FOLLOW-UP AUDIT OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S

INTERNAL CONTROLS OVER REPORTING

OF TERRORISM-RELATED STATISTICS: 

THE NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of the Inspector General

Audit Division

Audit Report 12-37

September 2012
i

FOLLOW-UP AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S

INTERNAL CONTROLS OVER REPORTING OF

TERRORISM-RELATED STATISTICS: 

THE NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In February 2007, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) completed 

an audit of the Department of Justice’s (Department) internal controls over 

reporting terrorism-related statistics. This audit reviewed terrorism-related 

statistics reported by the Department and three Department components – 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Executive Office for United States 

Attorneys (EOUSA), and Criminal Division, and it found that the Department 

components and the Department as a whole did not accurately report 

terrorism-related statistics.

1

 The 3 components did not accurately report 24 

of the 26 statistics reviewed, with some statistics significantly overstated or 

understated, while others were overstated or understated by minor 

amounts.2 

The OIG initiated this follow-up audit to determine if: (1) Department 

components took appropriate actions to implement the recommendations 

from our 2007 audit; and (2) corrective actions implemented improved the 

components’ ability to gather, track, classify, verify, and report accurate 

terrorism-related statistics. Following the 2007 audit report, the National 

Security Division (NSD) took over responsibility for corrective actions on the 

recommendations to the Criminal Division. In November 2008, the NSD’s 

Counterterrorism Section revised and republished its circular that 

established and documented internal control procedures for gathering, 

verifying, and reporting terrorism-related statistics. These procedures, if 

implemented appropriately, should ensure that statistics are accurately 

reported and supported. This audit provides our results pertaining only to 

the NSD. The OIG will similarly report on the corrective actions taken by the 

FBI and EOUSA.

While the NSD revised its procedures for gathering, classifying, and 

reporting terrorism-related statistics based on the recommendations from 

our 2007 audit, the NSD’s implementation of the revised procedures were 

not effective at ensuring that terrorism-related statistics were reported 

 1

 U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, The Department of 

Justice’s Internal Controls over Terrorism Reporting, Audit Report 07-20 (February 2007).

2

 For purposes of this audit, we considered the misreporting of a statistic as 

significant if the statistic was either overstated or understated by 10 percent or more. 
ii

accurately. In this audit, the OIG identified nine unique terrorism-related 

statistics reported by the NSD in budget submissions or other documents for 

fiscal years 2009 through 2012, and the auditors selected five of the nine 

statistics to test for accuracy. The OIG determined that the NSD did not 

accurately report four of the five statistics we reviewed.

Although it appears that the statistics were not significantly overstated 

or understated, the inaccurate reporting indicates a need for the NSD to 

strengthen further its application of controls for gathering, verifying, and 

reporting its terrorism-related statistics. The statistics were inaccurately 

reported because the NSD’s: (1) Counterterrorism Section did not maintain 

documentation detailing the statistics on convictions, charges, and cases 

favorably resolved at the time the numbers were reported; and (2) Office of 

Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism did not have written internal 

control procedures for gathering, tracking, verifying, and reporting its 

terrorism-related statistic on U.S. victims of terrorism identified abroad. 

These inaccuracies indicate a need for the NSD to strengthen further its 

application of controls for gathering, verifying, and reporting terrorismrelated statistics. 

This audit report makes three recommendations to help the NSD 

improve the accuracy and documentary support for the terrorism-related 

statistics it reports. Such documentation should clearly support the 

individuals, cases, or other applicable data necessary to support the overall 

number or percentage reported for each statistic. Accurate statistics are 

important as the data is used by Department management and Congress to 

make budgetary and operational decisions. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.............................................................................. 1 

Audit Purpose and Scope .................................................................... 2 

Prior OIG Audit.................................................................................. 5 

FINDING AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................ 7 

 

ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE NSD TO IMPLEMENT THE 

RECOMMENDATIONS FROM OUR 2007 AUDIT WERE NOT

EFFECTIVE AT ENSURING THE NSD ACCURATELY REPORTED

TERRORISM-RELATED STATISTICS................................................. 7 

2007 Audit Results ............................................................................ 7 

The Criminal Division’s and NSD’s Responses to Our 2007 Audit

 Recommendations .......................................................................... 8 

Accuracy of NSD Terrorism-related Statistics Reported Subsequent to

 Our 2007 Audit............................................................................... 9 

1. Number of convictions or guilty pleas in terrorism or

terrorism-related cases arising from investigations primarily after

September 11, 2001.................................................................. 13 

2. Individuals charged with terrorism or terrorism-related crimes

since September 11, 2001 .......................................................... 15 

3. Percent increase in the number of U.S. victims of terrorism

identified abroad ....................................................................... 17 

4. Percentage of counterterrorism cases favorably resolved................ 19 

5. Percentage of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act emergency

applications processed within 7 days ........................................... 23 

OIG Conclusions ................................................................................ 24 

Recommendations ............................................................................. 25 
STATEMENT ON COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS AND REGULATIONS...... 26 

ACRONYMS ..................................................................................... 27 

APPENDIX I – AUDIT OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY.... 28 

APPENDIX II – OTHER PRIOR AUDITS AND INSPECTIONS THAT 

REVIEWED OR TOUCHED UPON THE ACCURACY OF TERRORISMRELATED STATISTICS REPORTED BY THE DEPARTMENT................. 36 

APPENDIX III – THE NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION’S

RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT AUDIT REPORT ...................................... 39 

APPENDIX IV – OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS

AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE

REPORT .......................................................................................... 42 
1

INTRODUCTION

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Department of 

Justice (Department) made the prevention of terrorism and promotion of 

America’s security its primary strategic goal.

1

 Department resources 

devoted to preventing terrorism and promoting the nation’s security have 

increased from approximately $737 million in fiscal year (FY) 2001 to 

approximately $5.2 billion in FY 2011, an increase of 606 percent. In its 

FY 2003 – 2008 strategic plan, the Department established the following 

three objectives to accomplish its terrorism strategic goal: 

• Prevent, disrupt, and defeat terrorist operations before they occur.

• Investigate and prosecute those who have committed, or intend to 

commit, terrorist acts in the United States.

• Combat espionage against the United States by strengthening 

counterintelligence capabilities.2

To show how the Department has performed against these objectives, 

the Department and its component agencies gather, classify, and report a 

wide range of terrorism-related statistics. For example, some of the

terrorism-related statistics reported by the Department’s National Security 

Division (NSD) were the: 

• number of individuals charged with terrorism or terrorism-related 

crimes since September 11, 2001; 

• number of convictions or guilty pleas in terrorism or terrorismrelated cases arising from investigations primarily after

September 11, 2001; 

• percentage increase in the number of U.S. victims of overseas 

terrorism identified; 

• percentage of counterterrorism cases favorably resolved; and

 1

 U.S. Department of Justice, Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2012 – 2016.

2

 The Department subsequently made minor revisions to the objectives for 

accomplishing its terrorism strategic goal as noted in the Department’s Strategic Plan. 
2

• percentage of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act emergency 

applications processed within 7 days.

3

The Department and its components regularly report such statistics in 

budgets, annual financial statements and statistical reports, the Office of 

Management and Budget’s Performance Assessment Rating Tool, 

performance plans, congressional testimony, speeches, press releases, and 

official publications.4

Audit Purpose and Scope

The purpose of our follow-up audit was to determine what actions the 

National Security Division (NSD) took in response to our 2007 audit and 

whether those actions improved the NSD’s ability to gather, track, classify, 

verify, and report accurate terrorism-related statistics. The Department 

relies on the NSD and other components to implement its counterterrorism 

strategies. The NSD collects a variety of terrorism-related statistics 

measuring these counterterrorism efforts.

We identified the terrorism-related statistics reported by the NSD by:

• interviewing officials from the Department and the NSD; and

• analyzing budget submissions, congressional testimony, 

performance plans, and other documents maintained by the 

Department and the NSD. 

 We identified the following 9 unique terrorism-related statistics that 

were reported by the NSD 17 times in budget submissions or other 

documents for FYs 2009 through 2012.

 3

 The first two statistics on charges and convictions were reported in the Department 

of Justice’s Congressional Budget Submission for FY 2009. The latter three statistics – U.S. 

victims of overseas terrorism, counterterrorism cases favorably resolved, and Foreign 

Intelligence Surveillance Act emergency applications – were reported in the NSD’s 

Performance Budget Congressional submissions for FY 2011 and FY 2012.

 4

 The Performance Assessment Rating Tool is used to identify the strengths and 

weaknesses of federal programs and to develop funding and management decisions aimed 

at making the programs more effective.
3

Statistic Description

Number

Reported

Where Statistic 

was Reported

Operational or 

Informational5

1. Number of convictions 

or guilty pleas in 

terrorism or terrorismrelated cases arising 

from investigations 

primarily after 

September 11, 2001

319

through

FY 2007 

319 

through

FY 2007

Department’s FY 2009 

Congressional Budget 

Submission

Fact Check: Terrorism 

and Terrorism Related 

Prosecutions by the 

Bush Administration

(posted to the 

Department’s website -

www.justice.gov)

Operational

Informational

2. Number of individuals 

charged with terrorism 

or terrorism-related 

crimes since 

September 11, 2001

512 

through

FY 2007

512 

through

FY 2007

Department’s FY 2009 

Congressional Budget 

Submission

Fact Check: Terrorism 

and Terrorism Related 

Prosecutions by the 

Bush Administration

(posted to the 

Department’s website - 

www.justice.gov)

Operational

Informational

3. Percentage increase in 

the number of U.S. 

victims of overseas 

terrorism identified

400% in 

FY 2009 

113% in 

FY 2010

NSD’s FY 2011 

Performance Budget 

Congressional 

Submission

NSD’s FY 2012 

Performance Budget 

Congressional 

Submission

Operational

Operational

4. Percentage of

counterterrorism cases 

favorably resolved

100% in 

FY 2009 

100% in 

FY 2010

NSD’s FY 2011 

Performance Budget 

Congressional 

Submission

NSD’s FY 2012 

Performance Budget 

Congressional 

Submission

Operational

Operational

 5

 We focused our review on statistics used for operational purposes and excluded 

statistics used for informational purposes. Operational purposes included statistics used in 

budget requests, performance plans, and annual financial statements and statistical reports. 

