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i 

98–916 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–88] 

RECOMMENDATIONS FROM 

THE NATIONAL COMMISSION 

ON THE FUTURE OF THE ARMY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL 

AIR AND LAND FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 10, 2016 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio, Chairman 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

PAUL COOK, California 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

THOMAS MACARTHUR, New Jersey 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

JESSE TOLLESON, Professional Staff Member 

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

NEVE SCHADLER, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Tsongas, Hon. Niki, a Representative from Massachusetts, Subcommittee on 

Tactical Air and Land Forces .............................................................................. 2 

Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces .................................................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

Ham, GEN Carter, USA (Ret.), Chairman, National Commission on the Future of the Army, and Hon. Robert F. Hale, Commissioner, National Commission on the Future of the Army .................................................................... 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Ham, GEN Carter ............................................................................................ 36 

Turner, Hon. Michael R. .................................................................................. 33 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Statement from Reserve Officers Association of the United States ............. 47 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE NATIONAL 

COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF THE ARMY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES, 

Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 10, 2016. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael R. Turner 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Mr. TURNER. The hearing will come to order. We have votes that 

are coming up, so we are going to try to get through our opening 

statements, General Ham’s opening statement, and then return for 

questions. 

So the subcommittee meets today, along with members of the full 

committee, to receive testimony on the findings and recommendations of the National Commission on the Future of the Army 

[NCFA]. I would like to welcome our distinguished panel, General 

Carter Ham, U.S. Army, retired, Chairman of the Commission appointed by Chairman Thornberry, and the Honorable Robert F. 

Hale, the commissioner appointed by Ranking Member Smith. Mr. 

Hale was also the lead for the Commission’s subcommittee on aviation issues. 

The Congress was prompted to form the Commission in large 

part over two major concerns. The first was how the Army should 

best organize and employ the total force in a time of declining resources. The second was whether the Army should proceed with the 

transfer of AH–64 Apache aircraft from the Reserve Components to 

the Regular Army, as directed by the Army’s Aviation Restructure 

Initiative, ARI. 

The Commission reported its findings to Congress and the administration on January 28, 2016, and made 63 recommendations, 

19 of which were directed towards Congress for potential action. 

This will provide the committee with enough time to review the 

recommendations as the committee prepares to mark the National 

Defense Authorization Act for 2017. 

In considering recommendations, the Commission was instructed 

to take into account, quote: ‘‘anticipated mission requirements for 

the Army at acceptable levels of national risk in a manner consistent with available resources and anticipated future resources.’’ 
2 

I want to underscore those last two, because it is a significant 

limit upon the Commission’s view, and that was available resources 

and anticipated future resources. 

Consequently, the Commission assumed that the Army budget is 

flat-lined at the fiscal year 2016 Presidential budget levels. The 

Commission has indicated that a total force Army of 980,000 soldiers is an acceptable level of risk, but is the lowest total end 

strength the Army can go given mission requirements and the current defense strategic planning guidance. Again, the Commission 

did not consider the potential for budget increases over the amount 

of the fiscal year 2016 Presidential budget. 

However, the Commission did acknowledge that the current defense guidance does not include emerging threats such as Russian 

aggression and the growing threat of ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq 

and the Levant]. The Commission then further notes that perhaps, 

quote, their ‘‘greatest concern is the inadequacy of that guidance.’’ 

We have heard senior military leaders testify before this committee that our military is operating at the ‘‘ragged edge’’ and that 

current assumptions in the defense guidance are rosy at best. Here 

is what we know. The Army is being asked to do more with less. 

Demands from the combat commands for Army capabilities and capacity continue to increase. The world’s security environment is 

considerably worse now than when the Department of Defense conducted its more recent Quadrennial Defense Review in 2014. 

Going beyond just Russia and ISIL, North Korea conducted another ballistic missile test over the weekend. The Army has soldiers 

deployed in over 140 countries. The Army has provided over 1.5 

million troop-years to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001. 

And the Army has nearly 100,000 soldiers committed to the Pacific 

and continues to deter aggression in the Korean peninsula. However, despite these demands, the Army has continued to downsize 

and budgets have been reduced. 

I hope today we can engage in candid discussion regarding total 

Army force capability and capacity as compared to the current and 

emerging threats. I want to briefly touch on the Army’s Aviation 

Restructure Initiative, or ARI. 

Originally, the ARI had proposed numerous changes to Army 

aviation capacity, including the transfer of all Apache helicopters 

out of the Army National Guard to the Regular Army. The Commission examined three comprehensive options for the Army’s ARI, 

and we look forward to hearing more details about their final recommendations. This should also provide a great opportunity for the 

committee to gain a better understanding of the Commission’s 

views in how to better utilize the Reserve Components. 

Before we begin, I would like to return to my good friend and colleague, Niki Tsongas, for her opening remarks. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the Appendix on page 33.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. NIKI TSONGAS, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM MASSACHUSETTS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR 

AND LAND FORCES 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good afternoon to 

our witnesses. I appreciate you both being here. 
3 

The National Commission on the Future of the Army had an ambitious task, and I commend the commissioners—the two of you— 

and their staff for the work they put into this report. I would also 

like to thank the chairman for opening the hearing to the full committee, as these topics impact the men and women of our Army stationed across the country and around the world. 

As many of us in this hearing have heard before, the Army is 

being asked to do more with less against an array of diverse and 

complex global threats. These constraints require the Army, the 

Department of Defense [DOD], and Congress to closely examine the 

appropriate distribution of active Guard and Reserve forces, as well 

as the right mix of capabilities needed to defend the United States 

and its allies. 

Today’s challenges also require the Army to ensure that it is optimizing the performance of its soldiers to see that they remain the 

best trained and best equipped force in the world. 

The Commission’s recommendations appear to fall into three 

broad categories. First, the Commission made specific recommendations regarding the size, location, and composition of the Army. 

Second, the Commission report makes many recommendations on 

how to further integrate the Reserve Components of the Army, the 

National Guard and Army Reserve, with the Regular Army. Finally, the report includes recommendations on the future of Army 

aviation, and in particular the question of where Apache helicopters should reside. 

I look forward to hearing more details about how the Commission reached its conclusions on all these topics. I would also like 

to hear more about the cost associated with the Commission’s recommendations. If Congress chooses to pursue any of the recommendations in the report, the money will have to come from somewhere, either within the Army or from another military service’s 

budget. 

Fully understanding these potential tradeoffs is a critical part of 

considering the Commission’s recommendations. These are not easy 

decisions to make, and I appreciate the opportunity to have a robust debate here in Congress on the way forward. I look forward 

to hearing more about how you arrived at some of your key recommendations. 

Thank you. And with that, I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Congresswoman Tsongas. 

I ask unanimous consent that non-subcommittee members be allowed to participate in today’s hearing after all subcommittee members have had an opportunity to ask questions. Is there objection? 

Without objection, non-subcommittee members will be recognized 

at the appropriate time for 5 minutes. 

With that, General Ham. 

STATEMENT OF GEN CARTER HAM, USA (RET.), CHAIRMAN, 

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF THE ARMY, 

AND HON. ROBERT F. HALE, COMMISSIONER, NATIONAL 

COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF THE ARMY 

General HAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ms. Tsongas, 

thank you very much. On behalf of all my fellow commissioners 

and the great staff that support us, I thank you for inviting me and 
4 

Secretary Hale to testify before the committee on a report on the 

future of the Army. 

The committee and your staff have already received the Commission’s report, so I won’t spend a lot of time addressing specific 

points. But I would like to give you a sense of how we approach 

the task that you gave to us in the fiscal year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA]. 

The Commission made every effort to be inclusive, accessible, 

and transparent. We visited 17 States and interacted with over 320 

different Army units across all 3 components. We interacted with 

all 54 adjutants general and with 33 Governors. About 80 Members 

of Congress engaged with the Commission, as well, and we met 

with all 6 geographic combatant commanders and many of our 

most important allies and foreign partners, and that frankly is only 

a partial list of our engagements. 

As Chairman Turner indicated, we paid strict attention to the 

law you passed creating the Commission. Importantly, our recommendations had to be consistent with, I quote: ‘‘acceptable levels 

of national risk and anticipated future resources.’’ 

In other words, we simply were not unbounded in our work. 

The result is a set of 63 specific recommendations that we believe 

are well researched, based on realistic assumptions, and backed by 

solid data. First, America’s Army is the best in the world. Those 

who wear the uniform deserve our gratitude each and every day. 

