United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 21-2642

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Philip Maccani, also known as Phillip Maccani

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

 ____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids

 ____________

 Submitted: April 13, 2022

Filed: September 20, 2022

____________

Before SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and GRASZ, Circuit Judges. 

____________

SMITH, Chief Judge. 

 Philip Maccani pleaded guilty to one count of possession of an unregistered

National Firearms Act firearm, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5861(d), and 5871.
On appeal, Maccani argues that the district court1

 erred in denying his motion to

suppress evidence obtained from the trailer he occupied. We affirm.

I. Background

When a storm caused Maccani’s neighbors to experience a power outage, the

neighbors attempted to start a generator to provide power to his house. Disturbed by

the generator’s noise, Maccani entered his neighbor’s property and, according to the

neighbors, yelled at them and threatened them. Maccani’s behavior so startled his

neighbors that they retreated into their residence and called the police.

Two officers, Deputies Dylan Schmid and Heath Omar, of the Linn County

Sheriff’s Office, arrived shortly thereafter. They found Maccani standing near the side

door of his trailer, which was parked next to Elkhorn Drive. Maccani explained to the

officers that he was frustrated with his neighbors for running their generator while he

was trying to play guitar. One officer saw Maccani “holding a firearm in his right

hand and attempting to conceal the firearm behind the doorjamb.” R. Doc. 61, at 4.

He directed Maccani to show his concealed hand. Maccani refused. He explained that

he would not show both hands because he had a “shotgun in his other hand.” Id.

Maccani went in the trailer and put the firearm down. Then he exited the trailer and

approached the officers. As he approached, one officer observed a firearm tucked into

Maccani’s back waistband. When the officers told him to stop, he removed the

firearm and “placed [it] on the floor inside the doorway of his trailer.” Id. at 5. He

walked out of the trailer and knelt down but soon became agitated and stood up. After

he would not comply with their orders to stay seated, the officers wrestled Maccani

to the ground and placed him in handcuffs.

1The Honorable Charles J. Williams, United States District Judge for the

Northern District of Iowa. 

-2-
As the officers placed Maccani in the back of their patrol vehicle, they smelled

alcohol on his breath. While seated in the patrol car, Maccani banged his head against

the security window, causing two lacerations to his forehead. This injury required him

to be taken to a hospital. 

Prior to departing, Maccani asked the officers that his trailer be secured by his

father. While securing the trailer, one officer observed a lit candle in the back of the

trailer. Upon request, Maccani’s father gave the officers consent to enter the trailer

to put out the candle. Inside the trailer, “an officer observed a ‘sawed-off single shot

12-gauge shotgun’ and a camouflage Daisy Powerline 35 air rifle . . . lying on the

bed.” Id. at 6. 

Thereafter, the officers acquired a search warrant for the trailer. The search

revealed “a loaded Harrington & Richardson Topper 18 12-gauge weapon made from

a shotgun” as well as other firearms, contraband, and other paraphernalia.2Id. The

sawed-off shotgun was not registered to Maccani in the National Firearms

Registration and Transfer Record. Having been shortened, the shotgun had an overall

length of less than 26 inches.

2Other items found in Maccani’s trailer included 

a loaded Kel-Tec PMR-30 .22 caliber pistol that had one round

chambered, a pill bottle that contained 2.82 grams of a green leafy

substance which field tested positive for marijuana, a bandolier that

contained 23 rounds of 12-gauge Winchester Super X Double Buckshot

ammunition, [and] three pill bottles that contained unknown amounts of

.22 caliber ammunition.

Id.

-3-
Maccani was charged with possessing an unregistered National Firearms Act

firearm. Maccani moved to suppress the items removed from his trailer. The

magistrate judge recommended that the district court deny the suppression motion.

According to the magistrate judge, (1) “the search warrant established probable cause

and was sufficiently particular so as to satisfy the Fourth Amendment”; (2) “even if

the warrant was constitutionally deficient, the subsequent search of defendant’s trailer

was lawful under both the Leon[

3

] good[-]faith exception and the automobile

exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement”; and (3) “the seizure of

defendant’s shotgun was justified under the plain view doctrine.” R. Doc. 57, at 17.

Accordingly, “none of the evidence seized was fruit of the poisonous tree.” Id. 

Maccani objected to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. After

some factual modifications, the district court adopted the report and recommendation

and denied Maccani’s motion. The court concluded:

The warrant was validly issued and executed, the search of the trailer

was lawful under either the search warrant or automobile exception,

Deputy Omar’s entry into defendant’s trailer was justified under either

the third party consent or community caretaking doctrines, and officers

would have inevitably discovered the shotgun during the search under

the warrant or automobile exception. The shotgun and ammunition

found inside the trailer are therefore not fruits of any conceivable

poisonous tree. 

United States v. Maccani, 526 F. Supp. 3d 420, 458–59 (N.D. Iowa 2021). 

Maccani pleaded guilty to possession of an unregistered National Firearms Act

firearm, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion.

3United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922–23 (1984). 

-4-
II. Discussion

On appeal, Maccani argues that the district court erred in denying his

suppression motion. He contends that the warrant was invalid because it lacked

probable cause and failed to describe with particularity the items that police intended

to seize. 

