1997 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

6-23-1997

Graves v. Lowery

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 96-7277

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Recommended Citation

"Graves v. Lowery" (1997). 1997 Decisions. Paper 138.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997/138
Filed June 23, 1997 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

No. 96-7277 

MARCA M. GRAVES; ANTOINETTE R. TRUEITT; LAURA 

SEGARRA; DEBRA C. NAPPER; MARSHELL L. NAPPER; 

SHERRY L. REIFF; DOROTHY R. CLEMONS, 

Appellants,

v. 

HORACE A. LOWERY, Individually and in his official 

capacity as District Justice of the Magisterial District 

12-1-04; THE COUNTY OF DAUPHIN; SUPREME COURT 

OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 

APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

(D.C. Civil No. 95-cv-01624) 

ARGUED DECEMBER 12, 1996 

BEFORE: BECKER, MANSMANN and LEWIS, 

Circuit Judges. 

(Filed June 23, 1997) 
James J. West (ARGUED) 

105 North Front Street 

Harrisburg, PA 17101 

 Attorney for Appellants

A. Taylor Williams 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 

Administrative Office of PA Courts 

1515 Market Street, Suite 1414 

Philadelphia, PA 19102 

Attorney for Appellees, Horace A.

Lowery and Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania

David A. Wion (ARGUED) 

Jeffrey L. Troutman 

Office of County Solicitor 

County of Dauphin 

Post Office Box 1295 

Harrisburg, PA 17108 

Leonard Tintner 

Boswell, Snyder, Tintner & Piccola 

315 North Front Street 

Post Office Box 741 

Harrisburg, PA 17108-0741 

Attorneys for Appellee, County of

Dauphin

OPINION OF THE COURT 

LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 

Seven former clerks, who worked in a state judicial

district in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania (the "Clerks"), 

brought a sex discrimination suit pursuant to Title VII of 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 et seq., in 

the Middle District of Pennsylvania, which named Dauphin 

County, among others, as a defendant. The district court 

 2 
dismissed the Clerks' complaint against Dauphin County 

pursuant to Rule 12b(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure on the ground that as a matter of law, Dauphin 

County could not be considered either the Clerks' 

"employer" or "co-employer." Graves v. Lowery, No. CV-95- 

1624 (M.D. Pa. April 8, 1996). The Clerks appeal from the 

district court's order dismissing their complaint. 

On appeal, we are asked to address a narrow and unique 

question of employer liability under Title VII: whether the 

Clerks, who are formally considered employees of the 

judicial branch of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, are 

precluded, as a matter of Pennsylvania law, from pursuing 

a federal employment discrimination claim against Dauphin 

County, Pennsylvania. For the reasons stated below, we 

conclude that they are not so precluded. Accordingly, we 

will reverse the district court's order. 

I. 

The issue for resolution here arises from the continued 

uncertainty surrounding the structure of Pennsylvania's 

judicial system. In 1968, the Pennsylvania Constitution was 

amended to create a "Unified Judicial System." Pa. Const. 

art. V, § I; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 301 (West 1981) 

(corresponding statutory provision). That system, however, 

has yet to be fully implemented. Most significantly, for 

example, county courts continue to be funded by the

individual counties in which those courts sit.1 Thus, the 

salaries of court employees are paid by county governments 

rather than the state. 

Because this system of funding is contrary to the idea of 

a "Unified Judicial System," the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court struck down the system as unconstitutional. See

County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 534 A.2d 760 (Pa. 

1987).2 The court then stayed its order, directing the state 

_________________________________________________________________ 

1. Pennsylvania's unified court system consists of "the Supreme Court, 

the Superior Court, the Commonwealth Court, courts of common pleas, 

community courts, municipal and traffic courts in the City of 

Philadelphia, such other courts as may be provided by law and justices 

of the peace." Pa. Const. art. V, § 1. 

2. In particular, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that county 

funding of county courts was an impediment to judicial unification 

 3 
legislature to enact a new funding system that would truly 

"unify" the Pennsylvania judiciary. Id. at 765. To date, the 

state legislature has failed to enact a constitutional funding 

scheme. See Jim Strader, Counties Want State to Fund

Courts; Supreme Court Will Try Again to Persuade

Legislature to Pay for Running County Courts, Pitt. Post 

Gazette, Jan. 5, 1997, at B5; Phyllis W. Beck, Foreword: A

Blueprint for Judicial Reform in Pennsylvania, 62 Temp. L. 

