1 RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 14a0158p.06 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

_________________

I N RE : M ICHAEL A LLEN B OWERS ; M ARGARITA V ILLE B OWERS , Debtors

.

_________________________________________ P LYMOUTH P ARK T AX S ERVICES , LLC, Appellants ,

v

.

M ICHAEL A LLEN B OWERS ; M ARGARITA V ILLE B OWERS , Appellees

. ┐ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ┘ No. 13-4404

Appeal from the United St ates District Court

for the Northern District of Ohio at Akron No. 12-51549—No. 12-51549. Argued: June 18, 2014 Decided and Filed: July 21, 2014 Before: KEITH, CLAY, and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.

_________________ COUNSEL

ARGUED: Scott W. Paris, KEITH D. WEINER & ASSOCIATES CO., LPA, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Robert M. Whittington, Jr., Akron, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Scott W. Paris, KEITH D. WEINER & AS SOCIATES CO., LPA, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Robert M. Whittington, Jr., Akron, Ohio, for Appellee. 

### >No. 13-4404 Plymouth Park Tax Serv. v. Bowers, et al. Page 2

_________________ OPINION

_________________ McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Plymouth Park appeals the Bankruptcy Court’s Order which held that under Ohio law, the interest ra te a Chapter 13 debtor must pay under his plan during the pendency of a bankruptcy proceeding to a tax certificate holder is the “certificate rate
of interest” shown on the face of the tax certificate . Plymouth Park alleges that the appropriate interest rate is 18%, as provide d in Ohio Revised Code (“O.R. C.”) § 5721.38 (2010), instead of 0.25%, the rate provided in the tax certificate. This is an issue of fi rst impression fo r this Circuit. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that the Bankruptcy Court was correct and AFFIRM

.
I.
We begin with a brief overview of Ohio tax lie n law. When real estate taxes are not paid by a property owner, a tax lien attaches to the subject property, annually, on the first of every January, which includes interest, pe nalties, and other fees accrue d until paid. O.R.C. § 323.11. Summit County and several other Ohio counties sell outstanding tax obligations to investors in
the form of tax lien certificates (“tax certificates”). O.R.C. § 5721. 1 By selling these tax certificates, the county creates much needed revenue from unpaid property taxes. The investor purchasing a tax certificate obtains a lien against the taxpayer’s pr operty and the right to pursue the taxpayer for unpaid taxes. O.R.C. § 5721.30–.43.

The tax certificate entitles the tax certificate holder to the first lien on the property. O.R.C. § 5721.32. Property owners are given not ice of the opportunity to redeem the tax certificate and thereby remove the lien by paying the certificate holder the purchase price plus interest, penalties, and costs pursuant to O.R. C. § 5721.32. The tax certifi cate holder also has the

1 As an initial matter, it is important to note what version of the Ohio Revised Code is being referenced. The version of the O.R.C. applicable to this case is the version effective on November 3, 2010, the date the tax certificate was purchased. See CapitalSource Bank FBO Aeon Fin., L.L.C. v. Donshirs Dev. Corp. , No. 99032, 2013 WL 1697492, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. April 18, 2013) (stating that the trial court “erred” when it applied the version of the O.R.C. effective at the time of fo reclosure instead of the version effec tive at the time the tax certificate was purchased); Eastwood Local School Dist. v. Eastwood Educ. Ass’n , 875 N.E. 2d 139, 143 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (“Except where a contrary intent is evident, the parties to a contract are deemed to have contracted with reference to existing law.”). Unless stated otherwise, the Ohio Revised C ode referenced in the opinion is the version in effect on November 3, 2010.No. 13-4404 Plymouth Park Tax Serv. v. Bowers, et al. Page 3

