NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING 

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED 

 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL 

 OF FLORIDA 

 SECOND DISTRICT 

DONALD HOCHBAUM, by and through ) 

JOANN HOCHBAUM, Attorney-in-Fact, ) 

 ) 

 Appellant, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Case No. 2D16-89 

 ) 

PALM GARDEN OF WINTER HAVEN, LLC;) 

PALM GARDEN HEALTHCARE ) 

HOLDINGS, LLC; PALM HEALTHCARE ) 

MANAGEMENT, LLC; SUMMIT CARE ) 

CONSULTING, INC.; SUMMIT CARE, ) 

INC.; SUMMIT CARE II, INC.; CYPRESS ) 

HEALTH GROUP, LLC; CYPRESS ) 

MASTER HOLDING, LLC; and HC ) 

NAVIGATOR, LLC a/k/a HEALTH CARE ) 

NAVIGATOR, LLC (as to PALM GARDEN ) 

OF WINTER HAVEN), ) 

 ) 

 Appellees. ) 

 ) 

Opinion filed October 5, 2016. 

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 

from the Circuit Court for Polk County; 

Mark Carpinini, Judge. 

Isaac R. Ruiz-Carus and Megan L. Gisclar 

of Wilkes & McHugh, P.A., Tampa, for 

Appellant. 

Kirsten K. Ullman and Amy D. Prevatt of 

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, 

Tampa, for Appellees. 
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MORRIS, Judge. 

 Joann Hochbaum, on behalf of her deceased husband Donald Hochbaum, 

appeals an order granting a motion to compel arbitration filed by defendants Palm 

Garden of Winter Haven, LLC; Palm Garden Healthcare Holdings, LLC; Palm Garden 

Healthcare Management, LLC, Summit Care II, Inc.; Summit Care Consulting, Inc.; and 

Summit Care, Inc. (collectively referred to as the nursing home defendants). We 

conclude that the arbitration agreements at issue contain an attorneys' fees provision 

that violates public policy but that the offending provision may be severed from the 

agreements. Accordingly, we affirm the order compelling arbitration but remand for the 

trial court to strike the attorneys' fees provision from the arbitration agreements. 

 In 2015, Hochbaum filed a three-count complaint against the nursing 

home defendants. Count one alleged negligence in violation of section 400.022, Florida 

Statutes (2013), count two alleged a breach of fiduciary duty, and count three alleged 

violations of section 415.1111, Florida Statutes (2013). The nursing home defendants 

filed a motion to compel arbitration, arguing that Hochbaum, as attorney-in-fact for her 

husband, had signed arbitration agreements in connection with her husband's residency 

at the nursing home. 

The trial court held a hearing on the nursing home defendants' motion to 

compel arbitration on December 1, 2015. The nursing home defendants relied on three 

arbitration agreements signed by Hochbaum in 2013 and 2014.1 Hochbaum argued 

 1On July 26, 2013, Hochbaum signed an Optional Arbitration Agreement 

and a separate Resident and Facility Arbitration Agreement. On January 14, 2014, she 
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that all three arbitration agreements violate public policy because they require each 

party to pay for their own attorneys' fees, thereby eliminating the fee-shifting provision of 

section 415.1111. The trial court then inquired about procedural and substantive 

unconscionability, and Hochbaum argued that the agreements are both unconscionable 

and void as against public policy. The trial court ruled that Hochbaum had not 

established unconscionability and granted the nursing home defendants' motion to 

compel arbitration. 

Hochbaum first argues on appeal that the arbitration agreements are 

unenforceable because they violate public policy by limiting Hochbaum's statutory right 

to attorneys' fees under section 415.1111. In her complaint, Hochbaum asserted a 

count for violation of section 415.1111, alleging that the nursing home defendants' "acts 

or omissions constitute exploitation of a vulnerable adult in violation of" the statute. 

Section 415.1111 provides that "[a] vulnerable adult who has been abused, neglected, 

or exploited as specified in this chapter has a cause of action against any perpetrator 

and may recover actual and punitive damages for such abuse, neglect, or exploitation." 

