No. 14257 

IN THE SUPREME COW OF THE STATE OF I4XCANA 

1979 

IN RE TI-E MAFUUAGE OF 

NANCY E. KUWZ, 

Petitioner and Respondent, 

-VSTHOMAS M. KWZ, 

Respondent and Appellant. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, 

Hon. H. William Coder, Jdge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Ralph T. Randono, Great Falls, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Church, Harris, Johnson & Williams, Great Falls, Mntana 

Sdmitted on briefs: March 12, 1979 

Decided: Ai ,, i - 1 19-9 

Filed : 

.-: 
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

c his is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court 

of the Eighth Judicial District, County of Cascade, in which 

the court granted respondent Nancy Kuntz a dissolution of 

marriage and ordered certain custody and property dispositions. 

The trial court ordered that the land and home, which 

were valued at $59,850, be sold and after all debts connected 

with it paid, the proceeds equally divided. In addition, 

the machinery and livestock were ordered sold. The remaining joint debts of the parties were to be paid from the 

proceeds and the remainder divided equally. Each party was 

awarded the vehicle they were using at the time of separation. 

Prior to discussing the issues raised by appellant, we 

note that the counsel for appellant herein was not the 

counsel that tried this matter before the District Court. 

Therefore, some of the issues raised on appeal were matters 

that, had he been present at the time of the trial, would 

have been handled differently. Nevertheless, he takes the 

record as he finds it. 

The issues presented for our review are: 

1. Did the District Court err in making the division 

of property between the parties ordered in its decree of 

October 17, 1977? 

2. Did the District Court make the required findings 

of fact necessary to support the decree? 

3. Did the District Court make the required conclusions of law necessary to support the decree? 

4. Did the District Court err in excluding the evidence of Howard Parker as to value? 
5.  id the District Court err in its rulings upon 

examination of Bruce A. Nelson (a) as to the exclusion of 

testimony as to other sales and (b) as to accepting the 

opinion of the witness? 

For the purpose of this opinion we divide the issues 

into two categories, combining issues one through three on 

whether or not the court followed the statutes as required 

in considering the partiest assets for distribution and 

issues four and five as to whether the testimony concerning 

property valuation was properly received. 

Appellant takes issue with the fact that the court did 

not specifically find a certain value as to property, both 

personal and real, and be more specific in its findings. He 

alleges that section 40-4-202 MCA requires such findings by 

the court in the division of the property. Here, the court 

found that the value of the house and land was $59,850 and 

that there was a $15,000 mortgage outstanding. The court 

then ordered the property sold and the proceeds divided 

equally after the indebtedness was paid. While the court 

did not specifically place a value on the few cattle or the 

small amount of machinery that was on the farm, it did 

instead order that it be sold with the farm and ordered 

those proceeds divided equally also. In our opinion this 

was a workable method in dividing the only assets of the 

parties as both parties had contributed towards their 

preservation. The court's order is logical and practical, 

and in our opinion follows the requirements of section 40-4- 

202 MCA and case law. A review of the case law upholds the 

finding of the District Court in this regard. See In re 

Marriage of Caprice (1978) Mont . , 585 P.2d 641, 

35 St.Rep. 1460, and Marriage of Barron (1978), Mont . 

, 580 P.2d 936, 35 St.Rep. 891. 
Appellant relies on several cases of this Court which 

he believes are controlling: Robertson v. Robertson (1978), 

Mont. , 590 P.2d 113, 35 St.Rep. 1889; In re Marriage of Capener (1978), Mont. , 582 P.2d 326, 35 

St.Rep. 1026; Vivian v. Vivian (1978), Mont . , 583 

P.2d 1072, 35 St-Rep. 1359; In re Marriage of Kramer (1978), 

Mont . , 580 P.2d 439, 35 St.Rep. 700; and Martinez 

v. Martinez (1978), Mont. I 573 P.2d 667, 35 St.Rep. 

61. These cases are not at point in this matter for they 

either had no findings as to the assets of the parties or 

record upon which required a determination of net worth to 

support the distribution in particular cases to one of the 

parties. 

Putting a net dollar figure on the bottom line would 

not affect the judgment in this case for the sale would 

establish what the figure should be. Here, what the District Court says in its order is: Here are the assets, sell 

them, pay your joint debts, and split what remains. It is 

a simple, practical and logical way for the District Court 

to divide the assets and liabilities of the parties dissolving their marriage. The duty of the court was to consider the statutory factors and equitably divide the property. We find that the court did so. 

In addition, appellant argues that the facts do not 

support the findings. The standard for reviewing that claim 

is clearly set forth in In re Marriage of Jorgensen (1979), 

Mont. , 590 P.2d 606, 36 St-Rep. 233, where we said 

that findings may not be disturbed by us unless clearly 

erroneous (Rule 52(a), M.R.Civ.P.). The evidence here 

supports the findings. The rule in Montana for our review 

of property division in marital cases is whether the District Court acted arbitrarily, without employment of con- 
scientious judgment, or exceeded the bounds of reason in 

view of all the circumstances. Zell v. Zell (1977), 

Mont. . 570 P.2d 33, 34 St.Rep. 1070. Appellant has 

not shown arbitrariness on the part of the District Court 

that goes beyond conscientious judgment or beyond reason. 

We next consider whether the court properly admitted 

the expert testimony of Bruce Nelson, a realtor, concerning 

the value of the acreage and the buildings on same, and then 

restricted cross-examination on the sales of other property 

in the area. Appellant claims this case must be reversed 

because Mr. Nelson was allowed to testify about the value of 

the real estate. He also claims his attorney should have 

been allowed to cross-examine Mr. Nelson about other sales. 

Mr. Nelson was allowed to testify as an expert about 

his opinion of the real estate value. Rule 702, Mont.R.Evid., 

reads: 

"If scientific, technical, or other specialized 

knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue, 

a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, 

skill, experience, training, or education, may 

testify thereto in the form of opinion or otherwise." (Emphasis supplied.) 

The court must decide whether the expert is qualified. 

Rule 104, Mont.R.Evid. 

Mr. Nelson's qualifications are found in the record: 

he is a licensed real estate broker; has been so since 1952; 

belongs to professional organizations; and has made his 

living since 1952 selling real estate state-wide. He has 

sold numerous farm properties, is familiar with the values 

of property in the area, and had inspected the property in 

question. The court allowed his opinion as to the value. 

We find no error. 
The District Court considered all necessary factors and 

made rulings considered equitable under the circumstances. 

We affirm the judgment of that court. 

/' 1 Justice 

/ 

We concur: 

%,ce,aw&4 

mief Justice