In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 01-3423

ELVIRA M. JIMENEZ,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MADISON AREA TECHNICAL COLLEGE,

JACKYE THOMAS, CAROL BASSETT,

and WILLIAM STRYCKER,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 00-C-424—Barbara B. Crabb, Chief Judge.

____________

ARGUED MAY 31, 2002—DECIDED FEBRUARY 28, 2003

____________

Before HARLINGTON WOOD, JR., COFFEY, and ROVNER,

Circuit Judges.

COFFEY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Elvira Jimenez

(“Jimenez”) filed an action against her former employer

Madison Area Technical College (the “College”) under 42

U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, alleging that the College had

discriminated against her on the basis of race, ethnic origin, and sex. After finding that Jimenez had relied on

falsified documents to support her civil rights claims, the

district court sanctioned Jimenez, under Rule 11(c) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and dismissed her suit
2 No. 01-3423

1 The district court also imposed monetary sanctions on Jimenez’s

attorney, Willie Nunnery, in the amount of $16,473. Nunnery

did not appeal from the court’s imposition of such sanctions.

Accordingly, the monetary sanctions are not at issue in this

appeal. See infra note 3.

with prejudice.1 Jimenez claims that imposition of such

a harsh sanction amounts to an abuse of discretion. We

affirm the district court’s dismissal of Jimenez’s Complaint.

I. Background

Jimenez was hired by the College on September 26, 1989.

While employed by the College, Jimenez worked in various administrative positions within the College’s business

lab, adult education department, and student services

department. Jimenez claims that her troubles started in

1993, when she began to receive derogatory comments

from and to be harassed by certain College administrators, all on account of her race (Hispanic).

In 1997, Jimenez took a leave of absence from her job

and sometime thereafter filed a worker’s compensation

claim against the College. She alleged that certain College administrators had harassed her and caused her

emotional distress. In support of these allegations, Jimenez

produced a number of inflammatory letters and e-mails

allegedly written by various colleagues and supervisors

during the term of her employment. The communications

contained derogatory references to Jimenez’s race, see, e.g.,

Def. Ex. 6, Oct. 31, 1995 E-mail (stating that Jimenez

was “a stupid mexican after all. . . .”); and Def. Ex. 16, June

16, 1997 Letter (“I am almost ensured that your little spic

ass was out the door at that time . . . whether we’d like

to admit our preferences or racist conduct it happens

and it’s natural.”), and described alleged instances of sexual harassment involving Jimenez, see Def. Ex. 24, July
No. 01-3423 3

2, 1997 Letter (apologizing for taking “violent sexual actions against” Jimenez and for “slapping [her] buttocks,

and massaging [her] shoulders . . . [and] grabb[ing] [her]

breasts”).

Having some doubts about the authenticity of the alleged discriminatory communications, the College spoke

with the purported authors of the various writings. In

sworn statements, each of the alleged authors denied

having written the alleged communications attributed

them. See, e.g., Def. Ex. 3, Bassett Aff. ¶ 4 (stating that

the Oct. 31, 1995 e-mail attributed to her by Jimenez was

“a complete fabrication and forgery”); Def. Ex. 15, Simone

Aff. ¶ 6 (calling the June 26, 1997 Letter she had purportedly written “nothing less than a complete fabrication and

forgery”); Def. Ex. 25, Strycker Aff. ¶ (stating that the letter

attributed to him was “a complete fabrication” and that

Jimenez’s allegations of sexual harassment were “untrue,

baseless in fact and libelous”).

After its investigation of the matter, on November 12,

1997, the College, through counsel, advised Jimenez’s

counsel, Willie J. Nunnery, that the alleged authors of the

derogatory letters and e-mails had denied writing the

communications attributed to them. The College requested that Nunnery produce the original documents for

its review. Neither the attorney, nor his client, complied

with the request. Upon the completion of the worker’s

compensation investigation, Jimenez’s claim was denied.

Jimenez never returned to work and her employment

was subsequently terminated.

Despite having knowledge of the College’s investigation

into the fraudulent documents, Nunnery brought the

instant lawsuit against the College on behalf of Jimenez,
4 No. 01-3423

2 Although Jimenez had previously filed a discrimination suit

against the College in January 1998, she had voluntarily dismissed that suit after the College had filed a Motion to Dismiss.

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.2 In the Complaint,

Jimenez alleged that the College had infringed upon her

equal protection rights by discriminating against her

based on her sex, ethnic origin, and race. Jimenez subsequently amended her complaint to add as defendants her

former colleagues Jackye Thomas, Carol Bassett and

William Strycker (the same colleagues to whom she had

previously attributed the alleged discriminatory communications). Defendant Thomas had been one of Jimenez’s

supervisors at the College, while Defendants Bassett and

Strycker had been employed in the College’s human

resources department during Jimenez’s tenure at the

College.