Informational purposes included statistics used in speeches, press releases, publications, 

and websites. While some terrorism-related statistics were reported only once, most were 

reported twice.
4

Statistic Description

Number

Reported

Where Statistic 

was Reported

Operational or 

Informational

5. Percentage of Foreign 

Intelligence 

Surveillance Act 

emergency applications 

processed within 7 

days

100% in 

Calendar 

Year 2009 

100% in 

Calendar 

Year 2010

NSD’s FY 2011 

Performance Budget 

Congressional 

Submission

NSD’s FY 2012 

Performance Budget 

Congressional 

Submission

Operational

Operational

6. Percent of U.S. victims 

of terrorism provided 

with service and 

compensation 

information within 3 

business days of victim 

response to Office of 

Justice for Victims of 

Overseas Terrorism 

Outreach

80% in

FY 2009

95% in

FY 2010

NSD’s FY 2011 

Performance Budget 

Congressional 

Submission

NSD’s FY 2012 

Performance Budget 

Congressional 

Submission

Operational

Operational

7. Percentage of 

counterterrorism cases 

where classified 

information is 

safeguarded (according 

to the Classified 

Information Procedures 

Act requirements) 

without impacting the 

judicial process

100% in 

FY 2009

100% in 

FY 2010

NSD’s FY 2011 

Performance Budget 

Congressional 

Submission

NSD’s FY 2012 

Performance Budget 

Congressional 

Submission

Operational

Operational

8. Percentage of 

international training 

needs met

78% (47 of 

60) in 

FY 2009

100% (13 

of 13) in 

FY 2010

NSD’s FY 2011 

Performance Budget 

Congressional 

Submission

NSD’s FY 2012 

Performance Budget 

Congressional 

Submission

Operational

Operational

9. Number of individuals 

that were charged with 

terrorism violations 

from January to June 

2009 and have been

successfully prosecuted 

and/or sentenced in 

federal courts 

nationwide

Greater

than 30

Statement of the 

Attorney General before 

the U.S. Senate 

Committee on the 

Judiciary on June 17, 

2009

Informational

 Source: Documents as identified in the “Where Statistic was Reported” column
5

After our initial review of the nine statistics, we excluded from our 

review the last statistic shown in the preceding table because the statistic 

was used for informational purposes only, as opposed to operational 

purposes. We interviewed NSD officials and reviewed documents showing 

the actions the NSD took in response to our prior audit. To assess whether 

the NSD’s actions in response to the 2007 audit improved its ability to 

gather, track, classify, verify, and report accurate terrorism-related 

statistics, we selected the first five statistics shown in the preceding table to 

test whether the statistics were accurate. We selected these five statistics 

based on: (1) our assessment of the significance of the statistic to the 

Department’s counterterrorism efforts; (2) certain risk factors such as the 

number of times the statistic was reported, the extent to which internal 

controls were established and documented, and the extent we found 

inconsistencies in the statistics reported; and (3) whether the statistic was 

reviewed in the prior audit. The NSD reported the five statistics a total of 

eight times for operational purposes. 

We analyzed documentation and conducted interviews with NSD 

officials to determine if the information reported for each statistic was 

accurate. In some cases we reviewed documentation for each item counted 

in the statistic reported. In other cases we reviewed documentation for a 

sample of the items counted.6

More details about our methodology for selecting and evaluating the 

accuracy of the terrorism-related statistics reported by the NSD are 

contained in Appendix I. The results of our audit work and testing are 

reported in the Finding and Recommendations section of the report.

Prior OIG Audit

 

In February 2007, the OIG issued an audit report on the Department’s 

internal controls over reporting terrorism-related statistics.

7

 The audit found 

that the Department components did not accurately report terrorism-related 

statistics. The Department components lacked adequate internal controls for 

gathering, verifying, and reporting terrorism-related statistics.

In the report, we made five recommendations to the Department’s 

Criminal Division to assist it in improving the internal controls to ensure the 

 6

 For those statistics where we reviewed a sample of items counted, the number of 

incorrectly reported transactions could have been higher if we had conducted a 100 percent 

review of items reported.

 7

 U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, The Department of 

Justice’s Internal Controls over Terrorism Reporting, Audit Report 07-20 (February 2007).
6

accuracy of its reported terrorism-related statistics. Subsequent to the 

audit, the Department’s newly established NSD took over responsibility for 

corrective action on the recommendations we made to the Criminal Division. 

In response to the recommendations, in November 2008 the NSD’s 

Counterterrorism Section revised and republished its terrorism-related 

statistics procedural circular that established and documented internal 

control procedures for gathering, verifying, and reporting terrorism-related 

statistics. In our judgment, the procedures, if implemented appropriately, 

should ensure that statistics are accurately reported and supported. 

This current audit is a follow-up audit to our 2007 audit. In the 

Finding and Recommendations section of this report, we discuss in detail the 

corrective actions the NSD took in response to our prior recommendations, 

as well as the results of our testing to determine whether those actions 

improved the NSD’s ability to gather, track, classify, verify, and report 

accurate terrorism-related statistics.

Appendix II discusses other previous audits and inspections completed 

by the OIG and Government Accountability Office (GAO) prior to our 2007 

audit that reviewed or touched upon the accuracy of terrorism-related 

statistics reported by the Department.
7

FINDING AND RECOMMENDATIONS

ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE NSD TO IMPLEMENT THE 

RECOMMENDATIONS FROM OUR 2007 AUDIT WERE NOT 

EFFECTIVE AT ENSURING THE NSD ACCURATELY REPORTED

TERRORISM-RELATED STATISTICS

While the NSD revised its procedures for gathering, classifying, and reporting 

terrorism-related statistics based on the recommendations from our 2007 

audit, the NSD’s implementation of the revised procedures were not effective 

at ensuring that terrorism-related statistics were reported accurately. As a 

result, our testing of terrorism-related statistics reported by the NSD 

subsequent to the corrective actions being implemented found that the NSD 

inaccurately reported four of the five statistics we tested. Our testing 

revealed that the inaccuracies likely were not by significant margins.8 

However, the inaccuracies indicate a need for the NSD to strengthen further 

its application of controls for gathering, verifying, and reporting terrorismrelated statistics. Accurate statistics are important as the data is used by 

Department management and Congress to make budgetary and operational 

decisions. 

2007 Audit Results

Our 2007 audit found that the Criminal Division inaccurately reported 

the five statistics we tested. We determined that the Criminal Division 

should improve its procedures for gathering and reporting statistics. For the 

five statistics we tested, we found that:

• two statistics were significantly understated; 

• one statistic was understated by a minor amount; 

• one statistic was reported accurately one time and was significantly 

understated another time it was reported; and 

• one statistic was accurately reported one time it was reported, was 

significantly understated one time it was reported, was overstated 

by a minor amount one time it was reported, and was understated 

by a minor amount another time it was reported.

 8

 For the purposes of this audit, we considered the misreporting of a statistic as 

significant if the statistic was either overstated or understated by 10 percent or more.
8

Our 2007 audit found that the statistics were inaccurately reported 

primarily because the database used to track the statistics was incomplete 

and not kept up-to-date. We found that the Criminal Division’s 

Counterterrorism Section had not established formal procedures to: 

(1) instruct staff on what data is to be reported in the database, and how 

and when the data is to be reported; and (2) validate the accuracy of the 

information reported in the database. 

The Criminal Division’s and NSD’s Responses to Our 2007 Audit 

Recommendations

Our 2007 audit made five recommendations to strengthen the Criminal 

Division’s internal controls for accurate collection and reporting of terrorismrelated statistics. We recommended that the Criminal Division:

(1) establish and document the internal control procedures for 

gathering, verifying, and reporting terrorism-related statistics;

(2) maintain documentation to identify the source of all terrorismrelated statistics reported;

(3) maintain documentation of the procedures and systems used to 

gather or track the statistics reported;

(4) maintain documentation of the methodologies and procedures used 

to verify the accuracy of the statistics reported; and

(5) ensure that terrorism-related statistics are not reported unless 

evidence is maintained to support the statistics. 

In March 2007, the NSD informed us that it had assumed responsibility 

from the Criminal Division for maintaining the terrorism-related statistics and 

for addressing the recommendations we made to the Criminal Division. As a 

result, in November 2008 the NSD’s Counterterrorism Section revised and 

republished its terrorism-related statistics procedural circular that 

established and documented internal control procedures for gathering, 

verifying, and reporting terrorism-related statistics. Our review of these 

documented procedures found that the NSD had developed an internal 

control structure that, if implemented properly, should be sufficient to 

ensure accurate reporting of terrorism-related statistics. 
9

Accuracy of NSD Terrorism-related Statistics Reported Subsequent to 

2007 OIG Audit

For this follow-up audit, we identified nine unique terrorism-related 

statistics that were reported by the NSD in budget submissions and other 

documents for FYs 2009 through 2012. As shown in the table beginning on 

page 3 of the report, the NSD reported the 9 statistics a total of 17 times.

