### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JAMES CONRAD
Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County No. 97-04362 Joseph B. Dailey, Judge

No. W1999-00650-CCA-R3-CD - Decided June 28, 2000

The defendant appeals from his conviction of extortion which arose from his activities as a “free lance bounty hunter.” Because we find that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and that consecu

tive sentencing w

as mandatory for

the defendant, w

ho committed a felo

ny while on parole for a f

elony, we affir

m the trial court’ s judgment. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

W ITT , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which S MITH , J., and W EDEMEYER , J., joined. C. Anne Tipton, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, James Conrad.

Paul G. Summers , Attorne y General and Re porter, J. Ross Dye

r, Assistant Attorn

ey General, Nashville, Tennessee, William L. Gibbons, District Attorney General, Lee Coffee, Assistant District Attorney General, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION

The defendant, James Conrad, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of extortion, a Class D felony, which resulted in a career offender sentence of twelve yea rs to be served in co

nfinement consec

utively to sentenc

es on previous con

victions. In th

i s appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the trial court’s failure to grant the defend

ant’s moti on for judgment of acquittal, and the consecutive nature of the incarcerative

sentence. Afte

r hearing oral a

rgume nts and reviewing

the record and th

e applicable law, we conclude that the first two issues are meritless because t he evidence supports the jury’s finding that the defendant extorted money from the victim, despite the defendant’s claim that he was acting lawfully as a “bounty hunter” and claiming justified expenses for his services. We further conclude that the consecutive sentence was not only authorized but was mandatory. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

In the light most

favorable to the state, the evidence showed that on October 1, 1996 the defendant came to the residence of Stanley Grove to get Grove to help him locate and apprehend-2-

Vincent Shelby. Grove characterized himself and the defendant as “free l ance” bo unty hunters. Shelby, twenty-nine years of age, had been released in May 1996 on a $10,000 bail bond to answer to a charge of motor vehicle habitual offending. Grove testified that the defendant told him that a capias had been issued for Shelby’s apprehension, and asan accommodation to his friend Conrad, Grove accompan

ied the defenda

nt to Shelby’s place

of employment.

After arriving at Shelby’s job site, the defendant, who was armed with a nin e millimeterpistol, accosted Sh elby and informed

him that the men were taking him into custody on the capias. The bounty

hunters hand-cuffed Shelby and put him in the back seat of the defendant’s
car. Shelby testified that the defendant asked him if he could raise any money for the purpos e of paying the defendant to release him. Shelby indicated that he could ask his mother, Mary Wright, the victim in

the case. Shelby testified that Grove and the defendant left him in the car while they dined at a Krystal’s restaurant for about an hour

. Then, they drove

Shelby to his and his

mother’s residence.

Present

inside the residen ce were the victim, her eld erly father, he

r seven-year-

old daugh t er, and three young children who were friends of the victim’s daughter. Ultimately, the defendant,

Grove, and Shelby, who remained handcuffed, entered the residence where the defendant and the victim fell into a heated discussion after the defendant proposed that he would release Shelby if the victim would

pay him $200 for his “

expenses.” The

victim testified that she

did not wish to pay any money to have Shelby released because “it wasn’t like my son wasn’t going nowhere he hadn’t been before.” The victim testified that the defendant became angry and abusive when she would not agree to pay themoney. She testified that he threatened to arrest the victim for harboring
a fugitive, pulled th

e pistol and waved

it around the room,

threatened to “f

- - - this whole house up” and to kill everyone in the house, and slammed Shelby i nto the wall and pe

nned him with his

hand
or arm on Shelby’s neck. During the pro longed encoun ter in the residence the victim called her attorney, who advised her to call the police; however, the victim testified that she was scared and harried by the confusion around her, especially her concerns for the welfar e of her agitated

father, and did not call the police. She testified that she needed to “get [her

father] out of the way and then [] had all these children running through the house at the same time.” Responding to her father’s pleading that unless she paid the money, she may never see her son again, she succumbed to the demandf o r payment of $200 and wrote a check in that amount payable to James Conrad, who by this time had placed She

lby back in

Conrad’s car an

d was preparing t

o surrender him in

to official custody.

