of unusually large killing-force concentration, the 

AU force might have to operate in battalion response units, but operations requiring the entire 

brigade are unlikely. Assuming that the normal mode of operation will be at the company level,

an AU brigade of 3 battalions will field 9 companies, 6 of which might be deployable at any 

single time. A brigade of 5 battalions will field 15 companies, 10 of which would be deployable 

at one time. Thus, an AU brigade would be capable of carrying out 6-10 operations

simultaneously—a substantial capability that could cover most of the population of the province 

within a few hours at most and could thus deter or engage most enemy forces. 

This AU brigade would have to be properly equipped and supported. A brigade of the 3 

battalions would total about 2,400 troops in those maneuver units; one of 5 battalions would total 

4,000 troops. Combat support and combat service support units would roughly double the 

required manpower. Thus, an AU brigade of 3-5 battalions would involve about 4,600-8,000 

troops in Darfur, and an additional 2,000-3,000 support troops in rear-area supply and staging

locations. An essential element of support is the maintenance and sustainment of equipment. 

Required training and support include adequate spare parts, maintenance training at various 

levels from individual equipment maintenance through higher echelons, and eventual equipment

replacement procedures. 

Helicopters would be especially important. Based on U.S. Army standards, a reasonable 

estimate is that this AU Force would require 3 or 4 command helicopters, 10-15 reconnaissance

helicopters, 24-36 attack helicopters, 40-50 utility helicopters, and 15-25 heavy cargo 

helicopters.

52 (These numbers are smaller than the number of helicopters available among 

African militaries in the aggregate, but greater than the number of reliable ones that would be

available.) An AU force of this many helicopters clearly would require an effective logistic 

support infrastructure to keep them operating at high tempo. U.S. experience in combat shows 

that helicopters are delicate instruments that require considerable maintenance and consume 

large amounts of spare parts and fuel. This is especially the case for attack helicopters and air 

assault helicopters used in direct combat operations, but even cargo helicopters can quickly 

suffer breakdowns if they are not well-supported. Support staff must be skilled at maintenance, 

 51 These figures are derived from map measurements of the Darfur region. 52 Although some African countries have significant numbers of helicopters on paper, augmentation by Western

assets and support personnel is likely to be necessary. 

31
 

repair, refueling, rearming, and planning. Fortunately U.S. and other western militaries have 

ample experience at employing helicopters for difficult missions. A western-operated AU 

helicopter force should be capable of operating effectively in Africa today. If African militaries

are expected to operate the helicopter force, they will need to be endowed with the necessary 

skills, which would take time.

Similar analysis applies to other aircraft that would be operated by the AU force, 

including attack gunships, cargo transports, and fixed-wing strike aircraft. With the necessary air 

bases, stocks, and trained support personnel, high-tempo air operations can be mounted and 

sustained. Because such operations will be highly demanding, they initially should be carried out

by Western militaries that are experienced in using combat and support aircraft at high tempo in 

austere locations. But as African forces acquire the requisite skills, they can gradually take over

the air operation for both helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. 

The force also would require a large number of trucks, Humvees, and other small 

vehicles. Support assets would need to be sized and structured for the mission. Requirements for 

munitions might be relatively modest, but requirements for fuels, food, construction materials, 

medical supplies, maintenance, and similar assets might be relatively high. In sum, to say that a 

net-capable force would be able to intervene effectively to stop mass killing in a place like 

Darfur is not to say that it would be a simple operation or that it would be 100% successful. 

A Hypothetical Operation

 

How, specifically, might such an African force with Western support operate to bring an end 

to mass killing in Darfur? The following illustrates a possible course of action, based on the 

assumption of a 3-battalion brigade (the smallest viable force). In this case, assuming Western 

support and a high state of readiness of the African intervention forces, upon strategic warning of 

mass killing, such a force would deploy to Darfur within days of an AU political decision and 

orders to do so. Once there, it would be distributed as follows: 

• The force headquarters, mechanized battalion, support units, and air assets would deploy 

to a single central location, (e.g., an air base). 

• The two light motorized infantry battalions would disperse to locations some distance

from force headquarters to extend coverage across the province and shorten response 

times.

53

• From these three locations, multiple SOF-UAV detachments would disperse across the

surrounding countryside, thus providing a networked capacity for surveillance of 

potential sites of violence 

• Deployable Western C2 systems and links would be overlaid on this brigade-battalion

African force disposition and “wired” into wider intelligence networks. 

Upon warning of impending killings: 

• Surveillance and strike aircraft would launch to detect and intercept government air or 

ground deployments. 

• SOF with UAVs would track killing forces approaching a population center and relay 

intelligence to brigade and battalion headquarters.

 53 Alternatively, infantry and mechanized units from these battalions could be cross- attached, thereby forming three 

combined-arms battalions, each with two companies of light infantry and one company of light mechanized forces. 

32
 

• Within an hour of tactical warning, attack helicopters and gunships (possibly with F-16s) 

would arrive to interdict killing forces, based on spotting guidance from SOF and/or 

requests from African ground commanders. 

• Within at most a few hours, light infantry forces—ranging from a single company to an 

entire battalion—would arrive at the scene by truck, C-130, or helicopter lift, depending 

on the distance, urgency, and amount of force needed. 

• If combat ensued, African ground forces would use deadly force against the killing 

forces. 

• If necessary, mechanized reinforcements would arrive by ground or air within a day, 

thereby adding firepower to the light infantry forces. 

• Because of the resourceful use of networked forces and exploitation of speed, this same 

pattern of phased application of joint combat power could be conducted elsewhere in the 

province and repeated over a period of days and weeks. 

• With Darfur countryside secured by African combat forces, AU/UN peacekeepers would 

deploy to preserve local stability, restore order, and set conditions for reconstruction. 

• Within a month or two, the combat force could be withdrawn, leaving AU/UN 

peacekeepers in its place. 

In addition to responding to, interdicting, and defeating attacks on the population, the

intervention force could be given the mandate, and therefore should have the capability, to 

destroy the capacity of the killing forces to fight and kill. Air-assault ground forces and air-strike 

forces could be used against enemy centers of gravity and choke points, such as operating and 

support bases, command posts, and supply chains. Even though killing forces may have little 

such infrastructure and critical nodes, destroying what they have could weaken their

effectiveness and determination. 

Again, as important as the employment of forces are the provision, sharing, and use of 

information. The awareness and collaboration requirements of this otherwise modest operation 

are quite demanding, mainly because of the importance of speed (to cover territory and gain

tactical advantage) and the need to be able to engage and integrate air and ground assets 

distributed throughout the force. The first requirement, of course, is to get an accurate picture of

what is happening in the province as a whole. The second is to look more persistently at

concentrations of vulnerable populations and activities of killing forces. With this as an 

information base, surveillance sensors and HUMINT networks must then be used to detect and 

report dangerous movements by killing forces against population concentrations. All such

information must be fused and made available not only to force headquarters but also to the 

distributed battalion headquarters, suggesting the need for deployable, province-wide

communications links. 

