[ PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 18

- 10157

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 1:15

- cv - 01422

- AT

LUXOTTICA GROUP, S. p .A., an Italian corporation, OAKLEY, INC., a Washington corporation,

Plaintiffs

- Appellees Cross Appellants,

versus AIRPORT MINI MALL, LLC, a Georgia limited liability company, d.b.a. Old National Discount Mall, YES ASSETS, LLC, a Georgia limited liabi l ity company, CHIENJUNG YEH, a.k.a. Jerome C. Yeh, DONALD C. YEH, individually, JENNY YEH, ALICE JAMISON, Defendants

- Appellants Cross Appellees. Case: 18-10157 Date Filed: 08/07/2019 Page: 1 of 302 ________________________ Appeal s from the United States District Court for t he Northern District of Georgia

________________________ ( August 7, 2019 ) Before WILSON , JILL PRYOR and TALLMA N, * Circuit Judges. JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge: Luxury eyewear manufacturers hold ing registered trademarks brought a contributory trademark infrin gement action under the Lanham Act against owners of a discount mall whose sub tenant s were selling counterfeit eyewear. At trial , t he jury returned a verdict in the plaintiffs’ favor. After careful review and with the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that n one of the issues the d efendants raise on appeal demonstrates reversible error, so we affirm the jury’s verdict

. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff s Luxottica Group , S.p.A

. and its subsidiary Oakley, Inc. (collectively and individually “Luxottica”) manufacture and sell luxury eyewear and own registered trademarks for the Ray

- Ban and Oakley brands

. Defendants Jerome and Jenny Yeh own d efendant Yes Assets, LLC. In 2004, Yes Assets purchased the Old National Village Shopping Center in College Park, Georgia.

* Honorable Richard C. Tallman, United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. Case: 18-10157 Date Filed: 08/07/2019 Page: 2 of 303 The Shopping Center include d about 30 store fronts as well as a n approximately 79,000

- square - foot indoor space (the “Mall”) , which contain ed between 120 and 130 booths to lease to individual vendors

. Defendant Alice Jamison, the Yehs ’ daughter, manage d the Shopping Center. Her responsibilities include d review ing leases, collect ing rent, and visit ing the Shopping Center and Yes Assets’ tenants , including the lessee of the Mall

. Until December 1, 2009, Yes Assets leased the Mall to a tenant , who assign ed it to a subtenant , who subleased it to former Georgia congressman Pat Swindall, who in turn sub leased the booths to vendors. Fr om December 1, 2009 for ward , Yes Assets leased the Mall to d efendant Airport Mini Mall, LLC (“AMM”) , a company Jerome and Jenny created and later gave to their son , d efendant Donald Yeh , and t he Mall became known as the International Discount Mall , AMM’s tradename

. Under the lease agreement , Yes Assets provide d AMM and its subtenants (the vendo rs in the 120 to 130 booths) with a variety of services

— including lighting, water, sewerage, maintenance and repairs, painting, and cleaning

— and a parking area for customers. Greg Dickerson , whom Jerome hired as AMM’s property manager , sub leased the booths to vendors and reported
to Jamison and Jerome until 2013, when Jerome had a stroke, and to Jamison and Donald after ward

.

Case: 18-10157 Date Filed: 08/07/2019 Page: 3 of 304 AMM’s tenure as the Mall’s landlord saw three law enforcement raids there , during which officers executed search warrants , arrested sub tenants, and seized alleged counterfeit s of Luxottica eyew ear and other brands’ products

. After the first raid , law enforcement left a copy of the search warrant and a list of items seized , including eyewear bearing Luxottica’s marks, at the raided booth

. The second raid last ed more than 14 hours and involved approximately 30 federal and local law enforcement agents who shut down the M all to execute search warrants, arrested subtenant s for selling counterfeit goods , seized thousands of counterfeit items bearing Luxottica’s marks, and loaded the items o nto a tractor

- trailer parked in front of the Shopping Center

. Dickerson witnessed the second raid from the Shopping Center ’s parking lot and notified Jamison , Donald , and Jerome and Jenny ’ s attorney , Louis Bridges

. Dickerson later walked through the M all to compile a list of the booths where law enforcement had seized goods and informed Jamison, Jerome, and Bridges about his inquiries of sub tenants regarding the raid and whether they were selling counterfeit items

. E ach subtenant denied s elling counterfeit merchandise, but Jamison admitt ed that she would expect the subtenants to lie if they were selling counterfeit goods

. On Bridges’ advice, t he d efendants decided to take no action against the subtenant s unless the subtenants were convicted of a crime

. More than a year after Luxottica filed this lawsuit,

Case: 18-10157 Date Filed: 08/07/2019 Page: 4 of 305 police executed several more search warrants at the Mall and seized additional counterfeit items bearing Luxottica’s marks

. Luxottica twice sent letters notifying the d efenda nts that their sub tenants were not authorized to sell Luxottica ’s eyewear and that any mark resembling Ray

Ban or Oakley marks would indicate that the glasses w ere counterfeit

. The second letter also identified specific booths Luxottica suspected of selling counterfeit
eyewea r . Jamison and Donald w ere aware of both letters

. Dickerson visited the booths named in the second letter but made no attempt to determine whether th ose

ve ndors’ eyewear product s were counterfeit or to terminate their leases. After Luxottica filed this law suit, Jamison and Bridges attended a meeting at the College Park Police Department to discuss the unlawful selling of counterfeit product s at the M all

. Despite the raids, letters, and meeting with law enforcement, the d efendants took no steps to evict the infring ing subtenant s ; they even renewed leases with several of the sub tenants who had been arrested during the 14

- plus

- hour raid. In the month leading up to the filing of this law suit , Isabel Rozo, an employee of Luxottica’s private investigator Geanie Johansen, purchased and photographed $15 and $20 counterfeit Ray

- Ban glasse s at several booths. Ray

- Ban glasses norma lly retail for $1 4 0 to $2 2 0 a pair.