For our initial testing during this audit, we interviewed NSD officials to 

determine whether internal controls were in place and documented to ensure 

the nine statistics were accurately gathered, classified, and reported.9

 

Through these interviews, we learned that NSD’s Counterterrorism Section, 

Office of Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism, and Office of Intelligence

had established internal controls to ensure all nine terrorism-related 

statistics reported were accurately gathered, classified, and reported. We 

found that internal controls were both established and documented as 

required for seven of the nine terrorism-related statistics reported by the

NSD. Internal controls for the remaining two terrorism-related statistics 

tested were established, but not documented in writing for the Office of 

Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism, which provided us a written draft 

of its internal control procedures during our testing activities. 

As explained previously, subsequent to our initial review of the nine

statistics we excluded one statistic from our review because the statistic was

used for informational purposes only as opposed to operational purposes.10 

From the remaining eight terrorism-related statistics, we selected five 

statistics for detailed testing. We considered: (1) the significance of the 

statistic to the Department’s counterterrorism efforts; (2) certain risk factors 

such as the number of times the statistic was reported, the extent to which 

internal controls were established and documented, and the extent we found 

 9

 According to Office of Management and Budget Circular A-123, Management’s

Responsibility for Internal Control, internal controls are the organization, policies, and 

procedures that help program and financial managers achieve results and safeguard the 

integrity of their programs. The Government Accountability Office’s Standards for Internal 

Control in the Federal Government require that the controls and all transactions and other 

significant events be clearly documented, and that the documentation be readily available 

for examination. The documentation should appear in management directives, 

administrative policies, or operating manuals and may be in paper or electronic form. All 

documentation and records should be properly managed and maintained. 

 10 We focused our review on statistics used for operational purposes and excluded 

statistics used for informational purposes. Operational purposes included statistics used in 

budget requests, performance plans, and annual financial statements and statistical reports. 

Informational purposes included statistics used in speeches, press releases, publications, 

and websites.
10

inconsistencies in the statistics reported; and (3) whether the statistic was 

reviewed in the prior audit.

 

During our 2007 audit, we found that the statistics identified were 

primarily reported as numbers. During this follow-up audit, we found that 

the statistics identified were primarily reported as percentages instead of 

numbers. For the statistics reported as numbers, we attempted to obtain a 

listing of the data (charges or convictions) included in the reported numbers. 

However, as discussed in detail in the following sections, the NSD did not 

maintain a listing of the data at the time each statistic was reported. 

Instead the NSD provided us current lists from its tracking system detailing

the numbers reported, but those lists did not match the numbers reported 

for the statistics. For the statistics reported as percentages, we obtained a 

listing of the data (victims, cases, or applications) that NSD officials told us 

they used to calculate the percentages reported. For four of the five 

statistics we tested, we selected a sample of the data from the listings 

provided by the NSD and reviewed evidence to support the data reported. 

Consequently, had we reviewed 100 percent of the data for each of these 

four statistics, the number of improperly reported data items that we 

identified could have been higher than our audit results show. For the 

remaining statistic tested, the number of data items reported was relatively 

low and therefore, we reviewed 100 percent of those data items. 

As shown in the following table, we found that the NSD did not 

accurately report four of the five statistics we tested. We found that the 

documentation that NSD provided us did not support most of the reported 

statistics we tested, but it appears not by material amounts. Nevertheless, 

the inaccurate reporting does indicate a need for the NSD to strengthen 

further the application of its controls for gathering, verifying, and reporting 

its terrorism-related statistics. 
11

Description of NSD

Statistic Reported

Results of OIG Analysis

and Sample Testing

1. Number of convictions or guilty pleas in 

terrorism or terrorism-related cases 

arising from investigations primarily after

September 11, 2001 (as of 

September 30, 2007)

In the FY 2009 budget submission, the NSD 

reported 319 convictions or guilty pleas, but 

the NSD did not maintain support for the 

convictions or guilty pleas included in the 

reported number. The NSD provided a list 

during the audit that identified 324 

convictions or guilty pleas occurred during 

the reporting period. We tested a sample of 

34 of the 324 convictions or guilty pleas and 

found no discrepancies.

2. Number of individuals charged with 

terrorism or terrorism-related crimes 

since September 11, 2001 (as of

September 30, 2007)

In the FY 2009 budget submission, the NSD 

reported 512 individuals charged, but the 

NSD did not maintain support to show the 

individuals included in the reported number. 

The NSD provided a list during the audit that 

identified 544 individuals charged during the 

reporting period. We tested a sample of 55 

of the 544 individuals and found no 

discrepancies.

3. Percent increase in the number of U.S. 

victims of terrorism identified abroad

In its FY 2011 performance budget 

submission, the NSD reported that the 

number of victims identified during FY 2009 

increased by 400 percent over the number of 

victims that had been identified prior to

FY 2009. The NSD provided a list of 50 

victims identified through the end of 

FY 2008, and an additional 200 victims 

identified in FY 2009. We tested a sample of 

17 of the 50 victims identified through 

FY 2008 and 71 of the 200 victims identified 

in FY 2009. We did not find any 

discrepancies in the 17 victims tested for the 

period through FY 2008. However, we found 

that for 7 of the 71 victims tested for

FY 2009, the NSD did not receive address 

information until FY 2010 and, consequently, 

these victims should not have been counted.

In its FY 2012 performance budget 

submission, the NSD reported that the 

number of victims identified during FY 2010 

increased by 113 percent over the number of 

victims that had been identified prior to

FY 2010. The NSD provided a list of 282 

victims identified in FY 2010. We tested a 

sample of 94 of the 282 victims identified in 

FY 2010 and did not find any discrepancies. 

However, the 282 victims reported did not 

include the 7 victims that were reported as 

identified in FY 2009 that we found should 

have been reported as identified in FY 2010. 
12

Description of NSD

Statistic Reported

Results of OIG Analysis

and Sample Testing

4. Percentage of counterterrorism cases 

favorably resolved

In its FY 2011 performance budget 

submission, the NSD reported that 100 

percent of the counterterrorism cases closed 

in FY 2009 were favorably resolved. The 

NSD provided us a list of 59 individuals 

whose cases were closed in FY 2009 and the 

NSD officials told us that 2 of those 59 

individuals were incorrectly reported as 

having favorable outcomes. We reviewed all 

59 individuals and did not find any 

discrepancies other than the 2 discrepancies 

identified by the NSD.

In its FY 2012 performance budget 

submission, the NSD reported that 100 

percent of the counterterrorism cases closed 

in FY 2010 were favorably resolved. The 

NSD provided us a list of 39 individuals 

whose cases were closed in FY 2010 and that 

the NSD counted as cases favorably 

resolved. We reviewed all 39 individuals and 

found 1 individual that had an outcome that 

was neither favorable nor unfavorable. The 

NSD believed the individual should not be 

included in the group of cases closed and we 

agree. However, we believe the NSD should 

have explained in the budget submission 

that one case was excluded and the basis for 

its exclusion. 

5. Percentage of Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Act emergency applications 

processed within 7 days

In its FY 2011 performance budget 

submission, the NSD reported that 100 

percent of the FY 2009 Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Act emergency applications 

were processed within 7 days. The NSD 

provided us a classified list of the 

applications processed. Because the 

numbers are classified, we do not disclose 

these numbers in this unclassified report. 

We tested a sample of the applications 

reported and found no discrepancies.

In its FY 2012 performance budget 

submission, the NSD reported that 100 

percent of the FY 2010 Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Act emergency applications 

were processed within 7 days. The NSD 

provided us a classified list of the 

applications processed. We tested a sample 

of the applications reported and found no 

discrepancies.

 Source: OIG analysis of NSD documentation for the statistics tested
13

We determined that the statistics reported by the NSD were inaccurate 

for the following reasons.

• The NSD’s Counterterrorism Section did not maintain 

documentation detailing the data reported for statistics on 

convictions, charges, and cases favorably resolved at the time the 

numbers were reported. Until early 2010, the Counterterrorism 

Section was using an electronic spreadsheet application to track 

cases. Using the electronic spreadsheet, the Counterterrorism 

Section counted its statistics manually, which increased the risk of 

human error. In early 2010, the Counterterrorism Section

established a new case tracking system that, in our judgment,

reduced the potential for human error. 

• The NSD’s Office of Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism did not 

have written internal control procedures for gathering, tracking,

verifying, and reporting its terrorism-related statistic on U.S. 

victims of terrorism identified abroad because the Office was 

relatively new, was switching from a manual tracking system to an 

automated tracking system, and was still developing the process at 

the time the statistic was reported. During the audit, the Office

drafted the internal control procedures. 

Our detailed testing results for the five statistics are discussed in the 

following sections: 

 

1. Number of convictions or guilty pleas in terrorism or terrorismrelated cases arising from investigations primarily after

September 11, 2001

In the Department’s FY 2009 Congressional Budget submission, the 

NSD reported that through September 30, 2007, it had obtained 319 

convictions or guilty pleas in terrorism or terrorism-related cases arising 

from investigations primarily conducted after September 11, 2001. 

We requested that the NSD provide us a listing of the 319 individuals 

reported as being convicted or having pled guilty, along with documentation 

to support that each conviction or guilty plea was in a terrorism or terrorismrelated case, and that each conviction or guilty plea occurred during the 

period September 11, 2001, through September 30, 2007. An official in the 

NSD’s Counterterrorism Section, who is currently responsible for tracking 

such terrorism statistics, told us that he was not involved in the tracking of 

this statistic at the time it was reported. The official also told us that the 
14

individual responsible for this statistic at the time it was reported was no 

longer employed by the NSD. When we asked the Section to reproduce the 

319 individuals reported with convictions or guilty pleas, it was unable to do 

so. Instead, the list provided from the electronic spreadsheet showed that 

324 individuals were convicted or pled guilty in terrorism or terrorism-related 

cases from September 11, 2001, through September 30, 2007.

