U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

21–461PDF 2016

EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN ENERGY: CHALLENGES

AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. REGIONAL

PRIORITIES

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 8, 2016

Serial No. 114–220

(Committee on Foreign Affairs)

Serial No. 114–90

(Committee on Science, Space, and Technology)

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the

Committee on Science, Space, and Technology

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/,

(

http://science.house.gov or http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

(III)

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

RANDY K. WEBER, Texas 

JOHN R. MOOLENAAR, Michigan 

STEVE KNIGHT, California 

BRIAN BABIN, Texas 

BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas 

BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia 

GARY PALMER, Alabama 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

DARIN LAHOOD, Illinois 

WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

KATHERINE M. CLARK, Massachusetts 

DON S. BEYER, JR., Virginia 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

PAUL TONKO, New York 

MARK TAKANO, California 

BILL FOSTER, Illinois 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY

HON. RANDY K. WEBER, Texas, Chair

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

STEPHAN KNIGHT, California 

BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

KATHERINE M. CLARK, Massachusetts 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Amos J. Hochstein, Special Envoy and Coordinator for International 

Energy Affairs, Bureau of Energy Resources, U.S. Department of State ....... 10

The Honorable Jonathan Elkind, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, U.S. Department of Energy ....................................................................... 17

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Amos J. Hochstein: Prepared statement ........................................................ 13

The Honorable Jonathan Elkind: Prepared statement ......................................... 19

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 44

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 45

(1)

EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN ENERGY: 

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR 

U.S. REGIONAL PRIORITIES 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY,

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 2:29 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittees will come to order. 

After recognizing myself, Chairman Weber, Ranking Member 

Deutch, and Ranking Member Grayson for 5 minutes each for our 

opening statements, I will then recognize other members seeking 

recognition for 1 minute. 

We will then hear from our witnesses. And, without objection, 

the witnesses’ prepared statements will be made a part of the 

record, and members may have 5 days to insert statements for the 

record, subject to the length limitations in the rules. 

We are also expected to be joined by the chairman of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, Chairman Smith, and 

possibly Ranking Member—oh, here he is, right on time—and possibly Ranking Member Johnson as well. Let me look over here. No. 

So I will be pleased to recognize them as they arrive. 

The chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. 

Three months ago, I led a bipartisan congressional delegation 

trip to Cyprus and Israel. I was joined by Carolyn Maloney, Gus 

Bilirakis, and my friend and colleague from our Middle East and 

North Africa Subcommittee, Randy Weber, who is participating 

today as chair of the Science, Space, and Technology Subcommittee 

on Energy. Energy was the focal point of our trip, and one of the 

major talking points we heard in both Israel and Cyprus was that 

the natural gas developments in the Eastern Mediterranean has 

the potential to be more than just an economic boost for both countries; natural gas development has the potential to drastically 

change the geopolitical landscape of the region for the better. 

While in Israel, Prime Minister Netanyahu and other Israeli 

Government officials told us that the democratic Jewish state was 

2

on the verge of reestablishing relations with Turkey, and, indeed, 

just a few short weeks after our trip, Israel and Turkey announced 

relations had been restored. No doubt the potential to collaborate 

on natural gas developments played a central role in those discussions. 

Since the discovery of natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean, 

Israel’s relationships with Greece and Cyprus have improved. 

While in Cyprus, we were told that the Cypriots are working to 

bring the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean area together to 

create a multilateral forum that would include Israel. We were told 

by Cypriot officials that they consider themselves part of Israel’s 

strategic depth and plan on working closely with Israel on issues 

of counterterrorism, security, crime, and trafficking. It was clear 

that energy has emerged as a key incentive that can help resolve 

the Cyprus problem and end Turkey’s occupation of the northern 

part of Cyprus. A potential pipeline carrying Cypriot and Israeli 

natural gas to and through Turkey could not only improve relations 

in the region, it could be then routed into Europe. That would help 

our European friends in reducing their dependence on Russian energy and decrease Russian influence in that area. 

We have yet to see the tangible contributions from Ankara regarding Cyprus reunification, an issue that is of utmost concern to 

this committee. With cheap Israeli natural gas, we can see Israel 

strengthening its relationship with Jordan and Egypt and reshaping the traditional alliances in the region, as both nations could 

benefit from alternative energy sources. So the United States has 

a vested interest in seeing these projects in the Eastern Mediterranean come to fruition in order to bolster our partners in the region 

but to also bolster our own national security interests. 

Of course, the potential economic benefits realized by Eastern 

European nations should all these natural gas projects be developed would be immense. And it won’t be just an economic benefit 

to the Eastern European nations. It was the U.S.-based company 

Noble Energy that made these potentially game-changing natural 

gas discoveries offshore both Israel and Cyprus. Exxon has also 

participated in Cyprus’ latest round of licensing. 

As the projects expand and come online, that will create more 

jobs and bring in more revenue. But there are, of course, still various important impediments in the way. It would clearly be in Jordan and Egypt’s benefit to work with Israel so they can decrease 

their energy subsidies that heavily burden their economy in lieu of 

a cheaper alternative, but will they allow other political considerations to derail stronger cooperation with Israel? Are energy incentives sufficient to end Turkey’s occupation of Cyprus, or will this 

opportunity pass and limit the extent of energy cooperation in the 

region? Is Israel ready to be a regional leader, and can it resolve 

its domestic issues favorably to allow these projects to go forward? 

The United States can play a pivotal role in resolving some of 

these issues. We want to hear what positive steps the administration is taking to encourage these projects to go forward and how, 

if at all, we are providing support to Israel, to Cyprus, Turkey, 

Egypt, and Noble Energy even, to get these ambitious projects online and benefiting the region. We want to know how these issues 

factor in the administration’s foreign policy when it comes to these 

3

nations and the region, because the Eastern Mediterranean natural 

gas discoveries can drastically reshape the region and benefit so 

many of our allies. 

And, with that, I recognize Ranking Member Deutch for 5 minutes. And I will then recognize the other members and ranking 

members. And I know that Ranking Member Bernice Johnson, 

Chairman Smith, and many others will be speaking as well. 

Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you. Thanks, Madam Chairman, for holding 

today’s hearing. Thanks to Chairman Weber and Ranking Member 

Grayson. And thank you to the witnesses for being here and for the 

good work that you and your agencies do. 

Energy security is an integral part of stability in a volatile part 

of the world. Recent gas finds in the Eastern Mediterranean 

present opportunities for new relationships and unprecedented cooperation between regional actors. 

I co-chair the Congressional Hellenic-Israel Alliance with my 

friend Congressman Gus Bilirakis, whom I saw walk in just a moment ago, who joined Chairmen Ros-Lehtinen and Weber on their 

recent delegation to Israel and Cyprus. Much of the work that we 

do in the caucus is focused on energy cooperation, and we have 

seen the way that these gas finds have really brought these three 

countries together and deepened their relationship in a really 

meaningful way. 

These are countries that have so much in common, including a 

respect for and commitment to democracy, and now have an opportunity to work together to create energy independence for their 

own countries, to help their neighbors meet their rising demands, 

and to eventually bring this gas to new markets. 

The trilateral meeting earlier this year between Israel, Cyprus, 

and Greece resulted in the establishment of a commission to explore possibilities for a pipeline to Europe. Getting this gas to Europe will go a long way toward decreasing Europe’s energy dependence on Russia. And, from a national security perspective, helping 

Europe diversify from pro-Western sources can help contribute to 

increased international stability. Cyprus’ discovery of the Aphrodite 

field in 2011 was the catalyst for the serious discussion of a pipeline connecting the Eastern Mediterranean gas fields. Unfortunately, the stalled reunification talks have hampered that planning 

process. I know that both sides are hopeful that talks can conclude 

before the end of the year, giving way to a new era of cooperation. 

Many have speculated on the role that energy played in the recent 

rapprochement between Turkey and Israel, and I hope that Special 

Envoy Hochstein will speak to how this development impacts Cyprus, as well, and how the current instability in Turkey affects 

prospects for regional cooperation on a pipeline. 

For Israel, the discovery of the Tamar and Leviathan fields are 

a game-changer. Since the Tamar field went online, natural gas 

now accounts for 30 percent of Israeli fuel consumption, up from 

11 percent in just 2008. Production from the Leviathan field has 

the potential to more than meet all of Israel’s natural gas needs, 

leading it to be an exporter in the future. Israel also appears to finally be on the road to overcoming the regulatory challenges that 

have stymied progress over the past several years. Her neighbors 

4

have recognized this potential for a stable gas source. Memoranda 

of understanding have been negotiated with Egypt, Jordan, and the 

Palestinian Authority for various gas deals. 

