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S. HRG. 113–634 

U.S. POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN AND 

THE REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF 

THE JUNE 2014 TRANSITION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JUNE 18, 2014 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

DANIEL E. O’BRIEN, Staff Director

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Republican Staff Director

(II)


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee, opening statement ................. 2 

Dobbins, Hon. James, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 

U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ...................................................... 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6 

Response to question submitted for the record by Senator Robert Menendez .................................................................................................................. 39 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Marco Rubio . 41 

Magsamen, Kelly E., Acting Assistant Secretary, Asian and Pacific Security 

Affairs, Department of Defense, Washington, DC ............................................. 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 12 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Robert 

Menendez ....................................................................................................... 39 

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, opening statement .... 1 

(III)


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
(1) 

U.S. POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE 

REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE JUNE 

2014 TRANSITION 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 18, 2014 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:20 p.m, in room SD– 

419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Menendez, Cardin, Shaheen, Murphy, Kaine, 

Corker, Risch, Rubio, and McCain. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

The CHAIRMAN. Good afternoon. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will come to order. 

Let me thank both of our witnesses for joining us today as we 

consider U.S. policy in Afghanistan and the regional implications 

of the drawdown of international forces. 

The hearing comes at a critical time. The President has announced his drawdown plan. The Bergdahl transfer took place, and 

a second round of Presidential elections was held on Saturday. The 

images of Afghans, especially women, lining up to vote were inspiring and a testament to the broad commitment to the democratic 

process. But no matter who ultimately wins, the incoming government will face significant challenges, some of crisis proportions. 

First, I have real concerns about the viability of the Afghan economy, which has already begun to contract with the drawdown of 

international forces. According to SIGAR, U.S. assistance over the 

past 7 years was equivalent to about 75 percent of the country’s 

GDP. I understand that Afghanistan will require assistance both 

off and on budget for quite some time, but what I have never seen 

is a credible and comprehensive plan for real sustainability in 

Afghanistan that incorporates past projects and future work. To 

continue to support robust assistance, I will need to see a serious 

examination of project sustainability. 

Second and above all, the new government will face an ongoing 

security challenge. The Afghan National Security Forces performed 

well during the last fighting season and protected voters during 

these two rounds of elections. But as we look forward, those forces 

still do not have the logistical capabilities nor close air support that 

will be required in an ongoing fight against the insurgency. 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
2 

And finally, this hearing will also explore the regional implications of the drawdown. Pakistan announced a full-scale operation 

into North Waziristan over the weekend, a long overdue move in 

my view, which indicates that their government is taking the 

threat from cross-border terrorist groups more seriously. We have 

heard that our friends in India and the governments of Central 

Asia are concerned about what the drawdown will mean for 

regional stability in the years ahead. 

So today, I hope that we will hear the administration’s vision for 

security in the region and how U.S. interests will be protected in 

this dynamic and volatile part of the world. Will the threat posed 

by terrorist groups in the region change following the drawdown of 

U.S. troops? How will our security cooperation with countries in 

the region evolve? 

It must be said Afghanistan is not Iraq, but it is hard not to 

draw comparisons to today’s security situation in Iraq and what we 

could see in the coming years as we wind down our presence in 

Afghanistan. At the end of the day, we have to guard against letting history repeat itself because of decisions we make and actions 

that we fail to take. Today, I hope our panelists can help clearly 

lay out the choices that are before us. 

Frankly, last month when the administration announced plans to 

completely draw down forces from Afghanistan by 2016, I was concerned about the plan and I still have concerns. We have made 

hard-fought but fragile gains in Afghanistan that need to be protected through continued support of the ANSF and the Afghan 

Government. 

And finally, alongside our regional security efforts, the administration has embarked on a new Silk Road initiative which seeks to 

strengthen Afghanistan’s economic ties in the region. In my view, 

this could be a boon for Afghanistan’s economy, but I am concerned 

that long-standing barriers to regional cooperation may prove too 

great to overcome. 

So I look forward to hearing in detail from Ambassador Dobbins 

how this vision is being translated into reality and what challenges 

lie ahead. Before I introduce both of our witnesses, let me recognize 

Senator Corker for his opening remarks. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for having 

this hearing. 

And to the two of you, thank you for coming here and helping 

us understand what is developing in the region. 

As was said, an election process is underway. Hopefully, it is 

going to be one that the people of Afghanistan consider is valid. It 

looks like that may well be the case, as has been the norm. Obviously, claims of fraudulent activity are taking place, and whether 

that is just someone who is behind in a race trying to put themselves in a better position or whether that is actually occurring, we 

will see. But it appears that the election process has gone by in a 

way that hopefully will have some degree of credibility and we can 

move on. 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
3 

As the chairman mentioned, the President’s announcement 

regarding having 9,800 troops after this year in Afghanistan—candidly the first part of that for me was one that is welcomed. I was 

very concerned that there were people at the White House pushing 

for a zero number, and I know they were pushing. Fortunately, 

they were not successful. I think all of us know—who have talked 

with General Dunford—the only way for us to have a multiplier 

effect around the country where we are enabling the five areas of 

the country outside of Kabul to actually continue to put forth security is for us to have that number of troops. On the front end, I 

will say General Dunford was pushing for 10,000 troops. The President has agreed to 9,800 troops. That is a good thing. 

The second part of the announcement, though, where artificially 

we are deciding that you are going to step down over the next 2 

years to zero is something that is unacceptable. I hope the President will revisit that. I hope he will take steps relative to what is 

happening on the ground. My sense is—and I hope this is the 

case—that that was simply a statement for domestic consumption, 

one we have seen a lot of out of this administration, to hopefully 

assuage people back home. But obviously, based on what we have 

seen in Iraq, making decisions about timelines that have nothing 

to do with what is happening on the ground have been very detrimental to the region. And as the chairman mentioned, there are a 

lot of concerns in the region about this statement, which again we 

hope is one that is only rhetorical, not based in reality. But with 

that, hopefully progress will be made, and hopefully, a decision 

about the number of troops that will actually remain there over 

time again will be based on what is happening on the ground. 

I know the special envoy will have some statement to be made 

about the other issue relative to some of the switches that have 

occurred recently. I look forward to that. I appreciate his call, and 

I look forward to the testimony of both of you today. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Corker. 

So we are pleased to have with us today Ambassador James Dobbins, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Ambassador Dobbins is no stranger to the committee or to that part of 

the world. So we welcome you back, Ambassador, to the committee. 

And Kelly E. Magsamen, who is the Acting Assistant Secretary for 

Asian and Pacific Security Affairs of the Defense Department. 

I will just start off by saying we will include your full statements 

in the record, without objection. I would ask you to try to summarize your statements in around 5 minutes or so so that we can 

enter into a dialogue with you. And, Ambassador, we will start 

with you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES DOBBINS, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator 

Corker, members. I would like to start by thanking this committee 

for its continuous support for our country’s efforts in Afghanistan. 

I personally much appreciate the counsel and support that we have 

gotten during my tenure. 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
4 

I think both Senator Corker and Chairman Menendez have 

raised the issue of whether the President’s announcement provides 

sufficient time for the Afghan Armed Forces to develop independent and sustainable capabilities and for the country to stabilize. 

And I think the answer is, it can provide enough time. Whether it 

does or not is going to depend on several factors. And I would like 

to go through what those factors are, which I think will answer a 

number of other questions or at least raise a number of other questions. 

First of all, it does depend on whether the Afghan security forces 

take advantage of the remaining time, during which they will be 

getting American advice, training, and assistance through the presence of an American and NATO military presence. There I think 

that the prognosis is reasonably positive. There is little doubt that 

the Afghan security forces have improved measurably over the last 

3 or 4 years and even over the last year. We have gone from having 

a presence in Afghanistan of NATO and American forces of over 

150,000 to having less than 50,000 today, and during that period, 

Afghan security forces have not crumbled, have not weakened. 

They have, in fact, measurably improved by almost any metric, and 

I think that is a generally recognized fact, that there have been 

continuous improvements in their performance during this period 

of drawdown. And so I think there is a reasonable prospect that 

those improvements can continue and the remaining deficiencies, 

some of which the chairman mentioned, can be made up during 

this period of continued American military presence. 

I would also note that the American military presence is not 

going to disappear in 2017. It will be incorporated in a significantly 

sized Office of Defense cooperation within the framework of the 

American Embassy rather than as an independent force. So that is 

one of the dependents. 

I think it is also going to depend on whether the current Presidential elections produce a widely recognized outcome, one that is 

accepted by Afghans as a whole, one that is recognized by the 

international community, one that sustains a continued international support, financial support, as well as other forms of support. 

So far, as you both noted, the election process has been notable 

for meeting its timetables, for being conducted in a reasonable 

secure environment given the conditions in the country, for the 

moderation and constructiveness of the campaign, and for the participation of voters. 

I do think, however, that the most difficult time and the greatest 

challenges are probably still to come. You know, Afghanistan—as 

in other countries, there is not a large record of good losers. In situations at Afghanistan’s level of development, there are levels of corruption. There are fraud. There are mechanisms to detect it, but 

the mechanisms themselves become controversial and challenged. 

It is going to be some time before we know the outcome of the vote. 

It is, therefore, critical that everyone, the candidates, their supporters, as well as the media and the voters, remain patient, not 

prejudge the outcome and allow the Afghan electoral institutions 

time to do their job effectively in accordance with Afghan law. 

As happened in the first round of voting, Afghans who have specific concerns and complaints have the opportunity to bring them 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
5 

to the independent electoral commission and the independent electoral complaints commission. These bodies understand that their 

transparency and their impartiality will be critical to ensuring the 

Afghan people broadly accept President Karzai’s successor. As I 

said, we are already seeing heightened levels of controversy over 

the second round, and I anticipate we are going to go through a difficult few weeks before we have an outcome that is generally 

accepted and widely recognized as reflecting the will of the Afghan 

people. 

A third factor that is going to be important is, as the chairman 

has noted, the regional behavior. Afghanistan is historically a weak 

state surrounded by more powerful states who have often acted in 

ways that tend to promote conflict in Afghanistan. This has not 

happened in recent years to the extent that it has historically. 

Indeed, there is an unusual conjunction of policies in the neighboring states. I think it was interesting and maybe remarkable 

that in the aftermath of President Karzai’s announcement in 

December that he was not going to sign the bilateral security 

agreement, President Putin, President Xi, Prime Minister Singh, 

and Prime Minister Sharif each individually and privately urged 

him to sign the agreement. That is a pretty unusual conjunction of 

regional states that actually are advising him to support the continued presence of an American and NATO military presence, albeit for a limited period of time. But still, it does show that there 

is an anxiety about the transition, that there is an anxiety about 

the country’s stability, that for the moment at least, all of these 

states are supporting the regime in Kabul, want to see it consolidated, want to see us help to continue to support that consolidation. We obviously need to maintain that coherence. 

Among Afghanistan’s neighbors, Pakistan probably has the 

greatest potential for influence over Afghanistan’s future, for better 

or worse. In the past, Pakistan has projected influence in Afghanistan by its toleration of and even support for Afghan militants. The 

growth of an indigenous militant threat to Pakistan’s own constitutional order in the form of the Pakistani Taliban, or TTP, and the 

many links between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, along with 

several other militant and terrorist groups active in Pakistan, have 

made this an increasingly costly and ultimately unsustainable 

strategy and one that I think most of the Pakistani leadership now 

recognize as wholly unsustainable. 

After an extended effort to negotiate with the TTP, Prime Minister Sharif has ordered a major military offensive designed, we are 

told, to clear all militants, foreign and domestic, out of their major 

stronghold in North Waziristan. In the short term, this offensive 

will present challenges to Afghanistan as innocent civilian refugees, along with Afghan, Pakistani, and other foreign militants flee 

across the border. In the longer term, however, if the Pakistani 

authorities deliver on their promise to deny the use of their territory to all militant groups, foreign as well as domestic, this effort 

will significantly enhance security in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. 

Finally, the last dependency I would like to mention is frankly 

the dependency for this timetable or any timetable with respect to 

Afghanistan on continued congressional support. In the current 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
6 

fiscal year, Congress cut the foreign assistance budget to Afghanistan by something like 50 percent. Now, I think in the report that 

accompanied that, it was explained that this was caused both by 

a large buildup in the pipeline and frankly also by some provocative and unnecessarily provocative statements that President 

Karzai had made that rightly I think caused a great deal of anxiety 

and annoyance. I am hoping that both of these problems will be in 

the past. The pipeline has been reduced. President Karzai will soon 

be succeeded by a new leadership. 

We agree that aid for Afghanistan, both civilian and military, 

particularly in the civilian area, needs to be gradually reduced over 

the next several years, but we would urge that this be a gradual 

process. There is already a number of important transitions that 

are underway in Afghanistan. I have talked about the electoral 

transition. We have talked about the military transition. We do not 

want to pile too many abrupt transitions on Afghanistan all at 

once. So I think the administration will go back to the more gradual reduction and historic aid levels, which I think were $5 billion 

only a few years ago, and we hope that the Congress will support 

us in this regard. 

Now, we have all read for years about—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Can I have you wrap up because we are at 10 

minutes already? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Sure. I am done. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Dobbins follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JAMES DOBBINS

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, members of the committee, thank 

you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss U.S. policy in Afghanistan and the region along with my colleague, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense 

Magsamen. 

Allow me to begin by thanking the members of the committee for your continued 

support for our mission; I know that you also share my appreciation for the generosity and steadfast resolve of the American people in support of Afghanistan. I 

would particularly like to recognize the dedication and bravery of thousands of 

American men and women who have served in our armed forces, our diplomatic outposts, and our assistance programs in that country. 

This mission began in 2001 to ensure that Afghanistan could never again be used 

by those who would plot against the United States or our allies. Since then, in concert with partners from more than 50 nations, we have advanced this goal. Working 

hand in hand with dedicated Afghans, we also transformed the lives of millions. All 

of us—Americans, Afghans, NATO allies, ISAF partners, and the many other countries that have joined this unprecedented international effort—share a vision of a 

sovereign, unified, democratic, and stable Afghanistan, a vision which is closer to 

realization today than at any time in that country’s history. 

