No

No. 97-647

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1998 MT 252

BALYEAT LAW, PC, as Trustee,

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

v.

GEORGINA BEVERLY PETTIT, 

Defendant and Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twentieth Judicial 

District,

In and for the County of Lake,

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-647%20Opinion.htm (1 of 20)4/19/2007 3:09:02 PM
No

The Honorable C. B. McNeil, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Regan Whitworth, Balyeat Law Offices, Missoula, Montana

For Respondent:

Andrea J. Olsen, Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes Tribal Legal Services, Pablo, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: February 18, 1998

Decided: October 20, 1998

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-647%20Opinion.htm (2 of 20)4/19/2007 3:09:02 PM
No

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

Justice William E. Hunt, Sr. delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ Balyeat Law, P.C., as Trustee, (Balyeat) appeals from an order of the Twentieth 

Judicial District Court, Lake County, granting Georgina Beverly Pettit’s (Beverly) 

motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm.

¶ The following issues were raised on appeal:

¶ 1. Did the District Court err when it addressed whether the Justice Court properly 

entered the default judgment and whether the state court had jurisdiction over this 

case?

¶ 2. Do the state courts of Montana have subject matter jurisdiction over an action to 

collect a debt for medical bills arising out of transactions on the Flathead Reservation, 

brought by a non-Indian creditor against an enrolled member of the Confederated 

Salish and Kootenai Tribes who resides on the reservation and whose spouse 

incurred the debt?

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-647%20Opinion.htm (3 of 20)4/19/2007 3:09:02 PM
No

¶ 3. Do the state courts of Montana have subject matter jurisdiction over an action to 

collect a debt for medical bills arising out of transactions that occurred off the 

Flathead Reservation but within the State of Montana, brought by a non-Indian 

creditor against an enrolled member of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes 

who resides on the reservation and whose spouse incurred the debt? 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ Beverly Pettit is an enrolled member of the Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes 

(Tribes). She has resided within the exterior boundaries of the Flathead Reservation 

her entire life. The record reveals that she works for Mission Valley Power, a 

business entity owned by the Tribes, and that all her assets are located on the 

reservation. On August 10, 1991, she married Lyle Pettit. Lyle is not a member of the 

Tribes, although he also lives within the exterior boundaries of the Flathead 

Reservation. 

¶ Lyle incurred medical debts at three medical institutions: St. Luke Community 

Hospital (St. Luke’s), Rittenour Medical Clinic, and Community Medical Center. St. 

Luke’s is located in Lake County, within the exterior boundaries of the Flathead 

Reservation. Rittenour Medical Clinic is located in Sanders County, outside the 

exterior boundaries of the Flathead Reservation. The Community Medical Center is 

located in Missoula County, also outside the exterior boundaries of the reservation. 

Although the District Court made no findings of fact as to when the medical debts 

were incurred, it appears from the record that Lyle incurred some of his debts at St. 

Luke’s in July 1989 and February 1991, prior to his marriage to Beverly. The 

remainder of the debts were incurred after his marriage. None of the medical debts 

were incurred by Beverly.

¶ All three medical institutions appointed Balyeat as trustee for Lyle’s debts. On 

May 1, 1995, Balyeat filed a complaint in Lake County Justice Court alleging that 

Beverly was indebted to it for $1843.60 for goods and services provided to Lyle by 

the three medical institutions. Balyeat did not name Lyle as a defendant. On June 14, 

1995, the Justice of the Peace entered a default judgment against Beverly for the 

requested sum plus interests and costs. 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-647%20Opinion.htm (4 of 20)4/19/2007 3:09:02 PM
No

¶ On January 17, 1996, Beverly filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, 

contending in part that the Lake County Justice Court had neither personal nor 

subject matter jurisdiction over her because she was a member of the Tribes residing 

within the exterior boundaries of the Flathead Reservation and because the debts 

were incurred by her husband Lyle both before and during their marriage. On 

February 27, 1996, the Justice of the Peace denied her motion without any opinion or 

rationale stated.

¶ Beverly appealed to the District Court on March 7, 1996, and on July 17, 1996, the 

District Court entered an order granting her motion to dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction. The court did not support its order with any memorandum of opinion or 

rationale. Balyeat appealed to this Court. The record on appeal, however, was devoid 

of any affidavits, hearing testimony or discovery establishing what the facts actually 

were. Moreover, there was no memorandum of opinion or rationale of the court 

whose decision we were requested to affirm, modify or reverse. In light of the 

complexity and sensitivity of the issues involving state court jurisdiction over 

reservation Indians in civil matters, we thus remanded the case to the District Court 

with instructions to develop a factual record and render findings of fact, conclusions 

of law and a memorandum of opinion. We also instructed the parties on any further 

appeal of this case to this Court to cite and argue legal authorities that pertain to the 

specific factual record. See Balyeat Law, PC v. Pettit (1997), 281 Mont. 95, 931 P.2d 

50.

