In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

Nos. 20-2236 & 20-2709 

RALPH HOLMES, et al., 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v.

SALVADOR A. GODINEZ, Acting Director 

of Illinois Department of Corrections, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 11-cv-2961 — Young B. Kim, Magistrate Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED JANUARY 22, 2021 — DECIDED MARCH 16, 2021 

____________________ 

Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. 

KANNE, Circuit Judge. This is a straightforward contract interpretation case. Plaintiffs are Illinois prison inmates with 

hearing problems. They executed a judicially enforceable Settlement with the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) 

that requires IDOC to provide them with certain audiological 

care. 
2 Nos. 20-2236 & 20-2709 

Two provisions of the Settlement are at issue: one grants 

the court power to award attorney fees to Plaintiffs if IDOC 

“has been in substantial non-compliance” with the Settlement, and the other requires IDOC to refer inmates in need 

for an audiological evaluation by a licensed audiologist. 

Plaintiffs sued to enforce the Settlement and for attorney 

fees based on past violations of it. The district court obliged. 

The district court correctly awarded attorney fees to Plaintiffs based on IDOC’s “substantial non-compliance” with the 

Settlement of referring about 700 inmates for inadequate evaluations. But the court incorrectly determined that IDOC was 

obligated to ensure that its prison inmates receive audiological evaluations (or re-evaluations) within a set timeframe—

the Settlement contains no such requirement. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the district 

court, and we terminate our stay of the district court’s order. 

I. BACKGROUND

In the underlying class action, Plaintiffs alleged on behalf 

of deaf and hard-of-hearing inmates in IDOC custody that 

IDOC unlawfully denied them “the assistance they need to 

communicate effectively and participate in IDOC programs 

and services.” The parties executed a Settlement in July 2018 

to resolve their dispute. 

Among other things, the Settlement requires IDOC to 

screen inmates for hearing problems, to refer inmates in need 

to a licensed audiologist for a more thorough audiological 

evaluation, and then to maintain records of inmates’ evaluations and provide inmates with certain care according to the 

results of their evaluations. 
Nos. 20-2236 & 20-2709 3

For about a year after the court approved the Settlement, 

IDOC admits that it incorrectly referred about 700 inmates to 

licensed hearing instrument dispensers (“LHIDs”)—i.e., hearing-aid salesmen—instead of audiologists for their audiological evaluations (the “LHID violations”). IDOC discontinued 

the practice in July 2019 after the parties reached an out-ofcourt agreement to resolve it. 

In 2020, Plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the Settlement 

arguing that IDOC is not ensuring that the audiological evaluations are completed within a reasonable time period; they 

allege there is as much as an eight-month gap between their 

screenings and their audiological evaluations. Plaintiffs also 

sought attorney fees for the investigation and resolution of the 

LHID violations. 

This motion to enforce the Settlement and for attorney fees 

involved two aspects of the agreement. First, the Settlement 

requires IDOC to ensure that inmates whose hearing screenings show that they are deaf or hard of hearing are “referred 

to an audiologist for an Audiological Evaluation at the earlier 

of: (a) thirty (30) days after arrival to their home facility; or (b) 

45 days after being admitted into IDOC custody.” Second, the 

Settlement states that if the court finds that IDOC “has been 

in substantial non-compliance” with the Settlement, the court 

“has the power to enter, and shall enter, whatever orders are 

necessary to ensure compliance with the terms of the Settlement.” That power includes awarding “reasonable attorney’s 

fees for any work expended by Class Counsel in investigating 

and litigating such non-compliance.” 

The district court concluded that IDOC was in substantial 

non-compliance with the Settlement through the LHID violations, and it thus ordered IDOC to pay Plaintiffs about $54,000 
4 Nos. 20-2236 & 20-2709 

in attorney fees for the investigation and resolution of those 

violations (the “attorney-fee decision”). 

The district court also determined that the Settlement requires IDOC to ensure the audiological evaluations are completed within a reasonable timeframe, which it defined as 90 

days after a referral (the “evaluation decision”). 

