About the Report

This report assesses the contributions of political parties to, 

and their place within, the Afghan political landscape through 

transition and beyond and how they continue to navigate the 

limitations of their lack of formal political role. Part of broader 

United States Institute of Peace research on the 2014 Afghan 

elections, the report is based on more than fifty interviews 

conducted in 2014 with members of twelve political parties both 

before and after the presidential and provincial council elections.

About the Author

Anna Larson is a research associate at the Centre of Contemporary 

Central Asia and the Caucasus at the School of Oriental and 

African Studies, University of London. She is coauthor with 

Noah Coburn of Derailing Democracy in Afghanistan.

2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 362 March 2015

© 2015 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Contents

Party Origins, Leadership, and Membership 2

Party Activities, Messages, and Strategies 8

Contemporary Party Activities 9

Looking Ahead 16

Anna Larson

Political Parties in 

Afghanistan

Summary

• Political parties in Afghanistan have no historical precedent of a legal, formalized role 

within the political system. Since 2001, however, they have been able to register officially 

as organizations. 

• Elections in Afghanistan, particularly those in 2014, have provided a stimulus for change within parties that has the potential to offer more than the simple collectivity of a common cause.

• Changes in party behavior include greater outreach to urban educated Afghans through 

greater use of communications technologies, greater influence among young people generally, more parliamentarians aligning themselves openly with parties, consolidated voting 

blocs, more space for women, more and earlier preparation for elections, and greater 

engagement in national-level debate.

• These changes, however, are opportunistic rather than strategic and do not look beyond 2015.

• Institutionalization of the changes taking place within parties will depend on the availability of resources and the political will of party leadership but also critically the new administration’s approach and incentives created for parties’ consolidation as political actors.

• A constitutional loya jirga apparently scheduled for some point before the end of 2016 may 

provide the necessary opportunity for parties to lobby for greater involvement in government. 

• For lobbying to prove successful, parties will need to ensure that their voice is heard, possibly by gaining influence in the lower house of parliament in the 2015 elections.

Introduction

Political party activity in Afghanistan in the twentieth century was confined to the fringes 

of national politics. Opposition movements and parties—whether communist left or religious 

right—were forced either underground or into exile. Since 2001, under a new and formally 

democratic constitution, however, former Islamist military factions, communist organizations, 

ethno-nationalist groups, and civil society organizations have transformed themselves into 

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SPECIAL REPORT
2 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 362

political parties. They represent a diverse cross-section of the political landscape and have 

all evolved as institutions in recent years. None, however, are organizers of political beliefs or 

mobilizers of voters in the way that parties in mature democracies are. The term party today 

thus encompasses a range of organizations with very different organizational and political 

backgrounds. Even so, key similarities in how they operate are evident. A number of them 

have been able to influence the executive and legislative branches of government, though not 

always with electoral victories.

Yet little research to date has focused on how Afghan parties generally are evolving. The 

election of a new president in 2014 and parliamentary elections scheduled for later in 2015, 

however, open the door to potential for change in both the formal and the informal roles of 

parties within the political system. 

Parties prepared far more for the April 2014 presidential and provincial council elections 

than they had at any time previous, many aligning themselves openly with one candidate or 

another early on. New coalitions and parties with well-known personalities in their leadership 

councils—such as the Right and Justice Party (Hezb-e Haq wa Adalat) and the National Coalition of Afghanistan (Ettemad-e Milli)—consolidated even further in advance of the election. 

Several parties—such as Mahaz-e Milli (wa) Islami and Hezb-e Islami—both successfully narrowed the number of their provincial council candidates to one or two per province, so as not 

to split the vote between them, and attempted to make the most of the 20 percent quota for 

women’s seats.

Only some of these technical preparations, however, appear to have translated into gains 

at the polls. For example, reducing the number of candidates in provincial council elections 

has not necessarily meant winning more seats. Parties also rely heavily on informal, old guard 

patronage politics—and sometimes fraud. The potential for longer-term changes to functionality and influence will depend to a significant degree on the new administration’s approach 

to party politics.

As the dust from the 2014 elections settles and negotiations between key actors begin to 

reshape the balance of power, parties could come to play a significant role in bargaining to 

secure influence in the coming years.

Party Origins, Leadership, and Membership

A widely held view among the Afghan public is to associate today’s political parties with the 

violence of 1979 to 2001: with the communist groups that seized power in 1978 and the mujahideen based in Peshawar and Quetta during the 1980s and 1990s and with the destruction 

of the civil war. Seeing parties as simple political entities rather than as fronts for military 

organizations is, at best, difficult for most Afghans.

Origins

Political parties in Afghanistan have their origins in the mobilization of the mashrutiat (constitutionalist) movement of the early 1900s, though development into the organizations of today 

was neither straightforward nor linear.1 Groups of disaffected youth surfaced in opposition to the 

reign of Amanullah Khan (1919–29) and to successive constitutional governments. These groups 

included the Afghanan-e Jawan, or Young Afghans, who pushed for constitutional reform and 

were modeled on the Young Turks movement in contemporary Turkey. Much later, in the 1940s, 

the Wesh Dzalmian movement headed a more general opposition to the ruling elite.2 Under the 

premiership of Daoud Khan in the 1950s, opposition groups were forced underground but continued to meet to discuss and publish alternative views on the Afghan political system.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital 

worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others 

with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

Stephen J. Hadley, (Chair), Principal, RiceHadleyGates, LLC, 

Washington, DC • George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct 

Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, DC • Judy Ansley, Former Assistant to the President and 

Deputy National Security Advisor under George W. Bush, Washington, DC • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner 

in Residence, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International 

Studies, Washington, DC • Joseph Eldridge, University Chaplain 

and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, School of International 

Service, American University, Washington, DC • Kerry Kennedy, 

President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human 

Rights, Washington, DC • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care 

Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, NV • Stephen D. Krasner, Graham 

H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford 

University, Palo Alto, CA • John A. Lancaster, Former Executive 

Director, International Council on Independent Living, Potsdam, 

NY • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Mason 

University, Fairfax, VA • J. Robinson West, Chairman, PFC 

Energy, Washington, DC • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice 

President, Leadership Conference on Civil and 

Human Rights, Washington, DC 

Members Ex Officio

John Kerry, Secretary of State • Ashton Carter, Secretary of 

Defense • Gregg F. Martin, Major General, U.S. Army; President, 

National Defense University • Nancy Lindborg, President, 

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USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 362 3

During the 1960s, both Islamist and leftist groups flourished on university campuses 

across the country, many of which were newly established under the government’s policy of 

increased investment in higher education.3 These groups were also encouraged by the new 

constitution in 1964, which promised the ratification of the Parties Law to grant political 

parties the right to exist as officially recognized organizations. They were instead marginalized, first when Mohammad Zahir Shah refused to sign the law after parliament had ratified 

it and again in 1973 after Daoud’s coup d’état and subsequent systematic quashing of any 

group that opposed his rule.

From their exile in Pakistan and Iran, ulema-run religious organizations and political 

groups that had sprung from student movements in the universities consolidated as armed 

militias and mobilized against the Soviet forces that invaded Afghanistan in 1979. A decade 

later, when these groups—with considerable international backing and input from regional 

players, most notably Pakistan—had secured the departure of Russian troops, they would 

earn a reputation for brutality and military excess during a destructive civil war. Their defeat 

by the Taliban led to a period of bleak political stability based on a rigid and theocratic 

vision of governance that left no room for party pluralism. Not until 2001 and the new 

democratic constitution did parties reemerge.

