United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted April 25, 2007

Decided April 26, 2007

Before

Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

Hon. ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

No. 05-2816

JAMES T. LOCKHEART,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

OFFICER JOHN DRAPIEWSKI,

OFFICER JOHN A. MACIEJEWSKI,

SR., OFFICER CHRISTOPHER

STRAHLMAN, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Northern

District of Illinois, Eastern Division

No. 95 C 343

Samuel Der-Yeghiayan, 

Judge.

O R D E R

In this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, James Lockheart

contends that Chicago police officers assaulted him and tried to frame him for

armed robbery. The district court granted summary judgment for the officers, and

we affirm.

The facts leading to Lockheart’s encounter with the police are not in dispute. 

In February 1993, a black male wielding a screwdriver accosted Theresa

Wojnarowski in the parking lot of the Driftwood Restaurant, where she worked. 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 05-2816 Page 2

When a passerby saw the attack and yelled, the assailant dropped his screwdriver

and a set of keys and ran. Wojnarowski picked up the screwdriver and keys and

went into the restaurant. Lockheart, who is black, entered the restaurant a short

time later and sat at the bar. Wojnarowski saw him there and identified him as her

assailant. Her coworkers quietly summoned the police, but when a patron thought

she saw Lockheart reaching for the keys Wojnarowski had found in the parking lot

and left on the bar, employees restrained Lockheart and held him for the police. 

Sergeant John Drapiewski and Officer John Maciejewski, Sr., arrived at the

restaurant and arrested Lockheart for attempted aggravated sexual assault. 

Wojnarowski also signed a complaint for armed robbery after the officers reportedly

searched the restaurant parking lot and found her purse, its scattered contents, a

$20 bill, and another screwdriver.

Lockheart was charged with attempted aggravated sexual assault and armed

robbery. At his May 1994 trial, the state was unable to produce the two

screwdrivers or the keys, and Sergeant Drapiewski testified that he caused them to

be destroyed by mistake. The jury acquitted Lockheart of armed robbery but found

him guilty of committing the attempted sexual assault. That conviction was

overturned on direct appeal, and a second trial ended with a hung jury. A third

trial in October 1998 resulted in a guilty verdict, and this time Lockheart’s

conviction and 30-year prison term were upheld on direct appeal. People v.

Lockheart, 835 N.E.2d 994 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002), petition for leave to appeal denied,

787 N.E.2d 178 (Ill. 2003). Lockheart, who represented himself throughout the

criminal case, remains in prison. See Lockheart v. Hulick, 443 F.3d 927 (7th Cir.

2006).

Meanwhile, Lockheart brought this action in January 1995. In his initial

complaint he named as defendants Drapiewski, Maciejewski, and a third officer

identified as “Chris Strawmen.” A second amended complaint filed by appointed

counsel in February 2000 changed the third name to “Christopher Strolman.” 

Lockheart really intended to name Officer Christopher Strahlman, who was not

served until May 2000. In the second amended complaint—Lockheart’s last—he

alleged that Drapiewski and Maciejewski assaulted him during his arrest and then

planted the second screwdriver and a $20 bill in the restaurant parking lot to

support a fabricated charge of armed robbery. They did this, according to

Lockheart, because he is black and because they knew that Wojnarowski was the

sister-in-law of a fellow police officer, Strahlman. Lockheart also alleged that

Drapiewski and Maciejewski later destroyed the keys and screwdrivers because

they knew that investigation would show that the keys dropped by the assailant did

not belong to him. Finally, Lockheart alleged that Strahlman came to the police

station after his arrest and assaulted him. The district court concluded that these

allegations raised a Fourth Amendment claim of excessive force against Drapiewski
No. 05-2816 Page 3

and Maciejewski, a like claim against Strahlman, and a supplemental state-law

claim of malicious prosecution against Drapiewski and Maciejewski.

The case languished, mostly because Lockheart wanted it stayed while his

state criminal case continued. Finally in September 2004 the three officers moved

for summary judgment. Along with their motion they submitted a Statement of

Undisputed Facts denying that Lockheart had been abused in any way. The district

court gave Lockheart notice that the officers’ version of events would be deemed

admitted if not contested. See N.D. Ill. Loc. R. 56.1; Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d

100, 102 (7th Cir. 1982). Lockheart filed a response generally disputing the officers’

statements, but without specific cites to the record. In February 2005 he moved for

a one-month extension of time in order to file an additional response. Lockheart

submitted his further response without waiting for court approval, but once again

he generally disagreed with the officers’ statements without pointing to any record

evidence supporting his claims. 

In granting summary judgment, the district court concluded that Lockheart

filed his claims of excessive force outside the applicable two-year statute of

limitations. The court added that Lockheart had not properly challenged the

officers’ Statement of Undisputed Facts, and so he effectively admitted that only

necessary force was used during and after his arrest. The court also held that

Lockheart’s supplemental state-law claim for malicious prosecution failed as a

matter of law. The court reasoned that Drapiewski and Maciejewski had probable

cause to arrest Lockheart for armed robbery based on the complaint made by

Wojnarowski, and that probable cause is a complete defense under Illinois law to a

claim of malicious prosecution.

On appeal Lockheart argues that the district court erred in holding that his

Fourth Amendment claims were time-barred, and in granting summary judgment

for Drapiewski and Maciejewski on his claim of malicious prosecution. Our review

is de novo, see Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 2006), and we may

affirm a grant of summary judgment on any basis fairly supported by the record,

Hill v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 218 F.3d 639, 642 (7th Cir. 2000). Here, regardless of

whether Lockheart’s claims were timely, he presented the district court with no

evidence to support them. According to the officers’ undisputed statements, they

used only reasonable force while arresting him and did not assault him after he was

in custody. As such, Lockheart’s excessive-force claims necessarily fail. 

Additionally, the officers had probable cause to arrest him because Wojnarowski

identified Lockheart as her attacker. The existence of probable cause defeats a

claim of malicious prosecution under Illinois law. See Mannoia v. Farrow, 476 F.3d

453, 459 (7th Cir. 2007); Johnson v. Target Stores, Inc., 791 N.E.2d 1206, 1225 (Ill.

App. Ct. 2003). The district court therefore was required to grant summary
No. 05-2816 Page 4

judgment in favor of the officers. See Schrott v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 403 F.3d

940, 944 (7th Cir. 2005). 

AFFIRMED.