For several years now, our efforts have increasingly focused on consolidating the 

gains made over the past 13 years, and on empowering Afghans and Afghan institutions to deliver security, the rule of law, and vital services, including health, education, and economic opportunity, that all Afghans deserve. That is why we 

launched a process of transition in 2010, by which the Afghan National Security 

Forces have increasingly taken the lead role in protecting the Afghan people from 

insurgents who would turn back the clock on the extraordinary changes in Afghanistan. When Afghan and NATO leaders announced in Lisbon in 2010 that, by the 

end of 2014, Afghans would have full responsibility for their own security, many 

said the timeline was unrealistic—that the ANSF was simply not up to the challenge. A year ago last June, however, we marked the ‘‘milestone’’ of transition to 

Afghan lead on all combat operations throughout the country. Since then, Afghan 

forces have won the trust of the Afghan citizens in their ability to protect them, a 

trust that was manifest in the high voter turnout during both rounds of the recent 

elections. 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
7 

Last month, President Obama announced that, contingent on the conclusion of the 

Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA), the United States is prepared to keep 9,800 

troops beyond the end of this year to participate in a NATO train, advise, and assist 

mission, and to continue a limited counterterrorism mission. By the end of 2015, 

U.S. forces will shift to a Kabul-Bagram disposition. By 2017, the U.S. security mission in Afghanistan will transform to an embassy-based security assistance model 

with a significant military and defense component. The President also made clear 

that 2017 will not mark the end of our commitment to Afghanistan. Afghans will 

need the assistance and partnership of the international community for years to 

come to strengthen their institutions, economy, and government. With continued 

support from Congress and the American people, the commitments in the Strategic 

Partnership Agreement, at the NATO summit in Chicago, and at the Tokyo Conference will help ensure that Afghanistan continues on a path of self-reliance and 

democratic development. 

The timetable President Obama has laid out for Afghan self-sufficiency is a 

demanding one, but no more demanding than the transition already accomplished. 

Since 2011, NATO forces in Afghanistan have dropped from over 140,000 to 48,000 

today, without occasioning any substantial loss of ground or population to the 

Taliban. 

Institutional capacity has also grown beyond the security sector, as evidenced by 

the recent Presidential and local elections, the first to be administered almost 

entirely by the Afghans, the first to have occurred on schedule, and the best organized to date. 

In April, roughly 7 million Afghans voted in the first round of the Presidential 

election—significantly higher than the turnout of the 2009 vote. Last Saturday, the 

runoff pitted two strong candidates against each other. On both occasions, Afghan 

forces provided the security, Afghan electoral bodies planned and administered the 

voting, Afghan media provided platforms for reasoned discussion about policy, 

Afghan civil society organizations and candidate agents monitored the polling centers, and Afghan political elites formed multiethnic tickets and campaigned all 

across the country. 

Equally notable was the quality of the campaign, which was spirited and widespread, while generally moderate in tone and national in character. The candidates 

crisscrossed the country, participated in large rallies, while generally eschewing 

negative campaigning and narrow ethnically based appeals. 

The first round of Afghan Presidential elections in April and Saturday’s runoff put 

the ANSF to the test. On both occasions the Taliban organized hundreds of attacks, 

but Afghans still lined up to vote. Last Saturday, NATO forces did not fire a single 

shot, leaving election day security entirely in Afghan hands. Considering how much 

the Taliban had focused on disrupting the Afghan elections, the ANSF’s efforts to 

secure the election bode well for the ANSF’s performance in the long run. 

It will be some time before we know the outcome of the vote. It is therefore critical that everyone—the candidates and their supporters, as well as the media and 

the voters—remain patient, not prejudge the outcome and allow the Afghan electoral institutions time to do their jobs effectively and in accordance with Afghan 

law. As happened in the first round of voting, Afghans who have specific concerns 

and complaints have the opportunity to bring them to the Independent Election 

Commission and the Independent Electoral Complaints Commission. Those bodies 

understand that their transparency and impartiality will be critical in ensuring that 

the Afghan people broadly accept President Karzai’s successor as legitimate and 

credible. Premature or undocumented allegations of fraud are as dangerous as fraud 

itself. 

The Afghan Government has tentatively scheduled the inauguration of the next 

President for August 2, and we look forward to working with whoever that will be. 

At the same time, we also recognize the need for national unity, and call on both 

candidates to work together after the election in the spirit of patriotism that has 

marked the campaign so far. 

The next Afghan President faces many challenges and uncertainties. What is certain is the commitment of the United States to our partnership with Afghanistan. 

An important aspect of this is our commitment, which President Obama reiterated 

on May 28, to conclude the BSA with the next Afghan administration as quickly as 

possible. With both Presidential frontrunners having stated publicly that they would 

sign the BSA promptly upon taking office, the way forward on this now appears 

clear. 

Let me also recognize the vast improvements in human rights that have been 

made since 2001—none more striking than the gains made by women. There are 

serious concerns that as our presence draws down, these rights will somehow be sacrificed. I am encouraged that both candidates made strengthening the rule of law, 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
8 

the protection of human rights and improving governance central tenets of their 

campaign platforms. Independent institutions like the judiciary and the human 

rights commission have a critical role to play in ensuring that there is no backsliding on the gains that have been made, and it is important that the next President nominate and appoint strong, qualified, and reform-minded individuals to lead 

these bodies. The United States remains committed to supporting and bolstering the 

transparency of these institutions so that all Afghans have confidence that their 

rights will be protected. Crucial as well to promoting accountability and respect for 

human rights is an independent, vibrant civil society—which has blossomed remarkably in Afghanistan over the past decade, and must retain the operating space to 

do its vital work. 

And in terms of governance, we all must remember that Parliamentary elections 

are less than a year away. Parliament has made important strides in adopting new 

laws, in vetting Presidential nominations and in serving as an oversight body to improve government accountability. Parliamentarians will need to continue performing 

these important functions, even as the campaign season for the legislative elections 

approaches. And the next President and the security institutions will need to work 

closely with the electoral bodies to ensure those elections are timely and successful. 

Given the progress that has been made in the political transition thus far, we are 

also beginning to think about how best to help the new Afghan President to address 

the myriad challenges he will face. The new President will need to strengthen 

Afghan executive, legislative, and judicial institutions; address corruption, which is 

corrosive to the legitimacy of the Afghan state; pursue economic reforms that will 

enable private sector led growth and stabilize the fiscal environment; determine a 

path for launching a reconciliation process; and set a constructive course for improving relations between Afghanistan and its neighbors. In my experience, governments 

all around the world often have problems doing more than one or two things at a 

time—which makes the scope of the agenda faced by the Afghan state all the more 

daunting. 

We have a stake in supporting the new government as it confronts these challenges and strives to not just maintain, but build on the progress that has been 

made over the last 12 years. The President’s announcement of our post-2014 presence is a step toward defining this long-term commitment. To support this agenda 

and ensure it is effective, we will need continuing support from Congress. Afghanistan will require significant U.S. and international attention for years to come— 

including continuing robust levels of development and security assistance. 

In 2012, we joined with the rest of the international community in Tokyo to outline a program of sustained international support combined with an Afghan-led program of reform and institutional development. This ‘‘mutual accountability’’ 

acknowledged that foreign assistance would necessarily decline—but that we would 

seek to graduate that decline so as to protect the gains achieved with our support 

and investments. When Congress cut the fiscal year 2014 appropriation for Afghanistan by 50 percent, it noted the difficult bilateral relationship, and particularly the 

failure of the Afghan Government to sign the BSA, as well as the existing funding 

pipeline. 

We believe the President’s fiscal year 2015 foreign assistance request for Afghanistan, although it represents an increase from the previous appropriation, reestablishes a responsible, downward trajectory for our assistance and reflects what we 

expect to be a productive working relationship with the new Afghan Government 

and the reality of a much diminished pipeline. As we reduce our assistance over 

time, it is critical that we defend the gains made over the past year, including by 

Afghan women and girls, and give the Afghan Government the time and space necessary to build sustainable sources of revenue. 

Later this year, the United Kingdom has agreed to organize a conference to 

review progress since Tokyo, and to enable the new Afghan Government to present 

its plan for inclusive economic growth and increasing sustainability. As I mentioned 

earlier, the challenges, most notably corruption, are significant, but they are issues 

that the current Presidential candidates stressed during the campaign. 

Both candidates have also talked about the need for a process of political reconciliation to bring an end to the bloodshed and violence that has wracked Afghanistan 

for three decades and ensure its long-term stability. The specifics of such an effort 

will be for the new Afghan President to decide, but United States will continue to 

support steps that improve the climate for an Afghan-led reconciliation process. Our 

objective has been and continues to be to promote and support a political process 

by which Afghans sit down with other Afghans to determine the future of their 

country. Both Presidential candidates have promised to pursue efforts at peace and 

reconciliation. This past weekend again demonstrated the desire of the Afghan people for peace, their determination to decide their future for themselves, and their 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
9 

commitment to do so through free elections. That underscores the conviction we 

share with the Afghan people that, as part of the outcome of any reconciliation process, the Taliban and other insurgent groups must break ties with al-Qaeda, end violence, and accept Afghanistan’s Constitution, including its protections for women 

and minorities. 

One of the potentially positive factors weighing in favor of stability in Afghanistan 

is the increasing convergence of regional interests. States across the region are recognizing that their stability is linked to Afghanistan’s stability and prosperity. Late 

last year, after President Karzai chose to delay signing the BSA, President Xi, President Putin, Prime Minister Singh, and Prime Minister Sharif each engaged with 

him to urge that he conclude the agreement. It is extraordinary that the Russians, 

Chinese, Indians, and Pakistanis would all support the continuation of a U.S. and 

NATO military mission in Afghanistan for at least several more years. 

Clearly, as this unusual conjunction of regional views indicates, the U.S. and 

NATO drawdown is a source of anxiety for regional powers. Pakistan, Uzbekistan, 

and China all fear Afghanistan becoming a safe haven for their own hostile militant 

groups. India fears Afghanistan again becoming a training ground for terrorist 

groups targeting them. Russia remains concerned about the flow of narcotics. Iran 

and Pakistan fear new floods of refugees. For the present these varying concerns 

have led to a convergence of policy, in favor, Iran excepted, of a continued U.S. and 

NATO presence, and in support of the existing constitutional regime in Kabul. The 

United States consults with all of these countries in various multilateral forums, 

and, again with the exception of Iran, also does so on a frequent bilateral basis. 

There remains, however, great untapped potential from connecting Afghanistan 

economically with its neighbors to the north and south. This is why we are working 

to promote regional economic connectivity in the broader South and Central Asia 

region through the New Silk Road initiative. Increased economic connectivity will 

also improve regional security and stability by giving Afghanistan’s neighbors a bigger stake in Afghanistan’s future. Of course, regional connectivity in South and Central Asia is a challenging undertaking in the world’s least economically integrated 

region. We have seen encouraging steps such as improved trade, transportation, and 

energy links between Afghanistan and Central Asia. To help create a regional Central Asia-South Asia energy market, the United States is supporting the CASA– 

1000 electricity transmission project, which when completed, will enable Tajikistan 

and Kyrgyzstan to supply 1,300 megawatts of surplus summer hydropower to 

Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

While we have serious differences with Russia on Ukraine, we continue to value 

our dialogue with Moscow over Afghanistan, including on discussions with Russia 

and Central Asia on counternarcotics. China will soon host a large regional meeting 

focused on addressing a number of common challenges. Prime Minister Modi of 

India invited both President Karzai and Prime Minister Sharif to join other regional 

leaders at Modi’s inaugural, demonstrating his interest in regional cooperation. 

Of all these powers, Pakistan probably has the greatest potential for influence 

over Afghanistan’s future evolution, for better or worse. In the past, Pakistan has 

projected influence into Afghanistan via its toleration of, and even support for, 

Afghan militants. The growth of an indigenous militant threat to Pakistan’s own 

constitutional order, in the form of the Pakistani Taliban or TTP, and the many 

links between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, along with the several other militant and terrorist groups active there, have made this an increasingly costly and 

ultimately unsustainable strategy. After an extended effort to negotiate with the 

TTP, Prime Minister Sharif has ordered a major military offensive designed, we are 

told, to clear all militants, foreign and domestic, out of their major stronghold in 

North Waziristan. In the short term this offensive will present challenges to 

Afghanistan, as innocent civilian refugees, along with Afghan, Pakistani, and other 

foreign militants flee across the border. In the longer term, however, if the Pakistani authorities deliver on their promise to deny the use of their territory to all 

militant groups, foreign as well as domestic, this effort will significantly enhance 

security in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. 

In 2001 parts of Kabul looked like Berlin at the end of the Second World War. 

In December of that year, when I reopened the American Embassy as the first post 

9/11 U.S. special envoy for Afghanistan, Kabul was a ruined city, ravaged by decades of invasion, civil war, and Taliban autocracy; the capital of a country that had 

no police force, no military, no ministries, no judicial system, few schools. Societies 

take a long time to recover from historical trauma of this magnitude, but only 13 

years later, Afghanistan has millions of children in school, an increasingly effective 

defense and police force, a professional independent media, and a functioning political system. These institutions, working together, were able to carry out two nationwide elections in the space of 2 months, despite bad weather, an active insurgency, 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
10 

and a short tradition of democratic practice. The Afghans have repeatedly demonstrated their desire for democracy and rule of law and to interact with other countries in the region and the world as a sovereign nation with its own traditions. 

We have read for years about continued prevalence of violence, high levels of corruption, limited governmental capacity and misdirected foreign assistance. All of 

this is undoubtedly true. Yet despite these genuine deficiencies longevity in Afghanistan has risen by 20 years since 2001, the largest such leap in life expectancy that 

any society has ever achieved over such a short period. Twice as many Afghans can 

read and write today as could in 2001, and twice as many again will be able to do 

so 10 years from now. Poverty and corruption have replaced insecurity as the prime 

voter concerns in much of the country. Yet despite these real and well-grounded concerns, polling continually reveals that most Afghans see their lives improving, have 

a positive assessment of their government, are confident in the capacity of their 

army and police and are optimistic about their future. 

