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© USIP 2013 • All rights reserved.

“What is beyond doubt is that 

the Taliban have the means, more 

than in any previous election, to 

become a significant actor in the 

electoral process.”

November 22, 2013

Electoral Offensive 

Taliban Planning for Afghanistan’s 

2014 National Elections

Antonio Giustozzi

E-mail: antonio.giustozzi@googlemail.com

Casey Garret Johnson

E-mail: cjohnson@usip.org

peaceBrieF163

Summary

•	 The Taliban have more resources and are better organized to disrupt Afghanistan’s 2014

national electionsthan wasthe case in any of the country’slast four elections. Still, there are

disagreements between insurgent leaders about carrying out a campaign of violence and

intimidation. 

•	 One group, led by Akhtar Mansur and tied to the Quetta Shura, favored, at least forsome time, a

more conciliatory approach and in the spring met informally with Afghan government officials

to discuss allowing the pollsto go forward. Another group, led by Taliban military commander

Zakir and the Peshawar Shura, favors disrupting the election. 

•	 These upper-level divisions may have little consequence on the ground since rank-and-file

fighters are either vowing to carry out attacksregardless or, as has happened in the past, may

strike local deals with political entitiesto look the other way and allow voting to take place.

A Capacity To Disrupt

WithAfghan presidential and provincial council electionslessthan six months away, a major concern is

whethertheTaliban will allow them to proceed.One school ofthoughtisthatthey willseek to disrupt

electionsto deny the next government as much legitimacy as possible.Anotherschool ofthought

isthatthey willseek to influence their outcome in a way thatisfavorable to theirlong-term political

objectives, which are to overthrow the currentregime.Whatis beyond doubtisthattheTaliban have

the means, more than in any previous election,to become a significant actorin the electoral process.

The prospect of disruption is particularly worrying because Taliban influence is greatest in the

Pashtun south and east. The suppression of turnout in Pashtun areas could lead to an indefinite

suspension of the polls or an outcome seen asillegitimate by those unable to vote, turning the

election into a tool of ethnic rivalry rather than an exercise of national unity. A more pragmatic

attitude could inject energy into the political negotiation process. This brief, based on more than

50 interviews with Taliban footsoldiers,subcommanders and leadersfrom March to May 2013 and

carried out under the direction of Antonio Giustozzi, attemptsto shed light on current deliberations within the Taliban movement on this crucial question.1

The U.S. Institute of Peace will publish

a longer paper based on thisresearch and authored by Giustozzi.
© USIP 2013 • All rights reserved.

Electoral Offensive

page 2 • PB 163 • November 22, 2013

Propaganda And Pragmatism

The Taliban, on principle, has opposed all four previous national elections. Their ability to do so,

however, has varied throughout the years. In 2004, while the movement wasreconstituting itself,

they adopted a wait-and-see attitude about Afghanistan’s first election. Persuasion, propaganda

and intimidation, rather than direct violence, were their main means of undermining the process.

By 2009 and 2010, the Taliban had grown farstronger and were able to openly attack polling sites,

candidates, voters and election officials. Yet in some areas with a heavy insurgent presence—

northern Helmand and central Zabul provinces, for instance—local commanders made informal

agreements with candidates and powerbrokersto allow voting to take place. These dealstended

to be ad hoc, local and self-interested, and the Taliban movement never rhetorically veered from its

anti-election stance.

More noteworthy isthat the elections began to expose divisions within the movement. In 2009

and 2010, the Peshawar Shura was mostly in favor of allowing the electionsto go forward, according

to a current member.Quetta, by contrast, wassteadfast in its desire to disrupt the elections. Peshawar’sstance wasless a matter of tolerance or political flexibility than a realization that their ability to

conduct disruption operations outside of Kunar and Nuristan was, at that time, rather weak.

Today the situation is different: The Peshawar Shura is more organized and unified in its antielection stance and has been given more funds and responsibility to disrupt the 2014 election

than Quetta. 

Peshawar Out Front

The Peshawar Shura has been setting the agenda for the Taliban’s 2014 election disruption strategy.

