Filed 1/11/23 P. v. Stewart CA2/7

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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DARNELL TREALL STEWART,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B313986

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. TA151337)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County. Sean D. Coen, Judge. Affirmed.

Charles Thomas Anderson, under appointment by the 

Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Stacy Schwartz and Colleen M. 

Tiedemann, Deputies Attorney General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.

__________________________________
2

INTRODUCTION

Darnell Treall Stewart appeals from an order for the 

execution of a previously imposed four-year state prison sentence. 

The trial court suspended execution of that sentence after 

Stewart pleaded guilty in July 2020 to one count of assault with a 

deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)).1 For the next 

year, Stewart failed to comply with virtually any conditions of 

probation. In March 2021, Stewart admitted to violating the 

terms and conditions of his probation in a different courthouse 

before a different judge from the one who imposed the original 

sentence. In July 2021, Stewart appeared in the original 

courthouse on an additional probation violation. That judge 

found Stewart in violation of probation and executed the state 

prison sentence. Stewart contends the sentence violated his plea 

bargain with the People at the prior March 2021 probation 

hearing. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. Stewart’s Underlying Offense and Sentence

By information filed March 13, 2020, the People charged 

Stewart with kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a); count 1), assault with 

a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 2), injuring a spouse, 

dating partner, or co-parent (§ 273.5; count 3), and making 

criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a); count 4). As set forth in a 

February 28, 2020, probation report, these charges arose from an 

incident on February 3, 2020, between Stewart and Vanessa 

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless 

otherwise stated.
3

Ruiz, his dating partner of 10 months. Stewart and Ruiz argued 

in a motel room when Ruiz questioned whether Stewart “had 

been sleeping with other women.” In the course of the argument, 

Ruiz left the room, and Stewart followed. He pushed her to the 

ground, took her cell phone out of her purse, and threw it to the 

ground, breaking it. Stewart then kicked Ruiz and stomped on 

her legs. As she tried to escape, Stewart picked her up off the 

ground and held a knife to her abdomen, stating, “If you keep 

trying to run, I’m going to kill you.” Stewart forced Ruiz back to 

the motel and began to undress her. She then escaped. Stewart 

was on parole at the time of these events.

On July 1, 2020, Stewart appeared in the Los Angeles 

County Superior Court in the South Central District courthouse 

in Compton. Given Stewart’s lengthy and violent criminal 

record, the probation report recommended “a sanction that will 

act as a deterrent against this type of behavior,” and suggested a 

state prison sentence. Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, 

Stewart pleaded no contest to assault with a deadly weapon 

(count 2). As part of the stipulated sentence, instead of the 

prison sentence recommended by the probation report, Stewart 

agreed that the court would sentence him to the upper term of 

four years in state prison, with execution of that sentence 

suspended. Stewart further agreed to a five-year probation term, 

with certain conditions. Among them, Stewart agreed to 

complete a 52-week domestic violence prevention program, abide 

by a 10-year protective order, and abide by all terms and 

conditions of probation including, relevant here, to “obey all laws 

and orders of the court.”
4

The court emphasized to Stewart the importance of 

complying with probation: “You are embarking on a 

responsibility, commitment to the court that you are going to 

comply with the terms and conditions of probation . . . . I want to 

make sure that you understand that you have a responsibility. 

This is a fantastic offer that’s been made by the People, crafted by 

your smart lawyer. But you [are going to] have to comply with 

this. If you don’t, then you [are going to] be standing right there 

in yellow.” Stewart responded, “All right.” After the court said,

“Make sure you understand me,” Stewart’s public defender 

confirmed with Stewart, “You understand?” to which Stewart 

replied, “Yes, sir.”

