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*********************************************** 
ALFRED J. KLOIBER ET AL. v. LINDA JELLEN ET AL.

(AC 43382)

Elgo, Cradle and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiffs, K and M, sought an injunction and to recover damages from

the defendants for trespass, private nuisance, common-law negligence

and statutory negligence in connection with a property dispute between

the parties concerning surface water runoff onto certain real property

located directly between the parties’ properties. F Co., a limited liability

company of which K is the principal and sole member, holds title to

the subject property, which is maintained as a rental property. The

plaintiffs never owned, occupied or resided at, or had a possessory

interest in, the subject property. Following a trial on the merits, the

trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendants, from which

the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Held that the plaintiffs lacked

standing to maintain this action in their individual capacities against

the defendants and, as self-represented individuals, could not maintain

it on behalf of F Co., and, therefore, the action should have been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Argued May 17—officially released September 21, 2021

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, trespass,

and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in

the judicial district of Danbury and tried to the court,

Krumeich, J.; judgment for the defendants, from which

the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Improper form of

judgment; reversed; judgment directed.

Melanie McNichol, self-represented, with whom, on

the brief, was Alfred J. Kloiber, self-represented, the

appellants (plaintiffs).

Robert O. Hickey, with whom, on the brief, was Ryan

T. Daly, for the appellees (defendants).
Opinion

ELGO, J. In this property dispute among neighbors,

the self-represented plaintiffs, Alfred J. Kloiber and Melanie McNichol,1 appeal from the judgment of the trial

court in favor of the defendants, Chris Jellen and Linda

Jellen. On appeal, the plaintiffs raise a variety of issues

related to the court’s disposition of their trespass, private nuisance, negligence, and statutory negligence

claims. Following supplemental briefing by the parties

on the issue of standing, we conclude that the plaintiffs

lacked the requisite standing to maintain this action.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court

and remand the case with direction to render a judgment of dismissal.

The following facts are relevant to this appeal. As

the court found in its memorandum of decision, ‘‘[t]he

[three] properties in question are located in Sherman off

Route 39 South between Wanzer Mountain and Squantz

Pond.’’ In 1988, the defendants purchased real property

known as 158 Route 39 South (defendants’ property),2

on which they constructed a home.3 Central to this

dispute is the parcel known as 160 Route 39 South

(subject property), which the court found was ‘‘downhill from and adjacent to [the westerly side of] the

defendants’ property . . . .’’4 Further west and adjacent to the other side of the subject property is 162

Route 39 South (plaintiffs’ property), which the plaintiffs purchased in 1999. The subject property thus sits

directly between the plaintiffs’ property and the defendants’ property.

Approximately twenty years after the defendants

developed their property and more than a decade after

the plaintiffs purchased their property, an entity known

as ‘‘Fred’s Country Rentals, LLC,’’ acquired the subject

property in December, 2010. It is undisputed that

Kloiber is the principal and sole member of that limited

liability company. It also is undisputed that the limited

liability company holds title to the subject property. As

the court found in its memorandum of decision, the

subject property at all relevant times was maintained

‘‘as a rental property.’’5 At no time did the plaintiffs

occupy or reside at the subject property. Rather, the

uncontroverted evidence presented at trial indicated

that they resided at the plaintiffs’ property at all relevant times.6

In December, 2017, the plaintiffs commenced this

action for injunctive and monetary relief, which concerns surface water runoff onto the subject property.

Their operative complaint contained four counts alleging trespass, private nuisance, negligence, and statutory

negligence. As the court noted in its memorandum of

decision, ‘‘[t]he only activity by the defendants that the

plaintiffs point to as contributing to the migration of

surface water onto the subject property concerns the
construction of the defendants’ house . . . . The plaintiffs complain that the defendants developed a woodland lot by constructing a house with roofs, gutters,

leaders and downspouts, a driveway and a parking area,

which . . . added ‘impervious surfaces’ that the plaintiffs contend channeled surface water that eventually

traveled to the subject property. The defendants also

constructed a septic system that included a swale to

divert groundwater away from the septic fields. . . .

All the changes in surface conditions to the defendants’

property were in accordance with the building plans

approved by municipal authorities when their house

was constructed and certificates of occupancy were

issued.’’ (Footnote omitted.)