¶ On August 27, 1997, the District Court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of 

law and order, granting Beverly’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. The court held that the issue of the state court’s jurisdiction was 

properly before it, because the issue of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction could 

be raised at any time. It applied the three-part test articulated in State ex rel. Iron 

Bear v. District Court (1973), 162 Mont. 335, 512 P.2d 1292 and held that the court 

did not have jurisdiction over the action because Beverly was a member of the Tribes 

and under Montana precedent, the exercise of state jurisdiction would interfere with 

reservation self-government. The court further held that the Tribes and the state of 

Montana had not agreed to concurrent jurisdiction over debt collection actions 

pursuant to Public Law 280. Finally, it held that § 40-2-106, MCA, did not subject 

Beverly to liability for Lyle’s debts, because that statute did not confer jurisdiction 

which was otherwise precluded, and Beverly had not engaged in significant offreservation contacts so as to render her subject to the jurisdiction of the state court 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-647%20Opinion.htm (5 of 20)4/19/2007 3:09:02 PM
No

in this matter. This appeal followed. The case is now ready for review.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ Whether to dismiss a claim based on lack of jurisdiction presents a question of law. 

We review a district court’s conclusions of law to determine whether they are 

correct. In re Marriage of Skillen (Mont. 1998), 1998 MT 43, ¶ 9, 956 P.2d 1, ¶ 9 

(citing Poteat v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. (1996), 277 Mont. 117, 119, 918 P.2d 677, 

679).

ISSUE ONE

¶ Did the District Court err when it addressed whether the Justice Court properly entered 

the default judgment and whether the state court had jurisdiction over this case?

¶ Balyeat contends that the District Court had no authority to review whether the 

Justice Court properly entered a default judgment. It points to § 25-33-303, MCA, 

which provides that a party may not appeal a judgment by default rendered in 

justice court "except on questions of law which appear on the face of the papers or 

proceedings and except in cases when the justice’s or city court has abused its 

discretion in . . . refusing to set aside a default or judgment." In this case, Balyeat 

argues that although Beverly raised the jurisdictional issue in her motion to set aside 

the default judgment, she identified nothing on the face of the complaint that 

indicates subject matter jurisdiction may be lacking. It further contends that she 

never actually argued that the Justice Court abused its discretion nor did she 

establish any evidence supporting such a claim. Balyeat maintains that the court 

therefore had no authority either to address the jurisdictional issue or set aside the 

default judgment. We disagree.

¶ It is well-settled that the issue of a court’s subject matter jurisdiction may be 

presented at any time. See Rule 12(h)(3), M.R.Civ.P. ("Whenever it appears by 

suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject 

matter, the court shall dismiss the action.")(emphasis added). See also In re 

Marriage of Skillen, ¶ 10 ("A motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction may be raised at any time and by either party, or by the court itself."); 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-647%20Opinion.htm (6 of 20)4/19/2007 3:09:02 PM
No

Geiger v. Pierce (1988), 233 Mont. 18, 21, 758 P.2d 279, 281("It is a fundamental 

axiom of our legal system that the issue of subject matter jurisdiction may be invoked 

at any time in the course of a proceeding.")(citing In re Marriage of Lance (1984), 

213 Mont.182, 186, 690 P.2d 979, 981). This is true even if subject matter jurisdiction 

is not attacked until after the entry of default. See, e.g., Larrivee v. Morigeau (1979), 

184 Mont. 187, 192, 602 P.2d 563, 566, cert. den., 445 U.S. 964, 100 S.Ct. 1653, 64 L.

Ed.2d 240. In short, a party can never waive or consent to subject matter jurisdiction 

where there is no basis for the court to exercise jurisdiction. In re Marriage of 

Skillen, ¶ 10 (citing In re Marriage of Miller (1993), 259 Mont. 424, 427, 856 P.2d 

1378, 1380). Therefore, notwithstanding Balyeat’s arguments that Beverly did not 

present the issue in the proper fashion or identify any legal issues on the face of the 

complaint, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is not waived and the court cannot 

refuse to entertain the motion to dismiss. We hold that the District Court did not err 

when it considered the issue of the state court’s jurisdiction and did not err in 

determining whether the Justice Court had properly entered the default judgment.

ISSUE TWO

¶ Do the state courts of Montana have subject matter jurisdiction over an action to collect 

a debt for medical bills arising out of transactions on the Flathead Reservation, brought by 

a non-Indian creditor against an enrolled member of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai 

Tribes who resides on the reservation and whose spouse incurred the debt?

¶ Balyeat maintains that the state court has jurisdiction over that portion of the 

action that relates to the debts Lyle incurred at St. Luke’s, which is located within 

the exterior boundaries of the reservation. In presenting this argument, Balyeat does 

not distinguish between those debts incurred by Lyle prior to his marriage to Beverly 

and those debts incurred after his marriage. It makes no difference in any event, 

because we hold that the state court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the 

dispute over all debts incurred at St. Luke’s.

