We have substantially completed our review of the events that took place at the 

White House Complex (WHC) on March 4, 2015. Our objective was to conduct 

a factual inquiry and to assess the reasonableness of the actions of the 

individuals involved. It was reported that two senior Secret Service special 

agents, including one who is responsible for all aspects of White House 

security, disrupted the scene of an investigation of a suspicious package during 

an elevated security condition at the WHC. It was further alleged that these two 

agents were under the influence of alcohol after attending a colleague's 

retirement celebration at a local bar/restaurant. 

We conducted this investigation from March 12, 2015 until April 30, 2015. We 

conducted approximately 48 interviews, and reviewed records from the Secret 

Service, the Washington Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) and, pursuant 

to subpoena, records from a private entity. The records we reviewed included 

emails, telephone records, radio transmissions from the night in question, and 

videos from the White House, the MPD, and the U.S. Department of Commerce. 

From this material, we were able to establish a timeline, attached to this report 

as appendix A, and still images taken from the video, attached as appendix C 

and D. We also have attached a map of the agents’ route, attached as 

appendix B. Still images taken from the various video surveillance cameras are 

attached as appendix C, D, and E. 

While the facts that we uncovered in this investigation shed light on particular 

management challenges facing the Secret Service, we are deferring specific 

conclusions about potential systemic issues facing the Secret Service until we 

complete a series of inquiries of the following incidents, currently underway: 

•	 A 2011 incident when shots were fired at the White House; 

•	 A 2014 incident when an armed private security guard came in close
 

proximity to the President;
 

•	 A 2014 White House fence-jumping incident; 

•	 A 2015 incident when an individual possibly known to the Secret Service 

landed a gyrocopter on the grounds of the U.S. Capitol. 

Additionally, but separately, we are investigating alleged misconduct of specific 

Secret Service personnel. At the conclusion of our investigations, we will issue 

public reports regarding our investigations of the following matters: 

•	 An allegation that, in March 2015, one or more Secret Service agents 

accessed, through the Secret Service data systems, the employment 

application of an individual who later became a Member of Congress. 

1 
• An allegation that, in March 2015, a senior manager, after a farewell 

party involving drinking, sexually assaulted a female subordinate. 

This inquiry centered around the activities of two senior Secret Service 

personnel. Marc Connolly is the Deputy Special Agent in Charge (DSAIC) of the 

Presidential Protective Division (PPD), a position he has held for the last two 

years. Connolly, a member of the Senior Executive Service, has about 27 

years’ experience in the Secret Service. Connolly’s positions within the USSS 

have included Resident Agent in Charge, Grand Rapids, MI; Assistant Special 

Agent in Charge (ASAIC) of the PPD; and Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) for 

the Office of Government and Public Affairs (GPA). Connolly’s duties as DSAIC 

include managing the security of the WHC. In that capacity, he is responsible 

for handling all aspects of White House security. Connolly’s supervisor is 

Robert Buster, Special Agent in Charge (SAIC), PPD. 

George Ogilvie has been with the Secret Service since 1996. He is the Assistant 

to the Special Agent in Charge (ATSAIC) at the Washington Field Office (WFO). 

He has previously worked in PPD, the Baltimore and New York Field Offices, 

the GPA office and currently, at the WFO as a supervisor in the protection 

squad. He reports to the ASAIC of WFO, who in turn reports to the DSAIC and 

the SAIC at WFO. 

The party 

The retirement party for Edwin Donovan, who was at the time the Deputy 

Assistant Director in the GPA office, was held at Fado Irish Pub and 

Restaurant, a bar and restaurant in the District of Columbia, on the evening of 

March 4, 2015. Witnesses stated that there were about 30 to 40 people in 

attendance, including Donovan and his wife. It appears that approximately 55 

people were invited. Donovan arranged to provide for open wine and beer 

service, as well as food. According to the bar tab for that event, the guests 

ordered 53 servings of beer, 7 glasses of wine, and 3 sodas. Food was served in 

a buffet-style setting, totaling about $729. The event started at approximately 

5:30 p.m. and lasted until approximately 7:30 p.m., at which time the open bar 

was closed and Donovan’s wife paid the tab. 

According to Fado personnel, the majority of the party left immediately after the 

party concluded. However, four individuals – consisting of Connolly, Ogilvie, 

and two non-agent Secret Service personnel who work in GPA – remained at 

the bar together. Accounts differ as to whether other Secret Service personnel 

also remained and if so, when they left. Most observers said that the Connolly 

and Ogilvie party was the last to leave. Ogilvie opened a tab at 7:44 p.m., 

secured with his credit card, and paid the bill three hours later, at 10:45 p.m. 

2 
 

 

 

On his bill, there were charges for eight glasses of scotch, two vodka drinks, 

one glass of wine, and three glasses of beer. 

We questioned Ogilvie, Connolly, and the other two employees about their 

consumption of alcohol at the party and afterwards. Ogilvie admitted to 

drinking two scotches from his tab and one beer from the open bar, which he 

said he did not finish. Connolly stated that he had drunk two beers during the 

open bar period, and only ginger ale and water thereafter. He told us that he 

did not think he had anything to drink from Ogilvie’s tab. The female Secret 

Service employee acknowledged drinking two vodka drinks from Ogilvie’s tab. 

The male Secret Service employee stated that he drank one beer from his own 

tab and one scotch on Ogilvie’s tab. Ogilvie in his interview maintained that 

the balance of the drinks on his tab – five glasses of scotch, a glass of wine and 

three beers – were given away to others, but he could not recall for whom he 

bought drinks. Ogilvie stated during his interview that he consumed his last 

alcoholic beverage 45 minutes before he left the bar. 