But even those great men and women serving in uniform, the 

Army faces severe challenges, many of them budget-driven. 

From fiscal years 2010 to 2015, overall defense spending declined 

7 percent, but Army funding declined 14 percent. On the two main 

issues before the Commission—force size and mix and the Apache 

transfer—the Commission found the following. An Army of 980,000 

is the minimally sufficient force to meet current and anticipated 

missions at an acceptable level of national risk. Within that 

980,000, the Commission finds the Regular Army should be 

450,000, an Army National Guard of 335,000, and the Army Reserve at 195,000, represent the right mix of forces and, again, the 

absolute minimum levels to meet America’s national security objectives. 

To fully understand this recommendation, it is important to remember again the mandate that you gave us. We were tasked to 

size the force in light of the two previously mentioned considerations—acceptable risk and anticipated resourcing. Adjust either or 

both of those and you would reasonably arrive at very different 

conclusions. In our assessment, an Army of 980,000 is again the 

absolute minimum; a floor, not a ceiling. 

On the Apache question, the Commission recommends the Army 

maintain 24 manned Apache battalions, 20 in the Regular Army 

and 4 in the Army National Guard. The Commission recommendation has advantages over the Aviation Restructure Initiative in 

both wartime capacity and surge capacity and it will reduce peacetime deployment stress. It will also, in our view, promote better integration of the Regular Army and the Army National Guard. 

To offset the cost of having four Apache battalions in the Guard, 

the Commission suggests that the Army add only two Black Hawk 

battalions to the Guard instead of the four that are currently 
5 

planned, and we recommend some slowing of Black Hawk modernization. 

The report also contains several prominent themes based on the 

Commission’s fact-finding and analysis. The Commission considers 

sustaining the All-Volunteer Force vital to the future of the Nation. 

A return to a draft or other model of compulsory military service 

will not yield the quality Army the Nation requires, but an AllVolunteer Force is expensive to recruit and retain. We believe 

doing so is the right choice. 

The Commission believes it is critically important to develop a 

true total force culture. While the Regular Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve are distinct, essential, and 

interdependent, they are meant to operate as one force, with their 

efforts fully integrated. We found gaps and seams that exist in the 

implementation of the total force policy, and our report highlights 

some of those and offers some remedies. 

For example, we recommend putting all Army marketing under 

one office, fielding a consolidated pay and personnel system, and 

making changes to the existing section 12304b authority that will 

make it easier for the Army to employ the Reserve Components. 

The Commission recommends funding at the President’s fiscal year 

2016 level, which would provide the Army with the minimum resources necessary to meet its requirements and acceptable levels of 

risk. 

But given the evolving strategic environment and the potential 

for growing instability, even this level of funding may prove inadequate. Additionally, Army funding must be predictable. Successive 

years of budget uncertainty and continuing resolutions have had 

significant negative consequences for the Army. 

It should be understood that in the Commission’s view even with 

budgets at the President’s budget for fiscal year 2016, the Army 

would still suffer from some significant shortfalls in aviation and 

short-range air defense, as well as other capabilities that we address in the report. 

That is a very brief rundown of what we found. Certainly not everyone will agree with our recommendations. Indeed, many have 

already voiced their disagreement. What I do hope, though, is that 

our report will contribute to the important debate that you and the 

Congress and the administration and the Army—indeed, the Nation—must have to determine how America’s Army should be sized, 

trained, modernized, and postured. 

With that, Secretary Hale and I are prepared to answer your 

questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Ham can be found in the Appendix on page 36.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, General. It is our honor to have our 

chairman with us today, and I recognize Chairman Thornberry. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to take 

a moment—and I know I speak on behalf of Mr. Smith, as well— 

to express our appreciation to General Ham and to Mr. Hale for 

their willingness to serve on this Commission, as well as the work 

that the Commission has done, as well as the staff that have made 

all this possible. 
6 

I think that you all have done exactly what we asked you to do 

in answering some very specific questions, but as General Ham 

was just referring, you have also set up some of the larger discussion that we need to pursue, such as how we make sure all the 

components of the Army work together in a total force. 

So I think this is very good and very important work, and I just 

want to express appreciation to the work of the commissioners and 

the staff. In a relatively short amount of time, you have dealt with 

some very big issues. So thank you. 

And I would yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to thank 

both of you for the work that you have done. And it is incredibly 

helpful to us. We also need to look at it in the context of the limitations that you were given in putting the construct together. 

And so with that, General Ham, I have a question for you. It 

wasn’t within your charge. You were constrained and limited by 

budget caps. But I would ask if you could opine, if Congress did 

have additional funds to allocate, would you recommend that Congress stop the Army drawdown? General Ham. 

General HAM. Yes, thanks, Mr. Chairman. As the Commission 

did not look at that issue specifically, let me speak personally rather than as chairman of the Commission. It is my view that with 

additional funding, were additional funding to be available, some 

of the capability shortfalls that we mentioned in the report, some 

in aviation, short-range air defense, missile defense, military police, 

wheeled vehicle transport, and some other capabilities would be 

highly beneficial to the Army and would reduce the risk that we 

assessed given the size of the force that we recommended. 

So I think that is where additional capability, additional capacity 

would buy down risk over time. And maybe Secretary Hale has 

some thoughts. 

Mr. HALE. May I briefly on the budget side of this? The budget 

that was released yesterday has less resources—and I think you all 

know—for the Army and DOD than was in the fiscal year 2016 

budget plan, by a significant amount. So we are already off the 

track that the Commission assumed in terms of funding for DOD. 

And I think the Commission feels strongly we need to get back on 

that track in 2018 and beyond, and 2017 if that is possible. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. General Ham, of course, I am referring 

to the total force drawdown numbers. In your report, you have said 

what the force needs to do, and you have said what some of the 

threats are as to how that force can be utilized. But as you know, 

the total force drawdown is based on budgetary constraints that 

you were given. 

If Congress had the resources and we could stop the drawdown 

of the total force numbers, should we? 

General HAM. Mr. Chairman, I believe doing so would be wise, 

and it would afford the Army the opportunity to gain some of those 

capabilities that are currently in shortfall. The one caveat that I 

would offer, Mr. Chairman, is it is not just about the size. The size 

is important. But the size of that force, that Army must be properly 

modernized, trained, and resourced. So it is not just the number. 

It is all—— 
7 

Mr. TURNER. But, General, let me interrupt you for just a second. 

I understand that what you are saying is that in addition to having 

the force numbers, you have to have resources, you have to have 

training, you have to have capability for those force numbers. But 

I appreciate your statement that the total force number does matter and that if we had the resources, your recommendation it’d be 

that we not draw the force down, but that we also in addition to 

it adequately equip it, train it, and provide it with capability. 

General HAM. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. I agree with that. 

Mr. TURNER. Okay, thank you. One other question, and then I 

will turn to Congresswoman Tsongas. 

In looking to Europe, Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, Commanding General of Army Europe, has stated that there used to be 

300,000 soldiers in Europe during the height of the Cold War. 

Today we have 30,000 distributed all over Central and Eastern Europe with the same mission—to assure allies and to deter Russia, 

just like we did in the Cold War, according to General Hodges. 

There is a big difference in capability and capacity between 

300,000 and 30,000. General Ham, could you elaborate on the Commission’s reasoning for recommending number 14, to realign an 

ABCT [armored brigade combat team] back to Europe? And could 

you give the committee your thoughts on whether this should be 

a permanent station or rotational unit? 

General HAM. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Our recommendation is 

that an armored brigade combat team be forward stationed, assigned to Europe, rather than the current model of rotational 

forces. Rotational forces are certainly capable and offer a lot to the 

command, but it is our assessment that stationing an armored brigade combat team in Europe has two effects. 

One, it conveys a sense of permanence and commitment, which 

is helpful both in deterrence and in assurance. But secondly, we 

found in the larger sense that the Army’s nine—the Regular 

Army’s nine armored brigade combat teams are totally consumed 

in the current rotational model, which has rotational armored brigades to Korea, that basically is three to make one, to the Mideast, 

three to make one, and Europe, three to make one, which means 

all nine armored brigade combat teams in the Regular Army are 

committed, leaving no capacity for an unforeseen contingency. 

