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D.C. METRO: IS THERE A SAFETY GAP? 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION, 

AND PUBLIC ASSETS 

AND THE

SUBCOMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEETH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FEBRUARY 13, 2015 

Serial No. 114–2 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://www.house.gov/reform 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

ROD BLUM, Iowa 

JODY B. HICE, Georgia 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin 

WILL HURD, Texas 

GARY J. PALMER, Alabama 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MATT CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan 

TED LIEU, California 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands 

MARK DESAULNIER, California 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico 

SEAN MCLAUGHLIN, Staff Director 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

MICHAEL KIKO, Professional Staff Member 

CHRIS D’ANGELO, Professional Staff Member 

SARAH VANCE, Clerk 
(III) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC ASSETS

JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman 

GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin, Vice Chair 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR. Tennessee 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois, Ranking 

Minority Member 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

MARK DeSAULNIER, California 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina, Chairman 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan, Vice Chair 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia, Ranking 

Minority Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

(V) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on February 13, 2015 ....................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Mr. Jonathan Rogers, January 12, 2015, Metrorail Passenger 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 10 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 13 

The Hon. Christopher A. Hart, Acting Chairman, National Transportation 

Safety Board 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 15 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 18 

Mr. Mortimer L. Downey III, Board of Directors, Chairman, Washington 

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 33 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 36 

Mr. Edward R. Mills, Assistant Fire Chief Operations, D.C. Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 42 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 47 

Ms. Jackie L. Jeter, President and Business Agent, Amalgamated Transit 

Union, Local 689 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 56 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 58 

(1) 

D.C. METRO: IS THERE A SAFETY GAP? 

Friday, February 13, 2015 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC

ASSETS, JOINT WITH THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 9:05 a.m., in room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John L. Mica (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present from Subcommittee on Transportation and Public Assets: 

Representatives Mica, Amash, Massie, Grothman, Chaffetz, 

DeSaulnier, Boyle, and Cummings. 

Present from Subcommittee on Government Operations: Representatives Meadows, Jordan, Walberg, Massie, Mulvaney, Buck, 

Carter, Grotham, Connolly, Maloney, Norton, and Clay. 

Also present: Representative Beyer. 

Mr. MICA. Good morning. And I’d like to welcome everyone and 

call to order this joint hearing this morning of the Transportation 

and Public Assets Subcommittee along with the Government Operations Subcommittee. Welcome, everyone. 

The topic of our hearing today is ‘‘D.C. Metro: Is There a Safety 

Gap?’’ With that question, we will address the matter of the recent 

unfortunate death and incident we had in the D.C. Metro. 

And welcome our witnesses this morning. We’ll introduce you 

shortly. 

The order of business will be first I’ll start with an opening statement, then we’ll go to the acting ranking member. And I understand Ms. Duckworth is to be back with us soon, proud mother of 

a new baby girl. And then we’ll go to Mr. Meadows, who chairs the 

Government Operations Subcommittee, and then Mr. DeSaulnier, 

who we’ll recognize for his Statement, and other members. 

So with that, without objection, the chair is authorized to declare 

a recess at any time. Also would ask unanimous consent that our 

colleagues from the 8th and 10th Districts of Virginia, Mr. Don 

Beyer and Congresswoman Barbara Comstock, be allowed to fully 

participate in today’s hearing. Without objection, so ordered. 

And with that, let me start with my opening Statement, then 

we’ll proceed. So, again, I thank you for coming. This is an important hearing. Both of the subcommittees have jurisdiction. We are 

fortunate to chair a new transportation oversight subcommittee, 

working with Mr. Meadows and Mr. Connolly and others. It’s a day 

that we find ourselves about 1 month ago yesterday when a Wash-
2 

ington native, Carol Glover, tragically lost her life as she and hundreds of other passengers on a Yellow Line train, Metro train, 

where stuck for over an hour in a smoke-filled tunnel. And that 

was just 100 yards away from the L’Enfant Metro Plaza Station. 

More than 80 people were hospitalized in that incident. 

Now, we do have pretty broad authority, but specifically Congress does have a unique relationship with the District of Columbia, and this committee specifically has a unique responsibility to 

the District of Columbia as far as oversight and responsibility to 

really monitor incidents like this in a transit system that serves 

not only the region but also our Nation’s capital and receives a very 

significant amount of Federal dollars. 

The investigation into this incident is still underway, but any 

loss of life and an incident like this certainly deserves our attention 

and our review, particularly at this point, especially considering 

some of the alarming facts that have come to light in just the last 

30 days since the incident. There are some things that we know 

and some things we are learning. I brought this paper, headline of 

yesterday’s paper, ‘‘NTSB: Metro Fans Set Wrong.’’ That was kind 

of startling for all of us to learn yesterday. 

We know and we’ve heard the District has reviewed some of this 

incident also, but we know that there were some very serious communication issues between Metro and first responders. We also 

know that radios used by D.C. fire and emergency service workers 

only work sporadically and that firefighters had to use an alternative method of communication, such as runners and personal cell 

phones. 

We also know that it took over an hour to evacuate all of the passengers off the train. And we know, of course, I think that everyone 

who has looked at this to date has said that the response could and 

should have been much better. 

Today’s hearing is not just about the January 12 incident, but 

rather how our regional transportation system responsibly and that 

agency and numerous agency and area responders can do a better 

job, be prepared to do a better job, and how to react better in emergencies. 

It has been nearly 14 years since the terrorist attack of September 11. Since then, the National Capital region alone has received over a billion dollars in Federal taxpayer money and FEMA 

preparedness grant programs. In fact, the authority here has received over $200 million in Homeland Security grants—these are 

significant amounts of money—to try to make us prepared. That 

was with a loss of life, but it was a small incident, and what we 

might have is this area again being the target of a terrorist act and 

face a much more horrific incident. 

Yet firefighters were unable to get timely and accurate information about the emergency and were unable to use their life-saving 

communication equipment in the tunnel and also in the station. 

Metro provides rescue training for regional first responders, and 

yet at the D.C. Council hearing last week we learned that only 100 

D.C. firefighters attended this training session last year. Something’s wrong when you have those numbers. 

According to D.C. fire, requests were made to Metro to cease all 

Metrorail traffic in and around L’Enfant Station so that the first 
3 

responders had assurances they were safe from any train traffic. 

NTSB is investigating some of these allegations and also that this 

request initially fell on deaf ears. 

Had an opportunity yesterday to go down, hear from an NTSB 

representative, and visit NTSB. If you haven’t done that, members, 

I highly recommend it. Only took about an hour, but you’ll see 

some of the incredible work. Actually, looked at some of the equipment and some of the damage to rail items that were taken from 

that site that they are now inspecting. But the NTSB does a great 

job. And, again, I encourage members to go and see firsthand what 

they are doing. 

D.C. Metro is, in fact, one of the most important transit systems 

in the country. It serves our Nation’s capital. It not only serves millions of Federal employees and daily commuters, but it also helps 

people from around the United States, some of them are constituents, people from around the world, come to this, our Capital City. 

And they should have a safe, reliable system. In fact, I checked this 

morning, and what are the figures here? About three-quarters of a 

million people a day use the Metro system. Over 200 million people 

a year use the Metro system. It is one of the most active in the Nation in any metropolitan area. Anyone who rides Metro should 

know it is safe and secure, and it is our responsibility to followup 

on that. 

While we’re all pleased about the urgent recommendations and 

steps that NTSB has already made, and some of the steps that the 

city has taken to deal with the issues and problems that have been 

brought to light, there appears to be some commonsense solutions 

to all of these problems. Also, just the way we deal with Metro. 

I keep in my desk drawer some of my Metro cards. This is the 

one from New York City. I just pulled these out this morning. This 

is the one from here in the District. Okay. The back of the D.C. 

Metro card says, ‘‘Know more. Know first,’’ and it talks a little 

bit—this is fine print, I can barely read it, and I have some pretty 

good eyesight for my age. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Can I help you? 

Mr. MICA. No, I’m telling you, I can read it. It talks about you 

must produce this card for the police. It talks about a consumer 

hotline, I guess you can call. This is the D.C. card. Again, I just 

pulled these out of my drawer today. Here is the New York Metro 

card in huge bold letters, ‘‘Subway emergency instructions,’’ and 

then it tells you a little bit. I spoke to common sense. I guess emergency information on something like that is something we could 

even look at. 

So, again, I think this is a hearing to find out what went wrong 

and what we can do to make things right. 

Finally, as far as our committee and the transportation committee, I recall that we had done something in the MAP–21 bill 

and following—this is in a report we’re releasing today—following 

the 2009 Fort Totten collision, NTSB called for enhanced statutory 

authority to get the authority from FTA because the agency was 

barred from performing adequate safety oversight on Washington 

Metro. 

With the enactment of MAP–21, our transportation bill, on July 

6, 2012, FTA was granted authority—that’s 3 years ago—they were 
4 

granted authority to oversee the safety of public transportation 

throughout the United States and also on Metro. So far FTA has 

not made any rules, not a single rule to increase safety of public 

transportation. However, last week FTA announced that it will 

audit Washington Metro safety procedures. 

So some things have been done to try to address this by Congress. Agencies were given authority to act and they did not act. 

So that’s a concern and we’ll address that. 

So, again, I hope this hearing can make an incident like this, 

again, a very sad memory, but something we could do better and 

learn from. So, again, I appreciate you all participating. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. 

Let me turn to Ranking Member Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks to you 

and Mr. Meadows for so graciously agreeing to have this hearing. 

It is of great import to all of us, but particularly all of us who represent parts of the National Capital region. And we really appreciate your willingness to do this for Mark and me at our first subcommittee hearing. So thank you. 

On January 12 public confidence in Metro was shaken once again 

by a deadly electrical arcing and smoke accident near L’Enfant 

Plaza that tragically took the life of one of our constituents in Virginia, Ms. Carol Glover. On behalf of every member of this committee, I know, we are offer our deepest condolences to her family 

and our sincere gratitude to the brave first responders and good samaritans, one of who is with us today, who acted courageously to 

help the passengers stuck on the smoke-filled Metro car, train 

number 302. 

We also want to take a moment to thank Mr. Jonathan Rogers, 

one of our witnesses today, who demonstrated tremendous courage 

and coolness under difficult circumstances in braving the deadly 

smoke to tend to his fellow passengers and to administer CPR to 

try and revive Mrs. Glover. We owe it to Mrs. Glover’s family and 

all of the passengers on that train to do everything in our power 

not only to fully uncover why this accident took place, but to also 

integrate all lessons learned to ensure it never happens again. 

The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority was established by an interState compact in 1967 to plan, develop, build, finance, and operate a balanced regional transportation system in 

the National Capital area. And one does need to take a moment 

here so that the narrative isn’t only about what goes wrong. From 

nothing, this region built the second most utilized transit system 

in America and serves especially the Federal Government, the biggest customer, the most dependent, and the biggest beneficiary of 

Metro every day. When Metro doesn’t function, the Federal Government has to shut down. And the Federal Government is the only 

entity not at the table providing an operating subsidy. 