It also provides that "[a] party who prevails in any such action may be entitled to recover 

reasonable attorney's fees, costs of the action, and damages." Hochbaum claims that 

this remedial provision is eliminated by the language of the arbitration agreements 

requiring that each party pay their own attorneys' fees and that the agreements are void 

as against public policy because they defeat the remedial purpose of the statute. 

The trial court mistakenly understood the issue to be one of 

unconscionability and rejected Hochbaum's challenge to the nursing home defendants' 

 

signed an Optional Arbitration Agreement. All three agreements provide that "[e]ach 

party shall be responsible for their own attorneys' fees." 
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motion to compel arbitration. But the question of whether an agreement is 

unconscionable is distinct from the question of whether it is void as against public 

policy. See Bland ex rel. Coker v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 927 So. 2d 252, 

257 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), abrogated in part on other grounds by Basulto v. Hialeah 

Auto., 141 So. 3d 1145, 1159-60 (Fla. 2014), and Shotts v. OP Winter Haven, Inc., 86 

So. 3d 456, 474 (Fla. 2011); Fonte v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 903 So. 2d 1019, 

1023 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). Hochbaum's main argument at the hearing was that the 

arbitration agreements are void as against public policy because they defeat the 

remedial purpose of section 415.1111. 

"A remedial statute is designed to correct an existing law, redress an 

existing grievance, or introduce regulations conducive to the public good. It is also 

defined as [a] statute giving a party a mode of remedy for a wrong, where he had none, 

or a different one, before." Fonte, 903 So. 2d at 1024 (alteration in original) (quoting 

Adams v. Wright, 403 So. 2d 391, 394 (Fla. 1981)). "[W]hen an arbitration agreement 

contains provisions that defeat the remedial purpose of the statute, the agreement is not 

enforceable." Flyer Printing Co. v. Hills, 805 So. 2d 829, 831 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). 

In Shotts, 86 So. 3d at 474, the supreme court held that provisions in an 

arbitration agreement requiring arbitration to be conducted in accordance with certain 

arbitration rules and prohibiting an award of punitive damages violated public policy 

because the provisions limited statutory remedies created by the legislature under the 

Nursing Home Resident's Rights Act. The court recognized that in enacting the Act, the 

legislature created a civil cause of action for violations of nursing home residents' rights; 

the legislature set no cap on pain and suffering damages and provided for an award of 
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punitive damages. Id. (relying on Romano v. Manor Care, Inc., 861 So. 2d 59, 62-63 

(Fla. 4th DCA 2003)). "In light of the recognized need for these remedies and the 

salutary purpose they serve," the court "conclude[d] that any arbitration agreement that 

substantially diminishes or circumvents these remedies stands in violation of the public 

policy of the State of Florida and is unenforceable." Id.; see also Gessa v. Manor Care 

of Fla., Inc., 86 So. 3d 484, 493 (Fla. 2011) (holding that limitations on liability in 

arbitration agreement, in the forms of a cap on noneconomic damages and a waiver of 

punitive damages, "directly frustrate the remedies created by the statute" and thus 

violate public policy). 

In enacting the Adult Protective Services Act in chapter 415, the 

legislature "recognize[d] that there are many persons in this state who, because of age 

or disability, are in need of protective services." § 415.101(2). The legislature intended 

"to provide for the detection and correction of abuse, neglect, and exploitation through 

social services and criminal investigations and to establish a program of protective 

services for all vulnerable adults in need of them." Id. Section 415.1111 creates a civil 

cause of action for abuse, neglect, and exploitation committed against vulnerable 

adults, and it provides for actual and punitive damages as well as prevailing party fees 

and costs. Thus, the Act under which Hochbaum seeks relief in count III is remedial in 

nature. 