Case: 18-10157 Date Filed: 08/07/2019 Page: 5 of 306 Luxottica sued the d efendants for contributory trademark infringement under § 32 of the Lanham Act , 15 U.S.C. § 1114

. The district court denied the d efendants ’ motions in limine to exclude evidence , except for their second motion , which it granted in part to limit the evidence Luxottica could introduce regarding sales at the Mall of counterfeit non - Luxottica brands and counterfeit sales that occurred before AMM took over as the Mall’s landlord

. After an 11

- day trial , the jury returned a special verdict hol ding all d efendants except Jenny liable for contributory trademark infringement and assess ing $100,000 in damages for each infringed trademark , totaling $1.9 million in damages . Having moved for judgment as a matter of law a fter the close of all the evidence , the d efendants renewed their motion, which the district court denied. The d efendants appeal the jury verdict, a portion of the district court’s instructions to the jury regarding the application of Georgia landlord

- tenant law , and the district court’s denials of their motions in limine and renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 (b)

. 1

1 The defendants appeal the denial of their first motion for judgment as a matter of law made under Rul e 50(a), but because the only way to preserve a Rule 50(a) motion is to renew it under Rule 50(b), we review only the denial of their renewed motion under Rule 50(b). The defendants also appeal the district court’s submission to the jury of the amount of statutory damages to be award ed

. B ecause they make no argument about th e statutory damages issue in their briefs on appea l, however, we deem it abandoned. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co. , 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014). We grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss the cross

- appeal because Luxottica has abandoned it.

Case: 18-10157 Date Filed: 08/07/2019 Page: 6 of 307 II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW We review de novo questions of law, such as the legal standard for liability for contributory trademark infringement. U.S. S ec . & E xch

. C omm’n v. Big Apple Consulting USA, Inc. , 783 F.3d 786, 795 (11th Cir. 2015). We also review de novo a district court’s denial of a Rule 50(b) motion. Id. at 813. “Judgm ent as a matter of law is appropriate only if the facts and inferences point overwhelmingly in favor of one party, such that reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary verdict.” Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Exel, Inc. , 884 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) , cert. denied , 139 S. Ct. 1373 (2019)

. “We consider all the evidence, and the inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“W e will not second

- guess the jury or substitute our judgment for its judgment if its verdict is supported by sufficient evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)

. O rders denying motions in limine are reviewed for abuse of discretion

. Kropilak v. 2 1st Century Ins. Co. , 806 F.3d 1062, 1067 (11th Cir. 2015) . Under that standard, we will reverse a district court’s ruling “ only if the court applie [d] an incorrect legal standard, follow [ed] improper procedures in making the determination, or ma [d] e [] findings of fact that are clearly erroneous

. ” I d. (internal Case: 18-10157 Date Filed: 08/07/2019 Page: 7 of 308 quotation marks omitted) . T he movant must also establish “substantial prejudicial effect

. ” Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co. , 513 F.3d 1261, 1276 (11th Cir. 2008). This Court review s jury instru ctions de novo to determine whether they

“ misstate the law or mislead the jury to the prejudice of the objecting party. ” Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo

. Ass’n , 765 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although our review is de novo , w e will

reverse based on a district court’s jury instructions “ only where we are left with a substantial and ineradicable doubt as to whether the district court properly guided the jury. ” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
We affirm the district court on each issue appealed. The district court (1) correctly determin ed that the evidence was sufficient

— even under the legal standard the defendants urge us to adopt

— to support the jury’s verdict finding the defendants liable for contributory trademark infringement ; (2) committed no reversible error in instructing the jury; (3) correctly determined that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict on each def endant’s individual liability; and ( 4 ) did not abuse its discretion in the challenged evidentiary rulings

. A. Luxottica Presented Sufficient Evidence to Sustain the Jury’s Verdict on Contributory Trademark Infringement . Under the Lanham Act, the owner of a registered trademark may hold someone contributorially liable for trademark infringement if that person induces

Case: 18-10157 Date Filed: 08/07/2019 Page: 8 of 309 or knowingly facilitates the infringement

. The d efendants argue that the district court should have followed the reasoning of a Second Circuit case that they believe impo sed a tough er knowledge requirement for contributory trademark infringement claim s . Under that court’s reasoning , the d efendants argue , the evidence was insufficient to prove that they had the requisite knowledge of , or demonstrated willful blindness to , their sub tenants’ direct infringement. We disagree and affirm the district court’s denial of the d efendants’ Rule 50 (b) motion

. First, w e explain the elements of the contributory trademark infringement cause of action

