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i 

98–914 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–86] 

NAVAL STRIKE FIGHTERS: 

ISSUES AND CONCERNS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL 

AIR AND LAND FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 4, 2016 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio, Chairman 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

PAUL COOK, California 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

THOMAS MACARTHUR, New Jersey 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Professional Staff Member 

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

NEVE SCHADLER, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Tsongas, Hon. Niki, a Representative from Massachusetts, Subcommittee on 

Tactical Air and Land Forces .............................................................................. 2 

Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces .................................................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

Davis, LtGen Jon M., USMC, Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps 

for Aviation (DC(A)), U.S. Marine Corps; RADM Michael C. Manazir, USN, 

Director, Air Warfare Division (N98), U.S. Navy; and RADM Michael T. 

Moran, USN, Program Executive Officer, Tactical Aircraft, U.S. Navy .......... 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Davis, LtGen Jon M., joint with RADM Michael C. Manazir and RADM 

Michael T. Moran .......................................................................................... 33 

Turner, Hon. Michael R. .................................................................................. 31 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Jones ........................................................................................................... 55 

(1) 

NAVAL STRIKE FIGHTERS: ISSUES AND CONCERNS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES, Washington, DC, Thursday, February 4, 2016. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael R. Turner 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Mr. TURNER. The hearing will come to order. 

The subcommittee today meets to receive testimony on issues 

and concerns regarding the strike fighter fleets for the Department 

of the Navy [DON]. 

I would like to welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses: 

Lieutenant General Jon M. Davis, Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Aviation; Rear Admiral Michael C. Manazir—— 

Admiral MANAZIR. Manazir. 

Mr. TURNER [continuing]. Manazir—sorry, director of—Manazir, 

Director of the Air Force division for the U.S. Navy; and Rear Admiral Michael T. Moran, Program Executive Officer for Tactical 

Aircraft. 

Thank you for your service and for your attendance today. 

We are here today to talk about the Department’s strike fighter 

programs, but I want to take a moment to pause and remember the 

tragedy of January 14th in Hawaii, when we lost 12 Marines and 

2 CH–53Es. We must do everything in our power to ensure the 

readiness and safety of our young men and women in uniform. 

At the outset, I would also like to note that the Department of 

Defense [DOD] will not release its fiscal year 2017 budget until 

Tuesday. Accordingly, I expect that our witnesses will not be able 

to discuss the details of the upcoming budget request. 

However, the members do have questions about the budget, 

which are to be taken for the record. I would ask that our witnesses respond promptly after the budget is submitted to Congress. 

We have several issues to cover today, but in my opening remarks I want to highlight two committee concerns: the Navy strike 

fighter shortfall and the issue of physiological episodes in the F/A– 

18 fleet. 

In hearings last year for the fiscal year 2016 budget request, Admiral Greenert, then the Chief of Navy Operations, described a requirement to procure an additional 3 squadrons of F/A–18E/Fs, or 

about 35 aircraft. Additionally, the Marine Corps’ unfunded re-
2 

quirements list included six F–35B aircraft to replace six AV–8B 

aircraft destroyed at Bastion Airfield in Afghanistan when the 

enemy broke through Marine defenses in September 2012. 

This committee and the Congress heard that call. For fiscal year 

2016 the committee added 12 F/A–18E/F aircraft and 6 F–35B aircraft. 

The National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA] signed into law 

in November of last year reflects those increases. The Consolidated 

Omnibus Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2016 included these authorized increases and added two more F–35C aircraft for the 

Navy. 

We know that that helped to alleviate some of the Navy’s strike 

fighter shortfall, and the fifth-generation fighter increases will improve the Navy’s warfighting capabilities. We look forward to hearing more from our witnesses on how these increases helped and 

how much more we need to do. 

Since 2009, the Department of the Navy has noticed a rise in 

hazard reports, known as HAZREPs, regarding the physiological 

episodes in the Navy’s F/A–18 and EA–18G fleets. According to the 

Navy, physiological episodes occur when a pilot experiences a loss 

in performance related to insufficient oxygen, depressurization, or 

other factors present during the flight. 

We have been informed that the Navy has organized a physiological episode team to investigate and determine the causes of 

these physiological episodes in aviators. As symptoms related to depressurization, tissue hypoxia, and contaminant intoxication overlap, discerning a root cause is a complex process. 

We understand that determining the root cause, or causes, of 

physiological episodes in F/A–18 aircraft is a work in progress. We 

look forward to learning more today about the Navy—what the 

Navy is doing to address this and it is an important issue. Very 

many Members of Congress are very concerned about these issues. 

Before we begin, I would like to turn to my good friend and colleague from Massachusetts, Ms. Niki Tsongas, for any comments 

that she may want to make. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the Appendix on page 31.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. NIKI TSONGAS, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM MASSACHUSETTS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR 

AND LAND FORCES 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, to our witnesses. Welcome. It is good to have you 

before us. 

We here in Congress have no greater responsibility than making 

sure that the men and women we send into harm’s way are provided with the best and safest equipment available. Today’s hearing on naval strike fighters is an example of the kind of oversight 

Congress must do to make sure that happens, and I thank the 

chairman for focusing on this important topic. 

There are many issues to discuss today, including whether or not 

we have enough strike fighters, the state of their material readiness, and the potential need for funding adjustments once we see 

the President’s budget request [PB] next week. 
3 

However, while the number of aircraft we have is an important 

issue, the performance and quality of those aircraft is just as important. As such, I would like to focus my concerns today on one 

particular topic highlighted in today’s testimony and the hearing 

materials provided to members. 

This issue is the troubled performance of the on-board oxygen 

generation system of the F–18 fleet. Specifically, I am concerned 

about the high rate of hypoxia, which is caused by a lack of oxygen, 

and other physiological events apparently being experienced by the 

crew members of F–18 aircraft over the past 5 years. 

The members of this committee remember well the impact that 

on-board oxygen generation system failures had some years ago on 

the F–22 fleet, both in terms of the risk it posed to service members and to the impact it had on the grounding of the entire F–22 

fleet. With this in mind, it caused me great concern to learn of the 

higher than expected rate of physiological events for F–18 pilots 

over the past several years, going back to at least 2010, according 

to the Navy. 

While it must be pointed out that there has, thankfully, not yet 

been a confirmed loss of life or aircraft attributed to such events, 

the increasing rate at which these incidents are occurring and their 

potential for catastrophic incidents is not lost on any of us. To me, 

this boils down to keeping our naval aviators and naval flight officers safe. 

Just as we place a high priority on body armor for our ground troops, making sure the oxygen system works as it should in a $15 

million-a-plane fighter aircraft should be a top priority. While there 

are many important parts of a complex fighter aircraft, I am sure 

our witnesses would agree that the basic life support system for the 

crew is one of the most important of all. 

So I look forward to hearing more today about this issue as well 

as others that you are here to talk about, what the Navy is doing 

to correct it, and what the outlook for the future is. In addition, I 

hope to hear what Congress might be able to do to help solve the 

problem. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

I understand that only General Davis will be giving us an opening statement. 

General Davis. 

STATEMENT OF LTGEN JON M. DAVIS, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS FOR AVIATION (DC(A)), 

U.S. MARINE CORPS; RADM MICHAEL C. MANAZIR, USN, DIRECTOR, AIR WARFARE DIVISION (N98), U.S. NAVY; AND 

RADM MICHAEL T. MORAN, USN, PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER TACTICAL AIRCRAFT, U.S. NAVY 

General DAVIS. Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Tsongas, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the issues and concerns associated with the Department’s strike fighter programs. 

Additionally, today we will be addressing fiscal year 2016. 

The programs of the 2017 Presidential budget submission has 

not been released, so we won’t be talking about that today, sir. 
4 

Joining me today is the Navy’s Director of Air Warfare, Rear Admiral Mike Manazir; and the Program Executive Officer for Tactical Aircraft, Rear Admiral Mike Moran. I am honored to be here 

with them today. 