Defendants moved to dismiss Jimenez’s Amended Complaint, which the district court granted, ruling that

Jimenez had failed to state a claim of discrimination. At

the same time, the court gave Jimenez leave to file a second amended complaint.

In her Second Amended Complaint, Jimenez broadened

her factual allegations to include claims that, on a number

of occasions during Jimenez’s tenure with the College,

Defendants had sent her e-mails and letters containing

racial slurs and blatantly discriminatory epithets. See, e.g.,

Second Amended Complaint ¶ 24 (“Defendant Bassett

wrote something to the effect [that] ‘. . . you are . . . giving

yourself the reputation of being . . . a little dirty, money

hungry spic.’ ”); id. ¶ 27 (“Bassett sent an e-mail . . .

indicating ‘. . . I guess you are . . . a stupid Mexican. . . .’ ”);

id. ¶ (“Defendant Thomas sent an e-mail to the effect, ‘it

was wrong for me to call you a loud-mouth power-monging

[sic] spic and compare you to Fideel [sic] Castro’s dictatorship style of leadership.’ ”).
No. 01-3423 5

Familiar with the false allegations contained in the

alleged discriminatory e-mails and letters submitted in

connection with Jimenez’s failed worker’s compensation

suit, Defendants’ counsel attempted to persuade Nunnery to withdraw the lawsuit on the basis that the documents underlying the allegations were less than authentic

and fraudulent documents. Going further to achieve a

fair disposition of the matter, on December 13, 2000,

Defendants’ counsel sent Nunnery a letter informing him

that each of the Defendants unanimously denied authorship of the various e-mails and letters attributed to them

by his client, Jimenez, and requested a dismissal of the

suit. See Def. Ex. 1, Dec. 13, 2000 Letter. Jimenez and

Nunnery did not agree to dismiss and continued to pursue the false and ridiculous action against Defendants.

The Defendants’ attempts to deter the suit having failed,

they sent Nunnery a proposed motion for sanctions on

March 1, 2001, providing Nunnery and Jimenez with the

21-day notice required under Rule 11. Fed. R. Civ. P.

11(C)(1)(a). Thereafter, Defendants Thomas, Bassett

and Strycker, as well as the College, filed their Motion for

Rule 11 sanctions with the district court. The district

court held an evidentiary hearing in the matter.

At the hearing, Jimenez repeatedly denied that the

alleged communications were fraudulent and maintained

that the named Defendants had, in fact, made the discriminatory statements contained in the writings. Nunnery

also testified, informing the court that his “standing position” on issues of credibility was that “when there is a

judgment call, [he] fall[s] on the side of my client.” Tr. at 60.

On such basis, he justified his refusal to dismiss the

case, claiming that it was “not in the best interests of

[his] client” to believe Defendants’ affidavits disclaiming

authorship of the documents. Id. He claimed that he

was waiting until he conducted depositions to test the

credibility of the various letters and e-mails produced by
6 No. 01-3423

Jimenez, as well as her related allegations of discrimination.

Defendants Bassett, Thomas and Strycker, testified at

the hearing and emphatically denied having written the

letter and e-mails that Jimenez had attributed to them.

Defendants recounted that they had been “hurt” and

“outraged” by the vile statements that had been wrongfully associated with them. Tr. at 88, 112.

Based on the testimony of the various witnesses and

other evidence presented at the hearing, the court

found that Jimenez and Nunnery had used and filed “obviously fraudulent documents” in support of the fictitious

allegations of racial discrimination in the Second Amended

Complaint. Jimenez v. Madison Area Tech. College, et al.,

No. 00-C-424, at 14 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 13, 2001) [hereinafter Jimenez I]. The court’s finding was clear, succinct,

direct, and left no room for doubt that “[n]one of the

individual defendants wrote the emails, memoranda or

letters attributed to them by plaintiff.” Id. at 10.

In support of its finding that the documents were fabricated, the court noted the suspicious nature of the statements contained in the various documents. For instance, the communications made repeated references to

Jimenez’s language deficiency, which the trial judge found

to be “peculiar” in light of the fact that “she ha[d] no[ ]

[language deficiency].” Id. at 13. Also, given the blatantly

discriminatory nature of the alleged communications, the

court remarked that “[i]t [wa]s unlikely that persons

holding professional [positions] in human relations or in

the union would make the statements attributed to them

[and] even more unlikely that they would document their

discriminatory statements in writing.” Id. at 12-13.