None of these four individuals – Connolly, Ogilvie, and the two Secret Service 

personnel – could recall what, or even whether, the others in their small group 

were drinking. All four stated that in their opinion none of them were visibly 

intoxicated. In addition, Fado personnel said they did not observe anyone 

visibly intoxicated.1 

The four individuals left together shortly after 10:45 p.m. Ogilvie had driven 

from WFO and parked his government-issued vehicle, a dark late-model Ford 

SUV, on 8th Street between Secret Service headquarters (950 H Street, N.W.) 

and the restaurant at 808 Seventh Street, NW. Connolly asked Ogilvie for a ride 

to his government car, parked at the White House. The other two left in a cab. 

Suspicious package incident at WHC E Street entrance 

While Connolly and Ogilvie were at the bar, at approximately 10:24 p.m. a 

woman pulled up in her car to the guard station at the perimeter of the WHC, 

at the intersection of E Street (which is closed to the public in the direction of 

the WHC) and 15th Street (hereinafter, “E Street entrance”). It consists of a 

guard station, set slightly back from the public sidewalk on the west side of 

15th Street. It is an entry point for official vehicles needing access to the White 

entrance for vehicles. A vehicle requesting entry is checked by officers at the 

guard station, then directed westbound inside the perimeter on E Street toward 

1 Under District of Columbia law, a restaurant or bar is prohibited from serving or allowing the 

consumption of alcohol to someone who is or appears to be intoxicated. D.C. Code § 25-781. 

House grounds, and is manned by Uniformed Division (UD) officers. The 

majority of E Street is , with a 

3 


Virginia. However, a second UD cruiser (cruiser 2) had stopped a vehicle 

matching that description at 15th and Jefferson Streets, approximately a half 

mile south of the White House, and radioed in the stop. When cruiser 1 heard 

that radio transmission, he discontinued following the vehicle, because he 

assumed that cruiser 2 had apprehended the suspect. Only after cruiser 1 

discontinued following this vehicle did he learn that the individual in the 

vehicle stopped by cruiser 2 did not match the description of the individual 

throwing the package, and had been subsequently released. 

One of the UD officers at the scene had been able to obtain a license plate 

number and by 10:37 p.m. reported it to the JOC. By 10:40 p.m., the wife of 

the vehicle owner had been identified as being “of record” with the Secret 

Service. By about 1:30 a.m. on March 5th, agents learned that the suspect 

had an encounter with the Capitol Police the day before, and from that 

encounter learned the hotel at which the suspect said she was staying. By 1:45 

a.m., agents had responded to the hotel, but found that the suspect had 

checked out earlier in the day. Secret Service agents from the Philadelphia 

Field Office were dispatched to the home of the suspect. At 2:00 a.m., Secret 

Service agents interviewed the suspect’s husband and discovered the suspect’s 

travel plans and cell phone number. By 6:00 p.m., the suspect was located in 

Gordonsville, Virginia, and by approximately 7:00 a.m. the next day, March 

6th, the suspect was interviewed. An arrest warrant for assault under the D.C. 

Code was issued for the suspect on March 10th. 

Ogilvie and Connolly approach the roadblock at 15th and F Street 

Ogilvie told investigators that the route he took to the White House from Fado 

was to drive south on 8th Street to H Street. From H Street he drove to New 

York Avenue, to the intersection of 15th Street. personnel were at the 

intersection of , approximately two blocks south of the 

intersection of New York Avenue and 15th Street. Together, they directed both 

vehicle and pedestrian traffic to ensure no one would travel south on 15th 

Street south of F Street. This was accomplished by directing southbound cars 

to turn left onto F Street, heading east. Similarly, westbound F Street traffic 

would be prevented from turning south onto 15th Street. 

. 

Slightly before 10:57 p.m., Ogilvie approached the intersection of 15th and F in 

a group of three cars. The first vehicle approached and the officer motioned it 

to turn and it turned east onto F Street. Ogilvie was the second vehicle. 

According to one UD officer, the officer directed Ogilvie with his flashlight 

approximately three to four additional times to make the turn, but the vehicle 

would not turn east onto F Street. According to the UD officer directing traffic, 

Ogilvie stopped, and the UD officer made eye contact with both the driver and 

6 
 

 

 

 

 

 

the passenger; at that time, the passenger showed his credentials or White 

House pass. According to Ogilvie and Connolly, Ogilvie flipped down his 

passenger side visor, which had police lights on it. The UD officers recall that 

Ogilvie either activated his emergency lights or sounded his air horn. 

The UD officer recognized the driver as a Secret Service employee. The UD 

officer did not recognize the passenger, nor did he specifically reconcile the 

displayed identification photo with the passenger. The officer told us that he 

believed he stepped out of the way so that the vehicle could proceed closer to 

him; thinking that the driver of the SUV would subsequently stop, roll down 

the window, and ask the location of the suspicious package and the ICP. 

Additionally, the officer stated that he may have waived at the SUV when he 

stepped out of the way for it to approach, but did not specifically recall. 

The SUV did not stop. It drove by the officer and slowly proceeded south on 

15th Street. The officer did not attempt to stop the SUV, as he assumed the 

occupants of the SUV were Secret Service personnel responding to the 

suspicious package incident. The officer told us that in retrospect, he felt that 

he should have been more insistent to find out why the SUV was there, but 

“really thought” the SUV was there because of the suspicious package 

incident.6 

When interviewed, both Ogilvie and Connolly recall that the roadblock was set 

up at New York Avenue and 15th Street, and the encounter took place as 

Ogilvie attempted to turn left (south) from New York Avenue onto 15th Street. 

However, both UD officers told us that they were set up two blocks south of 

that, on 15th and F Streets. The MPD video we reviewed confirmed that the 

checkpoint was not set up at 15th and New York, as Ogilvie and Connolly 

recalled. 

To Connolly, the officer’s presence was not significant because it was a 

common occurrence to see a law enforcement presence near the WHC. An 

officer’s presence could mean a street is blocked off to the public, but White 

House pass holders are permitted through. During the interview, Connolly 

provided examples of why a street could be blocked off, including motorcade 

entry/exit, protectees nearby, an incident on either side of the WHC, or a 

general observation post. To Ogilvie, the presence of the officers did not raise 

any red flags to him because this is type of activity occurs frequently around 

the White House. 