Following the uprisings in Egypt in 2011, Jordan faced serious 

disruptions to its gas supply as terrorists in the Sinai repeatedly 

attacked the Arab Gas pipeline from Egypt. A pipeline from Israel 

to Jordan has been approved to facilitate a $15 billion agreement 

between U.S.-based Noble Energy, the developer of Israel’s fields, 

and Jordan’s national electric power company. Noble Energy also 

spearheaded a 2014 deal to bring gas to the West Bank. And just 

this week, Israel announced a partnership with the Dutch to help 

supply gas to Gaza. Cooperation that brings about benefits to the 

people, real benefits that impact their daily lives, like alleviating 

water and gas shortages, can go a long way to reducing tension on 

the ground. Noble has also signed an agreement with an Egyptian 

firm for an undersea pipeline. 

Now, it is no secret that relations between Israel and its friendly 

neighbors should be strengthened. I hope that the Governments of 

Jordan and Egypt continue to withstand domestic pressure to cancel these deals. Both of these countries are in desperate need of 

new energy sources, and these deals can provide much-needed relief. 

Egypt, once a net exporter, has two LNG facilities that have not 

operated at capacity for several years, and the rise in domestic demand decimated Egypt’s ability to export. If these facilities are able 

to be secured, they would be ideal for use by Cyprus. Egypt’s surprising discovery of the Zohr field, the largest find in the Eastern 

Mediterranean, adds a new dimension to the regional aspect. Egypt 

is hopeful that gas from Zohr can reach domestic markets by 2017, 

and, depending on demand, the ability to export in the future could 

provide a much-needed boon to Egypt’s economy. 

Mr. Hochstein, I hope that we can discuss in greater detail how 

the Zohr discovery fits into planning for the future of Eastern Mediterranean gas. 

And with all the activity in the Eastern Mediterranean, there is 

a real opportunity here for the U.S. to use our expertise to provide 

technical and political support to these countries as they move forward. 

And, finally, Madam Chairman, you and I partnered to introduce 

and pass the U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Act in 2014. I know 

we are both proud of this legislation that showcased the depth and 

breadth of the U.S.-Israel relationship. 

And one area that this bill made remarkable advances in was energy. In addition to authorizing a dialogue and a number of new 

energy initiatives and expanding grant programs, the bill authorized the establishment of a joint U.S.-Israel energy center in the 

United States that would leverage the experience, knowledge, and 

expertise of all that we have here in the United States and in 

Israel and move toward the development of domestic resources to 

address needs. And I want to stress that this showcases just how 

much there is for our two countries to do together and the substantial impact this kind of research can have around the world. And 

it is the kind of thing that doesn’t get enough attention. And there 

is a lot more I haven’t touched upon that I hope we have a chance 

5

to get into and hear from the witnesses, especially how U.S. energy 

imports are impacting these developments around the world and 

Iran’s reentry into the energy market. 

I thank our witnesses and you and look forward to a fruitful discussion. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. 

And we are so thrilled that the full committee Science Chairman 

and Ranking Member, Smith and Johnson, have joined us today. 

And Lamar is the only one who knows that my childhood nickname is Lily, so he is a good friend. 

The chairman is recognized. 

Mr. SMITH. I thank the chairwoman for working with the Science 

Committee to host today’s hearing. Our shared jurisdiction over 

international energy issues is an important piece of U.S. foreign 

policy. I look forward to our discussion on the appropriate roles of 

the Department of Energy and Department of State. 

Today, the Subcommittee on Energy and the Subcommittee on 

the Middle East and North Africa will examine the opportunities 

for energy development in the Eastern Mediterranean. We also will 

discuss how cooperative research and development with our allies 

can bolster U.S. diplomacy and provide opportunities for new scientific discoveries. 

While the State Department’s responsibility to execute U.S. foreign policy is well-known, the Department of Energy’s Office of 

International Affairs also plays an important role in foreign policy. 

DOE describes the purpose of its International Affairs Program as 

integrating the Department’s research programs, national labs, and 

science and technology policy to pursue U.S. Government objectives 

on energy and national security issues. The Department also provides subject matter expertise and vital information on the impact 

energy development can have on global stability and security, 

which is of interest to our national security agencies. 

DOE currently engages on energy issues with dozens of countries. Its agreements include bilateral R&D partnerships and multilateral efforts on regional energy issues that range from energy 

efficiency and oil and gas exploration to providing electricity to 

rural communities around the world. By working to ensure energy 

security for our allies, the U.S. can engage in diplomacy that improves regional stability and increases innovation. 

In the Eastern Mediterranean, energy issues have a significant 

impact on regional security. The United States has a long history 

of engagement in the region, particularly in support of one of our 

closest allies, Israel. On energy issues, DOE has led cooperative research efforts with Israeli scientists for decades, with formal agreements on energy research dating back almost 30 years. 

Programs such as the Binational Industrial Research and Development Foundation and the Israel-U.S. Binational Science Foundation encourage collaboration between the nations’ top labs and scientists. These programs research a broad range of topics that include oil and gas exploration, production, and distribution technologies, energy efficiency and renewable energy, and water desalination and treatment facilities. 

The U.S.-Israel Energy Dialogue, reestablished by DOE in 2011, 

fosters scientific engagement on cybersecurity, civil nuclear energy, 

6

and basic research and development activities. These programs leverage DOE national labs and researchers to produce the kind of 

scientific collaboration that can lead to the next technology breakthrough. 

The recent discovery of the Tamar and Leviathan gas fields off 

the coast of Israel have the potential to foster new regional trade 

relationships. It could even provide a source of natural gas for U.S. 

allies in Europe. DOE-led cooperative R&D for natural gas production, transmission, and distribution can help drive this development. It can create the potential for Israel to become a net exporting country, establish energy trade with its neighbors, and ensure 

Israeli energy security for years to come. 

I thank our witnesses, Assistant Secretary Elkind and Special 

Envoy Hochstein, for testifying today. We look forward to their 

comments about the role DOE plays in support of U.S. diplomacy 

and opportunities for energy engagement with allies in the Eastern 

Mediterranean. 

Thank you, Madam Chair, for that recognition. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Chairman Smith. 

And now we would like to turn to Ranking Member Eddie Bernice Johnson, who is recognized. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

And good afternoon to all. 

I am so appreciative of you holding this joint hearing on energy 

opportunities in the Middle East and, in particular, on the research 

and development partnerships in the region. 

DOE’s international partnerships span the globe, and they are 

an important tool in expanding clean energy innovation and addressing climate change. One of the strongest partnerships we have 

is with Israel. Our Nation and the state of Israel have a long history of cooperation in developing clean energy technologies and in 

promoting and ensuring energy security for Israel in particular. 

This relationship is not only in each of our national interests but 

vital for our shared commitment to the region as well. 

The U.S. supports a number of successful initiatives to promote 

this collaboration. The DOE’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy has issued awards for research in wind, solar, energy storage, and many others. These funds are matched by the 

Israeli Government and the awardee, allowing for greater leverage 

on every dollar DOE invests. 

In addition to DOE’s work with Israel, the Department has also 

collaborated with industries in Turkey to employ better energy-efficiency practices and technologies. These partnerships strengthen 

our country’s own R&D efforts and make a positive impact on our 

diplomatic work in the region. If we wish to continue to promote 

scientific advancement in energy security, great collaboration in research and development must continue to be a high priority. 

I look forward to hearing from our distinguished panel on the 

progress we have made in this area and on the opportunities we 

should turn to next. 

I thank you and yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Ranking Member Johnson. 

7

And now I would like to turn to Chairman Weber, who is the 

chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Good afternoon, and welcome to today’s joint subcommittee hearing examining energy opportunities in the Eastern Mediterranean. 

I want to thank my colleagues on the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

for working with the Science Committee to hold this very important hearing. 

Today, we will have an opportunity to receive an update on U.S. 

diplomacy and regional energy development and will conduct important oversight of the Department of Energy’s ongoing cooperative research and development programs with our allies in the region. We will specifically hear about DOE’s energy engagement 

with Israel, the key U.S. ally in the region. 

The Department of Energy plays a vital role in ensuring global 

energy security. By engaging with our allies through energy, environment, and technology cooperation, DOE provides opportunity for 

international researchers to access the scientists and the research 

infrastructure at our national labs. It also gives U.S. researchers 

the chance to work with new partners on innovative research and 

opens the door for future discoveries and technology breakthroughs. 

This kind of collaboration provides opportunity for international 

dialogue and directly supports U.S. diplomatic efforts around the 

world. 

In the Eastern Mediterranean, our strongest ally is Israel. So it 

should be no surprise that DOE has a long history of cooperation 

with Israel, or what I call the start-up nation, on energy research 

and technology development. Starting with a research partnership 

that was formalized in 1987, the Department has consistently 

prioritized this strategic partnership. 