Once warning is given and forces respond, sensors must provide real-time information on 

both friendly and killing forces. Whatever the source—UAV, manned surveillance aircraft, or 

information gleaned by SOF or combat units—this data must be available to the on-site 

commander and other junior or noncommissioned officers. Such information superiority over 

killing forces can multiply the combat effectiveness of the response unit and also indicate what if

any additional support is needed. No less important are the links among the ground forces and 

air-strike forces, since either may be engaged as both sensors and shooters. Lastly, information 

sharing and collaboration between quick-response units and force headquarters are critical. Even 

33
 

though decisionmaking should be decentralized as much as possible, there will be decisions that 

must be made by the force commander. 

Least tangible but perhaps most important are the leadership qualities and 

decisionmaking skills of African officers—not only the force commander but also the junior

officers who command quick-response battalions, companies or smaller units. These individuals 

must be willing to take responsibility, be able to integrate reliable intuition with rapid reasoning,

and have key cognitive abilities, such as anticipation, quick reaction time, opportunism, and the 

capacity to learn in action.54 They must be able to cope with the ambiguities and dilemmas

inherent in the sort of interventions described here, know right from wrong, have exceptional 

collaborative skills, and be self-aware of their mental strengths and weaknesses. African military

structures and traditions have neither demanded nor fostered such qualities among junior officers

nor given them much authority to decide and act under fire. Therefore, one of the most important 

aspects of Western training will be to impart and nurture what it takes for an officer to succeed in

an urgent, dangerous, high-stakes, messy, networked operation. To some extent—but only 

some—Western advisors embedded in the force can assist African colleagues in making use of

information, making sense of the situation, and making quick and sound decisions.

There is little question that the net-capable force described above, operating in the 

manner described, could largely stop the Janjaweed. While not every village could be protected, 

and not every killing orgy prevented, most would. After a few costly engagements, the 

Janjaweed might try to avoid the force by striking villages quickly and stealthily in remote

locations, by lying low, or by dissolving. In all likelihood, the Janjaweed would not continue 

killing and raping at the same rate. 

As stressed earlier, international involvement cannot end once the killing has been 

stopped. Peacekeeping, stabilization, reconstruction, and possible reconciliation will follow. But 

we know from several cases—the current struggle to build a new Iraq, for instance—that the

success of such follow-on endeavors depends critically on the level of security, which can be 

shattered if hostile forces reappear as insurgents, terrorists, or criminals. Therefore, to the extent 

possible, the intervention force should attempt to neutralize the potential for violence against 

civilians, peacekeepers, or aid-workers once it has left. Beyond stopping the killing, this could 

require seeking, defeating, disbanding, disarming or destroying at least part of the killing force. 

In the Darfur case, under threat from the intervention force and no longer able to do Khartoum’s 

dirty work, Janjaweed fighters might accept terms for their own demobilization. This additional 

mission of eliminating the killing force could, of course, be more demanding and risky than 

stopping killing. While setting conditions for a secure future are highly desirable and should be 

part of the intervention mandate, inability to achieve it should not be a reason to refrain from 

intervention to stop the killing itself. 

What Could Go Wrong?

Intervention to stop mass killing is bound to be complex and fraught with danger. In 

Darfur, risks include hostilities with government military forces, ambush, and getting ensnared in 

a civil war. If the intervention force is given an expansive mandate, there is a good chance that 

government military forces would act against what they might regard as an invasion force. At 

 54 For a treatment of decisionmaking demands and opportunities presented by networked warfare, see David C.

Gompert, Irving Lachow, and Justin Perkins, “Battle-Wise: Gaining Cognitive Advantage in Networked Warfare,” 

Defense and Technology Paper 8 (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2005). 

34
 

worst, this could lead to a major escalation into an Africa-wide conflict that the sponsors of the 

African intervention had never intended. For this reason, it would be important to act forcefully 

to challenge the first indication of government intervention. Western and African air power 

should be sufficient to prevent government military units from interfering with humanitarian

intervention operations. 

Another danger is that of ambush or other circumstances in which small, light, 

intervention forces find themselves isolated and over-matched. Reliance on networks for 

information dominance and reinforcement could backfire if sensors or communications links fail 

or are disrupted.55 While this is unlikely to be a problem against a primitive adversary, it is

possible that a company trying to save a village could be exposed to heavy casualties, possibly 

including atrocities. The response to such an occurrence should be strong, such as striking 

Janjaweed forces even though they are not menacing population centers. 

Finally, the intervention force might embolden Darfur rebels, thus fanning a civil war. 

The rebels of Darfur have done little to protect the people of Darfur, and it is more likely that 

they would take advantage of an international intervention than curtail their activities.

Anticipating this risk, AU political authorities or officers must communicate in advance that 

rebel military opportunism will not be tolerated. While the merits of the rebels’ cause against 

Khartoum go beyond our scope, forcible humanitarian intervention should, as a general rule, 

focus strictly on the goal of saving lives and, to the extent possible and consistent with that goal, 

avoid precipitating permanent political change. 

In sum, our hypothetical, net-capable force, with the right mandate, rules of engagement 

and Western support, should be able to stop mass killing in a situation like Darfur. Of course, our 

analysis assumes that African countries would make available their most capable forces, that 

Western assistance in training and equipping would be forthcoming and effective, that WesternAfrican cooperation would be close, that exceptional African officers would emerge, that African 

personnel would be able to operate information terminals, and that the West would provide air 

support. In other words, an effective African capability for forcible humanitarian intervention is 

conceivable, but the effort to create it, while not prohibitively difficult or expensive, will be a 

great challenge for all involved. The remaining chapters of this study are about meeting that 

challenge. 

V. Getting There

Setting the Goal

 

We have identified a force that is roughly equivalent in size to the 8,000 called for by the 

UN Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS).56 That is where the similarity ends, however. The 

force we prescribe should possess enough speed, maneuverability, lethality, awareness, and 

inter-connectedness to carry out forcible humanitarian intervention missions. Precisely because 

 55 In the Darfur case, it is unlikely that Janjaweed or their backers could attack the computers and networks of the 

intervention force. 56 UN News Service, “Thousands of troops needed in Darfur to protect civilians and workers, UN envoy says,” 23

March, 2005, available at 

<http://www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewsID=13747&Cr=sudan&Cr1=&Kw1=Thousands+of+troops+neede

d+in+Darfur+&Kw2=civilians&Kw3=workers>. 

35
 

we have suggested such a capable force, building it would be an ambitious undertaking. The 

modest size of the force should not mask the difficulties on the road to its creation, notably: 

finding and helping build the requisite number of first-rate African participating units; preparing

them—in fact, transforming them—for networked operations; intensifying AU-Western 

cooperation; unifying Western assistance efforts (at least for this force); and preparing for 

combined African-Western operations. 

The first step on the road to creating an African force that could to stop mass killing

would be to set a definite goal, to be agreed upon within the AU and between the AU and the 

group of developed nations prepared to help. We suggest that an appropriate goal would be to 

create an “African Humanitarian Combat Force” (AHCF) as a new added element of the ASF

under the AU. The AHCF would provide new capabilities for the ASF, not compete with it. 

Of course, there are ways and opportunities for Africans to increase their capacity of

forcible humanitarian intervention short of creating an actual multilateral force-in-being. 

