U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

i 

89–511 2015

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–118] 

FISCAL YEAR 2015 OVERSEAS 

CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS 

BUDGET REQUEST 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 16, 2014 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois 

PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

JACK SCHULER, Professional Staff Member 

SPENCER JOHNSON, Counsel 

AARON FALK, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2014 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, July 16, 2014, Fiscal Year 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations Budget Request ......................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, July 16, 2014 ....................................................................................... 41 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 16, 2014 

FISCAL YEAR 2015 OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS BUDGET 

REQUEST 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Work, Hon. Robert O., Deputy Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of 

Defense; Winnefeld, ADM James A. ‘‘Sandy,’’ Jr., USN, Vice Chairman, 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Department of Defense; and Michael J. McCord, 

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), U.S. Department of Defense ....... 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 45 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 46 

Work, Hon. Robert O., joint with ADM James A. ‘‘Sandy’’ Winnefeld, 

Jr. ................................................................................................................... 48 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Coffman ...................................................................................................... 59 

Mr. Kilmer ........................................................................................................ 60 

Mr. Shuster ....................................................................................................... 58 

Ms. Tsongas ...................................................................................................... 57 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2015 OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY 

OPERATIONS BUDGET REQUEST 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 16, 2014. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:19 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ 

McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to welcome our witnesses to today’s 

hearing on the Department of Defense’s Fiscal Year 2015 Overseas 

Contingency Operations Budget Request. We appreciate your flexibility this morning, as we dispense with other legislative matters. 

Joining us today are Mr. Bob Work, Deputy Secretary of Defense; 

Admiral Sandy Winnefeld, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff; Mr. Michael McCord, Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller. This is the first time Mr. Work and Mr. McCord are appearing before the full committee in their new positions. 

Welcome. Happy to have you here. And I congratulate you both 

and look forward to working with you in these new assignments. 

Admiral, you have been here many times. Thanks again for being 

here with us. 

However, today, you have an unenviable task of explaining a late 

OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] request that has little detail and contains new funds and authorities that Congress heard 

about for the first time in the press, rather than from the Department, an occurrence that has become all too frequent. 

Although the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] has 

passed the House, we will continue to work with the other committees of jurisdiction to review the $58.6 billion OCO request and 

provide detail authorizations as we go to conference. 

I am deeply concerned by the emerging narrative that, based on 

the projection of significantly fewer troops deployed to Afghanistan 

in 2015, the OCO request should automatically have a proportionate reduction. 

U.S. contingency operations do not end with Afghanistan. As recent headlines show, U.S. forces in theater support a broad range 

of operations outside of Afghanistan, from the broader Middle East 

to the Horn of Africa and the Philippines, as well as other places 

around the world. 

A decade of war has taken its toll on our forces. We have a moral 

obligation to our troops to reset the force and to restore readiness. 
2 

Frankly, I am concerned that future OCO requests will not rectify the reset liabilities that currently exist. 

While we continue to migrate enduring requirements from OCO 

to the base budget, we understand that sequestration continues to 

be a burden on the Department. The only way to relieve this burden is to eliminate the discretionary budget caps imposed on the 

military. 

Lastly, while my focus today is on the broader OCO request, I would also comment that the President has set up the $5 billion 

counterterrorism and European funds for failure. We understand 

that these initiatives were levied on the Department by the White 

House without coordination, and you are now working to develop 

spending plans. But while counterterrorism partnerships and reassuring our European allies are important and necessary, the President’s approach lacks detail and is too broad in scope. 

I look forward to hearing your testimony today on these important matters. 

Mr. Smith. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 45.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do welcome our witnesses. I appreciate your work and look forward to your testimony 

on this subject matter. 

The purpose of the Overseas Contingency Operation from when 

it was first set up—the funds were to fund the efforts in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. And this fund, at least in part, will do that in Afghanistan. There are still troops there. Our commitment to Afghanistan 

is going to last beyond the end of 2014. 

There are train and equip aspects of it. And in addition to the 

fact that we will have, if the bilateral security agreement ever gets 

signed in Afghanistan, residual forces there—as well we should. 

There is a terrorism threat from that region. We all remember 

9/11, that unguarded territory in Afghanistan gave Al Qaeda safe 

haven to plot and plan. They are still there. The Taliban is still 

there. There are groups we need to be worried about. So, that portion of the funding makes a great deal of sense. We are going to 

need to continue to go forward there in some capacity. So, we will 

see where that comes out. 

Personally, I support the drawdown. I think the fewer troops we 

have there, the better, going forward for a variety of different reasons. But we will have a commitment there. 

Second, in this OCO request are some of the new authorities that 

the chairman outlined for a Combating Terrorism Partnership 

Fund and a European Reassurance Initiative. Both of those may 

make sense. I think I speak for the entire committee when saying 

we need to know more about what they mean, or what is going to 

be contained in them. 

Contained in one of those funds is an authorization for a Department of Defense [DOD] effort to support friendly rebels in Syria. 

Now, this is an effort that personally, I support. I understand the 
3 

limitations of it, but the bottom line is, when you look at ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] and what is going on in Syria 

and Iraq, regardless of the outcome, we are going to need friends 

in that region. 

We have got an ugly situation between Assad, Iran, Hezbollah, 

and various Al Qaeda affiliates, or worse, in the case of ISIL. But 

the Free Syria movement that really started the idea that Assad 

needed to be replaced is primarily made up of people who are not 

sectarian. They simply want a better government and a better life 

for themselves. We can identify some of those people. We have 

identified some of those people, and we need to support them, because they are in a very, very hostile neighborhood. Still, on that 

piece, we would also like greater specifics. 

And then we get to the real big issue, which the chairman mentioned. And that is that a substantial portion of this OCO request 

really is not directly related to the war in Afghanistan. It has been 

spread out amongst a variety of different other funds. And I understand why we are doing that. It has been a difficult 4 years, frankly, for the entire discretionary budget, not just for the Department 

of Defense, as we have gone through government shutdowns, 

threatened government shutdowns, sequestration, and a variety of 

other things that have made planning and funding anything, certainly at the Department of Defense, complicated and difficult, and 

has really put us in a deep hole. And I share the chairman’s sentiment. 

I don’t support sequestration. I would expand upon that to say 

I don’t just oppose sequestration for the Department of Defense, 

but for all other discretionary spending, as well. And there are a 

fair number of discretionary programs. You know, infrastructure, 

energy, health care, education—on and on—that have also faced 

the uncertainty and devastating cuts of the last 4 years. Sequestration doesn’t make any sense. However, none of those other areas 

of our budget have an OCO. They don’t have a place to go to backfill. 

I don’t necessarily oppose the idea that the Department of Defense does, but greater specificity as to the justification for that 

spending is something the committee and Congress is going to need 

to hear. All of which would not be an issue if we could get rid of 

sequestration and pass appropriations bills in a timely manner. 

You know, whatever the number is, at least give some predictability and dependency to the money we are going to spend. Congress hasn’t done that, and that has created no end of problems. 

And I realize that the OCO is trying to respond to that situation, 

but we would like to hear a greater explanation for how those 

funds are going to be spent, and why. 

With that, I yield back. I look forward to the testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 46.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Before we hear from the witnesses—begin the business of the 

committee, I want to make clear that members of the audience 

must maintain order and refrain from manifestations of approval 

or disapproval of the committee proceedings, or interfere with the 
4 

conduct of the committee’s business. Any comments or disruptions 

during the hearing from the public will not be tolerated, and, if 

necessary, will result in removal from the committee room. I want 

to state this at the outset so that everybody knows the rules. 

Mr. Secretary. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT O. WORK, DEPUTY SECRETARY 

OF DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; ADM JAMES 

A. ‘‘SANDY’’ WINNEFELD, JR., USN, VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT 

CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; AND 

HON. MICHAEL J. MCCORD, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT O. WORK 

Secretary WORK. Mr. Chairman, I have a longer written statement that I would like to insert in the record, but I would like your 

permission to just give a very brief overview. 

The CHAIRMAN. Each of the witnesses’ complete written testimonies will be included in the record without objection, so ordered. 

Secretary WORK. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, members of the 

committee, we very much appreciate the opportunity to be here 

this morning. On behalf of Secretary Hagel, Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey, and the men and women 

in uniform that we all serve, we want to thank this committee especially for your continued support to our troops, who every day 

are conducting operations on behalf of our Nation’s security in 

what is becoming a very volatile, complex, and dangerous world. 

It is with those ongoing operations in mind that I would like to 

address DOD’s fiscal year 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations 

request. As you know, it is $58.6 billion, which the President recently submitted to Congress. This request is about $27 billion—$26.7 exactly—or about one- third less than the $85.3 billion enacted by Congress for OCO last 

year. It is $100 billion less than the $159 billion that was enacted 

just 4 years ago. 

It reflects a continued downward trajectory of our war-related 

spending as we conclude our combat mission in Afghanistan after 

13 years of war. However, even as the war ends—and this was one 

of the points that the chairman made—we will continue to seek 

OCO to cover the costs of returning, repairing, and replacing equipment until that process is complete—the costs associated with our 

broader presence in the Middle East, from which we support a 

number of critical missions in the region, as well as unforeseen 

contingencies. 

The requested funds for 2015 would provide $53.4 billion for Operation Enduring Freedom [OEF]. This funding will support the responsible drawdown of forces in Afghanistan, as announced by the 

President. It will provide continued support and assistance for the 

Afghan National Security Forces and our coalition partners. It will 

pay for the retrograde of equipment and personnel and the continuing reset of forces. And it will enable a really vast range of support activities in theater, including logistics and intelligence. And 

it will support a portion of the temporary Army and Marine Corps 
5 

end strength that supports OEF as approved by this committee, 

which we very much thank you for. 

The 2015 OCO request also supports the two Presidential initia- tives the chairman and the ranking member referred to—$5 billion 

for the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund, of which DOD would 

receive $4 billion, and $1 billion for the European Reassurance Initiative, which DOD would receive $925 million. Before I briefly 

touch on these two initiatives, I would just like to talk about three 

important points of the OCO submission writ large. 

The costs in Afghanistan and the greater Middle East region remain substantial. Even with the end of our combat role in Afghanistan, we will continue to provide continuing support for our troops 

and carry out our ongoing counterterrorism mission there, which I 

am sure everyone here will agree, is not getting any easier. This 

will require high-end intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

assets, close-air support, force protection, and logistics into next 

year. We also must return thousands of pieces of equipment from 

Afghanistan to our home stations and close down hundreds of combat facilities there. That is a process that is ongoing and that I 

talked with the people in my recent trip to Afghanistan. It also 

supports other important missions, as approved by this committee 

and the other committees in Congress, outside of Afghanistan, including the Middle East [and] Horn of Africa. 

Secondly, this request will continue to help our military recover 

and reset from more than a decade of fighting. It is going to be 

used to repair and replace damaged or worn-out equipment after 

prolonged use. And when units return from combat, as is our intent, and this Congress—I mean, this committee—has supported, 

restoring them to a condition that allows them to conduct training 

exercises, achieve their readiness levels, and prepare for future deployments. The need for this equipment reset will continue beyond 

2015. 

Third and finally, this request provides continued support and 

assistance to our partners, the Afghan National Security Force. 

Over the last year, these forces have demonstrated tactical superiority over the Taliban and they have prevented the Taliban from 

gaining momentum, as demonstrated by their professionalism in 

the most recent national elections. 

We believe it is critically important that we maintain sufficient 

financial support for these forces, so they can sustain these gains 

and continue to assume full responsibility across Afghanistan. 

I will just quickly touch on the two new initiatives. I know there 

are a lot of questions about them. The CTPF, the Counterterrorism 

Partnership Fund, this $5 billion includes $4 billion, as I said, for 

the Department of Defense. And the overall goal is, one, to increase 

the ability of our partner countries in the region to conduct 

counterterrorism operations and, two, prevent the proliferation of 

terrorist threats from neighboring states. And three, participate in 

multinational counterterrorism operations, including countering 

ISIL and other terrorist groups in the region. 

About $2.5 billion of that is for counterterrorism support, and $1 

billion for a Syria Regional Stabilization Initiative, which will help 

Syria’s neighbors including Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey confront the threats there. As part of this initiative, we are seeking 
6 

$500 million to train and equip vetted elements of the moderate 

Syrian armed opposition, and an additional $500 million would be 

for crisis response for U.S. forces. 

The second initiative, the ERI, the European Reassurance Initiative, was announced on June 3rd in the President’s speech in Warsaw. It proposed increases in the U.S. military deployments in Europe after the developments in Eastern Europe and in Ukraine, in 

particular. 

We believe that a more temporary increase in rotational U.S. air, 

land, and sea presence in Europe, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, along with more extensive bilateral and multilateral 

exercises and trainings are necessary and appropriate demonstrations of support to our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] 

allies and partners who are deeply concerned by Russia’s occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea and other provocative actions in Ukraine. 

So to summarize, the funds we are requesting will support our 

troops who are already serving in harm’s way in Afghanistan and 

elsewhere in the Central Command area of responsibility. They will 

support the President’s decision to maintain U.S. presence in Afghanistan. They will fund these two initiatives that are needed to 

further our national security objectives, both in counterterrorism 

and Europe, and we ask for your support for these requests. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. And we look forward to answering your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Work and Admiral 

Winnefeld can be found in the Appendix on page 48.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. No further opening statements. 

Thank you. 

As I stated in my opening remarks, there is a narrative that, 

based on the lower number of troops deployed in Afghanistan in 

2015 after we have finished the drawdown, the OCO request 

should only be $20 billion in fiscal year 2015. This obviously 

doesn’t take into account operations and enduring activities outside 

of Afghanistan, as well as resetting the forces’ equipment returns 

from theater. 