During our discussion with the NSD Counterterrorism Section official, 

he agreed that the spreadsheet is routinely updated as changes occur in the 

case. Therefore, data in the spreadsheet at any given time may not match 

data reported as of a previous date. Such was the case when we asked for 

the system data to support the 319 convictions and guilty pleas reported. In 

our judgment, the NSD should maintain the documentation available at the 

time the statistic was reported that details the convictions or guilty pleas

reported for the statistic. 

We asked why the support was not maintained given that: (1) our 

prior recommendation was to ensure that terrorism-related statistics are not 

reported unless evidence is maintained to support the statistics, and (2) the 

NSD’s revised procedures resulting from our prior recommendation require 

that source documentation be maintained for reported statistics. A 

Counterterrorism Section official said that his interpretation of our prior 

recommendation was that it related only to statistics that were reported 

outside of the NSD. He said that he did not believe that statistics reported 

by the NSD within the Department were considered external to the NSD. We 

explained that this interpretation of our prior report and recommendation 

was inaccurate because: (1) our prior report and recommendation on 

maintaining support for statistics were not limited to externally reported 

statistics, and (2) supporting documentation should be maintained for all 

reported statistics. Moreover, by submitting this statistic on convictions for

inclusion in the Department’s budget submission to Congress, the statistic is 

reported outside of the NSD and is ultimately released publicly. Therefore, 

the NSD should ensure such statistics are accurate. 

 

We explained to the Counterterrorism Section Chief that the electronic

spreadsheet listing provided by a member of his staff showed 324 individuals 

with convictions or guilty pleas from September 11, 2001, through 

September 30, 2007, but the Counterterrorism Section reported 319

individuals with convictions or guilty pleas in the budget. The Chief said he 

was surprised the number was that close. The Chief thought the number

would have been further off considering they did not retain support for the 

statistic. The Chief also said that part of the problem was their tracking

system. Until early 2010, the Counterterrorism Section was using an

electronic spreadsheet application to track cases. Using the electronic
15

spreadsheet, the Counterterrorism Section counted its statistics manually, 

which increased the risk of human error. In early 2010, the 

Counterterrorism Section established a new case tracking system that, in our 

judgment, minimized the potential for human error. 

To assess the accuracy of the reported statistic, we selected a sample 

of 108 of the 324 individuals listed as convicted or pleading guilty in

terrorism or terrorism-related cases. We determined that 74 of the 108

individuals selected were convicted or pled guilty prior to February 4, 2005. 

Because these 74 convictions or guilty pleas were included in the pool of 

cases tested during our prior audit, we excluded the 74 convictions or guilty

pleas from testing during this audit. For the remaining 34 convictions or 

guilty pleas, we reviewed documentation in the Public Access to Court 

Electronic Records (PACER) system to verify that the individuals were 

convicted or pled guilty in a terrorism or terrorism-related case, and that the 

date of the conviction or guilty plea occurred during the period 

September 11, 2001, to September 30, 2007.

11 If the documentation in the 

PACER system did not show the conviction or guilty plea was in a terrorism 

or terrorism-related case, we asked NSD officials to provide additional 

information to show the conviction or guilty plea was for a terrorism or 

terrorism-related case. We found that all 34 individuals tested were 

convicted or pled guilty in a terrorism or terrorism-related case during the 

reporting period.12 However, because the listing provided by the NSD 

showed 324 individuals were convicted or had pled guilty, instead of the 319 

reported, the NSD apparently understated by at least 1.5 percent the 

reported number of convictions or guilty pleas. We do not consider the 

amount of this deviation to be significant.

2. Individuals charged with terrorism or terrorism-related crimes 

since September 11, 2001 

In the Department of Justice’s FY 2009 Congressional Budget 

submission, the NSD reported that the Department had charged 512 

individuals with terrorism or terrorism-related crimes since September 11, 

2001, through September 30, 2007. 

We requested that the NSD provide us a listing of these 512

individuals. We also requested documentation supporting that each charge 

 11 PACER is an electronic public access service that allows users to obtain case 

information from federal appellate, district, and bankruptcy courts via the internet.

12 Our testing for this statistic was based on a sample of convictions or guilty pleas 

reported. While our sample testing did not identify any discrepancies, discrepancies may 

have been identified based on a 100 percent review of convictions and guilty pleas reported.
16

was for a terrorism or terrorism-related violation and that each charge 

occurred during the period September 11, 2001, through September 30, 

2007. For the same reasons as discussed for the first statistic tested on 

convictions, the Counterterrorism Section did not maintain a listing of the 

512 individuals reported. Likewise, the Counterterrorism Section could not 

reproduce a listing showing the 512 individuals reported as charged. 

Instead, a Counterterrorism Section official provided a list from the 

electronic spreadsheet showing 544 individuals charged with terrorism or 

terrorism-related crimes from September 11, 2001, through September 30, 

2007.

As discussed for the previous statistic, because the spreadsheet is 

routinely updated as changes occur in the case, data in the spreadsheet at 

any given time may not match data reported as of a previous date. Such 

was the case when we asked for the system data to support the 512

reported for the number of individuals charged. Therefore, the current 

spreadsheet is not adequate support for statistics reported in the past. In 

our judgment, the NSD should maintain the documentation available at the 

time the statistic was reported that details the individuals reported for the 

statistic. 

 The Counterterrorism Section Chief told us that the 512 charged

statistic was in fact reported by the Counterterrorism Section. The Chief also 

told us that the period covered by the reported number was from September 

11, 2001, through September 30, 2007. We explained to the Chief that the 

electronic spreadsheet listing provided by a member of his staff showed 544

individuals charged, but the Counterterrorism Section reported 512

individuals charged in the Department’s 2009 budget. As for the statistic on 

convictions, the Chief attributed part of the problem to the Counterterrorism 

Section’s tracking systems.

 We selected a sample of 182 of the 544 individuals reported as 

charged with terrorism or terrorism-related violations to perform testing to 

determine the accuracy of the reported number. We determined that 127 of 

the 182 individuals selected were charged prior to February 4, 2005, and 

thus were included in the group of individuals charged that we tested during 

our prior audit. We excluded those 127 individuals from testing during this 

audit. For the remaining 55 individuals, we reviewed documentation in the 

PACER system to verify that the individuals were charged with a terrorism or 

terrorism-related violation, and that the date of the charge occurred during 

September 11, 2001, to September 30, 2007. We found that all 55 

individuals tested were charged with a terrorism or terrorism-related 
17

violation during the period.13 However, because the listing provided by the 

NSD showed 544 individuals charged, instead of the 512 reported as 

charged, the NSD apparently understated by about 5.9 percent the 

individuals charged with a terrorism or terrorism-related violation. We do 

not consider the amount of this deviation to be significant.

3. Percent increase in the number of U.S. victims of terrorism 

identified abroad

Fiscal Year 2011 Performance Budget Congressional Submission

 In the NSD’s FY 2011 Performance Budget Congressional submission, 

the Office of Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism (Office) reported that 

it had increased the number of U.S. victims of overseas terrorism identified 

abroad from 50 as of the end of FY 2008, to 200 through the end of 

FY 2009, an increase of 300 percent. However, before submitting its 

FY 2012 Performance Budget Congressional submission, the Office compared 

the current data to the previously reported data and realized that it had 

reported this statistic incorrectly in the FY 2011 Performance Budget. The 

Office had reported that the overseas victims identified increased to 200, 

when it should have reported that the overseas victims identified increased 

by 200 victims identified to a total of 250 victims. The Office corrected this 

error in the FY 2012 Performance Budget by showing the increase from 

FY 2008 to FY 2009 was 200, or a 400 percent increase. We asked officials 

of the Office of Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism for a listing of the 

50 victims of overseas terrorism that had been identified from the inception 

of the program through FY 2008, and the 200 victims reported as identified 

in FY 2009.

 We selected samples of 17 of the 50 victims identified through FY 2008 

and 67 of the 200 victims reported for FY 2009, and we tested the accuracy 

of the reported numbers. Office of Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism

officials explained that individuals are not counted as victims of overseas 

terrorism until the date the FBI, or other credible source provides victims’ 

names and addresses.

14 We reviewed documentation maintained by the 

 13 Our testing for this statistic was based on a sample of individuals reported. While 

our sample testing did not identify any discrepancies, discrepancies may have been 

identified based on a 100 percent review of individuals reported.

14 According to an official from the Office of Justice for Victims of Overseas 

Terrorism, other credible sources include the State Department, United States Attorney’s 

Offices, NSD’s Counterterrorism Section, United States military, or other non-government 

sources that the Office of Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism considers credible based 

on professional judgment. 
18

Office and the FBI showing the date the FBI provided the victims’ names and 

addresses to the Office. We found that all 17 victims tested from the 50 

victims identified through FY 2008 were appropriately reported as identified 

since the inception of the program through FY 2008. However, we found 

that 3 of the 67 victims reported as identified in FY 2009 were actually not 

identified until FY 2010.15 In addition, four other victims associated with one 

of the three sampled victims were inappropriately reported as identified in 

FY 2009. The seven individuals incorrectly counted in FY 2009, were

U.S. victims of July 2009 suicide bombings at hotels in Jakarta, Indonesia. 

However, because the victims’ names and addresses were not provided by 

the FBI until January 29, 2010, they should not have been reported until 

FY 2010. We discussed these inaccuracies with officials within the Office of 

Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism, and the officials agreed that the 

seven victims should have been counted in FY 2010 instead of FY 2009

statistic. 

