.. 

Department of Health and Human Servces 

OFFICE OF 

INSPECTOR GENERAL 

NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK: 

MALPRACTICE REPORTING 

REQUIREMENTS 

SERV/Cts 

.(h'Iod3a 

Richard P. Kusserow 

INSPECTOR GENERAL 

OEI-OI-90-00521 
EXECUTIVE SUMMAR Y


PUROSE 

The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of proposed changes to the 

malpractice reporting requirements for the National Practitioner Data Bank. 

BACKGROUN 

Since September 1, 1990, the National Practitioner Data Bank has received and 

maintained records of malpractice judgments and disciplinary actions against licensed 

health care practitioners. It provides hospitals and other health care entities with 

information relating to the professional competence and conduct of physicians 

dentists, and other health care practitioners. 

Debate continues about the type of malpractice actions that should be reported to the 

Data Bank. Currently, all malpractice payments must be reported, regardless of 

amount. Some organizations feel that reports should be limited to payments above a 

certain floor--perhaps $30 000 or $50 000. Payments under this floor, they believe 

most likely represent the efforts of practitioners or insurers to settle "nuisance suits 

are not evidence of actual malpractice, and present an unnecessary burden for 

reporters. In contrast, some believe that the current reporting mandates should be 

extended to include all open malpractice claims. They argue that claims, though not 

in themselves evidence of malpractice, are more timely and therefore more useful than 

payments alone in assessing practitioners' records. (In practice , an open claim 

reporting requirement would almost certainly be accompanied by a closed claim 

reporting requirement to be fair to practitioners named in malpractice suits who were 

eventually exonerated. 

Congress instructed the Public Health Servce (PHS) to prepare a report on the 

advisability of imposing a floor and of adding open claims to the Data Bank. The 

PHS requested Office of Inspector General (DIG) assistance in surveying two classes 

of interested parties: (1) licensing boards in States with reporting requirements similar 

to those under consideration for the Data Bank and (2) malpractice insurers. Our 

discussion is based on written responses to a mail survey from 62 malpractice insurers 

telephone interviews with high-level officials of 6 State medical boards (3 of which 

. require open claims reporting and 3 of which require paid claims reporting above a


dollar threshold), and data we collected for a related study on the Data Bank. 

FIINGS 

REQUIRING OPEN CLAIM REPORTS


Requig that open milpractice claim be reported to the Data Bank coul ad over 

125, 00 hour to inurers ' annual paperwork burden--an increase of at least 580 percent. 
For every claim insurers paid in the last year, they opened 3.56 claims and 

closed 2. 23 claims without payment. 

An open claims reporting requirement could increase the insurance industry 

annual reporting work load from just over 20 000 to almost 150 000 hours. 

In th three States sueyed report of open milpractie claim do not in thelves usll signif vilatins of mecal practice cod, but are somehat usef to meal 

board in th aggegate or as supplemetal informtin.


In Iowa, Texas, and New York, open claim reports rarely lead to disciplinary 

actions against physicians. 

In these States, open claim reports are used as supplemental information to a 

broader investigation or for research purposes. 

IMPOSING A REPORTING FLOOR 

A reportg flor woul signifcantly reduce the nwnber of report forwarde to Data Bank quri. 

A $50 000 floor would have eliminated nearly half of the malpractice reports 

sent to Data Bank queriers. A $30 000 floor would have eliminated 38 percent. 

A reportg floor coul affect the milpractice claim settlement proes. 

Several insurers believe that a floor would make practitioners more receptive to 

settling small claims. 

Some insurers noted that the allocation of large payments among multiple 

practitioners could be manipulated to prevent reporting. 

Th exrinces of the three sueyed States with reportg flors iItrate tht flrs have 

potentil drawback.


New Jersey recently repealed its floor in response to concerns about its impact. 

Ohio stil has a reporting floor, but its medical board has found Data Bank 

reports of malpractice payments under the State floor worth investigating. 

Malpractice payments in California are often made for one dollar less than the 

State reporting floor. 
CONCLUSION€

Based on th informtin we received frm milpractice iners State meal board 

and th Data Bank we conclu that the potentil drawbacks of reportg ope claim or impog a reportg floor outweigh the potentil ben.€

The reporting of open claims would lead to a significant time and cost increase for the€

malpractice insurance industry. A requirement to that effect would be unpopular with€

insurers, and our interviews with State licensing boards suggest that open claim€

information on individual practitioners has limited utilty.€

A floor on malpractice payments would certainly ease the reporting burden for 

insurers and might reduce litigation costs by encouraging settlements. On the other 

hand, it could lead to distortion and misrepresentation in the settlement process and 

could prevent valuable information sharing. 

We offer these findings to the Public Health Service as it summarizes its research and€

formulates its recommendations to Congress. However, because our inspection was 

limited in scope, we cannot offer a definitive recommendation as to whether or not to 

change the Data Bank reporting requirements. Additional information , such as the 

predictive value of open claims and small payments and the overall distribution of 

malpractice payment amounts, is needed to make such an assessment. We anticipate 

that PHS wil consider such issues before making its recommendations to Congress. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . .. . . .. .. . . .. .. .. . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

TABLE OF CONTENTS€

PAGE€

EXECUTIVE SUMMAY€

INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1€

FINDINGS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3€

Requiring Open Claim Reports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3€

Imposing a Reporting Floor. . . . 5


CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8€

APPENDICES€

A. METHODOLOGY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .€ . . . . . . . . . A-€

B. NOTES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . € . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. B-€
INTRODUCTION€

PUROSE 

The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of proposed changes to the 

malpractice reporting requirements for the National Practitioner Data Bank. 

BACKGROUN 

The National Practitioner Data Bank maintains records of malpractice judgments and 

disciplinary actions against licensed health care practitioners. It was established by 

Title IV of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986,1 and has been in 

operation since September 1, 1990. The Data Bank provides hospitals and other 

health care entities with information relating to the professional competence and 

conduct of physicians, dentists, and other health care practitioners. It is intended to 

be an important (but not the only) tool in the practitioner assessment process. The 

Data Bank is funded by user fees and Federal outlays. It is administered by Unisys 

Corporation under contract to the Health Resources and Servces Administration 

(HRSA) of the Public Health Service (PHS). 

State licensing boards, hospitals and other health care entities, and professional 

societies submit reports of adverse actions against practitioners to the Data Bank. 

These groups must report actions against physicians and dentists and may report 

actions against other licensed practitioners. Malpractice insurers must report 

payments made on behalf of alJ licensed practitioners. 

Data Bank records may be released only to authorized entities, including hospitals and 

other health care entities, State licensing boards, professional societies, and, under 

specified conditions, plaintiffs' attorneys in malpractice suits. Also, practitioners may 

request their own records. Only hospitals are required by law to query the Data Bank. 

They must request records for practitioners wishing to obtain clinical privileges and 

every two years, for all practitioners on staff. 

Debate continues about the type of malpractice actions that should be reported to the 

Data Bank. Currently, all malpractice payments must be reported, regardless of . amount. Some observers feel that reports should be limited to payments above a 

certain floor. The American Medical Association (AMA) has suggested a $30 000 

floor, and the Physicians Insurance Association of America (PIAA) has proposed one 

of $50 000. Payments under this floor, they believe, most likely represent the efforts 

of practitioners or insurers to settle "nuisance suits." Such payments, they claim, are 

not evidence of actual malpractice and present an unnecessary burden for reporters. 

In contrast, some believe that the current reporting mandates should be extended to 

include alJ open malpractice claims. They argue that claims, though not in themselves 

evidence of malpractice, are more timely and therefore more useful than payments 
alone in assessing practitioners' records. (In practice , an open claim reporting 

requirement would almost certainly be accompanied by a € closed claim reporting 

requirement. In other words, each claim would be reported at least twce--once at 

opening, once at closing, and perhaps at other key junctures in between. An open 

claim reporting requirement without a closed claim reporting requirement would be 

unfair to practitioners named in malpractice suits who were eventually exonerated. 

Congress instructed PHS to prepare a report on the advisabilty of imposing a floor 

and of adding open claims to the Data Bank. The PHS requested OIG assistance in 

surveying two classes of interested parties: (1) licensing boards in States with reporting 

requirements similar to those under consideration for the Data Bank and 

(2) malpractice insurers. SpecificalJy, PHS asked (1) what the current reporting 

burden on malpractice insurers is and how it would be affected by a change in 

reporting requirements, and (2) what lessons can be learned from States that currently 

require open claim reporting or have had reporting floors. 