Later in the plea proceeding, the court summarized 

Stewart’s obligations and warned again that any probation 

violation would result in execution of the state prison sentence:

“Court: Now I read, I’m sure, a mouthful. It’s a lot for you 

to digest, understand, absorb. But there are the fines and 

fees and terms and conditions of probation. And the two 

major ones – really three – are to report to probation as you 

are supposed to, go to the [domestic violence] program, and 

stay away from Ms. Ruiz. You violate any terms and 

conditions of probation and you’ll be back in jail again, sir. 

I want to make sure you understand that. And you’ll be 

going to state prison.

“[Stewart]: Yes.”

A short time later, Stewart’s lawyer again emphasized the 

point: “Also, I want to remind him that I filled out a little 
5

probation referral form with a lot of information, my number, 

what he’s pled to, that he’s going to prison for four years if he 

even jaywalks.” After some further comments from his lawyer, 

and additional colloquy, the court again confirmed, “You 

understand all of that? Mr. Stewart, you understand all of that?” 

to which Stewart replied, “Yes, Sir.” Finally, the court offered 

one last blunt reminder: “The last thing you want to do is see 

Ms. Ruiz or don’t go that program or don’t go to the probation 

department and you [are going to] have a bad day. You [are 

going to] be standing right there in yellow and you are going to 

state prison.”

Stewart received credit for time served of 147 actual days 

in custody.

2. Stewart’s Initial Performance on Probation

Stewart next appeared in court on July 31, 2020, when he 

provided proof of enrollment in the domestic violence program. 

The court ordered him to ensure probation approved the 

program, and to return on November 9, 2020, with a progress 

report from the program. Stewart failed to appear as ordered on 

November 9, resulting in revocation of probation and the 

issuance of a no-bail bench warrant. The next day the court 

recalled and reissued the warrant, holding it until November 18, 

after Stewart reportedly came to court but left ill before his 

counsel arrived. Stewart appeared on November 18, but without 

the ordered proof of enrollment in the domestic violence 

counseling program. The court ordered him to appear on 

December 22 with proof of enrollment. On December 22 Stewart 

appeared late but with the requisite proof of enrollment, 
6

resulting in the reinstatement of probation and an order to 

appear with a progress report on March 22, 2021.

3. Stewart Resolves a New Case in a Different Courthouse

On February 9, 2021, Stewart failed to appear for his 

arraignment in the El Monte courthouse on a new misdemeanor 

charge for violating the protective order prohibiting contact with 

Ruiz and a corresponding petition to revoke probation in the 

instant case. The court summarily revoked probation and set a 

probation violation hearing for February 23.

After several continuances, Stewart appeared on March 10, 

2021, in El Monte. The court had before it a probation report 

prepared for the February 9 court date. The report characterized 

Stewart’s performance on probation as “poor,” citing his new 

arrest, his failure to stay in contact with probation since 

December 2020, and his failure to progress in his domestic 

violence counseling requirement.2 It recommended a jail sanction 

if the court found Stewart in violation of probation.

In another negotiated disposition, Stewart admitted the 

probation violation for an agreed 90-day jail sentence and 

dismissal of the new misdemeanor case. As the court explained:

“What you’ll be doing today is if you admit to the felony 

violation, the People are willing to dismiss your open 

misdemeanor here. You’ll have to serve 90 days in the 

county jail, and, upon release, you will remain on felony 

2 The report’s additional reference to a failure to enroll in an 

anger management program appears to arise from confusion over 

the way the sentencing court characterized the domestic violence 

counseling program.
7

probation. You’ll have to reenroll in the domestic violence 

counseling and just be mindful that on this felony case you 

have four years suspended.”