6 As previously noted, a private car trailed Ogilvie through the roadblock at 15th and F. The UD 

officer got into his cruiser to pursue it as Ogilvie was pulling into the E Street entrance, leaving 

a recently-arrived Metro PD unit to handle the roadblock. 

7 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

OIG investigators that Ogilvie had his head back in the seat and his eyes were 

wide open as if he was trying hard not to blink, and in notes written that 

evening described both agents as having a “deer in the headlights” look. The 

fourth time that the UD officer asked Ogilvie what they were doing there, he 

responded that they had drove in down 15th Street and “no one stopped us.” 

According to one of the officers, Connolly asked “where are the post officers and 

the K-9?” At that point, according to each of the officers at the scene, Connolly, 

who had been checking his blackberry, acknowledged that they were at 

condition yellow.7 Ogilvie, in response to a question, stated that they had just 

come from headquarters. 

All three officers at the scene thought something was “not right.” They did not 

smell any alcohol, and none of them noted that either agent slurred their 

speech or otherwise appeared intoxicated, but each of the officers thought that 

the agents were “not making sense.” At about 11:03 p.m., one of the officers 

decided to call for the watch commander, a captain who was the highest 

ranking UD officer on duty that night. The officer told the watch commander 

that "we have a situation, we have Connolly and Ogilvie down here and they 

aren't making any sense." The officer recalls telling the watch commander 

either "I can't smell alcohol" or "I don't know if alcohol is involved." The watch 

commander recalls the officer saying “they may be drunk.” Because of the 

circumstances, the watch commander called Inspector Williams, his immediate 

supervisor, to let him know the situation as he knew it: that reportedly 

Connolly had driven into the crime scene, that he smelled of alcohol and that 

he was upset. Telephone records reveal a 54 second call between the watch 

commander and Inspector Williams at 11:09 p.m. 

The UD watch commander arrived on the scene, received a summary of what 

occurred and told the three officers that he would handle the situation, and the 

three officers retreated away from the vehicle, outside of earshot, as the watch 

commander approached the SUV. 

According to the watch commander, Ogilvie asked in a calm voice, “What’s the 

hold up?” The watch commander told Ogilvie of the suspicious package 

7 Connolly, in his statement to OIG investigators, stated he realized that they were at condition 

yellow as they were driving on 15th Street, but before they reached the E Street entrance. This 

is contradicted by Connolly’s prior statement to Assistant Director William Callahan on March 

9, in which he said that once the UD officers at the E Street entrance told Connolly it was 

condition yellow, he retrieved his blackberry from the back seat of the vehicle and realized that. 

Connolly’s account as told to AD Callahan is consistent with the interviews of the UD officers. 

Additionally, when Ogilvie recounted the episode to his supervisors on March 10, he stated that 

Connolly did not access his blackberry until after they entered the E Street entrance. A review 

of the Secret Service video showed that Ogilvie as he pulled up was attempting to display his 

identification badge, characteristic of someone expecting UD personnel to be standing post at 

the time. 

9 
 

 

 

 

incident that they were working and, in the watch commander’s words, Ogilvie 

gave him an “oh shit look.” The watch commander described Connolly, who 

was on his cell phone, as having a flushed face, glazed eyes and his clothing 

slightly disheveled. The watch commander detected a slight odor of alcohol 

coming from the car and asked if they he had been drinking, to which Ogilvie 

replied "what?" The watch commander asked the question again and Ogilvie 

responded by turning his eyes towards Connolly, nodding slightly and in a low 

voice answered "yes." To the watch commander, Ogilvie's appearance was 

normal and he was calm and professional. The watch commander told OIG 

investigators that he believed Ogilvie had consumed alcohol, but wasn't 

exhibiting any signs of intoxication such as flushed face, slurred speech, glassy 

eyes or lack of concentration. Ogilvie, in his interview with OIG investigators, 

acknowledged that he told one of the UD officers that “I had a drink.” 

While the UD officers were dealing with the car, Connolly was on his mobile 

phone. First, according to Connolly, he called the JOC, and spoke to the senior 

Special Agent on duty that night and made the notification that they were at 

the White House complex and that they were at condition yellow.8 

Connolly was also called by UD Deputy Chief Dyson at 11:19 p.m. Dyson 

commands the UD officers at the White House and reports to the SAIC of PPD 

through Connolly. Dyson had received word of the situation from Inspector 

Williams, who had been informed by the watch commander. Dyson wanted to 

know if everything was OK. Dyson stated that Connolly told them everything 

was fine. According to Dyson, Connolly said "I f––ed up." Connolly added that 

the "kid" from the WFO (presumed to be Ogilvie) gave him a ride to the White 

House and they drove around a road block and into the E Street entrance so 

Connolly could get to his vehicle. According to Dyson, Connolly told him that 

once they arrived at the E Street entrance, they realized that no one was posted 

in the area, so they stopped the vehicle, looked around and realized that 

something was wrong. At that time, Connolly and Ogilvie reached for their 

respective blackberries and saw the e-mail notifications that there was a 

suspicious package located at the entrance where they were stopped. Connolly 

went on to say that they had no knowledge of the package and it was his fault 

for not paying attention to his blackberry. Dyson advised Connolly that he 

needed to make notification before the incident got out of hand. According to 

Dyson, Connolly agreed with Dyson regarding the notification. 

According to the watch commander, he believed that Ogilvie was fit to drive, 

but that Connolly was not. When interviewed, the watch commander told OIG 

investigators that he made the final decision on releasing Ogilvie based on his 

law enforcement experience that Connolly was intoxicated but Ogilvie was not. 

8 This call is not reflected on Connolly’s blackberry telephone records, yet both Connolly and 

the agent at the JOC recall this call being made. 