METIODOLOGY 

To assess the potential change in reporting burden for insurers, we mailed 

questionnaires to 220 companies which are authorized to report malpractice payments 

to the Data Bank. We describe our methods for selecting these companies in 

appendix A. We received 81 responses, 19 of which we disregarded because they 

came from companies that had paid fewer than 5 malpractice claims over a recent 12-

month period. We believe that these 19 companies would not have sufficient 

experience in reporting to the Data Bank to provide accurate estimates of the 

associated reporting burden. The remaining 62 insurers account for about 90 percent 

of the country s malpractice claim activity. 

To learn from States' experiences with alternative reporting requirements , we 

conducted telephone interviews with high-level officials from medical licensing boards 

in six States. Using the Federation of State Medical Boards Exchange and brief 

confirmation telephone calls to State boards, we identified 15 boards that receive 

reports of open claims and 7 boards that receive reports only on payments above a 

specified floor.6 From the list of boards receiving open claim reports we chose Iowa 

New York, and Texas on the basis of State size and geographic diversity. From the 

list of boards in States with reporting floors, we chose California, New Jersey, and . Ohio because their floors were the highest (and therefore closest to the floors 

suggested for the Data Bank). 

We also analyzed Data Bank records that we obtained for a related study. These 

records consisted of all Data Bank matches through March 19, 1992.€

Our review was conducted in accordance with the € IIIerim SIUlldards for Inspeclioll€

issued by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency. 
FINDINGS€

REQUIRING OPEN CLAIM REPORTS€

Reqg tht open mi/practice claim be reported to th Data Bank coul ad over 

125 00 hour to iners' annl paperwork burden--an inrease of at least 580 peen 

For every claim insurers paid in the past year, they opened 3.56 claims and 

closed 2. 23 claims without payment. 

The 61 insurers who responded to our survey question paid a combined total of€

648 claims on behalf of individual licensed practitioners during a recent 12-month 

period. At the same time, they opened files on a combined total of 52 105 claims. 

This yields an opened-to-paid-claims ratio of 3.56: 1.10 The ratio was higher for 

physicians than for other types of practitioners: 3.83 for physicians, 2.66 for dentists 

and 2.73 for other practitioners. Also during this 12-month period, insurers closed 

693 claims without payment. For closed claims the unpaid-to-paid ratio was 2.€

overall, 2.48 for physicians, 1.25 for dentists, and 1.74 for other practitioners.€

An open claims reporting requirement could increase the insurance industry€

annual reporting work load from just over 20 000 to almost 150 000 hours.€

Over its first 447 days of operation, the Data Bank received 19 897 malpractice 

payment reports,1 This is equivalent to 16 247 reports per year. At 3.56 opened 

claims per paid claim, an open/closed claim reporting requirement would add 57 839 

reports of open claims and 36 231 reports of unpaid closed claims annuaIJy. This 

increase of 94 070 reports would bring the annual total to 110 317 reports. 

Insurers told us they require an average of 80 minutes to complete each Data Bank€

malpractice report form. On average, they require 40 minutes for gathering 

information, 22 minutes for tying and mailing the form, and 17 minutes for reviewing 

and correcting the verification documents sent back to them by the Data Bank.13 At 

80 minutes per form, 16 247 reports would take 21 663 hours to complete. In contrast 

110 317 reports would require 147 089 hours.14 The 125 426 hour difference 

represents a 579 percent increaseY€

In the three States sueyed, report of open mi/practice claim do not in thmselves usll signif violatins of meical practice codes, but are somewhat useful to meal 

boards in the aggegate or as supplemental informtion. 

In Iowa, Texas, and New York, open claim reports rarely lead to disciplinary 

actions against physicians. 

The Iowa board received 181 open claim reports in 1990. Of those, 51 (28 percent) were referred to the board's Discipline Committee for further investigation. None of 
those referrals ended in disciplinary action. An official there told us, however, that in 

previous years there have been disciplinary actions taken in cases that arose from 

malpractice claim reports. 