Energy security is a key priority for Israel, and not just for 

Israel. It directly contributes to regional stability. By enabling 

Israeli development of their natural resources, including the sizable 

Tamar, Dalit, and Leviathan offshore natural gas deposits, the 

United States can promote economic growth and help establish 

trade relationships between Israel and its neighbors, which will 

mean stability in the Middle East. Noble Energy, a U.S. company 

based in Houston, Texas, helped discover these gas fields. And 

today, the ongoing research partnership between DOE and Israeli 

scientists will provide technical expertise and the technologies to 

help successfully develop and export this resource. With regional 

partnerships to develop pipeline infrastructure, Israel’s natural gas 

resources could even fuel Europe, serving as an alternative to Russian natural gas and providing energy security even to more U.S. 

allies. 

Now, look, DOE is engaging with Israel on renewable energy, 

cybersecurity, desalination—I can do this, I can do this, Madam 

Chair, I know, I know—and energy storage technology—my ‘‘tang 

is getting tongled’’—cybersecurity, and efforts to protect our critical 

infrastructure. Maintaining this dialogue in cooperation with our 

key ally should remain a U.S. priority. 

In the past year, we have even seen DOE take a leading role in 

negotiating U.S. international agreements. In the case of the Iran 

nuclear deal and the Paris climate agreement, my colleagues and 

8

I have raised very serious concerns. So I am pleased to discuss 

DOE engagement, where we see clear benefits from the U.S. and 

our allies and the potential for real breakthroughs in energy technology. 

I want to thank Assistant Secretary Elkind and Special Envoy 

Hochstein—am I saying that right? Good enough? Okay—for testifying to the committees today. Your testimony will provide a valuable update to Congress on the impact of energy on regional stability and how your respective departments can best engage to support our allies and advance U.S. goals. 

By supporting cooperative research and development with our allies, the Department of Energy can contribute to U.S. diplomacy, 

the security of those allies, and promote groundbreaking energy research, all the while helping to ensure a more stable region in the 

world. I look forward to you two gentlemen laying out the framework to do just that. 

I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Weber. 

And now I am pleased to yield to my Florida colleague, Ranking 

Member Grayson, for his statement. 

Alan? 

Mr. GRAYSON. Thank you. 

I actually don’t have anything to add to my colleagues and what 

they have said already, but there is something I want to emphasize, and that is the importance of this development to peace in the 

Middle East. The opportunity for peace is based upon a very fragile 

concept called personal safety and security. There is no peace unless people feel that they are not in danger. And that is a requisite 

on all sides—on both sides, and on all sides. 

Israel has felt for decades now that there is a noose around its 

neck regarding its energy supplies. And these are fragile. In the 

modern world, energy supplies are corporatized and centralized 

from the well to the pump and everywhere in between. And the result of that is that there is a vulnerability intrinsic to the energy 

supply system that is not necessarily the case with regard to the 

supply of food or the supply of shelter or other basic necessities. 

It is, actually, similar to the bottleneck that we see with the 

Internet. Last night, I saw the movie ‘‘Snowden.’’ In the movie 

‘‘Snowden,’’ they illustrate this point by pointing out that the entire 

Internet service in Syria was shut down inadvertently by a cyber 

attack—inadvertently. 

And the same thing can be true with energy supplies. Energy 

supplies are centralized in a manner that makes them uniquely 

vulnerable. And as long as Israel, as long as other countries in the 

region feel that they are vulnerable in that regard, it is difficult for 

people to even grasp the concept of peace. 

We lived through similar circumstances decades ago in the 

United States. I can well remember how the shutdown of oil supplies and oil imports to the United States led to my parents getting 

up at 5 o’clock in the morning, along with many, many other Americans, in order to get their gas in the morning and waiting online 

for hours in order to make that happen. I can also remember how 

the quadrupling of oil prices, worldwide oil prices, led to the deepest postwar recession that we had until the year 2008. In the same 

9

way, countries like Israel, other countries in the region feel vulnerable to similar attacks on their economy, on their safety, on their 

way of life. And as long as that is true, then it’s unreasonable to 

expect anything resembling peace. 

So what we have here, through the discovery of natural gas supplies that are fortuitously spread around the Eastern Mediterranean in areas that Israel can possibly exploit, Egypt already is exploiting, Lebanon might be able to exploit, Cyprus is already exploiting, that creates a common interest in peace and security and 

a sense of safety that is absolutely necessary if we are going to see 

a peaceful Middle East at any point in time. 

I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Ranking Member 

Grayson. 

I would be glad to recognize any members for opening statements 

they would like to make for a minute. 

Mr. Bilirakis is recognized. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you so much, Madam Chair. And thank 

you for allowing me to sit in on this very important subcommittee. 

Thanks for holding it as well. 

I also want to thank Chairman Weber and Ranking Member 

Deutch and Ranking Member Grayson and members of the subcommittee, again, for inviting me to participate in the joint subcommittee hearing concerning the increasingly important energy 

priorities in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean regions. 

When I co-founded the Congressional Hellenic-Israel Alliance 

Caucus, along with my friend Representative Deutch, one of our 

primary goals was to promote the growing partnership between 

Israel, Greece, and Cyprus—a partnership which could yield important economic and national security benefits for the United States 

and the region. 

Energy diplomacy has been at the core of that partnership. Noble 

Energy’s 2010 discovery provided a great surge in optimism that 

natural gas cooperation would provide energy security, economic 

growth, and global stability in a notoriously unstable region. Exclusive economic zones were established quickly and with minimal 

friction. Energy cooperation resulted in security cooperation, greater Israeli tourism to Greece and Cyprus, and projects like the EuroAsia Interconnector. 

If this cooperation continues and expands to include other regional actors, natural gas could bring the region together the way 

coal and steel brought Europe together after World War II. The energy potential of this region furthers the U.S. interests by making 

allies and strategic partners energy independent, by helping Greece 

and Cyprus out of their economic crisis, by stabilizing Egypt and 

Jordan, and by incentivizing Turkey to avoid destabilizing behavior 

in the region. That is why we need to focus today on how the U.S. 

is both furthering cooperation in the region and working to overcome obstacles. 

Turkey’s ability and willingness to play a positive role in a stable 

Eastern Mediterranean must be determined. Without a decisive 

and tangible move toward ending its occupation of Cyprus, Turkey—one of the greatest beneficiaries of an Eastern Mediterranean 

10

energy region—remains one of the greatest obstacles to this promising future. 

I want to thank the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North 

Africa and the Subcommittee on Energy for highlighting this important issue for the stability and security of the Middle East. 

And I yield back. Thank you very much. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Bilirakis. 

Seeing no other requests for time, I am so pleased to welcome 

our panelists. 

We are delighted to welcome back Mr. Amos Hochstein, who 

serves as Special Envoy and Coordinator for International Energy 

Affairs for the Bureau of Energy Resources at the Department of 

State. Prior to this role, Mr. Hochstein served as Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for Energy Diplomacy and even a former staffer of the 

House Foreign Affairs Committee. 

You survived that; you can go to a lot of places. So welcome back, 

Amos. 

Next, we would like to welcome to our subcommittee for the first 

time, but hopefully not the last time, the Honorable Jonathan 

Elkind. Mr. Elkind is the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs with the Department of Energy. Prior to that role, Mr. Elkind 

served as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary. And prior to 

joining the State Department, he was a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. 

Welcome, Assistant Secretary Elkind. 

As I said, your remarks will be made a part of the record. Please 

feel free to summarize. 

And we will begin with you, Mr. Hochstein. 

STATEMENT OF MR. AMOS J. HOCHSTEIN, SPECIAL ENVOY 

AND COORDINATOR FOR INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AFFAIRS, 

BUREAU OF ENERGY RESOURCES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE 

Mr. HOCHSTEIN. Thank you, Madam Chair. It is good to be back 

where it all started for me 20 years ago. So I appreciate that. 

Madam Chair, Ranking Members, Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss energy developments and opportunities in the Eastern Mediterranean. 

But let me start here at home to frame it. The United States has 

transformed into the world’s energy superpower. That is true in oil, 

gas, wind and solar, efficiency, and R&D. 

We have increased oil production from 51⁄2 million barrels a day 

to nearly 9 million barrels a day and transitioned from being a significant and increasing importer of natural gas to an important exporter. By the end of the decade, the United States may match 

Qatar in export volumes of LNG. 

We have seen investments in U.S. renewables rise to $58 billion 

in 2015 alone and increased solar generation more than twentyfold 

in the last 8 years. Any way you use the word ‘‘energy,’’ the United 

States is the leader, and the world is looking to us for leadership. 

This is a time of turbulence for global energy markets, due in 

part to the transformation taking place in the United States. As 

you know, oil costs less than half what it did 2 years ago, and 

11

prices for gas in Europe and Asia are at historic lows. Energy is 

also again playing an increasing role in geopolitics. 

But today we are here to discuss the Eastern Mediterranean. 

Discoveries offshore Cyprus, Israel, Egypt, and potentially Lebanon 

have already redefined regional relationships and, I believe, will 

continue to be a catalyst for increased economic and political cooperation through interconnection and integration. 