Following a two day trial, the court issued a comprehensive memorandum of decision, in which it found

that ‘‘[t]he surface water collected on Wanzer Mountain

tends to migrate downhill across Route 39 onto the

defendants’ property . . . and from there through natural gullies, channels and rivulets to the subject property. . . . [T]hese natural channels were likely the

result of long-standing natural water flow, not any activity to direct or increase the flow onto the subject property by the defendants. . . . [T]here is no evidence that

the defendants directed or increased the natural flow

onto the subject property. All the changes to the contours on the defendants’ property and the structures and

paved areas erected were in accordance with approvals

received from municipal authorities when the defendants’ house was constructed . . . and would have

been known by the plaintiffs before the purchase of

the subject property. . . . Nor is there proof the flooding and erosion experienced on the subject property

was caused by any alterations to the defendants’ property. . . .

‘‘There was no evidence of the natural water flow

before improvements to the defendants’ property; it is

probable that surface water flowed down the mountain

and over the highway onto the defendants’ property

before it was improved and that excess water migrated

downhill to the subject property. There is no evidence

that the changes made to the defendants’ property

caused the conditions complained of by the plaintiffs.’’

The court thus concluded that the plaintiffs could not

prevail on any of their claims and rendered judgment

in favor of the defendants.

From that judgment, the plaintiffs appealed. At oral

argument before this court, McNichol, who was the only

plaintiff presenting oral argument, was asked precisely

who held title to the subject property.7 Consistent with

her testimony at trial,8 McNichol responded that title

to the subject property was held by ‘‘an LLC.’’ Mindful

that a question of subject matter jurisdiction may be

raised at any time, including sua sponte invocation by

a reviewing court; DeCorso v. Calderaro, 118 Conn.
App. 617, 623 n.11, 985 A.2d 349 (2009), cert. denied,

295 Conn. 919, 991 A.2d 564 (2010); see also Smith v.

Snyder, 267 Conn. 456, 460 n.5, 839 A.2d 589 (2004)

(‘‘[w]e raise this issue of standing sua sponte as it implicates our subject matter jurisdiction’’); we subsequently

ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs on the

issue of the plaintiffs’ standing to maintain this action.

‘‘Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery

in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction

of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or

representative capacity, some real interest in the cause

of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest

in the subject matter of the controversy. . . . [If] a

party is found to lack standing, the court is consequently

without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the

cause.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) J.E. Robert Co. v. Signature Properties, LLC,

309 Conn. 307, 318, 71 A.3d 492 (2013); see also Ion

Bank v. J.C.C. Custom Homes, LLC, 189 Conn. App.

30, 42, 206 A.3d 208 (2019) (‘‘the court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction over an action commenced by a

plaintiff without standing’’). Because the issue of standing implicates a court’s subject matter jurisdiction, it

is subject to plenary review. Channing Real Estate,

LLC v. Gates, 326 Conn. 123, 137, 161 A.3d 1227 (2017).

In their supplemental brief, the plaintiffs acknowledge that they neither own nor hold title to the subject

property.9 They nonetheless maintain that they possess

standing to maintain the four causes of action alleged

in their complaint. We disagree.

In count one, the plaintiffs alleged trespass against

the defendants. By way of relief, they sought, inter alia,

‘‘[a]n immediate injunction requiring the defendants to

cease and desist allowing the flow of their surface water

runoff to enter over, under and onto’’ the subject property. As our Supreme Court has explained, ‘‘[t]itle is

an essential element in a plaintiff’s case, whe[n] an

injunction is sought to restrain a trespass . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Socha v. Bordeau, 277

Conn. 579, 586, 893 A.2d 422 (2006). When both monetary damages for trespass and an injunction are sought,

as is the case here, ‘‘both title to and possession of the

disputed area must be proved . . . and the burden of

proving them is on the plaintiff.’’ (Citations omitted.)

McCullough v. Waterfront Park Assn., Inc., 32 Conn.

App. 746, 749, 630 A.2d 1372, cert. denied, 227 Conn.

933, 632 A.2d 707 (1993). Because the plaintiffs by their

own admission do not hold title to the subject property,

we conclude that they lack standing to maintain the

trespass action alleged in their complaint. See Ventres

v. Farmington, 192 Conn. 663, 668, 473 A.2d 1216 (1984)

(‘‘the trial court correctly found that the plaintiff had no

standing to complain of trespass’’); Zanoni v. Hudon,

42 Conn. App. 70, 75, 678 A.2d 12 (1996) (trial court

‘‘correctly concluded’’ that plaintiffs lacked standing to
bring trespass action).