The defendant refu sed to accept the check and demanded cash. The victim agreed to drive to an autom atic teller ma chine at a nearby grocery store to obtain $200 in cash. The defendant,

driving his car which also contained Grove and the still-handcuffed Shelby, followed the victim to the store. When the victim obtained the money, she handed it to Grove, who gave it to the defendant. At some point, Grove gave the victim

a receipt for $200, upon

which he signed his

name fictitiously

as Stanley Granderson. After receiving the $200, the defendant removed the handcuffs and released Shelby.

After the men release

d Shelby, the victim “

smack[ed him] up side [his] head,” drove-3-

him home, and told him “to get [his] ass out of her car.” She testified that

she had refused to sign the May 1996 bail

bond because she

had determined th

at she “was not pa

ying any more mone

y to keep [Shelby] out of jail.”

On the evening of October 1, 1996, after leaving the company of the defendant and Grove, the victim called the police. Her complaint led to charges which ultimately resulted in the extortion conviction.

At the defendant’s trial, the state introduced a lett er addressed to Grove which, by handwriting analysis, the state proved had been written by the defen dant. In it, the defendant pleaded with Grove to “exonerate” the defendant fr om the charges. Grove, who also had charges pending against him from the October 1 incident, testifie d as a state witnes s. The defendant opted notto test

ify but d id present two alib i witnesses who tes

tified that the def

endant was in Holly Springs, Mississippi, on October 1, 1996.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

. We address as a single issue thedefendant’s cla ims that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict and that the trial court erred in overruling h is Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. The standard for the trial court’s determination of the Rule 29 claim is the same as the appellate court uses to review the sufficiency of the evidence. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 29(a); State v. Bush , 942 S.W.2d 489, 517 (Tenn. 1997) (appendix, ex cerpt of Courtof Criminal Appea ls opinion, Hayes, J .); State v. Adams , 916 471, 473 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

When the sufficiency of the evidence

is challenged,

the rele vant question for an appellate court is whether, after reviewing the evidence in t he light mos t favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt. Jackson v. Virgini a , 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2782 (1979); Tenn R. App. P. 13. See also , State v. Williams , 657 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1983). This rule applies to findings based
on both direct a

nd circum stantial evidence. State v. Thomas , 755 S.W.2d 838, 842 (T enn. Crim. App. 1988). Circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to convict one of a cr ime. State v. Boling , 840 S.W.2d 944, 947 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).

It is w ell est abl ish ed t hat a ju ry v erdict, app roved by the trial judge, accredits the testimonyof the witnesses f or the state

and resolves all conflicts in favor of the theory of the state. Statev. Hatchett , 560 S.W.2d 627, 630 (T enn. 1978); Statev. T ownsend , 525 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Tenn. 1975). On appeal, the state is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reas ona ble or l egit ima te i nfer ence s wh ich may be draw n therefrom. State v. Ca bbage , 571 S.W.2d 832, 836 (Tenn. 1978).

Moreover, a verdict aga

inst the defendant removes the presumption of innocence and raises a presumption of g

uilt on appeal, State v. Grace , 493 S.W. 2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973); Anglin
v. State , 553 S.W.2d 616, 620 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977), which the defendant has the burde n o f-4-

overcoming. State v. Brown , 551 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tenn. 1977).

For purposes of the present ca se, a pers on commits extortion who “uses coercion upon another person w

ith the inte

nt to . . . [o]btain property, services, [or] any advantage or immunity.” Tenn. Cod

e Ann. § 39-14-112

(a) (1997). Our

Code provides that:
“Coercion” mea

ns a threat, howe

ver communicate

d, to: (A) Commit any offense; (B) Wrongfully accuse any person of any offense; (C) Expose any person to hatred, contempt or ridicule; (D) Harm the credit or business repute of any person; or (E) Take or withhold action as a public servant or cause a public servant to take or withhold action. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106(a)(3) (1997).