This optimism will be tested in the years ahead. As NATO forces continue to draw 

down economic growth will slow and the Afghan security forces will be repeatedly 

challenged. The Afghans, other regional governments, our NATO partners and the 

international donor community will all be looking to United States to continue to 

lead in supporting the continued consolidation and extension of the dramatic 

changes that have already taken place in that country. Our ability to do so will 

depend upon the willingness of Congress to continue to respond positively to this 

and future administrations’ requests for security and economic assistance funding, 

even as the overall costs of our engagement in Afghanistan will continue to decline 

rapidly. 

The CHAIRMAN. I am sure there will be questions where you will 

be able to fill out anything you have not done. 

Ms. Magsamen. 

STATEMENT OF KELLY E. MAGSAMEN, ACTING ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY, ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS, 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. MAGSAMEN. Thank you. I will try to keep this short. 

Chairman Menendez, Senator Corker, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify 

today on the United States mission in Afghanistan beyond 2014 

and the regional implications of our transition. 

First, I would like to thank our men and women of the Armed 

Forces who have fought and served in Afghanistan, as well as our 

incredibly capable diplomats like Ambassador Dobbins and other 

civilians from across the interagency. We have not forgotten what 

brought us to Afghanistan more than a decade ago, and our core 

objectives are clear: disrupt threats posed by al-Qaeda, support 

Afghan security forces, and give the Afghan people the opportunity 

to succeed as they stand on their own. 

Since 2001, our forces have placed constant pressure on al-Qaeda 

and other terrorist networks operating in the region. United States 

and NATO forces have also helped develop and enable the Afghan 

National Security Forces to provide security for their own country. 

Since assuming the lead for security across Afghanistan exactly 

1 year ago today, the ANSF has proven resilient and capable. With 

minimal coalition assistance, Afghan forces now plan and execute 

nearly all combat operations, continue to improve their capacity to 

execute large, joint combat operations, and demonstrate tactical 

superiority over insurgents. 

Most recently, the ANSF demonstrated their capability to provide effective security for the Afghan people during both the first 

and the second rounds of the Presidential elections. The Afghan 

Government and its security forces worked closely to prepare for 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
11 

the first democratic transfer of power in Afghanistan’s history. 

Twice this year, Afghans have defied the Taliban-led insurgency 

when they turned out in large numbers to cast their votes. The performance of the ANSF during these two rounds is a major milestone in our efforts to develop a capable force that is accountable 

to the Afghan people. 

The ongoing drawdown of U.S. and NATO forces reflects the 

progress that the ANSF has made. Yet, much work remains to 

develop a self-sufficient ANSF. Throughout the end of this year, 

U.S. forces will continue to provide the time and space for the 

Afghan Government and security forces to increase their capacity. 

By next year, Afghans will be fully responsible for securing their 

country, and we will be in an advisory role pending the conclusion 

of a United States-Afghanistan bilateral security agreement and a 

NATO-Afghanistan status of forces agreement. 

As President Obama announced on May 27, the United States 

intends to maintain a limited military presence of 9,800 forces in 

Afghanistan in 2015 and provide the bulk of forces for the followon NATO mission known as Resolute Support. A post-2014 U.S. 

military presence will have two objectives: training, advising, and 

assisting the Afghan National Security Forces as part of the 

NATO-led Resolute Support mission, and supporting counterterrorism operations against the remnants of al-Qaeda. 

In 2015, the NATO-led train, advise, and assist mission will 

focus at the corps level and above to develop further capabilities in 

aviation, intelligence, and special operations, as well as the capacity of Afghan security ministries. As part of the NATO mission, the 

United States will also focus on ensuring effective use of future 

U.S. assistance to the ANSF. By the end of next year, the U.S. 

force presence should be reduced by roughly half and consolidated 

in Kabul and Bagram. 

In 2016, our focus will be on advising at the ministerial level to 

ensure contracting, procurement, and financial management practices. By the end of 2016, the U.S. military forces would be limited 

to a Kabul-based presence with a strong security assistance component to assist in sustaining the ANSF. A security cooperation office 

in Afghanistan will serve as the mechanism for continued security 

cooperation with the Afghan Government in areas of mutual interest, much as we do around the world. It will also allow us to maintain an enduring relationship with the ANSF and continue to build 

their capacity. 

Beyond the drawdown of forces in Afghanistan, the United States 

will continue to have, as the Ambassador reflected, national security interests in South and Central Asia. These include preventing 

terrorist groups from threatening our homeland, our citizens, and 

our interests, addressing terrorism and extremism in Pakistan, and 

advancing a stable, secure, and independent Central Asia. To pursue these interests, we will continue to conduct security cooperation with these countries in the region. 

In closing, the steps that United States forces and our NATO 

partners have taken in Afghanistan, as well as our efforts to build 

partner capacity in the region, will help set the conditions for 

regional security in the years ahead, even as challenges remain. 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
12 

Achieving improved regional stability will require sustained U.S. 

leadership and engagement. 

I would like to thank this committee for its leadership and support of the United States military mission in Afghanistan, as well 

as your continuing support of our men and women in uniform and 

our diplomats and other civilians. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Magsamen follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KELLY E. MAGSAMEN

Chairman Menendez, Senator Corker, distinguished members of the committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify on the U.S. mission in Afghanistan beyond 

2014 and the regional security implications of our transition. It is also an honor to 

speak alongside Ambassador Dobbins. 

First, I would like to thank the men and women of our armed forces who have 

fought and served in Afghanistan, as well as our incredibly capable diplomats and 

other civilians from across the interagency. We have not forgotten what brought us 

to Afghanistan more than a decade ago. Since 2001, our forces have placed constant 

pressure on al-Qaeda and other terrorist networks operating in the region and have 

helped develop and enable the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to provide 

security for their country. Our core objectives in Afghanistan are clear: disrupt 

threats posed by al-Qaeda; support Afghan security forces; and give the Afghan people the opportunity to succeed as they stand on their own. 

Since assuming the lead responsibility for security across the country 1 year ago, 

the ANSF—composed of 336,306 personnel—are now successfully providing security 

for the people of Afghanistan. Afghan forces plan and execute nearly all combat 

operations, and continue to improve their capacity to execute large, joint combat 

operations across the country with minimal coalition assistance. The ANSF have 

proven resilient and capable, demonstrating tactical superiority over the insurgents 

during the last fighting season and already during this fighting season. 

The ANSF most recently demonstrated their ability to provide effective security 

for the Afghan people in the first and second rounds of their Presidential elections. 

The Afghan Government and its security forces have worked closely—on an unprecedented level—to prepare for the first democratic transfer of power in Afghanistan’s 

history. Twice this year, Afghans have defied the Taliban-led insurgency and turned 

out in large numbers to vote for their democratic future, including a turnout of 

nearly 7 million voters in the first round. ANSF performance during these two 

rounds is a major milestone in our efforts to develop a capable force that is credible 

in the eyes of the Afghan people. 

Although the drawdown of U.S. and NATO forces reflects the progress that the 

ANSF have made, there is still much work to do to develop ANSF capacity toward 

sustainment. Through the end of this year, our mission will continue to provide the 

time and space for the Afghan Government and security forces to increase their 

capacity and assume full responsibility for Afghanistan’s security. Starting next 

year, Afghans will be fully responsible for securing their country and we will be in 

an advisory role. 

The Department of Defense is committed to a responsible drawdown of U.S. forces 

and an appropriately resourced follow-on NATO mission in Afghanistan. As President Obama announced on May 27, the United States intends to maintain a military presence of 9,800 forces in Afghanistan in early 2015, and provide the bulk of 

forces for the follow-on NATO mission, known as Resolute Support. A continued 

U.S. and NATO military presence is conditioned upon the conclusion of the U.S.- 

Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement and NATO-Afghanistan Status of Forces 

Agreement. The post-2014 NATO mission will advise the continued development of 

security activities to the Afghans as the international community seeks to normalize 

its relationship with Afghanistan. NATO is expected to approve the Resolute Support operational plan at the NATO Foreign Ministerial on June 24, and will convene 

a force generation conference later this summer to align national contributions with 

operational requirements. 

As Secretary Hagel stated after President Obama’s force level announcement, our 

enduring presence ‘‘will help ensure that al-Qaeda cannot reconstitute itself in 

Afghanistan, and it will help us sustain the significant progress we have made in 

training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces.’’ To that end, the post2014 U.S. military presence will have two objectives: training, advising, and assisting Afghan forces as part of the NATO-led Resolute Support mission and supporting 

counterterrorism operations against the remnants of al-Qaeda. 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
13 

The NATO-led train, advise, and assist mission will be directed at the corps-level 

and above. As part of this mission, the United States will complement Afghan security efforts by closing institutional capability gaps, sustaining major equipment, and 

ensuring effective use of future U.S. assistance to the ANSF. The advisory mission 

will continue to build ministerial capacity and fielded force capabilities as the ANSF 

mature to become a professional and sustainable security force. Advisors will assist 

the Afghan security ministries, army corps, and police zones with performing tasks 

such as planning, programming, budgeting, acquisition, and human resource management so they can provide the required support to tactical units. For the fielded 

force, advisors will address gaps in aviation, intelligence, and special operations, as 

well as logistics, medical, and counterimprovised explosive device (IED) capabilities. 

By the end of 2015, the U.S. force presence should be reduced to roughly half the 

levels from the beginning of that year and consolidated in Kabul and at Bagram Airfield. In 2016, a continued advisory effort would be embedded at the ministerial/ 

institutional level to address anticipated shortfalls in financial management, procurement, and contracting. By the end of 2016, the U.S. military would be limited 

to a Kabul-based presence, with a strong security assistance component to sustain 

the ANSF. Beyond 2016, a Security Cooperation Office in Afghanistan would serve 

as the basis for continued strategic cooperation with the Afghan Government in 

areas of mutual interest, including advancing regional security and cooperation. It 

would also allow us to maintain an enduring relationship with the ANSF, build 

partner capacity, and preserve the access and influence necessary to help ensure 

stability in Afghanistan and the region. We will use the coming years to continue 

building a strong relationship with Afghanistan through security assistance-related 

activities, such as military education and training exercises. 

Sustained ANSF and coalition efforts have prevented al-Qaeda’s use of Afghanistan as a platform for terrorism. These efforts have forced al-Qaeda to focus on survival rather than on operations against the West. Despite our success in degrading 

core al-Qaeda, remnants remain in the border region and coordinate with other 

extremist organizations, such as the Haqqani Network, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, 

and Lashkar-e-Taiba. Beyond 2014, U.S. forces will remain focused on denying safe 

haven to al-Qaeda and keeping pressure on the extremist network to limit the operational ability of transnational and foreign military groups inside Afghanistan. 

The United States will continue to have national security interests in South and 

Central Asia beyond the drawdown of our forces in Afghanistan. These include preventing terrorist groups from threatening our homeland, U.S. interests, and citizens; 

addressing terrorism and extremism in Pakistan; and advancing a stable, secure, 

and independent Central Asia. To pursue these interests, we will continue to conduct security cooperation with countries in the region to help promote strategic stability on the subcontinent. 

Security cooperation with Pakistan has helped facilitate counterinsurgency operations that constrain al-Qaeda and militant groups like the Pakistani Taliban, 

which threaten the United States, Pakistan, and other countries in the region. For 

example, Coalition Support Funds have helped the Pakistan military maintain more 

than 125,000 troops in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and security assistance—to include equipment such as night vision devices and radios—has 

improved Pakistan’s counterinsurgency and counterterrorism capabilities. The delivery of upgraded F–16s to Pakistan led to the increased effectiveness of their air 

operations, especially in night strikes that limit militant freedom of movement. 

U.S. support and engagement have also contributed to counterterrorism cooperation against al-Qaeda and to Pakistan’s efforts to disrupt IED networks responsible 

for attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan’s counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and counter-IED efforts will remain critical as we continue the drawdown 

in Afghanistan. U.S. support to Pakistan also supplements its efforts to improve internal stability, which is vital for improved stability in the region. It is therefore 

essential that we maintain defense cooperation with Pakistan at close to current 

levels through 2016. 

The Central Asian states are also an important facet of the regional security landscape. In addition to the assistance these nations provide directly to Afghanistan 

through trade, building infrastructure, supplying electricity, and education resources, Central Asia has steadily supported U.S. efforts in Afghanistan by allowing 

the transit of military materiel and personnel through their territories as part of 

the Northern Distribution Network. Since the independence of Central Asian 

nations in 1991, the United States has supported the ability of these states to maintain their sovereignty and independence by building their capability to secure their 

borders, counter narcotraffickers and extremists, and better manage their defense 

and security institutions. The United States will continue to pursue these interests 

during and following the drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
14 

In addition to our bilateral security cooperation efforts, the United States will continue to play a mediation role in the region. Cross-border militant attacks remain 

a challenge to maintaining positive relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 

addition to attacks by Pakistan-based militants in Afghanistan, we are growing 

more concerned about Afghanistan-based militants launching attacks in Pakistan. 

These attacks have contributed to an uptick in border clashes between the two countries. In recent instances, Pakistan attempted to de-escalate clashes using the procedures put in place by Islamabad and Kabul, with facilitation from ISAF and the 

Office of Defense Representative–Pakistan. Maintaining a strong relationship with 

the Pakistan military and the ANSF will be necessary to mitigate future flareups. 

We intend to press both Islamabad and Kabul for greater cooperative measures 

after the new Afghan administration takes office. In addition, an improved relationship between Pakistan and India is essential to regional stability. The recent 

engagement between Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and newly elected 

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is cause for cautious optimism. Recognizing 

the important role the United States has to play in terms of regional engagement, 

we hold trilateral dialogues with Afghanistan and Pakistan, and with Afghanistan 

and India. These meetings are held in addition to formal and informal bilateral 

engagements with each of these countries on issues relating to regional security. 

In sum, the steps that U.S. forces and our NATO partners have taken in Afghanistan, as well as efforts to build partner capacity in the region, will help set the conditions for regional security in the years ahead. Achieving improved regional stability will require sustained U.S. leadership and engagement in the region. 

