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TOBACCO: TAXES OWED, AVOIDED, AND EVADED 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 29, 2014 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Finance 

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE 

RON WYDEN, Oregon, Chairman 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

DEBBIE STABENOW, Michigan 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado 

ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania 

MARK R. WARNER, Virginia 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

CHUCK GRASSLEY, Iowa 

MIKE CRAPO, Idaho 

PAT ROBERTS, Kansas 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

PATRICK J. TOOMEY, Pennsylvania 

JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, Staff Director 

CHRIS CAMPBELL, Republican Staff Director 

(II) 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Page 

Wyden, Hon. Ron, a U.S. Senator from Oregon, chairman, Committee on 

Finance .................................................................................................................. 1 

Hatch, Hon. Orrin G., a U.S. Senator from Utah ................................................. 2 

WITNESSES 

Manfreda, John J., Administrator, Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, Washington, DC .......................................................................................... 4 

Gootnick, Dr. David, Director, International Affairs and Trade, Government 

Accountability Office, Washington, DC .............................................................. 6 

Bernstein, Ronald J., president and CEO, Liggett Vector Brands LLC, Morrisville, NC ................................................................................................................ 15 

Patel, Rocky, owner, Rocky Patel Premium Cigars Inc., and board member, 

Cigar Rights of America, Naples, FL .................................................................. 16 

Tynan, Michael, policy officer, Oregon Public Health Division, Portland, OR ... 18 

Drenkard, Scott, economist and manager of State projects, Tax Foundation, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 20 

ALPHABETICAL LISTING AND APPENDIX MATERIAL 

Bernstein, Ronald J.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 15 

Prepared statement with attachments ........................................................... 29 

Responses to questions from committee members ......................................... 72 

Drenkard, Scott: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 20 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 74 

Responses to questions from committee members ......................................... 84 

Gootnick, Dr. David: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 85 

Responses to questions from committee members ......................................... 110 

Hatch, Hon. Orrin G.: 

Opening statement ........................................................................................... 2 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 113 

Manfreda, John J.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 115 

Responses to questions from committee members ......................................... 129 

Patel, Rocky: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 16 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 141 

Responses to questions from committee members ......................................... 148 

Tynan, Michael: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 18 

Prepared statement with attachments ........................................................... 151 

Responses to questions from committee members ......................................... 171 

Wyden, Hon. Ron: 

Opening statement ........................................................................................... 1 

Prepared statement with attachments ........................................................... 176 

Page

IV 

COMMUNICATIONS

Center for Regulatory Effectiveness ....................................................................... 183 

National Association of Convenience Stores (NACS) ............................................ 221 

Small Business Cigar Coalition .............................................................................. 228 

(1) 

TOBACCO: TAXES OWED, AVOIDED, 

AND EVADED 

TUESDAY, JULY 29, 2014 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The hearing was convened, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in 

room SD–215, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ron Wyden 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Cardin, Warner, Hatch, Grassley, Crapo, and 

Thune. 

Also present: Democratic Staff: Jocelyn Moore, Deputy Staff Director; David Berick, Chief Investigator; Chris Arneson, Tax Policy 

Advisor; and Anne Dwyer, Professional Staff Member. Republican 

Staff: Chris Campbell, Staff Director; Kimberly Brandt, Chief 

Healthcare Investigative Counsel; and Nicholas Wyatt, Tax and 

Nominations Professional Staff Member. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RON WYDEN, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM OREGON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON FINANCE 

The CHAIRMAN. The Finance Committee will come to order. 

Today the Finance Committee will examine a classic case of tax 

evasion; specifically, how dozens of companies making tobacco products are able to dodge taxes owed under current law by changing 

only a few words on the packaging labels. This evasion fleeces 

American taxpayers out of billions of dollars, and it means children 

and teens are more easily hooked on tobacco. 

The tax evasion tale goes like this. In 2009, the Congress renewed the Children’s Health Insurance Program, which currently 

provides insurance coverage to more than 8 million children each 

year. To pay for that coverage, the Congress raised excise taxes on 

certain types of tobacco products, including cigarettes and loose 

roll-your-own tobacco. The tax rate on tobacco for pipes and some 

large cigars, however, remained lower. 

So, immediately after the law was enacted, companies pried open 

a big loophole. They started changing the labels on their packaging. 

Products that would have been labeled ‘‘roll-your-own tobacco’’ one 

day were labeled ‘‘pipe tobacco’’ the next, and the tax bill on them 

plummeted. Companies also stuffed small cigars with a few extra 

grams of tobacco. That way they could be considered large cigars 

and be taxed at a lower rate. 

Now, the numbers show just how big this loophole has become. 

Sales of pipe tobacco have skyrocketed more than 10-fold in just 5 

2 

* For more information, see also, ‘‘Present Law and Background Relating to Tobacco Excise 

Taxes,’’Joint Committee on Taxation staff report, July 25, 2014 (JCX–93–14), https:// 

www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4659. 

years. It just seems implausible that so many more Americans 

would suddenly start smoking pipes. 

Today the Finance Committee is going to inquire as to why it is 

so easy to skirt the law. Clearly there has been a lapse in good government. After 5 years, the Treasury Department’s Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, or TTB, still has not drawn a meaningful distinction between tobacco products. Instead, they have ignored everything except for the words on the package: ‘‘roll-yourown’’ or ‘‘pipe.’’ All it takes to exploit this loophole is some ink on 

the label, and the committee is going to see that demonstrated 

today. No muss, no fuss, no teams of tax lawyers poring over legal 

documents. 

Unfortunately, the financial burden this loophole inflicts on 

American taxpayers is enormous. The committee is going to hear 

today that the tobacco loophole has cost taxpayers more than $2 

billion over the last 5 years—more than $2 billion. Furthermore, 

the loophole seriously undermines the effort to discourage smoking 

among America’s children and our teens. According to the Surgeon 

General, evidence shows that raising the cost of cigarettes is a factor in stopping kids from smoking, but when tobacco is cheap because of a blatant loophole, young people are more likely to buy it. 

TTB has had ample time to solve this problem, but it has not followed through. So today the Finance Committee is going to inquire 

why that is the case. Is it a lack of resources needed to mount an 

adequate enforcement effort? TTB has four criminal agents at this 

point to enforce the law for the entire country. Could it be that one 

hand does not know what the other hand is up to? When the Food 

and Drug Administration was dragged into the situation, it made 

matters worse by actively allowing companies to continue using the 

loophole. The Food and Drug Administration even sent letters to 

companies giving them the green light. 

My bottom line, as we begin this inquiry, is that this loophole 

hurts taxpayers, it hurts kids, and it needs to be closed. As has 

been our practice, we are going to work on this important issue, we 

are going to work on it in a bipartisan way, and I am very pleased 

to yield to Senator Hatch for his comments.* 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Wyden appears in the appendix.] 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ORRIN G. HATCH, 

A U.S. SENATOR FROM UTAH 

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. According to 

written testimony we received today, the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax 

and Trade Bureau collected approximately $23 billion in taxes in 

fiscal year 2013, making it the third-largest tax collection agency 

in the U.S. Government. This amount is even more significant 

when you consider the number of tobacco-related transactions undertaken and that millions of Americans are represented somewhere in that $23 billion. Of that amount, around $14 billion came 

from collecting taxes on tobacco products. It seems that there is 

some truth to the quip attributed to former House Majority Leader 

3 

Thomas Foley that ‘‘if you don’t drink, smoke, or drive a car, you’re 

a tax evader.’’ [Laughter.] 

Now, because of the large sums of money involved in this issue 

and because of the number of people and businesses affected, it is 

important that Federal excise taxes are administered accurately 

and fairly. In fact, Senator Kennedy and I made the tobacco tax the 

basis for the Children’s Health Insurance Program and the State 

Children’s Health Insurance Program, otherwise known as SCHIP. 

But, as with the income tax and our tax system as a whole, compliance needs to be based on a belief that clear rules are constantly 

enforced in a way that does not put taxpayers at a disadvantage 

to those who do not follow the rules. We also need to keep in 

mind—and this is true for all tax policy—that tax avoidance and 

tax evasion are very different behaviors. The tax code should consist of clear rules, and people will either follow them or they will 

not. To the taxpayer, the tax code is not a bill for a government 

program or a claim on whatever someone might consider to be the 

patriotic amount, it is a set of rules for arriving at a specific and 

definite number. 

During today’s hearing, we will specifically discuss two market 

shifts in tobacco products that seem prevalent since the passage of 

the Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act, or 

CHIPRA, in 2009, which increased tobacco taxes. One of these is 

an apparent shift from roll-your-own tobacco to pipe tobacco, as the 

chairman has suggested, which is taxed at a lower rate. As one of 

our witnesses noted in his written testimony, one tobacco manufacturer has ‘‘acknowledged that there was no real difference between 

its roll-your-own tobacco and its pipe-cut tobacco.’’ Given the fact 

that roll-your-own tobacco is taxed at around 10 times the rate of 

pipe tobacco, this market shift deserves our attention. Another 

market trend that I expect to be highlighted in this hearing concerns an apparent shift from what the Internal Revenue Code defines as ‘‘small cigars’’ to ‘‘large cigars,’’ which results in tax savings if the manufacturer’s price is below a certain amount. 

