S. HRG. 114–350 

UNITED STATES POLICY AND MILITARY STRATEGY 

IN THE MIDDLE EAST 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MARCH 24; SEPTEMBER 22; OCTOBER 27, 2015 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

UNITED STATES POLICY AND MILITARY STRATEGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

21–401 PDF 2016

S. HRG. 114–350 

UNITED STATES POLICY AND MILITARY STRATEGY 

IN THE MIDDLE EAST 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MARCH 24; SEPTEMBER 22; OCTOBER 27, 2015 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

THOM TILLIS, North Carolina 

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

CHRISTIAN D. BROSE, Staff Director 

ELIZABETH L. KING, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

MARCH 24, 2015

Page 

UNITED STATES MIDDLE EAST POLICY .................................................................... 1 

Takeyh, Dr. Ray, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations ....................................................................................................... 4 

Pollack, Dr. Kenneth M., Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Middle 

East Policy, The Brookings Institution .............................................................. 9 

Harvey, Colonel Derek J., USA, Retired, Director, Global Initiative for Civil 

Society and Conflict, University of South Florida ............................................. 21 

Rand, Dr. Dafna H., Deputy Director of Studies and Leon E. Panetta Fellow, 

Center for a New American Security ................................................................. 23 

SEPTEMBER 22, 2015

UNITED STATES MIDDLE EAST POLICY .................................................................... 61 

Petraeus, General David H. USA (Ret.), Former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; Commander, International Security Assistance Force; Commander, United States Forces Afghanistan; Commander, United States 

Central Command; and Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq .................. 66 

OCTOBER 27, 2015

UNITED STATES MILITARY STRATEGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST .................................. 119 

Carter, Hon. Ashton B., Secretary of Defense ....................................................... 123 

Dunford, General Joseph F., Jr., USMC, Chairman of Other Joint Chiefs 

of Staff ................................................................................................................... 127

Questions for the Record ......................................................................................... 179 

(III) 

(1) 

UNITED STATES MIDDLE EAST POLICY 

TUESDAY, MARCH 24, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room SH– 

216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain (chairman) 

presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, 

Wicker, Ayotte, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Graham, Reed, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, and King. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman MCCAIN. Good morning. I thank all the witnesses for 

being here this morning. 

The committee meets today to receive testimony on United 

States policy in the Middle East. This hearing could not be more 

timely, and I want to thank each of our expert witnesses for appearing before us today on this critical and complex topic: Dr. Ray 

Takeyh, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council 

on Foreign Relations; Dr. Kenneth M. Pollack, Senior Fellow for 

Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution; Colonel Derek J. Harvey, U.S. Army, retired, Director of 

the Global Initiative for Civil Society and Conflict at the University 

of South Florida; Dr. Dafna H. Rand, Deputy Director of Studies 

and Leon E. Panetta Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. 

Last month, the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, testified before this committee, ‘‘in my 50-plus years in the intelligence business, I don’t know of a time that has been more beset 

by challenges and crises around the world.’’ Nowhere is that truer 

than in the Middle East. 

From Libya and Yemen, to Iraq and Syria, the old order in the 

Middle East, both the regional balance among states and the social 

order within states, is collapsing and no new vision has emerged 

to take its place. This underlying dynamic is made worse by the 

failure of U.S. strategy and leadership to shape events in this vital 

part of the world for the better. Instead, unfortunately, we have too 

often confused our friends, encouraged our enemies, and created a 

vacuum for hostile states such as Iran and Russia and vicious nonstate actors such as al-Qaeda and ISIL. 

The President stated our goal is, ‘‘degrading and ultimately destroying ISIL.’’ However, I fear our effort in Iraq may be exacerbating the conditions that gave rise to ISIL in the first place by 

2 

overly relying on brutal Iranian-backed Shia militias and insufficiently empowering Sunni Iraqis. The situation is far worse in 

Syria. 

The administration has defined its policy in Syria more by what 

it will not do rather than by what end state we aim to achieve. The 

President repeatedly stresses that he will not put boots on the 

ground and that we will not go after Assad. But we still do not 

know whether we will defend the Syrian opposition we are training 

against Assad’s barrel bombs. And the administration still believes 

somehow that Assad will negotiate his own removal from power, 

even though conditions on the ground do not support it. Our partners are not assured of U.S. resolve by statements of what we will 

not do. And hope in Syria or anywhere else is not a strategy. 

Likewise, nuclear negotiations with Iran are clearly reaching the 

end game and we should recall how much we have conceded. As 

Dr. Henry Kissinger testified in January before this committee, an 

international effort supported by six U.N. Security Council resolutions to deny Iran a nuclear weapon capability has become an essentially bilateral negotiation over the scope of that capability. As 

Dr. Kissinger put it, ‘‘The impact of this approach will be to move 

from preventing proliferation to managing it.’’ 

What has been obscured and possibly downplayed in our focus on 

the nuclear negotiations is the reality that Iran is not simply an 

arms control challenge. It is a geopolitical challenge, as we have 

seen more clearly than ever today. 

In Iraq, the same Iranian-backed Shia militias that killed hundreds of American soldiers and marines are dictating the battle 

plans of the Iraqi Government and exacerbating the sectarian tensions that first led to the rise of ISIL. 

In Syria, the Iranian-backed Assad regime, together with Iranian 

proxies like Hezbollah, continue the slaughter that has killed more 

than 200,000 Syrians and displaced 10 million more. 

In Yemen, only 6 months after President Obama held it up as 

a successful model of United States counterterrorism, the takeover 

by Iranian-backed Houthis has pushed the country to the brink of 

a failed state and a sectarian civil war, strengthening the hand of 

both al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. 

And yet, while Iran is increasing the scope and pace of its malign 

activities in the region, there is a dangerous delusion that somehow 

Iran can be a force for good in the region, aligning with the United 

States in the fight against ISIL. For example, Secretary Kerry recently said of the Iranian military action in Iraq, ‘‘the net effect is 

positive.’’ Similarly, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General 

Dempsey, said, ‘‘As long as the Iraqi Government remains committed to inclusivity of all of the various groups inside the country, 

then I think Iranian influence will be positive.’’ 

General David Petraeus gave a realistic picture in a recent interview, which is worth quoting in full: ‘‘The current Iranian regime 

is not our ally in the Middle East. It is ultimately part of the problem, not the solution. The more the Iranians are seen to be dominating the region, the more it is going to inflame Sunni radicalism 

and fuel the rise of groups like the Islamic State. While the United 

States and Iran may have convergent interests in the defeat of 

Daesh, our interests generally diverge. The Iranian response to the 

3 

open hand offered by the United States has not been encouraging. 

Iranian power in the Middle East is thus a double problem. It is 

foremost problematic because it is deeply hostile to us and our 

friends. But it is also dangerous because the more it is felt, the 

more it sets off reactions that are also harmful to our interests— 

Sunni radicalism and, if we are not careful, the prospect of nuclear 

proliferation as well.’’ 

This is a perilous moment in history for a region of enormous importance to American national interests. It is clear that we are engaged in a generational fight against brutal enemies and that defeating these enemies will require clear thinking, setting priorities, 

and a strategy funded by adequate resources. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on these important questions. 

Senator Reed? 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and good 

morning. Let me join Senator McCain in welcoming our witnesses 

and let me thank the chairman for arranging this hearing in the 

lead-up to Thursday’s sessions with our combatant commanders responsible for Africa and the Middle East. The timing is absolutely 

superb. Both regions are facing critical security challenges that will 

continue to demand our time and consideration for the foreseeable 

future and beyond, and hearing from experts outside of our Government is an important input into our process. 

Among the most significant issues in the Middle East today is 

whether there will be any nuclear framework agreement reached 

between the P5 + 1 and Iran. The end of March is fast approaching 

and, deal or no deal, the outcome of these negotiations will undoubtedly have an impact, not only on the international community’s relations with Iran, but also reverberating across the region, 

indeed across the world. 

In Iraq and Syria, despite the setbacks that extremist fighters 

have suffered, ISIS remains capable militarily and continues to 

consolidate its power in the region, including through the coercion 

of local populations. Coalition airstrikes have enabled Kurdish 

Peshmerga in northern Iraq and Iraq security forces, operating 

with militia forces north of Baghdad and most recently in Tikrit, 

to begin to retain ground from ISIS. But significant concerns remain about the growing influence of Shia-dominated militias, many 

with close ties to the Quds Force, and if, when, and how those 

forces will be integrated into the Iraqi security forces or disbanded. 

In addition, increasing reports of human right abuses and brutal 

violence by Shia militias in Sunni communities retaken from ISIS 

control, as has been recently reported in Amerli, threaten to exacerbate the sectarian divide in Iraq and undermine efforts by the 

Abadi government to govern more inclusively. 

Also of concern is when Iraqi security forces will be ready to 

launch a counteroffensive to retake Mosul and how Iran will wield 

their growing influence inside Iraq. 

In Syria, coalition airstrikes have enabled Syrian Kurdish fighters to regain control of Kobani and expand outward, but ISIS remains a formidable force. General Nagata will begin training the 

4 

moderate Syrian opposition in the coming month and, if successful, 

over time these forces could further roll back ISIS gains and assist 

the coalition to promote the conditions for a political settlement 

with Assad. I am interested in the views of our witnesses on the 

potential of the Syrian training initiative to achieve its objectives 

and the challenges it will face confronting ISIS. I am also interested in your assessment as to whether Iran or Russia could help 

facilitate an Assad departure. 

In North Africa, the deadly events in Tunisia last week are a reminder that ISIS is bent on expanding its power and influence and, 

despite setbacks, it continues to draw fighters to its self-declared 

caliphate. While we must continue to apply pressure on ISIS in 

Iraq and Syria, I believe it will also be critical for the coalition to 

use diplomatic and other tools of statecraft to more strategically 

counter ISIS’s narrative and undermine their appeal globally. Over 

the past week, the world has watched the Houthis gain additional 

territory in southern Yemen, and all indications today are that the 

country of Yemen is headed towards a protracted civil war. Given 

United States counterterrorism interests in Yemen, these developments are of deep concern and how the United States will adjust 

our posture to ensure our CT operations can continue is an issue 

to monitor closely. 

Thank you again for appearing today, and I look forward to hearing from you on these and many other important issues. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

We will begin with Dr. Takeyh. Doctor, thank you. 

STATEMENT OF DR. RAY TAKEYH, SENIOR FELLOW FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Dr. TAKEYH. Thank you, Senator McCain and Senator Reed, for 

having me here today. It is always a pleasure to appear with my 

friends. 

I was asked to try to situate Iran’s role in the region as the region goes through vulnerable and violent transitions. 

I think it is fair to say—and I am not exaggerating—that the 

Middle East is a region that perennially divides against itself. In 

the past monarchies and radical republics, secular ideologues battled for influence. Today, another more durable cold war is descending on the Middle East, this time underpinned by sectarian 

identities. Syria and Iraq are a heart of this new conflict, pitting 

Iran and the Shia militants against Saudi Arabia and the Sunni 

sects. The region cannot regain its footing unless these civil wars 

somehow subside. 

More than any country, Iran has always perceived itself as the 

natural hegemon of the region. For the leadership of the Islamic 

Republic, the Arab Awakenings have shaken the foundations of the 

Middle East, making the region more susceptible to their inroads. 

In the Iranian leaders telling, America is a crestfallen, imperialist 

state hastily retreating from the region. Today, Tehran does see 

the United States as unable to impose a solution on the recalcitrant regional problems. Whatever compunction Tehran may have 

had about American power has greatly diminished over the past 

years with the hesitations in Syria and Iraq. Today, too often our 

redlines are erased as carelessly as they are drawn. 

5 

The fear gripping Arab capitals is that arms control agreement 

with Iran will lead to a detente between the United States and 

Iran. This concern has some justification in fact and in history. 

During the heydays of arms limitation talks between the United 

States and the Soviet Union, nuclear accords were often followed 

by commerce and diplomatic recognition. Washington has often 

been seduced by the notion that a nuclear agreement can pave the 

way for other areas of cooperation. At least for now, Iran’s leaders 

abjure such gestures of reconciliation, focusing on exploiting opportunities that have suddenly appeared and pressing their case in 

various contested areas. 

The Islamic Republic’s approach to Iran has undergone, in my 

view, subtle and disturbing changes. The threat from ISIL has led 

Iran to become more transparent and more aggressive in its approach to Iraq. Iran has stepped into the many vacuums of Iraq organizing its forces, directly defending its key cities, and providing 

indispensable assistance in a timely manner. Iranian officers, as 

was mentioned, are embedded with Iraqi units and are leading the 

campaign against ISIL strongholds. In the process, Iran has been 

instrumental in stemming ISIL assaults and may account for the 

shrinkage of its frontiers. However, these successes have come at 

a terrible cost that could endanger the stability of the region and 

independence of Iraq itself. 

Iran’s reliance on the Shia militias as opposed to the Iraqi army 

has done much to disquiet the Sunni community, further accentuating the sectarian cleavages that divide the country. The rise of 

ISIL has much to do with the Sunni community’s grievances regarding its marginalization in Iraq and elsewhere, such a brazen 

attempt to empower Shia militias at the expense of Iraqi national 

institutions further threatens the cohesion of that country. Although the Iraqi Government led by Prime Minister Abadi is concerned about the scope and scale of Iran’s interventions, it has limited options given the forces arrayed against it. The Iranian claim 

that their intervention as opposed to the passivity of the United 

States and Turkey has saved the day does seem to resonate with 

some members of Shia and Kurdish communities. 

Syria has similarly emerged as a centerpiece of Iran’s regional 

strategy. Syria’s divided ethnicities, a central role in Iran’s assault 

on the prevailing Arab order, mean that Assad had many more 

cards up his sleeves. Washington proclaimed a goal but failed to 

plan for the actual removal of Assad. It is difficult to predict with 

any precision how civil wars unfold and how they essentially come 

to an end. By their very nature, civil wars are unpredictable phenomena, susceptible to sudden shifts and changing fortunes. However, it is not too premature to suggest that the morale of Assad 

forces at this point is high while the fragmented opposition is suffering not just from lack of arms but also from the absence of international patronage. The infusion of Russian arms, Iranian funds, 

Hezbollah troops will ensure that Assad may be well maintained. 

The Islamic Republic’s calculations always differed in Syria than 

those of the United States. They were confident that Assad could 

turn back the tide of history if suitably supported. To check Iran’s 

power in the Levant, the United States has to be a more active 

player in Syria, as was mentioned, and maybe that is going to hapVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:53 Sep 08, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21401.TXT WILDA
6 

pen. The challenge becomes more difficult every day given the 

scope and scale of the casualties and fatalities. 

The success of United States policy in the Middle East, I will finally say, and toward Iran hinges to some extent on the nature of 

the United States-Israeli alliance. Simply put, Iran today dismisses 

the possibility of U.S. military retaliation irrespective of its provocations. It is entirely possible that Iranians are once more miscalculating and misjudging America’s predilections. Nonetheless, 

while the American military option has somewhat receded in the 

Iranian imagination, Israel still somewhat looms larger. Fulminations aside, Iranian leaders have taken Israeli threats more seriously and are at pains to assert their retaliatory options. It is here 

that the shape and tone of Israeli-American alliance matters most. 

Should the Iranian regime see divisions in that alliance, they can 

assure themselves that a beleaguered Israel cannot possibly strike 

Iran while at odds with its superpower patron. Such perceptions 

cheapen Israeli deterrence, diminish the potency of Western remaining sticks, and make obtaining a suitable arms control agreement even more difficult. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Takeyh follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY RAY TAKEYH

More than any other nation, Iran has always perceived itself as the natural 

hegemon of its neighborhood. Iranians across generations are infused with a unique 

sense of their history, the splendor of their civilization, and the power of their celebrated empires. A perception of superiority over one’s neighbors defines the core of 

the Persian cosmology. The empire shrank over the centuries, and the embrace of 

Persian culture faded with the arrival of the more alluring western mores, but an 

exaggerated view of Iran has remained largely intact. By dint of their history and 

the power of their civilization, Iranians believe that their nation should establish 

its regional predominance. 

However, to ascribe Iran’s foreign policy strictly to its sense of nationalism and 

historical aspirations is to ignore the doctrinal foundations of the theocratic regime. 

The Islamic revolution of 1979 left a permanent imprint on Iran’s foreign policy orientation. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini bequeathed his successors an internationalist vision that divides the world between the oppressed and the oppressor. Such 

a view is consistent with Shia political traditions where a minority sect struggled 

under Sunni Arab rulers that were often repressive and harsh. Thus, the notion of 

tyranny and suffering has a powerful symbolic aspect as well as practical importance. Iran is not merely a nation seeking independence and autonomy within the 

prevailing order. The Islamic revolution was a struggle between good and evil, a 

battle waged for moral redemption and genuine emancipation from the cultural and 

political tentacles of a profane and iniquitous West. Irrespective of changing nature 

of its presidents, Iran will persist with its revolutionary and populist approach to 

regional politics. 

For much of the past 3 decades, the Islamic Republic’s inflammatory rhetoric and 

aggressive posture concealed the reality of its strategic loneliness. Iran is, after all, 

a Persian nation surrounded by Arab states who were suspicious of its revolution 

and its proclaimed objectives. The Gulf sheikdoms arrayed themselves behind the 

American shield, Iraq sustained its animosity toward Iran long after the end of its 

war, and the incumbent Sunni republics maintained a steady belligerence. Iran nurtured its lethal Hezbollah prote ́ge ́ and aided Palestinian rejectionist groups but appeared hemmed in by the wall of Arab hostility. All this changed when Iraq was 

reclaimed by the Shias and the Arab Spring shook the foundations of the Sunni 

order. Today, the Guardians of the Islamic Republic see a unique opportunity to 

project their power in a region beset by unpredictable transitions. 

For the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei Arab Spring means ‘‘a people have 

emerged who are not dependent on America.’’ Whatever confidence-building measures his diplomats might be negotiating in Europe, the Supreme Leader insists that 

Iran is ‘‘challenging the influence of America in the region and it is extending its 

7 

own influence.’’ In Khamenei’s depiction, America is a crestfallen imperial state 

hastily retreating from the region. Today Tehran sees an America unable to impose 

a solution on a recalcitrant Middle East. Whatever compunctions Tehran may have 

had about American power greatly diminished with the spectacle over Syria where 

Washington’s redlines were erased with the same carelessness that they were initially drawn. 

The key actors defining Iran’s regional policy are not its urbane diplomats mingling with their Western counterparts in Europe, but the Revolutionary Guards, 

particularly the famed Quds Brigade. For the commander of the Quds Brigade, General Qassim Soleimani the struggle to evict America from the region began in Iraq. 

‘‘After the fall of Saddam, there was talk by various individuals that they should 

manage Iraq, but with Iraq’s religious leaders and Iran’s influence, America could 

not reach that goal,’’ proclaimed Soliemani. The struggle moved on and today ‘‘Syria 

is the front-line of resistance.’’ For the hardliners, the Sunni states attempt to dislodge Assad is really a means of weakening Iran. The survival and success of the 

Assad Dynasty is now a central element of Iran’s foreign policy. 

The fear gripping Arab capitals is that an arms control agreement will inevitably 

lead to de ́tente with Iran. This concern has some justification in history. During the 

heydays of arms limitation talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, 

nuclear accords were often followed by commerce and diplomatic normalization. 

Washington has often been seduced by the notion that a nuclear agreement can 

pave the way for other areas of cooperation. The challenge for the United States is 

to defy its own history. America must find a way to impose limits on Iran’s nuclear 

ambitions through negotiations while restraining its regional ambitions through 

pressure. This will require rehabilitation of America’s battered alliance system in 

the Middle East. Strategic dialogues and military sales can only go so far. Washington’s cannot reclaim its allies’ confidence without being an active player in the Syria 

and Iraq. So long as America exempts itself from these conflicts then its other 

pledges ring hollow to a skeptical Arab audience. 

IRAQ: IRAN’S NEW FRONTIER

The Islamic Republic’s approach to Iraq has undergone a subtle and important 

change. For much of the period in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion, Tehran’s overriding objective had been to prevent Iraq from emerging as the dominant power in 

the Persian Gulf contesting Iranian quest for hegemony. Thus, it was crucial for the 

theocratic regime to ensure the Shia political primacy. However, Iran also guarded 

against any spillover from the enraging civil war that was threatening Iraq’s cohesion. Dismemberment of Iraq into three fledgling states at odds with each other 

would present Iran with more instability in its immediate neighborhood. To pursue 

its competing goals, Iran embarked on a contradictory policy of pushing for elections 

and accommodating responsible Sunni elements while at the same time subsidizing 

Shia militias who are bend on violence and disorder. 

The threat emerging from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has led 

Iran to become much more transparent and aggressive in its approach to Iraq. Iran 

has stepped into the many vacuums of Iraq: organizing its forces, directly defending 

its key cities and providing indispensable assistance in a timely manner. Iranian officers are embedded with Iraqi units and are leading campaigns against ISIL 

strongholds. In the process, Iran has been instrumental in stemming ISIL’s assaults 

and may account for shrinkage of its frontiers. However, these successes have come 

at costs that could endanger the stability of the region and the independence of Iraq 

itself. 

Iran’s reliance on the Shia militias as opposed to the Iraqi army has done much 

to disquiet the Sunni community, further accentuating the sectarian cleavages that 

divide that hapless country. Given that the rise of ISIL has much to do with the 

grievances of the Sunni community regarding its marginalization in Iraq, such a 

brazen attempt to empower the Shia militias at the expense of Iraqi national institutions further threatens the cohesion of that country. Although the Iraqi Government of Prime Minister Abadi is concerned about the scope and scale of Iranian 

intervention, it has limited options given the forces arrayed against it. Iran’s claim 

that its intervention as opposed to the passivity of the United States and Turkey 

has saved the day does seem to resonate with both the Shias and the Kurds. 

To be sure, Iran has even begun reaching out to a segment of the Sunni community with its offer of arms and aid. The message of assistance is buttressed by the 

claim that the international community and the United States are indifferent to the 

plight of Iraq. It is best for the Sunni community to come to terms with Iraq’s new 

benefactor, the Islamic Republic of Iran. This message has thus far not been wellVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:53 Sep 08, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21401.TXT WILDA
8 

received by the Sunni leadership. As the result of ISIL’s assault and Iranian response, Iraq today once more stands divided against itself. 

Yet another disturbing aspect of Iran’s machinations in Iraq is its plans for the 

Shia militias potentially beyond Iraq. Iran’s model of operation in Iraq is drawn 

from its experiences in Lebanon in the early 1980s. At that time, Iran amalgamated 

a variety of Shia parties into the lethal Hezbollah. In recent years, Hezbollah has 

emerged as not just Iran’s most reliable terrorist ally but an Iranian proxy in variety of the region’s conflicts. The Hezbollah shock troops have appeared not just in 

Lebanon but also in Syria and Iraq. The purpose of Iran’s military dispatches and 

its organization of the Shia militias may have been limited to Iraq but as the region 

further descends into a sectarian conflict, these forces may yet serve as an instrument of Iranian power throughout the Middle East. 

SYRIA: THE EPICENTER OF THE NEW MIDDLE EAST

The Arab Spring and its promises of peaceful democratic change grounded to a 

halt in Syria. Bashar Assad followed the grisly footsteps of his father in massacring 

his countrymen. The civil war in Syria is not just tearing up that country but it 

is defining the future of the region. The Middle East is a region that perennially 

divides against itself. The late Malcom Kerr, one the preeminent historians of the 

region, once described the 1960s as a time of an Arab cold war with the monarchies 

and radical republics struggling against each other. Power more so than ideology defined that cold war, thus allowing it to gradually fade. Today, a different and a more 

durable cold war is descending on the Middle East, this time underpinned by sectarian identities. Syria is at the heart of this conflict, pitting Iran and the Shia militants against Saudi Arabia and the Sunni sector. The region cannot regain its footing unless the Syrian civil war somehow ends. 

In the heady days of the Arab Spring, despots were collapsing with alacrity that 

heartened even the most cynical observers of the Middle East. A region known for 

authoritarian stability was suddenly faced with mass protests and calls for democratization that were proving successful. ‘‘Assad must go’’ was proclaimed from the seat 

of Western chancelleries. How could he not go when the more formidable House of 

Mubarak collapsed with such ease? And how could the president of the United 

States not call for the departure of an adversary after he had called for the eviction 

of America’s most trusted ally when he faced a popular revolt. 

Still, Syria proved different. Its divided ethnicities, its central role in Iran’s assault on the prevailing Arab order, mean that Assad had many more cards up his 

sleeves. Washington proclaimed a goal but failed to plan for the actual removal of 

Assad. It is difficult to predict with precision how a civil war unfolds. By their very 

nature, civil wars are unpredictable phenomena, subject to sudden shifts and changing fortunes. However, it is not too premature to suggest that the morale of Assad 

forces is high while the fragmented opposition is suffering not just from lack of arms 

but also the absence of international patronage. The infusion of Russian arms, Iranian funds and Hezbollah troops will ensure that Assad is well-maintained. The opposition can add to this misfortune the image of Syria’s tyrant begin accredited by 

the United Nations for dismantling chemical weapons he was not supposed to have, 

much less use. 

The Islamic Republic’s calculations always differed from those of the United 

States. The mullahs were confident that Assad could turn back the forces of history. 

To check Iran’s power in the Levant, the United States has to an active player in 

Syria. Through provision of arms to reliable rebels, taking a firm stand against Russian and Iranian mischief, it is still possible to dislodge Assad from power. The challenge becomes more difficult every day. Too many lives have already been lost and 

too much advantage has already been ceded to Assad and the Ayatollahs. To reverse 

this trend will prove a formidable, but ultimately, an indispensable task. 

AMERICA’S ROLE

Although the United States has been effective in estranging Iran from its European allies and its traditional Russian protector, we have played a limited role in 

affecting Iran’s position in the Middle East. Beyond arms sales to Arab state and 

attempts to assuage Israeli concerns, we have not undertaken a systematic effort 

to isolate Iran in its immediate neighborhood. Under the rubric of a policy of coercion, all of Iran’s seeming regional assets have to be contested. From the Shia slums 

of Baghdad to the luxurious palaces of the Gulf, Iran has to find a new, inhospitable 

reality as it searches for partners and collaborators. 

The success of America’s Iran policy to some extent hinges on the nature of 

United States-Israeli alliance. Simply put, Iran today pointedly dismisses the possiVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:53 Sep 08, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21401.TXT WILDA
9 

bility of United States military retaliation irrespective of its provocations. It is entirely possible that Iranians are once more misjudging America’s predilections. 

Nonetheless, while America’s military option has receded in the Iranian imagination, Israel still looms large. Fulminations aside, Iranian leaders take Israeli threats 

seriously and are at pains to assert their retaliatory options. It is here that the 

shape and tone of United States-Israeli alliance matters most. Should the clerical 

regime sense divisions in that alliance, they can assure themselves that a beleaguered Israel cannot possibly strike Iran while at odds with its superpower patron. 

Such perceptions cheapen Israeli deterrence and diminish the potency of the west’s 

remaining sticks. 

All this is not to suggest that Washington cannot criticize Israeli policies, even 

publicly and forcefully. The ebbs and flows of the peace process will cause disagreements and even tensions between the two allies. But, as it plots strategies for resuming dialogue between Israel and its neighbors, the administration would be wise 

to vociferously insist that the dynamics of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations will not 

affect Washington’s cooperation with Israel on Iran. 

Despite all professions of common interests and subtle and indirect hints of cooperation to come, the Islamic Republic will only alter the dimensions of its foreign 

relations if it is confronted with a dramatic threat. As in 2003, Khamenei will be 

prone to pay a high price for his survival. Should we gain sufficient coercive leverage then we will be in a position to alter Iran’s policies. Under these circumstances, 

we would strive for restricting Iran’s nuclear program as opposed to the highly problematic task of conditioning its enrichment activities. Iran would be asked to cease 

subverting its neighbors and limit its support to Hezbollah and Hamas to political 

advocacy. Human rights would have to assume a high place in our negotiations— 

Iran must be pressed to honor international norms on treatment of its citizens. In 

the end, it is important to stress that the confrontation between the United States 

and Iran is a conflict between a superpower and a third-rate autocracy. We should 

not settle for trading carrots and sticks and hoping for signs of elusive moderation 

from truculent theocrats. A determined policy of pressure can still ensure that the 

Islamic Republic will be a crestfallen, endangered and therefore a constructive interlocutor. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Dr. Pollack? 

STATEMENT OF DR. KENNETH M. POLLACK, SENIOR FELLOW, 

FOREIGN POLICY, CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY, THE 

BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 

Dr. POLLACK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator 

Reed, distinguished Senators. It is always a great pleasure to address this committee, and I thank you for having me back. 

Mr. Chairman, I have prepared written testimony, and I would 

ask that it be entered into the permanent record. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Without objection. 

Dr. POLLACK. Thank you. 

With that in mind, I am going to emphasize just four points from 

my written remarks that I think are worth putting on the table as 

part of this conversation. 

The first of them is, of course, the problems Middle East were 

long in the making, and therefore they are unlikely to be quick in 

solving. They reflect, as Senator McCain mentioned in his opening 

remarks, the breakdown of the post-war political order. They are 

a result of the slow failure of the states of the Muslim Middle East 

over the past 20 to 30 years, coupled with rather volatile swings 

in United States policy over the last 15 years and most recently a 

significant American disengagement from the region. We need to 

recognize, as we consider how best to reshape our policy toward the 

region, that it is going to take a similarly long-term approach to 

deal with the many problems of the region. 

10 

And here I think it important to note that one of the greatest 

problems that the United States has had when dealing with the 

problems of the Middle East over the past 40 to 50 years has been 

that we have consistently and unfortunately prioritized short-term 

political expediency over our long-term strategic interests. This is 

one—not the only, but an important element of the chaos and turbulence that we now face in the region. And if we are going to be 

serious about trying to guide the region to a better place, one 

where our interests are less threatened and better protected, we 

are going to have to start prioritizing those long-term strategic interests over the short-term political considerations. 

Second, al-Qaeda and ISIS and the growth in Iranian influence 

across the region are significant threats to American interests, but 

they are not the core problems of the region. They are, in fact, 

symptoms of the deeper problems of the region. As a result of the 

state failures and American missteps in the region, we have seen 

security vacuums in failed states open up in a number of key 

states. The Iranians and al-Qaeda have filled those vacuums. That 

is what they do. They creep in wherever they are able. 

The proper way to fight them, as we should have learned from 

our long experience in this respect, is to fill the security vacuums 

and deal with the failed states. You cannot defeat terrorism simply 

by killing terrorists. It does not work. We have to address the underlying grievances that give rise to the terrorist problems to begin 

with, and similarly, we need to remember that Iran is itself an 

alien force in the Arab world, which the Arabs will reject if given 

the opportunity to do so. 

I think the best example that this is both the right answer and 

the plausible solution to our problems is provided by our experience 

in Iraq from 2007 to 2009. In 2006, Iraq was in a state of complete 

civil war. The state had broken down. Al Qaeda dominated part of 

it and the Iranians another part of it. But finally in 2007, after of 

litany of mistakes, which the members of this committee rightly 

and regularly criticized, the United States finally adopted the right 

set of policies in Iraq. We secured the populace. We forged a new 

power sharing agreement among the warring factions. We brought 

the alienated Sunni community back into Iraq’s political system, 

and as a result, we ended the civil war and stabilized the country. 

And the result was that the Iraqis, with considerable American 

assistance, but with them largely in the lead—the Iraqis drove out 

al-Qaeda in Iraq, which had already declared itself the Islamic 

State of Iraq, the precursor of today’s ISIS. And not only did they 

drive out AQI, they also drove out Iran. In Operation Charge of the 

Knights and the subsequent military operations that followed, 

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had a brief moment of real nationalism, and he and his people, united, drove out both the terrorists 

and the Iranians. This is the right solution to the problems of alQaeda, of ISIS, and of expanding Iranian influence in the region. 

Third point. For this reason, the civil wars of the region in Iraq, 

in Syria, in Libya and Yemen, with the threat of civil wars breaking out elsewhere, in Jordan, conceivably in Egypt or Bahrain, 

these have to be our first focus. They have become the engines of 

instability in the Middle East. I will say that I think that the policy 

articulated by the President in September of 2014 and later elaboVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:53 Sep 08, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21401.TXT WILDA
11 

rated on by Chairman Dempsey before this committee several days 

later is largely the right approach. I would agree that that strategy 

must encompass the termination of the Assad regime as well, but 

broadly speaking, the policy articulated by the President and the 

Chairman are the right approaches to dealing with the civil wars, 

at least in Iraq and Syria, which are the two most important of the 

civil wars we face. 

The key question is whether these efforts will be properly 

resourced and implemented by the entirety of the U.S. Government. If they are, there is every reason to believe that they can 

work. However, I fear that we are making the same mistake that 

we made in 2001 when we intervened in Afghanistan, in 2003 

when we intervened in Iraq, in 2011 when we intervened in Libya, 

and again in 2011 when we withdrew from Iraq. And that is, we 

made a major military move unaccompanied by concomitant political, diplomatic, and economic measures designed to translate military operations into meaningful foreign policy achievements. 

We need to remember that the problem of ISIS is bigger than 

just the problems of Iraq and Syria, but so too the problems of Iraq 

and Syria are also bigger than just the problem of ISIS. If all we 

do is defeat ISIS in Iraq and degrade it in Syria, we will probably 

accomplish nothing. It will be back. The civil wars there will rage 

on and new terrorist groups just like them will be generated by 

those conflicts. 

Finally, I think it important to recognize and count in our foreign 

for the fact that we have almost certainly not seen the last of the 

Arab Spring. Unless there is meaningful change, political, economic, and social, in the Muslim Middle East, the unrest will be 

back. We do not know when. We do not know how. We do not know 

in what form. But it is highly likely that it will return and possibly 

in more virulent form. This time around this wave of unrest left 

us with four failed states that turned into civil wars and a host of 

even more repressive governments and even more vicious terrorist 

groups than we faced before. We cannot know what a next wave 

will produce. 

But I would simply say in closing that the smartest answer that 

the United States could adopt to that question, to that uncertainty 

is to not run that social science experiment at all, but instead to 

press and to enable the Arab states to engage in a process of reform that is the only meaningful alternative to repression followed 

by revolution. 

Thank you, Senator. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Pollack follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY KENNETH M. POLLACK

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Senators, I am honored to be able to appear before you to discuss United States policy toward the Middle East. 

I came to Washington and began work on the Middle East in the United States 

Government at the end of the Iran-Iraq War. During that period, the Middle East 

has rarely ever seemed ‘‘good’’ and only briefly ever hopeful, but I have never seen 

its problems as bad as they are now. The region’s current dreadful, dangerous situation demands that we reassess American policy toward the Middle East to ask how 

best we can secure our interests today, and perhaps help guide the region—or key 

parts of it—toward a better future. 

The United States continues to have vital interests in the Middle East, and our 

actions (and inactions) have been an important contribution to its present dismal 

12 

state. The United States was not wholly culpable for the current situation in the 

region, but we were also hardly blameless. Many of its problems might have been 

averted or mitigated by different American policies at various points over the past 

30–40 years. Had we wanted to move the region in a better direction, we had many 

chances to do so. Unfortunately, successive American administrations have 

prioritized short-term expediency over long-term strategic benefit, and we missed 

those opportunities time and again. 

To my mind, a concomitant point is that the problems of the region did not happen overnight, even if some of their symptoms caught us by surprise over the past 

five years. All of them were long in the making, and thus none of them lend themselves to quick fixes. Again, it has been the American predilection for quick fixes— 

for slapping a figurative Band-Aid on the latest Middle East conflagration and then 

trying to ignore it—that has brought us to the current state of affairs. The problems 

of the Middle East have become too deep and too wide to be treated in such fashion. 

SOME HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Mr. Chairman, it is of critical importance that we recognize the historical forces 

at work that have brought us to the current circumstances in the region. Not as 

an excuse for an inaction, but rather to understand how we got to where we are 

so that we can better understand what will likely be necessary to reach a better 

future. 

At root, what is going on in the Middle East is the break down of the post-World 

War II order. That, not the borders drawn after World War I, is the real source of 

the problems. After the Second World War, the colonial powers of France and Britain were slowly forced to give up their control over the states of the region. They 

were replaced, across the Arab world and Iran, by autocracies of two kinds: monarchies or secular dictatorships (which we euphemistically referred to as ‘‘republics’’). 

None of these governments had much legitimacy, even the monarchies which generally took power during the inter-war period and so had little claim to tradition 

or longevity. 

Nevertheless, they proved more or less functional for the first several decades 

after the war. All of them developed modest economies fueled largely by oil, either 

directly from their own oilfields or indirectly via remittances and aid transfers. All 

of them featured top-heavy and deeply corrupt bureaucracies responsible for employing a disproportionate share of their workforces. All of them indulged highly dysfunctional educational systems that eventually failed to produce the kind of innovative labor pool necessary for information-age economies. All of them built repressive 

security institutions that instilled fear in their populations and convinced all but the 

most desperate or reckless from protesting against the systems. From the 1940s 

through the 1990s, these regimes clunked along, providing the bare minimum of 

goods and services to their population, often excusing their performance by blaming 

external conspiracies focused on Israel, the United States or the West more broadly. 

Beginning in the 1990s, these systems began to come under pressure and to fail. 

Out of control demographics begat workforces too big to be employed by the public 

sector. For a great many Arabs (and Iranians), the corruption, incompetence and 

callousness of the regimes that had seemed like bearable problems when times were 

better, suddenly became unbearable as times got harder. The rapid advance of information technology enabled economies in East Asia and Latin America to surge 

ahead of the Muslim states, while the proliferation of that technology brought home 

to more and more people in the Muslim Middle East the revelation that they were 

falling behind. In the vast majority of cases, the regimes responded by becoming 

more repressive, crushing any who proposed an alternative way of organizing their 

societies. The regimes clung to power, but the repression only intensified the unhappiness of their citizens. 

An ‘‘expectations gap’’ opened up across the Arab world and Iran, between the circumstances that the people found themselves and where they believed they ought 

to be. As it has everywhere else around the world and across time, that expectations 

gap created large-scale internal unrest. By the late 1990s, it had already produced 

attempted (but failed) revolutions, insurgencies and terrorism. In the region and in 

the West, many began to call for political, economic and social reform in the Muslim 

Middle East—reform as the only realistic alternative to revolution or repression. 

But those calls were not heeded and in 2009 in Iran and 2011 across the Arab 

world, these problems finally exploded in what we call the Green Revolution and 

the Arab Spring. 

Those revolts produced two very different, but equally dangerous outcomes. In 

Libya, Syria and Yemen, the unrest was adequate to destroy the control of the old 

regime. However, because the regimes had successfully prevented any alternative 

13 

conceptions of organization from emerging, there was nothing to take their place. 

They became failed states, enabling power vacuums to emerge, which in turn produced civil wars among various sub-state identity groups who fought for power, to 

avenge past wrongs, and out of fear that failure to do so would bring about their 

destruction by extremists among the other groups. 

In virtually all of the other Arab states and Iran, the regimes were able to stamp 

out the unrest before it could snowball into revolution, but only at the price of even 

greater repression. In so doing, they capitalized on widespread fears that unrest 

would produce chaos and civil war as in Libya, Syria and Yemen. Tolerance for repression has some other sources as well. In Morocco and Jordan, the monarchs have 

promised far-reaching (and popular) reforms but have so far under-delivered on 

those promises, while in Lebanon and Algeria, the memory of their own previous 

civil wars has dampened enthusiasm for protest. 

But renewed repression inevitably has its price. In places like Bahrain and Egypt, 

it has produced festering discontent and terrorism. Many of the other states of the 

region remain fragile to say the least. In Algeria and Jordan, public unhappiness 

lurks just below the surface of public discourse. In Saudi Arabia, the new king, 

Salman, felt it necessary to disburse cash to buy acceptance for his accession in a 

manner reminiscent of Caligula and Nero. Ultimately, repression and fear of civil 

war can only produce a (false) stability for so long. If there is not reform, there will 

eventually be more revolutions, failed states, civil wars, insurgencies and terrorism. 

AMERICAN DISENGAGEMENT

There is one last piece of the historical puzzle that needs to be put on the table 

before we can begin to discuss how the United States might begin to help the Middle East dig it’s way out of it’s current situation. That is the role of the United 

States itself. 

Even after the British finally surrendered their colonies in the 1940s and ‘50s, 

London continued to serve as the great power guarantor and mediator across the 

Middle East. In the Persian Gulf, Britain protected Saudi Arabia and the small 

Emirates as they grew into important oil producers. London backed the Jordanian 

monarchy and checked the designs of radical regimes from Egypt’s efforts in Yemen 

to Iraq’s designs on Kuwait. 

Americans did not always like the way that the British oversaw the Middle East. 

The Truman Administration prevented Great Britain from overthrowing the 

Mossadeq government. While the Eisenhower Administration turned around and 

embraced that project, it later blocked Britain and France from ousting Gamal ‘Abd 

al-Nasser in 1956. In part for that reason, when the British announced that they 

were withdrawing from ‘‘East of Suez’’ in 1971, the United States was reluctant to 

their place. 

Nevertheless, circumstances forced us to do so. Initially, we tried to empower regional proxies—first Israel, then Iran, and then Saudi Arabia—to protect American 

(and Western) interests in the region instead. But the Israelis were hated by the 

Arabs, the Saudis lacked the will or the capacity to act decisively, and then the 

Shah of Iran was overthrown in 1979. Indeed, the Iranian revolution proved to be 

a watershed. Our strongest regional ally was replaced by our most strident and 

charismatic foe, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The threat his revolutionary Iranian 

state posed to American allies across the region forced the United States to become 

militarily involved in the Persian Gulf for the first time, a commitment expanded 

when Iran’s defeat (with American assistance) in the Iran-Iraq War created the opportunity for Saddam Husayn to invade Kuwait and pose a different, but equally 

dangerous threat to the region’s vital oil exports. 

And so Washington, finally shouldered the burden once borne by London. The 

United States became the ultimate guardian of the region’s oil flows, the mediator 

of many of its disputes, the deterrent to its worst threats. The true hegemon of the 

Middle East. As part of that evolution, American policy-makers increasingly were 

forced to accept that the region’s internal politics were important to American interests because internal problems could affect regional stability and its oil exports. 

Of course, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the Bush ’43 Administration attempted to eradicate some of the region’s problems permanently by military force. 

Their invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan may have been well-intentioned (or not, as 

historians will ultimately decide) but they could not have been more poorly executed. The result was two long and painful wars that created a public desire to diminish America’s role in the Middle East, if not end it altogether. 

The Obama Administration took office determined to make that wish reality to 

the maximum extent possible. The United States disengaged from Iraq pell-mell, 

quickly undoing much of the progress painstakingly achieved in 2007–2009. ElseVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:53 Sep 08, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21401.TXT WILDA
14 

where across the region, the United States absented itself from myriad other events. 

Washington stopped pressing for political and economic reform among the Arab 

states, turned its back on the Arab-Israeli peace process, and allowed civil wars to 

erupt and spread unchecked. When the Green Revolution broke out in Tehran and 

the Arab Spring spread across the region, Washington offered thin rhetorical support but nothing of substance. 

Ultimately, however, the Da’ish (or ISIS or ISIL or Islamic State) offensive of 

June 2014 that overran Mosul and much of northern Iraq forced the United States 

to recognize that it had swung the pendulum of American involvement with the 

Middle East too far in the opposite direction from the militarized interventions of 

the Bush ’43 era, toward an equally dangerous isolation from the region. President 

Obama’s decision to re-intervene militarily in August and his shift in strategy declared in September 2014 were critically important steps in the right direction, although there is still a great deal to be done to turn his statements into concrete 

programs in both Iraq and Syria. 

Ultimately then, the problems of the Middle East can be traced back to a combination of the breakdown of the internal order of the region as the semi-functional 

autocracies established after World War II have slowly grown ever more dysfunctional, coupled with the withdrawal of its traditional great power hegemon. Stabilizing the region will mean dealing with both of these problems, although neither 

lends itself to a simple turning back of the clock. However, even before these major 

tasks can be contemplated, there is a more immediate priority: dealing with the 

failed states/civil wars that have become the key drivers of instability in the Middle 

East. 

DEALING WITH THE CIVIL WARS OF THE REGION

Today, the principal source of the turbulence and violence threatening the Middle 

East are the four civil wars currently raging in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Libya. Before the United States can start to address the deeper problems of the failure of the 

Muslim Middle Eastern state system, it first needs to help mitigate or eliminate 

these engines of instability. 

Some of these civil wars threaten U.S. interests directly. In particular, Iraq and 

Libya are important oil producers. All of them threaten U.S. interests indirectly, by 

breeding vicious terrorist groups, generating millions of refugees that threaten to 

overwhelm neighboring states, radicalizing regional populations and potentially 

sucking their neighbors into interventions they cannot win. Indeed, historically, civil 

wars have had a bad habit of causing civil wars in neighboring states as well as 

metastasizing into regional conflicts. 

Moreover, civil wars have proven historically difficult to contain. I think it worth 

noting that the Obama Administration, despite all its rhetoric to the contrary, pursued a determined policy of containment toward the Syrian civil war until spillover 

from that civil war (in the form of Da’ish) helped push Iraq back into civil war. At 

that point, the Administration rightly recognized that containment of the Syrian 

civil war had failed and the United States would have to adopt a more pro-active 

policy to try to bring about an end to the conflict—and to the renewed civil war in 

Iraq it helped rekindle. 

It is an unfortunate reality that it is widely believed that it is impossible to do 

anything about ‘‘somebody else’s civil war.’’ A well-developed body of historical scholarship on civil wars demonstrates that while it is not simple or straightforward for 

a third party to end a civil war peacefully, it is hardly impossible. Indeed, the policies articulated by President Obama on Iraq and Syria in September 2014 conform 

nicely to the lessons of this history, and therefore should give us some confidence 

that they are feasible, if properly resourced and executed. 

Iraq. In Iraq, as I and others have reported, the narrow military effort to defeat 

Da’ish is going quite well. The real problems, including with the military piece, are 

largely political. As is well understood at this point, Iranian-backed Shiite militias 

are playing an outsized role in Iraq’s military victory, frightening the Sunni populace they are meant to liberate with the specter of ethnic cleansing. The militias 

need to be corralled by Iraqi Army formations, preferably guided by American advisors accompanying them in the field. That will require further development of Iraq’s 

security forces and additional American advisors. 

Of equal or greater importance is to forge a new power-sharing arrangement between the Sunni and Shiite Arab communities as the United States did in 2007– 

2008. Too often, the Obama Administration has dismissed this as a luxury, an academic nicety rather than a practical necessity. They are wrong. Without such a new 

power-sharing arrangement, Iraq’s Sunni Arabs will have no sense of the Iraq they 

are being asked to fight for. They have no intention of going back to 2011, when 

15 

1For a more extensive explanation of this strategy and why it could succeed in accomplishing 

American objectives in Syria, see Kenneth M. Pollack, ‘‘An Army to Defeat Assad: How to Turn 

Syria’s Opposition Into a Real Fighting Force,’’ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 93, No. 5 (September/October 2014), pp. 110–124. 

a Shiite prime minister manipulated Iraq’s existing political structure to repress 

their community. Without such a power-sharing agreement, Iraq’s Sunnis are likely 

to resist the central government by force, and in doing so will open the door once 

again to Da’ish. 

Although I could make many additional points about what is needed to translate 

battlefield victories into meaningful political achievements in Iraq, I will add just 

one more. This is the need for a thoroughgoing reform of the Iraqi Security Forces 

to turn them back into the apolitical and largely professional force they had become 

by 2009—before former Prime Minister Maliki politicized the officer corps and 

turned the army into an incompetent, sectarian tool for his own narrow political 

agenda. Doing so will require retaining an American training and advisory presence—along with all of their support forces—for a decade or more. But it is absolutely critical to ensure that Iraq has a reasonably strong and independent military 

that can be counted to protect all of its minorities and see that the terms of the 

new power-sharing arrangement is honored by all sides. 

Syria. Addressing the problems of the Syrian civil war is even harder. Unlike 

in Iraq, the Asad regime is deeply unpopular with the majority of the population 

but the opposition is badly fragmented and dominated by Sunni extremists. In these 

circumstances, the Obama Administration’s stated policy is arguably the only course 

of action that makes sense given the unique history of Syria and the general history 

of civil wars. The United States should not want to see either the Asad regime or 

the Sunni extremists prevail because they can only do so by mass slaughter and the 

victory of either would then create new threats to U.S. allies. However, the current 

moderate Syrian opposition is too weak, too fractious and too vilified to serve as the 

foundation for a viable third force. Consequently, the United States will have to 

build a new Syrian opposition army—something we have done with success elsewhere. 1 Moreover, we will have to provide it with extensive training, a full panoply 

of weaponry (including some armor and artillery), and the backing of a major 

United States air campaign as we did for other indigenous opposition armies in 

Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya. 

While this strategy certainly can succeed in ending the fighting and compelling 

a new power-sharing agreement that would stabilize the country, it is not going to 

be easy. It will take a long time and will require a sustained American commitment 

throughout. And this is the great question mark hanging over the Administration’s 

approach to Syria. The military program to recruit, train and equip a new Syrian 

opposition army has proceeded painfully slowly. The process of creating a corresponding political framework is even further behind. Indeed, it is virtually nonexistent. Finally, while there is an argument to be made that progress in Syria can 

and should follow progress in Iraq, waiting too long there will make the Syrian effort far more difficult when the United States finally gets around to it, and risks 

the impact of spillover into Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and back into Iraq—which is 

unlikely to enjoy any post-Da’ish stability if Da’ish continues to have a sanctuary 

next door. 

Libya. Libya will require an approach much like Syria. It too needs a new military, one that is apolitical and professional, capable of defeating all of the partisan 

forces and then serving as the kind of strong, institution around which a new political system could be organized and enforced. Libya will also require the same kind 

of power-sharing arrangement to provide an equitable distribution of power and resources among its warring factions (which are primarily geographic—Cyrenaica vs. 

Tripolitania, Misrata vs. Zintan—although a secular-religious divide is being overlaid on these longer-standing divisions). 

Both efforts will require a great deal of external support to succeed. The challenge 

with Libya is that while it is strategically far more important than the attention 

it has so far received, it is not as important to American interests as Iraq (and by 

association, Syria). Given the extent of the actual or proposed American commitments to Iraq and Syria, it seems unlikely that the United States would make a 

similar effort in Libya. 

That means that Libya must largely be a European undertaking. Europe is far 

more directly affected by the loss of Libyan oil and trade and the increase in Libyan 

refugees. The problem, which this Committee understands only too well, is that the 

Europeans have allowed their militaries to atrophy to virtual impotence, and they 

have shown little willingness or ability to harness their economic and diplomatic resources for difficult, protracted missions like stabilizing and rebuilding Libya. Even 

16 

though the Europeans would need to furnish the bulk of the combat aircraft, trainers, advisors, weaponry, economic assistance and diplomatic muscle to stabilize 

Libya, it will invariably require the United States to convince them and enable 

them to do so. We will probably have to provide political leadership, logistical assistance, military command and control, and possibly some advisors as well if we are 

to move them to do what is ultimately in their own best interest as well as ours. 

Yemen. Yemen is the hardest of all. It is the home of one of the most dangerous 

al-Qa’ida franchises in the Middle East and the civil war has badly disrupted the 

current American system of suppressing that threat. But we cannot wish away the 

ongoing civil war and ultimately, eliminating the threat of al-Qa’ida in the Arabian 

Peninsula (AQAP) will require an end to the civil war itself. The last piece of our 

Yemeni dilemma is that, as dangerous as AQAP may be, it is not so dangerous that 

the American people will countenance an invasion and occupation of the country. 

Nor is Yemen so important as to justify the kind of American effort that the Obama 

Administration has committed to in Iraq and Syria. Indeed, given how parsimoniously the Administration has resourced its commitments in Iraq and Syria, it seems 

especially unlikely that they will make a simultaneous effort in Yemen. 

Given these difficult realities, America’s best recourse in Yemen may be to relocate our counterterror assets across the Red Sea to the Horn of Africa and try as 

best we can to contain the Yemeni civil war. I recognize that I wrote above that 

it is very difficult to contain the spillover from a civil war, but I simply see no alternative in the case of Yemen. The only country willing to intervene in Yemen is 

Saudi Arabia, which probably lacks the capacity to do so effectively. Indeed, the 

greatest danger stemming from the Yemeni civil war may be the Kingdom’s determination to intervene there to try to stave off spillover from the civil war. 

For over fifty years, the Saudis have feared that internal conflict in Yemen will 

infect the Kingdom and spawn a civil war there as well. Despite the fact that Yemen 

has been wracked by internal conflict for nearly that entire period and it never has 

caused internal instability in the Kingdom, this has not kept the Saudis from worrying that it someday will. These fears have been exacerbated by (exaggerated) Iranian support for Yemen’s Houthi rebels. Now Riyadh fears that Iran is taking over 

the state on its southern border, to match what the Saudis see as an Iranian ‘‘takeover’’ of Iraq, the country on their northern border. 

There is a real risk that the Saudis will keep doubling down in Yemen and in 

so doing will overstrain themselves—politically, militarily and even economically. 

The Kingdom cannot afford to get dragged deeper into a Yemeni quagmire it cannot 

stabilize on its own. This is especially true given the challenges the Kingdom is likely to face from historically low oil prices and exorbitant new financial commitments 

in an effort to stave off the Arab Spring. The great danger is that the Kingdom 

could find itself bankrupted and torn apart by an endless commitment to a Yemeni 

quagmire, as Pakistan has been by its intervention in the Afghan civil wars. 

The Kurds. Although the Kurds of Iraq are not in a state of civil war themselves, 

they deserve a special place in our consideration of how to deal with the civil wars 

of the region. In a turbulent part of the world, where there are few stable regions 

and where the United States has few friends, the Kurds of Iraq stand out. Although 

their security has been compromised by the Da’ish threat, with American air power, 

weapons and training, they have restored their borders and are taking the fight to 

the enemy. Their economy remains hobbled by graft and low oil prices, but they remain relatively better off than most of their neighbors—and well ahead of either 

Syria or the rest of Iraq. And while their political system still has a long way to 

go, there is the potential for meaningful progress there and some intelligent and enlightened leaders who could show the way if given the tools to do so. 

All of this should make the United States particularly well disposed to the Kurds 

of northern Iraq as we try to stabilize this region and prevent the chaos any farther. 

It would be best—for the Kurds, for Iraq and for the United States—if Iraqi 

Kurdistan were an independent nation, but that prospect is at least several years 

off. In the meantime, America’s interests argue for expanding a strategic partnership with the Kurds to include additional military, diplomatic and economic aid. As 

long as Kurdistan remains a formal part of Iraq and as long as the Iraqi government is one that the United States will want to continue to back, doing so will require constant diplomatic balancing with the sovereign Iraqi government. However, 

we should think creatively and lean forward in assisting the Kurdistan Regional 

Government with its priorities, even as we also push them to move in the directions 

critical for our own interests. 

17 

THE TWIN CHALLENGES OF DA’ISH AND IRAN

One of the worst mistakes that the United States appears to be making in its policies toward the Middle East is to focus them on the twin threats of Da’ish and Iran. 

There is no question that both seek to harm American interests, and quite possibly 

the American people themselves. Neither has our best interests at heart and both 

have shown the willingness to attack Americans whenever it suits their purposes. 

But it would be disastrous to make them the centerpiece of our Middle East policy. Both Da’ish and the spread of Iranian influence are symptoms of the problems 

of the region, NOT the problem itself. As my friend Vance Serchuk—once a staffer 

to this committee—recently put it, wherever the United States has allowed a security vacuum to open up in the Middle East, that vacuum has been filled by Iran 

and al-Qaeda. That has proven true in Iraq, in Syria, in Yemen and partially in 

Libya (where Iran has not yet found a foothold.) That same competition is also 

threatening fragile states like Lebanon and Bahrain. 

It is distressing to see the United States endlessly repeat the same mistakes. In 

2001, the Bush Administration foolishly declared a ‘‘War on Terrorism.’’ After 14 

years, that war has failed to eradicate terrorism and even failed to eradicate alQaeda, the principal target of that effort. That is not surprising. You cannot fight 

terrorism simply by killing terrorists. One hundred years of history has made that 

abundantly clear. And yet, in 2014, the Obama Administration declared war on 

Da’ish (or ISIL as it prefers to call the group). The war on Da’ish is just as misguided as the Bush Administration’s War on Terrorism. 

Terrorist groups are nothing but violent revolutionaries. Killing terrorists, while 

often a necessary component of any strategy is also insufficient to eradicate the 

problem of terrorism. Only by eliminating the underlying grievances that feed the 

movement is it possible to do so. That is why the only place where the United States 

ever successfully ‘‘eradicated’’ al-Qaeda (and then only temporarily) was in Iraq in 

2007–2010. We did so by addressing the basic problems of the country: securing the 

populace, forging an equitable power-sharing arrangement and division of economic 

resources, bringing Iraq’s alienated Sunni community back into the fold, and building a largely apolitical military. The group once known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (which 

had already declared itself the Islamic State of Iraq, or ISI) was only saved from 

oblivion by the civil war breaking out in neighboring Syria. 

The United States government needs to recognize that the problem of Da’ish is 

bigger than just the problems of Iraq and Syria, but so too the problems of Iraq and 

Syria are bigger than just the problem of Da’ish. The United States must fashion 

a policy to heal the civil wars in Iraq and Syria to drive Da’ish out of these countries. That is the ONLY way to do so. Even if we inflict a catastrophic military defeat on Da’ish in both countries, if we do not address the problems of their civil 

wars, Da’ish—or something just like it—will be back within a year or two. However, 

as we should have learned in Iraq, if we end the civil war, the terrorists will be 

forced out. While they will doubtless find homes in other regional civil wars, failed 

states and failing states, removing them from Iraq and Syria would be an important 

step in the right direction. 

The same logic applies to Iran’s expanding influence as well. Too often, Americans 

portray the Middle East as a chess match between Washington and Tehran—with 

all of the other countries and players reduced to pieces on the board. That is a dangerously misguided analogy. Iran is not controlling events in the region and is mostly reacting to them. It has undoubtedly made very significant gains over the past 

2–4 years. Today, Iran wields more influence in Iraq than at any time since the 

Ottoman conquest of Mesopotamia. Its allies hold sway in Lebanon, are the strongest force in Yemen, and are making a modest come back in Syria. 

However, it is absolutely critical to recognize that these Iranian gains have all 

come as a result of failed states and civil wars which the Iranians took advantage 

of exactly as al-Qaida and Da’ish have. Once again, the best way to diminish and 

eliminate Iranian influence in these places is to end the civil wars. Once again, Iraq 

furnishes the best example. In 2008–2009, it was the Iraqis who drove Iran from 

Iraq just as they effectively drove out AQI. Once the United States finally established security and forged a new power-sharing agreement among Sunni and Shiite 

Arabs, it was the Iraqis (with considerable American assistance) that drove Iran’s 

principal remaining ally, Muqtada as-Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi militia, first from 

Basra, then Qurnah, Amarah, Kut and Sadr City itself. By the beginning of 2010, 

Iran had virtually no influence in Iraq because Iraqis felt strong and united in a 

new sense of nationalism. (Unfortunately, that would collapse after the 2010 elections when the United States failed to enforce the rules of the democratic system, 

which then allowed Iranian influence back in). 

18 

Both Da’ish (and al-Qaeda) and the spread of Iranian influence are threats to 

American interests because these groups continue to define themselves as enemies 

of the United States. But we make two disastrous mistakes in thinking that they 

are the sources of our problems in the region and that the best way to address them 

is to attack them directly. History has demonstrated that it is possible to fight terrorism and roll back Iranian influence. But the best and only realistic way to do 

so is to heal the hurts of the region, rebuild its failed states and end its civil wars. 

Those are the open spaces that both AQ/Da’ish and Iran exploit. Protect those 

spaces, and neither will find the soil to grow or spread. 

RESURRECTING REFORM

Beyond ending the civil wars currently roiling the region, the United States must 

also push forward policies that will help avoid the creation of new failed states and 

new civil wars—recognizing that both the Sunni terrorists and the Iranians will be 

doing the opposite in hopes of creating new hosts to infect. This means embracing 

the cause of political, economic and social reform in the Muslim Middle East that 

the United States has toyed with for decades, but never made more than a halfhearted commitment. 

The political, economic and social grievances that gave rise to the Green Revolution and the Arab Spring have not gone away. They have been temporarily suppressed. They will be back. We don’t know when and we don’t know in what form, 

but they will undoubtedly be back. And a critical goal of American policy moving 

forward must be to guard against that day heading it off as best we can by pushing 

the states of the region to adopt reform, not repression, as the only viable long-term 

solution. 

The United States should not avoid the need for political reform simply because 

it is hard to accomplish. The Middle East is in such bad shape because it is at the 

beginning, not the end, of a regional movement demanding political change. The 

more stridently governments resist reform, the more violence there will be. We can 

try to put off the inevitable but ignoring the need for real change will mean that 

change, when it inevitably comes, will be violent, producing new revolutions, failed 

states, civil wars and other problems for the United States and its allies. We cannot 

avoid the wider set of underlying economic, political and social problems that were 

the ultimate cause of the Arab Spring and the civil wars it inadvertently produced. 

If we are to avoid worse, reform is the only path out. 

That is a simple statement and unquestionably the right answer for the states 

of the region to avoid further civil wars and internal unrest. But it is wicked hard 

in practice. Having come through the searing events of 2011, many of the Arab regimes that survived have concluded that any reform would only encourage greater 

demands for change that could easily escalate out of control—producing the revolts, 

state collapse and civil war that they (and we) fear. They aren’t entirely wrong. Reform that is handled badly—too fast, too slow, too narrow, too wide—can produce 

exactly that dynamic. No reform at all, however, is a recipe for disaster. 

As a final point on the issue of the importance of reform, it is worth noting the 

exception to the regional rule. Alone among the states of the Muslim Middle East, 

Tunisia has embraced dramatic reform and begun a difficult process of real democratization. It has already survived multiple crises where it might easily have veered 

back toward dictatorship and repression (as Egypt unfortunately has). If its transition is successful, it could prove to be a useful example for other states to follow— 

the first Arab democracy. 

That is a potentially transformative role, one that the United States should nurture. The opposite is also true: were Tunisia to fail, it would be taken by many as 

a sign that political pluralism and free-market economics are impossible in the Muslim Middle East, thus generating renewed support for repression as the only alternative. For both of these reasons, the United States, and the West more broadly, 

have a huge stake in the success of Tunisia. Even in an era of shrinking foreign 

aid budgets, Tunisia is a wise investment and potentially our best bet. 

Moreover, other small states with the potential to move further down the path 

of reform—like Morocco and Jordan—could be usefully persuaded to do so with the 

promise of more generous aid. Again, these are exactly the kind of investments in 

the future of the Middle East that can only pay off in the long run, but are in fact 

the only potential solutions for the deep-seated problems of the region that simply 

cannot be solved by quick fixes. 

19 

REACHING OUT TO OTHER GREAT POWERS

Although the United States can and should swing the pendulum of American involvement in the region back toward the center, as the Obama Administration has 

already begun to do, this cannot be the only answer to our problems. Ending the 

civil wars of the region and pushing the Arab states to embrace the long process 

of meaningful political, economic and social reform is not going to be easy. Executing and enabling such policies will require real resources, and a commitment 

maintained over years if not decades. While public opinion polls indicate considerable willingness on the part of the American people to commit resources to the problems of the Middle East, it seems unlikely that this nation will make another massive commitment to the Middle East, say on a par with the commitment it made 

to Iraq in 2003–2011, anytime soon. 

If the United States is no longer able or no longer willing to bear such costs alone, 

we are going to need to find others to share the burden. Certainly, the Europeans 

can provide some assistance, especially in the economic realm. But the Europeans 

now punch well below their weight in all policy spheres and we should not count 

on too much from them. Some regional states can contribute economic resources and 

political clout to certain specific projects, like ending the civil war in Syria, but gone 

are the days when the Saudis would back any American project no matter how disconnected from their own immediate security concerns. Moreover, even though the 

Saudis embraced (gradual) reform at home under King Abdullah, at the same time 

they ardently pursued counter-revolutionary policies that stifled reform abroad. 

Consequently, we should not assume that the region can do this on its own, even 

with advice, encouragement and pressure from the United States. 

For all of these reasons, the United States may have to begin to look to new players on the Middle Eastern scene to help advance these ambitious, but essential, policy objectives. The two obvious candidates are China and India. 

At first blush, this idea may seem ludicrous. The Chinese often see themselves 

as our ultimate rival for global dominance or at least local dominance in East Asia. 

They often ally with odious Middle Eastern regimes out of venal self-interest. They 

try to avoid getting involved in the internal affairs of other countries whenever possible and are often unmoved by aggressive behavior by anyone other than the 

United States. For its part, India has massive internal issues of its own to sort out, 

has little military capacity, and is locked in a sixty-year old struggle with Muslim 

Pakistan. 

Yet there are other factors that argue entirely in the opposite direction. China 

and India are two of the fastest industrializing countries in the world, and are increasingly dependent on Middle Eastern oil (far more so than the United States). 

Their political systems require continued economic growth and that economic 

growth is threatened by instability in the oil markets (or just high prices) that can 

be triggered by instability in the Middle East. Thus, the primary interest of both 

India and China in the Middle East is the same as America’s primary interest there. 

Moreover, both are developing power projection capabilities and increasingly looking 

to protect their interests abroad. 

The trick will be to persuade the Chinese and Indians that while they may not 

care about the internal affairs of the states of the Middle East today, they will in 

the future—and when they do, they are liable to wish that they had cared about 

it all along. What is required is to induce Beijing and Delhi to understand that the 

problems of the region are creating chronic internal instability which is ultimately 

the greatest threat to the oil exports of the region. 

If we are able to do so, we will succeed in turning a major challenge for our grand 

strategy into a major asset. If the Chinese and Indians (to a lesser extent) insist 

on seeing the United States as an adversary and are willing to associate with states 

regardless of their actions—foreign or domestic—this will greatly complicate the 

ability of the United States to dampen the risk of interstate conflict and to press 

regional regimes to adopt far-reaching reforms. They will always be able to hide behind the Chinese, getting what they need from Chinese businessmen and using Beijing as a diplomatic and (eventually) military counterweight to the United States. 

Implementing a grand strategy of enabling reform in the Muslim Middle East will 

be that much more difficult under these circumstances. However, if we are able to 

bring the Chinese and Indians around, they would then become our allies in the 

same initiative. 

Imagine the impact of these three great powers working in tandem to discourage 

foreign aggression and encourage internal reform? Imagine if regional reformers had 

alternative great power backers (one without the taints we have acquired) to turn 

to for aid in all its forms? Imagine if would-be troublemakers met a united front 

of Washington, Beijing and Delhi determined to prevent them from causing misVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:53 Sep 08, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21401.TXT WILDA
20 

chief? Imagine if local regimes found the champions of both East and West determined to move them down the path of reform—and willing to help them do so? 

This recognition creates a basis for mutual understanding. If China and India acknowledge their own need for greater stability in the Middle East to ensure the free 

flow of oil, but recognize that the region is fragile and can be a trap for foreign great 

powers, then Chinese and Indian policymakers may be receptive to an arrangement 

that minimizes great power competition in the Middle East, maximizes cooperation, 

and possibly even establishes a division of labor in which the United States continues to play a leading military and political role, with economic and diplomatic 

support from Beijing and Delhi. 

Whereas India is the world’s most populous democracy, China itself has made 

only grudging political reforms—and certainly has not championed political pluralism abroad. Nevertheless, China’s ambivalence about democracy probably won’t 

be a serious stumbling block to cooperation in promoting internal reform and helping to make that possible across the Middle East. The Chinese have demonstrated 

a high degree of cynicism when it comes to systems of government elsewhere, showing few reservations about democratization in South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, and 

Indonesia, let alone farther afield in Europe, Africa and Latin America. As long as 

a country is doing whatever it is China wants and needs, Beijing has typically 

shown itself willing to tolerate political reform. 