The chairman mentioned that there is substantial financial support from the Federal Government. That’s true, I guess, on the capital side. There’s a 10-year plan. The Federal Government provides 

$150 million a year, and we very grateful to especially Mr. Mica 

for his support when he was chairman of the Transportation and 

Infrastructure Committee in that program. My predecessor Tom 

Davis in this job was instrumental in offering that legislation. But 
5 

that’s only for capital. There is not a dime of Federal money that 

goes into operating subsidies. 

So the subsidies are borne entirely by the local jurisdictions, even 

though, as the chairman points out, this is the Nation’s capital subway and we bear the burden of 12 million visitors who come to visit 

their Nation’s capital every year, and it is somehow the responsibility and burden of the localities to absorb that without any Federal help, and that’s a fact. I think we have to keep that in mind. 

The issue before us today is not really about resources, though it’s 

always about resources. 

Metro is truly America’s subway, as I said. Similar to all mass 

transit systems, it’s not impervious to wear and tear brought on by 

time and millions of those riders. Prior to the incident last month, 

the horrific 2009 Fort Totten collision that killed 9 passengers and 

injured 80 more was a startling wake-up call that America’s subway was aging, in need of major improvements. 

In the aftermath of that, the National Transportation Safety 

Board found that the 1970’s era 1000 series cars were susceptible 

to telescoping during a collision, which resulted in the loss of lives 

when those trains collapsed like an accordion. As we discuss the errors and failures in the most recent arcing incident at L’Enfant 

Plaza it is vital that we not lose sight of the fact that WMATA 

faces zero-sum decisions with limited funding, and in many respects devoting the majority of its focus, time, and funding toward 

retiring those antiquated 1000 series cars, which Congress asked 

them to do. It was a logical strategic decision when one considers 

that Metro is a multibillion-dollar system that only benefits from 

millions in Federal assistance. 

I want to commend the NTSB for taking swift action earlier this 

week in issuing six urgent recommendations aimed at ensuring 

Metrorail’s ventilation system is in good working order and that 

transit systems across the Nation are learning from the January 12 

tragedy. 

However, one remains profoundly disappointed that the NTSB 

recommendations were even necessary. I’m stunned that WMATA 

even needed an independent Federal agency to remind it that the 

Metrorail system must have a ventilation system in good working 

order. The overwhelming majority of the Metro system in Washington, DC, is underground. It is not a new fact that we might have 

eventualities we have to respond to. 

Regrettably, our concerns have not been alleviated in preparing 

for this hearing. It was with great consternation, for example, that 

I reviewed a September 2007 NTSB accident report on the derailment of Chicago Transit Authority train number 220. It was very 

troubling to discover on page 49 of that report the following recommendation issued to the FTA: Inform all rail transit agencies 

about the circumstances of the July 11, 2006, CTA subway accident 

and urge them to examine and improve as necessary their ability 

to communicate with passengers, perform emergency evacuations 

from tunnel systems. Sound familiar? Including the ability, it goes 

on, to, one, identify the exact location of a train—hmm—locate a 

specific call box, and remove smoke from their tunnel systems. 

That was guidance issued in 2007 to all transit agencies, including 

Metro. 
6 

It’s very frustrating that WMATA appears to have possessed the 

requisite information to understand the real world consequences of 

malfunctioning ventilation systems and the need to examine its 

ability to remove smoke from Metro tunnel systems and yet appears not to have taken meaningful action over the past 7 years 

with respect to this important FTA guidance. We certainly want to 

examine that in this hearing. 

There is a troubling pattern where WMATA and D.C. Fire and 

Rescue appear to be repeating past mistakes. For example, in 2007, 

two NTSB members expressed serious concerns that it took more 

than an hour to fully evacuate passengers from two Metrorail train 

cars after a derailment near Mt. Vernon Station. We knew about 

this as a problem years ago. What have we done to make sure our 

passengers are safe? And that’s the purpose of today’s hearing and 

we want to get at the truth. 

And so I appreciate very much our panelists being here today 

and our two chairmen for their graciousness in holding this hearing. I yield back. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. MICA. Let me now recognize Chairman Meadows of the Government Operations Subcommittee. Welcome. And I guess your 

first hearing. Congratulations. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to personally start out by thanking the ranking member, my good friend 

Gerry Connolly. This particular incident we’ve already had a number of conversations about. Both of us were able to meet with the 

Mayor yesterday. And I think it sets a good foundation for hopefully getting to the bottom of not only this problem, but certainly 

some of the comments that continue to get made on a regular basis 

by the over 200 million riders that we have annually on the Metro 

system. 

So I’m going to deviate from my prepared remarks, primarily because the chairman and the ranking member have given you a lot 

of statistics, and all of those in the effort of not being redundant, 

I will not go into those. But first and foremost, today’s hearing is 

really about ensuring that the Metro riders in our Nation’s capital 

and the surrounding areas are as safe as possible. 

And as I mentioned, the D.C. Metro area covers some 200 million 

riders annually. These are not just the hard-working citizens, although they are predominantly the ones who ride it each and every 

day. They are the ones that know where to go, which escalators to 

avoid, how to get down. As a neophyte to that, yesterday evening 

I went down, and I know that if you are not skilled you get run 

over. And so as I went down and actually participated in what millions of people do each and every week, I was able to look at it with 

a fresh eye and say, well, why is this happening, why is that happening? Shouldn’t we have more money? You have two escalators 

coming up and one going down, shouldn’t it by be the other way 

at this particular time of the day. And the people I was with said, 

well, at least your escalators are working. 

So as we see that, I can say that really more that we need to 

use this safety event as a wake-up call, not just because of the 

tragic nature of the safety event, but also to go further in terms 
7 

of what we need to do to make sure that it is properly funded, 

properly maintained, and properly operated each and every day. 

So I’m going to close with this, because I put out on Twitter, I 

said, give me your recommendations, what do you think? I didn’t 

realize how active the Twitter response would be. And so I’m going 

to read three Twitter responses, and this is kind of indicative of a 

plethora of others that we had. I had one that says, I’ve been commuting for 16 years (Federal worker) lack of accountability, poor 

management, info, general attitude of not caring. This is from a 

customer. 

I got another one who said, Increased fares for decreased service, 

fires on train. This was the one that concerned: Twitter being more 

reliable for info than WMATA. And the third one I’ll read is, 

Thanks for asking, main problems fare hikes without improvements in service, safety hazards, and a lack of communication. 

Now, these are not my words. There are really hundreds of responses that would be very close to this. And so what I hope that 

we can do today is hear from the experts. That’s why you’re here, 

the experts, to give us different perspectives not only on safety, but 

what we need to go be doing going forward. I thank each of you 

for being here. I thank you for your attention to this matter. And 

I will yield back. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Meadows. 

Mr. MICA. And now welcome and also recognize today our acting 

ranking member, nice way to start out, Mr. DeSaulnier. You’re 

from California? 

Mr. DESAULNIER. The San Francisco Bay area. 

Mr. MICA. Great. Well, welcome and congratulations. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank 

Chairman Meadows and the ranking member, Mr. Connolly, as 

well. And I want to share my condolences and concern for the entire metropolitan area from 3,000 miles away in California. 

I also want to thank NTSB for hosting me and others yesterday. 

It was very informative. And I’m also thankful of your reputation, 

which is well deserved. 

And to Mr. Rogers I want to add my thanks to you. You exemplified Tocqueville’s observation about Americans many years ago 

that the genius of America resides in the simple truth that you can 

expect extraordinary things from ordinary Americans. So thank 

you for being here. 

As we all know, on January 12, 2015, an electrical breaker on 

one section of the third rail tripped, a Yellow Line train stopped 

in that tunnel, and the cars filled with smoke near the L’Enfant 

Plaza Metro Station. This incident unfortunately resulted in the 

death of a passenger and hospitalization of more than 80 riders. It 

raises serious concerns about maintenance, oversight, and safety, 

particularly for the many commuters in the D.C. metropolitan area 

which relies so seriously for this infrastructure every day. 

While this incident occurred in the D.C. area, it raises significant 

concerns about Federal oversight of mass transit systems nationwide. The Federal Transit Administration is charged with issuing 

safety regulations and a national safety plan, but has failed to do 

so. And as an aside, in the report in our binder it is signed by a 

deputy FTA administrator who I used to work for—work with, I 
8 

should say, Freudian slip—when I served 10 years on the Bay 

area’s metropolitan planning organization, the Metropolitan Transportation Commission. And I know she’s a consummate professional, Therese McMillan. 

In addition, it appears that recommendations made to Metro by 

the National Transportation Safety Board after previous safety incidents were not fully implemented. So just to be clear, Metro has 

deficiencies to answer for, but so do Federal regulators. As Mr. 

Connolly said, Metro is America’s subway and this has national implications. For those of us who have fought for increased transit in 

regional and local and State government, and believe that Americans, particularly younger Americans, as we become even more urbanized, need choices when it comes to transportation in congested 

areas like Washington, DC, New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and 

San Francisco. We want to give commuters choices, and that requires reliability and safety of all our transit operators. 

In California we understand the need for safety for riders and 

workers and transit facilities. The Bay Area Rapid Transit agency 

is a large transit system, although not nearly as large as Metro, 

serving 450,000 riders on average every day. When a tragic accident occurred in October 2013 when two BART workers were 

killed, we started a thorough investigation with NTSB and with 

State officials, and we are still examining particularly the safety 

culture that led to that incident. 

I look forward to fully examining why there was a delay in evacuating passengers, why the ventilation system was not working 

properly, and why first responders were unable to open the train 

doors or communicate on their radios. I also want to fully understand the specific causes of this incident and do what is necessary 

to ensure that, as Mr. Connolly says, this never happens again. I 

look forward to hearing from the witnesses and finding answers to 

these questions. I appreciate the committee’s interest in this important issue and thank the chairs once again for hosting this important hearing. 

And then last, I have particular concerns over safety culture. We 

know that safety culture is not some unimaginable, hard-to-define 

issue, whether it is in hospitals or refineries, chemical plants, or 

manufacturing facilities, or any government agency. It is real, it is 

palatable. And I will say I’m very concerned about the comments 

represented by the rank-and-file workers. I look forward to asking 

questions of the governing board and the representative of the 

rank-and-file workers in my questions. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. 

Mr. MICA. And other members seek recognition? Ms. Norton. The 

gentlelady from the District is recognized. 

Ms. NORTON. Chairman Mica, just a word, first of thanks to my 

good friends, Mr. Mica and Mr. Meadows. You will note that this 

is a joint hearing, and I do believe that that indicates the importance of this hearing to the Federal Government. You can call this 

America’s subway all you want to, and for all intents and purposes 

a Federal subway because it’s essential to the functioning of the operations of the Federal Government. And, yes, it is essential to our 

constituents here in the National Capital region. 
9 

There have already been, and I want to thank the multiple parties for the hearings, briefings and hearings in the Congress and 

in the District and early reports from NTSB. And we see WMATA 

already beginning, before the report is done, to make corrections, 

and we are enormously grateful for that. And I do believe it restores or helps restore confidence in the system. 

I simply want to say that after the great tragedy of 2009 when 

we lost nine residents, all nine of them lived in the District of Columbia, it doesn’t matter where they lived, this time we lost one 

resident who lived in Virginia, it is a personal tragedy, it is a regional tragedy. 

