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93–641 PDF 2015

S. HRG. 113–589 

U.S. POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ AND SYRIA AND 

THE THREAT POSED BY THE ISLAMIC STATE 

OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT (ISIL) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 16, 2014 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

ANGUS KING, Maine 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

PETER K. LEVINE, Staff Director 

JOHN A. BONSELL, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

SEPTEMBER 16, 2014

Page 

U.S. POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ AND SYRIA AND THE THREAT POSED BY THE

ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT (ISIL) ................................................ 1 

Hagel, Hon. Charles T., Secretary of Defense ....................................................... 5 

Dempsey, GEN Martin E., USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ...................... 13 

Questions for the Record ......................................................................................... 69 

(III) 

(1) 

U.S. POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ AND SYRIA AND 

THE THREAT POSED BY THE ISLAMIC 

STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT (ISIL) 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 2014 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room SH– 

216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) 

presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Nelson, 

McCaskill, Udall, Hagan, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, 

Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, Inhofe, McCain, Sessions, Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Graham, Vitter, and Lee. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. The committee will come to order. We’re asking 

all the audience now to either take their seats and be quiet or 

please leave. 

This morning, the committee receives testimony from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 

the threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, 

known as ISIS or ISIL, and on the President’s strategy for addressing this threat. 

Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, we welcome you both. We 

look forward to your testimony. 

ISIS has terrorized the Iraqi and Syrian people, engaging in 

kidnappings, killings, persecutions of religious minorities, and attacking schools, hospitals, and cultural sites. ISIS has brought 

home its barbarity with the brutal beheading of American journalists, James Foley and Steven Sotloff, and British aid worker, David 

Haines. 

While ISIS is currently focused on building an Islamic caliphate 

in the Middle East, its poisonous ideology is hostile, not only to the 

region, but to the world, and there is real risk that the area it controls could become a launching pad for future terrorist attacks 

against the United States and our allies. This threat is amplified 

by foreign fighters who travel from Western countries to join with 

ISIS and then return to their countries of origin with advanced 

training and fighting experience. 

I recently returned from Iraq, where U.S. airstrikes are helping 

Kurdish Peshmerga forces and Iraqi security forces break ISIS’s 

momentum. However, our military leaders and intelligence experts 

2 

uniformly say that airstrikes alone will not be sufficient to defeat 

ISIS. A number of elements of a successful strategy against ISIS 

are embodied in the approach outlined by the President last week. 

First, the participation of key Arab states in the region will be 

critical to the effectiveness of any international coalition. If Western countries act in Iraq and Syria without visible participation 

and leadership of Arab nations, it will play into the propaganda 

pitch of the violent extremists that we are interested in dominating 

Iraq and Syria. ISIS’s poisonous strand of Islam is a threat to all 

Muslim countries and can only be purged in a lasting way by mainstream Islam in the Arab world. 

The international conferences in Jeddah last week and in Paris 

yesterday were a good start, with a number of Arab states declaring their shared commitment to develop a strategy, ‘‘to destroy 

ISIL wherever it is, including in both Iraq and Syria,’’ and joining 

in an international pledge to use, ‘‘whatever means necessary,’’ to 

achieve this goal. 

Second, our assistance has been requested by the Government of 

Iraq, which has made a commitment to govern in an inclusive manner. The effort to rid Iraq of ISIS cannot be successful without the 

support of all elements of Iraqi society, including not only Shi’ites, 

Kurds, and religious minorities, but also the Sunni tribes, who 

strongly oppose the Maliki Government. The more the new government in Baghdad does to address the grievances of Iraq’s Sunni 

communities, the more successful they will be in helping rid their 

country and the world of the ISIS poison. 

Third, the President has announced that combat operations in 

Iraq and Syria will be carried out by Iraqis and Syrians with the 

support of a broad international coalition. That is the better approach, because, in this part of the world, the use of military force 

by Western nations can be counterproductive if it is not done correctly. In the absence of a Western target on the ground, ISIS’s actions will undermine its own cause, because its brutality will continue to be targeted at fellow Muslims. We should be fully engaged 

in training and equipping Iraqis, Syrians, Kurds, and other local 

forces that are willing to take on ISIS, but we should try to counter 

the narrative of fanatics who attack Western combat forces on the 

ground as an occupation. 

I believe the President, under both domestic and international 

law, has the authority to conduct the type of limited military campaign that he outlined last week. However, bipartisan, bicameral 

congressional support will make it easier for the President to build 

an international coalition, including the open and visible support of 

Arab countries. We should have the chance, before we leave, to vote 

on legislation that would authorize the U.S. military to openly 

train-and-equip the vetted moderate opposition in Syria, and I hope 

that Congress can come together to support it. 

Senator Inhofe. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

After a year of the White House indecision and handwringing, 

the President finally presented to the American people his strategy 

3 

to defeat ISIS. That was announced last week, however, it fell 

short in two vital areas that I want to share with you. 

First, the President again failed to acknowledge the seriousness 

of the threat that ISIS poses to the U.S. national security in its 

homeland. His claim that America is safer may support his political 

narrative, but it’s not true. 

Secretary Hagel, I appreciate your honesty when you described 

ISIS on August 21 when you said that it’s a imminent threat to 

every interest we have, whether it’s in Iraq or anyplace else. I 

agree with you. ISIS has reported 35,000 fighters, nearly three 

times larger than it was in June. It’s tripled since June and is 

growing larger every day. It’s estimated that at least 2,000 fighters 

hold Western passports and at least 100 are U.S. citizens. This, 

coupled with their vast resources, large safe haven, blood, thirst to 

kill more Americans, is a recipe for disaster. The administration 

continues to say, ‘‘No specific evidence of plots against the homeland exist.’’ Now, I want to remind everyone that we didn’t have 

any specific evidence of plots against the homeland before September 11, 2001. 

Now we face an extremist organization that is larger, more brutal, better networked, and better funded than al Qaeda ever was. 

I believe it’s critical to have in the record and that we establish 

today, how ISIS is fundamentally different from al Qaeda. 

First of all, al Qaeda hides in caves. ISIS takes holds of governments’ territories the size of my State of Oklahoma. 

Second, al Qaeda has small groups of specialized fighters using 

terrorist tactics. ISIS is an army, with tanks, artillery, using conventional military, insurgent, and terrorist tactics. 

Al Qaeda is based in remote regions of the world. ISIS sits on 

Europe’s doorstep. 

Al Qaeda uses the outdated propaganda and Arab-language 

media, but ISIS uses sophisticated media in multiple languages, including English, to spread its cause to recruit fighters. Al Qaeda spent $1 million—this is very significant, Mr. Chairman—on September 11. ISIS, we were going to say, until today, 

takes more than $1 million every day. There is an Associated Press 

story this morning that shows, very convincingly, that they have 

access to an additional $3 million every day. 

Now, the second thing that I think is a vital area. The President’s strategy to defeat ISIS is fundamentally detached from the 

reality on the ground. Let’s be clear. ISIS commands a terrorist 

army comprised of tens of thousands of organized fighters who 

have tanks, antitank missiles, and artillery. Its conventional battlefield successes have allowed it to triple its ranks in size in only 3 

months. It will take an army to beat an army. However, instead, 

the President presented the limited counterterrorism strategy that 

he compared to his approach in Yemen and Somalia. The difference 

between al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia and that of ISIS are enormous, and our strategy for each should reflect that reality. Taking 

this one-size-fits-all approach is destined for failure. 

General Deptula, architect of the successful U.S. air campaign 

that destroyed the Taliban army on the battlefield in 2001, said, 

‘‘We need to institute an aggressive air campaign in which air 

power is applied like a thunderstorm, not like a drizzle.’’ FurtherVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:16 Mar 11, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\DOCS\93641.TXT JUNE
4 

more, airstrikes can only be fully effective, especially in the urban 

areas ISIS is entrenched in, when paired with skills of a trained 

air controller on the ground. The President, however, already ruled 

out boots-on-the-ground. There was a collective sigh of relief at 

ISIS headquarters in Syria when they heard him say that. His 

claim of ‘‘no boots-on-the-ground’’ is an insult to the men and 

women in Iraq today who are serving in harm’s way. We already 

have boots-on-the-ground, in Erbil, in Baghdad, and throughout 

Iraq. We should ask the pilots dropping bombs over Iraq whether 

they think they are in combat, pilots who have faced the real 

threat of having to eject over ISIS-held territory. I am not advocating an army division or combat elements on the ground, but it 

is foolhardy for the Obama administration to tie the hands and so 

firmly rule out the possibility of air controllers and special operators on the ground to direct airstrikes and advise fighter forces. It 

sends the wrong message to our troops, to the enemy, and to partners. 

Furthermore, if Congress does authorize the training and equipping of the Syrian moderate opposition, and then pushes them into 

combat without advisors on the ground, that effort is most likely 

to fail. 

We still don’t have the answers to the most important and fundamental questions about what we’re ultimately trying to accomplish. 

For example: What does a defeated or destroyed ISIS look like? 

Finally, I hope we get the answers today, not only to the President’s strategy, but also about the current state of our military 

residents. General Dempsey, nothing significant has changed, but 

when you warned, on February 12 of last year, that our military 

is on a path where the force may become, ‘‘so degraded and so unready that it would be immoral to use force’’—when 6 years of massive budget cuts and another round of defense sequestration is on 

the horizon, we are still on that path. Despite this, the administration is still calling on our military to support its pivot to Asia, bolster our European allies against a growing Russian threat, successfully transition our missions in Afghanistan, support the response 

to the ebola as we’ve heard this morning, with another 3,000 troops 

going to be going over there, and now to launch military operations 

against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Unlike what the President seems 

to believe, you can’t have it both ways. You can’t slash our defense 

budget, on one hand, while expecting our military to do it, on the 

other. If we want our military men and women to go into harm’s 

way and defend this country, we need to give them the training, 

the tools, and the support they need to succeed. Without a ready, 

capable military, the President’s imperfect strategy will remain 

what has become the trademark of this administration: a lot of 

tough talk that isn’t backed by meaningful action. 

I was hoping we could debate these broadly important issues 

with the National Defense Authorization Act, but we have not been 

able to do that, so it looks like, Mr. Chairman, that this is it. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

Secretary Hagel. 

5 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES T. HAGEL, SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE 

Secretary HAGEL. Chairman Levin, Senator Inhofe, members of 

the committee, Chairman Dempsey and I very much appreciate the 

opportunity—— 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay, would you—[directed to the audience] 

we’re asking you again to please sit down, and, if not, we’re going 

to ask you to leave. No, thank you—thank you for—would you 

please now leave? Would you please now leave? I am asking you 

to please leave. You’re acting very warlike, yourself. Would you 

please leave? 

Thank you. 

Secretary Hagel. 

Secretary HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, as I was saying, Chairman 

Dempsey and I very much appreciate the opportunity this morning 

to discuss the President’s strategy to degrade and ultimately defeat 

ISIL. 

As you all know, today, President Obama is in Atlanta, meeting 

with CDC officials regarding the ebola crisis, and then will travel 

tonight to Tampa to receive a briefing from the Commander of U.S. 

Central Command (CENTCOM), General Austin, on operational 

plans to implement his ISIL strategy. I’ll join the President tomorrow in Tampa for that briefing. 

The Department of Defense’s (DOD) civilian and military leaders 

are in complete agreement that the United States and our allies 

and partners must take action against ISIL and that the President’s strategy is the right approach. However, as President 

Obama has repeatedly made clear, American military power alone 

cannot and will not eradicate the threats posed by ISIL to the 

United States, our allies, and our friends and partners in the region. Iraq’s continued political progress toward a more inclusive 

and representative government and its programs of reform and reconciliation will be critical to achieve the progress required. We believe that the new Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi is committed to 

bringing all Iraqis together against ISIL. To support him and the 

Iraqi people in their fight, the coalition will need to use all its instruments of power. We intend to use all of those instruments of 

power—military, law enforcement, economic, diplomatic, and intelligence—in coordination with all the countries in the region. 

To succeed, this strategy will also require a strong partnership 

between our executive branch and our Congress. The President has 

made it a priority to consult with congressional leadership on the 

ISIL challenge, as have Vice President Biden, Secretary Kerry, and 

many senior members of the administration. I have appreciated the 

opportunities I have had to discuss the President’s strategy with 

many members of this committee and other members of the Senate 

and the House over the last couple of weeks. We will continue to 

consult closely with Congress as this campaign moves forward. 

ISIL poses a real threat to all countries in the Middle East, our 

European allies, and to America. In the last few months, the world 

has seen ISIL’s barbarity up close as its fighters advanced across 

western and northern Iraq and slaughtered thousands of innocent 

civilians, including Sunni and Shi’a Muslims and Kurdish Iraqis in 

religious minorities. ISIL’s murder of two U.S. journalists outraged 

6 

the American people and exposed to the world the depravity of 

ISIL’s ideology and tactics. Over the weekend, we saw ISIL’s murder of a British citizen. 

ISIL now controls a vast swath of eastern Syria and western and 

northern Iraq, including towns and cities in all of these areas. ISIL 

has gained strength by exploiting the civil war in Syria and sectarian strife in Iraq, and it has seized territory across both countries and acquired significant resources and advanced weapons. 

ISIL has employed a violent combination of terrorists, insurgent 

and conventional military tactics. ISIL has been very adept at developing technology in social media to increase its global profile 

and attract tens of thousands of fighters. Its goal is to become the 

new vanguard of a global extremist movement and establish an extremist Islamic caliphate across the Middle East. It considers itself 

the rightful inheritor of Osama bin Laden’s legacy. 

While ISIL clearly poses an immediate threat to American citizens in Iraq and our interests in the Middle East, we also know 

that thousands of foreign fighters, including Europeans and more 

than 100 Americans, have traveled to Syria with passports that 

give them relative freedom of movement. These fighters can exploit 

ISIL’s safe haven to plan, coordinate, and carry out attacks against 

the United States and Europe. 

Although the Intelligence Community has not yet detected specific plotting against the U.S. Homeland, ISIL has global aspirations. As President Obama has made clear, ISIL’s leaders have 

threatened America and our allies. If left unchecked, ISIL will directly threaten our Homeland and our allies. 

In his address to the Nation last week, President Obama announced that the United States will lead a broad multinational coalition to roll back the ISIL threat. More than 40 nations have already expressed their willingness to participate in this effort, and 

more than 30 nations have indicated their readiness to offer military support. President Obama, Vice President Biden, Secretary 

Kerry, and I and others have been working, and will continue to 

work, to unite and expand this coalition. 

At the NATO Summit in Wales, Secretary Kerry and I convened 

a meeting of key partners in the coalition. I then went to Georgia 

and Turkey. The Georgians made clear that they want to help. Turkey, by virtue of its geography and its common interest in destroying ISIL, which is holding 46 Turkish diplomats hostage, will play 

an important role in this effort. Turkey joined our meeting in 

Wales, and Secretary Kerry and I continue to discuss specific contributions Turkey will make. 

Secretary Kerry convened a meeting in Jeddah last week with 

the foreign ministers from the six Gulf Cooperation Council nations, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, and all signed a communique to do their share in the comprehensive fight against ISIL, including joining in the many aspects of a coordinated military campaign against ISIL. 

Also, last week 22 nations of the Arab League adopted a resolution at their summit in Cairo calling for comprehensive measures 

to combat ISIL. 

Yesterday, in Paris, French President Hollande, who traveled to 

Baghdad last weekend, hosted a conference attended by United NaVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:16 Mar 11, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\DOCS\93641.TXT JUNE
7 

tions (U.N.) Security Council Permanent Members, European and 

Arab leaders, and representatives of the European Union, Arab 

League, and U.N. They all pledged to help Iraq in the fight against 

ISIL, including through military assistance. 

Key allies, such as United Kingdom, France, and Australia, are 

already contributing military support, and other partners have 

begun to make specific offers. 

At next week’s U.N. General Assembly, we expect that additional 

nations will begin making commitments across the spectrum of capabilities, building on the strong Chapter 7 U.N. Security Council 

Resolution adopted last month, calling on all member states to take 

measures to counter ISIL and suppress the flow of foreign fighters 

to ISIL. 

Also next week, President Obama will chair a meeting of the 

U.N. Security Council to further mobilize the international community. As you all know, former International Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF) Commander and Acting CENTCOM Commander, 

General John Allen, has been designated to serve as Special Presidential Envoy for the global coalition to counter ISIL. President 

Obama is meeting with General Allen this morning. 

General Allen will work in a civilian diplomatic capacity to coordinate, build, and sustain the coalition, drawing on his extensive 

experience in the region. He will be the administration’s point man 

to coordinate coalition contributions and to build support within 

the region. He will work closely with General Austin to ensure that 

coalition efforts are aligned across all elements of our strategy. 

In his address to the Nation, the President outlined the four elements of this strategy to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL. Let 

me now describe how we are implementing this whole-of-government approach. 

First, in close coordination with the new Iraqi Government, we 

are broadening our air campaign to conduct systematic airstrikes 

against ISIL targets. To protect Americans threatened by ISIL’s 

advances and to prevent humanitarian catastrophe, the U.S. military has already conducted more than 160 successful airstrikes, 

which have killed ISIL fighters, destroyed weapons and equipment, 

and enabled Iraqi and Kurdish forces to get back on the offensive 

and secure key territory and critical infrastructure, including the 

Mosul and Haditha dams. These actions have disrupted ISIL 

tactically and have helped buy time for the Iraqi Government to 

begin forming an inclusive and broadbased governing coalition led 

by the new Prime Minister. That was one of President Obama’s essential preconditions for taking further action against ISIL, because the Iraqi people must be united in their opposition against 

ISIL in order to defeat them. This will require a united and inclusive government. This is ultimately their fight. 

The new broader air campaign will include strikes against all 

ISIL targets and enable the Iraqi security forces, including Kurdish 

forces, to continue to stay on the offensive and recapture territory 

from ISIL, and hold it. Because ISIL operates freely across the 

Iraqi/Syrian border and maintains a safe haven in Syria, our actions will not be restrained by a border in name only. As the President said last week, ‘‘If you threaten America, you will find no safe 

haven.’’ 

8 

The President of the United States has the constitutional and the 

statutory authority to use military force against ISIL in Syria as 

well as Iraq. CENTCOM is refining and finalizing those plans, 

which General Austin will brief to the President tomorrow in 

Tampa. This plan includes targeted actions against ISIL safe havens in Syria, including its command and control, logistics capabilities, and infrastructure. General Dempsey and I have both reviewed and approved the CENTCOM plan. 

The second element of the strategy is to increase our support for 

forces fighting ISIL on the ground, the Iraqi and Kurdish forces 

and the moderate Syrian opposition. To support Iraqi and Kurdish 

forces, the President announced, last week, that he would deploy 

an additional 475 American troops to Iraq. Part of that number includes approximately 150 advisors and support personnel to supplement forces already in Iraq, conducting assessments of the Iraqi 

security forces. This assessment mission is now transitioning to an 

advise-and-assist mission, with more than 15 teams embedding 

with Iraqi Security Forces at the headquarters level to provide 

strategic and operational advice and assistance. The rest of the additional 475 troops include 125 personnel to support intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions out of Erbil and 

200 personnel to increase headquarters elements in both Baghdad 

and Erbil, helping us better coordinate military activities across 

Iraq. 

By the time all these forces arrive, there will be approximately 

1,600 U.S. personnel in Iraq responding to the ISIL threat. But, as 

the President said last week, American forces will not have a combat mission. Instead, these advisors are supporting Iraqi and Kurdish forces and supporting the government’s plan to stand up Iraqi 

national guard units to help Sunni communities defeat ISIL. 

The best counterweights to ISIL are local forces and the people 

of the area. In June, the President asked Congress for the necessary authority for DOD to train-and-equip moderate Syrian opposition forces, and $500 million to fund this program. We have now 

secured support from Saudi Arabia to host the training program for 

this mission. Saudi Arabia has offered financial and other support, 

as well. The $500 million request the President made in June for 

this train-and-equip program reflects CENTCOM’s estimate of the 

cost to train, equip, and resupply more than 5,000 opposition forces 

over 1 year. The package of assistance that we initially provide 

would consist of small arms, vehicles, and basic equipment, like 

communications, as well as tactical and strategic training. 

As these forces prove their effectiveness on the battlefield, we 

would be prepared to provide increasingly sophisticated types of assistance to the most trusted commanders and capable forces. Because DOD does not currently have the authority to conduct a 

train-and-equip mission, the administration has asked Congress to 

provide the authority in the Continuing Resolution (CR) it is currently now considering. A rigorous vetting process will be critical 

to the success of this program. DOD will work closely with the Department of State (DOS), the Intelligence Community, and our 

partners in the region to screen and vet the forces we train-andequip. We will monitor them closely to ensure that weapons do not 

fall into the hands of radical elements of the opposition, ISIL, the 

9 

Syrian regime, or other extremist groups. There will always be 

risks in a program like this, but we believe that risk is justified by 

the imperative of destroying ISIL and the necessity of having capable partners on the ground in Syria. 

As we pursue this program, the United States will continue to 

press for a political resolution to the Syrian conflict resulting in the 

end of the Assad regime. Assad has lost all legitimacy to govern 

and has created the conditions that allowed ISIL and other terrorist groups to gain ground and terrorize and slaughter the Syrian 

population. The United States will not coordinate or cooperate with 

the Assad regime. We will also continue to counter Assad through 

diplomatic and economic pressure. 

The third element of the President’s strategy is an all-inclusive 

approach to preventing attacks from ISIL against the homelands of 

the United States and our allies. In concert with our international 

partners, the United States will draw on intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic, and economic tools to cut off ISIL’s funding, improve our intelligence, strengthen homeland defense, and stem the 

flow of foreign fighters in and out of the region. 

The Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security have launched an initiative to partner with local communities to counter extremist recruiting. The Department of Treasury’s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence is working to 

disrupt ISIL’s financing and expose their activities. 

The final element of the President’s strategy is to continue providing humanitarian assistance to innocent civilians displaced or 

threatened by ISIL. Alongside the Government of Iraq, the United 

Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and France, U.S. troops have already 

delivered lifesaving aid to thousands of threatened Iraqi civilians 

on Mount Sinjar and the Iraqi town of Amirli. In total, the U.S. 

military conducted 32 airdrops of food and supplies, providing over 

818,000 pounds of aid, including nearly 50,000 gallons of water and 

nearly 122,000 Meals Ready-to-Eat in these operations. In addition 

to this assistance, last week DOS announced an additional $48 million in aid for civilian organizations to meet the urgent needs of 

Iraqis displaced by ISIL. Our total humanitarian assistance to displaced Iraqis is now more than $186 million for fiscal year 2014. 

The United States is also the single largest donor of humanitarian assistance for the millions of Syrians affected by the civil 

war. Last week, Secretary Kerry announced an additional $500 

million in humanitarian assistance. Since the start of the Syrian 

conflict, the United States has now committed almost $3 billion in 

humanitarian assistance to those affected by the civil war. 

All four elements of this strategy require a significant commitment of resources on the part of the United States and our coalition partners. 

Mr. Chairman, I think everyone on this committee understands 

fully, this will not be an easy or a brief effort. It is complicated. 