However, both operational effectiveness (speed, coherence, standards) and absolute clarity about 

multilateral control (under the AU) argue for a specific force. Moreover, defining such a goal 

would offer strong motivation to prospective participants, facilitate international support, and 

permit measurement of progress. It might also signal to dangerous groups that the AU was not

going to tolerate mass killing. 

Existing African Capacity and AU Initiatives 

 

African military forces range widely, from the South Africa National Defense Force at 

the upper end to the 500-person Sao Tomean military. Six militaries in Africa with significant 

operational experience and combat capabilities, including airlift, strike, and mechanized forces

illustrate the potential:57

 

Ethiopia: 182,500 troops. The army consists of six divisions, three reinforced mechanized 

brigades, and strategic reserve divisions of six brigades. The air force has 48 combat 

aircraft, 25 attack helicopters, 4 C-130s, and 12 transport helicopters. 

South Africa: 55,750 troops. The army is organized in five regional joint task forces and 

one SOF brigade. The army also has regular cadre units comprising seven armored 

battalions, and 27 infantry battalions, including an airborne battalion, eight artillery 

battalions, and five air defense battalions. The air force includes 50 combat aircraft, 12 

attack helicopters, and 5 squadrons of transport aircraft, including nine C-130s, and 

UAVs. 

Nigeria: 78,500 troops. The army includes one armored division, consisting of two 

armored brigades; one composite division, consisting of one motorized infantry brigade, 

one amphibious brigade, and one airborne battalion; two mechanized divisions, each 

consisting of one mechanized brigade and one motorized infantry brigade; and one air 

defense brigade. The air force includes 84 combat aircraft, 10 attack helicopters, and 5 C130s, plus other transport. 

 57 All numbers are from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2004-2005 (Oxford:

Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005). It is worth noting that the official 

numbers may not reflect accurate inventories or the quality of the force and the equipment. 

36
 

Kenya: 24,120 troops. The army includes one armored brigade, five infantry battalions, 

one artillery brigade, and one airborne battalion. The air force has 29 combat aircraft and 

34 attack helicopters. 

Ghana: 7,000 troops. The army includes two brigades, including six infantry battalions, 

one training battalion, two airborne/SOF companies, and one reconnaissance regiment. 

The air force includes 19 combat aircraft, 13 small transport aircraft, and 34 attack 

helicopters. 

Senegal: 13,620 troops. The army includes three armored battalions, six infantry 

battalions, one commando/airborne battalion, and one artillery battalion. The air force 

includes eight combat aircraft and seven transport aircraft. 

 

Compared to all other regions but Europe, Africa has ambitious plans for multilateral 

forces, which have the advantages of pooling scarce capabilities, de-nationalizing defense, and 

promoting African solutions to African problems. In 2004, the African Union established 

agreements for the ASF, comprising African peacekeeping units that can deploy in crisis

situations at short notice. Current plans are for the ASF to consist of five “regional” (i.e. subcontinental) brigades, which can be deployed by either the African Assembly (the AU equivalent 

of the UN General Assembly) or the AU Peace and Security Council (the AU equivalent of the 

UN Security Council). The ASF is envisioned essentially to provide peacekeeping in civil wars, 

implement disarmament programs, and provide humanitarian relief.58 The presumption is that a 

peace agreement or ceasefire is in place and that the parties to a conflict accept the deployment

of peacekeepers. This region-by-region ASF is developing unevenly. There is progress in 

establishing a Western Standby Brigade, and somewhat less progress in developing Eastern, 

Central and Southern Standby Brigades. Plans for a Northern Standby Brigade are at a standstill. 

Sierra Leone and Mali volunteered to serve as ASF regional logistics depot locations,59

and Nigeria has pledged to supply C-130 medium lift aircraft, one motorized battalion, and 

specialist units including reconnaissance, engineering, and artillery units.60 Provisional units 

totaling 4,500 troops and 1,000 police and civilian workers were identified for the East African 

Standby Brigade in 2004. Under the auspices of the Economic Community of Central African 

States, the 2,400-strong Central African Standby Brigade is scheduled to be formed for the first 

exercise in Chad in 2005.61 In the South African region, twenty military planners based in

Botswana will draw up operational requirements for the brigade; decisions on the regional 

headquarters and depots are slated for 2006.62

 58 Todd Pitman, “African Leaders Sign Common Security Plan,” Associated Press, February 28, 2004, available at 

<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/region/0228sign.htm>. 

59 Helmoed-Romer Heitman, “West African states form rapid-reaction force,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 24, 

2004. 60 Segun Adeyemi, “ECOWAS members pledge 6,500 troops for standby force,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 

13, 2004. 

61 Helmoed-Romer Heitman, “Central African States commit to standby force,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 12,

2005. 62 BBC Monitoring International Reports, Botswana Likely to Host Sub-regional Standby Force, December 28, 

2004. 

37
 

While the current ASF design is not explicitly restricted to peacekeeping, there is no 

mention of offensive or air-strike capabilities, and the nature of the forces and the training they

will receive confirms that they are not intended or being prepared for forcible intervention and

combat. Nor does there seem to be any recognition of the possibility of leap-frogging over 

traditional structures and operating concepts to embrace the potential of information and

networking. 

External Military Capacity-Building Efforts in Africa

 

In the decade since the international failure to stop the Rwandan horror, Western

countries have provided assistance to build African multilateral capacity. The assistance has 

ranged from imparting democratic values to teaching management, to fostering common regional 

experiences and perspectives, to unit and individual training and education. The political basis 

for this is consensus among the Africans, the North Atlantic allies, and other advanced 

democracies that Africans should take primary responsibility to deal with their security 

problems. 

The Bush administration has asked Congress to fund a Global Peace Operations Initiative 

(GPOI) to improve African peacekeeping capabilities. GPOI targets include training 75,000 

peacekeepers, primarily in Africa, boosting training for peace support operations in regions

including Africa, and establishing transport and logistics arrangements to assist countries that 

want to participate in operations but lack the capabilities.63 GPOI will be implemented through

the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program (ACOTA), with $50m in 

funding for FY2005 to improve African peacekeeping capabilities. There are currently eleven 

ACOTA partners, including Ghana, Kenya, Ethiopia, Botswana, Senegal, Mozambique, Benin, 

Malawi, and Mali, that are in training programs; South Africa and Zambia are in training 

discussions.64 More partners are on the horizon. ACOTA training programs are tailored to each 

recipient nation’s needs, so as to build good soldiers who become good peacekeepers. Hence, 

South African forces are focusing their training on information security, information operations, 

and logistical operations in regard to C-130 airlift. Smaller militaries focus on “niche” skills, i.e.

airfield logistics or standing up civilian-military operations centers. ACOTA also implements a 

train-the-trainer approach, preparing Africans to use their ACOTA-trained units to train their

national militaries, thereby reinforcing peacekeeping capacity and effectiveness. 

Ghana is a good example of success. The Ghanaian peace-support operations training

school now runs a 10-week training program for all Ghanaian peace operation forces, maintains 

its own equipment, and has started training future trainers. Supplementing this, ACOTA 

emphasizes working with regional organizations, like the Economic Community of West African 

States, enabling the mobilization of bilaterally-trained forces for multilateral operations. 

