* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-10936

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

MI NA MALCOLM, also known as Sora

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas 

USDC No. 3:05-CR-229-ALL

Before GARWOOD, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Mi Na Malcolm pleaded guilty to four counts of a seven-count superseding

indictment charging her with, inter alia, conspiracy to hold or harbor aliens for

purposes of prostitution, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1328 and 18 U.S.C. § 371;

harboring illegal aliens for commercial advantage and financial gain, in violation

of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A), (B)(i), and attempting to transport funds in excess of

$10,000 without filing the required report, in violation of 31 U.S.C. §

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

December 21, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 06-10936

1 Malcolm claims that this enhancement was based solely on actions taken against

“Victim No. 1,” but paragraph 33 of the PSR clearly states that the enhancements made with

respect to “Victim No. 1” were also being made with respect to “Victim Nos. 2 through 15.” 

2 Malcolm also argues that she was unable to rebut the U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1(b)

enhancement because the PSR did notidentify “Victim No. 1.” But, as stated above, paragraph

33 ofthe PSR clearly states that the enhancementfor coercion pursuantto U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1(b)

was made with respect to all fifteen victims, so Malcolm's argument that she could not rebut

the PSR because she did not know which victim was being coerced is without merit. 

2

5316(a)(1)(A), 5332(a). The Presentence Report (PSR) and the factual resumè

to which Malcolm admitted set forth, inter alia, that Malcolm paid smuggling

fees for Korean women brought into the United States; that the women were

required to work in one of Malcolm’s sexually-oriented businesses as prostitutes

in order to repay the smuggling debt; and that their movements were monitored

and their freedom restricted.

The PSR included a four-level fraud or coercion enhancement pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1 on the basis that the offense involved coercing fifteen victims

to engage in prostitution.1 After grouping, the range was 78 to 97 months,

subject to a maximum of five years on counts one and six and ten years on count

four. The district court concluded that an upward departure to 120 months was

warranted because, among other reasons, the offense involved at least fifteen

aliens, the aliens were brought into the country and harbored for the purposes

of engaging in prostitution, and the aliens were monitored constantly and

required to be available at all times for prostitution.

Malcolm first argues that the district court committed Sixth Amendment

error under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), by applying the section

2G1.1 enhancement based on facts neither admitted by her nor proved beyond

a reasonable doubt.2 Malcolm’s argument is without merit. Booker eliminated

any Sixth Amendment error caused by judicial factfinding with respect to

sentencing by rendering the Sentencing Guidelines advisory rather than
No. 06-10936

3 Assuming arguendo that the enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1(b) was erroneous,

it would not have had any impact on the calculation of Malcolm's guideline range because it

was under Count 1, which was grouped separately from Counts 4 and 6 and when Counts are

grouped separately the Guidelines instruct us to use the higher of the two groups when

calculating the Guideline range. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. The total offense level for Count 1 was 22

with the enhancement and it would have been 18 without the enhancement. The total offense

level for Counts 4 and 6 was 26, which is higher than for Count 1 in either case, so this was

the offense level that was used to calculate Malcolm's Guideline range. Therefore, even

assuming there was error in applying a U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1(b) enhancement, that error was

harmless because it had no impact on her Guideline range.

3

mandatory. See United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005).

Malcolm was sentenced in July 2006, under this advisory sentencing regime.

Accordingly, there was no Sixth Amendment Booker error arising out of the

district court’s factfinding. See United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 793, 797-98

(5th Cir. 2006). To the extent that Malcolm contends that there was an

insufficient evidentiary basis for the adjustment, Malcolm failed to deny or rebut

any of the information in the PSR and she admitted facts that supported the

enhancement. Thus, Malcolm has not shown any clear error in the district

court’s findings. See United States v. Solis-Garcia, 420 F.3d 511, 513-14 (5th

Cir. 2005).3

Malcolm next challenges the district court’s upward departure, arguing

that the case did not fall outside the heartland of cases because the factors on

which the court relied were taken into account by the Guidelines. After Booker,

our reasonableness review of an upward departure entails an abuse-of-discretion

standard. See United States v. Saldana, 427 F.3d 298, 310 (5th Cir. 2005). A

sentencing court does not abuse its discretion in deciding to upwardly depart

when its reasons for doing so (1) advance the objectives set forth in 18 U.S.C. §

3553(a)(2); and (2) are justified by the facts of the case. Id. The PSR and the

court cited, inter alia, evidence that the offense involved more than ten aliens

and that they were harbored for the purpose of engaging in serious criminal

activity. These factors are grounds for a departure under the Guidelines. See
No. 06-10936

4

U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1, comment. (n.6) (upward departure may be warranted if offense

involves more than ten aliens); U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1, comment (n.3) (upward

departure may be warranted if aliens are harbored knowing that the aliens

would be engaged in serious criminal behavior). In addition, the court

reasonably could have found that the degree of coercion present, which,

according to the court, effectively constituted enslavement, was such that the

case was outside the heartland. See Saldana, 427 F.3d at 312; see also U.S.S.G.

§ 5K2.0(a)(3). Finally, the court could have concluded that the sentencing

objectives of punishment, deterrence, and protecting the public warranted a

departure. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s

decision to depart.

Malcolm contends in a conclusory manner that deposition testimony of two

of the fifteen victims negates the factors relied on by the court for a departure.

She did not offer (or refer to) this evidence (or call it to the attention of the

probation officer) at (or before) sentencing and she makes no explanation of her

failure to do so, although the depositions were taken nearly seven months before

sentencing. Further, she fails to cite any particular portion of that testimony nor

does she provide any legal or factual analysis. Thus, she has abandoned any

such argument by failing to brief it adequately. See United States v. TorresAguilar, 352 F.3d 934, 936 n.2 (5th Cir. 2003); see also FED. R. APP. P. 28(a). In

any event, in light of her own admissions at rearraignment and the unrebutted

information set out in the PSR, Malcolm has failed to demonstrate an abuse of

discretion.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.