We believe the statistic for the increase in victims of overseas 

terrorism was inaccurately reported primarily because of an oversight by the 

Office of Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism. However, we did note 

that while the Office had a process for gathering, verifying, and reporting 

this statistic, the process was not documented in writing. The Office did not 

have written procedures because the Office was newly established in 2005, 

was switching from a manual tracking system to an automated tracking 

system, and was still developing the process at the time the statistic was 

reported. However, at our suggestion, in October 2011, the Office 

developed draft written procedures to gather, verify, and report United 

States victims of overseas terror attacks. As of June 21, 2012, those draft 

procedures had not been finalized. 

We concluded that the Office of Justice for Victims of Overseas 

Terrorism should have reported no more than 193 victims identified in 

FY 2009, instead of 200. As a result, the Office overstated by at least 3.6 

percent the percentage reported for the increase in U.S. victims of overseas 

terrorism identified abroad in FY 2009. We do not consider the amount of 

this deviation to be significant.

Fiscal Year 2012 Performance Budget Congressional Submission

In the FY 2012 Performance Budget Congressional submission, the 

Office of Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism reported that it had 

increased the number of U.S. victims of overseas terrorism identified abroad 

 15 Our testing for this statistic is based on a sample of victims reported. Therefore, 

the number of transactions incorrectly reported could have been more based on a 100

percent review of victims reported.
19

from 250 as of the end of FY 2009 to 532 through the end of FY 2010, an 

increase of 113 percent. We asked officials of the Office for a listing of the 

282 victims of overseas terrorism that it reported as identified during

FY 2010.

 We selected a sample of 94 of the 282 victims for testing to determine 

the accuracy of the reported number. We reviewed documentation 

maintained by the Office of Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism and the 

FBI showing when the FBI or other credible source provided the victims’ 

names and addresses to the Office. We found that all 94 victims tested were 

appropriately reported as identified during FY 2010.16 However, as 

previously discussed, we found seven victims reported as identified during 

FY 2009 who should have been reported in FY 2010. As a result, the Office

understated by at least 5 percent the percentage reported for the increase in 

U.S. victims of overseas terrorism identified abroad in FY 2010. We do not 

consider the amount of this deviation to be significant.

4. Percentage of counterterrorism cases favorably resolved17

Fiscal Year 2011 Performance Budget Congressional Submission

In the NSD’s FY 2011 Performance Budget Congressional submission, 

the Counterterrorism Section reported that 100 percent of its 

counterterrorism cases were favorably resolved in FY 2009. We explained to 

a Counterterrorism Section official that the budget did not clearly define how 

this statistic was determined. In the FY 2011 budget, the NSD defined this 

statistic only as including all cases closed during the fiscal year. The 

definition did not contain a standard for determining whether a case was 

favorably resolved, such as through any conviction, convictions on certain 

charges, convictions with certain punishment or length of sentence, or some 

other standard. Without such a standard, it is not apparent what cases are 

counted when calculating this statistic. In addition, the definition did not 

explain how a case was counted when the case involved multiple defendants 

with different outcomes, such as convicted, acquitted, or dismissed. We 

asked whether the statistic related to: (1) cases resolved favorably for the 

government or (2) defendants for whom charges were resolved favorably for 

the government. After discussion with us, the official said that the statistic 

 16 Our testing for this statistic is based on a sample of victims reported. While our 

sample testing did not identify any discrepancies, discrepancies may have been identified 

based on a 100 percent review of victims reported.

17 As discussed in the following text, the NSD’s performance budget submissions did 

not include a standard for “favorably resolved,” so it is difficult to determine the accuracy of 

this statistic. 
20

was based on defendants and not cases because of the difficulty in making a 

determination when the cases involve multiple defendants with different 

outcomes. 

We requested that the NSD provide us a listing of the defendants 

associated with the reported percentage of cases favorably resolved in

FY 2009. A Counterterrorism Section official told us that the NSD did not 

retain a list or number associated with the reported percentage because the 

NSD’s electronic spreadsheet application supported the results and those 

results could be produced upon request. We asked the official to provide us 

a listing of all defendants charged with terrorism or terrorism-related 

violations who had those charges resolved (convicted, acquitted, dismissed, 

or other resolution) during FY 2009. The official provided us a listing of 59 

such defendants. We compared this listing to a listing we previously 

obtained from the NSD showing: (1) all defendants charged with terrorism 

or terrorism-related violations since September 11, 2001; (2) the outcome, 

if any, of those charges; and (3) the date of the outcome. Based on the 

comparison, we concluded that the list of 59 defendants with resolution of 

charges in FY 2009 was complete. 

After providing us the listing of 59 defendants with favorable resolution 

action in FY 2009, a Counterterrorism Section official performed an analysis 

of the actions for these defendants and determined that 2 of the 59 

defendants were incorrectly counted as having favorable outcomes. Both of 

these defendants were acquitted of the charges. 

We also reviewed the documentation in the PACER system to verify 

that all 59 defendants were charged with a terrorism or terrorism-related 

violation, and to determine whether the defendants’ charges were resolved 

favorably for the government during FY 2009. Our review confirmed that the 

charges for 2 of the 59 defendants were not favorably resolved in FY 2009. 

Below are details for the two cases which were not supported by the 

evidence. 

• The defendant was charged with transporting explosive materials 

without a license or permit and carrying an unregistered weapon. 

The jury acquitted the defendant on both charges. 

 

• The defendant was charged with: (1) one count of material support 

to a foreign terrorist organization, (2) one count of material support 

to a foreign terrorist, (3) one count of conspiracy to destroy 

buildings by explosives, and (4) one count of seditious conspiracy. 

The jury acquitted the defendant on all four counts.
21

As a result, the NSD overstated by about 3 percent the reported 

counterterrorism cases favorably resolved in FY 2009. We do not consider 

the amount of this deviation to be significant.

 

 We discussed the discrepancy with the Counterterrorism Section Chief, 

who said the Counterterrorism Section did not retain listings of defendants 

and documents showing the outcome of the charges against these 

defendants because the support would be voluminous and require a large 

amount of file space. The Chief also reiterated that part of the problem was 

the Counterterrorism Section’s electronic spreadsheet tracking system that 

has subsequently been replaced with a new tracking system that in our 

judgment is more effective. 

Fiscal Year 2012 Performance Budget Congressional Submission

In the NSD’s FY 2012 Performance Budget Congressional submission, 

the Counterterrorism Section reported that 100 percent of its 

counterterrorism cases were favorably resolved in FY 2010. We noted the 

same problem with the FY 2012 budget not containing a clear definition of 

how this statistic was determined. In the FY 2012 budget, the NSD defined 

this statistic as counterterrorism cases closed during the fiscal year that 

resulted in court judgments favorable to the government. However, like for 

the FY 2011 budget, the definition did not: (1) contain a standard for 

determining whether a case was favorably resolved; and (2) explain how a 

case was counted when the case involved multiple defendants with different 

outcomes, such as convicted, acquitted, or dismissed. Again, the 

Counterterrorism Section official said that the statistic was based on 

defendants and not cases because of the difficulty in making a determination 

when the cases involve multiple defendants with different outcomes. 

We requested that the NSD provide us a listing of the defendants 

associated with the reported percentage of cases favorably resolved in 

FY 2010. A Counterterrorism Section official told us that the NSD did not 

retain a list or number associated with the reported percentage because the 

NSD’s electronic spreadsheet application supported the results and those 

results could be produced upon request. We asked the official to provide us 

a listing of all defendants charged with terrorism or terrorism-related 

violations who had those charges resolved (convicted, acquitted, dismissed, 

or other resolution) during FY 2010. The official provided us a listing of 41

defendants, but the official told us that the NSD did not include 2 of the 41 

defendants in the pool of defendants whose charges were resolved in FY 

2010. The rationale for excluding these two defendants is explained below.
22

• One defendant excluded was believed to have been killed in 

September 2010 during a foreign government operation. However, 

the charges against the defendant had not been dismissed as of the 

end of FY 2010. 

• The other excluded defendant was considered to be a fugitive and 

the charges against this defendant were still pending as of the end 

of FY 2010. 

We believe it was appropriate not to include these two defendants in 

the calculation since there was no formal resolution action on the charges 

during FY 2010.

We compared the listed information for the remaining 39 defendants to 

a listing we previously obtained from the NSD showing: (1) all defendants 

charged with terrorism or terrorism-related violations since September 11, 

2001; (2) the outcome, if any, of those charges; and (3) the date of the 

outcome. Based on the comparison, we concluded that the list of 39 

defendants with resolution of charges in FY 2010 was complete. 

After providing us the listing of 39 defendants with favorable resolution 

action in FY 2010, the Counterterrorism Section official performed an 

analysis of the actions for these defendants and determined that all 39 

defendants were correctly counted as having favorable outcomes.

We reviewed the documentation in the PACER system to verify that all 

39 defendants were charged with a terrorism or terrorism-related violation 

and to determine whether the defendants’ charges were resolved favorably 

for the government during FY 2010. Our review noted that 1 of the 39

defendants did not have a favorable outcome for the government in FY 2010 

as explained below.

• The defendant was charged in the District of Colorado for making 

false statements to a federal agent in a matter involving 

international and domestic terrorism. The case against the 

defendant was dismissed in the District of Colorado on February 1, 

2010, because, according to the Counterterrorism Section Chief, the 

defendant was part of another ongoing case being prosecuted in the 

Eastern District of New York. In conjunction with the dismissal, the 

defendant was ordered to appear in the Eastern District of New York 

on the other charges. Subsequent to the dismissal of the charges in 

the District of Colorado, the defendant was also charged during July 

2011 in the Southern District of New York with fraud and misuse of 

visas and permits.
23

During FY 2011, a jury in the Eastern District of New York found the 

defendant guilty of conspiracy to obstruct justice and obstruction of 

justice that entailed destroying and concealing evidence, providing 

false statements, and encouraging others to testify falsely. During 

FY 2012, the defendant pled guilty in the Southern District of New 

York to the visa fraud and agreed to consent to the disposition of 

the case in the Eastern District of New York. The defendant was 

sentenced for the convictions in both cases on February 10, 2012. 