In addition to these recent market shifts, we need to be mindful 

of more longstanding issues that clearly deal with tax evasion. For 

example, smuggling of counterfeit or diverted products where Federal taxes have not been paid is a serious problem, possibly costing 

the U.S. billions of dollars in tax revenue every year. 

Finally, since we are discussing tobacco, the health component of 

this issue is also important. Evasion, counterfeiting, and black 

markets, in addition to denying Federal, State, and local governments revenue, also side-step health-related requirements along 

with restrictions intended to reduce the appeal of tobacco to minors. 

I hope this hearing sheds light on how we can improve tax administration by ensuring that our tax laws are being enforced appropriately. I also hope that it will help us understand if the laws 

themselves have not been written in a way to accomplish what was 

intended. And, though we are talking about a specific set of Federal excise taxes on a product that is controversial, that should not 

distract us from the fundamentals of good tax policy. One of the 

things I have always worried about in taxing tobacco is that we 

have to be careful how we do that, because you are going to have 

4 

an underground economy doing things that we will not be able to 

control. So I am very concerned about how we approach this. 

I appreciate the chairman’s interest in trying to do what is right 

here, and we will see what we can do. I have to tell you, Mr. Chairman, I can only stay for a few minutes and then I have to leave, 

but I appreciate your leadership. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Senator Hatch, first of all, I want everyone 

to understand that one of the reasons it is so important to get this 

right is that you have led this fight with respect to children and 

the Children’s Health Insurance Program for years. You and Senator Kennedy—and I think we know our colleague Senator Rockefeller—have been partners in this effort. I so appreciate the advocacy on behalf of children that you have engaged in for many, 

many years. I think it drives home why both of us are committed 

to getting this right, and I look forward to working with you. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Hatch appears in the appendix.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Our hearing today is going to consist of two panels. The first panel will include two government witnesses from the 

Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, known as TTB, and 

the Government Accountability Office. Our second panel includes 

industry members and experts on the cost of tobacco tax evasion. 

We are going to, therefore, have six witnesses, so we would like our 

guests to limit their testimony to 5 minutes. 

Our first witness will be Mr. John Manfreda, the Administrator 

of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau that is part of 

the Department of the Treasury. Our second witness will be Dr. 

David Gootnick, Director of International Affairs and Trade at the 

Government Accountability Office. We thank both of you for your 

cooperation and for coming. Your prepared statements are going to 

be made a part of the record. 

We will start with you, Mr. Manfreda. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN J. MANFREDA, ADMINISTRATOR, ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO TAX AND TRADE BUREAU, WASHINGTON, 

DC 

Mr. MANFREDA. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Hatch, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify about TTB’s tobacco enforcement activities. We 

greatly appreciate your interest in our bureau. 

The Internal Revenue Code imposes Federal excise taxes on tobacco products and establishes a comprehensive framework to protect the revenue. Under this authority, we collected over $14 billion 

in tobacco excise taxes in fiscal year 2013. Our tax authority also 

extends to alcohol products, firearms, and ammunition, under 

which we have collected an additional $9 billion last year. 

Our tax enforcement strategy involves the development and application of multiple tools and skills to ensure compliance with the 

Internal Revenue Code and to detect and address tax evasion. Our 

specialists evaluate permit applications to ensure that only qualified persons operate in the tobacco industry, and we investigate 

high-risk applicants prior to approval. 

Through the use of risk models and other intelligence, our analysts identify diversion schemes and refer cases for further field 

5 

work. Our auditors and investigators then apply advanced investigative techniques to pursue these leads, deploying teams with diverse skill sets for large, complex investigations. As these cases develop, if there are indications of criminal activity, they are referred 

to our special agents for investigation and potential referral for 

prosecution. We also operate a tobacco laboratory which ensures 

the appropriate tax classification of products and provides analytical support for audits, investigations, and rulemaking. 

The Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act 

increased the tax rate for all tobacco products and equalized the 

tax rate for cigarettes, roll-your-own, and small cigars. The tax rate 

for pipe tobacco was also increased, but to a significantly lower 

rate. These tax changes resulted in increased tobacco tax collections, although the amount of the increase has decreased steadily 

since fiscal year 2010, the first full year following CHIPRA. Overall, however, tobacco tax collections remain higher than they were 

pre-CHIPRA. The tax rate differentials resulting from CHIPRA created new incentives for manufacturers, importers, and consumers 

of certain tobacco products. 

Since CHIPRA increased the tax on small cigars and small cigarettes, we have not found evidence of widespread misclassification 

of cigarettes as cigars under the Internal Revenue Code. We have, 

however, seen a notable shift in the cigar market. Although 

CHIPRA raised the tax on both small and large cigars, it created 

an incentive to shift production to the large cigar category because, 

depending on price, the tax rate on a large cigar can be significantly lower than the tax on small cigars. Large cigars are the only 

tobacco product for which the excise tax is based on the manufacturer’s or importer’s sale price. 

Since CHIPRA, we have found that cigar manufacturers and importers are structuring operations or sales to lower their taxable 

sale price, resulting in a decrease in the average tax collected per 

large cigar. We have also seen a significant shift in removals of 

pipe and roll-your-own tobacco. Because the two products can be 

similar, and because the tax on roll-your-own tobacco was significantly increased as compared to pipe tobacco, a portion of the rollyour-own tobacco market has switched to pipe tobacco since 

CHIPRA. We believe that this disparity, combined with the tax 

rate increase on cigarettes, has resulted in an increase in the popularity of machines that can make cigarettes from roll-your-own or 

pipe tobacco. These issues will likely exist as long as incentives remain under the Internal Revenue Code for manufacturers to reclassify products or restructure transactions to achieve a lower tax by 

taking advantage of rate differentials. 

In addition, a 150-percent increase in the Federal excise tax on 

cigarettes imposed by CHIPRA increased the incentive to evade 

Federal taxes through tobacco diversion. We have seen numerous 

diversion schemes and are addressing them through multiple 

means, including criminal prosecution. Our Criminal Enforcement 

Program is critical to our ability to effectively curtail current illicit 

operations and deter others from engaging in diversion activity. 

I am proud of this bureau and what we have been able to accomplish in the 11 years since we were established. Despite our small 

size of about 465 employees, we have worked to maximize the 

6 

reach of our resources, collecting roughly $23 billion in fiscal year 

2013, which represents a return of approximately $450 for every 

dollar invested in TTB’s revenue collection activities. 

I sincerely appreciate the opportunity to testify before the committee today and would be happy to answer any questions you 

have. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Manfreda appears in the appendix.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Gootnick? 

STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID GOOTNICK, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRADE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. GOOTNICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and 

members of the committee, thank you for asking GAO to participate in this hearing. 

As you know, Federal excise taxes on tobacco products have long 

aimed to both raise revenue and discourage tobacco use. My statement today will focus first on the market shifts among smoking tobacco products that followed the 2009 changes to the Internal Revenue Code, and second, on the impact of these market shifts on tax 

revenues. 

I will focus on the four tobacco products: roll-your-own tobacco, 

pipe tobacco, small cigars, and large cigars. Consumption of these 

four products has increased over the past decade and now represents 12 percent of smoking tobacco sales in the United States. 

As Figure 2 from my written testimony shows, CHIPRA eliminated certain tax disparities among these products and created others, as we have been discussing. You can see here the pre-CHIPRA 

rates and the post-CHIPRA rates, and you can see that the rates 

on cigarettes, roll-your-own tobacco, and small cigars were raised 

and made equivalent. However, you can also see that the postCHIPRA rate on pipe tobacco is now roughly one-tenth of the rate 

of roll-your-own. 

Unlike these products and not shown in the slide, the large cigar 

tax, as has been mentioned, is calculated as a percentage of the 

manufacturer or importer’s sales price, up to a maximum. This is 

the so-called ‘‘ad valorem’’ tax. The key point on large cigars is 

that, after CHIPRA, inexpensive large cigars are now taxed at a 

much lower rate than their counterpart small cigars. So, as you 

would expect, the market shifted in response to these changes. 

Manufacturers shifted their products to take advantage of lower 

tax rates, and price-sensitive consumers shifted their preferences. 

As you can see in Figure 4, the sales of low-tax products spiked 

after CHIPRA, and high-tax products plummeted. Specifically in 

this figure, you see that sales of large cigars more than doubled, 

while sales of small cigars declined by nearly 90 percent. So the 

immediate spike in large cigars is shown here on the heavy line, 

and the crash of the small cigar market on the thin line. Likewise 

in Figure 3, you see sales of pipe tobacco increasing over 7-fold, 744 

percent, and sales of roll-your-own tobacco declining by over 80 percent. 