The court then took Stewart’s plea. Stewart admitted to

“failing to abide by the terms and conditions [of probation], 

specifically violating the protective order and picking up this new 

misdemeanor case.” After taking Stewart’s plea, the court 

modified probation to include the stipulated 90-day jail sentence, 

reinstated probation “under the same terms and conditions,” and 

confirmed with Stewart that he “accepted and understood” those 

terms and conditions. At the request of Stewart’s lawyer, the 

court set a remand date for April 9, 2021, and directed Stewart to 

appear at his existing March 22 date in Compton. Because only 

the Compton court purportedly could vacate the March 22 date, 

and because Stewart practically could not reenroll in the 

domestic violence counseling class until after he completed his 

90-day jail sentence, he needed to ask the Compton court for a 

future date for that purpose. As the court put it after taking the 

probation violation admission:

“You need to go to Compton on March 22nd, 2021. And just 

let them know, I’ll note it in the file as well, that you have a 

surrender date on April 9th, and that you’ll need a future 

court date so that you can return to get reenrollment 

paperwork, if necessary, or show proof of reenrollment in 

your domestic violence counseling class so that you are 

letting the Court know that you are abiding by the terms 

and conditions of probation by being in your domestic 

violence counseling class.”
8

4. The Compton Court Orders Execution of the Four-year 

Suspended Sentence Based on Stewart’s Probation 

Violations

On the morning of March 22, 2021, the day set by both the 

Compton and El Monte courts for Stewart to appear in the 

Compton courthouse, Stewart failed to appear. The court 

revoked probation and issued a bench warrant. Then at 1:30 p.m. 

that day, Stewart’s counsel appeared remotely and represented 

that Stewart was “in the hallway as he does not feel well.” The 

court recalled and reissued the warrant, holding it until April 6. 

The probation report prepared for the March 22 appearance

again characterized Stewart’s performance on probation as 

“poor,” referencing Stewart’s failure to communicate with 

probation since December 2020, Stewart’s failure to keep an 

appointment with probation on February 8, and his “unknown” 

status in the domestic violence program. The report 

recommended community service, an admonishment to complete 

domestic violence counseling, and monthly telephonic contact 

with his probation officer.

On April 6, 2021, Stewart again failed to appear, resulting 

in the issuance of a no-bail bench warrant. Stewart did appear 

for his jail remand on April 9, 2021, to serve the probation 

sentence pursuant to his March 10 plea agreement in the 

El Monte courthouse.

Stewart then appeared in custody at the Compton

courthouse for a bench warrant hearing on May 3, 2021. The 

court recalled the warrant and ordered a supplemental probation 

report. After a further continuance, Stewart requested a 

probation violation hearing, which the court set for July 8, 2021.
9

On July 8, Stewart appeared, still in custody, for the 

probation violation hearing. The supplemental probation report 

ordered by the court deemed Stewart’s progress on probation 

“unsatisfactory.” It recounted that Stewart had “failed to make 

any contact with this [probation] officer or the probation 

department” prior to his April 9 remand, was terminated from his 

domestic violence class in December 2020, and failed to provide 

proof of anger management counseling. The court read and 

considered this report.

Stewart’s lawyer essentially conceded the violation: “the 

only reason the court would be imposing prison would be for his 

failure to return to the court date before he surrendered. And 

that’s a valid concern,” and Stewart “accepts he has not met his 

obligation . . . . He shouldn’t get a free pass.”3 Stewart’s counsel

agreed “there’s a risk to safety,” but he urged that the 

“extenuating circumstances” of Stewart’s condition on March 22 

should result in reinstatement and modification of probation to

include a new substance abuse treatment program. Counsel 

explained that when Stewart arrived to court several hours late 

on March 22, he “was having some type of either illness or mental 

health episode based on some new medication,” which “then led 

to some serious confusion about the next court date.” Stewart’s 

counsel offered to call the bailiff as a witness to Stewart’s 

condition on March 22.