¶ It has long been recognized that tribes are presumed to maintain their inherent 

tribal sovereignty and jurisdiction over the activities of both Indians and non-Indians 

on reservation lands. Geiger v. Pierce (1988), 233 Mont. 18, 20, 758 P.2d 279, 280 

("Generally civil jurisdiction over commercial activities presumptively lies in the 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-647%20Opinion.htm (7 of 20)4/19/2007 3:09:02 PM
No

tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty, provision or federal 

statute.")(citing Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante (1987), 480 U.S. 9, 18, 107 S.Ct. 

971, 978, 94 L.Ed.2d 10, 16); In re Marriage of Skillen, ¶ 56 ("As a matter of 

sovereignty, tribes are presumed to have jurisdiction over the activity of members 

and non-members alike within the exterior boundaries of the reservation.") 

¶ In Williams v. Lee (1959), 358 U.S. 217, 223, 79 S.Ct. 269, 272, 3 L.Ed.2d 251, 255-

56, the United States Supreme Court expressly held that in light of the tribes’ 

inherent sovereignty, absent Congressional Acts, state courts do not have jurisdiction 

over debt actions brought by a non-Indian creditor, where the transaction at issue 

arose on the reservation. The Supreme Court stated:

Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been 

whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make 

their own laws and be ruled by them.

Williams, 358 U.S. at 220, 79 S.Ct. at 271, 3 L.Ed.2d at 254. The Supreme Court 

concluded that "[t]here can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction [in 

the debt action] would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs 

and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves." Williams, 358 

U.S. 223, 79 S.Ct. 272, 3 L.Ed.2d at 255. See also Kennerly v. District Court of the Ninth 

Judicial District of Montana (1971), 400 U.S. 423, 429, 91 S.Ct. 480, 483, 27 L.Ed.2d 

507, 511 (holding that absent the consent of the tribe in accordance with Public Law 280 

and affirmative legislative action by the state, the tribe has exclusive jurisdiction over a 

debt collection action arising out of a transaction on the reservation between a non-Indian 

creditor and an Indian defendant).

¶ The Montana Supreme Court has consistently applied and confirmed the holdings 

in Williams and Kennerly. Based in part upon the test articulated in Williams, this 

Court has outlined a three-part test for determining whether the state courts of 

Montana have jurisdiction over transactions occurring on the reservation. In State ex 

rel. Iron Bear v. District Court (1973), 162 Mont. 335, 346, 512 P.2d 1292, 1299, we 

stated:

Before a district court can assume jurisdiction in any matter submitted to it, it 

must find subject matter jurisdiction by determining: (1) whether the federal 

treaties and statutes applicable have preempted state jurisdiction; (2) whether 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-647%20Opinion.htm (8 of 20)4/19/2007 3:09:02 PM
No

the exercise of state jurisdiction would interfere with reservation selfgovernment; and (3) whether the Tribal Court is currently exercising 

jurisdiction or has exercised jurisdiction in such a manner as to preempt state 

jurisdiction. 

See also Marriage of Skillen, ¶ 46 (holding that in jurisdictional disputes between tribal 

and state courts, the Iron Bear test and a traditional sovereignty analysis apply in the 

adjudicatory context). 

¶ In accordance with Williams and Kennerly and the three-part test outlined in Iron 

Bear, this Court has held that the Montana courts have no subject matter 

jurisdiction over a debt collection action such as the one in this case, which arises on 

an Indian reservation and is brought by a non-Indian creditor against an enrolled 

member of the tribe residing on the reservation. See Geiger, 233 Mont. at 21, 758 

P.2d at 281; Security State Bank v. Pierre (1973), 162 Mont. 298, 305, 511 P.2d 325, 

329-30. In both Geiger and Pierre, this Court held that state court jurisdiction over 

such an action would interfere with tribal sovereignty and tribal self-government. 

Geiger, 233 Mont. at 21, 758 P.2d at 281; Pierre, 162 Mont. at 305, 511 P.2d at 329-

30. 

¶ Balyeat contends that even though Beverly is a member of the Tribes and resides 

on the reservation and even though the transaction arose on the reservation, state 

court jurisdiction will not interfere with tribal self-government, because the Tribes 

consented to share concurrent jurisdiction with the state courts in this area of law 

pursuant to Public Law No. 280, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1161-62, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326, 28 U.

S.C. § 1360. Enacted in 1953, Public Law 280 provides a procedure whereby states 

may assume concurrent jurisdiction over civil causes of action to which a tribal 

member is a party and which arise within the boundaries of an Indian reservation. 

Pub.L. 280, 28 U.S.C. § 1360. While six states assumed jurisdiction under the 

statute’s express terms, other states, including Montana, were entitled to unilaterally 

"assume jurisdiction at such time and in such manner as the people of the State shall, 

by affirmative legislative action, obligate and bind the State to assumption thereof." 