right, after complying with all st atutory requirements, to initiat e foreclosure proceedings on the real property after one year passes from the tax certificate purchase date, but no later than the end of the certificate period, which is six years. Id. To initiate foreclosure, the certificate holder
must file a notice of intent to foreclose with the county treasurer. O.R.C. § 5721.37. The tax
certificate holder can file its notice of intent to foreclose as long as the property owner has not “redeemed” (i.e., paid off) the certificate. Id.
The facts of this case are not in disput e. Michael Allen Bowers and Margarita Ville Bowers (the “Debtors”) allowed the taxes to become delinquent on their property located in Akron, Ohio. After the Debtors became delinquent on their taxes, the Summit County Treasurer held a tax certificate sale and Plymouth Park Tax Services (“Plymouth Park”) purchased two delinquent tax certificates pursuant to statute. The first tax lien certificate (Cer tificate #1) was filed on November 5, 2010 with the Summit Count Fi scal Officer indicating a purchase price of $4,083.73 with a negotiated interest rate of 0. 25%. On October 3, 2011, the second tax lien certificate (Certificate #2) was f iled with the Summit County Fiscal Officer indicating a purchase price of $2,045.44 with a negotiated interest rate of 18.00%. Both of these certificates are titled “Tax Certificate (Negotiated sale).” R. 32, Stipulation as to Undisputed Facts at 7–9. 2 The certificates are signed by the “Treasurer/Fiscal Of ficer or Designee,” Shelly Davis, who certified: “I do hereby certify that at a ne gotiated sale pursuant to O.R.C. § 5721.33 this tax certificate for the parcel listed below was offered and sold . . . .” Id.
Both certificates also state that “[t]his certif icate will be canceled six years after the date of delivery pursuant to Ohio Revised Code 5721.37, unless the date is extended because of bankruptcy pursuant to O.R.C. 5721.37(A)(3)(b).” Id. The tax certificates stated that “[t]he purchaser of this Tax Certificate or any transferee is entitled to file a notice of intent to foreclose on this parcel within six years after the purchase of the Tax Certificate, or by the date negotiated with the county treasurer.” Id.
On April 17, 2012, the Summ it County Fiscal Officer f iled a tax lien foreclosure complaint against the Debtors. The complaint was filed “pursuant to a request for foreclosure

2 Any reference to docket numbers refers to the Bankruptcy Court docket (Case No. 12-51549).No. 13-4404 Plymouth Park Tax Serv. v. Bowers, et al. Page 4

form sent to the Fiscal Of ficer by Plymouth [Park].” Id. at 2, ¶ 6. The foreclosure complaint stated that “as provided by Section 5721.38(b) of the Ohio Revised Code” the “redemption price” calculated by the Fi scal Officer was $10,585.82. Id. at ¶ 6; at 11, Ex. D.
On May 10, 2012, the Debtors filed their Chap ter 13 plan and petiti on. R. 1, Chapter 13 Petition. The Debtors did not file any notice to “redeem” their property during the pendency of the bankruptcy action. Rather, th e Chapter 13 petition and “payment plan” was the plan filed by the Debtors pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 1321. The Debtors’ Chapter 13 plan proposed to pay interest on Plymout h Park’s tax certificat es at the interest rates listed on those
certificates: 0.25% on Certificate #1 and 18.00% on Certificate #2. R. 3, Chapter 13 Plan Filed by Debtor Michael Bowers at 3. On May 23, 2012, Plymouth Park filed a proof of claim based on both certificates in the amount of $10,521.46, an amount that included $2,120.00 in fees and the principal balance of $7,781.19 plus 18% interest on both certificates from June 1, 2012. Accordingly, the Debtors’ plan and Plymouth Pa rk’s claim put the parties at odds: while the Debtors sought an interest rate of 0.25% on Ce rtificate #1 and 18% on Certificate #2, Plymouth
Park demanded that the Debtor s pay 18% on both certificates.
The Bankruptcy Court held an Evidentiary Hearing on August 16, 2012 where testimony was taken regarding the procedur es and fees involved in Summ it County’s tax lien foreclosure process. On December 5, 2012, the Bankruptcy Court ordered the parties to file additional briefs “regarding the applicability and/or inapplicabil ity of Ohio Revised Code § 5721.38 to the issues before the Court, specifically to what extent, if any, a debtor’s chapter 13 plan treatment of the
tax certificate holder’s claim shoul d be equated with the process of redemption contemplated by § 5721.38.” R. 44, Order Directing Part ies to File Briefs at 1. Th e parties filed their respective
briefs.
On March 22, 2013, the Bankruptcy Court en tered its Order and Memorandum Opinion overruling and sustaining in part both Plymouth Park’s Objection to Confirmation and Debtors’ Objection to Proof of Claim. The Bankruptcy C ourt agreed with Plymou th Park that Plymouth
Park’s claim was a tax claim 3 under 11 U.S.C. § 511 and that stat e law governed the interest rate