If the Army were allowed to forward station an armored brigade 

combat team in Europe, that would provide not only positive effects 

on deterrence and assurance, but it would provide some residual 

capacity to the Army for an unforeseen contingency. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. We are going to pause. Votes have been 

called. I thank both of you for your patience. But we will be returning for additional questions after the votes. That will be recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. We will resume the hearing and turn 

to Congresswoman Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to follow up. 

You have issued 63 total recommendations, and close to 20 of those 

were directed towards Congress that we needed to act. But I am 

curious how you would rank order them, if there are some that you 

see more pressing and others that could be addressed later. And I 

will start with you, General Ham. 
8 

General HAM. Thanks, ma’am. We purposely did not prioritize 

the recommendations, but I think—I will offer my thoughts on ones 

that perhaps might require a little more attention than others. For 

me, it would begin with the very first recommendation that says 

maintain and sustain the All-Volunteer Force, and clearly, Congress’s role in that is absolutely essential. I think, frankly, if we 

don’t do that, the rest of it almost doesn’t matter, because we have 

got to have the quality women and men to join the Army that are 

necessary. 

Secondly, I would emphasize the Congress’s role in assuring prediction and responsible budgeting for the Army. I think that is absolutely vital to give that element of stability and predictability to 

the Army in its funding processes. 

Thirdly, there are a number of recommendations that address 

specific actions that cause the total force policy to be implemented 

more fully. Some of those require some legislative change, and so 

I would group those total force recommendations perhaps as a next 

priority for the Congress to address. 

And again, just the larger recommendation with regard to the 

size and readiness of the force, the 980,000 at required levels of 

readiness, I think that would obviously also rank very, very high. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Secretary Hale, would you agree with that? Or 

would you have a slightly different prioritize? 

Mr. HALE. No, I agree with it. I want to underscore the need for 

predictable budgets. This turmoil is just eating the time of senior 

leaders and the Congress, I might add. 

Let me just give a couple of examples of the last theme that General Ham raised, and that is integrating into the total force. I think 

the Apache recommendation actually fits within this category. And 

that if you follow the Commission’s recommendation, there will be 

one other area of connective tissue between the Guard and the Regular Army. 

But the recommendations on multicomponent units are also I 

think very important. The Army is already doing this, but I think 

the Commission believes they could do more. And we made some 

specific suggestions for a pilot program in aviation that could lead 

to more multicomponent units. And there are a number of others, 

like integrated recruiting. 

So there are several, I think, specific ideas that fit within the 

theme that General Ham raised of integrating the Regular Army 

and the Guard in a better manner. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Did you identify costs associated with that integration? And how did you—or not? And if so, how would you pay for 

them? Were there tradeoffs you would make in favor of that, moving forward in that way? 

General HAM. Ma’am, the one area where we tried to address 

costs specifically as to tradeoffs was in the aviation realm. For the 

other recommendations, we did not. Frankly, time and capacity of 

the staff and expertise, we did not have the time to offer specific 

cost findings with many of the other recommendations. I am seated 

next to the cost expert, as you know. 

Mr. HALE. A title I am trying to shed. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Mr. Secretary, you might have some off-the-top-ofyour-head idea of cost. 
9 

Mr. HALE. No, I think I won’t go there. But I will say, in the 

aviation area, we did do costing there, that Congress specifically 

tasked us to look at the Apache transfer. And the—although the 

Commission’s recommendation adds to capacity and peacetime capabilities, it does add to costs, about $165 million a year in operating costs and around $400 million in one-time procurement costs. 

And we did offer what we called an illustration of ways to offset 

that cost through a slight decrease in the size of the Black Hawk 

fleet and a modest slowdown in a modernization of the fleet. It is 

not that Black Hawks aren’t important; they are. But they are a 

large fleet, and we felt that it was more important, if you had to 

offset the costs, it was more important to accomplish the Apache 

transfer even if some offsets had to be made. 

And there were some other general offsets that were discussed, 

as well. So we certainly paid attention to costs. Although as General Ham said, outside of aviation, we did not specifically cost each 

option. 

Ms. TSONGAS. At least it is an acknowledgement that there are 

costs associated with this and that in the world of constrained resources that as we move forward we are going to have to think 

about that as we implement or not some of these recommendations—— 

Mr. HALE. But some of them won’t add to cost. I mean, for example, the multicomponent units, if you use the same units—I mean, 

unless you add the units—you won’t significantly add to costs. I 

think some of the things can be done without significantly added 

costs, and I would hope that when you see the Army’s response 

that they will identify some of those for you. 

Ms. TSONGAS. I have a follow-on question. In the end, in an AllVolunteer Force, in any Army, it comes down to the people that you 

are able to attract. And what I would like to do—one of the recommendations was you want to stop cuts in the overall size of the 

Army. But even if this was followed, our troop levels will still be 

at the lowest levels in decades. So that is why I do think that those 

you do have are of the highest caliber. 

So how can the Army continue to improve the physical, the psychological, the cognitive, the overall human performance of the 

force to make sure that those that you are attracting are able to 

perform at the highest level and you make the most of every soldier? 

General HAM. Thanks, ma’am. As you know, that was not a specific charge to the Commission to look at that issue. So if you will 

allow me to step away from my role as chairman and speak perhaps to some of the things that we observe throughout the force. 

The young women and men of the Army, all three components, 

Regular Army, Army National Guard, Army Reserve, what we 

heard loud and clear is that they joined to serve. They want to be 

utilized. So that is part of, I think, the recruiting and retention 

challenge for a quality force is use that force. 

We heard—this is anecdotal—but we heard from a number of 

young soldiers, mid-grade soldiers, particularly in the Reserve 

Components, that if they weren’t going to be utilized, if they 

weren’t going to be operationally employed, well they might choose 

to do something else. So I think that has an important part of it. 
10 

I think a second component to successful recruiting and retention 

is that the young people who we’ve had the great fortune to engage 

with across the Army, they want to feel like what they are doing 

makes a difference, that they are making a valuable contribution. 

Certainly they are concerned about compensation; that is certainly 

an important piece of this. But it is not only the piece. It is not 

the only piece of their sense of service. 

And so I think it is this combination of challenge, of importance 

of mission, combined with the proper level of compensation that 

will allow the Army to continue to attract in an admittedly declining pool of eligible women and men across the country to serve, but 

will continue to attract the bright young people that the Nation 

needs in its Army to maintain its vitality and effectiveness. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Secretary Hale, do you have any thoughts about 

it? Yes, it is not an easy challenge that the Army then has taken 

on, in terms of just making sure it can recruit and retain those 

that can meet the tests, whatever they may be. And to ensure that 

you have the capabilities you need across the force, as well, not just 

at the individual that is feeling well able to contribute at the highest level, but that you are also finding all the talent you need for 

the specific jobs, and you kind of align them properly. 

General HAM. Yes, ma’am. I think that is right. And, of course, 

the requirements are changing. But I think we found certainly 

young people with highly technical educational backgrounds that 

are attracted to work in growing fieldings such as cyber defense 

and the like. And so looking for opportunities to match those skills 

and attributes that young people bring with the needs of the Army 

I think will be a vital component, again, to maintaining the excellence that the Army has achieved over many years. 

And I would add just one other point is, the people who serve, 

they want to know that they are serving in the world’s best Army. 

That requires a continued emphasis on leader development. It also 

entails a commitment to modernizing the force, to make sure that 

the soldiers are properly equipped to encounter any potential adversary. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you for your testimony. 

I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Fleming. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, General, thank 

you for your service in uniform and your continued service in retirement, which is not so much of retirement. You are actively 

working now, and we thank you for that. 

I was here earlier when you testified. And if I understand correctly, you said that 980,000 is really an absolute floor that we 

have to operate from. And I assume you also mean 450,000 for the 

Active Duty Component. Is that still correct? 

General HAM. Doctor, that is correct. So that we were careful in 

the words that we chose. And so we chose that an Army of 980,000 

broken down by components, 450,000 Regular Army, 335,000 National Guard, 195,000 in the Army Reserve, is minimally sufficient. 

We were careful about those words. 

Dr. FLEMING. So it is really not even close to being ideal, where 

we really need to be on our manpower strength? 
11 

General HAM. We of course, we are not charged with recommending what might the ideal force be. It was, what was the force 

within acceptable risk and with anticipated resourcing? So that is 

how we came to that agreement amongst the Commission, that 

minimally sufficient was the right descriptor. 