Regarding a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review legal

conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. United States v. $45,000.00

in U.S. Currency, 749 F.3d 709, 713 (8th Cir. 2014). We “will affirm the district

court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence unless it is unsupported by substantial

evidence, based on an erroneous interpretation of applicable law, or, based on the

entire record, it is clear a mistake was made.” Id. at 713–14 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “no

warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be

seized.” “To be valid under the Fourth Amendment, a search warrant must be

supported by a showing of probable cause.” United States v. Summage, 481 F.3d

1075, 1077 (8th Cir. 2007). “Whether probable cause exists depends upon the totality

of the circumstances, but it requires a showing of facts sufficient to create a fair

probability that evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched.” United

States v. Gabrio, 295 F.3d 880, 882–883 (8th Cir. 2002) (cleaned up).

While a warrant may issue only upon a finding of probable cause, [the

Supreme] Court has long held that the term probable cause means less

than evidence which would justify condemnation and that a finding of

probable cause may rest upon evidence which is not legally competent

in a criminal trial.

United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 107 (1965) (cleaned up). “The essential

protection of the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment . . . is in requiring

-5-
that the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence be drawn by a

neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the

often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,

240 (1983) (cleaned up). When reviewing a probable-cause determination, we give

deference to the issuing magistrate’s determination. Id. at 236. The Fourth

Amendment requires that the issuing “magistrate had a substantial basis for

concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.” Id. (cleaned up).

Maccani argues that the warrant was invalid. He contends that the officer who

submitted the warrant application lacked the background, training, or knowledge to

assert that the suspected marijuana taken from the trailer was in fact marijuana. He

also challenges the warrant as deficient in its specificity of what exactly was intended

to be seized. 

The search-warrant application contained an affidavit from one of the officers

along with two attachments. The affidavit indicated that the officers had observed that

Maccani possessed firearms, ammunition, and what appeared to be marijuana.

Attachment A noted that the officers “believed that . . . multiple firearms, offensi[v]e

weapons[,] and illegal narcotics [we]re . . . contained inside” of Maccani’s trailer.

R. Doc. 31-1, at 11. Attachment A also detailed Deputy Schmid’s years of experience

in law enforcement and time at the Linn County Sheriff’s Office. The affidavit further

recorded that (1) Maccani was in illegal possession of this property; (2) the property

was “used or possessed with the intent to be used as the means of committing a public

offense or concealed to prevent an offense from being discovered”; and (3) the

property was “relevant and material as evidence in a criminal prosecution.” Id. at 10.

Both the officer who drafted the warrant and the issuing magistrate judge signed the

warrant.

-6-
Maccani compares the warrant application in this case with the wholly

insufficient warrant at issue in Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004). The district

court rejected Maccani’s comparison: 

Unlike the warrant at issue in Groh, the warrant here is not “plainly

invalid.” The warrant here contains significantly more information than

in Groh. In addition to a description of defendant's trailer and the

address of where it could be found, the warrant included a number of

specific items which could reasonably be construed as objects of the

search, albeit in narrative form.

Maccani, 526 F. Supp. 3d at 446. 

We agree with the district court’s analysis. “The [Fourth Amendment’s]

particularity requirement ‘is a standard of “practical accuracy” rather than a

hypertechnical one.’” Summage, 481 F.3d at 1079 (quoting United States v. Peters,

92 F.3d 768, 769–70 (8th Cir. 1996)). The description of items found in the warrant

meets the pragmatic standards imposed by the Fourth Amendment.

The district court further concluded that, even if it were mistaken in finding

that the warrant was valid, the good-faith exception applied. “Under the good-faith

exception, evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant issued by a magistrate that

is later determined to be invalid, will not be suppressed if the executing officer’s

reliance upon the warrant was objectively reasonable.” United States v. Proell, 485

F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 2007). 

Maccani contends that this exception does not apply because the officers’

reliance on the warrant was unreasonable. Maccani argues that the officers’ reliance

on the warrant was unreasonable because (1) the warrant lacked particularity about 

-7-
what was to be seized and, (2) since one of the officers drafted the warrant himself,

it could not reasonably be argued that he relied upon the issuing magistrate’s

approval. 

Law enforcement’s reliance on a warrant is unreasonable under Leon

(1) when the affidavit or testimony supporting the warrant contained a

false statement made knowingly and intentionally or with reckless

disregard for its truth, thus misleading the issuing judge; (2) when the

issuing judge wholly abandoned his judicial role in issuing the warrant;

(3) when the affidavit in support of the warrant is so lacking in indicia

of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely

unreasonable; and (4) when the warrant is so facially deficient that no

police officer could reasonably presume the warrant to be valid. 

Id. at 431 (internal quotation marks omitted). There is no evidence of any of these

deficiencies in this case. Maccani has not shown that the officers’ reliance on the

warrant was “objectively [un]reasonable.” Id. at 430. The warrant application

affidavit passes muster. It was neither deceptive nor deficient. The district court did

not err in admitting evidence found pursuant to the warrant.4

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

4Because we hold that the warrant was not defective and that the good-faith

exception applies in any event, we need not address the other warrant exceptions. See

Bakke v. Murex Petroleum Corp., 342 F. App’x 230, 234 (8th Cir. 2009)

(unpublished). 

-8-