The United Kingdom is taking a similar approach to support African initiatives to 

develop military capacity. The UK trains African troops to conduct effective peacekeeping

operations, through significant efforts with Ghanaian, Kenyan, Tanzanian, and South African 

militaries. By 2010, at least 17,000 African troops will have been trained directly or through

organizations supported by the UK government. Training activities include peacekeeping map 

 63For more details, see Douglas J. Feith, “The Global Peace Operations Initiative and Its Potential Boost to African 

Militaries,” African Armed Forces Journal, September 2004, 7-8. 64The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary, African Affairs, International Security Affairs, United States 

Department of Defense, interview by author, Washington, DC, March 22, 2005. 

38
 

exercises, conducting peacekeeping training courses, and exercises at the Ghana Staff College (a 

UN regional center for peacekeeping training) and in South Africa and Tanzania. Supplementing 

this, a number of senior-level courses and numerous operational and tactical level training 

activities are run each year at the Kenya Peace Support Training Center. The UK government

also supports the effort of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in eastern 

Africa to create the East Africa Standby Brigade.

France has a well-developed capacity-building program called Reinforcement of African 

Capacity to Maintain Peace (RECAMP). RECAMP trains African battalions to carry out 

peacekeeping operations so they can participate in brigade-size forces within a regional 

framework. RECAMP also aims to integrate humanitarian support with peacekeeping efforts and 

is supported by around 20 donor nations from most European Union states, the United States,

Canada, Russia, China, India, Japan, and Argentina. In November 2004, 1,500 soldiers from the 

proposed 6,500 West African Standby Brigade received humanitarian-assistance training under 

the French capacity-building program. A RECAMP exercise was held in Benin from November

2004 to February 2005. 

A number of other countries have smaller, but useful assistance efforts to train African

militaries. Collectively, however, Western assistance is not well-integrated, optimized, or

targeted, except loosely concentrating on peacekeeping capacity. 

Building on Current African and External Efforts

 

Because we are proposing a multilateral force under AU auspices, and in view of existing

international efforts to enhance African capabilities (GPOI, ACOTA), we recommend that the 

AHCF be developed under the established umbrella of the AU ASF. Given this, there are two 

options worth considering: creating a new element of the ASF, drawn from all of Africa, and

utilizing the current five-region/five-brigade structure. 

The first option has important advantages. Organizing the AHCF from an Africa-wide 

pool would help ensure a critical mass of high-quality combat units, whereas relying on each of 

the five regions might well not. Moreover, the standards for the regional peacekeeping brigades 

and AHCF are quite different; the former are to function mainly in permissive conditions (UN 

Chapter 6 and Chapter 7), while the latter are fighting forces specifically designed for nonpermissive conditions in which a peace agreement may not exist, including the possibility of 

offensive operations. Blurring this distinction would endanger the combat effectiveness of the 

AHCF. In addition, the regional peacekeeping brigades are important in their own right and short 

of capabilities as it is. It would be a mistake for the AU to create a combat intervention force at 

the expense of the peacekeeping forces needed to consolidate stability and permit reconstruction,

post-intervention. Both capabilities are needed. 

The other advantage of an Africa-wide force is that it would facilitate effective 

partnership with the West. Given the demanding combat mission and requirements of an AHCF, 

Western effort to help build one must be much more focused and integrated than current to 

increase regional peacekeeping capacity. Establishing and meeting high common standards 

would be facilitated by a single Western effort linked to a single African effort. Furthermore, 

planning Western participation in support of actual operations would be much easier if there was 

a single, Africa-wide AHCF. 

The advantages of basing African humanitarian combat forces on the regional brigades

are mainly political and expedient. Agreement already exists on the regional brigades. Also, 

39
 

African states within any of the five regions may be more agreeable to use of a force coming 

from within that region; troop contingents from distant parts of Africa may seem as foreign as 

non-African troops. 

In the end, Africans will decide how (and of course whether) to construct an AHCF. If

they accept the need for a highly capable force that can stop mass killing—combat-ready, 

cohesive, net-capable, rapidly deployable, built with Western assistance, and capable of 

receiving critical Western operational support—they will find it difficult if not impossible to 

create one in each of five regions or drawn from the five regional peacekeeping forces. 

If it is deemed too difficult to reach agreement at the continental level to create an Africawide force, a constructive alternative might be to look to one of the regions, such as West Africa, 

to take the lead by forming a humanitarian combat brigade in addition to the national forces

already being earmarked for participation in the regional peacekeeping brigade. That regional

force could then be made available to the AU for deployment anywhere in Africa, under AU 

mandate and management. Instead of such an initiative then being replicated in the other regions,

which could preclude an Africa-wide force, it could be open to participation by qualified

countries from other African regions. Upon accepting units from outside the initial region, the 

force would begin transforming from a regional to an Africa-wide capability. 

Whatever the formula, selection of forces for the AHCF will be critical. Several standards 

might be considered when recruiting and screening for participation: 

• Good governance and democratically-accountable armed forces 

• Peaceful and responsible conduct toward neighbors 

• Military capability 

• A record of effective contribution to multilateral forces, e.g., existing ASF 

• Geographic balance and broad participation to underscore AHCF legitimacy 

Africa is in transition, as are many of its countries. It may be difficult to find willing and 

able participants that meet absolutely all such standards. Rather than ironclad tests, the standards 

should be important considerations. Once again, this is for Africans to sort out, though it is only 

fair to point out that non-African supporting countries may have more difficulty assisting certain 

countries than others. 

Another issue is what size units to seek from the main participants. In theory, battalions 

would be ideal, since each battalion must operate with cohesion and common standards. If this is 

not practical, perhaps assembling the AHCF based on company-size commitments would be 

acceptable—the company being the preeminent unit of action in the concept of operations

described earlier. At the far extreme, the AU could create a force based on the nomination, 

recruitment, volunteering, and screening of individuals from any country in the AU. The authors 

believe that, on balance, the most practical and efficacious approach is at the battalion level. This

approach should at least be explored before an alternative is pursued. 

Creating an AHCF would require a multi-track approach tied together by integrated 

training and doctrine to engender and exploit the principles of networked operations, as 

illustrated in figure 4. Western support for the AHCF would come in two forms: 

• programmatic assistance to build capacity (the white areas below each curve) 

• capabilities to fill AU gaps during actual operations

65 (the shaded areas) 

 65 An example of Western initiatives that can be used to fill the immediate operational gaps in African contingencies 

is the November 2004, EU Defence Ministers agreement to form EU Battle Groups—mobile combat units that 

would be ready to address international crises at short notice. Initially conceived in the wake of the EU Operation

40
 

WEAPONS, PLATFORMS,

TACTICAL SENSORS,

SUPPORT EQUIPMENT,

BRIGADE COMPONENTS

WEAPONS, PLATFORMS,

TACTICAL SENSORS,

SUPPORT EQUIPMENT,

BRIGADE COMPONENTS

Figure 4. Multi-track program to establish the AHCF 

 

Over time, as shown, capacity-building assistance will reduce operational gaps to be 

filled by Western forces. The potential for capacity-building, and thus the need for capabilities 

gap-filling, varies significantly from one type of capability to another (as the different curves 

indicate different rates of change). For example, African contributions in main combat units

would be expected to rise quickly, whereas African C4ISR capacity would require a longer 

period of time. With each track progressing at its own agreed and practical pace, it is critical that 

the African-Western partnership oversees the entire process so that (a) the capability would exist 

at any time to conduct successful intervention, and (b) over time, African capacity is developed. 