7 

The key here is that manufacturers can shift their products because the tax code differentiates roll-your-own and pipe tobacco in 

large measure by their appearance, packaging, and labeling, which 

allow firms to re-label their products with minimal, if any, changes. 

Likewise, the tax code distinguishes small and large cigars only by 

their weight, and at a breakpoint of 3 pounds per thousand, a 

small cigar can undergo minimal changes, as you have mentioned, 

to qualify as a large cigar. 

Regarding the revenue consequences of these shifts, we modeled 

what tax revenues would have been if market shifts resulting from 

the substitution had not occurred. Our analysis used the long-term 

trends in consumption prior to CHIPRA and the expected fall in demand due to higher tax rates. Thus, we believe our estimates made 

conservative assumptions on the magnitude of tax avoidance. 

In the bottom line, we estimate the tax avoidance due to the observed market shift to be in the range of $2.6 to $3.7 billion since 

the enactment of CHIPRA. Over the same interval, actual postCHIPRA revenue on these four products is roughly $5.3 billion, so 

you can see that the tax avoidance, in both magnitude and as a 

percentage, is significant. 

As you have heard, TTB has limited options in response. They 

have sought to curtail the growing availability of unpermitted rollyour-own tobacco machines in commercial use that emerged after 

CHIPRA; however, the core incentives towards pipe tobacco remain. In addition, the Bureau has analyzed proposals to differentiate roll-your-own and pipe tobacco based on the physical attributes, but there is no real consensus on what, if any, characteristics truly distinguish these two products. 

Finally, there are additional challenges with the ad valorem tax 

on large cigars, which creates opportunities for tax avoidance or 

evasion through intermediary transactions. These transactions 

truly blur the line between tax avoidance and tax evasion. 

In conclusion, we maintain that Congress should consider equalizing the tax rates on roll-your-own and pipe tobacco and, with 

TTB, consider options for reducing tax avoidance due to the gap between small and large cigars. Proposals in this regard have included establishing a floor on the ad valorem tax or increasing the 

weight threshold for large cigars. 

Mr. Chairman, this completes my remarks. I am happy to answer your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gootnick appears in the appendix.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Obviously, when you are talking about $2.6 billion to $3.7 billion being evaded in taxes, if anything, the committee has understated this challenge. You are talking about sums 

of money that are very substantial. Of course, the whole point of 

this exercise, which Senator Hatch and Senator Kennedy and Senator Rockefeller started, is to try to make sure that we are taking 

steps to protect children. 

Now, Mr. Manfreda, at this point we have 39 States asking you 

to issue new rules to more clearly distinguish between cigarettes 

and cigars. So that is the majority—well over the majority—of our 

States that are asking for clarification on this central point, which 

8 

of course goes right to the tax evasion that Dr. Gootnick is talking 

about. 

Now, almost 8 years ago you all issued a Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking, but nothing happened. So let us start by having you 

tell us why that is the case, that after 8 years and 39 States asking 

for clarity on something that is right at the heart of this tax evasion question, why it has not been done. 

Mr. MANFREDA. That is a fair question. Back in 2006, we did do 

a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding differentiating a cigarette from a cigar. However, with CHIPRA equalizing the tax rates 

between a small cigarette and a small cigar, the priority for the 

revenue issue associated with that was pretty much neutralized. 

What I mean is, they are now taxed the same way. 

Given the fact that we are a very small agency, we have very 

small resources, CHIPRA created other rather large problems for 

us to address in regard to classification issues, specifically rollyour-own tobacco versus pipe tobacco. 

So we have been looking at and we have been going forward with 

the research and the differentiation; however, it has not had that 

big a priority from a tax collecting point of view as roll-your-own 

tobacco or pipe tobacco does have. So we are in the process. We 

have it on track as a rulemaking effort. Down the road we will be 

coming out with rulemaking on that. 

The CHAIRMAN. So when will that be? Because, as of right now, 

the small cigars are getting through the loophole. So when? 

Mr. MANFREDA. Well, small cigars are getting called a loophole. 

What they are exercising their right to do is increase the tobacco 

with regard to the weight of the small cigar to make it a large 

cigar. That is a statutory line we cannot change, sir. By that, when 

they are adding maybe 2 or 3 ounces of more tobacco to make it 

a large cigar, that is how they are crossing the line. 

The CHAIRMAN. The problem, however, is that cigarettes are now 

in effect cigars, and that is the problem. I just keep looking at all 

these proposals that you make, and the tax evaders always seem 

to get around them. Then you say there is some other reason that 

you cannot act. 

So let us go then to the question of pipe tobacco after the Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization. A number of 

participants in the roll-your-own tobacco cigarette market quickly 

shifted to labeling their products as lower-taxed pipe tobacco. Then 

they got a wink and a nod from the retailers, to direct consumers 

to the right bag, and the companies were able to dodge $22-perpound in tax by slapping pipe tobacco labels on bags full of cigarette tobacco. 

Now again, in 2010, you issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking to deal with a problem that GAO has spotlighted and 

I have spotlighted. But again, somehow the regulation just was not 

issued. In fact, I gather there was not even a formal proposed regulation, and GAO points out that billions of dollars are being lost as 

a result of this loophole. So what is the reason for the delay here? 

Mr. MANFREDA. Again, a fair question, sir. If you will remember, 

we put out an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking back in 

2010. We extended that comment period in 2011, airing industry 

proposals for differentiation. 

9 

In our airing, we looked at characteristics that could differentiate 

these products, from cut size, moisture content, residual sugar, the 

amount of black tobacco in a product, or the amount of weight associated with flavors or other non-tobacco products. 

The CHAIRMAN. The bottom line is—because I want to ask one 

other question—we do not have a regulation that will ensure that 

we are not seeing tax law evaded. When is that regulation going 

to come out? Can you give us a firm commitment now? 

Mr. MANFREDA. We are going to air a rulemaking in January. 

The CHAIRMAN. Of 2015? 

Mr. MANFREDA. Of 2015. 

Sir, the issue here, and what has made this so very difficult is, 

if you go back and you look at our comments from our 2011 rulemaking, we got an additional 170 comments, 32 of which came 

from industry members. Those comments were so diverse, and, 

when you dug into them, you actually got into the point of, they 

were reflective of their own individual products that were on the 

market. So what we are left with is, we are trying to come up with 

an objective, measurable, not easily manipulated standard that 

draws the line at the right place. 

The CHAIRMAN. But of course an agency gets comments. To not 

have issued even a proposed rule is, I just think—we have had a 

classic case of tax evasion, and it seems like we are looking at a 

classic case of foot-dragging, and we have to do better. 

I want to ask you one other question, and my time is up. That 

is, there of course is tremendous interest in the question of ecigarettes. After decades of work, there has been an effort to cut 

down on kids smoking, and fewer Americans pick up a cigarette 

every day, but there has been an explosion in the use of ecigarettes, especially among young people. 

I am concerned about whether history is going to repeat itself, 

because it was not very long ago when I was in the House and I 

went down a row with tobacco executives and asked whether nicotine was addictive and they all said no, and I am very concerned 

about whether we are going to go down the same route with people 

saying, let us study this and then we will finally decide whether 

these nicotine delivery devices ought to be taxed and regulated. So 

it would be very helpful to have on the record whether or not TTB 

now has the authority to tax e-cigarettes. 

Mr. MANFREDA. Sir, we do not, under the Internal Revenue Code, 

have the authority to tax an e-cigarette that does not contain tobacco. We have to have tobacco in the product to meet an Internal 

Revenue Code definition of a tobacco product, so currently we do 

not. 

The CHAIRMAN. All right. 

Let us go, next, to Senator Warner. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this hearing. Let me also say I concur with you that it appears, 

on these tax avoidance issues, the failure to have at least a regulatory framework is losing the government revenue. It is not fair; 

it is not right. 

I was curious to hear comments about at least some level of a 

floor, since it seems like your ability to manipulate a little bit of 

tobacco in or out of a product puts you above or below a threshold 

10 

that could have a huge change in your taxation. Obviously, I think 

the charts were pretty powerful about how the market has diverged 

so much. 

In Virginia we have a tradition of tobacco products. Most of our 

companies are extraordinarily responsible in how they deal with 

this. I do not think there should be such a wide variety of tax consequences between products that may have equal or similar health 

concerns. 

What I want to ask the witnesses is, let’s move a little away from 

this question of straight avoidance, or manipulation in a sense, to 

issues around just plain illicit activities. Mr. Manfreda, I want to 

start with you, and then I will go to Dr. Gootnick. My understanding is that, at this point, there is little to no transparency regarding what entities actually hold TTB permits, so investigative 

efforts are in many ways hindered from their inception. 

Without adequate enforcement—and I believe either in my notes 

or in your testimony I read that you have only about four enforcement agents—manufacturers without permits, that do not have 

any authorization at all, are free to operate without fear of enforcement of any laws. Often without that enforcement, they avoid any 

payments at all of Federal or State excise tax. 

I have heard actually some extraordinary and astounding numbers. In some places, as much as half the cigarettes consumed may 

be either totally non-taxed or under-taxed, particularly in certain 

jurisdictions with very high-tax components around cigarettes. 