For example, many credit regional energy development for the 

deepening of the relationship between Israel and Cyprus and 

Greece. The successful exploration, production, and export of natural gas resources in the Eastern Med will require exactly the political cooperation and economic integration that the United States 

has long supported in the region. This remains a top foreign policy 

priority for the United States, which is why I have spent a significant amount of my time devoted to these opportunities and why engagement by Vice President Biden and Secretary Kerry on these 

issues has been so robust. 

Let me start by describing the current landscape in the Eastern 

Med. In January 2009, Noble Energy discovered the Tamar gas 

field offshore Israel, containing approximately 7 TCF of gas. The 

next year, they discovered the Leviathan field, with approximately 

18 TCF of gas. The Israel discovery spurred exploration in nearby 

Cyprus, where Noble discovered Aphrodite in 2011, with an estimated 41⁄2 to 5 TCF of gas. That increased interest in the region, 

coupled with positive developments in Egypt’s investment climate, 

led to additional exploration in Egypt, yielding Italian firm Eni’s 

Zohr field discovery, mentioned earlier, with approximately 30 

TCF, making it the largest discovery to date in the Mediterranean. 

Eni’s discovery of the Zohr field, which lies just south of Cyprus’ 

EEZ, sparked renewed interest in exploration offshore Cyprus, 

which had been waning after the Aphrodite find because a number 

of exploration wells did not produce significant discoveries. Cyprus 

just concluded an extraordinarily successful third bid round, with 

bids from companies including ExxonMobil, Qatargas, and others. 

This cycle of exploration and development in the region will continue as long as discoveries continue to be made, expanding potentially to places like Lebanon and Greece. 

I believe the Eastern Med remains an underexplored and underdeveloped area, and I fully expect that significant discoveries will 

continue to be made there. However, the market is still looking for 

validation that historical political differences will not get in the 

way of investment and development. 

One of the early lessons learned in the development of Eastern 

Med resources is the critical importance of regulatory certainty, a 

business climate that is conducive to investment, contract sanctity, 

and close cooperation between the government and the private sector. The lack of regulatory clarity and stability cost Israel years in 

development of its largest offshore resource. But despite early challenges, I am now optimistic and confident in the long-term stability 

of energy development in the region. 

Let me be clear: Energy will not solve political differences in the 

region, but it can and, in fact, already has provided incentives to 

accelerate political accommodation and encourage compromise. 

12

The future I see for the region includes new and old pipelines 

connecting Israel’s offshore resources to Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, 

and the Palestinian Authority. It includes Cypriot gas exports to 

Turkey and/or Egypt, allowing Egypt to satisfy its own power needs 

and export via existing but now idle LNG terminals. New resources 

will allow Turkey to diversify its heavy dependence on a small 

number of suppliers and use its extensive pipeline network to reach 

Europe as well. 

The success of all these plans, however, hinges on cooperation. 

Countries will save billions if they share infrastructure and market 

access. If they don’t share these resources, most of the gas will 

have to stay in the ground. The importance of these developments 

is not isolated to the Eastern Mediterranean but it is part of a 

broader energy security puzzle, connecting dots from Jerusalem to 

Nicosia, Athens to Baku, from Baghdad and Irbil to Sophia and 

Belgrade and Kiev. 

The Eastern Mediterranean can play a role in freeing Central 

and Southeast Europe from their overwhelming dependence on 

Russian gas. Turkey has the potential to transform from a country 

with a heavy reliance on Russian energy to a critical hub connecting Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. This is an exciting opportunity to enhance prosperity, economic security, stability, and 

political security. 

That is why we have made this a top priority for the United 

States. I don’t believe that this vision of increased national security 

through energy security is wishful thinking. We are seeing it become a reality today. 

I thank you, and I look forward to your questions, Madam Chair. 

Thank you again for inviting me to testify. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hochstein follows:]

13


21461a-1.eps
14


21461a-2.eps
15


21461a-3.eps
16


21461a-4.eps
17

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Welcome back. 

Mr. Elkind? 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JONATHAN ELKIND, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Mr. ELKIND. Thank you, Madam Chair, Chairman Weber, Ranking Member Deutch, Ranking Member Grayson, distinguished 

members of both subcommittees. I appreciate the opportunity to 

appear before you today. 

My name is Jonathan Elkind, and, as has been stated, I am the 

Assistant Secretary for International Affairs at the U.S. Department of Energy. My office advances U.S. objectives in international 

energy security, national security, and clean energy deployment by 

applying DOE’s knowledge of energy technologies, markets, and 

policies. 

Let me provide some context at the outset in regard to natural 

gas in particular. This is a time of dramatic change, as just has 

been noted, in global energy markets, and these changes will be 

felt in the Eastern Mediterranean as well. Decades of investment, 

both by the U.S. Government and private industry, have produced 

a cascade of scientific and technological advances which allowed us 

to unlock unconventional gas and oil resources. 

Pipeline systems have historically dominated natural gas trade 

around the globe. However, new facilities to liquefy natural gas, 

chiefly in the United States and Australia, are rapidly changing 

this reality. In fact, the U.S. Energy Information Administration, 

or EIA, projects that global LNG trade will exceed pipeline natural 

gas trade by 2020. 

Together with an increasing reliance on shorter-term contracts, 

natural gas markets are now characterized by greater liquidity and 

competition, features simply not seen in the past. The implications 

for the United States and for trading partners and allies, such as 

Israel, are enormous: Greater availability of clean-burning fuel, 

more security of supply, greater ability to diversify one’s purchasing. 

In the Eastern Mediterranean region, one sees significant new 

upstream prospects and competing proposals to monetize those gas 

reserves by building pipeline and LNG infrastructure, as my colleague Amos Hochstein has just sketched out. 

Bearing in mind Israel’s current consumption of around 300 billion cubic feet per year, Israel has sufficient gas supply for 25 years 

while also allowing for exports. Companies working offshore from 

Cyprus and Egypt, as has been noted, have also made major gas 

discoveries. 

When it comes to moving this gas to markets, a great deal of attention has focused on regional pipelines, and some of these 

projects have been called out already. There have also been discussions not only about exports to Cyprus and to Greece but then also 

to Turkey as well. One must remember, however, that the development of multibillion-dollar natural gas production and transportation systems requires transparent and predictable legal and regulatory structures. The terms, in short, must simultaneously attract 

investors and advance the interests of the host countries. 

18

Let me now turn briefly from the global and Eastern Med natural gas issues to DOE’s work with Israel on energy and science 

issues. Our collaborations involve frequent Cabinet-level engagement between the Secretary of Energy and Israeli counterparts, as 

well as engagements among senior officials, researchers, and experts through our annual U.S.-Israel Energy Dialogue. 

Here are some highlights of this effort. 

One is collaboration on the energy-water nexus. Israel and the 

United States both face the challenge of providing new water resources and new energy production. So DOE and Israel’s Ministry 

of National Infrastructure, Energy, and Water Resources recently 

announced the U.S.-Israel Desalination Design Challenge, a competition that encourages leading engineers and researchers in the 

U.S. and Israel to design integrated energy and desal systems. 

DOE and the Israeli Ministry also recently announced a U.S.-

Israel postdoctoral exchange program, which will enhance scientistto-scientist cooperation between DOE-funded research programs 

and Israeli scientists in energy-related topics of interest. 

Comments have already been made by several of the ranking 

members and chairs about the BIRD, the Binational Industrial Research and Development, Foundation and its energy component in 

particular. BIRD Energy has approved 32 projects, with a total of 

$21.6 million combined from the U.S. and Israeli Governments and 

matching dollars on a greater-than-one-to-one match from the private sector. 

Energy cybersecurity is a top concern for both of our countries 

and was a featured topic in the October 2015 U.S.-Israel Energy 

Dialogue and was also a point of great focus when Secretary Moniz 

visited Israel earlier in the current year and spoke about this topic 

with the Israeli cyber coordinator, with Energy Minister Steinitz, 

and with Prime Minister Netanyahu. 

To institutionalize our energy research engagements, DOE is 

now establishing a Virtual Center of Excellence for Joint Research. 

And I would be happy to provide more information about that in 

the question-and-answer, if desired. 

Again, I appreciate the opportunity to be with you here today. 

Thank you for the opportunity. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Elkind follows:]

19


21461b-1.eps
20


21461b-2.eps
21


21461b-3.eps
22


21461b-4.eps
23


21461b-5.eps
24


21461b-6.eps
25


21461b-7.eps
26


21461b-8.eps
27

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you to both gentlemen for excellent 

testimony. 

We will begin our question-and-answer period. 

Israel and Cyprus are both relatively new to natural gas production. In Israel, we saw robust debate on the domestic level as well 

as Supreme Court challenges, regulatory burdens to overcome. 

Most of these have been cleared, but there are still some disputes. 

Cyprus is obviously ideally suited to be a focal point of sorts for 

the region, with pipelines headed in all directions. Cyprus can simultaneously be connected to Israel, Egypt, Greece, Turkey, but 

not all of these connections will be established at once. 