3 At the hearing, the People seemed to agree that the 

violation before the court involved Stewart’s failure to appear, 

stating, “I believe the scope of the probation violation hearing 

that the court was considering was just that Mr. Stewart did not 

return to court.”
10

The court stated it did not need the bailiff’s testimony, and 

accepted counsel’s representation of what happened on March 22,

noting (as to the failure to appear) “[a]nd that’s one aspect of why 

we’re here.” The court then found Stewart in violation of his 

probation, explaining: 

“[Stewart] did not come to court the last court appearance 

in our matter, but I do understand the extenuating 

circumstances that were described to me. However, the 

culmination of things here, the picking up of the new case 

but which was already addressed, but in our supplemental 

report he simply never checked in with probation. It’s been 

a year to date, thereabouts, and nothing was done in this 

matter. And I am very concerned about the public safety 

issue as well.”

The court then invited comments regarding sentencing. 

Stewart’s counsel urged the court not to impose the state prison 

sentence because Stewart already had admitted to the violation 

that led to the new misdemeanor case and had served that 

sentence. Instead, Stewart’s counsel suggested the court “just 

impose some custody time” and allow Stewart to attend the 

treatment program counsel had arranged. The district attorney 

submitted on his prior comments that “I’m going to submit at 

what the court had indicated at the previous court date as to 

what to do today,” and that looking at Stewart’s performance on 

probation overall, he did not see Stewart as “a good candidate for 

any new terms of probation” because “he hasn’t shown any 

indication that he will complete those.”
11

In ordering execution of the four-year state prison sentence, 

the court acknowledged “the issues that Mr. Stewart had 

suffered,” but weighed those issues against “the safety concerns I 

have here at least for the public” and a “second chance, a third 

chance, and a fourth chance” that the court felt Stewart had 

while on probation without success.

Stewart timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

Neither party addresses the proper standard of review. To 

the extent Stewart challenges the probation revocation decision, 

we apply a substantial evidence standard of review. (People v. 

Urke (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 766, 773, citing People v. Superior 

Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 681 [“We review a probation

revocation decision pursuant to the substantial evidence

standard of review.”].) In doing so, we accord “great deference” to 

the trial court’s decision because “the granting and revocation” of 

probation lies “‘entirely within the sound discretion of the trial 

court.’” (Urke, at p. 773.) “On appeal, we must view the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the People and must presume in 

support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could 

reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (See People v. Jones

(1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.)

To the extent Stewart challenges the sentence, 

“[s]entencing choices such as the one at issue here, whether to 

reinstate probation or sentence a defendant to prison, are 

reviewed for abuse of discretion. ‘A denial or a grant of probation 

generally rests within the broad discretion of the trial court and 

will not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the 
12

court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious 

manner.’” (People v. Downey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 899, 909.) 

The defendant has the burden to demonstrate an abuse of 

discretion. (People v. Vanella (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 463, 469.)

Section 1203.2 permits the court to terminate probation “if 

the interests of justice so require and the court, in its judgment, 

has reason to believe from the report of the probation officer or 

otherwise that the person has violated any of the conditions of his 

or her probation.” (§ 1203.2, subd. (a).) The court may revoke

“upon its own motion” or a petition by the probation officer, 

among others. (Id. at subd. (b)(1).) “Upon any revocation and 

termination of probation . . . if the judgment has been pronounced 

and the execution thereof has been suspended, the court may 

revoke the suspension and order that the judgment shall be in 

full force and effect. (Id. at subd. (c).)

“‘[A] negotiated plea agreement is a form of contract and is 

interpreted according to general contract principles.’” (K.R. v. 

Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 295, 304, citing Doe v. Harris

(2013) 57 Cal.4th 64, 69.) “Experience and practice can, in some 

circumstances, lead courts to recognize the incorporation of 

implied terms to a contractual agreement.” (K.R., at p. 304, 

citing Retired Employees Assn. of Orange County, Inc. v. County 

of Orange (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1171, 1178-–1179.) If contractual 

language is clear and explicit, it governs. (People v. Shelton

(2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 767.) However, if the contract terms “‘“are 

in any respect ambiguous or uncertain”’” the court must then 

interpret the contract “‘“in the sense in which the promisor 

believed, at the time of making it, that the promisee understood 

it”’” based on “‘objective manifestations of the parties’ intent.’” 