Finally, the court ordered IDOC to ensure that the 700 inmates who received inadequate evaluations by LHIDs were 

given proper audiological evaluations by August 28, 2020—

about twelve weeks after the date of the court’s order (the “reevaluation decision”). 

IDOC appeals these three decisions. We stayed the effect 

of evaluation and re-evaluation decisions during the pendency of this appeal, and we will address those two decisions 

in tandem. 

II. ANALYSIS

The parties agree that because the Settlement is judicially 

enforceable, it is a consent decree. Doe v. Cook County, 798 F.3d 

558, 563 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[I]f an agreement is judicially enforceable—that is, if a violation means anything other than restarting the litigation on the merits—the agreement must be 

treated as a ‘consent decree’ ... .”). 

We review a district court’s interpretation of a consent decree de novo. In re Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litig., 741 F.3d 811, 

816 (7th Cir. 2014). Plaintiffs request that we show deference 

to the district court’s order because we have “sometimes said 

that we will give an unspecified amount of deference to a district court’s interpretation [of a consent decree] when that 

court has overseen the litigation for a long time and is familiar 

with the details of what may be a complex arrangement.” Id. 
Nos. 20-2236 & 20-2709 5

But de novo review is appropriate here because we are interpreting the terms of a consent decree that sets out the parties’ 

“substantive rights and obligations.” Id. 

“For purposes of construction, a judicially approved consent decree is essentially a contract.” United States v. Alshabkhoun, 277 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. 

City of Northlake, 942 F.2d 1164, 1167 (7th Cir. 1991)). It is thus 

interpreted according to principles of state contract law. City 

of Northlake, 942 F.2d at 1167. 

Under Illinois law, which applies here, “the court’s ‘primary objective in construing a contract is to give effect to the 

intent of the parties.’ The court must first ‘look to the language 

of [the] contract alone, as the language, given its plain and ordinary meaning, is the best indication of the parties’ intent’ ... 

.” Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Beazer E., Inc., 802 F.3d 876, 

881 (7th Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) 

(quoting Gallagher v. Lenart, 874 N.E.2d 43, 58 (Ill. 2007)). “[A] 

court will not rewrite a contract to suit one of the parties ... .” 

Wright v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., 554 N.E.2d 511, 514 (Ill. App. Ct. 

1990) (citing A.A. Conte, Inc. v. Campbell–Lowrie–Lautermilch 

Corp., 477 N.E.2d 30 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)). Illinois law imposes 

“a strong presumption against provisions that easily could 

have been included in the contract but were not.” Id. (citing 

Braeside Realty Tr. v. Cimino, 479 N.E.2d 1031 (Ill. App. Ct. 

1985); Ebrahim v. Checker Taxi Co., 471 N.E.2d 632 (Ill. App. Ct. 

1984)). And “a court will not add terms simply to reach a more 

equitable agreement.” Id. (citing Nat’l Tea Co. v. Am. Nat’l Bank 

& Trust Co. of Chi., 427 N.E.2d 806 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)). 

The district court followed these principles when it 

awarded attorney fees to Plaintiffs but did not precisely 
6 Nos. 20-2236 & 20-2709 

follow them when it ordered IDOC to ensure that audiological evaluations be completed within a certain timeframe. 

A. The Attorney-Fee Decision 

Once more, the Settlement states that if the court finds that 

IDOC “has been in substantial non-compliance with the Settlement Agreement, then the court has the power to enter, and 

shall enter, whatever orders are necessary to ensure compliance with the terms of the Settlement.” That power includes 

awarding “reasonable attorney’s fees for any work expended 

by Class Counsel in investigating and litigating such noncompliance.” 

IDOC admits that it was in “substantial non-compliance” 

with the Settlement when it committed the LHID violations. 

Thus, we easily conclude that the court had authority under 

the Settlement to award attorney fees for the investigation and 

resolution of that past non-compliance in order to ensure that 

it does not repeat. 