Upon reviewing the transcript of the evidence, weare aware that the testimony of the state’s witnesses include

s various inconsist

encies and contr

adictions. Nevertheless,

as pointed out above, it is the jury’s prerogative to resolve contradictions in the evidence, to weigh the evidence, and to resolve credi

bility issues. The r

ecord contains a

n adequate basis

upon which a reasonable jury could find beyond a rea

sonable doubt that t

he defendant thr

eatened to perf

orm violent crimina

l acts i n the victim’s resid

ence, with the inte

nt to obtain money. T

he jury heard tes

timony th at th e defendant threatened to kill the people in the house and to “f- - - this whole house up” and that he, after assaulting Shelby, said, “You’ll be lucky if y ou see you r son again.” Obviously, the jury accredited

this testi mony. We may not trespass upon the jury’s province by drawing our own inferences from the evidence or by ma king credibility as sessmentsdifferent from those made by the jury. During oral argument before this court, the defendant posite d as a part of his insufficiency of the evidence claim that he was p

rivileged to

request and receive the $200 payment
as reimbursement of

his expenses in loc

ating and appreh

ending Shelby. We i

nferred from hi

s argument a claim that the bail bonding law made express provision for such expense claims.

Code section 40-11-301 defines and limits the activities of “professional” bondsmen. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11- 301(a), (b) (19 97); see also Te nn. C ode Ann. § 40-11-126 (1997) (u npro fessional conduct). The Code’s regulation of professional bondsmen “extends to and includes the agents, representatives or employees of such profes sional [bondsmen], or those acting for [them], whether withor without compensation or salary.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-301(d) (1997). Upon payment of a forfeiture of a criminal defendant’s bond, the bondsman “may arrest thedefendant on
a certified copy of the capias, or may, by a written authority en dorsed on such copy, authorize another person to make the a rrest.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-133(b) (1997). Bondsmen are prohibited from accepting anything “of value from a principal except the premium” and “collateral
or security or other indemnity from the principal which shall be returned upon final termination of liability on the bond.” Tenn . Code Ann. § 40-11-126(8) (1997). In the latter case, the bondsman1 The Code did not recognize “bounty hunters” as such until the enactment of section 40-11- 318, effec ti ve May 18, 1998. That section defines a bounty hunter as “an agent of a professional bondsman who [,for a contingent fee,] attempts to or takes into

custody a person w

ho has failed to appear in court and whose bond has been forfeited.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-318 (Supp. 1999). Under this section, persons convicted of felonies are disqual ifie d to act as bounty hunters. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-318(b) (Supp. 1999). A convicted felon who performs the ser

vices of a bounty hunter commits a Class A misdemeanor. Id

. The 1998 act g overning the activities of bounty hunters obviously did not apply to the enter prise i n which the defendant was engaged on October 1, 1996. As a convicted felon, the defendant would have been d

isqualified to act

as a bounty

hunter under

the 1998 act. However, code section 40-11-128 prohibits co nvic ted felons from acting as bondsmen or agents of bondsmen. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-128 (1997). This code section does apply to the defendant and disqualifies him to act as either a bondsman or as an agent for one.
-5- must provide a receipt for the col la teral which describes the collateral and states the terms for redemption of the collatera l. 1
Having reviewed the applicabl e provi sions of the bail bonding law, we find no provision which authorize s a bondsman or his agent to charge expenses to his principal. In addition to the bond premium, the bondsman may accept collateral, but the defendant’s activities in procuring $200 from Ms. Wright on October 1, 1996 cannot reasonably be viewed as obtaining collateral or securing Shelby’s bond. The defendant did not characterize the mone y in this manner, and the receipt -- even if it could be viewed as othe rwise legit

imate -- did not specify terms for the redemption of the collateral, as required by section 40-11-126(8). Thus, we discern no specific nor expressauthority for the defendant to assert that the $2

00 served as reim

bursement for his

expenses.