Legal and Electoral Limitations

Even at this point, however, political parties had little political space. As of 2003, they were 

officially recognized as legitimate entities and allowed to organize and speak publicly. The 

law, however, did little more than classify them—with no reference to a political role—

alongside social associations and civil society organizations.4 The electoral system chosen 

for the 2004–05 presidential and legislative elections—the single nontransferable vote 

(SNTV) system—did not require candidates to be party members. In these early days, no 

space was allocated on the ballot paper for candidates to declare party affiliations.5 Candidates therefore had little incentive to stand with parties, just as parties had little incentive 

to back candidates’ campaigns with resources. The selection of the SNTV electoral system by 

Afghan and international actors was a deliberate choice intended to exclude parties, partly 

because of the violent reputation parties had acquired in the war years and partly to stymie 

opposition to the new government.

Since then, several attempts have been made to change the electoral system but without success, given President Hamid Karzai’s strong bias against political parties. In 2013, 

electoral reform proposals, including a provision for a mixed electoral system that combined 

SNTV with a party list, were put forward to parliament by the Cooperation Council of Political Parties and Coalitions and Civil Society Organizations. These were eventually rejected, 

however—unsurprisingly, perhaps, given that a change to the electoral system might well 

have jeopardized the chances of reelection for standing members of parliment (MPs).

In 2009, a new Parties Law was introduced, requiring all parties to reregister and including 

new conditions aimed at reducing their numbers. Instead of having to produce the signatures 

of seven hundred members, they were required to collect ten thousand—from all provinces of 

Afghanistan. This condition did reduce the number of officially registered parties, from more 

than one hundred to sixty-three, but appears to have done little to help consolidate party 

support bases or institutionalize party practices.6 Indeed, rather than facilitate party political 

activity, the law constrains it, for example, by stipulating that parties register not with an 

independent body but instead with the Ministry of Justice, effectively tying registration to 

compliance with either government policy or government officials. In spite of this, however, 

parties still consider official registration a valuable commodity and, at the time the new law 
4 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 362

was introduced, actively sought to ensure that they reregistered in accordance with the new 

requirements. That they did so speaks to the way in which government accreditation is perceived as a critical aspect of parties’ existence as legitimate actors and renders them far from 

informal organizations, despite a lack of any legal political role within the system or any formal 

influence in government.

Why Join a Political Party?

When parties have a limited political role, a fairly negative reputation, and do relatively little 

between elections, it is reasonable to ask why anyone would consider spending time or other 

resources joining one or working for one. Because the electoral system does not require that 

candidates for the parliament or provincial councils be party members, party membership 

offers no formal advantage to aspiring representatives, and the negative connotations that 

a party affiliation still may hold could harm an election campaign—though the mujahideen 

tanzims and former People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan membership also appear to 

have benefited candidates in terms of campaign support and notoriety within specific communities. Many party members work as volunteers, and financial incentives in the form of 

regular, salaried positions are few and far between. Yet more people, particularly in urban 

areas, are now willing to talk about their political affiliations with parties.

What is it then that draws members in? Some parties offer an attractive way for urban 

young people to move up the political ranks. This explanation was typical:

I have been a member of this party for around eight years, and I joined when I was a 

school student because I was interested in political and cultural activities and keen to 

attend the gatherings and meetings of representatives who joined the provincial council 

and parliament through this party. I am interested in party activities as a way of getting 

higher positions in the government through the party. –Wahdat-e Islami party member

The phenomenon of young people increasingly seeing parties as a vehicle for self-promotion 

and political career-making in Afghanistan has been documented elsewhere as well—how 

older, reestablished parties in particular have taken on the role of patron, providing facilities, 

such as university dormitories, and basic services for students in return for political support.7

This arrangement now appears to go beyond a simple patron-client relationship, however. 

Young people rise in the ranks relatively quickly on the basis of their English, computer, and 

social media skills. Parties increasingly recognize the value of these contributions and want to 

have more of an impact on young people. As a senior Hezb-e Islami member explained, “One 

real problem for us is that in Kunar [Province] our party still has little influence among young 

people, and the youth branch...was only recently registered with the Ministry of Justice.” 

Another member of a more recently established party talked about the need to create greater 

political space for young people in general: “We should try to change the current political 

structure to a more modern one in which educated youth should have the opportunity to come 

into power and have more space within the government.” Another sign of the evolving role of 

youth is the increasing comfort level in being openly critical of party leadership.

In the run-up to the 2014 elections, young people across all twelve parties studied seemed 

to be joining parties in greater numbers. This increase does not necessarily indicate a changing trend and could simply have been an attempt to align with a winning team. Young people 

were choosing carefully and were often keen to talk about the reasons behind their choices. 

Certainly youth cannot be lumped conveniently into a single category presumed to have liberal 

political leanings.8 Although some clearly stated their choice as against old-guard leadership—members of Hezb-e-Millat, for example—others were keen to emphasize their support 

and admiration for the military heroes of their parents’ generation. Parties that are prepared to 

make some changes in communication methods—such as an embrace of new communication 

Parties that are prepared to make 

some changes in communication 

methods—such as an embrace of 

new communication methods and 

greater engagement with global 

current affairs—are reaping the 

benefits of more educated 

young people becoming 

involved in politics.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 362 5

methods and greater engagement with global current affairs—are reaping the benefits of more 

educated young people becoming involved in politics.

Competing with registered political parties for youth membership, however, are new radical 

movements, such as Jamiyat-e Islah and Hizb ut-Tahrir. These organizations, established in 

Afghanistan only within the last five years, promote a conservative, anti-West, anti-democracy 

political stance and attract large numbers of urban, educated youth. In providing an urban, 

generally nonviolent alternative to insurgency, such groups attract members by providing 

Internet access and lessons in computer literacy. Additionally, given their growing popularity, 

they can mobilize large crowds relatively quickly. A recent Jamiyat-e Islah demonstration in 

Herat, for example, was reportedly attended by as many as forty thousand young people.9

These groups occupy a vacuum that the political parties have not been able to fill, in that they 

are at once technologically savvy, demonstrate an interest in and connection with international affairs, are well organized, and speak with a religious authority that resonates with many 

young Afghans. Although connections to the older tanzims are not explicit, potential exists 

for collaboration with some branches of Hezb-e Islami. For the most part, however, existing 

parties appear to be threatened by these newer and more radical groups.10

The increased willingness to associate with political parties points to the importance of 

the 2014 elections and is a function of the recent political climate. Political debate around 

the elections dominated most news media, and public interest was high. Of the twelve 

parties studied, nine took advantage of this situation, chose their presidential candidates 

quickly, and presented voters with clear affiliations at least a month before the first round 

of the polls. In doing so, these parties built trust among their supporters and were able to 

promise tangible rewards in the form of future patronage if their candidate won.

Women, particularly young women, also appear to be more interested in joining parties. 