We are at war with ISIL, as we are with al Qaeda. Destroying ISIL 

will require more than military efforts alone, it will require political progress in the region and effective partners on the ground in 

Iraq and Syria. As Congress and the administration work together, 

we know this effort will take time. The President has outlined a 

10 

clear, comprehensive, and workable strategy to achieve our goals 

and protect our interests. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, thank you for your continued support, and that of this committee, and your partnership. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Hagel follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. CHARLES T. HAGEL

Chairman Levin, Senator Inhofe, members of the committee: Chairman Dempsey 

and I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the President’s strategy to degrade and 

ultimately defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). 

Today President Obama is in Atlanta meeting with CDC officials regarding the 

Ebola crisis, and will then travel to Tampa to receive a briefing from the Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), General Lloyd J. Austin III, on 

operational plans to implement his ISIL strategy. I will join the President in Tampa 

tomorrow for that briefing. 

The Defense Department’s civilian and military leaders are in complete agreement that the United States and our allies and partners must take action against 

ISIL, and that the President’s strategy is the right approach. 

However, as President Obama has repeatedly made clear, American military 

power alone cannot eradicate the threats posed by ISIL to the United States, our 

allies, and our friends and partners in the region. Iraq’s continued political progress 

toward a more inclusive and representative government—and its program of reform 

and reconciliation—will be critical. We believe that Iraq’s new Prime Minister, 

Haider al-Abadi is committed to bringing all Iraqis together against ISIL. To support him and the Iraqi people in their fight, the coalition will need to use all its 

instruments of power—military, law enforcement, economic, diplomatic, and intelligence—in coordination with countries in the region. 

To succeed, this strategy will also require a strong partnership between the executive branch and Congress. The President has made it a priority to consult with Congressional leadership on the ISIL challenge, as have Vice President Biden, Secretary 

Kerry, and many senior members of the administration. I have appreciated the opportunities I’ve had to discuss the President’s strategy with members of this committee and other members of the Senate and the House over the last couple of 

weeks. We will continue to consult closely with Congress as this campaign moves 

forward. 

THE ISIL THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES

ISIL poses a real threat to all countries in the Middle East, our European allies, 

and to America. 

In the last few months, the world has seen ISIL’s barbarity up close as its fighters 

advanced across western and northern Iraq and slaughtered thousands of innocent 

civilians—including Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish Iraqis, and religious minorities. ISIL’s 

murder of two U.S. journalists outraged the American people and exposed the depravity of ISIL’s ideology and tactics to the world. Over the weekend, we saw ISIL’s 

murder of a British citizen. ISIL now controls a vast swath of eastern Syria and 

western and northern Iraq, including towns and cities in these areas. 

ISIL has gained strength by exploiting the civil war in Syria and sectarian strife 

in Iraq. As it has seized territory across both countries and acquired significant resources and advanced weapons, ISIL has employed a violent combination of terrorist, insurgent, and conventional military tactics. 

ISIL has also been very adept at deploying technology and social media to increase its global profile and attract tens of thousands of fighters. Its goal is to become the new vanguard of the global extremist movement and establish an extremist Islamic Caliphate across the Middle East. It considers itself the rightful inheritor 

of Osama bin Laden’s legacy. 

While ISIL clearly poses an immediate threat to American citizens in Iraq and 

our interests in the Middle East, we also know that thousands of foreign fighters— 

including Europeans and more than 100 Americans—have traveled to Syria. With 

passports that give them relative freedom of movement, these fighters can exploit 

ISIL’s safe haven to plan, coordinate, and carry out attacks against the United 

States and Europe. 

Although the Intelligence Community has not yet detected specific plotting 

against the U.S. Homeland, ISIL has global aspirations and, as President Obama 

11 

has made clear, ISIL’s leaders have threatened America and our allies. If left unchecked, ISIL will directly threaten our Homeland and our allies. 

BUILDING A COALITION IS KEY TO PRESIDENT OBAMA’S STRATEGY

In his address to the Nation last week, President Obama announced that the 

United States will lead a broad multinational coalition to roll back the ISIL threat. 

More than 40 nations have already expressed their willingness to participate in 

this effort, and more than 30 nations have indicated their readiness to offer military 

support. President Obama, Vice President Biden, Secretary Kerry, and I and others 

have been working in recent weeks to unite and expand this coalition. At the NATO 

Summit in Wales, Secretary Kerry and I convened a meeting of key partners in the 

coalition. I then went to Georgia and Turkey. The Georgians made clear that they 

want to help. Turkey, by virtue of its geography and its common interest in destroying ISIL, which is holding 46 Turkish diplomats hostage, will play an important role 

in this effort. Turkey joined our meeting in Wales and Secretary Kerry and I continue to discuss specific contributions Turkey can make. 

Secretary Kerry convened a meeting in Jeddah last week with the Foreign Ministers from the six Gulf Cooperation Council nations, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon . . . and all signed a communique ́ to ‘‘do their share in the comprehensive fight 

against ISIL, including . . . joining in the many aspects of a coordinated military 

campaign against ISIL.’’ 

Also last week, the 22 nations of the Arab League adopted a resolution at their 

summit in Cairo calling for comprehensive measures to combat ISIL. Yesterday in 

Paris, President Hollande of France—who traveled to Iraq last weekend—hosted a 

conference attended by the U.N. Security Council permanent members, European 

and Arab leaders, and representatives of the EU, Arab League and United Nations. 

They all pledged to help Iraq in the fight against ISIL, including through military 

assistance. 

Key allies such as the United Kingdom, France, and Australia are already contributing military support and other partners have begun to make specific offers. At 

next week’s U.N. General Assembly, we expect that additional nations will begin 

making commitments across the spectrum of capabilities, building on the strong 

Chapter VII U.N. Security Council Resolution adopted last month calling on all 

member states to take measures to counter ISIL and suppress the flow of foreign 

fighters to ISIL. Also, next week President Obama will chair a meeting of the U.N. 

Security Council to further mobilize the international community. 

Former International Security Assistance Force Commander and Acting 

CENTCOM Commander General John Allen, has been designated to serve as Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. President Obama 

is meeting with General Allen this morning. General Allen will work in a civilian, 

diplomatic capacity to coordinate, build and sustain the coalition, drawing on his extensive experience in the region. He will be the administration’s point man to coordinate coalition contributions and to build support within the region. He will work 

closely with General Austin to ensure that coalition efforts are aligned across all elements of our strategy. 

IMPLEMENTING PRESIDENT OBAMA’S STRATEGY

In his address to the Nation, the President outlined the four elements of this 

strategy to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL. Let me now describe how we are 

implementing this whole-of-government approach. 

1. Broader Air Campaign 

First, in close coordination with the new Iraqi Government, we are broadening our 

air campaign to conduct systematic airstrikes against ISIL targets. 

To protect Americans threatened by ISIL’s advances and to prevent humanitarian 

catastrophe, the U.S. military has already conducted more than 160 successful airstrikes which have killed ISIL fighters, destroyed weapons and equipment, and enabled Iraqi security forces and Kurdish forces to get back on the offensive and secure key territory and critical infrastructure—including the Mosul and Haditha 

Dams. 

These actions have disrupted ISIL tactically, and helped buy time for the Iraqi 

Government to begin forming an inclusive and broad-based governing coalition led 

by the new Prime Minister. That was one of President Obama’s essential preconditions for taking further action against ISIL, because the Iraqi people must be 

united in their opposition against ISIL in order to defeat them. This will require 

a united and inclusive government. This is ultimately their fight. 

12 

The new, broader air campaign will include strikes against all ISIL targets and 

enable the Iraqi security forces—including Kurdish forces—to continue to stay on 

the offensive and recapture territory from ISIL and hold it. 

Because ISIL operates freely across the Iraqi-Syrian border, and maintains a safe 

haven in Syria, our actions will not be restrained by a border in name only. As the 

President said last week, ‘‘if you threaten America, you will find no safe haven.’’ 

The President of the United States has the constitutional and statutory authority 

to use military force against ISIL in Syria as well as Iraq, and CENTCOM is refining and finalizing those plans, which General Austin will brief to the President tomorrow in Tampa. This plan includes targeted actions against ISIL safe havens in 

Syria—including its command and control, logistics capabilities, and infrastructure. 

General Dempsey and I have both reviewed and approved the CENTCOM plan. 

2. Increased Support for Iraqi Security Forces and the Syrian Moderate Opposition 

The second element of the strategy is to increase our support for forces fighting 

ISIL on the ground—the Iraqi forces, including Kurdish forces, and the moderate 

Syrian opposition. 

To support Iraqi security forces and Kurdish forces, the President announced last 

week that we would deploy an additional 475 American troops to Iraq. 

Part of that number includes approximately 150 advisors and support personnel 

to supplement forces already in Iraq conducting assessments of the Iraqi security 

forces. This assessment mission is now transitioning to an advise-and-assist mission, with more than 15 teams embedding with Iraqi security forces at the headquarters level to provide strategic and operational advice and assistance. 

The rest of the additional 475 troops include 125 personnel to support intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance missions out of Erbil and 200 personnel to increase 

headquarters elements in both Baghdad and Erbil . . . helping us better coordinate 

military activities across Iraq. 

By the time all these forces arrive, there will be approximately 1,600 U.S. personnel in Iraq responding to the ISIL threat. But, as the President said last week, 

‘‘American forces will not have a combat mission.’’ 

Instead, these advisors are supporting Iraqi security forces and Kurdish forces 

and supporting the government’s plans to stand up Iraqi National Guard units to 

help Sunni communities defeat ISIL. 

The best counterweights to ISIL are local forces and the people of the area. In 

June, the President asked Congress for the necessary authority for the Department 

of Defense (DOD) to train-and-equip moderate Syrian opposition forces, and $500 

million to fund this program. 

We have now secured support from Saudi Arabia to host the training program for 

this mission, and Saudi Arabia has offered financial support as well. The $500 million request the President made in June for this train-and-equip program reflects CENTCOM’s estimate of the cost to train, equip, and resupply more 

than 5,000 opposition forces over 1 year. The package of assistance that we initially 

provide would consist of small arms, vehicles, and basic equipment like communications, as well as tactical and strategic training. As these forces prove their effectiveness on the battlefield, we would be prepared to provide increasingly sophisticated 

types of assistance to the most trusted commanders and capable forces. Because 

DOD does not currently have the authority to conduct a train-and-equip mission, 

the administration has asked Congress to provide the authority in the Continuing 

Resolution it is currently considering. 

A rigorous vetting process will be critical to the success of this program. DOD will 

work closely with the Department of State, the Intelligence Community, and our 

partners in the region to screen and vet the forces we train and equip. We will monitor them closely to ensure that weapons do not fall into the hands of radical elements of the opposition, ISIL, the Syrian regime, or other extremist groups. There 

will always be risk in a program like this, but we believe that risk is justified by 

the imperative of destroying ISIL—and the necessity of having capable partners on 

the ground in Syria. 

As we pursue this program, the United States will continue to press for a political 

resolution to the Syrian conflict resulting in the end of the Assad regime. Assad has 

lost all legitimacy to govern, and has created the conditions that allowed ISIL and 

other terrorist groups to gain ground and terrorize and slaughter the Syrian population. The United States will not coordinate or cooperate with the Assad regime. 

We will also continue to counter Assad through diplomatic and economic pressure. 

3. Preventing Homeland Attacks 

The third element of the President’s strategy is an all-inclusive approach to preventing attacks from ISIL against the homelands of the United States and our alVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:16 Mar 11, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93641.TXT JUNE
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lies. In concert with our international partners, the United States will draw on intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic, and economic tools to cut off ISIL’s funding, 

improve our intelligence, strengthen homeland defense, and stem the flow of foreign 

fighters into and out of the region. The Department of Justice and the Department 

of Homeland Security have launched an initiative to partner with local communities 

to counter extremist recruiting, and the Department of Treasury’s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence is working to disrupt ISIL’s financing and expose 

their activities. 

4. Continued Humanitarian Assistance 

The final element of the President’s strategy is to continue providing humanitarian assistance to innocent civilians displaced or threatened by ISIL. 

Alongside the Government of Iraq, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and 

France, U.S. troops have already delivered lifesaving aid to thousands of threatened 

Iraqi civilians on Mt. Sinjar and the Iraqi town of Amirli. In total, the U.S. military 

conducted 32 airdrops of food and supplies, providing 818,500 pounds of aid including 45,500 gallons of water and nearly 122,000 meals ready-to-eat in these operations. 

In addition to this assistance, last week the Department of State announced an additional $48 million in aid for civilian organizations to meet the urgent needs of 

Iraqis displaced by ISIL. Our total humanitarian assistance to displaced Iraqis is 

now more than $186 million in fiscal year 2014. 

The United States is also the single largest donor of humanitarian assistance for 

the millions of Syrians affected by the civil war. Last week, Secretary Kerry announced an additional $500 million in humanitarian assistance. Since the start of 

the Syrian conflict, the United States has now committed almost $3 billion in humanitarian assistance to those affected by the civil war. 

A LONG-TERM EFFORT

All four elements of this strategy require a significant commitment of resources 

on the part of the United States and our coalition partners. 

This will not be an easy or brief effort. We are at war with ISIL, as we are with 

al Qaeda. But destroying ISIL will require more than military efforts alone . . . it 

will require political progress in the region, and effective partners on the ground in 

Iraq and Syria. As Congress and the administration work together, we know this 

effort will take time. The President has outlined a clear, comprehensive, and workable strategy to achieve our goals and protect our interests. Thank you for your continued support and partnership. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Secretary Hagel. 

Thank you. [Directed to the audience.] Would you please leave? 

Would you please leave the room now? We are asking you nicely, 

but—we are asking you nicely to please leave the room. Look, we 

are asking you nicely. Would you please leave the room? Thank 

you. We have asked you for the last time. Thank you very much. 

Thank you for leaving, and—thank you. Goodbye. 

Now, as soon as the noise is removed from the room. 

We would ask all of you to avoid these kind of outbursts. They 

are not doing anybody any good, including hearing what this testimony is, and they are not doing you and whatever your cause is 

any good, either. 

Thank you very much. Would you please—I am asking you nicely 

to please leave the room. We are asking you again. Would you 

please remove this gentleman? Thank you very much. Goodbye. 

Goodbye. Thank you. 

General Dempsey. 

STATEMENT OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, CHAIRMAN, 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

General DEMPSEY. Thank you, Chairman Levin and Ranking 

Member Inhofe, members of the committee. I do appreciate the opportunity to appear before you this morning. 

14 

Secretary Hagel has described in detail the elements of our strategy against ISIL. The role the U.S. military is taking is, in my 

judgment, appropriate. This is an Iraq-first strategy, but not an 

Iraq-only one. 

Job one is empowering the Iraqi ground forces to go on the offensive, which they are already beginning to demonstrate. This requires a partnership with a credible Iraqi Government, which is 

also showing positive signs of becoming inclusive of all of its population. 

Within this partnership, our advisors are intended to help the 

Iraqis develop a mindset for the offensive and to take actions consistent with offensive. Our military advisors will help the Iraqis 

conduct campaign planning, arrange for enabler and logistics support, and coordinate our coalition activities. If we reach the point 

where I believe our advisors should accompany Iraq troops on attacks against specific ISIL targets, I will recommend that to the 

President. 

As long as ISIL enjoys a safe haven in Syria, it will remain a 

formidable force and a threat. While this work in Iraq is taking 

place, we will simultaneously pressure ISIL in Syria. With coalition 

partners and contributions, we will begin building a force of vetted, 

trained, moderate Syrians to take on ISIL in Syria. We will work 

to ensure that they have a Syrian chain of command and report to 

a moderate political authority. This force will work initially at the 

local and community level and help pull together Syrians who have 

most felt the harsh hand of ISIL. 

In conjunction with that long-term effort, we will be prepared to 

strike ISIL targets in Syria that degrade ISIL’s capabilities. This 

won’t look like a ‘‘shock and awe’’ campaign, because that’s simply 

not how ISIL is organized. But, it will be a persistent and sustainable campaign. 

I want to emphasize that our military actions must be part of a 

whole-of-government effort that works to disrupt ISIL financing, 

interdict the movement of foreign fighters across borders, and undermine the ISIL message. Given a coalition of capable, willing regional and international partners, I believe we can destroy ISIL in 

Iraq, restore the Iraq/Syria border, and disrupt ISIL in Syria. 

ISIL will ultimately be defeated when their cloak of religious legitimacy is stripped away and the population on which they have 

imposed themselves reject them. Our actions are intended to move 

in that direction. This will require a sustained effort over an extended period of time. It is a generational problem, and we should 

expect that our enemies will adapt their tactics as we adjust our 

approach. 

As the situation in the Middle East evolves and continues to demand our attention, we are also balancing other challenges in other 

regions, ebola being the most recent, along with reassuring our European allies against Russian aggression and continuing our mission in Afghanistan. Our young men and women in uniform are 

doing so much more. They conduct hundreds of exercises, activities, 

and engagements every day, actions that deter conflict and reassure allies around the world. They are performing magnificently. 

But, I am growing increasingly uncomfortable that the will to 

provide means does not match the will to pursue ends. The SecVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:16 Mar 11, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93641.TXT JUNE
15 

retary and I are doing what we can inside DOD to bridge that gap, 

but we will need your help. If we do not depart from our present 

path, over time I will have fewer military options to offer to the 

Secretary and to the President, and that is not a position in which 

I want to find myself. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, General Dempsey. 

We are going to have a 6-minute first round. We have a lot of 

us here, and we all want to have an opportunity. Then, if we go 

around once and have a reasonable hour facing us, we will try to 

have a very short second round. But, we just won’t know that until 

we get to it. 

General Dempsey, let me start by asking you for your professional military opinion of the military strategy which was announced by the President last week. Do you personally support the 

strategy? 

General DEMPSEY. I do, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Can you tell us why? 

General DEMPSEY. Because the nature of the threat is such that, 

as I mentioned, it will only be defeated when moderate Arab and 

Muslim populations in the region reject it. Therefore, the way forward seems to me to run clearly through a coalition of Arab and 

Muslim partners, and not through the ownership of the United 

States in this issue. 

The strategy does that. It seeks to build a coalition, encourage 

an inclusive government to address the grievances that have 

caused this in the first place. It applies U.S. military power where 

we have unique capability to do so. Over time, it allows those populations to reject ISIL. 

Chairman LEVIN. In terms of utilizing the ground forces that are 

Syrian and Iraqi rather than western forces, is that part of the 

thinking at this time, as well, to avoid a western ground force in 

an Arab or Muslim country, for the same reason that you just 

gave? 

General DEMPSEY. I do think that the approach to build a coalition and enable it leaves me to leverage our unique capabilities, 

which tend to be, as I mentioned, the ability to train and plan and 

provide intelligence and provide air power. 

As I said in my statement, however, my view at this point is that 

this coalition is the appropriate way forward. I believe that will 

prove true. But, if it fails to be true, and if there are threats to the 

United States, then I, of course, would go back to the President and 

make a recommendation that may include the use of U.S. military 

ground forces. 

Chairman LEVIN. Secretary Hagel, you’ve made reference to this, 

but I would like you to elaborate how important is it that the coalition have very strong visible participation by Arab and Muslim 

states? 

Secretary HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, you just reflected, in your question to General Dempsey, on the point, and I would pick up where 

General Dempsey left off. This is not a west-versus-east issue. This 

is not a U.S./European coalition against Muslim countries or a 

Muslim region. It’s important that the world see, especially the 

people of the Middle East see, that the threat that is confronting 

16 

them first, and all of us, needs to be addressed by the people of 

their region as well as all nations and all people in the world. To 

have Arab Muslim nations be present and public about their efforts 

in this coalition helps that. It’s critically important to the ultimate 

success of winning against all extremist factors and factions in the 

Middle East, specifically ISIL. 

Chairman LEVIN. That same approach of having the people of 

these countries basically purge the strand of Islam that is so poisonous that is trying to take over in their countries, is one argument for using indigenous national forces on the ground rather 

than outside, and particularly western forces. 

Secretary HAGEL. Yes. I said in my statement, Mr. Chairman, 

that the most significant powerful force against extremism in the 

Middle East is the people, themselves, who will not accept this 

kind of barbarity and brutality. The Muslims of the world know 

that what ISIL represents in no way is what their religion, what 

their ethnicity, what their background represents. To have the local 

forces be involved, supported by local people, is the most significant 

thing I think we can do as we support them, as we are doing and 

will continue to do in every way, to defeat ISIL and other extremist 

threats. 

Chairman LEVIN. I believe that you have testified that, on the 

equp and training of Syrian people—that the goal is to train-andequip about 5,000 in 1 year. Now, how is that going to match up 

against the ISIL numbers? Let me just start with that one. 

Secretary HAGEL. As I have said, and the President said, and 

General Dempsey has said, and I think in our briefings here, in our 

closed session briefings we have had with members of the Senate 

and the House and our staff here this week—5,000 is a beginning, 

Mr. Chairman. This is part of the reason this effort is going to be 

a long-term effort. 

We will do it right. We will be able to train-and-equip these 

forces through our ability to give them tactical, give them strategic 

guidance in leadership, the kind of equipment they need, where 

they can move not just as bands of a few people, but as legitimate 

forces. Five thousand alone is not going to be able to turn the tide; 

we recognize that on this side. On the ISIL side, on the different 

estimates that continue to come out, those estimates float, Mr. 

Chairman, because it is hard to pinpoint at any one time exactly 

what the strength of ISIL is. We know it’s significant. We know, 

because of their successes over the last few months, they have 

picked up significant support. We also know that a lot of that support is forced support, ‘‘You will either be part of this or your family is killed, or you will be killed.’’ It is an imperfect process. 

But, the 5,000 per year—and we may do better; we might be able 

to do better—but, we do not want to overstate or overpromise, because we want the right people, our part of the overall strategy 

that I articulated here, as outlined by the President. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would ask that you turn the maps over. This is just for reference. We put this together, with the help of the military, with the 

help of some think tanks, and the colors represented there, the orVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:16 Mar 11, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93641.TXT JUNE
17 

ange would be what is under ISIL control right now; the gray 

would be the Kurdish control; and then, the brown would be the 

ambitions of ISIL. 

Do you look at that map and find any problem with it, either one 

of you? 

[The information referred to follows:] 

General DEMPSEY. Actually, Senator, in terms of their ambition, 

I think that is probably understating their ambition. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. 

General DEMPSEY. I think, if left unaddressed, they would aspire 

to restore the ancient Kingdom of al-Sham, which includes the current state of Israel and runs all the way down to Kuwait. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes, we are trying to be conservative on this. 

General DEMPSEY. Yes. 

Senator INHOFE. But let people know, this is a big area. 

Secretary Hagel, do you have a problem with this? 

Secretary HAGEL. No. I think General Dempsey stated it exactly 

right. 

Senator INHOFE. All right. 

Okay. According to some of the reports, the U.S. intelligence 

agencies believe that ISIL does not represent the immediate threat 

to the United States. In fact, Daniel Benjamin, who was President 

Obama’s top counterterrorism advisor during his first term, he 

said, ‘‘Members of the Cabinet and top military officers all over the 

place describing the threat in lurid terms that are just not justified.’’ 

I appreciate, Secretary Hagel, the statement you made when you 

said that ISIS poses ‘‘an imminent threat to every interest we 


916ful1.eps
18 

have, whether it’s in Iraq or anyplace else.’’ Do you still agree with 

that statement? 