Pub.L. 280, § 7, 67 Stat. 588, 590 (1953). Pursuant to the 1968 Indian Civil Rights 

Act, Congress subsequently repealed the provision which authorized the states to 

unilaterally assume jurisdiction, and thereafter required the consent of the majority 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-647%20Opinion.htm (9 of 20)4/19/2007 3:09:02 PM
No

of the adult tribal members before the state could assume jurisdiction. 25 U.S.C. §§ 

1322, 1326. See also In re Marriage of Wellman (1993), 258 Mont. 131, 136-37, 852 

P.2d 559, 562 (briefly outlining history of Public Law 280); State ex rel. McDonald v. 

Dist. Court (1972), 159 Mont. 156, 159-160, 496 P.2d 78, 80-81 (same).

¶ Although consent of the tribal members was thus not required by Public Law 280 

prior to the enactment of the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act, Montana nevertheless 

established a consent procedure in 1963 for extending its civil adjudicatory powers 

onto the reservation. See Mont.Sess.Laws, Ch. 81, 1963, now codified at §§ 2-1-301 

through 2-1-306, MCA. Subsequently, in 1965, the Confederated Salish and Kootenai 

Tribes enacted Tribal Ordinance 40-A (Revised) pursuant to which the Tribes 

consented to the assumption of enumerated areas of civil jurisdiction by the state 

courts of Montana onto the Flathead Reservation. In accordance with § 2-1-302, 

MCA, the governor of Montana thereafter issued the required proclamation dated 

October 8, 1965. Pursuant to Public Law 280 and Tribal Ordinance 40-A (Revised), 

the laws and jurisdiction of the state of Montana were thereby extended onto the 

Flathead Reservation in the following areas:

(a) Compulsory School Attendance

(b) Public Welfare

(c) Domestic Relations (except adoptions)

(d) Mental Health, Insanity, Care of the Infirm, Aged and Afflicted

(e) Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Rehabilitation

(f) Adoption Proceedings (With consent of the Tribal Court)

(g) Abandoned, Dependent, Neglected, Orphaned or Abused Children

(h) Operation of Motor Vehicles upon the Public Streets, Alleys, Roads and Highways

(i) All Criminal Laws of the State of 

Montana; and all Criminal Ordinances of 

Cities and Towns within the Flathead 

Indian Reservation. 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-647%20Opinion.htm (10 of 20)4/19/2007 3:09:02 PM
No

¶ In determining whether Tribal Ordinance 40-A (Revised) extends jurisdiction over 

this case, we keep in mind several rules of statutory construction. In general, the role 

of this Court has always been "to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in 

substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what has 

been inserted." Section 1-2-101, MCA. Statutory language must be construed 

according to its plain meaning and if the language is clear and unambiguous, no 

further interpretation is required. Lovell v. State Comp. Mut. Ins. Fund (1993), 260 

Mont. 279, 285, 860 P.2d 95, 99. Only when the language is ambiguous does the 

Court apply rules and principles of statutory interpretation. When construing Indian 

law, the canon of construction applied by the courts for over a century and a half has 

been to resolve all doubtful expressions in favor of Native Americans. Worcester v. 

Georgia (1832), 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 8 L.Ed. 483; Antoine v. Washington (1975), 420 

U.S. 194, 199, 95 S.Ct. 944, 949, 43 L.Ed.2d 129, 134. See also In re Marriage of 

Skillen, ¶ 106 (Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 

¶ In this case, however, this Court is not asked to simply interpret a state or federal 

statute that applies to Native Americans, but we are asked to interpret an ordinance 

that was promulgated by the Tribes themselves. Hence, it is even more imperative 

that we afford every deference to the Tribes and resolve all ambiguities in its favor. 

This is particularly so in this case. The ordinance we are asked to construe is one 

whereby the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes voluntarily consented to the 

extension of jurisdiction to the Montana courts in very limited areas. Absent the 

clearest evidence of the Tribes’ intent to consent to the assertion of authority by state 

courts onto their sovereign land, the Tribes retain their exclusive jurisdiction. 

¶ For that very reason, this Court has thus held Tribal Ordinance 40-A (Revised) 

must be strictly construed so as not to extend state court jurisdiction beyond that 

expressly directed by the Tribes. Liberty v. Jones (1989), 240 Mont. 16, 19, 782 P.2d 

369, 371. In Liberty, the Court declined to construe the term "public welfare" in the 

ordinance so broadly as to include state court jurisdiction in cases that affected the 

general happiness, well-being and welfare of the citizens of Montana. Instead we 

strictly limited it to the "practical issues of economic assistance to the needy." 

Liberty, 240 Mont. at 19, 782 P.2d at 371. We stated that "[i]n the absence of an 

express directive giving the State jurisdiction over disputes between tribal members, 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-647%20Opinion.htm (11 of 20)4/19/2007 3:09:02 PM
No

which arise on the reservation, Montana cannot extend its authority over such 

controversies." Liberty, 240 Mont. at 19, 782 P.2d at 371 (emphasis added). 

