THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

In the Matter of Kenneth Gary Cooper, Respondent 

Appellate Case No. 2014-002702 

Opinion No. 27534 

Submitted June 8, 2015 – Filed June 24, 2015 

DEFINITE SUSPENSION 

Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and C. Tex 

Davis, Jr., Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, both of 

Columbia, for Office of Disciplinary Counsel. 

William L. Runyon, Jr., of Charleston, for respondent. 

PER CURIAM: In this attorney disciplinary matter, respondent and the Office 

of Disciplinary Counsel have entered into an Agreement for Discipline by Consent 

(Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 

Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court 

Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, respondent admits misconduct and consents to 

the imposition of an admonition, public reprimand, or a definite suspension not to 

exceed twelve (12) months. We accept the Agreement and suspend respondent 

from the practice of law in this state for twelve (12) months. The facts, as set forth 

in the Agreement, are as follows. 

Facts 

On January 31, 2012, respondent went to a restaurant where his son tended bar in 

order to drive his son home after completing his shift. While at the restaurant, 

respondent came into contact with a former neighbor and the neighbor's son. A 

verbal altercation escalated into a physical fight. The Charleston County Sheriff's 

Office responded. The former neighbor alleged respondent and respondent's son 
 

physically assaulted him and his son. The former neighbor refused medical 

treatment while his son was transported to the hospital. 

On February 3 and February 7, 2012, the neighbor and his son met with detectives 

from the Charleston County Sheriff's Office and positively identified respondent as 

the individual who had assaulted them. On February 29, 2012, respondent was 

arrested and charged with Assault and Battery, 2nd degree, and Assault and 

Battery, 3rd degree. 

Respondent represents that he believed that both charges against him were going to 

be tried in General Sessions Court. In actuality, the Assault and Battery, 3rd 

degree, charge was heard by the Magistrate's Court and, on April 17, 2012, 

respondent was found guilty in absentia. On May 17, 2012, respondent paid the 

fines and costs in the amount of $1,124.76 to satisfy the sentence. 

Thereafter, respondent retained counsel. Among other actions, counsel filed a 

motion seeking to obtain the son's medical records from the night of the 

altercation. The son's medical records demonstrated the son was substantially 

intoxicated and that his injuries would not support the Assault and Battery, 2nd 

degree, charge. 

On November 6, 2013, the Assault and Battery, 2nd degree, charge was remanded 

to Magistrate's Court. Ultimately, this charge was marked nolle prosequi on May 

21, 2014. 

Law 

Respondent admits that by his conduct he has violated the following provisions of 

the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR: Rule 8.4(a) (it is 

professional misconduct for lawyer to violate Rules of Professional Conduct) and 

Rule 8.4(b) (it is professional misconduct for lawyer to commit a criminal act that 

reflects adversely on lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as lawyer in other 

respects). 

Respondent also admits his misconduct constitutes ground for discipline under the 

following Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 413, SCACR: Rule 

7(a)(1) (it shall be ground for discipline for lawyer to violate Rules of Professional 

Conduct). 
 

Conclusion 

We accept the Agreement for Discipline by Consent and definitely suspend 

respondent from the practice of law in this state for twelve (12) months.1 Within 

fifteen days of the date of this opinion, respondent shall file an affidavit with the 

Clerk of Court showing that he has complied with Rule 30 of Rule 413, SCACR. 

DEFINITE SUSPENSION. 

TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., concur. 

BEATTY, J., not participating. 

1 Respondent's disciplinary history includes a six (6) month suspension from the 

practice of law, with conditions. In the Matter of Cooper, 397 S.C. 339, 725 

S.E.2d 491 (2012). In addition, the Court found respondent in criminal and civil 

contempt of this Court for willfully violating the conditions of his six (6) month 

suspension and failing to pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding. In the 

Matter of Cooper, 405 S.C. 579, 748 S.E.2d 778 (2013).