IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs January 10, 2001

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RICHARD CRAWFORD

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 98-09420 W. Otis Higgs, Judge

No. W2000-00335-CCA-R3-CD - Filed March 14, 2001

DAVID G. HAYES, J., dissenting.

Our law provides: “A person charged with an offense has no burden to prove his innocence.”

TENN.CODE ANN.§39-11-201(c). Because I am unable to disregard this most basic principle of law,

I am also unable to affirm the judgment of conviction in this case.

The facts may be summarized as follows:

A motorist is stopped while driving a vehicle on a public street. The police inform

the motorist that the vehicle that he is driving is stolen. The motorist states that the

car is his and produces a Tennessee title to the vehicle and other proof of ownership.

Although the title exhibited to the officer does not show a completed transfer to the

motorist, it does bear the name of the previous owner and matches the VIN number

on the vehicle. The motorist advises the police that “he bought the car two weeks

earlier from a car lot,” but does not furnish the name of the car lot. At some point

during the on-scene investigation, and after answering numerous questions, the

motorist advises the police that he will answer no further questions. At this point he

is arrested.

A conviction may not rest solely upon conjecture, guess, speculation, or a mere possibility.

State v. Tharpe, 726 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Tenn. 1987). In this case, the defendant’s conviction is

essentially based on his possession of the stolen vehicle alone, i.e., unaided by other independent

proof that the Appellant had received it knowing it to have been stolen. The defendant’s explanation

for possession was unrebutted. I find under these circumstances that the explanation for possession

was arguably reasonable and sufficient to overcome the inference of guilty knowledge. In the

absence of evidence which could have shed light on the missing facts of this case, I am unable to
1

The only evidenc e in the recor d even linking the defendant to T & A Auto Sale s was the testimo ny of Sgt.

Webb that the defendant stated he worked there:

Q: (Prosecution) A nd did he tell you what his occup ation was?

 A: He said he worked at a car sales lot. And I believe it was T and A Auto Sales on Lamar.

We note, however, that T & A Auto Sales is not listed as a place of employment on the defendant’s pre-sentence report.

Even assuming the defendant did work at this location, there is absolutely no testimony indicating his position there.

2

Lt. McCartney testified that the defendant produced “some paperwork - it wasn’t anything official as I recall.

It was just a bill of sale or someth ing . . . - it wasn’t a title . . . .” Sgt. We bb, howe ver, testified that the defendant

produced a Tennessee title at the scene.

Additiona lly, Lt. McCartney related that he observed scratch marks on the VIN plate located on the dash of the

Cadillac. This testimo ny was contra dicted by S gt. W.E. D awkins, who is also assigned to the auto theft division and who

specializes in performin g vehicle iden tifications for the p olice dep artment. Dawkin s testified that he noticed nothing

wrong or u nusual abo ut the VIN plate - “[it] looke d like any VI N numb er on any ca r.”

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conclude that the proof before us excludes “every other reasonable hypothesis save the guilt of the

[defendant].” State v. Crawford, 225 Tenn.478, 482, 470 S.W.2d 610, 612 (1971). While the proof

presents speculation or possibility as to the defendant’s guilt, such proof is insufficient to support

a conviction. Tharpe, 726 S.W.2d at 900. 

Apparently, no independent police investigation was undertaken. Minimal investigative

effort could have verified or negated the defendant’s claim of ownership and whether the name on

the title was a real or fictitious person. There is nothing in the record which suggests that the police

ever seized or recorded any information from the documents of ownership examined at the scene.

We are without proof as to whether the vehicle was acquired at less than its value or any other

evidence establishing the circumstances by which the defendant came into possession of the stolen

vehicle. The defendant made no attempt to flee and his response to police was neither contradictory

nor improbable. Contrary to the trial court’s findings and those implied by the majority, I find

nothing in the record to support the conclusion that the defendant was a car salesman with T & A

Auto Sales on Lamar in Memphis.1

 Moreover, numerous other findings entered by the trial court

are simply not supported by the record.

The police officers’ testimony at trial was less than compelling and at times materially

contradictory with other officers’ testimony.2

 In sum, the arresting officer testified at trial that the

defendant was arrested because “ . . . the vehicle was stolen. He claimed to be the owner; the public

VIN plate had been switched.” The majority opines that “the state is not required to subpoena all

car lot dealers in and around Shelby County to establish that none of them sold this vehicle to the

defendant, in order to dispute his statement that he bought it from an unnamed ‘car lot’.” I read this

to mean that the defendant should have provided the police greater assistance in the prosecution of

their case against him. 

Finally, with regard to the defendant’s second issue of valuation, I am unable to agree that

the value of the vehicle was properly established. As the record reflects, the prosecutor rested its

case without proving valuation. The trial court then permitted the State to reopen its case. As the
3

THE COU RT: All right. Did you speak to your insurance company about this stolen vehicle?

THE WITN ESS: Yes, sir, I did.

THE COURT : And is that what they arrived at, at 16,000?

THE WITNES S: What ended up happening, the value at the time it was stolen in December was

16,000. We did not settle until sometime in 1998, basically on into January. And at the time we

settled, because a year had gone around, the Blue Book value had dropped to 15,500. And that was

the amount we settled upon.

THE COU RT: Alrig ht. I’ll allow that.

[PROSECUT ION]: Thank you, judge.

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majority states, the owner of the vehicle testified that the 1992 Cadillac was purchased by his mother

for approximately $45,000. This ignores the fact, however, that the theft occurred in December of

1997 and that no proof was presented to establish the value of the five-year-old Cadillac on the date

it was stolen. Moreover, although the blue book value was alluded to, no foundation was ever laid

for the proper introduction of this proof. See Tenn. R. Evid. 803(17). With reference to the $15,500

valuation also noted by the majority, this figure was developed not by the prosecutor, but by the trial

judge after the court assumed interrogation of the witness.3

The most important function which a court has to perform with respect to criminal law is to

not make easier the conviction of the alleged miscreant; rather, it is the protection of the innocent

against false convictions. In view of the judicial shortcuts taken, the cumulative errors previously

noted, the prosecution’s failure to properly establish valuation, and the overall insufficiency of the

evidence, I would reverse and dismiss the conviction.

___________________________________ 

DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE