THE TEST OF WAR

1950-1953

Tbe Test 0f War. the second volume in the

planned comprehensive History of the Office

of the Secretan' of Defense, follows the evolution of OSD from the outbreak of the Korean

\,'ar in June 1950 to the end of the Truman

presidenC\' in January 1953. Like the first

\'olume in the series (The Formative Years,

194--1950). the present one focuses on the

secretaries of defense, their staffs, and OSD's

administration of the Pentagon and examines,

bn'ond OSD and the Department of Defense,

the larger framnvork of national security

organization and policy that involved the

White House. Congress, and other agencies of

the go\'ernment.

:\5 the central n'ent of this period, the

Korean War tested the mettle of officials and

institutions throughout the national security

establishment. but nowhere more acutely than

in the E,ring offices of the Pentagon leadership.

The Korean-era secretaries of defense-Louis

Johnson, George Marshall, and Robert

Lo\'ett-confronted a maze of problems

relating to strategy, budgets, manpower,

",'eapons de\'elopment, and service roles and

missions, Operating under wartime pressures

",'hile anempting to manage a department onh' recenth' created and still undergoing major

adjustments. they faced a formidable agenda

made e\'en more difficult by domestic pOlitical

and economic constraints that narrowed the

options a\'ailable to them.

In a narrati\'e rich in both documentary

detail and broad-brush perspective, The Test

of H--a r assesses ho\y well the secretaries met

these challenges, Success or failure depended

not onh' on their effectiveness in managing the

Pentagon bureaucracy, in particular their interaction ""ith the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the

still parochial-minded military services, but also

on their relationship with Truman, Secretary

of State Dean Acheson, and a contentious Congress unhappy O\'er the firing of MacArthur, the

pace of mobilization, and the progress of the

""ar generallY.

Korea. of course, was the flash point for

a Illuch ""ider struggle unfolding during this

Continued 01'1 back flap
time, the effort by the United States to contain

the expansionist activities of the Soviet Union

and communism. As the conflict in the Far East

dragged on seemingly indefinitely, officials in

Washington turned their attention increasingly to Europe and the strengthening of the

Western alliance. Much of the book deals with

the shaping of NATO and the related subject

of military assistance.

In a thoughtful conclusion, The Test of

War observes that the precedents established

ill these seminal years-the beginnings of a

military-industrial complex, the changing

strategic formulations that allowed for reliance

on nuclear as well as conventional weapons,

the sharp debate over European vs. Asian

priorities, and, above all, the staunch and expensive commitment to containment-would

influence national security policy and the U.S.

defense effort for the remainder of the century.

DORIS ~1. CONDIT received her A.B. and M.A.

degrees from George Washington University.

She has held various historical and research

positions with the U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers Historical Division, The Johns

Hopkins University, American University, and

the American Institutes for Research. Mrs. Condit is the author of or collaborator on

numerous military-political studies relating to

""ar and conflict, including Case Study in Guerrilla \Far: Greece During World War II,

Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict

(3 \·ols.), and Modern Revolutionary

n"arfare-An Analytical Overview.
History of the Office of the Secretary ofDefense

The Test of War, 1950-1953
HISTORY OF THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Alfred Goldberg, General Editor

Volume I: Steven L. Rearden, The Formative Thars, 1947-1950 (1984)
HISTORY OF THE OFFICE

OF THE

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Volume II

THE TEST OF WAR

1950-1953

Doris M. Condit

Historical Office

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Washington, D.C. • 1988
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

(Revised for volume 2)

Bibliography: v. 1, p.

Includes indexes.

Contents: v. 1. The formative years, 1947-1950/ Steven L. Reardenv. 2. The test of war, 1950-1953/ Doris M. Condit.

1. United States. Dept. of Defense-History. I. Goldberg, Alfred,

1918- .11. Rearden, Steven L., 1946- .111. Condit, Doris M.,

1921- . IV. United States. Dept. of Defense. Historical Office.

UA23.6.R4 1984 353.6'09 84-601133

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402
Foreword

This volume is the second in the series planned for the History of the

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). This series is intended to present a

scholarly, objective, and critical history of OSD with primary focus on

national security policy and decisions relating thereto.

Volume II presents the Washington background of the Korean War and

other momentous events-international and domestic-from the perspective

of the highest levels of government. It is concerned with what the Truman

administration, and especially OSD, JCS, and the military services, were doing

in response to these events. It seeks to weave together strategic planning, force

programming, budgetmaking, creation of military forces, direction of the

Korean War, collective security efforts, and military assistance, and to assess

the impact of all of these phenomena on OSD and the Department of Defense.

If there seems to be much stress on controversy and differences of opinion in

detailing the process of making policy and strategy decisions, it should be

borne in mind that planners and policymakers are normally concerned with

unsettled questions that inevitably provoke prolonged discussion, argument,

and dispute. Such examination of process may help provide perspective and

historical awareness to those who must make decisions today and in the

future.

The early stages of war or periods of prolonged international tension are

the real test of defense policies because of the high level of uncertainty and the

limited military resources usually available to implement policy and strategy.

The emphasis in this volume, therefore, is properly on the first year of the war

and the early grappling with collective security and military assistance. For a

better understanding of this early period, adequate attention to the background and setting is indispensable. Much Significant information not previously available is presented in this volume.

Military operations in Korea are treated only to the extent necessary to

understand plans and strategic and political decisions. The space devoted to
ii Foreword

military operations in Korea and Indochina varies with their significance in

the larger context of events. But because detail is necessary to establish the

essential discipline of the subject, the author has sought as far as possible to

let the facts tell their own story, to say how and why things happened. But she

has not shirked the historian's duty of indicating conclusions to which the

evidence seems to point.

The author, Doris M. Condit, holds A.B. and A.M. degrees from the

George Washington University and served as a historian with the Historical

Division of the U.S. Army Engineer Corps, the Operations Research Office of

The)ohns Hopkins University, and the American Institutes for Research. She is

the author of a number of political-military studies, including Case Study in

Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II and Modern Revolutionary

Warfare-An Analytical Overview.

This publication has been reviewed and its contents declassified and

cleared for release by concerned government agencies. Although the manuscript itself has been declassified, some of the official sources cited in the

volume may remain classified. This is an official publication of the Office of

the Secretary of Defense, but the views expressed are those of the author and

do not necessarily represent those of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

ALFRED GOLDBERG

Historian, OSD
Preface

This second volume of the History of the Office of the Secretary of

Defense (OSD) covers the period from June 1950 to January 1953. It treats

mainly the problems confronting the secretary of defense and his department

as a result of the North Korean invasion of South Korea and President

Truman's decision that the United States should go to the aid of the South

Koreans. The Korean War raised strategic questions that had to be addressed

immediately. The secretary of defense and other u.s. officials groped to create

a coordinated policy that would meet a range of possible perils. President

Truman stated the broad outlines of policy in July 1950: The United States

would fight in Korea, build up overall U.S. strength, and create a worldwide

collective security network.

The United States adhered to this basic policy throughout the Korean War

years in the face of other fateful changes in the international scene. The

Chinese Communist intervention in Korea in November 1950 multiplied

strategic and tactical difficulties and created a dilemma over the possible

escalation of the war. Although armistice talks began in]uly 1951, the Chinese

Communists and North Koreans refused to complete a mutually acceptable

agreement, thus confronting the administration with the question of how to

win militarily without escalating the conflict. Meanwhile, limited military

operations in Korea continued for two more years, causing many casualties

and further complicating already formidable U.S. domestic and international

problems. If nothing seemed certain at the beginning of the war, little could

be taken for granted during its later stages. In the end, the death of Stalin and

internal Soviet affairs may have had more to do with ending the war than any

U.S. actions.

The beginning of war in June 1950 confronted the three-year-old Department of Defense with an immediate challenge to fight and to prepare for other

anticipated contingencies. The United States undertook to revitalize and rearm

NATO and to find a way to bring still-occupied West Germany into the service
iv Preface

of Western European defense. In Asia, the Korean War intensified concern

about the security of Indochina, establishment of a new peaceful relationship

with Japan, and creation of a collective security network in the Pacific.

Military assistance became a worldwide undertaking of the Department of

Defense. Although no atomic weapons were used in Korea, the wartime

period saw great growth in nuclear technology, both in the United States and

the Soviet Union.

Under wartime pressures, the secretary of defense truly became the

president's deputy for military affairs. As a member of the National Security

Council and a major actor in the determination of U.S. policy, he also played

a key role in international affairs, particularly in NATO. Through his power

over the Defense budget, he was the arbiter of problems between the military

services, including the critical controversy over military roles and missions

that erupted once again in the FY 1953 budget battles. It was also his duty to

maintain a proper balance of civil and military power within the Department,

not an insignificant problem in view of the sometimes conflicting roles of the

military department secretaries and the chiefs of staff and the resistance of the

military services to OSD control.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense grew in size and importance in

response to the rapid increase in the growth and complexity of defense

problems. The country's need for military forces caused Marshall to elevate

the manpower function to the assistant secretary level. The imperative of

collective security and a much-enlarged military assistance program greatly

enhanced the role of the secretary's assistant for international security affairs.

Wartime experiences led to the recasting of other elements of OSD, particularly the logistical and research and development functions.

The present work is concerned with policy and the decision-making

process. At the level of the secretary of defense, the interaction between

military, diplomatiC, and political policy and action increased markedly and

became more complex and significant during these years. The development of

U.S. national security policy depended on a close and cooperative relationship

between the Departments of State and Defense, such as prevailed during

Marshall's and Lovett's terms as secretary.

The large number of topics addressed in this volume made it desirable to

adopt a thematic approach. The opening chapters set the stage, and subsequent chapters are grouped topically, beginning with those covering the

Korean War and other events in Asia. Later chapters deal with the relationship

of strategic plans and programs to Defense budgetary developments, NATO

matters, military assistance, nuclear weapons, and internal organizational

problems. Despite the brief span of time covered by the volume and the large

number of subjects it considers, there are some areas of Defense interest that
Preface v

are not covered in any detail: overseas base rights and construction problems,

logistics and industrial mobilization matters, intelligence, and Latin American

and Middle Eastern affairs. Some of these subjects may be treated by later

volumes in this series.

What makes a Defense history of 1950-53 of particular concern almost

half a century later is that the United States is still grappling with many of the

same problems it faced then. The East-West confrontation still exists. Questions of European defense and NATO viability continue to be persistent and

vital. Korea remains divided between North and South, and the United States

maintains a military presence in Korea and Japan.

While Southeast Asia has diminished as a focus of U.S. interest, Japanese

rearmament has become a major question for both the Japanese and the

Americans. U.S. ties with Australia and New Zealand have tended to loosen,

but the underlying need for cooperation in the face of future military danger

remains real. The most dramatic and positive achievement seems to be the

rapprochement with the People's Republic of China, a prime military antagonist during the Korean War. Not only are many of the questions the same or

similar, but there is still a deep perplexity over how to deal with them. How

much military strength the United States needs and how much it can afford are

as vital questions today as in 1950-53. That earlier period also illuminates the

relationship between defense policy and domestic support for the administration. For an understanding of the genesis of the national defense problems

and ideas that confront the nation today, the Korean War period is seminal.

* * * * *

This work has observed certain conventions. Abbreviations have been

used to save space; any doubts may be resolved by consulting the glossary,

although each abbreviation is explained the first time it occurs. Painstaking

efforts have been taken with statistical tables, but it is possible that they may

not agree with other tables found elsewhere. It is probably wise to view

statistical tables as indicators of effort rather than as absolutes. Every effort has

been made to avoid technical terms or to explain them at first use.

The research entailed in this undertaking was an immense task, made

easier by the help of many persons. I particularly want to thank the

resourceful and knowledgeable archivists and librarians in the Military Reference Branch of the National Archives and Records Administration, the Harry

S. Truman Library, and the Pentagon Library. In addition, a number of fellow

historians shared documents and graciously pointed the way to additional

materials. These included Roger M. Anders of the Department of Energy;

Helen M. Bailey and Walter S. Poole of the JCS Historical Division; Robert J.
vi Preface

Donovan, who made available an early draft of Tumultuous li'ars, his book

on the later Truman years; Jonathan F. Fanton, who provided his Ph.D.

dissertation on Robert A. Lovett; Lawrence S. Kaplan, who supplied documentary materials on NATO; and Forrest C. Pogue, biographer of George C.

Marshall. Nathaniel H. Goodrich, Maj. Gen. Kenneth D. Nichols, and General

George V. Underwood, Jr., furnished personal papers and manuscripts. The

papers ofJohn H. Ohly, who gave generously of his time, criticism, and wise

counsel-to the immense benefit of this project-were particularly valuable

for the military assistance chapters. The original photographer of many of the

pictures presented in the volume, Frank Hall, culled them from official

collections.

I am deeply indebted to the many government officials of the period who,

despite the burden of their daily schedules, shared their memories in

interviews with the author. They made the documentary trail come alive with

anecdotes and opinions that had never previously found their way onto paper.

I am especially grateful to Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter. General). Lawton

Collins, George M. Elsey, William C. Foster, Henry Glass, Nathaniel H.

Goodrich, W. Averell Harriman, Robert LeBaron, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,

Marx Leva, Robert A. Lovett, Wilfred). McNeil, Maj. Gen. Kenneth D. Nichols,

John H. Ohly, and General George V. Underwood, Jr. The volume leans

heavily on these first-hand accounts of events.

To the many people, both historians and former officials, who attended a

seminar on 3 April 1984 to consider an early draft of this volume, lowe much.

They included Roger M. Anders, Young-gil Chang, General). Lawton Collins,

Jonathan F. Fanton, Nathaniel H. Goodrich, Najeeb E. Halaby, General Lyman

L. Lemnitzer, Edward). Marolda, Charles Burton Marshall, Maj. Gen. Kenneth

D. Nichols, Paul H. Nitze, Forrest C. Pogue, Walter S. Poole, Steven L. Rearden,

Lt. Kenneth Schaffel, James F. Schnabel, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr. Written

comments were provided by Robert F. Futrell, Roswell L. Gilpatric, Henry E.

Glass, Walter G. Hermes, Lawrence S. Kaplan, Billy Mossman, Theodore

Tannenwald, Jr., and Wayne Thompson.

I have been the fortunate recipient of much help and support from

colleagues and friends in the OSD Historical Office. Harry B. Yoshpe, who

initiated work on Volume I in this series, was a valued friend and giver of

information. Steven L. Rearden, author of Volume I, with whom I shared many

perplexities and problems, was a constant source of useful advice and

encouragement. Richard M. Leighton and Robert). Watson, who respectively

are writing the two volumes that follow this one, have leavened friendship

with sage counsel and sensible solutions to problems. Maurice Matloff and

Max Rosenberg have read and commented helpfully on various chapters.

Samuel A. Tucker offered invaluable advice in identifying and locating files
Preface vii

and papers still within the Pentagon, as well as reading and criticizing draft

chapters. To Alice C. Cole, Stuart I. Rochester, and Roger R. Trask, I am

especially grateful for their hard work in reading and commenting on the

substance and form of the entire volume. Debora O. Langdon helped to

prepare the bibliography. Gloria M. Morgan provided much-needed and

-appreciated administrative support. To Ruth E. Sharma, whose patience and

good will were exemplary, lowe a great debt of gratitude for the careful and

precise typing of numerous drafts.

Special recognition is due two persons intimately involved with this

work. I am deeply indebted to Alfred Goldberg, OSD historian and the general

editor of this series, for the chance to write this volume, for his penetrating

and perceptive insights, and for his skill in bringing the volume to publication.

And to my husband, Kenneth W. Condit, who has borne with such grace the

cross of a second historian in the family, go my greatest thanks for his

unending patience, rectitude, and wise advice whenever I asked.

DORIS M. CONDIT
Contents

I. Prelude to War 1

The Perception of Danger 2

A Reexamination ofPolicy: NSC 68 6

A Catalyst ofDecision 10

II. The Role of the Pentagon 13

The Secretaries of the Military Departments 16

The Office of the Secretary ofDefense . 17

Preparations for War 28

First Months of War 31

September 1950: A New Team 34

III. The North Korean Attack 41

A Divided Korea 41

Combating Aggression 47

The United Nations Command 55

Finding US. Troops for Korea 58

Policy in Pursuit ofEvents 62

Defeat of the North Koreans. 65

IV. The Chinese Entry into the War 71

Ear~v Views of Chinese Intentions 71

The Northern Borders 73

Enemy Sanctuary and MacArthur's Mission 77

Continuing the UN Ground Offensive . 81

Response to Defeat. 83

The Question of a Cease-Fire 87

The Possibility of UNe Withdrawal 91

V. A Policy of Limited War 97

A New Toughness 98

Across the 38th Again 99
x Contents

Recall ofMacArthur 103

Ridgway and Military Policy 108

US. Policy Defined: NSC 48/5 111

Military Operations and Directives 113

Toward the Negotiating Table 115

VI. Fighting But Talking . 119

The Start of the Talks: An Agenda 119

A Military Demarcation Line 121

Ground Operations 124

A Challenge to Air Superiority 126

Review of US. Options in Korea 129

Item 5 133

Item 3: Concrete Arrangements 134

VII. The Prisoners of War. 139

The Major Issue-Repatriation 139

Screening, Violence, and Propaganda 145

Recessing the Negotiations 150

VIII. The Final Round. 155

The Protracted War 155

The Ammunition Problem 157

Finding Substitute Troops 161

End of the Fighting 165

IX. Formosa: A Reversal of Policy. 173

Neutralization and Assistance 174

Effects of the Chinese Intervention in Korea 177

Review of Policy: NSC 48/5 . 180

NSC 128: The Failure to Find an Offensive Mission. 183

X. Japan: A New Relationship 187

Situation in]une 1950 187

A State-Defense Agreement. 189

Effect of Chinese Intervention in Korea 190

Toward a Peace Treaty 193

Security in the Pacific . 194

Post-Treaty Problems and Policy. 197

A Start on Rearmament 200

XI. Indochina: The Threat in Southeast Asia 205

Effect of the Korean War 207

Moves to Stem the Tide 210

Policy Differences and NSC 124/2 214

Declining Fortunes 218
Contents xi

XII. A Budget for Korea-FY 1951. 223

The Basic Budget and First Supplemental. 223

The Long Term: NSC 68 227

The Second Supplemental 233

A Final Supplemental . 240

XIII. A Budget for Rearmament-FY 1952 243

The Beginnings 244

After the Chinese Intervention 245

New Service Requests 249

The Fiscal lear 1952 Budget 250

Too Much or Too Little? 254

The Outcome. 258

XlV. A Stretchout Budget-FY 1953 261

Requests for Immediate Expansion 261

The Status ofMobilization: NSC 114/1 262

New Force Levels for FY 1952 and FY 1953 265

Completing the Military Program: NSC 114/2 . 269

Lovett's FY 1953 Budget Request 273

Truman's Decision to "Stretch Out" 276

The Fight in Congress . 280

Xv. The Last Truman Budget 285

A Continuing Problem: Korean Combat Costs. 286

Status of Programs: NSC 135 290

Reappraisal of Objectives and Strategy 292

FY 1954 Estimates 295

Lovett's Review of Service Requests 297

FY 1953 Supplement and FY 1954 Budget 300

XVI. NATO: The Defense of Europe 307

NATO Organization in Mid-1950 310

Planning for NATO Defense 311

German Rearmament . 316

The New York Meeting. 320

Marshall, Moch, and the Pleven Plan 323

Deadlock and Compromise. 327

The December Meetings 332

XVII. Building a NATO Structure 337

Two Challenges to NATO 337

Organizational Adjustments 341

The 1952 Reorganization ofNATO :)44

Two New NATO Members 347

Spain and Yugoslal'ia . 353

The NATO Military Command 361
xii Contents

XVIII. Increasing NATO Strength 369

The NATO Defense "Gap" 369

Attempts to Close the Gap 373

Infrastructure Requirements 377

NATO s Military Status. 380

The German Contribution . 384

Victory, Defeat, and Resurrection 390

XIX. Organization for Military Assistance 395

Administration inJune 1950 396

Organizational Changes 400

The Mutual Security Act of 1951 404

Further Reorganization 406

Reactions in Washington 410

XX. Growth of Military Assistance. 413

Effect of the Korean War 414

Preparing a FY 1952 Request 416

The FY 1952 Appropriations 420

A Budget for FY 1953 . 424

A Proposal for FY 1954 428

XXI. Implementing Military Assistance 433

Operations through June 1951 . 434

The Quest for Deliveries in FY 1952 . 437

Battles over Priority 441

OffShore Procurement . 444

The Legacy of Military Assistance 451

XXII. OSD Nuclear Responsibilities . 455

Pentagon Arrangements 456

Exchange ofAtomic Information 458

Deployment, Custody, and Use 463

Expanding the Atomic Weapons Stockpile. 467

Development of Guided Missiles. 473

Production ofNonnuclear Components 475

The Thermonuclear Test 477

XXIII. The Search for Greater Efficiency 483

The New Inner Office . 483

Monry, Legislation, and Foreign Military Matters 485

The Importance of Manpower 488

Medical Policies 495

The Information Function . 497

National Mobilization. 498

The Munitions Board Dilemma . 501

The Research and Development Board 506
XXIV. The Civil-Military Dimension

The Military .

The Service Secretaries.

Lovett's Report on Unification

XXv. Conclusion.

Contents xiii

513

516

523

525

533

List of Abbreviations .

Notes

Note on Sources and Selected Bibliography.

Index

Charts

1. Office of Secretary of Defense, 23 May 1950

2. Channels of Command in Korea, July 1951 .

3. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, June 1950

4. NATO After April 1952 .

5. Key NATO Military Personnel, January 1952.

6. Organization for the Mutual Defense Assistance Program,

June 1950

7. U.S. Coordinating Organization for Military and Economic

Assistance, Mid-1951 .

8. U.S. Organization for Mutual Security Programs in European

NATO Countries, 1952

9. Office of Secretary of Defense, 15 October 1952.

Tables

1. Ammunition Supply

2. Strength of Forces Authorization Before and After North

Korean Invasion .

3. Development of FY 1951 Strength and Force Levels

4. FY 1951 End Strengths Authorized and Budgeted

5. FY 1951 Appropriations.

6. Development of FY 1952 Defense Budget .

7. Development of FY 1952 Strength and Force Levels

8. FY 1952 Appropriations.

9. Development of FY 1953 Strength and Force Levels

10. Development of FY 1953 Defense Budget

11. FY 1953 Basic Appropriation

12. FY 1953 Appropriations.

539

543

659

685

faces 18

118

313

346

364

398

403

408

510

160

225

238

240

241

252

255

259

278

279

283

284
xiv Contents

13. Development of FY 1954 Strength and Force Levels

14. Proposed FY 1954 Budget

15. The Gap: DC-28 Requirements Less Planned

Contributions

16. TCC/SCS Recommendations .

17. NATO Force Goals Accepted at Lisbon

18. End CY 1953 NATO Strength Goals Compared

19. FY 1952 Foreign Aid Programs

20. FY 1952 Mutual Security Appropriations

21. Defense Action on Military Assistance .

22. Korean War Expenditures as Percentage of GNP and

Total Government

Photographsjollow pages 130 and 418.

301

304

371

375

377

382

420

422

452

500
History of the Office of the Secretary ofDefense

The Test of War, 1950-1953
CHAPTER I

Prelude to War

Not quite three years had elapsed since the creation of the Department of

Defense when the North Koreans surged across the 38th parallel into South

Korea in the predawn hours of 25 June 1950 in what was to be the start of a

three-year war. In Washington it was the afternoon of 24 June, a quiet summer

Saturday. President Truman was away from the capital, visiting his family

home in Independence, Missouri; Secretary of State Dean Acheson was

relaxing at his farm in Maryland. Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson,

accompanied by General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, had returned to Washington only that morning after a visit to General

Douglas MacArthur in]apan. While Bradley, who was sick, went home to bed,

Johnson spent a few hours at the Pentagon that afternoon. Neither man was

aware of the stark act of aggression 12,000 miles away that overnight would

stir the nation from its summer doldrums. I

First word of the invasion of South Korea arrived in a United Press

bulletin from Seoul, Korea, broadcast over Station WRC in Washington at 8:49

p.m. The United Press Bureau in the capital, which had released the bulletin

to its clients, immediately queried the State Department and General Bradley

about the report, but neither knew anything. The United Press also notified

the president's Kansas City office of the event. The State Department received

the first official news in a coded cable from Ambassador John J. Muccio in

Seoul only at 9:26 p.m. 2

As reports of the North Korean onslaught reached Washington, startled

State Department and military officials on duty immediately sought further

information from Korea. Around 10:00 that evening Secretaries Acheson and

Johnson were notified; shortly after, Acheson called Truman. While the State

Department planned to seek the support of the United Nations to stop the

aggression, the Army set up a communications network to the Far East.
2 THE TEST OF WAR

Although Johnson and Bradley carried out a scheduled trip to Norfolk the

next day, they returned to confer with the president that Sunday evening in

the first of a series of meetings that would mark a major turning point in U.S.

national security policy.·~

The Perception ofDanger

The strength and constancy of the North Korean drive deep into South

Korea convinced u.s. leaders that a serious Communist challenge to the West

had begun. It was a conclusion that accorded with their perception of events

since 1945.

The Truman administration and a growing number of Americans in June

1950 saw the USSR, despite its participation on the Allied side in World War

II, as a threat to the United States and the world. As Louis Johnson told the

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations at the time, "Soviet intentions must be

judged from their actions. They do not permit complacency. ".} U.S. officials

remembered that at the end of World War II Soviet troops had occupied

Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria and that with Soviet aid local

Communist parties had soon transformed these countries into Soviet satellites.

Albania had declared itself a "people's republic" in January 1946 and joined

the Cominform in 1950. In early 1948 a Soviet-supported coup brought

Czechoslovakia into the Communist bloc. In Eastern Europe, only Yugoslavia-whose Communist government under the World War II leader Tito Oosip

Broz) had broken with the Kremlin in 1948-remained independent in 1950.

For the rest, Soviet domination was so complete that Winston Churchill's

famous reference to an "iron curtain" having descended over Eastern Europe

seemed more real than symbolic.

Efforts to extend Communist control over other adjacent non-Communist

countries had also alarmed the West. Soviet control or domination of

northern Iran was only narrowly averted in 1946. That year also Communist

guerrillas in Greece, with support from nearby Communist nations, began a

three-year war to gain control of that country. Turkey also believed itself to be

in danger. In divided Germany, where the prewar capital, Berlin, although in

the Soviet zone, was under four-power control, the Soviets imposed in

mid-1948 a complete blockade of the city's surface transportation links to the

West, making necessary an airlift to supply its western zone.

The Truman administration had also been concerned about Communist

advances in Asia. When the long civil war in China ended in late 1949 with

the defeat and flight to Formosa (Taiwan) of the Nationalist forces of Chiang
Prelude to War 3

Kai-shek Giang Jieshi)· and the victory of the Communists led by Mao

Tse-tung (Mao Zedong), the Soviets immediately tried to expel Chiang's

representative from the UN Security Council. When this effort failed, the

Soviets began a boycott of the council. On 14 February 1950 Moscow signed

a 30-year treaty of friendship, alliance, and mutual assistance with Peking. In

Malaya, the Philippines, and Indochina, widespread guerrilla warfare flared

after World War II, with Communist support or leadership of these movements. A new government in Indonesia seemed vulnerable to a Communist

takeover. In North Korea a Communist government tried by propaganda,

provocation, and guerrilla tactics to subvert the unstable non-Communist

government in South Korea. Indeed, Defense Secretary Johnson told two

congressional committees in early June 1950 that he considered the problems

in the area of China even more difficult than those of Europe. 6

Although the postwar perception of the Soviet Union as an unfriendly

adversary rather than an ally had been gradually accepted by most Americans,

they hoped that the United Nations would be able to maintain international

order in the face of this potential menace, sparing the United States large

military commitments. President Truman, pushing to balance the budget and

reduce the huge wartime debt and worried about the possibility of inflation

stemming from the pent-up demand for consumer goods, pursued a policy of

retrenchment. As a result, the U.S. armed forces, which had reached a peak

strength of 12 million during World War II, were hastily demobilized and

defense appropriations were radically trimmed. 7

The Truman programs to counter Soviet moves were generally reactive

and preventive but constituted a significant expansion of the American

concept of security. In early 1947, when the United States took over from a

nearly bankrupt United Kingdom the responsibility for helping Greece and

Turkey to stand against Communist pressures, Truman announced a doctrine

of aid to countries threatened by such aggression. The United States supplied

economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey and sent a military mission to

Greece. In June 1947 Secretary of State George C. Marshall publicly offered

U.S. aid to help restore the economies of wartorn Europe, including the Soviet

Union and the Eastern bloc countries in his proposal. The Soviets, however,

forced the Poles and Czechs to withdraw their acceptances, an act that British

Prime Minister Clement AttIee later called a "declaration of the 'cold war'."

With the 1948 crises in Czechoslovakia and Berlin at hand, Congress

appropriated more than $6 billion for worldwide assistance, earmarking $4

billion in Marshall Plan funds for the Western European nations.s

• Chinese names are spelled as they appear in documents of the time; the pinyin system of

transliteration is given in parentheses after the first appearance of the name.
4 THE TEST OF WAR

Alarmed by the unsettled international situation, the United States took a

bold and unprecedented peacetime step, signing on 4 April 1949 the North

Atlantic Treaty, a 12-nation mutual defense pact. In July 1949 Congress

approved the treaty and later appropriated $1.3 billion for military assistance,

of which $1 billion was for Europe. It also approved $5.7 billion for economic

aid, including more than $4.7 billion for the Marshall Plan countries. By

mid-1950, however, despite this assistance, Western European economies still

lagged behind their prewar levels. Moreover, the weak state of NATO defenses

lent credence to the widely held view that a Soviet attack on Western Europe

would achieve substantial early success.')

Having successfully countered Communist moves in Iran, Berlin, and

Greece, the Truman administration kept U.S. forces at a modest strength.

Determined to payoff the $247 billion public debt and balance the government's books, Truman held the total Pentagon request for FY 1949, covering

1 July 1948 through 30 June 1949, to $13.2 billion in new obligational

authority; when Congress added $822 million for extra Air Force procurement, the president refused to spend the money. In early 1949 Truman limited

the FY 1950 Department of Defense (DoD) request to $14.3 billion in new

obligational authority, overriding military protests that the amount would not

support even current strength levels and the plea of Secretary of Defense

James Forrestal for at least $16.9 billion. 10 Replacing Forrestal with Louis A.

Johnson in the spring of 1949, Truman reduced the military budget ceiling for

FY 1951 to $13 billion and, even after the successful Soviet atomic explosion

in August 1949, raised the request to only $13.4 billion. When Congress

appropriated $14.35 billion for FY 1951, including $851 million extra for the

Air Force, Truman impounded the extra money. These sums, small when

compared with World War II budgets, were still huge by prewar standards; in

any case, Truman had no intention of allowing the United States to "default

through bankruptcy." Neither had the Congress. Prior to June 1950 there

developed no congressional groundswell for any major increase in military

spending. I I

As a result of Truman's actions, U.S. troop levels remained low, although

far higher than before World War II. In 1947 Truman had advocated allowing

the draft to lapse, but the Czechoslovakian and Berlin crises of 1948 led him

to ask for a new Selective Service Act of two years' duration, making 19-

through 25-year-old men liable for 21 months' service and setting the

maximum strength of U.S. armed forces at slightly over 2 million, a historic

high for peacetime. The president's attempt to secure universal military

training, however, proved highly unpopular and he eventually withdrew the

proposal. In mid-1950 total U.S. military strength approximated 1,460,000.

Although Johnson claimed in March that the Army was "stronger today than
Prelude to War 5

at any time since the end of the war," all but 1 of its 10 divisions were

understrength and lacking in equipment. Defending an administration request

for a three-year extension of the draft in early June 1950, Johnson pointed to

the need to maintain a position of readiness and an alert posture because of

international tensions, the Soviet atomic explosion, and the aggressive behavior of the Soviet Union. 12

The administration's reluctance to embrace a large U.S. military buildup

despite the troubled state of the world reflected its belief that a large

rearmament program might be provocative, that it would undoubtedly have

inflationary effects, and that the U.S. atomic monopoly could offset Soviet

strength in conventional forces. When the USSR exploded its own atomic

device in August 1949, in advance of most predictions, the U.S. monopoly

ended. 13 Apprehension about the pace of Soviet nuclear development

mounted in late January 1950, when the British government informed the

Truman administration that it planned to charge Dr. Klaus Fuchs, a Germanborn nuclear physicist working in the British atomic program, as a Soviet

agent. Because Fuchs had had access to U.S. information on nuclear weapons-including a theoretically possible fusion or hydrogen bomb believed to

be far more powerful than the atomic bomb-Washington officials worried

about the extent of his revelations and the possibility that the Soviet nuclear

program might be more advanced than they had previously thought. 14

The Fuchs crisis, which broke publicly on 2 February 1950, occurred at

a time of growing fear in the United States over Communist subversion. Trials

of persons accused of subversive activities or spying for the Soviets had

already occurred. After Secretary of State Acheson publicly defended Alger

Hiss, a former State Department official who was convicted in January 1950

of perjury concerning his Communist connections, many believed the government to be riddled with Communists. This fear provided the lightning rod

for vicious political attacks on Acheson and on administration policies; many

persons linked "communism in government" with the "loss of China" to Mao

Tse-tung. Acheson fought the demands of the congressional "China Lobby"

for U.S. aid to Chiang Kai-shek to help him regain the mainland. Republican

Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin became a national figure by manipulating fears of an internal Communist threat; other Republican leaders,

including Ohio Sen. Robert A. Taft, supported or tolerated McCarthy's attacks

on the Truman administration. In Congress the bipartisan approach to foreign

policy faltered, and Truman remained vulnerable to the charge of being "soft

on communism" for the rest of his term in office. IS

On 31 January 1950, Truman took two important steps in response to the

new Soviet atomic capability. First, he ordered development of a thermonuclear bomb to the testing stage. Second, he directed the secretaries ofstate and
6 THE TEST OF WAR

defense to reexamine U.S. objectives and plans in the light of the Soviet atomic

breakthrough. After Fuchs's arrest, Johnson in late February urged the

president to "proceed forthwith on an all-out program" to develop the

H-bomb, including the means for its production and delivery. Although

appalled by the costs, Truman on 10 March declared the project of the

"highest urgency" and ordered planning for production should the H-bomb

prove feasible. On 8 June he approved construction of a facility that could

produce material needed for the H-bomb but which would also be useful for

expansion of the A-bomb program should the H-bomb fail. He had not yet

made up his mind about the policy review that he had ordered, now known

as NSC 68. 16

A Reexamination ofPolicy: NSC 68

The men who prepared NSC 68 included Paul H. Nitze, director of the

State Department's Policy Planning Staff, who chaired the group; Maj. Gen.

Truman H. Landon (USAF), who represented the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Maj.

Gen. (USA Ret.) James H. Burns, who represented Secretary Johnson. l

: In

February 1950, during the course of the review group's work, George F.

Kennan-one of the State Department's Russian experts, and at the time the

department's counselor-in a paper for Acheson expressed doubt that the

cold war had "suddenly taken some drastic turn to our disadvantage." He felt

that current U.S. policies were generally valid, although military emphases

were disproportionately prominent, and advocated ending U.S. strategic

dependence on the atomic weapon, even if this meant "a state of semimobilization, involving some form of compulsory military service and drastic

measures to reduce the exorbitant costs of national defense." III

In the end, NSC 68 presented an alarming view of the international scene.

It pictured the Soviet leadership as intent on retaining absolute power in all

areas under its control, extending its authority and eliminating effective

opposition, dominating the Eurasian land mass, and subverting or destroying

its principal enemy, the United States. Possessing an atomic capability in

addition to conventional armed forces far larger than required to defend their

national borders, the Soviets commanded a "great coercive power for use in

time of peace." While the Soviets probably did not "intend deliberate armed

action involving the United States at this time," NSC 68 observed that war

could still occur through miscalculation or misinterpretation. 1'.1

The Joint Chiefs judged that if war began in 1950 Soviet forces would

probably overrun most of Western Europe, drive toward the oil regions of the

Middle East, consolidate their gains in the Far East, strike by air against the
Prelude to War 7

United Kingdom, launch air and sea attacks in the Atlantic and Pacific, and use

atomic weapons on selected targets. Looking ahead, the study forecast that

conditions would deteriorate still further; u.s. intelligence estimated that the

Soviets might possess 10 to 20 atomic bombs by mid-1950 and a stockpile of

200 by mid-1954. The year 1954 was therefore a critical date, since "delivery

of 100 atomic bombs on targets in the United States would seriously damage

this country." 20

NSC 68 emphasized that for the United States to "survive and flourish" it

needed to maintain a healthy international community and contain the Soviet

system "by all means short of war." This required reducing Soviet control and

influence and forcing Soviet adherence to generally accepted standards of

international behavior. NSC 68 expressed the fear that, without sufficient

military strength to guarantee national security and make containment credible, the United States would be reduced to a "policy of bluff." The report

viewed the current U.S. atomic superiority as a mixed blessing, since a

successful atomic strike on the Soviet Union probably would not cause the

USSR to surrender or prevent it from occupying Western Europe, while use of

atomic weapons might prove "morally corrosive" to the American people and

at best only gain time to develop general military superiority. "The risks we

face," NSC 68 averred, "are of a new order of magnitude. ,,21

Considering how to meet the Soviet threat, NSC 68 rejected three

options-continuance of the current situation, reversion to a policy of

isolation, or resort to preventive war. Rather, it recommended building up the

free world's political, economic, and military strength, including conventional U.S. forces, to a level sufficient to support foreign commitments and

protect against disaster. If war could be avoided, such military strength would

allow renewed political and economic initiatives. Above all, NSC 68 stressed,

the United States must complete its military buildup while it still possessed a

powerful atomic deterrent. 22

To a large extent NSC 68 reaffirmed the conclusions that Kennan had

drafted for NSC 20/4, approved in 1948. Like the earlier report, NSC 68 held

that, short of war, the United States should seek to reduce Soviet power and

influence in perimeter areas and encourage satellite independence, foster

attitudes among the Soviet people that might modify Soviet governmental

behavior, and create situations to compel acceptable Soviet behavior in the

international arena. In peacetime, the United States should develop a deterrent

military readiness that could be maintained indefinitely, assure the nation's

internal security, maximize its economic potential, increase where possible

the economic and political stability and military capability of non-Soviet

nations and strengthen their pro-U.S. orientation, place maximum strain on

the Soviet power structure, and inform the American public of the threat. 2:\
8 THE TEST OF WAR

The major difference between NSC 68 and NSC 20/4 was the degree of

military buildup envisioned. Whereas NSC 20/4 had felt that the risk was

sufficient to "warrant, in common prudence, timely and adequate preparation," NSC 68 found it "imperative" to have a "much more rapid and

concerted build-up" of U.S. and free world strength. Compared with current

defense budget ceilings in the neighborhood of $13 billion, Nitze's group

privately believed that it might require annual defense budgets of $40 billion

to thwart the Soviet design for world domination. Short of war, this policy

was to "force the Kremlin to abandon its present course of action and to

negotiate acceptable agreements on issues of major importance." NSC 68

stressed the achievement of U.S. objectives by the "strategy of the cold war,

building up our military strength in order that it may not have to be used.,,24

Secretary johnson undoubtedly agreed with the NSC 68 delineation of the

Soviet threat, but its emphasis on large-scale rearmament was unpleasant news

to a man staking his political reputation on military economy. At a stormy

meeting with Acheson on 22 March, johnson complained of not having had

sufficient time to read and digest the report and irascibly asserted that at the

moment he would agree to "nothing" in the study draft. When the document

was completed, Acheson signed it but doubted that johnson would do so. In

the Pentagon, however, the departmental secretaries and the joint Chiefs

endorsed the report before it reached johnson. The secretary scratched his

signature across the page, and NSC 68 went to Truman on 7 April. Five days

later Truman referred it to the National Security Council. He wanted to know

the implications of the study's conclusions, the specific programs envisioned,

and, most importantly, their cost. 2';

Prior to the North Korean attack, johnson and Truman had their qualms

about NSC 68. They were not alone. Even before the paper went to the

president, an assistant secretary of state questioned the economic assumptions, arguing that the military balance was actually tilting toward the United

States and that the nation's economic capacity far surpassed that of the

Soviets. He feared that a large-scale military effort might bring on a depression

and a national "disaster." Another assistant secretary of state believed that the

public would react negatively to a huge arms race and predicted that the

country would tire of the effort. 2(, Charles E. Bohlen-like Kennan an

experienced hand in dealing with the Soviets and currently at the U.S.

embassy in Paris-thought the Soviet regime's primary objective was to

maintain itself in power, extending its ascendency abroad only when it could

be done without risk. Pointing out that the U.S. atomic monopoly had not

deterred Soviet aggressiveness, Bohlen questioned whether a conventional

military buildup would do so or, indeed, whether a start toward rearmament

might not, at least initially, "hamper rather than help in the cold war."
Prelude to War 9

Drawing back from the prospect of large-scale military expenditures, he

suggested greater emphasis on the research and development of new

weapons. 27 Later in April, Ambassador Alan G. Kirk cabled from Moscow that

although the Soviet regime was "steering a course as close as possible to

full-scale war short of actually precipitating it," he believed that the Kremlin

was unready for global war and would avoid a showdown until it attained

"overwhelming superiority of force. ,,2H

An NSC ad hoc committee that included representatives from seven

agencies in addition to State and Defense addressed the questions about NSC

68 programs and costs. Johnson designated General Bradley and General

Burns to represent Defense. 29 Meeting for the first time on 2 May, the

committee soon discovered that its 11 members had almost as many opinions

about NSC 68. The Council of Economic Advisers thought the U.S. economy

could sustain substantial new programs but would be limited by major

economic and social problems. The National Security Resources Board,

considering it possible that the Soviets might attack before 1954, wanted a

strong civil defense program and an increase in its strategic materials stockpile

objective from $3.8 billion to $6 billion. The Bureau of the Budget representative, on the other hand, questioned the NSC 68 estimate of Soviet strength,

the existence of a military gap, and the Soviets' ability or intent to strike in

1954. He suggested that a large-scale u.S. mobilization would become

increasingly costly and be "tantamount to notifying Russia that we intended to

press war in the near future. ".30

Unsurprised by the disparate views of the NSC ad hoc group, Johnson

directed the Pentagon to develop and cost a military program. On 25 May he

asked the JCS to estimate the military requirements for NSC 68 and the

anticipated military deficiencies if current programs were kept constant. He

also asked the Defense comptroller to calculate the cost of remedying both

U.S. and foreign equipment deficiencies. The secretary further requested a

Defense-wide analysis of a military buildup for the years 1951-55. Although

Johnson wrote that the NSC 68 costing studies were of "urgent importance,"

he directed that they not interfere with the regular budget process. Meeting

with high Pentagon officials on 7 June 1950, Johnson said that he did not

consider it sound to try to reach maximum military strength by 1954; rather,

he thought it only realistic to assume that the president would hold the FY

1952 military budget ceiling to approximately $13 billion. 31

Still unapproved on the eve of the Korean War, NSC 68 delineated more

completely than ever before the broad post-World War II concept of national

security that would dominate American policy. Between 1945 and 1950 the

United States had given evidence of its expanded national security horizons

through its policies and actions in many areas of the world-Iran in 1946,
10 THE TEST OF WAR

Greece and Turkey in 1947, the Middle East in 1948, Germany and the Berlin

airlift in 194R-49. The North Korean assault in June 1950 immediately

presented the Truman administration with the fateful choice of whether or not

to go to war to prevent the extension of Communist power by force of arms.

A decision to act would translate the national security concept expressed in

NSC 68 into policy and action on an unprecedented scale and further commit

the United States to its expanded global role.

A Catalyst oj Decision

When the North Koreans attacked on 25 June, the president did not yet

have answers to his request for specific programs and costs. Subsequent

conjecture has provided no clear answer as to whether or to what extent the

NSC 68 conclusions would have been implemented had the Korean War not

occurred.' Before Korea the secretary of defense apparently did not consider

a sizeable military buildup likely, especially not in the immediate future. But

the North Korean invasion made Johnson's position untenable.

Flying back from Independence, Missouri, on Sunday, 25 June 1950,

Truman vividly recalled the events that had led to World War II, remembering,

as he later wrote, "how each time that the democracies failed to act it had

encouraged the aggressors to keep going ahead." Certain that a North Korean

success would embolden Communist leaders to attack countries even closer to

the United States, and that "no small nation would have the courage to resist,"

Truman feared that any failure to react would ultimately mean "a third world

war, just as similar incidents had brought on the second world war." In

Europe, indeed, U.S. allies feared that they might be next. As one British

member of Parliament later put it, people "almost universally assumed that

Korea exemplified a new Soviet technique of war by proxy which might be

applied at any moment somewhere in Europe. ",2

The North Korean attack brought about a growing consensus within the

U.S. government. "For the first time," one official remembered, "there was a

judgment at the top level of government that the Soviet Union might be ready

to resort to overt military aggression outside of Eastern Europe." As Acheson

testified before a congressional committee on 2 August 1950, the assault on

South Korea served "notice ... that the international Communist movement

• The administration's efforts to implement "iSC 6H following the start of the Korean War are

dealt with in Chapters XII through xv. Dean Acheson (Present at the Creation, 374) later doubted

that "anything like what happened in the next few years could have heen done had not the

Russians heen stupid enough to instigate the attack against South Korea and opened the 'hate

America' campaign."
Prelude to War 11

will use ... the force of arms to achieve its purposes." Johnson also repeated

the warning, claiming that the true significance of the North Korean attack

was that the Communists acted even at the "risk ofstarting a third world war. "

For the three-year-old Department of Defense, the North Korean invasion

presented a first challenge to a great trial by arms. -"
CHAPTER II

The Role of the Pentagon

To meet the North Korean challenge in June 1950, the United States had

to rely on a Department of Defense that was still in an embryonic stage. The

stormy battles of the early years of unification had abated, even if all the

wounds had not yet healed, but strong-willed interservice competition for

men, money, weapons, and missions still persisted, as did some forms of

resistance by the military services to the authority of the secretary of defense

and OSD. Still, the role of the secretary of defense within the national security

structure had been more completely delineated, and Louis Johnson had

achieved much greater success than James Forrestal in imposing the secretary's

authority on the Pentagon. Soon the imperative demands of war would call

forth a larger measure of unity and cooperation from the services.

The military establishment that undertook the direction of the Korean

War in mid-1950 had been shaped by the National Security Act of 1947 and its

1949 amendments. At its head, the secretary of defense functioned as the

president's principal assistant in all matters relating to the Department of

Defense; his most important powers derived from his control of the military

budgets. The 1949 amendments had further enhanced the power of the

secretary by eliminating an earlier provision that powers not specifically

granted to the secretary of defense should be retained by the service

secretaries. Moreover, the service secretaries had lost their status as Cabinet

members and their places on the National Security Council (NSC). Thus, the

Department of Defense was the only executive department in the Pentagon,

and its secretary the only Cabinet-level official and NSC member. Finally, the

amendments had created the post of deputy secretary and authorized three

presidentially appointed assistant secretaries. I

Although the secretary of defense exercised "direction, authority, and

control" over the departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force, his authority was

13
14 THE TEST OF WAR

still limited by the law's provision that they were to be separately administered

by their respective secretaries. The secretary of defense could not transfer,

reassign, abolish, or consolidate the services' combatant functions without

specific congressional approval; nor could he impair their functions through

control of military personnel or expenditure of funds. No longer able to report

directly to the president or the director of the budget, the service secretaries

had the legal right, after first informing the secretary of defense, to go directly

to Congress with any "proper" recommendation. The law specifically denied

the secretary of defense the right to establish a military staff other than the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, although military personnel could serve as his assistants

or aides.

In addition to the Department of Defense and the Department of State,

the national security structure included three other major organizations

created by the National Security Act of 1947. At the top of the structure, the

president chaired the National Security Council, an interdepartmental body

with four other statutory members in 1950-the secretary of defense, the vice

president, the secretary of state, and the chairman of the National Security

Resources Board (NSRB). Established to advise the president on coordinating

the military, industrial, and civilian mobilization in time of war, NSRB had as

its chairman in mid-1950 W. Stuart Symington, the former secretary of the Air

Force, and included the heads or representatives of such executive departments and independent agencies as the president designated, including the

secretary of defense. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), created to

coordinate U.S. intelligence activities, reported to the NSC; its director usually

attended council meetings.

One of the goals in creating the new national security structure had been

to bring a large, unwieldy, and technologically complex military establishment within an organizational framework readily amenable to control by the

president as commander in chief and by Congress. A single overall department, with a secretary of defense reporting to the president and responsive to

Congress, constituted a major step toward this end. Anticipating these

changes, Congress had revamped its own committee structure early in 1947,

replacing in each house the separate committees on military and naval affairs

with a single committee on armed services. As a result, the military departments had to defend their authorization requests before the same committees

in the House and Senate. In 1949 the House and Senate appropriations

committees combined their military and naval subcommittees into single

defense subcommittees and dealt with the first unified military budget, that

for FY 1950. Looking back, General J. Lawton Collins, Army chief of staff

from 1949 to 1953, felt that the unification of the congressional committees

was "possibly the best thing that ever happened to achieve real service

unification.' >2
The Role of the Pentagon 15

Louis A. Johnson, big, energetic, aggressive, and flamboyant, by training

and practice a lawyer and politician, presided over the Pentagon as secretary

of defense in June 1950. Remembered by one close subordinate as a man who

would "call a spade a damn shovel," Johnson made few real friends among his

new associates at 000. His Air Force secretary later observed that he was

"pretty arrogant with everybody except the President.,,3 Having served as

assistant secretary of war from 1937 to 1940,Johnson possessed experience in

military matters, but he probably owed his appointment in March 1949 to his

strong political connections and fundraising services on behalf of Truman's

1948 presidential campaign. Obviously ambitious, Johnson apparently

thought that the Defense post might serve as a steppingstone to the presidency; he intended to leave his mark on the Pentagon. As one Truman

biographer later wrote, ". . . Louis Johnson, two hundred pounds of power,

competence, acerbity, wile, and bumptiousness, hit the Pentagon like a

thunderstorm." Johnson took over for his own use the somewhat more

imposing offices occupied by the secretary of the army. Enthusiastically

embracing the lowered defense spending decreed by Truman and determined

to impose order on the military services and end their divisive fighting,

Johnson moved within a month of his arrival to cancel construction of the

Navy's $100 million supercarrier USS United States and to support the

building of B-36 bombers for the Air Force, thus doubly offending the Navy. 4

Not only did Johnson move quickly in 1949 to establish control over the

military services, but he sought to ensure control over DoD relationships with

other departments, notably the Department of State. To prevent what he

considered "end runs" by the services, Johnson consolidated within his own

office State-Defense liaison concerning "major matters of interest within the

politico-military field," an arrangement that Acheson and the State Department considered obstructive. State-Defense relations were strongly affected

by the intense aversion that Johnson and Acheson felt for each other. 5

Moreover, the two men disagreed on policy matters: Acheson viewed Europe

as indispensable to the security of the United States; Johnson advocated a

policy that emphasized Asia and, particularly, support for non-Communist

Asian governments such as Chiang's Nationalist regime on Formosa. 6 After the

March 1950 blowup between the two men over NSC 68, Acheson made no

secret of his disdain for Johnson. His conduct, Acheson felt, was "too

outrageous to be explained by mere cussedness"; he became convinced that

Johnson was mentally ill. While publicly both men denied the feud, the reality

was quite different. 7

The only person in the Pentagon reputed to be able to "talk turkey" to

Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Stephen T. Early, had been press

secretary to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, special assistant to President

Truman, and vice president of Pullman, Inc., before coming to the Pentagon
16 THE TEST OF WAR

in the spring of 1949. Early provided Johnson with political and personal

advice and was generally well liked in the Pentagon. One service secretary

called him a "superb human being," and Johnson publicly stated that Early

was a source of "great consolation, strength and guidance" who made the

secretary's own job more bearable.s

The Secretaries of the Military Departments

The role of the service secretaries under Johnson declined both because

ofthe 1949 amendments to the National Security Act and Johnson's direct and

forceful exercise of authority. During the less than 18 months of his incumbency there were three secretaries of the Army and two secretaries each of the

Air Force and Navy-a total of seven. Four secretaries resigned during the first

13 months of Johnson's tenure. The first Army secretary, Kenneth C. Royall,

resigned in April 1949, shortly after Johnson arrived. When the Navy

secretary, John L. Sullivan, left in May, there followed a major, Navy-inspired

congressional investigation of allegations against Johnson and the Air Force

and the eventual ouster of Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Louis E. Denfeld.

In April 1950 Air Force Secretary W. Stuart Symington, whose relations with

Johnson had become increasingly rancorous, departed from the Pentagon.

That same month Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray, who had replaced

Royall only a year earlier, also resigned. Although one or two of these

resignations were apparently in the making before Johnson's arrival, it may be

inferred that the high incidence of departures was a measure of Johnson's

generally troubled relationship with his service secretaries. 9

As a result of the shuffling, two of the secretaries of the military

departments were new on the job when the Korean War broke out in June

1950. Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., not quite 38 years old and the

youngest of the three secretaries, previously had been director of the Bureau

of the Budget. He became the third secretary of the Army on 12 April 1950,

a mere eight years after entering the Army as a second lieutenant during World

War II. As budget director, Pace had worked directly with President Truman

and, as one Defense official recalled, seemed "strong as horseradish, just as

firm as anybody could be." Potentially, Pace had influential sources of

support, but in June 1950 he was still finding his way and learning his

Pentagon job. 10

Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews, a 63-year-old banker, lawyer,

and corporation executive from Nebraska, was in June 1950 the oldest

military secretary in age and service. As a friend of Louis Johnson and a loyal

Democrat who had helped Truman in the 1948 presidential campaign,
The Role of the Pentagon 17

Matthews possessed solid political credentials but had little knowledge of

Navy affairs when he assumed office on 25 May 1949. Viewed as an outsider

and often referred to as a "rowboat secretary," presumably in reference to his

Nebraska origins, Matthews was immediately caught up in Johnson's cancellation of the Navy's supercarrier and went through a difficult and damaging

fight leading to Admiral Denfeld's departure. It was Matthews who in the fall

of 1949 recommended as the new chief of naval operations Admiral Forrest P.

Sherman-a man who was to be widely admired for returning the Navy to an

even keel. Matthews' biographer judged that he had become an "average"

secretary by June 1950 but had irretrievably lost the Navy's confidence. 11

When Matthews left in mid-1951, Dan A. Kimball, under secretary in June

1950 and reputed to have the "knack of getting along with nearly everyone,"

took his place. Knowledgeable about Navy matters, Kimball was an advocate

of the supercarrier and sympathetic to the admirals' position in the 1949

fight. During the Korean War he saw to it that the Navy got a new start on

supercarriers. Moreover, in recommending Admiral William M. Fechteler as

the new chief of naval operations to replace Admiral Sherman, who died

suddenly in June 1951, Kimball judiciously chose a man who had not been

involved in the "Revolt of the Admirals." A strong leader, Kimball gained

credit, along with Sherman, for restoring Navy confidence and maintaining its

integrity. 12

Thomas K. Finletter, second Secretary of the Air Force, was a 56-year-old

lawyer who had been picked by Truman over Johnson's objections. Sworn in

on 24 April 1950, Finletter had served as a special assistant to the secretary of

state in 1941-44, as chairman of the president's Air Policy Commission in

1947-48, and as minister in charge of the Economic Cooperation Administration Mission to the United Kingdom in 1948-49. Regarded as cold in

manner but highly intelligent and an "independent thinker," Finletter was

already a vigorous advocate of air power. 13

The Office of the Secretary ofDefense

To assist him in overseeing the service secretaries and their departments,

Johnson relied on the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), which,

generally speaking, encompassed all those Defense offices and agencies not

part of the three military departments. Many OSD elements were prescribed

by law: the secretary of defense and deputy secretary; the three assistant

secretaries, of whom one was the comptroller; the Munitions Board (MB), the

Research and Development Board (RDB), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff OCS)-

each with a chairman; and an Armed Forces Policy Council (AFPC). The
18 THE TEST OF WAR

Military Liaison Committee (MLC) to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC),

which had a statutory chairman, had heen created by the Atomic Energy Act

of 1946 and its amendment. The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949

created a statutory position in OSD that was used for the position of assistant

to the secretary of defense for foreign military affairs and military assistance. 14

Four organizations within OSD had been established by the defense

secretary rather than by statute: the Personnel Policy Board, the Civilian

Components Policy Board, the Office of Medical Services, and the Office of

Public Information. In addition, johnson's executive secretary, his special

assistants, the Staff Council, and the Management Council were nonstatutory

entities directly attached to the secretary's immediate office.

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARIES

Expecting to rely heavily on the three assistant secretaries of defense

provided by the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act, johnson

retained men who had been Forrestal's assistants to fill two of these important

new posts. Wilfred). McNeil, a wartime naval reserve officer who had risen to

flag rank and had been Forrestal's long-time associate, was the OSD comptroller, with the rank of assistant secretary. Marx Leva, a lawyer and wartime

naval officer who had been Forrestal's loyal assistant, became johnson's

assistant secretary of defense for legal and legislative affairs. To become

assistant secretary for administrative and public affairs, johnson brought in a

fellow member of the American Legion and old friend, Paul H. Griffith, who

had served previously in the War Department. I';

The OSD comptroller's office in mid-1950 had four divisions headed by

men handpicked by McNeil. As assistant and later deputy comptroller for

budget and McNeil's deputy for day-to-day operations, Lyle A. Garlock played

an important role, his competence and effectiveness allOWing McNeil to be the

"outside man." Below these division heads McNeil had a number of able and

spirited younger men on whom he relied for ideas and first-hand reporting.

McNeil and his staff of I 00 in mid-1950 helped make the secretary of defense

an increasingly potent force throughout the department. 16

A McNeil initiative that proved invaluable during the Korean War-Title

IV of the 1949 amendments-gave the secretary of defense the power to

control the rates and amounts of obligation of service funds and to require the

services to set up uniform budgetary and fiscal procedures. To reorganize the

handling of common-user items and common-service industrial- or

commercial-type facilities, Title IV also empowered the secretary of defense

to require the services to establish working capital funds. The new system in
CHAAT 1

OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

23 MAY 1118

I I

I

L

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 1 Hun. Louis JohnIon 3£110 .,

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE I~ "''' Hun. Stephen T. E..-Jy 3£121 1352 i t

-l I

Chief Historian R. A. Winnacker

SPECIAL ASSISTANTS

Brig. Gen. Louis H. Renfrow 3£880 23n James C. Evans 3£842 2431

I

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Execulive Secretary Maj. Gen. Leven C. Allen 3E925 6492 Assistants Col. Kennelh R. Kreps 3E925 74032 Capt. Jack Hottwic:k, Jr., ISH

3E925 5098

3A938 74216

I

ftfAW COUNCIL

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1

MANAGEMENT toMMrtT&E

GIna ...... T. ~75255

~f *575351 "'l. . 3M1S 75351

~=-- r-=r 75351

ARMED FORCES POLICY COUNCIL

::=(~:'r,.:l.cm:=:)

I

ASSISTANT SECRETARY (ADMINISTRATIVE AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

Han. Paul H. Griffith 3£880 2334

Director of Administration Ralph N. Stohl 30920 5104 AssIstant for Administration J. Robert Loftis 3C822 73111 D1r., OrganIzation & Methods Div. J. W. C'" .,8 n261 Dlr.,~&FlnarceDiv.

J. RobIrt Loftis 3C917 74466 Dlr.,PtrsonneIDiv.

John S. Mayfield 38913 73723 Dlr., OffIce5ervlcesDiv.

DI~~ M. Acting 3C916 3144

Lt. Col. ~udt D. Barton 3C93& 71201

AssistantforAdminlstratiYe~ 5tvSidney K. Rubenstein, 3735

Assistant for Interdepartmental Administrative 5ervices Raymond J. Hayden 3C878 n241 Secretary, Armed Forces & Staff CouncIls TownSend W. Hoopes 30919 6241 Civil Defense Liaison Officer Lt. Col. Barnet W. Beers 38879 73271

I

AS:~~T~~I:;~~~A:F~l~~~)AL

Hon. Marx Leva 3E970 4351

General Counsel Felix Larkin 3E970 71626 Associate General Counsel Nathaniel H. Goodrich 3E854 74090 John G. Adams 3E967 4131 Director. Dfflce of Legislative Liaison R. Adm. Harold A. Houser, USN

3E956 6431

~'?J~~~. USA 3E9n 4717 Brig. Gen. R. E. Eaton. USAF3D968 5007

I I I

AS8I8TAHT SECRETARY (COMPTAOI.L£A)

Hun. W. J. MilNII 3£. 3237

:i:!=0lil far "=0 71101 ='I'fat 3C7I1 3147

~~Engi".... 5166

~~FoIl. AdamI 3C858 76107

If

ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY (FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE)

MIl. Gen. (A.t) JImn H. Burna

3£824 6273

DirIc:tor,OffIcIofforliGnMllltaryAssistanee

Maj. Gen. Lyman LermitZlr30933 73331

~~ofForeion~A~r~

I I DIRECTOR Vacancy 2E8OO 71346

OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

oew:rts 2E8OO 71311 Asst to the Director

Brig. Gen. A. Robt. Gin~, 71084

News Division Osgood Roberts 2E8OO 71311 Public Relations DIvision Lt. Col. D. T. Jones, Act. 2E780 75737

DIRECTOR Dr. Richard L. MeiIIng 3E988 5971

OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES

Chairman. Advisory Committee Charles P. Cooper 30967 n433

CHAIRMAN Edwin H. Burgess 3C961 75253

CIVILIAN COMPONENTS POLICY BOARD

Execulive Officer R. Adm. I. M. McOuiston3C961 75253

CHAIRMAN J. Thomas Schneider 3A918 75201

PERSONNEL POLICY BOARD

Director of Staff Vice Adm. John L. McCrea 3A918 74222 Deputy Director of Staff • CIviIan Personnel Leon L. Wheeless 3A886 5348 Deputy Director of Staff • MIlItary Personnel 8riO. Gen. John H. McCormlcI(

3A878 74166 Chief, A. F.lnformation & Education DIv.

Maj. Gen. Wm. K. Harri~ 4782

CHAIRMAN Hubert E. Howard 3Ea 5254

MUNITIONS BOARD

DIrector of Staff Maj. Gen. PatrIck W. TImberlake. USAF 3E810 71183

DIrectorofProduc:llon~.ActinO

Maj. Gen. A. B. Quinton, 3Ei26USA72711

DI~~~~~~~ 72691

CHAIRMAN RobIrtI.t8aRJR ... 751'1

:i'l~=8~

~. Gen. KInneIh D.•USA

rt:'T~H:~ bTl' USA R. Adm. R1IIph A. Ofstle, USN

=: t: =.cEy~r:f6

CHAIRMAN WIIam Webster 3£1000 3400

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD

Ex~AobIrt 3E1ooo 3737

or:..~ 3E1014 3637 DirIctor,~DlvtIion

Dr. S. D. ComIlI 3£1036 2126 OI:rO,r DIvlsion,~ 3804

CHAIRMAN Gen. Ornar Bradley 2£873 71321

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DIrector of the Joint Staff R. Adm. Arthur D. Davis, USN

2£928 6275 Secrelary,JointChiefsofStaff

Capt. Wm. G. Lalor, USN 2E928 72700

Di~~~=. S.r:~lval. Group

2£1000 78335
The Role of the Pentagon 19

effect created a business relationship among the various services, each one

making purchases just as in the civilian economy. McNeil felt that the

establishment of such a purchaser-seller relationship would improve Defense

functioning and lower costS.1 7

By inclination and training careful with both his own and government

money, McNeil enjoyed success in dealing with Congress, particularly the

members of the appropriations subcommittees. Congenial, candid, and upright, McNeil had earned widespread congressional respect and friendship

while playing an important role under Forrestal. After some initial doubt,

Johnson understood that this Forrestal holdover was a natural to aid in a

Defense economy program. In turn, McNeil's own opinion of Johnson

improved as time went by. Looking back later, McNeil thought that within six

months of coming into office Johnson had started to do "a pretty good job"

although his grandstanding tendencies "probably diminished his stature." Iii

Whereas McNeil was generally held in high esteem, Griffith as assistant

secretary for administrative and public affairs had difficulty earning respect

for his performance. Some OSD colleagues felt that his principal role was as

Johnson's "intimate buddy" and "personal troubleshooter." Johnson himself

praised Griffith's "loyalty, integrity, and ability." Under Griffith a staff of 150,

headed by a director of administration, Ralph N. Stohl, provided OSD with

such basic functions as personnel, budget and accounting, office services, and

security. There was also a small civil defense liaison staff.' 19

Younger than either McNeil or Griffith, more liberal than either in

political outlook, and steadfast in admiration for Forrestal, Marx Leva established a "very early and a very good relationship" with Johnson and received

strong backing from him. When some partisans accused Leva of haVing too

many Republican lawyers on his staff, Johnson told him to continue to hire the

best lawyers he could get and promised to "protect your flanks." Publicly,

Johnson placed Leva in the class of the "extremely able and grand lot"

working in his office. 20

Leva's office in mid-I950 employed 56 persons in two major divisions.

General Counsel Felix Larkin headed the Office of Counsel; Rear Adm. Harold

A. Houser, the Office of Legislative Liaison. In the spirit of unification, Leva

tried to see that military officers in his office did not work solely on affairs

related to their own service but also on matters relating to other services.

Looking back later, Leva felt he had had a good deal of success with this

arrangement. Congressional matters held paramount importance for Leva's

• Leadership in civil defense matters shifted from the military to the National Security Resuurces

Buard in March 1949.
20 THE TEST OF WAR

office, particularly bills having Defense-wide implications such as those

concerning military strength, the draft, and conditions of service. 2 1

James H. Burns, a retired Army major general who had earlier served with

Johnson in the War Department and had worked extensively on lend-lease and

other programs during World War II, also held a position of considerable

importance. In August 1949 Johnson made Burns, in whom he had complete

trust, his consultant on politico-military matters, a position without administrative responsibilities. Simultaneously he established under Najeeb E. Halaby an Office of Foreign Military Affairs (OFMA) which also handled NATO

matters. At this time Maj. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer represented Johnson in

discussions with the State Department on a new program of military assistance, and shortly thereafter he became the OSD director of military assistance. The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 provided for four presidentially appointed positions; on Johnson's suggestion, Truman nominated Burns

to one of these posts. In NovemberJohnson made Burns his principal assistant

for foreign military affairs and military assistance and placed under him the

two offices headed by Halaby and Lemnitzer. This was a major step toward the

institutionalization of the position that in 1953 became the assistant secretary

of defense for international security affairs. 22

Burns's office held the major responsibility for Defense-State liaison.

Without affecting the military departments' basic relations with State,'

Johnson in August 1949 set up within OFMA a State Liaison Section to

consolidate the exchange of documents and information, particularly in the

political-military field, formerly a function of State liaison officers in the

three military departments. 23 Customarily Burns and top OFMA staff members, joined by JCS operations deputies, met on an informal weekly basis with

high State Department representatives, usually including the director of the

Policy Planning Staff. When Congress approved the military assistance program in the fall, Johnson ordered that all relevant DoD dealings with other

departments, except for certain overseas operations, would be "to and

through my office," that is, through Lemnitzer as OSD director of military

assistance. Burns's office also represented Johnson on the staff of the National

Security Council. Relatively small, considering its far-flung responsibilities,

Burns's total staff consisted of 71 civilians and military in mid-1950. 24

For Burns, in poor health with a bad heart condition, life under Johnson

was not easy. The secretary wanted to save money, did not favor foreign

involvement, especially in Europe, and apparently did not find the idea of

NATO or military assistance particularly agreeable. Halaby, strongly anti-

• This included formal written channels of communication, intelligence channels, and working

groups for interdepartmental business.
The Role of the Pentagon 21

johnson, perceived the secretary as a man with "no sense of humor, totally

devoid of humility, and more obsessed with power the longer he stayed in

office" and on his way to wrecking the Defense Department. Halabydescribed by one informed observer as "a bit arbitrary, a bit arrogant, very

ambitious" -was not entirely trusted by johnson, who eventually maneuvered him out of the PentagOll. Lemnitzer also had his problems; years later he

still felt keenly the extreme frustration of serving as johnson's representative

on interdepartmental committees. 2~

Burns, too, could be angered by johnson's rudeness to subordinates. On

one such occasion, Lemnitzer dissuaded Burns from completing a letter of

resignation he had begun to write. As Lemnitzer later recalled, Burns was

indispensable-' 'the fellow that could quiet and talk to the Secretary and

extract a decision . . . . a catalyst, without the likes of which we couldn't

have gotten anywhere with the Secretary." Halaby agreed with Lemnitzer on

Burns's importance, his objectivity, and his independence. Burns's success

was no doubt founded on the mutual affection he and johnson had for each

other, a friendship that may have been tested but was never ended. 26

STATUTORY STAFF AGENCIES

Whether Secretary johnson had in mind any particular organizational

design or any set of guiding principles for shaping OSD is not clear. Perhaps

the plainest purpose that emerged was a determination to retain for the

secretary maximum power of decision. Consequently, he was reluctant to

delegate authority, particularly to the chairmen of two major statutory staff

agencies-the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board.

These were two of the five agencies that johnson regarded as "primary . . .

within their respective spheres of activities." Four were created by law-the

Munitions Board, the ROB, the jCS, and the Military Liaison Committee to the

Atomic Energy Commission. The fifth was the Personnel Policy Board, a

nonstatutory agency. The first three of these agencies employed 1,461 persons

in mid-1950, or about 60 percent of all OSD personnel, civilian and military.r

The four-member Munitions Board (MB) consisted of the chairman,

Hubert E. Howard, and one under or assistant secretary from each of the three

military departments. The largest single agency in OSD, it had a mid-1950

staff of 706 military and civilians. The board's statutory functions related to

the procurement, production, and distribution of materiel for the armed

services, all in support of jCS plans and subject to the secretary's "authority

and direction." Dealing with matters on which there were major service

differences and rivalries, the board was often hard pressed to reach decisions.
22 THE TEST OF WAR

The 1949 amendments to the National Security Act attempted to resolve this

problem by transferring the power of decision from the board to the

chairman. Disinclined to vest full authority in the chairman, Johnson limited

his power of decision to those instances when the other three board members

were not unanimous. In addition to serving the secretary's purposes, this

action may also have been intended to placate the military services, which

consistently opposed giving full power to the chairman. 28

The Research and Development Board (RDB) included seven membersa chairman and two representatives (one military and one civilian) from each

of the three military departments. It had a staff and two divisions, one for

programs and one for planning. Meeting approximately once a month, the

board advised the secretary on the status and continuing adequacy and trends

of scientific research relative to national security. It was supposed to map out

an integrated military research and development program, formulate policy

for military research in relation to other agencies, advise the Joint Chiefs on

the possible implications of research for military strategy, and coordinate the

work of the military departments. It could initiate, eliminate, or change the

emphasis of the services' programs and review their budgets, but it could not

direct or control their internal administration of research and development.

With the )CS, the Research and Development Board shared direction of the

Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG), an agency set up in 1948 to yield

an impartial, supra-service scientific and technical evaluation of weapon

systems. 2')

The 1949 amendments to the National Security Act had granted the RDB

chairman, under the authority of the secretary of defense, the power of

decision. As with the Munitions Board, Johnson limited that power to

instances where the service representatives were not unanimous, although he

made the RDB chairman his principal assistant and deputy in all DoD research

and development matters. The board's service composition, however, guaranteed that any exercise of authority involved negotiation and compromise. 30

RDB committees with cognizance over technical fields of interest or types

of weapons (as, for example, guided missiles, aeronautics, and electronics)

performed most of the technical work. Many committees also had subordinate

panels. Both committees and panels consisted of military and civilian parttime representatives, totaling about 1,500 persons in the spring of 1950, all

but 280 serving without compensation. Chaired by William Webster, the RDB

in mid-1950 had a permanent full-time staff of 315 civilians and military..:\ I

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consisted of a chairman and the three service

chiefs. The 1949 amendments that created the post of chairman gave him

precedence over all other military officers in rank, but he was to exercise no

military command over the Joint Chiefs and to have no vote in their
The Role of the Pentagon 23

deliberations. The chairman served as the JCS presiding officer, provided an

agenda for meetings, and informed the secretary of defense, and when

appropriate the president, of issues about which the Joint Chiefs could not

agree. General Omar N. Bradley, the first statutory JCS chairman, served until

August 1953. The three service chiefs in mid-1950 were General). Lawton

Collins, the Army chief of staff; Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, the chief of naval

operations; and General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, the Air Force chief of staff. Both

Collins and Vandenberg remained in office until mid-1953; following Sherman's death inJuly 1951, Admiral William M. Fechteler became chief of naval

operations. ,~2

The National Security Act made theJCS responsible for specified duties to

be carried out subject to the "authority and direction of the President and the

Secretary of Defense," either of whom could assign them additional duties.

They prepared strategic plans and provided strategic direction for U.S. military

forces, produced joint logistic plans and assigned logistic responsibilities to

the services, established unified commands in strategic areas, reviewed major

materiel and personnel requirements, formulated policies for the joint training

and military education of the armed forces, and provided U.S. military staff

representation at the United Nations. These statutory functions were further

delineated by a 1948 "Key West Agreement" reached by the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, approved by the preSident, and issued by the secretary of defense.

Specifically, the agreement defined JCS functions as including, "subject to the

authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense," the

"general direction of all combat operations." By law the Joint Chiefs had a

Joint Staff of not more than 210 officers appointed in approximately equal

numbers from the three services; actual strength in mid-1950 totaled 450

civilian and military personnel. ,~~

The Joint Chiefs had the responSibility for advising the secretary of

defense, the NSC, and the president. Like the service secretaries, they could,

after notifying the secretary of defense, take matters directly to Congress.

These duties and prerogatives allowed varying interpretations of their exact

position within the Defense organization and of their precise relationship to

the secretary. Although Johnson was not a man to quibble when it came to

delineating his own powers and had been known to refer to "my" chiefs of

staff, their precise relationship to the secretary and OSD remained unsettled in

some respects throughout the Korean War years.' ,-\I

The fourth statutory staff agency assisting the secretary of defense-the

Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)-had

been created by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which placed the control of

• See Chapter XX1V for a further discussion of this question.
24 THE TEST OF WAR

atomic energy matters under the five-member civilian commission. The law

vested ultimate control over military use of atomic weapons in the president

and established a congressional joint Committee on Atomic Energy to watch

over the entire program. The Military Liaison Committee (MLC), required to

make appropriate recommendations to the AEC and inform it of Defense

activities, also reported to the military on AEC actions or nonactions that

might impair military interests, surveyed national requirements, coordinated

Defense activities, and recommended program priorities and changes. It acted

as a staff adviser to the secretary of defense and the military secretaries and

maintained close liaison with the jCS and the Munitions Board. 35

Originally composed of six military men, the MLC operated directly

under Secretary of Defense Forrestal, who in April 1948 added a civilian

chairman to be his "personal adviser and deputy" for atomic matters, and

made each service's appointments of members subject to the secretary's

concurrence. He also gave the MLC a broad grant of authority to resolve

interservice differences, consult with other government agencies, and exercise responsibilities on behalf of the entire Defense establishment. After

passage of the amendments to the Atomic Energy Act in October 1949, the

president appointed the MLC chairman, who received a salary and status on a

par with the chairman of the Munitions Board. Administering the oath of

office to Robert LeBaron, Secretary johnson told him that no job in the

Pentagon was "more important than yours." LeBaron, who remained in office

until 1954, had a small staff consisting in mid-1950 of 39 military and civilian

members. 36

johnson gave the committee wide latitude to make recommendations on

all matters of "major policy relating to military applications of atomic energy"

and to act for the secretary. The military serviCes, however, remained

responsible for their individually supported research and development

projects, and they collectively provided coordination and training in the

handling and use of atomic weapons.' 37

NONSTATUTORY BOARDS AND OFFICES

Forrestal and Johnson set up nonstatutory agencies in OSD to take care of

additional functions that did not seem appropriate for assignment to existing

staff agencies. These agencies offered certain advantages since the secretary

could appoint or remove individuals, change their duties, delegate or with-

• This was accomplished through the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP), a tripartite

agency that reported separately to each of the three service chiefs.
The Role of the Pentagon 25

hold authority, or even abolish the agencies without congressional approval.

Since such offices were wholly creatures of the secretary, they gave him less

concern about control than did the statutory agencies. Four nonstatutory

agencies or offices played important staff roles in Johnson's OSD-the

Personnel Policy Board, the Civilian Components Policy Board, the Office of

Medical Services, and the Office of Public Information.

The Personnel Policy Board (PPB) was created in early 1949 to study and

develop uniform policies throughout the military establishment for both

military and civilian personnel activities, eliminate unnecessary duplication,

and create a central authority for interdepartmental concerns. Still, some

personnel matters remained within the province of other OSD agencies: The

Munitions Board considered those relating to military contractors and suppliers, manpower mobilization requirements, and Selective Service calls; the

Joint Chiefs handled military training and education responsibilities, determined military strength requirements, and allocated personnel among the

services. The Personnel Policy Board consisted of a civilian chairman and an

under or assistant secretary from each of the military departments. In August

1949 Johnson made the board responsible for personnel policy but delegated

to its chairman the authority to act for the secretary-with full power of

decision-in matters falling under the board. In June 1950 J. Thomas

Schneider, a lawyer and businessman, chaired the board on a full-time basis.

PPB had a staff of 38 civilians. 3H

Johnson established the Civilian Components Policy Board (CCPB) in May

1949 to develop overall policies and coordinate military service plans and

programs related to the organized reserves and the national guard, which

together had a strength of more than 2,500,000 in mid-1950. The board was

to eliminate competitive service activities, review and coordinate their

policies and programs, and support the Defense Department's strategic and

logistic plans under basic personnel policies established by the Personnel

Policy Board. The CCPB consisted of a civilian chairman appointed by the

secretary of defense and 18 other members, 6 from each service, including an

under or assistant secretary, a regular military officer, and 4 representatives

from the reserves or national guards.' In mid- I950, Edwin H. Burgess, vice

president and general counsel of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, served as

the unpaid, part-time chairman. 39

The Office of Medical Services evolved from the recommendation of a

committee in 1949 to establish a medical "director general" with full

authority to set up and control DoD medical policies, standards, and

programs. The committee considered this a step toward unification and the

• The Navy had no national guard organization.
26 THE TEST OF WAR

more efficient utilization of scarce medical personnel without creating a

single medical service. In May 1949 Johnson established an OSD Medical

Services Division and granted the recommended authority to its director, who

could be either civilian or military. That autumn the division became the

Office of Medical Services, with Dr. Richard L. Meiling as its director; by

mid-1950 it had a staff of 23 civilian and military personne1. 40

Johnson charged the medical services director with broad responsibilities

throughout Defense, but the military departments remained responsible for

their own medical programs. As of 1 July 1950, health care for civilians came

under Meiling, with the services' surgeons general conducting the field

programs. The Office of Medical Services supervised a program of joint

medical publications and exercised broad policy and administrative review

over various unified laboratories, institutes, and boards. Giving priority

attention to the fighting forces, Meiling's office emphasized joint use of all

service medical facilities. Studies went forward, meanwhile, for an extensive

blood procurement program, a health program for women in the armed

forces, and further unification of medical services. Problems persisted,

however, because this OSD policy agency had no control over service medical

programs.4 I

A similar problem of divided authority plagued the Office of Public

Information (OPI), the fourth nonstatutory agency, created by Forrestal on 17

March 1949 as a single consolidated OSD office with a director to develop and

establish public relations policies and practices on a Defense-wide basis.

Forrestal intended OPI to be the sole Defense agency for public information in

the capital area except for congressional information. and he forbade the

services to maintain public relations staffs in Washington except those needed

to guide and supervise field installations. OPI responsibilities included press,

radio, television, photograph. and newsreel services; accreditation of correspondents; analysis of public information; and security review and clearance

of manuscripts and other materials. 42

Although Forrestal's establishment of a consolidated office seemed a wise

move and later had Johnson's support, it was widely viewed within the

Pentagon as a "punitive and restrictive" attempt to end military service leaks.

Following service and press protests, Johnson in June 1949 restricted OPI

clearance review to matters "classified for security reasons." In March 1950

the service secretaries recommended that Johnson restore most Washington

operations to the services. An April study by the Defense Management

Committee, on the other hand, recommended strengthening the new office.

Although Johnson took no official action, OPI status declined because he

generally bypassed the agency in his own dealings with the media, and

Deputy Secretary Early doubted the value of unifying the function. 43 Operat-
The Role of the Pentagon 27

ing under Osgood Roberts as acting director and with a staff of 222 civilian

and military personnel in mid-1950, most assigned from the services, OP1

remained weak and largely unavailing in its efforts to provide centralized

control over all Defense public information activities.""

THE INNER CIRCLE

In mid-1950, Maj. Gen. Leven C. Allen, serving as Johnson's executive

secretary, managed the secretary's immediate office with a staff of 48 persons.

Johnson authorized Allen to issue directives on approved policy matters

within OSD's jurisdiction, an authority he also granted Early, the three

assistant secretaries, and the chairmen of the five primary staff agencies. Some

special assistants also worked directly out of Johnson's immediate office,

including Louis H. Renfrow, an old Johnson friend known for his jovial

manner, and James C. Evans, who handled matters related to racial integration

in the armed forces. 45

Also closely attached to the secretary was the Defense Management

Committee, which Johnson established in August 1949 to help him provide

for the greater economy and efficiency that he hoped would be the hallmarks

of his administration. General Joseph T. McNamey (USAF), chairman of the

committee and]ohnson's "direct representative," was a highly regarded officer

who had already helped Johnson to abolish a large number of committees and

boards. Composed of service representatives at the assistant secretary level or

higher, the committee reported directly to the secretary. \6 Johnson accorded

the committee a broad mandate: It could form subsidiary agencies as

necessary and could "direct the Departments and Agencies independently to

undertake work under its monitorship" whenever facilities were available.

Only on matters of major policy did the committee have to get secretarial

approval."7 As of May 1950, the Defense Management Committee estimated

that it could save up to a billion dollars annually-an expectation that Johnson

firmly shared."H

The Armed Forces Policy Council (AFPC), originally established as the

War Council in the National Security Act and renamed in the 1949 amendments, was the most important of the secretary's advisory bodies. It consisted

of nine persons-the secretary and deputy secretary of defense, the three

service secretaries, the JCS chairman, and the three chiefs. The law stated that

the council was to advise the secretary of defense on "matters of broad policy

relating to the armed forces and . . . consider and report on such other

matters" as he might direct."9 While Forrestal had used the council mainly to

debate issues, Johnson was perhaps less interested in AFPC views than in his
28 THE TEST OF WAR

own AFPC role. The law made him the AFPC chairman with the power of

decision, a right that Johnson regarded as crucial-"therein was the power of

the Secretary of Defense to unify. ,,50 While Johnson considered the AFPC

useful, he did not clearly define its functions before the start of the Korean

War. The council met weekly and on special occasions; by May 1950 so many

people were attending AFPC sessions that Johnson complained he was unable

to discuss "highly confidential matters." Accordingly he limited attendance to

22 officials, but a larger number often still sat in. Only after the start of the

Korean War did the AFPC begin to playa more substantive role underJohnson,

particularly in early budget considerations. 5 I

Perhaps as a consequence of the AFPC's deficiencies, the service secretaries had begun to meet jointly before mid-1950. Forrestal had convened his

army, navy, and air force secretaries biweekly in a grouping known as the

Committee of Four. Johnson dropped this practice, but Pace, Finletter, and

Matthews felt that periodic consultation would help them to settle interservice

disputes and better advise the defense secretary. After discussing the matter

before the AFPC, Johnson reinstated the separate secretarial meetings, but he

did not attend. By June, the three secretaries conferred regularly. 52

In May 1949 Johnson instituted a lesser body-the Staff Council-to

inform him on "important matters of interest" and to advise him on matters

not important enough to be considered by the AFPC. Chaired by the deputy

secretary, the Staff Council included the heads or representatives of most OSD

offices and staff agencies. 53

Although Johnson may have seemed autocratic within the Pentagon, he

was careful to keep the president well informed, even on relatively small

matters. Truman undoubtedly liked to know what was happening in the

Pentagon, but he may have felt that sometimesJohnson told him more than he

wanted to hear. Once Johnson received the president's approval, however,

woe to the man in the Pentagon who crossed the secretary, particularly when

the issue involved what Johnson perceived as encroachment on his turf.

Preparations for War

President Truman had acquired a comprehensive knowledge of the

mobilization process through his chairmanship of the Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program (better known as the Truman

Committee) during World War II. The Korean War, however, on a much lesser

scale and unfolding incrementally,. presented different problems. Initially,

there was much uncertainty about the requirements for men and materiel, and

changes in programs occurred frequently as the fortunes of war fluctuated.
The Role of the Pentagon 29

There was little doubt, however, about the need for coordination and

cooperation among all agencies prosecuting a war effort. Once U.S. forces

joined battle in Korea, Truman moved quickly to ensure interdepartmental

collaboration. Intent on making greater use of the National Security Council,

the president on 6 July 1950 instructed all NSC members to forward proposals

related to Korea through the council rather than directly to him, so that all

major officials might be kept informed. Subsequently, he directed a monthly

check on the status of all NSC projects. 54

The president directed the council to meet more frequently and in small

groups where discussion would not be inhibited. He limited attendance to the

five statutory NSC members and only six others-Secretary of the Treasury

John W. Snyder, presidential special assistant W. Averell Harriman,' former

NSC executive secretary and current presidential consultant Sidney W. Souers,

JCS chairman Omar N. Bradley, CIA director Walter Bedell Smith, and NSC

Executive Secretary James S. Lay, Jr. Other officials could attend only with the

president's approval. In the absence of the president, the secretary of state

would preside over the Thursday afternoon meetings. 55

To improve preparation for NSC meetings, Truman on 19 July directed the

secretaries of state, defense, and treasury, the NSRB chairman, the CIA

director, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff each to nominate one person to serve on

a senior staff headed by the NSC executive secretary. Burns wanted Johnson to

nominate Maj. Gen. Sidney P. Spalding, the current Defense representative on

the NSC staff; the service secretaries, on the other hand, wanted Johnson to

nominate one of their number. Although Johnson wrote "not at this time"

across their memorandum, he apparently changed his mind after discussing

the matter at the White House. In the end he named Finletter as his own

representative and Rear Adm. E.T. Wooldridge as theJCS representative on the

NSC Senior Staff. 56

The president also revived the NSC Special Committee on Atomic Energy,

to which he had appointed the secretaries of state and defense and the AEC

chairman in February 1949. This committee had subsequently recommended

U.S. development of a thermonuclear bomb. 57 On 25 August 1950 Truman

reinforced its authority, directing it, as a first step, to consider all atomic

matters affecting the three departments, so that "everybody interested will

know exactly what is going on." In its staff deliberations, Robert LeBaron,

MLC chairman, normally acted for the secretary of defense, while the three

senior military MLC members constituted the committee's military advisers. 51!

• Harriman later became a statutory NSC member when he was appointed to the newly created

post of director for mutual security in late 1951. In December 19';0, when Truman created the

post of director of defense mObilization, his appointee to that position, Charles E. Wilson, was

added to the list of NSC attendees.
30 THE TEST OF WAR

The president underscored his new determination to bolster NSC coordination of u.s. policy by his more regular attendance at the more frequent

meetings. In its 33 months of existence before the start of the Korean War, the

council had held 57 meetings, averaging 1.7 per month; in the remaining 31

months of the Truman administration, it held 71 meetings, an average of 2.3

per month. More important, whereas Truman had gone to "fewer than a

dozen" of the 57 meetings before Korea, he presided at 61 of the 71 meetings

during the war. ~')

While Truman gave national security policymaking more personal attention and infused new order into NSC procedures, he also sought better

coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization through the

National Security Resources Board. On 9 July 1950 Reorganization Plan No. 25

transferred the functions of the board to its chairman, Stuart Symington, and

the board became adVisory to him. 60 But whereas Symington advocated

large-scale economic mobilization early in the war, Truman originally envisioned only a limited national industrial mobilization, preferring an incremental approach in the hope and expectation that the war could be contained in

extent, time, and intensity. Not only was there the enormous expense

involved, but the economy, already running close to capacity, had little slack

to absorb a large defense effort. 6 I Although Symington set up committees and

issued a profusion of analyses and reports, basic programming lagged, military

requirements constantly changed, and by mid-September 1950 the NSRB

coordination effort faltered. Symington apparently continued to believe

Truman would broaden NSRB functions and powers, but the preSident proved

unwilling to do so and for all practical purposes bypassed the NSRB in

mobilizing for the Korean War.' 62

Setting the broad guidelines of U.S. policy on 19 July 1950, the president

asked for more money for defense spending, a $5 billion increase in taxes, and

authority to increase defense production and regulate the civilian economy.

Congress gave him the defense money and the tax increase. Furthermore, the

Defense Production Act of 1950 (PL 81-774), signed on 8 September, allowed

the president to assign priorities, allocate materials and facilities, requisition

property for defense production, regulate consumer credit, make or guarantee

defense production loans, negotiate long-term contracts for scarce materials,

and impose wage and price controls until 30 June 1951. By Executive Order

10161 of 9 September 1950 Truman delegated priority and allocation authority to an agency in the Commerce Department, the National Production

• In the spring of 195 I Symington became the administrator of the Reconstruction Finance

Corporation; the NSRB continued in a weakened role until its abolition in 1953.
The Role of the Pentagon 31

Authority, under Manly Fleischmann, and created an independent Economic

Stabilization Agency under Eric Johnston to oversee voluntary restraints on

wages and prices 63

Within days of the start of the Korean War, Congress extended for one

year the Selective Service Act of 1948 and authorized the callup of reserve and

national guard forces for 21 months' active service-thereby bringing back to

duty many veterans who had only recently served in World War II. On 30 June

Congress raised Army strength to 837,000 men and provided for a 502,000-

man, 70-group Air Force with 24,000 aircraft. In July it suspended for 4 years

all previous ceilings on the authorized strengths of the military services and

extended all existing enlistments for 12 months, thus retaining in service some

372,000 persons slated to leave within the next year.61 In early September

Congress provided for a so-called "doctors draft." But despite Johnson's

urging, it refused to agree to Truman's politically unpopular request for

universal military training, causing the president in late August 1950 to

withdraw his plan. 65

First Months of War

Within the Pentagon, Johnson moved cautiously after the Korean War

started. He had to condition himself to a new set of circumstances that

demanded expansion rather than contraction of the military establishment,

where the emphasis would be on spending rather than on economizing.

Moreover, the major decisions on the direction of the war would come from

the president and the National Security Council, somewhat circumscribing

Johnson's role and requiring that he function within a framework that placed

a premium on interdepartmental cooperation. Recognizing the need for

greater cooperative efforts, Johnson began to take steps toward that end both

inside the Pentagon and with other departments.

In July 1950 Johnson regularized the meetings of the three service

secretaries as The Joint Secretaries and sought their advice more frequently.

On 11 July he authorized the military departments to build up their civilian

personnel strength to the FY 1951 level but said that any further increases

would have to be justified. A week later he gave the various departments and

agencies authority to prescribe overtime work but told them to make no

general announcement. 66

With a Military Air Transport Service and a Military Sea Transportation

Service already in operation, Johnson on 23 August established a policymaking Military Traffic Service for coordination within the continental United

States of commercial transportation-land, air, and water-for the entire
32 THE TEST OF WAR

Department of Defense. As its director, Johnson appointed E. Grover Plowman, the U.S. Steel Corporation's vice president for traffic, who was succeeded within a few months by Kenneth L. Vore. 67

The friction between Defense and State meanwhile came to a head early

in July 1950, when Paul Nitze, director of State's Policy Planning Staff,

complained about the difficulty in securing "speedy and clearcut decisions on

matters involving the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service departments, and the

office of the Secretary of Defense." At a meeting with Acheson and Harriman

on 12 July, Johnson acknowledged that Burns alone could not handle all the

complex State-Defense liaison relationships and agreed to allow such liaison

without specific clearance from Burns. Johnson's agreement to Harriman's

suggestion that the three men should dine together once a week pointed up

the unusual affability of this meeting. Despite these efforts, Acheson later

observed that State-Defense relations were at their lowest ebb in September

1950.68

Johnson also regularized relations between the Defense Department and

the Treasury. Because of problems in Korea, he agreed on 13July to formalize

a "working relationship" between the two departments and made McNeil's

office the official point of contact with Treasury for the entire Department of

Defense. 69

Once the Korean War started, Johnson wanted Pentagon officials to cut

down on public pronouncements. On 3 July 1950 he told the AFPC members

that he had canceled all his own speaking engagements for the next few weeks

to avoid any public discussion of Korea, and he asked the service secretaries

and chiefs to do the same insofar as possible. The council agreed that all OPI

press releases should be general in nature. By the end ofJuly, however, the

military department secretaries asked johnson and Early to lift the ban on

speeches. On 7 August Early circulated the State Department's "information

objectives for the rest of 1950," the first of which stated that U.S. foreign

policy was "designed to maintain and to defend tbe peace. ,,70 Apparently

Navy Secretary Matthews felt that this statement allowed him to advocate

"instituting a war to compel cooperation for peace .... We would become the first aggressors for peace. ,,71 When internal OSD speech clearance

procedures unfortunately failed, Matthews's speech of 25 August in Boston

created a public furor, but the major blame fell on johnson when some

accounts attributed the notion to him. Although Matthews was contrite and

Truman proved forgiving,' it was one more embarrassment that johnson did

not need at the time. 72

• Matthews remained as Navy secretary until the following summer, when Truman appointed him

U.S. ambassador to Ireland.
The Role of the Pentagon 33

By September 1950 the Korean War had doomed whatever political

aspirations johnson may have had. Moreover, his maladroit dabbling in

extra-Defense matters had irritated the president, who noted that his defense

secretary had an "inordinate egotistical desire to run the whole government"

and had managed to offend every member of the Cabinet. Shortly after joining

Truman's White House staff in late June 1950, Harriman reported that he had

overheard Johnson congratulate Republican Senator Taft for a speech criticizing Truman and calling for Acheson's ouster. Afterward, Harriman said,

johnson suggested that if Acheson could only be removed, Johnson would see

to it that Harriman became secretary of state. The White House found this

story "almost incredible" despite Harriman's reputation for the "absolute

truth. "73

johnson's relations with Congress also were deteriorating. Although the

earlier stringent ceilings on defense appropriations and spending had been

Truman's policy, Johnson had carried out the cuts so enthusiastically that the

onus fell on him when it appeared that they had been excessive. Johnson's

arrogant manner and the abrasiveness of his early appearances before congressional committees had alienated some members. Also, Defense economies

had reached far beyond the Pentagon, and congressmen had received constituent complaints about the effects on local interests. Then, when the North

Koreans badly mauled the U.S. troops during the opening months of the war,

Johnson became a press scapegoat, and public and congressional attitudes

soured further. Critics recalled his flamboyant remarks that he was converting

military "fat into muscle" and that, if the Soviet Union attacked, American

military forces would be ready to respond almost immediately. 7 1

Truman nonetheless publicly supported his defense secretary. When

asked on 3 August about a congressman's suggestion that both Acheson and

Johnson should resign, Truman responded with some heat to reporters, telling

them that neither man would resign "as long as I am President." On 31 August

Truman told newsmen that Johnson had not "embarrassed" the president. But

it did seem that the defense secretary had become a political liability,

especially with the approach of the midterm elections. Eleanor Roosevelt,

widow of the late preSident, obviously spoke for many when she wrote

Truman in a personal letter, "1 can not tell you how the feeling against

Secretary johnson is building up. ,,7';

By early September Truman had decided to ask for johnson's resignation

when he came for his regular weekly meeting, but the president did not raise

the matter on 5 September when johnson brought with him Secretary

Matthews. With press stories suggesting his imminent departure, johnson

received the bad news from the president on Monday, 11 September, in an

off-the-record meeting that left johnson unable to talk and the president
34 THE TEST OF WAR

feeling "as if I had just whipped my daughter, Margaret." Although Truman

initially granted johnson's request for a few days to think it over, the president

called Early on 12 September to urge that johnson resign immediately and

recommend George C. Marshall as his successor. Resigning forthwith himself,

Early gathered a small OSD group to help compose a letter of resignation for

johnson to take to the Cabinet session that afternoon. Still hoping for a

reprieve, johnson took the unsigned letter with him, but when the two men

met alone, Truman told the reluctant and distraught Johnson that he would

have to sign. Leaving office on 19 September 1950, Johnson returned to his

law offices at Steptoe and Johnson in Washington. 76

September 1950: A New Team

With Johnson's resignation in hand on 12 September, the president called

George C. Marshall, whom he regarded as "one of the most astute and

profound" men that he had ever known, to tell him that "what they had been

talking about" had been completed. 7

" Not only did Marshall stand high in

Truman's esteem, but he was famed throughout the country as the "organizer

of victory" in World War II. As chief of staff, he had restructured the U.S.

Army and created the unity of command in the field essential to victory. At the

same time, Marshall had learned much about establishing and maintaining an

effective relationship with Congress. By his fair dealing, strength, and

intellectual force he had also won the admiration of Allied Ieaders. 78 In

1945-46 Marshall served Truman as his special representative in China,

attempting to reconcile the warring Nationalist and Communist factions

before concluding that it was a hopeless task. As Truman's secretary of state

from January 1947 to January 1949, Marshall earned the plaudits not only of

the president but of State Department insiders for his skills in organizing and

rationalizing the policymaking process. Dean Acheson, who succeeded Marshall at State, spoke of him with admiration. European allies were heartened

by Marshall's nomination as secretary of defense ....')

In accepting Truman's offer of the Defense post, Marshall warned Truman

that he feared that the political far right in Congress still blamed him for

Chiang's defeat and might use his confirmation hearings to attack him and

thus hurt the president. Appreciative of Marshall's concern, Truman was

undeterred, but the results were as Marshall had anticipated. Senator Taft

opposed Marshall's appointment, particularly since it would strengthen the

position of Secretary of State Acheson. Sen. William E. Jenner declared during

the hearings that Marshall was "not only willing, he is eager to play the role

of a front man for traitors" and asked how the Senate could confirm "an
The Role of the Pentagon 35

unsuspecting, well-intentioned stooge, or an actual coconspirator with the

most treasonable array of political cutthroats ever turned loose in the

executive branch of our Government. "HO Revolted by such diatribes, Congress

passed the enabling legislation, • and the Senate confirmed Marshall, 57 to 11,

on 20 September. He was allowed to retain his army commission and his

retirement pay of $18,761, and received $3,739 as secretary of defense, the

two emoluments together equaling $22,500, the pay of a Cabinet officer at

that time. Sworn in on 21 September 1950, the new secretary still thought of

himself as "General" Marshall and preferred to be so addressed. Hl

Overnight, State-Defense relations changed from extremely difficult to

extraordinarily open. To Acheson's embarrassment, his "revered and beloved

former chief" insisted on observing every known rule of protocol. The older

and more famous Marshall walked on the left side of Acheson, the senior

Cabinet officer, entered cars from the street side and sat on the left, stepped

aside for Acheson to pass through doors first, and waited for Acheson to speak

first at meetings. Nor was this mere form; cooperation was just as real when

it came to substance. "For the first time," wrote a relieved Acheson, the two

secretaries and their top advisers "met with the Chiefs of Staff in their map

room and discussed common problems together." There were to be many

such meetings. HZ

Marshall immediately demonstrated the intense interest in manpower

policies that had characterized his years in the Army. Taking advantage of the

fact that the law did not specify functions of two of the assistant secretary

posts, Marshall decided to change the resigning Griffith's post to an assistant

secretaryship for manpower and personnel. In a move that proved initially

controversial, he nominated Anna M. Rosenberg, an expert on labor matters

with wide government experience, to the job. This was Marshall's only major

change in OSD organization and personnel.t The two other assistant secretaries-McNeil as comptroller and Marx Leva for legal and legislative affairsremained with Marshall.

Marshall's personal style in the Pentagon differed from that ofJohnson.

Warm and friendly in social situations, Marshall at work tended to be aloof

and sometimes forbidding; even with close associates he maintained a certain

distance, addressing them by their last names only. He made a point of not

strolling the halls, and few were the subordinates who dropped into his office

for an informal chat. Marshall had long since learned to control his strong

• The National Security Act of 1947, sec 202 (reaffirmed in PI. 81-216, )() Aug 49) prohibited the

appointment as secretary of defense of anyone who had within the previous 10 years been on

active duty as a regular commissioned officer. Special enabling legislation thus had to be passed

to allow Marshall to undertake the secretaryship.

t For more on this matter and on other changes in OSD, see Chapter XXIII.
36 THE TEST OF WAR

temper, but luckless ones were chilled by the ice of his demeanor. If not easily

approachable, Marshall possessed, as some Pentagon intimates discovered, a

dry wit and a kind, even fatherly, side. In any event, he inspired respect and

hard work. Writing of the general's earlier days as secretary of state, Acheson

noted that Marshall's presence was a "striking and communicated force. His

figure conveyed intensity, which his voice, low, staccato, and incisive,

reinforced. It compelled respect. It spread a sense of authority and of calm.

There was no military glamour about him and nothing of the martinet." At 69

and after a long bout with ill health, an aging Marshall was not at his peak in

September 1950, but too much could be made of this. As Col. Marshall Carter,

who became the executive to the secretary, recalled Marshall's performance,

"he was intensely practical, oriented to getting things done. . . . Things just

started to happen, he made things go. ,,83

Marshall helped ensure a smooth administration by bringing Robert A.

Lovett into the Pentagon as his deputy secretary of defense. Educated at Yale

and Harvard, Lovett at 55 was a man of~uch experience and attainment. After

service as a naval aviator in France during World War I, he joined the firm of

Brown Brothers, Harriman and Co., where his international banking experience broadened his horizons. Lovett served as a special assistant to Secretary

of War Henry L. Stimson (December 1940-April 1941) and as assistant

secretary of war for air (April 1941-December 1945), during which time he

was a strong advocate of U.S. air power. He was considered to have been "one

of Forrestal's oldest and most intimate friends" and had a wide circle of

friends in the government. 84 Lovett returned to banking after the war but

came to Washington again in 1947 to serve as under secretary of state under

Marshall. With Marshall away on trips for long periods and ill during the latter

part of his tenure, Lovett spent much time as acting secretary of state and

played a major role in developing U.S. foreign policy. In January 1949 Lovett

again went back to his New York office. 8 ';

When Marshall agreed to become secretary of defense in September 1950,

Lovett once more left his banking connection to join his friend and mentor in

the Pentagon, where, as he later recalled, he "felt completely at home."

Appointed by Truman on 28 September and sworn in on 4 October, Lovett

served as Marshall's deputy until 16 September 1951, carrying the major

burden of administration. "Lovett carries out the policies I have announced,"

Marshall told a journalist. "He is in complete charge of operations." In the

Pentagon Lovett became Marshall's alter ego. 86

A weary Marshall wrote Truman on 1 September 1951 that he wanted to

leave and recommended Lovett to succeed him. To Lovett, Marshall said that

there was no choice, that he would have to become the secretary. Following

Marshall's retirement on 12 September 1951, the Senate confirmed Lovett on
The Role of the Pentagon 37

14 September, and he was sworn in as secretary on 17 September. Hanson

Baldwin of The New York Times wrote that a "better appointment could not

have been made." When Lovett's tenure ended on 20 January 1953, there

could be little doubt that he had succeeded in measuring up to the president's

expectations. H7

No one could have satisfied Truman without being "decisive, specific,

frank," as Marshall once described Lovett; he also operated with discretion

and a selflessness rooted in impeccable motives and an absence of personal

ambition. Beyond these attributes, Lovett was also a sophisticated administrator who realized that an operation as large as Defense would inevitably have

things go wrong "no matter how talented the people ... and no matter

how good their intentions. " Under attack by Congress, Lovett did not look for

"somebody to hang" but worked to avoid recurrences of mistakes. Beyond

being tough and determined, he was also friendly, unassuming, gregarious,

and remarkably witty. His pithy remarks were memorable and quotable: On

dealing with an impossible situation, he was apt to mutter, "To hell with the

cheese, let's get out of the trap." After a long and apparently unpleasant

medical examination at Walter Reed Army Hospital, he wryly told his

luncheon companions that he was convinced that the Army Medical Corps

was "dedicated to the proposition that they can too make both your ends

meet. " When Prime Minister Churchill, at a British embassy stag dinner party,

asked Truman how they would answer to St. Peter when called to account for

the atomic bombing ofJapan in World War II, Lovett defused a possibly tense

situation. Quickly intervening, he lightly asked the prime minister how he

could be sure that he and the president would both be in the same place for

judgment. Churchill took the cue, Acheson and others joined in the quick turn

of tone that had been offered, and the evening was saved. HH

An unfailing grace underlay Lovett's style of bringing people willingly if

gradually to his own position. In the Pentagon he preferred to proceed toward

unification by cooperation. Even when strong positions were taken-and

strong words exchanged-he tried to keep the disagreement on a professional

level. Philosophically there was little if any difference between Marshall and

Lovett as to the military's role. In their view, evident as much from their

actions as their statements, each military service and department had an

appropriate mission to fulfill, as each proved every day during the Korean War.

Nor did they believe the revolutionary new atomic weapons should be under

the control of anyone service. No one service was paramount; the ideal was

a proper balance of forces. Furthermore, Lovett, like Marshall, perceived the

Defense Department and the military services as part of the larger government. While they no longer faced "dividing up a scarcity" of funds or

equipment or forces as in Forrestal's and Johnson's days, neither Marshall nor
38 THE TEST OF WAR

Lovett saw military requirements as overriding other governmental needs

except in an emergency. Rather, in Lovett's own words, they aimed for a good

defense "cruising speed," adaptable to various contingencies. The military

budgets during the Marshall-Lovett years, allowing for the pressures of the

war, consistently reflected this philosophy. 89

As to the secretary's relations with Congress, Lovett found much cause for

comment, if not complaint. Writing to a colleague in December 1951, Lovett

listed 11 major congressional committees and 14 subcommittees "of primary

interest to the Department of Defense." The secretary of defense, Lovett later

mused, "cannot and should not be in operations . . . but when a problem

comes up . . . the Congress turns instinctively to the civilian head of the

Department when they are looking for a sacrificial goat to offer on the altar of

public opinion. It is a natural thing." Changing metaphor, he continued:

"They don't have to stuff him at all. They can just take him right up there and

kick him around. That is one of the occupational hazards." Even this, he took

with considerable graceYo

Lovett's deputy, William C. Foster, had formerly headed the Economic

Cooperation Agency (ECA), created in 1948 to implement the Marshall Plan

for Europe. Encouraged by Lovett, Marshall, and Truman to accept the

Pentagon post, Foster found that his technical, engineering, and business

background in many ways complemented Lovett's strengths. A graduate of the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Foster had spent 24 years with a steel

products company, rising to its presidency. He had served in the War

Department during World War II and as under secretary of commerce

from 1946 to 1948 before going to ECA. Foster took the oath of office on

24 September and remained with Lovett to the end of the Truman

administration. 91

Foster's role at Defense was that of a true deputy, since Lovett gave him

full power to deal with all matters in the secretary's absence. On arrival in the

Pentagon, Foster's first assignment was to represent the secretary at the NATO

meeting in Ottawa. As Lovett had under Marshall, Foster functioned much like

a general manager, handling, among other tasks, the preparation of the

defense budget in conjunction with the OSD comptroller. As Foster later

recalled, the job was enough to keep him busy "71/2 days a week." Lovett,

however, retained decision over all policy matters, keeping a sure hand on the

helm. The association of the two men, although a new one, was quite

amicable, but it did not have the remarkable rapport of the Marshall-Lovett

relationship. 92

For the new and untried Office of the Secretary of Defense the Korean

War was indeed a time of testing. By contrast with OSD, the military services,

even the new Air Force, had proud traditions and many years of experience as
The Role of the Pentagon 39

organizational entities. Only a few years before they had fought and won a

great war. That OSD grew in size during the Korean War was in response to the

larger demands made on it. That it grew in stature and power may be

attributed in large part to the strong, positive, and respected leadership of

Marshall and Lovett and their key assistants.
East China Sea

..-

Sofu Gan

BONIN ",

ISLANDS"

IwoJima"

300

o Kilometers

1

'---.1---,'-I-'l1r--'I I I 300

o Miles

Philippine Sea

SOVIET UNION

~"" ;/,-

vfJ •

,oS~."

~~Okinawa

• Harbin

Cheju·do 0

Yellow Sea

CHINA

Peking

East Asia-1950
CHAPTER III

The North Korean Attack

The North Korean onslaught across the 38th parallel on 25 June 1950

touched off a great international conflict of three years' duration. The first five

months witnessed the initial North Korean success, the U.S. decision to come

to the aid of South Korea, the organization of a United Nations Command to

combat the aggression, and the defeat of the North Koreans. The first of a

series of clearly defined phases of the Korean War, it ended in late November

1950.

A Divided Korea

A tangle of political, economic, and strategic interests had historically

involved both Eastern and Western powers in the affairs of the Korean

peninsula. A shared boundary and superior strength had allowed the Chinese

to dominate Korea for centuries. When China was forced to give way in Korea

to the Japanese after the Sino-japanese War of 1894-95, the peninsula

became a pawn in Russo-Japanese relations, a phase that ended with the

Japanese victory over the Russians in 1904-05. Formally annexing Korea in

1910, Japan maintained its ascendancy through World War II.

At the Cairo Conference in 1943, the United States, Great Britain, and

China agreed that upon Japan's defeat Korea should become "free and

independent" after a "period of apprenticeship" under a four-power trusteeship. Stalin acceeded to this arrangement in May 1945. At the Potsdam

Conference in July, in anticipation of Soviet entrance into the war against

Japan, the Americans and Soviets discussed a line of demarcation for future

Soviet air and sea operations in Korea. They did not delineate ground or

occupation zones, since, as Truman later wrote, they did not expect either

41
42 THE TEST OF WAR

Soviet or US. ground forces to enter Korea in the near future. 1 After the

japanese surrendered on 2 September 1945, Korea was to be jointly occupied

by the United States and the Soviet Union until a democratic government

could be established. The United States hoped to receive the japanese

surrender in Korea as far north as possible, thus limiting the Soviet-occupied

area, but geography and time restricted the ability of US. forces to reach the

north. By agreement, japanese troops north of the 38th parallel surrendered

to the Soviets, those south of the line to US. forces. This division of Korea left

the capital Seoul, its port of Inch'on, and the southeastern port of Pusan in

US. hands. 2

In September 1945 U.S. Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK) under it. Gen.

john R. Hodge assumed control of military and civil affairs. Civil responsibilities were handed over to the Koreans in September 1946, with US. personnel

as advisers. The South Koreans established an Interim Government in May

1947, and the United States provided substantial assistance. Although Washington disapproved the establishment of Korean army and navy forces, it

agreed to arm the Korean civil police and supported a Department of Internal

Security with a constabulary and coast guard. Toward the end of 1947 the

constabulary numbered between 18,000 and 20,000 men equipped with

captured japanese weapons and trained as infantry. Although the constabulary

was intended to be a reserve force for the national police, the two groups had

sharp political differences and sometimes fought each other."

In the northern part of Korea after the end of World War 11, Communisttrained Korean exiles returned from the Soviet Union and created a central

government known as the Interim People's Committee, under the leadership

of Kim Sung Chu, who called himself Kim II Sung after a heroic anti-japanese

resistance leader. Incorporating a range of Korean parties, this government

purported to be democratic, but Korean Communists controlled it. By

mid-1946 the Soviets had reduced their forces to 10,000 men and created a

well-trained and -armed North Korean people's militia, which by September

1947 had an estimated strength of 125,000."'

In an effort to establish an international trusteeship for all of Korea, a

joint u.S.-USSR Commission negotiated sporadically, but by September 1947

it was clear that no accord was possible. S By then also, the joint Chiefs of Staff

concluded that the United States had no particular strategic interest in

maintaining either troops or bases in South Korea. Viewing U.S. troops in

Korea as a "military liability" in the event of an Asian war, the joint Chiefs

concluded that such troops could be better used elsewhere and that an early

withdrawal would avoid later embarrassment.() With Soviet-American negotiations stalemated, Secretary of State Marshall decided to seek a withdrawal of

troops through the United Nations. The Soviets called for all foreign troops to
The North Korean Attack 43

leave the peninsula. Fearing that the weak southern zone would be easy prey

for the North Koreans after a total withdrawal, the United States sponsored a

resolution providing for UN-supervised elections in both Korean zones by the

end of March 1948, to be followed by the formation of a single government

for Korea and the withdrawal of all occupation forces. The UN General

Assembly approved the resolution in November 1947, but in the spring of

1948 the Soviets refused entrance to the UN Temporary Commission on

Korea, established in November 1947 to supervise the elections. The United

States then decided to go ahead with elections in the south and to form a

Korean government. 7

The utter weakness of the prospective South Korean government made its

relationship to the United States particularly significant. NSC 8, which Truman

approved on 8 April 1948, evidenced the administration's uncertainty and

indecision about Korea. It sought a middle course, neither abandoning Korea

nor guaranteeing its security, but calling for provision of such support as was

practicable and feasible, including military and economic assistance, a diplomatic mission, and, if appropriate, a military advisory group. To allow the

20,000 U.S. troops still in South Korea to leave by the end of 1948, the United

States would expand, train, and equip the Korean constabulary to meet all

security needs short of overt aggression by North Korean or other forces. In

any event, NSC 8 specified that the United States should not become so

"irrevocably involved" in Korea that it could be caught in a war situation.s

The UN Temporary Commission on Korea supervised the 10 May 1948

election in South Korea and certified its results. In July the newly elected

Korean National Assembly approved a constitution and elected Dr. Syngman

Rhee, a strong anti-Communist patriot, as president. On 15 August the

Republic of Korea (ROK) came into being. With the U.S. military occupation

thus ended, Truman sent a special representative, John). Muccio, with the

personal rank of ambassador,' to negotiate with the Koreans the terms of the

U.S. troop withdrawal scheduled for 15 January 1949. The United States

considered the newly elected government entitled to be regarded as the

government of all Korea in accordance with the UN General Assembly

resolution of November 1947.9

Meanwhile, similar developments occurred in the North, where the

Soviets installed a government in P'Yongyang. On 9 September 1948 the North

Koreans established the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which the

USSR immediately recognized and hailed as a government for all Korea. There

were now two governments in Korea, each claiming the right to rule the

• Muccio officially became the U.S. ambassador after the United States formally recognized the

Republic of Korea on I January 1949.
44 THE TEST OF WAR

whole country. While continuing military assistance to the People's Republic,

the Soviets announced they would remove all of their troops by the end of

1948. 10

In accordance with NSC 8, the United States began to build up South

Korean strength before withdrawing U.S. forces. In August 1948, Hodge

signed an interim military agreement with the Rhee government providing for

the turnover of security responsibility as fast as possible. The United States

agreed to support a constabulary of 50,000 men that would become the

nucleus of a South Korean army and established a Provisional Military

Advisory Group (PMAG) under Brig. Gen. William L. Roberts. In midSeptember U.S. troops began their withdrawal, but violent domestic unrest

shortly thereafter, especially guerrilla warfare and mutinies in the constabulary, much of it Communist instigated, threatened to topple Rhee's government. Alarmed by the increased turmoil in South Korea and the effect of the

success of Mao's Communist forces in China, Rhee asked that U.S. forces

remain until order was restored. Ambassador Muccio also advised Washington

to delay the U.S. troop departure. 11

Although the U.S. Army wanted to continue the troop pullout, it bowed

to State Department wishes and in November 1948 directed General Douglas

MacArthur, Commander in Chief Far East (CINCFE), to retain in Korea one

reinforced regimental combat team of not more than 7,500 men. On 12

December the UN General Assembly-while recognizing Rhee's as the only

lawful Korean government and establishing a permanent seven-nation UN

Commission on Korea (UNCOK) to work for Korean unification-urged the

early removal of all occupation forces. The situation became embarrassing to

the United States when, two weeks later, the Soviets announced their

complete troop withdrawal. 12 MacArthur, although pessimistic about the

South Koreans' ability to cope with any combination of invasion and

Communist-led internal disorder, believed that they would soon be able to

assure their internal security absent external attack. In January 1949 he

recommended 10 May 1949, the first anniversary of the South Korean

elections, as an appropriate date for the U.S. troop withdrawal. Shortly

thereafter he indicated that the South Korean army should be so organized as

to demonstrate its peaceful purpose and thus scotch claims that it was a threat

to the North. l~

The State Department's fears for South Korea's survival intensified when

the CIA predicted in February 1949 that a U.S. troop withdrawal under current

conditions would probably lead to a North Korean and possibly a Chinese

Communist invasion. The CIA recommended postponing the troop removal

until early 1950. I' In March 1949, however, the administration, while

reaffirming the broad objective of NSC 8 to establish a "united, self-governing,
The North Korean Attack 45

and sovereign Korea," decided in NSC 8/2 to remove its remaining 7,500

troops by 30 June 1949. It would continue political, economic, technical,

military, and other support; regularize the existing U.S. Provisional Military

Advisory Group; intensify training of the South Korean army (formerly

constabulary), coast guard, and police; and build up equipment and supply

stockpiles. It would increase the supply basis for the ROK army from 50,000

men to its actual strength of nearly 65,000, including some air detachments.

The United States agreed also to support a 35,000-man national police force

and a small coast guard, but no navy or separate air force. I';

U.S. policy toward Korea, as expressed in NSC 8/2, continued to reveal the

ambivalence that had characterized it since 1945. The administration,

strongly prompted by the military, did not want to tie down U.S. forces in

Korea nor to undertake the responsibility and expense of arming the South

Koreans to defend themselves against external aggression. The question

remained, what to do in the event of an attack. Speaking to the National Press

Club in Washington on 12 January 1950, Acheson declared that the U.S.

defensive perimeter in the Pacific ran through the Aleutians to Japan, the

Ryukyu Islands, and the Philippines and that there could be no U.S. guarantee

against aggression for other areas in Asia and the Pacific, which, if attacked,

would have to place "initial reliance" on their own resistance and "then upon

the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United

Nations." Although Acheson called this a force which "so far has not proved

a weak reed to lean on," it was certainly a still untested force. 16

In accordance with NSC 8/2, American troops left Korea on 29 June 1949

under UN observation, USAFIK disbanded as of midnight of 30 June, and the

interim military agreement automatically ended. The ROK army, which one

U. S. officer declared "could have been the American army in 1775," along

with the police and coast guard, took over responSibility for South Korean

security. On 1 July 1949 the provisional U.S. advisory team became the

permanent U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG),

under the continued leadership of General Roberts. Serving as part of the

American Mission in Korea under the administrative control of Ambassador

Muccio, it maintained liaison with MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo. Authorized a strength of 472 officers and men at the end of 1949, KMAG was

planning inJune 1950 to reduce this number. 17 U.S. assistance to South Korea,

as Secretary Johnson later testified, amounted to $444 million in economic

and $56 million in military aid between 1945 and June 1950.' The Truman

administration allocated slightly more than $10 million in grant military aid

• This was under the Surplus Property Act of 1944. The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949

provided for military assistance beginning in FY 1950.
46 THE TEST OF WAR

for FY 1950 and planned to support a ROK army of 84,000, but both Roberts

and Muccio believed that Korea needed at least $20 million. Less than $1,000

worth of this military aid actually reached Korea before mid-1950. III

As the fateful last Sunday of June 1950 approached, South Korea had

approximately 95,000 men in an eight-division army. The earlier ROK

decision to expand beyond the C.S. support base of 65,000 had created major

equipment gaps and serious interference with the KMAG training program.

Unit training was further disrupted in 1950 because the ROK army, having

fought 542 counterguerrilla operations in the last half of 1949, had two

divisions almost constantly engaged in guard or antiguerrilla duty. Although

there was no U.S. commitment to support a Korean air force, the Rhee

government had created a small force that by June 1950 consisted of

approximately 1,800 officers and men with 14 liaison and 10 trainer aircraft.

The 6,000-man coast guard possessed about 58 serviceable vessels. Both

services had a few KMAG advisers, but the efforts of Roberts and Muccio to

obtain more U.S. advisers and equipment, including aircraft, had not succeeded. In all, the South Korean armed forces totaled approximately 103,000

men in June 1950. In addition, the South Korean national police-with a

strength of 48,000, motley equipment, a few assigned U.S. advisers, and

control divided between the national and provincial governments-had

to cover the eight mainland provinces and the islands of Cheju-do and

Ullung-do. I')

Although the South Koreans believed that the North Koreans had more

than :HlO,OOO men under arms, the U.S. embassy in Seoul estimated the figure

to be about 103,000, and the CIA set their strength at 98,500. After the

invasion, U.S. sources placed North Korean strength at between 90,000 and

100,000 men, organized into approximately ..., divisions and 5 brigades.

Well-trained and armed by the Soviets, the North Koreans had heavy armor,

artillery, and high-performance aircraft. 20

In numbers alone, the South Korean forces were relatively close to, or

slightly greater than, the northern forces. As for effectiveness, Muccio

considered ROK troops, except for their lack of air strength, to be superior in

"training, leadership, morale, marksmanship and ... small arms equipment." Muccio thought that, given some measure of air defense and heavy

artillery, they would be reasonably equal if not superior to the North Korean,

but not Soviet or Chinese, forces. The CIA estimated that the North Koreans,

with superiority in armor, heavy artillery, and aircraft, could reach "limited

objectives in short-term military operations against southern Korea, including

the capture of Seoul" In the long term, the North Koreans would have to

depend on increased Soviet support, which would be forthcoming if requested. Believing that regular Sodet or Chinese Communist military units
The North Korean Attack 47

would join in only as a last resort, the CIA questioned whether North Korea

could gain effective control over all of South Korea. In the absence of an overt

attack, it thought the current North Korean program of "propaganda, infiltration, sabotage, subversion and guerrilla operations" would not succeed if

U. S. aid to South Korea continued. 21

Meanwhile, both North and South Korea were playing a dangerous game

along the 38th parallel. More than 400 North Korean armed forays across the

border occurred in the second half of 1949; some resulted in heavy casualties.

By mid- I 950 five South Korean divisions were busy guarding the border. To

complicate matters, the South Koreans also precipitated some border incidents, many occurring when they attempted to take and prepare defensive

positions along the 38th parallel or even north of it. Although the South

Koreans were excitable and at times provocative, UNCOK field observers

reported on 24 June 1950 that the ROK forces were organized defensively

along the 38th parallel and in no position to carry out a large-scale attack.

Furthermore, they lacked the equipment for aggressive action; the United

States was not even preparing them to repulse an attack against their own

territory. If such an attack came, KMAG officers estimated that supply would

be on a "bare subsistence basis," with full-scale, defensive operations supportable for about 15 days. Apparently few South Koreans or KMAG personnel

doubted that an attack would eventually come. 22

Combating Aggression

Although the South Koreans had long been apprehensive, the North

Korean attack, at about 4:00 a.m. on Sunday, 25 June 1950 (Korean time),'

proved unexpected, partly because of the many earlier "false starts." Invading

in four major drives across the 38th parallel, including amphibious landings

on the east coast, the North Koreans used approximately 6 infantry divisions

and other army and border constabulary units, supported by about 100 tanks,

heavy artillery, and 100 to 150 combat planes. Concentrating in the west,

their forces quickly captured Kaesong, pushed toward Uijongbu about 17

miles from Seoul, and before the day ended made air attacks on Kimpo airport

near Seoul and reportedly new over Seoul.

Late on 25 June the North Korean government broadcast a claim that

South Koreans had invaded north of the 38th parallel and that the North

• It was :1:00 p.m. Saturday afternoon, 2-'1 June, in Washington. To account for time differences

between Korea and Washington. 1:1 hours must be added to Washington's Daylight Savings Time

and 14 hours to Eastern Standard Time. Ikcause MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo operated on

daylight time, 14 hours must be added to EDT. Dates are based on the place of action.
48 THE TEST OF WAR

Korean army was "putting up stiff counter-operations." While the five lightly

armed and surprised South Korean divisions fell back before the invaders,

Ambassador Muccio termed the North's claim an attempt to "clothe their

naked aggression . . . with patently absurd charges." The United Nations

observers in South Korea regarded the situation as serious, with the possibility

of "full-fledged war. ,,2~ In Washington, Secretary Johnson, who received the

news Saturday night, 24 June, delegated responsibility to act on behalf of the

Department of Defense to Secretary of the Army Pace. Shortly after midnight,

the Army set up a command post to serve as a clearinghouse for messages from

and to the State Department, the military services, and the Far East. From

Independence, Truman approved State Department advice to place the matter

before the United Nations. 2'

On 25 June Truman, recalling unhappily the dire history of appeasement

in the days before World War II, returned to Washington. Meeting the

president's plane, Johnson and Acheson discussed with Truman the possibility

of U.S. involvement. John Foster Dulles, later to preside over many crises

himself as secretary of state and at the time in the Far East as a consultant to

Acheson on Japan, advocated the employment of U.S. force if necessary, under

UN aegis. From Moscow, the U.S. Embassy cabled that the North Korean attack

represented a "clearcut Soviet challenge" and recommended support for the

South Koreans. State Department intelligence asserted that there was "no

possibility that the North Koreans acted without prior instruction from

Moscow" and emphasized the blow to U.S. prestige if South Korea fe11.2~

Acheson believed Soviet involvement almost a foregone conclusion and that it

would be necessary to "steel ourselves for the use of force."· 26

The UN Security Council, with Soviet representative Jacob Malik still

boycotting the sessions,t at about 6:00 p.m. on 25 June adopted (9 to 0, with

Yugoslavia abstaining) a resolution calling for the immediate end of hostilities

in Korea, the withdrawal of the North Korean forces above the 38th parallel,

and the assistance of UN members in carrying out the resolution. The major

question before the president was what to do if North Korean forces ignored

the UN resolution. P

Flanked that evening by the Joint Chiefs and the service secretaries,

Johnson joined Acheson and four other State Department officials for dinner

with the president at Blair House. At the time, the secretary of defense seemed

• A cogent argument against the theory that the Soviets ordered the attack was made as early as

the spring of 1951 by a former member of the U.S. military government in Korea (see Wilbur W.

Hitchcock. "North Korea Jumps the Gun." in Norman A. Graebner. ed, Nationalism and

Communism in Asia: The American Response, 9"'O-lO9).

t Malik had been boycotting the Security Council meetings since January 1950 as a protest against

its refusal to seat the Chinese Communist regime in place of the Chinese Nationalists.
The North Korean Attack 49

less concerned about Korea than Formosa, which he thought more important

to the United States. 2H Thoroughly worried about the Korean situation,

Acheson had several recommendations he had hammered out with the

military earlier in the day. He suggested to Truman that MacArthur be directed

to send to Korea military supplies over and above those in the regular military

assistance program, that u.s. aircraft cover the evacuation of u.s. dependents

from Korea, that further aid for Korea be considered, that the Seventh Fleet

move from the Philippines to Formosa to prevent any attack on or from that

island, and that aid to French forces in Indochina be stepped up.• 29

Since the Joint Chiefs as a body had no recommendations, Johnson asked

each of the chiefs and service secretaries to speak individually. The chiefs

generally supported the actions that Acheson had suggested; General Collins

in addition wanted MacArthur to send a survey group to Korea. Believing that

the Soviets did not want all-out war, General Bradley and Admiral Sherman felt

that Korea was as good a place as any to stop adventurism. General

Vandenberg agreed that the North Koreans should be stopped, but he warned

that, if the Soviets intervened, Russian jets would operate from much closer

bases than the Americans. Secretary Pace and General Bradley questioned the

advisability of using U.S. ground forces in Korea and Johnson opposed such

use. Agreeing that MacArthur should send military supplies to Korea, Johnson

frowned on any real delegation of presidential authority to the Far East

commander. In what may have been a remarkable presentiment of the future,

he counseled that MacArthur's instructions should be detailed, "so as not to

give him too much discretion." 30

Truman agreed to authorize MacArthur to send supplies and a survey

group to Korea, use U.S. air to protect supply deliveries and cover the

evacuation of U.S. dependents, move fleet units from California to Hawaii, and

send the Seventh Fleet to a new base in Japan but without any final decision

as to its mission. He told the Air Force to plan-stressing that the order was

only for planning purposes-to "wipe out all Soviet air bases in the Far East. "

He instructed the State and Defense Departments to surmise where the next

Soviet action might be expected. The president directed that U.S. action be

confined for the moment to Korea and to the United Nations, and he warned

the conferees against any public comments or press leaks.·~ I

Monday, 26 June, saw "rapid deterioration and disintegration" in South

Korea; its National Assembly appealed to the United States and the United

Nations for help. Reporting that the North Korean invasion was "wellplanned, concerted and full-scale," with South Korean forces "taken completely by surprise," the UN Commission on Korea thought the conflict was

• On Indochina, see Chapter XL
50 THE TEST OF WAR

assuming major proportions. Evacuating female employees and dependents,

Ambassador Muccio worried about bringing out the rest of the embassy

staff. 52

These developments created a bleak background that evening for the

president's second Blair House meeting, when he approved four additional

steps proposed by Acheson. Truman waived all restrictions on U.S. air and

naval operations below the 38th parallel to give South Korean forces full

support and a chance to regroup. Beyond Korea, he increased U.S. military

forces in and accelerated military aid to the Philippines, and he increased aid

and ordered a strong military mission sent to Indochina. He also approved

Acheson's proposal to order the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack against or

from Formosa. Pleased with this move, Johnson stated that he agreed with the

recommended actions, and he hoped that these steps would settle the Korean

problem. But no one was confident of the outcome. Collins thought the

situation very serious, and Bradley worried that if U.S. troops went into Korea

the United States would lack forces to meet its other commitments without

mobilization. Truman broached the probable need for funds and mobilization,

and in a solemn mood said, "I don't want to go to war. ,,55

With Acheson and Johnson, the Joint Chiefs, and the service secretaries

present, Truman met with congressional leaders on Tuesday, 27 June, to brief

them. With few exceptions, the congressional reaction was supportive, and

the president released a public statement about the situation. In the afternoon

the House approved, 315 to 4, a bill extending the Selective Service Act for

one year, with a special provision allowing the callup of all reservists; the next

day the Senate followed suit, 70 to O. With the Soviet representative still

absenting himself, the UN Security Council on 27 June adopted (7 to 1)' a

second u.S.-sponsored resolution recommending that all UN members

"furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel

the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."

The UN resolution adopted the U.S. decision taken earlier; Acheson later

wrote that some U.S. action, "said to be in support of the resolution ofJune

27, was in fact ordered, and possibly taken prior to the resolution. ,,34

The situation in Korea continued to deteriorate. Brig. Gen. John H.

Church, whose survey group had become the GHQ Advance Command and

Liaison Group in Korea (ADCOM), reached Korea about 7:00 p.m. on 27 June

and tried to rally Korean defenses along the Han River. With three ROK

divisions no longer existing as organized units and the KMAG advisers still

• To demonstrate its independence. Yugoslavia voted against the resolution; Egyptian and Indian

representatives. lacking instructions. abstained. The Indians later supported the resolution; Egypt

did not. The United States on 3 July took the view that it was satisfied with benevolent neutrality

on the part of Yugoslavia and would not press for open support.
The North Korean Attack 51

unaccounted for, Church reported to MacArthur that u.s. ground forces would

be needed to drive the North Korean invaders back to the 38th parallel. By the

evening of 28 June the central front had caved in and Seoul and Kimpo airfield

were in North Korean hands. At Muccio's urging, Rhee and other South

Korean leaders left Seoul and tried to reestablish the South Korean government at Taejon. 3s

Early on 28 June in Washington: Acheson sent Johnson a draft policy

statement indicating that, although the decision to commit U.S. air and sea

power in Korea had been taken "in the full realization of a risk of war with the

Soviet Union," it did "not in itself constitute a decision to engage in a major

war" with the Soviets if their troops intervened in Korea. In that event,

Acheson felt, U.S. forces should defend themselves and report to Washington.

Johnson sent this message to the Joint Chiefs, who were already thinking in

terms of increases in naval forces but did not want to commit U.S. ground

troops. 36

The National Security Council met that afternoon in the White House,

with the Joint Chiefs and service secretaries again present. Directing a review

of all policy dealing with areas along the Soviet perimeter and an analysis of

possible Soviet moves, Truman also agreed with Acheson that the Pentagon

should study U.S. military capabilities to meet any emergency. The president

observed that he did not want to abandon Korea unless a new military

situation elsewhere required him to do so. It was noted that after only two

days of operations in Korea, U.S. air power was experiencing difficulties

because of the distance between U.S. bases and the operational zone, bad

weather, enemy camouflage, and the prohibition on going north of the 38th

parallel to destroy enemy bases or pursue enemy aircraft. The president

remarked that the last problem might be considered later. 37

Events on Thursday, 29 June, hastened the full involvement of U.S. forces

in Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were now considering whether MacArthur

should be authorized to extend air and naval operations above the 38th

parallel into North Korea if necessary to avoid losing South Korea. However

reluctantly, they were also moving toward the commitment of U.S. ground

troops to provide for communications and transportation service-and for

combat if necessary-to protect the southeastern port and airfield of Pusan.

Recognizing that such a move would require presidential authorization,

Johnson asked Truman to meet again with his advisers. The meeting was

scheduled for 5:00 p.m. that day. 38

After Johnson read a proposed JCS directive to MacArthur, Acheson

supported the use of air operations above the 38th parallel so long as they did

not approach the international borders of North Korea; he showed no aversion

to the proposed assignment of U.S. ground forces, which he regarded as a
52 THE TEST OF WAR

limited commitment. More cautious, Truman stated that air and naval operations above the 38th parallel should be allowed only to destroy munitions

supplies. Stressing that US. operations in Korea were to restore peace and

maintain the South Korean border, the president had reservations about

Acheson's proposed policy in the event of Soviet intervention in Korea.

Truman thought a defend-and-report order, essentially Acheson's suggestion,

might be acceptable as a directive to MacArthur, but he did not want any

public disclosure of its contents. He did not want the United States so deeply

committed that contingencies elsewhere could not be met. State and Defense

agreed to rewrite the directive. Truman also decided to direct MacArthur "to

make a full and complete report" on the Far Eastern situation. 39

The council discussed two other important matters. The Soviets had that

day refused a US. request to intercede in Korea, referring in their answer to

the "principle of the impermissibility of interference by foreign powers in the

internal affairs of Korea." The People's Republic of China (PRe) meanwhile

denounced the US. support of South Korea. Acheson interpreted these two

communications to mean that the Soviets would not themselves intervene, but

that they might use the Chinese Communists. More encouraging was the

increasing number of offers of assistance from other UN members. The

president wanted to accept all offers to ensure that the response in Korea had

as much UN representation as possible. 40

By 7:00 p.m. Johnson and Acheson had agreed to a new directive for

MacArthur, sent later that evening. It authorized the general to use US. naval

and air forces to provide the "fullest possible support" for South Korean

efforts and to employ U.S. Army forces for essential service support and to

ensure "retention of a port and air base" at Pusan. MacArthur could extend air

and naval operations into North Korea against purely military targets if

essential to his mission or to avoid unnecessary casualties. But he was directed

to take special care to avoid operations near the North Korean borders with

Manchuria and the Soviet Union. The order also repeated the U.S. decision to

neutralize Formosa. Finally, MacArthur was told to take defensive measures,

not to aggravate the situation, and to report to Washington if Soviet forces

intervened. 41

By the time these orders went out from Washington on 29 June, it was

already the morning of 30 June in Korea, where MacArthur was considerably

ahead of his Washington colleagues in more than time. Earlier that morning

and despite poor weather, MacArthur had led a high-ranking group of 14

officers on a visit to Korea. During the trip there, he had ordered Far East Air

Forces (FEAF) headquarters to attack North Korean airfields. Arriving in

Suwon, about 20 miles south of Seoul, MacArthur met with General Church,

Ambassador Muccio, and President Rhee, then drove to the south bank of the
The North Korean Attack 53

Han River, where the disorganized South Koreans were rapidly retreating from

the already-lost Seoul. Church could account for only 8,000 South Korean

troops that morning but expected to locate 25,000 by evening. As for

Americans, Church had his own ADCOM group, Roberts's KMAG, and 33 men

from an antiaircraft battalion that had arrived that day and had seen immediate

action. By the end of his visit, MacArthur decided that U.S. ground forces

were needed if South Korea was to be saved; he so informed Washington. 42

MacArthur's message arrived in Washington before 1:00 a.m. on 30 June.

He requested authorization to send in a U.S. regimental combat team and to

build to a strength of two divisions in preparation for an early counteroffensive. In a teletype conference with General Collins at 4:00 a.m. (Washington

time), MacArthur held firm to his recommendation. When Pace informed the

president, Truman immediately authorized the use of the regimental combat

team but not the two-division buildup.43

At another meeting with the Blair House participants early that morning,

Truman informed them of what he had done. Because of the unavailability of

U.S. troops for a quick buildup in Korea, he seemed inclined to accept a

Chinese Nationalist offer of 33,000 troops from Formosa. Acheson, however,

feared that the Nationalists' involvement might trigger Chinese Communist

intervention in Korea or Formosa, and the Joint Chiefs expressed reluctance to

divert u.s. transport and equipment to the Nationalists' use. Accepting these

objections, Truman decided to grant MacArthur "full authority" to use in

Korea the U.S. ground forces under his command inJapan. The president also

approved a naval blockade of North Korea. The die was cast, with the

apparent approval of all concerned, in a meeting that lasted about half an

hour. 44

Johnson and other key administration officials joined the president again

at 11 :00 a.m. on 30 June to meet with congressional leaders. Describing the

steps being taken in Korea, Truman stressed that the United States had acted

under the auspices of the United Nations. While most of the senators and

representatives seemed to approve, Sen. Kenneth Wherry questioned the

president's legal authority to send ground troops to Korea without consulting

Congress, and Sen. Alexander Smith suggested that the administration obtain

a supporting congressional resolution. The press release Truman read at the

meeting and issued later that day mentioned operations against specific

military targets in North Korea and the imposition of a naval blockade, but it

dealt less than frankly with the decision to commit U.S. ground troops to the

defense of South Korea: "General MacArthur has been authorized to use

certain supporting ground units." Secretary Johnson showed no such reticence, however, when he talked with New York Times reporter Harold B.

Hinton, who filed a story clearly indicating the scope of the decisions. 45
54 THE TEST OF WAR

In four steps-the decision on 25 June to give equipment to the Koreans

and to use U.S. air and naval forces to ensure the safe evacuation of Americans

from Korea; on 26 June, to use u.s. air and naval strength below the 38th

parallel to support the South Korean army; on 29 June, to allow U.S. air and

naval operations north of the 38th parallel; and on 30 June, to use U.S. ground

forces in Korea and to blockade North Korea-the United States committed

itself to a difficult and treacherous Asian ground war that was to last more

than three years. Testifying a year later before congressional committees,

Johnson stated that the impetus to use U.S. forces had come from the secretary

of state. The military, Johnson noted, had pointed out the difficulties and

limitations of military action, but they had "neither recommended it nor

opposed it. ,,46

This commitment of the United States to full-scale combat in Korea must

be regarded as one of the most fateful decisions in U.S. and world history after

1945. The evidence assembled and analyzed by scholars who subsequently

subjected the events to meticulous inspection serves primarily to emphasize

the complexity of the background against which the decisions were made. It

is clear that many factors influenced the president and contributed to the

decisions at each stage in the tense days between 25 and 30 June.

Perhaps of most immediate effect were the powerful, nearly irresistible

pressures for a swift response to the frantic pleas for military succor from the

Korean government and MacArthur. U.S. security and foreign policy considerations-concern for the U.S. world leadership role-obviously weighed

heavily. More subtle but equally compelling were domestic pressures that

inclined the administration toward intervention. Truman and Acheson had

been subjected to harsh and growing criticism of their Far East policy for

several years before the Korean War. These criticisms centered on the China

policy-the "loss of China," the failure to support Chiang Kai-shek and

Formosa, the Communist threat elsewhere in Asia. Republican senatorschiefly Robert A. Taft, William P. Knowland, Kenneth Wherry, Joseph R.

McCarthy, and William Jenner-had propagated a "soft on communism"

issue, accusing the President of appeasement and foreign policy failures. This

political assault had put Truman increasingly on the defensive and probably

contributed to the administration's taking measures, such as tightened internal

security, to demonstrate its awareness of subversive danger from within as

well as from without. By late June 1950 the McCarthy campaign against the

internal Communist danger was in full cry, requiring the administration to

defend itself against accusations that were generally lacking in substance but

potentially damaging politically.

The domestic political atmosphere, then, had to be very much on the

mind of the president and his advisers, especially Acheson, during these early
The North Korean Attack 55

days of the Korean War. It is reasonable to assume that it was one of the factors

that the administration weighed in the balance in making decisions. While

there is no specific evidence that it directly influenced any decision, its effect,

even if only unconscious, may well have been considerable. To have failed to

go to the aid of South Korea would undoubtedly have unleashed a torrent of

criticism that might well have reached political crisis proportions. It would no

doubt have given rise to accusations of the "loss of Korea." In light of these

possible serious political consequences for the administration, it would have

been difficult for Truman to resist the direction in which his instincts and

events were taking him anyway-toward intervention.

Truman was thus on firm political ground in making the decisions that led

to full U.S. involvement in the Korean War. It is clear that he had the supportthe enthusiastic endorsement-of Congress, the press, and the public. The

Republican opposition approved the president's actions while still blaming the

administration for not having acted more forcefully in the past. In light of the

state of both international and domestic affairs at the time, it is hard to

conceive that Truman could have decided other than he did between 25 and

30 June.

Nonetheless, the United States made the commitment to Korea without

clear answers to questions concerning immediate and long-range objectives,

particularly with regard to maintaining or ending the division of Korea at the

38th parallel, reacting to possible Soviet or Chinese Communist intervention,

or responding to a Soviet military initiative elsewhere. Nor did U.S. leaders

know precisely how, acting in support of the UN resolutions of 25 and 27

June, to bring about a truly multinational effort in Korea.

The United Nations Command

Fighting a war under the United Nations required new and uncharted

procedures. By 4 July the State Department proposed a unified command that

would fly the UN flag and be headed by a U.S. officer who would periodically

report to a UN special committee that would review offers of assistance and

advise the UN Security Council. Johnson and the Joint Chiefs, however,

disliked the idea of a UN committee that might want to exercise operational

control of forces in Korea. With this feature removed, Truman approved the

plan,' and the UN Security Council adopted it on 7 JulyY

• Although drafted in the State Department, some department officials found the final UN

resolution regarding command in the Korean War "defective" since it merely called on the u.s.

president to designate the UN commander rather than clarifying the president's authority in the

chain of command by making him the commander and calling on him to designate a deputy.
56 THE TEST OF WAR

There could be little doubt that MacArthur-already Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) for the occupation of Japan, Commander in

Chief, Far East (CINCFE) for all U.S. military forces in the area, and the

Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Far East (CG USAFFE)-

would become the UN commander in chief. Truman approved the choice on

8 July, and the Joint Chiefs informed MacArthur on 10 July. He immediately

established a United Nations Command (UNC) with headquarters in Tokyo and

on 12July assigned to the Eighth U.S. Army, then on occupation duty in Japan,

responSibility for ground operations in Korea. Subsequently, its commander,

Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker, set up his headquarters in Korea (EUSAK) and

assumed command over U.S. and, with the approval of President Rhee, South

Korean troopS.elM MacArthur was directed to emphasize the United Nations

aspect of his command and to submit action reports to the UN Security

Council. 4\1 Johnson and the Joint Chiefs objected, however, when the Department of State prepared the initial report in Washington. After this, UNC

headquarters prepared and submitted semimonthly reports, which, after JCS

review, went in turn to the secretary of defense, the Department of State, and,

finally, the UN Security Council. ~o

Although the United Nations Command initially included only South

Korean and U.S. troops, Truman wanted the armed forces in Korea to be "truly

representative of the United Nations." Because of the mix of military and

political factors, both Defense and State were to review all offers, and all

decisions were to be made in Washington. In OSD, Deputy Secretary Early,

who led a determined effort to get the State Department to involve other

countries, enthusiastically applied Truman's policy. I The British immediately

offered naval forces, explicitly limiting their use to Korea and excluding any

participation in the U.S. effort in Formosa; by 30 June, the Netherlands,

Australia, Canada, and New Zealand had also offered naval or air forces. The

United States quickly accepted all these contingents for the UNe. By this time,

however, only 7 of the 47 countries that favored the two UN resolutions of 25

and 27 June had offered military assistance to Korea. Many UN members

apparently hoped for a qUick end to the Korean affair, and, indeed, the British

and Indians were trying, futilely, to get the Soviet Union to mediate.';2

On 7 July the secretaries of the military departments informed Johnson

that they wanted at least "symbol troops" from Britain, France, the Netherlands, Scandinavia, and Canada; they also felt that there should be some Asian

forces and they hoped in particular for Indian troops. Johnson shared their

sentiments and conveyed them to Truman. Six days later, the service secretaries told Johnson they felt it imperative for the other UN member nations to

send ground troops; otherwise Americans might become reluctant to support

NATO. With the UNC not faring well in Korea, the need for Allied help was
The North Korean Attack 57

more than symbolic, but only two more small offers-of one ship by the

French and 30 officers by the Bolivians-came at this time. 53

Less enthusiastic than either Johnson or the service secretaries about

international military contributions of units differing in language, training,

and equipment, the JCS advised Johnson on 14 July that u.s. acceptance of

further military offers should hinge on military usefulness and that they

wanted to be consulted in each instance. They listed the United Kingdom,

Australia, Pakistan, New Zealand, and Canada as possible providers of ground

units. 54 Johnson told the Joint Chiefs he would consult with them on all

offers, but he noted the president's desire to accept all national contingents,

which he fully supported. In fact, Johnson had already agreed to accept an

offer the Joint Chiefs had rejected on military grounds. Meanwhile, he asked

the JCS to provide general criteria for acceptability, to name all countries from

which offers could be utilized, and to indicate the feasible size of the

contribution. 55

In response, the Joint Chiefs stipulated that they wanted contributions of

approximately 1,000 men organized into an infantry battalion, with combat

and service support, full equipment, 60 days' level of supply, and sufficient

English-speaking personnel to avoid communications problems. Transportation should be provided by the parent nation or a contributing UN nation;

logistic support, by the parent nation or by the United States on a reimbursable

basis. Similar terms applied to naval forces. Accepting these criteria, Johnson

also supported a JCS recommendation against any U.S. undertaking to

organize, train, and equip an international unit composed of individual

volunteers from nations unable or unwilling to support a national unit. 56

Seeking Johnson's agreement to encourage "maximum direct participation" by all UN members,· Acheson on 24 July spelled out somewhat different

procedures. He believed tenders of assistance should be made to the United

Nations, then communicated to the U.S. Government, which would arrange

the specific details with the proferring government. The United States should

accept all offers of assistance, even if unusable, Acheson urged Johnson, but

State would try to get proposals modified to a usable form. Further, the United

States should not solicit military units unless they were to be employed in the

combat area. 57

By late July there were seven offers of ground forces ranging in size up to

a brigade. Concerned about the pOSSibility of accepting assistance that might

not be used and fretting that the United States might acquire some embarrassing future obligations, Johnson on 31 July asked the joint Chiefs to comment

• The UN secretary general on 14 July had sent a second request for aid to the 53 UN members

then supporting the UN resolutions on Korea.
58 THE TEST OF WAR

on Acheson's proposed procedure, but he did not have time to act on their 8

September response before his resignation. The new secretary, Marshall, did

not disagree with Acheson but reiterated the JCS view that Allied military

assistance should come immediately, conform as closely as possible to the JCS

general criteria, and carry no commitment on combat employment. S8

In practice, the JCS criteria had to be modified. On 7 August the Joint

Chiefs significantly changed one condition by providing that a unit as small as

a company might be accepted. Although both Johnson and Marshall wanted to

maintain the principle of reimbursement for US. supplies, this too was

changed at State's insistence. S9 The United States waived or reduced some

payments and allowed the use of US. grant aid for equipping national forces

for service in Korea. These steps helped make the Korean defense an

international effort. 60

By 5 January 1951, 16 nations other than the United States and South

Korea-Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Ethiopia, France,

Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, South

Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Kingdom-had sent or agreed to

contribute military units to South Korea's defense. All except South Africa sent

ground forces, the United Kingdom in significant numbers; at least 10 nations

also sent naval and/or air forces. British and Australian ground forces arrived

in August and September 1950, the Turkish in October; all three forces were

involved in combat action by early fall. The last contingent to arrive, the

Colombian, came in June 1951. By mid-November 1951, military units of all

contributing countries, except Cuba, had seen action in Korea. Many acquired

outstanding combat records, with, unfortunately, accompanying casualties. In

addition, Denmark, India, Norway, and Sweden-and also Italy, not yet a UN

member-contributed medical units. By the end of the war, 22 other UN

members and 5 nonmembers made offers that for one reason or another were

not implemented. 61

The United Nations Command in Korea, symbolically at least, betokened

a United Nations effort, but the U.S. component remained by far the largest,

providing as of November 1951 more than 50 percent of ground forces, 83

percent of naval forces, and 98 percent of air forces. South Korean contingents

constituted approximately 43 percent of ground forces, 9 percent of naval,

and less than 1 percent of air forces. Other UN nations provided about 6

percent of the ground forces, 8 percent of naval forces. and 1 percent of all air

forces. 62

Finding U. S. Troops for Korea

Involvement in the Korean War quickly revealed US. shortages, particularly in ground forces. In June 1950, the Army had 10 divisions-4 in the Far
The North Korean Attack 59

East under MacArthur, 1 in Germany, and 5 in the continental United States.

The occupation forces in Japan were under strength and not combat-ready;

the troops in Germany were indispensable there. Most of the divisions in the

United States were under strength and one division was considered unsuitable

for service in Korea. Collins wanted to keep the 82d Airborne Division at

home and "intact for emergency use anywhere. ,,63

On 30 June the president gave MacArthur permission to use all the

divisions under his command; Washington initially thought that the U.S.

forces already in Japan might suffice. Truman also agreed when MacArthur on

2 July asked for a marine regimental combat team with its attached air unit.

However, when MacArthur on 5 July requested shipment of an infantry

division, an engineer special brigade, and an airborne regiment for operations

to take place between 20 July and 10 August, the Joint Chiefs asked him to

estimate his total needs. Meanwhile, the U.S. forces so hastily thrown into

battle met the enemy for the first time on 5 July at Osan, about 30 miles south

of Seoul, and took a severe mauling over the next few days. Bradley told the

NSC on 6 July that there were only about 25,000 South Korean and 13,000

U.S. troops in Korea to fight approximately 90,000 North Koreans. 64

Reassessing the situation on 7 July, MacArthur told the Joint Chiefs that

his forces controlled the air and sea, but the ground war was going poorly.

The aggressive and well-trained North Korean force, well equipped and

excellently led, had shown "superior command of strategic and tactical

principles." Once the enemy was stopped, MacArthur intended to exploit U.S.

air and sea power and make an amphibious strike behind the mass of the

enemy's ground forces. To do this, he needed 4 to 4 1/2 full-strength infantry

divisions, an airborne regimental combat team, and an armored group with

full artillery and service elements. The Army would have to provide approximately 30,000 men from the United States. Naval and air forces, currently

adequate, would probably have to be augmented later, although MacArthur

had already supported a Far East Air Forces request for 700 additional planes.