Even where China opposes efforts to promote democracy, such as in North Korea 

and Myanmar, its concern is principally with preserving regimes friendly to it and 

avoiding chaotic transitions that could affect its interests. The kind of gradual, indigenously-driven process of political reform (which may or may not produce true 

democracy depending on the desires of the people themselves) envisioned in this 

grand strategy should be acceptable to the Chinese if they come to see it as in their 

interests because it will ensure long-term stability even if comes at the expense of 

short-term dislocations. 

Persuading China and India to help share the burdens of the Middle East will 

likely consist of more than just compelling conversation. In particular, a critical element in making China and India our partners in this enterprise will be giving them 

a role in the Middle East commensurate with their growing strength and aspirations. This is going to be particularly hard for the United States with regard to 

China, because it is going to mean accepting Beijing as our equal in the geopolitics 

of the Middle East. Rather than making unilateral decisions after minimal consultation with our regional allies, Washington will have to learn to negotiate common 

policies with Beijing—and Delhi. It will certainly mean lots of painful coordination 

with other governments, whose concurrence will often be vital for the sake of the 

wider partnership if not for cooperation on the specific matter itself. It may mean 

allowing the Chinese and Indians basing rights in the region, both so that they feel 

comfortable that they can protect their own interests, and so that they are able to 

exercise their influence jointly with us. It will probably mean agreeing to do some 

things Beijing’s way and other things Delhi’s. 

All of this would be laborious, frustrating, time-consuming, and even enraging for 

America’s leaders and diplomats, but the rewards would be well worth the effort. 

Moreover, they appear increasingly necessary given America’s diminishing willingness to bear the costs of the Middle East on its own. 

THE NECESSITY OF LONG-TERM STRATEGIC FOCUS

I have attempted to cover a lot of ground in this testimony, sketching out the 

framework of a new American grand strategy for the Middle East. There is a great 

deal more that would need to be said to explain how these broad approaches could 

be translated into concrete policies. But such a framework is a necessary starting 

point both in building such a program and in debating whether it is the right one 

for the nation. I believe it is, if only because I can think of no other that would better suit our interests in the Middle East, our circumstances, and the tools and resources we have available to us there. 

The one critical requirement of this strategy that I fear we may have in inadequate supply is the commitment to see it through. We are an impatient people, especially when it comes to the confounding problems of the Middle East. We have 

typically sought to fix a problem there, or just fix it-up, and then move on to something we liked more. Unfortunately, the history of our involvement in the region 

since 1971 has been that every time we have tried this, it has not fixed anything 

at all, and instead the problem has inevitably come back to bite us later, and require far more effort and resources to address it then. As I have said elsewhere, 

the Middle East is NOT Las Vegas: what happens there does not stay there. 

21 

Nor do its problems admit themselves of quick and easy solutions. It took a long 

time and a lot of disastrous mistakes (by Arabs, Iranians, Turks, Israelis, Europeans, Americans and many others) to bring the region to its current distressing 

state of affairs. No American strategy is going to change that quickly. While there 

are solutions to the problems we face in the Middle East, they require, time, patience and the determination to see them through. 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Senators, our Founding Fathers explicitly created the United States Senate to be the guardians of America’s long-term good. To 

ensure that at least some segment of the nation’s leaders had the perspective and 

the ability to fight for what is in the country’s interests beyond tomorrow or even 

six-months from tomorrow. For that reason, I urge you, as you contemplate United 

States policy toward the Middle East to be the voice of strategic wisdom. To consider 

how deep the problems of the region have become, and to press for changes in American policy that put in place the long-term shifts that will be needed to actually deal 

with the problems of the region, rather than merely trying to paper over them until 

the next, worse crisis engulfs us. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Colonel Harvey? 

STATEMENT OF COLONEL DEREK J. HARVEY, USA, RETIRED, 

DIRECTOR, GLOBAL INITIATIVE FOR CIVIL SOCIETY AND 

CONFLICT, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA 

Mr. HARVEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ranking minority, and 

members of this committee. Thank you for inviting me to testify. 

I did not submit prepared remarks, but I am going to make some 

extemporaneous points, and I hope that they are relevant. 

First, I agree with almost everything that has been said, so I will 

just highlight a couple of points about the broader regional trends 

that we need to take into consideration. Besides the post-Arab 

Spring dynamics and the failure of governance and institutions, 

there is a fracturing of society. And one of the overarching themes 

going here is this conflict within Islam and a conflict within the 

Ummah. And it manifests itself in several ways. You have the 

jihadist extremists Sunni-Salafist approach, a takfiri, annihilationist agenda, which is against establishment Islam and the established authorities. And that is at one level. But there is also an 

intra-jihadist fight going on, and then there is a Sunni versus Shia 

fight going on at various levels too. And it is at the grassroots level, 

but it is also at a geopolitical level. So you have got four clear levels of intra-sectarian conflict going on, and then you have an intraShia dynamic which is being dominated right now by Qom over the 

Iraq-based Najaf-Karbala view of a more quietest approach to 

Islam. 

And so we have to take this into consideration because it is at 

the heart of how many in the region are looking at this through 

the sectarian divide and the approaches from these sub-national 

elements and at the National level. You hear it at the senior levels 

in the UAE, Qatar, and in Kuwait. You also hear it across the region in the Levant. So we have to take that into consideration. 

Now, very quickly a couple of quick points. 

One, the immediate threat is ISIS, but also an immediate threat 

currently is the encroachment and empowerment of Iran across the 

region, and it is the most dangerous, long-term threat. ISIS is not 

the most dangerous long-term threat, and we are misplacing our 

priorities and we are forgetting about our strategic long-term interests in securing an independent, sovereign, not-aligned Iraq. Iraq 

is vital to the stability of the region, and we are at deep risk of 

22 

losing Baghdad today. In fact, we may have dug such a deep hole 

that it is not recoverable for us. And I see a similar pattern emerging to what we had with the Warsaw Pact, Moscow, and their client states, East Berlin, Warsaw, Prague, et cetera where Baghdad, 

Damascus, and Beirut are simply client states of Tehran. 

The current fight against ISIS. I think we are still underestimating the deep support that it has, not only in parts of Iraq 

and Syria, but also the empathy that it has in the Gulf. The operations against ISIS have had success on the margins, along the 

Kurdish zone, Kirkuk, northern Nineveh. It has been clearing in 

Diyala, the Hamrin Mountains, and pushing up the Tigris River. 

Some localized tactical successes in Anbar Province. 

But even when you achieve clearing and holding in these places, 

you are still going to have a residual, deep Sunni Arab resistance 

effort unless there is fundamental change in Baghdad. And I think 

we all understand that. We could be back to the days of 2006 with 

an ongoing industrial strength insurgency. And the way this fight 

has been moving forward in a bulldozer-like approach where you 

demolish a city like Jurf al-Sakhar, southwest of Baghdad, what 

has happened in Diyala and what appears to be happening in 

Tikrit—this does not bode well for Sunni and Shia relations at the 

grassroots level. 

Prime Minister Abadi is not sectarian in my judgment, but he remains weak and isolated. The Iraqi security forces are weak and 

marginalized in this current construct. Shia militias are enhanced 

in their power and influence, and their loyalty is to the Supreme 

Leader Khamenei and their source of emulation Khamenei, not to 

Najaf, not to Karbala. The one exception in this case is the Sadr 

movement, and that is an area where there are some opportunities 

to reach out for an Iraqi Shia nationalist agenda within these militia elements. But we have a long and troubled history with the 

Sadr trend, but I think that is one area of some opportunity. 

Tehran’s sphere of influence, as I have said, is expanding and 

they have the advantages of proximity, deep knowledge of the players in the region, a vital strategic interest in achieving their objectives, and a ruthless and committed leadership that knows how to 

work in this environment. And those are all things that the United 

States fails to bring to the table and has not brought to the table 

in recent years. 

The Sunni Arab community is likely weaker and more divided 

than ever in Iraq. Likewise, it is the same thing in Syria. Major 

population displacement is unlikely to be redressed with major 

Sunni communities moving back into these places like Sakhar or 

even in Diyala or eventually Tikrit because there seems to be an 

agenda underway of diminishing, if not cleansing major Sunni communities from around the Baghdad belts and the approaches into 

Baghdad in a way to create buffer zones. And this is something 

that has been done in the past, but they are just expanding the geographic reach. And General Chisori and others from the Qods 

Force has been orchestrating the same kind of effort around Damascus and in other regions of Syria. It is a plan that they have 

and we need to understand how they are approaching this. 

Long term, if there is going to be successful reconciliation between these communities, there is going to have to be an addressVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:53 Sep 08, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21401.TXT WILDA
23 

ing of the disenfranchisement and marginalization. That means 

some kind of local autonomy, a national guard, better resource distribution, and rebuilding and reinvestment in these Sunni Arab 

areas. Again, that is unlikely to occur under the political dynamics 

in Baghdad. And with the increasing influence of Iran and hardline Shia, it even makes it less likely. 

Lastly, over the last year or more, our engagement in Iraq has 

been insufficient to the task. We remain viewed as a peripheral 

player, hesitant and weak. Without sufficient military capabilities 

invested in this effort in ways that are aligned to achieve our political, economic, and diplomatic objectives, we are not going to be 

considered a major player. I am not sure we can change our approach at this point in time and develop a conceptual approach to 

our engagement in Iraq and execute it effectively to counter the 

gains made by Iran over the last 6 months for sure but how they 

have been building their enterprise there over the last several 

years. 

We see a cementing of Shia militia relationships from Beirut to 

Syria to Iraq, and these are not just on the military side, but they 

are business, they are economic, partnering going on between members of the Maliki family, families in Beirut, the Assad family, and 

others. We could go into great detail if one wanted to approach how 

this cementing of relationships is being orchestrated by the Qods 

Force and MOIS. 

With that, I will just stop, and I am looking forward to answering any of your questions. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Dr. Rand? 

STATEMENT OF DR. DAFNA H. RAND, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF 

STUDIES AND LEON E. PANETTA FELLOW, CENTER FOR A 

NEW AMERICAN SECURITY 

Dr. RAND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, 

members of the committee. Thanks for inviting me to testify. 

I ask that my longer written statement be submitted for the 

record. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Without objection. 

Dr. RAND. Great. 

And shortly I just wanted to focus on the particular strategic 

principles that I believe should guide and inform and shape United 

States foreign policy toward the Middle East and North Africa over 

the near term. 

And I applaud your instinct to hold the hearing on the greater 

question of U.S. Middle East foreign policy because we are all so 

involved in the day-to-day crises. 

I would offer six strategic principles that I believe should inform 

our approach to the Middle East in the near and longer terms. 

First, the United States should not shy away from publicly and 

privately articulating its interests and objectives. These have endured, surprisingly, despite the tumult in the region. They have 

not changed over time very much, and they include protecting the 

U.S. homeland and its personnel and interests abroad; countering 

radicalization, terrorism, and proliferation; and securing the free 

flow of natural resources, commerce, and other goods. The U.S. 

24 

seeks to protect its allies, including the State of Israel, and advance 

a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And all these 

goals support U.S. interests while advancing regional and international security. The United States also works with the governments and people of the region to address public demands for education, employment, governance, human rights, and just institutions. 

The second principle is that the real and perceived U.S. presence 

in the region matters. Without it, the regional powers will try to 

manage and structure regional order, often working at cross purposes with each other and the United States. And the best example 

here is the United States efforts to stand up the coalition to combat 

ISIS in the past 6 months. Here this multilateral coalition of over 

60 nations, I believe, has inserted a degree of management, regional architecture, and order to the post-Arab Spring environment. It has generated some preliminary positive outcomes. The 

practical results, of course, can be seen in some of the beginning 

signs of military degradation of ISIS, which is still preliminary but 

significant, as well as regional allies’ efforts and interests in countering ISIS’s financing, ideology, and recruitment efforts. These 

gains are very modest, but the fact that the Arab allies are working 

in sync with each other and with the United States and other countries is a positive development. For example, the Saudis have just 

invited the Iraqi prime minister to visit Riyadh, which is an unprecedented sign of diplomatic investment in the new Iraqi Government. 

The third principle is that the United States must seize all diplomatic openings and create them as a first resort policy. In almost 

all cases, the alternative to diplomacy involves risk, security dilemmas, and greater instability. This is true with the current negotiations between the P5+1 in Iran. It is also true when it comes to 

the negotiated end to the Syrian civil war and for the pursuit of 

the final status agreement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is 

also true in Yemen and Libya I will add. 

The fourth important principle is when the United States chooses 

to intervene militarily, judiciously, it must use force carefully. U.S. 

military interventions in the region have been most successful 

when they have involved local partners, when the use of coercion 

is carefully targeted to achieve a defined end state, and when the 

United States makes it clear that it has no intention of deploying 

ground troops semi-permanently in the region as the only day-after 

solution. 

Fifth, the ideal end state for most of our efforts in the region involve building partner self-sufficiency, measured by the ability and 

the will of local leaders and their security forces to combat mutual 

threats, joint threats such as terrorism and proliferation. The 

training, equipping, and assisting of local partners must be done 

with an eye for shaping how these partners view their own strategy 

and military doctrine, including the threat perception that they 

hold. While building partnership capacity will necessarily focus on 

the measurable military capabilities, ensuring that all partner 

forces act professionally and in a manner consonant with the ultimate goal of inclusive governance are equally important objectives. 

25 

1Magued Osman, ‘‘Rapid Population Growth Imperils Egypt,’’ The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, December 16, 2013, http://www.aucegypt.edu/gapp/cairoreview/pages/articleDetails.aspx? 

aid=484. 2This is a figure cited by the World Economic Forum, in Holly Ellyatt, ‘‘Youth Unemployment 

in Rich Middle East a ‘Liability’: WEF,’’ CNBC, October 15, 2014, http://www.cnbc.com/id/ 

102088327. 

U.S. security assistance and training across the region must be designed in a manner that reflects these particular local challenges. 

And finally, U.S. partners must subscribe to the view that it is 

borne of abundant recent evidence that in this particular region 

stability is borne of governance that is inclusive, multi-sectarian, 

and based on compromise and responsible leadership. And this is 

why Iran may share United States concerns about ISIS in Iraq, but 

ultimately is not an enduring partner in the strategic fight against 

the group in the region. 

Thanks very much. I look forward to your questions on specific 

countries and cases where these principle apply. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Rand follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. DAFNA H. RAND

Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, and members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify. Events are changing rapidly in the Middle East and North Africa 

(MENA), challenging the pursuit of United States interests and values. Often we 

are mired in the current crisis of the moment; this hearing offers an opportunity 

to consider overall U.S. policy objectives in this fluid region, and a strategy to 

achieve them. 

ASSESSING REGIONAL DYNAMICS

Any discussion of current and future United States-Middle East policy must be 

founded on a realistic assessment of the regional drivers of change. The following 

four trends have emerged over the past decade and, while not exhaustive, they are 

directly shaping the context for how the United States pursues its policy objectives 

in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). 

First, while it is premature to conclude that the entire nation state system has 

failed across the region, the weakening of central government authority is observable in the monarchies, former presidential republics, one-party systems, and of 

course in the many states mired in civil conflict. There is a growing contestation 

of power in most MENA capitals, with elites and publics challenging the status quo. 

In some cases, such as in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya, we can visually see the 

state failure in the large swaths of ungoverned territory. 

Elsewhere, evidence of state weakening and de-legitimation may have longer term 

manifestations. In Egypt, for example, despite the strong rule of a new strong man, 

the largest Arab country faces grave socio-economic problems and a population that 

will reach 100 million by 2025.1 Egyptians are facing decreased opportunities for 

free expression, organization, and representation, portending poorly for future stability. Indeed, the current Egyptian government’s approach to its political opposition 

and to domestic counter-terrorism could generate new types of terrorist threats, 

thus weakening the state over the medium term. 

Second, as both a cause and a result of this state weakening, social mobilization 

by non-state actors is rising: individuals, citizen groups, tribes, regional blocs, and 

ethnic and sectarian parties are expressing themselves and their identities in an unprecedented way, demanding rights, cultural protection, economic opportunity, and 

justice. In some cases, the impact of social media is over-exaggerated, but it is true 

that the rapid increase in Twitter, Facebook, and other on-line social media use reflects a yearning for expression by many, particularly the approximately 50 percent 

of MENA citizens who are 25 years old or younger.2 In some cases, social and tribal 

identities are replacing the institutional structures of the state—this is true in parts 

of Syria, Iraq, Libya, and elsewhere. In other cases, political parties and factions 

defined by ethnic and sectarian identities are demanding greater rights and, in 

some cases, autonomy. 

Social mobilization can trigger non-violent protests, as we saw in 2011, but it also 

has the potential for violence. A third trend is a very real increase in radicalization 

26 

3 Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Director, National Counterterrorism Center, ‘‘Countering Violent 

Islamist Extremism: The Urgent Threat of Foreign Fighters and Homegrown Terror,’’ Testimony 

to the Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, February 11, 2015, 

http: / / docs . house . gov / meetings / HM / HM00 / 20150211 / 102901 / HHRG - 114 - HM00 - Wstate - 

RasmussenN-20150211.pdf. 4 Richard Barrett ‘‘Foreign Fighters Fighting in Syria,’’ The Soufan Group, June 2, 2014, 

http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/TSG-Foreign-Fighters-in-Syria.pdf. 

and terrorism. The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) is a terrifying organization: it holds territory; espouses an ideology that even al-Qaeda finds too violent; 

and is attracting over 20,000 foreign fighters from across the globe to fight in Syria 

and Iraq.3 The majority of these foreign fighters are coming from the Arab world.4

The appeal of this violent, cult-like ideology, which encourages attacks against minority groups, women, and children and reflects a distorted interpretation of Islam, 

is alarming. It is important to note that while ISIS poses a direct threat to the 

United States, and to its regional partners, radicalization and terrorism in MENA 

is not limited to Sunni jihadists. Indeed, Iranian-funded terrorism endures and also 

threatens United States interests and allies across the region. 

Unfortunately, social mobilization and radicalization are part of the same phenomena, caused in part by inadequate governance and institutions, depressed economic opportunity and an absence of appropriate jobs, the fracturing of security infrastructures, and the appeal of radical jihadism as an alternative ideology and 

identity. These trends were emerging for many years before the Arab Spring; the 

protest movements of 2011 and the state responses to the revolutions has accelerated these phenomena. 

Finally, a fourth trend involves the greater activism with which the region’s powers have responded to the combination of state failure, revolution, and radicalism 

in the post-2011 era. Regional actors have tried to manipulate weak and broken 

states, materially supporting proxies in civil conflicts and influencing weak governmental actors and parties. Iran has long tried to influence the political system in 

Lebanon, and more recently has expanded its influence into Baghdad and Damascus. The weakening and failure of states across the region offers Tehran greater opportunities to involve itself operationally in local crises, reflected most directly in 

Iranian military support to the regime of Bashar al-Assad. 

Other countries are using their economic wealth, and their ideological soft power, 

to try to influence the outcomes of the region’s conflicts. For example, since 2011, 

Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia have all tried to support opposition fighters in the 

Syrian civil conflict. External patronage did not generate coherence, cooperation, 

and moderation among those fighting the Assad regime and its proxies. In some 

cases, when regional powers intervene, they are working at cross-purposes, because 

they often disagree on the role of Islam in political life as well as on how—and 

whether—to establish inclusive and pluralistic governance systems. 

U.S. POLICY IN AN ERA OF REVOLUTION, RADICALIZATION, AND REGIME WEAKENING

In the face of these trends, and the likelihood that the current conditions of ideological and political competition and conflict will endure, U.S. strategy in the region 

need not be overly broad and all-encompassing. While the United States should not 

respond to the challenges in the region on a case-by-case approach—mainly because 

these conflicts are interconnected—it would be overly simplistic to impose a onesize-fits all grand strategy at this moment when the region’s states are becoming 

more dissimilar in terms of trajectories of democratization, violence, terrorism, and 

economic conditions. 

Instead, it makes sense to endorse a series of strategic principles for the United 

States to articulate publicly and privately. These principles should inform particular 

U.S. policy approaches to individual countries and conflicts. Although in some cases, 

the United States may have to deviate from these principles, it is preferable to have 

a working mission statement for the United States, a cogent explanation of what 

the United States is seeking and how it will pursue these objectives. The following 

strategic principles should guide U.S. policy in the near term: 

Cleary state U.S. interests and values in the region 

U.S. interests are unambiguous and have not changed significantly over time: The 

United States is protecting the American homeland and its personnel and interests 

abroad; is countering radicalization, terrorism, and proliferation; and is securing the 

free flow of natural resources, commerce, and other goods. The United States seeks 

to protect its allies, including the state of Israel, and to advance a two state solution 

to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. All of these goals support U.S. interests and enhance regional and international security. 

27 

The United States works with the governments and people of the region to address public demands for education, employment, governance, human rights, and 

just institutions. The United States promotes these ideals because they reflect 

American values. It has also learned that the pursuit of the above U.S. interests 

in this region is inextricably tied to—and sometimes depends on—the opportunities 

afforded to MENA’s citizens. 

Appropriately assess U.S influence, leverage, and leadership 

For decades, many people and governments in MENA have harbored unrealistic 

views about the scope of U.S. influence in the region, particularly U.S. policymakers’ 

ability to shape regional events. These expectations, and the vision of an omnipotent 

United States masterminding events in the region, are unrealistic. Additionally, 

they do not reflect the American people’s desire for cooperation and partnership, 

rather than for control in the MENA region. 

It is equally unproductive, however, to underestimate the opportunities for U.S. 

influence and leverage over events and decision-making in the region. Despite the 

challenging environment and the rise of new state and non-state actors, the United 

States can creatively deploy its civilian and military toolkit to increase security, 

prosperity, and opportunity. U.S. diplomatic persuasion and its role as a leader of 

international coalitions can prod governments and their people to counter threats 

and to address basic human security concerns. In some cases, the United States can 

prod domestic economic and political reforms, particularly when this tough domestic 

work represents a collaboration between the United States, MENA governments, 

local civil society, and the MENA citizens who are advocating for change. 

Recent events have shown that U.S. influence may be best achieved when the 

United States mobilizes regional and international coalitions, whether the goal is to 

fight terrorist groups such as ISIS, to impose multilateral sanctions against Iran, 

or to cooperate on threats such as cyber and maritime insecurity. In short, the people of the region should not overestimate the determinant nature of U.S. Middle 

East policy, even as policymakers in Washington should not underestimate U.S. influence in this part of the world. 

Finally, real and perceived U.S. presence in the region matters. Without it, regional powers will try to manage and structure the regional order, often working 

at cross purposes with each other and the United States Therefore, it is far preferable that the United States leads coalitions, such as the current international coalition against ISIS, to provide order, direction, and a shared strategic vision. Moreover, there is no substitute for the U.S. security guarantor. The people and states 

of the region will increasingly transact economic and even security business with 

other great powers, but will continue to look to the United States to provide regional 

order and leadership. 

Align specific policy tools with the U.S. end goal 

The United States must seize all diplomatic openings as a first resort, and create 

diplomatic opportunities were none exist. The United States has unrivaled bilateral 

diplomatic relations with many allies and partners in the region, as well as the ability to move other international actors to support regional goals, such as preventing 

Iranian nuclear proliferation, reaching a negotiated end to the Syrian civil war, or 

pushing for a final status agreement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The case for 

diplomacy is clear: in this region, alternatives to diplomacy almost always involve 

greater bloodshed. 

When the United States chooses to intervene militarily, it must use force carefully. U.S. military interventions in the region have been most successful when they 

have involved local partners, when the use of coercion is carefully targeted to 

achieve a defined end state, and when the United States makes it clear that it has 

no intention of deploying ground troops semi-permanently in the region as a ‘‘day 

after’’ solution. As events in Iraq from 2003–2010 demonstrated, the indefinite, 

unending commitment of U.S. combat troops, deployed in the heart of the Arab 

world, can incite greater anti-American violence and redirect the nature of the fighting so that the United States becomes a party to the conflict. 

Finally, the ideal end state for most military interventions in the region involves 

partner self-sufficiency, measured by the ability and will of local leaders and their 

security forces to combat mutual threats such as terrorism and proliferation. The 

training, equipping, and assisting of local partners must be done with an eye for 

shaping these partners’ entire strategy and doctrine, including the state’s threat 

perception. While building partnership capacity will necessarily focus on the measurable military capabilities, ensuring that all partner forces act professionally and 

in a matter consonant with the ultimate goal of inclusive and fair governance are 

equally important objectives. U.S. security assistance and training programs across 

28 

5Daryl G. Kimball, Issue Brief, Arms Control Today, Vol. 7., Issue 5, March 5, 2015, http:// 

www.armscontrol.org/Issue-Briefs/2015–03–03/Netanyahu-On-the-Iran-Nuclear-Issue-A-RealityCheck. 

the region must be designed in a manner that reflects the particular, local challenges. These include the reasons why local partners may not have the will to fight 

or why partner security forces may be politicized or otherwise act unprofessionally. 

Define partners and partnerships carefully 

Partners in the Middle East, whether those currently fighting with us against 

ISIS in Iraq and Syria, members of the anti-ISIS Coalition, or other longstanding 

friends and allies share tactical and strategic security goals. Partners identify similar threats. As discussed above, however, building partnership capacity cannot exclusively focus on the technical abilities of regional security forces to fight and use 

American weapons. U.S. partners must subscribe to the view, born of an abundance 

of recent evidence, that in this region stability is born of governance that is inclusive, multi-sectarian, and based on compromise and responsible leadership. This is 

why Iran may share U.S. concerns about ISIS but cannot be an enduring partner 

in the strategic fight against the group in Iraq and Syria, given its record supporting sectarian political parties that do not espouse pluralistic and inclusive governance. While these principles above are broad, they can guide U.S. policy responses to 

today’s crises from Libya to Yemen. There are a few immediate implications of the 

above principles: 

First, U.S. efforts since August 2014 to combat ISIS through the efforts of a multilateral Coalition have inserted a degree of management, regional architecture, and 

order to the post-Arab spring Middle East and North Africa that is generating many 

positive outcomes. The practical results of U.S. leadership is manifest in the work 

being conducted by the 60-member Coalition, states working in concert to not only 

militarily degrade ISIS but also to train moderate Syrian opposition forces and new 

units of the Iraqi security forces and to counter ISIS’ financing, ideology, and recruitment efforts. 

Investing U.S. ‘‘skin in the game’’ against ISIS is helping to move regional partners toward unprecedented support countering foreign fighters (i.e. Turkey), countering terrorist financing (i.e. Qatar), and bolstering the Iraqi government diplomatically and through assistance (i.e. Saudi Arabia). This Coalition alone is not 

a panacea for the problem of ISIS but it represents an effective mechanism that is 

yielding results on the battlefield and in terms of aligning strategic goals in regional 

capitals. The Coalition must be nurtured and supported. 

Second, the United States must seize diplomatic opportunities, such as the current negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran. In almost all cases, the alternatives 

to diplomacy involve risk, security dilemmas, and greater instability. Opponents of 

diplomacy have not offered a persuasive near-term plan for preventing an Iranian 

nuclear weapon without risking potential violence and greater instability for the 

United States and its regional allies.5 Similarly, the pursuit of a negotiated end to 

the Syrian civil war and the negotiation of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict still offer the best pathways for long-term, enduring conflict resolution. 

Third, the principles above also point to the right approach to countering Iran’s 

network of shadowy militias, action forces, and terrorist groups that are contributing to destabilization in the region. Iran is not a partner in the work of rebuilding 

multi-sectarian, inclusive governing institutions. In some cases, coercive measures 

will be required to counter the Iranian action networks. In other cases in order, to 

prevent Iranian penetration and influence, other regional actors, with U.S. support 

will need to play a direct and leading diplomatic and security assistance role. In 

Yemen, for example, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states led by Saudi Arabia 

should be in the lead, providing security and countering terrorists who are stoking 

ethnic and sectarian bloodshed across the country. The United States must publicly 

and privately support GCC efforts. 

CONCLUSION

In short, MENA states and societies are undergoing a decades-long process of 

transformation. This process will continue to be violent and non-linear. A U.S. presence and leadership role in the region is critical, to managing and containing crises 

and preventing regional competition and disorder. In most cases, diplomatic interventions should be a first resort of U.S. policy, but other U.S. tools, when deployed 

carefully and with clear end goals, can help to achieve key U.S. interests. 

29 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you, Dr. Rand. And I thank the witnesses for their important contributions. 

I know the witnesses are aware that General Petraeus made a 

statement in the last few days where he basically stated that he 

believed that Iran was a greater threat long-term in the Middle 

East than ISIS is. Just maybe beginning with you, Dr. Takeyh, 

maybe if you, all the witnesses, respond to General Petraeus’ statement. 

Dr. TAKEYH. Well, I think they are different threats. One is also 

this kind of annihilistic terrorist group that, as was mentioned, is 

borne out of Sunni community’s grievances. The other is a nation 

state that has command of nation state resources, its economy. It 

has military and all that. So in the long term, I think that is probably a greater threat to the stability of the region. When you have 

a nation state married to a revisionist ideology enhancing its military capabilities, that will loom over the region for some time to 

come. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Dr. Pollack? 

Dr. POLLACK. Senator, I agree with that statement. I would 

strongly agree with Dr. Takeyh’s characterization of it. Al Qaeda, 

ISIS is a terrorist group. It represents an extreme element of the 

Sunni community, one that they may broadly sympathize with but 

they do not necessarily want to represent them, let alone to rule 

over them. Its staying power in the region is going to be limited 

and we have seen it experience difficulties. That is not to suggest 

that it is not a very serious threat that needs to be dealt with. It 

does. But exactly as Dr. Takeyh has pointed out—and I think this 

was also the point that Colonel Harvey was making earlier—at the 

end of the day, Iran is a major power in the region. It has the capacity to dominate the region and has done so for centuries in the 

past. Ultimately that is a greater threat to the United States because it demonstrates a greater ability to control the region and to 

sustain that control over time, if allowed to do so. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Colonel Harvey? 

Mr. HARVEY. Sir, there are no indications that Iran’s malign intent in the region vis-a-vis its neighbors has shifted. Any beliefs 

that Iran’s agenda in the region is going to change based upon 

reformists taking power as a result of the nuclear agreement down 

the road are probably the same kinds of people that would think 

that a Libertarian candidate in the United States could win a presidential election in the next 10 years. It is not going to happen. The 

few signs of political reformists advancing within the government 

from academia, from economic arena, elsewhere are minor. The 

hardliners are well entrenched, and the system is aligned to keep 

them that way. We see Khamenei posters popping up throughout 

Iraq. We see them posting on their webs in these Shia militias that 

they are going to liberate Shia in Kuwait, in Bahrain, and in the 

eastern provinces. Intent plus capability equals threat. Our longterm threat, the current threat is still Iran until we see real signs 

of change. 

Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Dr. Rand? 

Dr. RAND. The sources of each threat is different. I would just 

highlight something my colleagues have not mentioned, which is 

30 

that ISIS has reinterpreted and distorted even al-Qaeda’s fatwas 

about killing civilians, you know, giving a free reign to its folks to 

kill women and civilians and minorities. There is something new 

and different and terrifying about ISIS that cannot be overestimated. That is that the source of the Iranian threat is real and 

true and has been explained here. I see their vision of a winnertake-all governance system as deeply terrifying to our goals and 

our objectives in the region. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Colonel Harvey, you were heavily involved in the surge and other 

activities in Iraq. We now see pictures and publicity coverage by 

the Iranians and others of Soleimani in orchestrating and leading 

the attack on Tikrit. Is this not the same guy that sent the coppertipped IED’s into Iraq which killed hundreds of American soldiers 

and marines? And should we not be more aware of the malign influence of Soleimani through the last—I believe he has been in 

power for 21 years. And would the average Iraqi not believe that 

it is the Iranians that are now coming to the rescue of the Iraqis 

against ISIS and not the United States of America who seems to 

be observing the activities around Tikrit? 

And finally, does the difficulty that they are now experiencing in 

retaking Tikrit not indicate the magnitude of the challenge that 

they face in attempting to retake Mosul? 

Mr. HARVEY. Sir, Soleimani and the Iranian Guard corps commander Jafari and others have been deeply involved in Iraq for the 

last 6 or 7 months. And for the Shia community and even in the 

Kurdish region, they see that the Iranians have become major players and they are contributing on the ground. And the publicity and 

the information campaigns have been really effective in my judgment, and Soleimani has taken a front-line role in showcasing Iranian presence. 

He is in fact the one that orchestrated the campaign against the 

United States. Iran focused on creating disorder and undermining 

our efforts there—and they are probably one of the key reasons 

that we had such difficulty—and undermined domestic U.S. will in 

that regard. But he has also been deeply behind the efforts in Syria 

and of course in Lebanon. Very brutal approaches in orchestrating 

and conceiving of sectarian cleansing, barrel bombs, and that type 

of thing attacking the types of targets and focusing on not going 

after elements like al-Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra, and ISIS in order to 

create this picture of either Assad or the extremists, very Machiavellian in their approach. 

At the end of the day, Khamenei’s access and presence and his 

underlings in the command centers in the 6th infantry division, in 

the 8th infantry division with commandos provides them reach 

and, I think, influence that is going to be far-lasting. And we just 

do not have that type of presence or capability on the ground. They 

know how to play in this terrain. We have not. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Dr. Rand, maybe we could ask—Dr. Rand, do 

you—— 

Dr. RAND. It is an interesting question about whether there are 

any lessons learned from the Tikrit offensive that could be applied 

by the ISF towards the potential battle in Mosul. This is, I think, 

what everyone is watching in the media right now. A lot I think 

31 

will hinge on how the people of Tikrit feel liberated, quote/unquote, 

by these popular mobilization forces. There were mixed reports in 

the media about the response by the individual civilians and citizens in Tikrit to the so-called liberators. 

I think the ISF and, of course, the units that we are training 

there have learned about this long-term versus short-term tradeoff 

in terms of you might have a short term free of ISIS, but there 

could be long-term human rights abuses and other grievances that 

accrue when you are ruled by groups like the popular mobilization 

units. 

Dr. POLLACK. Senator, if I could add to this. First of all, I think 

this is a critical issue. I think that what we are seeing now is very 

dangerous. I will just simply add to Dr. Rand’s point by noting that 

even if we see short-term success—and the Iranians are smart 

about this and the Iraqi allies are smart about this—they are trying hard to win hearts and minds. But if there is not beyond that 

a process of reconciliation between Iraqi Sunni and Shia, over the 

long term this is going to break down and lead to renewed violence. 

In addition, I think the last part of your question gets at a very 

important issue, which is that while Iran’s influence in Iraq is now 

deep and wide—in fact, I would say that it is greater in Iraq than 

at any time since the rise of the Ottoman Empire. I do not think 

that that is an exaggeration—it is not permanent necessarily. And 

there are Iraqi allies that we might help to push back on them. 

And the best we have is Haider Abadi. From my conversation with 

him and from other Iraqis, I am convinced that Prime Minister 

Abadi does not like the Iranian presence, would like to see it limited, would like to push back on it, but he needs our help. He will 

be coming to the United States in the middle of next month, and 

this provides a terrific, a critical opportunity for the U.S. Government to enable him and empower him to be able to push back on 

the Iranians. But he needs resources. He needs the support of the 

United States. He is going to need additional American military 

and civilian assistance, not necessarily because he has a specific 

need for anything, but because he needs to demonstrate to his own 

people and to his rival political leaders that he has the full support 

of the United States, that the United States is providing resources 

just as Iran does, and to give him the ability to push back on what 

the Iranians are doing and demonstrate that there is a way to 

work with the United States and people do not need to simply work 

with the Iranians. 

You are absolutely right, Senator. Going around Baghdad with 

signs, as Derek Harvey was pointing out, all proclaim Iraq’s thanks 

to Iran for saving them from the ISIS threat. And when you speak 

to Iraqi leaders, across the board they all believe that it was Iran 

who saved them in the summer of 2014, not the United States. We 

have got to reverse that narrative. 

Dr. TAKEYH. I agree with Ken in suggesting that the Iranian influence may be substantial but not enduring. The Iranian model of 

operation in Iraq is, to some extent, drawn from their experiences 

in Lebanon in the 1980’s where they sort of amalgamated the Shia 

political community into a single political party and developed a lethal Hezbollah proxy force. That is sort of their model in Iraq. Although I think the Shia community in Iraq differs from that of LebVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:53 Sep 08, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21401.TXT WILDA
32 

anon. It has its own sources of emulation. It has its own religious 

authority. It has its own religious hierarchy, and I think it will be 

prone to resist the surge of the Iranian influence in that country 

for all the reasons that Ken suggested and particularly during the 

time of Maliki, 2007–2009, where there was Iraqi leadership that 

put Iraqi nationalism above sectarian identities. 

What I fear is as Iranians are training these Shia militias, they 

are training them today for domestic contests in Iraq. Are they 

going to try to use them as they use Hezbollah for transnational 

purposes, try to deploy them in other places? At this point, I do not 

think they can because there is so much work to be done in Iraq, 

but as the ISIS threat diminishes, I think you may see them having plans for those particular militias to operate in Syria and operate beyond the boundaries of Iraq. And that is something that we 

should be quite concerned about because it is the birth of multiple 

Hezbollahs. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I thank the witnesses. 

Senator REED. Dr. Takeyh, you made an allusion in your discussion to our ops negotiations during the Cold War with the Soviets, 

and you suggested that there were some collateral benefits too. But 

my sense—and I will ask you—is that those negotiations were most 

specifically focused at reducing nuclear threats. In the context of 

Iran, regardless of whether there are any collateral benefits, do you 

believe it would be useful to reach an agreement with the Iranians 

that can be verifiable that would at least check their present nuclear ambitions? 

Dr. TAKEYH. I think, as was suggested I think by Dr. Rand, the 

most viable solution to an Iranian nuclear challenge is a negotiated 

one. But it has to be an agreement that has the right technological 

attributes, not just limited to verification procedures. 

The dirty little secret about arms control, Senator Reed, is that 

infractions of arms control agreements are difficult to prosecute. So 

you can have a verification regime, but it is very difficult to prosecute infractions from the first arms control negotiated, the Test 

Ban Treaty by Kennedy, through all the SALT and START agreements to all the framework agreements. So we have to be concerned about the components of this particular agreement. And I 

would say there are some indications that this is technologically 

permissive. It excludes some key issues from being considered, and 

therefore, not any deal is superior to no deal. 

Senator REED. No. I think that is a concept that we all embrace. 

We have to look very carefully at the agreement. But the issue is 

if we can get an agreement, which is verifiable, which has all the 

technological issues, that is important in and of itself even if it 

does not immediately reflect a new Iran with new openings to the 

West and less enthusiasm about their expansive hegemonic—I am 

mispronouncing it, but you get it—is that fair? 

Dr. TAKEYH. I think historically we have looked at arms control 

agreement as precursors to better relationships. That is the Americans. Our adversaries have not. The Soviets saw no particular contradiction about signing SALT II and invading Afghanistan. 

Senator REED. But nevertheless, we entered these agreements. 

And I think looking back, it materially increased our security. 

33 

Dr. TAKEYH. I think a good agreement can enhance our security. 

A deficient agreement can substantially detract from it. 

Senator REED. I understand. 

Any other comments on this, Dr. Pollack? 

Dr. POLLACK. Absolutely, Senator. I think the point that you are 

making is a very important one because as we assess whatever 

agreement we may get with the Iranians—and I also have my concerns about some of the rumors swirling around about specifics of 

it. But nevertheless, we have to assess it based on the real alternatives. If we do not get an agreement with the Iranians, is it likely that we will be able to force them back to the table and get a 

better one at some later point? I remain very skeptical of that. And 

I think under those circumstances, the most likely alternatives will 

either be military action against Iran, which I am on record and 

I will say again I think would be a mistake, a mistake by us and 

a mistake by the Israelis. I do not think it will solve the problem. 

I think it will greatly exacerbate the problem. 

The alternative is that the Iranian nuclear program is unconstrained, and under those circumstances, I suspect that at some 

point the Iranians will acquire a nuclear weapon. And if that is the 

case, I think that we will look back and say the opportunity that 

we missed was one that we should not have missed. 

Senator REED. Quickly, any other comments, because I do have 

one other line—— 

Mr. HARVEY. I think that they are headed to a nuclear weapon 

with the deal or without the deal. That is just my judgment from 

everything I have been looking at with this regime unless there is 

fundamental change in the regime. I am concerned about their 

long-range missile program, their long-range cruise missiles of 

about 3,000 miles, and their continued efforts to weaponize warheads. There is only one purpose for these types of long-range 

weapons and that is to marry them with a nuclear warhead. 

Senator REED. Dr. Rand, any comments? 

Dr. RAND. I already said on the record that I believe negotiations 

are the best alternative here. 

I would just add that resuming multilateral sanctions is going to 

be very, very difficult in the future, and evidence of the previous 

sanctions regime has shown the importance of multilateral sanctions with bilateral U.S. sanctions to really maximize the coercion. 

Senator REED. Let me just turn quickly because all of you, both 

in the comments about Syria and Iraq, have suggested this is really a political problem. The kinetics, the military operations are 

critically important to buy time, but we have to have—and again, 

this seems deja vu, deja vu. We have to resolve internal conflicts 

in Iraq between Sunni, Shia, and Kurds. We have to resolve the 

issue in Syria in terms of a minority Alawite government and a 

huge majority Sunni population. 

And it begs the question. You know, let us assume that we are 

able to dispose of Assad, get him out, we are able to defeat the ISIS 

threat. The costs, the investment that we are going to have to 

make in both those countries I would assume would be staggering. 

So the good news, if we win—and I think this is a question we did 

not pursue vigorously enough before we went into Iraq—is what 

will be the costs in terms of not just resources but commitment of 

34 

personnel on the ground, capacity building of governments. I mean, 

I was, like Colonel Harvey, recently in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 

capacity of ministries to operate is very limited. 

So just quickly, we are talking about if we are pursuing this sort 

of strategy—it is not the quick win, take out these militaries, stick 

somebody in the government. We are talking about a multi-trillion 

dollar enterprise over many years. Is that fair? 

Dr. TAKEYH. I think, as again Ken suggested, it will take a long 

time to reconstitute these nation states. I think Iraq, as bad as it 

is, is easier than Syria. And I think success of Iraq will contribute 

to success in Syria. Iraq does have ingredients of being able to reconstitute itself as a unitary state in command of its territory. I 

think Syria, for all practical purposes, will be very difficult to reconstitute Syria as a nation state with the sort of a central authority that has all the attributes of a national authority that we can 

think of, protecting its borders, ensuring law and order, commerce, 

and all that. So Syria is a much substantial challenge than Iraq 

is. But I think Iraq can contribute to success in Syria. 

Senator REED. And just before the others comment, let me inject 

something else. This would not be a one-dimensional approach by 

the Department of Defense in terms of—this is State Department, 

AID, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Justice 

building judicial systems so that if sequestration went into effect, 

our ability financially to carry out this grand strategy would be basically mooted. 

Dr. TAKEYH. Substantial costs, yes. 

Senator REED. Dr. Pollack? 

Dr. POLLACK. Senator, I want to be careful here. As you will remember, I famously went on record saying that I could not imagine 

that the invasion of Iraq in 2003 would wind up costing us trillions 

of dollars. That is because I also could not imagine that the Bush 

administration was going to make the parade of mistakes that they 

made in Iraq, which wound up costing us trillions of dollars. 

That said, I am very skeptical of the idea that Iraq and Syria 

will again cost us trillions of dollars. On this, I do disagree with 

you. It is because I think the experience of Iraq has illustrated that 

a great deal of what we did in Iraq was probably unnecessary. 

First, again, so much of what was about combat operations that 

were largely about cleaning up the mess that we made starting in 

2003. If you think about how things might have gone differently if 

we had done the right thing—that is, what we did in 2007. If we 

had done it in 2003, those costs would have been dramatically reduced. 

In addition, a lot of what we did on the civilian side was not 

quite germane to the ultimate solution of the problem. I want to 

be careful there. It did buy us Iraq’s goodwill after having made 

so many mistakes, but at the end of the day, fixing sanitation in 

Ramadi was not critical to stabilizing the country. What was critical to stabilizing the country—and incidentally, the historical 

record of other civil wars makes this clear—was, again, securing 

the population, forging a new power sharing arrangement among 

the warring factions and ensuring that there was some entity that 

can create trust over the long term. That is what we need to be 

going for in Syria. That is what we need to be going for in Iraq. 

35 

As Dr. Takeyh has pointed out, as I have said as well, Iraq is going 

to be somewhat easier than Syria because we have got some basis 

to do that in Iraq. But nevertheless, this is mostly about the difficulty of creating those processes, none of which ought to be that 

expensive. The big expensive piece for us will be the military piece, 

which is absolutely necessary in both Iraq and Syria, and some degree of civilian assistance again, as I said, mostly to empower the 

kinds of actors that we want to help. But the lesson we should 

learn from Iraq is that a lot of the money that we wound up spending on Iraqi civilian programs really was not a key contributor to 

what actually created stability there in 2007 to 2009. 

Mr. HARVEY. Sir, I think I would like to point out one thing, and 

that is in the Gulf, in Jordan and Morocco where we did not see 

the Arab Spring, we have fairly authoritarian monarchial governments that are perceived for the most part to be legitimate by their 

populations. I would be very careful about what we are seeking in 

Syria as far as interim steps towards some sort of political solution 

there. 

What we need is capable, possibly authoritarian transitional, 

technical approaches there, bottom-up approaches to build the community of interests at the provincial level. Top down is a problem, 

and we have to make sure that we align it to the political-cultural 

dynamic of Syria, and that is going to take some hard looking at 

the demographics and what makes sense politically, tribally, et 

cetera because there are a lot of bridges that we could take advantage of once we got to the point where we are actually talking 

about what would it look like. 

I think we can diffuse costs regionally and internationally because there is interest. Iraq is very much a different story because 

they have got tremendous wealth. Syria does not have that kind of 

wealth. 

And I am doubtful when you look at intervention—and I teach 

a class on intervention—I think we do have to be humble about 

what it is that we can do. Our leadership is absolutely critical in 

shaping it, but at the end of the day, our ability to bring the interagency together in a whole-of-government approach, to have everything prioritized and to have the executive committing political 

capital to achieve something and explain it to the American public, 

I have doubts about our ability to do those things in order to 

achieve something on the ground there. 

Senator REED. Dr. Rand, quickly please. 

Dr. RAND. I would just add one quick additional point, which is 

the role of allies in the reconstruction or the future of Syria and 

Iraq. As I mentioned, this coalition has preliminarily had some success in moving these countries to work in sync. And as we know, 

before this coalition, for many years in the Syrian conflict, a lot of 

the Gulf countries were funding opposition forces out of their own 

bank accounts. So it is far better to have a unified, coherent strategy in Syria, and there are resources but they just have to be 

moved through a coalition and through leadership. And I believe 

the United States can leverage its leadership role to gain allied 

support for both countries. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

36 

Dr. Takeyh and Dr. Pollack, you heard in Senator McCain’s 

opening statement the quote by David Petraeus. Do you generally 

agree with General Petraeus in that statement? 

Dr. TAKEYH. Yes. 

Dr. POLLACK. Yes. 

Mr. HARVEY. Yes, Senator. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you generally agree, Dr. Rand? 

Dr. RAND. As I said, I think there are different sources of the 

threats. 

Senator INHOFE. Not much has been said about the negotiations 

that are taking place right now, and I will get back to that in a 

minute after asking this initial question. But when we had what 

I thought was really a great speech that Netanyahu made when he 

was over here and was talking about the negotiations, what are 

your feelings about his—how close to target was he on the negotiations specifically when he had made the joint speech to our House 

and the Senate? 

Dr. TAKEYH. I think actually if you look at the content of the 

speech, the prime minister moved from his previous positions of 

total dismantlement of the Iranian nuclear program in a pragmatic 

way. He is often accused of being a maximalist and so on. He actually adjusted his own previous prohibitions in order to come closer 

to what the 5 Plus 1 are negotiating. And he established some 

benchmarks, namely the scope of the Iranian nuclear program 

should be conditioned on its behavior in the region, terrorism, and 

so on. I do not think that is what is happening in the negotiations. 

They are maintaining them pretty much on the nuclear issue. So 

in that sense, his attempt to link Iran’s nuclear ambitions to its regional ambitions is not something that is being upheld by the 5 

Plus 1 in their negotiations. It may be sensible, but it is not happening. 

Senator INHOFE. Dr. Pollack, I am just talking about his statement to the joint session, not since the election and some of the 

things that are perhaps a little bit different. What do you think 

about his analysis at that time? 

Dr. POLLACK. I think the prime minister exaggerated a number 

of different points, and while again I think there is truth in logic 

in them, we also need to be asking the question what is practical. 

As Dr. Takeyh just pointed out, I think that the idea of linking the 

nuclear deal to Iranian behavior elsewhere is problematic. And 

here I would suggest that I think that both critics on the left and 

right are making too much of the deal. 

I actually would suggest that we need to think about the deal exactly the way the Iranians are. The Iranians are portraying this 

deal as a simple transaction, limits on their nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. And I think they have made it very 

clear they are not interested in anything beyond that. Certainly the 

Supreme Leader is not. I am sure that Foreign Minister Zarif 

would love a rapprochement, but I do not think that that is in the 

offing because of the remarks of the Supreme Leader. 

I think that we need to do the same. I think that we need to recognize that there is utility, exactly as Senator Reed’s questions 

raised, in having a deal that will provide some degree of limits on 

Iran’s nuclear ambitions. I will not disagree with Colonel Harvey 

37 

that I think the Iranians would like at some point to have a nuclear weapon, but I think that they have made the decision that 

they do not need an actual weapon at this point in time. And what 

I am looking for is a deal that reinforces that inhibition for as long 

as possible. If that is the case, I think that that does remove a very 

important element of the problems in the Middle East including 

those faced by Israel. But we should not assume that our problems 

with Iran go away once the nuclear deal is signed, and I think it 

a mistake for us to be calibrating our responses elsewhere in the 

region under the assumption that we are going to have a kinder, 

gentler Iran after a nuclear deal. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. Before this hearing, I mentioned to you I 

was going to ask the question about the prediction that was made 

back in 2007 that by 2015 that Iran would have a weapon and a 

delivery system. Here it is 2015. And now you are saying you are 

not convinced that they ultimately want the weapon. Is this what 

you are saying? 

Dr. POLLACK. No. What I am saying is I think they do ultimately 

want the weapon. I think that they have decided in the short-term 

not to get it immediately because we have created very important 

disincentives for them to do so. 

Senator INHOFE. Do you think our intelligence back in 2007 was 

accurate? 

Dr. POLLACK. I do not think that it was wrong. As an old intel 

analyst, I have seen this movie any number of times, Senator. I can 

remember predictions about when Iraq would get a nuclear weapon, and they keep moving and they keep moving. And we need to 

assume that the Iranians have some kind of a program behind the 

scenes that has probably been making progress. 

Senator INHOFE. Well, the same with North Korea and others. 

We are always making these predictions. 

Dr. Takeyh, what do you think about what they said back in 

2007 and their intentions, and how close are they today? 

Dr. TAKEYH. The intentions of the Iranians to have— 

Senator INHOFE. By 2015, they would have a weapon and a delivery system. 

Dr. TAKEYH. I think to some extent, the fact that that objective 

was not that—the timeline was not met is a testimony to success 

of export control, sabotage, and sanctions, and what the international community has managed to do in terms of imposing costs 

on the Iranian calculation. 

The Islamic Republic deals more in nuclear weapons. To 2 weeks 

ago, their former negotiator, who is the current representative of 

the Supreme Leader to the Supreme National Security Council, 

Saeed Habibi, said in an interview in a talk at the university that 

Americans have all these weapons and they are objecting to the 

fact that we want to get enough material for one bomb. That was 

2 weeks ago. He is not a former official. He is the current representative of the Supreme Leader to the Supreme National Security Council that makes all the decisions regarding nuclear strategy, as well as domestic issues. 

No, the question is not intentions. The question is can the international community provide obstacles to their intentions. And a 

deal can impose restraints, but it can also serve as a pathway. 

38 

There are problems in terms of a sunset clause, upon expiration of 

which Iran can have an industrial-sized nuclear program, similar 

to Japan and the Netherlands. That is a dash to a bomb. There is 

a problem about the kind of technologies that they will have as a 

residual program. There are problems in terms of other aspects of 

this deal. So a deal can be both a restraint that delays the program, but also a pathway that makes the march toward that weapon more legal, legitimate, and therefore effective. So it is illegal 

and dangerous, legal and longer. 

Senator INHOFE. Well, I am running out of time here, and I 

wanted to get to what is happening right now in Yemen because 

it has been a strategy that the President has talked about for a 

long time. We do airpower. Then we let the other guys get on the 

ground. In fact, this is a direct quote. He said, this strategy of taking out terrorists who threaten us, while supporting partners on 

the front lines, is one that we have successfully pursued in Yemen. 

Any comments on Yemen? 

Mr. HARVEY. Sir, I think one of the issues we have had is focusing almost exclusively on a counterterrorism approach in, say, the 

horn of Africa and in Yemen and not looking at some of the wider 

opportunities, more opportunities we have to engage and build up 

security forces and partnerships in a way to solidify governments 

and address some of the other issues that we could have earlier. 

I think right now the problem in Yemen for us is where are they 

headed. It is a large population, about 30 million. It is radicalized. 

You have got the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, Houthis backed by Shia 

there. It is not really a strategic threat to us from the Bab-elMandeb straits, but from a Saudi perspective in the Gulf, it is very, 

very concerning because of the radicalization and the terrorism 

that can emanate from there. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. Mr. Chairman, I am going to get some 

questions for the record, so I assume you are going to leave that 

open because I think it is significant. We have all this talent here. 

We need to extract as much as we can. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I would like to ask Dr. Rand if she has additional response to Senator Inhofe’s question. 

Dr. RAND. I think it is an excellent question and it is alarming 

what has happened in the past 2 months. The long-term solution 

or the short-term solution really is a combination of counterterrorism and political strategy that involves governance and negotiations. And the National dialogue was occurring between 2012 and 

2014 in Yemen and had international buy-in and had neighbor buyin. The challenge for the U.S. is really the risk assessment of placing diplomats and other civilians on the ground to work this process. The same reason why the U.S. security asking for the embassy 

to withdraw—other Western embassies have withdrawn because of 

security conditions. So it is a dilemma. The solution is a political, 

civilian assistance mission, but the tactics to get there requires a 

risk and that is the calculation the U.S. Government has to make. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Dr. Pollack? 

Dr. POLLACK. I just wanted to add. Thank you, Senator. 

First, Senator, when I heard the President make that statement, 

I absolutely cringed. It is the worst way that we can handle these 

situations. And as I said, to think that you can simply fight terVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:53 Sep 08, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21401.TXT WILDA
39 

rorism by killing terrorists is an absolute mistake, and I would 

hope that we would have learned that after 14 or 40 years of trying 

exactly that approach and failing so miserably. 

In the case of Yemen, I think that there were other alternatives 

available in the past, but now we need to accept the fact Yemen 

is in civil war. It is not slipping into civil war. It is not on the brink 

of civil war. This is civil war. This what it looks like. 

And to go back to my conversation with Senator Reed just a 

minute ago, solving civil wars is not impossible, but it is not easy. 

It is not simple. It is not fast, and it can be very expensive. And 

while I think that the American interests in Iraq and by extension 

Syria are significant enough to merit that kind of an effort there, 

as President Obama has signed us up for, I think rightly so, I am 

hard-pressed to imagine that we are going to make a similar effort 

in Yemen, which does not engage our interests the way that Iraq 

and Syria do, especially when we are making exactly that kind of 

an effort in Iraq and Syria. 

So I think we are going to have to rethink Yemen entirely, and 

to simply say that we need to come up with better governance or 

we need to provide for negotiations, this is not going to work. The 

history of civil wars makes it very clear it is not going to work. 

And I will simply say two things about Yemen. One, we are going 

to have to contain the Yemeni civil war as best we can, despite the 

fact that the historical evidence demonstrates that it is exceptionally difficult to contain the spillover of civil wars. And second, one 

of the most important things that I would argue we need to do is 

to keep our allies, the Saudis, out. The Saudis have an obsession 

with Yemen and with the notion that Yemeni internal instability 

will affect their own. It has not despite the fact that Yemen has 

been unstable for 50 years. But the Saudis cannot help themselves, 

and I think one of the greatest dangers is a Saudi Arabia that is 

itself facing a number of internal challenges will overstretch its resources by getting deeply involved in a Yemeni quagmire. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Donnelly, the Saudis look at the 

map and look at where Yemen is situated. I share their concerns. 

Senator Donnelly? 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In regards to Iraq, we are trying to push ISIS back and trying 

to enlist the help of the Sunni moderates. How do the Sunni moderates help when it is primarily Iranian Shiite militias? And so you 

are asking them to fight other Sunnis and stand with Shiite militias that have attacked their own families over the years. 

Dr. POLLACK. If I can begin, Senator, I think this is the critical 

question facing Iraq and our efforts there. It is why we need to recognize that the key obstacle to be overcome is forging a new power 

sharing arrangement between Sunni and Shia. And unfortunately, 

what I consistently hear from senior U.S. Government officials is 

the sense that this is somehow an academic exercise that can follow the successful conclusion of the fighting. It cannot. It is a necessary precondition. 

If Sunnis do not know what a future Iraq is going to look like, 

if they do not know what the Iraq they are fighting for is going to— 

how it is going to treat them, if they do not know what role they 

are going to play, what guarantees, what rights they are going to 

40 

have in it, they are not going to be willing to fight for that Iraq 

against what they see as a Shia-dominated government that has in 

the past oppressed them. We can make short-term gains. They 

might be able to retake Tikrit. They may even be able to take 

Mosul. The danger is that in doing so without that umbrella power 

sharing arrangement that will make all Sunnis comfortable that 

the future Iraq is one that they want to be part of, they will go 

back to resistance. And at some point, they will probably go back 

to ISIS or al-Qaeda or some other vicious Sunni group which they 

do not particularly like, but they see as a critical ally in a fight 

against a vicious Sunni government. 

That is how ISIS came back in in 2013 because they saw Nouri 

al-Maliki rip up the hard-won power sharing arrangement that we 

forged in 2008–2009. If we do not have that this time around, all 

of the military gains are likely to prove ephemeral, and they are 

likely to feed a worse civil war in Iraq in the future rather than 

ending the current one. 

Mr. HARVEY. Sir, the Sunni leadership is fractured. If you look 

for legitimate leaders, they are at the provincial and sub-provincial 

level. In Baghdad, you have real challenges with Sunni coherence 

and engagement and representation and engagement despite the 

MOD being a Sunni, for example. 

Senator DONNELLY. Well, it seems to me, to put it in more basic 

terms for right here, it is like, okay, these are my really bad cousins, and I do not like them at all. But you are asking for me to 

join the people I really do not like who live in the next town over 

to go and fight my own cousins. My job is to clean up my cousins. 

It is not their job to come in and clean them up. 

So until we figure out the Sunni moderate piece, does it not 

make it extraordinarily difficult to have success? And here we are 

hoping to move out ISIS, and in return, we are looking at 

Soleimani with Shiite militias. And you go, how is that a better 

choice? 

Mr. HARVEY. Senator, for the last year we have known, for the 

most part, who the moderate Sunni Arab provincial and sub-tribal 

leaders are in these provinces. 

Senator DONNELLY. Right. 

Mr. HARVEY. We have not been able to deliver. We do not have 

a presence. There is no honest broker on the ground that can help 

build those bridges in an effective way. There has been empty 

promise after empty promise from the prime minister’s office and 

others from MOD that they are going to provide weapons and arms 

and munitions effectively to the different tribes that have taken up 

the fight against ISIS, and it has not been forthcoming in any significant way. 

Senator DONNELLY. Let me ask you this. Abadi may be trying, 

but is he not still surrounded by so many of Maliki’s people and 

those are the ones who are still pulling the strings on decision after 

decision? 

Dr. POLLACK. I might put it slightly differently, Senator. I do not 

think you are wrong about that, but I just might phrase it differently, which is that he does not have his own people. This is one 

of the biggest problems. When you meet with Prime Minister Abadi 

and the people around him, he has got one or two guys—and I am 

41 

not exaggerating—one or two guys who he relies on for almost everything. And then those people have—— 

Senator DONNELLY. Let me ask you this. What would you recommend we do there at this point? 

Dr. POLLACK. First point. I think that Derek is absolutely right 

about the fragmentation of the Sunni community, but I do not 

think that that is something that either Abadi or the Sunnis can 

overcome themselves. We are going to have to do it. This is actually 

what we did in 2008 where then-Ambassador Crocker became the 

Sunni surrogate in the conversations with the Shia. I think the 

same thing needs to happen this time. 

Second point—— 

Senator DONNELLY. Do you think that the Iranian nuclear discussions are hanging us up in Iraq? 

Dr. POLLACK. I think unfortunately they are, and I do not think 

they should. That was my response—— 

Senator DONNELLY. I am sorry. 

Dr. POLLACK.—to Senator Inhofe’s question before. I think that 

we need to regard this as a transactional thing, and we need to set 

that aside as—— 

Senator DONNELLY. One is here. One is here. You do each 

deal—— 

Dr. POLLACK. Correct, because that is how the Iranians treat it. 

And the Iraqis could not care less about what deal we sign with 

the Iranians. They want to know what the heck we are going to 

do in Iraq and why are we not doing more to help them, to help 

the Iraqis who would like to push Iran back and move in the direction we would like them to. 

Point number two is we need to be in a position to empower people like Prime Minister Abadi, both helping him create the infrastructure to manage the Iraqi Government, but also giving him the 

resources to take action and to demonstrate to other Iraqis, who 

quite frankly are mostly on the fence, that there is a reason for 

coming with him and the American side and not simply— 

Senator DONNELLY. I am out of time. But I just want to ask you 

real quick. How do you empower the Sunni moderates at this point 

and give them the space to do something? 

Mr. HARVEY. I think part of the solution is you have to have 

enough U.S. force presence, credibility, and leadership on the 

ground with a sense that the U.S. will be committed to be there 

over the longer haul. It requires not only a CT presence, but it requires some attack aviation, logistics aviation, force protection so 

that we can actually move around the battle space and do the engagement and help build these political bridges and do the same 

things we did between the Baghdad government and these leaders 

in these provinces in the past. And you have to have a certain 

amount of presence on the ground to do that. We do not have that 

presence. 

We also need to bring in people that have the experience and the 

ongoing relationships with these people. There are many that have 

those relationships, but they need to be identified and selected and 

brought in to help with this effort. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

42 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Sessions? 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Colonel Harvey, I think you just gave the only real answer, solution in Iraq that we have heard. We have got a lot of problems, but 

that is the solution I think. 

Dr. Pollack, you said problems the long in making will be long 

in solving. Just briefly, would you say with the spasm of extremism 

and violence and sectarianism in the Middle East that we have to 

have a long-term policy—I mean 30, 50, 60 years—to try to be a 

positive force in bringing some stability to that region? History tells 

us those spates of violence tend to cool off, but often decades in 

cooling off. 

Dr. POLLACK. Yes. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

You said I believe also that the word is getting out that Iran 

saved Iraq. I have a vivid memory of the ambassador to the United 

States from Iraq being pounded by a juvenile CNN reporter about 

why he was taking assistance from Iran. He said we want assistance from the United States. This is who we have stood with for 

a long time. We want to be with them, but we face an existential 

threat, and we will have to take the assistance wherever we get it. 

And Senator McCain warned in 2011—I do not want to be 

blamed again, but we made a lot of mistakes before 2011. We made 

some after 2011. And I really, really, really believe going to virtually zero presence in Iraq was a colossal disaster. Go back and 

read Senator McCain’s warnings about what would happen if we 

did that, and it has happened exactly like he said to the great tragedy. 

Now, Colonel Harvey, General Stewart, the Defense Intelligence 

officer who was there during the Awakening in Fallujah and that 

area, acknowledged in this committee that if we embedded with the 

Iraqi forces instead of allowing the Iranians to be embedded with 

them, they fight better. They have more confidence, that they feel 

like the operations are better planned, that they have air support 

and smart weaponry that can help them if they get in trouble. Do 

you think even a small number of special forces embedded with the 

Iraqi military forces, if we had done that, as they had to, on Tikrit 

could have made a positive difference? 

Mr. HARVEY. Sir, I do think it could make a substantial difference. One of my concerns right now, though, is that we are 

training a lot of Shia militia that are being integrated into some 

of the training programs separate and apart from the training that 

is going on for Pesh and the Sunnis out in Anbar at Al Asad. And 

I think that is a concern for me. 

The presence of the U.S. at headquarters at the division and 

lower would be much appreciated. I know that there is real frustration by Iraqi commanders that they have Asa?ib Ahl al-Haq or you 

have got Badr Corps or you have got Kata?ib Hezbollah, Shia militia members coordinating their operations in their headquarters. 

And a U.S. counterbalance to that would be very welcomed. It 

would improve their efficiency, their capability, their confidence. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, General Petraeus said I think at the 

same part of the remarks that Senator McCain quoted—said, ‘‘as 

for the United States’ role, could all of this have been averted if 

43 

we had kept 10,000 troops here? I honestly do not know. I certainly 

wish we could have tested the proposition.’’ Do you agree with 

that? 

Mr. HARVEY. I think it would have been very helpful, sir, but it 

requires political engagement and a commitment to achieving the 

objectives that we have laid out—— 

Senator SESSIONS. But, Colonel Harvey—— 

Mr. HARVEY. If you do not know where you are going, any road 

will get you there, and I am afraid that we have not known where 

we are going with Iraq. 

Senator SESSIONS. I would certainly agree with that. But in 2011 

we had somehow with American influence negotiated an understanding with the Shia and the Sunni and the Kurds. The country, 

as the President acknowledged, was on a sound path. When we left, 

it began to fall apart. We can blame Maliki if we want to, which 

is ultimately the problem, but maybe if we had kept our influence 

there and they knew we were going to be there giving them confidence, perhaps they would have stayed the course with the 

progress that had been made by 2011. 

Mr. HARVEY. Sir, I think that it would have made a difference. 

It depends upon how you act on the information. We had significant early and often warning about the Islamic State emerging 

threat going back to late 2012, 2013. Clearly DIA Director General 

Flynn was highlighting that to the different committees. Ambassador Brett McGurk was highlighting the deterioration of the situation. Even though you have warning, though, you have to have 

someone who is going to act on it and not wish that Iraq would be 

in the rear view mirror. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, it is certainly a complicated situation, 

and it will remain that way for 30-plus years. Hopefully not. 

With regard to the—my time is about out, but I will just say, Dr. 

Takeyh, that I do not think any agreement is good in itself, as you 

have indicated. If it leads us to have a misunderstanding about 

what likely is going to occur in the future, that would be bad. If 

Iran continues to maintain its determination to go forward with a 

nuclear weapon, if we reach an agreement, our ability to sanctions 

and other actions could weaken and could also cause us to lose 

credibility in the region. 

Senator McCain had a group of observers of smart people tell us 

that they think Iran has no intention whatsoever of slowing down 

its action and that negotiations are simply a way to get relief from 

the sanctions as they continue their plot to go forward with a nuclear weapon. 

Dr. TAKEYH. Well, I absolutely agree with that, Senator. And I 

think in response to Senator Reed’s question, I suggested a good 

agreement is a nice thing to have, but a deficient agreement that 

has residual enrichment capacity, a limited sunset clause, does not 

include the ballistic missiles, does not discuss previous military dimensions of the program, upon which a viable verification regime 

can only be built on—even a 1-year breakout period I do not believe 

is sufficient. So I think if an agreement does not cover all these 

issues and all these concerns in a real viable way, then I am not 

quite sure if any agreement is suitable. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

44 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator King? 