Can you discuss the activities and force structure outside of Afghanistan that the OCO request supports and how these funds directly or indirectly correlate to the number of boots on the ground 

in Afghanistan? 

Secretary WORK. Yes, sir. Operations directly related in Afghanistan in the force protection operations there have come down from 

28—or $26.2 billion in 2013 enacted and have fallen all the way to 

$11 billion. So we are actually seeing in Afghanistan, as troops levels come down, a very substantial reduction. 

But you know, over that same time, the amount of money that 

is dedicated to in-theater support in Central Command area of responsibility, which the relevant committees in Congress have been 

very helpful. That is $18 billion. The remainder of the money is all 

really indirectly in support of Afghanistan. For example, the Joint 

IED [improvised explosive device] Defeat [Organization]. That is 

very heavily focused on Afghanistan, as well as other partners. The 

extra money includes reset. The extra money includes the two new 

funds that the President has asked for. It includes the Army and 
7 

the Marine Corps temporary end strength. It includes classified 

support. 

So if someone just looks at the boots on the ground, I think they 

are missing the forest for the trees. The actual money that is supporting the operation’s force protection in Afghanistan itself is coming down. But the indirect support for those forces as well the 

other forces in the Central Command area of operations are still 

doing very, very important work and that is what is really part of 

the whole $57 billion. I would ask Admiral Winnefeld if he has—— 

Admiral WINNEFELD. And I think the fact that it is $26 billion 

less than it was this current year is very indicative of the fact of 

the drawdown in Afghanistan. But just because something isn’t in 

Afghanistan doesn’t mean that it is enduring. And I would echo 

Deputy Secretary Work’s statements about—there is an awful lot 

in this request that is outside Afghanistan, but that supports Afghanistan or is an integral part of our operations in Afghanistan. 

But I would also like to make the point that as sequester has impacted the Department, it has really squeezed our ability to absorb 

within the Department unanticipated operations. I will just use a 

couple of examples. The Tomodachi earthquake in Japan. We absorbed all of the expenses for that that were not what we would 

normally be spending for deployed ships and the like elsewhere in 

the Department. 

We have a lot less capability to do that now than we did before. So the $500 million which is part of the CTPF request is going to 

help us do things like that. Another example, we have a Patriot 

battery in Turkey that we put in last year, because of the crisis in 

Syria. The Army is taking that out of hide right now. And as you 

know, the Army is not in a position to take an awful lot of stuff 

out of hide. 

So I think it is a reasonable request in here, in terms of $20 billion less than last year—fully supports the operations in Afghanistan, including how they are supported from outside Afghanistan, 

and also it starts to build just a little bit of room for us to be able 

to manage unanticipated contingencies that can arise anywhere in 

the world. And we really would appreciate congressional support 

for that idea and for the small amount of funding we are asking 

this year for that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Readiness, specifically, with respect to the services’ core mission has been affected by over a decade of war. For 

example, young Marines have not trained in core amphibious missions. They are becoming Army. And the Air Force cannot meet its 

readiness needs until 2023. Given the current pressures on the 

base budget, did the Department consider addressing non-reset and 

sustainment readiness shortfalls in the budget amendment? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Mr. Chairman, in trying to stay true and 

faithful to what the concept of overseas contingency operations 

really means, we didn’t view that kind of training necessarily as 

falling into that category. It would be tempting to do that. We 

would love to do that. But we really wanted to stay faithful and 

really reset this OCO idea into what it is really supposed to be. 

But what we would really like to get is support from the Congress for the readiness accounts that we have, so that we can train 

all of the services into that full spectrum of operations that you so 
8 

correctly refer to. And I think that the overall budget submission 

the Department has made will help us do that. The more we lose 

in things like compensation savings, and the like, we are going to 

squeeze that even more. 

Secretary WORK. Just to follow on, Mr. Chairman, I couldn’t 

agree more with the vice chairman’s comments. 

If you took the money that was outside—if you just said, ‘‘Okay, 

we are only going to fund the forces and the force protection operations in Afghanistan, and that is it,’’ the rest of that money would 

have to be absorbed in the base budget. And as the vice chairman 

said, it would most likely come out of primarily readiness. And we 

are ready. As the chairmen of the Joint Chiefs had told this committee and others, the readiness problem is the thing that worries 

us the most every day. This is not something that we are making 

up. This is something that we actually spend most of our time 

thinking about—how do we get out of this readiness trough over 

the next couple years? 

So, I completely echo what the vice chairman said. If we had to 

absorb a large portion of this in 1 year, we would in essence have 

two sequestration hits in 1 year. It would be extremely difficult, if 

not impossible, to absorb that type of a cut. 

The CHAIRMAN. You know, my concern isn’t that the number is 

too high. My concern is it is too low—both this and the base budget, but we have talked about that many times. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just to sort of drill down this point—in terms of what the OCO is for. Is it your contention that the full $58.6 billion—well, first 

of all, for overseas contingency operations—I guess, how would you 

define those? I mean, we think of it in a fairly straightforward way 

in terms of the cost of being in Afghanistan. 

Now, Admiral, you mentioned some other issues. But if, in fact, 

the OCO is meant to be broader than that, that is okay. But I 

think we need some parameters on what ‘‘broader than that’’ 

means. So, is there any way you can break it down and say, okay, 

$58.6 billion—you know, $20 billion of it or whatever is for what 

is going on in Afghanistan. You know, another $10 billion is for the 

readiness gaps that have been created by what is going on in Afghanistan, and even, I guess, probably still absorbing what happened with Iraq. And then we have got other portions for, as you 

mentioned, Admiral, some of those unforeseen things. 

I think, that is one of the things that has been sort of vexing for 

Congress about the OCO presentation here, is it has been sort of 

a ‘‘hide the ball’’ thing. We don’t know why. I mean, there may be 

justifications, but it has not been clearly explained beyond, as I 

said—the average Member of Congress—okay, OCO—we are in Afghanistan. We get that. But what else? Is there any way you could 

refine your point on that? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Sir, before I defer to the deputy secretary 

and to Mr. McCord—the way we would tend to define what ought 

to be in an OCO-like appropriation would be anything that we do 

while we are deployed, or that supports our deployments that is 

over and above what we would normally do in a tabula rasa peaceful world—— 
9 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

Admiral WINNEFELD [continuing]. Where we are just maintaining 

a deterrent presence. And I hate to do math in public, but I would 

say, you know, about $53 billion of this is directly supporting something that we wouldn’t ordinarily be doing, and that is an Afghanistan contingency. 

And there are other things in there—the President’s initiatives 

on the CTPF and the ERI that are things that we wouldn’t ordinarily be doing in a normal world, either. 

I will give you an example of what I mean by this. 

An ordinary aircraft carrier with its carrier air wing that is deployed to the Arabian Gulf for a deterrent presence—none of the 

flying hours that that carrier flies that it would normally fly on a 

normal deployment are charged to OCO. Anything it flies above 

and beyond that to support a contingency in Afghanistan, or even 

flying missions over Iraq, as we are now, we would tend to charge 

to OCO because that is something we didn’t anticipate doing. 

In a way, you can look at it as actually being more efficient with 

the defense budget, rather than having a large budget that you, 

you know, try to find the slop in, if you can find it in order—you 

know, rob Peter to pay Paul—you would now have a fund that you 

can use, particularly with the CTPF and the $500 million I just 

mentioned. 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. But you only spend strictly controlled if it 

is something over and above what you would ordinarily do. 

Mr. SMITH. I understand that. I mean, one could make the argument that—I mean, there is always going to be something unanticipated in the defense world. And you try to budget within the parameters of that, and not have a separate fund in case something 

comes up. 

And, again, most of the other budgets—they have things that 

come up and surprise them, as well. Department of Homeland Security is experiencing that right now. But we have done this with 

disaster relief and on and on. But, of course, we do occasionally 

send up supplementals for all of those things. In fact, one has been 

requested for the Department of Homeland Security. So, I think 

that does make sense. 

Secretary WORK. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary WORK. Just to follow on—again, for those who just 

count the troops in Afghanistan and say, ‘‘Holy moly. The—— 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

Secretary WORK. ‘‘OCO isn’t coming down’’—it is an entirely erroneous argument. If you take a look at the amount of money that 

is specifically just for operations of the forces and the force protection, then you see that downward slope from, as I said, $26 billion 

in 2013 to only $11 billion in this one. But as the vice chairman 

has said, over time, we have rules that we actually have to follow 

with OMB [Office of Management and Budget] that have developed 

with our interaction with Congress and OMB. 

Everything that is in this request, we can explain based on past 

practices. It includes the Joint IED Defeat [Organization]. It includes the Office of Security Cooperation of Iraq. It includes all the 
10 

reset money. It includes a temporary end strength. All of these 

things are indirectly in support of those service men and women 

who are in Afghanistan. 

And then the other portion of it, specifically to your question, 

is—about 2 years ago, we started to debate on whether or not to 

include these outside Afghanistan and in-theater costs. And for the 

last 2 years, they have been part of the OCO budget and are in this 

year. And that is another $18 billion, so—— 

Mr. SMITH. And I get all that. Let me just note that it would be 

more helpful for all of us concerned if all of that calculating was 

done sooner, so that we—you know, I mean, we marked up our bill 

in May. We went through all of that. I mean, May is a good 6, 7 

months into the fiscal year. It seems like we ought to be able to 

get that to us somewhere around the same time that we get the 

general budget request. And that should happen. 

One final area of questioning. The problem with these two 

funds—and I—you know, I certainly support the idea of the, you 

know, the counterterrorism fund. I think, you know, in building 

partnerships with our friends in Europe and all that. But as we 

look at them, they appear fairly open and open-ended in terms of, 

you know, what you could conceivably spend the money on. 

Where in the OCO request are there any restrictions on those 

two funds on what the DOD could decide to do with the money? 

Secretary WORK. Well, sir, I think this is an interactive discussion that we are looking forward to. On one side is, have a fully 

cooked plan that we can say, ‘‘This is exactly how we expect to 

spend the money,’’ and then debate the merits of the plan. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. 

Secretary WORK. And the other one, which is what we have tried 

to do, is, we see what is happening in the greater Middle East and 

the Central Command area of responsibility and Europe. We know 

that we already have plenty of authorities, which the Congress has 

given us—1206, 1208, 1207, Global Sustain and Lift. And rather 

than saying, ‘‘We think we will put money on all of those bins that 

have caps,’’ it would be better for us to agree on the types of things 

that we would be able to do, and then work with the oversight level 

that the Congress is comfortable with. 

So, it is these two poles. I know that on one side, it is a fully 

cooked plan. The other one is to have a more flexible plan, which 

is what we are arguing for. But we are actually looking forward to 

the discussion with the committees and Congress on how best to 

do this. Because we see what is happening in Iraq, Afghanistan, 

Syria, throughout the greater region. Flexibility is something we 

really need now, based on the very, very difficult time we have in 

our overall budget. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. And I would just add briefly, we have the 

15-day notification requirement that we will have to submit to the 

Congress. And I know that there is a waiver in there. But if you 

go to that well too often, you are going to end up losing in the end. 

And we do really look forward to working with the Congress on 

this. 

Mr. SMITH. I am not sure arguing right now about notifications 

requirements is the best approach with this committee, but I do appreciate that it is there. 
11 

So, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Secretary 

Work, welcome. I think on that last point, however, you have been 

given kind of a difficult assignment for your first job here in front 

of this committee on these new authorities. And I am sympathetic 

with having a discussion on how we can improve the authorities 

that exist to deal with the real world. 

Our subcommittee has a number of hearings on 1206, 1208— 

what is happening with that money, what sort of circumstances are 

we confronting around the world, and how do existing authorities 

tie our hands for dealing with them? 

I just don’t think coming up—the President giving a speech at 

the end of May and then coming up a few weeks later saying, ‘‘Give 

me $5 billion for me to spend’’ is a very good way to have a conversation about having these authorities. And so, let me see if I understand a couple things. 

One is that this new authority on counterterrorism does not replace 1206, 1208, or the Global Security Fund. It is kind of a piggy 

bank over here that then you could move funds from the new authority into those other funds. Is that right? 

Secretary WORK. Yes, sir. That is essentially correct. It is a 

transfer fund which would utilize the existing authorities so it 

would give us permission to go over the caps that you have already 

established in those particular authorities after notifying Congress 

and describing what we would do. 

We are only asking for one new authority and that has to do with 

the Syrian initiative. But we can’t go too much into that in an open 

hearing. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. No, I understand. 

It just seems to me, for example, this year in its regular budget 

request, the administration asked for an increase in some of the 

caps. So we ought to have that conversation. As I say, we just had 

a hearing last week going on where that money is spent and why 

we are bumping up against the cap. But to have another fund out 

here that can just get around the caps, to me, may not be the most 

helpful approach moving forward. 

Let me just ask one question on the Syria thing because it looks 

like half of the money goes to neighbors. And I notice in your written statement, some of that is for humanitarian purposes. Is that 

money that DOD would spend? Is it giving to Jordan, et cetera. Explain to me the humanitarian aspects of DOD OCO funds for Syria’s neighbors. 