MacArthur also warned that intervention by either the Chinese Communists

or Soviets would create a new and unpredictable situation. 65

MacArthur's request made clear the imperative need to augment U.S.

forces. Bypassing Johnson, Truman sent White House aides to the Joint Chiefs

to get some idea of the numbers. When Johnson discovered this, he called in

the Joint Chiefs and immediately forwarded their request for 108,500 more

men to the president without comment. After discussing the requirement at

the Cabinet meeting on 7 July, Truman authorized Defense to exceed the

military personnel budget ceilings, to use the draft, and to accept reservist

volunteers; eventually he approved MacArthur's request. The requirements for

4 to 412 divisions could be met by using 3 u.s. divisions still in Japan and

sending approximately 11/2 divisions from the United States. 66
60 THE TEST OF WAR

On 9 July MacArthur drastically increased his requirement, asking for the

immediate dispatch of four divisions from the United States. The North

Korean force, MacArthur indicated, seemed to have Soviet leadership and

technical guidance combined with some Chinese Communist ground elements. Even holding the southern tip of Korea was "increasingly problematical." The following day, MacArthur asked that Eighth Army's four understrength divisions be built up to full war strength, and he raised his request for

a Marine regimental combat team to a division.67

MacArthur's requests, which Collins viewed as "perfectly legitimate and

warranted," had in 10 days' time raised the military requirement for u.s.

ground forces in Korea from 2 divisions to 8 or more, thereby creating a major

dilemma. Meeting MacArthur's needs would strip both Japan and the United

States of troops and leave nothing to bolster Europe's defenses or meet any

other contingency. To ignore MacArthur's needs would cast doubt on the

ability of the United States and the UN to enforce the UN mandate in Korea.68

While the Joint Chiefs studied MacArthur's 9 July request, Truman sent

Generals Collins and Vandenberg to the Far East for a firsthand look. Arriving

on 13 July, they found MacArthur confident that the North Korean advance

could be halted and the battlefield stabilized, although he was uncertain when

or where. Once that occurred and he received his reinforcements, he planned

to launch a counteroffensive, including an amphibious operation, to cut off

enemy forces. He wanted to interdict North Korean supplies from Manchuria

and Vladivostok by daily bombing attacks and noted that the tunnels and

bridges of those supply routes offered "a unique opportunity" for the use of

the atomic bomb. He envisioned cutting off Chinese Communist reinforcements by operations in North Korea rather than by advancing into Manchuria

and speculated that he might have to occupy all of Korea. 6

,)

Above all, MacArthur, who before the 25 June attack had viewed Korea as

strategically unimportant to U.S. interests, now spoke of the vital importance

of meeting the Communist challenge. "We win here or lose everywhere,"

MacArthur told Collins and Vandenberg; "if we win here, we improve the

chances of winning everywhere." He reiterated his need for eight infantry

divisions. Collins warned that it was not realistic to expect four more U.S.

divisions, although the earlier requests would probably be met. With U.S.

resources scarce, Collins told MacArthur's staff not to get "too grandiose."

Reporting later to Johnson and Truman, Collins observed that the South

Korean and u.s. forces could probably maintain a bridgehead around Pusan,

and he urged sending U.S. reinforcements promptly.70

Washington was already planning to send certain available separate

regiments and regimental combat teams to Korea and to further expand the

u.s. armed forces. On 13 July Truman informally approved an Air Force recall
The North Korean Attack 61

ofreserves, and the Joint Chiefs, who had already received their 108,500-man

increase, asked for an additional 115,000. On 18 July they requested a third

increment. Johnson supported the requests, which would raise US. armed

forces' strength from approximately 1.5 million to more than 2. 1 million.

Truman approved the new strengths on 19 Ju1y.7!

As UNC forces continued their grim retreat in South Korea, there was

growing fear in the United States that MacArthur's forces might actually be

pushed off the peninsula. Acutely aware of this, the president decided that he

must report to Congress and the nation. Administration leaders had been

considering such a report since at least 30 June, when Senator Wherry had

questioned the president's authority to send troops to Korea. Although the

president decided not to seek a congressional resolution approving his

action-one of the few matters on which Acheson and Johnson agreedAcheson had strongly urged a report in early July, and the president's personal

speechwriter had prepared a draft. Johnson, on the other hand, wanted the

preSident to delay until they knew what legislation and how much money

would be needed-a position Truman himself favored. However, as the

situation steadily worsened and MacArthur's troop requests arrived in rapid

succession, congressional and public support became vital. Between 15 and

18 July Marx Leva represented Defense in a hectic team effort with State and

the White House to prepare the president's message. 72

On 19 July Truman spoke by radio and television to the American people,

and in a separate message detailed to Congress the course of Korean events and

the initial US. steps taken on behalf of the United Nations. He emphasized

three broad lines of action: The United States would send additional men,

equipment, and supplies to MacArthur; it would rearm US. forces even

beyond the needs of Korea; and it would assist other free nations associated

with the United States to become strong. He announced that he had authorized strength increases, use of the draft, activation of National Guard units,

and the callup of units and individuals from the reserves, and he recommended removal of the statutory limits on the size of the US. armed forces. He

promised to submit an additional appropriation request to Congress within

the next few days.73

Johnson immediately granted the secretaries of the military departments

the necessary authority to call up the National Guard and the reserves, which

together totaled more than 2.5 million, most of whom needed additional

training before service in Korea. By 3 August the Army recalled 134 National

Guard and 202 organized reserve units, with a total strength of about 70,000,

planning to bring these units up to their authorized strength of 161,000 by

recruiting civilian volunteers and recalling both active and inactive reservists.

The Army also sent out draft calls for 100,000 more men, expecting to reach
62 THE TEST OF WAR

900,000 by 31 October. The Navy and Marine Corps planned to reach a

strength of approximately 541,000 by calling up some 91,000 from the

organized reserve and, if necessary, the inactive reserve. The Air Force, calling

up slightly fewer than 50,000 people, expected to reach a strength of almost

462,000. 74

These additions required another increase in armed forces authorized

strength, which, as approved on 10 August, provided ceilings of 1,081,000 for

the Army, approximately 755,000 for the Navy and Marine Corps, and about

548,000 for the Air Force-a total of almost 2.4 million. A few days earlier,

Congress had heeded Truman's call to remove the statutory limitations on the

size of the armed forces. By mid-August, approXimately three full divisions

and two regimental combat teams had been approved for movement from the

United States to the UNC in Korea. These reinforcements began to arrive in

Korea in late July; most reached there by the early fall. Together with the U.S.

divisions in Japan, the surviving South Korean units, and some Allied troops,

they provided MacArthur with the equivalent of the eight-plus divisions he

had sought on 9 July.75

Policy in Pursuit ofEvents

In addition to stabilizing the battlefield, the arrival of large-scale reinforcements would enable MacArthur to go ahead with his plan for an

amphibious attack behind the enemy's main lines, which would, if successful,

place the UNC in a good position to destroy the North Korean armies. This

possibility made more urgent a Washington decision on whether to allow

MacArthur's forces to cross the 38th parallel, under what conditions, and for

what objectives. As early as 12 July, George M. Elsey, one of the president's

administrative assistants, noted that the Pentagon was making plans "without

knowing whether our forces are to stop at the 38th parallel or continue north

to the Manchurian Border." On 17 July Truman formally requested NSC

consideration of what U.S. policy should be when the invaders were driven

back to North Korea. 76

Concerned about what military steps the United States should or could

take if Soviet forces entered Korea, the president asked the secretary of

defense on 29 June to study the problem. The Joint Chiefs informed Johnson

on 10 July that it would be "militarily unsound" for large U.S. forces to fight

in Korea if major Soviet forces entered the war, that it would be better to

minimize the U.S. commitment there and prepare to execute general war

plans, including full-scale mobilization, rather than engage in combat in an
The North Korean Attack 63

area of "slight strategic importance," one chosen by the Soviets, where the

outcome would not be decisive. In complete agreement with the Joint Chiefs,

Johnson on 20 July sent their assessment to the NSC. 77 Declaring that only the

president could decide to execute war plans, State held that the situation

needed to be evaluated. Believing that the USSR would enter the Korean War

within six months, Symington and the NSRB wanted the United States to

participate, consistent with U.S. war plans, in any UN action while simultaneously beginning to mobilize and trying to gain international support. The

NSC tried to resolve the differences, but with the Soviets remaining out of

Korea the council eventually dropped the paper (NSC 76).78

How the United States should respond to Soviet moves elsewhere became

part of the larger study ordered by the president on 28 June, a review of U.S.

policies pertaining to all the countries on the European and Asian perimeters

of the Soviet Union. The initial draft of NSC 73 took a relatively optimistic

view of Soviet intentions in Korea but a pessimistic view of the outcome

should Soviet intentions prove less benign than anticipated. The Joint Chiefs

took issue with the study's emphasis on Soviet intentions rather than

capabilities. They thought that if the Soviets initiated attacks elsewhere that

could be related to the Korean situation, it portended general war and the

United States ought to mobilize. 79

Subsequent drafts responded to the course of events during July and

August, eventually taking a less foreboding view of Soviet intentions as the

USSR showed no indication of intervening in Korea or taking action elsewhere. Reflecting the uncertainties and pressures of this period, the fourth

draft was limited to contingencies occurring within the next two or three

months, leaving NSC 68, still under review, to propose basic long-term

programs. Although the Joint Chiefs continued to take a more pessimistic view

of the Soviet danger, the final version reflected the subtle changes that had

occurred in the U.S. perception of Soviet capabilities and intentions. The JCS

assessment of a "greatly increased" risk of Soviet resort to general war was

tempered to "may have been increased." The study deemed the use of USSR

satellite forces alone, either in Europe or Asia, or the use of Chinese

Communist forces against Formosa or in Korea, as immediate possibilities. It

supported a rapid U.S. buildup to a high level of constant military readiness

and suggested a number of possible American reactions to Soviet moves.

Should the Chinese Communists intervene in Korea, the United States was to

avoid a general war, continue UNC military action in Korea as long as there

was a reasonable chance of success, extend that action to include air and naval

action against the Chinese mainland, and review U.S. military commitments.

With neither Johnson nor Acheson entirely satisfied, the NSC on 24 August
64 THE TEST OF WAR

adopted the paper with minor amendments (NSC 73/4) as a "working guide"

but deferred all final decisions on U.S. reactions until the event was "certain

to occur. "HO

By this time the military situation seemed less ominous and u.s. officials

began to address the possibility that North Korean forces could be driven back

to the 38th parallel. In both State and Defense there were conflicting views on

how to proceed should this occur. Military leaders tended to believe that

MacArthur should cross the 38th parallel, defeat the enemy, and occupy North

Korea in support of a free, united, and independent Korea-provided that the

United States mobilized its strength to cover other strategic areas, the Soviet

Union did not intervene in Korea or elsewhere, and the United Nations

formally changed its war objective to seek Korean unification and

independence. HI The secretaries of the military departments, however, worried that any goal of unifying Korea implied the "expulsion from Korea of the

Communists as an organized political and military force" and a U.S. and UN

military commitment to carry it out, actions beyond current official U.S. or

UN policy. In response to the secretaries' request, Johnson on 29 August asked

for an urgent review of the question. H2 NSC 81 was the result.

In NSC 81, State and Defense planners compromised, stating that no final

decisions on future military action in Korea could yet be made but that there

was a legal basis for limited UNC operations north of the 38th parallel to

"compel the withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind this line or to

defeat these forces." Air and naval operations had been allowed north of the

38th parallel from early in the conflict; now amphibious, airborne, or ground

operations would be permitted. But the conclusions were hedged. MacArthur

was to proceed north of the 38th parallel only if no major Soviet or Chinese

Communist forces had entered Korea, announced their intention to enter, or

threatened to counter UN operations militarily in North Korea. No UNC

operations were to extend close to the Manchurian and Soviet borders of

Korea. "Not in any circumstances" were other than South Korean units to be

used in the northeast province or along the Manchurian border. The paper

also dealt in some detail with military actions to be taken or avoided in the

event of various types of Chinese or Soviet intervention, considered a possible

UNC occupation of North Korea, and offered some principles to govern UN

action in Korea in the posthostilities phase.H3

In general agreement with the NSC 81 draft, the secretaries of the military

departments suggested that MacArthur be required to obtain Washington's

approval before launching any major ground operations above the 38th

parallel. The Joint Chiefs, skeptical that the front could be stabilized above the

38th parallel, thought that the North Koreans might be broken south of the

38th parallel but that subsequent operations, presumably of a guerrilla
The North Korean Attack 65

character and handled by South Korean forces, would have to "take place both

north and south of the 38th parallel." Eager to get U.S. forces out of South

Korea as soon as possible, they wanted any UN occupation of Korea limited to

the principal cities in South Korea and ended speedily. They understood that

MacArthur and Rhee had agreed that the South Korean government, on its

return to Seoul, would grant a general amnesty, call for a general election, and

set up a single government for all Korea. At the NSC meeting on 7 September,

Acheson, Johnson, and Bradley concurred that MacArthur should come to

Washington for a final decision. The council thereupon adopted NSC 81

subject to some redrafting. 84

On 11 September Truman approved NSC 81/1, the revised report, which

declared there was a legal basis for UNC operations north of the 38th parallel

and that such operations would be authorized provided there was no major

Soviet or Chinese Communist intervention, but advance presidential approval

would have to be obtained. Decisions concerning the northern boundaries

altered the prohibition against operations "close to" those borders to one

forbidding operations extending "across" them and diluted the earlier flat

prohibition against the use of non-Korean units in the far north, stating that

"it should be the policy" not to use them. 8 ';

As for the ultimate political objective of military operations, NSC 81/1

concluded that the United States should Vigorously advocate UN adoption of

three principles for the posthostilities period: unification of Korea arranged

by Korean representatives chosen in free elections under UN auspices;

reestablishment of the South Korean government in Seoul as the "only lawful

government in Korea"; and, finally, UN assistance in helping Korea deal with

the economic, social, and political problems attending unification. 86

MacArthur was to plan for a possible occupation of North Korea and the

reorientation of its people; in case of an occupation, he was to consult with

the South Korean government, assume a posture of "liberation rather than

retaliation," and exercise a stabilizing influence. The United States was to

withdraw its forces as soon as practicable after organized North Korean

operations ended. Despite an apparent tilt toward unification rather than a

mere return to the 38th parallel as the goal, NSC 81/1 did not change official

U.S. policy on this point, which awaited UN Security Council action. What

happened would depend on whether MacArthur's planned counterstrike

would succeed. 87

Defeat of the North Koreans

After the first clash with U.S. troops on 5 July the North Koreans pushed

the U.S. and ROK troops of Eighth Army down toward Pusan at the base of the
66 THE TEST OF WAR

peninsula. Not until early August could the Eighth Army establish the "Pusan

perimeter," a line in the form of an inverted "L" protecting this key port.

When the North Koreans began a general offensive on 1 September, they

breached the perimeter at several points and were repelled only with great

difficulty. The original plan for an amphibious landing in July or August

delayed, MacArthur decided on an amphibious landing of two divisions, with

a subsequent airborne drop, to take place on 15 September at Inch' on, near

Seoul on the west coast of Korea. If successful, it would place the United

Nations Command astride the South Korean road and rail net.l'l8

The selection of Inch'on as the site for an amphibious landing was sharply

questioned because it seemed to many, including Admiral Sherman, chief of

naval operations, that the site possessed" every conceivable geographical natural handicap.'" Although these obstacles alarmed many military leaders, MacArthur thought they helped ensure strategic surprise. Inch'on would succeed,

he told Collins and Sherman, and "save 100,000 lives."l'l9 The Joint Chiefs

wavered; Johnson supported the operation. Truman also agreed. The JCS informed MacArthur on 8 September that they approved the Inch'on landing. 9o

Ironically too late for the departingJohnson, the landings on 15 September

proved as successful as MacArthur had envisioned. As Johnson claimed a few

weeks later, MacArthur "hit our enemies 'where they aint'... [and) changed

the course of the Korean campaign in a matter of hours." UNC forces of the

independent X Corps under Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond captured Inch'on on

16 September. By 22 September they had taken Kimpo airport, secured the

south bank ofthe Han River, and overrun Suwon airfield. Walker's Eighth Army

broke out ofthe Pusan perimeter and joined the Inch'on force on 27 September.

Seoul was in UN hands on 28 September, and MacArthur restored the government of Syngman Rhee to its capital city the next day. UNC forces were now

close to or at the 38th parallel. MacArthur currently had approximately

198,000 ground combat troops, including 113,500 Americans, 81,500 South

Koreans, and some 3,000 British and Filipinos. Of 14 North Korean divisions,

only an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 soldiers escaped above the 38th parallel,

but these included much ofthe enemy high command and most senior officers.

The North Koreans were also desperately building up new unitsY I

• Tactical surprise would be impossible because the rocky. shoal-laden approach to the harbor

required a daylight landing and Wolmi-do. a rugged fortified island in the channel. would have to

be taken before Inch'on could be attacked. At high tide. the only time when there would he

enough water for the landing craft, Inch'on lacked beaches and its seawalls rose 12 feet or more

out of the water. Any delay would strand the landing craft. since the harbor became a mud flat at

ebb tide. High tides. furthermore. occurred only rarely If the landing did not come off on IS

September, the next high tide would not occur until I I October. by which time rough waters

would make the Inch,on approach extremely dangerous.
The North Korean Attack 67

This rapid turnabout in the fortunes of the UNC forces compelled the

administration, sooner than anticipated, to make a decision about fighting

beyond the 38th parallel. Following NSC 81/1 guidance, the Joint Chiefs

drafted formal instructions concerning the 38th parallel. State concurred,

with the proviso that the Rhee government be restored only in South Korea,

leaving the political future of North Korea for UN determination. With the

president's approval, the Joint Chiefs on 27 September authorized MacArthur

to cross the 38th parallel provided there was no major Chinese Communist or

Soviet threat. UNC forces were not to cross the Manchurian or USSR borders

in the north, and "as a matter of policy" non-Korean ground forces were not

to be used in the areas bordering those international boundaries. No UN naval

or air power was to operate against Manchuria or Soviet territory. MacArthur

was to submit his plan for approval.92

The JCS directive specified that if major Soviet units became involvedeither openly or covertly north of the 38th parallel or openly south of that

line-MacArthur was to assume a defensive posture and report to Washington.

He was not to discontinue UN air and naval operations north of the 38th

parallel because of the presence of Soviet or Chinese troops, but if either

country announced an intent to reoccupy North Korea and gave warning,

"either explicitly or implicitly, that their forces should not be attacked," he

was to refer the matter at once to Washington. If major Chinese Communist

units intervened in South Korea, either openly or covertly, UNC action would

continue as long as there was "a reasonable chance of successful resistance."

If small Chinese or Soviet units operated covertly south of the 38th parallel,

action was to continue. 93

Submitting on 28 September a broad general plan for moving north of the

38th parallel sometime between 15 and 30 October, MacArthur indicated that

he would use Walker's Eighth Army to attack in the west, drive north across

the 38th parallel, and seize the North Korean capital of p'yongyang. Almond's

X Corps from Inch'on was to be sealifted around southern Korea in order to

make an amphibious landing at Wonsan on the east coast of North Korea. It

would remain independent of Eighth Army but make juncture with it after

landing. He had no current indication, MacArthur noted, of any entry of major

Soviet or Chinese Communist forces into North KoreaY4

In response to a JCS request, Marshall obtained Acheson's and Truman's

endorsement of MacArthur's plan. 95 Meanwhile, Marshall penned a personal

note to MacArthur saying that Eighth Army should not announce that ROK

divisions would stop and regroup before crossing the 38th parallel, since it

was the "evident desire" of the United Nations not to have to vote on crossing

the 38th parallel but to deem that MacArthur had "found it militarily

necessary to do so." Marshall added, "We want you to feel unhampered
68 THE TEST OF WAR

tactically and strategically to proceed north of the 38th parallel." MacArthur

cabled back the next day, "Parallel 38 is not a factor in the mil employment of

our forces. . . . Unless and until the enemy capitulate I regard all of Korea

open for our mil operations." Marshall apparently made no further

response. 96

On 1 October MacArthur broadcast the first UNC message calling on the

North Koreans to lay down their arms but received no reply.97 Meanwhile, the

UN General Assembly' changed its objectives by approving on 7 October a

Western-sponsored resolution calling for the establishment of conditions of

stability in all Korea, elections throughout Korea under UN auspices, creation

of a unified, independent, and democratic government for all Korea, and the

country's economic rehabilitation. It invited "all sections and representative

bodies" throughout Korea to cooperate in restoring peace, holding elections,

and establishing a government. The resolution asked for the early removal of

all UN forces except those needed to ensure stability and hold elections, and

it created a seven-member United Nations Commission for the Unification and

Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) to replace a previous commission in setting

up the new government and rebuilding the country.91\ When MacArthur

transmitted the UN resolutions to the North Koreans on 9 October, calling on

them to surrender and cooperate with the United Nations in establishing "a

unified, independent and democratic government" of Koreans, Kim II Sung in

a radio address declared that the North Koreans had no intention of

surrendering. 99 This response left it up to MacArthur to proceed with military

action to enforce the UN decree. Although the UN resolution did not state that

MacArthur would "impose" a single unified and democratic government over

all Korea, Acheson later acknowledged that its language was ambivalent. 100

The Joint Chiefs became concerned that their 27 September directive did

not adequately cover actions that MacArthur should take in the event of a

sudden Chinese Communist intervention. On 6 October they asked Marshall

to obtain Truman's approval for a directive specifying that if major Chinese

units intervened openly or covertly "anywhere" in Korea without prior

announcement, the UNC commander should continue to fight as long as his

forces had a "reasonable chance of success." In any event, he was to get

Washington's authorization before attacking targets in Chinese territory. These

instructions, which hinted at a possible widening of the war, were extremely

important because they became the operative ones when the war expanded.

With State Department and presidential approval, the JCS sent the new

directive to MacArthur on 9 October. 101

• The Korean question went to the General Assembly since the Soviet delegate had returned to the

Security Council on I August and would veto any resolution unfavorable to the North Koreans.
The North Korean Attack 69

That day Eighth Army moved across the 38th parallel. After initial hard

fighting the North Koreans fell back, and by mid-October Walker was ready to

assault P'yongyang, while his ROK troops spread into central and eastern

North Korea, seizing Wonsan on 11 October. Heavy mining of Wonsan's

harbor and beaches delayed X Corps, still independent of Eighth Army. Its

units that sailed from Inch'on assembled ashore at Wonsan between 25 and 28

October, while the units shipped from Pusan landed at Iwon between 29

October and 9 November. 102

The climactic events of the month after Inch'on provided the inspiration

for a meeting between Truman and MacArthur at Wake Island on 15 October.

The initiative for the meeting came from Washington, where Truman's staff

persuaded him that a face-to-face meeting with MacArthur, whom he had

never met, could have positive results-politically and otherwise. The threat

of Chinese intervention and the other political and military uncertainties

provided additional incentive for Truman. Neither Acheson nor Marshall

accompanied the president to the meeting.' 103

At Wake, high optimism prevailed. MacArthur told the president that he

did not think the Chinese Communists would intervene but that if they did

they would be defeated. He expected organized resistance in Korea to be over

by Thanksgiving, and he hoped that he would be able to withdraw the Eighth

Army to Japan by Christmas, leaving two U.S. divisions and the UN forces

there until elections were held. The general strongly supported a Japanese

peace treaty and a Pacific collective security pact. The meeting ended on a

cordial note, and the participants departed happily, without any presentiment

of the dark clouds ahead, In Washington, the Pentagon began to consider

cutbacks in Korean supplies and replacements and redeployment of troops

from Korea to Europe,I04

Back in Tokyo, MacArthur on 17 October drew a new operational line

from Sonchon to Songjin across North Korea, approximately 40 miles from

the Chinese border and almost 100 miles from the Soviet border, South of this

line all UNC troops could be used without restriction, Walker's troops took

the North Korean capital of P'yongyang on 19 October, a UNC airborne

landing north of p'yongyang succeeded on 20 October, and UNC forces

crossed the Chongchon River on 24 October. Walker then sent his Korean

troops toward the Yalu River on the northern boundary of North Korea. 105 On

24 October MacArthur authorized the use of any and all troops to secure all of

North Korea, cautioning only that non-Koreans should be replaced as feasible

• Marshall reportedly advised Truman against bringing MacArthur back to Washington in view of

the political problems such a visit might entail; Acheson disapproved of Truman's going to Wake

Island. See Roy K. Flint, The Tragic Flaw: MacArthur; the Joint Chiefs, and the Korean War,

355-56; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, 456.
70 THE TEST OF WAR

by Korean units. When the Joint Chiefs remonstrated, the general answered

that his order was a matter of military necessity, that the JCS instructions of 27

September had labeled the use of Koreans-only a "matter of policy," and that

Marshall's letter of 29 September provided the "necessary latitude for modification." In any case, MacArthur stated, the subject had been covered at the

Wake Island conference. 106 Nothing more was said. On 26 October one

Korean unit reached the Yalu, and, as Walker commented a day earlier,

"Everything is going just fine." 107

While Eighth Army in the west planned for each of its units to go as far

as it could "without regard to lateral contact," Chinese Communist troops

attacked the ROK II Corps the night of 25 October, and within days the corps

disintegrated. On 31 October Walker ordered his commanders to limit their

pursuit and restore defensive positions, and he managed to save a bridgehead

over the Chongchon. In the next week, the Chinese virtually destroyed an

entire battalion of the U.S. 8th Cavalry Regiment. After MacArthur called him

to account for stopping, Walker pointed out on 6 November that the Korean

II Corps had collapsed, the U.S. I Corps was under heavy attack, and

ammunition supplies were limited to one day of fire in his forward area. In

light of the "new factor of organized Chinese Communist forces," Walker

planned to resume the offensive only after he had secured his right flank,

marshaled attack troops, and restored his supplies. MacArthur said no more.

That same day the Chinese mysteriously withdrew into the hills. 108

Operating to the east of Eighth Army, General Almond's ROK troops,

moving toward the Changjin reservoir, also met Chinese resistance for the first

time on 25 October. Almond himself interrogated some Chinese prisoners and

notified MacArthur. The 1st Marine Division, which moved out on 30 October

to relieve the South Koreans on the road to the reservoir, also met heavy

resistance and suffered the effects of a sudden severe drop in temperature.

Concerned about the division's vulnerable position, Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Smith,

its commander, concentrated his men despite orders to move north rapidly,

thus exercising, as General Collins put it, "sound tactical judgment" that was

to save his troops. On Almond's left, U.S. units of the Seventh Division

encountered Chinese Communist resistance on 8 November but continued

north to reach the Yalu on 21 November, marking the farthest northern

advance of any U.S. units in the war. 109

The North Koreans were a spent force. But the Chinese Communists were

another matter, and the pOSSibility of their large-scale intervention was

uppermost in the minds of all concerned with the Korean problem, especially

Secretary Marshall. The first phase of the war was over; it seemed likely that

a new and more dangerous one was beginning.
CHAPTER IV

The Chinese Entry into the War

From the beginning State and Defense officials had feared that Chinese

Communist intervention could transform the Korean War into a major

East-West conflict. Anticipating this possibility, the president on 24 August

approved NSC 73/4, which held that "in the event of the overt use of

organized Chinese Communist forces in Korea" the United States should not

allow itself to be drawn into a general war with the People's Republic of China

(PRC). However, if the Chinese did intervene, and the UN forces had "a

reasonable chance of successful resistance," the United States should continue

and extend military action to include authority to engage in air and naval

operations against the PRC outside Korea. NSC 81/1, approved on 11

September just before the lnch'on landing, reaffirmed these provisions and

added one more-that the UN Security Council condemn the PRC for

intervention. Future U.S. actions would be determined by what the Chinese

did, and no one could predict their intentions. The uncertainty remained even

after Chinese units attacked UNC troops on 25 October 1950, since the

Chinese troops disappeared soon after this engagement. 1

Early Views of Chinese Intentions

Washington had been trying for months to fathom PRC intentions. James

R. Wilkinson, the u.s. consul general at Hong Kong, reported on 22

September that he had received reliable evidence that the Chinese Communists would not get involved in Korea and might limit further aid to North

Korea. When Chinese Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs Chou En-Iai

stated publicly on 30 September that the Chinese would not "supinely tolerate

seeing their neighbours being savagely invaded by imperialists," Wilkinson

71
72 THE TEST OF WAR

interpreted the remark as made for internal Chinese consumption. Likewise,

American officials tended to downplay Chou En-lai's assertion on 3 October

to Indian Ambassador Kavalam Madhava Panikkar that the PRC would fight if

UNe. especially U.S., forces crossed the 38th parallel; Panikkar was known to

be highly sympathetic to the Chinese Communists and to view the United

States as a warmonger. 2 To avoid reliance on Panikkar as the only channel of

communication with the PRe. U.S. diplomats attempted to contact the

Chinese directly, but the latter refused to have even informal conversations.'

Analyzing the bellicose pronouncements of the Chinese, the CIA on 12

October conceded the possibility of full-scale Chinese intervention in Korea

but felt it "not probable in 19';0" unless the USSR opted for global war. Direct

Soviet intervention in Korea seemed even less likely unless Moscow decided

on general war. In CIA eyes, the risk of general war existed, but how likely it

might be remained a matter of speculation. Although Wilkinson reported on

13 October that Peking had reacted to the UNC crossing of the 38th parallel by

warning again that the Chinese would not "stand idly by" while the United

States invaded North Korea, he noted that informed observers in Hong Kong

considered Chinese Communist engagement in Korea unlikely. A 14 October

report from Burma spoke of "fe"erish activity" in Peking and the massing of

half a million Chinese troops near the Manchurian-Korean border, but it was

only one among many widely varying accounts and appeared to have little

effect in Washington. Observers saw the PRC actions largely as part of a war

of nerves, and the State Department inclined toward the theory that Chinese

intervention, if it occurred, would be limited and cmTrt in nature.'

At this time MacArthur did not believe the Chinese would enter Korea in

force. At his meeting with Truman at Wake Island on 15 October, he suggested

to the president that his plan to secure all of Korea would prove a "tremendous deterrent to the Chinese Communists moving south . . . ." Not

only was intervention unlikely, but it would not be decisive, and UNC forces

no longer feared Chinese intervention. MacArthur thought that the risk to the

PRC was too great for it to intervene. Of 300,000 Chinese Communist troops

thought to be in Manchuria, he felt that at best only 50,000 to 60,000 could

cross the Y.llu River, at which time they would he extremely vulnerahle. When

Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk told MacArthur privately that the PRC

had threatened to enter the war if UNC forces crossed the 38th parallel,

MacArthur was surprised. If the Chinese did declare war on the United States,

he thought they would have assurances of Soviet support and would have to

he treated with the "utmost seriousness. '"

The Wake Island conference appeared to have the unfortunate effect of

simultaneously allaying U.S. apprehensions concerning possible PRC intervention while reinforcing Chinese fears that the Americans were planning
The Chinese Entry into the War 73

aggression against them. 6 The absence from the meeting of both Marshall and

Acheson, the two key Washington figures who might have engaged the general

in more probing analysis, lost the opportunity to create a firmer basis for

understanding between MacArthur and Washington. The most constructive

result of the Wake Island meeting on the PRC question was a decision that the

United States would do all it could to reassure the Chinese. On 17 October

Truman stated publicly that the United States sought "no territory or special

privilege . . . [and had] no aggressive designs in Korea or in any other place

in the Far East or elsewhere. ,,7 The United States would continue to observe

the integrity of the northern international boundaries of North Korea-but

not, as it turned out, without considerable difficulty.

The Northern Borders

While ground operations were contained south of the 38th parallel before

the Inch'on breakthrough, U.S. naval and air forces had authorization to

operate north of that line after 29 June 1950 provided they remained "well

clear" of the international boundaries separating North Korea from Chinese or

Soviet territory. Truman upheld the restriction when Secretary of the Air Force

Finletter suggested an overflight of Soviet territory in early July. On 27 July

Acheson proposed that aerial reconnaissance in Korea be authorized up to the

Yalu River in the west and to the limit of the naval blockade in the east. With

presidential agreement, Johnson transmitted this authority to the JCS on 2

August, noting that the naval blockade extended to the Korean-Soviet border

on the east coast and cautioning that reconnaissance flights should "stay clear

of and not overfly the frontier of Manchuria and the Soviet Union. "H

The limitation also applied to U.S. strategic air operations in North Korea.

When U.S. aircraft on 12 August bombed the North Korean port of Rashin

(Najin), approximately 17 miles from the Soviet boundary, Deputy Under

Secretary of State H. Freeman Matthews complained to General Burns in the

Pentagon that the operation would upset the Soviets and did not conform to

the directive to stay clear of the Soviet boundary. News stories and reports

suggesting the raid was directed against the Soviet Union caused State to fear

a Soviet military entry into North Korea or other retaliatory measures. <)

Despite presidential approval of the operation, State pressed for Defense to

consult with it before future bombings of Rashin or any other place close to

the northern borders. lO Denying that there had been a frontier violation,

Johnson on 21 August claimed that Rashin's petroleum storage plant made it

a purely military target, and he suggested that worrying about Soviet views or

newspaper opinions would place "in question practically all military features
74 THE TEST OF WAR

of our Korean operations." Although johnson granted the importance of

political considerations, he opposed political supervision of military operations as long as they were conducted "within the terms of the over-all

decision" and with military commanders held responsible for the outcome.

"Once war operations are undertaken ...," johnson wrote, "they must be

conducted to win." 1 1

While the Air Force withheld further attack on Rashin pending review of

its military importance, the joint Chiefs on 5 September reaffirmed its value as

a military target, and two days later johnson and Bradley asked Truman to

approve renewed bombing. Worried about the international impact-particularly since a Soviet officer had been identified as the pilot of an attacking

enemy aircraft shot down in the Yellow Sea-Truman wanted johnson and

Acheson to discuss the matter before bringing it to him. Consequently the

joint Chiefs temporarily suspended all attacks on Rashin. Il Meanwhile, the

Soviets took to the UN Security Council charges made by the Chinese of U.S.

air attacks on targets inside Manchuria. When Air Force investigations

confirmed the accuracy of the charges, Acheson consulted the president and

found him "inclined strongly" to the State Department position against any

military operations anywhere near the international borders. I'>

After MacArthur's success at Inch'on and the subsequent collapse of

North Korean forces, the need for a UNC strategic bombing offensive

diminished. On 26 September the joint Chiefs cabled new instructions to

MacArthur, rescinding their earlier strategic target objectives and limiting

targets in Korea to tactical objectives. In their 27 September general directive

to MacArthur, the jCS stipulated that during his forthcoming ground offensive

there would be no air or naval action against Chinese or Soviet territories. 1 •

The northern borders became a real issue in October, when the Soviets

claimed that U.S. aircraft had attacked their territory. At State's request,

Deputy Secretary Lovett asked the joint Chiefs to direct MacArthur to make an

inquiry, which proved the accuracy of the Soviet charges. 1 U.S. diplomats

apologized in the United Nations, and Lovett took up with the JCS Acheson's

suggestion to draw a more explicit line for air operations in northern Korea.

Despite new Chinese charges to the United Nations on 26 October of eight

violations of PRe territory by US. planes between 1=; and 2=; October, the

joint Chiefs on 1 November rejected the idea of a more explicit operational

line. Lovett informed Acheson on 4 November 1950 that Defense had decided

that no further directive was needed. 1(,

Possible liNC violation of Korea's international borders was all the more

important because, although days had passed since Chinese units first engaged

UNC troops on 25 October, no one yet knew whether the PRe planned to give

limited, possibly covert. aid to the North Koreans, or to mount a full-scale
The Chinese Entry into the War 75

action. Reporting to Truman on 1 November the presence of between 15,000

and 20,000 Chinese troops in North Korea, CIA director Walter Bedell Smith

thought that the Chinese were concerned about their border and wanted to

establish a cordon sanitaire to protect the important hydroelectric complex

along the Korean side of the Yalu River that provided power to Manchuria. 17

In the State Department, however, a more pessimistic view began to emerge.

Reports from Hong Kong indicated that the top PRC leaders had decided to

fight in Korea, and further reports of military activity in China seemed to

confirm the information. By 3 November State's Office of Chinese Affairs

believed the PRC might intervene even without Soviet backing and called for

U.S. and UN reassurances concerning the inviolability of the Chinese-Korean

border and protection for legitimate Chinese interests along the Yalu. 18 The

British and Canadian governments also expressed concern. I')

In Korea, UN forces were feeling the full effect of the first Chinese attacks

and the first severe winter weather; moreover, enemy fighter planes had begun

to contest UN air supremacy. On 1 November the first Russian-built MIG-IS

jets appeared, much superior to available U.S. propeller planes. MacArthur

now did not rule out the "distinct possibility" of full, open intervention, but

he believed a more or less covert and limited degree of Chinese activity more

likely. Indeed, the Chinese activity level still seemed to be low-scale, as only

35 prisoners had been taken. On 5 November MacArthur notified the UN that

Chinese forces were "presently in hostile contact" with the United Nations

Command. 20

Given MacArthur's views and the great importance Washington attached

to the inviolability of the northern borders, Lovett was taken aback when

Finletter informed him early on 6 November that MacArthur had ordered the

Far East Air Force to launch an intensive two-week bombing attack against

North Korean targets, excluding Rashin and the large hydroelectric complex

along the Yalu but including all bridges crossing the frontier river. UN aircraft

were to keep south of the international border, attack close targets only under

visual conditions, and destroy the Yalu bridges on the Korean side. The air

offensive was to begin at 0300 on 7 November in Korea-in the early

afternoon of 6 November, Washington time. 2 \

Rushing to the State Department, Lovett found Acheson and Rusk

conC(~rned that MacArthur's air operation would abrogate a U.S. agreement to

consult the British before taking any UNC action involving Manchuria.

Planning to follow up MacArthur's 5 November report by asking for a UN

resolution condemning Chinese intervention, State felt that precipitate action

along the border might alienate UN allies. If UNe air attacks spilled over into

Chinese territory, the Sino-Soviet treaty might even bring the Soviets into

Korea. Lovett doubted that any bombing results would be worth the risks.
76 THE TEST 01' WAR

When Marshall agreed to postpone the attack unless there developed a threat

to troop security, Lovett told Finletter to get the Joint Chiefs to stop the

operation until Truman, then in Kansas City, could be consulted. The

president, willing to approve MacArthur's order if there were "an immediate

and serious threat to the security of our own troops," thought postponement

in the best U.S. interest and inquired about MacArthur's reasons for the order.

The Joint Chiefs then directed MacArthur to postpone all bombing within five

miles of the Manchurian border until further instructions and asked for his

reasons for bombing. 22

MacArthur's panicky reply stunned Washington: "Men and materiel in

large force," he reported, were "pouring across all bridges over the Yalu from

Manchuria," placing his troops in jeopardy and even threatening the "ultimate

destruction" of his command. With the enemy cleverly moving at night and

air interdiction of little use because of the restricted geographical area,

MacArthur claimed that his only recourse was to destroy the bridges and

installations supporting the enemy's advance and that every hour of delay

would be "paid for dearly in American and other United Nations blood." He

was suspending the strike "under the gravest protest" and asked that the

president reconsider lest there be a "calamity of major proportion." When

Bradley read this message to Truman over the phone, the president approved

the bombing. 2 ' After further discussions among Marshall, Lovett, and Acheson

later on 6 November, the Joint Chiefs told MacArthur to proceed if the action

was essential to UNC safety, but they specifically exempted the Yalu hydroelectric complex. Pointing out to MacArthur that it was vital to keep the

fighting localized and that utmost care should be taken to avoid any violation

of Manchurian territory and air space, they asked for a report on any hostile

action from Manchuria and for a new estimate of the situation. 21

On 7 November MacArthur replied in a far calmer tone that there were

organized Chinese ground units in Korea of unknown but sufficient size to

capture the initiative in the west and to slow the UNC offensive in the east. He

thought that they would be used and reinforced "at will, probably without any

formal declaration of hostilities." The situation might well make a UNC

advance impossible and a retreat necessary. Bombing along the northern

border was his only recourse, but he did not intend to destroy the hydroelectric installations or to violate Manchurian or Siberian territory. In two further

cables on 7 November, MacArthur renewed his plea for more men and materiel

and raised a question concerning the increasing numbers of hostile planes

being met in combat in North Korea. Based in Manchuria, they crossed the

border to attack UN aircraft and when pursued quickly fled to the "complete

sanctuary" of Manchurian air. "The effect of this abnormal condition,"

MacArthur declared, "upon the morale and combat efficiency of both air and
The Chinese Entry into the War 77

ground troops is major." But this time the general proposed no remedy and

merely requested instructions. 2';

Marshall appreciated MacArthur's very real problems. In a warm, "very

personal and informal" message on 7 November, the secretary reassured the

general that everyone in Washington, including the president, was anxious to

support him to the utmost. Noting that the "extremely grave international

problem . . . could . . . easily lead to a world disaster," Marshall asked

MacArthur if he thought the Yalu hydroelectric complex was the "dominant

consideration" of the Chinese. MacArthur replied the next day, expressing the

view that the Chinese were not worried about the hydroelectric complex.

Then, in the grandiloquent style he often affected, the general invoked history

and psychology to expound at some length on his belief that Chinese culture

and character had changed, becoming increasingly nationalistic and aggressive. Although PRC interests currently paralleled Soviet ones, MacArthur

thought the Chinese-involved not only in Korea but also in Tibet and

Indochina'-had the same lust for the expansion of power that had animated

all would-be conquerors. 26

In the Pentagon, MacArthur's answer seemed high-flown and patronizing,

and Marshall's staff resented what it termed his "idiot treatment" of the

secretary. Marshall's response was brief: He thanked MacArthur but said that

he had "misunderstood" the query, which was addressed to the events of the

past week. "Don't bother to acknowledge this," Marshall ended. 27

Enemy Sanctuary and MacArthur's Mission

Whatever the nature of the personal relationship between Marshall and

MacArthur, the secretary gave the general full support. Following MacArthur's

7 November message about hostile aircraft operating from the safe sanctuary

of Manchuria, Marshall sent Finletter and Vandenberg to the State Department

to discuss taking the problem to the United Nations. 2M Marshall was also

prepared to ask the NSC to accept a policy of "hot pursuit" that would allow

U.S. planes to follow their attackers across the Yalu "for a prescribed and

limited distance." On 8 November, Finletter and Rear Adm. E.T. Wooldridge,

representing Marshall and the Joint Chiefs respectively, told the NSC Senior

Staff that MacArthur and the Pentagon might soon "take the position that it

would be necessary to permit United Nations air action into Manchuria in

order to prevent the flow of men, materiel, and other supplies." But Finletter

did not think that such air action would be decisive, and the CIA representa-

• See Chapter Xl.
78 THE TEST OF WAR

tive pointed out that the use of UNC air power in Chinese territory might well

bring on full-scale intervention by the large Chinese forces thought to be in

Manchuria. According to the official CIA estimate these numbered 700,000, of

which 200,000 were regular field forces. 29

To aJCS request for comments on the possible reexamination of the UNC

mission and how to deal politically with the Chinese intervention, MacArthur

replied on 9 November that his current authority to use air power everywhere

in Korea would allow him to stop enough Chinese from crossing the Yalu to

deny victory to the enemy. He expected to secure all of North Korea by a drive

to the border in mid-November and thought any change in his mission would

be a fatal indication of weakness and destroy UNC morale. MacArthur

compared a British proposal to stop short of the northern boundary of Korea

to the 1938 Munich agreement that left Czechoslovakia "impotent"; he

recommended "no weakening at this crucial moment" and wanted to press

forward to complete victory. The United States, he said, should seek a UN

resolution condemning the Chinese invasion. For the time being, the Joint

Chief., agreed with MacArthur. Doubting that the enemy could drive UNC

forces from Korea or that global war was imminent, even if its risk was higher,

they recommended to Marshall that the United States try to solve the problem

politically through the United Nations, plan for the possibility of global war,

and keep MacArthur's mission under rniew. Preparing for an NSC meeting

that afternoon, Marshall concurred. At this point, MacArthur had authorization to keep pushing northward in Korea. ,0

With Truman absent, Acheson presided at the NSC meeting on 9 November and suggested a discussion of enemy intentions and a suitahle U.S.

response. Reporting that MacArthur was still out of contact with the enemy

and that two days of aerial reconnaissance had revealed nothing, Bradley

assessed the current situation. If the Chinese wanted only to protect the Yalu

power complex, U.S. assurances might help; if they wanted to fight a war of

attrition in Korea, U.S. resources would he committed indefinitely and, should

global war ensue, the United States might lose. If the Chinese wanted to drive

UNC forces off the peninsula, they would need Soviet help, which would lead

to World War III. CIA director Smith stood firm on his agency's estimate that

the Soviets did not want to involve their own troops in a general war and that

they might be pleased to see U.S. and PRe forces at war, but he wondered

whether the Chinese would agree to he their pawn. When Acheson pointed

out the absence of a U.S. political commitment to the conquest of all Korea,

Smith thought that either standing pat or drawing back would have serious

political consequences, while going forward would be difficult."

Political reactions aside, Bradley regarded MacArthur as overly optimistic

in believing that air power would enahle him to expel the Chinese already in
MANCHURIA

YELLOW

SEA

Korea (1950-51)

SEA

OF

JAPAN

o
80 THE TEST OF WAR

Korea. The Soviets had recently given the PRC 200 to 250 aircraft, and more

Chinese troops could easily cross the Yalu once it froze. Even holding a line

in Korea would mean a lot of casualties, and Bradley wondered how long UNC

forces could remain in their current positions without attacking the Manchurian bases. The Joint Chiefs, he stated, thought a step of this magnitude

required a UN decision..~2 Deeply concerned, Marshall apparently felt it

premature to change UNC objectives. It worried him that MacArthur's wide

dispersion of UNC forces in northeastern Korea left them vulnerable and that

the U.S. forces there were 20 percent below full strength, with South Koreans

filling the American ranks. He also remarked that South Korean divisions

would have to be created to take the place of UNC troops once the latter left

Korea. Bradley thought MacArthur's deployments might be an effort to

occupy the country in order to hold elections; in any event MacArthur would

probably try to hold a line around the all-weather port of Hungnam. 5.~

Searching for a possible solution, the council considered whether another line in Korea might be better than the current one from a military

standpoint. Despite the fact that a UNC retreat would be politically unpopular

and demoraliZing to the South Koreans, Bradley emphasized that a line as far

south as possible could be better defended. Marshall again pointed out that

winter weather would make the Yalu River boundary militarily meaningless.

Acheson, however, felt it was a politically desirable line, since it would allow

UN elections to be held at once in all of Korea. If a 20-mile demilitarized

buffer zone extending across the Yalu were established, Acheson thought it

might reassure the Soviets, force the Chinese out, and permit the holding of

elections. But he feared that the Chinese would then demand the withdrawal

of all foreign troops from Korea and equal North and South representation in

the new government, steps that recent history suggested would soon lead to

an all-Communist government. Finally, Acheson agreed that MacArthur's

directive should not yet be changed; he should be free to operate without

bombing Manchuria. State should follow up its diplomatic initiatives and try

to establish direct communications with Peking, and the NSC Senior Staff

should continue to study the matter.·~ I

Following the NSC meeting, Acheson and the president gave public

speeches intended to assuage Chinese fears. The United States joined five

other nations in asking the UN Security Council to call on all states to refrain

from assisting North Korea and affirming UN policy to keep inviolate the PRC

frontier with North Korea and to protect legitimate Chinese interests, but the

council merely debated the proposal. Meanwhile, the Chinese notified the

United Nations they were sending a delegation to charge the United States

with aggression; they rebuffed every U.S. attempt to talk with them. -"~ The

Indian Ambassador to Peking, Panikkar, reported that Soviet planes would
The Chinese Entry into the War 81

attack U.S. aircraft bombing Manchuria. The British pressed for a large buffer

zone in the north and, despite the recent loss of two American B-29 bombers

to Manchurian-based enemy aircraft, they and others opposed any action such

as hot pursuit that might bring on full-scale war. 56 On 17 November the British

refused to endorse any violation of the Manchurian border and suggested

delaying the coming UNC offensive. At the same time they tried to get in

direct touch with the PRe. Clearly, if the United States allowed its pilots to

enter Manchurian air space, it could expect little support from countries that

felt such action might provide the excuse for full-scale Chinese or even Soviet

intervention. 57

In mid-November MacArthur was still busy preparing for the postponed

UNC ground offensive. Air attacks to take out the Yalu bridges and destroy the

area between the UNC lines and the northern border began on 8 November,

while MacArthur built up supplies for his ground forces. As late as 17

November the general believed there were only 25,000 to 30,000 Chinese

soldiers in Korea, although his headquarters intelligence had earlier estimated

up to 77,000 as well as an enlarged enemy capacity for behind-the-lines

guerrilla warfare. Once the UNC offensive started, MacArthur hoped to drive

all Communist forces north of the Yalu within 10 days. UNC troops would

stop at the boundary and release all prisoners, and Eighth Army would go back

to Japan. If he could succeed in the few weeks before the Yalu froze,

MacArthur thought the Korean campaign would end and that the Chinese

would be satisfied to have demonstrated their aid to the North Koreans and

their ability to engage in a major conflict. If the UNC offensive did not

succeed and the Chinese continued to pour across the Yalu, MacArthur felt

that he would have no choice but to bomb key points in Manchuria and "the

fat would be in the fire." Such a prospect alarmed Washington. 5H

Continuing the UN Ground Offensive

Deeply troubled, General Burns suggested to Marshall on 14 November

that an emergency conference be held with MacArthur. Dubious, Marshall told

Burns to discuss the possibility with the State Department. After State reacted

negatively, Burns told Marshall on 17 November that continuing the current

military objectives in Korea seriously risked U.S. involvement in a world war.

Even if military objectives in Korea could be gained without global war, Burns

thought the United States might be worse off on the Yalu line than on a more

southern one. It was not reasonable, Burns felt, to expect MacArthur to

"recommend a change in military objectives from complete victory to partial

victory"; that responsibility belonged to Washington. 5')
82 THE TEST OF WAR

Meanwhile, Marshall, reading the daily reports in from the Far East,

learned on 20 November that the enemy had organized a strong-points

defense of key terrain features in the area between the UNC front and the

Yalu. The lack of enemy activity, Marshall read, resembled "similar withdrawals . . . in the past . . . [that) preceded definite offensive action." On

21 November Burns reminded the secretary of the absence of firm decisions

regarding possible Chinese-Soviet retaliation, a neutralized zone, and limiting

MacArthur's orders. 40

Joined by Lovett and the Joint Chiefs on the afternoon of 21 November,

Marshall met with Averell Harriman and with Acheson and other State officials

to discuss continuation of the UNC offensive in the face of the Chinese entry

into Korea and the possibility of a large-scale intervention. To Marshall's

gratification, Acheson supported maintaining MacArthur's current military

directive, which called for the pursuit of enemy units north of the 38th

parallel and their destruction as a military force, or, if large Chinese forces

appeared, continuation of the mission as long as success seemed possible.

Acheson still wanted to consider a demilitarized zone on the south side of the

Yalu. The Joint Chiefs also thought it militarily advantageous to hold at a line

along the high ground 10 to 25 miles south of the Yalu rather than at the

river's edge. Marshall, who had earlier held some doubts about the establishment of a neutral zone along the northern borders, suggested that the

appropriate time to make such a proposal would be after a UNC military

success. 4I Consulted a few days later, MacArthur argued that the PRC would

view a drawback as weakness.42

The meeting of 21 November in effect confirmed the decision to proceed

with the UNC ground offensive, now scheduled for 24 November; no further

discussion of the matter occurred at the NSC meeting on 22 November.4~ In

Korea the Chinese remained quiet, unexpectedly freeing 27 wounded u.s.

prisoners. On 24 November the CIA estimated that the Chinese meant to

continue their current holding operations in North Korea, maintain or

increase their strength in Manchuria, and obtain UNC withdrawal from Korea

by intimidation and diplomacy. If UNC forces remained, the Chinese would

increase their undeclared operations, but there was insufficient evidence to

determine whether they would take full-scale offensive action. The CIA

believed the Soviets would continue to provide planes and equipment,

technical advisers, and possibly "volunteers. "H

The Eighth Army began its offensive in the west on 24 November, while

the still independent X Corps in the east prepared to move west. on 27

November to lend assistance. After an easy advance on 24 and 25 November,

Eighth Army ran into numerous enemy counterattacks on 26 November; X

Corps, moving into position that day, also encountered substantial resistance.
The Chinese Entry into the War 83

Well-equipped with artillery, mortars, and aircraft, the enemy executed

"skillful infiltrating movements" and concentrated his heaviest attacks against

South Korean troops. Eighth Army believed that more than 100,000 Chinese

troops were in Korea and that a general enemy offensive was under way. With

both Eighth Army and X Corps beginning to withdraw, MacArthur's message

on 28 November shocked Washington: All hope of localizing the Korean

conflict could now be "completely abandoned." Estimating enemy strength at

50,000 North Koreans and 200,000 Chinese, MacArthur warned that his

command faced "an entirely new war" under conditions "beyond its control

and its strength." He was going on the defensive. 45

Response to Defeat

On hearing MacArthur's distressing news, General Burns immediately

suggested to Marshall that the president should seek every means to unify the

country, starting by meeting with Democratic and Republican leaders. Although Marshall did later take up the suggestion with Truman, the president

made no immediate decision.'6 Marshall called an AFPC meeting on 28

November to discuss possible air and ground reinforcements for MacArthur.

General Vandenberg thought that the formidable Soviet MIG-IS, now in

action in Korea. could be handled by F-84 and F-86 planes, currently being

unloaded in japan. But since General Collins still wanted to retain the 82d

Airborne Division in the United States, no ground reinforcements would be

available before the spring of 1951. Marshall asked the JCS and the secretaries

for their views on the situation. 47

The radically changed circumstances in Korea would obviously impose a

greater demand for resources. Assuming that U.S. action would continue

under the UN aegis, the service secretaries accepted Collins's advice that a

UNC line could be held somewhere in North Korea and recommended to

Marshall that the United States should carry out its UN obligations, localize the

war in Korea, and avoid a general war with the Chinese Communists. No UNC

ground troops should be sent to the Chinese mainland, use of Chinese

Nationalist troops in Korea would be inadvisable, and holding the Soviets

responsible for the PRC offensive would be politically unwise. The United

States should try to get other nations to increase their contributions to Korea,

build up NATO strength, and accelerate the u.s. military buildup.iH

With the secretaries of the military departments and the joint Chiefs

present at an NSC meeting also held on 28 November, Marshall read aloud the

secretaries' memorandum. He emphasized the importance of avoiding a

general war with the Chinese Communists and agreed that U.S. military
84 THE TEST OF WAR

strength must be built up. Troubled by the gap between MacArthur's forces in

northeast Korea and the Korean coast, Marshall assumed advanced UNC forces

would be withdrawn and regrouped, but he still felt it inadvisable to interfere

with the field commander. He defended MacArthur's offensive as a reconnaissance in force necessary to ferret out Chinese intentions. Less sanguine than

Collins about holding a line in Korea, Marshall wanted to find a way to

"withdraw with honor."

Although the joint Chiefs opposed a general war with the PRC, they still

advised against changing MacArthur's directi,'e, at least for the next day or

two, since the Chinese offensive might be limited. They did not want to send

more u.s. ground units to MacArthur; barring the cutoff of X Corps in the

northeast or Soviet intervention, Collins thought MacArthur could hold a line.

When Truman asked about defense against Chinese air strikes, Vandenberg

stated that MacArthur would either have to strike at the Chinese airfields or

move UNC aircraft out of Korea to japan, a step that would seriously limit

ground support of UNC troops. The joint Chiefs did not recommend an air

strike across the border "at this time."

Acheson, too, felt the situation exceedingly dangerous; with the possibility of general war increasing, he wanted the Korean action ended. UN forces

should engage in air operations in Manchuria only if "essential to save our

troops," he insisted, and no Chinese Nationalist soldiers should be used in

Korea. He advocated additional political, economic, and covert activities

against the Chinese Communists and wanted to charge them with aggression.

UNC troops should therefore establish a defensible military line in Korea and

hold it, so that any new enemy attack ,vould then represent a clear case of

aggression. The president came to no decisions. but the NSC clearly felt that

time was running out. I')

A growing irritation with MacArthur became manifest during the 28

November meeting. Acheson was unsure that MacArthur understood his

directive and asked how to explain to him that the main objective was now to

end the war in Korea so that "real dangers" in other areas, particularly

Western Europe, could be met. Vice President Barkley asked why the general

had promised his troops they would be home for Christmas; why had he not

recognized the situation facing him? Bradley suggested that MacArthur might

have been trying to reassure the Chinese that UNC troops would leave. Truman

stressed the need to support the general in public. Marshall finally concluded

that "we would have to ride around" the embarrassment. ~o

The next day MacArthur proposed using Chinese Nationalist troops in

Korea, pointedly remarking that their use now would neither cause the

Chinese Communists to enter Korea nor deprive Formosa of defenders. The

joint Chiefs deferred consideration of his request. That same day, Truman
The Chinese Entry into the War 85

directed Marshall to see that all instructions to MacArthur from the JCS were

"processed through the Secretary of Defense to the President personally."~I

MacArthur did not help his standing in Washington when, in response to

a JCS query of 30 November, he strongly defended the disposition of X Corps

in the northeast and its relationship to Eighth Army. The concept of uniting

the two elements in a "practically continuous line across the narrow neck of

Korea," MacArthur wrote, was not feasible. The line was too long, UNC forces

were too weak, and the Taebaek mountains, running north to south in Korea,

created logistical problems and split the front. MacArthur declared that X

Corps was currently threatening enemy supply lines and diverting 6 to 8

enemy divisions from attacking Eighth Army, a claim that irritated the Joint

Chiefs and which Bradley later spoke of as "insulting. ,,~2 In another message

that same day, MacArthur stated that, despite UNC air interdiction efforts, the

Chinese were still building up in Korea and Eighth Army would have to

continue to "replace to the rear." He now thought that the enemy wanted to

destroy UNC forces completely and to take all of Korea. Still concerned over

the growing gap between Eighth Army and X Corps, the Joint Chiefs asked

MacArthur that evening to consider extricating the exposed elements of X

Corps and coordinating his two forces to prevent their being outflanked.

Adding a last sentence to this message, Marshall told MacArthur to ignore the

entire region northeast of the Korean waist unless the safety of his command

was involved. The message, however, was not an explicit directive.~·"

The changed situation soon had effects elsewhere. In the United Nations,

Gen. Wu Hsiu-chuan, representing the People's Republic of China, addressed

the Security Council on 28 November and demanded the withdrawal of U.S.

forces from Formosa and Korea. Two days later the council rejected the PRC

draft resolution. Meanwhile, the Soviets vetoed the U.S.-favored six-power

resolution to reassure Peking and call upon all states to refrain from assisting

North Korea. ~j

U.S. allies, already jolted by the threat of a greatly expanded conflict,

were further dismayed by Truman's remarks at a press conference on 30

November. When a reporter asked whether use of the atomic bomb in Korea

was under active consideration, the president in an ill-advised moment

responded affirmatively, although he stressed that he did not want to use it.

His answer created an international uproar and, in Acheson's words, brought

British Prime Minister Clement Attlee "scurrying across the ocean a few days

later" to consult with Truman. On the afternoon of 30 November Acheson

observed to Lovett that unless the Chinese were stopped in Korea, no U.S.

diplomatic moves would work. He wanted to meet with Marshall. ~~

The next day Marshall, Lovett, the service secretaries, and the Joint Chiefs

met with Acheson, who expressed concern about the "virtual state of panic"
86 THE TEST OF WAR

among U.S. allies and the need to restore confidence among friendly nations

in both Europe and Asia. To this end, he asked whether the military could

establish and hold a line in Korea, perhaps as a prelude to a UN cease-fire

resolution or even a withdrawal. Marshall, Bradley, and Collins believed it

would be difficult since X Corps still had to regroup and the possibility of

enemy air attacks had to be considered. General Nathan F. Twining, the Air

Force vice chief of staff, thought that if the Chinese mounted mass air attacks

against South Korean ports the United States would have to retaliate against

Chinese airfields. Admiral Sherman agreed but thought the Soviets might then

join in further air attacks. In the event of active Soviet support for the Chinese,

Bradley and CIA director Smith feared the UNC would have to leave Korea and

would probably be engaged in a general war; Collins thought the United States

might have to consider threat or use of the atomic bomb as a last resort.

Bradley and Sherman agreed that the UNC would be fortunate if it could get

a cease-fire and return to the 38th parallel; Collins concurred but thought the

time had not yet come. Marshall felt that such a move would indicate great

U.S. weakness. Earlier in the meeting, he agreed that Collins should go to

Korea immediately to take a firsthand look.

Lovett summarized the group's consensus: Korea was not a decisive area,

and "while the loss of Korea might jeopardize Japan and perhaps bring about

its eventual loss, Western Europe was our prime concern." For political

reasons, the United States should try to hold on in Korea, regrouping its troops

and stalling for time to work out a cease-fire or a truce, even if it ultimately

involved the abandonment of Korea. ,;(, For the next several months withdrawal from Korea remained a constant possibility, waxing and waning as

UNC military fortunes surged or receded.

When Marshall, Bradley, and Acheson met with President Truman the

evening of 2 December, Walker's Eighth Army was retreating down the

western side of North Korea, its right flank shattered and its 2d Division no

longer fit for combat. In the east, Almond's X Corps had begun to withdraw

toward Hungnam on the coast. Pessimistic about the military outlook,

Marshall was deeply troubled about the political price of a cease-fire and the

cost in casualties of any UNC evacuation under air attack. Questioning how in

good conscience the United States could abandon the South Koreans, he

sought a way to save both UN troops and l:.S. honor. With this dilemma

unsolved, the group decided to wait until after the visit of Prime Minister

Attlee a few days later and Collins's report from Korea. Marshall suggested ';- asking Attlee to propose a settlement.

By Sunday. :1 December, the UNC estimated its battlefront casualties for
The Chinese Entry into the War 87

30 November and 1 December alone at more than 11,000 men. Together

Eighth Army and X Corps had 107,000 u.s. troops plus South Koreans and

other UN contingents to confront an estimated 26 Chinese divisions in Korea

supported by an additional 200,000 troops in the rear. MacArthur expected

Eighth Army to withdraw below the 38th parallel to Seoul, while X Corps

attempted to reach the Hamhung area near the port of Hungnam. Reporting

that his troops were physically and mentally worn out, MacArthur pronounced his directives completely outdated and asked for "political decisions

and strategic plans . . . adequate fully to meet the realities involved. "';8

The Question of a Cease-Fire

A three-hour State-Defense conference held in the Pentagon the morning

of 3 December, although inconclusive, confirmed the gloomy prospect. After

a military briefing by Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, the Army deputy chief of

staff for operations and administration, Acheson speculated about a cease-fire

and possible terms. Although the United States might move back to the 38th

parallel under a cease-fire, Acheson doubted that the PRC would accept less

than a full UNC withdrawal from all of Korea. The Chinese might even

demand U.S. withdrawal from Formosa, a UN seat, and a voice in the Japanese

peace treaty negotiations. t Although they desired to avoid war with Communist China, the Joint Chiefs thought the political price of a cease-fire very

high, but without one it was uncertain whether MacArthur's forces could get

to beachheads on the coast. Sherman spoke against a cease-fire as selfdefeating in the long run. Ridgway also felt strongly that the UNC should not

abandon the South Koreans but fight as long as possible. ';9

All of the military, even those accepting the need for a cease-fire, felt

strongly that Peking should pay for its surprise attack on the UN Command.

Acheson, however, felt that retaliation was a prescription for disaster. Once

agreeing to a cease-fire, the United States could not go back on its word.

General war with China should be avoided since many U.S. allies might "quit

us and deal with the Soviet Union." The military crisis had to be solved in a

way that would preserve Allied unity in the United Nations. 60

Although Marshall viewed the Allied attitude in the United Nations as

"illogical, amounting almost to bad faith," he counseled his Defense col-

* MacArthur later claimed that total UNC losses in the entire Yalu campaign were relatively light:

"".5:P killed. wounded. or missing in Eighth Army; 5.658 in X Corps (Douglas MacArthur,

Reminiscences, .P-i).

t See Chapter X.
88 THE TEST OF WAR

leagues to recognize the reality of the current situation. If the United States

had to make a UN proposal for a cease-fire, Marshall believed it should provide

for a line on the 38th parallel. Such a proposal should be made quickly, since

the Chinese could overrun South Korea as soon as MacArthur's troops went

into beachhead positions. But while agreeing that MacArthur should be

authorized to move to such positions, Marshall did not want to bar other

choices. He remained concerned about the South Koreans. Following the

Pentagon meeting, Marshall, Acheson, and Bradley briefed the president. With

his agreement, the Joint Chiefs concurred in the concentration of UNC troops

into beachheads; preservation of forces was to be MacArthur's primary

consideration.(, I

Despite Acheson's apparent advocacy of a cease-fire proposal, a number

of State Department officials, meeting with Acheson on 4 December, agreed

with George Kennan's view that the worst possible time to negotiate with the

Soviets was in the midst of seeming defeat. Assistant Secretary of State Dean

Rusk noted the apparent dejection of U.S. military leaders and stressed the

need for a military stand in Korea that would shore up the U.S. diplomatic

position in Europe and the Far East. Admitting later that he had lost faith in

MacArthur by this time, Acheson telephoned Marshall to see if they could

resolve to find "a place to hold and fight the Chinese to a standstill." While

willing, Marshall wanted to see first whether MacArthur could extricate X

Corps; he did not want to dig UNC troops into a "hole without an exit. ,,62

The secretaries of the military departments took an opposite position

from Acheson's, urging Marshall to evacuate CNC forces if they were pursued

south of the 38th parallel and, with UN approval. to blockade China and bomb

Chinese communications lines. The Joint Chiefs were now ready to accept a

cease-fire on the 38th parallel if that could be arranged without unacceptable

concessions. If not, they wanted to fight until forced out, provided the UN

denounced the PRe aggression. They also suggested a naval blockade of China

and the bombing of Chinese communications as possible military reprisals("

The international concern over the debacle of UNC forces in Korea and

the heightened threat of an expanded war with China came to a head in the

Truman-Attlee summit meeting that began on 4 December. At this and

subsequent sessions Attlee spoke for a point of view strongly held not only by

the British government and its opposition, but also by the French, other

European countries, and most of the UN. The Truman administration, on the

other hand, lacked substantial political support both internationally and

domestically; indeed, it was under intense attack from political opponents

who damned the administration's policy in Asia as weak and vacillating and

viewed the British as appeasers of the Chinese Communists. Under the

pressures of these political attacks and widespread demands for punishment
The Chinese Entry into the War 89

of the Chinese, Truman and Acheson, even had they been so disposed, could

not allow themselves to be persuaded by Attlee.

Worried by more than possible use of the atomic weapon, Attlee wanted

to persuade the Americans to end the hostilities with the Chinese. 64 The war,

he maintained, threatened to expand dangerously and absorb u.s. energies,

leave Europe open to attack, and strengthen the Sino-Soviet bond. Becoming

involved in war with the PRC seemed to be "handing the game over to the

Russians," Attiee told Truman, Acheson, and Marshall. Not entirely unsympathetic toward Peking and eager to create a China independent of the Soviets,

the British favored a cease-fire "without strings" in Korea and viewed some

concessions to Peking as reasonable. Formosa traditionally belonged to

whatever Chinese controlled the mainland; a seat in the United Nations would

at least make the PRC approachable and possibly more amenable; and a major

Chinese Communist role in the Japanese peace treaty negotiations was not

necessarily alarming. Attlee did not know what settlement Peking might

demand in Korea. 6~

Conceding the dangers involved in any enlargement of the conflict,

Acheson viewed Attlee's concessions as likely to make an aggressor "increasingly aggressive." Marshall told Attlee that the loss of Formosa would be a step

toward liquidation of the U.S. position in the Pacific. Ready to accept a

cease-fire at the 38th parallel in Korea, the Americans would concede no

more, preferring to fight even if they were eventually pushed out. They would

be no worse off in future negotiations and would have at least demonstrated

U.S. faithfulness to friends in difficult times. By the final session with Attlee

on 8 December, Collins had returned from Korea. He believed that X Corps

could be safely evacuated and joined with Eighth Army and that the combined

force could then hold a bridgehead position around the southern port of

Pusan for an undetermined period. 66

Between 4 and 8 December the British and Americans discussed other

aspects of the war with great candor and some friction. When Attlee

complained that MacArthur directed UNC forces without consulting other UN

partners in Korea, Marshall staunchly defended the general, explaining the

joint State-Defense control system over MacArthur and pointing out that the

British had been consulted on such questions as possible air action against

Manchuria. The Americans showed little sympathy for the British idea of an

Allied committee to run the war, and Bradley even offered to assist dissatisfied

Allies in withdrawing troops. The president asserted that he would continue

in charge of the action in Korea unless the United Nations changed the

arrangement, and he seized the moment to say that, if UNC troops were

bombed, "every airfield in sight" would be hit in retaliation. 67

In the end, the need for Anglo-American unity in the face of the common
90 THE TEST OF WAR

danger prevailed. The United States had discarded any idea of unifying Korea

by force and the British were now ready to agree that the UNC should stay in

Korea until driven out if cease-fire negotiations failed; publicly the two allies

declared themselves ready to pursue the UN mission and to negotiate for the

purpose of solving the Korean problem on the basis of a "free and independent" Korea. They reaffirmed their intention to increase their military

strength and proceed with plans for the collective defense of Europe. On the

subject that had ostensibly brought Attlee to Washington, the communique

stated that the president hoped never to use the atomic bomb and desired to

keep the British "informed of developments which might bring about a

change in the situation." The British accepted the U.S. position on Formosa

but remained convinced that Communist China should be seated in the United

Nations. 6H

Although the British and Americans had agreed they would not propose

a cease-fire in the United Nations, the British indicated during the Washington

discussions that they would support one if its conditions seemed reasonable.

Would the Americans? In Korea, all elements of X Corps had reached

Hungnam but still had to be evacuated to Pusan and regrouped before

rejoining Eighth Army, where they would corne under General Walker's

command; the retreating Eighth Army was just north of the 38th parallel and

had reached the third of nine successive planned lines of defense. 69 The

matter of a cease-fire had become a pressing concern when the NSC

considered it on 11 December because 13 Arab-Asian nations planned to

propose a UN resolution on the subject. On the one hand, a cease-fire would

create military problems by ending air reconnaissance north of the 38th

parallel and affecting U.S. naval operations; on the other hand, Marshall feared

that U.S. opposition to the resolution might be interpreted as rejection of a

peaceful solution of the Korean problem. In the event of a cease-fire,

therefore, he wanted a large UN commission in Korea, with free access to both

sides of the lines, to keep track of what was going on. The president approved

an NSC recommendation that the United States should consider a cease-fire

that would avoid placing MacArthur's forces at a military disadvantage and

preclude political concessions.-o

Marshall was annoyed, however, when, in setting forth specific terms for

a cease-fire, the Joint Chiefs pointed out to him that it would probably prevent

the attainment of the UN objective of a free and united Korea. Forwarding the

JCS views to Acheson, Marshall wrote that he understood that the Joint Chiefs

were not advocating "a continued fight for the conquest of North Korea. ,,-,

On 14 December the United States supported passage in the UN General

Assembly of an Arab-Asian resolution that called for the creation of a

three-man commission to examine the basis for a cease-fire. Any U.S.
The Chinese Entry into the War 91

ambivalence on the issue ended on 22 December, when the Chinese rejected

the resolution, claiming it had been "illegally adopted" because the PRC had

not participated in the UN proceedings. Two days later Chou En-Iai charged

that the u.s. invasion of North Korea had "obliterated forever" the 38th

parallel as a line of demarcation and declared that any peace terms had to

provide for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea, settlement of

Korean affairs by the "Korean people themselves," removal of all U.S.

"aggression forces" from Formosa, and a Chinese Communist seat in the

United Nations. The UN cease-fire effort was in effect over. 72

The Possibility of UNC Withdrawal

While efforts in the UN centered on a cease-fire, the United States had to

deal with the urgent demands from the battle area. The Far East situation

became even more complicated for Marshall when MacArthur, who had long

since moved his U.S. divisions from Japan to Korea, requested on 19

December that four recently called-up National Guard divisions be sent to

Japan. There was no question that U.S. troops were needed in Japan to guard

against a possible Soviet attack, but the National Guard divisions would not be

combat-trained before June 1951, and there were competing claims for them

in the United States and Europe. Recognizing both Japanese vulnerability and

the difficulty of sending more divisions to the Far East, Marshall again asked

in the AFPC whether there was any way for the United States to "withdraw

from Korea with honor." Dean Rusk, who had been invited to attend by

Marshall, spoke strongly against a voluntary U.S. withdrawal. Claiming that

U.S. forces in Korea represented only I() percent of all American forces and

viewing the total U.S. casualties in Korea since the start of MacArthur's

November offensive as not excessively heavy, he felt that UNC forces had been

outmaneuvered, not seriously defeated. Rusk thought a voluntary U.S.

withdrawal would not only abandon the South Koreans but destroy respect

for U.S. military power, enhance Chinese Communist prestige, and create a

"chain reaction of defeatism and disillusionment both nationally and

internationally. "7,,

Of the service secretaries, only Finletter backed Rusk. Of the Joint Chiefs,

Sherman believed withdrawal militarily desirable, while Vandenberg supported the removal of ground forces from Korea and the conduct of air and sea

operations against China. Bradley, who viewed withdrawal from Korea as a

matter for decision at the highest U.S. or perhaps UN levels, did not think

MacArthur should retreat farther south unless the enemy showed a "serious

indication" of moving south of the 38th parallel. No Pentagon official
92 THE TEST Of WAR

proposed sending MacArthur the National Guard divisions. Pointing out that

MacArthur's orders placed the security ofJapan above Korea, Bradley felt that

MacArthur could send one or two divisions from Korea to Japan without

critically affecting the Korean situation. ~l

At Blair House on the evening of 26 December, Truman asked Marshall,

Acheson, Bradley, and a few others present to consider whether a military

position could be held in Korea, now that X Corps had been safely evacuated

from Hungnam. Rejecting the idea of a UNC withdrawal, Acheson repeated

Rusk's earlier arguments and favored staying in Korea and testing Communist

strength. He questioned MacArthur's directives and said he was unable to

understand why MacArthur had sent all his troops to Korea. Conceding that

the many orders had caused some confusion, Marshall agreed they should be

rewritten as necessary. Marshall remained anxious about the defense ofJapan

and the difficulty of getting troops out of Korea should enemy air attacks

start. ~s

In a new directive on 29 December the Joint Chiefs informed MacArthur

that the Chinese appeared to have the "capability of forcing United Nations

forces out of Korea" but that he could expect no substantial reinforcements.

They recommended he hold a line somewhere in Korea and deflate the

enemy's military and political prestige if this could be done without high

losses. They directed MacArthur to defend along his planned successive

defense positions, damaging the enemy as much as possible. If UNC forces had

to retreat to the Kum River line just north of Taejon and the Chinese again

threatened massive attacks, MacArthur could expect an order to withdraw to

Japan. The Joint Chiefs asked for his comments, particularly in view of his

"continuing primary mission of defense ofJapan for which only troops of the

Eighth Army are available." ~(>

The general's answer on 30 December was later characterized by Maj.

Gen. Courtney Whitney-his staff officer, friend, and biographer-as

"probably MacArthur's most important single comment on the Korean

war. ,,-- Asserting that a military estimate of the Korean situation depended on

political and military policies not yet formulated, MacArthur suggested that if

the United States or the UN recognized "the State of War which has been

forced upon us by the Chinese authorities," retaliatory measures might include

blockade of the Chinese coast, destruction of Chinese industrial capacity by

air and naval attack, use of Chinese Nationalist forces in Korea, and attacks by

Chinese Nationalist forces in Formosa against the mainland. He judged that

the Soviet reaction to such steps would essentially depend on their view of

their strength relative to that of their prospective opponents. Agreeing that

everything possible should be done to secure Europe, MacArthur felt that the

acceptance of defeat elsewhere would "insure later defeat in Europe itself."
The Chinese Entry into the War 93

He recommended against a UNe withdrawal from Korea because combat there

pinned down Chinese Communist resources and protected other Asian areas,

including Japan, which should have the National Guard divisions. If there

were to be no U.S. reinforcements, no use of the Chinese Nationalists, and no

military measures against the PRC, MacArthur agreed that theJCS directive for

a "successively contracting defense line" outlined the only possible way to

accomplish a UNC evacuation. He felt a decision for complete withdrawal

could wait until UNC forces retreated to the beachhead. 78

In Korea, meanwhile, uncertainty prevailed. Since early December 1950

there had been a relative lull in the fighting, giving UNC forces breathing time.

A change in commanders followed General Walker's death in a jeep accident

on 23 December. General Ridgway, MacArthur's own choice, succeeded

Walker. This appointment had important consequences, for MacArthur was

willing to give Ridgway, unlike Walker, a free hand: "Do what you think best,

Matt. The Eighth Army is yours." Ridgway's revitalization of the demoralized

Eighth Army is one of the classic achievements of recent military history. He

had little time before meeting the first test, however, for the Chinese launched

their "Third Phase Offensive" on 31 December. Prudently retreating, Ridgway

evacuated Seoul on 4 January 1951 and eventually fell back to the fourth

prepared defense line. Eighth Army finally contained the attack, and by 10

January the enemy offensive had spent itself. Nonetheless, the repeated retreat

of UN forces and the second loss of Seoul left South Korean troops dispirited

and convinced they would eventually be abandoned. 79

Meanwhile the Joint Chiefs gave MacArthur no encouragement when they

informed him on 9 January 1951 that, if he could stabilize the UNC position

in Korea, two partly trained National Guard divisions could be sent to Japan;

if not, troops evacuated from Korea would have to serve forJapanese defense.

Washington would expedite a program for arming Japanese security forces

and make an effort to intenSify an economic blockade of China. MacArthur

was to continue to defend Korea in successive positions and inflict maximum

damage on the enemy, subject to the primary consideration of his troops'

safety and his basic responSibility for Japan. He was to evacuate Korea when

he thought it necessary to avoid severe losses of men or materie1. 80 Consideration of the retaliatory measures against the PRC mentioned by MacArthur

would have to await further developments.

Requesting clarification on 10 January, MacArthur strongly implied that

the JCS directive was self-contradictory since he had "insufficient strength to

hold a position in Korea and simultaneously protect Japan." Existing forces

could hold a beachhead line in Korea but not without losses, and the term

"severe" was subject to interpretation. He agreed that evacuation from Korea

would eventually become necessary but argued that from a military viewpoint
94 THE TEST OF WAR

his "tired" and "embittered" troops should be withdrawn as rapidly as

possible. He asked whether the current goal of U.S. political policy was to

"maintain a military position in Korea-indefinitely, for a limited time, or to

minimize losses by evacuation as soon as it can be accomplished?" If there

were overriding political considerations, MacArthur ended, Eighth Army

could hold for "any length of time up to its complete destruction."x 1

Reactions in Washington varied. Acheson saw the issue in black and

white: The general was trying to avoid any blame if things went wrong,

unduly pressuring to widen the war to include the PRe, and "incurably

recalcitrant and basically disloyal to the purposes of his Commander in

Chief." General Collins felt "considerable sympathy" for MacArthur. The Joint

Chiefs had also sought clarification of U.S. political objectives only to be

confronted with questions about military capabilities; MacArthur, Collins later

wrote, had "pointed up his dilemma-and ours. "X2 Secretary Marshall later

described this period as the lowest point of the war; MacArthur's suggestion

of a possible breakdown of troop morale concerned him greatly. Knowing

that Ridgway had also voiced some worries about South Korean troop morale,

Marshall felt this might really be a turning point and again wanted an

independent view. X5

When Marshall took MacArthur's message to Truman, the president called

an NSC meeting for 12 January. At the meeting, Truman agreed that Collins

and Vandenberg should go to Korea and that another message should be sent

to MacArthur repeating Washington's desire to hold the line in Korea as long

as possible before withdrawal. The president further agreed that MacArthur

should see a JCS working paper that tentati\'t~ly listed 6 national military

objectives with regard to Communist China and Korea and 16 actions to be

considered under certain circumstances-including .3 of MacArthur's earlier

suggestions. x4 This paper, which Marshall sent without concurrence to the

National Security Council, became NSC 10 I and was further studied but never

approved. X~

Despite Marshall's warning that personal letters to theater commanders

were "dangerous," the president also decided to reassure MacArthur personally.· xc, Using a State Department draft, Truman on 13 January sent MacArthur a review of the basic U.S. goals in Korea and asked for the general's

views on the maximum effort his forces could reasonably he expected to

• Acheson later claimed (present at the Creation. 'i 16) that Marshall and Bradley "joined me in

urging the President that he-rathn than the Chiefs of Staff. with whom General MacArthur

would argue-should send him a third message." Availahle sources indicate that Marshall and

Bradley wanted to separate the military and political messages to MacArthur hut are silent as to

who they thought should send the political message The I'ise minutes. as indicated in the text,

would lead one to helieve Marshall did not favor the president sending the message himself.
The Chinese Entry into the War 95

make. The message was not a directive, Truman wrote, but simply to explain

"something of what is in our minds." The letter pleased MacArthur, particularly Truman's statement that, in the worst event of a forced UNC withdrawal,

the United States would "not accept the result politically or militarily until the

aggression has been rectified." When Collins and Vandenberg arrived in

Tokyo, MacArthur was still unhappy about the lack of reinforcements but told

them that, finally, he had his directive to remain in Korea indefinitely.H7 As

Collins wrote later, he also told them "with some emotion, that his command

should not be held responsible for the defense ofJapan while required to hold

in Korea." On 19 January Collins returned to Washington believing that Eighth

Army was "in good shape and improving daily" under Ridgway, who expected to be able to hold for at least two to three months.HH
CHAPTER V

A Policy of Limited War

As 1951 began Marshall faced some of the most complex and demanding

challenges of his career. Not even the urgent and seemingly overriding

exigencies of the Korean War could engage all of his attention. The "Great

Debate" over U.S. national security policy, launched by Senator Taft and

Herbert Hoover, with the prime issue the administration's accordance of

strategic priority to Europe and the stationing of American troops in Europe

under NATO, reached its climax in the early months of 1951. * It required the

combined efforts of the president, Acheson, Marshall, Eisenhower, and

Bradley to turn back the assault on administration policy. Marshall devoted his

best efforts to upholding the administration position in support of NATO and

proved especially effective in his testimony before joint committees of

Congress on 15 February.

In Korea, the United Nations Command was in a desperate situation in

January 1951, again fleeing south, pushed by a Chinese enemy far stronger

and more dangerous than the North Koreans. Elsewhere, both in Asia and

Europe, the Korean War ex'acerbated U.S. problems and fed fears of possible

Soviet actions and general war. Ridgway would shortly turn around the

military situation in Korea, but the overall problem of how to settle the

conflict would remain. MacArthur wanted all-out victory in Korea even at the

cost of enlarging the war, while the State Department hoped to limit the

damage to UNC forces and U.S. prestige in order to retain the confidence and

support of U.S. allies and regain the diplomatic initiative. It was a troubled

time.

* See Chapter XVII.

97
98 THE TEST OF WAR

A New Toughness

Even as Washington officials debated in late 1950 the question of a

possible UNC withdrawal from Korea, actions that would eventually improve

the U.S. political position were occurring in the United Nations. After the

Chinese Communist rejection of the first UN cease-fire overture on 22

December and their launching of a new military offensive in Korea on 31

December, the UN Cease-Fire Group proposed on 11 January 1951 a halt to

hostilities followed by withdrawal of all non-Korean forces, eventual holding

of elections, and immediately after agreement on a cease-fire, establishment of

a Sino-Soviet-Anglo-American body to settle Far Eastern problems, including

the status of Formosa and the Chinese UN seat. Truman decided to support

this plan, which obviously included issues he would have preferred not to

address, and realistically accepted the likelihood of strong political criticism

at home; he was aided immensely when both Moscow and Peking refused the

offer. Complaining that the proposal was meant "merely to give the United

States troops a breathing space," the Chinese on 17 January demanded that a

general Far East settlement precede negotiations for a Korean cease-fire. I

With Defense agreement, the State Department decided to ask for UN

condemnation of Chinese aggression in Korea and for further assistance from

all UN members. Introducing on 20 January a resolution affirming that the

People's Republic of China was "engaged in aggression in Korea," the United

States reassured the other countries that passage of the measure would not

authorize any extension of general hostilities to, or the bombing of, mainland

China. On the other hand, the United States and the UNC reserved the

freedom to bomb any Manchurian airfields from which large-scale air attacks

on UNC troops in Korea originated or to counterattack if the Chinese attacked

UN forces outside Korea. 2 Detecting indications that the PRC was having

second thoughts on the earlier cease-fire resolution, the British and other

Allied nations demanded ameliorating changes in the U.S. text, Arab-Asian

nations pushed a rival resolution, and the Soviet Union mounted a rejection

effort. Nonetheless, the United States managed to get its resolution of

condemnation approved by the UN General Assembly on 1 February. 3

Simultaneously, the military situation in Korea improved a great deal.

Ridgway ordered a limited UNC counterattack on 15 January 1951 and then

launched a larger operation on 25 January, recapturing Inch'on on 10

February and making gains of approximately 10 to 30 miles elsewhere. Seoul

was almost within sight. Despite a new Chinese and North Korean offensive

on the central front in mid-february-aimed as usual primarily against the

South Korean troops, who were initially routed-Eighth Army parried the

assault after heavy fighting and counterattacked on 21 February. By the end of
A Policy of Limited War 99

the month and for the first time since the Chinese offensive started in

November 1950, the UNC held a solid, relatively stable line across Korea. By

early March 1951, Ridgway was poised to move again.'

Although the U.S. stance on the fighting front toughened, Washington did

not want to commit more forces to Korea, partly because it had so few trained

troops to send and partly because it intended to send divisions to Europe.

Ridgway received replacements for U.S. casualties but no additional troops.

The 82d Airborne Division remained in the United States, use of the Chinese

Nationalists was politically impossible, and there was little hope for additional support from other UN countries. Washington did not better its offer of

two National Guard divisions for Japan if the Korean line were stabilized.

Although the South Korean government urged arming some 500,000 South

Koreans, the Joint Chiefs agreed with MacArthur that U.S. arms could be better

used to supply Japanese police reserves. As a result, there was no increase in

ROK strength at the time. 6

Similarly, Washington maintained all the existing restrictions on bombing.

On 15 February, when MacArthur again requested permission to bomb Rashin

and the JCS agreed on military grounds, Marshall initially concurred. But after

discovering that Acheson opposed the attack because of continuing political

and international risks, Marshall talked with Bradley, and the JCS turned down

MacArthur for the time being on political grounds. On 26 February MacArthur

asked authority to destroy the entire North Korean power complex, including

the Yalu River plants, but the JCS, fearing possible infringement of Manchurian air space, denied the request on 1 March.- At the same time, in discussions with UN allies the United States still held to its right to bomb

Manchurian airfields or to counterattack under provocation from China. H

Across the 38th Again

With Ridgway's Eighth Army moving north, the 38th parallel once again

became an issue. Technically, MacArthur possessed the authority to proceed

north of the 38th parallel, but the political adVisability of the move remained

questionable. In February 1951 the State Department suggested that any

cease-fire should be accepted on the line of the 38th parallel as "best suited to

the U.S. and UN interest," although it would lead to a status quo ante

settlement. Even if Chinese and North Korean forces withdrew north of the

38th parallel without a cease-fire, State felt that the main body of liNC forces

should remain in South Korea, although "with freedom to patrol or thrust into

a zone, say 20 miles north of the 38th parallel" in order to keep the enemy off

balance.'!
100 THE TEST OF WAR

At a JCS-State meeting on 13 February Bradley raised the question of U.S.

political objectives in Korea, since Ridgway now had a capability for any

required actions short of a major UNC move north of the 38th parallel. With

the 38th parallel of no military consequence, a decision to cross it, he felt,

should hinge on political considerations. State, however, wanted the decision

to be militarily based; although "no agreement short of the 38th parallel

would be politically acceptable," the current line could be accepted if it

proved "militarily advantageous." The difficulty in resolving the issue retlected the uncertainty, both political and military, that prevailed in the

administration. State and Defense agreed, however, that there should be no

public commitment not to cross the 38th. When asked about a possible

crossing at a press conference on 15 February, Truman stated that it was a

strategic matter in the hands of the theater commander. III Nonetheless, with

Allied governments insisting on full consultation before UNC forces again

moved across the 38th parallel, Acheson asked Marshall on 23 February for

Defense comments on a draft State memorandum for the president contending

that although establishment of a "unified, independent and democratic

Korea" remained the u.s. and UN political objective, a general UNC advance

above the 38th parallel was undesirable and that a new directive for MacArthur was needed. II

Seeking advice on the State memorandum within the Pentagon, Marshall

found that Burns and the service secretaries generally agreed with Acheson,

while the Joint Chiefs thought State's approach "unsound." As long as the

political objective remained a unified Korea, the JCS felt that there should be

no change affecting MacArthur's disposition of forces "either north or south

of the 38th parallel as best to provide for their security." Accepting their

position, Marshall suggested to Acheson on 1 March the urgent necessity to set

out U.S. political objectives and to inform the president that MacArthur would

report to the JCS and request instructions before proceeding north of the 38th

parallel. From Dean Rusk, Frank Nash of Marshall's office learned that the

State memorandum was intended to help "firm up" the president's thinking.

The two officials agreed that Harriman might read the memorandum and

related documents in preparing to brief the president, while the question of

the 38th parallel would be handled in the context of an NSC review of U.S.

policy in the Far East. 12

The issue of the 38th parallel became a matter of growing public notice

after Ridgway's forces recaptured Seoul on 14 March. Ridgway had publicly

stated two days earlier that he felt the United Nations would have a major

victorv if UNC forces ended the war in control up to the 38th parallel. l~

Replying to a United Press question on 15 March, MacArthur declared that

crossing the 38th parallel involved "more fundamental decisions" than were
A Policy of Limited War 101

within his authority or responsibility as a military leader, but he added that

any decision could not "ignore the heavy cost in Allied blood which a

protracted and decisive campaign would entail." Asked at a press conference

that day whether UNC forces would be allowed to advance beyond the 38th

parallel, Truman repeated that the decision to cross remained one for the field

commander to take. South Korean President Rhee, alarmed by the reluctant

tone of these pronouncements, immediately proclaimed in a radio address his

own firm conviction that UNC forces should not only cross the 38th parallel

but should proceed to the Yalu River. Ii

Rhee's concern was well founded. While the UN allies agreed on the

desirability of a united, independent, and democratic Korea, they had little

desire to achieve that goal by continuing the attack beyond the 38th parallel.

Kennan advised Acheson that a second advance would only "invoke trouble":

If the Chinese could not stop the UNC troops, the Soviet Union might

intervene. With Ridgway's fortunes rising, it seemed to Acheson a good time

to start a new cease-fire initiative; on 19 March he presented Marshall, Lovett,

and the JCS with a plan involving a presidential announcement. 1 Following

their meeting, State initiated discussions with other governments, including

all those with military forces in Korea, to obtain their agreement. Notifying

MacArthur on 20 March that State was planning a presidential statement to the

effect that the UN was now prepared to discuss a settlement in Korea, the Joint

Chiefs asked what authority the general might need for the next few weeks in

relation to the 38th parallel. MacArthur asked only that "no further military

restrictions be imposed." 16

Although no change in directive authority had been made, the new

international discussions had some effect on the UNC's freedom to cross the

38th parallel. As Acheson noted, MacArthur had authority to cross the

parallel, but the absence of a common point of view on policy became clear

the next day when a British government minister publicly stated that there

would be no general UNC advance across the parallel without full intergovernmental consultation. In Korea, where the Eighth Army had reached a

line just south of the 38th parallel, Ridgway informed MacArthur on 22 March

that he planned to push just north of the 38th parallel but would advance

slowly and carefully, with the objective of destroying enemy troops and

materiel rather than seizing territory. MacArthur approved without referral to

Washington but told Ridgway not to move north of the 38th parallel in force

until he had specific authorization to do so. Ridgway moved out on 22 March,

steadily approaching the parallel. 17

On 23 March Acheson gave Truman a draft of the proposed presidential

cease-fire statement, noting that arrangements might be completed in time to

issue it the following week. Truman took the matter under advhement, but it
102 THE TEST OF WAR

seemed clear that the announcement was imminent. Unfortunately, it was at

this precise moment that MacArthur, as he left Tokyo for a trip to Korea (24

March Far East time), issued a statement pointing out Chinese weakness in the

face of UNC forces, even though the latter's operations had been highly

restricted, and declaring that an expanded UNC effort would "doom Red

China to the risk of imminent military collapse." Acknowledging the fundamental questions to be political, MacArthur stood ready on his authority as

military commander to confer with the enemy commander to try to find "any

military means whereby the realization of the political objectives of the

United Nations in Korea . . . might be accomplished without further

bloodshed. " 1H

MacArthur's statement spoiled any presidential initiative and confused

U.S. allies. 1') Meeting with Acheson and other State officials late that night

(still 23 March, Washington time), an exasperated and angry Lovett thought

that MacArthur should be relieved at once. When Lovett and others conferred

with the president the next day, Truman directed that his order of 5 December

1950· requiring Washington clearance of all public statements by government

officials and military commanders be called to MacArthur's attention. Further,

MacArthur was to inform Washington of any enemy response to his statement.

Truman later wrote that MacArthur's public appeal to the enemy "left me no

choice-I could no longer tolerate his insubordination." At the meeting on 24

March, however, the president said nothing about dismissal. 20

In Korea, Ridgway's offensive went well, and UNC forces stood roughly

along the 38th parallel by the end of March. After taking fearful punishment,

enemy units escaped into North Korea to a strongly fortified position along

the south side of the "Iron Triangle," the American name for an important

enemy resupply and staging area in the central area north of the 38th parallel.

Here the enemy was known to be preparing for another offensive, but

whether Ridgway would be allowed to cross the 38th parallel remained

unclear. At a press conference on 27 March, Marshall stated that any general

troop advance across that line would be solely a political decision. On 29

March the president indicated that MacArthur could still cross the 38th

parallel but that the political situation would to a large degree control the final

answer. Also on 29 March the Chinese broadcast their reply to MacArthur's

offer-they found it insulting and promised to redouble their military

efforts. 21

Having reached the 38th parallel, Ridgway planned to keep the enemy off

balance and to take UNC forces to a new line-Kansas-just north of the

parallel. Flying to Korea on 3 April, MacArthur instructed the Eighth Army

• Sent to MacArthur on 6 December.
A Policy of Limited War 103

commander to make a strong fight for Kansas but to limit and control any

advance beyond it. On 5 April UNe forces began the attack, and by 9 April

they were on or drawing near the Kansas line. Ridgway wanted to make a final

UNe advance into North Korea to the more northerly Utah and Wyoming lines

to create a salient that would help him dominate the Iron Triangle. If the

enemy launched a strong offensive, Ridgway planned a fighting withdrawal

through successive defense lines. This was the battlefield situation when

Ridgway learned on 11 April of his appointment to take MacArthur's place. * 22

Recall ofMacArthur

The culminating event leading to the president's dismissal of General

MacArthur occurred on 5 April, when Joseph W. Martin, Jr., the Republican

minority leader in the House of Representatives, read on the House floor a

letter that the general had written to him on 20 March. 2"1 Its final paragraph

spelled out MacArthur's policy disagreement with the Truman administration:

It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where the

Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest

and that we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield; that here we

fight Europe's war with arms while the diplomatic (diplomats?] there still

fight it with words; that if we lose the war to communism in Asia the fall of

Europe is inevitable, win it and Europe most probahly would avoid war and

yet preserve freedom. As you pointed out. we must win. There is no

suhstitute for victory. 2 I

The letter to Martin once more clearly revealed MacArthur's reluctance to

subordinate his personal policy preferences to those of the commander in

chief. To be sure, like many commanders in the field, he had experienced his

share of frustration at the hands of Washington, dating back at least to the

early days of World War II; to him, it probably seemed more than his share.

But unlike most other field commanders, he seemed to find it difficult to

accept these frustrations as deriving from the broader demands of national

policy and to subordinate his personal views and ambitions. In the end, his

failure to abide by specific and repeated military restrictions proved his

undoing.

* Ridgway later wrote that his first intimation of his changed status came when a newspaperman

greeted him with the statement. "Well. (;eneraL I guess congratulations are in order." First asking

the llewSpapnmilll 10 cxplain allll lhen. :llkr gelling no :Insl\'('r, turning to Seerl'lary I'a~'t'.

Ridgway reported that Pace "gaYe me no sign that he had heard what had heen said." (Matthew

B. Ridgway, Soldier. nJC Mcmoirs ot .llau/Je/l' Ii. Rhl,l{/I'a)', no)
104 THE TEST OF WAR

MacArthur's letter impelled the president to take immediate action. As

Truman told his staff later, he thought MacArthur would be regarded as "a

worse double-crosser than [Civil War General George B.) McClellan. He did

just what McClellan did-got in touch with minority leaders in the Senate. He

worked with the minority to undercut the Administration when there was a

war on." 2~ Coming as it did during the stressful period of the Great Debate

over U.S. foreign policy, the reading of MacArthur's letter to the House by

Martin could not help but infuriate the president. It was the latest and most

intolerable of MacArthur's indiscretions.

When the president asked Marshall, Bradley, Harriman, and Acheson to

meet with him on Friday morning, 6 April, to discuss what he should do about

MacArthur, the responses varied. Bradley, deeply upset, apparently gave

Truman the impression that he favored recall, although he wanted to consult

with the Joint Chiefs.• 2(, Acheson, who already viewed MacArthur's 24 March

battlefield statement as "a major act of sabotage of a Government operation,"

felt there was "no doubt what General MacArthur deserved; the sole issue was

the wisest way to administer it." But he realized that Truman needed the

"carefully considered advice and unshakable support of all his civilian and

military advisers" to survive the political storm that would ensue. The

president should give Marshall and Bradley time to discuss the matter. 27

For Marshall, the issue was not only extremely difficult but also distasteful. Marshall and MacArthur had never been friends; the exchange of letters in

the fall of 1950 had indicated that. Marshall was also affronted by the general's

intrusions into political affairs. But MacArthur had had a brilliant Army career.

Son of a famous soldier, he had been first in his 1903 class at West Point, a

brigadier general at the age of 38, and Army chief of staff from 1930 to 1935.

After leading U.S. forces to victory in the Pacific in 1945, he served with

extraordinary success as "proconsul" of Japan. At 71, the UNC commander

had become an almost legendary figure to many Americans. Marshall was the

only general senior to MacArthur. Precisely because the two men had often

been regarded as competitors, the recall of MacArthur was bound to place

Marshall in an embarrassing position, and the extreme Republican right wing

in Congress, supportive of MacArthur, would exploit the matter to the fullest.

To relieve a successful commander could even have repercussions on the

Korean battlefield. It is also not unlikely that Marshall felt some sympathy for

MacArthur. 2H

In any event, at the 6 April meeting with Truman, Marshall temporized,

• It is douhtful that Hradley was originally for dismissal. as Truman thought. Hradley's own notes

indicate that he recommended against MacArthur's relief at the Friday morning meeting on (,

April. Acheson also does not suggest that Bradley wanted dismissal at that time.
A Policy of Limited War 105

saying that he felt they should, move cautiously and needed time to reflect

further. He raised the possibility that the general's dismissal might even result

in a congressional delay of military appropriations. Truman asked that all

records bearing on the MacArthur issue be brought to Marshall's attention and

told the group to meet without him to discuss the matter. They did, that

afternoon. Marshall, joined by Bradley, asked Acheson if they could not call

MacArthur back to Washington for discussions before any final decision.

Acheson thought this a "road to disaster"-MacArthur at home, eloquent and

"in the full panoply of his commands," would "gravely impair the President's

freedom of decision." Marshall backed down. 29

When the same group met again with the president the next morning,

Truman agreed to defer any decision until after the weekend and asked

Marshall for a final JCS judgment "based on purely military considerations."w

Back in the Pentagon and still searching for a less explosive outcome, Marshall

and Bradley drafted a possible letter to MacArthur pointing out the "difficult

position in which he was placing the government." Meanwhile, Truman

consulted House Speaker Sam Rayburn and ChiefJustice Fred Vinson, both of

whom urged caution, while Vice President Barkley, in the hospital, agreed to

whatever the president decided. On Sunday, 8 April, Truman met alone with

Acheson, who advised him to continue "his very wise course of not disclosing

the trend of his thoughts until all recommendations were in and he was ready

to decide and act." 51

While Marshall waited in his Pentagon office, the Joint Chiefs of Staff met

for almost two hours on Sunday afternoon before finally agreeing that the

president was "entitled," as Collins later put it, to "have a commander in the

field whose views were more in consonance with the basic policies of his

government and who was more responsive to the will of the President as

Commander in Chief." Reporting to Marshall, the "sad and sober" chiefs

individually indicated their concurrence with Truman's intention to dismiss

MacArthur. Instructing Bradley to present the JCS views to the president at the

Monday morning meeting, Marshall offered the chiefs no inkling of his own

thoughts. Rather. as he later testified, he was influenced by the JCS opinion. At

the Monday morning meeting on 9 April, with Harriman and Acheson "very

emphatic" in their recommendation for recall, Marshall finally added his own

concurrence. 5 2

At Truman's direction, Bradley drafted MacArthur's relief order, dated 10

April, which the president signed Monday afternoon. Since Army Secretary

Frank Pace was then in Tokyo, Marshall ordered him to proceed to Korea,

where he could be informed through diplomatic channels rather than Army

communications (thus precluding premature revelation) and instructed to

deliver the order personally to MacArthur. Pace flew to Korea as ordered but
106 THE TEST OF WAR

because of a power failure did not get the second message in time. Hearing

that the story had leaked to reporters, the White House called a press

conference at 1:00 a.m. on 11 April to announce the electrifying news of

MacArthur's recall. In Tokyo, Mrs. MacArthur, informed by an aide who had

heard the word on the radio, told the general-who may have had a

premonition of the recall-the afternoon of 11 April. MacArthur left Tokyo on

16 April, reaching Washington on 19 April; Marshall and the Joint Chiefs met

him at the airport. Some 300,000 people lined the streets to hail him. ~~

MacArthur addressed a joint session of Congress that same day, and then

went on to a series of tumultuous and emotional greetings throughout the

nation. From 3 to 5 May he testified at hearings of the combined Senate

Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, laying out his fundamental differences with the Truman administration on issues of national

strategic policy. MacArthur's testimony, as well as that of administration

witnesses, was reviewed for security and quickly made available to the

public.~4

MacArthur did not view either his letter to Representative Martin or his

battlefield message of 24 March to the enemy as legitimate reasons for recall.

He did not believe that these communications went beyond the bounds of his

authority or privilege, he had not considered it necessary to clear these

releases with Washington, and he did not see that they had undercut

the president's policies and plans. Nor did he understand why he had been

recalled. On the issue of Korea, MacArthur testified that, although he agreed

with the president's initial decision to act, he had been operating in a policy

vacuum. He claimed that the limited war sought by the administration

was indeed appeasement and would forfeit Asian trust, encourage communism, and require continuing "sacrifice of American blood." As a UN

supporter, MacArthur wanted Allied aid in Korea to continue; he rejected any

thought of a U.S. ground war in China and said he had never advocated use of

atomic weapons in the Far East. He was bitter, however, about the limitations

placed on conventional air power and the failure to approve the actions he

wanted to take against China, which he felt would force the PRe to the peace

table. MacArthur said he believed that the Joint Chiefs supported him on this

point. 3S

On the larger issue of the East-West struggle, the general saw communism

anywhere in the world as the enemy of the United States. Once the United

States undertook to contest communism in Korea, MacArthur asserted, it had

to win that war or the problem would spread; win, and one could "diminish

the pOSSibility of a third world war." MacArthur did not think war with the

Soviets inevitable; they would act according to their assessment of their

relative strength and their current success using political and other means.
A Policy of Limited War 107

Without a "short and honorable conclusion" in Korea, MacArthur warned,

the United States would face further losses of lives and the "complete

degradation and sacrifice of our moral tone." MacArthur declared his high

opinion of Secretary Marshall, but his testimony also implied that the civilian

side of the administration was blocking a military victory in Korea.-'('

At Truman's direction, Marshall met with Acheson and the Joint Chiefs to

prepare for the hearings. Privately, Marshall turned for advice to an old and

trusted adviser, sending his executive, Marshall Carter, to see Bernard Baruch,

the well-known "confidant of presidents," who was, however, not in Truman's

favor. Baruch advised Marshall to be extremely careful, warning that the

Republicans would attempt to discredit both Acheson and Marshall in order to

embarrass the administration. Baruch told Marshall not to appear to attack the

general but simply to explain the reasons for his relief and to disclaim any

responsibility for the manner in which it had been carried out.'""'

Marshall testified from 7 to 14 May, paying tribute to MacArthur, a

"brother Army officer, a man for whom 1 have tremendous respect as to his

military capabilitieS and military performances and from all I can learn, as to

his administration ofJapan. " But Marshall stressed that MacArthur's 24 March

battlefield call for a cease-fire had cost the United States a chance to negotiate

a settlement of the Korean conflict, and he made plain his personal disapproval of the general's public criticism of the president's policy. MacArthur

had disobeyed the president's order to clear all statements, and the general's

letter to the minority leader had triggered the president's decision to act."H

As for MacArthur's implication that the Joint Chiefs had agreed with him

on Korean policy, Marshall brought out the "basic differences of judgment

between General MacArthur, on the one hand, and the President, the Secretary

of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, q,n the other hand." These inherent

differences between MacArthur and Washington were the cause of MacArthur's recall, not any violation of orders concerning military operations.

Although sharing MacArthur's sensitivity to battlefield casualties, Marshall

stressed that a field commander's views were limited, whereas the government had to balance U.S. interests and objectives in one area against those in

other areas. The recall resulted, Marshall suggested, because of strong doubts

that MacArthur could be trusted any longer with "making decisions that

normal command functions would assign to a theater commander." Once the

president decided on MacArthur's recall, Marshall felt that it should take effect

immediately, but he indicated no approval of the manner in which it was

carried out.--\')

Marshall diagnosed U.S. policy alternatives as three-to accept MacArthur's plan to extend the war, to withdraw completely from Korea, or to

continue the fight on a limited basis. To accept MacArthur's proposal, the
108 THE TEST OF WAR

secretary held, would inevitably lose Allied cooperation, jeopardize the whole

policy of collective defense, and hazard a general war-risks greater than any

possible gain, On the other hand, quitting Korea without a fight would

"violate our promise" and "sacrifice" the South Koreans. To continue the fight

in Korea on a limited basis, especially if the UNC could in the process destroy

the enemy's elite armies, seemed to Marshall the best way to reach a

satisfactory basis for negotiations. It would avoid general war, retain U.S.

allies, and generally improve the situation. Marshall advised patience, telling

the senators the East-West struggle had "no quick and decisive solution

. . . short of resorting to another world war." U.S. policy sought to "contain

Communist aggression in different fashions in different areas without resorting to total war. ".!!)

Marshall's seven days of testifying were long, tiring, and repetitious

because he was asked the same questions over and over. Unfriendly senators

such as Bourke B. Hickenlooper, William F. Knowland, Harry Cain, and Styles

Bridges interrogated him about the relative importance of Europe and the Far

East to the United States. They badgered Marshall with questions intended to

place him on the defensive about his earlier roles as the president's representative in China and as secretary of state,f I Vigorously defending the administration's policies, Marshall effectively countered MacArthur's call for victory at

any cost and set the stage for the Joint Chiefs, Acheson, and others who had

yet to testify, Although the hearings were troublesome, they gave the

administration a chance not only to justify its actions to the American people

but also to communicate what it wanted the Chinese and the Russians to

hear.-f2

By the end of June 1951, when oral testimony finally concluded, the

public may have been somewhat confused, but it at least knew that the policy

alternatives presented in such black-and-white terms by General MacArthur

were in fact exceedingly complex, risk-laden, and expensive. The divided

joint Senate committee did not write a final report, but 8 of its 26 members

filed a report in August highly critical of the administration. By that time,

much of the passion with which Americans had reacted to MacArthur's recall

seemed to have spent itselff'l

Ridgway and Military Policy

While Marshall defended the administration's policies in Washington,

Ridgway took over in Tokyo, personally and officially directing his commanders not to do anything that would extend the conflict. These repeated cautions

reflected Ridgway's fears that rash actions in the field might cause the war to
A Policy of Limited War 109

spread beyond Korea and lead to World War Ill. He told his air and naval

commanders not to operate along the borders of North Korea within a 3-mile

range of China or a 20-mile range of Soviet territory. II

The situation with Eighth Army was a little different. Marshall and

Truman had approved General Collins's recommendation of L1. Gen. James A.

Van Fleet to replace Ridgway in Korea. Immediately appointing Van Fleet

Eighth Army commander, Ridgway assigned him the mission of repelling

aggression against "so much ... [South Korean territory] as you now

occupy." Eighth Army forces were not to advance in strength farther north

than the Wyoming line except on Ridgway's orders, and he also wanted to be

informed prior to any major advance beyond the more southern Utah line.

Ridgway decided, despite his full confidence in Van Fleet, "a courageous and

competent field commander," to approve his principal tactical plans only after

personally consulting both Van Fleet and his corps and division commanders.

As the new CINCUNC, Ridgway gave his Eighth Army commander far less

leeway in directing the Korean ground action than MacArthur had given

Ridgway.j~

Van Fleet took command of the Eighth Army on 14 April, only eight days

before the start of a most intense and protracted enemy assault, during which

he was forced to fall back from the Kansas-Wyoming line, while more than

330,000 Chinese drove toward Seoul. By the end of April Eighth Army had

retreated approximately 35 miles to a so-called "No Name" line that stretched

from roughly 5 miles north of Seoul across the peninsula, where, with major

air support, it maintained itself and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy.

The Chinese finally fell back in early May, still unbeaten. III U.S. intelligence

reported about 542,000 Chinese troops in Korea, while the North Korean

Army now numbered almost 200,000. Another 750,000 Chinese were in

Manchuria. Against these forces, Van Fleet had about 270,000 U.S. and Allied

troops, plus almost 235,000 South Koreans. Told by Ridgway to retain the

initiative, Van Fleet directed divisional patrolling north of the UNC lines and

planned a general offensive.l~

The possibility of Soviet intervention in Korea or attack against Japan also

claimed Ridgway's attention. On 17 April he asked for authority to move UNC

forces from Korea to Japan in the event of a Soviet attack. Agreeing in

principle, the Joint Chiefs authorized him to plan but not to begin a major

withdrawal from Korea without specific approval and not to plan to use any

non-U.S. forces outside of Korea. On 27 April Ridgway responded that a UNC

withdrawal from Korea would depend on Eighth Army's successful southward

retreat and thus the only forces available to defend Japan would be those

already there at the time of attack.'H

Ridgway worried also about the increased capabilities of enemy air in
110 THE TEST OF WAR

Korea. On 27 April he asked for discretionary authority to strike Chinese air

bases in Manchuria and the Shantung Peninsula in the event of a major enemy

air strike in Korea and for immediate authority to conduct air reconnaissance

over air bases in those areas. Actually, the authority Ridgway sought, despite

British objections against leaving such a decision to the field commander, had

been approved by theJCS, Marshall, and Truman some weeks earlier, but it had

not been communicated to MacArthur lest he use it to justify premature action

and enlarge the war. With Lovett and Acheson agreeing, the Joint Chiefs sent

the authority to Ridgway the next day along with another strong warning. Air

reconnaissance was to be surreptitious and at high altitudes; any retaliatory air

attack on Chinese territory, they told Ridgway, should be made only if "time

and circumstance do not permit reference to the JCS. ,,-i<J

The recurrent question of increased arming, equipping, and training of

South Korean forces to substitute for U.S. units came up again in April. After

MacArthur's departure, the South Korean government renewed its request for

U.S. support of 10 additional South Korean divisions, but Ridgway, like

MacArthur earlier, and for the same reasons, was opposed. Again the Koreans

were put off. 50

The problem of formulating a directive that would be mutually acceptable

to Washington and the theater commander had plagued both parties since the

beginning of the Korean War. Differences over the content and interpretations

of directives had played no small part in MacArthur's strained relations with

Washington and his eventual dismissal. Returning once more to the task, the

Joint Chiefs sent Ridgway on 1 Maya new presidentially approved directive

that combined a number of existing directives. The new version repeated most

of the missions defined in earlier ones and continued injunctions against

violating Russian or PRC territory. It gave overriding priority to defending

Japan and maintaining the security of forces in Korea. In a significant change,

the directive allowed no general advance beyond the Kansas-Wyoming line

without prior approval, although deeper limited moves were authorized. This

change reflected the prevailing opinion, shared by the Joint Chiefs and

Ridgway, that most signs and circumstances pointed more to an eventual

political than military solution in Korea. The prospect of a greater intensification of the war that would draw in more Chinese troops and place a greater

strain on the United States and its allies did not appeal to the Joint Chiefs. They

told Ridgway that he was to report to them immediately for instructions if the

enemy military leaders asked for an armistice in the field. 5 I

Ridgway, who had just sent to Washington his own preferred version of a

directive, including authority to send ground troops across the Manchurian

and Soviet borders if necessary and freedom to use the two National Guard

divisions in Japan, was not pleased. Much like MacArthur earlier, Ridgway
A Policy of Limited War III

viewed his UNC objective to clear enemy forces out of all Korea as beyond his

capabilities in view of the limitations on forces and the restrictions against

advancing beyond the Kansas-Wyoming line. Like MacArthur, he saw the

admonition to safeguard his UNC forces in Korea as antithetical to his CINCFE

mission to defend Japan. The requirement for JCS approval before an

evacuation of Korea and the prohibition on using non-U.S. forces outside of

Korea seriously curtailed his freedom to act. He was dismayed not to have

received clear authority for air reconnaissance over Manchuria and the

Shantung Peninsula. On II May his representatives arrived in Washington to

discuss the matter with the Joint Chiefs. At this point, however, U.S. policy

was close to being set. ~2

US. Policy Defined: NSC 48/5

In May, U.S. policy in the Far East was being clarified in Washington in the

light of the greatly improved situation in Korea and Ridgway's assumption of

the theater command in Tokyo. Redefining policy involved revision of NSC

48/2, approved in December 1949, well before the start of the Korean War.

Under consideration were such questions as another crossing of the 38th

parallel, possible actions against the Chinese Communists, and settlement of

the conflict. A State Department paper sent to the NSC in March 1951 took

positions against forced unification of Korea, against widening the war, for

separating U.S. military and political objectives, and for allowing UNC forces

to operate within limits across the 38th parallel. ~5

On 27 March, shortly after MacArthur's call to the enemy ended the

president's planned initiative for a cease-fire, the Joint Chiefs informed

Marshall that they doubted the military advantages of an armistice without an

overall political settlement, since the Chinese would simply gain a needed rest

from combat while UNC troops would have to remain in Korea in event of

renewed attack. They recommended that an armistice deal solely with Korea,

end all armed operations there, establish a demilitarized zone behind which

each side would withdraw, provide for UN supervision, and prohibit the

introduction of new military units or war equipment-all these provisions to

continue in effect until a permanent political settlement transpired. Furthermore, the armistice should not prejudice the U.S. position with regard to the

Soviet Union, Formosa, or the Chinese seat in the United Nations. ~I Marshall

felt that these ./CS demands were excessive and impinged on political matters.

Forwarding the ./CS memorandum to State on 3 I March, Lovett as acting

secretary noted that he agreed generally with its conclusions except for those

political questions that the two departments might discuss separately. ~~
112 THE TEST OF WAR

The improved UNC military situation in Korea in the spring of 1951

prompted the JCS to make further policy recommendations to Marshall. With

reference to the Soviet Union, if the Soviets precipitated a general war, the

Joint Chiefs advised Marshall in April, UNC forces should be immediately

withdrawn from Korea and redeployed. If Soviet "volunteers" entered Korea

in sufficient strength to threaten UNC forces, the latter should withdraw and

the United States should mobilize for general war. If the Korean conflict

remained unchanged, the JCS recommended continuing the military action

until conclusion of a satisfactory political settlement. Marshall submitted the

JCS memorandum to the president and the NSC for consideration. ~6

Revised policy paper NSC 48/3 proposed to continue Korean military

action until conclusion of an acceptable settlement that would "as a minimum, terminate hostilities, end the aggression, and provide against its

resumption." This formula generally satisfied the service secretaries, but the

Joint Chiefs complained that it was not comprehensive enough to allow them

to develop required military policies. Paul Nitze at State thought they were

raising "one of MacArthur's principal contentions. "~.,, At a meeting on 2 May,

Marshall maintained that, beyond ending all hostilities in Korea, a minimum

settlement should deny to the Communists all Korea south of the 38th

parallel, restore Rhee's authority there, provide for a ROK military buildup

sufficient to deal with renewed North Korean or Chinese aggression, and

permit when deemed possible the eventual withdrawal of U.S. and other UNC

forces. Nor should any settlement preclude an eventual political arrangement

under UN aegis leading to a "united, independent and democratic Korea."

With Truman not yet ready to act, there would be a new draft utilizing

Marshall's suggested wording. ~H

When the NSC met to discuss NSC 48/4 on 16 May, the Joint Chiefs were

still dissatisfied. They wanted the stated objective to call for an end to the

hostilities, a staged withdrawal of all non-Korean forces, a South Korean

military buildup to "deter or repel" a renewed North Korean aggression, and

the establishment of a northern border so located as to facilitate South Korea's

defense but in no case south of the 38th parallel. ~') During the discussion, Vice

President Barkley questioned why, if the long-term objective was to unify

all Korea, the current objective called for the rescue of South Korea only.

When Acheson remarked that unification of all Korea had never been a

military objective, General Collins pointed out that Ridgway's orders were still

to eject the aggressors from all of Korea and that his complaints derived from

his lack of an adequate force to do so. Modification of Ridgway's directive had

to await approval of the new policy statement. After the NSC adopted the

paper with theJCS-proposed revisions, Truman approved it as NSC 48/5 on 17

May.(,()
A Policy of Limited War 113

Following the jCS-proposed alterations, NSC 48/5 stated that the United

States should strive by political means for a free and united Korea without

jeopardizing U.S. positions on the Soviet Union, Formosa, or the Chinese seat

in the United Nations. It also affirmed that if the current minimum

U.S. objectives, essentially those stated by the jCS, could not be achieved,

military action should continue. The United States should solicit increased

Allied support, develop South Korean military strength as fast as possible, and

through UN agencies help Korea politically and economically.61

NSC 48/5 also clarified U.S. policy toward the PRe. The overall objective

was to "detach China as an effective ally of the USSR and support the

development of an independent China which has renounced aggression,"

but meanwhile the United States should "deflate Chinese Communist political

and military strength and prestige by inflicting heavy losses on Chinese forces

in Korea." If the Chinese attacked outside Korea, the United States was to

expedite planning for a possible naval and air blockade of the China coast,

military action against Chinese targets outside Korea, and operational assistance for possible Chinese Nationalist operations. U.S. efforts to secure Allied

support for these moves were to continue. In addition, the United States

should encourage anti-Communist Chinese elements both in China and

outside, stimulate differences between Peking and Moscow and within the

Peking government, continue U.S. economic restrictions against China, oppose a PRC seat in the United Nations, and persuade the United Nations to

impose political and economic sanctions. 62

NSC 48/5 admonished against extending Korean hostilities either into

China or into a general war with the Soviet Union. If Soviet "volunteers" came

into Korea and threatened UNC safety, the United States should consider

withdrawing and preparing for general war. If general war with the Soviet

Union occurred, the United States should withdraw UNC forces from Korea

and redeploy U.S. forces 6 -'l At last there was a U.S. policy for ending the

Korean conflict consistent with UNC military capabilities.

Military Operations and Directives

Ridgway now had to deal with further changes in his mission. With NSC

48/5 approved, the joint Chiefs on 31 May amended, with the advice of

Ridgway's emissaries, the earlier directive to which he had objected. While

safeguarding UNC forces, Ridgway was to inflict maximum losses on enemy

forces in Korea so as to "create conditions favorable to a settlement" as

outlined in NSC 48/5. The new directive eased the restrictions on his use of air

and naval operations by allowing an approach to within 12, rather than 15,
114 THE TEST OF WAR

miles of the Manchurian and Soviet borders. Ground forces could reach a line

"passing approximately through" the Hwach'on reservoir area north of the

38th parallel in east central Korea. The directive repeated the instruction to

notify Washington immediately if the enemy requested an armistice. 64

The new, more northern line for ground operations took into account the

tactical situation in Korea, where on 16 Mayan estimated 21 Chinese divisions

had attacked, mainly along a 25-mile line from Ch'unch'on to the Hwach'on

reservoir in the east, while a lesser enemy force strongly probed along a

40-mile axis in the west. Although South Korean divisions once again

retreated in disorder with large losses of equipment, Van Fleet was able to plug

the gap, and three days later Eighth Army counterattacked, surprising the

enemy and inflicting heavy casualties. At the end of the month the army was

approximately back to the Kansas line; by mid-June, it reached the KansasWyoming line, which Ridgway wanted held, with limited forays to punish the

enemy.65

Early in June, during this advance by UNC forces, Marshall visited Korea

and Japan. He wanted particularly to greet and encourage Ridgway who,

according to Marshall Carter, was probably "the single officer in the whole

military establishment that the secretary most admired." Marshall felt that

Ridgway, through his valor and astuteness, had restored the UNC military

position in Korea. The two leaders discussed various matters of military

policy, presumably including military operations, manpower, Ridgway's directive, and the pOSSibility of negotiations. 66

By this time negotiations were a real pOSSibility. The JCS pondered the

wisdom of restricting UNC ground operations while the enemy was in

disarray, and on 20 June they sought Ridgway's advice. Concerned about any

compromise of the Kansas-Wyoming line, Ridgway wanted Van Fleet to move

at least 20 miles north to allow for a 10-mile outpost line of resistance and for

a possible lO-mile demilitarized zone later. On 26 June, however, Van Fleet

told Ridgway that the advance would be costly.6~ At this point the Joint

Chiefs, with Ridgway's agreement, undertook to revise the 31 May directive,

separating his U.S. (CINCFE) and UN (CINCUNC) functions. This last major

restatement of Ridgway's directive came on 10 July.6H

The CINCUNC directive had few changes. Tactical ground operations

were authorized throughout Korea, but no UNC forces were to cross into

Manchuria or Soviet territory. Ridgway was to submit recommendations for

the development of dependable South Korean military units. As CINCFE,

Ridgway was to support UNC operations in Korea and provide air and naval

defense for Formosa and the outlying Pescadores Islands against a Chinese

Communist attack. He could continue aerial reconnaissance over a limited

area of China. In the event of a Soviet attack in the Far East, the defense of
A Policy of Limited War 115

japan was his "overriding mission." If U.S. forces outside Korea came under

attack, he could react in self-defense but could not retaliate against Chinese or

Soviet territory without Washington's specific approval. However, he was to

plan for possible retaliatory action against mainland China, as provided by

NSC 48/5. 69

At this point, with negotiations for a cease-fire finally commencing, the

UNC had cleared all of South Korea except for a small western area, and it had

made some territorial gains above the 38th parallel in the east. To achieve even

this, a UN army of more than 550,000 men-composed of 7 U.S. and 10 ROK

divisions, 4 brigades, 1 separate regiment, and 9 separate battalions-had

suffered some 78,800 US. casualties (21,300 killed), a number of Allied

casualties, and 212,554 Korean casualties (21,625 killed). Of more than

469,000 Korean civilian casualties, some 170,000 had died. Opposing the

UNC, there stood approximately 459,000 enemy troops in 13 Chinese armies

and 7 North Korean corps.' Another 743,000 Chinese reserves waited in

Manchuria, while the UNC troop limit had about been reached. Despite

tremendous losses, the Chinese armies had achieved worldwide prestige in

the Korean fight and remained capable of offensive action.-'o

Toward the Negotiating Table

On 30 May, following Eighth Army's return to the Kansas line, Ridgway

suggested to Washington that the next 60 days would offer "optimum

advantages" for diplomatic negotiations. Indeed, overtures to the Soviets had

already been made, and a first unofficial talk between George Kennan, then on

leave from the State Department, and Yakov Malik, the Soviet Union's

permanent representative to the United Nations, coincidentally occurred on

31 May. The two men met alone at Malik's Long Island summer house, but

nothing tangible resulted from this meeting. At a second meeting on 5 june,

Malik indicated that the Soviets "wanted a peaceful solution . . . of the

Korean question-and at the earliest possible moment." He recommended

getting in touch with the Chinese and North Koreans. By mid-June the United

States was discussing possible negotiations with other Allied powers but still

could not make direct contact with Peking.-. I

The secret Soviet-American discussions became public on 23 june, when

Malik, in a UN-sponsored radio broadcast generally critical of U.S. policy, said

that the Soviet people wanted to settle the Korean question and that talks

• A year later U.S. estimates placed enemy ground strength in Korea in July 1'J'i I at 'ill9.llll0-

277,llOO Chinese Communist and 232.000 North Korean troops.
116 THE TEST OF WAR

should begin on a cease-fire and armistice providing for withdrawal from the

38th parallel by both sides. On 25 June, the first anniversary of the war,

Truman publicly announced U.S. readiness to "join in a peaceful settlement in

Korea now." Most Allied nations now seemed hopeful about the possibility of

a negotiated peace.~2 From Moscow, U.S. Ambassador Alan G. Kirk reported

that the Soviets were serious and that the Chinese were also behind the move.

He thought that Peking was finding the Korean War "bloody and expensive"

and harmful to its overall economic program; the Soviet approach had both

served their own peacemaker role and offered the Chinese opportunity to

save face."7·'l

How to reach the Chinese and the North Korean governments in the

absence of diplomatic channels posed a problem. Since the United States did

not officially recognize either government, it wanted to exclude certain

political questions, such as Formosa, from the talks. Chinese forces, furthermore, were supposedly "volunteers" for whom only their military commander could presumably speak. The United Nations, with a PRC delegation

still there, seemed to Acheson the "worst of all places to conduct discussions." Therefore, he suggested that Ridgway initiate the move, and the

president agreed.~.j Ridgway broadcast a Washington-drafted message to the

enemy on 30 June (Korean time).~~

The next day, in a message approved by Truman, Acheson, and Marshall,

the Joint Chiefs informed Ridgway that the major U.S. military concern was to

end the Korean fighting, assure against its resumption, and provide for UNC

security. Also, it was of the greatest importance to arrange military terms

acceptable to the United States over a long period in the event that a political

settlement could not be reached. The minimum U.S. armistice position was to

confine the settlement to Korea, end hostilities there, establish a demilitarized

zone across Korea, require ground forces to remain in position or be

withdrawn to the rear, and allow replacement but no introduction of new air,

ground, or naval units or personnel. Equipment levels could be increased only

for health and welfare purposes. A mixed UNC-Communist military armistice

commission was to be created to supervise the execution of terms. Ridgway

could adopt more advantageous positions initially, but the JCS enjoined him

not to demand so much that world opinion might become unfavorable, not to

engage U.S. prestige to the point that he could not retreat to minimum terms

later, and not to let the talks break down unless he failed to obtain minimum

terms.~6

Although the possibility of an end to the Korean fighting generally

pleased the UN allies, the South Koreans were dismayed at the prospect that

Korea would not be reunited. Their ambassador in Washington had already

indicated his keen resentment at being excluded from the periodic State
A Policy of Limited War 117

Department briefings for the contributing Allied countries, and Acheson

feared that the South Korean reaction might jeopardize UNC forces. ~7 On 30

June the Rhee government demanded that armistice terms include a Chinese

withdrawal to Manchuria, North Korean disarmament, UN prevention of third

party support for North Korea, South Korean representation in any international meeting relating to Korea, and the barring of any plan in conflict with

Korean sovereignty or territorial integrity. President Rhee, who saw himself as

the only legitimate head of government for all Korea, was greatly agitated, and

only visits by Ambassador Muccio and Generals Ridgway and Van Fleet

persuaded him, at least for a time, to accept the realities of the situation."'H

On 1 July Chinese General Peng Teh-huai and North Korean General Kim

II Sung replied to Ridgway that they were "authorized . . . to suspend

military activities and to hold peace negotiations" and suggested meeting at

Kaesong on the 38th parallel, rather than on the neutral ship that Ridgway had

proposed. Opposed to immediate suspension of military activities, Ridgway

argued that the meeting should be delayed. Washington agreed that military

operations should continue but told Ridgway to go ahead with the meetings.

On 3 July Ridgway notified the Chinese and North Koreans of his agreement

to meet at Kaesong on 10 July or earlier and proposed that liaison officers

meet in advance. The enemy agreed. There was no decision to stop fighting

except in the immediate zone of the talks, but at least the two sides appeared

ready to begin negotiations toward a cease-fire.~<) The formal armistice talks

began on 10 July 1951. Although the possibility of an armistice seemed

auspicious, Ridgway believed the enemy capable of launching another attack

at any time.Ho

• The South Korean amhassador attended his first State Department hriefing with the other

ambassadors on 3 July 19'51.
CHART 2

CHANNELS OF COMMAND IN KOREA

JULY 1951

UN SECURITY COUNCIL -- THE PRESIDENT - NATIONAL

SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRETARY DEPARTMENT

OF DEFENSE OF DEFENSE

:

I

COORDINATION I

JOINT CHIEFS I

I

OF STAFF

DEPARTMENT

OF STATE

ARMY

CHIEF OF STAFF

GOVERNOR, UN COMMANDI SUPREME

COMMAND, RYUKYU ISLANDS FAR EAST COMMAND ALLIED POWERS

I I I I

U.S. JAPAN HEADQUARTERS FAR EAST NAVAL FORCES, LOGISTICAL EIGHTH ARMY AND SERVICE

FAR EAST COMMAND COMMAND AIR FORCES

I I II I I I I

SEVENTH FIFTH STRATEGIC

FLEET U.S. UNITS ROK ARMY KMAG AIR FORCE AIR

COMMAND

I

ATIACHED ATIACHED ATIACHED

UN NAVAL UN GROUND UN AIR

FORCES UNITS FORCES
CHAPTER VI

Fighting But Talking

Even before the Korean armistice negotiations began in July 1951,

Secretary Marshall had decided to step down. Long in poor health and

fatigued by his year in the Pentagon, Marshall left office on 12 September

1951. 1 As Lovett took the helm, the overriding concern continued to be

Korea. During the course of the alarmingly slow military negotiations at

Kaesong there persisted a troublesome warfare of little movement that

produced a lesser but still high rate of casualties and allowed the enemy to

strengthen defensive fortifications and build up supplies. The growth of the

enemy's air power in both quantity and quality posed a particular threat.

These uncertain circumstances required the United States to keep under

review the courses of action it might have to take in the event of an armistice,

no armistice, or even a breached armistice.

The Start of the Talks: An Agenda

The first formal meeting of the armistice negotiators took place on 10July

1951 in Kaesong-Korea's ancient capital located northwest of Seoul close to

the 38th parallel and the first major South Korean city to fall to the North

Korean attackers. Responsible to General Ridgway, Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy

led the UN negotiating team.· On the enemy side, although North Korean Lt.

Gen. Nam 11 was the chief delegate, Chinese Maj. Gen. Hsieh Fang seemed to

be the controlling voice. t2

• The original UN negotiating team also included Maj. Gen. Henry 1. Hodes (USA); Maj. Gen.

Laurence C. Craigie (USAF); Rear Adm. Arleigh A. Burke (USN); and Maj. Gen. Paik Sun Yup (ROKA).

t The additional members of the original enemy team included Chinese Lt. Gen. Tung Hua and

North Korean Maj. Gens. Lee Sang Cho and Chang Pyong San. According to General Nam, the

correct names of their two armies were the "People's Army of the Democratic People's Republic

of Korea" and "The Chinese People's Volunteers."

119
120 THE TEST OF WAR

From the start, the Communists sought to exploit the situation to extract

maximum propaganda advantage. Pictures of UN jeeps entering Kaesong

bearing the agreed-upon white truce flags appeared in Asian papers above

captions describing their "surrender." Enemy guards ordered UN envoys

about and refused Western press representatives entry until Ridgway threatened to stay away. U.S. negotiators encountered animus, arrogance, and

rudeness. Believing the Communists viewed civility as a sign of weakness,

Ridgway urged JoY to be tough. In this disagreeable atmosphere, UN negotiators endured two years of dreary, exasperating, and repetitious talks. As

Ridgway observed, it was "nearly enough to make men welcome a return to

battle." Only at the lower staff levels was the atmosphere less grim; here,

Communist colonels acted "more down to earth and practical." Sometimes,

they even smiled.'

The enemy negotiators were subject to strict control by their governments, as were the UN emissaries, whose orders came from the U.S. government acting as the agent of the United Nations. Every formal statement made

by Joy or the other UN negotiators was carefully approved in advance in Korea

and Tokyo and often in Washington as well. Adding comments and recommendations, Ridgway daily sent summary analyses and verbatim accounts of

meetings to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At weekly or more frequent meetings, JCS

and State representatives studied and discussed these papers. On important

matters. Marshall or Lovett met with Acheson and the Joint Chiefs and

submitted recommendations to Truman for approval. In fact, the UNC

negotiators took no major step without the president's approval. Sensitive to

the need to act in concert with C.S. allies. who wanted an end to the war,

Washington intended to continue the Korean talks if at all possible and was

prepared to make concessions if necessary. The l'NC representatives led by

Joy, on the other hand. believed that the road toward peace could be more

quickly traversed by the adoption of more forceful and uncompromising

positions. This fundamental difference of view between Washington and the

theater persisted throughout the negotiations. * Whatever their personal

beliefs, however, the negotiators faithfully obeyed orders from Washington. I

The first item of business at Kaesong was to prepare an agenda for the talks.

The Communists proposed a five-pOint agenda and insisted that it include two

points-the ,-\8th parallel as the line of demarcation between the two Korean

sides and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea. On 16July the enemy

* On :\ May 1')';2 Joy t:xclaimnl in his oian·. "The JCS for once seem to he our siot:'" (St:t: Allan

E. Goooman. co. Negotiating While Fighting: tbe IJiarj' ,,{Admira! C 7iln/er.!o)' at the Korean

Armistice Con{erlmce. :\')(,.) Collins recoros that State officials meeting with the JCS usually

incluonltwo or three from a group incluoing Charln F. Bohlen. I' Alexis Johnson. II. freeman

Matthews. Li\'ingston :\lcrchant. Paul :\ilZc. ano Dean Rusk.
Fighting But Talking 121

finally conceded that the military demarcation line item could be listed without

reference to the 38th parallel, but they persisted on the withdrawal issue.

U.S. officials were unwilling to capitulate on this issue because UNC

withdrawal would leave South Korea easy prey to the enemy, discussion of

withdrawal would alarm and frighten the South Koreans and possibly lead

them to act rashly, and troop withdrawal was primarily a political issue to be

discussed only at a higher governmental level. On this last point Marshall

strongly supported the JCS view that the matter was inappropriate for military

negotiators but that there should be no delay in high-level negotiations for a

political settlement immediately following an armistice. Although Acheson

concurred, he noted pragmatically that any political settlement would require

Communist agreement, and therefore he stressed the need to achieve a

military armistice that would be acceptable over a long period. 6

The troop withdrawal issue became aggravated to the point that Ridgway

was ready to break off the talks. Then on 25 July the Communists offered to

drop foreign troop withdrawal in return for a vaguely worded fifth item on the

agenda. 7 The UNC team agreed, and on 26 July the two sides adopted an

agenda of five points, the first of which had been fulfilled and the last of

which was so broadly stated as to be almost meaningless:

1. Adoption of an agenda.

2. Fixing a military demarcation line between the two sides so as to

establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for a cessation of

hostilities.

3. Concrete arrangements for the achievement of a cease-fire and

armistice, including the composition, authority, and functions of a

supervising organization to oversee the plan.

4. Arrangements relating to prisoners of war.

S. Recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on hoth sides.

In accepting the agenda, the UN delegation made it clear that it made no

advance commitment to any specific agreement regarding the items. It had

taken 16 days to reach an accord on the agenda,H

A Military Demarcation Line

With the agenda settled, the Communist negotiators again proposed the

38th parallel as the line of demarcation, arguing that it was of historic importance and that each side would have to withdraw about equally from the
122 THE TEST OF WAR

irregular battlefield line to get back to the 38th. The next day, 27 July, Joy

advanced the idea that there were actually three "zones of military significance" -air, sea, and ground, none based on the 38th parallel. He argued that

the end of UNC air, sea, and ground hostilities would represent a far greater

concession than a cease-fire by the enemy ground forces in Korea. Joy then

proposed a demarcation line generally favorable to UNC forces, with a

20-mile-wide demilitarized zone. Ridgway did not think the enemy was

surprised by the refusal to accept the 38th parallel as the boundary.9

On 28 July Nam II scornfully rebuffed Joy for his "completely absurd and

arrogant statement" regarding the demarcation line and asked, "for what

actually have you come here?" Joy in turn rebuked Nam II for a "rhetorical

question so inappropriate, so irrelevant and so discourteous as to be unworthy

of a reply." Still, he replied at length. When Nam II refused to change his

position, a deadlock ensued, and on 10 August the two delegations actually

confronted each other across the table for more than two hours without

speaking. Ridgway wanted to break off negotiations, but Washington preferred that the onus of a negotiating failure fall on the Communists. Alleging

that the UNC had bombed the negotiating site at Kaesong, the Communists

halted negotiations entirely on 23 August. 10

From almost the beginning of the talks difficulties over Kaesong's neutral

status exacerbated the disagreement at the negotiating table. The constant

maneuverings of Communist and UNC troops around the perimeter of the

neutral zone increased the chances of its violation. Enemy trucks bearing

white flags drove through the neutral zone, and an enemy company once

passed in sight of UN negotiators in their Kaesong quarters. Kaesong's

closeness to the enemy supply line, against which thousands of UNC air

sorties occurred, made the UNC vulnerable to claims of air violations of the

neutral zone. Over a two-month period the Communists alleged almost 200

air violations, creating the need for constant UN investigations and denials.

Communist charges of an incident on 10 September, however, turned out to be

accurate and there was a UNC apology. I I

Ridgway wanted to end Kaesong's status as a neutral zone, but Washington ordered him to wait for a Communist response. Even though the

Communists offered to resume negotiations at once, Ridgway remained

unwilling to hold any more talks in Kaesong unless directly ordered to do so. 12

Although sympathetiC to his position, Washington was resolved to avoid a

permanent rupture in the talks, even if it meant continuing to meet at Kaesong

or conceding some modification of the UN demarcation line. Ridgway and the

negotiators, on the other hand, wanted to hold firm. U

The differences between Ridgway and Washington reflected a growing

divergence of views concerning the value of an armistice. Marshall, the Joint
Fighting But Talking 123

Chiefs, and State-as well as Ridgway-thought in August that the Chinese

would drag out the negotiations as long as possible in order to improve their

military position. At an NSC meeting on 29 August, Marshall informed Truman

that commanders in Korea expected a Communist attack within days. 14 By late

September, however, Ridgway indicated that, with the approach of winter and

a currently unfavorable enemy military situation, the Communists needed an

armistice more than the UNC. "Time works to their disadvantage," he cabled

Washington. Truman sought to clarify the matter by sending Bradley and

Charles E. Bohlen of the State Department to the Far East. 15

In October Bohlen reported that UNC forces had high morale, were well

supplied, and were deployed in a good position well forward of the Kansas

line. Despite growing enemy air strength, particularly MIG-ISs, UNC commanders saw little evidence of a general enemy offensive in the near future. It

was not necessary to hurry the talks, Bohlen thought; indeed, there might be

justification for "stringing them out, even in endless debate as to site," but he

recommended against their complete rupture. Rather, the UNC should continue its efforts, Ridgway should not be forced to return to Kaesong, and a

new UN demarcation proposal should be made. 16

Ridgway's strong stance paid off, for the Communists proposed enlarging

the neutral zone and moving the conference to Panmunjom. With UNC

agreement, the full negotiating teams convened for the first time in two

months on 25 October. Joy accepted a North Korean proposal to send the

demarcation question to a subdelegation to prepare recommendations for the

delegations, and work began that afternoon. 17 The UNC proposed a new line

of demarcation, not very different from their earlier offer. The Communists

refused it because, they contended, it would require a disparate number of

withdrawals by their side and they did not want Kaesong to be in either the

UNC or the demilitarized zone-but they no longer referred to the 38th

parallel as their line. Unimpressed by the enemy's lack of reference to the 38th

parallel, Ridgway remained determined that Kaesong be in one of the two

zones. On 6 November, however, the JCS advised him to accept the ChineseNorth Korean line in the Kaesong area provided the enemy agreed to conclude

work on all agenda items within a given time. Iii

The major differences over demarcation included the location of the line

and the demilitarized zones, the withdrawals required on both sides, and

whether Kaesong should be placed in one of the two demilitarized zones,

which the Communists opposed. On 8 November the Communists made a

new offer to fix the demarcation line and the demilitarized zone on the basis

of the existing line of battle. Ridgway believed it would be a major mistake to

accept this proposal, but he was prepared to trade Kaesong for a final

demarcation line that would follow the actual line of contact as of the
124 THE TEST OF WAR

effective date of an armistice. I') With Lovett and Truman both preferring the

JCS position of 6 November, Ridgway was instructed to press for early

settlement of agenda item 2 on the basis of the current line of contact, but

with the understanding that such agreement would remain valid only for a

specific time, possibly 30 days, while negotiations continued on the remaining agenda items. 2o

Despite misgivings, the UNC negotiators at a plenary session on 27

November ratified agreement on item 2. Both sides accepted the principle that

the military line of contact would become the demarcation line and that the

current line would become final without any change if they signed an

armistice within 30 days.21

Ground Operations

Once the two sides decided to begin negotiating, the nature of further

military operations in Korea became more uncertain. When Lovett asked

about the possible use of atomic weapons in Korea, the Joint Chiefs thought

that they should be considered only in the event of a military disaster, and

Ridgway was so notified in August II)'; I. Meanwhile, Ridgway and Van Fleet

decided against any attempt at large-scale offensive ground action. To cut

down on any enemy buildup and to keep him off balance as well as to

maintain Eighth Army's fighting edge, they agreed early in July that Eighth

Army should undertake a series of small-scale operations to straighten the

Kansas-Wyoming line. They eliminated Kaesong as a target because it was still

the armistice conference site. 22

In late July Van Fleet decided to move against an area in the Taebaek

mountains where North Koreans in control of the hills around a circular valley

area known as the "Punchbowl" were harassing liNC forces. The summer

campaign began on IH August and was marked by heavy fighting; it was ';

September before Eighth Army took the aptly named Bloody Ridge, somewhat

southwest of the Punchbowl, and completed the operation. Three days later

Van Fleet moved out again, attacking three nearby peaks, later poignantly

dubbed Heartbreak Ridge, which his forces took on 13 October. The operations cost approximately 6,-!00 lINC casualties, including many South Koreans and a number in the French component, and innicted an estimated 40,000

North Korean casualties. These operations removed the sag in the Punchbowl

area and shortened the eastern segment of the Eighth Army line across

Korea. 2'>

Between 3 and 23 October Van Fleet's troops mounted three attacks

against the Chinese in the west, actions in which the South Koreans made an
Fighting But Talking 125

excellent showing. When the assault ended on 23 October UNC casualties

numbered about 8,500, with enemy losses estimated at over 51,000. Truman's

concern that the operation had created a bulge in the UNC line across Korea

was allayed by Lovett's assurance that the danger was not great. 2-<

When the armistice talks resumed at Panmunjom on 25 October 1951,

only two days after the end of Van Fleet's costly line-straightening operations,

Ridgway preferred not to proceed with further planned offensive operations.

On 12 November he directed Van Fleet to assume an "active defense" posture

and to limit action to the taking of defensive terrain and outpost positions,

using not more than one division. In November the major Eighth Army

operation was a 2-day attack to move forward 2 miles on a 7-mile front. 25 The

27 November 1951 agreement on the demarcation line was then immediately

and almost universally perceived as a de facto cease-fire. Indeed, British

Foreign Minister Anthony Eden asked Lovett in Rome whether an armistice

had been achieved. 2('

Casualties became an important public issue in late November, for in the

4'/2 months since the start of the armistice talks the UNC suffered almost

60,000 killed, wounded, or missing, including more than 22,000 Americans.

Whatever the validity of the UNC claim that the enemy lost almost four times

that number-some 234,OOO-in the same period, the American people were

in no mood to accept more casualties. Even before the armistice talks began,

the public desire for peace had fostered the hope and belief that the war was

almost over. There was no real taste for fighting for hills that would probably

revert to the enemy after the armistice was signed.r

After u.s. press accounts in late November stated that UNC troops had

been ordered not to fire except in self-defense, the president denied the story,

but the truth was more complex. Van Fleet had issued instructions to ensure

that every soldier understood that fighting would continue until the final

armistice was signed. But he had also directed Eighth Army, while preparing

for combat in the event of "unduly prolonged" negotiations, to reduce

operations to the minimum needed to maintain its current position and to

avoid unnecessary casualties. Ridgway felt that Van Fleet had exceeded his

authority; still he pointed out to the ]CS on 30 November that casualties

"could scarcely be ... justified" because the demarcation line agreement

stipulated that any additional ground taken in the 30-day grace period would

be relinquished. 2H Meanwhile the Chinese and North Koreans used the grace

period to fortify their lines with underground bunkers and intricate fortifications. By the beginning of 1952 it was clear that any further UNC ground

action would entail heavy costs. 2')

Beyond ordering the South Koreans to stamp out guerrilla activity in the

rear lines, Van Fleet planned no major offensive action in January 1952. In
126 THE TEST OF WAR

February Ridgway vetoed plans for limited operations as too costly, and in

March he permitted offensive action only as necessary for reconnaissance and

counteroffensive measures. After Van Fleet got qualified approval for a limited

attack in April, he postponed it indefinitely. Introduction of a liberal policy of

troop rotation improved Eighth Army morale, but unit effectiveness dropped

because of the replacement of battle-wise troops with inexperienced

soldiers. 50

Both UNC and Communist battle losses decreased but did not disappear.

UNC casualties, which had reached 20,000 in October 1951, dropped to

11,000 in November, 3,000 in December and again in January, and below

2,500 per month from February through April 1952. Enemy losses, probably

always overestimated, were placed at 80,000 in October 1951 and 50,000 in

November, 20,000 a month in December and January, and in a range of 11,000

to 13,000 a month from February through April 1952.'\1

During the same period UNC strength increased marginally to more than

637,000, despite a slight decrease in U.S. forces. The increase came from the

addition of almost 60,000 South Korean troops and an increase in the small

Allied contribution. Estimated Chinese strength rose from 377,000 on 1

November 1951 to 642,000 by January 1952; North Korean strength apparently remained fixed at about 225,000. By the end of April 1952 the enemy

had available 82 divisions, well equipped with armor, artillery, and ammunition, and much improved in combat efficiency. 52 Nonetheless, Ridgway

doubted that they would attack. Their forces were defensively deployed, they

had spent the winter building defensive installations, and there were no

prisoner reports of an impending attack. Still, at an NSC meeting in April,

when the president inquired about the possibility of an extended offensive,

General Bradley agreed it was important to take into account the growing

enemy capability to launch a new ground threat. 5.'

A Challenge to Air Superiority

From the time the Chinese entered Korea in late 1950, they operated their

aircraft back and forth across the Yalu River, while the UNC prohibited its

planes from follOWing them across the river boundary, thus granting the

enemy a sanctuary. With a rapid buildup of Chinese air strength in the early

spring of 1951 and increasing enemy air activity, both Marshall and the Joint

Chiefs wanted to authorize "hot pursuit," which would have allowed UNC

planes to follow attacking enemy aircraft "across the Yalu for a prescribed and

limited distance." When Acheson pressed the Allied governments for support,

however, they refused. The United States dropped the matter for the moment
Fighting But Talking 127

but maintained that in the event of a massive enemy air assault it would take

whatever action was necessary to safeguard UNC troops. The JCS drafted an

order for UNC air retaliation beyond Korea in the event of a large-scale enemy

air attack launched from outside Korea. The president approved the order, but

the JCS did not send it to MacArthur; • they sent it to Ridgway shortly after he

assumed command. 34

On 19 April, the day MacArthur returned to Washington and addressed

Congress, Air Force Secretary Finletter, a strong advocate of air power, brought

the problem of the enemy's continuing buildup before Lovett and the Army

and Navy secretaries. Air intelligence estimated that with the addition of 300

to 400 Russian planes the Chinese air force had increased to a total of 700 to

800 aircraft, including 250 jet-propelled Russian MIGs. In addition, the

Soviets had about 3,700 planes in the vicinity of the Korean border. Against

this array the UNC could count on 1,185 planes, including Navy and Marine

air. Finletter thought that U.S. planes were superior to and better handled than

the enemy's and could contain a surprise Chinese air attack. But he believed

that U.S. air would suffer serious damage in such an engagement and not be

able to prevent later Chinese air attacks; if the Chinese augmented their air

force, the danger would increase. 3 5

Although Finletter agreed to obtain Allied concurrence before retaliation

against enemy air bases, he wanted the United States to reserve its freedom of

action and questioned the reactive nature of U.S. policy. He argued that the

American people thought UNC air control in Korea "almost complete" and

that they should be informed of the current danger and of plans to retaliate

only after an enemy attack. The Army and Navy secretaries sided with

Finletter, but the Joint Chiefs were divided, and Bradley agreed with Collins

that the "proper committee of Congress" should be informed firstY' Marshall

drew up a draft of a public statement that, if mass enemy air attacks occurred,

the United States would be "forced to take immediate action to protect our

forces," including hot pursuit and destruction of the enemy's air bases, planes,

and supporting facilities. State reacted negatively and drafted a paper that

merely indicated the possible necessity of countermeasures. The administration took no action. 37

In May Ridgway requested 10 more U.S. air groups, and in mid-June he

asked Finletter to support this request and another one for additional

antiaircraft battalions, radar equipment, and airfield construction funds. t

Writing Marshall on 19 June, Finletter claimed that the Chinese currently had

1,000 aircraft, of which some 400 were jets, including the advanced MIG-15s.

• See Chapter V

t For the budgetary fight to increase air strength at this time, sec Chapter XIV
128 THE TEST 01' WAR

Although the lJNC now had 1,.f 18 planes, Finletter wanted to get more tactical

aircraft to Ridgway, if necessary diverting them from NATO or other military

assistance countries. He asked Marshall to discuss with Acheson the possibility

of a public statement, or to allow Air Force officials to do so..'>H Three days later

Finletter sent Marshall a Far East Air Forces (FEAF) estimate that the Chinese

air force would be quantitatively equal to the UN force by 1 December 1951

and equal in combat effectiveness by I April 1952 unless FEAF were

augmented. But with the agreement in July 1951 to hold armistice talks,

Finletter's idea of a public statement and ultimatum seemed untimely 5')

At the start of cease-fire negotiations in Korea, Ridgway expanded UNC

air operations in order to hold down an enemy buildup. Noting considerable

activity around the North Korean capital of P'yongyang, he proposed on 21

July to mount an all-out air strike against military targets in that city after first

warning the inhabitants. Lm'ett and Bradley both opposed the attack, and

Truman agreed it should be postponed. When Ridgway protested, the president approved the strike. specifying no advance warning and no unusual

publicity. The 30 July air attack on p'yongyang did not produce the major

results that Ridgway had hoped for, and he raised the pOSSibility of bombing

Rashin, a principal enemy supply base. III The Joint Chiefs persuaded Marshall

that visual bombing would preclude violation of the international borders,

and the president gave the go-ahead. On 25 August, 35 B-29 bombers struck

Rashin in a highly successful attack. By the end of August Ridgway felt that,

rather than additional ground forces, he needed at least one more F-86 wing

and one more B-29 wing. II

Eager to augment Ridgway's air power. Lovett asked Finletter in October

whether additional B-26 bombers (an old plane out of production, the B-26

was still useful in interdiction work in Korea) could be sent to the Far East.