 

The Counterterrorism Section Chief said that the dismissal of the 

charges against the defendant in the District of Colorado in FY 2010 was a 

neutral outcome as it was neither favorable nor unfavorable. The Chief 

believed that the case should not have been included in the group of cases 

counted for this statistic since the individual was re-charged in another case. 

We agree that it would have been appropriate to not include this case in the 

group given the circumstances.

 

5. Percentage of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act emergency

applications processed within 7 days

In the FY 2011 Performance Budget Congressional submission, the 

NSD reported that 100 percent of its emergency applications made pursuant 

to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended (the FISA 

Act) for calendar year 2009 were processed within 7 days. The FISA Act

requires that an emergency application be submitted to the FISA Court 

within 7 days after the Attorney General, or his designee as defined by the 

statute, approves the emergency authorization. To meet operational needs, 

the NSD’s practice is to file these applications with enough time for the FISA 

Court judge to rule on the applications within 7 days after the Attorney 

General, or his designee, approves the emergency authorization.

We obtained a list of the calendar year 2009 FISA emergency

applications from the NSD’s Office of Intelligence’s FISA Case Tracking 

System and associated with the 100 percent statistic reported by NSD.18 We 

selected a sample of the calendar year 2009 FISA emergency applications for 

testing to determine the accuracy of the reported percentage. 

For each of the sampled emergency applications, we reviewed whether 

the amount of time between when the Attorney General, or his designee,

 18 The numbers associated with this statistic are classified and therefore are not 

disclosed in this unclassified report.
24

approved the emergency authorization and when a FISA Court judge 

approved the application was no more than 7 days. 

We found that all sampled emergency applications for emergency 

authorization were approved by a FISA Court judge within 7 days of the date 

the Attorney General, or his designee, initially approved the authorization. 

In the FY 2012 Performance Budget Congressional submission, the 

NSD reported that 100 percent of its FISA emergency applications for 

calendar year 2010 were processed within 7 days. 

We obtained a list of the calendar year 2010 FISA emergency

applications from the NSD’s Office of Intelligence’s FISA Case Tracking 

System and associated with the 100 percent statistic reported by NSD. We 

selected a sample of the calendar year 2010 FISA emergency applications for 

testing to determine the accuracy of the reported percentage. 

For each of the sampled emergency applications, we reviewed whether 

the amount of time between when the Attorney General, or his designee, 

approved the emergency authorization and when a FISA Court judge 

approved the application was no more than 7 days. 

We found that all sampled emergency applications for emergency 

authorization were approved by a FISA Court judge within 7 days of the date 

the Attorney General, or his designee, initially approved the authorization. 

OIG Conclusions

Overall, we found that the NSD had improved its reporting of 

terrorism-related statistics, but additional improvements are needed to 

ensure accurate reporting of all statistics. The NSD had revised its 

procedures for gathering, verifying, classifying, and reporting its statistics 

based on the recommendations from our 2007 audit, but the NSD’s 

implementation of those revised procedures were not effective to ensure the 

accuracy of most of the statistics we tested. During our 2007 audit, all five 

of the statistics reported by the Criminal Division, for which the NSD now has 

responsibility, were reported inaccurately. In this follow-up audit, four of the 

five NSD statistics we tested were reported inaccurately. While the 

inaccuracies were not by significant margins, these inaccuracies are 

important because Department management and Congress need accurate 

terrorism-related statistics to make informed budgetary and operational 

decisions. 
25

Recommendations:

 We recommend that the NSD: 

1. Ensure that established procedures for maintaining documentation to 

support all terrorism-related statistics reported are followed. Such 

documentation should contain a list of the individuals, cases, or other 

applicable data necessary to verify the overall number or percentage 

reported for each statistic.

2. Ensure that the draft procedures developed by the Office of Justice for 

Victims of Overseas Terrorism for gathering, verifying, and reporting its 

terrorism-related statistics are formally published.

3. Ensure that the definitions included in the budget for reported statistics 

clearly identify how the group of items counted for each statistic was 

determined.
26

STATEMENT ON COMPLIANCE WITH 

LAWS AND REGULATIONS

As required by the Government Auditing Standards, we tested the 

NSD’s processes, controls, and records to obtain reasonable assurance that 

the Department complied with laws and regulations that, if not complied 

with, could have a material effect on the NSD’s ability to report terrorismrelated statistics accurately. Compliance with laws and regulations 

applicable to the NSD’s reporting of such statistics is the responsibility of 

NSD management. An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence 

about compliance with laws and regulations. The specific laws and 

regulations we reviewed included the relevant portions of the Office of 

Management and Budget Circular A-123, Management’s Responsibility for 

Internal Control.

Except for instances of non-compliance identified in the Finding and 

Recommendations section of this report, the NSD complied with the laws and 

regulations cited above. With respect to those activities not tested, nothing 

came to our attention that caused us to believe that the NSD was not in 

compliance with the laws and regulations cited above. 
27

ACRONYMS

Acronym Description

Department Department of Justice

EOUSA Executive Office for United States Attorneys

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FISA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

FY Fiscal Year

GAO Government Accountability Office

NSD National Security Division

OIG Department of Justice Office of the Inspector 

General

PACER Public Access to Court Electronic Records

PENTTBOM Pentagon/Twin Towers Bombing Investigation
28

APPENDIX I 

AUDIT OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

Our objectives were to determine if the: (1) NSD took appropriate 

actions to implement the recommendations from our 2007 audit; and 

(2) corrective actions implemented improved the NSD’s ability to gather, track, 

classify, verify, and report accurate terrorism-related statistics. We conducted 

this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. Our audit concentrated on, but was not limited

to, the period subsequent to the issuance of our prior audit in February 2007 

through April 2, 2012. 

 We performed the following work at the NSD located in 

Washington, D.C.: 

1. As shown in the following table, we developed a group of 9 unique 

terrorism-related statistics reported by the NSD 17 times in budget 

submissions or other documents for FY 2009 through FY 2012 by:

• interviewing key NSD personnel regarding internal and 

external documents in which terrorism-related statistics are 

reported; and

• reviewing the documents identified through interviews and 

searches for terrorism-related statistics.
29

Statistic Description

Number

Reported

Where Statistic

was Reported

Operational or 

Informational19

1. Number of convictions 

or guilty pleas in 

terrorism or terrorismrelated cases arising 

from investigations 

primarily after 

September 11, 2001

319

through

FY 2007 

319 

through

FY 2007

Department’s FY 2009 

Congressional Budget 

Submission

Fact Check: Terrorism 

and Terrorism Related 

Prosecutions by the 

Bush Administration

Operational

Informational

2. Number of individuals 

charged with 

terrorism-related 

crimes since 

September 11, 2001

512 in

FY 2007

512 in

FY 2007

Department’s FY 2009 

Congressional Budget 

Submission

Fact Check: Terrorism 

and Terrorism Related 

Prosecutions by the 

Bush Administration

Operational

Informational

3. Percent increase in the 

number of U.S. 

victims of terrorism 

identified abroad

400% in

FY 2009 

113% in

FY 2010

NSD’s FY 2011 

Performance Budget 

Congressional 

Submission

NSD’s FY 2012 

Performance Budget 

Congressional 

Submission

Operational

Operational

4. Percentage of

counterterrorism 

cases favorably 

resolved

100% in

FY 2009 

100% in

FY 2010

NSD’s FY 2011 

Performance Budget 

Congressional 

Submission

NSD’s FY 2012 

Performance Budget 

Congressional 

Submission

Operational

Operational

5. Percentage of Foreign 

Intelligence 

Surveillance Act 

emergency 

applications processed 

within 7 days

100% in 

Calendar 

Year 2009 

100% in 

Calendar 

Year 2010

NSD’s FY 2011 

Performance Budget 

Congressional 

Submission

NSD’s FY 2012 

Performance Budget 

Congressional 

Submission

Operational

Operational

 19 We focused our review on statistics used for operational purposes and excluded 

statistics used for informational purposes. Operational purposes included statistics used in 

budget requests, performance plans, and annual financial statements and statistical reports. 

Informational purposes included statistics used in speeches, press releases, publications, 

and websites. While some terrorism-related statistics were reported only once, most were 

reported twice.
30

Statistic Description

Number

Reported

Where Statistic

was Reported

Operational or 

Informational

6. Percent of U.S. victims 

of terrorism provided 

with service and 

compensation 

information within 3 

business days of 

victim response to 

Office of Justice for 

Victims of Overseas 

Terrorism Outreach

80% in

FY 2009

95% in

FY 2010

NSD’s FY 2011 

Performance Budget 

Congressional 

Submission

NSD’s FY 2012 

Performance Budget 

Congressional 

Submission

Operational

Operational

7. Percentage of 

counterterrorism 

cases where classified 

information is 

safeguarded according 

to the Classified 

Information 

Procedures Act 

requirements without 

impacting the judicial 

process

100% in

FY 2009

100% in

FY 2010

 

NSD’s FY 2011 

Performance Budget 

Congressional 

Submission

NSD’s FY 2012 

Performance Budget 

Congressional 

Submission

Operational

Operational

8. Percentage of 

international training 

needs met

78% (47 of 

60) in 

FY 2009

100% (13 

of 13) in

FY 2010

NSD’s FY 2011 

Performance Budget 

Congressional 

Submission

NSD’s FY 2012 

Performance Budget 

Congressional 

Submission

Operational

Operational

9. Number of individuals 

that were charged 

with terrorism 

violations from 

January to June 2009 

and have been

successfully 

prosecuted and/or 

sentenced in federal 

courts nationwide

Greater

than 30

Statement of the 

Attorney General 

before the U.S. Senate 

Committee on the 

Judiciary on June 17, 

2009

Informational

 Source: Documents as identified in the “Where Statistic was Reported” column

After our initial review of the nine statistics, we excluded from our 

review the last statistic shown in the preceding table because the 

statistic was used for informational purposes only as opposed to 

operational purposes.
31

2. We reviewed documentation and interviewed NSD officials to 

identify the following information for each of the remaining eight

terrorism-related statistics reported for: 

• the period covered by the statistic;

• the key NSD personnel responsible for tracking and reporting 

the statistic and what mechanisms were used to track the 

statistics; and

• the processes used to report the statistics and the internal 

controls established to ensure the accuracy of the reported 

statistics. 