Rev. 693, 697 (1988) (describing unification of the judicial 

system as still "at the drawing board stage"). As a

consequence, the uncertain status of the Unified Judicial 

System continues to cause a myriad of funding-related 

problems. See, e.g., Jiuliante v. County of Erie, 657 A.2d 

1245 (Pa. 1995) (court of common pleas sought to recoup 

from county attorney's fees incurred by court in defending 

itself against application of county's antinepotism policy to 

court employees); Snyder v. Snyder, 620 A.2d 1133 (Pa. 

1993) (dispute between court of common pleas and county 

over raise for court employees). 

The Clerks -- Marca M. Graves, Antoinette R. Trueitt, 

Laura Segarra, Debra C. Napper, Marshell L. Napper,

Sherry L. Reiff, and Dorothy R. Clemons -- worked in 

Magisterial District 12-1-04, which is situated in and 

funded by Dauphin County, Pennsylvania.3 The Clerks 

worked under District Justice Horace A. Lowery, who was 

appointed in August of 1992 to fulfill the remaining term of 

a previous district justice.4 Approximately twenty-five clerks 

_________________________________________________________________ 

because the potential infiltration of county politics would erode the 

integrity and impartiality of the judicial system. See County of Allegheny, 

534 A.2d at 765 ("[I]f court funding is permitted to continue in the hands 

of local political authorities it is likely to produce nothing but suspicion 

or perception of bias and favoritism."). 

3. Pennsylvania is divided into 60 judicial districts. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 

Ann. § 901 (West 1996). Dauphin County is judicial district #12. Id.

Magisterial districts are drawn within a given judicial district according 

to current population densities. Id. § 1502 (West 1981). 

4. There is one district justice in each magisterial district. See 42 Pa. 

Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1511 (West 1981). District Justices have jurisdiction 

over such matters as landlord-tenant disputes, misdemeanor criminal 

offenses and civil claims for less than $8,000.00. See id. § 1515 (West 

1996). 

 4 
worked in Magisterial District 12-1-04 when District Justice 

Lowery came into office. Not one of the seven clerks who 

are parties to this appeal was hired by Lowery. 

Within a short time after Lowery's arrival, the Clerks 

notified the office manager, Noime LeGrand, that Lowery 

had been sexually harassing them. The Clerks notified 

LeGrand pursuant to procedures set out in the sexual 

harassment policy contained in the Dauphin County 

Personnel Manual. After an investigation, LeGrand 

concluded that the Clerks' claims had merit and that 

Lowery's harassing conduct was pervasive. 

On January 20, 1993, LeGrand, along with nine coworkers, including the Clerks, submitted a formal 

complaint to the Dauphin County Court Administrator

alleging various incidents of sexual harassment by Lowery. 

In response, Dauphin County convened an investigative 

panel, which was chaired by the County's Chief Clerk. The 

County also made counseling services available to the 

Clerks. 

Soon after the investigative panel was convened, Lowery 

fired LeGrand and an assistant bookkeeper, Elista Vennie. 

Lowery notified the Dauphin County Commissioners of his 

decision to terminate the two employees. Dauphin County, 

however, refused to effectuate the terminations and, 

instead, assigned the two employees to other magisterial 

districts within the County. The County continued to draw 

the salaries of LeGrand and Vennie from Lowery's budget. 

According to the County, it refused to effectuate Lowery's 

termination of the employees because it was concerned 

about its own potential liability if the employees later 

proved that Lowery's termination of the employees 

amounted to retaliatory discharge. 

Lowery then took a number of other retaliatory actions, 

including firing two of the Clerks -- Marca Graves and 

Sherry Reiff. He also refused to approve vacation time and 

other requests for some of the other clerks. 

Later, Lowery sought to fill the two positions vacated by 

LeGrand and Vennie. The County, however, refused to

approve funding for the positions, maintaining that because 

LeGrand and Vennie -- the "terminated" employees -- were 

 5 
still on the payroll and because their paychecks were 

coming out of Lowery's budget, he was, in effect, asking for 

funding for two additional positions. 