Finletter replied that plans to increase the number of B-26s in the Far East

from 140 to 216 could not take place until the following summer because of

parts shortages. Meamvhile, the B-29 bombers. carrying the burden of the

interdiction work, were too slow for their jet fighter escorts and were

experiencing heavy losses from the enemy's jet planes. 12 By the fall of 1951

it was clear that the enemy's MIG-15 was superior to all U.S. planes but the

F-86 Sabrejet, a day interceptor that approached the MIG-15 in performance

but was inferior to the Soviet plane in rate of climb and combat ceiling and had

only limited utility in bad weather or at night. However, the F-94 Starfire

interceptor fighter overcame the last two difficulties. 15

Faced with the need for more air units for Korea and a shortage of trained

F-86 crews, Finletter was unwilling to solve the problem by sending combatweary pilots back to Korea. In late December he recommended to Lovett that

they send an all-weather F-9ci wing from the Air Defense Command.
Fighting But Talking 129

Moreover, he suggested withholding 75 F-86 aircraft from the United Kingdom and another 75 from Canada for shipment to Korea. Finally, to augment

the three B-29 wings in the Far East and the two wings currently on alert for

movement to that area, Finletter proposed sending still another B-29 wing,

even though the transfer would interfere with Strategic Air Command

training. 4 '

In discussions with Pace and Kimball on 10 January 1952, Finletter stated

his belief that Lovett and the service secretaries would all be vulnerable if

armistice negotiations failed and UNC forces did not have the shield of

additional air power.'~ On 6 February the Joint Chiefs notified Lovett that one

war-strength F-94 squadron would be sent to Korea that month and 60 F-86

planes would be purchased from Canada at the rate of 10 per month. With

these and 12 more F-86s per month from U.S. production, the Joint Chiefs

expected that by June the Far East Command would have two full-strength

F-86 wings backed by a 50-percent war reserve. They viewed the two wings

of B-29s already alerted for Korea as sufficient augmentation. Since these

arrangements constituted what was currently practicable, Lovett had to be

satisfied.'(,

By the spring of 1952, Finletter estimated Chinese air strength at

approximately 1,700 planes, including 900 jets, mainly MIG-15s- "a serious

threat." The F-86 was proving more than a match for the MIG-15, with only

23 F-86 planes lost through January 1952 compared with 166 MIG-15s

claimed. Overall, the score was less favorable, with U.S. losses of 402 planes

compared with the enemy's 349. Part of this disparity derived from the

enemy's unwillingness or inability to use planes for interdictory operations or

close support of ground troops; the United States had lost 296 aircraft in

interdiction operations and 65 in close support. While enemy air power posed

a potential threat, Finletter could still claim unchallenged UNC control of the

air over the battlefield.'~

Review of l! S. Options in Korea

In this context of continuing disarray in the armistice talks, perslstmg

battle casualties, and the growth of enemy air capability, the administration

undertook to review again U.S. policy for Korea. On 13 July 1951, only three

days after the cease-fire talks started, the Joint Chiefs wrote Marshall that they

thought it would be "necessary to increase military pressure on the enemy" if

the talks should fail, but they did not want to involve the United States in a

general war with Communist China. They recommended the nation should

increase the scale of operations in Korea; support covert operations against
130 THE TEST Of WAR

China and Korea; expedite Japanese defense preparations; and press u.s. allies

to support such steps as political and economic pressure on China, additional

forces for Korea, and a naval blockade of mainland China. They thought

Ridgway should not only increase the scale of military operations but be

allowed to advance at least to the neck of the North Korean peninsula. Air

attacks should be permitted against all North Korean targets, including Rashin

and the Yalu River installations, and hot pursuit of hostile aircraft should be

allowed, "to include destruction of enemy planes after landing, and neutralization of opposing antiaircraft fire. "'H

Refraining from comment, Marshall on 18 July sent the JCS memorandum

to Truman, who in turn discussed it with Marshall and Acheson. If an armistice

came in Korea, State believed it should be followed by political discussions

leading to a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem on the basis of the UN

goal of a unified, independent, and democratic Korea, but without involving

other Far Eastern questions.'') With minor reservations, the JCS, the secretaries of the military departments, and Marshall accepted this position. ~()

The Joint Chiefs rejected State's position that if the armistice talks in

Korea did not succeed, any ensuing U.S. military and political actions should

be related to possible enemy moves. They considered this position as "not

only unsound but so dangerous militarily as possibly to jeopardize the security

of the United Nations forces in Korea"; it would limit Ridgway's freedom of

action and greatly increase the risks because of delays inherent in the many

consultations State anticipated having with Allied nations. Rather, the Joint

Chiefs wanted the measures advocated in their 13 July memorandum initiated

without delay. The service secretaries supported the JCS position. Writing

Acheson on 4 September, Marshall agreed with all the earlier JCS recommendations except hot pursuit. Because of its far-reaching implications and the

need for further refinement and clarification before adoption of such a policy,

Marshall reserved his own position and sent the JCS views on hot pursuit to

the NSC for consideration. I

With State and Defense unable to agree on what to do if the armistice talks

failed, more questions surfaced and positions shifted within the Pentagon.

Some OSD officials worried that the JCS proposals had not taken account of

U.S. objectives, particularly in view of the potential heavy casualties that

might ensue, and feared that "violent American [domestic] reactions" might

follow any breakdown in the cease-fire talks. Some Defense officials thought

that overall policy, not just the matter of hot pursuit, should be reviewed in the

National Security Council. ~2 On 13 September Lovett told Acheson that he felt

the entire issue required further study. The secretaries of the military

departments jointly wrote Lovett on 25 September that they now disagreed

with the JCS recommendation to increase the scale of ground operations,
Louis A. Johnson, Secretary of Defense, 1949-50.
Johnson S\\'ears in James H. Burns as Assistant to the Secretary of Defense,

December 1949. Witnesses are Frank Pace and Stephen Early.

The Joint Chids of Staff-Gl:nl:rals Bradley. Vandenberg, and Collins and Admiral

'herman, I<)=;0
President Truman,

Vannevar Bush, and

Louis Johnson, 19 May

1950.

Assistant Secretaries of

Defense Marx Leva

and Wilfred]. McNeil

on 12 September

1950, first anniversary

of their swearing-in.
1'.leeting of the UN Security Council on 27 June 1950.

LO\·ett. French General de Laure de Tassigny, and Marshall, September 19'51.
Amphibious craft at Inch'on.

C.S. Army gun crew in action in Korea, July 1950.
Troops of the 7th Division advance toward 38th parallel, April 1951.

Korean refugees flee southward from 38th parallel, April 1951.
CSS \'alley Forge operating off Korea, july 1950.

F-86 Sabrejets on

patrol duty over "MIG

Alley" in northwest

Korea,

The Dai Ichi building,

Tokyo, Headquarters,

Far East Command.
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F-84 Thunderjets over North Korea.

Air Force evacuation plane takes off with wounded as Army mobile gun stands guard.
L.S. Army tanks in P'yongyang, North Korea.

Battleship Missouri in action against Chong Jim, North Korea, 21 October 1950.
Infantrymen of the 5th Regimental Combat Team move up for attack on Chuk-Chon

mountain, Korea, August 1950.

C S. Navy underwater demolition team at Wonsan, North Korea, October 1950.
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Defiant Chinese Communist prisoners strip and discard clothing.

Troops of 25th

Infantry Division

firing on enemy

positions three miles

south of 38th parallel,

~tarch 1951.
General :Y1ark W Clark and North Korean General Nam II sign armistice agreement, 23

JulY 1953.

President Syngman Rhee of South Korea with Generals Partridge, Van Fleet, and

Ridg~'..a\·
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Fighting But Talking 131

provided the enemy made no m.ilitary move after termination of negotiations.

But they advocated getting prior Allied agreement for hot pursuit and asked

for study of the possible use of tactical atomic weapons against suitable North

Korean targets. S~

By the end of September 1951 the enemy air buildup had convinced both

Ridgway and Lt. Gen. Otto P. Weyland, commanding general of FEAF, that hot

pursuit was undesirable under any conditions; Bradley labeled it "rushing into

a hornets' nest." Later, the Joint Chiefs deleted hot pursuit from their 13 July

recommendations. They thought, however, that it might become necessary to

use U.S. air forces to attack certain Chinese air bases if enemy air activity

seriously jeopardized U.S. forces in Korea. The JCS still thought that if the

armistice talks failed, Ridgway should be given considerable latitude in his

operations-allowed to increase ground pressure and no longer restricted to

the neck of the North Korean peninsula. They did not mention use of atomic

weapons. 54

Aware that their recommended measures would probably enable Ridgway

to maintain pressure but not to take decisive action, the Joint Chiefs warned

Lovett that additional U.S. forces would probably be required should the talks

at Panmunjom fail. They asked for NSC determination of U.S. objectives in

Korea in the event of no armistice. On 9 November Acting Secretary of

Defense William C. Foster sent their memorandum, with his concurrence, to

the NSC, where, in connection with an already initiated study, it became part

of the NSC 118 series.ss

Finletter and the Army and Navy secretaries reviewed a draft NSC paper,

and on 10 December Pentagon officials met with the president. Still dissatisfied after the meeting, Finletter wrote Lovett that although the United States

had decided to make every possible concession to get a cease-fire, an armistice

would actually worsen its military position. If foreign combatants remained in

Korea, the Chinese could easily build up their strength; if foreign troops

withdrew, the Chinese could reenter from Manchuria at any time, while it

would be very hard to put UNC forces back in Korea. In addition to other

measures, Finletter warned that special air actions and use of the A-bomb

would have to be considered. The National Security Council was already

addressing these issues. S6

On 11 December Lovett called for the views of the JCS and the service

secretaries on the current NSC draft report of NSC 118/1, which expressed the

goals of U.S. policy in Korea in much the same way as NSC 48/5. Ultimately,

according to the draft report, the United States was to seek, by political rather

than military means, a united, independent, and democratic Korea. Currently,

it was to try to reach a Korean settlement that would end the hostilities,

establish South Korean authority below a northern boundary located gener-
132 THE TEST OF WAR

ally not south of the 38th parallel, provide for the staged withdrawal of

non-Korean forces from Korea, and permit a South Korean military buildup

sufficient to "deter or repel a renewed North Korean aggression." The Cnited

States should avoid any extension of the connict into general war with the

Soviet Union or China, and continue military action until an armistice was

signed.

If the armistice negotiations succeeded. :\ISC 11 HI 1 recommended that

the United States try to establish a CN commission to negotiate a political

settlement; maintain existing economic and political sanctions against China;

urge UN countries to keep their forces in Korea as long as required; and train

and equip South Korean forces to assume increasing defense responsibilities.

The UN nations fighting in Korea should also warn the Chinese and North

Koreans that "military action without geographic limitation" would result if

they renewed the aggression.

If the armistice talks clearly failed, NSC I 18/1 called for expanding the

U.S. mobilization effort. enlarging the scale of Korean military operations.

removing all restrictions against advances or attacks in Korea except for areas

within approximately 12 miles of the USSR borders. and allowing U.S. air

attacks on air bases in China if specifically authorized by the president.

Unresolved disagreement between State and Defense led to the inclusion of

two versions of another measure: State called for joint enforcement of a

complete trade embargo against China: Defense. for a naval blockade of China

or, failing that, joint enforcement of a complete embargo on all shipments to

China.~~

When the NSC discussed the paper on 19 December. the major point of

contention concerned the Allied warning about breaking the armistice. NSC

118/1 argued that if necessary the United States should act unilaterally to make

it clear that future aggression in Korea would be punished by military actions

"not necessarily . . . limited in geographic scope or in methods of warfare

employed. ,,~H Acheson felt the language inappropriate for a public warning.

and he opposed a unilateral U.S. \varning. The Joint Chiefs also disliked the

statement's implied threat to the Soviets and its "too rigid commitment of

future U.S. action under unknown circumstances." As a result. the :\ISC

significantly altered the sentence by removing its last phrase concerning

methods. Even so, the statement was not meant to control the language of a

future warning. ~')

Acheson thought that Ridgway should consult Washington before increasing the scale of operations or beginning any major ground advance in Korea

and that the State Department should have an opportunity. time permitting, to

inform key allies before any unilateral t'.S. air attacks on Chinese air bases.

Lovett did not object. As for a possible embargo or blockade of China. Lovett
Fighting But Talking 133

told the NSC: that the Joint Chiefs and service secretaries both preferred a

blockade, but when he suggested studying the probable effectiveness of a

trade embargo versus a blockade, Acheson declared that the real problem was

British opposition to a blockade. The revised draft carried both the State and

Defense versions('()

The NSC did not debate two further provisions. In case the enemy

indefinitely delayed the armistice talks while building up militarily, the United

States was to increase political and economic pressures gradually and execute

measures planned in the event of a clear failure of negotiations. Whether or

not there was an armistice, NSC 118/1 continued the standing instructions to

Ridgway for use in the event of massive enemy air attacks against the UNC in

Korea. If Soviet "volunteers" entered Korea in sufficient numbers to threaten

UNe safety, the United States was immediately to consider withdrawing its

forces from Korea and placing itself in the best possible posture for general

war.!>l

Truman approved the revised draft, NSC: 118/2, on 20 December. It

remained in effect as a statement of policy throughout the remainder of the

Korean cont1ict. a 19-month period of uncertainty as to whether there ever

would be an armistice.!>2

Item 5

By the time Truman approved NSC 118/2, the 30-day period for completion of an armistice had almost expired. When the period lapsed on 27

December, the negotiators at Panmunjom had not completed agenda items 3,

4. and 5, and item 2, the military line of demarcation, remained subject to

revision. With work on items 3 and 4 lagging, Joy proposed on 31 January

1952 that the delegations discuss agenda item 5, recommendations to the

countries involved. The enemy delegation agreed, and the first meeting on

this subject took place on () February. ('0

In preparation, Ridgway had told Joy in early December 1951 that item 5

should be worded broadly. to the effect that the governments involved should

consider calling a political conference. The Joint Chiefs instructed Ridgway

on 24 December not to specify the form of discussion or the participants in

the final statement of item 5. (>I Korean political questions could be addressed

through a UN commission composed of a number of interested countries

rather than the belligerents alone. Ridgway could agree to naming North

Korea and the PRC on the one side, with South Korea and the United Nations

on the other. but Washington took the position that the Soviet Union should

not be separately named since, as a UN member. it was already included. On
134 THE TEST OF WAR

5 February 1952 the Joint Chiefs reminded Ridgway that the statement should

suggest that governments deal with these matters at a higher-level political

conference or by some other political means.6~

On 6 February the Communist negotiators proposed holding a political

conference within three months of an effective armistice-with North Korea

and the PRC on the one side and the concerned UN countries on the otherto consider the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, a peaceful

settlement of the Korean question, and other external matters related to peace

in Korea. The proposal seemed very close to Ridgway'S instructions, and he

wanted to act quickly. On 9 February the UN negotiators submitted a statement

that clearly limited any political conference to purely Korean issues.66 When

Nam II objected repeatedly during the next week, however, the UN side

prepared to drop this limitation. Then, before it could introduce a new

proposal, the enemy delegation on 16 February offered a political conference

that would settle the questions of foreign forces' withdrawal and "the Korean

question, etc. ,,6~

The new enemy statement met Washington's needs. The next day the UN

negotiators formally accepted the Communist proposal, with the understanding that the recommendation would be sent to the United Nations as well as

South Korea, that foreign forces were non-Korean forces, and that the "etc."

did not refer to any non-Korean matters. Essentially completed between 6 and

17 February, the resolution of item 5 was the brightest spot in the armistice negotiations. Now the negotiators had to turn back to the difficulties of

item 3. 6H

Item 3: Concrete Arrangements

With the 27 November 1951 agreement on the military demarcation line,

talks had begun immediately on item 3, arrangements for carrying out the

armistice. Although Ridgway wanted detailed and firm instructions and

deplored the UN practice of granting concessions during the talks, which he

felt led to enemy pressure for further concessions, he found it difficult to get

final orders.()')

Lovett, like Acheson, thought it would be hard, if not impossible, to

negotiate at Panmunjom sufficiently ironclad terms to police a Korean

armistice. Aerial observation or the frec movement of observer teams would

be necessary to safeguard UNC troops from an enemy buildup, but it was

unlikely the Communists would accept such arrangements. Furthermore,

with major enemy bases located in Manchuria, Lovett thought the concept of

full inspection in Korea might be meaningless. In his view, a public warning by
Fighting But Talking 135

the Western powers might be a more effective deterrent to renewed aggression. A warning, however, required prior agreement on retaliatory steps.

Meeting Anthony Eden in Rome on 27 November 1951, Lovett, Acheson, and

Bradley found the British foreign minister sympathetic but wary of anything

beyond bombing Communist airfields above the Yalu. When Bradley said

Ridgway needed some form of security against the Communists, such as a

blockade, Eden said he would have to check with his government. 70

At Panmunjom on 27 November, Nam 11 proposed that both sides stop

fighting the day the armistice was signed and withdraw from the demilitarized

zone within 3 days and from the rear of the other side to their own side of the

demarcation line within 5 days. No armed forces should enter the demilitarized zone or attack it. Finally, both sides should name an equal number of

representatives to form a joint commission to make specific armistice arrangements and oversee implementation. Struck by Nam Il's failure to mention

inspection, the UN negotiators countered with a plan calling for a cease-fire

within 24 hours of the armistice, creation of an equally and jointly manned

commission to carry out the armistice terms, and a demilitarized zone with no

armed forces except as specifically and mutually agreed, with governance by

the two military commanders according to the military armistice agreement.

The enemy accepted these points the next day. But the UN plan also proposed

that there be no increase in military forces, supplies, equipment, or facilities

by either side; free access throughout Korea for the military armistice

commission and its joint observation teams; and a withdrawal of each side's

armed forces "from the territory controlled by the other side.,,71

Nam 11 argued at subsequent meetings that it was unnecessary to

specifically prohibit increases in military personnel or materiel or to claim free

access throughout Korea for observers, since the withdrawal of all foreign

troops from Korea would obviate any need to worry about these particulars.

In any event, he declared, the UN principles exceeded the scope of the

military armistice talks and showed the need for a higher level conference. He

asked for clarification of the last point, the withdrawal of each side's armed

forces from the other's territory. The suggested UNC phrasing was intended to

allow UNC retention of certain islands off the coast of North Korea during an

armistice period. If the Communists agreed to this point, UNC negotiators

could agree with all of their proposals for item 3 insofar as they went. But the

UNC representatives claimed that the heart of item 3 was the principle of joint

inspection, which meant joint observation teams located at ports, airfields,

and key points throughout Korea and joint aerial observation of Korea. 72

On 3 December Nam 11 proposed that neither side bring into Korea any

military forces, weapons, or ammunition "under any pretext." Since the

Communists excluded any rotation whatsoever of troops or replenishment of
136 THE TEST OF WAR

supplies and equipment, the measure would effectively end the UNC presence

in Korea. Nam II also proposed, as Ridgway summarized it, formation of a

neutral nations supervisory body to conduct "necessary inspection, beyond

the demilitarized zone, of such ports of entry in the rear as mutually agreed

upon by both sides, and to report to the Joint Armistice Commission the result

of the inspection. ,,-', Although Nam said that this proposal incorporated the

reasonable portions of the UN principle and had to be taken as a whole, it

evoked many UN questions, particularly whether the Communists meant for

the supervisory body to be independent of the proposed military armistice

commission.-',

Nonetheless, the Joint Chiefs found the Communist proposals promising

and told Ridgway on 5 December to "prevent any regression." They doubted

that even enemy acceptance of the UN proposals would ensure UNC safety if

the Communists later breached the armistice. and they explained that the

outcome of Lovett's and Acheson's discussions in Rome could make a

difference. The JCS might still reconsider item 3: therefore Ridgway was not

to take any irrevocable position. ~'i

By 7 December four basic issues under item 3 remained to be resolvedpersonnel levels and equipment stocks, offshore islands. the neutral nations'

supervisory body, and rehabilitation of facilities. On these issues, Lovett and

the JCS agreed with Acheson that Ridgway would have to be considerably

more flexible. Rotation of personnel was nonnegotiable. but Ridgway could as

a last resort concede control of the offshore islands and accept mutually

agreed neutral observer teams provided they were responsible to the military

armistice commission. Lovett was also willing to concede rehabilitation of

Korean facilities except for airfields and even that could be referred to

Washington if it became the final obstacle to an agreement. The Joint Chiefs

formally instructed Ridgway on 10 December. ~(,

Ridgway viewed the airfields issue as the key question. On IH December

he asked for final positions that the UN negotiators could announce at times

of Ridgway's choosing. He advised against extension of the pending 30-day

time limit. The Joint Chiefs pointed out that a prolonged armistice would

require terms that could be enforced over the years and that the chief deterrent

to renewed aggression would be an Allied warning of retribution against

China. Ridgway was not to announce any position as final and should agree to

a 15-day extension of the 30-day time limit. He was to remain firm on rotation

for as many personnel as he needed and on the location of neutral observer

teams and their relationship to a military armistice commission. He could

yield on the effective date of the armistice. aerial observation, and replenishment of military equipment and supplies except combat aircraft. At his
Fighting But Talking 137

discretion, he could accept the rehabilitation of a number of airfields; no

fields, old or new, should be permitted to accommodate jet aircraft. 77

Before the end of December Joy reported that he had reached the

authorized final position and would take a firm stand. In early January 1952,

Ridgway informed Washington that, if the enemy was allowed to reinforce his

air strength in North Korea while UNC air strength could not be effectively

increased and atomic weapons were not authorized, the UNC could not

successfully retaliate against any post-armistice attack and the planned Allied

warning would have little meaning. 7H

When Winston Churchill, once again prime minister, visited Washington

for talks in January 1952, discussion centered on the retaliatory steps that

might be taken if the enemy later breached an armistice. Lovett explained that

the United States would limit any retaliatory bombing to transportation and air

concentrations, and Bradley said there was no plan to use the atomic bomb,

particularly since there were no suitable targets in Korea, but both men still

thought there would have to be a blockade of the China coast. Although the

talks ended without any consensus on the precise retaliatory means to be

used, the Americans apparently felt there was sufficient agreement to permit

Ridgway to omit from the armistice terms the prohibition on airfield construction or rehabilitation if that became the last impediment to peace.

Meanwhile, he should try to settle all other outstanding issues. 79 On 25

January the Communist negotiators accepted a UNC proposal to omit the

reference to airfields; later they conceded UN retention of five additional

islands, leaving troop rotation as the major issue. HO

By the end of February the UNC had dropped its demand for rotation

from 75,000 to .35,000 men per month, while the Communist negotiators had

finally raised the number to 30,000. They would consent to 35,000 only if the

UN side accepted 5 ports of entry per side rather than the 12 it wanted. At the

same time the enemy delegates made additional demands: acceptance of the

Soviet Union as a member of the neutral nations commission, extension of the

armistice terms to areas beyond the Korean peninsula, and permission for

neutral observers to inspect UNC military equipment and weapons without

restriction. They also refused to report the location of their major forces to the

military armistice commission or to guarantee not to redeploy such forces to

increase their offensive capability. Believing that the enemy thought they

could afford to talk indefinitely, Lovett told Truman early in March 1952 that

there was no way to tell whether the talks would succeed. Hl

In mid-March the UN negotiators agreed to accept the Communist

positions on ports of entry and on notification and redeployment of military

forces if they in turn would agree to gather no military intelligence during

inspection and to limit the armistice to the Korean peninsula. Other than the
138 THE TEST OF WAR

airfields question, only the matter of the Soviet Union's nomination as a

neutral nation remained unresolved. On 19 April the two sides finally agreed

to send item 3 back to a staff officers group. But this time the issue was joined

with the discussions on prisoners of war under item 4. HZ On 28 April Joy

offered to concede the airfields issue if the Communists agreed, first, not to

demand that the Soviet Union be on the neutral nations' supervisory commission under item 3 and, second, to accept the UN position on the prisoners

of war under item 4. On 2 May Nam II accepted the offer provided there could

be a "reasonable compromise" on the prisoners of war. With item 3 no longer

a major point of contention in the armistice talks, everything now depended

on the prisoner of war negotiations.H~
CHAPTER VII

The Prisoners of War

By the time the UNC negotiators offered the package deal on 28 April

1952 to complete the Korean armistice, the prisoner of war issue had become

a critical element in the negotiations. Both sides had captured and held great

numbers of prisoners. The enemy reported capturing more than 65,000 UNC

and South Korean soldiers in the first nine months of the war, and UNC camps

held approximately 137,000 enemy prisoners by January 1951. 1 The variety

of backgrounds and the diverse political views held by the captives in the UNC

camps created complications. Some of the prisoners thought to be North

Korean soldiers or guerrilla infiltraters turned out to be captured South Korean

troops who had been impressed as "volunteers" into the North Korean armies,

while others were South Korean civilians caught in roundup operations.

Moreover, each group in the UNC camps included pro- and anti-Communist

prisoners. After the Chinese Communists entered the war, the UNC discovered

that it held a diverse ideological mix of Chinese prisoners-Communists,

non-Communists, and even former Chinese Nationalist soldiers.

The Major Issue-Repatriation

It was inevitable that repatriation would become the central issue when

the negotiators at Panmunjom took up agenda item 4 on 11 December 1951.

The Communists insisted on an all-for-all exchange in accordance with the

provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1949, which provided for the

mandatory repatriation of prisoners of war. South Korea had signed the

convention. The United States had not ratified the convention and North

Korea was not a signatory, but both countries had pledged to observe its

provisions pertaining to prisoners of war.

139
140 TilE TEST OF \\AR

\X'ithin the administration achinTment of a consensus on the matter of

repatriation came only after prolonged discussion and debate over a period of

more than six months in Il)~ I and I ,)~2, invol\'ing State, Defense, Ridgway,

and the president. The basic issue di\'iding State and Defense was forcible

repatriation of prisoners, and both changed and refined their positions more

than once. Early in the negotiations the JCS and the Army firmly supported

voluntary repatriation although aware of some of the disad\'antages. But the

Defense view changed during the fall of I ')~ I to greater readiness to accept an

all-for-all exchange if the Communists rejected the one-for-one proposal.

The Americans soon found themsel\'es in an agonizing dilemma. Their

overriding aim, especiall~' in the \'iew of Ridgw;l\', his successor, General Mark

W. Clark, and the (';\IC negotiators at Panmunjom, was to secure the return of

all U.S. and ROK military and ci\'ilian prisoners held by the Communists. At

the same time, they could not countenance returning to the enemy by force

prisoners-i\'orth Korean, South Korean, and Chinese-who did not want to

be returned to Communist control. l{ccalling World War II experience, *

Truman and his advisers belinTd that application of the Geneva Convention

principle of all-for-all exchange, as the Communists insisted, would mean

condemning thousands of anti-Communist prisoners to imprisonment or

death. On the other hand, insistence on a one-for-one exchange could mean

a prolonged delay in anv exchange, thereh\' affecting the li\TS of the IT.S. and

RO K prisoners. 2

Ways of accomplishing the desired end were dehated within Defense and

among DoD, State, and the president. The preSident and the State Department

considered it particularl\' important to retain the mora] and material support

of as many of the nations of the world as possible for IT.S. war and peace

efforts. Throughout this period and after, lTN and Allied nations hrought

strong pressures to hear on the administration to take more accommodating

pOSitions in armistice negotiations and to end the war quickly-pressures that

douhtless influenced the administration's deliherations on prisoner of war

policy. :\'0 less important, changing circumstances in Korea, at the armistice

talks, and in \X'ashington greatly affected the attitudes among the American

decisionmakers on this emotion-laden issue. Within Defense, in particular,

most discussion participants changed positions at one time or another. It

required many months of appraisal and reappraisal of all aspects of the issue

hefore the JCS could inform Ridgway, himself given to douhts and equivocation, on the suhject of the president's final \\'ord on prisonCf exchange, And

* After \\orld \\:lr II. in keeping with agrtTmellls \\ith the Russians. the Wcstern Allies foreibh'

returned large numbers of prisoners of \\ar lormerh held I" the (,ermans W the Smil't I·nion.

\\here malll of them are helinnl w ILI\T heen exnuted or imprisoned.
The Prisoners of War 14 I

this final statement could not be truly final; more than a year of exasperating

and mutually recriminatory talks ensued before Panmunjo!11 adjustments were

made.

In preparation for the armistice talks, Truman on ;)0 June 19'; I approved

instructions to Ridgway to exchange prisoners on a one-for-one basis with

minimum delay. Since such an exchange would have left many prisoners in

UNC camps because of the disparity in numbers held by each side, the Joint

Chiefs suggested to Marshall that prisoners not be repatriated unless they gave

full consent. Acknowledging the arguments against voluntary repatriation-it

was contrary to the Geneva Convention, might establish a poor precedent for

future wars, would feed Communist propaganda, and might even create an

excuse for breaking off the armistice talks-the Joint Chiefs nonetheless felt

their modified approach to be justified. Beyond the humanitarian considerations, voluntary repatriation would confirm the liNe promises of safety

and asylum, establish liN reliability and compassion, and enhance future U.S.

psychological warfare effectiveness.'

Acheson argued with Marshall that the JCS proposal "might jeopardize the

prompt return" of prisoners held by the Communists and that it conflicted

with the Geneva Convention. To avoid injustice to certain classes of prisoners

who were likely to be killed on their return to their homeland, Acheson

proposed use of paroles and suggested that the two departments work out a

solution. In the Pentagon, Lovett presumed that the one-for-one stance was a

negotiating position and believed that an all-for-all exchange of prisoners

would cost the 1fnited States very little militarily. He asked the Joint Chiefs on

2'; September to think about the advisability of an overall exchange if the

one-for-one approach failed. I With Ridgway also in favor of an all-for-all

exchange, the Joint Chiefs prepared a new draft directive in November. ')

Reviewing the new draft, State altered its position. Although the welfare

and return of liNC soldiers from enemy camps remained the overriding

consideration, State wanted to consider further whether to return lINC-heid

prisoners who had committed criminal acts before their capture. Because of a

moral obligation to enemy soldiers who might be subject to reprisal on their

return, Ridgway should seek to avoid the forcible return of such prisoners.

State's concern reflected Truman's own intense interest in the question. The

president considered an all-for-all exchange basically unfair in view of the

disparate numbers held by the two sides; and the idea of forcing prisoners to

return to death or slave labor repelled him('

Meeting on :; December. the Joint Chiefs and State officials hammered out

their differences. The ensuing directive of 10 December in essence told

Ridgway to defend vigorously a one-for-one exchange of prisoners as long as

possible but, if necessary, to agree to an all-for-all exchange provided the
142 THE TEST OF WAR

exchange procedure took into account the wishes of individual POWs. This

odd position undoubtedly ret1ected the ambiguity in the minds of most of

those involved in its formulation. The proposal was dependent on Communist

submission of a list of their UNC and ROK prisoners "conforming satisfactorily to our best estimates of those they hold ...-

At Panmunjom on 11 December the enemy negotiators proposed that

each side release all its prisoners of war to the other side as soon as the

armistice was signed. The UNC negotiators, on the other hand, asked for an

immediate and full exchange of prisoner lists and "early regulated exchange of

prisoners of war on a fair and equitable basis." The ]CS directed Ridgway to

seek also the exchange of UN civilians and South Korean government

personnel held in enemy camps. When Ridgway doubted his ability to exact

these terms, the]CS told him to make a strong effort and authorized him to use

his own formula of an all-for-all exchange based on a one-for-one exchange of

UNC-held against enemy-held prisoners. to be followed by delivery of all

additional UNC-held prisoners of war desiring repatriation. 1i

On 18 December the enemy and UNC negotiators finally exchanged

prisoner lists. The Communists claimed to hold only 11.559 prisoners of

war-7, 142 South Koreans, 3,198 Americans. and 1,219 other UNC soldiers.

By comparison, UNC records showed 11,500 Americans missing in action,

while the South Koreans claimed that the enemy held 88.000 of their troops

and civilians. In October Ridgway had estimated a maximum return of 6,000

UN and 28,000 South Korean troops, plus some civilians,'! At Panmunjom,

UNC representatives remonstrated that the lists released to them contained

huge discrepancies and did not account for many Americans and South

Koreans known to have been captured. 10

By the same token, the UNC list disappointed the Communists, since its

total was lower than the UNC had previously reported to the International

Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva. This discrepancy resulted from the

removal of some 2,000 soldiers originally listed twice, the escape or disappearance of a number of enemy soldiers, and the discovery and subsequent

reclassification as civilian internees of some 37,500 South Koreans impressed

into the North Korean army. Compared with the Communist list, however, the

UNC list was lengthy, containing the names of 95,5." 1 North Koreans, 20,700

Chinese, and 16,243 impressed South Koreans retained in POW status-in all,

more than 132,000 names. II

With the UNC delegation inquiring about some 50,000 unlisted persons

and the Communist delegation demanding explanations for a claimed shortage of some 44,000, further meetings failed to bridge the gap. The Communists denied the validity of the LlNC recategorization of the South Koreans or

of anything that in any way indicated a policy of voluntary repatriation.
The Prisoners of War 143

Concerning the 50,000 unlisted South Korean troops, they reported that it

was their "policy to educate POWs and release them directly at front,"

apparently straight into their own armies. A majority of the 50,000, they

asserted, had been so released, while others had died in UNC raids or of illness

or had deserted. 12 They refused to allow Red Cross representatives to visit

their camps or to agree to an early exchange of the seriously sick and

wounded. The two sides spent Christmas 1951 fighting over numbers. After a

long UNC discourse on the missing 50,000 UN and South Korean soldiers, the

chief Communist delegate on agenda item 4 insultingly suggested there was

no need to worry since "they must have gone home a long time ago. No small

number of them must be fighting in your rear for liberation of South Korea." 13

Ridgway now prepared to use the compromise plan, basically an all-forall exchange with no forced repatriation. When the Communists did not

instantly reject the idea of exchanging civilians, Rear Adm. R.E. Libby, the

senior UNC representative on the item 4 subdelegation, proposed on 2January

1952 a prisoner exchange frankly based on voluntary repatriation. II The

fierce enemy reaction caused reevaluation of this proposal; clearly the

Communists would not accept the voluntary concept. On 15 January the Joint

Chiefs reminded Ridgway that it would be necessary to inform the president

before breaking off the talks, and that it was possible the government's stand

might be modified. 15

On 3 February the Communist negotiators offered a variation of an

all-for-all exchange. Washington gave Ridgway permission to drop all demands for the return of enemy-held ROK civilians who had not lived south of

the 38th parallel, and the enemy negotiators also made some concessions. But

the UN negotiators did not depart from the principle of voluntary repatriation,

even though they changed the term to a possibly more acceptable "no forced

repatriation." Whatever the choice of words, however, free versus forcible

repatriation remained the key issue separating the two sides. 16

State and Defense meanwhile reviewed the question. At a meeting on 1

February, Lovett and Acheson agreed to persist in the demand for no forcible

repatriation, to develop a plan for releasing prisoners who would be endangered by repatriation, thus confronting the Communists with a fait accompli,

and to send State-Defense recommendations to the president. Subsequently,

Lovett expressed doubt about the positions taken, Admiral Fechteler withdrew

his previous concurrence, and General Vandenberg firmly opposed the

proposals. 17

At a second State-Defense meeting on 7 February, State maintained its

opposition to forcible repatriation but thought Defense was showing a "clear

disposition to agree to return all prisoners of war," including, if necessary, the

reclassified South Koreans. In fact, however, Lovett, Foster, and Finletter
I-H 'IIII' TFST OF \\AR

remained uncertain. Following the meeting. Acheson sent LmTtt a Stateprepared draft of a joint memorandum for Truman declaring that the Inited

States would refuse to use force to return I' :"(-held prisoners of war whose

lives were likely to be seriously endangered by repatriation. The poli<'T \\'as to

be so implemented as to minimize jeopard\' to either enemy-held 1'\lC

prisoners or the armistice talks. and kn allies \\'ere to be consulted. LmTtt's

first reaction was noncommittal. IH

,\leeting with Truman and Acheson on H February. Loyett said that because

of continuing internal Defense differences mTr the polin he did not want to

sign the joint memorandum. He did not want to make such an important

decision without nTn knowing how many Chinese or ,\iorth Koreans in 1 ;\IC

camps would actually have to be returned forcibly. He asked "whether or not

the risk of loss of thc three thousand l'.S. PO\X"s lin enemy campsl and the

possibility of a breakdown in the truce and a consequent enlargement of

contlict did not. in fact. Glrry \\ith it a greater moral responsibility than any

we owed to Communist PO\\'s who had been shooling;1t us only a short time

ago." Accepting Acheson's position againsl forcible repatriation as more

realistic than the earlier State stand of limiting repatriation to those who

accepted it voluntarilY. LmTtt also recognized thaI considerable tlexibility

would be allO\\Td in the procedures for carning out the policy. He felt that

substantial agreement between State and Dc!ense might \l'! be reached as more

e\'idence became ayailable. I')

After further discussions. Truman appro\Td Acheson's posit ion against

forcible repatriation. asserting that the 1 nited States would "ha\'e to accept

the risks." Hoping the number of prisoner refusals would he low. Truman

agreed to lel\T the method of separating them to the military. Lo\ett asked the

president not to take am' final policy position until State consulted key allies.

and Acheson agreed to this. Finally. Truman told LmTtt to direct Ridgway to

continue to oppose forcible repatriation and to take steps to "identify and

withdraw in some fashion" the PO\\'s who would not return unless forced to

do so. LmTtt told DoD officials that the president \\as intent on this course

and that it would take a strong case to change his mind,211

[n a meeting later. Acheson agreed with I.mTtt that Truman wanted to

begin identifYing and \\ithdra\\'ing prisoners but nOI to take an irrnocable

stand in doing so. From ·()kyo. Ridgway had expressed his opposition to

cmTrt screening. but if it had to be done he wanted 10 do it quickly and in

<.la~·light. segregating those prisoners opposed to repatriation. He attacked the

idea of releasing prisoners un\\'illing to return as a subterfuge likely to destroy

all chance of getting back enem\'-held 1 :\C soldiers and perhaps nTn of

reaching an armistice. Although \\illing to trade off airfields for \"()luntan

repatriation. Ridgway saw no indication thaI the cnemy \\'mlld agrec. (on-
The Prisoners of War 14 ')

vinced that negotiations would ultimately be broken off if the [';\! negotiators

did not consent to forcible repatriation, Ridgway on 27 february 19')2 urged

that the authorities in Washington send him a "final position on the POW

question now." 2 I

Meeting with Truman and State and Deknse officials that day, Lovett

finally assented to a policy of no forcible repatriation. A nwssage drafted by

State and approved by Lovett, Acheson, and Truman infornted Ridgway that he

already had his final position. The screening procedure could be done openly,

and he was to remove from POW status but retain in liNC custody those

prisoners who would resist returning to Communist control. After Ridgway

prepared revised prisoner-of-war lists he should then inform the Communist

negotiators of I'N willingness to have an all-for-all exchange. These orders

went forward despite the outbreak of violence in the 1':'\C camps.22

Screening, Violence, and ProjJaganda

In the early days of the Korean War, the I':\IC had kept its prisoners of war

in stockades scattered throughout South Korea. After the Chinese became

involved, the ['NC moved the cantps south and concentrated them around the

port of Pusan. Since the camps were a security hazard, Ridgway removed most

prisoners to the small island of Koje-do off the southern tip of Korea as soon

as he stabilized the front in early 19') 1. Selected only because no better place

could be found. Koje-do was a barren. mountainous 1';0 square miles.

crowded with some 200,000 inhabitants and refugees and lacking suitable Hat

land or space for prisoner dispersal. The I'NC originally built :)2 compounds.

each group of H surrounded by a barbed wire enclosure. By the fall of 19'; 1

thev held over 1.)0.000 North Korean and 20,000 Chinese prisoners and were

so overcrowded that there was little space between enclosures. Some 9,000

['.S. and South Korean troops. mostly the latter. many of poor caliber. served

as guards. 2.'

With only limited 1'l\'C control over the compounds. Communist prisoner leaders took over. easily communicating with each other. establishing

strict internal discipline, terrorizing non-Communist prisoners. holding trials,

and meting out punishments including death. Nonetheless. despite sporadic

violence in the fall of 19'; I, ntuch of it the result of enmity between the North

Korean prisoners and the South Korean guards, Ridgway thought the guards

could manage. A first sereening in late 19'; 1 went forward without undue

incident. In earlv 19';2. howner. massive resistance developed when Ridgway

began a more thorough screening of the Koje-do prisoners. On 1H february

more than a thousand prisoners armed with homemade weapons attacked
146 TilE TEST OF WAR

u.s. troops entering one compound. In the ensuing violence the toll was high:

1 U.S. soldier killed, 38 UNC soldiers wounded, 77 prisoners killed or

mortally wounded, and 140 injured. Enemy negotiators at Panmunjom

immediately denounced the "thorough fabrication of what you call 'voluntary

repatriation' .,,2.

In response the UNC moved some of the prisoners to two other islands,

Pongam-do and Cheju-do, increased the guards at Koje-do, and installed a new

commander, Brig. Gen. Francis T. Dodd. Unrest on Koje-do nonetheless

escalated, and on 13 March South Korean guards responded to stones hurled

by North Korean prisoners by firing without orders. Ten prisoners were killed

outright and 28 were wounded, 2 of whom later died. The Communist

negotiators formally protested the "barbarous massacre. ,,2~

Despite the heated Communist reaction. when talks returned to the staff

level on 16 March, Ridgway found the enemy representatives willing to accept

the principle of voluntary repatriation for a large number of their captives

who had originally resided in South Korea. But they would not discuss

Chinese prisoners held in liNC camps. They expected the return of around

132,000 prisoners in all. 26 When a UNC officer unguardedly indicated that

the total might be as high as 116,000, the Communists suggested an immediate

screening, and liNC negotiators felt a cautious optimism. r

The UNC designed the rescreening that began on 8 April to encourage

returnees, but it soon became apparent that the results would not please the

enemy negotiators. Of the 106,37 6 screened, onl~' )1,231 (28,421 prisoners

and 2,810 civilians) were willing to return voluntarily. Even by adding to the

repatriation figure some 44,000 Koje-do prisoners who had refused to be

screened and some 12,000 in the Pusan prison hospital who had not yet been

interviewed, the liNC could not meet the Communists' expectation. Ridgway

himself estimated that only 70,000 would want to return. 2H When told the

figures on 19 April, the enemy negotiators were unwilling to consider them.

After they unilaterally ended the staff officer executive sessions on 25 April,

Ridgway felt that negotiations were rapidly approaching a deadlock. 2

<)

In this context the liN representatives on 2H April proposed to combine

all outstanding issues from agenda items 3 and 4, conceding the enemy

demand for airfield rehabilitation in return for acceptance of the UN positions

on the prisoner of war and on Soviet exclusion from the neutral nations'

supervisory commission. As part of this "final and irrevocable effort," some

70,000 UNC-held prisoners of war would be exchanged for approximately

12,000 enemy-held prisoners. On 2 May the Communist negotiators offered to

accept the proposal if the UNC would agree to exchange 132,000 for 12,000.

On 7 May the two sides agreed to open plenary sessions at Panmunjom.
The Prisoners of War 147

Ridgway and Truman issued public statements in support of the UN package

proposal, while Acheson and Lovett prepared to make comments to the

press. w

These plans came to an abrupt halt on 7 May when the unscreened

prisoners in Koje-do compound 76 captured the UNC camp commander,

General Dodd, tried him for his "crimes," and later pressured him to bargain

the terms of his release with his successor, Brig. Gen. Charles F. Colson.

Ridgway told Van Fleet to take "all necessary action" to free Dodd. To secure

Dodd's release on the evening of 10 May, Colson agreed to issue a statement

made to order for enemy propaganda:"I

. . . I do admit that there have been instances of bloodshed where many

prisoners of war have been killed and wounded by UN forces. I can assure

you that in the future the prisoners of war can expect humane treatment in

this camp according to the principles of International Law. I will do all

within my power to eliminate further violence and bloodshed. H

General Mark W. Clark, who had arrived in the Far East on 7 May 1952 to

replace the departing Ridgway,' lost no time in denouncing the agreement,

strengthening the garrison on Koje-do, and replacing Colson with Brig. Gen.

Haydon L. Boatner. Eventually Clark transferred responsibility for prisoners

from Van Fleet to a new command, the Korean Communications Zone.

Meanwhile Boatner moved civilians off Koje-do, reorganized the staff, rebuilt

smaller and stronger compounds, and moved forcefully against prisoner

defiance of authority. On 10 June UNC troops entered compound 76, which

was openly preparing for battle, and cleaned it out after a 2 1/2-hour fight,

transferring the prisoners to the smaller compounds. The casualties included

1 American speared to death and 14 hurt, 31 prisoners killed, and 139

wounded. After other compounds gave in without major resistance, searchers

found large caches of homemade weapons. Although small-scale incidents

continued, the camp was thereafter under better control and the screening

could be completed.·B

The Koje-do incident damaged U.S. prestige throughout the world. At

best, it indicated apparent carelessness and incompetence; at the worst, it

seemed to confirm Communist charges of brutality in the prison camps.

Indirectly, it seemed to reinforce earlier Communist charges of UNC use of

germ warfare, made when Malik spoke at the United Nations of "toxic gases"

fired from UNC guns. North Korean and Chinese radio broadcasts had claimed

that the United States was firing artillery shells filled with bacterial agents and

• Ridgway succeeded Eisenhower as NATO supreme allied commander in Europe.
148 THE TEST OF WAR

dropping infected flies, snails, and rodents from planes. Ridgway called the

charges "fallacious," and Acheson termed them "entirely false." Lovett

advised Truman on 5 March 1952 that some counteraction was called for,

since friendly sources saw the charges as having an impact even beyond

China. 34

Chinese Premier Chou En-Iai warned on 8 March that u.s. pilots invading

China with bacteriological weapons would be treated as war criminals. The

Chinese claimed that the United States was spreading cholera, typhus, and

bubonic plague by planes and testing germ warfare weapons on prisoners of

war at Koje-do. The Chinese embassy in India mounted a major anti-American

effort among scientists and intellectuals. Soviet newspapers also devoted

much space to these themes, in an anti-American campaign that George

Kennan, then U.S. ambassador in Moscow, termed unequaled in "viciousness,

shamelessness, mendacity and intensity." The North Koreans ignored a World

Health Organization offer to help control plague, and both the North Koreans

and the Chinese refused Red Cross offers to investigate their charges. Believing

the Communist propaganda might be intended to justify such an attack on the

United States or its allies, Finletter recommended to Lovett that the United

States counter the enemy propaganda, continue its own biological and

chemical warfare programs, and develop defensive measures. 35

The issue came to a climax on 5 May when the enemy produced

"confessions" by two captured U.S. fliers that they had dropped "germ

bombs." New charges of poison gas use soon followed. An indignant Lovett

told the press on 16 May that the allegations were utterly false and that anyone

who claimed UN or U.S. use of bacteriological warfare or poison gas "lies in

his teeth." The president also denied the charges. Ridgway, in Washington on

his way to replace Eisenhower as NATO commander, reaffirmed to Congress

that the UNC had never used germ or gas warfare. Anticipating a worldwide

intensification of the propaganda campaign by the Communists inJune, when

Malik was slated to become chairman of the UN Security Council, the United

States proposed a UN resolution calling for full investigation of the germ

warfare charges by the International Committee of the Red Cross and by

international scientists. The Soviet Union vetoed the resolution. 36

As Boatner moved to reassert control over the prisoner compounds on

Koje-do in June, Communist propaganda began to switch from emphasis on

germ warfare to the theme of UNC "atrocities" against the prisoners of war.

The international reaction was severe. Without informing Acheson, Truman

told Lovett on 11 June to invite representatives of five neutral nations to

investigate the POW situation. Lovett immediately consulted the Department

of State, which extended invitations to India, Indonesia, Sweden, Switzerland,
The Prisoners of War 149

and Pakistan. Although Truman was anxious for a neutral nations' review, only

Pakistan accepted, and the idea faded away. ~7

Whatever else the effects of Communist propaganda, it made the lives of

the UN negotiators miserable. When open sessions resumed at Panmunjom on

8 May, they became simply a propaganda forum. AdmiralJoy cabled Clark that

it would be far better to suspend negotiations than to continue meeting daily

at the insistence of the enemy, and thus displaying UNC weakness. ~H The Joint

Chiefs rejected the notion, since events at Koje-do had "confused and

unsettled public attitudes" and a unilateral breakoff might undermine domestic and international support for the American position. Leaving Korea on 22

May to take up new duties as superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy, Joy

once more recommended strongly to Clark suspension of the plenary sessions

until the Communists accepted the u.s. position. Nonetheless, although U.S.

public opinion was becoming impatient with the stalemate at Panmunjom, the

State Department felt that Allied opinion in favor of continuing the talks had

to be taken into account..

w

On 23 May, however, when joy's successor, Maj. Gen. William K.

Harrison, experienced the "bitter denunciation" of the Communist negotiators, he immediately proposed a four-day recess. Admitting that this action

violated the "spirit or apparent intent" of Washington's instructions, Clark

defended it as necessary and desirable. Daily sessions resumed on 27 May

despite Harrison's opposition. On 31 May Clark reported that he and the UNC

negotiators unanimously agreed that the "only hope for an armistice on

present terms lies in convincing the Communists that our position is firm and

final." Reading the cables, Lovett realized that a decision would soon have to

be made. But not yet. There were, in fact, some diplomatic indications that

the Chinese might settle for 100,000 returnees. The Joint Chiefs cabled Clark

on 5 June that Allied confidence in the UNe screening was so shaken by the

Koje-do episode that he should not suspend the talks; Harrison could meet

every three to four days instead of dailylO

With Boatner in control on Koje-do, the UNC finished the prisoner

screening on 27 June. The final figures showed that, of 169,944 enemy

soldiers and civilians, 83,722, or not quite half, wanted to go home. This

included almost two-thirds of the North Koreans but less than one-third of the

Chinese soldiers. Although the number desiring repatriation was higher than

the earlier 70,000 estimate, it remained to be seen whether it was high enough

to satisfy the enemy. Several rechecks helped little, since the number of

returnees dropped to 82,900, including only 6,400 Chinese. To avoid future

problems over the South Korean civilian internees it held, the UNe released
150 THE TEST OF WAR

nearly 27,000 of them beginning on 30 June. But as June ended Washington

had not decided how or when to inform the enemy negotiators of the

screening results.! 1

Recessing the Negotiations

Despite Harrison's belief in early July that some progress was being made,

the enemy delegates indicated on 6 July that they expected the return of

approximately 110,000 persons, including all of the 20,000 Chinese in UNC

hands-a view that made the latest screening results potentially "explosive."

On 11 July the Joint Chiefs told Clark he could give the enemy negotiators the

round figure of 83,000 returnees, including 6,400 Chinese, and offer a

post-armistice validation by an impartial agency.-l2 A week later, enemy

negotiators asserted that they expected the return of 116,000 prisoners,

including all 20,000 Chinese. On 25 July they asked for open plenary sessions.

UNC delegates agreed, but Washington wanted to avoid use of the meetings for

abusive propaganda and gave Clark authorization to seek seven-day recesses.

The delegates met only four times during August, but staff officers met daily

and by 29 August had completed a 63-article armistice, all agreed to except for

2 articles relating to the repatriation of prisoners. Nonetheless, Lovett had

little hope of an armistice, since, as he noted, the Communists could have had

one at any time during the past year."

Although the UNC negotiators officially adhered to the terms of the 28

April 1952 package deal, there were tremendous political pressures on the

Truman administration to find an acceptable end to the unpopular war.

Meeting jointly, State and Defense officials considered numerous alternatives.

However, when State proposed in August that the president publicly offer an

immediate armistice with the exchange of all prisoners desiring repatriation,' Clark objected that the enemy might counter with a percentage

exchange that would leave many UNC soldiers in enemy camps.1-< He

suggested offering various alternatives for solVing the prisoner-of-war question and then recessing to allow time for analysis; if on reconvening the

enemy rejected every proposal and offered none of his own, Harrison should

be authorized to recess the talks indefinitely. At that point, Clark felt, the

military aspects of negotiations would be substantially conduded, and the

• The idea wa~ ha~cd on a letter ~enl br Vincenl W. Hallinan, the Progressive Party'~ pre~idential

candidate, to Dwight D. Eisenhower and Adlai E. Stnenson, thc Republican and Democratic

candidates. in the summer of 1952. Hallinan'~ plan \\"a~ supported or the U.S. Communj~t Partr

and printed in Moscow but given little attenlion by I·.S. media. Amha~~ador Kennan in ;\1oscow

thought it an excellent idea.
The Prisoners of War 15 1

question of peace in Korea might logically be removed from the UNC. At a

meeting with JCS representatives on 2 September, State officials showed little

enthusiasm for Clark's plan. is

The idea of a presidential statement was revived when President Miguel

Aleman of Mexico suggested that each side return the prisoners desiring to go

home and send the unrepatriated prisoners to UN countries agreeing to take

them. State proposed to combine Aleman's plan with a presidential proclamation asking for an immediate cease-fire, followed by specific proposals at

Panmunjom offering a face-saving way to avoid the no forcible repatriation

issue. 46 Pentagon officials did not like the new approach, and Clark thought

State's plan would leave the prisoner issue basically unresolved while releasing the enemy from all military pressure.!'

When Acheson supported his department's proposal and Lovett sided

with other Defense officials against it, the issue became more acute. Lovett,

Foster, and returned UN negotiator Admiral Libby visited the White House on

15 September. Libby bitterly told the president that in his seven months'

experience at Panmunjom he felt he was dealing with people with the "quality

of talking animals" and that" equitable compromises or concessions were not

to be expected." Lovett added that Defense felt State's suggestion was unwise

and that they unanimously supported Clark's position. Lovett felt strongly

that a presidential proposal would be seen as weakness and fail to move the

Communists. Truman said that he would not make such a proposal and that

Harrison should be authorized to walk out at Panmunjom after making one

more overture, with no further meeting until the Communists had made a

constructive offer. He assured his visitors that pressure in Korea would have to

be increased. The president also authorized the release of 11,000 more

prisoners found to be South Koreans caught up in UNC dragnets, an action

acceptable to both State and Defense. The meeting seemed to give Defense all

it had asked. efH

The Joint Chiefs prepared a new draft directive for Clark, but State

representatives, while agreeing to recess the talks indefinitely, refused to drop

the idea of a presidential proposal. The Joint Chiefs asked Lovett to help, and

on 17 September Lovett, Fechteler, and Libby met with the secretary of state.

Acheson argued that a presidential initiative for a cease-fire would not breach

the 28 April package proposal and would considerably enhance the U.S.

position in the UN General Assembly; if the Communists refused, the UNC

could resolve the question of the nonrepatriates by simply releasing them as

political refugees. Lovett disagreed. He thought State's proposal altered the

package deal and that the u.s. position in the General Assembly was

"perfectly sound without making such an offer." If the Communists, still
152 THE TEST Of WAR

facing UNC military force, would not accept the proposal on prisoners, Lovett

warned that they "undoubtedly would never do so without military

pressure. "'9

On 24 September Truman held a meeting in the White House to consider

the problem. Acheson declared that State and Defense had no major differences on what to do next in Korea and that they agreed that the principle of

no forcible prisoner return was inviolate. He thought it time for the UNC to

reiterate its negotiating position in the armistice talks and to recess if the

Communists proved obdurate. There probably would be adverse consequences. For one thing, the UN might want to establish a commission to

handle the prisoner question. The United States would have to oppose this

and work to maintain Allied support for its position. Furthermore, in the heat

of the current U.S. presidential campaign, the administration could be subject

to criticism for apparent indecision. U.S. policy, Acheson said, was to achieve

an armistice on the terms already put forward; if an armistice came, "there

will undoubtedly be strong pressure domestically to weaken our position in

Korea while we are not certain there will be similar pressures on the Chinese

Communists." If there was no armistice, could the UNC "increase the

pressure without unacceptable casualties?"

The president declared that he was not willing to do "anything in the

world" to get an armistice; the purpose of an armistice was to get peace, but

not if it left the Communists free to take over elsewhere. The Pentagon

representatives defended the idea of making a final proposal, recessing

indefinitely if the Communists would not accept, and increasing military

pressure to induce acceptance. They pressed for an armistice that would

finally resolve the prisoner of war issue and still protect UNC forces on the

battle line. ~()

The president made his decision. Harrison would make a final proposal,

the enemy negotiators would have about 10 days to consider it, and the UNC

would prepare to do what seemed necessary. At Acheson's suggestion,

nothing was to be said to imply an ultimatum. In answer to specific points,

Truman confirmed that the question of repatriation was to be dealt with in the

military armistice and not to be deferred to a political conference. Military

pressure on the enemy was to begin immediately if they refused the package. I

In accordance with new instructions and Truman's personal message to

Clark expressing the hope that the UN proposal would be "presented with the

utmost firmness," Harrison offered the final plan on 28 September. He

suggested five different procedures for exchanging prisoners, each without

resort to forcible repatriation and including verification of the individual

prisoner's intent. He then asked for a recess until 8 October to give the enemy
The Prisoners of War 153

negotiators a chance to analyzt: the offer. Nam II found nothing new in the

proposal but agreed to the recess, meanwhile urging the UNC delegates to

reconsider. ~2

On 8 October Nam II rejected the UNC proposal, saying it was "still run

through by your unreasonable demand of forcible retention of war prisoners."

After a long statement, Harrison indicated that the UNC delegates would not

come to the talks "merely to listen to abuse and false propaganda." He was

calling a recess, but not ending the negotiations. After nine months spent in

futile negotiation of agenda item 4, the UNC negotiators would be willing to

meet again whenever the Communists had a written proposal that could bring

about an honorable armistice. Despite protests by the North Koreans and

Chinese, Washington held firm. Although the words "indefinite recess" were

never officially used at Panmunjom, the 8 October meeting was the last during

the Truman administration. The only contact from then on would be between

liaison officers. As secretary of defense, Lovett did not see the Korean War

ended by negotiation. The question was whether he would see it concluded

by military pressure. ~5
CHAPTER VIII

The Final Round

The major argument that underlay the proposal of the Department of

Defense in the fall of 1952 to make a final offer on the prisoner of war issue

and then recess the Panmunjom talks was that such action, coupled with

increased military pressure, appeared to offer the best chance of forcing the

Communists to accept an armistice and acquiesce in the u.s. position on

prisoner repatriation. In support of this policy, Lovett declared at the

State-Defense meeting on 17 September 1952 that the UNC was prepared to

maintain military pressure on the enemy in Korea indefinitely. I So while the

armistice talks seemed to drag on endlessly, the fighting in Korea also

continued, at a heavy cost in lives, greatly intensifying the frustration and

bitterness in Washington and probably in Peking.

The Protracted War

During the fall of 1952 the intractable nature of the ground war clearly

-demonstrated the high cost of relying on UNC ground forces to maintain the

required pressure on the enemy. Earlier, in April, Ridgway was able to shrug

off the Communist troop buildup as more defensive than offensive in nature.

In May there occurred only small-scale operations-probes, patrols, and raids.

But by June actions had begun to grow perceptibly in size and number

although engagements were still confined to fighting over relatively minor

terrain features. In July, the UNC estimated opposing ground forces at

947,000-267,000 North Koreans and 680,000 Chinese-almost a doubling

of their troop strength since the start of armistice negotiations. The limited

tactical objectives of the summer and fall-known by such names as Bunker

Hill, Old Baldy, Capitol Hill, Outpost Kelly, and Jackson Heights-became for

155
156 THE TEST OF WAR

the UNC forces "a savagely contested, seemingly endless struggle for control

of another hill." 2 Concerned by the increased enemy activity, Van Fleet

decided to improve his defensive line in an operation expected to take 5 days,

involve 2 battalions, and cost about 200 casualties. Approved by Clark on 8

October 1952, the day the Panmunjom talks recessed, Operation SHOWDOWN lasted over a month, involved 2 divisions, and cost 9,000 UNC

casualties, the heaviest in a year. Although the Chinese lost an estimated

19,000 men, Clark, upset about the UNe's "heavy and excessive casualties,"

told Van Fleet there were to be no repetitions.·~ With the advent of cold

weather in late November, the fighting subsided; each side stocked supplies

and sent out patrols and probes. The winter months through February 1953

remained generally quiet, although participants in any given small unit action

might not have thought so.'

Because Washington was unwilling to accept the heavy casualties resulting from large-scale ground action, the UNC relied on air power to exert the

pressure necessary to induce the enemy to accept an armistice. For this

purpose, continuing control of the air over Korea remained a first priority.

Increasing enemy air strength had been causing concern for a long time. By

June 1952 the Chinese had a 22-division air force consisting of 1,830 aircraft,

including about 1,000 jets; the Soviets, potential foes, had approximately

5,360 planes in the Far East. AfterJune, the combined force stabilized at about

7,000 aircraft, a "vastly overwhelming theoretical air superiority." Still, the

Chinese and North Koreans had relatively few expert pilots and continued a

mainly defensive air strategy. By mid-September Lovett happily noted that the

monthly U.S. aircraft production rate exceeded a year's losses in Korea from all

causes. The much-improved F-84G Thunderjet fighter-bomber was beginning

to replace the F-84E in the Far East Air Forces, and the modified F-86F, "the

most suitable fighter-bomber employed in Korea," would replace the F-86A

Sabre in 1953. Better planning, training, and management and the construction of more modern airfields also increased Air Force operational capability. ';

One continuing problem was interservice friction over close support

operations. The Navy and Marine Corps planes, controlled by on-the-spot

observers and accustomed to operations within a confined area, seemed to

ground commanders to give more effective support than Air Force planes.

Although 30 percent of all offensive sorties during the last two years of the

war were for close support, the Army was never completely satisfied with the

Air Force effort, and the Air Force seldom felt the ground targets worth the

planes and crews 10st 6

Air interdiction operations constituted an important element in the use of

military power to bring the enemy to the negotiating table. From May 1951

through May 1952, UNC attempts to cut the enemy's lines of communication
The Final Round 157

from its supply base in the north to the battlefront in the south proved less

effective than expected against both roads and railroads as the enemy learned

to counter the attacks. Aerial interdiction continued but on a reduced scale

because of high losses.~

To increase pressure on the enemy, UNC air expanded its attacks in May

1952 to include important target complexes. In June Air Force and Navy

planes struck the North Korean hydroelectric power complex, with telling

results and no air casualties. When the British complained about lack of prior

consultation, Acheson apologized, Clark accepted a senior British officer on

his staff, and thereafter the Americans notified the British beforehand of such

operations. Some congressmen asked why the power complex had not been

attacked earlier. On 10 July FEAF prescribed a new "air pressure" policy aimed

at making the war more costly for the enemy and reinforcing the UN

negotiating position at Panmunjom by the maximum selective destruction of

enemy equipment, facilities, and personnel. Such operations during July-September proved expensive in UNC planes, however, as the enemy concentrated

flak and searchlights against the attacks.!>

Beginning in October, UNC planes made the Communist armies a major

target; massed fighter-bomber groups sought out and attacked troop and

supply positions in and near the battlefront and far to the enemy's rear.

"Choke" operations in December 1952 and January 1953 created bottlenecks

and destroyed accumulated equipment and transport. Although no one type

of air operation proved a military panacea, the Joint Chiefs notified Lovett in

November 1952 that UNC air superiority had largely prevented a major enemy

buildup of supplies; combined with the naval blockade of North Korea, it had

denied a still greater increase in enemy troops and helped Eighth Army to

maintain itself against stronger enemy forces. Moreover, air power undoubtedly represented the best means currently available that "might impel the

Communists to agree, finally, to acceptable armistice terms. ,,'> It was clear by

the end of the Truman administration, however, that air power alone could

not end the war and that the United States was unwilling to pay the price in

lives that much enlarged ground operations would entail.

The Ammunition Problem

During the very period when military pressure was expected to play an

important role in bringing the Communists to terms at Panmunjom, reports of

artillery ammunition shortages increased noticeably. Ammunition expenditure rates had always been high in Korea, especially after Van Fleet took over

in May 1951. Even after negotiations began in July and combat tapered off,
158 THE TEST Of WAR

heavy artillery usage continued, and shortages had occurred during the battles

late that summer. The use of artillery ammunition peaked in October. That

month Lovett, becoming alarmed by the situation, asked Pace for information

about shortages but went no further, since the Army was fully empowered to

handle ammunition procurement. Van Fleet's extraordinarily high ammunition usage, however, threatened to deplete ammunition reserves in the theater,

then set at 75 days of supply.' In October Ridgway requested and received an

increase in the authorized theater stock level to 90 days; in December he

authorized Van Fleet to raise the reserve level in Korea from 30 to 45 days. 10

As Lovett well knew, ammunition for Korea came mainly from leftover

and refurbished World War II ammunition stocks, which were large but

unbalanced-plentiful for some rounds and short for others. Before Korea,

there had not been money to rehabilitate and balance the stocks, while new

production was suspended because of the size of the stockpile. The services

made deliveries of ammunition to Korea in 1950, in fact, by drawing upon

supplies intended for countries receiving military assistance and by limiting

shipments to U.S. forces in Europe and elsewhere. This created a global

problem for the Army. Even after Congress appropriated new funds for

ammunition inJanuary 1951, plants needed 18 to 24 months to start up again.

Large amounts of new ammunition could not be expected before late 1952. 11

With Ridgway plainly worried about ammunition usage rates in Korea by

early 1952, Van Fleet that spring made a 20-percent cut in interdictory fire,

which constituted two-thirds of all Eighth Army fire, although both men

agreed that heavy use of ammunition helped to keep down the UNC casualty

rate. Then suddenly enemy fire jumped from approximately 1,200 rounds

across the front in February 1952 to 3,300 rounds in April and 6,250 inJune.

In July Van Fleet ordered that 155-mm. shells, now very scarce, should be

used only on the most remunerative targets during quiescent periods. 12

When Lovett became aware in February or March 1952 of a shortage in

five types of ammunition (l05-mm. and 155-mm. howitzers and 60-mm.,

81-mm., and 4.2-in. mortars), he directed his special assistant for production

expediting, Clay Bedford, to investigate. Bedford's discovery that administrative action consumed five months of production lead time and that delivery

schedules seemed overly optimistic disconcerted Lovett, but Pace and Collins

assured the secretary that the Army was accelerating production. By mid-April

1952, however, Bedford learned that currently scheduled production could

barely meet, and in some cases would not meet, Eighth Army requirements

under current usage rates if the war lasted two more years. I; A major steel

• This was a planning term defined as the average number of rounds a given type of weapon was

expected to fire daily. computed on the basis of World War II experience
The Final Round 159

strike in June and July seriously threatened the production of steel casings for

ammunition and aggravated the problem before it was settled. *

In July Lovett learned of the large increase in enemy artillery fire and

again asked Pace for information about ammunition stocks. When Pace

blamed the ammunition shortage mainly on the lack of funds, t Lovett

consulted with Defense comptroller McNeil and sent Pace a strongly worded

note on 15 August. Asserting that money had been more than ample and

putting the blame on the Ordnance Corps, Lovett told Pace that he should get

the facts and make it "difficult or impossible for the empty and evasive excuse

of 'no funds available' to be given to you, as Secretary, to divert attention from

a failure to get production." Unrestricted and very heavy use of all types of

ammunition during the heavy ground fighting in Korea during the fall made

the situation increasingly serious. II

With high Army officials still maintaining that lack of funds was the basic

cause for the ammunition shortage, Lovett agreed on 7 November to ask for a

$50 million supplement to the current budget, but he told Pace that the Army

needed to place contracts at once for the still unobligated $1.75 billion

available for ammunition. When Army officials continued to plead money

problems, Lovett placed ammunition procurement on a mobilization basis and

gave Hugh Dean, who had replaced Bedford, the "full authority of his office

on a liberal interpretation basis to take such action as he deems necessary to

overcome both supply and production deficiencies." Lovett wanted current

production emphasized without regard to longer range concerns, usual

procurement practices, or minor price differentials. I~

On 21 November, Lovett asked Clark for a report on the ammunition

situation and his recommendations. Believing that he owed Clark an explanation, Lovett in a personal letter three days later went into more detail on the

Army's "sorry showing" and outlined the steps he had recently taken. Clark,

who felt he had just received "the first firm indication" that Washington

appreciated the ammunition supply problem, replied to Lovett that the 90-day

theater stock level would be adequate for all except one item, providing the

stocks were actually on hand. He considered the current situation critical in

seven categories: IOS-mm., l55-mm., and 8-in. howitzers; 60-mm. and

8I-mm. mortars; I55-mm. guns; and fragmentation grenades. Clark told

Lovett that he had had to restrict firing rates and that the shortages had

* See Chapter XXIII.

t Much latcr, Pace claimed that in the fall of 1950. in response to Gcneral MacArthur's

announcement of the war's expected end by Christmas 1950. he had cut ammunition production

by a quarter and 001 could nOI get that ammunition Iproduction] back LIp." (Statement. Pace. in

Kenneth W. Thompson. ed. "fbe Truman PresidenCj': Intimate Pers!Jectil'es. "ol II of Portraits of

tbe Presidents. 15 I.)
160 THE TEST OF WAR

prevented launching a major ground offensive, seriously curtailed limited

attacks, and caused worry even in small-scale defense operations. His field

commanders wanted to fire ammunition at greater rates, and their inability to

do so had brought them higher casualties. Clark urged increased u.s.

production. 16

Lovett directed the Army to place $ 57 million in a fund to be used only

for accelerating ammunition programs approved by Dean. The latter explored

the possible use of World War II ammunition stocks in the possession of

wartime allies, and the Army converted some battalions in Korea to weapons

using less critical ammunition. I~

Although these actions helped, even more important, increased production began to yield results by November 1952. As Lovett later recalled,

ammunition production "bulged" that month and continued to improve

rapidly thereafter. By Christmas, only the 81-mm. mortar round was below

the "safety level" of 60 days of supply in the Far East theater. For the five

categories where Lovett considered shortages particularly serious, the stock

level in the Far East theater grew steadily in terms of days of supply. IH

TABLE I

Ammunition Supply

(days of supply on hand in theater)

60-mm. mortar

81-mm. mortar

4.2-in. mortar.

105-mm. howitzer.

155-mm. howitzer.

Max Authd 27 Nov 52 25 Dec 52 13 Feb 53 25 Mar 53

90 74 84 112.3 107

90 37 39 61.3 78

90 122 128.2 150

90 82 74 76.5 71

90 58 63 78.0 91

In April 1953, shortly after the changeover in administrations, Collins

testified that ammunition was "pouring off the lines right now." The full

authorized rates could be fired in Korea, and the Army was beginning to build

up a general reserve. ['.>

Just as the production of ammunition became more plentiful, congressional investigators, seeking to make political capital out of the shortages,

tried to fix responsibility on the departed Truman administration. Returning

home for retirement in early 1953, Van Fleet fueled the controversy by

claiming that there had been serious and critical shortages for the entire 22

months he was in Korea; at times, he said, the "stockpiles in Korea went to

zero behind the line." Lovett, now out of office, took a more measured view,
The Final Round 161

although he agreed that at times there had heen shortages in five particular

rounds and that sometimes the shortages had been critical. Bradley and

Collins, on the other hand, contradicted Van Fleet's claims and Collins spoke

of the "many inconsistencies" in Van Fleet's testimony. According to Collins,

the ammunition available in Korea was adequate for Van Fleet's mission

despite difficulties in its distribution within Korea. The shortages, Collins

maintained, had not been in Korea, but in the theater reserves, the general

reserve of the United States, and the supplies needed for U.S. missions in other

areas of the world. Clark, too, took a position that discounted Van Fleet's

allegations. 20

The welter of conflicting testimony makes it difficult to assess the effect

or even the extent of the ammunition shortage.- That Van Fleet wanted more

is true; that at times he may have used too much is possibly also true. That the

use of more ammunition would have made a major difference in the UNC

military fortunes in Korea seems doubtful, since political and military

objectives rather than ammunition supply determined the nature and extent of

UNC offensive operations. It is debatable, in fact, whether lack of ammunition

affected the tactical situation in any except limited and short-term situations.

The shortage, however, held the potential for great danger, both militarily and

politically, especially if the enemy launched a major offensive, and as such it

fully warranted Lovett's strong actions.

Finding Substitute Troops

With the armistice negotiations recessed after 8 October 1952 and

military operations in Korea stalemated, the prospect of ending the war any

time soon by either negotiation or military action seemed dim. As the connict

dragged on, Lovett and others in the Pentagon began to think of how to

extricate some or all of the American troops. Since U.S. forces could not

simply be withdrawn-in such an event Chinese and North Korean soldiers

were likely to pour down the peninsula and conquer the South-it became a

question of what could be substituted for U.S. divisions. The Allies would not

augment their forces to any major extent; deployment of Chinese Nationalist

troops remained unlikely; any use ofJapanese forces would be repugnant to

the Koreans.

One source for a substitute fighting force that was available and eager to

play an enlarged role was South Korea itself. Initially, 30,000 South Koreans

had been given three weeks of training, placed in the ranks of the first four

U.S. divisions to reach Korea, and thrown into the fighting in 1950. As the

Korean Augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSA), approximately
162 THE TEST Of WAR

13,000 South Koreans continued to serve in U.S. units even after the first

desperate days. 21 Many other South Koreans joined or were drafted into their

own armed forces. The United States supported only a small South Korean

navy, marine corps, and air force, but it financed a Republic of Korea army

(ROKA), which with Rhee's consent fought under UNC command, up to a

ceiling of 250,000 men and 10 divisions. When Truman approved this level of

support in November 1950, Marshall questioned the ability of South Korea to

maintain so large an army. Indeed, its early combat record-it faltered in the

face of the Chinese offensives in late 1950 and again in April 195 I-left much

to be desired. 22

U.S. policy (NSC 48/5, May 1951) called for the development of dependable South Korean military units as rapidly as possible and in sufficient

strength to take a major share of the UNC burden. But the size of the forces

and the rate of buildup came under frequent review, in large part because of

the volatile and unstable political and economic conditions in South Korea.

President Rhee, bent on reunification of the two Koreas under his leadership,

pressed for creation of a huge South Korean Army that he claimed would

allow the withdrawal of U.S. troops. He opposed the start of the armistice

talks in July; in September he suggested terms obviously unacceptable to the

enemy and subsequently hinted that his government might not observe the

terms of any armistice. Rhee's aggressive and intransigent attitude on most

issues relating to the war and unification caused Lovett and Acheson concern

about the consequences of equipping him with a large military machine that

might defy UNC control and pursue an independent military course. Still,

there seemed to be no feasible alternative to South Korean manpower, and a

steady buildup of ROKA continued.2~

The woeful South Korean economy, violently disrupted by the war and

wracked by high inflation, could not hope to support a large military

establishment without heavy U.S. assistance. The potential cost to the United

States of such a burden, together with the extensive economic assistance

afforded South Korea, influenced U.S. consideration of underwriting the cost

of a continuing expansion of the ROK military. The political and economic

uncertainties created a dilemma for U.S. policymakers that continued even

after the armistice was signed. 21

As the armistice talks opened in July 1951, U.S. advisers began a program

of upgrading and training of the ROK army. Van Fleet believed that training

and a dependable and able South Korean officer corps were the army's greatest

needs; he also recommended that South Koreans should officer ROK divi-

* From 60.000 to 100.000 other South Koreans served in the Korean Service Corps. acting as

lahorcrs for l':'>:C units.
The Final Round 163

sioos. Nonetheless, U.S. KMAG advisers remained at all training bases and at

all ROKA headquarters levels from army to battalion, performing supervisory

functions close to those of command. In November the U.S. Army augmented

KMAG by 800 spaces, to a total of 1,800 officers and men. In March 1952

Ridgway approved giving the 10 South Korean divisions the full U.S. artillery

complement of 4 battalions, and by January 1953 half the ROK divisions had

received their artillery. 25

By early 1952 Ridgway expressed concern that his control over South

Korean forces might be ended once an armistice was negotiated, since his

authority rested simply on Rhee'sJuly 1950 letter to MacArthur, which limited

UNC command to the duration of hostilities. Although Ridgway urged

negotiation of a formal agreement, Truman followed State-Defense advice to

depend on U.S. military and economic leverage. Increased U.S. anxiety about

possible South Korean adventurism seemed justified because Truman, in

approving NSC I 18/2 on 20 December 1951, had sanctioned a policy of

developing and equipping sufficient South Korean military forces to "deter or

repel a renewed aggression by North Korean forces alone" and to assume

eventual responsibility for South Korea's defense. 26

The Joint Chiefs advised Lovett in January 1952 that they believed the

most appropriate ROKA mission for the immediate future would be only to

resist and delay the advance of any North Korean attack until external forces

could arrive, while those South Korean forces currently being trained might

relieve U.S. troops after an armistice "if and when practicable." Although this

post-armistice mission was much more limited than that envisioned in NSC

118/2, the JCS considered it "more in consonance with ROK capabilities."

Taking into account also the heavy U.S. materiel commitments elsewhere, the

JCS recommended for FY 1953 planning purposes a I6,000-man, 50-vessel

South Korean navy; an 8,000-man, I-division marine corps; and a 4,000-man,

46-plane air force. They proposed to maintain the South Korean Army at its

current level of 250,000 men and 10 divisions. 27

When the Armed Forces Policy Council met on 8 April, Navy secretary

Kimball, back from a Far East trip, reported that Van Fleet wanted to train 20

ROKA divisions. Surprised and somewhat embarrassed, Pace replied that a

10-division increase had never been reported through channels. In response to

a query from Washington, Ridgway also disclaimed knowledge of such a

request and emphatically disagreed with Van Fleet, who had already made his

position public in a magazine interview. Although Washington made no

change at that time, a need soon developed for manpower to fill out

additional South Korean artillery and tank units and to provide for 10

additional infantry regiments suitable as possihle expansion cadres. In early
164 THE TEST OF WAR

May Ridgway asked for logistical support for over 360,000 ROKA spaces, but

still within the 10-division framework. 28

General Clark, who replaced Ridgway in May, favored expansion of the

Korean army. Following the prisoner-of-war emergency at Koje-do and a

South Korean constitutional crisis,· he asked in mid-June for approximately

19,500 men to form 6 more regiments and a bulk allotment of 92,100 spaces

to provide for trainees, patients, interpreters, general prisoners, and others for

whom the Koreans had no separate arrangements. On 23 June he requested

two more ROK army divisions and an increase in logistical support troops.

Worried about shortages in artillery equipment and ammunition, the Joint

Chiefs in late June recommended holding the ROK army to 10 divisions and

250,000 combat personnel. 29

Support for a sizable increase in South Korean forces came soon from the

service secretaries who, pointing to "staggering differences" between the cost

of a U.S. soldier abroad and a "local native fighter," asked Lovett on 8 July

whether sufficient consideration had been given to replacing Western

troops.t Requesting JCS comments on 30 July, Lovett succinctly noted that the

idea was to replace U.S. troops, not just to train additional local forces. In

August General Collins, apparently convinced that the South Koreans were

developing into "good fighters," approved Clark's request for the 92,100 bulk

personnel allotment and supported his request for two more South Korean

divisions. Having achieved this much, Clark followed up with additional

requests to increase the ceiling for KATUSA personnel to 28,000 and the ROK

marine corps to 19,800. The South Korean government also wanted to enlarge

its air force. W

On 26 September the Joint Chiefs reversed their earlier position, recommending to Lovett a 12-division ROK army with 6 separate regiments, an

enlarged ROK marine corps, a combined army-marine strength of 463,000,

and a KATUSA increase to 28,000. Lovett, however, did not approve the

request immediately, for the JCS had also indicated that equipping enlarged

South Korean forces would impair other programs: delay by two months the

delivery of critical items to NATO countries, Japan, and Southeast Asia; extend

• Rhee provoked the crisis on 24 May 1952 by placing Pusan under martial law and arresting on

treason charges some of his political opponents in the National Assembly. The crisis prompted

widespread criticism, and on 2 June Truman wrote Rhee asking him to defer further such action.

Rhee, however, held fast to his demands. During June he secured a constitutional amendment

from the National Assembly prescribing popular election of the president and vice president and

a second legislative chamher, thereby assuring his reelection and his greater ability to cope with

the assembly.

t McNeil later put the cost of initial equipment for a u.s. division at about SI75 million, for a

South Korean division at $40 million. He figured the cost of a South Korean division operating in

combat at S100 million a year, compared with a U.S. division at S200 million to $300 million.
The Final Round 165

by two months the 50-percent equipment ceiling on U.S. units in the United

States; cause further delays in military assistance shipments; and possibly force

continuation of reduced ammunition allotments for U.S. and ROK training.:\ 1

Nonetheless, a larger South Korean force seemed the most feasible answer to

demands to reduce U.S. manpower in Korea. Pace and Assistant Secretary of

Defense Anna Rosenberg supported a larger ROK force. Lovett strongly

recommended the ROK increase, estimated to cost about $431 million, to

Truman on 25 October. The president's approval on 30 October set a

12-division, 6-regiment ROK army limit and an overall army-marine manpower ceiling of 463,000.:\2

At the request of General Collins, Clark in the meantime had sent to

Washington a plan, about which he had serious doubts, for reducing the U.S.

manpower ceiling by 50,000 and allowing the phased withdrawal of 4

(including 2 U.S.) UNC divisions from Korea during 1953-54 and for

assumption by ROKA of responSibility for the entire front line by mid-1954,

at the earliest. The plan assumed that the military stalemate in Korea would

continue and that a 20-division ROK army with a manpower ceiling of more

than 639,000 (including 104,200 noneffectives) would be on hand by August

1953. Pointing out that the U.S. Army lacked funds for the ROK increases and

would have to divert equipment from other programs, particularly military

assistance, Pace asked Lovett on 17 November for basic decisions on force

goals, priorities, and fiscal support for South Korean forces..~:\ Lovett knew

that the JCS had doubts about the complete substitution of local for U.S.

divisions because they had already told him on 29 October that-despite

lower costs, potential savings of U.S. casualties, and public relations benefits-U.S. forces in Korea had to be kept at "levels commensurate with the

threat to U.S. security interests in that area." They referred primarily to Japan,

Formosa, and the Philippines. On 5 December Lovett asked for JCS comments

on Clark's plan, but, with president-elect Eisenhower on record in support of

more ROK divisions, the Joint Chiefs did not formally respond until the new

administration took office.:\i

End of the Fighting

Truman's 30 October 1952 decision to increase ROK forces by two

divisions reflected increasing U.S. awareness that any new UNC military

initiative in Korea at current force levels would be expensive and possibly

counterproductive. A JCS committee had already calculated that, if the

armistice talks broke down, 11 more U.S. divisions, 54 more ships, 221!~ more

air wings, and the use of atomic weapons would be required to clear Korea of
166 THE TEST OF WAR

9

YELLOW SEA

The Demarcation Line-27 July 1953

SEA

OF

JAPAN

J

f

all enemy forces. Unhappy with this forecast, the Joint Chiefs sent the study

back for review and in September asked Clark for advice. 35

In his reply on 29 September Clark blamed the failure thus far to reach an

armistice agreement on the inability of the UNC to exert sufficient military

pressure on the enemy, but he doubted that he could win a military victory in

Korea given his available forces and the probable losses. To compel the enemy

to accept an armistice on UNC terms, Clark thought it would be necessary to

bomb targets in China and Manchuria and to impose as well a naval blockade

of China, possibly mounting a major ground offensive, including an amphibious assault. In October Clark notified the JCS that his plan for a drive to the

Wonsan-P'yongyang line would require 3 more U.S. or UN divisions, 2 South

Korean divisions, 2 Chinese Nationalist divisions, 12 artillery battalions, and

20 antiaircraft battalions. Clark also urged giving serious consideration to the

use of atomic weapons, particularly against air bases in Manchuria and North

China. In the Pentagon, however, Pace advised Lovett that a major military

offensive in Korea was unrealistic in terms of money, forces, and equipment

and would completely undermine all efforts to reduce U.S. manpower

requirements. He pressed for a decision on future ground operations in
The Final Round 167

Korea. y, No decision was made, however, pending the outcome of the

presidential election. Eisenhower's victory confirmed the extent of the war's

unpopularity with the public. Keeping a promise made during the campaign,

Eisenhower visited Korea in early December but predictably showed no

interest in a renewed ground offensive.·'7

After the election, Collins informed Clark that the Joint Chiefs would

consider his views on the use of atomic weapons. Although the United States

was already stockpiling small atomic bombs capable of delivery by tactical

aircraft, * the Truman administration opposed their use. The Joint Chiefs

continued to feel there were no sufficiently rewarding targets inside Korea.

Furthermore, there remained a tacit U.S. agreement to consult the British

prior to using atomic weapons in Korea..:\8

Late in 1952 the Indian government pressed for a UN resolution on

prisoner repatriation..:\') Defense objected to it because of the absence of

sufficient guarantees of UNC troop safety and for the disposition of nonceturning prisoners of war. Nonetheless, Allied support for the resolution

persisted. io On 24 November, however, the Russians suddenly denounced the

Indian resolution. Then on 3 December, with U.S. support, the UN General

Assembly passed the resolution as revised to meet U.S. concerns. Affirming

that force should not be used against the prisoners, it set procedures for their

return and declared that the fate of those prisoners still unwilling to go back

after a period of consideration should be decided by a political conference

and implemented by the United Nations. The Chinese and the North Koreans

flatly rejected this version"" Then more riots erupted in the prisoner-of-war

camps in Korea, and UN support again declined for the U.S. position on no

forced repatriation. i2

By the end of 1952 no new initiatives remained open to the "lame duck"

Truman administration. Utterly frustrated by the course of the armistice

negotiations, Lovett and Truman also had no success in their efforts to bring

about a truce through force. The next steps would have to await the coming

of the new administration.

Eisenhower as president played an even more dominant role in Pentagon

affairs than had Truman. More familiar with European problems than Truman,

Eisenhower seemed both more sympathetic to the Europeans and simultaneously less concerned about European reactions to Korea, where he was

* In mid- 1951 the JCS had considered the possibility of using atomic weapons "if necessary to

prevent disaster to our forces in the Far East'· and endorsed a recommendation for testing the

feasibility of providing tactical atomic support of ground operations. In late September and early

()ctoher U.S. forces carried out several simulated atomic strikes during a limited UNC ground

offensive. See James F Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, The Korean War, vollIl of History of the

Joint Chiefs of StaJI The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy. pt 2:6 I,-1-1
168 THE TEST OF WAR

ready to take a tougher line even while seeking an honorable armistice. When

a new Communist ground and air buildup in the neutral negotiating zone of

Korea threatened UNC positions in February 1953, Clark received permission

to abrogate the neutrality agreement and to strike Kaesong in the event of an

enemy attack. Unwilling to approve a large-scale UNC ground offensive,

Eisenhower seemed inclined to increase military pressures by other means and

stood ready to explore the use of atomic weapons in Korea, particularly the

new small tactical bombs. If the Europeans objected, Eisenhower suggested

that they might be asked to provide more troops for Korea. 43

Approval for a large increase in South Korean forces proceeded by stages

over a period of four months in 1953. Soon after taking office Eisenhower

accepted a JCS recommendation for an immediate 2-division increase in the

South Korean army to a total of 14 divisions. In response to requests from

Clark, supported by the Joint Chiefs, the president approved in Mayan

immediate buildup to 16 divisions and an ultimate 20 divisions for the ROK

army with U.S. support levels of 655,000 men, plus a 23,500-man marine

corps, a 9,000-man air force, and a 1O,000-man navy.44

The death of Premier Joseph Stalin on 5 March 1953 created a political

void in Moscow that apparently diminished Soviet interest in continuation of

the Korean War. A major break in the armistice impasse came on 28 March

when the Chinese and North Korean military commanders, Peng Teh-huai and

Kim Il Sung, accepted a UNC offer to exchange sick and wounded prisoners

and suggested the renewal of truce negotiations. On 30 March Premier Chou

En-Iai endorsed both ideas and proposed a solution to the prisoner-of-war

problem similar to the Indian UN resolution. On 1 April Soviet Foreign

Minister VM. Molotov publicly approved the Chinese suggestion, and Eisenhower accepted the Communist proposal. Between 20 April and 3 May, in

Operation LITTLE SWITCH, the UNC handed over 6,670 sick and wounded

prisoners of war and civilian internees and received 684 enemy-held prisoners

in exchange. 45

When armistice talks resumed on 26 April, the Eisenhower administration continued to insist on no forcible return of unwilling prisoners, but the

president did not wish to prolong the negotiations indefinitely. When the talks

appeared to be stalemated again in May, UNe air attacks on North Korean dams

caused floods and damaged rail lines and farm crops. Clark planned to

maintain a strong ground defense, carry out a limited offensive, and make

heavy air attacks on critical targets. The enemy also initiated and intensified

ground action throughout May.46

With NSC 118/2 more than a year old, Eisenhower began a review of U.S.

policy on possible courses of action if the talks failed. The question of using

atomic weapons came up again prominently during the policy deliberations,
The Final Round 169

particularly since Eisenhower thought that several North Korean airfields

would provide good targets for testing their effectiveness. 47 The Joint Chiefs

believed there were no especially good atomic targets in Korea; they thought

a large number of atomic weapons would be needed if action had to be taken

outside of Korea. 48 On 19 May they wrote that ending the war by military

means would require a coordinated ground drive toward the narrow waist of

Korea north of P'yongyang, air and naval operations against China and

Manchuria, and "extensive strategical and tactical use of atomic bombs." The

NSC made no decision but agreed on 20 May to adopt the JCS recommendation as a general guide if "more positive action in Korea" was required. 49

Determined to convince the enemy of u.s. resolve to conclude the war,

Eisenhower let it be known-in India, China, and Panmunjom-that the

United States would "move decisively without inhibition in our use of

weapons" and not necessarily confine hostilities to the Korean peninsula. 50

UN allies continued to pressure the United States to conclude an armistice, especially after Chou En-Iai's apparent acceptance of the general

principles of the Indian resolution. Despite Rhee's objections, the UNC

negotiators on 25 May made a new armistice offer closely related to the Indian

version-a five-nation custodial commission to accept both Chinese and

Korean nonrepatriates, safeguards against prisoner coercion, a 90-day period

for explaining to and persuading prisoners, and finally a political conference

with a 30-day time limit to deal with disposition of nonrepatriates, or

alternatively, reference of the matter to the UN General Assembly. At Panmunjom on 4 June the Communists basically agreed to everything except the UN

role, offering a complete draft of a prisoner-of-war accord. On 8 June the

delegates signed an agreement on item 4 that implicitly accepted the principle

of no forcible repatriation. Work started immediately on revising the demarcation line and marking the boundaries of a demilitarized zone. 51

While the final touches were being put on the armistice, the enemy

launched his heaviest attack in two years, concentrating on South Korean

troops. Eisenhower once again brought up the possibility of using tactical

atomic weapons in Korea, but Collins discounted their value. Although the

president maintained that their use would be tactically effective and hold no

implication of mass killing, he emphasized that he was "just exploring the

problem orally" and in no sense making a decision. On 16June the two sides

in Korea agreed on the demarcation line. By 18 June the military situation

stabilized as Communist attacks subsided. 52

Agreement on a final settlement was still jeopardized by President Rhee's

open hostility to any truce plan that did not provide for Chinese Communist

withdrawal from North Korea, that permitted foreign Communist custodial

forces on Korean soil, or that turned over Korean nonrepatriates to a neutral
170 THE TEST OF WAR

state. Despite U.S. efforts to reassure him, Rhee ordered his troops to release

non-Communist North Korean prisoners of war from the prisoner compounds, and 25,000 escaped on the night of 17-18June. Escapes continued

on a reduced scale over the next few days while UNC troops brought in from

recent heavy fighting tried to cope. The possibility of clashes between U.S.

and South Korean forces at the compounds caused much concern in the

theater and in Washington. By the end of the month, only 8,600 of the 35,400

North Korean nonrepatriates remained in UNC custody, and Eisenhower

remarked that the United States seemed to have acquired "another enemy"-

although he admitted the United States had recently considered the release of

prisoners.5~ The Communist negotiators, apparently convinced of UNC

connivance in the escapes, did not walk out of the talks, but on 20 June they

did ask how the armistice terms could be carried out if the UNC could not

control the South Koreans. 54

While the Americans reasoned with a stubborn Rhee, Chinese Communist forces again attacked ROK units on 24 June. Attesting to the intensity of

the fighting, UNC forces expended 2.7 million artillery rounds in June, more

than in any other month of the war, and Eighth Army suffered more than

23,000 casualties, mostly among the South Koreans. UNC estimates placed

enemy fire at approximately 12 percent of its own rate and enemy casualties

at over 36,000. On 29 June Clark replied by letter to the Communist protest

of 20 June, and on 8 July the Communists, although not completely satisfied,

agreed to resume talking. When the negotiators returned to Panmunjom on 10

July, two years after their first meeting, the main problem was to convince the

enemy that Rhee would honor an agreement without the UNC promising to

use force against him. But after several days of meetings, the enemy seemed to

be stalling, presumably to see how far his new military offensive would get. 55

Beginning on 6 July, the Communist offensive forced UNC troops to fall

back. When some South Korean units retreated beyond their ordered limits,

U.S. units had to fill the gaps in the line; it was 16 July before the South

Koreans could return to the line they were supposed to occupy. The enemy

had penetrated six miles, cut off and disorganized many ROK units, and forced

the use of nine U.S. and ROK divisions to stop his advance and regain some

ground. Firing more than 375,000 rounds, enemy artillery achieved its

greatest volume in the last month of the war, while the UNC returned more

than 2 million shells. UNC casualties in July amounted to almost 30,000;

Communist losses were estimated at over 72,000. There were still more than

a million Chinese and North Korean troops in Korea, and they seemed ready

to continue the war indefinitely. 56

When the negotiators met again on 19 July the enemy's assault was

slowing, and Communist delegates proceeded with the remaining tasks-to
The Final Round 171

revise the line of demarcation, define the demilitarized zone, plan for the

exchange of prisoners, form the various commissions, and conclude the truce

arrangements. The final line was near the 38th parallel but geographically

easier to defend than the 38th parallel boundary; it involved somewhat greater

territorial concessions on the part of the North Koreans than of the South.

General Harrison and General Nam 11 formally and silently signed the

armistice at Panmunjom at 10:00 a.m. on 27 July. General Clark and a ROKA

representative countersigned it that afternoon. Ground activity had already

stopped, and artillery fire and air sorties ended at 10:00 p.m. S7

Some loose ends remained. On 27 July the UN allies signed a joint policy

statement-over which State and Defense had labored for more than two

years-promising retaliation if the Communists renewed their attack in South

Korea. It was not issued immediately, however, for fear that Rhee might

deliberately provoke renewed enemy action; Clark finally included it in his 7

August summary report to the United Nations. sH

The two sides exchanged prisoners of war in August and September 1953

during Operation BIG SWITCH. Each side delivered to the Neutral Nations

Repatriation Commission those who wanted to go home-more than 75,000

(including 5,640 Chinese) from the UNC camps and more than 12,000

(including 3,597 U.S.) from enemy camps. The two sides then delivered

nonreturning prisoners to the commission, which held them for 120 days. Of

22,604 enemy nonrepatriates (including 14,704 Chinese), 628 decided to go

home, 86 went to India, 51 escaped or died in custody, and 21,839 were sent

back to the UNC, which simply released them.' Of 359 UNC nonrepatriates,

2 (of 23) Americans and 8 Koreans changed their minds and returned home,

2 Koreans went to India, and 347 were sent back to the enemy command. S9

After three years of devastating war, Korea remained divided in July 1953

roughly along the 38th parallel, the line that had divided it since the end of

World War II. In North Korea, wasted by aerial attack, estimated military

casualties numbered over 500,000, while millions of civilians had fled to

South Korea or vanished. In South Korea, casualties were estimated at

approximately 300,000 military plus about a million civilians; Seoul was

about 50 percent destroyed, and some 5 million persons, about a quarter of

the population, were destitute and homeless. The last 4 of the 20 ROK army

divisions were activated at cadre strength before signing of the armistice. The

U.S. Senate and the ROK National Assembly in January 1954 approved a

bilateral mutual defense treaty, signed on 1 October 1953, effective 14

November 1954.

Of the other major participants in the Korean War, the Communist

• The Koreans returned to South Korean control; the Chinese went mainly to Formosa.
172 THE TEST OF WAR

Chinese were thought to have sustained between 1 and 1.5 million casualties,

among them many highly trained troops. American losses included 33,629

dead, 92,134 wounded, 21 nonrepatriates, and 24 still listed as missing as late

as September 1954.60 Charges of collaboration made against enemy-held U.S.

soldiers resulted in investigations of about 500, a few convictions of misconduct, and a national debate that produced a new Code of Conduct for U.S.

prisoners of war.61

The Military Armistice Commission, responsible for overall supervision

of the demilitarized zone, met on 28 July 1953 in an initial atmosphere of

harmony, but accusations of violations soon surfaced and became recurrent.

The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and its inspection teams

stationed at the 10 ports in North and South Korea also began work but could

not prevent a renewed Communist military buildup. A political conference,

provided for in the armistice, met between 26 April and mid-June 1954 in

Geneva, Switzerland, but it achieved no tangible results toward Korean unity.

The problem of how to unite Korea remained unsolved. 62
CHAPTER IX

Formosa: A Reversal of Policy

Even before the Korean War, the fate of the island of Formosa had become

a major political issue in the United States. In June 1950 the island was under

the control of Chiang Kai-shek, recently defeated and driven from mainland

China by the Communists under Mao Tse-tung. Long a part of China, the

island had been ceded to Japan after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. At

the Cairo Conference in November 1943 the United States had promised the

return of the island to the Chinese Nationalist government, and in 1945 the

Nationalists reoccupied Formosa. At the beginning of the Korean War, in the

absence of a formal peace treaty with' Japan, both the People's Republic of

China (Communist) and the Republic of China (Nationalist) claimed Formosa. 1

The dispute over Formosa forced the United States to reappraise the

island's role in U.S. security policy in the Pacific. From late 1949 on, Formosa

became an important issue that steadily engaged the time and attention of the

Department of Defense. Even those officials who saw Chiang's government as

weak and corrupt preferred Chiang to Communist control over the island. 2

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff had declared in 1948 that a Communist

Formosa would be "seriously unfavorable" to American interests, they rejected then and in 1949 the use of U.S. military forces to prevent such a

takeover. 3 Shortly before the end of 1949, alarmed at the prospect of

Communist domination of East Asia, the JCS were moved to recommend a

"modest, well-directed and closely supervised program" of military aid for

the Nationalists on Formosa ..'

At a meeting with the Joint Chiefs on 29 December, Secretary of State

Acheson opposed sending military aid, arguing that because of deep-seated

internal problems no short-term assistance was likely to save the island from

the Communists. Looking to the long term, he wanted the United States to ally

itself on the side of Asian nationalism, strengthen mainland China's neigh173
174 THE TEST OF WAR

bors, and wait until Sino-Soviet differences created an opportunity to detach

the PRC from Soviet domination. In Acheson's view an independent China,

even if Communist, would be much preferable to an isolated Chinese

Nationalist Formosa. S The president supported Acheson, publicly declaring

on 5 January 1950 that the United States had no territorial designs on Formosa

or other Chinese lands; sought no special rights, privileges, or bases on

Formosa; would have no military involvement in the Chinese civil conflict;

and, while continuing economic aid, would provide no further military aid or

advice to the Chinese on Formosa. The Nationalists would have to purchase

any military items they might want, subject to U.S. approval. On 12 January

Acheson's speech to the National Press Club did not include Formosa within

the U.S. defensive perimeter in the Pacific. 6

This U.S. policy, which implied that Formosa was ultimately expendable,

became a major political issue, particularly in Congress, where a powerful

group of Republicans and some Democrats looked on the "loss of China" in

1949 as evidence of foul play or at least poor judgment on the part of the

Truman administration. The "China Lobby" of politicians, commercial interests, and other groups supported the Chiang Kai-shek government to the hilt

and kept Formosa in the forefront of debate over u.s. Far Eastern policy.

President Truman thus had to reckon constantly with the domestic political

repercussions of his Formosa policies. Within the administration Louis

Johnson and Dean Acheson were at loggerheads over the matter. Johnson

gained support for his position of helping Chiang during his visit to Japan in

June 1950, when General MacArthur presented him with a paper contending

that in enemy hands Formosa would constitute a strategic salient, an "unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender," in the center of a u.s. line

sweeping from the Aleutians through Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines.

MacArthur pressed for a u.s. survey of military aid requirements for Formosa

but did not suggest using U.S. military forces to save the island. 7

Neutralization and Assistance

Acheson's long-range China policy became one of the first casualties of

the Korean War. Viewing the North Korean attack as a "clear-cut Soviet

challenge" and with advisers such as George Kennan warning that Formosa

might be the next target, Acheson proposed at the first Blair House meeting on

25 June that the u.s. Seventh Fleet be used to prevent both a Chinese

Communist attack on the island and a Chinese Nationalist attack on the

mainland. But he did not want the United States to "tie up with the

Generalissimo." The president approved Acheson's proposal the next night.
Formosa 175

Truman also rejected Chiang's offer of 33,000 troops for Korea, accepting

Acheson's argument that the Nationalist tr;oops were needed to defend

Formosa and that their deployment to Korea might provoke Chinese Communist intervention there. 1i

On 27 June the president publicly declared that PRC control of Formosa

would constitute a direct threat to u.s. forces in the Pacific area and that

consideration of the island's future status would have to "await the restoration

of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by

the United Nations. "9 Reacting quickly, Peking pointed out that Truman's

latest statement contradicted his earlier declaration. Premier Chou En-lai,

calling on Chinese to unite and take back Formosa from the "American

aggressor," on 6 July condemned the u.s. stance. The Indian ambassador to

Peking, Kavalam Modhava Panikkar, reportedly thought that the Chinese

Communists were preparing to attack Formosa, and the Soviet ambassador in

Peking was reported to have toasted the island's "early liberation." 10

George Kennan, who believed that the Chinese Nationalists could not

repel a Communist assault on Formosa and that State should avoid incurring

later charges of inhibiting U.s. military preparations, suggested on 17 July that

Acheson warn the presidect and the Pentagon that the island's fall would

damage the United States politically and that U.S. forces would have to be used

in its defense. In a special message to Congress on 19 July, Truman tried to

calm the Chinese Communists. He emphasized the u.s. neutralization policy

for Formosa and declared the United States desired no territory or special

privilege, preferring a peaceful settlement of all Formosan questions. I

1

In the UN the United States was drifting toward diplomatic isolation on

the issue of Formosa. Unlike the Americans, the British and some other

nations recognized the PRC, construed the Cairo declaration to mean the

return of Formosa to whatever Chinese government controlled the mainland,

and sought to give Nationalist China's UN seat to the PRe. Nations currently

urging the Soviet Union to end its UN boycott and help restore peace in Korea

seemed quite ready to meet the Soviet demand to seat the PRC. 12

In the meantime, the United States moved to make it easier for the

Nationalists to purchase U.S. military equipment, including tanks and jet

aircraft. 13 The Joint Chiefs advised Johnson on 27 July that loss of the island

would be "seriously detrimental" to U.S. security and urged approval of grant

military assistance and dispatch of a military survey mission to Chiang. II

Acheson agreed, provided that Chiang's forces were strengthened only to

serve as a defensive backup for the Seventh Fleet. Truman approved. 15

In response to a MacArthur request for immediate shipment of ammunition to the Nationalists, Truman allocated more than $14 million in MDAP

funds for Formosa, and the Department of State approved a $9.8 million
176 THE TEST OF WAR

Defense program, with a special priority rating directly below that for

Korea. 16 In September a U.S. military survey mission, under Maj. Gen. Alonzo

P. Fox from MacArthur's headquarters, recommended arming Chiang's forces

for the defense of Formosa. The first delivery in response to MacArthur's

request was loaded by the end of October, but the items in MacArthur's list

constituted the only materiel sent to Formosa in 1950. Washington took no

final action in 1950 on the Fox recommendations. 17

Meanwhile the growing Chinese Communist threat against Formosa

tested U.S. policy. Chiang's government, reportedly deeply resentful of U.S.

restrictions it had accepted on 28 June 1950, raised several questions about

what it could do to defend itself prior to an actual attack. 18 Johnson and

Acheson concurred in the Nationalist plan to continue air and naval reconnaissance, provided there was no armed offensive action against the China

mainland, and agreed to Nationalist communication with the Seventh Fleet.

Acheson declined, however, to raise questions with the British about the

shipment of military supplies from Hong Kong to Communist areas, and

Johnson went along. 19 As for the defense of the offshore islands, Johnson

concurred with MacArthur and the JCS that there should be no U.S. responsibility for areas beyond Formosa and the Pescadores. The offshore islands

were thus strictly a Nationalist responsibility. 20

On 14 July the Nationalists asked permission to bomb airfields and troop

concentrations on the China mainland as a defense measure against purported

Communist preparations to attack Formosa. Acheson responded with an

emphatic no, but the Joint Chiefs pointed out to Johnson that the Chinese

Communists could transport an estimated 200,000 mainland troops to

Formosa and had already announced their intent to capture the island. Noting

the high political cost that Acheson had placed on Formosa's loss, they

recommended that the president allow Nationalist forces to mine mainland

staging waters and attack amphibious concentrations directed against Formosa. MacArthur agreed, and Johnson forwarded the request to Acheson and

Truman, who referred it to the NSC. Acheson did not object to mining but

considered preventive bombing attacks unacceptable. 21

At this point MacArthur's visit to Formosa complicated the situation.

While he was on the island on 31 July and 1 August, the Nationalists tested the

U.S. policy of neutralization by launching an attack in mainland waters. The

world press suggested that by dealing directly with Chiang Kai-shek MacArthur had rejected neutralization and opted for a more aggressive approach. 22

Despite a caution against doing so from Army Secretary Frank Pace,

Johnson decided to push the president to allow preemptive Nationalist attacks

on amphibious concentrations if positive intelligence warned of an imminent

assault on Formosa or the Pescadores. But Truman was unwilling to entrust
Formosa 177

MacArthur with such an important decision and firmly rebuffed Johnson.• 23

On 14 August the JCS directed MacArthur that, in the event of a Communist

attack on Formosa, the u.s. defense would be confined to "practicable"

actions that did not commit any U.S. forces to the island itself. By this time,

as it turned out, MacArthur no longer thought that the PRC planned to invade

Formosa. 24

MacArthur precipitated another incident of both domestic and international import when he sent a message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars to be

read at their convention on 28 August. Leaked three days earlier to the press,

the message received wide publicity. It contradicted some fundamental

aspects of u.s. policy and implied that not defending Formosa was the

position of "those who advocate appeasement and defeatism in the Pacific."

Since the United States was urging on the United Nations the president's

pronouncement that the United States had "no designs on Formosa," the

MacArthur message was especially inopportune and politically embarrassing.

Learning of the message on 25 August, Acheson had a copy sent to the

president, who saw it as a contradiction of his policy. When the president told

Johnson to order MacArthur to withdraw the message, Johnson tried to

temporize. An impatient Truman called the Pentagon and dictated the words

of the order to Johnson, who sent it shortly after 5:00 p.m. Johnson's

behavior undoubtedly further damaged his standing in the administration. 2s

Effects ofthe Chinese Intervention in Korea

Disliked by Johnson, U.S. Formosan policy did not please Acheson, either,

but for different reasons. The secretary of state considered it interim policy,

and he did not want to make long-term commitments about such questions as

the Chinese seat in the United Nations, continued recognition of the Nationalists as the government of all China, and especially u.s. support for a

Nationalist return to the mainland. These issues, Acheson thought, should be

settled eventually on the sole basis of "overall u.s. interests" and not on the

basis of commitments to the Nationalists. On 25 August he even offered to

place the Formosa issue before the UN after Chou En-Iai complained to that

organization that U.S. "aggression" prevented the PRe from liberating the

island. This offer reflected Acheson's desire to close the "considerable gap"

over Formosa between the United States and its friends in the UN. On 31

• MacArthur later wrote that Harriman cautioned him early in August 19<;0 about Truman's

"extreme dislike" for Chiang Kai-shek and said that Johnson "was on his way out because the

President suspected him of being on too friendly terms with the Generalissimo." (Douglas

MacArthur, "Mr. Truman Yielded to Counsels of fear:' US. News and World Report, 17 Feh <;6.)
178 THE TEST Of WAR

August Truman called the Seventh Fleet's presence in the Formosa Strait

"flank protection" for UNC forces in Korea and averred that the Formosan

situation was "one for settlement. ,,26

At the same time a far different long-term view of Formosa was beginning

to crystallize in the Pentagon. The JCS recommended to Johnson on 8

September that the United States not agree to any UN proposal on Formosa

that might enhance the Soviet military position in the Far East or open the way

for a PRC takeover of the island. Johnson left office in mid-September still at

odds with Acheson on U.S. policy for Formosa r

The attack on Tibet at the end of October by the Chinese Communists and

mounting evidence of their possible intervention in Korea gave greater

urgency to the Formosa question, and increased the likelihood of UN

consideration. Acheson told Secretary Marshall on 11 November that State

would support a UN General Assembly resolution to establish a commission to

study the Formosan question; he promised that State "would leave the way

open" for UN action against the PRC and for the use of Formosa as a base for

operations against the Chinese Communists if they attacked. Marshall asked

Acheson to defer action until Defense views were available and suggested an

NSC review of Formosan policy.2H

On 24 November Acting Secretary of Defense Lovett strongly recommended to Acheson the JCS view that the UN resolution would have

disadvantageous effects because it "would neutralize Formosa strategically"

and restrict U.S. freedom of action. If politically necessary, the resolution

could be accepted with certain deletions that would eliminate these effects.

After the massive Chinese Communist attack in Korea a few days later,

Acheson told Marshall that the UN study was deferred, that JCS views would

be considered, and that State concurred in the need for an NSC policy review.

Acheson asked Marshall to ascertain JCS views on whether denial of Formosa

to the PRC would meet U.S. military strategic needs; if not, he wanted to know

what the additional requirements were. If diplomatic and economic measures

could not meet security needs, Acheson wanted a JCS opinion on the use of

U.S. military force. 2')

When British Prime Minister Clement Attlee came to Washington in early

December to discuss the Korean situation, he expressed little sympathy for

retaining Chiang in power on Formosa. The British acknowledged that the

United States could not consider recognizing the PRe but thought that in

return for a cease-fire in Korea the Americans would be well advised to drop

Chiang, accept the Chinese Communists into the United Nations, and yield

Formosa to them. The Americans felt these steps would constitute a reward

for aggression. Marshall pointed out that it would be intolerable to abandon

Formosa to an enemy power, thus splitting the U.S. defensive island chain and
Formosa 179

"taking a step to liquidate our positIOn in the Pacific." President Truman

indicated that sacrificing Formosa was politically unacceptable to the administration. Essentially, the two nations agreed only on trying to settle the

Formosan question peacefully. :Ill

In response to a request from Marshall to reevaluate previous views on

Formosa, the Joint Chiefs reiterated that neutralization would benefit the PRC

and weaken the U.S. strategic position in the area. In the event of a full-scale

war with the Chinese Communists, it would be desirable to have Formosan

ports and airfields for U.S. use. Furthermore, Chinese Nationalist forces on the

island would be the "only visible source of manpower for extensive guerrilla

operations in China and a possible invasion of the mainland." Should

diplomatic and economic measures not suffice, the chiefs now declared, the

United States ought to be prepared to use naval and air forces to safeguard

Formosa.~1

On 9 January 1951 the JCS rejected MacArthur's December proposals to

use Nationalist troops in Korea, establish a naval blockade of China, make

naval and air attacks on Chinese mainland industrial centers, and allow

Nationalist diversionary attacks on the mainland..-\2 But three days later, their

position on Formosa evolving with events, they recommended to Marshall

three new measures: a military training mission and increased military

assistance for Chiang; "all practicable covert aid" to any effective Nationalist

guerrilla forces in China; and removal of restrictions on provision of logistical

support to Nationalist operations against the Communists. These proposals

came before the National Security Council as NSC 101, but with State opposed

to several provisions, particularly Nationalist operations against the mainland,

the council asked for more study on 17 January. Unsatisfied, Marshall wanted

the council to come to grips with China policy, weighing UN support for the

United States against U.S. security needs..-\.-\

As the Korean battlefield situation began to improve, the Joint Chiefs

looked less favorably on military involvement in Formosa, and on 30 January

they told State representatives that their objective was primarily to "deny the

island to a hostile government." A week later the Joint Chiefs dropped their

recommendation to allow Nationalist operations against the mainland on the

premise that the United States should do "nothing to spread the war outside

Korea." With State and Defense more in agreement, the NSC dropped

consideration of the 101 series; so long as the war in Korea did not spread,

neutralization of Formosa by the Seventh Fleet would continue. If Formosa

were attacked, however, the United States expected the Nationalists to assist in

its defense. On 28 February the Joint Chiefs told MacArthur the Nationalists

might retaliate in the event of a clearly identified Communist air or sea attack

against the island. The JCS endorsed immediate U.S. retaliation with prior
180 THE TEST OF WAR

approval from Washington if the Chinese Communists attacked American

forces outside of Korea.·H

Truman's dismissal of MacArthur on 11 April thrust the Formosan

question prominently into the public debate on national strategy and policy. In

his address to Congress on 19 April, MacArthur argued that the loss of

Formosa would endanger the entire U.S. defense line in the Pacific. In

addition to other measures, • he advocated removal of restrictions on Nationalist operations and U.S. logistical support for those operations. Testifying

before Senate committees on 3 May, MacArthur claimed that Nationalist forces

should have been used in Korea once the Chinese Communists attacked and

that the failure to do so had cost thousands of UNC lives. 3S Four days

later Marshall rebutted these charges, not only expressing doubt about the

Nationalists' military effectiveness but testifying that MacArthur's recommendations would have forfeited the friendship of U.S. allies and risked war with

mainland China and perhaps all-out war with the Soviets. The secretary stated

his support of U.S. policy to "deny Formosa to Communist China and to

oppose the seating of Communist Chinese in the United Nations. ,,36

Review ojPolicy: NSC 48/5

Beyond the public glare, Marshall, Acheson, and others had meanwhile

been reviewing overall U.S. policy in the Far East, as expressed in NSC 48/2,

approved on 30 December 1949. In a March 1951 study of Nationalist military

effectiveness, the ]CS concluded that Chiang would have great difficulty

maintaining himself on Formosa for a year without Seventh Fleet's protection.

As for overt Nationalist operations against the mainland, the JCS believed that

U.S. support was indispensable but would likely be unavailing in terms of

achieving ultimate success. For the time they recommended that the Nationalists be equipped austerely and trained for an eventual campaign against the

PRC.·P

When the NSC on 2 May took up the question of Formosa in a draft of

NSC 48/3, it seemed to Acheson that the Joint Chiefs were leaning toward

providing an unlimited increase in U.S. aid to the Nationalists and holding

Formosa for an "indefinite period or forever." Acheson preferred to limit U.S.

assistance to support only defense of the island but saw the possibility that a

mainland resistance movement "might make use of the Nationalist resources

• These were intensification of the economic blockade of China, naval blockade of the China

coast, air reconnaissance of China's coastal area and ,\'!anchuria, and by implication, at least,

bombing north of the Yalu.
Formosa 181

on Formosa." He remained flexible on an ultimate settlement, stating that the

island should be kept "out of the hands of an unfriendly China, not out of the

hands of a friendly China." Marshall expressed no views at the time. 5H

At the final NSC discussion of a revised text for NSC 48/4 on 16 May,

Lovett suggested inserting the word "non-Communist" in the statement,

"Detach China as an effective ally of the USSR and support the development

of an independent [non-Communist] China which has renounced aggression."

Acheson demurred, saying that although he hoped ultimately for a nonCommunist China, he would be satisfied, at least temporarily, to get a "Titoist

China opposed to the Soviet Union." The president agreed with Acheson, the

council adopted NSC 48/5, and Truman approved it the following day.:\9

NSC 48/5 retained the Seventh Fleet's mission to neutralize Formosa as

long as required by U.S. security interests. It encouraged such political

changes in the Nationalist regime as would "increase its prestige and influence

in China proper." U.S. military and economic assistance to the Nationalists

was intended to aid them in defending the island and participating in possible

defensive or offensive operations against Chinese Communist aggression

outside Korea. NSC 48/5 offered no long-term u.s. commitment to support

the Nationalists, to defend the island beyond the mission of the Seventh Fleet,

or to help Chiang Kai-shek return to the mainland. While it reiterated U.S.

recognition of the Nationalists as the legal government of all China, it also

advocated actions on the mainland that might eventually undermine Chiang's

role-development of a non-Communist leadership, influencing leaders and

people to reorient their Communist government, and the fostering of an

indigenous resistance against the PRe. These activities represented State's

hope of finding a "third force" around which dissidents in China might rally

and within which Nationalist forces might eventually find a role. ,0 This hope

proved impossible of achievement.

A direct means by which to implement NSC 48/5 guidance on Formosa

was through the military aid process. ell A U.S. Military Assistance Advisory

Group (MAAG) under Maj. Gen. William e. Chase, sent to Formosa in the

spring of 1951, became one of the chief instruments for controlling the

Nationalists' use of U.S. assistance. *",2

On the basis of the Fox survey report of September 1950, Defense set up

a FY 1951 military assistance program of $71. 2 million, but no materiel

deliveries beyond the original MacArthur request were made through mid1951. Although the military assistance program for FY 1952 was cut to

* The Nationalists proved adept at putting their economic house in order, and in 1952 adopted

the principle of a balanced budget. winning Lovett's praise for demonstrating how aid could lead

to "self-help."
182 THE TEST Of WAR

approximate! y S190 million!~ from the S2:)7 million recommended by

Defense, combined military-economic assistance for the Nationalists

amounted to around S300 million, the largest aid program on a per capita

basis. Still, at the end of 1951 the cumulative total of all deliveries amounted

to less than S25 million."

As it turned out, despite efforts to use the aid package as a lever to

promote policy objectives, the military assistance program in this period

proved strangely counterproductive. The large programs planned nourished

the Nationalists' hope of returning to the mainland but did nothing to

encourage emergence of a "third force" within mainland China, which was

the U.S. preference. The United States intended that "every penny . . . [be]

properly and effectively used," but the lack of deliveries no doubt weakened

General Chase's ability to recommend reforms to the Nationalists, who

interpreted the slow deliveries and the effort to find a third force on the

mainland as indications of U.S. disfavor.l~

By the fall of 195 I, U.S. strategy choices had narrowed considerably. The

Korean armistice talks were foundering, no third force leadership could be

found in China, and Communist operations had decimated mainland guerrilla

groups and left the mainland populace fearful and passive. Weak as they were,

the Nationalists on Formosa seemed to be the only card in the u.s. hand.-<6

Still not satisfied with U.S. policy as expressed in NSC 48/5, the Joint

Chiefs on 24 October 1951, reacting to a proposed UN consideration of the

Formosan question, wrote what Frank Nash, assistant for international security affairs, described to Lovett as the "strongest of many strong JCS memoranda on the subject." For the foreseeable future, the JCS wanted Formosa

denied to any Communist power and its government oriented to the United

States. International consideration of the island's final status should be

delayed until peace and security had returned in the Pacific. The JCS wanted

the United States to support a friendly Chinese regime on Formosa, develop its

military potential, and "place due emphasis on the well-being and wishes of

the Chinese Nationalist population." U.S. security interests in Formosa, the

chiefs concluded, were sufficient to override Allied political concerns, and

the United States should if necessary act unilaterally to maintain its military

position on the island.'-

When Lovett transmitted the ]CS views to State, he suggested a reexamination of NSC 48/5, but State was unwilling. Another opportunity for reappraisal came in late 195 I when CIA director Walter Bedell Smith, worried

about the "waning" U.S. assets in the Far East, wrote Lovett on II December

that both the Chinese mainland guerrilla forces and the Nationalists on

Formosa needed to be "strengthened, built up, and used within the immediate

foreseeable future" if they were to be of any benefit to the United States. He
Formosa 183

suggested rotating Nationalist troops to the Korean front and using them for

raids against the mainland from the offshore islands. But even though Truman

on 20 December approved a policy of using covert operations against

mainland China if the Korean armistice negotiations were indefinitely delayed

or failed, the president specifically declared that NSC 48/'; still expressed U.S.

Formosan policy.IX

Smith again wrote Lovett on 30 January 1952 to report that Admiral

Arthur W. Radford, Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC), soon to assume

responsibility for defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, agreed with the

CIA's views. The Joint Chiefs, too, were in basic agreement with Smith. On 4

March they wrote Lovett that, because of Formosa's major importance to U.S.

security interests, the United States should deny it to any Soviet-allied Chinese

regime, take unilateral action if necessary to retain it as a base for possible U.S.

military operations, continue Seventh Fleet protection until the Nationalists

could assume its defense, and develop the potential of a friendly Chinese

regime on the island. U.S. military aid for defensive purposes and for possible

future overt offensive action should be continued, the JCS said, but organized

Nationalist units should not be used for covert activities in the Far East. Frank

Nash thought that Smith's points were inadequately treated in NSC 48/5 and

that the JCS views were not fully consistent with it; on 22 March Defense

submitted the JCS opinions for examination. I')

NSC 128: The Failure to Find an Offensive Mission

When the council took up the JCS views as NSC 128 on 2 April, Truman

emphasized that policy on Formosa was subject to debate. Deputy Secretary of

Defense Foster urged immediate review of the .JCS paper, hut the president,

following Acheson's advice, directed that State and Defense, with a CIA

representative present, study the paper. It soon became clear that State was

willing to arm and train the Nationalists for a future offensive role but did not

want to define that role or to change the current U.S. policy against Nationalist

operations on the mainland. The JCS, on the other hand, wanted to continue

Seventh Fleet's mission to defend Formosa from attack but no longer to stand

in the way of Nationalist operations. ~o

While Defense and State views remained divergent, the possibility of a

PRC assault on the offshore islands began to look serious, and the two

departments agreed to the Nationalist defense of the islands, if the Nationalists

so chose. The United States would give no direct aid but would allow the use

of limitcd amounts of materiel already supplied. The defensive mission of the

Nationalist Chinese was thus broadened. I In the Pentagon on 15 July, the
184 THE TEST OF WAR

Armed Forces Policy Council considered expediting the readiness of the

Nationalist divisions for possible use in Korea, and in August the ]CS formally

stated that the Nationalist divisions could be trained and ready within months

of receiving the necessary equipment. ~2

Lovett took the matter of using Nationalist forces in Korea to the

president, who authorized further interdepartmental study. Many of the

earlier arguments on the subject came up again: It would be more expensive

than training more South Korean divisions, introduce a new language and

communications problem, irritate C.S. allies, engender South Korean resentment, possibly end the peace talks, and become a political issue in the 1952

presidential campaign. While State apparently had little objection to arming

and training Nationalist divisions for offensive operations, it still did not want

to agree to any specific operation, including their use in Korea. ~-" Lovett, on

the other hand, seemed averse to spending large sums of money on Nationalist

divisions unless they had a specific mission. At a White House meeting on 24

September, Truman spoke of the Formosan question as politically sensitive

and thought the main value of the Nationalists was their potential threat to the

China coast rather than their employment in Korea.~· By this time the

Nationalist government also held the view that its own interests lay in

defending Formosa and increasing pressure against the Chinese mainland until

it could be recaptured. ~~

The administration did not complete work on NSC 128, and NSC 48/5

remained in force. The mission of the Seventh Fleet remained unchanged-to

defend Formosa and the Pescadores against Chinese Communist attack and to

restrain the Nationalists from attacking the Chinese mainland. Thus, during

the Truman administration the JCS never realized their desire to utilize

Nationalist forces in offensive operations.

In the meantime, deliveries for the large-scale military assistance program

lagged and did not pick up substantially until the end of 1952. Total deliveries

for 1950 and 1951 amounted to less than 525 million; almost as much arrived

between January and June 1952, when cumulative total shipments reached

$47.8 million. By the end of December 1952 the total amounted to $104.3

million, with approved programs of more than S376 million for fiscal years

1951 through 1953. The scale of this assistance made it clear that the

Nationalists were to be trained and equipped to an extent that did not preclude

possible future offensive operations. ~6

When Eisenhower became president in January 1953, he interpreted the

Truman order to the Seventh Fleet as requiring the "United States Navy

. . . to serve as a defensive arm of Communist China," and in February he

rescinded the order. At that time Chiang promised to consult with the u.s.

government before making any sizable attack on the mainland. Later he gave
Formosa 185

the United States base rights on, Formosa, and in 1954 the two governments

concluded a mutual defense treaty. Formally, at least, the policy of neutralization ended with the change in US. administrations. ~~

The Formosa issue and the events of the Korean War shaped the course of

US. relations with the two Chinas for the next two decades. The bitterness,

suspicion, and distrust of the years of fighting carried over into the postwar

period and prevented the establishment of normal relations between the

United States and the PRe. On two occasions-in 1954 and 1958-the United

States overtly supported the Nationalists when the Chinese Communists

threatened hostilities against Formosa, The Defense Department stand on the

strategic importance of Formosa to the United States position in the Pacific

and the consequent imperative to deny it to the PRC remained a basic element

in US. Pacific policy. The perception of the PRC and communism as a threat

to other parts of East Asia profoundly affected U.S. policy throughout the area,

especially in Japan and southeast Asia. In particular, this perception of the

PRC helped drive the United States into a deepening involvement in Indochina

and eventually into another unwanted war.
CHAPTER X

Japan: A New Relationship

With the fate of Formosa uncertain and the Chinese mainland in the

unfriendly hands of Mao Tse-tung, Japan took on a vital strategic significance

as the anchor in the u.s. defense line in the Pacific running from the Aleutians

to the Philippines. Perhaps as much as any other factor, the threat to Japan

posed by the North Korean attack compelled u.s. action in June 1950. As

Robert Lovett remarked in retrospect, Soviet intentions in the Far East pointed

"a dagger at the heart ofJapan," and Korea could not be permitted to fall to

communism. In turn, the war in Korea forced the United States to review its

relationship with Japan. I

Situation in June 1950

Defeat in World War II was costly to the Japanese. They lost Manchuria,

Formosa, and the Pescadores to China and the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin

to the Soviet Union. The United States occupied the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands

and became the UN trustee for the Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana Islands. In

June 1950 Japan itself remained under Allied occupation, nominally supervised by an II-nation (later 13-nation) Far Eastern Commission headquartered

in Washington and a 4-power Allied Council in Tokyo. The Soviets were

represented in both organizations. Actual occupation authority resided in

General MacArthur as Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) in Tokyo. 2

The July 1945 Potsdam declaration-approved by the United States, Great

Britain, and the Chinese Nationalists'-provided that postwarJapan would be

occupied until a new order of peace, security, and justice was established in

• Chiang Kai-shl"k was not prl"sent at Potsdam; Ill" Sl"nt approval by wire.

187
188 THE TEST OF WAR

the world and "convincing proof" existed that the Japanese could no longer

make war. Disarmed, occupied, and demilitarized, the Japanese in 1947

adopted a constitution renouncing maintenance of a military establishment and

the use of force, apparently reflecting the sentiment of the people. As early as

March 1947 General MacArthur publicly suggested signing a peace treaty with

Japan and ending the occupation, declaring that its people were ready for

responsible democratic government. The State Department's attempt to call a

peace conference at that time failed, however, because of disagreement, particularly by the Chinese and Soviets, on matters of procedure and substance.'

Official U.S. policy, set forth in NSC 13/2 (1948) and 13/3 (1949), stated

that the United States should avoid pressing for a treaty but should be ready to

act whenever the Allies could agree on procedure. The United States meanwhile should prepare the Japanese for independence and seek preliminary

Allied agreement on a treaty that was to be "as brief, as general, and as

non-punitive as possible." Moreover, the United States should reduce its

occupation forces inJapan and minimize their psychological impact; whether

such forces would remain after a treaty would depend on then current

conditions. The United States would retain facilities on Okinawa and certain

other outlying islands for the long term and develop Yokosuka naval base in

the Japanese home islands, anticipating its post-treaty "retention on a commercial basis." Japanese internal security forces were to be strengthened. U.S.

aid, it was expected, would advance the country's economic recovery and

there were to be "no further industrial reparations removals from Japan and

no limitation on levels ofJapanese peaceful productive capacity.'"

This expression of policy did not entirely satisfy either State or Defense.

Acheson favored an early treaty as a way of freeing the Truman administration

to concentrate on its European commitments and permit Japan's transformation into a U.S. political and economic ally. Secretary of Defense Johnson

sided with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who thought a treaty premature. They

expressed concern over the continued availability to U.S. forces of bases in

Japan, aggressive Soviet expansionism, and the risk of losing Japan. The JCS

and Johnson held to these views in spite of Acheson's request for JCS

reassessment of the question in October 1949. NSC 48/2, on 30 December

1949, deferred formal decision on a Japanese treaty, but in February 1950

President Truman asked State and Defense to prepare a new paper for the

National Security Council on the subject.() General MacArthur remained firm

in support of the immediate negotiation of a treaty.-

Further talks did not resolve the differences between the two departments. In an effort to proceed, Acheson on 18 May 1950 appointed John

Foster Dulles, a respected international lawyer with support in the Republican

Party, to head a State Department study group on the Japanese question. H
Japan 189

A State-Defense Agreement

Fully occupied with Korea after 25 June, Johnson delegated supervision

ofJapanese treaty matters to his assistant for foreign affairs, James H. Burns.

Dulles, believing that the outbreak of the Korean War made a treaty more

necessary than ever, proceeded, with Acheson's and Truman's approval, to

prepare a draft which State sent to JohnsonY When Dulles telephoned

Johnson on 3 August to talk over the paper, the secretary asserted that with a

war on he had no time to discuss a peace treaty for Japan; moreover, he

claimed, Dulles's draft did not conform to the views of either the JCS or

MacArthur. Johnson said that MacArthur had reversed his original position

and had sent him a second memorandum on the subject. Dulles replied that he

had seen MacArthur's most recent memorandum and that the treaty draft did

accord with MacArthur's position in the second memorandum. The treaty

draft gave the United States the "right to maintain inJapan as much force as we

wanted, anywhere we wanted, for as long as we wanted." When Dulles asked

how the Pentagon could ask for more, Johnson agreed that, if this were the

case, State and Defense could "get together and go places." I ()

Maj. Gen. Carter B. Magruder, working under Burns, and John M. Allison,

deputy to Dulles, headed a small State-Defense committee, and interdepartmental agreement seemed nearer when MacArthur reported that he liked the

Dulles draft. II In late August, however, the Joint Chiefs were still reluctant to

agree to a treaty and viewed Japan's full independence as far in the future. If

negotiations for a treaty were politically necessary, they wanted the occupation continued, specific conditions included, and the treaty not signed until a

favorable settlement of the Korean War. In any event, they deemed Dulles's

current draft inadequate to safeguard U.S. security interests and therefore

unacceptable. 12

Although Johnson conveyed the JCS position to Acheson and the president, he offered to have Magruder help iron out the differences and agreed

that the two departments could list principles to govern negotiations rather

than bicker over specific language. Allison and Magruder prepared such a list

and a draft report, both satisfactory to the JCS; on 7 September 1950 Johnson

and Acheson signed a joint memorandum to Truman. 1:1

The joint memorandum marked the first State-Defense agreement on a

Japanese treaty. It provided that the United States should proceed with

preliminary negotiations, but the treaty should become effective only when

U.S. interests dictated and "in no event" before the Korean War's favorable

conclusion. The treaty was to deny all Japanese resources to the Soviets and

guarantee that no unacceptable foreign forces would be allowed south of

Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands; continue the U.S. strategic trusteeship over
190 THE TEST OF WAR

the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall Islands; and provide exclusive U.S.

strategic control over Marcus Island, the Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan, and

the Ryukyu Islands south of latitude 29° north. The treaty would not prohibit

Japanese self-defense, would provide for at least initial garrisoning in Japan of

forces under a U.S. military command, and would specify that the United

States could maintain armed forces in the country "wherever, for so long, and

to such extent as it deems necessary," with specific terms of their relationship

to the Japanese to be handled in a separate bilateral agreement. As one State

Department officer wrote, the "brutally frank terms" of the memorandum

represented State's concession to the military. II

Truman approved the joint memorandum on H September and sent it to

the National Security Council, where it became NSC 60/1. In September the

president publicly stated that he had authorized informal discussions with

other governments on a Japanese peace treaty, and by October State was

holding preliminary conversations with representatives of the countries on

the Far Eastern Commission, including the Soviet Union. I'; In November State

circulated its views that a peace treaty should recognize Korean independence

and provide for U.S. administration of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands and for

great power disposition of Formosa, the Pescadores, South Sakhalin, and the

Kuriles. There were to be no reparations, and {'.S.-Japanese cooperation was

to be maintained pending the creation of alternative security arrangements.

Defense meanwhile completed a draft of a separate U.s.-Japanese mutual

security treaty, which the State Department and General MacArthur began to

review early in November. 1(,

Effect ofChinese Intervention in Korea

The massive Chinese Communist intervention in Korea in late November

created a crisis in planning for Japan. State and Defense agreed that the attack

increased the pOSSibility of general war and heightened Japan's vulnerability,

but they disagreed on a course of action. The military believed that the Korean

crisis dictated continuation of the occupation, while State chafed under the

restrictions of the joint memorandum. On 13 December Acheson wrote

Marshall asking for Defense opinion on concluding a peace treaty before the

Korean War ended, committing C.S. forces to the defense of the Pacific island

chain, returning the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands to Japan, and exploring a

Pacific pact. He proposed sending a mission immediately, headed by Dulles

and with Defense representation. to discuss a treaty in Tokyo. ,-

Defense reactions varied. MacArthur again supported an early peace

conference and the restoration of Japanese sovereignty, but he viewed the
Japan 191

possible return of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands as strategically

"unthinkable." IH Initially negative toward immediate negotiations, the Joint

Chiefs met with State Department officials on 3 January 1951 and agreed to

the commitment of substantial U.S. defense forces to the Pacific island chain

and to discussions of a possible Pacific pact with U.S. allies. State in turn was

to try to secure continued U.S. strategic control over the Ryukyus and Bonins.

TheJCS still worried about the effect of a Japanese peace treaty on the Korean

situation and whether it might provoke overt Soviet action against Japan. 19

Nonetheless, after discussing the matter, Marshall and Acheson on 9 January

advised Truman to amend the terms of the 7 September 1950 agreement

immediately. 20

Affirming U.S. willingness to commit a "substantial armed force" to the

defense of the Pacific island chain and to join a security arrangement with

Pacific island nations, Truman appointed Dulles his special representative as

peace negotiator, but without authority to make any final U.S. commitments.

Accompanied by Army Assistant Secretary Earl D. Johnson, General Magruder,

and Col. C. Stanton Babcock as Defense representatives, Dulles left for Tokyo

on 22 January. The Joint Chiefs no doubt welcomed the understanding that a

peace settlement would come into effect only after the exchange of ratifications, a process that presumably offered an opportunity to control the

timing. 21

In early 1951 the great debate over foreign policy, and in particular the

dispatch of U.S. divisions to Europe as part of the NATO forces, was coming

to a head. So too was the matter of providing U.S. reinforcements for Japan,

which had been almost denuded of U.S. troops since the start of the Korean

War. The Joint Chiefs had rejected MacArthur's initial request for four National

Guard divisions to bolsterJapanese security, but on 29 January they offered to

send two divisions in March, with no public announcement because of fear of

adverse effect in Europe, where the NATO countries eagerly awaited a strong

American military presence. However, when it became apparent that sending

troops to Japan might make the Soviet global threat seem more immediate and

therefore might help rather than hurt the administration's case in the

congressional debate over troops for Europe, Truman approved the shipment

of the two divisions on 23 February, and Marshall saw to the issuance of a

public announcement prior to his appearance before a congressional committee. The two divisions actually reached Japan in April. 22

The Dulles mission, which arrived in Tokyo on 25 January, succeeded in

reaching a general agreement with the Japanese, who were greatly encouraged

because the U.S. terms were much more generous than expected. Despite

Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida's fears of resurgent Japanese militarism, he

was receptive to the proposed security arrangement with the United States but
192 THE TEST OF WAR

preferred, because of the japanese public's attitude and the antiwar clause in

the country's constitution, to incorporate it in a separate administrative

agreement subject to approval by executive action alone. L5 Yoshida also

informally agreed to continued U.S. use of japan as a base for the duration of

the Korean War. These agreements, as Dulles pointed out, were subject to U.S.

negotiation with its allies. 24

On visits to the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, Dulles found

little sympathy for the proposed japanese settlement. The Philippine government wanted $8 billion in reparations and a guarantee that the Chinese

Nationalists would retain Formosa, a move the Filipinos thought far more

important to their security than a Pacific pact. The Australians opposed

guaranteeing Formosa to the Nationalists, and neither Australia nor New

Zealand would accept a nonpunitive japanese treaty without specific and

adequate security assurances from the United States. Dulles proceeded to

negotiate a draft mutual security pact between Australia, New Zealand, and

the United States (ANZUS). 2~

Following Dulles's return to Washington, Acheson decided that the single

Pacific pact idea should be dropped in favor of separate U.S. security

arrangements-with japan, with the Philippines, and with Australia and New

Zealand. As he wrote Marshall in early April, the japanese peace treaty and

Pacific arrangements had political significance in the upcoming Australian

elections and in persuading the British to accept a treaty not prohibiting

japanese rearmament. Acheson also suggested that Truman should make a

public statement. 26

In the Pentagon, the Army, Navy, and Air Force secretaries preferred the

original idea of a general Pacific pact and recommended to Marshall a bilateral

agreement with japan; they opposed a presidential statement. The joint Chiefs

did not object to the notion of several security pacts but wanted a presidential

statement to reflect certain of their views. They wanted the U.S.-japanese

security arrangement and the peace treaty to come into effect at the same

time, preferred an informal trilateral arrangement rather than a formal pact

with Australia and New Zealand so as to avoid demands for coordinated

planning, and suggested dealing individually with other security problems in

the Pacific. Concurring in the jCS position, Marshall also informed Acheson of

the service secretaries' admonition against a presidential statement. Dulles

redrafted a planned presidential statement to Marshall's satisfaction, and

Truman released it on 18 April. It noted the progress already made on security

arrangements in the Pacific and indicated that the United States would move

ahead on separate agreements with Japan, the Philippines, and Australia and

New Zealand. The timing was fortuitous, for the japanese peace treaty had

apparently received a setback because of General MacArthur's recall.r
japan 193

Toward a Peace Treaty

The dismissal of MacArthur on 11 April stilled the strongest pro-treaty

voice inside Defense. Shocked by MacArthur's firing and worried about the

possible adverse effects, Dulles debated whether to continue with negotiations. Persuaded by strong assurances of support from Truman and Acheson,

Dulles returned to Tokyo in mid-April to reassure the Japanese that no major

change in u.s. policy was contemplated and to inform them of the difficulties

posed by the Allies. 2H

The joint Chiefs remained strongly opposed to an immediate treaty.

Given the president's determination to move forward, they accepted early

signing of a treaty, but they wanted it to come into effect only later, certainly

not before U.S. garrison divisions were in place in Japan and the bilateral

security treaty and its implementing administrative agreement were operative.

They still disliked Dulles's draft treaty with Australia and New Zealand.

Sending the jCS views to Acheson, Marshall promised a final Defense position

later. An obviously angered Dulles cabled from Tokyo that any delay would be

"disastrous to u.s. prestige in Asia" and that, if Defense resisted, State should

appeal to Truman. Meeting with Dulles, EarlJohnson, the Joint Chiefs, and the

service secretaries on 25 April, Marshall tried to effect an accommodation; he

felt that the Korean situation could be stabilized so that some U.S. troops

could be returned to japan and that the United States should proceed with the

treaty. 29

Pushing hard for a settlement, State on 27 April initiated planning to take

over certain nonmilitary functions in japan currently handled by the occupation authorities. General Ridgway protested directly to Marshall, and the Joint

Chiefs objected that such planning would magnify security risks and diminish

U.S. military authority. 50 Although there was some feeling in OSD that the

Joint Chiefs might be overreacting, Marshall strongly urged Acheson not to

diminish Ridgway's authority in Japan, to confine planning to Americans and

U.S. government agencies in Washington, and to implement no plans until

after the end of Korean hostilities and further Department of Defense

consideration. 5 I Undoubtedly aware ofJCS sensibilities, Acheson acceded, at

least temporarily.' 52

A major problem in the spring of 1951 was getting consent to a

nonpunitive treaty from the wartime Allies, particularly the British, who still

wanted a "war guilt" clause, some reparations, and limits on Japanese

rearmament. The British also thought the Chinese Communists should

• In July 1951, with the peace treaty imminent, Acheson renewed the request and transfer

planning resumed.
194 THE TEST OF WAR

participate in the treaty and be given Formosa, while the Soviets should get

South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands.~~ A compromise Anglo-American

version of the treaty, readied in early May, appeared less benevolent than

Dulles's earlier draft. It provided for Japanese renunciation of all claims to

Formosa, as well as South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, but with no final

disposition of those islands. Neither Chinese government was to sign the

peace treaty; the Japanese were to decide later with which one to make peace

separately. The Allied right to reparations was recognized in principle, and

Japan was to negotiate compensation separately with the various countries.

The draft recognized Japan's "inherent right of individual or collective

self-defense. "~"'

Once the British accepted the treaty draft on 2 I June Acheson was

anxious to move ahead. But the Joint Chiefs, reiterating a number of previous

concerns, now held that the treaty should not come into force until U.S.

ratification was completed, clearly indicating, Marshall wrote Acheson, that

they objected to its "coming into force as between Japan and any of the Allied

powers until after the date of its ratification by the United States." Aware that

this meant giving the United States, in effect, "unlimited control over the

actions of its sovereign allies," Marshall suggested that the president decide

the matter. 35 While Marshall testified before a congressional committee on 29

June, Lovett reported to Truman that Marshall felt that State's advice on the

treaty should be "pretty nearly controlling." Since the current draft provided

that the treaty was not to come into effect until nine months after Japanese

ratification, Lovett reported that Marshall thought that Dulles had already

accomplished a great deal. The president ruled in favor of the treaty as it

stood. ~6

Still unhappy after reviewing the latest draft of the treaty, the Joint Chiefs

wrote Marshall that there was no assurance that the bilateral security treaty

would come into effect simultaneously; Lovett wrote State that he shared their

concern. On 20 July State circulated a semifinal Anglo-American treaty draft

and an invitation to a concluding conference to all states that had been at war

with Japan. Although there seemed to be little initial enthusiasm for the peace

treaty, even among the co-sponsoring British, only Burma, India, and Yugoslavia refused to attend the conference. Even the Soviet Union accepted. r

Security in the Pacific

The Japanese peace treaty was almost ready for signature, but much work

remained on the subsidiary security treaties and agreements. As drafted in

early February 1951 and revised in July, the security treaty gave the United
Japan 195

States the right to station land. sea, and air forces in and about Japan and

denied that right to any third power. The security treaty would come into

effect when ratified and would expire when the U.S. and Japanese governments felt that area peace had been adequately provided for otherwise. It also

called for a separate administrative agreement on stationing U.S. troops in

Japan. 3M

Despite previous coordination, the Joint Chiefs complained to Marshall

on 17 July that the proposed security treaty was inadequate in not providing

specifically for U.S. use ofJapan as a base for military operations whether or

not such operations were under UN aegis and in not granting permission for

UNC forces to support Korean operations through Japan as long as

necessary.3,) Marshall obtained Acheson's assurances that the peace treaty and

other security treaties would go into effect simultaneously. By 2 August the

two departments had agreed on the text, including some changes by the

Japanese. On 11 August Lovett formally accepted the language of the security

treaty and concurred in State's plan to publish it only just before the peace

conference. 4o

No State-Defense understanding existed, however, on the administrative

agreement that was the key to the U.S.-Japanese security treaty. The Pentagon,

in fact, was still studying a draft prepared in Tokyo in February 1951 and

acceptable to the Japanese. On 15 August State informed Marshall that the

Defense delay made it doubtful that an administrative agreement could be

signed by the time of the peace conference in early September. 41 The Joint

Chiefs wanted a complete revision of the document, insisting that it be signed

concurrently with the peace and security treaties; that it give the United States

the unilateral right to appoint a U.S. supreme commander over all U.S. and

Japanese forces in the event of an emergency; and that Japan grant the United

States exclusive criminal jurisdiction over all U.S. troops, civilian employees,

and dependents remaining in Japan. 42

In OSD, Assistant Secretary Daniel Edwards advised Lovett against

supporting a demand that carried the "flavor of that extraterritoriality which

is so obnoxious to oriental peoples" and would preclude Japan's return to full

sovereignty. Lovett sent the JCS views to State as an expression of the purely

military point of view, with the idea of working out adjustments. State

officials, however, found the JCS recommendations utterly unacceptable

because they demeaned Japan and betokened a military philosophy that

would make it impossible to carry out U.S. "diplomatic policy toward Japan,

to say nothing of the rest of the Far East." Such fundamental differences could

not be readily reconciled, and the two departments remained at odds over the

U.S.-Japanese administrative agreement. 4 :

1

Concerning the trilateral ANZUS security treaty, the Joint Chiefs opposed
196 THE TEST OF WAR

anything that suggested combined military planning, especially a proposed

Pacific council that might ally itself with other regional organizations such as

NATO and involve the United States in endless interregional planning. They

therefore wanted to require unanimous consent by all ANZUS treaty parties

before other Pacific nations could be invited to join-a view in direct conflict

with that of the Australians, who preferred broad arrangements with European states having Pacific interests and other international security groups.

Eventually, after meeting with Defense representatives, Dulles agreed to

demote the Pacific Council to a simple "council" to consider "matters

concerning the implementation of this treaty" and limited the consultative

relationship to Pacific countries. Acheson later claimed that these concessions

were "a consolation prize" given the Joint Chiefs for losing the fight to delay

the peace treaty. In August 195 I the ANZUS treaty was finally ready for

signature. ci,

As for a security pact with the Philippines, the Joint Chiefs recommended

against a formal treaty since the United States had already guaranteed that

country's security and defense, stationed U.S. armed forces there, and

provided military aid. However, a month before the scheduled Japanese peace

conference, the Philippine government, distressed at the lack of American

support for its $8 billion reparations claim against the Japanese, strongly

protested U.S. "discriminations." Acheson then proposed to Marshall a

separate security treaty with no provision for bilateral military consultations

and leaving undisturbed the "particularly advantageous" U.S. military

arrangements. i5 The service secretaries wanted "positive assurance" that the

Filipinos would sign the Japanese peace treaty, but the Joint Chiefs offered no

major objections. Dulles soon found, however, that the Philippine government wanted the same kind of formal consultation that had been accorded the

Australians. Although State inserted a new provision to this effect in the treaty,

Acheson assured Lovett that it was devised to avoid setting up a council similar

to that in the ANZUS treaty. Seeing "no objection . . . from a military point

of view," General Bradley decided not to convene the JCS to consider the

matter.'('

Differing views between State and Defense on the meaning and intent of

the three mutual security pacts surfaced again in August in reaction to some

remarks Dulles drafted for presentation by Truman at the forthcoming San

Francisco peace conference. Dulles's emphasis that security in the Pacific had

been put on a collective basis aroused General Bradley's fear that the "United

States could become so entangled in collective security as to limit its freedom

of action." The military wanted the right to act in the Pacific area without

formal multilateral consultations, and they wanted the president's speech to

accord with their view that there was "no present authorization for suggesting
japan 197

a form of Pacific NATO. ",... In a speech at San Francisco, Truman described the

three security treaties as "regional arrangements for the common defense

against aggression" and "initial steps toward the consolidation of peace in the

Pacific," but he did not suggest creating in the Pacific the complex structure

of multinational bodies and joint planning that characterized NATO. 48

The Pacific security treaties did not guarantee that the United States

would automatically go to war in the event another signatory was attacked,

since they provided only that each party would act to meet the common

danger "in accordance with its Constitutional processes." Nonetheless, as

Frank Nash told Lovett, there was a feeling that the United States was "setting

forth a new program of security in its broadest sense for the free nations of

Asia and the Pacific." The security treaties would ensure against any future

aggression from within the treaty area, assuage fears of a rearmed japan, and

provide for the use of force in the common interest to repel external

aggression. With the Philippine-United States Mutual Defense Treaty signed in

Washington on 30 August 1951 and the ANZUS Treaty signed on 1 September

in San Francisco, the stage was set for the Japanese peace conference. 49

The San Francisco conference opened on 4 September, with more than 50

nations in attendance, to consider a peace treaty that had grown to 21 pages

from the original 8-page Dulles draft. Proposing rigorous procedural rules that

would allow no alteration of the treaty's text, Acheson and Dulles planned to

forestall any Soviet moves for a "wrecking" operation. Once the conference

adopted the rules, there was little the Soviet bloc could do; the Soviet, Polish,

and Czechoslovakian delegates walked out. On 8 September, 49 countries

signed the treaty; later that same day the United States and japan signed their

bilateral mutual security pact. 50

Although Marshall, about to retire, had played a major role in bringing

about Defense acceptance of a Japanese treaty while the Korean War was still

going on, neither he nor Lovett attended the conference. Instead, Nash

represented the Defense Department. Marshall passed on to military officials

Acheson's warning just before the conference began that U.S. defense agencies

should be alert to the "increased risks." When Acheson, surprised by the

Soviets' lack of aggressiveness at San Francisco, suggested that they might be

preparing for a "large scale offensive in Korea," Marshall warned Bradley that

the Joint Chiefs should give the matter "very serious consideration. ,,51

Post-Treaty Problems and Policy

Marshall's successor, Lovett, well understood that the signing of the peace

treaty and the Pacific security pacts did not complete the work required for
198 THE TEST OF WAR

the transformation from U.S. occupation to Japanese sovereignty. Many

matters in which Defense had a strong interest still had to be settled-Japan's

choice in recognizing a Chinese government, completion of the U.S.-japanese

administrative agreement, ratification of the peace and security treaties, and

the treatment to be accorded japan before the peace treaty came into force. On

all of these questions there were fundamental differences between State and

the jCS. In addition, the attitude of the Japanese constituted a key new

element in the evolving relationship. 52

Although the japanese ostensibly were free to choose which Chinese

government to recognize, the Joint Chiefs opposed Japanese rapprochement

with Communist China, for which there appeared to be support in japan,

Fifty-six U.S. senators advised Truman in mid-September that the "wrong"

japanese decision would damage the peace treaty's chances of U.S. ratification. The British favored japanese recognition of Communist China, and

when Yoshida appeared to waver, the United States promptly applied diplomatic pressure. 5.' In November 1951 the Japanese opened a Government

Overseas Agency on Formosa, the highest form of diplomatic recognition

available to them at that time. The next month Yoshida assured the United

States thatJapan would establish normal relations with the Nationalist Chinese

as soon as the peace treaty was ratified.• 5.

Earlier, in October, the Japanese began to demonstrate their post-treaty

independence quite clearly, when Yoshida indicated that he wanted U.S.

military authorities to release many requisitioned buildings, and in particular

to move General Ridgway's Tokyo headquarters from the prestigious Dai Ichi

building, across from the Imperial Palace. When a State Department spokesman in Japan publicly affirmed that the building would be returned to the

Japanese after the occupation ended, the matter became an issue between

State and Defense. 55 After Ridgway protested strongly that the change would

weaken his position, Bradley took the issue directly to Lovett and Defense

notified State on 23 November that, insofar as it was concerned, the Dai Ichi

question had most definitely not been decided. 5(,

After San Francisco, Defense regarded as a pressing objective the conclusion of an administrative agreement implementing the terms of the U.S.-

Japanese mutual security treaty. Dulles rejected a jCS-revised text as "unsatisfactory" because it treated the japanese "as defeated enemies and as orientals

having qualities inferior to those of occidentals." State and the jCS remained

at loggerheads over the issue of exclusive U.S. criminal jurisdiction. 5

: Finally,

• The Japanese and Nationalist Chinese governments signed a bilateral peace treaty at Taipei,

Formosa, on 28 April 19';2, a few hours before Japan regained sovereignty under the San

Francisco treaty.
Japan 199

in mid-January 1952 Truman approved negotiation of the administrative

agreement as an executive agreement, accepted a current draft as an initial U.S.

position, and ruled against any U.S. discrimination between European and

Japanese governments on the matter of criminal jurisdiction. Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk began negotiations with the Japanese on 29 January. 58

State planned to solve the problem of criminal jurisdiction by applying

the NATO formula to Japan. Lovett, however, argued that this meant using a

procedure not yet ratified by the United States; moreover, it would give Japan

more power over U.S. forces than that exercised by some European allies.