. Second , b ecause the defendants do not contest that landlords may be held contributorially liable for their (sub)tenants’ direct trademark infringement, we assume without deciding that contributory liability for trademark infringement
exte nds to the landlord

- tenant context. Third , we resolve the defendants’ argument about the proper legal standard by assum ing without deciding that liability for contributory trademark infringement requires that the defendant have knowledge of specific acts of direct infringement. Even under this standard, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict because the d efendants had a t least constructive knowledge of their sub tenants’ direct infringement

. 1. Contributory Liability Under the Lanham Act
The contributory trademark infringement cause of action stems from the application of “basic tort liability concepts to determine the scope of liability”

Case: 18-10157 Date Filed: 08/07/2019 Page: 9 of 3010 under the Lanham Act. Duty Free Americas, Inc. v. Estée Lauder Cos. , 797 F.3d 1248, 1276 (11th Cir. 2 015) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2 T he Supreme
Court first acknowledged the existence of this cause of action in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc. , 456 U.S. 844 (1982)

. In that case,

m anufacturers had supplied pharmacists with a generic version of a drug whose brand name was trademark ed

. Id. at 846

- 48. S ome pharmacists had infringed the brand name manufacturer’s mark by mislabel ing bottles containing generic capsules as containing brand name capsules. Id. at 848

- 51, 854. But instead of suing th e infringing pharmacists, t he brand name manufacturer sued the generic manufacturers, id. at 846

- 47 , 849

- 51 , prompting the Supreme Court to re cognize in the Lanham Act a cause of action for contributory infringement: “ if a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributo rially responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit.” Id. at 854. 3

2 The plain text of § 32 of the Lanham Act prohibits only direct infringement: a person may not “ use” or “reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark .

. . in connection with the sale .

. . of goods or services ” if such use “is likely to cause confusion.” 15 U .S.C. § 1114(1). 3 The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in the generic manufacturers’ fav or, holding that the Court of Appeals should not have disturbed the district court’s findings that the generic

Case: 18-10157 Date Filed: 08/07/2019 Page: 10 of 3011 A claim for contributory trademark infringement thus has two elements: (1) a person or entity commits direct trademark infringement under the Lanham Act; and (2) the defendant (a) “intentionally induces” th e direct infringer to commit infringement, (b) supplies a “product” to the direct infringer whom it “knows” is directly infrin ging (actual knowledge), or (c) supplies a “product” to the direct infringer whom it “has reason to know” is directly infringing (constructive knowledge). See id. The defendants do not c hallenge the first element

— the jury’s finding of direct infringement by their subtenants

. As to the second element, Luxottica proceed ed on a knowledge rather than an intentional inducement theory, so o nly the actual and constructive knowledge prongs of the second element are at issue in this appeal

. In suppo rt of its theory that the defendants had at least constructive knowledge of their subtenants’ infringement, Luxottica presented evidence tending to show that the defendants exhibited willful blindness to the subtenants’ unlawful conduct. Across the circui ts, a consensus has developed that willful blindness is one way to show that a defendant had constructive knowledge in cases of contributory trademark infringement

. See Coach, Inc. v. Goodfellow , 717 F.3d 498, 503, 505 (6th Cir. 2013); Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v . eBay Inc. , 600 F.3d 93, 109

- 10

manufacturers had not “ suggested, even by implication, tha t pharmacists should dispense generic drugs incorrectly identified as ” the brand name d rug. Inwood , 456 U.S. at 852, 856

- 58.

Case: 18-10157 Date Filed: 08/07/2019 Page: 11 of 3012 (2d Cir. 2010); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc. , 76 F.3d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1996); Hard Rock Caf e Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc. , 955 F.2d 1143, 1149, 1151 n.5 (7th Cir. 1992) ; see also United States v. B axter Int’l, Inc. , 345 F.3d 866, 902 (11th Cir. 2003) ( holding, in the context of the Medicare Secondary Payer statute, that “ [a] party that willfully blinds itself to a fact .

. . can be charged with constructive knowledge of that fact”)

. Willful blindness occurs when a person “suspect[s] wrongdoing and deliberately fail[s] to investigate.” Hard Rock Cafe , 955 F.2d at 1149. We a gree with the other circuits that willful blindness is a form of constructive knowledge for contributory trademark infringement. We evaluate the strength of Luxottica’s evidence regarding willful blindness and constructive knowledge in Part III.A.3. 2. Landl ord Liab ility for Contributory Trademark Infringement Whether contributory liability for trademark infringement extends to the landlord

- tenant context is a question of first impression for this Court. The defendants in Inwood supplied the very product the direct infringers mislabeled with the plaintiff’s trade mark. 456 U.S. at 846

- 50

. In contrast, the d efendants in this case supplied services and support

— such as space, utilities, maintenance, and parking

— that facilitated the direct infringers’ sale of counterfeit goods

. In this
case, t he defendants do not contest th at Inwood ’s contributory trademark infringement cause of action may be applied to the landlord

- tenant context. We

Case: 18-10157 Date Filed: 08/07/2019 Page: 12 of 3013 therefore assume without deciding that a landlord may be contributorially liable for its (sub)tenants’ direct trademark infringement if the landlord intentionally induces the infringement or knows or has reason to know of the infringement while supplying a service (such as space, utilities, or maintenance) that facilitates it