3 Neither party now disputes that this claim is a “tax claim” under federal law. In 2005, under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA), Congress included a provision for Interest on Tax Claims, 11 U.S.C. § 511(a), which provides:No. 13-4404 Plymouth Park Tax Serv. v. Bowers, et al. Page 5

at issue. However, the Bankruptcy Court reject ed the proposition that the 18% rate in O.R.C. § 5721.38(B) should apply to the Debtors’ plan. The Bankrupt cy Court stated:
According to Ohio Revised Code § 5721.38(B)(2), the owner of the property “may redeem the parcel by payi ng . . . interest on the certificate purchase price for each tax certificate sold respecting the parc el at the rate of eighteen per cent per year.” The debtors allege that Ohio Revised Code § 5721.38(B) is limited to those instances where “a part y redeems real estate from a certificate sale by paying cash to the county tr easurer.” Debtors’ Reply at 1. The debtors further allege that this redemption does not cont emplate “redemption by way of periodic payments as in a chapter 13 plan.” December 14, 2012 Brief at 4. The Court agrees. Creditor has not established, and the Court finds no support for, the contention that the negotiated interest ra te does not apply. He re, the debtors are not redeeming their property as c ontemplated by Ohio Revised Code § 5721.38(B); therefore, the statute does not apply.
R. 51, Bankruptcy Ct. Order and Memo. Op. at 4.
The Bankruptcy Court further explained: “M oreover, ‘Ohio law establishes that the
Creditor is entitled to the interest rate establis hed by the tax certificate auction on the Debtor’s delinquent real estate taxes.’” Id. (quoting In re Cortner , 400 B.R. 608, 612 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2009)). The Court thus held that the appropriate interest rate for Certificate #1 was 0.25%, the
rate listed on the tax certificate.
Plymouth Park timely appealed to the Ba nkruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) on April 2, 2013. After hearing oral arguments, the BAP issued an opinion affi rming the Bankruptcy
Court’s order. In re Bowers , 506 B.R. 249 (B.A.P. 6th Cir.). The BAP concluded that the 0.25% interest rate on Certificate #1 should apply. A pplying the 2010 O.R.C. § 5721.37(a)(3)(b) and (c) to the case, the BAP concluded that the 0.25% inte rest rate listed on the tax certificate was the
“certificate rate of interest” and continued to accrue during the pendency of the bankruptcy action. O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(c).
Plymouth Park timely appealed.

If any provision of this title requires the payment of interest on a tax claim or on an administrative expense tax, or the payment of interest to enab le a creditor to receive the present value of the allowed amount of a tax claim, the rate of interest shall be the rate determined under applicable nonbankruptcy law

. (emphasis added).No. 13-4404 Plymouth Park Tax Serv. v. Bowers, et al. Page 6

II.
The Court reviews the decision of the bankrupt cy court directly, giving no deference to
the decision of the BAP. Dickson v. Countrywide Home Loans (In re Dickson) , 655 F.3d 585, 589–90 (6th Cir. 2011). The Court reviews conclusi ons of law, such as a bankruptcy court’s interpretation of state law, de novo

. Id. De novo review requires the appe llate court to determine the law at issue independently of th e Bankruptcy Court’s determination. Hamerly v. Fifth Third Mortg. Co. (In re J & M Salupo Dev. Co.) , 388 B.R. 795, 800 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2008) (citing First Union Mortg. Corp. v. Eubanks (In re Eubanks) , 219 B.R. 468, 469 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998)).