The Texas board began about 130 investigations based on open claim reports from 

September 1990 through August 1991. Seven or eight of these (6 percent) resulted in 

disciplinary actions.€

The New York board reported that no open c1aim reports resulted in disciplinary 

actions because they are not used to open investigations. The official we intervewed 

noted , however, that many doctors against whom actions were taken did have 

significant" malpractice claim histories. 

In these States, open c1aim reports are used as supplemental information to a 

broader investigation or for research purposes. 

The Iowa State Board of Medical Examiners follows up on each open claim report it 

receives from the State s insurance commission. Once it has received a more 

complete description of the event, it can choose to pursue or drop the investigation. 

The board officiaJ we interviewed believes that open c1aim reports have a role in 

protecting the public but acknowledges that most reports are without merit. 

predicts that the board wil have to adopt a screening mechanism to weed out open 

c1aim reports that are not worth pursuing at all. He feels it is too early in the Data 

Bank' s life to recommend whether to add an open c1aim reporting requirement. 

The New York State Board of Professional Medical Conduct has the authority to 

begin investigations of physicians against whom several malpractice claims have been 

opened. In practice, however, it does not. Instead, it adds reports of open claims to 

its comprehensive research-oriented data base. When the board initiates 

investigation on other grounds, it retrieves the subject physician s c1aims history from 

the data base to create a more complete historical file. A high-Jevel board official did 

not recommend that the Data Bank begin collecting open c1aim information because 

(1) open claims are not necessarily indicative of poor practice, and (2) the Data Bank 

might not be able to accommodate the additional influx of information. 

The Texas State Board of Medical Examiners is likely to begin an investigation 

whenever three or more claims are opened against a physician in a five-year period. 

It also uses open claim reports for research purposes. Although the board official we 

interviewed finds the open c1aim reports useful enough as supplementary information 

to justify the effort of collecting and storing them , she considers them "not terribly 

useful. . . about a 4 on a scale of 1 to 10." She feels that an open claim requirement 

for the Data Bank is unnecessary because doctors are generally required to report 

their malpractice claims histories to hospitals anyway. She believes that doctors who 

lie about their histories are likely to be discovered through sources other than the 

Data Bank.€
IMPOSING A REPORTING FLOOR€

A reportg flr woul signifcantly reduce the nwner of report forward to Data Bank 

qurs. 

A $50 000 floor would have eliminated nearly half of the malpractice reports 

sent to Data Bank queriers. A $30 000 floor would have eliminated 38 percent. 

When a hospital, licensing board, or other health care entity requests information on a 

certain practitioner from the Data Bank, and that practitioner has been reported to 

the Data Bank, it is referred to as a "match." As of March 19, 1992, there had been a 

total of 20 954 matches, 16 962 of which involved single malpractice payment 

reportsY 

The average amount of malpractice payments involved in a match was $132 358, but 

most matches invoJved payments far below this mean. Had the Data Bank adopted

AM' s suggested floor of $30 000, 37. 9 percent of the malpractice matches would not 

have occurred because the malpractice payments wouJd not have been reported. The 

PIA' s proposed floor of $50 000 wouJd have eliminated another 8.9 percent of 

malpractice matches. 

The usefulness to queriers of matches on small payment reports or any other tye of report is not yet known. We intend to address this question in a forthcoming report. 

A reportg flr coul affect the malpractice claim settlement proces. 

Several insurers believe that a floor would make practitioners more receptive to 

settling small claims. 

Small malpractice claims can often cost more to litigate than to pay outright.18 For 

this reason, it can be in an insurer s interest to settle small claims even when it 

believes it could win in court. Doctors, however, may have an incentive not to settle 

because settlements as well as judgments are reported to the Data Bank. Doctors 

may fear that Data Bank queriers wil interpret any report as a blemish on the 

doctor s record, and that queriers may not distinguish between claims that were settled 

for convenience as opposed to cause. Several insurers commented that doctors would 

. be more wiling to settle small claims if the Data Bank had a floor and the claims did€

not have to be reported. 