Similarly, in this case, the state court does not have jurisdiction over the debt 

collection action absent an express Tribal directive.

¶ A review of Tribal Ordinance 40-A (Revised) reveals that the Tribes have not 

consented to concurrent jurisdiction over debt collection actions or indeed any 

commercial activities. In none of the enumerated areas, did the Tribe expressly agree 

to such an extension. Moreover, on this point, our holdings in Pierre and in Geiger 

are dispositive. As in this case, in both Pierre and Geiger, the debtors were members 

of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes and in both cases the commercial 

transaction occurred on the Flathead Reservation. Tribal Ordinance 40-A (Revised) 

thus required interpretation. In Pierre, we examined Tribal Ordinance 40-A 

(Revised) and implicitly held that the ordinance did not extend jurisdiction over the 

debt action to the Montana courts. Pierre, 162 Mont. at 304, 511 P.2d at 329. See also 

Larrivee, 184 Mont. at 201, 602 P.2d at 570-71 (examining Pierre and noting that "a 

commercial transaction is not one of the subjects over which the state assumes 

jurisdiction through Tribal Ordinance 40-A (Revised)"). Similarly, in Geiger, we 

noted that the Tribes had not consented to the assumption by the state of jurisdiction 

over commercial debt transactions occurring on the Flathead Reservation. Geiger, 

233 Mont. at 20, 758 P.2d at 280. In both cases, the Court thus held that the state 

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the exercise of such jurisdiction 

would interfere with tribal sovereignty and the Tribes’ right of self-government. 

Pierre, 162 Mont. at 305, 511 P.2d at 329-30; Geiger, 233 Mont. at 21, 758 P.2d at 

281. 

¶ Although the Tribes did not expressly consent to the extension of jurisdiction in 

debt actions, Balyeat nevertheless contends that the action relating to the debts 

incurred at St. Luke’s can be litigated in state court pursuant to sections (d) and (c) 

of Tribal Ordinance 40-A (Revised). Again, we disagree.

¶ First, Balyeat cites Liberty, 240 Mont. at 18, 782 P.2d at 371, and argues that 

section (d) of the ordinance extends jurisdiction to the Montana courts in the area of 

"Medical Health." It contends that because this action involves debts incurred at a 

medical institution, the state court thus has jurisdiction. Balyeat’s position is wholly 

without merit. 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-647%20Opinion.htm (12 of 20)4/19/2007 3:09:02 PM
No

¶ As Beverly has pointed out in her papers and as the District Court pointed out in 

its decision, Balyeat relies on a typographical error in the Liberty opinion. That 

opinion misquotes section (d) as extending jurisdiction to the state in the area of 

"Medical Health," whereas section (d) actually extends jurisdiction in the area of 

"Mental Health." See also Pierre, 162 Mont. at 304, 511 P.2d at 329 (correctly 

quoting Tribal Ordinance 40-A (Revised)). Thus, the very premise upon which 

Balyeat’s argument is based is flawed. 

¶ Balyeat also argues that the matter may be litigated in state court pursuant to 

section (c), which extends concurrent jurisdiction to the state in the area of 

"Domestic Relations (except adoptions)." Tribal Ordinance 40-A (Revised). Balyeat 

points to §§ 40-2-106, -205 through -207, and -210, MCA, and argues that under 

Montana law a person is liable for the necessary expenses of her spouse, including 

medical expenses. Specifically, § 40-2-106, MCA, provides:

Liability for acts or debts of spouse. Neither husband nor wife, as such, is 

answerable for the acts of the other or liable for the debts contracted by the 

other; provided, however, that the expenses for necessaries of the family and 

of the education of the children are chargeable upon the property of both 

husband and wife, or either of them, and in relation thereto they be sued 

jointly or separately. 

Section 40-2-210, MCA, defines "necessary articles" to include services that are 

"reasonably required to provide for the health . . . of the married person. . . ." Balyeat 

reasons that these statutory sections fall within Montana’s "domestic relations" law. It 

concludes that the Tribes therefore consented to extend jurisdiction to the Montana courts 

to litigate actions pursuant to those statutory sections. Hence, the state court has 

jurisdiction over its claim that Beverly is liable to it for the debts incurred by Lyle. We 

reject Balyeat’s contention.

¶ The sole argument advanced by Balyeat in support of its position rests with its 

contention that § 40-2-106, MCA, falls within Montana’s "domestic relations" law. 

That statute in fact falls within Title 40, entitled "Family Law," chapter 2, entitled 

"Husband and Wife." However, what is at issue is not whether that statute is 

contained within Montana’s conception of what constitutes "domestic relations," but 

rather whether that statute falls within the Tribes’ definition of "domestic relations." 

We conclude that it does not.