So, Mr. Manfreda, I understand that you are a small agency. I 

want to associate myself with the chairman’s remarks that I do 

think we need to start this regulatory process sooner rather than 

later. But when we are talking about just plain illicit activities, 

how concerned are you about this? Can you talk about efforts that 

your office is undertaking with State enforcement agencies to deal 

with this illicit trade of tobacco? 

Mr. MANFREDA. Yes, sir. Our criminal enforcement function over 

the last 4 years has actually developed 72 cases, 70 of which are 

presently accepted by U.S. Attorneys’ Offices to pursue as criminal 

cases. Out of that, we have identified over $345 million in potential 

tax liability, and we have physically seized over $121 million worth 

of merchandise as well. But diversion is a real problem, especially 

with a commodity like we are regulating. When the intrinsic value 

of the commodity is dwarfed by its tax liability, it is a recipe for 

illegal conduct. 

Senator WARNER. But is it safe to say that some of the numbers 

that I have referenced, that in some States as much as half of the 

tobacco products sold may be fully illicit and not have even appropriate TTB permits, is that too high a number, or is that in the 

range? 

Mr. MANFREDA. Sir, I do not have statistics on that. I am unable—— 

Senator WARNER. But you are the enforcement entity. 

Mr. MANFREDA. Yes, but diversion—— 

Senator WARNER. It seems fairly stunning to me that you do not 

have statistics, plus or minus 10 percent, or up to 50 percent of the 

tobacco products in a State like New York with a high tobacco tax, 

are illicit. 

11 

Mr. MANFREDA. Well, again, are we talking about Federal excise 

tax or are we talking about State taxes that are covered under the 

jurisdiction of ATF? 

Senator WARNER. Pick your poison. 

Mr. MANFREDA. We do not have jurisdiction over contraband cigarette taxing. That is when you—— 

Senator WARNER. But because there is a failure to have any kind 

of transparency about which of these manufacturers that are not 

following the rules at all in terms of TTB permits—— 

Mr. MANFREDA. Well, we coordinate our efforts with State authorities. We have ongoing dialogue with most States. We have tax 

agreements to give us the ability to share tax information with 

State authorities. 

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, may I take one more moment 

to ask one other question? 

The CHAIRMAN. Of course. 

Senator WARNER. It just seems to me we should have concerns 

about this agency, both in terms of the regulatory approach as well 

as the fact that we do not seem to have a lot of good data in terms 

of actual illicit activities that are also potentially losing us revenue. 

That is where, Dr. Gootnick, I wanted to ask you, can you talk in 

any detail about how the illicit trade is affecting tax collection and 

how changes in CHIPRA may have affected that positively or negatively? 

Dr. GOOTNICK. Right. Start with the observation that, for a pack 

of cigarettes, for example, more than 50 percent of the retail sales 

price of a pack of cigarettes is taxes and fees. That is the Federal 

excise tax the TTB is responsible for, plus State excise taxes, local 

taxes in many cases, the master settlement agreement, the tobacco 

buy-out. That set of taxes and fees is over 50 percent of the price 

of a pack of cigarettes. So, when you get a product where the profit 

margin for illicit activity is high and the penalty is relatively low, 

there is going to be a range of activities. 

Those activities range from true smuggling across international 

boundaries to diversion of product that is deemed for export but is 

reintroduced into the domestic market absent the Federal excise 

tax, to what I think you are talking about, which is movement of 

cigarettes from, say, Virginia, a low-tax State, to New York, a hightax State. In addition, there are Internet sales that do not pay required taxes. 

There have been estimates that the magnitude of diversion on 

State excise taxes is in the range of $5 billion annually. I do not 

know how reliable those numbers are. It is inherently difficult to 

quantify what is covert and what is an underground activity. 

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I guess my final point—and I 

appreciate you giving me a little bit of extra time here—is that it 

seems like there may be two buckets here. One bucket, which I 

think you focused appropriately on, is, do we have a floor? How do 

we make sure that there is not an ability to game the system somehow within the, at least quasi-legal, context of roll-your-own or 

moving from small cigar to large cigar, these kind of manipulations 

which affect us in terms of a lot of revenue? 

There is also this other bucket of activities which we have heard 

referenced of up to 50 percent full tax evasion or fully illicit manipVerDate Mar 15 2010 17:45 Jun 02, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 R:\DOCS\94638.000 TIMD
12 

ulation, or failure to even have any kind of registration. Those just 

seem to be out-and-out wrong actions. I believe we need to take action in both areas. 

Again, I appreciate the chairman giving me this extra time and 

having this very important hearing. 

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Virginia is being too logical. 

Heaven forbid that logic should break out on this, but I very much 

appreciate your separating those two considerations out. I look forward to working with you to pursue that. 

Let us move on again to kind of stay with this question of what 

is behind the inaction. Dr. Gootnick, you have reviewed the rollyour-own tobacco issue, the shift to large cigars. You have said that 

the problem is getting worse, this effort to circumvent the higher 

taxes, and it has gotten worse since you last looked at it. 

Now, given all that, the committee, back in 2012, included a provision in the Highway Bill that required roll-your-own machines offered for use at retail locations—we would be talking about convenience stores, tobacco shops—to be registered as commercial cigarette manufacturers. It was the point of the committee back then 

that this provision would stop the use of these machines for tobacco 

tax evasion and reduce the use of mislabeled roll-your-own tobacco. 

My sense is that that has not happened, and that is pretty much 

what you have said. But what is your sense of why the transportation bill provision has not worked? I mean, why has that not 

been an effective tool to close the loophole and block the bleeding 

of these enormous sums of money? 

Dr. GOOTNICK. Right. I would say, in a nutshell, it is because the 

incentive remains to switch from roll-your-own to pipe tobacco. But 

you are very correct that the transportation legislation in 2012 

made clear that roll-your-own machines in commercial use were to 

be considered manufacturers of tobacco and should be taxed accordingly. 

The use of commercial roll-your-own machines went underground 

a little bit more than it had been. Insofar as these roll-your-own 

machines still exist, they do not necessarily as frequently exist 

right inside a retail tobacco outlet, but they do exist right next 

door. 

So we have observed—I had a team go, in this local area within 

20 to 30 miles from here, to retail outlets and observe one retail 

outlet that formerly had a roll-your-own machine on its premises. 

Now there was a wall between the roll-your-own machine and the 

tobacco outlet where an individual could buy the pipe tobacco and 

the tubes, go around the corner to the roll-your-own machine. We 

actually observed an individual walk in, join the club for $10, and 

then provide them with their tobacco and walk out with a carton 

of cigarettes. Using roll-your-own tobacco, they saved easily 10 

bucks on a carton of cigarettes. So the incentives remain, and the 

process still goes on. 

The CHAIRMAN. And, Mr. Manfreda, what is your response to 

that? I mean, again, we have a substantial question of enforcement, where it seems like the government is just behind those who 

would try to skirt the laws and rules. What is your response to exactly what Dr. Gootnick just said? 

13 

* The Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act of 2012. 

Mr. MANFREDA. I would concur with him that the major incentive here is the tax differentiation between the products. I would 

tell you that, at present, we have over 72 investigations under way 

regarding cigarette-making machines. All but six of those have 

raised issues of whether or not a social club is exempt from the liability as a manufacturer. 

We have not seen any representation where a social club would 

fall within the exemption from being considered a manufacturer of 

tobacco products. Some of the issues associated with finding this— 

and I do agree with the doctor that these have gone underground— 

when MAP–21 * was issued, we sent out over 1,467 letters to locations where we knew these machines were. 

The problem is, we have no jurisdiction over these machines or 

their operators, they are not required to keep records, and they are 

not required to cooperate with us. They are really easily moveable. 

So enforcement of this becomes a very difficult problem. 

I do know that, out of the 72 investigations we have under way, the liability associated with any one location is about $54,000. So 

it is time-consuming. They do not cooperate with us. Even the manufacturers of the machines have an incentive not to cooperate with 

us. So, it is a very difficult problem to put to bed, because they are 

mobile and they hide. 

The CHAIRMAN. Fourteen hundred machines, 72 investigations, 

and still—unless I am missing something—no actual enforcement 

actions. Part of my concern is that, when there are no enforcement 

actions, it basically says to those who try to skirt the laws, you are 

home free. 

I mean, the whole point of enforcement, especially with scarce resources—and I am aware that you all are pressed in terms of resources—is, if you do not have some enforcement actions where you 

go the distance, it just sends the worst possible message, because 

those who would try to make money and exploit these loopholes to 

take advantage know they are home free. That is what I am so 

troubled about. 

I want to move on to one other area where I need to know whether new legislation is actually needed, and that is the question of 

processed tobacco and the diversion of it. Now, in 2009 the Congress expanded your authority to address this issue, the shipment 

of untaxed processed tobacco, so that the agency could get a better 

handle on whether or not the manufacturers were paying the right 

taxes. 