This change is likely in part because parties are now offering more to women, if not substantively (such as contributions to internal decision making) then at least symbolically (support 

for provincial council campaigns). However, support for a campaign does not guarantee party 

allegiance, particularly given that many choose not to officially declare party affiliations on 

the ballot. For example, only thirty-six of 308 women candidates in the provincial council 

elections in 2014 were officially affiliated (see table 2). The advantage here is that women 

can simultaneously eliminate the risk to electoral success that the generally negative public 

image of political parties carries and still have their campaign costs covered yet not be held 

accountable once elected.

Women who do consider themselves party members have joined parties for other reasons as well. For example, international agencies working with parties often stipulate that 

women representatives be sent to training workshops as party delegates, that women hold 

positions within or at the head of women’s councils or committees within the party, or that 

women be offered opportunities to run for provincial council or parliamentary seats. In some 

cases, though less common, parties also provide women the opportunity to stand for senior 

party leadership positions. One woman described the changes she had seen in the Jamhori 

Khwahan party since she joined in 2008:

In the beginning when the party office opened in Herat, the number of women members 

was very few, but it has increased now. The party has more than ten thousand members, 

of which more than 35 percent are women. The number of women is increasing day by 

day as women understand that parties are the most appropriate space for their political 

participation and decision making in society. Women can claim their rights through 

parties. Women have a very effective role in the political activities of the party in this 

province, especially in elections. In this year’s election, women’s role was tremendous.

Thus, at least in the run-up to the 2014 elections, parties seem to be recognizing the value 

of a previously untapped resource—the ability of women to convince other women to vote. 

International agencies working 

with parties often stipulate 

that women representatives 

be sent to training workshops 

as party delegates, that 

women hold positions within 

or at the head of women’s 

councils or committees within 

the party, or that women 

be offered opportunities to 

run for provincial council or 

parliamentary seats.
6 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 362

In some cases, parties’ recognition of women’s skills appears to go further, with senior figures 

in the party recognizing women’s contributions to the substantive improvement of the party. 

Even in parties commonly associated with conservative social values, such as Hezb-e Islami, 

respondents mentioned the need for women observers in elections, for example. They also 

noted how, despite patriarchal norms in remote provinces, they were able to bring a significant number of female observers to the polls. These changes do not for the most part indicate 

any substantive or cognitive change within parties to promote women members and do not 

champion women’s rights. They are instead largely opportunistic measures adopted to take 

advantage of the reserved seats system or to gain credit for the accomplishments of female 

provincial councillors (such as instigating service provision in their communities).

What Does Joining a Party Involve?

Although interest in parties and movements among educated urban youth is increasing, support for parties does not necessarily translate into formal membership. Joining a party can 

simply mean supporting its activities. Most parties claim to have member databases, but the 

membership counts that officials cite vary widely. Most parties do have formal membership 

procedures, but these procedures tend to be convoluted and involve character references 

from local officials or religious leaders. Some have a two-stage system that entails an initial 

probation period. Some provide membership cards, others only issue these after the probation 

period, and still others do not issue them at all for fear of misuse—being passed into the wrong 

hands and used to gain access to party meetings, for example. These provisions underscore 

the nature of the political environment in Afghanistan at the moment—an environment that 

is formally open to political organization but also highly insecure, providing anyone opposed 

to a party’s activities with opportunities to disrupt or attack them. In such a context of deep 

distrust, it is not wholly surprising that across the board, regardless of either when a party 

formed or its particular political leaning, joining formally is a fairly arduous process. Despite 

this disincentive, however, the benefits of being connected to a party that might tap government resources by supporting a winning presidential candidate seem to override otherwise 

tedious formalities.

Rank-and-file members tend to have little say in party decision making and may have 

relatively little contact with party offices as a general rule, especially in the provinces, where 

offices are subject to closure if funds prove inadequate. This situation does not appear to have 

changed very much over the last ten years, though urban members in cities other than Kabul 

seem to have greater connection now with head offices in the capital than a decade ago. In an 

election year, however, party activities predictably increase. Provincial offices are tasked with 

getting out the vote, for which they often enlist the support of members on a voluntary basis. 

Kabul offers more opportunities for members to be involved in party activities on a regular 

basis: All of the parties studied maintain headquarters in the capital that are usually open to 

members. The frequency of events or meetings held at the party headquarters depends largely 

on funds available but also usually coincide with important events, government decisions, or 

situations to which the party must respond. A young party member with political ambitions 

would need to volunteer at party headquarters, for example.

Significant gaps remain that prevent parties from consolidating further as political entities. With the possible exception of the Right and Justice Party, party financing remains 

predominantly provided for and controlled by the party leader, along with the majority of 

key decision making. Policy stances remain ill-defined and usually formed in response to 

issues and events rather than made proactively ahead of time, and communication of party 

decisions to regional branches is generally minimal. These gaps relate to internal obstacles 

within the organizations but perhaps to a greater degree to the broader political context in 

Policy stances remain ill-defined 

and usually formed in response 

to issues and events rather than 

made proactively ahead of time.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 362 7

which Afghan parties function. For this reason, many aspects of the old-guard political culture exist in newly established parties and coalitions as well as in their older counterparts, 

where one might expect resistance to change.

Leader-Dominated Politics

It is perhaps unsurprising that the former anti-Soviet jihadi figureheads of parties such as 

Wahdat-e Islami-e Mardum (Wahdat Mardum) and Junbesh-e Milli (wa) Islami continue to 

hold primary authority within their party, given their reputations as military leaders and 

the considerable influence they still wield among their supporters as a result.11 Although 

members of these and other parties formed during or before the war years talked about the 

processes through which candidates could put themselves forward for council elections, 

most concluded that the leader made the final decisions. A Wahdat-e Islami (Wahdat Islami) 

party member explained:

For the nomination and support of provincial council candidates by our party, there are 

certain criteria, such as levels of education, being famous in their local community and 

so on. Internally we announce that nominations are open. Those members that see 

themselves as eligible request to be candidates for the provincial council, and then we 

shortlist those candidates that are the most eligible. Finally, it is decided by the leader 

who should run for the provincial council election. 

This practice is also common in more recently formed parties, however, demonstrating a 

similar kind of leader deference. Some parties, such as Ensejam-e Milli, established in 2007, 

have a council of leaders who ultimately decide which provincial council candidates will run 

in the name of the party. According to one member, though, “For the presidential elections, 

it is up to the head of the council of leaders whom to support.” Decisions in this party, he 

explained, were becoming less participatory over time, and in fact the party greater success 

in the 2009 elections when other party members had a greater role in candidate selection.

Other parties and coalitions have rotating leadership systems. According to their members, for example, Right and Justice, Afghan Mellat, and Hezb-e-Millat all stipulate in their 

party constitutions the need to vote for a leader every five years at a party congress. These 

grand meetings, however, are expensive to hold for the smaller parties and are often put 

off indefinitely for this reason. Sometimes, as in the case of Jamiyat, they are never held 

because of divisions within the party. Such stipulations are also not coupled with a term 

limit, enabling a leader to stay in power indefinitely. One member of the Hezb-e-Millat, 

established in 2012 in response to issues with the old-guard Hazara leadership of the Wahdat 

parties, talked about this as a key problem:

Our party is newly established, mainly by educated youth. One of our goals is to bring 

young people together in the party. There are not any jihadi or traditional leaders in 

our party. We need to have a system in which people can come to power and then 

step down for others to take over. It should not be the case that leaders remain at the 

head of party forever.