As you are well aware, the Department faces an aviation readiness challenge, which includes reduced strike fighter capacity 

available to support the tactical aviation force’s operational and 

training requirements. While your invitation requested focus on 

these DON strike fighter challenges, we note the readiness of—is 

a preeminent concern for all of naval aviation, and that extends beyond the strike fighter inventory alone. 

The Department’s legacy F–18 and AV–8B readiness challenge is 

attributed to a series of events beginning with the delays in JSF 

[Joint Strike Fighter] procurement, which translated to an unplanned maintenance to extend the service lives of legacy aircraft 

beyond their designed life. Additionally, combatant commanderdriven operations and Navy and Marine Corps training and readiness requirements are driving increased strike fighter utilization 

rate, thereby adding to the current depot maintenance workload. 

In an effort to meet strike fighter inventory requirements, our 

depots are executing a service life extension program. However, the 

depots’ throughput of planned service life extension work has been 

complicated by the discovery of unexpected corrosion-induced work, 

leading to longer repair times for the inducted airframes. The extremely high demand for our assets for such a prolonged period of 

time is challenging our ability to maintain and sustain them appropriately. 

While the Navy and Marine Corps share the Department’s F–18 

A through D fleet, the resulting readiness challenges associated 

with increasing F–18 at or reporting is vastly different. The Navy 

prioritizes and continues to meet deployed readiness requirements 

set forth in the Optimized Fleet Response Plan. 

Achieving these standards, however, has come at the expense of 

force training for the operational squadrons at the early stages of 

the fleet readiness training plan and the fleet replacement squadrons responsible for the air crews’ initial and refresher training— 

basically training our seed corn. This poses risk to our future readiness, impacts our surge capacity, and places additional stress on 

the operational hardware through overutilization. 

As the Nation’s force in readiness, the Marine Corps does not 

achieve readiness requirements on a tiered structure. Rather, Marine aviation is expected to sustain a nominal readiness requirement to fight tonight. 

However, Marine aviation is not meeting that readiness requirement, due in large part to the limitations in operational capacity— 

not enough airplanes on the line. 

In the strike fighter communities we are unable to generate the 

minimum flight time required to operate the thresholds to readiness—required readiness. The challenge is twofold. 

In our F–18 A to D fleet we are simply not producing enough aircraft at our depots to meet our readiness requirements. In our Harrier fleet, the primary limiting factor is parts availability—supply. 

Together, these challenges manifested in an overall force readiness degradation that can only be overcome with improved equip-
5 

ment availability through legacies in sustainment and in new aircraft transitions. We are addressing the problems through an—on 

a number fronts, including initiatives to improve our depot 

throughput to return more aircraft to fleet—and you will hear more 

about that today, I am sure; synchronizing our readiness enabler 

accounts; and exploring means to reduce utilization. 

The sustainment of our legacy fleet is a priority to meet our combatant commander-driven operations in the near term. We have 

also recognized the adverse effect overutilization has on our hardware and on our—and have implemented service life management 

protocols into the F–18 E and F fleet earlier in its life cycle. 

Finally, we are successfully integrating new F–18 and F–35 aircraft into the fleet to address the usage attrition, a portion of our 

challenge that can only be overcome through aircraft procurement. 

We thank Congress for recognizing our concerns in fiscal year 

2016 and helping like you did—that, in fact, is going to be really, 

really helpful—and authorizing and approving—appropriating additional funding for aviation depot production and the additional 

strike fighter aircraft to address our military capacity challenge. 

We appreciate the committee’s continuing support and oversight 

on these important issues and look forward to the questions as we 

explore all facets of this complex situation. 

Thank you. I look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Davis, Admiral 

Manazir, and Admiral Moran can be found in the Appendix on 

page 33.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, General. 

In your prepared testimony, General Davis, you note that naval 

aviation readiness is in a precarious position and that Marines are 

flying an average 58 percent of the required flight time necessary 

to be ready for the Nation’s call. Can you talk about the factors 

that have led to this decreased state of readiness? 

And also, Admiral Manazir, can you please tell us—you state 

that the Navy is also in a precarious position—are they getting as 

few as 58 percent of required flying hours, like the Marine Corps? 

And this would be a great opportunity for both of you to give a 

commercial on why this budget year is incredibly important, because that is what we are doing right now. 

General DAVIS. Absolutely, sir. 

I can start if you would like, Mike. 

Admiral MANAZIR. Go ahead. 

General DAVIS. We are. I ran the numbers. Again, I get almost 

a weekly update on where we are, and we tracked a 30–60–90 

flight time for our pilots. 

So if you look at the inventory in our flight lines, it is really a 

readiness factory. And our training and readiness manual for the 

Marine Corps, we are not on a tiered readiness profile; we operate 

what they call T2.0, which means about 70 percent of our fleet is 

ready to go, and go meet our Nation’s bidding. 

We have got a reduced or smaller number of squadrons that 

meet our operational commitments, but—so we don’t do a tiered 

readiness. We stay at a—our target is to stay at a constant level 

of readiness. 
6 

The training and readiness manual for an F–18 pilot calls for 

about 15.8 to 16 hours a month per pilot to fly. They are flying, 

on average the last 365 days, 10.6 hours a month, so significantly 

lower than the requirement. 

The Harrier fleet is supposed to fly about 15.4 hours a month. 

They are flying about 10.3 to 10.4 hours per month, so vastly lower 

than the requirement. 

So they are not achieving a T2.0 readiness level; they are achieving about a T2.7 level. 

We are meeting our operational requirements, and what we are 

doing is we are paying with that middle bench. Those forces that 

would deploy quickly when the Nation called for a contingency, 

they are getting less airplanes to train with. While we are meeting 

our operational commitments, we are doing that just in time. 

I would say that is a result of a couple things: One, reduced 

budgets for operation and maintenance accounts; delay of the new 

aircraft procurement, or lowered ramp for airplay of the Marine 

Corps’ case, like the F–35. The sequestration impacted us, and also 

I think sequestration really impacted on the depot capability out 

there to repair our aircraft. 

So in the Marine Corps on the TACAIR [tactical air] side—that 

is F–18—today the F–18 fleet is operating right around 50 percent 

of its capacity in the United States Marine Corps. 

If I was to add the F–18s and the Harriers that I am supposed 

to have on the line on any given day, it is about 238 airplanes. Of 

those 238 I am supposed to have on the line to meet that T2.0 

readiness requirement, about 178 are what they call ‘‘in reporting,’’ 

that they are there, they are actually on the flight line, okay? 

Of those 178 I can fly, today, this morning we could get airborne 

about 110 of those airplanes. There are just not enough up airplanes on the line, sir, all right? 

So it is a combination of how we sustain our aircraft; in the Harriers’ case, not enough parts for the Harriers. We have done an 

independent registry review to figure a way to basically get out of 

that, and I briefed the committee on that. 

And last year your help in 2016, laying supplies and money in 

to go help us recover that platform will help us recover the Harrier 

in about 2016–2017 back to where we need to be on our flight line 

readiness. 

The F–18 is more of a depot problem, and it is a little bit longer 

problem. But talking with Admiral Manazir and working very 

closely with the Navy, we believe we will be back to 12 aircraft per 

squadron somewhere about FY [fiscal year] 2017 or early 2018. 

A shout out, from my part, to Admiral Paul Grosklags and Admiral L.J. Sewell. I think that they are doing a great job down there 

with the resources we have given them to change both the readiness equation in NAVAIR [Naval Air Systems Command] and what 

they are doing in our depots. 

So bottom line, I would say that we don’t have enough assets on 

the line to do the job, enough up aircraft to train our Marines. We 

will make our Nation’s call and readiness, but I think there is risk 

out there in the larger fight with our bench not having enough aircraft to train and fly with on a daily basis. 

Admiral MANAZIR. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question. 
7 

We have similar readiness statistics as the Marine Corps in the 

percentages. As General Davis noted, the Marine Corps does not 

tier their readiness; they stay at a level readiness to be a force in 

readiness all the time, 24/365. 