3. Of the eight operational statistics, two were reported during the 

prior audit and were also reported subsequent to the prior audit 

with updated data. During this follow-up audit, we selected those 

two statistics, which are described below, for follow-up testing.

Previously Reported Terrorism-Related Statistics

Selected for Detailed Testing

Description of Statistic System Used to Track Statistic

1. Number of convictions or guilty pleas in 

terrorism or terrorism-related cases 

arising from investigations primarily 

after September 11, 2001

Counterterrorism Section’s 

electronic spreadsheet application

2. Number of individuals charged with

terrorism-related crimes since 

September 11, 2001

Counterterrorism Section’s 

electronic spreadsheet application

4. For the remaining six operational statistics, we used a risk level to 

decide which statistics to test by developing a method to weigh the 

level of risk that the operational statistics were reported 

accurately. We came up with the following six categories of risk 

and used a risk rating scale of one to three within each category 

with one being relatively low risk and three being relatively high 

risk.
32

OIG’s Methodology for Measuring

Risk of Terrorism-Related Statistics

Risk Category/

Rating Elements

Risk

Rating

1. Frequency of use

 Reported 1 to 3 times 1

 Reported 4 to 10 times 2

 Reported 11 to 35 times 3

2. Internal controls

 Established and documented 1

 Established but not documented 2

 Not established 3

3. Magnitude of the statistic

 reported

 From 0 to 100 1

 From 101 to 1,000 2

 Greater than 1,000, to include any dollar-

 related numbers, percentages, and hours 3

4. Inconsistencies in statistics

 reported

 No inconsistencies 1

 One inconsistency 2

 Multiple inconsistencies 3

5. Reported in informational formats

 by others

 Reported by other than the Attorney

 General, Deputy Attorney General, FBI

 Director, or EOUSA

1 

 Reported by EOUSA 2

 Reported by the Attorney General, Deputy

 Attorney General, or FBI Director 3

6. Preciseness of the statistic

 reported

 No operational statistics in group are

 precisely stated 1

 Some operational statistics in group are

 precisely stated 2

 All operational statistics in group are

 precisely stated 3

We calculated an overall average risk score for each of the

six operational statistics by adding the risk rating assigned for each 

of the six risk categories and then dividing this sum by six. We 

selected the following three of the six operational statistics for 

audit testing based on the risk rating we calculated and on our 

judgment of the significance of the statistic to the war on terror.

 
33

New Terrorism-Related Statistics Selected for Detailed Testing

Description of Statistic

System Used to Track 

Statistic

1. Percent increase in the number of 

U.S. victims of terrorism identified 

abroad

Victims of Overseas Terrorism

Tracking Tool

2. Percentage of counterterrorism cases 

favorably resolved

Counterterrorism Section’s 

electronic spreadsheet 

application

3. Percentage of Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Act emergency 

applications processed within 7 days

Office of Intelligence’s FISA Case 

Tracking System

5. We interviewed NSD officials and reviewed supporting 

documentation to determine whether the five operational statistics 

selected for testing were accurately reported. 

Methodology for Sampling the NSD Statistics

For four of the five NSD operational statistics that we selected for 

detailed testing, we selected samples for the six times the four statistics 

were reported by:

• obtaining a listing showing the data (charges, convictions, guilty

pleas, victims, cases, or applications) reported for each statistic; 

and

• selecting one third of the data items to test.

The samples were not statistically designed to enable projection of the 

sample results to the entire population of data reported for each statistic.

For the remaining operational statistic, we obtained a listing showing 

the data reported for the statistic and we selected all the data for testing 

because the total data items reported was small. The following table shows 

the number of data items selected for each of the eight times the five

statistics were reported.
34

Samples Selected for NSD Statistics Tested

Statistic Description

Data Items

Reported

Data Items

Provided by NSD 

During Audit

Data Items

Tested

1. Number of 

convictions or guilty 

pleas in terrorism or 

terrorism-related 

cases arising from 

investigations 

primarily after 

September 11,

2001

319 through

FY 2007 

324 10820

2. Number of 

individuals charged 

with terrorismrelated crimes since 

September 11,

2001

512 through

FY 2007

544 18221

3. Percent increase in 

the number of U.S. 

victims of terrorism 

identified abroad

400% in FY 2009

113% in FY 2010

200

282

8822

94

4. Percentage of

counterterrorism 

cases favorably 

resolved

100% in FY 2009

100% in FY 2010

59

39

59

39

 20 We initially selected a sample of 108 of the 324 individuals convicted of terrorism 

or terrorism-related violations. However, 74 of the 108 individuals selected were convicted 

prior to February 4, 2005, and therefore were included in the group of individuals convicted 

that we tested during our prior audit. Therefore, we excluded those individuals from testing 

during this audit, leaving 34 individuals tested during this audit.

21 We initially selected a sample of 182 of the 544 individuals charged with terrorism 

or terrorism-related violations. However, 127 of the 182 individuals selected were charged

prior to February 4, 2005, and therefore were included in the group of individuals charged

that we tested during our prior audit. Therefore, we excluded those individuals from testing 

during this audit, leaving 55 individuals tested during this audit.

22 To calculate the percentage increase reported, the NSD divided the number of

victims identified in FY 2009, by the baseline of 50 victims that had been identified prior to 

FY 2009. We selected a sample of 17 of these 50 victims to test the accuracy of the 

baseline number used in the NSD’s calculation. We also selected a sample of 67 of the 200 

victims identified during FY 2009. Based on a reporting deficiency we found for 1 of the 67 

victims tested, we also tested 4 additional victims associated with the victim for which we 

found the reporting deficiency.
35

Statistic Description

Data Items

Reported

Data Items 

Provided by NSD 

During Audit

Data Items

Tested

5. Percentage of 

Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Act 

emergency 

applications 

processed within 7 

days

100% in Calendar 

Year 2009 

100% in Calendar 

Year 2010

See footnote23

See footnote23

See footnote23

See footnote23

Source: The Department’s Congressional Budget Submissions and the NSD’s Performance 

Budget Congressional Submissions

 23 The numbers associated with this statistic are classified and therefore are not 

disclosed in this unclassified report. 
36

APPENDIX II

OTHER PRIOR AUDITS AND INSPECTIONS THAT REVIEWED 

OR TOUCHED UPON THE ACCURACY OF TERRORISMRELATED STATISTICS REPORTED BY THE DEPARTMENT

Besides our 2007 audit of the Department’s internal controls over 

reporting terrorism-related statistics, we identified other previous audits and 

inspections by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) that reviewed or touched upon the accuracy of 

terrorism-related statistics reported by the Department.

As noted in our 2007 audit report, the OIG previously reviewed 48 

terrorism-related statistics or supporting systems and made 

recommendations to correct deficiencies identified. The results of these 

reviews were included in the following nine audit and inspections reports 

issued from September 2003 through September 2005.

Report Title

Report 

Number

Date

Issued

Follow-up Audit of the Department of Justice 

Counterterrorism Fund

03-33 September 2003

Federal Bureau of Investigation Casework 

and Human Resource Allocation

03-37 September 2003

The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Foreign 

Language Program – Translation of 

Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence 

Foreign Language Material

04-25 July 2004

Internal Effects of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation’s Reprioritization

04-39 September 2004

The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Efforts 

to Hire, Train, and Retain Intelligence 

Analysts

05-20 May 2005

Review of the Terrorist Screening Center 05-27 June 2005

The Department of Justice’s Terrorism Task 

Forces, Evaluation and Inspections

I-2005-007 June 2005

The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Foreign 

Language Translation Program Follow-Up

05-33 July 2005

External Effects of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation’s Reprioritization Efforts

05-37 September 2005

 Source: OIG audit, review, and inspection reports

 
37

In a January 2003 report, the GAO reported on the Department’s need 

for better controls and oversight of terrorism-related statistics.24 The GAO 

reported that in FY 2001 the Department switched from using the FBI’s 

terrorism-related conviction statistics to using those of EOUSA for its annual 

report because of: (1) concerns raised by a newspaper article’s allegation 

that the Department had inflated its terrorism numbers in its FY 2000

Performance Report,

25 and (2) an effort to report conviction statistics that 

would be less likely to be misinterpreted. Prior to FY 2002, the FBI and 

EOUSA used different criteria to classify cases and resulting convictions as 

terrorism-related, resulting in differences in how each entity ultimately 

classified a case. Consequently, the total number of convictions classified by 

the FBI and EOUSA as terrorism-related differed. Also, because EOUSA

prosecutes federal cases, its classification system only includes federal 

convictions, while the FBI’s classification system also includes convictions in 

state, local, and international courts obtained with the FBI’s investigative 

assistance. The GAO reported that the Department did not have sufficient 

management oversight and internal controls in place to ensure the accuracy 

and reliability of terrorism-related conviction statistics included in its annual 

performance reports.