In an effort to compel the County to terminate LeGrand 

and Vennie and provide the funding necessary to hire two 

new employees, Lowery filed suit against the County in the 

Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. The Commonwealth 

Court held that "Lowery has the authority to discharge his 

employees without approval from the county 

commissioners, and the right to refill the positions thus 

vacated in his office." Lowery v. Sheaffer, No. 62 M.D. 

1993, slip op. at 4 (Pa. Commw. May 13, 1993). In addition, 

the court found that the County was required by state law 

to provide the court with adequate funding to maintain its 

operation. Id. The County then removed LeGrand and 

Vennie from the payroll. 

LeGrand and Vennie filed suit in the Middle District of 

Pennsylvania under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 

Lowery and Dauphin County.5 LeGrand and Vennie alleged 

that the County's funding of their positions was sufficient 

to impose employer status on the County. Thus, according 

to LeGrand and Vennie, the County could be held liable 

under both Title VII and § 1983 theories. LeGrand v.

Lowery, No. CV-93-1980, slip op. at 4 (M.D. Pa. May 3, 

1994). The district court dismissed the complaint against 

Dauphin County pursuant to Rule 12b(6), holding that 

because the judiciary was defined by state law as the 

employer of judicial personnel, Dauphin County could not 

be considered the employer of LeGrand and Vennie. Id. at 

8. We affirmed that decision by judgment order. LeGrand v.

Lowery, 65 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 1995) (unpublished table 

decision). 

_________________________________________________________________ 

5. The Clerks and Dauphin County assert that the lawsuit filed by 

LeGrand and Vennie was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only. The 

district court, however, stated that the suit was brought under § 1983 

and Title VII. See LeGrand v. Lowery, No. CV-93-1980, slip op. at 2 

(M.D. Pa. May 3, 1994). Because the district court's analysis in LeGrand

clearly discussed Dauphin County's potential liability in Title VII terms, 

see id. at 3-9, we will assume that LeGrand and Vennie did assert a Title 

VII claim. 

 6 
LeGrand's claim proceeded against Lowery and, at a 

subsequent jury trial, Lowery was found individually liable 

to LeGrand under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.6 Immediately 

thereafter, Lowery filed for personal bankruptcy protection. 

The Clerks filed this Title VII action in the Middle District 

of Pennsylvania on September 26, 1995, against Lowery, 

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and Dauphin County. The 

Clerks premised Title VII liability against the defendants on 

the following theory: that District Justice Lowery engaged in 

a pattern of quid pro quo sexual harassment, created a 

hostile working environment and retaliated against the 

Clerks for reporting his conduct; that Lowery was the 

supervisor of the Clerks; that Dauphin County was the coemployer of the Clerks; and that the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court was the co-employer of the Clerks. The Clerks also 

alleged that, through custom, the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court had delegated its statutorily granted governing 

authority over court employees to Dauphin County. In sum, 

the Clerks claimed that all three defendants exercised some 

employer-type authority over them and, accordingly, all 

three defendants could be held liable for Lowery's harassing 

conduct under Title VII. 

Dauphin County filed a motion to dismiss on the ground 

that under the Unified Judicial System, District Justice 

Lowery had the sole power to hire, fire and supervise his 

employees. The district court agreed and dismissed the 

complaint against Dauphin County, finding the case 

indistinguishable from LeGrand, which had previously 

determined that the County could not be considered an 

employer of county court employees. See Graves v. Lowery, 

No. CV-95-1624, slip op. at 2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 1996) (citing 

LeGrand v. Lowery, No. CV-93-1980, slip op. at 8 (M.D. Pa. 

May 3, 1994)). The Clerks appeal from the district court's 

dismissal of their complaint against Dauphin County.7 

_________________________________________________________________ 

6. LeGrand was awarded $30,000 in damages. Vennie apparently 

dropped out of the case prior to the judgment. 

7. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court settled with the Clerks prior to the 

entry of the district court's order dismissing the Clerks' complaint 

against Dauphin County. Dauphin County implies that, by settling, the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court has accepted responsibility as the employer 

 7 
The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291. 

II. 

Our review of a district court's decision to dismiss a 

complaint for failure to state a claim is plenary. Nami v.

Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996). We must accept as 

true "the factual allegations in a complaint and all 

reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom." Holder

v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1993) 

(quoting Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 

103 (3d Cir. 1990)). Thus, a court should not grant a 

motion to dismiss "unless it appears beyond a doubt that 

the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 

which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 

U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). 

Dauphin County contends that the Clerks can assert no 

set of facts that would create an employer-employee

relationship between the Clerks and Dauphin County. In 

_________________________________________________________________ 

of the Clerks. As the Clerks note, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court did not concede its employer status. The Clerks state that the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court asserted the following in support of its 

motion to dismiss: 

"[T]he general authority of the Supreme Court over courts of 

common pleas, let alone an individual magisterial district, is rarely 

if ever used, and the Unified Judicial System is not yet a reality. In 

light of [the] stay of the Allegheny County decision, the current 

system remains in place, and the Supreme Court exercises its 

supervisory powers only to do that which is reasonably necessary to 

insure the integrity of the system and the efficient administration of 

justice." 

Appellants' Reply Brief at 2 (quoting Memorandum of the Supreme 

Court of Pennsylvania in Support of Motion to Dismiss). 

For purposes of this appeal, we will assume that the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court has not accepted responsibility as the employer or coemployer of the Clerks. We note, however, that under the Clerks' theory 

of liability, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's status as their employer 

would not preclude the co-employer liability of the County. 

 8 
Dauphin County's view, because the Clerks served at the 

discretion of District Justice Lowery, only he can properly 

be considered their employer. This employment 

relationship, the County claims, is defined by the 

Pennsylvania Constitution's requirement of a Unified 

Judicial System. See Pa. Const. Art. V, § 1. 

The statutes which implement the Pennsylvania 

Constitution's requirement of a unified system define the 

personal staff of judicial officers as "[p]rivate secretaries, 

law clerks and such other personnel as an individual may 

be authorized by law to select and remove . . . ." 42 Pa. 

Cons. Stat. Ann. § 102 (West 1981). Individual counties are 

required to maintain a judicial account from which they 

must pay the salaries, fees and expenses of the court 

systems within that county. See id. § 3541; Allegheny

County v. Commonwealth, 534 A.2d 760 (Pa. 1987). 

Dauphin County maintains that even though counties 

across Pennsylvania are required to pay the salaries of 

court personnel, the personnel are "employed" by the 

courts. To support this contention, the County relies on a 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, which held: 

Since the court has the inherent right to hire, 

discharge and supervise, an employer-employee 

relationship exists by definition between the judges and 

their appointees. The fact that those employees are

paid by the county does not alter the court's employer 

status. 

County of Lehigh v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., 489 

A.2d 1325, 1327 (Pa. 1985) (citations omitted). 

We do not dispute the proposition that the courts are 

considered the employers of judicial personnel. In our view, 

however, this fact does not preclude the possibility that a 

county may share co-employer or joint employer status 

with the courts. While we have found no case which directly 

implicates this issue in the factual scenario we confront 

here (that is to say, which involves the narrow question of 

the division of responsibilities between counties and courts 

vis-a-vis judicial personnel), we draw some guidance from 

cases which have found joint employment status when two 

entities exercise significant control over the same

 9 
employees. Cf. NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Penn. Inc., 

691 F.2d 1117, 1123 (3d Cir. 1982) (recognizing concept of 

"joint employer" when separate entities share or codetermine conditions of employment); Rivas v. Federacion

de Asociaciones Pecuarias, 929 F.2d 814, 820-21 (1st Cir. 

1991) (recognizing that when an entity exercises sufficient 

control over employees it may be considered a "joint 

employer"); G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 879 

F.2d 1526, 1531 (7th Cir. 1989) (same). We emphasize that 

this case is unique, and we recognize that the cases we rely 

upon in connection with this question are factually

distinguishable. But consistent with the legal principle of 

joint employer status discussed in these cases, we conclude 

that although a court may have the "inherent right" to hire 

and fire employees -- even though those employees are 

paid by a county -- it may also have the derivative right to 

delegate employer-type responsibilities to a county. 