Dr. FLEMING. Would you comment on the fact that this administration’s budget, because of increasing OCO [overseas contingency 

operations] needs, is now wanting to pull OCO out of base budget? 

Would you like to comment on that and what impact it has on this 

end strength number? 

General HAM. Doctor, if you will allow me, I will make a brief 

comment and then look to the guy who understands this better 

than I do. I think one of the challenges with the overseas contingency operations funding is its lack of predictability, and that is 

why I think it is important to make sure that there is the right 

level and a predictable level of funding in the Army’s base funding 

so that they can undertake many of the modernization efforts that 

are necessary. 

As far as the impacts, let me turn to my partner here. 

Mr. HALE. Well, the Commission focused on the minimum needed 

resources, and we really didn’t look at how it ought to be funded. 

And I want to reiterate that we endorse the fiscal year 2016 plan, 

and we are not on that track now, as you know. The Army is significantly below those resources in this budget because of the Bipartisan Budget Agreement last year. 

In terms of OCO, if I could follow General Ham and step away 

a bit from the Commission, it has the problems that he just said. 

You don’t want to fund a lot of things in OCO because it is only 

one year at a time and the Department desperately needs to be 

able to look out over several years in planning programs. 

That said, if the environment is such that it is the only way to 

go, at least I personally wouldn’t turn it down. I think we have got 

to make things work. 

Dr. FLEMING. Right, right, excellent. Also, again, back to you, 

General. The Commission cited the unstoppable OPTEMPO [operations tempo] within the Active Component a number of times 

throughout the report. Could the Commission provide some more 

specifics on what it found on the high rate of deployments, the current small size of the force, and how this has strained the Army? 

General HAM. Yes, sir. Again, so we engage soldiers across the 

Army. We found the high operations tempo, rapid deployments 

below that level which is optimal for the Active Component, which 

would ideally be at least 2 years at home for 1 year operationally 

deployed, 4 or 5 years at home for the Reserve Components for 

every year mobilized or operationally deployed. 

We found lots of units that were, particularly in the Regular 

Army, spinning faster than that, particularly in certain fields: aviation, missile defense, special forces, to be sure, and many others. 

Part of that, the Commission felt, was due to the challenge in assured access and funding to allow Reserve Component units to perform many of those missions, which they are certainly perfectly capable of performing, but in some cases that requires a bit of additional funding to pay principally the salaries for those mobilized or 

activated Reserve or National Guard soldiers. 
12 

Dr. FLEMING. Right. Well, let me just say in ending here, I want 

to thank you again, General Ham, for your position on this, that 

this is an absolute more ragged edge, as we often say, that we cannot go below this floor. And, really, all things being said, really, we 

need to have better funding and more manpower. 

But thank you. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. Mr. Walz. 

Mr. WALZ. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 

putting the emphasis on this report that it deserves and pointing 

out some of the critical issues we are going to be tackling here. And 

to the Commission, I can’t thank you enough for the work you did. 

On behalf of the co-authors, myself, Mr. Graves, Mr. Miller, Mr. 

Meadows, and former member Rahall, who put this in the NDAA, 

rarely have I seen since I have been here the letter and the intent, 

the congressional intent to carry it out the way you did it, and so 

thank you for that. 

It was to inform us before we made decisions going forward. The 

number of people you went and spoke to, it is astounding. And I 

hear feedback all the time, and I want a special thank you from 

those National Guard folks out in Minnesota, that you took the 

time, you included them in this discussion. 

And so when you are speaking of these issues, you are speaking 

exactly the way we are hearing it, about what they want to do, 

they want to be part of this team, they want—and we deserve to 

give them the best training, best equipment, and then integrate 

them into that fight. So thank you for that. 

And it is on that that I would segue to, how do we do a better 

job? Did you come out of anything on that that maybe both of 

you—your opinions on this, General Ham—what do you think on 

integration? 

We have tried this before. We tried integrating battalions in. We 

took troops out and leaders and embedded them at times. Certainly, over the last 10 years, the Guard has picked up their fair 

share of the missions and done them, but how do we go forward 

to ensure that this is a part of the strength we need? 

General HAM. Congressman, I would offer two broad categories 

of how this might be enhanced in the future. One is, there has got 

to be from the very top leadership in the Army, from the Secretary 

of the Army and the Chief of Staff and the Sergeant Major of the 

Army, this continued emphasis on the total force. There is one 

Army. It happens to have three distinct interdependent, but essential components. 

But as General Milley, the Chief of Staff of the Army, points out 

in many of his public addresses, over every soldier’s breast pocket, 

it says U.S. Army. It doesn’t say anything else. It says U.S. Army, 

irrespective of component. So I think that cultural emphasis by the 

Army’s leadership is important. 

Having said that, there are some matters in policy and even 

some in law that would help in the Commission’s view to further 

the integration of the three components of the Army, such as the 

increased emphasis on the one Army school system, where, again, 

irrespective of component, your trained and educated the leader development programs for officers and noncommissioned officers are 
13 

the same. You know, you grow up in the Army and you have different roles, so that is one area that we think a difference could 

be made. 

And as I mentioned in my opening statement, some additional 

flexibility and, indeed, some additional resourcing in the section 

12304b authority that allows for the employment of Reserve Component forces would be helpful, again, I think, in integrating the 

total force. 

Mr. HALE. I couldn’t agree more. The tone at the top is key. And 

I sense hearing General Milley speak, that he does want more integration, and we have heard that privately from him, and I have 

seen it in his statements. In addition to what General Ham said, 

there are a couple others I mentioned earlier. I think the Apache 

transfer itself is another way to help toward integration, as are 

multicomponent units. 

I will mention two others that are in the report, one an integrated recruiting system. Right now, all three components have 

their own recruiting system, sometimes even competing with each 

other. The Commission recommended at least a pilot to look at integrating those. 

And the Army right now does not have a single pay and personnel system that allows everybody to see each other’s when the 

appropriate security guidelines, obviously. Integrated Pay and Personnel System–Army, IPPS–A, as it is called, is important I think 

to the overall integration. It is on its way. And I would urge that 

Congress fund it consistent with it meeting appropriate milestones, 

but treat it as a high-priority project. 

Mr. WALZ. Well, I appreciate your thoughtfulness. And I said, it 

is to inform members of this committee and probably more importantly the folks who aren’t on this committee that are in Congress. 

And I can’t stress enough to my colleagues—I think many of us are 

concerned about these end strength numbers and we are concerned, 

as we rightfully should be, simultaneously on costs. 

The Guard and Reserve is a way you can get your cake and eat 

it, too. And if it is done correctly, it has to be a part of this discussion. 

And so I encourage us to continue to take these recommendations 

to heart and the work that you did will inform us as we go forward. 

You have done a great service, and I appreciate it. 

I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Walz, I believe you have a unanimous consent 

request for the committee. 

Mr. WALZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. I did 

have—the Reserve Officers Association, I ask for unanimous consent to put their statement in the record. They, too, pretty much 

echo that and thank you for what you did and talk about the one 

Army total force, so if I could submit that. 

Mr. TURNER. Are there any objections? 

Mr. WALZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Without objection, the statement of the Reserve Officers Association will be included in the record. And turning to Mr. 

Gibson. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 47.] 
14 

Mr. GIBSON. Well, thanks, Mr. Chairman. And I thank the ranking member, as well. Thank you for your leadership on this very 

important issue and holding this hearing. I also want to welcome 

in and stress my gratitude to both of our panelists today for their 

distinguished career serving our service men and women and their 

families. 

You know, I want to echo the comments, certainly the work of 

the Commission. With regard to integrating the force, the total 

Army, I can recall back—although sometimes it seems like 1,000 

years ago, being 17 years old and enlisting as a private E–1 in the 

Army National Guard, serving 5 years there, and then going in the 

Regular Army for 24 years, and then now on this side. 

And while I think that there has always been good faith efforts 

to have this one force, I think that the weight of the Commission 

and Congressman Walz, highest ranking enlisted man to ever serve 

in these chambers, you know, and his team sponsoring this Commission I think is helpful, particularly when I see the Army leadership coming together and really wanting to do exactly this. 

I think it is going to be really important, which leads to my next 

point, and that, Secretary Hale, I thank you for the work that you 

have done over your career on really bringing efficiencies, the reforms that are necessary, because as you both point out, I mean, 

we don’t—end strength means very little if we have a hollowed-out 

force. We can’t have that. We need to have fully trained, equipped, 

and ready force, and it needs to be rightsized, too, but all of that 

has to come together. 