The Navy has a tiered readiness system, where basically in the 

early phases of the workups prior to going on deployment we have 

a lesser readiness requirement, just as the squadrons get ready to 

go in the basic training phase. And then we move to an intermediate phase where we resource them a little bit higher. And 

then we fully resource them to go on deployment. 

We also are meeting our deployed requirements. We are meeting 

our integrated and advanced training prior to deployment. Where 

we are taking the readiness hit is down in the lower maintenance 

phase or basic phase, when you want to just get an aviator time 

to fly. 

We have found that even in this tiered readiness level, if you picture sort of a bell curve in training, so you train up, you go on deployment at the highest level, and then you walk back down again, 

that bell curve has gotten steeper. So we have taken the readiness 

out of the front end and the back end, where you sustain the readiness. 

That means that a significant part of our force that is shorebased, in training and not deployed yet, is experiencing a lot less 

flight time than they are required to spend. And so it gets to the 

same kind of percentage chances that General Davis talked about. 

We have had to shut down squadrons if they don’t have enough 

time in the air. We create a floor of flying hours at 11 hours a 

month—we call that our tactical hard deck—for a pilot in the 

United States Navy, and we say, ‘‘If you can’t get 11 hours per 

month you are not proficient and current enough to remain safe in 

the airplane.’’ And so we try to get that 11 hours per month. 

The proximate causes of this are the underfunding of what we 

call the enabler accounts. Your committee, Congress has been wonderful in PB16 of giving us the readiness funding and the increases 

in aircraft to help with the problem. 

But we have had about a decade of critical underfunding of what 

we call the enabler accounts. So if the flying hour count is the 

1A1A account, that is the money it takes to fly the airplane, the 

hours that it takes. Underpinning that 1A1A account is the depot 

account, 1A5A; sustainment accounts like the 1A3A and the 1A4N. 

I am doing alphabet soup here. 

The problem is that we typically focus on one kind of account. 

We go fly the hours and we underfund the spares; we underfund 

the depot; we underfund the parts that go into that flying. 

And we have done that in the service over the last 10 years, and 

that stuff is coming to fruition. 

Sequestration hit us, as General Davis said, where the workforce 

in the aviation depot was laid off. We couldn’t bring that work to 

bear on the depot workload, and those depot airplanes backed up. 

So it is a combination of factors. 

Again, the PB16 budget moves the needle in the right direction. 

The aircraft that you added—and as you noted in your statement, 

Mr. Chairman, Admiral Jon Greenert last year said, ‘‘I need two 
8 

to three squadrons to fix the hole that I have to replace the airplanes we have been using over the years.’’ 

So far we haven’t got the two to three squadrons yet, although 

we are moving towards that, thank you very much. And so we still 

need about another 16 or so Super Hornets to fill the hole here in 

the midyears of the teens. 

But we are experiencing the same kind of readiness hits that 

General Davis is and we are having to take those hits back at 

home and so keep the deployed operations moving. 

Mr. TURNER. General Davis, the Marine Corps has the majority 

of the Navy’s legacy fleet of F/A–18s in its inventory, which are affected by the problems with the environmental control system, 

causing physiological episodes in aviators. General, I was a mayor 

before I came to Congress, and of course I had police force and a 

fire department. 

Our fire department had problems with their breathing apparatus, and they—we never could figure out what was wrong with 

it. It would randomly go out when people were in, you know, the 

most unsafe conditions, obviously, running into burning buildings 

to save other people. 

In the end, even though we couldn’t find what the problem was, 

we had an issue of confidence with our firefighters, and it affected 

their performance and their safety. How is this affecting the issue 

of the confidence of our pilots? 

General DAVIS. I think that, first off—and I have flown both the 

AV–8 and an F–18, so one of the things I learned flying the F–18— 

I am very confident in the OBOGS [On-Board Oxygen Generation 

Systems] system in the AV–8 but, you know, I was—we always 

watched the—on the climb-out the schedule to make sure that we 

are good to go from an oxygen perspective. 

I will tell you that I am very confident my Navy team here to 

go fix the OBOGS problem, make sure we got a—I got a good system for my Marines. The Marines love flying the F–18. It is a 

workhorse for us. 

We don’t worry that much about the OBOGS right now, and 

again, we do have—we know that the Navy is working that for us, 

so—and I actually have—my youngest son is a Marine F–18 pilot 

that flies an OBOGS F–18C right now and just got back from deployment. I think he is more worried about his—the number of airplanes on the line right now for him to go train than he is the 

OBOGS. 

But I do defer to the Navy exactly what we are doing on that, 

sir, but that we are confident the Navy is getting their arms 

around the OBOGS problem. 

Mr. TURNER. And the environmental control system? 

General DAVIS. That as well, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. Admiral Moran, sustainment of the F–35: Now that 

the F–35B has entered the Department of the Navy’s inventory and 

its first operational squadron last year, and the Navy is expected 

to declare IOC [initial operational capacity] with its F–35C in the 

late 2018 or early 2019, what challenges do you see for 

sustainment of these aircraft and how is the Naval Air Systems 

Command preparing for these challenges? 

Admiral MORAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 
9 

First I will tell you that the F–35 is not in my portfolio, so the 

tactical aircraft for the Navy—F–18, AV–8B. F–35 is still run by 

the Joint Program Office [JPO], General Bogdan. 

So I will tell you we are full participants in the JPO when we 

talk about sustainment, integration to the carrier deck and how we 

work those issues. But I would not comment here today on the 

long-term sustainment of F–35 in the Navy. I would really defer 

that to the Joint Program Office or the F–35 Program Office. 

Admiral Manazir. 

Mr. TURNER. Would you like to comment on the physiological episodes in the F/A–18, please? 

Admiral MORAN. Oh, absolutely. Yes, sir. 

You know, ma’am, you mentioned this is a top priority. I will tell 

you, it is absolutely a top priority in the United States Navy and 

the Marine Corps. You know, we have what we call the Naval 

Aviation Enterprise, that we meet monthly at the three-star level. 

So General Davis, Admiral Manazir are leaders on that team. 

Admiral Shoemaker, who is the commander of Naval Air Forces, 

leads that with Vice Admiral Grosklags at NAVAIR Systems Command. 

And so that is a top priority that is discussed on a monthly basis 

at the three-star level. So every incident that occurs, I will tell you, 

comes to my desk if not daily, certainly weekly. 

And we have a very robust physical episode team, as you mentioned, and pretty much over 120 people at this point that are looking at every aspect of our environmental control system [ECS], of 

our OBOGS system, and really the human interface to that system 

to make sure we are uncovering anything that can continue to mitigate that risk. 

I will tell you, since 2009, when they started raising or increasing in numbers, we put a lot of things in place. The ECS system 

really is a decompression sickness piece, so it is a pressurization 

in the airplane. 

So we have made probably close to 18 or 19 changes in that system to date—pressure valves, control valves, sensors—as we have 

updated that airplane and we learn more. So continuously looking, 

from a material standpoint piece. 

On the OBOGS side, we are looking at replacing some of those 

components, too. 

Sir, and your mention on the breathing apparatus for the firemen, it is the same thing. So, you know, when we get the gas— 

or the air through the engines and we filter it to get the nitrogen 

out and then other contaminants out, it is really a filtration system 

that we are looking at. 

So we replaced that filtration system. We field it in about 219 

jets today; we are going to get it in all the jets. That really has 

done a great job of getting rid of the carbon monoxide and improving the breathing gas for the pilots. 

And then the oxygen monitor system, we have got a new system 

in place now that has been in test—funded in 2017 to start going 

on the airplanes when it completes tests here later this year. So 

incrementally, each of those systems replacing that. 

But I will also tell you, from leadership’s direction, the awareness of the problem is just been made keenly aware across all of 
10 

our sites. So we have a roadshow that is the NAVAIR System Command engineers, our fleet folks, our safety center folks, our aviation 

medicine folks, go out to all of the sites and really increase the 

awareness for our pilots of what the—what it—what we are dealing 

with. 

So we have increased the training as part of that. So what we 

did every 4 years to do hypoxia training we are now doing every 

year. We have got a new, more realistic breathing apparatus training environment that we do every 2 years now that really gives the 

pilots a real kind of sense of what that hypoxia feeling is going to 

be, because it is really that awareness piece. 