So what comes first? What is the U.S. priority in that region? 

Mr. HOCHSTEIN. Madam Chair, I think you described it correctly. 

And as the entire region has, as we articulated, both Mr. Elkind 

and myself, the resources discovered in different countries. If this 

was just about common sense and you took out all politics and all 

the geopolitics, we would have a great hub that was humming with 

pipelines going in different directions and cooperation. 

So I think when you ask the question, what comes first, I think 

you have to look at where the advancement on geopolitics is advancing in line with the technical and the economic advances. 

Noble Energy and its Israeli partners already negotiated a deal 

with Jordan that started in 2012. And it started as quiet discussions and ended up in a pipeline signing agreement that will bring 

gas from Noble to two private companies at the Dead Sea area in 

Jordan. That is already in construction now and will be complete. 

That is a very small amount of gas, but it is the first marker and, 

by the way, the first infrastructure project that connects the two 

countries in a 20-year peace. 

You now have a chicken and an egg. We have to get some of the 

disagreements to move away. Israel has a pipeline that connects it 

to Egypt, goes through the Sinai, as was mentioned by several of 

the members. It was blown up, I think we are now at 32 times in 

the last few years. It can be reverse-flowed so it can take gas from 

Israel to Egypt, but it has a dispute over it that is in international 

arbitration courts. So, until that is resolved, it cannot be used. As 

was also mentioned, we can have an offshore pipeline under the 

sea connecting it to Egypt. 

I think what we have to see now with the normalization between 

Israel and Turkey and if a solution can be reached on the island 

of Cyprus that will allow the unlocking of the ability to build a 

pipeline from Israel via Cyprus to Turkey, as well as cooperation 

with Egypt to allow Israel to use and have access not only to the 

Egyptian domestic market that is still thirsty for gas but also for 

their idle LNG terminals that can reach Europe. 

So I have the same question; what comes first? We are trying to 

work on all different fronts to see whatever can come first. What 

is clear is that the United States needs to continue to play an active role in trying to find what the geopolitical solution is, find the 

stumbling blocks and remove those, so that the private sector can 

find the economic solutions to be able to move forward. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

28

And, Mr. Elkind, one thing that we don’t hear too much about 

when discussing the Eastern Mediterranean energy future is the 

role of the Palestinian Authority. 

Could you tell us, have there been any discussions in the administration about the role of the PA in the Eastern Mediterranean energy development and what would that role be? And how do you 

deal with Israel and the PA while Hamas still controls Gaza? 

Mr. ELKIND. Madam Chair, I am happy to start an answer to 

that, but some elements of what you have just posed as a question 

to me fit, I would say, perhaps a little bit more naturally in the 

State Department’s lane, so my colleague may wish to add. 

The discussions around the development of these resources go to 

the monetization of the resource. These are, after all, economic undertakings first and foremost. And without benefits to simultaneously, as I said before, to the investors and to the host countries, 

then the idea of these projects remains theoretical and doesn’t 

progress beyond that. 

Now, the very obvious political difficulty that exists between the 

state of Israel and the Palestinian Authority is one that I think nobody on any side hopes will persist any day longer than absolutely 

necessary. On the contrary, a peaceful settlement is in everybody’s 

interest. 

But the specific terms and the degree to which natural gas resources from Israel’s offshore would be provided to the Palestinian 

Authority is something that is hugely sensitive, as the chair will 

appreciate. There are from time to time discussions about this, but 

I wouldn’t feel it appropriate for me to go farther than what I have 

said. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, thank you. 

And Mr. Hochstein? 

Mr. HOCHSTEIN. There was an agreement that was signed that 

would allow some of the offshore gas to come into the Palestinian 

Authority to fuel a potential power plant in Jenin, which would 

work for all sides. 

Additionally, there is right near the original Noble discovery, the 

smallest one, called Mari-B, there is a field on the Palestinian side 

of the waters called Gaza Marine that is owned by the Palestinian 

Authority and was leased out originally to British Gas, which was 

purchased recently by Shell. There is a strong interest to be able 

to develop that field. I think we need some advancement on the 

politics to be able to move forward, but it would be of great advantage both to Israel and to the Palestinian Authority for them to be 

able to develop that field. 

Clearly, there would have to be cooperation, as the gas would 

have to come onshore in Israel, not in Gaza, and then be able to 

be fed into the Palestinian Authority territories. As Ranking Member Deutch mentioned earlier, there was some reports of a change 

toward a gas pipeline to Gaza. I think we are still trying to work 

on that. This is a longer-term plan. But what is clear is we want 

to be able to work with the Israelis on identifying a way to get the 

Gaza power plant back online in a way that both allows for electricity restoration in a reliable manner, as well as allowing for it 

to be done in a secure manner, from Israel’s perspective. 

29

We are also working with them on some renewable energy options, which would allow the Palestinian Authority to spur investment and economic activity. And my team will be out there shortly 

to work with them on that. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

And one last question. Mr. Deutch had brought up the U.S.-

Israel energy center that was authorized in the U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Act, a bill that Mr. Deutch and I worked on 

which became law in December 2014. It has been nearly 2 years. 

Why has this not come online yet? And what needs to happen to 

make it happen? 

Mr. ELKIND. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Indeed, this is something that we are working on formulating 

right now. I will note simply as a statement of fact that, while the 

bill did authorize the creation of the center, there were no resources associated with that, and so we have had to go through the 

exercise of identifying those resources. We have now done so. 

We think that there is a beneficial function to be played by a virtual center that helps to create stronger ties between researchers 

in Israel and in the United States. If you permit me, I would note 

that this would build on literally decades of such ties. My father, 

who at an earlier stage—well, when he was still alive—at an early 

stage in his career was at both Brookhaven National Laboratory 

and then Argonne National Laboratory and, in his cancer research 

work, had exceptionally close ties with collaborators from Israel. 

So this is building on a very long and storied history. We think 

there is more important work to be done, and we are now working 

on doing precisely that. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Sounds good. Thank you so much. 

Ranking Member Deutch is recognized. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you very much. 

Just to follow up on that point, Secretary Elkind, this virtual 

center that you described, there are now resources to create it. Do 

you have a sense of when that might actually move forward? 

Mr. ELKIND. So we have to work through some of the details with 

our Israeli counterparts, and we have not done that yet. But there 

was a prerequisite feature, which was to identify resources, and 

that has now happened. So I expect that this will be operational 

in 2017, but that is an estimate, it is not a commitment. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Okay. Thank you. Understood. 

Mr. Hochstein, I know you recently traveled with the Vice President to Turkey. This is a question perhaps for both of you, but I 

will start with you. 

Many of us have concerns about the direction that Turkey is 

headed, and I am concerned about human rights and freedom of 

speech, long-term security. But I want to believe that President 

Erdogan understands the importance of regional energy cooperation. And so I would ask, to what extent during your visit did you 

discuss energy issues, including an Israel-Cyprus pipeline? 

I also just had a couple of followups. The recent repair of relations between Turkey and Russia has revived talk of the Turk 

Stream project that would carry Russian gas to Southern Europe 

while bypassing Ukraine. And if that happens, are you still committed to Turkey as an energy hub, or do other routes—Egypt for 

30

one; potential pipeline from Israel to Cyprus to Greece another—

become higher priorities? 

Mr. HOCHSTEIN. Thank you, sir. Yes, I did travel with the Vice 

President, and I thank you, sir, for asking me the question about 

the energy part of the discussion. 

We did touch on the energy issues, as we have in previous meetings in Turkey, in the Vice President’s trips there and in meetings 

in Davos. I think President Erdogan does understand and I think 

the Energy Minister and Prime Minister have a keen understanding of the advantages that energy security provides for Turkey. 

But let me connect the two pieces of your question. Turkey today 

gets just above 50 percent of its natural gas from Russia. It gets 

another piece from Iran as well. So the vulnerability in the dependence on a Russian source is an economic vulnerability that Turkey 

is keen to overcome. As a result, you have seen an effort to diversify its resources, one, through an intention to lease floating LNG 

terminals to be able to import more from the market, and the second, embarking on discussions around the region to see how it can 

diversify its sources. The normalization with Israel obviously had 

a lot to do with security issues, but the energy security piece was 

clearly a critical role, as was stated by both countries publicly. 

But to complete that project, in order to be able to realize the 

economic benefit of energy security from the normalization, you 

have to have an agreement in Cyprus, because the pipeline that 

would go from Israel to Turkey goes through the EEZ of Cyprus. 

And I truly hope and believe that Turkey understands the critical 

nature and the strategic nature or the element that has been added 

in on the Cyprus discussions—that is, energy. 

But let me connect that to the second question on Turk Stream. 