Secretary HAGEL. I do. 

Senator INHOFE. Do you, General Dempsey? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, I do, Senator. 

Senator INHOFE. One of the things that I was glad to see is that 

for the American people, there’s been a wake-up call. Last week, 

there was a CNN poll that said that 70 percent of the people in 

America believe it’s a threat to our Homeland. Then yesterday, another one came out. This was a Wall Street Journal poll, the same 

thing, 70 percent of the people. I think that wake-up call has 

taken. 

Now, when President Obama—and this gets back to some of the 

statements you made in your opening remarks—he said, ‘‘Our objective is clear. We will degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL 

through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy.’’ 

Now, it’s clear—and we have talked about this side—this is an 

army. I outlined, in my opening statement, the six basic differences 

between al Qaeda and what we are facing right now. Do you generally agree with that? 

General DEMPSEY. What I generally agree with, Senator, is that 

they have been using conventional tactics until such time as we applied air power, and that they’re beginning to adapt now. 

Senator INHOFE. Now you don’t agree that that strategy that we 

would impose against terrorists or some group is appropriate today 

with looking in terms of the giant army that we are facing. 

General DEMPSEY. No, I agree we have to build the capability of 

the ISAF and the Pesh to address it conventionally while also including a counterterrorism component in our strategy. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. 

Secretary Hagel, I would like to get in the record here as to who 

is in charge of the war, because we hear people like Ambassador 

Beecroft in DOS saying that they are in a lot of the control. If it’s 

CENTCOM Commander Austin, then I feel a lot better about it. Is 

that who is in control of this? It’s now military? 

Secretary HAGEL. Yes. In my opening statement, Senator, I tried 

to frame some of that up, for example, what I mentioned about 

General Allen’s role, initial role, as a coordinating role. But, I also 

said that he would work directly in that coordination with General 

Austin as the CENTCOM Commander. That’s why President 

Obama will be with the CENTCOM Commander in Tampa tomorrow to go over the plan. 

Senator INHOFE. Sure. 

Mr. Secretary, my concern is, I don’t want people to be under the 

delusion that this is just another terrorist effort that we are going 

to be pursuing. 

Asked by a reporter on September 11 to define victory against 

ISIL, the White House Press Secretary said, ‘‘I didn’t bring my 

Webster’s Dictionary with me up here.’’ Secretary Hagel, you didn’t 

bring yours, either. Can you define what victory looks like to the 

United States against ISIL? 

Secretary HAGEL. I believe victory would be when we complete 

the mission of degrading and destroying, defeating ISIL, just as the 

President laid out that was his objective. 

19 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. I understand that. I got a different interpretation when I listened to his speech. When he said, on the fight 

against ISIL, ‘‘It will not involve American combat troops fighting 

on the soil. American forces will not have a combat mission.’’ 

Let me ask you two questions, General Dempsey: First, in your 

opinion, are the pilots dropping bombs in Iraq, as they’re now 

doing, a direct combat mission? Second, will U.S. forces be prepared to provide combat search and rescue if a pilot gets shot 

down, and will they put boots-on-the-ground to make that rescue 

successful? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes and yes. 

Senator INHOFE. Good. I appreciate that. 

The last question I have, because I know I have gone beyond my 

time. We have been complaining about what has happened in the 

funding, and now we are looking at the sequestration and all of 

this. In light of all of this that’s occurred since we originally started 

talking about the funding that would be necessary, do you think we 

are adequately funded now to take care of all these things that we, 

as I stated in my opening statement and you have also agreed to? 

Where are we on our funding? Are we adequate? 

Secretary HAGEL. Two answers to your question. No is the first 

basic answer. But, the budget that we will be coming up here presenting, in a few months, will contain what we believe is going to 

be required to carry forward, for the longer term, this effort. In the 

short term, this is why we are asking for the $500 million authority for the train-and-equip. Plus, the President had asked, a few 

months ago, for a $5 billion counterterrorism partnership fund, 

plus a billion-dollar European initiative fund, as well. 

I think what General Dempsey said in his closing comments in 

his statement probably summarized pretty well. As you have noted, 

all of the different pressures that are now coming down on this 

country, residing, a good amount of it, at DOD, one of the things 

that we have been warning about is sequestration over the last 

year and a half. We will come forward in our budget for the next 

fiscal year with some new requests. 

General DEMPSEY. If I could just elaborate? On behalf of the 

Joint Chiefs, because we’ve discussed this frequently about our 

ability to balance capability, capacity, and readiness. 

Last year, we said that the size of the force that was projected 

over the course of the POM, over the Future Years Defense Plan, 

was adequate to the task if the assumptions made were valid. 

Some of the assumptions we made were about commitments, and 

some of the assumptions we made were about our ability to get 

paid compensation, healthcare changes, infrastructure changes, 

and weapon systems. We didn’t get any of those, actually, or very 

few of them, and the commitments have increased. We do have a 

problem, and I think it will become clear through the fall. It’s not 

a problem that we can solve just with overseas contingency operations (OCO). That is to say, the operational contingency funds. 

There’s a base budget issue here, too, we have to get at. 

Senator INHOFE. I know that’s true. But, you mentioned the 

Chiefs, and Odierno and the other Chiefs have come and testified 

in this room before us that, even before these things erupted, it 

20 

was not adequate. As we all know, risk increases when the adequacy is not met. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much. 

We have a quorum here now, and so I am going to ask the committee to consider the list of 2,458 pending military nominations. 

They have been before the committee the required length of time. 

Is there a motion to favorably report the nominations? 

Senator INHOFE. I so move. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is there a second? 

Senator REED. Second. 

Chairman LEVIN. All in favor, say aye. [A chorus of ayes.] 

Opposed, nay. [No response.] 

The motion carries. Thank you very much. 

[The list of nominations considered and approved by the committee follows:] 

MILITARY NOMINATIONS PENDING WITH THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

WHICH ARE PROPOSED FOR THE COMMITTEE’S CONSIDERATION ON SEPTEMBER 16, 

2014. 

1. MG Gustave F. Perna, USA, to be lieutenant general and Deputy Chief of 

Staff, G–4, U.S. Army (Reference No. 1465). 

2. Capt. Kathleen M. Creighton, USN, to be rear admiral (lower half) (Reference 

No. 1540). 

3. Capt. Todd J. Squire, USN to be rear admiral (lower half) (Reference No. 

1545). 

4. In the Navy, there are three appointments to the grade of rear admiral (list 

begins with Brian B. Brown) (Reference No. 1590). 

5. In the Army, there are 417 appointments to the grade of major (list begins 

with Stephen R. Abrams) (Reference No. 1604). 

6. In the Army, there are 420 appointments to the grade of major (list begins 

with Isaiah C. Abbott) (Reference No. 1605). 

7. In the Army, there are 862 appointments to the grade of major (list begins 

with Jason K. Abbott) (Reference No. 1606). 

8. MG Steven L. Kwast, USAF, to be lieutenant general and Commander and 

President, Air University (Reference No. 1943). 

9. MG Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, USAF, to be lieutenant general and Deputy 

Commander, United Nations Command Korea; Deputy Commander, U.S. Forces 

Korea; Commander, Air Component Command, Republic of Korea/U.S. Combined 

Forces Command; and Commander, Seventh Air Force, Pacific Air Forces (Reference 

No. 1944). 

10. Col. Scott G. Perry, ARNG, to be brigadier general (Reference No. 1945). 

11. Col. Joseph J. Heck, USAR, to be brigadier general (Reference No. 1946). 

12. BG Mark S. Inch, USA, to be major general (Reference No. 1947). 

13. VADM Philip S. Davidson, USN, to be admiral and Commander, U.S. Fleet 

Forces Command (Reference No. 1948). 

14. RADM Dixon R. Smith, USN, to be vice admiral and Commander, Navy Installations Command (Reference No. 1949). 

15. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel 

(Lisa L. Adams) (Reference No. 1950). 

16. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Richard 

D. Mink) (Reference No. 1951). 

17. In the Air Force, there are 11 appointments to the grade of major (list begins 

with David L. Allison) (Reference No. 1953). 

18. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel 

(Claudia D. Henderson) (Reference No. 1954). 

19. In the Army, there are 265 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel 

(list begins with Jesse Abreu) (Reference No. 1955). 

20. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Sun 

S. Macupa) (Reference No. 1956). 

21. In the Army, there are 450 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel 

(list begins with Brian S. Adams) (Reference No. 1957). 

21 

22. In the Army, there are 280 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel 

(list begins with Clark C. K. Adams II) (Reference No. 1958). 

23. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of captain (Edward J. 

Eder) (Reference No. 1959). 

24. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander 

(William A. Burns) (Reference No. 1960). 

25. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander 

(Kevin L. Bell) (Reference No. 1961). 

26. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of commander (Clayton 

M. Pendergrass) (Reference No. 1962). 

27. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander (Casey D. Ferguson) (Reference No. 1963). 

28. In the Navy, there are 71 appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander 

(list begins with Crystal R. Aandahl) (Reference No. 1964). 

29. In the Navy, there are 73 appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander 

(list begins with Cynthia N. Abella) (Reference No. 1965). 

30. In the Navy, there are 34 appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander 

(list begins with Christopher A. Adams) (Reference No. 1966). 

31. In the Navy, there are 35 appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander 

(list begins with Jesse D. Adams) (Reference No. 1967). 

32. In the Navy, there are 30 appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander 

(list begins with Jon A. Angle) (Reference No. 1968). 

33. In the Navy, there are 67 appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander 

(list begins with Todd A. Anderson) (Reference No. 1969). 

34. In the Navy, there are 73 appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander 

(list begins with Austin G. Aldridge) (Reference No. 1970). 

35. In the Navy, there are 182 appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander (list begins with Alwin L. Albert) (Reference No. 1971). 

36. LTG Tod D. Wolters, USAF, to be lieutenant general and Deputy Chief of 

Staff, Operations, Plans and Requirements, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force (Reference 

No. 2001). 

37. BG Veralinn Jamieson, USAF, to be major general (Reference No. 2002). 

38. MG John W. Nicholson, Jr., USA, to be lieutenant general and Commander, 

Allied Land Command, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Reference No. 2004). 

39. BG Paul M. Benenati, USAR, to be major general (Reference No. 2005). 

40. BG Michael A. Calhoun, ARNG, to be major general (Reference No. 2006). 

41. BG Bret D. Daugherty, ARNG, to be major general (Reference No. 2007). 

42. In the Army, there are three appointments to the grade of brigadier general 

(list begins with Raul E. Escribano) (Reference No. 2008). 

43. In the Army Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with Herbert J. Brock IV) (Reference No. 2009). 

44. In the Army, there are 125 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel 

(list begins with Syed Ahmed) (Reference No. 2010). 

45. In the Army, there are 26 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list 

begins with Bradley Aebi) (Reference No. 2011). 

46. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander 

(Gregory E. Oxford) (Reference No. 2012). 

47. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander 

(Benjamin I. Abney) (Reference No. 2013). 

48. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of commander (Joel N. 

Peterson) (Reference No. 2014). 

49. In the Navy, there are eight appointments to the grade of captain (list begins 

with Gregory C. Cathcart) (Reference No. 2015). 

Total: 2,458. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony. 

General Dempsey, we have had a debate going on and on about 

no boots-on-the-ground, some boots-on-the-ground, no boots-on-theground. It might help us all if you would clarify precisely what our 

forces are doing in Iraq today. You all suggested that if the situation changes, you might recommend or come to us with a recommendation that they would enhance their mission or change 

their mission. But, can you clarify what they are doing? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, I can. Thanks for asking, Senator. 

22 

First of all, I think everyone should be aware, when we talk 

about combat forces, that’s all we grow. When we bring a young 

man or woman into the military, they come in to be a combat soldier or a combat marine—we don’t bring them in to be anything 

other than combat-capable. But, that is different than how we use 

them. In the case of our contributions in Iraq right now, the airmen, as the ranking member mentioned, are very much in a combat role. The folks on the ground are very much in a combat advisory role. They are not participating in direct combat. There is no 

intention for them to do so. I have mentioned, though, that if I 

found that circumstance evolving, that I would, of course, change 

my recommendation. 

An example. If the Iraqi security forces and the Pesh were at 

some point ready to retake Mosul, a mission that I would find to 

be extraordinarily complex, it could very well be part of that particular mission to provide close combat advising or accompanying 

for that mission. But, for the day-to-day activities that I anticipate 

will evolve over time, I don’t see it to be necessary right now. 

Senator REED. One of the presumptions would be, because we are 

using air power, that there is sufficient capacity in the Iraqi forces 

to coordinate that air power on the ground? Is that the issue you 

are looking at, or that is an issue? 

General DEMPSEY. No, we have, Senator. Let me use the Mosul 

Dam operation as a great example of that. On the ground, we had 

the Peshmerga, and we had the counterterrorist service from the 

Iraqi security forces, and then, in an operation center in Erbil, we 

had our own folks, using predator feeds and a system we call the 

ROVER to be able to help the Iraqis manage the battle on the 

ground. Incredibly complex. Three languages: English, Kurdish, 

and Arab. We worked through it. It was a real challenge, but we 

worked through it. As we did, we learned some things about how 

to use advisors from remote locations. 

I am not saying this will work every place, every time. But, we 

pulled that mission off, and I think it’s a good template for future 

operations. 

Senator REED. I presume one of the areas you are really looking 

at is these capable Iraqis who can communicate and coordinate on 

the ground, their special forces particularly. 

General DEMPSEY. Trained by us, that’s right. 

Senator REED. Right. 

Mr. Secretary, the President’s proposing to train about 5,000 individuals a year to go back into Syria. The Saudis have agreed to 

host it in some manner. How do you integrate these forces back 

into Syria? Will they go in as units? What’s the plan after they are 

trained? Because I think that is part of the issue. 

Secretary HAGEL. Senator, one of the points that I made a couple 

of minutes ago, in answering Senator Inhofe’s question, was the 

point about training them as units so they can operate as units, 

which is, with your military experience, critically important as you 

build an effective opposition force, not just a hit-and-run group of 

rebels, but an effective force—command-control, tactics, strategy. 

So, yes, that is the fundamental training principle of how we begin. 

The length of the time here depends on a number of things, but 

we are probably talking about 8 weeks per cycle. That might move, 

23 

within a week or 2, but that’s the intent of how they would train 

up. 

The CENTCOM leaders are already focused on that, are already 

structured to do that, are preparing. One of the things the President will get tomorrow, as he spends the day with General Austin 

and the CENTCOM planners and commanders in Tampa, is taking 

him through that entire structure. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

General Dempsey, I think in your remarks, or the Secretary’s remarks, you suggested that the immediate operations will probably 

most likely be in Iraq, simply because we have the Iraqi National 

Security Forces, we are already partnering them, we just conducted 

strike. That will put ISIL in the position of, as we hopefully become 

more effective, of making a decision to reinforce or to respond in 

Iraq and weaken them in Syria or to pull back into Syria. I think 

your strategy is probably the most effective use of what we have 

at the time, but would you like to comment on that? 

General DEMPSEY. The strategy is to squeeze ISIL from multiple 

directions so that they can’t do what they have been doing, which 

is maneuver places where they’re not under pressure. If we can get 

the Government of Iraq to reach out to these populations that have 

been disadvantaged during the Maliki regime so that the ISIL 

doesn’t have a free-flowing stream in which to float, and if we can 

get the ISAF—and we have done an assessment of the 50 brigades 

of the ISAF around Baghdad, we know which ones are capable of 

partnering and improving their capabilities—if we can get enough 

of them to go on the offensive, both west and north, get the 

Peshmerga to squeeze from north to south, and then find a way, 

over time, in Syria initially to disrupt using air power, and eventually to pressure using a moderate opposition, then I think we place 

ISIL in an untenable position. In the middle of that, restore the 

border so they can’t flow back and forth freely. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank the witnesses. 

I understand that, according to your testimony, we will be training and equipping approximately 5,000 in 1 year. Is that correct? 

Secretary HAGEL. Yes. 

Senator MCCAIN. The estimates for ISIL now are that there are 

some 31,000 metastasizing in a very rapid fashion into a much 

larger force. To many of us, that seems like an inadequate response 

to what—— 

Chairman LEVIN. [Directed to the audience.] Would you please be 

quiet. I am asking you now to please leave the room. Please remove 

this lady. Please remove her. The disruptions are not going to be 

acceptable to anybody. They are not helping you in any way. Please 

remove the lady from the room. Thank you very much, to our Capitol Police officers. Thank you. 

Senator MCCAIN. I always appreciate special attention from this 

group, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.] 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator McCain. 

24 

Senator MCCAIN. Obviously, this group of 5,000, as you mentioned, in unit-sized deployments will be back in Syria, fighting 

against ISIL. They will also be fighting against Bashar Assad, 

which they have been doing for a number of years before ISIL was 

ever a significant factor. Now, they will be fighting against Bashar 

Assad. Bashar Assad will attack them from the air, which he has 

done, and with significant success, not only against them, but 

there’s been 192,000 people who have been slaughtered in Syria 

since the onset. If one of the Free Syrian Army is fighting against 

Bashar Assad, and he is attacking them from the air, would we 

take action to prevent them from being attacked by Bashar Assad? 

Secretary HAGEL. Senator, let me begin. To the first part of your 

question, the 5,000. 

Senator MCCAIN. Dispense with that. I’d like to answer the question. If the Free Syrian Army units are attacked from the air by 

Bashar Assad, will we prevent those attacks from taking place and 

take out Bashar Assad’s air assets, both helicopter and fixed wing, 

that will be attacking the Free Syrian Army units? 

Secretary HAGEL. We’re, first of all, not there yet, but our focus 

is on ISIL. That is the threat—— 

Senator MCCAIN. So we heard. 

Secretary HAGEL.—right now to our country and to our interests 

and to the people of the region. What we are training these units 

for, yes, is a stabilizing force in Syria, as an option, but the first 

focus is, as I just said, as the President laid out in his statement 

to the country—— 

Senator MCCAIN. I take it from your answer that we are now recruiting these young men to go and fight in Syria against ISIL, but 

if they are attacked by Bashar Assad, we are not going to help 

them. Is that correct? 

Secretary HAGEL. They will defend themselves, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. Will we help them against Assad’s air—— 

Secretary HAGEL. We will help them, and we will support them 

as we have trained them. 

Senator MCCAIN. Will we repel Bashar Assad’s air assets that 

will be attacking them? 

Secretary HAGEL. Any attack on those that we have trained who 

are supporting us, we will help them. 

Senator MCCAIN. I guess I am not going to get an answer. It 

seems to me that you have to neutralize Bashar Assad’s air assets 

if you are going to protect these people that we are arming and 

training and sending in to fight. 

Is that inaccurate, General Dempsey? 

General DEMPSEY. The coalition we are forming, Senator, won’t 

form unless—if we were to take Assad off the table, we would have 

a much more difficult time forming a coalition. I think what you 

are hearing us express is an ISIL-first strategy. I don’t think we’ll 

find ourselves in that situation, given what we intend to do 

with—— 

Senator MCCAIN. You don’t think that the Free Syrian Army is 

going to fight against Bashar Assad, who has been decimating 

them? You think that these people you are training will only go 

back to fight against ISIL? Do you really believe that, General? 

25 

General DEMPSEY. What I believe, Senator, is that, as we train 

them and develop a military chain of command linked to a political 

structure, that we can establish objectives that defer that challenge 

into the future. We do not have to deal with it now. 

Senator MCCAIN. That’s a fundamental misunderstanding of the 

entire concept and motivation of the Free Syrian Army. It is 

Bashar Assad that has killed many more of them than ISIL has. 

General DEMPSEY. I agree. 

Senator MCCAIN. For us to say that we are going to go in and 

help and train-and-equip these people, and only to fight against 

ISIL, you’re not going to get many recruits to do that, General. I 

guarantee you that. That’s a fundamental fallacy in everything you 

are presenting this committee today. 

Secretary Hagel, was the President right, in 2012, when he overruled most of his national security team and refused to train-andequip the moderate opposition in Syria at that time? 

Secretary HAGEL. Senator, I was not there at the time, so I am 

limited—— 

Senator MCCAIN. I’ll ask General Dempsey, then. He was there 

at the time. 

General DEMPSEY. I am sorry, Senator, when you asked the question—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Was the President right, in 2012, when he 

overruled his Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and Director 

of the CIA, and refused to train-and-equip the moderate opposition 

forces in Syria, which, according to your testimony, we are doing 

today? 

General DEMPSEY. Senator, you know that I recommended that 

we train them; and you know that, for policy reasons, the decision 

was taken in another direction. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Are you concerned, Secretary Hagel, about our southern border? 

We received testimony from our Homeland security people that our 

border is porous and the people who are now free to travel to the 

United States and also other radical elements might cross our 

southern border to attack the United States? 

Secretary HAGEL. I am always concerned about our borders. 

Senator MCCAIN. I mean, is that a serious concern of yours? 

Secretary HAGEL. I think we have to always look at these things 

as serious concerns. 

Senator MCCAIN. In other words, do you think we have to improve our border security, especially on the southern border? 

Secretary HAGEL. We can improve our border security. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

My time is expired. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator McCain. 

Senator Nelson. 

Senator NELSON. Senator McCain, you’re aware that there were 

published reports of covert training. 

Senator MCCAIN. I am aware of it. I am also aware of the scale 

of the training that was required. I am also aware of the situation 

today. I am also aware 192,000 people have been slaughtered, a lot 

of them with these so-called ‘‘barrel bombs,’’ and the use of chlorine 

26 

gas, which has caused a humanitarian disaster of incredible proportions. Yes, I am aware of that. 

Senator NELSON. General Dempsey, are you aware of the published reports of covert training? 

General DEMPSEY. Senator, we don’t comment in public about 

any aspect of covert training. 

Senator NELSON. Mr. Secretary, I believe that the President has 

the constitutional authority to go on and attack ISIS. This is going 

to be for the long haul. Eventually, this issue will have to come to 

Congress for authorization for the use of military force. You all 

have an appropriations request right now. 

My question is, if Congress does not approve—and I have heard 

some Members of Congress say that they are not going to vote to 

approve this $500 million request—if they did that and refused before we adjourn to go home for the election, what kind of message 

do you think that sends? 

Secretary HAGEL. I think that message would be very seriously 

misunderstood and misinterpreted by our allies, our friends, our 

partners around the world, and our adversaries. This is a clear 

threat, what the President has talked about, the threat to this 

country from ISIL, and what his request is, and reaching out to 

Congress for partnership as he has done, in consultation with 

many Members of Congress, to be partners in this effort to protect 

this country. If Congress would not agree to that request, it would 

be a pretty devastating message that we send to the world. 

Chairman LEVIN. [Directed to the audience.] All right, all right, 

would you please not take advantage of the freedom of this place? 

Will you please remove this lady from the room? Thank you. This 

disruption is not helping either the facts to be known or helping 

your cause in any way. 

Senator NELSON. Mr. Secretary, I’ve taken this position that I 

think the President has the constitutional authority to go on and 

attack inside Syria. The fact that you’re making this request, and, 

as you’ve testified here today, that you’ll train up 5,000 over the 

course of the next year, does that basically mean any kind of coordinated effort on the ground in Syria is delayed for a year? 