I would like to thank this committee for its leadership and support of the U.S. 

military mission in Afghanistan, as well as for your continuing support of our men 

and women in uniform and of our diplomats and other civilians. I look forward to 

answering your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you both for your testimony. 

Ambassador Dobbins, let me ask you. As I said in my opening 

statement, Afghanistan is not Iraq, but the deterioration of the security environment in the latter raises questions about the announced plans to withdraw United States combat troops by the end 

of 2016. I am concerned that the timeline emboldens militants in 

the country who will simply wait out the departure of U.S. forces. 

So can you give the committee a sense of the deliberations which 

led to the decision to eliminate the operational and support role for 

U.S. troops by 2016, and what are the opportunity costs to not 

maintaining a more significant military presence there beyond 

2016? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I think the main lines of analysis were the 

pace at which the Afghan Armed Forces could repair or address the 

continuing deficiencies. I think Kelly can probably answer this in 

more detail. But the general discussion said that they are capable 

of independent tactical and operational actions, but that some of 

the higher level capabilities still need further development. These 

would include program budgeting, personnel management, maintenance, sustainability of the force, those kinds of higher level management issues at the ministerial and corps level. And given that 

the improvements that have been made in their tactical and 

operational capabilities over the last several years, these should be 

fixable within the timeframe that has been set out. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me ask you, Ms. Magsamen. Given the 

lack of capacity in logistics and air support, if we think that they 

have made so much progress that what is left to be finished can 

be done in 2 years, how do you think they will perform without the 

capacity in logistics and air support after 2016? 

Ms. MAGSAMEN. Let me say a quick thing on the timeline. I 

think when we were deliberating on this, the timeline is in our 

view appropriate to where the ANSF is currently and where we see 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
15 

their shortfalls and how we are going to spend the next 2 years 

addressing those shortfalls. And as I said earlier in my opening 

remarks, they are performing quite well at the tactical level and 

operational level. They are performing more complex joint operations. They are doing 99 percent of conventional operations right 

now, about 98 percent of special operations. 

The CHAIRMAN. No. I appreciate that. I heard you. I listen to testimony when it is given here. 

But I want to get to my point. Looking at the ANSF now is one 

thing. Looking at the ANSF 2 years from now is another. And the 

question is without air support and logistical abilities, how do you 

think they will be able to perform. 

Ms. MAGSAMEN. I cannot really speculate how they are going to 

perform in 2016, but what I can tell you is that air support—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, but you have made that determination by 

deciding that you are going to withdraw by 2016. So someone made 

a determination that you can judge because otherwise you could 

not withdraw by 2016. 

Ms. MAGSAMEN. Yes, sir. In our judgment, the areas we are planning to focus on over the next 2 years include aviation, they include 

intelligence, they include logistics and sustainment like I said. 

These are going to be the areas of focus that General Dunford and 

ISAF are going to be focusing on post-2014. As you know, aviation 

is a long-term and complex set of programs, but this is going to be 

an area of focus for us. We are going to have 9,800 troops by the 

end of the year. They are going to be there. This is not like we are 

dropping off a cliff at the end of this year. We are going to continue 

to do training and advising and assisting in these areas. We do 

think they are capable, and we do think they can get there. It is 

complex. It is going to be a long-term effort with the ANSF. It is 

going to require a long-term international commitment, but we are 

confident that the ANSF is making progress. I think they have 

demonstrated that progress over the last two rounds of elections. 

They are demonstrating it every day through all the operations 

that they are conducting. And, yes, there are shortfalls and we are 

cognizant of those shortfalls, but we are working to fill them. 

The CHAIRMAN. There is a difference. And I do applaud them for 

what they did during the elections. But there is a difference 

between that and a full-fledged frontal attack by those who may be 

emboldened to thinking that the United States will not be there. 

And I hope to God that they are capable of doing so because after 

so many American lives and national treasure, I would hate for us 

to see losses. 

I did not vote for the war in Iraq because I think that was a 

colossal mistake, probably one of the most consequential decisions 

that was ever made in the recent history of the United States. It 

has cost us trillions of dollars and thousands of lives. And so as far 

as I am concerned, that was a colossal mistake. 

But I did vote for Afghanistan. That is where Bin Laden was. 

That is where al-Qaeda was. That is where the perpetrators of September 11 were. Those towers were where 700 of my citizens in 

New Jersey were taken and 3,000 Americans were taken. So I am 

not about to just walk away, although I certainly am far from a 

warmonger by any stretch of the imagination. But I am concerned 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
16 

that we are not doing what will be necessary in order to achieve 

the long-term benefits. 

Let me ask you about the region. As I traveled through the 

region and most recently in the gulf, all I heard is: Are you going 

to stay? And then we had the announcement. Unfortunately, that 

announcement was while I was in the gulf and I did not know 

about it. And the reality is that there is significant concern. 

So, Ambassador, talk to me about the regional implications and 

what we are looking at in terms of the region because when I was 

in Pakistan, they wanted to know if we were going to stay, and 

they were making judgments based on that. And obviously they are 

going to make judgments now. I see that they launched some 

efforts in certain parts of Pakistan and along the region there that 

is contiguous with Afghanistan, but I doubt they are going to do 

very much to the Haqqani Network as part of that. So talk to me 

about the regional consequences of the decision as well. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, I would say most regional powers 

are relieved that we are not leaving right away. They are relieved 

that the zero option is no longer considered probable. They are 

relieved that we will have a significant presence there next year. 

And most of them would like us to have it there longer. In fact, 

probably most of them would like us to stay indefinitely. 

There are exceptions to that and significant exceptions. I would 

guess that Russia, China, and Iran are all pleased that there is an 

end date to our presence. The Russians and the Chinese I think 

both are glad we are staying for a while, but they are glad it is 

only a relatively brief while. 

As to what we need to do, we do need to capitalize on what 

degree of consensus there is. We need to continue to work the trade 

and regional economic integration piece which both aids Afghan 

development but even more importantly gives everybody in the region a stake in Afghan stability as their own prosperity depends in 

growing measure on trade links that include Afghanistan. And so 

this is an important area that we, along with our South and Central Asian Bureau, continue to work on very actively. 

We need to continue to engage the major players in the region, 

India, Pakistan, China, Russia, bilaterally as well as in the several 

multilateral forums which exist to talk about at the moment the 

Afghan elections, to talk about the transition, to talk about how 

some of those countries can continue to assist both the Afghan 

security forces and Afghan stability more generally. We have not, 

in recent years, talked bilaterally to the Iranians, but they are 

included in a number of the multilateral forums that we engage in 

consultations in as well. 

I think you accurately perceive the concerns of the regional powers, and as I said, from their standpoint what they got was I think 

they appreciated the greater clarity about our intentions for next 

year. I have not heard complaints about next year, but as you have 

heard, some of them are concerned about—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I think all of us who care about the commitment 

we have made here are glad to see this. I never believed the zero 

option was real except if we did not get a security agreement. I 

think it would have been disastrous. So I guess they are relieved 

by having the affirmation that we are not leaving, but I do not 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
17 

know how relieved they are from my conversations about the 

declared time period in which we are going to leave. 

There are a lot of questions here that I would like to ask you 

about. Sustainability of projects is one. If you want more money, 

we are going to have to see the sustainability of projects at the end 

of the day. And also I have questions about the post-election process and what we are doing. But there are a lot of members here. 

So let me turn to Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say that on the 

sustainability issue, I am with you. I got to tell you I think most 

of us have been shocked by the massive amount of nation-building 

that had no relevance to security, and I do hope we will go through 

those with a fine-tooth comb. And I hope the State Department will 

bring us to understand the purpose of those and how they will be 

sustained. 

But back to the number of security forces. I know this was a long 

and contorted decision, one that could have been made some time 

ago, as soon as the Presidential candidates, all of them, said they 

were going to sign the agreement. But the decision process was 

contorted. There were people, were there not, Mr. Dobbins, within 

the administration pushing for zero? Is that true? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I do not recall anybody explicitly pushing 

for it in any meeting I attended. So formally not. And I attended 

virtually every meeting. 

Senator CORKER. People have predicted what is happening in 

Iraq. Many people on the dais have been talking about what would 

happen in Iraq if we did what we did with a no Syria policy, with 

leaving the way that we left, and with having a Prime Minister 

that is not governing his country in the appropriate way. So even 

though people knew it was going to happen and even though you 

saw indications of what was happening, have the recent events in 

Iraq in any way caused people to reassess declaring the zero option 

in 2016 for Afghanistan? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. You know, as Chairman Menendez said, 

Afghanistan is not Iraq. I quite understand the analogy you are 

making which is, to a degree, a fair analogy, that if you leave too 

early, most of your investment can be lost as a result. I am not 

arguing against that. I am arguing that in Afghanistan we are 

doing just the opposite of that. 

And the situations are very different. In Iraq, the people did not 

want us and not a single Iraqi politician was prepared to advocate 

our staying. In Afghanistan, the people overwhelmingly want us to 

stay, and every single contender in the Presidential election said 

they would sign the BSA. In Iraq, they could get along without us, 

at least temporarily because they had plenty of money. In Afghanistan, they cannot possibly get along without us. 

Senator CORKER. Well, just since you said that, in a sense they 

want us there, and I agree with that analogy although I am not 

sure we could not have still worked an arrangement in Iraq that 

is different than what it is and what it has been. I think you would 

agree with that. 

How did we decide 2015, 2016? In other words, yes, the country 

welcomes us. Yes, it is the apparatus which we are using for intelligence. Yes, it matters a lot to the region. So since both the 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
18 

Presidential candidates that are in the lead have said stay, why is 

it we announced that we were going to leave in 2016 and have the 

specific numbers in each year? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. You know, I do not think the decision in 

Afghanistan was made in a vacuum. I wrote six or seven books on 

Afghanistan, Iraq, and on post-conflict stabilization during the 10 

years I was outside the Government. And anybody who has read 

those knows that my view is more is better. More money, more 

time, more manpower gets you better results. 

But resources are finite. All I have to worry about is Afghanistan 

and Pakistan. But the President and you have to worry about every 

other place in the world where U.S. resources, U.S. money, U.S. 

troops, and the time and attention of high-level policymakers are 

needed. And it was against that background of a metastasizing 

threat from al-Qaeda and similar groups, a spread of that threat 

to a number of other societies, the fragmentation that is occurring 

in a lot of other countries which are now in a lot worse shape than 

Afghanistan is that the decision was made to take a calculated 

risk. We thought 2 years would be enough. And on that basis, the 

President made a decision because there are a lot of other claims 

on those resources. 

Senator CORKER. Well, since you attended all those meetings and 

you heard all the tongue and cheek comments that take place in 

these kind of meetings, is your sense that this was basically a 

throwaway comment for public consumption and if things on the 

ground deteriorated, that the President would actually be very 

open to ensuring that the gains that have been so hard-fought are 

kept in place? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. No, I do not think the President is disposed to review this decision. 

Senator CORKER. So this is an absolute, regardless of conditions 

on the ground, you all absolutely made a decision that this is the 

way it is going to be. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I believe the President has made a decision which he intends to keep, which carries us through 2016. Now, 

I cannot speak for what would happen if there were massive diversions from expectations, but I do not think the President is disposed at present to review this decision. 

Senator CORKER. It is amazing when we talk to people within the 

administration that know things like this and are pretty tuned in. 

They say, hey, guys, do not worry about this. This is just a plan. 

We are going to reassess. But you are telling me as a special envoy, 

this is concrete. Right now, this is not just a plan, but this is the 

way it is going to be. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I think this reflects the President’s intentions. 

Senator CORKER. Let me ask you this question. The leadership 

there that is on the ground—I think all of us know both of the candidates that are in the finals and have had, I am sure, multiple 

meetings with each of them. Do you view either one of the winners 

as an improvement over the leadership that we now have in 

Afghanistan? It is not much of a bar I know. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I think President Karzai’s leadership will 

probably have to be evaluated in hindsight over the entire 10 or 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
19 

12 years of his presence there. I was instrumental in his initial 

selection to run the provisional government. I think he has made 

a major contribution in putting Afghanistan on a path toward constitutionalism and democracy. I think he has done a remarkably 

good job of bringing together the various ethnic and sectarian and 

linguistic and religious groups and overcoming those kinds of 

obstacles. He has done this through a process of distributing 

patronage, which has the side effect of increasing corruption but 

also has the side effect in a country that has very weak institutions 

of creating constituencies in every single ethnic and religious and 

linguistic group in the country for the central government, for constitutional order. And that is a significant contribution. 

Now, in the last couple of years, our relations have deteriorated 

seriously. I think either one of the candidates will devote significant effort to improving that relationship. I believe there will be 

responsiveness here to that, and I believe that, therefore, the relationship will significantly improve. 

I would also say that President Karzai seems to be playing a balanced and constructive effort to try to bring this electoral process 

to a conclusion that everybody in Afghanistan can accept. We are 

not there yet. It is going to be a difficult several weeks I think until 

we get there. And I think his leadership is going to be continually 

important in that regard as well. 

Senator CORKER. If I could, Ms. Magsamen, this is my final question. I know you keep throwing out the security office—or you have 

a couple times in your answers to questions and your presentation—at the Embassy. And it is almost as if to placate people 

who are concerned—or at least that is the way I hear it—that are 

concerned about this absolute drawdown. Could you tell us just a 

little bit about what the security office within the walls of the 

Embassy will do relative to making the country and also the region 

more secure? 

Ms. MAGSAMEN. Thank you, Senator, for the question. I think it 

is an important one because, as you know, around the world we 

have this kind of security cooperation office. We manage a ton of 

very complex security and defense relationships with partners like 

Jordan, with partners like Colombia. And, sir, you can pick your 

different version. They all vary in how they operate. We will tailor 

the office of security cooperation in Afghanistan to the Afghans’ 

needs. It will afford us an opportunity to provide continued advice 

to the ANSF and assistance and execute security assistance 

through that office and process it and help work with the Afghans 

in terms of improving their programming and planning and 

budgeting. 