A. Overview of Parties’ Arguments
The parties approach the issue at hand in two distinct ways. Th e Debtors claim that O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(b) provides the answer to the question of what interest rate applies to the tax certificate during the pendency of the Debt ors’ Chapter 13 bankruptcy. That section
addresses when a tax certificate holder may file for foreclosure and also provide s the guidelines for how the filing of bankruptcy effects the tax certificate holder’s rights to foreclose. The Debtors claim that O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(c) mandates that in terest on the ta x certificate
accrues at the “certificate rate of interest” (the interest listed on the tax certificate) during any pending bankruptcy claim.
Plymouth Park approaches the issue di fferently—by relying on O.R.C. § 5721.38, which addresses a taxpayer’s right to “redemption.” Section 5721.38 allo ws a taxpayer to redeem a parcel after the filing of a notice of intent to foreclose by paying the county treasurer a set
amount. The Debtors did not seek to “redeem” their property, as set forth in the statute. However, Plymouth Park contends that the 18% st atutory interest applies because they filed the
notice of intent to foreclose and the Debtors did not redeem the property. Plymouth Park
contends that even if a formal redemption is required to trigger the 18% statutory interest, the bankruptcy “payment plan” could constitute such a redemption.
Because these two approaches are distinct, we lay out the Debtors’ and Plymouth Park’s approaches separately.No. 13-4404 Plymouth Park Tax Serv. v. Bowers, et al. Page 7

B. Debtors’ Interpretation of O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(b)
As the Bankruptcy Appellate Court corre ctly noted, the Ohio Revised Code’s tax certificate provisions specifically address situ ations where delinquent taxpayers file for bankruptcy protection. O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(b), effective when the tax certificate was purchased on November 3, 2010, stated:
If, before six years after the date a tax certificate was sold or before the date negotiated by the county treasurer, the ow ner of the property files a petition in bankruptcy, the county treasurer, upon being notified of the fili ng of the petition, shall notify the certificate hol der by ordinary first-clas s or certified mail or by binary means of the filing of the petition. It is the obligation of the certificate holder to file a proof of claim with th e bankruptcy court to protect the holder’s interest in the certificate parcel. The la st day on which the ce rtificate holder may file a notice of intent to foreclose is the later of six years after the date the tax certificate was sold or the date negotia ted by the county treas urer, or one hundred eighty days after the certificate parcel is no longer propert y of the bankruptcy estate; however, the six-year or negotiate d period being measur ed after the date the certificate was sold is tolled while the property owner’s bankruptcy case remains open.
O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(b) (current version at O.R.C. § 5721.37(A )(2) (2011)). In essence, O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(b) places a six-year statute of limitations period running from the date of sale or negotiation of the tax certificate in which the tax certificate holder must file a notice of intent to foreclose. As the BAP noted, “if a taxp ayer filed for bankruptcy at some point within those six years and the certificate holder filed a cl aim with the bankruptcy court, then the six year period would be tolled ‘while th e property owner’s [the taxpay er’s] bankruptcy case remains open.’” In re Bowers , 506 B.R. 249, 255 (B.A.P. 6th Cir.) (a lteration in original) (quoting O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(b)).
The statutory provision imme diately following this secti on, O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(c), provides that “[i]nterest at the ce rtificate rate of interest conti nues to accrue during any extension of time required by division (A)(3)( a) or (b) of this section unless otherwis e provided under Title
11 of the United States Code.” Accordingly, the Debtors argue th at during the six years running
from the date of the sale of the tax certificat e to Plymouth Park, and du ring the pendency of the Debtors’ Chapter 13 case, interest accrues on the cer tificate at the “certificate rate of interest.” As defined by O.R.C. § 5721.30(G), the “certificate rate of interest” is the “r ate of simple interestNo. 13-4404 Plymouth Park Tax Serv. v. Bowers, et al. Page 8