(Ibid., citations omitted.) In determining the parties’ mutual 
13

intent, the court considers the “‘surrounding circumstances under 

which the parties negotiated or entered into the contract; the 

object, nature and subject matter of the contract; and the 

subsequent conduct of the parties.’” (Ibid., citations omitted.)

2. The March 10 Plea Bargain Extinguished Stewart’s 

Violations as of That Date

Stewart concedes he had violated the conditions of his 

probation several times by March 10. However, he argues that 

when he admitted the probation violation for violating the 

domestic violence restraining order on March 10, it necessarily 

and impliedly immunized him for any other violation up to that 

point even if not expressly part of his admission. 

The People disagree that Stewart’s March 10 plea bargain 

included any implied terms. The People contend the “bargain” 

meant the court would dismiss Stewart’s misdemeanor case in 

exchange for his probation violation admission, but the 

agreement did not address or include terms regarding his other 

probation violations. Stewart has the better argument.

The People acknowledge that a plea bargain can contain 

implied terms if “supported by the record.” Here, the People 

argue, the March 10 plea bargain must be limited to its express 

terms because the parties did not discuss other prior probation 

violations. The People cite only to People v. Paredes (2008) 

160 Cal.App.4th 496 in support of this interpretation of events. 

In Paredes, the sentencing court agreed to recommend against 

deportation. (Id. at p. 498.) After a post-sentencing change in 

federal law resulted in removal proceedings, the defendant 

asserted his plea bargain included an implied term protecting 

him from deportation. (Ibid.) The circumstances of the plea in 
14

Paredes did not support a finding that anyone had made a “no 

deportation” promise. To the contrary, the prosecutor denied 

expressly making such a promise, and “the trial court 

admonished Paredes that he could be deported as a result of his 

plea.” (Id. at p. 511.) Finally, the fact that the prosecutor did not 

have the legal power to bind the federal government further 

supported the conclusion that the plea agreement included no 

such promise, express or implied. (Id. at p. 512.)

The circumstances here differ for several reasons. First, 

although the parties did not expressly address the effect of 

Stewart’s admission on his other outstanding violations, the 

parties and the court did discuss Stewart’s other violations at the 

March 10 hearing. Stewart’s counsel initially requested that the 

court vacate the March 22 date in Compton because Stewart 

could not serve his 90-day sentence and simultaneously remain 

enrolled in a domestic violence class. When advised that only the 

Compton court could modify the March 22 date, the court agreed 

to “note it in the file” that Stewart had an April 9 surrender date 

so Stewart could appear in the Compton court on March 22 to 

“get reenrollment paperwork, if necessary, or show proof of 

reenrollment in your domestic violence counseling class.” This 

discussion implies that the court contemplated reenrollment in 

the class, not further violation proceedings relating to it. The 

court also reinstated Stewart’s probation, incorporating the prior 

terms and conditions, which a court would not typically do if it 

anticipated further violation proceedings. Finally, Stewart 

admitted to “failing to abide by the terms and conditions [of 

probation], specifically violating the protective order and picking 

up this new misdemeanor case.” Although the court “specifi[ed]” 

the protective order violation, it also made general reference to 
15

Stewart’s failure to abide by the “terms and conditions.” To the 

extent this language is ambiguous, the court’s actions in 

reinstating probation and directing Stewart to reenroll in 

domestic violence classes after his 90-day jail sentence, taken 

collectively, strongly suggest the parties “mutually intended” that 

the admission would address Stewart’s failures up to that point. 

(See K.R. v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 304.) The 

“subsequent conduct” of the parties corroborates this 

interpretation. The prosecutor made no mention of, and took no 

steps to pursue, additional violation proceedings until Stewart 

later failed to comply with an order to appear in court. (People v. 

Shelton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 767.)