A fundamental aspect of leader domination in Afghanistan’s political parties threatens 

their sustainability as organizations—financing. A Hezb-e Millat party member described 

the situation in his own party this way:

It is sometimes difficult to differentiate between the party’s property and the leader’s 

property. Commonly, ordinary members of parties depend on the financial support of 

the leaders. Also, when someone is going to be appointed to a government position, 

the head of the party should approve this. The leaders have a monopoly over financial 

and political resources, and this is a big challenge for parties.

Because no official government funding is available to parties, few parties charge significant membership fees, and sources of funding are limited; parties are left open to the 

speculation that they accept funds from outside or foreign forces—Iran, Pakistan, Saudi, 

Russia, India, the United States, or Turkey, for example.
8 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 362

Party Activities, Messages, and Strategies

A frequent criticism of Afghan parties by international and Afghan observers alike is their 

apparent lack of policy-based platforms and their reliance instead on the personality and 

patronage networks of the leader. A Jamhori Khwahan member explained:

In other countries, elections offer a good chance for parties to communicate with 

people and get the support of people, but in Afghanistan it is individuals who run in 

the elections and just use the name of party as a means to their own ends. Individuals 

are important in Afghanistan, not parties....One of the principles of democracy is that 

candidates should introduce their plans and programs, but here candidates only try to 

gather the support of influential people and key leaders during the elections.

Although this statement rings true as a general rule, parties have made some progress 

in consolidating their ideological stances. Rough ideological divisions between groups of 

parties are well established, as Thomas Ruttig notes—Islamists, ethno-nationalists, leftists, 

and new democrats each generating different support bases depending on their stances on 

the relationship between religion and government, for example.12 Islamist parties are more 

at liberty in the current political environment to make their views on this subject public 

than, say, those who believe that religion and government should be separate. However, in 

the run-up to the 2014 elections, parties sided with presidential candidates over a range of 

issues that complemented their general ideological positions and not simply over ethnicity 

or whether a member of their party was nominated as a vice presidential candidate. 

The signing of the U.S.-Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement, for example, was important 

to many parties. The Hezb-e Millat party, the newest of the twelve studied, was, as noted, 

established in response to dissatisfaction among young Hazaras with the traditional leaders of other Hazara parties. It supported Zalmai Rassoul in the first round of elections as a 

moderate, educated choice. In the run-off, it then supported Ashraf Ghani, having negotiated with both candidates and having found Ghani’s future plans—in particular his solution 

to the Kuchi-Hazara land dispute—the most convincing. Ordinarily this support would be 

surprising in light of Ghani’s Kuchi heritage and his perceived Pashtun nationalist leanings 

in the 2009 elections. Apparently, however, when faced with the choice between Ghani and 

Abdullah Abdullah, Ghani’s technocratic background and rhetoric over the Kuchi-Hazara 

issue swung the decision to overlook previous concerns over perceived ethno-nationalism.

Generally, however, none of the parties studied had clearly defined policy agendas that 

dealt with national-level developmental and social issues, such as health care, education, 

or economic growth. Rather than proactively pursue policy goals, parties tend to react in 

hindsight. This wait-and-see approach is partly also to do with lack of practical experience 

in government and lack of incentive. The phrase “once we are in government, we will decide 

how to move forward” was common in interviews. A representative of Junbesh expressed 

it clearly:

The success of the [presidential candidate] we support will have an important impact 

on the strength of our party, because the head of our party will then be the second 

most important person in the country. With the success of our team, we will have more 

chance to achieve the goals and objectives that our party has been fighting for. If our 

candidate is not successful, then our party will have a reaction, but I don’t know at the 

moment what that reaction will be.

In some ways, the 2014 elections and the incentives they presented forced parties to be 

more proactive than usual, particularly in terms of determining well in advance the candidates 

they would support. This effect will be difficult for parties to recreate in 2015, however. 

Once again parties will not be required for candidacy, but the stakes over parliamentary seats 

will be higher than ever before as a result of the guaranteed place for all legislators in the 

constitutional loya jirga scheduled to take place within two years—part of the political deal 

brokered by U.S. secretary of state John Kerry to end the 2014 presidential electoral impasse. 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 362 9

Other incentives to secure a parliamentary seat include the precedent now established for MPs 

to make lucrative business deals through their parliamentary positions, the need for parties 

and communities more generally to make connections to the new central administration under 

Ghani, and new parliamentary privileges that make positions in parliament at once more desirable and less attainable. Parties’ ability or lack of ability to maintain the seats they already 

have in the Wolesi Jirga—which for some parties, including Hezb-e Islami and the Wahdats, 

for example, is significant—and to gain more seats in the lower house will have a direct impact 

on their potential influence at the national level going forward.

What parties offer in place of clearly articulated policy platforms or publicly defined 

ideological stances speaks to the reasons people join parties and are doing so increasingly 

at the moment: opportunities for interest aggregation and representation in government. In 

making organizational gains ahead of the elections, parties have demonstrated their capacity to bring together bloc votes and represent interest groups. Interest groups remain for 

the most part ethnically or geographically based, some of the newer parties and coalitions 

excepted. Their increasing popularity indicates the extent to which (ahead of elections at 

least) interest group representation in government—a politics of presence—is important to 

the Afghan electorate.

Contemporary Party Activities

The 2014 elections clearly had a galvanizing impact on party organization and cohesion, 

providing impetus and momentum for campaign activities but also the collectivity of a 

common cause to hold groups together. Other changes in party behavior in the run-up to 

presidential elections in 2014 are also significant:

• greater influence among students and young people through the provision of 

literacy and computer courses or residential hostels—Hezb-e Islami, Junbesh, 

Jamhori Khwahan, Hezb-e Millat

• more parliamentarians willing to align themselves openly with parties and 

generally aligned with the same parties over the last two years13—Hezb-e Islami, 

National Coalition, Right and Justice, Ensejam

• parliamentary seats consolidated into potentially reliable voting blocs within 

parliament—Hezb-e Islami, Wahdat Islami, Ensejam

• more space in general for women in party leadership structures, and women 

increasingly willing to align themselves publicly with parties

• more and earlier preparation for elections—all parties except Ensejam

• greater engagement with national-level debates on issues such as the Bilateral 

Security Agreement with the United States—Hezb-e Islami, National Coalition, 

Right and Justice, Ensejam, Hezb-e Millat, Wahdat Mardum

• paying administrative staff in nonpolitical roles—Wahdat Mardum, Wahdat Islami, 

Hezb-e Islami, Ensejam, Hezb-e Millat, National Coalition, Right and Justice

• holding internal elections to fill some positions—Hezb-e Islami, Right and 

Justice, National Coalition

These gains have contributed to the creation of more political space for parties at both 

local and national levels and to a more positive public view of parties than a decade ago.

Clearly, the extent of change within parties varies, but the factors that determine the 

most significant changes are not straightforward. Indeed, members of one new party—

Ensejam—thought that its capacity to represent member interests and organize politically 

had regressed since its formation in 2007. Similarly, Hezb-e Islami—which is one of the 

most socially conservative parties in Afghanistan and has both a military background and 

a wide rural support base—has made several changes recently to maximize political gains 
10 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 362

in the pre-electoral environment. Junbesh supporters appear to have been galvanized into 

political action by Ghani’s nomination of Junbesh leader Abdul Rashid Dostum as his first 

vice president—the numbers of Junbesh-affiliated candidates on provincial council ballots, 

albeit in areas where they are traditionally well received, were higher than those of any other 

party (seventy-seven of 275, some 28 percent of the total). Other parties also had leaders on 

presidential tickets, but this did not have the same effect on provincial council candidates 

for any other party, efforts being concentrated on the presidential race instead. 