The trial court concluded that, because Jimenez had

presented “obviously fraudulent documents to support

[her] allegations in [the] complaint,” id. at 14, and, further-
No. 01-3423 7

3 Nunnery failed to appeal from the district court’s imposition

of monetary sanctions against him. The instant appeal is thus

limited to a review of the district court’s sanction against Jimenez,

i.e., its entry of judgment dismissing her case with prejudice. See

Jimenez v. Madison Area Technical College, et al., No. 01-3423

(7th Cir. Dec. 21, 2001) (order limiting the scope of appeal to a

review of Jimenez’s appeal from dismissal of the case).

more, because Nunnery himself had failed to perform a

reasonable inquiry into the validity of the documents,

both Jimenez and Nunnery shared responsibility for the

fraudulent submissions. Id. Notably, the trial judge labeled Jimenez and Nunnery’s actions “the most blatant

example of a Rule 11 violation that [she had ever] seen.” Id.

The trial court sanctioned both Jimenez and her counsel

for their respective violations of Rule 11 and dismissed

Jimenez’s suit, with prejudice. The court also ordered

Nunnery to pay a sum of $16,473 to Defendants. Jimenez

filed a timely appeal to this Court.3

II. Analysis

A. Review of Rule 11 Sanctions

Rule 11 requires that an attorney or party, certify to

the best of his “knowledge, information, and belief, formed

after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,” that

any pleading presented to the court is not presented for

an improper purpose, that the claims therein have a legally sufficient basis, and that the allegations and other

factual contentions have evidentiary support. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 11(b). One of the basic purposes of Rule 11 is to “deter

baseless filings in the district court . . . .” Cooter & Gell

v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110

L.Ed.2d 359 (1990). Under Rule 11(c), a district court

may impose sanctions on a party or her counsel (or both),

for failing to comply with Rule 11(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c);
8 No. 01-3423

Fries v. Helsper, 146 F.3d 452, 458 (7th Cir. 1998) (“a

court may impose sanctions on a party for making arguments or filing claims that are frivolous, legally unreasonable, [or] without factual foundation . . . .”) (emphasis

added). See also In re Alberto, 119 B.R. 985, 993 (Bankr.

N.D. Ill. 1990) (“[w]hen an attorney and client share

responsibility for litigation strategy and such strategy

violates Rule 11, courts can impose joint and several

liability. . .”).

“We review a trial court’s decision to grant Rule 11

sanctions with deference . . . ‘because the trial court alone

has an intimate familiarity with the relevant proceedings. . . .’ ” Divane v. Krull Elec. Co., 200 F.3d 1020, 1025

(7th Cir. 1999) (quoting R.K. Harp Inv. Corp. v. McQuade,

825 F.2d 1101, 1103 (7th Cir. 1987)). Indeed, “the district

court is better situated than the court of appeals to marshal

the pertinent facts.” Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 402. A

district court’s imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is thus

“ ‘reversible only when there has been an abuse of discretion.’ ” Divane, 200 F.3d at 1025.

On appeal, Jimenez does not contest the trial court’s

finding that she relied on falsified documents to bolster

her discrimination claims, and with good reason, for the

trial court’s assessment of her fraudulent conduct has

ample support in the record. See, e.g., Bassett Aff. ¶ 5, Def.

Ex. 3 (noting that an undated letter attributed to her

by Jimenez was “basically identical” to a November 30,

1993 Letter in fact written by her, except that certain

racially hostile language had been added); id. ¶ 8 (stating

that the date on an alleged e-mail message attributed to

her was inconsistent with the day of the week on which

it was purportedly sent); Tr. at 96 (remarking that she

was “unfamiliar” with the language used in a May 5, 1995

e-mail that Jimenez claimed she had written).

Perhaps because an attack on the district court’s finding of fraud would be futile, Jimenez instead argues
No. 01-3423 9

that the severity of the district court’s sanction of such

behavior—i.e., its dismissal of her amended complaint—was

an abuse of its discretion. She claims that “[t]here is

nothing in the Court’s record to indicate . . . that [her claims

of denial of equal protection and retaliation] were fraudulent.” Jimenez Br. at 14. Though her precise reasoning

is difficult to comprehend, Jimenez apparently argues

that the district court’s sanction (dismissal) should have

been less harsh because not all of her civil rights claims

were based on the fraudulent documents. We disagree.

Jimenez’s equal protection and retaliation claims are

inseparable from the fraudulent allegations of discrimination underlying those claims. Indeed, Jimenez’s entire

cause of action rests on her claim that the College allegedly discriminated against her based on her race

and origin—the very allegation she sought to bolster with

a bevy of falsified documents. See Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 1-4 (outlining claims of equal protection violation, hostile work environment, and disparate treatment,

all of which are supported by Jimenez’s allegation of

racial discrimination as evidenced by the letters and

e-mails).

