The Honorable Robert T. Dawson, United States District Judge for the Western * District of Arkansas, sitting by designation.



## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 98-2190EM

_____________ Alan Adams, * * Appellant, *

* v. * * St. Charles County Ambulance District, * a Political Subdivision of the State of * Missouri; Frank K. Grimes; Brad Pring; * Appeal from the United States Carl Phillips; Warren Ostman; Nikki * District Court for the Eastern Kessel; Timothy Roettger; Diane * District of Missouri. Borgerding, Individuals and in Their * Official Capacity as Directors of St. * [UNPUBLISHED] Charles County Ambulance District; * Michael Whitlock, Individually and in * his Official Capacity as Chief Executive * Officer of the St. Charles County * Ambulance District, * * Appellees. *

_____________ Submitted: November 16, 1998

Filed: December 4, 1998

_____________ Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD and FAGG, Circuit Judges, and DAWSON, District * Judge.-2- _____________ PER CURIAM. The St. Charles County Ambulance District (St. Charles Count y) employed Alan Adams as a paramedic. After St. Charles County terminated Adams’s employment , Adams filed suit and claimed, among other things, his discharge vio lated the Fourteenth Amendment’ s guarantee of procedural due process of law. The district court granted St. Charles County’s motion for summary judgment on Adams’s due process claim , concluding Adams was an at-will employee without a protected property interest in his job. Adams appea ls. We review both the district court’s grant of summary judgment and its deter mination of state law de novo. See Greeno v. Little Blue Valley Sewe r Dist. , 995 F.2d 861, 863-64 (8th Cir. 1993).
Constitutionally protected property interests are created by independent sources such as state law, municipal ordinances, or contracts, and a p arty’s claim of entitlement to a protect ed interest “must be decided by reference to state law.” Bishop v. Wood , 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976); see Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth , 408 U.S. 564, 577-78 (1972). St. Charles County adopted a Memorandum of Understandin g governing the terms and conditions of Adams’s employment. See Strunk v. Hahn , 797 S.W.2d 536, 541 (Mo. App. 1990); Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 105.510, 105.520 (West 1997). Adams contends the Memorandum of Understanding gave him a protected propert y in terestbecause the Memorandum of Understanding provided Adams could only b e te rminated

for just cause. We disagree. The district court correctly concluded th e Memorandum

of Understanding’s plain language established Adams was an at-wil l employee and ha d no protected property interest in his employment. See Strunk , 797 S.W.2d at 541-46; Amaan v. City of Eur eka , 615 S.W.2d 414, 415-16 (Mo. 1981) (en banc); cf. G reeno , 995 F.2d at 863-64. The Memorandum of Understanding gave St. Ch arles County the unlimited right to discharge employees, contained no provision s stating nonprobationary employees like Adams could be dischar ged only for cause, and-3-

reserved to St. Charles County any managerial powers not expressly negotiated away in the M emorandum of Understanding. See id. Thus, St. Charles County properl y dischar ged Adams without giving him notice of the reasons for his discharge or a hearing. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill , 470 U.S. 5 32, 538, 541-42 (1985). We affirm the judgment of the district court.

RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judge, concurs in the result and concurs in th e judgment.
A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.