IDOC provides two counter arguments, but neither is persuasive. First, IDOC argues that Plaintiffs should not have 

been permitted to seek attorney fees because the Settlement 

provides that the parties “shall meet and confer and attempt 

to resolve any issues of potential non-compliance prior to 

such issues being the subject of any motion with the Court.” 

This argument is not well developed and, as we’re able to construe it, is not convincing. IDOC correctly notes that the parties did meet and confer to resolve the LHID violation, so the 

meet-and-confer provision was satisfied. But IDOC still appears to argue that because the parties resolved the issue on 

their own, the court had no power to then enter the attorneyfee award. We don’t read the Settlement that way. Nothing in 
Nos. 20-2236 & 20-2709 7

it prevents Plaintiffs from asking the court for an award of the 

fees incurred during the parties’ out-of-court negotiations. To 

the contrary, it explicitly provides that the court “may award 

reasonable attorney’s fees for any work expended by Class 

Counsel in investigating and litigating ... non-compliance.” 

Second, IDOC argues that because the court must find that 

the Department “has been”—not had been—in non-compliance, there must be an “ongoing” violation for the court to 

award attorney fees; the violation here, though, ceased in 

2019. This argument is unconvincing because the plain and 

ordinary usage of “has been” is to refer to events that are ongoing or that were completed in the past. The Chicago Manual 

of Style ¶ 5.132 (17th ed. 2017) (“The present-perfect tense is 

formed by using have or has with the principal verb’s past participle ... . It denotes an act, state, or condition that is now 

completed or continues up to the present [E.g., she has] put 

away the clothes.”). 

This plain meaning applies here. Peoples Gas Light & Coke 

Co., 802 F.3d at 881 (quoting Gallagher, 874 N.E.2d at 58). As 

IDOC notes, the Settlement does not require the court to find 

that IDOC “had been” in non-compliance (i.e., that a violation 

was completed in the past). But it also does not require the 

Court to find that IDOC “is” in non-compliance (i.e., that a 

violation is ongoing). Instead, the Settlement uses the term 

“has been,” which, as explained, encompasses both scenarios. 

And it makes sense for the court to be able to enter orders that 

help ensure both that past violations don’t repeat and that ongoing violations cease. Thus, the district court correctly found 

that because IDOC was in substantial non-compliance with 

the Settlement through the LHID violations, it could award 

attorney fees for the resolution of that non-compliance. 
8 Nos. 20-2236 & 20-2709 

B. The Evaluation and Re-Evaluation Decisions 

For this second issue, the relevant part of the Settlement 

provides that IDOC must ensure that inmates whose hearing 

screenings show that they are deaf or hard of hearing are “referred to an audiologist for an Audiological Evaluation at the 

earlier of: (a) thirty (30) days after arrival to their home facility; or (b) 45 days after being admitted into IDOC custody.” 

The key word in this provision is “refer.” 

Refer in this context most ordinarily means “to send or direct for treatment.” Refer, Merriam-Webster, 

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/refer; accord

St. Louis Effort for AIDS v. Huff, 782 F.3d 1016, 1027 (8th Cir. 

2015) (defining refer as “to send [or] direct for treatment, aid, 

information, or decision” (alteration in original) (citing Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1907 (1993))). 

So, we agree with the district court that, based on the 

meaning of the word “refer,” IDOC has some obligation regarding the completion of the evaluations—it must use its 

best efforts to actually “send” its inmates in need to an audiologist so that the evaluations can be performed. Grant v. Bd. 

of Educ. of Chi., 668 N.E.2d 1188, 1197 (1996) (“A best efforts 

undertaking has been likened to the exercise of good faith implied in all contracts.” (citations omitted)). 

The district court, though, went one step further and determined that IDOC must ensure that the evaluations, or reevaluations, are completed within a specific timeframe. That 

was a bridge too far. 

By its plain terms, the Settlement only obligates IDOC to 

refer inmates for audiological evaluations and then to keep 

records of the evaluations and to treat inmates based on the 
Nos. 20-2236 & 20-2709 9

results of their evaluations. As the district court noted, “IDOC 

is correct that the Settlement requires a Class Member to be 

referred within the 30- or 45-day period, not physically evaluated within that time period.” 