On the same day of the announcement of the normalization with 

Israel, there was an announcement of discussions between Turkey 

and Russia and then followed by a meeting in Saint Petersburg on 

August 9 between the two leaders. And Turk Stream was heavily 

featured in the press releases coming out from Moscow. Turk 

Stream, or its predecessor South Stream combined with Nord 

Stream 2, are the Russian attempt and insistence on continuing to 

dominate their monopoly in natural gas in a significant portion of 

Europe. The Turk Stream that we are talking about now originally 

was four pipelines that would replace Ukraine, the transit through 

Ukraine, that would have a devastating impact on Ukraine. Turk 

Stream today is, first of all, a discussion of one pipeline that would 

essentially swap what Turkey gets from Russia via the Balkans 

with a different route. So that is a little bit different from the full 

Turk Stream that we had talked about in the past. 

Still, our view is that we don’t need geopolitical projects that 

Russia is financing as it is a national security threat to Europe. So 

I think that there is a lot of room here. 

Mr. DEUTCH. So, just going back to something you said earlier 

in your answer, are you suggesting that President Erdogan, understanding these regional issues, that the desire to move forward on 

these energy issues may actually contribute to the likelihood of reunification of Cyprus? 

31

And if that happens, then, given the concerns about Russia, does 

that become the focus of these energy discussions? 

Mr. HOCHSTEIN. Like I said in my testimony, the energy piece is 

not a replacement for solving geopolitical problems and disputes 

that have existed for a very long time throughout the region. What 

they do provide is an incentive, I believe, and potentially a catalyst. 

I do believe that all countries in the region—Turkey, Cyprus, 

Greece, Israel—understand what the benefits would be for energy 

security, cooperation, and prosperity if a solution could be found in 

Cyprus. Whether or not one is going to be found, I don’t know, and 

there are others that are going to be smarter than I am and more 

informed on that. But it is clear to me that throughout the region 

there is an understanding of the linkage between what the benefits 

are and would be for all parties. And that is why I think we are 

at a critical time. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And then, finally, Madam Chairwoman, if it is 

okay, just to circle back, given the Zohr discovery and the recent 

Cyprus-Egypt deal and the existing infrastructure in Egypt, if a 

deal in Cyprus—if there isn’t reunification this year, does that 

make the Egyptian option essentially phase one for the Eastern 

Med? 

Mr. HOCHSTEIN. I certainly think that there can be multiple 

phases here. I think it is not a zero-sum game. There is enough gas 

already discovered in Israel and Cyprus and Egypt to allow for gas 

to flow in both directions. 

I think the cost is going to feature. So the cost of a pipeline to 

Turkey via Cyprus through the island is far cheaper than some of 

the other options, surely than the one that was mentioned before 

to Europe, which is extraordinarily expensive. 

So I think the economics do allow for both options. And I think 

they compete a little bit differently, because one would be LNG 

from Egypt to Europe or to the other parts of the international 

market; to Turkey, it would be pipeline gas, which is priced differently. So it provides even more flexibility, more options for both 

Cyprus and for Israel. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Great. 

Thank you to both the witnesses. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Chairman Randy Weber is recognized. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you. 

Wow. You know, we have two LNG plants in my district in 

Texas. I am kind of wondering maybe if Texas ought to just annex 

Cyprus and take care of this whole issue, because we know how to 

export LNG. 

So many questions. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Forget it. 

Mr. WEBER. Yeah, I know. 

Mr. Hochstein, you said—I think it was you—in response to the 

chairman’s question, it is kind of a chicken and an egg thing going 

on. Well, I would submit, if you can get gas production and you can 

get somebody producing that gas, then the egg will follow. 

Because once one country gets that energy security—and you can 

tell me, both of you gentlemen, if you think that is a correct assessment—if you can just get your toehold in there, if you can just start 

32

that production and get somebody producing it, don’t you think the 

other countries would see the reliability, the affordability, and 

would follow suit and would actually get in gear and do something? 

Mr. Elkind, you look like you are——

Mr. ELKIND. Well, Chairman Weber, we have seen around the 

globe a lot of times instances where backbone infrastructure that 

started—and you can look at Alaska as an example—helps to spur 

other developments in a very constructive way. 

But I go back to the comments about how the global natural gas 

market is changing, and the story in your district is a huge part 

of that. We are talking about a 40-percent increase globally in the 

capacity to liquefy natural gas. And so this is a competitive marketplace. And one of the conclusions that has for the Eastern Med 

is that it is going to have to be investors who are able to look at 

a long game. 

So would initial success help? Yes, that has already helped, if 

you look at the case of the early production offshore Israel, which 

has brought a lot of benefits to the state of Israel. But the market 

that surrounds the Eastern Med is not simple. It is competitive. It 

is going to get more so. 

Mr. HOCHSTEIN. So I think, to add just the element of the chicken and the egg that I mean, so, of course, you are right. If somebody starts developing the gas—Israel has developed gas, but it is 

really for the domestic market. It hasn’t yet developed Leviathan. 

The reason they haven’t developed Leviathan is because they had 

all these concerns and they were stuck in court and everything 

else. 

Mr. WEBER. Yeah. 

Mr. HOCHSTEIN. They finally get rid of that issue, and we are 

now ready, but here is the issue: A company like Noble or any 

other company, in order to be able to approve and to commit to billions of dollars of development of a field the size of Leviathan, need 

to have some contracts for exports that will allow them to justify 

the investment ahead of time. And that is when you get to this 

chicken and the egg. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, I think that is what he called predictable regulatory regulations to develop this—in your remarks. 

Go ahead. 

Mr. HOCHSTEIN. Yeah. So they now have the regulatory system, 

but they need to be able to find markets to sell to. They need to 

be able to conclude arrangements with Jordan or Egypt or Turkey 

or others. Israel doesn’t have its own LNG facilities, and, therefore, 

it has to rely on a neighbor to be able to get the gas to the international markets. 

So when you say that doesn’t one of them need to start developing, they do, but they also need to be able to conclude arrangements to sell it in order to be able to justify the investment. 

Mr. WEBER. I am aware. 

Mr. HOCHSTEIN. That is where we are coming in and trying to 

figure out how do we help that process along, of removing the geopolitical stumbling blocks to be able to have the economics drive it. 

Mr. WEBER. Do you think that the unrest—well, it is actually a 

two-part, I guess, as it pertains to Turkey. 

33

The chairwoman, by the way, puts on an excellent congressional 

delegation. If you want to go over there and learn a lot, she is the 

ticket. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Lots of Halloumi. 

Mr. WEBER. And she likes the good cheese over there too. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. That is the cheese, not booze. 

Mr. WEBER. Yeah. I wanted to get that on the record. 

Do you think that the—I mean, we were over there trying to foster a better relationship between the Cypriot Greeks and the Cypriot Turks, and then all this stuff happened in Turkey. So now you 

have not just one unrest to deal with, you actually have two. 

Elaborate on how important you think the purported coup—how 

long you think that is going to take to play out. Is it going to have 

a long-term effect on these negotiations? 

Mr. HOCHSTEIN. I really couldn’t say the effect, the political effect, of the post-coup environment. Obviously, Turkey went through 

a devastating time of recovering from, you know, a radical event 

that they see as their 9/11. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, then let me ask you a specific question, if I 

can. I know that is broad and open-ended. Their Minister of Energy—because I know there was, like, 60,000 people that were kind 

of arrested and detained and spirited away, if you will—was he or 

she one of them? 

Mr. HOCHSTEIN. No. The Minister of Energy is still there——

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Mr. HOCHSTEIN [continuing]. And I speak to him regularly. 

Mr. WEBER. So, in essence, that line of communication is still in 

place. 

Mr. HOCHSTEIN. Yeah, I have not seen any disruption—since 

those, you know, 50 days or so ago of the coup, I have not seen any 

disruption in the energy relationship. And especially in the region—the conversations, regionally, are continuing. I have seen the 

Minister a couple times since then and spoken to him on the phone 

almost weekly. 

So I think that, while there is a lot of churn going on politically 

in the country and they are trying to get back to normal, on the 

energy front there has not been a change in pace. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

And, Mr. Elkind, did you want to weigh in on that as well? 

Mr. ELKIND. Thank you, Mr. Weber. 

The only thing that I would add to this that hasn’t been covered 

by Mr. Hochstein is a little bit of the long view. 

We have been engaged with Turkey on these energy issues, energy transportation issues, for a long time, back to the 1990s and 

the first development of the Caspian Sea resources offshore from 

Azerbaijan. 

And I would say it has been my observation from my time inside 

government in the 1990s, outside governments, working with some 

of the energy companies myself, that there have been ebbs and 

flows in Turkish policy. There have been times where our Turkish 

colleagues really, with a sense of incredible purpose, moved forward on the kind of backbone infrastructure that I was remarking 

on before. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline comes to mind, the 

South Caucasus gas pipeline. 

34

I am confident that Turkey will continue to play that role of 

being an important partner in this, in the energy projects. I will 

leave the politics to others. But, again, I stress that there have 

been ebbs and flows. There have been times where we wondered, 

was Turkey still committed to this vision of being a key link 

from——

Mr. WEBER. A connector, if you will? 