10 
The watch commander, in a written statement to us, stated that while Ogilvie 

admitted that he had consumed alcohol, his eyes were normal, speech was 

normal, and his demeanor was polite and professional, and the watch 

commander did not believe that he was intoxicated. The watch commander 

stated that he observed Ogilvie drive a short distance when he directed him to 

drive , and Ogilvie 

was able to do that without incident. The watch commander stated that he had 

asked the others on the scene whether they thought that Ogilvie was 

intoxicated, and none did.9 

The watch commander called for which had to be ordered to the E 

Street entrance after initially refusing to enter the blast area. 

 and the watch commander permitted the agents to drive off. The 

total time elapsed from entering E Street to being released was approximately 

17 minutes. 

The watch commander’s statement to the OIG investigators, that he thought 

that Ogilvie was fit to drive, is contradicted by his statement to other witnesses, 

who stated that the watch commander made statements that night that to 

other UD officers that both agents were under the influence of alcohol, 

describing to one officer their condition as being “hammered.” One UD officer 

told OIG investigators that the watch commander said that he did not ask to 

have a field sobriety test conducted because it would be a “career killer.” (The 

watch commander, when interviewed, denied making the statements.) The 

watch commander also separately told the other three officers at the scene that 

the agents had admitted that they had been drinking. He also told his 

supervisor, Inspector Williams, that he thought the agents were in violation of 

the “10 hour rule,” meaning that they had been drinking within 10 hours of 

reporting for duty. 

The watch commander did think Connolly was intoxicated, but he was under 

the assumption that Connolly was going to remain at the WHC or a local hotel 

overnight. Due to forecasted weather conditions, many UD officers were staying 

in hotels and the watch commander assumed Connolly was as well. He called 

officers at the interior posts to check to see if Ogilvie and Connolly had made it 

to the West Executive parking lot. The watch commander stated that if he had 

known that Connolly intended to drive home, he would have made a further 

investigation regarding Connolly’s fitness to drive. While none of the three 

 

9 There is a discrepancy between the watch commander’s statement and that of the three 

officers first on the scene. The watch commander stated that he had asked the officers on two 

occasions (before he approached the vehicle and after about the sobriety of the 

occupants. None of the three officers, when interviewed by OIG investigators, recall such a 

conversation, and one specifically told us that the watch commander never asked them for 

their opinion as to the sobriety of the two agents. 

11 
 

 

 

 

 

officers at the scene were certified in administering a field sobriety test 

(although one of the three officers originally at the scene was a former 

instructor), there was a UD officer at the WHC that night who was so trained. 

In fact, after being released from the E Street entrance, both Ogilvie and 

Connolly immediately drove home in their assigned government vehicles. 

Connolly and Ogilvie spoke to each other on the drive home, in two calls 

(combined) lasting over seven minutes. Connolly also called UD Deputy Chief 

Dyson, in a call lasting over five minutes. 

Secret Service Policy on Drinking and Government Vehicles 

The Secret Service policy on drinking has been amended on a number of 

occasions as a result of previous incidents, including an update after this 

incident. On March 4, there were several relevant Secret Service policies in 

existence, although the policies are generally vague and we found that the 

knowledge of these policies by Secret Service personnel varied. 

One policy in effect on March 4 prohibited Secret Service personnel who are 

authorized to carry firearms from using intoxicants during working hours. As 

noted in the policy, “This includes periods while on official travel, or at any 

time when such employees may reasonably expect that they may be called 

upon to perform an official duty.” 

Additionally, the Secret Service policies in effect on March 4 included limitations 

on the use of alcohol while off duty, particularly while on protective assignments 

away from agents’ home offices. The policy also prohibits the use of alcohol within 

10 hours of reporting for duty at any time. Additionally, while on a protective 

assignment away from the home office, agents are prohibited from drinking at the 

protectee’s hotel once the protective visit has begun, but are permitted to drink “in 

moderate amounts” while off duty during the protective mission. 

Secret Service’s policy on drinking alcohol and subsequently driving a 

government vehicle was similarly vague. The UD had a policy that prohibited 

operating a government vehicle “while under the influence of intoxicants.” That 

policy, instituted in 2012, only applied to UD personnel and not the special 

agents. The only other vehicle policy stated that that the operator must 

“observe all traffic laws.” 

We found that different Secret Service personnel had differing understandings 

of what the alcohol policy was as it relates to government vehicles. Director 

Clancy, for example, testified on March 24, 2015 to the House Oversight and 

Government Reform Committee as follows: 

12 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CHAFFETZ: At the time of the March 4th incident, what was the Secret 

Service policy for driving a government vehicle after drinking alcohol? 

CLANCY: At the time of the incident, you cannot drive a government 

vehicle under the influence of alcohol. 

CHAFFETZ: Can you have a drink, what level? What level is acceptable? 

CLANCY: The way the policy reads going off memory here, is that if you 

are impaired, if you have -- you're not able to control your actions. So it's 

not a legal limit, it's not the legal limits. In other words, it could be less. 

You may not be intoxicated by a legal limit but someone could say that 

you don't have proper abilities. 

Connolly, when interviewed, stated that he believed that the policy meant that 

you could not drive drunk, but that you could have a drink and then drive, so 

long as you were not impaired. Likewise, Ogilvie told us that he believed that 

the policy was that you could drink and drive, so long as you were not 

impaired.10 Ogilvie’s supervisor was unaware of any policy on drinking and 

driving. 

The Secret Service’s policy at the time of the March 4th incident did not comport 

with existing DHS policy. That policy, which was established on March 18, 2011 

as part of DHS’ fleet management guide, prohibits any DHS employee from the 

consumption of alcohol within 8 hours of operating a government vehicle. While 

this policy supersedes the Secret Service policy, we found no evidence that anyone 

within the Secret Service was aware of the DHS policy or efforts on the part of the 

Department to enforce the policy among components. After this incident, on April 

20, 2015, the Department issued a memo reminding components of the DHS 

policy and instructing that components may have policies that are more stringent, 

but not more lenient than the DHS policy. 