According to one member, an“ElectoralOffice”was established in February 2013 and was allocated

$5 million to create a network of“Electoral Commissions.” 2

Taliban“election commissioners”said their instructionsinvolved convincing elders not to

participate in elections and to burn their voter identification cards. ATaliban logistician in Ghazni

said he was ordered to stockpile weapons and ammunition, with an eye to a Taliban offensive. In

spring 2013, Taliban commandersfrom the provinces were recalled to Pakistan to be briefed about

the elections plan and were told to spend all their energy in the week before the election“until we

had 100 percent prevented the electionsin our districts and provinces.” 3

Some sourcessaid that Peshawar had threatened to cut funding or even attack any Taliban supporting the election process. By June 2013, provincial commanders who talked to Kabul politicians

in Wardak and Ghazni about facilitating electionsin their areas of control had reportedly been

sacked and detained.

But what the Taliban publicly say they are planning to do and what they are actually doing

does not always align. The procedure adopted for buying and registering voters’cardsisrevealing.

Taliban election commissionersin the districts had a budget to buy voters’cardsfrom elders, usually costing about $10 each. The cards were counted and copiessent to Peshawar by the Taliban

but then returned to the elders who were told to wait for orders. 

Interestingly, the cards were not destroyed but rather left in the hands of the elders. This

suggeststhat the Taliban were keeping open the option of influencing the electionsrather than

simply disrupting them. Similarly,separate sourcesreported that during the September–October

candidate nomination period Taliban were selling the photocopied cardsto potential candidates.4

It is unclear whether in this case the Taliban were simply raising revenue off of the elections

process or if they were trying to shape the field of candidates.
© USIP 2013 • All rights reserved.

Electoral Offensive

page 3 • PB 163 • November 22, 2013

ATaliban source in Khostsaid in late 2012 that Peshawar Shura members were debating

whether to support a presidential candidate in 2014. That means hard-line opposition to the

elections has not been the only option discussed. 

Quetta’s Hard-liners

Though Peshawar hasso far taken the lead in planning to disrupt the elections, the most antielection faction within the Taliban is under the control of Abdul Qayum Zakir in Quetta. Zakir and

his alliance of commandersrepresent the hard-line and ascendant faction within a divided Quetta

Shura. It isin part because of this division that Zakir has allowed Peshawar take the lead in planning disruptive activities and funders have allocated the majority of funding for them to Peshawar.

Peshawar has been allowed to open its“Electoral Commissions”even in areas under Quetta

control, including the north and parts of Zabul and Ghazni provinces.

Zakir and Peshawar’s position as ofspring 2013 wasthat both peace negotiations and elections

were impossible aslong as“foreigners”were in Afghanistan. Successful elections, in particular,

would be seen as America’s victory. 

Zakir’s commanders and rank and file were the most eager of all factions within the Taliban to respond to the elections with violence. In a typicalsentiment, a Zakir fighter from Ghaznistated:“There

are some Taliban who think elections are happening anyway so we must talk with the government

and getsome money, but we say,‘No, thisis not true.’ The Taliban must notsupport the elections.” 5

The Other Side Of Quetta

In other areas under Quetta’s control,such as Kandahar, Helmand and Farah, electoral disruption

efforts will be left to selected Taliban commanders and networks. This plan seemsintended to

allow the Akhtar Mansur alliance, the other main faction within the Quetta Shura, to stay out of the

anti-election campaign. His negotiating efforts with Kabul and third parties could continue while

allowing forsubstantial violence and sabotage in the south.6

A Quetta Shura member reported that representatives of Mansur met Afghan President Hamid

Karzai in Qatar in March to discussthe elections, peace talks and issues of national unity. According to thisindividual, Karzaisaid he needed the support of Mansur’s alliance to hold electionsin

Pashtun areas.

The conditions presented to Karzai in return for the alliance not moving to derail elections

reportedly included the release of Taliban prisoners, a number of ministerial posts and ambassadorships, changesin the constitution and the departure of foreign forcesfrom Afghanistan.

Mansur’s group wasready to support a presidential candidate aslong as he was“a Muslim”and did

not have any relationship with western forces.