The plaintiffs also alleged private nuisance on the

part of the defendants. Under Connecticut law, such a

claim may be brought only by an owner or occupier of

the property in question. ‘‘A private nuisance exists only

where one is injured in relation to a right which he

enjoys by reason of his ownership of an interest in land.

. . . [A cause of action for private nuisance] includes

all injuries to an owner or occupier in the enjoyment

of the property of which he is in possession, without

regard to the quality of the tenure.’’10 (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Webel v. Yale University, 125 Conn.

515, 525, 7 A.2d 215 (1939); see Couture v. Board of

Education, 6 Conn. App. 309, 315, 505 A.2d 432 (1986)

(plaintiff could not maintain private nuisance action

‘‘[b]ecause he suffered no injury in relation to his ownership of an interest in land’’); Welsh v. Nusbaum, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk,

Docket No. CV-17-6033010 (June 7, 2018) (66 Conn. L.

Rptr. 574) (plaintiff’s allegation that ‘‘she was a [longterm] occupant of the property’’ sufficient to survive

motion to strike private nuisance claim); Petrarca v.

Doubleday, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV-09-5013111 (November 17, 2010)

(50 Conn. L. Rptr. 886) (concluding that tenant’s ‘‘claim

sounding in private nuisance’’ against ‘‘ ‘owner/landlord’ ’’ of property was legally sufficient to survive

motion to strike); Arachy v. Schopen, 22 Conn. Supp. 20,

20–21, 158 A.2d 604 (1960) (plaintiff could not maintain

private nuisance action because ‘‘he was not injured in

relation to a right which he enjoyed by reason of his

ownership of an interest in land’’); Goldberg v. Wolotsky,

8 Conn. Supp. 72, 73 (1940) (plaintiff could not maintain

private nuisance action because he was not owner or

occupier of property where injury occurred); see also

Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 440 Mich. 293, 303, 487

N.W.2d 715 (1992) (‘‘[t]he essence of private nuisance

is the protection of a property owner’s or occupier’s

reasonable comfort in occupation of the land in question’’); Philadelphia v. Brabender, 201 Pa. 574, 576,

51 A. 374 (1902) (‘‘only the owners or occupiers’’ can

maintain private nuisance action); Bowers v. Westvaco

Corp., 244 Va. 139, 148, 419 S.E.2d 661 (1992) (‘‘[a]

private nuisance is the using, or authorizing the use of,

one’s property, or of anything under one’s control, so as

to injuriously affect an owner or occupier of property’’

(internal quotation marks omitted)); W. Keeton et al.,

Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (5th Ed. 1984)

§ 87, p. 619 (private nuisances ‘‘interfere with [the] right

to the undisturbed enjoyment of the premises which is

inseparable from ownership of the property’’); W. Keeton et al., supra, p. 622 (‘‘[p]rivate nuisance is a tort that

protects the interest of those who own or occupy land’’).

Here, the plaintiffs do not own the subject property.

See footnote 9 of this opinion. It also is undisputed that

the plaintiffs never occupied the property. See footnote
6 of this opinion. Accordingly, they lack standing to

maintain a cause of action for private nuisance against

the defendants.

Relying on § 821E of the Restatement (Second) of

Torts, the plaintiffs nonetheless claim that they are entitled to maintain a private nuisance action due to their

purported status as ‘‘possessors’’ of the subject property. That claim is unavailing. Titled ‘‘Who Can Recover

For Private Nuisance,’’ § 821E enumerates three classes

of individuals ‘‘who have property rights and privileges

in respect to the use and enjoyment of the land affected

. . . (a) possessors of the land, (b) owners of easements and profits in the land, and (c) owners of nonpossessory estates in the land that are detrimentally

affected by interference with its use and enjoyment.’’

4 Restatement (Second), Torts § 821E, pp. 102–103

(1979). The plaintiffs in this case do not qualify for any

of those three classes.

As the commentary expressly states, the term ‘‘[p]ossessors of land,’’ as used in § 821E, is defined in § 328E.