Mr. ELKIND. Yes. And we will see. I think that that is still where 

their intention is, but that is for the Turks to determine and for 

them to show. 

Mr. WEBER. All right. Thank you. 

And, Madam Chair, I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Weber. 

I am so pleased to yield to Coach Perlmutter because he is an 

outstanding Member of Congress, but his real claim to fame is that 

he goes out there every morning with the congressional women’s bipartisan softball team and coaches us on to victory. So thank you. 

He is recognized for all the time that he cares to have. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Well, now that I know your nickname is Lily, 

you are going to be doing wind sprints when I say, ‘‘Lily, hit it.’’

No, thank you, Madam Chair, and it is a pleasure to participate 

with your committee. And this is a fascinating conversation, obviously very complicated. And, Mr. Hochstein, when you talk about 

geopolitics, I don’t know whether it is geographic politics or geologic politics, because it is both. And there are a couple big players 

in the region you haven’t talked about much: Iran and Saudi Arabia. 

You also mentioned energy security and energy prosperity. And 

I think we have to break this down into a couple, three phases for 

me to even absorb anything you guys are talking about: National 

security; sort of the foreign policy international relationship, friendship, alliances; and then global markets. Because at the price of 

natural gas today and the price of oil today—which, you know, they 

sort of run in tandem—there isn’t much of incentive to develop expensive fields in dangerous places. 

And so the question then is, Israel developing for their own domestic use and their own national security and maybe working 

some of this, these pipelines and things like that, to develop international friendships that they might not otherwise have. 

So I guess my question to both of you is, with Saudi Arabia 

pumping into a glut and just having an oversupply, and the demand has sort of stayed the same out there, so prices have 

dropped, how do you see things developing? Has everything come 

to a screeching halt at these prices? Or what actually is happening 

out there, in this part of the world, as they are trying to develop 

this new resource? 

Mr. ELKIND. Thank you, Congressman. 

Has everything come to a screeching halt? Well, no, but none of 

the companies that are involved in any of these projects in any of 

the countries that you have mentioned can afford to try to defy 

gravity. The market creates a backdrop that is not favorable and 

friendly to the kind of large, capital-intensive projects that we are 

talking about. 

35

But the companies we are talking about also understand from 

the beginning that these are multidecadal projects. And so they 

take a long view that looks not only at today’s price environment 

but also an expectation of what that may be for 25 to 40 years. And 

that is where I think that there is a general sense that, although 

we have this abrupt change that is happening in natural gas markets right now, with new production in the United States, first and 

foremost, but also in other places around the globe—there is also 

a skyrocketing demand for a natural gas as a lower-carbon and 

lower-polluting, in terms of air quality, urban air quality, fuel. 

So these companies that we are talking about, by their nature, 

take the long view. They will look at today’s reality with a sense 

of caution. You will have read, of course, about the reductions in 

capital budgets that almost every global hydrocarbon company is 

experiencing right now. 

I would say that it is not easy to be new to the hydrocarbon business. And Mr. Hochstein commented before about some of the 

bumps in the road that have been experienced as Israel tried on 

various approaches to its interaction as a state, with the investor. 

But we perceive that there is progress that is being made. We are 

optimistic that this necessity of creating a predictable pathway into 

which companies can put enormous quantities of resources, of investment, we think that this is on a much better trajectory now, 

where we are optimistic because, at base, we hear optimism from 

the companies. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thank you. 

I mean, I guess—and my time has expired—but you have this 

international, you know, cover that sometimes you have alliances, 

sometimes you are fighting with each other over there, and that is 

a political risk that any company has to consider. So that is getting 

straightened out. So kind of to Mr. Weber’s question, you know, 

those kind of things are getting ironed out. 

But that price risk, that a Saudi Arabia can drive the prices 

down in the 1980s and drive everybody out of business, or they do 

the same thing at 107 bucks a barrel for whatever their goal is, to 

increase their market share or to keep Iran out of business or to 

try to shut the Russians down, that price risk is going to be something that both the bankers as well as the oil companies are going 

to say, whoa, you know, you have the international risk tamed, but 

that price risk is too much for us to overcome our worry. 

That is what I see. But I was also a bankruptcy attorney and did 

a lot of oil and gas bankruptcy, so that is kind of my mindset on 

this. 

Anyway, thank you very much. 

I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Coach. 

Mr. Neugebauer. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for holding this 

hearing. 

You know, we have been talking about the increased capacity in 

the region and, obviously, the increased capacity that is happening 

domestically here in the U.S. And when you start talking about 

that infrastructure, you know, I think I hear two different dialogues going on. One dialogue is the ability for those countries to 

36

export, you know, natural gas, but then the other is the utilization 

domestically within their own countries. 

And I think, Mr. Hochstein, you mentioned that Israel had gone 

from using, like, 11 percent natural gas to, like, I think, was it 30 

percent? Yeah. 

So the investment to increase the distribution system within 

their own country is a different investment than someone coming 

in and wanting to build export capacity in there. Which one of 

those are you all most focused on now? 

Mr. HOCHSTEIN. Well, first of all, I think it is both. Israel went 

through a process of very quickly increasing their capacity. And recently—they have reached a certain limit due to their existing infrastructure—but as recently, I think, as last week, Minister 

Steinitz announced that they were going to do more conversions of 

three additional coal plants to gas in order to be able to take advantage of gas. 

I think this is still an issue for them in their negotiations with 

private sector, because the private sector would like to have the 

guarantee of exports beyond—even if there is an increase in the domestic market, they still want the certainty of having the 

optionality of—if they are going to be investing, again, in the $6 

billion to $10 billion to $12 billion in developing this field, that 

they have access to the broader market. So there is a cap there. 

In Egypt, we are deeply engaged with the Egyptians on trying 

to work with them on getting a better handle on the power sector. 

Because they are such a historic gas producer, they had most—all 

their power comes from gas, and they ended up with plateauing 

their production, but their demand increased significantly. 

So they had power shortages in the summer during Ramadan 

over the last several years. This past summer is probably the best 

summer they have had, and partly due to a lot of engagement by 

bringing in some American companies to do emergency power—

with GE, and Siemens was there as well—but also thinking 

through what is the investment strategy domestically. 

Egypt is interesting because, as a result of actually changing the 

investment climate, meaning being willing to increase the price 

that they are going to be buying the gas, they ended up with, immediately upon doing that, significant new investments, in the billions of dollars. The Zohr field discovery was done as a result of 

that, as was BP’s onshore discoveries. They also increased their 

ability to transform from an exporter to an importer and bought 

first one, then another, LNG floating terminals to be able to import 

gas, and are looking to—with us and how we can work with the 

Ministry of Electricity and Power—to rationalize the inefficiency in 

the power sector so that they can get more with less. But they have 

had a real struggle in that capacity. 

So, even with the discovery of Zohr, 30 TCF, which is the largest 

in the area, that still, even if it comes online, won’t be enough to 

cover the domestic market, which means there is still an ability to 

take Israeli gas or Cypriot gas, deliver it to the LNG terminals in 

Egypt, and use that as an export vehicle from Egypt to other markets. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. What is——

Mr. ELKIND. If I might just jump in for a second——

37

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Absolutely. 

Mr. ELKIND [continuing]. I mean, to your question about domestic consumption versus export, part of the calculus for all of the potential domestic consumers has to be whether there is reliable supply available. And I think about discussions that one heard in the 

United States up until even the early 1990s, where a standard reaction was, well, why would you use natural gas in power plants? 

Today, the answer is simple: Because it is very affordable. It is a 

clean, cheap, inexpensive, and plentiful fuel. 

Now, we have worked with the Israelis on natural gas utilization 

issues that are of interest to them, such as natural gas vehicles, 

which can help to alleviate the transportation fuels challenges. 

They also, as Israel has, have some particular challenges in this 

space, where security concerns which would not be front of mind, 

necessarily, for a natural-gas-powered bus in a city in the United 

States is absolutely front of mind to our colleagues in Israel. And 

so we have worked through some of those issues with some of the 

very deep expertise in the DOE lab system. But then, also, combination systems. They intend to have a much greater share of renewables in their total fuel mix. And the pairing of variable renewables resources and quick-ramping natural gas generation capacity 

creates some very interesting opportunities for Israel as well. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. The power plants in Israel, are they public or 

private plants? 

Mr. HOCHSTEIN. There has been a liberalization of the market. 

So, traditionally, the utility company, the IEC, the Israel Electricity Company, is government-owned. Recently, they have opened 

up the market in stages to allow for private investment to have 

their own generation. It is still, though, overwhelmingly dominant 

by the IEC, it has sort of a controlling board, the PUA, which controls the policy and the price setting. So the overwhelming negotiator with Noble and its Israeli partners, and Delek, was the PUA, 

because whatever is established there will essentially set the stage 

for the private developers. 