3. The July 8 Sentence Did Not Violate the Implied Agreement 

from March 10

Stewart contends that the July 8 sentence in Compton 

violated an implied term of the plea bargain he reached on 

March 10 in El Monte by using pre-March 10 violations to find 

Stewart in violation of probation. The People argue that the 

court properly could rely on all violations identified in the 

supplemental probation report it ordered, which included 

Stewart’s termination from the domestic violence program on 

December 22, 2020, and his failures to communicate with his 

probation officer. The People further contend that even if the 

March 10 El Monte plea agreement prevented the Compton court 

on July 8 from relying on any pre-March 10 violations, Stewart 

still committed additional violations between March 10 and 

July 8 sufficient to support the trial court’s findings. We find 

that sufficient evidence supports the finding of a probation 
16

violation on July 8 and that the court did not abuse its discretion 

in ordering execution of the state prison sentence.

a. Substantial evidence supports the probation 

violation finding at the July 8 hearing

A trial court need only find a violation of probation by a 

preponderance of the evidence. (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 

51 Cal.3d at p. 442.) But “the evidence must support a conclusion 

the probationer’s conduct constituted a willful violation of the 

terms and conditions of probation.” (People v. Galvan (2007) 

155 Cal.App.4th 978, 982.) Where evidence is uncontroverted 

that a probationer did not fail to appear due to “irresponsibility, 

contumacious behavior or disrespect for the orders and 

expectations of the court,” the trial court may abuse its discretion

if it uses that failure to appear as the basis to revoke probation. 

(People v. Zaring (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 362, 379.) 

The court’s July 8 recitation of reasons to find Stewart in 

violation of his probation references both pre-March 10 and postMarch 10 conduct. After discussing the failures to appear, the 

court refers to “the culmination of things here,” going on to list 

“the picking up of the new case but which was already 

addressed,” and the “supplemental report he simply never 

checked in with probation.” Stewart contends the court’s

consideration of pre-March 10 violations invalidates its finding 

that Stewart violated probation.4 When discussing the failures to 

4 The People argue Stewart forfeited any challenge to the 

court’s consideration of these violations by failing to object in the 

trial court. However, the People confuse the failure to object to 

consideration of these factors at sentencing (which the court could 

validly do), with consideration of them as the basis for the 
17

appear and the reasons for them, the court stated, “And that’s 

one aspect of why we’re here.” Although not a model of clarity, 

that comment and the other references do not necessarily imply 

the court relied on pre-March 10 violations when finding Stewart 

in violation of probation on July 8. But even if the court did so, 

we only look to whether substantial evidence supports the court’s 

decision. If it does, it is harmless error that the court may also 

have relied on improper material. 

The record contains evidence of three possible probation 

violations after March 10—failures to contact his probation 

officer and two failures to appear—all referenced by the court at 

the probation revocation hearing. The probation report prepared 

for the March 22 hearing indicated that Stewart should 

telephonically contact his probation officer monthly. The 

supplemental report ordered by the court on April 6 indicates 

that Stewart “failed to make any contact” with his probation 

officer before his remand to county jail on April 9. Thus, Stewart 

failed to contact his probation officer for approximately one 

month. 

Stewart points to language differences between the 

supplemental probation report and earlier reports to suggest 

probation did not instruct him to contact probation after the 

March 10 hearing. Viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the People, as we must, the more reasonable 

interpretation is that probation instructed Stewart to report to 

his probation officer monthly, but he consistently failed to do so –

right up until the July 8, 2021, hearing. It makes no sense that 

after Stewart failed to report to probation between December 23, 

violation itself. Thus, People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356, 

cited by the People, does not apply.
18

2020 and his March 10, 2021, plea bargain, probation would not 

instruct him to report regularly from that point forward. The 

March 22, 2021, report suggests that instruction was to report 

monthly. He did not, according to the supplemental report, 

contact probation in the month between the March 10, 2021,

hearing and his April 9, 2021, remand to county jail (a span that 

includes his failure to appear on March 22 and April 6). The trial 

court specifically referenced Stewart’s failure to report when 

finding him in violation of probation on July 8, 2021. At a 

minimum, the trial court could “reasonably deduce from the 

evidence” that Stewart failed to report as directed after March 10,

and we therefore must presume the existence of that fact. 