Now, you all have asked for additional authority in this area because of your concern that untaxed processed tobacco shipments 

are being diverted through intermediaries and your ability to track 

the shipments is being lost. So why was the authority in the Children’s Health legislation inadequate on this point, so we know exactly why you need the additional authority that you are talking 

about? 

Mr. MANFREDA. In the President’s budget, we proposed that any 

transfer to a non-permittee would be regarded as a removal of rollyour-own tobacco. The reason the current framework is a problem 

is that, when a manufacturer or processed manufacturer ships to 

14 

a non-permittee, the first shipment is required to be reported to us, 

but what we have seen is there are multiple shipments after that 

that are not required to be reported to us. 

The ability to follow that shipment is at the whim of the persons 

we are going to, who are not required to report to us, keep records, 

or do anything like that, so the audit trail becomes almost impossible to follow without cooperation. That is why we would want to 

limit the transferability of processed tobacco to non-permittees. 

The CHAIRMAN. Did you want to add anything to that, Dr. 

Gootnick? 

Dr. GOOTNICK. I was just going to say that processed tobacco is 

really, I think, a straightforward example of an intermediate good 

being treated as a consumer item. So the intention under the definition of processed tobacco is that it is used as a factor in the making of a consumer good, but indeed it is just simply being used, and 

can be used with minimum modification in, for instance, these commercial roll-your-own machines to make cigarettes. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Gootnick. 

I am going to excuse you both at this time, but I want it understood that, with the problem now more serious even than we had 

originally assessed, Mr. Manfreda, we need some clear rules. The 

idea that 39 States, as I stated, wait around for years and years, 

and there are proposals, it kind of reminds me of the marquee at 

the old movie house where it says ‘‘coming soon’’ and it never gets 

there. 

I mean, you all make these proposals, and year after year after 

year goes by, as those who would try to skirt the laws get more 

inventive and more and more creative, and the combination of the 

lack of clear rules—for reasons that I am still not clear on—plus 

the fact that we cannot even have a handful of enforcement actions 

to send a message of deterrence, I think is a prescription for trouble. So at this point I am going to ask—— 

Senator Crapo is here, and I will just make a unanimous consent 

request, and then see if my colleague has questions. 

At this point I am going to ask unanimous consent to include in 

the record two analyses prepared by the TTB analyzing the number of tobacco companies that switched their small cigars to large 

cigars and roll-your-own cigarette tobacco to pipe tobacco. The identity of the individual companies is not included in these analyses 

because the information is considered protected under section 6103 

of the Internal Revenue Code. These analyses were provided to and 

were discussed with minority staff. Without objection, they will be 

made part of the record. 

[The analyses appear in the appendix on p. 178.] 

The CHAIRMAN. So let me recognize my friend and colleague Senator Crapo for any questions he has for the first panel. 

Senator CRAPO. Senator, I have no questions for the first panel, 

and I look forward to moving on to see what the next panel has. 

The CHAIRMAN. Very good. Gentlemen, you are excused. 

Our next panel will be Mr. Ronald Bernstein, president and CEO 

of Liggett Vector Brands of Morrisville, NC; Mr. Rocky Patel, 

owner of Rocky Patel Premium Cigars and board member of Cigar 

Rights of America in Naples, FL; Mr. Michael Tynan, Policy Officer, Oregon Public Health Division in Portland, OR; and Mr. Scott 

15 

Drenkard, economist and manager of State projects, Tax Foundation of Washington, DC. 

Gentlemen, if you all will come forward. All right. I am very 

pleased that we have this panel, and let us begin with you, Mr. 

Bernstein. 

STATEMENT OF RONALD J. BERNSTEIN, PRESIDENT AND CEO, 

LIGGETT VECTOR BRANDS LLC, MORRISVILLE, NC 

Mr. BERNSTEIN. Chairman Wyden, Ranking Member Hatch, and 

members of the committee, my name is Ron Bernstein, and I am 

president and CEO of Liggett Vector Brands. Liggett is the fourthlargest cigarette manufacturer in the United States and has been 

operating since 1873. Thank you for inviting me to testify today. 

Seventeen years ago, Liggett became the first tobacco company 

to break ranks with the industry and settle tobacco-related litigation. We also were the first, and remain the only, company to state 

that smoking is addictive on our packaging and to voluntarily list 

ingredients on our cartons. These actions reflect Liggett’s longstanding cooperative relationship with Congress, the public health 

community, and regulators. With that backdrop, we are here today 

to shine a light on illegal conduct that is costing the U.S. billions 

in tax revenues. 

In 2009, Congress raised tobacco taxes to help fund the State 

Children’s Health Insurance Program. The taxes on cigarettes, rollyour-own tobacco, and on little cigars were raised to the equivalent 

of $10.07 per carton. At the same time, Congress only marginally 

raised the tax on pipe tobacco to $1.15 per carton equivalent. That 

means the Federal excise tax on cigarette tobacco is roughly 10 

times that on pipe tobacco. Before the ink was dry on the legislation, certain tobacco manufacturers embarked on a campaign to 

evade the tax increase by relabeling roll-your-own tobacco as pipe 

tobacco. 

For example, what a smoker would have found in a store before 

the tax increase was called Kentucky Select cigarette tobacco. The 

product made available after the tax increase is called Kentucky 

Select pipe tobacco. The chief differences between these products 

are the label and a substantially lower tax rate. 

Here is a bag of Desperado. Astoundingly, this company pasted 

on a label that says ‘‘All Natural Pipe Tobacco’’ and used tape to 

cover the statement ‘‘Makes approximately 500 cigarettes’’ on the 

back. Everyone knows that this is cigarette tobacco. The manufacturer knows, the consumer knows, and I know. I know because I 

tried smoking it in a pipe and it was not a pleasant experience. 

We met with representatives from TTB in 2010 and showed them 

that all of the growth in the category was coming from mislabeled 

pipe tobacco rather than genuine pipe tobacco. TTB advised they 

were aware and had expected this problem when Congress failed 

to equalize the tax on pipe tobacco with roll-your-own tobacco and 

cigarettes in 2009. 

Since the existing tax code definition of RYO included anything 

sold as cigarette tobacco or roll-your-own tobacco, TTB already had 

clear authority to enforce the law, especially since the manufacturers of the product knew exactly what they were doing and were 

16 

using a variety of tactics to inform consumers that the product was 

really roll-your-own tobacco. 

We were pleased to learn shortly after the meeting that TTB had 

issued a statement on its website indicating that specific guidance 

would be forthcoming in the near future. Four years later, we are 

still waiting for that guidance. Meanwhile, sales of pipe tobacco 

have grown by over 700 percent, while roll-your-own has declined 

by over 80 percent, and cigarettes have declined by over 20 percent. 

This chart—which is included in my written statement—looks 

very similar to the one that GAO put up and really tells the whole 

story. None of the manufacturers of genuine pipe tobacco have seen 

any real growth during this period, nor are we aware of any growth 

in the sale of pipes. Yet products labeled as pipe tobacco have 

grown in sales from less than 1 percent of the total cigarettes 

equivalent market to over 6 percent, or more than 18 billion cigarette equivalents. Despite this, TTB has issued no specific guidance, and over $3 billion in excise taxes have been lost by the Federal Government. 

Even after a GAO report clearly demonstrated that the explosion 

of pipe tobacco sales was entirely due to roll-your-own tobacco sales 

and had admissions from manufacturers to this fact, TTB still 

failed to act. Under the definition of cigarette tobacco in the Tobacco Control Act, FDA also has clear authority to treat mislabeled 

pipe tobacco as misbranded and to require it to be properly labeled 

and regulated as cigarette tobacco, but they too have allowed two 

markets to exist, one regulated and properly taxed, the other not. 

Additionally, since 2009 the renegade tobacco industry has also 

relabeled little cigars as filtered cigars. Here is an example, which 

you can see looks exactly like a pack of cigarettes and also contains 

menthol, which is not typically found in real cigars. This has created another tax dodge that has cost the Federal Government close 

to $900 million. Together with mislabeled pipe tobacco, these products now comprise over 8 percent of the cigarette market. 

We welcome the attention that Congress is once again bringing 

to this issue and look forward to working with you to address the 

problem. Thank you for your attention. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bernstein, thank you. I just am struck by 

the fact that, 2 decades ago when I asked tobacco executives 

whether nicotine was addictive and they were under oath, they 

said ‘‘no,’’ and you have come here today and in effect given us real 

candor as to what is going on in the marketplace. I very much appreciate it, and we will have some questions for you in a moment. 

Mr. BERNSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bernstein appears in the appendix.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Patel, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF ROCKY PATEL, OWNER, ROCKY PATEL PREMIUM CIGARS INC., AND BOARD MEMBER, CIGAR RIGHTS OF 

AMERICA, NAPLES, FL 

Mr. PATEL. Thank you, Chairman Wyden, Ranking Member 

Hatch, and members of the committee, for granting me this opportunity to testify before this committee. My name is Rocky Patel, 

17 

and I am the owner and CEO of Rocky Patel Premium Cigars, 

founded in Naples, FL. 