Secretary HAGEL. If we don’t have ground capability in a moderate opposition, yes, it affects a rather significant dimension of the 

overall strategy. 

Senator NELSON. Some people are saying that attacking ISIS, 

both in Iraq and Syria, is playing into their hands by them using 

that to divide Muslims against us. What is your opinion? 

Secretary HAGEL. This is why the coalition, including, out front, 

publicly, Muslim Arab countries, is so critical to this. I think in one 

or two of my answers this morning, as well as in my testimony, I 

noted that. 

Senator NELSON. Can you shed any more light—as ISIS, as one 

of the two of you have testified, recedes into an urban area and 

takes shelter there among a civilian population, how, in Iraq, for 

example, can the Iraqi security forces be able to root them out of 

that civilian territory? 

Secretary HAGEL. This, again, is why we need the people, themselves, in Iraq, in Syria, to support a unified unity, inclusive, representative government in Iraq to help them do that. The Sunni 

27 

tribes are critical to this. What’s allowed so much of this to happen, 

Senator, as you visited there many times, is—the last government 

in Iraq, over the last 5 years, have actually exacerbated the effort 

and intentionally destroyed the capability of a unity government to 

bring in the Sunni/Shia/Kurdish populations to a government that 

they would trust, that they could have confidence in, that they 

knew would work in everyone’s interest. Your question cuts directly 

to the overall effort, here, of what the President talked about in a 

new, inclusive unity government, which we have some confidence 

in, but we believe that a body will do. So far, in his appointments 

to his cabinet, we have seen evidence of that inclusiveness. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson. 

Senator Wicker. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony today. 

Here’s how I view it. The surge in Iraq, ordered by President 

George W. Bush, worked. President Obama rejected the advice of 

many of his top military leaders to leave a residual force. Our administration did not make every effort that it possibly could to gain 

a Status of Forces Agreement in Iraq. We completely withdrew. 

Now ISIS is there, controlling large parts of the territory and 

wreaking the havoc that the President’s responding to. 

I am willing to help the President, and to help you gentlemen, 

take this hill again if I believe there is a plan that will work and 

be successful. If training 5,000 troops by the end of 1 year is going 

to help us be successful against something that’s already metastasized, and at 31,000, which is the size of ISIS now, I want to help, 

if we can be convinced it will work, and also if we can have some 

assurance that we will not throw away our gains this time, as we 

did after the surge worked. 

General Dempsey, in answer to the question by the chairman of 

this committee, ‘‘Do you support the President’s strategy?’’ you say 

that you do. Now, the Washington Post reports that Mr. Obama 

has rejected the recommendation of his top military commanders 

that U.S. Special Operation Forces be deployed to assist Iraqi army 

units in fighting the rebels. Is that report by Rajiv Chandrasekaran 

correct, in the Washington Post? Where did you come down on that 

recommendation? 

General DEMPSEY. No, that report is not correct. Where I came 

down on the recommendation, in terms of having advisors accompany—this is the issue we’re describing, whether advisors, who are 

already there and generally resident in headquarters—whether 

they would accompany the Iraqi security forces into combat. I have 

not come to an occasion where I believe that’s necessary. They are 

doing fine. We’re able to provide them air power using full motion 

video and systems—— 

Senator WICKER. Who is doing fine? 

General DEMPSEY. The Iraqi security forces and the Peshmerga 

are moving back on the offensive. 

As I said, Senator, if I get to the point where, for a particular 

mission, I think they should accompany, I’ll make that recommendation. 

Senator WICKER. Yes, and I did hear you say that, and I at least 

appreciate that. 

28 

Let me submit for the record a column in today’s Washington 

Post, Mr. Chairman, by Marc Thiessen, wherein he talks about 

General Lloyd Austin, a top commander, U.S. Forces in the Middle 

East. To quote Mr. Thiessen, ‘‘In 2010, General Austin advised 

President Obama against withdrawing all U.S. forces from Iraq, 

recommending that the President instead leave 24,000 U.S. troops 

to secure the military gains made in the surge and to prevent a terrorist resurgence. Had Obama listened to Austin’s counsel, the rise 

of the Islamic State could have been stopped.’’ Where did you come 

down on that debate, General Dempsey, at that point? 

[The information referred to follows:] 


916ful2.eps
29 


916ful3.eps
30 

General DEMPSEY. Actually, Senator, we don’t debate anything in 

the military. We provide options and let our elected officials make 

their decisions. 

It’s well known that all military leaders believed we needed to 

leave some residual force in Iraq to continue the development of 

the security forces. There is a debate, in which I am not a participant, about whether we tried as hard as we could to leave it there. 

That’s a debate that will continue, I believe. But, I thought we 

should have left forces there. I traveled to Iraq, as the Chief of 

Staff of the Army at the time, and I discussed it with the Prime 

Minister. 

Look, I don’t know how history will exactly describe this. Let me 

describe Nouri al-Maliki as a very difficult partner most of the 

time, and in particular on that issue. 

Senator WICKER. On the issue of trying hard enough, I think 

anybody that’s really observed the situation would acknowledge 

that a U.S. Government that can go into Iraq today and persuade 

the Prime Minister to step down could certainly have mustered the 

skills to get them to sign a Status of Forces Agreement. It’s obvious 

to me that we didn’t try very hard. 

Let me just reiterate to you, I want us to win. I want us to defeat 

ISIS. But, I want a plan that can be successful, and I am not sure 

5,000 trained in a year can be successful against 31,000. I want to 

make sure that we don’t make the same mistake again by throwing 

those gains away. 

One quick question to you, Secretary Hagel. In reading your testimony about what the coalition partners are going to do, I have 

no idea specifically what we are asking of them or what we can expect. They’ve expressed their willingness, they’ve indicated their 

readiness, they want to help, to do their share, begin making commitments, take measures to suppress the flow. I have no idea, 

based on your testimony, what our coalition partners are expected 

to do, or even what we want them to do. 


916ful4.eps
31 

Secretary HAGEL. Senator, my intent was not to give you that inventory this morning and go through that. 

Senator WICKER. Are you able to? 

Secretary HAGEL. We can do that privately, in closed session, 

with a number of countries. That’s what we’re doing right now. 

We’re in the process of doing that right now. As I mentioned, over 

the last 2 weeks, we’ve been building the coalition. We’ve been organizing the coalition. General Allen’s main job, as I noted in my 

testimony, is doing that right now. He’s meeting with the President 

this morning. We have all finalized that effort. We have a list of 

over 40 nations who we have talked to. Most have come to us, who 

have volunteered specific areas of expertise, what they would do. 

We’ll make specific requests. That’s ongoing right now. That’s part 

of the plan the President discussed. 

Senator WICKER. Will Saudi pilots in Saudi jets be involved in 

airstrikes? 

Secretary HAGEL. Like I said, it’s part of the plan, and I don’t 

want to get into the specifics of that in an open hearing. But, as 

I said in my testimony, as Secretary Kerry has said as recently as 

yesterday, we have Middle Eastern allies who have said that they 

will be involved in military operations with us. For right now, at 

an open hearing, let me leave it that way. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Secretary HAGEL. Let me assure you that that is going on right 

now, and it’s a key part of what we need to do. 

General DEMPSEY. If I could assure the Senator that, when Lloyd 

Austin and I convene a Chief of Defense Conference soon, after the 

President approves the campaign plan, there’s a couple of things 

we have to accomplish. One is, we need to make the campaign plan 

the Iraqi campaign plan, not CENTCOM’s campaign plan. Second, 

the contributions of, in particular, the Arab nations need to be real. 

This is military, now. I’m not looking for political support, I’m looking for special forces advisors, I’m looking for trainers, I’m looking 

for tankers, I’m looking for ISR, and I’m looking for strike aircraft. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator McCaskill? 

Senator MCCASKILL. Just to clarify a different set of circumstances, when Maliki and the Government of Iraq told us to get 

out and refused to do a Status of Forces Agreement, I am pretty 

sure Iran was with them on that, correct? Iran was very close to 

Maliki, and Iran wanted us out of Iraq as much as the Iraqi Government did at that point in time. Is that a correct assessment, 

Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, I guess I’m stuck with this one because 

I was the one here, right? Here I am, I said I did not want to get 

into the debate; now I am in the debate. 

You know what? Who knows what was going through Prime Minister Maliki’s head at the time. I can tell you from personal contact 

with him, he had a almost obsessive notion of his sovereignty and 

wanting to establish it. Was he influenced by Iran? Undoubtedly. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. 

General DEMPSEY. It is pretty hard to say, Senator. But, what I 

will tell you, he was a very reluctant partner. 

32 

Senator MCCASKILL. I guess the point I am trying to make is, it’s 

a much different situation now, in terms of getting Maliki to step 

down. Iran was very concerned about ISIL taking over Iraq and 

what that meant. Clearly there was pressure being exerted for 

Maliki to step down, by Iran. I think, for us to take credit for getting Maliki to step down is unrealistic, in light of what the geopolitical forces were in their neck of the woods at that point in 

time. 

Secretary HAGEL. I was here, on this episode, and I can tell that 

it wasn’t the United States that pushed Maliki out; it was his own 

people, Iran being part of that. It wasn’t the United States dictating that Maliki stay or not stay. Let’s not forget that Iraq is a 

sovereign nation, it has elections. We may not like the outcomes, 

but it is a sovereign country. That was the entire point when President Bush signed the December 2008 agreement to leave Iraq. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. 

Secretary HAGEL. It was a sovereign nation. The United States 

didn’t force or push, through some new system of influence, Maliki 

out. It was the people that made that decision. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I want to touch on the issue of the Shia militia. As we looked at the surge, one of our successes in the surge 

was certainly our ability to bring over moderate Sunnis. That was 

noted at the time and talked about a great deal, about our ability 

to finally get the cooperation of a lot of moderate Sunnis. Clearly, 

the moderate Sunnis have thrown in with ISIL because of the political problems that they were confronted with, in terms of exclusion 

from the Iraqi Government. The clerics put out the call to repel 

ISIL to the Shia militias, and they have been partially responsible 

for the successes that have occurred on the ground. 

What are we doing? This is just one of many complex problems 

that presents itself in this tangle that we are in. One of the most 

complex is, how are we going to deal with the empowerment of the 

Shia militia within the Iraqi security forces, moving forward, as we 

try to ultimately get a political solution, which is a unified government and security forces that represent all parts of that country? 

General DEMPSEY. Couple of things, Senator. One is, I’m a little 

reluctant—in fact, I try not to ever talk about ‘‘the Sunni’’ as a 

monolithic block. If the Senator’s chart was still up there, it looks 

like ISIL has geographic objectives. It actually has tribal objectives. 

It eats its way tribe by tribe, wherever it goes. The fact that it ends 

up in Mosul is actually more happenstance of the tribe they are 

trying to pursue. If we showed the tribes on that slide, there would 

probably be 48 to 54 different tribes that ISIL has, in some ways, 

coerced or co-opted or driven away. The Sunni are not monolithic 

in any sense, and we have to remember that. 

The second thing is, on your question about the Shia militia. I 

think our offer of support, here, will be conditional. For example, 

there were 50 Iraqi brigades that we assessed, 26 of them we assessed to be reputable partners. That is, to say, they have remained multi-confessional, they are well-led, they still have their 

equipment, they seem to have a certain cohesion and a commitment to the central government. The other 24 concerned us a bit 

on the issue of infiltration and leadership and sectarianism. 

33 

We can apply our support conditionally, and that’s the way we 

influence the outcome I think you’re discussing. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Finally, I’m assuming that this is a contingency operation and wanted to point out that the new provisions 

of the war contracting legislation that have been put into law 

should be applicable for this effort. I know that there is some talk 

that you’ve asked for cost estimates for security assistance mentors 

and advisors in Iraq through a contracting platform. I don’t know, 

are we building training facilities in Saudi, the American Government? If so, I just wanted to sound the alarm now, before rather 

than after, that all these contracting provisions that we’ve worked 

so hard to get into place, that we don’t go down the road of mistakes that we have traveled so frequently around this contracting 

space in contingencies. 

Secretary HAGEL. I can assure you, Senator, that any commitments we made, in contracting or anything else, we will follow the 

law clearly and consult with Congress. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCaskill. 

Senator Ayotte. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank both of you for your service during these challenging times. 

I wanted to follow up, General Dempsey, on a question that Senator Wicker had asked you about, about providing our advisors or 

our Special Forces, embedding them with the Iraqi forces. I believe 

you said that you don’t believe that that is necessary right now. 

Would you agree with me, though, that airstrikes are much more 

effective with having our Special Forces, or having a Joint Terminal Air Controller (JTAC) capability, in terms of the effectiveness of strikes on the ground, with our people? 

General DEMPSEY. It depends on the kind of contact that the two 

forces are having. Please let me explain. 

When the two forces are separate, when ISIL is at some geographic separation from the Iraqi security forces, it’s not very difficult at all to discriminate between the targets. 

Senator AYOTTE. Sure. Isn’t our problem with when they are not 

out in open space, when we have to distinguish between, for example, civilian targets and military targets, that our people are very 

effective at that? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, absolutely. That is where I was headed. 

If we get into a circumstance where the forces are very intermingled, then the target discrimination becomes more difficult. 

I will say, this isn’t a light switch, either you do it or you don’t. 

There are technologies available, that we didn’t have 5 years ago, 

that allow us to actually apply force and to see the situation on the 

ground in ways we couldn’t before. I’m not walking away from 

what I said. If we get to the point where I think we need the JTAC 

with the Iraqi security forces, I’ll make the recommendation. But, 

I’m not there. 

Senator AYOTTE. You do not think we need that at this time? 

General DEMPSEY. I do not. 

34 

Senator AYOTTE. Can I ask you a question? What was General 

Austin’s thought on this, given that he’s the CENTCOM Commander and his prior experience in Iraq? 

General DEMPSEY. On the Mosul Dam operation, the one I described earlier, which was very complicated, of the two different 

forces speaking two different languages, he did suggest that we 

should use the JTACs in an accompanying role. As we discussed it 

and worked through it, he found a way to do it, as I described it 

to you. 

Senator AYOTTE. He has not made recommendations, beyond the 

Mosul Dam operation, that we should embed our Special Forces or, 

certainly, JTAC capability with the forces? 

General DEMPSEY. Not at this time. No, he shares my view that 

there will be circumstances when we think that’ll be necessary, but 

we haven’t encountered one yet. 

Senator AYOTTE. I think we’ve had experience with this, though, 

haven’t we, prior in Iraq, with having our forces embedded, and 

also with Afghanistan, of our people being quite effective, in terms 

of targeting the airstrikes? You would agree with me? 

General DEMPSEY. Absolutely. We know how to do that. 

Senator AYOTTE. Yes. Thinking about as we are dealing with civilian populations, I’m not confident how this is going to happen 

without the assistance of our trained special operators on the 

ground, here. 

But, I appreciate that you’ve said that you have not ruled this 

out. 

General DEMPSEY. I have not, in terms of recommendations. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. Has the President ruled it out? 

General DEMPSEY. At this point, his stated policy is that we will 

not have U.S. ground forces in direct combat. So, yes. 

Senator AYOTTE. Including operators and JTAC embedded on the 

ground. 

General DEMPSEY. That’s correct. But, he has told me, as well, 

to come back to him on a case-by-case basis. 

Senator AYOTTE. Let me ask you about the threat that we face, 

Secretary Hagel, General Dempsey. So, General Allen, who I have 

great respect for, and I know both of you do, as well, he has been 

appointed the Special Presidential Envoy for the global coalition to 

counter ISIL. We all know his experience, not only in Iraq, but in 

Afghanistan. He has described in August ISIL as a clear and 

present danger to the United States. Do you agree with his characterization? 

Secretary HAGEL. Senator, I was asked the question earlier, 

whether I agreed, still, with what I had said. My words were 

quoted back to me about an imminent threat to America’s interests 

around the world. I said, yes, I do, ISIL is a threat to America, our 

allies, our interests around the world. I’m not going to answer for 

General Allen, but I think we all agree, at least within the administration—General Allen, General Dempsey, General Austin, me, 

the President, others—that ISIL is a threat. I said that in my testimony. The President of the United States said it last week in his 

speech. 

Senator AYOTTE. Do you believe it’s a present threat to us? 

35 

Secretary HAGEL. A present threat, meaning they murdered two 

Americans over the last couple of weeks. I’d say that’s a pretty imminent threat. 

Other threats that they have in—and how they threaten us—— 

Senator AYOTTE. Yes, I would agree. Our prayers continue to go 

out to the Foley and Sotloff families, who—Jim Foley was from 

New Hampshire, and Steven Sotloff went to school in New Hampshire, so I believe it’s an absolute clear and present threat to us. 

Let me ask you about the Americans who have joined. In the 

Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 

last week, we had testimony from our top Homeland security officials, as well as from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 

about the 100 Americans that have either gone to Syria or attempted to go to Syria. What I learned was that this is not a firm 

number. How confident are we that we have track of these individuals, that we know that there’s only 100 involved? 

I would ask the same question with regard to those who are 

holding Western passports, where we know that many of those 

countries—unfortunately, Jim Foley’s murderer had a British accent, and we have a visa waiver program with Great Britain. How 

confident are we in those numbers, as we look at this Homeland 

threat, the ability and track of those individuals to come back to 

the United States of America in some way. 

Secretary HAGEL. Senator, I think, like any of these threats, they 

always present imperfect situations. When you ask ‘‘how confident,’’ we are as confident as we can be, but you’re constantly 

working at trying to make it better, more secure. I announced 

today in my testimony, it was announced a couple of days ago, 

what we’re doing with Homeland security, what we’re doing with 

the Deparment of Justice, what we’re doing with our Border Patrol, 

in coordination with all of these other nations, on identifying these 

individuals that we do know, or we are pretty sure of, are in the 

Middle East, Syria, or wherever. There may be some we don’t 

know. We’re constantly refining and focusing on this. I don’t think 

we can ever be too confident that we have it all. But, we have some 

confidence that we do have the numbers about right. 

Senator AYOTTE. I thank you. My time is up. What I heard in 

the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee last week did not give me a great degree of confidence, in 

terms of what we don’t know, because the FBI has basically said 

that 100 number could be many more; and also we know less, even, 

about those where we do not always have full intelligence-sharing 

with all the Western passport-holders. 

Secretary HAGEL. No, that’s right. 

Senator AYOTTE. I think this is a real issue for us. 

Secretary HAGEL. It is an issue. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. 

Secretary HAGEL. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Wicker made a request that I failed to acknowledge, that 

a column from the Washington Post be inserted in the record. It 

will be inserted in the record. 

I will also insert in the record Secretary Gates’s paragraph, 

which reads as follows in his book: ‘‘In the end, the Iraqi leadership 

36 

did not try to get an agreement through their parliament that 

would have made possible a continued U.S. military presence after 

December 31. Maliki was just too fearful of the political consequences. Most Iraqis wanted us gone.’’ 

Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning, gentlemen. 

It is very clear that ISIL presents a very serious threat to U.S. 

interests and allies in the Middle East, and the group’s actions 

have left no doubt that it’s going to take both brains and brawn 

to defeat them. We have to hit them hard. We have to deny them 

safe haven. We have to bring strategic capabilities of the United 

States and a committed international alliance to bear against 

them. We need to work with our partners on the ground to eliminate the conditions that have allowed this cancer to spread so 

quickly. The rise of ISIL should serve as a warning to leaders 

throughout the Middle East. I would urge, as I think we all have, 

that the new Iraqi Government must take immediate steps to move 

past the shortsighted and harmful policies that have contributed to 

the current crisis. 

This is going to take our best effort. I know we have it in us. We 

do need to get it right. 

General Dempsey, in that spirit, let me direct a question to you. 

In order to defeat this enemy, we will need to be tough and smart. 

You noted, last month, that defeating ISIL will require all application of all tools of national power: diplomatic, economic, information, and military. Could you describe how these tools would be 

used as part of a well-planned international effort to confront this 

threat? 

General DEMPSEY. First, let me align myself with your assertion 

that an inclusive Government of Iraq that reconciles the three 

major groups—Sunni, Shia, and Kurd—is absolutely a necessary 

precondition to the defeat of ISIL inside of Iraq. 

To your point, there has to be an integration of diplomatic, economic, in the sense of support for the Government of Iraq, as well 

as counterfinancing efforts so that the money that a Senator previously described that ISIL is garnering every day can be interdicted, tracked, and disrupted, the flow of foreign fighters. Those 

are strategic regional issues, really, because ISIL knows no boundaries, knows no borders. It’s not a matter of convenience that we 

form a coalition, it’s a matter of necessity. 

Strategically and tactically, we have to get enough of the Iraqi 

security forces and enough of the Peshmerga to go from defense to 

offense, to put it about as bluntly as we can. As we do, the Government of Iraq has to fill in behind that. 

To be candid, the three big risks that I would mention to you are 

if the Government of Iraq fails to become inclusive—and, though 

the signs are promising, they haven’t yet fully delivered; second, if 

a coalition forms, but doesn’t have endurance—because this is 

going to take several years; and then the third risk is retribution— 

when we encourage and assist the Iraqi security forces and the 

Pesh to regain lost territory, we have to be alert for the fact that, 

unless the Government of Iraq is there to embrace the people and 

37 

show that they work together, there could be some retribution on 

the part of those who may have been seen as complicit with ISIL. 

We have some challenges ahead, but we are open-eyed to them, 

and I think we have a good campaign plan. 

Senator UDALL. I’d follow up on that. You have significant experience on the ground in Iraq, and I think you know the region as 

well as anyone. Our military will be able to provide advice and assistance, clearly, but can you explain the reasons why it’s important for the Iraqi security forces to take the lead in fighting back 

against ISIL on the ground? 

General DEMPSEY. The author, Tom Friedman, has a famous saying that, ‘‘no one in the history of mankind has ever washed their 

rental car.’’ I find that to be a good way to remember that ownership is ultimately what measures commitment. I think it’s clear 

that they have to own this—with our help and with the help of regional partners, but they have to own it. 

Senator UDALL. I talked with Senator Graham last week, and we 

were discussing the fact that it’s, I think, now time for the Arab 

leaders to really, truly step up. If this isn’t an existential threat to 

them, it’s certainly close to one. I think that’s what you are saying 

and what we’re saying, as the United States. 

Mr. Secretary, good to see you. Do you consider ISIL to be an associated force of al Qaeda? Could you explain your reasoning? 

Secretary HAGEL. It has been an associated force of al Qaeda. It 

has, over time, essentially displaced al Qaeda. But, there are still 

affiliations, to this day. However, it has been associated with al 

Qaeda. 

Senator UDALL. General Dempsey, let me turn back to you. 

We’ve been talking about Syria. It’s, I think, one of the most complex military environments we’ve ever seen. As you plan the mission to train-and-equip moderate Syrian opposition forces, how does 

DOD define ‘‘moderate,’’ and how do we take further steps to ensure that the weapons and the training we provide won’t fall into 

the hands of these extremists groups? 