Secretary WORK. I think I might be mixing apples and oranges 

here, sir. There is $500 million for us to improve the partnership 

of the surrounding countries around Syria, so that would be Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq. Then there is $500 million to assist 

appropriately vetted Syrian opposition groups. And then there is 

another $500 million that State has—or excuse me—$500 million 

that State has that—and I believe—and I will ask Mr. McCord to 

make sure I am not getting this wrong, that I think most of the 

humanitarian assistance would be coming from the State aspect of 

it. 
12 

Secretary MCCORD. Yes, if you think about the humanitarian crisis that there is of all the displaced people, that is not something 

the Department is planning on handling with our part. And I 

think, in fact, State would mainly do that with some of their existing funds. We would be much more focused on the border issue, the 

border security with Jordan, things like that, than dealing with 

the—we are not intending to go into the refugee camps and provide 

assistance with our fund. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Right. Well, that is what I wanted to make 

sure I understood. Let me just ask briefly about the European Reassurance Initiative. I guess my first question is about the name. 

We are part of a NATO treaty alliance where we are pledged to defend each other when attacked. So why does Europe need to be reassured with money? 

Secretary WORK. Sir, this would be—well, first of all, I just came 

back from the United Kingdom, and I spoke with the senior leaders 

and they said, 6 months ago, they were trying to figure out what 

the NATO Summit would be really discussing. And now President 

Putin has given them very much focus. 

All of the governments in NATO and the European Union are 

trying to determine, you know, how to respond. And this is something that the United States has always done to reassure our 

NATO allies that we would be with them. And all of this money 

would go into allowing us to have more frequent forward deployments, more frequent exercises. We would be able to do improved 

infrastructure that would allow rapid reinforcement, if that became 

necessary. 

So this is just another commitment to NATO that this—we understand, you know, you have shifted your attention to Asia. This 

is just another way to reassure our allies and NATO that we are 

a global power. We have global responsibilities and we would want 

them to know that we are there with them. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, not my thought. For what it is worth is 

they need to be reassured, perhaps of U.S. leadership and U.S. 

commitment. I am not sure that having another fund really accomplishes that. But I yield back. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to all of you, Secretary Work, Admiral, and Mr. Secretary McCord as well. I know it is a little difficult to speak in 

terms of a great deal of detail. And I understand the way you need 

to bracket that. But I also wonder if you could go into some detail 

than you have given us about the $140 million for the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq and more background about how that is 

going to be spent and how the additional U.S. forces in Iraq would 

be funded? I understand this is not boots on the ground, but we 

still have to fund. And what other potential courses of action in 

Iraq, how would that be funded? 

Secretary WORK. Ma’am, the OCO budget does not include any 

money that would cover the operations and the things that we have 

been doing most recently in Iraq, as far as the assessments, et 

cetera. The Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq [OSCI] has been 

there since we have left. They handle all the FMF [foreign military 
13 

financing] cases. They are responsible for bringing the F–16s into 

service as well as all of the other ones. This has been a longstanding program. 

And the Office for Security Cooperation-Iraq, obviously, a lot will 

determine on what the outcome is on the government formation in 

Iraq. But right now, nothing in the OCO covers any of the other 

aspects we are doing with the possible exception of the $500 million 

we have asked for crisis support operations, which goes right back 

to what the vice chairman was saying. These were unexpected 

events. It would be very difficult to take out of hide. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. The deputy is exactly correct, on the $140 

million for OSCI Iraq. Those are the people who are trying to help 

the Iraqis at the ministerial and high levels, you know, maintain 

their military. The current things that we are doing in Iraq we 

wouldn’t use OCO for that because those are coming out of forces 

that are already in theater. We didn’t deploy any extra forces to 

the theater to do this. I would say, and obviously it is this fiscal 

year, it is not the fiscal year we are asking for this appropriation. 

But in a future year, for example, we had to take some contingency 

action in Iraq. If the President were to choose to do that, then this 

is the kind of—the $500-million piece of this which is relatively 

small, compared to the amount of contingency money we have 

spent in other places, but it is a start. That is what we would tap 

into to fund and recover from some of those operations. And a related example would be if we had taken kinetic action in Syria last 

year, then this is the first place we would turn. That small $500 

million fund. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Are you suggesting then that if there are additional 

dollars for Iraq, the 15-day notification would kick in? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. We would, yes, we would. If we were to do 

that, we would give you the 15-day notification. Now if it were an 

emergency, as we have done in the past with Congress, we will— 

you know, we will call and say, hey, we don’t have 15 days here, 

are you okay with this. And we have had a pretty good cooperative 

relationship, I think, with Congress when that has come into play. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. Great. I know that the—a question was asked 

about the Syria Regional Stabilization Initiative, but I think it is 

still an issue of why that requirement is part of the undefined 

transfer fund. And not a direct request of Congress to provide assistance. Can you clarify that again? 

Secretary WORK. As part of the broader counterterrorism partnership strategy that the President outlined, obviously, everything 

that is happening right now in Syria and Iraq has been the focus 

of intense discussion and debate with inside the administration. 

And I think the President felt that we know we are going to be 

doing something. We are not certain what it is. And what we tried 

to do is peg to certain levels of effort. So for example, the $500 million that we had for our partners, we just said, what would happen 

if we had to do something to assist one of the countries. And we 

just kind of built it out from there to give examples to the committee and Congress on this is type of things that we are anticipating. But it is impossible for us to predict exactly right now what 

it might be. 
14 

Admiral WINNEFELD. You know, the other thing I would append 

to that, if I might, is you know Russia’s illegal seizure of Crimea 

occurred after our budget submission. And so, you know, we didn’t 

intend to submit a new budget because of that. This is a good vehicle for us to approach the Congress and request money to do the 

things we think we need to do in Europe to reassure our allies. 

Mrs. DAVIS. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

And Mr. Work, I just want to read you three headlines, and then 

I want to get to a question. ‘‘Is the Pentagon Wasting Taxpayers’ 

Money in Afghanistan?’’ ‘‘The United States ’Military Was No 

Match for Afghan’s Corruption,’’ subtitled ‘‘the Pentagon wasn’t 

just defeated by the country’s graft—the Pentagon made it worse.’’ 

And then another title, ‘‘Money Pit: the Monstrous Failure of U.S. 

Aid to Afghanistan.’’ 

I represent the 3rd District of North Carolina, which is the home 

of Camp Lejeune Marine Base and Cherry Point Marine Air Station. 

Four weeks ago, I went to Walter Reed Hospital. There were two 

Marines from my district who had been severely wounded. 

In visiting the rehabilitation area, I met three Army soldiers 

from Fort Bragg, which is not in my district, who had lost one leg 

each. 

Then the young Marine that I went to see—I saw he and his father—the young Marine had lost two legs and one arm; 23 years 

of age. The father had the saddest eyes I have ever seen as we 

were talking about his son’s future. 

The second Marine from Camp Lejeune February this year 

stepped on a 40-pound IED, lost both legs. 

I look at the absolute waste of life first and money second and 

here you are asking for money. I understand that. 

But the American taxpayer is absolutely frustrated and broke because of these overseas activities. I do not understand why you can 

sit here today and ask for this money with such waste, fraud, and 

abuse going on in Afghanistan. 

A few of us on this committee have met separately with John 

Sopko, the Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction. And we 

met in a bipartisan way at an 8 o’clock breakfast that we put together ourselves. 

And to hear his explaining of absolute ridiculous waste of the 

taxpayers’ money, and then I look at these Marines and these 

Army guys that I saw just a few weeks ago—I don’t know how in 

good conscience the administration or the Defense Department can 

come here and ask for additional money when you can’t even account for 70 percent of it that is going over there. 

It is an absolute waste and I do not understand on behalf of the 

taxpayers and those in the military when we sit here at many 

hearings and we talk about we need more money to maintain platforms, to build new platforms, to rebuild our military that has 

worn out, where in the world did we not get to a point that we say 

enough is enough? 
15 

The Afghan’s parliament had the right to vote on a 10-year bilateral security agreement, and we in Congress have not had that opportunity. I don’t blame the President for that; I blame ourselves, 

quite frankly. 

But the frustration of the American people is getting deeper and 

deeper and deeper. And I don’t know why you need this money; it 

is nothing but a slush fund, anyway. 

And we got no more business going into Syria than I do walking 

from here to China; it makes no sense at all. 

I would like just to hear your comments about accountability because I know you are new on the job. But you need to get John 

Sopko in your office, one-on-one, and get John Sopko in front of the 

President of the United States and just hear how the American 

taxpayer is being abused. 

Yes, sir; please. 

Secretary WORK. Well, sir, I am a Marine. I finished Active Duty 

in 2001. I visited the very same service men and women who are 

on the ward in Walter Reed. In fact, I think I went just last week. 

I think if you asked any of them if their—— 

Mr. JONES. [Off mike.] 

Secretary WORK. Well, I just wanted to say, sir—— 

Mr. JONES. Sir, I wanted to know about the waste, fraud, and 

abuse that is taking place every day and what is the Department 

of Defense trying to do about it? That is all I want to know. 

Secretary WORK. All right, sir. I will get right to it. I think each 

of them would say that they felt that their sacrifices were for something worthwhile. 

I just visited General Dunford in Afghanistan. His discretion—— 

Mr. JONES. You are not answering—my time is almost up. 

Secretary WORK. All right. 

Mr. JONES. You cannot explain the waste, fraud, and abuse and 

that is what is wrong with your request, quite frankly. Thank you. 

Secretary WORK. Sir, I would say that we can explain—the IG 

[Inspector General] is doing a very valuable function in pointing 

out to areas where we could have done better, but we believe that 

the money that we are requesting is for a worthwhile endeavor. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, I want to thank you for your testimony here today. 

I am still trying to make sense of all this. Some of it has been 

answered, but there are still some contradictory or unclear purposes for the fund. 

Let me ask this: What percentage of the request is for making 

up for base budget shortfalls and are OCO funds being used for 

UFRs [unfunded requirements]? 

Secretary WORK. I didn’t hear the last part of the question, sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I said are OCO funds being used for unfunded requirements? So, I said they—what percentage of the request is 

making up for base budget shortfalls and the second question is are 

OCO funds being used for unfunded requirements? 

Secretary MCCORD. Congressman, we would say none of it is 

used for base budget shortfalls. Per se, our base budget as was 

noted by the ranking member was well—you know, submitted well 
16 

before this one was. So, we didn’t have anything that was being 

saved for an OCO request that was undetermined. 

The OCO request was waiting on the enduring presence issue 

mainly. We did not—the OCO request has no correlation with the 

service chiefs’ unfunded requirements list. That is not what it— 

again, not what it was built for. 

There are things, and the deputy secretary alluded to the temporary end strength, that would be very difficult for us to do without the OCO, but it is not the case that we are—that we view this 

as just extra base budget money. 

Secretary WORK. A different way to answer, sir, is that if we had 

to absorb this into our base budget, it would make already a difficult problem for us impossible. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. And I would add that there are things we 

rejected that could have been in this request that would have done 

exactly what you are suggesting, and that would be substituting, 

you know, basically an unfunded requirement slipping in here and 

we rejected that during this process. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. So, is the fund to be used solely to support foreign 

forces, entities, et cetera, assisting U.S. forces, as indicated in 

budget justification materials and that the name implies? Or is the 

fund going to be used to fund U.S.-only efforts and operations? 

Secretary WORK. Are you speaking of the OCO writ large, sir, or 

one of the two funds that we just—— 

Mr. LANGEVIN. One of the two funds. 

Secretary WORK. The two funds—there is money in there for U.S. 

forces. As the vice chairman said, there is $500 million to support 

our contingency response operations. There is money in there to 

support ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] enablers that we might purchase in support of our partners; that 

might be a Predator orbit, for example. 

So, there are things that would support our forces in those funds. 

But a very good portion of it is to support our partners. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. And, so then, my next question is what is your 

understanding of the interagency policy process by which the National Security Council will solicit information on requirements for 

funding from this account, allocate funding in, and how will the 

money actually be executed? 

Secretary WORK. It was developed through a very robust interagency process involving Department of State, OMB, Department 

of Defense, our other government agency partners. 

We anticipate what would happen is the National Security Council and OMB—we would go to them, explain what we want to do; 

they would then give their approval. Then we would come to Congress with 15-day notification and wait and go from there. 

So, we do anticipate an interagency process here, with the exception of emergent things, as the vice chairman has said. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. And I would just add, as an example, the 

$500 million that we would anticipate for training and equipping 

Syrian opposition forces—that is going to be subject to a very, very 

intense and rigorous interagency process through the deputies and 

the principals, ultimately the President, and then of course we 

would consult with Congress with the 15-day requirement. 
17 

Mr. LANGEVIN. And so, then my next question—Mr. Secretary, 

could you expound upon the plans for the $140 million requested 

for the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq and what courses of action require additional funding requests to Congress and what actions would cause the Department to notify Congress or congressional notification to undertake additional military intervention? 

Secretary WORK. Mr. McCord might have some more specifics. 

But as we discussed, sir, the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq 

has been there since we left in 2011. 

They do all of the FMF cases. So, right now, they are the ones 

who are handling the transfer of Hellfire missiles; they are the 

ones who were working on the F–16s that the Iraqis have purchased; they would be the ones that would handle the other things, 

just like another Office of Security Cooperation in many of our 

countries around the world. But I don’t have any more specifics on 

that. 

Secretary MCCORD. I would just add that the OSCI request is the 

same request that we had last year and the year before, as the deputy said, that the committees have approved in the authorizing and 

appropriation language, have given us the particular authorities 

that vest in the OSCI, whether it is for transportation or logistics. 

So there is nothing new in the OSCI. What is the new situation 

in Iraq, as the vice chairman said, with respect to the advisers, 

with respect to what is going on with ISIL, is not encapsulated in 

any specific proposal in this request. 