The reason that this tragedy bothers me so much is if we look 

back to 2009 we can trace that tragedy to a rather even hard-tounderstand technical problem with the equipment. Think about the 

cause of this tragedy. Think about the fact that we’re dealing with 

what everybody would regard as the ABCs of running a common 

carrier, being able to communicate from the surface to underground, making sure that the smoke goes the right rather than the 

wrong way. My friends, I can think of nothing worse than being 

smoked to death underground, in a subway. That’s what happened 

here. 

The communication problems were perfectly foreseeable. Getting 

the fans working in the right way was what everybody assumed 

was happening all the time. So my concern for this tragedy is even 

greater than the 2009 tragedy, greater because I think we had foreseeable problems and because something went clearly wrong here. 

That’s why I’m so grateful to my good friends for calling a hearing 

which I think is perfectly appropriate because this is a system that 

the Federal Government itself depends upon. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. 

Mr. MICA. Do other members seek recognition? 

OK. Since there are no other members seeking, did you, Mr.—— 

Mr. BEYER. I will wait for questions. 

Mr. MICA. OK. Wait for questions. Very good. 

Then what we will do now is we will turn to our witnesses. And 

members will have 5 legislative days who would like to submit a 

written Statement. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. MICA. Let me first introduce and welcome our witnesses. 

First, welcome Jonathan Rogers, a Metro passenger who was 

present on January 12 at the Metro incident. The Honorable Christopher Hart, acting chairman of the National Transportation Safety 

Board. Mr. Mort Downey, he is the chairman of the Board of Directors of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. And 

he’s also, I understand, accompanied by a panel of experts behind 

him. And we have Mr. Edward Mills, assistant fire chief, who is 

in charge of operations of the D.C. Fire Emergency Medical Rescue 

Services Department. And Ms. Jackie Jeter, and she is president 

and business agent for Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 689. 

Let me see, the ones that are accompanying Mr. Downey, Mr. 

Downey, are they going to also to be called on to—— 

Mr. DOWNEY. Only if something comes up. 

Mr. MICA. Can you identify them? 
10 

Mr. DOWNEY. Yes. I’m accompanied by Chief Ron Pavlik, the 

chief of the Metropolitan Transit Police Department, and also Jack 

Requa, who is the interim general manager of Metro. They are sitting behind me. 

Mr. MICA. OK. So what we will do, this is an investigations and 

oversight subcommittee of Congress joint hearing today, and we do 

swear in all of our witnesses. I’d ask the gentlemen that were just 

identified to also stand, our witnesses to stand please, be sworn in. 

Could you raise your right hand? Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you’re about to give before these two subcommittees of Congress is the whole truth and nothing but the 

truth? 

Let the record reflect that all of the witnesses answered in the 

affirmative. 

So with that we have got some new witnesses, particularly Mr. 

Rogers, to testify in Congress and this panel. We try to ask you to 

limit your remarks to about 5 minutes. If you have additional information or some background you’d like to be made part of the 

record, just a simple request to the chair and we’ll put it into the 

record. 

With that, again, we welcome Mr. Jonathan Rogers, who was a 

passenger on that fateful day. 

Welcome, sir, and you are recognized. You’ll have to turn you mic 

on and pull it up as close as you can, Mr. Rogers. 

WITNESS STATEMENTS 

STATEMENT OF JONATHAN ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. Is that good? Thank you. 

Honorable members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. My name is Jonathan Rogers and I have 

been a resident of the District of Columbia for 7 years. 

On the afternoon of January 12, 2015, I departed a conference 

at the Walter E. Washington Convention Center to return to my 

office in the Navy Yard neighborhood of Washington, DC. At the 

Mt. Vernon Square-Convention Center Station I mistakenly 

boarded a Yellow Line train headed for Huntington. I boarded the 

second car from the front of the train and according to WMATA’s 

usage history report from my SmarTrip card, I entered the station 

at exactly 3 p.m. I can accurately confirm the timeline of events 

that followed with electronic time stamps from smartphone pictures I took that afternoon. 

By coincidence, I took my first photo at 3:11 p.m., shortly before 

the trained reached L’Enfant Plaza, and that photo depicts a normal, safe experience on the Metro train. After the train departed 

the L’Enfant Plaza Station, we entered a tunnel, and after approximately 10 seconds the train came to an abrupt halt. The train conductor announced over the intercom, there’s a problem, everyone 

stay calm. Within seconds, gray-colored smoke was visible as it 

seeped through the tops of the passenger doors. A passenger on our 

car used the emergency intercom to alert someone that there was 

smoke on the train. 
11 

We heard no response, and shortly thereafter the train conductor 

entered our car and made his way to the back of the train. The conductor was using his radio to communicate with central. I only 

heard him describing the situation on the train. I didn’t hear any 

responses to the conductor’s messages. Eventually he passed 

through our car again on his way back to the front of the train. 

In the first of several announcements, the conductor informed us 

over the intercom that we should remain clam, the train was going 

to make its way backward to L’Enfant Plaza to escape the smoke. 

We were told not to evacuate the train and not to open the doors 

because the train would not be able to move if we did so. Further, 

there was zero visibility in the tunnel, and the conductor repeated 

the same message nearly every 2 minutes until the train was evacuated. 

At one point, the conductor assured passengers that there was no 

fire in the tunnel, only smoke. Approximately 5 minutes after the 

smoke had entered the train, the train lurched backward but failed 

to move, and by this point only the emergency lights above the 

doors were lit and the train was dark and filling with thick smoke. 

The next photo I took was at 3:20 p.m., which was several minutes after the smoke had become thick. So as a very conservative 

estimate one could mark the beginning of the incident at that time, 

3:20 p.m. 

The video I took was recorded at 3:25 p.m. which captures passengers struggling to breathe and also a portion of the train conductor’s announcements. Verbatim the announcement was, once 

again, customers, please stay calm, please stay calm. We’ve got one 

train about to get off the platform at L’Enfant Plaza right now as 

we speak. As soon as this train leaves, I will be getting you all 

back to the platform. Please stay calm. Please do not open the 

doors. If you open the doors, the train will not move. 

In the photo I believed to be the last I took before giving CPR 

to Mrs. Glover—sorry—other passengers were laying on the ground 

at 3:39 p.m. The next photo I took was at 4:01 p.m., where it appears passengers are standing as we lined up to evacuate the train. 

At no point were we ever told that we would be evacuating and 

walking back to the platform. A line moving toward the back of the 

train seemed to form on its own. 

The next photo I took was at 4:20 p.m. as the line had slowly 

advanced toward the back of the train. This photo depicts firefighters evacuating a passenger who is having a seizure after other 

first responders had performed CPR on him. This was the first 

time I saw any first responders. I can’t speak for when they arrived 

at the train, but this was the first time I saw them. 

Firefighters then guided us out of the side passenger doors onto 

a narrow walkway on the side of the tunnel. We followed a single 

file line back toward the station with help from firefighters on the 

tracks lighting the way with their flashlights. The last photo I took 

was during that walk at 4:22 p.m., over an hour after the incident 

began. 

Once we reached the station platform, we proceeded up the escalators to the street level. Naturally the scene outside was chaotic, 

and some passengers sought the help of first responders, while others just went on their way. I lingered in the area for a few minutes. 
12 

No one directed me toward an ambulance or any other medical attention. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I’d be happy 

to answer any questions you might have. 

[Prepared Statement of Mr. Rogers follows:] 
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Mr. MICA. Well, hold the questions. I don’t know, can you queue 

the video that we’ve got that Mr. Rogers took? See if we’ve got 

that? 

I know they flashed some of the pictures during your testimony 

of the pictures that you took. 

[Video shown.] 

Mr. MICA. Well, Mr. Rogers, we thank you for providing us with 

not only the documentary of the incident and the horrific experience, but also for your heroic act in trying to save that passenger. 

So thank you very much on behalf of the full committee. I know 

everyone appreciates it. 

So now I’ll turn to Mr. Hart and welcome him, and he is the acting chairman of the NTSB. 

Welcome, Mr. Hart, and you’re recognized. 

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER A. HART 

Mr. HART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman Mica and Chairman Meadows and Ranking Members Connolly and DeSaulnier, for inviting 

me to testify today on behalf of the NTSB. 

The NTSB is an independent Federal agency that Congress created to investigate transportation accidents and incidents. We determine the probable cause and issue safety recommendations in 

an effort to prevent future mishaps. We have investigated mass 

transit accidents and issued recommendations about them for more 

than 40 years. It’s a mode of transportation that is used by millions 

of people every day and safety is our utmost concern. 

The NTSB included mass transit safety in its 2015 most wanted 

list to increase awareness of and support for the most critical 

changes that are needed to reduce mass transit accidents and incidents and save lives. 

With that introduction, let me turn to this accident. On January 

12 at about 3:15 p.m., Metro train 302 stopped in a Yellow Line 

tunnel south of the L’Enfant Plaza Metro Station because it encountered heavy smoke, as you’ve already heard.The train following train 302, which was train 510, had entered the L’Enfant 

Plaza Station and stopped about 100 feet from the south end of the 

platform because of the smoke in that station. 

WMATA police and D.C. fire and emergency medical services 

helped to evacuate passengers from the L’Enfant Plaza Station. 

Some passengers on train 302 self-evacuated through the tunnel either to L’Enfant Plaza or toward the Potomac River Bridge, but 

others, most others, remained on the train. Unfortunately, one person died and scores required medical treatment as a result of this 

accident. And I would join with the members in extending our condolences to the family and friends of Mrs. Glover. 

We know now that the smoke was the result of an electrical arcing event. NTSB has collected evidence from the site, which Chairman Mica and Mr. DeSaulnier and others of you had the opportunity to see in our laboratory. We thank you for coming to visit 

to see it up close and personal. We’re looking at that to determine 

what caused the arcing event. 
16 

Also, we are aware of the various accounts of the emergency response that day. Many of these accounts have not been helpful to 

our safety investigation because they are often out of context and 

not validated or corroborated, and thus they are not helpful as a 

valid basis for drawing useful conclusions. We will issue the complete facts, but we are reluctant to issue any facts until we have 

the complete facts around that situation in order to avoid misinterpreting and out-of-context analysis. 

To date, the NTSB has gathered a great deal of information and 

continues to review data to validate it and provide an unbiased account of the facts of that day. Our investigators will look at many 

factors, including conditions leading to the arcing itself, emergency 

response efforts, emergency communications and interoperability, 

WMATA’s efforts to improve its overall safety and safety culture 

since its Fort Totten accident in 2009, the State of WMATA’s infrastructure and State of good repair, the Federal Transit Administration’s rulemaking on public transportation safety, and the Tri-State 

Oversight Committee’s oversight responsibility. 

There is still much work to be done to produce a final investigative report. As part of this process, we will hold a public investigative hearing on June 23 and 24 to gather additional investigative 

information and to add to the public’s knowledge about the events 

of that day. 

But as this investigation continues, we issue urgent recommendations if we identify safety issues in the course of any investigation that warrant immediate attention. More specifically, we 

issued three urgent recommendations to WMATA earlier this week 

regarding its ventilation system. These recommendations are about 

providing guidance and training on how to use the ventilation system, how to ensure that these procedures conform to best practices, 

and checking to make sure that the ventilation system is in working order. 