And then the training and air crew procedures, all being implemented. So what I would tell you what we do now and I can see 

that on a daily basis. 

When an incident pops, you know, I would tell you, before the 

pilots would go on their oxygen, their auxiliary oxygen for 100 percent for a period of time and then get out of it. The new procedure 

is, hey, bleed that system out, recover the airplane, and return to 

base. 

And I will tell you, that is—in every incident that I have seen 

in my time here so far the pilots are executing those new emergency procedures very effectively. 

So I think where it is a multipronged approach that we are hitting this. It is absolutely a focus for us and we continue to make 

gains. 

And I will tell you that the things we are doing now is really trying to understand the contamination piece. I mean, are there any 

things getting in the gas, you know, that the pilots are breathing 

that we are not aware of? 

So I think we have really gone after the carbon monoxide and 

have really good test results. And now we are doing a study to see 

what else is out there that may be contaminating, you know, the 

gas that the pilots are breathing. 

Right now we don’t have a way to measure that in the airplane, 

and so we are looking at ways right now, testing a couple things 

down at Pax River that we can put into their emergency gear to 

not interfere, but measure the gas so that if there is something out 

there that we are not seeing yet, hopefully we will learn that and 

build that into the filtration system. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Admiral. 

Congresswoman Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I appreciate, Admiral Moran, your testimony in trying to address some of the issues. But I do want to continue to have a conversation around it because it is, I think, an issue that despite all 

your efforts and investments in policies and training and everything else, the numbers still don’t go down. 

I mean, in fact, they have, I think over the last—the rate of 

events has been consistently in the range of 20 to 30 events per 

100,000 flying hours for the past 3 years. So even as you have 

made these investments, you are not seeing a lot of progress. 

So, Admiral Manazir, I wanted to ask, what would be a normal 

or expected rate of such events for the fleet? And what would you 
11 

look to see as these efforts are being made? Is there such a rate? 

Have you created something that you are looking to achieve? 

Admiral MANAZIR. Ma’am, that is a good question. Let me describe the physiological event just a little bit and put it into terms 

that might be a little more understandable. 

First and foremost, I have complete confidence in the system— 

the training and the backup systems that we have on the Hornet 

and the Super Hornet. We designed them for redundancy. 

A physiological event occurs when a pilot feels dizzy, feels confused, feels a little strange in the airplane. Admiral Moran mentioned the trainer that we have now. 

I have been flying Navy airplanes since 1982 on oxygen. I commanded an F–14 squadron that had OBOGS back in 1998. I have 

two cruises with that system and I have four cruises with the 

Super Hornet—deployed Super Hornet. 

I have never experienced a hypoxic event outside of training. I 

haven’t personally. 

But what we do with the trainer now is you get into a simulated 

cockpit on the ground, you put an oxygen mask on, and you do simulated training. The system is set up so you can fly a simulator. 

And they gradually reduce your oxygen content and they train us 

to recognize the symptoms. 

It is not a instant ‘‘you are gone.’’ It is a confusion factor. 

And so when a pilot feels that, he is—he deploys his emergency 

oxygen, which is 100 percent oxygen bottle like we used to do. Then 

he reaches down underneath his left thigh, he pulls a handle, and 

he goes onto emergency oxygen. 

That backup system immediately gives him emergency oxygen 

and the symptoms subside enough for him to land the airplane. 

That system has worked 100 percent every time and I am confident 

it still will. 

We haven’t developed a rate per 100,000 flying hours because 

even one event like that, catastrophic, can—you can lose the airplane. I don’t think we will, but we are trying to drive these events 

down through all of the actions that Rear Admiral Moran talked 

about, and driving those rates down. 

I will comment to you that the rates started to climb in 2010. 

That is the year that we told everybody, ‘‘Okay, we think there is 

a problem here at Navy leadership.’’ 

So instead of just coming back and going, ‘‘Yes, I was kind of 

dizzy. Everything is fine. It passed. It passed,’’ we said I want you 

to report every single event. So I think the phenomenon that you 

are seeing between 2010 and now is an increase in reporting. 

They are very real events and they do key us into where we go 

for causal factors. But the chairman talked about the firefighting 

breathing apparatus. It is like chasing a ghost; we can’t figure out 

because the monitoring devices that do this are not on the airplane 

to figure out whether there was a small oxygen content more than 

we needed, less than we needed, or a carbon monoxide event, or 

poison in the gas, something that came off of bearings, breathing 

toxic air. 

We haven’t been able to figure that out, so we have been chasing 

ghosts. I mean, we are replacing and creating new parts and chasing those things. 
12 

So, ma’am, I think we are just trying to get that rate down as 

far as possible, while still understanding causal factors. But if we 

had a confidence problem in the airplane we would ground the 

fleet. 

And we don’t have that problem. That is why you don’t see the 

commander of Naval—NAVAIR, Vice Admiral Paul Grosklags, 

going to that extreme measure, because we have confidence in the 

system. We are just trying to figure out the cause of these episodes. 

Ms. TSONGAS. And I appreciate the efforts that you all are making. It is obviously a real issue and one that—in which the safety 

of the pilots is, you know, paramount in everybody’s mind. 

But even as you are making all the—so I appreciate that the reporting is better so you have a better understanding of the scope 

of the problem. That is always the first step we have to take. 

But that has also been in concert with all these other efforts that 

you are making to try to address and solve the problem and fix it. 

And despite that, there seems to be no progress made because the 

reported numbers remain the same. 

So I am curious, in addition, as we are talking about the budget 

going forward, what the cost of this has been. And is it a funding 

issue? Is it a technological—some issue that people just somehow 

haven’t been able to identify? Could you address that? 

Admiral MORAN. Yes, ma’am. 

You know, I don’t see it as a funding issue. We have gotten all 

the resources we have asked for on the technical side to go ahead 

and investigate the causal factors, so I don’t see it as a research 

question. 

The new filter material that we are replacing in the current systems has been funded and supported, so we are putting those in 

the airplanes as we speak. Like I said, only 219 systems to date, 

but, you know, they are looking to do about 40 a month to get that 

into all the jets. 

The new oxygen monitor system is resourced. It is going through 

the final stages of its testing, as I said, in Pax River. That is funded in fiscal year 2017 they have to be installed in the airplanes. 

The changes we have made to date on the ECS system have all 

been funded and supported across the board. 

So from an acquisition standpoint, providing systems to the fleet, 

I have not faced any resource challenges or issues to get that support across the enterprise. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Have you looked at installing an automatic backup 

system, and would there be a cost to that? 

Admiral MORAN. Well, as Admiral Manazir talked, we do have 

the automatic oxygen—the oxygen system as a backup. What we 

are looking at is can we increase the amount of that oxygen system 

that we carry in the airplane so we can give it a longer duration 

and that emergency piece. So we are actively today looking at can 

we increase. 

Right now, depending on the altitude and really the condition of 

the pilot, that lasts anywhere between 20 minutes and maybe down 

to 5 minutes. So can we extend that, you know, by two- to fourfold 

to give that pilot a—you know, that real backup system for an extended period of time? We are looking at that, as well. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Would there be a cost issue associated with that? 
13 

Admiral MORAN. It would be an expense, yes, ma’am. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Representative Cook. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

We talked a little bit about some of the concerns in aviation 

readiness, General, and I want to talk about the backlogs in the 

depots. 

During the summer every year I kind of go back for a reunion 

at Camp Lejeune. I was in the Swansboro area. 

By the way, every August it rains down there every time I come 

and it comes down in buckets, but that is another story. Things 

haven’t changed much. 

But I went out to Cherry Point and I visited the depot there, and 

I was very, very impressed with the briefs and everything like that. 

But I am concerned about the room that they are going to have; 

I am concerned about whether there is enough actual space there, 

and this is for not only the East Coast depot but the—and I haven’t 

visited the West Coast depot—whether you have the physical space 

in the plant. 