Some insurers noted that the allocation of large payments among multiple€

practitioners could be manipulated to prevent reporting.€

We asked insurers whether a floor for the Data Bank would affect the way they 

allocated payment amounts in cases where multiple practitioners were found liable for 

damages. Thirty-nine of the 55 respondents said " " and another 3 said "probably 

not." But we also received several affirmative responses. The first two following 
comments came from companies with over 2 000 insured physicians each, and the third 

from a company that insures 3 500 registered nurses: 

Yes. When more than one practitioner is involved, we will be under pressure 

to have payments under the floor amount instead of true allocations. 

Yes. Many physicians refuse to settle a case if it means that their name will be 

reported to yet another agency (in this case, the NPDB). Therefore, if a 

settlement opportunity exists among multiple defendants, and that settlement 

can be divided so that none of the defendants' names would be reported (even 

if one defendant health care provider is more culpable than another), it is likely 

that the larger than floor dollar amount settlement would occur but not 

reported to the Data Bank. (emphasis in original) 

Possibly. If the amount is combined, and there is no definitive split between 

the facility and the practitioner, the decision probably would be made to 

allocate to the practitioner only that amount below the floor. 

Th exrinces of the three sueyed States with reportg flors iItrte tht flrs hae 

potenl drawbacks. 

The impact of State-imposed reporting floors varies from State to State. Even in 

States with reporting floors, licensing boards are now notified of all their licensee 

malpractice payments, regardless of amount. Copies of all malpractice payment 

reports submitted by insurers to the Data Bank are automatically forwarded to the 

appropriate boards. The information contained in Data Bank reports, however, may 

not be equivalent to the information contained in State-mandated reports. 

New Jersey recently repealed its floor in response to concerns about its impact. 

The New Jersey State Board of Medical Examiners had a $25 000 reporting floor from 

July 1983 to January 1990. As part of a broad malpractice reform movement that 

year, the floor was eJiminated for two reasons. First, the board found that many 

doctors were settJing claims for $24 999, which indicated that the settlement amount 

had more to do with the floor than the true value of damages involved. Second, the 

board was concerned that it would not find out about incompetent physicians who had 

. many judgments or settlements for amounts less than the floor. 

No reports of malpractice payments have led to investigations or disciplinary actions 

against New Jersey physicians in the past year. The board official we spoke with 

beJieves that malpractice information is useful only as a supplement to a broader case 

file. Nevertheless, he advises against a floor for the Data Bank, saying that it is 

important to collect a full set of information. 

Ohio still has a reporting floor, but its medical board has found Data Bank 

reports of malpractice payments under the floor worth investigating. 
The Ohio legislature granted authority for the Ohio State Medical Board to collect€

reports of malpractice payments over $25 000 in early 1987. This followed a survey of 

Ohio insurers that determined that payments under $25 000 often represented 

settlements designed to avoid litigation costs. 

In the State s fiscaJ year ending August 31 , 1991 , the board investigated 18 percent of 

reports it received on maJpractice payments over the floor. It also investigated 

9 percent of reports it received on malpractice payments under the floor, which it 

received as copies of reports to the Data Bank. Two reports of payments over the 

floor led to disciplinary action , compared with none as yet for payments under the 

floor. Despite the low number of disciplinary actions, the board official we spoke with 

is convinced that maJpractice information is useful and worth collecting, regardless of 

payment amount. The fact that investigations had been started as a result of Data 

Bank reports of small payments led him to advise against a floor for the Data Bank. 

He was confident that the investigations would eventually lead to disciplinary actions.€

Malpractice payments in California are frequently made for one dollar less than 

the State reporting floor.€

The reporting floor in California is $30 000. Through March 19, 1992, 1 816 lump-sum 

malpractice payments by California physicians were involved in one or more matches 

between Data Bank reports and queries. Of those 1 816 payments, 176 (9. 7 percent) were for exactly $29 999. Another 21 were for amounts between $29 000 and $29 990. 

Only 17, however, were for exactly $30 000. Clearly, part of the maJpractice claim 

settlement process in California involves avoiding reports to the State medical board. 