The recommendation about improved processes in response to 

smoke events and about training regarding those processes results 

from our discovering in the investigation that the ventilation fans 

could have been used more effectively to remove the smoke from 

the tunnel. We also learned that one of the smoke alarms ahead 

of train 302, which was very close to the arcing event, activated 

several minutes before that train left the L’Enfant Plaza Station. 

So one of the issues we will be looking at is to what extent are 

those alarms apparent in the control center and how do they react 

when they see a smoke alarm in front of a train. 

Are these safety issued limited to WMATA? We do not know. In 

order to obtain assessments of ventilation systems in other transit 

systems, perhaps in your own districts, we also issued an urgent 

recommendation to the Federal Transit Administration to audit 

such ventilation systems in transit agencies under its regulatory 

purview and companion recommendations to the American Public 

Transportation Association, or APTA, to apply these accident lessons even more broadly. 

Our goals, as always, are to prevent accidents and prevent or 

mitigate the severity of injuries in any future event. And we will 

issue more recommendations if needed as the investigation pro-
17 

ceeds. We must work to ensure that the circumstances of this event 

do not occur again, here or in any other transit system. 

Thank you for inviting me to testify today, and I look forward to 

responding to your questions. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Hart. 

[Prepared Statement of Mr. Hart follows:] 
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Mr. MICA. We will now turn to Mr. Mort Downey. He chairs the 

Board of Directors of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 

Authority. 

Welcome, and you’re recognized. 

STATEMENT OF MORTIMER L. DOWNEY III 

Mr. DOWNEY. Thank you, Chairman Mica and Chairman Meadows, Acting Ranking Member DeSaulnier, and my Congressman, 

Gerry Connolly to be here. I am Mort Downey, recently elected 

chair of the Board of Directors of Metro, and a regular Metro rider 

over the last 20 years, and a New York City subway rider for 30 

years before that. So I am familiar with these systems. 

First, I have to say on behalf of the board we were devaStated 

by the outcome of this event. We have expressed and continue to 

express our condolences to the family of Carol Glover, who lost her 

life. And obviously we thank all of the first responders, our employees and the members of the public who came to the aid of our customers during that incident. 

As Chairman Hart identified, an investigation by the NTSB is 

now underway. Metro is fully engaged and cooperating with what 

Chairman Hart outlined is a very comprehensive look at where we 

are in terms of safety. The fact there is an empty chair between 

the chairman and myself is not an indication that we are not working closely together. We are joined at the hip on this investigation. 

And we stand ready to act on NTSB recommendations, including 

any preliminary findings. 

Just 2 days ago, the chairman issued the first recommendations 

adopted by the NTSB, not only to us, but to the entire transit industry concerning the tunnel ventilation system. Even before those 

recommendations were in our hands, Metro had already conducted 

a systemwide inspection of all the tunnel fan shafts, and at that 

point found them to be in good working order. We also provided retraining to the 39 controllers at the Rail Operations Control Center 

in terms of proper use the fans. We are now in the process of developing additional protocol and training. 

But as the NTSB continues its review we are not waiting. Yesterday, having looked at the findings that were in our hands, I directed Metro’s chief safety officer, Jim Dougherty, to identify an 

independent expert panel organization who could review for us the 

Metrorail Operations Control Center, its equipment, its procedures, 

the training, the information that they have in place. To run a 

world class transit system we have to have a fully operational, fully 

dependable operations control center. Decisions are made there 

that obviously affect the lives of our customers, and we’d like to get 

a good look by fresh eyes as to how that control center works. 

We’ve also identified and begun to implement 10 early safety actions based on our own assessments. These 10 include such steps 

as signage being installed on the outside of all of our railcars to 

identify the doors that are readily accessible and openable without 

a key from someone on the ground or on a platform to get passengers out. 
34 

We obviously train first responders on how to access the railcars. 

We want to add that on-the-site information that they would need. 

We also have given train operators independent authority should 

they encounter a smoke incident to immediately turn off the vent 

system in the train that’s bringing air into the train. That formerly, for whatever reason, was something they needed permission 

to do. We want our employees to act on their own ideas of what 

needs to be done. And as I said, we have reviewed the protocols for 

our employees at the Rail Control Center but intend to do more 

there. 

As another early action, our Office of Emergency Management, 

which is under the supervision of the Police Department, has created an enhanced schedule for full-scale emergency drills to be conducted with scheduling allowed for 3 years, not that we will stop 

after that point, but to give the jurisdictions clear indication of 

when those drills will occur, where they will occur, some will be underground, some will be on aerial structures, some will be in stations. It is an additional opportunity for us and the jurisdictions 

and the law enforcement and response agencies to test their capabilities, to build coordination, and to practice unified command in 

a real-life setting. 

We are also working with the region’s fire chiefs through the 

Council of Governments to establish regular radio testing and reporting protocols. As you’ve heard, each jurisdiction has its own 

radio system, but we have to make sure that they are workable inside the tunnel environment. It is not that we’ll all be on the same 

radios, the issue is that everybody’s radios will work and that we 

can communicate to Metro employees, fire and rescue can communicate to their people, and at the top chain in the incident command they can communicate with each other. And there will be 

regular testing and reporting of the status of the system so that 

we’re all aware if anything needs to be fixed. 

We mentioned Homeland Security earlier. We are an open system. There are unique challenges in maintaining the security of the 

system. We are grateful for the support that has come to install 

equipment and to build additional facilities. We are using that. We 

have now cameras throughout the system to capture what’s going 

on. We are also, as you know, rebuilding the system with a capital 

program to take a 39-year-old system and begin to put it back in 

the shape that it should be in. There are a lot of things, the new 

railcars are a key part of that, but there are upgrades of tracks, 

structures, signal systems. 

We have developed safety programs, some that we’ve actually 

created on our own. A roadway worker training program for those 

employees who are out working on the tracks. A Close Call program where we get the cooperation of all employees to bring to our 

attention, either directly to us or anonymously through a Federal 

agency, anything that has happened that we should know about 

that we could build safety improvements on that. We also implemented a Fatigue Management System, the first on any transit 

property, to be sure that our employees are not being called to 

work longer hours than are helpful. 

When I joined the board, there were 29 open recommendations 

from the NTSB stemming from Fort Totten and earlier accidents. 
35 

Twenty-five of those are closed, four are still open but are in an 

acceptable condition, at least as far as the Safety Board is concerned. We are working to finish all of them. We have closed all 

but one recommendation from Federal Transit based on a review 

they produced in 2012. We will be welcoming them back in the next 

few weeks to start another review of the safety culture and the 

safety achievements in the system. It is still our No. 1 focus. 

I believe we’ve made real progress, but we cannot claim that we 

are where we need to be. In the face of this event, we need to do 

more and we will do more, not only for ourselves, but with our 

partners, but primarily for the customers and riders and public in 

this region who need to depend on us. So I thank you for the opportunity to be here, and I also will be happy to answer your questions. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Downey. 

[Prepared Statement of Mr. Downey follows:] 
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Mr. MICA. And we’ll turn to Mr. Edward Mills, the assistant fire 

chief for the District of Columbia. 

Welcome, sir. And you’re recognized. 

STATEMENT OF EDWARD R. MILLS 

Mr. MILLS. Good morning. Good morning, members of the Transportation and Public Assets and Government Operations Subcommittee. My name is Edward Mills. I currently serve as the assistant fire chief with the District of Columbia Fire Department. As 

this is my first time before Congress, let me take a moment to introduce myself and the position for which I serve. My role is to 

oversee emerging operations for the District of Columbia Fire and 

Emergency Medical Services Department, to coordinate with other 

public safety agencies and Federal partners, including WMATA, to 

prevent, protect, mitigate, respond to, and recover from disasters 

and emergencies. I’ve spent 36 years of dedicated service in the 

Fire and Rescue Service, 18 years in Prince William County as 

both a career and volunteer firefighter, as well as 18 years with the 

District of Columbia Fire Department. 

I thank you for allowing me the opportunity to discuss the District’s response to the January 12 incident at the L’Enfant Plaza 

Metro. I will provide a brief summary of the incident, our response 

to it, and corrective steps we have already taken. I also want to 

State from the outset that the suffering that occurred during and 

as a result of the January 12 incident and tragedy, I extend my 

sympathies to the family of Mrs. Carol Glover and everyone else 

who was injured or went through that terrifying experience that 

day. 

I want to assure the committee and the public that on January 

12 my department responded quickly, acted bravely, and conducted 

rescue efforts that led to a positive outcome of the incident. I’m 

grateful that the Mayor Bowser administration has taken immediate steps to address issues identified by our preliminary reviews, 

which I believe will improve safety precautions. The administration 

has also taken the unprecedented steps of releasing 911 call transcripts and providing a thorough chronology of the events. In doing 

so, our goal was not to assign blame, but to be open and transparent with our residents, visitors, and Metro riders. We want to 

assure the residents and visitors of the District of Columbia that 

our department is prepared to handle any type of emergency at any 

time. 

The incident inside the L’Enfant Plaza Metro Station, according 

to a publicly released NTSB preliminary report, on January 12, 

2015, at approximately 3:06 p.m., an electrical breaker at one end 

of a section of third rail tripped or remained open. At approximately 3:15 p.m., moments after it departed southbound from 

L’Enfant Plaza Metro Station toward the Potomac River Bridge, a 

six-car Yellow Line train encountered heavy smoke and came to a 

complete stop in the tunnel. 

After stopping, the rear of the Metro train was about 386 feet 

from the south end of the L’Enfant Metro Station. A second six-car 

train arrived at L’Enfant Plaza at approximately 3:25 p.m.And was 
43 

also affected by heavy smoke. This second train stopped, allowing 

its passengers to exit the train and evacuate from the station. 

At 3:18, the Office of Unified Communications received a 911 call 

from a construction worker who reported smoke coming from a 

Metro ventilation shaft at 9th and Water Street SW. The Office of 

Unified Communications dispatched Fire and EMS units at 3:22 

p.m. They arrived on scene at 3:25 p.m. The two responding units 

reported the smell of smoke emitting from the grate of the ventilation shaft. 

Approximately 5 minutes after responding on the scene, responders observed two individuals in the ventilation shaft who apparently had self-evacuated from that stranded train. The responders 

notified their battalion fire chief, opened the ventilation shaft 

doors, descended approximately 50 to 75 feet to assist and evacuate 

those two individuals. 

The second emergency call from a WMATA supervisor was received by the Office of Unified Communications at 3:22 p.m. The 

WMATA supervisor reported heavy smoke in the upper level of the 

L’Enfant Plaza Metro Station. A subsequent call from a different 

WMATA employee was received at 3:24. The caller requested medics and Fire units to L’Enfant Plaza Metro Station due to smoke 

in the station and individuals having difficulty breathing. 

At 3:28, the Office of Unified Communications dispatched a 

Metro station box alarm to L’Enfant Plaza Metro. The first unit, 

Rescue Squad 1, arrived on the scene at 3:31 p.m. The first MPD 

unit from the 1st District arrived on the scene 1 minute later. At 

3:33 p.m., Engine 4, Engine 18, and EMS 6 arrived on the scene, 

followed by Engine 23, Engine 10, and Engine 1. 