Indeed, with conditions varying widely from country to country in Europe,

there was no clear NATO precedent. State and Defense finally agreed that the

United States should have exclusive criminal jurisdiction in Japan until

ratification of the NATO accord or the lapse of one year after the signing of the

administrative agreement. After either of these events the Japanese could

request reconsideration. Pleased with the idea of parity with NATO, the

Japanese eventually accepted this formula. 59

Lovett supported the JCS position that Ridgway as CINCFE should have

sufficient authority to carry out his operational duties in the event of an

emergency. The January 1952 State-Defense draft prOVided, at JCS insistence,

that if hostilities occurred or threatened, the United States would establish a

combined U.S.-Japanese command and designate its commander.60 Japanese

resistance to such an explicit arrangement eventually resulted in a statement

calling for the two governments merely to consult on what to do. Once again

the two countries postponed detailed planning for a collective security

arrangement; they signed the administrative agreement on 28 February.61

Defense welcomed completion of the administrative agreement since the

Senate already was considering the peace and security treaties, ratified by the

Japanese in November 1951. On 20 March 1952 the Senate approved both of

these treaties, and in April it confirmed as u.s. ambassador Robert Murphy, a

man known for his ability to deal with both diplomatic and military issues.

When the peace treaty, the mutual security treaty, and the administrative

agreement with Japan went into effect on 28 April the u.s. occupation ended.

Soon even its most noticeable symbol disappeared when General Mark Clark,

who replaced Ridgway in May, decided to leave the Dai !chi building and

move to new quarters at Pershing Heights. When the building reverted inJune,

Yoshida's "Japanese man in [the] street" could appreciate the symbolic

change. 62

u.s. policy had to adjust to the new relationship with Japan. In midFebruary 1952 Lovett had agreed with the State Department to send to the

president a State draft for interim policy gUidance. Contending that Japan was

of "such vital strategic importance" to the United States that hostile forces
200 THE TEST OF WAR

should not be permitted to control any part of its territory, the study, which

became NSC 125, called for Japan's "voluntary and strong commitment" to

joint action with the United States and the free world. 6 :\ Defense, however,

wanted NSC 125 to specify that Japan should maintain a complete embargo on

exports to the Chinese mainland; State believed that trade controls could be

limited to strategic materials.(H In August Lovett agreed that Japan should

embargo all u.S.-controlled items as long as the Korean War continued, but

that multilateral pacts would determine export controls thereafter. The NSC

immediately adopted the paper, and the president gave his formal approval to

NSC 125/2 on 7 August 1952.('~

Declaring that the United States "would fight to prevent hostile forces

from gaining control of any part" ofJapanese territory, NSC 125/2 sought a

Japan capable of its own defense, contributing to area security, and acting as

an industrial source of supply for the free world-a U.S. ally, a partner in all

Pacific security and economic arrangements, and a UN member. The United

States would assist Japan to develop its military industrial capacity and to

create a military force able to defend against external aggression and participate in Pacific area defense. Meanwhile, sufficient U.S. forces were to be

maintained in and around Japan so that, combined with Japanese forces, they

could defend the country According to this final Truman administration

statement of policy on Japan, the United States would continue to base in that

country the forces needed for the Korean War.(,()

NSC 125/2 did little to resolve the problem of the Ryukyu, Bonin, and

other islands, for which, according to the Japanese peace treaty, the United

States could propose a UN trusteeship, meanwhile possessing full right to

exercise the power of administration over each territory and its inhabitants.

The administrative agreement continued to reserve U.S. rights. In formulating

NSC 125/2, State had wanted the United States to make a goodwill gesture to

Japan by returning the islands and obtaining necessary military rights by an

agreement. Lovett, on the other hand, had supported the JCS position to leave

the islands' status unchanged. NSC 125/2 reconciled the two positions by

stating that the United States would pursue "long-term military requirements"

in accordance with later State-Defense recommendations. The issue was not

to be resolved for many years. The Japanese, with strong ties to the islands,

were openly hostile to the arrangement. 6 -

A Start on Rearmament

From the Defense viewpoint, the paramount post-treaty question concerned Japanese rearmament, and Yoshida himself considered it unthinkable
japan 201

to leave the country "sovereign and naked.,,6H On 8 july 1950, with U.S.

occupation divisions leaving for combat in Korea, MacArthur had authorized

the japanese government to establish a japanese National Police Reserve

ONPR) of 75 ,000 men. Activated a month later and consisting of four army-like

divisions equipped with light weapons, the jNPR constituted the only real

japanese security force. The national government controlled it directly, and,

despite a generally negative public reaction, the jNPR did not lack applicants.

The country had no air force, and the japanese Maritime Safety Board

operated only a small coast guard, whose sole armament consisted of the

individual crew members' side arms. 69

After the Chinese intervened in Korea in late 1950, MacArthur proposed

to equip the four jNPR divisions with heavy arms equivalent to those of the

U.S. Army. The joint Chiefs concurred and further recommended that the U.S.

Army equip six additional jNPR divisions in FY 1952. In OSD, Burns pOinted

out the dilemma-giving heavy weapons to the jNPR clearly contravened

Allied occupation policy, but the japanese right of self-defense seemed "basic

and inalienable." He eventually recommended the jCS position to Marshall,

who agreed and asked Acheson's views in February 1951. Fearing that

unilateral U.S. rearmament ofJapan would forfeit international support for the

japanese peace treaty, alienate the japanese, and provide a possible pretext for

Soviet intervention, State suggested stockpiling the necessary military equipment in japan until after the peace treaty. Marshall and the jCS agreed to the

proposal, and Truman approved on 3 May.70

The Army now had the authority to stockpile equipment in japan for the

four existing JNPR divisions but not to release it to them without State or

"highest government level" approval. Defense was also to plan and budget for,

but not to stockpile, equipment for an extra sixjNPR divisions. 7l After the San

Francisco conference in September, and with Japanese security apparently

threatened by increased tension in the Far East, Lovett supported the jCS

desire to allow Ridgway discretionary power to release the stockpiled

equipment. State objected to the proposal because the peace treaty had not yet

been ratified; it suggested keeping the equipment at U.S. bases, where

japanese personnel could train. 72 U.S. allies agreed to this plan, and Acting

Secretary Foster told the Joint Chiefs on 5 December that they might quietly

initiate jNPR training in heavy weapons.7.'>

Viewing world conditions as extremely critical, the jCS advised Lovett

that japanese rearmament should be based on little expectation of warning

before an attack on Japan. japanese security would be the "overriding

mission" of U.S. forces in the Far East, while Japanese forces would cooperate,

support UN policies and actions, help defend the country from external

aggression, maintain internal security, and assume more responsibility for
202 THE TEST OF WAR

their own defense. To support this larger military role, the JCS recommended

the expansion of the JNPR into a 10-division force with a strength of 300,000

and the creation of a small navy and air force. u.s. military assistance would

begin in FY 1954. The Joint Chiefs proposed establishment also of a central,

cabinet-level Japanese defense agency under civilian control. 74

The current plan to provide the JNPR with U.S. equipment called for

fairly large Defense expenditures. Army funds provided slightly over $228

million for the Japanese stockpile in fiscal years 1951 and 1952 and military

assistance appropriations were to be used in FY 1954, but there was a gap in

FY 1953. With Ridgway strongly in favor of the program, Lovett in December

1951 approved the inclusion of $300 million additional for the Japanese

program in the Army's FY 1953 budget.~~ By the time the peace treaty came

into force in April 1952, the United States had turned over to the JNPR light

equipment from the stockpile worth more than $350 million.~6 In July

General Clark asked for authority to give heavy weapons to the police reserve,

but Japan was by this time a sovereign nation and there was no statutory basis

for authorizing the transfer. Truman did, however, approve a JCS proposal

that as commander in chief he should authorize the loan of heavy equipment

to the Japanese without financial responsibility for loss or damage, and its

release began in August 1952.~H

By mid-1952 the JNPR still consisted of approximately 75,000 men,

organized into four lightly armed divisions that Clark considered capable of

operating only at battalion level. As Lovett reported to Truman, Defense hoped

to extend the force to 110,000 men by 1953, to 6 divisions by 1954, and to 10

divisions by 1956.79 The Joint Chiefs claimed in July 1952 that they attached

the highest importance to helping Japan redress the Far Eastern military

imbalance and relieve U.S. forces. In August NSC 125/2 viewed the Japanese

development of a "balanced, 1O-division ground force and appropriate air and

naval arms" as a first step.HO Japan had already agreed to increase JNPR

strength to 110,000 men and to accept U.S. heavy military equipment, but

actual strength did not approach 100,000 until the following spring. HI

In August 1952 the Japanese met another U.S. military objective by

creating a new agency, the Security Board, * which operated directly under

the Japanese cabinet. The board, limited to maintaining peace and order in

the country and protecting lives and property, directed the JNPR, renamed the

Hoantai or Security Force, and a small sea armH2

The Keibitai or Maritime Security Force shared the same mission as the

ground forces and included the vessels that had formerly operated under

* In this volume. Japanese military agem:ies han' heen referred to hy the names given them hy

Prime Minister Yoshida in his memoirs.
Japan 203

the old Maritime Safety Board. Marshall and the Joint Chiefs had long wanted

to arm the Japanese coastal patrol boats, and in late August 1951 Truman had

agreed with Marshall that a Japanese-manned, American-officered, coast

guard-type organization operating in waters contiguous to the Japanese

islands would offer no valid basis for a charge that Japanese naval power was

being revived. H5 When the peace treaty became effective in April 1952,

Yoshida himself pointed out that there were only 45 patrol boats to guard a

9,000-mile coastline and requested the loan of U.S. vessels. To provide a legal

framework, Congress passed a special law in July, and in November 1952 the

two governments signed an agreement providing for the loan of 18 frigates

and 50 landing ships. The actual transfer, however, did not occur until the

spring of 1953.H4

No Japanese air force came into existence during Lovett's tenure, although

the JCS in December 1951 had called for an initial air force of 2 squadrons,

eventually growing to 27. General Clark had also wanted a Japanese air force,

defensive in nature and closely integrated with the Far East Air Forces, to

counter Communist air power, which he considered the greatest single threat

to Japanese security.Hs Indeed, Soviet overflights of Japanese territory were

increasing in occurrence and apparent seriousness. Between 28 September

and 25 October 1952 there were 14 Soviet overflights by jet-type aircraft, 2 of

them deep penetrations. Clark lacked Japanese-based aircraft capable of

engaging the Soviet planes. H6 On 30 October the Joint Chiefs recommended

inclusion of equipment for 27 Japanese squadrons in the FY 1954 military

assistance program, but not until March 1953 did they tell Clark that they felt

the nucleus for an air force should be established and discussions with the

Japanese government should proceed. H7

Although the effort to rearm Japan seemed slow to many Americans,

some Japanese felt the United States was pushing too hard. With vivid

memories of World War II, they feared that rearmament would create

economic burdens, reestablish a military caste, and still be insufficient to cope

with a real Soviet threat. Viewing large-scale rearmament as "completely out

of the question" and willing to move only very gradually, Yoshida appeared

"wobbly" to the Americans. HH On the other hand, the Japanese saw the

Americans as part of the problem, proViding inadequate information on U.S.

policies and objectives and lacking the spirit of genuine mutuality. Yoshida's

political opponents taunted him with the charge that rearmament would make

the Japanese the "tools of American imperialism and aggression. ,,89

Despite this negative aspect, U.S.-Japanese relations seemed vastly improved by January 1953 when Lovett stepped down as secretary of defense.

The Korean War, then 31 months along, had hastened the end of the

occupation and the restoration ofJapan's sovereign status, also bringing to the
204 THE TEST OF WAR

country some measure of economic prosperity. U.S. security treaties with

Japan, Australia and New Zealand. and the Philippines provided a basis for

collective security in the Pacific area. By subordinating JCS reservations and

fears to the political realities of the day. Marshall and Lovett had been

instrumental in effecting these changes. There was still much to be done

before Japan could become the strong, peaceful, and democratic country that

was the U.S. goal. but it was now mainly up to the Japanese themselves to find

the way The United States hoped that the Japanese would increasingly assume

their own self-defense and be able to aid in the defense of the Pacific area.

Lovett obviously felt that a start had been made. reminding the Japanese

ambassador in late August 1952 that U.S. forces in Japan plus the JNPR

divisions would make an attack on Japan "expensive if not foolhardy...')0 In

any event, between September 1950 and January 1953, Marshall and Lovett.

accepting and orchestrating rather than initiating changes, had helped to

create a revolution in Japanese-American relations and set a new course for

the future.
CHAPTER XI

Indochina: The Threat in

Southeast Asia

just as the outbreak of the Korean War changed u.s. policy on Formosa

and facilitated a peace treaty with japan, it also affected u.s. policy on

Indochina, where the French were in the fourth year of a bitter struggle

against the Communist Viet Minh movement led by Ho Chi Minh and

supported by Communist China. Although the French in early 1950 granted

Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam a measure of independent status as Associated

States of the French Union, most of the Indochinese people believed the

French intended to retain control over their entire country, and few in

Vietnam supported the French wholeheartedly in the ongoing battle to save

the northern Vietnamese area of Tonkin from the Viet Minh.

The United States viewed Indochina as the "most strategically important

area" of Southeast Asia and "subject to the most immediate danger." Arguments advanced in support of these assumptions, which quickly became

generally accepted as conclusions, centered about the need to contain the

advance of communism in Asia by the Chinese and the Russians. Indochina

constituted an indispensable part of the line of containment against communism in the Pacific that stretched from japan through Formosa and the

Philippines. It was the strategic key to Southeast Asia, where Thailand,

Malaya, Burma, and Indonesia would be ripe targets for Communist expansion

if the Viet Minh triumphed. This chain reaction, according to the "domino

theory," could have a powerful psychological impact on India, Pakistan, and

the Philippines, adversely affecting U.S. security interests in those areas. And

finally, Indochina had great strategic and economic importance because of its

location astride one of the great sea crossroads of the world. I

Both the State and Defense departments fully understood that political

and racial factors complicated the French role in Indochina and had to be

205
SEA

•

INDIAN OCEAN

CHINA

Kwangsi Province

Southeast Asia-1950

Amoy. lPue:oOuRMOSA

ISLAND

HONG KONG •..

PESCADORE ISLANDS

N

i
Indochina 207

taken into account in formulating U.S. policy. These factors derived largely

from the colonialism whose demise in Asia and Africa the United States had

been encouraging since the end of World War II. The Indochinese people

wanted independence and an end to French domination. These nationalist,

racial, and colonial elements had to be given heavy weight in any calculations

of U.S. policy toward Indochina. It followed logically that the United States,

while supporting the French in the struggle against the Viet Minh, would favor

independence for the Indochinese states, eventual French withdrawal, and

establishment of effective local defenses against Viet Minh aggression.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with State's assessment of the strategic

importance of the Southeast Asian mainland to the United States and that

Indochina's fall would undoubtedly lead to the fall of neighboring countries.

They recommended quick implementation of military aid programs for the

area but urged, in view of the earlier U.S. experience with the Chinese

Nationalists, that aid be carefully controlled and integrated with political and

economic programs. Because the French military needs were acute, the JCS

proposed sending interim assistance to Indochina and establishing a small U.S.

military aid group there immediately.2 These views and those of the State

Department came under consideration by the NSC in the spring of 1950.

Approving Southeast Asia policy in NSC 64 on 24 April 1950, President

Truman directed State and Defense to prepare a program to protect U.S.

security interests in Indochina.

The Joint Chiefs soon urged an even more forceful U.S. position,

including U.S. assumption of Western leadership in helping the Southeast Asia

area, and they again affirmed the pressing need for early U.S. military aid to

Indochina. Only a few steps were taken toward implementing NSC 64,

however, before the Korean War started.... Despite recommendation for a

$ 23.5 million economic program and a $ 17 million military assistance

program, the president in May 1950 authorized only $750,000 in economic

and $10 million in military assistance. First deliveries began in June 1950.s

Effect of the Korean War

The Korean War had immediate impact on U.S. assistance to Indochina.

On 27 June 1950 Truman announced acceleration of military aid to the area

and allocated an additional $ 5 million. On 8 July he raised the total amount to

$ 31 million. The U.S. program was to supplement rather than replace French

assistance, help the three Associated States achieve internal security, and

strengthen the French Union Army's resistance to Communist subversion and

aggression. Acknowledging that future events, in Korea or elsewhere, might
208 THE TEST OF WAR

make it necessary to divert U.S. aid from Indochina, Secretary of State Acheson

declared that the United States would meanwhile give the "strongest support

possible." A U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) under Brig. Gen.

Francis G. Brink began arriving in Saigon in late July.6

U.S. officials also took a sharper look at the activities of the Chinese

Communists, who began a major program in April 1950 to equip and train the

Viet Minh and appeared ready to intervene openly. Early in July the Joint

Chiefs suggested that, if the PRC gave overt military assistance to the Viet

Minh, the United States should increase its military aid to the French, consider

providing air and naval assistance, and ask the United Nations to make forces

available to resist the Chinese aggression. A joint State-Defense survey

mission. headed by John F. Melby of the State Department and including a

military group under Maj. Gen. Graves B. Erskine (USMC). recommended on

6 August an increase in U.S. military assistance. citing the threat of the Chinese

Communists and the Viet Minh and the apparent inability of the French to

control the situation. Donald R. Heath, who became minister to Vietnam,

Laos. and Cambodia in late June. strongly supported the recommendation of

the survey mission.

By mid-August 1950 the situation had grown increasingly serious, and

State considered possible political concessions by the French, including a date

for independence of the Associated States. that might gain the "spontaneous

cooperation" of the Indochinese peoples. H Nonetheless, Indochina was still

viewed as primarily a French problem. NSC 73/4. approved by Truman on 24

August,' recommended, in the event of an overt Chinese attack in Indochina,

that the United States join with the British in supporting France and the

Associated States and accelerate and increase U.S. military assistance, but avoid

a general war with the Chinese.')

Although U.S. plans called for a total of $133 million for Indochina in the

regular and first supplemental FY 1951 military assistance appropriations, the

Joint Chiefs noted that U.S. aid would increase the military capabilities of the

French Union Forces but would not enable them to defeat the Viet Minh.

Alarmed that a French loss could jeopardize the U.S. military position in Asia,

the JCS recommended taking bolder political measures and expediting additional military aid. Moreover, the French should plan for operations acceptable to the United States and within U.S. aid capabilities, form separate

national armies in the Associated States. and hold military talks with British

and U.S. commanders in the Far East regarding coordination of operations.

The JCS also wanted the French informed that under existing circumstances

no U.S. armed forces would be committed in Indochina. III Concurring

• See Chapter III
Indochina 209

"generally," Defense Secretary Johnson forwarded the JCS views to Acheson.

In early September Acheson warned the French of limits on U.S. military

assistance and of the need for a coordinated plan; he proposed tripartite

military talks. II

In September and October the French suffered serious reverses along the

Chinese border. Lacking manpower, leadership, and adequate military intelligence, they were overextended and unable to counterattack, reinforcing doubt

about their ability to remain in the northern area. Claiming that they could no

longer meet their military commitments to both NATO and Indochina, the

French told the Americans of their need for more U.S. military equipmentbut no U.S. divisions "for the moment.,,12

With some Pentagon officials worried that the French might "quit cold,"

the Americans sought to keep the French and Indochinese forces viable long

enough to allow them to catch up with the Viet Minh in strength. U During

conversations in Washington in October, Defense Secretary Marshall told

French Defense Minister Jules Moch that Indochina would have top priority

on all military assistance shipments, and in fact a priority equal to that for

Formosa was granted on 23 October. Over JCS opposition and even at the

"expense of the Korean pipeline," Marshall decided to send 30 much-wanted

B-26 aircraft. 14 The JCS received approval for a FY 1951 military assistance

program of $133 million for the French and the Associated States on 23

October, and shipments began almost immediately. The United States also

indicated willingness to make funds available to increase military production

in France. By the end of January 1951 about $50 million in U.S. military

equipment had been shipped to Indochina, and some Americans considered

the aid as possibly decisive in enabling the French to hold on. 15

Seeking a greater voice in the employment of its military assistance in

Indochina, the United States became steadily more involved in Vietnam. State

and Defense agreed that the French should signal the waning of colonialism in

Indochina by making political and economic concessions and creating national armies. 16 The trend toward greater U.S. involvement was such thatJohn

Ohly, the State Department's deputy director of military assistance, wrote

Acheson that the United States seemed to be supplanting the French in

Indochina and that failures were beginning to be attributed to the Americans.

Not only might the United States be "on the road to being a scapegoat," but he

felt it was dangerously close to direct intervention. 17

Shortly after the Chinese Communists attacked in Korea in late November

1950, the Joint Chiefs recommended to Marshall that for the long term the

United States should try to establish conditions in Indochina requiring no

foreign armed forces, press the French to provide eventual self-government

"either within or outside of the French Union," support UN membership for
210 THE TEST OF WAR

the Associated States, and encourage a regional security arrangement for

Southeast Asia. For the short term, the United States should ensure that the

French retained primary responsibility in Indochina. U.S. military assistance

was to be limited to logistical support and tied to an "overall military plan

prepared by the French, concurred in by the Associated States of Indochina,

and acceptable to the United States." Further increases in military assistance

were to depend on French moves to create greater popular support. IH

If the Chinese Communists should attack in Indochina, the ]CS recommended that the United States support France and the Associated States by all

means short of using American military forces or becoming involved in a

general war with Peking. If the French appeared ready to abandon the war in

Indochina, the United States would have to reconsider its policy. Some U.S.

officials doubted, however, that the United States would intervene militarily

even in that event. On 20 December Marshall sent the JCS paper to the

National Security Council, which considered it later during work on NSC

124. 1')

Moves to Stem the Tide

The French were willing to grant greater independence to the Indochinese states as long as they remained within the framework of the French

Union. In November 1950 the French increased the Associated States' responsibilities while continuing financial aid. They retained their base rights in

Indochina, continued to maintain a number of their own administrators, and

restricted the three states' freedom in foreign affairs. Even the French

agreement to establish in 1951 a national Vietnamese army under the supreme

command of Emperor Bao Dai seemed suspect to the Vietnamese since it

would be responsible to the French High Command. The French also

increased their 1951 budget for Indochina and considered sending more

troops from home. 20

Hoping to achieve greater cohesion and unity, the French on 7 December

1950 named Gener.d Jean de Lattre de Tassigny to two posts-commander in

chief of the French Union Forces and high commissioner in Indochina.

Despite French concessions, Asians still saw Indochina as under tight French

control. Bao Dai was not an effective ruler, there were rivalries within his

government, and some friction between it and de Lattre. 21 Finding a local

leader around whom public support would rally proved extremely difficult.

Almost despairingly, U.S. Minister Heath told Washington in early 1951 that

the enemy leader, Ho Chi Minh, was the "only Viet who enjoys any measure

of national prestige. ,,22

Both French and Indochinese officials felt that U.S. aid held the key to
Indochina 211

containment of the Viet Minh ..When he visited Washington in late January

1951, French Premier Rene Pleven proposed to Truman, Acheson, and Marshall

that permanent procedures be established for coordination and cooperation in

the Far East among the United States, Britain, and France. Before responding

to de Lattre's current demands for French reinforcements, the French government needed to know what the United States could supply. Plans for a fourdivision Indochinese national army were dependent on u.s. funding of about

$70 million, almost half the cost. The French wanted to obtain the use of a U.S.

aircraft carrier and asked whether the United States would send men and

materiel to help them to fight, or, if the Chinese attacked, to get out of Indochina. Truman told Pleven that, "barring unforeseen developments," the

United States would expedite deliveries on currently planned aid programs.

Marshall ruled out a new carrier, but he promised that restrictions limiting use

ofthe Langley (recently transferred to France) to the Mediterranean area would

be lifted, allowing its employment in Asian waters. Truman refused to provide

an additional $70 million for the national army and said that no U.S. forces

would be committed to Indochina, but he declared that the United States

would, if possible, assist in evacuating the French if the Chinese invaded. l :

1

Meanwhile, U.S. military assistance programs for Indochina mushroomed, reaching more than $210 million for FY 1951 by the end of March

1951, with plans for a $170 million program in FY 1952. Having given

Indochina priority over all other military assistance countries at the end of

1950, the United States had shipped or was ready to load by 31 March 1951

more than $79 million in equipment. In March the French government

decided to send de Lattre the troops he requested. But the Viet Minh, having

developed large-size regular military units and relying on strong Chinese

logistical support, presented a growing military threat that the French feared

they might not be able to contain even with reinforcements. 24

Preparing in May for military talks with the British and French later in the

month in Singapore, the JCS thought that, despite U.S. aid, the Viet Minh

would conquer most of Tonkin if Chinese logistical aid continued and French

strength was not augmented further. They suggested accelerating U.S. military

assistance deliveries, helping to train the national armies, and planning for

emergency evacuation aid, but again underlined the primary French responsibility in Indochina. Approved by the president on 17 May, NSC 48/5

reemphasized U.S. determination not to commit troops to Indochina but to

provide military assistance, encourage internal autonomy and social and

economic reforms, and promote international support for the Associated

States. The Singapore talks developed no concrete tripartite arrangements for

operations in Indochina. IfTonkin was the key to Southeast Asian security, the

French alone remained responsible for its defense. 2 ;
212 ·THE TEST Of WAR

The administration of U.S. economic aid in Indochina in this period

further complicated Franco-American relations. The Economic Cooperation

Administration (ECA). which managed this effort to strengthen the fragile

Indochinese governments, bypassed the French and dealt directly with the

Associated States. The French resented the publicity for American programs

and disregard of their own efforts. Objecting specifically to large-scale U.S.

classes in the English language and the size of the U.S. mission in Saigon, the

French feared Indochina might become a U.S. zone of int1uence. Heath

reported that these views, held by a majority of French civil officials, and

probably by de Lattre also, were potentially harmful to future efforts. Heath

told Washington in mid-June 1951 that the general remained determined to let

nothing "interfere with his formula for Franco-Vietnamese solidarity" or

Vietnam's retention in the French Union. 2('

By the end of June Heath himself pointedly reiterated that U.S. policy

should still be to "supplement but not to supplant" the French in Indochina.

Noting that only French arms and resources were keeping Indochina from

collapsing, Heath made a number of suggestions for improving FrancoAmerican relations. He was instructed to reassure de Lattre and did so with

apparently good results. 27 The Truman administration considered this an

opportune time for the general to visit the United States, an invitation he had

long sought. When de Lattre came to Washington in September, he emphasized that. rather than limiting Indochinese independence, as many Americans

seemed to assume, the French were trying hard to promote the independence

of the Associated States, at huge expense spending a billion dollars a year for

a war in which French losses already amounted to 9H,000 men, including

30,000 killed. 2H

Pointing out that the same Vietnamese who made a "Grade A parachutist

in the governmental forces would make a fanatical communist guerrilla if Ho

Chi Minh had reached him first," de Lattre hoped for increased and speedier

deliveries of promised U.S. military equipment. Conferring with Lovett on 20

September, de Lattre emphasized Indochina's importance in the fight to save

Asia from communism and the U.S. responsibility to supply Indochina as well

as Korea: "I am your man just as General Ridgway is your own man. Your own

spirit should lead you to send me these things without my asking." Assuring

de Lattre that the United States regarded him as a "comrade in arms," Lovett

pushed the military services to accommodate French requests and got their

promise to ship most of the critical items by the end of the year. Although de

Lattre later upset the State Department by publicly claiming that his visit had

changed U.S. policy toward Indochina, his major success lay in getting the

Pentagon to try to accelerate already programmed aid. 29

In Vietnam the situation seemed to be getting worse at the end of 1951.
Indochina 213

Under Bao Dai and Prime Minister Tan Van Huu the Vietnamese government

remained internally divided, unrepresentative of most Vietnamese, and unable

to attract new leaders. W In October 1951 the Viet Minh attacked in the

northwest, weathered a counterattack, pinned French forces down at Hoa

Binh, and reinfiltrated the recently cleared Tonkin Delta area. The French

public, for its part, keenly resented the costs and casualties sustained in

Indochina. In December Ambassador David Bruce cabled from Paris that the

French might greet a proposal to quit Indochina "with a sense of emotional

relief. ,,51 By this time too, General de Lattre, sick and reportedly despairing of

victory, had left Indochina, a loss that to Americans had appalling political

and military implications. 52

De Lattre dkd in January 1952, and in AprilJean Letourneau became high

commissioner while simultaneously continuing in Paris as minister of state in

charge of relations with the Associated States. The new military commander,

General Raoul Salan, believed the French could hold out provided the Chinese

did not enter in force. In February the French skillfully retreated from Hoa

Binh but were humiliated by their failure to hold the base after high-cost

battles. 55

In the face of continuing setbacks, the French in December 1951

requested immediate military conversations with the British and Americans

on concerted action to be taken if the Chinese entered Indochina in force.

Agreeing to the meeting, the JCS recommended to Lovett that in the event of

overt or major "volunteer" Chinese intervention the United Nations should

act and the United States should consider air or naval action but commit no

ground forces. In the event of either UN or U.S. action, operations might have

to include an air and naval blockade of the China coast, concurrent action

against selected Chinese targets, and the use of Chinese Nationalist forces. 5 I

With representatives of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand present as

observers at the Washington tripartite meeting in January 1952, the French,

British, and American delegates recommended that their governments warn

Peking that any aggression in Southeast Asia would bring three-power

retaliation not necessarily confined to the area of aggression. Unable to agree

on specific retaliatory steps, they turned the question over to a five-power ad

hoc committee including the Australians and New Zealanders. The talks left

the French without any firm assurances as to what would be done if the

Chinese entered Indochina before issuance of a warning. 55

The ad hoc committee's deliberations were also inconclusive. The British

believed that a coastal blockade of China or attacks on mainland military

targets would invite Chinese Communist action against Hong Kong, while the

French thought such actions would divert forces from Indochina; both

wanted retaliation confined to the immediate area of the attack in Indochina
214 THE TEST OF WAR

or along the China border. The British and French also wanted a combined

Allied command. Apparently, the conferees did not discuss the possible use of

atomic weapons. They agreed on only one point-the inadvisability of using

Nationalist forces from Formosa on the Asian mainland. Since the British and

French representatives seemed to be speaking from firm governmental positions, it was clear that U.S. policy would have to be reconsidered. 56 The three

nations had agreed to a warning but not on any steps to take if the warning was

disregarded.

PO!iLy Differences and NSC 124/2

Much as with the warning to the Chinese Communists in Korea, a

divergence of views developed between State and the JCS over the proposed

warning about Indochina. Given that the United States did not want to risk

general war or use atomic weapons, State demanded to know just what

military steps might be taken if Peking ignored a warning, while the Joint

Chiefs asked for a political assessment of Indochina's importance before they

could suggest military options. This clash of views, which affected policy

discussions for a long time, intensified in February 1952 during the formulation of NSC 124. The draft report proposed that, if Chinese Communist

intervention jeopardized retention of the Tonkin Delta area, the United States

should support a French request for immediate UN action and participate in

any collective international efforts to support the French.r

The Joint Chiefs felt the draft NSC 124 had not addressed the "political

importance of the fall of Indochina" in its wider dimensions and opposed the

report's recommendations. They believed that area-limited reactions would be

indecisive and last indefinitely, thought a successful counteraction would have

to include operations against the Chinese mainland, and questioned whether

the UN would call for hostilities against Peking. If the United States had to act

unilaterally, the political, economic. and military costs would be tremendous-and the decision would strongly affect future U.S. global strategy. If the

United States could not retaliate directly against China, the JCS recommended

that Americans accept the loss of Southeast Asia and limit their reaction to

aiding a forced French-British evacuation of the area ..'IX

Disturbed, the State Department shifted the report's emphasis to what, in

any case, it perceived to be actually the greater danger in Indochinaincreased subversion and a French pullout. Although Lovett sympathized with

the JCS desire for political guidance, he supported Acheson's views on the

likely deterioration in the Indochinese situation. At an NSC meeting on 5

March, Lovett thought it "very sensible" to consider more logistical assistance
Indochina 215

for the French effort, even to the extent of $1 billion to $1.5 billion per year,

but he noted that this could come only at the expense of aid to other areas.

The council thereupon directed its staff to consider possible courses of action

in the event of overt Chinese aggression or continued worsening of the

situation..-\') Meanwhile, the French appeared to be weakening in their

determination to remain in Indochina. H)

In April 1952 the Joint Chiefs wrote Lovett that Southeast Asia could not

be saved if the Chinese Communists attacked. Effective control of the Tonkin

Delta area by the French and the Associated States remained the key to

successful defense. The ]CS favored air and naval action against the source of

aggression but opposed using U.S. ground forces on the Southeast Asian

mainland. If thir.gs became worse without Chinese intervention, the ]CS had

no major objections to State's proposal to continue and intensify existing

courses of action. The Army, Navy, and Air Force secretaries, on the other

hand, disliked a plan that they felt would only preserve the status quo; they

wanted the United States to tie aU future expanded support to a clear-cut

French declaration to withdraw by a given date. 11 Frank Nash supported the

idea of a firm French commitment to leave, and Lovett suggested to Acheson

that the two departments reconcile their differing points of view. 12

When Lovett, Acheson, and other officials of the two departments met on

12 May, the ]CS continued to maintain that military steps should be taken

against China itself if Peking ignored a warning and invaded Indochina. But

Acheson's doubts that he could get British or French agreement on retaliatory

measures lessened enthusiasm for a warning. On the other hand, absent PRC

intervention, State thought it very much in the U.S. interest that the French

stick it out in Indochina even if things worsened. Acheson stressed the need

to encourage the French to meet their Indochinese responsibilities, through

more U.S. logistical support if necessary.i5

When Lovett, Acheson, and Bradley met with the president on 19 May to

prepare for a tripartite foreign ministers meeting later that month, Truman

agreed that the United States should favor further development of the national

Indochinese armies, additional U.S. assistance, and issuance of a warning to

China against further aggression in Southeast Asia. Acheson, Truman said,

should also seek agreement on Allied actions to be taken should the warning

be ignored. The United States was to avoid discussing internal changes in

Indochina except possible financial support for the national armies. II At the

tripartite meeting in Paris in May the French noted that their creation of 40

Vietnamese battalions, some of which had already performed weU in combat,

demonstrated local support, and had probably decreased the chance of

Chinese intervention by lessening "the propaganda value to them of haVing

white Europeans to attack."''i
216 THE TEST OF WAR

On a visit to Washington in June, however, French Minister Letourneau

expressed doubts about achieving military victory in Indochina since the

Chinese would increase their aid or even intervene if the French began to win.

Only an overall Far Eastern political settlement offered hope of a solution in

Indochina. If the French forces could bottle up the Viet Minh in remote, less

populated areas, it would give the Associated States breathing room to acquire

the political and military strength that would allO\v the French to withdraw

and the indigenous governments to take over. Barring PRC intervention,

Letourneau believed that forces on hand could hold the Tonkin area; if the

Chinese invaded in force, the French would len·e. He did not ask for British

or American soldiers.'('

At this time French Union Forces in Indochina consisted of about 74,000

troops from metropolitan France and ':;0,000 African and Foreign Legion

troops plus Indochinese volunteers. By comparison, the national armies

numbered about 1':;0,000, organized into 40 Vietnamese, 6 Cambodian, and 6

Laotian battalions. Half had "practically no" French officers and the rest only

limited numbers. Some units had already fought well. and indigenous soldiers

were taking most of the casualties. Further progress in doubling the Vietnamese national army by the end of 19':;4, Letourneau thought, would be less

dependent on money or materiel than on finding qualified personnel.

Letourneau found the Pentagon sympathetic to his needs. 1- The United States,

already providing approximately a third of the cost of supporting Indochinese

operations, agreed to increase its assistance. ,H

With Acheson publicly optimistic that the tide was "moving in our favor"

in Indochina, a new version of NSC 124. based on Truman's 19 May decisions,

neared completion. The JCS concurred in the new document, merely noting

the dearth of U.S. forces to meet manifold commitments. Pace and Finletter

informed Lovett that they did not believe the United States could support

forces sufficient to fight local wars and also carry out the NSC 68 plans for

rearmament. They therefore wanted to hold the Soviets responsible for any

local wars in which satellite troops participated and to include them in any

joint warning. Dissenting strongly, Navy Secretary Kimball admonished that

the inclusion of Russia in a warning would "speedily put us in a position of

initiating general war over insufficient cause." 1<) These comments and the

secretarial differences were apparently kept within Defense.

In the NSC discussion on 2'5 June Deputy Secretary Foster asked the

council to note the service secretaries' views that the French should be urged

to reduce their participation in the affairs of the Associated States. Truman

approved NSC 124/2 the same day. Dealing with all of Southeast Asia, this

report remained U.S. policy for the region throughout the rest of the Korean

War period.~()
Indochina 217

NSC 124/2 restated the U.S. objective of preventing Southeast Asian

countries from falling into the Communist orbit. Although calling for vigorous

opposition to Chinese aggression in Southeast Asia, it considered an overt

attack less probable than continued subversion. The United States should seek

international agreement-with at least France, the United Kingdom, Australia,

and New Zealand-to a joint warning against aggression in the area, contingent on prior Anglo-French agreement to specified courses of retaliatory

action, including a naval blockade of mainland China. \

NSC 124/2 proposed that if the Chinese Communists moved openly

against Burma or Thailand, the United States participate, to the extent its

worldwide commitments would allow, in a UN or international military

action against Communist China. If the Chinese invaded Malaya or Indonesia,

the United States was to take appropriate military action against the PRC and

assist in defending the attacked country either as part of a UN action or in

conjunction with other friendly governments. Even in the absence of Chinese

aggression, NSC 124/2 indicated US. willingness to provide some form of

economic, technical, or military assistance to threatened countries. ~2

Concerning Indochina, NSC 124/2 offered a number of recommendations: continued US. promotion of international support for the Associated

States; • assurances to the French of US. regard for their efforts and sacrifices

in Indochina; and recommendations to Congress for aid for France. Moreover,

the French ought to reduce their participation in internal Indochinese affairs

while recognizing their continuing primary responsibility for Indochinese

security. The United States would support a wide variety of political, military,

and economic programs designed to achieve the desired ends. In the absence

of Chinese intervention, NSC 124/2 called for increased US. aid on a highpriority basis and opposition to any French withdrawaL~5

If the PRC forces intervened either openly or covertly in Indochina, NSC

124/2 recommended US. support for immediate UN warning and action,

without geographic limitation. For defense of Indochina and the interdiction

of enemy lines of communication, including those in China, the United States

would provide the major interdiction forces, with France and the Associated

States providing the ground forces. If appropriate, the United States might take

additional measures, including a naval blockade of mainland China in

conjunction with the French and British, covert operations on the Chinese

mainland, and use of Chinese Nationalist forces in Southeast Asia, Korea, or

mainland China. With French-British agreement and Allied assistance, the

United States would take air and naval action against all suitable Chinese

• By January 1953 Vietnam was recognized by 34 nations.
218 THE TEST Of WAR

military targets except those close to Soviet borders. Lacking such agreement,

NSC 124/2 declared, the United States should consider acting alone. I

Carrying out the steps called for in NSC 124/2 in the event of Chinese

intervention in Indochina suggested the possibility of quick U.S. involvement

in a general war with China. Thus, U.S. policy in June 1952 was a far cry from

that of August 1950 (NSC 73/4) or May 1951 (NSC 48/5).

Many of the actions proposed in NSC 124/2 depended on getting the

French and British to participate if the PRC attacked despite an Allied

warning.~~ French, British, Australian, New Zealand, and U.S. military representatives met in Washington in October 1952 to determine collective military

capabilities for action if the Chinese disregarded an Allied warning. They

concluded that a combination of measures-including a full sea blockade and

air action against suitable military targets in China-would have the best

prospect of stopping aggression. Again the use of atomic weapons was

apparently not considered. Although there appeared to be considerable

military agreement. this was illusory since the British still claimed that the

contemplated measures were beyond Allied capabilities and the French

believed that retention of Tonkin might be jeopardized by the dispersion of

forces for use directly against China. ~(, As Acheson noted earlier, the British

and French feared that U.S. "impulsiveness ... might draw them into a war

with China. ,,~- Lacking Allied agreement concerning possible action, the

matter of a warning became moot, at least during the Truman administration.

The most tangible result of the October conference was U.S. agreement to set

up a liaison mechanism for coordinating five-power military planning in

Southeast Asia. ~H

Declining Fortunes

In Indochina General Salan planned an offensive for the autumn of 1952

provided he could get sufficient airlift to transport three paratroop battalions

simultaneously. Before Salan could strike, however, a Viet Minh offensive

threatened the French hold on Tonkin. including areas contiguous to Laos.

Forced to withdraw to Na San. the French, although isolated, new in

equipment, supplies, and reserves and made a strong defense.~')

Eager to help Salan carry out his planned offensive operation and defend

against Viet Minh attacks, Lovett pushed for a quick response to French

requests for equipment. 'Ib alleviate shortages of spare parts and ammunition

for ground troops, the United States shipped supplies on an emergency basis.

The Pentagon also applied special priorities to send 50 C-47 transport planes

for French airborne battalions. withdrawing 29 from other military assistance
Indochina 219

areas and lending 21 USAF aircraft. 60 Twice during the fall the U.S. Air Force

sent mechanics to Indochina to assist in maintenance of U.S. aircraft types. 61

By mid-December, however, Lovett's office had to face the possibility that U.S.

participation in Indochina might have to be broadened yet further. 62

At the end of the Truman administration, the forces of the French Union

were still at Na San, patrolling extensively, while their weakened reserves in

the Tonkin Delta carried out pacification tasks. Although the fall operations

had cost the enemy heavy casualties, the Viet Minh were still able to assume

the initiative, not only in Tonkin but also in Annam, the central part of

Vietnam. The French believed that the Viet Minh, despite heavy losses, would

continue the campaign in northwest Tonkin in order to penetrate and overrun

Laos, possibly the most difficult part of Indochina to defend and strategically

valuable since it would provide a new Viet Minh frontier with China and

Thailand. Military operations since October 1952 forced a general recognition

of Viet Minh strength and the importance the Chinese placed on their success.

No one expected an early French victory.(d

In both Indochina and France, the military situation had severe political

repercussions. Few Indochinese among a war-weary and skeptical populace

supported the efforts of either the French or their own governments. Friction

continued between Bao Dai, his government officials, and the French. In

France, many members of the government and the public generally thought

the price of the Indochina effort too high. Even with U.S. aid amounting to

approximately 45 percent of the total, the French estimated their cost for 1953

at about $820 million. * There were 73,000 metropolitan French in the

123,000-strong French Union Forces, constituting a sizable portion of the

460,000 troops currently facing about 400,000 Viet Minh (including 160,000

Viet Minh "regulars"). Despite a NATO resolution of 17 December 1952

stating that the defense of Indochina deserved the support of NATO members,

the French were eager to free themselves from Indochina so that they could

deal with the question of German rearmament. t Viewing the Indochinese

struggle as more in the interest of the free world generally than of France

alone, the French wanted their allies to share a much greater part of the

burden in Indochina(H

With the French obviously disenchanted, the question of Indochina

* The French projected a total 1955 cost at the equivalent of S1.68 billion, of which they

expected direct U.S end item aid of $540 million to Indochina and a Vietnamese contribution of

5100 million. Of the 51.24 billion left, the French "counted on" overall U.S. economic and

military aid to France of about 5450 million, leaving 5820 million for the French to foot.

Combined U.S. economic-military aid to France and Indochina would thus amount to about 45

perct:nt of tht: total cost.

t See Chapter XIX.
220 THE TEST Of WAR

loomed larger for U.S. policymakers, who considered increasing U.S. assistance for a planned 40-battalion expansion of the Vietnamese national army,

assuming some direct role in training the local armies, and inducing the

French to send conscripts to Indochina, this last a most delicate proposal not

likely to be entertained. Particularly, the United States wanted to be "taken

further into the confidence of the French Government in the matter of the

conduct of military and political operations in Indochina." On 19 January

1953, his last full day in office, Deputy Secretary Foster directed the JCS to

consider the possibility of broadening C.S. assistance to Indochina, particularly through training indigenous forces and maintaining U.S.-supplied

equipment. 6~

Military assistance had burgeoned during 1952. In February Lovett had

agreed to purchase $ 200 million of French-ordered equipment in FY 1952 for

use in Indochina. He also acquiesced in placing major U.S. military assistance

contracts in France to help the French support both the Indochina effort and

their increased responsibilities in NATO. By the end of December 1952, some

$775 million had been programmed under FY 1950 through FY 1953 military

assistance appropriations and over $127 million under Lovett's special February agreement. Defense placed Indochina in the same priority category as

Korea for military assistance in March 1952. Just over $334 million in

equipment had been delivered or shipped to port by the end of I952.(,()

Indochina seemed to be the key not only to Southeast Asia but also to the

viability of the European alliance, because the impact of the Asian war

affected the French contribution to European defense and created problems

for the other members of NATO. But since large military assistance programs

had come into general disfavor with the U.S. public and Congress, it was not

possible in late January 1953 to make a firm commitment to the French for the

coming U.S. fiscal year. Although President Eisenhower, in his first State of the

Union message on 2 February 1953, linked the U.S. effort in Korea and the

British and French struggles in Malaya and Indochina as part of the "same

calculated assault that the aggressor is simultaneously pressing," he essentially

repeated long-accepted policy. 6-

The U.S. commitment in Indochina grew prodigiously during the Korean

War, with most of the burden of support falling on the Department of

Defense. The bold onslaught of the Chinese Communists in Korea and their

backing of the Viet Minh in Indochina confirmed U.S. perception of the PRC

as an aggressive and expansionist power bent on dominating East Asia. Fear

that the fall of Indochina would lead to the loss of all Southeast Asia to

communism provided much of the motivation for the growing U.S. involvement in Indochina. The determination to deny Indochina to the Communists

would require ever greater U.S. engagement in the peninsula, and eventually,
Indochina 22 I

more than a decade later, the ultimate step of committing American troops to

battle in Vietnam. Beginning in 1953 the new administration would have to

make further decisions about the U.S. role in the struggle for Indochina, for,

while Acheson and Lovett had increased the U.S. stake in that country, they

had also apparently kept u.s. options open. Although it appeared that the

United States could still disengage itself from Vietnam, each successive

commitment would draw it closer to the vortex in which it would eventually

be engulfed.
CHAPTER XII

A Budget for Korea-FY 1951

The Korean War created an urgent and constantly growing demand for

men and materiel that had to be met immediately. The FY 1951 budget,

submitted only months before 25 June 1950 but not yet passed by Congress,

became obsolete almost overnight and had to be augmented by a series of

supplemental appropriations throughout the fiscal year. The massive expansion of military forces was not entirely for Korea. A large part of the money

went for the buildup of American forces in the United States and Europe, and

additional enlarged appropriations were for military assistance to countries

threatened by Communist aggression, particularly NATO Europe, Indochina,

and Formosa. These measures derived from the administration's assessment

that it had to face the threat of attack on both Western Europe and the United

States as well as in Asia if the war spread beyond Korea.

In response to the almost daily changes in the fortunes of war in Korea and

the growing demands for larger forces elsewhere, the military services and the

Joint Chiefs found themselves engaged in what must have seemed an endless

process of revision of force requirements and appropriations requests. The

tight lid that Truman had imposed on the budget for the preceding four years

blew off in spite of the president's continuing cost-consciousness and efforts

to reduce the size of Defense requests. The net effect for FY 1951 was the

creation of a military establishment more than twice as large and a level of

Defense appropriations more than three times as high as in any of the preKorean War years.

The Basic Budget and First Supplemental

Although it was only six days before the start of FY 1951 when the

Korean War began, Congress had not yet passed the year's basic budget

223
224 THE TEST OF WAR

appropriation. Trying to meet President Truman's defense ceiling of $13

billion, Secretary of Defense Johnson had requested only $13.394 billion in

new obligational authority, and the Bureau of the Budget had recommended

only $13.078 billion, including $873 million of unused obligational authority

from the previous fiscal year. 1 This amount was to provide for an Army of

630,000 men and 10 understrength divisions; a Navy of 239 major combat

ships, 2 Marine divisions at 36-percent strength, and a Navy-Marine end

strength of approximately 46l,(lOO; and an Air Force of 48 groupst and

416,000 men. Overall military strength on 30 June 1951 was to be approximately 1.5 million. 2

Testifying before a House appropriations subcommittee on 12 January

1950 in behalf of the FY 1951 budget, Johnson had emphasized the benefits

of the administration's economy drive. Pointing to his success in reducing

Defense expenditures, he claimed that "we are securing more defense per

dollar appropriated." Although committee members questioned U.S. military

capabilities, they also appeared pleased with the idea of saving money.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, then president of Columbia University, who

had participated as the unofficial JCS chairman in preparing the FY 1951

budget, favored a few additions to Johnson's budget, mainly for aviation, and

estimated their cost at a few hundred million dollars, less than a 2-percent

increase 5 In April 1950 Johnson submitted an additional request for $300

million for air and naval aircraft procurement and $50 million for naval

destroyers and small antisubmarine ships. With the United States fighting in

Korea, Congress allowed immediate 000 use of FY 1951 funds even though

it had not yet appropriated the money. The appropriation act, PL 81-759,

signed on 6 September 1950, provided $13.278 billion, including the $873

million left over from the previous year.~ But by this time the budget's force

limitations had already been exceeded.

With the services clamoring for more funds after the start of the Korean

War, Johnson told the assembled secretaries and chiefs at a meeting of the

Armed Forces Policy Council on 3 July 1950 not to ask Congress individually

for additional funds. Further FY 1951 requests were to be made on the basis

of an approved balanced program for the three services.

On 6 July General Bradley gave Johnson the first formal JCS request for a

military augmentation, followed quickly by two more requests on 13 and 18

July. The three incremental increases totaled 615,000-204,000 for the Army,

258,000 for the Navy and Marine Corps, and 153,000 for the Air Force.(' By

19 July the president and Johnson had approved all three requests.~ Also, on

* The fiscal year at this time hcgan on 1 July and ended the following 30 June.

t Groups were later redesignated wings.
FY 1951 Budget 225

14 July Johnson authorized the services to spend, at an accelerated rate, FY

1951 funds in advance of normal apportionment procedures. H

In two weeks time, the u.s. military establishment, with an actual

strength of about 1,460,000 men on 30 June 1950, went from a planned FY

1951 end strength of approximately 1.5 million to an approved figure of

slightly more than 2.1 million effective as soon as possible, an increase of

some 41 percent. <)

TAIlLE 2

Strength of Forces Authorization Before and After North Korean Invasion

Basic FY Apvd as of

1951 Budget 19 Jul 50 'Y., Increase

Army ....... 630,000 8Yi.OOO 32.4

Navy and Marines. '16 1.000 718,000 55.7

Air Force ...... 416,000 569,000 368

Total .. 1.507.000 2,12 I,000 4I.4

This explosion of requests for more than 600,000 men precipitated

demands for additional training, equipment, and supplies. Combat in Korea

required battle-ready Army and Marine divisions, Navy ships, and Air Force

wings and squadrons. The Joint Chiefs sent a complete set of FY 1951 force

requirements to Johnson on 18 July. 10 They asked for substantial enlargement

of FY 1951 forces-an Army of 11 divisions; a Navy of 911 vessels, including

282 major combat ships and 12 carrier air groups; a 2-division Marine Corps

with increased strength for both divisions; and an Air Force of 58 wings. II

Although the Korean War was going badly for the retreating U.S. forces in

mid-July, Johnson maintained a ceiling on a supplemental FY 1951 budget

request intended to pay for the expansion. He regarded $10.5 billion as the

maximum figure since the president stated publicly on 19 July that he would

ask for approximately $10 billion. On 21 July McNeil reported to Johnson that

the $10.5 billion package prepared by the secretaries and chiefs provided for

a buildup of forces for both Korea and elsewhere, but he thought the total

inadequate since it did not contain sufficient money for naval aircraft,

shipbuilding, and construction. McNeil submitted and Johnson approved a

supplemental for precisely $10.6 billion. Sending it to the Bureau of the

Budget with McNeil's reservations, the secretary added that, if necessary, he

would submit further requests. 12

Still cautious, Truman told Director of the Budget Frederick J. Lawton not

to put "any more money than necessary at this time in the hands of the
226 THE TEST OF WAR

Military." U Accordingly, the supplemental request, submitted to Congress on

24 July, was trimmed to fit within the $10.5 billion ceiling, with most of the

cut made in Air Force military personnel. It included $3.064 billion for the

Army, $2.648 billion for the Navy, $4.535 billion for the Air Force, and $240

million for establishment-wide activities (contingencies and emergency fund).

For this supplemental, which amounted to almost 80 percent of the original

FY 1951 request, Truman requested authority to transfer 10 percent from one

appropriation to another * to provide for flexibility and orderliness in the

buildup of forces both for Korea and the minimum desired 1952 forces, with

first priority going to Korea. I'

A subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations heard

Johnson's statement and testimony the day after submission of the supplemental. Sensitive to his image as an economy-minded defense secretary,

Johnson sought to convince Congress that previous budget cuts had not

compromised the battleworthiness of U.S. forces. Pointing to Congress's own

expressed interest in economy, the secretary emphasized that he had sought to

eliminate "unnecessary overhead, with a simultaneous improvement in the

combat potential of the Armed Forces"; he claimed that "over-all combat

potential ... was at a higher level on June 25-the day the Republic of Korea

was invaded-than had been the case at any time since postwar demobilization was completed." Johnson noted that for the United States the Korean

conflict was a test of supplying troops at long distance and that logistical

difficulties and slow progress could be expected. Nonetheless, he insisted that

the military establishment provided a sounder mobilization base for expansion than the United States had ever had. 15

When Johnson finished his statement, George H. Mahon, chairman of the

House subcommittee, propounded two major questions. He wanted to know

whether the $10.5 billion supplemental was enough for the emergency and

whether the country was facing the "beginning of world war III." Johnson

responded quite simply that he expected Defense would probably have to ask

for additional funds for naval aircraft and Army and Navy public works. He

suggested that $10.5 billion might be more than needed if matters went well

in Korea or inadequate if they did not. Speculating that the current course of

events might be "but the beginning of larger things," Johnson assured the

representatives that the figures were the soundest that the Pentagon could

currently determine and suggested that Mahon check with each of the

services. Mahon did. In turn, he called on Secretary Pace and General Collins,

Secretary Matthews and Admiral Sherman, Secretary Finletter and General

* This authority later made it possible to "lend" military assistance funds included in the first

supplemental to the military services (see hdow and Chapter XXI).
FY 1951 Budget 227

Vandenberg, and finally General Bradley. All agreed that, with the provisos

already mentioned, the amount requested was appropriate and proper. But

they did not foreclose, as Bradley put it, the possibility that "we may have to

come back later and ask for more." 1(,

The congressional climate was such that it would have been hard not to

ask for more. On 28July McNeil informed Johnson that House Appropriations

Committee members viewed the supplemental request favorably except for its

omission of such items as public works and naval aviation. He reported that

Rep. Harry R. Sheppard thought Johnson should "fix them now or you'll

regret it and be subject to a lot of criticism later." Actually, the Army and Navy

military construction programs were already prepared. l' Further, Navy and

Air Force representatives had met and agreed on moderniZing naval air "to

approximately the same degree which would be accomplished by the Air

Force." This meant raising the amount for naval air in the supplemental

request by about SI.2 billion. lH On 29 July McNeil wrote the Bureau of the

Budget that Johnson had decided to send an additional request for $950

million for naval aircraft, plus $85 million for Army military construction, $90

million for Navy public works projects, and $:15 million for contingencies. Of

this total request for S1. 16 billion, the BoB allowed all but S4 million of Navy

public works, and Truman sent Congress a new request for SI .1';6 billion on

4 August 1950. 1'J

Congress combined the two presidential requests, one for S10.487 billion

and the other for S1.1 ';6 billion, totaling S11.64:1 billion. At DoD's request,

the Senate added another 586 million for an Air Force research and development facility and for Army and Navy medical care. In Public Law 81-843 of

27 September 1950 Congress provided the total SII.729 billion, of which

more than 60 percent was for procurement of major military items. 1bgether

with the S1:1.278 billion in the basic FY 19'; I budget, Defense now had some

52'; billion at its disposal. 2o

The Long Term: NSC 68

Although the first FY 19'; 1 supplemental appropriation provided funds

for supporting the forces being sent to Korea, it was in fact a stopgap measure,

formulated in response to an emergency situation without being closely

related to larger national security considerations. In the summer of 1950 U.S.

policymakers still sought an appropriate response to what they perceived as

the Soviet challenge without wreaking havoc on the U.S. economy. The most

recent statement of basic long-range U.S. national security policy was the still

unapproved State-Defense document of 7 April 1950 known as NSC 68,
228 THE TEST OF WAR

programs and costs for which were being developed when the Korean War

began.

For the Truman administration, at least, the aggression in Korea ended

any doubts that the Soviets were embarking on a highly dangerous course of

adventurism, one whose consequences were unpredictable. On 27 july 1950

Truman told the National Security Council that "despite our preoccupation

with the developments in Korea," it was necessary to look ahead to the next

four or five years. Believing such planning to be urgent, the president directed

the council to respond to NSC 68 by 1 September 1950. 21

Even before the Korean War the joint Chiefs had projected the need for an

enlarged U.S. military force by mid-1954 (viewed in NSC 68 as the year of

maximum danger from the Soviet Union and its growing nuclear stockpile)-

a 12-division Army, a Navy of 324 major ships, and a 69-wing Air Force. The

joint Chiefs gave johnson a "flash estimate" of these 1954 requirements on 17

july. McNeil's budget division on 19 August revised its previous figures and

tentatively projected military expenditures ranging between $22 billion and

$33 billion in each of the fiscal years from 1951 through 1955, for a total of

S150 billion. Other costs, such as military assistance, the atomic energy

program, and contingencies, added close to S37 billion in expenditures for

the five-year period. 22 When the NSC Senior Staff and the ad hoc committee

working on NSC 68 considered the program on 22 August, however, they

doubted its adequacy. The group proposed extending the president's deadline

by two weeks, and OSD and JCS representatives agreed to revise the military

program and cost estimates. 25

johnson prodded the joint Chiefs on 24 August about the adequacy of

military projections to meet NSC 68 requirements. 21 On 1 September the joint

Chiefs dramatically expanded their mid-1954 goals, recommending an 18-

division Army, ai, 161-ship Navy, a 2'j,-division Marine Corps, and a 95-wing

Air Force. They raised mid-1954 strengths to 1,353,000 for the Army, 887,000

for the Navy and Marine Corps, and 971,000 for the Air Force-a total of

3,211,000. To reach these 1954 levels and fight in Korea would require

immediate increases in FY 1951 goals to a 17-division Army of 1,261,000, a

1,026-ship Navy with 675,918 sailors, a 2-division Marine Corps with

166,155 marines, and a 70-wing Air Force of undesignated personnel

strength. 2 ';

If accepted, the projected FY 1954 goals under NSC 68 would entail a

tremendous increase in Defense spending on top of Korean requirements. The

services indicated they would need almost S2 14 billion in obligational

authority, from a high of S53.3 billion for FY 1951 to a low of $ 35.3 billion

for FY 1955, presumably a period of stable force levels. The estimates did not

include the costs of atomic energy, guided missiles, or foreign aid programs.
FY 1951 Budget 229

Because of the urgency for a projection of total costs, McNeil's office prepared

a long-term Defense budget on 5 September by simply adding up the

individual service figures. 2(,

Although taken aback by the cost estimates, which quadrupled the

original FY 1951 budget, Johnson realized both the reality of the threat and

the president's concern, and he intended to act. Still, he wanted assurances

that the figures had been sufficiently reviewed by the services and his own

office. "It's easy," he noted at an AFPC meeting on 5 September, to "add on

five billion, maybe more." Worried about program duplications and the

programs still not included, Johnson wanted the Pentagon to have its house in

order before releasing the figures, even though they were supposed to go to

the NSC staff the next day. Deciding on an internal review, Johnson directed

that the services individually and the Joint Chiefs as a group check the service

budgets against the NSC 68 force requirements. The three departmental

secretaries were to do the same, both individually and collectively as the Joint

Secretaries. Their decisions would then go to McNeil and General Joseph 1'.

MeNarney, who would work with the service budget officers on program

refinements and have ready an agreed budget no later than the morning of 12

September for a final discussion by the AFPC. The approved program would

go to the NSC bv noon that day. The president accepted Johnson's proposed

timing. n

The tightness of the schedule testified to the pressures on Defense

planning during the Korean War years. But on the positive side, the interservice fights and the frustrations that had marked the previous five years

diminished greatly, in large part because of the availability of more money to

the services. The problems of the fall of 1950, serious as they were, related to

growth and momentum.

Following Johnson's oral instructions at the 5 September AFPC meeting,

the secretaries and chiefs the same day set up a six-man committee to review

the services' cost estimates. Meeting again on 7 September, they examined

their committee's work, adjudicated differences, and signed a seven-page

memorandum of agreement. 2H Pace later referred to these joint meetings as

among the "most worth-while sessions" he had attended during his government service. However, by the time the secretaries and chiefs met with

Johnson on 12 September, cost estimates had risen to S260 billion for military

items during the five fiscal years 1951 through 1955. Alarmed, Johnson

wanted to know whether they were prepared to recommend this amount to

the president and the NSC and to support it before Congress. 2,)

The secretaries and the chiefs strongly affirmed their estimates as realistic

and even minimal. According to Collins, it was the first time since World War

Ii that they had "gotten together, Secretaries and Chiefs alike, and arrived at
230 THE TEST OF WAR

what I regard as a realistic approach to the problem ... from a military point

of view." McNeil and McNarney, both fiscally conservative, also backed the

new service cost estimates. McNeil thought them "close enough" to give the

president a clear picture, and McNarney viewed them as necessary to carry out

u.s. overseas commitments..,0

Despite the virtually unanimous Pentagon support for the NSC 68 estimates, Johnson, still concerned, believed that the possibility of higher costs

would be politically unpopular and would unlock "the door to increasing

commitments in Europe." The secretary, who had been asked to resign by

Truman the day before, stressed that loyalty to the White House required that

the figures remain absolutely secret while the president decided whether to

forward them to the NSC." Truman sent the new JCS force requirements and

the tentative Defense cost estimates to the NSC without delay. 32

When George Marshall succeeded Johnson as secretary of defense on 21

September, it was apparent that the nation's security policy had taken a

radically different course from that of the five years following World War II.

The Pentagon stood to gain more money and forces from the change, but it

also faced potential problems. NSC 68 authors, who saw the current North

Korean aggression as a Soviet-inspired adventure, advocated that the United

States take a more active stance to deter or, if necessary, to defeat further Soviet

or Soviet-instigated challenges. U.S. military forces might also conceivably be

committed in places other than Korea. To assume such obligations, military

strength had to be built up, but it would take time to transform money into

trained combat soldiers and military equipment.

It was clear that the $25 billion already appropriated to meet immediate

Defense needs for FY 1951 would be inadequate. Furthermore, planning for

FY 1952, started in early 1950, had to be reformulated in the light of Korea.

The size of these budget requests, moreover, depended not only on Korea but

also on pending policy decisions concerning the overall nature of the Soviet

threat and the U.S. strategy for meeting it.

Secretary Marshall and his deputy, Robert Lovett, were well aware of all

these considerations, as well as of the various factors that underlay policy and

made defense spending in peacetime unpopular. Historical U.S. aversion to

large peacetime military forces was reinforced by Truman's innate economic

conservatism and the widespread fear in the administration that too large a

U.S. military budget would create economic upheaval and give the enemy a

victory without a fight. The Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) thought that

although the recommended buildup did "not approach full mobilization it

would impose severe strains on the economy" and a need for "a wide range

of direct wage, price and allocation controls, as well as a greatly expanded tax

program . . . by the end of this year in order to stave off spiraling
FY 19') I Budget 2:\1

inflation. "'>5 Money spent for defense would also affect some domestic

programs adversely and cost the president political support. Furthermore,

Marshall knew that MacArthur's brilliantly successful amphibious attack at

Inch' on on 15 September already suggested to many that the tide may have

turned in Korea, that NSC 68 fears might be overblown, and that military

spending could in fact be limited. Truman gave Marshall eight days of grace to

get his thoughts in order, rescheduling consideration of NSC 68 from 21

September, the day Marshall took office, to 29 September.'>!

Marshall requested comments and recommendations on the NSC 68 programs from the service secretaries, the chiefs, and the acting chairman of the

Munitions Board. 5'; Of the total NSC 68/1 cost estimate of $ 287 billion for five

years, the military program alone, now revised and including one year of Korea,

would absorb some $2:\') billion, or 5260 billion after adding military assistance, atomic energy projects, and contingencies5(, Pace, Matthews, and Finletter commended NSC 68/1 as an excellent presentation, and when the Joint

Chiefs generally approved it, Marshall forwarded their comments to the NSC.'>~

Meanwhile, Marshall sought the advice ofJames H. Burns, his assistant for

foreign military affairs and military assistance. Burns agreed in principle with

a military buildup, but he was "worried about the size of the proposed

appropriations, their effect upon the American economy and the American

way of life and the possibility that these great expenditures will not be

supported over the') year program by the American public." Noting that the

NSC 68/1 military cost estimates had been prepared at a time of uncertainty in

Korea when judgments had undoubtedly been affected by conditions of the

moment, Burns suggested, 1:\ days after Inch'on. that Marshall ask the NSC

staff to restudy the five-year program within a £200 billion limitation,

exclusive of the cost of Korea. 5H

The National Security Council met on 29 September to consider both NSC

68 and the programs contained in NSC 68/1. Cautioning that the programs and

estimated costs for NSC 68 were not yet final, the president suggested the

council endorse NSC 68 policy and "work out the details as the programs are

developed." Although Truman was willing to grant more time for study.

Marshall was ready to accept the NSC 68 conclusions immediately. NSRB

chairman Symington stressed the greatly broadened scope of the new NSC 68

plan and pointed out that they should move quickly since the defense and

stockpiling programs would take 142 percent of current materials

production. Y)

At this point the president emphasized that the Soviet threat could be met

only by the collective action of many nations. He wanted every agency to be

informed about U.S. policy and to deal uniformly with other governments.

The National Security Council adopted. with minor changes, the conclusions
2;12 TilE TEST OF WAR

of NSC 68 * as a .'statement of policy to be followed over the next four or five

years." The next day, ;10 September, the president approved in NSC 68/2 the

policy conclusions of NSC 68 and directed they be implemented. Thus the

policies first proposed by the Departments of State and Defense in April 1950

became official three months after the start of the Korean War, at a time when

that war seemed nearly over.'lI

The president did not approve the specific NSC 68/1 implementing

programs, which were to be revised for NSC reconsideration not later than 15

November. To review the scope, timing, and costs of the military program,

Marshall turned to Lovett and assigned McNeil, McNamer, and Burns to help

him. Sending out instructions for the review, Lovett stated on 5 October that

in every instance the JCS programs of 1 September would be compared with

their NSC 68 estimates of 17 July, actually prepared before the Korean conflict

started. 'I

When the Joint Chiefs briefed Lovett on 10 October, they generally held

firm to their I September force goals for both 1951 and 1954. While Lovett

continued to hear briefings on specific programs throughout October, it was

uncertain whether the DoD cost estimates for NSC 68 would have to be

revised. 12 When General Collins raised the question at an AFPC meeting on 17

October, Lovett pointed out that NSC 68/1 military requirements would take

about 20 percent of the national income. and he wanted to be sure of Defense

needs. Rather than simply adding up service estimates, Lovett hoped to arrive

at a lower figure by setting "priorities of danger and priorities of need." When

Collins asked for a directive on what this would mean, Lovett said he was not

yet ready but gave examples of "adjustment downward. ",5

During this same AFPC meeting Marshall explained his approach to

Defense readiness. At the 29 September NSC meeting he had told the president

that of all the NSC 68 conclusions the three of most concern to Defense dealt

with the maximization of the U.S. economic potential, the strengthening of

non-Communist nations' orientation toward the United States, and the

development of a level of military readiness that could be "maintained as long

as necessary." Emphasizing the last of these goals, Marshall had expressed his

concern over the maintenance of congressional and public support. Now, on

I"'" October, in the relative privacy of the Armed Forces Policy Council,

Marshall stated that he was not interested so much in scaling down JCS

requirements as in implementing them so that they would last. He wanted u.s.

expansion efforts under NSC 68 predicated not on anxieties of the moment

but on a long-term politically and economically feasible basis, one that

Congress and the public would continue to support. "

* See Chapter I for discussion of "ISC 61' conclusions.
FY 19'; I Budget 233

By 1 November McNeil's office produced a revised estimate for the NSC

68/ I military program, reducing expenditures for the total five-year program

to 5131 billion for U.S. armed forces alone and lowering total budget

expenditures for all NSC 68/ I programs to $190.6 billion. The McNeil estimate

would cut an anticipated five-year U.S. budget deficit from more than $ 100

hillion to $42 billion. But even these lower military costs for NSC 68/ I caused

concern. At an AFPC meeting on 14 November, Lovett pointed to strong

congressional criticism-including that of the pro-military chairman of the

House Committee on the Armed Services, Carl Vinson-over the military's use

of manpower, particularly reserves, and the cost of military programs. Lovett

feared that the high manpower requirements of NSC 68/ I could not be

reached without calling on veterans and married men or lowering physical

standards. Beyond these potential political problems, Lovett felt the Pentagon

had to balance its need for men against its need for materiel.·~ Meanwhile, the

immediate task was to bring into accord with NSC 6R the planning for the

imminent second supplemental appropriations request for FY 19'; 1.

The Second Supplemental

In mid-November 19';0 Defense work on a second budget supplement for

FY 19'; 1 was approaching a climax. The costs of Korea were already high in

terms of both men and materiel. On 31 July the Joint Chiefs had written

Johnson that the Army, currently authorized R34,000 men, needed an

additional 247,000 for a new FY 19'; 1 end strength of I, OR 1,000. The

secretary and the president had approved the new strength and authorized the

Army to induct National Guard units. In addition to the Army augmentation,

some increases in the Navy and Air Force brought the armed forces' authorized FY 19';1 end strength to 2.4 million, compared with the 2.1 million

provided in the first supplemental budget. 1(,

In a lengthy memorandum of 24 August, Secretary Pace had pointed out

to Johnson that the Army based its estimates for the first supplemental

appropriation on maintaining four divisions in Korea, whereas it would "soon

be supporting the equivalent of eight." Since the rapid Army expansion

required reactivation of many installations and the equipping of new units,

Pace feared that the Army would run out of both regular and first supplemental FY 19'; I funds in five major areas between the end of September and

mid-December 19';0. He also complained that, unknown to Congress, it had

been forced to implement unfunded programs, an obvious reference to the

Army's arming and equipping South Korean and other troops. LJrgingJohnson

to bring these facts to the president's attention and secure authority for a
234 THE TEST OF WAR

second supplemental request for FY 1951 funds, Pace enlisted the support of

the Navy and Air Force, which were experiencing similar problems.'" When

Johnson and Pace discussed the subject with Truman, however, the president

decided he could not submit another supplemental request before midNovember. Meanwhile, the Army received emergency interim support in

September through the use of military assistance funds. IH

On 13 September, just before leaving the Pentagon, Johnson directed that

planning begin for a new supplemental FY 1951 request to cover the forces

and buildup authorized since submission of the requests leading to the first

supplemental. With the new budget request to be submitted in November,

Johnson noted that McNeil's office would have to work closely with the three

military departments and the Bureau of the Budget. I')

The Joint Chiefs sent Marshall on 22 September new recommendations

very close to their 1 September goals and based on the joint JCS-secretarial

decisions of 7 September. The chiefs accepted the budgetary assumption that

the Korean War would end by June 1951; meanwhile first priority in FY 1951

would go to Korean operations. By 30 June 1951 the Army was to have 17

divisions and 1,263,000 troops, with all overseas units and half of the

U.S.-based units equipped at 100-percent and the remainder at 85-percent

strength. The Army was to expedite the purchase of modern equipment so

that all its active units could be equipped not later than mid-1952 and it could

establish war reserve stocks of major items by mid-1954. The Joint Chiefs set

the end strength of the Navy at 322 major combatant ships, 12 carrier air

groups, and 689,000 sailors; the Marine Corps would have a strength of

166,000 men. Naval combat units would be manned at an overall average of

85 percent of war complement; amphibious forces in the Far East and the two

Marine divisions were to be at 100-percent strength and fully equipped. For

the Air Force, the chiefs recommended an end strength of 70 wings and

688,000 personnel. The Strategic Air Command and all units deployed

overseas would be "combat effective," but other tactical units would remain at

"less than desired effectiveness levels." By 30 June 1951 armed forces

strength would exceed 2.8 million men. ~()

The JCS goals for FY 1951 now came close to, and in some instances

exceeded, the NSC 68 goals for FY 1954 set before the war started, and they

took a long stride toward meeting the far higher FY 1954 goals proposed on

1 September. Marshall approved the FY 19'51 recommendations on 27

September, but only for the purpose of preparing and submitting budget

justifications. One of the factors that Marshall had to face, of course, was cost.

To a basic FY 19'51 budget and first supplement that amounted to about $25

billion, the new JCS recommendations would add more than $20 billion. I

Meanwhile, the success of liNe arms in Korea following the Inch'on
FY 19:; 1 Budget 23:;

landing brought into question the necessity for such large military outlays.

The president himself hoped that the DoD estimates could be materially

reduced. Army Secretary Pace feared as much, writing Marshall on 10 October

that the improved situation in Korea might make the BoB and Congress less

receptive to the next supplemental request. Of immediate concern, he called

attention to Army actions taken "without the specific and advanced authorization of the Congress. ,,~2 Receiving no answer from Marshall, Pace wrote

directly to Truman on 1 November, asking for official approval of the Army

actions in equipping South Korean troops. ~~ The president approved Pace's

memorandum on 4 November, but Marshall's office thought that the Army

secretary had handled the matter' 'considerably out of appropriate channels. "

Assuring Marshall and Lovett that such matters would be "properly processed

in the future," Marshall's executive, Col. Marshall S. Carter, tersely brought the

real problem to their attention: "The Army is broke and needs supplementary

appropriations to cover the Korean support already given and . . . anticipated future support."~f

The Joint Chiefs on 9 November urged Marshall to approve immediately

their 22 September recommendations for FY 19:; 1 force requirements since

these would not be reduced by possible future changes in FY 19:;2 force

proposals. Lovett, however, orally directed the chicf~ to review FY 1951

program objectives: although he mentioned no ceiling, he clearly intended a

reduction. On 13 November the chiefs stated that they had reduced force,

materiel, and personnel requirements to meet Lovett's general objectives.

They removed one Army division and two Air Force wings, decreased aircraft

procurement, and eliminated the modernization and rehabilitation of certain

reserve industrial plants. Reduction of estimates for acquisition and construction of real property and for research and development would follow. ~~

Thanking the chiefs at the AFPC meeting on 14 November, Lovett said

that the new figures for FY 195 I and FY 1952 should be called a "review and

revision" rather than a cut. He was, however, still unhappy with the small JCS

reduction in the 520 billion supplemental request for FY 19:; I. Lovett thought

costs were "far out of line," and he pointed out that even highly supportive

congressmen might be unenthusiastic about a 520 billion request. He wanted

to avoid having a budget ceiling imposed and preferred to work it out in the

Pentagon. ~(,

Lovett, moreover, took exception to the statement in the 13 November

Joint Chiefs' memorandum that they had reduced requirements to meet

objectives stated by him. Writing that their statement with regard to his role

"might well be misleading," Lovett spelled out on 17 November the objectives

he had earlier presented orally. lh achieve a realistic DoD budget based on

military needs, Lovett believed that force strengths should be feasible and that
236 TilE TEST Of WAR

men should be inducted only as weapons became available. He thought the

JCS should view FY 19'; I and FY 19';2 estimates as an interim program to

meet international commitments and maintain a reasonable long-term military

posture and that they should emphasize the development of industrial

capacity ready to produce. Stating that his position would be subject to radical

change should the international situation worsen, and welcoming the JCS

review of 13 November as a "good approach to the problem," Lovett thought

there were still many areas that could stand improvement-that is, be cut.sWhen the Joint Chiefs responded on 19 November, they maintained their

earlier position on FY 19'; 1 force levels. Although they wanted to arrive at a

"reasonable compromise," they saw FY 19'; 1 and FY 19';2 as the base years

for future programs and did not want the levels lowered. If, after considering

the risks, program objectives still had to be reduced below those of 13

November, the chiefs offered some possibilities, including a reduction of

about ';,500 in Navy end strength. But the tentative cost attached to their 19

November program was still approximately 520 billion, and they warned that

lesser programs would increase U.S. risks. Sending the JCS recommendations

to the NSC without concurrence on 20 November, a dissatisfied Lovett noted,

in a memorandum also initialed by Marshall, that the department would

continue its review. SH

Both Marshall and Lovett were by now aware that a larger war might well

erupt in Korea. An unsigned but closely held memorandum of 18 November

addressed to Marshall apparently ret1ected the secretary's worries. The author

feared the imminence of an enlarged war in Korea and questioned the

adequacy of the current U.S. "twilight mobilization." The memorandum

suggested NSC review of NSC 68 and the possibility of undertaking a "higher

order of mobilization of men and materiel at the present time." Marshall's

concern was evident, for he noted on the paper that it should be held for use

in connection with an NSC memorandum that he was planning to prepare.s')

The possibility of Chinese Communist intervention in Korea troubled the

State Department as well as the Pentagon, and important support for the JCS

estimate of FY 19'; 1 requirements came from the director of State's Policy

Planning Staff, Paul Nitze, who recommended to Acheson that the NSC put

forward whatever amount was acceptable to Defense, "presumably ... a

figure of the order of magnitude of 54'; billion." Subtracting the 525 billion

already appropriated for FY 19'; I in the basic and first supplemental appropriations. this meant support for a 520 billion second supplemental, although

Nitze found it "appalling" that so much money was needed for a relatively

small increase in strength. At a White House meeting on 22 November the NSC

advised the president that "without prejudice to normal budgetary review of

the cost estimates" it found the proposed military program for FY 19'; 1
FY 19~ I Budget 2)7

generally consistent with NSC 68/2 ohjectives()() Cuts were still possihle, even

prohahle, depending on the situation in Korea.

Following NSC action, the Pentagon centered its attention on revising the

second supplemental FY 19~ I hudget, as the Bureau of the Budget initiated

two days of hearings. Using the JCS strength and force figures, BoB personnel

came up with a new estimate of approximately S10.9 hillion, only slightly

more than half the original service request but sufficient, they claimed, to

provide for modernization of the active forces and some war reserves.

However, when the Chinese Communist offensive in Korea caused MacArthur's forces to begin a massive retreat, there was an equally massive retreat on

hudget cutting in Washington. At an NSC meeting on 28 November, Marshall

agreed to trim some items but felt there should he no cuts in either Defense

armament or personnel.(>!

Following a series of OSD meetings with the military departments, with

BoB representatives present as ohservers, the S10.9 hillion BoB estimate was

increased hy $ ~. 9 hillion to provide for additional weapons, war reserves,

facilities and equipment, a hroader production hase, and additional public

works needed to accommodate the expanded Defense forces at home and

overseas.()2 As McNeil later pointed out, the size of the request could have

been either $10 hillion or $20 billion, depending on decisions "as to when the

active forces should he proVided with modern equipment, the extent of

additional procurement for war reserves and the numher of desirahle as

contrasted with necessary items which would be included." To hold the

hudget down, he attested, many desirahle administrative projects had heen

eliminated. Still, McNeil declared, it was the first supplemental request since

1945 to he hased on military requirements rather than a dollar ceiling.(''>

The second FY 19~ 1 supplemental estimate that Lovett officially sent to

the BoB on 30 Novemher provided for practically all the strength and force

goals recommended by the JCS in November(" The total request was for

$ 16.844 billion, including $~ I million for OSD, with the emphasis on

equipment-$4.~ hillion of the $9.2 hillion Army share was for major

procurement, S1.6 hillion of the $) hillion Navy and Marine Corps budget,

and $2. hillion of the $4.6 billion for the Air Force. The BoB and the

president approved immediately('')

Transmitting the DoD request to Congress on I December, Truman

emphasized the grave nature of the situation. While the Chinese might have

been "misled or forced into their reckless attack . . . to further the imperialist designs of the Soviet Union," their action threatened world peace, forcing

the United States and other free nations to expand their military forces very

rapidly. Truman supported the seeond supplemental request as an immediate

means of augmenting the armed forces and the rate of military production.
1AItI.l: :\

llevclopmem of FY 1(1) I Strength and Forc:e Levels

Al'tual Basic JCS Rec JCS Rec JCS Rec JCS Rcc JCS Rec Approved Approvcd Fourth Actual

;OJun SO Budget IBJul50 I Sept ';0 22 Sep ';0 l:\ Nov SO 19 Nov ';0 24 Nov ';0 14 Dec SO Supplemem :\OJun ';1

Army

Divisions 10 10 II 17 17 16 16 17 IB IB

Regts/RCTs 12 12 12 14 15 15 15 15 18 IB

AAA bns 49 48 72 78 78 78 78 78 100 103

Other bns 39 90 138 138 150

End strength ';91,487 630,000 h 834,000 ' 1,261,000 1,263,000 1,263,000 1,263,000 1,261,000 1,353,000 1,552,000 1529,90~

Navy

Carriers, all classes. 15 15 19 (IR)" 20(IR) 20(IR) 20(IR) 20(IR) 20(IR) 27 27(IR)

Battleships I I I (R) 2(IR) 2(IR) 2(IR) 2(IR) 2(IR) 3(R) 3(2R)

Cruisers 13 13 15 15 15 15 15 15 19 15

Destroyers 136 140 172 200 200 200 200 200 248 209

Submarines 72 70 75 85 85 85 85 85 100 88

Other active ships 381 414 629 704 706 706 706 704 764 695

Toul ships 618 653 911 1,026 1,028 1,028 1,028 1,026 1,161 1,037

Air units:

Carrier groups 9 9 12 12 12 12 12 12 14 14

Other squadrons. 27 27 37 37 37 37 37 37 49 47

ZP airships/sqdns a . 2 sq 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 4 sq

MC squadrons 16 12 16 20 20 20 20 20 27 21

MC divisions. 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2+ IRCT 2 + IRCT

MC end strength 74,279 - 138,013 166,155 166,155 166,155 166,155 166,155 162,000 204,029 192,620

Navy end strength 376,501 579,805 675,918 689,394 689,394 683,872 675,918 725,000 735,000 732,152

Toul strength. 450,780 460,605 717,818 842,073 855,549 855,549 850,027 842,073 + 887,000 939,029 924,772

Air Force

Combat wings 42 42 52 61 61 59 59 61 80 - 72

Trp carrier wings. 6 6 6 9 9 9 9 9(3R) 15 87 15

Separate squadrons. - 13 14 23 23 24 24 23 28

MATS squadrons. - 20 20 20 24 24 20 30

End strength 411,277 416,000 " 569,000 688,186 651,095 651,095 651,000+ 971,000 850,000 788,381

Total Strength

Armed Forces . 1,453,544 1,506,605 2,120,818 - 2,806,735 2,769,644 2,764,122 2,754,073 3,211,000 3,341,029 3,243,055

a Lighter-than-air ships or squadrons.

h Man-year strengths.

C Raised to 1,081,000 on 10 Aug 50.

d "R" indicates reduced manning level for all or given number.

Note; The table is based on data from OSO, lCS, NSC. and congressional sources available in the aSD Historical Office, The basic budget for FY 1951 proposed a slightly higher manpower end strength than

was the actual case on 30 June 1950 and adjusted some force levelS'. After the start of the Korean War the JCS recommendations of 18 July were covered by the first supplemental FY 1951 appropriation.

Considerations relative to a long-term buildup and disagreement over final FY 1951 goals resulted in separate JCS recommendations of 1 September, 22 September, 13 November, and 19 November 1950. On

24 November the NSC, reacting to the Chinese Communist intervention, adopted increases in FY 1951 goals based on variousJCS recommendations; the second supplemental budget request seems to have

funded the November force level recommendations. On 14 December the NSC accepted that FY 1952 levels should be reached as soon as practicable, thus accounting for the fact that some actual force levels

on 30 June 1951 (e.g., 18 Army divisions) were higher than the FY 1951 goals approved on 24 November 1950. Meanwhile. the founh FY 1951 budget supplement provided for further changes in strength

and force levels (see Chapter XIII).
FY 1951 Budget 239

These steps would allow a quick increase in mobilization if the situation grew

worse or a leveling off if the situation improved. In any event, the country had

to be prepared to "endure a long period of tension. ,,66

Within an hour of receiving the president's budget request, Congress

began hearing witnesses. Leading off for Defense, Marshall asked Bradley to

review the military situation worldwide, for in the secretary's opinion the

problem included not only Korea but "pretty much the entire world." After

Bradley finished, Representative Mahon asked Marshall, "Is this all the money

you think . . . we should appropriate at this time?" After Marshall agreed

that it was, Mahon also asked General Bradley and each member of the ]CS the

same question; each thought it the best estimate that could be given at that

time. But Mahon was persistent; he still wanted to know why Marshall did not

need "additional funds which would get us in shape more quickly for an

all-out shooting war?,,67

Reminding the congressmen that he was no newcomer to military

matters, Marshall pointed out that money did not solve everything. In World

War I, for example, overlarge appropriations for aircraft production had

created confusion, little production, and a long period of recrimination. For

the current crisis Marshall wanted to acquire money and personnel only as

quickly as they could be efficiently utilized. Without a structure to train,

equip, and handle new troops, too large manpower increases would result in

waste. Marshall felt that the country's first priority should be to create the

assembly lines and tooling necessary for a future expansion of production.

Even if general war seemed likely in the next few months, he considered this

emphasis on production the best way to gO.68

Marshall's reluctance to accept massive appropriations derived partly

from the hope that there would be no all-out war and partly from a

pragmatism born of long experience. If the country plunged into large-scale

mobilization and there was no general war, Marshall pointed out to Mahon,

there would be serious psychological and financial repercussions. On the

other hand, Marshall worried about delay in establishing a "well-laid foundation and base for a very rapid mobilization if that becomes necessary. ,,69 As

Lovett later asserted, the country was used only to "full-out mobilization,

which was war, or none at all, which was peace";' in advocating a partial

mobilization, Defense was seeking to avoid the feast-or-famine approach to

military preparedness. 7o

Three weeks of testimony by Marshall, Lovett, McNeil, and other DoD

officials reassured Congress about the Defense position on mobilization. It

• Lovett overlooked the partial mobilization that occurred prior to Pearl Harbor, from May 1940

to December 1941. Full mobilization for World War II did not occur until after 7 December 1941.
240 THE TEST Of WAR

provided 516.795 billion for the armed forces, now expanding to a new FY

1951 end strength of almost 2.8 million men. Truman signed PL 81-911 into

law on 6 January 1951. So far, Defense had received 541.8 billion of new

obligational authority for FY 195 I .-I Reviewing the unsigned 18 November

1950 memorandum about the possibility of Chinese intervention, Marshall

noted on it that the second supplemental FY 195 I budget represented a

speedup of the mobilization, with the personnel strength planned to be

attained by 1954 virtually on hand by July 1951.- 2

A Final Supplemental

Even before Marshall could send the second FY 195 I supplemental

request to the president, the reverses in Korea dictated a further increase in FY

1951 force levels. On 24 November 1950 the JCS recommendations of I

September for a 17-division Army, a I,026-ship Navy, and a 70-wing Air Force

by mid-1951-i.e., I more division, 2 fewer ships, and 2 more air wingswere approved. Then, on 14 December. the president approved NSC 68/4,

including the achievement of FY 195~ force InTis "as rapidly as practicable."

Marshall called for estimates for a new PY 1951 supplemental which was

inextricably connected with work on the FY 1952 budget. The fourth FY

1951 supplemental' provided another 56.:'8 billion for the services when

Truman signed PL 82-4:' on :, I May 195 1.-,

fY I')'; I End Strengths Authorized and Budgetcd

(in rounded ligures)

Army.

:\a\y

\'1arines

Air Force

'Ii)tal

Basic First Second Fourth

Appropriation Supplemcnt Supplemcnt Supplement

(':'0.000 H:\t.OOO 1.2(,:\ .000 I. ';';2.000

:\H~ .000 ';HO.OOO (,H·t.000 ~:\';.OOO

~-t.OOO I:\H,OOO I ('('.000 20-t,OOO

-t 1(',000 ';6H,OOO (,';l.OOO H';O,OOO

I, ';O~ .000 2.120,000 2.-6-t,OOO :\':\'11,000

The Korean War thus reqUired more than doubling the strength of t'.S.

armed forces. FY 1951 appropriations for this purpose totaled 548.2 billion in

new obligational authority, equaling all Defense appropriations for the four

fiscal years 19,1""' through 1950.

* The third FY I')'; I appropriation did not includc militan' funds.
FY 1951 Budget 241

TABLE 5

FY 1951 Appropriations

New Obligational Authority

(in billions)

By Appropriation"

Basic 1951 Appropriation Act

First Supplemental ..

Second Supplemental .

Fourth Supplemental.

Total DoD .

By Department"

$1).27H

II. 729

16.795

6.)HO

$4H.IH2

Army ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 519.)60

Navy l2AHI

Air Force . ........... . l5.H96

OSD o 44·f

'Ibtal DoD . . . . . . . . . $4H.IH2

Air InterBy Major Category' Army Navy Force deptl Total

Military Personnel . $-l.OH) 52.))H 51.9)1 $ 8.)52

Operations &

Maintenance 5.04H 2.H5() ) 199 I 1.1 0)

Major Proc & Pdn . H.2)H 599) H.612 22H4)

Aircraft . . . . . . ......... (0.1)5) (2.H46) (7.094) (10.075 )

Ships & harbor craft (O.OH6) (O.69H) ( O.7H4)

Other. (H.O 17) (2.-+49) (I.5IH) (11. 9H4)

Acq & Constr Real Prop 0.500 0.470 1.456 2.426

Civilian Components. O.-l2H 0.22) 0.176 O.H27

Research & Development O).P 0.455 OAOH I .200

Industrial Mobilization 0.16) 0.076 0.07) 0.)12

Establishment-wide

Activities. 0.56) 0.070 0.041 0.444 1.118

·Ibtab. $19.)60 512.4HI $15.H96 $0.444 548.182

Note: Figures do not add in all instances because of rounding.

"'!able EISED-O';,) OASD(C). 17 Aug ';4, OSD His!. Later EISEl) reports give slightly varying

figures: figures used in this volume, unless otherwise indicated, renect those used during the

period.

t> Ibid.

e '!able EISED-I I'" OASD(C). .., Jan ';), OSD His!.
242 THE TEST OF WAR

Of the four FY 1951 Defense appropriations, the first, for approximately

S13.3 billion, was what the department would have needed-or would have

had to make do with-if the Korean War had not occurred. The first

supplemental, for some S11.7 billion, increased Defense funds by 88 percent

and represented the military's first guess on how much it would cost to ready

the standing forces for combat and to expand the services. Had the war ended

with the defeat of the North Koreans in the fall of 1950, it seems likely that

the Truman administration would have asked for very little more, if any, for

Korea and that Lovett's reduced second supplemental request would have

sufficed-or again been reduced-to pay for some degree of buildup under

NSC 68. The Chinese Communist intervention in Korea changed everything.

The second supplemental request, for S16.8 billion. was to meet a much larger

threat both in Korea and possibly worldwide. This money provided for more

than doubling the strength of the armed forces within a 12-montb period and

for making a start on procurement of equipment for a buildup. Work on the

final FY 1951 supplemental of S6.38 billion went forward in tandem with the

regular FY 1952 request. Tbe three supplementals added 262 percent to the

original appropriation.
CHAPTER XIII

A Budget for Rearmament-FY 1952

In planning for FY 1952, the Pentagon had to carry forward simultaneously two major programming efforts that influenced each other and

interacted increasingly during the evolution of the budget. The short-term

needs of the Korean War demanded high priority and immediate attention.

The volatile nature of the war, the constant threat of its enlargement, and the

uncertainty of its duration greatly complicated efforts to rationalize requirements and to effect a balance between short- and long-term needs. The longer

term programs, based on the national security requirements prescribed by

NSC 68, attempted to look four or five years ahead to meet the Soviet

challenge. This effort to develop annual budgets that would permit optimum

use of resources to meet both the demands of Korea and the larger threat of

war elsewhere was representative of the complexities of planning and

programming for the nation's security in a period of great stress and

uncertainty.

In anyone fiscal year the Department of Defense normally dealt with not

one but three budgets. Thus, in January 1950, when work began on the FY

1952 budget, DoD was also administering the FY 1950 budget and presenting

the FY 1951 budget to Congress. With the coming of war in June 1950, the FY

1951 budget underwent an enormous upheaval that required three supplemental appropriations, the last on 31 May 1951. The budget for FY 1952 also

took on an entirely new dimension because of the war and, as with the FY

1951 budget, was greatly affected by the long-term program requirements

developed under NSC 68. Budgeting remained in a state of flux during the

entire first year of the Korean War. Not until June 1951, when the battle lines

in Korea became stabilized and the prospect of armistice talks became a real

possibility, could the administration take a new look at military requirements

and impose better controls over appropriation requests and expenditures.

243
244 THE TEST OF WAR

The Beginnings

Preparation of the FY 1952 budget started long before the Korean War. On

23 January 1950 Secretary Johnson prescribed a schedule for submission of a

final budget. I A month later he told planners to assume that the armed forces

would be maintained in FY 1952 at approximately the level planned for 30

June 1951-a 1.5 million-man defense force. A tentative estimate of 10 May set

the new obligational authority for FY 1952 at S13.7 billion. 2 Work on NSC 68,

currently going forward, was not supposed to interfere with the development

of the FY 1952 budget, as Johnson informed civilian and military leaders on

25 May.'

Given the administration's strong emphasis on economy, it was not

surprising that, even after the start of Korean hostilities, the Joint Chiefs did

not recommend, except for the Air Force, programs much higher than those

submitted for the basic FY 1951 budget. Following a meeting on 3 July, they

proposed for FY 1952 a 10-division army with an end strength of655,000, a

707-ship (281 major) Navy and a 2-division Marine Corps with 586,000 sailors

and marines, and a 58-group Air Force with a mid-1952 strength of up to

505,000. The estimated cost of this 1.7 million-man program ranged between

516.3 billion and $18.3 billion.' This proposal was soon outdated, for on 11

July Johnson told the chiefs to defer final recommendations on FY 1952 force

requirements until FY 1951 changes could be determined. On 10 August, with

Korea looming ever larger, he informed both civilian and military leaders that

further work on the FY 1952 budget should await revised goals for FY 1951

and an approved preliminary military program for NSC 68.'

Preparation of the NSC 68 military program. covering a four- to five-year

period, included planning for some kind of military increase for FY 1951 and

later. Meanwhile, to meet the needs of Korean fighting. the approved FY 1951

end strength for U.S. armed forces rose to 2.1 million inJuly 1950 and to 2.4

million in August. On 1 September, as part of the long-range NSC 68 program,

the Joint Chiefs projected FY 1952 end strengths of 1.348,000 men for the

Army, 700,000 for the Navy, and 162,000 for the Marine Corps, but gave no

strength figure for the Air Force. By mid-1952 the Army was to reach 18

divisions, the Navy 1,109 ships, including 355 major vessels. and the Air

Force 78 wings.<>

In one of his last actions as secretary of defense, Johnson on 13

September directed resumption of preparation of the FY 1952 budget concurrent with work on what was to become the second supplemental FY 1951

request. with final 000 determinations to be made early in November. The

Joint Chiefs asked on 22 September that both the FY 1952 budget and the

second supplemental FY 195 I request be "increments of the phased build-up"
FY 1952 Budget 245

toward NSC 68 force levels for mid-1954. They increased FY 1952 end

strengths to about 3.1 million-l ,350,000 for the Army, 712,00 for the Navy,

170,000 marines, and more than 863,000 for the Air Force. * 7

Secretary Marshall approved the Joint Chiefs' FY 1952 recommendations

of 22 September for purposes of budget planning only; he wanted to hear the

NSC discussions and talk with the president before making a final decision. H

Meanwhile, with UNC forces doing well in Korea, Lovett pressed the chiefs to

consider reductions. On 13 November they dropped the overall strength level

from 3.1 million to 2.8 million for FY 1952, cutting all services. They

increased Air Force wings from 78 to 84 (combat and troop carrier) but

reduced naval and Marine forces? The Army would keep only 16 of 18

projected FY 1952 divisions and drop to a mid-1952 strength of 1,244,000.

Even so, the JCS estimated the cost of the FY 1952 program at only slightly

under $40 billion, tripling the $13.7 billion May estimate and more than

doubling the July projection. 10

These figures became part of the five-year NSC 68 estimates sent to the

National Security Council. When the council met on 22 November, it made no

decisions for FY 1952. II Several days later the massive Chinese attack on UNC

forces in Korea-in George Kennan's words, a time of "major failure and

disaster to our national fortunes" -brought into question all previous budget

planning. 12

After the Chinese Intervention

At an NSC meeting on 28 November, Lovett reversed his earlier position

and questioned the continuance in FY 1952 of the policy of establishing a

minimum mobilization base and building forces that could be maintained

indefinitely. Worried that the war might spread and become much more

intense, he suggested a substantial acceleration of the proposed rate of

mobilization for men, materiel, and readiness to provide in FY 1952 as much

as possible of the required forces. In view of the rapidly changing situation in

Korea, the president and the council made no decisions that afternoon. 15

Work on the NSC 68 programs advanced to the point that the NSC

expected to consider the matter of mobilization at its meeting on 14

* All Army units overseas and half of those in the United States were to be at I nO-percent

readiness; the rest at H5 percent. Marine forces were to be at full war strength. The JCS

recommended an ovcrall naval manning kvel of 75 percent of war compkment. lower than the

H5 percent of the previous year. hut noted that this might be raised later. Air Force readiness was

at "combat effective" kvds for the Strategic Air Command and all overseas units; others would be

below "desired dleetivcness levds.··
246 THE TEST OF WAR

December. Although the military program was still incomplete on 8 December, increases could be expected, for on 6 December the Joint Chiefs had

concluded and the NSC Senior Staff had agreed that the wisest course of

action was to reach by mid-1952 manpower and force targets recommended

for mid-1954. Ii Leon Keyserling, chairman of the Council of Economic

Advisers, thought that the speeded-up military program would require comprehensive planning and direct controls over critical materials, prices, and

wages, but that it was feasible. Although it would cut 1950 production levels

by more than 33 percent for civilian housing, 60 percent for automobiles, and

perhaps 100 percent for radios and televisions, Keyserling thought that the

peak effort would absorb less than 5 percent of the total labor force and about

25 percent of total national output.' He believed the country could maintain

this higher but still limited military effort indefinitely 1

Marshall recognized the difficulty in steering a clear and reasonable

course. He worried not only about the Korean fighting but also that Soviet

reactions might frighten U.S. allies in Europe and discourage NATO plans for

an integrated European defense force. He informed Truman on 11 December

that to temper demands in Congress for full mobilization he had disclosed to

one of its committees that the president might declare a national emergency. 16

On 13 December, when Truman and administration officials met with

congressional leaders, Marshall emphasized the constraints limiting the expansion of U.S. military power. Describing the proposal to accelerate troop

buildup and materiel procurement by two years, Marshall explained that he

wanted to establish a flexible military base that would permit the country to

expand its military force if necessary, maintain a plateau of strength, or even

cut back. I"'

For this two-year speedup the JCS submitted the previous FY 1954

requirements, to be met by 30 June 1952: an 18-division Army of 1,353,000

men; a Navy of 1,161 ships, 14 carrier air groups, 725,000 sailors; a Marine

Corps of 162,000 men; and a 95-wing Air Force of 971 ,000 men. Concurring,

Marshall forwarded these recommendations on 14 December for consideration at the NSC meeting that day.1H

The estimated costs for this NSC 68 military program totaled $ 169.1

billion for the five fiscal years 1951 through 1955. These funds were to

modernize and equip the active forces in the 3.2 million-man defense force,

assuming that the force goals would be continued through FY 1955. An

additional $40 billion to $45 billion would be required for mobilization and

war reserves, distribution by years to be made after decision on the rate of

• By comparison, he noted that World War II military needs ahsorhed 17 percent of the lahar

force and 42 percent of national production.
FY 1952 Budget 247

procurement. Altogether, the estimated total ranged between $209.1 billion

and $214.1 billion for the five years, not too far beyond the price tag that

Burns had suggested to Marshall months earlier. The sum of $ 31 billion was

specified for FY 1952, but costs for continued fighting in Korea would be

additional because of the planning assumption that Korean combat would be

over by 30 June 1951. 19

When the NSC met on 14 December 1950, Marshall declared his general

agreement with the NSC 68/3 programs.' 20 He noted, however, that the

Pentagon had not yet applied detailed studies of production facilities and

materials to the military program and its cost estimates, and he pointed out

that the mobilization and war reserve costs would be additional. Lovett

declared it well within U.S. capabilities to raise and equip the proposed forces

but wondered whether there would be sufficient materials and facilities

available if, on top of a $31 billion FY 1952 military program, the country also

attempted to procure the war reserves in FY 1952.

Although Marshall and Lovett worried about economic limitations, NSRB

Chairman W. Stuart Symington declared that "whatever the military wants,

the economy can stand." Seconding Symington's position, Keyserling questioned whether the proposed defense buildup met the NSC 68/3 description

of the emergency; he thought a much larger program possible, particularly in

view of what had been done in World War 11 and the currently stronger U.S.

economic base. This premise came into question, however, when Secretary of

the Treasury John W. Snyder pointed out that unemployment and idle

factories left considerable slack in the economy in 1940, while the 1950

employment and production levels were far higher so that less readily

available capacity for munitions production existed.

Regardless of the situation in Korea, both Marshall and Lovett clearly

resisted the idea of a speedier buildup at the 14 December meeting. Marshall

expressed particular concern that, if the mobilization and procurement of war

reserves proceeded all at once, production would peak and then drop,

whereas spending the $40 billion for such equipment over a period of several

years would avoid the problem. The secretary believed the Joint Chiefs would

prefer the latter course and he himself favored it. Influencing Marshall's

position was the rapid obsolescence of military equipment. But even more

important, buying reserve equipment on top of an already expanded military

program would decrease civilian production and lower civilian morale; he

therefore thought it necessary to compromise on the course to follow when

there had been no disaster such as Pearl Harbor to create a willing disposition

• The programs were military, foreign military and economic assistance, civil defense, stockpiling, information, intelligence, and internal security.
248 THE TEST OF WAR

to sacrifice. Besides, Marshall was fairly sanguine about the adequacy of an

armed force of about three million. Although the authorized number of

combat divisions remained small, Marshall felt that the independent regiments

and civilian components provided a nucleus for a future force strength of 47

to 50 divisions.

Truman said little during the NSC discussion, but he had some definite

ideas about not upsetting the economy. Noting that the men at the table had

managed the World War II effort, Truman saw no need for undue alarm.

Acheson, however, felt that the current danger to the l:.S. position "couldn't

be greater" and that it "would not be too much" if the United States had all the

troops the military wanted, all the materiel the European allies wanted, all the

equipment for the reserves, and a system for full mobilization. Secretary of

Commerce Charles Sawyer pointed out the absence of a list of military

requirements; he did not want to cut back civilian production until war orders

were ready to take up production capacity-to do so would be the fastest way

to destroy civilian morale.

At the conclusion of the discussion, the president approved an amended

NSC 68/:' "as a working guide for the urgent purpose of making an immediate

start." 21 Subsequently issued as NSC 68/-L the document began by noting that

the June invasion of South Korea had lent greater urgency to the problems

dealt with in NSC 68 and that the Chinese Communist intervention had

"created a new crisis and a situation of great danger." Brieny describing the

seven programs annexed to NSC 68/:', NSC 68/4 noted that they were not final

but represented the start of a major national security effort. lb prevent

military disaster and provide support for I'.S. foreign policy, the United States

had to create a mobilization and production base that would allow rapid

expansion to full mobilization and advancement of mid- 1954 military goals to

mid-1952. At JCS request, NSC 68/4 explicitly warned that if Korean hostilities did not end by :'0 June 1951 or if the world situation worsened, a military

force of :'.2 million men would not suffice. The report also made clear that

such a force could not "absolutely secure" the l'nited States against attack by

air or unconventional means. defeat the probable enemy. or thwart aggressive

Soviet actions along the periphery of the Soviet Union-although it could act

as a deterrent to Soviet aggression. 22

On 14 December the president also directed that the secretaries of state

and defense jointly review U.S. political and military strategy "with a view to

increasing and speeding up the programs. ,,25 This joint review meant keeping

the NSC 68 series under active consideration, a desirable procedure since the

14 December decisions did not provide for implementing a number of

important elements of U.S. military policy. Beyond moving ahead on troop

strength and rearming, Truman left the matter of war and mobilization
FY 1952 Budget 249

reserves subject to study and later decision and maintained a policy of partial

mobilization even during the period of greatest peril in Korea.

Speaking to the nation over radio and television on 15 December, the

president promised to continue the u.s. effort to uphold UN principles and

effect a peaceful settlement of differences with the Soviets, including the war

in Korea. He ruled out appeasement or surrender to aggression and promised

to build up u.s. and Allied defenses. To prevent inflation, he would ask for

further tax increases, reductions in federal nonmilitary expenditures, and

selective price and wage controls. To oversee these many activities, the

president appointed Charles E. Wilson, president of the General Electric

Company,' to head a new Office of Defense Mobilization. Truman also named

a former Florida governor, Millard Caldwell, as federal civilian defense

administrator and planned to ask for federal funds to help the states and cities

with civil defense preparations. Citing the bravery shown by U.S. troops in the

face of reverses in Korea, Truman invoked the nation's "courage and determination." The next day he proclaimed a national emergency. 24

New Service Requests

With the decisions to increase U.S. military forces and create a rapidly

expandable production base, DoD immediately needed to prepare an additional budget request for FY 1951. So far, Congress had appropriated $41.8

billion in new obligational authority for FY 1951, but Korean requirements

and the perception of increased worldwide danger demanded more funding.

Informing Director of the Budget Lawton on 20 December that Defense would

need approximately $10 billion additional for FY 1951, Lovett indicated that

the request for FY 1952 might be around $60 billion. On 6 January 1951

Marshall called for new DoD budget estimates, directed an in-house review of

current and additional programs, and ordered the development of new

programs. Estimates for additional FY 1951 funds and the FY 1952 budget

were both due on 18 February. 2~

By 18 February, however, the Korean situation had improved greatly.

Isolated American troops had been safely extricated, Ridgway had taken the

offensive with the Eighth Army, and u.s. leaders could reasonably believe that

UNC forces would be able to secure their positions in Korea. Despite these

improved conditions, the military services submitted budget estimates that

reflected December fears rather than the new, more hopeful outlook. The first

• Not to be confused with Charles E. Wilson. the head of General Motors Corporation. who later

became secretary of defense.
250 THE TEST OF WAR

departmental estimates amounted to an astounding $104 billion divided

between the final FY 1951 supplement and the FY 1952 budget. Before their

presentation to Marshall on 18 February, the services reduced the amount to

$10l.1 billion, with $28 billion for the last FY 1951 supplement and $73

billion for FY 1952, including $12.7 billion for public works. Lovett later

referred to these early estimates as "letters to Santa Claus. ,,2(,

After discussions with the secretaries of the military departments, Lovett

on 20 February set up a tridepartmental committee of high-ranking officials to

review the estimates and bring the service budgets in line. The committee first

identified three types of costs-those attributable to Korean combat consumption through FY 1951, those associated with establishing and maintaining the

forces approved for FY 1952, and those representing other procurement costs.

Ostensibly, the first costs would be included in the final FY 1951 supplement;

the second, in the FY 1952 budget request; and the third would be candidates

for removal from the budget. Since the 5 10 l. 1 billion budget had included

$26.5 billion for war reserves-$17.4 billion for the Army, 53 billion for the

Navy, and about $6.1 billion for the Air Force-the third category was by no

means minor. Lovett kept close watch on the work of the committee. r

Within days the committee arrived at a preliminary estimate of $9.6

billion for the FY 1951 final supplement, a considerable drop from the earlier

$28 billion estimate and more in line with Lovett's earlier 5 10 billion estimate.

When informed, however, the House Appropriations Committee did not take

kindly to this amount. As a result, the review continued, and the amount that

Marshall finally requested and which Truman submitted to Congress on 3 April

1951 was for only $6.42 billion to support forces and programs that could not

otherwise be funded in FY 1951. By that time Defense had requested still

another increase in manpower, and the last FY 1951 supplemental appropriation request provided for over 1.5 million soldiers, some 939,000 sailors and

marines, and 850,000 airmen. Of the Army's 52.9 billion share of the

supplemental, almost 45 percent was for the additional increase in end

strength; the Navy planned to use more than 30 percent of its $ 1.6 billion

share for aircraft construction and procurement; and the Air Force put 36

percent of its $ 1.9 billion share into aircraft and related procurement. 2H

Congress gave the services 56.38 billion for a total of 548.2 billion in FY 1951

appropriations, including about 55 billion for war reserves. 2<)

The Fiscal tear 1952 Budget

When the president submitted the fourth FY 1951 supplemental request

on 3 April, the FY 1952 budget was three months late and Congress was
FY 1952 Budget 251

annoyed. Earlier, on 8 March, with neither request in hand, Representative

Mahon had lectured an OSD witness, Brig. Gen. Robert S. Moore, McNeil's

special assistant, on Defense tardiness. The House Appropriations Committee,

Mahon told Moore, was "not going to be subjected to a last-minute stampede

to appropriate a lot of money about which we know nothing." Moore's

answer illuminated the complications of the budget process that beset the

Pentagon. Work on the FY 1952 budget had been well under way when the

Korean conflict began in late June 1950, Moore reminded Mahon; after making

up the first supplemental FY 1951 budget in July 1950, the FY 1952 budget

estimates had to be "thrown in the waste basket." Together with the second

FY 1951 supplemental, a new start on FY 1952 got under way, but it had to

be revised many times as the base was continually broadened and new

decisions in December 1950 required a complete revision. W At the time of

Mahon's complaint, the Pentagon was still six weeks from completing its

work, although General Moore did not say, and perhaps did not know, that.

The services' February 1951 estimate of $101.1 billion for the rest of FY

1951 and FY 1952 combined had, after the removal of $12.7 billion for

military public works and $6.4 billion for FY 1951, left $82 billion for FY

1952. 51 Marshall's office considered this amount, which included money for

a 12-month stockpile of war reserves, excessive and unattainable. Lovett

referred the FY 1952 budget estimate to the tridepartmental committee,

which worked on it for about two months, but the services would accept few

major reductions. 52

On 9 April the OSD and BoB representatives countered with a proposal

for a $49.3 billion budget for FY 1952, slashing the $82 billion estimate by 40

percent. They lowered service requests from $32.6 billion to $19.4 billion for

the Army, $21.7 billion to $12.1 billion for the Navy, and $27.3 billion to

$17.4 billion for the Air Force, while earmarking $0.465 billion for OSD. 55

When these McNeil-BoB proposals went out for review, it did not take long

for the services to seek restoration, although they were relatively restrained.

Army asked for restoration of only $2.8 billion, the Navy, $5.7 billion, and the

Air Force, $5.6 billion. The services objected instantly when McNeil's staff and

the BoB remained firm and allowed only small restorations. 54

A major issue was the strength the armed forces should maintain in the

face of the planning assumption that all fighting in Korea would end by 30

June 1951. Following a JCS request for more manpower in FY 1952, the

president on 12 January 1951 approved an increased FY 1952 end strength of

3,462,205. 55 On 6 April the JCS asked that the planning date for the end of

conflict in Korea be extended to 31 December 1951; Marshall approved but

only on condition that the FY 1952 budget not be changed. 56 By this time the

Army was asking for approximately IOO,OOO more spaces, a step opposed by
252 THE TEST OF WAR

the BoB, which also wanted to reduce the Navy by 60,000 and the Air Force

by 72,000. 37 On this issue, the BoB stafflost. As finally submitted to Congress,

the FY 1952 budget provided for an Army strength of 1,550,000, a Navy of

805,000, a Marine Corps of 175,516, and a 1,061,000-man Air Force, for a

total strength of almost 3.6 million. 38 These new figures exceeded by

approximately a quarter million men the total forces just provided in the final

FY 1951 supplement.

The FY 1952 budget controversy actually centered less on personnel than

on the amount of procurement necessary to supply the armed forces with

modern equipment. 39 The BoB contended that the Army and Navy had

received enough financing in FY 1951 to modernize and equip their authorized units and that most of their new 1952 procurement would be for war

reserves. Both these services, according to the BoB, expected to reach NSC 68

objectives (except for naval air) by mid-1952. The Air Force would not be able

to reach its goal of 95 wings by March 1953 and lacked any appreciable

amount of war reserves, its rate of expansion being generally geared to the

ability of the aircraft industry to provide components, particularly electronics

and jet engines. To reduce requests for FY 1952 funds, BoB recommended

deep cuts in service procurement of aircraft, ships, ammunition, and Marine

TABLE 6

Development of FY 1952 Defense Budget

New Obligational Authority

(in billions)

Service Budget Service Lovett President's

Requests Staff Recs Claims Request Request

Feb 51 9 Apr 51 Apr 51 19 Apr 51 30 Apr 51

Army ....... $32.6 $19.4 $22.2 $20.8 $20.4

Navy ....... 21.7 12.1 17.8 15.1 14.6

Air Force .... 27.3 17.4 23.0 19.9 19.4

OSD ........ 0.7 0.4- 0.7 0.5 0.5

(R&D) ...... 1.3 --

Total DoD .. $82.3 $49.3- $63.7 $56.3 $56.2

Source: Figures are from BoB budget tables.

- According to the OSD Comptroller's office (Table OASD(C), "Resume of Action on FY

1952 Budget Requests," RG 330, ATSD & DepSecDef files, lea 16 Apr 51), "1952 Budget

Tables" folder), the amount recommended for OSD was $0.7 billion, making the total $49.6

billion; in all other amounts, the tables used by the national security branch of BoB and by

the OSD Comptroller's office agreed.
FY 1952 Budget 253

Corps equipment as well as cuts in civilian component programs and levels of

training and operation.

Essentially, BoB analysts contended that it was not feasible to meet NSC

68 requirements by the new target date of mid-1952. The analysts estimated

that actual deliveries of goods and services in July 1951, the first month of FY

1952, would total $2.5 billion and would have to increase (on a straight line

projection) to $15 billion in June 1952 in order to reach the required $103

billion figure for FY 1952. Based on World War 11 experience, they calculated

that actual June 1952 deliveries might reach $4.8 billion. "It is obvious," they

wrote, "that the proposed build-up ... is substantially out of phase with

what might reasonably be expected."

When Lovett heard the final service claims on 17 and 18 April, he decided

that the McNeil-BoB staff proposal for a $49.3 billion FY 1952 budget had

"cut from the fat into the bone," as he later told Congress. Lovett therefore

reinstated about half of the cuts in service requests for restoration-$I.4

billion to the Army, $3.0 billion to the Navy, and $2.5 billion to the Air Force.

Most of the money was for equipment-aircraft and related items for the Air

Force; aircraft and ships for the Navy, including a supercarrier named the USS

Forresta( to replace the USS United States, canceled in 1949; and quartermaster, ordnance, engineer, and signal items for the Army. Lovett's action

exemplified his policy of concentrating budget funds in areas where procurement was the most difficult and the lead times longest. For items such as

aircraft, which took 18 months or more to produce, the services needed FY

1952 money for immediate obligation because, as Lovett put it, "manufacturers only put out orders to their suppliers and subcontractors to the extent

they have firm orders on their books. ",ll

Restoring almost $7 billion to the services, Lovett wrote Lawton on 19

April that Defense would require $56.3 billion in new obligational authority

for FY 1952-520.8 billion for the Army, $15.1 billion for the Navy, $19.9

billion for the Air Force, and $0.55 billion for OSD. These amounts would

provide for the NSC 68/4 forces approved on 14 December 1950 and for

additional facilities, tools, and tooling to broaden the production base. They

would also help to modernize the military forces, keep the supply pipeline

going, and begin procurement of reserve items. Lovett informed Lawton that

* The supercarrier had heen authorized (hut no money appropriated) hy PI. :I (82 Cong, 1 sess, 10

,\tar 'i I), which also ga\"e the Navy authorization to huild 'iOO,OOO tons of new ships and to

modernizc I million tons of existing fleet. The Navy let the supercarrier contract for the I:SS

Porrestal (named hy joint congressional resolution of:lO July 19'i 1) on 12 July 19'i 1; its estimated

completion time. originally :\6 months after keel-laying, was later reduced to 29 months after

keel-laying. or December 19'i-t. (Collgress alld the Natioll, 1945-1964, 267; l'S Dept Defense.

Semiallnual Report o/the Secretarv of De/elise . .Ianuarv 1 to.lulle jO, 1952, 1'i2-'i.:\.)
254 THE TEST OF WAR

he expected to make a few adjustments in the FY 1952 military program later;

in addition, Defense would probably need funds beyond the 556.) billion to

continue the Korean combat beyond 1 July 1951. I I

Truman asked Congress for 556.2 billion for FY 1952 on )0 April 1951.

With a military public works requirement estimated at 54.5 billion to be added

later, the total DoD request amounted to 560.7 billion in new obligational

authority. 42 Although the final FY 1952 request was considerably less than the

services' original proposals, it included both the 5) 1 billion for FY 1952 under

NSC 68/4 and a good start on the 540-45 billion for mobilization and war

reserves for the entire five-year period (FYs 1951-1955) in that program. The

president approved that month detailed FY 1952 materiel programs for Korean

combat and u.s. training needs through June 1952, for modern equipment for

the active and reserve forces, and for stock levels and war reserves.'"

Too Much or Too Little?

When Lovett submitted the budget on 19 April 1951, Under Secretary of

the Air Force John A. McCone wrote Marshall that OSD reductions in

proposed FY 1952 aircraft procurement programs would require many cuts,

particularly in provisions for extra plant capacity, tools, and tooling. To attain

a 95-wing program as soon as practicable, the Air Force had planned to

expand aircraft production from the current 200 planes per month to 1,100

units by December 1952 and to maintain that level through 195), after which

it would lower the rate to 300 units per month. Unless the Air Force was

assured of being able to submit a supplemental FY 1952 request by September

1951, McCone thought it might have to reprogram from 1,100 units to a

steady level of 700 units per month, to be maintained through 1953 and into

1954. 44

Lovett reminded McCone that the FY 1952 budget was supposed to

provide only those aircraft necessary to modernize the 95-wing program, not

war reserve aircraft or those in excess of unit equipment and test needs. The

budgeted aircraft were to be fully financed through December 1953, with

delivery schedules looking toward more than a thousand per month. Meanwhile, the rate of air buildup and production schedules would await review of

NSC 68 policies and programs.'~

While the Air Force saw the FY 1952 budget request as considerably less

than it wanted, the president viewed the Defense budget in quite another

light. Before submitting the military budget to Congress, Truman made known

his concern about its size and impact at a meeting on 27 April of officials from

Defense, BoB, the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Defense Production
lA-DU, 7

Devdopmcnt of' FY 19S1 Strt'nRth and Fort'e I.evds

Basic Split l.evels Levels Apvd Forl'es Anual

JCS Rec JCS Rcc JCS Rcc JCS Rec JCS Rec JCS Rec Budget JCS Rcc Approved JCS Rec Approvcd Approvcd ()hjcctivcs Slrcnglhs

7 Jul SO 1 Sep SO 22 Sep SO 1.:\ Nov SO 6 Dec SO '5 Jan SI .:\0 Apr ';1 16Jul ';1 27 Jul SI IS Aug 51 18/29 AUK 51 Fall SI .:\0 Jun 52 .:\0 Jun S2

Army

Divisions, 10 18 18 16 18 18 +3 18 +3 21 20 20

RegtslRCTs 12 17 18 IS 18 18 (18) 18 18

AAA bns. 6B 83 83 78 100 - + 17 100 + 17 117 110 110

Other bns. 50 150 - 150 - 150 (ISO)

End strength 655,000 1,348,000 I.350,000 1,244,000 1,353,000 1,416,000 I,S50,000 I,SS2,000 U50,000 US2,OOO' 1550,000 1,620,000 1,575,000 U94,693

Navy

Carriers, all classes. 18 24(IR) 24(IR) 23(IR) 27 27 (27J 27 29\2 tempi

Ballieships 1 3(R) 3(R) 2(R) 3(R) 4(R) +1 4(R) 4(3R) 4(3R)

Cruisers . 15 17 17 15 19 +1 18 (18) 19 19

Destroyers 172 216 216 216 248 248 [248J 248 243

Submarines ' 75 95 95 85 100 - + 100R) 100 + 100R) 110(10R) 110(1OR) 105(IOR)

Other active ships, 426 754 7S4 699 764 + 19 764 + 19 783 783 776

Total ships. 707 1,109 1,109 1,040 1,161 1,161 1,161 [1,190J 1,191 1,176

Air units:

Carrier groups 10 13 13 12 14 +4 14 +4 18 16 16

Other squadrons. 37 48 48 47 49 - +2 53 +2 5S 53 S3

ZP airships/sqdns 44 44 44 44 44 - 44 4(sqdns) 4(sqdns)

MC squadrons 16 23 23 22 27 2/3 wing 27 + 2/3 wing 27 3 wings 3 wings

MC divisions. 2(R( 2+ IRCT 2+ lRCT 2 2+ lRCT 21/3 +2RCT 2+ lRCT +2RCT [3) - 3 3

MC end strength 9S,66S 162,000 170,045 143,114 162,000 175,205 17S,S16 236,126 204,029b 236,126 Open 236,000 23S,320 23S,320(est)

Navy end strength. 490,IS6 700,000 712,000 666,798 725,000 810,000 805,000 859,888 805,000 857,390 for 820,000 820,000 818,000(est)

Total strength. 58S,821 862,000 882,045 809,912 887,000 985,205 980,S16 1,096,014 1,009,029 1,093,516 review 1,056,000 1,055,320 1,053,320(est)

Air Force

Combat wings, 52 69 69 75 80 Toward 138 by 80 "Possible 80 80 80

Trp carrier wings. 6 9 9 9 15 95 wings end 1954 15 Expansion" 15 15 15

Separate squadrons 14 25 25 25 28 - 29 to 138 Plus

MATS & tep carrier combat wings principle

squadrons . . 20 22 22 28 30 - 30 by mid-54 of incr.

End strength. 488,651 - 863,246 748,000 971,000 1,061,000 1,061,000 1,061,000 1,200,000 1,061,000 1,061,000 973,350 973,474

or 504,754

Total Strength

Armed Forces, . 1,729,472 3,095,291 2,801,912 3,211,000 3,462,205 3,591,516 - 3,620,029 3,845,516 3,737,000 3,603,670 3,621,487

or 1,745575

:I. Including cadets.

b Marshall approved the Marine Corps manpower increase on 10 July 1951, the extra battleship in lieu of one cruiser on 11 July 1951.

~. "R" indicates reduced manning level for all or given number.

Note: The table is based on data from OSD, JCS, NSC, and congressional sources available in OSD Historical Office.
256 THE TEST OF WAR

Administration, and the National Production Authority. He impressed on them

the importance of managing available funds to minimize the possible inflationary effect on the economy.46

Congressional concern about the size of the FY 1952 budget came later,

for when Lovett testified on 7 May members of a House appropriations

subcommittee inquired about its sufficiency. Lovett agreed that the $56.2

billion Defense request would be inadequate if the country had to fight a

general war in 1952, a possibility he did not rule out. But he opposed

mobilizing 12 million to 14 million men, a step he thought would hinder the

production of the necessary equipment for rearmament. Nor did he want

more money for procurement, for he thought it might clog procurement

channels, increase the current 18 to 20 percent inflation rate in the cost of

hard goods, and still not yield more finished items.'-

Lovett did want the services to have sufficient funds to give firm contracts

for long-lead-time items. He also sought money for facilities, basic materials,

and machine tools and tooling to create the desired industrial mobilization

base, for which he thought the FY 1952 budget included more than 50

percent of the needed funds in most areas. Lovett admitted that he had often

scratched war reserves in favor of future production facilities in the FY 1952

budget, but he thought some war reserves, such as ammunition, should be on

hand. The FY 1952 military program, he estimated, would absorb about 20

percent of the nation's production-not enough "to win a war . . . far from

it," but still enough to "protect us . . . [while] we go from the 20 percent of

national production to approximately 50 percent of national production

which we used in World War 11. "fH

An NSC meeting on 6 June discussed the close linkage between the state

of the civilian economy and the Korean War's absorption of materiel. Lovett

and Admiral Sherman estimated that losses in Korea approximated the

equipment for six divisions, valued at about $ 1.5 billion. Nonetheless, rather

than increase requirements, Lovett preferred to extend production schedules

and raise production goals. Assuring him that the civilian economy could

support the military requirement, Wilson urged not waiting too long; furthermore, if the NSC 68 military program through FY 1953 did not suffice, Wilson

stood ready to curtail the civilian economy and funnel more materials and

production into military end items. When Lovett pointed out that the

forthcoming review of NSC 68/4 was intended to provide the answers Wilson

sought, the latter repeated that his office could respond quickly if it only knew

the actual military requirements. Silent during this exchange, Truman concluded the discussion by amending his directive for a joint review of NSC 68

policies and programs to provide that it be a continuing one. I')

Questions of possible budgetary insufficiency soon gave way to those of
FY 1952 Budget 257

oversufficiency. By the time that Marshall, busy earlier with the congressional

hearings on MacArthur's removal, testified on 18 July, the Soviets had called

for peace in Korea, negotiators had begun to meet, and a quick armistice

seemed likely. Thus some members of Congress expressed less concern over

military sufficiency than over taxpayer annoyance. George Mahon greeted the

secretary by telling him that there was "much feeling among the people

generally and among the Members of Congress that the military people do not

conserve manpower and dollars as well as they should." Mahon questioned

whether the FY 1952 military buildup should be slowed down or its emphasis

changed.~()

Marshall, who earlier had warned against excessive funding for Defense,

now found himself defending the Pentagon budget against deep cuts. He

expressed dismay that a single Soviet action such as their Korean peace

initiative could achieve "an attitude of relaxation, of a let-down in our defense

program on the part of the American people." Viewing U.S. susceptibility to

Soviet overtures as tragic, Marshall was adamant that U.S. policy should not be

changed "every time the Kremlin decides on some new front." It was

important, he told the House committee, to "appear before the world as

determined, implacably determined, to get ourselves in such a strong position

that the Kremlin will not dare to upset the peace of the world." I

Marshall thought the $56.2 billion defense budget for FY 1952 struck a

happy medium. If war in Korea continued, the money would suffice. If the

fighting ended, the FY 1952 budget would provide a chance to meet U.S.

commitments for European rearmament and to build up U.S. strength in an

orderly fashion-more Army divisions without a large manpower buildup,

naval increases of a specialized type, and possibly "larger considerations in

connection with the air." Pointing out that he had fought the dangers of a too

rapid buildup in November and December 1950 when Congress thought he

was asking for far too little for FY 1951, Marshall in July 1951 fought against

a precipitate reduction. ~2

Despite Marshall's objection, the House cut more than $1.5 billion from

the FY 1952 military budget before sending it to the Senate. Here, however,

time worked in favor of the Pentagon, as the Korean armistice talks, begun on

10 July 1951, ran into difficulties and public euphoria changed to caution. As

the hearings wore on, the senators, their outlook affected by the Buctuation in

the war, became less concerned with saving dollars and more interested in

maintaining or augmenting U.S. military preparations. Lovett estimated that

materiel losses in continued Korean fighting might run between $4.7 billion

and 55.9 billion for FY 1952, amounts not included in the current budget. In

addition, the military services, particularly the Air Force, would require more

than $5 billion additional to improve their state of readiness.~5
258 THE TEST Of WAR

Marshall's earlier reference to "larger considerations in connection with

the air" underscored the lag in the Air Force buildup despite the authorized

increase from 48 wings in mid-1950 to 95 wings by mid-1952. When Finletter

testified before the Senate subcommittee in August, the Air Force had 87

wings but only 787,000 of its authorized FY 1951 end strength of 850,000. As

the Bureau of the Budget had acknowledged in its earlier analysis of the FY

1952 DoD budget, the services had progressed unevenly, and the Air Force

lacked "any appreciable amount of war reserve." The Senate hearings disclosed that the FY 1952 budget did not contain financing for almost 2,000

aircraft needed for the 95 wings. ~l

Anxious over the apparent lag in air power, the Defense subcommittee of

the Senate Committee on Appropriations met on 20 August with Lovett,

McNeil, Bradley, the service secretaries and chiefs, and other DoD officials for

a roundtable discussion. They agreed that the Pentagon should prepare a $5

billion supplemental bill in which all three services would share, but with the

Air Force getting the major portion. The proposed supplement was not to

increase force levels for FY 1952 but rather, as General Vandenberg put it, to

allow the Air Force to "move into the expanded program . . . with the least

possible delay, without loss of lead time."~~ The Air Force prepared a

supplemental budget estimate, and the Senate added $5 billion for Air Force

and Navy air expansion to the DoD request, with the proviso that all of it

could be obligated but only SO.5 billion spent in FY 1952. This additional

money would be placed in a national emergency fund under the control of the

secretary of defense. ~()

The Outcome

Despite these moves, the congressional appropriation for FY 1952 was

less than the S56.2 hillion requested hy the president. The House voted $54.6

hillion in new obligational authority in August 1951, the Senate's additions

raised this to $58.1 billion in September, hut the final congressional compromise in October provided $55.5 billion-including approximately $1 hillion

more for additional aircraft procurement-on the basis that additional money

could not he "providently expended." Having suhmitted its FY 1952 budget

late, Defense had to live for :) 1/2 months on continuing congressional

resolutions, the $55.5 hillion in new ohligational authority becoming final

only on 18 October, when the president signed PL 82-179.~-

The president's request for military puhlic works funds underwent a

similar reduction. The House reduced the request for 54.6 hillion to $4.2

hillion, the Senate further cut it to $:).8 billion, and it was only slightly
FY 1952 Budget 259

TABLE 8

FY 1952 Appropriations

New Obligational Authority

(in billions)

By Appropriation'

Basic 1952 Appropriation Act .

Second Supplemental Appropriation

Act (Military Public Works) .

Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act. .

Total DoD .

By Departmenth

Army .

Navy .

Air Force .

OSD .

Total DoD .

$55.513

3.890

1.033

$60.436

$21.626

16.098

22.265

0.446

$60.436

Interdeptl Total

$10.834

Air

By Major Category' Army Navy Force

Military Personnel .......... $4.724 $3.099 $3.011

Operations &

Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.439 3.470 3.638

Major Proc & Pdn .......... 8.675 7.801 12.760

Aircraft ................ (0.044) (3.786) (11.049)

Ships & harbor craft ...... (0.137) (1.786) ( 0.017)

Other.................. (8.494) (2.229) ( 1.694)

Acq & Constr Real Prop ..... 1.000 0.820 2.174

Civilian Components........ 0.369 0.226 0.122

Research & Development .... 0.436 0.542 0.508

Industrial Mobilization ...... 0.084 0.059 0.009

Establishment-wide

Activities ................ 0.899 0.081 0.043

Totals .................. $21.626 $16.098 $22.265

"lote: Figures do not add in all instances because of rounding.

0.013

0.433

$0.446

12.547

29.236

(14.879)

( 1.940)

(12.417)

3.994

0.717

1.499

0.152

1.456

$60.436

, Table FAD-182 OASD(C), 24 Oct 60, 3, OSD Hist.

h Table ElSED-117 OASD(C), 7 Jan 53, OSD Hist. Later ElSED reports give slightly varying figures;

figures used in this volume, unless otherwise indicated, reflect those used during the period.

C Ibid.
260 THE TEST OF WAR

increased to $3.9 billion in the second supplemental appropriation, PL

82-254, signed on 1 November.~H

The only other military funds made available for FY 1952-$1.4 billion,

less 5368 million earmarked for FY 1953-came in PL 82-431, the Urgent

Deficiency Appropriation Act, signed on 30 June 1952, the last day of the

fiscal year. These funds provided for such ongoing operations as pay,

maintenance and operations costs, and civilian relief in Korea; they were not

supposed to replace equipment losses in Korea, add to the strength of the

armed forces, or facilitate a future increase in strength. ~<)

With a total of $60.4 billion in new obligational authority available for FY

1952, the armed forces received more appropriated funds than in any year

since the end of World War II. Although the sums of money were vast, there

were heavy demands to be met, including replacement of combat losses,

expansion of the production base, and buildup of war reserves. The cost of

these requirements was compounded by a continuing inflation. As the battle

over the FY 1952 budget wound down, it was already apparent that the

struggle over the FY 1953 budget would also be hectic, perhaps as complicated and difficult to negotiate as its two predecessors.

• No funds went directly for the military services in the first FY 1952 supplemental, which

included moncy for stockpiling stratcgic and critical matcrials.
CHAPTER XIV

A Stretchout Budget-FY 1953

When President Truman called the FY 1953 budget his "biggest headache," complaining that he had "never had as much difficulty getting the

budget in shape," he no doubt had in mind the Defense budget. I Much of the

difficulty centered on determining the size, composition, and rate of buildup

of the military forces and the industrial mobilization-matters that the FY

1952 budget had never resolved. As the Department of Defense considered

the FY 1953 budget in the summer of 1951, it was plagued by the same

uncertainties that had been unsettling the budget process since the beginning

of the Korean War a year before. The war raged on even though armistice talks

were under way. A buildup of enemy air strength threatened llNC air

superiority, and there was no immediate prospect of withdrawal of ll.S. forces

from the peninsula. The possibility of other East-West confrontations continued to cast a long shadow over u.s. policy deliberations and the development

of military programs. In this atmosphere of confusion and uncertainty,

decisions had to be made on the extent and timing of economic and military

mobilization for the rest of FY 1952 and for FY 1953.

Requests for Immediate Expansion

Even before passage of the FY 1952 defense budget by Congress, the

services were already pressing strongly for further expansion. In June 1951

the Air Force wanted to increase its authorized FY 1952 force level of 95

wings (including 15 troop carrier wings) to 138 combat wings plus additional

troop carrier units. The Army wanted to raise its authorized FY 1952 combat

strength of 18 divisions by 3 new divisions, 2 to replace National Guard

divisions sent to Japan and 1 armored division for Europe. The Navy desired

261
262 THE TEST OF WAR

more ships, 4 new carrier air groups, and a buildup from 2 '/" to 3 Marine

divisions. After AFPC discussion on 20 June 1951, Marshall postponed a

decision on FY 1952 forces, calling for additional review by the services. 2

Further consideration was necessary because the services could not agree

on priorities for the expansion they wanted. The Army and Navy considered

the Air Force program excessive and a threat to their own requests for additional forces since Congress would undoubtedly take a hard look at these

proposals coming on top of the already high FY 1952 appropriation request.

Accordingly, General Collins and Admiral Sherman joined in recommending on

16July substantial augmentations for the Army and the Navy, with end strength

of 1,552,000 for the Army, 859,888 for the Navy, and 236,126 for the Marine

Corps. Rejecting Vandenberg's proposals, Collins and Sherman stated they

would agree to what was "reasonable and within capability of attainment.,,3

Vandenberg still wanted 138 combat wings for the Air Force-76 strategic

and 62 tactical and air defense-plus troop carriers. He argued that the threat

implicit in a "growing Soviet long-range air force and constantly increasing

stockpile of mass destruction weapons" required a U.S. force that would

provide a maximum deterrent, minimize the calculated risk, and yield the

most combat power in the event of general war-and only the Air Force could

meet these needs. Asking for priority over Army and Navy requests, Vandenberg sought authorization for the 138-wing force, and sufficient money in FY

1952 and FY 1953 to permit an orderly buildup to full strength by mid-1954.

Strongly supporting Vandenberg, Secretary Finletter wrote Marshall that the

Air Force proposal was feasible and even conservative, urged a quick go-ahead

because of the long lead times in aircraft production, and asked for some

330,000 more men to reach a strength of 1,390,000 in 1954. Finletter could

not yet provide a detailed cost breakdown, but he did state that a supplemental

appropriation would be needed in FY 1952. When weeks passed withoutJCS

agreement, Lovett on 7 August told the Joint Chiefs either to "narrow their

area of disagreement" or to ask the defense secretary to resolve the matter. 4

The Status ofMobilization: NSC 114/1

While State and Defense were still working on the joint review of U.S.

policy and strategy ordered by Truman in June, the president on 12 July asked

for a status report on NSC 68/4 programs by 1 August and a report

recommending revisions or modifications by 1 October. When completed, the

status report and review would become part of the NSC 114 series, successor

to the NSC 68 series as the prime statement of national security policy and the

underlying basis for FY 1953 budget planning.
FY 1953 Budget 263

Work on NSC 114 affected internal Pentagon relationships. On 21 June

Colonel Carter privately told Lovett that it was "at least embarrassing" that the

OSD representative on the NSC staff knew less about certain JCS views than

the State Department's representatives. Marshall subsequently informed the

Joint Chiefs of his "desire" that Frank C. Nash, who had replaced Finletter in

February 1951 as the Defense representative on the NSC Senior Staff, be

included in State-JCS conversations. 6 Because this new arrangement still left

the service secretaries outside the policy review process, they asked Lovett on

23 June whether it would be appropriate to discuss participation in the

process by their representatives. Lovett quickly set up an OSD steering

committee, including representatives of the Joint Secretaries, to assist the

Defense members of the NSC Senior Staff.-

The Joint Chiefs notified Lovett on 27 July that NSC 68 policies,

objectives, tasks, and assumptions remained valid except for the assumption

that Korean hostilities would end by the already-passed date of 30 June 1951.

Not optimistic about the outcome of the armistice talks, they noted that the

international situation in general had clearly deteriorated since December

1950, making some increase in approved military force levels necessary.

Arrears in the production of many items' would delay meeting the July 1952

target date for rearming U.S. military forces, although most items would be

available by the end of December 1952. Military assistance items would

probably lag beyond their target date of 1 July 1954. The Joint Chiefs assured

Marshall that it was "vital"-a word stronger than "critical" in the JCS

lexicon-to U.S. national security that a maximum effort be made to meet the

two target dates. These views had already been considered in the work on NSC

114, which was in draft form when the Joint Chiefs wrote the secretary.!>

The drafting of NSC 114 also revealed differences between Acheson and

Marshall and within the Pentagon over the speed and scope of the rearmament

effort. Describing the situation to Acheson on 3 I July, Paul Nitze, Director of

State's Policy Planning Staff, asserted that Marshall-and others in the Pentagon who had "lived through the bleak days of miniscule military budgets"

before World War Il-viewed the current large Defense budget as a "one shot"

effort. If all the money were spent in a massive immediate rearmament

undertaking, end items would be available faster but production lines would

have to shut down. Nitze thought Marshall, Lovett, and McNeil all preferred to

extend production over a longer period, a procedure that would permit

incorporation of improved weapon designs and avoid large stockpiles of

obsolete weapons. The JCS as well as his own office, Nitze wrote, gave more

• These included tanks, antiaircraft equipment, tactical radios, motorized equipment, heavy

construction equipment, electronics equipment, certain types of ammunition, and spare aircraft

engines.
264 THE TEST OF WAR

emphasis to the need for a faster buildup of weapons in hand, to deter war or

"to be ready, and in time, should war come. "l)

Nitze argued that a stretched out program would delay Allied rearmament

and noted that the Office of Defense Mobilization and the Council of

Economic Advisers believed the U.S. economy could tolerate a much greater

effort. State, CIA, and the Joint Chiefs regarded current free world strength as

"grossly inadequate" to deal with Soviet or Soviet satellite aggression. State

and CIA held that the United States, already in a period of considerable danger,

needed to attain adequate preparedness before growing USSR capabilities

reduced U.S. atomic superiority. Nitze thought the necessary money for an

enlarged and more urgent program could be obtained. 10

In the Pentagon, the Joint Secretaries had reservations about the NSC 114

draft, believing that it required further study and ought to be considered in the

Armed Forces Policy Council before DoD reached a final position. I I Although

the JCS agreed with the paper's assessment of the current risk-that the United

States and its allies were "already in a period of acute danger" and that it was

vital to reach NSC 68 objectives as soon as practicable-they did not agree

with all portions of the draft and complained of insufficient time for study.

Frank Nash also felt the need for more time to consider the issues. 12

Acting for Marshall, Lovett asked for a delay at the NSC meeting on 1

August, saying that he thought the draft conveyed some "erroneous impressions" and did not accurately reflect what had already been accomplished.

While granting a week's extension to present a "truer and a more favorable"

picture, Truman demanded results. He pushed Lovett to appoint a high-ranking

official to "ride herd" on the rearmament program and emphasized that the

ODM needed to know military materials requirements. 13 To satisfy the president, Lovett met with DoD officials on 4 August to discuss what could be done

to speed up military programs. Ii After further discussion at an AFPC meeting

on 6 August and with time running out, Defense submitted to the NSC staff

some suggestions that were substantially incorporated into the NSC 114 draft. IS

The revised draft, NSC 114/1, presented a gloomy picture of the current

world situation. Korea demonstrated Soviet willingness to risk global war to a

degree "greater than foreseen in NSC 68." Already strong in conventional

arms, the Soviets would acquire by mid-195 3 the atomic stockpile previously

predicted for 1954. The report pictured the Soviet Union as seriously

concerned about U.S. and Western rearmament and highly sensitive to U.S.

bases overseas or to any rearming of the former Axis countries of Germany

and Japan. Should the Kremlin fail in frustrating Western rearmament, NSC

114/1 warned, the "danger of Soviet preventive action will become acute." 16

In terms of strength in being, NSC 114/1 viewed the United States as

probably worse off in relation to the Soviet Union than before the Korean War.
FY 1953 Budget 265

The paper pointed out, as Lovett wished, that the FY 1952 military budget had

been submitted to Congress only in late April 1951 and that available funds

had been used to get long-lead-time items started and to expand the production base. However, a variety of manufacturing and other problems had

created delays. 17

In addition to producing end items, the u.s. mobilization effort was to

create a rapidly expansible production capacity that could support combat and

mobilization requirements if a total war occurred on or after 30 June 1952. NSC

114/1 reflected confidence that the economy could sustain new programs and

satisfaction that economic controls and high civilian production had temporarily reversed the inflation of the early period of mobilization. 1M

Advising that the services expected to meet the approved force and

personnel levels for FY 1952, NSC 114/1 pointed out that the main problem

was in the materiel program, especially for long-lead-time items. Only the

Army, and then solely for initial equipment, would be "fully equipped and

substantially but not fully modernized" by the end ofJune 1952. If the Korean

conflict ended immediately, the report estimated that the Army could sustain

operations for a global war in early 1953; if the fighting lasted through

December 1951, Army readiness would be delayed until late 1953. Modernizing equipment and accumulating minimum war reserves for the Navy would

take until 1953 or 1954. The 95-wing Air Force would be substantially in

being but only partially equipped with late-model aircraft by mid-1952; wing

modernization would occur between December 1952 and June 1954, although most air wings would be able to fulfill their missions before then. I'.>

NSC 114/1 concluded that the acute danger to the United States would last

until NSC 68 rearmament objectives had been attained and that the current U.S.

effort was inadequate for many critical, long-lead-time items. Without taking

a position on current schedules for readiness, the report declared that the

president should direct all departments and agencies to increase their efforts

to secure military equipment and establish an adequate mobilization base. 20

When the NSC considered the report at its meeting on 8 August 195 I, the

president observed that it seemed "in very good shape" and asked Lovett if he

agreed. With two minor corrections, Lovett did. After remarkably little

discussion, the council adopted NSC 114/1 and Truman approved its conclusions. In addition, the president directed the NSC to establish a unit that

would regularly review the status of all national security programs. 2 I

New Force Levels for FY 1952 and FY 1953

With NSC 114/1 completed, Lovett wanted a decision from the divided

Joint Chiefs on any further military buildup for FY 1952 and joined in their
266 THE TEST OF WAR

discussions to help effect a compromise. Vandenberg accepted an Army

increase "in view of the situation in Korea" and, although still unconvinced

of the merit of the Navy's proposal, agreed to a naval increase subject to the

imminent review of force levels for FY 1953. On 15 August the JCS

recommended FY 1952 increases of 3 divisions and 17 antiaircraft battalions

for the Army within its currently authorized end strength of 1,552,000. If the

Korean War continued beyond December 1951, the Army would need to

replace battle casualties with about 68,000 new men. The Navy was to be

increased by 1 battleship, 10 submarines at reduced war complement, 19

minor combat ships, 4 carrier air groups, and 2 antisubmarine air squadrons.

The Marine Corps would add two additional regimental combat teams to

round out a third division and additional air squadrons to complete a third air

wing. The Joint Chiefs also requested new FY 1952 end strengths for the Navy

and Marine Corps of 857,390 and 236,126 respectively, a total of almost 1.1

million. They asked for an Air Force end strength of 1,200,000 and a possible

expansion to 138 combat wings by mid-1954. 22

Excluding FY 1952 costs for Korean operations, the Japanese occupation,

and additional procurement funds that might be needed later, the Joint Chiefs

estimated that the increases would require a FY 1952 supplemental budget of

almost $5 billion-$86 million for the Army, $557 million for the Navy and

Marine Corps, and $4.3 billion for the Air Force. Their FY 1952 recommendations, moreover, did not imply approval of force levels for subsequent

years. 23

Reviewing these JCS recommendations, Marshall and Lovett worried

about their possible effect on manpower levels. However, Assistant Secretary

Rosenberg supported the Army's requirement for more men if Korean hostilities continued beyond December, and she gave qualified approval of the Navy

and Marine Corps strength requests. The Air Force had entered FY 1952

almost 273,000 men short of its approved strength figure, mainly because of

its lack of facilities to house and train them, and Rosenberg deferred a

recommendation on its strength. On 18 August Lovett notified the Joint Chiefs

that Marshall had agreed to ask for presidential approval of increases in forces

for the Army and Navy but approved the Air Force increase only in principle.

Currently unwilling to consent to FY 1952 manpower increases, Marshall

planned an immediate review of the Navy and Marine requests but denied the

Air Force manpower increase for the time being. All FY 1952 manpower

figures would be reexamined in the light of FY 1953 requirements. Lovett also

agreed that the adjustments and increases would require supplemental FY

1952 appropriations. 21

Approving Marshall's decisions on 29 August, Truman in the next few

weeks increased FY 1952 Army end strength by an extra 68,000 troops
FY 1953 Budget 267

needed for hostilities in Korea past December, thus authorizing a force of

about 1.6 million. He also raised naval and Marine manpower to 820,000 and

236,000, respectively. With the Air Force held at 1,061,000, the authorized

FY 1952 armed forces end strength now reached more than 3.7 million, a

figure that was to be reviewed again in the course of preparing the FY 1953

budget. 25 As it turned out, no additional FY 1952 money was forthcoming for

these increases in force levels and manpower; the Army and Navy had to

manage the expansion within their allotted funds.

Air Force expansion and the national mobilization rate remained the two

major issues left for resolution in the FY 1953 program. Formally requesting

FY 1953 force and strength recommendations on 9 August, Lovett reminded

the Joint Chiefs to bear in mind that Defense had been "building towards

forces that could be maintained both manpower-wise and materiel-wise for so

long as a period of tension may exist." If they felt it necessary to deviate,

Lovett asked them to justify the need when they submitted their FY 1953

recommendations on 10 September. 26

Having compromised on the FY 1952 strengths and still convinced of the

need for larger forces in being in the event of intercontinental and nuclear war,

the Air Force pressed strongly for 138 combat wings plus 25 troop carrier

wings (which it now called "air cargo groups"). Units would be phased in

only as personnel, installations, and equipment became available. Of the 138

combat wings, 113 were to be combat ready by the end ofJune 1953, with

manning levels providing for 30 to 90 days of combat operations. The Air

Force asked for FY 1953 end strength of 1.2 million r

The Air Force manpower request was actually low; had it been computed

on the same manning basis as the currently authorized 95-wing Air Force, the

138-wing force would have required 1.75 million men, a number that

Vandenberg admitted would have a "shocking impact" on U.S. manpower

resources. Even accepting lower degrees of readiness for commands having no

D-Day mission and generally limiting the expansion to flying units, the Air

Force would still lack sufficient manpower if war broke out and would have

to make a "superhuman effort" for an extended time. The Air Force needed

more units and men, Vandenberg told Rosenberg, because it could not

currently fulfill its assigned role in U.S. defense. 2H

Since the Air Force goals would cut into Army and Navy requirements, the

interservice dispute quickly resurfaced. Rejecting Air Force suggestions to

drop 3 divisions from the Army and 1 battleship, 10 submarines, 4 carrier air

groups, and numerous smaller units from the Navy, the two senior services felt

that the Air Force should manage with 119 rather than 138 combat air wings

and 17 rather than 25 troop carrier groups. The Army and Navy wanted the

Air Force to support more tactical air and fewer strategic and air defense
268 THE TEST OF WAR

wings. 29 Given these serious differences, it was not surprising that the Joint

Chiefs let slip by Lovett's target date of 10 September for submission of FY

1953 force levels. On 12 September Vandenberg notified the JCS that he

would send his recommendations to Finletter for direct submission to the

secretary of defense. An apologetic Bradley informed Lovett that the Joint

Chiefs could not resolve their differences, chiefly over the number of B-36

groups for 1953 and 1954, and would send him the individual service

requests. 50 When Lovett replied that the Joint Chiefs should either submit an

agreed position or request higher level decision, Bradley personally returned

the secretary's memorandum. On 17 September the Joint Chiefs prepared a

memorandum asking Lovett for a decision from a higher level on FY 1953

forces. The next day, Lovett and Bradley agreed that a JCS reply should be

delayed until after Lovett had met with the chiefs to discuss the matter. 51

To break the deadlock, Lovett asked a trio of service representatives to try

to adjust the differences and a 14-man panel to provide answers to five

questions he thought crucial to the FY 1953 force strength decision and

Senator Brien McMahon's current demands for an all-atomic Army, Navy, and

Air Force.' Lovett wanted to know whether tactical atomic weapons would be

ready for use by 1953 or 1954, whether they would replace or reduce the

need for strategic bombing capabilities, whether guided missiles with atomic

warheads would be effective weapons in 1953 or 1954, whether the proposed

Defense requirements constituted the proper use of resources, and whether

the Air Force was justified in demanding such a large expansion in heavy

bomber wings..~2

Two days later the panel replied that it thought that prototype or even

operational tactical atomic weapons could be available by mid-195 3, but that

tactical air weapons would supplement rather than replace strategic air

weapons in the near future. It was also reasonable to expect two guided

missiles capable of carrying atomic warheads to be in production before

mid-1953 and possibly two more by mid-1954. However, the need for tactical

and strategic aircraft would not be reduced in FY 1953, although missiles

might have some effect in FY 1954. Finally, the panel disagreed with the Air

Force request to increase heavy bomber wings from 6 to 12 in FY 1953 since

it considered medium bombers both tactically and strategically effective.