What seems to determine whether new strategies are adopted is a combination of factors. 

Among these are the fervor of very recent party formation (Right and Justice, National Coalition, Hezb-e Millat); resources to bring about changes in a consistent fashion (Hezb-e Islami, 

Right and Justice); the likelihood of a prominent party figure making good connections in 

the new administration, either through election or appointment; and political will at the top 

to incorporate young people and women and their skills into party activities (Hezb-e Islami, 

Right and Justice, National Coalition, Hezb-e Millat). 

Parties that have not adopted many of these strategies in recent years include Wahdat 

Islami, Mahaz, and Ensejam—members of which reported a lack of momentum, few readily 

available resources, and a disconnect between the leadership and other party officials and 

members. Although the electoral race and political environment have prompted greater activity within parties, only some of them have managed to use this context as a catalyst for change.

The changes described here are neither unidirectional nor indicative of permanent change 

in party behavior. Nonetheless, and though specific to the pre-electoral context, they have 

had a clear impact on the way in which particular parties (and the public in some cases) 

see themselves and their role in Afghan politics. Parties and coalitions with the capacity to 

adopt new strategies may be able to build on these in 2015 and possibly generate gains in 

political influence. Again, however, any potential will be limited by the lack of legal role for 

parties in the political system as it exists today.

Organizational Skills and Campaign Strategy

Some technical gains have been made relating to organizational capacity and skills within 

parties. Developing platform documents, planning regular outreach to urban constituents, and 

facilitating greater communication between central and regional branches have all featured to 

varying degrees over the last decade, constituting a form of institutionalization as these parties redefine themselves as legitimate, nonmilitary organizations. These activities peak in the 

months before an election, as they do in other countries. International funding for training and 

party resources increase during these periods, which helps bolster existing demand for change. 

Although many parties return to periods of relative inactivity between elections, largely due to 

a lack of sustainable funding sources, the cumulative effect of three successive rounds of elections in Afghanistan is that political parties are recognized as effective mobilization vehicles 

for promoting campaigns both within and beyond candidates’ established support groups.

Some parties were more active than others in promoting campaigns. This activity was 

determined by the extent of access to large groups of young volunteers with time to spare 

and of the connection to the candidates and their teams. The National Coalition, for example, 

launched a formidable campaign for its leader, Abdullah—as did Hezb-e Islami, one of whose 

members was nominated as Abdullah’s vice president. While drawing on historical tanzims to 

boost support bases and mobilize voters, as they had done in 2004 and 2009, parties did not 

rely solely on these groups as mobilization vehicles in 2014, trying to attract unaffiliated youth 

by organizing talks at universities, for example. This change marks a difference from the first 

round of post-Taliban presidential elections in which key ethnic leaders relied much more heavily on the tanzims and ethnic, wider family-based or localized support networks.

The cumulative effect of three 

successive rounds of elections 

in Afghanistan is that political 

parties are recognized as 

effective mobilization vehicles 

for promoting campaigns both 

within and beyond candidates’ 

established support groups.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 362 11

Table 1. Parties and Coalitions Interviewed, Presidential Candidates Supported

Party Leader Circa 1st Round 2nd Round 

Afghan Mellat Stanagul Sherzad 1966 Ghani Ghani

Harakat-e Islami-e Mardum Sayed Hussein Anwari 2005 Rahim Wardak, Rassoul Ghani

Hezb-e Islami Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal (moderate, elected 2008) 1975 Abdullah Abdullah

Ensejam Najibullah Sadeq Modaber 2007 Qayum Karzai Abdullah

Jamhori Khwahan Adela Bahram 2003 Ghani Ghani

Hezb-e-Millat Jafar Mahdawi 2012 Rassoul Ghani

Wahdat Islami

(split into factions in 1995)

M. Karim Khallili 1992 Ghani Ghani

Wahdat Mardum

(split from Wahdat Islami after Mazari’s death)

M. Mohaqqeq 1995 Abdullah Abdullah

Junbesh Abdul Rashid Dostum 1992 Ghani Ghani

Mahaz Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani 1980 Rassoul Ghani

National Coalition Abdullah Abdullah 2011 Abdullah Abdullah

Right and Justice Leadership council, four spokesmen 2011 Ghani Ghani

The kinds of campaign activities for the 2014 elections described by party members interviewed included door-to-door canvassing, organizing events and rallies, producing and distributing leaflets on presidential candidates’ policies, and getting out the vote through social 

media. The following respondent from the Jamhori Khwahan (Republican) party gave a fairly 

typical response when asked what his party had contributed to the presidential campaign:

To contribute to Ashraf Ghani’s campaign, I prepared a policy for the campaign team, 

which included a profile for each province. [Our party leader] campaigned in most of the 

provinces for Ghani on behalf of the party. During the campaign we focused on those who 

were not supporting us or had not decided who to support. Also we campaigned through 

SMS; social media, such as Facebook; and through organizing TV debates. 

Parties’ approaches to provincial council elections also serve as useful indicators of 

changes that have taken place in their organizational and institutional capacities over the 

last decade. First, unlike in 2004, all parties interviewed stressed the importance of winning 

provincial council seats:

“The success of provincial council candidates has [a] very significant role for the further 

strengthening of our party in the community as through the provincial council the party 

can build more trust and support among people.”

–Right and Justice

“Having a provincial council member is very important, as our representatives in the PC have 

been one of the only ways to help solve people’s problems.” 

–Wahdat Mardum

“The success of our provincial council candidates is the success of our party. We will 

have more influence among people if we have winning provincial council candidates. 

We will work more for people in this province.” 

–Hezb-e Islami

“Provincial council members have a very important role in the good performance of 

the party in society. Provincial council members act as a bridge between the party, the 

government and the people. The provincial council members facilitate better access of 

parties to people. Unfortunately, under the new law the provincial councils have very little 

authority, but still the provincial council can help expand a party’s role among people.” 

–Hezb-e Millat
12 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 362

The Hezb-e Millat respondent refers to how recent amendments reduced the authority 

of provincial councils to oversee the activities of provincial governors.14 Nevertheless, no 

party member interviewed expressed any doubt that party provincial councillors were still a 

key asset, likely because a council seat has value beyond the formal powers attributed to the 

position. It is arguably more valuable for the access to government authority, revenues, and 

patronage than for the potential to keep checks on how the governor chooses to distribute 

resources, for example. Ensuring a provincial council member’s continued party loyalty once 

elected has nonetheless been a challenge for many parties, and particularly newer ones, 

because no structural or formal incentives cement ties between councillors and their parties. 

Some parties had been more successful than others in the 2014 elections, some had lost 

seats, and some had emphasized campaigning for their chosen presidential candidate. Table 

2 presents an overview of the party candidates who declared their party affiliation and were 

successful—fifty-seven of 275—and does not include those who ran as independent. The 

success of the declaration strategy was clearly quite limited, though this varied greatly from 

province to province depending, for example, on the strength of a given party in the region. 