per year not to exceed eighteen per cent per year fixed . . . by the county tr easurer with respect to any tax certificate sold or tran sferred pursuant to a negotiated sale under section 5721.33 of the
Revised Code.” See In re Cortner , 400 B.R. 608, 614–15 (S.D. Ohio 2009). The “certificate
rate of interest” on Ce rtificate #1 is 0.25%.
Plymouth Park rebuts this reading of the st atutory scheme with a few arguments. First, Plymouth Park argues that O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(b) is inapplicable to the facts of this case. Plymouth Park correctly notes that it filed its no tice of intent to foreclose on February 10, 2012, three months prior to the initiation of the De btors’ bankruptcy procee dings. Plymouth Park contends that because they had filed a notice of inte nt to foreclose, there would be no basis to toll the filing of that notice, and th e 18% statutory intere st rate would apply. Plymouth Park argues that the interest set forth in O.R.C. § 5721.38(B) a ttaches with the filing of a Notice of Intent to Foreclose pursuant to O.R.C. § 5721.37 and § 5721.38. The notice of intent to foreclose was filed on February 10, 2012, and Plymouth Park claims 18% statutory interest attached to the subject certificate at that time. O.R.C. § 5721.38(B).
Plymouth Park’s readin g of the statute, however, assumes a fact: that the filing of a notice of intent to foreclose forces the early expi ration of the six-year period and triggers the application of the 18% interest rate. The BAP noted this assumption and held that the 2010 Ohio
Revised Code contained no indication that the “six year period for certificate holders to initiate the foreclosure process against taxpayers somehow expires early when a notice of intent to
foreclose is filed.” In re Bowers , 506 B.R. 249, 255 n.5 (B.A.P. 6th Cir.). The BAP went on to

state: In fact, it appears that the six year period su rvives the filing of a notice of intent to foreclose and the initiation of foreclosure proceedings and continues to provide important limitations on the rights of bot h tax certificate holders and taxpayers. For example, if a tax certificate holder file s a notice of intent to foreclose but has its foreclosure action dismissed without pr ejudice, it can file another notice of intent to foreclose, but must do so before the six year period ends. See Lakeview Holding, L.L.C. v. DeBerry , No. 99033, 2013 WL 1501640, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. April 11, 2013) (“[T]he certificate has not expired and the six year statute of limitations had not yet expi red . . . [the tax certificate holder] may therefore simply refile its notice of intent . . . .”).

Id.No. 13-4404 Plymouth Park Tax Serv. v. Bowers, et al. Page 9

Plymouth Park has not pointed to any stat utory provision or case which provides a basis for assuming that the filing of a notice of intent to foreclose triggers an early expiration of the six year period. While no case law on a particular subject is certainly no t grounds for foreclosing Plymouth Park’s statutory read ing of O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(b), further reasons support the Debtors’ interpretation of the re levant statutory provisi ons. As the BAP not ed in its opinion, the Court of Appeals of Ohio in Lakeview Holding, L.L.C. v. DeBerry applied the six year limitation period to the case, even though the tax certificate holder had filed a notice of intent to foreclose. Lakeview Holding, L.L.C. v. DeBerry , No. 99033, 2013 WL 1501640, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2013). While the f actual situation in Deberry did not involve a ba nkruptcy filing after a notice of intent to foreclose, the case involved the filing of a notice of inte nt to foreclose. If Plymouth Park’s reading of O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(b) was correct, the court in Deberry would not be concerned about the six year limitation peri od, because the filing of the notice of intent to foreclose would mean the six year limitati on expired early. However, the court in DeBerry , after
the notice of intent to foreclose was dismissed because the foreclosure complaint was not timely filed, continued to consider O.R.C. § 5721.37 (A)(3)(b) and the six year limitation period, irrespective of the filing of the notice of intent.
We hold that O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(b) applies to the instant case. As the Bankruptcy Court and the BAP correctly stated, the 0.25% interest rate on the face of th e tax certificate is the
“certificate rate of interest” and continues to acc rue during the extension of time because of the bankruptcy filing. In re Bowers , 506 B.R. 249, 255–56 (B.A.P. 6th Ci r.). Applicable Ohio law (O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(b)), 4 therefore, imposes an interest rate of 0.25% on Plymouth Park’s