(People v. Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 314.) This failure alone 

would constitute substantial evidence in support of the court’s 

finding on July 8 that Stewart violated probation after March 10.

In addition, Stewart failed to appear in court twice after 

March 10, 2021: first on March 22 (though he appeared later 

that day), and then again on April 6. Stewart’s counsel 

essentially conceded these failures, as he had to. However, 

Stewart’s counsel offered uncontradicted evidence, including a 

proffer of the bailiff’s testimony, that Stewart had mental health 

issues caused by medication on March 22 that made him late and

prevented him from entering the courtroom. The court accepted 

counsel’s representations as true. In its findings, the court 

explained that on March 22 Stewart “did not come to court . . . 

but I do understand the extenuating circumstances that were 

described to me.”
19

Stewart argues these comments indicate the court made a 

finding that the “extenuating circumstances” excused Stewart’s 

failure to appear and rendered the failure not willful. Except 

that the court never expressly found that Stewart’s failure was 

not willful. Understanding the extenuating circumstances does 

not exclude a finding that Stewart willfully failed to appear. 

Both could be true. Viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the People, the court had no obligation to find 

Stewart’s failure to appear resulted from “irresponsibility, 

contumacious behavior or disrespect for the orders and 

expectations of the court” before concluding that the failure was 

willful.5 (People v. Zaring, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 379.) 

But even if the uncontradicted evidence proffered by 

Stewart required the court to excuse Stewart’s failure to appear 

on March 22, the same evidence does not excuse his next failure 

to appear on April 6. Stewart’s counsel argued that Stewart’s 

issues on March 22 then “led to some serious confusion about the 

next court date.” However, the evidence proffer of the bailiff’s 

testimony did not extend to the reasons why Stewart failed to 

appear on April 6. The bailiff only observed Stewart on 

March 22. Stewart’s counsel’s argument that Stewart’s condition 

5 In People v. Zaring, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th 362, the court 

held that an order revoking probation was erroneous. Although 

the defendant appeared 22 minutes late for a court-ordered 

appearance, she presented uncontradicted evidence at her 

probation revocation hearing that unforeseen circumstances out 

of her control and parental responsibilities prevented her from 

appearing on time. (Id. at p. 379.) The facts here are quite 

different. Stewart had a record of failing to appear, never 

appeared in the courtroom on March 22, and offered no evidence 

why he failed to appear on April 6.
20

on March 22 somehow affected his ability to appear on April 6 

relies on sheer speculation. Thus, even if we excuse the March 22 

failure to appear as a basis to revoke probation, substantial

evidence supports a finding that the April 6 failure to appear was 

willful and a proper basis to revoke probation. Given the 

multiple failures to appear, and the nature of the evidence 

submitted by Stewart, this is not the “very extreme case” where 

we should “interfere” with the trial court’s decision to revoke 

probation. (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 443.)

b. The court did not abuse its discretion when it 

imposed the state prison sentence

Because substantial evidence supports the finding that 

Stewart violated his probation, the court did not abuse its 

discretion in ordering executing of the state prison sentence. The 

court warned Stewart in clear terms that any violation could 

result in execution of the sentence. That, too, was the bargain 

Stewart made. The court properly considered Stewart’s overall 

poor performance on probation and the public safety concerns 

acknowledged as a valid concern by Stewart’s counsel. Stewart 

has not met his burden to show the court abused its discretion. 

(People v. Vanella, supra, 265 Cal.App.2d at p. 469.)
21

DISPOSITION

The judgment of the superior court is affirmed. 

HOWARD, J.*

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

FEUER, J.

* Judge of the Marin County Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.