. 4
3. The Evidence Was Sufficient t o Prove That the Defendants Had at Least Constructive Knowledge of Specific Acts of Infringement. Pursuing a knowledge theory of contributory trademark infringement, Luxottica sought to prove that the defendants knew or had reason to know that their subtenants were selling counterfeit items yet continued to supply services (space, utilities, maintenance, and parking) that enabled th e subtenants to sell their goods. The question that arises

— another one of first impression for this Court

— is

w hether the knowledge theory of contributory liability requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of specific infringing a cts. We need not answer this question , however, because even if

4 We note that t hree circuits have applied Inwood to owners of flea markets whose tenant s sold counterfeit goods. See Hard Rock Cafe , 955 F.2d at 1148

- 49; Fonovisa , 76 F.3d at 265 (citing Hard Rock Cafe ); Coach , 717 F.3d at 503

- 04 (citing Hard Rock Cafe and Fonovisa )

. Such a result is also consistent with the general tort liability principles upon which Inwood ’s analysis rested. See Duty Free Americas , 797 F.3d at 1276 (“[T]he Lanham Act is derived generally a nd purposefully from the common law tort of unfair competition .

. . . In construing the Act, then, courts routinely have recognized the propriety of examining basic tort liability concepts to determine the scope of liability.” (internal quotation marks o mitted)); see also Restatement ( Secon d) of Torts § 877(c) ( Am. Law Inst. 1979) ( June 201 9 Westlaw update) ( “ For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious con d uct of another, one is subject to liability if he .

. . permits the other to act upon his premises or with his instrumentalities, knowing or having reason to know that the other is acting or will act tort i ously. ” ) ; id. cmt.d

.

Case: 18-10157 Date Filed: 08/07/2019 Page: 13 of 3014 liability for contributory trademark infringement requires the defendant to have knowledge of specific acts of direct infringement, the evidence in this case was sufficie nt for a reasonable jury to find that the d efendants had at least constructive knowledge of (or were willfully blind to) specific acts of direct infringement by their sub tenants. The defendants argue that the district court should have applied what they deem a stricter standard from Tiffany (NJ) v. eBay Inc. , 600 F.3d 9 3 (2d Cir. 2010) , in ruling on their renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. In Tiffany , the jewelry titan sued the online listing service eBay for contributory trademark infringement because vendors listed counterfeit Tiffany products for sale on eBay’s website. Id. at 96

- 97. Whenever Tiffany notified eBay of a direct infringer’s identity , eBay de listed th e vendor within 24 hours. Id. at 99. But , by itself , eBay was unable to identify and block each direct infringer, even with 200 employees focused on that task, because its website co ntain ed 100 million listings , and eBay lacked the ability to inspect goods in person and the expertise to distinguish Tiffany products from non

- Tiffany products

. Id. at 97

- 98. “F or contributory tradem ark infringement liability to lie ,” the Second Circuit held, “ a service provider must have more than a general knowledge or reason to know that its service is being used to sell counterfeit goods. Some contemporary knowledge of which particular listings a re infringing or will infringe in the future is

Case: 18-10157 Date Filed: 08/07/2019 Page: 14 of 3015 necessary.” Id. at 107. Because Tiffany’s demand letters identified no additional sellers of counterfeit goods other than th e sellers eBay had already delisted , eBay lacked actual or constructive knowledge of the remaining direct infringers

. T he
court thus upheld the bench trial verdict in favor of eBay. Id. at 96, 109. The defendants articulate Tiffany ’s legal standard for contributory trademark infringement as whether “Plaintiffs provide[d] notice to Defendants that a particular seller was then selling counterfeit versions of Pla i ntiffs’ product.” Appellants’ Initial Br. at 22 (internal quotation marks omitted)

. The defendants

err , though , in asserting that Tiffany narrowed the sources of a defendant ’s actual

or constructive knowledge to just one: notice by the trademark holders. Tiffany did not categorically shift the burden onto trademark holders to provide notice to defendants ; it simply clarified that certain facts of the case

— a marketplace of 100 million listings and eBay’s inability to inspect goods in person and lack of expertise to distinguish Tiffany from non

- Tiffany jewelry

— made it unlikely that eBay could identify the infringing vendors on its own, without help from Tiffany. Tiffany , 600 F.3d at 97

- 98, 109. In argu ing that it was Luxottica’s burden to notify the defendants of the infringing subtenants’ identities, the defendants fail to acknowledge that actual or constructive knowledge of the direct infringers’ identities could aris e from many sources, including steps the defendants could have taken to investigat e alleged direct infringement at the Mall after being put on

Case: 18-10157 Date Filed: 08/07/2019 Page: 15 of 3016 notice by Luxottica that unnamed subtenants’ may have been selling co unterfeit Luxottica products

. In any event, we need not decide today whether a defendant must be found to have had knowledge of specific acts of direct infringement for contributory liability to attach