Whether a claim is settled for $29 999 or $30 000, however, is not of great concern to the medical board. We interviewed a high-ranking official of the California Board of 

Medical Quality Assurance who considers all malpractice information minimally useful 

especially information on small payments. The board formally investigated 40 percent of all complaints and referrals it received in the last year, but only 11.5 percent of the maJpractice payments (all of which were for amounts of $30 000 or more). Because 

he believes that reports of small malpractice payments are of little use and create 

unnecessary processing work, the official recommended that the Data Bank adopt a 

reporting floor. 

. At least two factors minimize the utility of small malpractice payment reports to the 

California medical board. First, the board's computer system does not keep complete 

records of malpractice payments. Second, the board is unable to use the copies of 

Data Bank reports on payments less than $30 000 because the reports do not include 

the patient's name. Without patient names , the board has great difficulty obtaining 

detailed information on the incident leading to the malpractice payment. 
CONCLUSION€

Based on th informtin we received from milpractice iners, State meal board 

and the Data Bank we conclue that the potentil drawbacks of reportg ope claim or 

imposig a reportg flr outeigh the potentil bene. 

The reporting of open claims would lead to a significant time and CQst increase for the 

malpractice insurance industry. A requirement to that effect would be unpopular with 

insurers, and our intervews with State licensing boards suggest that open claim 

information on individual practitioners is only somewhat useful. 

The best argument for including open claim reports is that it could make the Data 

Bank a highly valuable research tool. The existence of a nationwide data base of€

malpractice claim activity could be helpful to malpractice researchers and policy€

makers. The Data Bank's authorizing legislation indicates that Data Bank information€

is intended to be used solely with respect to activities in the furtherance of the quality€

of health care."20 Whether this mandate would include medical malpractice research€

and whether the benefits of such research could justify the costs of collecting open 

claim information are unresolved questions.€

A floor on malpractice payments would certainJy ease the reporting burden for€

insurers and might reduce litigation costs by encouraging settlements. On the other 

hand, it could lead to distortion and misrepresentation in the settlement process and€

could prevent valuable information sharing. The experience in New Jersey and€

California and the comments of three large insurers indicate that reporting floors can€

have unintentional effects on settlement amounts. Also, a floor would significantly 

reduce the frequency of Data Bank matches. Until it is known whether these matches€

on sma)) payments are useful to queriers, an attempt to eliminate them would seem€

premature.€

We offer these findings to the Public Health Service as it summarizes its research and€

formulates its recommendations to Congress. However, because our inspection was 

limited in scope, y.e cannot offer a definitive recommendation as to whether or not to 

change the Data Bank reporting requirements. Additional information, such as the 

predictive value of open claims and small payments and the overall distribution of 

. malpractice payment amounts, is needed to make such an assessment. We anticipate 

that PHS wi1 consider such issues before making its recommendations to Congress. 
APPENDIX A


METIODOLOGY 

Surey of Malpractie Insurers 

We selected the nation s 20 largest malpractice insurance writers as listed in 

Healthweek magazine, October 21, 1991 for our survey. We then obtained from the 

Health Resources and Servces Administration a list of all non-Federal entities that 

were authorized to report malpractice payments to the National Practitioner Data 

Bank-- 056 companies or public agencies in all. We selected 100 companies at 

random from this list, discarding from the sample any companies located outside U.S. 

territory or whose parent organization was represented in the top 20. We mailed 

questionnaires to all 120 companies on November 21, 1991. Because our response 

rate was inadequate as we neared the due date of December 20, 1991, we selected 

another 100 companies at random. This time, in addition to the disqualification 

criteria above, we excluded companies whose titles contained the words "guaranty" or 

re-insurance." We learned from our first sample that such companies usually do not 

wrte malpractice insurance for individual practitioners. We mailed questionnaires to 

this second group of 100 on December 18, 1991. 

As of our cutoff date of January 27, 1992, we had received 81 completed surveys 

17 of which were from top 20 firms. We eliminated 19 respondents from the data 

base because they reported closing fewer than 5 claims with payment over a recent 

12-month period. We decided that these insurers did not have enough experience 

with Data Bank reporting to make reasonable estimates of the burden it imposes. 