So the OSCs can perform a variety of functions. It is not purely 

just a throughput for moneys. It is actually an opportunity for us 

to engage the Afghans to maintain channels of influence frankly 

with the ANSF through the Embassy as well. So these offices of 

security cooperation around the world can perform very complex 

functions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both 

for being here. 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
20 

Ambassador Dobbins, you talked about the Iraqis never wanting 

us to stay and the Afghans not wanting us to leave. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Yes. 

Senator SHAHEEN. What kind of an impact is what is happening 

currently in Iraq having in Afghanistan? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. You know, I have not seen any reverberations within Afghanistan to date. I am not sure the Afghans themselves, at least the man on the street, see much of a relationship, 

and they are pretty focused on their own problems and their own 

political process at the moment. 

Senator SHAHEEN. So is it having any impact on the potential for 

reconciliation negotiations to occur between the Taliban and the 

new leadership in Afghanistan once it is decided? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I think there is a prospect for renewed— 

and ‘‘renewed’’ may be too strong a term because there was not 

much of a process before, but for more meaningful efforts at reconciliation once a new government takes office. And it will depend 

on, first of all, the quality of the electoral process and whether it 

is divisive in the country or whether it unites the country behind 

a successor President. 

Secondly, I think the success of Afghan security forces during the 

electoral process will give the Taliban pause. 

Thirdly, if we complete the drawdown and if at the end of the 

year, Afghan security forces have continued to hold their ground 

and the Taliban is not making ground, I think all of those factors 

will go into their decisionmaking. They tend to fight during the 

spring and summer and talk among themselves during the fall and 

winter, and I would anticipate that that process of talking among 

themselves may well yield differences. Both of the Presidential candidates have indicated a willingness to engage in a reconciliation 

process and negotiation with the Taliban. The Taliban have clearly 

not been willing to talk to Karzai in the short term, but I think 

there is some prospect that they will be willing to do so as the 

result of all of those factors. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And are there any particular leverage points 

that we think the Afghan Government is going to have in potential 

negotiations with the Taliban? I hear you say that if the security 

forces maintain their ability to maintain security in the country, 

that that provides leverage. But there has been not a lot. There 

have been some reports that the Taliban are just waiting until we 

withdraw our troops and then they intend to reengage in a way 

that would make it difficult for the security forces to continue to 

maintain the gains that they have achieved. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I do not think we have any intelligence 

which would support the view that the Taliban has been pulling its 

punches over the last year and a half. I think insofar as we have 

an assessment, it has been that they have continued to try to hurt 

us, to make our withdrawal as difficult and painful as possible, to 

disrupt the elections, to disrupt the Afghan security forces. And so 

far, they have largely failed in that regard. 

Now, in terms of points of leverage, we have already talked about 

the Afghan points of leverage, and I think the other main source 

of leverage on them is going to be, for better or worse, the behavior 

of Pakistan. 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
21 

Senator SHAHEEN. One of the real concerns I think that exists 

once we withdraw is what happens to some of the gains that have 

occurred in Afghanistan, particularly for women. And I wonder if 

you can speak to what we anticipate might happen there. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, I think there have been some 

remarkable gains that are going to be difficult to roll back. You 

have had a 20-year increase in longevity, the largest such increase 

any society in the world has sustained in such a short period in 

human history. Twice as many Afghans can read and write today 

as could read and write a decade ago. That is not going to go away. 

And if the kids stay in school for another 10 years, twice as many 

Afghans again will read and write 10 years from now as can read 

and write today. 

You have had massive urbanization. People have moved away 

from their tribal, ethnic, and familial roots into more cosmopolitan 

urban centers. 

You have had a massive increase in communications, 75 TV stations broadcasting, largely national, not narrowly sectarian news 

and commentary. You have had cell phone coverage over 90 percent 

of the country. 

And in terms of attitudes, not only are women participating in 

elections, not only are women going in schools in massive numbers, 

but there have been changes in attitudes registered in polling so 

that now most Afghans believe women should be educated. Most 

Afghans believe women should vote. The get-out-the-vote among 

women in this last election was assisted by a number of religious 

leaders who are arguing that women should be allowed to and 

encouraged to vote. Those are changes that will not be reversed 

overnight. 

Now, if the Taliban overruns the country and takes control 

again, I do not even think they would be able to bring the country 

back to 2001. But I agree that it would be a significant reversal 

of what we have achieved, and that is why we are going to continue 

to cooperate with the Afghan Government and the Afghan people 

to prevent it. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Ms. Magsamen, I am not pronouncing your 

last name correctly. 

Ms. MAGSAMEN. It is Magsamen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Can you talk about the prospects for our 

drawdown of troops, what that might do to extremist movements 

in Pakistan? What is the impact going to be there? And have we 

seen any change in how the Haqqani Network, some of the extremist groups view us after the Bergdahl prisoner exchange? 

Ms. MAGSAMEN. In terms of the impact on Pakistan, I think we 

are getting ready to enter into a pretty critical period of transition, 

as the Ambassador talked about. And as I think everybody on this 

committee understands, security in Afghanistan is contingent on 

security in Pakistan and vice versa. This has been an area of 

intense focus, especially for General Dunford and General Austin, 

who have been engaging both the Pakistanis and the Afghans in 

particular on the importance of developing mechanisms to manage 

cross-border escalation among these groups. 

I think the key going forward here is that we are going to continue to engage leaders on both sides about the importance of 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
22 

managing and addressing the situation with extremists in the border region and putting into place mechanisms of cooperation and 

transparency, communication to manage border escalations. We recently had a few instances, as you probably know, on this. Like I 

said, the important part is putting in place these mechanisms. We 

have had sort of on and off bipartite military-to-military engagement between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and basically I think the 

next few years, it is going to be incumbent upon the Afghans and 

the Pakistanis, with our encouragement, to continue to keep talking and sharing information. 

In terms of the steps that you raise, Pakistan I think—they are 

an important CT partner for us. I think they are on a better trajectory in terms of the steps that they are taking, as you can see from 

the North Waziristan operations that are underway right now. I 

think that is an important step that Senator Corker pointed to earlier. There are places where our interests converge, and we work 

to cooperate with them. There are places where they diverge, and 

we engage them on those places as well. And we make very clear 

to the Pakistanis in particular our concerns about the Haqqani 

threat. We make that very clear and very direct across the interagency between State and the Department of Defense. 

So we are watching closely what the Pakistanis are doing. They 

have taken steps. They are making gains. The Pakistanis have over 

125,000 troops in the FATA. They are increasingly gaining control 

over territory. But at the end of the day, the situation in the FATA 

is really a long-term governance challenge for Pakistan, in addition 

to a security challenge. So we are encouraged by some of the steps 

they are making. Is it totally adequate? No, but we do think they 

are on the right trajectory. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. I am going to defer to Senator McCain. He has 

got an event. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Ambassador Dobbins, in late May, former senior Pentagon officials and leading counterterrorism analysts testified to Congress 

that the Taliban is on the verge of major resurgence. Do you agree 

with that assessment? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I have not seen any sign of it. I do think 

that our assessment is that as our forces draw down, they may be 

able to gain marginally more territory in rural areas. Maybe that 

is what he was addressing. 

Senator MCCAIN. I am talking about several of them did. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. If you are talking about overrunning 

major population centers, we do not see that. 

Senator MCCAIN. You do not see a major resurgence on the part 

of the Taliban. 

Did you personally recommend this drawdown, this date for 

withdrawal? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I am not sure it is appropriate to go into 

specific recommendations. I think you were here when I said my 

clear personal—— 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
23 

Senator MCCAIN. When people are confirmed, they are asked if 

they would give their personal opinion, and they usually say yes 

and I think you did too. So if you do not want to answer it, do not 

answer it, but that is not what you committed, I think, to this committee when you were confirmed. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I think you were here, Senator, when I 

said that my view is on these kinds of situations that more is better. More time, more money, more troops, more people yields better 

results. But it has to be made within a broader context. Throughout the discussions I and the State Department supported General 

Dunford’s recommendations at every point without qualification. 

Senator MCCAIN. Do you believe that this decision creates a 

higher or same or lower risk? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Than what? 

Senator MCCAIN. For a resurgence of the Taliban and the—— 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Senator, I think if we kept 100,000 troops 

there, the risk would be lower, but there is absolutely no possibility 

of our doing that. The Congress would not support it. The American people would not support it, and we have got other commitments. So the question is not—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Let me get this right. It is 100,000 troops or 

total withdrawal? No, Ambassador Dobbins, do not tell me that 

please. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I am sorry. 

Senator MCCAIN. What most of us advocated and we are seeing 

this movie in Iraq is that by announcing a complete withdrawal, 

that we encourage the Taliban. They wait for us to leave. And I am 

predicting to you now, as I predicted what happened in Iraq, that 

you will see a resurgence of the Taliban and great damage done by 

the Taliban to the Afghan people. I predicted it in Iraq, Ambassador Dobbins, and I am predicting it now in Afghanistan because 

you have sent the signal that do not worry, hang on, we are leaving. And so for you to set up this straw man, like the President 

does, 100,000 or nothing, I am saying what most military experts 

that I know is that we needed a residual force as we had in South 

Korea, in Berlin, in Bosnia, in Japan. In most every country in 

which we fought a conflict, we left behind a residual force not to 

keep fighting but to stabilize the country. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, in Bosnia, we have removed all U.S. 

troops, but we do—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Sure, we have a residual force to stabilize the 

country. If you want to go through country by country, you want 

to go after the Korean war where we left 38,000 troops and Americans were war-weary then—they were very war-weary, but we stabilized what was a corrupt country with a corrupt dictator called 

Syngman Rhee at the time because they needed to make the transition to democracy. Now South Korea is a great success. Most 

experts would agree that if we had not left a residual force, that 

would not be the case. You are ignoring the lessons of history, sir. 

So I ask again, do you think it is a higher or lower risk, the fact 

that we are pulling everybody out, not whether we are leaving 

100,000 or not? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I am sorry. I thought the question originally was whether the 9,800 is adequate. Your more broad question 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
24 

is whether zero or a large Embassy military presence, but the 

absence of an independent military command in 2017 is enough. 

You know, I think the answer is it depends. And my original testimony went through the four things that I think it mostly depends 

on. As I said, I think the President had to make his commitments 

and decisions with respect to Afghanistan based on a variety of 

other new threats and old threats. In the case of Korea, for 

instance, or Germany where troops remained after the stabilization 

phases, the principal threat continued to be in our view Chinese 

and Russian Communist aggression, and those were the—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Not the reason why we originally left a residual force there, Ambassador. The reason why we originally left a 

residual force in those places was to stabilize the country. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, it was to continue to defend against 

what we conceived as the principal direct threat to the United 

States. 

Senator MCCAIN. And there is a direct threat to the United 

States of America if the al-Qaeda and ISIS and others gain control 

of that region. Maybe you do not believe that. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Absolutely. No, I agree with that. And I 

think there is a chance that what we are proposing will adequately 

meet that threat. 

Senator MCCAIN. The question is whether a total withdrawal and 

announcement of it encourages the Taliban and increases dramatically the risk of the rise of the Taliban and further chaos in the 

country and further death and suffering and threats to the United 

States of America, which is why we went into Afghanistan to start 

with because of al-Qaeda being based there. It is a bad decision 

and we will pay a very heavy price for it. 

Mr. Chairman, I have no more questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murphy. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

On any given year over the course of this conflict, total foreign 

assistance has represented an amount approximately equal to the 

GDP; in the last few years, maybe closer to 90 percent of GDP. 

That is not a completely fair statistic given the fact that only about 

50 percent or less of assistance actually lands in Afghanistan. And 

you have seen some pretty remarkable growth rates of the economy 

as well. 

But clearly, inside that country, there is a crippling fear that the 

withdrawal of U.S. forces and the diminution of aid that you referenced in your initial testimony is going to have a pretty catastrophic effect on the economy. 

So you have made a recommendation that you would like to see 

aid from the Congress increased, but what are the conversations 

that we are having regionally with our allies to make sure that the 

economic support for the country is drawn down at a rate that will 

not lead to catastrophic collapse? And are we any closer to realizing 

some of the potential long-term assets that we have heard so much 

about in the country such as the vast mineral deposits that some 

have posited could lead to some pretty significant revenues for the 

government? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I think the best estimates from the World 

Bank, the IMF, and others is that Afghanistan’s growth rate will 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
25 

and already has slowed significantly. It has been growing at a rate 

comparable to China’s for the last 13 years, and that is not going 

to continue. I think they do anticipate that it will continue to grow. 

It is not going to go into negative growth is the current projection. 

But it will not grow very fast. And obviously, that deceleration is 

itself going to be a source of concern and will have an impact on 

some of the lives there. As you have indicated, Afghanistan is going 

to remain dependent on international assistance for some time. 

On the military side, that is going to be largely a function of the 

threat. If the threat diminishes, their dependence on that is going 

to diminish commensurately. If the threat does not diminish, then 

it is very hard to see how they could possibly afford a security 

structure of the current dimensions at any time in the foreseeable 

future. 

On the civilian side, I think we will be seeking assistance in the 

coming year that gets us back on the track which was a track of 

gradual diminution rather than abrupt diminution. So it would be 

a larger request than we received this year, but it would be a 

smaller request than we had requested this year and a smaller 

request than we received the year before last. So we do have a 

glide path. I cannot remember. It is about a 16-percent decrease 

over the next several years. 

And I think the important thing to measure this against is what 

we were spending when we had 100,000 troops there or even this 

year, 50,000 troops. The costs of a security assistance program and 

a civilian assistance program are dwarfed by the costs of a continued large-scale military presence in the country. 

Senator MURPHY. A question about their military’s capabilities. 

Ms. Magsamen, you gave some pretty robust testimony on this subject. So maybe I will direct the question to you. 

Admittedly, the last time I was there was a little bit over a year 

ago. I was impressed by the capabilities of a lot of the Afghan 

counterterrorism units. They are doing good work, but they, at the 

time, were deeply reliant on U.S. close air support. And I have not 

heard a lot of rosy estimates in the intervening year about the 

increased capabilities of the Afghan Air Force. So tell us about the 

ability for us to train up a competent air force, frankly, to many 

of our minds without buying a whole bunch-load of Russian helicopters to do the job so that when we leave, their very competent 

ground forces are not compromised by incompetent air capability. 