Senator KING. Mr. Chairman, I first want to thank you particularly for this hearing but the series of hearings that we have had. 

Abraham Lincoln once said if he was given an hour to split a cord 

of wood, he would spend the first 15 minutes sharpening his axe. 

And that is what we are doing here, is trying to think a bit instead 

of just doing. And I commend you for that. In fact, this hearing has 

helped me to think through. 

Dr. Pollack, I do not know if there is a question buried in here. 

I will it to you to find it. [Laughter.] 

Senator KING. But it seems to me that what we are seeing—you 

mentioned the phrase, ‘‘I’ve seen this movie before.’’ And we have 

seen this movie, the whole movie before. It was called Europe from 

1500 to 1950. We have got six historic trends that I can see: tribalism to nationalism; autocracy to some kind of democracy; economic democracy; number four, corrupt, incompetent government 

to reasonably competent, non-corrupt government. And then that is 

European history. And then we have got Sunni and Shia divisions 

that go back 1,200 years. We have got a new division in there. We 

have got radical Shia. We have really got three strains now that 

are contending. And then on top of everything else, we have got 

Persian-Arab, which goes back to Darius the Great. So we are dealing with an unbelievably complex series of historic trends that 

have, in fact, played out with catastrophic wars, civil wars. And on 

top of all that, we are watching this play out in a very brief period 

of time with 21st century weapons. 

Am I accurately reflecting all these trends that are occurring all 

at once? 

Dr. POLLACK. Senator, I find myself in complete agreement with 

you, and it goes back to my answer to— 

Senator KING. That is why I addressed my question——[Laughter.] 

Dr. POLLACK. And I think you have also got a very good model 

there because we do need to remember. We sometimes forget this. 

We look at Europe now. It is wonderful. We all like to go on vacation—— 

Senator KING. We had a world war 60 years ago. 

Dr. POLLACK. Exactly. And as you point out, for 500 years Europe was the worst continent on the planet by far. Every horrific 

thing that mankind has ever experienced, it experienced in Europe 

and to the worst extent possible. 

Senator KING. And we had a little matter of a civil war here. 

Dr. POLLACK. A little matter of that. 

But inherent in that comment, it also gets to the importance of 

a solution and thinking long-term about it because when we finally 

did in 1945 decide, you know, what, we cannot allow Europe to continue to create these problems for the world and for us and we actually got serious about it and moved Europe toward a process of 

reform, securing the area, and pushing the governments toward democratization, it took 40 years but it succeeded. 

We did the same thing in East Asia. We started to do the same 

thing beginning in the 1980’s in Latin America. And East Asia and 

Latin America are both moving very smartly. And you and I can 

both remember times when we had horrible, vicious wars, ethnic 

45 

cleansing, et cetera in both East Asia and in Latin America. Again, 

it took the United States saying we are going to get serious. We 

are going to make a long-term investment. We are going to move 

these countries toward reform. 

That is what is lacking in the Middle East. We have never been 

willing to do so. We keep just trying to slap a band-aid on the problem and hope it goes away. It does not. It gets worse and worse. 

Senator KING. And military is part of it, but the underlying dynamic is better lives for people. 

Dr. POLLACK. Exactly. It is political. It is economic. It is social. 

Senator KING. A question that sort of comes out of this—Mr. 

Harvey, you have had a lot of experience in Iraq. Can Iraq be one 

country? The term ‘‘inclusiveness’’ comes trippingly to the tongue. 

But are you ever going to have Sunnis and Shias, given the historic 

division, able to live in the same country without the kind of 

slights, oppression, discrimination that keep raising their head 

and, in fact, are raising their head right now in the attempt to retake Tikrit? 

Mr. HARVEY. Sir, it is very difficult when you have the extremes 

dominating the debate and shaping the security environment the 

way they are. But at its core, I think there are a lot of reasons to 

be optimistic about the continued possibility of a unified Iraq. 

There are very good reasons for the Kurdish regional government 

to stay aligned with Baghdad. First and foremost is they are significantly better off on a per capita basis getting part of that Iraqi 

oil wealth. And what they would have on their own is dwarfed by 

what they could get on a per capita basis out of Baghdad. 

Similarly with the Sunni Arabs who do not have that type of 

wealth—a potential in Anbar, but it is still a problem for them. But 

at a human level, there has always been a great deal of interconnectedness. Shia and Sunni tribes? intermarriage and those 

types of things. It has been the breakdown of civil order, the fracturing of the normalcy there, and the economic dislocation, and the 

fear that penetrates every part of that society about what their future looks like, which causes people to align on a sectarian basis 

right now. 

First and foremost, security. Give them hope with political agreements. It takes leadership. I do not think they can get there on 

their own. It takes U.S. engagement, in partnership with others in 

the region, but that is easier said than done. 

Senator KING. Abadi is the key right now. Abadi is the key. 

Mr. HARVEY. I think he is essentially a good man but, as I said 

in my opening comment, fairly isolated and weak at this point in 

time. 

Dr. TAKEYH. Can I just say one thing? Every time Iraq goes 

through one of its tribulations, there are arguments made on this 

partition. A partition of Iraq in three states does not enhance the 

stability of the Middle East. It does not enhance the stability of 

that subregion of the Middle East because it makes all—— 

Senator KING. I was not making a—— 

Dr. TAKEYH. No, no, no. I understand that. 

Senator KING. I was just trying to make a pragmatic—— 

Dr. TAKEYH. There is a resilience to the Iraqi national identity 

that has survived all these sectarian conflicts. I think for a lot of 

46 

reasons the Iraqis would want to maintain in a unitary state that 

has some degree of autonomy for the promises and the regional 

parliaments and so forth. But I do think that there is a history of 

Iraq as a unitary state with—— 

Senator KING. Only since 1918 or 1921 or 1922. 

Dr. TAKEYH. But there is an Iraqi national identity. And as Ken 

suggested, it did emerge in 2007–2009 to supersede some of the 

sectarian concerns. 

Senator KING. A quick question, Dr. Takeyh, a follow-up on Iran. 

You recently had a very interesting article with Michael Hayden 

about the technology of a violation and this idea of a 1-year breakout. Once you got to all the steps of reporting and verifying and 

everything else, it comes down to a couple of months. Could you articulate that? I think that is a very important point. 

Dr. TAKEYH. I want to, first of all, suggest that any arms control 

agreement—and the history of arms control agreements suggest 

it—is difficult to redress violations of that agreement. Now, that 

was true about SALT II. That is true about ABM. We were in a 

process of trying to adjudicate—— 

Senator KING. The INF—— 

Dr. TAKEYH. The INF agreement. That is right. 

There have been—the notion of a 1-year breakout time suggests 

that 1 year is a sufficient time for the international community to 

come to terms on coercive measures to compel Iranians to stop is 

a tough case to make because all the agencies of the U.S. Government have to agree. The IAEA has to begin a conversation 

with—— 

Senator KING. The Germans, the Chinese, the Indians. 

Dr. TAKEYH. Well, first is the Americans agreeing among themselves that there is a violation. And there is going to be investment 

in this particular agreement. Then the IAEA will begin a conversation with the Iranians about those infractions, and they may have 

some satisfactory resolution or as Parchin military base has indicated, they may not. 

Then it comes to the Security Council for contemplation of coercive measures to be implemented, and they usually begin with economic sanctions if there is an agreement among the 5+1. And they 

may not be because of the Russians and Chinese, not to mention 

Germany and others. And then you can apply that. 

Now, can an American President avoid all that and use force? 

Technically yes. Has it happened historically? No. And in the aftermath of the Iraq War of 2003, all American intelligence agencies 

are going to be more hesitant about WMD violations. The international community is going to be more skeptical, and any American President is likely to be more cautious. 

Senator KING. So one of the things we should look at in this 

agreement is the bureaucracy of enforcement. 

Dr. TAKEYH. I think inherently it is difficult to enforce violations 

of an agreement particularly if they are incremental. Let me give 

you three examples of violations. 

Senator KING. I am afraid I am out of time. But that does not 

mean you do not try to get an agreement, but maybe this is an aspect of it we should focus upon. 

Dr. TAKEYH. That is right. 

47 

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Graham? 

Senator GRAHAM. Let us make this relevant to the American people. From our own national security interest, a Sunni-Shia conflict 

of great depth and breadth is not good for us. Do we all agree with 

that? 

If you could, Dr. Rand, in 30 seconds, tell me why. 

Dr. RAND. Sure. A great regional divide that is sectarian in nature will play out in the worst possible way. We are seeing it in 

Syria and Iraq. You see it in Lebanon, elsewhere. So it will lead 

to conflict. It will lead to de-democratization. It will lead to weakening of states and leadership and the inability of central states to 

address the economic and political demands of their people. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, it lead to higher gas prices? 

Dr. RAND. Potentially. It depends which way the conflicts go. 

Senator GRAHAM. Will it make it harder to do business throughout the world? 

Dr. RAND. Potentially. 

Senator GRAHAM. When it comes to Syria, do any of you believe 

we have a plan in place that will destroy ISIL in Syria in the next 

3 years? 

Mr. HARVEY. There is no plan in place that would achieve that 

in the next 3 years, sir, in my view. 

Senator GRAHAM. Does everyone agree with that? 

Dr. POLLACK. I might take slight exception. I think that the plan 

laid out by Chairman Dempsey before this committee theoretically 

could do so in about 2 to 5 years. But it has to be properly 

resourced, and it has to be properly implemented. And there I do 

not see— 

Senator GRAHAM. On a scale of 1 to 10, what is the likelihood 

of this plan working in the next 3 years? 

Dr. POLLACK. Again, Senator, that depends on how well the 

United States pursues it. Given what we are doing now, I would 

give it about a 2. 

Senator GRAHAM. All right. What happens the day after? Well, 

do you all agree that no Arab army, if we could ever form one, is 

going to go into Syria and just fight ISIL and leave Assad in 

charge? 

Dr. POLLACK. I would completely with that, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Does everybody agree with that? 

Dr. POLLACK. I think it is a complete mistake to think that we 

can build a Syrian opposition army that will only fight Daesh. They 

will not. 

Senator GRAHAM. Does everybody agree with that? 

Mr. HARVEY. Sir, I also think that we need the Turkish Government on side for that. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right, and they are not going to get involved 

if you leave Assad in power. 

Mr. HARVEY. Absolutely correct. 

Senator GRAHAM. Because you are giving Syria to the Iranians 

if you leave Assad in power. Right? 

Mr. HARVEY. For the long haul, yes, sir. 

48 

Senator GRAHAM. Now, from an American point of view, if Syria 

is not resolved in the next 3 to 5 years, do you worry about our 

allies in Lebanon and Jordan? 

Dr. POLLACK. Yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. Could they be one of the victims of a protracted 

civil war in Syria? 

Dr. POLLACK. Absolutely. They are already suffering from the 

spillover of that civil war. 

Dr. TAKEYH. And I think it leads to radicalization of the Sunni 

community. Syria is a great incubator for radicalizing the Sunni 

community because of the level of slaughter there, which destabilizes all the other places, particularly the neighboring countries. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree that the terrorist organizations 

that are operating in Syria and Iraq, Yemen—if they are not dealt 

with more effectively, we could get hit here at home? The likelihood 

of an attack is going up on the homeland. 

Mr. HARVEY. Sir, I think there intent and there is capability to 

strike not only the Western European targets but U.S. targets in 

the homeland that will increase over time, undoubtedly. 

Senator GRAHAM. So the more foreign fighters that flow into 

Syria and Iraq to help ISIL and other organizations makes it more 

difficult for us to prevent the next attack because some of them 

have passports that could work their way back here. Right? 

Mr. HARVEY. Affirmative. 

Senator GRAHAM. Now, let us talk a little bit about Iran. Without 

a nuclear weapon, do you agree with me that Iran is wreaking 

havoc in the region? 

Mr. HARVEY. Correct. 

Dr. POLLACK. Yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. Everybody agrees with that. 

Dr. POLLACK. I would agree, Senator, but I would also say that 

I think we are allowing them to wreak havoc in the region. 

Senator GRAHAM. I could not agree with you more. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Could I say Dr. Rand may want to— 

Dr. RAND. Yes. I want to try to clarify that. I would not call it 

‘‘wreaking havoc.’’ I would say increasing its interventionism and 

its expansionism. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

Mr. HARVEY. Sir, I think they are creating disorder in order to 

enhance their ability to intervene and offer themselves as a solution. 

Senator GRAHAM. Would you agree with me that if they had 

more money, probably they would not build hospitals and schools 

with it if the current regime had more money? 

Mr. HARVEY. Sir, even under the constrained times they have 

had, they have probably provided over $4 billion to subsidize the 

Syrian Government in the last 18 months. 

Senator GRAHAM. So the idea that if sanctions were lifted and 

you infused their economy with more money, do you agree with me 

it would be more likely than not some of that money, if not most 

of it, would go to destabilizing the region? 

Dr. TAKEYH. I do not know how they apportion their budget, but 

I suspect—— 

49 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, if past behavior is any indication of future action, the answer would be yes. 

Dr. TAKEYH. I agree with that, yes. 

Dr. RAND. I mean, we do not really know because there is a great 

demand by the people of Iran. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, we know what they are doing now. 

Dr. RAND. Right, but the sanctions relief might be funneled to respond to the demands of the people. 

Senator GRAHAM. But I do not know how much influence the Iranian people have over their own budget. 

But here is what I am saying. The likelihood of more money in 

the hands of this regime to me creates more possibility for destabilization unless they change their behavior. 

Finally, is there a moderate hard-line divide in Iran in your view 

that is meaningful? 

Mr. HARVEY. Sir, I said in my opening comments that there really is not a divide that is meaningful to the outcomes that we are 

interested in here today. The hardliners have a lock on the levers 

of power there, Qods Force and the hardliners in the Council of 

Guardians and elsewhere. A moderate voice is, I think, not really 

hopeful of emerging in that country. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you all generally agree with that? 

Dr. POLLACK. I see a wide division of views within Iran. But I 

do agree with Colonel Harvey that at the end of the day, I think 

that the Supreme Leader is the one who calls the shots, and he has 

tended to move Iran in the direction mostly consistent with the 

hard-line viewpoint. 

Dr. TAKEYH. I would just say there is diversity of views, but on 

core security issues, I think there is more consensus than disagreement. 

Dr. RAND. I would just add if you look at the speeches of Rouhani 

and Zarif, you see greater pragmatism than some of their other colleagues in the government. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes. And their speeches and their action in the 

assembly of experts apparently is now in the hand of a pretty 

tough dude. 

Last question. I am over my time. Do you all agree that a bad 

deal with Iran would manifest itself with the Arab breakout in 

terms of their nuclear desires, that the worst possible outcome with 

a deal with the Iranians is to create a nuclear arms race in the 

Mideast where the Arabs felt like they needed to have a nuclear 

weapon of their own? 

Dr. TAKEYH. I think we will see proliferation of nuclear technologies in the region, not necessarily nuclear weapons, but perhaps other countries trying to experiment with an enrichment capacity or plutonium plants. I think we will see some sort of a proliferation of that as Sunni Arabs try to match Iran’s nuclear capabilities. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you very much. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Cotton? 

Senator COTTON. The Middle East is a place of many dangerous 

and complex questions, and the answer in whole or in part to virtually every one of those questions is Iran. 

50 

Why, after all, are we negotiating with the Islamic Revolution 

over their nuclear weapons program, but for the President’s quest 

to harpoon the great white whale of a nuclear agreement with 

Iran? 

Why is Bashar al-Assad still in power years after the President 

said he must go but for any reason because Iran views Syria as a 

legitimate sphere of interest and the President has largely conceded that sphere? 

Why is the Secretary of State wrong-footing himself repeatedly 

on our policy with Syria? Because the President is now effectively 

allowing Assad to stay in power. 

Why are the Qods Force increasingly the dominant force inside 

of Iraq, and why is Qasem Suleimani, the commander of the Qods 

Force, a man with the blood of hundreds of American troops on his 

hand, showing up like a celebrity on Facebook and other social 

media throughout Iraq? Because Iran views Iraq as a sphere of its 

interests and the West appears ready to grant that to Iran. 

Why did Yemen fall to Shiite militants that chant ‘death to 

America’ and ‘death to Israel’ ? Again, because they are aligned 

with Iran. 

Why is our campaign against the Islamic State going so slowly 

and haltingly? Because we are more concerned about upsetting 

Iran’s interest in the region. 

And why is Hezbollah still so strong in Lebanon? Because they 

remain Iran’s terrorist cat’s paw. 

In the face of all these negotiations with Iran and its drive for 

regional hegemony, the President has said repeatedly that he will 

not allow Iran to get a nuclear weapon and threat of force remains 

on the table. However, Dr. Takeyh, you say on page 6 of your testimony, ‘‘Iran today pointedly dismisses the possibility of U.S. military retaliation irrespective of its provocations.’’ Would you care to 

elaborate on that? 

Dr. TAKEYH. I do not believe at this particular point that they 

take the threat of American military retribution seriously. They 

could be miscalculating. I mean, the history of international relations is a history of miscalculations. But I do not believe they see 

themselves as vulnerable to a military strike. And that is often the 

case when you have a diplomatic process. I mean, diplomatic process is something that nobody wants to disrupt by actually undertaking military action against one of the participants. 

Senator COTTON. Do you believe that the President’s refusal to 

enforce his own red line against Bashar al-Assad’s regime in September of 2013 did anything to make Iran believe that he would 

not actually use the threat of force in any credible fashion? 

Dr. TAKEYH. As I think I mentioned in my opening remarks, the 

fact that we erase our red lines as carelessly as we drew them had 

an effect on the credibility of American deterrence. 

Senator COTTON. Now I would like to draw your attention to 

something you say shortly down the page on page 6. ‘‘While America’s military option has receded in the Iranian imagination, Israel 

still looms large. Fulminations aside, Iranian leaders take Israeli 

threats seriously and are at pains to assert their retaliatory options. It is here that the shape and tone of the U.S.-Israeli alliance 

matters most. Should the clerical regime sense divisions in that alVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:53 Sep 08, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21401.TXT WILDA
51 

liance, they can assure themselves that a beleaguered Israel cannot 

possibly strike Iran while at odds with its superpower patron.’’ Can 

you elaborate further? 

Dr. TAKEYH. Yes. Sure. I think that the divisions and the problems and tensions in U.S.-Israeli relations have not well affected 

Israeli deterrence posture as well because the view is that the two 

powers, Israel and the United States, are in such disagreement. 

Again, that might be a miscalculation. Israeli officials and the 

Israeli Government has in the past used military force at the times 

when the United States did not approve of it. But at this point, I 

think the perception is that Israel is somewhat restrained in terms 

of its military posture because—— 

Senator COTTON. Could that be because anonymous White House 

officials have been quoted in Western media reports saying that 

they have effectively delayed Israel’s opportunity to strike Iran before they get a nuclear weapon? 

Dr. TAKEYH. I think such disclosures are not helpful. But I do 

think that I am not entirely sure that Israel is bent on a military 

action against the Iranian nuclear facilities anyway. So we may be 

restraining a power that wants to be self-restrained. 

Senator COTTON. Diplomacy is always more effective when 

backed by the credible threat of force, though. Correct? 

Dr. TAKEYH. That is right, yes. 

Senator COTTON. Even if perhaps not the American credible 

threat of force. 

Dr. TAKEYH. Sure. 

Senator COTTON. So as you say, divisions in that alliance could 

undermine even that threat in the perception of Iran’s leaders. And 

last week in the aftermath of Benjamin Netanyahu’s decisive victory in Iran, the President and many of his senior advisors made 

several statements that they would have to reconsider our relationship with Israel, that they might allow the United Nations or other 

international institutions to take adverse action against Israel in 

an unfair and discriminatory pattern as is their history. 

As you may also be aware, Ayatollah Khamenei gave his annual 

Nowruz message on Saturday, just 3 days ago, in which he 

whipped the crowd into frenzied chants of ‘‘death to America.’’ And 

his response was, ‘‘yes, certainly, death to America.’’ And yesterday, the President’s spokesman said that it just for domestic political consumption. 

Do you believe the reaction to Benjamin Netanyahu’s statements 

in a democratic election versus the reaction to Ayatollah 

Khamenei’s statement discredits Benjamin Netanyahu as a critic of 

the President’s negotiations, undermines our relationship with 

Israel, and helps change our relationship with Iran? 

Dr. TAKEYH. Well, to separate the two issues, I do think that it 

is in the interest of both the United States and Israel to get beyond 

the point of disagreements that they have and try to rehabilitate 

the alliance. That is good for Israel. That is good for the United 

States. That is good for diplomacy toward Iran. 

As far as Ali Khamenei trying to satiate a domestic audience by 

chanting ‘‘death to America,’’ I do not know who that is. Most of 

the Iranians do not share his animosity toward America. So when 

he says those things, he actually is expressing his own opinion, an 

52 

opinion of many hard-line groups that share his proscriptive ideology. 

Senator COTTON. I suggest that when people chant ‘‘death to 

America,’’ we should take them seriously and reconsider whether 

we want to make nuclear concessions to such people and their regime. 

My time has expired. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Kaine? 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the witnesses. A number of topics. 

First, on the Foreign Relations Committee, now we are engaged 

in a discussion about finally authorizing the current war against 

ISIL. And I believe strongly Congress does need to do this. There 

are couple of sort of disputed points that we are kind of working 

through, and that is the wisdom of U.S. ground troops in such an 

engagement, what our posture should be in a war against ISIL visa-vis the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria. Those are two fairly 

critical areas where even in a body that overwhelmingly supports 

military action against ISIL, both the House and Senate—both parties do—there are some details that are important. I think we can 

get to a compromise, but there are details that are important. 

I would love your thoughts sort of on either of those points: you 

know, ground troops and how they should be used and also what 

should sort of the mission definition be in Syria in any authorization that we do. 

Dr. POLLACK. I am glad to start, Senator, and I will start by saying that I think that an AUMF is very important. I have always 

believed that having congressional support for major American foreign policy endeavors is absolutely critical in sustaining support 

over the long term. 

Second point. I think that initial ground troops will be necessary 

in Iraq, and they may prove necessary to some extent in Syria. 

Here I am thinking about the JTAC’s, the air liaison officers. 

But I also go back to a point that Colonel Harvey raised earlier 

on. I think that one of the critical elements missing from the Iraq 

advisory program is the accompany mission. I think that we do 

need American advisors down to brigade and battalion level accompanying Iraqis in the field both for the reason that Colonel Harvey 

mentioned, which is that it makes these forces more efficient, but 

also because it gives us a much greater ability to control the behavior of those forces. I think back, Senators Reed and McCain, to 

2006 when I can remember being in Iraq and having Iraqis say to 

me we get frightened when Iraqi troops come into our village and 

there are no Americans with them because we do not know who 

they are going to kill. If there are Americans with them, they tend 

to behave themselves. And so I think that accompany mission is 

absolutely critical to the political future of Iraq in ensuring that 

these forces do not run amuck as they have in a number of instances. 

And last point. With regard to Bashar al-Assad’s regime, I believe that a solution in Syria is impossible as long as Bashar alAssad remains in charge of the Syrian regime. I think that the 

Alawi community will have to be brought in, will have to be represented in a future power sharing arrangement, but I think that 

53 

Bashar himself and a number of key allies around him must go. 

And as we were talking about earlier, I think that it is foolish to 

believe that we can build a Syrian opposition army solely to prosecute a war against ISIS. It must be used to deal with the Assad 

regime and, in fact, the entire panoply of bad actors in Syria because it has to be about ending the Syrian civil war, not just killing 

ISIS. 

Senator KAINE. Other thoughts? 

Dr. RAND. Sure. I would add that the importance of the AUMF 

is a signaling device in addition to the authorization here. It is 

showing the credibility of what is already going on and what is 

happening and the intent and the support of the American people. 

So I think it is absolutely important to authorize this force. 

On the ground combat operations, there is a sunset clause in the 

draft language, and I think that is a very important part of this 

because part of the strategy against ISIS inherently involves a 

checking in or reporting requirement and seeing how things are 

going. This is a very fluid situation. So I would urge Members of 

Congress to look at reporting requirements and the sunset clause 

as also a way to see how the operation is going and what new types 

of offensive ground combat operations are needed over time. 

And then finally, on Syria, I am not sure if this draft language 

of AUMF is the right place to authorize use of force against Syria. 

But, of course, the debate needs to be, as Dr. Pollack has outlined, 

what is the plan for the reinsertion of these forces. How are they 

going to get in? Where are they going to go in? What are the priority areas? How are they going to work with the changing coalitions of Syrian oppositionists that every week are changing partners? And the other question is, what is the role of the Kurds in 

this part of Syria, particularly in the northeast? 

Senator KAINE. Let me ask a second question. U.S. policy since 

President Truman—and I consider myself a Truman Democrat or 

I would like to be one day thought to be a Truman Democrat. That 

is a high standard to meet. U.S. policy with respect to Israel has 

been to strongly support Israel as our ally, but also to support the 

notion of a Palestinian state. That was the original U.N. mandate 

and it was reaffirmed in the Oslo Accords, and that is official U.S. 

policy. 

I think it is safe to say that at least now sort of the official policy 

of the Israeli Government may be different. Both President Rivlin 

and now Prime Minister Netanyahu have indicated that there will 

not be a second state. I do not really see a one-state solution working, but maybe I have not figured out how it can. 

But given that the stated position of both the prime minister and 

the president of Israel at this point are contrary to what has been 

U.S. policy supporting two states, what, if anything, should the 

United States do now that there is that gulf in policy between our 

two nations? Should the U.S. change our policy, or should we keep 

the policy we have? And what should we do to try to make that 

a reality? 

Mr. HARVEY. Well, sir, I would say that the overall atmospherics 

in the relationship between the United States and Israel has clearly undermined the Israeli confidence about moving forward in a 

number of areas, and this is one that you have highlighted. It is 

54 

hard to make difficult decisions that go at your core political support at home, that go to the real threat to your country. They had 

a 50-day war last year with Gaza, after giving up in agreement 

after agreement after agreement things to the Gazans and Hamas. 

And when they look at the West Bank and you look at the onestate solution, first and foremost, you have to have confidence in 

your long-term security and what those arrangements might be. 

And right now, there is tremendous doubt in Tel Aviv about the 

strength of our relationship and whatever the sidebar decisions 

would be that are going to affect this overall agreement of a twostate solution. So I think, first and foremost, you have to right the 

ship politically, diplomatically between the two countries in order 

to create the environment that you might be able to move forward 

on. 

Senator KAINE. I am just curious. Are you suggesting that the 

disclaiming of the idea of two states is the United States? fault? 

Mr. HARVEY. No. What I am saying is that the impact—if you are 

in Tel Aviv and you are thinking about where you are headed with 

this two-state solution, you cannot discount the friction and the undermining from their view of 

their relationship with Washington, D.C. It has to impact these 

other decisions. 

Senator KAINE. I have no other questions, Mr. Chair. But if any 

other witnesses would care to comment on that—I am over my 

time, but— 

Dr. TAKEYH. I will just briefly say that in the 1990’s there was 

a notion that a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would 

transform the region. I do not believe that is true. But I also think 

the absence of that resolution does contribute to the instability of 

the region. And I think the prime minister’s advocacy on Iran and 

other issues would have much more force and legitimacy if he had 

a more forthcoming approach toward the Palestinian problem. 

Dr. POLLACK. Senator, I will add to that while I would not want 

to characterize Prime Minister Netanyahu’s position, because I do 

not feel like I understand it at the moment, I will simply say that 

I continue to believe that the best policy for the United States is 

to pursue the two-state solution. I believe that that is just. I believe 

it is equitable. As you pointed out, it was the original intent of the 

United Nations, and quite frankly, I do not see—no one has ever 

shown me a workable alternative, a one-state solution, a threestate solution, that both preserves the Jewish character and Israeli 

democracy. And that being the case, I see no reason for the United 

States to deviate from that policy and every reason for the United 

States to continue to advocate it as best we possibly can. 

Senator KAINE. Dr. Rand? 

Dr. RAND. I would just completely agree that the two-state solution has been the policy of the United States for decades and the 

policy of the international community and offers the U.S. and 

Israelis in my opinion the best option for living in peace and stability and security of the State of Israel. 

I would also add that I think it is dangerous to over-dramatize 

the current political tensions between Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and 

Washington in the sense that the broad national security 

apparatuses between the two countries—the relationships are very 

55 

strong and very thick, as this committee knows, in terms of defense 

appropriations having reached last year I think an unprecedented 

$3 billion in FMF, the Iron Dome, other missile defense programs. 

So there is a thickness to the relationship that is actually improving and increasing at the non-political level. And that portends a 

very important trend in U.S.-Israeli relations that supersedes the 

personalities of individual leaders. 

Senator KAINE. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I went over, but I 

appreciate you letting the witnesses take that question. 

Senator REED. Senator McCain has been very gracious to allow 

me to ask questions at the conclusion. Senator Hirono has just arrived, and so I will yield to Senator Hirono. Then when she is finished, I will ask questions. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you very much. 

This is a question for all of the witnesses to respond as you desire, a broader framing. The instability of multiple nations 

throughout the world, particularly in the Middle East and North 

Africa, has become a growing threat to U.S. interests by providing 

ungoverned space for extremism to operate. How do we balance the 

ever-increasing economic gap between developing nations and their 

vulnerability to power vacuums with radical ethnic and/or religious 

philosophies that appeal to rising young adult populations? Does 

anyone care to respond? 

Dr. RAND. Sure. This is an excellent question because this gets 

at the root drivers of some of the trends that we have been discussing that a lot of the U.S. foreign policy responses have to be 

predicated on what is actually going on. 

Here I would just raise two points in response to this question. 

One is that the rise in economic opportunity by some and the rise 

in education in the 1990’s and 2000’s actually created higher expectations among many of the youth in the region. So you had higher 

graduation rates across the Middle East and North Africa, including in many of the countries that saw a revolution in 2011, without 

the commensurate supply of jobs that were at the level for university graduates. And this is a serious problem and endures across 

the region. So there is a job retraining educational element to the 

economic dilemma. 

But the second point is that there are natural resources and economic sources of revenue in many of these states. So the key question is how to reform some of the state economic decision-making 

so that the budgets are growing and so that the state can use its 

resources and use its revenue, whether it is from oil or foreign aid 

or other assistance, to create the kind of market economies that 

will provide jobs and provide opportunity. 

Dr. POLLACK. Senator, if I could just add to Dr. Rand’s very cogent comments. I would like to pull out one of her points which I 

think is absolutely critical, and that is the role of education. And 

I would commend to you, if you have not already seen it, the Arab 

Human Development reports, in particular the volumes issued in 

2002 and 2003. These are landmark reports by Arab scholars and 

Arab experts looking at their own part of the world, commissioned 

by the United Nations. 

And the critical point that they came to was that, as Dr. Rand 

has pointed out, there has been a massive growth in the quantity 

56 

of education provided to Arabs, but no corresponding improvement 

in the quality of the education they receive. They continue to be 

taught by rote memorization with the disparagement of critical 

thinking in ways that do not equip Arabs to become productive 

members of an information economy. And as a result, you have gotten more and more people with high school and college degrees who 

believe that they are entitled to become middle and upper class 

citizens of their communities and of the world, but they simply do 

not have the skills to function as such. This is the most critical gap 

in the Arab world today. And again, it is a problem that is not 

going to be solved in the next 2 years or the next 10 years, but if 

we do want to help the Arab world move out of its current state 

of affairs, it is one that we need to help them address. 

Senator HIRONO. Well, following up then, are we doing something to address these kinds of institutional changes that need to 

occur with regard to the quality of their education? 

Dr. RAND. This is an excellent question, and this is an area 

where the U.S. State Department and United States Agency for 

International Development (USAID) is actively involved and has 

been for decades. Again, the going is tough. 

So in some parts of the region, there are still states functioning 

and there are a lot of reforms going on and the U.S. Government 

is working in places like Morocco and Tunisia. Even in Libya before 

this current round of fighting, there was a new authorization and 

appropriation for telelearning programs, education programs. So 

there is creative work that the U.S. Government is doing to try to 

address these gaps. 

The challenge is that there is an increasing number of states in 

the region where there is great instability and conflict. So we have 

four or five states where there is either failure or a civil conflict 

right now. And those states are providing a real challenge. 

And the other challenge is combating the appeal of foreign fighters and radicalization as part of this because the ISIS recruiters 

can work much faster than the international programs to support 

education and long-term job growth programs. 

Senator HIRONO. Can you point to a nation in the Middle East 

that is a model for the kind of changes that would really address 

the underlying problems or challenges in the Middle East that lead 

to instability? 

Dr. RAND. There is no one model that comes to mind. There are 

isolated programs that either the governments or the international 

community have introduced in Morocco, in Tunisia, in Jordan in 

particular that come to mind as useful. Again, it is very hard to 

measure the effect of an intervention on the outcome because a lot 

of this is a lot of different factors. International assistance can help 

and can work, and the U.S. should continue to do this even though 

it is hard, even though there are obvious demands on the budget. 

Mr. HARVEY. I think when we talk about the region, we have to 

recognize that the problems are different for the Gulf where addressing educational quality is an issue, the critical thinking, but 

it is different in North Africa and different in Syria. If you cannot 

establish security and address the building of the institutional capacity so the state not only controls the means of policing and the 

means of violence in the state but can deliver some services and 

57 

is exactly the go-to place and is relevant to people’s lives, then you 

are going to have some real problems. 

But the international community on a broader scale, whether it 

is USAID or others, large-scale projects tend not to work. A lot of 

the projects we have tend to be well-intentioned but not aligned 

with the social, cultural, business approaches there. We do not 

have good conditions-based metrics or conditions-based programs 

that require some accounting in a way that would be more transparent. And so it enables corruption in ways that become very dysfunctional. 

Or you engage in a place like Afghanistan with significant programs that, in effect, draw the entrepreneurial and the educated 

that are needed for other programs—they draw them to these larger USAID projects in a dysfunctional way. We need to keep the 

nurses and the doctors in the medical field not working in a USAID 

project because they speak English and make more money because 

we brought in a different pay scale that attracts these people. 

There are so many different things that seem to be going wrong 

when we try to do good things. 

Dr. POLLACK. Senator, if I could just quickly. I would actually 

point to Saudi Arabia. 

Senator HIRONO. With the indulgence of the chair. 

Dr. POLLACK. Thank you, Senator. 

I would actually point to Saudi Arabia for three different reasons, and I know it seems ironic because we typically think of 

Saudi Arabia as an utterly repressive, medieval regime. But under 

King Abdullah, there was a very determined effort to try to reform 

the Saudi educational system. King Abdullah tried to press for coeducation. He tried to press for a change in curriculum. He tried 

to press for Western instructors and Western methods of achievement. 

Now, a few things in order. First, it was largely a Saudi-driven 

process. It was the king and his advisors who recognized the importance of the need to do it and that pretty much did it on their own. 

We need to be looking elsewhere in the region for other Arabs who 

are willing to take this on themselves and then ask the question 

of how can we help you, which is about the best that we are going 

to do because they are going to have to drive this train themselves. 

Second, it is worth noting that the king had modest success. He 

did create King Abdullah University of Science and Technology, 

which is kind of, sort of a model for what could happen. And he 

did make some progress toward curriculum reform, co-education, a 

variety of other things. But it only moved so far. And we have to 

recognize that these kinds of big changes are going to move haltingly. 

And the third point to make is the reason that they only went 

so far is because the king was resisted by a whole variety of different factors within his society, the clergy, the bureaucracy, others 

with vested interest in the current society. And again, we need to 

recognize that these were all obstacles that need to be overcome. 

But, again, I think that Saudi Arabia in some ways is a wonderful case study to look at over the last 10 years of how to move 

things forward but also the difficulties in doing so, difficulties that 

58 

we should be thinking creatively of how we might help them overcome. 

Senator HIRONO. Do you think Qatar would also qualify for that 

kind of change? 

Dr. POLLACK. Qatar is difficult for reasons that I think that Colonel Harvey alluded to, which is that Qatar is unlike pretty much 

anything other than conceivably the UAE and Kuwait. It is not a 

great model for the larger states of the region. It is a tiny, little 

population. It is obscenely wealthy. They are able to do things in 

ways that no one else in the region can. And so we can look at 

them and again say, well, maybe there is something here that 

Arabs might look to as something they might some day emulate, 

but I think that the reality is that it is not a close enough approximation of the circumstances of the rest of the region to serve as 

a practical model. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator Hirono. 

And I want to thank the chairman for convening this hearing. It 

is extraordinarily thoughtful, insightful, and timely. And thank you 

all for your testimony. 

Just a couple of questions, and I asked the chairman if I could 

pose these. I was in the chamber and I listened to Prime Minister 

Netanyahu. It was a very eloquent and very powerful discussion. 

But one of the points I seem to recall is he said if we reject this 

agreement, we will get a better agreement. Do you believe that 

would be the case, Dr. Takeyh, that after all this effort and the political capital that all sides have laid down, that we will simply get 

a better agreement? 

Dr. TAKEYH. I think it is an impossible proposition to verify. It 

can only be validated in practice. And the prime minister’s position 

was that if this agreement proves unsatisfactory, you can go back 

and increase the level of pressure on Iran through the international community and so on and possibly come back with a more 

superior agreement. 

There have been times in history of arms control where that has 

taken place where you have gone back and revisited some of the 

issues and so on. The Iranian regime does have vulnerabilities less 

so today than it did in November 2013. I think it is fair to say— 

and I think history will validate this—that we could have gotten 

a better agreement than the joint plan of action in November 2013. 

I think that is largely true. At that time, the country was essentially suffering 7 percent negative economic growth. Today it is 

about 1–2 percent growth. At that time the Rouhani regime needed 

some sort of a validation of his strategy of his electoral claims, and 

at that time, Iran was much more vulnerable. And history has 

shown that Iranian presidents tend to be stronger in the first year 

than every other year. That is not unique to their presidency. You 

see it in other chief executives. 

Today there is more resilience in the system, more economic resilience, a greater degree of consensus, less measure of factionalism. It will be harder to do that today. I do not believe it is 

impossible. We have to consider the fact that these are negotiations 

between the international community and a superpower and a secVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:53 Sep 08, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21401.TXT WILDA
59 

ond-rate power with substantial vulnerability in terms of economic 

deficiencies, in terms of popular dissent, disaffection, and in terms 

of elite fragmentation. I cannot rule it out, but I can tell you it is 

going to be harder. 

Senator REED. Dr. Pollack? 

Dr. POLLACK. Senator, I find myself very much in agreement 

with Dr. Takeyh’s statement, my good friend. My body language 

might be a bit different than his, though. I think that everything 

that he has just said is absolutely accurate. We do not know. We 

will not know until we test the proposition. 

I also agree that we might have done better, and I wish we had 

done some things differently in terms of the tactics of how we got 

here, but given where we are, I think it unlikely that we will get 

a better agreement. And I think that a lot of this has to do with 

how the world now sees these negotiations, and I am quite concerned that if the United States walks away from this current 

agreement, as imperfect as it may be, that the rest of the world 

will blame us for doing so, not the Iranians, and that will make it 

very difficult to get a better deal. 

Dr. TAKEYH. I just want to say one thing very briefly. We do not 

have an agreement at this point. We have a negotiating process. 

Therefore, some of the deficiencies that have been highlighted, duration of sunset clause, absence of PMD—I think Secretary Kerry 

can strengthen his case internationally and here by going back and 

revisiting some of those issues. 

Senator REED. No. I do not think there is a question there. 

But I want Colonel Harvey and dr. Rand to comment also. 

But just, Dr. Pollack, to follow up, your sort of sense is that given 

all the events, we are at a critical moment, and that if there is not 

an agreement, there is a question of will the sanctions regime stay 

in place. Do you think that is likely? 

Dr. POLLACK. I am very concerned that it will begin to erode and 

erode quickly if we do not get an agreement soon. 

Senator REED. Even with the sanctions regime in place and we 

do not have an agreement, do you believe that the Iranians will accelerate their efforts to develop a nuclear device or at least a virtual nuclear device rather than just simply sort of status quo? 

Dr. POLLACK. That is a hard one to answer, Senator, because 

again I think it will be based on their calculation of how much they 

need it. And as I said, I do not think that they feel like they need 

a weapon right now, but I think it would also be calculated on their 

expectation of what is the best way to erode the sanctions regime. 

And again, I suspect that their feeling will be the best way to handle the breakdown of negotiations is to actually say, look, we do not 

want a nuclear weapon. We keep saying we do not want one. We 

are going to foreswear acquiring one at least for now to make clear 

that the Americans are the problem, not us. 

Senator REED. And then again, I think we always have to think 

worst case, which is with or without an agreement, with or without 

the durability of sanctions, if we detect a movement away from 

compliance and they are developing a nuclear capacity or technology or a breakout that is not a year but weeks, then we are 

forced with the issue of military action. One of the arguments that 

is made is that without an agreement—and it seems to track what 

60 

you said about sort of the world kind of consensus—our ability to 

engage the world community at least supporting us, maybe even 

after the fact would be diminished. Is that fair? 

Dr. POLLACK. I would agree with that. I think that we would be 

in a strong position to engage in military action which, again, I do 

not believe is the right course of action, but nevertheless, we would 

be in a stronger position with an agreement. And what is more, especially if we were seen as the party that walked away from the 

current negotiations, it would be very difficult for us to then come 

back to the world and say we would like international support to 

take military action against Iran for continuing to pursue their nuclear program. 

Senator REED. Let me ask Colonel Harvey. I do not know if I promoted you or demoted. I almost called you ‘‘doctor.’’ 

[Laughter.] 

Senator REED. And then Dr. Rand, and then I will conclude. 

Mr. HARVEY. We are not very good at maintaining a siege mentality against other countries, and I think that is part of the problem. I agree with everything I have heard heretofore on this issue. 

I wish that we would have not decoupled the missiles and delivery means from this track of negotiations. I think we need more 

transparency and more work on that. I think it would have been 

much better if we could have kept that connected. 

I am very concerned that we are not going to have the intelligence awareness and insights as to where they are at. And my belief, after studying this regime now for over 2 decades—and I used 

to be a missile and nuclear analyst at DIA on these issues—is that 

this is viewed in the leadership that matters in Tehran as just a 

transitional point, an obstacle to get over to continue to move in 

the direction because the character and nature of the regime is not 

fundamentally shifting, and we have not put any other conditions 

about behavior or missiles or other things to influence how that regime responds to this agreement. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Colonel. 

Dr. Rand, the last word, please. 

Dr. RAND. I mean, I want to repeat what some of my colleagues 

have said but just emphatically say that I think the logic behind 

waiting for a better deal has a lot of holes in it. And the first one 

is this question of what is the course of pressure that you then mobilize in the moment after this current negotiation breakdown. 

Where are the multilateral sanctions and the international will? So 

I do not see how you pinch Iran to get them to the table in 1, 2, 

3, 4, or 5 years. I have never seen that explained. 

But second, I think it is again just a question of what happens 

internal to Iran and domestic politics, which we do not want to rely 

on in terms of whether they go to accelerate nuclear weaponization 

in the aftermath of a failed deal. This is just a big unknown that 

will depend on a lot of things outside U.S. and international control. And I do not want to take that risk. 

Senator REED. Well, thank you all very much. 

I am going to, I think at this point, on behalf of Chairman 

McCain, thank you for extraordinarily effective and insightful testimony and recess the hearing. Adjourn it actually. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the committee adjourned.] 

(61) 

UNITED STATES MIDDLE EAST POLICY 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in Room SH216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain (chairman) 

presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, 

Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, 

Graham, Cruz, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, and Heinrich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Senator MCCAIN. Committee will come to order. 

Since a quorum is now present, I ask the committee to consider 

a list of 3,725 pending military nominations. All of these nominations have been before the committee the required length of time. 

Is there a motion to favorably report? 

Senator REED. So moved. 

Senator MCCAIN. Second? 

Senator SESSIONS. Second. 

Senator MCCAIN. All in favor, say aye. 

[A chorus of ayes.] 

Senator MCCAIN. The motion carries. 

Senate Armed Services Committee meets this morning to receive 

testimony on United States strategy in the Middle East. 

Eight years ago—eight years ago, our Nation was losing a war 

in Iraq. Despite the assurances of the Bush administration, the 

generals and leaders there, despite the favorable comments of, at 

that time, Secretary of Defense, who said, quote, ‘‘Stuff happens’’ 

and other equally ridiculous comments, we were losing the conflict. 

In fact, we were at a point where there was almost sufficient votes 

in the United States Senate to force a complete withdrawal from 

Iraq. 

And then a seminal event took place before this committee, a day 

that I will never forget. On September 11th, 2007, General David 

Petraeus appeared before this committee with Ambassador Ryan 

Crocker. Their compelling testimony was critical in securing support for the surge. An integrated civil-military campaign plan that 

defeated al-Qaeda in Iraq brought security to the Iraqi people and 

created the possibility for meaningful political reconciliation. 

62 

Now we meet again. Now we meet again. At a time of grave security challenges around the world, more than ever our Nation 

must be able to draw upon the wisdom and experience of its most 

distinguished leaders. That’s why I’m so pleased to welcome back 

before this committee—who has had many appearances before this 

committee—one of our most extinguished—distinguished leaders. 

I’m welcoming back General David Petraeus for his first appearance before Congress since leaving government. 

General, it’s good to see you. I want to thank you, on behalf of 

this committee, for your willingness to testify today and offer insights from your decades of distinguished service, especially your 

leadership in Iraq, Afghanistan, and as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. 

Across the Middle East today, the old order is collapsing both the 

regional balance among states and social order within states. No 

new vision has emerged to take its place. And across the region, 

chaos fills the vast ungoverned spaces left behind. Filling this vacuum have been terrorist groups such as Islamic State of Iraq and 

the Levant (ISIL) and al-Qaeda, on the one hand, and hostile states 

such as Iran and now Russia, on the other. This regional disintegration has only been made worse by a failure of U.S. strategy and 

leadership to shape events in this vital part of the world for the 

better. Too often, we have confused our friends, encouraged our enemies, mistaken an excess of caution for prudence, and replaced 

the risks of action with the perils of inaction. 

In Iraq and Syria 1 year after the President commenced airstrikes and committed United States troops, the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff and Commander of Central Command have 

characterized the fight against ISIL as a stalemate. ISIL has consolidated control of its core territories and expanded its control in 

Syria. Efforts to retake Iraqi cities, like Mosul, Fallujah, and 

Ramadi, have foundered. ISIL is expanding globally to places like 

Afghanistan, Lebanon and Yemen, Libya and Egypt. This appearance of success only enhances ISIL’s ability to radicalize, recruit, 

and grow. 

The Obama administration now tells us their strategy is working. Ultimately, ISIL is not 10 feet tall. It can and must be defeated. However, the current policy does not appear sufficient to 

achieve our goal of degrading and destroying ISIL. To put it mildly, 

this committee’s hearing last week on counter-ISIL strategy did little to alleviate these concerns. In the absence of an effective strategy, violent extremist groups like ISIL, al-Qaeda, and their adherents are expanding across the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia, 

including Afghanistan. 

After 14 years of fighting in Afghanistan, decisions made in the 

months ahead will determine whether our sacrifices were worth it. 

After pulling out of Iraq, against the advice of our military leaders, 

the President’s plan to withdraw from Afghanistan would risk a replay of that failure. We look forward to your views on this policy. 

In addition to the so-called Islamic State, the Islamic Republic of 

Iran has been another main beneficiary of the Middle East descent 

into chaos. For years, many of us have urged the administration to 

adopt a regional strategy to counter Iran’s malign activities in the 

Middle East. Unfortunately, that has not happened. Instead, the 

63 

administration has too often treated Iran as merely an arms-control challenge rather than the wider geopolitical challenge that it 

is. Left unchecked, Iran has stepped up its destabilizing activities 

in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, Bahrain, Gaza, and elsewhere. 

Whatever one thinks of the nuclear agreement, it will not resolve 

this larger Iran challenge, and will likely make it worse as Iran 

gains new legitimacy, the lifting of sanctions, and billions of dollars 

in sanctions relief. 

Into the wreckage of our Middle East policy has now stepped 

Vladimir Putin. As in Ukraine and elsewhere, he perceives the administration’s inaction and caution as a weakness, and he is taking 

advantage. Putin’s ongoing military buildup in Syria is the greatest 

expansion of Russian power in the Middle East in four decades, 

and it will allow Putin to prop up Assad, play kingmaker in any 

transition, undermine United States policy and operations, and ultimately prolong this horrific conflict. The main beneficiary will be 

ISIL. 

In classic fashion, the administration first condemned Putin’s 

move, but has now capitulated, agreeing to military-to-military 

talks. The first step toward a solution is recognizing there’s a problem. Unfortunately, that has appeared beyond the capacity of the 

administration. Instead, they continue to resort to a litany of truisms, strawman arguments, partisan attacks, and talking points 

that, to borrow a phrase, require, quote, ‘‘a willing suspension of 

disbelief.’’ 

In a display of self-delusion that can rival the Bush administration’s Iraq policy at its worst, the Obama administration now tells 

us their strategy is working, that we’re making progress, that time 

is on our side, that strategic patience is all we need, and that we 

should just stay the course. 

When our earlier strategy in Iraq in the broader Middle East 

was failing, not so long ago, we, thankfully, had leaders, like our 

distinguished witness, who were willing to face that situation with 

realism and a President who, to his everlasting credit, took responsibility for that failure and changed course. Other American Presidents, including Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton, have demonstrated 

a similar capacity for change. There’s no reason President Obama 

could not do the same. No one believes that there are good options. 

There never are. No one believes that these kinds of problems lend 

themselves to purely military solutions. They never have and never 

will. No one expects us to succeed overnight, and no one believes 

that America can or should solve every problem by itself. But, that 

does not absolve us of our responsibility to make the situation better, where we can. 

Yes, these problems are hard. But, as our witness once said, they 

are not hopeless. Now more than ever, we need some reasons to be 

hopeful again. 

I thank you for appearing before the committee today, and look 

forward to your testimony. 

Senator Reed. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

64 

And, General Petraeus, welcome back to the Armed Services 

Committee. 

This morning’s hearing continues the committee’s review of the 

policy issues confronting the United States in the Middle East. And 

your long experience in a number of leadership positions, both in 

the United States military and as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, makes you superbly prepared and qualified to provide your perspective on the current situation in the Middle East. 

And, once again, thank you for being here. 

The situation in the Middle East presents a deeply complex problem set, and it is a near certainty that the problems that were 

there challenge our Nation’s security today and for many years to 

come. And, while our Nation’s military is playing a critical role in 

addressing the threats emanating from the Middle East and lasting 

solutions will require, in addition, dogged diplomacy and persistent 

attention by our Nation’s civilian and military leaders and those of 

our allies and partners who share a security interest in the region. 

As the committee heard at last week’s hearing, the immediate 

threat confronting the United States, our partners, and allies in 

the Middle East is ISIL. ISIL’s control over portions of Syria and 

Iraq provides this violent extremist organization a base from which 

to terrorize civilians and spread its poisonous ideology, regionally 

and globally. The brutality of ISIL, coupled with that of the Assad 

regime and other armed elements in Iraq and Syria, has caused a 

collapse of stability in many areas and forced millions to flee the 

wanton violence. 

The emerging refugee crisis in Europe highlights the urgent need 

for the international community to focus on restoring security in 

the region. The United States-led international coalition, enabled 

by the leadership of retired General John Allen, has brought together 60-plus countries to respond to the ISIL threat, including a 

multinational air campaign to degrade ISIL’s capabilities and programs to train and equip local forces in Iraq and Syria. 

General Petraeus, we are very interested in your views on the 

value of a multilateral approach to confronting ISIL. I would also 

be interested to hear whether you support the efforts to build and 

work through local forces on the ground to liberate and then restore stability to areas previously under ISIL control. 

In Iraq, United States and partner nations are once again training and equipping Iraqi Security Forces and helping to recruit 

Sunni tribal forces to the counter-ISIL effort. General Petraeus, 

given your experience on the ground in Iraq, which is extensive 

and detailed both as an operational and strategic-level commander, 

I look forward to hearing your assessment of the broader military 

campaign, but also on whether the Iraqi Security Forces can summon the will to fight successfully against ISIL and other opponents 

within Iraq. 

Further, the administration has rightly, I believe, conditioned 

our support to the Iraqi government on their continuing efforts to 

be more inclusive and responsive to the concerns of the Sunnis, 

Kurds, moderate Shiites, and minorities. Again, your assessment of 

these political efforts would be deeply appreciated. 

In Syria, according to public reports, the DOD-run train-andequip program has experienced a variety of setbacks. Many observVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:53 Sep 08, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21401.TXT WILDA
65 

ers have criticized this program. And again, I would be interested 

in your assessment of the viability of this program. 

At the same time, the already difficult task of restoring security 

in Syria has only been further complicated by Russian President 

Putin’s recent provocative act of deploying Russian marines and 

equipment, including fighter aircraft and surface-to-air missiles to 

Assad-regime-controlled areas under the guise of joining the 

counter-ISIL effort. What President Putin hopes to gain from this 

brazen military intervention in this volatile situation is unclear. 

And we’d, again, like your perspective on that issue. 

The other major issue of the United States in the Middle East 

is Iran. Last well, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or 

JCPOA, entered the implementation phase. In the coming months, 

the Iranians have much work to do, and the world will be watching 

to see whether Iran will discharge its obligations. Holding Iran accountable during this phase of the agreement is, I would suggest, 

one of the most significant efforts that we can take, along with our 

allies. 

Aside from the JCPOA, General Petraeus, Iran’s malign and destabilizing activities are of critical concern. This includes the continued support and financing of the Assad regime, Hezbollah in 

Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Shiite elements in Bahrain, and 

Shiite militias in Iraq. Countering Iran’s malign influence is an 

area where the administration has made a significant commitment 

to our partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council, among them an 

increase in training and exercise programs to ensure these partners have the necessary capabilities to counter Iranian threats. 

Again, your assessment of these efforts would be appreciated. 

While much attention is focused on the Middle East, the United 

States continues to have nearly l0,000 United States forces deployed in Afghanistan as part of the Resolute Support Mission. A 

critical decision will have to be made in the next few months regarding the size of United States forces to be retained in Afghanistan during 2016 and beyond. Again, your advice in this respect 

would also be appreciated. 

And lastly, we cannot forget that al-Qaeda, especially its affiliates in Yemen and adherents in Syria, remain a transregional 

threat to the United States and other interests around the world. 

Your insights with respect to what might be done to keep the pressure on al-Qaeda, both their senior leadership and their organizational structure, is—would be deeply appreciated. 

Once again, thank you for your service—your distinguished service, and thank you for joining us today. 

Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, welcome back. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s good to be 

back. 

66 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA (RET.), 

FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE 

FORCE; COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES AFGHANISTAN; COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND; 

AND COMMANDER, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCES-IRAQ 

General PETRAEUS. Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, members of the 

committee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the situation 

in the Middle East. 

As you noted, Mr. Chairman, this is the first time I have testified 

in open session before Congress since resigning as Director of the 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) nearly 3 years ago. As such, I 

think it is appropriate to begin my remarks this morning with an 

apology, one that I have offered before, but nonetheless, one that 

I want to repeat to you and to the American public. 

Four years ago, I made a serious mistake, one that brought discredit on me, and pain closest—to those closest to me. It was a violation of the trust placed in me and a breach of the values to which 

I had been committed throughout my life. There’s nothing I can do 

to undo what I did. I can only say again how sorry I am to let— 

to those I let down, and then strive to go forward with a greater 

sense of humility and purpose, and with gratitude to those who 

stood with me during a very difficult chapter in my life. 

In light of all that, it means a great deal that you have asked 

me to share my views on the challenges in the Middle East, where, 

as you noted, I spent most of my last decade in government. I 

thank you for that, Mr. Chairman. And I thank you for the support 

and friendship that you have long extended to me. 

The Middle East today is experiencing revolutionary upheaval 

that is unparalleled in its modern history. At the root of this upheaval is the weakening or disintegration of state authority in multiple countries. This has led to a violent struggle for power across 

a vast swath of territory, the competition both between different 

groups within states, and one between different states in the region, and some outside it. Almost every Middle Eastern country is 

now a battleground or a combatant in one or more wars. 

The principal winners, thus far, have been the most ruthless, 

revolutionary, and anti-American elements in the region. This includes Sunni extremists, like the so-called Islamic State, which is 

attempting to carve a totalitarian caliphate out of the wreckage of 

the old order, and the Islamic Republic of Iran, which hopes to establish a kind of regional hegemony. 

All of the revolutionary forces, whether Sunni or Shi’ite, are exploiting the upheaval in the Middle East while also exacerbating 

it. While hostile to each other, the growth of each is feeding the 

sectarian radicalization that is fueling the other. But, none of them 

reflects the hopes of the overwhelming majority of Middle Easterners. 

The crises of the Middle East pose a threat not just to regional 

stability, but also to global stability and to vital national interests 

of the United States, for the repercussions of developments in the 

Middle East extend well beyond it. Indeed, the Middle East is not 

a part of the world that plays by Las Vegas rules. What happens 

in the Middle East is not going to stay in the Middle East. We see 

67 

this in the global reach of the Islamic State from the sanctuaries 

it has seized in the region, in the tsunami of refugees fleeing the 

conflicts of the Middle East, in the danger of a nuclear cascade 

sparked by Iranian actions, and in the escalating tensions between 

the United States and Russia over Syria. And it is in the Middle 

East today where the rules-based international order, the foundation of American security and prosperity since the end of World 

War II, is most in danger of coming apart at the seams. 

International peace and security do not require the United States 

to solve every crisis or to intervene in every conflict. But, if America is ineffective or absent in the face of the most egregious violations of the most basic principles of the international order that we 

have championed, our commitment to that order is inevitably questioned and further challenges to it are invited. 

I will focus here this morning on three countries at the eye of the 

present geopolitical storm: Iraq, Syria, and Iran. It has been more 

than a year since the United States commenced military action 

against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. And, while there have 

been significant accomplishments, the progress achieved thus far 

has been inadequate. An impressive coalition has been established. 

Key The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) leaders have been 

killed or captured. And support for local forces in Iraq and Syria 

has helped roll back ISIS in certain areas. Some elements of the 

right strategy are in place, but several are under-resourced, while 

others are missing. We are not where we should be at this point. 

In Iraq, we have halted and reversed ISIS’s momentum in some 

areas, but we have seen gains by ISIS in others, such as Ramadi. 

In my judgment, increased support for the Iraqi Security Forces, 

Sunni tribal forces, and Kurdish peshmerga is needed, including 

embedding United States advisor elements down to the brigade 

headquarters level of those Iraqi forces fighting ISIS. 

I also believe that we should explore use of joint tactical air controllers with select Iraqi units to coordinate coalition airstrikes for 

those units. And we should examine whether our rules of engagement for precision strikes are too restrictive. 

That said, we should exercise restraint to ensure our forces do 

not take over Iraqi units. I would not, for example, embed United 

States personnel at the Iraqi battalion level, nor would I support 

clearance operations before a viable hold force is available. 

As critical as the front-line fight against ISIS is, however, the 

center of gravity for the sustainable defeat of ISIS in Iraq lies in 

Baghdad. In this respect, we should recall that the cause of Iraq’s 

unraveling over the past several years was the corrupt sectarian 

and authoritarian behavior of former Prime Minister Nouri alMaliki and his government. This is what alienated the Sunni Arab 

population we worked so hard to get back into the fabric of Iraqi 

society during the surge. Maliki’s actions, in turn, created the conditions for the Islamic State to reconstitute itself in Iraq, after 

which it gained additional strength in the Syrian civil war and 

then, of course, swept back into Iraq. 

The key now is for the United States to help strengthen those 

in Baghdad who are prepared to pursue inclusive politics and better governance, goals that unite the majority of Iraq’s Shi’ites, 

Sunni, and Kurds. It is vital that Sunni and Kurds, in particular, 

68 

are again given a stake in the success of the new Iraq rather than 

a stake in its failure. 

There is, at present in Iraq, an unprecedented opportunity to 

support Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, who, with the back of 

Iraqi citizens in the streets, Iraq’s senior Shiite cleric, and one Shiite party, is embarked on very serious reforms that are being resisted by the leaders of the major Iranian-supported militias and 

former Prime Minister Maliki. 

The reality, then, is that the challenges in Iraq are neither purely political nor purely military. They are both. What is required, 

therefore, is an integrated civil-military plan in which diplomatic 

and military lines of effort are coordinated to reinforce each other. 

That is what Ambassador Crocker and I pursued during the surge, 

and all the elements of that effort are once again required, though 

it is the Iraqis who must provide the ground forces and achieve reconciliation if the results are to be sustainable. 

Unfortunately, we do not yet have the proper civil-military architecture in place to support this, though we do appear to be moving 

closer to it. Notably, the operational headquarters for the military 

campaign against ISIS in Iraq is based in Kuwait. This means that 

the United States Ambassador in Baghdad does not always have a 

day-to-day military counterpart. I would strongly recommend facilitating this by moving key elements of the headquarters to Baghdad 

and ensuring that a comprehensive civil-military plan is pursued. 

I note here that I’m very encouraged that the general selected to 

lead the campaign in Iraq is the officer who, as a brigade commander in Ramadi in the fall of 2006, launched the reconciliation 

initiative on which we subsequently built during the surge, leading 

eventually to what became the Anbar Awakening. 

I should also note that, in my view, the commander in Baghdad 

should focus primarily on Iraq while another commander, perhaps 

positioned in Turkey, perhaps under the three-star in Iraq, should 

be designated to focus on operations in Syria which clearly need 

greater unity of effort. 

Let me now turn to the situation in Syria. Syria today, Mr. 

Chairman, is a geopolitical Chernobyl, spewing instability and extremism over the region and the rest of the world. Like a nuclear 

disaster, the fallout from the meltdown of Syria threatens to be 

with us for decades, and the longer it is permitted to continue, the 

more severe the damage will be. 

It is frequently said that there is no military solution to Syria 

or the other conflicts roiling in the Middle East. This may be true, 

but it is also misleading. For, in every case, if there is to be any 

hope of a political settlement, a certain military and security context is required, and that context will not materialize on its own. 

We and our partners need to facilitate it. And, over the past 4 

years, we have not done so. 

It has been clear, from early on in Syria, that the desired context 

requires the development of capable, moderate Sunni Arab ground 

forces. Such Sunni elements are critical for any objective one might 

have in Syria: defeating extremists like ISIS, changing the momentum on the battlefield to enable a negotiated settlement, and upholding that agreement while keeping ISIS down. Unfortunately, 

we are no closer today to having that Sunni force than we were a 

69 

year ago or when support for such forces was first considered, several years ago. 

The central problem in Syria is that Sunni Arabs will not be willing partners against the Islamic State unless we commit to protect 

them and the broader Syrian population against all enemies, not 

just ISIS. That means protecting them from the unrestricted warfare being waged against them by Bashar al-Assad, especially by 

his air force and its use of barrel bombs. This, not ISIS, has been 

the primary source of civilian casualties. It has also been a principal driver of the radicalization fueling ISIS and the refugee crisis. 

The problems in Syria cannot be quickly resolved, but there are 

actions the United States, and only the United States, can take 

that would make a difference. We could, for example, tell Assad 

that the use of barrel bombs must end and that if they continue, 

we will stop the Syrian Air Force from flying. We have that capability. This would not end the humanitarian crisis in Syria or end 

the broader war or bring about the collapse of the Assad regime, 

but it would remove a particularly vicious weapon from Assad’s arsenal. It would demonstrate that the United States is willing to 

stand against Assad. And it would show the Syrian people that we 

can do what the Islamic State cannot: provide them with a measure of protection. 

I would also support the establishment of enclaves in Syria, protected by coalition airpower, where a moderate Sunni force could 

be supported and where additional forces could be trained, internally displaced persons could find refuge, and the Syrian opposition 

could organize. 

Now, no one is more conscious of the costs of military intervention or of the limits of our military power than I am. As Commander in Iraq and then Afghanistan during the height of combat 

in those countries, I wrote more letters of condolence to parents of 

America’s sons and daughters than any of my contemporaries. I do 

not make recommendations for any kind of military action lightly. 

But, inaction can also carry profound risks and costs for our national security. We see that clearly today in Syria. And Russia’s recent military escalation in Syria is a further reminder that, when 

the United States does not take the initiative, others will fill the 

vacuum, often in ways that are harmful to our interests. 

Russia’s actions to bolster Assad increase the imperative of support for the moderate opposition and Syrian civilians. We should 

not allow Russia to push us into coalition with Assad, which appears to be President Putin’s intention. While we should not rush 

to oust Assad without an understanding of what will follow him, 

Assad cannot be part of the solution in Syria. He is, after all, the 

individual seen by Sunnis across the region as responsible for the 

deaths of some 250,000 Syrians, the displacement of well over a 

third of Syria’s population, and the destruction of many of Syria’s 

once thriving communities. 

Finally, let me turn to Iran. The nuclear agreement negotiated 

by the Obama administration contains many positive elements. It 

also contains problematic elements. Over the next 10 to 15 years, 

the agreement will impose meaningful constraints on Iran’s nuclear 

activities. It will also, however, increase considerably the resources 

available for the Iranian regime to pursue malign activities. And, 

70 

in the longer term, as constraints imposed by the agreement expire, the risk of Iranian proliferation will increase. 

The key question, going forward, is, What will be the relationship 

of the United States to Iranian power? Will we seek to counter it 

or to accommodate it? As the Obama administration sought to promote the nuclear agreement, its senior members pledged the 

former: to counter malign Iranian activity. But, many in the region 

worry that the White House will now pursue the latter, attempting 

to work with Iran, perhaps beginning with Syria. This would be a 

mistake. To be sure, the idea of reconciliation with Iran should not 

be dismissed. But, it is one thing if reconciliation means that Iran 

abandons its Quds Force-driven foreign policy, sponsorship of extremist proxies, and pursuit of hegemony over its neighbors. It is 

a very different matter if reconciliation entails accommodating 

those actions. 

As we have seen in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, Iran’s activities are 

not only hostile to us and our partners, they also exacerbate Sunni 

feelings of alienation and disenfranchisement, which, in turn, drive 

sectarian radicalization and the growth of groups like ISIS. Thus, 

rather than viewing the nuclear agreement as marking the end of 

a hostile relationship with Iran that will enable our disengagement 

from the Middle East, we should see it as inaugurating a new, 

more complex phase of that competition that will require intensified United States involvement in the region. This should include 

several important actions: 

First, the United States should make absolutely clear that we 

will never allow Iran to possess highly enriched uranium and that 

any move in that direction will be met with military force. This 

guarantee must be ironclad to reassure our partners in the region 

and have the desired effect with Iran. Such a declaration would 

carry maximal credibility if issued by the President and Congress, 

together. 

Second, we must intensify our work with our Arab and Israeli 

partners to counter Iran’s malign regional activities. This can take 

several forms, including continued use of existing sanctions authorities against Iranian entities tied to terrorism, ballistic missile 

development, and human rights abuses. It should also include expedited approval of weapon systems sought by our partners in the 

region and greater integration of their capabilities. And it should 

encompass additional actions to demonstrate that the theater remains set with respect to our capabilities to carry out military operations against Iran’s nuclear program, if necessary. 

Beyond these actions, we should understand that the most immediate test for the credibility of our policy will be what we do in Iraq 

and Syria. The outcome in those countries will be the basis for the 

judgments of friend and foe alike about our steadfastness and competence in thwarting ISIS, other extremists, and Iran’s quest for 

hegemony. 

Mr. Chairman, the situation confronting the United States in the 

Middle East today is very hard, but, as I observed and as you recalled, when I took command in Iraq in early February 2007 

amidst terrible sectarian violence, ‘‘hard’’ is not ‘‘hopeless.’’ As complex and challenging as the crises in the region are, I’m convinced 

71 

the United States is capable of rising to the challenge if we choose 

to do so. 