So IDOC did not agree, expressly or by implication, to ensure that audiologists complete those evaluations within a defined period, and we “will not rewrite [the Settlement] to suit 

[Plaintiffs]” by stating otherwise. Wright, 554 N.E.2d at 514 

(citing A.A. Conte, Inc., 477 N.E.2d at 30). 

Indeed, it would be hard to imagine IDOC taking on any 

such responsibility, as the audiologists who perform the evaluations are out of the control of IDOC and perhaps unenthusiastic about treating inmates. Similarly, IDOC certainly did 

not assume, as Plaintiffs state in their brief, the obligation to 

itself “conduct the evaluations” within a reasonable 

timeframe. As explained ad nauseum, IDOC very clearly 

agreed only to “refer” inmates in need for evaluations. 

This plain reading is confirmed by many other provisions 

in the Settlement that do require IDOC to ensure that some 

aspects of the audiological care process are completed within 

specific timeframes. For example, IDOC must ensure that an 

inmate who requests a hearing screening “will receive such a 

screening within thirty (30) days.” The parties thus “easily 

could have” included a similar obligation for the completion 

of audiological evaluations (even if difficult to achieve as 

stated above). Id. (citing Cimino, 479 N.E.2d at 1031; Ebrahim, 

471 N.E.2d at 632). But they did not. 

Plaintiffs argue that we should depart from this straightforward reading of the settlement for four reasons. We do not 

find any of them convincing. 
10 Nos. 20-2236 & 20-2709 

First, Plaintiffs correctly point out that, under Illinois law, 

“[w]hen a contract does not specify a deadline for performance, a reasonable time will be implied.” Abellan v. Lavelo 

Prop. Mgmt., LLC, 948 F.3d 820, 829 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Bowens v. Quinn, 561 F.3d 671, 675 (7th Cir. 2009)). 

And because, as Plaintiffs assert, “[t]he Settlement requires IDOC to perform a specific act—an Audiological evaluation”—but does not set out a timeframe for performance, 

we should imply that IDOC must perform within a reasonable time. The issue, though, is that the Settlement does not require IDOC to perform an audiological evaluation. As explained, it only requires IDOC to “refer” inmates for such an 

evaluation, which is an obligation that comes with a set timetable and for which a timeframe need not be implied. 

Second, our decision today does not, as Plaintiffs contend, 

thwart the stated purpose of the Settlement to “benefit deaf 

and hard of hearing inmates who are confined in IDOC correctional facilities.” The fact is that Settlements are compromises in which the parties—as the term suggests—“settle” for 

less than they might have gotten at trial. They sacrifice some 

goals to achieve others and to resolve a dispute without the 

expense of further litigation. See Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO C.L.C. v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 521 

(1986). 

As Plaintiffs admit, then, “the relevant purposes in interpreting a consent decree (like any other contract) are the purposes embodied in the instrument rather than the maximum 

aspirations-which are bound to be inconsistent anyway-of the 

interested parties.” White v. Roughton, 689 F.2d 118, 119–20 

(7th Cir. 1982). 
Nos. 20-2236 & 20-2709 11

Our reading of the Settlement in this case furthers the 

stated purpose to benefit inmates. As interpreted, the inmates 

still receive its many benefits from the Settlement, including 

audiological screenings, a referral to an audiologist, and certain care after an audiological evaluation. 

In the end, even the evaluation itself is a benefit of the Settlement because Plaintiffs will—as they admit—eventually receive it, just not as soon as they’d like. True, we could read the 

Settlement to benefit Plaintiffs even more. But the plain text of 

the Settlement is our North Star, not Plaintiffs’ maximum aspirations. 

Third, Plaintiffs argue that it would be “absurd” for the 

Settlement to allow IDOC to simply refer an inmate for an audiological evaluation and then sit on its hands. Not so. 