Additionally, both of the agents involved had “home to work” authorizaton, 

meaning that they could use their government vehicles to commute from their 

home to their office and back. This authority is permitted in those instances: 

when the employee is assigned duty for the purpose of responding to 

calls which may be received after regular business hours, or when the 

10 None of the policies define “impaired,” but under a common understanding of the term, it is 

something less than intoxicated. According to the Center for Disease Control, loss of judgment 

begins with blood alcohol concentrations (BAC) as low as .02% and describes loss of judgment 

as a “typical effect” at a BAC of .05%. 

http://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/impaired_driving/bac.html The District of Columbia 

defines driving while intoxicated as having a BAC of .08%, or .04% if driving a commercial 

vehicle. A 180 pound man can reach a BAC of .04% after two drinks. 

13 
 

 

 

vehicle is used to make calls after regular hours of duty, or when 

transportation in a Government vehicle is otherwise essential to the safe 

and efficient performance of intelligence, counter-intelligence, criminal 

law enforcement, and protective services duties.... 

In other words, because Connolly and Ogilvie were required as part of their 

duties to be available to respond to situations after normal work hours, they 

were granted the authority to drive to and from work in their government 

vehicles. 

After the March 4th incident, the Secret Service issued yet another set of rules 

about alcohol consumption, prohibiting the use of a government-owned vehicle 

within 10 hours of drinking alcohol in any amount. The new policy comports with 

the DHS rules adopted in 2011. 

Notifications 

Neither Connolly nor Ogilvie notified their superiors of the incident, although 

Secret Service policy required them to report any incident which in their 

judgment “may be the cause of publicity or inquiry from others.” Director 

Clancy was first informed about the March 4th incident involving Connolly and 

Ogilvie at approximately 9:00 a.m. on March 9th, when a retired Secret Service 

agent called him and told him of an email that was making the rounds, alleging 

that two individuals were involved in a car crash at the White House, that it 

involved alcohol, and that it was in the middle of a suspicious package 

investigation. Although Clancy told us he believed the story to be bogus, he 

directed Office of Protective Operations Assistant Director (AD) William 

Callahan to determine if the story had any merit to it. Richard Coughlin, the 

acting AD heading up the Office of Professional Responsibility, met with Clancy 

shortly thereafter and showed him an email containing the same information, 

but that also identified Connolly and Ogilvie. At that time, pursuant to DHS 

policy, Clancy directed that Coughlin refer the matter to the DHS Office of 

Inspector General. Our office received the notification on the evening of March 

9, 2015. 

Connolly met with his supervisor, SAIC Buster, on March 6th and discussed 

the UD officer’s handling of the confrontation with the suspect in the 

suspicious package incident. Connolly did not mention the incident involving 

him and Ogilvie. Buster also first heard of the incident from Office of Protective 

Operations Assistant Director William Callahan on March 9th. When 

interviewed, Connolly said that he did not report his and Ogilvie’s entry into 

the E Street entrance during the suspicious package incident to SAIC Buster 

because Connolly thought it was a misunderstanding; not an incident. In his 

mind, there was no impact and nothing to relate to Buster. 

14 
 

 

 

 

Ogilvie stated that he did not believe the March 4th incident to be an issue so 

he had not made any notifications until March 9th. On that date, Ogilvie’s 

boss (the ASAIC of WFO) asked him in passing, “did you hear about an incident 

at the White House involving the PPD supervisor?” “I think Marc Connolly 

came in, suspicious package...” Ogilvie told him that “this is a rumor,” and 

explained what had occurred. Later that day, he also told the SAIC of WFO 

and according to Ogilvie, gave her a general overview of the incident. 

The incident with Connolly and Ogilvie was not memorialized in writing by any 

Secret Service personnel. The officer responsible for the JOC log did not record 

any of the incidents involving the agents into the log. The officer took full 

responsibility for failure to do so and was not coerced or advised not to include 

any account of the incident in the log. In hindsight, the officer believed this 

incident should have been recorded into the JOC log. The officer, at the time of 

the incident, while looking at the camera footage, believed the driver of the 

vehicle was someone who would figure out that they could not come into the 

post and would drive away. He did not think it would become the incident in 

question. 

Additionally, the incident report that was written for the suspicious package 

incident, the report written by WFO, the Watch Commander journal omitted 

the incursion of the crime scene by Ogilvie and Connolly. The watch 

commander reported the situation by telephone to his supervisor, Inspector 

Williams, both before and after the watch commander’s interaction with the 

agents. Williams, in turn, notified UD Deputy Chief Dyson. Additionally, the 

watch commander received a brief description via email from a UD officer in the 

JOC, describing the incursion, but not identifying anyone by name.11 The 

watch commander then forwarded this same email to Inspector Williams as 

well as to Deputy Chief Dyson. Dyson, in turn, forwarded the message as an 

“fyi” to both SAIC Buster and to Connolly. 

Deputy Chief Dyson, who was notified of the incident that night, told Connolly 

on two occasions that night that he needed to report the incident. Other than 

forwarding the email, Dyson never reported the incident. Dyson stated that he 

did not report the incident because he believed that Connolly would self-report. 

UD Chief Simpson was also notified on the evening of March 4th that two 

agents had driven into an area and alcohol was involved. Simpson stated he 

did not report this incident because he did not believe it was his job to do so, 

and assumed that Connolly was going to self-report. 

11 The full text of the email reads: The individual that entered [the E Street gate] moved the 

orange barrel, that was blocking the entrance, with his vehicle. He never exited his vehicle but 

moved it with his car then backed up and moved it again. 

15 
Video preservation 

The Secret Service video surveillance system at the WHC was installed in 2007 

and originally had a 24 hour recording retention requirement, which was later 

changed to 72 hours. The 72 hour retention policy was developed with the 

Secret Service Office of Chief Counsel in approximately June 2012. The 

determination of the retention period was a result of a variety of factors, 

including privacy issues, legal liability, the cost and capacity of the equipment. 

A longer retention period was not used because it was believed that security 

threats at the White House were immediately known and would not need to be 

preserved. 