We recognize that dismissal is a harsh sanction. Thus,

we understand why we have uncovered no prior instance

in which this Court has reviewed such an obvious and

serious Rule 11 sanction for an abuse of discretion. Nonetheless, it is proper for the trial court to impose a severe

sanction where the sanction is sufficient to deter repetition of the misconduct or to deter similar conduct by

third parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). And, in all cases, we

are to give the trial court “significant discretion in determining what sanctions . . . should be imposed for a [Rule 11]

violation.” Fries, 146 F.3d at 459 (emphasis added). Moreover, as this Court has recognized, non-monetary, as well

as monetary sanction, may be applied under the Rule, so
10 No. 01-3423

long as the sanction is reasonably necessary to deter

repetition of the offending conduct. Id.

The sanction of dismissal meets the requisite criteria

in this case, given the egregious nature of Jimenez’s

conduct. Jimenez’s claim was so unmeritorious and her

behavior so deceptive that the filing of her baseless claim

amounted to a veritable attack on our system of justice.

Although Jimenez believes the district court’s order of

dismissal was an abuse of discretion, the only abuses

ascertainable in this case were those committed by her

counsel and Jimenez herself. By bringing “false, fraudulent

and salacious charges of discrimination” against Defendants, Jimenez I, at 15, Jimenez exploited the judicial

process and subjected her former colleagues and employer to unnecessary embarrassment and mental anguish.

See, e.g., Tr. at 88 (stating that it was “very painful” to

see her “name attached to [such words]”); id. at 112 (noting “outrage” and “hurt” at the “fact that somebody

would think [he was] capable of [making the statements

attributed to him]”).

In light of the willful and malicious nature of Jimenez’s

flagrant Rule 11 violation, Jimenez I, at 14 (calling

Jimenez’s actions “the single most blatant example of a

Rule 11 violation [the district court had ever] seen”)

(emphasis added), we hold that the decision to dismiss

Jimenez’s case, as a sanction of her abusive conduct, was

within the bounds of the trial court’s sound discretion. See

Pope v. Fed. Express Corp., 974 F.2d 982, 984 (8th Cir.

1992) (noting that where “a litigant’s conduct abuses the

judicial process . . . dismissal of [her] lawsuit [is] a remedy

within the inherent power of the court.”).

B. Rule 38 Sanctions

The College has filed a Motion for Appellate Sanctions

under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
No. 01-3423 11

4 Jimenez addressed Rule 37(b) rather than Rule 11. See Jimenez

Br. at 14.

Pursuant to Rule 38, we may award just damages and

single or double costs to Appellee as a sanction against

Appellant for filing a frivolous appeal. An appeal is “frivolous” if its “ ‘result is foreordained by the lack of substance

to the appellant’s arguments.’ ” United States v. Ins.

Consultants of Knox, Inc., 187 F.3d 755, 761 (7th Cir. 1999).

The appeal in the instant case is patently frivolous. In

spite of the trial judge’s finding that they had submitted

“obviously fraudulent documents” to the court, and had

perpetrated “the most blatant example of a Rule 11 violation that [she had ever] seen,” Jimenez v. Madison Area

Tech. College, et al., No. 00-C-424, at 14 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 13,

2001), Jimenez and Nunnery had the audacity to file an

appeal from the trial court’s sanction. The “foreordination”

of Jimenez’s failure on appeal could not have been more

obvious. Not only did Jimenez cite to the wrong legal

standard in her brief before this Court,4

 she presented

only one page of legal argument in her favor. In light of

the flagrancy of Jimenez’s Rule 11 violation, and the lack

of support for her position on appeal, when considering

the direct and castigating language reciting parts of the

record by the trial judge, we conclude that appellate

sanctions are appropriate in this case.

As far as the amount of attorneys’ fees is concerned, the

College has presented affidavits attesting that its counsel has incurred $17,156.99 in costs and expenses since

the filing of this appeal. The College’s counsel has not,

however, given a specific breakdown of those fees and

costs. Despite its claim to have spent over 125 hours dealing with legal matters connected to this appeal, counsel

has made no effort to inform the Court exactly what

was done during those 125 hours. Indeed, such time
12 No. 01-3423

estimates are surprisingly high in light of the simplicity

of the legal issues presented to this Court.

We are not satisfied with the vague documentation of

costs and expenses heretofore provided by the College’s

counsel. Thus, we order counsel to submit, within the

next fifteen days, a more detailed schedule of its time

allocation and other expenses incurred in connection

with this appeal.

III. Conclusion

The district court’s imposition of sanctions under Rule

11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is affirmed and

the Motion for Rule 38 Appellate Sanctions granted. We

further order that a copy of this opinion be sent to the

Wisconsin Supreme Court Office of Lawyer Regulation.

AFFIRMED; MOTION FOR RULE 38

 SANCTIONS GRANTED.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—2-28-03