Illinois law requires that contracts must be construed to 

avoid absurd results, “in the sense of results that the parties, 

presumed to be rational persons pursuing rational ends, are 

very unlikely to have agreed to seek.” Beanstalk Grp., Inc. v. 

AM Gen. Corp., 283 F.3d 856, 860 (7th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). But “[t]his is an interpretive principle, not a species of 

paternalism.” Id. 

Our interpretation of the Settlement does not lead to any 

absurd results. To start, we’ve already determined that 

IDOC’s obligation to refer inmates in need carries with it a 

correlating obligation to use its best efforts to see that the inmate is actually sent to an audiologist for an evaluation. So 

IDOC can’t sit on its hands as Plaintiffs fear. 

What’s more, nothing in the record shows that IDOC has 

engaged in the conduct that Plaintiffs complain might one day 

occur. Plaintiffs only complain that the evaluations aren’t 
12 Nos. 20-2236 & 20-2709 

happening quickly enough—but they acknowledge that 

they’re happening. 

IDOC also presented evidence to the district court showing that it has not sat on its hands. Since 2019, its primary 

health-care vendor, Wexford Health Sources, Inc., has 

“stepped up its efforts to identify additional audiologists” 

who are willing to treat inmates. But as detailed by Wexford’s 

Vice President, those efforts are often fruitless as many audiologists refuse to work with inmates based on “concerns 

about security, the loss of other patients from the community 

who are concerned about the presence of offenders in the office, or the risk of lawsuits.” 

Even if Plaintiffs’ fears were credible, Plaintiffs are still receiving the many other benefits from the Settlement that they 

bargained for. If they wanted to secure an additional benefit—

that IDOC ensure the evaluations are carried out within a certain timeframe—then they should have demanded that it be 

spelled out in the Settlement. The omission of this extra requirement does not render the Settlement absurd. And even 

if the omission of such a requirement was inequitable, we will 

not paternalistically “add terms simply to reach a more equitable agreement.” Wright, 554 N.E.2d at 514 (citing Nat’l Tea 

Co., 427 N.E.2d at 806). 

Fourth, Plaintiffs emphasize IDOC’s responsibility to provide medical care under the Eighth Amendment and the 

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). But those constitutional and statutory duties are irrelevant to the contractual issue before us. This is a motion to enforce, so “it is the parties’ 

agreement that serves as the source of the court’s authority to 

enter any judgment,” not federal law. Alshabkhoun, 277 F.3d at 

934 (quoting Local 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of 
Nos. 20-2236 & 20-2709 13

Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 522 (1986)) (citing King v. Walters, 190 

F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 1999)). 

No court has decided whether the Eighth Amendment or 

the ADA requires IDOC to provide Plaintiffs with audiological evaluations. And as part of the Settlement, Plaintiffs released their claims under those laws, and IDOC denied violating them. 

In sum, there are no provisions in the Settlement requiring 

IDOC to ensure that the audiological evaluations are completed within a set timeframe. As a result, the court’s evaluation decision—which required IDOC to ensure that the evaluations be completed within ninety days of an inmate’s referral—was unsupported. 

Further, the court’s re-evaluation decision—which required IDOC to ensure the re-evaluation, by August 28, 2020, 

of the 700 inmates who suffered the LHID violations—likewise went beyond the provisions of the Settlement Agreement. 

As stated, the Settlement gives the court power to enter 

orders “to ensure compliance” with the settlement. While the 

attorney-fee decision falls within this grant of authority, the 

re-evaluation decision does not because it imposes a duty on 

IDOC not specified by the Settlement—in other words, it requires IDOC to do more than merely “comply.” For that reason, the court did not have authority to enter such a sanction. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s 

decision awarding $52,357.50 in fees and $1,741.35 in costs to 

Plaintiffs, and we REVERSE the decision of the district court 
14 Nos. 20-2236 & 20-2709 

requiring IDOC to ensure that inmates receive audiological 

evaluations or re-evaluations within the timeframe ordered. 

We TERMINATE our stay of the district court’s order.