So towards that end, you know, I just want to build on some of 

the earlier testimony, and here I am just going to ask in your best 

professional judgment, General Ham, in your case, your best military judgment, when a BCT [brigade combat team] is stood down, 

and it is completed, how long does it take to turn the light back 

on? 

Based on our experiences over the past decade, from the idea to 

the enunciation to the recruiting to the initial training to the integration in the unit, the training to the deployment into an operational area, how long is that period? 

General HAM. Having some experience, Congressman, in doing 

this, having stood up an infantry brigade combat team while I was 

a division commander, I would say at the bare minimum, fully 

resourced, priority for manning, for equipment, and access to all 

the right training, I would say 18 months would be an absolute 

minimum, probably closer to somewhere in the neighborhood of 24 

to 36, from a cold start. 

Mr. GIBSON. Right. So that would be the unit. And I concur. I 

think that is most of our—and then of course you have—just to 

plan it in, you have to recruit. And then you have to actually get 

them to basic training and AIT [advanced individual training] and 

actually assess them into the unit, so it can take as long as 3 

years, when you actually put that whole package together. 

And that is what I wanted to really put into the record here, is 

that we are making decisions this year on end strength and for the 

American people to know that this is one that we assume a lot of 

risk. If we get this wrong, you know, it is not like, oh, well, you 

know, next month, we can just fix that. 
15 

If we draw down too far, you are looking at a 3-year lag time before we can even recur or we can regain that capability in our 

Armed Forces. And you acknowledge and agree? 

General HAM. Congressman, I do. It is one of the reasons why 

we make a number of recommendations with regard to enhancing 

the readiness of the Reserve Components, but we also address the 

issue of expansibility, which has not gotten a lot of attention over 

the past several years, but there must be processes in place and 

plans in place so that in the eventuality where the Army is required to expand quickly, we know how to do that. And I think that 

requires some additional attention. 

Mr. GIBSON. Indeed. And I noticed that in the Commission—and 

I think that was helpful. I will lay out a question now, but I then 

want to move—and we will see if we have any time we can recur 

back to it. But what I was interested from Secretary Hale is, you 

know, the analysis of given a scenario where we draw down and 

then we have to bring a BCT back on Active Duty, what does that 

cost in relation to whatever we think it is that we are saving? 

But let me move on and see if we have time to go back to that. 

I do want to ask this question, and that is this. General, in your 

earlier statement, you talked about impact on troops and families. 

Thank you for that. And you know, you know, no one arguably 

knows that as much as you do. My point I want to get clarification 

for the record is that is assuming deterrence here. That is assuming, you know, we don’t have to go fight one of these major theater 

wars. 

If we had to go fight a major theater war, what would the impact 

then be on families in terms of dwell time? And what would that— 

because you know very well what that looked like in 2007, 2008, 

is troops ended up spending 16 months in theater and, you know, 

11, 12 months back home, and then were rotating back. 

So if you could for the record say what the impact would be on 

troops and families, if we do get committed to one theater. 

General HAM. Yes, Congressman, I would commend to you and 

to all the members there is a classified annex to the report that addresses some of those issues in greater detail. But what I would 

say is that certainly in the case of a full-scale mobilization or commitment to a large-scale operation in any future theater or war, at 

the size of the Army that is anticipated, there is no dwell time. You 

know, for the most part, soldiers deploy and they are engaged for 

the duration. 

This is a commitment on the parts of soldiers and their families 

to the defense of the Nation, and we have got to make sure that 

our support for them is commensurate with their commitment. 

Mr. GIBSON. And I thank you. I think that is a very important 

point to enter into the record in terms of what the risk we are taking on for troops and families. 

I will yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Wenstrup. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank both of you 

gentlemen for your hard work and the information you have been 

able to provide us and give us some insight to all these very important matters. 
16 

I like to think a lot of times about our military force as being a 

deterrent for our adversaries in many ways. And I was wondering 

if you could weigh in and maybe comment on where our current 

state of the Army and military in general is serving as a deterrent 

to our adversaries. 

And I know we have different types of adversaries today, potential adversaries. There is the peer to peer nation type adversaries 

and then there is the terrorist type adversaries. 

But I wonder if you could comment on where you think we are 

today as far as being an effective deterrent to actions. 

General HAM. Doctor, thanks for that question. I guess I would 

characterize deterrence in a couple of different ways. One is, in the 

purely military capability and capacity that the Nation possesses. 

That is measurable. It is accessible by force posture and levels of 

readiness. And that certainly shaped many of our recommendations, particularly with regard to posture overseas in Korea and in 

Europe, where there are a couple of different recommendations 

with regard to ground forces and Army aviation forces. 

But deterrence also is based on elements of will and demonstrated capacity. It is one of the reasons why we think the presence of forces in Korea and in the case of Europe, we believe, the 

forward stationing of an armored brigade combat team conveys in 

very visible terms the will of the Nation to commit to deterrence. 

Mr. HALE. Thank you. Let me just add a thought, and that is I 

think where the Army is able to deploy it is highly capable. This 

is a strong Army. The problem is more its capacity and can it do 

it in all the potential areas where they might be needed. I think 

that is the trade. The risks that we take is not having enough to 

do all of these requirements, meet all of these requirements. Where 

they are deployed, they are a capable force. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. So what I am reading from that, General, especially your comments, when you talk about Europe, is we could be 

a greater deterrent than we currently are. 

General HAM. Doctor, we make a recommendation that—it gets 

to the issue of, as this force, as this Army was sized and planned 

for the future, the strategic environment is different than it is 

today. 

We did not—and most of the plans did not—we anticipated a 

very different relationship with Russia than what has evolved over 

the past couple of years. And we believe that that necessitates a 

relook, a rethinking of our overall strategy for employment of military forces for both deterrence, but also of assurance of our allies 

and partners. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. I thank you both very much. I appreciate you 

being here today and the work that you have done. 

I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Gentleman yields back. We will go to Mr. Veasey. 

Mr. VEASEY. Yes, I wanted to ask a specific question about the 

Commission considering the integration of women in the all-male 

ground combat units and what they think of the recommendations 

and, if so, what considerations are being made and determined on 

that issue. 

General HAM. Congressman, let me start—let me ask Secretary 

Hale to comment. This obviously was not a specific charge to the 
17 

Commission. And the policy decision to open all specialties to 

women was made pretty late in the Commission’s endeavors. 

Having said that, we did have the opportunity to engage with 

leaders, with soldiers, both women and men, across the force and 

in all three components. And so we had some discussion about this. 

And I think the first response is one that won’t surprise you, Congressman. It was from leaders at all levels that says, if the policy 

changes, because it was uncertain at that time, if the policy 

changes, we will embrace it and move out and apply the new policy 

to the best efforts that we have. 

I would tell you, again anecdotally, in engaging with women, particularly young women, both enlisted and officers, there were mixed 

feelings about their personal interest in serving in the ground combat arms or other specialties which had previously been closed to 

women, but there was near unanimity in opening the opportunity 

to women who had the desire to serve in those specialties and the 

capability to serve in those previously closed specialties. I think we 

heard loud and clear that there was broad acceptance of the opportunity to do so. 

Mr. HALE. I agree with what General Ham said. I mean, it 

wasn’t a Commission issue, but speaking personally, I think it was 

the right decision. We need to harness all the capability we—or at 

least offer the opportunity to harness all the capability we can in 

the United States military, and this was a move in that direction. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back. 

Mr. GIBSON [presiding]. Gentleman yields back. We will go to Ms. 

McSally, please. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen, for your service and your hard work on this Commission. 

And I want to go back to the Apache transfer, and to be full disclosure here, the Silverbell Army Heliport is just outside my district, and many of the guardsmen live in my district. So any community is going to be concerned if they are hearing that, you know, 

something is going to change, we are going to lose those citizen soldiers from our community. 

But aside from that, I am concerned about the operational impact of the executing this and then also the cost, as you mentioned. 

I have trained a lot as an A–10 pilot with the Apaches, tremendous 

location there with the weather and the airspace and the Barry 

Goldwater ranges, but it is a unit by itself. 

So I am assuming if your recommendations are put into place, 

then we would lose that unit and that, you know, it would be located at some Active Duty Army base. So they would miss out on 

the operational strengths of being located where they are, so that 

is of concern to me, just because of the proximity and the airspace, 

the weather, the joint training opportunities. 