4 The BAP aptly noted that the result of this case remains the same under current Ohio law: The Ohio Legislature’s 2011 amendments to O.R.C. § 5721.37 replaced O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(b) and O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(c) with current O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(2), a division identical to the divisions it replaced except that the six year period in the 2010 O.R.C. has been replaced by the term “certificate period.” Oh io Rev. Code Ann. § 5721 .37(A)(2). That term is defined in current O.R.C. § O.R.C. 5721.30(Q) as “the period of time after the sale or delivery of tax certificate within which a certificate holder must initiate an action to foreclose the tax lien represented by the certificate . . . .” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5721.30(Q). Under both the 2010 and current statute a certificate holder has a certain period of time in which to foreclose, that period of time is tolled during a taxpayer’s bankruptcy case, and interest accrues during the tolling period at the certificate rate of interest. Were the current version of O.R.C. § 5721.37 to apply to this case, the “certificate period” would be tolled while th e Debtors’ bankruptcy case remains open, and during that time interest would accrue at th e “certificate rate of interest,” or 0.25%.

In re Bowers , 506 B.R. 249, 256 n.7 (B.A.P. 6th Cir.)No. 13-4404 Plymouth Park Tax Serv. v. Bowers, et al. Page 10

claim while the Debtor’s bankruptcy case rema ins open. O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(b) controls the answer to the question of what interest rate shoul d apply to Certificate #1: namely the certificate
rate of interest listed on the face of Certificate #1.

C. Plymouth Park’s Interpretation of O.R.C. § 5721.38
Plymouth Park maintains that O.R.C. § 5721.38 gua rantees it an 18% in terest rate on its claim. Plymouth Park argues that because th e Debtors did not redeem (i.e., pay off) the certificates at issue before or after Plymouth Park filed the notice of intent to foreclose, the 18% statutory interest set forth in O.R.C. § 5721.38 attached to Certificate #1. Plymouth Park believes that the statutory inte rest listed in O.R.C. § 5721.38 does not require a redemption to be formally sought. However, Plymouth Park argues th at assuming that the stat utory rate of interest were dependent on redemption, this Court should hold that the Debtors’ Chapter 13 Bankruptcy payment plan constitutes “redemption” as contemplated by Ohio Revised Code § 5721.38.
This section allows a taxpayer to redeem a parcel after the filing of a notice of intent to foreclose by paying the county treasurer an am ount equal to the total of the “certificate redemption prices” of all tax certificates resp ecting the parcel, certai n fees and costs, and
“interest on the certificates at the rate of ei ghteen per cent per year for the period beginning on the date on which the payment was submitted by the certificate holder [to initiate foreclosure proceedings] and ending on the day the parcel is redeemed under this division.” O.R.C. § 5721.38(B)(2). Under Plymouth Park’s reading, b ecause the Debtors filed the notice of intent
to foreclose and the Debtors did not redeem th e property, the 18% statut ory interest applies.
There are a few problems with Plymouth Pa rk’s interpretation of O.R.C. § 5721.38(B).
The statute states that the interest on the tax certif icate is in connection to the taxpayer seeking to redeem their property. O.R.C. § 5721.38(B)(2). The statute does not state th at the mere filing of a notice of intent to foreclose triggers the 18% interest rate on the tax certificate. Rather, O.R.C. § 5721.38(B)(2) makes clear that at any time af ter “payment to the county treasurer by the certificate holder to initiate foreclosure proceedi ngs . . . and before the filing of the entry of confirmation of sale of a certificate parcel . . . and before the decree conveying title to the
certificate holder . . . the owner of record of the certificate parcel . . . ma y redeem the parcel by paying to the county treasurer the sum of the follo wing . . . .” The statute then proceeds to listNo. 13-4404 Plymouth Park Tax Serv. v. Bowers, et al. Page 11