We are aware tha

t Code section 39-1 4-112(b) establi s hes affirmative

defenses to extortion when the ac cuse d “reasonably c laim[s]: (1) Appr

opriate restitutio

n or appropriate indemnification for harm done, or (2) Appropriate compensation for property or lawful services.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-112(b) (1997). We hav e considered whether the defendant’s claim for expense reimbursement avails him an affirmative defense, based upon some general theory of entitl ement s uch as quantum meruit . However, on this

basis as well, the d

efendant’s cla

im fails. First, in order to rely upon an affirmative defense, a defen dant must, “no later than ten (10) days before trial, notify thedistrict attorney general in writing of the intention” to rely upon a specified affirmative defense, and he must “file a copy of the notice with the trial court clerk.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-204(c), (d) (1997). The trial court clerk’s technical record filed as part of the appel late record reflects no such filing. Secon d, to make out an affirmative defense to extortion, the defendant must have reasonably

demanded an appropriate value for restit

ut ion, indemnification or compensation. See

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-112(b) (1997). Nothing in the record establishes the amount of any expense bo

rn by the defenda

nt in apprehendin

g Shelby, much less th

e appropriatene

ss of any expense claim. Further, the method employed by the defendant in demanding the mone y2 To the extent that Code section 39-14-11 2(c)(2) es tablishes an aff irmative defense

to extortion when the defendant c laims appropriate compensation for “lawful services,” it is not clear that the defendant’s bounty hunting “services” we re lawful. A priv

atecitizen may effe

ct an arrest foran offens e not committed in his or her presence “when a felony has been committed, and the arresting person has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested committed it.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-109(a)(3) (1997). Even if the “citizen’s arrest” statute may be applied in the presen t situation where the citize

n knows about a

capias issued against the person arrested, the record in the present case establishes no basis for concluding that a felony had been committed or that Conrad had a reasonable ba

sis for believing th

at Shelby committed i

t. Apart from

the citizen’s arrest provision in section 39-14-112(c), section 40-11-133(b) allow s a qualified bondsma

n, after a bond f

orfeiture, to

authorize anothe

r person to arre

st the principal,

by
a written endorsement

“on a certified copy of the capias.” This provision, however, is unavailing to the defendant because the record contains no copy of the capias and no written endorsement that authorized

the defendant to a

rrest Sh elby. F urther, the defendant, as a convicted felon, is not qualified to act as a bondsman or as an agent for a bondsman. SeeTCA § 40-11-128 (1997). Accordingly, the record fails to support the notion that the defendant’s “services” w ere lawful.
-6- cannot be described as reasonable. He physical ly assault ed the victim’s son in her presence and brandisheda gun in her home. “The issue of the existence of an affirmative defen s e may not be submitted to the jury unless it i s fairly raised by the proof.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-204(d)(1997). Thus, we conclude that therecord fails to sh ow that an affirm

ative defense pu

rsuant to section 39-14- 112(b) was fairly raised. 2

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction.

II. Consecutive Sentencing.

Relying upon Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-155(b), which establishes guidelines for consecutive sentencing, the defendant asserts in his brief that the trial court erred in ordering the present sentence to be served consecutively to previous convictions of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. The state argues that Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(3) controls and requires consecutive sentencing.

There is no dispute that the defendant was on parole for the prior felony convictions when the extortion was committed on October 1, 1996. Rule 32(c)(3) provides for the mandatory consecutive service of a “sentence for a felony committed while on parole for a felony.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(A).

During oral argu

ment, the defenda

nt conceded, and

we agree, that t

he state is-7-

correct. Consecutive sentencing was required by Rule 32(c)(3).

III. Conclusion. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.