I ended my statements before the Senate Armed Services Committee in the past by thanking its members for their steadfast support of our men and women in uniform. I will end my statement 

this morning the same way, repeating the gratitude that so many 

of us felt during the height of our engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan, for the committee’s extraordinary support for so many critical 

initiatives on and off the battlefield, even when a number of members questioned the policies we were executing. 

This committee has also long played a critical oversight role 

poising tough questions about U.S. policy and strategy. I highlight 

the leadership of Chairman McCain in this regard for questioning 

the strategy in Iraq before 2007 and calling for many of the key 

elements that ultimately made possible the stabilization of that 

country. The questions that members of this committee ask about 

our approach in Syria and the broader fight against ISIS continue 

in this tradition. 

Again, this committee’s unwavering support of those serving our 

Nation in uniform has meant a tremendous amount to those on the 

battlefield and to those supporting them. And it is with those great 

Americans in mind that I have offered my thoughts here this morning. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of General Petraeus follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GENERAL DAVID H. PETRAEUS, U.S. ARMY (RET.) 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, Members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the situation in the Middle East. 

This is the first time I have testified in open session before Congress since resigning as Director of the CIA nearly three years ago. And I think it is appropriate to 

begin my remarks this morning with an apology . . . one that I have offered before, 

but nonetheless one that I want to repeat to you and to the American people. 

Four years ago, I made a serious mistake—one that brought discredit on me and 

pain to those closest to me. It was a violation of the trust placed in me and a breach 

of the values to which I had been committed throughout my life. 

There is nothing I can to do to undo what I did. I can only say again how sorry 

I am to those I let down, and then strive to go forward with a greater sense of humility and purpose, and with gratitude to those who stood with me during a very 

difficult chapter in my life. 

In light of all that, it means a great deal that you have asked me to share my 

views on the challenges in the Middle East, where I spent most of my last decade 

in government. 

I thank you for that, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for the support and friendship that you have long extended to me. 

*** 

The Middle East today is experiencing revolutionary upheaval that is unparalleled in its modern history. 

At the root of this upheaval is the weakening or disintegration of state authority 

in multiple countries. This has led to a violent struggle for power across a vast 

swath of territory—a competition both between different groups within states, and 

one between different states in the region and some outside it. Almost every Middle 

Eastern country is now a battleground or a combatant in one or more wars. 

The principal winners, thus far, have been the most ruthless, revolutionary, and 

anti-American elements in the region. This includes Sunni extremists like the socalled Islamic State, which is attempting to carve a totalitarian caliphate out of the 

wreckage of the old order, and the Islamic Republic of Iran, which hopes to establish 

a kind of regional hegemony. 

All of the revolutionary forces—whether Sunni or Shiite—are exploiting the upheaval in the Middle East while also exacerbating it. While hostile to each other, 

72 

the growth of each is feeding the sectarian radicalization that is fueling the other. 

But none of them reflects the hopes of the overwhelming majority of Middle Easterners. 

The crises of the Middle East pose a threat not just to regional stability, but also 

to global stability and to vital national interests of the United States, for the repercussions of developments in the Middle East extend well beyond it. 

Indeed, the Middle East is not a part of the world that plays by Las Vegas rules: 

what happens in the Middle East is not going to stay in the Middle East. 

We see this in the global reach of the Islamic State from the sanctuaries it has 

seized in the region; in the tsunami of refugees fleeing the conflicts of the Middle 

East; in the danger of a nuclear cascade sparked by Iranian actions; and in the escalating tensions between the United States and Russia over Syria. 

And, it is in the Middle East today where the rules-based international order— 

the foundation of American security and prosperity since the end of World War II— 

is most in danger of coming apart at the seams. 

International peace and security do not require the United States to solve every 

crisis or to intervene in every conflict. But if America is ineffective or absent in the 

face of the most egregious violations of the most basic principles of the international 

order that we have championed, our commitment to that order is inevitably questioned . . . and further challenges to it are invited. 

I will focus here this morning on three countries at the eye of the present geopolitical storm: Iraq, Syria, and Iran. 

It has been more than a year since the United States commenced military action 

against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. And, while there have been significant 

accomplishments, the progress achieved thus far has been inadequate. An impressive coalition has been assembled, key ISIS leaders have been killed or captured, 

and support for local forces in Iraq and Syria has helped roll back ISIS in certain 

areas. Some elements of the right strategy are in place, but several are underresourced, while others are missing. We are not where we should be at this point. 

In Iraq, we have halted and reversed ISIS’s momentum in some areas. But we 

have seen gains by ISIS in others, such as Ramadi. In my judgment, increased support for the Iraqi Security Forces, Sunni tribal forces, and Kurdish peshmerga is 

needed—including embedding United States advisor elements down to the brigade 

headquarters level of those Iraqi forces fighting ISIS. I also believe that we should 

explore use of Joint Tactical Air Controllers with select Iraqi units to coordinate coalition airstrikes for those units. And we should examine whether our rules of engagement for precision strikes are too restrictive. 

That said, we should exercise restraint to ensure our forces do not take over Iraqi 

units. I would not, for example, embed United States personnel at the Iraqi battalion level; nor would I support clearance operations before a viable hold force is 

available. 

As critical as the frontline fight against ISIS is, however, the center of gravity 

for the sustainable defeat of ISIS in Iraq lies in Baghdad. 

In this respect, we should recall that the cause of Iraq’s unraveling over the past 

several years was the corrupt, sectarian, and authoritarian behavior of former 

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his government. This is what alienated the 

Sunni Arab population we worked so hard to get back into the fabric of Iraqi society 

during the Surge. Maliki’s actions, in turn, created the conditions for the Islamic 

State to reconstitute itself in Iraq, after which it gained additional strength in the 

Syrian civil war and then, of course, swept back into Iraq. 

The key now is for the United States to help strengthen those in Baghdad who 

are prepared to pursue inclusive politics and better governance—goals that unite 

Iraq’s Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. It is vital that Sunnis and Kurds, in particular, 

are again given a stake in the success of the new Iraq, rather than a stake in its 

failure. 

There is, at present in Iraq, an unprecedented opportunity to support Prime Minister Abadi who, with the backing of Iraqi citizens in the streets, Iraq’s senior Shia 

cleric, and the Shia ISCI party, is embarked on very serious reforms that are being 

resisted by the leaders of the major Iranian-supported militias and former Prime 

Minister Maliki. 

The reality is that the challenges in Iraq are neither purely political nor purely 

military. They are both. What is required therefore is an integrated civil-military 

plan, in which diplomatic and military lines of effort are coordinated to reinforce 

each other. That is what Ambassador Crocker and I pursued during the Surge, and 

all the elements of that effort are once again required, though it is the Iraqis who 

must provide the ground forces and achieve reconciliation if the results are to be 

sustainable. 

73 

Unfortunately, we do not yet have the proper civil-military architecture in place 

to support this, though we appear to be moving closer to it. 

Notably, the operational headquarters for the military campaign against ISIS in 

Iraq is based in Kuwait. This means that the United States Ambassador in Baghdad 

does not always have a day-to-day military counterpart. I would strongly recommend facilitating this by moving key elements of the headquarters to Baghdad— 

and ensuring that a comprehensive civil-military plan is pursued. 

I note here that I am very encouraged that the general selected to lead the campaign in Iraq is the officer who, as a brigade commander in Ramadi in the fall of 

2006, launched the reconciliation initiative on which we subsequently built during 

the Surge, leading eventually to what became the Anbar Awakening. 

I should also note that, in my view, the commander in Baghdad should focus primarily on Iraq, while another commander, perhaps positioned in Turkey and perhaps under the three-star in Iraq, should be designated to focus on operations in 

Syria, which clearly need greater unity of effort. 

Let me now turn to the situation in Syria. 

Syria today, Mr. Chairman, is a geopolitical Chernobyl—spewing instability and 

extremism over the region and the rest of the world. Like a nuclear disaster, the 

fallout from the meltdown of Syria threatens to be with us for decades, and the 

longer it is permitted to continue, the more severe the damage will be. 

It is frequently said that there is ‘‘no military solution’’ to Syria or the other conflicts roiling the Middle East. This may be true, but it is also misleading. For, in 

every case, if there is to be any hope of a political settlement, a certain military 

and security context is required—and that context will not materialize on its own. 

We and our partners need to facilitate it—and over the past four years, we have 

not done so. 

It has been clear from early on in Syria that the desired context requires the development of capable, moderate Sunni Arab ground forces. Such Sunni elements are 

critical for any objective one might have in Syria: defeating extremists like ISIS, 

changing the momentum on the battlefield to enable a negotiated settlement, and 

upholding that agreement while keeping ISIS down. 

Unfortunately, we are no closer today to having that Sunni force than we were 

a year ago—or when support for such forces was first considered several years ago. 

The central problem in Syria is that Sunni Arabs will not be willing partners 

against the Islamic State unless we commit to protect them and the broader Syrian 

population against all enemies, not just ISIS. That means protecting them from the 

unrestricted warfare being waged against them by Bashar al-Assad—especially by 

his air force and its use of barrel bombs. This, not ISIS, has been the primary 

source of civilian casualties; it has also been a principal driver of the radicalization 

fueling ISIS and the refugee crisis. 

The problems in Syria cannot be quickly resolved. But there are actions the 

United States, and only the United States, can take that would make a difference. 

We could, for example, tell Assad that the use of barrel bombs must end—and 

that if they continue, we will stop the Syrian air force from flying. We have that 

capability. 

This would not end the humanitarian crisis in Syria, or end the broader war, or 

bring about the collapse of the Assad regime. But it would remove a particularly 

vicious weapon from Assad’s arsenal. It would demonstrate that the United States 

is willing to stand against Assad. And it would show the Syrian people that we can 

do what the Islamic State cannot—provide them with a measure of protection. 

I would also support the establishment of enclaves in Syria protected by coalition 

airpower, where a moderate Sunni force could be supported and where additional 

forces could be trained, Internally Displaced Persons could find refuge, and the Syrian opposition could organize. 

Now, no one is more conscious of the costs of military intervention, or of the limits 

of our military power, than I am. As commander in Iraq and then Afghanistan during the height of combat in those countries, I wrote more letters of condolence to 

parents of America’s sons and daughters than any of my contemporaries. I do not 

make recommendations for any kind of military action lightly. 

But inaction can also carry profound risks and costs for our national security. We 

see that clearly today in Syria. And Russia’s recent military escalation in Syria is 

a further reminder that, when the United States does not take the initiative, others 

will fill the vacuum, often in ways that are harmful to our interests. 

Russia’s actions to bolster Assad increase the imperative of support for the moderate opposition and Syrian civilians. We should not allow Russia to push us into 

coalition with Assad, which appears to be President Putin’s intention. While we 

should not rush to oust Assad without an understanding of what will follow him, 

Assad cannot be part of the solution in Syria. He is, after all, the individual seen 

74 

by Sunnis across the region as responsible for the death of some 250,000 Syrians, 

the displacement of well over a third of Syria’s population, and the destruction of 

many of Syria’s once thriving communities. 

Finally, let me turn to Iran. 

The nuclear agreement negotiated by the Obama Administration contains many 

positive elements; it also contains problematic elements. 

Over the next 10–15 years, the agreement will impose meaningful constraints on 

Iran’s nuclear activities. It will also, however, increase considerably the resources 

available for the Iranian regime to pursue malign activities. And, in the longer 

term, as constraints imposed by the agreement expire, the risk of Iranian proliferation will increase. 

The key question, going forward, is: What will be the relationship of the United 

States to Iranian power? Will we seek to counter it, or to accommodate it? 

As the Obama Administration sought to promote the nuclear agreement, its senior 

members pledged the former, to counter malign Iranian activity. But many in the 

region worry that the White House will now pursue the latter—attempting to work 

with Iran, perhaps beginning in Syria. 

This would be a mistake. To be sure, the idea of reconciliation with Iran should 

not be dismissed. But it is one thing if reconciliation means that Iran abandons its 

Qods Force-driven foreign policy, sponsorship of extremist proxies, and pursuit of 

hegemony over its neighbors. It is a very different matter if reconciliation entails 

accommodating these actions. 

As we have seen in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, Iran’s activities are not only hostile 

to us and our partners. They also exacerbate Sunni feelings of alienation and disenfranchisement, which in turn drive sectarian radicalization and the growth of 

groups like ISIS. 

Thus, rather than viewing the nuclear agreement as marking the end of a hostile 

relationship with Iran that will enable our disengagement from the Middle East, we 

should see it as inaugurating a new, more complex phase of that competition that 

will require intensified United States involvement in the region. 

This should include several important actions. 

First, the United States should make absolutely clear that we will never allow 

Iran to possess highly enriched uranium, and that any move in that direction will 

be met with military force. This guarantee must be ironclad to reassure our partners in the region and have the desired effect with Iran. Such a declaration would 

carry maximal credibility if issued by the President and Congress together. 

Second, we must intensify our work with our Arab and Israeli partners to counter 

Iran’s malign regional activities. This can take several forms, including continued 

use of existing sanctions authorities against Iranian entities tied to terrorism, ballistic missile development, and human rights abuses. It should also include expedited approval of weapons systems sought by our partners in the region and greater 

integration of their capabilities. And it should encompass additional actions to demonstrate that the theater remains ‘‘set’’ with respect to our own capabilities to carry 

out military operations against Iran’s nuclear program, if necessary. 

Beyond those actions, we should understand that the most immediate test for the 

credibility of our policy will be what we do in Iraq and Syria. The outcome in those 

countries will be the basis for the judgments of friend and foe alike about our steadfastness and competence in thwarting ISIS, other extremists, and Iran’s quest for 

hegemony. 

*** 

Mr. Chairman, the situation confronting the United States in the Middle East 

today is very hard. But as I observed when I took command in Iraq in early February 2007 amidst terrible sectarian violence, hard is not hopeless. As complex and 

challenging as the crises in the region are, I am convinced the United States is capable of rising to the challenge—if we choose to do so. 

I ended my statements before the Senate Armed Services Committee in the past 

by thanking its Members for their steadfast support of our men and women in uniform. I will end my statement this morning the same way—repeating the gratitude 

that so many of us felt during the height of our engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan for the Committee’s extraordinary support for so many critical initiatives, on 

and off the battlefield, even when a number of Members questioned the policies we 

were executing. 

This Committee has also long played a critical oversight role, posing tough questions about U.S. policy and strategy. I highlight the leadership of Chairman McCain 

in this regard for questioning the strategy in Iraq before 2007 and calling for many 

of the key elements that ultimately made possible the stabilization of that country. 

The questions that Members of this Committee ask about our approach in Syria and 

the broader fight against ISIS continue in this tradition. 

75 

Again, this Committee’s unwavering support of those serving our Nation in uniform has meant a tremendous amount to those on the battlefield and to those supporting them. And it is with those great Americans in mind that I have offered my 

thoughts here this morning. Thank you very much. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much, General. And thank you 

for probably the most comprehensive overview that this committee 

has received on the situation. I’m very grateful. 

And I would mention, perhaps one of the most admirable and important part of my experience was watching your leadership, not 

only in the architect of the surge, but your motivation of the young 

men and women who are serving in the military as officers and enlisted. Your inspirational leadership to them was something which 

I will always remember with great admiration. 

You called for, in your statement, what some of us have been 

asking for, for years, and that is, the barrel bombs have got to end. 

It’s not ISIS that’s dropping the barrel bombs. And when my colleagues say ISIS is the problem, they’re not the ones that have 

killed 230,000 of their countrymen. It’s Bashar Assad. And let’s— 

and we should own up to that. And some kind of accommodation 

with Bashar Assad, of course, would fly in the face of everything 

that the United States of America has ever stood for. 

So, you are calling for, in your statement, that we tell Bashar 

Assad to stop the barrel bombs and establish an enclave where people could take refuge, could have protection from the incredible, insane cruelties of Bashar Assad. There’s going to be blowback on 

that. ‘‘Well, doesn’t that mean that we’re going to have to have 

American boots on the ground? Doesn’t that mean we’re back in the 

quagmire? Doesn’t that mean’’—I can see the reaction now from 

some of my friends who—by the way, the same ones that oppose 

the surge when they’re around. But, what’s your response to that, 

General Petraeus, that this would then cause us to be involved 

with boots on the ground and the—back into the quagmire that 

characterized our involvement prior to the surge? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, a couple of points, if I could, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, I think very important to underscore the fact that 

Bashar al-Assad can’t be part of the longrun solution in Syria. He 

is, as you noted, as I noted, the individual held responsible for well 

over 200,000, and perhaps as high as 250,000, Syrians dead, and 

he cannot—he is the magnetic attraction that is bringing jihadis to 

Syria to fight him. And, indeed—— 

Senator MCCAIN. And—— 

General PETRAEUS.—if we are to support a force, it won’t work 

for us, it won’t be supportable if we don’t support it against Bashar 

al-Assad’s actions against it, the most horrific of which are the 

dropping of barrel bombs. And that can be stopped. We have the 

capability to do that. We don’t have to put 165,000 troops on the 

ground to do that. We don’t have to put any boots on the ground 

to do that, although I think, at some point in an enclave, we should 

not be closed to the possibility of some advisors or support elements being in something like that, in the same way that we have 

them on the ground in Iraq. So, I don’t see this as the—entering 

a quagmire. I see this as taking out the most horrific casualty-producing item. 

76 

I think General Allen has said that well over 50 percent of the 

casualties overall in Syria have been caused by these indiscriminate barrel bombs that can, at a moment’s notice, drop from the 

sky. We have the capability to stop that. And we should. 

Senator MCCAIN. Speaking of Russia, I noted that the Russians 

have now—have aircraft that are primarily as interceptors, not 

close air support. ISIS doesn’t have an air force. It’s very interesting. And what is your assessment of what Vladimir Putin is trying to accomplish with this incredible buildup in Syria? And what 

should the United States do in response? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, first of all, I think you have to look at 

this, writ large. I think that what Vladimir Putin would like to do 

is resurrect the Russian Empire. You see this in a variety of different activities. Or at least the Soviet Union. He has a number of 

different activities—diplomatic, economic, and, of course, military— 

in a variety of countries around Russia. And now he is, of course, 

in Syria, as well, and trying to revive Russian relationships with 

countries in the Middle East. 

I think the immediate objective that he has in Syria is to solidify 

the corridor on the Mediterranean coast between Latakia, where he 

has his airbase, and Tartus, where they have the Russian naval 

base, the only naval base left in the Mediterranean. Clearly, he 

would like to shore up his ally, Bashar al-Assad. At the very least, 

he wants to make sure that Bashar is not thrown under the bus 

by either other regime members or perhaps even Iran until at least 

he has some better sense of the way forward. His objective is to 

keep that naval base, and indeed to keep the airbase that is also 

useful for solidifying it in that corridor. I would think, beyond that, 

he wants to help Bashar solidify his grip, which has been challenged increasingly in recent months by ISIS and then by other opposition forces, as well, that runs from the coast to Holmes and 

then down to Damascus and so that he can at least keep a rump 

Syrian state. 

But, again, as I said, Assad cannot be part of the longrun solution. But, as I also said, we should not be quick to oust Assad until 

we have some sense of what will follow him. 

Senator MCCAIN. So, the United States, in the short term, should 

do what in regards to this—in response to this significant military 

buildup? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, the first is, we should not go in league 

with this, we should not think that we should—we can partner 

with Russia and Iran and Bashar al-Assad against ISIS. Again, if 

Russia wanted to fight ISIS, they could have joined the 60-plusmember coalition that General Allen has so capably put together, 

and helped drop bombs on ISIS. They have some capabilities that 

would be useful to that fight. So, this is clearly not what they’re 

up to. And we have to be very clear in our resolve to ensure that 

we deter action by Russia that would involve any of the forces 

we’re supporting and certainly anything that we’re doing in that 

region, and show firmly, not provocatively, that we will not accept 

that. 

I might add that this also extends, of course, to what’s going on 

in Ukraine. I was there a week or so ago. The good news is that 

the violence is down somewhat in the east, probably because Putin 

77 

is going to the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly, then has 

another negotiating round and would like to get out from underneath the sanctions that are so crippling. 

I might note that I think that Putin is not playing the strongest 

hand in the world, although he’s playing his hand, tactically, quite 

effectively. But, at the end of the day, Vladimir Putin is going to 

run out of foreign reserves. He’s probably got 200 billion or so left. 

He will burn through those in the course of the next 2 years. And 

if the sanctions are still imposed at that time, he and the companies that have debt coming due—he running a very large fiscal deficit—are not going to be able to go to the world markets and get 

money to finance their government operations. So, I think he has, 

actually, a limited window of a couple of years to continue provocative actions in Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Syria, Georgia, and so 

forth. And we have to be very careful during this time, when he 

could actually lash out and be even more dangerous than he has 

been. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And 

thank you, I think, for calling this very important hearing. 

And, General, thank you for your very incisive and extraordinarily erudite treatment of these complex issues. It’s been very 

helpful. 

Just want to sort of go back to the point that you made. Long 

term, Assad cannot be the future of Syria. 

General PETRAEUS. Correct. 

Senator REED. But, short term, you acknowledge that there has 

to be some recognition of what the following on—— 

General PETRAEUS. Absolutely. 

Senator REED.—would be. 

General PETRAEUS. Sure. I mean, Syria could actually get worse. 

Senator REED. Right. 

General PETRAEUS. And we—— 

Senator REED. Now, the—— 

General PETRAEUS. It’s hard to believe that, but it could get 

worse. 

Senator REED. Does that in some way imply that, for at least the 

temporary expedient measure, we would have to work with Assad, 

with the Russians, et cetera, to create a transition? You know, 

your—you seem to pose this dilemma as, ‘‘He can’t go until we 

know what’s following him. But, he can’t stay forever. But, we don’t 

know’’—— 

General PETRAEUS. Right. 

Senator REED.—‘‘where to move.’’ 

General PETRAEUS. Sure. 

Senator REED. I think that’s a key—— 

General PETRAEUS. I—— 

Senator REED.—to the question. 

General PETRAEUS. I think actually being seen to work with 

Assad would unravel our relationships with our Sunni partners in 

the region. And I think it’s, therefore, not something we can do. 

Having said that, what we can do is ensure that we don’t launch 

an offensive or support an offensive by opposition forces that could 

78 

precipitate his departure before, again, there is some sense of what 

will follow. 

As I mentioned, again, this Sunni Arab force that we need to 

support is essential not just to fight ISIS. It’s essential to create—— 

Senator REED. Right. 

General PETRAEUS.—the context within which you might actually 

get a political agreement. And that context is not there right now. 

Senator REED. So, essentially what your advice would be is that 

this Sunni opposition force, composed of a whole range of elements 

with different political philosophies, if it put sufficient pressure on 

Assad, could force him to leave. Is that the solution? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, but—well, I don’t know about ‘‘force 

him to leave.’’ Again, they can force a negotiated settlement, out of 

which, I would think, there will come something that will not include Assad. 

Senator REED. Well, let me ask—— 

General PETRAEUS. Again, I don’t see how he’s possibly part of 

the longrun—— 

Senator REED.—let me ask—again, I think you have—because of 

your insights, you have continually revealed the complexity of this 

issue, and let’s—if we could pursue it—who’s going to do the negotiations if we’re looking for a negotiated agreement? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, there is the U.N.’s Special Representative of the Secretary General. He happens to be the same individual, Staffan de Mistura, who was the SRSG in—— 

Senator REED. Iraq. 

General PETRAEUS.—Iraq during the surge, as you’ll recall. 

Senator REED. Yeah. 

General PETRAEUS. And, candidly, I played a role in persuading 

him to do the same position in Afghanistan, where he was also 

highly capable. So, he—we have—there is a—an extant process. I 

actually am seeing him on Sunday in New York, just purely coincidentally. 

Senator REED. So, you know, in a practical sense, we should 

begin to energize this U.N. process as—— 

General PETRAEUS. We—— 

Senator REED.—an effective means to create at least a forum for 

negotiations—— 

General PETRAEUS. Correct. Now—— 

Senator REED.—without embracing—— 

General PETRAEUS.—I mean, this does exist. It’s been—it’s had— 

been halting, to put a happy face on it, but it does exist, and it is 

something on which we could build, again, as there is a sense of 

the context developing, where those in Damascus are going to realize that perhaps it’s time to cut a deal, and those who are supporting Damascus in Tehran and now—— 

Senator REED. Right. 

General PETRAEUS.—in Moscow. 

Senator REED. Let me—you, early on, were advocating a trainand-equip program for Syria, to get effective counter-ISIL and 

counter-—at least counter-ISIL forces on the ground. Now, what 

can we do to revitalize that effort? Is it possible to revitalize it, to 

be very—— 

79 

General PETRAEUS. I think it is. Frankly, again, it has to. If we 

cannot do this, we aren’t going to defeat the Islamic State. We’ve 

done a great deal with the Syrian Kurds. 

Senator REED. Yeah. 

General PETRAEUS. But, you can’t push Kurds, there or in Iraq, 

farther than the areas that they can hold with legitimacy. So, you 

can’t push them all the way, I don’t think, to take out the capital 

of the Islamic State, for example, and expect them to hold that. It’s 

not their traditional territory. And the same is true in Iraq. Those 

who say, ‘‘Well, just keep pushing the peshmerga further.’’ The 

peshmerga shouldn’t go further. Masuhd Barzani knows that. I 

have heard that. And there’s recognition that that shouldn’t go. So, 

again, in Iraq there also has to be the development of this force. 

And that is moving along. 

I think, actually, the pieces are in place if we will resource them 

and actually make a critical policy decision. And I think that’s the 

critical element for a Sunni force in Syria. They are not going to 

be willing to be supported by us if we’re not going to support them 

when they’re under attack by Bashar as well as when they’re under 

attack by ISIS. Oh, by the way, for that matter, Jabhat al-Nusra, 

the Khorasan Group, or some others. 

Senator REED. So, you think the—it’s been a long and winding 

road, but it can be done, putting in the field indigenous forces, Syrian forces, et cetera. And the key policy decision is that they would 

be protected against any foe that—— 

General PETRAEUS. Indeed. And taken down the barrel bombs. If 

the barrel bombs continue, then the air force goes down. 

Beyond that, I think we’re going to have to support some forces 

that will not have gone all the way through our train-and-equip 

program. Again, I think pushing everybody through that is not necessarily the solution for ramping up. 

Senator REED. If the President—if the Chairman would indulge—one of the approaches to taking down the barrel bomb is 

eliminating the airfields, although some of these can be dropped by 

helicopters, so that makes it very difficult. But, the other is to destroy the aircraft, et cetera. Is there any sort of—that runs the 

risk, obviously, of some response—if not by the Syrians, some response by even in the Russians, at least protesting. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, there was a—it was publicly reported 

that, had we taken out the chemical systems in the redline issue, 

that a lot of that would have been done, if not all of it, by sea- and 

air-launched cruise—— 

Senator REED. Right. 

General PETRAEUS.—missiles and a variety of other. So, you 

don’t even have to fly in the airspace, necessarily. The fact is, we’re 

already in Syrian airspace. We’re flying over it all the time. We’ve 

already put boots on the ground in Syria, special mission-unit 

boots. So, we have the capability to do a great deal, and I think 

we know how to do it capably and without undue risk. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

80 

I’m—I agree with Senator McCain when he said that it’s refreshing to get a very succinct presentation, breaking it out—Iran, Iraq, 

Syria. And you’ve—you have certainly done that, and I appreciate 

it very much. 

General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir. 

Senator INHOFE. One thing we haven’t talked about very much 

is the refugee situation. And it’s been our feeling, or at least my 

feeling for a long time, that until such time as we develop a strategy in the Middle East, that it’s going to be very difficult to address 

this. It’s also, as you pointed out, become more severe if we don’t. 

In January, General Mattis testified before this group. He said, 

quote, ‘‘We have many potential allies around the world in the Middle East who have rallied to us, but we have not been clear about 

where we stand in defining or dealing with the growing violent 

jihadist terrorist threat.’’ He’s saying the same thing. We don’t 

have a specific strategy there. 

Dr. Kissinger stated before this committee, ‘‘The role of the 

United States is indispensable. It’s time for a global upheaval. And 

the consequences of American disengagement magnifies and requires larger intervention later.’’ 

First of all, I’d ask, Do you agree with these assessments? 

General PETRAEUS. I do. Yes. 

Senator INHOFE. You know, I’m embarrassed to say that if we 

have a strategy in the Middle East and dealing with specifically 

these countries and others, I don’t know what it is, because we’ve 

been waiting for that strategy. And it seems to me that you’re not 

going to resolve the refugee problem, that’s a very real one—here 

we are, expanding the numbers that we would be willing to accept. 

And that’s just a drop in the bucket when you look at 4 million 

that are out there, plus another 8 million that have been displaced 

within—are still in Syria. So, until that time, I don’t think that’s 

going to resolve the problem. Would you have a specific explanation 

of the strategy of the administration in the Middle East, affecting 

the whole Middle East along with the Syria, Iran, and Iran? Do 

you know what that is? 

General PETRAEUS. I’ll defer to the administration for that. 

Senator INHOFE. Well, I’ve been deferring to the administration 

for that, also, and we still don’t have it. 

The—you mentioned Ukraine. I know this is supposed to be the 

Middle East subject, but I happened to be there right after the 

Ukrainian elections, with Poroshenko, with Yatsenyuk, the Prime 

Minister, and how proud they were, and how committed they were 

to us, that they, for the first time in 96 years, don’t have one Communist on their—in their Parliament. And then immediately—of 

course, the—Putin started invading, sending troops in, sending 

equipment in. Very similar to what’s happening in Syria. Now, you 

did respond to what they’re trying to, I guess, do with their military buildup in Syria. Is there anything you would like to add to 

that, in terms of what their end game is, what they’re trying to accomplish with that? 

General PETRAEUS. Let me go back to Ukraine, if I could, actually, because I think—— 

Senator INHOFE. Sure. 

81 

General PETRAEUS.—what Putin wants in Ukraine is to ensure 

that the—that Ukraine does not succeed. His worst nightmare 

would be a thriving, vibrant, prosperous democracy with free-market economy on his western border. He knows—he can look at Poland and see what’s—what happened in the 20 years since—Poland 

and Ukraine had roughly the same—— 

Senator INHOFE. That’s right. 

General PETRAEUS.—per capita gross domestic product (GDP). 

Poland is twice as much now. Ukraine is still mired where they 

were. So, he’s going to do everything he can, not only now that the 

conflict seems to be freezing, to keep it bubbling, but what he really wants to do is, again, ensure that there is failure in Ukraine. 

And, in that regard, the future of Ukraine is going to be determined in Kiev, not out in the Donbass. 

Senator INHOFE. Yeah. 

General PETRAEUS. And there are concerns about political infighting and so forth. And the Ukrainian leaders have got to pull 

together and get the politics right, just the way, by the way, Iraqi 

leaders have got to pull together, because the center of gravity, as 

I mentioned, of the fight in Iraq is actually not on the front lines. 

As important as fighting on the front lines is, and pushing back 

ISIS and out of Ramadi and out of Mosul and so forth, the future 

of Iraq is going to be determined by politics in Baghdad. And, as 

I mentioned, we have a unique opportunity right now to support 

the Prime Minister of Baghdad, who is, a year into the job, pursuing very aggressive reforms. He’s done away with the vice presidencies, the deputy prime ministers, eight ministries, and is now 

asking for examination of the activities of the chief justice, somebody who was actually a solid, reasonable chief justice during the 

surge and a few years after that, but then increasingly became 

used, I think, is an accurate description, by Prime Minister Maliki 

to go after the senior Sunni Arab politicians and to support other 

activities that ultimately alienated the Sunni population and undid 

what we achieved during the surge. 

Senator INHOFE. But—General Petraeus, my time is expired, but 

here’s what I’d like to do. I’d like to have you answer, for the 

record—I go back to Oklahoma, and I talk to people, and they contend, and I do, too, that we’re over-complicating this deal that we 

have proposed with Iran, and that you don’t really need to go beyond the fact that, as our—Ronald Reagan used to say, verify. 

Verification is important. I don’t think verification is there. So, I’d 

like to have you analyze just that part of this proposed deal. If we 

have something that can go as long as 54 days before going in to 

find out whether or not Iran is developing some of the things that 

we think they are, I’d like to know how that is—verification plays 

into this, if you’d do that for me. 

General PETRAEUS. Sure. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

General Petraeus did not respond in time for printing. When received, information 

will be retained in the committee files. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Nelson. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, thank you for your service. 

82 

Characterize, if you would, on the solution that follows Assad in 

order to get there. How could we interact with Russia, in the U.N. 

context, in order to bring about a political solution? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, first of all, I think it’s just important 

to acknowledge that there are various potential options for Syria. 

One could be, you could put the whole country back together again 

and have a multiethnic, multisectarian, pluralist democracy—I find 

that probably remote, in terms of possibilities—all the way to acknowledging that we can’t put Humpty Dumpty back together 

again and there will be a number of states carved out of the old 

Syria, perhaps a Sunnistan, a Shiite-Alawite-stan, and Kurdistan. 

Perhaps more than one. But, again, none of this is going to happen. 

They’re not going to have negotiations, certainly unless the individual most responsible for this civil war, Bashar al-Assad, and his 

regime feel that they are threatened and that their survival is in 

question. 

I think if you can get to that point, then you might have the leverage to conduct negotiations, in which case we would expect that 

Russia would be on the side of keeping a favorable regime to them, 

because, again, their overriding national interest in this case, beyond President Putin striding the world stage again, as he did to 

provide the way out of the chemical weapons conundrum, is to 

maintain the seaport that he has at Tartus, and the airbase in that 

corridor that connects them on the Mediterranean coast. 

Senator NELSON. In your opinion, are we not getting close to that 

point, where Assad feels completely threatened? 

General PETRAEUS. I think probably the Russian intervention 

gives him a degree of new hope. I think he has been losing recently, gradually, steadily over the course of recent years—or a 

sense that he might not be able to continue the fight. But, of 

course, progressively what has happened over the years has been 

that, first, Quds Force advisors entered to help, Iran bankrolled 

and provided equipment and so forth, Russia’s provided some of 

that, and then Lebanese Hezbollah entered the fray on the side of 

Syria, as well. There are also reports of various Shiite militias from 

neighboring countries fighting on his behalf. And certainly the support from Russia, especially if it includes a considerable amount of 

military hardware, will bolster him further. 

Senator NELSON. Turning to Iran and the agreement, I read your 

op-ed with Ambassador Ross, and I find it very compelling. There 

are a lot of conclusions that the two of you drew that I had drawn, 

as well, in determining how I was going to vote. And that was that, 

in the short term, it certainly is, in my judgment and apparently 

what you articulated, in the interest of the United States with the 

agreement, but, in the long term—and you speak in terms of 10- 

15 years down the road. Do you want to expand, then, on your 

idea? And I’ll quote from your op-ed. ‘‘In other words, deterrence 

is the key to ensuring not just that the Iranians live up to the 

agreement, but also to preventing them from developing nuclear 

weapons.’’ 

General PETRAEUS. Absolutely. And not only that, deterring, if 

you will, or dissuading or persuading, countries in the region that 

they don’t need to go to that similar point that Iran is, or will be 

at the 15 year mark and perhaps beyond, because then we’re going 

83 

to have a real threat to the proliferation regime that is in place— 

the nonproliferation regime. 

So, again, the key element here is an ironclad United States position—again, ideally from both Congress and the White House—that 

states unequivocally that if Iran ever moves toward enriching to 

weapons-grade, that we will stop that, militarily. 

Senator NELSON. And your other sentence that leapt out at me, 

‘‘But, verification means only that we catch the Iranians if they 

cheat. What matters more is that the Iranians recognize that they 

will pay a meaningful price when we catch them.’’ 

General PETRAEUS. Correct. Absolutely. Yeah. Again, they’ve got 

to know in advance. And there are provisions in this. The snapback provision actually, I think, is fairly artful. Again, there are 

many positive features in this. The elimination of other entire 20- 

percent stockpile, elimination of 97-98 percent of the low-enriched 

3.5 percent, ends the plutonium path to a bomb, intrusive inspections, with some wrinkles, to be sure, and some challenges that 

have been noted. But, again, a number of positive, but some problematic ones, because along with that will come the release of at 

least $50 billion, according to the Under Secretary of the Treasury, 

that has been frozen around the world. And this is for a country— 

that’s 10 percent of its GDP, just given to it. And, while most of 

that undoubtedly will go to worthy programs for Iranian citizens, 

there will be a portion that will end up in the pockets of the Quds 

Force and enable them to further enable Lebanese Hezbollah, 

Hamas, the Houthis in Yemen, who, when they couldn’t get their 

way at the political table, got their way with force of arms and so 

forth, and Shiite militia in Iraq. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Sessions. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

General Petraeus, thank you for your service to your country. It’s 

been so valuable to us. Those who have watched your career, who 

have been with you in Iraq, seen you serve the country, I’m not 

aware of anyone who’s done a more superior job than you. And my 

respect for you and your integrity is unmatched. 

And Senator McCain, I believe his opening statement is very important for all of us. I think the questions Senator Reed has asked 

raise the kind of practical questions we’ve got to deal with. And I 

believe that, at this point in time, we, as a Congress, needs to assert itself. 

I think the first thing Congress should say to this administration 

is, ‘‘Show us a strategy that will leave us—lead us out of this morass that we’re in.’’ And we don’t have that today. I believe—and 

I’ll ask you. You’ve seen the political world, and you see the disagreements and agreements that occur. Don’t you think it’s possible for the Republicans and Democrats on this panel, in this Congress, to agree on a long-term overall strategy for the Middle East 

that could guide us for decades to come? And isn’t that important? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, what’s interesting is that this is one of 

those moments in time where there seems to be bipartisan—a bipartisan sense of a need to do more, frankly. And that includes to 

define all the elements of a strategy. As I mentioned, some of those 

84 

elements are there, some are under-resourced, and some are missing. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, if we had an overall goal, I think it 

would be important to have our allies also join in that. I think— 

do you think that’s possible—our European—— 

General PETRAEUS. I—— 

Senator SESSIONS.—allies, particularly—— 

General PETRAEUS. I—— 

Senator SESSIONS.—could join with us in a—on a plan that we 

could—it’s got to extend beyond the next presidential election. We 

can’t change our strategy every time a President changes. 

General PETRAEUS. Look, I—you know, it’s always good to recall 

Winston Churchill on allies, and he said the only thing worse than 

allies is not having any. And I spent a good bit of my time in Afghanistan, in particular, but also in Iraq, doing what might be 

termed ‘‘coalition maintenance.’’ And I firmly believe that we 

should never go it alone if we can avoid doing that, although we 

should also recognize that there will be different contributions from 

different countries. And, at the end of the day, there was—there 

were virtually no countries in Afghanistan that did not have some 

caveat of some type. And the art of that—of coalition command is 

figuring out what each country can uniquely do well, where each 

country needs to be augmented, frankly, by U.S. assets to enable 

it to do what it—to contribute the most that it can, given the limitations that it has. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think this is a historic hearing. I remember 

Senator McCain’s reference to your testimony with Ambassador 

Crocker. I asked you at that time, and you’ve already answered it, 

about the Middle East, I think, today, what you said. And we worried, ‘‘Could we be successful?’’ And I asked you, ‘‘Do you believe, 

if you go to Iraq with the—that we can achieve a successful result?’’ You said yes. I asked you, ‘‘If you got to the point where that 

wasn’t possible, would you tell us so?’’ And you said yes. And you 

succeeded as you suggested that we could succeed. 

I just can’t tell you how much I value your opening statements. 

And I think we all should appreciate the efforts of Senator McCain 

at that time in 2007, when his presidential election—he placed everything he believed about the forces and our men and women in 

combat above any personal political goals. And I think that’s a good 

example for all of us today. 

General PETRAEUS. I seem to recall him saying that he would 

rather lose an election than lose a war. 

Senator MCCAIN. So, I did both. 

[Laughter.] 

General PETRAEUS. And he—you know, if I could just make one 

quick comment, Senator. It’s really important to remember the 

surge that mattered most was not the surge of forces, it was the 

surge of ideas. It was a change in strategy. Big ideas are everything. And shifting from consolidating on big bases and getting out 

of the neighborhoods to recognizing that the only way to secure the 

people is by living with them was big idea number one. It was very 

difficult to execute. It was costly. But, it was necessary, and it actually did help bring security and, ultimately, brought violence 

down by some 90 percent, coupled with the other big idea, which 

85 

was, you can’t kill or capture your way out of an industrialstrength insurgency. You have to promote reconciliation. And that’s 

why I singled out building on that case of reconciliation that had 

been established in late 2006 in—outside Ramadi by Lieutenant— 

now Lieutenant General MacFarland, who is actually back in that 

region and spending the bulk of his time in Baghdad. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you for your service. Thank you for 

your wise words. And I think it’s a challenge to us to see if we 

can’t, at this point in history, develop an overall view of the Middle 

East. There’s been studies that show the violence that have been 

around where extremists—extreme Islam tends to cause conflicts. 

And I think we need to see the whole region. And, within it, we’ll 

have allies, and we’ll have problems, we’ll have things we have to 

accept even if we don’t like. Some things we’re going to have to try 

to provide leadership on. And a long-term agreement of that kind 

among both parties and all of our people, including our allies 

around the world, I believe would be a positive development. My 

hand is open to try to reach that kind of agreement. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Manchin. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, General, thank you again for your service—— 

General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir. 

Senator MANCHIN.—but also for being here today and presenting 

to us. I think it’s most valuable. 

You know, we look at trying to find something that would resonate over in that part of the world, especially with Syria being so 

unstable right now, and our relationships in that area. You can 

only look back at our past performance and find out, you know, and 

learn from that. So, you know, when Qadhafi was taken out of 

Libya and we had nothing to replace Qadhafi with, we see what’s 

happened to Libya. We’re gone out of there. 

In Iraq, when Maliki was put in, there had to be somebody making decisions on this was the person we’re going to put in, knowing 

he had to be a hardline Shi’ite, knowing that he would divide up 

the Sunni-Shi’ite forces there and cause, basically, the unstability 

that we have. Was that not considered, or is it just impossible to 

find a moderate that can work with the different sectors involved? 

General PETRAEUS. First of all, there’s been a lot of discussion of 

this, and a lot looking back. Ambassador Jeffrey, who was the Ambassador at the time—— 

Senator MANCHIN. I might add, so I—— 

General PETRAEUS.—has written about this. 

Senator MANCHIN. That’s the caution that we have with Assad 

right now. Everyone’s saying, ‘‘Who do you replace him with?’’ 

What do you do, since we’ve had failures in both of those? 

General PETRAEUS. Again, this is—you know, you play the—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Sure. 

General PETRAEUS.—part you’re dealt. You can influence that 

sometimes. There may have been a moment to do that. I actually 

ended up being in Afghanistan during the penultimate months of 

that. But, I was there for the initial piece. 

We should remember that—you know, I’ve been tough in Prime 

Minister Maliki here, but Prime Minister Maliki during the surge 

and, indeed, in the years after the surge, he’s the one who went 

86 

after the Shiite militia in Basrah, very, frankly, impulsively, as you 

may recall, in the charge of nights in—in March. We called it 

March Madness, in March of 2008. And it was a very close-run affair until we could get all of the forces marshaled to support his 

elements that were on the ground. And ultimately, it was a resounding victory there, in Sadr City, in Khatami, in a number of 

other places in Baghdad, and actually set the conditions for a period of relative stability and reasonable harmony that lasted for 

several years after that. Tragically, he undid much of what was 

done during the surge, no longer honored agreements that were 

made with the Sunni population, with the so-called Sons of Iraq, 

and so forth. And again, there has been a lot of academic and pundit discussion, think-tank discussion on why we hung with him, especially because—former Prime Minister Allawi got one more vote 

in the Parliament, but then just couldn’t form a government, and 

so there was a lot of wrangling back and forth. 

Without question, this is something that is in everyone’s mind 

and in everyone’s memory. And again, certainly the experience 

with Qadhafi, although I think, at the point at which we committed 

to support the upspring—wellspring of citizens going after Qadhafi, 

that that, arguably, was the right move. What needed to happen 

after that, of course, was to immediately, as quickly as possible, try 

to carry out a DDR program—a disarmament, demobilization, and 

reintegration program—for all the different militias, try to help 

form security forces as quickly as possible. And I think that we 

have learned some lessons in that regard so that, when you’ve got 

an inclusive government, that it’s supported wholeheartedly and 

you move forward. 

Senator MANCHIN. If I may, sir, I—— 

General PETRAEUS. Sure. Yes, sir. 

Senator MANCHIN. Time’s limited here. But, the Iran nuclear decision was probably the most difficult for all of us, not just in this 

committee, but, I think, in the whole Senate membership. With 

that being said, I leaned strongly toward supporting, because I 

wanted to work with our allies. And I always said, if I couldn’t go 

home and explain it, I couldn’t vote for it. And I could not explain 

to West Virginians, basically, when they would ask the question, 

What happens at the end of 8 and a half to 10 years? What happens at 15? Because we put them in a position to be stronger if 

they had not changed their ways. And, since we didn’t hold them 

accountable, basically, for their actions of terrorists, then how do 

you expect them to change their ways later on? So, that was the 

one thing to stop me from supporting it. 

What I would ask you is, How damaging to our allies would we 

have been—would the U.S. have been if it had been defeated, if we 

had not—those who voted for it had not voted for it? Would it have 

damaged our relationships, since our allies were all saying, ‘‘We’re 

going to go without you’’? 

General PETRAEUS. Oh, absolutely. Sure. And I think there are 

big questions about what would have happened—what would happen to their sanctions regime. Could you get it back together? We 

had kept Russia and China onboard through this whole process. 

Does it all become unraveled? And so forth. 

87 

And, look, I think the real question—this is a reality. Focusing 

forward, taking the rearview mirrors off the bus, the biggest question is, What happens after 15 years? That’s when virtually all— 

there’s a few that linger. 

Senator MANCHIN. I got it. 

General PETRAEUS. But, virtually all of the restrictions of the 

agreement end, and Iran can move out quite smartly in a variety 

of different areas in building its enrichment capacity and other elements of a program. And that’s why it is so vitally important that 

the U.S. be very, very clear, crystal clear, ironclad, why the White 

House and Congress, together, should be very clear about what 

would happen if Iran ever made a move towards weapons-grade enrichment. That will also, again, not only, hopefully, deter Iran, but 

also reassure our Gulf allies. And that’s another very important 

consideration. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, sir. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Wicker. 

Senator WICKER. General Petraeus, thank you for your testimony. 

I think we could have gotten a Status of Forces Agreement in 

Iraq if we’d really, really tried. Do you agree with that? 

General PETRAEUS. Actually, I—let me put it to you another way. 

I—I mean, if it goes through the Parliament—the problem was, it 

was not probably going to be approved by the Parliament. 

An interesting fact is that I believe we now have 3500 troops on 

the ground without a Status of Forces Agreement. So, we seem 

comfortable doing this now that we really have to. And, candidly, 

that was something I think we might have considered trying, given 

that the Prime Minister was going to give his personal assurance, 

and tested out. There’s no guarantee that having 10,000 troops on 

the ground would have given us the influence or prevented Prime 

Minister Maliki from taking the highly sectarian actions that he 

did, but I would have liked to have tested the proposition. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you for that. 

I’m encouraged that you’re so positive about Prime Minister 

Abadi and his reforms, and the fact that he is—has the backing of 

Iraqi citizens in the streets. I assume by that you mean Kurdish 

Iraqi citizens in the street. Sunni—— 

General PETRAEUS. No, I mean—I mean Shiite Iraqi. If you look 

at the—— 

Senator WICKER. Okay. Well, what about—— 

General PETRAEUS. I think folks haven’t—— 

Senator WICKER.—the Sunnis—— 

General PETRAEUS.—picked up—— 

Senator WICKER.—and the Kurds? 

General PETRAEUS. I don’t think folks have picked up—well, they 

very much want to see inclusive governance. The Sunnis desperately need it, because, without this, they have no source of revenue. So, those who say, ‘‘Let Iraq break up,’’ by the way—it’s one 

thing to—for Kurdistan, which his largely autonomous, now actually has pretty good oil revenues coming in, although not enough. 

I can—they are running a deficit, and they still need what they can 

88 

get, their 17 percent out of the oil revenues from Iraq proper, 

which means really the two southern provinces that produce the 

most. But, there’s no oil or gas revenue going to be provided for the 

Sunni areas. There’s no production in those areas. So, one of the 

really serious problems is, How would they survive? The second is, 

Who draws the boundaries? Where are the borders? I mean, if you 

have a state of politics that’s so fractious that you have a population that’s alienated, how in the world are you going to have an 

amicable divorce? This will be a very fractious divorce, and it will 

be another civil war, perhaps, along the lines of Syria. 

Senator WICKER. Okay. 

General PETRAEUS. So, great concern about that. Abadi wants to 

pursue inclusive politics. But, I don’t think people have picked up 

that there are huge demonstrations going on in the cities of Iraq 

in the southern part of the country, because of citizens who are 

outraged by insufficient services, particularly electricity, during extraordinarily hot weather in recent weeks—really, month—and 

then corruption. And they are just flat outraged. The Grand Ayatollah, then, seeing this outrage through his clerics, issued statements that really encouraged the kinds of reforms that Prime Minister Abadi has now pursued, and they are now moving—each 

week, he has pursued more reforms. And, indeed, he knows that 

the only way to get—to combat ISIL sustainably is to get the people in the area where ISIS is located to turn against them in the 

same way that we did with reconciliation with the Anbar Awakening with the Sons of Iraq Program. But, of course, citizens can’t 

turn against a particularly barbaric force unless they have a sense 

that they’re going to be secured. So, this will have to proceed. But, 

to do that, you have to have Sunni Arab Iraqis who will not only 

clear, but then be able to hold these forces, with a considerable assistance from us in the form os intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and precision strike assets. 

Senator WICKER. Okay. So, let me make sure I understand. 

That—this sort of divorce you talk about is something really to be 

avoided in Iraq. And you have a different view about Syria, where 

you seem to suggest in your testimony it wouldn’t be the end of the 

world if Syria as we’ve known it does split up into three or four—— 

General PETRAEUS. Well, because they’ve had this horrific situation. I mean, Syria—— 

Senator WICKER. So, you have—— 

General PETRAEUS.—has gone through considerable—you can call 

it sectarian cleansing. I mean, you’ve had horrific sectarian displacement. I mean, this would not have been the solution for Syria 

4 years ago. But, we are where we are with Syria, and you see 

enormous displacement of different sects. You—— 

Senator WICKER. But, we can avoid that in Iraq, and we should 

make every effort to—— 

General PETRAEUS. No guarantee we can, at all. This is a—going 

to be a very close-run affair. But, we should try to avoid it, I think. 

There will be greater devolution of power. There’s going to be— 

have to be a different political bargain, if you will, between Baghdad and the Sunni Arab provinces. And, by the way, one of the 

challenges on the Sunni Arab side is that the Mosulawis don’t 

agree with the Tikrikis who don’t agree with the Anbaris. So, you 

89 

even have a fractious situation among the various Sunni leaders— 

by the way, all whom come through here or see you somewhere out 

in the region. So, that’s going to be difficult, as well. There is nothing easy about this situation right now. But, I don’t think we 

should just say, ‘‘Okay, we’ll just let it go further,’’ because there 

are still mixed areas in Baghdad, there are still mixed areas in the 

Baghdad belts. Diyala Province is still highly mixed. There have 

been efforts to reduce that amount of mixing. There has been sectarian displacement; indeed, in some cases, perhaps worse than 

that. But, the only way to prevent that kind of horrific civil war 

breaking out, which is what will—the result will be if there is a 

determination to break it into Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdistan—you’ve 

got to get inclusive politics. You, once again, have to give the 

Sunnis a sense that they have a stake in the success of the future 

of Iraq rather than a stake in its failure. And that’s what they 

came to feel, back in 2006, before the surge, and it’s what they 

have come to feel in the last couple of years, as well. 

Senator WICKER. Well, your answers are very thorough, and 

we’re way out of time. I—let me just ask for something on the 

record, because Senator McCain mentioned it in his opening statement. I would hope that, on the record, you can give us your insight as to what lessons we might apply in Afghanistan that we’ve 

learned from our experience in Iraq. 

General PETRAEUS. Could—Chairman, could I make two quick 

points on Afghanistan, possibly? 

First of all, there have been reports recently that there was a 

policy or an acceptance of what clearly is absolutely reprehensible, 

unacceptable behavior by certain Afghans with using male, essentially, sex slaves and so forth. I was very pleased to see General 

Campbell issue a statement today, the current Commander in Afghanistan, who, by the way, was a two-star in Afghanistan, as 

you’ll recall, with the great 101st Airborne Division when I was the 

Commander of the International Security Assistance Force. He was 

also there as a brigade commander. And he stated very clearly that 

has never been a policy, it is not a policy now, and it certainly was 

not something that was acceptable or even discussed, frankly, when 

I was the Commander of the International Security Assistance 

Force. 

The very first line of a counterinsurgency guidance that I put out 

as COM ISAF said we have to help—we have to be seen to be helping secure and serve the people, and we have to help the Afghan 

forces do the same. There’s no way that that kind of behavior 

would be seen as helping to serve the Afghan people. And it is absolutely unacceptable. 

Second, look, I do think that we have to take a very hard look 

at our future plans for the footprint that we have in Afghanistan, 

recognizing that now there is an Islamic State presence being established there, recognizing there still is work to be done to continue the disruption, the further disruption of al-Qaeda senior leadership in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. 

That campaign has had considerable—considerable progress, success, indeed not only on Osama bin Laden, but, over a certain period, three number-twos in about an 18-month period. And that is 

a very, very much diminished in capability central headquarters for 

90 

al-Qaeda, but it has to continue to be disrupted, because we don’t 

own the ground, and really nor does Pakistan, fully. 

Beyond that, we’re in a situation where, with a relatively modest 

number of United States forces providing assistance to our Afghan 

partners, we are able to continue to accomplish the mission that we 

went to Afghanistan to achieve. And we cannot forget why we went 

there and why we stayed. It was because Afghanistan was where 

al-Qaeda planned the 9/11 attacks and conducted the initial training for those attacks. And our mission was to ensure that never 

again would Afghanistan be a sanctuary for al-Qaeda or other 

transnational extremists to do that again. 

That mission has been accomplished, so far, as you know, Senator. It is now being done with a relatively modest number of U.S. 

forces. There still are casualties, but way, way less for us. In the 

meantime, Afghan forces are very much fighting and dying for 

their country to help achieve the mission that is so important to 

us and to them, to not allow the force retake their country, the 

Taliban, that did allow al-Qaeda to camp out on its soil and plan 

those attacks. 

Senator REED [presiding]. Thank you very much. 

On behalf of Chairman McCain, let me recognize Senator Donnelly. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, General, thank you and your family for your service to this 

country. And it is good to have you back here with us today, and 

we appreciate your ideas, your advice a great deal. 

One of the things I want to ask you about is, you emphasized the 

need to work with the Kurds, Turkey, Israel, and other allies, to 

interdict Iranian arms bound for extremist groups. We’ve had the 

authority to cut off these shipments. What are the challenges, and 

what are your recommendations, to help finish the job on this? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, the challenges have been that there has 

been fairly devious and difficult operational security carried out by 

Iran when it has provided weapons to different forces, whether it’s 

Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis, whatever. We do have a unique situation with respect to Hamas now that is quite extraordinary, and 

that is that Egypt, for the first time, is cutting the tunnels and absolutely obliterating the tunnels that used to enable the, basically, 

free movement of goods and—including weapons and ammunition, 

from the Sinai into Gaza. That is no longer a reality, and that is 

a major development in that regard, and a big help to us. 

Beyond that, I do think we make gains in a variety of different 

technologies and forms of intelligence, whether it’s so-called maritime big data or a variety of other advances that can help us interdict that flow of—maritime flow, first, as it has, to some degree, 

limited the flow to the Houthis, where, of course, in Yemen, where 

the Saudis, the Emirates, the Qataris, other Gulf Cooperation 

Council countries are engaged in rolling back the action of the Iranian-supported Houthis, who, as I mentioned earlier, are trying to 

get at the point of a gun what they couldn’t get at the negotiating 

table. 

Senator DONNELLY. Because I see this as a critical part of the 

nuclear agreement that was just put together, is, what you were 

talking about, the promise and the guarantee that we’ll stand with 

91 

them to push back on the conventional side from corner to corner 

here. And one of the areas is Lebanon, as well, and Hezbollah. How 

do you feel we can be most effective at interdicting materiel, missiles, and others going to Hezbollah? 

General PETRAEUS. I think what we can most effectively do is assist our Israeli allies, frankly, with the provision of intelligence 

from a variety of different sources. And they have certainly not 

shrunk from taking action when there have been meaningful movements of military capabilities going from Syria to Lebanon, for example. 

The concerns that President Netanyahu discussed with President 

Putin yesterday, I believe it was, undoubtedly included a discussion 

of Israel saying, ‘‘We will continue to take action if hardware that 

matters moves from, say, Damascus to—into the Beqaa Valley into 

Lebanon Hezbollah.’’ 

Senator DONNELLY. I wanted to follow up with a question about 

Baghdad, where you say so much has to be determined. When we 

were in Iraq not too long ago, it was pretty clear that the Shiite 

leadership in Baghdad was not creating any confidence with the 

Sunni leaders in the tribal belt out in Anbar and in other areas. 

And so, how do we change that mix? I know supporting Abadi is 

critical, but how do we change the mix of so many of the Shiite 

leaders who are tied to Iran so closely in getting some understanding in them that it’s not going to work against ISIS unless we 

have our Sunni tribal leaders with us, and they’re not going to be 

with us until they start to feel that the Shiite leaders in Baghdad 

understand that, give them a piece—give them, in effect, a piece 

of ownership of the country? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, what’s very, very important is that the 

elected Prime Minister of the country recognizes the criticality of 

inclusive politics. That is hugely important. It’s also important to 

recognize that the people right now are quite supportive of the actions the Prime Minister is taking, because the people are outraged 

about the lack of basic services, the corruption—— 

Senator DONNELLY. He has a real—— 

General PETRAEUS.—and so forth. 

Senator DONNELLY.—window now, then. 

General PETRAEUS. He has a window. This is a very tenuous situation, because, again, opposing him are the very forces that, arguably, saved Baghdad when the Islamic State was threatening it on 

its—on the belts. And then, these are the forces that some people 

are allied with. And they—by the way, at least a couple of these 

forces are led by individuals who were in detention, during my time 

as the commander of the multinational force, because of their involvement in the killing of our soldiers. They are now leading, not 

only militias, but parties in the Parliament, to give you some sense 

of how challenging this is. 

So, we’re going to have to patiently, painstakingly, day after day, 

engage, use our convening authority, our support for the establishment of Iraqi Security Forces not beholden to a particular political 

party with Iranian support, and so forth. 

But, this is going to be a close-run affair, make no mistake about 

it. Prime Minister Abadi has crossed the Rubicon into—in the form 

of the reforms that he is pursuing. Keep in mind that when he did 

92 

away with the vice presidencies, he did away with the jobs of the 

former Prime Minister of Iraq, Maliki, another former Prime Minister, Allawi, and the former Sunni Arab Speaker of the Parliament. These are considerable figures, and I think it was the 

right move, a very strong move, but he is going to have to be 

shored up in every way that is possible, not just by the United 

States, but by the coalition, and, more importantly, by forces within Iraq that want to see their country move forward again as an 

inclusive country rather than one that practices exclusive politics 

that are carried out, in many cases, at the force of a gun. 

Keep in mind the outrageous activities that have taken place in 

Baghdad, where one of these militias just recently, basically, kidnapped—I think it was 18 or so Turkish workers, moved them all 

the way from Baghdad down to Basrah without being stopped, and 

is holding them ransom down there for some not particularly clear 

objective, other than Turkey stopping the flow of ISIS into Iraq. 

There have been very, very public threats by some of the militias 

against serving leaders, including the Prime Minister. 

So, this is a moment of real consequence, a moment of considerable drama in Baghdad, and I think we have missed how significant it is to see this number of Iraqi citizens in the streets expressing their outrage at what’s going on in Baghdad, a Prime Minister 

who’s moving to take action in response to that, but very powerful 

elements that are going to oppose him. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you again for your service to the 

country. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN [presiding]. Isn’t it true that the major political influence is Iranian in Baghdad? 

General PETRAEUS. It is certainly a very important one. I’d have 

to think through what other one might possibly rival it. But, I can’t 

think—come up with one. 

But, you know, having said that, Chairman, as you know, Iraq 

has never wanted to be the 51st state of Iran and use that support 

like a crutch when it’s required. The problem is that, when that 

support gets tentacles into parties and so forth, it’s very hard to 

get it back out. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Fischer. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General, for your—— 

General PETRAEUS. Senator. 

Senator FISCHER.—service to this country, but also for being here 

today so that you can provide us with, I think, some very important insights. 

Our approach in Syria and Iraq seems to be that we’re going to 

be relying on local partners to be the boots on the ground. Just how 

far do you think these local partners are going to be able to take 

us? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, again, they’ll go as far as is in their interest to do so, which is why I mentioned earlier—we just have to 

be realistic about that. That is reality. That’s why I mentioned earlier, we should not think that the Kurdish peshmerga, for example, 

can be pushed much farther below where it is that they are in Iraq 

right now, or, frankly, the Syrian peshmerga. Again, you might get 

93 

them a bit farther, you might employ them for some specific operations. They’ll play a role in clearing parts of Mosul, one would 

think. But, they can’t, ultimately, hold those areas if they are predominantly Sunni Arab. So, I think, in that sense, we just have to 

be realistic. They have a stake, however, in doing, generally, what 

it is that we want done, which is to defeat the extreme—the most 

extreme of extremists, the Islamic State, and then also, of course, 

ultimately to create a context within which Bashar al-Assad will be 

ushered from the scene in Syria, although it’s difficult to tell, 

again, what ultimate shape Syria will have at that point. 

Senator FISCHER. General Dempsey speaks about patience and 

risk, and weighing of the patience needed and against how much 

risk we’re looking at. How much patience should we be exhibiting 

towards our local partners in Iraq and Syria? How long should we 

stick with them before we reach a point where we’ve assumed too 

much risk and there may be no options left that the United States 

can look at? When do we reach that point? And is a tactical stalemate where we want to be? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, look, as I said, we are not where we 

should be. And the tactical stalemate is actually a fairly dynamic 

stalemate. This is not a stalemate that has, you know, World War 

I trenches, and so forth. There’s a lot of movement. We are rolling 

back ISIS in certain places, inflicting very heavy casualties on 

them. I would not want to be a leader in the Islamic State in Iraq 

or Syria, because I think it would be very hard to get a life insurance policy if you were in those shoes. 

Having said that, there’s a lot of reinforcements flowing in. And 

yes, we’ve pushed them out of this area or that area, and then they 

go into Ramadi. Or, in Syria, they’ve sustained defeats around 

Khobani, and they go into lightly defended Palmyra. So, again, this 

is still a lot of movement. And ISIS is on the defensive in certain 

areas—without question, in many areas—but still has the freedom 

of action to exercise initiatives, certainly in some places. 

The key with our partners is, of course, to be—we should be impatient, we should push it as hard as we can. But, as you know, 

this is one of those where you can’t rush to failure. And that’s, unfortunately, what can happen if we push it just too hard. 

Senator FISCHER. I believe, in your opening, you said that, in the 

future, what will be our relationship to the Iranian power, as we 

see this after the agreement, and that the United States used to 

be a counter to Iran, and now we may be looking at accommodating 

them. Can you tell me what you feel would be the challenges and 

if there are any opportunities to both of those positions—— 

General PETRAEUS. Well—— 

Senator FISCHER.—if we find ourselves as—— 

General PETRAEUS. Sure. 

Senator FISCHER.—a counter or if we find ourselves as being 

there just to accommodate Iran? 

General PETRAEUS. Yeah. And again, what I said was that there 

are concerns in the region that we might accommodate Iran, that 

we might work with them, and now Russia—— 

Senator FISCHER. And certain comments—— 

General PETRAEUS.—and Bashar. 

Senator FISCHER.—I think—— 

94 

General PETRAEUS. Now—— 

Senator FISCHER.—have challenged our credibility recently, from 

the Secretary of State, with—in Syria, for example, though, as well. 

So, it goes to our credibility in the region, too, beyond that. 

General PETRAEUS. And credibility matters. 

Senator FISCHER. Yes. 

General PETRAEUS. I can tell you, I was just out in Asia, Mr. 

Chairman, and Australia, and it’s all about United States credibility and what does it—what does that mean for the South China 

Sea? Does what happened in Syria a few years ago have implications for that? The answer is yes, it does. 

At the end of the day, if Iran’s foreign policy is continued to be 

dictated by the Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force and enables proxies like Lebanese Hezbollah, a designated terrorist organization by the United States, Hamas, another one, Houthis, again, 

with what they’re doing, and murderous Shiite militia in Iraq, then 

obviously we have to counter that malign activity. If, on the other 

hand, Iran changes spots, whatever changes its approach and so 

forth, I—by all means, if the conditions change, then we should be 

always alert for opportunities to work with what used to be a 

former enemy. We’ve done this throughout our history. I think the 

chances of that are not particularly high, but it’s not something one 

can rule out if something happens as a result, perhaps of Iran 

being reintegrated into the global economy and deciding that it 

wants to be a responsible world citizen instead of trying to achieve 

regional hegemony. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Cotton. 

Senator COTTON. General Petraeus, thank you very much for 

joining us today. Thank you for your many decades of distinguished 

service—— 

General PETRAEUS. Thanks for your own service. 

Senator COTTON.—to our country. 

In your testimony, you’ve broken your main areas of focus down 

to Iraq, Syria, and Iran, and also you recognized the interrelated 

nature of them. I want to start with the section on Iran where you 

emphasize that the nuclear deal, whatever its short-term implications for the nuclear program, cannot be seen as ushering in a new 

age of accommodation or conciliation of Iran’s interests in the regions. Given what’s happened in Syria over the last month with 

Russia entering the picture, how do you think that our Arab and 

Israeli partners in the region view our current posture towards 

Iran’s influence in Syria? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, I think they’re actually waiting to see 

right now, frankly. I think—that’s why I inserted the point. I talk 

to a number of those individuals, and—on a quite regular basis— 

and they have expressed concerns about the future. And they want 

to see us continue to counter malign activity by Iran if that continues. And we have to be very, very clear about that. Beyond that, 

I think, again, the very clear, ironclad statement about what would 

happen if Iran moves towards weapons-grade uranium enrichment 

after the 15-year mark, or if they should do it before then, has— 

that has to be very clear, as well. That would speak volumes. 

95 

Senator COTTON. You helpfully recommend in your testimony a 

few concrete suggestions for policy direction for each of Iran, Syria, 

and Iran. There is one related to Iran that says, quote, ‘‘additional 

actions to demonstrate that the theater remains set with respect to 

our own capabilities to carrying out military operations against 

Iran’s nuclear program, if necessary,’’ end quote. Would you elaborate on what you mean by that? 

General PETRAEUS. Thanks, Senator. 

Back—in fact, when I was the Commander of United States Central Command, we developed a plan that would attack Iran’s nuclear program. It was quite thoroughly developed, rehearsed, and 

the theater was set. In other words, as a logistician, as Senator 

Ernst would appreciate, we—you know, we had all the bed-down 

sites, we had munitions positioned, the fuel. Everything is there so 

that if you need to conduct an attack like that on relatively short 

notice, you can do it. The theater has remained set, by and large, 

ever since. I think there’s the possibility of adjustments now, because some of the countries in the region, I think, would be more 

accommodating to basing than they were at that time. Kingdom of 

Saudi Arabia foremost among them. So, again, I think it’s time to 

very publicly lay out how we have postured our forces—again, not 

giving away major secrets, here, or something like that—but ensuring that the region knows, and Iran knows, that, if need be, we can 

do what is necessary with our military forces. 