Ms. MAGSAMEN. Sure. The Afghan Air Force is doing more support operations to the ANSF every day. Aviation programs, like I 

said earlier, I think are usually the longest lead time in terms of— 

you know, it is very complex to train pilots and to help them perform very complex operations with ground forces. This is something 

that is going to be an area of focus over the next couple of years. 

We are, in fact, actually going to begin training Afghan A–29 

pilots in January. So that is one of the areas. This is an area we 

are going to be focusing on a lot over the next 6 months. 

So they are making progress. It is going to be long term. In 

terms of providing close air support beyond 2014, that is not what 

we currently have underway, but we will be training up their pilots 

and working with them on this. But it is going to be a long-term 

effort. 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
26 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I know buying Russian helicopters is certainly controversial. I think it is important to recognize, first of all, 

they are a lot cheaper. And secondly, they are rather well-suited 

to operating at high altitudes, as is the case in Afghanistan. 

Senator MURPHY. Mr. Dobbins, just to jump to one last subject. 

We had a hearing on AUMF here in which the administration 

made the case that even with a repeal of the 9/11 AUMF, they 

thought they had most of the powers inherent in article 2 to continue to do the kind of counterinsurgency efforts that they want to 

do across the globe. What are your thoughts on what a repeal of 

the AUMF would do for our capabilities and necessities inside 

Afghanistan over the next several years? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I am not an expert on this question. I do 

not think we anticipate any diminution in our authorities with 

respect to Afghanistan over the next several years one way or the 

other. But I really have to beg off on the legal aspects of it, which 

I am not well versed in. 

Senator MURPHY. Ms. Magsamen, do you have thoughts on the 

consequences of an AUMF repeal? 

Ms. MAGSAMEN. Sure. So I would pretty much answer it the 

same way. I mean, an AUMF question extends far beyond Afghanistan, as you know, because AUMF gives us the authorities to operate globally against al-Qaeda and affiliated groups. So I will also 

beg off on the legal aspects of this question. We could take it for 

the record. 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The information referred to above was not available at the time this hearing went to press.] 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

Thank you both for being here. 

Ambassador Dobbins, I wanted to begin with your statement. 

You actually said something I agree with 100 percent. This mission 

began in 2001 to ensure that Afghanistan could never again be 

used by those who would plot against the United States or our 

allies, which was certainly the primary reason why we went in 

because 9/11 was coordinated from there. 

So I wanted to analyze the recent decision made by the President 

in light of that stated goal, the recent decision to release five 

Taliban commanders and others back to Qatar. 

The first thing I want to point to is this report from the State 

Department on terrorism, and it basically reads—these folks now 

have been released to Qatar. Qatar’s monitoring of private individuals and charitable association contributions to foreign entities 

remain inconsistent. Qatari-based terrorist fundraisers, whether 

acting as individuals or as representatives of other groups, were a 

significant terrorist financing risk and may have supported terrorist groups in countries such as Syria. 

I wanted to know what specifically has changed in Qatar 

between the time that report was released and June 1st when the 

Taliban deal was publicly announced to give the President confidence to overlook the problems outlined with Qatar’s enforcement 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
27 

mechanisms that were outlined in that State Department report. 

What has changed? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I think a couple of things have changed. 

The first is we negotiated a fairly detailed agreement with Qatar 

covering the degree to which these individuals would be monitored 

and which their activities would be limited to ensure that they 

were not capable, during the year they would spend in Qatar, of 

contributing in any way to the conflict in Afghanistan. Secondly, 

the President spoke to and received personal assurances from the 

Emir of Qatar. And I think the combination of those two things 

gave us the assurance we required. 

Finally, I would say that our experience to date—and obviously, 

it has only been a few weeks—has been that the Qataris are very 

assiduous in meeting all of those obligations. 

Senator RUBIO. It has been about 2 weeks. 

So the answer is that what has changed is that we got it in writing and they told us about it on the phone. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. And, you know, personal commitments 

from leaders of states. It means something. 

Senator RUBIO. But systemically nothing has changed in the government. It is primarily those two things and then, of course, the 

last 17 days you say they have done a pretty good job of it so far. 

Right? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Yes. 

Senator RUBIO. By the way, these five operatives that were 

released were not just any five operatives. One was the Taliban’s 

army chief of staff and the deputy defense minister. One was the 

deputy director of intelligence. A third was the military commander 

who coordinated Taliban operations with al-Qaeda. Another one 

oversaw an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan, and the last 

one planned attacks against the international coalition in Afghanistan. 

Of these five individuals that have been released, how many do 

you think will return to the fight against us? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Ultimately, I think it is quite possible that 

all of them might. But I think ‘‘return to the fight’’ is something 

of a euphemism. 

Senator RUBIO. How many of them will return to be active members of the Taliban? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Probably all of them. These people either 

were captured or surrendered within a few weeks of our arrival. All 

but one of them were captured or surrendered in 2001. One of 

them that you mentioned was captured a year later. So four of 

them had absolutely nothing to do with the insurgency. No connection with IED’s or suicide bombing or any of those things. They 

were part of the Taliban government. 

Senator RUBIO. Well, you would agree that their status, having 

been former detainees—— 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I think they will quite possibly return. 

They are middle- or late middle-aged individuals. They are not 

going to be on the battlefield in any meaningful way. So again, that 

is something of a euphemism. And it is not as if the Taliban have 

any lack of individuals like that. 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
28 

Senator RUBIO. So if they are not that special, why did they want 

them back, all five of these in particular? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I think they felt a sense of loyalty to them. 

I think they did want them back. I do not know that they wanted 

them back because they fill some deficiency. 

Senator RUBIO. Well, but they wanted them all back, but why 

these five in particular if they are of such diminished value? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Because these were the five most senior 

ones. 

Senator RUBIO. So your opinion is they do not have any special 

abilities or value that give the Taliban—— 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I would not go that far, but I think that 

the marginal utility from the Taliban standpoint is probably 

marginal. 

Senator RUBIO. Let me move on to another issue. Of course, this 

has been mentioned a moment ago about what is going on with 

ISIL in Iraq and they are gaining in strengthen and so forth. And 

this is enlightening in light of the fact that on May 27, President 

Obama announced in the Rose Garden that all U.S. forces would 

depart Afghanistan, leaving behind a normal Embassy presence in 

Kabul with a security assistance component, ‘‘just as we have done 

in Iraq.’’ 

So my question is, do you think if what is occurring in Iraq had 

occurred a month ago before the May 27 announcement—do you 

think the President would have reached the exact same decision 

that he announced on the 27th of May with regard to Afghanistan, 

given what we now see happening or occurring in Iraq? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I am sorry. 

Senator RUBIO. Had what is happening in Iraq over the last 10 

days—— 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Would that have changed the President’s 

decision? 

Senator RUBIO. Yes. Do you think that his decision regarding the 

status of forces in Afghanistan would have been different in terms 

of the numbers, the timing, the way it was phrased in terms of the 

timeline—— 

Ambassador DOBBINS. It might have changed the way it was 

phrased to avoid the Iraq comparison. But otherwise, I do not think 

the substance of the decision would change. 

And I think you have to also ask yourself suppose in 2011 the 

Iraqis had asked us to stay for an additional 2 years and we had 

stayed for an additional 2 years and repaired some of the additional problems in their structure, might that have also led to 

improvements. 

The President has not decided to pull out of Afghanistan. He has 

decided to stay there at this point 21⁄2 more years and then to continue an Embassy presence beyond that. He believes and we have 

reason to believe that the Afghan political and security structures 

will have developed to that point where a continued financial 

assistance and a continued security assistance relationship will be 

adequate to allow them to continue—— 

Senator RUBIO. So if we reach the end of the 21⁄2-year period or 

any time in between and it appears that the ability of the Afghans 

to prevent a repeat of Iraq is not sufficient, do you think the 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
29 

President will reconsider this decision or the timeframe in which 

it was announced and so forth? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I do not think he is presently disposed to 

reconsider the decision. 

Senator RUBIO. So in essence, what is occurring in Iraq is not 

weighing at all on what the President has announced or decided to 

do. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I am not aware of any discussions with 

the President in the last 2 weeks about Afghanistan. So I do not 

know the answer to that question. 

Senator RUBIO. The last question is the President—— 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I do not have any reason to think that his 

view has changed. 

Senator RUBIO. The President said that prisoner swaps happen 

at the end of wars. Is the administration planning to release any 

more Taliban prisoners in the runup to the 2016 deadline for 

removal of U.S. troops? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I do not know that there is any connection 

between the two. The administration continues to try to close 

Guantanamo by finding ways of transferring people who either do 

not present a threat or who can be sent to locations where that 

threat can be contained. I would anticipate that will continue—— 

Senator RUBIO. Well, the reason why there is a connection is 

because he said that at the end of wars—and he says the war in 

Afghanistan is over or coming to an end—it is normal to release 

prisoners or swap. When we get to that point in 2016 when, in fact, 

there is no military presence outside of our Embassy situation, do 

you know of any conversations occurring about what we would do 

with the rest of the Taliban prisoners since the war against the 

Taliban, according to the President, is now over? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I do not know of any conversations which 

link either the end of this year or the end of 2017 to prisoners in 

Guantanamo. There is an effect on prisoners being held in Afghanistan where we will lose our legal basis to hold any prisoners at the 

end of this year. Now, we do not hold any Afghan prisoners at all 

at the moment. We hold some non-Afghan prisoners in Afghanistan 

at the end of the year, and we will not be able to hold them after 

the end of the year. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to just follow 

up on the Bergdahl matter. I had not intended to get into it. 

Senator Rubio stated a number of specific concerns about the five 

detainees that were released. Let me put some other facts on the 

table that have now been testified to in open session by Secretary 

Hagel. There is no evidence that any of the five were engaged in 

an activity or planning against the United States. It might have 

been because of how early they were arrested or surrendered, but 

there is no evidence that any of the five took any steps or were 

involved in any planning activity against the United States. That 

is an important fact that I think needs to be put onto the table. 

Why did the Taliban want them back? Why did the United 

States want Bergdahl back? We did not want Sergeant Bergdahl 

back because of the critical role he was going to play in our military operations. We wanted him back because we bring our people 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
30 

home. I suspect there was a similar motive with respect to the 

other side. 

My understanding about this is the five detainees are detained 

at Guantanamo as prisoners of war because they were Taliban 

members, but not detained as enemy combatants because they had 

taken any steps against the United States. 

My understanding—and I think this was part of our earlier conversations here—is that as prisoners of war, when the war is over, 

international law suggests that these individuals would have to be 

released. The President gave a speech at West Point in the last 2 

weeks saying combat operations are finished in Afghanistan in 

2014. Under international law, there is an argument that this particular agreement puts these individuals under restrictions for a 

longer period of time than they would be under a restriction 

because of international law. 

So I have some concerns about the Bergdahl situation, largely 

about the notice to Congress. I think any White House that can 

plan a Rose Garden ceremony with the parents of Bergdahl could 

have called the heads of the Intelligence Committee to tell them 

what was going on. And I view that as not an oversight but as 

something, frankly, intentional. That chaps me a good deal. 

But the notion that these five Taliban members are going to get 

back into a war against the United States when there is no credible 

evidence that they were ever engaged in activities against the 

United States is something that has to be considered in figuring 

this out. 

And I do think, Mr. Chairman, we probably need to kind of get 

to the bottom of this, extending of the hearing that we had about 

the AUMF that you chaired. The testimony from the witnesses was 

what do you have that you might be worried about giving up if the 

AUMF expires. They said the continuing status of U.S. troops in 

Afghanistan, the ability of the DOD to do counterterrorism operations, and the status of all Guantanamo detainees could potentially change with the AUMF. But given that the five detainees in 

this instance were not detained because of actions against the 

United States but only as prisoners of war because they were members of the Taliban, my understanding of international law is if 

combat operations are over in 2014, there is an international law 

argument that they would need to be released without restrictions. 

They may be under more severe restrictions because of this deal 

than they would have been otherwise. 

We had a hearing in my subcommittee on April 30 about 

Afghanistan’s transformation past 2014 focusing on some of the 

social factors, women in school, increases in life expectancy, a 20- 

year increase in life expectancy in the last decade. Twenty years 

times 30 million people is like 600 million years of extra human 

life. We talked about those things. 

And there was a bit of evidence at that hearing that I thought 

was pretty staggering—or testimony, General Allen testifying. And 

he said that he thought for the Government of Afghanistan post 

2014, the existential threat was not the Taliban but the existential 

threat was corruption. I wonder if either of you would offer an 

opinion upon that testimony that General Allen gave. 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
31 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Yes. I guess it depends on the existential 

threat to whom. In terms of Afghanistan’s development and to a 

functioning and increasingly prosperous country, I think corruption 

is a very substantial obstacle. It is interesting that that corruption 

and economic development have displaced security as the top concerns for most Afghans. And the election campaign demonstrated 

that what the candidates mostly talked about was how they were 

going to fight corruption and improve the economy, not how they 

were going to fight the Taliban. 

Nevertheless, even though the Afghans remain very concerned 

about corruption, they also remain optimistic about their future, 

positive about their government, and generally confident in their 

institutions. So they can hold sort of two thoughts in their head at 

the same time. One is this corruption is really awful. The second 

thought is this is better than we have ever had it in our lifetime 

experience and that of our fathers. And so I think they have got 

both of those concepts down pretty strongly. 

As I said I think earlier, it is hard to make a distinction between 

corruption and patronage in some cases. You have got a country 

which particularly back in 2002, 2003 had weak or nonexistent formal institutions, and it was a shared patronage system that held 

the country together and that is still the case to some degree. Now, 

that has to diminish over time. You are never going to do away 

with patronage entirely, but you do have to corral it, regulate it, 

limit it, and create a more level playing field for people. The structure of the international assistance programs have laid out a road 

map, if you will, for Afghanistan to make a number of reforms and 

a certain proportion of our assistance and assistance from other 

countries is contingent on some of those reforms being made over 

time. 