That would, as the vice chairman said, have to come out of the 

Crisis Response Fund, or out of other OCO funds. But this request 

was not—the OSCI is in no way meant as a proxy for a new Iraq 

operation. It is just the same OSCI that we have been describing 

that we have had for a couple of years. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Admiral, Mr. Secretary, Mr. Secretary, thank you all for your service to our country, 

and for being here. And Secretary Work, congratulations on your 

confirmation, and we look forward to working with you on that. 

One of the questions that I have is somewhat a follow-up on 

what Mr. Thornberry said regarding the European Reassurance 

Initiative. I supported the President when early on he made the decision that we should have a pivot to the Asia-Pacific area, and 

then supported the Secretary of Defense when he said we needed 

to have a pivot to the Asia-Pacific area. 

Didn’t disagree when they changed the name to ‘‘rebalance.’’ 

That was okay. But my concern is if I look at that area, I still recognize we have got some of the largest militaries in the world located there. We have got some of the largest economies in the 

world located there, probably two-thirds of the world trade is going 

to come through there the next decade. 

But then I question this: When the President went for his visit 

there, he goes on the backdrop of a budget that was going to essentially cut a carrier out of our fleet, a budget that would put up half 

of our cruiser fleet, a budget that would impact our Tomahawk 

missile production. We hear rumors of him trying to take out six 

destroyers in the next budget. 
18 

And then I look at this request, and we have a European Reassurance Initiative, where we say we have got to convince our allies 

in Europe that we are there for them. If you are an ally in the 

Asia-Pacific area, how do you read all of this? When you say we 

have got all these words talking about the shift, and the pivot, but 

then I see this backdrop that is taking away the capacity. And then 

second, I see this fund to Europe, but I don’t see anything about 

the Asia-Pacific area to reassure our allies there. 

Give me some comfort level for them that I can take back to 

them. 

Secretary WORK. Sir, I believe our interactions with our allies in 

the Pacific are extensive and very fruitful. They see our base budget, and they see that 60 percent of a fleet, for example, is now in 

the Pacific theater. They see some of the other initiatives that we 

are going about. 

And the ERI, I think the President was clear, and I think we 

have made clear, we consider the ERI more of a temporary nature. 

We don’t see this one becoming more enduring. This was something 

that occurred. And our base budget is very, very, I think, focused 

on our allies in Asia, and working with both—I mean, the Australians, the South Koreans, the Japanese. I believe they would say 

that our interaction is very extensive. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Great question. I would say, first of all, if 

I were in the Pacific, and I observed the United States reacting to 

an illegal seizure of land by a large power, and that we are actually 

asking for money from the Congress to provide more reassurance, 

more actual building partnership capacity, more prepositioning in 

response to that, I might actually feel comforted that—— 

Mr. FORBES. And Admiral, I don’t want to disagree, because I respect all of you so much. But they do see China at this particular 

point in time, with all their territorial claims moving, and that to 

them is just as disconcerting as what they see in Europe. 

But let me give one more question. I don’t want to cut you off, 

because I would love to hear you answer. But help me on the OCO 

funding, too. As I understand it, we have got about 11,000, plus or 

minus, troops that are going to be there next year for fiscal year 

in Afghanistan. 

But the OCO funding also covers—we have got about 63,000 

troops around the globe. Could you just give me a snapshot so people understand this OCO funding is not just about Afghanistan, the 

broad breadth of what it is trying to cover in addition to that? 

Secretary WORK. Yes, sir. You are exactly right. The 11,000 is an 

average over 2015—excuse me, 11,000 over the course of the fiscal 

year as we draw down to 9,800, and then about half of that. 

The 63,000 forces that are in the Central Command area of responsibility in the Horn of Africa are doing very, very important 

missions every day; deterrence of Iran, working against 

counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa. 

So you are exactly right, sir, this covers 63,000 service men and 

women who are forward doing national security tasks every day. 

Mr. FORBES. Gentlemen, thank you so much for your time. And, 

Admiral, I would love to talk to you a little bit further. But I didn’t 

mean to cut you off, but I was just running out of time. So thank 

you. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 
19 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Barber. 

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen, for being here, and for your service. 

I want to talk a little bit about how OCO supports functions here 

at home. As you know, the budget concludes critical funds that 

keep our warfighters safe, and provide the resources for critical 

missions at military installations across the world. 

And actually in my district, Fort Huachuca in Sierra Vista, and 

Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Tucson, where I proudly represent the civilians, airmen, soldiers who serve a critical role for 

our Nation. And at Fort Huachuca, specifically, the Army intelligence, signal, and cyber operations, many of these members work 

at the Army’s Intelligence Center of Excellence, NETCOM [Network Enterprise Technology Command], and the Army—9th Army 

Signal Command Headquarters. These men and women provide 

critical capabilities at OCONUS [outside the continental U.S.], 

operational requirements and contingency missions around the 

world. They also serve in capacities that are at the leading edge 

of technology in the forefront of cyber warfare, which is one of 

DOD’s top priorities. 

Many special missions, gentlemen, like the ones at Fort 

Huachuca, have requirements that blend their daily tasks at home 

with overseas contingency operations. So I would like to ask, what 

do you see as the dual impact of sequestration, and the decline of 

OCO funding, on our intelligence and cyber communities; particularly, the important missions that are provided to our Army at Fort 

Huachuca? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. I don’t know that I can address Fort 

Huachuca exclusively, although we can get some answers for you 

on the record for that. But I would say that in the base budget, one 

of the things that we have protected very carefully is our cyber 

force. 

In fact, you know, we say flat is the new growth in our business. 

And in fact, the cyber force is growing. It is about the only place 

that is actually going to grow inside DOD over the coming years, 

based on the budget challenges we have had over time. So if that 

trickles down to Fort Huachuca, then—particularly on the cyber 

side, then there would be some benefit there, I would—— 

Mr. BARBER. Well, I certainly appreciate the plus-up in cyber is 

critical. I mean, clearly, the wars of today and tomorrow are going 

to be fought, in many ways, in that arena. 

Let me ask Secretary Work a question about the bilateral security agreement [BSA], which we still hope will be signed as soon 

as the Afghanistan Presidential election is resolved. The question 

I have is, if it is not signed by fiscal year 2015, what impact would 

this have on the OCO budget, and what changes would have to be 

made, and how would resources have to be allocated differently? 

Secretary WORK. It is a great question, sir. Well, first of all, a 

lot of people try you know, say, ‘‘Hey, isn’t what is happening in 

Iraq going to replay in Afghanistan?’’ 

And we say right now, absolutely not, because I have spoken to 

the people who tried to negotiate with Iraq on the status of forces 

agreement [SOFA], which would have allowed us to keep forces in 
20 

country. And they could not get their parliament to deliver. They 

asked us to leave. Period, end of story. 

There are a lot of different views on how that happened, but 

that, I think, is the truth of the matter. Both of the Presidential 

candidates in Afghanistan have said they will sign the BSA. 

Now, what is troubling to us is as this electoral crisis continues, 

there is going to come a point where we are going to have to make 

a decision. But right now, both of the candidates have said that is 

one of the first things they will address. 

They want U.S. forces to stay in the country. They want to have 

a very close partnership, which goes back to why we do not think, 

in any way, shape or form, that the money we are asking for would 

be wasteful. 

The other thing we have to—this also addresses NATO. NATO 

has a SOFA agreement that they need to sign. There is a NATO 

ministerial in September. If the electoral problem is not resolved 

by mid-September, that is where I think it would trigger a big debate internally with our NATO partners and with Congress. 

So, to your exact point, if it falls apart and the BSA is not 

signed, the President said we will start a withdrawal. And of 

course, that would impact ultimate spending on the OCO funding. 

Mr. BARBER. The clock is really ticking on this. Obviously, we 

now have a recount going on of all of the ballots. I mean, it could 

take weeks and weeks and then who knows what the end result 

will be, in terms of the dispute over the findings. 

Is there a breaking point when we have to decide we are out of 

there because we don’t have a BSA? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Really good question. Currently, it is actually an audit of the ballot boxes; it is not a recount; technical term. 

But that will take a little less time than an actual full recount. 

But we are working very closely—Joe Dunford over there is 

working very closely to support this process as best we can to get 

it done quickly, expeditiously, and get an answer to this question 

so we can have a President of Afghanistan who can be a partner. 

And so, if we can manage this through the timeframe that we 

think that is going to take. If it goes much beyond, let’s say, midSeptember, then we are starting to get into a little tougher situation in order to be able to do an orderly withdrawal by the end of 

the year. 

Now, we still will have a SOFA with them, so there is, you know, 

it is not like the end of the world. But we have placed as an end 

point the end of this year that we will have to be out of there if 

we don’t have a BSA. 

Mr. BARBER. Thank you. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. And a BSA, more than anything else—— 

Mr. BARBER. Thank you. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. The BSA is a statement of partnership 

from the government of Afghanistan. 

Mr. BARBER. All right. My time is up. Thank you, gentlemen. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to thank all three of you for being here. My appreciation of what you are doing is very personal. 
21 

Admiral, one of my sons is serving in the Navy today. And then 

I am very grateful—I served representing Parris Island, Marine 

Corps Air Station, Beaufort Naval Hospital, and so, I know firsthand the extraordinary troops. 

And I appreciate, Secretary Work, your pointing out the extraordinary success of our troops in serving in Afghanistan. 

My youngest son just returned—he is an engineer with SUTA 

[Split Unit Training Assembly] Army National Guard—from his 

service for a year in Afghanistan. 

My former National Guard unit, the 218th Brigade, served there. 

So, I know and I have seen—I have been there 12 times—what is 

being done for the people of Afghanistan, which is really to protect 

us, because that is—of course, it was from the caves—people need 

to remember, it was from the caves of Afghanistan that Osama bin 

Laden planned the attacks on the United States, September 11th, 

2001. 

With that said, I am equally concerned about the reduction in 

end strength of the Army and Marine Corps. And we have learned 

recently about the management situation on this—that there are 

troops in Afghanistan that have been informed that they are being 

separated from the Army. 

The media has said there are soldiers are receiving pink slips. 

It is wrong that you have troops serving overseas receiving these 

notices and they have to think about transition to civilian life— 

transition back home. I just—surely something is being done to address this. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Very important point—and that is keeping 

faith with our force as we draw down. Because of the budget pressures we are under, we don’t have a choice; we have to get smaller. 

That is a fact that we cannot circumvent; the question is can we 

do it in a compassionate way. 

Mr. WILSON. Right. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. And I may be wrong here, and I would 

have to consult with Ray Odierno, but Ray has been—and Jim 

Amos both with our ground forces have been incredibly considerate 

and compassionate, trying to make sure that we do this without 

yanking the rug out from underneath our troops. So, I don’t believe 

that anybody is being told to leave before the end of their enlistment. They at least have the predictability of fulfilling their enlistment. But I would want to check to make sure that that was accurate. 

But, again, it—and we are doing everything we can to support 

their departure from the military so that they have a successful 

transition into civilian life when it has to happen. But there is no 

question that we have wonderful young men and women in this 

country who are going to want to serve in the United States military who are not going to be able to do so. 

Secretary WORK. And sir, if I could just say—this goes back to 

the chairman’s I think very good point at the beginning of the 

hearing—the President does not want to get down to the sequestration level. He has made that very clear. 

If we go down to the sequestration level, the number of troops 

that we would have on Active Duty would be even much smaller 

than what we are planning for, which is at $115 billion above the 
22 

BCA [Budget Control Act] caps over the course of the fit-up. So, 

your point is, I think, spot-on. 

If we go to the BCA levels, then it becomes even more hard—it 

becomes harder to keep young men and women who want to serve 

their Nation in uniform because we have to get smaller, as the vice 

chairman said. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, we want to work with you. And we actually 

even want to work with the President. 

But it should be noted that it was the President’s plan, defense 

sequestration, according to Bob Woodward, in his book. And so, 

this needs to be addressed. 

I am also concerned, Secretary Work, you stated and somehow 

the American people believe that the war is ending. I believe that 

we are in a long-term global war on terrorism. 

We know that it began out of caves in Afghanistan September 

11th, 2001. But additionally, we have particularly, in the last year, 

Doctor Fred Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute has 

brought to our attention that Al Qaeda terrorists have spread 

across North Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia; that is in the 

last year. 

Additionally, we know that in the last month, the extraordinary 

city of Mosul and significant parts of Iraq have been seized by Al 

Qaeda operatives and their allies. 

Really, they are trying to accomplish their goal—death to Israel, 

death to America. The American people need to know—we are in 

a long-term war. 

So, what is your view about the global war on terrorism? 

Secretary WORK. Well, sir, I see the point. I did not mean to— 

what I meant to say is that our combat operations mission in Afghanistan would end at the end of the year, but we still have a lot 

of hard work with our Afghan partners to get them together. 

And I also agree that the situation in the Middle East, the situation in the Western Pacific, the situation in Eastern Europe—all of 

these things are of major concern to Secretary Hagel and the Joint 

Chiefs and the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund really is designed to get after that—the global fight against terrorist networks. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you for your—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Duckworth. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, one of our principal responsibilities here as Members 

of Congress and especially in this committee is to conduct rigorous 

oversight of defense programs and policies. 

Especially concerned with the Counterterrorism Partnership 

Fund proposal under OCO funding. I support the larger strategy 

for this money, but I am also very, very concerned about its specifics. 

My understanding is that to increase flexibility, the administration wants CTPF funds to be available for 3 years and to be able 

to transfer them to any DOD account or to a specified State Department account or to transfer the money between the two departments. And these monies could be spent anywhere overseas. 