They did say there, you know, I started to ask them about space, 

do we have to acquire land or what have you. They said no, they 

already own the land, which is amazing, and they can do it. 

So is this a concern about backups, about whether you are going 

to be able to take care of the F–35s? And do you have the readiness 

right now in the depots to handle this increase in terms of manpower, parts, and room? 

General DAVIS. Yes. Congressman, thank you very much for that 

question. I will probably ask Admiral Moran to help me a little bit 

in the end of that. 

But I would say we have got a pretty—we have got a good military construction plan to make sure that we have got the facilities 

to take care of our platforms—I do worry, it is not for this committee, but the V–22 as that comes into its rework. 

Will we have the room to go work those airplanes in? We are 

working them really hard and we are putting a lot of hours on 

those airplanes. They are going to come into the depot. 

As we work the depot, the number—probably one of the number 

one things we need out there besides—and every airplane is a little 

bit different, so they aren’t working on F–18s up there; we are 

working on Harriers, CH–53s, V–22s. In that case here there is 

some corrosion, a little bit in the V–22, but mainly, our main limiting factor out there with that particular depot is spare parts. 

You know, the parts—they would call, like if you are a racecar 

driver you are going to come in and get a complete turnover new 

parts you would have a list of equipment out there that you would 

put on that airplane. Same thing really with our F–18s, getting 

what they need as they come in, the—kind of the most common 

parts that come off that airplane need to get replaced. 

That is the number one thing for us right now with both Harrier, 

CH–53, both in the depots and in the flight line, is basically getting 

our turnaround time to where it needs to be. The 53 deals with 

about 25 percent—cable supply, as does the Harrier. 

And frankly, it is probably—you asked, Congressman Chair, you 

asked about the sustainment on F–35. That is my number one con-
14 

cern with F–35 is underfunding its spares accounts, both for the 

depot and for the flight line’s units. 

Mr. COOK. General, I want to switch gears a little bit, F–35—— 

General DAVIS. Sir. 

Mr. COOK [continuing]. And Expeditionary Air Field, Twentynine 

Palms. Years ago when the Harrier first came out used to have a 

sweeper to clear Lyman Road at Camp Lejeune. 

General DAVIS. Right. 

Mr. COOK. I used to always laugh when I saw that because of 

the fog and all that stuff. 

General DAVIS. Right. 

Mr. COOK. Is that going to be a problem or are we going to have 

to go away completely from an expeditionary air field? 

General DAVIS. No. 

Mr. COOK. Because when that wind blows at Twentynine Palms 

or in the desert or all that stuff there, this is a very, very expensive 

aircraft, and if you can reassure me and tell me everything is going 

to be fine. 

General DAVIS. We just actually did a deployment up to 

Twentynine Palms—— 

Mr. COOK. I know—— 

General DAVIS. And bottom line is they—it was the typical—it 

was November, December wind patterns out there and it wasn’t 

necessarily—they lost some sorties for weather mainly due to the 

crosswind limitations on—for the air—for affording that direct 

crosswind. And a lot of time above about 25, 30 knots you don’t fly 

because if a pilot ejects out of an airplane they get pulled across 

the desert floor and get—could get hurt that way. 

So Twentynine Palms is a training environment, so it is not operational. So we limit to the wind limits out there to make sure that 

we don’t hurt somebody. 

We actually dinged—on that particular deployment we actually 

had blade damage to two engines, right? But when we looked at 

it it wasn’t blade damage that required the engine to be removed. 

So we do have that. In every jet aircraft out there little rocks, little 

things get pulled up. 

But in this case here the F–35 proved to be very robust. It had 

some blade damage; it was blendered out and it wasn’t a problem. 

So what we are doing, though, in that—Major General Mike 

Rocco, a great commander down there at Miramar—they are very 

conservative and I think that is sensible. That airplane wasn’t supposed to go to Twentynine Palms until this spring. We pushed it 

up there early because, one, we wanted to stress, you know, how 

that airplane would operate logistically, how it was going to operate in support of the grunts out there at Twentynine Palms. And 

frankly, that airplane belongs in every climate place—not just on 

a main base, but on an amphibious carrier and also, too, in our expeditionary bases. 

So we got a lot of the data points we wanted to out of that. We 

will always have to be FOD [foreign object damage]-conscious when 

we go to expeditionary bases. But part of that is how we operate; 

part of that is what we have to sweep up to go in there. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Representative Johnson. 
15 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Manazir, over the past couple of years the Navy has cut 

F–35Cs in the future years defense planning budget. With the 

threat growing in numbers and capability in the 2025 timeframe 

and beyond, what is the Navy doing to recover these aircraft to ensure our carrier strike groups and carrier air wings remain relevant and are able to counter the growing threats? 

Admiral MANAZIR. Thank you very much for your question, Mr. 

Johnson. 

The Navy’s procurement of F–35C aircraft were cut for fiscal reasons, in line with other Navy priorities. 

And thank you, to the committee, for the support of extra F– 

35Cs in the PB16 budget, and that goes a long way towards capability. 

You will find the Navy buying additional F–35Cs in greater numbers as we go forward. The Navy, operating off of our flight decks, 

operates integrated capability, whether Super Hornets, EA–18G 

Growlers, E–2D Hawkeyes, or helicopters, to create a capability 

that can overmatch the threat. 

The F–35C is a critical part of that netted capability. Its stealth 

characteristics, its data fusion capability, and its very advanced 

identification of the threat capability allow us to extend the reach 

of the carrier strike group. 

So I think you will find, sir, that as we push forward in these 

future budget cycles that our prioritization of the F–35C for warfighting capability will increase. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

General Davis. 

General DAVIS. Again, adding the six Harriers last year—or the 

six F–35Bs to replace our combat losses is incredibly important and 

I want to say thank you very much, on behalf of the entire Marine 

Corps, for doing that. We lost a great squadron commander and six 

airplanes destroyed and two damaged at Bastion. 

Those airplanes are now going to be—fill up a VMFA–122. By 

getting those airplanes it will allow us to move an F–18 squadron— 

an older F–18 squadron out and move the new airplane in. 

I just spent the last 2 days down at Fort Worth with our F–35 

pilots and took—General Neller went down there with us. I will tell 

you that we have a war-winning airplane. 

So with the Marine Corps we heard Congressman Cook ask 

about going to expeditionary bases. We will go to our amphibious 

ships; we will go to expeditionary bases. And that airplane is going 

to change the way we fight. 

We took all the senior Marine leaders on down to go watch this 

for 2 days, and we had the young guys that are flying the airplane. 

They are flying a completely different way than everything we have 

ever flown before in a very positive way. Real combat capability, 

real combat multiplier. 

I think it is going to make the Marine Corps the force in readiness to be exponentially more qualified and more capable to meet 

the threats that loom at our Nation’s bow. We have got exactly the 

right system out there. 

Thank you for the support on that. 
16 

Bottom line, what I do worry about is that it comes in—not only 

the airplanes, and we are going into a full rate of production pretty 

close here in 18—is the sustainment support that goes along with 

that. If we get this great new airplane and my readiness rates are 

as good as they should be because I am taking parts off good airplanes because I don’t have the parts out there to put them on another airplane, and to make the readiness goals I need to, I think 

that would be a real tragedy. 

It is a fantastic airplane. With the young aviators that were out 

there, the only thing they can complain about with this airplane— 

the only thing—was spare parts. Not enough spare parts. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

General Davis, the F–35 is the only fifth-generation aircraft in 

production today, and I would like for you to highlight for us what 

the F–35 fifth-generation capabilities bring to the fight. 

General DAVIS. What we saw yesterday in a couple scenarios— 

and I want to—be careful—we have got to watch the classified nature of some of this stuff, the capabilities we have out there—we 

did close air support in a contested environment through overcast 

weather. 

We took a division of airplanes and basically we had a division 

of F–35Bs launching off an amphibious carrier and it struck a target that would have taken—to do—to take the target—and I was 

the CO [commanding officer] of our weapons school MAWTS [Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron] One. To do that 

strike with the conventional assets the Marine Corps owns today 

would have taken 12 to 14 airplanes. We did it with four. 