General DEMPSEY. Senator, I’d suggest to you that, though I recommended doing this a couple of years ago, we’ve learned a lot in 

the intervening time. We’ve learned a lot because of the nonlethal 

assistance we’ve provided, because we’ve had to make contacts with 

certain groups in order to flow that nonlethal assistance. We’ve 

learned a lot, as well, from our coalition partners who have been 

interacting with the Free Syrian Army. We also have learned some 

lessons in vetting in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. We are very 

closely partnered with our intelligence agencies. I would suggest to 

you that we’ve come a long way in our ability to vet. 

In terms of defining a moderate opposition, I don’t think that’ll 

be as difficult, actually. The region has become so polarized that 

those who are radical in their ideologies have made their move, 

and those that have not have actually demonstrated great courage 

in not making a move. 

I think we’ll be able to find the moderate opposition. I hope we 

can find them in the right numbers. 

By the way, the 5,400 is capacity. It’s just what we can throughput at several training bases in the course of a year. As the SecVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:16 Mar 11, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93641.TXT JUNE
38 

retary said, it’s not the desired end state for a moderate Syrian opposition. 

One last thing about developing a Syrian opposition. It really 

needs to be developed with a chain of command responsive to some 

Syrian political structure, not responsive to us. These can’t be simply surrogates and proxies; they have to be tied, linked to some political structure that ultimately could assist in the governing of 

Syria when, finally, the Assad regime is either overthrown or, 

through the negotiation, is changed. 

The important difference in what we’re trying to do, here, is 

build a force that can, over time, actually contribute to stability in 

Syria, not just fight. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Udall. 

Senator Vitter. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for your service, very much. 

Did either or both of you give the President any advice regarding 

a possible new Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)? If 

so, what was it? 

Secretary HAGEL. Senator, obviously the question of authority 

was asked early on as we developed a strategy and our advice to 

the President. Does he have the constitutional authority which he 

believes he does? His legal counsel told him he did. Does he have 

the statutory authority, which he believes he does, and he has said 

that as to his legal counsel saying the same thing. We believe that 

he has both statutory and constitutional authority. That was a recommendation that I made. 

He also noted, as you recall from last week’s statement to the 

American public, that he welcomed any additional authority that 

the President would give him, because he, feeling strongly that it 

is important that a strong partnership between Congress and the 

President always be established and always be seen in the eyes of 

the world. 

Senator VITTER. Let me restate my question. You’re saying he 

has legal authority without a new AUMF. A new AUMF could, nevertheless, be helpful. Did either or both of you give him advice 

about whether to seek one? 

Secretary HAGEL. I’ll speak for myself, and the Chairman can answer it. I did not advise him to seek any additional authority. I 

asked our general counsel and our attorneys what they thought, 

but I did not specifically say to—— 

Senator VITTER. General? 

General DEMPSEY. No, I haven’t had a conversation in the interagency about what a new AUMF would look like. 

Senator VITTER. Okay. The current estimate of ISIS fighters is 

about 35,000. Is that correct? 

General DEMPSEY. I think the last number I saw was actually 

31,000, but it’s an inexact science because of the fact that there are 

tribes that are coopted. 

Senator VITTER. Right. 

General DEMPSEY. Sometimes they would be counted in that 

number, but their heart’s not in it. But, the latest number is 

31,000. Right. 

39 

Senator VITTER. That number in the low- to mid-30s is clearly a 

huge growth over the last several months, correct? 

General DEMPSEY. It is. I assess it’s growth because of their success. The reporting probably lags facts on the ground. When that 

report was assembled, they were at their height of success. 

Senator VITTER. What’s your best guesstimate about what it 

might be a year from now? 

General DEMPSEY. I haven’t formed one, so I’d be happy to take 

that one for the record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The environment that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) will find 

themselves operating in the next year combined with the continuing pressure by coalition forces will influence the size and reach of ISIL in 2015. We have low confidence in the current estimate of 31,000 ISIL members and armed Sunni supporters. Continued pressure by coalition forces through military operations, reinforced with efforts to stem recruitment and deny movement of foreign fighters, could 

cause ISIL’s size to fall below current estimates. 

Senator VITTER. Okay. Given that number, and presumably increasing numbers, I take it everyone agrees some fighting force on 

the ground on the other side is necessary. What do you think that 

number has to be over time? 

General DEMPSEY. Do you mean the other side of the border, sir, 

or do you mean—— 

Senator VITTER. No, no, no. I mean our side of the fight against 

ISIS. 

General DEMPSEY. In Iraq, I think the combined forces of that 

part of the Iraqi Security Forces remain viable, and the Pesh, is 

adequate to the task of defeating ISIL in Iraq. I have concerns 

about the Syria side of this, for obvious reasons. 

Senator VITTER. Again, what do you think the Syrian number on 

our side of the fight needs to move to? 

General DEMPSEY. The problem on the Syrian side is less about 

how big the moderate opposition should become and more about 

how the lack of an inclusive government in Damascus affects the 

equation. In other words, the environment inside of Syria remains 

ripe for groups like ISIS because of the unwillingness of the Syrian 

regime to reach out to the Sunni population, which makes it challenging to determine how big a ground force would have to be. 

Senator VITTER. I mean, do you have any number in mind, any 

guesstimate about, as we speak, what would be a minimal optimal 

ground force? 

General DEMPSEY. Some time ago when this came up, in looking 

at the kind of tasks that we might assign to a force of that size, 

to include, for example, restoring the Syrian side of the Iraq/Syria 

border, the number that our military planners were considering 

was about 12,000. 

Senator VITTER. Okay. Besides training up Syrians on our side, 

what are the plans to add to that number to come up with a significant fighting force on our side in Syria? 

General DEMPSEY. Besides the train-and-equip mission we’ve just 

described—or we’re describing? 

Senator VITTER. I mean, I take it the train-and-equip mission 

we’re all in favor of can’t approach that number anytime soon, that 

we know of. 

40 

General DEMPSEY. That’s why I’ve said, consistently, this takes 

a persistent and enduring commitment. But, not anytime soon, 

that’s correct. 

But, I’ll tell you, if you’re asking me, ‘‘How does the opposition 

in Syria finally prevail against ISIL?’’—I think it’s going to require 

the assistance of, in particular, Jordanians and probably some of 

the Syrian Kurds and probably the Turks. 

Senator VITTER. Going back to the overall ISIS number of 31,000 

or 35,000, what percentage of that would you guesstimate is in 

Syria? 

General DEMPSEY. About two-thirds. 

Senator VITTER. So, great majority in Syria. 

Okay, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Vitter. 

Senator Hagan. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, thank you for your service. 

I am pleased that the strategy that the administration has developed for defeating ISIS does include the training and equipping the 

moderate Syrian opposition. This is something that I’ve pushed for 

over a year, in part to prevent the power vacuum among the rebels 

that would allow a group like ISIS to gain strength. Air power 

alone, while important, does not win a conflict like this. 

Reports of nearly 40 nations agreeing to support the fight against 

ISIS are a promising signal. While ISIS presents a severe threat 

to our national security, it also threatens many countries around 

the world, especially those in the Middle East. The United States 

cannot bear this fight alone, and a strong coalition, including the 

neighboring Arab states, is obviously critical to destroying ISIS. 

Secretary Hagel, what is the administration’s plan for going after 

the funding streams that are supporting ISIS? For example, it’s 

been reported recently that anywhere between $1 to $2 million a 

day is revenue that’s coming in to ISIS from oilfields and refineries 

that they have taken over and that they now control. Moving this 

oil doesn’t happen in a vacuum. Can you share if and how the 

United States is going after this funding stream and then any 

other funds that are available to ISIS? 

Secretary HAGEL. Senator, as you recall in my testimony this 

morning, I mentioned specifically what the Treasury Department is 

doing to coordinate this effort to go after the funding sources of 

ISIL. You mentioned oil, black-marketing oil through porous borders. That’s one of the obvious areas of funding. As you, I’m sure, 

know, ISIL has gotten control of small oilfields, and that’s obviously where it starts. But, they are multisourced through kidnapping and ransom and as they have gone into towns and cities over 

the last few months and decimated those areas, and raided banks 

and taken possession of great numbers of equities. 

There is no one answer. It is a multinational effort that our 

Treasury Department is leading, along with our DOS. Be assured 

that it is a premium focus to cut off resources for ISIL. It’s a premium focus for our strategy. 

Senator HAGAN. I think that’s very important, because it certainly would degrade their capability. 

41 

I also think it’s critical that the people of Syria have an alternative other than ISIS or other radical terrorist groups like it or 

the Assad regime. That’s why I have been pushing the administration to empower and arm the moderate Syrian opposition. While a 

strong moderate military force is essential, I do believe success on 

the battlefield can only set the condition for the political solution 

in Syria. 

General Dempsey, you were just speaking about this, in particular, who will actually be the leader of this moderate Syrian opposition force. My question is, who is ultimately going to lead the 

force that the U.S. and our partner nations train-and-equip, both 

politically and military? What is your current assessment of these 

capabilities? Then, what are the plans to develop the leaders that 

would form the backbone of a longer-term government? 

General DEMPSEY. Thanks, Senator. We believe, one of the advantages of undertaking an overt—we call it ‘‘Title 10’’—train-andequip mission is, it’s going to force that issue. It’s going to force the 

Syrian Opposition Committee, the Syrian National Congress, to 

find some way to establish a responsible political architecture into 

which this military force can plug in a way that the other effort 

has never actually forced. The other effort, largely dealt with 

through intelligence channels, doesn’t have the—kind of the forcing 

function that an overt program will have. 

I think the first step is to conduct an overt program. Second, as 

part of the program, I can assure you that we will not only be 

training riflemen, but also training leaders so that there is a military chain of command to whom these Syrian fighters are responsive. They’re not responsive to General Dempsey or Captain 

Dempsey, they’re going to be responsive to Syrians. Because, again, 

the effort, here, is to allow them to take ownership for this in a 

way that, heretofore, I don’t think they’ve had the opportunity to 

do so. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you. 

News reports suggest that there could be many Westerners, even 

Americans, that might be fighting with ISIS. Needless to say, 

that’s a serious concern, since it certainly has the potential to create more of a direct threat to the United States and our Western— 

European allies. Do you see the presence of radicalized Westerners 

fighting with ISIS and the Khorasan as a threat to the United 

States? If so, is there a part of our strategy that seeks to disrupt 

their ability to recruit new members from the west? 

General Dempsey. 

General DEMPSEY. Of course, I see it as a threat. The thing that 

sets ISIL apart is, in fact, its radical ideology. There’s another 

question about whether they’re an affiliate of al Qaeda. They have 

been al Qaeda. They were al Qaeda in Iraq. But, they became so 

radical that, actually, al Qaeda rejected them. I still consider them 

to be part of the al Qaeda ideology, but with a much more apocalyptic, if you will, world view. 

I don’t think—it’s not all 31,000, clearly. But, enough of them 

that, were they to be able to achieve it—and unless some of the 

governments in the region can find a way to address the social 

issues inside of their countries, then the seductive nature of that 

42 

vision becomes actually the most dangerous part of it, which is why 

their momentum has to be reversed. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Hagan. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Fischer. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for the challenges that you’re facing and 

the options you’re presenting to Congress on this. 

General Dempsey, Congress is being asked to fund training for 

about 5,000 moderate Syrian rebels. If Congress would provide that 

funding immediately, how long do you think it would take before 

a program’s going to be up and running? I realize there is a lot of 

variables involved in this. You need to find the folks that we’re 

going to be training. You need to thoroughly vet them to make sure 

they are the fighters that we need and that we desire. 

Also, how do the moderates leave the field of battle? How are 

they going to defend that territory in Syria while they’re being 

trained? How are they going to defend that against Assad? If you 

could address that, please. 

General DEMPSEY. To the first part of your question, Senator, we 

think 3 to 5 months to establish the program. Some of that is consumed by contracting for equipment. It’s not as much maneuvering 

people into the right place. But, during that period of time, as well, 

we would have to, with the help of, in particular, some of our regional partners, recruit and vet. But, 3 to 5 months, and then deliver a capability sometime between 8 and 12 months. That’s the 

timeframe that we’re working toward. 

To your question about, ‘‘Will they come to be trained?’’—in many 

cases, they’ve already been driven out of their homes and out of 

their villages by ISIL, or by the regime, in some cases, so we think 

we’ll be recruiting mostly from displaced populations. Therefore, it 

won’t be as though they’re giving up the security of their families 

to come and train with us. 

Senator FISCHER. Sir, I believe this is the first request from the 

administration, but it will not be the last. We’re looking at 5,000 

fighters now. We’re looking at a growing force by ISIL that, as 

you’ve estimated, is 31,000. Over this period of months where we’re 

going to be training—finding people, vetting, training them, that 

will only grow, in my opinion. 

As we look at this request, I believe it should be separate from 

the CR. I think it’s very important that Congress have a full debate 

on it. I know you probably have nothing to say on how we do our 

business here, but I believe we need to be honest with the American people on what lies ahead. With the request as it is, we are 

not being honest with the American people. 

If we truly are going to defeat ISIL, to degrade them and to defeat them, it’s not just this one request. Do you anticipate that the 

President will be sending more requests to Congress? If so, when 

may we expect to see those? 

I know you’re anxious to answer. 

Secretary HAGEL. I always like to respond to a fellow Nebraskan. 

43 

The reason that I’m going to answer first is because this really 

puts the general in a more difficult position than he should be in. 

So, he may want to add something, but let me answer this way. 

First, because I do know a little something about your institution, if it was a perfect world and if we didn’t have the time constraints that we all are under, and you weren’t all scheduled to go 

out of session, here, in a couple of days, and the world was more 

perfect, I agree, this should have a thorough airing with the American people. 

Senator FISCHER. If I can just interrupt you on that. 

Secretary HAGEL. Yes. 

Senator FISCHER. Just because we’re scheduled to go out on 

Thursday, we don’t have to go out on Thursday, do we, sir? 

Secretary HAGEL. That’s not a decision for me to make, nor a recommendation. That falls clearly on your side of the dais. 

But, that said, if we would not get the authority now, we would 

lose a considerable amount of time. I know it’s imperfect. It was 

never meant to jam anyone or to put anybody in a tough spot. But, 

it is my opinion—I think the President’s been pretty clear on this— 

that the time is of the essence, here. When Congress comes back— 

and obviously when you come back, I assume there will have been 

an election and start forming a new Congress—there will be a debate, there should be a debate about this. 

As to your questions, ‘‘What further requests might be coming?’’ 

Senator, right now the President has been as straightforward and 

honest with you, with the American people, as I have been. There’s 

no hidden agenda, here, or we’re waiting for another shoe to drop 

in a—on a request. No. I can’t guarantee you, at all—I don’t think 

you would want your Secretary of Defense to say, ‘‘I’m sorry, 

there—this is the end. No more.’’ I think General Dempsey’s point 

in some of his answers this—here this morning, he certainly will 

recommend if he thinks we need some more capabilities somewhere. 

Senator FISCHER. Right. 

Secretary HAGEL. That’s what you want. 

Senator FISCHER. Right. 

Secretary HAGEL. That’s the way I would answer your question. 

Senator FISCHER. I would say, as a fellow Nebraskan, that, when 

I traveled the State for 3 weeks in August, all across the State, for 

the first time I heard Nebraskans talk about foreign policy and ask 

questions about foreign policy. We didn’t hear that in any campaign, any debates, any forums. But, people in Nebraska are focused on this, they know it’s a concern. They are frightened, but 

they want this addressed in a way that we know the enemy is 

going to be defeated. They expect us to do our job. If that means 

staying here longer, then we need to do that. 

Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Fischer. 

Senator Manchin. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank both of you all for your continued service to the 

great country. 

44 

I agree with my Senator—my colleague, Senator Fischer—I agree 

wholeheartedly with her. We should stay here, and it should be 

separated. It’s a big enough issue for us to have a policy discussion 

and not be tied into the funding discussion that we’re going to have 

with the CR. But, with that being said, it is what it is. 

I have a hard time with all of this. My problem is—and I think 

I’ve spoke to both of you—when I go home to West Virginia, the 

same as Nebraska, the same as anywhere else in the country, people say, ‘‘What do you expect to be different than what you’ve done 

in that region of the world for 13 years? If money or military might 

hasn’t changed it, what makes you think you can change it now?’’ 

When you start looking at what we’ve spent, almost $20 billion, 

trying to build up a 280,000-person army in Iraq, and the first time 

they were tested, they turned tail and ran, turned over the arsenal 

that we equipped them with, now is being used against us. Anyone 

seeing the video of ISIS taking all that back into Syria—it is absolutely appalling for us to look at that. Then when you look at what 

we have done in that part of the world, a total of, in Iraq, $818 

billion has been spent, $747 in Afghanistan, and growing; $1.6 trillion to date, and growing; 4,400 lives lost in Iraq, 36,000 wounded; 

2,200 lives in Afghanistan, and 21,000 wounded. 

I understand Syria. It’s a sectarian conflict against the Assad regime. Everybody in there, whoever they may be, are fighting Assad, 

the way I understand it. If they’re all fighting Assad, even though 

they might not be united—they all know they’re trying to get rid 

of the Assad regime—we’re supposed to carve out 5,000, 3,000, 

5,000. At $100,000 per person, if my math is correct—$5 billion— 

or $500 million for 5,000, correct? Okay. So, that’s $100,000 per 

person that we’re supposed to do. Only thing that I know that 

we’re assured of is, that training and those weapons will probably 

be used against us at some time in the future if everything that’s 

happened in the past—I have a hard time understanding why all 

of a sudden we’re going to convince these 5,000 to turn and fight 

ISIS, who’s fighting the same religious war that they’re fighting 

against the Assad regime. Doesn’t make any sense. 

I’m in total support of air support, of using our tactical and our 

technology, as we have, for superiority. I think it should be the 

Arab Muslim ground game, if you would. That should be theirs. If 

we can booster them up a little bit—and you said we had to go 

back in, then either we’ve done a poor job of training in the beginning or Maliki was able to undo everything we did in the first 2 

years that we’ve been gone. If it’s that quickly undone, how can I 

go home to West Virginia and make sense out of this at all? 

Anybody want to take a shot at this? It just doesn’t make sense 

to me. 

Secretary HAGEL. If you put it that way, Senator. [Laughter.] 

First, I understand, I think, a lot of the complications. We are 

dealing with the same issue. I don’t minimize at all what you’re 

saying as you try to explain this to the people you represent. Let 

me make a couple of points. 

First, it’s not the United States alone that’s going to change all 

this. This is the whole point of what the President talked about in 

his statement to the American public last week. We are going to 

help empower the people of Iraq. We are going to do everything we 

45 

can to support their efforts with a new government, inclusive government. You mentioned the squandering of the last 5 years of the 

Maliki Government, which has brought a great deal of this on. 

Senator MANCHIN. But, you said that they’re a sovereign nation, 

so we don’t like the outcome, but they have a process. 

Secretary HAGEL. They have a process. 

Senator MANCHIN. That can be changing. That can change continuously. 

Secretary HAGEL. That’s right. We’re hopeful that this new government is going to put them back on a road of responsible, responsive, representative government. We are not going to have ground 

forces on the ground to do it for them. As you said, it should be 

the people of that region, of the country. As the chairman noted, 

the Peshmerga, Iraqi security forces have been able to get back on 

the offensive, with our assistance. 

Senator MANCHIN. But, those forces are able—and I’m so sorry, 

Mr. Secretary, I know how time runs here—those forces have been 

able, let’s say, to maybe hold the ground a little bit in their own 

territories, but they’re not going to be moving into Syria. 

Secretary HAGEL. That’s why we need a ground game in 

Syria—— 

Senator MANCHIN. But, ISIS hasn’t been—— 

Secretary HAGEL.—of the people there. 

Senator MANCHIN.—ISIS hasn’t been able to—they’ve tried to 

take out Assad, correct? Is it fair to say that ISIS has tried to take 

out Assad? 

Secretary HAGEL. ISIS has tried to take out everybody and—— 

Senator MANCHIN. But, Assad. They have—— 

Secretary HAGEL.—everyone around it, but—— 

Senator MANCHIN.—they failed—— 

Secretary HAGEL.—they’re a threat to us. I think that’s the main 

point that—Senator, that is important for you, but for all of us. 

ISIS is a—ISIL is a threat to the United States. 

Senator MANCHIN. But, Assad is not a threat to the United 

States. 

Secretary HAGEL. It’s not the same kind of threat. What he’s allowed to happen in his own country is why we have a problem in 

Syria. 

Senator MANCHIN. I agree, it’s—it’s barbaric also. 

But, here’s what I’m saying. I’m concerned about the United 

States of America. I’m concerned about West Virginia and all 49 

other States and everybody that lives in those States. I’m concerned about how we’re keeping them, from here, to do harm to 

America or Americans are planning. I’m for all of that. Attack 

wherever may be. But, I’m just saying, our past performance for 13 

years in that region hasn’t given us the results. We took out Saddam. We thought that would change. Iraq’s in worse shape. 

We’ve—take out Qaddafi. We thought that would change. It got so 

bad in Libya, we’ve had to pull out our own Embassy and our people in our Embassy. They’re wanting to take out—these barbaric 

dictators are unbelievable, but it seems like that’s what rules. If 

it’s not one, it’ll be another. We’re taking out a person—are turning 

our efforts to ISIS, who were Assad. I’m not supporting, any way, 

shape, or form, Assad. I think he should be gone. But, as long as 

46 

he’s able to remain there, he’s fighting the same people that we’re 

asking the people to train to fight that we’re going to spend $500 

million. Makes no sense to me, and I can’t sell it. I’ve tried, you 

can’t sell this stuff. No one believes the outcome will be any different. 

General, do you have anything to add to that? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, could I, Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman LEVIN. Of course. 

General DEMPSEY. This is important enough that I think we 

probably need to bleed over a little bit. 

If you look back, I’ve been in the job now 3 years. When you look 

back over the course of that time, I’ve been pretty clear that we 

have a generational problem, which is to say a 20-year problem. If 

it was 3 years ago, okay, maybe it’s a 17-year problem in the Middle East as these strongmen have been overthrown. What appeared 

to be for a moment in time a bit of a fledgling democratic movement has been hijacked, and it’s been hijacked by some extraordinarily dangerous people—dangerous not just to the region, but 

transregionally and globally, as well. 

One of the things you can count on the U.S. military to recommend is that to belabor the metaphor of ground game and other 

sports analogies—I’m always going to come to you and tell you 

what we need to play an away game. I don’t want to play a home 

game. 

I will promise you this. Left unaddressed, the issues in the Middle East will affect probably our European allies far more than us 

initially. I believe they’re awakening to that reality, by the way. 

There will be a period of unrest in the Middle East that initially 

will probably just be an economic challenge, but could ultimately 

actually threaten us directly here in the Homeland. 

So, we don’t have a choice. If I could wall up the continental 

United States and somehow assure you that the people of West 

Virginia will remain safe, I would do it, Senator. But, we can’t. 

We have three tools in the military arsenal. First, we can do 

things ourselves. We call direct action. Second, we can build partners. Third, we can enable others, like we’re doing with the French 

in Mali. 

What we’ve tried to do over the past few years is do less ourselves, more with partners, and enable others. That’s the right 

path. We should do less ourselves, enable partners, and build partners. But, if we fail to address all three, we’re back to doing it all 

ourselves. What we’re suggesting here is a strategy, where we can 

get others, not only to do some of the lifting, but maybe pay for it, 

as well. 