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-647%20Opinion.htm (13 of 20)4/19/2007 3:09:02 PM
No

¶ Regardless of whether or not Montana considers § 40-2-106, MCA, to be part of its 

so-called "domestic relations" body of law, Balyeat offers no evidence of what the 

Tribes themselves intended by the term. It is evident that the Tribes certainly did not 

intend the term to be co-extensive with Chapter 2 of Title 40, "Husband and Wife," 

because that would exclude the areas of marriage and termination of marriage, 

which are embodied in chapters 1 and 4 of Title 40 but yet are certainly within the 

common definition and plain meaning of "domestic relations." Additionally, Balyeat 

offers no evidence that the Tribes intended the term "domestic relations" to be coextensive with Montana’s entire "Family Law" title. If the Tribes had so intended, 

they should have expressly so stated.

¶ Furthermore, it makes no sense that the Tribes intended to extend jurisdiction to 

the State in a case such as this. Such an interpretation would render all Tribal 

members subject to state court jurisdiction in actions to collect the debts for 

necessaries incurred by the spouse on the reservation, even in cases where a tribalmember spouse who actually incurred the debt is beyond the reach of state court 

jurisdiction. 

¶ This case at heart remains a debt collection action. Even though Montana has 

codified § 40-2-106, MCA in its family law title, we decline to interpret "domestic 

relations" in Tribal Ordinance 40-A (Revised) so broadly as to include a debt 

collection action against a spouse. Absent an express directive giving the State 

jurisdiction over such a dispute, we strictly limit the term "domestic relations" to its 

plain and ordinary meaning. 

¶ Because the Tribes have not agreed to extend jurisdiction over this matter to the 

state courts pursuant to Public Law 280 and Tribal Ordinance 40-A (Revised), we 

conclude that state court jurisdiction would interfere with tribal sovereignty. We 

hold that the Montana courts do not have jurisdiction over this action against 

Beverly to collect on the debt Lyle incurred on the reservation at St. Luke’s. 

ISSUE THREE

¶ Do the state courts of Montana have subject matter jurisdiction over an action to collect 

a debt for medical bills arising out of transactions that occurred off the Flathead 

Reservation but within the State of Montana, brought by a non-Indian creditor against an 

enrolled member of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes who resides on the 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-647%20Opinion.htm (14 of 20)4/19/2007 3:09:02 PM
No

reservation and whose spouse incurred the debt? 

¶ As elaborated earlier, the state courts have no authority to exercise jurisdiction 

over commercial activities arising on the reservation involving a tribal-member 

defendant, because to do so would infringe on the right of the tribe to govern itself. 

See, e.g., Williams, 358 U.S. at 223, 79 S.Ct. at 272, 3 L.Ed.2d at 255; Geiger, 233 

Mont. at 21, 758 P.2d at 281. In general, however, when tribal members reach 

beyond the confines of reservation boundaries to engage in commercial activities, 

they are deemed to have submitted themselves to the laws of the state and are thus 

subject to state court jurisdiction. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones (1973), 411 U.S. 

145, 148-49, 93 S.Ct. 1267, 1270, 36 L.Ed.2d 114, 119 ("Absent express federal law to 

the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held 

subject to nondiscriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the 

state."); Little Horn State Bank v. Stops (1976), 170 Mont. 510, 515-16, 555 P.2d 211, 

214 (noting that when "tribal members elect[] to leave the reservation and conduct 

their affairs within the jurisdiction of the state courts," subject matter jurisdiction 

"lies with the state court, not the tribal court."), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 

2198, 53 L.Ed.2d 238 (1977). This Court has thus held that the Montana state courts 

have jurisdiction over transactions involving a tribal member, when that transaction 

involved "‘significant contacts’ with the state outside reservation boundaries." 

Crawford v. Roy (1978), 176 Mont. 227, 230, 577 P.2d 392, 393. In State ex rel. 

Flammond (1980), 190 Mont. 350, 352, 621 P.2d 471, 472, we again stated that 

"Montana may not exercise subject matter jurisdiction over transactions arising on 

Indian reservations unless the transaction entails ‘significant’ or ‘substantial’ 

contacts with the state outside of reservation boundaries."(internal citations omitted).

¶ In this case, Balyeat contends that the state court has jurisdiction over that portion 

of the action that relates to debts Lyle incurred at Rittenour Medical Clinic and at 

Community Medical Center, because those institutions are located outside the 

exterior boundaries of the reservation and all medical care was thus provided outside 

the reservation boundaries. In short, it argues that the transactions at those 

institutions entailed "significant" or "substantial contacts" with the state. 

¶ There is no doubt that if this were an action against Lyle, Lyle would be subject to 

state court jurisdiction. By going beyond the confines of the reservation to receive 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-647%20Opinion.htm (15 of 20)4/19/2007 3:09:02 PM
No

such medical care he established substantial contacts with the state and is thus 

deemed to have submitted himself to the laws and jurisdiction of the state of 

Montana. However, this is an action against Beverly, not Lyle. What is at issue is 

thus whether Beverly herself has established "significant" or "substantial" contacts 

with the state. We examine the transactions at each institution individually.