I want to make it clear that within 8 minutes of the time of dispatch, seven units from D.C. Fire and EMS were on the scene at 

L’Enfant Plaza Metro. I also want to emphasize the point that Fire 

and EMS responders at this point did not know there was a train 

in the tunnel filled with passengers. The only information we had 

received at that point was there was heavy smoke in the Metro station. 

Under Fire and EMS protocol, a Metro station box alarm consists 

of five engine companies, two ladder trucks, two battalion chiefs, 

one battalion chief responds to the Metro Operations Control Center in Landover, Maryland, one heavy rescue squad, one basic life 

support unit, and one advanced life support unit, along with one 

EMS supervisor. The first unit on the scene, Rescue Squad 1, who 

arrived at 3:31, made their way down into the platform level where 

they were met by members of the Metro Transit Police Department. And at that point, that was the first time we had any indication of a train being stuck in the tunnel. 

I arrived on the scene at approximately 3:35 and immediately assessed the ongoing situation. I did a face-to-face communications 

with the on-scene deputy fire chief, established unified command 

with the Metro fire marshal, as well as a member from the Metro 

Transit Police Department. 

The first responders had encountered a smoke-filled Metro station with numerous individuals evacuating the station or just having evacuated at the street level. Responders began assisting these 
44 

individuals, as these people had soot around their noses and 

mouths which may indicate potential respiratory burns. 

As first responders moved to the lower level platform, they first 

encountered an empty Metro train at the platform in an evacuated 

station. That did lead to some confusion as to whether that was the 

train in question. At that point, until they met with the transit police officers, it was not clear. So the train in the tunnel was still 

in question at that time. 

One group of first responders, Recon 1, entered the Metro tunnel 

following the catwalk alongside the train tracks. As you move down 

into the tunnel, the tunnel split for the Orange or the Yellow Line 

and the Green Line. The first group went down the side with the 

Green Line, shut the power off at the blue light station, and continued down. At that point, the crew from Rescue Squad 1 went to the 

opposite tunnel where they located the Yellow Line train approximately 386 feet into the tunnel, disabled the power by the blue 

light station, and at that point had made their way to the train and 

asked the passengers to open the door. Once they couldn’t open the 

door, they moved to the side where they had the keys to be able 

to open the door and start evacuating the passengers. 

Although their actions violated our department’s written protocols, once they were informed that there were passengers on a 

stranded train in the tunnel, they did make their way down to 

start assisting those individuals trapped. When they made it to the 

train and immediately got into the train to triage the individuals, 

a short time after they came across Mrs. Glover, brought her out, 

and made sure that she was headed back to the platform level. 

Yet once the first responders realized they were dealing with an 

incredibly serious situation with a train full of passengers, they did 

not wait for confirmation that the power was down. Instead, they 

acted, went into the tunnel filled with heavy smoke, had near zero 

visibility, and because they heard and felt the Orange and Blue 

Line trains entering the station on the lower-level tracks, there 

were still questions as to whether the power had been completely 

shut down. Yet they ignored these significant risks to themselves 

and made their way forward to help the stranded passengers. 

Once Rescue Squad 1 reached the train, they attempted to open 

the emergency exit door, as I Stated before. As they started removing the passengers, they were able to move them to the catwalk, 

which is 22 inches wide, which required us to make a single-file 

line and move the passengers out in an orderly manner. The Statement by the lieutenant from Rescue Squad 1 did acknowledge how 

cooperative the passengers on the train, for what they were going 

through, were, and we were grateful for their cooperation. 

In total, Fire and EMS treated several hundred individuals who 

were on the train. Eighty-four of those individuals were transported to local hospitals. 

During the incident, Fire and EMS personnel encountered difficulty communicating with each other inside the Metro station 

using traditional radio communications channels. Let me provide 

some context to that. D.C. Fire and EMS operate using 16 radio 

channels and has used those same channels since the year 2000. 

The technology used to operate this radio system was installed in 

2004, or upgraded in 2004, and is maintained by the Office of Uni-
45 

fied Communications. However, in the WMATA system, all belowground communications equipment is maintained by WMATA, including bidirectional amplifiers in the tunnels. These amplifiers, including those in the tunnel at L’Enfant Plaza, are design to boost 

radio transmissions and allow those transmissions to work underground. If the bidirectional amplifiers in an underground WMATA 

tunnel are not working, radio communications will be interrupted. 

The P25 radio system that went into effect in December 2014, 

while some of those 16 channels used by Fire and EMS became 

encrypted for us to utilize on incidents requiring sensitive communications, such as terrorist-type incidents, administrative communications, and joint operations involving criminal matters with law 

enforcement, all the radio channels used by Fire and EMS, both 

encrypted and unencrypted, failed to work that day. The 

bidirectional amplifiers in the L’Enfant Plaza tunnel were not 

working on January 12. As a result, all below-ground radio communications were interrupted during the response. 

I hasten to add that when we established an aboveground treatment and triage area for the people that we were evacuating, all 

of our radio channels, encrypted and unencrypted, worked the way 

we expected them to. 

Finally, we’ve learned that on January 8, during a subsequent 

response to the L’Enfant Metro Station, units responding that day 

experienced radio failures. Those failures were reported to 

WMATA, and WMATA responded to Fire and EMS that the problem appeared to be equipment issues within the station. Responders on January 12 had to use a variety of alternate means of communications, including cell phones, direct talk communications, 

and face-to-face communications within the tunnel. Mayor Bowser 

has instructed the Office of Unified Communications, in conjunction with WMATA, to conduct weekly testing of radios at all Metro 

stations in the District. We are aware that some of the surrounding 

jurisdictions have also implemented testing on their own Metro facilities within their jurisdictions. 

The results of the weekly OUC testings are shared with 

WMATA, which is responsible for taking corrective actions. During 

radio testing conducted the week of January 19, the Office of Unified Communications identified nine Metro facilities on the Red, 

Green, Orange, and Blue Lines that failed inspection. During 

OUC’s reinspection of all of those Metro facilities, additional failures have been found and are all under repair. These tests will 

continue on a weekly basis for the foreseeable future. 

In addition to the Fire and EMS initial report, HSEMA also produced an initial District of Columbia report on the L’Enfant Metro 

Station which highlighted many of these failures. OUC testing included the Metro station entrance, both ends, and middle of the 

train at platform levels and the specific areas of failure were noted 

and Office of Unified Communications provided that information to 

WMATA. 

Additionally, Fire and EMS has reissued a protocol to its members on the proper alternative means of communications when 

radio coverage in suboptimal or down locations, and Fire and EMS 

and OUC are working collectively with WMATA to identify and immediately address these communication issues. 
46 

Currently, NTSB is conducting an investigation into the incident. 

Mayor Bowser has ordered all District agencies to fully cooperate 

with that investigation. Fire and EMS has worked with NTSB to 

interview responders who were first on the scene, as well as to provide access to any documentation required by NTSB. 

And as a final and important point in my prepared testimony, let 

me emphasize the Mayor is committed to being transparent about 

information related to the incident. We have worked diligently to 

release as many details as we can to help the public make sense 

of the tragic events of that day. The mayor has committed to using 

all information related to the incident, including that which will be 

in the NTSB report, to help improve the District’s response to and 

from the public homeland security incidents. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Chief Mills. 

[Prepared Statement of Mr. Mills follows:] 
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Mr. MICA. And we’ll hear our last witness, Jackie Jeter. And 

she’s president and business agent of Amalgamated Transit Union, 

Local 689. 

Welcome. And you’re recognized. 

STATEMENT OF JACKIE L. JETER 

Ms. JETER. Thank you. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and full 

ranking committee members. Thank you for allowing the ATU to 

be a part of this hearing. We offer condolences to all those involved 

in the accident. 

I’m Jackie Jeter, president of ATU Local 689. Five years ago, 

after the tragic June 2009 Red Line accident, Local 689 testified in 

support of retraining plans, routine recertification, and equipment 

upgrades. We Stated our belief that the cultivation of a safety culture at the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority would 

not only benefit our members, but just as importantly, the riding 

public. 

I am here today to testify to the troubling fact that our system 

is still lacking acceptance of the need of a safety culture at 

WMATA. While we commend the improvements made since the 

2009 accident, we must point out the task of developing a safety 

culture has not been met. 

When I speak of a safety culture, I’m referring to overall attitudes, beliefs, and atmosphere that is cultivated at WMATA. We 

must have everyone, from the GM to the least senior, invested in 

making sure that safety is our No. 1 priority. This attitude must 

be reinforced from the top to the bottom with assurances that all 

the rules that are created are implemented fairly. Think about it. 

People experience a sense of pride when they are treated with dignity on the job, when their opinions are valued, their family responsibilities are respected, and they have a feeling of ownership 

through job security. 

As president, I hear the complaints of the lack of morale and confidence in the handling of our care. The majority of the employees 

of WMATA do not have comfort in the feeling of overall safety. A 

safety culture can only be effective when all employees are confident that their opinion and work ethic is valued. An essential 

part of establishing a safety culture is providing employees with 

the opportunity to express suggestions and comments when they 

experience safety concerns. 

Because of the lack of those feelings, our members have developed a sense of paranoia. It is difficult to get them to trust that 

WMATA will handle the information that they give with care. 

We believe change takes constant investment in workers, as well 

as property. It takes the acceptance of ideas, trust in their ability 

to build confidence in WMATA’s efforts, the efforts of their coworkers’ skills, and the implementation of safety initiatives that protect 

and build confidence on their behalf. 

I have Stated to officials of WMATA openly that they cannot discipline their way to a right and just safety culture. WMATA’s procedure implies that a safety culture can be developed with the sole 

use of discipline instead of implementing constant, intense training 
57 

procedures. Training will prepare the employees for catastrophic 

events like June 12. Most of our members are not sent to safety 

training until they make a mistake. We do not have a training program that employees can freely attend to enhance their skill level 

without permission of supervision. This is not a habit that promotes a willing, healthy safety culture. In order to have a great 

safety culture, training and discipline must go hand in hand in a 

proactive way. 

One of the recommendations implemented from the 2009 accident was the establishment of Safety Committee meetings. But 

most of the Safety Committee meetings are now attended by the 

few. The topics of discussion are mostly employee accidents, absenteeism, and workmen’s compensation claims. These may be important to the general manager or CFO, but they are not the most important topics that affect employees in their daily experience. 

These Safety Committee meetings have to be about the protection 

of employer, worker, and the riding public, not just the employer’s 

perspective on safety. 

Workers have developed their own expectations of safety based 

on their daily experiences, such as the lack of bathroom facilities, 

rats in the stations, unruly passengers, equipment issues, operator 

assaults, prompt report repairs, the cleanliness of stations, what to 

do before a passenger spits on you, the lack of police presence 

throughout the system, and the list goes on and on. This must be 

incorporated in the program of safety to gain trust and constant interest. 

My testimony today is not to lay blame or point fingers. Instead, 

it is intended to open the discussion that includes everyone, my 

members, WMATA, you, and the people who ride the buses and 

trains every day. And this discussion shouldn’t just happen when 

you want to implement a new safety procedure or policy. It is about 

developing the expertise and trust for all employees, so that a situation like January 12 can be handled in the safest possible way 

each and every time. 