Here, the Clerks allege exactly that -- i.e., that the 

County acted on authority delegated to it by the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Specifically, the Clerks allege 

that the County was integrally involved in their employment 

activities. For example, the Clerks were covered by the 

County's personnel policies.8 Additionally, every five years, 

the Clerks received pins for excellent service from the 

County. Thus, unlike the plaintiffs in LeGrand, the Clerks 

do not contend that Dauphin County's funding of their 

positions alone is sufficient to impose co-employer status 

on the County. See LeGrand v. Lowery, No. CV-93-1980, 

slip op. at 4 (M.D. Pa. May 3, 1994) ("[T]he plaintiffs 

contend that County funding of the plaintiffs' positions is 

indeed sufficient in itself to impose employer status on the 

County."). Rather, the Clerks argue that the County

assumed de facto responsibility over their employment. 

The district court rejected the contentions of the Clerks, 

concluding that this case was indistinguishable from 

LeGrand, which, of course, arose from the same facts as 

those presented here.9 Because LeGrand formed the basis 

_________________________________________________________________ 

8. These policies included holidays, vacation time, maternity leave, sick 

leave, etc. 

9. As noted earlier, LeGrand was summarily affirmed by this Court. See

LeGrand v. Lowery, 65 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 1995) (unpublished table 

decision). 

 10 
of the district court's decision in this case, we will discuss 

LeGrand in some detail. 

In LeGrand, the district court concluded that county 

funding of the plaintiffs' positions was insufficient to 

impose employer status on Dauphin County. LeGrand, slip 

op. at 4. While conceding that a payor-payee relationship is 

generally indicative of an employer-employee relationship, 

the court found funding alone insufficient to impose 

employer status on Dauphin County because the County 

was required by state law to fund positions for the courts. 

In other words, the court found that the County's lack of 

authority over the personnel decisions of the court absolved 

the County of any liability as an employer. Id. at 6. The 

LeGrand court did acknowledge, however, that the proper 

inquiry under Title VII for determining employer status 

looks to the nature of the relationship regardless of whether 

that party may or may not be technically described as an 

"employer." Id. at 7. The inquiry, as articulated by Sibley

Memorial Hospital v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 

1973), looks to the level of control an organization asserts 

over an individual's access to employment and the 

organization's power to deny such access. See also

Amarnare v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 611 

F. Supp. 344, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("When an employer has 

the right to control the means and manner of an 

individual's performance . . . an employer-employee

relationship is likely to exist."), aff'd, 770 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 

1985). The LeGrand court found that under the "control" 

test, the County's lack of authority to withhold funding for 

the employees' positions precluded the County from 

"controlling access" to the employees' employment 

opportunities. LeGrand, slip op. at 8. 

Although we do not disagree with the district court's 

analysis in LeGrand, in our view, LeGrand is 

distinguishable from this case. Unlike the plaintiffs in 

LeGrand, the Clerks have alleged facts in their complaint,

which, if proven, would allow them to show that Dauphin 

County, through its actions, was the de facto co-employer 

of the Clerks. As noted earlier, the Clerks do not contend 

that Dauphin County's funding of their positions is

sufficient to impose employer status on the County. Rather, 

 11 
the Clerks claim that the County, through its funding, 

actions and policies, exercised the requisite control over the 

daily employment activities of the Clerks to incur liability as 

a co-employer. 

Further, and perhaps most important, the Clerks contend 

that two of them were hired by County officials to work in 

Magisterial District 12-1-04.10 In our view, this asserted fact 

alone should have precluded the district court from

deciding the matter on a motion to dismiss.11 

We also find it significant that the Clerks were covered by 

the County's sexual harassment policy. Although Lowery 

could have legally ignored the policy, he did not. Cf. Settelen

v. County of Berks, No. 90-5992, 1991 WL 124572, at *2 

(E.D. Pa. June 28, 1991) (county board of judges explicitly 

exempted court-appointed employees from county employee 

handbook). It is not disputed that the Clerks understood 

that they were covered by the policy. Indeed, the Clerks 

drafted a complaint pursuant to the policy and submitted 

it to a County official. Based on these actions, we find it 

reasonable to infer that the Clerks expected the County to 

have the authority to intervene in the situation. This 

expectation was solidified when the County convened an 

investigative panel and provided the Clerks with counseling 

services. Although employee expectations are not 

dispositive of employer status, they are relevant to our 

analysis. See Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1337 

(6th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he most important requirement is that 

there be sufficient indicia of an interrelationship . . . to 

justify the belief on the part of an aggrieved employee that 

the [alleged co-employer] is jointly responsible for the acts 

of the immediate employer."). 