Lovett had his answers. 55

On 26 September the Joint Chiefs submitted their force recommendations

• The three service representatives were Army Brig. Gen, Marcus B, Stokes. Jr,. Navy Rear Adm.

Roscoe F. Good. and Air Force Lt, (;en, Charles B, Stone, III. The panel consisted of the service

secretaries, the director of guided missiles, the ROB chairman, the WSEG research director, the

chairman of the Military Liaison Committee. and seven scientific consultants, Regarding McMahon's demands, see Chapter XXII.
FY 1953 Budget 269

for FY 1953 to Lovett: for the Army, 21 divisions with 5 at reduced strength;

for the Navy, 1,191 ships but only 16 of the 18 carrier air groups it wanted;

for the Marine Corps, 3 divisions and 3 air wings; and for the Air Force, 126

combat wings and 17 troop carrier groups. Of the 126 combat wings, 57

would be strategic, 29 air defense, and 40 tactical; 16 would not reach combat

readiness in FY 1953. 01 ' Two days later the JCS recommended manpower

strengths for FY 1953. The Army, only recently granted a FY 1952 end

strength of 1,620,000, was to be reduced by mid-1953 to 1,596,000 but

would have to be augmented if Korean hostilities extended beyond June 1952.

The Navy was expected to increase its FY 1952 end strength of 820,000 to

853,220 by mid-1953, while a small increase from 236,126 to 245,180 was

recommended for the Marine Corps. The Air Force, with an authorized FY

1952 end level of 1,061,000, was to reach 1,220,000 by the end of FY 1953. 'IS

When Lovett took the force recommendations to the White House on 2

October, the president simply initialed the memorandum. Three days later he

approved the recommendations for budget planning purposes only; as Deputy

Secretary of Defense Foster warned the services, the president's action was

not to be "construed as final approval. ".0(, Although the Air Force continued to

try to get the 126 combat wings increased to 138, the JCS refused and formally

reaffirmed to Lovett on 11 October their force and strength recommendations

of late September.r

Completing the Military Program: NSC 114/2

In July the president had ordered two followups to NSC 68/4-a status

report on programs that the NSC adopted as 114/1 on 8 August and a report

recommending revisions or modifications, to be ready by 1 October. In

preparing for the latter report-NSC 114/2-Lovett asked the JCS on 20

August to state the "objectives and minimum tasks" to be fulfilled by their

proposed FY 1953 forces, the extent to which the military program would

meet national security needs, any factors limiting the program, and their

comments on any related aspects. On 6 September the secretary called on OSD

to submit by 15 September program costs and impact studies based on the new

force levelS.-'H When the JCS force recommendations did not arrive until 26

September it delayed these studies and the overall military program, without

which NSC 114/2 was incomplete. Lovett sought and received Truman's

agreement to extend the time for the Defense input to 17 October. 0')

On 11 October the Joint Chiefs reported that they intended their

recommended force levels to provide a base for rapid expansion, maximum

deterrence to enemy aggression, and a "reasonable assurance of victory" if
270 THE TEST Of WAR

war came. to But they displayed a lack of assurance by stating also that the

force levels would be insufficient for war. Such uncertainty and ambiguity

were all too common in planning and programming during this period.

Because the Air Force had several D-Day missions, including air defense

and strategic air warfare, the JCS thought the Air Force should emphasize

strength in being, while the Army and Navy should maximize "sustaining

power and mobilization potential." The JCS anticipated that forces might

remain at the FY 1953 level through mid-1957 unless major changes occurred

in the Korean War or the world situation. Assuming the end of hostilities in

Korea by mid-1952, no general war during FY 1953, timely FY 1953

appropriations, and supplemental FY 1952 funds to pay for materiel consumed in Korea, the Joint Chiefs expected the Army to have 18 trained but not

fully equipped combat divisions by mid-1952 and 21 by 1 March 1953. A

satisfactory minimum level of Army war reserve equipment, however, would

not be reached until 1954. The Navy would have its end FY 1952 forces in

operation on 30 June 1952, but modern equipment and a minimum level of

mobilization reserves would not be totally available until sometime in calendar years 1953 and 1954. The Air Force would not be fully eqUipped and

modernized until FY 1955.

TheJCS told Lovett that to meet his dictum to maintain desired manpower

and materiel levels over a long period, units scheduled for combat would be

fully organized, manned, trained, and equipped, while noncombat personnel

would be held to the minimum necessary for effective support. All Army

overseas combat units and half of the general reserve would have 100-percent

manning levels; the rest of the general reserve and reduced strength units,

about 80 percent. Navy submarines, Marine divisions, and Marine air wings

would be at 100 percent of war complement, but the average fleet manning

level would be based on 80 percent of officer and 90 percent of enlisted rates.

Air Force flying units were to be ready for combat operations and generally

equipped for 90 days, with key combat units at war strengths. The JCS report

also included service cost estimates of $116.2 billion for the next two years,

of which $64.2 billion was for FY 1953, with shares of $21.5 billion for the

Army, $ 16.2 billion for the Navy, and $26.5 billion for the Air Force.

Informally checking, McNeil learned that the Office of Defense Mobilization thought such large budget figures for FY 1953 would create unduly

high expenditures that year. As a result, OSD reviewed the effect of a plan that

essentially continued FY 1952 approved programs, and Lovett sent forward a

military blueprint for NSC 114/2 that incorporated a FY 1953 Defense budget

estimate of only $15 billion. OSD thought that this amount would allow the

services about $ 105 hillion to spend in the three fiscal years 1952-1954, a

sum it deemed sufficient to fully equip the forces, allow expansion of the
FY 1953 Budget 271

production base, and provide a substantial amount of mobilization reserves.

Even so, the Joint Chiefs stated a requirement for $50 billion additional for

war reserves, although not all for FY 1953. Otherwise, the military program

for NSC 114/2 generally incorporated the language from the 11 October 1951

JCS memorandum, including the FY 1953 force levels."

The NSC 114/2 report that went to NSC members on 12 October

reiterated the basic U.S. strategy of creating a military shield and behind it

developing "the political, economic and social strength of the free world." It

saw USSR military capabilities as formidable compared with those of the free

world. The Soviets already possessed significant strength in atomic, biological, and chemical weapons, sufficient economic strength to sustain a major

war effort, and large, well-equipped ground forces capable of overrunning

Europe, the Near East, and Southeast Asia. Soviet air power could support

their ground forces and might achieve initial surprise in an atomic strike on

the United States. Soviet air and submarine attacks might detract from the

value of Britain and Japan as U.S. bases. The Soviets lacked only adequate

naval forces and shipping for large overseas amphibious operations. NSC

114/2 anticipated that the USSR would gain in strength over the United States

in the next few years; by mid-1953 it might have a number of long-range,

two-way bombers able to strike the United States and cripple its retaliatory

power. Currently, the West was perhaps four years away from being able to

defend Western Europe in case of attack, although by mid-1953 it might be

possible to hold important strategic positions. ,2

Given U.S. atomic superiority, NSC 114/2 thought the Soviets less likely to

initiate general war than to exploit local opportunities. General war would

become more likely when they possessed sufficient atomic capability, particularly when they had reached a point where they could seriously damage U.S.

industrial targets and hinder U.S. retaliation. With both sides having atomic

capabilities, an adequate civil defense would help to "prolong the period

when we possess potent deterrents to war. "d

NSC 114/2 also saw the Soviets facing constraints and more affected by

U.S. actions than many believed. It acknowledged that there might come a

time when the Soviets would agree to accommodation with the West; if so, the

United States and the West might possibly take the initiative in seeking

peaceful solutions. However, until Soviet power and int1uence were reduced

to acceptable limits, the Western task of creating a shield against possible

Soviet aggression was of even greater urgency than before. II

State's Policy Planning Staff agreed with the Pentagon's assumption that

general war would not come in FY 1953 and that mobilization should continue

on a limited basis, including the deferral of the $50 billion for war reserve

stocks. But the staff expressed disappointment that, despite the growing Soviet
272 THE TEST OF WAR

threat and a recommendation to accelerate national security programs, NSC

114/2 projected a FY 1953 military program that stretched out the u.s. buildup.

State planners were also troubled by delays in military assistance programs, and

they viewed the need for a national civil defense program as compelling. Nitze

emphasized to Acheson on 17 October the negative effects on the conduct of

foreign policy of a stretchout of the U.S. military buildup. '5

While the ]CS tended to regard the NSC 114/2 assessment of future Soviet

capabilities as somewhat overdrawn, it seemed more realistic when the

second Soviet atomic test, announced by the White House on 3 October 1951,

was shortly thereafter followed by a third Soviet explosion. ,6 Whereas NSC

114/2 considered that the Soviets might be able by 1953 to retard the U.S.

ability to retaliate after an attack, the Air Force believed that they already

possessed that capability provided they used most of their stockpile in a

surprise attack. State's Policy Planning Staff believed the critical question for

NSC decision was whether or not to accelerate the U.S. military bUildup.i7

When the NSC met on 17 October, Truman felt that time was getting short

for preparation of the FY 1953 budget, while the NSC Senior Staff wanted

more time to reappraise the policies and programs in the light of the new

Soviet atomic explosions. Other considerations had to be taken into account.

Acheson pressed for more military assistance deliveries to Europe, and the

director of civil defense, Millard Caldwell, sought support for his program.

When Truman declared that the military did not seem to appreciate adequately

the significance of civil defense and that he wanted to "do something" for it,

Lovett replied that it faced a wall of "hopeless public apathy." Even the civil

defense director agreed that Congress was not interested. II>

The council recommended using the various NSC 114/2 programs for

preliminary FY 1953 budget planning and holding Defense to its $45 billion

estimate. Although the rate of military buildup dominated the NSC discussion,

the participants appeared less troubled about its size than its cost, beginning

with Truman's concern over the "immense amount" of money involved in

NSC 114/2 programs. Since Congress would not grant Truman's request for a

tax increase,' Secretary of the Treasury Snyder expected deficits of possibly $6

billion in 1952, $10 billion in 1953, and $12 billion in 1954.-!Y

Lovett emphasized to the NSC that OSD's $45 billion estimate was

provisional and arbitrary and that the actual FY 1953 budget might be higher

or lower. ODM director Wilson, who only that summer had worried about the

possible inadequacy of the U.S. rearmament effort, was uneasy about the

• In I95() Congress had heeded Truman's urging to raise income taxes (PI. 81-814) and to impose

an excess profits tax (PI. 81-9(9). and these steps had led to a $:\.5 billion surplus in FY 1951. In

October 1951 Congress was willing to give Truman only 55 ...., billion of his requested S1() billion

tax increase (PI. 82-18:\).
FY 1953 Budget 273

impact of the proposed DoD program and disturbed to learn that it did not

include atomic program expansion costs. Wilson viewed a speedup of military

production as possible, but it would take the country "close to a full war

footing," with all the problems of cutbacks, dislocations, and unemployment.

Strongly disagreeing, CEA chairman Keyserling saw a gap between the urgency

of the purported threat and the adequacy of the program proposed to meet

it. * Welcoming a reappraisal, Jack O. Gorrie, the acting NSRB chairman,

suggested that the military program would require extending the period of

military service from two to three years and lowering physical standards. ~()

Following the NSC discussion, Lovett agreed with Acheson and Gorrie

that the NSC Senior Staff should reevaluate the policies and programs in the

NSC 68 and 114 series and that the president should authorize FY 1953

budget planning on the basis of NSC 114/2 programs. The military program

was to be prepared within the $45 billion estimate, leaving the $50 billion

requirement for reserve stocks for further consideration. Approving the NSC

actions on 18 October, Truman specifically noted Lovett's caveats and directed

that $45 billion would not constitute an upper or lower limit but merely

provide a point of departure for preparation of the Defense budget. I

Lovett's FY 1953 Budget Request

Among the numerous assumptions and guidelines for FY 1953 budget

planning that Lovett had conveyed on 2 October, two had special significance.

First, on the assumption that FY 1953 would be a "year of armed peace with

world tensions," U.S. forces were to be ready for combat at any time, but the

budget would not take account of combat operations during FY 1953. Second,

Korean combat operations should be expected to continue until 30 June 1952

and combat costs would be excluded from the FY 1953 budget. Any extra

Korean costs occurring in FY 1952 would presumably be covered by a

supplemental appropriation. ~2

As the NSC discussion of 17 October revealed, the cost of the FY 1953

military program was a dominant concein. Although Lovett emphasized the

tentative nature of the $45 billion estimate, the services thought it, in fact, a

ceiling. Indeed, as early as 18 October the Air Force feared that it would fail

to get its desired $7 billion supplemental for FY 1952 or $26.5 billion

appropriation for FY 1953. On 29 October when Lovett formally called for

* Although Keyserling kept his remarks at the NSC meeting to a minimum and spoke in a

measured wa\', he was sufficiently exercised about the lag in the defense program to send the

president privately on 2 November 1<)'; I a 2e.i-page amplification of his views. Sec US Dept State,

Forei~n Relations o{the {lnited States. t'J5/. 1:2·1';-';\
274 THE TEST Of WAR

budget estimates by 20 November, he referred to the figure as only a bench

mark but directed the services to develop their budgets within $45 billion and

allocated $14.5 billion to the Army, $13.0 billion to the Navy, $17.0 billion to

the Air Force, and $0.5 billion to OSD. Any additional amounts were to be

shown and justified separately. That same day McNeil asked each military

department to prepare six budget estimates-first, for the allocated amount;

then with additions of $0.5 billion, $1 billion, $2 billion, and $3 billion; and

finally, a full requirements estimate. ~~

Less money and the tightening of OSD spending controls seemed to be

the watchword. Newspaper articles in November, including a New York Times

piece by Hanson Baldwin, speculated on an expected cut in Defense expenditures and at least a tentative administrative budget ceiling of $45 billion. In

AFPC discussions of 20 November, Deputy Secretary Foster stated the figure

was "merely a benchmark," but Secretary Finletter saw it as a ceiling, and

Admiral Fechteler asserted that it was a ceiling to the people who had to

prepare the budget. Since the issue involved Pentagon relations with President

Truman, the BoB, and Congress, General Collins called for continuing toplevel policy guidance. ~l

"Neither a tloor nor a ceiling," McNeil described the $45 billion budget

estimate at a 23 November staff meeting. He also pointed out that total military

expenditures in FY 1953-not appropriations, but the money actually spentwould be about $55-57 billion. For the first time during the Korean War, the

military procurement backlog was catching up, and expenditures suddenly

threatened to exceed new obligational authority. The BoB calculated that with

foreign military assistance and the atomic energy program, national security

expenditures would exceed $62 billion; the addition of nonmilitary costs

would bring total government spending to around $82 billion. With FY 1953

yearly receipts estimated at about $72 billion, there loomed a $10 billion

government deficit even with a 545 billion Defense budget. If military

requirements for raw materials created drastic cutbacks in civilian production,

tax receipts might drop and raise the deficit even further. Meanwhile,

Congress remained opposed to any further increase in individual or corporate

taxes. With less than 520 billion available for all nonmilitary government

programs, including some 5 14 billion for mandated statutory expenditures,

the BoB doubted that it could reduce spending by 5500 million even from the

remaining $5.5 billion in programs.~~

The military services clearly found a $45 billion FY 1953 Defense budget

unacceptable. Submitting the required budget estimates on 21 November,

Secretary Kimball reported that the Navy and Marine Corps needed almost

$I 18 billion for a minimally adequate program and that Lovett's allocation of

$I 13 billion fell far short of meeting program objectives. The Army wanted
FY 1953 Budget 275

$20.5 billion rather than the aUocated $14.5 billion; the Air Force asked for

$26.7 billion, not $17.0 billion; $5 billion was needed for military public

works; and only the OSD budget remained within its allotted $0.5 billion.

Estimates for these full requirements budgets totaled almost $71 billion.

Furthermore, with $14 billion projected for military assistance and nothing

yet specified for an expanded atomic energy program, the total for national

security remained unsettled. 56

Realizing the futility of forwarding to Truman the full requirements

budget, Lovett on 6 December urged the service secretaries to revise the

estimates. He pointed out that reserve stock requests had reached absurd

proportions; for example, the Army wanted 13,900 tanks but lacked the

manpower to handle half that number. Conceding that $45 billion might be a

"little low," Lovett warned the secretaries to "wring the water" out of their

current estimates or be "drowned by the Congress in it. ,,57 At a Sunday

meeting on 11 December, when Lovett and his Defense advisers met with

representatives of the BoB, ODM, and the Office of the Director for Mutual

Security,' it became clear that a $71 billion budget was out of the question.

Moreover, McNeil's office and BoB analysts had presented a FY 1953 budget

totaling $42.6 billion in new obligational authority, excluding public works.

Under such pressure the services cut their requests to $58.3 billion, and at

OSD conferences held between 12 and 15 December both sides compromised

and Lovett made his final decisions. 5H

On 17 and 21 December Lovett submitted to Lawton a DoD budget

request for $51.9 billion in new obligational authority for FY 1953-$0.5

billion for OSD, $15.5 billion for the Army, $14.5 billion for the Navy, and

$21. 4 billion for the Air Force. In addition, Lovett expected to ask for $3.5

billion for FY 1953 military public works. Although substantially reduced

from the services' $71 billion, Lovett's budget remained considerably above

OSD's earlier figure of $45 billion. The secretary also estimated that Defense

expenditures would reach $49 billion in FY 1952 and nearly $66 billion in FY

1953. 5') As Lovett wrote Lawton, the proposed budget would continue the

policy of building a rapidly expansible mobilization base, finance certain

reserve stocks, and support and equip the forces the NSC had recommended

on 17 October-a 21-division Army, ai, 191-ship Navy, a 3-division Marine

Corps, and an Air Force of 143 (126 combat) wings by the end of FY 1954 if

possible. The budget necessarily reduced FY 1953 end strengths below the

JCS-recommended levels: to 1,586,000 for the Army, 835,875 for the Navy,

243,730 for the Marine Corps, and 1,090,000 for the Air Force. 60

• This was an agency recently estahlished under Averell Harriman to handle, among other things,

military assistance matters. See Chapter XIX.
276 THE TEST OF WAR

At a meeting on 19 December, Lawton told Lovett and Foster that $ 2 billion

further should be cut, mostly from the Navy, but the budget director sought far

greater economies yet. With total government budget requests for FY 1953

reaching $100 billion against Truman's absolute ceiling of $83 billion, Lawton

needed to cut $17 billion, and Defense seemed a prime candidate for the ax.

Since stated military requirements appeared realistic, he thought the president

would have to choose between approving FY 1953 funds for them and postponing expenditures by extending the period for meeting the requirements.

Pointing out to Truman that DoD also wanted a FY 1952 supplemental, Lawton

noted that Lovett's current expenditure estimates would create deficits of $15

billion in 1952 and between $ 10 billion and $ 29 billion in FY 1953. Lawton

doubted that Defense could actually spend at the forecast rate and thought it

more realistic to expect a $6 billion deficit in 1952 and a $17 billion one in

1953. Believing Lovett's budget proposal incompatible with a policy of limited

mobilization, Lawton asked Truman whether the government should change

its policy or the Pentagon should reduce its budget. 61

Truman's Decision to "Stretch Out"

Already troubled, Truman recognized that Lawton's question reached to

the heart of the budget problem. The president also feared that the military

program would divert critical materials from U.S. industry and private

consumption and require rigid controls. At a White House meeting on 28

December attended by Acheson, Snyder, Wilson, Harriman, and DoD officials,

Truman expressed his deep concern that the military budget might well ruin

the U.S. economy and give the Kremlin the "fruits of a hot war victory

without having to fight it." The president thought it best for the country to

stretch out the military buildup, and he set an outside limit of $60 billion for

all military and military assistance expenditures in FY 1953. 62

Obviously, Truman's expenditure limit would have an immediate impact

on the FY 1953 Defense budget. He asked everyone to speak "frankly to this

vital subject," since this would be their only opportunity. In sympathy with

Truman's goals, Lovett supported the decision, seeking only to assure that

military production rates would continue to rise even under a stretchout.

Pace, Kimball, and Finletter also spoke, but none opposed the president's

stated limitations. Bradley, too, accepted the president's judgment. With this

apparent Defense agreement, it remained for Lovett and Lawton to work out

the FY 1953 DoD budget adjustments. 65

When the BoB markup of Lovett's $51.6 billion budget came the next day,

it provided $41.6 billion, plus $2.5 billion for public works, military pay

increases, and all other items of proposed legislation-a grand total of $44.1
FY 1953 Budget 277

billion in new obligational authority for all purposes in FY 1953. Long-leadtime items were the heavy losers in the BoB markup. The Army cut of $2.3

billion included almost $2.2 billion for procurement. Of $2.9 billion in Navy

cuts, $2.0 billion was in aircraft and related procurement, shipbuilding, and

ordnance. The Air Force lost $4.S billion, $3.8 billion in aircraft and other

procurement. In addition, the BoB had lowered military strengths.()'

After feverish Pentagon activity over a New Year's holiday, Lovett agreed

to ask for restoration of $1.4 billion to the Army, $1.7 billion to the Navy, and

$4.3 billion to the Air Force, in this last instance requesting more for aircraft

and related procurement than he had originally. Sending a revised FY 1953 DoD

request for $49 billion to the president on 4January 1952, Lovett estimated that

combined defense and military assistance expenditures would not exceed $44

billion in FY 1952 or $60 billion in FY 1953. However, the secretary asked to

be allowed to combine the FY 1953 figure with $26. 5 billion of still pending

FY 1952 expenditures, for a total of $S6.5 billion in expenditures for the

IS-month period from 1January 1952 to 30June 1953. He also asked that funds

be made available to the Pentagon expeditiously and that the military departments, with the secretary's approval, be allowed to adjust amounts within the

total figure. By juggling figures in this fashion, Lovett thought he could manage

a $49 billion FY 1953 budget that would allow a steady buildup of production

facilities. Although BoB personnel, including Lawton, worked directly with

Defense officials during the preparation of this request, Lovett apparently had

no indication of their position on individual items. 6 'i

To reach Lovett's $49 billion budget, the military services would have to

accept further reductions in manpower and forces. As eventually worked out,

Army strength was reduced to 1,552,000 and Air Force strength to 1,061,000

for the end of FY 1953. The Army dropped 1 armored division from the

previously planned 21 divisions, cut 7 antiaircraft battalions, and reduced the

strength of a number of its units. Of the 126 combat wings authorized for the

Air Force, 30 would not become combat effective in FY 1953. Navy forces and

strengths remained unchanged in this second budget, but the Navy had

already suffered the loss of two much-wanted carrier air groups in the original

forces program for FY 1953 and faced delays in getting modern equipment.

Lovett viewed the proposed forces as providing a "minimum mobilization

base."()() These FY 1953 changes also eventually required reductions in the FY

1952 program to bring it into line. *6~

* Army strength for the end of FY I<)';2 was reduced to 1,';7';.000 and Air Force strength to

<)7),)';0. The armored division and seven antiaircraft battalions cut from I'Y I<)';) Army forces

were also removed from I<)';2 force strengths. Cutbacks of 2 naval carrier air groups and 2 naval

air s<.juadrons-and an increase of I cruiser-were also made effective for I'Y I<)';2. The FY 1<)';2

force ohjective of the Air Force returned to 80 combat wings and I'; troop carrier groups (wings).
TABLE 9

Development of FY 1953 Strength and Force Levels

Army Rec Navy Rec AF Rec JCS Request Lovelt Request Lovell Request Actual

Sep 51 Sep 51 Sep 51 28 Sep 51 17 Dec 51 4 Jan 52 31 Dec 52

Army

Divisions .. ........ 21 21 18 21(5R) 21(R) 20 20(6R)

RegtsIRCTs........... 18 18 18 18(2R) 18(2R) 18 18(13R)

AAA bns............. 117 117 100 117 (44R) 117(44R) 110 I 13(83R)

Other bns......... 181 181 141 - - - - End strength . . . . . - - - 1,596,000 1,586,000 1,552,000 1,523,152

Navy

Carriers, all classes ..... 27 27 27 27 27 27 29[2 temp)

Battleships . . . . . . . . 4(3R) 4(3R) 3(R) 4(3R) 4(3R) 4(3R) 4(3R)

Cruisers ............ 19 19 19 19 19 19 19

Destroyers . . . . . . . . . . . 248 248 248 248 248 248 246

Submarines........... IIO(IOR) llO(IOR) 100 110(IOR) IIO(IOR) IIO(IOR) 103(IOR)

Other active ships. . . 783 783 764 783 783 783 (715)

Total ships.......... 1,191 1,191 1,161 1,191 1,191 1,191 1,116

Air units:

Carrier groups. . . . . . . 16 18 14 16 16 16

Other squadrons . . 55 55 53 53 53 53

ZP airships/sqdns. . . . . 4 4 4 4 4 4

MC sqdns/wings , .... 33 33 27 3 3 3

MC divisions ......... 3 3 2-113 3 3 3 3

MC end strength ....... - - - 245,180 243,730 243,730

Navy end strength ..... - - - 853,220 835,875 835,875

Thtal end strength . . . . - - - 1,098,400 1,079,605 1,079,605 1,033,698

Air Force

Combat wings ........ 119 119 138[25R) 126(16R) Toward 126(30R) 83

Trp carrier wings . . . . . . 17 17 25 17(IR) 143 wings 17(IR) 15

Separate squadrons . . . . . - - 55 - by mid-54

MATS squadrons ....... - - 54 - End strength . . . . . . . . - - 1,220,000 1,220,000 1,090,000 1,061,000 957,603

Total Strength

Armed Forces . . . . - - - 3,914,400 3,755,605 3,692,605 3,514,453

Note: The table is based on data from OSD, JCS, NSC, and congressional sources available in OSD Historical Office. "R" indicates reduced manning level

for all or given number.
FY 1953 Budget 279

TABLE 10

Development of FY 1953 Defense Budget

New Obligational Authority

(in billions)

Service Lovett BoB Lovett

Estimates Request Markup Request

11 Oct 51 17 Dec 51 29 Dec 51 4 Jan 52

Army $21. 5 $15.2 $12.9 $14.3

Navy . ....... . 16.2 14.5 11.6 13.3

Air Force 26.5 21.4 16.6 20.9

OSD .. 0.5 0.5 0.5

Total 000 . $51.6 $41.6 $49.0

Military public works, etc .. $ 3.5 $ 2.5

Truman % of

Approval Service

5 Jan 52 Estimate

$14.2 66

13.2 81

20.7 74

0.5

$48.6

$ 3.5

Source: Figures are from BoB budget tahles.

Alarmed by the scale of the budget reductions, the Joint Chiefs on 4

January 1952 sent Lovett a terse message stating that the period of 1954 was

"most dangerous" for u.s. security and that the reduced FY 1953 budget

would postpone to 1956 the achievement of a U.S. military capability to meet

the threat.(lH Although Lovett immediately gave the JCS message to Truman,

the president sent Congress on 21 January a Defense request for $48.6 billion

in new obligational authority for FY 1953. A separate request later for $3.5

billion covered military public works, pay increases, and all other items of

proposed legislation. The president estimated that Defense would spend

about $51 billion in FY 1953.(,')

Even before the president sent the budget request to Congress, the BoB

began to make adjustments in the combined Defense-military assistance

expenditure limitation. On 5January 1952 Lawton telephoned McNeil that the

combined $44 billion FY 1952 limit would be lowered to $43 billion and the

combined $60 billion FY 1953 limit to $58 billion, with a $50 billion Defense

share. McNeil thought that Defense needed a $52.5 billion share and told

Lawton that the Pentagon would find it hard to justify the lower figure to

Congress "with conviction." Declaring that military assistance required a

larger share, Lawton explained equivocally that the $58 billion total was "not

intended to void the $60 billion expenditure limitation [but that) ... the

aggregate of expenditures might be about the $ 58 billion level." When Truman

granted Lovett's request to combine the remaining FY 1952 expenditures with

what was now called a "less than $60 billion" FY 1953 expenditure limit, the
280 THE TEST OF WAR

total figure was set at 585.6 billion, with a Defense share of 875.6 billion. On

10 January Lovett allocated the money to the services on a quarterly basis, for

the 18-month period.~o The final expenditure figures would have to be

adjusted again depending on the appropriation for FY 1953. This promised to

be another battle.

The Fight in Congress

In his annual budget message to Congress on 21 January, Truman pointed

to Defense as the largest single item in the budget. He estimated total

government expenditures would reach 585.4 billion in FY 1953, more than in

any year since World War II. With tax receipts estimated at only 871 billion

and the public debt expected to reach its ceiling of $275 billion by 1 July

1953, Truman wanted a "pay-as-we-go" policy and asked Congress to give him

at least the shortfall in his earlier request for additional taxes.~l But Congress,

as it turned out, preferred to make budget reductions.

The House Committee on Appropriations heard testimony from Lovett,

McNeil, and other Defense officials beginning on 22 January. Because 1952

was a presidential election year, Congress wanted to reduce the DoD budget

and adjourn before the national party conventions in July. Appalled by the

losses in Korea, confused by truce talks that did not end the fighting, and

frustrated by a Cold War that appeared endless, the American public disliked

the nation's "militarization" and questioned money spent to rearm a Europe

that it regarded as less than wholly committed to defending itself. And

members of Congress, whether Democratic or Republican, were in no mood

to ignore the public will. Appropriations Committee Chairman Clarence

Cannon made it very clear that he wanted to be "in the black at the end of the

fiscal year instead of in the red" and that Defense was the major area for . ~z

savmgs.

After taking 8,765 pages of testimony, the House Appropriations Committee reported a bill of S44.4 billion, cutting almost 9 percent from Truman's

$48.6 billion request. Army cuts of $1.7 billion came mainly in procurement

and production; Navy cuts of 81 billion reduced aircraft and shipbuilding,

including the second supercarrier; and Air Force cuts of 5 1.5 billion took a toll

in aircraft procurement, maintenance and operations, and military personnel.

The House of Representatives upheld every committee cut and eliminated

another SO.5 billion, mostly in Army and Air Force requests, bringing the

appropriation down to S43.9 billion.~01

Lovett in February viewed Truman's $48.6 billion Defense request as the

"very thin edge of an acceptable calculated risk." On 24 April he asked the
FY 1953 Budget 281

Senate to restore approximately.$3.6 billion of the $4.7 billion House cut, for

a total of $47.5 billion, and later he sought an additional $0.5 billion for

increased military pay costs. On 4 June the president submitted a reduced FY

1953 military public works budget of about $3 billion to the House, which

treated it as a first FY 1953 supplemental budget request. The total of these

two requests came to $51 billion.74 Despite Lovett's testimony in late April

that further cuts would come out of military "bone and sinew," that the Joint

Chiefs thought the current request provided inadequately for national security, and that, by contrast, the current Soviet military budget was the largest

since World War II, the senators remained committed to a Defense cut. Rather

than settle for a "minimum order of national security," Lovett argued that he

would "take the budget deficit every time at this stage of international

tensions. ,,7S

Backing Lovett, the secretaries of the military departments sought restitution of money for specific service needs. Asserting that the House bill would

put off the creation of a 126-combat-wing Air Force to July 1957, Finletter

asked the senators to restore the deleted aircraft procurement money plus

enough to assure 126 combat wings by mid-1955. Kimball tried to save the

Navy's most modern airplanes and its number one priority item, a second

supercarrier, the Saratoga. Pace stressed that 81 percent of all Korean battle

casualties came from the Army, which needed a minimum strength of

1,552,000 and even more manpower if the war continued past mid-1952.

Reminding Congress that the Army had 20 divisions with an average strength

of 17,236 and might face a 175-division Soviet force that was equivalent to 83

divisions of 17,236 men each, Pace wanted $1.14 billion restored to the

Army.76

Defense officials were equally upset by a $46 billion limit the House had

set on FY 1953 Defense expenditures. Its author, Rep. Howard W. Smith,

claimed that his amendment would save money, help balance the budget, and

enable Congress once again to control the federal budget. Enthusiastically

supporting Smith, Rep. Frederic R. Coudert, who had earlier advanced a

similar idea, asserted that passage of Smith's amendment would assure that

the Pentagon would "no longer rule the nation." A coalition of Republicans

and southern Democrats provided a House majority vote of 220 to 131 to pass

the amendment, which limited the full use of both new and previously

appropriated money. 77

To the Pentagon the $46 billion congressional limitation on expenditures

appeared seriously damaging. Lovett estimated FY 1953 expenditures in the

range of $52 billion, including deliveries of many long-Iead-time items

ordered under earlier appropriations. In fact, Defense Production Administrator Manly Fleischmann expected FY 1953 to become the "first year of
282 THE TEST OF WAR

visible and substantial accomplishment in the field of munitions production."

Some senators seemed to think that previously appropriated money was

sitting in the Treasury and would not be affected by Smith's $46 billion

expenditure limitation. It fell to Lovett to explain that this was not true. Since

it was already too late to achieve major savings in the first half of FY 1953, the

services would have to make drastic reductions in the second half, canceling

important contracts on which partial payments had already been made and

losing some equipment nearly completed and ready for delivery. Even if the

limitation order were later rescinded, Lovett feared that Defense contractors

might become unwilling to deal with a department "subject to such violent

fluctuations." In his words, the amendment threatened the "whole doctrine

of this country ... to substitute machinery for men in fighting." He likened

the limitation to amputating an arm to save the cost of a coatsleeve. *-H

Following Lovett's testimony, the Senate Committee on Appropriations

eliminated the expenditure limitation. But the committee's final report of 27

June recommended a Defense appropriation of only 543.4 billion, compared

with the $43.9 billion in the House bill, most of the cut coming in Air Force

procurement and maintenance and operations. The Senate approved a total of

544.1 billion, giving the Air Force $668 million more. some of this money as

unfinanced contract authority for which funds would have to be appropriated

later.-Y

The results of congressional conferences. approved by voice vote on 5

July, eliminated both the House spending limitation and the Senate grant of

contract authority. The Senate's restitution of funds was generally upheld, and

the Navy received authority to proceed with its second supercarrier, using

funds on hand. PL 82-488, signed by Truman on 10 July, granted Defense

544.3 billion in new obligational authority. In all, Congress had cut the

president's request by close to 10 percent, with the Army the big 10ser.Ho

The military public works budget, treated as the first FY 1953 supplement, followed close on the heels of the basic bill and demonstrated the

congressional temper even more emphatically than the first bill. From the

president's request of 52.99 billion on 4 June. the House cut $806 million.

When 000 requested restoration of $ 21 0 million, the Senate Committee on

Appropriations removed over 52 billion more. leaving a mere $141.4 million,

and the Senate approved a bill for only S143.4 million. After the congressional

conference agreed to restore most of the money cut by the Senate, Congress

approved almost 52.3 billion. On 15 July the president signed PL 82-547, an

appropriation that cut his original request by about 23 percent. HI

* The principal argument against the Smith amendment was that Congress was acting improperly

in seeking to limit retroactively the use of money alread\' appropriated,
FY 1953 Budget 283

TABLE 11

FY 1953 Basic Appropriation

New Obligational Authority

(in billions)

Army .

Navy .

Air Force .....

OSD.

Pay request ....

Total DoD

President's Apvd by

Request Congress % of Services'

21Jan52 5 Jul 52 % Reduced Orig Request

514.200 512.240 14.0 57

. ......... 13.200 12.265 7.1 76

20.700 19.388 6.3 73

0.466 0.410 12.0

48.566 44.302*

0.470

$49.036 $44.302 9.7

* Discrepancy due to rounded figures.

The Department of Defense under Lovett received no further funds. In

one of his last official acts, Truman submitted on 10 January 1953 a second

supplemental FY 1953 request of $ 1.2 billion for Defense personnel pay.

Congress did not act until after the new administration took office and then

simply authorized the services to transfer $1.07 billion from already available

appropriations (PL 83-11). H2 Although the Korean War still dragged on in the

Far East, the time of easy money for the Pentagon had clearly passed.

The earmarking of almost 44 percent of all FY 1953 Defense funds for the

Air Force affirmed a greater emphasis on air power, albeit the buildup was

stretched out. This emphasis may be viewed as the normal progression toward

the balanced military forces planned under NSC 68 and NSC 114, since the Air

Force had fallen behind the other services in attaining approved force

strength, primarily because of delays in procurement of aircraft. At the same

time, and of greater significance for long-term strategy and programs, the

policies that shaped the FY 1953 budget-the stretchout of the military

buildup and the priority on air power-clearly foreshadowed the "New

Look" of the Eisenhower administration.
284 THE TEST OF WAR

TABLE 12

FY 195:\ Appropriations

New Obligational Authority

(in billions)

By Appropriation"

FY 195:\ portion of Urgent Deficiency

Appropriation Act, 1952

Basic 195:\ Appropriation Act.

First Supplemental (Military Public

Works) .

Second Supplemental

Total DoD .

By Department"

Army .

Navy.

Air Force .

OSD

Total DoD

$ 0.:\68

44:\02

2.290

0.000"

546.961

SI:\.19.f

12.628

20.588

.550

$46.961

Air InterBy Major Category' Army :'\Iavy Force deptl lbtal

Military Personnel . ......... 54.:\89 5:\.1"15 5:\.200 $ 10.744

Operations &

Maintenance ........... 4.:\50 2.889 :\.614 10.85:\

Major Proc & Pdn . 2.7:\6 5.:\16 11.750 19.802

Aircraft (0.025) 0·2""'6) (10.510) (15.811)

Ships & harbor craft (0.050) (0.624) ( 0.(74)

Other. ........ (2.661) (1416) (1.240) ( 5.:\17)

Acq & Constr Real Prop 0.586 0.:\6:\ 1.200 0.140 2.289

Civilian Components... 0.298 0.2.f I 0.186 0.725

Research & Development 0.458 OS"'I 0.600 0.0:\5 1.664

Industrial Mobilization 0.0:\1 0.020 0.004 0.055

Establishment-wide

Activities. 0.:\46 ().08:\ 0.0:\4 0.:175 0.826

]<Jtals ... ........... 51:\.194 $12.628 520.588 50.550 546.961

Note: Figures do not add in all instances because of rounding.

a Table EISED-054 OASD(C), 2:\ Jun 54, OSD Hist.

" Ibid.

c Table EISED-117 OASD(C). 7 .Ian 5:1. OS)) His!. includes S1.2 billion for personnel costs

requested in the second supplemental FY 195:\ but never received. As a result this category has

been reduced by 5786 million for the Army, 520:\ million for the Navy, 518:1 million for the Air

Force. and 526 million from interdepartmental establishment-wide activities.

" No new money; S1.07 billion from already available Defense appropriations authorized for

ohligation during FY 19';:1.
CHAPTER XV

The Last Truman Budget

The initiation of work on the FY 1954 budget followed hard on the

presentation of the FY 1953 budget to Congress in January 1952. This last

Truman budget was an exercise in uncertainty, for immediately after its

submission to Congress in January 1953 it became subject to reassessment and

change by a new administration. 1 In his last year in office, President Truman

nevertheless wanted to develop a tight budget for FY 1954 that would assure

the continuity of adequate, effective, and affordable military forces for the

United States.

In the Pentagon, Lovett and the military services recognized that the

continuing large Defense requirements would encounter serious funding

difficulties. The debates in Congress over the FY 1953 Defense budget and the

cuts in appropriations augured that, barring a major new international crisis,

the Pentagon would find it more difficult to secure money. In the FY 1952 and

FY 1953 budgets Lovett had supported appropriations for many long-leadtime items, and the military services already had in hand from the FY

1951-52 budgets huge amounts of unexpended funds that would carryover

for several more years. These funds would help tide the services over during

the anticipated straitened, more austere postwar years. From the standpoint of

the administration and Congress, the large carryover of funds made possible

smaller military appropriations for FY 1954 and thereafter.

Coming at a time of continuing great uncertainty about the war in Korea

and world conditions in general, the FY 1954 budget preparation brought to

the surface a profusion of underlying issues. The inherent conflict between

OSD and the military services manifested itself in sharply different analyses

and interpretations of military capabilities, resources, and requirements, with

the budget requests the ultimate resolution. OSD frequently considered

service andJCS estimates of force requirements and funds for Korea and other

285
286 THE TEST Of WAR

programs too high and even exaggerated. Lovett and his top aides-Foster,

McNeil, Rosenberg, and Nash-had to find an accommodation between the

powerful pressures for more men and money from the services and the no less

powerful pressures from the administration and Congress to keep a tight lid on

spending.

The military services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff faced the necessity of

striking a balance between the requirements for the Korean War and those for

other major claimants to resources-European defense, the Strategic Air

Command, and continental defense. The administration and OSD, continually

assuming an early termination of hos,tilities, preferred to fund combat costs in

Korea by supplemental appropriations late in the fiscal year or in the next

year's budget. Consequently, the military had to meet the war's demands for

manpower and money from already available resources, sometimes to the

detriment of other programs. This juggling of resources disturbed the military,

who kept insisting that the war be funded on a regular fiscal year basis,

moving the war's termination date year by year. This difference over the war's

termination date and the timing of funding of war costs occasioned sharp

exchanges between OSD and the services during consideration of the FY 1954

budget. In the end, Lovett often found it necessary and desirable to compromise differences, at times restoring manpower levels and money and at other

times insisting on reductions in estimates.

A Continuing Problem: Korean Combat Costs

One of the first issues encountered in preparation of the FY 1954

budget-how to pay for current Korean combat costs-revealed the difficulty

of reconciling military requirements with budgetary policy. The basic DoD

budget for a given year generally included the costs for personnel and normal

maintenance and operations in Korea, but it did not provide for replacement

of equipment consumed in combat. Since combat consumption rates were

unpredictable, it seemed sensible to include them in a supplemental budget,

meanwhile allowing the Korean combat forces priority on all available

materiel and other resources. The services had been put out when Congress

did not provide sufficient supplemental FY 1952 funds to replace the items

used in Korea. 2 Even worse from the JCS standpoint, the basic budget for FY

1953, greatly reduced from the original service estimates, was supposed to

cover only part of the FY 1952 Korean combat cost and could include no

funds for such costs in FY 1953.

Considering it impractical to assume the war would end by 30 June 1952,

the JCS on 16 January asked Lovett to assume for planning purposes that
The Last Truman Budget 287

Korean hostilities would "continue through any fiscal year then being

considered," subject to quarterly review. Thus, for the FY 1954 budget,

combat would be assumed to continue to 30 June 1954..3 Assistant Secretary

Rosenberg, however, advised Lovett that such an assumption would strongly

affect FY 1953 manpower planning for the Army and Marine Corps, both of

which had large numbers of ground troops in Korea. Under the current "no

combat" assumption, the two services had to absorb the combat pipeline

(which provided rotation and casualty replacements for Korea) within their

authorized strength; if hostilities were assumed to continue to 30 June 1953,

the services would undoubtedly require additional strength. Since lead time

for training took at least six months, the services needed to know immediately

whether or not to provide for a combat pipeline in FY 1953. Rosenberg told

Lovett she needed advice from the Joint Chiefs since their views would affect

planning for the April draft call. 4

Responding to Rosenberg's questions, the Joint Chiefs informed Lovett on

15 February that they did not want the services to absorb the combat pipeline

within authorized FY 1953 strengths; to do so would adversely affect Army

and Marine Corps readiness and, to a lesser degree, that of the Air Force.

Moreover, the services would need to continue the combat pipeline for six

months after the end of hostilities, diminishing it gradually thereafter. The JCS

recommended FY 1953 strength increments of 92,000 soldiers, 19,954

marines, and 65,000 airmen, a total of almost 177,000, and increases in

service expenditure ceilings to meet these requirements. Thus, more than four

months before the start of FY 1953, they notified Lovett that in view of these

recommendations, a supplemental budget would be necessary. 5

Supporting the JCS recommendations, Secretary of the Army Pace

pointed out that the lack of agreed manpower levels for FY 1953 would cause

trouble in planning the FY 1954 budget. He urged Lovett to renew his efforts

to secure an early NSC decision on planning assumptions, including force

levels and the continuation of Korean hostilities. 6 Late in March Lovett told

Rosenberg that the president had approved the FY 1953 estimates on the basis

of "no hostilities in Korea" and that he understood a supplemental appropriation might become necessary if the war continued. 7

By late May it was already too late to help the services in the first half of

FY 1953 because of the lead times involved. To provide trained personnel for

the combat pipeline in the second half, Rosenberg wanted Lovett to take the

matter to the National Security Council. Drafting a memorandum for Lovett's

signature, Rosenberg asked McNeil for costing advice and support. 8 Early in

June the Joint Chiefs renewed their request for adoption of the assumption

that Korean hostilities would "continue through any fiscal year being considered" and requested Lovett's approval of the assumption that combat would
288 THE TEST OF WAR

continue at least until mid-1953. At an AFPC meeting on 10 June, concerned

Pentagon leaders asked Foster for immediate action to avoid interruptions in

the procurement of materiel and personnel for the combat pipeline. Immediately after the meeting, Foster turned to McNeil for recommendationsY

On 17 June McNeil made the case against an increase in authorized force

levels, a supplemental FY 1953 budget request, or even the use of available

funds for a manpower increase. Since the value of military equipment

currently on order plus funds available for further purchases equaled

"perhaps twenty times the Korean requirements," McNeil felt that the

Pentagon should not ask for more money. Since it would cost almost $1 billion

for a 177,000-man augmentation, and even a modest increase of 44,000

soldiers and 7,000 marines would add $281 million, McNeil wanted the

services to use planned mobilization reserves to meet combat needs and

replace them later, a course more or less followed during the previous two

years. While such action would delay building to full mobilization reserve

requirements and involved some risk, he suggested that there would soon be

a pool of over 500,000 fully trained veterans, many with recent battle

experience. By not increasing strengths, Defense would avoid the additional

manpower cost and have money to sustain high production levels for a longer

time. With Congress determined to hold down military expenditures McNeil

told Rosenberg that he wanted these factors brought out clearly. 10

In responding to Foster, McNeil followed the same argument he had used

with Rosenberg. Pointing to a current carryover of about $58 billion in

unexpended funds in addition to the expected new FY 1953 funds, McNeil

considered it inadvisable to ask for more money. He recommended that the

services use basic FY 1953 funds for combat operations continuing through

30 June 1953, just as they had done the year before. Agreeing, Lovett signed

a directive to the service secretaries and Joint Chiefs on 24 June. 11

Still, the secretary had reservations about McNeil's argument on strength

levels. In Lovett's view, the armed forces were supposed to attain in FY 1953

a "level of operational readiness recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and

approved by the National Security Council." Hostilities beyond June 1952

would divert military manpower, reduce readiness below the approved levels,

and thus potentially limit military effectiveness. Since veterans could not be

recalled to duty except in an all-out emergency, Lovett thought that McNeil's

argument that discharged veterans were available as a mobilization potential

constituted "a change in concept as to the composition of the nation's ready

forces. " 12

Following Rosenberg's recommendation, Lovett on 2 July forwarded the

problem for NSC consideration, suggesting that the final number be determined only after the principle was established. This request, which became
The Last Truman Budget 289

known as NSC 134, "Implications of Continued Hostilities in Korea," limited

NSC consideration to the combat personnel pipeline, although Lovett seemed

ready to consider a change in the assumption regarding Korean hostilities to

cover the entire Defense program. Both the service secretaries and the JCS

apparently misunderstood his position. 13

Pressure from the services brought the larger issue to a head in the

summer of 1952. On 9 July Pace reminded Lovett that the 30 June 1952

planning date for the end of the war had already passed, and asked him to

obtain approval for the 92,000-man Army increase, the necessary additional

money, and the expenditure authority. Navy Secretary Kimball and Marine

Corps Commandant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., now wanted an increase

of 13,768 for a Marine Corps combat pipeline. Finletter wrote Lovett that the

Air Force was covering current Korean combat needs in expectation of a

supplemental FY 1953 budget. 14 The Joint Chiefs blamed a two-year delay in

materiel combat readiness on the "imposed unrealistic planning assumptions

regarding the cessation of hostilities in Korea, coupled with the attendant

delay in not being able to budget in advance for the materiel consumed

there." IS

On 31 July Pace wrote Lovett about the war's high consumption of

mobilization reserve supplies, many items of which were at "dangerously low

levels." If general war began, Pace claimed, the' 'Army could support no more

combat operations than the equivalent of those in Korea." Blaming these

results on a "budgetary policy which, as you know, the Army has never

considered sound and which I now regard as imperative to be changed," Pace

urged that the Army be allowed to prepare a FY 1953 supplemental budget

and include combat support in the FY 1954 budget. 16

Reacting strongly to Pace's memorandum, Lovett replied that the Army

had previously accepted the deferred financing of Korean combat usage and

that neither Pace nor Collins had ever raised the issue with Truman at White

House budget conferences. Apparently forgetting the JCS request ofJanuary,

Lovett reminded Pace that it was only in June that the Joint Chiefs had

recommended the inclusion of Korean combat needs in new budgets. He felt

there were serious objections to accepting the assumption that "we will be at

war two years from now." Insisting that the Army did not lack money,

particularly since it had ended FY 1952 with $1.4 billion not even obligated,

Lovett informed Pace that what the Army needed was more production of

equipment. ''Against the background of facts so far presented to me," Lovett

found "the 'no funds' excuse offered to you and to me ... tiresomely

threadbare. ', 17

Without agreement in the Pentagon, NSC 134 languished. Hoping to

settle the matter within Defense, Foster requested a delay in NSC consider-
290 THE TEST OF WAR

ation. At DoD request the council eventually canceled NSC 134. For the FY

1953 budget, the official planning date for the end of combat in Korea

remained 30 June 1952 long after that date passed, and the problem of

handling Korean combat costs remained an unresolved issue between the

services and the defense secretary. 111

Status ofPrograms: NSC 135

By September 1952 the Pentagon was deeply involved in the policy

review preceding the FY 1954 Defense budget. Continuing the reappraisal of

national security policy and strategy as developed in the NSC 68 and NSC 114

series, Truman had earlier asked for submission of program status reports on

1 August and an assessment of FY 1954 programs by 1 October. Once these

were finished, the budget could be completed. Despite the logical progression

of steps that Truman outlined, the work proceeded more or less concurrently.

In fact, on 28 June the president directed that FY 1954 military service

budgets be submitted to Lovett on 2 September and be based on currently

approved strength figures. Every effort was to be made to meet commitments

and missions within this strength. Lovett was to submit the Defense budget

estimate to the BoB by 1 November, only one month after completion of the

NSC assessment, and Truman planned to make a final decision by 1

December. 19

To prepare a status report on the military program, later incorporated in

NSC 135, Lovett asked the services to appoint representatives and charged

McNeil and Frank Nash, his assistant for international security affairs, with

seeing to the report's completion. By 26 July they had a draft ready. It

indicated that as of 30 June 1952 the Army temporarily exceeded its approved

strength of 1,575,000 and had reached its FY 1952 force objectives. The Navy

had a total of 1,176 combatant ships against its approved force objective of

1,191 ships, but it had 2 more heavy carriers than programmed, the result of

special authorization to keep 4 in the Far East. Its 16 carrier air groups and the

3 Marine air wings were all in being, and both Navy and Marine manpower

approached approved FY 1952 end strengths. The Air Force, slightly over its

30 June 1952 manpower objective of 973,350, had activated 80 combat and

15 troop carrier wings. Under the president's approved FY 1953 budget, the

Air Force did not expect to reach 126 combat wings until 30 June 1955. 20

Readiness levels varied widely in mid-1952. Depending on the unit, the

Army rated its divisions as having from 95 to 111 percent of their personnel

on hand; Navy on-hand ratings ranged from 68 to 91 percent; the Marine

Corps was at almost 100 percent; and the Air Force varied from 77 percent to
The Last Truman Budget 291

100 percent. Unit training uniformly ranked somewhat lower. The services

generally rated equipment on hand as high and modernized equipment on

hand as low. 21

Given these circumstances, the services and the Joint Chiefs qualified the

military capability to carry out NSC 114/2 missions. The Army thought it

could support combat operations during the first several months of a general

war only at the level of Korean War operations; if that war continued after

general war started, the total number of troops in action would drop initially

because of new pipeline demands. Inability to perform all Army missions

derived from insufficient reserve stocks, an inadequate mobilization base, and

low strength and readiness in the General Reserve. The Navy and Marine

Corps rated their ability to initiate D-Day tasks as good and improving, but

their ability to sustain and expand initial plans would remain unsatisfactory

until they received funds to stockpile sufficient war reserves. The Air Force

felt that it possessed a very limited capability to defend the Western Hemisphere and only a limited capability to carry out a strategic offensive. If

Korean combat continued during a general war, the Air Force would be hard

pressed to defend European lines of communication or to contribute to NATO

or Far Eastern defense. Its capabilities would improve under a continued

buildup. 22

The services and the Joint Chiefs agreed that the Korean War had led to

some positive results: It had increased manpower strength, provided battle

training, improved military doctrine and techniques, and furthered the

production and testing of new weapons. At the same time, the war had so

"dangerously depleted or exhausted" equipment reserves from World War II

that, even with increased production, there was a net drain on reserve stocks.

The Army claimed a $1.8 billion shortage in hard goods and reported that if

fighting continued it could not restore its pre-Korea position during FY 1953.

The Air Force claimed an attrition rate of 790 aircraft per year, compared with

80 per year prior to Korea. The JCS again contended that the failure to budget

in advance for Korean combat usage had delayed materiel combat readiness by

approximately two years. Korean requirements, they asserted, also accounted

for lagging military assistance deliveries to allies, a retardation in the reserve

programs, and some "strategic maldeployment" of u.s. forces. 23

Fully aware of the military tendency toward "worst case" presentations,

McNeil and Nash regarded the evaluation as overly pessimistic and suggested

modifications to Lovett. They felt that the Air Force capability to defend the

Western Hemisphere should be upgraded from very limited to limited and that

the Army's assessment of its initial ability to support general war operations

only at the level of Korea should be modified to indicate that this level

included the support necessary to meet a possible major Chinese offensive.
292 THE TEST OF WAR

Regarding these alterations as minor and not involving questions of substance,

Lovett accepted them. 24

McNeil and Nash also proposed that the report omit assertions about

materiel attrition and retardation in reaching materiel readiness since the examples were inaccurate. Lovett forwarded the status report with the suggested

changes, telling the services and the Joint Chiefs that he would include their

claims only if they supplied adequate supporting data. 2~ On 29 August theJoint

Chiefs agreed to the deletion of their two-year materiel retardation contention

but otherwise supported the Army and Air Force claims. Rejecting the claims,

Lovett disputed the accuracy of the Army figures and asserted that the Air Force

had received 5 new planes, generally of far superior caliber, for every combat

loss, the net increase exceeding 2,000 aircraft. 26

The differences between the services and the secretary demonstrated that

the increase in military strength that had occurred between mid-1950 and

mid-1952 could be viewed in two ways. On the one hand, the new numbers

appeared small in comparison with the perceived threat and the military

responsibilities; on the other hand, they showed a reassuring growth. Armed

forces strength had risen from fewer than 1.5 million in mid-1950 to more

than 3.6 million in mid-1952. The Army had gone from 10 to 20 divisions; the

Navy had expanded from 618 to 1,176 active combat ships and from 9 to 16

carrier air groups; the Marine Corps had increased from 2 to 3 divisions and

from 2 to 3 air wings; and the current Air Force strength of 80 combat wings

and 15 troop carrier wings approximately doubled the 42 combat and 6 troop

carrier wings of 1950. The strategic wings, the Air Force's prized offensive

force, had risen from 21 to 37. Although not all military units had fully

modern equipment, a large number of u.s. factories were tooled up for future

production. If general war occurred, the effort might appear puny. Measured

against the limited war in Korea, however, the rearmament achievement

seemed impressive. 27

The final military status report, joined to the other reports in NSC 135,

came up for consideration at an NSC meeting on 3 September. When Acheson

declared that he was "scared to death to have so many copies of so vital a

document around," Lovett echoed his fear, and the president directed the

return of all copies to the NSC. The business of the day then became NSC

135/1, the reappraisal of past programs. 2H

Reappraisal of Objectives and Strategy

By 3 September NSC 135/1 had already been under informal discussion in

Defense for some months. Commenting in July on an early draft, the service
The Last Truman Budget 293

secretaries told Lovett that it inadequately reflected increases in the free

world's relative strength; they expressed concern about its generally defeatist

tone. They suggested measures for reducing Soviet power without greatly

increasing the risk of all-out war, chiefly through political and psychological

operations. Questioning the paper's view that the United States should

develop a "greater capacity . . . to commit appropriate military forces for

limited objectives," they doubted that any additional u.s. forces should be

created and asked for increased flexibility in the use of free world forces. 29

By late August 1952, a reworked NSC 135/1 reaffirmed the basic goals and

policies developed earlier in the NSC 20, 68, and 114 series. It pointed to the

fundamental problem that although U.S. and Allied military readiness had

vastly improved, Soviet bloc strength, particularly atomic, had also substantially improved-to such an extent that U.S. vulnerability to direct attack,

already serious, would probably become critical within a few years. Barring

preemptive action, there seemed little likelihood of stopping Soviet atomic

growth. To deter the USSR from risking general war and to reduce its

opportunities for local aggression and political warfare, the free world had to

maintain sufficient overall strength, especially strategic offensive forces that

could inflict great damage on the USSR. Substantial improvements in civil

defense could help the United States absorb an initial Soviet atomic attack and

still strike back. ~()

NSC 135/1 encouraged the use of U.S. economic resources to buttress free

world strength and stability and urged the continuation of the U.S. policy of

a limited mobilization. It stated that the country should accept a degree of

vulnerability to attack and avoid undue emphasis on defensive measures at the

expense of U.S. offensive capability. It also cited the need to commit military

forces or materiel aid to combat local aggression and subversion in vital areas

such as the Middle East and Far East. If it was important to deter the start of

general war, it was also important to avoid losing any crucial lesser battles in

the Cold War.·" I

There was criticism of NSC 135/1 in the Pentagon. Although the Joint

Chiefs favored an expeditious military buildup and for the most part approved

the report, they looked with less favor on the possible use of U.S. military

forces in local wars, which might lead to deployments that could diminish

readiness for general war. Rosenberg warned Lovett that the decreasing U.S.

manpower pool would not substantially improve before 1960.~2 The secretaries of the military departments responded individually, agreeing on the

need for collective action to deter local aggression. ~~

For the NSC meeting on 3 September, Lovett prepared to deal with the

objection ofJack Gorrie, chairman of the National Security Resources Board,

that NSC 135/1 unduly favored offensive over defensive capabilities; Gorrie
294 THE TEST OF WAR

wanted a major national effort to correct the imbalance. Warning Lovett that

Gorrie was raising a major issue, the DoD representative working on NSC

135/1 suggested that u.s. offensive military forces capable of destroying

enemy atomic weapon carriers and bases at the source might constitute both

the best deterrent and the best defense. He wanted Lovett to resist any effort

to set impracticable goals for the defense of the United States. 34

At the NSC meeting Lovett complained that the draft had too belligerent

a tone and might even hold the "connotation of preventive war." As for Gorrie's

suggestions about continental defense, Lovett thought that there might not be

even an hour's warning in case of an actual attack and noted that World War

II had shown that about 75 percent of attacking aircraft would reach their

targets. The cost of an absolute defense of critical U.S. target areas would be

prohibitive, and no amount of effort would enable the passive defense agencies

to operate "with maximum efficiency." More worried about suitcase bombs

than an overt Soviet attack, Lovett did not think the civil defense problem

should be allowed to delay completion of NSC 135/1. With Acheson and

Harriman generally in favor of the report, the council referred NSC 135/1 back

to its senior staff for revision. The following day the president directed Acheson, Lovett, and Harriman to reexamine U.S. resource allocation. 35

A revised text of 17 September reaffirmed that, short of provoking war,

the United States should initiate measures to diminish Soviet control and

influence and to "foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system" to

the extent that the Kremlin would observe "generally accepted international

standards." Even at the risk of general war, the United States should seek to

block expansion of Soviet power. Responding to DoD criticisms, the report

accepted the services' suggestion for collective security in areas beyond the

Soviet bloc and called for encouragement and assistance in regional defense

and the development of indigenous forces, including consideration of the use

of U.S. resources in collective military action. The new phrasing, according to

Charles Bohlen, amounted to a "considerable watering down of the earlier

wording," bringing NSC 135/2 in line with existing policyY' Although the

Joint Chiefs were now satisfied, the service secretaries objected that the report

completely precluded unilateral U.S. action. The NSC Senior Staff agreed that

it had not meant to preclude unilateral action under all circumstances. 37

At an NSC meeting on 24 September, Foster indicated the Pentagon's

general approval of NSC 135/2. Acheson, although pleased with the report,

urged strengthening of the provision for possible unilateral U.S. action,

particularly in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, where it had proved

difficult to achieve satisfactory collective security arrangements. The council

adopted NSC 135/2 with Acheson's change, and the president formally

approved the final version as NSC 135/3 on 25 September. 38
The Last Truman Budget 295

The NSC meeting ended efforts within the Truman administration to

improve civil defense. When Gorrie again brought up the matter, particularly

in terms of a continental early warning system, Foster thought the cost

estimates greatly understated. Truman considered the matter of "greatest

importance," but the potential cost obviously disturbed him, and he merely

asked Defense to make a new cost survey. The administration took no

significant decisions on civil defense thereafter. Accordingly, it remained for

the Eisenhower administration to grapple with the difficult problem of

continental defense. 39

FY 1954 Estimates

Before the president approved NSC 135/3, Lovett had already received

the services' military budget estimates for FY 1954. On 11 March 1952 theJCS

had recommended a 21-division Army with an end strength of 1,596,000

soldiers, a 1,200-ship Navy of 850,000 sailors, a 3-division, 3-air-wing Marine

Corps of 248,797, and an Air Force consisting of 126 combat wings, 17 troop

carrier wings, and 1,220,000 personnel. They based these FY 1954 strengths

on the given assumption that Korean combat would end by 30 June 1953.

Approving the force levels for budgetary purposes, Lovett reduced the FY

1954 proposed manpower strengths to those currently approved for the end

of FY 1953: an Army of 1,550,000, a Navy of 835,875, a Marine Corps of

243,730, and an Air Force of 1,061,000.40

In the FY 1954 budget guidelines sent out on 7 April, Lovett stated as the

primary objective the maintenance of a high state of readiness for approved

peacetime forces and improvement of their mobilization potential while

preserving a strong national economy. The military services could assume

no combat consumption in FY 1954. In July the JCS set FY 1954 manning

levels· consistent with the previous year's. But in August, RDB Chairman

Walter G. Whitman wrote Lovett that "total force requirements cannot be

reduced at this time on the basis of new weapons and techniques." He

• All Army units were to be manned at full strength except for 5 divisions, 2 regiments, and 44

antiaircraft battalions at approximately SO-percent strength. The average fleet manning level was

to be 80 percent of officer and 90 percent of enlisted wartime complements, with fleet marine

forces and submarines at approximately 100 percent. Naval aviation units were to have the

"minimum adequate pilot level" but not to reach wartime complements, while shore personnel

were to be kept to the minimum necessary to support active units. In the Air Force, the strategic

bomber, reconnaissance, and fighter units, along with necessary supporting elements, were to be

at peace strength with a 25-percent crew augmentation. Air defense units in the United States,

Alaska. and the northeast approach were to be at peace strength augmented to provide 24-hour

per day alert capability. All air defense units not on 24-hour alert, military air transport

squadrons, tactical air units. and all other units were to be at peace strength.
296 THE TEST OF WAR

emphasized that the development of a "strong capability for effective delivery

of the A-bomb to check an initial Soviet attack is a matter of highest

urgency. " .. I

Submitting the Navy's FY 1954 budget estimate on 2 September, Kimball

termed minimal the Navy's request for about $15.5 billion; it conformed "in

spirit and letter" with Defense guidelines and Navy program objectives.

Finletter claimed that the basic Air Force budget of $ 17.1 billion accepted

"very substantial and possibly dangerous risks," with most equipment and

supplies provided on a peacetime basis, no provision for reserve aircraft, and

only limited quantities of guided missiles, ammunition, and petroleum

products to be procured. The Air Force said it accepted the risk because it

understood the secretary of defense and the Joint Chiefs favored doing so.

Finletter also included a $2 billion incremental budget, primarily for procurement of about 1,400 reserve aircraft and additional ammunition and petroleum products, and a second $2 billion increment for "highest priority

requirements" if war occurred on or after 30 June 1954. Despite the tone of

austerity, the Air Force based its budget on a FY 1954 end strength of

1,087,000, rather than Lovett's planning figure of 1,061,000.'2

The Army based its request for $16.2 billion in new obligational authority

on Lovett's strength guidelines and on continuing the FY 1953 force level of

20 divisions rather than 21 as recommended by the Joint Chiefs. Surprisingly,

it also included a second lower budget based on its belief that any new Army

appropriation would be held to approximately $12 billion, an amount which,

according to Acting Secretary Bendetsen, would necessarily mean a reduced

Army strength and entail major risks. However, since the Army provided no

backup for the smaller budget, McNeil finally decided that he would have to

use the larger figure. 4:1 Concurring with the analysis of Rosenberg's office that

the Army should be told to man 21 divisions with fewer personnel-a move

"designed to forestall" a later Army request for more men for the twenty-first

division-Lovett asked Pace to submit revised FY 1954 budget estimates based

on 21 divisions and an end strength of 1,487,000, with priority on units

currently needed for operations and emergency war plans. fl

Pace contended that the lowered strength would adversely affect the

Army's ability to meet its NATO commitments and approved FY 1955 plans.

He defended the request for 20 divisions and pointed out that the original

decision to form a twenty-first had been based on an Army strength of

1,596,000. Lovett countered on 21 October: He appreciated the "splendid

cooperation" of Army representatives during the manpower review process

and agreed to 20 Army divisions, but he reduced the Army's FY 1953 end

strength to 1,519,000 and kept the FY 1954 end strength at 1,487,OOO."'s

Thoroughly alarmed, Pace and Collins went to Lovett the next day to discuss
The Last Truman Budget 297

this "critically important" question. The Army wanted to use 1,552,000 as a

FY 1954 beginning, ending, and average strength, and Lovett agreed to

reconsider during the budget hearings he was about to begin. 46

By this time all the services knew they were in for another budget fight,

since McNeil's office, working with BoB representatives, had reduced the

overall DoD budget request from $50.5 billion to $36.5 billion. The OSD-BoB

estimate allowed only $10.5 billion for the Army, about $10 billion for the

Navy and Marine Corps, just under $15 billion for the Air Force, and about $1

billion for OSDY

Lovett's Review of Service Requests

Lovett began a week-long review of the FY 1954 service budgets on 27

October, offering each service a chance to present rebuttals. Flanked by

McNeil, Rosenberg, and other OSD staff members, Lovett met personally with

each service's secretary, chief of staff, and other officials. The BoB representatives who attended all these sessions generally did not participate in the

discussions. 48

When the Air Force asked for restoration of a FY 1954 end strength of

1,087,000, Rosenberg cited specific instances where manpower reductions of

25,000 could be logically and efficiently made. Lovett subsequently kept the

FY 1954 end strength at 1,061,000. 49 Finletter asked for the return of money

for aircraft and related procurement and an additional $2 billion for procurement of war reserves, chiefly aircraft, in order to achieve parity with the other

services on reserve equipment. Lovett thought this request posed the question

of u.s. dependence on war reserves versus working production lines, and he

postponed a decision until he had heard all the services and could apply a

common policy. In the end, he allowed $138 million for spare aircraft engines

and $347 million for war reserve aircraft but stipulated that both programs

were of low priority and would be the first abandoned if the president or

Congress demanded an adjustment. In all, Lovett allowed $7 billion for

aircraft and related procurement. He also eventually returned almost $400

million of about $700 million cut from Air Force maintenance and operations

by the OSD-BoB staff, despite his declaration that OSD-BoB field studies had

uncovered "gross inadequacies of the Air Force inventory systems and stock

control records. ,,50

Meeting with Lovett on 28 October, Pace reiterated the position he had

taken earlier-that the OSD-BoB staff estimate of $10.5 billion for the Army

should be raised to $14.6 billion and an additional $329 million added to

allow the Army to return to a strength of 1,552,000. On this point Rosenberg
298 THE TEST OF WAR

indicated that her recommended strengths did not include provlslOn for

continued combat in Korea during FY 1954, but if combat did continue there

would have to be a separate request to Congress. The Army end strength for

FY 1953 was held to 1,519,000 while that for FY 1954 remained at

1,487,000. 51

One of the Army's problems with the FY 1954 budget related to its

competition with the Air Force for the procurement and operation of

helicopters. In the two years following the creation of the Air Force in 1947,

most Army air units had been transferred to the Air Force, and the two

services had agreed that Army organic aircraft' would consist of fixed-wing

planes weighing no more than 2,500 pounds and helicopters of no more than

4,000 pounds to perform essentially noncombat missions in forward battle

areas. After the Korean conflict began, the Army became increasingly dissatisfied with these limitations, and on 2 October 1951 Secretaries Pace and

Finletter signed a special memorandum of understanding that removed all

weight restrictions on organic Army aircraft, defined as fixed-wing utility

aircraft (light) and rotary-type aircraft used as integral component elements

within a combat zone extending 60 to 75 miles to the rear of the battle line.

Army aircraft were not to duplicate such Air Force functions as providing close

combat support, assault transport, or troop carrier airlift, but they could move

supplies, equipment, and small units within the combat zone. The Army's

desire for more and larger machines, particularly helicopters, led to further

dissension that remained unsettled at the time of the FY 1954 budget

decisions. 52

Since the question went beyond a simple matter of duplication, Lovett

wanted the two services to resolve the dispute before he made a final decision

on the budget. In meetings held with Deputy Secretary Foster in October

1952, Pace and General Collins and Finletter and General Vandenberg worked

out their differences amicably. They agreed that Army fixed-wing aircraft

would be limited to 5,000 pounds, subject to secretary of defense review at

the request of either service secretary. They expanded the Army combat zone

to an area extending 50 to 100 miles behind the front lines, within which the

Army could transport supplies, equipment, personnel, and units. On 4

November 1952 the Army and Air Force signed a second memorandum of

understanding incorporating these provisions. 5.' Meanwhile, with negotiations going smoothly, Lovett granted the Army not quite $2.6 billion for

procurement and production of materiel, including aircraft, in FY 1954. 54

The Navy requested restoration of only $2.1 billion in its FY 1954 budget,

less than half of the $5.4 billion cut by the OSD-BoB review staff-an action

• These included planes for local liaison. artillery spotting. and courier dUly.
The Last Truman Budget 299

that may have occasioned Lovett's observation that the Navy budget seemed

the best of the lot. Nonetheless, the secretary's review of the Navy request

lasted from 29 to 31 October and generated a series of issues. The Navy's FY

1954 end strength had also been cut, and it wanted an end strength of

814,000 rather than 810,000. However, when Rosenberg expressed doubt that

a 0.5-percent reduction in manpower would have a major effect on Navy

efficiency, Kimball conceded the point. 55 The big issue for the Navy lay in the

OSD-BoB reductions in naval aircraft and ships. It asked Lovett to restore

$358 million of the more than $1.2 billion cut in shipbuilding so that it could

replace World War II ships at a steady rate and thus avoid a sudden surge in

shipbuilding activity. FY 1954 funds were to be used only for aircraft carriers

and destroyers. Believing that the Navy should be free to determine priorities

within approved force levels and an approved general level of shipbuilding

activity, Lovett restored the full $358 million, thus allowing a total Navy

shipbuilding program of approximately $1 billion per year for FY 1953 and

FY 1954. 56

When it came to aircraft, however, Lovett had doubts about Navy

practices. The OSD-BoB staff had removed more than $1.6 billion for aircraft

and related procurement, and the Navy asked for the return of $835 million,

including $700 million for aircraft. Paradoxically, the Navy expected the new

planes to have only a very short life as first-line items; at least one model was

scheduled to become obsolescent and second-line before delivery. The

OSD-BoB staff wanted the Navy to reprogram and use saved funds for

procurement of newer model aircraft in FY 1954. It also questioned 500

first-line aircraft scheduled to go to naval reserve units. The Navy contended

that its distinction between first- and second-line aircraft was sound, based on

the premise that the introduction of a new, improved enemy aircraft automatically created a requirement for a better u.s. replacement model. This did not

mean that the newly obsolescent model would not be used in exactly the same

way as when it was classified first-line. As Lyle Garlock of McNeil's staff wryly

observed, the Navy used second-line aircraft like first-line-except that it did

not count them as assets when asking for budget funds. 57

Navy aircraft procurement practices disturbed Lovett because they invited

congressional questions about waste. Furthermore, the Navy policy of declaring almost new aircraft to be second-line might mean that the Navy would

never meet its requirement for 2,989 first-line fighters, even though it would

receive about 5,800 jet fighters between July 1952 and December 1955. Lovett

also questioned whether the Navy plan to equip reserve units with first-line

aircraft-something the Air Force did not do-was a device to acquire

additional first-line aircraft for the Regular Navy in case of mobilization.

Although Kimball assured Lovett that no subterfuge was involved, the latter
300 THE TEST OF WAR

called it "sheer waste" to declare 18- to 24-month-old aircraft second-line and

directed the Navy to reprogram at a level of about $350 million, half of what

it wanted. The Navy was also to cut back on aircraft about to become secondline and to expedite the acquisition of new high-performance planes. sH

When Lovett reconsidered the matter on 31 October, the Navy reported

that the restoration of only $350 million would eliminate 547 aircraft from its

original proposal, including 158 high-performance craft. Lovett then agreed

to restore $350 million plus sufficient money for 93 of the high-performance

planes. The Navy also accepted McNeil's suggestion that in case of slippages

in old-model aircraft schedules it should reprogram the freed money for

new-model planes and stretch out the production of obsolescent aircraft.

Lovett's final decision returned to the Navy about $432 million of the $700

million that it had requested. In all, the Navy received approval to procure

approximately 1,900 aircraft-some 700 fewer than it felt it needed to buy

annually to maintain a "sustaining procurement program. "s,)

Sending the budget request to the BoB on 1 November, Lovett commended the joint review conducted by members of the BoB and McNeil's staff

and recommended that the practice be continued. The detailed estimates, he

pointed out, had been determined at conferences that also included the

service secretaries, the military chiefs, and other DoD officials. For FY 1954

Defense requested approximately $41.1 billion in new obligational authority.

Including various amendments and additions through 13 December, the

request rose to almost $43 billion. By this time also, with renewal of bitter

fighting in Korea, it became necessary to raise the FY 1954 Army and Marine

Corps end strengths. 60

FY 1953 Supplement and FY 1954 Budget

Since neither the current FY 1953 budget nor Lovett's FY 1954 budget

provided for continued combat in Korea, war costs remained a problem.

There were also unbudgeted FY 1953 personnel costs resulting from congressionally authorized expenditures for combat and mustering-out pay and a

military pay raise. On 8 November 1952, in accordance with Lovett's earlier

promise that he would consider the war costs after the FY 1954 budget had

been decided, McNeil asked the service secretaries for their supplemental FY

1953 estimates, assuming that existing combat consumption rates would

continue through 30 June 1953. He requested justification for the estimates,

reminding the service secretaries of the current congressional preoccupation

with economy.61

The preparation of the FY 1953 supplemental budget estimates followed

upon weeks of hard fighting in Korea and resulted in immediate upward
lABI.E 13

Development of FY 19')4 Strength and Force Levels

Lovett Lovett Truman ]eS Recs Planning Budget Budget

11 Mar 52 Figures I Nov 52 9 Jan S3

Army

Divisions. 21(5R)' 20

Rgts/RCTs [8(2R) - [8

AAA bus. 117 - [[7(448)

Other bus. - End strength. [,596,000 1,5S0,OOOb 1,487,000" 1,540,000

Navy

Carriers, all classes. 27 27

Battleships. 4(3R) - 4(3R)

Cruisers.. 19 - 19

Destroyers . 248 - 248

Submarines. IIO(LOR) llO(IOR)

Other active ships .. 792 792

Toral ships . 1,200 1,200

Air Units:

Carrier groups 16 16

Other squadrons. 53

ZP airships/squadrons. 4

Me wings. 3 - 3

Me divisions. 3 3

Me end strength .. 248,797 243,730 242,800" 248,6[2

Navy end strength 850,000 835,875 810,000 800,000

Total strength 1,098,797 1,079,605 1,052,800 [,048,612

Air Force

Combat wings . 126 - Toward

Trp carrier wings. 17 - 143 wings

Separate squadrons. - (133 operative

MATS & trp carrier sq. - by Jun 54)

End Strength 1,220,000 1,061,000 1,061,000 1,061,000

Total Strength

Armed Forces. 3,914,797 3,690,605 3,600,800 3,649,612

Actual

31 Dec 52

20(6R)

18([3R)

[ 13(83R)

1,566,852

29(2I.emp)

4(3R)

19

246

103 (lOR)

3

230,849

807,329

1,038,178

83

15

958,000

3,563,030

'" "R" indicates reduced manning level for all or given number.

h Excludes approximately 2,000 USMA cadets; the cadets were excluded also in the I Nov 52 figure.

<; Loven's I Nov 52 budget request was later changed to support an Army strength of 1,540,000 and a Marine Corps strength of 248,612, both figures adopted by

Truman in his 9 Jan 53 budget. See Itr ActgSecDef to DirBoB, 13 Dec 52, RG 330, ATSD and DepSecDef files, "FY 1954 Budget (McNeil file)" folder, Federal Records

Center, Suitland, Md.
302 THE TEST OF WAR

adjustments of FY 1953 end strengths for both the Army and the Marine

Corps. The Army asked for an increase of 30,500 and received 27,000, for a

FY 1953 end strength of 1,546,000. The Marine Corps was granted an

increase of 2,624 men, for a new FY 1953 end strength of 246,354. In

December 1952, Defense asked for a supplemental FY 1953 budget of $1.278

billion, with the negative outcome previously discussed.' 62

The supplemental budget request for FY 1953 brought the planning

assumption for termination of Korean combat to 30 June 1953, but the

possibility that the conflict might not end even by that date worried the Joint

Chiefs. On 10 December they asked Lovett once again to change the planning

guideline, to assume that Korean combat would continue to mid-1954 or to

the end of any fiscal year being considered. They also wanted him to provide

in the FY 1954 budget for Korean fighting into FY 1954. 63

The Defense budget request for FY 1954 came under severe scrutiny in

the BoB, which marked it down to $38.848 billion, with cuts distributed

among the services. DoD rebutted the cuts before the director of the budget

and subsequently at a meeting with the president in late December. 64 Truman

restored more than $2.4 billion of the BoB reduction, including $967 million

for the Army, $870 million for the Navy, and $601 million for the Air Force.

In the last-minute budget review, the Navy and Air Force both lost manpower

for FY 1953 and the Navy for FY 1954.65

Submitting the administration's last budget to Congress on 9 January

1953, Truman proposed about $41.3 billiont in new obligational authority for

the Department of Defense in FY 1954. His budget continued the policy of

"placing principal reliance on the capacity to expand production lines

rather than on the accumulation of large stocks of military end items." It

provided funds for the operation, training, and maintenance of an active

strength force of 3.6 million on a peacetime basis; procurement to equip and

modernize the forces; research and development programs; and essential

military construction. 66

The proposed military budget contained funds for 20 of 21 authorized

Army divisions, a 1,200-ship Navy with 16 carrier air groups, and a Marine

Corps with 3 divisions and 3 air wings. It continued the 143-wing goal (126

combat and 17 troop carrier) of Air Force expansion, with funds to allow it to

operate 133 wings by the end ofJune 1954. It did not include materiel costs

for the Korean War, for which the administration considered that additional

FY 1954 funds would be needed, particularly if combat continued past

• See Chapter XlV.

t Given variously in his budget message and the budget as 541.2 billion, 541.3 billion, and 541.5

billion (Budget of the United States, 1954, M12-14, A-3, 554). OSD used 541.3 billion (table

FAD-182 OASD(C), 24 Oct 60, OSD Hist).
The Last Truman Budget 303

December 1953. The product of prodigious labor in the Pentagon, this budget

came under challenge almost as soon as the Eisenhower administration took

office. Finding ways to reduce it significantly, however, did not prove an easy

task, and to that extent, at least, Lovett succeeded in his quest for all possible

economies.67

Of the total $72.9 billion U.S. Government budget that Truman submitted

for FY 1954, the $41.3 billion Defense portion accounted for 56 percent of

new obligational authority. Truman estimated that actual expenditures for

national security-including the military services, international security and

foreign relations, atomic energy, defense production and economic stabilization, civil defense, and merchant marine activities-would reach $57.3 billion

in FY 1954, 73 percent of all governmental expenditures. Despite tax

increases in 1950 and 1951, the government's deficit had continued to grow,

but not as much as had been feared. After a surplus in FY 1951, there was a

$4 billion deficit in FY 1952, and Truman expected deficits of $5.9 billion in

FY 1953 and $9.9 billion in FY 1954. As an outgoing president, he offered no

specific recommendations but made it abundantly clear that the "course of

prudence and wisdom would be to continue to strive for a balanced Budget

and a pay-as-we-go policy in our rearmament program...6H

For the three fiscal years 1951 through 1953 the president had asked for

approximately $163.7 billion for the Department of Defense, and Congress

had appropriated $155.6 billion, about 95 percent. The total FY 1952 request

for $62.2 billion was met by congressional appropriations of $60.4 billion in

new obligational authority, or over 97 percent, an amount in constant dollars

still unsurpassed 35 years later. Yet the pattern of appropriations showed that

the DoD budget had peaked. In FY 1953 the president requested a total of

$53.2 billion for Defense, far less than it wanted, and Congress provided less

than $47 billion, about 88 percent. In his last budget-for FY 1954-Truman

asked only $41. 3 billion in new obligational authority for Defense and

forecast a further decline in later budgets to a plateau that might range

between $35 billion and $40 billion annually.69 While this fell far below the

level of FY 1952, it still would be three times the size of budgets that had

immediately preceded the Korean War. Indeed, bigger budgets for u.s. defense

would be a long-term legacy of the North Korean attack of 25 June 1950.

The Korean War budgets-FY 1951 through FY 1954-responding to

many and varied political and military initiatives by the United States,

permitted in large measure the implementation of the military buildup

proposed for NSC 68. The coming of the war greatly weakened the arguments

of elements in the administration-the Council of Economic Advisers, BoB,

and Treasury-that would probably have sought to resist or contain the

implementation of NSC 68, and undercut their position on a balanced budget,
304 THE TEST OF WAR

TABLE 14

Proposed FY 1954 Budget

New Obligational Authority

(in billions)

By Department

Army .... ........... $12.110

Navy ............. 11.368

Air Force ....... 16.778

Interdepartmental . 1.031

1btal 000 ... $41.286

Air InterBy Major Category Army Navy Force deptl Total

Military Personnel. $4.734 $3.433 $3.560 $ 11. 727

Operations &

Maintenance .... 3.506 2.62"" 4203 10.336

Major Proc & Pdn . 2.452 4.347 7.439 14.238

Aircraft (0.151) (2.037) (6.131) ( 8.319)

Ships & harbor craft (0.005) (1.055) ( 1.(60)

Other. . . . . . . . . ........ (2.296) (1.255) (1.308) ( 4.859)

Acq & Constr Real Prop 0.700 0.700

Civilian Components... 0.395 0.269 0.209 0.873

Research & Development .... 0.502 0.593 0.627 0.060 1.782

Industrial Mobilization 0.050 0.021 0.006 0.500 0.577

Establishment-wide

Activities ... 0.470 0.078 (l.034 0.471 1.053 --- Totals. $12.110 $11.368 $16.778 $1.031 $41.286

Note: Figures do not add in all instances because of rounding.

Source: Table EISED-117 OASD(C). 7 Jan 53, OSD Hist.

low taxes, and minimal inflation. After 25 June 1950 and until the last year of

the war few officials in Washington argued against more money for defense.

The issue was one of degree rather than direction.

Strong congressional and tacit public support for larger defense appropriations reflected concern to meet the requirements of the fighting in Korea,

desire for a response to the Soviet Union-more than ever viewed as a.

continuing menace to the United States-and a perception of the positive role

to be played by the United States in bringing about a more stable and peaceable

world order. As the ultimate expression of strategy and policy, the budgets

made clear the great changes in the international political and military
The Last Truman Budget 305

intentions of the United States. There was no turning back thereafter from

collective and bilateral security commitments that required the maintenance

of large U.S. military forces abroad and promised military assistance to dozens

of nations that might become the objects of aggression. The Korean War

budgets clearly augured that for the indeterminate future the United States

would maintain a far larger peacetime military establishment than ever before

in its history. These budgets gave substance to the revolution in U.S. foreign

policy begun by the Truman Doctrine.
CHAPTER XVI

NATO: The Defense of Europe

The swift American response to the Communist attack in Korea did not

signify a change in American strategic priorities; it was an immediate response

to a challenge that could not be ignored. The Truman administration,

supported by majority opinion in the country, continued to accord the

defense of Western Europe a priority second only to that of the United States

itself, for it viewed the Soviet threat to Europe as the primary threat to U.S.

security. This judgment influenced the decision to limit the military response

in Korea and contributed to the undertaking of rearmament programs far

beyond the immediate needs of the Korean War. Although the buildup of the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during these years did not convey

the same high sense of immediacy and excitement as the battles and

campaigns in Korea, strategically it outranked Korea and imposed a major and

competing claim on American resources of men, money, and materiel. I

The North Korean attack, presumably concurred in and supported by the

Soviets, shook Western Europe as it did the United States. It cast doubt on the

view held by many Europeans that postwar Soviet actions in Eastern Europe

sprang from a determination to create a safety barrier of Communist states

across the historic invasion routes to the Soviet Union and that, having

secured such a protective ring, the Soviets would not resort to overt military

aggression against Western Europe. The immediate U.S. response in Korea

reassured Europeans that the United States would not passively accept

aggression against a country under the UN aegis, but the Western European

governments were fearful of Soviet intentions and painfully aware of their

own weakness. Their economies, still fragile in mid-1950, could not support

an adequate military defense without help from the United States. The

307
U.S.SR.

,: , ~.

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

600

I

NATO MEMBERS

OTHER N

.' 1

Scale or miles

200 400

I I

o

I

OCEAN

Europe-1950
The Defense of Europe 309

Brussels Treaty, a five-nation, 50-year alliance against aggression, had been

signed on 17 March 1948, but the Western Union Defense Organization it

established had only limited forces in being. Despite the signing of the far

more inclusive 12-nationt North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949 and the

subsequent beginning of u.s. military aid to Europe, Western Europe's ability

to defend itself against aggression was far from certain. 2

The difficulties facing NATO in creating an effective defense of Western

Europe, as with all coalition efforts, reflected the sharply different national

interests and concerns among the major powers involved. Resolution of the

most important issue-German rearmament-required finding a mutually

acceptable compromise with the French, who greatly feared the resurgence of

their old and hated enemy and dreaded the possible hostile reaction of the

Soviets to such a move. The French also sought to promote the concept of an

integrated European army and political structure, motivated at least in part by

the desire to ensure control of a rearmed Germany within such a framework.

The British, traditionally averse to participating in European political institutions, disliked the French proposals and preferred working through a NATO

structure that would involve the United States and Canada. Raising the forces

for Europe's defense and the respective contributions remained a constant

problem, while the Europeans gave special attention to the role to be played

by the United States-the size of the contingent it would send to Europe and

the military assistance it would provide to NATO countries.

In the second half of 1950, State and Defense, although immersed in the

problems of the Korean War, had to cope with the urgent necessity to get

NATO going. Their efforts met with a large measure of success by the end of

1950 because of their awareness of the issues that had to be confronted, their

patience, and their willingness to compromise when necessary. In these

matters, the State Department took the lead. Within DoD, Marshall and Lovett

generally succeeded in modifying the sometimes overly rigid positions taken

by the ]CS and the services. Because of their mutual respect and ability to

work well together, Acheson and Marshall played the key roles in shaping

policy on NATO and in fashioning the compromises that produced agreement

among the NATO countries on the issues that engaged their attention during

this period.

* The five were the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg..

t The 12 were the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy,

Portugal, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Canada, and the United States. The treaty (Art. V) says that

an armed attack on one nation "shall be considered an attack against them all" and that each

member will assist the attacked parties.
310 THE TEST OF WAR

NATO Organization in Mid-1950

Early NATO organization largely followed that of the existing Brussels

Treaty Organization and its Western Union Defense Organization. The North

Atlantic Treaty established a North Atlantic Council (NAC), consisting of the

foreign ministers of member states; it held its first meeting in September 1949.

Chaired by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the council established two

important subordinate committees. The Defense Financial and Economic

Committee, composed of finance ministers meeting irregularly but with a

permanent working staff, provided advice on the financial and economic

resources needed for a buildup. The Defense Committee, consisting of

defense ministers and responsible for preparing unified NATO plans, was

headed in mid-1950 by U.S. Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson.."I

The Defense Committee oversaw a further elaboration of committees and

groups. The Military Committee, chaired by General Bradley and including the

chiefs of staff of NATO nations, prepared policy guidance and military

recommendations for the Defense Committee. Military Committee representatives from the United Kingdom, France, and the United States served as a

Standing Group for the Military Committee, and they or their deputies met

regularly in Washington. Five regional planning groups, each with an American representative or "consulting member," were responsible for developing

specific regional defense plans and reported to the Standing Group. A Military

Production and Supply Board, headed in June 1950 by its U.S. representative,

Munitions Board Chairman Hubert E. Howard, had a permanent working staff

and reported to the Defense Committee.'

As it turned out, the officials who filled most key NATO positions held

responsible posts within their own countries and could devote relatively little

time to Alliance matters. In May 1950, to help deal with the multiplying

problems, the North Atlantic Council established a body-the Council Deputies-to represent the foreign ministers and sit permanently in London. 5

Charles M. Spofford became the deputy U.S. representative to the North

Atlantic Council and chaired the Council Deputies, who held their first

meeting on 25 July, one month after the outbreak of the Korean War. Although

the selection for this important position of a lawyer little known in diplomatic

circles initially aroused some misgivings, Spofford later earned high praise for

the "tact and ability with which he discharged his sometimes invidious role of

being international Chairman and at the same time, the head of the United

States Delegation."(, Spofford's role raised questions in DoD about the extent

of his authority over matters that DoD considered strictly military. State

intended that Spofford serve not only as chief U.S. representative to NATO in

Europe and as an ex officio member of all NATO committees but also as chief
The Defense of Europe 311

representative in Europe for Mutual Defense Assistance. Defense maintained

that Spofford's role should be more carefully delineated, particularly with

reference to his responsibilities in military matters, where the Joint Chiefs

wanted his authority limited and that of Defense representatives adequately

recognized. 7

A State-Defense compromise in December finally settled the matter.

Ambassador Spofford was not to be referred to as the "Senior United States

representative to NAT Overseas," but he remained ex officio an advisory

member of all U.S. delegations to NATO bodies with freedom to deal with all

NATO committees and receive from all delegations current and full information "exclusive of detailed military planning." The agreed terms of reference

maintained Spofford's right to assure political-economic-military coordination among all U.S. representatives to NATO and to provide coordinated advice

to Washington, but they did not include a provision that all U.S. delegations

should receive their instructions through him. Although these interdepartmental differences dragged on for almost five months, Spofford performed his

duties effectively. H

Planning for NATO Defense

More serious than organizational problems for the fledgling alliance was

the weakness of its European members. Even before the North Korean attack,

the United States had taken a major step to help the individual countries to

rearm. In October I949-one month after the first North Atlantic Council

meeting-Congress appropriated $1.3 billion for military assistance. This

included $1 billion for Europe, of which Congress made release of $900

million contingent on the president's approval of NATO "recommendations

for an integrated defense of the North Atlantic area." On 6 January 1950 the

North Atlantic Council approved a strategic concept that stressed the defensive mission of Alliance forces. At least initially, the major responSibility for

reacting against an aggressor in Europe would devolve on the United States for

strategic air operations, the United States and the United Kingdom for

protection of ocean lines of communication, and the European powers for

ground forces, harbor and coastal defense, and tactical air and air defense

operations. On 27 January Truman accepted the NATO defense concept, and

the U.S.-European bilateral agreements necessary for the start of U.S. military

aid were signedY

Following approval by the North Atlantic Council of the strategic

concept, the Standing Group directed the five regional planning groups to

prepare area defense plans against a Soviet attack, both for a near-term
312 THE TEST OF WAR

emergency and for 1954. The Standing Group chose 1954, soon to be

designated in NSC 68 as the expected date for Soviet acquisition of a large

stockpile of atomic bombs, because, in the words of the NATO history, it was

"sufficiently far ahead for long-range planning, but not too remote to make

plans unrealistic." By the spring of 1950 the NATO Defense Committee had

under consideration a detailed four-year Medium Term Defense Plan (MTDP)

that envisioned defensive positions along the line of the Rhine-1jssel in the

east, the ltalo-Austrian Alps and the Isonzo River in Italy in the south, and, if

possible, along the Kiel Canal and northern Norway in the north. The plan

required 90 divisions plus 7 brigades and 252 battalions of ground troops,

almost 1,100 combat ships, and 8,800 aircraft. Although the ]CS viewed the

force requirements as unattainable by 1954, the plan provided for the

integrated defense of the entire Western European area. The Defense Committee approved it on 1 April 1950 as a "first approximation" of the forces

needed to defend Europe, asked for revisions based on a more realistic

assessment of available forces, and requested the member nations to state what

military strength increases they planned to make. 10

At the fourth North Atlantic Council meeting in May, the foreign ministers

voted unanimously to drop the use ofseparate national forces, which might be

balanced individually but not necessarily as a whole. They urged their

governments to help create "balanced collective forces" for the whole North

Atlantic area, even while taking national needs into full consideration. I

1

At this time, the Alliance had on the continent 1,000 aircraft' and about

14 divisions of uneven quality and strength; indeed, one British military

commander thought that only the 2 U.S. divisions in Germany were combat

ready. By comparison the Soviets had about 25 divisions and 6,000 aircraft

stationed in forward areas, with many more divisions and aircraft in the Soviet

Union. t Whereas Soviet units possessed a highly centralized command

structure, NATO divisions came under no unified authority and were not well

deployed for defense. Moreover, some European powers, such as France, were

being drained by colonial wars; any suggestion of German rearmament

• Presumably many more aircraft from the United Kingdom. United States, and Canada would

have been available if needed.

t These 1950 estimates accorded with some later U.S. estimates of Soviet strength. On 16 January

1952 General Joseph 1'. McNarney testified that the Soviets had in East Germany alone 20

divisions of about 14,000 men each, highly mechanized and with about 90 percent of a U.S.

division's firepower. On 26 March 1952 General Alfred M. Gruenther testified that, of a total of

about 175 Soviet divisions averaging ahout 12,000 men each (and which they could increase to

about 300 divisions within 30 days of mobilization). the Soviets kept 30 in Eastern Europe during

1951 and 1952. Gruenther thought they could make about 8.000 of their 20,000 aircraft availahle

in Europe. In the same period, he noted, Soviet satellites increased their divisions from 59 to 65.

The 1950-52 estimates wcre too high, for later analyses found that many of the Soviet divisions

consisted only of cadres or were not first-line units.
CHART 3

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

JUNE 1950

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

(Foreign Ministers)

Council Deputies

London

I

I I

DEFENSE FINANCIAL

AND ECONOMIC COMMITTEE DEFENSE COMMITTEE

(Finance Ministers) (Defense Ministers)

I I PLANNING BOARD

FOR

I I OCEAN SHIPPING PERMANENT

WORKING STAFF MILITARY COMMITTEE MILITARY

PRODUCTION

(Chiefs of Staff) AND SUPPLY

BOARD

I I

STANDING GROUP PERMANENT

WORKING

(US-UK-France) STAFF

• AL PLANNING GROUPS I

NORTH SOUTHERN CANADA- WESTERN NORTHERN EUROPE ATLANTIC UNITED STATES EUROPE EUROPE WESTERN OCEAN MEDITERRANEAN
314 THE TEST OF WAR

threatened NATO unity; and there were no American or British pledges of

additional troops for Europe. The major improvement seemed to be that, as

Acheson later noted, "where we were naked we began to admit it." 12

Although the MTDP fixed the line of the Rhine-1jssel as the major

defensive position for 1954, it was more realistic in the early summer of 1950

to think in terms of a series of successive NATO withdrawals from Germany

and perhaps even France, should defense positions become untenable in the

face of a Soviet attack. U In June the North Korean assault not only caused

NATO to confront the inadequacies of European defenses but raised American

and European fears that those defenses might suddenly be tested. On 13 July

the service secretaries, together with the Joint Chiefs, advised Secretary

Johnson that the United States should increase its forces in Europe and send

additional military equipment to help other countries expand their forces.

Johnson urged Truman to consider the recommendation favorably. 14

The National Security Council was already discussing steps to cope with

further Soviet action, and the Joint Chiefs were planning immediate increases

in U.S. forces, both for Korea and for general rearmament. After discussions

with Johnson, Acheson, and Harriman, Truman approved a proposal to

provide $4 billion to $6 billion extra for FY 1951 military assistance on the

understanding that the other NATO countries would greatly expand their

military efforts. 15 By early August the NATO Council Deputies agreed to

report European responses to a U.S. request for military increases. They also

considered another U.S. request-that the Alliance agree to an initial highpriority production program in Europe for equipment as quickly as additional

funds became available. Meanwhile, the NATO Standing Group and the JCS

tentatively lowered the MTDP requirement for 90 divisions by 1954 to 67 5,k,

divisions, but they anticipated that actually only 56',k, could be provided. I()

When the NATO Council Deputies asked Johnson, as chairman of the

Defense Committee, for further recommendations for strengthening the

Alliance's military posture, the secretary turned to his Pentagon advisers.

Bradley asked for the buildup of NATO forces, accelerated production of

European military equipment, improved mobilization procedures and training

programs, and more effective national military services. Munitions Board

Chairman Howard, worried about equipment deficiencies, recommended

giving higher priority to the development of specific production programs

and an improved process for release of U.S. military aid funds. I~ The Joint

Chiefs agreed on the overriding importance of production, since deficiencies

existed everywhere. They also recommended studying whether the Alliance

should accept new members, including West Germany and Spain, encompass

Austria within its sphere of protective interest, and increase Italy's military

capabilities. The service secretaries wanted Johnson to tell Spofford that the
The Defense of Europe 315

United States was "prepared to undertake an aggressive war for peace," that

Americans demanded an all-out endeavor and expected a similar approach by

Europe. I!!

It is possible that some of these ideas were aired at the luncheon Johnson

held for Spofford and others on 18 August 1950. Officially, however, Johnson

confined himself to recommending only the purely military suggestions, since

he had agreed with Acheson to restrict guidance to U.S. representatives in

NATO to matters accepted by the two departments, and the question of

admission of non-NATO countries into the Alliance had not been resolved. As

a result, the Council Deputies agreed to ask the Defense Committee to indicate

specific areas of national inadequacy in matters of military service, mobilization, and training. 19

The responses from the NATO countries to the U.S. call for increases in

European national defense forces by mid-1951 disappointed Spofford and the

State Department, who estimated that the nations proposed to spend only an

additional $3.5 billion over three years, whereas Europe could probably

afford to spend an extra $10-12 billion in that period. By comparison, the

United States planned to commit about $4.5 billion in military assistance to

NATO countries for FY 1951 alone. 20

On the other hand, the U.S. response did not indicate any immediate

increase in American forces in Europe. TheJCS told Johnson on 18 August that

the Far East would absorb most current U.S. manpower increases but that the

greater part of these would probably be available for worldwide deployment

if Korean hostilities ended or open hostilities with the Soviet Union began. It

was up to the Europeans to augment European defense forces. Spofford

defended the U.S. position before the Council Deputies by pointing out that

the United States was undertaking a very substantial defensive effort and

planning a large increase in the assistance program. Although Europeans might

fear the effect of large defense expenditures on their economies, he warned

that economic recovery would be futile without the strength to deter

aggression. Spofford asked the NATO deputies to consider whether the

member countries had provided adequate forces to defend Western Europe

collectively. By 3 September the deputies concluded that the total planned

military effort was insufficient. 2 1

Pentagon officials saw no basis for determining the numerical adequacy

of the European responses since the NATO MTDP was still incomplete.

Johnson agreed that pressure on the countries should be maintained, but he

also thought any attempt to precipitate an immediate showdown might

boomerang. In fact, the Pentagon found satisfactory the proposed 23 new

European divisions. Provided the augmented U.S. military aid program could

support the increases, James H. Burns's Office of Foreign Military Affairs and
316 THE TEST OF WAR

Military Assistance felt the country answers should be accepted as satisfactory.

Johnson informed Acheson on 12 September that Defense welcomed the

country increases proposed for mid-195 1 as a first step.22

The possibility of military increases exposed the absence of a centralized

NATO military organization. British Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery, then

chairman of the Western Union Commanders in Chief Committee, considered

an effective military organization a prerequisite to adequate use of military

equipment. 2~ The French went much further, coupling their decision to

implement an additional defense program of 2,000 billion francs and 15 new

divisions within two years with a demand for a NATO organization "oriented

in all branches pursuant to a common directive." They wanted to establish an

executive body having the broadest possible authority. Already feeling that the

war in Indochina was "draining life blood" from France, the French espoused

what they termed the "fairest possible distribution" of financial burdens

through the establishment of a NATO common fund, to which the United

States could contribute, and the institution of a common budget for NATO

military expenses. They called for more British and American troops in

Europe, a unified military command, and the creation of a World War II-type

Combined Chiefs of Staff to determine general strategy and serve as a general

staff. They also called for the end of all duplication of functions between the

Brussels Pact and NATO countries. 24

In London the Council Deputies set up a special group to study the

nonmilitary aspects of the French proposals and sent their military suggestions to the Defense Committee. In Washington, the French proposals were far

from popular. The United States had called for immediate enlargement of

NATO military forces on a national basis; the French claimed that such efforts

would only result in waste. The Truman administration also wanted to

maintain unilateral control over the U.S. military assistance program, which

operated on a country-by-country basis, rather than place such funds in a

common pool managed by an international organization, as the French

preferred. Moreover, the common fund approach was highly unlikely to find

a favorable hearing in the Congress. Rather than undertake a major and

complete overhaul of the entire NATO system, U.S. policymakers preferred to

focus more narrowly on the organizational needs of the Alliance military

effort. 2~

German Rearmament

In considering the defense of Western Europe against a possible Soviet

invasion, Europeans-the French in particular-wanted a strong initial stand

along a line placed "as far east as possible," preferably along the Elbe River
The Defense of Europe 317

which ran through East Germany. This line, farther east than most u.s.

military authorities thought realistic, raised questions about mustering sufficient NATO troops to defend it without resort to German units. Even before

the Korean War the Joint Chiefs believed that a viable defense of Europe

required the participation of still-occupied West Germany. 26 Once the fighting

in Korea started, the JCS wanted the French, still powerfully animated by

feelings of revanche against the Germans, to agree to modify restrictive

controls on West German industry, accept early German rearmament, and

authorize a small force of 5,000 West German federal police. Assenting only

to the need for a small police force, the State Department considered

discussion of German rearmament untimely. When the JCS position came

before the NSC on 6 July, shortly after the North Korean attack, Truman stated

that consideration of German rearmament was premature but agreed to study

the matter. 27

The logic of a German contribution to European defense became more

compelling. The Alliance needed German industry and manpower, and it was

apparent that without the willing help of the Germans an eastern NATO

defensive line could not be defended. Under current planning, a defense along

either the Rhine or the Elbe would require 56 divisions in place and on a full

war footing within 30 days of the outbreak of hostilities. If all the increments

planned for 1 July 1951 came into being, they would not quite reach this

number. As Ambassador David Bruce cabled from Paris, it would be "ridiculous" for European nations to make the sacrifices for a full defensive effort

and leave the Germans free to manufacture consumer goods for their own

internal consumption and foreign export. Even worse, if the Germans failed to

participate on NATO's side, the Soviets would undoubtedly find their own

way to utilize German resources against the West. From Moscow, Ambassador

Alan G. Kirk observed that the loss of Germany to the Soviets would be "far

more dangerous for the French" than a rearmed West Germany. 28

Acheson later said his "conversion to German participation in European

defense was quick." Korea and the need for a forward defense in Europe,

which would require German forces, had persuaded him. On 31 July he told

Truman that the question was "not whether Germany should be brought into

the general defensive plan but rather how this could be done." The State

Department, Acheson continued, was thinking about the creation of a

European or North Atlantic army, made up partly of national contingents and

partly of recruits, acting under a central command. German troops would

thus become part of a European system rather than constituting a national

military force. Truman directed Acheson to proceed with this planning?')

At the same time Acheson also began to consider an increase in U.S.

troops for Europe and new Alliance command arrangements. At a meeting
318 THE TEST OF WAR

with Truman, Harriman, and Johnson, Acheson suggested that the time had

come for direct U.S. participation in new NATO military activities, with the

United States taking responsibility for a unified command and placing

additional American forces in Europe. Disturbed by the pressure for immediate action, Johnson at first demurred but informed Acheson the next morning

that General Bradley agreed. Discussing the matter with Truman again on 10

August, Acheson said it would be taken up with Defense in an orderly fashion,

although "some strong differences of opinion" might result. ,0

On 16 August State proposed to Defense that NATO establish a European

defense force that would receive political guidance from the Council Deputies

and strategic guidance from the Standing Group reorganized as a World War

II-type Combined Chiefs of Staff. State recommended a single commander, an

American; an integrated international staff, including Germans and Americans; and field forces consisting of national contingents, including German

units integrated at the division level. A central organization also headed by an

American would manage the production and procurement of major military

items. State asked DoD for its early concurrence or comments so that the

matter could be referred to the president quickly."

Defense did not entirely agree with State's plan, which Johnson referred

to as a "substantial modification" of its previous position on Germany. Noting

that the NSC was still pondering the problem, Johnson observed that the Joint

Chiefs, who were still studying Alliance defense organization, thought it

premature to consider the matter in NATO. At an NSC meeting on 24 August,

however, Acheson pressed for decisions before the start of a major series of

international meetings. Tbe French, British. and American foreign ministers

would meet on 12 September, the North Atlantic Council on 15 September,

and the Defense Committee, for the first time since the beginning of the

Korean War, in October. Noting the growth of East German military capability,

Truman discussed the departmental differences with Acheson and Johnson on

26 August and directed that they give him written answers providing agreed

State-Defense answers to a number of questions. 52

Responding to the president, the Joint Chiefs wrote Johnson on 30 August

that they were willing to commit additional U.S. forces to the defense of

Europe if European forces were also increased. They supported the concept of

a European defense force with German participation but thought German

forces should enter at once on a national basis rather than on an "other than

national" basis as Truman proposed. They believed that a supreme commander for the European defense force should be named eventually and a

combined staff created immediately, Americans should hold NATO leadership

positions such as supreme commander and chairman of a strengthened

Military Production and Supply Board, and the Standing Group should be
The Defense of Europe 319

gradually transformed into a combined chiefs of staff. To invigorate the

Alliance, the Joint Chiefs advocated controlled rearmament of West Germany

and its admission to NATO, Spanish membership in NATO, and U.S. full

participation in all regional planning groups..B

The JCS thus fully supported German rearmament and participation in

NATO defense but did not at the time officially link these actions to a U.S.

contribution. During the State-Defense review process that followed, U.S.

High Commissioner for Germany John j. McCloy returned to Washington to

support Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's request to create a central West

German police force and the offer of German participation in a European

army if the Allies would replace the occupation with a contractual arrangement. McCloy argued that a West German police force and a West German

military contribution to NATO would meet European needs and German

desires and preclude enemy utilization of German strength. 34 In underlined

changes to the draft reply to the president, the joint Chiefs now linked

German participation in a NATO force to further U.S. contributions and

recommended to johnson that

. . . an American national be appointed now as Chief ofStaff and eventually as Supreme Commander . . . but only upon the request of the

European nations and upon their assurance that they will provide sufficient

forces, including an adequate German force, to constitute

a . . . command reasonably capable offulfilling its responsibilities..~5

Concerning additional U.S. troops for Europe, Acheson later recalled that

Truman had stated on 31 August that he had no intention of sending more

troops to Europe. The U.S. hesitancy caused uncertainty among Europeans

and within the North Atlantic Council. On 7 September the Joint Chiefs

recommended a total U.S. force in Europe of "about 4 infantry divisions and

the equivalent of 11/2 armored divisions, 8 tactical air groups, and appropriate

naval forces . .. in place and combat ready as expeditiously as possible."

The JCS declared that it was "now squarely up to the European signatories of

the North Atlantic Treaty to provide the balance of the forces required for the

initial defense.' 036

Johnson and Acheson signed a joint reply to the president's questions on

8 September. They recommended that a European defense force be created

under NATO, specified the U.S. forces to be sent to Europe as soon as possible,

and recommended that Americans occupy key NATO positions. They made

every effort to ensure German participation by linking the U.S. effort to

European acceptance of Germany into the new defense force. Acheson later

thought the linkage was a mistake, but he apparently did not question it at the

time. Satisfied with the recommendations, Truman sent the letter for imme-
320 THE TEST OF WAR

diate NSC review. After NSC concurrence, pro forma under the circumstances,

the president on 11 September approved the joint response as NSC 82. On 9

September Truman, reversing his position of 10 days earlier, made public his

decision to send additional troops to Europe, relating the extent and timing to

the "degree to which our friends match our actions. ".-\-

The New York Meeting

The question of West Germany's rearmament and admission into NATO

became central in deliberations on the creation of NATO's military forces. For

the French, in particular, the proposal to admit the Germans into full

partnership in the Alliance seemed a bitter pill to have to swallow. The French

people and government harbored suspicion. distrust, and outright hatred of

Germany and adamantly opposed German participation in the Alliance at this

time. Suspicion also characterized the French attitude toward the Anglo-Saxon

powers, for Paris suspected British motives on the continent and feared that

there would emerge a loose but dominant grouping of the United States,

Britain, and Germany, with France relegated to a subsidiary role. This fear was

reinforced by the initial U.S. linkage of its own efforts in Europe to acceptance

of Germany into NATO. Moreover, the French did not feel confident that the

United States would remain a full partner in the Alliance over the long term.

These fears and suspicions dominated French attitudes during the months

of debate on the German question among the NATO nations in 1950-51. As

the foremost proponent of bringing the Germans into NATO, the United States

had to find ways of arranging an accommodation between the French and the

Germans, who kept increasing their own demands for more favorable terms as

the price for rearming. It required a great deal of diplomatic maneuver and

compromise by State and Defense officials. In the end, changing international

circumstances had perhaps the greatest weight in resolving the issue.

When the British, French, and American foreign ministers met in New

York on 12 September, preparatory to the North Atlantic Council meeting

three days later, the central themes were how to defend NATO and the role

West Germany might play. Because the French government had rejected

German participation in the Alliance, Foreign Minister Robert Schuman did

not want the matter referred to the council. Anticipating political abuse at

home for even having offered to increase French military forces without a firm

U.S. commitment of additional financial and materiel aid, the French government sought a detailedLJ.S. reply to its earlier organizational proposals. British

foreign minister Ernest Bevin neither supported nor opposed the U.S. proposal for German participation in the Alliance but eagerly sought the

appointment of a NATO supreme commander. ,-\H
The Defense of Europe 321

Acheson had little negotiating room, for Defense described itself as

"uncompromising" in its view that increased European forces, German

participation, and an integrated force under a NATO supreme commander in

return for full u.s. participation constituted a nonnegotiable package. As

Acheson reported to Truman, Schuman and Bevin had firm instructions and

their governments seemed unable to grasp the full significance of the

momentous U.S. decision to commit its forces in peacetime to the defense of

Western Europe. The French and British, Acheson noted, seemed willing

enough to accept what the United States offered but "were reticent about their

contributions; and had flatly refused to face in any way the question of

German participation." Bevin told Acheson, however, that the British agreed

in principle to German participation and that the next step should be

discussions with the Germans. 39

When the North Atlantic Council met on 15 September, the French still

opposed German inclusion in a European defense force even though the other

NATO members seemed prepared to agree, at least in principle. Schuman

himself may have been amenable, but his government allowed him no

latitude. At an impasse, the council decided to invite the defense ministers to

join their discussion. iO

Prior to arrival of the defense ministers, the foreign ministers on 18

September moved toward greater accommodation with West Germany. They

proposed to relax some occupation controls if the Germans accepted certain

economic and financial commitments. They also agreed to review Allied

restrictions on industries, allow an immediate rise in steel production, and

terminate the state of war with Germany as soon as possible without altering

the status and rights of the occupying powers. Although the foreign ministers

refused Adenauer's request for a 25,000-man national German police force,

they permitted a Laender-based [state-based] force with an initial strength of

30,000 men that would be at the central government's disposal. They agreed

to increase and reinforce Allied forces in Germany, to study the problem of

German participation in an integrated European defense force, and, most

importantly, to guarantee German territorial integrity by treating an attack

against Berlin or the Federal Republic of Germany "as an attack upon

themselves." But they reached no decision on allowing German military units

within a European army.' I

Acheson felt that the participation of the defense ministers in the New

York discussions might help persuade the French, particularly the French

defense minister, Jules Moch, a Socialist whose son had been garroted by the

Germans for underground activities during World War II. Moch had reportedly threatened to resign his post if German participation was accepted, an

action that probably would have brought down the French government. The
322 THE TEST Of WAR

Americans hoped that the British defense minister, Emanuel Shinwell, also a

Socialist, might influence Moch. The new U.S. defense secretary, George

Marshall, due to be sworn in on 21 September, was also expected to exert a

salutary influence, since Moch admired the American general. 12

When the tripartite meetings resumed on 22 September with the arrival

of the defense ministers, Schuman stated that the French would discuss

German troop units for NATO after the creation of a strong central European

force and completion of the materiel program; any immediate decision for

German inclusion would be premature and dangerous. He confirmed, however, that the French did not mean waiting until the entire Medium Term

Defense Plan had been achieved. Moch suggested that NATO should consider

other major problems-completing the defense plan by 1952 rather than

1954, strategic deployment of Allied forces in Germany, the types of equipment to be produced, and plans for financing. Before the ministers discussed

German military participation, Moch declared, they should consider how to

accomplish the MTDP and the matter of German participation in the initial,

nonmilitary phases of defense preparation.l:\

Shinwell responded by pointing to the inadequacy of Western defenses,

the absolute need to accept the U.S. offer of troops, the imperative of

defending east of the Rhine, and the necessity for some organization within

Germany to provide for order in case of attack. Moreover, Western countries

would be psychologically affected if the Germans did not share in the burden

of their own defense. Marshall agreed with Shinwell on the military situation

and timing and stated that the administration would have trouble getting

defense appropriations if it could not assure Congress that all available

German resources would be used to defend Europe. Schuman reported that

the French government did not categorically reject the possible use of German

units but needed nine months for discussions and sounding out public

opinion before considering the matter. H

When the three defense ministers met alone during the afternoon recess,

Marshall hoped to achieve some concession, however small, from Moch. The

secretary apparently concluded that pursuit of immediate French agreement to

an ultimate goal was poor tactics and risked French alienation and total failure;

getting Moch to agree to certain specific measures, on the other hand, might

commit the French to the ultimate goal. To Marshall's pleasure, both Shinwell

and Moch accepted some lesser steps that the Joint Chiefs had suggested to

Marshall.j~

At the ninth and final session of the tripartite talks on 23 September there

appeared to be a ray of hope for French acceptance of German participation

as Moch seemed willing to try to get French agreement. Since the French

parliament would not meet until 17 October, Marshall postponed the Defense
The Defense of Europe 323

Committee meeting until 28 October. The basic question of German participation remained unresolved, but the Americans were optimistic. Even Acheson felt that Moch had changed his position. 46 Meanwhile, the United States

took steps toward making a further concession to meet the European desire

for a supreme commander who would act as a rallying point for action. With

U.S. policy committed to the eventual appointment of such a commander,

State and Defense agreed to speed up the timetable. On 25 September Truman

said that the man he expected to designate would want an actual command

and forces in being; he promised to appoint him as soon as NATO assurances

and commitments were "on the line.,,47

The North Atlantic Council concluded by noting the shortfall in collective national defense efforts and stating that NATO needed to establish as soon

as possible an integrated defense force, but it did not mention German combat

units. The defense force would have a supreme commander with sufficient

authority to ensure effectiveness and an international staff representing all

contributing nations. The council meeting made it clear that the supreme

commander should be designated as soon as adequate national forces were

assured. 4H

The council asked the Defense Committee to recommend the steps

necessary to establish an integrated defense force, the peacetime powers to be

accorded the supreme commander, the geographical limits of his command,

and the method and timing of national force contributions. The Defense

Committee was to consider any further authority required by the Standing

Group, any changes or simplifications needed in the existing NATO military

structure, and the channel through which the council should provide political

direction to military agencies. The council also requested that the Defense

Committee recommend how, from a technical viewpoint, Germany could

make its most useful contribution to European defense without the establishment of a German national army or general staff. The problems that the

foreign ministers had failed to resolve either in the tripartite talks or in the

North Atlantic Council meeting they now dropped into the lap of the defense

ministers and their chairman, Secretary Marshall.!'!

Marshall, Mach, and the Pleven Plan

Back in Washington, Marshall prepared for the delayed but increasingly

important Defense Committee meeting. Proposing to handle the German

question through a unilateral U.S. proposal at the meeting, Marshall instructed

a Pentagon working group to draft a U.S. position on an integrated European

force for NATO, which was "not to be contingent on German participation but
324 THE TEST OF WAR

adaptable to her inclusion." ~() Meanwhile, a separate State-Defense working

group, including the Joint Chiefs, considered the U.S. proposal for German

participation. I

The State-Defense group quickly concluded that Germany's most useful

contribution to European defense would be to provide the means for

estahlishing a more eastern defense line. They saw active German participation as essential to the defense of West Germany and agreed that there should

be an early German commitment to NATO, including military units, to assure

German assistance and preclude any later lapse into neutrality. The group

recommended that German military units enter NATO as balanced ground

divisions with German commanders, to be integrated with non-German units

at corps and higher levels. To safeguard against renascent German militarism

there would be a number of specific conditions, including prohibition of a

German national army and general staff and limitation of the German

contribution to no more than one-fifth of the divisions in the total NATO

force. ~2

Marshall found the paper failed to propose a specific approach and thus

offered no basis for successful negotiations with the French. He wanted more

detailed and practical arrangements for incorporating German units into a

European defense force, even suggesting the possibility of initially placing

German platoons in U.S. divisions. Advising Marshall on 11 October that too

many details would make the proposal appear to be a "flat United States

demand," Acheson suggested that Marshall stand firm on the previous U.S.

proposal for a NATO defense force that included German units, since it had

been supported by all nations except France. Ambassador Bruce reported that

the French cabinet could not reach a decision on the Germans and stressed

Moch's "temperamental aspects" but doubted he would resign. ~5

On 13 October the Joint Chiefs submitted a revised draft of the StateDefense paper that Marshall had disliked, including a suggestion that if the

Defense Committee deadlocked, the United States might propose attaching

West German battalions and smaller units to U.S. forces in Germany. What

they really wanted, however, was a West German contribution in the form of

ground divisions, perhaps 10 to 1'5 but not exceeding one-fifth of the readily

available Allied divisions. Unless agreement on German participation came

now, the JCS recommended a U.S. reexamination of its plans in the event of

war with the Soviets, "including the magnitude and extent of the United States

contribution to the defense of Western Europe ... I

On the same day the JCS also wrote Marshall that the first implementing

step toward a European defense force should be the immediate appointment

of a supreme commander, who should participate fully in its formation.

Privately and later in writing the Joint Chiefs recommended to Marshall the
The Defense of Europe 325

selection of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, supreme commander of the

Allied forces in Western Europe during World War II and currently president

of Columbia University. They recommended issuance of a basic directive for

the supreme commander, provision for his headquarters and an international

staff, designation of the national forces to be placed under him, provision of

operating funds for the following year, formation of German units and their

incorporation into the integrated forces, and commitment of additional

peacetime and mobilization forces. The JCS thought that the Council Deputies, as the highest civilian NATO body in continuous session, should give

political guidance to the Standing Group, which in turn would pass it on to the

supreme commander. They repeated their conviction that a German contribution and U.S. support for a NATO defense force should be linked. 55

Acheson did not want to mention publicly a precise number of German

divisions for fear of intensifying the emotional issue, or to make any decision

on possible alternative or intermediate plans. Increasingly concerned over the

JCS linkage of a German contribution to American support for the European

defense force, he suggested that it might be better to leave the matter open for

reexamination. Marshall approved a U.S. position rewritten to incorporate

Acheson's suggestions. On 19 October Truman asked Eisenhower to visit him

at the White House on his next trip to Washington. 56

In preparation for the Defense Committee meeting in Washington, a

strongly worded State Department briefing paper advised Marshall that Moch

was growing even more bitter on the subject of German participation, to the

point that he would resign from the government if necessary. The paper

suggested that Marshall emphasize the safeguards being worked out for German

participation and lay the "rather terrifying military situation on the line in a

mostforceful manner. " If the French wanted to move the NATO defense line

as far east as possible, this would require active German participation. 57

Meeting with Marshall on 16 October, Moch posed the possibility that a

rearmed Germany would eventually side with the Soviets as the most

powerful force in Europe. The French, Moch felt, would turn down the

German rearmament proposal at the Defense Committee meeting on 28

October; he asked Marshall to postpone the German issue and name a supreme

commander who would study the problem and make recommendations.

Agreeing on the need for a supreme commander, Marshall made it clear that

the United States required an answer to the German problem by 28 October,

particularly if appropriation of further funds for Europe were to be defended

before Congress. He reminded Moch that without German help NATO would

have to place its defensive line west of the Rhine. 5H Moch found this

unacceptable hur suggested no alternative course. At preliminary meetings

with representatives of the defense ministers on 18 and 19 October, Lovett
326 THE TEST OF WAR

discovered that Moch's attitude reached down to the French working level,

although some of the French military seemed to accept the need for German

military units in NATO. 59

The Americans also learned that Schuman had under consideration a new

plan, originally conceived by Jean Monnet, the brilliant originator of the idea

for a European Coal and Steel Community, * for German participation in a

European army. Addressing the French Assembly on 24 October, Premier Rene

Pleven made public the plan's main elements-the simultaneous pursuit of

two related lines of activity, one within and one outside of NATO. As

explained by Moch, within the Alliance all existing plans to create forces and

increase production would continue, including the French offer to commit 20

divisions by 1954. The supreme commander would be appointed at once, his

terms of reference and geographic authority agreed upon, and all available and

future combat troops placed under his command. Outside the Alliance, the

new European Assembly, to be created under the European Coal and Steel

Community, would have a European defense minister responsible for a new

experimental NATO force. This force would be composed of French cadre

units, into which equal numbers of French and German soldiers would be

assigned, up to an initial strength of 100,000 men, but with no German

formations above company or battalion level. Trained and operational units

would eventually be reassigned to the NATO supreme commander. 60

The Pleven Plan, hurriedly conceived and unclear in many particulars,

dismayed Marshall, Acheson, and the president. Time would be lost in waiting

for the European Coal and Steel Community plan to become effective and for

the establishment of the proposed new European Community political

structure. The French also wanted to finance the new arrangement through a

common budget, and working this out was certain to be time-consuming and

politically difficult in the United States. The political effect on Germany was

sure to be disastrous, since the French plan appeared to consign the Germans

to permanent military inferiority. The relationship of the Pleven Plan's

European army to a NATO army was also unclear. Would it duplicate NATO's

need for country forces, funds, and supplies and thus increase country costs?

When could a German contribution be expected?61

Marshall was bothered and ambivalent as the date for the NATO Defense

Committee meeting approached. He wanted a German contribution but

sympathized with the French feelings about Germany; indeed, he still felt that

• On 25 May 1950 France invited six governments to join in a plan to place Franco-German

production of coal and steel under a common higher authority. Germany, Italy. Belgium, the

Netherlands, and Luxembourg accepted; the United Kingdom refused. The pact was signed on 18

April 195 I. Although this proposal hecame known as the Schuman plan. Jean Monnet was its

originator, as he also was of what became known as the Pleven Plan.
The Defense of Europe 327

a wiser U.S. approach would have included a series of small steps, allowing

more time for French deliberations. General Bradley regarded the Pleven Plan

as "entirely impractical," and several defense ministers expressed to Marshall

displeasure with the plan's delays and ambiguities. When Shinwell termed it

"military folly and political madness," Marshall stated he was unable to

"penetrate the miasma" of the French plan; he reiterated this point to both the

Portuguese and Dutch defense ministers. 62

At a meeting on 27 October, Marshall and Moch reportedly enjoyed a

"friendly, relaxed and informal" conversation but found no area of agreement. Answering the secretary's criticism of a combined French-German

army, Moch referred to it as experimental and emphasized that there was

theoretically no limit to the number of German soldiers as long as there were

no German divisions. Noting his complete agreement with Pleven and

Schuman, Moch said that he considered the new plan to be a logical step

toward the acceptance of international authority in Europe. When Marshall

asked about the plan's practicality, Moch had no reservations.63

Deadlock and Compromise

When the NATO defense ministers met in Washington on 28-31 October,

Moch strongly defended the Pleven Plan, pointing out that the new European

force's units would be as available to NATO as national units, that German

units would be integrated and armed more quickly under the French than the

U.S. plan, and that France planned to integrate all European forces for NATO

into a single army after the transition period. When other defense ministers

objected that the Pleven Plan would forfeit the U.S. troops that were tied to a

German contribution, Moch indicated that even so the French government

would not accept the U.S. plan. 61

Trying to mediate the differences and avoid criticism of the French plan,

Marshall stated that the United States recognized that German rearmament

constituted more of a threat to Europe than the United States. Nevertheless,

any plan adopted by the committee would have to be militarily realistic and

assure adequate NATO defensive capability. When the disagreement persisted,

Marshall suggested referring the problem back to the Military Committee for

study.6s

The Defense Committee took up several other important agenda items,

including the creation under NATO of an integrated European defense force,

already favorably considered by the Military Committee. Assuming a satisfactory solution to the German problem, the United States was prepared to move

ahead on the European defense force and to designate a supreme commander.
328 THE TEST OF WAR

In fact, when the NATO defense ministers and chiefs visited the White House

on 30 October, Truman told them that a high-ranking general would be made

available for appointment as supreme commander. At the time, Eisenhower

was in Washington in expectation of a call. The next day, however, Marshall

informed the defense ministers that absent a decision on German participation, it would not be possible to make arrangements for the final form of the

command and structure of the integrated NATO force. He proposed again that

they send the problem back to the Military Committee without action. 66

The postponement of appointment of a supreme commander for Europe,

although not inconsistent with the u.s. position that the German question had

to be resolved first, came the day after Truman's apparent promise to make an

appointment and evoked strong reactions from Shinwell and Moch. It may be

inferred that the postponement was intended to prod the Alliance members,

and particularly the French, to take positive action on German rearmament

and a role in NATO.

Shinwell insisted that the Defense Committee needed to achieve some

success and urged a recess to seek a solution. To Moch's charge that the United

States had changed its stand on the immediate naming of a supreme commander, Marshall replied that he had instructed U.s. representatives on the

Standing Group and the Military Committee to refrain from raising the

German issue solely to be helpful and allow time for French discussion and

consideration. Moch-who in a highly unusual move had Mme. Moch sit

directly behind him and advise him at the meeting, thus separating himself

from the French military men, who were known to be reconciled to the

necessity of a German contribution to the NATO force-was now increasingly

at odds with his fellow defense ministers. One by one, they deplored French

intransigence, criticized French plans, and showed the gravest concern over

their failure to reach agreement. 6 -

Between sessions, Marshall stopped at the White House to apprise

Truman of their progress. At the afternoon session the defense ministers

decided to postpone further discussion of the integrated NATO defense force,

the supreme commander, and German participation until their next conference. The October meeting was over. 6H

The u.s. postmortem noted that the Defense Committee had agreed on

objectives for military training and mobilization procedures, the importance

of standardiZing NATO equipment, creation of a standardization agency under

the Standing Group, and the number and types of forces each country should

provide. Ten days before the defense ministers meeting, on 18 October, the

Joint Chiefs had recommended, and Marshall had concurred in, 1954 NATO

force goals of 982/" divisions, 558 major combat vessels, and 12,997 aircraft.

The force goals adopted by the defense ministers were lower than those
The Defense of Europe 329

recommended by the )CS-95 1A divisions,· 556 major combat vessels, and

9,212 aircraft. To many, the achievements seemed small compared with the

failures. Many smaller nations, particularly Denmark and Norway, felt the big

powers had ignored their interests and security needs. As the North Atlantic

Council had earlier delegated the thorny questions of a NATO defense force

and German participation to the Defense Committee, the latter now turned

them over to the Council Deputies and the Military Committee.69

While Acheson felt that the Defense Committee's failure proved the

impossibility of combining the U.S. proposal for a NATO defense force with a

German contribution, he also thought the current French position unsound.

Moch's attitude shocked him. When Ambassador Bruce discussed the situation with the French prime minister, Pleven said that the French people would

not tolerate any reconstitution of a German national army. He did promise to

handle Moch, to try to conciliate the Germans, and to permit French delegates

to discuss in the Military Committee and the Council Deputies any plan

relating to a German contribution. When the Council Deputies met on 13

November, a revised French proposal still called for German units to be

integrated into a European army under a non-NATO European defense minister

and European assembly and financed by a common budget. But the French

agreed to the formation of German regimental combat teams approximately

one-third the size of a division and to some immediate preliminary measures.

They also promised no undue delay in forming a federated European army and

no discrimination against Germany. Beyond these points the French would

not move. 70

Washington was not swayed by the latest French proposal. Burns felt the

only significant shift from the original Pleven plan was the acceptance of

German regimental combat teams. He advised Lovett on 14 November that the

u.s. position should not be compromised. State was also disappointed with

the French concessions, although Acheson surmised that French actions

stemmed from their doubts about British motives and U.S. dedication to NATO

in the long term. U.S. policymakers remained unsure of the underlying

purpose of the French proposals. 71

In Europe, meanwhile, the French public began to accept the notion of

their former enemy contributing to NATO, while paradoxically the Germans

appeared to turn against it. After the Ambassadors in Paris and London, Bruce

and Lewis W. Douglas, met with McCloy and Spofford in London, they

advised Acheson on 16 November that adequate room existed for a FrenchAmerican compromise. They felt that German contingents should enter NATO

on equal terms and that transitional agreements would probably be necessary.

• The plan was to have 49 1/, divisions available on D-Day, 79 1/, on D + 30. and 95'/, by D + 90.
330 THE TEST OF WAR

Believing that the French would accept "something close to the American

plan" if it could be done without the political embarrassment of Moch's

resignation, Spofford wanted to split the military and political arrangements.

Essentially, he suggested a trade-French support for the U.S. military plan,

including German national units of regimental combat team size, in return for

U.S. support of the French effort to work out the necessary European political

institutions for a federated European army. 72

Burns suggested to Lovett on 17 November that the Spofford proposal

was "fairly satisfactory," and by the next day there was an agreed StateDefense position. Spofford was to accept German units smaller than divisions

for the initial development phase, with the understanding that such units

would become divisions whenever the new NATO force headquarters so

decided. Any German recruitment, registration, and training functions not

performed by the new supreme commander were to be carried out by a West

German federal agency controlled by the Allied High Commissioners. The

United States, in turn, accepted the French plan to create European political

institutions and a European army whose units would eventually be integrated

into NATO, but it was unwilling to wait for these developments to occur before

integrating German units, including, if necessary, German divisions, into

NATO forces. Still, the French were to have time to "sell their federated

structure to Germany and other interested Europeans." Both State and

Defense felt that many extremely complicated matters would become simpler

after appointment of a supreme commander, development of a command

structure, experience in working with the Germans, and possible changes in

the political climate in France. 73

When Spofford put forward the U.S. proposal in general terms at the

Council Deputies' meeting on 20 November, the Dutch member proposed

creating a high commissioner in NATO rather than a European defense

minister. 74 Four days later the French representative welcomed U.S. support

for the French political plan but argued that Spofford had failed to link the

steps toward a German contribution and European confederation, define a

precise basis for attaining European integration, or agree to German regimental combat teams. The French at this time also rejected the Dutch suggestion

of a NATO high commissioner. On 27 November the French deputy continued

his resistance and another deadlock ensued. 75

Two profound fears agitated the French. On the one hand, fear that the

Germans had reached a "trading position" and were raising the price for

cooperation moved them toward action; on the other hand, fear that German

rearmament might provoke the Soviet Union held them back. Of the two

possibilities, the latter seemed more formidable since Moscow had already

reacted sharply to the NATO discussions. At the October meeting in Prague of
The Defense of Europe 331

the Eastern European foreign ministers, the Soviets demanded a treaty of

peace with Germany, unification of East and West Germany by means of an

all-German council, and Allied agreement not to rearm Germany. After the

Defense Committee met, the Soviets sent notes to the three Western occupying

powers, declaring that measures to revive the German army in West Germany

would not be tolerated. On 3 November Moscow asked for a meeting of the

Council of Foreign Ministers of the four occupation powers to discuss carrying

out the Potsdam agreement to demilitarize Germany. 76

As Acheson later wrote, the U.S. proposals produced "not only division

within the alliance but a massive attack from the opposition. " He appealed to

Schuman to end the standoff, citing the "dangerous drift of German opinion"

and the bad news from Korea, where the Chinese Communists were driving

back UNC troops. By 3 December Spofford reported from NATO that the

French were being far more flexible. 77

During the visit to Washington from 4 to 8 December of Clement Attlee,

Truman, Acheson, and Marshall assured the British prime minister that despite

the impact of the Korean War, Europe was still the primary U.S. concern and

the Soviets the major enemy. The United States, they emphasized, remained

determined to proceed with NATO, settle the questions in dispute with the

French and Germans, and increase the forces available for NATO's defense.

Attlee wanted more American troops in Europe and a U.S. military leader

appointed as supreme commander as quickly as possible. The British reluctance to become involved in European political institutions was reflected in

their opposition to the French plan for a European army under non-NATO

political aegis. To get British support for the U.S. position, Acheson was ready

to promise an American commander. At the meeting on 6 December he asked

Marshall pointedly whether "all of the President's advisers" would recommend that Truman name a supreme commander if the French difficulty was

removed and the Spofford proposal approved. 78

Marshall hedged his reply. Two days earlier, the Joint Chiefs had informed

him that the U.S. military buildup had to be increased and accelerated to meet

obligations in the Far East and under NATO and that it was imperative to

augment European defense capabilities by increasing effective European

forces in being and utilizing the German war potential. They stood ready to

consider the appointment of a supreme commander whenever there was

agreement on German rearmament. Marshall had already recommended these

views to Acheson. 79 The service secretaries, on the other hand, had urged the

appointment of an American commander for NATO forces at the earliest

possible moment without attaching any strings. Marshall replied to Acheson

that the Defense Department would go ahead with the appointment provided

a "reasonable basis" existed. 80
332 THE TEST OF WAR

To reach such a basis required compromise. Earlier, Ambassador Bruce

had suggested that, if the United States gave visible, public evidence of its

strong support for the French concepts, Paris might agree to the immediate

start of a NATO army with German participation. Burns waf11ed Lovett against

such a "horse-trade" lest the United States appear to be co-sponsoring the

French plan and "indirectly urging" small European countries to join the

French. On 6 December, however, at the meeting with Attlee, Acheson favored

sending a letter of support which the French cabinet much desired, and

Marshall strongly endorsed this as the only way to break the deadlock. Attlee's

acceptance of the Spofford proposal assured U.S. consent to the immediate

appointment of an American as supreme commander.8\

As a result of these agreements, the United States offered its letter of

support to Schuman on 7 December. It expressed U.S. backing for European

integration and a French conference of interested European powers to

consider implementation of the French proposals. It also promised that, if

invited to attend, the United States would assist in bringing the conference

deliberations to a successful conclusion. The letter provided the French

government with the reassurance it felt it needed to get the necessary political

and public support for an agreement to German rearmament. In accepting the

formation of German regimental combat tcams under NATO, the French

apparently compromised their hopes for a European army.82

The December Meetings

The letter to Schuman, with its related understandings between the two

governments, broke the deadlock over German rearmament, thus opening the

way to agreement on the fundamentals of creating a NATO military establishment. On 9 December, the Council Deputies concurred in the Military Committee's report on the political aspects of German rearmament and recommended that NATO invite the occupying powers to discuss with the Germans

the question of their participation in the defense of Western Europe.8~

The Council Deputies endorsed recommendations calling for Germany to

provide militarily acceptable and effective units instillcd with a European

rather than a narrowly nationalistic outlook. German units would enjoy full

equality with all others, but safeguards against German militarism would

continue until the Allies felt it safe to discard them. German unit size would

not at first exceed the regimental combat team, but conditions and the new

supreme commander's views would eventually determine how the units

should be used. German air units were permitted for the defense of West

Germany and support of its ground units but would be part of NATO's air
The Defense of Europe 333

forces. The occupying powers, the supreme commander, and German authorities would together plan to raise and initially train German forces. NATO

agencies were to recommend the extent of German armament production,

with safeguards exercised by the occupation authorities. The German defense

administration, still not determined, would be civilian and subject to Allied

control even if the occupation ended. There should be no German defense

ministry or general staff. 84

The Military Committee met in London on 12 December and recommended to the Defense Committee a report on the creation of an integrated

European defense force within NATO, the establishment of a supreme headquarters, and the reorganization of the military structure. The next day the

Military Committee and Council Deputies met together and approved, formally and jointly, a political report on the German contribution and a military

report that continued to limit the German strength to one-fifth of the Allied

strength in NATO. Forwarded to the Defense Committee, these two reports

comprised a single document entitled "German Contribution to the Defense

of Western Europe." These London actions set the stage for Defense Committee and North Atlantic Council meetings in Brussels.85

Despite Marshall's leading role in these matters, the secretary did not

want to leave Washington because of the critical situation in Korea; he decided

to send Army Secretary Frank Pace to Brussels in his place. As Burns's office

informed Pace on 9 December, Truman supported the creation of a defense

force in Europe and, with European agreement, would appoint an American as

the NATO supreme commander. Pace was also told that Marshall believed that

these two points represented the U.S. political objectives; Marshall considered

the conditions under which the United States approved the integrated force

and appointed the supreme commander to be military considerations subject

to agreement between him, the ]CS, and General Eisenhower. When Pace and

Acheson were satisfied that conditions in Europe allowed the United States to

proceed, the Defense Committee and the NATO Council could make the

appropriate announcements. 86

On 14 December Marshall and Lovett met with Eisenhower to discuss his

appointment as NATO supreme commander. Eisenhower expressed concern

about what he considered efforts by the British and the U.S. Navy to keep

North Sea and Mediterranean forces outside his NATO command. Marshall and

Lovett assured him that the]oint Chiefs supported placing all U.S. forces in the

area under him in case of need. Although Eisenhower had earlier made clear

his expectation that a sizable NATO force would be available before his

appointment, he now took a more realistic attitude. Lovett's felicitous remark,

that the supreme commander would be the person around whom Europe

could rally, proved appealing. Even more than size, Eisenhower wanted a
334 THE TEST OF WAR

quality army made up of well-trained, well-equipped, ready units capable of

quick expansion. If the Europeans demonstrated a wholehearted effort,

Eisenhower felt the United States might well send in 10 divisions. Although he

thought that the Germans held the key to a successful European defense,

Eisenhower told Marshall and Lovett that they should not be allowed to think

they held the upper hand; when the Germans saw NATO's strength swell, he

believed they would want to join. At the end of the meeting, Lovett believed

that Eisenhower was reassured and ready to accept the appointment.H7

As the NATO meetings neared, the French and Germans seemed to waver

over German rearmament. The French still feared provoking the Soviets, to

the point of hesitating to put into effect the decisions on Germany.HH The

German people, for their part, were diffident about rearmament and had

reached no consensus. Some Germans had become pacifists in reaction to two

great German military defeats in less than 30 years; many feared that

rearmament would bring few advantages while imposing many dangers; and

practically all Germans reacted negatively to the tone of the NATO discussion

and its implications of German inferiority. In late November 1950, Adenauer

told the High Commissioners Council that the German people would not

accept the sacrifices entailed in participating in the defense of Germany and

Western Europe until their complete freedom was in prospect.H9 The British

thought the Germans would probably rebuff any NATO offer. In preparation

for a formal approach to the Germans, Acheson in mid-December asked about

the availability of U.S. military equipment for them. Lovett replied that he

expected to have sufficient equipment to train approximately 10 German

combat teams by late summer 1951 and warned against appearing "overly

anxious." Noting the Germans' increasing insistence on their own terms,

Acheson told McCloy it was premature for the Germans to take any position

on participation in NATO defense before they had been consulted.')0

Whatever problems remained, the Brussels meetings on 18-19 December

went precisely as planned. With Pace chairing the sessions, the Defense

Committee approved the reports on German participation and NATO military

organizationYI The North Atlantic Council, meeting jointly with the defense

ministers, approved the two reports of 18 December. When Acheson suggested that the council might wish to name the supreme commander, the

members responded with enthusiasm. Moch immediately and graciously

recommended the name "in the minds of everybody-General Eisenhower."

With little more discussion, the council asked the United States to make the

designation. The next morning the council agreed to formalize its unanimous

agreement to Truman's designation of Eisenhower by having the foreign and

defense ministers sign the document and by asking each government to

confirm separately the designation. 92
The Defense of Europe 335

With creation of the defense force and the naming of the supreme

commander, the overriding need was for a troop buildup. Acheson suggested

that each member nation immediately place under Eisenhower the ready

forces earmarked for NATO, as the United States intended to do with its forces

in Europe.· Because of the obvious inadequacy of these forces for the tasks

ahead, Acheson requested, first, that the NATO countries increase their

strengths, as the United States planned to do, and, second, that member

nations follow the U.S. lead in increasing their production of arms and

supplies and establishing a European counterpart to the newly appointed U.S.

director for defense mobilization. The council took no further action on these

suggestions, but the Brussels meeting had done its work well; the deadlock

was broken and NATO was moving forward. 93

Acheson reported to the NSC on 21 December the steps that NATO had

taken. The High Commissioners in Germany were to inform the Germans of

the acceptance in principle of German regimental combat teams in NATO but

not to press them on the issue of rearmament, since relations with the West

German government had to be put on a more permanent basis. When Marshall

asked about the French attitudes, the secretary of state reported that both

Schuman and Moch had been "very good. "94 But the two secretaries, who

had played the key roles in shaping U.S. policy on NATO and in fashioning the

compromises that had led to Eisenhower's appointment as SACEUR, knew

well that further serious obstacles and challenges remained to be dealt with.

• In a personal letter of 19 December 1950, Truman placed all u.s. forces in Europe at

Eisenhower's disposal. (Ltr Pres to Eisenhower, 19 Dec 50, FRUS 1950, 1II:604-05.)
CHAPTER XVII

Building a NATO Structure

Establishment of a military command and the naming of Eisenhower as

supreme commander constituted a bold start toward a NATO military structure. Still, Europeans generally and the French in particular, harboring serious

fears that the Soviets might retaliate, sought tangible assurances of U.S.

commitment. At the same time, they hoped for a relaxation of East-West

tension that might render less imperative the difficult and costly rearmament

effort contemplated. For its part, the United States had to cope also with the

greatly enlarged and intensified war caused by the Chinese intervention in

Korea.

At the start of 195 l, this intricate state of affairs was further complicated

by two challenges that brought into question the viability of the whole North

Atlantic concept. The first challenge, a new Soviet offer to discuss a settlement

of East-West differences, suggested the possibility of peaceful rapprochement. The second, a debate in Congress, brought into question the Truman

administration's right to send troops to Europe and created doubt as to the

strength of the American commitment to NATO. Both events threatened to

erode the administration's efforts to create a strong alliance. Fortunately,

NATO weathered these problems, and in the next two years it reorganized the

structure of its civilian agencies, made its military commands functional, and

enlarged its geographic scope. Marshall and Lovett played principal roles in

U.S. efforts to expedite these changes.

Two Challenges to NATO

On 3 November 1950 Moscow demanded a conference of the four occupying powers to discuss the 194'1 Potsdam agreement to demilitarize Germany.
338 THE TEST OF WAR

This indication of Soviet opposition to West German rearmament was seen in

Washington as part of a complex Soviet design, including a propaganda campaign against the United States, to disengage the Federal Republic of Germany

from the West. On 30 November, East German Premier Otto Grotewohl called

for a meeting of East and West German delegates as a first step toward German

reunification, a goal intensely desired by all Germans, I

In West Germany, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer proceeded cautiously, for

he faced a dangerous situation. He did not consider Allied occupation troops

capable of meeting a Korea-type invasion of an unarmed West Germany. The

Chinese intervention and UNC retreat in Korea increased the sense of

imminent danger in West Germany, and Adenauer, as he later wrote, was

shocked that "broad sections of the population were seized by paralysing

fear.,,2 The chancellor played for time, telling Grotewohl on 15 January 1951

that before any meeting could take place there would have to be guarantees of

personal freedom and security for Germans in the Soviet zone and a

dissolution of the East German People's Police. Bypassing Adenauer, the East

German Volkskammer (parliament) made a direct approach to the West

German Bundestag, which held to Adenauer's preconditions. 3

NATO's clear need for German forces and the Soviet overtures gave

Adenauer a stronger bargaining position from which to negotiate terms for

West German cooperation with NATO. On 14 January he stated publicly that

the Germans would not rearm until the West agreed to give financial support,

change the occupation status, grant Germans equality with other national

units in a combined defense force, and provide protection in the event of

East-West rapprochement. Reacting negatively to these terms, the British and

French favored responding positively to the Soviet call for a Big Four

conference on the German question. Public opinion impelled the governments in both countries to meet Moscow at least halfway, particularly after the

Soviets on 20 January accused both France and Britain of pursuing unfriendly

policies and violating their wartime treaties of alliance with the Soviet Union.

The prospect of East-West detente was attractive. It would provide relief from

the threat of war, diminish the financial drain of rearmament, and permit

indefinite deferral of German rearmamenL'

U.S. officials viewed the Soviet call for a Big Four conference in a different

light. Marshall, Acheson, and Truman considered it a Soviet "spoiling

operation."~ Nonetheless, taking account of European attitudes, the United

States agreed to talks, insisting that the conference agenda include not only

the German question but also the larger question of worldwide international

tensions. Although the Soviets would not agree to this, representatives of both

sides eventually met in Paris to prepare for a meeting of the Council of Foreign
Building a NATO Structure 339

Ministers. The first exploratory meeting took place on 5 March, and agreement

on an agenda seemed possible by the end of the month.<l At this juncture the

Soviets demanded the addition of questions concerning NATO and U.S. bases

in Europe and the Near East. The West refused, the Russians persisted, and

after 74 meetings the talks ended on 21 June without an agreed agenda. The

talks allayed European fears of an immediate Soviet attack, but they also

revealed the extent of Soviet animus and distrust and made it clear that

European security would depend on NATO's success.""

Perhaps more critical for the Truman administration than these Soviet

diplomatic ploys was the challenge at home to its European commitment. On

20 December 1950 former President Hoover launched the "Great Debate" in

a television speech in which he criticized European failure to support U.S.

policies, questioned the continuance of u.s. aid for Europe, and suggested a

"Western Hemisphere Gibraltar" from which the United States could rely on

sea and air power to hold the Atlantic Ocean, including Great Britain, and the

Pacific Ocean along the line ofJapan, Formosa, and the Philippines. Denying

that this stance was isolationist, he saw it as necessary to "avoid the rash

involvement of our military forces in hopeless campaigns." Sen. Robert A.

Taft, a potential contender for the Republican presidential nomination,

quickly took up the attack, arguing that the United States was not legally

obligated under the NATO treaty to send troops to Europe and that in any case

the president needed congressional authority to do so. On 8 January 1951

Sen. Kenneth S. Wherry introduced a Senate resolution providing that no U.S.

ground forces should be sent to Europe before Congress adopted a "policy

with respect thereto." Truman, who had just designated Eisenhower as

NATO's first supreme commander, fully intended to provide him with more

American forces. The president did not think he needed congressional

approval to dispatch troops, publicly stating that "I don't ask their permission, I just consult them." In the Senate, even bipartisan Republicans who

supported U.S. troops for Europe expressed concern over the constitutional

issue between the two branches of government and the president's unyielding

posture.!!

On 23 January the Senate referred the Wherry resolution to the combined

Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations. While some bipartisan

Republican senators, including Arthur H. Vandenberg, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.,

and H. Alexander Smith, searched for a compromise, the Truman administration sought to avoid a confrontation. On 29 January, when the Joint Chiefs

advised augmenting the two U.S. divisions in Europe by one armored and

three infantry divisions, Truman approved but directed that the recommendation not go beyond the JCS.'J
340 THE TEST OF WAR

When Eisenhower returned from a tour of European capitals in late

January, he told Truman and the Cabinet that NATO needed 10 or 12 U.S.

divisions· as part of a force of 50 to 60 divisions and derided the idea that

such a force would be provocative. It would be sufficient to defend Europe

successfully, he held, but far too small to attack the Soviets, and the Russians

knew it. At an informal joint congressional meeting on 1 February, the general

stressed NATO's importance to U.S. safety and its need for U.S. equipment,

leadership, and patience. For several hours that afternoon, Eisenhower

answered Senate committee questions, steadfastly maintaining that the Soviets

could be deterred and that he was confident enough of achieving Alliance

unity to be "willing to devote the rest of my life to try to make it work." In

particular, Eisenhower did not want limitations on the number of U.S.

divisions for Europe. 10

Secretary Marshall, first to testify when the Senate committees' joint

hearings opened in mid-February, offered a contrast to Eisenhower's personal

and emotional appeal. Arguing that greater U.S. strength in Europe would

deter aggression and help keep friendly governments in power, thus aiding

U.S. security, Marshall urged augmenting U.S. ground strength in Europe. He

revealed, with Truman's permission, the plan to send four more divisions to

Europe. The small size of the planned augmentation took a great deal of wind

out of the sails of the opposition; indeed, some senators questioned whether

a total ofsix U.S. divisions could reestablish European morale. Marshall replied

that there were no plans to send more and that the real problem would be to

create those four divisions. Nonetheless, he opposed congressional limitation

on the fmal number, saying that too high a figure might give the Europeans too

much bargaining power and one too low might destroy U.S. flexibility. II

The Senate committees also heard Acheson, Bradley, and the Joint Chiefs

of Staff as administration witnesses and 32 others, including Hoover, Wherry,

and General Lucius D. Clay, who had been both commanding general of U.S.

military forces in Germany and military governor of the U.S. Zone. On 14

March the committees reported out two substitute versions of Wherry's

resolution-Senate Resolution 99, which required only Senate action, and an

identical Senate Concurrent Resolution 18 that required House actionneither of which would have the force of law. Both versions approved

Eisenhower's appointment, agreed that the United States should supply a "fair

share" of NATO forces, asked for JCS certification that other NATO countries

were also doing their share, and requested the president to consult Congress

before sending any U.S. troops abroad. After an acrimonious debate, by a vote

of 49 to 43 on 2 April the Senate accepted an amendment offered by Sen. John

• In December 1950 Eisenhower had hoped for 20 C.S. di\'isions.
Building a NATO Structure:)41

L. McClellan that limited to four the number of additional U.S. divisions to be

sent abroad "without further congressional approval." Other attempts to

tighten the resolutions or give them the force of law failed. Finally, on 4 April,

the second anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Senate

passed Senate Resolution 99 by a vote of 69 to 21; the concurrent resolution

also passed, but by only 45 to 41. Obviously, despite the troubling constitutional issue, a majority of senators supported the administration's European

policy. 12

Although Congress clearly manifested its desire to have a voice in any

future increase of u.s. troop strength in Europe, Truman never accepted its

right to do so. When asked how he felt about sending more troops to Europe

without obtaining prior congressional approval, the president replied that the

"Senate and the House have always been consulted in any major policy, and

that situation will develop in the usual manner." U The ambiguity of the

answer was probably deliberate.