In a March 2004 report, the GAO reported on: (1) the guidance and 

procedures followed by federal law enforcement agencies regarding counting 

investigations and arrests, and (2) how investigations and arrests statistics 

are used.26 The report also discussed whether multiple agencies were 

counting and reporting the same investigations and arrests. The GAO 

concluded that law enforcement agencies often count the same 

investigations and arrests resulting from joint operations and present these 

statistics in their public documents and budget justifications. The GAO also 

observed that: (1) none of the law enforcement agencies reviewed have a 

central repository of joint investigations and arrests, and (2) not all of the 

agencies distinguish between unilateral and joint arrests and investigations 

within their databases. The GAO concluded that making this distinction 

 24 U.S. General Accounting Office, Justice Department: Better Management 

Oversight and Internal Controls Needed to Ensure Accuracy of Terrorism-Related Statistics,

GAO-03-266 (January 2003). On July 7, 2004, the GAO was renamed the Government 

Accountability Office.

25 Mark Fazlollah and Peter Nicholas, “U.S. Overstates Arrests in Terrorism,” The

Philadelphia Inquirer, December 16, 2001.

26 U.S. General Accounting Office, Federal Law Enforcement: Information on the 

Use of Investigation and Arrest Statistics, GAO-04-411 (March 2004). The GAO reviewed

six federal agencies: the Drug Enforcement Administration; FBI; United States Marshals 

Service; the former U.S. Customs Service and Immigration and Naturalization Service, now 

part of the Department of Homeland Security; and United States Postal Inspection Service.
38

would help Congress when making budget decisions related to these 

agencies.
39

APPENDIX III

THE NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION’S RESPONSE TO 

THE DRAFT AUDIT REPORT

U.S. Department of Justice

National Security Division

Office of the Assistant Attorney General Washington DC 20530

August 20, 2012

Michael E. Horowitz

Inspector General

U.S. Department of Justice

Washington, DC 20530

Re: Response to the Follow-Up Audit of the Department of Justice's Internal Controls

Over Reporting of Terrorism-Related Statistics: The National Security Division

Dear Inspector General Horowitz:

Thank you for the opportunity to provide a response to the Office of the Inspector

General (OIG) report on its Follow-Up Audit of the Department of Justice's Internal Controls 

Over Reporting of Terrorism-Related Statistics: The National Security Division. I have

attached the results of the National Security Division (NSD)'s sensitivity review, as well as

NSD's official response, concurring with each of the recommendations in this Report and

setting out the actions that NSD has taken to address each of them.

Please let me know if NSD can be of further assistance on this or any other issue.

Sincerely,

Lisa O. Monaco 

Assistant Attorney General

National Security Division
40

National Security

Division

Response to Follow-up of the Department of Justice's Internal Controls Over Reporting 

of

Terrorism-Related Statistics: National Security

Division

The National Security Division (NSD) appreciates that the OIG acknowledges in its

report regarding its Follow-up of the Department of Justice's Internal Controls Over

Reporting of Terrorism-Related Statistics: National Security Division (Report) that NSD has 

"improved its reporting of terrorism related statistics," in part through the revision of its

procedures for gathering, verifying, classifying, and reporting those figures. See Report, page

24. As the

Report acknowledges, NSD's statistics did not appear to be significantly overstated or 

understated; nevertheless, we agree that NSD's implementation of its revised procedures has 

not been fully effective at ensuring accurate reporting, and that the controls NSD has in place

for gathering, verifying, and reporting its terrorism-related statistics should be further 

strengthened.

NSD is committed to ensuring that investigations and casework related to terrorism and 

terrorist threats are reported accurately and, as further outlined below, has already taken steps

to implement all three of the OIG's recommendations.

Recommendation 1. Ensure that established procedures for maintaining documentation to 

support all terrorism-related statistics reported are followed. Such documentation should 

contain a list of the individuals, cases, or other applicable data necessary to verify the

overall number or percentage reported for each statistic.

• Resolved. NSD concurs with this recommendation, and going forward, its

Counterterrorism Section (CTS) will maintain both an electronic snapshot and a hard

copy record of the data from its case tracking system used to support operational 

statistics at the time such statistics are reported in NSD budget, Congressional, or other 

documents.

Recommendation 2. Ensure that the draft procedures developed by the Office of Justice

for Victims of Overseas Terrorism for gathering, verifying, and reporting its terrorismrelated statistics are formally published.

• Action complete. NSD concurs with this recommendation, and in July 2012, the Office 

of Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism (OVT) published its Victims of Overseas 

Terrorism Tracking Tool Circular Protocol for all OVT employees. It is available on a 

part of NSD's intranet accessible to OVT employees. The Tracking Tool is an

automated organization and management system that enables the OVT promptly to
41

access information about the criminal justice response to overseas attacks with U.S.

citizen victims and OVT's efforts to assist those victims. The Circular Protocol explains 

in

detail how the Tracking Tool functions and the roles played by OVT personnel.

• Technical comment. OVT has assessed that on page 11, box 3, the total number of 

victims that OIG sampled for 2009 was 71, not 67. Following OIG's assessment that 3 

of

67 victims were missing address information, OIG reviewed an additional four 

victims from the same case in which missing information was found, and those four 

were also found to be missing address information. These four victims were included 

in the number of victims reported by OIG as "actually not verified until FY 2010," 

and thus should also be included in the total number of victims reviewed by OIG. 

OVT suggests that the result included in box 3 would be accurate if changed to state: 

However, we found that for 7 of 71 victims tested for FY 2009 NSD did not receive

address information until FY 2010 and should not have been counted."

Recommendation 3. Ensure that the definitions included in the budget for reported statistics 

clearly identify how the group of items counted for each statistic was determined.

• Action complete. NSD concurs with this recommendation, and has changed its

budget language for current and future budget presentations to more clearly articulate

how data is grouped to calculate the terrorism-related statistics reported in those 

documents (e.g., statistics-reflecting "cases" favorably resolved has been changed to

"defendants" whose cases were favorably resolved). Going forward, the NSD

Executive Office, in coordination with CTS and NSD leadership, will continue to

ensure that NSD budget documents clearly and consistently define the data behind 

reported terrorism-related statistics.

Because NSD already has addressed each of these recommendations by improving its 

controls over reporting of terrorism-related statistics, we believe that no further actions are 

required. NSD is committed to effectively implementing these recommendations on a 

continuing basis, so that we can ensure that investigations and casework related to terrorism 

and terrorist threats are reported accurately.

2
42

APPENDIX IV

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS

NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT

The OIG provided a draft of this audit report to the NSD. The NSD’s 

response is incorporated in Appendix III of this final report. The following 

provides the OIG analysis of the response and summary of actions necessary 

to close the report.

Recommendation Number:

1. Resolved. The NSD concurred with our recommendation to ensure 

that established procedures for maintaining documentation to support 

all terrorism-related statistics reported are followed. The NSD stated 

in its response that its Counterterrorism Section intends to maintain 

both an electronic snapshot and a hard copy record of the data from its 

case tracking system used to support operational statistics at the time 

such statistics are reported in the NSD’s budget, congressional, and

other documents. 

This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation 

demonstrating that the NSD revised its circular containing internal 

control procedures for gathering, verifying, and reporting terrorismrelated statistics. The circular should require that NSD maintain both 

an electronic snapshot and a hard copy record of the data from its case 

tracking system used to support operational statistics reported in the 

NSD’s budget, congressional, and other documents.

2. Resolved. The NSD concurred with our recommendation to ensure 

that the draft procedures developed by the Office of Justice for

Victims of Overseas Terrorism (OVT) for gathering, verifying, and 

reporting its terrorism-related statistics are formally published. The 

NSD stated in its response that in July 2012, OVT published its Victims 

of Overseas Terrorism Tracking Tool Circular Protocol that explains in 

detail how the tracking tool functions and the roles played by OVT 

staff. The NSD also made a technical comment regarding the number 

of reported victims for FY 2009 that the OIG tested. In response to 

the NSD’s comment, we made minor edits to the tables on pages 11 

and 33 to clarify the number of reported victims that we tested. 
43

This recommendation can be closed when we receive and verify the 

adequacy of OVT’s July 2012 published procedures for gathering, 

verifying, and reporting its terrorism-related statistics.

3. Resolved. The NSD concurred with our recommendation to ensure 

that the definitions included in the budget for reported statistics clearly 

identify how the group of items counted for each statistic was 

determined. The NSD stated in its response that it has changed its 

budget language for current and future budget presentations to more 

clearly articulate how data is grouped to calculate the terrorism-related 

statistics reported in those documents. As an example, the NSD 

stated that the definition for its statistic reflecting cases favorably 

resolved has been changed to defendants whose cases were favorably 

resolved. The NSD’s response also stated that its Executive Office, in 

coordination with the Counterterrorism Section and NSD leadership, 

will ensure that NSD budget documents clearly and consistently define 

the data behind reported terrorism-related statistics.

 

This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence

demonstrating that the NSD has revised: (1) the budget language for 

current and future budget presentations to clearly identify how the 

group of items counted for each statistic was determined; and

(2) its circular containing internal control procedures for gathering, 

verifying, and reporting terrorism-related statistics to show that the 

NSD’s Executive Office, in coordination with the Counterterrorism 

Section and NSD leadership, will verify that terrorism-related statistics 

reported are clearly and consistently defined and support the data 

behind the terrorism-related statistic.