I think that’s the message to the people of West Virginia. We 

have to be engaged, because we are antithetical. Most of ISIL’s ideology is antithetical to our values. You just can’t let them fester. 

Question is, do we do it ourselves or try to do it with others? 

We’re trying to do it with others. I think it’s the right path. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Manchin. 

Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. I think that’s a good way to begin. I couldn’t 

agree with you more. The goal is to destroy ISIL and all they represent. Is that correct? 

47 

General DEMPSEY. It is. 

Senator GRAHAM. Very briefly, describe what destroying ISIL 

would look like, General Dempsey. 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, I’m probably going to be a little more articulate about that in Iraq, because we have a partner and we have 

a credible ground force to enable. 

Defeating or destroying ISIL in Iraq will require the combined 

forces of ISF and Pesh to go offensive, to regain lost territory, while 

concurrently—and this is the important part—the Government of 

Iraq fills in behind with inclusive policies addressing the complaints of the Kurds and—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Can’t we just maybe speed up the—— 

General DEMPSEY. Then we restore the border and then they’re 

defeated. 

Senator GRAHAM. No, I’m with you. You take all the territory 

they hold, you take Mosul and Fallujah away from them, you put 

an Iraqi military on the ground that will be loyal to the Iraqi people, not just to the Shi’as, you have an inclusive government in 

Baghdad, where the Sunni tribes will feel like they’re better off 

playing politics in Baghdad than siding with ISIL. That’s destroying their ability to regenerate in Iraq. Syria, we’ll talk about in a 

minute. But, I want to continue the theme about why all this matters. 

Is there any doubt in your mind, each of you, that if ISIL had 

the capability to kill millions of Americans, they would do so? 

General DEMPSEY. There’s no doubt in my mind. They’ll kill anybody who doesn’t conform to their narrow ideological bent. 

Secretary HAGEL. I agree. 

Senator GRAHAM. So, really, it’s mankind against ISIL, it’s just 

not us against ISIL or Sunni Arab states against ISIL. If you’re a 

Christian in the region, they will kill you very quickly. Is that correct? 

General DEMPSEY. Unless you convert. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Now, I guess what I’m trying to persuade my colleagues, that these problems only get worse over time. 

But, are they limited to the Mideast? Are there radical Islamists 

that we should worry about in Africa? 

General DEMPSEY. Absolutely. 

Senator GRAHAM. Does the authorization to use military force 

allow this administration to go in to attack al Qaeda in the Arab 

Peninsula in Yemen without a new authorization? 

General DEMPSEY. It does. Anything affiliated with al Qaeda. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. I’m going to write you a letter and name 

the organization that we could not attack without a new AUMF. 

I just want to see how far this goes. I’m a very robust Article 2 guy, 

but I think this is a pretty robust reading of the current AUMF. 

But, I’m not going to stand in your way. We need to get this right. 

Now, areas of agreement. Training the Free Syrian Army, you 

recommend we do that, with all of the complications that go with 

it. 

General DEMPSEY. With a coalition, I do. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. So, now let’s get to Syria. To destroy 

ISIL if two-thirds of ISIL is in Syria, do you agree that somebody 

has to go in on the ground and dig them out eventually? 

48 

General DEMPSEY. Somebody, yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. It’s better for us to be part of that somebody 

than just to be the only ones doing it. 

General DEMPSEY. Absolutely. 

Senator GRAHAM. Can you think of an Arab army that you could 

form in the next year that you would have confidence that could 

go in and destroy ISIL in Syria, hold the territory without substantial American support? 

General DEMPSEY. There are partners in the region who have 

very capable special operating forces, and I think the campaign 

would envision that they would participate. That would certainly 

be our ask of them to participate in a ground campaign. 

Senator GRAHAM. My question is, can you envision a coalition of 

Arab states that have the capabilities to go into Syria, defeat ISIL, 

hold the territory without substantial U.S. military support? 

General DEMPSEY. As long as, Senator, you’ll elaborate on what 

you mean by ‘‘substantial U.S. military support.’’ 

Senator GRAHAM. Getting them to the battlefield. How do they 

get there? What does it take to maintain a large army in the field? 

Do they have the intelligence capability if we don’t help them? Do 

they have sufficient air power to win the day without our support? 

Do they have the special forces capabilities to go and kill the leaders of ISIL without us being on the ground? 

General DEMPSEY. I was with you until ‘‘without us being on the 

ground.’’ Because, as I mentioned in previous testimony, I—— 

Senator GRAHAM. It’s easy. If you think they can do it without 

us being on the ground, just say yes. 

General DEMPSEY. Yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. What if they lose? 

General DEMPSEY. Any campaign is built on assumptions. I just 

made one. If the assumption proves invalid, then you have to readjust your—— 

Senator GRAHAM. What are the consequences of an Arab army 

going into Syria virtually on their own and getting beat by ISIL, 

to us? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, I wouldn’t suggest virtually on your own. 

I think they’ll be enabling support that we would have—— 

Senator GRAHAM. By us? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, I do think, yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. We’re having a semantic problem here. 

But, the bottom line is, What does it mean to the world if we take 

on ISIL and they defeat the people we send in to take them all? 

That’s a bad day for us, do you agree? 

General DEMPSEY. It’s a bad day for the region. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. It’s a bad day for the world, isn’t it? 

General DEMPSEY. It is. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with me this is probably our last 

best chance to put these guys in a box and keep them there? 

General DEMPSEY. I think it’s our last best chance to convince regional governments that if they don’t solve their internal problems, 

we can’t do it for them, and they’d better get serious about it. 

Senator GRAHAM. What if the following happens: The regional 

players say that, ‘‘I don’t trust the United States, because you’ve 

been so unreliable. You have drawn red lines and done nothing. 

49 

You withdrew from Iraq and left the place in shambles, that I really don’t want to follow your leadership, because I don’t think you’re 

capable of winning the war, because you don’t have the resolve’’? 

What if they tell us, ‘‘We’re not going to do anything other than 

maybe drop a few bombs’’? Would you consider the recommendation 

to the President that allowing ISIL to maintain a safe haven in 

Syria and to grow in capability over time is a major threat to the 

United States? Could you envision yourself recommending to the 

President, if nobody else will help us, that we go in on the ground 

and clean these guys out in Syria? If we had to. 

General DEMPSEY. I haven’t confronted that question yet, Senator, but I’ll react to it. I don’t think that, even if we were to go 

in on the ground, armored divisions with flags at furl—— 

Senator GRAHAM. The full weight of the military. 

General DEMPSEY. I don’t think we would do anything more than 

push this problem further to the right. This has to be—to your 

point, if we don’t get the kind of coalition I’m describing, then we’re 

into a very narrow CT framework, in my view. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. If I may just follow this point. So, our 

national defense, in terms of stopping ISIL from killing thousands 

or millions of Americans if they get the capability really comes 

down to whether or not we can convince the Arab world to go in 

there and defeat these guys? 

General DEMPSEY. It really comes down to building a coalition so 

that what the Arab Muslim world sees is them rejecting ISIS, not 

us defeating them. 

Senator GRAHAM. They already reject ISIL. Do you know any 

major Arab ally that embraces ISIL? 

General DEMPSEY. I know major Arab allies who fund them. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes, but do they embrace—they fund them because the Free Syrian Army couldn’t fight Assad. They were trying 

to beat Assad. I think they realize the folly of their ways. 

Don’t taint the Mideast unfairly. Is it fair to say that most Syrians have two things in common: they don’t like ISIL and they 

don’t like Assad? Most Syrians. 

General DEMPSEY. I agree. 

Senator GRAHAM. Is it fair to say that most Muslims reject what 

ISIL does in the name of their religion? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. Is it fair to say that if we don’t contain this 

threat and eventually destroy it, that it gets worse over time and, 

a year from now, if they’re still flourishing in Syria and this coalition hasn’t come about, America is more in danger of a major attack than we are today? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. 

Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, both for 

being here this morning and for your service. 

I would like to direct my question, first, in a different direction. 

I think the barbarism and the threat that ISIL poses really became 

real for people in this country, certainly for people in New HampVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:16 Mar 11, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93641.TXT JUNE
50 

shire, with the brutal murders of James Foley and Steven Sotloff. 

As Senator Ayotte has said, Jim Foley is from New Hampshire, 

and Steven Sotloff went to school there, so we saw that very personally, in terms of what happened. 

I know that it has been reported that there was an effort to rescue the hostages who were being held by ISIL that was not successful. I certainly commend all of the courageous servicemembers 

who were part of that effort. There have been reports, in recent 

news stories, from the Foley family that really raise, I think, very 

troubling and serious questions about the support that our Government provided to the families and to the effort to free Jim Foley 

and Steven Sotloff and the other hostages who are currently being 

held who are American citizens. Is there more that our Government can and should be doing to support the families and to looking at how we can help free hostages when they’re being held in 

this situation? 

Secretary HAGEL. First, like all Americans, our thoughts and 

prayers go out to the families. 

As to your question, Senator, DOD does not have the direct responsibility on this. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Right. I understand that. 

Secretary HAGEL. However, that said, thank you for your comments about the rescue mission. Because it’s an open hearing, we 

don’t want to say too much more about it, but it’s been in the press. 

To your point about, ‘‘Can we do better and do more and is there 

an effort to address some of the more human dimensions of this?’’— 

I’m not going to prejudge any of our departments and agencies in 

how they handle it, but I think we all must be mindful of the humanity, here, involved if it was our children or any of us personally 

in this situation. I know our law enforcement people, those who 

have responsibility for dealing with this, it’s a tough responsibility. 

They follow the law. I think we could and should maybe revisit 

some of these practices. 

Our national security policy directive is very clear on ransom. 

That’s been in place for many years through different administrations. I’m not suggesting we change that, by the way. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I appreciate that. 

Secretary HAGEL. I think that maybe there are some areas that 

we could do a little better with, as far as in dealing with families 

and the human part of this. Again, that’s not meant as criticism 

for any of our agencies or departments, because I don’t know all 

the facts on how it was handled. 

General DEMPSEY. Just because you mentioned the mission, 

itself. I’ve been at this a long time. That was the most complex, 

highest-risk mission we’ve ever undertaken. That should give the 

families some solace and you some confidence that, as a military, 

we are very focused on this. We have some limitations in our ability to collect intelligence inside of Syria. But, when we had the opportunity to do so, we tried to get them. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I appreciate that. I do hope, though, given 

what we’ve heard from the Foleys and from the other families, that 

there will be a reassessment of how our government supports families facing this kind of a crisis. 

51 

Next, I want to go to the estimate of ISIL’s troop strengthen, because it’s been as you reported, 31,000 is the most recent estimate. 

How could it have grown to that size without our intelligence recognizing the threat? What is part of our plan to address the recruitment? There have been a lot of reports about how effective the 

messaging is that ISIL has been using to recruit young people, particularly westerners. How is that part of our plan? Why is our intelligence not picking up the extent to which this effort has been 

growing? 

General DEMPSEY. I can’t speak for the Intelligence Community 

or the intelligence agencies. I’ll tell you they’re focused on it. The 

way they grow, though—I mentioned that ISIL’s strategy is actually to consume tribes. They may be in a conflict with a tribe one 

day, and then overcome it the next, which might increase their 

numbers by 3,000, 4,000, 5,000. Once the tribal leader pledges allegiance, the entire thing shifts over. 

That’s part of it, I think. They’ve also sprung a few thousand 

prisoners from different prisons inside of Iraq that were very hardened terrorists. 

They are growing. But, again, the numbers that are reported 

were estimated based on the free rein that, at the time, ISIL was 

having in Iraq. I think we’re going to see some shift in that. That’s 

part of our strategy, actually. The public diplomacy part of this, 

which is not a military line of effort, but it has to be part of our 

strategy. We have to point out to Arab and Muslim youth—and 

Western youth, for that matter—the risk posed by this ideology. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. My time is up, but I just want to 

close by saying I certainly intend to support the request for funding 

to train-and-equip vetted opposition groups in Syria. I do believe 

that it would be a mistake for us not, in Congress, to have a debate 

about a long-term, broader strategy to go after ISIL. I think it’s 

very important for us to have a bipartisan, bicameral support for 

that effort and a debate here that the American people can be part 

of. I know that the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is working on a specific authorization for use of military 

force, which I intend to work with him on. I certainly hope there 

will be an effort on the part of the administration to work with 

Congress on that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. 

Senator Lee. 

Senator LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks, to both of you, for being here today and for all you do 

for our country and all you do to keep us safe. This is an exceptionally important issue as it relates to our national security. 

I think the President, last week, quite accurately portrayed the 

threats that we’re facing from ISIS, that it’s a threat to the Middle 

East with aspirations to attack global targets, including the United 

States. The President should, in my opinion, do everything he possibly can to protect Americans and to protect U.S. facilities in Iraq 

and Syria from ISIS and from other terrorist activity. 

I believe, however, like many of my colleagues on both sides of 

the aisle, that the President should seek congressional authorization for his expanded campaign to degrade and destroy ISIS. I also 

52 

do not believe that we should authorize parts of this conflict 

through a CR. This is a serious and important discussion about our 

national security, and it should be debated and discussed and ultimately voted on within Congress, based on its own merits, and it 

shouldn’t be lumped in with a much broader discussion about a lot 

of other things. I think we owe it to those who valiantly put their 

own lives on the line, to make sure that this is debated and discussed, and that the parameters are properly set in its own context. 

Secretary Hagel, I have a question for you as it relates to some 

of this discussion as it relates to some of the things that President 

Obama has said in recent weeks about ISIS. In an interview that 

I believe he had with Thomas Friedman at the New York Times, 

just barely a month ago, he stated that the notion of arming Syrian 

rebels has ‘‘always been a fantasy. This idea that we could provide 

some light arms or even sophisticated arms to what was essentially 

an opposition made up of former doctors, farmers, pharmacists, and 

so forth, and that they were going to be able to be able to battle 

not only a well-armed state, but also a well-armed state backed by 

Russia, backed by Iran, a battle-hardened Hezbollah, that was 

never in the cards.’’ 

Now, the President, hardly a month later, is seeking authorization to do basically that. So, Mr. Secretary, what has changed? 

Why does the President, who apparently didn’t think that would 

work, and described that as some sort of fantasy about a month 

ago. What has changed to make him think that it will work now? 

Secretary HAGEL. Thank you, Senator. First, at the risk of interpreting what the President meant when he said that, I recognize 

that is always risky, as I have said. But, let me address your question this way. 

What’s changed now is the urgency of what has occurred in the 

Middle East, specifically in Iraq and Syria, the murder of two 

Americans, now a third, a brutal murder of a British citizen, the 

different dimensions that we’ve seen, the last 5 weeks especially, 

unfold, what ISIL has been able to achieve in a relatively short 

amount of time, the changing of a government, the leaving of one 

Iraqi Government with a new government coming in. Over about 

a 6-week period, Senator, there was, and were, a number of occurrences that came together that I do think presented a whole new 

picture of realities, of urgency, of dangers, of threats. Let me stop 

there and see if that helps you a little bit. 

I saw the interview, and I read the interview. But, again, at the 

risk of trying to interpret what he meant, I offer that. 

Senator LEE. I appreciate that. I do understand that there were 

some developments that have occurred since then that have 

brought this appropriately to our attention, to the attention of the 

world. I would be curious to know, though, strategically, how that 

changes something that he previously described as a kind of fantasy into something that could be realistic. But, I understand that 

that’s difficult for you to answer in this context. I’d love to be able 

to talk more about that on another occasion if we can. 

Can you describe what the end objective in Syria is for the 

United States? In other words, do we still contend that Assad must 

go, that he cannot stay in power, and also, what the objective is 

53 

as it relates to the moderate groups that the President would like 

to see lead this. What does the post-Assad Syria look like that we 

are after? Or is that our objective at all? 

Secretary HAGEL. The issue on our position with Assad remains 

very clear. The President stated it, I said it in my testimony here 

this morning. The President has said, many times, still strongly believes, that Assad has lost the legitimacy to govern his own people. 

We have a country, Syria, in complete chaos and upheaval because 

of Assad. That’s the individual responsible for creating what is occurring and has been occurring. 

Your question about the end state in Syria. I think what we, the 

administration, I think the American people, would want to see 

and—the Syrian people, as a free Syria, where men and women 

and their families have rights to choose and have rights to determine their own leaders and their own futures. I think that is really 

the essence of the ultimate objective we’d like to see in Syria. 

Senator LEE. Okay. I see my time is expired. Thank you, Mr. 

Secretary. 

Secretary HAGEL. Senator, thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lee. 

Senator Blumenthal. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, to both Secretary Hagel and Chairman Dempsey, for 

again being with us and for your explanation and very forthright 

testimony here today and, in the past, both publicly and privately, 

to members of this committee and the Senate. 

I want to say to you, first, Secretary Hagel, how much I appreciate the decision that you made recently to change DOD policy on 

reviewing other-than-honorable discharges for veterans suffering, 

at the time of their discharge, from post-traumatic stress, and most 

especially, my thanks to you on behalf of the 80,000 Vietnam-era 

veterans who will benefit by that policy change to give them liberal 

consideration as they apply to the discharge review boards. These 

veterans who suffered, at the time of their discharge, from posttraumatic stress often received less-than-honorable discharges because of the injuries that they suffered in combat, at war. They’ve 

lived with the stigma and the blackmark on their records for decades, many of them became homeless and jobless as a result. I 

want to thank you for committing to me, when we first met, that 

you would do the right thing, and then, in fact, doing the right 

thing. I really appreciate your policy change in that regard. 

I want to, perhaps unfairly, quote to you something that you said 

on the floor of the Senate in 2002, in October, at the time that the 

Senate voted in favor, and you voted in favor, of Senate Joint Resolution 45, which was the resolution that authorized the use of force 

in Iraq. You said, ‘‘In authorizing the use of force against Iraq, we 

are at the beginning of a road that has no clear end.’’ You went 

on to say, ‘‘While I cannot predict the future, I believe that what 

we decide in this chamber this week will influence America’s security and role in the world for the coming decades. It will serve as 

the framework, both intentionally and unintentionally, for the future’’—and then you said, quite wisely, in my view, as it turns 

out—‘‘for an intensification of engagement with Iraq in the Middle 

54 

East, a world which we know very little and whose destiny will 

now be directly tied to ours.’’ 

We’ve lived with the framework that came from that vote. We’ve 

suffered, as Americans, greatly in both the loss of people and the 

sacrifice of treasure, money. That is the reason why Americans now 

feel so conflicted, often ambivalent, about the brutality of the action that we’ve witnessed—the beheading, shockingly, repulsively, 

of these two brave individuals—and yet, the war weariness that 

many Americans feel at this point. 

General Dempsey mentioned earlier the quote from Thomas 

Friedman, that nobody ever washed a used car. But, a lot of people 

have rented unwashed cars. It seems to me we are, in effect, renting an unwashed car, insofar as we want to make sure that it’s 

serviceable and it works, but do not want to go into a situation 

where there’s no clearly defined exit strategy. 

Can you tell us what the threat is to the United States that we 

will eliminate by degrading and defeating ISIL? 

Secretary HAGEL. That’s always the problem of giving a speech 

on the floor of the Senate, that it is on the record. [Laughter.] 

Let me just comment on that, because it is going to reflect on my 

answer to your question. 

I put a lot of time into thinking about that speech, Senator, and 

I recall writing it. The part of it that you read back, I do not disassociate myself from at all. For those words that you read back, 

I’m even more mindful, as Secretary of Defense, of my responsibilities. Doesn’t mean I’m right, but I’m even more mindful than I 

might otherwise be of what I saw occur, starting in 2001–2002, and 

I was part of. That’s first. 

Second, to the real question, what is the threat, and how will it 

change? I think we are in a different situation today, in what the 

President has laid out to the American people as to what his objectives are, versus where we were in 2002. Main reason is that ISIL 

is a very clear threat to the United States of America, to our people. You mentioned the two brutal murders of two Americans. 

That’s not just a threat, that’s an action that was taken. 

There are a number of other examples. To our allies. I thought 

General Dempsey’s commentary to answer a difficult question that 

Senator Manchin posed, was full of a lot of thoughtful and wise 

thinking on where this is all going to go if we don’t do what we 

should do and need to do now. I think that’s different from where 

we were in 2002. 

Now, because I do think ISIL is a threat, and a very clear threat, 

to the United States, to our interests, to our people, to our allies— 

and we could spend a lot more time this morning going through 

that case and making that case—I think what the President’s laid 

out, what I strongly support, is the right thing to do, because it is 

in the interest, clearly, of our country. 

One last point on this. What General Dempsey said about ‘‘If we 

don’t do something now’’—and I think the way the President has 

framed that ‘‘something,’’ how we’re going to do it—we can’t do it 

alone. I think it’s been clear in a lot of the testimony this morning, 

in the questions, that this country, the United States of America, 

as much as we have engaged, as much as we have bled, the treasure and the lives that we have left behind, we still haven’t fixed 

55 

the problem. We can’t fix the problem alone. That’s why all the dimensions of what the President’s talking about, to me, make sense. 

I think if we can do what we intend to do and what we believe we 

can do, bringing all these groups together, the very people who are 

most at risk, then we can be successful at averting this great 

threat to this country. That’s what’s different. That’s what I think 

the threat is. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. 

Senator Cruz. 

Senator CRUZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. Thank you for your 

service, especially during these challenging times. 

Mr. Secretary, I want to start with you. If ISIS is able to consolidate power and to create and dominate a nation-state and to retain 

access to, potentially, billions of dollars in oil revenue, over time 

what is the specific danger to America if they are able to use that 

nation-state to project jihad here? 

Secretary HAGEL. Senator, as you have expressed it and asked 

the question, over time if ISIL is not stopped, and with the economic power that it has now, then what I would foresee happening, 

not only an immediate threat to United States citizens and our 

people, our interests, but I think you could very well find Jordan 

go down as the country that we know it today. I think Saudi Arabia could well be beyond just threatened, their oilfields. I think the 

expansion of where this could go in the Middle East, dominating 

oil production. Lebanon is also in a very tentative state. Libya is 

in chaos. Everywhere you look in the Middle East, there is trouble. 

If a force like ISIL, in my opinion, is allowed to continue with its 

ideology, with its resources, with its capability, then, as General 

Dempsey said, there’s no doubt, it will impact this country and the 

world economy. Now, this is down the road, if this is not stopped. 

But, I think that’s what we’re looking at here, Senator. It’s an immediate threat to our interests, as well. 

Senator CRUZ. General Dempsey, worst-case scenario, if ISIS 

were allowed to consolidate power, in your judgment what would 

be the worst-case specific risk to the Homeland and to the lives of 

American citizens? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, Senator. The combination of radical ideology plus a youth bulge—the entire region is suffering a youth 

bulge—inequitable distribution of resources and a state of Islamic 

radicalization would, first of all, almost surely trigger a confrontation with Iran into which the rest of the world would be drawn, for 

obvious reason, but also provides them with this combination of resources plus radical ideology that we actually haven’t seen. Most 

of the radical ideologies are resource-starved, or at least resourcelimited. A resource-rich radical ideology must become a threat. It’s 

just inconceivable that it wouldn’t be. 