Now, my experience even in highly developed countries like the 

United States is it is hard to make more than one reform at a time. 

We are still absorbing changes in our health care system. And we 

are asking Afghanistan to make reforms of comparable magnitude 

in terms of how it affects the lives of individuals and particularly 

how it affects the political system. We have got about 18 such 

changes we would like them to make all at once, which has not 

happened and is not going to happen. They are making slow 

progress. Both candidates have probably listed corruption, along 

with economic development, as their top priorities, and I think we 

will have to continue to encourage them to deliver on those. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Just one or two final questions. In 2014, the State Department’s 

Bureau of Counterterrorism report said that ‘‘Afghan, Taliban, and 

Haqqani Network leadership and facilitation networks continue to 

find safe haven in Pakistan, and Pakistani authorities did not take 

any significant military or law enforcement action against these 

groups.’’ 

Now, as I mentioned, Pakistan recently launched an operation 

into North Waziristan ostensibly to target elements of the Pakistani Taliban that have attacked the state. But I am really very 

skeptical that they will attack or target the Haqqani Network during the operation. 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
32 

What is your current assessment of Pakistan’s willingness to confront the Haqqani Network during the operation? Either one of 

you. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. In the last few weeks, we have addressed 

this with the Pakistani leadership, making clear the priority we 

attach to addressing the challenge that the Haqqani Network represents to our forces and to our facilities and to our personnel in 

Afghanistan. We have been assured by Prime Minister Sharif, by 

General Raheel Sharif, by the Interior Minister Chaudhry, by the 

head of the ISI, General Zaheer, and today in a conversation with 

General Mahmoud, the chairman of their joint chiefs, that they are 

going to treat all militant groups similarly and that they are going 

to force all foreign militants out of northwest Waziristan and 

Pakistan. 

I think your concern is justified. I think we will be examining 

this carefully. We have gotten the right assurances, but there is a 

historical pattern of activity, which I referred to in my written testimony and which I read to you, which indicates that there are 

habits here that are going to be difficult to break. And so I think 

we have made our position clear. They have said the right things. 

The CHAIRMAN. That is a lot of assurances. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. But actions speak louder than words. 

I think the Pakistanis look at the Haqqani Network much different than they look at the Pakistani Taliban in terms of their 

own interests. And I also think that for a variety of political, governing, and other reasons, they do not target this network. I hope 

that as we are considering what our continuing engagement with 

Pakistan is, that we are going to not only seek commitments, but 

we are going to judge accordingly how they act in terms of our assistance to them because I think this is incredibly important. And 

if you do not make it—if performance in this regard does not become a measurement, then I think all the assurances in the world 

will mean nothing. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I agree. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you about the review that is going 

on with our policies toward the countries of Central Asia. If we are 

going to have sustainability in terms of the economic situation in 

Afghanistan, this is going to be pretty critical. And the progress 

that has been made on the CASA–1000 project, which will provide 

electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan and Pakistan, is significant, but I am thinking about what obstacles there are to the 

completion of that. What is it going to mean in terms of being able 

to move forward on the new Silk Road project? I know they are not 

directly connected, but if you can achieve one, then maybe you can 

actually make progress. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. What is the second one? 

The CHAIRMAN. The new Silk Road project. 

Define our interests as part of the Central Asian effort with 

Uzbekistan. I know you are dealing with Afghanistan and Pakistan, but these are interrelated from my perspective. To the extent 

that you can share some insights into that. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, the CASA–1000 or 5000 is moving 

forward. It has gotten international blessing. It is getting interVerDate Mar 15 2010 16:19 May 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE T

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
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national support from the United States, from the international 

financial institutions. All of the necessary countries have bought 

into it in principle. The last I heard, which was a few weeks ago, 

was that there was still a pricing negotiation going on between 

Afghanistan and Pakistan, that is, how much Pakistan would pay 

Afghanistan for the electricity that was being transmitted over 

Afghanistan to Pakistan—so it is essentially a commercial negotiation, if you will—would still have to be resolved. And then, of 

course, the lines have to be built, and that will depend in part on 

the security situation, although with respect to that project, people 

seem more sanguine that it can be done within the current environment, whereas some of the other larger investments like a pipeline from Turkmenistan would probably require more significant 

improvements in the security situation before it became viable. 

As to the new Silk Road, that is, of course, a complex of proposals and ideas rather than a single commercial venture like the 

CASA venture. And I think the Chinese have their own Silk Road 

vision, which they arrived at independently but which is largely 

compatible with our own. Central and South Asia is the least economically integrated region in the world. That is, the countries of 

this region trade less with each other than the countries of any 

region in the world. Pakistan, for instance—its largest market is in 

the United States, despite the fact that it is neighboring India and 

China. That is crazy obviously. And that is symptomatic of the 

region as a whole, although not to quite that same extreme degree. 

So breaking down those barriers to trade and creating commercial 

links, including infrastructure links, roads, electric grids, pipelines, 

but also just breaking down the barriers is what the new Silk Road 

concept is really about. 

It is not heavily funded on the part of the United States. I mean, 

we are putting political energy, limited resources, and pushing it. 

China is going to be hosting a meeting in August on the Heart of 

Asia group which will address these issues to some degree, and 

there will be other regional issues. 

The CHAIRMAN. So that is far off. The realization of this is years 

away. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I mean, you would have to go through it 

project by project. Some of them are easier than others. In terms 

of Uzbekistan, first of all, I think it is notable that among the targets that the Pakistanis are going after very vigorously now are 

Uzbek groups in Pakistan have been one of their prime targets in 

the recent military actions there. 

Uzbekistan tends to prefer to work bilaterally rather than multilaterally. So they are kind of resistant to larger groupings like in 

the new Silk Road context. They tend to be a bit more resistant 

than some of the other countries of the region to working in anything except purely bilateral arrangements which can sometimes 

create a problem. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Magsamen, what is our security cooperation 

with Uzbekistan? 

Ms. MAGSAMEN. Let me comment more generally on Central Asia 

and I will get to Uzbekistan. 

A stable and secure and independent Central Asia is definitely 

in our interests, and as you know, the Central Asian states have 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
34 

been critical during this period in Afghanistan, especially on the 

NDN network for us. We have in place a series of security cooperation efforts underway with pretty much all of the Central Asian 

states focused on border security, counternarcotics, countering 

extremism, and also helping them build up their defense institutions, so working through defense reform efforts. We have a number of tools at our disposal going forward in terms of FMF and 

IMET and DOD counternarcotics funds, DOD 1206 funding, and we 

intend to use them going forward. I think the next couple of years, 

the Central Asian states are going to be increasingly looking to us 

on the security front, and I think it will be important for us to 

respond accordingly to their concerns. 

In terms of cooperation in Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, Uzbekistanis—you know, they are very concerned as well about the potential for terrorism groups to spread into Central Asia, as you know, 

and in particular the IMU, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, 

is an area of increasing concern for them. And that group has been 

focused largely in Afghanistan, but they are watching that closely 

to see whether it moves into Central Asia. 

But we are focused going forward mainly on the border security 

piece and the CT cooperation with many of these countries. 

The CHAIRMAN. Particularly in Uzbekistan, is this about border 

security and counterterrorism? 

Ms. MAGSAMEN. I would have to get you the specific answers on 

the breakdown of the security cooperation. 

The CHAIRMAN. If you would, because I am concerned about the 

human rights situation in Uzbekistan and recently wrote to President Karimov on behalf of five political prisoners, which I would 

like to include in the record, the letter that we sent to him for this 

hearing, which I know Senator Durbin has also been really concerned about, a member of the committee as well. 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The information requested and the letter referred 

to above were not made available at the time this hearing went to 

press.] 

The CHAIRMAN. So I would like to know exactly what we are 

doing with the Uzbeks, so I can judge on that. 

Ms. MAGSAMEN. We will follow up with a full answer. The 

CHAIRMAN. Fine. Thank you. 

And finally, Ambassador, today Dr. Abdullah has called for a 

halt to the vote counting citing allegations of widespread fraud. 

Now, I heard your comments before. We are going to go through 

a difficult period of time. But what is our role in moving through 

this potentially contentious period in terms of having an improving 

dialogue between the two campaigns and through this process? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, we are urging that both sides 

remain engaged with the electoral institutions, and we regret any 

moves to the contrary. So we are talking to both of the candidates 

regularly. We are encouraging them to talk to each other, which 

does not seem to be happening as frequently as it should either 

directly or via intermediaries. We are certainly talking to the electoral institutions. The international community has observers who 

observe the vote count, as the two candidates are permitted to do, 

as it goes forward. And we are in regular contact with President 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
35 

Karzai who, as I have said, so far has been playing a responsible 

role in trying to keep the candidates in the game. 

Our basic view is that the electoral institutions have to be supported. They have to be given a chance to do their job, that there 

certainly was fraud. There were significant levels of fraud in the 

first round and almost certainly in the second round. There are 

mechanisms for challenging and dealing with this fraud, and these 

mechanisms have to be given a chance to work. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief. 

First of all, thank you for being here today and thank you for 

what you do. Mr. Ambassador, I get the strong sense that you pursued a different policy relative to laying out the timelines. You do 

not have to answer that. I would just say that while I hope that 

we are able to have the kind of success in Afghanistan that will 

warrant that type of withdrawal—I do hope, as you continue on, if 

you see things on the ground that show that that type of withdrawal, arbitrary and precipitous, will have a damaging effect, that 

you will urge strongly that the administration consider a different 

course of action. I think you will. I think you have done that in private sessions with us. Again, I know many others at the State 

Department, for instance, on Syria and other places have wished 

that we would take a different course of action, and I know the 

White House has overruled. But I hope you will continue on the 

path that I think you have been on. 

And secondly, I would just ask the question in closing. The chairman and I are sitting down with the Joint Chief from Pakistan 

that you referred to earlier at 5 o’clock. I think most of us have felt 

both the intelligence agency and the military have been double 

dealing with us, and I think it is pretty much public record that 

that is the case. I know they are here to convince us that something is different now, and they are going to strongly go into North 

Waziristan. 

I would just ask. I know the Prime Minister has urged that not 

to occur and has urged us to pursue policies that would allow them 

to have some kind of an agreement with the Taliban and other terrorists in that region. Is the Prime Minister firmly supportive of 

what the military is doing? I know in their country, many Americans do not realize that the military and the civilian piece are very 

separate, but is the Prime Minister strongly supportive of that 

activity? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Yes. First of all, I think the Prime Minister’s view and the civilian government’s view was that they had 

to give the elements of the TTP a chance to climb down to disarm 

and to respect the constitution and operate within it. And they 

engaged in negotiations with that objective, and they did that without any objection from us. I do not think there were great expectations that that would succeed, but I think their feeling was that 

that was a necessary step both because they could peel some elements of the insurgency off as a result and, secondly, because they 

needed to go into a massive operation of this sort, which is going 

to produce a lot of refugees, a lot of costs, a lot of damage to innocent people, as well as to the guilty, on the basis of a strong 

national consensus. 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
36 

They now have a strong national consensus. The Prime Minister 

has authorized and directed this particular action. While I think 

the military may have had different views throughout this period, 

they have saluted and done what they have been told. So when 

they were told not to take action, they did not. When they were 

authorized to take action, they are now taking the action. 

So while you are right that historically there has been a strong 

distinction between civilian and military leadership and while this 

has not gone entirely away, the two are a lot closer and civilian 

authority over the military is gradually being demonstrated. And 

we assume this will be a gradual process. 

I have told you about the assurances we have received with 

respect to the Haqqani Network. If you are going to be having 

meetings, I think you need to not only hear those assurances but 

make clear that you are going to evaluate your own attitudes based 

on the degree to which you believe those assurances are fulfilled. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

I wanted to briefly address this issue—two things. Senator Kaine 

a moment ago pointed out that none of these five—there are any 

links that any of these five had ever been involved in direct attacks 

against the United States. But in fact, it is much more complex 

than that. The 9/11 Commission, for example, found that the 

hijackings in the United States on September 11 of 2001 were a 

culmination of a three-step plan that al-Qaeda had. 

The first part, of course, was the assassination of the Northern 

Alliance commander, Ahmad Shah Massoud. 

The second was the following day on September 10, al-Qaeda and 

the Taliban took their second step. It was a delayed Taliban offensive against the Northern Alliance, which was apparently coordinated to begin as soon as that first step took place. They wanted 

to weaken the opponents of the Taliban because they knew there 

would be retribution for the 9/11 attacks. And the 9/11 Commission 

found that Fazl, one of the five people that have been released, was 

the one who was one of bin Laden’s chief lieutenants in this operation who helped carry this out. 

By the way, of the five that have been released, two are wanted 

for U.N. war crimes. So I think that this notion that somehow 

these individuals have never directly plotted against the United 

States—you could probably say that about every member of 

al-Qaeda for the most part. They were not directly in the room 

plotting the 9/11 attacks, but they certainly were key facilitators of 

providing a safe haven for al-Qaeda to carry these things out. And 

as the 9/11 Commission found out, at least one of them was a key 

operative in this three-step plan leading up to 9/11. 

The second statement that has been made here today is that the 

war is over and that when wars end, this is normal to exchange 

prisoners. And in fact, we may have no legal basis to hold them. 

But I am curious. Earlier today you said to us—and it happens 

to be the absolute fact—that the Taliban has not gotten that memo. 

For example, as you stated, the Taliban is not holding back. They 

are still shooting at Americans. They are still planting IEDs. They 

are still trying to kill Americans. 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
37 

Can I ask? Do you anticipate that in 2016 when we are down to 

only an Embassy presence, will the Taliban still pose a mortal 

threat to Americans in Afghanistan irrespective of the number of 

people we have there? Will they will be shooting at Americans? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Okay. Let me try to answer this in some 

order. 

First of all, none of those five are wanted for U.N. war crimes. 