But then also, as we have seen units sometimes go from Active 

to Guard or Reserve, you will see the expertise that we have of the 

pilots potentially flowing into the Guard and Reserve from Active 

Duty, so you can retain that expertise, but if you are going in the 

other direction, I am assuming you thought through—it is not likely to have a bunch of Guard pilots want to transition back to Active 

Duty. They have other jobs. They are rooted in the community. 
18 

So just the execution of that sounds very cumbersome to me. And 

also we might lose operational capability, certainly lose tremendous 

expertise if we go forward with your recommendations. It is not 

clear to me whether you are recommending with the four units 

staying in the Guard, would the training capability stay in the 

Guard and the operational capability be in Active Duty, just to 

clarify that? 

And then I do want to clarify, obviously, there is cost that comes 

with that, so what was the logic behind making a recommendation 

that is increasing costs? And could you clarify again what those 

costs are? 

General HAM. So I think let me start and then we will turn to 

Secretary Hale, who chaired the aviation subcommittee. Firstly, 

ma’am, we did not make any recommendations with regard to 

which units might be affected. We think that is left best to the 

Army. 

We did, as the law required us to do, we did, in fact, actually 

look at the process by which Army National Guard forces are allocated amongst the States and territories and found with some 

minor recommendations, mostly administrative, that that process 

was pretty sound. 

So I think the Commission has full confidence that if this recommendation is adopted, there is a good process to determine 

which units might be affected. 

Secondly, let me say that the recommendation doesn’t change the 

number of battalions that were intended to remain in the Regular 

Army. From the Aviation Restructuring Initiative, there will be 20 

battalions, our recommendation keeps that same number in the 

Regular Army, but adds 4 battalions into the Army National 

Guard. That is over and above the Aviation Restructuring Initiative. 

The intent was that those 4 Army National Guard battalions 

would be fully manned, but they would be equipped only with 18 

by 24 aircraft. That is largely an acknowledgement of the added 

cost that would be required. 

But when those battalions would be mobilized and operationally 

employed, they would cross-level amongst units, a practice which 

the National Guard is quite familiar with. Chief of the National 

Guard Bureau, director of the Army National Guard have advised 

the committee during its work that they are comfortable with that 

level of cross-leveling, so that when one of the four Army National 

Guard battalions would be operationally employed, it would go as 

a full-up battalion with its own personnel, but with aircraft from 

additional battalion—or from additional units. 

With regard to the costs, let me turn to the cost expert. 

Mr. HALE. We looked at four criteria before I get to the costs. 

One of them was cost. One, wartime capacity in a key scenario that 

is stressful to the Apaches. Second, a surge capability across a variety of scenarios. Third, how do they help in peacetime? Or how do 

they do in peacetime? And finally, costs. 

I won’t go through all of the options, but the Commission option 

ranked better of those that we looked in terms of wartime capacity, 

it had somewhat more surge capability than the Army’s initiative. 
19 

And it offers some opportunity if these units are used, and we certainly hope they would be, to help in the peacetime, as well. That brings us to cost. It does cost more, about $165 million a 

year in operating costs, and a one-time cost in procurement to manufacture more Apaches to the E model of about $400 million. We 

did offer offsets. They are illustrative. We recognize that and mentioned earlier they involve two fewer units of Black Hawks helicopters, the assault helicopter, and a modest slowdown in the modernization program for Black Hawks. 

Black Hawks are important. But we felt that it was more important to have a balanced force with some more Apache capability, 

even if we had to pay for it through modest changes in the Black 

Hawk program. 

So we tried to look at a broad criteria that included cost, but it 

wasn’t solely cost. 

Ms. MCSALLY. So did the criteria include the potential loss of expertise and having to rebuild some of that expertise in the Active 

Army for the experience you will lose? 

Mr. HALE. Well, as General Ham said, we would keep all 20 battalions that are currently in the Army, Apache battalions that are 

currently in the Army, so we shouldn’t lose any capability there. 

It will be the same battalions and they will be recruiting for them. 

We would keep some ability for the Guard to be a repository of talent when Apache pilots leave, if they want to stay in the Guard, 

they would have the opportunity to do that under the Commission’s 

proposal. So we would have some more capability there, but the 

same in the Active. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay, great, thanks. My time is expired. 

Thank you. 

Mr. TURNER. Gentlelady yields back. Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

General Ham and Mr. Hale, I thank you both for your work on 

this informative Commission report. General Ham, a number of the 

Commission’s recommendations focused on total force integration, 

preparing and leveraging the Reserve Component as an operational 

force, including increasing the annual number of Army National 

Guard combat training center rotations. 

Now, if that were to be implemented, how can Congress ensure 

that the readiness built through the rotations is best maintained 

and best capitalized during the unit’s on year, if these units are not 

deploying as they have in past years? 

General HAM. It is a great question, ma’am. And you will allow 

me, let me offer an example that we came across. We visited the 

116th brigade combat team based in Idaho, but with units from 

many, many different States, during their training at the National 

Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. 

That unit, all of those units in that brigade had spent a considerable number of days, many more than the 39 minimum number of 

days each year. Some of those soldiers had 50 or 60 days in the 

year leading up to their National Training Center rotation. And 

they voiced the same concern that you did. 

As they exited the National Training Center, at the peak of their 

readiness, they said, but we are going home. We want to be used. 
20 

We are trained. We are ready. And so that was a large part of why 

we recommended increased use of the 12304b authority, why we increased continued reliance on the operational capabilities that are 

resident in the Reserve Components of the Army, to capitalize on 

that investment in readiness that the Army had made. 

The soldiers saw it. The leaders of that unit saw it. And I have 

confidence that the leadership of the Army, the Secretary and the 

Chief of Staff and the Sergeant Major of the Army are recognizing 

that, as well, and say we simply cannot afford to train units for 

training sake. We have to train and build readiness so that those 

forces can be operationally employed across the Army’s needs. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Did you want to add to that? 

Mr. HALE. I agree with that. 

Ms. BORDALLO. All right. Thank you very much. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GIBSON. Gentlelady yields back. Mr. Bridenstine for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for the great work you have done on 

the National Commission on the Future of the Army. I know we 

are going to hear from a lot of stakeholders on it, but I think on 

balance it is a lot of very good recommendations that this committee is going to have to take very seriously and move forward 

where we can. 

I wanted to talk to you for a second about some of the shortrange air defense and field artillery concerns. General Ham, the 

Commission found unacceptable shortfalls in the short-range air 

defense and field artillery. Fort Sill is in my home State of Oklahoma, the Fires Center of Excellence, and of course, it is the 

Army’s home of air defense and artillery. 

When you think about how important this is to the Army, a couple of things that were mentioned in the National Commission on 

the Future of the Army were the threats from unmanned aerial 

systems and cruise missiles. Could you maybe take some time and 

explain to this committee why it is so important that we make sure 

that we are taking into account short-range air defense and field 

artillery? 

General HAM. Thanks, Congressman. First of all, I would commend to you the classified annex that has some further detail 

about the threats that are posed by potential adversaries in this 

domain. And I think it is important to this discussion. 

At an unclassified level, I would go back to a previous comment 

that said when the Army that we have today was planned and 

structured, we did not envision the nature of the threat environment in which the Army must operate today. As one example, we 

did not anticipate that there would be many places in the world 

where the Army might operate where they would be subjected to 

threats by enemy air forces either manned or unmanned or cruise 

missiles. That is in large testament to the extraordinary capability 

of the world’s finest Air Force to do that, but the threat situation 

has evolved. 

And I would highlight particularly as we have seen integrated 

air defenses in Syria, as we have seen Russia’s employment of both 

manned and unmanned systems in eastern Ukraine, it presents a 
21 

different operating environment than that which was envisioned, 

and we believe that the Army needs to take note of that and restore some capability within the force to counter those measures. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So could you maybe share—is the concern on 

the shortfall, is it primarily modernization? Is it munitions? Is it 

manning? Is it doctrine? What is the—can you be more clear on 

what that shortfall might be? All of the above? 

General HAM. It is a little bit of all of the above. It is structure 

and modernization. As one example, for very sound reasons, the 

Army has made a decision that all of its short-range air defense 

battalions reside in the Reserve Components. There are none in the 

Regular Army. At that time, that made a lot of sense. In our view, 

it doesn’t make a lot of sense today, so there is a structure issue 

there, as well. 