Id., comment (c), p. 103. Section 328E, in turn, defines

‘‘possessor of land’’ as ‘‘(a) a person who is in occupation of the land with intent to control it or (b) a person

who has been in occupation of land with intent to control it, if no other person has subsequently occupied it

with intent to control it, or (c) a person who is entitled

to immediate occupation of the land, if no other person

is in possession under [c]lauses (a) and (b).’’ 2

Restatement (Second), Torts § 328E, p. 170 (1965). It

is undisputed that the plaintiffs have never been in

occupation of the subject property. See footnote 6 of

this opinion. Furthermore, because they concededly are

not the owners of the subject property, they are not ‘‘a

person who is entitled to immediate occupation’’ of that

property when it is unoccupied. The plaintiffs, therefore, are not possessors of the subject property, as

that term is used in the Restatement (Second). See 4

Restatement (Second), supra, § 821E (a), p. 102. There

also is no claim or evidence in this case that the plaintiffs are owners of easements and profits in the subject

property. See id., § 821E (b), p. 102. Finally, in light of

their concession that the subject property at all relevant

times was owned by a limited liability company; see

footnotes 8 and 9 of this opinion; the plaintiffs plainly

are not owners of nonpossessory estates in the subject

property. See id., § 821E (c), p. 103. They thus do not

qualify as possessors of the subject property pursuant

to the Restatement (Second).

Apart from the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the

plaintiffs have provided no legal authority to support

their claim of a possessory interest in the subject property. At trial, both plaintiffs equated ownership of real

property with possession thereof and testified that they

were in exclusive possession of the subject property

due to their status as owners of the property,11 which
testimony they now concede was incorrect. See footnote 9 of this opinion.

Although the plaintiffs testified that they paid the

mortgage, property taxes, and utility bills for the subject

property, they presented no documentary evidence of

such payments, save for a redacted Form 1098 mortgage

interest statement for 2018 addressed to Kloiber at ‘‘PO

Box 8832 New Fairfield, CT 06812.’’12 More importantly,

they provided no evidence that such payments were

made in their individual capacities, rather than on

behalf of the limited liability company that owned the

subject property. At all relevant times, Kloiber was the

principal and sole member of that company. This court

takes judicial notice of the records of the Connecticut

Secretary of the State, which indicate that the business

address of that limited liability company is ‘‘PO Box

8832 New Fairfield, CT 06812’’—the same address contained on the mortgage interest statement admitted into

evidence. See, e.g., Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Server,

Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. CV-17-6011564-S (September 13, 2018)

(taking judicial notice of business address of limited

liability company); Dowling v. Schupp, Superior Court,

judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-11-6027560

(July 28, 2015) (taking judicial notice of ‘‘the corporate

records in the [S]ecretary of [the] [S]tate’s office’’).

The plaintiffs have provided this court with no authority to support the contention that the payment of certain

bills and expenses on behalf of a limited liability company by one of its members suffices to establish a possessory interest in real property owned by that company, particularly when the payor never occupied the

property. See DeNunzio v. DeNunzio, 90 Conn. 342,

348, 97 A. 323 (1916) (‘‘The plaintiff as an officer . . .

never had possession of any of the assets of the corporation in his own right. His possession as an officer . . .

was that of the corporation. As an individual he never

had any corporate assets . . . and no right to the possession of any [corporate assets] . . . .’’). In the present case, any interest the plaintiffs had in the subject

property derived exclusively from their activities on

behalf of the limited liability company in a representative capacity. In such circumstances, they cannot be

said to have a possessory interest in the subject property. Accordingly, the plaintiffs lacked standing to maintain an action for private nuisance against the defendants.

For that same reason, the plaintiffs lacked standing

to maintain their common-law and statutory negligence

actions. Although the plaintiffs submit that ‘‘their claims

were based solely on an invasion of their individual

rights,’’ they have not identified any rights that are distinct from, and not derivative of, those of the limited

liability company that owned the subject property.

Because the plaintiffs did not own, occupy, or have a
possessory interest in that property, any harm caused

by the defendants’ allegedly improper conduct was sustained by the limited liability company, as the owner

of the subject property. See Padawer v. Yur, 142 Conn.

