NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL NORRIS, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 16-0875

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2015-151869-001

The Honorable Michael D. Gordon, Judge

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED 

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz 

Counsel for Appellee

The Hopkins Law Office, PC, Tucson

By Cedric Martin Hopkins

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 4-19-2018
STATE v. NORRIS

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Chief Judge Samuel A. Thumma

joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Christopher Michael Norris appeals his convictions and 

sentences for (1) unlawful imprisonment, a class 6 felony and domestic 

violence offense; (2) aggravated assault, a class 4 felony and domestic 

violence offense; (3) threatening or intimidating, a class 1 misdemeanor and 

domestic violence offense; and (4) disorderly conduct, a class 1 

misdemeanor. Norris’s counsel filed a brief in compliance with Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969), 

advising that after searching the record on appeal, he found no meritorious 

grounds for reversal. Norris was given the opportunity to file a 

supplemental brief but did not do so. 

¶2 Our obligation is to review the entire record for reversible 

error. See State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537, ¶ 30 (App. 1999). We view the 

facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the conviction and resolve all 

reasonable inferences against Norris. State v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293 

(1989). 

¶3 Married for about nine months and having a baby together,

Norris and his wife, A.T., stopped living with one another while they 

worked through some “issues.” Norris, deciding to drop by the home

where A.T. was staying one night, asked her to come outside with the baby. 

When A.T. brought the baby outside in a car seat, Norris, who was “really 

mad,” accused A.T. of infidelity. With A.T. and the baby in his car, Norris 

“drove off really fast.” 

¶4 Stopping the car in front of his cousin’s apartment and not 

accepting her denials, Norris began hitting A.T. all over her body. Norris 

cursed at A.T., punched and slapped her in the face, bit her hand, face, and 

ear, threatened her with death, and at one point, wrapped at least one hand 

around her neck and squeezed until she felt she was going to pass out. 

Fearing that Norris “would do something worse” and not wanting to leave 

the baby in the car, A.T. did not fight back but remained in the car for hours.
STATE v. NORRIS

Decision of the Court

3

¶5 When the sun started to rise, Norris ordered her to get out of 

the car. Still frightened, A.T. started going with Norris up to his cousin’s 

second-floor apartment bringing the baby along. She screamed for help and 

ran to the neighbor’s apartment, “banging” on the door. Undeterred, and 

in the presence of eyewitnesses, Norris drug A.T. into his cousin’s

apartment while she attempted to hold on to the hand rails. The cousin, 

upset with the situation, told Norris that “he couldn’t be doing that at her 

house,” and once inside, Norris started acting normal. The neighbor came 

over soon thereafter and helped A.T. and the baby into her apartment, 

where they waited until emergency personnel arrived. 

¶6 The State charged Norris with kidnapping, aggravated

assault, threatening or intimidating, and three counts of disorderly conduct. 

After the superior court granted the State’s request to dismiss one count of 

disorderly conduct, the case proceeded to a nine-day jury trial. The jury

acquitted Norris of kidnapping and one count of disorderly conduct, but

found him guilty of unlawful imprisonment (the lesser-included offense of

kidnapping) (Count 1), aggravated assault (Count 2), threatening or 

intimidating (Count 3), and one count of disorderly conduct (Count 4). The 

jury also found the unlawful imprisonment, aggravated assault, and 

threatening or intimidating counts were domestic violence offenses, and 

that these counts involved the infliction or threatened infliction of serious 

physical injury and caused physical, emotional, or financial harm to the 

victim. 

¶7 In open court, the superior court awarded 394 days of 

presentence incarceration credit and imposed concurrent sentences of 4.5 

years for Count 1, 12 years for Count 2, and time served for Counts 3 and 4.

The court also imposed a $20 probation assessment, $50 family offense 

assessment, and $50 address confidentiality assessment on both Counts 1 

and 2. According to the sentencing minute entry, the court imposed the 

same assessments on Count 3. This timely appeal followed. 

¶8 After a thorough review of the record, except for the 

sentencing errors explained below, we find no reversible error. The 

superior court incorrectly calculated Norris’s presentence incarceration 

credit. The record reveals that Norris was initially taken into custody on 

November 10, 2015, and remained in custody until sentencing on December

9, 2016. Because Norris was incarcerated for 395 days prior to sentencing, 

he must be given credit for one additional day of presentence incarceration 

credit. We modify Norris’s sentence accordingly. See State v. Stevens, 173 

Ariz. 494, 495-96 (App. 1992) (correcting a miscalculation in presentence 
STATE v. NORRIS

Decision of the Court

4

incarceration credit by modifying the sentence without remanding to the 

trial court).

¶9 The record also reveals that the superior court did not orally 

pronounce the assessments for Count 3—threatening or intimidating, a 

class 1 misdemeanor and domestic violence offense—but simply imposed 

the assessments in the sentencing minute entry. See State v. Powers, 154 Ariz. 

291, 295 (1987) (vacating the “felony assessment” imposed by minute entry

because “the proper method of correcting an illegal sentence is not by 

minute entry,” but “in open court with the defendant present”). Thus, we 

vacate the assessments for Count 3: $20 probation assessment, $50 family 

offense assessment, and $50 address confidentiality assessment. See Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 26.16(a) (“The judgment of conviction and sentencing on the 

judgment are complete and valid at the time the court orally pronounces 

them in open court.”); see also State v. Whitney, 159 Ariz. 476, 487 (1989)

(“Oral pronouncement in open court controls over the minute entry.”).

¶10 Norris was represented by counsel at all stages of the 

proceedings against him. Except for several instances before and during 

trial, Norris was present at all critical stages. In those instances, Norris, who 

was in custody, either waived his presence or refused transportation to 

court. The few times Norris was a few minutes late for trial, it was due to 

in-custody transportation issues. We find no error because the matters 

discussed before he arrived were procedural or unrelated to defending 

against the charges. See State v. Dann, 205 Ariz. 557, 573, ¶ 61 (2003) 

(“[B]ecause the conferences involved entirely procedural matters and [the 

defendant] has not shown that he was entitled to attend or that he could 

have contributed to his defense had he been present, we do not find that 

[defendant]’s right to be present was violated.”); State v. Jones, 197 Ariz. 290, 

308, ¶ 51 (2000) (“Although a defendant has the right to be present at trial, 

his right extends only to those situations in which his presence has a 

relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend 

against the charge.” (internal quotation omitted)). 

¶11 Additionally, the evidence presented supports the conviction 

and the sentence imposed falls within the range permitted by law. As far 

as the record reveals, these proceedings were conducted in compliance with 

Norris’s constitutional and statutory rights and the Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure. Therefore, we affirm Norris’s convictions and 

sentences, except for modification of the presentence credit noted above. 

As to Count 3, we vacate the assessments.
STATE v. NORRIS

Decision of the Court

5

¶12 Defense counsel’s obligations pertaining to Norris’s 

representation in this appeal have ended. See State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 

584 (1984). Counsel need do no more than inform Norris of the outcome of 

this appeal and his future options, unless, upon review, counsel finds “an 

issue appropriate for submission” to the Arizona Supreme Court by 

petition for review. Id. at 584-85. Norris has 30 days from the date of this 

decision to proceed, if he wishes, with a pro per motion for reconsideration 

or petition for review.