Senator CRUZ. Do you believe, if they were able to consolidate 

that power, that there would be a risk of their attempting, and perhaps even succeeding, with a terrorist attack of the magnitude of 

that that occurred on September 11, 2001, or potentially an even 

greater terrorist attack? 

56 

General DEMPSEY. I’d phrase it this way. Given what they’ve already demonstrated, in terms of brutality and utter disregard for 

human life, other than that which adheres to their ideology, whatever weapon system they would have in their possession, there’s no 

doubt in my mind they’d use it, to include weapons of mass destruction. 

Senator CRUZ. It’s been reported that upwards of 100 Americans 

are fighting alongside ISIS, have affiliated themselves with ISIS. 

How would you assess the risk of Americans with U.S. passports 

coming back to the United States to carry out acts of terror here? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, we’ve actually been in close contact with 

both the intelligence communities and law enforcement. The risk 

will increase unless their momentum is reversed and unless their 

dominance of the media space—they are actually quite capable in 

social media and other forms of messaging. So, unless their momentum is blunted, which will begin to strip away this myth that 

they’ve surrounded themselves with, and unless we counter them 

in the media space, then the risk of radicalization through things 

like the Internet will continue to rise. 

Senator CRUZ. But, you would characterize the risks of Americans coming back from ISIS with U.S. passports as significant? Is 

that fair? 

General DEMPSEY. I do. That view is shared by our European allies, as well. 

Senator CRUZ. If the objective were to destroy ISIS—not to just 

degrade them, but to destroy them within 90 days, what would be 

required militarily to carry that out? 

General DEMPSEY. It’s not possible, Senator, because militarily, 

we could confront them, we could destroy a lot of equipment, we 

could drive them underground, if you will. But, as I said, they will 

only be defeated or destroyed once they’re rejected by the populations in which they hide. Truly, there is no military solution to 

ISIL. 

Senator CRUZ. What would be required to kill those who are taking up arms right now? 

General DEMPSEY. Actually, I think that’s the path we’re on, 

which is to say using our unique capabilities, our counterterror capabilities, our ISR capabilities, our air capabilities, while working 

on the rest of the equation, which is this coalition of willing allied 

partners, or willing Arab partners. It may be a tough pill to swallow, but there is no military solution. It has to be part of a broader 

whole-of-government regional campaign. 

Senator CRUZ. One final question, Secretary Hagel. The President, as I understand it, has laid out what could be an extended 

military operation that could extend many months, or even years. 

In my view, carrying out such an operation, not responding to immediate exigency, requires congressional authorization. I think 

Congress would be prepared to grant that authorization if a specific 

case were made with clear objectives. What is your position as to 

the legal authority of the administration to carry out an extended 

military campaign for years, potentially, absent congressional authorization? 

57 

Secretary HAGEL. I believe the President has the statutory and 

constitutional authority to take the action that he is doing to protect this country as he laid it out to the American people last week. 

Senator CRUZ. What is the legal authority that you’re basing that 

on? 

Secretary HAGEL. The statutory authority is the AUMF of 2001, 

and if you wanted to add something to that, it would probably be 

the AUMF of 2002. 

Senator CRUZ. My time is expired. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

I assume that you meant there’s no purely military solution to 

ISIL. When you said there’s no military—because you’re seeking—— 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, there’s no purely military solution. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

General DEMPSEY. Right. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Now, we’re going to need to stick very carefully to the 6-minute 

rule, because we have—one, two, three, four, five, at least. We have 

to be out of here at exactly 1 p.m., so please, watch that clock, everybody. 

Senator DONNELLY. I’m not your problem. [Laughter.] 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Donnelly. I didn’t mean to—— 

Senator DONNELLY. No, no, I know that. I know that, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

I want to thank both of you for everything you’ve done and for 

your service to our country. 

I want to get back to what you were talking about as to having 

to have partners and to have buy-in. I’ve heard the role that General Allen is going to play. Is a big part of that role, in your minds, 

working with the Sunni tribal leadership, the people they’ve 

worked with before, to try to get them to get back to a place almost 

that they were before, which is working together with us and, in 

effect, almost a second Awakening? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, that’s one of the reasons General Allen 

was such an attractive figure for that role. General Lloyd Austin, 

the Commander of CENTCOM, was in Iraq, as well, and he has incredible regional relationships, though this coalition will be beyond 

the region. We’re looking for European partners, and maybe even 

nontraditional partners. But, General Allen is certainly going to 

focus on the tribes. 

Senator DONNELLY. General Austin has done a tremendous job, 

but it doesn’t hurt to have someone else in the lineup to help him 

with it, I would think. When we look at this, what are the kinds 

of things that General Allen can do, in effect, to start to get the 

tribes to look at this differently, to say, ‘‘Look, our interests are 

more aligned with this coalition that’s being put together than with 

this group, ISIS’’? 

General DEMPSEY. At the national level, I think he will, along 

with our diplomats, encourage the new Iraqi Government to answer some of the grievances that both the Sunnis and the Kurds 

have had for years, actually, since 2004. I think there’s some indication that there’s reason to believe that that could occur. 

58 

The Sunni tribes in al-Anbar aspire to form a national guard for 

some time. I think that’s one of the capabilities that might actually 

contribute significantly to that outcome. The Maliki Government 

was actually, as you might expect them to be, very much against 

the idea of a national guard in al-Anbar, believing they were already dealing with a national guard of sorts in the Peshmerga in 

Kurdistan. I think this government may be more open to it, and 

I think that’ll be one of the lines of effort. 

Senator DONNELLY. Is this something that we can get done in 

Iraq if we don’t get buy-in from the Sunnis? 

General DEMPSEY. As I said in an earlier question, Senator, 

every campaign plan makes assumptions, and then, if those assumptions are valid, you stay on path; if the assumption is rendered invalid, you deviate. One of the really important assumptions 

of this campaign is that we can, in fact, separate the moderate 

Sunni tribes from the ISIL ideology. If that proves untrue, we have 

to go back to the drawing board. 

Senator DONNELLY. Okay. You had talked before about taking 

back Mosul, and the effort to do that. It would involve ISF, in that 

we’re working with the best parts of ISF, or trying to. I guess this 

touches back again on that same subject, which is getting the 

Sunnis to accept those parts of ISF. Is that part of what General 

Allen is going to do, and what General Austin is working on? 

General DEMPSEY. Absolutely, yes, sir. 

Senator DONNELLY. Okay. This is, again, for either of you. There 

are reports that you mentioned, financially, about ISIS getting income of $3 to $5 million per day, is what we’ve heard, that they 

are the best-financed terrorist group. So many of them have tried 

to put shoelaces and chewing gum together. That’s not the case 

here. What is the plan, or what are we working on, to try to cut 

off their financing? Because the oil they’re selling has to be going 

somewhere, and someone has to be paying them. So, how are we 

going to do that? 

Secretary HAGEL. Senator, I mentioned this in two previous answers here. 

Senator DONNELLY. I apologize, I wasn’t here for that. 

Secretary HAGEL. But, it’s an important question. I also noted it 

in my testimony, that the administration has put together a focus, 

working with our Treasury Department as the key interagency department, with all other allies and partners around the world. You 

mentioned oil, the black marketing of oil has been, recently, a very 

significant resource for them. 

Senator DONNELLY. Right. 

Secretary HAGEL. They have taken small oilfields in Syria and 

Iraq. That’s something that we can address through what we’re 

looking at on some of our strategic focus outside of the Treasury 

Department. The ransom, the terrorism, all of the ways they finance themselves, we have a task force, working through the 

Treasury Department, to focus on this. But, that has to be, and is, 

a major part of our overall strategy, to cut off that funding and 

flow of resources. 

Senator DONNELLY. The last thing I’ll ask is about coordination 

with our European allies in regards to the people with European 

passports who can get visa waivers and other things, the efforts 

59 

that are going into that. Is that being done with all of our European allies over there? 

Secretary HAGEL. That, too, is a major part of the coordination, 

not only with our allies, but it is part of the overall strategic focus 

of our interagency departments, and we are working on all that. 

That’s law enforcement, that’s DOS, it’s all the other agencies coming together to focus on it. We took it up, by the way, at Wales, 

at the NATO Summit, 2 weeks ago, when we were together, as we 

will continue to do. But, it’s a very significant part of the overall 

strategy. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you both. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Donnelly. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, gentlemen, both for your service. 

We’re dealing with some difficult times. 

But, General Dempsey, you served in combat in Iraq, you were 

in charge of training the Iraqi troops. How many years ago was 

that? 

General DEMPSEY. 2005 to 2007, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. That’s several years we’ve been training the 

Iraqi troops. Will they fight? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, they will fight, if they are well led and 

believe that their government is looking out for, not only their best 

interests, but their families. 

Senator SESSIONS. Will they be encouraged if they felt they had 

U.S. air support? 

General DEMPSEY. Absolutely. 

Senator SESSIONS. I believe you said earlier that our first priority 

should be ISIL. Is that correct? 

General DEMPSEY. I did, Senator. 

Senator SESSIONS. I agree with that. There’s no doubt about that 

in my mind. Don’t we have a commitment, to the Kurds, the Shia, 

the Sunnis, that we worked with for 10 years in war and helped 

them establish, at least for a time, a government that functioned 

in Iraq? Don’t we have, as a nation, some sort of relationship, a 

bond between our two nations, even though we’ve had difficulties 

in recent years? 

General DEMPSEY. I can tell you that those who have served 

there obviously feel that bond. 

Senator SESSIONS. I certainly hear that from people who have 

served there. I think we owe those who have served and who have 

suffered to be successful, if we can be successful. I think we can 

be successful. 

We’ve had a lot of questions about Syria. There are many complications in Syria. But, if we’re going to make ISIL the first priority, shouldn’t we emphasize our relationship with our friends, the 

Kurds, in Baghdad, and the Iraqis, and begin to work with them 

to turn the tide? In terms of strategy, where you begin, wouldn’t 

the first place to be to put ISIL on the defensive in our ally, Iraq? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes. 

Senator SESSIONS. I want your military opinion, but if we embedded a number of Special Forces with the Iraqi military, and they 

knew that they had access to intelligence from the United States 

60 

and air support from the United States, wouldn’t that encourage 

them to be more effective, militarily? 

General DEMPSEY. As I mentioned in my opening statement, 

there may be times when I believe that would be necessary in 

order to make the mission successful. I don’t think so on a day-today basis. 

Senator SESSIONS. Let me just ask you directly. If there’s a military unit in Iraq today, an Iraqi unit, and they had United States 

military embedded with them, and they were asked to undertake 

an offensive operation, would they not be more emboldened and encouraged to know that they had Americans there with them? 

General DEMPSEY. In those cases where I would assess the mission to be complex enough that it would absolutely require our expertise forward, I’ll make a recommendation to do it. We also don’t 

want them to become dependent upon us. There’s a fine line to be 

drawn there. 

Senator SESSIONS. They’ve become a bit dependent on U.S. air, 

I acknowledge. I do believe you’re correct, that they will fight. But, 

I don’t think they will have the kind of morale boost that we’d like 

them to have if they don’t have confidence that they have air support, and that is enhanced with embedded soldiers. Surely, that’s 

true, is it not? 

General DEMPSEY. I would love to find an occasion where we 

might have Jordanian Special Forces embedded, and Emirati Special Forces embedded. 

Senator SESSIONS. If we all had horses, we’d take a ride. We 

don’t have that. 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. We’re talking about down the road. You said 

several times, we need to blunt the momentum, we need to change 

the momentum on the battlefield. Don’t we need to start taking 

back a territory in Iraq—those of us who share that view—— 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, absolutely, Senator. 

Senator SESSIONS.—and can’t we get—— 

General DEMPSEY. But, your premise is that we have to have 

U.S. embedded advisors forward. I don’t share that premise, at this 

point. 

Senator SESSIONS. Did we use embedded people when they took 

the Haditha Dam back? 

General DEMPSEY. We did not. 

Senator SESSIONS. How did we assist them in that instance? 

General DEMPSEY. We have advisors embedded in headquarters 

that can help direct, using overhead imagery, full-motion video, 

and direct strikes. 

Senator SESSIONS. Would it be in our advantage to, sooner rather 

than later, encourage the Iraqis to get on the move? 

General DEMPSEY. Absolutely. But, we want to make sure they’re 

ready, as well. 

Senator SESSIONS. You started training them in 2007, and it’s 

been a number of months now, and we’ve had only—I just think 

we’re in a position to start taking some advances. I think it’s necessary to blunt the momentum. 

Secretary Hagel, briefly, I notice that the House put in their CR, $91 billion for the OCO funding. The President had asked for $58 

61 

billion. Is that money going to be used to—in addition to the $550 

million for training and equipping the Free Syrian Army? Is that 

going to be used to carry out military operations in the region? 

Secretary HAGEL. I haven’t seen what the House did, and I think 

our Comptroller may be here. If I might take a second to ask Michael McCord, who you all know, Mr. Chairman—— 

Chairman LEVIN. Have to make it real quick, because we have 

four more—— 

Secretary HAGEL. Okay, because I haven’t seen what the House 

did. I don’t want to say or respond to that until I know. 

Senator SESSIONS. Could you respond in writing on what your 

position is with regard to this? 

Secretary HAGEL. We can do it for the record. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Secretary HAGEL. I’ll provide it for the record. 

Chairman LEVIN. If we could get that this afternoon. Because, 

obviously, it’s important what the administration’s position is. 

Secretary HAGEL. We will. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Yes, the President’s $58.6 billion fiscal year 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request will be used primarily to support the continued military operations in Afghanistan operations. The request also includes a new initiative, the $4 

billion Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF), which builds on existing tools 

and authorities to respond to a range of terrorist threats and crisis response scenarios and to support the Syrian opposition. The CTPF will have three broad purposes: 

(1) $1.0 billion to provide support to Syria and its neighbors through a Regional 

Stabilization Initiative to provide assistance to the Syrian opposition. The request includes a proposed authority to train-and-equip vetted elements of the 

Syrian armed opposition to help defend the Syrian people, stabilize areas 

under opposition control and facilitate the provision of essential services, 

counter terrorist threats, and promote conditions for a negotiated settlement. 

Additionally the funds are to be used to provide greater support to Syria’s 

neighbors—Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey—as we work together to confront the growing challenges presented by the Islamic State of Iraq and the 

Levant, al-Nusrah Front, and other violent extremist groups. 

(2) $2.5 billion to provide counterterrorism support to partner nations, including 

capacity-building and enabling support, a two-track framework for allocating 

CTPF dollars for specific mitigating efforts: expanding our efforts to provide 

direct support to partners in those countries and regions where terrorist 

threats pose the greatest challenge to U.S., allied, and partner security interests; and augmenting U.S. military capabilities needed to sustain a higherlevel of partnership activity globally and enabling partners to perform their 

own security operations. 

(3) $0.5 billion to help the Department of Defense (DOD) respond to unexpected 

crises. The volatile situation in Iraq is just one situation that underscores the 

importance of reserving funds that can be allocated based on unforeseen 

needs. A crisis response fund would facilitate flexibility and speed in responding to this or other contingencies (after appropriate congressional notification), 

and would allow DOD to maintain balance between responding to emergency 

requirements and being ready to respond to future contingencies. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Hirono. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, to both of you for your service. 

You and the President have made a very strong case that ISIL, 

if left unchecked, will be a threat to Europe and to the United 

States. They are attracting recruits from all over the world, including the United States. 

62 

General Dempsey, you noted that, as we were looking at that 

map, what looks like territorial gains by ISIL is really a tribal-bytribal overcoming. My question to you, General Dempsey, is, even 

as we are asked to provide the authorization to arm and equip the 

Free Syrian Army, how important is it that we work with the 

Sunni tribal leaders to enable them to fight off ISIL in both Syria 

and Iraq? 

General DEMPSEY. It’s absolutely an integral part of the campaign plan. 

Senator HIRONO. What exactly are we doing working with the 

Sunni tribal leaders to enable them to fend off ISIL? 

General DEMPSEY. This probably requires the integration of several things. I mentioned, already, the fact that the Iraqi Government has to demonstrate that it actually cares about the Sunni 

tribes and not to just fence them off in al-Anbar Province. That’s 

one line of effort. The other is the effort of General Allen, as he 

goes forward using some of his previous relationships to meet with 

the tribal leaders and begin the formation of a national guard for 

al-Anbar Province. Then, I think it’ll be a matter of regional partners who have Sunni Government providing some of the—maybe 

most, actually—of the funding and materiel support to that organization. 

Senator HIRONO. Do you see evidence that this kind of effort is 

working, that these tribal leaders that have been marginalized or 

excluded are now going to trust what we’re doing? 

General DEMPSEY. I can’t make that report yet, Senator. What 

I will tell you is that, while ISIL was making these broad, sweeping movements across Iraq, many of the Sunni tribes completely 

got discouraged and they didn’t feel like they had any reason or capability to stand up to ISIL. 

Now that ISIL momentum has been slowed, it hasn’t been 

stopped and it hasn’t been reversed, but it’s been slowed—and we 

did see, today, actually, an ISF unit moving south of Baghdad, near 

Jurf al-Sakhar, for the first movement south of Baghdad. Now all 

of a sudden we’re getting tribal leaders reaching out, saying, 

‘‘Okay, if you’re going to be serious about this, then we’ll talk to 

you.’’ 

I think it was a necessary first step that we showed them we 

really were serious. 

Senator HIRONO. There were some earlier questions about concerns being raised about the Free Syrian Army that has been fighting Assad. What makes us believe that, when we train-and-equip 

them, that they will turn their attention to fighting ISIL? Do we 

have some kind of an agreement with the 5,000 forces—Syrian 

army forces that we are going to vet and train that—do we have 

some kind of an agreement that says, ‘‘You will fight ISIL and 

you’re not going to be fighting Assad’’? 

General DEMPSEY. No. We do not have any agreements at all, because we haven’t begun the recruiting effort. We don’t have the authority to begin, so we haven’t really done anything but come up 

with a concept. 

Senator HIRONO. Let’s say that you do get the authority. Then 

what kind of terms would you put forth to enable us, as much as 

possible—we realize there are risks, here—to have us conclude that 

63 

the people we are recruiting are actually going to fight ISIL and 

not Assad? 

General DEMPSEY. The important part of an overt program is, 

we’ll link it to a political structure over which we will have a certain amount of influence because of their dependence upon us for 

supplies, ammunition, and so forth—as well as the fact that the regional partners, in particular, I think, as long as they’re—if the regional partners believe we’re just going to ignore Assad and just 

leave him there in perpetuity, then we’re going to have a problem 

with building a coalition. But, we can, it seems to me, coalesce 

around the idea that ISIL is the immediate threat and, therefore, 

should be addressed first. 

Senator HIRONO. Of course, there is the question of, what is 

Assad going to be doing while the Free Syrian Army is busy attacking ISIL? There are a lot of complexities involving Syria. 

General DEMPSEY. There are. 

Senator HIRONO. Secretary Hagel, we know that ISIL is attracting recruits from all over the world, including from the United 

States. I note, in your testimony, that you said that the Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security have 

launched an initiative to partner with local communities to counter 

extremist recruiting. Can you talk a little bit more about what this 

constitutes, what this initiative is all about? 

Secretary HAGEL. First, thank you for pointing that out, because 

as I noted in one of my earlier answers, it’s a very important component of the overall strategy here to deal with ISIL. Since I’m not 

involved in that part of the strategy and the operations, I can’t go 

too deep into how they’re doing it, exactly. The point being is to enlist local communities’ law enforcement awareness of who’s in their 

communities, who’s coming in and out of their communities, just be 

more alert of things that are out there that will help our Homeland 

Security people, our law enforcement individuals be more aware of 

things that may be occurring, shouldn’t occur, and then also working with our international partners as we trade information on individuals who are flowing in and out of these countries. We know, 

as you have mentioned, and I think Marty mentioned and I mentioned, that there are thousands of Europeans that we know are in 

Syria and the Middle East, and these people all have passports 

which allow them access to our country, to different countries in 

the world. It’s a combination of using those sources and coordinating that effort. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Hirono. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, to the witnesses, for your helpful testimony today. 

I believe the President’s four-pillar plan, announced last Wednesday night, is generally reasonable, but I have one significant point 

of disagreement that I want to spend some time on, and that is the 

question of whether the President has the authority, without additional congressional authorization, to carry out the mission, as described. 

Secretary Hagel, you have used the phrase ‘‘war against ISIL’’ 

today, and others in the administration have used that phrase. 

64 

General Dempsey, you have talked about a multiyear effort, and 

others in the administration have expressed the same concern. I 

believe very strongly, and I don’t think that it’s just a theoretical 

or law-professor argument, that the President does need the authority of Congress to conduct the mission that he described and 

you’ve discussed today. 

In a matter like this, the President’s power is basically composed 

of two kinds of powers—and you’ve alluded to them—constitutional 

or statutory. The constitutional power is under Article 2, as powers 

Commander in Chief. While there’s some gray area that’s been debated often since 1787, the general understanding of the power of 

a Commander in Chief under Article 2 is to defend the Nation. An 

offensive military action then triggers the need to go into Article 

1 and have Congress declare war. That was first tested by a Virginia President, Thomas Jefferson, when fighting a terrorist organization of his day in the same general region, the Barbary pirates. 

He had the authority, and believed he did, to repel attacks, one 

after the next. But, when he decided he needed to go on offense, 

‘‘Let’s wipe out this threat so we don’t have to just keep repelling 

attacks,’’ he stated plainly that, ‘‘I can’t do that. I can’t go on offense without Congress.’’ 

Senator Obama made the same point very clearly in 2007, ‘‘The 

President does not have power under the Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve 

stopping an actual ongoing or imminent threat against the Nation.’’ 

Within the last 2 weeks, the Director of National Counterterrorism 

Center, Matthew Olson, said, ‘‘At this point, there is no credible information that ISIL is planning to attack the United States.’’ I understood the President’s comments last week, and other comments, 

to suggest that ISIL is a significant threat, a serious threat, a 

growing threat, but, in terms of an imminent threat to attack the 

United States that would trigger the Article 2 defense powers, it 

does not seem to exist at this point. 

Then there are statutory powers. The White House has cited 

both the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs. 2001 AUMF, it’s important to remember not only what Congress authorized, but what Congress refused to authorize. The Bush administration approached Congress 

and said, ‘‘We would like the power to undertake military action 

against terrorist groups in order to prevent terrorist attacks on the 

United States.’’ If Congress had granted that AUMF, it clearly 

would have covered this threat. But, Congress overwhelmingly rejected that wording of the AUMF, did not believe in a preemptive 

war doctrine, did not want to hand the power to an executive to 

unilaterally determine who to go after. Instead, Congress narrowed 

the AUMF to have it be with respect to the perpetrators of the attacks of September 11. ISIL was formed after September 11. 

There’s been an administrative gloss by both administrations, the 

Bush and Obama administrations, to go beyond the perpetrators of 

September 11 to talk about associated forces with al Qaeda. Has 

there been a time which ISIL has been associated with al Qaeda? 

There was a time. But, they are not associated now. They’ve disclaimed each other. They’re even battling in some theaters. 