. Even if specific knowledge is necessary, t he trial evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendants had at least constructive knowledge of specific instances where their subtenants infringed Luxottica’s marks. Unlike in Tiffany , the d efendants here did not need Luxottica’s help to identify th e infringing sub tenants. A lthough Inwood create d “ no affirmative duty to take precautions against the sale of counterfeits,” Hard Rock Caf e , 955 F.2d at 1149, the jury reasonably could have found that Luxottica’s notice letters would have prompted a

reaso nable landlord to do at least a cursory visual inspection of the M all’s 1 30 booths to determine which vendors display ed eyewear with Luxottica’s marks and

s old it at prices low enough

— $15 or $20 a pair for glasses that typically retail at $1 4 0 to $2 2 0 a pair

— to alert a reasonable person t hat it was counterfeit

. 5 Similarly, the jury reasonably could have found that a cursory visual inspection of 130 booths to see if they displayed what appeared to be counterfeit Luxottica

5 O ne of Luxottica’s witnesses acknowledged that the re is a leg itimate secondary market for Ray

- Ban and Oakley eyewear, so the statements in L uxottica’s letters that the Mall’s tenants were unauthorized retailers w ere of limited use to the defendants. Nevertheless , the jury reasonably could have foun d that the d efendants kn ew or should have know n t hat $15 and $20 eyewear bearing Ray

- Ban trademarks was counterfeit.

Case: 18-10157 Date Filed: 08/07/2019 Page: 16 of 3017 eyewear wa s not so burdensome as to relieve the defendants of the responsibility to investigat e after being informed by Luxottica that unnamed subte nants may have been engaging in illegal activity. What’s more , previously we have held that evidence of “serious and widespread” infringement makes it more likely that a defendant knew about the infringement. Mini Maid Servs. Co. v. Maid Brigade Sys., Inc

. , 967 F.2d 1516, 1522 (11th Cir. 1992). T he three law enforcement raids

— one of which lasted over 14 hours and required a tractor

- trailer to haul away the seized merchandise

— evidence d “serious and widespread” violations that gave the d efendants a t least constructive knowledge that their subtenants were selling counterfeit goods

. Id

. After the 14

- plus

- hour raid, Dickerson, the d efendants’ property manager , walked through the M all ; compiled a list of booths where law enforcement had seized goods ; an d informed Jerome, Jamison, and Bridges about his conversations with sub tenants regarding the raid and whether they were selling counterfeit products

. T he record evidence of (1) t he raids, arrests, and seizures , ( 2 ) the meeting at the College Park Police Department Jamison and Bridges attended where they discussed the sale of counterfeit goods at the Mall , and ( 3 ) the d efendants’ ability to visually inspect the approximately 130 booths was, taken together , sufficient to support a jury finding that the d efendants had a t least constructive knowledge of ,

Case: 18-10157 Date Filed: 08/07/2019 Page: 17 of 3018 or were willfully blind to learning , which sub tenants were direct ly infring ing Luxottica’s trademarks

. In sum, evidence of the defendants’ knowledge of specific infringing acts by sub tenants who relied on the services the defendants provided (including space, utilities, and maintenance) amply support ed the jury verdict

. T he district court did not err in de nying the defendants’ Rule 50(b) motion.
B. The District Court Made No Reversible Error in Instruct ing the Jury. The defendants take issue with two of the district court’s instruction s to the jury

. W e discern no reversible error in either one

. First , t he defendants protest the district court’s instruction to the jury that Georgia law permits landlords to evict commercial tenants without resort to legal proceedings where the tenant has contractually waived its right to those procedural protections

. See Ru cker v. Wynn , 441 S.E.2d 417 , 419 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) , disapproved on other grounds by George v. Hercules Real Estate Servs., Inc. , 795 S.E.2d 81, 89 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016)

. The defendants contend that Rucker is inapposite because in that case , the tenant’s nonpayment of rent constituted a clear default under the lease

. Rucker , 441 S.E.2d at 419. But here, the defendants assert, they lacked clear evidence of their subtenants’ defaults

. The y argu e that without clear evidence of their subtenants’ de faults, the y could have been sued for

Case: 18-10157 Date Filed: 08/07/2019 Page: 18 of 3019 wrongful eviction had they attempted “to use self

- help to evict [their] [sub]tenants.” Appellants’ Initial Br. at 46.
Yet t he defendants ’ contention that they lacked clear evidence of their subtenants’ defaults belies the evidence presented at trial and ignores the provisions in AMM’s sublease s that would have permitt ed the defendants to evict infringing subtenants. AMM’s standard sublease agreement provided that a “[v]erified written complaint[]” that a subtenant was selling counterfeit goods would constitute an “immediate breach” of the lease and au t horize AMM to dispossess the subtenant “immediately.” Doc. 162

- 12 at 21. 6 Bridges , Jerome and Jenny’s counsel, acknowledged at trial that a search warrant accompanied by a sworn affidavit would qualify as a “[v]erified written complaint[]

. ” 7 Id. The jury reasonably could have found that the defendants could have sought copies of search warra nts executed during the raids

— one of which was left at the booth targeted by the first raid

— to obtain proof of their subtenants’ defaults. Even if law enforcement had refused to provide copies of the search
warrants, the defendants had another tool at thei r disposal. AMM’s standard sublease agreement also provided that a subtenant’s failure to comply with trademark law would constitute a default on the sublease. Thus , the jury

6 “Doc. #” refers to the numbered entry on the district court’s docket.
7 Bridges did not represent the defendants at trial. Case: 18-10157 Date Filed: 08/07/2019 Page: 19 of 3020 reasonably could have found that the defendants could have photographed the boo ths displaying counterfeit Luxottica