The fact that Mansur had not issued clear guidelines on the election by April 2013 was confusing

to hissubcommanders. One cadre said that he wasstill waiting for ordersfrom Mansur and that

there were no real differences between different fronts concerning the elections. He felt that only if

Mansur’srequests were accepted by Karzai would a real difference arise between Mansur’s alliance

and the Zakir-Peshawar position.7

Volatility And Trepidation

In practice, it will be difficult to attribute acts of violence against the electoral processto specific Taliban networks. This will become even more complicated if Mansur’s conciliatory position forcessome
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Electoral Offensive

page 4 • PB 163 • November 22, 2013

powerful but anti-election fronts within his alliance to realign with Zakir.8Also, there is a possibility

that the local deals cut during the 2009 and 2010 elections could return on a greaterscale; that could

lead to more polls opening but also more uncertainty in the minds of locals, preventing actual votes

from being cast. Last but not least, Mansur’s and Zakir’s groups are trying to resolve their differences

through negotiations, which could alter their attitude toward the elections.

In this volatile environment, the government of Afghanistan wasreportedly approaching elders

to lobby local Taliban to allow voting. Among eldersthere appearsto be even less appetite than in

2009–10 to petition the Taliban given the mostly ineffectual or dangerous attemptsto convince the

Taliban in the past. There was no evidence, at least in mid-2013, that the Taliban as a whole would be

more receptive to local entreaties. If deals are indeed struck, they will likely again be interest-based

arrangements with local power brokersrather than the result of communitiesrisking their livesto

demand their constitutional and human right to cast ballotsin a free and fairsetting.

Notes

1.	 This brief is based on interviews conducted in the spring of 2013 with 37 Taliban insurgents,

ranging from rank-and-file district level fightersto newly appointed election disruption

commissionersto Peshawar- and Quetta-based upper-level leaders. Taliban interviews were

supplemented and in some casestriangulated with another 26 interviews with eldersliving in

Taliban-influenced areas. Geographically, the interviews were distributed asfollows: Quetta 1,

Peshawar 1, Baghlan 14, Balkh 5, Badghis 5, Helmand 4, Kandahar 9, Ghazni 4, Zabul 6, Logar 6,

Nangarhar 11, Wardak 7, Ghazni 5, Kunduz 1.

2.	 The presence of these commissioners was confirmed by independentsources.

3.	 This was confirmed by another Peshawar commander.

4.	 Presidential candidates are required to submit 100,000 voting card identification numbersto

be eligible. Provincial Council candidates mustsubmit 200–600, depending on the size of the

province. The ability of the Taliban to influence Provincial Council elections, where the voting

margins of winning candidatestend to be very small, issignificant.

5.	 Interview with Zakirsubcommander, Ghazni Province

6.	 The Mansur alliance is allied with the Rahbari Shura, a group of respected mostly old-guard

Taliban leaders who are not as powerful or as well funded as Taliban fighting groupssuch as

the Peshawar Shura or the Zakir Alliance.

7.	 Similarly, a Kandahar-based representative of the Baradar front, which is part of the Mansur alliance,said that it was not yet clear what they would do with regard to the elections, although he

believed that the withdrawal of foreign troops wasstill a condition forsupporting the elections.

8.	 Some fightersfrom the Baradar and Dadullah fronts have already defected to join more radical

groups. An interviewee in the Quetta Shura close to Mansur admitted that there were some

people in Mansur’s own network, within the Rahbari Shura and Baradar front, who were

against the elections and opposed to Mansur’stalks with Karzaiso were negotiating with Zakir

to join his alliance.

About This Brief

Antonio Giustozzi is an independent 

researcher who received his PhD 

from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and 

is currently associated with the 

War Studies Department at King’s 

College London. He is the author 

of several articles and papers on 

Afghanistan, as well as four books: 

War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan, 1978-1992 (Georgetown 

University Press); Koran, Kalashnikov 

and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency, 2002-7 (Columbia University 

Press); Empires of Mud: War and 

Warlords in Afghanistan (Columbia 

University Press); and Policing 

Afghanistan (with M. Ishaqzada, 

Columbia University Press, 2013). 

He also authored a volume on the 

role of coercion and violence in 

statebuilding, The Art of Coercion

(Columbia University Press, 2011). 

Casey Garret Johnson has worked in 

Afghanistan since 2008, conducting 

research on tribes, politics and the 

insurgency for an Afghan research 

and peacebuilding organization and 

serving as a governance advisor 

with U.S. Agency for International 

Development in Kandahar.