We interviewed the contractor who designed the system, who stated that the 

system will not retain video past that set time and will begin to record over the 

beginning of the video file once it gets to this set time. The OIG independently 

verified with the contractor that proprietary forensic tools would not be able to 

find any data from the incident because the video data is constantly 

overwritten. Additionally, OIG learned from the Secret Service that they were 

unable to recover additional video footage from the March 4 incident. We do not 

believe any other video of either incident exists, except for the MPD video and 

the video recovered from the Department of Commerce camera. 

Beyond the 72 hour retention, specific incidents can be preserved for 

intelligence or evidentiary purposes. These requests ordinarily come from an 

on-scene commander at the WHC, usually a UD sergeant or above. In order to 

record an incident, the UD sergeant in the JOC reverses the feed, identifies the 

requested video, downloads it to a local hard drive, then "burns" a copy to a 

compact disc. On the night of March 4, the video regarding the suspect leaving 

the object was burned to removable media by JOC personnel that evening for 

evidentiary and intelligence purposes. The incident involving Connolly and 

Ogilvie was burned to removable media at the request of the UD officers at the 

scene, who wanted to determine precisely the manner in which the barrel was 

moved. 

Conclusions 

•	 The UD personnel on scene reacted to the suspicious package generally in 

accordance with Secret Service policy and operational procedures. The 

establishment of the perimeter should have been better executed. While 

there is often confusion inherent in a fast-moving and factually fluid 

situation, a number of vehicles and pedestrians came within close proximity 

to the object after the UD had established the safety perimeter. 

•	 Contributing to the confusion was the inconsistent interpretation of the 

scene of the suspicious package. The scene was often interpreted by 

16 
personnel as a “safe zone” instead of a crime scene. If the scene had been 

interpreted as a crime scene, the overall documentation and security of the 

scene may have changed, including documenting incursions into the crime 

scene. 

•	 The UD made reasonable attempts, while they were securing the scene, to 

canvas the area for the suspect, but an early partial description of the 

suspect vehicle foiled the ability to apprehend the suspect during her flight. 

Secret Service investigative agents reacted quickly to identify the suspect 

and determine the nature of the threat. 

•	 Connolly and Ogilvie displayed poor judgment and a lack of situational 

awareness in driving into the scene. Even if they had not been aware of the 

condition yellow through email notifications, it would have been obvious to a 

reasonable observer as they drove down 15th Street and into the E Street 

vehicle entrance that something was amiss. Yet, according to the weight of 

the evidence, neither Connolly nor Ogilvie were aware of the situation until 

the UD officers spoke with them. 

We conclude that it was more likely than not that both Connolly’s and 

Ogilvie’s judgment was impaired by alcohol. While during their interviews 

each denied drinking to excess that evening, we must assess those denials 

in light of the UD officers’ observations of the agents’ behavior, the fact that 

they had just spent the last five hours in a restaurant/bar in which Ogilvie 

ran up a significant bar tab (at least some of which he was unable to 

account for), and that two highly experienced Secret Service supervisors 

drove into a crime scene inches from what the rest of the Secret Service was 

treating as a potential explosive device and which, under different 

circumstances, could have endangered their own lives and those of the UD 

officers responding. 

•	 It was the watch commander’s sole decision to allow Connolly and Ogilvie to 

pass without further inquiry into their sobriety. The watch commander 

made his decision on his own assessment, based on his observations, which 

included speaking with the agents and watching Ogilvie drive a short 

distance to an area in which . There 

is a factual disparity, which we were unable to resolve, as to whether the 

watch commander consulted with the other officers on the scene as to their 

opinion of the agents’ condition. In any event, it would have been far 

preferable if he had ordered a field sobriety test or made other inquiries to 

establish both agents’ fitness to drive. 

However, the watch commander’s actions must be considered in light of the 

vast disparity in rank between the watch commander and Connolly (who 

was in the watch commander’s chain of command), the vague and 

17 
insufficient Secret Service policy regarding drinking alcohol and driving 

government vehicles, and the Secret Service’s reputation for punishing or 

ignoring those who would further investigate or report such violations. 

•	 We have found no evidence that the video of the incident was intentionally 

deleted or destroyed. The clips involving the suspect placing the package 

were extracted from the White House video system for intelligence and 

criminal investigative purposes. The video of the incident involving Connolly 

and Ogilvie was extracted as a result of a request by UD officers at the 

scene. The remaining video evidence was overwritten in the ordinary course 

of the operation of a system that was designed to overwrite older video. 

•	 Neither the PPD SAIC nor Director Clancy were aware of the incident until 

Clancy was notified by an outside party on March 9. Director Clancy acted 

appropriately upon receiving information about potential misconduct. 

Both Connolly and Ogilvie had a duty to report the incident to their 

superiors, but did not do so. The policy relies on the good judgment of the 

individual to determine what to report. That two highly experienced 

supervisors, understanding the numerous high-profile incidents involving 

Secret Service’s protective function and its employees’ use of alcohol, would 

believe that the event in which they were involved did not need to be 

reported reflects either poor judgment or an affirmative desire to hide their 

activities. 

The watch commander reported the facts as he understood them to his 

superior officer. The watch commander and his subordinates should have 

been able to rely on their superior officers to appropriately report the 

situation. 

Both UD Deputy Chief Dyson and UD Chief Kevin Simpson were notified 

that night that two agents had been drinking and had driven into an 

evacuated area, and each could have reported the incident. 

18 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Appendix A1 

Time Event Source 

10:23 Suspicious vehicle arrives at E Street entrance MPD video 

10:24 Suspect interacts with UD officer, leaves object Secret Service 

video 

10:24 USSS/Joint Operations Center (JOC) advised 

that an unattended item (book, wrapped in a 

sweatshirt) was thrown by a subject in the 

vicinity of E Street entrance. 