Junbesh provides an example: The combination of the party’s leader being nominated as 

Ghani’s vice president and a known support base in provinces such as Faryab and Jawzjan 

appear to have bolstered its strategy of fielding many formally affiliated party candidates 

in these provinces (twenty-one and sixteen respectively) ending in electoral victories (five 

and ten, respectively). In locations where Junbesh has widespread support, flouting the 

conventional wisdom of narrowing the number of candidates in a given constituency to 

minimize the competition against one another under SNTV seems warranted. In other provinces, Junbesh was successful in running fewer candidates, so a mixed strategy based on 

a province-by-province assessment of support was clearly advantageous. If Junbesh is able 

to repeat this performance in the parliamentary elections, its elected representation could 

be significant.

Although some respondents attributed losses to fraud, which they considered higher in 

2014 because the Independent Election Commission (IEC) attention was focused on the 

presidential race, a number of respondents also reflected on flaws in party strategy and 

attributed the problem to putting new, unknown candidates forward (Wahdat Islami) or to 

the leadership’s being undecided on whom to support (Ensejam). Faulting the party rather 

than fraud or the electoral authorities is a significant change from accounts of the 2009 

and 2010 elections.

Overall, parties are taking greater advantage of the SNTV system. Although many still 

complain that it is the principal obstacle to their development and expansion, election 

strategies in 2014 generally—save for those with regional support bases—involved reducing the number of party candidates, declared and undeclared, to minimize competition 

between them and, in theory, to win more seats in the provincial council. This approach 

worked for some parties in some places but was not universally successful. Wahdat Mardum, 

for example, attempted to keep numbers of candidates low and in the end fielded four party 

candidates and two independents in the Kabul race, but none were successful. Members 

attribute the failure to fraud and blame the IEC both for interfering and for overlooking 

fraud in the provincial council contest in order to focus on the presidential race. Clearly, 

however, the Kabul election was hotly contested, seats being valued far more highly than in 

many other provincial councils across the country.

The variables influencing which candidates were successful in which provinces for which 

parties are numerous, and identifying trends is especially difficult given that elections in 

Afghanistan are so highly personalized. Nevertheless, the information is useful to illustrate 

just how few candidates run officially as party candidates—none in Logar, Nimroz, Parwan, 

Ensuring a provincial council 

member’s continued party 

loyalty once elected has 

nonetheless been a challenge for 

many parties, and particularly 

newer ones, because no 

structural or formal incentives 

cement ties between councillors 

and their parties. 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 362 13

Table 2. Official Party Candidates’ Winning Seats

Province Total on Ballot (W) Party Candidates (W) Affiliation Count Winners (W)—Affiliations 

Badakshan 118 (9) 4 (1) Jamiyat 2

Hezb-e Azadagan 2

0

Badghis 32 (5) 2 (0) Junbesh 2 1–Junbesh

Baghlan 152 (11) 11 (0) Jamiyat 3

Junbesh 3

Hezb-e Islami 2

Ensejam 1

Paiwand-e Milli 1

Wahdat Mardum 1

2–Jamiyat, Paiwand-e Milli

Balkh 123 (17) 34 (5) Jamiyat 17

Junbesh 6

Wahdat Islami 4

Wahdat Mardum 3

Ensejam 1

Harakat 1

Hezb-e Islami 1

Hezb-e Millat 1

7 (1)–Jamiyat 5 (1), Wahdat Mardum 1, Junbesh 1

Bamiyan 53 (13) 16 (2) Wahdat Islami 5

Wahdat Mardum 4

Ensejam 3

Harakat 2

Hezb-e Millat 1

Right and Justice 1

3–Wahdat-e Islami 2, Wahdat Mardum 1

Daikundi 72 (14) 18 (6) Wahdat Islami 6

Wahdat Mardum 5

Ensejam 2

Wahdat Milli Islami Afghanistan 2

Eqtedar-e Milli 1

Harakat 1

Kar wa Tawsea 1

4 (1)–Wahdat Islami 2, Wahdat Mardum 1, 

Wahdat Milli Islami Afghanistan (1)

Farah 30 (5) 5 (1) Afghan Mellat 2

Right and Justice 1

Hezb-e Islami 1

Taraki Watan 1

1–Taraki Watan

Faryab 52 (6) 24 (3) Junbesh 21

Jamiyat 3

5 (2)–Junbesh

Ghazni 84 (7) 14 (1) Wahdat Islami 7

Wahdat Mardum 2

Ensejam 2

Unknown 3

3 (1)–Wahdat Islami (1), Ensejam, Unknown

Ghor 61 (12) 2 (0) Junbesh 1 

Ensejam 1

1–Ensejam

Helmand 99 (10) 1 (0) Hezb-e Islami 0

Herat 166 (21) 5 (0) Afghan Mellat 1

Junbesh 1

Wahdat Mardum 1

Ensejam 1

Wahdat Islami 1

0

Jawzjan 59 (6) 20 (1) Junbesh 16

Jamiyat 4

10 (1)–Junbesh
14 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 362

Kabul 457 (49) 35 (7) Bawar-e Milli 5

Wahdat Islami 5

Dawat 4

Wahdat Mardum 4

Paiwand-e Milli 3

Etelaf-e Milli 2

Hezb-e Islami 2

Unknown 2

Adalat wa Tawsea 1

Ensejam 1

Harakat 1

Hezb-e Wahid Islami 1

Hezb-e Millat 1

Solh-e Milli 1

Tafahum 1

Wahdat Milli Islami Afghanistan 1

1–Dawat

Kandahar 74 (7) 2 (0) Hezb-e Islami 1

Hezb-e Mutahid-e Milli 1

0

Kapisa 49 (4) 1 (0) Etelaf-e Milli 1

Khost 63 (4) 2 (0) Solh-e Milli 1 

Unknown 1

0

Kunar 34 (6) 1 (1) Hezb-e Islami 0

Kunduz 107 (5) 9 (0) Junbesh 5

Hezb-e Islami 2

Ensejam 1

Right and Justice 1

1–Junbesh

Laghman 53 (5) 1 (0) Hezb-e Islami 1 0

Logar 40 (4) 0 0 0

Nangarhar 118 (10) 10 (1) Hezb-e Islami 4

Afghan Mellat 2

Dawat 1

Harakat 1

Hezb-e Wahid Islami 1

Jamhori Khwahan 1

1–Dawat

Nimroz 38 (8) 0 0 0

Nooristan 43 (6) 2 (0) Bawar-e Milli 2 0

Paktya 66 (5) 2 (0) Aquam-e Faqeer 1

Mahaz 1

0

Paktika 35 (5) 3 (0) Mahaz 3 0

Panjshir 30 (5) 1 (0) Junbesh 1 0

Parwan 86 (10) 0 0 0

Samangan 60 (8) 14 (1) Jamiyat 5

Junbesh 3

Wahdat Mardum 3

Harakat 2

Wahdat Islami 1

3–Jamiyat, Junbesh, Wahdat Mardum

Table 2. Official Party Candidates’ Winning Seats cont.