A. Rittenour Medical Clinic

¶ With regard to the transaction at Rittenour Medical Clinic, Beverly herself 

engaged in absolutely no off-reservation acts that would vest the state court with 

jurisdiction over that portion of the debt action. Lyle alone received medical care and 

Lyle alone incurred the debts. Balyeat fails to identify any contacts, let alone 

"substantial" contacts, engaged in by Beverly which would subject her to the state 

court’s jurisdiction.

¶ Instead of identifying any off-reservation contacts, Balyeat once again contends 

that Beverly is liable for Lyle’s debts pursuant to § 40-2-106, MCA. The record is not 

clear as to whether Beverly and Lyle were married on the reservation or off the 

reservation, but Balyeat does not base its argument upon the location of the marriage 

ceremony. Instead, Balyeat argues that the mere fact that Beverly is married to Lyle 

is enough to subject her to the jurisdiction of the Montana courts. It cites McQuay v. 

McQuay (1930), 86 Mont. 535, 539, 284 P. 532, 533, and argues that § 40-2-106, 

MCA, creates an agency between spouses. According to Balyeat, when Lyle incurred 

debts for medical care he received off-reservation, his off-reservation contacts 

constituted "substantial contacts" with the state courts, which in turn were 

immediately imputed to Beverly as his agent. She thus became obligated to pay for 

them at the moment Lyle incurred them. Once again, we reject Balyeat’s contention.

¶ The logic behind Balyeat’s argument is missing an important step. Assuming § 40-

2-106, MCA, does indeed apply to members of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai 

Tribes who reside on the reservation, then Balyeat may be correct in arguing that 

Lyle’s off-reservation transactions (which would then be imputed to Beverly) 

constitute "substantial contacts" with the State so as to subject Beverly to the 

jurisdiction of the state court. However, Balyeat fails to cite any legal authority or 

provide any analysis to explain how or why § 40-2-106, MCA, applies to a tribal 

member living on the reservation in the first instance or whether § 40-2-106, MCA, 

somehow independently confers jurisdiction with the state court. It is our view that 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-647%20Opinion.htm (16 of 20)4/19/2007 3:09:02 PM
No

the off-reservation contacts engaged in by Lyle, cannot also be used to bootstrap 

Beverly into state court when she herself has done nothing to submit herself to state 

court jurisdiction. Rather, we must first determine whether § 40-2-106, MCA, 

independently applies to members of the Tribes residing on the reservation. Only 

then do Lyle’s contacts outside the reservation boundaries become relevant. 

¶ We conclude that § 40-2-106, MCA, neither applies to Tribal members residing on 

the reservation nor somehow independently confers the state court with jurisdiction. 

A contrary holding would interfere with tribal sovereignty. As we elaborated 

previously, the courts have repeatedly recognized "the Federal Government’s 

longstanding policy of encouraging tribal self-government." Iowa Mutual Insurance 

Company v. LaPlante (1987), 480 U.S. 9, 14, 107 S.Ct. 971, 975, 94 L.Ed.2d 10, 18 

(citations omitted). Aspects of sovereignty include the tribe’s right to exercise 

authority over not only its land but also its members. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 

14, 107 S.Ct. at 975, 94 L.Ed.2d at 18 (The policy of encouraging tribal selfgovernment reflects the fact that Indian tribes retain "‘attributes of sovereignty over 

both their members and their territory. . . .’")(citation omitted).

¶ This Court has also emphasized the sovereign right of tribes to govern members 

who reside on the reservation, most recently in In re Marriage of Skillen. In that 

case, we declined to jeopardize a tribe’s political integrity and its authority to 

exercise exclusive jurisdiction over a resident Indian child in a domestic case, even 

though the child may have significant off-reservation contacts through a non-Indian 

parent. We stated that "sovereignty must include at least the right to exercise 

authority over members within tribal boundaries." In re Marriage of Skillen, ¶ 61. 

Furthermore, it is well-settled that tribes retain this sovereign right over tribal 

members and their land where the Congress has failed to its assert its authority. As 

we pointed out earlier in this opinion, the state courts may take no action that 

undermines the authority of a tribe to govern itself. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220, 79 S.

Ct. at 271, 3 L.Ed.2d at 254; State ex.rel.Iron Bear, 162 Mont. at 346, 512 P.2d at 

1299. 

¶ In this case, there is no doubt but that forcing Beverly to defend herself in state 

court pursuant to § 40-2-106, MCA, would infringe on the Tribes’ sovereignty over 

its members and undermine its authority to govern its own affairs. Beverly is a tribal 

member who has resided within the exterior boundaries of the Flathead Indian 

Reservation her entire life. She works on the reservation for an entity owned by the 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-647%20Opinion.htm (17 of 20)4/19/2007 3:09:02 PM
No

Tribes, and all her assets are located on the reservation. She has done nothing 

personally to avail herself of state law and state court jurisdiction; she has taken no 

action by which she could have reasonably expected to be haled into state court. 