This court has held that an arbitration agreement that limits the statutory 

remedy of attorneys' fees violates public policy. In Flyer Printing Co., the arbitration 

agreement "required the parties to equally bear the costs of the arbitration and 

arbitrator's fees." 805 So. 2d at 831. But the statutes on which the plaintiff's claims 
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were based "permit[ted] the prevailing party to seek recovery of all her fees and costs." 

Id. (citing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), and the 

Florida Civil Rights Act, § 760.11(5), Fla. Stat. (2000)). This court held that the 

agreement violated public policy because "[t]he agreement contravened [the plaintiff's] 

statutory right to seek a full award of her fees and costs under" the statutes, "thus 

defeating the remedial purpose of those statutes." Id. at 833.

The arbitration agreements in this case require the parties to equally bear 

the fees associated with arbitration, in contravention of Hochbaum's statutory right to 

seek a full award of her fees under the prevailing party attorneys' fees provision of 

section 415.1111. Thus, according to Flyer Printing Co., this provision of the arbitration 

agreements violates public policy.2 

The nursing home defendants argue that the arbitrator should decide 

Hochbaum's public policy concerns. But in Shotts, the supreme court held that "it is for 

the court, not the arbitrator, to determine whether an arbitration agreement 'is 

unenforceable on public policy grounds,' " 86 So. 3d at 459 (quoting Global Travel 

 2We note that the First District in Brasington v. EMC Corp., 855 So. 2d 

1212 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), questioned this court's opinion in Flyer Printing Co. The 

Brasington court stated that the Flyer Printing Co. decision was based on a federal 

decision that was no longer in force because the federal court vacated the decision on a 

joint motion for dismissal, referring to Perez v. Globe Airport Security Services, Inc., 253 

F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2001), vacated by 294 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2002). 855 So. 2d at 

1216. However, this court in Hernandez v. Colonial Grocers, Inc., 124 So. 3d 408, 410 

(Fla. 2d DCA 2013), rejected the argument that the fate of the Perez decision affected 

the holding of Flyer Printing Co. The Hernandez court clarified that the Flyer Printing 

Co. decision was based on the rationale set forth in Paladino v. Avnet Computer 

Technologies, Inc., 134 F.3d 1054 (11th Cir. 1998), that an arbitration agreement that 

defeats a statute's remedial purpose is not enforceable. 124 So. 3d at 410. The 

Hernandez court held that the Flyer Printing Co. decision "is still the law of the Second 

District." Id. 

 
- 7 - 

Mktg., Inc. v. Shea, 908 So. 2d 392, 398 (Fla. 2005)), thus abrogating this court's 

decisions to the contrary in Bland, 927 So. 2d 252, and Rollins, Inc. v. Lighthouse Bay 

Holdings, Ltd., 898 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). 

 We next consider whether the offensive provision may be severed from 

the agreements. Hochbaum argues that the provision cannot be severed from the 

agreements in order to preserve the enforceability of the agreements because the 

agreements do not contain severability clauses and because severance of the offending 

provision would require the court to rewrite the parties' contracts. 

 Case law suggests that in order for an offending provision to be severed 

from an agreement, the agreement should contain a severability clause. See LTCSPSt. Petersburg, LLC v. Robinson, 96 So. 3d 986, 988 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (holding that 

offending limitation-of-liability provision could be severed from arbitration agreement 

because agreement contained "a very broad severability clause"); Presidential Leasing, 

Inc. v. Krout, 896 So. 2d 938, 942 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (holding that provision in 

arbitration agreement violated public policy and could not be severed from agreement 

because severance argument had not been made below and the agreement did not 

contain a severability clause). 

 However, recent supreme court cases indicate that the existence of a 

severability clause is not dispositive of the issue. In Gessa, the arbitration agreement 

contained limitations of remedies that violated public policy. The agreement had no 

severability clause, but the court nonetheless analyzed whether the offensive provisions 

could be severed from the agreement. 86 So. 3d at 490. The court recognized that it 

had established a general standard for determining whether 

a contractual provision is severable from the whole, and that 
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standard provides in part: "[A] bilateral contract is severable

where the illegal portion of the contract does not go to its 

essence, and where, with the illegal portion eliminated, there 

still remains of the contract valid legal promises on one side 

which are wholly supported by valid legal promises on the 

other." 