Senator COTTON. What message does the absence of a United 

States Navy aircraft carrier group in the Persian Gulf send to Iran, 

Syria, and Russia, on the one hand, and the Sunni Gulf states, on 

the other hand? 

General PETRAEUS. It says that there are limits to U.S. military 

power. What I don’t know is whether that means that there’s none 

in, not only the Arabian Gulf, but also in the Arabian Sea. In the 

past, we’ve actually had two out there, at a—or at least a minimum 

of one, although that one might sit off the coast, sort of south of 

Pakistan, flying its aircraft up into Afghanistan every day. And if 

there’s none in either of those locations, again, that’s a statement 

that there are distinct limits to what it is we’re capable of doing, 

and therefore, there are limits to what we can do to help the forces 

in the region. 

Senator COTTON. Moving northward to Syria, you write, in one 

of your proposals for Syria, ‘‘We could, for example, tell Assad that 

the use of barrel bombs must end, and, if they continue, we will 

stop the Syrian air force from flying.’’ I suspect that he will not listen to us if we tell him that, so we must stop him if we want them 

to stop. Did you propose this policy to President Obama while you 

were in government? 

General PETRAEUS. Yeah. When Syria started, I was the Director 

of the CIA, not in uniform anymore, and certainly didn’t have any 

responsibility for military actions with respect to Syria. 

Senator COTTON. Did you support that policy that others recommended? 

General PETRAEUS. I don’t remember a recommendation of it. I 

don’t remember barrel bombs at that time, frankly. Again, this is 

the very early stages, where there was no Lebanese Hezbollah, 

there was no ISIS, there was no Jabhat al-Nusra, there was no 

96 

Khorasan Group, and there was no—maybe limited Quds Force advisors on the ground. 

Senator COTTON. And now there’s Russia, with surface-to-air 

missiles and fighter aircraft. Could you explain to us what exactly 

it would look like if we were to stop Assad from using these barrel 

bombs or to ground his aircraft, given the presence of Russia in 

such heavy numbers now? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, I think Russia would probably get a little bit of advanced warning once certain assets are in the air. This 

doesn’t mean that you have to penetrate into the integrated air defense of what might be left of that integrated air defense of Syria. 

You can do this with, again, lots of different forms of cruise missiles coming off of ships, subs, and planes. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you. My time is expired. 

Senator REED [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Cotton. 

On behalf of the Chairman, let me recognize Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

And, General Petraeus, great to have you with us. This testimony has been quite helpful. So, I’m going to just go into areas 

where I’m confused and I’m really interested in your opinion. 

We’ve had a lot of testimony before this committee, really over 

the last year and a half, most recently General Austin’s posture 

hearing in March of this year, that talks about the instability we’re 

seeing in the region as kind of a spiking of a longstanding Sunni/ 

Shiite divide that is, at some points, relatively calm, and, at other 

points, you know, pretty significant. And yet, I’ve also heard others 

say that that might overstate it. It could be more Arab v. Persian 

or, you know, Revolutionary Guard v. monarchy, or it could be all 

of them together. But, I just would like to ask your question—your 

opinion on this. Do you think the Sunni/Shiite divide, kind of the 

sectarian divide, is widening? And is that a significant contributing 

factor to the challenges that we’re seeing? 

General PETRAEUS. I think that there has been a widening of the 

sectarian divide. I think what you see in Syria is very much a sectarian civil war. But, I would also point out, there are also ethnic 

overtones, because, in Syria alone, you have a Kurdish—Syrian 

Kurdish element that clearly wants, and has now achieved, a degree of greater autonomy. And you have, of course, the same in 

Iraq. And then, frankly, in some other countries you have what 

might be more of a tribal—or, say, an Islamist versus non-Islamist, 

as is the case in Libya, with a real civil war, but largely between 

Sunni Arabs, or in Tunisia, which has been more of a political contest, where, thankfully, the two leaders of the major parties actually agreed to agree with each other, or at least not to be a—opposed to the bitter end, but actually reach some compromise. 

Senator KAINE. To the extent that—so, multiple factors. And 

that’s my sense, too, from my more limited experience. But, to the 

extent that some of the divide—some of the instability is caused by 

a widening sectarian divide, would you agree that it is pretty important that the United States not unwittingly sort of, you know, 

plant our feet on one side or the other of a sectarian divide? Sunni 

versus Shiite is not the U.S.’s issue, and we do need to be careful 

and just kind of be mindful of not giving the impression that we’re 

taking a side in a sectarian divide. 

97 

General PETRAEUS. No, I think that’s—that is accurate. And I 

think all we have to do if people say, ‘‘Well, you’re on the side of 

the Gulf Cooperation Council countries or all Sunni Arab,’’ we 

would then merely point out, of course, that we have supported the 

Shiite Arabs in Iraq, and if it were not for our action, Sunni Arabs 

would still be ruling the country. 

Senator KAINE. Right. Indeed. 

General PETRAEUS. A Shiite-majority country, by far. 

Senator KAINE. Indeed. 

Another strategic challenge. It seems like the areas where we’ve 

done best in the battle against ISIL are the areas where we’ve 

worked in close cooperation with the Kurds. I was at the—with 

Senator Donnelly at the Joint Operations Command in Erbil in 

July, I guess, and then some of the activities of the United States 

and Kurds working together in northern Syria have had some success. But, sadly, ‘‘no success’’ doesn’t create some of its own challenges. And, on the Syrian side, it just struck me as odd that, after 

a long time of trying to get Turkey more engaged in the battle of— 

against ISIL, it was—when we started to do a lot of work together 

with the Kurds, around Khobani and elsewhere, and achieved some 

success, that Turkey then decided, ‘‘Okay, now is time we want to 

really participate in this.’’ And then, there’s obviously been tension 

between Turkey and some of the, you know, very elements that— 

Kurdish elements in northern Syria that are having some success 

against ISIL. I’d be interested in your, kind of—— 

General PETRAEUS. Sure. 

Senator KAINE.—thoughts on the Turkish role, here, and how we 

maintain that NATO alliance with Turkey and get them involved 

in the battle against ISIL without them cutting the legs out from 

under the Kurds, who have been effective partners. 

General PETRAEUS. I mean, Turkey’s been an ally for decades, 

very, very important country in the defense, first, against the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union, and continues to play a very important 

role. And I think it’s very significant that, again, General Allen and 

others did great work to get access to Incirlik Airbase and to get 

pledges by Turkey to—certainly to make the movement of ISIL 

through their country into Syria much more difficult. 

But, clearly there are historic tensions between Turkey and their 

Kurdish population. Very sadly, very tragically, there is now much 

greater violence as a cease-fire—and there are various explanations 

as to why this has happened, and whether the blame lies in the 

capital of Turkey or out with the Kurds, themselves. 

But, this another complicating factor, without question. And I 

think we saw that the Kurdish Regional Government of Iraq, which 

was starting to think that Turkey would be very, very supportive 

as they were exporting oil through Turkey and so forth, when they 

tried to reinforce Khobani with Kurdish peshmerga from Iraq, 

found it very difficult to move that until the United States again 

offered its convening authority and brought people together and 

helped push that through. So, there are some historic tensions 

there, as well. 

And so, again, the—I mean, the bottom line, as you very, very 

rightly identified, there aren’t—there are sectarian divides that are 

98 

very, very important, probably—arguably, the most important, unless you’re caught in the middle of an ethnic divide—— 

Senator KAINE. Yeah. 

General PETRAEUS.—between, say, Arab and Kurd or Arab and 

Persian, when that’s the most important. And then there’s also a 

tribal overlay, and even in—Islamist versus non-Islamist in countries like, again, Libya, Tunisia, and, frankly, in Egypt, for that 

matter. 

Senator KAINE. Great. 

General, thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Senator REED. On behalf of the Chairman, let me recognize Senator Rounds. 

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, sir. 

General Petraeus, thank you very much for your service to our 

country. 

Over the last year or so, Prime Minister of Israel has come before 

us and explained and expressed his concern with regard to the— 

what I would call the nuclear concession agreement which our administration has proposed. King Abdullah of Jordan has been before us and has requested, as he said—first of all, on the day that 

it was announced that one of his pilots had been incinerated, he 

said, ‘‘Thank you for the F-16s, but,’’ he says, ‘‘it would be very appropriate if we could also receive some of the armaments, which we 

have been waiting on as a country for literally 24 months.’’ And 

then, in the spring of this year, Saudi Arabia, along with a coalition of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan, Iraq, Sudan, Egypt, and 

UAE, when they began their campaign in support of, or at least in 

their attempt to make headway in Yemen, we found out about it 

as a nation after it had occurred. Seems to me that that does not 

suggest, in any one of those occasions, a deep degree of cooperation 

and trust with those traditional partners that we have. You mentioned the need for coalition maintenance. Could you give us your 

assessment on what needs to be done right now to perhaps begin 

the process of building and maintaining that coalition that we’ve 

been relying on in the Middle East for years? 

General PETRAEUS. Sure. And some of the elements, of course, 

were in my opening statement, where I talked about, again, first 

and foremost, reassuring them that Iran will never be allowed to 

enrich to weapons-grade, then approving requests for various weapon systems that have taken a long time to be approved and 

wouldn’t seem to threaten any of the balances about which we are 

concerned. That’s particularly interesting now that there is a convergence of interest between Israel and the Gulf states, as an example. The integration of different military capabilities of the countries themselves—take ballistic missile defense, early warning systems, and so forth—again, this is something we have been pushing. 

Secretary Carter has encouraged, as Commander of Central Command. Again, there’s more we can do in those areas, as well. 

Again, this is—really comes down to a question of whether we’ll 

be there when they need us most. There’s no question there have 

been strains. There’s no question that some of the episodes in recent years have generated some concern. We have to be careful not 

to overdo it, because there’s an insatiable desire for certain—you 

99 

know, the requests never stop. But, I think we do have to reassure 

these countries, and I’ve laid out some ways, in the opening statement, I think, on how we should go about that. 

Senator ROUNDS. I’d like to go back to one of those thoughts, and 

that was that you indicated we should make it crystal clear that 

we would not allow uranium enrichment to occur with regard to 

the Iranians’ activities. 

General PETRAEUS. To weapons-grade. 

Senator ROUNDS. To weapons-grade. 

General PETRAEUS. Right. 

Senator ROUNDS. Do you think that’s missing in the—or one of 

the items which was missing in the arrangement or the proposal 

that the administration has brought forward? 

General PETRAEUS. I think we can make it more clear. And, 

frankly, if Congress and the White House were to do it together, 

if this was, you know, seen as ironclad—again, remember that, of 

course, it’s not Members of this Congress or this White House that 

are going to be around 15 years from now. It’ll be their successors’ 

successors. But, establishing a U.S. policy that becomes, again, 

very, very foundational, I think would be a very important move. 

The President did, in a letter to one of your House of Representatives, Congressman Nadler, lay this out, but then there was a little 

qualification later on. So, again, this is a time just to be absolutely 

clear, straightforward. And I think that that opportunity is there. 

Senator ROUNDS. I agree with you. I wish it would have been included in the proposal that we saw. 

Finally, with regard to reconciliation, I just noted one item— 

when we talk about building and trying to find those coalitions and 

so forth, I just wanted to—a clarification, and that is with regard 

to ISIS. Do you see any reconciliation ever available with those 

who we now term as ISIS? 

General PETRAEUS. Certainly not with any of their leaders, middle leaders, or probably the bulk of the rank-and-file. I mean, this 

is such an extremist organization that it is probably beyond redemption. I wouldn’t rule out the possibility of a few misguided 

souls that want to come back to the fold. 

A fair amount was made that I said that we should deal with 

Jabhat al-Nusra, the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria. I really didn’t say 

anything of the sort. What I did say is, we should try to strip away 

from within—Jabhat al-Nusra has had a number of groups that 

probably would have been classified as moderate Sunni Arab elements drift to it because it had resources, and they did not, and 

because it, probably more importantly, is actually fighting against 

Bashar al-Assad, and the forces that we were supporting had to accept that they’d—they would not do that, as a condition of our providing them weapons and training. 

And I do think that there’s a possibility that there might be some 

sub-sub elements, and certainly some fighters, that could be wooed 

back to the cause of the—we did this—you know, it was not popular throughout the ranks in Iraq in February 2007 when I said 

that we are going to have to sit down with people who have our 

blood on their hands—al-Qaeda Iraq and associated insurgent 

groups. That did not mean that we sat down with the leaders of 

Iraq—of al-Qaeda Iraq. We tried to kill or capture them. The same 

100 

with the major insurgent groups. It did mean that there were a 

number of individuals, though, below that with whom we did deal 

and did bring them in. Ultimately, you know, there were 103,000 

or so Sons of Iraq, of which about 80,000 or so were Sunni Arab. 

And, by the way, there were Shiite Arab Sons of Iraq, as well, ones 

that wanted to shed their ties with the militia, particularly after 

the militia were defeated. 

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, sir. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman MCCAIN [presiding]. Senator Hirono. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General, for being here today. 

The Middle East is an area that is very complicated, and there’s 

a lot of instability there, to say the least. So, how would you rank 

the most destabilizing forces in the Middle East, if you were to look 

at Assad, ISIL, Iran and its malign activities in the region, alQaeda? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, I mean, they’re all sources of enormous 

instability and, really, again, problems that extend beyond the region. The—— 

Senator HIRONO. So, would you be able to rank them? 

General PETRAEUS. I don’t think I can, no. And I—you know, on 

a given day, we might be more concerned with a plot by the Islamic 

State, which might actually do enormous damage in Europe to one 

of our allies, or perhaps even inspire something in the United 

States. On another day, it might be the actions of Iran in providing 

lethal munitions to Hamas to rain indirect-fire—— 

Senator HIRONO. So—— 

General PETRAEUS.—objects on Israel. 

Senator HIRONO.—General, in the 10 years that you were—that 

you served in the Middle East, then, has it always been thus there? 

It could have been the Taliban, it—you know, there was always 

just a whole range of entities who created tremendous instability 

in that area—has it always been that way in the Middle East? 

General PETRAEUS. Oh, no, I think the instability in the Middle 

East is much greater now than it was, say, when I was the Commander of U.S. Central Command, from 2008 through 2010. I 

mean, for one thing, we’ve had the Arab Spring. So, it’s not just 

a result of extremist elements, Bashar al-Assad, or Iran. It is the 

throwing over of longtime dictators who did achieve a degree of stability in their countries, but obviously at such great expense—— 

Senator HIRONO. Yes. 

General PETRAEUS.—that, ultimately, the people rejected them. 

So, I think that’s probably the single biggest cause of the instability. And what you see then is groups like the Islamic State and, 

indeed, in some degree—to some degree, Iran and others, that are 

taking advantage of ungoverned or inadequately governed spaces. 

I think one of the lessons of the post-Arab Spring is that if an area 

is ungoverned or inadequately governed, extremists may well seek 

opportunities in those locations. 

Senator HIRONO. Well, hence your caution about Assad and, if he 

were to be toppled, then who would come in to take his place. 

101 

There are some who have said that we ought to support the partitioning of Iraq, turning to Iraq, so that the Kurds, the Shiite, the 

Sunnis would have their areas. And I believe you said, today, that 

that would be a bad idea. Did you say that? 

General PETRAEUS. I did. 

Senator HIRONO. And do you see any kind of scenario where partitioning Iraq in some way would actually lead to some level of stability in allowing that country to go forward? 

General PETRAEUS. It’s a wonderful question. I have no intellectual objection to the concept of a Shiitestan, Sunnistan, and 

Kurdistan. I have never had anyone explain adequately to me, 

though, how you get to particularly the Sunnistan and the 

Shiitestan. Who is it that draws the boundaries? What happens, in 

terms of oil revenue for Sunnistan, which has no oil production in 

the footprint that it now occupies? So, again, this is a—there are 

some very serious practical issues here which, if not resolved, result in a civil war, and you’ll have Syria Part 2, except in Iraq. So, 

again, intellectually, academically, okay. Tell me how you’re going 

to get there in a country in which the politics are so fractious—— 

Senator HIRONO. Yes. 

General PETRAEUS.—that the Sunni Arabs feel alienated from 

Baghdad. They’re not going to agree. This is not going to be an amicable divorce. This will be a civil war. 

Tragically, there has been further sectarian displacement during 

the latest violence, as there was, in fact, in the 2005-2006 timeframe, to a considerable degree. But, they’re certainly by no means 

divided. And again, the concept for how the Sunnis would survive, 

how they’d generate revenue, how all of this would work, I think, 

are quite problematic. 

Senator HIRONO. So, would you say that any kind of movement 

toward that kind of partitioning should come from within? It certainly shouldn’t be imposed upon them from—— 

General PETRAEUS. Very, very good point. Indeed—— 

Senator HIRONO. We have not had—— 

General PETRAEUS.—you may—— 

Senator HIRONO.—much luck doing it—doing things that way. 

General PETRAEUS. You—well, I mean, the boundaries were 

drawn by outsiders, and—— 

Senator HIRONO. Yes. 

General PETRAEUS.—you see them be obliterated now, to some 

degree. 

Yeah. No, I think you have raised a very, very important point, 

and that is that, whatever the future is, it’s going to have to be 

agreed upon or it’s going to be fought over. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I did have one more question, if I—I’m running 

out of time, but—would you mind? 

Senator MCCAIN. Actually, you’ve run out, but please go ahead. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. 

Over the weekend, the United States began military-to-military 

talks with Russia following the arrival of additional Russian military equipment, including tanks and fighters already in aircraft in 

102 

Syria. And I just wondered, What would your primary objectives be 

if you were holding these talks with Russia? 

General PETRAEUS. Make sure that nothing goes bump in the 

night, you know, that there’s not an operation carried out by either 

side that is misconstrued by the other, is misinterpreted, and ends 

up in shooting where there doesn’t need to be shooting. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General PETRAEUS. I mean, the same as we actually have shipto-ship conversations with Iranians. We had ship-to-ship conversations with Chinese in the counter-piracy mission off Somalia. Actually, we had ship-to-ship with Iranian ships that were actually 

helping with the counter-piracy mission. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Tillis. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

General Petraeus, I apologize for having to step out. I’ve been to 

a committee meeting, two meetings, and a vote since then, but I 

was here to listen to your opening statements, and I have to agree 

with the Chair, I think you did a extraordinary job in kind of setting the stage for the discussion and some of the concerns we 

should have in the region. 

I did want to go back—and I do apologize if others asked you to 

expand on this; if you did, just let me know and I’ll go back to the 

record—but, when you were talking about proposing enclaves as 

potential safe havens within Syria, could you give me an idea of 

what that would look like? Over what reasonable timeframe could 

we do it? To what extent could that potentially have a positive impact on the refugee situation in the region? Just give me a little 

bit better idea of how that would play out. 

General PETRAEUS. Yeah. I don’t think I can give you a timeline. 

I mean, it’s going to start with us actually making a declaration 

that the barrel bombs are going to stop and that we’re going to defend what’s-ever in that enclave. 

Senator TILLIS. And what statement or what strategic positions 

are we taking to end the barrel bombing? I mean, what, precisely, 

would the U.S. military, and potentially coalition partners, be 

doing to make sure that that just ceases? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, you have a policy decision and a policy 

statement that says, ‘‘The barrel bombs stop, and, if they don’t, 

your air force stops flying.’’ Our military can figure out how to stop 

the—Bashar’s air force from flying. 

Senator TILLIS. I have another question, and—— 

General PETRAEUS. Could I—— 

Senator TILLIS. Oh, of course. 

General PETRAEUS. On the enclave, Senator, I’m—the enclave is 

hugely important when it comes to refugees. I mean, what’s happening is, the refugees are just—they’re just giving up. And so, 

they are very much—they would want to go back, I think, still now, 

if there’s any hope. And an enclave gives them hope. Without that, 

over time you’re just going to see a continued exodus. And it’s—it 

is already overwhelming, obviously, borders and countries in Europe. 

Senator TILLIS. Now, we—you know, once you create an enclave, 

it could, on the one hand, be a safe haven, on the other hand, be 

103 

a huge target. So, then how do we—you know, we have attempted 

to train the Free Syrian Army as a potential—the original thought 

was not to put them in an offensive posture, but to put them in 

some sort of defensive posture so they, themselves, could create, I 

guess, enclaves around the areas that they, maybe, came from, and 

that that’s not working. But, how do we then make sure that we 

have the presence on the ground to ensure the security of these so 

that they would be perceived as a safe haven in the region, versus 

the mass exodus that we’re seeing now? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, first, again, there’s a policy decision 

that says, ‘‘We’re going to protect you against all enemies, not just 

against the Islamic State.’’ And I think, if they understand that, 

and if you put a sufficient constellation of assets over them, that 

you could do a reasonably good job with that and equip them with 

some radios and other communications devices so that we can be 

alerted if they’re experiencing pressure. I—again, I don’t want to 

make light of this. This is very complicated military activity, but 

it is doable. 

Senator TILLIS. Can they—— 

General PETRAEUS. And, at a certain point, I’m not, you know, 

at all against having some of our forces in an enclave—— 

Senator TILLIS. And I think—— 

General PETRAEUS.—assuming it’s reasonably secure. 

Senator TILLIS.—you said in an advise-and-assist role. 

General PETRAEUS. That’s right. That’s right. 

Senator TILLIS. I have a—shifting to a different direction—Iran— 

the—last week, the President doubled down on his position to now 

allow petroleum exports from the United States while, at the same 

time, the Iran deal was going to allow Iran to export oil. I think 

some estimates, after the sanctions are lifted, as many as a million 

barrels a day. It’s my understanding they need a price point of 

about $130 a barrel for them to really start balancing their books. 

General PETRAEUS. Oh, I—no, I don’t think so at all, Senator. 

Not Iran. 

Senator TILLIS. So, you think it’s lower than that. 

General PETRAEUS. Oh, I think it’s much—it’s a good bit lower 

than that, yeah. 

Senator TILLIS. I may have my—— 

General PETRAEUS. Yeah. 

Senator TILLIS.—facts wrong. But, just conceptually—— 

General PETRAEUS. I mean, they wouldn’t sell the extra million 

barrels—again, you’re—— 

Senator TILLIS. If they didn’t—— 

General PETRAEUS.—you’re saying to—— 

Senator TILLIS. Let me finish—— 

General PETRAEUS.—for their budget? 

Senator TILLIS.—the thought process. 

General PETRAEUS. I think they’re okay. 

Senator TILLIS. Well, let me finish the thought process, though. 

For—based on your military and intelligence experience, do you 

believe that the United States being able to also participate in the 

global markets and being able to export oil and other energy products to other nations who may become dependent on Iran at the 

104 

same time that Iran is benefiting economically from it, is also a 

strategic weapon that we should be looking at? 

General PETRAEUS. Look, this is not just based on my military 

intelligence. I’m the chairman of the KKR Global Institute, and I’m 

a partner in KKR, one of the global investment firms, big private 

equity firms in our country. And, first of all, by the way, the analysis on crude oil exports shows that not only would the price of 

WTI, West Texas Intermediate, go up slightly so the producers 

would be better off, it would actually have an impact on Brent 

crude prices, which would come down—the global price—which is 

a lot of what we refine. And the price at the pump probably would 

go down. So, it’s—— 

Senator TILLIS. So—— 

General PETRAEUS.—a very interesting—if you look at—I think 

it’s the CBO that did the analysis of this. One of our analytical organizations here, I think, on Capitol Hill has looked at this. And 

it’s a very interesting dynamic. 

Senator TILLIS. And, General—— 

General PETRAEUS. Beyond that, I don’t think we should get involved in markets, as a country, unless we want to do something 

like sanctions. So, again, you wouldn’t do it—if you want to use 

sanctions or economic tools as a weapon, fine, but otherwise I think 

you have to be very careful about intervention in global markets. 

Senator TILLIS. Mr. Chair, I apologize. I’ll be brief. 

The 130 number, I think, was the kind of profit they would have 

to throw off to also fix their fiscal problems, versus the actual market price. 

But, the other question—— 

General PETRAEUS. Or maybe to do investment—— 

Senator TILLIS. That’s right. 

General PETRAEUS.—in the fields in the future. There’s—— 

Senator TILLIS. That’s—— 

General PETRAEUS.—there’s something there. But, again—— 

Senator TILLIS. That’s what I was referring to. 

But, I guess, finally, I’m—I want to make sure I understand the 

answer to your question. Do you believe that the United States 

being able to extract more energy from the regions under our jurisdiction, and provide that energy, is a part of a strategic play to 

hedge against Iran’s ability to go out, make more money, fund more 

malign activities, do more of the bad things they’re already doing? 

General PETRAEUS. Look, we ought to produce all the oil and gas 

that we can, if we’re making a profit. If we can enable countries 

like Iraq to revive their oil industry as we did, it helps Iraq, it 

funds their government. By the way, they’re running a fiscal deficit 

now. 

But, again, we—this is really about market forces, I think, much 

more than getting involved in this as a country. The fact is that 

the energy markets right now, because of the U.S. shale gale, the 

oil energy revolution so far, most significant with crude oil in the 

global markets, and next—by the way, the next big disruption is 

going to be in the liquified natural gas markets because of the approval now of whatever it is, six or seven liquified natural gas 

(LNG) plants for the United States—they’ll be—and that’s going to 

be a huge challenge for President Putin. And, as I mentioned earVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:53 Sep 08, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00110 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21401.TXT WILDA
105 

lier, Putin’s hand is getting weaker. He’s running enormous deficits, he’s carrying out very costly adventures outside his country, 

he’s got a limited amount of foreign reserves left to fund this, and 

he doesn’t have access to the global markets, because of the sanctions on him and on the major—many of his major banks. So, I 

think he’s got problems down the road. And, oh, by the way, when 

our LNG hits European markets, just as Australian LNG is hitting 

Asian markets, you’re going to see a compression of natural gas 

prices, even though he’s selling it off the pipeline and we’ll have 

had to liquefy, ship, and regasify. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. General Petraeus, thank you for being here 

and for your insights into what’s happening in the Middle East. 

I know—last week General Austin was here, and he got questioned by a number of members of this committee about the trainand-equip mission. And, unfortunately, what he had to say about 

that mission suggests to me, and I think to others on the committee, that it has not accomplished what it was supposed to. And 

I—my recollection is that you advocated for a similar kind of mission—early, before it actually started. And I wonder if you have 

thoughts about what can be done at this point. I think, as it has 

been operating, it has not been successful. So, what should we be 

doing? Is there any way to right it? Should we just abandon it and 

go on to—— 

General PETRAEUS. Look—— 

Senator SHAHEEN.—other areas? 

General PETRAEUS. First of all, you can’t abandon it, because 

anything we want to accomplish in Syria has to be enabled by a 

Sunni Arab force on the ground, whether it’s the defeat of the Islamic State or creating a context within which the Bashar al-Assad 

regime might be willing to go to the negotiating table, or stemming 

the flow, the exodus, of refugees from Syria that is overflowing European countries. 

Senator SHAHEEN. So, how—— 

General PETRAEUS. I think the central—— 

Senator SHAHEEN.—do we make it work? 

General PETRAEUS.—the central issue is that we have to pledge, 

and then take action, to support these fighters against anybody 

who comes at them, whether it’s ISIS, which we want them to 

fight, or Bashar al-Assad or Jabhat al-Nusra or even other elements. So, again, we’re going to have to support them against all 

of these. They want to fight Bashar. We’ve at least got to enable 

them to fight Bashar’s forces in a local way, without, as I mentioned in my statement, creating the conditions where Bashar goes 

before we have a sense of what it is that we want to see follow him 

or what will follow him. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

In your testimony, you talked about establishing enclaves in 

Syria that would be protected, which I interpreted as what’s normally described as safe zones. Is that what you’re—you were suggesting by the enclaves you were talking about? 

General PETRAEUS. Save havens, I think, it—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. I had a—last—— 

106 

General PETRAEUS. And, by the way, they can be in the south as 

well as the north. I mean, and actually there’s a reasonable one in 

the south, I think, arguably, contiguous to Jordan. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, last week we heard, at the Foreign Relations Committee, from Michael Powers, who—of Mercy Corps, 

which has done a lot of work—humanitarian work in Syria. And he 

expressed grave concerns about establishing safe zones. He suggested that it would be very difficult to keep them actually safe 

without a lot of investment of additional airpower and troops. He 

also thought they could become a target for extremists and that 

they could be used by some countries as an excuse to reject refugees. So, how does your proposal suggest we address those 

issues—— 

General PETRAEUS. Well, we’re going to defend it. I mean, we 

have to make very—what he’s saying—you just can’t declare something a safe zone and expect everybody to honor that. We would 

have to—again, this is the key. The forces that we support aren’t 

going to stay supportable. They won’t even stay alive, as we have 

seen, if we don’t take very active measures, have a credible campaign for them to pursue. And part of that campaign should be establishing enclaves. That’s—I don’t really like the word ‘‘safe 

zones.’’ There’s nothing safe about a safe zone, unless you’re going 

to defend it. And the people on the ground will judge whether or 

not you’re doing that, and they’ll vote with their feet whether 

they’re willing to stay or even come back or depart with all—a 

number of the others. 

So, we would have to invest in supporting that zone. It doesn’t 

mean, I don’t think, that you have to have our boots on the ground 

in that enclave. Although, again, at some point, security is adequate, I would be comfortable doing that, just as we were comfortable doing it in Iraq. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Finally, one of the things that I think we have 

not done as successfully as we need to is to counter the ISIL propaganda. And do you have thoughts about how we could be better responding? 

General PETRAEUS. This is a really, really difficult problem because of the magnitude of it, the sheer number, the way that machines are used to amplify, to magnify. I think we’ve got to get 

smarter about that. I’ve talked to people at Google Ideas, for example, about various techniques that could be used on our side in the 

same way that they’re used on their side. We did have a program 

at CENTCOM during part of the time that I was the Commander, 

where we had what we termed ‘‘credible voices.’’ These were native 

speakers, sometimes dialect speakers, with academic training in 

various religious disciplines and so forth. And they were quite effective. The problem is that it’s very costly. And again, whether 

that effect is really measurable is something that could be debated. 

So, I think we do have to partner more effectively with those that 

really understand the technology. And then we have to activate 

those who are willing to engage in this. I don’t know that it can, 

by any means, be all government. I just don’t think we can generate the critical mass that would be sufficient for this task. 

Senator SHAHEEN. My time is up, but should it be spearheaded 

by CENTCOM or by State Department? Or coordinated—— 

107 

General PETRAEUS. The problem with it being spearheaded by 

State Department can be best explained by an episode when I was 

the CENTCOM Commander and the Under Secretary of State, 

high-ranking government official, came to CENTCOM to ask, I 

think, for $1- or $2 million for—from us, which we provided, somehow, to help them with their program. So, it’s—State Department 

has never been adequately funded. I don’t know if Senator Graham 

is here. He would—he’s the subcommittee chair, I think, still—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. Right. He is. 

General PETRAEUS.—of the key committee, and has generally 

agreed with that. But, we have always called for State and AID to 

do more, and more and more, and yet we have not given them the 

appropriations, nor, in some cases, the authorization to do that. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Ernst. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Admiral McCain. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator ERNST. General Petraeus, thank you for appearing in 

front of the committee today. 

And I think you can see, from the attendance at this committee 

today, that your opinions and your thoughts are very highly valued. So, thank you for sharing with us—— 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you. 

Senator ERNST.—today your thoughts. 

I would like to go back to the Kurds a little bit. I think we’ve 

talked a lot about it, and everybody’s asked questions, but maybe 

not in all manners. So, the Kurds have been a great ally to us. And 

I’ve heard that from many of the men and women that have served 

in that region. They’ve been a great partner for 25 years or so. And 

they have a healthy respect for the rule of law. They’ve been very 

helpful with a number of minorities—ethnic minorities, religious 

minorities. And what can we do to better provide support for the 

Kurdish regional government, the Kurdish peshmerga? I believe we 

need to double down in this effort, regardless of whether they may 

push beyond their regional boundaries. But, they do provide an 

area, whether we can engage them in shaping operations, whether 

it is to provide an area for us to base—can you give us some 

thoughts? 

General PETRAEUS. I—— 

Senator ERNST. The advantages—— 

General PETRAEUS. I can. The fact is, we are based there. As you 

know, we have headquarters, we have operational headquarters, 

we have very close relationships. In both my military and intel 

lives, we were very, very closely linked. 

I think the single biggest issues are the provision of weapons and 

other supplies, to streamline that. You know, I’ve said we have to 

support Prime Minister Abadi. We need to strengthen him. That 

means we can’t bypass him on these issues. But, we need to figure 

out how to get this so that, ideally, it doesn’t have to touch down 

in Baghdad, it can go directly to them. Some coalition members are 

doing that, I think, actually, with—— 

Senator ERNST. They are, correct. 

General PETRAEUS.—our tacit approval, if not applause. I think 

that’s the single biggest step that we could take, and to look very 

108 

carefully at what it is we’re providing. And there are some additional items—again, I was in—happened to be there for a conference in Sulaymaniyah, back in the earlier part of this year, and 

had a lot of people come and plead that particular case. 

The other is to determine—you know, the KRG, the Kurdish Regional Government, is in very, very difficult financial times right 

now because of the price of oil going down by 55 percent. It’s not 

only reduced what they get, but it’s reduced the amount from 

which the 17 percent that they get from the central government is. 

And so, they’re having a very difficult time. They’re supporting 

hundreds of thousands of refugees on their soil. Anybody who goes 

up there and flies over this will see a camp every few kilometers. 

And, indeed, they’re fighting a war. And again, if we could provide 

additional assistance to them that would be of support, I think that 

would be very valuable, also. 

We have very much enabled them. We helped them hold off—had 

it not been for decisive action, actually, at a critical moment last 

year, it’s very possible that the Islamic State might have gotten 

closer to the capital of Erbil. That held that off, and then has really 

retaken most of the area around the Kurdish Regional Government. And, candidly, there are no more disputed internal boundary 

areas in Iraq. They are generally controlled by the Kurdish Regional Government as a result of the operations that have taken 

place with our support. 

Senator ERNST. Very good. I appreciate those thoughts very 

much. I would tend to agree. 

I would love to see more assistance going to the KRG, of course, 

in consultation with the Iraqi government. I applaud you on that, 

as well. 

If we could turn to Turkey, just very briefly, we’ve talked a little 

bit about the fact that they have mobilized. And, unfortunately, 

what we have seen is that, through their mobilization of resources, 

whether it’s political, military, instead of really pushing back 

against ISIS, we see there’s been a turn to mobilize against PKK. 

And what do you see the impact is to those coalition forces, the 

anti-ISIS coalition forces? And what are the greater implications of 

that, and thoughts, maybe, from some of those coalition members? 

General PETRAEUS. I don’t know that this has a huge effect on 

U.S. or coalition forces. They’re not being diverted to assist. There’s 

a certain—slight degree of support that we have provided in the 

past in the intelligence realm that I don’t imagine has changed a 

great deal. What I think is very significant is what’s happening 

within Turkey as a result of this. The sheer escalation of the violence, a situation that was relatively calm and seemed to be heading toward one in which there was greater and greater reconciliation between the government in Ankara and the sizable part of 

their population in Turkey that is Kurdish, with the allowance of 

certain—meeting certain desires of that Kurdish population. And 

all of a sudden, the wheels have come off the bus. And whether this 

is connected with a future election in Turkey or something else, it 

is very distressing to see, because, again, the violence on both sides 

now has escalated very, very rapidly and quite considerably. 

Senator ERNST. Great. Thank you. 

My time is expired. Thank you, General. 

109 

Thank you, Admiral. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator King. 

Senator KING. General, first, courage is an element of character. 

And courage to admit mistakes, particularly in an open forum such 

as you did at the beginning of your testimony today, to me is a 

huge indicator of character, which I think is the essential quality 

of leadership. And I want to compliment and acknowledge that you 

did something that wasn’t easy this morning. And it’s very meaningful. 

Question about Russia and Syria. The recent buildup of Russian 

troops, of course, is very worrisome. On the other hand, Russia 

was—you should pardon the expression—an ally when it came to 

getting rid of the chemical weapons. Is there a geopolitical opportunity where Russia may recognize the danger of ISIS to them, to 

Chechnya and to the—that ideology—and there could be common 

cause with them, not to dump Assad precipitously, but to work on 

a negotiated agreement, where Assad would be moved aside? Because Assad is ISIS’s evil twin. He brought them into being. 

General PETRAEUS. Exactly. And continues to inspire the recruiting and the—it’s a magnetic attraction. 

Senator KING. Exactly. So, talk to me about the possibility of 

talks with the Russians seeing—I believe countries act in their interests. And, in this case, they have an interest in not seeing ISIS 

metamorphose into terrorism in their country. Do—is there an opportunity here for working in concert with the Russians to move 

Assad aside, perhaps guaranteeing their presence? You mentioned 

the bases on the Mediterranean. 

General PETRAEUS. This is not something I’d rule out at all, Senator. I think, again, there’s no question they have an interest. 

They’re worried about the effect on—in the Caucuses. There are 

Chechens that are down, fighting, without question, in Syria. 

There’s a worry, of course, they’ll go back, presumably, and be 

more effective. So, the problem is, if they had wanted to have done 

this, if that was really their goal in life, they could have contacted 

the coalition of more than 60 countries and said, ‘‘Where could you 

bed down our aircraft? How can you integrate us into the air 

tasking order? We’d like to drop bombs on ISIS, just like you guys.’’ 

Senator KING. It appears—— 

General PETRAEUS. And, of course—— 

Senator KING.—that these recent moves, they’ve simply said, 

‘‘We’re going to shore up Assad, no matter what.’’ 

General PETRAEUS. It—well, it’s really—again, you—you’re right. 

This is about national interest, and their national interest is to preserve the naval base that they have at—in Tartus, down—— 

Senator KING. So, perhaps there’s a way to—— 

General PETRAEUS.—down on the coast—— 

Senator KING. Perhaps there’s a way to assure—— 

General PETRAEUS.—and then Latakia, the airbase. 

Senator KING. Perhaps there’s a way to assure that without necessarily guaranteeing the presence of Assad. 

General PETRAEUS. There could be, at some point. Again, if there 

are serious negotiations. It’s not the kind of thing that you would 

just rule out unequivocally. The—this is real complicated right 

now, though, and if they really enter the fight on the side of Assad, 

110 

rather than just sort of protecting, again, this coastal enclave that 

matters to them, strategically, geostrategically, then we’re going to 

see real complications. And, ultimately, you could end up—you 

don’t want to be in direct conflict. 

You know, I’m—look, Russia is an important power. It has carried out very provocative actions. It doesn’t mean that we need to 

be provocative in return, but we do need to be firm in return. We 

do need to establish what is unacceptable actions—Ukraine, as an 

example. And we have to do that here, but we’ve got to see this 

develop a bit further, recognizing, again, that there is a very clear 

way for them, if they just wanted to attack ISIS, and that would 

be to join the coalition. 

Senator KING. Changing the subject. You talked about barrel 

bombs and airpower. Is there an alternative—and I’m keenly—I’m 

very aware of the problem, but an alternative closely vetted Syrian 

opposition with MANPADs or similar weapons, which could neutralize Assad’s air force without mobilizing a major air war and coordinated strikes and essentially escalating the conflict? In other 

words, you—— 

General PETRAEUS. The—— 

Senator KING.—you can take care of barrel bombers from the 

ground or from the air. 

General PETRAEUS. This has been an issue in virtually any of 

these kinds of endeavors that we’ve—— 

Senator KING. Since Afghanistan. 

General PETRAEUS.—engaged in. Exactly. And the concern, of 

course, is that one gets out of hands and drifts over somewhere else 

and takes down a civil airliner. And so, the risk in this has to be 

very, very carefully measured and mitigated. There are some techniques, some technologies, some other things that can be employed. 

I’m not sure that we have not done that or that other countries 

have not done that. I—but, it’s a very risky proposition. And we 

would—we have to do—exercise enormous caution if we employ 

that. 

Senator KING. And those mitigation factors would be crucial. 

Final—— 

General PETRAEUS. Yes. 

Senator KING.—question. Do people wake up in Iraq and think 

of themselves as Iraqis, or as Sunnis and Shiites, or as Kurds? 

General PETRAEUS. Sadly, I think, in recent times, it is more 

their sectarian or ethnic identity, rather than Iraqi. Having said 

that, I remember when the Iraqi soccer team won the—I think it 

was the Asia Cup, and that night there were cheers all the way 

from Basrah through Baghdad to Erbil. So, there can be unifying 

features. 

And let’s never forget, the most important centrifugal force in 

Iraq is still there, and that is the distribution of the oil revenues 

by the central government to the provinces, the ministries, and so 

forth, including the Kurdish Regional Government. 

Senator KING. Thank you. Thank you, General. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Sullivan. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, General, good to see you again. I also want to echo what 

Senator King said about your comments earlier. We very much apVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:53 Sep 08, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00116 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21401.TXT WILDA
111 

preciate you being here, and what you did, what you’ve done for 

the country. 

I wanted to just talk a little bit—I know there’s been a lot written on the surge and what you did, and what the Chairman and 

others did, with regard to that important strategy. To me, it’s an 

example of where you have a strategy, you have rhetoric, and then 

you actually have action. And what I mean by ‘‘rhetoric’’ is, we— 

you know, the President and others announced what we are going 

to do, and then we took action. And I think one of the broader strategic failures right now that certainly we’re seeing with all the 

chaos in the world is that we—in many ways, as a country at the 

high levels, whether it’s the President or the Secretary of Defense 

or others—we’re talking about things—redlines in Syria, Bashar alAssad’s got to go—even Secretary Carter gave what I thought was 

a very powerful speech at the Shangri-la dialogue—— 

General PETRAEUS. I was there. 

Senator SULLIVAN.—when we were out there. 

General PETRAEUS. Right. 

Senator SULLIVAN.—on the built-up islands in the South China 

Sea. But, the—but, none of these statements have been followed up 

by action, unlike what you did with the surge. What happens 

when, as a country, we talk a lot, but don’t act? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, first of all, I think we have taken action. And I have to be somebody who sits here and says that I—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. Where have we—on those three examples—— 

General PETRAEUS. We killed Osama bin Laden—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. No, no, I just gave you—I gave three examples. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, no—but, I was merely going to say that 

this is not a record of unmitigated lack of action. But, in my statement, I said that inaction—in some cases, inaction has consequences. And I think that is the case with some of the cases that 

we’re dealing with in Syria, without question. 

Senator SULLIVAN. So, what do you think happens when we don’t 

take action? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, if you do not act—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. If you say—if you make a statement—— 

General PETRAEUS.—others may. Others will question. Again, 

you know, the art of this is figuring out when to take action and, 

of course, what action to take. This is not an argument that you 

should always take action, everywhere, all the time. As I said—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. But, shouldn’t you take action if you—— 

General PETRAEUS.—we can’t solve all the problems. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Should you take action if you’re actually— 

what I’m talking about is not just random action. I’m talking 

about—— 

General PETRAEUS. Sure. 

Senator SULLIVAN.—to implement stated policies that you’ve already announced as a country. Are you hearing, in your travels 

throughout the world, that the United States is losing credibility, 

in terms of our national security and foreign policy? 

General PETRAEUS. Look, there are some questions out there. 

And what I was going to do was point out where there have been 

actions, because there—this is not, again, a record of no action. 

112 

There have been some very, very courageous actions. I took very 

tough issues to this President, and he took action. There have also 

been some that—on which there was not action. And if those in 

which there is not action taken really matter, then, obviously, 

again, there are consequences. They accumulate. 

I do think that the Syrian redline that was not a redline, which 

had a decent outcome in the end, as was pointed out—you know, 

90 percent or so of the chemical weapons gone. But, the way we 

got to that was quite a circuitous path. And to be bailed out by 

President Putin, at the end of the day, was, again, a very interesting outcome. That is not the kind of case, I don’t think, that instills—you know, and again, a great sense of confidence in the 

United States. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Let me ask another—in terms of actions. You 

know, in another area of the world, in the Arctic, we’re seeing a 

lot of strategic interest from the Russians and other nations, for 

reasons of natural resources, transportation routes. And you’ve 

seen a really pretty dramatic aggressive move by the Russians, in 

terms of a new Arctic military command, four new BCTs there, 40 

icebreakers, a lot of heated rhetoric there. And then, in terms of 

the United States action, if we were to remove a—our substantial 

Arctic forces, say the only airborne BCT in the entire Arctic or Asia 

Pacific, what do you think that would do, in terms of additional 

Russian reactions in that part of the world? 

General PETRAEUS. I’m just not—I have expertise in a reasonable 

number of places in the world, but I’ll defer to you on the Arctic, 

I’m afraid. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Okay, let me ask one final question, General. 

You know, I think there’s a bit of a strategic irony going on, where 

some of us think that, in certain parts of the world, we’re withdrawing. And yet, when you look at—and you and I have talked 

about the instruments of American power, not only the military, 

but things like energy that we’ve talked about, the ability, in terms 

of finance, the ability—resurgence of manufacturing in the United 

States, best universities in the world, by far. I mean, the list—agriculture—the list is very, very strong, where we have so many advantages over other countries, whether it’s China, whether it’s Russia—long-term advantages. How do we utilize those in a way that 

show that we still are the country holding all the cards in—on so 

many different instruments of power that countries measure power 

by? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, first of all, we don’t all the cards, but 

rumors of America’s demise have been greatly exaggerated, to paraphrase Mark Twain. I teach a course called ‘‘The Coming North 

American Decades’’ at the Honors College of the City University of 

New York. I’ve just done a monograph at Harvard as a Fellow, 

again, on ‘‘The Great New Emerging Economy: North America.’’ 

When I was asked, a year or so ago, in London, ‘‘After the American Century, what?’’—and I think they asked—expected me to say, 

‘‘The Asian Century’’ or ‘‘The Chinese Century.’’ I said ‘‘The North 

American Decades.’’ 

The bottom line is that our economy is fundamentally—it’s got 

lots of challenges and there’s a lot of issues that we need to resolve, 

some with the help of this body, working together with the other 

113 

body. All that notwithstanding as—at a time when the number-two 

economy is slowing down quite significantly, we don’t yet see the 

rise of India, the Eurozone has got a very differentiated recovery. 

The U.S. has continued—we may be in the longest recovery in our 

history. It has not achieved escape velocity. There’s aspects of it, 

again, that are not great. But, when you look at the rest of the 

world, and when you look at the fundamentals of the United 

States, whether it’s demography compared to the others, whether 

it is the values that we share with our two neighbors—I mean, you 

don’t see Mexico asking China to pivot to North America to help 

them balance against the United States the way every country that 

has a maritime boundary with China is doing to us. 

So, there are enormous strengths here in this country. You enumerated a number of them. I’ve laid them out elsewhere. There are 

a number of actions that this body, again, could take to address 

issues that are really headwinds to us capitalizing on this tremendous opportunity, because of the Energy Revolution, foremost, but 

also the IT Revolution, which enables all the others, the Manufacturing Revolution that’s now beginning to gather steam, and the 

Life Sciences Revolution, which is starting to gather momentum, as 

well. We are the leaders, or among the leaders, in every one of 

these areas. And we have a number of really great, again, fundamentals here that are going to keep this country and North 

America, writ large, in a very enviable position. I would not want 

to be in any other economy than this one right here. And I now 

get paid to analyze those kinds of factors and elements. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. General, thank you very much for a lifetime of 

extraordinary service under difficult circumstances. 

General PETRAEUS. And thanks to you for yours. As I noted in 

a response to—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes, sir. 

General PETRAEUS.—a local newspaper’s article here, you served 

nine stints under my command in Iraq, CENTCOM, and Afghanistan alone, each of those as a week or a bit longer. I was very skeptical before the first one. I didn’t—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Yeah. 

General PETRAEUS.—appreciate the great opportunity we were 

going to have. 

Senator MCCAIN. We can understand the skepticism. 

[Laughter.] 

General PETRAEUS. And—yes—and, under duress, I accepted 

Colonel Lindsey Graham of the Judge Advocate General Corps of 

the U.S. Air Force Reserve, and I must say that, after every single 

one of those visits, you came back and provided a real nugget and 

one of these big ideas that helped us come to grips with one of the 

serious issues we were confronting, starting with issues that we 

had at Camp Bucca, as you’ll recall, in Iraq, and carrying all the 

way through various legal conundrums that we had with President 

Karzai in Afghanistan. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, thank you. You’ve certainly made my 

day. And it was a very small contribution, and it—— 

114 

General PETRAEUS. And I am nonpartisan, by the way—— 

[Laughter.] 

General PETRAEUS.—Mr. Chairman. I—really. Honestly. 

Senator GRAHAM. But, I really appreciate that. The bottom line 

is, I enjoyed the heck out of it, and I learned a lot under your command and working with people in the region. 

So, let’s try to see if we can make some sense out of the world 

as it is. There’s two things going on at once, I think, in the Mideast: a fight for the heart and soul of Islam and a demand for social 

justice, particularly by young people and women. Do you agree with 

that? 

General PETRAEUS. Certainly among the two biggest issues. I 

don’t know if—I’d put some economic issues that might be in the 

social justice category, but that one be another element that’s—— 

Senator GRAHAM. The only reason I mention this—I just want 

the American people to understand that young people are not going 

to live in dictatorships for our convenience any longer. Do you 

agree with that? 

General PETRAEUS. They’re not doing it for our convenience, to 

begin with, but I think what—the real point here is that the age 

of the—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes. 

General PETRAEUS.—dictators is certainly under a certain degree 

of strain. And we’ve seen it boil over in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, 

Syria—some degree, Yemen. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, would you agree that America should 

take sides in this struggle, and side with young people and say, 

‘‘Yes, you’re right to demand a larger voice about your children if 

you’re a mother, you’re right to want more economic opportunity.’’ 

We should say—we should embrace what they’re asking for. 

General PETRAEUS. Yeah, I don’t know that I would do this as 

a universal declaration, but I would certainly have that in the back 

of my mind as I looked at each—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Well—— 

General PETRAEUS.—each and every case. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, I’m going to do it as a universal declaration. That’s just me, though. 

Now, on the other side of Islam, there’s a—do you agree with me 

that most Muslims reject radical Islam? 

General PETRAEUS. Yes. Yeah. 

Senator GRAHAM. And that is a—to suggest otherwise, you really 

don’t understand the region—that the biggest victim of radical 

Islam is other people in the faith. 

General PETRAEUS. It’s generally Muslims. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yeah. And you have been there more than anyone I know. Don’t you agree with me that the good news for all of 

us is that we can partner with people within the faith who are willing to partner with us and destroy this radical ideology? And it’s 

going to require these partnerships. 

General PETRAEUS. Correct. I mean, we have sought to do that. 

We have done that. We do it—— 

Senator GRAHAM. So, when people say they’re—— 

General PETRAEUS.—in our own country. 

115 

Senator GRAHAM.—all the same, they don’t know what they’re 

talking about. You have seen—— 

General PETRAEUS. I’m a Presbyterian. I don’t think all Presbyterians are the same, either, frankly. 

Senator GRAHAM. Good. Good. Nor do I, General. 

But, the point I’m trying to make, for people to look at the Mideast as ‘‘everybody’s the same, everybody is radical,’’ they miss the 

boat. Most fathers and mothers don’t want to give their daughters 

to ISIL. 

General PETRAEUS. Correct. 

Senator GRAHAM. So, that is something we need to build upon. 

In terms of Iraq, the President has said the goal is to degrade 

and destroy ISIL. That is the right goal. Do you agree? 

General PETRAEUS. ‘‘Destroy’’ is a very high bar in the military 

lexicon, and I think it’s actually been lowered slightly to ‘‘defeat,’’ 

which I think is adequate. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

General PETRAEUS. I’d love to destroy them, as well. We did destroy al-Qaeda in Iraq, I think—— 

Senator GRAHAM. You—— 

General PETRAEUS.—it’s safe to say. 

Senator GRAHAM.—certainly did. And I want—— 

General PETRAEUS. And, sadly, they were able to resurrect themselves in the form of ISIS, and then gain strength in Syria and 

come back into Iraq. 

Senator GRAHAM. Absolutely. Now—but we are where we are. 

The surge—— 

General PETRAEUS. Right. 

Senator GRAHAM.—didn’t work, and it was a marvelous thing to 

witness. 

Do you believe more American ground forces would help lead to 

the defeat of ISIL in Iraq? 

General PETRAEUS. What I’ve laid out here today is, indeed, a requirement for additional forces—not ground combat forces. 

Senator GRAHAM. I agree. 

General PETRAEUS. Additional advisors at brigade headquarters 

level, probably augmentation at—what’s going to happen is, you 

know, you will get a critical mass, at some point, of Sunni forces. 

And it will start off—set off a chain reaction, as we did when we 

had the—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Sure. 

General PETRAEUS.—the Anbar Awakening, where we—it rippled 

up and down the Euphrates River, then ultimately it goes up the 

Tigris. We have to be prepared to capitalize on that. And I suspect 

we’ll have more training locations, more locations where we’ll have 

advisors in assistance. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. But, would a couple of aviation battalions help—Army aviation battalions? 

General PETRAEUS. It would help. You’re going to incur greater 

risk, obviously—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Definitely. 

General PETRAEUS.—and you’re now getting into the—into this 

in a way—we have, obviously, attack helicopters, which we have 

employed. 

116 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

General PETRAEUS. Now you’re starting to add numbers quite 

considerably, and I’d be concerned about possible ramifications of 

that. 

Senator GRAHAM. And I—I’m over, but I do want to talk about 

Syria. Is there anyone left to train in Syria that would have the 

capability to both destroy ISIL and push Assad out? Is there an indigenous force left to train? 

General PETRAEUS. I think there are forces that, if we pledge to 

support them against everybody, not just the—fight the Islamic 

State—and start off by actually allowing them to solidify control 

over an enclave—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

General PETRAEUS.—before we launch them or push them into 

an offensive—— 

Senator GRAHAM. What about a regional force? Would you support the creation of a regional force with two goals in mind: to destroy ISIL and push Assad out? 

General PETRAEUS. I’d have concerns about that. I think that—— 

Senator GRAHAM. What concerns? 

General PETRAEUS.—to have neighbors go into one of the countries in this region—again, every country is different, and—but, to 

go into a country that is as already fractured as is Syria, I think 

there are some complications with that. 

Senator GRAHAM. Finally, Assad should go? He must go? 

General PETRAEUS. He has to go, ultimately. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

General PETRAEUS. But, the keyword there is ‘‘ultimately,’’ underscored and bold letters, because, until we have a sense of what 

will replace him, we need to be very careful not to push him out, 

because what comes after could actually be even worse. 

Senator GRAHAM. How many people do you think are left that 

would be willing to fight both ISIL and Assad? And how long would 

it take to train this indigenous force? And would you have American boots on the ground as part of that training? 

General PETRAEUS. I—I’d put them, certainly, on the ground, 

first in Turkey and Jordan. I’d certainly be willing to put them into 

an enclave, when it’s solidified, secure, and you’re not going to put 

people in jeopardy of ending up in an orange jumpsuit in a cage. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. But, do—how long do you think it would 

take to—— 

General PETRAEUS. I don’t know, Senator. Again, you give me the 

assumptions, and I could give you a timeline. But, again, there’s 

a host of assumptions that we’d have to make before we could get 

any precision on that. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you very much. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator REED [presiding]. General, on behalf of Chairman 

McCain, let me thank you for your extraordinary testimony, insightful and thought provoking as always, and also for your incredible service to the country. And one thing that always impressed 

me about you is that your dedication to the men and women you 

led was unshakeable, and everything you did was about those 

young soldiers and sailors and marines and airmen. Thank you, sir. 

117 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator REED. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:23 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(119) 

UNITED STATES MILITARY STRATEGY IN THE 

MIDDLE EAST 

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 27, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:02 a.m. in Room 

SD–G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain 

(chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, 

Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Lee, Graham, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, 

Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, and Heinrich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman MCCAIN. Good morning. The committee meets today to 

receive testimony on United States Strategy in the Middle East. 

I want to thank our distinguished witnesses for appearing this 

morning and for their service to our Nation. 

Before I proceed, I’d like to remind our witnesses, this committee’s rules require written testimony to be submitted 24 hours in 

advance of a hearing, and I’d like, from now on, to try—for our witness to try to adhere to that. 

The tragic loss last week of Master Sergeant Joshua Walker, a 

veteran of 14 combat deployments, reminds us of the high stakes 

of our mission in the Middle East and how grateful we are to those 

Americans serving there. We need a strategy worthy of those who 

carry it out. Unfortunately, we don’t have that. 

What’s worse, it appears the administration has not even defined 

the problem correctly. A policy of ‘‘Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) first’’ fails to understand that ISIL, for all of the threat 

it poses, is actually just a symptom of a deeper problem, the struggle for power and sectarian identity now raging across the Middle 

East, the epicenter of which is Iraq and Syria. That is why ISIL 

exists today with the strength that it does. This problem will only 

get worse the longer this conflict rages on. 

We hear it said all the time, quote, ‘‘There is no military solution 

to this problem,’’ which is a truism. But, that, too, is misleading. 

The real problem is that there can be no diplomatic solution without leverage, and there is a clear military dimension to this problem. Secretary Kerry can take all the trips he wants to Geneva, 

but, unless the military balance of power changes on the ground, 

diplomacy, as has been amply proven, will achieve nothing. Changing those conditions is what the administration has consistently 

120 

failed to do. Instead, it is assumed our Nation could withdraw from 

the Middle East and avoid the conflict at its heart. Moreover, on 

those occasions when the administration has felt compelled to respond, after the use of chemical weapons, for example, or with the 

rise of ISIL, and now amid the worst refugee crisis in Europe since 

World War II, the administration has merely addressed the symptoms of the underlying problem rather than the problem itself, and, 

all too often, made that problem worse. 

There is no clearer example of this than the Syrian train-andequip (T&E) program. From the start, the administration said the 

fighters in this program could only fight ISIL, not Bashar Assad’s 

forces, which have slaughtered and displaced exponentially more 

Syrians than ISIL has. In addition, the administration made no 

commitment, until only recently, to provide these forces with any 

meaningful military support once they returned to Syria. After millions of dollars and months of effort, the program failed to come 

anywhere close to the Department’s original expectations. 

The President has expressed surprise about this failure. It was 

not a surprise. It was completely predictable, and many of us here 

did predict it. Only someone who does not understand the real 

problem, which is the underlying conflict in Syria and Iraq, or does 

not care to, could think that we could effectively recruit and train 

large numbers of Sunni Syrians to fight only against ISIL, with no 

promise of coalition assistance if they came under fire from Assad’s 

forces. Rather than fixing the problem, the President suspended it. 

But, this is tantamount to killing the program, because it’s destroying what little trust our Syrian partners have left in us, to say 

nothing of allies like Turkey and Jordan, which invested their own 

money and prestige in this program. 

The President now says, incredibly, the failure of this program— 

his program—the President’s program—proves he was right for not 

wanting to do it in the first place. Harry Truman must be spinning 

in his grave. If there is an opposite for Commander in Chief, this 

is it. 

The training and effort in—the training effort in Iraq has its own 

challenges. Indeed, it is deja vu all over again. We don’t have 

enough United States forces to train and advise Iraqi units at the 

right levels. We’re still not providing sufficient support to Sunni 

tribes, which are the center of gravity in this fight against ISIL. 

We’re looking the other way as Shi’a militias go on the offensive 

in the Sunni heartland. We hear complaints that Iraqis have no 

will to fight, but, we’re prohibiting United States forces from bolstering their will to fight by advising them in combat or calling in 

airstrikes. We learned all of these lessons in Iraq just a few years 

ago, and apparently we have to relive these failures now. 

For nearly seven years, the administration has tried to extract 

America from the Middle East. Instead, we have created a massive 

power vacuum that has been filled by ISIL, al-Qaeda and its affiliates, on the one hand, and Iran and its proxies, on the other. Now 

into this vacuum has stepped Vladimir Putin. Putin’s intervention 

in Syria really began in Ukraine. The administration’s failure to 

impose greater costs on Russia, particularly by providing defensive 

arms to Ukrainian forces, allowed Putin to annex Crimea, dictate 

the terms of a frozen conflict in eastern Ukraine, and then pivot 

121 

to Syria. It’s also confirmed Putin’s belief that the administration 

is weak. To Putin, weakness is provocative. 

The administration’s response, thus far, to Russia’s intervention 

in Syria has only made this problem worse. First, it urged Russia 

not to build up its forces in Syria. Putin ignored these warnings. 

The administration then tried to deny Russia the airspace to move 

into Syria. Failed. Putin responded by bombing moderate Syrian 

forces, many of whom are allied with the United States. What has 

been the result? The number of United States airstrikes in Syria 

has dropped. The train-and-equip program in Syria was halted just 

as it was starting to show some battlefield results. The administration scrambled to pen a so-called ‘‘deconfliction agreement’’ with 

the Russians that spells out more of what we will not do in Syria. 

Indeed, this agreement means the United States is now moving out 

of the way and watching as Russian aircraft, together with Iranian, 

Hezbollah, and Assad’s ground forces, attack and kill brave Syrians, many of whom our Nation has supported and encouraged. 

This is not only harmful to our interests, it is immoral. 

What we must do to hasten the end of the conflict in Syria and 

Iraq, in particular, we must stop Assad’s use of airpower and his 

horrific barrel bombs, which are the major killer of Syrians and 

driver of refugees out of the region. We must establish areas in 

Syria where civilians can be safe and do what is necessary to protect these areas in the air and on the ground. We must recognize 

that Putin is not interested in a negotiated solution in Syria that 

favors United States interests, so, we should, instead, impose real 

costs on Russia, not just in Syria, but everywhere we have leverage 

to do so. Finally, as General David Petraeus has recently said, we 

must devise a strategy to confront Iranian power and designs in 

the region rather than acquiescing to them. 

Some will object, as they have for years, that we cannot bear the 

costs of these actions. But, consider the costs of our current inaction and half measures. Mass atrocities in Syria will continue. Our 

allies and partners in the Middle East will be put at greater risk 

of existential danger. Europe will continue to be destabilized and 

consumed by the internal challenge of managing the refugee challenge. The cancer of ISIL will grow more potent and spread across 

more of the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, posing a greater threat 

to our national security. Iran will be emboldened in its pursuit of 

its malign regional ambitions. Putin will establish Russia as a 

dominant military power in the Middle East for the first time in 

four decades. All the while, America’s credibility and influence will 

continue to erode. 

Make no mistake, this is the course we are now on. This will be 

the consequences of our current policy. No one believes there are 

easy answers to the underlying problems in the Middle East, but 

this much should be clear: We cannot go on pretending that we can 

somehow avoid these problems or that the current approach of trying to treat the symptoms of the disease, rather than its cause, will 

work if only we give it more time. It will not. Policies of gradual 

escalation never do. 

Senator Reed. 

122 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me join the Chairman in welcoming back the Secretary of 

Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Thank you, 

gentlemen, for your service. 

Today’s hearings comes in the midst of a series of events altering 

the security situation in the Middle East. These include a massive 

wave of refugees fleeing the continued violence on the ground in 

Syria and Iraq, the deployment of Russian air and ground forces 

in Syria, the suspected ISIL attack in Turkey that killed over 100 

people and injured hundreds more during a peace rally in Ankara, 

and the deployment recently of Lieutenant General Sean McFarland, the new commander of Operation Inherent Resolve, Secretary 

John Kerry’s recent meetings with the Foreign Ministers of Russia, 

Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. In addition, the hearing also comes only 

weeks before the G20 summit in Turkey, where these issues and 

the international response will be at the forefront. 

General McFarland has been in the command of military operations in Syria and Iraq for a little more than 45 days. I understand that he has used this time to evaluate the situation on the 

ground and may be recommending changes to the campaign. General McFarland’s arrival comes at a critical time, as the coalition 

military campaign requires a reevaluation of our strategy. 

In Syria, the coalition faces a series of intermingled conflicts, including the counter-ISIL fight, the Syrian civil war, a regional 

proxy war between the Gulf states and Iran, a sectarian SunniShi’a conflict, our counterterrorism fight, and the intervention of 

Russia, a potential great power struggle. Considering these challenges, it is important that we continually assess the role of our 

Nation’s military in helping to bring about the conditions for an acceptable and sustainable settlement. 

In Iraq, the recent visit by Chairman Dunford and General Austin have focused attention on the coalition’s effort to train and 

equip the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). However, taken as a whole, 

the ISF have not shown the will to make necessary advances in the 

operation to take Ramadi, for example. The political leaders in 

Baghdad have not made the progress needed in the broader agenda 

of improving the inclusiveness of the Iraqi government and addressing the longstanding grievances of Kurds, Sunnis, moderate 

Shi’a, and minorities. 

The recent operation by Kurdish Peshmerga forces, accompanied 

by United States Special Operations Forces in northern Iraq, despite the tragic loss of one of our finest soldiers, demonstrated that 

such targeted efforts can have significant success in protecting innocent civilians and degrading ISIL. These kinds of operations can 

also result in critical intelligence to support the coalition’s broader 

campaign against ISIL. While these operations are obviously not 

without risk, the time may have come to evaluate whether the 

tempo of such counter-ISIL operations can be increased and whether our troops can play an even more active role in enabling the 

ISF, including by accompanying their forces at lower echelons, especially when direct contact with the enemy is not expected. 

According to reports, the coalition’s provisions of close air support 

to Syrian Kurdish forces have shown success in northern Syria. 

123 

The recent decision by the administration to equip a group of 

Sunni tribes who have come together to form a Syrian Arab coalition to fight alongside Syrian Kurdish forces shows promise for 

placing additional pressure on ISIL in Raqqa and the surrounding 

areas. If successful, this would be a positive development towards 

the objectives of the broader campaign. However, I am concerned 

that the decision to completely suspend the Department’s overt 

train-and-equip program may not enable us to accomplish our goals 

in Syria. Where the program clearly failed to live up to heightened 

expectations, my understanding is that the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force had recently recalibrated the program based on 

lessons learned, and that later graduates today are having a direct 

impact as enablers in the fight against ISIL. The coalition cannot 

succeed in Syria without a reliable Sunni force on the ground to 

hold any territorial gains. Building this force will require time and 

patience. Critically, it will require the building of trust through 

training engagements and persistent contact between the coalition 

and our new partners on the ground. I hope the Secretary and the 

Chairman will provide the committee a clear understanding of the 

conditions required to reengage in training of vetted individuals or 

small groups. 

The deployment of Russian forces in Syria, and their indiscriminate military operations targeting the moderate opposition, have 

the potential to set off another wave of refugees across Europe. 

More specifically, Russia’s military operations in Syria have complicated the coalition air campaign and have the potential to draw 

the attention of moderate Syrian operation—opposition forces, rather, away from counter-ISIL operations. Russian operations have 

also negatively impacted the distribution of humanitarian and 

other nonlethal aid to the Syrian people. 

In the coming months, I hope General McFarland will be provided with the operational flexibility to implement necessary modifications to the campaign against ISIL. Secretary Carter and Chairman Dunford, I would be interested in your recommendations for 

how to ensure that General McFarland receives the operational 

flexibility and support needed to be successful, going forward. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your testimony. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Welcome the witnesses. 

Secretary Carter. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ASHTON B. CARTER, SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE 

Secretary CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Reed, members of the committee. Thanks for inviting us to 

come here today before you to discuss the counter-ISIL campaign 

in Iraq and Syria, and, along the way, to address some of the concerns, Mr. Chairman, that you raised, and to share with you, Senator Reed, some of the plans and initiatives that the Chairman and 

I are formulating for our campaign in both Iraq and Syria. 

This is the first time, for me, appearing before this committee 

alongside Chairman Joe Dunford, who was just in the region last 

week, as was noted. I’m grateful to Joe for answering my and the 

President’s call to step down from what every marine knows is a 

higher position—namely, Commandant of the Marine Corps—to beVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:53 Sep 08, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00129 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21401.TXT WILDA
124 

come Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. To this committee, for 

conforming Joe, thank you. 

I’m glad to have you here with me today. 