How Marshall felt about the debate is unknown. Recalling the occasion

later, Acheson wrote that Marshall's testimony on 15 February had been

delivered with "devastating effect." Eisenhower, on the other hand, found

General Clay's testimony "so much more effective and convincing ... than

Marshall's, Bradley's, or any of the others that I cannot escape the fervent wish

that he [Clay] were our Sec. Defense." Eisenhower's surprising judgment may

have reflected his disappointment at the limitations on u.s. troop support for

Europe. 14

Marshall had told Eisenhower in March that Defense would try to send the

four additional U.S. divisions in 1951. Upset by press reports that six divisions

would be the extent of u.s. support, Eisenhower did not see, as he wrote to

Harriman in Washington, "how we can find, in fearful limitations of this

character, any real inspiration for the European populations." It was clear that

Eisenhower had misgivings the U.S. troop restriction could imperil his NATO

mission. Apparently he felt also that Marshall had compromised too far. 1 ';

Organizational Adjustments

With NATO about to embark on a major buildup of military forces,

questions of structure inevitably arose to engage the attention of member

countries. Now that the organization would have to begin functioning on a

large scale, it became apparent that changes would have to be made to

accommodate different views, not least those of the u.s. State and Defense

Departments. Defense was averse to any major adjustments until NATO

became operational, and the Joint Chiefs opposed any reorganization of the
342 THE TEST OF WAR

military structure that might diminish their role or that of the United States.

The State Department, on the other hand, saw a need for changes.

In the fall of 1950, a Canadian proposal boldly addressed the matter of

ministerial representation in NATO by suggesting abolition of both the

Defense Committee and the Defense Financial and Economic Committee and

inclusion of the defense, finance, and foreign ministers, and occasionally

prime ministers, in a single council. The current Military Representatives

Committee would then become a permanent "Defense Committee" composed of the NATO chiefs of staff or their representatives, and the Standing

Group would act as the proposed Defense Committee's steering and executive

agency and provide the channel for political guidance to the military

commands. The plan did not impress Marshall, since he doubted that NATO's

problems derived from its organization and felt that the Alliance should

emphasize the creation of the defense forces. 16

At the December 1950 meeting in Brussels, the North Atlantic Council

did not adopt the Canadian proposal, but it authorized two major organizational changes. It replaced the Military Production and Supply Board with a

new, upgraded Defense Production Board (DPB), responsible directly to the

Council Deputies. The new board, headed by a chairman under whom all

country delegations worked, had a "coordinator" with a separate international staff, which paralleled in Europe the role of the newly created U.S.

Office of Defense Mobilization. I" Under this new organization, William L.

Batt, chief of the American DPB delegation, represented Marshall on NATO

military production matters. On Marshall's recommendation in January 1951,

Truman appointed William R. Herod, president of the International General

Electric Company in New York, as Coordinator of Defense Production.

Marshall noted that Herod's NATO responsibility would be "second only to

that of the Supreme Commander." HI

The second organizational change reflected complaints of the smaller

countries that the three-nation Standing Group determined too many important

matters. The Military Committee therefore established a permanent Military

Representatives Committee (MRC), composed of representatives of the military

chiefs, to meet in the Pentagon in Washington, where the Standing Group

convened. The new MRC representatives came from all NATO countries except

Iceland, which had no military forces, and Luxembourg, which was represented by Belgium. As the MRC's steering and executive agent, the Standing

Group also undertook certain tasks previously performed by the three regional

planning groups being replaced by Eisenhower's NATO command and established a liaison office in London to work with NATO agencies operating there. I')

Despite these changes and Marshall's desire to avoid a major NATO reorganization, the impetus for a more complete overhaul remained strong. By the
Building a NATO Structure 343

end ofJanuary 1951 Marshall and the 000 stood alone in support of the status

quo. State pressed Lovett for Defense reconsideration, advancing a plan to

maintain both the Defense Committee and the Defense Financial and Economic

Committee-but in advisory roles. The North Atlantic Council would be the

senior body of NATO, with its members representing governments. Instead of

having all ministers as members of the council, as in the Canadian proposal,

State suggested that each government individually determine the membership

of its national delegation and that there be one yearly plenary council meeting

attended by all cabinet-rank representatives in NATO. 20

When Lovett asked for Defense comments, the service secretaries advised

postponing NATO reorganization until Eisenhower's new military headquarters and the Defense Production Board began to function fully. The Joint

Chiefs disliked the State Department proposal because it increased the powers

of the Council Deputies, and they contemplated the possibility that Charles M.

Spofford, the U.S. deputy, responsible only to Acheson, might give directions

to the secretary of defense. They preferred the Canadian proposal, which

would elevate Defense influence by including defense ministers in the council

and making Spofford a representative of Marshall as well as Acheson. They

adamantly opposed changes in the Military Committee, Military Representatives Committee, and Standing Group. In particular, they did not want the

Standing Group, in which the United States played such a major role, to be

controlled by a committee that might reduce American influence to "that

which would be exercised by a small power." The Joint Chiefs pointedly noted

that they had not been consulted about NATO military reorganization, a matter

they considered within their purview. 2 I

Lovett reasserted to Acheson in February Marshall's view that reorganization should wait until NATO became fully operational. If it proved politically

necessary to move ahead, Lovett suggested modifying the Canadian proposal

and making no change in the three NATO military bodies. He was willing to

replace the Defense Financial and Economic Committee with a new finance

and economic board. Lovett also agreed to incorporate the Defense Committee in the North Atlantic Council, where the defense ministers would join the

foreign ministers-a development he felt especially desirable to ensure full

consideration of military matters. With the Council Deputies then empowered

to act for both the foreign and defense ministers when the council was not in

session, Defense would send Spofford a representative to assist him with his

new duties. Lovett also supported U.S. military leaders in opposing relocation

of NATO agencies from London to Paris. 22

Lovett's letter influenced State to seek a compromise, at least to include

finance or other ministers in the council. Opposed to further dilution of

council membership, Burns cautioned Lovett against any compromise on
344 THE TEST OF WAR

what he considered the main point-"Acheson and Marshall together in the

Council as co-members will give real strength to NATO." After further

discussions, however, Lovett agreed to the inclusion of other ministers on the

understanding that council membership would be limited to foreign and

defense ministers, with other ministers present only as required. He also

agreed to locating a new Financial and Economic Board in Paris. In turn, State

assented to keeping NATO's military structure unchanged. Although Defense

was not displeased with these organizational developments, Burns wrote

Spofford on 27 April that he was "glad to see the end in sight." 23

In early May the Council Deputies approved a revised Canadian proposal

that kept the military organization intact. With defense and finance ministers

incorporated into the North Atlantic Council, the U.S. secretary of defense

moved from a secondary to a primary NATO role. Spofford, now representing

Marshall as well as Acheson in the Council Deputies, wanted Marshall to have

confidence in the organization and the people and immediately offered the

secretary's representative the title of vice deputy.2j Lovett accepted the JCS

view that the vice deputy should be a civilian but insisted, overJCS objection,

that he should have a small military staff and, over State objection, that he

should have a separate communications link to the Pentagon. 25 Finally, in

mid-November 1951 Defense designated Daniel K. Edwards, who had briefly

replaced Marx Leva as assistant secretary of defense for legal and legislative

matters, as vice deputy U.S. representative, North Atlantic Council. 26

The 1952 Reorganization ofNATO

When the reconstituted North Atlantic Council met in September 1951 at

Ottawa-with the foreign, finance, and defense ministers all present-the

large number of participants made it difficult to get business accomplished.

Never altogether happy about the 1951 NATO reorganization, State now was

convinced that other arrangements had to be made. In November Harriman,

reporting to the Rome council meeting as chairman of the NATO Temporary

Council Committee (TCe), • stated the need for organizational tightening, and

the council directed a study by the Council Deputies. The TCC report of 17

December recommended appointment of a NATO director-general to head an

international staff and carry out council decisions. The report did not

recommend the removal of NATO agencies from London, since Harriman

knew that Winston Churchill, again British prime minister, strongly opposed

the move.

27

The JCS reacted lukewarmly to the TCe's organizational recommenda-

• See Chapter XVIII.
Building a NATO Structure 345

tions but did not oppose another NATO reorganization, provided it did not

change the military groups. OSD comptroller McNeil, who believed that

NATO needed to give greater consideration to financial matters at all levels,

supported the reorganization. On 15 January 1952 Lovett informed Acheson

that Defense thought that NATO should be recast to provide a capable and

effective civilian organization to support its growing military force. 28 State

had already proposed to the Council Deputies a reorganization plan that

included abolition of the Council Deputies, the Defense Production Board,

and the Financial and Economic Board. A permanently functioning North

Atlantic Council under a secretary general was to be created, and all NATO

civilian agencies, including those in London, were to be located in or near

Paris. Although Defense was not altogether satisfied with the proposal, Lovett

concurred in the State Department position. 29

The reorganization approved at the Lisbon council meeting on 25

February essentially incorporated the U.S. proposal to concentrate all NATO

civilian activities in a single headquarters, the North Atlantic Council, which

would have an integrated international secretariat under a secretary general, as

well as permanent country representatives heading national delegations of

advisers and experts. Remaining in permanent session, the council would

assume the functions of all abolished agencies and take over the annual review

task begun under the Temporary Council Committee. Three times a year the

council would hold meetings of foreign, defense, or finance ministers as

required, or even heads of government, at its permanent headquarters in or

near Paris, under an annually rotating chairmanship. The secretary general

would be the council's vice chairman and preside in the chairman's absence.

NATO's military organization would remain unchanged, and both the Standing

Group and the Military Representatives Committee would continue in Washington. Liaison arrangements between the military agencies and the council

were to be strengthened..:\o

The Lisbon meeting finally settled the troublesome problem of the site for

NATO headquarters. Since the British wanted the new secretary general to be

a Briton, they accepted the qUid pro quo of Paris as the site of NATO

headquarters. The Americans in turn agreed to the appointment of Sir Oliver

Franks, the British ambassador to the United States, as secretary general. When

Franks refused the position, the Americans maintained that the caliber and

reputation of the new secretary general were more important considerations

than nationality, while the British gave the impression that the United States

should support any new candidate they offered..:\ 1 The agreement of Lord

Ismay, then secretary ofstate for commonwealth relations, to take the position

ended the embarrassment. Lovett expressed his approval since he thought

Ismay favorably disposed to the United States..:\2
CHART 4

NATO

AFTER APRIL 1952

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Paris

Chairman (changes annually)

Vice-ChairmanlThe Secretary General

SECRETARY GENERAL

MILITARY COMMITIEE Paris

Washington INTERNATIONAL

STANDING GROUP STAFF/SECRETARIAT

MILITARY ~. LIAISON OFFICE - REPRESENT- STANDING

ATIVES GROUP Paris COUNCIL COMMITIEES

COMMITIEE

I Paris

I I

SUPREME ALLIED SUPREME ALLIED CANADA - U.S. CHANNEL COMMITIEE

COMMANDER COMMANDER REGIONAL PLANNING

EUROPE ATLANTIC GROUP CHANNEL COMMANDS
Building a NATO Structure 347

The new centralized organization under Ismay came into effect on

NATO's third birthday, 4 April 1952. Spofford, the deputy U.S. representative

and chairman of the Council Deputies, resigned to return to private law

practice, while his staff moved to Paris to work under William H. Draper, Jr.

Already handling major U.S. responsibilities for mutual security in Europe,

Draper became also the U.S. permanent representative to the North Atlantic

Council, representing the secretary of defense in both roles.'~ However,

Draper's military assistance responsibilities had brought him into conflict with

other Defense elements in Europe, and Lovett refused to concur in Draper's

instructions, a situation not resolved until July.•

Both Marshall and Lovett had to deal with much organizational restructuring in NATO, mainly directed toward centralizing and strengthening its

civilian apparatus. Generally, both secretaries sought to minimize change;

when it became unavoidable, they tried to maintain control over those matters

that were Defense responsibilities within the United States. The need to find

an accommodation with State on these points led to a complex give-and-take

relationship between the two departments, which became evident again in the

events leading to the admittance of Greece and Turkey to NATO membership.

Two New NATO Members

Located at the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea and bordering on the

Soviet bloc, Greece and Turkey occupied a pivotal geographic position for the

future military defense of Western Europe. Potentially, the two countries

could provide the West with bases and manpower to help form a barrier

against a Soviet thrust toward the oil-rich Arab states of the Middle East.

Despite Greece's position on the flank of a potential Soviet drive westward,

U.S. military men thought Turkey had more strategic importance. Determined

that neither country should fall under Communist domination, the United

States had been supplying assistance to them for several years.~'

By 1950 u.s. aid amounted to approximately $886 million, the major part

going to Greece to relieve economic suffering and combat a Communist-led

guerrilla war that had begun in 1946. U.s. military equipment and a Joint u.s.

Military Advisory and Planning Group OUSMAPG) played a major role in

helping Greece to overcome the pro-Soviet People's Liberation Army of Greece

(ELAS) by the fall of 1949. Cooperation between the United States and Turkey

also became closer. Following the visit of Army Chief of Staff General Collins

to Turkey in March 1950, the chief of the Joint American Military Mission for

• See Chapter XIX for a discussion of this prohlem.
348 THE TEST OF WAR

Aid to Turkey OAMMAT), Maj. Gen. H.L. McBride, began to advise and assist

in Turkish military planning. ~5

The u.s. intended that its aid to help defeat the Greek guerrillas benefit

Turkey as well as Greece, but neither country was offered a formal security

guarantee. The United States wanted to enable the Greek military establishment to maintain internal order and thus avoid Communist domination of the

country. In Turkey, the U.S. sought to strengthen the Turkish armed forces to

ensure the country's continued resistance to Soviet pressures and ability to

stand against a Soviet invasion should it occur. Military aid was also intended

to provide for possible U.S. strategic operations from Turkey in the event of

conflict with the USSR. ~6

By May 1950 the United States was prepared to proceed with construction of several air bases in Turkey, an action supported by Secretary Johnson.

The Turks, keenly aware of the vulnerability of their position on the Soviet

border, pressed for a formal security guarantee in the form of a regional

defense arrangement, preferably through membership in NATO, that would

include the United States. ~7

In pursuing such an arrangement, the Turks sought to strengthen their

defensive alliance system. In a mutual assistance treaty signed in 1939 and

reaffirmed in 1949, France and the United Kingdom had pledged to come to

Turkey's aid in the event of attack, but realistically the Turks could expect little

more than token military support. Talk of a possible Greek-Turkish-Italian

alliance that might more closely link Greece and Turkey to NATO remained

indefinite. On 19 July 1950, after the start of the Korean War, President

Truman publicly stated that the United States had "taken action to bolster the

military defenses of individual free nations, such as Greece, Turkey, and Iran."

In approving NSC 73/4 on 24 August, Truman decided, in the event of a Soviet

or satellite attack on Greece or Turkey, to accelerate military assistance and

send such forces as could be spared without imperiling U.S. security. But the

Turks considered nonbinding public statements and nonspecific secret policy

decisions unsatisfactory substitutes for formal guarantees. ~H

The State Department in August asked for Defense views on Turkish

membership in NATO, with its implications for future similar requests from

Greece and possibly Iran. The service secretaries opposed such membership as

contrary to NATO's concept and purpose and an unduly complicating factor in

its operation. ~') The Joint Chiefs, on the other hand, recommended support

for immediate associate status in the Alliance for both Greece and Turkey and

reconsideration of the question of full membership when NATO defenses

became more developed. They wanted no formal Mediterranean regional pact

or country assurances but did not object to informal French-British-American pledges to Turkey that a Soviet attack against Turkey would probably
Building a NATO Structure 349

start a global war and that the Allies would act accordingly. Johnson supported

the JCS view. In discussions with State, however, Pentagon representatives

made it clear that Defense opposed any specific U.S. commitment for

additional military assistance at the expense of higher priority obligations

elsewhere. 40

In September 1950, when Acheson raised the question of associate NATO

status for Greece and Turkey with the British and French foreign ministers,

they agreed to place the matter before the North Atlantic Council meeting. On

16 September the council approved a U. S. proposal to offer associate status to

Turkey and later to Greece if Turkey accepted. Both countries agreed in early

October. 4 I

When Marshall became secretary of defense in late September, he asked

the Joint Chiefs to consider the proposed association of Greece and Turkey

with NATO and to present their views on military strategy in the Mediterranean area. The JCS pointed out that U.S. plans called for a strategic offense in

Europe and a strategic defense in the Middle East and the Far East. Turkey

should therefore be strong enough to deter a Soviet or satellite attack, or at

least to offer serious defense, and to deny the Soviets a Black Sea exit. The

Joint Chiefs wanted the Greeks to develop enough military strength to delay to

the maximum the advance of Soviet bloc forces. They hoped that both

countries would provide the Allies with military bases and support, undertake

guerrilla warfare in overrun areas, and coordinate plans with friendly neighbors. On 10 November Marshall approved the JCS recommendations as

guidance for NATO military planning. 42

Both the Greeks and Turks found their associate NATO status unsatisfactory. The Turks were particularly disappointed with their junior position and

reluctant to grant further U.S. military concessions without receiving formal

security guarantees. In the United States, Greece and Turkey became a political

issue in February 1951 when Thomas E. Dewey, the 194H Republican presidential candidate, publicly advocated full NATO membership for the two countries. Many senators agreed with him. In March Acheson informed Marshall that

the advantages of a U.S. security guarantee for Turkey and Greece currently

outweighed the disadvantages, and he asked for Defense views. 4:1 In the belief

that Eisenhower favored membership, • the service secretaries joined with the

Joint Chiefs in recommending to Marshall early NATO membership for both

countries. Concurring on 14 April, Marshall wrote Acheson that the United

States should propose and support such membership.44 Full membership for

Greece and Turkey became official U.S. policy before the end of May. 4~

• On 2 April 1951 Eisenhowl:f said that he felt SHAPE's mission did not include the Middle East

although he was concerned about those areas.
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Building a NATO Structure 351

At the North Atlantic Council meeting in Ottawa in September, the United

States obtained the council's consent to invite the two countries to join NATO.

The enlargement of the area of the NATO security guarantee, however,

required a change in the Alliance charter. After the Council Deputies signed a

new protocol on 22 October, the United States tendered an invitation on

behalf of NATO. On 18 February 1952, during the council meeting at Lisbon,

the formal accession took place. Greece and Turkey had their security

guarantee; NATO had 14 members and its area extended from the Western

Hemisphere to the Caucasus along the border of the Soviet Union. 16

The accession of Turkey to NATO membership brought it to the fore in

planning for the defense of southeastern Europe and the Middle East. The

Turks, on the occasion of Eisenhower's visit to Ankara in early March 1952 to

discuss possible command arrangements, seemed to view the new relationship as more with the United States than NATO. The Supreme Allied Commander appeared impressed by their military spirit, readiness to cooperate,

and grasp of NATO problems.-\7

Since NATO membership gave Turkey its desired security guarantee, the

Allies had no hesitation in asking the Turks to take on increased regional

burdens. Indeed, British support for the inclusion of Turkey had hinged on

Turkish willingness to join some arrangement for Middle Eastern defense.

Viewing Turkey as the only significant military power in the Middle East, the

Americans welcomed Turkey's desire to playa greater role in stabilizing and

securing the area. On a visit in the summer of 1952, Frank Nash, who had

replaced Burns as Lovett's assistant for international security affairs, asked the

Turks whether, if attacked, they would be willing to fight in other Middle

Eastern areas. While willing to join an Allied defensive effort in the Middle

East, the Turks clearly preferred not to deploy their forces outside of Turkey. III

Nevertheless, the Turks played a helpful role in the U.S. and NATO attempt

to organize a Middle East defense organization intended to include the Arab

states. Turkish leaders, strongly anti-Communist but pragmatic, in 1952 were

also agreeable, with U.S. support, to a rapprochement with the Communist

but non-Soviet bloc country, Yugoslavia. A Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav pact of

friendship resulted from this effort in early 1953. With this evidence of area

cooperation, the southeastern t1ank of NATO appeared somewhat less vulnerable. Indeed, Turkey viewed the tripartite pact as simply a step toward

Yugoslav adherence to NATO itself, a development that might occur whenever

the attitudes of member states and Yugoslavs would permit.-\9

With Turkey in NATO, the United States prepared to discuss a number of

direct measures requiring Turkish assistance, including wartime denial to

Soviet ships of a Black Sea exit via the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles by the

possible peacetime mining of the Turkish Straits with special devices that
352 THE TEST OF WAR

would offer no danger to peacetime navigation. During discussions in 1950,

the Turks had thought the project militarily desirable but feared their

vulnerability to retaliation without a security guarantee. The British worried

that the mining might violate the Montreux Convention of 1936 governing the

Straits, of which they, the Soviets, and the Turks were all signatories. 50 At the

time, the Americans were concerned that the Turks might exploit Soviet

hostility to extract a U.S. security commitment or that the Soviets might

demand changes in the convention. In March 1951 Burns recommended to

State a U.S. Navy suggestion to stockpile mines and component equipment and

review the question later. Although the subject came up again in 1952, no

further operational steps occurred during Lovett's time. 51

Turkey's NATO membership also brought a review of U.S. military

operating rights and facilities in the country. The United States had already

supported the construction of seven air bases, including a large airfield

capable of supporting strategic air operations. By mid-1952 these bases were

ready or under construction. Although the Air Force wanted to use the

airfields, particularly the large one at Adana, before as well as after the start of

an attack, no arrangements had been made. State still considered the matter

politically sensitive in mid-1952, but Secretary of the Air Force Finletter felt

he needed a usage agreement to justify to Congress Air Force expenditures in

Turkey.52 When Finletter raised the issue with Turkish authorities in September 1952, the State Department feared possible Turkish demands for stationing

U.S. Air Force units in Turkey. Nonetheless, Finletter recommended that State

negotiate base rights, and Lovett asked Acheson to do so on 6 January 1953.

Since the Turks seemed amenable and it was probable that the Soviets believed

an agreement already existed, State acquiesced in seeking both pre- and

post-strike operating rights. No negotiations occurred, however, until after

Lovett left office, and even then they proceeded slowly despite apparent

Turkish receptiveness. 53

With augmented status and greater responsibilities in their area, the Turks

wanted more aid to support a much enlarged military force. U.S. military

assistance had already helped the Turkish armed forces to grow both in

numbers and quality. In mid-1950, when Turkey had 3 armies of 19 divisions

with a total strength of approximately 235,000 men, the United States believed

the Bulgarians alone could attack and occupy most of Thrace before the Turks

could stop them. At the time General McBride viewed conditions in the

Turkish force as alarming. 5.. Ignoring the Turkish desire for new, fully

motorized and mechanized-if untrained-units, McBride and his replacement in the fall of 1950, Maj. Gen. William H. Arnold, emphasized instead

such steps as deactivating less efficient units, increasing the number of

noncommissioned officers, reducing the gendarmerie, frequent and realistic
Building a NATO Structure 353

inspection, using American field training teams, and building up equipment

stocks only as trained forces could utilize them. By mid-1952 Turkish forces

numbered about 375,000 men, with 500,000 trained reserves, and were

considered capable of defending against any Communist satellite attack

without outside help. ';';

By this time, however, Congress was unwilling to increase mutual

security appropriations, and greater Turkish demands could only be met at the

expense of other claimants. The Turks, belieVing that they had accepted

greater strategic responsibilities, contributed more military power, and made

a larger financial sacrifice than countries receiving two or three times as much

U.S. assistance, were irritated when they received compliments but not the

amounts of aid they desired. Planned U.S. military assistance programs* of

$162 million for FY 1951 and $232 million for FY 1952 and a contemplated

FY 1953 program of $233 million did not satisfy the Turks. ';(,

As a member of NATO with considerable responsibility in the Mideast,

Turkey expected considerate treatment and, particularly, consultation on all

matters of direct interest, which unfortunately did not always occur. The

United States could not convince the Turks that increased military assistance

could not be made available. In the view of one American diplomat who

served in Turkey, these failures of communication, although small, significantly clouded U.S. relations with a ready and willing ally. ';-

Spain and Yugoslavia

The U.S. perception of a greater Soviet threat in Europe during the Korean

War years spurred efforts to acquire additional military strength on the side of

the West from two heretofore outcast countries-Spain and Yugoslavia.

Neither was a likely candidate for NATO membership. Spain, still under the

dictatorship of the fascist Falangist government of General Francisco Franco

and far to the political right of NATO members, remained virtually isolated

from the rest of the Western world, its support of Nazi Germany during World

War II still unforgiven, particularly by France and Great Britain. Yugoslavia, a

Communist country far to the left of NATO nations, under the leadership of

Marshal Tito Oosip Broz), had until lately been a Soviet satellite. In 1948 it had

been expelled from the Cominform for unfriendliness toward the Soviet

Union and violation of Marxist theory and practice. Both Spain and Yugoslavia had large but poorly equipped military forces that might, for reasons of

survival, fight on the side of the West against a Soviet attack.

* The Turks also received l;.s. economic aid, although on a declining scale by FY 19';2.
354 THE TEST OF WAR

The potential importance of Spain as a bastion of last resort in Europe if

the Soviets overran Germany and France had attracted the attention of the JCS

before the Korean War, but strained relations between the United States and

Spain had precluded any steps toward a rapprochement. A UN resolution in

1946 barred Spain from all UN activities and urged member nations to

withdraw their ambassadors and ministers from Spain; the United States

complied but maintained a charge d'affaires in Madrid. Moreover, President

Truman expressed a strong personal aversion to Franco. 58

In May 1950 the Joint Chiefs advised Secretary Johnson that, if general

war broke out, Spain might be the "last foothold in Continental Europe for the

United States and its allies" and strongly recommended military cooperation

with the Spanish. Truman thought the JCS opinion "decidedly militaristic,"

and even after the outbreak of the Korean War the State Department, with

some cause, looked on Spanish participation in NATO as a potential source of

"dissension and controversy among our allies. ,,59 Johnson prodded the

president to give Spain some assistance under the terms of the transfer

provision of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, but Truman did not favor the

idea. Signing the FY 1951 General Appropriation Act on 6 September, the

president viewed as optional its provision of $62.5 million for a loan to

Spain. 60

In November, however, the United States voted to revoke the UN resolution of 1946. Although Truman remarked at the time that it would be a "long,

long time before there is an Ambassador to Spain," he named Stanton Griffis

to the post in late December. By early 1951, when the JCS recommended

NATO membership and U.S. military assistance for Spain, State had edged

closer to the Defense position but wanted time for preliminary political

negotiations. Secretary Marshall recommended "more of a sense of urgency"

in the U.S. attitude toward Spain. General Eisenhower, eyeing Franco's 20

divisions, told Truman and the Cabinet on 31 January that he could use such

help for his NATO forces. Two days later, Truman approved an immediate

approach to Spain and some military assistance. 61

Receptive to the U.S. overtures and aware of the improbability of an

invitation to join NATO, Franco told Ambassador Griffis that, if properly

armed, his country would participate in defending Europe against an attack,

with or without a formal pact. The French and British took an unfavorable

view of negotiations with Spain and insisted that they be consulted before any

U.S. discussions. Defense opposed exploratory military conversations with

the French and British as premature, but Acheson declared such discussions

essential. Marshall and the JCS yielded, but talks in late June failed to remove

the objections of the two countries. Congress meanwhile carried over into the

next fiscal year the 562.5 million for a Spanish loan. 62
Building a NATO Structure 355

In the Pentagon, both the secretaries of the military departments and the

JCS asked Marshall to ensure that if Spanish membership in NATO was delayed

the United States would make other military arrangements with Spain. The

president approved this Defense position as U.S. policy (NSC 72/6). It

remained policy for the rest of the Truman administration.()~

In July 1951 Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, chief of naval operations-in

one of the last official acts of his career-held military discussions with

Franco in Madrid and thus paved the way for further talks. In late August a

military team under Maj. Gen. James w. Spry, USAF, began technical discussions in Madrid; it submitted a report to theJCS on 2 November. 6ci During this

period the United States reassured the French and British that the Spanish

negotiations were indeed of extreme importance to Western European defense. Meanwhile, Congress appropriated $100 million for military, economic, and technical assistance to Spain in FY 1952 for use at the president's

discretion. 65

Events did not augur well for an early agreement between the two

countries. The popular Stanton Griffis resigned, adding to Spanish public

uncertainty about U.S. policy. General Eisenhower was quoted as opposing

Spain's admission to NATO. When asked about this remark by newsmen,

Truman said that he had "never been very fond of Spain," and then amended

his comment to mean the Franco government, thus provoking outrage in the

Spanish press and prompting a letter from Franco. Furthermore, the new U.S.

ambassador, Lincoln MacVeagh, did not present his credentials until late March

1952.66

In response to the military team's report, the Joint Chiefs informed

Secretary Lovett on 16 January 1952 that they wanted to establish aJoint U.S.

Military Group OUSMG Spain) to begin military negotiations and to use the

$100 million appropriation for U.S. military projects in Spain. Deleting the

last recommendation because military assistance funds could not legally be

used for U.S. construction abroad, Lovett sent the JCS views to State. With

State's concurrence, Acting Secretary of Defense Foster on 24 March approved

both the appointment of a temporary JUSMG (Spain) and, for planning

purposes, a JCS list of U.S. military requirements in Spain. Under Maj. Gen.

August W. Kissner, USAF, the group began talks in April, while a U.S. economic

team also entered into negotiations with the Spanish-both sets of talks

preliminary to formal government-to-government negotiations. 67 In essence

the talks would determine how much assistance would be needed to acquire

the right to develop and use bases in Spain.

Of the $100 million appropriated for Spanish assistance, the Joint Chiefs

in February 1952 proposed using only $12 million for military end items and

the remaining $88 million for economic aid to support military objectives.
356 THE TEST OF WAR

They wanted to apply $78 million in counterpart funds· generated by u.s.

economic aid to development of military bases in Spain. Of a planned

three-year base construction program of approximately $400 million, the first

year's share of $130 million would also require $52 million from regular Air

Force and Navy funds. Lovett approved in March a package deal jointly

developed by JCS, State, and OSD officials, but Secretary Finletter proved

unenthusiastic about using regular Air Force funds, and the Spanish were

dubious about releasing the counterpart funds for U.S. base construction. The

Joint Chiefs felt that if Spain would not release at least $50 million in

counterpart funds, it would be undesirable to spend the $100 million

appropriation. In June, the Mutual Security Act of 1952 extended the

availability of the $100 million into FY 1953 and added $25 milliont as a

minimum mandatory expenditure for economic, technical, or military assistance to Spain. 68

Although the entire extra $25 million went for military equipment for

Spain, making a total of $37 million in military assistance, plus $88 million in

economic aid, the Spanish viewed the $125 million total as far too small, and

negotiations came to a standstill. Madrid apparently found offensive not only

the amount offered in comparison with aid to other countries, but also the

U.S. insistence on maintaining American forces on Spanish soil during

peacetime. 69 Ambassador MacVeagh recommended adding $30 million to the

U.S. offer and assuring Spain of continued support of its defense efforts. In the

Pentagon, Nash advised Lovett in early August that while assurances could be

given, the United States had to be able to use Spanish military facilities in

peacetime also and that the $125 million figure was a maximum for FY 1953.

In October MacVeagh assured the Spanish of U.S. support over a period of

several years and expressed hope for closer association between the two

countries. The reaction seemed favorable. 7()

The amount of the U.S. military aid package, however, remained undetermined. Apparently believing that they might be called on to undertake

missions elsewhere in Europe, the Spanish indicated to General Kissner that

their military aid requirements came close to $1.4 billion. Kissner recommended in late summer 1952 that Spain be assigned certain defense tasks and

granted $440 million in military aid over a period of years. In November

Lovett went along with the JCS view that the $440 million figure accorded

with U.S. objectives but that it was premature to assign specific defense tasks.

Then in December Madrid proposed that construction of U.S. bases in Spain

• Counterpart funds were created in local currencies by foreign governments in payment for

commodities sent under u.s. economic assistance programs. A percentage of these funds was

reserved for u.s. use in the countries involved.

t The $125 million total was in addition to the $62.5 million loan.
Building a NATO Structure 357

and the equipping of Spanish forces by the United States proceed "on a parallel

basis" and that use of the bases in time of war be a matter for prior

consultation between the two governments. Neither of these propositions was

acceptable to the United States. However, by late December the two countries

had negotiated a military aid package for FY 1954 of $85 million."'l

In January 1953 Truman agreed that the United States must show good

intent by raising the Spanish share in the FY 1954 military assistance program

from $31 million to $85 million, but the Franco government was not informed

of this change. An agreement finally signed on 26 September 1953 gave the

United States the right to establish naval and air bases on Spanish territory and

provided military and economic aid. The Korean War years thus set the stage

for effective bilateral military cooperation with the Spanish, but another

generation would pass before Spain would be admitted to NATO.'2

As with Spain, U.S. rapprochement with Yugoslavia evolved slowly and

fitfully. By mid-1950 the United States had provided some limited economic

aid, but mutual suspicion still persisted between the two countries.'5 Although Tito had not requested U.S. arms and Yugoslavia currently could not

qualify for grant military aid, fear of a Soviet-assisted attack against Yugoslavia

impelled Truman in November 1949 to approve NSC 18/4. This report

envisaged that the United States would furnish arms to the Yugoslavs in an

emergency if they requested them and it was feasible. The United States

consulted its allies but did not inform Tito of the decision. While the

American officials did not know Yugoslav requirements, they knew that the

country's conglomeration of arms was largely obsolete and in need of

maintenance and repair. 7 1

The advent of the Korean War increased U.S. concern over Yugoslavia's

vulnerability to Soviet bloc pressure or attack. In August 1950 the Truman

administration secured an amendment to the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of

1949 permitting military assistance to additional countries. Reaffirming the

policy of providing military aid but no military forces to Yugoslavia in the

event of Soviet aggression, the Joint Chiefs recommended immediate coordination of planning with France and the United Kingdom and use of Defense

funds to stockpile the necessary supplies until military aid was decided upon.

With State not averse to stockpiling, French, British, and American representatives met in October to review Yugoslav military requirements and to locate

sources of materiel. Unable to ascertain Yugoslav needs, the tripartite report,

completed in October, approved in principle sending older military equipment and forwarded an initial program for governmental consideration.'~

A severe drought and declining economic conditions seriously affected

Yugoslavia in the summer of 1950. When Belgrade asked in October 1950 for

$100 million in U.S. aid, half for food and half for industrial raw materials,
358 THE TEST OF WAR

Marshall, seriously concerned that Yugoslav unrest might affect the military

situation in Europe, urged immediate U.S. action. 76 Within weeks, State and

Defense officials put together a stopgap program of $33.5 million, including,

with Truman's approval, $16 million of military assistance funds for food

rations for the Yugoslav armed forces. In December 1950 Congress approved

$ 38 million for food for Yugoslavia. Thus within two months of the Yugoslav

request the Truman administration made available food grants of approximately $70 million. 77

Although State had earlier seemed amenable to stockpiling military

equipment for Yugoslavia, it wanted a complete NSC policy review and Allied

consultation before approaching Tito about military assistance. The JCS

advised Marshall that without military assistance Yugoslav resistance to attack

would probably be short lived. Tito therefore should be approached concerning his requirements and stockpiling begun on a priority equal to NATO's, but

the United States should remain uncommitted and no deliveries should be

made before aggression occurred. 7H

In early 1951 the Joint Chiefs informed Marshall that they favored

acceptance of the October tripartite report but that no FY 1951 military

assistance funds should be diverted to Yugoslavia unless an overriding priority

were assigned. They recommended a FY 1952 program of $160 million to

provide for handling and transport of equipment for the Yugoslav stockpile.

Marshall generally concurred but thought events might lend greater urgency to

the JCS plan. Publicly, Tito was still saying that he would not yet ask for

Western arms, but in fact his representative had been in Washington and

seemed open to the possibility. With indications of Soviet shipments of heavy

equipment to satellite military forces and concentrations of Romanian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian troops along the Yugoslav border, Tito responded to a

U.S. invitation and in late December 1950 submitted a list of Yugoslavia's most

urgent requirements 7 ')

The State Department strongly supported sending arms to Yugoslavia,

and on 31 January 1951, after a tour of the NATO countries, Eisenhower told

Truman and the Cabinet that he favored giving arms to the Yugoslavs in the

event of war. Lovett, however, had wondered whether Defense could provide

the arms that Tito wanted since they were already in short supply. The Joint

Chiefs suggested diverting some FY 1951 MDAP funds-later set at $77.5

million-to create a stockpile of equipment. Lovett then agreed that Tito

should be advised of the immediate availability of a small amount of captured

and surplus equipment. 'HI)

, The services prepared two lists of equipment for delivery; the initial shipload sailed on 1 May

in a Yugoslav vessel that arrived on 20 May
Building a NATO Structure 359

The specter of a Soviet-inspired attack caused concern in Washington that

Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey-which together had more troops than

General Eisenhower was apt to command in NATO for quite some timemight be overrun one by one. On 14 February, with reference to a possible

attack against Yugoslavia, Acheson publicly called attention to Truman's

earlier statement that any new aggression in the world would "strain the fabric

of world peace to a dangerous extent."H! The ominous signs convinced Tito

of the need for greater cooperation with the West. Addressing the discontent

of some Yugoslav Communists over his increasingly pro-Western orientation,

Tito told a political conference in February that the country would remain

Communist but would have to accept his policy of working with the Western

nations, which had helped by sending food. Tito reminded his audience that

the country's safety was enhanced by Western statements that an attack on

Yugoslavia would result in a larger conflict. Claiming he had not yet asked for

Western arms, Tito said he would do so if he considered an attack inevitable.Hz

During an NSC review of u.s. policy on 7 March, Marshall pointed out

that it would probably take six months after a decision to send military

equipment before delivery could be made to the Yugoslavs. Reaffirming U.S.

interest in helping the country remain independent of Soviet domination, the

NSC agreed that the United States should expedite economic assistance, try to

determine Yugoslav military requirements, act in conjunction with the NATO

nations to facilitate Yugoslav arms purchases, provide direct grant assistance

including military items, and inform Tito that he could count on Western

materiel support if attacked. For this last purpose the United States was to

establish a special stockpile as rapidly as possible and plan for "appropriate

military support." In the event of hostile guerrilla actions by Eastern bloc

countries, the United States should support action through the UN, consult

and act with its allies, and deliver such military equipment as Belgrade

requested and the JCS recommended. Against an overt attack on Yugoslavia,

the United States should take all the above measures, implement its military

support plans, and prepare for the "increased threat of global war." There was

no mention of use of American military forces; the United States sought no

bases. In summary, the new policy, inconclusive on the matter of U.S.

operational support, definitely promised military supplies in the event of an

attack on Yugoslavia, with an immediate commitment to such support.

Truman approved this policy in NSC 18/6 on 12 March; no further formal

change in policy toward Yugoslavia occurred during his presidency. H~

In early April the tripartite working group of the previous year reassembled to see what equipment could be supplied to Yugoslavia by the British,

French, and Americans. Chaired by Brig. Gen. George H. Olmsted, the OSD

director of military assistance, the committee agreed that the need for
360 THE TEST OF WAR

assistance had increased and that the West should supply some military

equipment as soon as possible after joint consultations. 84

At the end of April Burns told State that Defense needed to hold technical

talks directly with Yugoslav military authorities. Following extended conversations, Col. Gen. Koca Popovic of Yugoslavia and Brig. Gen. Clyde D.

Eddleman, USA, representing the JCS, on 13 June 1951 signed a memorandum

of agreement-not binding on the governments-specifying a second list of

arms for shipment. Popovic indicated that the Yugoslav government planned

to request U.S. military assistance formally and to conclude the necessary

bilateral agreement; he assented in principle to early technical and operational

planning staff conferences. Despite Tito's expressed aversion to a military

alliance with the West or involvement in NATO, he eventually agreed to

exploratory military talks with U.S. officials late in 1952. 85

On 28 June 1951 Belgrade made a formal request for military assistance,

and bilateral technical talks began on 7 August, with Olmsted serving as chief

of the Joint MDAP Survey Mission. Since Tito insisted that the talks be held in

Washington, the mission had little chance to observe conditions in Yugoslavia. The survey mission report, submitted in September, indicated that

Yugoslav forces could utilize $88.6 million in U.S. military assistance during

FY 1951 and $746 million during FY 1952 and FY 1953, amounts well in

excess of previous recommendations. The report recommended immediate

approval of the FY 1951 figure and approval of the FY 1952 and FY 1953

figures subject to revision. Citing their bad experience with Soviet military

advisers, the Yugoslavs did not want to allow another foreign mission in

Yugoslavia, but the United States remained adamant on this point. The two

nations finally signed the agreement on 14 November.86

Despite Yugoslavia's apparent importance, its priority for military assistance equipment·remained the same as that for NATO, with the result that, of

a total of $90.9 million in military assistance programmed for Yugoslavia in FY

1951, only $9.1 million had been shipped by the end of December 1951. But

by December 1952 the military assistance program for the three fiscal years

1951-53 had reached $444 million; nearly $114 million worth of supplies

had already been sent or was in depots awaiting shipment.87

Granting the unlikelihood of Yugoslav adherence to NATO, the United

States desired improvement in Belgrade's relationship with its three NATO

neighbors-Greece, Italy, and Turkey. Nonetheless Italo-Yugoslav relations

remained poor because of the Trieste issue, which was not resolved until

1954.' Yugoslav relations with Greece and Turkey improved considerably

• The Italian Peace Treaty of February 1947 divided the Free Territory of Trieste, a part of Italy

between 1919 and 1947, into two zones-a northern one administered by the British and

Americans and a southern part administered by the Yugoslavs. In March 1948, while Yugoslavia
Building a NATO Structure 361

after Tito in the summer of 1952 declared his willingness to cooperate with

them for mutual defense. In late 1952 the Yugoslavs held military talks with

the Greeks and then the Turks, and the three nations signed a five-year treaty

of friendship and collaboration at Ankara in February 1953.HH

Although Spain and Yugoslavia were not invited to join NATO during the

Korean War period, they did draw considerably closer to the West. Without

the benefit of formal pacts, there was an end to their isolation from the West

and some reason to believe that the two countries might be counted on to fight

against Soviet aggression.

The NATO Military Command

While the United States searched for additional Allies to assist in the

defense of Europe, the NATO military structure had to surmount major

problems in its evolution after 1950. The Alliance faced a formidable task of

organizing the three integrated commands-for Europe, the Atlantic, and the

Mediterranean-authorized by the NATO Council in December 1950. At that

time, only the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Eisenhower, was appointed. Both Europeans and Americans felt that if anyone

could create an effective defense force, Eisenhower was the man to do it.

Marshall looked on Eisenhower as "rather unique in the world. "H9

For chief of staff for Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe

(SHAPE) Eisenhower immediately selected Lt. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, a

brilliant director of the JCS Joint Staff and the Army's current deputy chief of

staff for plans and operations. With Gruenther and several other U.S. officers,

soon to be joined by representatives from other NATO nations, Eisenhower

began work on SHAPE's organizational and command problems. SHAPE

occupied temporary quarters at the Astoria Hotel in Paris until moving to its

permanent site near Versailles in June 1951. 90

Viewing NATO as the "last remaining chance for the survival of Western

civilization," Eisenhower in January 1951 visited the military and political

leaders of the NATO countries and Germany. Returning to Washington at the

end ofJanuary to report to Truman and address Congress, Eisenhower told the

president, Marshall, and the Cabinet that he wanted to create a "combined

was still a Cominform member. the Allies declared the arrangement unworkable and wanted all of

Trieste returned to Italy. The outraged Yugoslavs refused to release Italy from the peace treaty.

After Yugoslavia left the Cominform, the Allies were embarrassed by continued ltalo-Yugoslav

disagreement but could not go back on their declaration. Despite Tito's offer to settle all

outstanding issues with the Italians in September 19'; I, the matter continued as a major problem

until late 19';3, when the Allies abandoned the idea of restoring all of Trieste to Italy.
362 THE TEST OF WAR

spiral of strength" by building European confidence through the creation of a

strong and unified NATO military organization. He wanted 10 to 12 U.S.

divisions plus additional troops from NATO nations and from other countries

also if they offered help freely and unconditionally. He urged that u.s. arms be

produced "exactly as if we were going to war.,,91

Back in Europe, Eisenhower faced the immediate problem of devising a

headquarters and command organization into which the disparate NATO

forces could fit and function efficiently. Writing Marshall on 12 March,

Eisenhower reported that his command problem was "more complicated than

it was in World War II because of the increased number of nations,

and . . . [because] economic and political factors enter into everything we

do." Personal and national aspirations, rigid views, and mutual suspicion

created problems among the staff. In addition, Eisenhower observed to others,

there was still "no budget, not even for housekeeping."92

For the deputy supreme commander of SHAPE, Eisenhower chose the

redoubtable Field Marshal The Viscount Montgomery, the famous and often

difficult British World War II leader who had headed the Commanders in

Chief Committee of the Western Union Defense Organization.· Contrary to

the fears of those who felt that Montgomery would be a fractious and scenestealing rival, Eisenhower found him "a fine team-mate . . . thorough,

painstaking, and, surprisingly enough, . . . patient. "9.3 British Air Chief

Marshal Sir Hugh Saunders and French Admiral Andre Lemmonier became

deputies for air and sea respectively. None of the deputies, Eisenhower

wrote Marshall, had any command functions; theirs would be "tasks of an

administrative, advisory, consultative, and preparatory nature, involving

contacts both with my own staff and with the governments of NATO."

Supporting Eisenhower, the Joint Chiefs instructed their Standing Group

representative to back his plany4

On 2 April Eisenhower formally activated SHAPE and its central and

northern commands, while a southern command remained under consideration. Personally taking responsibility for Allied Forces Central Europe, Eisenhower named two French officers, Marshal Alphonse Juin and Vice-Adm. Robert Jaujard, as commanders in chief of its land and naval forces and an

American, Lt. Gen. Lauris Norstad, as commander of its air forces. British

Admiral Sir Patrick Brind became commander in chief ofAllied Forces Northern

Europe and also headed its naval force, while an American had charge of air,

and Danish and Norwegian officers commanded their respective national land

forces. Allied Forces Southern Europe, established in June 1951, came under

• On 20 December 1950, the Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty Powers decided to

merge the military organization of Western Union into NATO.
Building a NATO Structure 363

U.S. Admiral Robert B. Carney, who also commanded its naval forces, while an

Italian and an American became chief of land and air forces respectivelyYs

After Eisenhower assumed his duties as SACEUR, he looked for an

intermediary through whom he might frequently but indirectly communicate

with the president, finally settling on Harriman, at that point Truman's special

assistant.96 Obviously disturbed by the relief of General MacArthur in the

spring of 1951, Eisenhower wrote Harriman on 12 May that the newspapers

were saying a "great deal about soldiers necessarily clearing with higher

authority in advance anything they may have to say on matters lying outside

their own professional concerns." Eisenhower complained that, although he

was expected to generate enthusiasm in Europe and become involved in more

than just military matters, he saw no way that he could ever clear his remarks

beforehand with 12 different NATO governments. As a result, he declared to

Harriman, he would "keep still, in every language known to man." Harriman

encouraged him to speak out. 97

It is difficult to estimate whether or to what extent Eisenhower's feelings

about his own possible vulnerability affected his feelings toward Marshall,

whose congressional testimony on troops for Europe he had found less than

reassuring. Marshall, for his part, expressed strong feelings of esteem and

affection for Eisenhower. In September 1951 Marshall wrote that he could not

leave office without telling Eisenhower of his "tremendous admiration for the

job you have done and are doing in Europe." When Eisenhower responded

warmly, Marshall was deeply moved: "It is difficult for me to express the

feeling of appreciation I have for your appraisement of my services. ,,98 After

Lovett succeeded Marshall, the connection between SACEUR and the secretary

of defense became less personal and close. Despite Lovett's desire to cooperate, further organizational problems and delays in getting U.S. military

assistance equipment to NATO created an undercurrent of friction at the

official if not personal level. •

Eisenhower, impressively successful in his role of SACEUR, was looked on

in Europe, according to a State Department view, as the "personal embodiment of NATO itself" and a "leading U.S. spokesman, and to some

extent ... a roving U.S. Ambassador." When Eisenhower left SHAPE at the

end of May 1952 to run for the presidency, Truman designated General

Ridgway to succeed him as SACEURY9

The attempt to establish two other NATO supreme commands on the same

level as Eisenhower's, one for the Atlantic and another for the Mediterranean,

produced no positive results in 1951. Rather, the problems that emerged

threatened to strain Anglo-American relations. In accordance with the De-

• See Chapter XIX.
CHART 5

KEY NATO MILITARY PERSONNEL

JANUARY 1952

STANDING GROUP

LT. GEN. PAUL ELY (FR)

A.C.M. SIR WILLIAM ELLIOT (SR)

V. ADM. JERAULD WRIGHT (U.S.)

(Permanent Representatives of Chiefs of Staff)

Washington

I

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR)

GENERAL OF THE ARMY EISENHOWER (U.S.)

DEPUTY (AIR) SHAPE

AIR CHIEF - Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe H DEPUTY (NAVY) .1

MARSHAL SAUNDERS (SR) FIELD MARSHAL THE VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY (SR) VICE ADMIRAL LEMMONIER (FR)

I

I I I I I

Commander-in-Chief Commander-in-Chief Commander-in-Chief Flag Officer Commander-in-Chief

Allied Forces Allied Land Forces Allied Air Forces Allied Forces

Northern Europe Central Europe Central Europe Central Europe Southern Europe

(CINCNORTH) (CINCLANDCENT) (CINCAIRCENT) (FLAGCENT) (CINCSOUTH)

ADM. SRIND (SR) GEN. OF THE ARMY JUIN (FR) LT. GEN. NORSTAD (U.S.) V. ADM. JAUJARD (FR) ADM. CARNEY (U.S.)

Oslo, Norway Fontainebleau, France Fontainebleau, France Fontainebleau, France Naples, Italy

I I I I I I I

Commander Commander Commander Commander Commander Commander Commander

Allied Land Forces Allied Land Forces Allied Air Forces Allied Naval Forces Allied Land Forces Allied Air Forces Allied Naval Forces

(COMLANDNORWAY) (COMLANDDENMARK) (COMAIRNORTH) (COMNAVNORTH) (COMLANDSOUTH) (COMAIR SOUTH) (COMNAVSOUTH)

LT. GEN. LT. GEN. MAJ. GEN.

TAGEN·MANSTEEN LT. GEN. MOLLER MAJ. GEN. TAYLOR ADM. SRIND de CASTIGLIONE SCHLATIER ADM. CARNEY

(NOR) (DEN) (U.S.) (SR) (IT) (U.S.) (U.S.)

Oslo, Norway Copenhagen, Denmar1< Oslo, Norway Oslo, Norway Verona, Italy Naples, Italy Naples, Italy
Building a NATO Structure 365

cember 1950 request ofthe North Atlantic Council, Truman nominated Admiral

William M. Fechteler for the position of Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic

(SACLANT) early in February 1951. Routine approval was expected, but Winston Churchill bitterly attacked the Attlee government's acceptance of a second

U.S. supreme commander. Attlee's promise to reconsider was followed by a

heated British public debate centering on a charge that dismayed Eisenhowerthat the United States was "seizing positions of authority" in NATO. 100

With Defense concurrence, the State Department instructed Spofford on

9 March to delay NATO action on Fechteler's appointment even if the British

did agree. At the same time, the Americans tried to find a compromise

solution. 101 The British wanted to hold a military position in NATO equal to

Eisenhower's-if not SACLANT, certainly Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean. But by now a Mediterranean command appeared to be in conflict

with Eisenhower's planned organization of his southern command, which

would include the U.S. fleet in the Mediterranean. The Americans suggested

downgrading SACLANT's title to commander in chief and appointing a British

Supreme Allied Commander Middle East over a command separate from

NATO. This did not satisfy the British, and Eisenhower wanted any compromise plan to clearly delineate the responsibilities of adjacent NATO commands. At Acheson's suggestion, Lovett agreed to discussions with the British,

but the meetings in May proved inconclusive. 102

In July 1951 Lovett went along with the JCS on proceeding with the

appointment of the American SACLANT, but Admiral Sherman's sudden death

that month led to Fechteler's elevation to the post of chief of naval operations.

Although Vice Adm. Lynde D. McCormick became the U.S. nominee for

SACLANT, the British asked for a delay in his appointment to avoid any notion

that Fechteler had been personally objectionable to them. Besides, they still

wanted to pair the announcement of an American SACLANT with that of a

British supreme commander for some other post in NATO. 10:\

By midsummer 1951 doubts arose about the proposal to create a Supreme

Allied Command Mediterranean. Although Marshall believed that Eisenhower

had designed SHAPE's southern European command under Admiral Carney "to

be adaptable to any Mediterranean Command as may be agreed in the future,"

in fact naval forces in the Mediterranean were already operating under Eisenhower. Furthermore, the French also thought that they should have the principal NATO command in the Mediterranean. Further complications emerged as

the possibility of Greek and Turkish membership in NATO increased. 10.

With troubles growing in Egypt and Iran, it seemed possible that the

Mediterranean command might be superseded by a Middle East Command.

Setting up such an organization, however, proved no easier than creating one

for the Mediterranean. Even at the risk of further deferring the appointment
366 THE TEST OF WAR

of SACLANT, the NATO Standing Group thought advances should be made first

to Turkey and Egypt. Angered at the British, the Egyptians refused even to

discuss the possibility of joining a Middle East command, and both the Greeks

and Turks were determined, once they joined NATO, to come under

Eisenhower. 105 An attempt to set up a Middle East organization separate from

NATO under the auspices of seven nations-the United States, United Kingdom, France, Turkey, Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africaalso failed .• By the end of 1951, the Middle East Command idea was stillborn,

the Mediterranean Command proposal languished, and SACLANT still had not

been appointed. 106

In November 1951 in London Admiral Fechteler assured Churchill, newly

returned to office as prime minister, that under the Atlantic Command

proposal his government would retain authority over British home waters.

Although Churchill indicated that his main objection to the plan had been

removed, he still saw no necessity for an overall NATO commander in the

Atlantic. Visiting Washington in January 1952, Churchill, according to Acheson, waxed eloquent about the need for a British supreme commander over

"that Western sea whose floor is white with the bones of Englishmen." Only

after careful maneuvering by the Americans did he finally consent to let NATO

go forward and appoint an American SACLANT. The Supreme Allied Command Atlantic was established by the end ofJanuary 1952, with headquarters

at Norfolk, Virginia. An advance planning staff began to replace the old North

Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group, and Admiral McCormick took on his

new duties as SACLANT on 10 April. Like Eisenhower, McCormick reported

directly to the Standing Group and could communicate directly with the

countries supporting him. Unlike Eisenhower, SACLANT had no permanently

assigned forces, although he could hold training exercises. In any case, NATO

finally had its second supreme commander. IO~

The establishment of SACLANT left unsettled the question of how to

organize the Mediterranean area or where to fit in Greek and Turkish forces after

their formal acceptance into NATO in February 1952. At the Lisbon conference,

in February, an interim agreement placed their land and air forces under

Eisenhower within Carney's southern European command. In August, Carney

set up a subordinate command for these new forces, with headquarters in

Turkey and an advance post in Greece. Naval arrangements for the Mediterranean remained undecided, although the Military Committee was to propose

a definite solution at the next meeting of the North Atlantic Council. IO!l

Even though the British and Americans agreed on the need for an overall

NATO naval commander in the Mediterranean, they still disagreed on the

• Talk of a Middle East Defense Organization continued for another year but to little avail.
Building a NATO Structure 367

specifics. The British wanted a separate area command, with a British

commander in chief, if not a supreme commander, reporting directly to the

Standing Group. The Americans viewed the Mediterranean as SACEUR's

southern flank and wanted a commander subordinate to Eisenhower; privately, they feared that an independent British commander might not be fully

responsive to him. The two powers resolved the matter at the end of 1952 by

setting up under Eisenhower a subordinate NATO command to control Allied

naval forces and secure the Mediterranean. Admiral The Earl Mountbatten

became commander in chief of Allied Forces Mediterranean and opened his

headquarters at Malta in March 1953. The command arrangements remained

complicated since the French, Italian, Greek, and Turkish naval forces under

Mountbatten were also responsible for certain national tasks, while the U.S.

Sixth Fleet-the chief element in Mediterranean defense-remained under

Carney. Although the British got a NATO commander in chief, the problem of

organizing the Mediterranean seemed to have been solved more to U.S. than

British satisfaction. 109

Of the original five NATO regional planning groups, three were replaced

by commands under SACEUR and one by SACLANT, while the fifth survived all

the changes. The Canada-United States Regional Planning Group worked in

Washington under the direction of the chiefs ofstaff of Canada and the United

States, submitting its plans for North American defense to the NATO Standing

Group for approval. One other special NATO military entity also came under

the Standing Group. The Channel Committee, established in late 1950, included the naval chiefs of staff of Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and the

United Kingdom. In February 1952, a Channel Command was set up directly

under the Channel Committee. Jointly led by two British officers, one serving

as the Allied commander in chief and the other as the Allied maritime air

commander in chief-compensating to some extent for Churchill's agreement

to an American SACLANT-the Channel Command would have the wartime

responsibility of maintaining control of the Channel and the North Sea areas,

protecting sea lanes of communication, and supporting operations by SACEUR

and SACLANT. 110

Thus, during the Korean War years NATO's military organization took

form only after much labor and the resolution of serious Anglo-American

differences over command arrangements. OSD officials felt that strong

Anglo-American ties and basic common interest would prevail, and they

did. III By the end of 1952 Lovett could feel considerable satisfaction that the

issues surrounding NATO's military structure were substantially settled. But

there still remained the problem of raising the military forces that would

provide the ultimate deterrent to aggression against Western Europe.
CHAPTER XVIII

Increasing NATO Strength

At the start of 1951 NATO had a new supreme allied commander but

grossly inadequate forces. Beyond sending more troops to Europe, the Truman

administration needed to find ways to support the efforts of NATO members

to raise, equip, and maintain military forces without ruining their economies

or arousing disruptive internal political opposition. And the strength of

Germany, so recently the feared and hated enemy of World War II, had to be

brought into NATO's service. The realization of these goals would come only

after years of intense deliberation and negotiation among the countries

involved. The experience afforded the United States an object lesson in the

trials and tribulations to be encountered in fashioning an effective coalition in

peacetime.

The NATO Defense "Gap"

When General Eisenhower officially opened Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) on 2 April 1951, two days short of the second

anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, he commanded fewer

than 15 combat-ready divisions and 1,000 operational aircraft. Authorized by

the five Brussels Treaty powers to take over the responsibility of the Western

Union Commanders in Chief Committee, Eisenhower also inherited plans

developed by the three NATO regional planning groups that SHAPE had superseded, including a Medium Term Defense Plan (MTDP) with a target date of

1July 1954. 1 Originally drafted by the Standing Group and approved as a first

approximation ofrequirements by the NATO Defense Committee in April 1950,

the MTDP, revised as DC-28, had been approved by the Defense Committee

and sent to the North Atlantic Council on 28 October 1950. Essentially a plan

369
370 THE TEST OF WAR

to raise and maintain indefinitely a given force, DC-28 projected a military

buildup sufficient to deter an attack or, if one occurred, to permit establishment

of a strong European defense line. Although the member governments agreed

on the MTDP in late 1950, many had doubts about its cost. 2

When Eisenhower outlined his strategic concept to the president and the

Cabinet in late January 1951, he described Western Europe as the narrow neck

of a bottle whose wide base was the Soviet Union. If the Soviets attacked

Europe, the narrow neck would become the center ofresistance. Viewed in this

fashion, Europe had two flanks, one in the North Sea area and the other in the

Mediterranean, both of which would have to be heavily armed. If the Soviets

attacked in the center, Eisenhower planned to "hit them awfully hard from both

flanks"; with sufficient NATO strength, the center would hold, and the Soviets

would turn back. But the forces that Eisenhower wanted and the requirements

for DC-28 far exceeded what the NATO countries felt they could afford to raise.

As Eisenhower soon learned, the United States would not provide more than

six divisions. By the spring of 1951, the Standing Group gave the highest

priority to closing the gap between forces required and forces offered.

Reviewing the DC-28 requirements in late May, the JCS phased them for

the start of combat (D-Day), 30 days later (D + 30), and 90 days later (D + 90).

Comparing these figures with the planned country force contributions, the

JCS identified the extent of the gap for Marshall and recommended that certain

countries, including the United States, contribute additional forces to make up

the deficiency (see TABLE 15 below).'

The cost of creating and supporting the proposed NATO forces caused

much concern and study in Washington. It seemed to General Bradley that

Europe wanted the United States to "foot about 90 percent of the total bill."

Lovett advised Bradley in May that prior to submission of a U.S. proposal for

additional force commitments by member countries it would be necessary to

make a thorough economic and financial feasibility study of the plan.

Meanwhile the International Security Affairs Committee (ISAC)' conducted a

full-scale study of European production and financial capabilities, total costs,

and probable deliveries of u.s. military assistance. As a report for Marshall

from the OSD Office of North Atlantic Treaty Affairs noted, a decision on the

amount of U.S. assistance would be the prime factor in solving the NATO

military gap.(,

Using cost figures compiled by McNeil's office, General Burns informed

Marshall and Lovett on 20 June that a four-year NATO defense buildup

(including Germany) from FY 1951 through FY 1954 would require $72

billion, of which Europe might provide between $37 billion and $43 billion.

• For an explanation of (SAC and its functions. see Chapter XIX.
Increasing NATO Strength 371

TABLE 15

The Gap: DC-28 Requirements Less Planned Contributions

Army Divisions

Required ...

Committed

Gap .

Naval Combat Vessels

Required .

Committed .

Gap ...

Aircraft

Required.

Committed ..

Gap .

• The discrepancy in subtraction cannot be satisfactorily explained; although different

sources give slightly varying figures for divisional requirements and commitments, all show

a gap of 4 divisions.

Viewing the projected European contribution as optimistic, Burns estimated

the unfilled cost as somewhere between $30 billion and $40 billion. Of this,

the United States had already financed about $12 billion in previous military

assistance programs, leaving approximately $18-28 billion still unfunded. An

ISAC report indicated that the NATO program might succeed if the United

States could persuade the Europeans to contribute more, cut military requirements by $8 billion or $9 billion (where this could be done without sacrificing

military objectives), and raise U.S. military assistance programs for FY 1953

and FY 1954 by approximately 30 percent. 7

Burns recommended that Marshall "support the attainment of our European military objectives" since any other course would undermine Eisenhower and Western European defense. In accord, Marshall declared at an ISAC

meeting on 21 June that the United States should either back Eisenhower or

"frankly give up supporting him." Believing that the United States would have

to supply at least $17 billion in assistance in the next two years, the secretary

agreed with Acheson that they should put the matter to the president. Four

days later Truman verbally approved the JCS force recommendations for

NATO. H
372 THE TEST OF WAR

Truman further agreed that the Europeans should be asked to increase

their forces to complete the NATO objective planned for 1954. This also raised

the u.s. obligation; beyond the six divisions scheduled for Europe by the end

of 1951, in the event of war in 1954 the United States would send seven more

divisions by D + 90. Truman also sanctioned increases to 22 tactical air wings,

1,400 active front-line aircraft, and 509 naval vessels of all types. In the event

of an attack on Europe, the U.S. portion of NATO strength was expected to

reach 13 percent of ground forces, 15 percent of tactical air forces, and 25

percent of naval requirements. The president approved notifying Congress of

the need to continue the current high level of military assistance for Europe

for two more years. With these decisions, the United States fashioned its initial

position on completing the DC-28 defense plan; an offer of U.S. troops and

aid could be made.~

Informing the Joint Chiefs of the president's decisions and sending them

the ISAC evaluation of their force plans, Marshall left to their judgment

whether modifications should be made. On 28 July the Joint Chiefs provided

the Standing Group with somewhat altered recommendations on tentative

forces; Lovett also sent revised costing figures. 10 By mid-August the Standing

Group had prepared its position and planned to send it, with the comments

of the NATO Military Representatives Committee, to the member countries for

review during September. The Standing Group was to prepare a final military

report for consideration by the NATO Military Committee in October so that

the plan could go to the North Atlantic Council by the end of the year. II

Further actions had to await Eisenhower's assessment of required

strength. Although Col. Royden E. Beebe. director of the OSD Office of North

Atlantic Treaty Affairs, told Lovett in July 1951 that he believed Eisenhower

would be "forced to go along" with the JCS plan, SHAPE's requirements, sent

to the Standing Group in mid-August, derived from a plan that differed from

the DC-28 plan. Eisenhower proposed a forward strategy with a strong

defensive zone east of the Rhine, a major German contribution, and a

substantial allocation of Atlantic naval forces in direct support of European

land forces. Although satisfied with 46 D-Day divisions, Eisenhower wanted

reserve ground forces available within 30 rather than 90 days of the start of

hostilities. 12 This last provision had great significance for the Europeans, who

were depending on 90 days of grace to mobilize their reserves. The two plans

did not vary greatly in numbers of divisions, but SACEUR's timing made the

gap larger. DC-28 requirements for 95 II, divisions on D + 90 left a gap of 12

divisions; Eisenhower's demand for 97 divisions by D + 30, when only 67'/,

would be available, left a gap of almost 29. If German forces did not supply

some of the missing divisions, the onus would fall on the NATO nations. As

Frank Nash remarked to Marshall, the United States was beginning to see
Increasing NATO Strength 373

"some of the complexities of satisfying General Eisenhower's requirements

without imposing undue burdens on the contributing countries." 13

The NATO gap posed serious procedural and psychological problems.

The different plans had to be so combined that one document could be

considered at the Military Committee and the North Atlantic Council meetings

later in the year. Furthermore, the European nations had to accept the

economic costs of a greater effort. Realizing that cost analyses prepared by the

United States alone or by the Standing Group would not necessarily induce the

Europeans to increase their production and mobilization efforts, the United

States decided to support a NATO costing exercise. 14 At the North Atlantic

Council meeting in Ottawa in September 1951, Secretary of the Army Frank

Pace, representir.g Lovett, reported on the status of the U.S. defense effort and

urged each government to review its own military production and manpower

decisions in relation to overall Alliance requirements. Reacting to the American pressure, the council on 19 September created a special Temporary

Council Committee (TCe) to reconcile ends and means. 15

On receiving country comments, the Standing Group revised the MTDP

force requirements, taking into account Eisenhower's desires. At Rome in

November, the Military Committee referred to the defense ministers the

Standing Group plan, now somewhat altered and labeled MC 26/1. The new

plan for 1954 gave Eisenhower 46 D-Day divisions and 98 (ready and reserve)

on D + 30; it also set requirements for 1,394 naval vessels (642 large) and

9,285 aircraft. Despite the extent of these goals, the Joint Chiefs considered

MC 26/1 most austere but still a plan, with "force requirements . . . based

strictly upon military factors." 16

Meeting alone on 26 November, the defense ministers approved without

change a U.S. resolution requesting that the Temporary Council Committee

consider MC 26/1 and that member nations speed up work on the 1952

portion of the plan. It was clear that all military requirements would receive

a rigorous new review in light of the nonmilitary considerations that had

brought the TCC into being. 17

Attempts to Close the Gap

Charged with finding a way to balance NATO security requirements

against the "realistic politico-economic capabilities of member countries," the

TCC planned to attack the problem by lowering military requirements and

raising country contributions. 18 With all NATO nations represented, the TCC

was headed by an Executive Board of the British, French, and American

members-Hugh Gaitskell (soon to be replaced by Edwin Plowden), Jean
374 THE TEST OF WAR

Monnet, and Averell Harriman, the elected chairman. There were two major

TCC working groups-the Screening and Costing Staff (SCS), consisting of

representatives of all member nations, which worked on military matters; and

the Temporary Economic Analysis Staff, to provide economic and financial

data. The TCC would review recommendations from the Executive Board,

which came to be known as "The Three Wise Men." 1<)

Believing the Screening and Costing Staff of paramount importance,

Lovett named the chairman of the OSD Management Committee, General

McNarney, to serve as the U.S. representative. With McNarney as its directorgeneral, the SCS had power to review MTDP requirements, recommend

economy measures, prepare a cost estimate, and suggest modifications over a

wide range of national activities. Coordination between the TCC and the

Department of Defense came under Beebe's Office of North Atlantic Treaty

Affairs. 20 At Harriman's request, Lovett created another channel between OSD

and the TCC in the person of Col. George A. ("Abe") Lincoln, appointing him

a special assistant to the secretary of defense and assigning him as defense

adviser to Harriman. 21 Lincoln, a versatile and experienced planner, had

worked earlier in 1951 on a military assistance costing exercise. *

Acting quickly, the TCC sent all member countries questionnaires on

military factors and on political and economic factors. The countries found

the questions specific, probing, and unsettling; even the United States refused

to divulge certain military information. 22 Some State Department officials

interpreted the Pentagon's disinclination to defend the dollar amounts of

future U.S. military assistance before its allies as a refusal to recognize that U.S.

decisions could be affected by the NATO relationship and commitments. Nash

thought that Lovett and Harriman should have a "heart-to-heart" talk on the

matter.2.:I In early November Lovett sent Pace to Paris to meet with the TCC

Executive Board. Pointing out that the United States was furnishing the major

part of Alliance equipment and had a higher proportion of its population

serving in the armed forces than any other NATO country, Pace indicated that

the Alliance could not expect more than the six U.S. divisions promised by the

end of 1951 and that the Strategic Air Command would not be available to

NATO in event of war until its primary mission of counterattack against the

enemy homeland had been completed. Despite these caveats, Lincoln described the discussion as "highly satisfactory to all present. ,,21

By mid-December 1951, when the final TCe report was ready, actual

forces under Eisenhower numbered )'5 divisions. almost ),000 aircraft. and

700 naval vessels. t McNarney's Screening and Costing Staff proposed a revised

* See Chapter XXI.

tThese figures are from Ismay. NATO. tbe First Fil'e leurs. 102. Estimates in :'-JO\Tmber 1951

placed SHAPE forces at 2ef D-Day divisions.H D + .~O divisions. and 1, SHO aircraft at the end of
Increasing NATO Strength 375

program based less on MC 26/1 and its progressive buildup to 1954 than on

Eisenhower's preference for an immediately effective, combat-worthy force

with considerable deterrent value. As a result, McNarney emphasized 1952

divisions for SACEUR at the general expense of the 1954 buildup envisioned

in MC 26/1. The only exception was an increase in air power for 1954. 25

TABLE 16

TCC/SCS Recommendations

End End End 1954 Variation

CY 1952 CY 1953 CY 1954 from MC 26/1

Divisions (M + 30) ........ 541

1, 69Y, 86 2

1, -lIY,

Major combat vessels (M-Day)* 361 402 - 240

Aircraft (M-Day) .... 4,230 7,005 9,965 +680

* M-Day was the date on which mobilization was to commence and might or might not be

the same as D-Day. the commencement of hostilities.

The TCC recommended adoption of its 1952 goals as firm, while it

termed those for 1953 and 1954 "provisional" and "planning" goals, respectively. Not only had the SCS lowered 1954 force requirements, it had also

made large-scale cuts in military costs. There still existed, however, an

equipment gap of about $10 billion that would necessitate increased u.s.

military assistance. 2(,

The TCC success, as one U.S. diplomat wrote, owed much to the

remarkable understanding of international political-military-economic relationships shown by the Three Wise Men and McNarney and particularly to

their willingness to devote themselves entirely to this first NATO review. 27

Eisenhower hailed the effort as a "truly monumental piece of work" and

hoped the countries would immediately start to meet the recommended goals

for 1952. Some Pentagon officials happily beheld NATO as being "on the

threshold of securing a physical deterrent military force in Europe, not just on

paper but with helmets on and rines ready." However, the member countries

had to react and the report needed final adjustments before the next North

Atlantic Council meeting in Lisbon in February 1952. 2/l

In January 1952 the Joint Chiefs advised Lovett that they felt the TCC/SCS

strength figures constituted "essentially a limited time-phased capabilities

approach" to NATO medium term requirements. Less than pleased that the

1'1') I. See msg l'Slkleg NAC to AetingSecState. r Nov') I. Dept State, Foreign Relations of the

United States, 1'J51. Ill. pI 1:'" 31.
376 THE TEST OF WAR

TCC questioned the validity of 1954 as the target date for meeting requirements, the Joint Chiefs reported that they were studying whether the SCS

figures for 1952 and 1953 would actually result in a balanced force in 1954.

The NATO Military Committee subsequently found that the TCC/SCS forces

were not militarily balanced. agreed that MC 26/1 represented the "magnitude

and the balance of forces required," and wanted every effort made to keep the

forces in balance. 2'1

On 15 January Lovett recommended to State acceptance of the SCS force

plans for 1952 and 1953 as a basis for committing U.S. forces to NATO and

sending military assistance, although he upheld the JCS on the need for study

to see whether SCS force levels would meet NATO defense requirements. Nash

advised Lovett that the u.s. comments of 22 January on the TCC report

reflected the positions of all major Defense elements except for the JCS

insistence on 1954 as the year of attainment of MTDP requirements."o

To reach the recommended strengths. the TCC on 8 February proposed

$2.42 billion in additional national expenditures, but the countries had

committed themselves to only half that amount. Later that month the TCC

warned that up to a quarter of the divisions and a tenth of the aircraft for 1952

might not be realized. Eisenhower reacted quickly and vigorously; he wanted

to know exactly what forces he would be assured of getting by the end of

1952. The Standing Group proposed as a matter of "urgent military necessity"

goals of 26 M-Day divisions, 532/" M+ 30 divisions, and 3.940 aircraft for the

end of 1952-slightly less than the TCC/SCS figures.'"

At the Lisbon meeting in February. Lovett and Acheson labored to find a

formula that would enable the Europeans to accept the budget increases

necessary to support the 1952 NATO forces. 52 The council adopted the

following "firm" 1952 goals, "provisional" 1953 goals. and "planning" 1954

goals (see TABLE 17 below).55

Although somewhat below the TCC/SCS ground and air figures for the end

of 1952. the Lisbon ground force goals for 1954 reached or exceeded the

committee's goals. The council accepted McNarney's aircraft figures as 1953

and 1954 goals and markedly increased naval strengths. The United States was

to contribute 52/" of the M-Day divisions and 72/" of the M+ 30 divisions for

both 1952 and 1953. and 62/'> and 92/" divisions, respectively, in 1954. The

Lisbon goals included no German divisions for 1952 but incorporated 6 in both

M-Day and M+ 30 figures for 1953 and 8 in M-Day and 12 in M + 30 figures

for 1954. No forces were included for Greece and Turkey, not formally accepted

into NATO until the Lisbon conference. The council also adopted a TCC

recommendation for an annual NATO review of the sort just concluded. 5-4

A triumph of high hopes and expectations, especially for the Americans.

the Lisbon conference promised far more than it could ever deliver. Many. if
Increasing NATO Strength 377

lABLE 17

NATO Force Goals Accepted at Lisbon

Ground divisions

M-Day .

M +30.. . .

Major combat vessels

M-Day .

M + 180 .

Aircraft (M-Day) .

End CY 1952 End CY 1953 End CY 1954

25 36'/, 41 'I,

51 2/, ny, 89'/,

461 470 504

834 848 941

4,067 7,005 9,965

not most, of the European foreign and defense ministers no doubt suspected

or believed that the force goals were beyond attainment. Still, they went along

with Lovett and Acheson while privately warning that the economies of their

nations could not, and the people would not, bear the heavy burden entailed,

Nevertheless, the goals adopted at Lisbon served a useful purpose in putting

a brave public face on the intentions and capabilities of the Alliance. And even

if the goals were soon recognized as beyond reach, for a time they served as

a spur to efforts to provide SHAPE with more and better forces.

Infrastructure Requirements

On 24 February 1952 Acheson cabled Truman from Lisbon that only two

problems remained, one of which was infrastructure. This term referred to the

air and naval bases, fuel storage facilities, signal communications, and other

installations necessary for NATO's military forces to function. U.S. officers

unofficially shortened the definition to "public works to support operational

plans." By the end of 1951 infrastructure requirements were becoming critical

to the further growth of NATO forces. Airplanes without gas storage facilities

or airfields, troops without barracks, and military units without adequate

communications had little military value. Both Eisenhower and the Tee were

emphatic on the primary importance of infrastructure requirements. 3";

Since not all facilities could be constructed or paid for at once, NATO

divided the infrastructure program into projects for a given time period,

usually a calendar year. Once such a program "slice" was approved, host

countries had to acquire the necessary land and let construction contracts.

The five Brussels Pact countries contributing to Western Union developed the

first slice, including 35 tactical airfields, signals communications, and an
378 THE TEST OF WAR

international military headquarters-all to be completed in central Europe by

the end of 1951. Of the $90 million cost, France contributed over 45 percent,

the United Kingdom about 27 percent, and the Benelux countries about 27

percent. When SHAPE became operational under Eisenhower in April 1951,

facilities became a command problem, and Lovett directed the service

secretaries to work out a general U.S. policy on infrastructure. 56

By June a Joint Secretaries' subcommittee working under Assistant

Secretary of the Army Karl Bendetsen prepared a draft report stating that the

European NATO countries should pay for all infrastructure costs, including

those required for American troops, although to secure important facilities

without delay the United States might have to share some of the cost. Even so,

the maximum U.S. share was to be limited to its proportional use of facilities

and would not include any land costs. Fearing that prolonged negotiations

over payment might delay the construction of much-needed facilities, Eisenhower and SHAPE questioned the Bendetsen plan. 5

- After negotiations with

Eisenhower and other U.S. officials in Europe and discussions in Washington,

Lovett-who felt that mainly the Europeans should pay for the programapproved a compromise position that would provide for some u.s. financing,

particularly of air bases for U. S. use. 5H

Work on the second-slice program began after Eisenhower's statement in

May 1951 of SHAPE's urgent 1951 requirements. Marshall underlined the

seriousness of the situation in early September when he noted the inadequacy

of European facilities to receive the additional U.S. divisions scheduled to

arrive in 1951. At the September meeting in Ottawa, the North Atlantic

Council supported Eisenhower's program up to 11 new tactical airfields and

10 extensions, at a cost of approximately $221 million.5')

The Ottawa agreement put the Europeans at a disadvantage since it not

only continued to exclude consideration of host country contributions of land

and existing utilities but also accepted that when NATO no longer needed the

installations, the host countries might have to compensate the Alliance for the

residual value and economic benefit from new facilities. At the Pentagon's

insistence, SACEUR was to have freedom in deploying his forces, and all

infrastructure installations were to be built to a minimum common SHAPE

standard yet to be developed. ,0 If the United States needed or wanted a higher

standard than the common infrastructure, it alone would pay the additional

cost. Representing Lovett at Ottawa, Pace agreed that the United States, which

had not contributed to the first slice, would shoulder slightly over 48 percent

of the second-slice costs. Canada and the five Brussels Pact countries would

pay the remainder. As finally set, the u.s. share of the common infrastructure

for the second slice amounted to S106.-1 million. while France and the United

Kingdom bore costs of $47.6 million and 539.2 million respectively.-tl
Increasing NATO Strength 379

At the time of the TCC review in late 1951, estimated NATO infrastructure

requirements through 1954 amounted to $7.5 billion-$6.9 billion for

SACEUR alone-and the inadequate infrastructure was acknowledged as a

major impediment to the creation of a useful NATO defense force. 42 In

December SHAPE based its program for calendar year 1952 on MC 26/1

military requirements rather than the lower TCC/SCS goals and called for

construction of signals installations and war headquarters and the new or

further development of 140 tactical airfields. For the first time the program

included airfields in north central and south central Europe, but the emphasis

remained as before on France, the proposed location of one third of the new

fields. 43 The United States accepted the proposed program, but the British and

French dug in their heels, and SHAPE finally agreed to defer certain airfields

and facilities. +I

At Lisbon in February 1952 the North Atlantic Council referred consideration of the third slice to an international committee including Lovett as the

U.S. representative. Patiently, Lovett led the 10 involved NATO nations to

agreement on a $425.6 million program that would build 55 new tactical

airfields, improve 27 more, and construct new communications facilities and

war headquarters-all to be completed in 1952 or 1953. In addition, 25 new

airfields and 10 airfield extensions were to be built in West Germany. Lovett

approved a u.s. share of $182 million, or 42.8 percent, somewhat less than

the previous year. France and the United Kingdom agreed to pay $56 million

each, or slightly over 13 percent apiece, leaving 7 other NATO nations with

the remaining 31 percent."

The nations did not accede readily to such large third-slice costs. Lovett

and Acheson had to agree to provide $500 million in additional U.S. economic

and military assistance to enable the French to sustain their NATO and other

military responsibilities. i6 To make the heavier load acceptable to the British,

Lovett proposed that in FY 1953 the Defense Department buy additional

British materials and supplies to ensure a dollar flow that would cover $28

million, half of Britain's infrastructure cost; with much difficulty, this was

eventually done. i7

In the spring of 1952 the United States estimated that the cost of the

fourth slice might reach $650 million, including $370 million of postponed

third-slice requirements. Reviewing the SHAPE program for 1953, the JCS had

doubts about its size and whether all elements qualified as common infrastructure, a view that became the U.S. position. The United States also felt that

infrastructure projects in Greece and Turkey, included for the first time,

should be deleted from the program and executed nationally with U.S. help.4H

By the time the NATO annual review got under way in the fall of 1952,

Defense proposed U.S. support for a $400 million program-including
380 THE TEST OF WAR

SACEUR's requirements and, for the first time, SACLANT's-with a maximum

U.S. share of 40 percent. Meanwhile, cost overruns of 33 percent in the

second slice and 10 percent in the third slice had to be considered. i

,)

At the Paris meeting in December 1952, the North Atlantic Council

approved a $473 million fourth-slice program but it agreed to finance only a

first increment of $230 million, of which a 40-percent U.S. share would be

$92 million. Although General Ridgway, Like Eisenhower earlier, insisted that

the infrastructure program would have to be provided even at the expense of

other programs, NATO did not plan to finance the second-stage increment of

$243 million until the council's spring 1953 meeting. Meanwhile, SHAPE

estimated that further infrastructure needs in the years 1954 to 1956 would

cost $700 million. so

NATO's failure in late 1952 to provide all the fourth slice struck the U.S.

military establishment as an indication of Europe's diminished sense of

urgency in preparing to defend against Soviet attack. Progress in infrastructure

construction was also disappointing, although in large part anticipated

because of the delays in second-slice financing. By the end of December the

first-slice program was complete, but the 1952 airfield program and signals

projects were far behind schedule.sl Adding to the general difficulties, the

annual review of 1952 uncovered further military problems.

NATO's Military Status

The successful Lisbon meeting in February 1952 scarcely ended before

work on the second NATO annual review began in both the Standing Group

and the DoD. The Standing Group was planning to send the countries a new

1953-55 NATO program for comment, and it appeared from the start that

1953 goals could not realistically be expected to exceed those accepted at

Lisbon. As Nash wrote the secretaries of the military departments and Joint

Chiefs on 31 March, the Lisbon force levels for 1953 and 1954 represented the

maximum they were likely to get. Privately, Nash told Foster that the goals

would have to be reduced by at least 25 percent. S2 Nash's well-founded

pessimism was fed by a study prepared in McNeil's office that showed a

$16-18 billion Alliance shortfall, mainly in major military equipment, that

would have to be made up if the Lisbon force goals were to be met. Apparently

not particularly upset by the disclosure, McNeil suggested to Lovett that the

information might help him to determine the "validity and practicability of

the SG force recommendations." By late April the Standing Group had

prepared firm 1953 goals for the original NATO countries plus Germany and

preliminary figures for Greek and Turkish force contributions. In the process
Increasing NATO Strength 381

they lowered Lisbon M-Day ground and air requirements and raised naval

requirements. Still high, the new Standing Group goals, subsequently known

in revised form as MRC 12, reached toward MC 26/1 goals and represented

military requirements, not country capabilities. 5~

In full support of a balanced service approach and of using military

requirements as the basis of NATO force goals, the Joint Chiefs told Lovett in

May that "each Service, NATO-wide, should achieve in any given year

approximately the same percentage of the over-all NATO Service requirements

until 100 percent is reached by all three Services." Greek and Turkish forces

should be integrated into the MC 26/1 plan and the status of German forces

clarified. In general pessimistic about attaining the Standing Group goals for

1953, the Joint Chiefs doubted that U.S. military assistance, even if it could be

maintained at current levels, would be sufficient. They warned Lovett that, in

accepting the force goals, the United States must make it "absolutely clear"

that it was not committed to providing all the armament needed to reach

NATO objectives. Nonetheless, as Nash's office quickly suggested to Lovett,

the Joint Chiefs still clearly supported the Standing Group's infeasible goals,

even though the problem would likely become worse after 1953, when

maintenance and replacement requirements would add to costs. 54

OSD cast about for other views. McNeil's office, deeply involved in the

costing effort, doubted that NATO countries could maintain the forces

projected for 1953 and 1954. Pace and Finletter thought that strength goals

should be based on country capabilities rather than military desirability and

hoped that new tactical atomic weapons would eventually provide the

necessary additional firepower. Kimball, on the other hand, defended the use

of military requirements at this early stage in the annual review process. He

doubted that atomic weapons would permit lowering conventional force

requirements and believed the JCS correct in assuming that the new weapons,

plus all of the planned conventional forces, would be needed just to "prevent

the overrunning of a large portion of Europe in the opening phases of a war."

In June 1952 the Joint Chiefs reaffirmed that they considered the general

period of 1954 to be very threatening to European security; they recommended that U.S. military assistance be extended beyond FY 1954, that

Alliance efforts be increased, and that the yearly buildup toward the military

requirements of the MTDP be continued. 55

Meanwhile, Foster on 23 May 1952 sent Acheson the Standing Group

goals and the JCS comments as the basis for an initial U.S. position. In his

reply, Acheson found the force goals economically beyond reach and proposed that the force plan assume that NATO resources in FY 1953 and FY

1954 would be at least $8 billion less than the cost of the forces the JCS

wanted. To do otherwise than base the U.S. position on a "militarily sound
382 THE TEST OF WAR

forces plan capable of approximate achievement," could be construed as a U.S.

commitment to send more military equipment, would discourage realistic

planning and negotiation, and would affect the force balance. 56 In full accord

with Acheson's position, Lovett immediately instructed Bradley to inform the

Standing Group that although the United States considered the group's plan

militarily acceptable, it had serious reservations as to its feasibility. In early

August 1952 Foster established a special ad hoc committee under Army Brig.

Gen. Donald P. Booth to prepare comprehensive recommendations on NATO's

1953-55 force goals. 57

By late September the Booth committee provided Lovett with a Defense

proposal for the initial U.S. position on the 1952 NATO annual review. It

recommended 1953 ground and air goals generally lower than either the

provisional Lisbon goals for 1953 or the Standing Group goals. 5H

TABLE 18

End CY 1953 NATO Strength Goals Compared

Lisbon MRC- I2 Booth Cte Country Replies

Divisions (M-Day)

Without Greece and lurkey 362/, 3"'2/, 34 301;'1

With Greece and Turkey. 60 57Y, 39Y,

Divisions (M + 30)

Without Greece and lurkey ... ny, 652/' 64 47

With Greece and Turkey. 99 98'/, 842/,

Major Combat Vessels (M-Day)

Without Greece and 'Iurkey .. 470 380 373 337

With Greece and lurkey ...... 380 388 350

Major Combat Vessels (M + 180)

Without Greece and Turkey ... 848 759 779 747

With Greece and lurkey ...... 759 794 760

Aircraft (M-Day)

Without Greece and Turkey 7,005 6,373 5,454 5,644

With Greece and Turkey .. 6.777 ';,747 6,151

Looking two years ahead, to the end of 1955, and guided by the Defense

view that atomic development allowed "no material change at this time in

force requirements," the Booth committee recommended that NATO achieve

62 2/, divisions, 411 major combat ships, and 9,350 aircraft for M-Day. *

Although Booth himself considered the 1955 goals probably higher than

NATO could attain, the committee did not think its figures were really

* These figures included 8 German, 10'/, C;reek. and 13 Turkish divisions; and 8"'8 German, 200

Greek, and 354 Turkish aircraft. Ships were not shown by nationality.
Increasing NATO Strength 383

"militarily safe goals"; rather, they were an "approximation of the most

effective balanced collective strength" achievable within the NATO countries'

economic limitations and without increases in US. aid. The Booth goals were

dictated chiefly by economic considerations and "balanced by the pattern of

MC 26/1."59 The service secretaries accepted the Booth committee goals. The

Joint Chiefs of Staff were less enthusiastic, and even though they approved the

report's policy guidance and force goals, they strongly endorsed the committee's recommendation for a reappraisal in 1953. Recommending the report to

Acheson in mid-October, Lovett made it clear that the question of military

balance should be included in the 1953 reappraisal. With Acheson's concurrence, the Booth committee report became the initial US. negotiating

position for the 1952 annual review. 60

After submitting his report in Washington, Booth led a sizable Defense

team to Paris to work as part of a task force under Ambassador Draper. The

Military Representatives Committee had already approved the Standing Group

goals and forwarded them as MRC 12 to the North Atlantic Council. Draper's

task force argued for the US. goals, analyzed country submissions, and helped

prepare a NATO position. 61 But the initiative and drive of the previous year

could not be recaptured. As reported by a US. representative, "the difference

from TCC in personnel, institutional arrangements, attitudes and atmosphere

is as night from day. ,,62 The French wanted detailed information about US.

force strengths and military expenditures and favored pooling all NATO

productive and financial resources under a central authority. The Americans

realized the French plan would have to be approved by the president and

Congress and considered it a French bargaining position, but it provoked

them. 63 The British argued that ultimately the development of new atomic

weapons and tactical techniques would reduce requirements for conventional

forces and justify a slower pace of rearmament. 61

In Washington, Pace and Finletter and some members of Congress shared

the British view on new weapons to a degree.' The Joint Chiefs did not feel

that conventional forces could be safely reduced in the next several years; the

Research and Development Board and Ridgway agreed, at least through 1954.

Meeting informally with North Atlantic Council members in September 1952,

General Bradley tried to dispel their "wishful thinking" about new

weapons. 65

Securing NATO agreement on firm force levels for FY 1953 and provisional goals for FY 1954 was an uphill battle. Draper and his colleagues found

growing resentment of U.S. insistence on setting firm NATO goals for 1953. In

late 1952 many Alliance members felt that the Soviet threat was abating, and

• See Chapter XXII.
384 THE TEST OF WAR

they disliked American pressures for additional and possibly unnecessary

military expenses. Defense representatives in Paris perceived the Europeans as

viewing the United States as militaristic, "preparing more to win a war against

the USSR than to prevent a war." In the face of this growing opposition, the

Americans first lowered and then decided not to present the Booth goals as

the U.S. position. Ridgway recommended that NATO utilize its resources to

improve existing units, strengthen support forces, and increase logistic

support rather than create new units lacking adequate backing. Unable to

reach agreement, the Paris council endorsed the Ridgway concept and

extended its annual review into the spring. As a result there were therefore no

approved NATO force goals for 1953 when the Truman administration left

office. 66

One reason for the Paris conferees' coolness toward new 1953 goals was

their belief that the 1952 goals set at Lisbon had been nearly met. The 1952

M-Day goal of 25 divisions had been achieved. For M+ 30, however, the force

fell short of the goal of 51 2

A divisions by about 10 percent because of

deficiencies in personnel, training, equipment, and support. M + 180 naval

forces, although adequate in number, had some imbalance in types and a

serious shortage of minesweepers. Of the Lisbon goal of 4,067 aircraft by the

end of 1952, only 3,273 were available, and of these only 2,072 met MRC 12

standards. In U.S. eyes, NATO still lacked a modern air force, needed more

ground divisions, and fell short in certain classes of naval vessels. Ridgway

pointed out to the council the extent of the force deficiencies and asked that

his remarks be made public. Not receiving permission, he first appealed to

Lovett and then solved the problem by incorporating the information in an

address that was made public. 67

To a large extent, the positions on NATO adequacy reflected different

attitudes about Soviet intentions, with Ridgway and the Joint Chiefs more

pessimistic than the Europeans. Despite the larger forces in being at the end of

1952, American optimism had moderated by the end of the Truman administration. With many Alliance members apparently unable or unwilling to

create the forces the United States considered necessary for an adequate

defense, Lovett and Acheson saw the inclusion of German troops in NATO as

the best hope left. 61>

The German Contribution

Efforts to devise an arrangement that would bring West Germany into the

NATO defense orbit had been under way since the NATO meeting in December

1950. The "Brussels formula" adopted then involved three steps-discussion
Increasing NATO Strength 385

of the military aspects of a German contribution between the Allied High

Commissioners in Germany and West German government representatives;

French-initiated talks on the creation of a European army through which

German units might be brought into NATO; and examination by the occupying

powers and West Germans of a new contractual relationship to replace the

occupation. 69 Although these steps were to be approached simultaneously

and separately, they were so linked that a favorable outcome depended on the

successful conclusion of each.

InJanuary 1951, when talks began with the West Germans in Bonn, the

Allies had already made clear that they wanted German forces placed within

a NATO structure, limited in size to 20 percent of Alliance forces, and with

German air units directly under SACEUR. In Washington, both Defense and

State hoped for a West German contribution of almost 200,000 men, formed

into 12 regimental combat teams by the end of 1951; the Joint Chiefs wanted

30 regimental combat teams by the end of 1952. Marshall felt that West

German forces were "militarily, politically and psychologically essential" to a

NATO defense of West German territory. 70

The Germans seemed less than anxious to create a large military force

with its attendant expenses and dangers without political compensations. The

discussions started to move only after Eisenhower publicly stated in early

February that German participation was not essential to NATO's military

progress. 71 But by May the Bonn military talks stalled. Burns advised Marshall

to obtain Eisenhower's views on whether he wished to participate in military

discussions on German rearmament. Writing Eisenhower on 7 May, Marshall

said that the complex political aspects of the matter should not be allowed to

delay prompt development of a German military program. 72

Eisenhower concurred with Marshall, but he thought military decisions,

such as the initial size of German military units and their level of integration

into NATO, so inseparable from political factors that he "should not voice an

opinion at this time" and asked to be informed about JCS views. As a result,

Marshall pushed ahead in early June, when the so-called Bonn report

(sometimes called the Petersberg report) of the Allied High Commissioners on

the German military proposals was ready. Approving JCS procedures for

handling the report, Lovett directed Burns's office to prepare a military

assistance program for Germany and informed Acheson of Defense plans to

get an answer from the occupying powers by early August. No matter how

delicate French sensibilities might be, Lovett wanted to avoid any delays in

going ahead with German rearmament. 73

The Bonn report confirmed the controversial nature of the German

position. Accepting many of the safeguards spelled out at Brussels, the

Germans rejected the regimental combat team concept as militarily inefficient
386 THE TEST OF WAR

and wanted immediate 1O,000-man divisional units. They considered the

Allied prohibition on heavy armored units inequitable and wanted to create

armored divisions, which they deemed the most efficient. They demanded

their own defense ministry, civilian in character, under the control of the

Bundestag, to administer their military effort. In general, they rejected any

Allied control that did not apply to all NATO forces equally. With these

caveats, the Germans offered a force of 100,000 men for 195 I and 250,000

men by the end of 1952, providing for 12 armored divisions, 20 air wings, and

242 light naval vessels and small submarines. The High Commissioners

estimated that the initial nonrecurrent cost of German rearmament would be

$4.76 billion, plus $0.53 billion as an annual recurring cost, with the Germans

able to contribute about $1.43 billion annually.~"

The Pentagon took a favorable and even enthusiastic position on the Bonn

report. Both the Joint Chiefs and OSD wanted the German military contribution immediately, whatever the final political decision on a European army.

Beebe advised Burns and Marshall against letting the French concept of a

European army block any "practical" German program. Keenly aware of the

powerful pressures within Defense to achieve German rearmament without

delay, Marshall had supported that position; he still favored it. 75

In State, however, feelings were mixed. The French-sponsored conference

on a European army had begun its Paris sessions on 15 February 1951, with

five nations participating: France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, and Luxembourg. The Netherlands eventually decided to join with these countries in

forming a European defense force. The other NATO countries, including the

United States, sent observers to the conference but did not become part of the

European army. With the Paris conferees showing some agreement by June

1951, the French did not want the German military proposals reviewed before

the successful conclusion of their own conference. 76

McCloy, who returned to Washington for discussions in early June

convinced that the Germans would make no military contribution until they

received substantial military and political equality, urged Defense and State to

reach agreement on the timing of German rearmament. He supported the

European army as a means of bringing German forces into NATO. Ambassador

Bruce wrote Beebe that the French and Germans were currently showing a

"cooperative spirit" and that there was a "distinct pOSSibility of being able to

'marry' the best features of the two reports." Beebe saw to it that both

Marshall and Lovett read Bruce's letter. ~~

Despite the reactions of McCloy and Bruce and clear hints from State that

the United States might have to change its position on the European army

concept, the Pentagon remained firmly opposed to delaying German rearmament until the French could set up a European army. When review of the Bonn
Increasing NATO Strength 387

report was postponed at least until receipt of a report from Paris, Beebe

suggested to Lovett on 2 IJune that Marshall ought to take the position that the

United States favored the European army in principle but that its creation

should be postponed until a less critical time.78 When McCloy repeated that

the French would "come around" if the European army were accepted and

insisted that this was the only way to make progress toward a German

contribution, Defense officials were not impressed. Lovett informed the Joint

Chiefs the next day that the United States should "prevent any delay on the

Bonn Report because of the European Army discussions."79 Marshall stood

firm even after Eisenhower early inJuly responded affirmatively to the idea of

a European army primarily as a training and administrative organization rather

than a field army and suggested calling it the "European Defense Forces. ,,80

Although Marshall viewed West German rearmament within NATO as an

immediate need and the French-sponsored European army as at best a

long-range objective, Defense had to yield to political realities. At a StateDefense meeting on 16 July, Acheson stressed the necessity of giving strong

U.S. support to the European defense force concept in order to get French

backing for the start of West German rearmament and training. He thought the

whole matter could be solved in 60 days if "all NATO members would buckle

down." Marshall raised the question of European willingness to make "real

sacrifices," and suggested that Acheson present his ideas in writing to the

president and the NSC. 81

In a memorandum for the president, Acheson proposed that the United

States support the European army provided that it was part of Europe's

common defense and appropriately related to NATO, responded to SACEUR's

military needs, and would not delay a German military contribution. He

recommended that Germany, with a new, enhanced status and as a key

contributor to Western defense, should be admitted to full NATO membership.

The provisions for Germany's immediate rearmament and membership in

NATO encouraged Defense to accept the new policy. On 30 July, after

Eisenhower had agreed, Lovett and Acheson signed the memorandum. The

National Security Council adopted the paper as policy (NSC 115), and the

president approved it on 2 August.8z That month Lovett designated Nash and

Karl Bendetsen to represent Defense in consultations with State on the

German question and later assigned additional staff.83

The third aspect of the negotiations concerned a change in the West

German contractual relationship which would bring the Allied occupation to

an end. After the December 1950 meeting of the North Atlantic Council in

Brussels, the Allied High Commissioners and West German government

representatives held exploratory meetings in Bonn. By 9 August 1951 the

Allied High Commission had ready an early report reviewing German atti-
388 THE TEST OF WAR

tudes, the major Allied and Allied-German disagreements, and recommendations for new arrangements. Meeting in Washington in September, the French,

British, and U.S. foreign ministers agreed to negotiate understandings with the

West Germans for inclusion of a "democratic Germany, on a basis of equality,

in a Continental European Community, which itself will form a part of a

constantly developing Atlantic Community." By late September the decisions

made by the foreign ministers at their Washington meeting had been presented

to Chancellor Adenauer along with a proposal for negotiations to follow. 84

Changing the German contractual relationship involved many prickly

issues. For example, Adenauer wanted a West German security guarantee

within the basic contractual agreement, an arrangement the Joint Chiefs

feared might later bind the United States in undesirable ways. They preferred

a separate affirmation of the September 1950 tripartite declaration that the

Allies would treat any attack on West Germany or Berlin as an attack upon

themselves. Acheson accepted the Defense formula but could not resist

pointing out the JCS inconsistency in simultaneously supporting German

membership in NATO with its formal security guarantee. 85 The president

resolved another problem on 19 October 1951 when he signed a joint

congressional resolution terminating the state of war between Germany and

the United States. France and the United Kingdom had already done this, and

26 other nations followed suit in 1951. By the end of October, the stage was

fast being set for a German settlement.86

By mid-November, the Allied High Commission for Germany had a new

report and draft of a general contractual agreement ready for meetings of the

French, British, and U.S. foreign ministers in Paris. After meeting alone on 21

November, the three ministers the next day welcomed German Chancellor

Adenauer, the first time since the start of World War II that the Allies had met

with a German minister on terms of equality. The four men approved the draft

agreement, subject to final confirmation by their governments. It was to be

signed and published only after agreement on a German military contribution

to NATO through a European force and completion of separate conventions

governing subordinate contractual issues. 87 This entailed considerable work,

for it involved such technical yet emotional matters as the status of Allied

forces left in Germany after the occupation ended, German logistical and

financial support for those forces and any future European defense force, and

the continuation of security safeguards against a possible revival of German

militarism. 88

The Pentagon held strong opinions in direct conflict with French views

on prohibiting German manufacture of munitions. With the NATO countries

unable to meet all of their munitions requirements, the Joint Chiefs favored

making the maximum practicable use of German industry, and Lovett
Increasing NATO Strength 389

concurred. 89 Acheson sympathized with the Pentagon position, but he and

Lovett discovered in November at the NATO meeting in Rome that agreement

on the issue would be difficult. The French wanted specific prohibition of

German manufacture of heavy weapons and suggested reexamination of the

matter only after the European Defense Community (EDC)-the name given

to the European army concept-came into existence. Eventually, the Germans

indicated that they neither wanted nor expected to produce such weapons; in

January 1952 McCloy thought the matter had become academic.9o

Meanwhile, the Paris negotiations on the European Defense Community

proceeded slowly. The Joint Chiefs complained that an interim report

produced in July failed to provide a "sufficient basis . . . for the raising of

German contingents at the earliest possible date. ,,91 Since Eisenhower's direct

liaison with the Paris conferees had helped to keep the negotiations moving,

both Lovett and the Joint Chiefs wanted him to develop a plan that would

"insure an immediate German contribution.,,92 The foreign ministers meeting

in Washington in September reaffirmed support of the major powers for a

European Defense Community, and Adenauer backed the concept when he

met with the Allied ministers in Paris on 22 November.93 At the NATO meeting

in Rome beginning on 24 November, the Benelux ministers showed alarm over

the direction taken by proposed arrangements for EDC, fearing French or

German domination of such an institution. They preferred to work through

NATO, believed that formation of EDC would lessen U.S. interest in Europe,

and worried that financing the organization through a central budget could

create trouble for them.94 On 26 November Lovett agreed with Acheson and

other U.S. representatives that the United States must know by 15 January

1952 whether EDC could be successfully organized. The council requested

that NATO and EDC agencies prepare to correlate their respective obligations

and relationships.95

Work on the EDC treaty progressed in January 1952 as the larger NATO

nations tried to reassure the Benelux countries and urged the six EDC nations

to reach agreement. But all the while the small countries still feared big-power

dominance, the French continued to worry about a renewal of German

strength, and German public opinion wavered despite Adenauer's vigorous

support of EDC. In approving the European army concept by a 56-percent

majority vote on 8 February, the Bundestag demanded the end of all

discrimination against Germany. In Paris eight days later the French National

Assembly gave EDC a 53-percent endorsement but stipulated the maintenance

of restrictions and limitations on Germany, the retention of British and

American military forces in Europe, and an Anglo-American guarantee against

German secession from the EDC force. With the diplomatic situation touchy,

Lovett again sent Nash to represent him during meetings of the foreign
390 THE TEST OF WAR

mmlsters in London in February. There was little progress until Adenauer

joined the group.96

The German chancellor accepted a proposal that the NATO and EDC

councils should meet and consult jointly. Not yet ready to discuss costs, he

acquiesced to publication of the TCC figure of DM 11. 25 billion' as Germany's

initial yearly contribution to European defense. He agreed also that Germany

should not produce certain war materials and suggested including Germany as

part of an EDC forward zone in which such materials would not be produced

for strategic reasons-a move that would avoid any obvious discrimination

against Germany. Eventually the Allies and Germans agreed that annexes to

the EDC treaty would prohibit German production of certain heavy equipment, such as complete aircraft or even certain components. As for atomic

weapons, Adenauer promised, in a separate letter signed on 27 Mayas part of

the final agreement, that the Federal Republic of Germany would legislate

against the "development, production and possession of atomic weapons."

No restrictions on German munitions manufacture, therefore, appeared in the

contractual agreements.97

Victory, Defeat, and Resurrection

At the North Atlantic Council meeting in Lisbon in February 1952 the

member countries showed a spirit of resoluteness that gave Lovett and

Acheson hope of early success in getting German troops into NATO. After the

council on 22 February adopted a resolution approving the establishment of

EDC and recommended making NATO and EDC arrangements reciprocal, final

approval of EDC seemed near. In March, however, the Soviet Union opened a

new drive for a German peace treaty based on reunification, neutralization,

and limited rearmament-an approach that appealed to many French and

Germans. The Allies answered by demanding all-German elections and the

formation of an all-German government as prerequisites to negotiations, but

by April it was unclear whether the EDC treaty and the contractuals could be

kept linked together. Faced with the pOSSibility that the Germans might

demand going ahead with the contractuals if the EDC treaty was "hopelessly

bogged down," Acheson wanted to set 9 Mayas the deadline date for signing

both sets of treaties; this would bardy allow enough time for Congress to

consider the treaties before it adjourned in )uly9H

• This figure included OM6.8 billion for the costS of Allied forces, OM 1.0 billion for Berlin.

policy, etc., and OM;3.45 billion for West German military forces. In U.S. money, OMI 1.25 billion

equaled approximately $2.7 billion per year.
Increasing NATO Strength 391

Lovett saw eye-to-eye with State on the necessity to conclude the

negotiations, but he had to face questions about dividing the revised first-year

German defense contribution-DMlO.2 billion (about $2.45 billion)-between EDC and the Allied forces remaining in Germany. Defense officials

assumed that, of the total amount, about two-thirds would go for Allied costs,

and the rest for U.S. costs. Bendetsen and McNeil, particularly, were determined that the Germans should pay the actual cost of U.S. expenses, and in

May Lovett sent them, as well as Nash, to Europe to help negotiate. After

discussions between the Defense contingent and State Department negotiators, the Americans proposed allowing DM5.S billion for EDC-related expenses, including construction costs, and DM4.4 billion for Allied costs,

including a U.S. share of only DM2.2 billion-a total of about DMI2.4

billion,'Y9

Anxious to conclude the negotiations, Acheson did not want to haggle

over a U.S. share that he believed would be adequate, and he thought the

Germans should not be asked to pay more than the Lisbon figure. Nonetheless,

the foreign ministers, meeting on 24 May, failed to agree. Then on 25 May the

Soviets sent a threatening note to the Federal Republic of Germany that rallied

the Germans to Adenauer's support. That same day, as Nash soon reported, he

settled the German defense contribution, with its U.S. share, completely

satisfactorily. 100

After the ministers found a way to guarantee the French against German

secession from the European defense force, the negotiations concluded

successfully on 25 May. The parties signed the contractuals, including dozens

of documents, in Bonn on 26 May. Except for a limited range of rights reserved

to the Allies in Berlin and West Germany, including the stationing of forces

and certain emergency powers, West Germany received a status of equality.

Moving to Paris, the representatives of the six EDC negotiating nations signed

the 19 documents involved in the EDC treaty on 27 May. This agreement, in

which the United States did not participate, provided for the common

political institutions, armed forces, and budget that the French wanted. It

allowed the Germans to organize modified divisions with a wartime strength

of approximately 15,000 men and accepted the corps, consisting of 3 to 4

such divisions, as the level of national integration. Finally, the United States

joined the other nations in signing a protocol extending NATO defense

commitments to the European Defense Community, thus giving Germany a

security guarantee without making that country a member of NATO. 101

With the signing of the EDC documents Acheson thought he saw the

"beginning of the realization of an ancient dream-the unity of the free

peoples of Western Europe." To Lovett and other Pentagon officials it seemed

that NATO would at long last get the 12 German divisions necessary to provide
392 THE TEST OF WAR

a margin of safety against a Soviet attack on Europe. The only step left was

ratification of the various agreements. The U.S. Senate on 1July approved the

German contractuals and the NATO protocol and ratification followed. U.S.

hopes for quick ratification of the contractuals by the other states rose when

the British approved them on 1 August, but the French and Germans still had

to act. Washington also hoped that the six EDC nations would ratify the treaty

promptly. On 10 August. when these nations formally inaugurated the

European Coal and Steel Community in Luxembourg, • ratification appeared in

sight. 102

While work continued in Europe on steps to implement the political and

military institutions created by the EDC treaty, Lovett pushed ahead in

Washington to speed the formation of West German divisions as soon as the

ratifications occurred. As an occupied territory, Germany had been ineligible

to receive military assistance on any basis, but the United States had begun an

emergency German stockpile program in FY 1951. About $462 million was

programmed and supply action amounting to $435 million was initiated by

mid-1952, but the program's priority was low and less than $50,000 worth of

equipment had actually been shipped to U.S. storage in Europe. 10.~ In May

1952 Lovett asked for JCS recommendations for organizing military assistance

in West Germany, and planning for this continued throughout the summer and

fall. 10" After the Germans became eligible for reimbursable military assistance

on 18 July the Joint Chiefs recommended they be declared eligible for grant

military assistance. But French and German failure to ratify the contractuals

delayed matters, and the United States meanwhile allotted more money to the

stockpile. 10';

The failure of the Germans and French to ratify the agreements in a timely

fashion generally nullified OSD's advance preparations. Fearful of a Soviet

attack and distressed over the continued division oftheir country, the Germans

debated the value of the treaties. In the Bundestag both treaties on 6 December

fell 40 votes short of the two-thirds necessary for ratification. The Germans

finally ratified the contractuals in March 1953, but they did not act favorably

on the EDC treaty until 1954. In France, the fear of German rearmament

seemed to outweigh all other considerations. The French parliament first

deferred debating the German contractuals and the EDC treaty until after the

Germans approved; then the political opposition, led by former Premier Edouard Herriot, precipitated the French equivalent of the U.S. "great debate."

Finally in late August 1954, with the EDC treaty already ratified by four of the

six signers and receiving favorable consideration in Italy, the French National

Assembly rejected both the contractuals and the EDC treaty. 106

• The Schuman plan had been ratified in December 195 I.
Increasing NATO Strength· 393

The French defeat of its own EDC proposal created a crisis in European

relations that led to a nine-power conference during the early autumn of

1954, at which the six EDC treaty signers, joined by the United Kingdom,

Canada, and the United States, considered how to proceed. At a subsequent

four-power conference in October 1954, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States adopted and signed a protocol ending the

occupation in West Germany. On 23 October the Federal Republic of Germany

received an invitation to join NATO.' In November the United States initiated

discussions with the Germans and offered to supply grant military aid on a

basis comparable to that given other European nations, with deliveries to

follow the usual signing of a bilateral agreement and the German accession to

NATO. At this time the stockpile begun in 1951 held some $453 million in

equipment, thus assuring the possibility of rapid deliveries. On 9 May 1955

Germany formally joined NATO, and in December 1955 it ratified the bilateral

agreement with the United States. Almost three years had passed since the

Truman administration had left office. 107

In September 1950 Acheson had pointed out to the Europeans the

"absolutely unprecedented" peacetime steps the United States was prepared to

take-"to place substantial forces in Europe, to put these forces into an

integrated force for the defense of Europe, to agree to a command structure,

to agree to a supreme commander, to join in a program for integrating

European production." 108 In the view of the Defense Department, all these

steps were worthwhile if they led to a German contribution to NATO. Yet

when Lovett stepped down as secretary of defense in January 1953, he

realized that the 12 German divisions for NATO were still a distant goal. The

delay must have seemed utterly frustrating to the man who, with Marshall and

others, had worked so hard in Defense to devise a response to the larger threat

they perceived in the Korean attack.

Some students of NATO and European affairs have not found the

three-year delay in German entry into NATO or the death of the EDC idea

altogether negative. Since Europe was not attacked during the interim, the

delay at least allowed time for the NATO countries to come to terms with the

idea of Germany's rearmament. Concerning the EDC concept, one scholar has

suggested that "without the earnest of European cooperation provided by the

French, a reinvigorated American isolationism might have fulfilled the Allies'

worst fears about U.S. intentions toward Europe." 109 In destroying the EDC

idea, the French may indeed have dismissed a system difficult to implement,

duplicative and expensive to operate, and potentially disruptive to the NATO

• The Western Union powers also agreed to amend the 1948 five-power Brussels treaty and to

create under it a seven-nation Western European Union that would include Italy and West

Germany.
394 THE TEST OF WAR

Alliance. The French denial of the plan has also been seen as having forced the

United States to retain its troops in Europe, thus helping to sustain that

"complete revolution in American policy" forged during the Truman years.

Yet others complain that the long stationing of U.S. forces overseas had major

disadvantages and led to continuing friction within the Alliance. I to Still, it is

reasonable to assume that the many years of peace enjoyed by Europe since

1950 owe a great deal to the security arrangements that Marshall and Lovett

did so much to help create.
CHAPTER XIX

Organization for Military Assistance

The rearmament of Western Europe and fulfillment of NATO force

programs rested on the vital bedrock of u.s. military assistance. As Secretary

Johnson told Congress in support of the original program, "to the two great

measures of our dynamic foreign policy-the Marshall Plan and the North

Atlantic Treaty-we must now add the essential military aid to meet the grave

deficiencies in the equipment with which they [our allies] are attempting to

guard the boundaries of the North Atlantic community." Not only did military

assistance represent the "best possible way to increase the security of the

United States," he maintained, but it "would have been essential to our

military security even if there had been no pact." Outside of Europe, other

countries needed assistance so that they could, in the words of the Mutual

Defense Assistance Act, "participate effectively in arrangements for individual

and collective self-defense." 1

The 1949 act included NATO Europe in Title I; Greece and Turkey in Title

II; and Iran, South Korea, the Philippines, and the "general area" of China in

Title III. Although Congress provided for both reimbursable and grant aid, the

law placed such restrictions on the former that, in fact, most military

assistance was grant aid.· The act also set certain preconditions for U.S.

military aid. Each recipient country had to sign a bilateral agreement with the

United States; in the case of the NATO countries, a NATO defense plan also had

to be approved by the United States before most of the Title I funds could be

released. These requirements made it certain that State and Defense would

have central roles in administering the program. Because military assistance

also affected U.S. economic assistance in important ways, the Economic

• These restrictions were later liberalized. Reimbursable aid was handled in the same way as

grant aid except that the United States received payment.

395
396 THE TEST OF WAR

Cooperation Administration (ECA) became a third party to the program. A

far-flung program, new to the u.s. peacetime experience and due for vast

expansion soon after the start of the Korean War, military assistance involved

extremely complex problems of coordination and greatly increased the

responsibilities of the secretary of defense. 2

Administration in]une 1950

In June 1950 the military assistance program operated under Truman's

Executive Order 10099 (27 January 1950), which delegated to the secretary of

state most of the power given to the president under the 1949 act, including

final authority to approve country programs and to allocate appropriated

funds. The order directed the secretary of state to "advise and consult" with

the ECA administrator and the secretary of defense. Acheson conferred most

of his derived powers on a special assistant, Director of Mutual Defense

Assistance James Bruce, who occupied the highest of four positions authorized by the 1949 act. John H. Ohly served as deputy director, also a statutory

position, and as acting director after Bruce resigned shortly before the start of

the Korean War. Ohly, as a special assistant to the secretary of defense from

1947 to 1949, had overseen the development and presentation of the

Pentagon's first military assistance program. Keenly alert to the new program's

far-reaching impact on foreign, military, and economic affairs, he remained a

key figure in the foreign assistance field throughout the Korean War years and

for a number of years after. 5

The two additional statutory positions established in the act were in the

ECA and the Department of Defense, the latter position held by James H. Burns,

Secretary Johnson's assistant for foreign military affairs and military assistance.

To him reported Maj. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, who as first OSD director of

military assistance had worked under Ohly to develop the original military

assistance program. An outstanding Army officer with wide experience in

Europe during World War II, Lemnitzer later became Army chief of staff, JCS

chairman, and NATO SACEUR. Lemnitzer's close and harmonious relations

with Burns and Ohly proved of great advantage when it became necessary to

speed up military assistance. When Lemnitzer left Washington in the fall of

1950 for a command in Korea, he was replaced first by Maj. Gen. Stanley L.

Scott, an Army combat commander, and somewhat later by Maj. Gen. George

H. Olmsted. In the summer of 1951 Frank C. Nash replaced Burns. 4

Defense, State, and ECA used two interdepartmental committees to

recommend policies, provide operational direction and coordination, and

adjust interagency differences in the military assistance program. A Foreign
Organization for Military Assistance 397

Military Assistance Coordinating Committee (FMACC), with representatives

from the three agencies, operated through working groups that prepared

papers for its consideration. Chaired by the State Department representative,

usually Ohly, the FMACC met weekly or oftener to try to resolve issues

collectively. Unresolved differences were supposed to go to a Cabinet-level

steering committee composed of the secretaries of state and defense and the

ECA administrator, but it apparently never met. S

Within each country receiving military assistance the organization for

administering the program mirrored the tri-agency arrangement in Washington.

Representing the State Department, the U.S. ambassador directed the implementation and coordination of the program. Generally, the ambassador delegated these functions to a full-time special assistant for military assistance,

usually a career foreign service officer. The ECA chief of mission advised the

ambassador about the effect of military assistance on the country's internal

economic condition and its U.S. economic aid program. A Military Assistance

Advisory Group (MAAG)' represented the Department of Defense on the embassy staff. The senior military officer, usually a general officer of considerable

experience, served as the adviser to the ambassador on military assistance

matters. Together or with their staffs, the ambassador, the ECA mission chief,

and the MAAG head were commonly referred to as the "country team.,,6

The advent of the MAAGs, their continually increasing size, and the

difficulties of administering a new program frequently created problems

within the various embassies. Often large in relation to the regular embassy

staff, the MAAGs by October 1950 included more than 1,300 military and

civilian personnel in the European NATO countries plus Greece and Turkey,

and housekeeping arrangements were no minor problem. The privacy of

military communications versus the right of ambassadors to see all messages

became a sensitive issue. Conflicts resulted, since the ambassadors' special

assistants were sometimes high-handed in dealing with senior MAAG officers,

and experienced general officers seldom cared to work with special assistants

who might be well qualified but lacked the authority to make immediate

decisions. Such tension often had repercussions in Washington, where both

Lemnitzer and Ohly "spent a great deal of time worrying about" effective

management of the country-level organizations. 7

Regional coordination of military assistance programs in NATO Europe

came through the European Coordinating Committee (ECC), which consisted

inJune 1950 of Lewis Douglas, the U.S. ambassador to the Court of St.James's,

who served as chairman; W. Averell Harriman, the ECA special representative

• In some areas, U.S. military groups with a different title already functioning for training or for

earlier aid programs carried out the military assistance program.
CHART 6

ORGANIZATION FOR THE MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

JUNE 1950

FOREIGN MILITARY

ASSISTANCE STEERING

COMMITTEE - FMASC

FOREIGN MILITARY

ASSISTANCE COORDINATING

COMMITTEE - FMACC

I ISECRETARY OF

THE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

LEVEL

}

EUROPEAN

REGIONAL

LEVEL

'Committee Chairman

--MDAP Policy and Program Control

Defense and ECA have separate lines of command

and administrative control for their own separate

responsibilities which are not shown on this chart.

COUNTRY

LEVEL

EMBASSY

STAFF

U.S. AMBASSADORS TO: Greece, Iran, Philippines, Turkey, Korea

EXISTING

MILITARY

MISSION

EMBASSY

STAFF

U.S. AMBASSADORS TO (And Special Assistants for MDAP):

Belgium, France, Luxembourg,

Norway, Denmark, Italy, Nether- lands, United Kingdom

MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY

GROUP (MAAG)
Organization for Military Assistance 399

in Europe (succeeded on 28 June by Milton Katz) located in Paris; and General

Thomas T. Handy, Commander in Chief, United States European Command

(CINCEUR), with headquarters in Heidelberg, who had been designated the

military representative for military assistance in Europe (MILREP). The three

men met as necessary in London, where a small executive directorate under

Col. Charles H. Bonesteel carried out the ECC's day-to-day functions. H

As CINCEUR Handy headed what was nominally a JCS unified command

but which inJune 1950 consisted essentially of U.S. Army forces. He was also

the senior member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Representatives, Europe-an

agency composed of the three commanders in chief of the U.S. Army, Navy,

and (after 20 November 1950) Air Force commands in Europe-which served

as the U.S. element in NATO defense planning. In military assistance matters,

Handy reported to the JCS for certain particulars, including all MAAG

activities, and to the secretary of defense for all other operations and

activities. He discharged his MILREP responsibilities mainly through the Joint

American Military Advisory Group OAMAG), located in London under Maj.

Gen. A. Franklin Kibler. JAMAG provided staff support for U.S. participants

involved in NATO military planning and U.S. military assistance and directed

the day-to-day functioning of the latter program in Western Europe.'>

The June 1950 organization for administering mutual defense assistance

thus consisted of a trio of U.S. agencies-State, Defense, and ECA-operating

under a complicated system for joint coordination at each of three levels-in

Washington, the recipient countries, and Europe as a region. Despite the

complexity of the system, it possessed a practicality that may be readily

grasped from a brief review of the process. The first step in creating a military

assistance program for a NATO country was to ascertain its military deficiencies in meeting NATO requirements; this involved cooperation between

national representatives and the U.S. country team to produce an agreed

deficiency list. This list went forward for regional level review to JAMAG,

which, with the help of the MAAGs and U.S. elements in NATO, checked it for

conformity to NATO plans and U.S. guidelines and the possibility of intercountry help. The pruned but still tentative list then went to Washington,

where the services reviewed and priced it. Subsequently, Defense, FMACC,

and the Bureau of the Budget further reviewed and perhaps cut it. After the

president approved the program, he included it in a military assistance budget

for congressional consideration. I ()

Although the United States expected to fill most military assistance

requirements by sending U.S.-produced items, some items could be better

produced in Europe with U.S. help.• The 1949 Mutual Defense Assistance Act

• Oubidt: of tht: NATO art:a fnv countrit:~ po~~t:~~t:d tht: capacity to product: MJphisticatt:d

weapon~, and l:.S. equipment wa~ provided.
400 THE TEST OF WAR

provided for such aid through an "additional military production" (AMP)

feature, under which certain essential items such as machine tools could be

sent to Europe. Never large, the AMP program increasingly gave way to other

procedures during the Korean War period. In any case, once AMP aid was

approved, the responsibility for carrying out such projects normally rested

with the ECA. II

Within Defense, the military services were the operating agents for

military assistance, but the secretary of defense and his office directly oversaw

the Pentagon's implementation of the program. Given an approved program

and appropriated funds, the services provided the necessary equipment either

by initiating orders for new production or by sending already available service

stocks. Most early deliveries were of readily available, used items that the

services determined to be either "excess" or "reserve." The latter, considered

part of the services' mobilization reserves, had to be replaced with new

equipment bought with military assistance funds, but items excess to the

reserve requirement could be sent without charging military assistance funds

except for the cost of repairs, modifications, and transportation. The 1949

law limited this practice to a total of $450 million in terms of the original gross

cost, but Congress increased this to $1 billion by late 1951. 12

As Lemnitzer recalled, the services saw military assistance as a way to

modernize their own equipment stocks and, with implicit congressional

consent, charged the MDAP program high prices for reserve items and repairs

to excess equipment. After these abuses became obvious, the secretary of

defense set a pricing formula that limited the charges. As the Korean War

progressed, used equipment became less available for military assistance, and

the services had to purchase new items. They did not set up a separate channel

for purchase of military assistance items but integrated them with regular

military procurement. 13

Organizational Changes

By the start of the Korean War small quantities of equipment had actually

been delivered and training programs had begun, but the military assistance

program proceeded with only a moderate sense of urgency, and the adequacy

of the organizational structure was unclear. State saw a need for greater

centralization and executive strength, particularly in Europe, which had a

special need for intercountry coordination and stronger support of U.S.

representatives in NATO. Because European countries feared that enlarging

their military forces would drain off the economic resources needed to house,

feed, and clothe their populations, Washington wanted to coordinate military
Organization for Military Assistance 401

assistance and the economic aid program to avoid harming national economies during the quickened NATO military buildup after the start of the Korean

War. The likelihood of expanded future military assistance programs, in

Europe and elsewhere, also made it desirable to strengthen the FMACC in

Washington.

After June 1950 a growing number of officials and agencies evinced

interest in foreign assistance matters, chief among them Harriman, who had

returned from Europe to become the president's special assistant. The

Treasury Department also desired formal inclusion in the FMACC process.

Congress soon increased military assistance funds fourfold,' and policy and

operational problems multiplied. Overworked FMACC staff members became

"utterly fatigued." 14

While concerned officials discussed the organizational problem, Truman

in late September asked Budget Director Frederick Lawton to examine the

situation. After two months of studies by a number of agencies, Lovett

concurred in a revised organization subject to JCS concerns that nothing

should infringe on their own or others' statutory duties. IS On 19 December

Lawton sent the president a memorandum of understanding signed by

Defense, State, ECA, and Treasury, and Truman approved it the same day. The

memorandum provided that the director of mutual defense assistance in State

should be replaced by a much strengthened director for international security

affairs, who would speak for the department and its secretary on NATO as well

as military assistance matters and take the lead in interdepartmental coordination. Thomas D. Cabot, a Boston banker and insurance executive, filled the

new position; Charles A. Coolidge, a Boston lawyer who later joined Lovett's

staff, was named deputy director. In the Pentagon, Secretary Marshall on 11

January 1951 appointed Burns his assistant for international security affairs

and established under him a new Office of North Atlantic Treaty Affairs

headed by Air Force Col. Royden E. Beebe, Jr. 16

The memorandum of understanding replaced FMACC with a Committee

on International Security Affairs (ISAC), consisting of senior staff representatives and responsible for both mutual defense assistance and NATO matters.

Cabot chaired 1SAC, which included General Burns and representatives of

Harriman, the ECA, and Treasury. In general, the reorganization left the

existing machinery and responsibilities for management and coordination of

military assistance matters unchanged. DoD retained primary responSibility

for "determining the military character of international programs, for developing and implementing the end item and military training programs and for

developing U.S. determinations as to military requirements in the formulation

• See Chapter xx.
402 THE TEST OF WAR

of programs for military production abroad." Cabot, as the State Department

representative, retained authority for final approval of military assistance

programs and the allocation of military assistance funds. [""'

While the Washington reorganization proceeded during the winter of

1950-51, regional coordination in Europe also came under review. The

essence of the ECC organization was the State-ECA-Defense triad of Ambassador Douglas, Ambassador Katz, and General Handy, meeting in London.

Beginning in the summer of 1950 the role in military assistance matters of

Ambassador Charles M. Spofford, the deputy U.S. representative to the North

Atlantic Council, became an issue between DoD and State.

The terms of reference originally proposed for Spofford in July 1950

recommended that he serve as U.S. representative for mutual defense assistance in Europe and that the ECC executive directorate become part of his

permanent staff. Because Spofford was Acheson's deputy in NATO, some

Pentagon officials feared that State intended to diminish the military role in

Europe by transforming the ECC from a three-agency executive coordinating

committee for military assistance into an advisory committee to Spofford. IH

In November 1950 State proposed to replace Douglas with Spofford as the

State Department member and ECC chairman, to make the ECC executive

directorate part of Spofford's permanent staff, and to name Spofford the U.S.

representative for mutual defense assistance in Europe. Both the Joint Chiefs

and the OSD Office of Military Assistance objected to what seemed to them

insertion of an "additional echelon" between Secretary Marshall and General

Handy. Assured that State intended no changes in the MDAP system and that

Spofford's role .would not differ from Douglas's. Defense agreed to Spofford's

chairmanship of the ECC and the assignment to him of the ECC executive

directorate. On 16 December Truman approved Spofford's new role and the

addition of NATO matters to ECCs area of concern. I')

As spelled out in March 195 1 by ISAC, Spofford had responsibility for

general political guidance and overall coordination on political, economic,

and military matters; Katz, for economic mobilization activities, U.S. economic assistance-programs, and coordination of ECA missions; and Handy. for

coordination of the U.S. military end item and training programs and guidance

of the country-level MAAGs. William L. Batt, the senior C.S. representative to

the NATO Defense Production Board, advised the ECC on matters related to

NATO industrial production, and a senior U.S. liaison officer from SHAPE

consulted on matters related to NATO military planning20

The reorganization of 1950-51 was, admittedly, not a perfect solution.

Whatever the improvements involved in the establishment of a broader-based

ISAC, departmental adjustments, and the ECC's increased membership, coordination problems remained extremely complex Eisenhower's impatience
r----------------

I

I

1

~----------------

: SPECIAL ASSISTANT

1 TO THE PRESIDENT I

L1 HARRIMAN _

CHART 7

U.S. COORDINATING ORGANIZATION FOR

MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

MID-1951

I THE PRESIDENT I

FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE

STEERING COMMITIEE (FMASC)

SECRETARY OF SECRETARY OF ECA

DEFENSE STATE ADMINISTRATOR

MARSHALL ACHESON FOSTER

-----------------,I

I

1

-----------------1

SECRETARY OF : THE TREASURY 1

I

SNYDER 1

----------- 1

COMMITIEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

(ISAC)

ASSISTANT TO ASSISTANT TO DIRECTOR ASSISTANT TO ASSISTANT TO

HARRIMAN SECRETARY OF DEFENSE INTERNATIONAL ECA ADMINISTRATOR SECRETARY OF

SECURITY AFFAIRS THE TREASURY

GORDON BURNS CABOT HALABY HEBBARD

• PUBLIC INFORMATION POLITICO- MILITARY FOREIGN AID DEFENSE FINANCIAL AND

COMMITIEE GROUP COMMITIEE PRODUCTION GROUP ECONOMIC GROUP

(PIC) (PMG) (FAC) (DPG) (FEG)

ADAMS BEEBE SCOTI VAN ATIEN VAN ATIEN

EUROPEAN COORDINATING COMMITIEE

(ECC)

U.S. MILITARY

REPRESENTATIVE FOR U.S. SPECIAL

MILITARY ASSISTANCE U.S. DEPUTY REPRESENTATIVE

IN EUROPE (ECA)

HANDY SPOFFORD KATZ

---,I

I

1 __ J

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

I

__ J
404 THE TEST OF WAR

pointed up the shortcomings. In May 1951 he wrote Marshall that Europeans

were complaining of "unreasonable" delays in the U.S. military assistance

program. He cited long waits for u.s. plans and specifications and reported

that Spofford, Katz, Batt, and various U.S. ambassadors had reinforced these

criticisms. The general expressed his "uneasy feeling" that the complaints

might be justified; he felt that Cabot and Burns in Washington had failed to

take prompt action. Eisenhower thought that the situation created the

impression of a lack of U.S. efficiency and seriousness and provided other

nations an excuse for not fulfilling their NATO obligations. Conceding that

Burns's office might not always have acted as expeditiously as possible,

Marshall replied that the program had proceeded in a generally satisfactory

manner and was currently being "attacked with vigor. ,,11 Apparently still not

satisfied, Eisenhower discussed the matter with Harriman, Spofford, and Katz

during the summer of 1951 and agreed to take a more active coordinating role,

particulary with the ECC. In September the general charged a section of the

SHAPE office with keeping him informed on all aspects of u.s. overseas aid. 12

The Mutual Security Act of 1951

Eisenhower's criticisms prompted greater attention to organizational

matters in Washington. The ECA was to expire in 1952 and a decision had to

be made about its future. Closer to Defense was the matter of ISAC's handling

of the coordination function. 23

An interdepartmental Executive Group, set up in the early spring of 1951

to help prepare the presentation of the administration's legislative request to

Congress for FY 1952 foreign assistance, showed awareness of difficult

organizational problems. Col. George A. Lincoln, Marshall's representative,

informed Lovett that the Washington troubles were "as much men and

administration as directives and organization." At the end of May Lincoln

reported to Marshall that ISAC was still "logically the agency to undertake the

task of integration and coordination. ,,2, Neither Acheson nor Marshall

favored shifting responsibility for coordination outside of State, and the

administration's proposed budget authorization' specifically recommended

that State continue to furnish leadership for the entire program. The administration offered no recommendation for any major organizational change. 2~

When the Senate quickly expressed dissatisfaction with the current

organizational arrangements, Marshall reacted negatively to the prospect of

more change, reflecting a general Pentagon attitude that the current ISAC

• The budgetary issues considered in this proposal are discussed in the following chapter.
Organization for Military Assistance 405

organization was just beginning to work as intended. Dismissing overseas

complaints as the "inevitable congenital reaction from people in the field,"

Marshall declared to the Senate committee that Defense had no objection to

the current operational procedures for foreign aid. Bradley echoed Marshall's

position; his major interest was to see that Defense should retain under any

reorganization the functions it currently exercised. 26

In the end, the Mutual Security Act of 1951, signed on 10 October 1951,

both met the Senate's desire for a centralized, separate organization and

granted most of what Bradley wanted. Section 506a of the act gave the

secretary of defense "primary responsibility and authority" for determining

country requirements, integrating military assistance with regular service

procurement, supervising equipment usage and training programs, and delivering end items. The secretary of defense was to determine priorities in

procurement, delivery, and allocation of equipment; the president was to

continue to apportion funds. 27

Terminating ISAC, the act centralized responsibility for "continuous

supervision and general direction" over all U.S. foreign assistance programsmilitary, economic, and technical-in a Cabinet-level director for mutual

security, placed in the Executive Office of the President. However, by

excluding NATO matters from his duties and by specifying that nothing should

infringe on the powers of the secretary of state, the new act in effect left

primacy in NATO affairs to Acheson. Unlike Cabot, a sub-Cabinet officer who

reported to the secretary ofstate, the new director for mutual security became

a statutory member of the National Security Council and reported directly to

the president. He also headed the Mutual Security Agency (MSA), which took

charge of economic assistance when the ECA was terminated at the end of

1951, six months ahead of schedule. Truman appointed Harriman to the

director's post on 31 October and delegated to him in Executive Order 10300

most of the president's responsibilities under the new act. The president

directed the secretary of defense to exercise his responsibilities under the act

subject to Harriman's coordination, direction, and supervision, and to keep

Harriman fully informed. 28

Turning over direction of the day-to-day economic aid operations in the

Mutual Security Agency to a deputy director, Harriman established a separate

staff in the Office of the Director for Mutual Security (ODMS) to supervise the

entire program. Key members on the staff included Lincoln Gordon, assistant

director first for program and later for policy and planning, and Theodore

Tannenwald, Jr., assistant director and counsel and later chief of staff.

Harriman also drew on former ISAC personnel, including Ohly, who, after

being detailed from State to ODMS, jOined its staff in June 1952 as assistant

director for program. 29
406 THE TEST OF WAR

Although Harriman did not have much greater legal authority over

military assistance than his predecessors, his personal stature, his closeness to

Truman and other high officials, and his Cabinet status and NSC membership

made a difference in terms of the "real authority" that he could exercise. Even

though the secretary of defense retained primary responsibility for administration of military assistance under both the Mutual Security Act and Executive

Order 10300, there was, in Tannenwald's words, "just no question that

somebody was being put between the president and the departments involved-the statute required it. ,,~() Harriman's organization thus had the effect

of constraining the authority and influence of the Pentagon.

Many Defense officials found the situation difficult to accept; changing

conditions, new personnel, and increasing administrative complexities enhanced the possibility of misunderstanding and friction. While Lovett and

Harriman may never have been at odds, differences occurred at the working

levels of their offices. Tannenwald later noted that "the latent hostilities never

became open conflicts. But the problems were there, make no mistake about

it." Still, looking back, Ohly remembered an "extraordinary degree of

cooperation and mutual respect" among the departmental representatives

who "together, informally and very much as peers," tried to work out

solutions to their problems. 51

Further Reorganization

At the end of 1951, the tide of organizational adjustments in Washington

and some expected changes within NATO seemed certain to alter military

assistance arrangements in Europe, although at least for the time being the

regional system was supposed to remain in effect. Presumably the European

Coordinating Committee remained the final authority for regional coordination, but reform was in the offing. Spofford intended to leave NATO after its

forthcoming reorganization. Katz had resigned, and a representative from the

Mutual Security Agency would take his place. Although General Handy

remained MILREP and CINCEUR, Eisenhower as SACEUR exerted increasing

influence on the U.S. military assistance program. His power derived not only

from his own extraordinary prestige but from the terms under which he had

gone to Europe, for Truman had given him direct operational control over all

U.S. forces in Europe to the extent necessary for the accomplishment of his

NATO mission. 52

By the end of 1951 the key military assistance agency under Handy,

Kibler's Joint American Military Advisory Group, had more than two years of

experience and was vital to regional coordination. U.S. military men became
Organization for Military Assistance 407

concerned over JAMAG's possible removal from London, since they believed

the issue of relocation could become a question of control. Eisenhower

wanted JAMAG to be located in or near Paris, headquarters for both SHAPE

and the administration of the U.S. economic program in Europe. Handy,

Kibler, and Spofford, however, argued that JAMAG could operate best by

remaining in London, where Spofford was still functioning. In December

Eisenhower conceded the point, at least temporarily, but he remained

convinced that JAMAG's performance could be improved. 33

Reorganization began with the early phasing out of Spofford's responsibility for military assistance and Truman's selection on 12 January 1952 of

William H. Draper, Jr., as the U.S. Special Representative in Europe (SRE). An

investment banker and corporation executive, Draper had previously served

under General Clay in Germany and as under secretary of the army from 1947

to 1949. With regard to the overseas assistance programs in Europe, he now

held a position much superior in station to Spofford's, for he was responsible

directly to the president. Draper was to direct European regional activities of

the Mutual Security Agency and supervise the military and economic assistance programs in Europe. 3.{

Draper's scope went beyond Harriman's to include NATO affairs. When

the planned reorganization of the North Atlantic Council occurred on 4 April,

Draper replaced Spofford in the enhanced role of U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, again responsible directly to the president. Assuming responsibility for both NATO and the mutual security program, Draper represented four U.S. Cabinet officers in Europe: For NATO

policy affairs, he acted for the secretary of state; for general supervision of the

economic assistance program and coordination of all mutual security programs, the director for mutual security; for certain financial matters, the

secretary of the treasury; and for all NATO and military assistance activities

involving OSD, the secretary of defense. Frederick L. Anderson, a retired Air

Force general, served as Draper's deputy, with the personal rank of

ambassador. 3s

With the dismantling of Spofford's London office in the spring of 1952,

Lovett moved Daniel Edwards to Paris as Draper's deputy for defense affairs,

with responsibility for NATO matters only. Edwards resigned that summer, and

Lovett appointed Luke W. Finlay, a former Standard Oil of New Jersey

executive, to the post. .36 Draper's office had some 89 persons dealing with

military assistance matters. 37

Defense officials tended to view their relationship with Draper's office as

somewhat unclear on military assistance matters. Lovett's channel passed

through Handy and the ECC, of which Draper was to become the new

chairman; the ECC executive directorate was already in Paris under him. In the
CHART 8

U.S. ORGANIZATION FOR MUTUAL SECURITY

PROGRAMS IN EUROPEAN NATO COUNTRIES

1952

THE

PRESIDENT

EXECUTIVE OFFICE

OF THE PRESIDENT

DIRECTOR

FOR

MUTUAL SECURITY

W. AVERELL HARRIMAN

WASHINGTON

I I I

MUTUAL DEPARTMENT OF

DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY AGENCY DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

DEFENSE DIRECTOR STATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY W. AVERELL HARRIMAN SECRETARY JOHN W. SNYDER

AND OTHER ROBERT A. LOVETT DEP. DIRECTOR DEAN G. ACHESON AGENCIES

W. JOHN KENNEY AS APPROPRIATE

I I I

I I

REGIONAL I I

I

I

I

U.S. MILITARY REP. U.S. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE I

I

FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN EUROPE I

(MILREP) AND ___ ...J

GEN. THOMAS T. HANDY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE

TO NORTH ATl.ANTIC COUNCIL 1

JOINT AMERICAN AMBASSADOR WILLIAM H. DRAPER, JR.

MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP

(JAMAG) ECONOMIC I DEFENSE I POLITICAL

MAJ. GEN. A. FRANKLIN KIBLER FUNCTIONS FUNCTIONS FUNCTIONS

AMBASSADOR - - - - - - --

LEADERSHIP AND

COORDINATION

COUNTRY I r-----L----,

TEAM

MILITARY I TREASURY I

ASSISTANCE MSA MISSION EMBASSY I REPRESENTATIVES:-

ADVISORY GROUP I AND OTHERS

(MAAG) L~~ ~r:P_R.9£,~I~~EJ
Organization for Military Assistance 409

general confusion, ECC meetings, which had been infrequent, were now

simply not convened. Under these conditions Kibler'sJAMAG seemed increasingly important to the military, who viewed their continued control of it as

crucial. Its fate became steadily more entwined, however, with the larger

problem of finding a new military organization for u.s. forces in Europe, one

which could operate more effectively to administer the many diverse U.S.

defense functions overseas. 3M

Lovett had come under heavy congressional attack, not only because of

problems related to military assistance, but also because of stories of delay,

duplication, and waste in the construction of bases in Europe and North

Africa. By the end of 1951, the secretary felt that the solution for many of

these problems lay in bringing the three u.s. commands in Europe-the U.S.

European Command, u.s. Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean

Command, and u.s. Air Forces in Europe-under a unified command with a

single commander to consolidate the logistical effort. Lovett's choice for

commander was Eisenhower. 39

In January 1952 Lovett sent William D. Pawley, a former ambassador

acting as the secretary's special assistant, to talk with Eisenhower about the

possibility of taking on the additional role. The general thought placing u.s.

and NATO commands under one person might prove detrimental to both

positions. He turned over the question to General Handy, Admiral Carney, and

General Norstad, the three top U.S. commanders in Europe, who did not

succeed in presenting an agreed solution. 40

Meanwhile the JCS had informed Eisenhower on 8 February that all

logistical and administrative operations of joint concern should be integrated

under a single U.s. commander-either Eisenhower or his u.s. deputy-with

command authority over all u.s. forces. Eisenhower countered on 14 March

by suggesting the creation of a new u.s. military representative in Europe (US

MILREP) as a counterpart to Draper in his role as u.s. special representative.

This new official, responsible to both the Joint Chiefs and the secretary of

defense and senior to the three U.s. commanders in chief in Europe, would

have directive authority but no operational control over u.s. forces in Europe.

He would be subordinate to SACEUR but hold no position within the SHAPE

command structure. 41

Eisenhower's proposal did not meet the requirements of either Lovett or

the Joint Chiefs for a u.s. unified commander, and it soon became even more

unpalatable when Draper let it be known that he thought the proposed us

MILREP should be responsible to him as the u.s. special representative.

Although Eisenhower apparently had no objections, the Pentagon's reaction

was strongly negative; Lovett reportedly remarked that there was to be no

secretary of defense in Europe. 42
410 THE TEST OF WAR

When the possible move ofJAMAG to Paris again came up in early April,

many in the u.s. military establishment saw Draper's growing power as a

threat. Draper's desire to have both the JAMAG offices and the proposed us

MILREP located in the same building with him, combined with his contention

that the latter report to him, made military authorities fear lest JAMAG itself

be completely absorbed. Handy wanted to maintain JAMAG as a military

organization and opposed its move to Paris until establishment of the US

MILREP. i3

Reactions in Washington

With these issues having emerged in Europe, Lovett carefully examined

Draper's terms of reference when Defense formally received them on 24 April.

The new terms, based on Draper's becoming permanent representative to the

North Atlantic Council as well as U.S. special representative in Europe, had

been drafted in Harriman's office and provided that Draper would act for

Lovett for military assistance matters in Europe and for NATO matters. Within

this general responsibility, Draper would "coordinate and supervise military

assistance programs and related activities of US MILREP." These terms created

waves of protest in the Pentagon. The Joint Chiefs declared that such terms

would interpose a civilian element between the defense secretary and the

establishedJCS military command structure in Europe. They wanted Draper to

act for the secretary only on military assistance functions "other than those

relating to Section 506a of the Mutual Security Act of 1951." The JCS

proposed that he coordinate with, not supervise, US MILREP. The Army, Navy,

and Air Force secretaries were equally adamant that Lovett should have a

direct line of authority to the proposed US MILREp'·il

Although Nash spent hours with Harriman's representatives trying to

clarify the situation, the best he could get was elimination of the word

"supervise" and an understanding that the matter of coordination between

Draper and the new US MILREP would be included in the latter's terms of

reference. Although Nash recommended approval, Deputy Secretary Foster

decided to await the JCS views.·~

Eisenhower, incensed by the services' inability to agree on the matter,

wanted Lovett, if necessary, to create the new organization himself. In the

meantime, both Eisenhower and Draper believed that the lack of coordination

in Europe was costing valuable time and money. When Colonel Beebe asked

Draper directly about his future relationship with JAMAG, Draper said that he

would consult with both JAMAG and the proposed US MILREP, not interfere

with their military recommendations, and report his own views to Lovett.
Organization for Military Assistance 411

Noting thatJAMAG in London could hardly playa strong role while NATO and

other activities operated from Paris, Beebe believed it necessary that JAMAG

move to Paris soon. Nash wanted JAMAG to move immediately, and Foster

agreed.'tC,

On 9 May Bradley notified Lovett that the Joint Chiefs thought that

Eisenhower should establish a separate u.s. joint staff, headed by a deputy

with no other U.S. or NATO responsibility, to administer military matters of

joint service concern that required coordination in Europe. Since Eisenhower

was resigning as SACEUR to run for president, there was need for immediate

action. 47 This time, Eisenhower agreed to accept responsibility for U.S.

military matters of a joint nature. He wanted the area of operations to coincide

with his NATO command and his new authority to be "commensurate with

responsibilities assigned." Eisenhower assumed that the new U.S. headquarters would be set up in or near Paris, and he expected his and Draper's

deputies to achieve full day-to-day coordination. 48

On 23 May the Joint Chiefs, with Lovett's concurrence, reaffirmed

Eisenhower in the position of U.S. military representative in Europe (US

MILREP) and authorized him to establish a separate U.S. joint staff under a

deputy receiving maximum delegation of authority. They favored Handy

because of his previous experience as MILREP. The Joint Chiefs delayed a final

decision on the geographic area but asked that Eisenhower act immediately to

avoid leaving the problem to General Ridgway, who would take over as

SACEUR on 30 May. Accepting Handy as Deputy US MILREP, Eisenhower on

29 May submitted for approval Handy's letter of instructions and terms of

reference. 49 The Joint Chiefs, however, considered the terms too broad and

sent back revised ones. Eisenhower thereupon informed Lovett and theJCS on

30 May that he would not assume the responsibilities of US MILREP and had

suspended all arrangements. Ridgway inherited the problem. ~()

Although Ridgway found no consensus on the matter when he sounded

out the U.S. commanders and advisers in Europe, he and Handy both favored

the Lovett-JCS solution in which the NATO SACEUR also became a U.S.

unified commander. Ridgway told the Joint Chiefs on 11 June that the move

would also help Lovett to achieve "maximum economy" in the European

theater.~l

After discussing the matter separately with Eisenhower and Ridgway, the

Joint Chiefs informed Lovett on 30 June that Ridgway should be appointed

U.S, unified commander with the title of United States Commander in Chief,

Europe (US CINCEUR), with the three U.S. commands in Europe under

him, He would also assume the functions of the other major U.S. military

agencies in Europe. JAMAG personnel would provide the nucleus for US

CINCEUR's staff. In addition. Ridgway was to be responsible for administering
412 THE TEST OF WAR

such military assistance activities in Europe as had been assigned to Defense

and was to coordinate with Draper on military assistance and other joint

logistical or administrative tasks. 52 Asking for Truman's approval on 7 July,

Lovett pointed out that as US CINCEUR, Ridgway would command all U.S.

forces in all NATO areas but not, except in emergency, in areas outside of

NATO. He would establish a U.S. headquarters under Handy as Deputy US

CINCEUR, with an extensive delegation of authority. Truman approved

immediately. 5.3

With this decision reached, Lovett finally concurred in Draper's terms of

reference as U.S. special representative in Europe. Lovett accorded Draper the

right to act for the secretary of defense in the "over-all coordination and

supervision of Mutual Security Program activities," while Ridgway was to

administer the military aspects of the program for Europe and to control and

administer those military agencies engaged in such activities. In addition,

Ridgway would coordinate U.S. joint logistical and administrative matters,

including military procurement abroad, negotiations for base rights, and

construction of bases. Lovett expected full coordination between Ridgway

and Draper, but he stipulated that any unresolved issues should be submitted

to him in Washington. 54

When Ridgway assumed his duties as US CINCEUR on 1 August 1952, the

military assistance organization in Europe seemed to be clarified. In a

departure from the original plan, however, Deputy US CINCEUR Handy

moved not to Paris but to Frankfurt, where he set up a headquarters including

a military assistance division staffed by former JAMAG personnel. Handy

remained in Frankfurt until almost a year after the end of the Korean War. 55

Lovett's office was generally satisfied with its relationship with Draper's

office. 56

Despite the troublesome internal and interdepartmental problems, by the

end of Lovett's tenure as secretary of defense the administrative apparatus for

military assistance was far superior to the weak, almost experimental organization of the first years of the program. Within the Pentagon, working

arrangements between the secretary's office, the military services, and the JCS

generally had been ironed out. By great personal effort, Nash had helped forge

a strong OSD working team and a cooperative relationship with Harriman's

office. At the regional level, the Pentagon's relationships with Draper, the

NATO organization, and the U.S. commanders and agencies in Europe were

more clearly delineated and operating with less friction. Moreover, the MAAGs

now had some practical experience on which to draw. Although some

organizational problems undoubtedly still remained when Lovett left office in

January 1953, a sound foundation for the future had been constructed.
CHAPTER XX

Growth of Military Assistance

The Korean War radically affected the attitude of the Truman administration toward military assistance and NATO. Fear of Soviet military initiatives

elsewhere, particularly in Europe, lent great urgency to the rearming of Allies

and friendly countries. The initial sum appropriated for the first Mutual

Defense Assistance Program (MDAP)-$1.314 billion for FY 1950, of which

$1 billion was for NATO Europe-and the $1.222 billion in new obligational

authority for FY 1951 requested of Congress on 1 June 1950, only 24 days

before the North Korean invasion, overnight seemed utterly inadequate.

Calculations of the maximum support that public opinion and Congress

would allow for military assistance were suddenly revised in the context of a

more threatening world environment. The initial disposition of Congress and

the public to support administration measures for military assistance gave way

in time to doubts and opposition, but the basic thrust persisted, raising the

military assistance program to levels never contemplated before the Korean

War and giving it an unexpectedly lasting institutional status. 1

Congressional committee hearings on the military assistance request for

FY 1951, beginning on 5 June 1950, gave no hint of the ultimate size of the

program. Pointing out that without U.S. aid NATO troops would lack

equipment and European economic stability would be seriously threatened,

Secretary Johnson testified that the small programs planned for FY 1951

would only partially overcome the "dangerous disparity in strength between

the armed east and the disarmed west." Greece needed equipment to deal

with the continued threat of guerrilla outbreaks, while Iran, Korea, and the

Philippines had to contend with threats of external Communist aggression.

Asia, Johnson informed the senators, required help to combat Communist

guerrillas in Indochina and to build up a constabulary for maintaining internal

security in Indonesia. Envisioning the need to continue military assistance for

413
414 THE TEST OF WAR

three or four more years, Johnson guessed that the following year's request

would be no more than that for FY 1951 and that the program's cost would

thereafter drop. 2

When George Marshall-at the time holding no official positionappeared before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 7 June, he

acknowledged that the Mutual Defense Assistance Program might encourage

the Soviets to act quickly, before Europe was militarily secure, but he thought

the greater danger lay in sitting "idle and impotent." Soviet-American

reconciliation could only come, Marshall said, if the West spoke from genuine

strength and high resolve. The currently requested MDAP appropriation

would provide only a minimum defense capability, but he thought it sufficient

to have a deterrent effect.