10:25:46 Suspicious vehicle leaves MPD video 

10:26:27 Two marked UD cruisers leave E Street, lights 

activated, in pursuit of suspect 

10:26:41 Unknown vehicle permitted to enter E Street 

entrance 

MPD video 

10:28 WHC moved to condition yellow Tello email 

10:29 UD officer pulls over suspect vehicle on 15th 

Street; vehicle released at 10:31 after 

description of the package thrower does not 

match driver 

Radio traffic 

10:29 Pedestrians walking southbound on 15th 

Street sidewalk next to object 

MPD video 

10:28 WHC elevated to Condition Yellow JOC log 

10:30 Temporary barrier established at the entrance 

to E Street entrance 

DOC video 

10:34 Units requested to secure Ellipse and Freedom 

Park 

JOC log 

10:36 MPD/EOD notified JOC log 

10:33 

(approx.) 

15th street blocked to traffic in both directions 

at F street to the north and Constitution 

Avenue to the south 

Radio traffic, MPD 

video 

10:35 License plate reported to JOC JOC log/Radio 

traffic 

10:40 Wife of owner is identified as being “of record” 

with Secret Service 

JOC log 

1 All times are taken from videos supplied by the Secret Service, MPD, or the Department of 

Commerce, from an analysis of police radio transmissions, emails, telephone records, or times 

noted on official logs. The task was complicated by the fact that the time stamp on each video 

source was not synchronized with the others. The Secret Service video was about 5 seconds 

different than that of MPD’s. Likewise, the Department of Commerce video had a time stamp 

that was about 4:35 behind that supplied by the Secret Service. Likewise, times listed on 

telephone records may not be synchronized with the video records. We attempted to reconcile 

these disparities. Approximate times are noted. 

1 
Time Event Source 

10:42:37 Unknown vehicle, while travelling south, 

passes in close proximity of object 

MPD video 

10:45 

(approx.) 

Director Clancy received telephone notification 

from PIOC of suspicious package incident 

MOA 

10:48 JOC sends first email with subject line: 

“condition yellow -- suspicious package [E 

Street entrance].” The body of the email 

describes it as “an item believed to be a book 

wrapped in a sweat shirt.” Notifies all that E 

Street entrance is closed to traffic. 

email 

10:54 Unidentified pedestrian walks from Ellipse 

toward E Street entrance and comes in close 

proximity to the object. 

MPD video 

10:56 Connolly and Ogilvie turn south on 15th 

Street NW and drive past ICP 

MPD video 

10:58 Connolly and Ogilvie arrive at E Street 

entrance 

MPD video 

10:58 Unknown car drives past E Street entrance 

and unattended item, pulled over by UD 

cruiser 

MPD video 

10:59 UD cruiser sits on 15th across from E Street 

entrance in close proximity to unattended item 

MPD video 

11:00 Two unidentified pedestrians walk within feet 

of unattended item 

MPD video 

11:01 Officers manning directed to approach the car 

at E Street entrance and tell him to exit the 

complex 

radio 

11:03:42 UD officer calls watch commander (2:28), 

informs him that Connolly and Ogilvie were at 

E Street entrance “and there could be a 

problem...they may be drunk...” and that they 

were inside the barrier area of the suspicious 

package scene 

Phone records, 

MOA 

11:08 Initial request for K-9 to respond to E Street 

entrance 

Radio via Sgt. 

Parsons 

11:09 Watch commander calls Inspector Williams (54 

seconds) per interview to inform him of 

situation regarding Connolly and Ogilvie. 

Phone records, 

MOA 

11:09 Buster advises WH Deputy COS of suspicious 

package; Connolly copied 

email 

11:10 Deputy Chief Dyson receives call from 

Inspector Williams, per interview informing 

him about the situation with Connolly and 

Ogilvie 

Phone records, 

MOA 

2 
 

Time Event Source 

11:12 PIOC alert sent describes it as “unattended 

item (book)” 

email 

11:12 MPD EOD arrives at Incident Command Post JOC log, radio 

traffic 

11:12 Watch commander orders K-9 unit to sweep 

Ogilvie’s government car after initial K-9 

refusal to enter area 

Radio traffic 

11:14 Watch commander receives call from Inspector 

Williams (2:10) 

Phone records 

11:14:40 Ogilvie and Connolly drive off (total time from 

entering E street to departure was 

approximately 17 minutes) 

Commerce video 

11:19 Connolly receives call from Deputy Chief 

Dyson (09:13) 

Phone records 

11:30 MPD EOD approaches package Radio traffic 

11:39 or 

11:46 

MPD EOD declares package safe JOC log (11:39) 

radio traffic (11:46) 

11:47 Watch commander calls Inspector Williams 

(1:33) 

Phone records 

11:47 PPD SAC Buster receives forwarded (cryptic) 

email from Deputy Dyson re orange barrel 

email 

11:47 Radio broadcast that suspicious package had 

been declared safe 

Radio traffic 

11:51 PIOC alert notifies that MPD EOD declared the 

item safe; condition green; streets and fence 

line reopened 

email 

3 
 

 

 

 

Fado Irish Pub 

USSS Headquarters 

WHC 

E Street Entrance 

Path Walked by Ogilvie and Connolly Upon Departing Fado 

Path Travelled to WHC 

in Ogilvie’s Vehicle 

Approximate Location of Ogilvie’s GOV while at Fado 

15th Street and 

Jefferson Drive 

APPENDIX B
 

 

 

Path Travelled to 

WHC in Ogilvie’s 

Vehicle 

WHC 

E Street Entrance 

Retractable Barrier 

ICP 

DOC 

MPDC 

Camera 

MPDC 

Camera 

DOC 

Camera 

Constitution Avenue 

Ogilvie Flipped Down 

Visor Light; Connolly 

Displayed Identification 

APPENDIX B
USSS guard station at the perimet

WHC, at the intersection of E Stree

closed to the public) and 15th St

Street Entrance”)