- brand eyewear for sale

— just as Rozo, the employee of Luxottica’s private investigator Johansen , did

— which would have assist ed the defendants in establish ing that their subtenants were in breach of their subleases

. U pon a sub tenant’s first default under the sublease agreement , AMM could evict the subtenant and retake possession of the booth after providing five days’ notice ; no notice was necessary for a subsequent default

. Likewise, Yes Assets’ lease wit h AMM required AMM to “comply with all applicable laws,” and failure to do so would constitute a default on the lease , entitling Yes Assets to terminate the lease and immediately assume possession of the Mall. Doc. 162

- 9 at 7 , 31

. AMM’s continued provisi on of services to the infringing subtenants despite having at least constructive knowledge of their infringement violated the Lanham Act. See Part III.A.3. In turn, AMM’s continuing support of infringing subtenants put it in default of its lease with Yes Assets and gave Yes Assets grounds to terminate the lease and dispossess AMM. As part of their conten tion that they lacked clear evidence of their subtenants’ breaches of the subleases, t he defendants further argue that Luxottica’s notice letters were nothing more than unsubstantiated hearsay insufficient to provide clear evidence of breaches

. We reject this argument as well . F or one thing , the defendants never objected at trial to the letters’ admission. For another ,

Case: 18-10157 Date Filed: 08/07/2019 Page: 20 of 3021 the letters were admissible for their effect on the recipient, not for the truth of the matter asserted , so they were n o t hearsay . Fed. R. Evid. 801(c ). And even without these letters, the jury reasonably could have found that the search warrants or photographs of counterfeit eyewear on display would have provided the defendants with clear evidence of their subtenants’ breach es of their subleases.
Seco nd, t he defendants protest the district court’s instruction that the jury could find that the defendants had the ability to control their subtenants’ activities in the Mall if “Airport Mini Mall, LLC, Yes Assets, LLC, Jerome Yeh, Jenny Yeh, Donald Yeh, and /or Alice Jamison possessed the right, ability[,] or authority to control either (i) the use of the physical retail space that it rented at the Discount Mall, or (ii) the activities that any of its vendors could engage in while occupying such space at the Discount Mall.” Doc. 155 at 17 (emphasis added). Essentially, the defendants object on appeal to the district court’s use of “and/or.” The defendants easily could have requested that the district court fix this conjunction, but they forfeited this objec tion by failing to raise it to the district court. Even if they had preserved it, however, the district court’s instruction was not reversible error. Although AMM was the Mall’s sole landlord, a corporation may act only through its agents. See United Te chs. Corp. v. Mazer , 556 F.3d 1260, 1271 (11th Cir. 2009). The district court’s instructions could have been more precise by explaining , based on our above descriptions of AMM’s standard sublease

Case: 18-10157 Date Filed: 08/07/2019 Page: 21 of 3022 agreement and Yes Assets’ lease with AMM, that (1) Jerome, Jenny, and Donald were agents of AMM with the power to evict infringing subtenants; and (2) Yes Assets and its manager Jamison could have evicted AMM for failing to evict the infringing subtenants. But without any “substantial and ineradicable” se nse that the district court’s imprecise instruction misled the jury or prejudiced the defendants, we will not reverse. Bhogaita , 765 F.3d at 1285.
We find no reversible error in either of the challenged jury instructions

. C. The Evidence Was Sufficient to Su pport the Jury’s Verdict on the Individual Defendants’ Liability for Contributory Infringement. The defendants contest the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict holding Jerome, Donald, and Jamison individually liable for contributory
t rademark infringement. Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Luxottica, as we must in reviewing the denial of the defendants’ Rule 50(b) motion, Exel , 884 F.3d at 1329, we conclude that t he evidence was sufficient to show that these three defendants had at least constructive knowledge of direct infringement by subtenants who relied on the services they provided

. Jerome was copied on e

- mails between Swindall , who leased the Mall from Yes Assets up until December 2009, and the College Park Police Department regarding alleged sales of counterfeit goods at the M all in 2008 . The jury could infer from Swindall’s testimony that these e

- mails would have put a reasonable landlord on notice to watch out for sales of counterfei t goods, including goods

Case: 18-10157 Date Filed: 08/07/2019 Page: 22 of 3023 bearing Luxottica ’s marks. Jerome was also informed about Dickerson’s conversations with subtenants after the 14

- plus

- hour raid that took place during
AMM ’s tenure as the Mall’s landlord . Donald admitted he knew about Luxottica’s notice letters and widespread sales of counterfeit merchandise

. And Jamison, who managed the Shopping Center, knew about Luxottica’s notice letters and at least one of the raids and attended a meeting at the College Park Police Department after this laws uit was filed to discuss the sale of counterfeit products at the M all. 8
D. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Its Evidentiary Rulings. The defendants appeal five sets of the district court’s evidentiary rulings. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in any of these rulings. First, the defendants argue that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony of and counterfeit eyewear obtained by Rozo, an employee of Johansen, who was the investigato r Luxottica hired to make undercover

8 The d efendants argue that Luxottica failed to pierce the corporate veil under Georgia law and show that the individual defendants were the “moving, active, conscious force[s]” behind their subtenants’ i nfringement. Appellants’ Initial Br. at 55 (internal quotation marks omitted). But Luxottica need ed to prove only the elements of contributory trademark infringement: (1) direct infringement by a third party and (2) either intentionally inducing the dir ect infringement or providing a product or service to the direct infringer despite having actual or constructive knowledge of the direct infringement. The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Luxottica established both elements as to Jerome, Donald, and Jamison

. Piercing the corporate veil is irrelevant to proving individual contributory liability, as is demonstrating that the defendants were the “moving, active, conscious force[s]” behind their subtenants ’ infringement, which is the standard for imposing individual liability for direct , not contributory , infringement. Chanel, Inc. v. Italian Activewear of Fla., Inc. , 931 F.2d 1472, 1477

- 78 (11th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted)

.