We dealt with a very high-end sand threat. We dealt with weather doing close air support through the clouds. I am not sure we 

would have got in with the conventional fourth-generation airplanes we fly today. It would have been a very difficult problem. 

With fifth-generation, four airplanes, and the way they flew 

those airplanes, looking at basically talking to the forward air controller through the clouds with their synthetic aperture radar, with 

picture-quality optics out there through the cloud, 1,000-foot overcast, we would not be able to do that today. But a high degree of 

fidelity. 

I think it is going to change the way we do close air support, and 

change the way we support our Marines on the ground. 

The second scenario was a four ship going against a very—a 

strike mission defended by very high-end surface-to-air missiles 

and a very high-end adversary aircraft—division of aircraft. They 

took care of all the four adversaries they were up against, took care 

of the sand threat, and killed the target with no attrition. 

So I think it is going to change the way we do business. It has 

certainly changed the way that the Department of the Navy fights 

the fight because we will fight our F–35Bs alongside the carrier 

wing out there, being an integrated fight out there, I think getting 

better value for the taxpayers’ money and much better capability 

than we have had today. 

Like the V–22 has changed the Marine Corps and the naval services in a positive way how we project power from the sea, the F– 

35B is going to allow us to project power from a sea base and our 
17 

expeditionary bases ashore in a very positive way for our Nation. 

I was very excited what I saw yesterday not from what I know but 

really from what those young guys were doing in the airplane with 

the technology that you provided for them. 

Thanks very much. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. General Davis, thank you for elaborating on the F– 

35 sustainment question with—on Admiral Moran’s answer. 

General—excuse me, Representative Graves. 

Mr. GRAVES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My question is for General Manazir, and it is encouraging to 

hear, obviously, the Navy has taken the, you know, the tactical 

aviation, at least the shortfall, very seriously, and you are obviously intending to acquire more F/A–18s. And you have testified 

before this committee before and you have said that the mainstay 

of the, you know, the strike fighter force is—F–18s is going to be 

through 2035, I think was the timeframe that was used. And we 

are now two or three squadrons short, given the shortfall. 

But I would like you to address, you know, the importance of 

keeping the Super Hornet and the Growler lines operational, which 

is something that worries me, because you can’t just start these 

lines up, you know, out of nowhere. And if we are going to keep 

these airplanes flying and maintained and everything else, we have 

to keep those, you know, those lines moving. But can you address 

that? 

Admiral MANAZIR. Yes, sir. Thank you very much for the question. 

As I testified last year, the Navy is about two to three squadrons 

short of Super Hornet. The fundamental reason for that is we have 

been overutilizing our aircraft over the last—mostly—close to a 

decade without replacing them in the numbers that we need to. 

And that overutilization was done in support of our ground wars 

in two countries. That attrition of 35 to 35—35 to 39 aircraft a year 

was highlighted by Admiral Greenert last year when he said 2 to 

3 squadrons to fill that hole. 

The Super Hornet is a vastly capable airplane that will complement the F–35C going forward through the decade of the 2020s 

into the 2030s, and as our statement notes, the predominance in 

numbers until the mid-2030s is going to be in Super Hornet as we 

continue to flow the F–35Cs into the air wing going through the 

decade of the 2020s. The complementary capability of those Super 

Hornets, along with the F–35C, gives us our striking power, our 

reach off the aircraft carrier. 

It is vital to maintain a viable line at St. Louis for the Super 

Hornet for the near term here, in order to get those numbers into 

the air wings that we need to, and then to extend the force out 

through the 2030s until we get to a predominance of F–35C. And 

so acquiring those airplanes—and thank you very much to the subcommittee and the overall Congress for getting those extra Super 

Hornets to replace the numbers that we have flown. 

Also, the extra Super Hornets over the next several years covers 

the slide in initial operational capability F–35C to the right. We 

have had previous IOCs of the F–35C planned for several years 
18 

earlier. This slide in F–35C capability to the 3F software block of 

the airplane is such that we have had to continue to buy Super 

Hornets to keep the capability in our air wings high. So it is vital 

to maintain that line open, sir. 

Mr. GRAVES. We can actually go beyond that, too, and that is one 

of the things I worry about throughout all branches of the military 

is backfilling our used-up equipment. We have got a real problem 

with that and it worries me. And I’m obviously more interested in 

aviation than I am other areas, but thank you for your comments 

very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Representative Graham. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all very much for being here. 

We went on a trip, this subcommittee, to Eglin, and one of the 

concerns that was raised was about the maintenance system for 

the F–35, acronym ALIS [Autonomic Logistics Information System]. And it seemed like there were a lot of challenges that were 

being faced, and we have already talked about some of the maintenance issues that allow our jets to be ready to fly when we need 

them. 

Can you give an update on where we are with ALIS? Thank you. 

General DAVIS. Yes. Eglin is the—where VFA–101 is, I think. 

The Marines have moved out. Our squadrons are now up in Beaufort; and Yuma, Arizona; and soon to be in Iwakuni, Japan. And 

we also have systems up—aircraft up at Edwards with our operational test unit. 

We are achieving the kind of success rates we need to right now 

with ALIS. We have one workaround that we have found, we 

worked on with our operational readiness inspection. And our IOC 

declaration was the one thing that you still got to do is you have 

got to use a laptop computer to download the engine numbers you 

need to after the flight. 

But for the most part, a lot of the ALIS is understanding the system and also the training for your enlisted maintainers. So we 

have some really good maintainers that know ALIS really well. No 

system is without its flaws, but we are not finding the debilitating 

problems with ALIS out there. 

And the big thing we are finding is our turnaround times were 

inside 2 hours. If I have the parts then we can make the turnaround, but if I don’t have the parts we are not making that. 

So I think that—and we also took an expeditionary deployable 

ALIS up to Twentynine Palms. It was one of the things we talked 

about out there, as well. 

So we got your main base; we are putting them on the Navy 

ship, the L-class ships and the carriers. And also we had one we 

wanted to take up so we could be light and austere. 

Some of the initial reports were that it had a lot of bandwidth 

limitations out there. I think part of that, too, is how we train our 

Marines. We are using some of those same pipes for our communications out there, and I think probably limiting the number of 

things that we download outside of the work stuff we need to do 

is going to allow us to get the ALIS information we need in a timely manner. 
19 

So we are not losing sorties for ALIS right now, that I am being 

told about. And our turnaround time is actually quite good. Not 

without problems, but not impossibility out there. So thank you. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Anyone else have a comment about ALIS, not 

ALIS? Sorry. I mispronounced it—— 

General DAVIS. You might have said it right; I might have said 

it wrong. I don’t know. 

Ms. GRAHAM [continuing]. So many acronyms, y’all. Very—— 

General DAVIS. Right. There are too many. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Another question, just this might seem like common sense, but I, you know, I hear that you all are saying that 

the—our pilots are not getting enough training time. What do you 

all think that does for our vulnerability from a security standpoint? 

Admiral MANAZIR. Ma’am, thanks for the question. 

We both testified earlier, as—right after the opening statements, 

that we are losing training time in the phases leading up to deployment. What that affects is our surge force. And so if we keep our 

deployed readiness up high, as we do in both services, and we are 

on the front lines with those forces, if something were to happen 

and we were required to surge forces from the United States, those 

forces are not as adequately trained now and we would have to put 

a whole bunch of resources in there to fly—to upgrade the flying 

of those forces to be able to surge behind. 

That goes across—for the Navy that goes across our carriers, our 

air wings, our parts, or the full resourcing piece. So the combined 

effect of the under-resourcing of readiness accounts, spares, all the 

accounts across the board, is such that our surge force is not going 

to be recovered for a little while here. 

We are targeting specific areas in that surge resourcing to be 

able to get to a surge number by the end of this decade and get 

back up to where we expect to be for the backup, the reserve, the 

surge forces. That is where we see that impact. 

General DAVIS. Ma’am, for the United States Marine Corps, 

again, it is our deployment model. We are supposed to maintain a 

baseline readiness of this 70 percent, and the hours kind of what 

we pay for our flight hour dollars, I can’t execute the flight hour 

dollars because I don’t have the flying—up-flying machines to do 

the job. 