Subjecting Beverly to a forum other than the one the Tribes established for 

themselves risks the potential for conflicting judgments as to whether there is a 

spousal agency between her and Lyle so as to render her liable for Lyle’s medical 

debts. This in turn will result in a corresponding decline both in the authority of the 

Tribes to enact their own laws governing the relationship between spouses for 

purposes of liability and debt actions and in the authority of the Tribes to adjudicate 

disputes involving their members residing on their land. 

¶ Furthermore, as we pointed out earlier, pursuant to the 1968 Indian Civil Rights 

Act, and §§ 2-1-301 through 2-1-306, MCA, the Montana courts have jurisdiction 

only over those areas of law to which the tribal members expressly consent. As we 

held earlier, the Tribes did not agree to extend jurisdiction to the state courts over 

debt collection actions against a spouse who is a member of the Tribes residing on the 

reservation pursuant to Public Law 280 or Tribal Ordinance 40-A (Revised). 

Asserting state court jurisdiction over Beverly pursuant to an area of law to which 

the Tribes did not consent, when Beverly herself took no steps to subject herself to 

the state court’s jurisdiction, would essentially amount to an unlawful, unilateral 

assumption of jurisdiction in violation of both state and federal law. 

¶ In sum, we hold that the state court does not have jurisdiction over the action 

against Beverly to collect the debts incurred by Lyle at Rittenour Medical Clinic, 

because § 40-2-106, MCA, does not apply to members of the Tribes residing within 

the external boundaries of the reservation or independently confer the state courts 

with jurisdiction, and because Beverly did not engage in significant or substantial 

contacts with the state outside the boundaries of the reservation.

B. Community Medical Center 

¶ With regard to the transactions at Community Medical Center, Balyeat argues that 

Beverly engaged in substantial off-reservation contacts so as to vest the state court 

with jurisdiction over that portion of the debt collection action. Specifically, it 

identifies a document signed by both Lyle and Beverly on February 7, 1992, which 

pertains to at least some of Lyle’s medical bills at that institution. The document is 

labeled "Community Hospital Inpatient Account Policies." The top portion of the 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-647%20Opinion.htm (18 of 20)4/19/2007 3:09:02 PM
No

document contains the heading "payment plans" and requests that the patient 

choose from one of the payment plans listed. In this case, Lyle requested an extended 

time payment plan. The document then outlines the finance charge applied after 60 

days from the date the patient is discharged, along with other terms. The middle of 

the document contains a box labeled "Release of Information - Financial Agreement 

- Assignment of Insurance and Medicare Benefits." Among the terms printed in this 

box, the document provides that "I also understand that I am responsible for all 

charges incurred regardless of insurance or third party liability. . . ." and "Should I 

not pay this account as due, I will be liable for any court, attorney or collection fees 

incurred by Community Medical Center in collection of any balance due on the 

account for services rendered." 

¶ Balyeat characterizes this document as a contract, and argues that by signing it 

along with Lyle, Beverly engaged in a commercial transaction which constitutes a 

significant contact with the state. Beverly, on the other hand, states that it is not a 

contract, and alternatively characterizes it as an "admission document" or an 

"account stated." Although each party characterizes it in a light most favorable to 

the argument it advances, neither party actually briefs the issue as to whether or not 

it is a legal contract that obligates Beverly to pay for Lyle’s debts, and the record 

contains no evidence explaining the document or describing the circumstances under 

which it was signed. 

¶ Similarly, the District Court simply referred to the document as a "financial 

agreement for the payment of medical services provided to her husband," and stated 

it was a "minimal off-reservation contact." However, it made no findings of fact 

regarding the circumstances under which it was signed, and no conclusions of law as 

to whether it was a binding contract subjecting Beverly to liability. 

¶ Whether or not this document constitutes a binding off-reservation commercial 

transaction entered into by Beverly is crucial to a determination as to whether her 

signature on this document constitutes a significant contact. However, the Court is 

unable to determine whether or not this document is indeed such a contract as 

Balyeat suggests. 

¶ As the plaintiff in this debt collection action, it is Balyeat who bears the burden of 

proving that Beverly entered into a binding off-reservation contract to pay for Lyle’s 

debts and that she thereby engaged in a significant contact with the state. It failed to 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-647%20Opinion.htm (19 of 20)4/19/2007 3:09:02 PM
No

carry this burden. It failed to develop a factual record below to explain the document 

and the circumstances under which Beverly signed it, and it failed to cite and argue 

legal authorities which would establish that the document on its face constitutes a 

binding contract. 

¶ Accordingly, this Court holds that Balyeat failed to prove that Beverly engaged in 

significant off-reservation contacts so as to subject her to the state court’s 

jurisdiction. We hold that the state court does not have jurisdiction over the action 

against Beverly to collect the debts incurred by Lyle at Community Medical Center.

¶ Affirmed.

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

We Concur:

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-647%20Opinion.htm (20 of 20)4/19/2007 3:09:02 PM