The 20 million premium cigars we handle each year embody the 

values of artisan craftsmanship, strict quality control, and the use 

of the finest aged tobaccos. While not defined under the tax code, 

premium cigars are made from a 100-percent wholly tobacco wrapper, are made by hand with 100-percent tobacco binder and filler 

containing no filter, tip, or non-tobacco mouthpiece, and weigh in 

at at least 6 pounds per thousand. These are considered to be highgrade tobacco products. The closest approximation to a premium 

cigar in the tax code is the large cigar, which weighs at least 3 

pounds per thousand. As a result, there are physical weight differences between what we consider a premium cigar and what is 

considered a large cigar under the code. 

The premium cigar culture is also unique and is rooted in the social nature of premium cigar consumption, often used in celebrations. The typical cigar shop is a family-owned brick-and-mortar 

store that is the modern-day equivalent of a general store or barbershop where men and women who share a passion for premium 

cigars can enjoy each others’ company, share common interests, 

and discuss the issues of the day in a relaxed, comfortable environment. Many of these experienced tobacconists have spent years visiting my farms and factories so as to provide the superior expertise 

their customers expect. Premium cigars occupy a niche within the 

overall cigar and tobacco market, serving an adult consumer base 

with a complex palate and appreciation for high-quality tobacco 

products. 

Since the 1970s, cigars have been classified as either small or 

large based upon weight and taxed differently based upon this classification. Premium cigars are lumped into the large cigar category 

under the code. In 2009, the enactment of CHIPRA transformed tobacco taxation by significantly raising the Federal excise taxes on 

both small and large cigars, along with other tobacco products including cigarettes, pipe tobacco, and roll-your-own tobacco. 

Before CHIPRA, premium and large cigars were taxed at a greater amount of either 20.719 percent per cigar or not more than 

4.875 cents per cigar. After CHIPRA, these rates rose to the greater amount of either 52.75 percent per cigar and 40.26 cents per 

cigar, respectively. This resulted in as much as a 726-percent tax 

increase on premium cigars per thousand, one of the highest increases in the history of the U.S. tax code. However, taxes on small 

and large cigarettes only increased by approximately 158 percent 

per thousand sticks after CHIPRA. 

The 2012 GAO report highlighted that price-sensitive manufacturers and consumers began substituting higher-taxed products 

with lower-taxed ones. Some industry participants took steps to 

avoid taxes by reclassifying their products by adding weight to 

small cigars in order to qualify as large cigars. Our solution to this 

issue would be to define premium cigars in the code to distinguish 

between non-premium cigars and premium cigars. A premium cigar 

could be defined according to several unique factors, including that 

premium cigars are unfiltered products that are hand-wrapped, are 

100-percent leaf tobacco, and weigh more than 6 pounds per thousand. 

18 

These differences would make it impossible to game the definition of premium cigars based on weight alone, allowing Congress 

and the regulators to focus on the differences between small, large, 

and premium cigars and reduce the opportunity and incidences of 

tax avoidance. We also support a lower flat tax for premium cigars, 

which should have the added benefit of simplicity and certainty, reducing the compliance burden on the premium cigar industry and 

the enforcement burden on the TTB. 

Such a flat tax could, and should, be lower than the current rate 

applied to large cigars to more appropriately calibrate the relative 

differences between the tax rates. We also believe that the policies 

adopted in the response to the GAO report should focus on key 

sources of revenue loss and not focus on tobacco products that are 

not the source of tax avoidance. Importantly, cigars represented 

less than 4 percent of the Federal excise tax revenue from all tobacco products in 2012. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify before the committee. I would be pleased to answer any questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Patel. We will have 

questions in a moment. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Patel appears in the appendix.] 

The CHAIRMAN. We are glad to see Oregon well-represented here 

today. Mr. Tynan, please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL TYNAN, POLICY OFFICER, 

OREGON PUBLIC HEALTH DIVISION, PORTLAND, OR 

Mr. TYNAN. Thank you, Chairman Wyden, Ranking Member 

Hatch, and members of the committee. My name is Michael Tynan. 

I am the Policy Officer for the Public Health Division in the Oregon 

Health Authority. Prior to that, I was at the Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention’s Office on Smoking and Health. I have 

been invited here to talk to you today about studies I published on 

changes that have happened since the Federal excise tax increased 

in 2009, but before that, since I am the only public health voice, 

I want to talk about the dangers and health effects of smoking. 

Tobacco use is the leading cause of death and disease in the 

United States. Each year, 480,000 people die from smoking and exposure to second-hand smoke, and CDC estimates that 18.1 percent 

of adults in the United States are smokers. The good news is, we 

know how to end the tobacco use problem in this country. Ending 

the tobacco use problem is a political question, not a scientific one. 

We know what works. Increasing the price of tobacco, establishing smoke-free environments, warning about the dangers of 

second-hand smoke with aggressive media campaigns, and increasing access to cessation are the tools available to public health that 

can significantly reduce smoking and tobacco use. 

Increasing the price of tobacco is the most effective tobacco prevention tool available for public health. Simply put, the more cigarettes cost, the less people will smoke. Every 10-percent increase 

in the price of cigarettes results in a 4-percent decline in consumption and can have an even greater impact on youth. 

Dr. Gootnick already spoke to you about reports published by 

GAO concerning changes in the tobacco use patterns and product 

design since 2009, and my full testimony contains a summary of 

19 

the papers that I have published, and my colleagues at CDC and 

in Oregon, on this topic. I will summarize those by saying that our 

papers reached complementary conclusions to what GAO reported 

to you earlier today. Our papers included an estimate of Federal 

revenue loss, and, although we used different timelines and slightly 

different methodologies, we found that, through June 2013, Federal 

tax receipts on the pipe/roll-your-own switching alone reduced Federal tax receipts by $2.3 billion. There were additional losses to 

State governments in lost excise taxes and lost State revenue. 

But let me walk you through what this means practically for a 

smoker. This, as you have seen earlier, is a 1-pound bag of rollyour-own tobacco. However, as you can see, it has a pipe label on 

it. This bag can be purchased online for about $10. I went to my 

neighborhood roll-your-own shop on Sunday. I walked to it. I did 

not ride my bike, but I walked to it, Senator, and it cost me $16. 

So, because it has a pipe label on it, that is why it is so inexpensive. Had it had a roll-your-own label on it, it would have been at 

least $22 more. 

But the interesting thing was, even though the store’s name is 

Roll-Your-Own Mart, they do not even sell roll-your-own tobacco. 

All of the tobacco they sell there is pipe tobacco. The clerk told me 

that roll-your-own tobacco is too expensive, so they do not carry it. 

They sell pipe tobacco instead. 

This $16 bag will make approximately 500 cigarettes. That is 

about 21⁄2 cartons of cigarettes. So for comparison, a single carton 

of cigarettes in Oregon costs $45. Two hundred cigarettes for $45, 

or you can make 500 for $16—if you were a smoker and your taxes 

went up, which product would you buy? 

The public health community is concerned about this, because, 

instead of quitting in response to the 2009 Federal cigarette tax increase, it appears that some smokers have switched to pipe tobacco, 

allowing them to maintain their addiction to tobacco products. Also, 

as you heard earlier, the changes do not stop at pipe tobacco. There 

have been changes to the type of cigars people smoke, or at least 

in the way that those cigars are taxed. 

So this is a machine-made cigarette, which you saw earlier, made 

by Cheyenne Tobacco. This is a small cigar made by Cheyenne Tobacco. They are identical. The difference is, this one is wrapped in 

white paper, this one is wrapped in tobacco leaf. That is how this 

is classified as a small cigar. Then what manufacturers did after 

2009 is, they took these products, still sold in a pack of 20, that 

were small cigars, made them a little bit heavier, and classified 

them as large cigars. In some cases, as you mentioned, Senator, 

that was done by adding a little bit more tobacco to the product. 

It has also been done by adding kitty litter to the filter to make 

them heavier. 

So again, the public health concern is that smokers who might 

have otherwise quit have instead switched to products that have allowed them to maintain their addiction to tobacco products. Public 

health is also concerned because the morbidity and mortality effects of all forms of combustible tobacco are the same. If you smoke 

a cigar the way you smoke a cigarette, it does not matter how it 

is taxed, there are going to be health effects. 

20 

Changing how these products are classified also does not just result in lost revenue, but also changes how these products are regulated by the Food and Drug Administration. These products are 

now available in candy flavors and with misleading descriptors like 

‘‘Lite,’’ ‘‘Mild,’’ and ‘‘Low,’’ even though those practices are banned 

by the Food and Drug Administration and by Congress in the Tobacco Smoking Act. 

So at least two policy approaches exist that can address these tax 

and policy loopholes. First, as was discussed earlier, the objective 

characteristics could be identified that could classify these products 

separately from one another. Second though, and more importantly, 

tax parity for combustible tobacco is the direct way to impact this 

practice. 