Effect of the Korean War

The North Korean attack only 18 days after Marshall's testimony hastened

congressional action to authorize and appropriate money for FY 1951. Signed

by Truman on 26 July, the enabling legislation (PL 81-621) extended the

military assistance program for one year and authorized a FY 1951 appropriation. Specifically, the act increased grant aid coverage to all NATO members, •

and changed from 5 to 10 percent the amount of money which the president

might transfer between the various titles. Truman could thus use up to 10

percent of the funds to assist, if necessary. any non-NATO country in Europe

whose location made it strategically vital to NATO defense and U.S. security.

This critical provision made it possible to give assistance to Yugoslavia, which

had broken with the Soviet bloc in 1948 and was subject to tremendous

pressure from the Soviets. The law not only increased the original $450

million limitation on the use of excess equipment to 5700 million but eased

some of the onerous restrictions on reimbursable aid and allowed the

provision of more industrial equipment for European military production. Six

weeks later Congress appropriated the requested S1.2 billion in the General

Appropriation Act of 1951 (PL 81-7 59).'

Planning for increased military assistance had meanwhile begun immediately after the initial shock of the Korean War had been absorbed. General

Lemnitzer in OSD and John Ohly at State agreed in the Foreign Military

Assistance Coordinating Committee (FMACC) that military assistance should

be greatly increased, but neither had fixed on an exact amount. Taking the

• The first act restricted grant aid to NAIU membns applying for such assistance before (, October

(')4'); Portugal. Canada. and Iceland. which had not requested aid hefore that date. were now

eligible
Growth of Military Assistance 415

initiative with McNeil on 14 July, Lemnitzer wrote that despite the lack of

detailed programs it was important to get started on production of long-leadtime items and recommended a supplementary FY 1951 request of $4 billion.

He based this figure on a four-year estimate of $17 billion to equip NATO

forces by July 1954 and $3 billion to arm other friendly countries. From this

$20 billion total he then subtracted $8 billion, an optimistic estimate of what

the NATO countries could provide for themselves, to reach a requirement for

$12 billion in U.S. military aid. Dividing that by three years rather than four

in order to allow for production lead time, Lemnitzer arrived at his $4 billion

supplemental request. 5 Burns endorsed the amount on the premise that it

would be "building up an Arsenal of Democracy which could be used to

supply our own forces or those of our allies as circumstances justify."

Lemnitzer did not disagree with this position; the new program would

increase the U.S. production base, while any MDAP equipment would be

available to U.S. forces up to the time of shipment to another country.6

Working intensively, FMACC used $4 billion as a tentative discussion

figure. Both the specific figure and the timing of the decision were crucial.

The United States intended to ask the NATO countries to make a vastly

expanded military effort and needed to be able to give them some idea of the

U.S. help they might expect; in turn, their willingness to arm would help

support the administration's request to Congress. By 21 July Defense and State

agreed that an increased MDAP program of $4 billion to $6 billion should be

presented to the president. Meeting with Truman, Acheson, and Harriman that

day, Johnson proposed $4 billion for military materiel alone and suggested

that some part could be used to finance European manufacture of military

equipment. In approving the proposal, Truman emphasized that he was

creating a negotiating position with the NATO countries and that the $4-6

billion figure was subject to change.-

At Johnson's insistence the lower figure prevailed, and after conferring

with the services Lemnitzer outlined a tentative division of the money.

Accepting his suggestions, Truman on 1 August requested a $4 billion

supplemental FY 1951 MDAP appropriation from Congress, including $3.5

billion for the European countries in Title I; $193 million for Greece, Turkey,

and Iran in Title II; and $ 303 million for Title III Asian nations. H Treating the

situation as an emergency, Congress agreed to consider the request in the

supplemental bill for regular FY 1951 military funds, without a separate

authorization bill, and eventually appropriated $4 billion. On 27 September

Truman signed PL 81-843, which also gave him specific authority to transfer

military assistance equipment to Defense use if necessary.'>

At the end of September 19')0 the total funds available for military

assistance since its inception amounted to more than $6.5 billion dollars, but
416 THE TEST OF WAR

the administration considered the sum insufficient to prepare an adequate

NATO defense by 1954. "In no cases under MDAP," Lemnitzer told Lovett in

October, " are we providing all the equipment needed. We are working in the

area of deficits." 10

Preparing a FY 1952 Request

How to get a better measure of the extent of the deficits proved difficult

during a period of rapid changes in anticipated requirements. When Truman

approved NSC 68/2 on 30 September, at a time of high optimism for a quick

end to the Korean War, U.S. officials thought that a total of $21.7 billion would

cover overseas aid for the five-year period 1951 through 1955, including

$16.7 billion for military assistance. But the massive Chinese intervention in

November ended any possibility of shifting U.S. military equipment from

Korea to Europe, reinforced fears about Europe's vulnerability, and underscored the problems to be faced if Europe were attacked. In a Washington

atmosphere of deep pessimism, the FMACC agreed by early December that the

total five-year foreign aid requirement might come to $33.4 billion, including

$25.1 billion for military assistance. After further NSC review, Truman on 14

December approved the cost estimates included in NSC 68/3 as a working

guide for the purpose of immediate action. 11

Of the $25.1 billion military assistance requirement for creation of a

viable European defense by mid-1954, $5.2 billion had been appropriated in

FY 1951, leaving a balance of approximately $20 billion. To allow time to

produce complicated military equipment, however, Defense needed much of

the money as soon as possible. Secretary Marshall asked for $6.6 billion for

military assistance in FY 1952. The tentative breakdown-$5.8 billion for the

NATO countries and a German stockpile; $270 million for Greece, Turkey, and

Iran; and $560 million for Asian countries-derived from an OSD study

prepared with the help of the military services, the JCS, and the NATO

Standing Group. The FMACC and the Bureau of the Budget approved these

figures for inclusion in the president's 1951 annual budget message, which

carried a single figure of $10.956 billion for military assistance, economic aid,

and an expanded international information program. 12

Informing the Joint Chiefs on 27 December of the president's approval of

a $6.6 billion military assistance budget request for FY 1952 and of the

planned breakdown between titles, Lovett directed them to keep to the given

figure unless they had good reason for a change and to develop a supplemental

$250 million program. On 7 February 1951, however, the Joint Chiefs

recommended increases of over $1.6 billion, raising the total FY 1952 request
Growth of Military Assistance 417

to $8.2 billion. They assigned more than $6.3 billion for Title I alone,·

including $250 million for a German stockpile and $300 million for Spain.

Even so, the country allocations seemed woefully inadequate compared with

MAAG-reported deficiencies-$ 2.3 billion against $15.1 billion needed for

France and $475 million against almost $3 billion required for the United

Kingdom. Adding amounts for Yugoslavia and a Middle East contingency fund

to Title II, the JCS request for this area exceeded $654 million. For Asia,

including Japan, the JCS asked for $1.17 billion, and for Latin America $80

million. Of the $8.2 billion total, the Joint Chiefs assigned more than half as

an Army responsibility. Despite the JCS recommendations, Marshall apparently did not press at this time for increases in the agreed-upon $6.6 billion for

FY 1952. 13

By mid-March Defense and the other agencies involved in the military

and economic aid programs were preparing a joint budget presentation to

Congress. Fully aware of the obstacles that threatened a request for foreign aid

funds centering on European needs, Marshall agreed with Acheson and ECA

Administrator William C. Foster that a high-level, full-time interdepartmental

executive group should be established to prepare a bill that would integrate the

requests for economic, military, and technical assistance. Marshall's representative was Col. George A. LincoIn.t Separate from the International Security

Affairs Committee (ISAC), the Executive Group members worked intensively,

often in conjunction with ISAC and Harriman's office, from their first meeting

on 20 March for the two-and-a-half months it took to ready the presentation

for Congress. J.j

Lincoln soon discovered that Lovett was disturbed both by the time needed

to prepare the combined foreign assistance budget for Congress and by the

Bureau of the Budget's desire to hold extensive hearings of its own. The delay,

Lovett feared, might lead to congressional confusion between the military

assistance and regular Defense appropriations requests. He also considered it

inadvisable to combine economic and military assistance totals, as Harriman

and others wanted, and preferred the figures to be shown separately for each

title. Defense did not want its military assistance funds thrown into a larger pot

from which those funds might be diverted to other uses. 15

• The Joint Chiefs based their Title I NATO recommendalions on a version (DC 28) of the NATO

Medium Term Defense Plan that did not list force requirements by countries. The total

requirement was adjusted according to a complex and ingeniousJAMAG formula, which estimated

individual country requirements to equal the planned total. weighted them according to their

importance, subtracted on-hand or funded equipment, and distributed the deficiencies. The

United States was to supply 60 percent of the total net equipment deficiencies for FY 1952-54-

24 percent to be funded in FY 1952, 24 percent in FY 1953, and 12 percent in FY 1954.

t The ECA representative was initially C. Tyler Wood and later Najeeb E. Halaby, while Col.

Charles H. Bonesteel, III, USA, represented Acheson and acted as the group's informal chairman.
418 THE TEST Of WAR

Lincoln felt that Congress would also ask questions about the program's

accomplishments, continuing requirements, probable duration, total cost,

coordination, and relationship to U.S. objectives. The Executive Group

thought it might find some answers by comparing NATO resources with the

requirements for the Medium Term Defense Plan (DC 28). Its study indicated

large deficits, but Lincoln was appalled by the unreliability of the data. Telling

Lovett and Bradley that there was no specific responsibility in the Pentagon or

elsewhere for estimating the cost of NATO plans (except force requirements)

on a unilateral u.s. basis, Lincoln urged Defense to accept the responsibility.

Meanwhile, the Executive Group study suggested that the total cost of

equipping the necessary NATO forces would be about $43 billion, and it

seemed likely that there would be a $15-20 billion production gap and a

$15-20 billion financial gap by mid-1954 if V.S. military assistance remained

as planned under NSC 68/3. Lincoln's briefing upset Bradley, who was

convinced that Congress would demand some positive results before appropriating more funds. \(,

Lincoln informed Lovett on 17 April that the Executive Group anticipated

serious opposition in the congressional hearings. For some time Defense

officials had been growing increasingly apprehensive about congressional

attitudes toward military assistance. The deficiencies of the programshortfalls in commitments, expenditures, and shipments; inadequate or

incorrect data on requirements and costs; and a general appearance of

disorganization and uncertainty-had reinforced prejudices already held by

some in Congress against the program. The sacking of General MacArthur,

following shortly after the "great debate" on troops for Europe, had created a

new national uproar, further intensifying these prejudices. It ensured also that

congressional attention would focus once again on foreign and military policy

and the administration's emphasis on Europe. The entire spring of 1951 was

a period of congressional turmoil, public confusion, and administration

apprehension. It seemed certain to Defense officials that Congress would

require hard and accurate information about the military assistance program

and specifics about costs and the duration of the program. It would not accept

generalities and platitudes. 1-

Without clear supporting evidence, Lovett believed that the FY 1952

military assistance request would be "slaughtered" by Congress. He directed

McNeil to prepare separate cost estimates for NATO and Germany, while

Marshall directed the JCS to prepare a "strategic reassessment of the Medium

Term Defense Plan." Lincoln informed SHAPE of the two ongoing efforts in

the Pentagon, as well as of a concurrent review by ECA of European financing

and production capabilities. IH

On 27 April 1951, well before completion of the OSD studies, Lovett,
George C. :--larshall, Secretary of Defense, 19'50-') 1.

Frank C. Nash, Assistant to the Secretary of

Defense for International Security Affairs,

1951-53.

Charles A. Coolidge, Assistant Secretary of

Defense (Legal and Legislative Affairs),

1951-52.

Meeting of the Joint Secretaries. Seated: Matthews, Pace, Finletter; standing: Edward T.

Dickinson, assistant to the Joint Secretaries.
Marshall addresses NATO Defense Committee, Washington, October 1950.

~Iarshall, Truman, and Acheson bid farewell to General Eisenhower on his departure for

Europe, January 1951.
LL Gen. Alfred H. Gruenrher, Chief of Staff, SHAPE, 1951-53, Supreme Allied

Commander Europe, 1953-56.

)0 l' S. F-8-i Thunderjets turned over to the Italian Air Force at Brindisi, Italy, under the

\lutual Defense Assistance Program.
Loading tank for

shipment under the

Mutual Defense

Assistance Program,

1952.

Mutual Defense Assistance Program training of Allied military personnel.
General Eisenhower meets with members of NATO Standing Group, January 1951

(.-\dmiral \"/right, Lt. Gen. Ely, Lt. Gen. Gruenther, standing, and General Bradley and Air

Chief :--Iarshal Lord Tedder).

:--Iarshall and Acheson in a lighter moment.
Truman with Bradley and Ridgway, new Supreme Allied Commander Europe, May 1952.

\Iarshall greets Jules Moch, French Minister of Defense, October 1950. French

.-\mbassador Henri Bonnet in center.
Marshall with NSRB chairman W. Stuart Symington, Assistant Secretary of Defense Anna

Rosenberg, and Leon H. Keyserling, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers.

William C. Foster, Deputy Secretary of

Defense, 1951-53.

Walter G Whitman, chairman of the

Research and Development Board,

1951-'53.
President Truman and Assistant Secretary Anna Rosenberg with members of the Defense

Advisory Committee on Women in the Services, in the White House Rose Garden, 1951.

Women directors of the services-Capt. Joy B. Hancock, USN, Col. Mary A. Hallaren,

USA, Col. Katherine A. Towle, USMC, and Col. Mary Jo Shelly, USAF.
Roben A. Lovett, Secrct:lry of Defense, 1951~53.
Eisenhower at ceremony upon retirement from Army prior to running for president, June

1952.

Churchill \·isits Loven at the Pentagon, January 1952

joint Chiefs of Staff-Collins, Vandenberg, Bradley, and Fechteler, 1952.

John D. Small, chairman of the Munitions Board, with members and staff, November

1952
Outgoing and incoming secretaries-Lovett and Charles E. Wilson with their deputies and

sen-ice secretaries, December 1952.

Lm-ett presents certificate of appreciation to K.T. Keller, Director, Office of Guided

\lissiles. Present are Bradley, Foster, and Nichols, January 1953.
First test of U.S. Army's atomic cannon, Nevada, May 1953.

Robert LeBaron, Assistant to the Secretary

of Defense (Atomic Energy), 1949-54.

U.S. Navy aircraft carrier launches Regulus

missile.
Growth of Military Assistance 419

Cabot, Foster, Harriman, and the Executive Group met with Budget Director

Lawton and other BoB personnel to consider the FY 1952 program. While

Lovett won his point that military and economic aid should be shown separately, he was surprised at the extent of the BoB challenge to more money for

military assistance. Questioning the need for any new obligational authority,

the BoB declared that if the proposed FY 1952 MDAP program passed, the

backlog of unexpended funds would reach $8 billion by 30June 1952. Lovett's

arguments-that increasing U.S. production rates of long-lead-time items

would rapidly accelerate deliveries and expenditures, while a favorable turn of

events in Korea could release equipment for military assistance deliveries-fell

on deaf ears. Lawton considered the current budget requests so questionable

that he did not want Defense to make even informal congressional contacts. ll)

BoB, furthermore, wanted to know what effect the nonexpenditure of

funds (indicating the nondelivery of military equipment) would have on NATO

defense plans and whether Defense had considered giving a higher delivery

priority to NATO. The inquiry revealed clearly that no matter how large the

appropriations for military assistance, U.S.-produced materiel generally was

drained off for the Korean battlefield or for U.S. rearmament and did not go

to military assistance recipients. Tongue in cheek, Lincoln wrote Lovett on 1

May 1951 that he gathered that "the subject of munitions allocation as

between U.S. military programs and MDAP is considered a difficult one within

the Department of Defense." The day before, in a memorandum for the

record, he mused: "When MDAP was born, the worries were over unwisdom

in expenditure of funds. Now the worry is over getting any appreciable

portion of the funds expended. ,,20

McNeil's costing study backed Lovett's position that the current lag in

military assistance expenditures did not obviate the need for FY 1952 funds.

Even allowing for increased European production, Canadian military assistance to Europe, and delivery of all U.S. military assistance programs through

FY 1952, the study revealed a 1954 NATO equipment gap ranging from a

minimum of $10.5 billion, with no provision for Germany, to a maximum of

$18.4 billion, including $4 billion for Germany. Lincoln thought McNeil's

study the best of all U.S. attempts to date to cost NATO defense plans despite

the fact that it lacked figures for Norway and Portugal, was based on already

unrealistic September 1950 prices, and did not include post-1954 maintenance costs. After adding the missing country estimates and adjusting for

inflation, Lincoln thought it "reasonably optimistic" to speak of an apparent

deficiency on the order of $15 billion, with Germany costing another $4

billion. Although the new study convinced Lincoln that the program was

manageable, Lovett wanted a field review of the figures and sent the study to

U.S. leaders in Europe and to the U.S. element in SHAPE. 21
420 THE TEST OF WAR

On 15 May Lincoln briefed the BoB on the completed costing studies, but

not until 22 May did Defense learn that BoB had held the combined FY 1952

foreign aid program to $8.5 billion, including $6.25 billion for military

assistance. 22 The president incorporated these amounts into his 24 May

request to Congress. Meanwhile, the chairman of the House Committee on

Foreign Affairs warned Lincoln that the Pentagon could expect "long and

troublesome" hearings. 2:)

TABLE 19

FY 1952 Foreign Aid Programs

(in billions)

Economic Military Total

Title I Europe ....... 51.728 55.240 56.968

Title II Middle East .... .......... 0.125 0.415 0.540

Title III Asia 0.r5 0.555 0.930

Title IV Latin America .. 0.022 0.040 0.062

52.250 56.250 58.500

The FY 1952 Appropriations

Aware of growing congressional resistance to appropriating money for

foreign assistance, Nathaniel H. Goodrich, OSD assistant general counsel, had

earlier thought it would be a good idea to "get the important committees in

the House and the Senate to go to Europe and take a look for themselves

before they considered the legislation." Goodrich later recalled that Marx

Leva liked the idea, as did others, including Eisenhower. Members of the

House committees on appropriations, armed services, and foreign affairs went

to Europe in June 1951, and in July a smaller group of senators visited France,

England, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and Germany. When the senators asked Eisenhower in Paris whether the United States was not carrying a disproportionate

load in Europe, the general answered that he had originally gone to Europe

"thoroughly convinced that America was making a great sacrifice. However,

my European friends told me: 'You provide the gun but we are providing the

man.''' In Eisenhower's eyes, Congress was dealing with matters that would

"determine the future for a good many days.,,2.

Marshall invited the touring representatives and senators to the Pentagon

for luncheon discussions upon their return from these trips, but congressional

doubts remained strong. Marshall contended that the military assistance

program would be needed even if the Korean War ended suddenly, while
Growth of Military Assistance 421

Bradley warned that any reduction in the $6.25 billion request would

seriously affect NATO by leaving some units without the necessary equipment. But some senators still thought they could reduce the request by 10

percent. Sen. Brien McMahon wrote Marshall asking whether he had considered the possible use of tactical atomic weapons to defend Europe. Marshall

assured McMahon that the capabilities and limitations of future improved

weapons were well known but that sufficient defense forces would be

required in any event to keep attackers from overrunning prepared launching

installations. With or without the new weapons, the planned FY 1952 military

assistance program fell "short of providing the total means required to do the

job," but it was precisely adapted, Marshall asserted, to a buildup that would

"in time provide the military strength to defend Europe. ,,25

Despite the efforts of Marshall and the administration, Congress reduced

the overall $8.5 billion request, finally authorizing not quite $6 billion for

military assistance. Beyond creating a new organization to coordinate and

control all foreign aid programs, • the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (PL 82-165),

signed on 10 October, contained provisions allowing the president to transfer

up to 10 percent of the funds under any title of the act to other titles and to

transfer 10 percent of all Title 1 funds between military and economic assistance. It also increased by another $300 million, thus raising to $1 billion, the

amount of excess equipment that might be supplied as military assistance. 26

To conform with the authorizing legislation, the Pentagon revised its FY

1952 appropriation request. It also asked Congress for $44.5 million to

liquidate prior years' contract authority and for reappropriation of $816.7

million in unobligated and lapsing balances from earlier appropriations.

Lovett, who testified on 8 October, urged appropriation of the full amounts,

declaring that Congress could not have given a "more thorough 'going-over' "

to any legislation. 27

Following immediately on the heels of the authorization act, the House

on 11 October appropriated almost $7 .5 billion for all foreign aid and

reappropriated, as requested, the lapsing balances from former years. The

Senate reduced the amount by about 5 percent and added $100 million for

military, economic, or technical aid to Spain, to be used at the president's

discretion. Congress voted on 20 October, and Truman signed PL 82-249, the

Mutual Security Appropriation Act of 1952, on 31 October. The bill cut the

president's request for $6.25 billion in military assistance by about 8 percent,

his request for $2.25 billion in economic aid by 36 percent. 28 But for the

persistent advocacy of the Defense establishment, it is likely that the cuts

would have been greater.

• See Chapter XIX.
422 THE TEST OF WAR

TABLE 20

FY 1952 Mutual Security Appropriations

New Obligational Authority

(in billions)

President

Budg Msg ]CS Recs

15 Jan 51 7 Feb 51

President

Request

24 May 51

Congress

Authorizd

10 Oct 51

Congress

Approvd

31 Oct 51

Military Assistance

Title 1 .......... $5.800 $6.327 $5.240 $5.028 $4.774

Title 11 .......... 0.270 0.654 0.415 0.396 0.396

Title III ....... 0.560 1.169 0.555 0.535 0.535

Title IV .... 0.080 0.040 0.038 0.038 --- Total .......... $6.630 $8.230 $6.250 $5.998 $5.744

Economic Aid [4.034) 2.250 1.486 1.440

Spain ............. 0.100

Other ... 0.292

Total MSP $10.956 $8.500 $7.483 $7.284

Note: Figures do not add in all instances because of rounding.

With the 1952 funds finally appropriated four months into the fiscal year,

Nash asked the director for mutual security for interim permission to allow

the services to begin immediate supply action. But unlike FY 1951, when

funds had been made instantly available on the basis of emergency conditions,

formal program changes were now required. On 16 January 1952 the Joint

Chiefs proposed a new division of funds, giving priority to equipping already

activated or committed forces. Of $4.2 billion scheduled to be spent for

materiel for Title I countries, they recommended amounts ranging from $2.1

billion for France to $ I 56 million for Yugoslavia. 2

,) The large allotments to

France and Indochina reflected the Joint Chiefs' concern about France's role

in NATO and the growing anxiety about the fate of Indochina. Nationalist

China also fared well, but in the Middle East no countries other than Turkey,

Greece, and Iran received aid, evidence of the disinclination of the JCS to

become further involved in that region.

At the same time the JCS took a somber view of the failure to receive the

$8.2 billion they had originally requested for FY 1952, predicting significant

delays in fulfilling the year's program objectives. They asked Lovett to oppose

especially any use of the transfer provision that would shift funds from

military to economic assistance. W

JCS anxiety was well founded. Since September 1951 Truman had been

alarmed over a mounting economic crisis in Europe. The large British defense
Growth of Military Assistance 423

effort-which reduced the production of exportable items and required large

imports of raw materials, thus generating strong inflationary pressures, a

substantial dollar deficit, and a major decline in foreign exchange-created a

loss of confidence, a flight from sterling, and the prospect of national

insolvency. If the United States wanted the British to maintain their defense

effort, economic aid in some form had to be provided. In addition, France was

experiencing many of the same troubles as a result of its Indochina burden. At

the president's request, ISAC had prepared a detailed report on Europe's

economic woes. One remedy that became a more important option when

Congress drastically reduced FY 1952 economic aid was the use of the

transfer provision. I

On 2 February 1952 Harriman asked Truman to transfer $478 million

from military to economic assistance funds-$ 300 million for the United

Kingdom, $100 million for France, and $78 million for Greece, Turkey, and

Yugoslavia. The Joint Chiefs' opposition to the transfer stemmed from

reluctance to lose any more sums from an appropriation they considered

already inadequate. They believed such a transfer would make it even more

difficult to provide equipment for NATO forces, rendering achievement of the

1954 target date for NATO rearmament improbable. After further discussion,

Bradley agreed with Lovett that the transfer was "justified from the military

point of view," since the transferred funds would enable those countries to

continue defense production and thus bring about "at least as great, and

probably a greater military defense contribution" than the sending of an

equivalent dollar amount of U.S. military equipment. Informed of Bradley's

assent, the president approved the transfer on 4 February. ~2

The transfer of almost half a billion dollars from the military assistance

program made it necessary to reprogram the remaining funds for European

countries, and the Joint Chiefs recommended doing so on a prorated service

basis. Lovett agreed to this on 1 March and also to several shifts of funds,

including an increase of $30 million for Indochina. With a new FY 1952

appropriation-even after some subtractions-a total of $11.5 billion had

been made available for military assistance ..'~

Having the money in hand did not guarantee smooth functioning of the

program. The reduction in FY 1952 funds required transfers and adjustments

in procurement and production and computation of force and equipment

plans for the individual countries. Since commitment of funds for procurement lagged badly, Congress became increasingly reluctant to appropriate

additional large sums. The Joint Chiefs and the military services found

themselves continually in a volatile situation in which most of the components of the military assistance process-money, requirements, production,

and delivery-always lagged behind schedule and were subject to frequent
424 THE TEST OF WAR

change. Such an atmosphere could not help hut leave Defense with a sense of

uncertainty about military assistance programs.

A Budget for FY 1953

In June 1951, when Marshall and Acheson advised Truman that support of

NATO would create a continuing high demand for U.S. military assistance after

FY 1952, the president authorized them to so inform Congress. By August

administration estimates of NATO and German defense costs through FY 1954

reached $72 billion, a figure considerably higher than the estimate in NSC

68/3 or considered by Lincoln for the FY 1952 budget. In the fall of 1951 ISAC

established that $18.7 billion * of the $72 billion total would be needed for

military assistance in FY 1953 and FY 1954, while another $2.1 billion would

be required to help European countries perform their share of rearmament. Of

the $20.8 billion in military aid and defense support for Europe, ISAC thought

the FY 1953 Title I program should include S14 billion for immediate letting

of contracts for long-lead-time items. 5 !

By contrast, OSD carried a one-line item of only $5 billion for all military

assistance in FY 1953, a figure that Lovett conceded was arbitrary and subject

to change but which represented all he thought Congress would grant. Truman

doubted that the public shared his own sense of urgency about military

assistance and suspected they would not support a larger amount. 5~ The Joint

Chiefs considered the $ 5 billion figure inadequate in the face of military

equipment deficiencies, which they computed as exceeding $27 billion

worldwide-more than $23 billion for Europe alone-for the fiscal years

1953 and 1954. Lovett sent the JCS deficiency requirements to Harriman for

submission to BoB, but at a BoB meeting on 11 December the $5 billion OSD

projection for military assistance won out. In the face of congressional

economy calls and the program's general unpopularity, the administration did

not push for an increase in military assistance. Moreover, BoB projected

increases in U.S. budget deficits from $6 billion at the end ofJune 1952 to $13

billion a year later and then continuing upward, possibly creating further

inflationary pressures. >,(, Such an economic condition would, of course,

threaten what Leon Keyserling at an NSC meeting called the "plush" standard

of consumption in the United States. r

* ISAC reached the military aid figure of 5 IX.7 billion by subtracting from 572 billion (I) estimates

of C.S. aid in the amount of S11 billion already budgeted, (2) Canadian aid of S I billion, and (3)

gross European expenditure estimates of 5--i 1.3 billion during 19'5 1-'5--i. These last estimates were

admittedly on the optimistic side. German rearmament requirements would possibly raise the 572

billion total to £76.X billion.
Growth of Military Assistance 425

The chances of securing congressional approval of a large military

assistance appropriation diminished further because of the continued existence of a large backlog of unexpended funds from previous appropriations

and the president's limitation at a meeting on 28 December 1951 of FY 1953

defense expenditures to $60 billion, including $8 billion for military

assistance.' Theoretically, the expenditure ceiling did not limit appropriation

requests, but in practice Congress was unlikely to appropriate new money for

military assistance if the backlog of unspent money exceeded the $8 billion

expenditure limitation. Still another factor likely to affect the FY 1953 military

assistance budget was Truman's policy of stretching out military spending and

programs over a longer period. 38

Stressing his commitment to Eisenhower, the president twice declared on

28 December that he intended to give NATO forces an equal priority with U.S.

divisions once Korean needs were met. Lovett pointed out that a lower rate of

expenditures in FY 1953 would mean less new equipment, but he thought

slippages in raising country forces would lower European requirements and

offset the shortfall. In any event, he felt, and the president agreed, that U.S.

production rates would not be the limiting factor for NATO forces. 39

The Joint Chiefs warned Lovett in January 1952 that holding the FY 1953

military assistance budget to the previous year's level would mean that the

NATO Medium Term Defense Plan could not be achieved by 1954 and would

leave materiel deficiencies of approximately $20 billion, an amount too large

to be made up in FY 1954. Nevertheless the president asked Congress for only

$7.9 billion for both economic and military assistance in FY 1953.40 This

meant, as Foster informed the JCS, that military assistance budget planning

would have to be held to a ceiling of $5.4 billion. Furthermore, after

subtraction of handling, transportation, and certain other costs, only $4.65

billion remained for the military end-item and training programs, of which $1

billion was to be allocated for offshore procurement in Europe. t41

Within Defense the restrictions on funds intensified a problem that was

larger than the simple allocation of deficits among programs. A major issue

was how the deficits would be allocated by service, especially as between the

Army and the Air Force, for the Navy program was small. The Air Force,

lagging behind the other services in efforts to attain the projected force goals

for itself and for the NATO countries, wanted what the Army and Navy

considered a disproportionate share of military assistance funds. Bradley,

Collins, and Fechteler thought the Army should get 54 percent and the Air

Force 32 percent, while Vandenberg reversed the percentages, assigning only

• See Chapter XlV.

t See Chapter XXI.
426 THE TEST OF WAR

29 percent to the Army and 57 percent to the Air Force. The Joint Chiefs even

disagreed on asking for Lovett's decision. Bradley, Collins, and Fechteler

wanted immediate approval of their program; Vandenberg thought the secretary should wait for Eisenhower's recommendations. 12

As the Army-Navy proposal would allow each service "to progress

toward the ultimate force requirements in approximately the ratio of unfilled

requirements," Nash recommended to Lovett that he accept it. On 9 February

Foster approved but said that Eisenhower's views should be taken into

account. Eisenhower recommended that FY 1953 funds be used first to equip

all forces begun under previous programs, including both combat and service

support elements. Next, he thought, money should go to equip the forces

recently agreed on at Lisbon. Any remaining Title 1 funds should be spent to

reach 19';4 NATO force goals. In effect Eisenhower seconded the Army-Navy

balanced forces concept.!5

On 6 March Truman submitted a special congressional message in support

of his $7.9 billion FY 19';3 request for the Mutual Security Program, of which

$';.42'; billion was for military aid. Asserting that the program would "yield

far larger returns, in terms of our own security, than if the same amount were

used for our own defense establishment," Truman claimed that the question

about the amount was whether it was too small. The Joint Chiefs carefully

pOinted out to Lovett that the president's budget request covered only 17

percent of the total military equipment deficiencies. H

If Truman and the Joint Chiefs viewed the FY 19';3 request for mutual

security funds as inadequate, Congress saw things differently. When Bradley

testified that $ ';.4 billion was less than the S7 billion average monthly cost of

World War II, the congressional committees were not impressed. Once again

they questioned the amount of money still unobligated and unexpended from

previous appropriations, complained of military waste, and deplored the folly

of deficit spending. Defending the bill before the House Committee on

Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Lovett

emphasized the soundness of the request and insisted there was no leeway in

the figures. The national economy could sustain the cost. and national

security demanded it. Lovett defended the services' ability to obligate and

expend funds efficiently and predicted that almost all of the military assistance funds available would be obligated by 1 July 19.,2 and that only $';."

billion of a total of $ 16.8 billion available through FY 19';.1 would still be

unexpended at the end of FY 19';3. This shortfall, he explained, was

inevitable given the time lag between letting of contracts and actual delivery

of end items. I~

Despite these arguments, the House Committee on Armed Services

reduced the FY 19'; 3 foreign aid authorization request by a billion dollars
Growth of Military Assistance 427

when it reported out a $6.9 billion bill, and the House itself reduced this to

less than $6.2 billion. The Senate, acting on its own committee's recommendation of $6.9 billion, authorized a little over $6.7 billion. A conference

committee divided the difference between the two versions to reach a

compromise authorization of $6.45 billion, an amount passed by both houses.

This included not quite $4.6 billion for military assistance, a cut of about $800

million. On 20 June Truman signed the enabling legislation (PL 82-4(0).46

The authorization allowed unexpended balances from previous appropriations to remain available for another year, provided at least $25 million for

military and economic aid to Spain, and gave the president the authority to

use as much as $ 20 million in assistance funds for any country without regard

to eligibility, up to a maximum of $100 million. \7

In considering appropriations for FY 1953, Congress made a further large

cut in funds, despite the pleas of Lovett, who testified in early June that about

$1.1 billion in military assistance funds had been obligated the previous

month, a figure based on service estimates.'1l When the amount proved to be

only $ 351 million, some congressional members charged that they had been

misled. Both Lovett and Foster were annoyed and embarrassed by this

additional demonstration of what they considered ineptitude or manipulation

by the military services. At best, it appeared that they did not have control of

the situation. Although the services made frantic efforts to commit large sums

inJune, it was too late.") Congress allowed just over $6 billion for all FY 1953

foreign assistance, including the $4.2 billion for military assistance, a cut of 22

percent from the $5.4 billion Truman originally requested and more than 7

percent below the amount authorized. Signing the bill on 15 July, the

president called the appropriation inadequate and charged that it had been

politically manipulated to give an "illusion of economy"; it actually meant

"less fire power and less air cover" for the free world. 'i0

Asking the Joint Chiefs to recommend program cuts made necessary by the

lowered appropriation, Foster suggested that they use as a basis the current

NATO Standing Group force goals subject to change during the NATO annual

review in the fall. 'i I Although theJoint Chiefs rejected the use ofthis lower force

basis rather than the accepted Lisbon goals, they split again over dividing the

Title I programs. The Air Force wanted to reduce Navy funds by $16 million

and Army funds by $222 million in order to provide I I additional fighter

squadrons. As a result, the Jes asked Lovett to decide the distribution of Title

I funds after considering the differing service views. They agreed, however, in

opposing any transfer of Title I funds from military aid to economic (defense

support) aid unless it was directly related to the production of military end

items, and they were given an opportunity to consider it further. The Joint

Chiefs also agreed on allocations for countries in Titles II, III, and IV. 'i2
428 THE TEST OF WAR

In late July Foster approved, except for Title I materiel, the JCS recommendations as guidance for the services to develop programs. Nash and his

deputy for European affairs, Najeeb Halaby, leaned toward the Air Force view.

By early August it was clear that strong differences existed, for General

Ridgway, now in Europe as SACEUR, supported the Army-Navy view. A

solution finally emerged when Nash found overestimates in handling costs

and certain other sources of funds. This permitted Foster to support the Air

Force without it appearing to be at the expense of the Army and Navy. The JCS

desire to use Lisbon force goals would be considered later. ~'>

The whole issue of NATO force goals remained in abeyance for the rest of

Truman's term. What was clear at the end of the year, as revealed in opinion

polls, was the increasing unpopularity in the United States of foreign aid,

including military assistance. The high point of congressional support for

large military assistance appropriations had passed, as work on the proposed

FY 1954 budget would soon confirm.

A Proposal for FY 1954

By July 1952 the administration had fixed on a $7.5 billion ceiling for the

entire FY 1954 Mutual Security Program, with a maximum of $5.9 billion for

the military assistance portion. Although the normal budget process was to be

followed, with the usual review of policies and programs, Lovett was to

submit by August an initial proposal that Truman might use in his State of the

Union message in January 1953 and in discussions with President-elect

Eisenhower. ~I

Because time was short and the 1952 NATO annual review would not take

place until later, the initial budget proposal was to be prepared entirely in

Washington, without field consultation. Harriman suggested that an appropriate breakdown of the $ 5.9 billion military assistance proposal would

include $4.4 billion for Europe, $360 million for the Near East, $1.12 billion

for the Far East, and 520 million for Latin America. Of the Far Eastern share,

$500 million was to be allocated to Japan if it could be absorbed; otherwise,

the $5.9 billion total was to be reduced. OSD forwarded these details to the

JCS on 11 July and suggested using MRC 12 force goals, a refinement of the

earlier NATO force goals, as the best available basis for U.S. programming of

Title 1 funds.~~ The Joint Chiefs generally agreed with Harriman's suggested

title breakdown, but they again disagreed among themselves on intcrservice

apportionment and asked Lovett for a decision. Favoring the balanced

approach to equipping NATO forces, the Army and Navy chiefs wanted to

assign only $1.125 billion to Title I air programs, while the Air Force claimed
Growth of Military Assistance 429

to need $1.625 billion to reach a proportionate force level in 1956. Despite

their continuing argument over Title I materiel, the Joint Chiefs agreed that

the $5.9 billion budget ceiling for FY 1954 could not meet the military

requirements for all areas of the program, and their recommendations were

conditional on the NATO annual review. ~()

Given the president's timetable, Foster tentatively approved the ArmyNavy position and authorized the Air Force to submit data for the extra $500

million it wanted, but he delayed making a final decision. Quickly prepared by

the military services and supported by the JCS on the basis of the MRC 12

force goals, the initial FY 1954 military assistance budget request went to

Harriman's office in August and from there to the BoB.~7 Although Defense

limited its basic request to the ceiling figure of $5.9 billion, it submitted

separate requests for more than $1.2 billion in additional money-$500

million for the Air Force, $298 million for ammunition and unit equipment

for the Army, $100 million for naval escorts and minesweepers for the Navy,

$100 million for a Middle East emergency stockpile fund, and $233 million for

the u.s. share of NATO infrastructure costs. Much of this additional program

fell into the category of possible offshore procurement. Total Defense submissions for FY 1954 funds thus amounted to approximately $7.1 billion. ~H

When Ohly sent the Pentagon's military assistance proposals to BoB on

18 November, he raised a number of questions while recommending holding

the total amount to $5.6 billion. Unhappy that the FY 1954 budget had failed

to take into account large deficiencies in the non-NATO requirements of the

British, he also considered the French situation sufficiently grave to require

Cabinet-level review. Unless the United States supported a French buildup

greater than German rearmament under NATO, he foresaw the possibility that

the French might withdraw from Indochina and scuttle the European Defense

Community treaty, thereby keeping Germany out of NATO and creating a deep

schism in Western European ranks. He supported the use of military assistance

to help the French in Indochina, regarding the war there "in many

respects . . . as crucial, and perhaps more crucial, to the free world than the

war in Korea." In general, Ohly thought that sending sophisticated weapons

to countries unable to maintain and operate them independently would

eventually make those countries dependent on U.S. aid for a long period. He

viewed the large program for the Chinese Nationalists as a mistake unless their

purely defensive mission was changed, and he believed the Japanese could not

use more than $300 million in the face of popular disapproval of

rearmament. ~<) Ohly supported the use of military assistance money for

offshore procurement, thus emphasiZing the economic aspects of military

assistance.

On 17 December Lovett learned that BoB was cutting military assistance
430 THE TEST OF WAR

to $4.2 billion, largely because of the anticipated huge amount of unspent FY

1953 funds. The bureau disallowed the Air Force's $500 million program, the

extra naval ships, Army ammunition reserves, a Spanish program, and the

Middle East stockpile. It severely cut funds for Japan and practically eliminated those for Latin America. Like Ohly. BoB viewed MRC 12 NATO force

goals as unrealistically high in the light of expected European troop shortfalls

and held that higher u.s. production rates in 1953 would make early funding

of long-lead-time items less urgent. Unlike Ohly. BoB saw no requirement for

additional offshore procurement in Europe. (,0

In the Pentagon, Ohly's letter alarmed Nash; he feared that reductions in

end-items and training would cut those programs by almost $2 billion, while

more offshore procurement would increase DoD burdens. Defense also

expressed concern about the drastic cuts in the Japanese program and Middle

East stockpile. Pessimistic after the BoB cut in December. Nash's office felt a

54.2 billion budget request for FY 1954 military assistance would undoubtedly end up as a congressional appropriation of 53.2 billion or less, an

"unacceptable" prospect. Diagnosing the FY 1954 budget problem as the

result of having set unrealistically high NATO force goals, McNeil nonetheless

agreed that the request should be kept sufficiently large to avoid its emasculation by further congressional cuts. In blunt terms, this meant a military

assistance request of at least $ 5.2 billion in order to maintain some assurance

of a $4.2 billion appropriation. 6 \

After Foster held strategy conferences with McNeil, Nash's people,

Harriman, and others, Defense presented the case for restitution to Lawton on

20 December. After a second meeting two days later, the group met with the

president. In these meetings Foster and Harriman defended a total FY 1954

military assistance budget of almost $ 5.7 billion. They sought to reinsert more

than a billion dollars for Title 1 items, including money for the special Air

Force program, ships, Army ammunition, and German and Spanish requirements. Foster argued that a $ 5.7 billion military assistance program could

support an offshore procurement program of not more than $ 1.2 billion. To

reach the $ 1. 5 billion that Harriman and Ohly wanted, another $ 350 million

would have to be added to the military assistance budget.(,2

Although OSD thought that Truman favored the BoB position, he restored

all the requested funds except for the additional $ 350 million. Defense now

expected its FY 1954 budget request for military assistance to be in the

neighborhood of $5.7 billion. On 9 January 1953, in a final annual budget

message to Congress, the president again listed a one-line, estimated FY 1954

foreign assistance budget of $7.6 billion in new obligational authority.6~ That

same day Harriman's office notified the Pentagon that it was assigning only

55.16 billion for military assistance, not including two separately listed
Growth of Military Assistance 431

programs of $120 million for Spain and $200 million for infrastructure.

Furthermore, within a Title I allotment of $3.8 billion, $1. 5 billion was to be

used for offshore procurement. OSD took issue and the argument remained

unresolved when Lovett left office on 20 January.6j It did appear, however,

that Defense had succeeded in maintaining a considerable margin of safety

against possible future congressional cuts. The issue awaited decision by

President-elect Eisenhower.

The military services, JCS, OSD, the president, and Congress occupied

ascending rungs on a ladder representing a range of decisions on military

assistance requirements and costs. Between the often "worst-case" requirements and costs stated by the military and the known disposition of Congress

to cut requested funds, OSD and the president had to find a formula that

would bridge the gap. This was especially difficult for the secretary of

defense, who had to defend military requests before the BoB and the president

and impose the latter's budget decisions on the military.

Marshall and Lovett frequently found themselves forced to make hard

choices between competing demands for money and materiel. Pressured by

the Joint Chiefs and the services from one side to meet the requirements of the

U.S. military establishment first, and by Harriman and the mutual security

people from the other side to speed up and increase foreign military

assistance, they had to find ways of apportioning scarce resources equitably.

On occasion, they overruled or modified JCS positions; on other occasions

they opposed the demands of Harriman and his staff. It was a thankless task,

earning them criticism from all sides, including Congress and the public.

Under the circumstances, it was impossible to satisfy everybody, for it was a

case of attempting too much with too little.

Experience during World War II and in the State Department during

1947-49 had given Marshall and Lovett an informed perspective of the

international scene that predisposed them to favor collective security. Only a

decade earlier Marshall, then U.S. Army chief of staff, had acqUiesced in the

transfer of scarce Army weapons and equipment to Britain, not without

misgivings, because he accepted the overriding necessity of keeping Britain in

the war against Germany in order to give the United States time to arm. Both

men had supported U.S. lend-lease, which from 1941 on had armed many of

the nations of the world in the struggle against Germany and Japan. In

1950-51 Marshall and Lovett fully understood the logic of arming allies and

friends against the possibility of Soviet aggression in Europe and elsewhere.

Their support of military assistance was thus wholehearted, tempered only by

the more urgent demands of the Korean War and other high-priority U.S.

programs.

The Korean War reversed the emphasis of U.S. foreign assistance, which
432 THE TEST OF WAR

earlier had been more heavily weighted toward economic than military aid.

Whereas the military assistance appropriation for FY 1950 ($1.3 billion) was

about one-third the size of that for economic aid, in the three following years

military assistance appropriations totaled about $15 billion as against $6

billion for economic aid. This trend continued only briefly after the Truman

administration left office, and nonmilitary aid soon reached parity or better.()~

The sudden influx of dollars for military assistance during 1951-53, however,

represented an additional and complicating factor at a time when the

Department of Defense also had to cope with the difficulties of equipping

troops for the war in Korea and rearming U.S. troops generally. These

circumstances, in turn, created major problems in implementing the military

assistance programs and translating appropriated dollars into equipment in the

hands of allies.
CHAPTER XXI

Implementing Military Assistance

The rapid and enormous increases in military assistance programs and

appropriations after the start of the Korean War compounded existing

problems and created new ones for the secretaries of defense. Since U.S.

mobilization began in earnest only in December 1950, production and

delivery of military equipment lagged far behind schedule during most of the

rest of the war. Moreover, the military services frequently and legally mixed

military assistance funds with regular military funds in procurement programs, thus creating additional problems in allocation of finished items. Much

concerned with the needs of the Korean battlefield and U.S. rearmament, the

services consistently accorded themselves priority over military assistance in

allocating new equipment. This practice was difficult to condemn, for the

demands of battle exercised a powerful compelling influence. The State

Department and later the Office of the Director for Mutual Security, more

responsive than the services to the needs of recipient countries, particularly in

Europe, frequently exerted pressure to speed up military assistance deliveries.

The secretaries of defense thus found themselves caught between strong and

conflicting demands.

Statutory delegations of authority over military assistance matters to

other departments and agencies circumscribed the role of the secretaries of

defense in their oversight of the program within DoD. The State Department,

the Office of the Director for Mutual Security, and the military services all had

powerful voices in the making of policy and the operation of the program.

Often lacking the power of final resolution, Marshall and Lovett had to

negotiate and seek consensus in military assistance matters, frequently resorting to exhortation, particularly with the services, on such matters as the

obligation and expenditure of funds and deliveries of materiel. Operating

under volatile conditions and requirements, the secretaries of defense found

433
434 THE TEST Of WAR

it impossible to meet the demands of foreign recipients and the ambitious

goals set for the u.s. programs and consequently suffered the blame and

harassments evoked by these failures.

Operations through June 1951

Altbough the original FY 1950 appropriation became law in October

1949, it was late January 1950 before the NATO countries signed the necessary

bilateral agreements and Truman approved NATO's concept of an integrated

defense, thus releasing the major part of Title I funds. But before the money

could become available to the Department of Defense, it had to obtain

approval for its detailed programs from the Foreign Military Assistance

Coordinating Committee (FMACC). Consequently, most FY 1950 money

became available for obligation only when the fiscal year was almost over. By

30 June 1950 DoD reported that of the $ 1. 3 billion FY 1950 appropriation, it

had initiated supply action on approximately $478 million in materiel

programs* and that it had shipped to port about $68 million in equipment,

including excess stocks. Referring to FY 1950 deliveries in terms of measurement tonst rather than dollar cost, General Lemnitzer reported to a Senate

committee that by the end ofJuly 1950 the Title I countries of Europe had

received over 95,000 tons of equipment plus 170 aircraft and 2 destroyer

escort vessels; Greece and Turkey in Title II, almost 93,000 tons; and Iran,

Korea, the Philippines, and countries in Southeast Asia, almost 12,000 tons

and 58 aircraft. All told, deliveries amounted to 200,000 measurement tons

plus aircraft and naval vessels. I

Despite a brave public face, Lemnitzer privately became seriously concerned over the rate of deliveries once the Korean combat began, and he urged

Secretary Johnson to speed up shipments. On 10 July Johnson emphasized to

the secretaries of the military departments the need to accelerate MDAP

deliveries, reminding them that they had received most of their FY 1950

MDAP funds and could also use some of the still-unappropriated funds in the

regular $1.2 billion FY 1951 request. 2 Army Secretary Pace did not see how

the Army could possibly meet the new Korean requirements and simultaneously supply MDAP equipment. Although Korea was an MDAP country, the

Army had suspended MDAP shipments and was supporting the campaign

there through regular service shipments that did not count as MDAP deliveries. Korea's priority under current conditions constituted only a temporary

* On 2 August 19';0 Lemnitzl'f claimed that Defense had ohligated more than S9';O million hy "0

June 19';0; Defense latl'f reported having ohligated more than S I hillion hy that date

t A measurement ton is usualh' reckoned at -jO cuhic feet for cargo freight.
Implementing Military Assistance 435

deviatiOn, the Armed Forces PoliCY Council decided, from the principle that

the services had to meet both their regular and MDAP commitments. 5

In August Pace admitted that the Army's performance had not been as good

as he wished or intended to make it, but he pointed out to Johnson that

substantial MDAP deliveries under the FY 1950 program could not be expected

until late in the calendar year. Even repair of Army excess items took six to nine

months because ofslowdowns in delivery of spare parts." Late and inadequate

military assistance deliveries, as Lemnitzer reported to Johnson earlier, occurred because current and expected production rates of U.S. industry could

not satisfy the triple requirements of Korean operations, u.S. rearmament, and

military assistance. The primacy of Korean needs was incontestable, and except

in special cases where theJCS intervened, the services met MDAP requirements

only after meeting U.S. operational, training, and reserve requirements. Acting

on a suggestion from Lemnitzer, Johnson asked the JCS to establish a general

supply priority for MDAP equipment and to set up the machinery and procedures for allocating critical items in short supply.

Reviewing the priorities problem, the Joint Chiefs asserted that theirJoint

Munitions Allocation Committee should handle the matter and agreed to add

Lemnitzer as a nonvoting advisory member. In October they assigned first

priority to operations in Korea, followed by otherJCS-determined operational

requirements and minimum U.S. national security requirements. Military

assistance deliveries received second priority, with NATO countries taking

preference. The JCS recognized, however, that political and foreign policy

considerations might override the strict application of their priority system,

which Secretary Marshall approved on 7 November. 6

Two special cases had already arisen. On 14 September the Joint Chiefs

concluded that Formosa's supply priority should be "above all military

assistance programs other than those in direct support of operations in

Korea," and a month later they recommended the same priority for equipment

going to the French in Indochina. On 29 December the JCS recommended

placing Indochina at the very top of priority two and including Formosa with

the NATO countries. Still, all MDAP shipments remained in priority two.!

The Army had additional problems. In September 1950 Pace informed

Johnson that price increases were forcing cuts in MDAP procurement,

including spare parts needed for equipment already overseas, and that he

would have to use FY 1951 MDAP money to cover the deficit. He was assured

of assistance when the need arose. H At the same time, regular Army requirements outran the appropriations, and Lemnitzer, at the suggestion of John

Ohly, then MDAP deputy director, asked the FMACC about a temporary "loan"

of available MDAP funds to get regular Army procurement started. Believing

that the loan would speed up the letting of contracts and thus help expand the
436 THE TEST Of WAR

u.s. industrial base and produce quicker military assistance deliveries in the

long run, Ohly suggested that State immediately make available to the

Pentagon MDAP funds already tentatively earmarked for the Army MDAP

program plus an additional $1.2 billion of FY 1951 MDAP funds. Since the

Army would use the money mainly for interchangeable items, it could repay

the military assistance program later with Army-funded items or, for items not

common to both programs, by transferring regular funds received later.')

On 28 September, after approval by the president, Marshall authorized

Pace to go ahead. 10 This allocation, plus another of more than $800 million

for medium and light tanks, gave the Army authority to use almost $2 billion

in FY 1951 MDAP funds for its own needs only a few days after submission of

the official Defense request. Lemnitzer thought the speed with which the

money became available would "permanently silence the critics of the present

MDAP organization." This prediction proved inaccurate, but the agreement

demonstrated the ability of State and Defense to cut through red tape in time

of need. The Air Force received a similar advance somewhat later. 1 I

Absorbed in Korean War matters, it was 8 December before the Joint

Chiefs recommended to Marshall that most of the $4 billion supplemental

MDAP FY 1951 funds be used for materiel. • They also warned that deliveries

of MDAP materiel would be slow-the Korean War had already absorbed

available equipment and further deliveries would have to come from new

production subject to long lead times. 12

Of the $5.2 billion appropriated for MDAP in FY 1951, approximately

$5.0 billion became available to Defense by the end of the fiscal year on 30

June 1951. Of this amount, DoD had obligated $4.4 billion but spent only

$896 million. Adding FY 1950 and FY 1951 funds together for a total of more

than $6.5 billion, Defense had received for use $6.2 billion, of which it had

placed contracts for over 88 percent ($5.5 billion) but spent only 15 percent

($946 million). 15 Reporting to Senate committees on 27 July, Marshall did not

emphasize dollar amounts but stressed the 1.6 million measurement tons that

had been sent abroad-including more than 4,500 tanks and combat vehicles,

2,900 major artillery pieces, and 19,000 general purpose vehicles-plus 900

aircraft and more than 190 naval vessels and small craft. Marshall indicated

that these deliveries, which included excess equipment, had completed about

• In Title I the JCS recommended that France receiye the largest grant-S 1.184 million-while

5420 million was to go to the United Kingdom, 5,78 million to Belgium and Luxembourg, $,24

million to the Netherlands. 524'" million to Italy, 5,,; million to Denmark, Norway, and Portugal.

and 5200 million was to start a stockpile for a possible West C;erman army. They allowed 5400

million for additional military production and S I 0 million for administration. In Title II the JCS

recommended 596 million for Greece. 58, million for Turkey. and SI; million for Iran. They did

not diyide 5270 million in Title III assistance at that time Training for all countries came to 51;

million, and there was 52, million for eontingencies.
Implementing Military Assistance 437

80 percent of the FY 1950 program and had made a good start on the FY 1951

program. He expected Defense to complete FY 1950 deliveries by the end of

December 1951 and the FY 1951 program, with the exception of some

long-lead-time items, by the end of December 1952. 14

The Quest for Deliveries in FY 1952

By the end of December 1951 the receipt of new FY 1952 appropriations

of more than $ 5.7 billion swelled the cumulative funds for military assistance

to almost $12.3 billion, less adjustments of about $800 million, for a total of

about $11.5 billion. At this halfway point in the fiscal year, State had allocated

to Defense $9.6 billion, of which the services had obligated 71 percent ($6.9

billion) but had spent less than 19 percent ($1.8 billion). (See TABLE 21.) Only

$1.6 billion in end items, induding excess stocks, had been shipped. Obviously, completed country deliveries did not even begin to fulfill the programs

for fiscal years 1950 and 1951, let alone FY 1952. IS

In February 1952 Ohly informed Nash of his concern about the Pentagon's "extremely low obligation rate." Fearing that failure to obligate all FY

1952 funds might lead Congress to cut the FY 1953 budget request, Nash

asked for a speedup in the allocation of funds to Defense and assured Ohly that

the services expected to obligate large amounts in relatively few contract

awards. Complaining about frequent program adjustments, Nash wrote that

each one involved "re-examination of program procurement plans in every

item affected and a recommencing of the entire process of procurement

negotiation on the eve of anticipated date of award." Nash saw another

potential problem in the large amount of money earmarked for overseas

procurement, where it might take longer to negotiate contracts, and even then

items might eventually have to be reprogrammed for U.S. procurement. 16

Although Nash defended the services against outside criticism of their

performance, Lovett took up the matter with the secretaries of the military

departments in March, asking them to correct a performance "below what it

should be." Relying on service assurances, Lovett informed the Senate

Committee on Foreign Relations on 19 March that except for $300-400 million

DoD would obligate all military assistance funds by the end ofJune 1952. 17

For March, the services reported obligations of almost $1.2 billion, the largest

to date. IX During April Lovett continued to exhort the secretaries in personal

conversations and at AFPC meetings, but Nash's staff remained dubious about

reaching the June goal. I') April obligations for the three services totaled an

incredibly low $ 3.1 million. Exasperated, Lovett warned Finletter that the Air

Force could not continue to operate on the premise that military assistance
438 THE TEST OF WAR

"was established and is continuing primarily to extend the capabilities of the

u.s. Armed Forces." During May the services obligated only $351 million, but

in June they reported an astounding $2 billion. 20

By the end of June 1952 a considerable statistical improvement had

occurred. Of the $11.5 billion three-year cumulative total, $11.4 billion had

been allocated to Defense, of which $11.05 billion (97 percent) had been

obligated. Ostensibly, the services had achieved a major victory since they had

placed about $5.6 billion under obligation during FY 1952, but only the most

liberal interpretation of obligations by the services made the June figure

possible. Although Nash appeared relieved and gratified, Harriman's office

was wary, and Ohly later termed the June obligational record a "spectacular

triumph in the area of legerdemain" by the services rather than a meeting of

all legal contractual requirements. It is unknown to what extent deobligations

subsequently occurred, but they may have been considerable since monthly

obligations averaged only $67 million for the ensuing five months, whereas

those for the first five months of 1952 had averaged about $437 million. 21

Whatever the success in obligating FY 1952 funds, cumulative equipment

deliveries-based on total three-year expenditures of slightly more than $3.2

billion, or about 28 percent of appropriated and allocated funds-fell well

below u.s. and foreign expectations. For the rest of Lovett's term, deliveries

remained the central deficiency in the military assistance program. A year

earlier, in July 1951, the JCS had recommended that the secretary take urgent

measures to accelerate deliveries. But when Marshall asked in late August

about giving the military assistance program a higher priority rating, the Joint

Chiefs declined. and in October reaffirmed it as a secondary priority. To

produce more materiel for military assistance, they suggested expansion of

u.s. production and increased offshore procurement. 22 At the president's

request, Lovett took no action on these suggestions. When Acheson pointed

out at an NSC meeting on 17 October that military assistance deliveries lagged

far behind schedule, Lovett stated that there were no more excess U.s. stocks

to send, that it would take time to get new production, and that, furthermore,

the European countries were not complaining. On 23 October Lovett sent the

president a review of the delivery problem. 2,-\

Already aware of the problem, the president verbally instructed 000

officials during a visit by Eisenhower to Washington in November 1951 to see

that NATO's equipment needs were met. When the NATO Temporary Council

Committee recommended in early December that NATO establish its own

system of priorities for MDAP end items, the Cnited States agreed, since it

would help in relating MDAP deliveries to country military capabilities.

SHAPE subsequently prepared priorities for army and air force units, and in

time SACI_ANT prepared a naval priority list. 2 I
Implementing Military Assistance 439

At a Cabinet meeting on 21 December Truman expressed impatience at

the failure to get military equipment into the hands of U.S. allies. He asked for

special attention to Western European defense and reiterated that Eisenhower

was to have the same priority as U.S. divisions for equipment except for the

overriding priority for Korea. The president pointedly remarked that the

military services were "contracting for MDAP but taking the end items for

themselves, if it suited them." Lovett considered the remark unfair but

promised to do all possible to meet the targets; by April 1952 he had come to

the same conclusion as the president. For the present, he informed the

services of Truman's view that "those who would have to fight first should get

equipment first." On 9 January 1952 Truman put his oral directive into

writing. Materiel in current inventories or produced in 1952 was to be

available for military assistance subject only to the needs of Korea or other

JCS-determined active combat areas and to the limits of appropriated funds.

The president directed Lovett and Harriman to work out the details of a new

allocation policy. 25

High expectations in recipient countries and implied U.S. promises,

particularly in NATO, also aggravated delivery problems. The Temporary

Council Committee had estimated that it would require U.S. expenditures of

$9.8 billion for Europe alone during FY 1952 and FY 1953 to provide

sufficient military assistance deliveries to achieve the force goals later approved at the NATO Lisbon meeting in February 1952. Worldwide, the

requirement was for a two-year MDAP expenditure of $12 billion, $3 billion

each six months, more than tripling the expenditures of the July-December

1951 period. 2() On 21 January 1952 Truman projected expenditures of $4

billion in FY 1952 and $8 billion in FY 1953. At the time, foreign aid experts

considered $4 billion "unduly optimistic" for FY 1952; they saw $3.2 billion

or $3.3 billion as closer to the mark. 27

Whether the expenditure of $4 billion was absolutely necessary in FY

1952 was not altogether clear. When Nash's staff could not determine if all the

needed U.S. equipment could be supplied for the TCC-planned 1952 NATO

units, he asked what effect delivery arrears had thus far had on NATO growth.

At the end of February 1952 a JAMAG study indicated there had been no

delays in activating NATO units up to December 1951 but that it was becoming

increasingly difficult to achieve satisfactory combat readiness. At the start of

1952 European NATO countries had the equivalent of 441!~ divisions in

existence, but only 11 were reasonably combat effective, while 13 suffered to

some degree from lack of equipment. JAMACi thought future delivery failures

would have an increasingly adverse effect. 2M

By March 1952 Lovett realized that both Truman's $4 billion expenditure

figure and the $.1. 2 billion one were unrealistic. Using new service estimates
440 THE TEST OF WAR

in congressional testimony, Lovett lowered. the expected FY 1952 MDAP

expenditures figure to $2.7 billion. Harriman's staff considered this lower

figure a "tremendous blow" since it fell short of target figures already below

what they deemed necessary for the planned forces in Europe. By April

Lovett's S2.7 billion figure itself appeared unrealizable, and $2.3 billion

seemed more likely. Noting that expenditures had not varied much from

November 1951 to April 1952, Harriman's office concluded that Defense had

failed to take "vigorous steps to carry out the President's directives. ,,2'.1

Aware of the growing criticism from Harriman's office, Lovett exhorted

the services at AFPC meetings, by directives, and through his Office of Military

Assistance to speed up expenditures and deliveries. ,0 Nevertheless, at the end

of April 1952, with but two months left in the fiscal year, the services still

needed to expend another $ 1 billion to keep Lovett's S2.7 billion promise for

FY 1952. Since newly allocated equipment items took from 45 to 60 days to

go through the delivery system under the most favorable conditions, Defense

would have to effect immediate shipment and then instantly process the

documents to meet the deadline.' I On 1 May Lovett again asked the service

secretaries to hasten expenditures and outlined several possible actions. As a

final option he suggested that the services might include as expenditures

finished materiel waiting in depots for shipment to port whenever port

storage or shipping space became available. This would create additional

outlays and thus help to make a better statistical showing. 52

Even with such exceptional measures. total MDAP expenditures for FY

1952 amounted to slightly under 52.3 billion. Though this figure far exceeded

the total of $946 million spent before FY 19S2. it did not spare Defense from

severe criticism, since the Pentagon still had $8.2 billion left in appropriated

and allocated funds before receiving FY 19S3 money..'5 FY 1952 outlays of

less than $2.3 billion also meant that the next year's expenditures would have

to be at the extraordinary level of 59.7 billion to reach Truman's promise of

$12 billion in expenditures for the two years. At the same time, Defense

estimates of probable FY 1953 spending were falling, not rising. Although

Lovett in March 1952 had projected to Congress a $7.7 billion MDAP

expenditure level for FY 19S3, Defense officials spoke in terms of 56 billion

by April and of $ S billion by August. 5. Within weeks, the estimates sank to

$3.7 billion, and even this came under question after the president's decision

in October to augment South Korean forces..'~

The problem did not appear to have an easy solution. Military assistance

users had little chance of obtaining U.S.-produced materiel in competition

with higher priority claimants. The Air Force had diverted military assistance

aircraft to Korea and the Air Training Command, and the Army had suspended

all military assistance shipments of mortar and artillary ammunition except to
Implementing Military Assistance 44 I

Indochina. Searching the records of the Army Allocations Committee, Nash

verified the insufficiency of equipment to meet requirements, and in August

1952 he told Lovett that U. S. industrial output could not satisfy military

requirements..-\('

Nash's worries increased when he discovered that the value of actual

MDAP shipments fell well below the expenditures rate, and on 26 August he

asked McNeil to investigate. The comptroller's office reported that the higher

expenditure figure resulted mainly from advance and progress payments on

contracts, but the situation was extremely complicated. In some cases,

indeed, expenditures had not even been recorded. -\7 Whatever the reasons,

the low rate of MDAP expenditures in FY 1952 and the slower rate of

deliveries projected for FY 1953 placed Defense in an embarrassing predicament. Closely watching the disappointing trend of deliveries, Harriman had

urged Lovett and Foster in July 1952 to seek remedies. One of his own

correctives called for higher priorities for military assistance equipment,

particular!y for Europe. 5M

Battles over Priority

The competItion for military equipment among a large number of

powerful claimants focused greater attention on the establishment of priorities for allocation of U.S. munitions production. With Harriman arguing the

case for larger and speedier military assistance shipments to the NATO

countries and exerting pressure on Defense to make a better showing, the

machinery and methods for making allocations came increasingly into question. The JCS and the military services, occupying a central position in the

process, were reluctant to accept changes that might diminish their dominant

role in setting priorities, allocating equipment, and according delivery preference to U.S. units over military assistance recipients.

When Truman in January 1952 directed Lovett and Harriman to work out

an allocation policy to provide adequate equipment for the NATO forces that

would fight first in the event of war, Lovett immediately asked the services to

carry out the president's directive. The Navy, with a relatively low MDAP

commitment, reponed that it could comply without materially affecting its

own goals. Pace expected the Army to fill Eisenhower's needs by the end of

1952 except for electronics equipment, combat vehicles, and ammunition,

but he feared that the new policy might affect the planned activation of the

Army's own forces and its ability to respond in case of global war. Finletter

told Lovett that the Air Force had integrated military assistance into its priority

system, thus placing NATO requirements on a par with USAF direct contribu-
442 THE TEST Of WAR

tion units. What caught Lovett's eye. however, was that the Air Force also

planned to accord its strategic and air defense forces priority over NATO and

other military assistance requirements, justifying its action as "fully in

consonance" with the president's directive to equip first those who would

fight first. w

Lovett felt uneasy about the effect of the president's directive, particularly if European countries did not clearly understand the overriding priority

to be given to Korea and other combat areas. Nash wrote Harriman to this

effect in early February, and Lovett planned to explain the caveat at the Lisbon

meeting later that month.'o To Harriman's request for detailed delivery

information on a monthly basis. Lovett replied that the figures were not

available and that quarterly reports would have to suffice. He thought use of

monthly figures in NATO would be counterproductive and advocated a "broad

brush treatment" when discussing future equipment deliveries. 'I

Determined that there be no misunderstanding about C.S. intent to

maintain control over U.S. resources. Lovett asked the Joint Chiefs for their

proposal for putting a NATO priority system into effect. Such a system, he

thought, should at least ensure that equipment went only to units in being and

with sufficient manning and training to warrant deliveries. Agreeing with the

secretary, the Joint Chiefs spelled out their criteria and reminded Lovett that

NATO commanders and the Standing Group could only make "recommendations concerning the relative priority needs of the major NATO commands. ".2

In March the Joint Chiefs presented Lovett with a new priority policy to

meet the president's January directive. They gave top preference to UN and

u.s. forces engaged in Korean operations or in other ./CS-determined active

combat areas, currently Indochina. Second priority included all U.S., NATO,

and German forces scheduled for D-Day operations in NATO areas; strategic

air warfare operations; air defense and antiaircraft defense of the United States

and Canada; and minimum support and training requirements for those

forces. Third priority went to all other C.S., NATO. and German forces for

deployment in or embarkation to operational areas by D + )0 days. including

service support; approved increments of Japanese defense forces; and high

priority requirements for Austria, Yugoslavia. Formosa, and Spain. Three

lower priorities accounted for all other claimants. The Joint Chiefs specified

that no equipment was to be furnished any foreign country at a rate greater

than it could be profitably utilized, and they acknowledged the need for

tlexibility in operating the priorities system. ','

Approving with only minor changes both the JCS criteria for NATO

priority recommendations and their priority categories. Deputy Secretary

Foster forwarded them to Harriman on ) I March. •I Harriman. who wanted to

speed up military assistance shipments to :\IATO. immediately raised questions
Implementing Military Assistance 443

about relative priorities of U.S. and NATO forces, seeking justification for the

preference accorded certain U.S. forces. Still, he felt that the JCS recommendations represented real progress and asked for Lovett's earliest comments so

that they could prepare a priorities statement for Truman.'~

When Lovett sent Harriman's questions to the Joint Chiefs, they reminded

the secretary that they had intended their recommendations as general policy

guidance. Holding to their original categories, the JCS defended the high

priority for certain U.S. forces not assigned to Europe or NATO as essential to

u.s. and NATO security and consistent with equipping first those who would

fight first. They agreed, however, that U.S. air defense and antiaircraft defense

forces in the second priority should be limited to those units scheduled to

operate at the outbreak of hostilities. Minimum training requirements were to

be included in the same priority band as the force they supported. Lovett

replied to Harriman along these lines on 21 May. et(,

When Harriman continued to question priorities for some categories of

D-Day to D + 30 forces, Lovett supported the Joint Chiefs in their refusal to

consider changes. Still unconvinced, Harriman reluctantly agreed on a report

to the president. Finally, on 11 October, more than nine months after

Truman's original request, Harriman and Lovett signed a letter that generally

adhered to the JCS views.'-

Despite the delay, completion of a u.s. system of military priorities

proved timely since SACEUR and SACLANT priority lists were of little value.

Nash found that they made little distinction among competitive claims and

placed most units in the top priority band. Since Harriman's staff and the State

Department shared this view, the JCS priorities system remained the major

basis for allocating military assistance end items. 'H

Earlier, Lovett and Foster had decided to examine the Pentagon machinery for allocating new weapons production. In the fall of 1951 Nash had asked

his predecessor, General Burns, to come back from retirement to examine the

Pentagon's procedures. Nash endorsed Burns's recommendation that a highlevel committee he established for that purpose, but General McNarney

opposed the proposal as unnecessary. In August 1952 Lovett definitely

decided against bringing in a high-level official to deal with allocation but still

pondered whether to establish a council in his office.''!

The creation of a high-level OSD group to review military priorities and

allocations had much appeal. Not only did Lovett want OSD staff members to

have a more direct connection with the process, but an OSD council would

provide an appropriate forum for Harriman's participation without letting

him get into the real process of deciding specific deliveries. ~() Despite the JCS

position that lagging deliveries resulted from lagging production rather than

failure of the priorities or allocations machinery, Lovett established on 4
444 THE TEST Of WAR

Octoher a Munitions Allocation Council to advise and assist him in discharging his statutory duty to set "priorities in the procurement, delivery and

allocation of military equipment."~l Chaired hy Foster, the seven-memher

civilian council included Nash, McNeil, Munitions Board Chairman Small, and

the service under secretaries, with a standing invitation to Harriman, who

attended the first meeting on 14 Octoher. At this session Nash explained that

the council would not change current Defense allocation practices hut instead

would deal with hroad policy questions.~2

Although the Munitions Allocation Council came into heing hecause of

repeated complaints ahout deliveries, it actually provided little more than a

forum for discussion of issues. After a few meetings, Harriman was disenchanted. When military assistance expenditures for the first six months of FY

1953 Ouly-December 1952) reached only 51.6 hillion-a yearly rate of 53.2

billion-Harriman prepared a long memorandum in January 1953 for the next

secretary of defense. He recommended reorganization of the council with a

strong staff and a high-level director empowered to take action and with

review hy the director for mutual security of staff work prior to meetings. This

document, signed at the end of hoth his and Lovett's term in office, reflected

Harriman's deep disappointment at the slowness of military assistance

deliveries. ~,

Offshore Procurement

Continuing difficulties in delivery of sufficient U.S.-produced items to

military assistance recipients persuaded Harriman's office to make strenuous

efforts to procure large amounts of military goods ahroad. Normally, l!.S.

forces stationed abroad engaged in some local procurement, mainly for

perishable items. The practice was expanded to include hardware items in the

United Kingdom following talks between Truman and Churchill in January

1952 and as a result of an agreement between Lovett and Ismay at Lisbon in

February. But all these programs utilized regular Defense appropriations

rather than military assistance funds. Prior to mid-1951, little direct contracting with European suppliers for military assistance items occurred, although

neither the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 nor the Mutual Security Act

of 1951 contained preclusive .. Buy American" provisions. By mid-195 1,

however, an offshore procurement program (OSP) for military assistance

seemed to promise not only faster deliveries of materiel, lower transportation

costs, a larger NATO production hase, and a lessening of demands on U.S.

plants, hut also a means of increasing European countries' dollar credits and

solving some of their economic and financial problems. Some American
Implementing Military Assistance 445

planners apparently came to the view that offshore procurement would

"prime the pump" in Europe and eventually decrease the need for U.S.

military assistance. ~4

In July 1951 the European Coordinating Committee recommended

spending up to $2 billion of FY 1952 military assistance funds in European

plants. Subsequently the International Security Affairs Committee in Washington planned for increasing use of offshore procurement. ~~ In August Lovett

directed the military services to begin planning for offshore procurement of

ammunition, spare parts, aircraft, and other items; two months later ISAC

approved a tentative FY 1952 program for $516 million. At Lisbon in February

1952, the United States agreed to give France $500 million in economic and

military aid in FY 1952, earmarking $200 million for offshore procurement of

military itemsY'

In February Lovett appointed the Army as executive agent for an initial

Defense offshore procurement program that by then amounted to approximately $618 million. AJoint Coordinating Board, with all services participating under the Army's chairmanship, prepared the way for offshore procurement in Europe. Draper's office provided the board's secretariat, which

coordinated efforts to avoid conflicts with U.S. economic goals for the

recipient country. ~~

Implementing the program proved immensely complex. Special offshore

procurement agreements had to be reached before contracts could be let, and

decisions had to be made on whether to let contracts directly with foreign

firms or through foreign governments.~H Many European producers needed

help in getting machine tools, dies, drawings, and other equipment for

production lines; Harriman's permission had to be obtained to include such

costs in the program. Pricing problems arose because U.S. law allowed a rate

only 10 percent higher than the American price, even though the latter might

not be truly comparable. ~') European firms objected strongly to the standard

renegotiation clause in U.S. contracts, and a blanket exemption had to be

worked out with the u.s. Renegotiation Board.('() Arrangements had to be

made for the method and currency of financing and payment, and in some

cases preproduction loans had to be concluded. 61 Foreign taxes were also a

problem; Lovett's decision that no military assistance funds should be used to

pay such taxes resulted in long negotiations with foreign countries. 62 As Nash

informed Lovett in April 1952, it had required seven months to arrive at a

"position where contracting officers were free to devote their full attention to

the technical aspects of contract placement." Despite congressional impatience, however, he urged Lovett to maintain an "orderly method of doing

business offshore" in order to protect against waste and fraud 65

The military services generally preferred to keep contracts within the
446 THE TEST OF WAR

United States, where they were closely meshed with regular procurement

contracts and administration was easier. Domestic production also permitted

greater security against intelligence leaks or sabotage and better control over

production lines. Offshore procurement diverted funds from U.S. plants and

to some extent affected both the steady growth of production and the ability

of plants to expand in event of need for full mobilization. In March 1952

Under Secretary of the Air Force Gilpatric protested to Lovett that any further

diversion of military assistance funds from U.S. aircraft production to offshore

procurement in FY 1952 or FY 1953 would adversely affect both regular and

military assistance programs from January 1953 through 1955. Some officials

speculated that the Army was so anxious to keep its production lines moving

with military assistance funds that it might stall offshore procurement

indefinitely.(" With contracts let by mid-April for only S34 million of an

approved program of $618 million in offshore procurement, the Munitions

Board wondered whether the services were just ineffective or refusing to

"carry through with the spirit of top level policy." By the end ofJune 1952,

however, OSD reported that a total of $443 million in OSP contracts had been

placed under the FY 1952 MDAP program, plus S177 million under the

French Lisbon program.' Six months later, the FY 1952 program total had

reached $639 million(''i

Meanwhile, in reaction to plans to increase the offshore procurement

program to S1 billion in FY 1953, both OSD and the military services felt that

an offshore level of $600 million to $700 million would be quite sufficient. In

October 1952, however, Harriman and Draper told Defense officials that this

amount fell below the minimum needed to keep the European NATO countries

going. Harriman directed Defense to place more than $1.2 billion in MDAP

contracts with European plants during FY 19';3.(,('

The French in particular needed a larger offshore procurement program

to help defray the costs of their share of NATO forces and infrastructure.

Disappointed at the low level of u.s. support and confronted by inflation,

soaring costs for Indochina, and an overwhelming 1,400 billion franc budget,

the French felt they would have to cut their NATO military production unless

they received more help. In March 1952 Pleven asked the United States to

purchase tanks, armored cars, radar equipment, naval vessels, and aircraft

through offshore procurement('~

In the Pentagon, Lovett's special assistant, William Pawley, wrote the

secretary that he doubted the near-collapse of French heavy industry and

suggested that possible offshore procurement of items on the Pleven list

• The larger sum included S155.) million for france, 565.) million for the l!nited Kingdom. and

S1)8. 7 million for Italy.
Implementing Military Assistance 447

should form the basis of a quid pro quo for use in future negotiations.

However, after Acheson informed the French that the United States would

make every effort to provide offshore procurement to maintain the

"maximum output of items most needed for Indochina and NATO," Lovett

expressed doubt that there were many "quids" left. 68 In May, when the French

provided a new, $623 million list of items they planned to cancel unless the

United States assumed the contracts, U.S. military and economic representatives in France reduced the list to $ 24 3 million and then Washington pared it

to $186 million. 69

Visiting Washington in June, French Minister of State Jean Letourneau

pushed for more than $500 million in U.S. economic and military support for

FY 1953. The United States informally agreed to make an additional allotment

of $ 150 million in FY 1953 military aid for Indochina. DoD wanted to include

this amount in the $500 million program, but Harriman's office insisted that

the agreement meant an increase in the FY 1953 figure to $650 million. 7o

Meanwhile, the administration made no decision on the Pleven list.

When the French protested Defense cuts in the list, Foster claimed the entire

$186 million list would have to be funded within the $650 million total for FY

1953. By August Pleven was concerned that the $186 million might simply

vanish into thin air. In OSD, Olmsted recommended a total French aid package

of not more than $500 million in all FY 1953, with the Defense share held to

$200 million. 71 Anticipating reduced appropriations, Harriman's Mutual

Assistance Advisory Committee recommended on 7 October a total of only

$525 million in economic and military aid for France. In approving this figure,

Harriman stipulated that the $255 million military assistance portion (later

reduced to $217.5 million) should be procured in France. 72 While the military

tended to resent this as a transfer of funds from a military assistance program

to an economic aid program, Deputy Secretary Foster, with his long background in the Marshall Plan program, understood well the difficult problems

that the U.S. cut augured for a French government that earlier had made public

a $650 million U.S. support level. Maj. Gen. George J. Richards, the MAAG

chief in Paris, believed, however, that the French would accept the lower

figure.~5

Nash directed that negotiations begin immediately for $99 million in

offshore ammunition contracts. The French and U.S. staffs in Paris began work

within a week, but no contracts followed, partly because French prices were

high and French companies had technical difficulties in producing U.S.-type

ammunition. Visiting Pleven in December 1952, Lovett went to great lengths

to explain U.S. contracting problems, but he also conceded deficiencies at

home. Although U.S. representatives agreed later in December to procure

French-type ammunition, no contracts were signed during Lovett's tenure. 7 ';
448 THE TEST OF WAR

Assistance to the British also became a matter of urgency during Lovett's

time in office. The United States provided relatively little economic assistance

to Britain during fiscal years 1950 and 1951 and planned none for fiscal year

1952. Since Britain seemed able to meet most of its own military needs, U.S.

military aid for fiscal years 1950 through 1952 amounted to less than $762

million. By the fall of 1951, however, it seemed clear that financial difficulties

would force the British to cut their NATO defense programs in order to reduce

dollar outlays for raw materials and allow the production of exportable items

that would gain dollar credits. ~5 In January 1952 the United States decided to

supply the British with $300 million in FY 1952 economic aid. The tentatively

planned program for FY 1953 provided about $600 million in economic aid

and approximately $300 million in military aid. After congressional cuts in the

FY 1953 foreign aid budget, the United States adjusted the British program to

approximately $400 million in economic aid (defense support) and about

$360 million for military assistance. Used for offshore procurement, military

assistance would enable the United Kingdom to earn dollar credits.~6

Hoping that contracts could be placed quickly, the British government in

March proposed U.S. purchases of Centurion tanks, fighter aircraft, and other

items. InJune the United States decided to buy, as a top priority item as soon

as FY 1953 funds became available, 535 British Centurions for delivery to

Holland and Denmark as U.S. military assistance. Harriman approved the

program in September, and by the end of the year DoD placed contracts worth

$90 million for tanks and related ammunition. undoubtedly one of the fastest

transactions made during FY 1953. By the end of February 1953, however, FY

1953 offshore procurement in the United Kingdom had reached only $98.5

million. 7H

In the meantime, the United States sought to expand offshore procurement elsewhere in Europe. At the time of the Centurion proposal, the British

had also offered to sell aircraft; later they sent a detailed proposal for a $200

million U.S. purchase of 740 aircraft for use by NATO forces.~') Because the

French also sought to sell aircraft, the NATO Defense Production Board

studied the matter. By the summer of 1952, the board and NATO Secretary

General Lord Ismay proposed a complicated deal that included part of the

Pleven proposal and called for production of 1,700 aircraft and spare parts for

which the United States was to pay $225 million in military assistance funds,

while seven European NATO countries would pay $175 million and take

delivery of the aircraft. The United Kingdom. France, Italy. the Netherlands,

and Belgium were to produce the aircraft; together with Denmark and

Norway, they would be the future users. In July the Americans agreed to

commit the $225 million provided that the other countries would indeed

participate. HO
Implementing Military Assistance 449

In Washington, the aircraft proposal reopened questions about offshore

procurement. H I Air Force leaders criticized the aircraft proposal as political in

nature. Moreover, it did not provide for adequate spare parts and ground

support equipment, and was overly optimistic about prices and deliveries.

Unwilling to procure "these foreign aircraft," the Air Force wanted Draper's

office in Paris to perform the task. Lovett and Nash meanwhile pressured

Finletter to support the program. At a September meeting in Paris that McNeil

and Nash both attended, Draper's office consented to reduce the number of

aircraft from 1,700 to 1,100 in order to provide money for adequate spare

parts and logistical support, and Under Secretary Gilpatric reluctantly agreed

that the Air Force would undertake procurement provided several conditions

were met.' Nash called the meeting "bloody but useful" and reported that

OSD would continue its support for the program. Easing the burden on

military assistance funds, Harriman's office agreed that $75 million should be

a defense support (economic aid) contribution, making the military share of

the $225 million package only $150 million. H2

On this basis, U.S.-British procurement negotiations began before the end

of 1952, and by the spring of 1953 the British share increased from $63

million to more than $159 million for 465 planes. On 19 January 1953, his last

full day in office, Foster authorized placing a firm contract with the French for

140 aircraft at $52 million-an offer raised in the spring of 1953 to cover 225

aircraft at a cost of more than $86 million. As Lovett and Foster left office, the

Ismay-Batt aircraft proposal was still in the nature of an experiment.H3

Although it had been thought that U.S. and European ammunition

deliveries would yield a 60-day combat reserve for U.S.-type weapons in

NATO, at the end of 1951 ammunition and explosives loomed as the most

serious of NATO's military deficiencies. Without even considering future

German requirements, planners expected the ammunition gap to reach $839

million by mid-1952, $2.27 billion by mid-1953, and $5.34 billion by

mid-1955. The situation did not improve during 1952, when the combined

effect of exceedingly heavy ammunition expenditures in Korea and the

domestic U.S. steel strike caused the suspension of shipments of artillery and

mortar ammunition to all military assistance recipients except Indochina. H4

Should war break out in Europe between July 1952 and June 1953, Army

studies revealed that there would be shortages for 18 months in five critical

types of U.S.-produced ammunition. European plants lacked the capacity to

produce U.S.-type ammunition, could not produce sufficient European-type

• Aircraft were to be selected on the basis of recommendations by Air Force evaluation teams,

OSD directives would prescribe specifications and terms of purchase, foreign governments would

perform all contract administration, and U.S. acceptance of aircraft would be based on their

acceptance by the country that produced them.
450 THE TEST Of WAR

ammunition, and needed an additional plant investment of approximately

S1.45 billion to meet wartime requirements>l~ Pointing to the seriousness of

the situation and the time needed to expand European production capacity, in

June 1952 Foster urged on the Mutual Security Agency an immediate start,

with financing by the individual NATO countries and, if it became necessary,

help from defense support funds>l6

Meanwhile, the United States tried to expand European ammunition

production through the use of military assistance funds for offshore procurement, letting almost 5200 million in contracts for the purpose in FY 1952. FY

1953 priority commitments included 599 million for ammunition procurement in France and 516 million for ammunition in the Centurion tank

program in the United Kingdom. In addition, DoD accepted further offshore

procurement of approximately 5200 million of ammunition in Europe,

bringing the FY 1953 total for this item to more than S300 million. H~

By the fall of 1952, however, there was danger that offshore procurement

might be regarded as a panacea for many European economic problems. Fearing

possible political repercussions from high levels of unemployment in Italy,

Harriman asked Foster to take "prompt and vigorous action, and if necessary by

resort to extraordinary procedures," to place additional offshore contracts in

Italy. Shortly thereafter Acheson wrote Lovett that State was thinking in terms of

5207 million. HH Defense considered the amount excessive and the Army, which

had difficulty finding Italian producers able to bid within 110 percent of U.S.

prices, the legally permissible differential, refused to waive the restriction unless

ordered to do so. Harriman again urged Foster to place at least 15 150 million in

such contracts by March, plus contracts for the 1526 million Italian share of the

aircraft program. At the end of December 19';2, however, FY 19';3 offshore

procurement in ltaly amounted to only 1542 million WJ

With Harriman and Draper present, the Pentagon's Munitions Allocation

Council on 8 January 1953 agreed to accept Draper's recommendation that

bids be solicited from all European countries on the total amount of offshore

procurement contracts authorized and the Italians then be given an opportunity to meet the most acceptable bids up to S1';0 million. If the procedure

failed to yield S150 million in Italian contracts, DoD was to consult with

Harriman to see whether premium prices should be paid in order to achieve

the goa!.'>\) By March 19';3 offshore procurement contracts in Italy for FY

1953 reached only 5';7 million; in May they totaled S14'; million, and a

contract followed late that month for S32 million for approximately ';0 jet

aircraft. Fears about the effect of delays dissipated when the Italian election in

June returned to power the pro-NATO Christian Democrats.'> I

Lovett and other OSD officials found themselves in the unenviable

position of being pressured on the one side by Harriman and on the other by
Implementing Military Assistance 451

the military services. Of the large $1.2 billion offshore procurement program

planned for FY 1953, Defense had officially placed only $178 million in

contracts by the end ofJanuary 1953 when Lovett left office. By mid-1953,

however, combined offshore procurement contracts for fiscal years 1952 and

1953 had reached $2.2 billion, of which the Army handled approximately

$1. 3 billion. Recipients included 15 European countries, with France receiving contracts for $1.1 billion, almost half of the two-year total; the United

Kingdom, $452 million; and Italy, $367 million. 92

The Legacy ofMilitary Assistance

By January 1953 more than three years had passed since the first military

assistance appropriation, and it was possible to assess some of the program's

achievements, failures, and problems.

The training area, which received less than 2 percent of the total funds,

showed few major problems and substantial accomplishmentsY3With the start of

military assistance, the MAAGs had quickly initiated training programs to instruct

European personnel in the operation and maintenance of u.s. equipment. In the

first year of military assistance 12,100 foreign students attended u.s. military

training courses, 8,200 in the United States and 3,900 in U.S. installations in

Germanyy4 By the end of 1952 almost 21,800 foreign nationals-14,200 from

Europe, 5,400 from the Middle East, and 2,200 from Asia-had completed

courses, either in the United States or overseas; another 5,000 were attending

courses. It was hoped that trained persons would in turn be able to teach others

in their own country. To continue the military training mission, there were 137

U.S. mobile teams, with 45 more being readied. In early 1953 General Handy felt

that European training, which he believed had equal importance with the

provision of materiel, had improved greatly since the start of the programy5

By contrast, at the end of 1952, after three years of military assistance

operations, the materiel program in which OSD was so heavily involved had

a record of limited achievement. Of the $15.6 billion appropriated, approximately $14.3 billion was available to the Pentagon, of which the services had

obligated almost $12 billion. But total expenditures-including the training

program, administrative costs, and various preproduction expenses, as well as

end items-amounted to only $4.8 billion, or less than 34 percent of the

money available to Defense. In fact, less than $4 billion worth of equipment,

or about 28 percent, had actually been shipped to port, including $554

million of excess stocks not charged to the program. 96

Although Eisenhower and Ridgway had ample justification for their

concern about the slippage of military assistance deliveries, by the end of
452 THE TEST OF WAR

1952 NATO strength, excluding Greek, Turkish, and German forces, had made

substantial but mixed progress toward development of a combat-worthy force.

Lisbon goals for the initial combat forces had been met, but the M + 30 force

objective of 50-plus divisions had slipped by 42j.1 European divisions. Of those

divisions in existence, 1021, were considered not up to combat standard, and

only the British had totally met the force goals in numbers and effectiveness.

Nash could not determine the extent to which lack of u.s. deliveries might

have caused the slippage. U.S. investigation indicated that equipment lags had

not prevented the activation of any European units during 1952 but might in

some instances have retarded training and had indeed kept some units from

reaching combat effectiveness9~

TABLE 21

Defense Action on Military Assistance

(in hillions of dollars)

Appropriated Availahle Ohligated Expended Shipped

hy Congress to DoD hy DoD by DoD to Port

FY 1950 ... 51.:3140

:30 ]un 50 S1.0785 $0.049:3 $0.0686

FY 1951 ..... [5.2225]

Cumulative ... 6.5:365

31 Dec 50 51431 2.0190 0.:3065 0.5144

30 ]un 5 I 6.2365 5.510:3 09459 1.1212

FY 1952 .... [5.74401

Adjustments -0.8017

Cumulative. 11.4788

31 Dec 51 9.6161 6.8953 1.8169 1. 5994

30 ]un 52 11.4241 11.0490 3.2238 2.4793

FY 195:3 .... [4.2198]

Adjustments -0.0416

Cumulative ........ 15.6570

31 Dec 52 14.288:3 12.0280 4.8042 :3.9261

:30 ]un 53 1:3.5001 7.0289

Source: Reports of DirOMA OSD, MDAP: Department of Defense Operations, 1951-53.

The delivery gap centered on certain items. Army items in short supply in

Europe included Centurion tanks as well as U.S.-produced antiaircraft equipment, medium artillery and ammunition, recoilless rifles, mortars, and

communications equipment. U.S. military men viewed ammunition reserves
Implementing Military Assistance 453

in Europe as dangerously low and believed the cause lay in low production

rates and the higher u.s. priorities for Korean and Indochinese needs. In

general, naval goals for the end of 1952 were reached, although there were

some shortages in electronics equipment, minesweepers, and ammunition.

Air Force deficiencies included radar and communications equipment, support equipment, personal flying equipment, and T-33 aircraft-critical items

in the United States as well as in EuropeyH

From Europe Eisenhower had emphasized the insufficiency of military

assistance deliveries, but Lovett knew that the next administration would find

itself as concerned with other military assistance problems. Perhaps the most

persistent and difficult problem that Lovett had to face involved balancing

military assistance requirements against the needs of the U.S. military services.

Truman had been aware that, beyond genuine war claims, the services used

the MDAP program to help reequip their own forces. Not without reason, the

services had initially viewed the program as a means of disposing of obsolete

excess and reserve equipment and of upgrading their own equipment by

buying better replacements; after the start of the Korean War they tended to

see strong military assistance claims as a threat to their own rearmament.

Notwithstanding the war's demands, the services sent almost $4 billion of

military equipment to other countries by the end of December 1952, most of

this after June 1950. This was no mean feat in view of the low level of U.S.

military production at the start of the conflict.

Lovett's office continually had to arbitrate the claims of adherents of

unilateral U.S. rearmament and of those favoring collective rearmament. The

issue was not necessarily clear, for there were serious questions raised about

U.S. dependence on collective security. Could recipient countries rearmed at

the expense of U.S. forces be relied on to help the United States in time of

need? Conversely, did u.s. military assistance imply a guarantee of military

support should recipient countries become involved in war? The questions

were clear, the answers more elusive.

Stockpiling arms for a future West German army-which the Defense

Department strongly favored-remained a matter of conjecture in the face of

the French and German failure to ratify the European Defense Community

treaty by the end of 1952. Moreover, the high cost of a conventional NATO

defense discouraged many Europeans, with some looking to atomic weapons

as the quick, easy, and cheap way to create a proper deterrent. Neither Europe

nor the United States had yet faced the full implications of such a policy. On

the other hand, whatever the decision on use of atomic weapons, how much

stretchout of military assistance for conventional rearmament was safe?

The military assistance programs also raised policy questions involving

social, political, and economic effects in Europe. Did political expediency
454 THE TEST OF WAR

justify the use of less efficient foreign producers for offshore procurement?

Would the provision of technologically sophisticated weapons to countries

lacking a strong production base lead to their long-term dependence on the

United States? Was it wise to give military assistance to anti-Communist

countries that were also undemocratic? Despite the eagerness of many

governments to receive U.S. military assistance, the rearmament thus supported might be sowing the seeds of U.S. unpopularity abroad. No one

seemed to know precisely how to address these potentially unfortunate

ramifications.

Both the questions and the problems indicated the magnitude of the U.S.

effort and the nature of the achievement. Certainly no European defense

effort sufficient to proVide even a minimal deterrent could have been

conceived and built at this time without U.S. military assistance. Created in

1949, the U.S. military assistance program, whatever its shortcomings, was of

sufficient size and accomplishment, along with its older partner program of

economic aid, to lend credence to Truman's claim on leaving office that it

would stand as one of the "dramatic and historic accomplishments in the

twentieth century struggle for peace and decency for mankind.' ,99
CHAPTER XXII

OSD Nuclear Responsibilities

The secretary of defense possesses no responsibilities of greater import

than those for nuclear weapons. During the Korean War years he dealt with all

major questions of national nuclear policy, both as a member of the National

Security Council and of its Special Committee on Atomic Energy, which also

included the secretary of state and the chairman of the Atomic Energy

Commission (AEC). On the international scene, the secretary of defense

served as one of the U.S. representatives on the Combined Policy Committee

(CPC), which also included British and Canadian members and set policies for

tripartite cooperation.

The Korean War greatly increased U.S. apprehension about Soviet and

Chinese intentions, thereby contributing powerfully to the decisions for a

major buildup of the U.S. military establishment and particularly the intensified emphasis on procuring and deploying atomic weapons. The war seemed

to vindicate Truman's decisions in January 1950 to explore development of an

H-bomb and to expand the production of atomic weapons, and it focused

attention on the adequacy of these programs. The growing number and

diversity of atomic weapon programs and the pressures from many sides

created a number of critical policy issues, particularly concerning custody,

deployment, and use of atomic weapons, expansion of programs, and

exchange of nuclear information with foreign countries. OSD and the Atomic

Energy Commission clashed directly and frequently over these issues.

The unstable and threatening international situation and the overall expansion of U.S. military power had the effect of strengthening Defense's voice

in policy matters and reinforced the military's aggressive efforts to enhance its

atomic weapons role. The AEC saw itself as the defender of civilian control

over atomic energy against military assaults seeking to capture significant

elements of its functions. Fighting a defensive battle against a much larger and

455
456 THE TEST OF WAR

more influential foe, the AEC eventually had to yield some of its operations to

DoD, but it continued to assert the principle of civilian control. President

Truman, the arbiter of the issues between the AEC and the military, wholeheartedly believed in civilian control of atomic energy, but he found it

necessary to permit the enlargement of military participation in atomic policy

and operational matters.

If the Department of Defense sought an expanded role in atomic matters,

the most fervent and forceful advocacy of the most far-reaching proposals for

expansion of nuclear forces came from the chairman of the Joint Committee

on Atomic Energy OCAE), Sen. Brien McMahon, who crusaded with missionary zeal almost until the day of his death in July 1952. To Secretary Lovett's

question of how much was enough, it seemed clear that McMahon's answer

was that there could never be enough.

Pentagon Arrangements

Although the AEC had responsibility for developing, refining, producing,

and storing atomic weapons as well as for developing the far more powerful

fusion-type hydrogen bomb, the Department of Defense participated importantly in such programs at many levels. The Joint Chiefs of Staff set military

requirements for nuclear weapons and advised the president and secretary of

defense concerning their use. The military services had the mission of

delivering weapons on target when and if the president so ordered. They also

performed research and development work to improve existing delivery

systems and develop new ones. Through the Armed Forces Special Weapons

Project (AFSWP), the services helped to maintain AEC-held atomic weapons.

Exercising overall policy direction within DoD, the secretary could turn to the

Atomic Energy Committee of the Research and Development Board for review

of service plans for research and development and to the Military Liaison

Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission (MLC) for information on AEC

views and actions and for recommendations on general policy questions.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 had established the MLC as a liaison

organization, but the AEC tended to view it as a pro-military voice seeking a

larger role for the military services in atomic energy matters. Determined to

resist such intrusion, the AEC criticized the MLC's handling of the liaison

function. To neutralize this criticism, the MLC chairman, Robert LeBaron,

suggested that the AEC commissioners be kept informed of military developments. In December 1950 Lovett invited the commissioners to attend OSD

morning briefings, but this gesture apparently did not succeed in relieving the

tension in the AEC-Defense relationship. 1
OSD Nuclear Responsibilities 457

To define MLC authority more fully, Marshall on 17 January 1951 gave the

committee anew directive reaffirming its responsibility as his principal

agency in atomic energy matters and enjoining it to keep the AEC "fully

informed of all atomic energy activities of the Department of Defense."·

Marshall further enlarged LeBaron's role by appointing him to act as "Deputy

to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy Matters" whenever he was

specifically representing the secretary or the department with external

agencies, and "Coordinator and Staff Advisor for Atomic Energy Matters"

within the secretary's office. 2 Following Marshall's directive, LeBaron began

submitting periodic reports on DoD activities to the AEC, but this action also

failed to improve the MLC's standing with the commission. 3

Intervention at times by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, especially Senator McMahon, further complicated DoD and MLC affairs. In

February 1952, for example, McMahon complained to Lovett about the MLC

chairman's low Pentagon status, eighteenth in rank below the secretary, and

the relatively low rank of the committee's military members, most of whom

were one- or two-star officers. McMahon planned to offer an amendment to

make the MLC chairman an assistant secretary of defense for atomic energy

and to create similar positions in the military departments. This plan provided

that the committee would then consist of the new assistant secretary of

defense as chairman, the three new service assistant secretaries, and three

military representatives of "not less than" three-star rank. 4

Responding diplomatically, Lovett expressed "considerable reservation"

about McMahon's plan. He pointed out that LeBaron already had access to the

secretary equal to that of other principal assistants, as well as direct contact

with the secretaries of the military departments. Lovett noted that he

personally kept much closer control over atomic energy matters than over

other matters under principal assistants, and handled actions himself because

of their sensitivity. Since the current military MLC members included each

service's senior atomic energy officer and one of its senior operations officers,

Lovett thought that appointment of three-star officers would confront the

services with the problem of finding qualified high-ranking men. Furthermore, he assured McMahon, frequent discussions in the Armed Forces Policy

Council gave the secretary of defense a balance of military and civilian advice

on atomic energy matters. ';

• In May 1951 the MLC consisted of LeBaron as chairman, plus Brig. Gen. Stanley R. Mickelsen

and Brig. Gen. Herbert B. Loper for the Army; Rear Adm. Frederic S. Withington and Rear Adm.

Charles F. Coe for the Navy; and Maj. Gen. Frank F. Everest and Maj. Gen. Roscoe C. Wilson for

the Air Force. A year later three changes had occurred: Capt. James S. Russell had replaced

Admiral Coe, and the Air Force members were Maj. Gen. James E. Briggs and Maj. Gen. Howard

G. Bunker. MLC members also sat on the ROB Atomic Energy Committee.
458 THE TEST OF WAR

Since Lovett was sensitive to congressional opinion, it was probably not

wholly coincidental that he issued a new MLC directive on 8 March, less than

a month later, making the chairman his "principal advisor and assistant . . .

on the political, economic, and scientific aspects of atomic energy matters."

LeBaron's power of decision remained limited to matters on which the

committee could not reach unanimous agreement, and dissenting members

could still appeal his decisions. In view of criticism of MLC from the scientific

and academic communities, particularly among those who opposed the

thermonuclear project, program supporters considered it obligatory that

Lovett back LeBaron fully. The secretary, however, took no further steps to

elevate LeBaron's position. 6

Exchange ofAtomic Information

At the international level, Defense had to deal with significant questions

concerning the exchange of atomic information among the United Kingdom,

Canada, and the United States, questions which seriously affected relationships. The British and Americans had cooperated closely during World War II

to develop an atomic bomb, agreeing in 1943 at Quebec not to use the bomb

against each other and to obtain mutual consent before using the bomb

against, or giving information to, a third party. With Canada, they set up a

tripartite Combined Policy Committee (CPC) to perform certain duties such as

the allocation of materials and facilities for a mutually agreed program. At

Quebec in September 1944 President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

agreed to full collaboration in developing military and commercial uses of

fissionable material after the war. 7 Apparently unaware of either Quebec

agreement,' Congress in 1946 passed the Atomic Energy Act, which severely

restricted the exchange of atomic information with any nation. H Representatives of the three powers, with Lovett participating as acting secretary of state,

resolved this contradiction in January 1948 when they agreed on a modus

vivendi to last until the end of 1949. It allowed limited exchanget of scientific

and technical information and provided a means for allocating available ore

among the countries. The Combined Policy Committee continued to meet, its

• Acheson wrote that he learned of the Quebec agreements in February 1946; he briefed Senators

Vandenberg and Hickenlooper sometime that summer. James Forrestal evidently learned of the

agreements in July 1947, shortly before he became first secretary of defense. The United States

never officially confirmed the 1943 agreement.

t The epe in January 1948 agreed on nine basic areas for exchange of information: declassification, health and safety, isotopes, fundamental properties of clements, long-range detection,

reactor materials, extraction chemistry, natural uranium reactors, and research experience with

low-power reactors.
OSD Nuclear Responsibilities 459

three u.s. members including the AEC chairman, secretary of state, and

secretary of defense. ')

The strict limitations on information exchange in the Atomic Energy Act

of 1946 proved extremely troublesome. Although the administration did not

want to help the British produce atomic weapons, it reacted positively in

September 1948 when the British requested a substantial broadening of the

information exchange. Congress refused to expand the limits prescribed in the

act but did agree to an extension of the modus vivendi. 10 Members of

Congress, including the JCAE, became more receptive to greater tripartite

cooperation after the first Soviet atomic explosion became public knowledge

in September 1949. Their opposition stiffened again with news of the arrest

of Klaus Fuchs in England in February 1950. Secretary Johnson proposed

suspension of tripartite talks pending development of a U.S. policy acceptable

to both the executive and legislative branches. In April an interim allocation of

raw atomic materials was effected by an exchange of letters between Acheson

and the British ambassador. Convinced that any expanded information

exchange required amendment of the Atomic Energy Act, Johnson remained

an obstacle to increased tripartite cooperation until his departure in

September. I 1

In September 1950 the U.S. members of the CPC tried to resolve a number

of issues plaguing the tripartite relationship and, specifically, to respond to a

British request for ore. AEC Chairman Gordon Dean, who thought the British

plan to produce atomic weapons a waste of time and materials, suggested that

the United States acquire the British plutonium output for weapon fabrication

and in return supply the British with atomic weapons. General Bradley

favored this arrangement but doubted that the British would stop their

production effort completely. Dean's suggested arrangement would require

amendment of the Atomic Energy Act, an unlikely event in the near future.

Johnson agreed to Acheson's suggestion that Defense propose recommendations for a U.S. position on British-American cooperation on atomic weapons,

and the JCS asked the MLC to prepare a draft. 12

The MLC proposed basically an exchange of British plutonium for

finished u.s. atomic weapons plus limited U.S. information. Eager to persuade

the British to forgo weapons manufacture, the Joint Chiefs agreed to the MLC

proposition. U Sending the Defense plan to the other U.S. members of the CPC

on 31 January 1951, Secretary Marshall hoped for an interagency consensus

that would permit the three nations to proceed to formal agreement. He

specifically noted, however, that an extension of cooperation or information

exchange should "include adequate security provisions, and remain within

the limitations of pertinent legal authority." Marshall was aware that Dean

wanted to amend the Atomic Energy Act to allow more cooperation. I ..
460 THE TEST OF WAR

The AEC drafted an amendment allowing the commission to give other

nations any material or information that the commission, with NSC consent,

determined would promote US. security. Arguing that decisions on information exchanges should be made by the president, some 000 officials feared

that the proposed amendment would result in release of too much information and still not permit the desired weapons for plutonium trade. IS On the

surface, Defense and AEC objectives seemed to be close, but LeBaron thought

the commission wanted an "outright exchange of data," whereas Defense

wanted a quid pro quo and a strictly military exchange. After the defections to

the Soviet Union of British diplomats Donald MacLean and Guy Burgess' in

the late spring of 1951, the Joint Chiefs supported LeBaron, and the Pentagon

position hardened. 16 When Dean, at a meeting with Lovett and LeBaron in

June, again asked for 000 support of the amendment, Lovett expressed his

fears about British security. Dean found the situation ironic, since he thought

that the Defense-favored plan to give the British finished atomic weapons

would involve giving the British both weapons and US. technical knowledge.

According to Dean, Lovett was shocked by this possibility. 17

While Lovett and Dean debated broadening the information exchange,

the British indicated that they desired a "completely reciprocal exchange" of

certain kinds of atomic information and formally requested help in testing a

British atomic bomb the next year. Meeting with the US. members of the CPC

on 24 August, Lovett displayed uneasiness at the possibility that helping with

the British test would disclose information on US. weapons and thus go

beyond existing law. Unless the test could be modified, he felt that 000 would

have to withdraw its support. Dean agreed to make a counterproposal on the

British test and again sought Defense support for the amendment, offering to

exclude weapon information specifically. Both Lovett and Acheson thought

Congress would refuse to ease security limitations, but the meeting ended

with Lovett seemingly more inclined toward Dean's request. At a CPC meeting

three days later, Lovett informed the British that assistance in their test would

have to be conducted within the framework of existing u.s. law. IH

British security problems continued to worry LeBaron, as he wrote

Marshall on 29 August after a trip to London. LeBaron thought that the British

scientists who had most damaged security had defected for "mental reasons

and other conditions that develop after they are in the job" and that

governments lacked the analytical tools to screen these "complexities in

• MacLean had been head of the American department of the Foreign Office and British secretary

of the Combined Policy Committee in 1947 -48; Burgess had been second secretary of the British

Embassy in Washington from August 19'50 to May 19'51. Both men ned on 26 May 19'51, and the

announcement came on "7 June. Their defection followed that of Dr. Bruno I'ortecorvo, like fuchs

a member of the Harwell atomic research establishment in England.
OSD Nuclear Responsibilities 461

human character"; he thought there could be unknown potential defectors in

the u.s. program as well.· Two days later he recommended that Defense

withdraw its weapons-for-plutonium offer. 19

In an informal communication to State and the AEC in mid-September,

Bradley and LeBaron thought it most desirable that DoD handle atomic

weapon matters, including information, "through existing military channels."

They opposed sponsorship of any changes in the Atomic Energy Act by the

administration and wanted to be certain that information exchanges would

"on balance add to our military position." The two Soviet atomic explosions

that followed did nothing to allay Defense fears. Noting the rapid Soviet

progress, LeBaron wondered whether it represented their good fortune or

"security leaks from the U.S. program. ,,20

Lovett became increasingly concerned that a weapons-for-plutonium

exchange would disclose too much information. On 18 September he informed the Joint Chiefs that he proposed to withdraw the Defense offer and

to insist on handling future information disclosures on atomic weapons or

operations through "direct military channels" rather than through the cpc.

With JCS agreement, Lovett on 12 October formally notified Acheson that

Defense did not consider the time propitious for legislative changes expanding cooperation with foreign governments in atomic matters and was withdrawing the weapons-for-plutonium offer. By year's end the British, in turn,

refused the U.S. counterproposal for testing their bomb; they carried out their

test in Australia in early October 1952. 21

The AEC redrafted its proposed amendment to extend the range of the

modus vivendi, to allow limited exchange of information on technical matters

underlying weapons development, and to set up a series of safeguards. It

specifically excluded from the exchange any information related to the design

or fabrication of atomic weapons. Grant of a foreign request would require the

unanimous approval of the commission, AEC certification of the recipient

nation's security standards, an NSC recommendation in writing, the president's approval, and 30 days notification to the JCAE. 22

With LeBaron protesting that the commission was acting unilaterally and

that its amendment failed to safeguard vital information, Foster notified the

NSC on 1 October that Defense wanted prior interdepartmental agreement

before accepting the AEC proposal. Tensions mounted when OSD discovered

that the Senate had ignored the Pentagon in its consideration of the AEC

amendment. The House asked for DoD advice only on the day of its vote; after

• Indeed, Fuchs's arrest in February 1950 had led to the disclosure of the American spy ring of

Harry Gold. David Greenglass, Morton Sobol, and Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, all of whom were

convicted. The Rosenbergs were found guilty in March 1951 of conspiracy to commit wartime

espionage and executed in June 1953; Greenglass, Gold, and Sobol received prison terms.
462 THE TEST OF WAR

discussion in the Armed Forces Policy Council, Defense decided it was useless

to object. The AEC amendment became law on 30 October. 2.'\ The Joint Chiefs

were deeply disturbed. When Foster sent Dean a formal protest on 2

December, he got back a detailed rebuttal. DoD officials, particularly LeBaron,

thought that Dean had carefully planned with Senator McMahon to bypass

Defense. 2 !

In general, the Joint Chiefs viewed extensions of cooperation that helped

another nation's atomic energy position as basically incompatible with U.S.

security interests. They felt that no other Allied nation had the resources to

make a significant contribution to the atomic strength of the West; rather,

other efforts would result in competition for ores and increase the risk of

disclosure to the enemy. Still, on 20 November they proposed certain

exceptions to Lovett. If the u.s. members of the CPC and the president

unanimously approved, they thought the exchange of certain intelligence

information and "carefully circumscribed scientific and technical data," but

not weapons information, should be allowed. They also wanted permissionafter securing the approval of the president as commander in chief but

without NSC or congressional approval-to exchange weapons information

essential for comhined operations and to make an actual exchange of

fissionahle or weapon materials. Foster agreed and ordered the drafting of

standhy legislation. In June 19';2, however, Lovett cautioned against any steps

that might be construed as lessening the security of atomic information and

materials, and in Octoher he rejected a LeBaron-JCS request to forward the

draft legislation. 2~

After President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill agreed in January

19';2 to explore the questions further and Dean indicated willingness to

liheralize information exchanges, LeBaron remained unsympathetic. Trying to

reopen the matter in late August, Dean pointedly asked whether the United

States should compete or cooperate with the British and whether DoD, State,

and the AEC should cooperate in an appraisal of the British security system. *

Lovett replied in October that on this matter he doubted the "wisdom of, or

the need for any joint effort" with the AEC. 2(, It was ironic that some British

officials apparently sympathized with Lovett's position. It was even more

iron1c that, preparing to tighten security procedures. Lovett could utilize the

AEC amendment, which, as LeBaron observed. actually offered "hetter

protection" than the modus vivendi. Accordingly. on 12 December Foster

asked the U.S. members of the CPC to consider making all atomic information

exchanges subject to the procedures of the AEC amendment.r

* The United States had agreed in 19'51 that physical security standards in Canada and the [fnited

Kingdom were comparable to its own. The problem was personnel securit)
OSD Nuclear Responsibilities 463

The whole issue of intergovernmental exchange of atomic information

bespoke the deeply different philosophies of AEC and Defense, their divergent views on what national security required, and the increasing DoD fear

that leaks of research secrets were fueling the Soviet program. In these aspects

of what seemed a classic civil-military confrontation, the civilian secretary of

defense was a determined defender of military security, all the more so as he

perceived the political and military pitfalls that awaited the Department of

Defense should additional U.S. atomic secrets be lost. Further liberalization of

the Atomic Energy Act thus did not occur until 1954, under a new

administration. 2H

Deployment, Custody, and Use

The Department of Defense stated requirements for nuclear weapons;

and its operational forces, primarily the Strategic Air Command, stood ready

to deliver them. Whether to use such weapons, however, remained the sole

prerogative of the president. Defense helped to service atomic weapons, but

it controlled no stockpile of ready weapons. Title or ownership remained by

law in AEC hands; only the president could order the commission to hand

over weapons or fissionable materials to the military. 29

With the outbreak of war in Korea and heightened fears of a far greater

conflict, military men wanted to deploy nonnuclear atomic bomb components to forward areas, so that in an emergency it would be necessary to bring

in only the nuclear assemblies.' In July 1950 the Joint Chiefs requested

approval to store nonnuclear components abroad, and in August they proposed transfer of nonnuclear assemblies to aircraft carriers fitted to carry and

maintain bombs. The president approved both requests, including transfer of

nonnuclear components to the carrier Coral Sea. Later he agreed to nonnuclear transfers to additional carriers such as the Franklin D. Roosevelt and the

Midway. j() AEC concerns about not being consulted on transfers of nuclear

weapon components may have been allayed when Marshall in December

established a procedure for sending Defense requests for atomic weapon

transfers to the NSC Special Committee on Atomic Energy and stated that he

would keep it informed of major transfers of weapons.'" In June 1952, the

Joint Chiefs sought a progressive increase in the number of overseas locations

for nonnuclear assemblies. Truman, who had strong misgivings, told Lovett in

August that he would not approve forward deployment to areas where

political stability or security measures were uncertain.:'2

• By mid~ 19';0 26-1 nuclear~modifjed aircraft were availahle for delivering homhs. See Rohert D.

Little. Building an Atomic Air Force. 1949-1953. 11 ';.
464 THE TEST OF WAR

That same month Lovett asked the Joint Chiefs for their advice on the

possible deployment of nuclear components to locations where nonnuclear

assemblies were already in place. The JCS had rejected a similar proposal the

year before.~5 Answering this request, the Joint Chiefs divided. The Navy

wanted to stock its carriers with complete assemblies, but the Air Force

claimed that it did not have sufficient nuclear components for its own

requirements. Just before leaving office in January 1953, Lovett asked for

further JCS study. When several months later the Joint Chiefs agreed on the

desirability of having assembled weapons, the secretary of defense and the

president approved. Until then, the Joint Chiefs had been generally satisfied

with storing nonnuclear components in aircraft carriers and at a few overseas

locations and depending on delivery of nuclear components after the need

arose. 54

The transfer of nonnuclear or even nuclear components for forward

deployment raised less of an issue between the AEC and the Pentagon than the

question of which should have overall custody of nuclear weapon stockpiles

in the United States. The custody issue. indeed, occasioned a major interagency struggle as increasingly the JCS asked for military custody and control

of at least part of the nuclear stockpile. Meeting with the MLC in March 1951,

AEC chairman Dean seemed surprised to learn that military personnel had

been "performing functional surveillance on the entire stockpile, including

nuclear components, for some time." Concerned that AEC custody was an

"empty concept," Dean believed that proper spheres of AEC-Defense responsibility should be established. He thought that Truman's decision in April to

transfer a number of complete atomic weapons to the Air Force ended civilian

control over part of the nation's war reserve. That summer DoD and AEC

reached an agreement on managing the storage sites, but it was not immediately implemented and in any event did not solve the custody issue.-~'; In

December the Joint Chiefs told Lovett that they found the current system of

"divided responSibility . . . inimical to the best interests of the United

States"; they wanted Defense to have direct custody of sufficient weapons to

"assure operational flexibility and military readiness for use. ,,56

When Lovett took the matter to Truman in late January 1952, the

president turned to the NSC Special Committee. Dean held to the line that the

AEC should retain all fissionable material for peaceful purposes; weapons lent

to the military in emergencies still belonged to the AEC. Offended by the JCS

claim that divided responSibility harmed u.s. interests, the commission

officially stated in May that its plans for transferring atomic weapons in an

emergency had been tested and that it had trained military personnel in its

field service and stockpile activities. However, the AEC stood ready to discuss

Defense custody provided the commission retained control over part of the
OSD Nuclear Responsibilities 465

stockpile. InJune State supported placing some part of the weapons stockpile

in the complete custody of the military, but only if DoD accepted proposed

decisionmaking procedures on use of the atomic bomb. From now on, the

two issues proceeded hand-in-hand. 37

U.S. policy prescribed that only the president could make a decision on

use of atomic weapons. After the Korean War began, however, the NSC Special

Committee began to consider what procedures should be followed in making

such a decision. By late April 1951 a draft study, based mainly on a State

Department paper, concluded that the president would want the prior views

of the JCS chairman, the secretary of defense, the secretary of state, and the

AEC chairman. The study stipulated that the Joint Chiefs should initiate or

review any recommendation for use, explain the factors they considered, and

identify the specific weapons to be employed. The president would then meet

with the NSC Special Committee and the JCS chairman; if time allowed, the

president would also consult with congressional leaders, other government

departments, and appropriate foreign officials. Should the president decide to

act, he would then direct the AEC chairman to give the armed forces a specific

number of weapons, with the secretary of defense taking custody. 3M

Replying to Marshall's request for comments, the Joint Chiefs expressed

both serious concern about an "undesirable and unnecessary" study and their

determination to "record their non-concurrence." They objected to having

such a procedure imposed on their communication with the president and to

interposition of the NSC Special Committee between the president and

themselves. They conceded the president's need for advice from the secretary

of state, but not from the AEC chairman; they thought that security precautions precluded consultation with Congress and other groups. The Joint

Chiefs asked Marshall to oppose any study on procedures to be followed in

deciding on the use of atomic weapons. Marshall did not approve the current

study, thus halting at least temporarily NSC consideration of the issue. 39

Confident of their competence to participate in decisions on use of

atomic weapons, the AEC commissioners took the position that the MLC had

neglected to inform them of all Defense activities concerning atomic energy

and had thus failed to fulfill its statutory duties. LeBaron stood ready to review

and improve MLC liaison activity. On the procedures issue, he believed that it

had been on a "merry-go-round" with Marshall and the Joint Chiefs. In

October 1951 he recommended that Lovett explore the subject with Bradley

and examine JCS views on the "exact nature and scope of the unilateral

military responsibility for the use of atomic weapons." Although he recognized that the president would decide "when they should be initially used,"

LeBaron believed that where and how were matters for the military to

determine. Truman, he hoped, would support the Defense view. ·\0
466 THE TEST OF WAR

On 3 November Lovett told Bradley that he felt the time had come to

clarify Defense and AEC responsibilities. A month later the Joint Chiefs stated

that, once the president had decided to use atomic weapons, the JCS should

determine "where, how, in what numbers, and in what types ... under the

President as Commander in Chief of the armed forces." LeBaron thought the

JCS paper an "excellent statement" of Defense interests and recommended

that Lovett and Bradley discuss it with Truman. But the president wanted the

advice of the NSC Special Committee before considering the matter.'" I

Neither Acheson nor Dean would concede the JCS position; both upheld

the NSC right to advise the president on the matter of use. In June 1952 the

State Department declared that the role of the JCS as the president's principal

military adviser was not at issue; the fact was that the president desired

additional advice because of the political implications of decisions on use.

State thus supported having "a reservoir of finished weapons in the complete

custody of the military" but only if the decision to use such weapons was

made under the procedures that it advocated. Acheson then resubmitted the

procedures study in a slightly revised version and, with Truman's approval,

called for a meeting.... 2

With Bradley in attendance, the NSC Special Committee on 17 June

accepted the major elements of the procedures study; it also approved in

principle military custody of a portion of the atomic weapons stockpile .... " In

August the committee settled on a draft of "Agreed Concepts" giving it official

sanction to advise the president on atomic weapon decisions involving

production objectives, preparatory deployment, and use. The paper also

stated that Defense "should have custodial responsibility for stocks of atomic

weapons outside of the continental United States and for such numbers . . .

in the continental United States as may be needed to assure operational

flexibility and military readiness for use." The AEC would retain custody of

the remainder. With Bradley's concurrence, Lovett voted in favor, and on 10

September the president approved the concepts as the basis for more detailed

plans for implementation."

In October 1952 LeBaron supported an Armed Forces Special Weapons

Project study that recommended DoD custody of both nuclear and nonnuclear components overseas, aboard ship, and in the United States except for

weapons undergoing quality control. While the AEC would retain legal title to

all fissionable material, the study called for it to have actual custody of no

more than 5 percent of the weapons stockpile. IS To satisfy JCS concern over

divided responsibility, Lovett was prepared to ask the president to transfer all

current and future atomic weapons in the stockpile to DoD custody, with

accountability vested in the secretary of defense. But Acheson joined Dean in

opposing such a move, and on 12 January 1953 Lovett asked for JCS
OSD Nuclear Responsibilities 467

reconsideration. Replying on 11 March, after Lovett had left office, the Joint

Chiefs again requested full DoD custody of all atomic weapons, but the NSC

decided to postpone the transfer. In June, near the end of the Korean War,

President Eisenhower approved transfer of custody to and deployment of

nuclear components by the military to match the number of nonnuclear

components. 46 While the war inevitably had the effect of expanding the

military role in deployment and custody of atomic weapons, it did not alter

the principle of civilian dominance, particularly in the matter of possible use.

Expanding the Atomic Weapons Stockpile

The Soviet explosion of an atomic device in August 1949, followed by the

North Korean attack in June 1950, created mounting demands for expansion

of the atomic weapons stockpile. Senator McMahon, chairman of the JCAE,

became a powerful spokesman for large-scale increases in atomic weapons,

probably spurring administration officials into more far-reaching and earlier

action than they might otherwise have taken.

While the AEC directed development and production of fissionable

materials, Defense stated requirements for weapons. In 1947 the Joint Chiefs

had established weapon goals through 1952; in May and June 1949 they set

new goals through 1955, taking into account the increasingly efficient use of

fissionable material. Before the Korean War, however, with ore supplies

limited, the JCS expressed military requirements in terms of the amount of

fissionable material the AEC could be expected to produce rather than in terms

of actual military needs. 47 Essentially two approaches to expansion were

possible: reduce the raw materials needed to produce a weapon or find more

sources of raw materials. The former approach was obviously preferable from

the standpoint of economy since the greatest part of the cost went for

fissionable materials. Moreover, not only would a smaller, more efficient bomb

save money, but it would allow delivery by lighter planes, guided missiles, and

artillery, expanding the roles of all the military services. By June 1950 AEC

technological breakthroughs had begun to make possible large-scale expansion in production of the numbers and kinds of atomic bombs. However, the

ores needed to produce plutonium and uranium 235, both involved in

manufacturing the bomb, remained in relatively short supply, limiting production rates despite the technological advances. IX

Congress appropriated more than $2 billion for AEC programs under the

FY 1949 and FY 1950 budgets. Following the Soviet atomic explosion in

August 1949 and the decision to expand the fissionable materials program,

Truman in January 1950 requested $600 million for FY 1951. In March
468 THE TEST OF WAR

Secretary Johnson asked the JCS to reexamine long-range military atomic

requirements in conjunction with work on NSC 68.'<)

At the same time, Senator McMahon complained to Johnson that

"somewhat less than one-fortieth" of U.S. military spending since 1945 had

gone for atomic weapons, exclusive of the means of delivery,' and asked

whether he and the Joint Chiefs thought this adequate. When Johnson replied

that neither he nor the Joint Chiefs could make a categorical judgment,

McMahon demanded a straightforward answer and declared the question the

most important on military policy of his senatorial career. ~() Prodded by yet

another inquiry from the senator, Johnson, on the basis of an MLC-JCS draft,

guardedly stated on 1June 1950 that AEC production currently met the stated

JCS requirements but not all possible contingencies. Adequacy could not be

"judged with finality," and Johnson thought the currently planned program

consistent with available ore resources and overall U.S. defense

expenditures. I A few days later, Truman approved the construction of the

first two reactors at the Savannah River (South Carolina) plutonium plant,

asking for an additional $260 million. In September 1950, the third month of

the Korean War, Congress appropriated almost S I billion for an increased AEC

budget for FY 1951 and later added $260 million in the first FY 1951

supplemental. ~2

Questioning both the nature and adequacy of the planned expansion,

McMahon asked LeBaron on 28 June 1950 whether anyone had requested the

AEC to estimate how much it could increase the weapons stockpile at several

levels of higher spending. When MLC and AEC officials appeared before

McMahon's committee on 21 July, Gordon Dean testified that the commission

had been and was currently meeting the stated JCS requirements. Pointing out

that the AEC was "off the hook," LeBaron warned Johnson that the Pentagon

was in a vulnerable position since the McMahon committee wanted to know

the "yardstick that has been used in measuring these requirements. This is the

adequacy of effort question. "~5

Although the Joint Chiefs believed that there was no "absolute weapon,"

they argued that a stockpile of atomic weapons was "essential to the security

of the United States as adjuncts to military forces in being." On 1 August they

advised Johnson that atomic production should be sharply accelerated.

Johnson agreed and forwarded the JCS views to the president; then on 3

• From FY 19·P through FY 1952. the Air Force spent 525 billion. the Navy S17 billion. and the

Army $3 billion-a total of S.f5 billion-on all programs related to atomic weapons. In 1952 alone

this effort involved 440,000 military personnel. 220.000 civilians. and approximately 516 billion.

(Memo ChMLC for Dir]tStaff ]CS. 15 Apr 52. w/mc. RG .BO. "Congressional and Legislative"

folder; Itr LeBaron to ChAEC, 6 Mar 52, RG 330. CD -1~ 1.6 (A-Bomb); ltr SecDef to Rep Clarence

Cannon (ChCte on Appropriations). .f ]un 52. RG 330. CD -1"" 16.)
OSD Nuclear Responsibilities 469

August McMahon asked Truman to double the current schedule. ';4 At Johnson's suggestion, Truman agreed to a joint AEC-Defense study of expansion

and its national defense implications. With McMahon's prodding a report was

ready by mid-September.';'; It recommended no changes in FY 1953 objectives

but sought an expanded commission program to meet new JCS goals set on 12

September for a much larger stockpile of bombs and fissionable material to be

on hand by 1956. Although these goals were based mainly on military

requirements, the Joint Chiefs were still influenced by what they believed the

AEC could reasonably produce. Both the Munitions Board and the service

secretaries thought the proposed expansion feasible, and on 18 September

Johnson and Dean submitted the report to the NSCY'

On 19 September, his last day in office, Johnson wrote McMahon that he

thought the record now showed Defense support for the "production of the

greatest number of atomic weapons that can be made available."';7 McMahon

wrote Marshall on 21 September that the JCAE believed a very large expansion

of the U.S. atomic effort was necessary; the new secretary replied that the

proposed program "seemed to cover all the available possibilities."';!! Accepting the joint AEC-Defense draft report, the NSC Special Committee proposed

roughly to double already authorized programs for both fissionable materials

and atomic weapons at an estimated cost of almost $2.5 billion over six years.

Although uranium ore remained in limited supply, the proposed program

would meet the higher JCS requirements; it was also seen as consonant with

NSC 68, reasonable in cost, feasible in schedule, consistent with the current

rate of U.S. mobilization, and without significant negative impact on other

programs. ';9 With the secretaries of the military departments in agreement,

Marshall gave his approval to the report in the NSC. 60

On 9 October Truman approved the new expansion program recommended by the NSC Special Committee, cautioning against any public

disclosure before completion of current consideration of NSC 68. When the

Chinese intervened in Korea, the president requested and soon received an

additional $1.06 billion AEC appropriation in the second supplemental FY

1951 request. Congress also added $59 million in the fourth FY 1951

supplemental, making the total AEC appropriation for the year more than $2.3

billion. 61

Despite these actions McMahon continued to express dissatisfaction with

atomic progress and requested further details on military readiness. The Joint

Chiefs objected for security reasons and, with the president's agreement,

Marshall refused the senator on 2 April 1951. 62 Responding to McMahon's

suggestion that they consult informally on the matter, Marshall invited the

senator to lunch on 5 July. Speaking at some length of the need to build

"literally thousands and thousands" of atomic bombs to maximize U.S.
470 THE TEST OF WAR

military strength and offset the growing Soviet atomic stockpile, McMahon

criticized the small (2 percent) ratio of AEC appropriations to Defense dollars

as an "unwise allocation of funds." Marshall and Lovett agreed that some

expansion, particularly of lightweight, tactical atomic weapons, might be

useful; the Joint Chiefs also seemed interested.('·'

By this time conflicting views on further expansion had emerged in the

administration. The AEC remained officially neutral, but Dean had considered

the president's October 1950 expansion decision as the "maximum feasible

program without exorbitant or unreasonable expenditure in the light of

supplies of ore foreseeable at this time." Director of the Budget Lawton

questioned the cost, necessity, and feasibility of further expansion. Indicating

that AEC research had succeeded both in increasing the fissionable material

output from existing capacity and reducing the amount of fissionable material

required per atomic bomb, Lawton asked whether or not "ultimate war aims

place a limit upon the extent of the use of atomic bombs. "(,,

Undeterred by such questions, McMahon and the JCAE urged consideration of increases of 50, 100, 150 or more percent and thought it possible to

procure all the ore wanted "provided we are willing to pay the price."

McMahon also pressed for answers to new, tough questions about tactical

atomic weapons(,~ Attempts by Marshall and the JCS to blunt the effects of the

senator's persistent demands did not work. Addressing the Senate on 18

September 1951, McMahon challenged the administration's adherence to

costly conventional rearmament, a policy that he felt posed intolerable

choices-military safety with economic disaster or economic safety with

military disaster. Calling for the creation of an atomic army, navy, and air

force, McMahon wanted $6 billion per year spent on atomic preparedness. By

contrast, less than $ 1 billion had actually been spent in FY 1951. Congress had

just appropriated $1.14 billion for FY 1952, with Truman currently seeking

another $273 million.(,('

At Lovett's first Pentagon press conference as secretary of defense on 25

September 1951, he sought to counteract one widespread impression created

by McMahon's speech-that tactical atomic weapons were about to supplant

conventional ones. Urging reliance on "proved, tested, and available" weapons, Lovett declared that there was no "new, inexpensive, or magic way to

win wars in the near future." Tactfully adding that Senator McMahon was

"pointing the way to long-range objectives," Lovett won a generally good

press. 6 - Still, Lovett and the Joint Chiefs supported a limited increase in

fissionable materials production when they testified before the JCAE on 1

October. Lovett thought that getting a "good quick start" on atomic weapons

might help to avoid a general war and prove to be the "cheapest insurance we

ever bought as a nation. ,,(,H The White House announcements on 3 and 22
OSD Nuclear Responsibilities 471

October of the second and third Soviet atomic explosions may have hastened

congressional approval of two FY 1952 supplemental appropriations for the

AEC-one for $266 million and another for $200 million, bringing the FY

1952 total to about $1.6 billion. 6'J

A chain of events aggravated the expansion issue and further strained the

uneasy triangular relationship among Defense, AEC, and the ]CAE. In September 1951 LeBaron's handling of a study on possible expansion in which he

construed the AEC-Defense relationship as one of contractor and buyer

irritated the AEC. Early in October the commission stated that it would have

to be assured of high priorities for skilled manpower and critical materials

before decisions on an expansion program could be made. 70 Later in the

month, the ]CAE asked Defense and the AEC to complete within three months

a plan to maximize the role of atomic energy in U.S. defense. The Joint Chiefs

on 17 October adopted new goals requiring a major expansion of plutonium

and uranium 235 production. Two days later LeBaron told Lovett that the ]CS

should state their "actual military requirements," and he expressed serious

concern that AEC stockpile schedules had not been met recently. 71 Probably

spurred by the third Soviet atomic explosion, McMahon called for an

immediate, minimum production increase of 200 percent or more in both

plutonium and uranium 235. Lovett replied that Defense would cooperate on

a report for the ]CAE and hoped by the end of the year to have a preliminary

estimate of weapon requirements in terms of military need alone. 72

AEC and Defense meanwhile began to study the possibility of an

expansion program based on the interim ]CS requirements of 17 October and

the larger increase that McMahon proposed. Viewing the latter program as

overambitious, the majority of AEC commissioners found the]CS intermediate

program generally feasible but declined to recommend any expansion-less

because of their concern over priorities than their desire to ensure an NSC

discussion of the major questions involved. Lovett, on the other hand, was

willing enough to argue the case in the NSC Special Committee but did not

want to accord the AEC program special priority above military construction

projects.~' Endorsing the ]CS-recommended program to the NSC on 11

December, Lovett thought the president might well ask, "How much is

enough?" Although he thought that the Joint Chiefs should never claim that a

specific atomic stockpile would ensure U.S. safety and that any error should be

"on the side of too much rather than too little," Lovett added the caveat-

"within our economic capabilities and the over-all defense effort." Because of

the AEC-Defense differences and the ]CAE pressure, the NSC Special Committee presented all arguments orally to the president before submission of the

formal proposal.-'

At the White House meeting on 16]anuary 1952, when Lawton and ODM
472 THE TEST Of WAR

Director Wilson joined Acheson, Dean, Lov~tt, and the president, tensions

hecame apparent. Acheson had shown support for Defense, hut costs worried

Lawton, and Wilson expressed great concern ahout the heavy demands for

equipment and critical materials for the program. -~ To help with the Defense

hriefing, Lovett took with him General Hoyt Vandenherg, the Air Force chief

of staff. They argued that in an emergency the military would require atomic

weapons for U.S. defense, strategic operations in NATO, and large-scale

tactical operations. Lovett stressed the "colossal savings" that atomic weapons

would produce: The explosive effect of 1 ton of TNT costing S1,700 could be

obtained from fissionable material costing only S2~. He saw "almost limitless

possibilities" for the future military use of fissionable materials. The JCS

proposal to increase plutonium production by 50 percent and oralloy production by 150 percent took into account these possibilities, Lovett told Truman,

and would create larger stockpiles of atomic weapons at earlier dates. Its

impact on the u.s. economy would come mainly after completion of the

conventional arms buildup.-(,

The president wanted to know whether current disarmament negotiations might lead to an agreement with the Soviets. Acheson thought it highly

unlikely and indicated his strong support of Lovett's position. Dean reported

that, although the AEC commissioners did not particularly favor the proposed

expansion, they were not against it provided the issues were thoroughly

explored. Intrigued by the possibility of suhstituting atomic for conventional

weapons at some future time Wilson resolved his doubts and declared the

program feasible. Finally, Truman pronounced his verdict: "We will do it."

Following the president's decision, Lovett could give McMahon the report

he had asked for; in fact, LeBaron had already nudged Lovett to act "hefore

Senator McMahon's concern and sense of responsibility reach a boiling point."

In the report handed to the JCAE on 17 January, AEC and Defense agreed that

McMahon's expansion proposal was feasible but unrealistically high since it

would not produce many more weapons than the 50/150- percent JCS plan in

the next few years hut would have a considerahly greater impact on the economy. After several subsequent meetings with the AEC, the Joint Chiefs, and

Lovett, McMahon still helieved that the United States was going neither far

enough nor fast enough with its atomic weapons program.-H

Certainly availability of ore no longer inhibited expansion. Even hefore

LeBaron informed Lovett in April 1952 that the AEC did not seem to realize it

was committed to doubling its procurement objective to 12,500 tons per year

by 1961, Lovett had asked the NSC to explore the possibility of raising the goal

to 15,000 tons annually. In September, when the AEC concurred in an annual

goal of 12, ';00 tons to be reached as soon as possible, ore was coming from

the Belgian Congo, Canada, and the United States, while South Africa,
OSD Nuclear Responsibilities 473

Australia, and Portugal seemed to be promising future sources of supply. State

and DoD agreed to the 12,500-ton annual goal as an interim target pending

AEC study of the feasibility of a 15,000-ton goal. 79

Money rather than the supply of ore was the key to the 1952 expansion.

Although the administration lowered its $ 5.4 billion estimate for the undertaking, first to $4.6 billion (an AEC estimate) and then to $4.2 billion, not

every senator was as anxious as McMahon to increase the AEC appropriation

by even the reduced amount. The NSC reconfirmed the need for the

expansion program, but Congress cut the regular AEC FY 1953 budget request

by $174 million to $1. 138 billion and provided slightly less than $3 billion in

the first supplemental FY 1953 appropriation to take care of the expansion,

making a total of about $4.1 billion. Ho Even so, Dean assured Lovett in

September 1952 that the commission could undertake the expansion program. With more than $8 billion appropriated for the AEC in the three fiscal

years 1951 to 1953, DoD felt reasonably sure that there would soon be a

sufficiency, even a surplus, of atomic weapons. By the end of 1952, in fact,

LeBaron had less concern about the AEC expansion program than about the

availability of military vehicles to deliver the atomic weapons. Hl

Development of Guided Missiles

The prospect of having more atomic weapons proved a powerful stimulant to guided missile research and development. The key remaining problems

in mid-1950 were development of warheads light enough to be fitted to the

missiles and the overall organization and direction of the competing missile

programs of the military services.

From the end of World War II there had been high hopes of rapid progress

in guided missile development and keen service competition in development

efforts. But with money short, development expensive, and testing rudimentary, the era of guided missiles still remained just around the corner in 1950.

The services were designing some missiles, including almost all those for air

defense, to carry conventional warheads; other missiles, mainly offensive,

were to carry atomic warheads. The services planned some missiles to cover

thousands of miles; others were for short ranges, 100 or perhaps 200 miles.

But in June 1950 not one guided missile was operational. H2

The guided missile program suffered from too many cooks-the Research

and Development Board to review and coordinate service programs, the

Munitions Board to see that industrial capacity met military requirements, the

JCS to adjust service requirements. In the case of atomic warheads, the RDB

committee on atomic energy dealt with technological questions, the MLC
474 THE TEST OF WAR

represented DoD policy interests, and the Armed Forces Special Weapons

Project represented Defense in operational matters with the AEC. In August

1950 Under Secretary of the Nayy Dan A. Kimball recommended that the

secretary of defense establish an OSD director of guided missiles to coordinate

all ROB, Munitions Board. and JCS positions. The secretaries of the military

departments proposed establishing a DoD board for gUided missiles. Marshall

rejected the idea of a board, believing that it would infringe on JCS prerogatives and interfere with existing DoD machinery. but finally assured that

Kimball's plan would inyolve no organizational duplication and not bypass

any of the OSD statutory boards, he agreed to appoint a director to pf(wide

competent adyice in managing the various guided missile programs.H.~

Truman took an actiye role in selecting the guided missiles director,

personally recommending to the secretary of defense Kaufman T. Keller,

chairman of the board of Chrysler Corporation. Keller, who planned to remain

with Chrysler and to work part-time in the Pentagon without payor expense

money, wanted only a small staff and a knowledgeable and efficient full-time

military deputy, preferably Kenneth D. Nichols. an Army major general with

long experience in the atomic weapons project and an experienced operator

in military circles. Nichols accepted appointment after Keller agreed to his

stipulation that both of them should be present at all meetings concerning

guided missiles. H.

Although Nichols had earlier recommended an agency for guided missiles

operating directly under the president. the situation in 1950 did not allow for

anything so grandiose. Accordingly. Keller and Nichols took an entirely

different approach in drafting a charter for the new office. As Nichols later

recalled, they made Keller's role completely advisory: "About the only

authority he had was to give orders to me." In real terms. howeyer. Keller

needed no other authority, since McNeil issued a directive barring the seryices

from spending any money for production of guided missiles without the

written appronl of the secretary of defense, and Keller had made it eyident

that he would leaye if the secretary did not accept his recommendations.

Concentrating on production, Keller made first-hand inspections and determined, in conjunction with the services. which missiles were ready for

manufacture. After fully coordinating the matter with all agencies. Nichols

drafted recommendations for the secretary of defense. and Keller reyiewed

and edited the drafts. Often the two men went to see Truman (for whom

Keller felt he worked despite his appointment by the secretary of defense) to

tell him what they planned to present to Marshall or Lovett. Keller's recommendations generally had Truman's blessing before they reached the secretary,

whose usual response was simply to sign the necessary directives. According

to Nichols, L<wett considered this an efficient systemH~
OSD Nuclear Responsibilities 475

In mid-December 1950, only two months after he began his Pentagon

duties, Keller reported to Marshall that the first definite production schedules

would be ready in early 1951; a series of recommendations for the acceleration of specific programs soon followed. H6 In July 1951 Keller reported to

Truman that, although there was "progressive improvement," tangible results

were scarce. Eight missiles were in some stage of production, but he could not

predict when they would be ready for use. Keller thought that the actual work

should continue in the military services, where approximately 15,000 inhouse and contractor personnel were involved with guided missiles. 87 By late

summer 1951, Keller had recommended-or, as old Pentagon hands termed it,

"Kellerized"-17 missiles for continuation or acceleration of research or for

pilot production. By the end of 1951 he had reviewed 22 primary guided

missile programs for potential usefulness, fulfilling Lovett's expectation that

Keller's "practical judgment backed by unusual production experience"

would considerably accelerate the missile program. His recommendation for

pilot production of the Army's tactical Redstone missile, for example, gave the

German scientists under Wernher von Braun at Huntsville, Alabama, their first

opportunity to build real rockets in the United States. Keller remained in the

Pentagon through Lovett's term and subsequently until September 1953. H8

Guided missile research and development gradually expanded during the

Korean War years. Compared with $ 369 million spent on missile research and

development before July 1950, the government spent $159 million in FY

1951, $255 million in FY 1952, and $275 million in FY 1953. Under the

impetus of Keller's recommendations, the obligation of Defense funds for

gUided missile procurement soared, rising from $73.5 million before July

1950 to $471 million in FY 1951 and to $646 million and $765 million in the

follOWing two years.' It seemed clear that guided missiles would become a

vital part of the future atomic arsenal. H')

Production ofNonnuclear Components

As long as aircraft remained the delivery system, the problem of fitting

the atomic weapon to the system was relatively simple, according to LeBaron.

But approval of guided missiles for full production, as well as other developments, threatened to make the marriage of warhead to delivery vehicle more

complex. Some Pentagon officials felt that the AEC did not have the capacity

• Including research and develupment, facility expansiun, and procurement, obligatiunal totals

amounted to S-H I million through FY 19';0, S7H4 million in FY 19'; I. SI.O';H billiun in FY 19';2,

and S1 166 hillion in FY 19-;5. See Charles H. Donnelly, United Stutes Guided Missile Program,

H Doc 100. 99.
476 THE TEST OF WAR

to handle an immediate large-scale program for adapting atomic warheads to

special 000 weapons; they also criticized the work of some AEC contractors.

The prospect of having more nuclear than nonnuclear assemblies for particular weapons caused additional concern.')()

In July 1951 LeBaron proposed an AEC-Defense survey to determine the

extent to which the services could participate in designing, developing, and

fabricating nonnuclear components. The commission readily agreed, and a

joint group began work in November. However, the AEC representatives

resented the Pentagon's view of the commission as a Defense contractor, and

the working group dissatisfied LeBaron.')) When the joint working group

failed to develop a proposal acceptable to DoD, Foster, taking up a suggestion

by Secretary of the Navy Kimball, formed an ad hoc Defense committee to

prepare a Pentagon position. The committee proposed that Defense eventually

take over the development and manufacture of nonnuclear components from

the AEC, a plan the AEC rejected in March 1952.')2

In April, however, Dean told the Defense group that while little could be

gained by giving sole responsibility to DoD. the AEC was willing for the

services to take a primary interest in specific projects from time to time.

Dean's suggestion did not satisfy LeBaron, who still thought the commission

should produce only nuclear components and leave to the military services

such technical problems as hardware, electronics, and marriage to vehicles.

Lovett termed the situation a "fruitful source of irritating troubles" but

refrained from any immediate action.,)5 In May Dean suggested assigning

development, production, and stockpiling of nonnuclear components for new

weapons to whichever agency could best accomplish the task. The DoD ad

hoc committee hailed the proposal, and by mid-June the two agencies seemed

near agreement.')!

In September Le Baron switched tactics. He recommended to Foster and

the secretaries of the military departments that DoD desist from seeking

authority for development and manufacture of nonnuclear components. He

now believed that changing circumstances, particularly the AEC's own

probable unhappiness with large-scale munitions production, would eventually bring about the transfer of the responsibility to Defense without the latter

having to push for the transfer. Privately, he told Foster that the AEC

commissioners were warming to the notion of the changeover.')~

The test came in October 1952 when Foster informed Dean that the Army

wanted to take over production of nonnuclear components for the atomic

artillery shell. Readily assenting, the AEC further suggested on 15 December

that the Navy might want to produce another gun-type bomb. The changeover

did not actually take place until after Lovett left office.')(' President Eisenhower approved the transfer on 21 February 195;1, and the AEC and Army
OSD Nuclear Responsibilities 477

concluded an agreement on 5 June. By the end of 1953, the AEC also agreed

that Defense should produce nonnuclear components for implosion as well as

gun-type weapons.')";'

The Thermonuclear Test

In late January 1950, when the British first informed the United States of

the pending arrest of Klaus Fuchs, the question of whether to proceed with

u.s. development of a thermonuclear bomb had not yet been decided, but

some work had been under way for several years. Since Fuchs had had access

to U.S. scientific findings on the subject, American officials feared that he

could have passed them to the Soviets, who might be far ahead on the road to

an H-bomb. With these thoughts no doubt a factor, if not directly addressed in

discussions, Truman directed the AEC on 31 January' to continue work to

determine the H-bomb's technical feasibility; the scale and rate of effort were

to be decided jointly with Defense. Necessary ordnance developments and a

delivery system were to go forward concurrently.W{

On 24 February Johnson informed Truman that he supported the JCS

request for "all-out development" of the bomb and its means of production

and delivery. The NSC Special Committee also considered the matter of the

greatest urgency. Truman approved on 10 March, directing the AEC and

Defense jointly to recommend the level of preparation, particularly for the

production of tritium, considered essential to the new bomb but perhaps not

available in sufficient quantity. Johnson and the AEC chairman proposed and

secured Truman's approval on 8 June of construction of two heavy-water

reactors for tritium productionY'J

The AEC faced major problems in carrying out Truman's directive. It had

no immediately promising leads to development of a thermonuclear bomb.

Furthermore, some nuclear scientists continued to oppose the crash program,

notably J. Robert Oppenheimer-"father" of the A-bomb, chairman of the

AEC General Advisory Committee, head of an ad hoc panel on military

objectives for atomic energy, and member of the RDB committee on atomic

energy-who thought the effort wasteful and infeasible. Even some of those

working on the "superbomb," such as Enrico Fermi and Hans Bethe, were

either dubious about or deplored its development. Edward Teller, a controversial figure in the scientific community but a man of unremitting drive, was

• Barton J. Bernstein contcnds that Truman's decision to accelerate the development of the

H-homh was essentially made some weeks hefore the.) 1January 19~O meeting. See "Truman and

the H-homb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (March 1984), I)-16. If Fuchs's arrest did not

affect Truman's dccision, it certainly confirmed it.
478 THE TEST OF WAR

the physicist most determined that the United States should proceed on a

crash basis; in time he was to be regarded as the "father" of the H-bomb. Teller

acquired backing from natural allies outside the AEC-Senator McMahon;

William L. Borden, head of the JCAE staff; Lewis L. Strauss, formerly an AEC

commissioner and later AEC chairman; and Defense, where Air Force officials

and LeBaron lent powerful support. 100

By the spring of 1951 there were still no concrete results to justify Teller's

enthusiasm, and the president agreed with AEC and Defense advice that work

on a thermonuclear reaction should proceed simultaneously with "promising

developments" in fission weapons. 101 At this point, the thermonuclear

program finally moved on to a more promising course. In March Teller and

Stanislaw M. Ulam, who had prepared the theoretical mathematical analyses

for the thermonuclear bomb, presented separate schemes for proceeding.

Teller's plan, further refined by others, quickly led to a "new super," whose

principles were tested in early May 195 I at Eniwetok, where the "first small

thermonuclear flame ever to burn on earth" eviscerated a )OO-foot tower and

a concrete shelter. Meeting in Princeton six weeks later to review the test

results, scientists considered the principle of a fusion reaction proven and

viewed the mechanism for the new super as promising. Oppenheimer, now

convinced that the work could succeed, called the process "technically so

sweet that you could not argue about that." While the scientists regarded

other approaches as feasible, the new super seemed the most promising, and

the conferees quickly agreed on a program expected to lead to its full-scale test

in fall of 1952. The Princeton conference marked the start ofa new period of

confidence. 102

Despite the successful test, Teller found progress at Los Alamos too slow

and eventually left. Seeking support from McMahon and Defense, leller

wanted a second AEC laboratory established at Livermore. California, where

Ernest O. Lawrence was engaged in his pioneering work in high-energy

physics. Although Lovett indicated in March 1952 that he saw "no reason for

adverse criticism of the immediate effort," he believed that all approaches in

both thermonuclear and fission research ought to be pursued and concluded

that the research and development base should be broadened. He therefore

favored leaving the thermonuclear program at Los Alamos and establishment

of a second laboratory as soon as possible. 105

Others in the Pentagon, including Air Force Secretary Finletter, fully

supported the second laboratory. After a briefing by leIler, the service

secretaries on 19 March asked Lovett to persuade the NSC Special Committee

to recommend acceleration of work on thermonuclear weapons. LeBaron

backed them strongly. Meanwhile, a new technological development reduced

the requirement for tritium and made a program speedup more feasible. Itll On
OSD Nuclear Responsibilities 479

28 March Foster advised Acheson and Dean that the NSC should consider

intensifying and broadening the H-bomb effort, and on 1 April Teller spoke

with the same three officials about the second laboratory proposal. There

now seemed little doubt that a second laboratory would be established.

Although ill with cancer, McMahon wrote Truman on 30 May urging him to set

quantity requirements for H-bombs and expand production efforts, a proposal

the president transmitted for NSC consideration. In July the AEC established

a second laboratory at Livermore, and in September it began operation. 105

The DoD relationship with the JCAE worsened after the onset of

McMahon's illness and his death on 28 July 1952. His successor as chairman,

Rep. Carl Durham, wrote Lovett on 3 July of the committee's intense interest

in the possible future relationship between tactical atomic weapons and

hydrogen weapons and the defense of Western Europe and asked for a "full

and documented" report on Defense concepts, capabilities, and plans. The

Joint Chiefs viewed the request as an intrusion into their most secret war

plans; Lovett followed their suggestion to withhold the report but invited

informal discussion. This tactic of deflection did not work. The committee

was thoroughly annoyed, particularly since it had discovered in The New York

Times a summary of the findings of a classified study previously denied it.

Although Lovett wanted to maintain a good working relationship with the

committee, he did not change his position but rather offered to try to

"compose differences of opinion. " ! 0(,

While the JCAE wanted to reinforce the thermonuclear effort, others

viewed the program as "dangerous to world peace." As the time for an actual

H-bomb test neared, these opponents spoke out again. From the first,

Oppenheimer had seen the thermonuclear bomb as a weapon of destructive

power vast enough to threaten the very survival of life on the planet. !07 Some

members of the State Department panel of consultants on disarmament,

including Oppenheimer, argued strongly for postponement, claiming that a

U.S. test would actually aid the Soviet development effort as well as hurt arms

limitation attempts, unsettle free nations, make u.s. policy seem less flexible,

and preempt a decision that should be left for the next administration. 108

With the thermonuclear test scheduled to take place at Eniwetok just before

the presidential election in November, Dean asked for Lovett's views. Indulging in drollery, Lovett claimed to be the Washington official with the "least

knowledge of political implications"; he told Dean to "stick to schedule

. . . selected by non-political men for a non-political purpose." Only a few

days in the month were suitable for the test, and Dean proposed going ahead.