This seems like a lot of leeway that really hampers Congress’ 

oversight mission. Mr. Work and also Mr. McCord, if you could an-
23 

swer that aspect about—it seems this has become yet another slush 

fund where you can just transfer it between accounts without accountability and you can transfer it even between departments and 

you are asking for $5 billion, which seems like a large amount of 

money to have that little oversight on. 

Secretary WORK. Ma’am, again, we do not consider this a slush 

fund. We want to work with Congress to provide us flexibility in 

authorities that we already have to respond to a very, very fastmoving situation—generational change in the Middle East with all 

sorts of unintended problems or unexpected problems. 

I do not believe that we transfer money to State, ma’am. I think 

it is only within DOD accounts. 

Secretary MCCORD. That is correct. That was discussed in various drafts as we went through with the administration how to propose. In the end, what we proposed was that we would have a fund 

for ourselves and State would have theirs. 

But the NSC [National Security Council], as the deputy described, NSC and OMB would be in conversation with us about 

funds executed from our fund or theirs that would—for looking for 

consistency of purpose and things like that. I would also just add 

that the transfers would only occur—when we transferred money, 

we would then come to the committees, as we have done in the 

past with things like 1206 with the 15-day notice and wait. 

And we feel like this procedure has been fairly well-established 

on things like the Afghan forces and on 1206 before, of working 

with the committees to explain what we are trying to do and letting you see them. 

So, it is at the point the money would leave the fund and go to 

a particular place for execution that we would be bringing it to the 

committees. 

Secretary WORK. And just wanted to follow up, ma’am, that we 

would have to go to OMB and NSC and we would say this is what 

we would like to do. We would have to get their oversight approval 

and then we would have to come to Congress and give the 15-day 

notification and wait. 

So, we do not believe it is a slush fund that will allow us to just 

go willy-nilly. We think there are going to be all sorts of checks and 

balances. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Okay. On the portion of the OCO request that 

provides provision for Syria, a few things stood out to me. I understand that $1 billion has been preliminarily allocated for the Syria 

Regional Stabilization Initiative, and $500 million of that is to provide assistance to moderate elements of the Syrian opposition, including proposed authority to train and equip and vet elements of 

the Syrian army opposition. 

Admiral, can you speak a little bit to, and perhaps clarify, the 

details in terms of the types of training, the equipment to be provided, the number of fighters that would be trained? Who is going 

to train them? Is it us, our allies? Where are they being trained? 

How are we vetting these fighters? And what type of equipment 

are we giving them? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Unfortunately, and by the way, thank you 

for your service. 
24 

Unfortunately, a lot of that is classified and I wouldn’t be able 

to talk about it in a hearing like this. But I would say that we are 

coming together on the construct of a plan that would train moderate oppositionists in the country of Syria. We would train them 

outside Syria, obviously. I can’t get into where we would do that. 

We would provide them with weapons, intelligence, logistic support, military advice. And they would conduct the insurgency struggle and also counter ISIL potentially inside Syria. 

And I could be happy to sit down with you privately and go into 

more detail, particularly as we get towards a decision on that. I 

want to make sure the President has his decisions based on this 

to decide what it is—how he wants to configure this. But we do 

have a very good gelling together of a plan to do it. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. I would hope that you would be—thank you for 

offering to be available to brief the plan. And I hope that that 

would be available to the entire committee, or at the very least the 

committee leadership on a classified basis, I am sure. 

Also, I am very concerned with making sure we maintain oversight to make sure that any armaments we transfer to moderate 

rebels doesn’t end up in the hands of folks that are not friendly to 

us. 

I am out of time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. THORNBERRY [presiding]. Thank you. 

Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Work, Admiral Winnefeld, thank you for being here. I 

appreciate your attempt to answer questions that I think perhaps 

may be unanswerable at this point, which is part of our concern. 

I want to associate myself with Ms. Duckworth’s comments. The 

reason why people are concerned about this being a slush fund is 

because these are very large numbers and the detail is lacking. But 

they are concerned not just because of the concern of waste or that 

you may be ineffective in addressing serious issues. It is the issue 

of that we want to know what you are going to do because we are 

concerned about the outcomes here, not just the outcome of spending, the outcomes of what you are trying to accomplish. 

And that brings me to the European Reassurance Initiative. I am 

obviously very supportive of the European Reassurance Initiative 

when you look at the backdrop of what Russia has been doing. I 

believe the administration has been pursuing a false narrative with 

Russia that they are not an adversary. And Russia obviously has 

declared itself an adversary. 

But what we learned from General Breedlove with the new aggressiveness of Russia, both in its military posture and its actions, 

is that it has undertaken a number of snap exercises on the border 

of some NATO countries, and certainly Ukraine, as we have seen 

in Ukraine, that developed into actually an invasion force. 

So I am concerned that, one, the whole fact that we need a European Reassurance Initiative is because the operational funds for 

our presence in Europe have been cut too much. And two, there has 

been a lack of recognition of really the threat of what we were facing. 

Admiral Winnefeld, could you provide us some additional detail 

as to what you see? For example, has General Breedlove given you 
25 

details as to what types of exercises and initiatives would occur 

here? He has talked about a lack of readiness on the part of our 

forces and European forces if Russia should continue its aggressive 

stance. 

And Secretary Work, you indicated that these funds were temporary. I don’t—surely you don’t believe that Russia’s new posture 

is a temporary one, so hopefully you mean it is temporary in that 

you would need these funds to be incorporated into larger spending—sustained larger spending in the out-years. If you could explain that. 

Admiral. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. A couple of things. First of all, I think it 

is important to remember that the base budget for the DOD was 

submitted before any of this happened. And so this is essentially 

trying to recover from that, quite honestly, that there are initiatives we need to do in order to support particularly our Eastern 

European partners who are a little—not quite as strong as some 

of our Western European partners from a defense perspective. 

General Breedlove has already done a large number of things, 

and I am not going to eat up the clock by describing all of those, 

but it is significant force movements that we are taking out of hide 

with Air Force movements from Italy into various countries to support them with company-level training and the like. 

In terms of the ERI initiatives, though, they would do a number 

of things. An armored brigade combat team presence, which is 

quite expensive, we would be able to maintain that for a while 

longer; live deployments in the Black Sea; more Baltic air policing; 

deploying forces to train with Moldova, Georgia; a few more NATO 

exercises; increasing some of the training range capabilities and 

training sites in Bulgaria we would be doing; weapons storage at 

Camp Darby in Italy, upgrading that; and a number of other increased activities across Central and Eastern Europe. 

And you are correct. I think some of those are actually going to 

have to be enduring. We are going to have to fold those into perhaps next year’s base budget submission. But some of them, as the 

deputy secretary I think has pointed out in other testimony, are 1- 

year type things in that you would upgrade a facility, for example, 

a prepositioning facility that is something that would be a one-time 

expenditure. I think that is where we were coming from in terms 

of short term. 

Mr. TURNER. Secretary Work, so you would agree that this is not 

going to be a temporary? And by the way, you should probably rename this, instead of European Reassurance Initiative, the Responding to Russian Aggression Fund instead. 

But Secretary Work? 

Secretary WORK. Well, sir, your overall point, we are going 

through European infrastructure consolidation right now that will 

not take out any further forces than were already in the baseline 

plan. As the vice chairman said, this was to react to a situation on 

the ground in Eastern Europe. 

Mr. TURNER. But you believe this is going to have to be sustained, right? You don’t see the Russian aggression, their current 

posture being a temporary circumstance? You do believe that this 

fund is because we have cut too far and we have to reinvest? 
26 

Secretary WORK. Well, what we will do, sir, is in the fall review, 

we will readdress this as part of a broader look at our portfolio and 

take this in—— 

Mr. TURNER. Well, this is a yes or no question. Do you believe 

this circumstance to be temporary, that it will not require additional funding in the future? 

Secretary WORK. The ERI, I am not certain we would ever come 

back in the OCO, but I agree with you that what is happening in 

Europe will cause us to look over the longer term and what our investments will need to be. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Secretary Work. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you. 

Ms. Gabbard. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and for being here. 

I have a couple of questions with regard to the Counterterrorism 

Partnership Fund, but just first want to comment on why there is 

so much hesitation here I think from many of my colleagues and 

myself about the lack of detail. 

Mr. Work, you commented earlier—made a comment that struck 

me as you spoke about the need for flexibility in funding for Iraq, 

that it is your and the administration’s position that it is agreed 

that we must do something, but we are not sure what. 

And I think that assumption is what is troubling, that it should 

not be a given. As we look at the different conflicts that are occurring whether it be in Iraq or in other places, that we assume that 

we must do something because sometimes the answer to that question of what is in the best interests for us, the United States, the 

American people, the answer may be to not take action in that particular situation. 

So that assumption that we must do something, in particular 

with what is happening in Iraq right now, is where many of us are 

concerned about writing this kind of blank check to fund that 

something, if that something is not the right course of action to 

take. 

With regards to the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund, I think 

Congresswoman Duckworth asked a few questions, but I am wondering who are the targeted recipients of that funding, both in 

Syria and Iraq? And what are the objectives for providing that support? And the follow-on question to that is: Why is this requirement part of this undefined transfer fund and not a very direct request of Congress to provide assistance? 

Secretary WORK. Again, ma’am, talking about the specifics of the 

Syrian aspect of the fund, we wouldn’t be able to get too much into 

in an open hearing. 

Ms. GABBARD. Is the intent of this funding to assist rebel forces 

as they seek to overthrow the government? Or is it to target terrorist threats? 

Secretary WORK. Both, ma’am; $500 million would be associated 

with our partners around the area, so that includes Lebanon and— 

excuse me—Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey; and then $500 million would be to provide training and support to vetted Syrian opposition units. To your initial question, I agree with you that the 
27 

President may decide not to do something and that is—the purpose 

of this is to provide us the flexibility, when and if we do. And 

again, we have tried to build in the oversight so that we would not 

automatically start spending money without congressional understanding of what we were doing. 

Ms. GABBARD. Okay. Thank you. I have got one last question 

with regards to the CTPF funding and how that allocation of funds 

will be determined by region and at this juncture which COCOM 

[combatant command] stands to benefit the most from this fund. 

How is that determination made? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. The lion’s share of really—is where is the 

threat coming from. And a lion’s share of the terrorist threat is 

coming from the Central Command region. So when you consider 

Syria, part of Central Command; if there is support we are going 

to provide within Lebanon or Iraq or elsewhere, that is all in Central Command area of responsibility. But there is Northern Africa, 

where there is a considerable terrorist threat and Eastern Africa. 

Of course, that is AFRICOM [Africa Command] area of responsibility. So those are probably the two principal areas. But that is 

not to rule out that terrorist threat that emanates from some other 

region could not be addressed by using—— 

Ms. GABBARD. And how do we ensure that these funds don’t end 

up being duplicative to other efforts that are being executed or pursued by Department of State or other agencies? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. We have a good interagency process where 

we talk about our contingencies and the planning that we work 

through in a particular area. We have a very robust group that 

looks at Africa, a very robust look at Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, same thing with Eastern Africa, Al Shabaab in Somalia. 

And there is a lot of de-confliction that occurs in that forum. And 

the intent, of course, is to have complementary efforts, not stovepiped or isolated efforts. And so I think we have a fairly good process for working through those challenges. 

Ms. GABBARD. I guess it is—I just hope that in both departments 

that the feedback from folks on the ground, especially is being welcomed and heard, because oftentimes, as you know, some people 

can sit in a room up here without understanding exactly what is 

happening on the ground. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. It is a good point. And the lion’s share of 

those meetings we have a VTC [video teleconference] with the combatant commander actually having a representative and, you know, 

participating in the meeting. 

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank, Mr. Chairman. And Secretary Work, Secretary McCord, Admiral Winnefeld, thank you so much for joining 

us and thanks for your service. I want to begin by asking a question to all of you all. Looking at the OCO budget as it is presented, 

there is a heavy emphasis on post-Afghanistan transition. Can you 

tell me where in the budget are we emphasizing the reset of our 

forces, specifically those outside a weapons acquisition? 

Secretary WORK. OCO includes $9.2 billion for reset. We expect 

a future OCO request to have additional money. As we have been 

saying all along, we believe that the reset of our equipment will 
28 

take a couple—2 or 3 years after we cease our combat operations 

in Afghanistan. We are in the process of bringing back an enormous amount of gear that some of it has to be refurbished, upgraded, and we have to determine whether we need to get rid of 

it or replace it. So $9 billion in the OCO is for that. 

Mr. WITTMAN. How about specifically for training? I understand 

the equipment reset and the equipment going to depots, but how 

about on the training side? 

Secretary WORK. There is nothing in the OCO, as far as training 

of forces back in the United States. That has not normally been included in the OCO request. So that is included in our base budget. 

Mr. WITTMAN. So you believe the base budget adequately addresses that and fully executing the reset can be accomplished in 

the base budget? 

Secretary WORK. I would say, sir, that readiness of our forces 

and our future readiness, we all recognize that we are going to go 

through a 1- or 2-year trough in readiness, as we reset the force 

and as we come out of Afghanistan. So it is tight. It is extremely 

tight. And if we go to the BCA levels, it will be even tighter. And 

the chairman has already said he believes the risks of going to the 

BCA level would be unacceptable. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Well, then put this in context, what are the risks 

of not fully executing a reset, not just the equipment, but the training side? And what does that mean for us, whether it is the capability of our forces or making sure that the industrial base is there 

to make sure we have that capacity necessary going forward? Give 

me your perspective on what happens if we don’t fully execute the 

reset in its entirety? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. It goes without saying that the ability to 

reset results in the deployability of your force for future conflicts. 