Congress was wise in 2009 when it created tax parity for cigarettes and small cigars and roll-your-own to discourage switching 

between these products. The issue we are discussing today, Senators, is an unfortunate consequence of tax inequity between pipe 

tobacco, large cigars, and other combustible tobacco. Simply put, 

tax parity would expand the public health benefit of the 2009 Federal tax increase. 

The CHAIRMAN. I want to make sure I heard that right, but I 

thought you said that clay in kitty litter was added to the filter to 

make the small cigar heavier. Is that true? 

Mr. TYNAN. There are some instances where that has been done. 

Yes, Senator. 

The CHAIRMAN. Could you get us that for the record? I had not 

heard that before. 

Mr. TYNAN. Yes. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tynan appears in the appendix.] 

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Let us hear from Mr. Drenkard. 

STATEMENT OF SCOTT DRENKARD, ECONOMIST AND MANAGER OF STATE PROJECTS, TAX FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. DRENKARD. Thank you, Chairman Wyden and members of 

the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to speak today. In our 

77 years since our founding in 1937, the Tax Foundation has monitored tax policy trends at the Federal and State levels, and our 

data and research are heavily relied upon by policymakers, the 

media, and the general public. 

Tobacco taxes today are the highest they have ever been in the 

United States. The Federal rate currently stands at $1.0066 cents 

per pack of cigarettes, and State and local rates can add as much 

as an additional $6.16 per pack, as in Chicago, IL. These combined 

rates are equivalent to a tax in excess of 200 percent in some 

locales. Now, these taxes have a really substantial effect on the 

price of cigarettes as well. The most recent survey I found is that 

a pack of cigarettes costs $14.50 in New York City. 

The high tax burden on tobacco results in de facto prohibition on 

the products, bringing with it all the undesirable outcomes associated with the alcohol prohibition in the 1920s. The largest of these 

is cigarette smuggling. Our research shows substantial empirical 

evidence of tobacco smuggling from low- to high-tax jurisdictions, 

21 

with criminals pocketing the profits that would otherwise go to 

State revenue coffers. 

The Mackinac Center for Public Policy estimates that 57 percent 

of the cigarettes consumed in New York State in 2012 were smuggled into the State from other locales. Other States with substantial smuggling problems include Arizona at 51.5 percent, New Mexico at 48.1 percent, Washington at 48 percent, and Wisconsin at 

34.6 percent. 

On top of that, the news stories surrounding the black market 

for tobacco are shocking. We have uncovered instances of violent 

crime, like one disturbing episode in California where criminals 

sacked a distribution center, rounded up the employees at gunpoint, and made off with $1 million in cigarettes, and most importantly, the tobacco tax stamps. We have seen crime rings that involve corruption of law enforcement officers—this happened in 

Maryland—and even one instance of a crime ring running cigarettes from Charlotte to Detroit which was funding operations of 

the terrorist organization Hezbollah. 

In addition to smuggling authentic cigarettes from low- to hightax jurisdictions, criminals sometimes skirt the legal market altogether with counterfeit name-brand products and tobacco tax 

stamps. Counterfeiting is highly profitable. It is an international 

business that exposes consumers to products with increased levels 

of dangerous chemicals like lead and thallium. Various sources report finding insect eggs, dead flies, mold, and human feces in counterfeit cigarettes. One source estimates that the Chinese counterfeit cigarette business produces 400 billion cigarettes per year to 

meet international demand. 

This problem is far more pervasive than people are aware of, and 

even I am surprised by it sometimes. Last week when I was preparing for this testimony, I thought it might be interesting to see 

how quickly I could buy a pack of improperly stamped cigarettes, 

and I kid you not, the very first store I walked into in the District 

of Columbia to try to do this sold me a pack of cigarettes with a 

Virginia tax stamp. This is illegal. 

I brought along a few visual aids to help me make my point 

today. The first map—Figure 1 in my written statement—shows 

the large amount of the cigarette smuggling problem. Some States 

are outflow States, and those tend to be places where taxes are 

low, or at least relatively low compared to neighboring States. 

Other States are a lot higher, and New York is the most shocking, 

with the rate of 57 percent of the cigarette market being under the 

table. 

The second chart—Figure 2—is a scatter plot where each dot represents a State’s cigarette tax rate and their corresponding smuggling percentage. As you can see, as the taxes go up, the rates of 

smuggling go up in a pretty clear fashion. 

Then finally—on the last page of my written statement—is a picture of a car, what an apprehended smuggler looks like. As you can 

see, the smugglers are capable of fitting hundreds of cartons into 

just one regular-sized vehicle. In fact, the Virginia Crime Commission estimated in 2012 that a well-structured crime ring could 

pocket $4 million if they could fit a 16-wheeler with contraband 

cigarettes. 

22 

This is not what sound tax policy looks like. Subjecting certain 

products, even unhealthy ones, to wildly prohibitory rates has damaging unintended consequences. In 1994, the Canadian government 

found that smuggling rates were so high and crime was so senseless that they cut the Federal excise tax rate from $16 to $11 per 

carton. Many provinces followed suit, and smuggling rates declined 

in response. Canadian tax rates have since, unfortunately, crept up 

little by little, and smuggling rates have grown with them. The 

point here is that cigarette taxes are not a good revenue source and 

the products are currently over-taxed. 

Any conversation of raising rates needs to have a realistic expectation of how consumers will respond. We have learned from these 

panels that consumers will shift their purchases to lower-tax options because it is cheaper. It is our responsibility to make sure 

that we are not giving them incentives to shift them to the black 

market instead. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Drenkard. We will have some 

questions in a moment. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Drenkard appears in the appendix.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me start with you, Mr. Bernstein, because it 

is a pretty rare event in America when a major corporation like 

your company asks to come to Washington, DC and say to the government, we need to meet with you and talk about better oversight 

and better regulation. But as far as I can tell, that is what you all 

did. You asked to come to Washington to meet with the Treasury 

Department over this issue. Why did your company take this step 

in terms of asking to come to Washington to meet with Treasury 

officials? 

Mr. BERNSTEIN. Well, Senator, thank you. This is a big issue. We 

obviously operate on the street and we know what is going on, and 

we are able to see things quickly that the regulatory agencies may 

not be able to register as quickly. 

So we went to make them aware—and, at that point, the lost 

revenue was not as dramatic as it is today, because it has gradually increased over the 5 years. But at that time we could see that 

clearly there were two markets that were developing: one that was 

properly regulated and taxed and the other not. 

We felt it was appropriate to bring that to their attention. As I 

said in my comments, we were pleased to find out that they were, 

in fact, aware of it. We think we may have enlightened them on 

a few aspects of it that they had not seen, particularly the proliferation of the cigarette machines that had started at that time. 

We were hopeful when we left the meeting that there would be 

quick action. Unfortunately, as this hearing has indicated, that has 

not happened. 

The CHAIRMAN. And so they told you what at the meeting? What 

did they tell you they were going to do? 

Mr. BERNSTEIN. They did not tell us they were going to do anything. What they did was, they indicated that they were not surprised, that they were aware that it was a problem, that they had 

been aware that it would be a problem from the time that pipe tobacco was not raised to the same level as cigarettes and roll-yourown in 2009. 

23 

Just one other comment: our primary objective was to assure 

that the playing field is the same for everybody in the tobacco business. 

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I wanted to ask you about next, because we are looking today at Federal tobacco excise taxes, but 

there are additional incentives to mislabel and convert the 

cigarette-type products and the lower-tax pipe and cigar products 

because you can get around some State and local taxes as well. 

When you add all of this up, how big a price advantage do the 

firms that deliberately mislabel and convert their products to lowtax products have compared to firms like yours that are trying to 

comply with what the Congress at least intended? 

Mr. BERNSTEIN. Well, I think as was indicated by your gentleman from Oregon, you can go and buy 21⁄2 packs of cigarette 

equivalent in pipe tobacco for about $15, $16, whereas you cannot 

get a pack of legitimate and properly taxed cigarettes for under 

$30. I am using national averages when considering State excise 

tax variations. But if you look at it, I mean, the gap can be anywhere from $15 to $40 or $50 when you are talking about premium 

cigarettes. 

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Let us move on to Mr. Tynan. We 

thank you for coming, Mr. Tynan. We are glad to have you. 

As I pointed out in my opening statement, the reauthorization of 

the Children’s Health Insurance Program tried to establish the 

principle that all cigarette-type products would be taxed at the 

same rate, especially small cigars. When it became clear that there 

were those who were going to try to circumvent that principle by 

using these rolling machines, Congress passed legislation to try to 

shut that particular loophole. Your research indicates that all of 

these dodges together cumulatively have meant that the 2012 legislation has not had any real impact. In your view, why is that the 

case? 

Mr. TYNAN. We do not know why that is the case. The machines 

do not appear to be in the stores anymore, at least not anecdotally 

in the stores we have gone into in Oregon. But that does not mean 

that they have not gone underground or that that is different in 

other States. 

There needs to be some sort of national assessment of the retail 

space to identify what has occurred in the retail space or to see if 

the stores have gone underground. But simply, Senator, it may just 

be that smokers did not understand how much of a tax advantage 

there was with roll-your-own tobacco. 