Before I turn to the subject of today’s hearing, I want to reiterate, as I’ve said consistently since March and continue to believe, 

that Washington needs to come together behind a multiyear budget 

deal that supports our defense strategy, the troops and their families, and all elements of Americans’ national security and strength. 

I understand significant progress was made on this overnight, and 

I’m looking forward to reviewing the details. But, I welcome this 

major positive development, and applaud the members of this committee for what you’re doing to help us get there. 

The Middle East presents a kaleidoscope of challenges. But, 

there, as everywhere, our actions and strong military posture are 

guided by what’s in America’s interests. That’s our North Star. 

Amid this region’s complexity and uncertainty, those interests are 

to deter aggression, to bolster the security of our friends and allies, 

especially Israel, to ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf, to 

check Iran’s malign influence even as we monitor the implementation of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and to degrade and 

ultimately defeat ISIL. This last one, ISIL, poses a threat to our 

people and to friendly countries, not only in the Middle East, but 

around the world. 

Today, I will, first, outline the changes in the execution of our 

strategy that we have considered and are now pursuing militarily 

to gather battlefield momentum in the fight against ISIL. Then I’ll 

address what Russia is doing in Syria and why we won’t let it 

interfere with our campaign against ISIL. 

When I last spoke to this committee about our counter-ISIL campaign and its nine lines of essential military and nonmilitary effort, 

I made three things clear about the military aspects: first, that we 

will deliver ISIL a lasting defeat; second, that truly lasting success 

would require enabling capable, motivated local forces on the 

ground, recognizing that this will take time and new diplomatic energy; and third, that our strategy’s execution can and must and 

will be strengthened. All that’s still true. Our determination is unchanged even as the situation continues to evolve and we continue 

to adapt to execute our campaign more effectively. Today, I’d like 

to elaborate on the third point and explain how we’re adapting our 

campaign to do more, reinforcing what we know works. 

The changes we’re pursuing can be described what I—by what I 

call ‘‘the three R’s’’: Raqqa, Ramadi, and raids. Before I explain 

what they mean, let me also note that I took actions to streamline 

command and control of the counter-ISIL military campaign by assigning the entire effort to a single general officer, Lieutenant General Sean McFarland, where, in the urgency of the early phase of 

the campaign last year, several layers were added to the general 

officer already present in Iraq. 

The first ‘‘R’’ is Raqqa, ISIL’s stronghold and administrative capital. We’ve been clear for some time that we need to keep up pressure on Raqqa. To that end, we will support moderate Syrian forces 

fighting ISIL that have made territorial gains near Raqqa. Indeed, 

some of them are within 30 miles of Raqqa today. The Syrian Arab 

coalition, which we plan to strengthen through our new equipping 

125 

approach—more on that in a moment—will work over time with 

other Syrian anti-ISIL forces to push towards Raqqa. To the south, 

we plan to further strengthen our partner, Jordan. From the skies 

above, we expect to intensify our air campaign, including with additional United States and coalition aircraft, to target ISIL with a 

higher and heavier rate of strikes. This will include more strikes 

against ISIL high-value targets as our intelligence improves, also 

its oil enterprise, which is a critical pillar of ISIL’s financial infrastructure. As I said last Friday, we’ve already begun to ramp up 

these deliberate strikes. 

Part of this pressure includes our new approach to the Syria 

train-and-equip program. I, like President Obama and members of 

this committee, was disappointed with that program’s results. We, 

accordingly, examined the program this summer and have since 

changed it. I use the word ‘‘change,’’ not ‘‘end.’’ ‘‘Change’’ the program. While the old approach was to train and equip completely 

new forces outside of Syria before sending them into the fight, the 

new approach is to work with vetted leaders of groups that are already fighting ISIL, and provide equipment and some training to 

them, and support their operations with airpower. This approach 

builds on successes that local Syrian Arab and Syrian Kurdish 

forces have made along Syria’s northern border to retake and hold 

ground from ISIL with the help of United States airstrikes and 

equipment resupplies. If done in concert, as we intend, all these actions on the ground and from the air should help shrink ISIL’s territory into a smaller and smaller area and create new opportunities 

for targeting ISIL, ultimately denying this evil movement any safe 

haven in its supposed heartland. 

The second ‘‘R’’ is Ramadi, the capital of Iraq’s Anbar Province, 

which serves as a critical example of the Abadi government’s commitment to work with local Sunni communities, with our help, to 

retake and hold ground from ISIL, and, in turn, to build momentum to eventually go northward to Mosul. Under Prime Minister 

Abadi’s leadership, the Iraqis have begun to use American-made F– 

16s to support counter-ISIL operations, and have empowered capable battlefield commanders to step forward. As we see more 

progress towards assembling capable and motivated Iraqi forces 

under Baghdad’s control and including Sunni elements, we’re willing to continue to provide more enabling capabilities and fire support to help them succeed. However, the Iraqi government and security forces will have to take certain steps militarily to make sure 

our progress sticks. 

We need to see more in the direction of multisectarian governance and defense leadership. For example, we’ve given the Iraqi 

government two battalions’ worth of equipment for mobilizing 

Sunni tribal forces. As we continue to provide the support, the 

Iraqi government must ensure it is distributed effectively. Local 

Sunni forces aren’t sufficiently equipped, regularly paid, and empowered as coequal members of the Iraqi Security Forces, ISIL’s 

defeats in Anbar will only be temporary. 

The third and final ‘‘R’’ is raids, signaling that we won’t hold 

back from supporting capable partners in opportunistic attacks 

against ISIL or conducting such missions directly, whether by 

strikes from the air or direct action on the ground. Last week’s resVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:53 Sep 08, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00131 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21401.TXT WILDA
126 

cue operation was led by Iraqi Kurdish forces with United States 

advisors in support. One of those accompanying advisors, Master 

Sergeant Joshua Wheeler, heroically acted to ensure the overall 

success of the mission, and lost his life in the process. The death 

of any servicemember is a tragedy. As I told his family and teammates this weekend, we offer our condolences to Master Sergeant 

Wheeler’s loved ones for their loss. 

While our mission in Iraq is to train, advise, and assist our Iraqi 

partners in situations such as that operation, where we have actionable intelligence and a capable partner force, we want to support our partners, and we will. At the same time, the raid on Abu 

Sayyaf’s home, the strikes against Junaid Hussain, and, most recently, Sanafi al-Nasr, should all serve notice to ISIL and other terrorist leaders that, once we locate them, no target is beyond our 

reach. 

As we’ve looked at how to gather momentum and adapt to the 

changing battlefield, some have discussed putting a buffer zone, 

humanitarian zone, or no-fly zone in Syria. We have analyzed various options, and the political and military requirements of each. 

These options are complex and raise some challenges, which I’m 

prepared to discussed in answer to your questions. 

Let me now turn to Russia’s involvement in Syria. To be clear, 

we are not cooperating with Russia, and we’re not letting Russia 

impact the pace or scope of our campaign against ISIL in Iraq and 

Syria. While we negotiated a document on safety of flight with the 

Russian Minister of Defense, we do not align ourselves more broadly with their military actions, because, instead of singularly attacking ISIL, as they said they were going to do, they’re primarily attacking the Syrian opposition, as the Chairman has noted, which 

further fuels the tragic civil war there. Their actions suggest a doubling down on their longstanding relationship with Assad, sending 

advisors, artillery, and aviation to enable and support the Assad 

regime and Iranian forces in attacking moderates who oppose the 

regime and are essential to Syria’s political transition. It appears 

the vast majority of their strikes, by some estimates as high as 85 

to 90 percent, use ‘‘dumb bombs,’’ which obviously increases the 

possibility of civilian casualties. 

So, as Russia acts in a coalition of two with Iran at its side, the 

United States will continue to strengthen our 65-nation global coalition. Even as we’ve reached an understanding with the Russians 

on safety protocols for coalition pilots over Syria, we will keep prosecuting our counter-ISIL campaign unabated. We will keep supporting the moderate Syrian opposition, along with our other commitments to friends and allies in the region. Consistent with our 

strong, balanced approach towards Russian aggression elsewhere 

in the world, including NATO and Ukraine, we will keep the door 

open for Russia to contribute to efforts towards a political solution 

in which—which, in the final answer—analysis, is the only answer 

to the Syrian conflict. 

I’ve discussed the military strategy and accompanying campaign, 

but, before I conclude, I remind the committee that defeating ISIL 

and protecting America requires coordinated efforts across all of 

the so-called ‘‘nine lines of effort,’’ to include supporting effective 

governance in Iraq, enhancing intelligence collection, disrupting 

127 

ISIL’s financing, countering ISIL’s messaging, stopping the flow of 

foreign fighters, providing humanitarian support, and protecting 

our homeland, where other departments and agencies of our government have the lead. 

Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. General Dunford. 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC, 

CHAIRMAN OF OTHER JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

General DUNFORD. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, 

distinguished members of the committee, thanks for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss our challenges in the 

Middle East, and specifically the military dimension of our campaign against ISIL. 

I’ve been in my current position for just short of 4 weeks, and 

spent much of that time reviewing our counter-ISIL campaign. I 

also followed up on a commitment I made in my confirmation hearing to visit the region early in my tenure. Last weekend, to get a 

personal perspective on the campaign, I visited Israel, Jordan, and 

Iraq. I was extremely impressed with the focus and commitment of 

our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines that I met during the 

visit. Thanks to your support, I can report that they are well 

trained and equipped. 

Before taking your questions, I’d like to share a few thoughts on 

the counter-ISIL military campaign in Iraq and Syria. ISIL’s primary source of strength is its claim to be a caliphate. To be successful, the coalition’s military campaign must reduce ISIL’s territorial control, destroy its warfighting capability, and undermine its 

brand and aura of invincibility. There are two critical elements of 

the military campaign: 

The first is to conduct strikes against ISIL targets. The strikes 

are intended to kill key leadership and fighters, interdict their 

lines of communication, and deny them sources of revenue. 

The second critical element in the military campaign is to develop and support effective partners on the ground to seize and secure ISIL-held terrain. 

Many weeks before I became the Chairman, the leadership 

across the Department recognized that we needed to increase pressure on ISIL from multiple directions to generate momentum in the 

coalition’s military campaign. As with any campaign, we’re continuing to examine ways to enhance the effectiveness of our operations. 

But, we all recognize that ISIL is a transregional threat requiring a broader strategy. The immediate priority is to bear down on 

core ISIL across Iraq and Syria simultaneously. The framework for 

the campaign is the same for Iraq and Syria, but the conditions on 

the ground present unique challenges and opportunities. The end 

state is to defeat ISIL. Without a partner on the ground, Syria has 

clearly presented the most difficult challenge. No one is satisfied 

with our progress to date. Moving forward, we must continue to 

work with our Turkish partners to secure the northern border of 

Syria. We must do all we can to enable vetted Syrian opposition 

forces willing to fight ISIL. We must be more aggressive in strikes 

that will deny ISIL the access they have to oil revenue. 

128 

The Secretary has already addressed the adjustments to the Syrian train-and-equip program. I support the refined approach. While 

there will be challenges, we’ll be supporting groups who have already demonstrated the will to fight ISIL. Our support will be contingent upon their attacking specific objectives in meeting specific 

standards. We’ll look for opportunities to support vetted opposition 

groups in both the north and along the border with Jordan. 

In our initial efforts to build ground forces in Syria, Major General Mike Nagata and his team were operating under extraordinarily difficult conditions, and I’d like to thank them for their 

hard work. Due to their efforts, we have a much better understanding of the operating environment and the opportunities. We’ll 

be able to leverage their initiative and lessons learned as we make 

course and speed corrections. 

Last week, we began to move the campaign forward in another 

important way by striking a major oil facility and source of revenue 

for ISIL. Based on some superb analytic work and planning, Central Command (CENTCOM) is now postured to accelerate broader 

interagency efforts against ISIL’s economic means. The Central 

Command is also continuing to work with Turkey to secure border—the border area in northwest Syria. We still have some work 

to do. 

In Iraq, we’ve also been frustrated with the pace of operations. 

That said, there’s been recent progress in Baiji, some movement 

around Ramadi, and the Peshmerga have made progress in the 

north. After talking to the commanders on the ground, I believe 

we’ll have an opportunity to reinforce Iraqi success in the days 

ahead. We’ve developed a variety of options to do that. 

To be successful in Syria and Iraq, in addition to the initiatives 

I’ve mentioned and those outlined by the Secretary, we also need 

to continue to improve how we leverage our intelligence capabilities 

and do more to cut the flow of foreign fighters. I have a better understanding of these two issues after my visit, and those will be a 

priority for me in the days ahead. 

We will also continue to look hard at other ways to increase the 

effectiveness of coalition operations in the tempo of the campaign. 

The Secretary and the President have made it clear that they expect me to bring to them all of the options that may be—that may 

contribute to our winning the fight against ISIL. I’ve made a commitment to them that I would do that, and I’ll meet that commitment. 

In closing, as I complete my initial assessment of the campaign, 

I believe we’ve identified and started to implement a number of initiatives to move the campaign forward. We’re not satisfied or complacent about where we are, and we won’t be satisfied until ISIL 

is defeated. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to join you, and I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you very much, General. 

Secretary Carter, the President’s spokesman, after it was clear 

that the arm and train and equip by the DOD program had 

failed—President’s spokesman said that the President was—felt 

vindicated that this program had failed, because he never supported it to start with. This was a program that we invested $43 

129 

million, at least, of a $500 million program. I’m not sure how many 

young people were killed in trying to implement this failed program. Did you feel vindicated when this program failed? 

Secretary CARTER. Mr. Chairman, I thought that the effort—and 

I want to repeat something that the Chairman just said—I think 

that General Nagata, who was given this program, which was conceived last summer—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Yeah, I just asked—— 

Secretary CARTER.—approved through the winter—— 

Chairman MCCAIN.—the question whether you felt vindicated, or 

not—— 

Secretary CARTER. No, I was—— 

Chairman MCCAIN.—as the—— 

Secretary CARTER.—disappointed. 

Chairman MCCAIN.—President’s spokesman—— 

Secretary CARTER. I was actually—no, I was disappointed in it. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I see. 

Secretary CARTER. I wished it had turned out differently. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I see. 

Secretary CARTER. However, we—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. But, the—— 

Secretary CARTER.—are learning our lessons from that, and, 

therefore, our new approach differs in—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, then would one of those—— 

Secretary CARTER.—a fundamental way from—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Go ahead. 

Secretary CARTER. I can describe the difference between the old 

and the new. But, we think that we have learning lessons from 

that. 

Chairman MCCAIN. So, you don’t feel vindicated that the program failed. 

Secretary CARTER. I was disappointed that it failed. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I see. But, the President obviously wasn’t. 

He felt vindicated, according to his spokesperson. 

In this change that you were talking about—and already we’re 

seeing some of the changes—does that mean that we—these young 

people that we train and equip and send in to fight—that we’re 

going to protect them from being barrel-bombed and attacked by 

Russian aircraft? 

Secretary CARTER. I think we have conveyed the same obligation 

last time I was before you—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Right now, as we speak—— 

Secretary CARTER.—to protect—— 

Chairman MCCAIN.—Russian aircraft—— 

Secretary CARTER.—these forces—— 

Chairman MCCAIN.—are bombing—right now, as we speak, Russian aircraft are bombing moderate Syrian forces in Syria while we 

have deconflicted. Do you believe that we should be protecting 

those young people—— 

Secretary CARTER. Our Title 10 forces, we have an obligation to 

protect. We’ve stated that. We will have—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Are we protecting them? 

Secretary CARTER.—options to do that. We have authority to do 

that. 

130 

Chairman MCCAIN. Are we protecting them now? 

Secretary CARTER. They have not come—they’re operating in a— 

they have not come under attack by either Assad’s forces or Russia’s forces—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Russia’s air has not been—— 

Secretary CARTER.—the Syrian Arab—— 

Chairman MCCAIN.—attacking—— 

Secretary CARTER.—coalition and the Kurdish People’s Protection 

Unit (YPG). 

Chairman MCCAIN. No, no, I’m asking about the moderate Syrian forces that are there, some of whom we trained. 

Secretary CARTER. I’m sorry, I was speaking of our train-andequip—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. I’m asking the question about those that 

we—some of those we trained and equipped, moderate Syrian 

forces that are now being bombed by Russia. 

Secretary CARTER. With respect to the Title 10 forces that the 

Department of Defense trains and equips in Syria, they have not 

come under attack, but we have expressed—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. None of the moderate forces that—some of 

whom we have trained, are—have come under attack by Russia 

from the air? 

Secretary CARTER. Not in our train-and-equip program, our Title 

10 program, no. 

Chairman MCCAIN. That’s fascinating. It—— 

Secretary CARTER. But, let me be clear, Chairman, the Russians—and, obviously, Assad—do attack moderate Syrian 

forces—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Yes. 

Secretary CARTER.—which are supported by—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Primarily—— 

Secretary CARTER.—the international coalition. The—one of the 

reasons why the Russian approach is so—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. So, are we going to train—— 

Secretary CARTER.—wrongheaded—— 

Chairman MCCAIN.—are we going to train these young people, 

you say, in the change—are we going to send them into Syria to 

fight—are we going to protect them from being barrel-bombed 

by—— 

Secretary CARTER. The ones—— 

Chairman MCCAIN.—Bashar Assad and protected from—— 

Secretary CARTER. The ones that—— 

Chairman MCCAIN.—Russians—— 

Secretary CARTER. Yes, the ones that we—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Anyone we send in and—— 

Secretary CARTER.—train and equip—— 

Chairman MCCAIN.—train, we’re—— 

Secretary CARTER.—we have that—— 

Chairman MCCAIN.—going to—— 

Secretary CARTER.—obligation. 

Chairman MCCAIN.—protect from Russian air attacks. 

Secretary CARTER. We have an obligation to do that, and we’ve 

made that clear, right from the beginning of the train-and-equip 

program. 

131 

Chairman MCCAIN. We haven’t done it. We haven’t done it—— 

Secretary CARTER. They have not—— 

Chairman MCCAIN.—Secretary—— 

Secretary CARTER.—come under attack. 

Chairman MCCAIN.—Carter. 

Secretary CARTER. But, I’ve—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. I promise you they have. We will—— 

Secretary CARTER.—we have an obligation—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. We—you will have to correct the record. 

Now, General Petraeus and General—and former Secretary Robert Gates, SECDEF, and now, we understand, Secretary Hillary 

Clinton, have all stated that they think we should stop the barrelbombing and that we should train and equip, and we should have 

no-fly zone or aircraft exclusionary zones. I might point out, General Dunford, as complicated as it is, we were able to do Northern 

Watch and Southern Watch rather successfully in Iraq, although 

it’s not exactly the same. So, are you recommending that we should 

stop the barrel-bombing, as General David Petraeus and Secretary—former Secretary Gates and now Secretary Clinton—have 

suggested, to stop the barrel-bombing, to provide a no-—an aircraft 

exclusionary zone in order to protect the innocent civilians that are 

being driven into refugee status, in the greatest refugee situation 

since the end of World War II? 

Secretary CARTER. Yeah, Chairman, I—we have, as I indicated in 

my statement, analyzed zones of various kinds and—humanitarian 

zones, buffer zones, and you’re talking about—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Yeah 

Secretary CARTER.—no-fly zones. I can give you some of the considerations—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Stop the barrel-bombing. 

Secretary CARTER.—the—that would be one of the—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Yeah. 

Secretary CARTER.—intents of a no-fly zone. If you’d like, I can 

tell you some of the considerations that—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. I’d just like to know whether you support, or 

not. 

Secretary CARTER. We have not made that recommendation to 

the President. He has not taken it off the table. I can explain some 

of the reasons for our recommendation—or our—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. It’s not an issue that has not been examined, 

Secretary Carter. It’s been recommended for years by some of us. 

I mean, you have to examine it—— 

Secretary CARTER. But, we have looked at it quite—— 

Chairman MCCAIN.—all over again? 

Secretary CARTER. We’ve looked at it quite closely. I’m prepared 

to describe it. I know the Chairman is, as well. 

Chairman MCCAIN. It’s not a—it’s a matter—it’s an issue that’s 

been on the table for three or four years that I know of. It’s not 

a—we received information when General Martin Dempsey said it 

would cost a billion dollars a day or something incredible. But, it’s 

not a new issue. 

Secretary CARTER. It is not a new issue. It is a substantial military—— 

132 

Chairman MCCAIN. So, it seems to me you should have a position 

on it. 

Secretary CARTER. We have not recommended that. We have 

analyzed it. We’ve presented the alternatives—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. So, you do not—— 

Secretary CARTER.—to the President. 

chairman—support—— 

Secretary CARTER. We’ve not—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. You do not agree with General Petraeus and 

former Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton. 

Secretary CARTER. We do not have a concept of operations for a 

no-fly zone at this time that we’re prepared—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. After all these years, we don’t have a concept 

of operations. 

Secretary CARTER. That we’re prepared to recommend. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I just, Mr. Secretary, want to clarify. You have spoken exclusively about forces trained by the Department of Defense. You 

kept—Title 10, but there are a lot of titles in the U.S. Code. But, 

there are other forces on the ground that our coalition partners 

have trained, that have come under attack by the Russians. Is 

that—that’s clear, correct? 

Secretary CARTER. Absolutely true. 

Senator REED. But, the forces that are subject to direct training 

by the Department of Defense have been placed in areas which, for 

many reasons, have not been subject to aerial attack—— 

Secretary CARTER. Well, they’re fighting ISIL. 

Senator REED. They’re fighting ISIL. 

Secretary CARTER. So—and the Russians, as I stated, are not, 

even though they said they were. 

Senator REED. Now, let me go back to the points you made about 

the train-and-equip program. It has shifted from trying to train individual units, insert those units into the counter-ISIL fight, to 

identifying leaders and providing some training to the leader, and 

then—— 

Secretary CARTER. Right. 

Senator REED.—some support. There is another aspect of this approach which I’d like to clarify. That is training not just leaders, 

but individual enablers, people with technical skills that can go 

into a deployed unit and provide those skills. Is that still being 

done? 

Secretary CARTER. Yes, that is still part of the approach. That 

was part of the old approach, as well. But, the big difference is 

that, rather than trying to form brand-new units, we are identifying units that are already fighting ISIL, providing them equipment, and, as you point out, after vetting their leadership, providing them with selected abilities that help them leverage our 

enablement, particular with—from the air. 

Senator REED. From the air. So, the program still is able to do 

that and, in addition, grow not so much units, but teams of Syrian 

nationals that can go in as specialists on a whole range of issues: 

air support, medical support, logistics support—and aid these units 

in Syria. 

133 

Secretary CARTER. Exactly. Now, we’re very transactional in this, 

so we are giving some equipment, seeing how they perform, give 

some more equipment, and how—see how they perform. But, these 

are groups that already exist. The Syrian Arab Coalition, moving 

in the areas north of Raqqa, is an example of that. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

General Dunford, you just returned from Iraq, and you had conversations with the—Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi because there 

were disconcerting reports of invitations to the Russians, collaboration at the intelligence level with the Russians. What’s your latest 

estimate of that? Is it something that was a more political statement by the Prime Minister, or is there actual ongoing, real efforts? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, thanks—I asked that specific question to all the senior ranking leaders that I met with, and I explained to them how difficult it would be for us to continue to provide support if the Russians were invited in to conduct airstrikes. 

I was assured, at every level, that that wouldn’t be the case. 

Could I follow up on the train-and-equip? 

Senator REED. Yes, sir. 

General DUNFORD. In your opening statement, you mentioned 

that we completely suspended the program, and I just wanted to 

clarify one point. The individuals that we had previously trained, 

we are still supporting them when they’re still in the fight. There 

are a number of them that are doing exactly the kind of things you 

spoke about, Senator Reed. They’re providing joint terminal attack 

controller (JTAC)-like support for forces that are fighting ISIL. 

Senator REED. It’s—based on the Secretary’s comments, it’s our 

intention to expand that as rapidly as we can. 

General DUNFORD. Where there are opportunities. I would just 

say, you know, for the T&E program, although we’re talking now 

about the Syrian Arab Coalition and training those large groups, 

my perception and the guidance that we have from the President 

is, where there are other opportunities, we should bring those forward to him. When I talked to the team on the ground, I made that 

clear to them, that, when we see opportunities, we ought to develop 

concept of operations, bring that back, and expand the program, 

where it will work. We’ll look to do that both in the northern part 

in Syria as well as along the Jordanian border. 

Senator REED. One final question, General Dunford, is that—and 

you—both your testimonies highlighted this inability of the government in Baghdad to fully support Sunni forces in Anbar, particularly. Some of that is historic mistrust, et cetera. Do your—from 

your testimony, they’re—you’re considering having American advisors at—not at the company level, but higher up, and the one function they could perform is to be an honest broker, which would 

allow the payment of troops, would allow the government of Baghdad to feel that they have some control, and, in addition, demand, 

on behalf of Sunni forces, that they get the fair share. Is that part 

of your thinking, going forward? 

General DUNFORD. It is, Senator. I think there’s actually four 

reasons why you might consider putting forces in an accompany 

role. The first is what you’re suggesting, which is to really to bring 

some campaign coherence. I think the other is to ensure that our 

134 

logistics support is effective. Another challenge we’ve had is situational awareness and intelligence. So, that would be another—that 

would be another advantage of doing that. Then, also the better delivery of combined arms. So, there’s really four factors, I think, that 

would be considered. If it had operational or strategic impact and 

we could reinforce success, that would be the basic framework 

within which I’d make a recommendation for additional forces to be 

colocated with Iraqi units. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Just to make the record clear, Secretary Carter, there are coalition-supported and American-supported forces 

that are in Syria that are being attacked by Russian aircraft. Is 

that true or false? 

Secretary CARTER. I’m sorry, Mr. Chairman. There are moderate 

Syrian opposition forces—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Coalition-supported. 

Secretary CARTER.—in Syria supported by the coalition, and, of 

course, people that we think are part of Syria’s future and part of 

the Syrian political transition. 

Chairman MCCAIN. It’s hard to be part of—— 

Secretary CARTER. They are being attacked. That’s—and not 

ISIL—and that’s why the Russian approach is backwards, or—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. That’s why—— 

Secretary CARTER.—I’ve called it wrongheaded. 

Chairman MCCAIN. That’s why it’s immoral to train people in 

and watch them—to go in and fight, and watch them being destroyed and maimed and killed—— 

Secretary CARTER. For our part—— 

Chairman MCCAIN.—by Russia. 

Secretary CARTER. For our part, in our train-and-equip program, 

as I’ve said before this committee before, we have a moral obligation—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. You are making a distinction without a difference, Mr. Secretary. These are American-supported and coalition-supported men who are going in and being slaughtered. 

Secretary Inhofe—Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. My understanding, Mr. Chairman, that 

Senator Cotton is presiding, so I’ll defer to him and then ask that 

we return to regular order. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. Yes, I do have to 

go preside over the Senate. General Dunford, that’s the Senate 

equivalent of staff duty for a junior officer. 

Secretary Carter, you talked about our ‘‘nine lines of effort.’’ Not 

all of those are military lines of effort. Is that correct? 

Secretary CARTER. That’s correct. 

Senator COTTON. Now that General Allen has departed as our 

envoy in charge of those ‘‘nine lines of effort,’’ who are minding 

those nondefense lines of effort? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, it’s a good question. What—one of the 

things that I have proposed, and Secretary Kerry has accepted, 

that he and I meet periodically with the other agency heads who 

have the other nine—the other lines of effort. General Allen’s been 

present at those meetings. His successor, Ambassador McGuirk, 

will be present at them. I thought—it’s one of the things I noticed 

135 

when I began to look at this campaign—that since all of these lines 

of effort are—it is necessary to have moving in concert, we needed 

a better effort to do that. So, Secretary Kerry’s agreed to do that 

with me. We’ve had, I think, four meetings—General Dunford was 

at the last one—focused on—counterfinancing was the last one. Before that was foreign fighter flow both into the conflict region and 

out of the conflict region to Europe, around the world. We are addressing messaging and ISIL’s messages and efforts to recruit people online. 

So, there are lots of different dimensions to this that are not 

military, per se, but I believe that they’re opportunities to make 

the whole greater than the sum of the parts, and I’ve sought to 

seize those opportunities with Secretary Kerry, now with General 

Dunford, and make sure that all these different efforts are coordinated. They’re all important. The other participants are doing important things—the diplomatic people and the intelligence people 

and the homeland security and law enforcement folks. But, I think 

the whole can be greater than the sum of the parts. Just per your 

question, that’s exactly the intent. 

Senator COTTON. Is that a detailed way of saying there’s not a 

single person taking over all of the nondefense lines of effort? 

Secretary CARTER. There has not been a single person who had 

that responsibility. Remember, General Allen, who was superb— 

General Allen had the responsibility for assembling the coalition, 

which he did with great skill, and, to his credit and Ambassador 

McGuirk’s, we have a broad coalition. I’m talking about something 

different, which is assembling the mechanics of all of the nine lines 

of effort. So, that’s something I’m undertaking to do with Secretary 

Kerry, and we’re gathering in the other parties that are involved. 

Ambassador McGuirk will be part of that effort. But, I think it’s 

necessary—— 

Senator COTTON. I’d like to—— 

Secretary CARTER.—necessary organizational change. 

Senator COTTON. I’d like to shift briefly now to Russia’s move 

into Syria. A few weeks ago, before the major Russian movement 

into Syria, the United States Government requested that Bulgaria 

and Iraq close its airspace to Russian aircraft. How did we transmit that request to Iraq? 

Secretary CARTER. I do not know what the mechanics of that 

were. Can I get back to you on that, Senator? I simply don’t know. 

Senator COTTON. Is that something the State Department 

would—— 

Secretary CARTER. I’m happy to—— 

Senator COTTON.—typically do? The Department of Defense? 

Secretary CARTER. I—— 

Senator COTTON. The White House? 

Secretary CARTER. I—Joe, go ahead. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I believe that message would have 

been delivered by Ambassador Jones, in Baghdad. 

Senator COTTON. Iraq obviously declined our request, while Bulgaria accepted it. 

General DUNFORD. Declined the request—— 

Senator COTTON. Let Russian aircraft fly through their airspace. 

136 

General DUNFORD. There was—there has been Russian aircraft 

that’s flown through Iraqi airspace. My understanding is, it was 

not at the invitation of the Iraqi government. 

Senator COTTON. Does it—does the Iraq air force have the capability to protect its own air force and exclude a foreign air force like 

Russia’s? 

General DUNFORD. They have limited capability, Senator. They 

recently were fielded with F–16s, but they have limited air-to-air 

capability. 

Senator COTTON. So, if the United States Government requested 

that the Government of Iraq close its airspace to Russia, surely the 

United States Government was prepared to assist Iraq in closing 

its airspace and stopping Russian aircraft from flying over Iraq? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, I—it’s a sovereign decision by Iraq, but, 

I’ll tell you, we’re not uninterested in it. And—but, you’re raising 

a very important question, which is, Is Iraq going to cooperate with 

the Russian—what I would regard as mis-—I called it wrongheaded 

approach I Syria? We have received—and I believe that General 

Dunford received, just last week—from Prime Minister Abadi, in no 

uncertain terms, the statement that he will not work with the Russians, he will—he will not allow them to be partners with Iraq in 

that regard, that we are the preferred partners of Iraq. We’ve been 

insistent on that point. Prime Minister Abadi has repeated those 

pledges to us. I only say that because I—we feel emphatically about 

that—receiving those pledges, and intend to have them implemented by Prime Minister Abadi. But, he has not been ambiguous 

about that. I believe the most recent conversation was held by General Dunford, and perhaps you’d like to say something about that, 

Joe. It’s a serious issue. 

General DUNFORD. No, Senator, I raised it both with the Minister of Defense and the Prime Minister and, again, tried to explain 

to them that our continued support really would be problematic, 

were they to invite the Russians in to conduct strikes. I was assured that they had not extended that invitation, and they did not 

intend to extend an invitation to do that. 

Senator COTTON. Well, in closing, I would say it’s problematic for 

Russia to be resupplying its forces in Syria by flying through Iraq. 

We should renew our request that they exclude Russian aircraft 

from their airspace, and our military should be prepared to assist 

them in excluding Russian aircraft from their airspace. 

Thank you, Senator Inhofe, Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Manchin. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for your service and for being here. 

Let me—I think my question would be, What is our end game? 

The end game would be—we’ve been there, bogged down for quite 

some time. If you look at—when I go home to West Virginia and 

talk to the citizens, you know, they say, ‘‘Well, to stop this migration, you’re going to have to have a no-fly zone. You have to have 

protection where people feel like they’re safe. As the country regroups or rebuilds, that—there are still people there that, basically, 

are peace-loving, well-educated.’’ So, we haven’t made a decision on 

that. I know the Chairman has asked directly on that. 

137 

And then I start looking at, basically, with Russia’s involvement, 

and Russia being involved to protect Assad. Russia is more involved in protecting Assad and working with Iran to have some influence of what happens there, in my evaluation. Then, you look at 

the United States. We’re more concerned about fighting ISIL, if you 

will—or it looks to be—more so than protecting or fighting with our 

coalition, who wants to defeat Assad. 

So, what would be the end game? Who—what part are we going 

to be able to play in this unless we take on Russia or basically 

check Russia from what they’re doing, unless we have some type 

of diplomatic relations with Russia and an agreement with Russia? 

I see Russia as being in a situation—and they have involved themselves—to where they’re going to be a major broker in that region, 

because Iran seems to be, if you will, more influential, as far as in 

Iraq and in Syria, with Assad. Now with Assad being helped and 

propped up by Russia, we’re out there fighting ISIL. We don’t— 

we’re not protecting the people that can basically put any security 

back into Syria. I just—it’s a very confusing situation. It’s hard for 

us to say, ‘‘Okay, at the end of the day, here’s our end game.’’ 

And if somebody has any explanation for that and tells me what 

we’re trying to accomplish, I’d be happy to hear it. 

Secretary CARTER. I’ll take that, Senator. 

The—for us, the paramount objective is the defeat of ISIL. That 

will require—— 

Senator MANCHIN. That’s our number-one—— 

Secretary CARTER.—in Iraq—— 

Senator MANCHIN.—priority right now in Syria. 

Secretary CARTER.—because they’re trying to attack Americans. 

Senator MANCHIN. I gotcha. 

Secretary CARTER. We have to take that very seriously. 

Senator MANCHIN. Okay. 

Secretary CARTER. They must be defeated, and they must be—— 

Senator MANCHIN. You agree—— 

Secretary CARTER.—defeated very—— 

Senator MANCHIN. I’m sorry, Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary CARTER. Sorry. 

Senator MANCHIN. You do agree that Russia’s primary is to protect Assad. 

Secretary CARTER. Yeah. They said they were going to fight ISIL, 

and that’s not what they’re doing. 

Senator MANCHIN. Okay. So—— 

Secretary CARTER. They’re propping up—— 

Senator MANCHIN.—we—— 

Secretary CARTER.—Assad, which just fuels the civil war, which 

is the point the Chairman was making—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Okay. 

Secretary CARTER.—and fuels the—— 

Senator MANCHIN. So, we have two different—— 

Secretary CARTER. So, they’re on the—— 

Senator MANCHIN.—objectives right now—— 

Secretary CARTER.—they’re on the wrong side of the—— 

Senator MANCHIN. The United States and Russia has two complete different objectives. 

138 

Secretary CARTER. Well, they say they have the same objectives, 

but—— 

Senator MANCHIN. But, we don’t—— 

Secretary CARTER.—their actions—— 

Senator MANCHIN.—see that. I gotcha. 

Secretary CARTER.—belie that. 

Senator MANCHIN. And they’re basically in line with Iran in helping prop up Assad and protect Assad. 

Secretary CARTER. Iran has also supported Assad, absolutely, as 

well. 

So, to get to the question of the end game, the end game in Syria 

has to be a transition in which Assad is no longer running the 

country. We would like to see that transition occur in as peaceful 

and prompt a way as possible, because we would like there to be 

the—a—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Is it obvious that—basically, that Russia and 

Iran will have more influence on who the next leader or the leadership of Syria’s going to be than we will? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, I think that—I wouldn’t—I don’t think 

they can be sure of that, because the—— 

Senator MANCHIN. But, I’m saying they’re—— 

Secretary CARTER.—the future of—— 

Senator MANCHIN.—positioning themselves for that. 

Secretary CARTER.—Syria—the future of Syria will be in the 

hands of the Syrian people, and many of those are Syrian moderate 

opposition leaders who are being attacked by Assad’s forces, with 

Russia’s help, right now. 

Senator MANCHIN. Have we—— 

Secretary CARTER. That’s why Russia’s—— 

Senator MANCHIN.—been able to assist—— 

Secretary CARTER.—on the wrong side of—— 

Senator MANCHIN.—the migration of the people from Syria as 

being—— 

Secretary CARTER. Some of them. 

Senator MANCHIN.—more of the leaders—— 

Secretary CARTER. Some of them. 

Senator MANCHIN.—more of the well-educated, more of the 

peace-loving? 

Secretary CARTER. Yes. There’s a spectrum there that goes all 

the way over to true extremists, like Jabhat al-Nusra (al-Nusra) 

and al- —and ISIL, all the way through groups—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Can I ask, General—— 

Secretary CARTER.—much more moderate. 

Senator MANCHIN.—Dunford, if—on this—General, I know that 

we’ve talked before on some of this, but it’s just so—it’s so hard to 

go home and explain our involvement unless we’re going to have 

a no-fly and protect those who want to be there to rebuild their 

country. We’re not going to have much to work with. 

General DUNFORD. The Chairman said something important in 

his opening comments. I think that’s exactly what the military 

campaign is designed to do, and that’s to provide some leverage. I 

think what we owe—what we owe the President is options that will 

allow us to generate the kind of momentum and confidence in the 

139 

military campaign against ISIL that will give us leverage politically. 

So, the decision’s been made that the issue with Assad is being 

solved politically right now. So, I think there’s two separate approaches, here, in Syria that’ll come together at some point in the 

future. One is that we’re dealing with ISIL on the ground, and 

we’re doing that militarily, and that’s with the strikes and the 

partnership capacity that I spoke about a minute ago. Meanwhile, 

there are broader political negotiations that are taking place to determine the future of the transitional government. I think right 

now it’s pretty clear to me what we should be doing on the military 

side, and that is taking the fight to ISIL, generating momentum, 

keeping the coalition together, giving confidence in the campaign. 

Then, again—— 

Senator MANCHIN. If I can just—— 

General DUNFORD.—the Chairman talked about—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Mr. Chairman, if you indulge us, one more. 

If I can just ask: Is the rebels or the coalition forces, which we 

are supporting in Syria—are they more intent on fighting Assad or 

fighting ISIL? 

General DUNFORD. The individuals that we are supporting, specifically those in the north, are supporting—fighting ISIL. 

Senator MANCHIN. More so than Assad. 

General DUNFORD. More so than Assad. 

Senator MANCHIN. Even though—— 

General DUNFORD. So, that includes the Syrian Arab Coalition 

and the YPG and some smaller groups that we’ve supported. We 

have some other groups that we’re beginning to negotiate with in 

the south that have expressed the same intent. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Our committee rules have always been to submit the statements 

24 hours in advance, and I—that didn’t—it’s really helpful to us if 

we can get that. So, I’d ask you, in the future hearings, to do that. 

Appreciate the fact that both the Chairman and you, Secretary 

Carter, mentioned by name Josh Wheeler. Josh Wheeler is from 

Roland, Oklahoma. He’s one who is certainly a—he was a hero before all of this happened, and, by his actions, he saved 70 lives of 

hostages and fellow members of the Coalition Task Force. I—so, I 

appreciate very much your talking about him. 

I—since the—you were here before, Secretary Carter, in July, 

ISIL still controls much of the northern and western Iraq, despite 

more than a year of United States airstrikes and the loss of 

Ramadi. Significant setback. Russia continued its military buildup 

in Syria, as we’ve been talking about, and began operations to support Iraq. Iran Quds Forces in Syria have been joined by Iranian 

support forces from Lebanon’s Hezbollah to support the Assad regime. All under the command of General Qasem Soleimani, who 

previously directed attacks on United States forces in Iraq. We 

talked about the change in the train-and-equip program, which I 

would like to get—have you elaborate a little bit more on. But, in 

your statement that we got this morning, Secretary Carter, you 

said, quote, ‘‘To be clear, we are not cooperating with Russia, and 

140 

we are not letting Russia impact the pace and scope of our campaign against ISIL in Iraq and Syria.’’ 

Last week, we had—well, some time ago, we had Dr. Henry Kissinger in as a witness, but then last week we had five professors 

that were there in one of our really good hearings that we had on— 

I think it was on Wednesday or Thursday. We quoted Dr. Kissinger 

when he said, quote, ‘‘Syria is the latest symptom of a disintegration of the American role in stabilizing the Middle East order,’’ unquote. 

Now, do you think that’s inconsistent with the statements that 

you’ve made, Secretary Carter? 

Secretary CARTER. I think that the Middle East is certainly very 

tumultuous, but, once again, I come back to: our role is to protect 

American interests in that circumstance. That’s—— 

Senator INHOFE. Yeah, but are—— 

Secretary CARTER.—what we’re doing. Whether it be the fight 

against ISIL, our alliances and partnerships with Gulf countries, 

and Israel, our posture in the Gulf, all of that is intended to protect 

American interests in the Middle East. Is the Middle East tumultuous? You bet it is. But, our anchor is the protection—— 

Senator INHOFE. Well, when I read your statement, it seemed to 

me that it’s not totally consistent with that. 

What do you think, General Dunford, about Kissinger’s statement, in terms of our role in that part of the world? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, thanks. 

I mean, I—what I would agree with, with former Secretary Kissinger, is that we have a critical role to play in the Middle East. 

We have national interests in the Middle East, and we should be 

decisively engaged in advancing those national interests. 

Senator INHOFE. Yeah, okay, but—and I know this is about the 

Middle East, but—and Ukraine is another good example of what 

our posture is in that part of the world. A lot of us here were actually—well, I was there during the last election that they had, in 

October, when, for the first time in 96 years, they don’t have one 

Communist on—in their Parliament in the Ukraine. And so, President Petro Poroshenko and Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk 

and—they’re all—that was a pro-Western effort. And then, immediately, Putin started killing them all. Our response was sending 

blankets and K-rations—well, they don’t call them K-rations anymore, but—anyway, do you agree, General Dunford, that this is the 

right response that we should have had, to maintain what you 

have always perceived to be our role? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I don’t want to be evasive, but I’m 

not sure it would be appropriate for me to comment on an issue 

of policy and what we ought to do. I mean, it—I think my job is 

to provide military options to our leadership—— 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. 

General DUNFORD.—in support of the policy. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. We’ve been—let me ask you a question, 

because I don’t know. What is the current status of Fallujah? 

General DUNFORD. Fallujah, right now, is being held by insurgents. That is one of the areas that’s been identified for future operations by Iraqi Security Forces. 

Senator INHOFE. Well, yeah, that’s—you know what—— 

141 

Chairman MCCAIN. That’s comforting. We know it’s been identified. 

Senator INHOFE. All right. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Heinrich. 

Can’t make it up. 

Senator HEINRICH. Secretary Carter—Secretary Carter, if there 

is one lesson it seems to me we should have learned in the Middle 

East and North Africa by now, it’s that every time we think it can’t 

get worse, if there’s not an end game, it can. Removing Saddam 

Hussein at the cost of thousands of American lives gave us a chaotic civil war, an ethnic war that led to the vacuum that helped 

spawn ISIL. In Libya, we removed a brutal dictator, only to see 

chaos and extremism reign across what can now only loosely be 

called a country. 

So, to reference Senator Manchin’s comments that we need to 

think about an end game, here, I think about the fact that many 

of our colleagues now believe that the solution to Syria today is to 

focus directly on the removal of the Assad regime rather than the 

current administration focus on ISIL. 

So, I want to ask you: Were the Assad regime to fall without a 

plan in place for follow-on governance and a political settlement 

that could create some sort of stability, how confident are you that 

Syria wouldn’t just slip into an even more chaotic state, you know, 

potentially threatening our allies in the region, creating new opportunities for ISIL, and creating a new wave of refugees that could 

make the current outpouring of refugees look modest? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, that—the end game we seek is both the 

defeat of ISIL and a transition in Syria. You’re right, the sooner 

that occurs, the more likely it is that their—the structures of Syrian society aren’t completely destroyed by the time that transition 

occurs. That’s why hastening that political transition—Assad out 

and the political forces, to include the moderate Syrian forces now 

opposing Assad, have the opportunity to rebuild the country. That’s 

the only way to put Syria back together. And the sooner that occurs, the better. That’s why we—we’re supporting that political 

transition. But, at the same time, we have to defeat ISIL. They 

have to be militarily defeated. There’s no—— 

Senator HEINRICH. My point with respect to Assad is that, should 

Assad fall, we need to be thinking about what comes next so it’s 

not just an opportunity for ISIL and other extremist groups in that 

region. 

Secretary CARTER. I believe that the talks that Secretary Kerry 

is having with various partners—parties in the region this week 

are precisely aimed at deciding what the contours of that political 

settlement would be and what would come after it. But, one of the 

reasons why it’s so important that this occur quickly is that the 

structures of the Syrian state are going to be important to the future, and we don’t want them to disintegrate entirely. That’s why 

fueling the Syrian civil war, which is what the Russians are doing, 

is so wrongheaded. 

Senator HEINRICH. General Dunford, with respect to the potential no-fly-zone issue that was brought up earlier, what would be 

the limitations of that kind of course of action, given particularly 

142 

the new fairly sophisticated air defenses from Russia that are now 

inside Syria? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, from a military perspective, we can 

implement a no-fly zone, and we have the capability to do that. The 

challenges are political, legal, and then a diversion of the resources 

that are currently fighting ISIL in support of that no-fly zone. So, 

those are among the factors that were considered when we looked 

at the no-fly zone. 

Senator HEINRICH. Moving back to you, Secretary Carter, during 

your previous appearance before this committee, in July, you emphasized that Prime Minister Abadi was doing everything he could 

to recruit Sunnis to the fight. And I think you said that, quote, 

‘‘Only’’—or—‘‘Sunnis can take back Anbar.’’ Do you still feel this 

way? Can you update the committee on the progress, or lack of 

progress, in training Iraqi Security Forces? 

Secretary CARTER. It is still true. The recapture of western Iraq 

is going to require Sunni forces that participate in that recapture 

and then, of course, that keep the peace after the peace is won. 

That’s why we’re in—so intent on getting Sunni fighters into the 

fight. And the legacy of Prime Minister Nourial-Maliki was to 

make the armed forces of Iraq more sectarian, to the detriment of 

the Sunnis. That’s one of the things that led to ISIL. I think that 

Prime Minister Abadi is trying, but I think they—that—I’m going 

to be honest with you—Iraq needs to—— 

Senator HEINRICH. A lot of that—— 

Secretary CARTER.—do more—— 

Senator HEINRICH.—damage has been done. 

Secretary CARTER.—to attract—well, but if we’re going to reverse 

it, we need to try to recruit, pay, arm, and equip the Sunni forces. 

That is our purpose. That’s what we’re doing with the Iraqis. That 

needs to be part of the future. 

If I can also address the no-fly zone, I just—I just want to be 

clear. We have studied the no-fly zone as—the Chairman’s absolutely right, one knows how to do that. I thought it—I’ll give you 

some of the considerations that go into that. By the way, I should— 

the President hasn’t taken anything like this off the table. You 

asked whether we’ve recommended that. At this stage, we’ve not. 

A no-fly zone would be intended to prevent the Syrian air force 

from, as the Chairman said, ‘‘barrel-bombing’’ or otherwise using 

airpower, both fixed-wing and rotary-wing, against the civilians 

population. Where they’re doing that is over in the western part of 

the country, which is not the area where we’re flying in now, because we’re flying and attacking ISIL, further to the east. That 

area is protected by the Syrian Integrated Air Defense System. So, 

were we to fly there, we would need to deal with the Syrian Integrated Air Defense System, which is a substantial undertaking of 

its own that we have, as the Chairman indicated, analyzed, and we 

certainly have capabilities to do. Then, we would be interdicting 

both fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft that were attacking the 

Syrian population. 

The—I should note that it—however, that most of the civilian 

casualties inflicted by Assad’s forces on the civilian population have 

been from artillery. Obviously, this wouldn’t do anything about artillery, but it would do something about airstrikes. 

143 

It’s a substantial new undertaking. We’ve analyzed it. We’ve not 

made the recommendation to do it at this time. But, I respect people who are making recommendations for these kinds of zones. 

Then there are also humanitarian zones, which have been referenced also, which are a portion of Syria, now speaking conceptually, where people could congregate and be protected. Now, 

those—a zone thus created would be contested by ISIL, by alNusra, at a minimum, and so it would have to defended. So, again, 

it’s a substantial military undertaking. The people who live there 

would, therefore, take a ground force, with accompanying air 

forces, to accomplish that. The people who were protected could be 

people who live there or—and I think some people who have moved 

into Turkey, whom Turkey wishes to move back. But, I just want 

to be clear that, to keep it safe would require fighting to keep it 

safe, because the people who want to terrorize the population 

would attempt to attack such a zone. So, you need to think, in each 

case—and we’ve thought through several different cases—who’s in, 

who is kept out, and how the enforcement of it is done. 

So, there are air zones and there are ground zones. We have considered all of them. Again, the President hasn’t taken anything off 

the table. We’ve not made any specific recommendations in that regard, but we’ve looked at a variety of such possibilities. 

Let me ask the Chairman if he has anything to add to that. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, to my colleagues, for letting me 

jump ahead. I appreciate it very, very much. 

I want to see if I’ve got this right. We’re going to train people 

inside of Syria to fight ISIL, rather than training them outside of 

Syria; equip them inside and train them inside, right? New strategy. 

Secretary CARTER. Yes. That’s where they are. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. So, you know, count me in for trying to 

help. Do we still want to replace Assad? 

Secretary CARTER. Oh, absolutely. I mean—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Is that a goal of ours? 

Secretary CARTER. A—yes—a transition from Assad—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

Secretary CARTER.—to a government—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

Secretary CARTER.—of Syria that is—— 

Senator GRAHAM. General Dunford—— 

Secretary CARTER.—inclusive and moderate—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

Secretary CARTER.—and together. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

Secretary CARTER. Absolutely. 

Senator GRAHAM. General Dunford, is it smart to let Russia fight 

ISIL and we stay out of the fight? 

General DUNFORD. Russia is not fighting ISIL, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. But, that wouldn’t be a good idea, to rely on 

Russia to fight ISIL for us. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think we need to be engaged in advancing our own national interests. We have a national interest in 

dealing—— 

144 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

General DUNFORD.—with ISIL, and—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

General DUNFORD.—we should be doing that. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay, here’s—— 

General DUNFORD. We can do it—— 

Senator GRAHAM.—the question. 

General DUNFORD.—it more effectively. I’m not confident—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

General DUNFORD.—that Russia—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

General DUNFORD.—is effective—— 

Senator GRAHAM. I am—— 

General DUNFORD.—would be effective at doing it. 

Senator GRAHAM. I’m a million percent with you. 

Are we going to supply air support for the people we train to 

fight ISIL? 

General DUNFORD. We are, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do those same people want to take Assad 

down? 

General DUNFORD. The ones that we are supporting right now 

are focused on ISIL, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do they have a goal to take Assad down? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I don’t know. 

Senator GRAHAM. What do you mean you don’t know? 

General DUNFORD. Well, the ones we’re—we—I don’t know because—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Don’t you think most people in Syria want two 

things: they want to fight—they want to destroy ISIL and get rid 

of Assad, the person who’s killed 250,000 of their family? 

General DUNFORD. The—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Is that really a mystery? 

General DUNFORD. No, it’s not—— 

Senator GRAHAM. It’s not—— 

General DUNFORD.—Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM.—a mystery. Okay. Is Russia going to fight for 

Assad? 

General DUNFORD. Russia is fighting for Assad. 

Senator GRAHAM. Will Iran fight for Assad? 

General DUNFORD. They are doing that, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Will Hezbollah fight for Assad? 

General DUNFORD. They were doing that. 

Senator GRAHAM. When the people we train to fight ISIL turn on 

Assad, which they surely will, are we going to fight with them to 

replace Assad? 

General DUNFORD. I can’t answer that question, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Can you answer it, Secretary Carter? 

Secretary CARTER. Yeah, I—just to be clear, let’s take the—— 

Senator GRAHAM. That days is coming. 

Secretary CARTER.—YPG Kurds—well, I—the—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you see a scenario where the—— 

Secretary CARTER. Let me just— 

Senator GRAHAM.—people in Syria—— 

Secretary CARTER. Let me just address the—— 

145 

Senator GRAHAM.—don’t take—— 

Secretary CARTER.—the people that—— 

Senator GRAHAM.—on Assad? 

Secretary CARTER.—the people that are—that we are equipping 

are people who live in or come from ISIL-occupied territory, and 

they’re—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Do they want to take Assad down? 

Secretary CARTER.—on defeating ISIL and—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Do they want to take Assad down? 

Secretary CARTER. For the most part, they’re focused on defeating—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Do they want to take Assad—have you asked 

them? 

Secretary CARTER. We know what their intent is, and it is to 

fight ISIL. 

Senator GRAHAM. Come on. 

Secretary CARTER. They’re fighting ISIL now. 

Senator GRAHAM. You know as well as I do, both of you know, 

that the average Syrian not only wants to destroy ISIL, but they’re 

intent on destroying Assad because he’s killed 250,000 of them. 

Here’s the question for this committee. How do we leverage 

Assad leaving, when Russia’s going to fight for him, Iran’s going to 

fight for him, Hezbollah’s fighting for him, and we’re not going to 

do a damn thing to help people take him down? Y’all both know 

that. So, when Kerry goes over to Geneva, he is turning over Syria 

to the Russians and to the Iranians. 

Is there any credible military threat to Assad now that Russia, 

Iran, and Hezbollah’s on his side? Do you see any credible military 

threat to take him down, General Dunford? 

General DUNFORD. I think the balance of forces right now are in 

Assad’s advantage. 

Senator GRAHAM. Not his advantage. He is secure as the day is 

long. 

So, this is what’s happened, folks. The strategy is completely fallen apart. Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah are going to fight for their 

guy, and we’re not going to do a damn thing to help the people who 

want to change Syria for the better by getting rid of the dictator 

in Damascus. 

Do you see a scenario, Secretary Carter, where we would fight 

to support an effort to take Assad down, that we would fight alongside of people who want to take Assad down in Syria? Is that remotely possible? 

Secretary CARTER. We are—our approach to removing Assad has 

been to—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Does it have a military component? 

Secretary CARTER. It is principally a political effort in Syria. 

Our—— 

Senator GRAHAM. So, the answer—— 

Secretary CARTER.—military effort in Syria—— 

Senator GRAHAM.—is no. 

Secretary CARTER.—our military effort in Syria—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Are we going to fight with people who want to 

take Assad down? Are we going to provide them military help? 

Secretary CARTER. Our train-and-equip program—— 

146 

Senator GRAHAM. The answer is no. 

Secretary CARTER.—is to provide—— 

Senator GRAHAM. The answer is no—— 

Secretary CARTER.—is supportive of people— 

Senator GRAHAM. The answer is no. 

Secretary CARTER.—who are fighting ISIL. 

Senator GRAHAM. So, let me just end this. If I’m Assad, this is 

a good day for me, because the American government has just said, 

without saying it, that they’re not going to fight to replace me. The 

Russians and the Iranians and Hezbollah, this is a really good day 

for them, because their guy has no military credible threat. 

So, now you tell me what kind of deal we’re going to get, folks. 

I’m sure we’ll get a really good deal with this construct. So, what 

you’ve done, gentlemen, along with the President, is, you’ve turned 

Syria over to Russia and Iran. You’ve told the people in Syria, who 

have died by the hundreds of thousands, we’re more worried about 

a political settlement than we are about what follows. 

All I can say, this is a sad day for America, and the region will 

pay hell for this, because the Arabs are not going to accept this. 

The people in Syria are not going to accept this. This is a halfassed strategy, at best. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Since a quorum is now present, I ask the 

committee to consider a list of 1,663 pending military nominations. 

All of these nominations have been before the committee the required length of time. Is there a motion so—favorably report these 

1,663 nominations—— 

Senator REED. So moved. 

Chairman MCCAIN.—to the Senate? 

Is there a second? 

Senator KAINE. Second. 

Chairman MCCAIN. All in favor, say aye. 

[A chorus of ayes.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. The motion carries. 

Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thank you, to the witnesses, for your service and testimony. 

Secretary Carter, you stated that the primary objective of our actions, as you’ve described this morning, is the defeat of ISIL. I 

want to dig into that a little bit. 

Currently—I think I’m right on this—we are engaged in activities against ISIL, military activities in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, 

Yemen, Libya, and then, when we were on a—during that week of 

congressional recess, the President sent to Congress a war powers 

letter indicating the detachment of, I think, 300 American troops 

to Cameroon to assist in activities against Boko Haram, which has 

pledged allegiance to ISIL. Have I omitted any countries where 

there is currently activity that is either ISIL activity or groups that 

have pledged allegiance to ISIL? 

Secretary CARTER. We’re watching ISIL all over the world, Senator. As you know, it has aspirations and tries to metastasize, uses 

the Web. I mean, you—we have had—and Director Comey’s made 

this very clear—Americans who have self-radicalized—— 

Senator KAINE. That—actually, that—— 

Secretary CARTER. And so—— 

147 

Senator KAINE. That’s going to be my—— 

Secretary CARTER.—this is a—— 

Senator KAINE.—next question. 

Secretary CARTER.—phenomenon that is around the world. We’re 

watching it around the world—not just ourselves, but in law enforcement and intelligence circles. It’s one of the reasons why ISIL 

needs to be defeated. 

Senator KAINE. In terms of kind of kinetic activities by the military, though, am I right that currently, it’s Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya, and then the deployment of troops to Cameroon? 

Secretary CARTER. It depends on what you mean by that. 

You want to go ahead, Joe? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, we don’t currently have operations 

ongoing in Yemen—direct operations against ISIL. We don’t have 

operations against—Libya against ISIL. And our support in Cameroon is Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconaissance (ISR) support 

in support of operations against Boko Haram. 

Senator KAINE. Okay. But, Secretary Carter—— 

Secretary CARTER. We can get you what we’re doing—— 

Senator KAINE. Yeah. 

Secretary CARTER.—in each country. But, it’s—— 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The Department of Defense is currently engaged in activities against the Islamic 

State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and other terrorist groups in several countries 

in the Middle East, West Africa, Libya, and Afghanistan. 

Middle East: In the Middle East, the Department’s counter-ISIL efforts are focused in Syria and Iraq. 

Iraq: The military activities in Iraq seek to deny ISIL safe haven and build local 

partner capacity. The Department along with Coalition partners are conducting an 

ongoing air campaign to limit ISIL’s freedom of movement, constrain its ability to 

reinforce its fighters, and degrade its command and control. To bolster partner capacity, the Department is advising and assisting Iraqi Security Forces, and is training and equipping Iraq’s security forces. The United States military expects to deploy a specialized expeditionary targeting force to Iraq, with the Government of 

Iraq’s permission, to further pressure ISIL. 

Syria: The military activities in Syria seek to dismantle ISIL’s leadership, to work 

relentlessly with the help of Coalition partners to deny ISIL safe haven, and to enable capable, motivated local forces on the ground to fight ISIL and achieve a lasting defeat. Towards that end, the Department is providing ammunition and equipment packages on a case-by-case basis to appropriately vetted local counter-ISIL 

forces engaged in fighting ISIL, supporting these ground forces with increased Coalition airstrikes, and introducing a small number of advisors to cooperate with opposition forces. 

Yemen: Although the Department is watching with significant concern the actions 

of ISIL affiliates in Yemen, this has not yet required direct military action. 

Africa: The approach to counter the impact of ISIL-affiliated groups in Africa is 

generally to work by, with and through partners. 

Libya: The overall U. S. Government policy in Libya is to support the United Nations-led negotiations process to bring about a unified government; without a unified 

government, the United States will not have a reliable counter-terrorism partner to 

combat ISIL in Libya. The Department also works closely with governments and 

partners across the region to support a range of security missions, including border 

security and information sharing. In cooperation with these partners, the Department is working to assess the extent of ISIL’s presence in Libya and how best to 

counter the threat. Further, the Department is going after ISIL leaders wherever 

they operate. In Libya, for example, the United States military conducted an airstrike against ISIL’s Libya leader, Abu Nabil, in November. 

Lake Chad Basin: Similarly in the Lake Chad Basin region of West Africa, the 

Department is partnering with the nations in the region—Benin, Cameroon, Chad, 

Niger and Nigeria—who are committed to working together to defeat Boko Haram. 

To that end, the Department is providing airborne Intelligence, Surveillance and ReVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:53 Sep 08, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00153 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21401.TXT WILDA
148 

connaissance (ISR) support to contributing countries to improve the overall effectiveness of their counter-Boko Haram efforts. The U.S. forces in question are in the region to provide force protection for these ISR assets which will increase the Department’s ability to assess the connections between Boko Haram and ISIL. 

Afghanistan: In Afghanistan, the Department is taking this emerging threat seriously. Through the train, advise, and assist mission to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, the Department is supporting Afghanistan’s efforts to 

deter the expansion of ISIL’s affiliate in Afghanistan, the Islamic State in the 

Khorasan Province (IS–KP). Additionally, the Department is closely monitoring IS– 

KP’s development and associations to ISIL-core in Iraq and Syria to evaluate whether IS–KP’s emergence will have a meaningful impact on the threat environment in 

the region. United States forces in Afghanistan have the authority and capability 

to defend against IS–KP threats. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I don’t want to get into asking about nonDOD title activity, so I’ll omit that, but just—I think the record, 

in the public record, about activities in those countries is fairly 

plain. 

Secretary Carter, you indicate we’re watching ISIL in other countries. Is it fair to assume, based on your joint professional judgment, that ISIL continues to mutate and find adherents in other 

countries, and we may well have to contemplate DOD activity 

against ISIL in nations other than those that I’ve mentioned? 

Secretary CARTER. It could come to that. And that’s why I think 

we need to kill the source of it, which is in Syria and—— 

Senator KAINE. Iraq. 

Secretary CARTER.—Iraq. 

Senator KAINE. Is it fair to assume—you know, we pray that this 

is not the case, but that the death of Master Sergeant Wheeler may 

not be the last death of an American servicemember in this campaign to defeat ISIL? 

Secretary CARTER. I think we need to be realistic. We are—our 

people will be in positions—they are right now, every day; there 

are people flying right now, there are people training and advising 

forces there, and they are in harm’s way. There’s no doubt about 

it. 

Senator KAINE. And we’ve lost service personnel, before Master 

Sergeant Wheeler, not necessarily in direct combat or kinetic activities, but, as you say, they were in positions of danger because 

of their support for this mission against ISIL. 

Secretary CARTER. Yes. Make no mistake, they are in harm’s way 

in this fight against ISIL. No doubt about it. 

Senator KAINE. In your professional judgment, your notion that 

the primary objective is the defeat of ISIL, how long will that take? 

Secretary CARTER. It needs to be—I can’t tell you how long it will 

take, but I think that the—it needs to be soon, which is why we’re 

so intent upon strengthening our effort, which is why we are working with the Iraqis and trying to get them to field more Sunni 

forces, strengthening our training and equipping of Sunni forces, 

why we’re prepared to do more with those forces in Iraq. The President’s indicated that, and indicated a willingness for the Chairman 

and me to make him recommendations in that regard. So, to enable 

those Sunni forces so that they can take back the Sunni territories 

of Iraq. And, over in Syria, it’s Raqqa. 

Senator KAINE. If I can—— 

149 

Secretary CARTER. And that’s why the Syrian—the coalition 

forces that are intent—to get back to the question that Senator 

Graham was raising—they want to attack Raqqa and—— 

Senator KAINE. If I can—— 

Secretary CARTER.—take back Raqqa, which is occupied by ISIL. 

And they, therefore, deserve our support, and are receiving our 

support. 

Senator KAINE. Mr. Secretary, when you say ‘‘soon,’’ let’s just be 

realistic, sitting here today. Aren’t we talking—I mean, with all the 

countries that we’ve mentioned, and your acknowledged possibility 

that there could be more, aren’t we talking about an effort that is 

likely to be a multiyear effort, certainly well into the next administration? 

Secretary CARTER. That’s probably the case. And the reason is 

that the strategy is to—and this is an important part of the strategy, and we’ve said it right from the very beginning—is to support 

capable and motivated forces that can retake and hold territory, 

not to try to substitute for them. That’s the only way to have a 

lasting victory. And that—it takes some time to identify those 

forces, to motivate those forces, to train those forces. It depends 

upon the political circumstances in both Iraq and Syria. So, it does 

depend upon the political circumstances. That isn’t something that 

is anything other than a very real factor there. But, that’s necessary in order to have a lasting defeat, because we want ISIL not 

only to be defeated, but it has to stay defeated. That means the 

people who live there need to govern themselves and restore the 

peace and order. That’s what takes the time, is to develop those 

forces. It is hard work, but that’s what we’re doing in Iraq, and 

that’s what we’re doing in the new train-and-equip program in 

Syria. It will take some time. 

Senator KAINE. Mr. Chair, I’ll just conclude and say that I think 

that that answer, about the complexity and the fact that this, 

under any circumstances, is going to take significant time, is a very 

relevant one for us. The administration’s position about the authority to wage this war is based upon an authorization that was 

passed on September 18, 2001, before many of us were here, that 

specifically says the President is authorized to use force against 

those who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist 

attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001. I would just renew 

my observation that I think it would have been far beyond the contemplation of the Members of Congress who voted on that at the 

time, and it’s certainly beyond the contemplation of those of us who 

did not vote on that at the time, that those words would be applying, 15 years later, to an effort in the countries I just mentioned 

that may mutate to other countries that is, by the admission of our 

witnesses today, likely to take a good deal more. I think it’s very 

much time that Congress revisit the question of this authorization 

and try to provide some underlying legal justification for the ongoing military action. 

With that, Mr. Chair, I thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Fischer. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

150 

Secretary Carter, would you assess ISIL and al-Nusra to be 

among the most capable rebelled groups that are on the Syrian battlefield? 

Secretary CARTER. I would. They—they’re ferocious, they are extremely cruel and brutal. Of course, some of these forces that are 

not trying to brutalize the population, but trying to fight Assad, 

are, as has been indicated, more moderate Syrian forces, and they 

don’t behave that way, and that’s why they deserve to be, and will 

be, part of the Syrian political future after Assad. 

Senator FISCHER. Are you concerned that the Russian and Iranian attacks are going to further polarize the battlefield and we’re 

going to see more moderate fighters cooperate with ISIL and alNusra because those groups are more capable? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, that’s precisely the point I’ve made to 

the Russians. The way I put it is, they—pouring gasoline on the 

civil war in Syria by supporting Iraq, and they’re going to—they’re 

going to enhance the very extremism that they say they fear, and 

they have every reason to fear, because now ISIL and other groups, 

including Syrian opposition groups of all stripes, are turned against 

Russia. Russia’s had very bitter experience with extremism in their 

own country. This is why their actions are not consistent with their 

words and are—I keep using the phrase ‘‘wrongheaded.’’ 

Senator FISCHER. Have you—— 

Secretary CARTER. They say they’re doing one thing, and they’re 

actually doing another. 

Senator FISCHER. Have you told Russia not to attack units that 

have been trained by the United States or to avoid certain areas 

where U.S.-affiliated groups may be operating? Or have you indicated to the Russians in any way that the United States will respond to such attacks? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, we’ve certainly indicated that we intend 

to prosecute our counter-ISIL campaign unchanged, and we don’t 

intend to make any changes, and that we’re determined to do that. 

And we haven’t. 

Senator FISCHER. So, you have communicated to the Russians 

that, if there are attacks on United States-trained troops—or 

United States-trained units in any way, that we will respond. 

Secretary CARTER. I’ve said earlier in this testimony, and I’ve 

said publicly, that we have an obligation to our—the forces that 

we’ve trained and equipped, to protect them. We intend to do that. 