(One respondent that was unable to report the number of claims paid was kept in the 

data base because it insured nearly 5 000 physicians and 2 800 dentists. We believe 

that a company with so many insureds would have enough experience with the Data 

Bank to provide informed responses. ) Together, the remaining 62 firms insured the 

following number of licensed health care practitioners: 

Physicians: 254 000 

Dentists: 88 500 

Other: 125 000 TOTAL: 467 500 

Numbers have been rounded to the nearest 500 because several firms reported 

approximations rather than exact counts. The number for other practitioners is 

extremely conservative and consists largely of chiropractors and podiatrists insured by 

firms who were able to provide an exact or approximate count. Many respondents 

insure hospitals and alJ licensed health practitioners who work there. These firms 

usually did not have a separate file for each hospital-based practitioner insured, and 

therefore were not able to give us even an approximate count. 
A total of 14 648 claims were paid by the 61 firms with such data available for the 

12-month period. Based on the Data Bank's first 447 calendar days of experience, it 

receives 16 247 paid claim reports per year. Therefore, the insurers in our survey 

represent about 90 percent of the malpractice claim activity in this country. 

We made some adjustments to the written responses to improve logical consistency. 

For example, we ensured that the respondents' estimates of the total time required to 

complete a Data Bank report was equaJ to the sum of the times they reported as 

required for each step in the process. 

Virtually all of the figures reported to us as the number of claims opened, closed, and 

paid appeared to be actual counts rather than estimates-overy few ended in one or two 

zeroes. We therefore treated each response in these categories as an exact amount. 

A - 2€
APPENDIX B€

NOTE€

L. 99-660, Sections 401-432. 

Adverse actions include license revocation, suspension, and probation; clinical 

privilege revocation, suspension, reduction, restriction, and voluntary surrender; 

and professional society membership revocation, suspension, and denial; as well 

as other categories. 

Letter from the Chairman of the PIA Data Sharing Project to the Director of€

the Bureau of Health Professions, HRSA, February 25, 1991.€

One of the 62 included insurers did not report the number of paid claims 

because it was unable to break down closed claims into paid and unpaid. This€

insurer was included in our analysis because of the large number of€

practitioners it insured and claims it opened. We believe it must have paid at 

least 5 claims over the 12-month period used for reporting. 

The Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States , Inc. The€

Exchange: Section 3, Physician Licensing Boards and Physician Discipline, 1989-


1990 ed., pp. 34-35.€

Boards coJlecting open claim reports are in Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Iowa 

Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New 

York, Oregon, Texas, and Wyoming. Boards that recently had or stil have 

reporting floors are in California, Louisiana, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio 

Tennessee, and Washington. Since the Data Bank opened, these boards have 

also received copies of Data Bank reports on all claims paid by their licensees 

regardless of amount. 

There may be discrepancies between State statutes and State practices. The 

lists of States above are based solely on telephone conversations with State 

board staff and the Exchange. 

. 7. Office of Inspector General National Practitioner Data Bank: Profile of Matches€

OEI-01-90-00522, in press.€

A match occurs when a request for information from the Data Bank identifies a€

practitioner for whom a report is on file with the Data Bank.€

As stated above, 1 of the 62 insurers was unable to separate paid claims from 

unpaid closed claims and was excluded in the computation of this statistic. 
10. 

The 12-month period varied from insurer to insurer. One of the 62 did not 

report which period was used. All but 6 of the remaining 61 insurers included 

aJl or part of calendar year 1991 in their responses. The 12-month period 

began in December 1990 or January 1991 for 37 insurers. 

Malpractice claims general1y take years to close, so probably few if any of the 

640 opened claims were among the 14 648 paid claims. Our analyses assume 

no change from year to year in the rate of claim openings or the likelihood of 

claims closing with payment. If (as some have suggested) the existence of the 

Data Bank has discouraged settlements, then even fewer than 14 648 payments 

wiJl eventuaJly resuJt from the 52 640 claims opened during the 12-month 

period used. 

11.€ OveraJl ratios are based on 61 insurers. Practitioner-specific ratios are based 

on 51 physician insurers , 23 dentist insurers, and 27 other practitioner insurers. 

12.€ Unisys Corporation, Cumulative Data Bank Statistics Summary, presented to 

the Data Bank Executive Committee on December 5, 1991, p. 1. This number 

excludes initial reports that were later voided. The 447 days are calendar days 

not work days, and span from September 1 , 1990, to November 22, 1991. 