App. 812, 818, 66 A.3d 931 (concluding that plaintiff

lacked standing to bring action because, ‘‘[i]f the defendants’ alleged breach caused any harm . . . it was to

[the limited liability company], not to the plaintiff in

his individual capacity’’), cert. denied, 310 Conn. 927,

78 A.3d 145 (2013).

Tellingly, the plaintiffs, in their supplemental brief,

assert that the defendants’ actions interfered with ‘‘the

right of full and unfettered use and enjoyment of one’s

real property.’’ (Emphasis added.) Yet, the subject property indisputably does not belong to the plaintiffs—

it is owned by a limited liability company. The selfrepresented plaintiffs are not entitled to bring this

action in their individual capacities on behalf of that

limited liability company, despite the fact that Kloiber

was the sole member of that company.13 See, e.g., Channing Real Estate, LLC v. Gates, 326 Conn. 123, 138, 161

A.3d 1227 (2017) (‘‘[b]ecause a member of a limited

liability company cannot recover for an injury allegedly

suffered by the limited liability company, we conclude

that the defendant lacks standing to pursue a claim’’

on its behalf); O’Reilly v. Valletta, 139 Conn. App. 208,

214–15, 55 A.3d 583 (2012) (‘‘[a] member or manager

. . . may not sue in an individual capacity to recover

for an injury based on a wrong to the limited liability

company’’), cert. denied, 308 Conn. 914, 61 A.3d 1101

(2013); Ma’Ayergi & Associates, LLC v. Pro Search,

Inc., 115 Conn. App. 662, 666, 974 A.2d 724 (2009)

(rejecting plaintiff’s claim that he had ‘‘standing to

assert all of the causes of action on behalf of his companies because he is the sole member of those companies’’).14

The plaintiffs also argue, in passing, that the defendants interfered with their rights as ‘‘neighbors’’ to the

subject property. They have provided neither legal

authority nor analysis to substantiate that bald assertion. ‘‘[Our Supreme Court] repeatedly [has] stated that

[w]e are not required to review issues that have been

improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract

assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an

issue by failure to brief the issue properly.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Taylor v. Mucci, 288 Conn.

379, 383 n.4, 952 A.2d 776 (2008); see also Northeast

Ct. Economic Alliance, Inc. v. ATC Partnership, 272

Conn. 14, 51 n.23, 861 A.2d 473 (2004) (‘‘[i]nasmuch as

the plaintiffs’ briefing of the . . . issue constitutes an

abstract assertion completely devoid of citation to legal

authority or the appropriate standard of review, we

exercise our discretion to decline to review this claim

as inadequately briefed’’); Russell v. Russell, 91 Conn.

App. 619, 635, 882 A.2d 98 (parties must analyze relation-
ship between facts of case and applicable law), cert.

denied, 276 Conn. 924, 888 A.2d 92 (2005), and cert.

denied, 276 Conn. 925, 888 A.2d 92 (2005). We therefore

decline to review that abstract assertion.

In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the plaintiffs lacked standing to maintain this action in their

individual capacities against the defendants, which

necessitates a dismissal of the action. We further conclude that, as self-represented individuals, the plaintiffs

cannot maintain this action on behalf of the limited

liability corporation that owned the subject property at

all relevant times.

The form of the judgment is improper, the judgment

is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to

dismiss the plaintiffs’ action for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1

In this opinion, we refer to Alfred J. Kloiber and Melanie McNichol

collectively as the plaintiffs and individually by name.

2 At trial, Chris Jellen described the topography of the area in question

as a ‘‘steady . . . downhill’’ from the top of Wanzer Mountain to Route 39

South and the defendants’ property.

3 As the court noted in its memorandum of decision, ‘‘[t]he parties stipulated [that] the defendants’ property was woodland in December, 1988, when

the defendants purchased it, and the [defendants’] house, driveway and

septic fields were constructed in 1990.’’

4 McNichol testified at trial that the defendants’ property ‘‘sits uphill

directly east’’ of the subject property.

5

In their operative complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the subject property was purchased ‘‘to rent out for current income and as an investment

for long-term capital appreciation.’’ On direct examination, Kloiber was

asked, ‘‘what specific damages have . . . you incurred?’’ Kloiber answered

that ‘‘[t]he damages include, but are not limited to loss of rent . . . .’’

McNichol similarly testified that the defendants’ alleged conduct caused a

loss of rental income from the subject property.