Woman associated with suspicious 

arriving at the E Street Entra

APPENDIX C

I15‐06777 ‐ Metropolitan Police Department 
E Street Entrance

Woman departs E Street

Entrance after leaving

suspicious package and

assaulting UD Officer

Suspicious Pack

APPENDIX C

I15‐06777 ‐ Metropolitan Police Department 
E Street Entra

(Location of the Suspici

Woman departed E Street Entrance

at 22:25:46

(Approximately 1 Minutes Earlier)

Unknown sedan a

E Street Entra

APPENDIX C

I15‐06777 ‐ Metropolitan Police Department 
Unknown People Walking Southbound

in the Vicinity of E Street Entrance

Suspicious Package

APPENDIX C

I15‐06777 ‐ Metropolitan Police Department 
Location of incide

command post f

Suspicious Packa

incident

Possibly Connolly and Ogilvie tu

south on to 15th Street NW

APPENDIX C

I15‐06777 ‐ Metropolitan Police Department 
E Street Entrance

Connolly a

arriving a

Entr

Unknown Station Wagon

USSS‐UD Cruiser (subsequently conducts a traffic

stop of Unknown Station Wagon in proximity of E

Street Entrance)

APPENDIX C

I15‐06777 ‐ Metropolitan Police Department 
Connolly and Ogilvie E Street Entrance

arriving at E Street

Entrance

USSS‐UD Cruiser conducts traffic stop of

Unknown Station Wagon Traffic 

Suspici

APPENDIX C

I15‐06777 ‐ Metropolitan Police Department 
USSS‐UD Cruise

conducting traffic 

Unknown Station 

E Street Entrance

Unknown Station 

after traffic stop a

making U‐tu

Suspicious Package

APPENDIX C

I15‐06777 ‐ Metropolitan Police Department 
USSS‐UD Cruiser conducting U‐turn

after conducting traffic stop of

Unknown Station Wagon

E Street Entrance

Suspicious 

APPENDIX C

I15‐06777 ‐ Metropolitan Police Department 
2 Un

Person

north o

side of 1

E Street E

USSS‐UD Cruiser

with its emergency

lights extinguished

The vehicle containing Connolly and Ogilvie impacts

the traffic barrel at E Street Entrance at 22:58:06

(approximately 2 minutes earlier)

Suspicious Package

APPENDIX C

I15‐06777 ‐ Metropolitan Police Department 
E Street Entrance

Suspicious V

arriving at E 

Entranc

Retractable barrier Inspection a

I15‐06777 ‐ Department of Commerce

APPENDIX D
Woman placing the Suspicious Pac

E Street Entrance

I15‐06777 ‐ Department of Commerce

APPENDIX D
UD Officer

Distance traveled in

Reverse with UD Officer on

the passenger side of

vehicle

Immediately before the

vehicle went in reverse

Immediately after the

vehicle came to stop

I15‐06777 ‐ Department of Commerce

APPENDIX D
Oncoming traffic

Woman departing at E

Street Entrance

UD Officer

Suspicious Package

I15‐06777 ‐ Department of Commerce

APPENDIX D
UD Cruiser departing at E St

Entrance to pursue Woma

I15‐06777 ‐ Department of Commerce

APPENDIX D
Unknown Sedan Arrives 

Street Entrance

Suspicious Package

I15‐06777 ‐ Department of Commerce

APPENDIX D
Unknown Sedan after going thro

E Street Entrance

UD Offi

UD Officer

Suspicious Package

I15‐06777 ‐ Department of Commerce

APPENDIX D
UD K9 Officer

K9

Unknown Sedan

I15‐06777 ‐ Department of Commerce

APPENDIX D
Orange Traffic Barrel

Bike ra

(Enhan

Suspicious Package

UD Officer positioning

Orange Traffic Barrel

I15‐06777 ‐ Department of Commerce

APPENDIX D
Unknown V

southbou

15th Suspicious Package Stree

MPD

I15‐06777 ‐ Department of Commerce

APPENDIX D
Unknown Pedestrian

Suspicious Packag

I15‐06777 ‐ Department of Commerce

APPENDIX D
Suspicious Package

UD Cruiser (subsequently conducted traffic stop of

Unknown Station Wagon in proximity of E Street Entran

Unknown Station Wagon

Ogilvie and Connolly

I15‐06777 ‐ Department of Commerce

APPENDIX D
Unknown Vehicle moving on

the northeast side of the

Ellipse

Suspicious Package

Ogilvie and Connolly

approaching E Street Entrance

Orange Traffic 

I15‐06777 ‐ Department of Commerce

APPENDIX D
Unknown Vehicle moving on

northeast side of the Ellipse Suspicious Package

Ogilvie and Connolly

making contact with

Orange Traffic Barrel

Orange Traffic 

I15‐06777 ‐ Department of Commerce

APPENDIX D
Unknown Vehicle moving on

the northeast side of Ellipse Suspicious Package

Ogilvie and Con

E Street Entr

Orange Traff

I15‐06777 ‐ Department of Commerce

APPENDIX D
Additional Unknown Vehicle moving on

the northeast side of the Ellipse

Suspicious Package

Ogilvie and Conn

Orange Traffic 

I15‐06777 ‐ Department of Commerce

APPENDIX D
Ogilvie and Connolly stop

Orange Traff

Retractable barrier

Unknown Pedestrians

Suspicious Package

I15‐06777 ‐ Department of Commerce

APPENDIX D
Ogilvie and Connolly s

Retractable barrier

UD Officer reposi

the Orange Traffic 

Suspicious Package

I15‐06777 ‐ Department of Commerce

APPENDIX D
Ogilvie and Connolly S

Retractable barri

UD Officer Interacting with

Ogilvie and Connolly

Suspicious Package

I15‐06777 ‐ Department of Commerce

APPENDIX D
Ogilvie and Connolly departing

Retractable ba

Suspicious Package

I15‐06777 ‐ Department of Commerce

APPENDIX D
Vehicle Conta

Ogilvie and Co

USSS Camera Located on the Roof of

E Street Entrance

Suspicious Pa

Ogilvie Displ

Identificat

APPENDIX E