Again, every—is a little different. Your F–18—legacy F–18, coming out of the depot; Harriers is the parts. But it extends throughout Marine aviation. 

So I will tell you that we have a very codified and good training 

system. It is 1,000 times better than when I came in as a young 

guy in 1982. But our pilots, men and women, are not getting 

enough looks at the ball. They are not getting enough flight time 

experience out there to be ready to be that across-the-ROMO 

[range of military operations] force to the degree we need to. 

We train really hard. We are working incredibly hard to make 

our next-to-deploy unit go out the door ready to go, whether it is 

on a carrier, because we have got F–18s and soon-to-be F–35Cs will 

go on Navy carriers. And our regular strike fighter is going out 

there for our unit deployment program to Japan, Special Purpose 

Marine Air-Ground Task Force in the Middle East, and then all of 
20 

our new deployments—we are making those deployments just in 

time. 

And I look at the amount of risk, operational risk, and the wear 

and tear on the Marines and their families by doing it that way. 

There is no margin in my cupboards anymore. So any kind of help 

that you could give us in the sustainment accounts, any kind of 

help you can give us in recapitalizing our fleet—the old airplanes 

are great, but they don’t stay up as long as they should. 

A new airplane, properly sustained, will give us that long life we 

need. A lot of the airplanes we’re flying—you know, we brought the 

F–18 into the Marine Corps in 1981, the Harrier in 1983. We have 

got an—we have extracted maximum value out of those platforms, 

and we will continue to do so until we turn them in. 

And we have done our readiness recovery models to make sure 

we do do that and we get the readiness numbers we need to both 

in F–18 and Harrier. But we do need to recapitalize and sustain 

that system as quickly as we can. 

I worry about the training base. I also worry about my pilots 

leaving the Marine Corps because they are not getting enough 

flight time. These are the best and brightest that our Nation has 

produced, and I—it is probably the Air Force and the Army, as 

well. Great young people, they joined to fight; they joined to be 

good at what they do. 

It is like a quarterback—you know, the—all the great quarterbacks want all the snaps. Our pilots want all the snaps. 

An F–18 pilot in the Marine Corps should get 16 hours of snaps 

a month and he is getting 10. You know, and they are not as good 

as they should be. 

Admiral MANAZIR. And I want to add just something for the committee. Our standard is very, very high for readiness. General 

Davis talked about the standard that changed between when we 

both came in in 1982 to right now. We match our readiness against 

that standard. 

Your Navy and Marine aviation can beat any foe anywhere in 

the world hands down without trying. We train to that standard, 

and that standard is what we’re indexing to see if we are there. 

So our standard is very high. We want to achieve that standard 

without having to lower that bar, and that is why we tell you that 

we need more readiness dollars and resourcing and a focus on that 

standard to maintain our overmatch of any adversary in the world. 

Mr. TURNER. Representative Duckworth. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Thank you. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here. 

I would like to follow up on what my colleague from Louisiana, 

Mr. Graves, was touching on in terms of the shortfall of F–18s. 

Given all the different moving parts, basically, you know, in light 

of the current inventory of aircraft spare parts, crew, maintainers, 

do you have enough to support current demand—operational demand? 

General. 

General DAVIS. Yes, ma’am. On the F–18 I will probably try to 

answer for the Harrier, as well. 
21 

We have the inventory of pilots we need. We are under-resourced 

right now in F–18 pilots because for a small period there we took 

jets out of the training squadron to make operational commitments. 

We have stopped that, so our training base is sound. Now we are 

producing the number of F–18 pilots we need. 

But I am not getting them the looks at the ball, like we talked 

about. Same thing with the Harrier pilots. 

Our enlisted maintainers—those are the ones I focus on the 

most—— 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Yes. 

General DAVIS [continuing]. My master wrench-turners. I will 

tell you that we talked about spare parts, we talked about depot, 

we talked about in-service repair. The fourth pillar of that, for sustaining a legacy or a new airplane, is the quality of the maintainer. 

We’ve got great Marines and sailors. We are focused now on how 

do we retain those very best Marines and sailors, and how do we 

make sure they have got the right promotion opportunities and 

training opportunities to do that stratified training, much like our 

aviators do. 

I commanded the weapons school, and in 1978 with the weapons 

school they said, ‘‘We need to do this, to make better Marine aviators.’’ At the same time they said, ‘‘We need to make a schoolhouse like that for our maintainers, the patch-wearers, the trainthe-trainer.’’ 

We didn’t do that. We are doing that now. And the first class is 

going out at the weapons school in conjunction with the WTI 

[Weapons and Tactics Instructor] class to train that E–8 senior Marine to be the train-the-trainer to retain our very best and brightest. 

I think we don’t have enough parts, we don’t have enough airplanes. We have the human capital we need; we just need to give 

them the tools to be as good as they can be. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. And how does that affect your Reserve forces 

and the folks? You know, because as they leave Active Duty, the 

tempo, the quality of life, whatever it is, they decide to leave and 

you want to retain them in some way possible, so the Reserve 

forces is really a good place to keep those—to keep folks operational and in the game. How does the lack of parts, aircraft, 

school slots, all of that, help your—affect your Reserve forces? 

General DAVIS. Reserves are a critical component to our fleet. In 

fact, two of the TACAIR squadrons the Marine Corps will have 

are—we have two Reserve squadrons. One is cadred right now; I 

don’t have enough airplanes. 

And VMFA–112 has less than half the airplanes it is supposed 

to have. So it impacts the amount of flight time those pilots can 

get; it detracts the desire to go out front, leave from the Active 

Duty force to go to the Reserves. And frankly, we are looking—we 

are not getting enough looks at the ball so the normal experience 

level you are looking for a reservist to go there, a lot of these guys 

don’t have it as much as they needed to. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Right. 

General DAVIS. Lieutenant General Rex McMillian and I have 

worked in this very closely. Bottom line is, as go the Active fleet 

goes the Reserves. So if we are hurting in the Active force we are 
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going to be hurting in the Reserve. We are rebuilding the Reserves 

the same time we are rebuilding the Active fleet. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. So as the shortfall in F–18s, for example, 

across the service is happening, is—are you showing the same percentage of shortfall in the Reserves and Active fleet, or is it coming 

more—you are talking about you have a whole squadron that is not 

flying right now in the Reserves. 

General DAVIS. We cadred that squadron getting ready to stand 

up the F–35. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Okay. 

General DAVIS. But VMFA–112—and we did a kind of a force reduction to deal with the systems we have right now have got 19 

squadrons of—1 F–35 squadron, 1 Reserve F–18 squadron, 6 Harrier squadrons, and 11 F–18 squadrons right now in my inventory, 

and those are all legacy F–18s, plus the 2 training squadrons that 

go along with that. 

We will have two Reserve squadrons at end game. They will be 

F–35 squadrons, one at Beaufort and one at Miramar—or one at 

Cherry Point and one at Miramar. So building them up is critically 

important to us. 

And again, I think the Reserves is our buffer, right, and they are 

also part of our Active force. So making them healthy, making 

them as good as they can be is critically important to the future 

of the Marine Corps. 

We have got to fix the Reserves the same time we are fixing the 

Active fleet while making—right now making our operational commitments, and doing that as well as we can. In fact, our Reserve 

squadron is at Beaufort this week participating in the Marine Division Tactics Course, which is basically training our division of airto-air pilots to go be as good as they can be, and they are out there 

in force with the airplanes they have, totally integrated with the 

Active Duty Component, being assessed and evaluated like the 

young captains are at Beaufort. And generally they do very, very 

well. 

But we need to get them more inventory and more parts so they 

can do their job well. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Admiral, did you want to add anything? 

Admiral MANAZIR. Ma’am, for the United States Navy a similar 

type of thing. We have a—our full requirement of pilots, both Active and Reserve. We have our full requirement of maintenance 

personnel, both Active and Reserve. 