We have a very good understanding of what various contingencies 

around the world could require, whether it is a Korea contingency, 

Iran contingency, you name it. 

And that—all those—that calculus went into the formulation of 

the budget request for next year and indeed, into the strategy that 

accompanies the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review]. Can you defeat one adversary while denying the objectives of another? 

And as the deputy secretary pointed out, it is very fragile. It is 

extremely fragile right now and it will be for several years while 

we reset the force, while we recover our readiness. 

By the end of the 5-year plan, the way—with the President’s 

budget request, which is above sequester, we believe that we will 

be there and as we have described, you know, with moderate but 

on the high band of that moderate risk as I said in my QDR testimony. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Let me ask under this scenario: What happens if 

after this year, OCO goes away and then on top of that, we have 

sequester? 

Can you give me an indication about the risk and the scenarios 

we face looking at those two situations? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. I will go even further than that. 

If we have—if we lost OCO next year—because it is going to take 

us a while to recover, particularly to reset the force—if we just lost 

it completely next year and if we go back to sequester and if we 
29 

don’t get the compensation savings that we are asking for, and we 

are asked to retain systems that we believe that we need to divest, 

if all of that comes together then you will have a broken force at 

the end of the day. 

It won’t just be a hollow force; it will be a broken force. And we 

will not be able to execute even close to what the strategy asks us 

to do. 

Secretary WORK. I fully endorse those comments, Congressman. 

Right now, if you take a look at the defense industry, the reason 

why I think they are doing so well in terms of their share prices 

is they have been ruthless in cutting their overhead. 

We have not been able to do a BRAC [Base Closure and Realignment]. We haven’t been able to do some of the compensation savings—— 

Mr. WITTMAN. Secretary Work, I am limited in time. 

Let me go to this. I understand the technical explanation of that 

but give us an illustration about what that risk would mean either 

to the Nation or to our men and women that serve, just a simple 

illustration so people can understand that. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. If we were—and again, I want to stay out 

of classified—— 

Mr. WITTMAN. Sure. 

Admiral WINNEFELD [continuing]. Contingency pieces. 

But if we were to have a major contingency somewhere in the 

world, we would not be able to respond as fast or as robustly or 

with troops that are trained to the task. 

And with that comes blood, it comes time and it comes additional 

cost. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. That you are planning for $100-plus 

billion over BCA. And you both now just addressed again the problem that we have with sequester, but that is the law. 

I mean, I am violently opposed. I have talked about it ad 

nauseum. But it still is the law. So I hope you are also planning 

to follow the law. 

And then the statement you just made, Admiral, about the broken force, we have got 6 members of the committee here in the 

room out of now 62 and most Members of Congress don’t have any 

concept of what you are talking about. 

I hope that you can give us what you mean by a broken force. 

I understand that we don’t—maybe we need to have a classified 

session on just that because something is going to have to happen 

to inform Congress to the point where they get rid of sequester 

next year. Because if they don’t, I don’t think any of us want to 

see the consequences. 

So you need to speak up more often. Even I still need to speak 

up more often. But we need to have some information, some anecdotal or some—something that people can relate to and understand 

that are not on this committee, that don’t deal with this on a daily 

basis. 

Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
30 

When I was a kid in Arlington, Washington, you know, we didn’t 

have smartphones then—of course, no one had smartphones then— 

so we would make up games. 

We had a game we played outside. I am one of eight kids so a 

lot of kids, a lot of neighborhood kids. We played a game called 

dogpile. 

It is a very simple game. You picked one person to be ‘‘it’’; they 

ran away from the group and you jumped on them and you dogpiled on them and then it was someone else’s turn, just one big 

dogpile. 

So I am going to play dogpile on this terrorism fund because—— 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Should we try to run away? 

Mr. LARSEN. What is that? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Should we try to run away? 

Mr. LARSEN. No, you are safe there. You are safe there. 

Because we have developed 1206 and the Global Security Contingency Fund—and this argument about being a slush fund or not, 

I don’t really buy that. I don’t agree with folks who are accusing 

that. 

My question is the need. If we have 1206, we have the Global 

Security Contingency Fund, we are using those, what makes this 

counterterrorism fund so different? 

If you have to jump through all the interagency hoops that you 

have laid out and all the agreements in order to implement spending out of this proposed fund—you are already jumping through a 

lot of interagency hoops—what makes this so different than what 

we have already done? Because you are not doing a very good job 

of explaining that. 

Secretary WORK. Sir, we had a debate. 

One of the ways we could have come forward is to say, ‘‘We 

would like to raise the cap in 1206 this much, raise the cap in 

1207, 1208,’’ and that would have presupposed that we would have 

known exactly how we would have used those authorities over the 

course of the next year. 

What this is, is it provides us with the flexibility to come to the 

President and Congress and say, ‘‘We would like to exceed the caps 

in these particular authorities that Congress has already given us 

due to things that are happening right now in the world.’’ 

That is what is different. This provides us with a little bit more 

flexibility. 

Again—— 

Mr. LARSEN. So what about the existing authorities and their 

flexibilities? Speak to that. What about them is so inflexible? 

Secretary MCCORD. I would just cite two examples. 

I think both for legal reasons and for—as a matter of national 

policy, Syria is of such import that coming to Congress for a positive authority like this is the right answer in addition to the fact 

that there are particular things like working with irregular forces 

that probably are not doable under just straight 1206-type authorities that we have today. 

Another example, we—I think all of us believe it has been a good 

course of action for us to support what the French are doing in 

Mali. But because they are not a developing country, we are very 

limited in what we can do to support them. 
31 

And this would allow us to exceed those type of caps that we 

have on helping countries, even—it is still cost-effective for us to 

do so. It is a good idea for us to do so but legally, we are constrained. And just having 1206 as it stands today or the other authorities we have today are not enough to allow us to be more robust on that effort. 

Mr. LARSEN. Go ahead, Admiral. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. I was going to say, this is about two things: 

It is about quantity and flexibility. 

And we are trying to establish a sustainable counterterrorism 

framework wherever we need it around the global, principally, as 

I mentioned earlier, in the Central Command, in Africa Command 

areas of responsibility but it could be elsewhere. 

So essentially, we would like to have more in the resource area 

in order to be able to do that. 

Now the question, as you point out, is where do you put it? 

And we could put it in what we anticipate to be the right categories and we are always wrong. 

And for example, this year, we are really running out of 1208 

money far quicker than anything else. But we are stuck. 

So what would be, you know, an alternative would be to plus-up 

the funds to the quantity that we think we need and then give us 

the transfer authority, again, with consultation, with Congress, 15 

days, to be able to freely move among those funds so that if I need 

more 1208 and I have got some extra in 1206 then we can just 

move the money. 

But it would seem to us to be more reasonable to just have this 

fund here, which we consult with Congress on and that if we need 

to plus-up 1208-like activity then we can do it. 

It is really a matter of having the flexibility to act quickly to get 

things done around the world in favor of a sustainable CT [counterterrorism] framework. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, I just—I know we are jumping on you about 

8 to 9 percent of this total request. 

But we put a lot of work in the last decade into developing 1206 

and the security fund. And now you need this and it just seems a 

little backwards is all. 

So thanks for trying to explain a little better for me. I appreciate 

it. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to get to the reset in a second. But Admiral, certainly, I have a tremendous amount of respect for you and you just 

used the term, if I may, ‘‘consult with Congress.’’ 

Was there any consultation with Congress prior to the action 

that was taken in Libya? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. You are talking about the—— 

Mr. SCOTT. I am talking about the action to take Gadhafi out. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Yes, I wasn’t here at the time, so I couldn’t 

answer that question completely. 

Mr. SCOTT. With due respect to all of you, and I think this is 

where your problem is coming with this, including with myself, I 
32 

got a message 5 minutes prior to Fox News reporting that we were 

sending Patriot missiles into Libya. I would have objected to the 

action. I think that the northern portion of Africa was probably 

more secure then than it is now. 

And as I read through the statement, it says, and I will quote— 

‘‘as part of the Syria Regional Stabilization Initiative, we are seeking $500 million to train and equip’’ and it goes from there, ‘‘this 

effort represents a critical long-term investment to build Syrian capacity.’’ 

This country would be in a war in Syria right now, had this Congress, including myself, not objected to the action that the President wanted to take. 

I maintain that we were right to not get involved in Syria. And 

my concern is that if we pass this, if the President had this authority a year ago, we would be involved in a war in Syria right now. 

And the term ‘‘long-term commitment,’’ Americans are tired of 

being at war. I know those of you who serve in uniform are tired 

of it. I hear it from the soldiers that I represent. We have been over 

there. Desert Storm was almost 25 years ago. Desert Storm was almost 25 years ago. 

We have spent billions, if not trillions. And look at what is happening in Iraq right now. 

And so, I—it seems to me that the administration’s position is 

that they are gonna ask forgiveness instead of permission. They did 

not consult with us on Libya. I do not have any reason to believe 

that they would change and consult with us on this, going forward. 

And I have serious reservations about the ability to support that, 

especially with regard to the terms that we continue to use, a hollow force, a broken force. We are laying off United States soldiers. 

And I want to get, real quick, to the reset of the equipment and 

the sequester. And my primary concern is that if we are not able 

to repeal the sequester, which I voted against, what will happen to 

our depots and what impact will that have in our depots providing 

the necessary services to reset the equipment? 

And are they prepared and resourced to reset the equipment if 

the sequester goes into effect? 

Secretary WORK. If a sequester goes into effect at the full level, 

and/or if OCO drops down, then we would have to do a total relook 

at our strategy; we would have to do a total relook at our program 

and our budget. We would try to maintain the depots, to the greatest extent that we could. But all of our efforts to keep a balanced 

force, between personnel costs, investment cost, MILCON [military 

construction], and R&D [research and development], it would be extremely difficult. 

So, sir, I can’t give you an exact prognostication on what would 

happen to the depots, but every single aspect of our force would be 

under severe stress. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Yes, I couldn’t agree more, that the less 

work you have for the depots, the less people are employed by the 

depots, the more fragile they become, and the like. 

So we are very cognizant of that. I know that Frank Kendall, 

who is our AT&L [Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics] director, 

very cognizant of that. And it is something we have got to manage 
33 

very carefully. We only have a certain number of resources we can 

apply. 

To the first part of your question, I do want to briefly address 

it, if I could. And that is, there is a unanimous view inside all of 

the decisionmaking apparatus I participate in that we are not 

gonna put boots on the ground. This is not gonna be an Iraq or an 

Afghanistan war in Syria. It is not even gonna be a war. 

What we are talking about is not walking away from a potential 

ungoverned space where a terrorist activity can operate to threaten 

the United States. 

Mr. SCOTT. Admiral, we use the terms ‘‘hollow’’ and ‘‘broken.’’ 

There is only so much that the United States can do. And we have 

no OCO funding after 2015. If we don’t have OCO funding, what 

would happen to our depots and our reset of the equipment? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. If you don’t have the OCO funding at all, then, as the deputy secretary mentioned, you know, $9 billion of 

this is for reset. And a substantial part of that reset, almost all of 

it, is to the depots to reset vehicles and other equipment, helicopters and the like. 

If we don’t have that money, then we can’t spend it in the depots. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, gentlemen. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to drill down on two issues—Syria and then the contingency fund that we are worried about, or the—not contingency— 

combating terrorism partnership fund. 

I think, you know, I would certainly agree that, you know, that 

flexibility is important. I mean, if you look at what has happened 

with Al Qaeda, and this has been the big transition from, okay, 

they are a set force that is plotting and planning against the West, 

let’s go hit that group and before they hit us, basically, and we did 

that fairly effectively and, you know—well, we did it too late in Afghanistan, but once we did it, we did it effectively. We have been 

doing it in Pakistan and doing it in Yemen. 

But now, Al Qaeda has sort of spread. I mean you have got ISIL, 

which is, you know, they have decided they are not affiliated with 

Al Qaeda, but that doesn’t make them any less of a threat. It has 

become a battle against the ideology, and that ideology can pop up 

in a bunch of different places, and sometimes it is, you know, and 

the threat is different. Boko Haram is different from what is going 

on in Libya, is different from what is going on in Somalia. You 

know, how do you evaluate those threats and respond to them? 

And our authorities do have you a little boxed in in terms of how 

you do that. 

So I get that. I mean, the problem is that as my staff reads what 

has been put together here, to be honest, they are more knowledgeable about the stuff than I am, if you wanted to take this money 

and use it to refuel an aircraft carrier, there is nothing in this language that stops you from doing that. 

So we—I mean, first of all, do you disagree with that? And second of all, if not—we just—we have got to fence it in somehow. And 

from my understanding is, it is not terribly well-fenced. And that 

is a structural problem, and it is also a concern in that it wasn’t 
34 

as well thought out as it should have been before it was put into 

this. 

So help me out. You know, is it wrong to say that you could 

spend this to refuel an aircraft carrier? And, if so, what is the language in there that clearly restricts that? 

Secretary MCCORD. Well, certainly, as you know, that is not our 

intent or design. We don’t think the language is that broad. 

The—— 

Mr. SMITH. Let me say right, if I could, your intent and your design are, I am sorry, irrelevant to this conversation. It is a piece 

of legislation, so we want to know what is in the legislation. So let’s 

move past that first point, and you were on to the second one. 

Secretary MCCORD. Right. The second point—and I assume you 

are particularly talking about the new fund. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. 

Secretary MCCORD. Yes. 

Mr. SMITH. I mean, it is $5 billion. 

Secretary MCCORD. Right. 

Mr. SMITH. And the way this place works is, you know, $5 billion 

has parameters or no parameters, you know, we approve it, it goes 

up to you guys. And then you live within those numbers. 