Province Total on Ballot (W) Party Candidates (W) Affiliation Count Winners (W)—Affiliations 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 362 15

and Zabul, for example. It also highlights the way in which very few women run officially 

with parties (thirty-six of 275) and also how few are successful (eight of fifty-seven). Kabul 

provides an interesting case with thirty-five official party candidates and only one eventually successful. This result perhaps points to urban disillusionment with elections in general 

or to the perceived lack of utility of the provincial council among voters, which varies greatly 

from province to province, partly shown by the numbers of votes gained by the candidates: 

In Kabul, the highest vote-getter came in at 9,409 votes; in Ghazni, at 18,417; in Balkh, at 

20,825; and in Faryab, at 21,420, against the lowest in Uruzgan, at 2,034.

Cohesion and Fragmentation

The 2014 elections, then, have provided some incentive for internal party cohesion. At other 

times, however, parties have struggled to function as collective entities, and splinter groups 

have often enough broken off. Particularly since the assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani in 

2011, at least one party—the Jamiyat-e Islami, not featured in this study—has struggled to 

maintain cohesion in the face of prominent individuals vying for key positions within it.

The National Coalition is made up of political leaders who supported Abdullah’s campaign 

but is also a reestablished version of Abdullah’s earlier support group, Hope and Change, 

using a different name to appear more inclusive and less like Abdullah’s personal party.15

The likelihood of the coalition continuing its activities will depend on whether key Jamiyat 

personalities that have pooled their support behind Abdullah in the elections continue to 

support him once key decisions over appointments to the new cabinet have been finalized. 

If they do not, the National Coalition may well suffer the same fate as a number of other 

attempts at coalition in Afghanistan in recent years and disappear into obscurity. Right and 

Justice may have a greater chance of remaining united following the resolution of the election, as it does not have the same history of internal division among members and is also 

not led by a single individual but by four spokesmen. Much could change also, however, if the 

new president adopts policies that favor party development and political activity, creating 

incentives that encourage parties and coalitions to remain united.

Sar-e Pul 43 (6) 12 (2) Junbesh 7

Jamiyat 2

Wahdat Mardum 2

Wahdat Islami 1

6 (1)–Junbesh 3, Wahdat Mardum 2 (1), Jamiyat 1

Takhar 117 (8) 15 (3) Junbesh 11

Adalat Islami 1

Hezb-e Azadagan 1

Hezb-e Islami 1

Wahdat Islami 1

3–Junbesh 2, Hezb-e Islami 1

Uruzgan 33 (5) 1 (0) Hezb-e Islami 1 0

Wardak 46 (7) 8 (1) Wahdat Mardum 3

Ensejam 3

Wahdat Islami 2

5 (1)–Ensejam 3 (1), Wahdat Islami 1, 

Wahdat Mardum 1

Zabul 20 (3) 0 0 0

Total 2713 (308) 275 (36) — 57 (8)

Note: Compiled from official IEC final candidate lists and final results lists.

Table 2. Official Party Candidates’ Winning Seats cont.

Province Total on Ballot (W) Party Candidates (W) Affiliation Count Winners (W)—Affiliations 
16 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 362

Looking Ahead

The changes in party behavior that seem to be taking place at the moment can be explained 

several ways. First, parties may simply be institutionalizing gradually over time, increasing 

levels of educated young people in urban areas joining their ranks but also demanding more in 

return for their skills.16 This change is true particularly of parties with largely Hazara support 

bases. Urban Hazara communities, such as Dasht-e Barchi in west Kabul, more than other communities across the capital, have seen numerous private educational institutions established 

over the last few years. This goes some way toward explaining party development but does not 

account for the way in which some aspects of party behavior have not changed. Even newly 

formed parties at times reflect an old-guard mentality of leader-dominated inactivity.

Changes in women’s roles in parties seem to be a result of both the potential dividends 

their involvement in campaigning and observing could bring to parties in terms of voter 

support and monitoring fraud but also the incentives offered by international agencies 

providing support in return for the participation of female delegates.

Most critically, however, in the 2014 presidential election, unlike in 2009, the imminent 

departure of President Karzai promised a more open political playing field. It meant that 

parties had everything to play for and that it benefited them to make early decisions on 

which candidate to support. Further, the presidential election—at least until the second 

round of voting—proved a galvanizing force for party cohesion in that rallying around a 

candidate’s campaign provided not only an urgent, common cause for members to work 

toward but also a clear way to define themselves vis-à-vis other parties. Since the drawnout process of auditing ballots and negotiating results, however, this sense of urgency and 

momentum has quickly dissipated.

How the 2014 elections have played out goes some way toward explaining why major 

changes toward greater institutionalization of parties are not unfolding. If elections, for 

example, could be relied on as trustworthy exercises in which results are both transparent 

and quickly and clearly determined, parties would have good reason to mobilize, field candidates, and organize campaign strategies well in advance of the polls.

The expectation that 2014 might be different than earlier fraudulent elections meant 

that some of these preparations did take place and that parties did seem more organized. In 

the face of delays and ambiguity after the voting, however, it became clear that the outcome 

still seemed to depend on negotiations behind closed doors.

The deal brokered between run-off candidates Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah by 

Secretary of State John Kerry in July 2014 included a contract outlining a power-sharing 

agreement to form a national unity government. Under this agreement, Ghani was appointed 

president in September 2014, and Abdullah took on the new position of chief executive 

officer. Additionally, a loya jirga will be convened, ideally within two years, to amend the 

constitution and potenially accommodate a parliamentary system.17 Even at this point, 

several months into the new administration’s first term, speculation is considerable about 

how this new arrangement will be implemented, particularly in terms of dividing powers and 

reaching compromise. However, even if the contract does hold and a loya jirga is convened, 

the agreement provides little space for parties as political actors. In attempting to institutionalize a broad political coalition, the deal replicated a feature of previous eras of Afghan 

politics—delegitimization of a functioning, active opposition.

None of the parties had a strategy in place for parliamentary elections when interviewed, 

largely because the delays in the presidential electoral process and in the appointment of 

cabinet members have affected the momentum as well as both the willingness and ability 

to plan ahead. All respondents affirmed party intention to put forward candidates and were 

If elections could be relied on as 

trustworthy exercises in which 

results are both transparent and 

quickly and clearly determined, 

parties would have good reason 

to mobilize, field candidates, and 

organize campaign strategies well 

in advance of the polls.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 362 17

confident that parliamentary elections would take place, but preparations thus far seem to 

have been made more by potential candidates as individuals to make a name for themselves 

within parties during the presidential campaign.

Whether parties can put their experiences in the 2014 elections to good use in the parliamentary polls is yet to be seen. Fielding candidates in the name of the party rather than supporting independent candidates has had mixed results. It is therefore likely that most parties 

will opt for a mixture of the two and vary it across provinces. The stakes in 2015 will be higher, 

however, than for either the provincial council polls in 2014 or the parliamentary elections in 

2010 because parliamentary seats will be both more desirable and more difficult to secure. 

Parties may well adopt as diverse a strategy as possible, attempting to make the most of both 

old-guard and newer political tactics to increase their chances.

Much will depend also on the approach of the new president and chief executive toward 

parties. Many interviewees seemed confident that both Ghani and Abdullah would improve 

the political scene for parties and allocate them a greater role in government, though few 

could articulate how. To date, neither Ghani nor Abdullah have indicated any intentions in this 

regard. Ghani has made no commitment to the formation of his own party—a move that would 

change the stakes completely for parties—though his alliance to Dostum, the head of one of 

the most organized political parties in Afghanistan, might prove instrumental in this regard. 