To illustrate, at time T1, the AHCF could provide nearly all the ground-combat 

capability, logistics, and mobility, and a fraction of the air power, relying on the Western 

partners for most of the air power, and nearly all of the SOF and C4ISR. By T2, the Western 

contribution would be mainly C4ISR. With strong African and Western long-term commitments 

and follow-through, it is not unrealistic to suggest that T1 could be reached within a decade; this 

could be a goal against which resources and activities could be scheduled. . Even before then, 

 

Artemis by the French government in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Battle Groups are understood to be

available for African operations also— therefore, filling an immediate gap in African capabilities. For more details, 

see Karl-Heinz Kamp, “European ‘Battle Groups’: A New Stimulus for the European Security and Defense 

Policy?,” Analysen und Argumente aus der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 15, 1 (Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer Foundation, 

December 17, 2004).

41
 

combined African-Western capabilities for forcible humanitarian intervention would come into

being. 

Ultimately, after a decade or so, the AHCF could be virtually a self-reliant force,

signified by the curves’ plateaus that indicate Western contributions during operational 

contingencies would no longer be needed. Once that point has been reached, Western efforts 

could be focused solely on maintaining and improving African capacity. Even at that point, 

however, it could be politically and operationally advantageous to include some Western support 

(e.g., C4ISR, SOF and air). But this would be for the Africans to decide; they would no longer be 

vitally dependent on Western operational involvement. 

As already stressed, because of the huge dividends of creating a net-capable force, this 

effort must not only combine and upgrade African forces but also transform them to exploit 

information technology and network-based concepts of operation. Some of the most critical 

qualities—and difficult changes—have more to do with organization, human capital, command 

and control processes, traditions, cognition, and willingness to change. At the heart of this lies

the willingness to senior officers and authorities to entrust company- and battalion-level officers, 

and below, with authority to make quick decisions in an operation. While this runs against the

grain of African military (and societal) tradition—as it does in other parts of the world—it 

should be possible to create sufficient confidence and procedures whereby an initially small

number of highly capable officers are both permitted and willing to take command initiative 

when faced with situations of imminent or actual mass killing. We do not underestimate the 

importance or difficulty of this aspect, but we think it can be overcome with determination and 

focus. 

An AU-Western effort to create an effective AHCF would have to tackle the following 

challenges: 

• Convincing senior officers to delegate operational decisionmaking authority, and 

inducing junior officers to accept corresponding responsibilities 

• Fostering battlefield decisionmaking that combines use of abundant information with 

sound intuition 

• Developing horizontal (peer-to-peer) teaming to meet fluid operations demands 

• Building cognitive abilities to sort and evaluate information 

• Encouraging information sharing among units and across boundaries 

• Strengthening the willingness to take initiative and the ability to learn in action. 

 

Finally, and of somewhat less concern than the challenges just listed, is the technical ability 

to make good use of information terminals, displays, and network ports. It is important to keep in

mind that African troops in the AHCF would need to become effective end-users of such

technology, not designers or producers or suppliers; and for the most part the technology is 

highly end-user friendly. Recent experience in both non-military and military settings suggests 

that African officers and NCOs will have little difficulty absorbing and applying well-delivered

training in using information systems. While being a competent C4ISR end-user is obviously 

more complicated and unforgiving than being a proficient Internet user, we now know that 

exploiting information technology is within the reach of most people, given the opportunity,

instruction, and motivation. In any case, to the extent that using information systems is a

challenge for soldiers in the urgency and dangers of battle, there is no reason to think that 

African soldiers will fail where Western ones succeed. 

42
 

Current Western efforts to expand African peacekeeping capacity (e.g., the ASF) are 

essentially bilateral. Different Western countries concentrate their military-technical aid on 

different African recipients. There is some coordination in the form of periodic discussions 

among chief contributors (United States, UK, and France). While not ideal, these programs of

assistance need not be tightly coordinated, much less integrated, in order to be useful; 

peacekeeping missions are normally neither so demanding nor so dangerous that participating

forces must be interoperable in technology or doctrine. In contrast, Western assistance in 

creating an AU intervention force, as well as in providing operational support for the force, 

cannot be handled bilaterally. Occasional coordination meetings would be totally inadequate for 

the level of coherence required in Western support. The units of the force must meet common, 

high standards, be able to support and fight alongside one another, and function on common 

networks. Therefore, training and other assistance must be as strictly standardized as possible. 

Even more critical, of course, is that Western participation in an actual AHCF operation 

not be disjointed. In return for its striking advantages, networking demands operational and 

informational integration. Western intelligence, logistics, SOF, air, and advisory support in the 

run-up to and conduct of an AU operation would have to be unified among the Western 

providers and between those providers and the AU force. Moreover, the political decisionmaking 

and military command and control of a fast and difficult operation of the sort described earlier

would demand maximum Western unity, as well as African-Western unity. 

There are major advantages to forming a grouping or “club” of non-African countries 

willing to assist significantly in building the AU capability and, in principle, to provide support 

for operations. It would be best if this group of supporters operated through an existing 

institution with capability and background of its own in preparing and mounting multilateral 

military operations. The candidates to take the lead are the G-8,66 NATO, and the UN. The

following highlights the main strengths of each group: 

• The rationale for a G-8 lead is that it encompasses major economic power and is flexible; 

the G-8 could kick off an effort in cooperation with the AU and then either invite 

additional participants or initiate a larger ad hoc but formal grouping—a G-X—

specifically to work with the AU to create and support an AHCF 

• NATO has the capacity and experience in combat operations, including operations 

outside Europe; most of the countries that could provide assistance and operational 

support for an AHCF are NATO members or partners, and others could be included for 

this purpose 

• The UN provides added legitimacy, can tap into worldwide resources, and has vast 

experience and growing capacity in peace operations. A critical question is whether the 

UN would be able and authorized to provide support to combat forces involved in 

forcible humanitarian intervention, which does not presume that the parties to the conflict 

agree to allow the force to enter—a standard feature of UN-based peacekeeping. 

 

Whatever the institutional framework, the role of the United States in building African

capacity and providing operational support will be important, though not necessarily 

indispensable in every contingency. The United States has had underway, for some years, efforts 

to enhance African capacity to provide security and now plans to expand those efforts through 

the GPOI, as described earlier. Among other aims, GPOI is meant to create a large pool of 

 66 The G-8, or Group of Eight, is composed of the world’s leading economic powers (United States, UK, France, 

Germany, Japan, Italy, Canada) plus Russia; the EU also joins meetings. 

43
 

African peacekeepers. The relationship between that effort and what is suggested here should be

clear: 

• None of the efforts of the United States (or other Western democracies) to expand 

African peacekeeping capacity should be diverted, curtailed or delayed. Parts of Africa

are highly insecure and growing more so as political and economic conditions deteriorate. 

African peacekeeping is a required capability. 

• At the same time, GPOI is not aimed at creating advanced combat capability to intervene 

forcibly and defeat killing forces. If Africans and Westerners want an African capability 

that can stop future Rwandas and Darfurs, they will need a force that is trained, equipped, 

and supported for intense combat, whether the parties to the killing agree or not. 