Local 689 remains, as always, dedicated to safety, to our members, and our riders. And I’ll take any questions. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. 

[Prepared Statement of Ms. Jeter follows:] 
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Mr. MICA. And we will get to questions right now. With pending 

votes, we’ll try to make these as brief as possible and succinct. 

First, Mr. Downey, I guess you just took over as chair? 

Mr. DOWNEY. Three weeks ago. I’ve been on the board for 5 

years, but I’ve just become chairman. 

Mr. MICA. And I might say I’ve worked with him for many years, 

outstanding reputation. They couldn’t have a better chair. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. He’s also my constituent. 

Mr. MICA. Good. 

In any event, first of all, there was a communications failure. It 

appears that the system works above ground but not below ground. 

And you’re telling us that now it does work and it has been tested. 

Mr. DOWNEY. There is now a regular process of testing by 

the—— 

Mr. MICA. Does it work? 

Mr. DOWNEY. Things that have been identified that needed fixing 

are being fixed or have been fixed. 

Mr. MICA. But they may not be fixed. 

Chief. 

Mr. MILLS. The Office of Unified Communications, in conjunction 

with WMATA, we’re doing weekly tests in the various Metro stations. And any of our emergency responders that respond to stations also test the radios while they’re there,and there is a report 

that we fill out that gets forwarded by that company to one of our 

battalion chiefs, to WMATA and OUC. 

Mr. MICA. Somewhere the ball was dropped there. I was very 

concerned about the aboveground interoperability. We’ve had several incidents above ground and there was interoperability lacking 

with, well, we have D.C. Police, we have Secret Service, we have 

a whole host of folks. And some of you may recall the incidents. Do 

you think that’s under control, the ability to communicate between 

the different enforcements agencies and first responders? 

Mr. MILLS. Yes, Mayor Bowser has put out a directive that we 

will be going away from the encrypted, which will allow us to restore our immediate—— 

Mr. MICA. I’m talking beyond that, your ability to communicate 

with the other agencies. 

Mr. MILLS. Yes, we have that. 

Mr. MICA. OK. Let me ask you too another question. Was the 

training of the first responders, they said only 100 of the firefighters, 1,700 firefighters that might have to deal with these incidents have been trained. What is the story there? 

Mr. MILLS. We have various levels of training. Everybody who 

comes through our Fire and Rescue Training Academy receives 

training related to Metro and how to operate within a Metro systems emergency. Now, as we move forward with our training there 

are technical rescue training, which the 100 we sent out, that dealt 

specifically with elevators and escalator rescues within the Metro 

system. 

Mr. MICA. But basic things, like, again, more than likely the 

power might stay on in an incident, how to get people in and out 

with a hot track? 

Mr. MILLS. OK. We have tools as part of the basic training that 

they get in the training at the academy. 
65 

Mr. MICA. When it comes down to it, not everybody has been 

trained who might have to respond to those kind of incidents in, 

say, a hot track? 

Mr. MILLS. Yes, everybody receives that training while they go 

through the Fire and EMS Training Academy. When they’re in 

their rookie stage, everybody gets that training. 

Mr. MICA. On a Metro situation? 

Mr. MILLS. Yes. They get the basic Metro safety training. 

Mr. MICA. All right. 

Mr. DOWNEY. Mr. Chairman, could I add something to that? 

Mr. MICA. Yes. 

Mr. DOWNEY. The hundred out of a total of about 5,000 who were 

trained were individuals who came to our training center at Landover where there is a mock tunnel, where there are cars, where 

they really can see the hands-on. We can even fill it with smoke 

and show what that situation would be like. That’s what we hope 

we can do with the vast majority of people who would respond on 

Metro, so they could see what actually exists on the ground. 

Mr. MICA. And the system, there’s a conductor on each of these 

trains. Of course, we’ve got dozens, almost everybody on a Metro 

has a cell phone. They didn’t work. We’ve got recordings from Mr. 

Rogers’ attempts. And you can hear the communications were garbled. So people wouldn’t know if the conductor can’t tell them we 

have got people trapped in a car down here. That’s solved too? 

Mr. MILLS. We had a subsequent emergency last week where we 

had back-to-back Metro boxes, and they were at the same time. 

And the communications between Fire and EMS and Metro and the 

response that we got showed marked improvement. All of our requests that we made during those incidents Metro complied with 

immediately. And we were able to mitigate both of those incidents 

in a timely manner. 

Mr. MICA. OK. How many people here took Metro this week? 

Anybody? Raise your hand. OK. All right. Quite a few hands went 

up. As many as three-quarters of a million people a day want answers to those questions. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome again to the panel. 

Mr. Downey, picking up on your distinction. 

Mr. Mills, you said all 1,700 have taken training with respect to 

Metro, but not all 1,700 have gone to the Landover facility to be 

trained at the tunnel facsimile, is that not correct? 

Mr. MILLS. That’s correct. We are in the process, through the 

Washington Council of Governments Chiefs Committee, there has 

been rapid improvement in communications with Metro. And we 

are sending—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I’ve got very limited time. 

Mr. MILLS. OK. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Unlike you in your testimony, because we have 

votes coming. Is it up to the different jurisdictions whether they 

choose to have that specialized training, Mr. Downey? 

Mr. DOWNEY. We can’t force them to come. It is available. 
66 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. So weakness No. 1, we don’t have consistency in the requirement for training in responding to an incident 

in Metro anywhere in the system. 

Mr. DOWNEY. We have some that are very well trained. Fairfax 

County sent 754 responders. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And D.C. sent 100. 

Mr. DOWNEY. In this particular year, 100. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And most of Fairfax’s Metro is above ground? 

Mr. DOWNEY. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Most of D.C. Is below ground in tunnels. So, Mr. 

Mills, I know you’re new to Congress, but, I mean, this is very 

troubling that D.C. Has not elected to train all of its people at the 

Landover facility given the fact that 90-something percent of Metro 

in D.C. Is underground. 

Mr. MILLS. Well, the 100 you’re referring to was last year. Subsequent years prior to that we have rotated all of our companies out 

there. So a large number of our personnel have been trained at the 

Landover facility. Last year we sent 100 for technical rescue. 

Now, the Metro tunnel, as you say is underground, hasn’t 

changed. It’s still the same tunnel—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. 

Mr. MILLS [continuing]. That these individuals were trained on 

years ago. 

And let me make this clear: Our members would not have been 

able to respond to that incident on January 12, overcome the many 

challenges that they faced that day with lack of information, inability to communicate had they not received proper training in years 

past. They operated tremendously. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Mills, you don’t need to defend the rank and 

file. They’re brave men and women, and they put themselves in 

harm’s way. This is a management issue. This is about management, not about the rank and file. 

How much money has D.C. gotten since 2001 through UASI 

grants for radios and communication? 

Mr. MILLS. I don’t have those figures. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. It would be in the tens of millions, would it not? 

Mr. MILLS. I can’t answer that. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Really? Well, let’s get somebody who can. 

Mr. Downey, how much has Metro received in UASI? 

Mr. DOWNEY. Metro has received about $200 million in support—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. 

Mr. DOWNEY [continuing]. Much of which has gone for cameras, 

for terrorist teams, for our dog teams, but some of which has gone 

for radios and other communication. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. On September 2001, I remember vividly, two of 

our region’s systems didn’t communicate with anyone else, D.C. 

and U.S. Park Police. They were on different frequencies, they had 

different equipment. And we all vowed we were going to fix that. 

We were going to have a uniform set of standards so we could all 

speak to one another. And interoperability was paramount in our 

prioritization of UASI grants. 

Here we are 14 years later and Mr. Mills is testifying that none 

of the radios worked underground. They did work on the surface. 
67 

But his men and women couldn’t be communicated with so that 

they had an incident report and had accurate information as to 

where is the train, how many people are on the train, what’s the 

conditions of the people on the train, is the third rail turned off or 

not. 

I mean, how is this possible after 14 years and hundreds of millions—I assure you, Mr. Mills, it’s in the hundreds for D.C. As 

well—and we still don’t have the ability for Mr. Mills’ men and 

women to respond safely and to try to help Mr. Rogers and his 

companions on that train? How is that possible? 

Mr. DOWNEY. There are protocols. There are processes. Clearly 

they have to be exercised through training and through regular inspections to see that they are working. It’s an ever ongoing process. 

We can’t say because we spent the money in 2001, it would be 

working today. We have to be sure that it is working today. 

I mentioned earlier my concern about our Control Center. These 

people run the whole system. They were the ones who could actually know what was going on. We have to be sure that they’re hearing what’s happening and pass it along. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. But obviously the system did not work properly and one life was lost and we could have lost more. 

Mr. DOWNEY. Correct. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I have one more question, Mr. Chairman, because I know we’ve got to run. 

Mr. Hart, this is an easy one I think. Were Metro’s SOPs on ventilation consistent with the 2007 guidance issued by NTSB? 

Mr. HART. We didn’t find any written operating procedures, and 

so we don’t have a good answer for you yet. That’s one of the things 

we’re looking at in the course of the evaluation. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. If I’m looking at page 3 of your interim report, 

the answer seems to be no. 

Mr. HART. Well, we know that someone put an exit fan at the 

station, and that’s pretty much logical, that’s what you would expect to happen. There’s smoke in the station, let’s exit it. But they 

were also doing exit at the other place, which made it a pull/pull 

operation which didn’t move the smoke. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. My time is up. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. 

Let me recognize the chairman of the Operations Subcommittee, 

Mr. Meadows. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you to you for your testimony. 

Mr. Mills, let me come to you because you said that even when 

your men and women went down to make the rescue you weren’t 

sure if the electricity was turned off, you weren’t sure that there 

were passengers on the train. Is that correct? 

Mr. MILLS. Yes. At the time they initially made their way into 

the station, we had not received the information—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Yes, I need yeses or noes. I only have 5 minutes. 

Mr. MILLS. That’s correct, yes. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. If that is correct, why would you have not 

known? Who is responsible for letting you know that? 

Mr. MILLS. When the call was made from WMATA to the Office 

of Unified Communications, they should have—— 
68 

Mr. MEADOWS. So WMATA should have known that the track 

was energized, not energized? 

Mr. MILLS. Correct. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Said there’s people on the train, you need to get 

there, and that communication did not happen. 

Mr. MILLS. Correct. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Mr. Downey, why did that not happen? 

Mr. DOWNEY. That’s one of the reasons why I’ve asked the Control Center study to be accomplished. That’s their function. 

Mr. MEADOWS. I guess before we answer the question, Mr. Downey, how many people have to die and how many events do we 

have to have before we can answer that question? Why did that not 

happen? 

Mr. DOWNEY. We should not have another event like this at any 

time. We need to look at our procedures. We need to retrain our 

people. We need to establish—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. But I’ve looked at some of the question and answer, Mr. Downey, and this is not to be directed just at you, I 

looked at some of the questions and answers with 2009. And some 

of the same things were said back then—we’re going to do training, 

we’re going to do this, we’re going to do that. And yet here we are 

some 6 years later and the same thing happened. 

Mr. DOWNEY. I would like to provide for you the things we have 

done, but there’s—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. I don’t need—— 

Mr. DOWNEY. —still a long list of things that—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. If you tell the 80-plus people that were facing 

death about the things we have done, they don’t care about that. 