When these machines came into the stores, maybe consumers 

just got a taste of it, so to speak. But one thing I want to point 

out is that this is not just happenstance that this happened. I was 

still at the CDC at the time when the 2009 tobacco tax increase 

occurred. We were very interested to see if we could see an immediate impact of the increase, and we did not yet know that there 

was this pipe/roll-your-own difference that was going to happen. 

So I was tracking the TTB data on a month-to-month basis. 

When the new data came out for April 2009, I called TTB because 

I thought they had made a mistake in their data. I called them and 

said, you guys mixed up your pipe and your roll-your-own data. I 

think you reported them in the opposite. They said, no, no, we 

24 

didn’t, that data is right. So the fact that it happened the month 

it came out says to me that this was not an accident. 

The CHAIRMAN. What in your view, since you are a public health 

office, are the impacts to children of these various tax dodges? I 

want to get Mr. Drenkard into this debate about taxes a little bit 

later, but in your view what are the implications for children and 

the take-up rate and that sort of thing? 

Mr. TYNAN. Well, the implications for children are twofold. One 

is, if cigarettes cost less, we know children will be more likely to 

start smoking. Raising the price of tobacco products is one of the 

most effective tools to prevent youth from even starting. 

Eighty percent of people who start smoking start by the age of 

18. I am going to say that again: 80 percent of people who start 

smoking start by the age of 18. We know that flavors, flavors like 

candy flavors, like vanilla and wild cherry that these products are 

available in, are some of the things that make tobacco products attractive to children. 

We have published studies with my colleagues at CDC that show 

that 40 percent of youth who smoke tobacco products smoke a flavored tobacco product. So it is not only the price, Senator, but it 

is the fact that by classifying your product as a cigar you are able 

to get around FDA regulations that prohibit flavors, candy-like flavors, in cigarettes. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let us go to you, Mr. Patel, if we could. I am new 

chairing the committee and trying to think about the steps ahead. 

As you know, we have been talking about 2006, 2009, trying to 

clarify the difference between cigarettes and cigars. 

In 2009, when faced with the task of trying to prevent cigarettetype products from being rebranded as cigars to avoid the new 

higher tax on cigarettes, Congress just said, we will apply the new 

higher tax to small cigars. That pretty clearly has not been exactly 

an ideal situation. 

Would you support the idea of, in effect, going back to the drawing board and just getting a clear definition of what constitutes a 

cigarette and what constitutes a cigar? 

Mr. PATEL. Certainly. I represent the premium cigar category. In 

regards to cigars in general, I think under the TTB tax code, the 

language is very, very broad. There needs to be a concise definition 

separating what a premium cigar is, what a large cigar is, and 

what a small cigar is. Unfortunately, right now we have the migration from the small cigars to the large cigar category because of the 

weight requirement, the weight requirement being 3 pounds per 

thousand. 

What we suggest for the premium cigar category is to shift that 

weight to 6 pounds per thousand. That would stop the migration 

for the small cigars to the large cigar category. I think there needs 

to be a separate definition for the premium cigar category, which 

is the one I represent, because premium cigars are totally unique, 

they are different, they are an art form, they are a culture that has 

transited over generations. 

By the time we plant the seedling in the ground to the time we 

get a cigar in the box takes 4 to 5 years, and 300 different hands 

touch the tobacco. It is a totally different audience. It is marketed 

to adults, sold to adults. Minors cannot buy it, cannot enter tobacco 

25 

stores where premium cigars are sold. So it is a unique product, 

and I certainly think that narrowing the definition for premium cigars, large cigars, and small cigars would certainly help the cause. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is clear there are some clever people out 

there trying to rejigger their tax bills, and I am anxious to pick up 

on your suggestions. 

Let me ask you a question, Mr. Drenkard. It goes to this question 

of the e-cigarettes. I have worked with you all at the Tax Foundation on a variety of issues, especially tax reform, and always enjoy 

getting your input about where markets are headed. If e-cigarettes 

are not taxed and tobacco products are taxed, in your view, where 

is the market going to go? 

Mr. DRENKARD. Well, the market is going to go to electronic cigarettes to some degree. Now, I think it depends more on how that 

sort of thing affects the price. Also, that might be a desirable outcome from a public health perspective. 

Electronic cigarettes are found by many people who have looked 

at them to have a lower risk profile associated with them. To put 

it very basically, there are tens of thousands of carcinogens in a 

traditional incinerated tobacco product, and there are really only 

three items in electronic tobacco liquid. It is propylene glycol, nicotine, and glycerine. Other than nicotine, those two other items are 

found in food products. 

So my reading in the literature is that the risk profile is a lot 

lower. To me that indicates that there are a lot of desirable outcomes to be had from people switching from traditional incinerated 

tobacco to smokeless tobacco like that, or electronic tobacco like 

that. My brother, for example, quit cigarettes and moved to electronic tobacco, and I think that was a good move. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, as you know, some who study the ecigarette industry have said that these products have not been on 

the market long enough to know whether they have any negative 

health effects. 

I am very much, as we get into this, affected by that testimony 

that I heard in 1994, where clear scientific evidence was ignored. 

That is why I think there are real implications for this debate 

about when something is untaxed and something is taxed. We 

ought to get to the bottom of how markets work. 

Let us just give Mr. Tynan an opportunity to respond to the 

same question. If e-cigarettes go untaxed and traditional tobacco 

products are taxed, where do you think the market goes? 

Mr. TYNAN. I mean, the challenge with e-cigarettes is that they 

are currently an unregulated product, Senator. We do not know 

what the long-term health effects are going to be from smoking ecigarettes. Being unregulated, we could have two e-cigarettes that 

come from the same manufacturer on the same assembly line that 

have completely different constituents in them. Many of them also 

come from China. I would not put a plastic toy from China in my 

mouth, let alone something you have to inhale that puts things into 

your lungs. So, I mean, I think we have to be very careful when 

we think about the impact that it could have on long-term population health and the impact that it could have on youth starting 

to smoke. 

26 

What we do not want is people to become addicted to nicotine 

through an e-cigarette and then switch later to smokeless tobacco 

or cigarettes, which we know are harmful. So there need to be 

more long-term studies on the health effects. The challenge with 

many of the studies that are out there is that they have not necessarily been independent studies. 

We know from the 2006 Federal court case that the tobacco industry has been found by a Federal judge to be racketeers. One of 

the findings in that court case was that the tobacco industry manipulated scientific studies. So we need to be very thoughtful and 

look very closely at the studies that have found that e-cigarettes 

are safe and effective. 

The CHAIRMAN. And what is your take, Mr. Bernstein, on that 

same question of where the market will go if e-cigarettes are 

untaxed and traditional tobacco products are taxed? 

Mr. BERNSTEIN. Yes, Senator. Before I answer that, if I could just 

point out that when Mr. Tynan referenced the tobacco industry 

being convicted of racketeering, it is important to note that the 

judge dismissed Liggett from that because of Liggett’s behavior and 

viewed it in a much more positive light. 

The e-cigarette is a big question mark. I think the first question 

is, what is it? I think that has to be determined. In my opinion, 

it is either a medical device or it is a tobacco product, and it should 

be regulated as such in either case. I believe it is very difficult to 

predict where the e-cigarette market is going to go, because we do 

not know how it is going to be regulated, we do not know how it 

is going to be taxed. If it is not taxed and if it is not regulated, 

it will grow. But I cannot tell you that it will grow at an exponential rate, because there is not enough evidence yet to be able 

to say that. 

What I will tell you, though, is that there are people who are— 

and I understand the concerns about China—mixing up vats of eliquid in the back of their stores and then are selling it to individuals, and nobody has any idea what is in it. 

The CHAIRMAN. In the United States? 

Mr. BERNSTEIN. In the United States. In fact, our offices are in 

Morrisville, NC. There is a store in our center, the E-Liquid Lady, 

and she basically mixes up vats of—— 

The CHAIRMAN. And the E-Liquid Lady does exactly what? 

Mr. BERNSTEIN. They mix up vats of e-liquid in the back, and 

then they inject it into devices that people buy. 

The CHAIRMAN. And all of this takes place without any oversight? 

Mr. BERNSTEIN. None. 

The CHAIRMAN. All right. 

You four have been very helpful. I came here this morning with 

the view that this was a classic case of tax evasion. I have added 

to that judgment that we are certainly moving towards a classic 

case of government foot-dragging. I think what all of you on this 

panel have demonstrated is that those who skirt the laws clearly 

look like they are going to get more inventive about how they go 

about it. Mr. Tynan talked about kitty litters, and Mr. Bernstein 

talked about e-liquid ladies making injections and the like. 

27 

That ought to give everybody pause. So we have a lot of work to 

do to follow up here, and I want to thank all of you for your testimony and your cooperation. Members of the committee are going 

to have until the close of business on Friday, August 8th, to submit 

questions for the record. 

With that, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the hearing was concluded.] 

(29) 

A P P E N D I X 

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