Senator FISCHER. But, that does not include the coalition-trained 

troops—units. Is that correct? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, we don’t control all of the opposition 

forces to Assad. This gets back to the earlier question. Our trainand-equip program that the Department of Defense runs is oriented towards fighters whose principal preoccupation is fighting 

ISIL. There are others who are fighting Assad, and they do come 

under attack by the Russians. And that’s why—and—because some 

of them—— 

Senator FISCHER. Would it—— 

Secretary CARTER.—deserve to be part of the Syrian political future, that’s a serious mistake on Russia’s part. 

Senator FISCHER. Would it be a serious mistake on Russia’s part 

to attack any units that have been trained by other agencies beVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:53 Sep 08, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00156 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21401.TXT WILDA
151 

sides the Department of Defense? Would we have a response in 

that case? 

Secretary CARTER. I—that’s something we’d have to talk about 

separately, Senator. 

Senator FISCHER. Under Secretary Christine Wormuth stated 

that Article 2 of the Constitution allows the President to use force 

against Assad if he attacks Syrian rebels trained by the United 

States. I would assume that a similar determination has been 

made with respect to using force against Russian planes if they attack United States-trained rebels. Is that true? 

Secretary CARTER. Let me just repeat what I said about the—for 

the Department of Defense forces that we are training and equipping in Syria, we have an obligation to protect them. They’re fighting ISIL. They’re far from the territory that is contested or where 

the Russians are operating. But, we do have an obligation to defend them. 

With respect to other Syrian opposition forces and so forth, that’s 

something we’d have to discuss in a closed—— 

Senator FISCHER. Would the United States take action against 

Russian planes if Russian planes were attacking United Statestrained units? 

Secretary CARTER. I—just to repeat, we have indicated that we 

have an obligation, we have options, to protect our people, whom 

we have trained, against attack. 

Senator FISCHER. I would appreciate if you could provide us with 

some more information for the record. Specifically, if United States 

forces have the legal authority to intervene if Assad’s forces attack 

United States-trained fighters, but not if Russia attacks such fighters, if you could provide some clarification there; specifically, legal 

authority. 

Secretary CARTER. Will do. But, the short form is, as I say, we 

have an obligation, I believe we have the legal authority to do that. 

But, I’m happy to put that in more detail. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Although the Department’s lawyers would have to analyze the facts and circumstances present at the time, the Administration has concluded that, under appropriate circumstances, U.S. forces have sufficient legal authority to provide combat support to vetted Syrian counter-Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 

groups that the Department has trained or equipped who come under attack by Syrian government forces, consistent with the right of U.S. self-defense, if the action 

is necessary to address effectively the threat posed by ISIL to the United States and 

Iraq and meets the international law requirements of necessity and proportionality. 

A similar factual and legal analysis would need to be conducted in the event those 

groups are attacked by Russian forces. 

Secretary CARTER. And then, there are other aspects that you’re 

alluding to that we’d simply have to talk about in closed session. 

Senator FISCHER. Okay. 

Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator King. 

Senator KING. Mr. Secretary, before Senator Graham began his 

important line of questioning, I wrote, in my notes, ‘‘The opposition 

will never push Assad out as long as Russia and Iran are all-in.’’ 

I think that’s just the reality. And the question is, What do we do 

about that? There will be no—we can’t say, ‘‘Well, there’ll be a political solution, there’ll be negotiations.’’ The negotiations will flow 

152 

out of the military situation. They’ve already shown they’re not 

going to negotiate as long as they think they’re solidly in power, 

which they clearly think they do. On the other hand, talking about 

a no-fly zone, which would bring us in direct conflict with the Russian air force, raises very large geopolitical questions. 

But, give me some more thoughts on Senator Graham’s line of 

questioning. Let’s be realistic. You know, wishing is not going to 

make a policy. Assad is going to be there as long as Russia and 

Iran are willing to stay all-in. How do we change their calculus 

without a significant additional commitment of military power? 

Secretary CARTER. Two things. The—first of all, the—Russian 

support to Assad is having the effect of increasing and catalyzing 

and motivating the opposition to Assad. I believe that both the 

Russians and the Syrians will see the effects of that on the battlefield. You’re right, there will be—conditioned by the military situation on the ground there. 

With respect to the political transition and at what point Russia 

would recognize that its actions were fueling Syria’s civil war and 

fueling the extremism it fears, I can’t say—speak to that. 

Senator KING. That’s what that—— 

Secretary CARTER. Now, that is—— 

Senator KING. They—— 

Secretary CARTER.—what Secretary—— 

Senator KING. The—— 

Secretary CARTER. Kerry is exploring with the Russians. 

Senator KING. The Russians—— 

Secretary CARTER. But, I can’t—— 

Senator KING.—have to decide—— 

Secretary CARTER.—say when and whether they will reach that 

conclusion. 

Senator KING. They have to decide that ISIS is a bigger threat 

to them than the loss of Assad. And I don’t know when that’s going 

to occur; but I agree with you, that’s the narrow diplomatic opening. But, right now, they seem to be trying to have it both ways. 

You—as you point out, they can’t. As long as they prop up Assad, 

they’re essentially propping up Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 

(ISIS). 

Secretary CARTER. This is—— 

Senator KING. Because Assad is—— 

Secretary CARTER. This is the—— 

Senator KING.—the stimulus. 

Secretary CARTER.—logical contradiction in their approach. 

There’s no question about it. I’ve said that from the day that it 

started, and I said that to the Russian counterpart, why it’s so 

wrongheaded, their approach. And at what stage they’ll recognize 

that, I don’t know. I do commend Secretary John Kerry for talking 

to them and trying to find a different way, but they’d have to reach 

that recognition, and a part of that will be learned on the battlefield, and part of it will be learned in terms of extremism and how 

it is turned on Russia. 

Senator KING. But, I think the question that the administration 

has to address is, How do we ratchet up pressure on Assad to 

change the military calculus in such a way that it’s going to move 

that calculation? 

153 

Let me just change the subject for a minute. Both of you used 

the term, with regard to the Iraqi army, ‘‘capable, motivated Iraqi 

forces.’’ Isn’t that an oxymoron? You, yourself, have pointed out 

that this—that’s what’s been missing in Iraq. Is there any likelihood that that’s changing? Do we—— 

Secretary CARTER. There are some—— 

Senator KING.—have any intelligence on that? 

Secretary CARTER. There are some, but not nearly enough. For 

example, the Counter-Terrorism Service, the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS), which has been trained by the United States 

over time, is an effective, capable, motivated force. What we lack 

enough of in Iraq are capable and motivated Sunni forces. That is 

the type of force that is in short supply, and that is why it’s so important that the Government of Iraq continue to recruit Sunnis, 

pay them. We will equip them and train them, and we’ll support 

them in the battlefield. But, it will require Sunni forces to retake 

Sunni territory—— 

Senator KING. Does Abadi understand that in his gut, or is he 

just giving lipservice to this inclusion? Because if he doesn’t, if this 

isn’t real inclusion, we’re sunk. 

Secretary CARTER. He has been consistent in what he has told 

us, and—— 

Senator KING. But, is his actions—— 

Secretary CARTER.—including—— 

Senator KING.—are his actions bearing that out? 

Secretary CARTER. I think you have to be—I’d have to be candid 

and say that Prime Minister Abadi does not have his—complete 

sway over everything that happens in Iraq. We have insisted that 

anything we do to support Iraqi forces must be by and through the 

Government of Iraq. But, very clearly—and you see it—there are 

militias of various kinds, Shi’a militias, that are inadequately 

under the control of the government in Baghdad, and that’s one of 

the challenges there. But, the forces—— 

Senator KING. Well—— 

Secretary CARTER.—we support are those that are under the control of Prime Minister Abadi. I have talked to him, and I believe 

he is sincere in wanting to do the right thing there. But, again, 

wanting to do the right thing and having a complete authority are 

two different things in Baghdad. I think his authority is growing 

in that regard, but we do not yet have all the Sunni forces recruited, paid, enrolled, trained, and so forth, that we need and 

want. 

Senator KING. Well, I certainly hope we’ll use our influence to 

the maximum, because if that doesn’t—if that inclusion doesn’t 

happen, then this whole enterprise is for naught. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ernst. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. Thank you very 

much for your service. 

It’s a very difficult time, General Dunford. I was in theater with 

a handful of colleagues about the week before you were in theater. 

I was very disturbed at what I see going on on the ground. It’s a 

very tumultuous time. 

154 

Chairman Dunford, you did state that we need to take the fight 

to ISIL, and we need to continue the momentum. It’s concerning, 

because to continue the momentum, we actually have to have momentum, going forward. And, right now, the only group that I see 

in Iraq that’s fighting ISIL that has momentum is the Kurdish 

Peshmerga. Again, everybody knows how I feel about this. They’ve 

been great allies to us. In testimony before this committee over the 

past several months, we’ve had many, many prestigious military— 

former military commanders and governmental officials, such as 

General David Petraeus, General Mike Hayden, General Jack 

Keane, and, of course, former Secretary Bob Gates. And all of them 

agree that we really do need to enhance our support to the Iraqi 

Kurds as part of a more comprehensive strategy against ISIS. 

And I’m very concerned that right now our current strategy 

piecemeals the weapons, the equipment, and—my gosh, we have so 

many various types of calibers of weapons—that’s going from our 

coalition partners and the United States to the Kurdish 

Peshmerga. As a logistician, as a transporter, you know, supported 

those forces, our forces in Iraq, I know how difficult this would be 

for any army, that we are piecemealing so much up to the 

Peshmerga. 

So, what is our strategy to develop a more capable Peshmerga 

force for the long-term fight for ISIS? Secretary Carter, if you could 

address that, please. 

Secretary CARTER. Absolutely. You’re absolutely right. The Kurdish Peshmerga are a excellent example of capable and motivated 

ground forces. And so, they have taken and held territory. We support the—and most recently, of course, in the operation conducted 

this past week. 

With respect to equipping them—and you know from your logistics background, as you indicated very well—that rapidity and certainty of supply are very important to them. And we have a policy 

of routing equipment to the Kurdish Peshmerga through the government of Baghdad and—I think that’s where—the hinge on 

which your question turns—for the reason—to get back to what 

Senator King was asking earlier—that our approach to Iraq is to 

try to support a multisectarian government in Baghdad. So, we’re 

trying to do both: supply the Peshmerga and support Prime Minister Abadi as the leader of the country overall. 

Now, in the early days, that led—that issue led to some delay in 

our supplies to the Kurdish Peshmerga. Those delays do not occur 

now. So, we—and, by the way, it’s not just us; I think there are 

more than 14 other countries that are shipping tons and tons—— 

Senator ERNST. Quite a few. 

Secretary CARTER.—of question to the Kurdish—— 

Senator ERNST. Quite a few. 

Secretary CARTER.—Peshmerga. And so, I do not believe there 

now is a bottleneck in our supply to the Kurdish Peshmerga. We 

still do go through the routine of shipping through and with the 

permission of the government of Baghdad, for the very simple reason that we want to stick up for the principle of—— 

Senator ERNST. I do believe that we need to do a better job at 

this. 

155 

General Dunford, just very quick, if I could turn to you. How do 

the Iraqi Security Forces, or the Iraqi Army—how do their maneuver, fires, and effects units compare to the Kurdish Peshmerga’s 

units? 

General DUNFORD. I think the best of the Iraqis, the CTS forces 

and some of the brigades we trained, compare favorably to the 

Peshmerga. The Peshmerga also have, you know, very competent 

forces. But, I think the best of the Iraqis are about comparable to 

the Peshmerga. 

Senator ERNST. Okay. And we’re utilizing them to the best of our 

capability? 

General DUNFORD. We are. We—and, Senator, that’s an important question, because the one thing that the commanders told me 

is, those brigades that we actually have put through training, there 

is a qualitative difference in their performance. There’s two brigades, for example, surrounding Ramadi right now that have gone 

through our training program, and those two brigades have performed at a much higher level than the other units, as well as the 

CTS, the Counter-Terrorism Service, who’s also performed very 

well. 

Senator ERNST. So, you believe that training and advising and 

assisting below the division level would be very important in any 

future operations. 

General DUNFORD. I do—— 

Senator ERNST. For—— 

General DUNFORD. From a training perspective, in particular, 

yes, Senator. 

Senator ERNST. I do believe that needs to be part of our decisionmaking process as we move forward. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Hirono. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Dunford, in your testimony, you went over a number of 

areas that we need to focus on in our fight to defeat ISIL. And you 

said that we need to do more to cut the flow of foreign fighters to 

ISIL. Can you briefly describe what we’re doing now and what 

more we need to do in this area? 

General DUNFORD. I can, Senator. I had an—we have a team on 

the ground. They’re part of a ten-nation coalition that’s working on 

foreign fighters right now. But, it’s mostly a military view of foreign fighters. And so, when I sat down and spoke to that team, you 

know, one of the challenges that became clear is that we really 

don’t have, amongst all the coalition, kind of a common view of 

where the foreign fighters come from, how they move back and 

forth into the area, but, more importantly, not much of a track on 

where they go once they leave back to their home country. So, from 

my perspective—and this is an area that Secretary Carter and I 

have spoken to Secretary Kerry about last week—from my perspective, we need to do much more: one, to get a view of foreign fighters 

as a whole, and then make sure we maximize the legal, the military, and the political tools that are available to us to cut off the 

flow of foreign fighters. 

Senator HIRONO. So, is this an area that we’re going to see some 

kind of a measurable improvement? 

156 

General DUNFORD. Senator, for me, when I came back from my 

visit, there are two areas that I think we need to focus on to move 

the campaign forward. Two of many. The two that I personally engage on is, one, foreign fighters, and the other is intelligence. 

Senator HIRONO. So, you’re—we’re going to see some appreciable, 

measurable improvements. And I know you can’t talk about the intelligence side of things in this setting. 

So, Secretary Carter, in response to a question, you said that the 

timeframe for defeating ISIL is—it better be soon. And, from everything that we understand, this is—this whole area of the world is 

a—very complicated. And so, it is, I realize, difficult to really hone 

in, I suppose, on what a reasonable timeframe may be. At the same 

time, with regard to Assad, there were indications that he was 

about to collapse, that his regime was about to collapse. But, now 

that Russia has come in to bolster the Assad regime, two questions: 

How long do you think that Assad can be propped up by Russia’s 

actions? Two, do you think that Putin really is looking at a longterm scenario, where Assad stays in place, or is he much more interested, long term, in the stability of Syria for Russia’s own interests? 

Secretary CARTER. I can’t say what Vladimir Putin is thinking 

about Assad’s future, but I can tell what his behavior suggests. 

That is that he is—does want to support, at least for now, Assad, 

avoid the collapse of the Syrian state, which, as you indicated, I 

think he believed could occur, and that was one of the things that 

spurred his support—enhanced support for Assad. I’ve told you 

what I think of that approach. I think that it has the—it’s going 

to backfire, and that is have the opposite of the effect that he is 

seeking. It enhances the opposition to Assad, and it also enhances 

the extremism he says he fears. So, it’s not a very sensible strategy, but that appears to be what his behavior is—— 

Senator HIRONO. Well, that—— 

Secretary CARTER.—suggests. 

Senator HIRONO. That appears to be his immediate goal, but I 

think that Putin is also smart enough to figure out that if he really 

wants stability in Syria, he may not be able to get it as long as 

Assad is in power. 

I wanted to get to the no-fly zone. What would we need to do— 

if a no-fly zone is declared in Syria, what would we need to do to 

make sure that that no-fly zone sticks? 

Either one of you. 

Secretary CARTER. Yeah, I’ll start, and then maybe the Chairman 

can say. 

So, we have now, for quite a while, and preceding my time as 

Secretary of Defense, analyzed the possibility of no-fly zones. I’ve 

tried to give you some of the—an indication of some of the considerations there. That would involve operating in the part of the country which is not generally where we’re conducting air operations 

now and where there are Syrian air defenses. 

Senator HIRONO. Yes. 

Secretary CARTER. If we were going to put air crews in that environment, we would have to take care of those air defenses, which 

is a substantial military undertaking in its own—— 

Senator HIRONO. So, one scenario could—— 

157 

Secretary CARTER.—right. 

Senator HIRONO.—be that Assad would be—would not abide by 

a no-fly zone, and we would need to protect—— 

Secretary CARTER. No. I think you have to—— 

Senator HIRONO.—it. Therefore, we would be in—— 

Secretary CARTER.—assume it would be contested. 

Senator HIRONO.—direct conflict—— 

Secretary CARTER. Yeah, I think you have to assume—— 

Senator HIRONO.—with Assad. 

Secretary CARTER.—that these—an air—no-fly zone would be 

contested by Assad, because—— 

Senator HIRONO. Yes. 

Secretary CARTER.—its very intent was to engage his air force. 

Just, again, to get back to Senator Graham’s point, we have not undertaken to have United States forces engage Assad’s forces in a 

war for control—— 

Senator HIRONO. That’s probably one of the reasons—— 

Secretary CARTER.—of Syria. 

Senator HIRONO.—with that kind of—— 

Secretary CARTER. We haven’t taken that step. 

Senator HIRONO.—excuse me—with that kind of likely scenario, 

it’s probably one of the reasons that we hesitate in—— 

Secretary CARTER. That’s a—— 

Senator HIRONO.—creating a no-fly zone. 

Senator HIRONO.—substantial and new military undertaking. 

Likewise—— 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. 

Secretary CARTER.—zones on the ground would be have to be defended, as well, so there are military implications to the declaration of such zones. We have thought them through, but we have 

not made recommendations to—— 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you very much, Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. What you’re saying is the strongest nation in 

the world with the most capable military can’t even establish a nofly zone to protect people from being barrel-bombed by Bashar 

Assad. That’s—it’s an embarrassing moment. 

Secretary CARTER. Just to be—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Tillis. 

Secretary CARTER.—clear, Chairman, we could do it. I—but I—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Of course we could do it. People like General 

Petraeus and General Keane and every other military leader that 

I have know of—and we’re talking about having to shoot down all 

the—all we have to do is protect it and tell them not to fly into 

it, show—history shows that they won’t, if they’re going to get shot 

down. 

Senator Tillis. 

Senator TILLIS. General Dunford, Secretary Carter said that the 

Russian presence in Syria has not affected the pace or the scope 

of United States operations there. Is that because the pace is slow 

and the scope is narrow? How does that—I mean, how does that 

happen, when we have the administration saying that we’re not 

going to have any sort of conflicts with Russian air presences in 

Syria? It would seem like it is affecting the pace and scope. Do you 

agree with Secretary Carter? 

158 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I do. We are—because we’re focused 

on ISIL, and the Russians are largely conducting operations to the 

west, we are not operating in the same area as the Russians right 

now. We’ve had two or three incidents where we’ve had contact 

with Russian aircraft, and those preceded the Memorandum of Understanding that was signed on the 20th of the month. 

Senator TILLIS. So, that—I guess that goes back to what Chairman McCain said. A part of that is because we’re not necessarily 

providing support to those who are not trained, who are trying to 

take the fight to Assad but were not specifically trained by us. Is 

that—I mean, is that—— 

General DUNFORD. That’s correct, Senator. We’re operating in 

two different areas. 

Senator TILLIS. I want to get to Iraq, and specifically in your 

meetings in Iraq. First, I’d like an update on Iranian presence 

there; and then, secondly—I’ve only been here for ten months, and 

the discussion about having the Iraqi government reengage the 

Sunnis is already a broken record. Over the last year, is there any 

tangible evidence that they’ve actually acted on the words—— 

General DUNFORD. Senator—— 

Senator TILLIS.—of reengaging? 

General DUNFORD. Yeah. Senator, with the caveat that we’re not 

satisfied with the outreach to the Sunni, and very aware that that’s 

a necessary condition for us to be successful, is that we actually do 

have an inclusive government, inclusive of the Sunni, there has 

been some progress. For example, in the Anbar Province, there was 

an agreement to train and equip 8,000 Sunni. We’ve had about 

5,000 that have been identified, have been recruited, and have been 

trained, of that 8,000 number. So—and that’s slow progress—— 

Senator TILLIS. Is that more—— 

General DUNFORD.—for some—— 

Senator TILLIS. Is that more transactional—sorry, General 

Dunford, I want to be sensitive to time—is that more of a transactional win, or do you—are you seeing any sort of systemic 

changes that are going to make sure that that remains sustained 

and that we build on it? 

General DUNFORD. I can’t tell you that I’ve seen systemic 

changes, Senator. 

Senator TILLIS. I don’t think there is any. 

What about the Iranian presence in Iraq right now? Where are 

they? What are they doing? What should we be concerned with? 

General DUNFORD. Well, they still have the provisional forces 

that are there. 

Senator TILLIS. So, that’s—— 

General DUNFORD. Soleimani’s—— 

Senator TILLIS.—still around 1,000? 

General DUNFORD. You know, Senator, the numbers have been 

bounced around. I think it’s been more—you say 1,000? 

Senator TILLIS. Uh-huh. 

General DUNFORD. Yeah, I think there’s more than 1,000 Iranians that are on the ground in Iraq. 

Senator TILLIS. In Syria? 

General DUNFORD. In Syria, we think the numbers are probably 

something less than 2,000, is our assessment. 

159 

Senator TILLIS. Secretary Carter, I appreciate you mentioning 

Sergeant Wheeler. I know that he was from Oklahoma, but he and 

his wife and four sons, including a 3-month-old, live down in North 

Carolina. I think that, in that particular operation, you made a 

comment that those are the—those are operations that are probably occurring frequently, if—not a daily basis, but frequently, and 

American soldiers are at risk. In my opinion, I think the 

Peshmerga would consider that a combat operation. Do you consider what Sergeant Wheeler was doing a combat operation? 

Secretary CARTER. Sure. He was killed in combat. It—that wasn’t 

the intent, obviously. He was accompanying those forces. But, when 

he saw that they were running into trouble, he very heroically 

acted in a way that all the reports suggest spelled the difference 

between the success and failure of that important mission. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you. 

Secretary CARTER. So, it clearly was a—— 

Senator TILLIS. My final—— 

Secretary CARTER.—heroic. 

Senator TILLIS.—question. I want to start with General Dunford. 

General Dunford, were you consulted by the President before he 

vetoed the NDA? 

General DUNFORD. I was not, Senator. 

Senator TILLIS. Do you consider the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) being—having been passed either positive or negative to the men and women in uniform in your efforts? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think my job is to identify the requirements that we need to support the force—— 

Senator TILLIS. Do you think some of those requirements were 

fulfilled by our passage of the NDAA? 

General DUNFORD. There were—absolutely, sir. 

Senator TILLIS. Okay. And—— 

General DUNFORD. Inside the ND-— 

Senator TILLIS.—as a result of the veto, those requirements are 

not going to be fulfilled unless we can come up with a solution? 

General DUNFORD. Unless there’s a solution, Senator. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you. 

Senator—or, Secretary Carter, were you consulted by the President before he vetoed the NDAA? 

Secretary CARTER. I was, yes. 

Senator TILLIS. What was your recommendation to him? 

Secretary CARTER. My recommendation was to support his veto. 

Senator TILLIS. Was to support his veto? 

Secretary CARTER. I did—I supported it. I’ll tell you why. 

Two—— 

Senator TILLIS. That was going to be my next question. 

Secretary CARTER. Sure. Two principal reasons. The first is that 

I—and I started saying this in March, and I—it—I believe it—— 

Senator TILLIS. Mr. Carter, I’m going to be out of time. There 

may be other people—— 

Secretary CARTER. Well, let me just—— 

Senator TILLIS.—following up with it, but I—— 

Secretary CARTER.—tell you what those two—— 

Senator TILLIS. Let me—let me finish. 

Secretary CARTER. It’s an important subject. 

160 

Senator TILLIS. Then, to the extent the Chair will let you continue, I will defer to him. 

But, are you telling me, then, that you think that the President’s 

veto leaves our military—of the NDAA—better than with it? 

Secretary CARTER. I—the President’s veto of the NDAA is something that reflected two facts, just to get back to what I was going 

to say. One is that we need—and I believe the Department of Defense needs—budget stability greater than a 1-year horizon—— 

Senator TILLIS. Taking a step back—— 

Secretary CARTER.—and a foundation of base funding that is adequate—— 

Senator TILLIS. Mr. Secretary, nobody on this—— 

Secretary CARTER.—to our needs—— 

Senator TILLIS.—committee disagrees with you. That’s a wellworn path in discussions that goes all the way back to sequestration. But, I find it remarkable, given the circumstances we’re in 

now and the testimony today, that we would take a step back with 

this NDAA while we continue to fight that fight, because that’s 

going to require a willing administration. One thing’s clear to me, 

this administration is not willing to confront the challenges that 

these men and women have in uniform today. Taking a step back 

in these dangerous times, I don’t think makes sense. I respectfully 

disagree with your recommendation to support the veto. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Secretary CARTER. Well, if I can just say, I think that I—just to 

say what I think we need. What we need is what I hope is going 

on now, which is a true budget agreement, where Washington 

comes together behind a honest, straightforward budget with some 

multiyear horizon. That’s what the Department deserves, and 

that’s what I’ve been saying for months. Perhaps that is occurring 

as we speak. 

But, I can only be honest and say what I think is best for the 

Department. That’s, honestly, what we need. I realize that no individual member or individual committee can deliver that. It requires 

a coming together of gridlocked Washington behind an overall 

budget deal. I fervently hope that that occurs. I know there’s some 

indication—I’m not involved in it—over the last couple of days that 

that might occur, and that is what I have been urging ever since 

March. I fervently hope that can occur. That’s what the troops deserve. That’s what the world needs to see. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I would point out that Overseas Contingency 

Operations (OCO) will be part of this agreement, as well. 

Mr. Secretary, if you want to complete your answer, please continue. Or have you completed it? 

Secretary CARTER. There’s just one other aspect that I’d ask the 

committee, also apropos of the NDAA. There are a number of reforms that we have requested now for several years consecutively 

that have been denied in the authorization bill. I’d ask for—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. For example? 

Secretary CARTER.—that they be—some having to do with 

healthcare, some having to do with readjustments in force structure. These are things that the relevant armed services have determined are the optimal use of their resources. And the authority to 

carry out those reforms has been denied. And I’d just appeal to you 

161 

not to—to allow those reforms, because it is the professional judgment of the Department of Defense that better use for those funds 

can be had. In years when it’s difficult to find funding for the Federal Government—and I understand all the reasons for that—we 

have to use every dollar we do get to the—for the—to best use. And 

we’re not able to do that with some of the restrictions that are in 

the NDAA. That’s another reason why I’d ask you to reconsider 

some of its provisions. 

Thank you for the time to elaborate on that, Senator. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, I’d also point out that there’s about $11 

billion in savings, including in a mandatory 7-and-a-half-percentper-year reduction in headquarters staff, which we’ll be glad to 

show you the dramatic growth in those, tooth-to-tail, and many 

other reforms that have been made. I look forward to looking at 

further reforms with you as we begin new hearings when we resolve this issue and further very necessary reforms that we feel are 

called for. 

I’m proud of the reforms, frankly, that, in a bipartisan basis, this 

committee enacted. I am proud of the fact that we have dramatically revised the retirement system. I am proud of the fact that we 

are finally trying to get a handle on the cost overruns that has 

characterized acquisition practices. 

So, you may have some concerns. I can’t tell you, after being on 

this committee for nearly 30 years, how proud I am of the bipartisan product that we’ve produced. I hope that maybe sometime you 

might recognize that. 

Senator Blumenthal. 

Secretary CARTER. May I just second that? 

Chairman MCCAIN. Yes, go ahead. 

Secretary CARTER. We’re proud, too. I—and I thank you. I thank 

you, personally. I don’t mean to say there—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. No problem. 

Secretary CARTER.—that reforms haven’t been enacted. There are 

some additional ones that we would like to have. But, I salute the 

committee. The only way we can ask the taxpayer to give us more 

money for defense, which we need, is if we can also show that we 

use every dollar well. So, I appreciate your leadership in that regard. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, I thank you, Mr. Secretary. We do look 

forward to it. We’ll have hearings, beginning this week, on restructures that I—restructuring that I think are necessary. We want to 

work very closely with you. I’m very proud to work very closely 

with a graduate of West Point. 

Senator Blumenthal. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank both of you for your service to our Nation, and for your 

candid and forthright answers today in an area that is exceedingly 

difficult. 

As you may know, I’m working with a number of colleagues who 

both supported and opposed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to strengthen United States policy toward Iran; in 

other words, to improve and strengthen that agreement—among 

other ways, by providing more military assistance to our allies in 

the area, and anticipating that some of the financial windfall will 

162 

go toward increased extremism and even terrorist violence in that 

area. So, to bolster the defenses and military capacity of our allies 

in that region, this legislation will reassert the United States policy 

that a nuclear-armed Iran will never be permitted. It will reaffirm 

our dedication to imposing sanctions related to terror financing and 

human rights abuses. It will ensure that our allies, most especially 

Israel, will be provided with the assets that they need so that their 

defense will be bolstered and they will be able to deter Iran. 

General Dunford, you’ve just visited the area. Can you tell us 

what additional assets we can provide? Can you commit—and, Secretary Carter, I ask you to join in this question—that the United 

States will, in fact, bolster assets going to Israel and our other allies in the Middle East, and comment on this legislation? 

Thank you. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I can’t talk to the details now. I can 

tell you that the Minister of Defense from Israel is here today for 

meetings with Secretary Carter. We’ll have dinner with him this 

evening. As you probably know, they’re developing their perspective on what cooperation further we might have with them, to include the details of capability development that I had some initial 

discussions with their Chief of Defense—Minister of Defense and 

Prime Minister last week during my visit. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. In the conversations that preceded our 

votes on the agreement, I was assured—and I think other colleagues were assured—that, in effect, Israel will receive all the necessary assistance to make sure that its qualitative edge is not only 

maintained, but enhanced. Is that the policy of the administration? 

Secretary CARTER. Yeah, qualitative military edge of Israel is an 

important part of our overall policy toward the Middle East, and 

that’s exactly what I’ll be talking to—along with the Chairman— 

the Defense Minister of Israel about today. Of course, that’s one ingredient of our overall support for Israel and also, I should add, 

other Gulf partners and allies. 

I also need to add, since you’re asking about the Iran nuclear 

agreement, the maintenance of the military option, which we are 

charged with continuing to do. I continue to pay personal attention 

to that. I believe the Chairman does, as well. Our efforts to counter 

Iranian malign influence around the region and protect our friends 

and allies. So, there are a lot of dimensions to what we do there. 

All of that, which is our activity, remains unchanged with this 

Iran agreement. All of those things—the military option, support to 

Israel, support to other Gulf countries—that is longstanding pursuit of American interests in the Gulf, and we’re going to keep 

doing that. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I recognize that the policy remains unchanged, but the military assets will have to be increased, won’t 

they? 

Secretary CARTER. We will be doing more with Israel. That’s one 

of the reasons—that’s one of the subjects of my discussions with 

Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon, as it was when I visited there a 

couple of months ago and he hosted me the way I’ll be hosting him 

over the next couple of days. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Can you tell us whether you’re satisfied 

with the progress that’s been made in those discussions? 

163 

Secretary CARTER. He and I have a very good relationship, a very 

easy relationship, so these—we—these discussions are discussions 

among friends. We do things with Israel and have a closeness there 

that we have with very few other countries around the world. I 

can’t go into all the details here, but we can share them separately. 

But, it’s a very close defense—and a trusted defense relationship. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I would appreciate your sharing those details in a different forum. I am very interested in the details of the 

discussions that are underway now, and I want to be satisfied that 

we are fulfilling the commitments that were made to myself and 

my colleagues in the course of our discussions before the Iran 

agreement vote. 

Thank you very much, to you both. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Sullivan. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

You know, like Chairman McCain’s statement today, General 

Petraeus was here recently, and in his testimony, he also emphasized that, in the Middle East, there’s no easy answers, but that 

inaction has costs, whether it’s others filling the vacuum, like we’re 

seeing with Russia in the Middle East and in Syria, or whether 

United States credibility is undermined, especially when inaction 

contradicts policy statements. I think this is a—I think most of the 

members of the committee see this as a significant problem, not 

only in the Middle East, but beyond. 

General Dunford, do you believe that inaction has its own costs? 

How does the U.S. military weigh the costs of inaction, of doing 

nothing, when you’re presenting options to the President for—options on what we should be doing in the military—in the Middle 

East? 

General DUNFORD. First of all, Senator, you know, I absolutely 

agree that inaction is unacceptable when we talk about protecting 

our national interests. So, there’s no question about that. 

And with regard to when we provide military options to a particular challenge, absolutely I think it’s my responsibility to clearly 

articulate both the opportunity costs and the risk associated with 

not taking action against a particular issue. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you. 

Secretary Carter, you know, many members of the committee 

have been concerned about United States inaction in another part 

of the world, in the South China Sea. A lot of us on this committee 

saw that inaction was raising costs and undermining U.S. credibility. There was a number of us who were complimentary of your 

speech at the Shangri-la Dialogue. I was going to express concern 

about that, but just read in the paper about the freedom of navigation operation that we evidently conducted inside a 12-mile zone of 

a built-up Chinese island, just yesterday. Is that true? Did we do 

that? 

Secretary CARTER. We have made a commitment—and I appreciate your support—as part of our rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, 

which is so important to America’s future. We’re doing more at sea, 

we’re doing more in the way of presence. Just to give a general answer to what you said, we have said, and we are acting on the 

164 

basis of saying, that we will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law permits—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. Did we send a destroyer yesterday inside the 

12-mile zone of one of the—— 

Secretary CARTER.—to do that. There have been naval operations 

in that region in recent days, and there will be in the weeks and 

months—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. Inside the 12-mile zone of a China—— 

Secretary CARTER. I don’t want to comment—— 

Senator SULLIVAN.—built-up—— 

Secretary CARTER.—on a particular operation, but—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. You don’t want to comment? It’s all over the 

press right now. 

Secretary CARTER. I’m sure it is, but I—we reserve the right to 

conduct—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. If we do that within a built-up island that 

was undersea submerged rock, is that within—is that consistent 

with international law? 

Secretary CARTER. Yes, it is. 

Senator SULLIVAN. So, should we be doing that on a regular 

basis, in terms of freedom of navigation exercises? 

Secretary CARTER. We will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law permits and whatever—whenever our operational 

needs require—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. It would be good to know, just for the committee’s—— 

Secretary CARTER.—that we will—— 

Senator SULLIVAN.—perspective, whether or not the press reports 

are accurate on what we did. 

Let me ask another question about another area in the world 

where it seems like United States inaction clearly seems to be inviting more Russian aggression, where Russian actions are changing facts on the ground. Mr. Secretary, in your confirmation hearing, you talked about the Arctic is going to be a major area of importance to the United States, but—strategically and economically 

in the future—but you said it’s fair to say that we’re late to the 

recognition of that. I think it’s also fair to say that the Russians 

are not late to the recognition of that. Since your confirmation, the 

Russians have done the following in the Arctic: a new Arctic military command, four new Arctic brigade combat teams, 14 new operational airfields in the Russian Arctic, announcements of up to 50 

new airfields in—by 2020, a 30-percent increase of Russian special 

forces in the Arctic, 40 icebreakers—we have two, one is broken— 

huge new land claims in the Arctic, increased long-range air patrols with their Bear bombers, the most since the Cold War, a 

major military exercise in March that caught the U.S. military 

completely off guard—45,000 troops, over 3,000 military vehicles, 

41 naval ships, 15 submarines, 110 military aircraft, numerous elements of Russia’s western military district and elite airborne troops 

in that exercise. A lot of this concerns the committee. In the NDAA, 

which the President vetoed, we had a unanimous agreement here 

to have—to create an operations plan for the Arctic. That’s an important step to ensuring we have continued good options in the 

Arctic. 

165 

Can I get your commitment, both of you, to work with this committee on a robust—a robust—military Operation-Plan that will enable us to check Russia’s aggressions in the Arctic, keep our options open, and maintain our credibility in that important area of 

the world, given that that’s in the NDAA right now? 

Secretary CARTER. Yeah, you have mine. I appreciate your leadership in this regard. The Arctic is an important region for the 

United States, and actually for the entire world. So, we need to do 

more there. I appreciate the fact that you are a champion of that 

and can consider me a supporter. I appreciate—and we’ll have a 

chance, actually, to discuss that in Alaska later this week—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

General Dunford? 

General DUNFORD. Yes, Senator. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Mr. Secretary, sometimes here in this committee we have a sense of frustration. The news reports, all day, 

are about a U.S. destroyer, naming the destroyer, going inside the 

12-mile zone around these islands. Why would you not confirm or 

deny that that happened, since all the details and the action happened? This is what frustrates members of this committee, when 

it’s out there in the media, throughout, saturating the media, and 

you won’t even tell us. Is it—what—maybe you understand our 

frustration, here, Mr. Secretary. That’s—— 

Secretary CARTER. I do understand your frustration, and I’d just 

match it with my own frustration, which is that—these are operations that we should be conducting normally, and—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. But, the American people should know about 

it. We’re their representatives. You refuse to even confirm or deny 

something that is all over the media and confirmed by everyone? 

You come before this committee and say you won’t comment on it? 

Why? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, I don’t—I’m going to not be coy with 

you. I don’t like, in general, the idea of talking about our military 

operations. But, what you read in the newspaper is accurate. I 

don’t want to say more than that. I don’t want to say when, whether—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, at least—— 

Secretary CARTER.—and how we operate anywhere in the world. 

One of the things—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. I don’t that—— 

Secretary CARTER.—about freedom of navigation—— 

Chairman MCCAIN.—that the Senator asked you to tell why, 

when, and how. He just asked you to—whether you could confirm 

it, or not. 

Secretary CARTER. I can. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Donnelly—Secretary—Senator Donnelly. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to get back to Syria and to some of the questions the 

Chairman was asking about safe zones. We seem lost. We seem lost 

and at—confusion about what to do next, unable to put any real 

marker down or have any plan for success. The people are voting, 

166 

and they’re voting with their feet. They’re leaving. There’s refugees 

all over the world now. We have the opportunity to set up safe 

zones. What I hear is, we’re worried about the Russians, we’re worried about the Syrians, we’re worried about all of these things. I 

mean, at what point do we put a plan together, execute the plan, 

tell them what we’re going to do, and say, ‘‘Stay out of the way’’? 

Secretary CARTER. With respect to a safe—I’d distinguished a 

safe zone from a no-fly zone. A safe zone is a zone on the ground. 

We have analyzed them and discussed them with partners in the 

region. They are principally not in regions where we would expect 

them to be contested so much by Assad as by ISIL and al-Nusra. 

Therefore, they have to be defended against that threat, and that’s 

a military undertaking—— 

Senator DONNELLY. Are we unwilling to—— 

Secretary CARTER.—people in the region who—we have not made 

that recommendation. The reason—— 

Senator DONNELLY. At what point—how many people have to 

leave before we make that decision? 

Secretary CARTER. Senator, let me go back to—if you create a 

zone like that, then you do have to ask who is going to come into 

the zone. Are there people who have left Syria who are going to return to Syria from Turkey or Europe to occupy a zone from which 

they didn’t come? Are there people elsewhere in Syria who are 

going to come to that zone? So, you do have to ask yourself: For 

whom would it be attractive to be in such a zone? Then, secondly, 

who is going to defend—— 

Senator DONNELLY. Probably some of the folks in Germany and 

in other countries who would rather have stayed in their own country. 

Secretary CARTER. If they wished to return to the part of the 

country for which the zone—in which the zone is created. But, 

again, it would depend on where it was, and it would be contested—— 

Senator DONNELLY. Well, let me ask you—— 

Secretary CARTER. So, this—— 

Senator DONNELLY.—in barrel bombs—we’ve talked this time 

and after time here—why are we unwilling to send a message to 

Assad that if he continues with barrel-bombing, we will stop him 

and crater his runways? 

Secretary CARTER. We have not undertaken to engage, as the 

United States military, the Syrian military. We have not taken 

that step—— 

Senator DONNELLY. So, how do you ever stop the barrel-bombing? 

Secretary CARTER. The way that the civil war in Syria will end, 

just to get back to what we’ve been saying repeatedly, is for Assad 

to depart and for there to be a political—— 

Senator DONNELLY. Why would he depart, at this point? 

Secretary CARTER. Because the opposition to him is intense, and 

strengthening. 

Senator DONNELLY. Well, as far as I can see, he’s had three or 

four additional allies come onboard. If anything, the calculation for 

him is, his cards are getting better. 

167 

Secretary CARTER. Yeah. Again, our priority has been to combat 

ISIL. We are not, as the United States military, undertaking to 

combat Syrian—— 

Senator DONNELLY. Well, let me just ask you—— 

Secretary CARTER. That’s not a decision—— 

Senator DONNELLY.—this. In the process of—— 

Secretary CARTER.—not a decision—— 

Senator DONNELLY.—combating ISIL, does the United States 

stand by as another nation barrel-bombs the people we’re trying to 

protect? 

Secretary CARTER. We have sought now, for some time, and continue to do, a political transition in Syria that would end the Syrian civil war. We have not pursued a military solution—— 

Senator DONNELLY. Well—— 

Secretary CARTER.—to that. 

Senator DONNELLY.—I would just say, from my perspective—and 

I am not an expert like both of you—we seem lost. I have extraordinary confidence in the leadership at this table, but we seem lost. 

I would love to see alternate plans that may be out there. 

General Dunford, I was in Iraq a few months ago, was with the 

Sunni tribal leaders, and I just want to ask your best military judgment. In spending time with them, they said, ‘‘Look, if you showed 

an interest in us, if you showed—you know, had a helicopter come 

by every now and then, showed you really wanted to provide us 

with guidance, with logistics, with advice, et cetera, that partnership, that friendship we’ve always felt, we’ll be there. We’ll get the 

job done.’’ Do you think they have that capability? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I do. There are Sunnis that absolutely can take the fight to the enemy, and we’ve seen that in the 

past. 

Senator DONNELLY. So, while we try to continue to hope and 

pray that the Iraqi Security Force gets better, are we sitting here 

with Sunni tribal leaders who have the individuals who can actually start to move ISIS out of Ramadi? 

General DUNFORD. I think if the central government would do 

better at outreach to the Sunni, we absolutely could recruit more, 

train more, equip more, and support more Sunni in the fight. 

Senator DONNELLY. So, I think it’s almost fair to say the team 

is ready to go; they just need to get the signal to go. 

General DUNFORD. It would take some work, Senator, but there 

are people out there that we could put together to fight ISIL. 

Senator DONNELLY. That’s how we start to move ISIL out, I 

think. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator REED [presiding]. Thank you. 

On behalf of Chairman McCain, let me recognize Senator Lee. 

Senator LEE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Secretary Carter and General Dunford, for appearing 

in front of our committee today, and for your service to our country. 

The White House has been sending mixed and, at times, contradictory messages about what our interests are and what threats 

to our security exist in the Middle East. Many Americans are understandably coming to find our current strategy somewhat reminiscent of the old Warren Zevon song, since the President’s reaction 

168 

to—it seems to be to send in lawyers, guns, and money whenever 

and wherever a crisis breaks out. 

The situation in the Middle East is a very complicated problem 

for our current posture, but it’s certainly not historically aberrational. For more than 100 years, this region has been dominated 

by either external powers or internal authoritarians who have destroyed cultural institutions and disrupted the natural development of societies. The decentralization of power in these states, 

compounded by radical Islamism and ancient sectarian grievances, 

amounts to a time-tested recipe for the kind of conflict and instability that we’re seeing today and that tends to threaten our security. 

We continue to receive mixed contradictory reports about the effectiveness of ongoing efforts to retain, train, and equip the Iraqi 

Security Forces. When I ask why we believe it will work this time 

around, I’m usually told by Defense officials something like the following, something like, ‘‘Well, we have a better political partner in 

Baghdad now than we did before, and we have a partner who will 

not repeat the mistakes of his predecessor.’’ Now, this is not encouraging, as we know how quickly political institutions—political 

situations and calculations can change in the Middle East, particularly right now. 

So, General Dunford, I’m more concerned by what your predecessor, General Dempsey, described as the ‘‘will to fight’’ factor 

among the ISF. I believe that extends beyond simply having a better leader in Baghdad. Do you believe the kind of united Iraq that 

we have seen for the past century—that is with borders drawn by 

the British and French, and held together either by a Westernbacked monarchy or a Ba’athist dictator—is something for which 

the people of Iraq have the genuine will to fight, especially when 

they don’t have emergency assistance from a coalition like they 

have right now? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think, for most people in Iraq, it’s 

a lot more local than it is national. I do think that if a central government, for example, would outreach to the Sunni in the Anbar 

Province and provide basic services, that we would get Sunni fighters that would fight on behalf of the government. We’ve seen that 

in the past. 

Senator LEE. So, I’d like to expand the question a little bit more 

broadly, to places like Syria or Yemen. Do people of those countries 

have the will to fight for united governments in places where current territorial lines may have been imposed by a foreign force? 

General DUNFORD. There’s no evidence that I would know of that 

would indicate that they would. 

Senator LEE. Unfortunately, I think that we’re looking too hard 

for an easy answer—or a simple answer to some of these complicated questions. I encourage my colleagues and the American 

people to thoughtfully consider options in the Middle East before 

continuing down paths that I believe may lead to mission creep and 

to an indefinite United States military presence to prop up weak 

and sort of artificially created states designated around 

unsustainable boundaries. 

Now, the Department of Defense’s Syria train-and-equip program 

failed. It failed by a longshot. Define and train the level of fighters 

169 

desired under the vetting requirements established by Congress 

and the White House. Congress put these requirements in place because we were very concerned about who would be using U.S. assistance, and for what purposes they would be using it. 

Secretary Carter, does the failure of this program indicate to you 

that the viable ground force we desire for Syria simply does not 

exist within the parameters that the American taxpayer may be 

willing to support? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, I was disappointed in it, as well, but I 

don’t draw that conclusion. There are forces in Syria willing to 

fight ISIL and capable of fighting ISIL. The—we talked about the 

Kurd—Syrian Kurds as an example of that, the so-called Syrian 

Arab Coalition. In the new train-and-equip effort that we described 

today, we will look to identify and then support capable and motivated forces in—on Syrian territory that are willing to take on 

ISIL. We have identified some of them already. The new approach 

is to enable them, train them and equip them, rather than trying 

to create such forces anew, which was the previous approach. 

And I do understand why that approach was taken, and, you’re 

right, it was authorized by this committee last December. And I 

understand the considerations that went into that. I have concluded, and the President concluded, that that approach wasn’t 

working the way that it was conceived of a year ago, and that’s 

precisely why we’ve changed the approach. 

So, we have a different approach that we think will allow us to 

gain more momentum and, in particular, to allow us to put pressure on the city of Raqqa, which is the self-declared capital of the 

caliphate. So, on the Syrian side of the counter-ISIL fight, that is 

our intent, and we’re trying to gather momentum in that and several other ways that we detailed. 

Senator LEE. Okay. Thank you. 

I see my time’s expired, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator REED. On behalf of Chairman McCain, let me recognize 

Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Yes. Senator Reed— 

Thank you all for being here. 

By the way, let me, just at the beginning of my questions, give 

a mention to Master Sergeant Joshua Wheeler. He is—there probably is no better example of someone who has run to danger for 

this country over and over and over again. I believe this was his 

14th deployment. So, I wanted to mention his name in the hearing 

today. We all mourn his loss and the loss of his family, and we support them as they move through this trying time. 

Senator Reed asked you about the new Syrian forces in northern 

Syria. Have we provided resupply to those forces? 

General DUNFORD. We have, Senator. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. Have they successfully called in airstrikes? 

General DUNFORD. They have, Senator. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. Can you tell us, for the record, how 

many? 

General DUNFORD. I cannot, Senator. I can get that information 

for you. I don’t know the number. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

170 

Since the NSF were reinserted into Syria, they have facilitated 91 air strikes 

against ISIL as of 1 Dec 2015. 

Senator MCCASKILL. That would be terrific. 

On Iraq train-and-equip—as you all know, I have a tendency to 

read those Inspector General (IG) reports. The one that came out 

September 30th raised several concerns that I’m worried about. 

One is asking us to refurbish the conditions under which these 

Iraqis are training. The DOD IG recommends that the coalition 

work with the Iraqi Minister of Defense to devise and implement 

a plan that clarifies the contributions of Iraq and the United States 

to improve their living conditions. Evidently, they are—the IG is 

saying that we’re having desertions because they’re living in such 

squalor, in terms of the conditions under which they are training. 

I just think of the billions and billions on infrastructure we spend 

in Iraq, and I’m trying to get my arms around: Are we going to go 

in and fix up something that’s going to rot when we leave, or is 

Iraq going to step up and do what’s necessary to make these conditions palatable for our—the recruits? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, what I would tell you—and this is 

my perspective, and I think this is where we’re at right now—is 

that our relationship with Iraq has to be transactional, and there 

has to be certain conditions that they would meet before we would 

provide support. That absolutely is the framework within which I’ll 

provide recommendations for any support to the Iraqi forces— 

would be that it would be based on their behavior and their willingness to be true partners and meet certain conditions that would 

indicate they’d be heading the direction that you described. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Capital expenditures, you know, just really 

grate, I think, on many of us who have watched the amount of 

money that we wasted on capital expenditures in Iraq. On that 

same line of questioning, the Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs) that are coming from Afghanistan, the same IG report points out that many of them are missing parts, and there’s 

a real question whether they have the capability of maintaining 

these MRAPs, going forward. Once again, are there discussions 

about who is going to bear the costs of making these MRAPs that 

we’re giving them actually operational? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, are you talking about the MRAPs we 

gave to the Afghan Security Forces? 

Senator MCCASKILL. I’m talking about the ones—the excess ones 

that we’re moving over—United States is providing 250 MRAPs to 

the Iraqi Army. They’re excess defense items and being shipped to 

Iraq from Afghanistan. Those are the MRAPs I’m talking about. 

General DUNFORD. Yeah. I can’t comment on what the arrangements are, but I’ll get that information for you, Senator, in terms 

of what arrangements were made of giving them. Typically, when 

we provide that equipment, it’s in as-is condition when we provide 

it to another country. I assume that’s the rule—— 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The State Department is bearing the cost of the refurbishment and sustainment 

of the excess MRAPs that we transferred to Iraq. The contracted logistics vehicle 

used to pay was the Foreign Military Financing Program (Title 22 Grant Assistance). 

171 

Senator MCCASKILL. I just want to make sure we’re not going to 

the expense of sending them something that isn’t operational, that 

we don’t want to have to spend a lot of money to fix up, and, secondly, that they don’t have the capability of maintaining. You 

know, sustainability. I mean, Secretary Carter knows this has been 

a refrain from the very beginning. It does us no good to give them 

things if they cannot sustain it. Of course, that’s one of the reasons 

that we’re having the problems in Iraq we have right now, is they 

were politically incapable of sustainability. 

Briefly, on a separate subject, I just want to bring this up. I 

won’t go into the details here, but I am desperately trying to get 

at helping the veterans that were subjected to mustard gas experiments. I’m having a really difficult time with your folks about this. 

They’re saying that even if I have the name of a veteran and the 

privacy waiver, they will not give me information out of your mustard gas database without a letter from the Chairman. I don’t understand why this is so hard. Why is everyone not opening up 

these records and doing everything we can to get the word to these 

people? There are a lot of folks out there that were subjected to 

mustard gas experiments. The Department of Veterans Affairs 

(VA) wants to point at you. I’m hitting a wall at DOD on this. I 

really need a commitment from you all today that you will get me 

the information as to why this is—why me trying to help veterans 

who maybe have been exposed to mustard gas—why this should be 

so hard. Would you all be willing to make that commitment, that 

you will work with my office instead of—— 

Secretary CARTER. Yeah, I—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. They just keep throwing up roadblocks. I’ve 

been at this for months. 

Secretary CARTER. Senator, I’m not familiar with this issue, but, 

as always, I will make sure that we support your request. I’ll look 

into it, and we’ll—with the Chairman—and we’ll get back to you, 

as appropriate. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The Department of Defense has established a process where congressional staff 

may provide a Privacy Act and Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 

(HIPAA) release from each individual for whom they desire information, and we will 

provide a printout of information that was contained in the database. I understand 

that we have received and responded to a request from a Congressional office and 

provided information for two individuals. A letter from the Chairman is not required 

if the individual involved has given permission for the disclosure. Similarly, an individual may provide the Privacy Act and HIPAA release and ask for the information 

directly from the Department. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And I’ve been waiting since July for evidence to back up your claim that there was justification for the $36 

million, 64,000 square-foot building in Afghanistan. There was a 

call for discipline for the people who had okayed that building. It’s 

sitting empty. I’ve been asking since July as to—you said that you 

didn’t think—Secretary Carter, you contested the findings and said 

that you didn’t think disciplinary action was appropriate. I’ve 

asked what the evidence is that would indicate disciplinary action 

is not appropriate. I’ve been waiting since July. So, if you could get 

that on your To Do List, too, I would really appreciate it. 

Secretary CARTER. I will do that. 

172 

Senator MCCASKILL. You’ve got an able helper behind you there 

who ought to help with this. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator REED. On behalf of Chairman McCain, let me recognize 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator Sessions. 

Thank you, Senator. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you very much. 

Senator McCain laid out some serious criticisms of how we’re 

being—how we’re conducting our policy in the Middle East. I share 

most of those. I don’t think they’re little matters. They’re important 

matters. I think we’ve made some mistakes and struggled in ways 

that are not well, not good. I think it’s—so, I’ll just leave it at that. 

What I’d like to address today is the need for a strategy, long 

term, in the Middle East. I asked Kenneth Pollack, of the Brookings Institution, several months ago—he had mentioned in his 

statement, ‘‘This may take a long time.’’ So, I asked him—the 

whole problem of extremism in the Middle East, this spasm of violence we’re seeing throughout the entire region, how complex it is 

and how—and I asked him—and so, I followed up with him and 

said, ‘‘So, you’re saying this could last 10, 20, 50 years.’’ I remember very vividly. He looked at me, and he gave an answer you don’t 

often get. ‘‘Yes.’’ That was his answer. 

So, we’ve—and do we need a strategy—a long-term strategy that 

could deal with that? I’ve asked that question to Walter Russell 

Mead, and he said he’s never seen us, as a Nation, be so unfocused 

in a strategy, the historian that he is. 

The entire panel, I believe, week before last—General Jimmy 

Jones, President Obama’s National Security Advisor, General 

Keane, Ambassador, another scholar—all agree that we need a 

strategy, and we really don’t have one. 

Then I asked Secretary Gates, last week, and this is what he 

said that I think is relevant. He said, ‘‘My concern is that I don’t 

see an overreaching—or overriding strategy on the part of the 

United States with this complex challenge for the next 20 or 30 

years.’’ One of the benefits of containment—and there are lots of 

disagreements about how to apply it and how the wars we’ve 

fought under it, and so on—but, I will always believe that critical 

to our success in the Cold War was that we had a broad strategy, 

called containment, that was practiced by nine successive administrations of both political parties. It had bipartisan support, the general notion of how to deal with this. So, we don’t have anything like 

that with respect to the Middle East. I think that is long—and so, 

we’re kind of dealing with each of these crises individually rather 

than backing up and saying, ‘‘What’s our long-term game plan, 

here? Who are going to be our allies? Who are going to be our 

friends? Where do we contain? Where do we let it burn itself out?’’ 

We just haven’t really addressed those long-term questions, because it seems to me we’re thinking strictly in the short term of 

month-to-month. 

What—I know we’ve got nine points, Secretary Carter, but I 

don’t sense anyone in the region or anyone in the Congress believes 

that we have a deeply studied and long-term policy for the Middle 

173 

East that could extend for decades. First of all, do you think we 

need one? Do we have one? 

Secretary CARTER. We have a strategy toward the Middle East. 

Many elements of it are, in fact, of longstanding—decades longstanding. Again, the—our strategy begins with the pursuit of 

American interests, and that involves protecting our own country 

and our people, defending longstanding friends and allies, who include the Gulf states and especially Israel, which was discussed already, opposing the introduction of nuclear weapons to the region, 

which gets us to the Iran circumstance, and, in the current matter 

of ISIL, protecting our people and our friends and allies against 

ISIL by defeating it where it began, which is in Iraq and Syria. We 

described, today, that—the implementation of the strategy in both 

of those places to defeat—degrade and defeat ISIL. So, we’re doing 

that. 

So, I—it is a complicated region. I called it kaleidoscopic in my 

statement. But, American interests are not unclear. They’re clear. 

We—our strategy is intended to pursue those interests, and that is 

what we’re doing. Strengthening the pursuit of that strategy is why 

the Chairman and I have been describing to you today the new 

steps we’re taking in Iraq and Syria and with respect to unilateral 

actions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I know that’s the position of the administration, but, frankly, our Middle East allies that we talk to and 

come and visit us don’t feel confident that they know what the 

long-term goals of the United States are. Were they to defend Iraq 

against ISIL, who we’d shared shoulder-to-shoulder, General 

Dunford, for a decade? Are we going to pull out all troops? Apparently not, now, in Afghanistan, regardless of the situation on the 

ground. What about red lines in Syria? Are we going to honor 

those? 

Look, you can say that, but I think it’s clear that confidence in 

understanding of where we stand and what we’re going to do for 

the next 10, 20, 30 years, as any leader of a Middle Eastern nation 

has got to think, and as we should think, as a great Nation, I don’t 

think we’re there. 

So, I really believe more work needs to be done. I’m talking to 

my colleagues in the Senate. I believe we can reach a bipartisan 

policy. I really do. I don’t think it’s impossible. I’m going to work 

toward that goal. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Senator SESSIONS. One more thing. My time is over. But, I believe the Defense Department may underestimate the critical nature of the refugee crisis. This is not like Iran-Iraq war that went 

on for many, many years. This is impacting Europe right now. It 

is a humanitarian crisis. It’s being exploited by everyone else in the 

Middle East that would like to come to Europe. Europe is facing 

what one top diplomat told me was the greatest crisis since the— 

World War II. I think we’ve got to think about this safe haven, 

these safe zones, and get busy on it. If we—and General Petraeus 

said it might have to have some of our people at risk, defensively, 

to try to protect those areas, but we wouldn’t take a lot. You and 

I talked, Secretary Carter, about it. Can’t we get moving on this? 

How many more millions are going to have to flee and being lined 

174 

up in areas that we don’t—before we act? Just morally, my judgment is that Europe needs to know there is a place for these refugees to go, other than to flee the entire region. That will strengthen 

them. Can we not do that? 

Quickly. 

Secretary CARTER. Well, the—insofar as the refugees are coming 

from Syria—they’re actually coming to Europe from several—— 

Senator SESSIONS. All over. 

Secretary CARTER.—places, but, to the extent they’re coming 

from Syria, this is why it is so important that the Syrian civil war 

be put to an end. Our approach to that is political. It’s not military. 

That’s been a persistent subject of discussion here. We have not 

undertaken to achieve that goal militarily. Our approach to that is 

political. We hope that that transition occurs and that the civil war 

in Syria ends. That is something that—— 

Senator SESSIONS. What if it takes three years? Can’t we provide 

some sort of area there for people who are in danger to have safety 

and not have to leave the entire region? 

Secretary CARTER. I’ll just—I’d just repeat what I’ve said. We 

have analyzed it. I’m prepared to have shared with you the analysis we’ve done of safe zones, buffer zones, and no-fly zones. We 

have looked at the advantages and costs of those. The President 

has not taken them off the table, but we have not undertaken to 

create any of those zones at this time. I don’t rule that out in the 

future, Senator. We’re happy to discuss it with you, and discuss, in 

a different setting, the analysis that we have done. 

Senator REED. On behalf of Chairman McCain, let me recognize 

Senator Ayotte. 

Senator AYOTTE. I want to thank the Chair. Also thank Senator 

Donnelly. Appreciate it. 

I wanted to ask Secretary Carter—recently, the Iranians have actually tested a long-range missile, in violation of existing United 

Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions. This is something that 

Ambassador Samantha Power has confirmed. In fact, if you look at 

what the Iranians have done post-agreement, not only have they 

tested this missile, but, of course, they’ve wrongfully convicted a 

Washington Post reporter in Iran, and they—of course, we’ve had 

a lot of discussion today about the cooperation between Russia and 

Iran undermining stability in Syria and our interests there. 

So, I’ve also brought—been brought to my attention recently that 

the Supreme Leader of Iran has actually said, about the recent 

agreement, that, ‘‘Any imposition of sanctions at any level under 

any pretext, including repetitive and fabricated pretexts of terrorism and human rights on the part of any countries involved in 

the negotiations, will constitute a violation of the JCPOA.’’ 

So, here’s my question to both of you, and primarily to you, Secretary Carter. What are we going to do about their violation of already existing U.N. resolutions when it comes to testing ballistic 

missiles and long-range missiles? You’re the one that testified before this committee, the ‘‘I’’ in ICBM is ‘‘intercontinental.’’ As I see 

it, already Iran is violating resolutions, with no response from us. 

Already the Supreme Leader is basically saying, ‘‘You impose sanctions on any reason, even our support for terrorism or other human 

rights violation, we’re going to walk away from the JCPOA.’’ So, do 

175 

you not agree that their violation of the missile resolution warrants 

a response from the United States of America? What is that response going to be? Because, at this point, I haven’t seen any response. 

Secretary CARTER. I think that it’s—it needs to be very clear— 

it’s certainly clear to us, in the Department of Defense—that the 

conclusion of the nuclear deal with Iran, assuming it gets implemented, which was part of what your question gets to you—does 

not address all of our security concerns with respect to—— 

Senator AYOTTE. But, let me ask you this. 

Secretary CARTER.—Iran. And—— 

Senator AYOTTE. Just yes or no, should we respond to their testing of this missile, that violates existing U.N. resolutions? 

Secretary CARTER. I—I’ll describe one response that is in our 

area, and that is our continuing commitment to the development 

of missile defenses. That’s one of the reasons why we are developing and fielding—— 

Senator AYOTTE. I understand that we’re developing missile defenses, but what is our response when they behave badly already? 

Shouldn’t there be a response from the United States of America? 

We had, recently, a panel of experts here, and I asked each of 

them—and they came from different perspectives—if we should respond. They all agreed, ‘‘Yes.’’ 

Secretary CARTER. Well, the—in our area of responsibility, I 

would say this, Senator. I’ll let the—Ambassador Power and Secretary Kerry address the diplomatic side of it. But, in our area of 

responsibility—and I made this clear right from the beginning of 

the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear deal, that that does not end 

all of our security concerns with respect to Iran. 

Senator AYOTTE. I mean—— 

Secretary CARTER. That is why we—— 

Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Secretary, I’m sorry—— 

Secretary CARTER.—continue to—— 

Senator AYOTTE.—I don’t have a lot of time, but ending—it 

seems not ending. It seems like it’s just beginning, really, as we 

think about this unholy alliance between Russia and Iran, undermining our interests in Syria, as we think about them testing, in 

our faces, this long-range missile, as we think about what the Supreme Leader has basically said, ‘‘Any sanctions, we’re going to 

walk away from the JCPOA.’’ I would say that it’s really just beginning. 

That said, before I leave—I don’t have much time, but I need to 

ask question of you, General Dunford. I had the privilege of, recently, on Friday, going to the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility 

(‘‘Gitmo’’) and meeting with our men and women who serve there. 

They’re doing an excellent job under difficult circumstances, as you 

know. One of the issues that was brought to my attention—and I 

know that you, as a leader in our military, one of your jobs, having 

been a commander and serving, obviously, in the highest position 

in our military, understand that taking care of our men and women 

in uniform is so critical. Yet, we have a situation down there where 

we met with women guards who are being prevented from fully 

performing their mission because the five 9/11 attackers, who are 

charged with killing 3,000 Americans, will not allow them to perVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:53 Sep 08, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00181 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21401.TXT WILDA
176 

form their duties because they’re women. Can you tell me what you 

think about that and whether you think that is right, and how we 

should be addressing that? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I can tell you how I feel about it. I 

feel the same way as the Commander, U.S. Southern Command, 

General John Kelly, who describes it as outrageous. And I read his 

weekly report, and have read it for about—probably the last seven 

or eight weeks, to include the two or three weeks before transition. 

So, it’s outrageous. He’s identified it. And as you probably know, 

Senator, that’s being worked by lawyers. It’s an injunction. I 

don’t—I’m not using that as an excuse, I’m just sharing with you 

that’s actually the—where it’s at right now. It’s being worked by 

lawyers. The Commander has identified it. I think it ought to be— 

it is outrageous. It ought to be fixed. It hasn’t been, to date. 

Senator AYOTTE. I’d like to see the administration speak out 

against this. Here we talk about giving women more opportunity 

in combat, but this is a area where these women that we met with, 

by the way, that are serving there, they’re the very best. And they 

are not being able to perform the full responsibilities of their positions simply because they are women, because 9/11 terrorists are 

manipulating the system to say that our women cannot guard 

them. 

Secretary Carter, I hope you would agree with me that this is 

outrageous. And I would hope that the administration would do everything in its power to stand up for our women in the military. 

Secretary CARTER. I do want to associate myself with what the 

Chairman said. It is outrageous. And what General Kelly said, this 

is the—pursuant to an action of a Federal judge, and I understand 

that. But, if you’re—I think it is counter to the way we treat 

servicemembers, including women servicemembers, and outrage is 

a very good word for it. 

Senator AYOTTE. Well, I appreciate both of you being here. 

Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN [presiding]. Mr. Secretary and General 

Dunford, I’ve known both of you for many years, and I have appreciated very much your outstanding work. I am great admirers of 

both of you. I appreciate your service. 

But, could I, again, caution you, Mr. Secretary. It isn’t helpful to 

our relations and members of this committee when there’s a widely 

spread story stating the name of the ship, where it went, how it 

went, and then you come and tell us that you can’t confirm or deny 

something that is out there in the media. So, meaning that somebody has leaked all that information to the media and it’s out 

there, but you can’t tell this—members of this committee, who have 

the responsibility—it isn’t a privilege, it’s a responsibility to exercise oversight. 

The second issue I want to mention to you is Guantanamo. I understand that the President has said many—on numerous occasions, that one of his objections is Guantanamo. You and the President’s top aide came to my office and said you were going to give 

me a plan. I’ve always favored closing Guantanamo, for a whole variety of reasons. Yet, we still haven’t got a plan from you. In fact, 

not only not a plan—until I asked you about it specifically, there 

was no communication, after coming to my office and saying that 

177 

you’re going to give me that plan and I said we needed it before 

we marked up the defense authorization bill. We got nothing. Not 

an update, not a briefing on what was going on. So, we put in the 

language in Guantanamo, and the President then voices his strong 

objection to Guantanamo. 

Finally, this issue of whether we are protecting those people who 

we are asking to fight against Bashar Assad and ISIS. Isn’t it true 

that we’ve dropped munitions, General Dunford, to these—to a 

group of people who we are supporting in Syria? 

General DUNFORD. It is true, Senator. 

Chairman MCCAIN. It is true? Yet, are we going to protect them 

from Russian air attacks? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, we have the authority, we have the 

capability, and we have options to defend the forces that we’ve—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. But, is it true that the Russians are already 

attacking them? 

General DUNFORD. The ones we have trained, it—they have not. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I’m not asking the ones we’ve trained. The 

ones we dropped munitions to. 

General DUNFORD. No, the Russians have not attacked the ones 

we’ve dropped munitions to, Senator. 

Chairman MCCAIN. They have not. 

General DUNFORD. No, Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. They have not—— 

General DUNFORD. To make sure that you and I are speaking of 

the same group, the group I’m referring to is what’s known as the 

Syrian Arab Coalition. They’re operating in the northeast part of 

the country, north of Raqqa. We recently provided resupply to 

those individuals—ammunition—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. If they’re attacked by the Russians, we’ll defend them. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, we have the capability to do that, 

and we’d provide options. I can’t answer that question. 