All they care about are the things we haven’t done. 

Mr. DOWNEY. Right. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So let me ask you, Mr. Downey, because a lot has 

been made of the resources and lack of resources that we have and 

that this is not just a management problem. And so, because I 

don’t know, I just went in and I went to the National Transit Data 

base. And I looked at what transit in New York, Chicago, and here 

in Washington, what they’re spending. And when I looked at those 

figures, it looks like you’re spending more money than Chicago, 

who has a bigger system. So is it really a resource problem or a 

management problem? 

Mr. DOWNEY. I don’t know whether you’re talking about our operating expense or—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. I’ll look at operating and total because you’re 

spending more on all of those things. 

Mr. DOWNEY. I know we are spending more on capital than probably Chicago, not as much as New York. We’re spending a lot because we’re catching up from years and years of deferred maintenance. We really need to go through the system and replace—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. So your testimony here today is that you’re not 

really spending more than those systems that are actually bigger, 

that your budget is not bigger? 

Mr. DOWNEY. I don’t know if our operating—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Because I went back over 10 years and I looked 

at the budget and compared it to Chicago. And your budget every 

single year is bigger all the way around than Chicago, who is a big-
69 

ger system with more employees and more customers. So is that a 

management problem? 

Mr. DOWNEY. I’d be happy to look at that. I know it’s smaller 

than New York. The comparison to Chicago, I’m not familiar with. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. So let me go on a little bit further, because what troubles me is, is that we’ll have this hearing and nothing happens. Do you believe that some of the problem was because 

smoke in tunnels, trains not working, elevators not working, escalators not working, things not working, that that has become so 

commonplace that when Mr. Mills got the call they just figured, 

well, it’s just another smoke in the tunnel? Is that commonplace to 

see smoke in the tunnel? 

Mr. DOWNEY. There are occasions where either a trash fire or 

some small thing happens where there is smoke. But I think we 

should always assume that there are people at risk. I think the response should be based on the fact that trains run in the tunnels, 

people are on trains, we really have to keep that in mind as what 

could be a worst case, and respond to it. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Mr. Hart, let me, my last question is to you, because obviously you’re going to make some recommendations, you 

have made some preliminary things. I go back to some of the prior 

events, not just 2009 but before that, the ‘‘it says because you could 

not compel them to take action.’’ Do you expect the same response 

this time? 

Mr. HART. I wouldn’t want to predict what the response is. I 

would just say that, at this point, WMATA is cooperating with us 

very well in the—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Have they always cooperated with every recommendation in the past? Yes or no? 

Mr. HART. I wouldn’t say every recommendation, most—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. So there are recommendations that you deemed 

important that they did not respond to? 

Mr. HART. Yes. That’s correct. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. Thank you. 

Mr. MICA. Thank the gentleman. 

Recognize Mr. DeSaulnier. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Downey, thank you for your service. We appreciate part-time 

service. 

Mr. DOWNEY. Part-time, uncompensated service. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Yes. I’m aware. Many of us used to do that. 

So specifically to the safety culture, and specific responses, brief 

please, and then Ms. Jeter, this is disturbingly familiar to the situation in the Bay Area that I have been unfortunately very intimately involved with—— 

Mr. DOWNEY. I know that. 

Mr. DESAULNIER [continuing]. Between ATU, all of the locals at 

BART, and management. Ms. Jeter said the safety culture should 

go from the general manager down to the rank and file. I would 

add that it should be actively engaged in at the board level. 

Mr. DOWNEY. At the board level. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Unfortunately, too often in these boards, my 

experience is that you are very dependent on staff and sometimes 

reluctant to question staff. So what specifically is the board doing? 
70 

And I’m not ascribing blame, by the way, to either side, but the collective culture has led to somebody losing their life.I should say 

many people losing their lives. So for all the specific things we 

have to do in operations and improved resources, you’ve still got 

this culture. What is the board doing to remedy it? 

Mr. DOWNEY. I believe that that does start with the board. And 

I joined the board in 2010 in the aftermath of the Fort Totten incident. One of the first things I asked the board to do was to establish a regular Safety Committee. I’ve chaired that committee for 

the last 5 years. We meet once a month. We get regular progress 

reports on dealing with NTSB and other recommendations. We review incident reports. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Mr. Downey, excuse me, my question again, because we’re all limited in time, is the relationship with the employees.What are you doing specifically on the board to do corrective 

things for what’s been described by Ms. Jeter? And, again, I’m not 

ascribing blame. But it’s a problem that has to be solved. 

Mr. DOWNEY. One of our early actions was to do an employee 

survey. And, frankly, in 2011 it showed the conditions that Ms. 

Jeter described. We recognized that is what needed to be changed. 

We’ve taken a number of steps. A survey a year or so ago indicated 

to us that there had been improvement. But clearly there’s always 

more room. 

We at the top, at the board, are committed to a safety culture. 

If you ask me to describe it, I would describe it the same way Ms. 

Jeter did. We need to work down through the organization and find 

where in the middle it’s not functioning as it should. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Ms. Jeter, have you given specific recommendations to the board as to how to improve the situation, either outside 

of collective bargaining or during collective bargaining, that you’re 

comfortable giving to the committee? 

Ms. JETER. I won’t say specifically because I know there’s a couple letters that I’ve written to the board concerning things that the 

union feels needs to be looked at. But I can say that to the general 

manager and down through the Safety Committees we have. Mr. 

Connolly talked about the radio problems. It’s a radio problem 

throughout the system. It’s not just this particular incident that 

happened to happen with the preparedness team that was there, 

the emergency response team. It is a problem. 

And I’ve said to the general manager, Sarles, as well as the acting general manager, that some of the concerns that we have are 

the ones that we actually do not—we look at a survey and we look 

at employees saying, oh, yes, I would respond to a safety issue. But 

that’s not a safety culture. And anybody will say anything, especially when the rule says you’re supposed to report all safety 

issues. So, of course, they’re going to say yes to a survey. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Thank you, Ms. Jeter. 

Mr. Hart, your great comments under the Most Wanted List of 

Transportation Safety on page 2 of your testimony, ‘‘Mass transit 

agencies should work to identify, define, prioritize, and mitigate 

safety risks,’’ that’s permissive. Should it be less permissive and 

must? And what is the role of the Federal Department of Transportation? If you would be brief, I have a question for Mr. Rogers I 

want to finish with. 
71 

Mr. HART. Sure. We are not part of the Department of Transportation. Your question would be more aptly directed to the regulator, 

which is the Federal Transit Administration. We are the investigator. We can’t require anyone to do anything. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Okay. 

Mr. Rogers, again, thank you. And having lived through this— 

and probably the most important stakeholder here is the commuter 

and the confidence you have in the system—having listened to all 

this, and clearly something that was emotional and will stay with 

you the rest of your life, do you have any sense of greater confidence in the system and that this won’t happen again? 

Mr. ROGERS. I guess not yet, not at this point. But I’m hopeful 

that they can make the changes that’ll increase safety. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Thank you, sir. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MEADOWS [presiding]. Thank you. 

The chair recognizes the gentleman, Mr. Grothman. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. OK. Just a couple questions, I guess for Mr. 

Downey or whoever else wants to answer, just so I get a sense 

here. As far as other metros, Boston, Chicago, New York, or in Europe, Latin America, could you compare your safety record, per passenger or per trip or whatever, to these other systems in other 

countries or elsewhere around the United States? 

Mr. DOWNEY. We do regular reporting on incidents, number of 

passenger injuries, et cetera. We generally compare ourselves to 

where we were in the past to see that we’re getting better. There 

are data, but it’s very hard to make the comparison. I think on the 

whole we do rank reasonably well,but I wouldn’t totally depend on 

how we report things, how others report things. I think what is 

really important is we’re looking at where we are and where we 

need to be and measuring are we or are we not getting better. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. So you don’t really have a hard feeling, 

I suppose—— 

Mr. DOWNEY. Couldn’t give you a hard number. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Don’t really keep track of that? Okay. 

Mr. DOWNEY. I would give you one hard comment, which is public transit everywhere is a very, very safe mode of transportation 

relative to other ways of getting around. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. OK. 

Apparently in 2006 you had a similar incident, and the train operator, he just went car to car and did manage to evacuate the passengers. Could you comment on why that didn’t have this time or 

I guess why, is there training going on or why apparently the operator was able to handle this 8 years ago and not this year? 

Mr. DOWNEY. I think, as we heard from Mr. Rogers, the train operator in this incident, and I think the Safety Board report will 

clear up whatever happened, he did go through the train, he did 

communicate. From all I’ve read about it, this was, from his standpoint, a well-handled responsibility that he has. I think the 2006 

incident was a Chicago event, not a Washington event. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. OK. 

I yield my time. 

Mr. MEADOWS. I thank the gentleman. 
72 

We do have votes, and so I want to just remind members we 

have votes. But the chair recognizes the gentlewoman from New 

York. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you. I’ll be very brief. My condolences to 

Mrs. Glover’s family and appreciation to the first responders and 

good samaritans that rushed to try to save lives. 

Mr. Downey, I represent New York, and on 9 11 our radios didn’t 

work and it contributed to the loss of over 300 firefighters’ lives. 

And since then this Congress has tried to help localities make them 

work. And I understand that Metro has spent over $31 million on 

radio equipment and interoperability through the Federal Transit 

Administration-funded projects. 

So I just want to ask you, and I guess we don’t have time to hear 

an answer, but is there any more that Congress can do? But why 

can’t we get these radios to work? We can put people on the Moon, 

and if we could get these radios to work, it could save lives. And 

I’m not just going after your area. They still don’t work in New 

York. They’re still not interoperable. 

So there’s a disconnect. There’s something happening that this 

project that should be achievable is not working. I feel it’s critical 

and serious and that we need to be able to do it to save lives. But 

that’s my question. But the chairman is telling me we have to rush 

to vote. So I respectfully request an answer in writing back to the 

committee. Thank you. 

Mr. DOWNEY. We’ll provide you with that. 

Mr. MEADOWS. I thank the gentlewoman. I’m going to go ahead 

let her go ahead to vote. I will say that because of the serious nature of this particular event and obviously the serious tone of this 

particular hearing, we’re going to continue on with this hearing 

now and not recess. And I’m going to recognize the gentlewoman 

from the District here, Ms. Holmes Norton. 

Ms. NORTON. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was going to let Mr. 

Beyer go before—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. We’ll go ahead and recognize Mr. Beyer 

so he can go to vote. 

Ms. NORTON. He has the right to vote. 

Mr. BEYER. Thank you, Ms. Norton. 

Let me first, Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for being patient 

with all this. And let me first praise Mr. Jonathan Rogers for his 

brave, compassionate assistance to Carol Glover. The last year has 

been a difficult one for race relations in our country, and the powerful symbolism of a young white man showing such great love and 

courage for an older African-American woman in need is an inspiration to us all and a true sign of progress as our multiracial community heals and evolves. 

So, Mr. Rogers, thank you. 

I really only have one question for Mr. Mills. But I would like 

to begin reading parts of two letters I received from constituents 

and also ask for unanimous consent that both letters be submitted 

for the record. 