Now, I have been around here long enough to know that that is 

far from a black and white issue. There is a whole lot of gray in 

there, and people operate in the gray. 

But at least I would like to start out with some kind of parameters. 

Secretary MCCORD. Right. Certainly our counsels stand ready to 

work with yours. We stand ready to work with you and your staff 

if this is not drafted the way that you think it should be. But, first 

of all, there is a purpose to the fund, and refueling an aircraft carrier, I don’t really think fits the purpose, but more importantly—— 

Mr. SMITH. Okay, again, I am sorry—— 

Secretary MCCORD [continuing]. Language—— 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. That is a troubling way to put it. You 

don’t really think. Tell me. You wrote the darn thing. We are up 

here. 

Okay, here is the sentence, it says this, that clearly restricts that 

and clearly wouldn’t allow that. I am not hearing that from you. 

Secretary MCCORD. The concern that we have heard in the briefings our staff has done is with the notwithstanding phrase. And 

the notwithstanding phrase pertains to amounts and recipients for 

things like building partnership. We don’t interpret that as notwithstanding all laws, as has been, I think, raised as a concern at 

some staff briefings. We think that we have identified what we are 

trying to waive or notwithstand. 

Mr. SMITH. Right. And, you know, I mean, the language, I just 

have it in front of me here, basically, ‘‘such funds shall be available 

under the authority provided by any of the provisional law to enhance counterterrorism and crisis response activities undertaken 

by the armed forces and to provide support and assistance to foreign security forces, irregular forces, groups or individuals to conduct, support or facilitate counterterrorism crisis response activities.’’ 
35 

I mean, again, you know, well, we are sending an aircraft carrier 

into the Gulf because, you know, we are worried about what, you 

know, terrorist groups are doing. 

I am telling you, this is really, really poorly drafted in terms of 

narrowing it down to a specific set of purposes. 

So I have made that point, won’t keep making it. I will just say, 

(a) this has got to be fixed; (b) it is really not good that it came 

to us in this form in the first place. And, you know, not to echo 

Mr. Scott’s opinion, because I disagree with a lot of what he said, 

but that is why it never hurts to talk to Congress. We could point 

these things out, other than in a public hearing and work our way 

down to it. 

So let’s just work on that piece of it, which brings me to the second point, and that is Syria. 

And this one really concerns me, and it concerns me because I 

think the policy is correct, all right? I think it is way past time that 

we got title 10, DOD involved in working with, however you want 

to describe them, moderate, non-Al Qaeda, sympathetic forces, to 

help them in any way we can. 

It is not—and the frustrating part is, and I know a lot of this 

is classified. We do know who they are. You know, every time this 

comes up, people say, ‘‘We don’t even know who we are talking 

about funding.’’ We know, okay? We don’t know all of them, but 

there is some number of people within Syria who are involved in 

the fight against Assad who are not sympathetic to al-Nusra, who 

are not sympathetic to ISIL, who we have been working closely 

with for a number of years now, okay? 

Is that number 100, 1,000, 4,000? I don’t know, but there is some 

number of them unequivocally who exist and who have been getting the crap kicked out of them for the last couple of years because they are under-gunned, they are unfunded. The wack jobs 

have money coming in from all over the place. These guys have 

been getting it in dribs and drabs from us. 

We would like to open that aperture up just a little bit. And I 

think that is an incredibly important policy because if we don’t do 

it, we are in a situation where all you have is Assad, Hezbollah, 

and Iran on one side, and Al Qaeda and worse than Al Qaeda on 

the other side. 

Now, that makes 100 percent perfect sense to me that we need 

to back these people. But it hasn’t been well explained. You know, 

I had a colleague of mine who sits on the Defense Approps [Appropriations] subcommittee yesterday say they had the same briefing 

from you and you basically couldn’t tell them what the fund was 

for or who it was going to. 

So we need to do better than ‘‘it is classified so we really can’t 

talk about it.’’ I want you to sell this successfully, which means you 

have got to sell it, right? You have got to make the case: Here is 

why this is important. 

And so if you could sell us right now on why it is that we should 

be pumping money into these Syrian groups. Because I don’t just 

agree with Mr. Scott that this is somehow equivalent to starting 

another war. I mean, there is plenty of—you know, there is plenty 

of distance between us sending in 100,000 troops to Syria and us 
36 

backing people who are already fighting there who are critically 

important to do what we are trying to do. 

But give us another shot here. What is the Syria money for and 

why is it so important? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Sir, I—there are two questions here: Why 

and how? 

And I think you have done a very artful job in the last couple 

of minutes describing the ‘‘why.’’ We have an ungoverned space. 

There are two problems, right? The ungoverned space in which 

groups like ISIL and al-Nusra are capitalizing. And without getting 

into classified information, indications are that they have the potential to not only create instability inside Syria, with the neighbors, and U.S. interests elsewhere in the world, to include potential 

attacks on the United States. 

So there is plenty of ‘‘why’’ on the ISIL and al-Nusra front side 

alone, much less the carnage that has been happening in Syria 

over the last few years because of what the regime has been doing. 

So the ‘‘why’’ I think is fairly solid. 

The ‘‘how’’ is the question, and in a classified hearing, I can’t 

really discuss it in any kind of detail—and we are still frankly 

working through what are some fairly challenging legal issues, 

some fairly challenging partner issues, process issues—and by the 

way, partner issues outside and inside Syria. 

But we are congealing what I think is a pretty good way forward 

for this, that the amount of money we are requesting, or that we 

envision inside this request—the $500 million—is a pretty reasonable planning factor for what we would expect to do. 

Mr. SMITH. And one part of the ‘‘how,’’ if I may offer the suggestion, the specifics of the ‘‘how,’’ you know, but right up front, you 

say, ‘‘Well, what we are going to do is we are going to train and 

equip.’’ Okay? Now, how we get to train and equip, that is going 

to be difficult. 

But that is where I think it goes off the beam a little bit. When 

you get to the ‘‘how,’’ you say, you know, (a) we can’t talk about 

it; (b) we haven’t really quite figured it out. That doesn’t inspire 

confidence or support in a controversial plan. 

I would suggest better the ‘‘how’’ is we want to train them and 

equip them so that they are better positioned to fight. Then you 

can say, you know, how we do that, where we do that, we are working that out, but we do have partners, and we are confident it can 

happen. But if we don’t better train and equip these guys, they are 

going to get killed and they are not going to be there. And that is 

what this money is for. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Right. So if I can repeat back for possible 

correction, you are exactly right. We do want to train and equip the 

moderate members of the opposition so they can go in there and 

do essentially three things. They can counter the more radical elements of the opposition who are targeting them. They can undertake to place the Assad regime under such pressure that they are 

not under right now, that would cause them to come to the negotiating table. And at the same time, they can defend themselves and 

their families. 

Mr. SMITH. They can survive. 
37 

Admiral WINNEFELD. That is the intent. The precise details of 

how we do that, I just can’t share right now. 

Mr. SMITH. I understand that. 

I guess the final thing I will say is I know there is a lot going 

on in the world. I am painfully aware of the fact that there is a 

lot going on in the world. But if the White House is going to push 

a policy like this, they have got to fricking push the policy, all 

right? 

They can’t just, you know, not say anything to us forever, you know, move into and then, well, here is $500 million we are going 

to—I mean, for the United States Congress to vote to authorize a 

train and equip mission for rebel forces is a big damned deal. And 

I think it is something we ought to do, but this is more not for you 

guys. I mean, this is more for the White House: Sell it. Because if 

you don’t, there ain’t no way we are going to pass it. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. I couldn’t agree with you more. This has to 

do, candidly, with clocks—a clock for putting the fine details on the 

approach here and getting it approved where it needs to be approved, and the congressional clock of when you need to have hearings and when we need to explain. Those clocks did not match up 

very well in this situation and I absolutely—I am empathetic. I 

hate it, but it is what it is right now and we believe that eventually 

we will be able to consult with you and show you exactly what we 

are going to do with this. 

Mr. SMITH. It is what it is—it has got to get better. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Palazzo. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you all for being here today. It is really great 

to hear the questions and your testimony. 

I am just trying to reconcile in my head just some things. I know the enacted level for fiscal year 2014 OCO was $85 billion, and this 

year’s 2015 request for DOD is $58 billion. So that is about a $27 

billion, $28 billion difference. So I am more interested, what missions are you performing in 2014 that you are no longer going to 

be performing in 2015 that would cause a $27 billion or $28 billion 

decrease? 

Secretary WORK. Two areas—the drawdown of our combat operations in Afghanistan have been moving towards the end of this 

calendar year. So we will be moving down, which is one of the reasons why the amount of money in the operations and force protection line has dropped from $26 billion to $11 billion. So that accounts for almost $15 billion of the drop. 

The other portion is in theater because we are coming down in 

Afghanistan. And as the vice chairman said from the very beginning, a lot of this is indirectly support of that. That money has 

come down, in-theater support has come down from $24 billion to 

$18 billion. So that is another $6 billion cut. 

So, it has to do with the drawdown of our combat operations, as 

well as the proportional drawdown of the other things that we are 

doing in theater. 

Mr. PALAZZO. So, you would have us believe that the entire reduction is because of the drawdown of the boots on the ground in 

Afghanistan and related resources. Are you certain that there is no 
38 

other missions that may be, in the area outside of Afghanistan, 

that are going to be reduced or cut or no longer considered? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. I am not aware of any. Our presence in the 

Gulf is relatively stable. It is principally affected by the sequester 

and the readiness of our forces. And that presence is probably 

going to decrease over the coming years based on where the funding profile looks like it is going. But none of that has to do with 

the OCO piece of this. 

I don’t know of any missions that we are cutting off because of 

the $26.7 billion decrease. 

Mr. PALAZZO. As a follow-up to that, can you tell me what other 

missions OCO funds other than just Afghanistan? 

Secretary WORK. The Joint IED Defeat Organization, the Afghan 

Security Force Fund, but that is obviously—as well as the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund. That is separate from the monies that 

would support the operations of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. There 

is the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program, or CERP, 

which was approved by Congress and we have been utilizing; 

unexploded ordnance removal; coalition support; Office of Security 

Cooperation in Iraq; reset; the temporary end strength increase for 

medical, as well as Army and Marine Corps. 

So all those things are covered right now. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Okay. Go ahead. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. I was just going to say that this year’s OCO 

is essentially all Afghanistan. Now, there are subsidiary effects. If 

you have more force in the Arabian Gulf region, for instance operating airfields, strike aircraft operating out of those airfields, that 

go into Afghanistan, then there is also a deterrent effect elsewhere 

in the region. 

But the reason it is there and the money is for operations in Afghanistan. 

This request that we are asking for is a little bit different. We 

are asking for the $5 billion in the ERI and the CTPF money that 

would do things outside Afghanistan that would give us more flexibility in that regard. 

So I want to mention this year is different from what we are requesting for next year. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Okay, so counterterrorism in Yemen deterring 

Iran, that is not in the 2014 OCO? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. There are probably things inside the Arabian Gulf region that indirectly support those because they are 

there supporting Afghanistan. 

But the drone ops, for example, that we would be operating in 

a regional country that would support in Yemen would not be coming out of OCO. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Okay. 

Looking kind of further down, I guess, beyond 2015, what kind 

of funding do you see being in OCO if this is just going to be Afghanistan and similar projects? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. As we draw down our presence even more 

in Afghanistan, the Afghanistan OCO will continue—I would imagine if OCO continues as a fund, which we anticipate it would, it 

would be even smaller in the years following. 
39 

And then the way we have constructed this request, we are opening it up to other areas of agility that we think we need to have 

for other types of operations around the globe that are contingency 

operations that would not be in Afghanistan. 

Secretary MCCORD. I would just add that again, our OCO request, we often use Afghanistan synonymously with Operation Enduring Freedom but OEF has always had a few parts like the Philippines that have been outside Afghanistan, per se. 

As the vice chairman says, one of the big questions, and as Congress reacts to the proposal we have made this time, is to broaden 

some of that a little bit. 

We have had limited operations on, say, the Horn of Africa that 

have been considered OEF. But we are going farther across Africa 

in this proposal with this new fund. 

And so how Congress disposes of our request, I think, will inform 

what we come back with next year as to what OCO looks like. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, gentlemen. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we have been here for a couple hours and 

we have talked about a lot of things. But we haven’t hit on Yemen, 

the Philippines, Horn of Africa in much detail other than just a 

broad ‘‘Yeah, there will be other things to spend money on.’’ 

I hope that as we move forward and actually get into some legislation, try to get this thing done. 

Let’s see, I think we are here for another week or so before we 

go, maybe 2 weeks before we go to the August break and then we 

are here a week or two in September. 

Time is running out quickly so we do need to get to this, need 

to get those questions answered and move forward. 

As you can see, there are bipartisan concerns with this so it is 

important to get it all worked out and get it right. 

Thank you very much for being here with us today. Appreciate 

your first hearing in these—two of you in this job. You did very 

well. 

Thank you very much. This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

JULY 16, 2014 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JULY 16, 2014 

(45) 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JULY 16, 2014 

(57) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS 

Ms. TSONGAS. I am concerned that if we continue to fund every new operation 

with OCO, then we will never be able to end what was meant to be a ‘‘temporary’’ 

funding stream. Can you explain how DOD plans to transition to solely a base budget? 