• Efforts to build a net-capable humanitarian intervention force would “rub off” on other 

African peacekeeping forces. The use of information and information systems is of value

across the full spectrum of operations. Whether in providing computer and 

communications gear, training to permit its effective use, or operational intelligence to

assure success, the kind of assistance that is vital for an intervention force would be

beneficial for peacekeeping as well. 

 

In sum, creation of an AU force capable of stopping mass killing should and would 

supplement and complement ongoing efforts. 

VI. Policy Issues

 

A cooperative African-Western effort of the sort outlined to create a capable humanitarian 

intervention force will face a number of significant policy issues, some of which have already 

been noted. Unless squarely addressed and sensibly settled, these issues could make it difficult 

for a force to act effectively. 

 

Mandating Forcible Intervention and Adequate Rules of Engagement

 

An African force, with Western support, must have the authority as well as the capability, 

to intervene and forcibly stop mass killing. This raises the question of whether and how the force 

can be mandated to use whatever force is necessary. Once the capability exists, having a lesser 

mandate would be tantamount to a limited commitment to stop mass killing—in effect, no 

commitment at all. 

International law does not grant or protect any prerogative of sovereign states to brutalize 

their people or to stand by while others brutalize them on the territory they claim to control.

Sovereignty is no defense for conducting or failing to stop mass killing or other crimes against 

humanity. Because of growing global consciousness—and conscience—the concept of 

sovereignty is no longer absolute (as conceived by the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648) but 

increasingly qualified by the responsibility of every government to protect its citizens from 

severe abuse and violence. The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 

Sovereignty (ICISS), called The Responsibility to Protect, points out that there has been a 

growing acceptance since the end of the Cold War of the notion that the international community

has a both a right and a responsibility to intervene militarily in nations where governments either 

44
 

cause or fail to stop massive killings and other abuses of human rights.67 The report goes on to 

note that “the specific nature of the task to protect (people from their government) may over time 

lead to the evolution of a new type of military operation, carried out in new ways.”68

These concepts are echoed in the AU Constitutive Act, which establishes “[t]he right of 

the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of

grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”69

Note that genocide is not the only trigger for intervention. Even with its expanded role, 

however, the AU force in Darfur is only authorized to deter killing by creating a visible presence. 

It is important to be clear—and the AU charter is very clear—that the circumscribed mandate in 

Darfur is not the result of a lack of legal basis for forcible intervention. If the AU had had a 

humanitarian intervention combat force capable of stopping most or all of the killing, it could 

have given it the mandate to do precisely that. 

Note also that a “decision of the Assembly” of the AU is both necessary and sufficient to 

mandate an intervention for the purposes of this provision. Such a decision requires every effort 

to find a consensus; however, if that proves impossible, a two-thirds majority suffices. Neither

the agreement of the parties to the killing, nor the consent of the government of the country 

where the killing is happening, nor the approval of non-AU countries or organizations are 

absolutely required, though the latter two may be helpful. The AU may authorize intervention to 

save human beings from the actions or inaction of their sovereign. Of course, not only the 

consent but also the cooperation of the sovereign is desirable for both operational and political 

reasons, and every reasonable effort should be made to obtain it, provided time is not lost while 

killing occurs. That effort may include not only diplomatic and economic pressure, but also a 

threat or ultimatum to cooperate with or at least acquiesce in a military intervention or else be 

faced with one nonetheless, It is more likely that a negligent or complicit government will

consent to an intervention if it knows its consent is not a requirement. 

Still it is possible that the sovereign in question may not only object to, but physically 

resist, intervention, in which case forcible entry into the country may be mandated. Moreover, if

the declared mission is to stop mass killing, the legitimacy of the use of force as necessary to 

carry out the mission is implicit. It appears, then, that any reluctance in a particular case to grant 

explicit authority to use force to overcome the resistance of the sovereign and to discharge the 

mission is political, not legal. If the cases involve genocide or crimes against humanity—both 

terms that have been applied to Darfur—it would stand to reason that the international authority

would grant authority to intervene and act forcibly, assuming the capability exists. Of course, 

there could be mitigating circumstances, such as fault or killing on both sides, in which case the 

intervention force might have to be even-handed. In any case, neither the responsibility nor the 

right to protect is reduced in the event that more than one side is to blame. 

Rules of engagement flow from mandates and requirements. Operationally, rules of 

engagement can range from strict self-protection to the use of whatever force is necessary to

carry out the mission. There is no question that use of force—or at least the credible threat to use

force—may be essential to stop mass killing. A harder question is whether the intervention force 

can “shoot first” if an imminent threat exists to the force or to the people it is supposed to 

protect. Still harder is whether the intervention force can seek and attack killing forces when

 67 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. 68 Ibid., 57. 69 Organization of the African Union, “Constitutive Act of the African Union” (Lome, Togo: Organization of the 

African Union, July 11, 2000), Article 4h. 

45
 

those forces are not engaged in killing. Legally it is probably permissible. Operationally it is 

highly advantageous. Thus, provided the force is capable (manned, trained, and equipped) of 

implementing robust rules of engagement, it is a matter of policy whether or not it is authorized 

to do so. 

Political reluctance to grant expansive rules of engagement may stem from a lack of 

confidence that the intervention force can prevail in a fight. The sort of force we have prescribed, 

under certain circumstances, is designed to prevail and would have sufficient operational support

and backing to ensure that it does. Another concern about loose rules of engagement is that the 

intervention force may lack the discipline and control to act judiciously. The political authority—

the AU in this case—must have confidence in its troops to act with discipline, which derives 

from training and clear rules of engagement. 

In the end, providing adequate mandate and rules of engagement is a relatively clear

policy choice for Africans to make: Should military units capable of stopping killing be 

authorized to use whatever reasonable force is needed to stop killing? While there are sure to be

political complications and concerns about risks of unwanted consequences and escalation in any 

contingency, a reasonable premise is that, if killing is of a scale to warrant intervention, the

intervention ought to be given every chance to succeed. 

Given the need for an expansive mandate and rules of engagement, trust between African 

political and military leaders will be essential. There can be little room for disagreement that 

authority granted will be used judiciously to avoid unnecessary death and escalation, yet 

adequately to assure success. Finally, a clear and sufficient mandate and rules of engagement for

a well-trained and well-led force would reduce the probability of political micro-management of

operations, which is rarely helpful. 

AU Acceptance of Foreign Intelligence

 

Given the blemished history of Western involvement in Africa, from colonialism to 

siding with some odious regimes during the Cold War, the AU and many of its member states 

may be reluctant to accept the products of Western intelligence sources for fear that those same

sources may be used to spy on them. Moreover, like the UN, the AU might have institutional 

hesitation about accepting intelligence on one of its members. 

In this context, however, the case for accepting operationally critical intelligence is 

strong, especially in contingencies serious enough to warrant forcible intervention in the first 

place. It needs to be understood that the option of an African humanitarian intervention combat 

force is not viable without acceptance of intelligence. Networked forces derive their power not 

from size but from information. Timely, accurate, and abundant information is the equivalent of

ammunition. Without it, missions will fail, intervention forces will take casualties, and killing

force will continue their rampage. 