There certainly is a modernization component to this, as unmanned systems, smaller systems, more sophisticated adversary 

capabilities present themselves on potential battlefields, so there is 

a modernization aspect to this, as well. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. One of the things we have heard General 

Milley say—he stated on multiple occasions that the Guard should 

get at least two additional combat training center rotations in this 

year’s budget. 

Do you agree with that? 

General HAM. Congressman, we did not specify a number. We 

think that is best left for the Army. But we certainly do believe 

that it is—that the number of the Reserve Component combat 

training center rotations should be increased, importantly, but 

without diminishing, decreasing the number of Regular Army rotations. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. Well, that makes—and you think it is 

possible to do more for the Guard and not decrease the Regular 

Army rotations? 

General HAM. In our assessment, yes, it is. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. One other question I had was the—the 

recommendation to eliminate two Regular Army IBCTs [infantry 

brigade combat teams], and ultimately did you consider other areas 

where you could find 8,500 people or how did you come to the assessment that infantry brigade combat teams is where that number 

needed to come from? 

General HAM. Some of the details would be in the classified 

annex, Congressman, but in general, what I would say is that 

while infantry brigade combat teams certainly are stressed in any 

potential operational theater of war, they were less stressed than 

many other capabilities. And so we felt that we had to make at 

least some offer to say, if you have to make these very, very difficult decisions to increase some of the shortfalls in other capabilities, that this was a consideration, recognizing how difficult that 

decision might be. 

Mr. HALE. We did look at a number of other potential efficiencies. We didn’t study them in detail, but I think they—and they 

will be familiar to you. Most of them have been proposed. Health 

care reform, for example, the always difficult but important issue 

of closing unneeded facilities, and the integrated recruiting system 

that the Commission recommended—wasn’t recommended pri-
22 

marily to save money, but it would potentially save some dollars. 

So we did look at some other areas. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Did you guys look at the Army service component commands, the nine different Army service component commands as a place to find personnel? 

General HAM. We did look at the Army service component commands and spoke with them and with the combatant commanders 

that they support, but not so much in terms of potential space savings, while certainly there might be some utility in that, but it is 

important that the Army service components at least under current 

law and policy that is the mechanism by which combatant commanders access Army capabilities. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Right. 

General HAM. So diminishing that brings some risk with it, as 

well. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. And just real quick, did you guys look at Army 

Materiel Command? 

General HAM. We did not take a deep dive into Army Materiel 

Command, principally because it is a largely civilian entity, so we 

didn’t look at that as a potential space savings. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. The chairman is telling me I am out of time, 

so I will stop. 

Thank you. 

Mr. GIBSON. Good work. Time’s expired. We will go to Mr. Wittman, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thanks so 

much for joining us. Thanks for your efforts there with the Commission. 

I wanted to begin speaking from my perspective as Readiness 

Subcommittee chairman in saying that I wholeheartedly agree with 

your recommendation number 7 in the report that says the Army 

must continue to treat readiness as its most important funding priority. That is in line with what we have heard from senior Army 

officials, including General Milley, the Army Chief of Staff, who 

has repeatedly said that readiness is number one and there is no 

other number one. 

Secondly, I want to concur with recommendation number 14 that 

said the Army should forward station an armored brigade combat 

team in Europe. There is probably no other statement in the Commission’s report that acknowledges the changed strategic situation 

in Europe better than that recommendation. And in your report, 

you quote EUCOM [European Command] commander General 

Breedlove as saying the virtual presence by U.S. forces will be 

translated by both friends and adversaries as actual absence. 

And while we know the rotating U.S. forces into and out of Europe as we do now has significant value, we definitely need armor 

back in Europe, and that is needed because it is a credible deterrent to Vladimir Putin’s ambitions. 

The fact is, we have no armored units stationed in Europe anymore, and as I visited the Baltic states last summer to observe 

firsthand the impact of the European Reassurance Initiative, the 

prime minister of Estonia I think put it best when he told our delegation, deterrence is preferable to having to be liberated. 
23 

And with Prime Minister Roivas there giving us that perspective 

and having the longest period of time of independence for Estonia, 

I think those are very prophetic words. 

And finally, like all of my colleagues, I have serious reservations 

that the size of the total Army, especially the Active Duty Army, 

is enough at the current levels being proposed to fulfill all of its 

missions. And the report states that for some potential challenges, 

the Army might have capability and capacity shortfalls and will be 

forced to deploy units not fully ready, which would not be acceptable, pretty plain and straightforward. On the next page, it states, 

even assuming full access to all Army components, this force size 

provides only limited ability to react to unforeseen circumstances. 

And the report goes on to say that under current strategic guidance, the Army and other defense components are directed not to 

size themselves for large-scale, long-duration stability operations. 

Yet the other direction is to conduct current stability and 

counterinsurgency operations, and that stated as one of the top elements in the joint force prioritized missions as described in the national military strategy of 2015. So those two statements are at 

counter purposes. 

So not only is the 980,000 total Army at the minimum sufficient 

strength necessary to meet challenges of a future strategic environment, as stated in the report, it only barely meets that requirement 

when we wish away valid and required missions. And I think we 

have to be realistic about saying we can’t change the mission sets 

to meet what we wish is provided for us on the resource side. And 

I understand wanting to try to take the 450 number and shoebox 

it into something that will fit, but I just don’t believe that that is 

where we need to be directing this discussion. 

My question is this. Is it safe to assume that if the Army had 

included sizing for stability operations the requirement for more 

IBCTs and enablers, that the number would be significantly higher 

than the 980,000 total recommended in the report? 

General Ham. 

General HAM. Congressman, thanks. So, again, the two parts of 

guidance in the law that were so important to us were size and 

force mix at acceptable levels of risk and consistent with anticipated levels of resourcing. So as I mentioned, if you alter one or 

both of those parameters, you would get a very, very different answer. 

So if you were not budget constrained, I suspect the Commission 

would have come in with a much larger number. Or if you had 

said, you know, minimum levels of risk, you might get, again, a 

very, very different number. 

I think, Congressman, what you speak to highlights the requirement to continually assess the evolving security environment in 

which Army forces will be applied. Again, in our judgment, the 

numbers are what we think are consistent with the charge that you 

gave us in the law. If you tinker with either of those, I think we 

would have had a very different outcome. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Mr. Hale. 

Mr. HALE. I would just like to repeat what I have said earlier. 

We are off track from even the Commission’s recommendation in 

the latest budget. We recommended the fiscal 2016 budget request. 
24 

We are somewhat below that, probably $5, $6 billion below it for 

Army, and below it also for some of the other services. 

So I think the first thing we need to do is try to get back on that 

track, and then we will go from there. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, I just want 

to ask one quick question with a yes or no answer. 

Would you state then that under the current conditions we find 

today that an Army of 450,000 would be insufficient to properly 

manage risk and to address the threats we see before us today? 

General HAM. If greater resources were available, I would agree 

with that. At the current level of resources, I will stand by the 

Commission’s recommendation. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Mr. Hale. 

Mr. HALE. I agree. 

Mr. WITTMAN. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GIBSON. Gentleman’s time is expired. We will go to Mr. 

Coffman for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think my question to 

you is concerning pushing more capability to the Guard and Reserve to achieve cost savings. I think if you look at the costs of— 

I have read analysis where the cost of a sergeant E–5 in the Army, 

and if you take sergeant E–5 in the Reserve or Guard, that nondeployed it is about a third of the cost. 

And then when you take—and that is discounting the legacy cost 

of retirement. And so that individual when retired will not draw 

until late 60 in the Guard and Reserve. And the Active Duty will 

draw—they could draw as young as probably 37, 38 years old, with 

20 years in would be the youngest, probably certainly not the average. 

And so I am just wondering, do we need a separate analysis? Or 

do you think you press that issue in terms of shifting capability to 

the Guard and Reserve in order to retain—to where we are obviously not compromising capability, but to kind of bend the cost 

curve in terms of personnel costs? I will start with General Ham, 

you first. 

General HAM. Thanks, Congressman. We purposely did not seek 

to replow the ground that the compensation commission and others 

have looked at in this regard, but we certainly heard lots of testimony related to the points that you raised, that before mobilization 

or activation, certainly Reserve Component soldiers are less costly. 

We looked at it from the Commission’s standpoint more in terms 

of the operational capability that would be required to meet the 

Nation’s objectives of the Army, and that is what led us to the force 

sizing recommendations that we made. 