the items which the taxpayer must pay, including the tax certificate amount, the interest on the tax certificate, plus interest at a rate of 18% per year for th e period beginning on the day when the payment was submitted by the certificate hold er and ending on the day when the parcel is
redeemed. Id. The parties both admit that a foreclosure decree was never issued in the instant
case. Ohio caselaw remains clear that in order for a fo reclosure judgment to be a “final order,” the decree must be issued and address the rights of all lienholders and th e responsibilities of the mortgagor. CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Roznowski , ---N.E.2d----, 2014 WL 1924774, at *5 (Ohio May 15, 2014); Countrywide Home Loans Servicing v. Nichpor , 990 N.E.2d 565 (Ohio 2013) (holding that after a judgment entry grants a decree of foreclosure and orde r of sale, the foreclosure action cannot be dismissed, as the judgment is final). Accordingly, Plymouth Park’s interpretation of the statute appears to be at odds with the stat utory language. The statute makes clear that the
interest rate attaches to the act ual “redemption” of the property by the taxpayer. As the Debtors did not attempt to redeem the property here, and no foreclosure decree has been issued, Plymouth Park’s reading is simply untenable given the language of O.R.C. § 5721.38(B).
Plymouth Park next suggests that if “redemp tion” is required to trigger the 18% interest rate, the institution of the Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings and the paym ent plan in place for the bankruptcy may constitute a “redemption.” Plym outh Park is correct that there is no case law addressing this particular issue—whether a Ch apter 13 bankruptcy payment plan constitutes a “redemption” as contemplated by O.R.C. § 5721.38. Plymouth Park reaches the conclusion that the bankruptcy payment plan could constitute a “redemption” because O.R.C. § 5721.38(C)(2) 5 provides for redemption via payment plan. Plymout h Park contends that a Chapter 13 payment plan could satisfy this “payme nt plan.” The Debtors counter by arguing that O.R.C. § 5721.38(B) only applies to lump sum redemptions, not to paym ent plan redemptions lik e those carried out in

5 Ohio Revised Code § 5721.38(C)(2) states:
During the period beginning on the date a tax certificate is sold under section 5721.33 of the Revised Code and ending on the date the decree is rendered on the foreclosure proceeding under division (F) of section 5721.37 of the Revised Code, the owner of record of the certificate parcel, or any other person entitled to redeem that parcel, may enter into a redemption payment plan with the certificate holder and all secured parties of th e certificate holder. The plan shall require the owner or other person to pay the certificate redemption price for the tax certificate, an administrative fee not to exceed one hundred dollars per year, and the actual fees and costs incurred, in installments, with the final installment due no later than the expiration of the certificate period.No. 13-4404 Plymouth Park Tax Serv. v. Bowers, et al. Page 12

a Chapter 13 plan, and that they therefore need only pay the 0.25% interest rate stated on the tax
certificate. Debtors’ Br. at 1.

Ohio does not have a case which articulate s the difference between a redemption of real
estate from a tax certifi cate and the treatment of a tax certificate holder’s claim in a Chapter 13 plan. However, the Court does not need to r each this distinction. The 2010 O.R.C. provisions specifically require that the in terest rate on the tax certific ate to accrue at 0.25% while the Debtors’ bankruptcy case remains open. O.R.C. 5721.37(A)(3)(b). Applying traditional tenets of statutory construction to the instant case, specific statutory provisions prevail over more general provisions. See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank , 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2070–71 (2012). As O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(c) specifical ly addresses the effect of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy filing on tax certificates, this specific statutor y provision would “trump” the more general provision of O.R.C. § 5721.38, wh ich addresses redemption generally. Hartmann v. Duffey , 768 N.E.2d 1170, 1172– 73 (Ohio 2002). Furthe rmore, adoption of Plymouth Park’s theory would render O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(c) mere surplusage, in violation of another basic tenet of statutory construction. See Morton v. Mancari , 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (“[W]hen two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts . . . to regard each as effective. When there are two acts upon the same subject, the rule is to give effect to both if possible . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As expl ained above, O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(c) directly addresses the question of what interest rate applies to a tax certificate following the filing of Chapter 13 bankruptcy. If the Court were to apply O.R.C. § 5721.38 to the case as Plymouth Park suggests, this Court would be ignoring O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(c) and would be failing to give effect to this section which directly disc usses bankruptcy. We ther efore decline to adopt Plymouth Park’s interpretation of what constitute s a “redemption” and a pply the 0.25% interest
rate to Certificate #1.

III.

For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the Bankruptcy Court.