Mr. BEYER. The first is from Gary Matz, writing on behalf of 

himself and his wife Lynette. These are just excerpts. 

‘‘The very short answer is that we did not see any emergency assistance as we came out of the station. To go back, we were evacu-
73 

ated off the train, walked along the catwalk back to the station. We 

were struck by how quiet the station was. No people except for 

those being evacuated from the train. We proceeded up the escalators. We were met by a single Metro official at the top of the escalators who was directing traffic outside. 

‘‘We exited the station and saw a bus and perhaps one or two fire 

trucks. We remember seeing very few, if any, people. I remember 

kind of shrugging my shoulders and telling Lynette, let’s find a taxi 

and go home. 

‘‘I fully expected to be met by an organized team of people, medics or first responders or whatever. This was not the case. We did 

not see any organization, nor were we met by anyone. We simply 

came out to the street, surveyed the scene, noticing a few vehicles, 

and then decided just to go home.’’ 

Another letter came from Marc McKeigan about his son Paige 

McKeigan and one of his classmates, Joey Peterson. They are here 

today. Can you both just stand, just that were here. 

Let me read: ‘‘Thousands of parents entrust the safety of their 

children to WMATA every day as they commute to and from 

schools. My son Paige and five of his Gonzaga classmates were on 

the second-to-last car of that fateful Metro train. You can imagine 

my concern when I received an unexpected text from them at 3:41 

that day that simply said, I love you, Dad. Those boys thought they 

might die. 

‘‘Mercifully, the boys are OK, but they took it upon themselves 

to abandon the train. They determined which side of the train was 

farthest from the third rail and pulled the doors open. Using flashlights from their cell phones, they crept through the smokey tunnel 

to the platform at L’Enfant Plaza. Paige reported that when they 

got to the platform they saw a number of firemen standing there. 

No one asked the boys where they had come from or how they got 

off the train. When they got to the street, their faces were covered 

with soot and smoke, and no one approached them. 

‘‘The boys reported that after about 30 minutes of staying on the 

dark and smokey train, they decided to take matters into their own 

hands. I can at least partially understand the confusion in the tunnel, but why was there so little support for the passengers who 

made it off the train and back to the station? Where were the medical personnel, EMTs, fire support, even traffic cops?’’ 

We had another constituent call us and tell us that he was put 

on a bus at the station to the hospital, that the bus had no police 

escort and took over an hour to get to GW Hospital. So we’ve had 

lots of attention on fans and cables and radios and alarms and 

evacuation protocols, but aren’t we looking at massive failures of 

the simple emergency and medical response for the people who 

made it safely back to L’Enfant Station? 

So, Chief Mills, I have great difficulty reconciling your account 

of all the first responders arriving with the personal accounts of 

the survivors. Chief? 

Mr. MILLS. With that particular station, there are multiple exit 

points. The majority of the people we had exiting the station were 

at the 7th and D location near the HUD building. That’s where we 

had set up our treatment and triage areas because that’s where the 

largest contingent of people were coming out. There were other 
74 

exits at the Virginia Avenue station, that we initially had responders there,but they weren’t receiving anybody. And to be able to 

have enough personnel to treat the large number of individuals 

that were coming out of the other entrances, we had to redeploy 

those resources to other locations. And I can’t explain for, or I don’t 

know where everybody exited the station because of the multiple 

exits for that station. 

Mr. BEYER. One more question. Mr. Downey, has Metro made 

any plans to followup on the middle to long-term health impacts of 

the smoke inhalation on all the passengers? Some went to the hospital right away, but we know now about the toxic chemicals from 

the burned cables that were in the smoke. So what are we going 

to do about the possible continuing health concerns of those people 

that were on the train? 

Mr. DOWNEY. I’m not aware of any, but I will get back to you on 

that. 

Mr. DOWNEY. We do have as part of our protocol family assistance programs. When people have been injured on the system, we 

follow through with the families. But we need to check on that 

issue. I know it was an issue at the World Trade Center after 911. 

Conceivably it could be an issue here. 

Mr. BEYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MEADOWS. I thank the gentleman. 

I want to go ahead, we have a 911 call or recording. Could you 

go ahead and cue that up? And let’s listen to that. 

[Audio recording played.] 

Mr. MEADOWS. I think you get the point. Congress really, there’s 

a law in place that says that we had to have cell phone coverage 

in these tunnels. And it’s been put off because of the 2009, you got 

a waiver from Congress. But yet here we are in 2015 and still no 

911 call ability. 

Mr. Rogers, did you try to make a call or text to your family? 

Mr. ROGERS. Yes. I did try to text my wife and it didn’t work. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So it wasn’t successful? 

Mr. ROGERS. No. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So here we are in 2015, still, not only with this 

event but a major event, and, Mr. Downey, that’s something that 

we’re going to have to address. 

Mr. DOWNEY. Could I respond on that? 

Mr. MEADOWS. Sure. 

Mr. DOWNEY. We welcomed Congress’ action in asking that this 

be done. The next step was to get the communications carriers together, form a consortium to do the installation. They have been 

at it for a number of years. To date, all of the stations have been 

brought online. Cell service is available in the stations. It is not yet 

complete within the tunnels. 

Within the last year or so, unfortunately, the consortium that 

they created to do this work went bankrupt, causing a considerable 

delay. The carriers are now working again to put a vehicle in place 

to deliver this. We’ll make the tunnels available and the time available to make it happen. But it has been a long and complicated 

process. 

Mr. MICA [presiding]. Maybe you can provide the committee with 

that timeframe. 
75 

Mr. DOWNEY. We will do that. 

Mr. MICA. Ms. Norton, you are recognized. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I must say that the combination of the cell phone coverage and 

the chaos that Representative Beyer described above ground finally 

after people had been rescued is very troubling. And a lot needs to 

be fixed. But, nevertheless, I need to thank all of you for the service that you give, Mr. Downey without a penny of compensation. 

I particularly have to thank Mr. Rogers. You weren’t asked a lot 

of questions but your courage spoke for itself. I’m just pleased and 

proud to have you as a constituent of the District of Columbia. 

The Glover family hangs over everything we do, this hearing, it’s 

an inspiration and an impetus. 

Mr. Downey, let me say that I take it that the fares are not going 

to be raised and that WMATA understands that this is no time to 

raise the fares. I say that understanding that that will put a burden on the jurisdictions. And I need to tell you that I’m trying to 

help because of a bill I’m introducing that would fix the irrational 

disparity because tax benefits available to those who drive and 

those who use Metro resulting in loss of ridership to Metro. But 

you do agree that the burden should not be on those who ride the 

trains, particularly after this accident? 

Mr. DOWNEY. I certainly agree with you. We had a meeting of the 

Finance Committee of the board yesterday to discuss where we go 

with respect to balancing our budget. 

Ms. NORTON. I thank you for that. Again, with limited time, I 

have to move on. I need to ask about best practices. 

Mr. DOWNEY. But we certainly would like to find a way to do it 

without raising fares. 

Ms. NORTON. So we will not be raising fares? 

Mr. DOWNEY. I would hope we do not have to raise the fares. 

Ms. NORTON. And I understand it takes a vote of the board? 

Mr. DOWNEY. Yes. 

Ms. NORTON. I suppose this is really for Mr. Hart. It’s about best 

practices. We’ve heard, for example, that our firefighters have, indeed, gone to the tunnel or to the mock cars and the rest. Obviously they couldn’t all go at one time. But I’m really wondering if 

it is enough.Whether or not firefighters from the region and Metro 

workers need to be exposed to real-time exercises in the tunnels so 

that they are not faced with going into a dark tunnel for the first 

time. 

And I thank you, Mr. Mills. And I’ll tell you, I have a bias because I am a great-granddaughter of a firefighter who went to the 

D.C. Fire Department in 1902. And I’ll tell you, when firefighters 

go into a smoke-filled tunnel and they don’t even know that the 

third rail is off, my hat is off to those fellows. 

Ms. NORTON. But I need to know whether that’s enough. I bet 

many of those may have gone to Landover, but I wonder if they 

had ever been into a tunnel and whether we need real-time exercises in tunnels, recognizing that the trains have to run, that we 

can’t interfere with service, but real-time exercises in the tunnels 

across the region, not only in the District of Columbia, by firefighters and by WMATA workers. Would that be what would be 

best practices? 
76 

Mr. DOWNEY. One of our followup actions that we have already 

taken is to establish a schedule looking forward over the next 3 

years to hold such drills in each physical part of the system and 

each jurisdiction. 

Ms. NORTON. No, I’m asking Mr. Hart really about whether regionwide, because he’s the expert on best practices, is it enough to 

have a mock tunnel? I’m glad about the mock tunnel and the mock 

cars, but I’m asking whether best practices wouldn’t be to expose 

the firefighters and the WMATA workers to the tunnels. 

Mr. HART. Thank you for the question. One of the issues we are 

looking in the investigation is the adequacy of the training. We will 

be looking at WMATA’s existing training facility and we will be determining in the course of the investigation is that adequate or 

does it actually need on-scene training in various areas. 

Ms. NORTON. That’s what I’m asking for. And I thank you for 

looking at that. 

I’d like to ask Ms. Jeter a question. First of all, I must say another hero in this is that conductor who told the people it is not 

a fire, who kept them calm. I don’t know his name, but I’d like to 

put something in the congressional Record for him as well, as for 

Mr. Rogers, who performed, it seemed to me, as single individuals 

way above the cause of duty. 

I’m very concerned about this issue of a call line. We learned in 

2009 that the best practice in airlines and trains is to report safety 

problems. And apparently that’s routinely done what was not done 

in WMATA. Now, Ms. Jeter has said, well, yes, there is a call line, 

but the people still feel retaliation by supervisors if they report a 

safety issue. 

Mr. Hart, I need it know how the others are able do it so that 

people feel freely to say something happened in an airplane and 

you need to know this, and yet they feel that there will not be retaliation. Why in the world doesn’t that work after the 2009 accident at WMATA? 

Mr. HART. The success of the Near Miss Reporting System in 

aviation has been amazing, but we’ve certainly been exploring how 

to share that success with other modes. It has not been as easy in 

other modes and the biggest problem is the lack of confidence of 

the person reporting that their report will not be used against 

them. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, Ms. Jeter, why do you people think it will be 

used against them? Has it been used against people? 

Ms. JETER. Of course. And we do have a punitive system. So 

when your disciplinary system or your reporting system has a punitive result, that’s what they go to. 

Now, we have agreed to have a close call reporting system. 

That’s one of the initiatives that the union and WMATA did enter 

into. But the scope of the reporting system is so small because of 

the people that can use it, but that still lacks the confidence or the 

trust that if I go to a nonpunitive or anonymous reporting system 

that somehow that WMATA’s not going to know about it and I’m 

not going to get in trouble. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Ms. Jeter. 

And also thank you, Ms. Norton. We have gone a couple of minutes over on yours and they are calling the last vote here. 
77 

I want to thank all of our witnesses. What I’m going to do too, 

with agreement with the minority, we’re going to leave the record 

open for 10 days for additional questions that may be submitted by 

members and ask you to respond. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you so much. We can and we must do better. 

And appreciate your being part of this hearing today. 

There being no further business, this joint subcommittee hearing 

is adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

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