_________________________________________________________________ 

10. Laura C. Segarra and Debra Napper allege that they were hired, 

respectively, by John Bottonare and Phillip Intrieri, both of whom work 

for Dauphin County. 

11. The LeGrand court refrained from considering the implications of 

County input into the hiring process. See LeGrand, slip op. at 8 n.2 

("[W]e have no occasion to consider whether the County could be a Title 

VII employer in other circumstances when it does have input into the 

hiring process."). 

 12 
In sum, the precise contours of an employment 

relationship can only be established by a careful factual 

inquiry. See Magnuson v. Peak Tech. Servs., Inc., 808 F. 

Supp. 500, 510 (E.D. Va. 1992) (determining whether a 

defendant is a "joint employer" under Title VII requires 

"[c]onsideration of all of the circumstances surrounding the 

work relationship"), aff'd, 40 F.3d 1244 (4th Cir. 1994); see

also NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Penn., Inc., 691 F.2d 

1117, 1121 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting that under the NLRA, 

"the question of `joint employer status' is a factual one"). 

Here, the Clerks alleged facts in their complaint, which, if 

true, could allow a jury to find that Dauphin County was 

the co-employer of the Clerks. Specifically, the Clerks 

alleged that they were covered by the County's personnel 

policies, that they were told that they were County

employees, that the County investigated their allegation of 

sexual harassment, that they were subject to termination 

and/or reinstatement by the County and that two of them 

were hired by the County. 

By failing to take these allegations into account, and 

instead referring solely to the not-yet-implemented dictates 

of Pennsylvania law, the district court elevated form over 

function. The court could have, of course, looked to state 

law as one of many factors in making its determination. 

But, again, "a plaintiff's status as an employee under Title 

VII can be determined only upon careful analysis of the 

myriad facts surrounding the employment relationship in 

question." Miller v. Advanced Studies, 635 F. Supp. 1196 

(N.D. Ill. 1986). Indeed, such an analysis is essential when, 

as here, the nature of the employment relationship is quite 

uncertain. 

We decline to speculate as to whether the Clerks will 

ultimately succeed in their claim against Dauphin County. 

See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) ("The 

issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but 

whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support 

the claims."). We merely note that the employment 

relationship between the Clerks and the County was 

sufficiently ambiguous that the Clerks' claim against the 

County should not have been dismissed at the pleading 

stage. See DeFranks v. Court of Common Pleas, 68 F.E.P. 

 13 
Cases 1306, 1310 (W.D. Pa. 1995) (denying county's motion 

to dismiss Title VII complaint filed by a court reporter on 

the ground that the court reporter "must . . . be afforded 

the opportunity to establish the facts relevant to her 

employment"). Indeed, the County's own actions indicate 

that even it was unsure about its responsibilities to the 

Clerks. For example, the County's initial refusal to 

acquiesce in Lowery's retaliation attempt against Vennie 

and LeGrand suggests that the County thought that it may 

have owed a duty to those employees.12 

Finally, we note that insulating the County from any 

liability solely out of deference to state law would 

undermine the important policies underlying Title VII -- 

that is, to eradicate employment discrimination through 

federal remedies and to ensure compensation for victims. 

See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 230 (1982); 

Horn v. Duke Homes, Div. of Windsor Mobile Homes, Inc., 

755 F.2d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1985). In our view, if the Clerks 

can prove the allegations in their complaint and, 

consequently, prove that the County was their de facto coemployer, liability might very well lie with the County as 

well as with their employer as defined by Pennsylvania law. 

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

A True Copy: 

Teste: 

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

_________________________________________________________________ 

12. Dauphin County could be liable to the Clerks even though it did not 

directly engage in the harassing conduct. See Kinnally v. Bell of

Pennsylvania, 748 F. Supp. 1136 (E.D. Pa. 1990) ("The inaction of 

executive and management personnel may serve as a basis for liability 

under Title VII even where these high-level employees have played no 

direct role in the alleged discrimination."); Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 

1193, 1199 (8th Cir. 1981) (noting that "toleration of a discriminatory 

atmosphere alone gives rise to a cause of action"). The Clerks allege that 

the County did nothing to protect them from Lowery's harassing conduct 

and that the County, as their co-employer, had the duty to do so. 

 14