Where we suffer is the jets. As I described, we fully resource deployment and advanced training, and then we are unable, because 

of jet availability, to fully resource the basic phases. 

That also extends to the Reserves. So we are unable to fully resource the Reserves, so of their 10 jets—we have 2 Reserve squadrons. One is a blue backup that would—will continue to be trained 

to go on deployment in case we can’t send an Active squadron, and 

the other one is primarily an adversary squadron. Both do adversary duties for us, fighting—playing like they are opposing forces. 

The availability of jets is a problem in the Reserves and the 

lower-level phases of our pre-deployment training. The proximate 

causes of that are parts, and the depot throughput that we have 

already talked about. And the proximate cause of the depot 
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throughput, from a personnel standpoint, is artisans and engineers 

that we have had to hire since sequestration to make the depot 

flow continue. 

So our near-term readiness problem is the depot throughput. We 

continue to get better. We are 44 percent better this year than last 

year—or 2015 over 2014. We continue to get better and push those 

F–18Cs out to Navy and Marine Corps squadrons so that we can 

resource them properly with hardware and properly train the pilots. 

But the specific answer, ma’am, for Active and Reserve for the 

Navy is we have all the people that we need. It is the jets that we 

need to do—continue the training. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. I feel strongly that this Congress has—and previous Congresses has seriously done you a disservice by asking you 

to live up to an operational tempo, but not providing you the resources that you need. You don’t have to respond to that. That is 

a political statement, and—— 

Mr. TURNER. Your time is up. Just let me say I agree. And certainly that is—— 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER [continuing]. It is the budget battle time. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Yes. 

Mr. TURNER. This is the time for us all on this committee to 

make certain that our voices are heard to the other Members—— 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Yes. 

Mr. TURNER [continuing]. Of Congress so that hopefully we can 

get more resources, because this is not just, you know, inefficiency 

that is resulting in these falloffs; it is absolutely resources. 

And Congresswoman Tsongas gets our last question. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to follow up again on some of the issues on the F–18. 

First of all, I appreciate, Admiral Moran, your talking about the 

manual backup oxygen system, but I think we all would be concerned by the fact that you are asking a potentially incapacitated 

pilot to sort of help himself out of this. And it is my understanding 

that that would only give him 10 minutes, were he able to exercise 

it appropriately, and you would have no idea how far away he 

might be from the carrier or wherever he needs to get back to. 

So as you are looking at creating a budget, I think an automatic 

system is something that you might—I am sure you said you are 

thinking about it, but it seems to me that would give him much 

more time and he wouldn’t have to activate it—or he or she would 

not have to activate it themselves. 

Another question, though: I know last year’s NDAA authorized 

12 additional F–18s, so how is the Navy—and this is for you, Admiral Manazir—how are you making sure that these new planes 

aren’t delivered to the Navy without the same on-board oxygen system problems that you are struggling with today? 

Admiral MANAZIR. So, ma’am, thank you very much. Those new 

Super Hornets are coming off the production line with the newest 

modifications that NAVAIR and Boeing are working through, and 

it is a combination Boeing-Navy team that is looking at this 

OBOGS system very, very hard. 
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As soon as the technical work is done, the engineering work, to 

do these new parts—and Admiral Moran talked about them, the 

sieve and the regulator, the things that we think might be causing 

some of this—they get rolled into the production line. And then 

even when they get on the flight line we put those parts in there, 

too. 

So I am confident that the best technical minds in NAVAIR and 

also in Boeing are looking at this and we will roll those into the 

airplanes as they get to the fleet. And again, I have to tell you, 

ma’am, I have a lot of confidence in the airplane, having flown it. 

Ms. TSONGAS. And how will you be assured that all these fixes 

are working? 

Admiral MANAZIR. We will continue to monitor; we will find better ways to monitor. We will continue to have pilots report. We will 

look at that decline in reports. 

We will turn over every rock, every technical rock, that we can 

to make sure that we are going after every causal factor. 

It is difficult to prove a negative. So if a pilot doesn’t have a 

physiological event time after time after time—and again, ma’am, 

I have never had one ever and I have 3,500 hours in fighters. 

And so when somebody comes back and they say, ‘‘Well, did we 

fix it? Nobody has had an event,’’ and then all of a sudden we have 

an event, now we have to go back and see where the trend lines 

go. 

I have—— 

Ms. TSONGAS. Are you comfortable with the reports you are getting that you are being—getting an accurate sense of what the 

problem is out there? 

Admiral MANAZIR. Yes, ma’am. I think so. It is difficult because 

if a pilot is a little bit woozy, his recollection of the, you know, the 

exact leading up to, you know, what altitude were you, what were 

you doing, what did you—did you sense anything in the cockpit? So 

in our post-flight debriefs the flight surgeon talks to them as well, 

so we try to get as much fact as we can to then guide us in a scientific manner towards a cause. 

I am comfortable we will get there, but we are not going to stop. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you. 

I yield back. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral MORAN. Yes, ma’am. I just want to—— 

Ms. TSONGAS. Oh, go ahead. 

Admiral MORAN [continuing]. It is okay, ma’am. 

You know, when you say how are we going to know, I mean, 

all—part of this process we have developed some test procedures 

and test units to go check our pressurization systems and check 

our OBOGS systems that we didn’t have currently. So when we accept the airplane off the line we will use those systems, as well, 

to validate the performance as best we can on the ground. 

We didn’t have those before. We have them now, so we are 

leveraging them. 

And I will tell you, you know, it is really for us I think the kicker 

is can we really monitor, you know, what the gas the pilot is getting, is there any contamination in there, as I said earlier. So we 

do have some tools that we are employing now on our test squadrons to start—collect that data. 
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As Admiral Manazir said, it is hard to get that data when an air 

crew lands, to really know what they were breathing at the time 

they had that event. So we are trying to put some things in the 

airplane. 

So we are, right now today in our test squadron, starting to employ those to see if they are of value, and so that we can start getting them out into the field. So we are looking at that continuing 

to evolve to make the awareness piece, you know, the critical factor 

so it is not a surprise. They can tell it is coming on or get indications from the system on the airplane that it is coming on. 

Ms. TSONGAS. I guess a concern we would have that we would 

be paying for planes that still had this problem and put the pilots 

at risk. Thank you. 

Mr. TURNER. With that, we will be adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:11 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 4, 2016 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

FEBRUARY 4, 2016 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 4, 2016 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JONES 

Mr. JONES. I understand that the FY17 PB may not include the $23M in FY17/ 

18 funding for the F–35B Lift Fan facility at FRCE Cherry Point. This funding is 

critical in order to stand up the facility by 2022. Can you speak to this? 

General DAVIS. This MILCON project to support F–35B depot-level work at FRC 

East Cherry Point is currently in the planning stage, but not funded in the Navy’s 

FY2017 Presidential Budget. This MILCON Project is late to need; it should be complete no later than FY2022 in order to meet F–35 engine test requirements in support of the fleet, but cannot be stood up prior to FY2024 even with funding beginning in FY2018. The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Joint Program Office (JPO) planned 

procurement for the depot support equipment and tooling for the FRC–E is still on 

track for FOC in CY22. 

Mr. JONES. I understand one of the Marine Corps’ top priorities would be to move 

funding left from FY19 to FY17 for a specialized F–35B hangar at Cherry Point. 

Could you speak to this critical need and if this is one of your top unfunded priorities? 

General DAVIS. Based on the planned F–35 squadron laydown schedule for MCAS 

Cherry Point, funding for a F–35 hangar at this location will be needed in the near 

future, but not in FY2017. However, we do have a specialized F–35 Hangar aboard 

MCAS Miramar in San Diego, Ca as one of our top unfunded priorities for this year. 

Mr. JONES. Sir, I understand that the Marine Corps desires to have a security 

fence constructed at MCAS, Cherry Point. Where does this fall on the Marine Corps 

unfunded priorities list? And in what fiscal year will it be funded? 

General DAVIS. The MCAS Cherry Point airfield security fence was funded in the 

FY2016 MILCON budget. We appreciate Congress adding this project to the program. 

Æ