Case: 18-10157 Date Filed: 08/07/2019 Page: 23 of 3024 purchases and take photographs of counterfeit eyewear at the M all . They assert that Rozo’s testimony was unduly prejudicial because the destruction of her contemporaneous notes hindered both her ability to give reliabl e testimony and their ability to cross

- examine her. 9 We reject the defendants’ contention because th e e - mails Rozo sent to Johansen within 24 hours of her visits to the Mall provided a near

- contemporaneous account, and we have found no case hold ing that destruction of a witness’s contemporaneous notes

— especially when not done in bad faith

— requires the ha rsh sanction of complete exclusion of the witness’s testimony. Excluding evidence as unduly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 “is an extraordinary remedy [that] should be used sparingly,” and, in applying the rule, “courts must look at the ev idence in a light most favorable to admission.” Aycock v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. , 769 F.3d 1063, 1069 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). We are hard

- pressed to say that any “unfair prejudice” caused by Rozo’s testimony and the admiss ion into evidence of the eyewear she obtained and the photographs she took at the Mall “substantially

9 Luxottica argues that the defendants fa iled to preserve their objection to the admission of Rozo’s testimony and the eyewear she purchased at the Mall. Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence , we need not decide whether the defendants preserved th is objection or, if not, whether the district court com mitted plain error . The defendants have abandoned the argument they made to the district court about spoliation of evidence because they make no such argument in their briefs on appeal. See Sapuppo , 739 F.3d at 681

.

Case: 18-10157 Date Filed: 08/07/2019 Page: 24 of 3025 outweighed” their “probative value.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Moreover, the defendants were able to use cross

- examination to undermine Rozo’s testimony and th at of another Luxottica witness by demonstrating that these witnesses could not determine whether the counterfeit eyewear and photos of counterfeit eyewear displayed for sale that were presented to the jury came from the defendants’ mall or a different mal l. Second, the defendants protest the district court’s rearrangement of Exhibit 646, a collection of counterfeit glasses Rozo purchased at the Mall and the bags associated with each pair of glasses. 10 As we understand it, shortly after Rozo purchased each pair of glasses, she placed them in plastic bags and affixed stickers showing the number of the booth that sold her the glasses. 11 During the trial, three witnesses handled the exhibit, and somehow the glasses got placed into the wrong bags. 12 When counsel for both sides were unable to agree on how to restore the

10 Luxottica argues that the defendants also failed to prese rve their objection on this issue. Again, b ecause we determine that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rearranging the exhibit , we need not decide whether the defendants preserved th is objection or, if not, whether the district court com mi tted plain error

. 11 The record leaves unclear whether Rozo or Mall vendors supplied the bags. In addition, the trial transcript suggests that Rozo was inconsistent about putting the stickers on the glasses versus the bags, and she also testified that the stickers sometimes fell off, both of which may have contributed to the glasses becoming disassociated from their bags. 12 Rozo handled the exhibit first, then Johansen, then Luxottica’s director of intellectual property for the Americas. Twice

— during Johan sen’s testimony and after the director’s testimony

— it emerged that the glasses were no longer in the proper bags, but it is unclear how this happened. To resolve this issue, we need not determine how the glasses became separated from their proper bags.

Case: 18-10157 Date Filed: 08/07/2019 Page: 25 of 3026 exhibit, the district court rearranged the exhibit’s contents outside of the presence of the jury and counsel to ensure that each pair of glasses was placed in the correct bag before making the exh ibit available to the jury for its deliberations. Citing no authority, the defendants argue that determining the proper relationship between the glasses and the bags was a job for the jury, not the judge. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rearranging the exhibit because t rial judges retain discretion “to enable the jury to hear [and examine] the evidence in a clear, orderly and methodical manner .” United States v. Watson , 466 F.2d 549, 550 (5th Cir. 1972)

. 13 And even if the district court abused its discretion in reorganizing the exhibit outside of the presence of the jury and counsel, the d efendants do not argue that the district court re organized the exhibit erroneously or in a way that prejudiced them, so any error was harmless. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111; Fed. R. Civ. P. 61

. Third, the defendants object to the admission of evidence of supposed counterfeit sales that took place before AMM’s assumption of the Mall’s lease, arguing that this evidence was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. But evidence of “serious and widespread” sales of counterfeit goods increases the likelihood that the defendant s knew about and failed to stop the infringement of Luxottica’s

13 Decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered before the close of business on September 30, 1981 are binding on this Court

. See Bonner v. City of Prichard , 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

Case: 18-10157 Date Filed: 08/07/2019 Page: 26 of 3027 marks

. See Mini Maid , 967 F.2d at 1522. Apart from Swindall’s testimony, which we address below, the only other evidence of pre