Gessa, 86 So. 3d at 490 (quoting Shotts, 86 So. 3d at 475).3 The Gessa court applied 

that standard and concluded that "the limitation of liability provisions . . . , which place a 

$250,000 cap on noneconomic damages and waive punitive damages, are not 

severable from the remainder of the agreement" because they "constitute the financial 

heart of the agreement." 86 So. 3d at 490. 

 In Shotts, 86 So. 3d at 459, the arbitration agreement contained two 

provisions that violated public policy and a severability provision. But the Shotts court 

held that "the limitations of remedies provision in the present case that calls for the 

imposition of [specific arbitration] rules is not severable from the remainder of the 

agreement. Although the arbitration agreement in this case contains a severability 

clause, the [offending] provision goes to the very essence of the agreement." Id. at 478. 

It is clear from both Shotts and Gessa that the existence of a severability 

clause is not determinative of whether an offending provision may be severed from the 

agreement and that the "controlling issue is whether an offending clause or clauses go 

to 'the very essence of the agreement.' " Estate of Yetta Novosett v. ARC Villages II, 

LLC, 189 So. 3d 895, 896 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (applying Shotts and Gessa and holding 

that limitation-of-liability provision capping non-economic damages and precluding 

 3The Shotts decision quoted and adopted the rationale in Local No. 234 v. 

Henley & Beckwith, Inc., 66 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1953), which considered whether an 

offensive provision could be severed without any indication that the agreement at issue 

contained a severability clause. 
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punitive damages violated public policy and could not be severed, despite the existence 

of a severability clause, because the offending provision went to the essence of the 

agreement); see also Place at Vero Beach, Inc. v. Hanson, 953 So. 2d 773, 775 (Fla. 

4th DCA 2007) (refusing to sever offending provision regarding which arbitration rules 

should apply, even though agreement contained severability clause, because the 

agreement was built around offending provision and to sever out offending provision 

would require court to rewrite terms of the agreement); Lacey v. Healthcare & Ret. 

Corp. of Am., 918 So. 2d 333, 335 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (refusing to sever an offending 

provision from arbitration clause because the "agreement contain[ed] no severance 

clause" and the offending provision went to the essence of the contract). Rather, the 

court must determine whether the offending provision goes to the very essence of the 

agreement. 

 Here, the offending provision deals only with attorneys' fees. The 

provision does not require the arbitration to be conducted in accordance with certain 

rules, and it does not limit the compensatory or punitive damages that Hochbaum may 

recover in arbitration. Therefore, the offending provision is severable from each 

agreement because it does not go to the essence of the agreement. See Estate of 

Deresh ex rel. Schneider v. FS Tenant Pool III Trust, 95 So. 3d 296 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) 

(holding that provision limiting punitive damages, in violation of public policy, could be 

severed because it did not go to the heart of the arbitration agreement and because the 

arbitration panel could award other damages without limitation).

4 It is clear from the 

 4The arbitration agreement at issue in Estate of Deresh contained a 

severability clause, but as explained above, this fact is not dispositive of the issue. 

Even though the arbitration agreement contained such a clause, the court in Estate of 
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agreements in this case that the parties agreed to bind themselves to arbitration for any 

disputes arising out of Donald Hochbaum's residency at the nursing home. The 

attorneys' fees provision does not go to the heart of the contracts, and severance of the 

attorneys' fees provision would not require a drastic rewriting of the agreements and 

would preserve the intent of the parties to adjudicate their disputes in arbitration. See 

id. 

 Because the offending provision is severable from the arbitration 

agreements, we affirm the order compelling arbitration but remand with instructions to 

strike the attorneys' fees provision from the agreements. 

 Affirmed; remanded. 

 

CASANUEVA and KELLY, JJ., Concur. 

 

Deresh went on to consider whether the offending provision went to the heart of the 

agreement. 95 So. 3d at 301.