Indeed, so critical is the free and fast flow of intelligence that arrangements for its

acceptance and use by African forces in the AHCF ought to be clear and formal, not ambiguous. 

If this includes intelligence about the forces of a sovereign AU member, so be it. Because 

sovereignty does not protect a government from systematically killing or condoning the killing 

of its subjects, it does not shelter any information that could be used by AU-sanctioned 

international forces to stop such killing. 

It may be easier politically in some cases for the AHCF to accept information from

commercial firms that furnish surveillance information. To make it even easier, such information 

46
 

could be made available to the government in which the intervention is to take place. However, it 

would be a mistake for the AHCF to limit itself to information that can be gathered commercially

and/or shared with the local government. In many circumstances, having information that the 

government in question is not privy to could be crucial for success. To ensure operational 

effectiveness and security, the AHCF must be prepared to make use of the best information that 

can be generated—including intelligence from Western government sources—and to accept 

information that is denied to the local government. 

U.S. Willingness to Share Technology and Intelligence

 

Because a net-capable force derives its power from information, operational success 

would depend vitally on Western intelligence and information systems, know-how, and content, 

as already noted. While most HUMINT will be from African sources, African capacity to

provide intelligence by technical means will be one of the slowest capabilities to develop. There 

are two types of useful intelligence support: assistance in intelligence-gathering, dissemination, 

and use as part of the effort to develop the African intervention force, and the provision of realtime information in operations. 

The United States and other Western states are very careful about sharing intelligence

and even more careful about sharing intelligence technology and sources and methods. Indeed, 

they do not share freely even with one another, but do so selectively and on the basis of wellestablished intelligence liaison arrangements. There is also little sharing of intelligence

information to support UN missions. 

With regard to assistance, it is doubtful that the information systems and intelligence 

training needed by African intervention troops would be especially sensitive. Requirements are

mainly terminal computing and communications devices and displays—laptops, wireless 

devices, and other ports to the network. For the most part, commercial-off-the-shelf systems 

would suffice. If encryption is needed, this too is widely available outside government systems. 

It would be unnecessary to transfer sensitive technologies, which are for the most part buried in

the software and hardware of the network and the sensors that participating Western countries 

would control and operate. Although specific devices would be considered on a case-by-case 

basis, it seems implausible that selective and fairly basic Western assistance to African troops in 

using information networks would create a hole through which sensitive military technology 

would find its ways to those who would harm Western interests. 

The value of information shared in an actual operation would be short-lived. Provided 

killing forces were not able to gain instant access to it, its leakage would not be harmful. Western 

forces would certainly not be placed in danger. A more serious concern about sharing 

information is that it could compromise intelligence sources and methods, which sometimes can 

be inferred from content; such compromise can do more lasting damage to intelligence-collection

capability. This problem can be worked at two levels: first, by packaging (without delaying)

information so that sources and methods cannot be inferred; second, by developing regular 

intelligence-sharing relationships that provide for accountability of information and screening of 

individuals for reliability. While neither practice will be perfectly effective, together they can

reduce the risks of compromise to a manageable level. In any case, because the issue is

operational support in a contingency, the United States and other Western states will have to

decide whether enabling African forces to stop mass-killing is worth the risk and is better than

the alternatives. 

47
 

As previously noted, there are commercial firms that operate airborne sensors and sell 

intelligence products. If operating conditions are not especially demanding and Western 

participation is minimal, such intelligence might suffice. However, any participation by Western

air or ground personnel would warrant and most likely demand the use of government 

intelligence assets. Presumably, if the United States or other Western nations deem the operation 

to be important enough to furnish personnel in support roles, they would see fit to provide 

adequate intelligence as well. 

 

Non-African Troops with African Units

 

As we have explained, it will not be enough for Western countries to help prepare an 

African intervention force and then wish it luck as it heads into operations. For a long time to 

come, direct Western involvement will be essential. Such involvement is likely to require 

Western personnel performing some functions during an operation, on the ground, and connected 

to the African force. 

Starting at the least substantial level, these functions include: 

• Technical C2 support at operations centers 

• Operational advisory support at unit headquarters 

• Operational advisory support to African units in the field 

• Special operations with African units in the field 

• Autonomous special operations. 

 The latter three functions entail possible danger; the latter two could entail combat tasks. 

The functions performed by Western personnel should be determined prior to an 

operation and in view of the circumstances and needs anticipated. No Western country would 

give up the right to decide what if any support to provide in the event. However, it would not be 

helpful to rule out any of the functions as a matter of principle. Even with creation of an AHCF, 

the responsibility to protect innocent Africans is not restricted to African nations and troops. In 

the extreme, the direct use of force by Western SOF and strike aircraft should be an option, 

provided it is agreed with the AU. 

Over time, Western assistance efforts should be geared to bringing down the numbers of 

Western personnel assigned to an operation. In particular, the sooner the Africans can provide 

SOF and have sufficient competence in managing forcible humanitarian operations, the smaller 

the need for Western troops and advisors on the ground. Of course, Western states and the AU 

may decide that it is advantageous to involve Western personnel, even if they are not essential. 

As already noted in the discussion of intelligence needs, many services that support an 

African Humanitarian Combat Force in action could be outsourced to reputable firms that offer

combat advisory assistance, surveillance, security, logistical services, and even forms of special 

operations. Some are active today in Africa (as well as in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere). At

first blush, this may strike many observers as reliance on “mercenaries,” evoking most

unfortunate connotations from African history. Provided there is full transparency, control, and 

oversight by experienced management—i.e., Western governments—this option should not be 

rejected. By the same token, it should not be used as a way to allow Western countries to wash 

their hands of responsibility to assist AU forces in preparation or operation. 

48
 

Providing Africans with Capabilities That Could Be Misused

 

Although nothing could be further from the purpose of an African-Western effort to stop 

mass killing by forcible intervention, there is at least a theoretical danger that one or more

African countries could use new-found network-based capabilities to attack or intervene 

unilaterally against their neighbors or direct these assets against their own citizenry. Precisely 

because African military capabilities in general are so weak, it is possible for a state determined

to gain military advantage to do so—and then to use it. From the ashes of the 1994 slaughter and

civil war, the Rwandan military has become powerful compared to its neighbors, as well as

something of a neighborhood menace; Rwandan forces have been operating uninvited in the 

Democratic Republic of Congo. The bulk of the AHCF would, by design, be composed of the 

most capable combat forces available, and strenuous efforts would be made to make them more 

capable still. 

Compounding this problem is the offensive potential of network-based capabilities. After

all, the principal motivation behind the network-based military transformation of the forces of

the United States and other advanced democracies is the desire to be able to project forces over

distance to conduct rapid, decisive, expeditionary operations. As African armed forces become

faster, more deployable, more lethal, more survivable, and better able to gather, share, and

exploit information, there is no question that they will be more capable of intervening outside

their borders. 

There are four ways to mitigate this undeniable risk. First, net-capable African forces will 

remain critically dependent on the C4ISR of the United States and other Western states for years, 

if not perpetually. Depriving such a force of information is like depriving it of ammunition or 

fuel. This does not preclude one of the more advanced and ambitious participants in the AU 

force from acquiring some sensors of its own and creating network connectivity using widely 

available technology, but the effectiveness of the AHCF would be severely impaired without the 

Western C4ISR on which it would rely. Moreover, because net-capable forces are highly

interdependent, national units that participate in the AHCF would be less capable if taken out of 

that context.