But it is important that 450,000 in the Regular Army, 335,000 

in the National Guard, 195,000 in the Reserve is only sufficient if 

you properly train, modernize, and operationally employ those 

forces. If you put them on the shelf and don’t modernize them, then 

the Reserve Components will not be ready to answer the call. 

So it is—again, it is more than just the size number. It is the 

full package of training and modernization. 

Mr. COFFMAN. I think you would—and I would agree with you, 

and I think you would have to restructure the Guard and Reserve 

in order to accomplish that. We don’t want to go back to what hap-
25 

pened during the first Gulf War where you had an entire I think 

Army national brigade that was deemed unfit to deploy. But I just 

think we have got to press that issue. 

And maybe we have to rethink it in a broader way to where, do 

we want to maintain them as an operational reserve where they 

are going to be deployed to Active Duty maybe on an every 5 year 

basis or something like that for a limited period of time, as opposed 

to bringing them back to a strategic reserve and having a concern 

about their combat effectiveness being degraded? 

Mr. Hale. 

Mr. HALE. So you cited a common figure about a third. It varies 

to more like a third to two-thirds the cost. The aviation units are 

probably—in the Guard, even when not deployed, about two-thirds 

of the costs, or 60 percent, 70 percent as much. 

But the key here is the Regular Army can do some things the 

Guard just can’t realistically do. They can deploy early in a war. 

I will use the Apaches as a good example, because we looked at 

them with care. We have got shortfalls in a key scenario early in 

the war, and only the Active—the Regular Army can help there. 

That convinced us to leave the number of Active battalions at 20. 

But we are also short actually a little more later in the war. That 

is a capability that Guard can supply, and that is why part of the 

reason we recommended keeping four battalions of Apaches in the 

Guard. 

So it is a capability cost tradeoff, as you know, and I think the 

Commission did its best and came up with the proposal that General Ham has discussed and I certainly share that that as being 

the right way to go. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Again, you didn’t take into—I agree with you that 

certain units are more expensive than others based on the Active 

Duty Component that is required to support the Reserve unit. But, 

again, we are not taking into account legacy costs, and I think that 

full analysis needs to be done in terms of cost. 

And I also think that there are a lot of specialty areas that have 

a direct correlation to an occupation in the civilian world that don’t 

necessarily—where we don’t necessarily need that full capability 

except in a full mobilization. And yet we maintain surplus capacity 

on the Active Duty side. I am thinking about medicine as an example. 

Whenever I go to Bethesda—when I went to Bethesda in 2011, 

there was a very significant patient flow there coming out of Afghanistan. When I go there now, they are looking for patients. And 

so we are treating patients from the Boston bombing. They were 

bringing in veterans with non-service-connected issues, just to try 

and maintain the certain level of capability. 

And so I think that is something where we ought to look at 

plusing-up the Guard and Reserve and then bringing on when we 

mobilize. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. GIBSON. Gentleman’s time is expired. Ms. Tsongas for 5 minutes. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to follow up 

on an earlier question and focus it a little differently. You know, 

as we are talking about end strength and what the proper number 
26 

is, I think what we are all concerned with is the resiliency of the 

force and the pressures that come to bear, given the multiple challenges. 

And I have seen in Massachusetts where there has been a lot of 

research investment in sort of making just better understanding as 

I said how you improve the physical, the psychological, the cognitive, the overall human performance of the force, with the interest of and understanding the inordinate number of pressures that 

come to bear on those who do serve. 

And my question really is, do you see value in that going forward, as we are still—no matter what, but in a constrained environment, where we ask ever more of those who are serving, do you 

see value in that kind of research and development effort? 

General HAM. Yes, ma’am. Absolutely. In two ways. One is simply from a readiness standpoint, we want to make sure that soldiers are as ready as they can be, and as you indicate, that is more 

than just technical or tactical training or other means of readiness, 

but it is readiness of the whole person that is vitally important. So 

I think from a purely readiness standpoint, that is quite important. 

In perhaps a less objective measure, it is also I think integral to 

recruiting and retaining the quality people that we need, to know 

that when they raise their right hand and enlisted in the Army or 

are commissioned as an officer in the Army, that they are joining 

a profession that will attend to their needs and make sure that 

they are properly cared for and they are as capable and as ready 

to perform at maximum levels as is possible. 

And it also sends a very clear message to their families that we 

will care for your soldier when the worst possible things that can 

happen to soldiers happen, that their families have confidence that 

the Army will take care of them in those dire circumstances. So for 

those reasons, I think the points you mentioned are absolutely essential. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you. Secretary Hale, do you—the other 

question is, we have been debating end strength here. And I think 

we are all concerned about what the appropriate number is. But if 

you look at the current situation, we have soldiers of the U.S. 

Army deployed in over 140 countries around the world. Some are 

obviously fighting, engaged in the fight. Some are there in a deterrence mode. Others are there just to reassure allies and partners. 

And as we struggle with fiscal constraints, did you at all consider 

whether or not the Army is spread too thin? And is there better— 

should we be better channeling those that we do have in order to, 

for example, reduce the pressure on the deployed soldier and give 

them more dwell time? Was that part of your consideration? 

General HAM. It was, ma’am. And in fact, the law required us 

to look at that. I think in a general sense, the Commission’s view 

was one of the very best ways to alleviate the frequent operational 

deployments, particularly within the Regular Army, is to ensure 

that the Reserve Components of the Army are adequately trained, 

modernized, and prepared so that they can become more operationally employed. 

It has the value of relieving a little bit of operational stress on 

the regular force, but it also builds operational capability within 

the Reserve Components. 
27 

And, ma’am, we heard loud and clear from those soldiers in the 

Army Reserve and Army National Guard that they have a burning 

desire to be operationally employed. 

Ms. TSONGAS. So you didn’t see it as sort of retooling what the 

Army should be doing and where, but rather how you do it and 

who you have do it? 

General HAM. Well, it is certainly a mix of both. I think the demands from the combatant commands for the most part are increasing. There are systems within the Army and within the Joint 

Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to prioritize and 

balance those demands. The demands will probably almost always 

exceed the supply, so it is a matter of prioritization. 

And I think in general, the Commission’s view was that if the 

Army can more effectively employ the operational forces in the 

Army National Guard and Army Reserve, that will go a long way 

toward meeting that demand and relieving some of the stress that 

is evident in some communities in the Regular Army. 

Ms. TSONGAS. So you really didn’t—— 

Mr. HALE. And I would just like to add to that, if I might, I fully 

agree. We need to use the Guard and the Reserve. We tried in the 

Commission to put our money where our mouth was on this one. 

For example, when we suggested keeping four battalions or recommended keeping four battalions in the Guard, we included in 

the costs the added cost to call them up on the one to five basis 

that is one of the planning scenarios. 

And similarly, you have heard us say before we recommended 

more funding for this 12304b, which provides funds to call up the 

Guard and the Reserve. 

We repeatedly heard that the reason they are not used more is 

not that they don’t want to go. It is that there isn’t the funds to 

pay for them when they are called to Active Duty. So we tried to, 

as I say, put our money where our mouth is. We need to use the 

Guard and Reserve, and we need to fund it. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. GIBSON. Thank you. This concludes our questions. Any concluding remarks from our panelists? I will give you the opportunity 

at this point. 

General HAM. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I would conclude simply 

by again thanking you and Ms. Tsongas for the opportunity to 

come appear before the committee. And I would harken back to a 

comment Mr. Hale mentioned earlier in his testimony. The United 

States Army is the finest Army in the world. It has got some challenges, and we certainly need to be careful as we proceed. 

But there should be no question that this is the premier land 

force on the face of this planet today, and that is thanks to the 

great women and men who every day choose to serve this Nation 

in uniform. 

Mr. HALE. I would just like to take this opportunity to thank the 

guy to my right here. General Ham did a great job. He earned a 

merit badge in herding cats, which is one of the requirements if 

you I think are chairman of the Commission. He really did a good 

job in bringing us together and focusing on the key issues. So 

thank you. And thanks also to the staffs, some of whom are behind 
28 

me, who did an outstanding job helping us get through a tough set 

of issues. 

Mr. GIBSON. Well, I thank you both. And please do convey to all 

those on the Commission how much all of us here deeply appreciate their commitment to our country and the recommendations 

that they have provided. 

And with that, that closes the hearing. Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 4:00 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
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