Could a lawyer make a broad argument, a really creative argument that the AUMF covered ISIL? I suppose. I’m a lawyer, I’ve 

65 

made creative arguments. But, this President spoke at the National Defense University in May 2013, and he argued against 

broadening the open-ended AUMF and said, instead, what we 

should be doing as a Nation, and what he was committed to, was 

not broadening the open-ended AUMF, but trying to refine it, narrow it, and ultimately repeal it. I don’t know why we would take 

an open-ended AUMF and try to broaden it further when the President has made a commitment that it should be narrowed and refined. 

Finally, there was the AUMF with respect to Iraq that was 

passed in 2002. It was designed to topple a government that is long 

gone. There have been many successive governments since the 

Hussein Government was toppled. The administration testified, in 

a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing in May, that the 

2002 AUMF was obsolete and should be repealed. Again, to try to 

take these two statutory elements and stretch them so broadly, I 

think, is a significant problem, and it will create a precedent that, 

if we go along with it in Congress, we will live to regret, and possibly regret very soon. 

That said, I think the mission, as described, is reasonable. But, 

I think Congress is necessary. The President, last week, and you, 

today, have said, obviously, you would welcome Congress, because 

we’re stronger if we do it together, not just as an institution. We’re 

stronger in the support we provide to the men and women that we 

ask to bear the risk of battle. If we ask them to bear the risk of 

battle in a war that may take a number of years, that will have 

aspects that we can’t currently predict, some will be hurt, some will 

lose their lives, some will see bad things happen to their comrades 

in arms. If we’re going to ask them to risk that, then we should 

do our job to bless the mission and say that it’s worth it. If we’re 

not willing to do our job as Congress, bless the mission and say 

that it’s worth it, we shouldn’t be asking people to risk everything. 

It is my hope that this body will grapple with this four-point 

plan, will ask tough questions, will refine it, but will give our imprimatur to it so that we are not asking men and women to serve 

and potentially risk everything without us doing the job that we’re 

supposed to do in order to demonstrate the national support for the 

mission that we’re asking them to carry out. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Kaine. 

Senator King. 

Senator KING. I’m in complete agreement with Senator Kaine, 

and I’m glad he went before me, because he articulated it much 

more clearly and forcefully than I would have. 

I would only touch a bit on the history. The Constitution is very 

clear, and it wasn’t an afterthought or a minor comma here or 

there, ‘‘Congress shall declare war.’’ In fact, the interesting thing 

is, the first draft of the Constitution said, ‘‘Congress shall make 

war.’’ They had an—they argued about an amendment to change 

‘‘make’’ to ‘‘declare,’’ because they realized it was impractical for 

Congress to execute the war, so they changed it to ‘‘declare’’ to 

leave the power of execution to the President. But, they were very 

explicit about why they did that. If you look at the 69th Federalist, 

it talks about the differences between the President and the King 

66 

or other executives—and this is one of the principal things they 

pointed to—and the risk of having the power of war exclusively 

vested in the executive. 

In Madison’s notes to the Constitution on—I think it’s August 17, 

1787—Madison talks about this discussion of the declaration of 

war, and George Mason used a wonderful phrase. He said, ‘‘It is 

our intention—it is our goal—our goal here is clogging rather than 

facilitating war.’’ That’s an interesting term. They wanted it to be 

a deliberate decision. 

I believe, along with Senator Kaine, that stretching the AUMF 

from 2001 or 2002 to cover this situation renders the constitutional 

clause a nullity. I just believe, and the danger here is, as this happens year-by-year, war-by-war, conflict-by-conflict, eventually 

there’s nothing left of that provision, and we have, in fact, transferred to the executive the unilateral power to commit American 

forces. That’s not good for this country. We may like this President. 

There may be a President down the road we don’t like and we don’t 

want to have this power. The more precedent we establish—and it 

started with Harry Truman in Korea, where there was no declaration—I think the stronger that precedent becomes embedded, the 

more dangerous it is for the country. 

I think it’s significant that the administration is now using the 

word ‘‘war.’’ I won’t go further, but I think it’s an important point. 

I totally agree that Congress has to act, and it’s our responsibility 

to act. It’s our responsibility to act. It will strengthen the President’s hand, it will strengthen the coalition, it will strengthen our 

ability to draw coalition partners if we are a unified country and 

we’re not—Congress isn’t doing what it usually does, which is criticize and second-guess, and instead is a participant in the decision. 

Second point. We need to be thinking about three levels of strategy here, it seems to me. One is the plan the President articulated, 

which I believe was a coherent, thoughtful, and strong position. 

The President has articulated a plan. The question is, as General 

Dempsey has alluded to today, what’s Plan B if the coalition 

doesn’t stand up? What happens if Turkey and Saudi Arabia or all 

the other countries decide that they’re just not going to participate, 

and then we’re in a position of the West waging war on Islam?— 

which is exactly what ISIL wants. We cannot be in that position. 

We’ve already quoted Tom Friedman today. I’ll do it again. He had 

a wonderful phrase, and I’d paraphrase it applying to Turkey. 

‘‘They’re with us on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday. They’re 

against us on Tuesday and Thursday. They take the weekends off.’’ 

These other countries have to get engaged in this struggle. Turkey 

is one of the prime candidates, because that’s the jihadi interstate, 

that’s how the people are getting into Syria and getting to ISIL. 

The strategic question is, what if they don’t stand up? Are we going 

to do it by ourselves? I think the answer has to be, we can’t, not 

only because the American people aren’t interested in it, but also 

because it isn’t going to work. This war has to have a coalition face. 

The third strategic question, forgetting about this current battle, 

this is a battle in a long-term war. The real question, to me, is, 

what is our strategy for dealing with radical jihadism, generally, 

not just ISIL? We have al Qaeda, ISIL, al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, 

AQAP, al-Nusra. This is geopolitical whack-a-mole, and we have to 

67 

have a strategy to get to the bottom of why are young people joining these organizations? What’s motivating them? How do we 

counter their message that is attracting people into this radical 

death-oriented philosophy? 

The administration has to deal with the current crisis, I understand that. I think ISIL is a threat. But, we also have to deal with, 

what happens if the Iraqi army doesn’t stand up adequately? What 

happens if our troops that we train in Syria are unable to really 

take the fight to ISIL? 

The third question which I think is important is, we have to have 

a longer term, more broad strategy to deal with this threat. Otherwise, this is going to be a 100-year war. I just don’t think it’s in 

anyone’s interest to contemplate such a terrible outcome. 

Again, I want to thank you, gentlemen, and your testimony has 

been very helpful today, both of you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator King. 

Senator Gillibrand. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for your service and being here today. 

Secretary Hagel, much has been talked about the role of Turkey 

and concerns about foreign fighters using their territory to cross in 

to aid the fighting. When you were in Turkey last week, what can 

you tell us about our engagement with Turkey to help stream the 

tide of the foreign fighter flow? Also, Turkey really hasn’t committed publicly to what it will do as part of the core coalition. What 

can you tell us about their intentions with regard to this effort? 

Secretary HAGEL. Thank you, Senator. I know, as you have expressed it, other Senators, the importance of Turkey, here. We 

agree. 

First, you know that ISIL is currently holding 46 Turkish diplomats hostage. In my conversations with President Erdogan and 

the new Prime Minister, Davutoglu, all their senior leaders, this 

obviously was at the top of their priority list, which it would be. 

Secretary Kerry was there a few days after I was there. 

Now, that said, Turkey recognizes, as much as any country, the 

threat that ISIL poses as other extremist groups. They are working 

with us now, will continue to work with us. Obviously, in an open 

hearing, I can’t go too far down into this. We’d be glad to give you 

more in a closed session. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Also, the oil on the black market. 

Secretary HAGEL. That’s another issue that—— 

Senator GILLIBRAND. It’s a huge financing stream for them. 

Secretary HAGEL.—it’s another issue that we talk to them about. 

They’re not unaware of that. They know that it’s a threat. They 

know that it’s a major funding source of ISIL. They are moving to 

deal with some of these same issues. Our interests are common and 

clear. I think it’s important to recognize, again, that Turkey has 

been an invaluable member of NATO, still is. We have a NATO 

base there. We have a lot going on with Turkey, as do other NATO 

countries. Their interests are clear, and they understand that in 

this fight. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Many of the members of this committee 

have talked about the effectiveness of arming the moderate rebels. 

Senator Hirono just had a line of questioning about what agreeVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:16 Mar 11, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93641.TXT JUNE
68 

ments do they have with them? The Sotloff family have made certain questions about what information the moderates may have 

given to ISIL about their son. I’m concerned about how we assess 

their abilities, their effectiveness. When I met some of these opposition fighters the last time I was overseas, they wouldn’t even agree 

to locking down and securing chemical weapons, when they were 

found, and turning them over to an international body. How can 

you engage them? How can you truly vet them? How can we have 

any hope that, if they do agree to fight ISIL on some level, not just 

Assad, that they will continue to do so and not align themselves 

with ISIL when they feel like Assad is in their sights? 

Secretary HAGEL. I think a couple of points need to be reemphasized to answer your question. General Dempsey has talked about 

it today. I have. In both our testimonies. First, it goes back to a 

couple of recent questions that were asked here in the last few 

minutes. The United States cannot do any of this alone. This is 

why the local efforts, local organization has to be involved in this. 

Second, confidence and trust in their governments. When you 

really look at—with some intensity here, what’s going on in Syria, 

how did this happen, why was it allowed to happen in Iraq, how 

did the Sunni tribes just walk away from the government, three divisions of the Iraqi security forces dropping their weapons and running—why did all that happen? General Dempsey—I know it’s complicated, but he made a very important point. When people are 

disenfranchised, they don’t trust their government, they don’t have 

confidence in their government, their will to fight and to do the 

things that you’re talking about won’t be there. To reestablish trust 

and confidence coming from the locals, helping sustain them, build 

them, development, is really, I think, the answer to the question 

as much as anyone thinks. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. But, the moderate fighters, specifically, 

their goals are to unseat Assad. That is their primary reason for 

fighting. If we add this additional mission to them, ‘‘We are going 

to help you, but you must help defeat ISIL,’’ I don’t know what 

makes them trade off one mission for the other. I don’t know what 

hook you have that says, ‘‘You have to help us defeat ISIL, and 

we’ll assist in this’’ in a way that they don’t, at some point, say, 

‘‘No, our goal is to defeat Assad, and the way to defeat Assad is 

give all the weapons you just gave us to these better fighters that 

are represented by ISIL.’’ 

Secretary HAGEL. I don’t think they see it as an either/or. ISIL 

is a clear threat to them. What ISIL has done to them, to their people, their families, decimated their villages, the atrocities that ISIL 

has perpetrated on these people in Syria—it isn’t a matter of, 

‘‘We’ll fight either ISIL or Assad.’’ 

What I believe—and I think we have pretty clear intelligence on 

this, and the responsibility that we all have of understanding the 

people, first, is—it’s pretty clear they want a future for their families, they want to live in some peace and stability, with possibilities 

and jobs for their families. One of the points that was made here 

earlier this morning—and I think General Dempsey made it—until 

there’s some clarification on these millions of disenfranchised 

young men in North Africa, the Middle East, with no jobs, no possibilities, nothing, no hope, despair, then one country isn’t going to 

69 

be able to fix this problem. This is a deep, wide problem. I think 

it really does reflect back on your question. 

We can’t do it alone. It is a long-term effort. But, the threats to 

us are so clear now, and to these people, that we have to deal with 

it. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

I just want to clarify one number I think you both have used, a 

5,000 goal for the DOD train-and-equip program. If—and this is an 

‘‘if’’ as published reports indicate, there’s a covert program—I’m 

saying ‘‘if’’—any numbers involved in that covert program would 

not be involved in the 5,000. Is that correct? 

General DEMPSEY. That’s correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

We thank you very much for being here, for your testimony. 

We stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:09 p.m., the committee adjourned.] 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD BLUMENTHAL

STATUS OF U–2 DIVESTITURE CERTIFICATION

1. Senator BLUMENTHAL. [Deleted.] 

Secretary HAGEL. [Deleted.] 

2. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Hagel, the U–2 currently provides 75 percent 

of our actionable intelligence. Several combatant commanders are on record supporting the capabilities of the U–2 over the Global Hawk, based on the U–2’s multispectral capability and superior electro-optical infrared sensor. In the 2007 and 2012 

National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA), Congress precluded the retirement of 

the U–2 until intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) gaps caused by 

the retirement of the U–2 are fully mitigated. The law further stipulates that ‘‘until 

the capability to be fielded at the same time or before the U–2 aircraft retirement 

would result in equal or greater capability available to the commanders of the combatant commands.’’ It does not seem prudent to be retiring a capable platform for 

a less capable platform at a time when we are using our ISR assets at their highest 

operational tempo ever. What is your current plan to comply with the statutory requirement, upgrade the multispectral capabilities of the Global Hawk sensor, and 

fully fund a transition plan to move from reliance on the U–2 to only the Global 

Hawk without creating an ISR gap? 

Secretary HAGEL. The plan to upgrade the capabilities of the Global Hawk sensor 

and transition ISR missions from the U–2 to the Global Hawk is detailed in the office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation’s (CAPE) classified report to Congress. This report was prepared in response to section 143(c) of the NDAA for Fiscal 

Year 2014 and was briefed to members of the Senate Armed Services Committee 

on September 3, 2014. The Department of Defense Special Access Program Central 

Office is coordinating with your office to arrange a discussion in which CAPE can 

review with you the classified details of the plan. 

EXECUTIVE ORDER 13223

3. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Hagel, on September 14, 2001, President Bush 

signed Executive Order 13223, authorizing under 10 U.S.C. 12302 a partial mobilization of up to 1 million Reserve and National Guard personnel. He delegated this 

authority to the Secretary of Defense. Will you use this authority to mobilize members of the Reserve components for new regional challenges in Syria and Iraq? 

Secretary HAGEL. Over the past 13 years, the Reserve component has proven to 

be a capable and vital part of the Total Force. If the Service Chiefs determine there 

is a need to use Reserve component assets to combat the current challenges in Syria 

and Iraq, or elsewhere, then I would consider exercising my authority under 10 

U.S.C. 12302, pursuant to Executive Order 13223. 

70 

4. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Hagel, what is the plan for the Department 

of Defense (DOD) to end the partial mobilization of the Reserve components? 

Secretary HAGEL. DOD recommended to the President in August of this year that 

he continue the state of national emergency, initially declared on September 14, 

2001, and the authority to continue partial mobilization of the Reserve component 

for another year. The President did so on September 4, 2014. We will reevaluate 

this issue again in 2015 and determine if partial mobilization continues to be required. 

5. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Hagel, can you use authority under 10 U.S.C. 

12304 to maintain an operational reserve for current missions and deployments? 

Secretary HAGEL. We have been using the broader mobilization authority provided 

by 10 U.S.C. 12302 to support current terrorist response missions and deployments. 

We are evaluating whether 10 U.S.C. 12304 would provide adequate authority to 

support these missions. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS BEING USED FOR MISSIONS

6. Senator WICKER. General Dempsey, last week it was reported that Marine 

Corps Harriers operating off the USS Bataan carried out a strike against the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL). This marked the first time that our marines 

have participated in operations against ISIL, although they had been conducting 

ISR missions since the end of July. Also, the deployment of this Amphibious Ready 

Group was extended by 21 days in order to meet the needs of the combatant commander. These operations, and the extension of the ships’ deployment, reinforce the 

fact that amphibious ships give commanders the flexibility they need to carry out 

a variety of missions, and underscore my concern that we do not have enough of 

these ships. The incoming Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Dunford, expressed those concerns to this committee during his confirmation hearing. I would 

like to hear your thoughts on this too. Specifically, do you have enough amphibious 

ships to meet the growing requirements? 

General DEMPSEY. I agree that we do not have enough of these amphibious ships, 

which give commanders more flexibility to carry out a variety of missions. To meet 

all Combatant Command Marine daily ‘‘presence’’ requirements with only amphibious ships DOD would require more than 50 ships. However, that solution would 

not be affordable or prudent. DOD’s surge requirement is 38 amphibious ships, with 

33 being the affordable number to execute the strategy with acceptable risk. At 31, 

our current inventory is just short of that number. We do not have enough amphibious ships but given today’s fiscal environment and budget uncertainty, the current 

plan provides the best balance of assets in this period of limited resources and diminishing flexibility. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MIKE LEE

SYRIAN REBELS

7. Senator LEE. Secretary Hagel, in an article from the newspaper, The Daily Star 

of Lebanon, on September 8, 2014, a Free Syrian Army commander, Bassel Idriss, 

is quoted stating: ‘‘We are collaborating with the Islamic State and the Nursa Front 

by attacking the Syrian Army’s gatherings in Qalamoun.’’ The Hill newspaper reported on Friday that according to human rights groups monitoring the situation, 

a group of moderate rebels signed a cease-fire deal with ISIL. The Washington Post 

recently reported that Islamic State militants were using anti-tank weapons once 

held by moderate Syrian rebels. These reports were all in the past 2 weeks. How 

do you reconcile reports like this with the President’s plan to train and arm these 

fighters? 

Secretary HAGEL. The moderate Syrian opposition is caught in a two-front war 

against the Assad regime and terrorist groups such as ISIL and al-Nusrah Front. 

In some cases, moderate Syrian opposition units may have cooperated with extremists at the tactical level. Tactical cooperation does not indicate that moderate groups 

subscribe to the extremists’ ideology. In other cases, we know that extremist organizations, like ISIL, have posted false reports about collaboration with the moderate 

opposition, including claims of cease fires. Likewise, we also know that extremist 

groups like ISIL have attacked moderate groups in order to steal their weapons and 

71 

equipment. We will work closely with the Intelligence Community and foreign partners to screen recruits for any ties to extremist organizations. 

These anecdotes highlight—vice diminish—the need for a robust program to trainand-equip the moderate Syrian opposition to fight against groups like ISIL. With 

training they will be more effective in maintaining control of the weapons and 

equipment we give them. 

8. Senator LEE. Secretary Hagel, if the moderate rebels we train and arm in Syria 

do not perform as well as you hope and need additional force to combat either ISIL 

or Assad, will the United States escalate our involvement to assist them? 

Secretary HAGEL. We intend to carefully weigh the level of U.S. support against 

a range of factors as we move forward with this program, including the circumstances on the ground, the ability to achieve U.S. objectives, and the related 

costs, risks, and opportunities. At this time, we neither want to limit ourselves nor 

over-commit to levels of support, given the variable operating environment. 

COMBATING THE FLOW OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS

9. Senator LEE. Secretary Hagel, in the President’s speech last week, he discussed 

combating the flow of foreign fighters whose western passports allow for easier travel into the Western Hemisphere and the United States. I believe that the threat of 

these fighters returning from the battlefield to carry out attacks, such as the shootings on May 24, 2014, at the Jewish Museum in Belgium, are an issue that we must 

be addressing now. How is DOD coordinating with other U.S. Government agencies 

and our allies to identify, track, and prevent these fighters from leaving the battlefield and threatening the U.S. Homeland? 

Secretary HAGEL. DOD remains concerned about the foreign (i.e., non-Syrian) 

fighters traveling to and from Iraq and Syria. This concern is particularly acute 

with respect to those individuals from visa waiver countries, whose passports could 

allow them to enter the United States with limited scrutiny. DOD has a relatively 

small, but important, role in the U.S. Government’s effort to address this important 

challenge. DOD is currently focused on gaining a better understanding of the scope 

and complexity of the problem set and communicating insights to U.S. Government 

departments and agencies and foreign governments best situated to interdict these 

foreign fighters, such as through investigation and arrest. 

10. Senator LEE. Secretary Hagel, is the administration working with the Government of Turkey to disrupt the networks through their country that ISIL and other 

extremist recruits use to be smuggled into and out of Syria? 

Secretary HAGEL. The flow of foreign fighters (i.e., non-Syrian) to and from Syria 

remains a significant concern for DOD and many of our allies and partners including Turkey, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally. The Government of Turkey 

is a critical partner in the coalition of nations that seek to address the threats emanating from Iraq and Syria. Over the past months, DOD has conducted a number 

of high-level engagements with Turkish officials to pursue expanded cooperation in 

combating ISIL and stemming the flow of foreign fighters. These engagements include my most recent visit to Ankara on September 8, 2014. On foreign fighter 

issues, we have seen some progress already, and believe the Government of Turkey 

will soon further increase its own efforts, and will continue to collaborate with the 

international community to address this challenge. However, the effort to stem the 

flow of foreign fighters traveling to Iraq and Syria extends well beyond Turkey, to 

include source countries and other transit points in the region. DOD continues to 

collaborate with other U.S. Government departments and agencies, and to engage 

with international partners following the President’s speech at the United Nations 

General Assembly to ensure that we are supporting the broader international effort 

to address this challenge globally. 

11. Senator LEE. General Dempsey, President Obama stated that we do not have 

intelligence of specific attacks against the United States being planned by ISIL, but 

that they have the desire and ambition to do so. Where does the al Qaeda threat 

against the United States measure up against the threats we are currently seeing 

from ISIL? 

General DEMPSEY. Al Qaeda’s goal has had a greater focus on direct, larger scale 

attacks against the United States, while ISIL is more focused on smaller scale attacks that may not necessarily be directed against the Homeland but still target 

Americans and westerners throughout the world. 

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Due to their fight in Syria and Iraq and public calls for avenging strikes, ISIL 

has broader influence and appeal than al-Qaeda, increasing the possibility for inspired, individual attacks against the Homeland and Western interests. 

IRAQI GOVERNMENT AND SECURITY FORCES

12. Senator LEE. General Dempsey, I am especially concerned that the Iraqi Security Forces lost large quantities of U.S.-provided weapons to ISIL forces when they 

retreated from northern Iraq this summer. As you well know, we spent many years 

and billions of dollars training these forces. What is your current assessment of the 

Iraqi Security Forces and how are you working to prevent another collapse of their 

willingness to fight and secure the weapons we are giving them? 

General DEMPSEY. The collapse of portions of the Iraqi Security Forces can in part 

be attributed to poor leadership and mismanagement by a Shia dominated Government of Iraq. This is why military assistance from the U.S. Government and the 

coalition has been, and will continue to be, predicated upon the formation of an inclusive Iraqi government that includes representation from Sunni, Shia, and Kurds. 

An inclusive Government of Iraq will facilitate the proper management of the Iraqi 

Security Forces and prevent another collapse like the one that occurred this summer. Additionally, the Coalition to Counter-ISIL will institute a train, advise, and 

assist plan intended to improve the capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces, increasing their willingness to go on the offensive and take back lost terrain from ISIL. 

13. Senator LEE. General Dempsey, the Kurdish Peshmerga are proving so far to 

be reliable and efficient at pushing back against ISIL in northern Iraq. Are the 

Peshmerga and Kurdish political leaders supportive of a unified and stable government in Baghdad, or do their intentions against ISIL extend only as far as protecting their people and Kurdish territory? 

General DEMPSEY. The Kurdistan Regional Government has expressed support for 

and willingness to participate in the new Government of Iraq headed by Prime Minister Abadi. Its leaders have declared they will work with Baghdad to bring Iraq’s 

different communities together to confront the country’s political, economic, and security challenges. Kurdish and Peshmerga political leaders support a unified and inclusive Government of Iraq that operates in accordance with the Iraqi constitution. 

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