Second, the pursuit of AU multilateral military collaboration and capabilities, which has

already begun with the creation of the Regional Standby Forces, should help “de-nationalize 

defense,” the way it did and continues to do for the European members of NATO, which had

warred with one another for centuries. Apart from the political openness and trust that is

engendered by such sustained cooperation, the forces become interdependent, even to the point 

of being less capable of operating separately than together. This is especially so if AU efforts to

form both peacekeeping and combat forces cause the participants to begin specializing, rather 

than maintaining completely self-sufficient forces. 

Third, the development of AU combat capabilities could, in time, provide a source of 

collective security, whereby the excessive strength and misconduct of any one country could be 

checked by the strength of the Union as a whole. For example, if a strong country attacked a 

weak neighbor, it might have to face forces of the AU. Apart from the military obstacle this

would present to the aggressor, having to fight pan-African forces would turn the aggressor into 

a pariah. 

The final option is for the West to intervene, at AU or UN request, if an African country 

uses intervention forces that are stronger than other Africans, even acting collectively, can 

defeat. The option of Western intervention is not an appealing one; indeed, the proposal for an 

49
 

AU force with Western assistance and operational support is meant, in part, to minimize, not 

increase, reliance on Western military power to solve African security problems. However, 

Western military power would provide some insurance against an African country with advanced

military forces turning to aggression.

Command and Control

 

Any multilateral military operation can raise perplexing questions surrounding the basic issue 

of who is in charge, among them: 

• Where does the ultimate political decisionmaking authority reside? 

• From which participating country (accountable to whom?) should the commanding 

military officer come? 

• How does the command and control structure reflect the contributions and interests of the 

participating countries?

 

This set of issues could be especially complex in the case of an AU operation with heavy 

Western involvement, possibly orchestrated by NATO or the EU, and with the UN Security 

Council involved or not. A further complication is that most or all of the ground troops would be

African, much of the air-strike forces Western, and the C4ISR infrastructure and processes 

wholly Western and possibly American. 

Notwithstanding the critical dependence on Western operational involvement, operations 

of the sort described in this study should be African-led. African responsibility and command are 

important for the legitimacy and viability of an operation—quite possibly a violent one—the

mandate of which must come from the AU (with or without UNSC backing). Embedded Western 

personnel should respect African command consistent with prior understandings about mission, 

rules of engagement, campaign plan, geographic and escalation constraints, and contingency 

plans. While some might argue that this formula may not maximize operational effectiveness, it 

is at least equally possible that legitimacy can be of great importance to neighboring countries, 

the local population and authorities, and even the government in question—all of which may be

operationally critical. 

African political authority and command raise two immediate questions: 

• Who will decide whether and how an intervention will be mounted?

• Who will decide how the views of Western participants will be taken into account in 

the course of the intervention—as regards to both the operation as a whole and the 

conduct and use of Western personnel?

The U.S. body politic barely accepts the assignment of U.S. forces to the command of its 

closest and most capable allies. And no country—certainly not the United States, France, or the 

UK—is going to participate in a forcible humanitarian operation decided upon by other 

countries, much less an international organization of which it is not even a member. 

Nevertheless, here are some principles and practices that may permit solutions: 

• Obviously, every participating non-AU country would make its own decision whether to 

contribute. 

• As long as Western operational support is indispensable for decisive, modest-risk 

success—as will be the case for many years—those countries able and expected to 

provide that support will have a virtual veto on the operation. Given this leverage, they 

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will have a major influence in shaping the objectives, plans, and capabilities to maximize 

the prospects for success and minimize the risks of failure and casualties. Conversely, as 

Africans become self-sufficient, Western countries will have less leverage but also less at 

stake. 

• To the extent that Western countries provide indispensable support and, more important, 

place people at risk (e.g., SOF and pilots), the lead supporting country should assign the

deputy commander of the intervention force. Like the role often played by the British

deputy commander in a U.S.-led coalition involving sizeable UK forces, and risks, the 

Western deputy would have complete information, unhindered access, and considerable 

influence over both the operation as a whole and the use of Western forces. 

• Western military advisors posted in the force’s command chain, whether at headquarters

or in quick-response units, would have several functions: assisting their African 

counterparts, overseeing Western personnel, and acting as liaisons to their own 

governments. If problems arise, capitals can be informed and can settle problems

politically. Such Western advisory-liaison officers should do nothing in secret from 

African commanders. Similarly, African commanders should be open with Western 

personnel and apprise them of evolving plans. 

These are complex arrangements, and they require high degrees of clarity and mutual 

confidence and trust. Yet, when mass killing is imminent or has begun, speed is of the essence.

Consequently, it is imperative that the principles and practices governing military command and 

political decisionmaking be addressed not in the face of a crisis but in the calm course of AUWestern cooperation to create the capability. 

VII. Conclusions and Recommendations

 

We conclude this complex treatment of a complex idea with a simple conclusion and equally 

simple recommendation. 

Our conclusion is that the confluence of new technology, new-found collective readiness 

of Africans to “step up,” and heightened Western appreciation that Africa matters offers an

opportunity to form and use a militarily and politically feasible capability to stop mass killing. If 

several key points are accepted, the rest, though complex, can be settled: 

• Africans must take the lead 

• The combined force must be prepared and authorized to fight and win 

• Western support is indispensable 

• An unprecedented degree of African-Western cooperation is needed. 

 

Our recommendation is that African and Western governments and institutions begin to

discuss this idea without delay. Of course, much more analysis, discussion, and debate are 

needed, within governments, among governments, within and among international institutions, in

think tanks, among NGOs, in the media, and among lawmakers. Laying out some work-plan for

such a process in this report is impossible and unnecessary. The idea of making Darfur the last 

case—at least, the last unchecked case—of large-scale killing is compelling enough that all it 

should take is a few key governments and leaders charging ahead and challenging others to 

follow. If the U.S. government will do this, Europeans cannot and will not fail to join it—and

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vice versa. If AU officials and African national leaders seize the initiative, other Africans will 

get on board, and the West will be left with no choice but to respond. If leaders do not seize the 

opportunity to create a capability to stop mass killing, the verdict will be harsh when the next 

Rwanda or Darfur goes unchecked. 

A final observation: The development of African capabilities, with Western support, to 

intervene forcibly to stop mass killing should not, indeed cannot, relieve the advanced 

democracies of their own “responsibility to protect.” Western concern for human life must not 

decline the farther from the North Atlantic the problem occurs, or if Africans rather than 

Europeans are being slaughtered. These concerns are universal, not regional. They do not vary 

from Bosnian Muslims to Rwandan Tutsis. At the end of the day, the basis for the right and 

responsibility to protect are not interest-based but value-based. The combination of Western 

values and Western power imposes an obligation not only to enable Africans to use force to stop

killing in Africa, but to do so themselves, if Africans cannot or will not. If Africans and Western 

countries collaborate to create and use a humanitarian intervention force of the sort described 

here, it may be possible to stop mass killing without Western intervention—a success for all 

concerned. 

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