Chairman MCCAIN. They’d be interested. They’d be interested—— 

General DUNFORD. Yes, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN.—in knowing, I think, if we’re going to give 

them equipment and ask them to fight, and then they’re going to 

be—we can’t answer to them whether we’re going to protect them, 

or not. I don’t think—I think it’s a degree of immorality. 

So, anyway, Chairman, this—— 

Secretary CARTER. May I—the two parts you raised, just take a 

moment? 

First of all, again, I don’t mean to be coy about the ship sailing. 

I know things are in the newspaper. I’m just going to tell you 

where I’m coming from on that. It has nothing to do with this particular operation. There are all kinds of things in the newspaper 

that—and it—and that should not be in the newspaper. I don’t like 

to talk about military operations publicly. You are, of course, entitled to know everything, and be briefed on everything. But, talking 

about things in a public setting, I’m, in general, not—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. But, what—— 

Secretary CARTER.—not in favor of. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Why shouldn’t—— 

178 

Secretary CARTER. So, I don’t want you to think I’m being 

coy—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. But, what is—— 

Secretary CARTER.—or evasive. I—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. But, what is classified about it? What is it 

that you wouldn’t want—I mean, it’s—in fact, I think literally 

every member of this committee applauds it. So, I’m not sure 

that—what the reason is, why you wouldn’t want to just state what 

has already been, from somebody that works for you—the name of 

the ship, where it went, when it went, how it went, but yet you 

won’t tell us. That causes frustration, Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary CARTER. Okay. All right. Well, I don’t mean to cause 

you frustration. I just wanted you to know where I’m coming from. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, I hope you understand our frustration. 

Secretary CARTER. Yeah, I do. I do. But, I—and maybe my hesitation is excessive, but I don’t like to talk about military operations 

in public. Perhaps this one should be an exception. 

But, let me go on to the other thing you said, about Gitmo. I, too, 

favor, like you, closing Gitmo, if that is at all possible. That—because some of the detainees in Gitmo are not—cannot be safely 

transferred to another location, in order to close Gitmo, as you 

know, we would need to find a location in the United States, or locations, in which they could continue to be detained. What has 

taken the time, Chairman, is that we had to survey a number of 

sites. We’ve done that in a number of sites around the country. 

We’ve completed that—and we have—some of those are Department of Defense sites, some of those are Bureau of Prisons sites. 

We needed to have them nominated by the Justice Department and 

then to do the site surveys there. All of that took some time. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I understand. 

Secretary CARTER. The process is now complete, and I expect 

you’ll get your proposal shortly. 

Chairman MCCAIN. All right. I understand, but I would have appreciated an update. The cynicism over on this side, at the Capitol, 

is, to my view, somewhat justified, because the law was broken 

when Mr. Bowe Bergdahl was swapped for five people. The law required that the President of the United States notify the Congress 

of the United States. He didn’t do it, so, frankly, there’s a credibility gap that is huge, when the President acts in direct violation 

of the law, and using the excuse, well, he was afraid there was 

going to be a leak. Well, to me, that’s not sufficient reason to violate the law, and so, therefore, the cynicism here is immense. To 

expect—the President complains about the NDAA—to expect that 

this committee would act, after the President has violated the law 

and there is no plan, is, of course, something that is not—neither 

reasonable nor in keeping with our responsibilities. 

Could I say, again, of my respect. I appreciate the great work 

that both of you do. As I’ve said, we’ve known each other a long 

time. But, I also have to tell you, there’s a certain amount of frustration here because of the lack of communication. What we just 

talked about, of Guantanamo, is one. Another one is this policy, or 

lack of policy, about what people we train and equip, and whether 

we’re going to defend them, or not. The lack of a strategy to say 

that we can—have to take out Syrian air defenses in order to esVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:53 Sep 08, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00184 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21401.TXT WILDA
179 

tablish a no-fly zone is simply not true. You can ask—I’ll ask any 

military expert. That’s not true. You don’t have to take out Syrian 

air defenses. It’s Syrians that can’t fly into our places. We’ve had 

military’s—members like General Petraeus and General Keane and 

many others who obviously have a very different view of the whole 

issue of what we’re going to do, which, by doing nothing, has triggered a flood of millions of refugees, which is a problem we’re going 

to be grappling with for many years to come. It didn’t have to happen. 

Well, I look forward to more conversations with you. I appreciate 

you coming to the committee, I appreciate your service. 

This hearing, I’m sure you’ll be glad to know, is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

MILITARY STRATEGY TO SUPPORT POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

1. Senator MCCAIN. Our military efforts are directed at degrading and defeating 

ISIL but seem to ignore Russia, Assad, Iran and Al Qaeda. If we successfully defeat 

ISIL, but Al Nusrah, Assad, and Russia remain untouched or grow stronger, how 

does the resulting situation on the ground in Syria favor the interests of the United 

States? 

SECRETARY CARTER. The United States’ military efforts in Syria are aimed at defeating the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and countering other threats 

to the United States, including the al-Qa’ida aligned Khorasan Group. Even with 

ISIL defeated, the Department of Defense recognizes that the situation on the 

ground in Syria would remain extremely complicated. The Administration is working to build broad international support that will help to avoid the risk of creating 

a power vacuum in Syria, an outcome that would not be in the interests of the 

United States. To this end, the Defense Department is complementing counter-ISIL 

activities with diplomatic efforts to end the conflict in Syria—a political solution 

with buy-in from all parties is the best way to avoid this dynamic. The State Department has engaged diplomatically and has strongly supported the Vienna talks, 

which are aimed at organizing a cease-fire, establishing a political transition process, and resolving the Syrian conflict peacefully. 

2. Senator MCCAIN. What is your understanding of the political end state in Syria 

that our military efforts are designed to help achieve and what specific military conditions on the ground are you trying to create using military means that will support the ‘‘political solution’’ desired by the United States? 

Secretary CARTER. The military efforts in Syria are aimed at degrading and defeating the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and countering other terrorist threats to the United States, including from the al-Qa’ida-aligned Khorasan 

Group. ISIL must be degraded, dismantled, and ultimately defeated to protect the 

United States from terror attacks, and to set conditions for stability in the region. 

These military efforts complement the Administration’s other efforts to resolve the 

conflict in Syria through political negotiations. To that end, Secretary Kerry has intensified diplomatic efforts to reach a political resolution to the conflict in Syria, including making progress last month in Vienna, where major stake-holders in Syria 

agreed to a set of basic principles on resolving the conflict. 

General DUNFORD. The political end state in Syria that our military efforts are 

designed to achieve has four aspects: 1) the defeat of ISIL, 2) resolution of the Syrian civil war, 3) the peaceful transition of the Assad regime, and 4) an end to the 

commiserate humanitarian crisis. 

The specific military conditions on the ground that we are trying to create towards this are: 1) eventually seizing the ISIL stronghold of Raqqah, 2) cutting 

ISIL’s supply lines, 3) degrading its finances, 4) killing its leaders, and 5) taking 

back the territory ISIL now holds. 

180 

DETERMINING VICTORY

3. Senator MCCAIN. Beyond tallying up numbers of targets destroyed and senior 

leaders or ISIL fighters eliminated, what specific measures are you using to gauge 

your success against your objective to degrade and destroy ISIL? 

General DUNFORD. In accordance with the 2014 U.S. Government Strategy to 

Counter ISIL, we are utilizing comprehensive military coalition campaign assessments to measure progress against military objectives nested within the broader 

U.S. Government and coalition strategy to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL. 

Measures of success include but are not limited to: Defending the homeland by preventing and disrupting ISIL’s ability to plan and conduct external operations; Removing experienced and capable leadership; Dismantling ISIL’s military capabilities 

and command and control infrastructure; Denying safehaven by reducing terrain 

held or controlled by ISIL; and Developing the capability and capacity of partners 

who can effectively engage ISIL across Syria, Iraq, and wherever they emerge. 

CENTCOM assesses incremental gains in each of these measures and several recent developments highlight Coalition progress. These include: 

• The recent success of Iraqi forces in operations to retake and hold Ramadi; 

• Coalition successes in targeting the oil infrastructure that ISIL relies upon to 

fund operations; 

• The success of ongoing efforts to isolate the key population centers of Mosul and 

Raqqa; and 

• Removal of ISIL key leadership from the battlefield in Iraq and Syria. 

We are now pressuring ISIL in Iraq and Syria on more fronts than at any other 

point in the campaign, and without question, ISIL is feeling the effects of those efforts. We will continue to reinforce success in Iraq and Syria while aggressively 

looking for opportunities to adjust the trajectory of the campaign as the region’s geopolitical landscape evolves. 

4. Senator MCCAIN. How will you know when you have achieved your objective? 

How will you know when we have ‘‘won’’? 

Secretary CARTER. The Department is committed to degrading and ultimately defeating Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which poses a direct threat to 

the United States, to our regional partners, and to our European allies. The objective in Iraq and Syria will be achieved when ISIL’s ability to conduct external attacks is precluded and when local ground forces, supported by coalition air strikes 

and advice, have eliminated ISIL’s territorial possessions and its capacity to destabilize our partners and allies. The objective in Iraq and Syria will be accomplished 

through a variety of efforts, such as debilitating ISIL’s freedom of movement, destroying ISIL’s command and control structure, and undermining its ability to govern. The overarching objective is to create conditions that prevent ISIL or other 

similar terrorist organizations from taking advantage of ungoverned spaces and vulnerable, disenfranchised populations in order to threaten the United States and our 

allies and partners. 

General DUNFORD. We win when ISIL no longer poses a threat to the U.S., our 

allies, and our partner nations. We accomplish this as a coalition by denying ISIL 

safe haven from which to plan and coordinate external attacks, degrading ISIL command and control by removing key leaders from the battlefield, and dismantling the 

facilitation networks that allow ISIL to fund operations and move resources freely 

in Iraq, Syria, and beyond. 

While intensifying our efforts against ISIL in Syria and Iraq, we must also aggressively counter ISIL wherever and whenever they emerge. ISIL is a transregional 

threat, and requires a transregional approach. 

AIR EXCLUSION ZONE

5. Senator MCCAIN. Do you consider the indiscriminate use of barrel bombs by 

Assad against civilians an outrageous atrocity and morally repugnant? Is it a violation of the laws of armed conflict? 

Secretary CARTER. The Syrian government’s indiscriminate use of barrel bombs 

against civilians is certainly an outrageous atrocity, is morally repugnant, and is 

taking a terrible toll on the Syrian people. 

I condemn any intentional targeting of civilians by a party to an armed conflict 

or indiscriminate use of weapons, including bombs, to kill civilians. Although the 

specific facts of any particular case would have to be examined, intentionally targeting the peaceful civilian population and indiscriminately using weapons, including bombs, to kill peaceful civilians would violate the law of war. 

181 

General DUNFORD. Yes; the intentional or indiscriminate use of any weapon 

against civilians who are not a part of an organized armed group or otherwise taking a direct part in hostilities is morally repugnant and should be condemned as 

a violation of the law of war. 

The law of war principle of humanity forbids the infliction of suffering, injury, or 

destruction unnecessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose. The related 

principle of distinction requires parties to a conflict to distinguish between enemy 

combatants and civilians, including when conducting attacks against enemy combatants and other military objectives. The use of barrel bombs by any party to an 

armed conflict to deliberately target civilians challenges both of these principles, as 

does the indiscriminate use of such munitions in populated areas. 

6. Senator MCCAIN. From a capabilities perspective: if you were tasked by the 

President, upon determination that a barrel bomb attack by Assad against civilians 

had taken place, to target and destroy a portion of the aircraft at the Syrian military airfield nearest to the site of the barrel bomb attack, do our military forces 

have the capability to do that? 

General DUNFORD. Yes, we have the capability in theater to respond and strike 

targets precisely. Accordingly, if the President tasked us to do so, we could target 

and destroy a portion of the aircraft at the Syrian military airfield nearest to the 

site of a barrel bomb attack. 

7. Senator MCCAIN. If barrel bombs against Syrian civilians stop, would you expect the flow of refugees to increase or decrease? 

Secretary CARTER. Ceasing the Syrian government’s barrel bombing of civilians 

could be a very important step in lessening the terrible toll this conflict is taking 

on the Syrian people. 

It is unclear, however, what effect stopping the barrel bombing of civilians would 

have on the flow of refugees. The majority of civilian deaths in the Syrian conflict 

are the result of artillery fire, not barrel bombs. Ending barrel bombing would be 

just one step in improving security conditions sufficiently to be able to address the 

Syria refugee situation. 

General DUNFORD. I would expect a halt in barrel bombing of civilians would decrease refugee flow, but not stop it. Barrel bombing is only one of many factors 

threatening civilians. Assad’s ground forces, Russia’s indiscriminate air attacks, and 

ISIL are additional factors. 

8. Senator MCCAIN. Do the U.S. Armed Forces possess the capability and capacity 

to establish and enforce a limited air exclusion zone on the border—such as the area 

that is approximately 60 miles by 40 miles between the Euphrates river and the 

area north of Aleppo—to provide some degree of protection to the moderate opposition against barrel bombs and Assad regime strikes as well as facilitating the flow 

of humanitarian assistance? 

General DUNFORD. The U.S. Armed Forces possess the capability and capacity to 

establish an air exclusion zone—a ‘‘no-fly’’ zone—in Syria. An air exclusion zone 

would protect people on the ground below the zone from airborne attacks such as 

barrel bombs or other air-to-surface ordnance. Such an exclusion zone; however, 

would not deny surface-to-surface ordnance. As a result, we could not protect people 

within an air exclusion zone from attacks originating on the surface. Moreover, humanitarian assistance delivery is dependent upon protection from air and surface 

attack; therefore, an air exclusion zone would not facilitate humanitarian assistance 

flow without additional forces. 

RUSSIA IN SYRIA

9. Senator MCCAIN. Is the bombing by Russia of the moderate opposition making 

them more or less capable and likely of fighting ISIL and is it making them more 

or less likely to join forces with extremists? 

General DUNFORD. Russian bombing of moderate opposition forces makes them 

less capable of fighting ISIL. The bombing of moderate opposition forces results in 

higher casualties, equipment losses, and interruption of planned operations. 

10. Senator MCCAIN. In your opinion, where do Russian military objectives in 

Syria conflict with our national security interests? What military efforts, if any, are 

being undertaken to impose costs on the Russians for actions in Syria that run 

counter to U.S. interests? 

Secretary CARTER. Russian military objectives in Syria conflict with U.S. national 

security interests where their actions do not match their stated intent to combat 

182 

ISIL or emphasize solely the defense of Bashar al-Assad. Russia continues to support the Assad regime by conducting indiscriminate strikes that impact moderate 

Syrian opposition groups and cause casualties among Syrian civilians. Russia’s actions make it more difficult to achieve a successful political transition. A political 

transition will require the participation of the moderate opposition forces Moscow 

is attacking. Consequently, the U.S. will not cooperate in efforts that undermine a 

constructive political transition. 

As previously stated before this committee, the Assad regime bears overwhelming 

responsibility for the crisis in Syria, which has destabilized the region by displacing 

more than 12 million people both within Syria and as refugees abroad. This regional 

destabilization clearly runs counter to not only U.S. national security interests, but 

the interests of all the coalition’s members. 

The Department of Defense maintains a policy of no military to military cooperation with Russia and continues to support United States sanctions in response to 

its aggressive actions in Ukraine. In this context, cooperation in Syria that ignores 

Russian activities elsewhere would only embolden further pursuit of a losing bet to 

support the Assad regime. The United States will not let Russia determine our 

strategy nor cooperate in efforts that run counter United States interests. The Department has an agreement with Russia on air safety procedures that solely establish technical protocols to ensure the safety of our pilots and our coalition. This does 

not constitute coordination or collaboration with Russia. 

11. Senator MCCAIN. The lack of any meaningful assistance to Ukraine allowed 

Putin to dictate the terms of the frozen conflict in Ukraine and then pivot to Syria. 

Secretary Carter, if we provide meaningful military assistance to Ukraine, would 

Putin have to rethink what he is doing in Syria? 

Secretary CARTER. The Department has provided substantial security assistance 

to Ukraine, which has been calibrated towards supporting a diplomatic solution to 

the crisis. While not providing lethal assistance, the Department has committed 

more than $265 million in equipment and training since the beginning of the crisis 

to help Ukraine better monitor and secure its border, operate more safely and effectively, and preserve and enforce its territorial integrity. 

Russia appears to be pursuing public messaging, both domestically and internationally, to paint activities in Syria as part of a rapprochement with the West. 

These Russian efforts do seem to be motivated in part to counter isolation resulting 

from broad international condemnation of their activities in and around Ukraine. 

Russia’s actions in Syria will not take away from my strong condemnation of Russian actions in Ukraine, nor change sanctions and security support in response to 

those destabilizing actions. The Department views these conflicts as unrelated to 

the extent that specific actions on our part in one theater would change Russia’s 

calculus in another. Russian presence in Syria does not change the United States 

objectives in the region, nor will it diminish the United States commitment to provide robust security assistance to Ukraine. 

Russia has not refrained from taking definitive steps to further its national interests outside its immediate periphery region. I welcome the contributions of Congress 

in supporting a strong North Atlantic Treaty Organization Alliance through the European Reassurance Initiative and other efforts that assure allies and partners. 

Such efforts form a robust deterrent to Russian activity in and around Ukraine, as 

well as aggressive intervention by Russia in other theaters of operations. 

SYRIA TRAIN AND EQUIP PROGRAM

12. Senator MCCAIN. If the Syria Train and Equip program included allowing the 

moderate opposition to go after the Assad regime, would it be more or less successful at recruiting moderate opposition fighters? 

General DUNFORD. Under current policy, ISIL is our military adversary in Syria. 

The Train and Equip program was specifically designed to find, vet, and train moderate opposition fighters to oppose ISIL. If U.S. policy were to change to support 

opposition to the regime, I believe the number of moderate opposition fighters available for a train and equip program would increase. 

13. Senator MCCAIN. The Pentagon announced at the end of September that certain portions of the Syria Train and Equip program were on ‘pause’. Before the program, a coalition effort, was put on pause, were Turkey and Jordan consulted and 

if so what were their inputs? If not, how would you characterize their reaction to 

the pause? 

Secretary CARTER. The United States has been clear in communications with the 

Coalition partners about the changes made to the Syria Train and Equip Program. 

183 

Many Coalition partners continue to assist the efforts to enable local ground forces 

to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Syria. I thank those 

Coalition partners who have supported counter-ISIL efforts thus far, and the Department will continue to work with them on ways to broaden and deepen cooperation. 

14. Senator MCCAIN. Are fighters that were trained under the Syria Train and 

Equip program making a difference on the battlefield, if so in what ways? 

General DUNFORD. Yes, the New Syrian Forces (NSF) that were trained under the 

Syria Train and Equip program are making a difference on the battlefield principally by serving as forward observers to identify ISIL targets for the Coalition. 

Since the NSF were reinserted into Syria, they have facilitated approximately 100 

strikes against ISIL. In addition, the NSF have: (1) conducted raids that destroyed 

ISIL forces and infrastructure; (2) contributed to stabilizing the defensive lines of 

moderate opposition forces in northern Syria; and (3) contributed to the liberation 

of ISIL controlled areas and towns. 

15. Senator MCCAIN. How long do you assess the Syria Train and Equip program 

can remain on pause before the option to restart no longer exists? 

Secretary CARTER. Only the training portion of the Train and Equip program has 

been paused. The Department continues to work with vetted leaders of groups that 

are actively fighting ISIL, and is providing equipment and limited air support for 

their operations. The New Syrian Forces currently fighting in Syria have been a valuable asset in the efforts to degrade and defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the 

Levant (ISIL). I could recommend restarting training in the future if and when 

doing so would add strategic momentum to the counter ISIL fight. This approach 

builds on successes that local Syrian forces have achieved along Syria’s northern 

border to retake and hold ground from ISIL with the help of United States airstrikes. The Department is maintaining the training sites in a ‘‘warm status’’ for 

if and when it would make sense to train vetted elements of the Syrian opposition. 

There is not a specific timeline under which this option will disappear. 

16. Senator MCCAIN. Prior to the ‘pause’, who made the decisions about when to 

insert trained fighters of the Syrian moderate opposition back into Syria after training was complete and who made the decisions on whether or not to resupply and 

support the fighters we have trained while they are on the battlefield? 

Secretary CARTER. In consultation with leaders at U.S. Central Command 

(CENTCOM) and other locations, the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force— 

Syria Director recommended when to insert fighters trained by the Coalition into 

Syria and whether to resupply the groups trained. The concept of operation, as presented by CENTCOM through the Department of Defense, was ultimately approved 

by the National Security Council. These decisions were made using the best available assessment of the situation on the ground in the area where these groups were 

inserted and were fighting. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES INHOFE

MIDDLE EAST STRATEGY

17. Senator INHOFE. In your opinions, are we seeing the collapse of the Middle 

East’s geopolitical framework? Why or why not? 

Secretary CARTER. The Middle East is in a period of major change as the region 

continues to evolve and adjust to new political and social realities following the 2011 

‘‘Arab Spring.’’ In addition, Iran’s malign influence, the rise of the Islamic State of 

Iraq and the Levant, and increased sectarian tensions challenge the stability of the 

region in different ways. The Administration remains committed to advancing the 

United States’ enduring interests in this complex region. These include preventing 

the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, maintaining the free flow of energy 

and commerce, countering terrorism, and ensuring the safety and security of U.S. 

partners. The U.S. will continue to maintain steadfast partnerships with key allies 

and partners in the pursuit of a more stable and secure region to protect those interests. 

General DUNFORD. The geopolitical framework of the Middle East remains as 

complex as it has ever been, and there are stresses on several nation-states. However, we are not seeing ‘‘collapse’’ but rather continued tensions. Alliances, coalitions, and partnerships are working to address these tensions. The more stable 

states in the region, such as the GCC states, Jordan, and Egypt, are buttressing 

184 

their less stable neighbors. The exception is Iran, which is fomenting discord as it 

continues to export its revolution. 

18. Senator INHOFE. Has the lack of steadfast American leadership in the Middle 

East created a vacuum for which Russia is exploiting as an anti-US influence campaign? 

Secretary CARTER. No. Unlike Russia, the United States is at the core of leading 

international efforts to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL, which poses a direct 

threat to the United States and its allies and partners. The United States is also 

supporting a moderate Syrian opposition that is essential for reaching a political 

resolution to the current conflict. The U.S. will continue to be the single largest 

donor in addressing the humanitarian disaster in Syria and beyond its borders. Unlike Russia, the United States is joined by a coalition of some 65 partners in these 

efforts. 

Instead of assuming a leadership role, Russia is isolating itself from the large majority of the countries in the region, including Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf 

States, Jordan, and others. Russia’s aims in the Middle East likely go beyond its 

publicly stated goals in Syria. Russia is probably involved in the Middle East because it wants to be viewed as a security guarantor for regimes it favors in the region and wants to demonstrate that it is a key player in international affairs. I believe the Russian strategy is fundamentally flawed, and Russia’s actions, including 

devoting strikes overwhelmingly to non-Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 

targets in Syria, cast doubt on Russia’s seriousness about reaching a political solution to the conflict. 

General DUNFORD. No. I assess Russian presence to be principally driven by a desire to support the Assad regime. Despite its public rhetoric, countering ISIL is not 

a principal concern of Russian forces. 

Since Secretary Carter briefed this committee in July on the counter-ISIL strategy: 

• Afghanistan’s instability has forced the administration to maintain a 9,800 

troop presence through 2016. • We continue high risk operations in Iraq; illustrated in the recent loss of an 

American hero from Roland, Oklahoma, Master Sergeant Joshua Wheeler, who 

by his actions saved the lives of 70 hostages and fellow members of a coalition 

task force. • ISIL still controls much of northern and western Iraq despite more than a year 

of United States airstrikes and the loss of Ramadi was a significant setback. • Russia continued its military buildup in Syria and began operations to support 

Assad. • Iran Quds Forces in Syria have been joined by Iranian supported forces from 

Lebanon’s Hezbollah to support the Assad regime, all under the command of 

General Soleimani, who previously directed attacks on United States forces in 

Iraq. • The Administration scraped its $500 million Syrian rebel train-and-equip program. • And we are now seeing the greatest refugee crisis since WWII out of Syria. 

19. Senator INHOFE. What impact do these recent developments and activities 

across Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran and Syria have the ‘‘nine lines of effort’’? (DOD has 

lead on #2 and #3: deny ISIL safe haven and build partner capacity in Iraq and 

Syria)? 

Secretary CARTER. The United States continues to have the right strategy to degrade and ultimately defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). As you 

note, the Department is the lead on two of the nine lines of effort—denying ISIL 

safe haven and building partner capacity in Iraq and Syria. The approach is to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL by working through local partners to enable their 

success on the ground while degrading ISIL through the air. The coalition’s efforts 

have made some progress in Iraq and Syria over the past several months. For example, in Syria, with United States help, including 79 airstrikes, a coalition of Syrian 

Arabs and Kurds recaptured important terrain by pushing ISIL out of the town of 

Al Hawl and 800 square miles of surrounding territory in November. In Iraq, supported by coalition airstrikes, Iraqi Security Forces retook Tikrit; and United States 

airstrikes have enabled other Iraqi-led operations within Iraq. While the nine lines 

of effort remain valid, I constantly review our progress in each and adapt the strategy. As I have said publically, it is essential for all nine lines of effort to remain 

synchronized and I am continuously seeking ways to improve inter-agency coordination. I acknowledge that the U.S. faces serious challenges and I anticipate this will 

be a multi-year effort. 

185 

20. Senator INHOFE. The Assad regime is being directly supported by Russia, Iran 

and Cuba. Does this mean the U.S. will have to accept the fact that the Assad regime is there to stay? 

Secretary CARTER. As the Administration has stated previously, the conflict in 

Syria will not end until Assad is gone, as he has lost legitimacy to govern Syria. 

To that end, Secretary Kerry has intensified diplomatic efforts for a political resolution, and the Administration made progress last month in Vienna in moving the 

major stake-holders in Syria toward agreement on a set of basic principles to resolve 

the conflict. 

Russia and Iran’s decision to intervene militarily in Syria was a poor one. Russia 

and Iran are making themselves targets for violent extremists, and their efforts to 

prop up the Syrian government will further fuel the conflict. 

21. Senator INHOFE. Have United States airstrikes declined in Syria since Russia 

has initiated military operations? 

Secretary CARTER. The Coalition has not altered its operations in Syria due to 

Russia’s ill-conceived intervention. Separately, weather over Syria has at times restricted the Coalition’s ability to confirm targets before striking, limiting our ability 

to ensure our strikes are precise enough to reduce the risk of collateral damage and 

civilian casualties. There was also a decline in sorties in Iraq during this time period, where Russian aircraft are not operating, due to the same weather system. Although limited at times, during this time period, the Coalition’s strikes against the 

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have increased impact on the battlefield. 

During one particular offensive in Syria, a coalition of Syrian Arabs and Kurds, assisted by United States airstrikes, recaptured important terrain from ISIL, pushing 

ISIL out of the town of Al Hawl and 800 square miles of surrounding territory. 

Along the Mara line in northwest Syria, Coalition strikes have recently enabled 

moderate Syrian forces—including forces trained and equipped by the Department 

of Defense—to recapture two towns from ISIL. In addition to limiting the group’s 

freedom of movement, the strikes are systematically targeting the ISIL oil network 

and striking critical oil infrastructure—destroying 100’s of tankers—and degrading 

the group’s ability to fund militant operations. 

22. Senator INHOFE. Can the flow of refugees be stopped without addressing both 

the Assad regime and ISIL operations in Syria? 

Secretary CARTER. Failure to address the impact of both the Syrian government 

and the Islamic State in the Iraq and the Levant’s (ISIL) brutal attacks on the Syrian population will only lead to further fighting in Syria and to an increase in Syrian refugees. To that end, the Coalition is pushing ISIL out of territory in Iraq and 

Syria through a combination of air strikes and support to ground partners. Because 

of these efforts, ISIL can no longer operate freely in approximately 20 to 25 percent 

of populated areas in Iraq and Syria that it previously controlled. Secretary Kerry 

has also intensified diplomatic efforts for a political resolution to the Syrian conflict, 

resulting in progress last month in Vienna, where major stake-holders in Syria 

agreed to a set of basic principles on resolving the conflict. To address the immediate needs of displaced Syrians, the Department of Defense, with Congressional 

support, is providing approximately $115 million in humanitarian assistance. This 

assistance addresses life-saving needs in the categories of shelter, health and sanitation, and water for Syrian refugees and other displaced persons in Lebanon, Jordan, 

Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. 

IRAN

• This administration’s strategy, or more specifically a lack of across the Middle 

East created a power vacuum in Iraq, allowing the rapid expansion of ISIL as 

well as the growth of Iranian influence in Iraq and across the region. 

• Iran Quds Forces in Syria have been joined by Iranian supported forces from 

Lebanon’s Hezbollah to support the Assad regime, all under the command of 

General Soleimani, who previously directed attacks on United States forces in 

Iraq. 

• They are working with the Russian and Syrians to take back territory from 

Western-backed rebels fighting against Assad. 

• On 11 Oct, in violation of a 2010 U.N. Security Resolution, Iran tested an intercontinental ballistic missile, which could one day carry a nuclear weapon. 

23. Senator INHOFE. How do these actions impact regional stability and United 

States national security interests in the Middle East? 

186 

Secretary CARTER. Iran’s actions as described above impact regional stability and 

United States national security interests in the Middle East by prolonging the Syrian civil war, fueling sectarian tension in the region, and increasing the concerns 

of U.S. regional partners. Iran has never tested an intercontinental ballistic missile; 

however, its October 10 test of a medium-range ballistic missile, called ‘‘the Emad,’’ 

violated United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929, which prohibits Iran 

from testing missiles inherently capable of delivering a nuclear weapon. In response 

to the October 10 test, the United States, in conjunction with France, Germany, and 

the United Kingdom, submitted a joint report to the United Nations Security Council for appropriate action. More broadly, the United States continues to address the 

totality of threats posed by Iran to United States interests and to regional stability 

in a myriad of ways, including through the Department of Defense’s theater security 

cooperation plans. One key area of focus in these plans is the United States’ effort 

to strengthen, integrate, and modernize the ballistic missile defense capabilities and 

capacities of partners in the region. 

General DUNFORD. Iran’s malign activities threaten the internal security of Iran’s 

neighbors. Iranian support to the Assad regime and terrorist groups on the battlefields of Syria has helped to prolong that conflict. Iran’s influence in Iraq diminishes 

Baghdad’s control over its security forces and weakens its effectiveness in prosecuting the C–ISIL campaign. 

Iran’s continued violations of UNSCRs challenge the global nonproliferation institutions that are working to reduce ballistic missile threats, and Iran’s increasinglycapable ballistic missile inventory threatens its neighbors. 

24. Senator INHOFE. Are you concerned about Iran’s continued ballistic missile development and support to terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas? 

Secretary CARTER. I continue to be gravely concerned about Iran’s ballistic missile 

program and its support to terrorist organizations. For decades, the Department of 

Defense (DOD) has prioritized monitoring and responding to the totality of threats 

posed by Iran to United States interests in the Middle East. Iran’s missile development and support to terrorist organizations are not new phenomena. DOD will continue posturing forces in the Middle East to deter Iranian aggression and will continue to strengthen, modernize, and integrate the capabilities and capacities of U.S. 

partners in the region to reduce Iran’s ability to coerce them militarily, including 

strengthening our partners capabilities and capacities. Moreover, DOD will continue 

to counter and deter Iranian destabilizing activities through military partnerships, 

force posture, preparations, and plans. 

General DUNFORD. Yes. Iran’s continued violations of UNSCRs related to ballistic 

missiles undermine the global non-proliferation institutions that are working to reduce ballistic missile threats. Iran’s increasingly-capable ballistic missile inventory 

threatens its neighbors. 

I am concerned about Iran’s support to terrorist organizations. Iran’s malign activities in support of Hezbollah have bolstered Hezbollah’s capabilities. Iranian support to Hezbollah has prolonged the conflict in Syria, where Hezbollah fighters fight 

alongside the Assad Regime. Iran’s support of Hezbollah’s malign activities threatens other countries where Hezbollah maintains a presence. 

In Gaza, Iran’s renewed support of Hamas increases the volatility of an already 

tense situation. 

25. Senator INHOFE. How do these actions impact DOD’s efforts in the region? 

Secretary CARTER. For decades, the Department of Defense (DOD) has prioritized 

monitoring and responding to the totality of threats posed by Iran to United States 

interests in the Middle East. Iran’s October 10 test of a medium-range ballistic missile, and its support for the Lebanese Hezbollah and brutal regime of Syrian dictator 

Bashar al Assad are, unfortunately, not new phenomena. DOD will continue posturing forces in the Middle East to deter Iranian aggression and will continue to 

strengthen, modernize, and integrate the capabilities and capacities of United 

States partners in the region to reduce Iran’s ability to coerce them militarily, including in the area of ballistic missile defenses. 

General DUNFORD. Addressed in QFR 23. Please see response to QFR 23. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER WICKER

MIDDLE EAST STRATEGY

Secretary Carter and General Dunford, thanks for joining us this morning. 

187 

Chairman McCain called this hearing to discuss our strategy in the Middle East. 

As General Petraeus told our committee on September 22, ‘‘The Middle East is not 

a part of the world that plays by Las Vegas rules: What happens in the Middle East 

is not going to stay in the Middle East.’’ 

Our strategy should be bold and comprehensive. Our lack of early decisiveness on 

Syria left a power vacuum that is now being exploited by the Russians, a country 

General Dunford said this summer is the greatest threat to United States national 

security. The stakes are high and we cannot afford to take anymore half-measures 

against ISIS and Assad. 

General Petraeus told our committee that ‘‘If there is to be any hope of a political 

settlement [in Syria], a certain military and security context is required . . . We and 

our partners need to facilitate it—and over the past four years, we have not done 

so.’’ 

26. Senator WICKER. What do you believe is the appropriate United States military role to create the military and security context in Syria that General Petraeus 

refers to? 

Secretary CARTER. The Department’s efforts in Syria are aimed at degrading and 

defeating ISIL. These efforts complement diplomatic efforts to achieve a political 

transition in Syria. There is however no military solution to the conflict itself. To 

that end, Secretary Kerry has intensified diplomatic efforts for a political resolution, 

with recent progress in Vienna, where the major stake-holders in Syria agreed to 

a set of basic principles to resolve the conflict. 

Degrading and defeating ISIL is in the United States’ interest and a key part of 

our broader strategy in Syria. To accelerate these efforts against ISIL, the Department is enhancing its current campaign by deploying a limited number of Special 

Operations Forces to Syria to assist counter-ISIL forces, adding additional United 

States enablers in support of Iraqi ground forces and increasing support to neighboring countries, such as Jordan. The Department has also ramped up pressure on 

ISIL by providing support to additional ground forces in Syria, such as the Syrian 

Arab Coalition, and increasing air strike capabilities by deploying additional assets 

to Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. 

Russia’s strategy, on the other hand, is fundamentally flawed. It is clear that Russia is devoting its strikes overwhelmingly to non-ISIL targets in Syria, casting doubt 

on Moscow’s seriousness about reaching a political solution and contradicting its 

publically and privately stated justifications for its military intervention. Moreover, 

by its actions, Russia is making itself a target for violent extremists in Syria, from 

within Russia, and from other parts of the world. Instead of assuming a leadership 

role, Russia is isolating itself from the large majority of the countries in the region—including Turkey; Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States; Jordan, and others. 

General DUNFORD. The United States military role in the Syrian conflict is to lead 

and maintain the Coalition to counter ISIL, help create conditions on the ground 

that will end the Syrian conflict, and support the peaceful political transition of 

Assad from power 

United States leadership and military effort in the Middle East far outmatches 

the relatively small level of Russian involvement in Syria, which continues to be directed against Syrian opposition forces rather than ISIL. 

Chairman McCain has repeatedly referenced the terror and carnage caused by 

Assad’s barrel bombs that are deployed by Syrian aircraft. It’s the barrel bombs and 

air attacks that are causing most of the civilian casualties in Syria—not ISIS. 

Chairman McCain has repeatedly referenced the terror and carnage caused by 

Assad’s barrel bombs that are deployed by Syrian aircraft. It’s the barrel bombs and 

air attacks that are causing most of the civilian casualties in Syria—not ISIS. 

27. Senator WICKER. Do you agree with General Petraeus that we have the capability to take out Assad’s air force? How does the presence of Russian boots on the 

ground impact that option? 

General DUNFORD. Yes, I agree with General Petraeus that the U.S. military has 

the capability to destroy Assad’s air force. Attacking Assad’s air forces would likely 

result in both Syrian regime and Russian casualties, as Russian forces and aircraft 

are intermingled with those of the Assad regime, both on the ground and in the air. 

Sophisticated Russian air defenses also complicate any such mission. Such an effort 

would increase the possibility of miscalculation and unintended conflict with Russia, 

would complicate the situation on the ground, and could put the solidarity of the 

Coalition at risk. 

188 

28. Senator WICKER. Do you believe the U.S. has the capability to establish and 

enforce a no-fly zones over vulnerable Syrian populations? How does the presence 

of Russian boots on the ground impact that option? 

General DUNFORD. Yes, I believe the United States has the capability to establish 

and enforce no-fly zones over vulnerable Syrian populations that would protect people on the ground below from airborne attacks. However, no-fly zones would not 

deny surface-to-surface ordnance, so we could not protect those people from attacks 

originating on the surface, such as artillery attacks and ground-based assaults. The 

Syrian regime would likely oppose the establishment of no-fly zones as a violation 

of their territorial sovereignty. This opposition in turn could cause a major regional 

conflict that would ultimately exacerbate the plight of vulnerable Syrian populations. The presence of Russians on the ground, operating in support of the Syrian 

regime, amplifies the complexity and uncertainty in the region and further increases 

the risk of a major regional conflict in Syria. 

NDAA

29. Senator WICKER. Is it correct that military construction funding—funding for 

security upgrades, troop housing, and other military facilities—must be both authorized and appropriated? 

Secretary CARTER. Yes, it is correct that military construction funding must be 

both authorized and appropriated. 

30. Senator WICKER. Since that is the case, would you want to take this opportunity before our committee to revise your prior statements that the Defense Authorization Bill is unimportant and ‘‘just a policy bill’’? 

Secretary CARTER. The Defense Authorization Bill is important legislation for the 

national security of the United States. The Department needs a Defense Authorization Bill that will provide a stable, multi-year budget for sound defense planning. 

Budget stability beyond the 1-year horizon and adequately authorized funding are 

necessary for the Department to make optimal use of its resources. The Department 

also needs a Defense Authorization Bill that will enable detainee policies, provide 

authority for reforms of force structure, and modernize military healthcare. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

TEHRAN’S BALLISTIC MISSILE TEST

31. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Carter, what is the administration going to do 

about Iran’s October 10th ballistic missile test that violated U.N. Security Council 

Resolution 1929? 

Secretary CARTER. On October 21, the United States, the United Kingdom, 

France, and Germany submitted a joint report to the United Nations (UN) Iran 

Sanctions Committee on Iran’s October 10 medium-range ballistic missile launch. 

The report stated that the launch was a violation of UN Security Council Resolution 

1929 prohibiting missile launches inherently capable of delivering a nuclear warhead and requested that the UN Panel of Experts review the report and take appropriate action. The Administration will continue to urge the Security Council to respond effectively to any future violations of UN Security Council resolutions. 

32. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Carter, what specific steps does the administration 

plan to take in order to respond to Iran’s ballistic missile test and the U.N. Security 

Council resolution violation? 

Secretary CARTER. On October 21, the United States, along with the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, submitted a joint report to the United Nations (UN) 

Iran Sanctions Committee on Iran’s October 10, 2015, medium-range ballistic missile launch. The report stated that the launch was a violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1929, which prohibits missile launches inherently capable of delivering a nuclear warhead, and requested that the UN Panel of Experts review the 

report and take appropriate action. In addition, the United States will continue to: 

work with the more than 100 countries that have endorsed the Proliferation Security Initiative to help limit Iranian missile-related imports or exports; urge all countries to implement and enforce missile-related exports consistent with Missile Technology Control Regime standards; and impose penalties when warranted under 

United States domestic authorities on any additional Iranian entities involved in 

such missile tests. Finally, the United States will continue to sustain its missile defense capabilities in the region and bolster the capabilities of allies and partners. 

189 

33. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Carter and General Dunford, what specific steps 

are being taken to better protect United States military personnel in the region 

from a ballistic missile attack from Iran? 

Secretary CARTER. At the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Camp David Summit 

earlier this year, President Obama re-affirmed our commitment to missile defense 

in the Gulf region.We have taken a number of specific steps: First, we have created 

a robust regional U.S. missile defense architecture consisting of ballistic missile 

intercept, early warning, and command and control infrastructures. Second, the 

United States has worked bilaterally with GCC-member States to build up their 

own capacity for self-defense, complementing the U.S. capabilities already in the region. The United States is also working in conjunction with these bilateral efforts 

to aid the GCC as a whole in building an interoperable multilateral regional defense 

system. Finally, the United States intends to preserve a strong force posture in the 

Middle East, which will include United States missile defense capabilities, to protect 

key resources and augment the range of bilateral and multilateral initiatives we 

continue to pursue.In total, these efforts will increase efficiency and effectiveness of 

limited individual resources through expanding the capability as a whole to defend 

the region against the Iranian ballistic missile threat. 

General DUNFORD. The department takes the Iranian ballistic missile threat to 

United States military personnel very seriously. To counter this threat, we’ve forward deployed AN/TPY–2 radars, Patriot Air Defense Systems, and Aegis Ballistic 

Missile Defense-capable ships throughout the CENTCOM and EUCOM regions. We 

have deliberately chosen a forward defense posture, and thus, these systems are deployed to the maximum extent of their sustainability. In Europe, the first Aegis 

Ashore site will soon be active as part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach 

Phase 2. This site will not only provide defense to U.S. military personnel in Europe, but will also provide the U.S. contribution to NATO Ballistic Missile Defense. 

We will soon start work on building the second Aegis Ashore site in Poland. Finally, 

we are working to upgrade our early warning system in both theaters, and are increasing passive defense measures to minimize the impact of an attack in 

CENTCOM. 

34. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, what specific additional steps are we taking to work with Israel to improve their ability to defend against Iranian ballistic 

missiles? 

General DUNFORD. The United States and Israel jointly developed the Arrow 

Weapon System (AWS), which provides Israel with the capability to defend itself 

against imminent and emerging ballistic missile threats, while providing the United 

States with critical data and technology for its missile defense programs. 

Overall, ballistic missile defense cooperation constitutes our most robust bilateral 

effort to bolster Israel’s defense. In recent years, the U.S. has provided over $3 billion in addition to annual FMF to help develop intercept systems such as the Iron 

Dome for short-range rockets, the David’s Sling for medium range missiles, and the 

AWS for ballistic missiles. 

35. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Carter, if there are no consequences for Iran’s most 

recent violation—which is clearly designed to test U.S. resolve and see what they 

can get away with—won’t that simply exacerbate this consistent Iranian willingness 

to ignore its obligations and flout international law? 

Secretary CARTER. Iran’s October 10, 2015, test of the ‘‘Emad’’ Medium Range Ballistic Missile constituted a violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 

1929. The United States views this as a serious matter. There will be consequences 

for this violation. The United States has already raised this issue at the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Together with the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, the United States has asked the UN Security Council’s Iran Sanctions Committee to review the matter and recommend appropriate action. The United States 

will continue to press the UN Security Council to respond to any and all future Iranian violations of UN Security Council resolutions. Furthermore, the United States 

will continue to support the full range of unilateral and multilateral tools available—including the Missile Technology Control Regime, Proliferation Security Initiative, and a variety of United States domestic authorities—to counter Iran’s missile program. 

NEED FOR LONG-TERM LAW OF WAR DETENTION AND INTERROGATION FACILITY

36. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Carter, will United States interrogators have access to the five ISIS terrorists detained in the October 22 joint Iraqi Peshmerga and 

United States raid. 

190 

Secretary CARTER. United States Special Operations Forces have a well-established relationship with the Iraqi Peshmerga. The United States has arrangements 

in place with the Iraqi Peshmerga to ensure that United States personnel can receive important intelligence from captured Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant personnel. 

37. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Carter, if we capture al-Baghdadi or Ayman alZawahiri, where would we detain them for long term law of war detention and interrogation? 

Secretary CARTER. The appropriate disposition for a detainee is determined on the 

basis of all the facts and circumstances, including the national security interests of 

the United States and its allies and partners, and the conduct the detainee has engaged in, consistent with U.S. domestic law and international law. Depending on the 

circumstances, detainees may be prosecuted in the United States, detained in their 

home countries, or detained in a third country. The Department makes assessments 

regarding the appropriate disposition of detainees on a case-by-case basis. 

MORE EFFECTIVE TARGETING OF ISIS

38. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, according to CENTCOM, since October 23 

of last year, there have been 60,083 coalition sorties and only 8,751 weapons releases. That is about 85% of sorties returning without weapons release. What explains that number of sorties not engaging the enemy and what can we do to better 

identify and target ISIS? 

General DUNFORD. A myriad of factors influence both the number of sorties flown 

and weapons dropped; as of the end of 2015, the percentage of strike sorties that 

have gone kinetic (as measured by combatant commander airstrike accounting 

methodology) reached nearly 60%. Additionally, there is a constant requirement for 

strike support sorties such as ISR, air refueling, and other support flights that comprise the total number of sorties flown to date which leads to a varying rate of kinetic activity. 

ABADI’S PERFORMANCE

39. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, what is Iraqi Prime Minster Abadi doing 

to create an inclusive Iraqi government and Iraqi security forces? 

General DUNFORD. While he faces substantial domestic challenges, Prime Minister 

Abadi remains committed to building inclusive governance and Iraqi Security 

Forces. From a military and security standpoint, he and his government leaders 

have made progress in mobilizing Sunnis into official security institutions, particularly in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces. PM Abadi recognizes the necessity and efficacy of the Iraqi tribal mobilization program and has sought ways to keep its members paid and equipped. At PM Abadi’s directive, the Ministry of Defense removed 

several thousand ‘‘ghost soldiers’’ from Iraqi Army payrolls, increased the provincial 

cap for Sunni forces in Anbar, and recalled several thousand Sunni police. For 

greater detail on other Iraqi government efforts, I would refer you to the Department of State. 

40. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, what does Iraqi Prime Minster Abadi need 

to do that he is not, in order to create an inclusive Iraqi government and Iraqi security forces? 

General DUNFORD. Prime Minister Abadi must balance the influence and interests 

of multiple internal and external actors in a difficult, fiscally constrained political 

environment. He also must minimize Iranian influence over Shi’a militia and account for the role played by the Iraqi Shi’a who rallied to the Iraqi national cause 

by enrolling in the Popular Mobilization Forces. He and other government leaders 

will have to continue their work to remove ‘‘ghost soldiers’’ from Iraqi Army payrolls, account for the Iraqi Security Forces’ equipment, expand efforts to mobilize 

Sunnis into official government security institutions, enact institutional reforms, 

and appoint and empower capable subordinate commanders. 

SUNNI INCLUSION IN IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

41. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, what is the sectarian makeup of both the 

six Iraqi Army brigades and the 2100 counter-terrorism service personnel that 

CENTCOM reportedly helped train? 

General DUNFORD. We estimate the ISF units trained by CENTCOM are 80% 

Shia, 15% Sunni, and 5% other. This is an overall sectarian makeup for all six Iraqi 

Army Brigades with the understanding that each brigade makeup will vary dependVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:53 Sep 08, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00196 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21401.TXT WILDA
191 

ing on their respective region. In addition, we estimate Iraqi Counter-Terrorism 

Service personnel are 90% Shia and 10% other. 

JORDAN’S PERSPECTIVE

42. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, during your recent meeting with King 

Abdullah of Jordan, what were the King’s leading concerns? 

General DUNFORD. The King is clearly concerned how the Counter-ISIL campaign 

might impact Jordan, either through ISIL attacks near Jordan’s borders with Syria 

and Iraq or through a threat internal to the Kingdom. His Majesty is concerned, 

in particular, that as the coalition achieves military success against ISIL in northern Syria, the ISIL threat may move south, which would pose an increased threat 

to Jordan’s borders. Similarly, the King is concerned about a sudden refugee influx 

due to military operations against ISIL or other opposition groups. Military actions 

in the south of Syria could displace people who would seek safe haven in Jordan. 

43. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, what was King Abdullah’s assessment of 

U.S. policy and strategy in the region? 

General DUNFORD. The King was appreciative of United States support to Jordan. 

We have worked hard to deliver needed munitions and equipment to the Jordanian 

Armed Forces, to ensure they can continue to actively contribute to the counter-ISIL 

coalition. King Abdullah also agrees with our assessment that we are having military success against ISIL. He has concerns about ISIL encroaching on Jordan’s borders and wants more assistance in hardening Jordan’s defenses. The Joint Staff can 

provide additional details of our efforts on behalf of Jordan and the King’s assessment in a classified setting. 

44. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, what was King Abdullah’s assessment of 

the campaign against ISIS? 

General DUNFORD. King Abdullah shares our assessment that the coalition has 

degraded ISIL’s capability. King is concerned that military success in northern 

Syria could push ISIL south, creating pressure on the Jordanian-Syrian border. 

That possibility concerns me as well. The Joint Staff can provide additional detail 

on the King’s assessment and coalition efforts in support of Jordan in a classified 

setting. 

NATO

45. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Carter and General Dunford, in a recent hearing, 

General Jones expressed concern about NATO’s future. Do you share General Jones’ 

concern that NATO could be in danger? 

Secretary CARTER. Although the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is 

the most successful and enduring alliance in history, we are not taking its future 

for granted. The United States will continue to lead the Alliance as NATO adapts 

to evolving challenges on its eastern and southern flanks. With continued support 

from Congress, the Department will set the conditions for a transition from focusing 

on reassurance to an enhanced rotational deterrence presence on NATO’s eastern 

flank. 

On the southern flank of NATO in Europe, we will continue to work with both 

European and Middle Eastern Allies to defeat ISIL, end the civil war in Syria, and 

improve stability throughout the Middle East and North Africa. Most of the international community supports these efforts. The United States will continue to urge 

Russia to support these efforts as well. Ultimately the future of the Alliance is assured by its shared political values of human rights, democratic governance, and respect for the rule of law. These values, which stand in stark contrast to those of 

our adversaries, underwrite Alliance solidarity and the dedication to the principle 

that Alliance security is indivisible. 

General DUNFORD. It is my assessment that NATO solidarity and commitment remain strong. Alliance engagement in out-of-sector military operations for more than 

ten years has significantly enhanced our interoperability and generated valuable 

lessons that NATO is leveraging to combat new and emerging threats emanating 

from its southern and eastern flanks. 

As NATO adapts to its new security environment, U.S. leadership is important. 

On NATO’s eastern flank, we are setting conditions for an enhanced rotational deterrence presence. On NATO’s southern flank, we are working with both European 

and Middle Eastern Allies to enhance military capability, defeat ISIL, and improve 

stability. 

192 

46. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Carter and General Dunford, is the Department 

of Defense re-evaluating U.S. defense posture in Europe? 

Secretary CARTER. The Department continuously reviews its overseas force posture and looks holistically at how best to balance forward-stationed forces with those 

based in the United States that can deploy overseas when necessary. Any adjustments to the Department’s posture in Europe would be informed by the U.S European Command (EUCOM) Commander’s requests and balanced against the Department’s global commitments. The Department continues to use the global force management process to surge additional forces that are ready to operate in response to 

Combatant Commander requests. 

General DUNFORD. Yes, we are re-evaluating our defense posture in Europe to ensure we can respond in a timely manner to crises and contingencies in order to support USEUCOM objectives. Those objectives are to assure, deter, and defend against 

Russian aggression; support ongoing and future contingency operations; counter 

transnational threats; and help build our partners’ capabilities to help us accomplish these missions. 

Leveraging continued Congressional support, funded through the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), we are already increasing responsiveness and readiness by 

pre-positioning ammunition, fuel and equipment for use in regional training and exercises, as well as improving infrastructure that enhances NATO operations and enables Eastern Allies to rapidly receive reinforcements. The ERI also enables us to 

maintain our increased rotational force presence along NATO’s eastern flank under 

Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE (OAR) to demonstrate NATO commitment to deter 

and counter Russian malign influence, coercion, and aggression. In 2016, under the 

auspices of OAR, we will preposition additional European Activity Sets, which includes the full complement of equipment for one armor brigade combat team. Moving forward, we will continually assess what additional steps are required to meet 

the demands of a new and evolving security environment in Europe. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOE DONNELLY

COUNTERING IRAN

47. Senator DONNELLY. Secretary Carter, there is a wide range of Iranian activities and threats that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) does not address, including the recent ballistic missile test, Iran’s support for terrorism, the 

American citizens they continue to hold hostage, and their stream of anti-Semitism 

and hate directed toward our allies in Israel, among others. It is critical to both the 

success of the Iran nuclear deal and our broader strategic interests in the Middle 

East that we have a clear, effective strategy to push back on Iran in the areas not 

mentioned or addressed by the nuclear agreement. What are we doing today, tomorrow, and next year to step up our efforts to counter Iran’s influence and activities 

across the Middle East? 

Secretary CARTER. The United States will continue to utilize its posture, preparations, plans, and partnerships to address the threats posed by Iran to United States 

interests in the Middle East. The Department remains keenly aware of Iran’s support for militants and terrorists, its provocative naval activity, and the threats posed 

by its conventional military forces. The United States will continue to support efforts to hold Iran accountable for its destabilizing behavior. The United States will 

continue to work through the United Nations to enforce non-nuclear sanctions and 

will maintain United States sanctions against Iran in response to its terrorist activities, human rights abuses, and ballistic missile program. 

The United States remains well postured to counter Iranian threats through partnerships and preparations in the Middle East. The Department will maintain a robust and dynamic regional military presence and will reinforce security partnerships throughout the region. The Department of Defense will continue to: maintain 

plans and posture to bolster the security of our friends and partners in the Middle 

East, including Israel; defend against Iranian aggression; ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf; and check Iranian malign influence. The Department will also ensure that the President has options available for any contingency that might arise. 

48. Senator DONNELLY. How are our current efforts to counter Iran’s influence different from what we’ve done in the past? 

Secretary CARTER. Current efforts to counter Iran’s influence build on and 

strengthen our previous efforts. Department of Defense (DOD) efforts in this regard 

are part of a whole-of-government strategy. In particular, DOD continues to focus 

its plans, posture, preparations, and partnerships on countering the myriad threats 

193 

posed by Iran and remains committed to countering Iranian threats to United 

States interests in the region. This includes deterring Iranian aggression, addressing the threats posed by Iran’s unconventional and conventional military forces, and 

ensuring that the President has options to address any contingency scenario that 

might arise with respect to Iran. DOD will also continue to build upon extensive 

regional security partnerships to challenge any future threats posed by Iran. 

General DUNFORD. Since the United States and Iran continue to offer two very 

different narratives, DOD’s efforts, post-JCPOA, remain largely unchanged. The 

United States attracts allies and supporters through policies based on inclusion and 

freedom, while Iran attracts its surrogates and proxies through policies based on exclusion and violent revolution. Despite Iran’s and the United States’ overlapping interests of countering ISIL and implementing the JCPOA, DOD continues to plan 

and prepare contingency scenarios for Iran. In response to the Camp David Summit, 

DOD is pursuing new initiatives with our Gulf Partners on increasing security cooperation, conducting combined-joint exercises, and developing an integrated ballistic missile defense system. 

IRANIAN BALLISTIC MISSILES

49. Senator DONNELLY. Secretary Carter, Iran has the largest and most diverse 

ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East. This is a serious and bipartisan concern 

among members of the Armed Services Committee. My colleague Sen. Ayotte has 

diligently highlighted the risks posed by Iran’s missile program, and Sen. Sessions 

and I worked together this year on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee to fund missile defense programs in the United States and Israel. What are your priorities in 

missile defense, whether here at home or through partnerships with Israel and the 

Gulf States, to counter the threats posed by Iran? 

Secretary CARTER. I share your concern about Iran’s ballistic missile program. 

First and foremost, the homeland is already protected from limited Iranian and 

North Korean ballistic missile threats. Moreover, the Department places the highest 

priority on improving the reliability of the current Ground-based Midcourse Defense 

(GMD) system to defend the homeland against a North Korean or possible future 

Iranian intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attack. The Department is working 

with industry to redesign the exo-atmospheric kill vehicle to address identified reliability issues. The Department has also funded a Long-Range Discrimination Radar 

(LRDR) that is currently projected to be operational by 2020 and will improve our 

capability to discern the reentry vehicle in a threat cluster. Additionally, as thenSecretary Hagel announced in March 2013, the Department is increasing the number of ground-based interceptors to the GMD system by 14 to a total of 44 by the 

end of 2017. 

In Europe, the Department is continuing to implement the European Phased 

Adaptive Approach (EPAA). The Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System (AAMDS) in 

Romania will achieve Technical Capability Declaration by the end of this year. By 

spring 2016, all EPAA Phase 2 elements to include the AAMDS in Romania will 

be operational. Construction on the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System in 

Redzikowo, Poland, will begin in early 2016 with completion expected in the 2018 

timeframe. 

The United States has provided $3.69 billion in missile defense assistance to 

Israel since 2001. This investment in Israel’s national security has supported production of the Iron Dome defense system against rockets and mortars as well as codevelopment of David’s Sling and Arrow weapon systems that can shoot down 

longer-range rockets and ballistic missiles. 

The objective in the Middle East is to maintain a robust missile defense posture 

to protect deployed forces, and to establish a regional missile defense architecture 

in which all of the Gulf Cooperation Council states participate and contribute to the 

extent practical, leading to a layered defense network. 

SYRIAN SAFE ZONE

50. Senator DONNELLY. The safe zone versus ‘‘no-fly’’ zone in Syria was discussed 

during the SASC hearing on the United States Strategy in the Middle East. We all 

agree that the crisis in Syria is far from over and it is time that the United States 

and regional partners more aggressively address the human suffering there. If we 

were to establish a humanitarian safe zone in Syria, what would the force requirements look like—hypothetically? 

Secretary CARTER. Establishing a humanitarian safe zone would require a significant increase in forces because it would need to consist of both a no-fly zone to control airspace and a ground force component to clear and hold territory in Syria to 

create the ‘‘safe’’ area. Securing a humanitarian safe zone would be exceptionally 

194 

difficult for a number of reasons, including that extremist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and al-Nusra Front would attempt to infiltrate such a zone. The Syrian regime, backed by Iran and Russia, would also likely 

contest the establishment of the humanitarian safe zone, increasing the cost, complexity, and risk associated with it. There is also a significant risk that the establishment of safe-zone would fracture the counter-ISIL coalition. 

The Department of Defense estimates that a safe zone would require approximately 120 additional aircraft in theater, and approximately 20,000 military personnel to conduct operations to clear and hold the zone in Syria. These estimates 

can vary depending on the size and geographic location of the area as well as the 

Syrian government’s response. These numbers do not take into account the additional logistics necessary to support such an increased force. 

General DUNFORD. Establishing a humanitarian safe zone would require a significant increase in forces because it would need to consist of both a no-fly zone to control airspace and a ground force component to clear and hold territory in Syria to 

create the ‘‘safe’’ area. Securing a humanitarian safe zone would be exceptionally 

difficult for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that extremist groups 

such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and al-Nusra Front would 

attempt to infiltrate the zone. The conventional U.S. forces required to implement 

such a zone would likely become a magnet for local extremist actors. It is also likely 

that the Syrian regime, with support from Russia and Iran, would militarily oppose 

Coalition occupation of their sovereign territory. Absent an international legal basis, 

such as a United Nations Security Council Resolution, there is also significant risk 

of fracturing the counter-ISIL Coalition. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) estimates that a safe zone would require approximately 120 additional aircraft in theater and approximately 20,000 military 

personnel to conduct operations to clear and hold the zone in Syria. These estimates 

do not take into account the additional logistics tail necessary to support such an 

increased force. Those numbers could vary significantly depending upon the size and 

location of the geographic area and the Syrian government response. 

51. Senator DONNELLY. What type of commitment would that entail in terms of 

personnel, security, and funding? 

Secretary CARTER. Over the past two years, the Department of Defense has extensively examined options for a no-fly zone or safe zone in Syria based on geographic 

scope and objective. Both options would be a major military undertaking and would 

likely pull resources away from the counter-Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 

(ISIL) campaign as well as harm readiness to execute other war plans. 

In terms of security in such a safe zone, extremist groups on the ground such as 

ISIL and al-Nusra Front would attempt to infiltrate such as zone. The conventional 

U.S. forces required to implement such a zone would also likely become a magnet 

for local extremist actors. The Syrian regime, with support from Russia and Iran, 

would also militarily contest Coalition occupation of its sovereign territory. There 

is also a significant risk that the establishment of safe-zone would fracture the 

counter-ISIL coalition. The costs to establish a safe zone must account for both aircraft to enforce a no-fly zone and ground forces in Syria to clear and hold territory 

to create the ‘‘safe’’ area. 

The cost for a safe zone would be approximately $400 million dollars per month, 

depending on the location and size of the zone that would be implemented as well 

as the nature of the Syrian government response. This estimate does not include 

deployment costs; all forces are assumed to be in theater already. This estimate also 

does not include costs associated with infrastructure construction; all required infrastructure is assumed to exist. Finally, this estimate does not assume any combat 

losses. 

In terms of other resources, establishing a humanitarian safe zone would require 

approximately 120 additional aircraft in theater, and 20,000 military personnel conducting operations to clear and hold the zone in Syria. These estimates do not take 

into account the logistics necessary to support such an increased force, and also vary 

depending upon the size and location of the geographic area as well as the nature 

of the Syrian government response. It is also unclear whether Coalition partners are 

prepared to contribute manpower or funding to a safe zone. 

General DUNFORD. Over the past two years, the Department of Defense has extensively examined options for a no-fly zone or safe zone in Syria based on geographic 

scope and objective. In general, the commitment in terms of personnel, security, and 

funding that a Syrian safe zone would require are substantial. 

In terms of security in such a safe zone, extremist groups on the ground such as 

the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and al-Nusra Front would attempt 

to infiltrate such a zone. The conventional U.S. forces required to implement such 

195 

a zone would likely become magnets for local extremist actors and targets for asymmetrical attacks. The Syrian regime, with support from Russia and Iran, may also 

militarily contest Coalition occupation of its sovereign territory. 

In terms of other resources, establishing a humanitarian safe zone would require 

approximately 120 additional aircraft in theater, and 20,000 military personnel conducting operations to clear and hold the zone in Syria. These estimates do not take 

into account the logistics tail necessary to support such an increased force, and 

those numbers could vary significantly depending upon the size and location of the 

geographic area as well as the nature of the Syrian government response. It is also 

unclear whether Coalition partners are prepared to contribute manpower or funding 

to a safe zone. 

The costs to establish a safe zone must account for both aircraft to enforce a nofly zone and ground forces in Syria to clear and hold territory to create the ‘‘safe’’ 

area. The rough fiscal cost for a safe zone would be approximately $400 million dollars per month, which might vary depending on the location and size of the zone 

implemented as well as the nature of the Syrian government response. This estimate does not include deployment costs, as all forces are assumed to be in theater 

already. This estimate also does not include costs associated with infrastructure construction, as all required infrastructure is assumed to exist. Finally, this estimate 

does not assume any combat losses to personnel or major air and ground equipment. 

52. Senator DONNELLY. Are there previous humanitarian operations that would 

provide elements for this type of mission such as Kosovo, Turkey, Fukushima, or 

Pakistan? 

Secretary CARTER. Department of Defense (DOD) planners, along with interagency counterparts, absolutely consider the lessons from prior relevant humanitarian operations as they create options for mitigating the Syrian humanitarian crisis. In addition, DOD is currently contributing to humanitarian efforts in Syria and 

the region. DOD is providing approximately $115 million worth of humanitarian 

supplies (including transportation costs) to Syrian refugees and other persons displaced as the result of the ongoing Syrian crisis and conflict in Iraq. 

General DUNFORD. When planning current operations, we look for commonalities 

with past operations that may provide helpful insight for contingency planning; 

however, every operation contains a unique mix of circumstances that drive a tailored response. That said, we are in agreement with the humanitarian community, 

which generally does not support ‘‘safe zones,’’ as they imply a level of safety that 

often cannot be absolutely guaranteed or enforced. 

53. Senator DONNELLY. What type of interagency support would be required for 

a mission such as this? 

Secretary CARTER. Establishing a safe zone in Syria would require significant 

interagency support. The participation of the Department of Defense, Intelligence 

Community, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Department of 

State, and the Department of Homeland Security, among others, would all likely be 

required for such a mission, although the exact nature and degree of support would 

depend on the specifics of the zone established. 

General DUNFORD. While the Interagency (IA) has reviewed the viability of safe 

zones on multiple occasions at the National Security Council level, and each time 

has agreed that establishing such a zone is not appropriate or viable, the first requirement for a safe zone would be to gain IA concurrence. 

Should the decision to create a safe zone be taken, the IA would need to exert 

diplomatic effort to gain a legal basis for establishing the zone. Further diplomatic 

action would be necessary to garner support among allies and regional partners to 

contribute the forces and/or resources required to protect the safe area against attacks by both ground and air. This would include sufficient ground forces to safeguard the zone from rockets, missiles, artillery, and other conventional or terror 

threats. 

A safe zone mission would then involve coordinating the actions of participating 

humanitarian and Non-Governmental Organizations. IA support would be required 

to establish institutions to help resolve inevitable conflicts between the multi-cultural and sectarian inhabitants of the zone. The IA would also have a role to play 

within international institutions in maintaining governance accounting for differences between those who live in the zone and those who are temporarily resettled 

there. 

54. Senator DONNELLY. General Dunford, with all operations, we must consider 

the potential challenges and unintended consequences. Can you provide some of 

those challenges specifically for humanitarian and security operations? 

196 

General DUNFORD. Safe zones are natural targets. The primary challenge of establishing a Syrian Safe Zone is providing adequate resources to protect and sustain 

a refugee population. These resources, including the type and quantity of joint or 

multinational forces, humanitarian supplies and equipment, and diplomatic and 

legal justifications, are driven by the nature of the threat and the basic needs of 

refugees. 

A safe zone in Syria will have unintended consequences. These may include the 

departure of aid organizations due to security concerns or to maintain their neutrality. If the safe zone is not endorsed by the UN Security Council, UN organizations may be restricted by policy, security, and liability concerns. This could cause 

NGOs that depend on UN funding to also depart the zone. The safe zone may also 

attract a significant number of out-of-state regional refugees seeking protection and 

assistance. Similarly, neighboring countries may coerce refugee movement towards 

the safe zone. Both the push and pull of refugees may overwhelm the capacity to 

provide adequate security and assistance. 

Other challenges associated with the establishment of safe zones in such a complicated part of Syria include: (1) Risk of combat against Syrian/Russian/Iranian 

forces, which would cause a much greater humanitarian problem; (2) Risk of fracturing the counter-ISIL coalition. Absent an international legal basis, many coalition members do not support violation of Syrian sovereignty; (3) Risk of significant 

readiness reduction for forces postured against other global commitments; and (4) 

Risk of weakening the counter-ISIL campaign because of diversion of resources 

55. Senator DONNELLY. Secretary Carter, what type of Department of Defense 

personnel have the expertise for planning and conducting this type of operation? 

Secretary CARTER. At the planning level, the Department of Defense (DOD) has 

analyzed several safe zone options in Syria for the Administration’s consideration, 

but does not recommend any such option at this time. Establishment of a safe zone 

would involve air and ground forces to secure the territory and airspace for humanitarian operations. Therefore, DOD personnel with expertise in air and ground combat operations would be involved in planning and conducting this type of operation. 

DOD personnel would also plan and conduct any such operation in coordination 

with other interagency partners with experience in humanitarian operations. 

Æ