14-2485-cv

Murphy v. City of Stamford

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A

DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST

SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United

3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,

on the 14th 4 day of December, two thousand fifteen.

5

6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,

7 PIERRE N. LEVAL,

8 GUIDO CALABRESI,

9 Circuit Judges.

10

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12 KATHLEEN A. MURPHY in her individual

13 capacity and as administrator for

14 KAREN A. MURPHY,

15 Plaintiffs-Appellants,

16

17 -v.- 14-2485-cv

18

19 CITY OF STAMFORD, ET AL., 

Defendants-Appellees.1 20

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22

23 FOR APPELLANT: Kathleen A. Murphy, pro se,

24 Stamford, CT. 

1 The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend

the caption as set forth above.

1
1 FOR APPELLEE: Vikki Cooper, Deputy Corporation

2 Counsel, Office of the

3 Corporation Counsel, City of

4 Stamford, Stamford, CT.

5

6 Appeal from orders of the United States District Court

7 for the District of Connecticut (Hall, J.).

8

9 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

10 AND DECREED that the orders of the district court are

11 AFFIRMED in part and the appeal is DISMISSED in part for

12 lack of jurisdiction. 

13

14 Kathleen Murphy, pro se, appeals from the orders of the

15 United States District Court for the District of Connecticut

16 (Hall, J.) dismissing her federal civil conspiracy claims

17 for failure to state a claim and remanding the remainder of

her claims to state court.2 18 We assume the parties’

19 familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural

20 history, and the issues presented for review.

21

22 Murphy alleges that a Stamford tax assessor improperly

23 assessed the value of her property and that the Stamford

24 Board of Assessment Appeals (the “Board”) mishandled her

25 appeal of the assessment determination because a Board

26 member was conflicted, harbored animus toward Murphy, and

27 failed to consider Murphy’s evidence. Murphy brought claims

28 for federal civil conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3),

29 1986, for due process violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and

30 various state law claims. The district court dismissed her

31 §§ 1985(3) and 1986 claims as barred by the intracorporate

32 conspiracy doctrine, remanded her § 1983 claims pursuant to

33 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

34 by reason of the prohibition of the Tax Injunction Act, 28

35 U.S.C. § 1341, and remanded her state law claims after

36 declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

37

2 Although Murphy’s notice of appeal stated that she

was appealing only from the district court’s denial of

reconsideration, we will consider the notice of appeal to

encompass the district court’s underlying dismissal and

remand order as well. See “R” Best Produce, Inc. v.

DiSapio, 540 F.3d 115, 121-22 (2d Cir. 2008).

2
1 1. We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo,

2 accept as true all factual allegations, and draw all

3 reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Fink v.

4 Time Warner Cable, 714 F.3d 740-41 (2d Cir. 2013). To make

5 out a § 1985(3) claim, the plaintiff must allege a

6 conspiracy between two or more persons, Girard v. 94th St. &

7 Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 1976), and under

8 the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, the “officers,

9 agents, and employees of a single corporate entity are

10 legally incapable of conspiring together,” Hartline v.

11 Gallo, 546 F.3d 95, 99 n.3 (2d Cir. 2008)(internal quotation

12 marks omitted). As the district court determined, Murphy’s

13 conspiracy claims are barred by the intracorporate

14 conspiracy doctrine: the defendants were employees or agents

15 of Stamford, the alleged conspiratorial activities pertained

16 to and were motivated by the defendants’ respective public

17 duties, and all of the alleged discriminatory conduct

18 pertains to a single act (the wrongful property assessment). 

19

20 2. Murphy’s challenge to the order remanding her 

21 § 1983 claims is dismissed because 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)

22 deprives us of appellate jurisdiction. Price v. J&H Marsh &

23 McLennan, Inc., 493 F.3d 55, 58-59 (2d Cir. 2007). We

24 likewise lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s

25 denial of reconsideration. Petrello v. White, 533 F.3d 110,

26 116 (2d Cir. 2008). 

27

28 To the extent Murphy appeals from the remand of her

29 state law claims, we affirm the district court. Once the

30 district court determined that it lacked subject matter

31 jurisdiction to consider the § 1983 claims, it could not

32 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any related state

33 law claim. Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81

34 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir. 1996). As to the state law claims

35 that were related to the § 1985(3) claims: once the district

36 court dismissed the § 1985(3) claims, it did not abuse its

37 discretion in declining to exercise supplemental

38 jurisdiction over the state law claims. See Carnegie-Mellon

39 Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988).

40

41

42

43

44

3
1 Accordingly, and finding no merit in Murphy’s other

2 arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the orders of the district court

3 in part and DISMISS the appeal in part for lack of

4 jurisdiction.

5

6 FOR THE COURT:

7 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK

8

4