AIl time estimates are weighted averages. Individual estimates were weighted 

in proportion to the number of payments made during the reporting period. 

The sum of the average times required for each step in reporting is one minute 

less than the average time required for al1 steps combined. This difference 

most likely reflects the fact that 61 respondents estimated total time required 

but only 56 reported time required for each intermediate step. 

14.€ In fact, the percentage increase in the work load resulting from a Data Bank 

open claim reporting requirement could be even greater, for two reasons. 

First, not aJl of the current 21 000 hour burden is solely attributable to the Data 

Bank. Malpractice insurers have to report payments to most State licensing 

boards as weJl as to the Data Bank. Insurers in our survey estimated that, on 

average minutes of the time required to report a paid claim to the Data 

Bank also goes toward satisfying State reporting requirements (this average is 

weighted in proportion to the number of claims paid by each insurer and is 

based on 59 responses). Therefore, it could be said that the current Data Bank 

reporting burden is only 18 413 hours (16 247 . 68 -; 60). The 147 089 hours 

imposed by an open claim reporting requirement would therefore be an 

increase of 128 676 hours, or 699 percent. (Of course, in the States that 

currently require open claim reporting there would be some overlap with Data 

Bank reporting. Therefore, the 147 089 hour estimate is slightly high. There 

are far fewer States requiring open claim reporting, however, than paid claim 

reporting. ) 
15. 

16. 

17. 

18. 

. 19.€

Second, open claims may take even longer to report than paid claims. The 

insurers estimated that open claims would require an average of 96 minutes to 

report (this average is weighted in proportion to the number of claims opened 

by each insurer and is based on 51 responses). If this estimate is accurate, and 

if unpaid closed claims took as long to report as paid claims, then an open 

claims reporting requirement would increase the work load to 159 263 hours 

(57 839 open claims at 96 minutes each, plus 36 231 unpaid claims at 80 

minutes each (assuming no overlap with State reporting requirements), plus 

247 paid claims at 68 minutes each). This is an increase of 765 percent. 

Again, the increase could be somewhat lower for those insurers whose State 

reporting requirements overlapped with Data Bank requirements. 

Not surprisingly, there is virtually no support among insurers for an open claims 

reporting requirement. Fifty-eight of the 62 insurers in our survey were 

opposed to such a requirement. They objected to the burden it would impose 

on them and said that open claim information would be of little use to Data 

Bank users. 

The board's information system does not distinguish between open and closed 

claim reports. The figures presented in the text are based on the Assistant 

Director for Investigation s estimates that 50 percent of the 261 claim reports 

resulting in investigations are open claim reports, and that 4 percent of the 

371 disciplinary actions resulted from cases initiated through the malpractice 

claim reporting system.€

For a more complete description of the types of practitioners, queriers, and 

reporters who were involved in matches, see Office of Inspector General 

National Practitioner Data Bank: Profile of Matches OEI-01-90-00522, in press. 

Of the 18 521 total malpractice matches , 1 559 involved reports of the first in a 

series of multiple payments. For those matches, we were unable to determine 

the full amount of payment, and we excluded them from our analysis. 

S. General Accounting Office Medical Malpractice: Characteritics of Claims 

Closed in j984 HRD-87- , April 1987, p. 22. 

Eleven insurers made a comment to this effect as their primary or only reason 

for supporting a floor in response to one particular question. A number of 

other insurers made similar comments elsewhere in their written response. 

In response to our invitation for comments on the prospect of a floor for 

malpractice reporting to the Data Bank, 37 of the 62 insurers in our analysis 

expressed a clear opinion. All but 1 of the 37 were in favor. Several reasons 

were given in support of a floor, the most common being that it would relieve 

the burden on insurers, that small payments do not necessarily indicate poor 

care, and that it would encourage doctors to settle small claims. 
20. 

21. 

Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, section 427(b)(3). 

Although research is not mentioned specifically as a purpose of the Data Bank 

in the authorizing legislation, HRSA plans to release information to the public 

in a form which does not permit the identification of any particular health care 

entity, physician, dentist, or other health care practitioner" (56 Federal Regiter 

13389). This tye of release is not yet underway. 

B - 4