- December 2009 counterfeit sales that the defendants challenge is Luxottica’s questioning of Jamison and Dickerson regarding what they knew about alleged infringement at the Mall before AMM’s assumption of the lease. To lay an evidentiary foundation for the defendants’ knowledge of pre

- December 2009 counterfeit sales, the district court permitted Luxottica to cross

- examine the individual defendants on this topic. When Jamison and Dickerson denied knowledge of the pre

- December 2009 allegations, Luxottica ended these lines of questioning. Given the limited questions posed to Jamison and Dickerson, we disagree that any prejudice introduced by these questions “substantial ly outweighed” their significant “probative value

. ” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Fourth, the defendants object to the admission of evidence of alleged infringement of non

- Luxottica brands, arguing that this evidence was also irrelevant and unduly prejudicial because Luxottica failed to show that the non

Luxottica goods were actually co unterfeit. Yet the jury reasonably could have inferred that even mere allegations of counterfeit sales of non

- Luxottica products should have alerted the defendants to watch out for infringement of Luxottica’s brands, so this evidence was relevant to the j ury’s determination of liability. Further, in ruling on the defendants’ second motion in limine, the district court required Luxottica to ensure that the evidence of infringement of non

- Luxottica

Case: 18-10157 Date Filed: 08/07/2019 Page: 27 of 3028 products did not outweigh the evidence it presented of infr ingement of its own products. The defendants make no argument that the evidence of infringement of

non - Luxottica brands predominated over evidence of infringement of Luxottica brands. In addition , the district court gave the jury a limiting instruction t hat it could not find the defendants liable based solely on evidence of alleged infringement of other brands, a straightforward instruction “that the jury could easily understand and take to heart.” United States v. Mateos , 623 F.3d 1350, 1365 (11th Cir. 2010). “We presume that a jury follows the instructions given to it by the district court,” and the defendants “ha[ve] offered nothing to rebut this presumption.” Wilbur v. Corr. Servs. Corp. , 393 F.3d 1192, 1201 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation mark s omitted). Because the defendants have not demonstrated the ir entitle ment to the “extraordinary remedy” of exclusion of all evidence of infringement of other brands under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, the district court did not abuse its discretion in ad mitting this evidence. Aycock , 769 F.3d at 1069 (internal quotation marks omitted). Fifth, the defendants object to the testimony from Swindall, the Mall’s landlord prior to December 2009, because Luxottica failed to name Swindall in the pretrial witness list as a rebuttal witness and, according to the defendants, his testimony was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial

. Neither reason persuades us.

“ R ebuttal witnesses are a recognized exception to all witness disclosure

Case: 18-10157 Date Filed: 08/07/2019 Page: 28 of 3029 requirements,” United States v. Windha m , 489 F.2d 1389, 1392 (5th Cir. 1974), and “[t]he trial judge has broad discretion in determining whether to admit evidence and witnesses not included in pretrial orders,” Calamia v. Spivey , 632 F.2d 1235, 1237 (5th Cir. Unit A 1980); see also Travelers I ns. Co. v. Dykes , 395 F.2d 747, 749 (5th Cir. 1968) (“Much considered and wise discretion must be accorded to a district judge as [s]he deals with the infinite variables of evidence.”). Swindall testified regarding e

- mails between law enforcement and hims elf, on which Jerome was copied, about a raid that took place before the defendants took over as the Mall’s landlord. As the district court recognized, Swindall’s testimony and the e

- mails were probative of Jerome’s (and possibly other defendants’) actual or constructive knowledge of the infringement of Luxottica’s marks after AMM became the Mall’s landlord

— an important element of Luxottica’s claim that Jerome and other defendants were contributorially liable. And the district court limited Swindall’s tes timony to the e

- mails and any conversations he had with Jerome about the e

- mails. Given the district court’s wide discretion regarding evidentiary matters, the probative value of Swindall’s testimony to Luxottica’s case, and the limited nature of his test imony, we conclude that the district court committed no abuse of discretion in permitting him to testify. 14

14 A lthough the defendants repeatedly emphasize that Swindall had previous perjury convictions, they cite no authority suggesting that the district court had to exclude his testimony based on that fact. See United States v. Swindall , 971 F.2d 1531, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992). The

Case: 18-10157 Date Filed: 08/07/2019 Page: 29 of 3030 We affirm the district court’s rulings on each evidentiary issue that the defendants appeal. IV. CONCLUSION The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict hol ding the d efendants liable for contributory trademark infringement under the Lanham Act

. Concluding that the district court made no reversible error regarding any of the issues the defendants su bmit for our review , we affirm

. AFFIRMED.

district court p roperly permitted the defendants significant cross

- examination regarding Swindall’s perjury convictions, as allowed by Federal Rule of Evidence 609(b) where the witness was convicted and released from confinement more than 10 years earlier. The defendants ’ cross

- examination fully informed the jury as to reasons why they might doubt his credibility , and the jury was entitled to assess his credibility as it saw fit. See J & H Auto Trim Co. v. Bellefonte Ins. Co. , 677 F.2d 1365, 1366, 1375

- 76 (11th Cir. 1982 ) (reinstating jury verdict, despite trial judge’s disbelief of witnesses’ testimony, because making “credibility choices” is “precisely what juries are for”).

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