Secretary WORK. The base budget of the Department provides funds to organize, 

train, equip, and maintain the full spectrum readiness of the joint force. Other appropriations, such as the current OCO budgets, have historically been used to fund 

unforeseen operations, activities, contingencies, emergencies, and equipment reset 

beyond the scope of our normal base budget. As the demand for the use of military 

force remains high based on increasing global unrest coupled with major decreases 

in our budgets, the Department will likely continue to need contingency funding in 

some form of a supplemental for those activities over and above a normal base budget. 

Ms. TSONGAS. In the past, DOD has developed weapon systems that are tailored 

for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. One example of this is the Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN). Funding for BACN is once again contained 

solely in OCO. Combatant Commanders have stated many times that they want to 

keep BACN around after operations cease in Afghanistan. What is the plan to fund 

BACN once OCO funding has been removed? Will it be made a program of record, 

or will the Combatant Commanders lose another capability? 

Secretary WORK. The Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) is comprised of a fleet of EQ–4B and E–11A airframes and operations are exclusively funded with Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) resources. At this time, BACN is 

not a base-funded program of record and the Department intends to divest the EQ– 

4B and E–11A fleets if OCO funding is not available. Air Combat Command has 

evaluated options to create an E–11A BACN program of record, post conflict; however, sufficient funding is unavailable. 

Ms. TSONGAS. I am concerned that if we continue to fund every new operation 

with OCO, then we will never be able to end what was meant to be a ‘‘temporary’’ 

funding stream. Can you explain how DOD plans to transition to solely a base budget? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. The base budget of the Department provides funds to organize, train, equip, and maintain the full spectrum readiness of the joint force. Supplemental appropriations, such as the current OCO budgets, have historically been 

used to fund unforeseen operations, activities, contingencies, emergencies, and 

equipment reset beyond the scope of our normal base budget. We believe this is 

most logical and efficient way to fund these types of operations and activities because to properly anticipate them in the base budget could result in programmed 

funds that are never used if such contingencies do not arise. As the demand for the 

use of military force remains high coupled with major decreases in our defense base 

budgets, the Department will likely continue to need contingency funding in some 

form of a supplemental for those activities over and above a normal base budget. 

Ms. TSONGAS. In the past, DOD has developed weapon systems that are tailored 

for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. One example of this is the Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN). Funding for BACN is once again contained 

solely in OCO. Combatant Commanders have stated many times that they want to 

keep BACN around after operations cease in Afghanistan. What is the plan to fund 

BACN once OCO funding has been removed? Will it be made a program of record, 

or will the Combatant Commanders lose another capability? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. The Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) is 

comprised of a fleet of EQ–4B and E–11A airframes and operations are exclusively 

funded with Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) resources. At this time, BACN 

is not a base-funded program of record and the Department intends to divest the 

EQ–4B and E–11A fleets if OCO funding is not available. Air Combat Command has 

evaluated options to create an E–11A BACN program of record, post conflict; however, sufficient funding is unavailable. 

Ms. TSONGAS. I am concerned that if we continue to fund every new operation 

with OCO, then we will never be able to end what was meant to be a ‘‘temporary’’ 
58 

funding stream. Can you explain how DOD plans to transition to solely a base budget? 

Secretary MCCORD. The base budget of the Department provides funds to organize, train, equip, and maintain the full spectrum readiness of the joint force. Other 

appropriations, such as the current OCO budgets, have historically been used to 

fund unforeseen operations, activities, contingencies, emergencies, and equipment 

reset beyond the scope of our normal base budget. As the demand for the use of 

military force remains high based on increasing global unrest coupled with major 

decreases in our budgets, the Department will likely continue to need contingency 

funding in some form of a supplemental for those activities over and above a normal 

base budget. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER 

Mr. SHUSTER. There are some people that believe the Joint Improvised Explosive 

Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) should ceased to exist as the war in Afghanistan comes to a close. Others feel that JIEDDO should remain because the IED 

problem continues to grow worldwide and the IED is an ever-growing and ever-existing threat. What factors were looked at to draw the conclusion of reducing 

JIEDDO’s personnel by 3,000 and their funds by 60 percent? What impact will this 

have to available capabilities to the combatant commanders? 

Secretary WORK. The Department of Defense (DOD) recognizes the importance of 

transitioning the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) 

to an enduring joint organization. While maintaining key capabilities for support to 

Combatant Commands, the Department made the decision to reduce the size and 

budget for JIEDDO based on change of mission and downsizing in Afghanistan, and 

in response to the fiscal pressures on DOD. The decision was made to reduce 

JIEDDO to 975 personnel in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 and transition to a base capacity 

by FY 2017. The President’s Budget (PB) for FY 2015 includes the base budget necessary for 400 personnel and additional resources are provided though Overseas 

Contingency Operations (OCO) appropriations. The reduction of JIEDDO personnel 

and reduction of its funding was reviewed, in part, through the Deputy Secretary 

of Defense (DSD) Deputy’s Management Action Group (DMAG) process with reviews 

by the DSD conducted March 30, 2012, July 3, 2012, and July 17, 2013. At the July 

2013, DMAG, the DSD made the decision to transition the essential capabilities of 

JIEDDO to an integrated joint organization based on the following factors that enable tactical responsiveness and anticipatory acquisition to prepare for and react to 

battlefield surprise in counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, and other related mission areas to include counter-IED. 

In preparation for the 2013 DMAG, the staffing level of JIEDDO at the beginning 

of a two year transition period was determined by the Director, JIEDDO, presented 

at the DMAG, and approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. In November 2013, 

the DSD clarified direction to ensure that JIEDDO, as it transitions, sustains its 

counter-IED capability in support of U.S. forces while operations in Afghanistan 

continue. The Department’s processes to determine and request OCO funds were 

used for additional FY 2015 funding for JIEDDO, as it transitions, to continue the 

counter-IED support of U.S. forces while operations in Afghanistan and other areas 

around the world continue. The additional OCO funding of $379 million is for support that is beyond the capability that would be available if the funding were to be 

limited to the 400 personnel supported through the PB 2015 request. This will enable JIEDDO to adequately support the counter-IED requirements of the Combatant 

Commanders, with some limitations. Going forward, within the capacity of the projected base budget funding for 400 personnel and, to the extent that OCO funds are 

requested and appropriate, the integrated joint organization support, including 

counter IED efforts, to Combatant Commanders would continue at congressionally 

approved levels. 

Mr. SHUSTER. The Department of Defense and the State Department have $1.5 

billion that could be used for the Syrian Regional Stabilization Initiative. What will 

the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund provide to support partners’ counterterrorism efforts in the Middle East and Africa? How much does the United States currently spend on counterterrorism in those regions, and to what effect? 

Secretary WORK. A portion of the amount requested for the Counterterrorism 

Partnership Fund (CTPF) is intended to be used to build the operational and institutional capacity of partner nations to conduct counterterrorism operations. It is envisioned that these programs will be conducted using existing building partner capacity (BPC) authorities such as section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization 

Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2006, as amended, section 1207 of the NDAA for 
59 

FY 2012 (‘‘Global Security Contingency Fund’’ or ‘‘GSCF’’), as amended, and the 

Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) global authority granted in the FY 2012 

NDAA; or operational authorities such as Section 1208 of the NDAA for FY 2005 

(Public Law 108–375), as amended. Examples of programs conducted under those 

authorities could include: 

• Enhance partner border, maritime security and expeditionary operations capacity; 

• Enhance partner logistical capabilities, including transportation and engineering capabilities; 

• Enhance partner defense institutions, including in areas such as resource management, logistics and maintenance, and planning; and 

• Provide support to partner forces engaged in supporting or facilitating ongoing 

military operations by U.S. special operations forces (SOF) to combat terrorism. 

In FY 2014 DOD is undertaking, or expects to undertake, the following counterterrorism programs: 

1) Under the authority granted in Section 1208 of the NDAA for FY 2005 (Public 

Law 108–375), as amended, DOD expects to spend $28.5M for partners’ support of 

counterterrorism efforts in the Middle East and Africa. These funds are used to provide support to partner forces who are engaged in supporting or facilitating ongoing 

military operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) to combat terrorism. 

2) Under the authority granted in Section 1207 of the NDAA for FY 2012 (Public 

Law 112–81), as amended, DOD and the State Department expect to spend $7.75M 

to train and equip Libyan special operations forces to counter violent extremist organizations and better secure Libya’s borders against the illicit flow of weapons and 

foreign fighters. The State Department and DOD are also working to redesign a 

$14.89M GSCF program to improve Libyan border security adapted to accommodate 

the degraded political and security situation in Libya. Finally, DOD and the State 

Department recently notified a $40M GSCF program of assistance for Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria intended to counter Boko Haram. 

3) Under the authority granted in Section 1206 of the NDAA for FY 2006 (Public 

Law 109–63), as amended, DOD expects to spend $191.07M to build the capacity 

of national military forces, maritime security forces, and/or security forces in Middle 

East and African nations to conduct counterterrorism operations in FY 2014. As of 

16 September 2014, DOD has notified, but Congress has not approved, an additional 

$4.6M for Tunisia. These figures do not include costs associated with transportation, 

pre-shipment consolidation, or human rights vetting and training. 

4) Under the authority granted in Section 2011 of Title X, United States Code, 

DOD expects to spend $19.4M in support of enhancing U.S. SOF capability in foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare by training with partner nation 

forces in the Middle East and Africa. Although these funds are not explicitly used 

for training partner nations in counter-terrorism, the mission-essential tasks that 

U.S. SOF and partner nations use for interoperability training may be subsequently 

used to execute counter-terrorism missions. 

5) Under the authority granted in Section 2249c of Title X, United States Code, 

DOD expects to spend $14.9M for partner nations in the Middle East and Africa 

in support of targeted, non-lethal, combating terrorism education and training for 

mid- to senior-level international military officers, ministry of defense civilians, and 

security officials. These programs are designed to address key CbT challenges within partner nations through a tailored program of activities to meet specific Combatant Command objectives. 

6) Under the authority granted in Section 1203(d) (1) of the NDAA for FY 2012 

(Public Law 112–239), DOD expects to spend $75M in FY 2014 to enhance the capacity of the national military forces of Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Uganda 

participating in the African Union Mission in Somalia to conduct counterterrorism 

operations against al Qaeda, al Qaeda affiliates, and al Shabaab. 

7) Under the authority granted in Section 1022 of the NDAA for FY2004 (Public 

Law 108–136), as amended, DOD expects to spend $2.8M in support of law enforcement to identify and disrupt terrorist financial flows, and to implement BPC activities. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN 

Mr. COFFMAN. Looking at the President’s OCO request, of the $4 billion requested 

for the Syria Regional Stabilization Initiative, $500 million has been ‘‘vetted for elements of the Syrian opposition.’’ How has the Administration identified what groups 

qualify as an ‘‘opposition element’’? 
60 

Secretary WORK. The moderate Syrian opposition is not a monolithic group. The 

moderate Syrian opposition consists of a variety of groups, such as the Free Syrian 

Army, as well as other groups and individuals that also would undergo a deliberate 

vetting process. We anticipate that the train-and-equip program, which would be 

funded by the requested $500 million, will attract moderate opposition forces currently engaged in combat operations, but also volunteers that have not yet affiliated 

with a specific element of the moderate opposition. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Can you explain why the percentage of reduction for the OCO request from FY14 to FY15 (27.7%) was not more proportional to the percentage of 

troop reduction in Afghanistan for FY15 (74.7%)? 

Secretary WORK. The Department’s Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request supports direct and indirect costs associated with combat operations within 

Afghanistan. Although the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan will decline over 

the course of FY 2015, some war-related support costs will not decline as quickly 

as the forces themselves. In addition to providing combat support activities, the 

OCO request also supports In-Theater Support Activities (to include Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), Afghan Security Forces training and equipping, 

Coalition Support, and costs associated with returning the Military Services to the 

United States and retrograding their equipment. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KILMER 

Mr. KILMER. I understand that the Navy has assumed a liability of approximately 

$3 billion related to overseas contingency operations and that some 89 ships require 

dry-docking maintenance availabilities to correct the backlog of maintenance accrued during 1999 and 2009. If you could please describe the actions the Department has taken to ensure an appropriate level of staff and equipment at our public 

shipyards to conduct these resets. Additionally, please describe what actions the Department has taken to ensure that the private sector is ready to handle this increased level of effort. 

Secretary WORK. The Navy estimates that the backlog of maintenance on its ships 

will take approximately $1.3 billion over the Future Years Defense Program to correct. This backlog is specifically on surface ships, which conduct the majority of 

their depot-level maintenance availabilities in the private sector. As a result, there 

is no projected impact on the public shipyards. 

The impact to the private sector is minimized by conducting reset work during 

normally scheduled availabilities. Navy conducts detailed pre-availability inspections in an effort to accurately scope the work as early as possible. This helps the 

Navy and industry plan for the necessary manpower and resources to execute the 

desired workload. 

Mr. KILMER. As I am sure you are aware, this committee has taken a keen interest in the acquisition process and activities of the Department of Defense. Looking 

at the OCO budget, I am interested in understanding how much of the requested 

funds would be used for the acquisition of services not related to the maintenance 

and or restoration of combat equipment that was destroyed, damaged, stressed, or 

worn out beyond economic repair and how this differs from the FY 14 request? I 

am concerned with the stability of ongoing service contracts that are paid for with 

OCO funds. 

Secretary MCCORD. The FY 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request 

includes approximately $4.0 billion in contract services not related to the maintenance and repair of combat equipment. This represents a decrease of $4.6 billion 

from the FY 2014 enacted levels. The majority of these costs support ongoing intheater and CONUS operations providing contractor logistic support and base operations/facilities support. These contract services numbers do not include contracts 

in Afghanistan as these costs will continue to decline, and will not be enduring as 

the number of deployed service members continue to decrease. 

Æ