None. They may have committed war crimes, but the United 

Nations is not seeking them. If by the United Nations, you presumably mean the International Criminal Court. I do not believe the 

International Criminal Court—— 

Senator RUBIO. They have all been linked by United Nations 

groups with, for example, the slaughter of Shiites. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I am not sure what ‘‘linked by United 

Nations groups’’ means in that case. There are human rights advocates, including human rights elements of the United Nations, that 

have indicated that they may be associated with those crimes. That 

is absolutely right. That is different from saying—— 

Senator RUBIO. So are you confident that none of these individuals have committed human rights violations? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. No, of course not. Quite the contrary. 

Senator RUBIO. You think they have. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I think there are credible allegations. I 

think that is all you can say at this stage. But, yes, the allegations 

seem credible. They are still allegations, but they are credible. But 

there is no judicial process. They have not been indicted. Afghanistan is not seeking them. The ICC is not seeking them. So it is not 

as if they are evading some warrant that is out. Okay? So they are 

not wanted. 

Senator RUBIO. They have been named in allegations before U.N. 

tribunals. They have been named—— 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Just one of them, maybe two. I mean, your 

information may be correct. But there have been credible allegations about linkages to large-scale atrocities that probably could be 

qualified as war crimes. 

Senator RUBIO. What about Fazl’s involvement in the three-step 

plan leading up to 9/11? Now, the 9/11 Commission—— 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Let me get to that. 

Now, this is something you probably really need somebody from 

the intelligence community. My impression is that we do not 

believe that anybody in the Taliban, including Mullah Omar, were 

witting to the 9/11 attack. They did not know about it. They were 

not told about it. Now, I could be wrong. So that is something the— 

that is my impression that we do not believe that there was collaboration in planning that specific attack and that they were not 

aware that it was going to take place. So the idea that there was 

a three-step plan in which the Taliban were witting to all thee 

steps or part of it—I am not sure that our intelligence analysis 

would validate that. 

Senator RUBIO. Would you agree that the first two steps were coordinated with al-Qaeda? The Northern Alliance offensive leading 

up to 9/11. Let us assume for a moment, for the sake of argument, 

that the Taliban was not told that on 9/11 there is going to be an 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
38 

attack. They certainly coordinated with al-Qaeda to carry out both 

the suicide attack and the offensive on the 10th. Right? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. The Taliban carried out the offensive. So, 

obviously, they were witting to it. They were the principal instrument of it. I do not know whether they were witting to the attack 

on Massoud. It is quite plausible, but I do not know. 

And then you had a third point. 

Senator RUBIO. The points about the Taliban and the—— 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Oh, yes. Are they going to continue to 

present a threat? Quite likely, just as there are other countries in 

the world in which we have large embassies in which we are under 

threat. And in those cases, within our own perimeter, we provide 

for our own security. Outside the perimeter, we depend on the local 

forces. And our current estimate is that by 2017, Afghan forces will 

be capable of holding the Taliban at bay and continuing to secure 

the large population centers, including Kabul. 

Senator RUBIO. But I guess the bigger point that I was trying 

to—— 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Will the Taliban still be targeting us? Yes. 

Senator RUBIO. I guess my bigger point is traditionally when you 

talk about the end of a war, what you are talking about is both 

sides stop shooting at each other. My point is we may stop shooting 

at them, but they are still going to be trying to kill us. 

And I think the bigger point is, when you talk about these 

exchanges at the end of a war, Sergeant Bergdahl is returning to 

his family. By your own testimony here today, all five of these may 

be potentially, quite possibly returning to the Taliban to the same 

group that still targets us. 

So I do not think it is fair to say that the war is over. Certainly 

we may feel that way or some of our policymakers may feel that 

way. I do not think the Taliban feels that way. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. What the President has said is that 

United States combat operations are going to cease in Afghanistan 

at the end of the year. But, obviously, there is going to continue 

to be a war in Afghanistan, and we are going to be continuing to 

support—— 

Senator RUBIO. Again, I only raised that because the statement 

was made that at the end of wars, it is normal—— 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Fair enough. 

Senator RUBIO. My argument is the people you are releasing 

them to do not believe the war is over. In fact, as long as any 

American is present there, they will be in danger of being attacked 

by them. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you to both for your testimony and 

your service. 

Ambassador Dobbins, I must say, while I may not always agree, 

your depth and scope of knowledge here is an extraordinary asset 

to our country, and I appreciate the particular commitment you 

have, having come back to service in this regard. So thank you very 

much. 

Thank you both for that. 

The hearing record will remain open until the end of the day on 

Friday. 


FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
39 

And with that, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSE OF AMBASSADOR JAMES DOBBINS TO QUESTION

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. Ambassador Dobbins stated that the U.S. ‘‘New Silk Road’’ initiative is 

largely compatible with China’s ‘‘Silk Road Economic Belt’’ initiative. Please outline 

the compatibilities between the two initiatives and the potential for U.S.-China coordination and cooperation on economic development in Central Asia. 

Answer. Through the New Silk Road initiative, the United States supports 

energy, trade, transport, people-to-people, and other linkages that expand regional 

economic cooperation and development between Central and South Asia. Given both 

the challenges of building connectivity in one of the least integrated regions in the 

world and specific U.S. interests in the region’s development, we view working with 

other partners and countries, including China, as a means to enhance stability, 

security, and prosperity in the region. 

China is one of Central Asia’s largest trading partners, and Chinese objectives in 

the region include developing a Eurasian Trade Corridor that facilitates land transit 

of goods from China to Europe. China has also focused on infrastructure projects, 

including pipelines to bring natural gas from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to 

China. Through its ‘‘Silk Road Economic Belt,’’ China has prioritized infrastructure 

links between Central Asia and China. Chinese support for Central Asian road and 

rail infrastructure has led to decreased transit time and costs for exports. There are 

a number of other initiatives underway in the region, including the Asian Development Bank’s Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) program, that 

also advance the prospects for increased trade and economic investment across 

borders. 

Chinese efforts to develop primarily east-west links can complement some of our 

efforts to develop north-south trade routes linking Central Asia and South Asia. The 

United States engages with China on the region and regional economic connectivity 

through bilateral consultations, mutual support of CAREC activities, and as part of 

the ‘‘Heart of Asia’’ Istanbul Process under which a number of cross-border economic 

initiatives have been promoted. In fact, China is hosting a Senior Officials Meeting 

of the Heart of Asia process in July and a Ministerial in August. The Heart of Asia 

promotes an integrated region, with a particular focus on addressing security and 

economic issues related to Afghanistan. In both CAREC and the Heart of Asia process, we see the opportunity for further discussions and potential cooperation with 

China. Where we have shared interests, and can promote open trade and transparent investment and business climates, we will seek to do so, in cooperation with 

all of the countries of the region. 

RESPONSES OF KELLY E. MAGSAMEN TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

Question. The United Nations reported that 121 civilian casualties were attributed to the Afghan Local Police (ALP) in 2013. The report also included documented 

cases of torture by the ALP. How will the U.S. work to prevent human rights abuses 

by the ALP and the broader Afghan National Security Forces after 2016? How will 

you work with the new Office of Security and Human Rights in the Bureau of 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor at the State Department to ensure compliance with the Leahy Law? 

Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) is committed to deterring human 

rights violations by the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and promoting 

accountability within the Afghan Government. An ANSF that operates effectively 

and with respect for human rights is central to the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. 

This respect for human rights is integral to the ANSF’s ability to provide for 

Afghanistan’s security, to retain public support, and to continue to receive international community backing for ANSF development programs. 

In helping build the ANSF, the United States has assisted Afghanistan in implementing an eight-step vetting process for new recruits to the ANSF, which includes 

identification requirements; background, medical, and drug screening; input from 


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40 

village elders or guarantors; and biometric enrollment. This effort has helped to 

reduce the number of high-risk recruits accepted into the ANSF. Additionally, the 

United States has assisted the ANSF to develop training programs on human rights 

and law of war standards for each new recruit. This includes emphasis on the critical responsibility of each member of the ANSF to conduct their duties in a professional manner, and in alignment with international norms. As the U.S. presence in 

Afghanistan declines over time, we will encourage the ANSF to maintain focus on 

these programs. 

DOD has also worked closely with the Department of State to develop implementation guidance for the new DOD Leahy law, which is being finalized now. We continue to work with State on vetting procedures and remediation standards to ensure 

compliance with the DOD Leahy law in Afghanistan. 

Finally, DOD recognizes that sustained engagement is central to emphasizing the 

importance of human rights. As such, respect for human rights continues to be a 

key theme of DOD and U.S. Forces—Afghanistan (USFOR–A) efforts in their 

engagements with Afghan counterparts. 

TIMELINE TO ENHANCE ANSF CAPABILITIES

Question. Please provide a timeline of the U.S. plan to enhance the ANSF’s capabilities by the end of 2016 to operate independently of U.S. armed forces, particularly with regard to close air support, logistics, and medical evacuation. 

Answer. The capability gaps we expect to remain after the International Security 

Assistance Force mission ends on December 31, 2014, include air support (e.g., 

MEDEVAC and CAS), intelligence, special operations, and security ministry capacity (including logistics). U.S. and coalition partners remain committed to training, 

advising, and assisting the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) after 2014 as 

part of the NATO-led Resolute Support mission, provided the necessary legal frameworks are in place. The main focus of the Resolute Support mission will be on closing these capability gaps. 

The A–29 ‘‘Super Tucano’’ will provide the ANSF with a limited CAS capability. 

Afghan pilots and maintainers are scheduled to begin training on the A–29 in the 

United States in February 2015. Initial deliveries of A–29s to Afghanistan will begin 

in early 2016, with full operational capability occurring in 2018. DOD is also assessing other options to further close the CAS gap. Development of the Afghan logistics system, including maintaining the $13 billion 

in equipment that has been provided using the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund 

(ASFF), is one of our highest priorities. ASFF-funded cases are being implemented 

that will provide sustainment support for major end items. These efforts extend to 

the development and improvement of institutional logistics and maintenance training capabilities of the Afghan National Army and Police. U.S. support and technical 

assistance for the development of the Afghan logistics system will be a focus of our 

future efforts. 

MEDEVAC is currently provided by the Mi-17 helicopter fleet. Restrictions on 

DOD’s access to Russian industry for parts and engineering services would severely 

degrade this fleet and undermine ANSF MEDEVAC/casualty evacuation capabilities. 

SECURITY COOPERATION WITH UZBEKISTAN

Question. Please describe U.S. security cooperation with Uzbekistan. How will it 

change based on the troop drawdown from Afghanistan? I remain very concerned 

about human rights in Uzbekistan and recently wrote to President Karimov on 

behalf of five political prisoners. Please tell me how the Defense Department specifically engages with the Uzbek Government on human rights. 

Answer. Uzbekistan has been an important partner for the United States as an 

integral participant in the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), which has been 

an important route for supplies to our Forces in Afghanistan. During the surge and 

during the nearly year-long closure of Pakistan cargo routes, NDN routes through 

Uzbekistan were essential to sustaining U.S. military forces in Afghanistan. To a 

lesser extent, the NDN is being used for retrograde of materiel out of Afghanistan. 

This cooperation with Uzbekistan will continue beyond the end of 2014, as the 

Department of Defense intends to maintain multiple, redundant supply lines to 

Afghanistan for as long as the United States has Forces in Afghanistan or is providing support to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). 

As a participant in the NDN, Uzbekistan faces an increased risk from extremist 

forces. U.S. security and military assistance to Uzbekistan (e.g., Foreign Military 

Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), and counternarcotics-related assistance) is intended to help strengthen Uzbekistan’s capaVerDate Mar 15 2010 16:19 May 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE T

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER
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bility to maintain its border security and to build the capacity of Uzbek security 

forces to deter and defend against potential extremist threats. 

As you know, the Department of Defense is committed to upholding the intent 

and the letter of the DOD Leahy law and understands the value of robust human 

rights vetting. Recipients of DOD-funded assistance are vetted under the DOD 

Leahy law. Observance of human rights is included in all training and assistance 

programs, and Defense officials routinely discuss respect for human rights in highlevel dialogues with Uzbekistan counterparts. 

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR JAMES DOBBINS TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARCO RUBIO

Question. How many of the five Taliban commanders released in the prisoner 

swap for SGT Bergdahl have been accused of committing war crimes? 

Answer. None of the five Taliban members transferred to Qatar have been the 

subject of arrest warrants by an international tribunal. According to human rights 

organizations, at least one of the Taliban members may be implicated in atrocities 

that occurred before 9/11, but such reports do not necessarily provide a legal basis 

for detention. 

Question. Were these individuals’ records of committing atrocities against innocent Afghans considered when their release was being reviewed? 

Answer. These reports of atrocities against innocent Afghans occurring before the 

September 11, 2001, attacks were not the legal basis under which the five Taliban 

detainees transferred to Qatar were captured and subsequently held at Guantanamo 

Bay. The administration implemented a rigorous process that reviewed each of the 

five Taliban detainees who were transferred, including any information about the 

detainees’ military experience in Afghanistan’s civil wars. There were no illusions 

about these five detainees, who were mid- to senior level officials in the Taliban 

regime and party to violence against other Afghans. However, the five detainees 

have not been directly connected to any U.S. deaths. 

Question. Was an assessment done of the likelihood that these individuals, if they 

return to the battlefield, as administration officials have admitted is possible, would 

commit further war crimes against innocent noncombatants? 

Answer. Four of the five were assessed as likely to rejoin the Taliban in some 

way. However, we have no reliable indications that any of the detainees intend to 

commit war crimes against noncombatants if they rejoin the Taliban. We are of 

course concerned whenever the Taliban, or any other group, attack innocent civilians. 

Question. Is it standard practice for the United States to release individuals 

accused by multiple human rights groups and international organizations of ‘‘widespread atrocities?’’ 

Answer. The five detainees transferred to Qatar were captured and subsequently 

detained at Guantanamo Bay under the Law of War and not on the basis of accusations by human rights groups or international organizations. Pursuant to Executive 

Order 13492, the administration implemented a rigorous interagency process that 

reviewed each Guantanamo Bay detainee on a case-by-case basis in order to determine the proper disposition of each—transfer, prosecution, or continued detention 

pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). With respect to 

the detainees transferred to Qatar, each was approved for continued detention pursuant to the AUMF, and none was referred for potential prosecution. 

Æ 


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