6 At trial, Kloiber testified repeatedly that the plaintiffs ‘‘never lived’’ at

the subject property. He further testified that they had occupied the plaintiffs’

property at all relevant times. In their supplemental brief, the plaintiffs note

their status as ‘‘neighbors’’ to the subject property.

7 Although the plaintiffs offered into evidence a copy of the deed to the

defendants’ property, they did not submit a copy of the deed to the subject

property at trial.

8 At trial, the following colloquy occurred:

‘‘[The Defendants’ Counsel]: Ms. McNichol, who owns or who holds title

to the subject property?

‘‘[McNichol]: It’s under Fred’s Country Rentals, and it’s part of our marital estate.

‘‘[The Defendants’ Counsel]: So, the—the title ownership is in—

‘‘[McNichol]: My husband and it’s part of the marital estate.

‘‘The Court: I’m sorry. So, the title is under Fred—

‘‘[McNichol]: Fred’s Country Rentals.

‘‘The Court: Fred’s Country Rentals. That’s an LLC or corporation?

‘‘[McNichol]: It’s an LLC, Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: Okay. And—

‘‘[McNichol]: Under my husband’s name and—

‘‘The Court: And, what do you mean by under your husband’s name?

‘‘[McNichol]: So, it—

‘‘The Court: He owns Fred’s Countr[y] Rentals?

‘‘[McNichol]: Right, so [Kloiber is] the principal of Fred’s Country Rentals

and it’s part of our marital estate.

‘‘The Court: Okay. And, by marital estate you mean you have some interest

because you’re married to the person who owns the LLC?

‘‘[McNichol]: Yes.

‘‘The Court: Okay. So, all right. Are there any other owners of the LLC?

‘‘[McNichol]: No, Your Honor.
‘‘The Court: So, just [Kloiber]?

‘‘[McNichol]: Yes, Your Honor. . . .

‘‘The Court: All right. So [Kloiber is] the sole owner of the LLC?

‘‘[McNichol]: Yes.’’

9

In their supplemental brief, the plaintiffs concede that the subject property ‘‘is titled to and owned by an LLC’’ and that ‘‘there is no question as

to the [subject] property’s ownership by an LLC . . . .’’

10 The plaintiffs acknowledge that well established precept, which they

quote in their supplemental brief.

11 On direct examination, McNichol, acting in a self-represented capacity,

asked Kloiber: ‘‘[Y]ou still remain in possession of the [subject] property,

correct? You still own the property at this time?’’ Kloiber answered, ‘‘Yes,

my wife and I both own the property.’’ In her testimony, McNichol similarly

testified that ‘‘[Kloiber] and I are the only owners of the property. We hold

the sole title, and we remain in exclusive possession of the property.’’

12 That document, which the plaintiffs introduced into evidence at trial,

does not disclose the name of the account holder.

13 Because the plaintiffs have appeared in a self-represented capacity, they

cannot represent the limited liability company in this action. ‘‘Any person

who is not an attorney is prohibited from practicing law, except that any

person may practice law, or plead in any court of this state in his own

cause. General Statutes § 51-88 (d) (2). The authorization to appear [in a

self-represented capacity] is limited to representing one’s own cause, and

does not permit [self-represented] individuals to appear . . . in a representative capacity. In Connecticut, a corporation may not appear [in a selfrepresented capacity]. . . . A corporation may not appear by an officer of

the corporation who is not an attorney.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Certo v. Fink, 140 Conn. App. 740, 747 n.4, 60 A.3d 372 (2013).

14 We further note that the present case does not fall within the ‘‘narrowly

tailored exception’’ articulated in Saunders v. Briner, 334 Conn. 135, 174,

221 A.3d 1 (2019), which our Supreme Court explained is applicable ‘‘only

in rare circumstances’’; id., 174 n.39; nor have the plaintiffs so alleged. This

case does not involve a sole plaintiff seeking recovery for ‘‘capital [that]

belonged to him personally.’’ Id. Here, there are two plaintiffs who claim

an equal interest in the subject property and who submit that they ‘‘have

standing as individuals . . . .’’ This case also does not involve an attempt

to recover capital assets of the limited liability company, nor does it involve

breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, breach of an implied covenant

of good faith and fair dealing, or unfair trade practices claims. Rather, the

present case involves a dispute regarding water runoff from a neighboring

property, for which the plaintiffs seek injunctive and monetary relief.