The private developers are now trying to take advantage of gas, 

but they are also trying to take advantage of renewable energy and 

other things. But it is in the early stages of the privatization and 

liberalization. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Well, that will certainly provide additional 

capital, if they will, you know, open up those opportunities. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Dr. Yoho? 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I find this fascinating. You know, I was really excited when they 

found those gas supplies in the Mediterranean. And then my concerns kind of go along with my colleagues Mr. Weber and Mr. 

Perlmutter. With the geopolitical landscape, this is a game changer, obviously. You know, you have this tremendous supply of natural gas that is there. And, you know, down the road, they might 

find petroleum, you know, oil there. 

And when you look at the Russian market and what happened 

with the Ukraine as they were looking to go into the EU and Russia put the screws on them and tightened down and said, well, we 

38

are going to hold up your gas, and they threatened them, how is 

this going to affect the Russian market? When you see the price of 

the natural gas and the hit they have taken economically—and I 

know we have talked a little bit about that—but how do you see 

Russia coming into this? And what kind of influence are they going 

to have on the Baltic states there and those other ones and 

teaming up with Iran and putting more pressure on that area not 

to develop this? 

Mr. HOCHSTEIN. I think they are following it very closely. I think 

they are very concerned about the change in the market because 

of the history of the cold war, the pipelines that go through 

Ukraine and primarily the Ukraine route delivers gas to a significant amount of countries that have the Russian gas as 100 percent 

of their supplies. And, in some cases, it is less than 100 percent but 

the other sources are Russian gas that is coming through a different venue, so——

Mr. YOHO. Right. 

Mr. HOCHSTEIN [continuing]. It adds up. 

The concern there is that they want to keep this leverage, this 

political leverage. It is not just about selling gas to Bulgaria or to 

Serbia or Croatia or Hungary, et cetera. It is about keeping the political leverage that is very strong. 

And every 4 to 5 years, we have seen the utilization of that leverage—meaning, in 2005, they shut off the gas to Ukraine; in 2006, 

the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee created 

my position as a result; in 2009, they shut off the gas first to 

Ukraine, then to the rest of Europe that gets its gas through 

Ukraine; in 2014, they shut off the gas in June to Ukraine yet 

again. 

But we have adapted. And the European Union passed certain 

legislation that makes it more difficult for them. So, in June 2014, 

unlike in the past, we were able to reverse-flow gas from Poland, 

from Hungary, and from Slovakia back into Ukraine. 

But what we need, the problem to solve this, it will only be 

solved if there is new infrastructure at critical nodes in Eastern 

and Central Europe that will create a capability to import gas. 

Right now, there is none. All the LNG capability is in Western Europe or, for instance, in Spain and Portugal, but France doesn’t 

allow any natural gas to flow into France from Spain and Portugal, 

so it is essentially stranded. 

So we have worked with Greece and Bulgaria about creating the 

IGB, the Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria, to see if we can help accelerate and develop an LNG terminal in the waters in 

Alexandropoulos in Greece to be able to feed into that, to ensure 

that the gas pipeline from Azerbaijan through Turkey into Greece 

could also go into Bulgaria, to do the same in Croatia and Krk island. 

The Eastern Mediterranean, if it is developed, if we are successful in what we are trying to do and the Eastern Mediterranean develops, it won’t only be American gas or Australian gas or whomever. It will also be a very close, from a transportation cost perspective, for Egyptian LNG to reach in or for Turkey to carry that gas 

because it already has the interconnecting infrastructure. So you 

don’t have to pay for any new infrastructure. 

39

So this can really not only create new geopolitical relationships 

in the region—and I mean both geological and geographic—but it 

will also create an ability for Europe to use that gas to begin to 

free itself from the dependency on Russian gas and political——

Mr. YOHO. And that is what I want because that leads into, I 

think, the more serious thing, because as Russia gets squeezed 

more, we know they are going to react in some way, more than 

likely. 

What would you recommend on a U.S. foreign policy, something 

we can do to help—I don’t want to say stabilize that area—but secure that area with our ally like Israel? You know, I mean, more 

bases, more military equipment, or just a presence in that area 

without overstepping our boundary, but just to let them know we 

are here to help protect our allies. 

Mr. HOCHSTEIN. Well, two things. One, I think they already 

would like us to continue the role that we are playing diplomatically in creating the connections so that they can have an export 

market into the global market and especially into Europe. That is 

something that they have asked for continued support, and we will 

continue to do that. 

The second, though—and this is not only the administration, but 

Congress as well—is to continue to stand steadfast against the 

Russian projects. The way they will undermine these kinds of developments is by building projects where they will dump a lot of 

money—that a normal economic project wouldn’t allow—to build 

new infrastructure that connects Russia to Europe, that solidifies 

the monopoly status for the next generation or two, and would lock 

out Israeli gas, American gas, others——

Dr. YOHO. Sure. 

Mr. HOCHSTEIN [continuing]. And force them into costlier markets further out. 

So we need to continue this work beyond this administration and 

to work with our allies in Western and Eastern Europe to be able 

to block those kinds of political projects that the Russians are promoting in Eastern and Central Europe. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. I appreciate it. I am out of time. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Dr. Yoho. 

And I would like to recognize for our last question-and-answer 

period Mr. Bilirakis. 

But I want to point out that we have—we are so honored to have 

the Cypriot Ambassador here with us. 

So thank you, sir. Sorry that I did not call you out first. 

Mr. Bilirakis? 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it so 

much. 

A question for Mr. Hochstein: The U.S. administration in a number of previous instances has upheld the right of the Republic of 

Cyprus to exercise its sovereign rights in its exclusive economic 

zone and continental shelf. 

And I have asked this question when I was a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee a few years ago, and I received confirmation at that time from the State Department. Could you reconfirm 

the above position and inform us, in what practical ways can the 

administration support the effective exercise of that right? 

40

Mr. HOCHSTEIN. I don’t know what has been said in the past, so 

I will just speak to what is our policy today. And I think we have 

stated it clearly, and I will try to be as clear as I can. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Fair enough. 

Mr. HOCHSTEIN. We strongly support the Republic of Cyprus’ 

rights to develop natural resources in its offshore. I think I have 

said that publicly, both when I was in Cyprus and in travels 

around the region. We have continuously, when there has been any 

obstacle to them, we have worked to clear that and to make sure 

that everybody understands the U.S. position. 

We support American companies and international companies in 

working in all the blocks that have been tendered thus far. We supported the third energy—the third bid round that was announced 

just a few weeks ago so successfully. But—not ‘‘but’’—and we also 

believe that a political solution on the island will enhance the modernization of those discoveries. 

So I can tell you that I, personally, am a frequent and public 

cheerleader for discoveries in the offshore in Cyprus. I speak weekly with Minister Lakkotrypis and other ministers in Cyprus on seeing how we can be in a position to support Cyprus. I hope that that 

answers you as clearly as one can answer that. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you so much. I appreciate it. 

Next question, again for you, Mr. Hochstein: If a settlement cannot be reached to unify Cyprus, is the option of shipping Cypriot 

and Israeli gas to Egypt and perhaps utilizing the LNG terminals 

for export elsewhere the most likely phase one in the Eastern Mediterranean, in your opinion? 

Mr. HOCHSTEIN. Absent other developments that could happen 

between now and then, I think that is the most likely of scenarios 

for phase one. 

But, as we just discussed, Cyprus just had a new bid round. 

ExxonMobil is one of the companies, together with Qatargas, that 

has bid. We have to see if new discoveries will be made. 

Based on what we know today, with the current volumes that 

have been confirmed, the 41⁄2 to 5 TCF that Noble has discovered, 

I would say that is the most likely option. How exactly we do that, 

there are a number of different options, but that is probably the 

most likely. 

If a settlement is reached, then I think it becomes a phase one 

of two phases or a concurrent. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. 

All right. Last question. With the recent coup attempt—and I 

know Representative Weber touched on this, but I would like to 

touch this question again—with the recent coup attempt in Turkey, 

how has this changed the dynamics of the region and the ongoing 

Cyprus reunification negotiations? 

Mr. HOCHSTEIN. Again, as I have said before, I think I will leave 

the questions about the political implications to others. 

On the energy front, I have not seen a change. I think we continue to work together with Turkey on energy in an uninterrupted 

way. And I hope that the developments in the region on energy will 

continue to contribute as a motivator and accelerator to provide an 

incentive for the different parties, including Turkey, to reach a just 

and lasting agreement in Cyprus. 

41

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Elkind, do you want to touch on that? 

Mr. ELKIND. Congressman, thank you, but I don’t really have 

anything to add, other than what I have said previously about kind 

of the long view of our engagements with Turkey on energy issues. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. All right. Thank you. 

I yield back. Appreciate it. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Bilirakis. 

And we have 4 minutes to get to a series of votes. So we thank 

our witnesses. Thank you to all the members, and thank you to the 

audience as well. 

And, with that, the subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:58 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

(43)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

44

f


21461n.eps
45

Æ


21461m.eps