Much could change for parties if, for example, a loya jirga does amend the constitution in favor 

of a parliamentary system, and space is created for party involvement. At present, however, 

parties have not yet begun to lobby the new administration for change in any coordinated or 

strategic way.

Even before the results of the audit were announced, by early summer of 2014 it had 

become clear that elections had once again become just as much about negotiations and 

bargains between elites as they had been about voter preferences. It therefore remains 

strategic for parties to retain the connections of their leadership and mobilization along 

ethnic or regional lines to be better able to take advantage of both as political outcomes 

are negotiated. Parliamentary elections in 2015 will present a similar scenario in that deals 

and negotiations will play an important role in determining who wins. Some changes may 

be made to the way parties are run to make the most of new windows of opportunity—such 

as the influx of educated youth who demand more influence in party decision making or 

international training and support that requires female party delegates as participants. The 

outreach to youth will also become increasingly important as parties compete for young 

membership with other emerging groups and movements.

Parties that combine recent momentum—or draw on a long-standing reputation for political cohesion—with readily available financial and human resources and strategic, devolved, 

and engaged leadership will likely be able to institutionalize most effectively. However, any 

technical strategies adopted will remain superficial until large-scale contextual shifts in the 

political landscape reduce the advantages of old-guard politics. Such changes could include 

an electoral system that encourages greater party mobilization, parliament structuring to 

facilitate party-based interest groups, and opposition to government formally established as a 

legitimate political stance. These changes seem unlikely in a unity government. It is therefore 

even more important that parties lobby for change if and when the constitution is amended 

and that they acquire parliamentary seats for the influence in government and the loya jirga 

that such seats can afford.

Any technical strategies adopted 

will remain superficial until 

large-scale contextual shifts in 

the political landscape reduce the 

advantages of old-guard politics.

USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 362 19

Notes

1. Thomas Ruttig, “Islamists, Leftists and a Void in the Center: Afghanistan’s Political Parties and Where They 

Come From (1902-2006),” Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2006, 1, http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_9674-1522-2-30.

pdf?061129052448.

2. See Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), chapter 19.

3. Antonio Giustozzi, “Between Patronage and Rebellion: Student Politics in Afghanistan,” AREU Briefing Paper, 

February 2010, 1–2; Anna Larson and Noah Coburn, “Youth Mobilization and Political Constraints in Afghanistan: 

The Y Factor,” U.S. Institute of Peace Special Report no. 341, January 2014, 6.

4. This continued sidelining of parties was a deliberate attempt on the part of Hamid Karzai and Lakhdar Brahimi to 

“preserve stability” by de-emphasizing the social divisions that parties represented. See Ahmed Rashid, Descent into 

Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York: Penguin, 2008), 258. Larson 

and Coburn have argued elsewhere that the political space in which opposition groups have been able to mobilize 

against government policy appears to have decreased over the last century, with executive control from one regime 

to the next becoming ever more overbearing (“Youth Mobilization,” 7). This control has also shifted from the forms 

of overt authoritarian measures as enforced by Daoud to a more subtle manipulation of parliamentarians and party 

leaders through government patronage and the persistent, persuasive narrative presented by Karzai to enhance his 

own control over disorganized factions that parties represent division and conflict. 

5. For more on the SNTV system and its drawbacks, see Andrew Reynolds and Andrew Wilder, “Free, Fair or Flawed: 

Challenges for Legitimate Elections in Afghanistan,” AREU Briefing Paper, September 2004, 12–16.

6. Sixty-three parties are listed as officially registered with the Ministry of Justice on its website’s Dari page, 

although only fifty are listed on the English version of the page. It is also possible that more parties have 

registered since the page was last updated. 

7. Giustozzi, “Between Patronage and Rebellion.” To some extent, this occurs within newer parties also, some of 

which, such as Jamhori Khwahan, provide free English and computing classes for young people in return for their 

time volunteering for the party. Many newer parties simply do not have the resources of the old-guard parties 

however and so are less able to provide these kinds of services.

8. Larson and Coburn, “Youth Mobilization”; Borhan Osman, “Afghan Youth for Democracy? Not All of Them,” 

Afghan Analysts Network, April 2,2014, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/afghan-youth-for-democracy-notall-of-them.

9. Interview with political analyst, Kabul.

10. For more on these groups and the radicalization of Afghan youth, see Osman, “Afghan Youth.”

11. Significant attempts within Junbesh to minimize Dostum’s role and devolve decision making have been largely 

unsuccessful. During this study, Junbesh respondents referred to Dostum very much as the figurehead of the 

party, and his new position as first vice president is likely to emphasize this further. 

12. Ruttig, “Islamists, Leftists and a Void.”

13. This is in contrast to the general practice of parliamentarians promising allegiance to a number of different parties 

but openly admitting to membership of none. 

14. For details on how this came about, see Thomas Ruttig, “The Butter on The Bread: The Provincial Councils’ Fight 

for Extended Authority,” Afghan Analysts Network, March 23, 2014, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/thebutter-on-the-bread-the-provincial-councils-fight-for-extended-authority/. 

15. For more on what he calls the Jamiat dilemma, see Thomas Ruttig, “National Coalition vs National Front: 

Two Opposition Alliances Put Jamiat in a Dilemma,” Afghan Analysts Network, January 4, 2012, http://www.

afghanistan-analysts.org/national-coalition-vs-national-front-two-opposition-alliances-put-jamiat-in-a-dilemma.

16. Statistics detailing the increase in the urban youth demographic are not available. However, combining the 

population between ages ten and twenty-five (34 percent) with the increase in the last ten years in urban 

populations gives some indication of the size of the group. According to Afghanistan’s Central Statistics 

Organization, the urban population in Kabul alone rose by 46 percent from 2,435,400 in 2004–05 to 3,565,000 in 

2014–15. Population Reference Bureau, “The World’s Youth, 2013 Data Sheet,” http://www.prb.org/Publications/

Datasheets/2013/youth-datasheet-2013.aspx; Central Statistics Office, “Settled Population of Province by Civil 

Division,” 2004–2005 and 2014–2015, http://cso.gov.af/en/page/demography-and-socile-statistics/demographstatistics/3897. 

17. Carlotta Gall, “Political Divisions Threaten Kerry-Brokered Agreement in Afghanistan,” New York Times, July 25, 

2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/26/world/asia/political-divisions-threaten-kerry-brokered-agreementin-afghanistan.html?smid=tw-share&_r=1.
ISBN: 978-1-60127-285-0

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Of Related Interest

• Forging Afghanistan’s National Unity Government by Ali Jalali (Peace Brief, January 2015)

• A Rough Guide to Afghan Youth Politics by Gran Hewad and Casey Garret Johnson (Special 

Report, April 2014)

• Why Afghanistan’s Provincial Council Elections Matter by Anna Larson and Noah Coburn (Peace 

Brief, March 2014)

• Youth Mobilization and Political Constraints in Afghanistan: The Y Factor by Anna Larson and 

Noah Coburn (Special Report, January 2014)

• 2014 Presidential and Provincial Council Elections in Afghanistan by Zekria Barakzai (Special 

Report, October 2013)

• Perceptions of Politically Engaged, Influential Afghans on the Way Forward by Omar Samad 

(Special Report, March 2013)

• Justifying the Means: Afghan Perceptions of Electoral Processes by Noah Coburn and Anna 

Larson (Special Report, February 2013)