On 10 September Truman approved the NSC Special Committee's recommendation to proceed on schedule. 10')

The political implications of the test nevertheless worried Truman, and
480 THE TEST OF WAR

he let it be known that he would welcome a postponement if it could be

justified on technical grounds. None appeared. In early Octoher Truman told

Lovett that Gordon Dean should try to prevent any test hefore the election.

When Lovett approached Dean, the AEC chairman mentioned using military

channels, hut Lovett knew that this avenue would leave a documentary trail,

which Truman wanted to avoid. When it hecame clear that no good reasons

could he found for postponement, Dean so informed the president. Truman

wrote later that he then told Dean to "forget politics and hold the test on

whatever date weather conditions would he most favorable." I I ()

Meanwhile the administration decided on minimal publicity for the test.

On 9 September AEC and Defense jointly issued a hrief announcement of the

forthcoming test. I I I To some in State the time seemed propitious to approach

the Soviets for a general settlement of outstanding issues, yet there was also the

possibility that the Soviets might stall and thus delay the u.s. test indefinitely.

On 9 October, when the NSC Special Committee discussed the idea of a test

moratorium, neither Acheson nor Dean was particularly supportive and Lovett

strongly opposed a delay. He wanted the proposal dropped and any papers on

the subject destroyed. A State Department account ofthe meeting reported that

Lovett was troubled that such ideas "might very well he traced back to fellows

like Dr. Oppenheimer whose motivations in these matters were suspect" and

warned of "some adverse developments with respect to Oppenheimer." The

NSC Special Committee dropped the idea. The United States notified the British

and Canadians, made no further formal advance public announcement, and

observed maximum security restrictions. I 12

The MIKE test shot on 31 Octoher (Washington time) produced a

thermonuclear detonation with awesome results. Almost a thousand times

more powerful than the bomh dropped on Hiroshima in 1945, the shot hlew

away the entire island of Elugelab, leaving only a huge crater in the coral. The

AEC lahoratory at Los Alamos, designer and builder of the thermonuclear

device used in MIKE, was elated. Not only did the test confirm that the

hydrogen bomb was feasible, it also gave promise that full-scale production of

H-bombs might soon he possible. By the same token, as LeBaron wrote, the

magnitude of the explosion raised "many questions of national policy." I '"

After the tests, Lovett believed that the government should remain silent

about the results because a public announcement would impede investigation

and punishment of future breaches of security. Nonetheless, Truman approved

a brief AEC statement that world threats to peace and the ahsence of effective

arms control made it necessary to continue development efforts, but the

United States hoped to utilize nuclear energies for the "productive purposes of

mankind." II·,

Shortly after the MIKE shot Lovett decided, against informal JCS advice,
OSD Nuclear Responsibilities 481

to address again the question, still in the NSC Special Committee, of

expanding the H-bomb effort. Writing the NSC on 26 November concerning

the U.S. manned aircraft capability that would be available in 1954 to deliver

H-bombs in the event of an emergency, he promised that 000 would review

and restate military requirements for H-bombs in the light of the recent test

results. LeBaron pointed out to Foster that with military characteristics of the

H-bomb still uncertain, the Joint Chiefs would have to set official requirements on the basis of judgment alone. I I')

Meanwhile the service secretaries-who earlier had feared that the

Soviets would develop the H-bomb first-now voiced their dismay about its

potential effects. Unlike Lovett, they wanted a presidential statementpreferably a joint one by the outgoing Truman and the incoming Eisenhower

and possibly Congress-to publicize the awesomeness of thermonuclear

power and cultivate a public demand for effective international control. Foster

informally took the subject to the White House, and after Truman agreed that

some sort of report would be appropriate, Finletter drafted a statement. When

representatives of Defense, State, AEC, and the White House discussed the

draft on 30 December, Acheson labeled it a "horrendous statement" that

would frighten the public and adversely affect U.S. foreign relations. Finletter

argued that the president could not remain silent on the issue, and Charles

Murphy, the president's special counsel, thought some report politically

necessary, possibly as a part of the president's forthcoming State of the Union

message. Foster reported division in 000, with the service secretaries wanting

a public statement and Lovett opposed. Acheson came around to Murphy's

view. I 16

In his State of the Union address on 7 January 1953 Truman reviewed the

dramatic, seven-year transformation from the atomic to the thermonuclear

age. Stating that Soviet capabilities and the lack of arms constraints forced the

United States to continue developing nuclear weapons, the president somberly noted that nuclear weapons gave man the power to "extinguish millions

of lives at one blow, demolish the great cities of the world, . . . and destroy

the very structure of a civilization that has been slowly and painfully built up

through hundreds of generations." Declaring such a war "not a possible

policy for rational men," Truman promised that the Soviets would find

Americans "eager to reach understandings." Since nuclear power would be

"with us all the days of our lives," the president hoped it would be harnessed

to improve human existence, but he declared that the United States meanwhile

would have to sustain a "long hard test of strength and stamina." I 17

In ignoring Lovett's advice against making a public statement, the

president followed his own instinct to set the record straight. That the

challenge he passed to the incoming administration and the American people
482 THE TEST OF WAR

was a formidable one, there could be no doubt. On 12 August 1953, fewer

than 10 months after the MIKE shot, the Soviet Union exploded what was

apparently a thermonuclear device, and on 23 November 1955 it dropped a

true superbomb from an aircraft. IIH While the contending military forces in

Korea fought their battles with weapons of the past, there was occurring at the

same time a quantum leap in the development of terrible weapons for the

future. Indeed, the nuclear weapon advances of this period provided the

theoretical and practical basis for the emphasis on nuclear forces embodied in

the "New Look" policy of the successor Eisenhower administration.
CHAPTER XXIII

The Search for Greater Efficiency

The North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950 brought Louis

Johnson's campaign of retrenchment in the Department of Defense to an

instant halt. Overnight the Pentagon reversed its course. The pressure for less

turned into a drive for more. Caught up in the painful throes of an expanding

war during the less than three months of his tenure after 25 June, Johnson

found himself publicly blamed for the initial defeats of the outnumbered U.S.

forces in Korea, his political hopes for the future shattered, and his position

undermined by the president's distrust. *

When George C. Marshall succeeded Johnson in September 1950, he immediately recruited Robert A. Lovett as deputy secretary. Both men wanted an OSD

staff that would give them fast, informed advice and through which they could

set policy and monitor operations. In Marshall's view, efficiency meant keeping

the staff small and limiting its activities to policy issues. He did not seek drastic

organizational change; indeed, he found the current OSD organization generally

satisfactory and accepted some "growing pains" as inevitable. I

The New Inner Office

On assuming office Marshall brought to the Pentagon Col. Marshall S. (Pat)

Carter, who had helped him earlier at the State Department, to create the

counterpart of a general staff secretariat to provide central control of communications. Taking over the necessary OSD administrative sections and working

through the various military aides in OSD, Carter organized the Executive

* See Chapter II.

483
484 THE TEST OF WAR

Office of the Secretary (EXOS), as desired by Marshall. Serving both as its

director and as Marshall's executive officer, Carter alone from March 1951

could use the signature line, "For the Secretary of Defense," in official

correspondence. 2 When Lovett took over as secretary in September 195 1, he

retained his own executive, Marine Corps Col. Carey A. Randall, but otherwise

left EXOS undisturbed. An astute administrator with a sharp wit, Carter

advised Lovett to set a policy of limiting his public speeches, statements, and

appearances, counseling the new secretary that "exceptions to the above

should be based only on very intimate personal contacts which you do not feel

free to avoid . . . [such as] a quiet dinner with Mrs. Lovett . . . ." Carter

had a deputy and by the spring of 1952 he also had three assistant directors;

one of them, Col. George V. Underwood, Jr., who had been with Marshall in

China in 1946-47, took over when Carter left in the fall of 1952.5

Carter held strong views on the proper functioning of OSD. He admonished staff officers on one occasion that their job was to "advise your chief

what he ought to do, not to ask him what you ought to do." Carter instructed

the staff to consider all possible solutions to a problem and to propose a single

action for approval or disapproval. Underwood, with similar high standards,

saw the primary EXOS mission as assuring that "formal official actions in the

name of the Secretary of Defense are fully coordinated, consistent with

policy, and ofa quality, importance and timeliness befitting the signature.,,4

As central coordinating point, EXOS was generally considered a successful operation under Marshall and Lovett, but it irritated some OSD officials,

whose resentment derived from various sources-conflict of personalities, a

feeling that a screen had been inserted between them and the secretary, and

the fact that a largely military staff was handling the screening. With Marshall's

and Lovett's support, however, the EXOS staff continued to act as the

secretary's "hands." It increased from 58 military and civilian full-time

personnel at the end of 1950 to 87 at the end of 1952.s

The director of administration, Ralph N. Stohl, headed an office that took

care of numerous OSD administrative matters. J. Robert Loftis, Stohl's assistant

for administration, supervised four divisions-personnel, budget and finance,

office services, and security. Other assistants under Stohl had responsibility

for administrative security and special security programs, interdepartmental

administrative services, and what was left of the military responSibility for

civil defense.' Stohl's office increased from 150 persons at the end of June

1950 to 198 at the end of 1952.6

• The Office of Civil Defense was set up under the National Security Resources Board on 1 March

1950; it became independent by the president's executive order of 1 December 1950, with former

Florida Governor Millard F Caldwell confirmed as the first head of the Federal Civil Defense

Administration on 16 January 1951.
The Search for Greater Efficiency 485

The Sraff Council provided a major vehicle for coordinating OSD staff

work under Marshall and Lovett. Generally the deputy secretary met with

officials at the assistant secretary or lower levels. In]uly 1951 Marshall revised

the council's organization, limiting its membership to only 11 officials beyond

Lovett as chairman, although he could designate others. Marshall also directed

EXOS to furnish the council with a secretary to ensure that staff action

followed the council's decisions. 7 After Lovett became secretary, Deputy

Secretary Foster met with the council each Friday morning to discuss recent

developments and to resolve differences. Few doubted the council's usefulness; officials not included in its membership eagerly sought invitations.s

The focus of the Defense Management Committee under General Joseph

T. McNarney changed after the start of the Korean War from searching "with

a fine tooth comb" for economies within a shrinking Defense Department to

fostering efficiency during expansion. To strengthen the committee's role,

Secretary Johnson broadened its scope and designated staff members from the

comptroller's office as the nucleus of a permanent OSD management engineering group. In October Marshall formed a management division under

Comptroller Wilfred McNeil, who was to assume the Defense Management

Committee's duties when it came to an endY

Concentrating on OSD organization, materiel support, and manpower

controls, McNarney felt by June 1951 that his committee had succeeded in its

purpose. Its achievements included organizing OSD manpower and personnel

functions, reviewing and realigning the functions of the Munitions Board and

other OSD offices, establishing offices to manage expanded functions such as

transcontinental transportation and insurance (e.g., workmen's compensation

and public liability on defense contracts), and reducing from 18 to 11 the

offices reporting directly to Marshall. 10

In October 1951 Lovett decided to establish the Defense Management

Committee on a permanent basis. He retained McNarney as chairman until the

general retired at the end ofJanuary 1952, when Under Secretary of the Army

Karl R. Bendetsen became acting chairman. II In June Lovett replaced the

Defense Management Committee with a Defense Management Council consisting of Deputy Secretary Foster as chairman and the under secretaries of the

three military departments. 12

Money, Legislation, and Foreign Military Matters

In three principal areas that had the potential for confusion, OSD

managed the considerable growth of the Korean War period in a generally

orderly fashion. McNeil tightened his already firm grip on the comptroller's
486 THE TEST OF WAR

office during battles over the wartime budgets. Although Marx Leva resigned

as the assistant secretary for legal and legislative affairs in May 19=; 1, the office

underwent only minor organizational changes during the war. Except for the

troublesome military assistance program, an administrative and operational

headache, the Office of Foreign Military Affairs and Military Assistance, under

James H. Burns and later Frank Nash. coped well during the period with its

greatly expanded responsibilities.

Supporting McNeil's efforts to gain greater OSD control over the management of Defense funds, Marshall on 27 September 19=;0 directed the

secretaries of the military departments to name an assistant secretary or under

secretary responsible for fiscal management and to appoint departmental

comptrollers and deputy comptrollers. Delegating to McNeil the authority to

"take all necessary action and issue all necessary instructions in the area of

comptroller functions and organization," Marshall gave him functional control

over comptroller activities of the services. In December McNeil set up an

Advisory Council on Accounting Policy and Financial Procedures composed

of representatives from his office and the services. 15 By the end ofJune 1951

military accounting systems were improving and five working capital funds

had been established, simplifying business procedures and encouraging the

economical use of facilities. In other changes, McNeil established a Fiscal

Management Staff under W. Carl Blaisdell, and an Economic and International

Security Estimates Division under William H. Mautz to help cost NATO and

military assistance matters and to keep the comptroller abreast of important

economic problems. II

McNeil initiated a significant innovation around the end of 19=;0 by

bringing in BoB examiners to participate directly in the preparation of the

annual Defense budget request. He later recalled that Defense had "sold the

President on the idea of allocating 30 or 40 people from the Bureau of the

Budget" for this purpose. He remembered that BoB officials had been afraid

they "would be seduced . . . but we reassured them that they would have

'keys to the safe' and know whether we were trying to hook them or not."

The procedure yielded dividends. since BoB personnel obtained an early and

intimate view of the military's thinking. while Defense gained time in budget

preparation. The budget "markups" became a joint BoB-OSD product, "with

BoB personnel reserving the right to make their own recommendations to the

president. which they always did." 1

McNeil's highly personal management style roiled some Defense officials.

Some high Army and Air Force officers. for example. felt that McNeil, a

wartime Navy officer, favored his former service too much. Others disliked his

tendency to seek first-hand information through direct contacts within the

services rather than accepting information passed along through official
The Search for Greater Efficiency 487

channels. Marshall's Executive Office, which McNeil openly disliked, resented

his "end-around plays and . . . his own little secret contacts." 16 Nonetheless, his office maintained a commendable efficiency throughout the Korean

War years, managing its expanded functions and the far larger Defense and

military assistance budgets with a staff increase of only 30 percent-from 100

persons in June 1950 to 130 at the end of 1952. 17

Looking back shortly after leaving office, Lovett felt that at least one

reason for the increased ability to identify areas of excessive Defense cost lay

"in the introduction in the Department, largely under the stimulus of McNeil,

of the corporate form of operation." McNeil had his own personal rule for

discovering excessive costs, which he called the "40 percent effort" and

defined as the human failing that made planners ask for that much more than

they needed. To correct the situation, he felt that mixed groups of civilians

and military, with high-powered staffs, needed to review and analyze all plans

and schedules that translated strategic military plans into actual military

programs. The comptroller's office was unquestionably effective in trimming

service requests for funds. IH

The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Legal and Legislative Affairs also

handled a vastly expanded volume of work during the Korean War years.

When Marx Leva left in May 1951 Marshall named Daniel K. Edwards, a

lawyer who had served two years as mayor of Durham, North Carolina, as

assistant secretary. To succeed Felix Larkin, the able general counsel who left

in August 1951, Marshall brought in the energetic and incisive Roger Kent. In

the fall of 1951 Lovett sent Edwards to represent Defense at NATO, and

Charles A. Coolidge, a Boston lawyer, came from the State Department to the

Pentagon as Edwards's successor. Generally liked and respected, Coolidge

managed the office with finesse and skill. 1<)

By the spring of 1952 Coolidge had reorganized his office, with Roger

Kent as general counsel no longer heading a division but operating directly

from the assistant secretary's immediate office. Three divisions-Legal Services under Nathaniel H. Goodrich, Legislative Services under John G. Adams,

and Legislative Liaison under Rear Adm. Harold A. Houser-handled the

major business of the office. The increased workload during the Korean War

period resulted in a 60-percent expansion in legal and legislative personnelfrom "56 to 90 persons-between mid-19"50 and the end of 19"52. 20

After the start of the Korean War, the Pentagon's role in international

affairs and military assistance became markedly greater and more influential.

To accommodate this considerably enlarged responsibility, OSD had to make

organizational adjustments that added to the power and prestige of the

function. In keeping with the government-wide restructuring of mutual

defense assistance matters at the end of 19"50, Marshall on 11 January 1951
488 THE TEST OF WAR

appointed Burns assistant to the secretary of defense for international security

affairs. At the secretary's direction Burns added an office for North Atlantic

Treaty affairs, headed by Col. Royden E. Beebe, Jr., USAF, to the existing

offices for foreign military affairs, then under acting director Capt. Albert C.

Murdaugh, USN, and military assistance. under Maj. Gen. Stanley L. Scott,

USA. 21

Burns resigned in the summer of 1951 and was replaced by Francis

(Frank) Nash, a lawyer and professor of law at Georgetown University. Nash

had previously served Secretary of the Navy and then Secretary of Defense

Forrestal, for whom he had handled disarmament problems at the United

Nations. Since early 1951 he had been Marshall's representative on the NSC

Senior Staff and enjoyed a close rapport with the secretary. Highly regarded

within the Pentagon, Nash was also well liked by State Department and Mutual

Security personnel. John Ohly remembered him as having a "wonderful

personality, great negotiating skill, and superior intelligence; . . . a strong

friend to have in the military establishment.,,22 At least for a time, Nash

continued also as the Defense member of the NSC Senior Staff. On 3

November Lovett named Nash also as his assistant for international security

affairs and appointed Maj. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner, USA, as Nash's deputy. At

that time Lovett defined the position as including matters relating to military

assistance. foreign military affairs, North Atlantic Treaty affairs, politicomilitary matters, and the administration of occupied areas. 25

Major offices under Nash in the spring of 1952 included the Office of

Military Assistance, headed by Maj. Gen. George H. Olmsted; the Office of

Foreign Military Affairs. under Rear Adm. H.P. Smith; and the Office of North

Atlantic Treaty Affairs under Colonel Beebe. In July, by transfer from the

Munitions Board, the Office of Foreign Economic Defense Affairs, headed by

Navy Capt. Wakeman B. Thorp, also came under Nash. Helping with Nash's

NSC duties, Charles P. Noyes served as deputy representative to the NSC

Senior Staff, and Townsend W. Hoopes was an assistant for NSC affairs. Later

in 1952 Najeeb E. Halaby joined Nash as deputy for European mutual security

affairs. From a total staff of 81 persons in mid-1950, Nash's office grew to 198

at the end of 1952. 21

The Importance ofManpower

During a long military career, George Marshall had become increasingly

convinced that people were the single most important factor in the military

establishment. As he later reflected, on taking office as secretary of defense

this strong conviction was intensified by "tremendous pressures regarding
The Search for Greater Efficiency 489

manpower . , . from no less than five different offices in the Defense

Department." Moreover, 11 different agencies and some 115 field organizations had personnel responSibilities. Marshall saw the need for a single OSD

office to manage manpower-one that would centralize administration,

assure effective utilization of human resources, and establish policies to ensure

equitable treatment of personnel throughout the services. An opportunity

soon occurred when the resignation of Assistant Secretary Griffith left a

vacancy for Marshall to fill. 2~

Searching for a highly qualified assistant secretary, Marshall decided on

Anna M. Rosenberg, a recognized expert in labor relations who had previously

served in government posts under Presidents Roosevelt and Truman. Impressed with her credentials, Marshall was especially pleased with her support

for universal military training, a program long dear to his heart but still not

adopted by Congress. Surprising even Lovett, Marshall recommended Rosenberg to Truman, who immediately gave her a recess appointment subject to

Senate confirmation. She was sworn in on 15 November in Marshall's office. 26

The appointment, generally well received by the public, ran into trouble

when broadcaster Fulton Lewis, Jr., and others charged that Rosenberg had

supported a Communist-front organization. 27 Congress began an investigation, and on Leva's advice Marshall assigned Felix Larkin to shepherd the

confirmation through the Senate. The Armed Services Committee found the

charges "completely without foundation" and voted 13-0 to recommend

confirmation. On 21 December the Senate as a whole confirmed Rosenberg by

voice vote.' 28

Anna Rosenberg was a lively and impressive personality, the only Pentagon official Marshall addressed by first name. The secretary quickly gave her

broad authority to coordinate all Defense policies on military manpower and

civilian personnel,29 transferring to her office in April 1951 all Munitions

Board functions relating to manpower, industrial relations, and labor supply.

In May he abolished the Personnel Policy Board and appointed its chairman,

J. Thomas Schneider, director of personnel policy under Rosenberg; in June he

abolished the Civilian Components Policy Board, recreating it under Rosenberg as the Reserve Forces Policy Board. t Marshall and Lovett also established

a number of citizens' committees to report through Rosenberg, including, in

August 1951, the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services

(DACOWITS). ~()

To help manage these expanded responsibilities, Rosenberg selected an

• Later, the Federal Bureau of Investigation found another Anna Rosenberg who had actually

supported thc organization in question.

t This hoard later became statutory as a result of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 9 July 1952 (PL

H2-~76, sec 25:').
490 THE TEST OF WAR

able executive, Col. James F. Collins, USA. 51 Rosenberg traveled frequently

within the United States and made four extensive overseas inspection tours,

visiting most major U.S. military installations. After each trip she took actions

to remedy problems she had discovered 52 By mid-1952 her Pentagon office

had six major offices: manpower requirements, manpower utilization, manpower supply, industrial relations, armed forces information, and personnel

policy. By the end of the year, Rosenberg's staff numbered 327 full-time

civilian and military employees. 55

Much of Rosenberg's work concerned the amelioration of personal

hardships created by the huge expansion of the armed forces. In August 1950

Congress had authorized quarters' allowances for families of enlisted men (PL

8 I - 771), and Rosenberg's office sponsored and supported a flow of legislative

proposals to further improve the conditions of service life. The Veterans

Readjustment Act provided the same benefits for men serving in the Korean

War as for World War II veterans. The Combat Duty Pay Act of 1952 awarded

$45-a-month additional compensation, equal for all services, to men not

receiving other incentive pay who were subject to hostile fire for six or more

days per month. In early 1952 Rosenberg sought to have military pay raised by

10 percent, emphasizing that the cost of living had already increased well

beyond that. Congress provided a 4-percent pay raise and increased allowances by 14 percent in the Career Compensation Act of 1952 (PL 82-346). It

also continued until mid-1953 the $100-a-month bonus for volunteer medical

personnel (PL 82-410).''"'

With Marshall and Rosenberg at the helm, advocacy of universal military

training took on new life. In October 1950 Marshall considered the suggestion

that Defense might be able to "avoid a tremendous political problem" and "a

severe reaction from the American public" by asking for a Selective Service Act

amendment rather than for a universal military training law..5~ But he did not

go this route. With Rosenberg coordinating the action, Marshall presented to

Congress on 10 January 1951 a Defense plan combining a system of universal

military training with several draft changes, including a lowering of the

minimum draft age from 19 to 18 years and extension of the service period

from 21 to 27 months. After five months debating and substantially altering

the bill, Congress finally sent the Universal Military Service and Training Act

(PL 82-51) to Truman, who signed it on 19 June. 56

The act separated training and service into two programs-a temporary

draft for service and a permanent program of training. It continued the service

draft to mid-1955, increased the period of service to 24 months, established

a total military obligation of 8 years, dropped the draft age to 18 1/2 years when

all men 19 or over had been called, and made 4 months of basic training

mandatory before anyone could be sent overseas. Following Rosenberg's
The Search for Greater Efficiency 491

earlier advice, Marshall in April 1951 had directed that all new enlistees or

draftees be proportionally divided among the services on a qualitatively equal

basis. In July he went further, establishing an Armed Forces Examining

Stations Policy Board under Rosenberg and giving her responsibility for

developing policies to assure equal qualitative distribution. 37

Despite Marshall's belief that the new act was a "step of historic

significance," it did little more for universal military training than establish an

independent five-member National Security Training Commission to plan for

a future program that Congress might approve. Desiring to keep universal

training separate from the Korean combat, DoD proposed initiating a program

in FY 1953 with 60,000 18-year-olds who would receive 6 months' training

and then go into reserve units. Working closely with Pentagon officials, the

National Security Training Commission in October 1951 recommended a

60,OOO-man pilot project that would eventually grow into an 800,OOO-man

program, with the cost of the full program estimated at $4.2 billion for the

first year and $2.2 billion annually thereafter. But strong popular feelings

against universal training, especially during peacetime, made Congress consider limiting the plan to volunteers only. Although the service secretaries and

chiefs and the president approved the idea of volunteers, Congress rejected an

implementing measure in March 1952. The rejection went largely unlamented, even in Defense, where the services were not keen to take on an

additional and massive universal training program while fighting a war, and

Lovett, now secretary, apparently viewed universal training as having more

social than military value. 31>

By setting a total military obligation of eight years, the Universal Military

Training and Service Act assured a continual flow of manpower into the

various National Guard and reserve organizations of the services. At the same

time, the Pentagon had a heavy responsibility to correct conditions that had

occurred during the early Korean War callup of reserve components, when

thousands of combat veterans of World War 11, some of whom had even been

in the inactive reserves, had been called back to duty. Their military skills

made them particularly desirable, but they experienced a second uprooting

from civilian life and faced double jeopardy, while others who had not served

at all stayed home. Public complaints were numerous and loud. Called-up

reserve units also generally lacked modern equipment, had unit and individual training deficiencies, and needed reorganization. To prepare Army reserve

divisions for Korean combat required 9 to 12 months. The Air Force also

found extensive reassignment and training necessary within individual reserve

units and often aggravated unit problems by transferring key personnel; more

than seven months elapsed from callup until the first Air Guard wing saw

combat in May 1951. 3'J
492 THE TEST OF WAR

Marshall moved early to cope with the problems of the reserve forces. In

October 1950 he appointed a special committee headed by Edwin H. Burgess,

then chairman of the OSD Civilian Components Policy Board, to study the

issue and recommend necessary policies. The committee, which included

civilians as well as regular and reserve officers, refused to do away with the

state-controlled National Guard or Air National Guard' and recommended

continuation of all components of the reserve system. It called for the creation

of highly placed reserve offices in each service and a Reserve Forces Policy

Board in OSD; proposed a ready, standby, and retired classification within all

reserve components; and set across-the-board standards for pay and allowances, promotions, and separation. Approving the report in April 1951,

Marshall asked the service secretaries to prepare detailed programs for

Congress and told Burgess that the study was "one of the outstanding

accomplishments" of Defense unification.-l\l

Rosenberg pointed out to a congressional subcommittee in April that

fairness required sending home quickly the reservists who had previously

seen combat, particularly those from the inactive lists. Of a total of more than

2.7 million reservists on the rolls on 31 July 1951, some 731,000 were on

active duty, the Korean War peak. This number fell as the services made strong

efforts to release them-to about 508,000 by 30June 1952 and approximately

407,000 by the end of that year. l1

Meanwhile, in June 1951 OSD submitted a reserve bill based on the

Burgess committee's recommendations. After a year's consideration, Congress

finally passed the Armed Forces Reserve Act, which Truman signed on 9 July

1952. This legislation reaffirmed the existence of seven reserve componentsthe National Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Naval Reserve,

the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard of the United States, the Air

Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve-and created in each the

categories of ready, standby, and retired reservists. The Ready Reserve-which

was not to exceed 1.5 million persons and included all members of the

National Guards and ready reserve units-was subject to immediate recall in

time of war or national emergency either declared by Congress or proclaimed

by the president. Ready reservists not on active duty in the armed forces could

apply for standby status if their previous service qualified them. Standby

reservists were liable for active duty only when Congress declared a war or

national emergency. Even retired reservists with long service could be called

to active duty in time of war or in a national emergency declared by Congress.

This legislation, while not without problems, went a long way toward

bringing about order and equity in reserve affairs. i2

• The Navy had no national guard.
The Search for Greater Efficiency 493

Marshall also directed Rosenberg to exercise control over the seemingly

insatiable service requests for manpower, a major responsibility after the

president in April 1951 asked Defense to limit requirements and monitor

utilization of all military and civilian personnel. In July 1951 both military and

civilian DoD personnel in the Washington area came under a ceiling.

Wherever possible, the services replaced combat-qualified men in noncombatant assignments with women in uniform, men of limited combat capability,

or civilians. The replacement program went slowly because of difficulties in

hiring civilians and the failure of service efforts to recruit women, but DoD

curbed the rate of growth. 43

Rosenberg felt that Lovett's inauguration of comprehensive OSD reviews

of manpower requests for FY 1953 significantly strengthened her hand in

controlling service demands for manpower. Her office first provided detailed

and uniform policies and guidelines for all service requests; then her staff

joined with McNeil's staff and BoB representatives to review the service

programs-and ultimately to reduce military manpower goals by more than

178,000. DoD did not review civilian manpower requests as thoroughly and

allowed an increase of 147,000 for all of Defense. For FY 1954 Rosenberg's

office recommended a reduction of 154,000 in military manpower and

anticipated greater efficiencies in the use of Defense civilians. 44

The Korean War hastened progress in the integration of blacks in the

armed services previously initiated by President Truman. While the Air Force

adopted the goal of integration early, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Army

lagged behind in 1950. Korea brought about a drastic change in Marine Corps

outlook and practice. In the August battles for the Pusan perimeter, the Marine

Corps for the first time assigned large numbers of individual black servicemen

as replacements. From that time on the 1st Marine Division detailed large

numbers of black marines throughout its units. Its commander, Maj. Gen.

Oliver P. Smith, asserted that they "did everything, and they did a good job

because they were integrated, and they were good people." By March 1951

almost half of all black marines belonged to integrated combat units in Korea.

In December the Marine Corps commandant announced a general corpswide

policy of integration. 45

Integration proceeded more slowly in the Army, where many high-ranking

tradition-bound officers resisted it. When the Korean War began, blacks still

served mainly in segregated units. During the fall of 1950 many were assigned

as individual replacements to understrength white units in Korea. Although the

results of these experiments proved encouraging and the Army training divisions generally were integrated by March 1951, almost 90 percent of black

soldiers in the Army still served in segregated units. 46 Rosenberg emphasized

that integration was necessary if black manpower was to be used effectively.
494 THE TEST OF WAR

At her urging, on 2 April 1951 Marshall ordered all the services to use the

same selection standards and to share low-scoring draftees proportionately,

thus rejecting the Navy's discriminatory selection standard and the Army's

argument that its high proportion of poorly qualified men made segregated

units necessary. In the view of historian Morris MacGregor, this change

constituted the "single most significant contribution of the Secretary of

Defense" to the integration of the armed forces.'~

In May 1951, General Ridgway, who viewed separation of the races as

"un-American and un-Christian" as well as inefficient, recommended the

elimination of all-black units and a percentage integration of all Army units in

the Far East. In June he discussed the matter with Marshall during the

secretary's visit to Korea and Japan. In Washington Rosenberg pressed

Secretary Pace for affirmative action. Approving Ridgway's proposal of 1July,

the Army stipulated that integration should be spread over a 6-month period,

with black strength limited to 12 percent, or 10 percent in combat infantry

units. In Korea some all-black units were split up and their members

reassigned, while other black units received whites, the exchanges generally

occurring during normal rotation periods. By the end of October, Eighth Army

had integrated 75 percent of its infantry units; by May 1952, with 100-percent

integration achieved, "the Army began to experience the fruits of racial

harmony." Meanwhile, in December 1951, the Army ordered all major

commands to prepare integration programs, and a year later General Collins

ordered Army integration everywhere. Hl

Army and Marine Corps units in Korea proved the advantages of integration for combat. Counting a unit as segregated when it had more than 50

percent blacks, the Air Force had placed 95 percent of its blacks in integrated

units by the end of 1950; in mid-1952 there was only one segregated unit left.

By the end of 1952, the Navy had officially opened all jobs, ratings, and

schools to qualified personnel, but blacks were still clustered in the Steward's

Branch and generally found promotions slow. Although much undoubtedly

remained to be done, the integration achieved in the military services during

the war represented major progress in social change; by the end of 1954 there

were no all-black units in the armed forces. Rosenberg thought the campaign

had "effectively strengthened the defense effort. "''J

Efforts to attract women volunteers during the Korean War met with little

success, despite Rosenberg's belief that, when only men were being drafted,

"women should insist upon and assume some equality of sacrifice." Although

Congress lifted a 2-percent ceiling on women in the armed forces, the services

could not meet recruitment goals, and in November 1951 an intensive

recruitment campaign began. The Army opened 228 Army jobs short of

combat duty to women officers and permitted enlisted women to enter 19 of
The Search for Greater Efficiency 495

32 Army career fields. Women could enter 28 of 62 ratings in the Navy and 34

of 44 Air Force career fields. But the services rarely promoted women to the

higher ranks, and they wanted female recruits mainly to release qualified men

for combat duty. Between June 1950 and December 1952 the number of

women in the services rose from slightly more than 22,000 to more than

47,000, but the figures actually represented a small net percentage decline to

Ill, percent of the armed forces. While the services continued to seek women

replacements, asking for 59,500 by June 1953, actual female strength fell

slightly.so

Looking back in early 1953 on her service under Marshall and Lovett,

Rosenberg felt that her office had spared "no effort ... to meet the basic

objectives" in the field of Defense manpower and personnel. Where it had

not fully achieved these objectives, she felt it was not from any lack of

resolve. OSD colleagues generally admired what one termed a "firstrate performance." S 1

Medical Policies

Once U.S. troops entered into battle in Korea, the OSD Office of Medical

Services under Dr. Richard L. Meiling immediately assumed a larger and more

important role. Following several additions to Meiling's functions, Marshall on

2 January 1951 abolished the office and replaced it with an Armed Forces

Medical Policy Council to be headed by a civilian doctor and to include the

surgeons general of the military services and three civilian medical professionals. Meiling served as chairman of the council until 1 July 1951 when Dr.

W. Randolph Lovelace II replaced him; Dr. Melvin A. Casberg succeeded

Lovelace on 1January 1952. During the war, the council had a maximum staff

of only 24 military and civilian employees. S2

As the principal OSD agency for medical and health policy, the council

could issue directives in the secretary's name on policy matters within its

jurisdiction. Appeals from the council's decisions could be made through a

service secretary to the secretary of defense. The chairman had authority to

take action on approved council plans, programs, and policies. Forbidden to

engage in any administrative or operational duties for which an agency

already existed, much of the council's work consisted of coordinating the

interests of peripheral agencies, both inside and outside the Pentagon, • having

direct or indirect concerns with military medicine. S5

• Outside agencil's included the National Security Resources Hoard. Central Intelligence Agency.

Veterans Administration. Bureau of the Budget, State Department. U.S. Public Health Service,

American National Red Cross, National Research Council, and Atomic Energy Commission.
496 THE TEST OF WAR

Once fighting began in Korea, it became absolutely essential to meet the

urgent requirements that ensued, most immediately for blood plasma. A

program for blood plasma went into effect on 1 July 1950, and on 20 July

Secretary Johnson designated the American National Red Cross the official

collecting agency for the armed forces. In addition, World War II stocks of

blood plasma were reprocessed. Despite heavy continuing demands, particularly for whole blood, and some difficulties in the collection process, Dr.

Casberg later reported that no shortage of blood plasma ever occurred in

Korea. 51

The need for hospital beds also claimed immediate OSD attention. InJune

1950 the military services had a ceiling of 37,377 beds, including 19,734

occupied by military patients. In expectation of war casualties, Johnson late

that summer lifted the ceiling, agreed to suspend admission of any more

Veterans Administration (VA) patients to military hospitals, approved renovating and activating additional hospital facilities, and reopened or prepared to

reopen three Army hospitals closed earlier. The services maintained and

increased their joint usage of facilities. By 30 June 1951, OSD had authorized

88,800 beds, of which 47,564 were occupied by military patients. 55 Plans for

further hospital expansion went forward actively in early 1951, and progress

occurred in standardizing all service medical records and forms in order to

make interservice utilization more efficient. 56

The war brought to the fore the problem of treating long-term, severely

injured patients, for whose care military hospitals were not particularly well

equipped. Traditionally, military patients remained in military hospitals after

war service until completion of definitive care, but plans made in 1949 called

for the early discharge of such patients. In August 1950 Johnson announced

a policy of providing hospitalization for military patients until it became

apparent that the patient could not return to military duty. 57 At Truman's

direction, planning began for the utilization of VA hospitals for men being

separated from military service but still requiring long-term care. With the

president's approval, Marshall in February 1951 authorized the first patient

removals from military to VA hospitals, where it was anticipated that better,

more specialized treatment would be available. By mid-1952 this program

freed 3,541 beds in military hospitals, with substantial savings of military

funds. 58

The most pressing medical problem in 1950 was the shortage of doctors,

dentists, nurses, and other professional medical staff. While appeals went out

for nurse volunteers, DoD met an immediate requirement for doctors and

dentists that summer by sending active-duty medical officers overseas and

bringing in some medical reservists. This procedure raised questions of

fairness, since many of the approximately 6,300 active medical officers and
The Search for Greater Efficiency 497

30,000 reserve physicians had seen military service in World War II, while

many physicians more recently educated at public expense had little or no

military service. With volunteers lagging, Defense supported a draft of

doctors. s9 The so-called "doctors draft" bill, PL 81-779, signed on 9

September 1950, authorized the drafting of physicians, dentists, and other

medical specialists up to age 50, except for members of reserve units. The

draft system essentially called those with least service first, and draftees were

not to receive the $100 monthly bonus provided volunteers. The law also

allowed the secretary of defense to transfer medical officers between the

military services if both the officer and the service agreed. 60

Special doctor registrations took place in October 1950 and January

1951. With volunteers wanting, Marshall in April asked for the draft of 15,422

physicians, beginning with 4,868 in July. Truman approved a draft of

physicians starting in July 1951, but OSD canceled August and September calls

when an adequate number of volunteers responded to meet service needs.

Dentists were drafted in the spring of 1952.(ll

During the Korean War, there were about 3.7 physicians per 1,000 troops,

fewer than in World War II. Nonetheless the administration claimed that the

armed forces were receiving the "best medical care known in military

history. ,,62 Statistics supported the claim. Casberg pointed out that the rate for

death by disease alone had dropped from 7.5 percent during the Civil War and

0.06 percent in World War II to 0.05 percent, while deaths from combat

wounds had fallen from 14 percent and 4.5 percent to only 2 percent.

Moreover, 85 percent of the wounded in Korea returned to active duty

compared with only 77 percent in World War II. The use of large helicopters

to evacuate patients quickly, advances in surgical and medical procedures, and

better management of medical resources contributed to bringing down the

combat death rate. 63

The Information Function

The Korean War made possible a resurgence of the public information

function in the military services, largely negating the effort by Secretary

Forrestal in 1949 to centralize the function in OSD. A tremendous public

demand for information about the armed forces provided the military services

with an eagerly seized opportunity to expand the scale and scope of their

information activities both in the field and in Washington. In the summer of

1950 Deputy Secretary Early sanctioned a large increase in public information

staffs by the services. The OSD Office of Public Information (OPI) saw its role

eroding and its resources diminishing; after an initial spurt in personnel it

decreased from a strength of 264 in 1951 to 150 by the end of 1952.
498 THE TEST OF WAR

The decline of OPI and its powers may be attributed to the aggressiveness

of the military services in taking advantage of a wartime atmosphere and to

the relative indifference of Forrestal's successors to the organization and

control of the function, except for security review of public statements.

Marshall and Lovett apparently devoted little time and thought to the

problems of the Office of Public Information. The position of director of OPI

remained vacant from February to December 1950, when Marshall appointed

Clayton Fritchey, a well-known newspaper editor, to the post. When Fritchey

left for a White House post, Lovett appointed Andrew Berding as director on

1 July 1952. Osgood Roberts, who remained in OPI throughout the war as

acting director or deputy director, provided continuity during interregnums 64

Primarily because of problems with General MacArthur's public statements on government policy, Truman in December 1950 ordered government

officials to cut down on their public speaking and clear all statements

beforehand with State and Defense. Marshall decided to handle the clearance

procedure through his own office, and on 30 December Lovett delegated the

authority for setting clearance policy as well as security review to the OPI

director. When Truman reasserted the requirement for policy clearance after

General MacArthur's recall in April 1951, Lovett called existing procedures to

the attention of OSD officials, and in July he formalized the OSD security

review functions 6S

Congress sought to curtail the overlapping OSD and service efforts by

cutting public relations funds. In 1951 it limited funds for FY 1952 to just

under $11 million, almost $5 million less than requested; the following year

it set the FY 1953 limit at approximately $5.6 million, almost 50 percent less

than the previous year. Although these limits applied to all services worldwide, enforcement was difficult because the services could evade the limits by

transferring funds and functions. In OSD, on the other hand, Berding claimed

at the end of 1952 that his office had about half as many people as in the

spring of 1949 and operated on a budget of $550,000, covering "everything

by the strictest of accounting procedures." Forced to eliminate some OPI

functions, Berding foresaw that the services would regain a high degree of

autonomy in public information."" It was clear by 1953 that unification of the

public information function had not succeeded.

National Mobilization

Initially the Korean War required only a limited industrial mobilization,

and Truman hoped to keep it small, but once the Chinese intervened he had

to expand the effort and control it more tightly. In mid-December 1950 he
The Search for Greater Efficiency 499

declared a national emergency and established the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) within the Executive Office of the President. Naming Charles E.

Wilson, president of the General Electric Company, as ODM director, Truman

gave him responsibility for overseeing the entire preparedness effort, including the Economic Stabilization Agency and the Commerce Department's

National Production Authority.67 In January 1951 Truman also established a

Defense Production Administration to exercise general management of the

military production program subject to Wilson's "direction, control, and

coordination." Truman invited Wilson, who was generally sympathetic with

the goal of keeping mobilization as limited as possible, to attend Cabinet and

NSC meetings. The secretary of defense, meanwhile, became a member of the

Defense Mobilization Board under Wilson. 6H

Although the mobilization rose to a much higher level beginning in

December 1950, it did not approach the scale of the World War II effort. Still,

the economy inevitably felt its effect. Wilson feared that military expenses,

which had ranged between 4.6 percent and 6.2 percent of the gross national

product (GNP) in fiscal years 1947-49, would take 20 percent in the first year

of the war. To mitigate the mobilization's impact, he planned to control the

use of raw materials, expedite industrial production, and keep down

inflation. (,<)

In January 1951 Economic Stabilization Administrator Eric Johnston

decreed a general price-wage freeze in critical defense areas with some price

rollbacks later, thus irritating both labor and industry. In April the president

asked Congress for additional stabilization power and a two-year extension of

the authority granted him for one year in the Defense Production Act of 1950.

Responding in July, Congress extended the act for only one year, enlarging

some powers and limiting others, and created a Small Defense Plants Administration to encourage small businesses to participate in military production.

In 1952 Congress extended the president's authority to control prices, wages,

and rents in critical defense areas until 30 April 1953 but ended his authority

to control consumer credit on 30 June 1952.70

Truman's difficulties with Congress over his stabilization powers were

further compounded by the 1952 steel strike. When the union contract had

expired in December 1951, the steel companies and unions disagreed on new

terms, and Truman prevailed on the workers to remain at their jobs while the

Wage Stabilization Board studied the matter. When the board recommended

higher wages, better fringe benefits, and a union shop, the companies refused

unless they received a large price increase, which Truman was unwilling to

grant. Disagreement over this matter led to Wilson's resignation as ODM

director in March 1952. The unions rejected a company counteroffer and

voted to go on strike on 9 April. With Lovett and others warning of the
500 THE TEST OF WAR

damage such a strike would do to the military buildup, Truman on 8 April

directed the government to take over the steel mills while negotiations with

the workers continued-a move he considered well within his "implied"

constitutional powers. * Chief Justice Fred Vinson privately supported the

president's action. The companies sought legal redress, and on 2 June the

Supreme Court voted 6 to 3 in their favor. The workers then struck. After a

sizable wage boost, a price increase, and the loss of 20 million tons of steel

production, the strike finally ended on 24 July. As Lovett publicly declared,

the strike accomplished what "no form of bombing" could have donestopping all production for nearly two months in 380-odd steel plants.~l

The limited scale of the mobilization helped contain the threat of

runaway inflation. Compared with a 45-percent military consumption rate at

the peak of World War II, national defense expenditures never exceeded 14

percent of the GNP, well below Wilson's prediction of 20 percent for the first

year. The lower rate resulted partly hecause of the slow production start at the

beginning of the conflict. Still, DoD military expenditures (not appropriations) as a percentage of GNP more than doubled between the peacetime year

FY 1950 and the wartime year FY 1953; for all national defense expenditures,

the percentage tripled. 72

TAIlI.E 22

Korean War Expenditures as Percentage of GNP and Total Government

(in billions)

DoD Military Functions National Defense Programs *

Expend- (x) 'X, Total Expend- (Xl % 1()tal

FY itures GNP Govt itures GNP Gon

1950 511.891 45 30.1 513018 49 32.9

1951 19.764 6.4 44.9 22.47 1 7.2 51.1

1952 38.897 11. 5 59.6 4-1.037 13.1 67.4

1953 43.604 12.1 58.8 50.442 14.1 68.1

1954 40326 11. 1 59. 7 46.986 13.0 696

• "National Defense" includes activities of DoD and other agencies primarily related to

national defense, but not veterans' benefits and services.

The Truman administration did a creditable job in holding the overall rise

in the consumer price index during the Korean War to about 14 percent over

1947-49. However, the military budget experienced a much larger percentage

• In August 1950 the president had ordered the Army to take over and operate railroads when

workers threatened to strike; he returned the railroads to their owners in May 1952.
The Search for Greater Efficiency 501

increase-up to 28 percent-in the wholesale cost of metals and metal

products that composed so large a part of weapons manufacture. 73 Beyond

the use of direct controls, Truman's frugality also held down inflation.

Congressional enactment of the tax increases he called for in 1950 resulted in

a $3.5 billion surplus on 30 June 1951; the partial congressional response to

his 1951 request for increases held the FY 1952 deficit to $4 billion. However,

congressional failure to increase taxes further led Truman in January 1953 to

project deficits of $5.9 billion in FY 1953 and $14.4 billion in FY 1954.74

The Munitions Board Dilemma

From its inception in 1947 the Munitions Board was plagued by a military

challenge to civil authority, perhaps all the more vigorous and stubborn

because of the perception by the services that the board's supervision of

procurement policy could diminish their procurement responsibilities. This

apparent threat to military control of a major function involving a large share

of the service budgets remained a constant source of friction between the

civilian chairman of the board and its military members throughout the

Korean War.

The reluctance of Marshall and Lovett to endow the chairman of the

board with adequate powers to exercise authority over the services reflected

their lack of confidence in the statutory boards. This reluctance no doubt

derived also from the secretaries' disinclination to force major changes that

the military strongly opposed. As a result of the continuing indecision and

dissension within DoD, the Munitions Board did not play an effective role in

the industrial mobilization for the Korean War.

The sheer size and complexity of the military supply system also

contributed to the problems of management. In April 1951 the Army supply

program included approximately 700,000 items; the Navy program, about

779,000; and the Air Force program, more than 600,000. To equip and

maintain a single soldier overseas required more than five tons of supplies and

equipment, and by 1953 the initial equipment for a division cost approximately $175 million. 7s

In June 1950 the board had three major directorates-industrial programs, military programs, and military supply-under which some 21 councils, commissions, boards, and offices operated. That summer the Munitions

Board Cataloging Agency formally became the central government-wide

authority to develop a uniform and more efficient Federal Catalog System for

literally millions of military supply items. 76

The chronic difficulty of recruiting highly qualified people for top

government posts manifested itself in Marshall's search for a replacement for
502 THE TEST OF WAR

Hubert Howard as Munitions Board chairman. After a wide search, Marshall in

November 1950 sent Truman the name of John D. Small, a Naval Academy

graduate and New York businessman who had headed the Civilian Production

Administration for a time. After Senate confirmation, Small began revamping

the Munitions Board staff, seeking to replace the three military officers who

headed the directorates with five experienced civilians as vice chairmen.--

The Munitions Board grew in size and responsibilities during 1951. In

early February it established regional councils to coordinate military procurement and construction in the field, and in March Lovett directed that

the councils have full-time civilian chairmen to represent Small and Rosenberg and other OSD agencies on ODM-established interagency regional

committees. 7H

Within the Munitions Board difficulties in reaching decisions persisted in

1951, since three of the four board members were assistant or under

secretaries of the military departments who acted as both claimants and judges

for their own service requests and often joined forces against the chairman. In

late May 1951 Lovett asked the service secretaries to limit their board

representatives to policy determination and general supervision and leave

detailed actions to the chairman and his staff. The secretary tried to clarify and

amplify his views in a directive in July which stated that it was Defense policy

to have three basically independent military supply systems of maximum

possible uniformity, but only one service was to buy common-use items

whenever that was most efficient. The Munitions Board held the primary

responsibility, in collaboration with the military departments, for prescribing

implementation of procurement and supply policies.-')

Despite Lovett's efforts, Small's relations with the military services

deteriorated. The services agreed that the secretary of defense, through Small,

had the power to establish policies, but they emphasized that the Munitions

Board was only a planning agency, whereas they held full operational

authority. The Air Force, in particular, seemed to question Small's power to

direct any Air Force subordinate to do anything. The military departments felt

strongly that Small and his staff of businessmen were "not competent to make

executive decisions" and that the chairman could not make final decisions in

the face of unanimous service opposition. Ho

Small's position became increasingly tenuous. When the services united

against him he lacked the power to decide policy matters; without service

cooperation he could not enforce such decisions as the board made. Departmental secretaries had the right to depart from Munitions Board policies, the

services made little effort to educate field personnel concerning policies, and

practically no enforcement took place. The widely dispersed military procurement operations aggravated the problem. Furthermore, in both the Air Force
The Search for Greater Efficiency 503

and the Army procurement came under the military chain of command, and

even the civilian assistant secretaries had little control over such matters. HI

Small wanted to wield the power of decision even over the opposition of all

the other board members, a power that previous secretaries had refrained

from conferring on board chairmen. Choosing a conservative course in the

spring of 1952, Lovett allowed the Munitions Board more participation in and

control over procurement regulations but still did not give Small the final

power of decision. H2

The situation attracted the attention of Congress, which looked into

Munitions Board activities. In the fall of 1950 and again in 1951, Sen. Lyndon

B. Johnson's Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services

Committee blamed the Munitions Board, despite low pre-Korea levels of

stockpile funding, for materials shortages, particularly in rubber, wool, tin,

and tungsten. Other congressional committees investigating problems, duplication, and waste in military procurement also criticized the Munitions Board.

Lovett responded to further congressional complaints about production

bottlenecks by bringing in from industry an unpaid special assistant in

December 1951 to work with Small and the military services to help

overcome delivery lags and by setting up a small outside group to review

Defense business management procedures. H,'

In January 1952 McNeil warned Lovett and Small of a barrage of criticism,

fortunately mostly off-the-record, by members of the Defense Subcommittee

of the House Committee on Appropriations. Convinced that the military departments had inspired the assault, McNeil felt that the Munitions Board had

done a reasonably good job in many areas. It was in trouble, McNeil wrote

Lovett, for the "very simple reason that junior officers . . . on the staff are

in an almost impossible position critically to analyze and review the recommendations of senior officers of their respective services." Exploring further

at Lovett's request, McNeil reported that the congressmen felt the secretary of

defense would "bear the responsibility for what happened within the Department of Defense." Believing that Lovett had power to assign responsibilities

and to give the Munitions Board chairman greater powers of decision, they felt,

as McNeil put it to Lovett, that its chairman was the secretary's man. IH

The Munitions Board also figured prominently in the investigation of

federal supply management by the Bonner subcommittee of the House

Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments.' By March 1952

the subcommittee, highly censorious of the military procurement record, was

ready to consider new legislation and, if necessary, to extend the powers of

the secretary of defense. Lovett believed, however, that he had adequate

• This became the Committee on Government Operations on 4 July 1952.
504 THE TEST OF WAR

authority without new legislation. Concerned that if Lovett testified to this

effect he would be asked why he had not delegated more power to the

Munitions Board chairman, Assistant Secretary Coolidge warned the secretary

on 10 April that congressional reactions "could be most damaging to our

whole unification effort and to you personally. "H~

By late May 1952 the Pentagon was studying intensively the Bonner

subcommittee's report, which accused the military departments, particularly

the Air Force, of maintaining or creating separate supply systems for commonuse items. The Munitions Board generally agreed with the report. Citing five

years of "disappointing experience," the subcommittee's majority concluded

that the defense secretary needed a "stronger and clearer legislative mandate

for military unification" and recommended the creation of an assistant

secretary of defense for supply who, "without hindrance by the departmental

representatives," could work out a program to improve and integrate the

military supply systems. One subcommittee member, however, pointedly

noted that the secretary already possessed the power to resolve the problem

and questioned why he had failed to do so. H(,

In mid-June representatives of McNeil's and Coolidge's offices recommended that Lovett give the Munitions Board head the power of decision,

even if this step might "also entail the selection of another Chairman." They

also suggested resolving the board's military staffing problem by obtaining a

presidential directive authorizing the secretary of defense to control the

appointment or promotion of military officers serving in OSD.· The OSD

officials recommended that Lovett see Truman personally about this last

proposal, lest the president's own military aides "sidetrack or scuttle it. "H~

Loath to interfere in military promotions, Lovett refused to pursue the

idea. He had still not made up his mind how to resolve the Munitions Board

problem when he followed a long workday with three-and-a-half hours before

the Bonner subcommittee the night of 24 June. Lovett testified that, although

the secretary of defense possessed adequate legal authority to make the

organizational changes necessary for efficiency even in the face of service

challenges, he planned to use such authority only when a military department's practices clearly impaired effectiveness-a course of action that might

take more time but which over the long run, he judged, would make Defense

a "much more virile and effective organization than if I were continually

cramming things down the throats of the military Departments. "HH

• At that time OSD civilian chiefs either filled in the officers' fitness reports and left them for a

higher-rank officer of the same service to sign, or they wrote letters to he attached to formal

fitness reports. In either case, civilian views might or might not he taken into account in the

formal rating. In the spring of 1955 President Eisenhower made the civilian supervisor

responsihle for hoth completing and signing the single fitness report.
The Search for Greater Efficiency 505

Lovett's doubts about giving more authority to the Munitions Board

chairman grew in part out of his perception that the services viewed supply

functions as an integral extension of their command responsibilities and their

statutory right to separate administration. Lovett wanted the large Defense

apparatus to have unified, centralized policy direction and decentralized

operations. Furthermore, he was uncertain that supply centralization, which

already accounted for 75 percent of purchases by dollar amount, was good per

se. Bigger orders did not always result in lower prices. Decentralization, in

fact, often resulted in "a high degree of integration of the user and designer,

purchaser and producer." Nonetheless, he admitted the need to improve the

Munitions Board operation, and he conceded that the board would not be

adequate under full mobilization. Some of the congressmen told him they

considered it already inadequate under partial mobilization. H9

Lovett felt that no one action, such as the creation of a new assistant

secretary of defense or the grant of sole power of decision to the chairman,

was the answer; he wanted to look more closely at the board's current

functions and composition. He recognized that restrictions on the board went

too far and that it lacked clear authority in many areas, but he thought it

"equally clear that a slashing change in the procurement responsibilities of the

Military Departments would ... be most unwise." In any event, he preferred to move slowly, carefullyYo

Reviewing Lovett's testimony the next day, Coolidge thought the secretary had made damaging admissions and would be in a "very weak position"

if he failed to act at once to remedy the Munitions Board's defects and give its

chairman the sole power of decision. Although both Lovett and Foster

associated the board's failures with Small personally, Lovett on 29 July issued

a new Munitions Board charter giving the chairman the power of decision on

all matters falling under the board's jurisdictionyJ

During the same period, the Munitions Board became the secretary's

primary staff agency for implementing section 638 of the Defense Appropriations Act of 1953, which provided that the services could spend no money

for procurement, supply, or distribution except under regulations approved by

the secretary of defense. Previously, the services had separately promulgated

such regulations. In September 1952 the secretary of defense established the

Armed Services Procurement Regulation, applicable to all of the services.92

Meanwhile, further organizational changes in the Munitions Board had

the net effect of diminishing rather than enhancing Small's responsibilities. By

the spring of 1952 he had four major officials under him-John C. Houston,

Jr., as executive vice chairman; Harold R. Austin as vice chairman for

production and requirements; Nathaniel Knowles, Jr., as vice chairman for

materials; and Rear Adm. Morton L. Ring as acting vice chairman for supply
506 THE TEST OF WAR

management. On 29 July Foster transferred most of the functions of the Office

of International Programs from Houston to Nash's Office for International

Security Affairs.'!' Then, as a result of the Cataloging and Standardization Act

(PL 82-436, 1 July 1952), Foster in September established a new Defense

Supply Management Agency, headed by Rear Adm. .J.W. Fowler. Also in

September, in accordance with the Military Construction Act (PL 82-5.14, 14

July 1952), Lovett transferred Munitions Board responsibilities for public

works and family housing to a separate director of installations reporting to

the secretary of defenseY'

The Munitions Board staff grew from 706 (588 civilians and 118 military)

in June 1950 to 896 a year later, but with the divestiture of so many of its

functions in 1952 it dropped to 553 (458 civilians and 95 military) by the end

of that year. Not only materials and production problems but the constant

changes in and inherent weakness of the board's organization, the divergent

interests of OSD and the military services, and the secretary's apparent lack of

confidence in its chairman contributed to Munitions Board difficulties during

the war.'J';

The Munitions Board experience demonstrated the variety of organizational pressures that could plague the secretary of defense. When one asks

why Lovett did little to improve the situation, one must bear in mind the

constraints he faced. Established by statute, the boards could not be abolished

without congressional action. Although Congress urged changes, Lovett

sidestepped the issue because of uncertainty about what specific changes to

sponsor and doubt that change would result in long-run improvements in

operations. To reorganize the board when he had little time left in office

would have superimposed the hurden of change on already trouhlesome

problems. Since the board form of organization was proving weak, one could

suggest that Lovett should at least have moved quickly and decisively to find

a chairman better able to lead the board. But. as under previous secretaries,

the choice of candidates for this onerous and modestly paid position was

limited. Even if such a person had been found, there would have been, after

mid-1952, less than seven months for him to learn and undertake an

extraordinarily complicated job. Furthermore, a dominant chairman might

well have inflamed rather than damped down service-OSD friction. Hence, it

is not hard to understand why Lovett opted to hold off and save his

recommendations for reform for a later secretary of defense.

The Research and Del'e{0!Jment Board

The deficiencies inherent in the board system, so strikingly manifested in

the experience of the Munitions Board, also aftlicted the Research and
The Search for Greater Efficiency 507

Development Board (RDB) during the Korean War. There also the basic

problems centered on the powers of the chairman and the extent of the

board's authority over the military services, which habitually sought maximum independence of OSD.

Under regulations in 1950, the RDB chairman could make a final decision

only when the other six board members, representing the military services,

were not unanimous. He could take executive action on any issue when he

judged that it did not require, or time did not permit, formal board action.

However, a board member could challenge the chairman's decision by

appealing through his service secretary to the secretary of defense. 96

In February 1951 Marshall redefined the RDB charter, allowing the board

to issue directives in the secretary's name to implement its policies and

decisions; the chairman retained the power of decision when the board was

not unanimous. Nevertheless, the scientific community viewed the board as

having "too little (or no) authority and insufficient information" to deal with

the large-scale scientific needs created by the Korean War. Some observers saw

the board's system of committees and panels, composed mainly of part-time

people, as unable to "analyze the problems and see the whole picture." To

provide advice and guidance at another level, the president established a

Science Advisory Committee in the Office of Defense Mobilization; Oliver E.

Buckley, former president of Bell Laboratories, became its chairman in April

195 I. The new committee met only a few times a year, however, and played

little part in the redirection of scientific matters during the Truman

administration. 9~

Walter G. Whitman succeeded William Webster as RDB chairman on 1

August 1951. On leave from the chemical engineering department at the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Whitman had seen World War II

service with the War Production Board, explored the concept of a nuclearpowered aircraft, and served on the RDB committee on fuel and lubricants

and the AECs General Advisory Committee. A strong and aggressive administrator, Whitman nonetheless once told a congressional committee that the

ROB job was "too big for only one man." Since he did not want to be "carried

out on a stretcher," Whitman established an internal nine-man policy group to

prepare for the monthly board meetings by examining the work of the various

RDB committees and panels, taking into account JCS and Munitions Board

advice, and developing programs for the board's consideration. *91-{

* In IlJ'; I the statutory board consisted of Webster ami later Whitman as chairman plus Army

lnder SeLTetan' Archihald S. Alexander. :-Jayy l'nder Secretary Dan A. Kimhall. Air Force tinder

Secretary John A. :\\cCone. Army Maj. (;en Ward H. Maris. Rear Adm. Maurice 1'. Curts. and Air

Force .\laj. (;en. (;ordon P. Sayille. The military men headed their sen'iccs' research and

deYelopment effort By .\lay IlJ';2 RIlB memhership included Whitman as chairman. Army
508 THE TEST OF WAR

Over time Whitman realized that organization alone could not resolve

certain issues, particularly those concerning the chairman's relations with the

military services and the touchy matter of duplication in service efforts. Like

the chairman of the Munitions Board, Whitman felt keenly his lack of real

control over the services. He particularly sought for himself authority over

service budgets for research and development and the right to delete unproductive or duplicative programs, matters on which the full board currently

held final authority. In March 1952 he asked Lovett for a new charter giving

the RDB chairman sole power to make recommendations on these two

matters,'>') Congressional criticism that the current situation fostered service

duplication reinforced Whitman's position. In early April 1952, for example,

John Taber, the powerful senior minority member of the House Committee on

Appropriations, complained that Whitman was "surrounded" by service

representatives and not "allowed to make any decision or to do anything

which would put this set-up in order." 100

Over the objections of the military, Lovett finally decided to approve a

revised charter; in May I 952 he granted the ROB chairman the authority he

sought. While Whitman viewed the new charter as granting him, functionally

if not actually, a "second hat as an Assistant Secretary of Defense," service

representatives regarded the new grant of authority as inconsistent with the

National Security Act. Soon after Lovett left office, Whitman suggested that

Congress change the legislative framework to clarify the RDB chairman's

powers, particularly to give him more choice in the selection of board

members. Looking back, however, he thought that Lovett's charter had

provided the means for operating in a "reasonably satisfactory" way. 101

During the Korean War period, Defense obligation funds for direct costs

of research and development rose from $525 million in FY 1950 to 5987

million in FY 1951 and $1,287 million in FY 1952, an increase of almost 150

percent. These sums were only a small portion (about 3 1/2 percent) of the total

military budget. Despite the significant expansion of funds and work, the ROB

staff declined from 315 in mid-1950 to 272 at the end of 1952. 102

Reviewing in early 1953 his ROB experience. Whitman thought that the

failure to develop long-range integrated planning for DoD research and

development "under the direct leadership of the Secretary of Defense" was

the greatest deficiency in the ROB process. The ROB committees paralleled

the interests of the armed forces. and they included many military officers

deeply committed to current fields of research. The board thus tended to

focus on established military interests rather than "radically new conceptual

Assistant Secretary Earl D. Johnson and :\laj. Gen. Kenneth D. Nichols. ;\Iavy Assistant Secretary

for Air John F. Floberg and Rear Adm. Maurice E. Curts, and Air Force ['nder Secretary Roswell G.

Gilpatric and Maj. Gen. Donald L. Putt.
The Search for Greater Efficiency 509

ideas" that might lead to major breakthroughs. The situation did not bode

well for what Whitman judged the dominant U.S. military need in the next 5

to 10 years-an adequate defense, including a U.S. retaliatory capability,

against a Soviet nuclear attack. Because future security depended on the

effective prosecution of research and development, Whitman felt that the

secretary of defense needed to act immediately to tackle the long-range

need. IO~

The difficulty in long-range planning, Whitman believed, was compounded by the RDB chairman's lack of direct contact with the Joint Chiefs,

who seemed too involved in the Korean War to think about long-term

problems and too deficient in scientific thinking and outlook to deal with

highly technical matters. Whitman, in fact, had once suggested that, to make

a start, Lovett should establish a small planning team under the deputy

secretary of defense, including the JCS chairman, the Munitions Board

chairman, and the RDB chairman. Lovett, however, did not act on this

recommendation, and Whitman continued to worry in 1953 about "applying

proper selective emphasis" in research and development. [04

Marshall's and Lovett's efforts to achieve administrative and operational

efficiency within the Defense establishment went hand in glove with Truman's larger effort to control inflation and maintain the nation's economic

health while fighting a war. Truman's careful scrutiny of overall military costs,

curtailment of other government programs, imposition of economic controls,

and efforts, even though only partially successful, to raise taxes had a

generally beneficial effect. The Korean War effort stimulated the U.S. economy while adding less than $14 billion to the public debt by mid-1954, a fact

the Eisenhower administration was pleased to discover. 105

The small wartime increase in the public debt was, however, no indicator

of the war's cost in terms of dollars. McNeil in 1955 estimated that the direct

costs of the Korean War amounted to $18.1 billion, of which $2.3 billion was

for military personnel, $12.4 billion for supply and ammunition, $1.6 billion

for transportation costs, and $1.8 billion for support costs in the continental

United States and Far East Command. McNeil's estimate was the informed

guess of a knowledgeable person, but even he could have no idea of the

precise figure since federal accounting systems did not separate Defense

expenses for Korean combat from those for other military expenses. JOe,

Two other sources outside the Department of Defense estimated the

military cost of the war for fiscal years 1951-53 at $29.3 billion and $54

billion. For all national security costs, the first estimate set the price at about
CHART 9

OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

15 OCTOBER 1952

PRINCIPAL MILITARY ADVICE r------

I SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

r------------,

I JOINT SECRETARIES I I GROUP I

- - - - - - - - - - - - - DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE r------

r - - - - -...! - - - - - -, I DIRECTOR I I DEFENSE I EXECUTIVE OFFICE

I MANAGEMENT COUNCIL I -------------

I I I r--L-i I

ASSISTANT ASSISTANT ASSISTANT ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN RESEARCH MILITARY

SECRETARY OF SECf,~~1~~l OF SECf,~~1~~l OF SECRETARY FOR OF THE AND JOINT CHIEFS LIAISON

DEFENSE (Manpower and (Legal and INTERNATIONAL MUNITIONS DEVELOPMENT OF STAFF COMMITIEE

(Comptroller) Personnel) Legislative Affairs) SECURITY AFFAIRS BOARD BOARD TO AEC

I I I

I I I

RESERVE MUNITIONS DsEJ~~L;E WEAPONS SYSTEMS

FORCES BOARD MANAGEMENT EVALUATION

POLICY BOARD AGENCY GROUP

I I I I I I I

DEFENSE MILITARY TRAFFIC DIRECTOR OF DIRECTOR OF ASS~~l~NE~l~yTHE ARMED FORCES DIRECTOR OF

MANAGEMENT SERVICE GUIDED MISSILES ADMINISTRATION FOR PUBLIC MEDICAL POLICY INSTALLATIONS

STAFF INFORMATION COUNCIL

MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

I I

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY I IDEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY I I DEPARTM~~~COt THE AIR I
The Search for Greater Efficiency 5 11

$79 billion, still excluding interest costs or veteran benefits; the second

estimate of $164 billion included interest and veteran benefits. 107

The end of the Korean War in July 1953 did not bring about a settlement

of East-West differences. As a result, Defense expenditures did not return to

the rates of fiscal years 1948-50 (4.8-6.0 percent of GNP and 32.7-37.0

percent of government expenditures) but continued at a level of 9.9 to 10.7

percent of GNP (from a high of 12.1 in FY 1953) and 61.5-63.2 percent of all

federal spending during fiscal years 1955-57. 10H The continuation of such

large defense expenditures in peacetime made departmental efficiency a

matter of ongoing concern.

As Marshall and Lovett had discovered, however, creating a sound and

efficient Defense organization was no easy task. Military mobilization was

extremely complicated. The vastness of the effort, the interrelated and

competitive nature of many military programs, the swift pace of technology,

and the impact of military needs on the civilian sector made for enormous

complexity. By degrees rather than by large, sweeping strokes, nudging here

and pushing there, Marshall and Lovett worked to effect change and improvement. They achieved demonstrable if incomplete success in moving the

department farther along the road to unification in the form of greater

centralization of power in OSD.

More thorough changes in the direction of centralization occurred shortly

after Lovett left office and may be attributed chiefly to Lovett's spadework.

That Marshall and Lovett did not seek to bring about more substantial changes

while in office stemmed from several considerations. Their preoccupation

with the war and other persistent demands left them little time or inclination

to initiate innovations that would require significant additional attention,

including preparation of legislative proposals and testimony before congressional committees. Moreover, their short tenures probably deterred them from

undertaking a large-scale reshaping of OSD and the department. It remained

for a new administration, headed by a president of great military prestige and

commanding widespread public support, to implement some of the important

reforms that Lovett recommended as his term drew to a close.
CHAPTER XXIV

The Civil-Military Dimension

Progress toward armed services unification, or more accurately cooperation, desired by sponsors of the original legislation establishing the Department of Defense, hinged largely on the achievement of an effective working

relationship between DoD's civil and military elements. Finding the appropriate line between civil and military authority remained elusive because of

the imprecision or absence of statutory language, overlapping bureaucratic

jurisdictions, and the inconsistencies resulting from frequent leadership

changes.

At the beginning of the Korean War DoD was an unfinished creation, still

in the process of evolution toward a more coherent and cohesive organism.

The first secretary of defense, James Forrestal, had never succeeded in gaining

the full confidence of President Truman, for which he paid a price in his

efforts to establish effective control over his own department. Originally,

Louis Johnson had a good rapport with Truman and demonstrated his loyalty

to the president's policy in his unceasing efforts to cut the costs of defense.

Awareness within DoD that Johnson was the president's man and had his

support helped the secretary to attain a greater measure of control over and

compliance from the military services than Forrestal had achieved. When the

Korean War destroyed Johnson's public credibility and made him a political

liability, Truman found it advisable to fire him.

George Marshall, who enjoyed the admiration and respect of the president, retained Truman's confidence throughout his tenure. A towering military

figure, greatly respected by both civil and military authorities, Marshall

achieved an effective orchestration of the two elements within the Pentagon

without a major organizational reform. Lovett also refrained from large-scale

organizational change, but he concluded as he left office that civil authority

and control over the military needed to be reinforced. Still, despite the

513
514 THE TEST OF WAR

broadened responsibilities of the military services during these wartime years,

Marshall and Lovett maintained overall civilian control within the Pentagon

and established a foundation for further advances in such control.

Like other department heads, the secretaries of defense played the dual

and often ambivalent roles of the president's man and the representative of

departmental interests. Their prestige and power within DoD depended in no

small part on their ability to secure the resources desired by the military

services. Their status with the president depended on their willingness and

ability to carry out his policies. Marshall and Lovett generally succeeded in

finding a middle course between the president's desire to keep defense costs

down and the military services' demands for money; they benefited greatly in

this regard from the huge increases in the military budget during the Korean

War that provided the armed forces with much but never all that they wanted.

They succeeded in holding money and manpower requests from the military

services to reasonable levels, making the deep cuts, and thereby allowing the

president and Congress to deal with realistic DoD budgets and not the "wish

lists" originally submitted by the services. This intensive budget review, in

which McNeil played a key role, was one of the most time-consuming,

stressful, and vital services rendered by the secretaries.

The president gave Marshall and Lovett an unusually free hand in running

the military establishment. According to Lovett and Deputy Secretary Foster,

the president did not play politics with Defense. He left to the secretary and

the deputy secretary the appointment of Pentagon officials. Moreover, the

White House consulted them on the appointment of officials even at the

assistant secretary level in the military departments. They could see the

president at the White House any time on a half-hour's notice, and Truman

came to the Pentagon occasionally to meet with them and the Joint Chiefs.

Lovett spoke of Truman's attitude toward Marshall and himself as "so trusting,

so forthright, so heartwarming." I

Because so many foreign policy decisions depended on military considerations during this period, the secretary of defense exercised greater influence over such decisions than in peacetime. Johnson had too little political

capital left during his wartime tenure to benefit from the changed circumstances. But Marshall and Lovett enjoyed great respect and attention in the

policymaking role, their status further enhanced by their experience at the

State Department, where they had served from 1947 to 1949 as secretary and

under secretary respectively. Their intimate relationship with Secretary of

State Dean Acheson fostered the close and influential working connection

with State that Johnson had rebuffed so cavalierly and foolishly. Not until the

Kennedy and Johnson administrations of the 1960s did a secretary of defense

exert as much influence over foreign policy decisions as did Marshall and
The Civil-Military Dimension 515

Lovett. Their breadth of view and confidence afforded more than adequate

sanction for overruling on occasion the more narrowly military and sometimes parochial judgments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military services.

Thus Marshall sided with the State Department against the JCS on the timing

and some of the provisions of the Japanese peace treaty, and he rejected JCS

pressures for increases in military assistance funds in the FY 1952 budget.

Lovett overruled the proposals of the Military Liaison Committee and the JCS

in 1952 for legislation to permit certain kinds of exchanges of information on

atomic matters with foreign countries.

Because of the increasing exercise of legislative oversight of Defense

matters, the congressional relationship became of greater importance to OSD.

As the appropriations committees of the two houses of Congress delved more

deeply into the Korean War DoD budgets, the burden on the secretary of

defense and his principal assistants to maintain good relations with Congress

grew. Johnson, Marshall, and Lovett spent a significant part of their time

testifying at congressional hearings and conducting other business with

legislators and their committees. It is likely that they devoted more of their

workday to congressional matters than the 14 percent that Forrestal spent. 2

The congressional demands on the secretaries' time diminished their

capacity to manage the department and forced them to rely more heavily than

they might have preferred on their staff, theJCS, and the service secretaries for

advice and assistance. OSD and the military services maintained large staffs for

the express purpose of dealing with congressional matters. McNeil maintained

a special liaison staff of his own to handle budget business with the

appropriations committees. Moreover, virtually all elements of OSD and

military service staffs became involved to some degree or other in matters

pertaining to Congress. Access to Congress by the military services provided

them with opportunities to "end run" OSO, lobbying on behalf of their own

interests contrary to OSD positions.

The pressures of the war tended to discourage any disposition to make

sweeping changes in DoD organization. Even so, Marshall and Lovett continued the progress, in a modest way, toward interservice cooperation and

integration of functions begun by Forrestal and Johnson. A number of

functions were integrated at the interservice or OSD level, including supply

management, military housing, technical information, parachute testing, and

use of commercial transportation in the continental United States.' The vital

significance of coordinating communications intelligence led to the establishment in 1952, by presidential order, of the National Security Agency, which

came under the direction of the secretary of defense, the designated executive

agent for foreign signals intelligence and the communications security of the

government. 4
516 THE TEST OF WAR

The Military

The creation of the integrated structure for national security affairs and

the growing power of the secretary of defense inevitably brought civiliansprimarily the secretary, his deputy, and the assistant secretaries-increasingly

into matters that had been largely the domain of the military. The primary

areas in which tension between civil and military authority became manifest

were roles and missions, centralized direction of military operations, the

budget, manpower controls, procurement, and foreign military assistance-all

matters of the most intense concern to the services. The basic issue was where

to draw the line between the realms of the military and the civilian leadership,

which, of course, included the president and the secretary of state as well as

the secretary of defense. In particular, and increasingly, this had to do with the

trend toward greater direction from Washington of military operations and

tactics in the field. During the Korean War the military, especially General

MacArthur, complained about the incursion of civilian authority into strategic

and tactical matters they viewed as a military preserve.

The disputes between Washington and MacArthur that finally led to his

dismissal in April 1951 centered on the limits of the field commander's

authority. MacArthur interpreted directives and guidance from all levels in

Washington-Army, JCS, the secretary of defense, and the president-in ways

that afforded him wider latitude of action and expression than intended. In

part, this may be attributed to the ambiguity, vagueness, or contradictory

nature of such guidance. The confusion and uncertainty in Washington in

making policy and in wording directives during the extremely hectic months

from June 1950 to April 1951 gave the general ample opportunity to indulge

his own inclinations and preferences on strategy and tactics. His military

initiatives were secondary considerations in the decision leading to MacArthur's dismissal. In Truman's mind, MacArthur's principal transgression was

the public airing of views on U.S. strategy and policy contrary to those of the

president, an act of insubordination that also had damaging domestic and

international political repercussions. Truman-and in this belief he had the

support of Acheson, Marshall, and the Joint Chiefs-regarded such statements

by MacArthur as improper and unwarranted intrusions by a military commander into political matters beyond his province. Although MacArthur

professed that he was simply exercising his right to express views on military

matters, he obviously ignored direct orders from his commander in chief to

clear such statements with Washington before issuing them.

The MacArthur dismissal damaged the Truman administration politically

and fed the growing disillusionment of the American public with the Korean

War. Because of Defense's staunch support of the president's decision, it also
The Civil-Military Dimension 517

suffered, especially in Congress, from the storm of criticism against the

administration. Had anyone other than George Marshall been secretary of

defense at the time it is likely that even greater criticism would have been

visited on the department.

The removal of MacArthur from command in the Far East represented an

extreme in the disputes over policy and action that have frequently characterized relations between field commanders and higher authority. MacArthur's

successors, Ridgway and Clark, also protested and opposed decisions from

Washington, including priorities for forces, armistice negotiations, bombing

policies, and prisoner-of-war policies.

In Europe, Eisenhower, shortly after becoming SACEUR, found himself at

odds with Washington on such important issues as the size of American force

contributions to NATO and military assistance programs. As Eisenhower's

successor at SHAPE, Ridgway again had occasion to take issue with Washington. Efforts to compose the diverse and often opposing interests of the United

States and the rest of NATO led to strong and sometimes intense differences

between SACEUR and Washington.

The incidence and intensity of differences between Washington and the

field commanders appears to have been greater during the Korean War years

than during World War II. Certainly the major theater commanders of World

War II, Eisenhower and MacArthur, especially the latter, had disagreements

with the higher command and the political authorities, but with lesser domestic political repercussions than during the Korean War period. The limited

political and military objectives in Korea imposed greater strains on military

commanders than did the unconditional surrender objective of World War II.

Limitations imposed by civil authorities on the scope, intensity, and objectives

of operations often compounded problems in the battle area and added to the

normal friction in relations with Washington. The conclusion of armistice

negotiations required two years of the most frustrating and bitter disputation

instead of a few days as in World War II. The burden of both fighting and

negotiating under often constricting and sometimes ambiguous conditions

prescribed by Washington fell entirely on the theater commanders and their

subordinates. Inevitably the more narrowly focused views and purposes ofthe

theater commanders clashed with the global view of higher authority.

Fighting a war with a host of allies entertaining different and changing

political and military objectives created further strains and complications for

the U.S. defense effort. In South Korea the Rhee government sought the

complete defeat of North Korea and the unification of the two countries-

-goals that the United States and the UN abandoned after the Chinese

Communists entered the war in November 1950. By contrast, the UN, and

particularly the allied countries fighting in Korea, sought to impose restraints
518 THE TEST OF WAR

on the Unite~ States, to keep the war limited, and to terminate it as soon as

possible. These differences had important military consequences as the 000

and the field commanders found themselves buffeted from all sides and amid

these crosscurrents having to make decisions and choices that affected vital air

and ground military operations. Field commanders experienced confusion,

frustration, annoyance, and cynicism. Marshal of the RAF Sir John Slessor,

writing in 1954, no doubt voiced the sentiments of many U.S. military men:

"War without allies is bad enough-with allies it is hell!"s

Despite the enlarged OSD civilian role, the military services retained

much power within the Defense establishment. Although seemingly reduced

to providing support for the unified commands, the services enjoyed remarkable success in holding onto many functions and prerogatives, exercising

leverage through continuing control within their own organizations of the

military essentials-money, men, materiel, research and development, choice

of weapons, and, above all, the assignment and promotion of personnel.

The service chiefs remained key figures within the defense structure,

functioning as military heads of their services, executive agents of the ]CS,

members of the Armed Forces Policy Council, and members of the ]CS-in

which last role they were principal military advisers to the president, the

secretary of defense, and the NSC. They reported to their departmental

secretaries on matters within the scope of the secretaries' authority. Through

the ]CS they exercised strategic direction over all elements of the armed

forces, and, as executive agents, individual chiefs of staff exercised operational control over unified commands on behalf of the ]CS. The services

retained administrative and logistical control over the component commands

of the unified commands. Moreover, unified commanders had little voice in

the preparation of statements of requirements for the component commands;

the force and materiel programs prepared by the services seemed often based

on considerations that had more to do with the overall interests of the services

than with the operational needs of the combat commands. Consequently, the

preferences of the services for particular kinds and quantities of units and

weapons might not accord with the preferences of the unified commands.

Thus, the Air Force gave top priority to strategic bombers even though unified

commanders and the other services wanted more tactical fighters and transports. The Army sought guided missiles and atomic weapons even as combat

commanders called for more divisions and tanks. The Navy continued its

quest for a strategic atomic mission through continued development of supercarriers and larger carrier aircraft, sometimes at the expense of other operational needs.

In strategic planning, supposedly the realm of the ]CS and the unified

commands, the military services continued to play a large role. Their
The Civil-Military Dimension 519

headquarters staffs dominated the joint military planning and decisionmaking

process through their review ofJCS plans and the assignment to the Joint Staff

of officers whose first loyalty was to their services. The pull of service

remained dominant even as the Defense structure became larger and more

complex, and allegiance to service above other entities remained the norm.

The military services frequently united in opposing the growing centralization of power in OSD and any exercise of greater operational control by

OSD ,over the military, as in the Munitions Board and the Research and

Development Board. They consistently opposed structural and procedural

changes that threatened their power and influence. Forced to yield on

occasion to strong secretaries such as Johnson, Marshall, and Lovett, they

often found ways to evade secretarial authority and control.

Relations between the secretary of defense and the Joint Chiefs improved

after the departure ofJohnson in September 1950. As a former Army chief of

staff, Marshall fully appreciated the accomplishments and contributions of the

Joint Chiefs and generally supported them. "I frankly doubt," he told the

Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations in May 1951

during the MacArthur hearings, "that this Government will ever [again] be so

fortunate as to have such a collection of experience at one time in the Chiefs

of Staff. ,,6

When Lovett succeeded Marshall, the close and cordial association

between the secretary and the Joint Chiefs continued, but on a somewhat

different basis. Lovett, despite his high War Department position during

World War II, lacked the military background to elicit JCS deference comparable to that accorded Marshall, and his affable temperament contrasted

notably with Marshall's stiffer, more formal style. Moving around the Pentagon

more than Marshall, Lovett often joined the chiefs in the secure JCS meeting

room, known later as the "tank," and frequently saw them in his own office.

Even so, General Collins never felt that he got to know Lovett on a personal

basis, although he had "considerable admiration for him as a man." In

retrospect, Collins felt that Lovett "never had any great influence on the

thinking of the JCS." General Carter, director of the OSD Executive Office

under both Marshall and Lovett, felt that, although there may have been

differences between the secretaries of defense and the Joint Chiefs on

occasion, there were no real quarrels. In his view, "General Marshall, and Mr.

Lovett too, respected the military position of the Joint Chiefs and their

military advice." They, in turn, respected the secretary's position. Lovett

commented shortly after he left office that there was "never any question" of

the Joint Chiefs disputing the line of authority.7

The JCS structure and procedures remained the same during the period.

When the defense secretary sent a matter to the Joint Chiefs for consideration,
520 THE TEST OF WAR

they generally assigned it to one of three, high-level.JCS committees for

strategic plans, logistic plans, and intelligence matters. The relevant committee assigned the question to a joint staff group for research and preparation of

a paper which made its way back through the responsible JCS committee to

the Joint Chiefs for consideration. The processing of papers became a problem

during the Korean War period since the number of questions submitted for

JCS review multiplied and no real machinery existed for separating the

important from the less important queries-thus creating a logjam which

severely taxed the staff and the individual chiefs. Lovett once estimated that

more than a third ofJCS papers concerned "ordinary routine administrative

matters," including such questions as what agency should operate the services' coffee-roasting plants. H

Since the joint staff system tended to preserve individual service views,

any real reconciliation of such views had to come from the Joint Chiefs

themselves, who had the power to compromise issues and make concessions,

Beyond the JCS, the secretary of defense, with the help of his OSD staff, had

responsibility for passing judgment on JCS recommendations and decisions,

but OSD did not necessarily have full access to JCS information. Through their

control of the flow of the information to OSD and the service secretaries, the

service chiefs could do much to shape the nature and direction of policy on

important issues. Jealous of their role as military advisers to the president, the

chiefs maintained that as members of the JCS their deliberations and internal

papers were privileged and available to OSD only with their consent. On

occasion they apparently decided not to inform OSD about certain matters.

From the standpoint of OSD officials, this "standoffishness," as Frank Nash

called it, created an "iron curtain" shutting out OSD and its staff agencies and

consequently hindering OSD operations. Nash complained that "trying to

pierce the corporate veil" of the Joint Staff was a most difficult job; yet he saw

it as the "most important task" in developing fully coordinated Pentagon

positions on major issues,'"

An important channel of information between the Joint Chiefs and OSD,

General Bradley as chairman presided atJCS meetings, although by law he had

no "vote," a restriction that Lovett felt diminished the position. Strictly

speaking, the Joint Chiefs did not vote, arriving at their conclusions through

discussion. When the Joint Chiefs completed their deliberations, Bradley, who

met with the secretary often, informed him, usually in writing, of their

recommendations or disagreement, commenting freely and discussing the

matter verbally with the secretary. Although Bradley briefed the president

often, he generally left it to Marshall or Lovett to inform the president and

NSC of formal JCS recommendations and his own concurrence or nonconcurrence. 10
The Civil-Military Dimension 521

Since the secretaries of defense preferred to receive a unanimous JCS

recommendation, they frequently asked for further JCS review when split

decisions occurred. One result, General Vandenberg noted, was that the chiefs

felt a "powerful pressure from above" to reach agreement. Negative public

attitudes about interservice squabbles also influenced them to resolve their

differences. Vandenberg felt that the search for unanimity sometimes went too

far, failing to allow sufficient opportunity for individual chiefs to present

differing sides of arguments or for responsible superiors to hear them. He also

thought that the need to compromise made some interservice log-rolling

unavoidable. His negative assessment, some time after theJCS disagreement in

the fall of 1951 over the Air Force budget share, made clear that he and

Finletter were never truly satisfied with the compromise, each believing that

U.S. national security was being jeopardized. Although General Collins and

Admiral Fechteler opposed the Air Force's strategic view, they agreed that

strongly held positions often reflected true conviction, not simply service

loyalty. I I

While the secretary of defense might seek JCS unanimity, that did not

mean he would necessarily agree with their opinion or recommendation.

Since the Joint Chiefs were supposed to give military advice, and the secretary

had to take into consideration political, budgetary, international, and other

factors, disagreement was sometimes inevitable. In the 1951 budget argument,

for instance, the Air Force disagreement with a balanced rearmament policy at

least forced a review of the policy. The pressures on the secretary of defense

from the military services could be powerful and at times unrelenting, as

Forrestal had experienced to his dismay and as Johnson, Marshall, and Lovett

learned for themselves. General Collins later wrote in another context that

being secretary of defense was the "toughest job in Washington" after the

president's. With insight born of experience, he added, "No Secretary of

Defense worthy of his great responsibilities is ever likely to be popular

with . . . the Chiefs of services." 12

TheJCS executive agent system for unified commands attracted particular

attention from Lovett. The problem with the system arose from the inherent

conflict between the two roles played by the service chief. In his usual role as

chief of staff, he reported to his departmental secretary; in his role as a JCS

executive agent, however, he reported directly to the Joint Chiefs and thence

to the secretary of defense and the president, thus bypassing the service secretary. Since many activities carried out by a JCS executive agent had major

significance for his military department and its secretary, bypassing them often

produced misunderstanding and discord. This proved to be true for Army

Secretary Pace and General Collins. The general felt that he spent a great deal

of time keeping the secretary informed, but Pace was "outspokenly unhappy"
522 THE TEST OF WAR

with the lack of information on Army operations in Korea. A key issue in

point, the prisoner-of-war disorders on Koje-do,· caused Pace public embarrassment before a congressional committee because of his lack of knowledge

about the situation. If he had to accept ultimate responsibility, Pace wanted to

have commensurate authority and to be fully informed. 13

In the summer of 1952, when Lovett wanted to make the Army the

executive agent for construction activities in the U.S. European Command,

Pace took issue with him. Joint commanders, he told Lovett, did not report to

the Army secretary but to the Army chief of staff. As Army secretary, Pace

asserted, he exercised neither "command or administrative direction" nor

held any responsibility or authority. Since the "contrary ... [was] widely

believed," he found himself in the position of having an " 'implied responsibility' with no authority." Pace made it clear that, although he personally

supported the idea of a single construction agency in Europe, he did not want

the Army to undertake the responsibility. 14 Rejecting Pace's argument, Lovett

told him that he did not believe that the Army secretary had no responsibility

for a JCS command for which his chief of staff was the JCS executive agent.

When Lovett decided to make the Army secretary himself the executive agent

for the construction program, Pace agreed grudgingly, only on the condition

that he have "full, complete, clear authority" with certain stipulations spelled

out. I';

Pace's complaints caused Lovett to ask his staff to look into the legal

aspects of the matter. In August 1952 the assistant secretary for legislative and

legal affairs, Charles Coolidge, told Lovett that he was "troubled by the

legality of the method by which the JCS presently handle unified commands."

Unaware of the 1948 Key West agreement, Coolidge found no adequate

authority for the exercise of such command functions by the JCS or the Army

chief of staff. Sending Coolidge's memorandum to General Bradley, Lovett

wrote that the study confirmed his "grave doubts" as to JCS procedures and

suggested that Bradley might "wish to consider the matter as well as corrective

steps." Bradley's staff group pointed out that President Truman twice had

approved the unified command plan, but it suggested that the question of

designating the service secretaries rather than the service chiefs as executive

agents might be given further study. Coolidge later acknowleged that the Joint

Chiefs were "exactly within the letter and scope" of their instructions but he

still thought they should have no command function. 16

Lovett persisted in his determination that the Army oversee a construction

agency in Europe, and in October Pace felt "forced to admit, reluctantly," that

the secretary of the army should be designated the executive agent. Lovett

• See Chapter VII.
The Civil-Military Dimension 523

decided on action; on 3 December 1952, Deputy Secretary Foster designated

the secretary of the army "as the Executive Agent of the Department of

Defense" for construction matters in Europe, thus establishing a precedent. 17

While the secretary's exercise of power seemed to settle the immediate

problem, the whole question of working relationships between the military

heads of the services and their departmental secretaries remained unclear. The

law did not make the Joint Chiefs military advisers to the service secretaries,

and when a chief assumed his JCS role, it seemed that he was outside his

secretary's jurisdiction. However, the area was a cloudy one. Compatible

personalities or mutually perceived service needs might well foster close and

cordial ties, but a service secretary had no legal or inherent right to

information concerning JCS matters. IH As Finletter later testified, the Air Staff

usually informed him of problems and asked for his advice, but this was an

"act of grace" on their part. The separation and independence of the JCS

seemed so great that Frank Nash thought they had autonomy for all practical

purposes. In fact, he noted, the secretary of state regularly thanked the

secretary of defense for the cooperation of the Department of Defense and the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, as though they were separate entities. 19

The Service Secretaries

As against the secretaries of defense and the service chiefs, the secretaries

of the military departments had lost both power and prestige in the 1949

amendments to the National Security Act, which, Marshall thought, had

downgraded the status of the service secretaries unduly. Their diminished

stature was brought home to him painfully at a banquet when he saw the

secretaries "seated down on the floor while the Chiefs of Staff were sitting up

at the head table.,,20

The service secretaries strongly resented their diminished roles. Finletter

wanted to restore the military departments as executive departments with

Cabinet status, make the deputy secretary of defense junior to the service

secretaries, and eliminate command authority from theJCS. Kimball espoused

the traditional Navy viewpoint that OSD was too large and should be reduced

and that the service secretaries should be NSC members and probably Cabinet

members. Pace wanted Cabinet membership and, in some instances, the

privilege of attendance at NSC meetings. 21

Marshall and Lovett frequently asked the three secretaries for advice on

such critical matters as budgets, guided missile programs, NATO reorganization, military assistance, atomic weapons, and the Japanese peace treaty. In

June 1951 Marshall told Truman that he would obtain the views of the Joint
524 THE TEST OF WAR

Secretaries on important NSC matters, but since they were not a statutory body

he would not necessarily send the council their comments. Moreover,

Marshall declared, he would express his own views as secretary of defense at

NSC meetings only after considering the recommendations of both the Joint

Chiefs and the Joint Secretaries. 22

Lovett agreed with Marshall's position on the value of the civilian

secretaries' views, becoming convinced that the group was the "important

vehicle for operation and decision." When Lovett took the question ofthe JCS

deadlock over the future size of the Air Force to the Joint Secretaries in the fall

of 1951, Kimball felt that this action brought the secretaries back into full

participation in policymaking. Finletter also became convinced ofthe value of

the meetings, in part because he saw the secretaries, unlike the military chiefs,

as "expendable" and thus able to make "unpopular decisions." Pace agreed

with Lovett that the Joint Secretaries as a group were "far more useful and

effective in composing differences and in developing the basic policy and in

serving as a follow up system than the Armed Forces Policy Council. ,,23

In September 1952 Lovett formalized the Joint Secretaries as the Joint

Secretaries Group, including in its membership the secretary and the deputy

secretary of defense. The joint advice of the service secretaries and of Foster,

Lovett wrote, "is of great value . . . in exercising the direction, authority

and control over the Department of Defense." Lovett promised to give the

group's formal written views "appropriate consideration . . . in the same

manner as views presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ,,24

Some Defense officials thought the addition of the secretary and deputy

secretary of defense to the Joint Secretaries Group strengthened it considerably and created a body that, although nonstatutory, seemed "clearly superior

in authority to the JCS." Lovett, however, did not intend to create an alternate

Joint Chiefs of Staff; he sought rather a "board of directors" for 000 that

would spend time on the larger problemy of unification. As he commented

later, the Joint Secretaries Group was a place "where real trust and esteem

existed between the members," the agency through which "the supervisory

responsibility of the Office of the Secretary of Defense was largely exercised

in my term of office." Lovett felt that "this small organization, basically

informal, operated in many ways in lieu of the Armed Forces Policy

Council. ,,25 The Joint Secretaries Group brought the service secretaries

more directly into OSD policymaking and represented an assertion of civil

authority.

OSD officials hoped the Armed Forces Policy Council would operate as a

"top-level forum where civilian and military thinking would blend on

problems of national policy and forward planning" -indeed this had been the

congressional intent. When Marshall became secretary in 1950, he quickly
The Civil-Military Dimension 525

reduced the number of regular attendees at AFPC meetings from 22 or more

to the 9 statutory members. Lovett also kept the attendance limited and the

atmosphere informal-there were no formal agenda or minutes. 26

AFPC members seemed to have difficulty in defining their role in relation

to the NSC or theJCS. Occasionally a secretary and chief of one service joined

to promote that service's special interest. Sometimes it seemed that the Joint

Chiefs wanted to settle questions among themselves and freeze out the service

secretaries. Out of irritation, Finletter once recommended the removal of

service chiefs from AFPC membership. Frequently there was little time to

prepare for AFPC meetings; often they dealt with trivial matters. One OSD

official felt that perhaps only one of every three AFPC meetings during

Lovett's time could be described as "meaningful. ,,27

Marshall and Lovett evidently found it more effective to deal with the

Joint Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs separately than with the Armed Forces

Policy Council. From the two smaller groups, they could generally expect

written communications presenting positions and recommendations based on

substantial staff work. Two sets of specific written recommendations for

consideration must have seemed preferable to the more diffuse and often

inconclusive discussions in the AFPC.

The Korean War arrested only temporarily the decline in the stature of the

service secretaries. Marshall and Lovett relied on the service secretaries for

assistance in many matters that OSD could not deal with expeditiously under

the pressures of war and rearmament. But with the end of the war and the

expansion of OSD powers and structure under the Eisenhower administration, the service secretaries once more found their positions declining in

importance and influence. Few service secretaries in later administrations ever

achieved the levels of influence of the Korean War secretaries.

Lovett's Report on Unification

The growing pressures of overseeing the operation of an expanding and

ever more complex Department of Defense focused Lovett's attention increasingly on the structure of the establishment. In the summer of 1952 he initiated

studies of organization and unification under the direction of Assistant

Secretary Coolidge. These studies would contribute to the preparation of an

end-of-term report requested by the president.

In his report to Lovett in September, Coolidge saw the achievement of a

civilian-military balance as "probably the most difficult and delicate problem"

in managing the Pentagon. Although the U.S. form of government made

civilian control fundamental, Coolidge felt there had to be adequate military
526 THE TEST OF WAR

staffing throughout the defense structure to assure that the president, the NSC,

the defense secretary, and the service secretaries all received "proper military

advice." Noting that the Joint Chiefs remained over-involved in daily operations at the expense of long-range planning, he faulted them also for lacking

a necessary "broad, non-service point of view" and for bypassing the service

secretaries under the executive agent system. Yet he saw the Joint Chiefs as a

potent organization that would "probably function very effectively in war

time" and warned against changes that would diminish their capacity to do so.

Coolidge thought the secretary could recommend three steps for improving

Defense functions: require the AFPC to discuss JCS decisions before they went

to the National Security Council, direct the Joint Chiefs to establish a strong

planning organization, and separate the individual chiefs from routine operational duties so that they could concentrate on JCS and AFPC matters. 28

Coolidge opposed the use of military officers to staff the secretary's

Executive Office. Even though he found the performance of the officers

currently working there "beyond reproach," he counseled Lovett that "the

theory is unsound, particularly because officers with natural service loyalties

may sit in positions to select and slant what the Secretary sees." Coolidge

thought a civilian at the assistant secretary level should manage the Executive

Office, service the OSD councils and the secretary's staff meetings, establish

and control OSD military manning tables, and direct all OSD administration.

He recommended that the secretary of defense control efficiency ratings and

promotions of officers assigned to OSD and suggested that the service

secretaries should have more control over officer ratings and promotions

within the military departments. 29

Determined after the presidential election to arrange an "orderly turnover

of every department of the government to assist the incoming administration

to keep this nation a going concern," Truman invited President-elect Eisenhower to the White House to meet with key members of his administration.

Lovett joined Truman, Acheson, Snyder, and Harriman for about an hour of

discussion with an "unsmiling" Eisenhower (the election campaign had

strained relations between Truman and Eisenhower) on the afternoon of 18

November 1952. After the meeting, Eisenhower and Lovett returned to the

Pentagon for a briefing by the Joint Chiefs. Truman thought the preSident-elect

was getting a first glimpse of the seriousness of the matters with which he

would have to deal; Eisenhower himself thought he had learned little. 30

Coincidentally, on the same day Lovett responded in a long and seminal

letter to Truman's earlier request for suggestions of areas in Defense organization and administration where unification might be "profitably continued."

The secretary, who had long since determined that he would leave government service no matter who the next president might be, had been pondering
The Civil-Military Dimension 527

what changes he should recommend to the president; the impending turnover

of administrations provided additional incentive for taking stock of the first

five years of Defense unification.

Inevitably, the Korean War influenced much of Lovett's thinking about

DoD organizational changes. The war had reversed the years of retrenchment

after World War II, forcing a vast enlargement of the military establishment.

Particularly sensitive to congressional criticism of the size and performance of

DoD, the secretaries of defense sought to set an example in OSD by keeping

the staff small and limiting activities to the formulation and control of policy.

Under Johnson, OSD personnel numbered 2,388 full-time civilians and

military in June 1950. While the OSD workload grew enormously in support

of a 140-percent increase in military strength, OSD personnel growth was

restrained, rising in the same period about 30 percent, to 3,102 full-time

persons (including 1,765 in the Munitions Board, RDB, 1CS, and Defense

Supply Management Agency) by the end of December 1952.:\1

The war affected considerations of the future, for peace negotiations

were stalled and no one could be certain whether the fighting could be wound

down or might blaze up again. Aware of these uncertainties and their

imponderable effects on the DoD, Lovett offered thoughtful and pragmatic

recommendations "without any missionary zeal" in the hope his successor

might profit from past experience.

Characteristically generous, the secretary began his letter to the preSident

with a salute to the "remarkably high" quality of the military and civilian staff.

Regarding unification as evolutionary, Lovett cited much already accomplished and much yet remaining to be done. From the Korean War experience

he knew that in wartime a secretary's dollar control became "especially

weak." He believed that the secretary should have a military staff to help him

"handle the distribution of shortages in an efficient and direct fashion" in

time of war. 32

Lovett particularly wanted to clarify the secretary's role in relation to the

president, the JCS, and the military services. Because of the vagueness of the

law concerning the relationship with the]CS, he believed that the president by

"simple directive" or Congress by legislation should make it indisputable that

the secretary was indeed the president's principal assistant in all Defenserelated matters and that the Joint Chiefs constituted a DoD element subject to

the secretary's direction. Although the secretary disavowed any problems in

dealing with the JCS during his tenure, he saw a need for clarification of the

relationship. Lovett also wanted to make explicit the secretary's authority to

control and direct the three military departments. Viewing the services'

statutory right to separate administration as a "straddle," Lovett told Truman

that he had encountered problems in the field ofsupply, where "certain ardent
528 THE TEST OF WAR

separatists occasionally pop up with the suggestion that the Secretary of

Defense play in his own back yard." He suggested the assignment, with

exceptions if necessary, of all DoD functions to the secretary, who could then

assign or reassign such duties.

The secretary also thought the current law excessively rigid in prescribing

the form and function of the Munitions Board and the Research and

Development Board. This belief reflected the views of the service secretaries

also, not one of whom had a kind word for the boards. 33 Lovett implied that

the boards ought to be abolished and their functions transferred to the

secretary of defense, who would then establish OSD offices to function under

additional assistant secretaries of defense. The change would have the effect

of increasing the authority of the secretary of defense over logistical and

research and development operations of the military services.

Believing the Joint Chiefs' functions also too rigidly prescribed and the

JCS system inadequate to provide the secretary with proper military guidance,

Lovett declared that "the problem of the proper set-up of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff is the most difficult and delicate one in the field of our national defense

structure." Although the JCS organization was already overworked and too

much involved in daily operations, Lovett noted that, since he was prohibited

from having a military staff, he was forced to "flood the Joint Chiefs of Staff

with all sorts of papers." Suggesting that it was time to put aside the fear of

creating a general staff, Lovett posited two possible ways of meeting the

situation. One approach would be to create a new "Combined Staff,"

composed of senior officers who had just completed terms as service chiefs of

staff. This entity would operate through functional staffs-with a separate

promotion system and accountable only to the Combined Staff, the secretary

of defense, and the president-for overall military policies, strategic planning,

military requirements, and logistic planning. Admitting that such a change

might be disruptive and require further study, Lovett preferred another

suggestion for a modified Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As an alternative, he proposed that the Joint Chiefs delegate to the vice

chiefs most of their service-connected duties and confine themselves "exclusively to planning functions and the review of war plans in the light of new

weapons and techniques." TheJCS chairman's role should be strengthened by

granting him a voice in deliberations, but he should have no power of

decision. A strong planning division would constitute the principal JCS staff.

Lovett recommended that all other JCS military staff functions be transferred

to the secretary to "provide him with a combined military-civilian staff" to

aid in resolving service conflicts over such problems as budget, manpower,

procurement, and logistics. This staff would be responsible solely to the

secretary and through him to the president, and the secretary would control
The Civil-Military Dimension 529

its efficiency ratings and promotions. Lovett believed that the Joint Chiefs

should neither operate nor command except during time of war and then by

direction of the secretary of defense and the commander in chief. Viewing the

secretary of defense as the deputy to the commander in chief, Lovett

recommended that, with the advice of the service secretaries and chiefs, the

secretary of defense should establish unified commands and exercise authority over them.

Lovett's JCS recommendations went only slightly beyond the 1949

recommendations of Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and others, urging

deletion ofspecific JCS statutory duties from the National Security Act and the

substitution of a "simple statement" that the Joint Chiefs should "act as the

principal military advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense." 34

These changes would have afforded the secretary the option to assign the Joint

Chiefs specific duties and thus provided him with much greater flexibility and

authority.

For the armed services, which were "all different," Lovett proposed a

comprehensive organizational and functional study. Criticizing the overlapping functions of the seven Army technical services,' Lovett was amazed that

the system worked at all, let alone that it worked "rather well." Despite the

pOSSibility that reorganization of the technical services would be "no more

painful than backing into a buzz saw"-a colorful phrase that was to become

famous in Defense circles-Lovett believed the time for a change long overdue.

In other recommendations and comments, Lovett criticized the tendency

to set up too many headquarters and committees as costly, wasteful of

manpower, and cause of delay in taking action. He recommended keeping

standing forces at a minimum, relying instead on trained reserves, and

instituting Universal Military Training and Service. Deploring the "apparent

inadequacy of existing legislation to protect this country against traitors,

spies, and blabber-mouths," he asked for prompt action on this subject of

paramount importance. Finally, he asked that additional duties be imposed on

DoD only when absolutely necessary.

Lovett's 18 November letter-unclassified, informal, controversial, and

filled with pithy, quotable statements-soon found its way into the public

domain. A front-page article in The New York Times on 2 January 1953 was

captioned "Lovett Criticizes Defense Machine as Weak in Crisis"; on 8 January

the Pentagon released the original letter. 35

Then on 9 January Lovett wrote a top-secret memorandum for the

incoming secretary of defense dealing with classified matters and offering to

• Lovett had received a proposal from Under Secretary of the Army Karl Bendetsen on 22 October

1952 suggesting a functional reorganization of the Army and its technical services.
530 THE TEST OF WAR

discuss them. 'Lovett's first concern this time had to do with security

problems, specifically that industrial plants with unions dominated by

"known communists" at the international level were making secret U.S.

military equipment. The secretary warned that the situation currently provided an "enormous risk of ... delivery of information to enemy agents,"

as well as the potential for sabotage and strikes during an emergency. 36

Lovett considered the National Security Council inadequate as a final

forum for making national policy. Unlike Acheson, who felt that NSC

usefulness reached its peak during the Truman years, Lovett thought the top

officials had been unable to put in enough time on NSC matters, leaving too

much work to NSC staff members. The secretary also considered the U.S.

overseas apparatus for the mutual security program "over-organized," "overmanned," and "free-wheeling" to a possibly unwise degree. Looking at the

international situation generally, he suggested that the effectiveness of U.S.

control in Japan and the German Ruhr would provide a "convenient and

reliable index" of future political and military problems, particularly with the

Soviets. Finally, Lovett lamented the excessiVl: amount of paperwork in

000. 37

Both President Eisenhower and his defense secretary, Charles E. Wilson,

proved receptive to Lovett's ideas, and the new administration set up a

committee under Nelson A. Rockefeller to review Defense organization. It

reported on 11 April 1953, and on 30 April Eisenhower submitted to Congress

a message of his intent to reorganize 000 along with Reorganization Plan No.

6. The plan abolished the Munitions Board, Research and Development Board,

Defense Supply Management Agency, and Director of Installations and invested the secretary of defense with their functions. It increased the number

of assistant secretaries of defense from three to nine and made the OSD

general counsel a statutory position. The defense secretary had the full right

to prescribe the functions of these new positions, as well as those of any other

Defense employee or agency. 38

The reorganization transferred management of the Joint Staff from the

Joint Chiefs to the JCS chairman and also gave him the right of approval over

the selection of staff members. Appointment of the Joint Staff director was to

be subject to the approval of the secretary of defense. While the JCS chairman

got no vote, Eisenhower's plan relieved the Joint Chiefs of much administrative detail and opened the way for greater cooperation between the Joint Staff

and OSD officials and civilian scientists and engineers. The plan became

effective on 30 June 1953. 39

In his message transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 6 to Congress,

Eisenhower notified it of his intention to make two additional significant

changes. The secretary of defense would revise the Key West agreement to
The Civil-Military Dimension 531

provide for designation of military departments rather than chiefs of services

as executive agents for unified commands. This placed the service secretaries

in the direct chain of command and eliminated the authority of the Joint

Chiefs to designate one of their own number as an executive agent. The

second change approved by the president gave civilian officials responSibility

for the efficiency reports of military personnel assigned to OSD. This was

intended to give officers on duty in OSD more status within their own

services, which had generally regarded such assignments as outside the

mainstream of the service. 40

It is ironic, perhaps, that Lovett-who had tried to get along without

greater secretarial power and who so often expressed his desire to work

within the existing system-provided the impetus for major changes toward

greater centralization of power in the secretary's hands, as had the reluctant

Forrestal in 1949. Forced to operate during the Korean War within a system he

came to view as defective, Lovett had managed, and generally well, to keep

the department's machinery oiled and working. Although the competition

between the secretary and the military services, and among the services

themselves, continued to plague DoD, the secretaries of defense and other

OSD officials might justifiably have felt that they passed on to the next

administration a department that had gone through its years of trial not only

satisfactorily but creditably. If during the war years military influence had

necessarily grown in some spheres, Lovett's final report pointed the way to

redressing any civil-military imbalance. Indeed it helped move the balance

toward the civilian side.
CHAPTER XXV

Conclusion

It is arguable that the Korean War had as much to do with shaping the

world of the second half of the 20th century as did World War II. The hard-line

division of the world into two great armed camps, the unremitting political and

military competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, the greatly

increased reliance on nuclear weapons to deter war between the superpowers,

the commitment of the United States to a long-term military presence in Europe

and East Asia, and the maintenance of a greatly enlarged American military

establishment and arms industry for the indefinite future-all of these enduring

manifestations of cold war were created or intensified by the Korean War. Above

all, the years 1950 to 1953 witnessed the full acceptance by the United States of

its role on the world scene as the avowed and resolute protagonist of containment of the Soviet Union and communism.

The U.S. response to the Korean War and American perception of a

greater Soviet threat took a number of forms. Particularly after the Chinese

intervention in November 1950, the war provided a compelling rationale for

adopting most of the policies and rearmament programs advocated in NSC 68.

The Truman administration had no doubt that the Soviet Union had inspired

the North Korean attack and that Soviet support of the North Koreans and

Chinese Communists signaled further Soviet moves elsewhere. Apprehension

over Soviet intentions in Europe came to overshadow the war in Korea in

administration calculations and reinforced the political and military priority

accorded the defense of NATO Europe. Growth of a Soviet stockpile of nuclear

weapons intensified the sense of threat in the West and lent greater impetus to

U.S. nuclear arms programs and the development of delivery vehicles-bombers, missiles, and submarines.

Adherence in peacetime to a foreign alliance-NATa-represented the

greatest foreign policy departure in U.S. history. Until the Korean War the

533
534 THE TEST OF WAR

United States and, indeed, most of the European members, regarded NATO as

a paper entity. Such military arrangements as existed for the defense of

Western Europe against Soviet attack were clearly inadequate to the task.

Paradoxically, a war in Asia-on the Korean peninsula-created immediately

the perception of a greatly magnified Soviet threat to Europe and provided the

incentive for transforming NATO into a true working alliance. The European

NATO countries pushed for the establishment of a centralized military

command and markedly increased and accelerated their commitment of

military forces and resources to the coalition. The United States furnished

dynamic leadership, providing the alliance with an American supreme commander and stationing substantial military forces on the continent for an

indefinite period. Neither Truman nor Eisenhower looked on this as a

permanent arrangement, yet almost four decades later the American military

presence in Europe remained the ultimate guarantor of NATO.

The search for additional military power and strategic base areas to help

contain the Soviet threat hastened the conclusion of a contractual agreement

and eventually a peace treaty with Germany. That German divisions were

indispensable to a conventional defense of NATO Europe proved a convincing

argument for bringing West Germany into NATO and encouraging its rearmament. To strengthen NATO's eastern flank and provide a possible opening

toward a Middle East defense arrangement, the United States promoted the

membership of Greece and Turkey in the group. It also forged new military ties

outside of NATO with Spain and Yugoslavia.

As apprehension over a mounting Soviet and Chinese Communist threat

intensified, U.S. commitment to international collective security and foreign

economic and military assistance became stronger and went far beyond NATO.

In East Asia, the crisis brought on by the Korean War and the conflict in

Indochina underscored the strategic and economic value of Japan as a U.S.

bulwark against Communist expansion and spurred the signing of a peace

treaty earlier than the Joint Chiefs desired. Following the treaty, the United

States signed mutual security pacts in the Pacific area withJapan, with Australia

and New Zealand, with the Philippines, and eventually with South Korea.

Unlike Germany, which in time would provide the largest single national

contribution to NATO's ground forces, Japan rearmed only minimally, constrained by the provisions of its postwar constitution to maintain only a small

self-defense force. Its continuing dependence on the United States for security

allowed it to keep its defense costs at a very low level, thereby obtaining

long-term economic benefits. Japan's eventual rise to industrial superpower

status began with the economic revival it experienced during the Korean War

years when the country provided a convenient base for supply and maintenance of the U.S. and Korean forces fighting on the peninsula.
Conclusion 535

The Korean War put an end to any notion that the United States might be

able to terminate or even diminish its military presence in foreign overseas

areas. By the end of 1952 the Allied occupation of West Germany was nominal

and that ofJapan had ended, but the United States stationed even larger forces

than before June 1950 in these countries to guarantee their defense against

aggression. Moreover, the end of the fighting in Korea in July 1953 left South

Korea still at risk from the implacably hostile and unpredictable North

Koreans. This continuing threat from the North obliged the United States to

maintain large forces in Japan and South Korea to deter renewed aggression.

The war brought about an immediate threefold increase in US. military

assistance to NATO and other countries. Eventually the United States extended

economic and military assistance to dozens of nations on every continent of

the world. In Indochina the United States embarked on a program of military

assistance to the French, and subsequently the South Vietnamese, that ended

only a quarter of a century later. The military services had to use substantial

resources of men and money to provide military assistance adVisory groups in

countries receiving aid and to train increasing numbers of foreign military in

the United States. The Korean War thus sealed the US. commitment to an

enduring policy of alliances and military assistance on a global scale.

By the end of the war its long-term effects on the US. militaryestablishment were clear. As the military instrument of national security policy the

Department of Defense became a major participant in the making of policy

and the Pentagon was viewed worldwide as a symbol of American military

might. Expenditures for defense (including atomic energy and other non-DoD

activities) consumed two-thirds of the federal budget in fiscal years 1953 and

1954 and remained well above half for the remainder of the decade. Most

evident, because of the direct impact on the public and the high visibility of

the fighting in Korea, was the more than doubling of the size of the armed

forces and the acceptance by the nation of the higher peacetime levels of

strength for the indefinite future.

At the beginning of the Korean War, in June 1950, the strength of US.

forces stationed in foreign countries had reached a post-World War II low of

281,000, about 20 percent of a total strength of 1,460,000. Three years later,

as of 30 June 1953, a few weeks before the signing of the Korean armistice,

963,000 were posted outside the United States, some 27 percent of a total

strength of 3,555,000. Troop strength abroad declined thereafter to fewer

than 700,000 by 30June 1955 but at the end of the decade still remained well

above a half million. The largest concentrations were in Germany, Japan, and

Korea. Large numbers of additional personnel were always en route to or from

abroad, afloat on ships, in air squadrons, and in mobile activities temporarily

operating on foreign soil. Moreover, during the decade after Korea, the
536 THE TEST OF WAR

military services continued to employ more than a quarter million American

and foreign civilians (chiefly the latter) and oversaw as many as half a million

U.S. dependents in foreign countries. All told, the number of U.S. military

personnel and civilian employees and their dependents in foreign countries

averaged about 1.3 million during the decade. I

Even while the Korean War was being fought with conventional forces

and the U.S. military buildup in Europe consisted chiefly of Army divisions

and USAF tactical air units, the U.S. intention to rely in the future primarily on

air power, nuclear munitions, and other advanced weapons received reinforcement. The war greatly quickened the powerful technological and industrial impulses initiated by World War II, accelerating the research and

development of many weapons and related equipment and spurring new

projects. The emphasis on advanced technology to produce weapons that

could substitute for and minimize manpower requirements accorded with the

attitude of the American public toward military service in peacetime. The

continuing demand for large numbers of more potent weapons of increasing

complexity, together with foreign military assistance and sales and other U.S.

requirements, created a permanent market for a notably expanded peacetime

military industrial establishment.

The increased reliance on technology did not signify a major departure in

policy, for the Truman administration had been moving in this direction

before the Korean War, attracted by the prospect of deterring aggression at a

lesser cost in money and manpower than would be incurred by maintaining

the large conventional forces required to cope with the Soviet threat in Europe

and elsewhere. Within Defense, the military services divided sharply on the

issue, with the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps strongly opposed to the

priorities and force goals persistently advanced by the Air Force. For a number

of reasons-the overriding and more immediate requirements of the fighting

in Korea, the political rationale for stationing highly visible u.s. Army

divisions in Germany, the delays in aircraft production, and the lag in

procuring and training manpower by the Air Force-it became both necessary

and desirable to reduce the proposed Air Force wing strength and to stretch

out its buildup beyond the anticipated crisis year 1954. At the same time, the

large increase in production of nuclear weapons gave a further earnest of

intention to rely more in the future on strategic nuclear air power.

The paradoxical effect of the war on U.S. strategic policy became

increasingly evident. Although many strategic theorists concluded from the

experience that future wars would also be limited in nature, and therefore

conventional strength ought to be sustained at a high level, continuing

advances in the technology of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles would

vastly expand strategic nuclear capabilities and make the appeal of the nuclear
Conclusion 537

option ever more alluring. Facing the prospect of maintaining a peacetime

military establishment twice the pre-Korea size and at 21/2 to 3 times the cost,

the Eisenhower administration readily embraced the concept of nuclear

deterrence. The rapid buildup of the Strategic Air Command in the 1950s and

the paramount priority accorded it reflected Eisenhower's commitment to

what was called the "New Look." After a reassessment, Eisenhower reduced

and stretched out the buildup of all of the services but retained the emphasis

on air power and especially on strategic nuclear forces. During the remainder

of the decade the Air Force would receive the lion's share of the military

budget-approaching one-half of the total-and would exercise a telling

influence on U.S. strategic planning.

The Korean War was not a test of U.S. capability on the scale of World War

II; the partial mobilization required little more than a quarter of the military

manpower raised in 1940-45 and a much smaller industrial mobilization. But

the unity of purpose and effort that had marked the earlier war was

conspicuously absent in 1950-53. Because it was a "police action," an

undeclared war in a faraway and relatively unknown country, because its

limited objectives did not include surrender by the North Koreans and later

the Chinese, because it incurred disproportionately heavy casualties, and

because it dragged on without prospect of either victory or termination, the

war could not begin to command the unity of national purpose and wholehearted public support that World War II had evoked.

Already overburdened by the demands of fighting a war abroad and

having to cope with a host of other exigent problems, the secretaries of

defense soon found themselves caught up in some of the most bitter and

divisive domestic political battles of 20th century U.S. history. The vitriolic,

venomous fulminations of such ultrapartisans as Republican Senators McCarthy, Jenner, and Wherry far exceeded the bounds of legitimate criticism.

Their arraignment of the Defense Department included DoD's military as well

as civilian leadership and extended eventually even to allegations of conspiracy and internal subversion. The conduct of the war, its problematical

outcome, and the heavy toll of American lives afforded other opposition

elements opportunities to make political capital out of issues on which the

administration was vulnerable. The firing of General MacArthur excited a

storm of protest in which the secretary of defense and the department came

under intense attack. Other aspects of Asian policy-in particular the administration's handling of the China question-also provoked vehement reaction.

Some Republican leaders mounted a national campaign against the Truman

policy according strategic priority to Europe and the decision to station U.S.
538 THE TEST OF WAR

troops in Europe under NATO. Others condemned DoD for the dislocations

caused by the partial manpower and industrial mobilization. Still others took

the department to task for the lagging materiel procurement and production

programs whose shortcomings they viewed as hampering the war effort and

the provision of military assistance to allies.

Marshall and Lovett had to steel themselves to the charges and the

criticism. Forced by the administration's own overriding political considerations to fight a limited war that would permit no clearcut victory and to

honor vastly expanded U.S. military commitments throughout the world, they

found themselves constantly seeking to adjust means and ends to changing

policies and demands. Caught between the necessity to take action in volatile

situations in Korea and elsewhere on the one hand and the policy constraints

that often denied preferred or optimum responses on the other hand, the

secretaries frequently received blame for outcomes that were beyond their

control. Despite the persistent criticism and their own personal disappointments, they had much with which to be satisfied. Measured against the

extraordinarily difficult circumstances of these years, the Department of

Defense's performance in this first test of war under unification yielded a

balance sheet in which successes clearly outweighed failures. However

uneven the record in the eyes of critics, the efforts of Marshall and Lovett

unquestionably strengthened the fledgling defense organization they inherited from Forrestal and Johnson and the security of the nation they had served

so faithfully.
AA

ADCOM

AEC

AFPC

AFSWP

AMP

ANZUS

BoB

CCPB

CEA

CIA

CINCEUR

CINCFE

CINCPAC

CINCUNC

CJCS

CPC

CY

D-Day

DACOWITS

DoD

DPB

ECA

ECC

EDC

ELAS

List of Abbreviations

Antiaircraft

Advance Command and Liaison Group (Korea)

Atomic Energy Commission

Armed Forces Policy Council

Armed Forces Special Weapons Project

Additional military production

Australia, New Zealand, United States

Bureau of the Budget

Civilian Components Policy Board

Council of Economic Advisers

Central Intelligence Agency

Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command

Commander in Chief, Far East

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, United Nations Command

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Combined Policy Committee

Calendar year

Unnamed day on which a particular operation commences or is

to commence

Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services

Department of Defense

Defense Production Board (NATO)

Economic Cooperation Administration

European Coordinating Committee

European Defense Community

People's Liberation Army of Greece

539
540

EUSAK

EXOS

FEAF

FMACC

FMASC

FY

GNP

ISAC

JAMAG

JAMMAT

JCAE

JCS

JNPR

JUSMAPG

JUSMG

KATUSA

KMAG

M-Day

MAAG

MATS

MB

MDAP

MILREP

MLC

MRC

MSA

MSP

MTDP

NAC

NATO

NSC

NSRB

ODM

ODMS

OFMA

OPI

OSD

PL

PMAG

POW

PPB

List of Abbreviations

Eighth U. S. Army Korea

Executive Office of the Secretary of Defense

Far East Air Forces

Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee

Foreign Military Assistance Steering Committee

Fiscal Year

Gross National Product

International Security Affairs Committee

Joint American Military Advisory Group

Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Japanese National Police Reserve

Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group

Joint U.S. Military Group (Spain)

Korean Augmentation to the United States Army

United States Military Advisory Group to Korea

Date on which mobilization is to commence

Military Assistance Advisory Group

Military Air Transport Service

Munitions Board

Mutual Defense Assistance Program

Military Representative

Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission

Military Representatives Committee (NATO)

Mutual Security Agency

Mutual Security Program

Medium Term Defense Plan

North Atlantic Council

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

National Security Council

National Security Resources Board

Office of Defense Mobilization

Office of Director for Mutual Security

Office of Foreign Military Affairs

Office of Public Information

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Public law

Provisional Military Advisory Group

Prisoner of War

Personnel Policy Board
PRC

RCT

RDB

ROK

ROKA

SACEUR

SACLANT

SCAP

SCS

SHAPE

SRE

TCC

UN

UNC

UNCOK

USA

USAF

USAFFE

USAFIK

USMC

USMILREP

USN

WSEG

List of Abbreviations 541

People's Republic of China

Regimental Combat Team

Research and Development Board

Republic of Korea

Republic of Korea Army

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic

Supreme Commander Allied Powers

Screening and Costing Staff (NATO)

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe

Special Representative, Europe

Temporary Council Committee (NATO)

United Nations

United Nations Command

United Nations Commission on Korea

U.S. Army

U.S. Air Force

U.S. Army Forces, Far East

U.S. Army Forces in Korea

U.S. Marine Corps

U.S. Military Representative in Europe

U.S. Navy

Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
Notes

The citations that follow refer to a wide variety of published and

unpublished sources. Detail has been kept to a minimum without sacrificing

essential information. Readers should consult the bibliography for complete

information on the location of archival collections and for the full references

(publisher and date of publication) to printed works.

For the period 1950-53, the Office of the Secretary of Defense used a

subject filing system identified in the notes by the prefix "CD," followed by a

sequence of numbers further specifying document location. When retired to

the National Archives these files became part of Record Group (RG) 330, along

with files of the staff agencies and all subordinate OSD offices except for the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, which maintained its own separate system. All of the

above materials are housed in the Military Reference Branch of the National

Archives and Records Administration in Washington, D.C. Files identified as

"OSD Hist" are in the custody of the OSD Historical Office in the Pentagon.

1. PRELUDE TO WAR

1. Appointment calendar Louis Johnson. 24 Jun 50, OSD Hist; Dean Acheson, Present at the

Creation: My Years in the State Department, 402; Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A

General's Life: An Autobiography, 530; Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, vol II in

Memoirs by Harry S. Truman (hereafter cited as Truman, Memoirs II), 332.

2. EJL (E. John Long, Hist Off OSD), "Korean Crisis" (typescript), 13 Jul 50, OSD Hist.

3. Appointment calendar Johnson, 25 Jun 50, OSD Hist; Acheson, Present at the Creation,

402-04; Bradley and Blair, A General's Life, 532-56.

4. StatementJohnson, 5 Jun 50, US Cong, Senate, Ctes on Foreign Relations and Armed Services,

Mutual Defense Assistance Program, 1950: Hearings, 81 Cong, 2 sess (1950), 21.

5. These events, of course, have been the subject of much historical research and speculation.

This chapter treats the unfolding cold war as viewed by U.S. officials at that time, as, for

example, in First Semiannual Report on the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, US Cong,

House, Cte on Foreign Affairs, 81 Cong, 2 scss (1950), H Doc 613,2-4. The following works

will give some idea of the vast literature and widely varying views on the subject and lead the

reader to other sources: Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War,
544 Notes to Pages 3-6

1945-1950; John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War,

1941-1947; Lloyd C. Gardner, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Hans J. Morgenthau, The Origins

ofthe Cold War; Richard F. Haynes, The Awesome Power: Harry S. Truman as Commander

in Chief Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits ofPower: The World and United States Foreign

Policy, 1945-1954; Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1975 (3rd ed);

Robert J. Maddox, The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War; Thomas G. Paterson, ed,

The Origins ofthe Cold War (2nd ed); Adam B. Ulam, The Rivals: America and Russia Since

World War II; Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins ofthe Cold War and the National

Security State.

6. Statement Johnson, 5 Jun 50, Senate Ctes on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, Mutual

Defense Assistance Program, 1950: Hearings, 23; statement Johnson, 5 Jun 50, US Cong,

House, Cte on Foreign Affairs, To Amend the Mutual Defense Assislance Act of 1949:

Hearings, 81 Cong, 2 sess (1950), 28.

7 RobertJ. Donovan, Tumultuous Years: The Presidencv of Harry S Truman, 1949-1953,22;

Steven 1.. Rearden, The Formatil'e Years, 1947-1950, vol 1 in History of the Office of the

Secretary ofDefense, 12-13.

8. Rearden, Formative Years, 9-11, 148-69; Charles H. Donnelly. United States Defense

Policies Since World War II, 85 Cong, 1 sess (1957), H Doc 100, 4-13, 23-26; Harry Bayard

Price, The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning, 21-29, 36-48, 67; First Semiannual Report on

the MDAP, 3, 6; Max Beloff, The United States and the Unity ofEurope, 20-28; C. [Clement]

R. Attlee, As It Happened, 239 (quote); US Cong, Senate, Cte on Foreign Relations, Mutual

Security for Fiscal Years 1948 to 1959, 85 Cong, 2 sess (1958), 2; Congressional Quarterly

Service, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, 165-6(,.

9. First Semiannual Report on MDAP, 7-8,20,73-74, and passim; The NATO Handbook (1 Jan

52),7, 35; Price, The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning, 162; Senate Cte on Foreign Relations,

Mutual Security for Fiscal Years 1948 to 1959, 2; Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964,

166-67. For a detailed account of the military assistance program, see Rearden, Formative

Years, 489-519.

10. Donovan, Tumultuous Years, 55-65; Rearden, Formatil'e Years, 309-33, 335-60.

11. Donovan, Tumultuous Years, ';5-6';; Rearden, Formatir'e Years, 361-84, particularly 380.

12. DirMgmtlnfo OPS&Control OASD(C), table P-22.2, "Active Duty Personnel by Selected

Periods, 1918-1976," 18 Apr 77, OSD Hist; memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 21 Aug 52, wirh

table OSD, "Summary Comparison of Forces," 1 Aug ';2, ibid; memo McNeil for Johnson, 26

Jul 50, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "Supplemental Appro July & Dec 19';0" folder,

Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md; statementJohnson, 13 Mar ';0, US Cong, Senate, Cte on

Appropriations, Department ofDefense Appropriationsfor 1951: Hearings, 81 Cong, 2 sess

(19';0), 1';-16 (quote); statementJohnson, 1Jun ';0, US Cong, Senate, Cte on Armed Services,

Selectil'e Serl'ice Extension Act of 1950 and Manpower Registration and Classification Act:

Hearings, 81 Cong, 2 sess (19';0),6-7.

13. For significant information about the Soviet explosion, see R. Gordon Arneson, "The

H-Bomb Decision," Foreign Service journal (May 1969), 27-29; editorial note, US Dept

State, Foreign Relations ofthe United States, 1949 (hereafter cited as FRUS with appropriate

year and volume number), \;';40.

14. Arneson, "The H-Bomb Decision," pt 2:24-27,43; editorial note, FRUS 1950, \;524.

15. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 2';0-53, 359-61. 363; Donovan, Tumultuous Years,

29-33,36-39,74-88, 162-75, 183, and passim.

16. Ltr Truman to Acheson, 31 Jan 50, FRUS 1950,1: 141-42; rept SplNSCCte to Pres, 31 Jan 50,

ibid, '; 13-23, 513n I; ltrJohnson to Truman, 24 Feb 50. ibid, ';38-39; rept SplNSCCte to Pres,

9 Mar ';0, ibid, 541-42, ,;42n 1; US Cong, Joint Cte on Atomic Energy OCAE), "The Scale and

Scope of Atomic Production: A Chronology of Leading Events" (typescript), 22, RG 330, CD

471.6 (A-Bomb); AlOmic Energy Commission, "A History of The Expansion of AEC

Production Facilities" [AEC 11401 (typescript), 16; Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan,
Notes to Pages 6-13 545

Atomic Shield, 1947/1952, vol II in A History of the United States Atomic Energy

Commission, 415-17, 430; Truman, Memoirs 11, 309-11; Rearden, Formative Years,

446-56.

17. Draft memo Kennan for Acheson, 17 Feb 50, FRUS 1950, 1:160-67, 160n1.

18. As originally submitted by Acheson and Johnson, the report, dated 7 April 1950, was entitled

"A Report to the President Pursuant to the President's Directive ofJanuary 31, 1950." After

the president sent the report on 12 April to the NSC, it became NSC 68 and a copy of that

document, dated 14 April, is printed in FRUS 1950,1:234-92. Records of the State-Defense

policy review group meetings, including lists of attendees, are in ibid, 168-75, 176-82,

190-95,196-201,203. For other discussions of NSC 68, see John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies

of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy,

89-126; John Lewis Gaddis and Paul Nitze, "NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered,"

International Security (Spring 1980),4:164-76; Paul Y. Hammond, "NSC-68: Prologue to

Rearmament," in Warner R. Schilling et ai, Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets, 271-378;

Samuel F. Wells, Jr., "Sounding the Tocsin: NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat," International

Security (Fall 1979), 116-58; Rearden, Formative Years, 521-32.

19. NSC 68, FRUS 1950, 1:234-92 (249, 288 quotes).

20. Ibid,251-52.

21. Ibid, 252-56, 261-69, 281-82 (263, quote).

22. Ibid, 272-87.

23. Ibid, 289-92. Garbled text on page 291; missing line supplied from copy in Truman papers.

NSC 20/4 is in FRUS 1948, 1, pt 2:662-69, with conclusions on 666-69.

24. NSC 68, FRUS 1950, 1:288, 290-92. For figure of $40 billion, see Gaddis and Nitze, "NSC 68

and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered," 171-73.

25. Memcon Harry H. Schwartz (ExecSecPPS), [nd but apparently 22 Mar 50], FRUS 1950,

l:203-06; memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 14 Apr 50, wlltr, Truman to Lay, 12 Apr 50, ibid,

234-35; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 373-74.

26. Memo Willard 1.. Thorp (ASecState(E» for Acheson,S Apr 50, FRUS 1950, 1:218-20; memo

Edward W. Barrett (ASecState(PA» for Acheson, 6 Apr 50, ibid, 225-26.

27. Memo Bohlen for Nitze, 5 Apr 50, ibid, 221-25.

28. Msg Kirk for Acheson, 25 Apr 50, ibid, 292-93.

29. Memo ExecSecNSC for AdHocCte on NSC 68,28 Apr 50, ibid, 293-96; memcon ExecSecNSC

for Nitze et ai, 2 May 50, ibid, 297-98, 297nnl-9; two brfg papers for NSC mtgs, unknown

author for Johnson, 4 and 18 May 50, RG 218, CCS 334-NSC (9-25-47).

30. Memo Hamilton Q. Dearborn (CEA) for ExecSecNSC, 8 May 50, FRUS 1950,1:306-11; memo

NSRB, 29 May 50, ibid, 316-21; memo William F. Schaub (DepChfDivEstimates BoB) for

ExecSecNSC, 8 May 50, ibid, 298-306 (299, quote).

31. Memo Johnson for Pace et ai, 25 May 50, RG 330, ASD(C) files, NSC 68 folder, Federal

Records Center, Suitland, Md; memo SecAFPC for MbrsAFPC, 7 Jun 50, RG 218, CCS

334-AFPC (12-2-47).

32. Truman, Memoirs ll, 333; Denis Healey, "Britain and NATO," in Klaus Knorr, ed, NATO and

American Security, 210.

33. Interv with John H. Ohly by Doris M. Condit, Steven 1.. Rearden, 19 Apr 77,65, OSD Hist;

statements Acheson and Johnson, 2 Aug 50, US Cong, House, ete on Appropriations, The

Supplemental Appropriation Billfor 1951: Hearings, 81 Cong, 2 sess (1950),277,281.

II. THE ROLE OF THE PENTAGON

1. PI. 80-253 (26July 1947) and PI. 81-216 (10 August 1949), both in Alice C. Cole ct aI, cds,

Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944-1978

(hereafter cited as Cole, Defense Documents), 35-59, 84- 106, 108-11; Steven 1.. Rearden,
546 Notes to Pages 14-16

The Formative Years, 194"-1950, vol I in History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense,

16-27, 50-55; statement and testimony Johnson, 28 Jun 49, us Cong, House, Cte on Armed

Services, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services ofthe House ofRepresentatives

on Sundry Legislation Affecting the Naval and Military Establishment, 1949 (hereafter cited

as House Cte on Armed Services, Hearings, Sundry Legislation), 81 Cong, I sess

(1949), 11:2679-2869

2. Rearden, Formatil'e Years, 73-74: Hist off OSD, "The Department of Defense and the

Congressional Budget Process" (typescript), 6-8, OSD Hist; interv with J. Lawton Collins by

Alfred Goldberg, Roger R. Trask, Doris M. Condit, Steven L. Rearden, 2Ju181, 14-15, ibid.

3. Interv with Marx Leva by Doris M. Condit, Steven L. Rearden, 10 and 14 Jun 77,20, OSD Hist;

Najeeb E. Halaby, Crosswinds: An Airman 5 Memoir, 48; interv with John H. Ohly by Doris

M. Condit, 28 Apr 77,7-10, OSD Hist; interv with W. Stuart Symington by Alfred Goldberg,

Roger R. Trask, Steven L. Rearden, 27 May 81, 7-8 (quote), ibid.

4. Interv with Leva, 10 and 14 Jun 77, 12-13, 19-21,42-43,76-80; interv with W. Averell

Harriman by Alfred Goldberg, Doris M. Condit, 29 May 75, 3-4, OSD Hist; editorial,

"Johnson to Marshall," NY Times, 14 Sep 50; interv with W. Stuart Symington by Alfred

Goldberg, Roger R. Trask, Steven L. Rearden, 19 May 81, 18-19,23-28, OSD Hist; Halaby,

Crossu'inds, 48; Robert J Donovan, Tumultuous Years: The Presidency ofHarry S Truman,

19,j9-195], 61-65 (61, quote); inten' with Ohly by Doris M. Condit, Steven L. Rearden, 19

Apr 77, 44, OSD Hist; comments R.A. Winnacker, 4 Nov 83, ibid; interv with Wilfred J

McNeil by Doris M. Condit, Ronald Hoffman, 7 Jun 76, 16-21, ibid; interv with McNeil by

Alfred Goldberg, Harry B. Yoshpe, .'II May 74, 28, 30-32, ibid; Louis Johnson, "Teamwork

for Defense," American Magazine (July 1949), 34-35, 130-32; Itr SecDef to Pres, 23 Apr 49,

Condit file, OSD Hist; ltr SecDef to Eisenhower, 25 Apr 49, ibid; memo SecDef for SecNavy,

23 Apr 49, ibid; Itr Ohly to Condit, 12 Dec 83, w/comments, 4, ibid. For the story of the

supercarrier and B-36 controversy, see Rearden, Formative Years, 410-22.

5. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et ai, 3\ Aug 49 (quote), Condit file, OSD Hist; memcon [Harry

H. Schwartz, ExecSecPPS], 22 Mar 50, US Dept State, Foreign Relations ofthe United States,

1950 (hereafter cited as FRUS with year and volume number); Dean Acheson, Present at the

Creation: My Years in the State Department, 373-7'1; inten' with Lyman L. Lemnitzer by

Alfred Goldberg, Lawrence S. Kaplan, Doris M. Condit, 4 Mar 76, 15-17, OSD His!.

6. See, for example, notes ROC Amb to LS, [3 Jun 501, conv with Paul Griffith ., 5 (95/50),

Wellington Koo papers, Columbia l:niv, New York, NY; notes ROC Amb to US, [30 Jun 50],

conv with Louis Johnson ., ibid; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 349-53, passim.

7 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 37 3-74 (quote), 441; interv with Ohly, 28 Apr 77, 9-10;

interv with Harriman, 29 May 75, 2, 5; Arthur Krock, "In the Nation: The Dismissal of the

Secretary of Defense," NY Times, 14 Sep 50; editorial, "Johnson to Marshall," ibid; comments

R.A. Winnacker, -! Nov 83, OSD Hist; testimony SecDef and SecState, 30 Aug 50, US Cong,

Senate, Cle on Appropriations, Supplemental Appropriationsfor 1951: Hearings, 81 Cong,

2 sess (1950),296-97; inten' with McNeil, 51 May ""4,54, OSD His!.

8. PR 20-49A OPI ;\IME, 2 May 49, ibid; interv with Ohly, 28 Apr 77,8 (quote); interv with Leva,

10 and 14 Jun 77, 12; Who's Who in America, 1948-19,j9, 708; Tyler Abell, ed, Drew

Pearson Diaries, 1949-1959, 61-62; testimony Johnson, US Cong, House, Cte on Armed

Services, The National Defense Program-Unification and Strategy: Hearings, 81 Cong, I

sess (1949), 655; inten' with Symington, 19 May 81, 26. The position of under secretary of

defense, created by PL 81-56 (2 April 19'19), was changed to deputy secretary of defense by

PL 81-216 (10 August 1949).

9. OASD(PA), Department of Defense Fact Rook, 1985, 12, 14, 16; House Cte on Armed

Services, The National Defense Program-Unification and Strategy: Hearings, 495-98;

Halaby, Crosswinds, 50; inten' with Ohly, 19 Apr"""", 48; intervs with Symington, 19 May 81,

19-20,27 May 81, 1'1.

10. Interv with Leva, IO and 14 Jun """", 54-55: Who:~ Who in America, 1956-1957, 1962.
Notes to Pages 17-20 547

11. Paolo E. Coletta, "Francis P. Matthews. 15 May 1949-:'1 July 1951:' in Paolo E. Coletta. cd.

American Secretaries ofthe Nal'y, 11:78:'-827 (822, quote); Charles A. Willoughby and John

Chamberlain, MacArthur, 1941-195/, :'68.

12. K. Jack Bauer. "Dan Able Kimball, :'1 July 1951-20 January 195:':' in Paolo E. Coletta. ed.

American Secretaries ofthe Nal'y, II:829-41 (829, quote); memrcd Doris M. Condit, re conv

with Foster, 4 Nov 77, :" OSD Hist.

1:1. Diary Eben A. Ayers (WH press aide), 27 Mar 50, in Ayers papers. Harry S. Truman Library,

Independence, Mo; memrcd Doris M. Condit re conv with Goldberg, 10 .Ian 8:'. Condit file,

OSD Hist; memrcd Doris M. Condit re conv with Foster, 4 Nov 77. :'. ibid; Whos Who in

America, 1956-195 7 . 842; Joseph and Stewart Alsop, The Reporters Trade, 149.

14. Cole, Defense Documents, 5 I-59, 108-11; DirAdmOSD. Office of the Secretary of Defense

Organization Manual, [Sep 521, introduction 0.01; PI. 80-25:' (26 July 1947); PI. 81-216

(10 August 1949); PI. 79-585 (1 August 1946); PI. 81-:'47 (11 October 1949); PI. 81-:'29 (6

October 1949).

15. Testimony SecDef, 21 Oct 49, House ete on Armed Services, The National Defense

Program-Unification and Strategy: Hearings. 617-18.

16. Official Register ofthe United States, 1950, 120-21; interv with Henry E. Glass hy Doris M.

Condit, 18 Nov 8:', 2, OSD Hist; interv with Leva, 10 and 14 Jun 77, 7-11; Semiannual

Report ofthe Secretary ofDefense and the Semiannual Reports ofthe Secretary ofthe Army,

Secretary ofthe Nal'y, Secretarv ofthe Air Force, January I toJune 30, 1951 (hereafter cited

as Semiannual Report of the SecDefwith year), 75.

17. PI. 81-216 (10 August 1949); interv with McNeil, 7 Jun 76,5-7,9-16,47-48; Cole, Defense

Documents, 110-11; Carl W. Borklund, Men ofthe Pentagon: From Forrestal to McNamara,

71; testimony SecDcf, 28 Feb 50. US Congo Senate. Cte on Expenditures in the Executive

Departments. Til Improve Budgeting, Accounting, and Auditing Methods of the Federal

GOl'ernment: Hearings. 81 Cong, 2 sess (1950). 70-76.

18. Interv with McNeil. :'1 May 74. 16-19, 28-:'0, 45-46 (quote); testimony SecDer, 21 Oct 49,

in House Cte on Armed Services, tbe National Defense Program-Unification and

Strategy: Hearings, 617-18; intervswith Leva, 10and 14Jun 77. 9-11, and 8Mar74, 15-16.

19. 1nterv with Leva, 10 and 14 Jun 77, 12-1:1; testimony SecDer. 21 Oct 49. in House Cte on

Armed Services. The National Defense Program-Unification and Strategy: Hearings,

617-18; memo SecDef for DepSecDcf et al. 9 Nov 49, Condit file. OSD Hist; OJficial Register

of the United States, 1950. 119-20; Semiannual Report of the SecDef . JuZv I to

December 31, 1949, :'2-:':'; Semiannual Report of the SecDef . Januarv I tOJune 30,

1951. 75.

20. Intervs with Leva, 10 and 14 Jun 77, 10-11 (quote), and 8 Mar 74, :'4 (quote); testimony

SecDef, 21 Oct 49, in House Cte on Armed Services, The National Defense Program-Unification and Strategy: Hearings, 618.

2!. Paper OSD, "Summary of Provisions .," lca 1951].6-7, OSD Hist; Semiannual Report

of the SecDef.. January 1 tOJune 30, 1951,75; Official Register of the United States,

1950, 120; interv with Leva, 8 Mar 74, 14-16; Itr Ohly to Condit, 12 Dec 8:'. w/comments,

7, Condit file, OSD Hist.

22. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et ai, :' Aug 49, FRUS 1949, 1::'65-68; Halaby. Crosswinds. 49;

memo SecDef for DepSecDef et ai, 9 Nov 49. Condit file. OSD IIist; memo SecDcf for

SecsMiiDepts et al. 25 Nov 49, ibid; hr Burns to Pres, 11 Jul 5 I, ibid; memo ExecSecOSD for

SecsMiiDepts et ai, 6 Dec 49, ibid; PI. 81-:'29 (6 October 1949).

2:'. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et ai, :' I Aug 49, Condit file, OSD Hist.

24. Paper [OFMA OISA OSD]. "Comments on Brookings Report," rca 195 I-52]. Condit

file, OSD Hist; two memos SecDef for SecsMilDepts et ai, 25 Nov '"19 (quote) and 15 May 50.

ibid; memo SecDcf for ExccSecNSC, 8Jun 50. RG 218. CCS :':'4 NSC (9-25-47); Semiannual

Report afthe SecDef· . January I to]une 30, 1951.75. 'Iwenty-two persons are listed

under ATSD and 49 undcr MDAP.
548 Notes to Pages 21-25

25. Inten's with Lemnitzer, 21 Mar 74, 20, and 4 Mar 76, 16-18; Halaby, Crosswinds, 48-52;

interv with ably, 28 Apr 77,96-9""; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 371, 373-74.

26. Inten's with Lemnitzer, 21 Mar 74, 42 (quote), and 4 Mar 76, 12-14 (quote); Halaby,

Crosswinds, 49-50; Itr Burns to Truman, 11 Jul 51, Condit file, OSD Hist.

27. SecDef memo of 28 Mar 49, as quoted, OffCounselOASD(L&L), "Summary of Provisions .," Ica 19521, 25-26, Condit file, OSD Hist; PL 80-253 (26July 1947); PL 79-585

(I August 1946); PL 81-34"" (II October 1949); Semiannual Report of the SecDef

january 1 tojune30, 1951,75.

28. Official Register of the United States, 1950. 124-28; PL 81-216 (10 August 1949);

Semiannual Report of the SecDef . january 1 tojune 30, 1951,75; DoD Directive, 3

Nov 49, with amendment, 13 Sep 50, OSD Hist; paper, OffCounsel OASD(L&L), "Summary

of Provisions .," lea 1952J, 11-12, Condit file, ibid.

29. PL 80-253 (26 July 1947); PL 81-216 (10 August 1949); Official Register of the United

States, 1950, 128-29; John Ponturo, Analytical Support for the joint ChieJs oj StaJf The

WXEG Experience, 1948-1976,2,65-71, 113-15.

30. PL 81-216 (10 August 1949); DoD Directive, 14 Sep 49, OSD Hist; testimony ChRDB, II Jan

50, US Cong, House, Cte on Appropriations, Department oj DeJense Appropriations for

1951: Hearings, 81 Cong, 2 sess (1950), 153-65; testimony ChRDB, 24 Jan 52, US Cong,

House, Cte on Appropriations, Department of DeJense and Related Independent Agencies

AppropriationsJor 1953: Hearings, 82 Cong, 2 sess (1952),203.

31. Testimony ChRDB, II Jan 50, House Cte on Appropriations, Department of Defense

Appropriations Jor 1951: Hearings, 153-65; Semiannual Report oj the SecDeJ.

january 1 tojune 30, 1951,75.

32 PL 81-216 (10 August 1949); OASD(PA), Department ojDeJense Fact Book, 1985, 39, OSD

Hist; Clark G. Reynolds, "Forrest Percival Sherman, 2 November 1949-22 July 1951," in

Robert William Love, Jr., ed, The ChieJs oj Naval Operations, 209-32; Gerald Kennedy,

"William Morrow Fechteler, 16 August 1951-17 August 1953," ibid, 235-4 I.

33. PL 81-216 (10 August 1949); ]CS Hist Div, History oJ the UniJied Command Plan, 20 Dec

77, 5-6; DoD Directive, 21 Apr 48, in Cole, DeJense Documents, 276-85 (278, quote);

Wilber W. Hoare, Jr., "Truman," in Ernest R. May, The Ultimate Decision: The President as

Commander in Chief, 186-87; Semiannual Report oj the SecDeJ. . . january 1 to june

30, 1951,75.

34. PL 81-216 (10 August 1949); Cole, DeJense Documents, 108-09; statement and testimony

Johnson, 28 Jun 49 and 6 Jul 49, House Cte on Armed Services, Hearings . .. Sundry

Legislation, I1:2679-2715, 2779-2827; Harold Hinton, "Johnson a Victim of Economy

Moves," NY Times, 14 Sep 50.

35. PL ""9-585 (I August 1946); Rearden, Formative Years, 111-14; DoD Directive 1910,

Military Liaison Committee, 15 Jun 48, OSD Hist.

36. PL ""9-585 (I August 1946); memo Forrestal for Donald Carpenter (ChMLC), 8 Apr 48, OSD

Ilist; DoD Directive 1910, Military Liaison Committee, 15 Jun 48, ibid; PL 81-347 (II

October 1949); PR 258-49 OPI OSD, 30 Sep 49, OSD Hist; Semiannual Report oj the

SecDeJ. . januarv 1 tojune 30, 1951,75; OASD(PA), Department oJDeJense Fact Book,

1985,37 ; Rearden, Formative Years, I I 1-14.

37. Rearden. Formative Years, 398, 437; DoD Directive, 26 Nov 49, w/memo SecDef for

SecArmy et ai, 26 Nov 49, OSD Hist.

38. Paper OffGenCounsel OASD(L&L). "Summary of Provisions .. lea 1952), 25, OSD Hist;

DoD Interim Directive, 22 Feb 49. ibid; memo Johnson for SecArmy et ai, 31 Mar 49, ibid;

DoD Directive, 8 Aug 49, ibid; memo Paul A. Griffith (ASD(APA)) for SecsMiiDepts et ai, 14

Dl:C 49, ibid; PR 152-50 OPI OSD, I Feb 50, ibid; Itr Ohly to Condit, 12 Dec 83,

w/commems, 9, ibid; Rearden, Formatiz'e Years, 103-05; Semiannual Report oj the

SecDeJ . .. january 1 tojune 30, 1950, 25-27, 210; OJJicial Register ofthe United States,

1950, 123.
Notes to Pages 25-28 549

39. PR 52-49A OPI NME, 20 May 49, OSD Hist; DoD Directive, 14 Jun 49, ibid; memo SecDef

for SecArmy et aI, 16 Sep 49, Condit file, OSD Hist; Semiannual Report ofthe SecDef .

January 1 toJune 30, 1950,22; Official Register of the United States, 1950, 123.

40. Memo Melvin A. Casberg (ChAFMPC) for George A. Wyeth (OSD), 9 Mar 53, w/paper on

AFMPC, Condit file, OSD Hist; Official Register ofthe United States, 1950, 12:\; Semiannual

Report of the SecDef. . January 1 to June 30, 1951, "75; Rearden, Formative Years,

108-11.

41. DoD Directive, 12 May 49, OSD Hist; PR 198-50S OPI OSD, 5 Oct 50, ibid; memo Casberg

for Wyeth, 9 Mar 53, w/paper on AFMPC, ibid; interv with Lemnitzer, 4 Mar 76, 18-19;

Semiannual Report ofthe SecDef. . . January 1 to June 30, 1950, 29-32. The reduction

in hospitals ordered on 1 February 1950 had been supported earlier by the Director of

Medical Services and the Cooper committee (paper [Hist Off OSD], "Notes for 'Fiscal 1951

Report,' " [ca early 1951], OSD Hist).

42. Memo Forrestal for SecArmy et aI, 17 Mar 49, Condit file, OSD lUst; lecture ChDefMgmtCte

at AWC, Ft Leavenworth, Kans, 8 Nov 50, 12, ibid.

4:\. Memo Johnson for SecsMilDepts, 7 Jun 49, Condit file, OSD Hist; memo M-2:\9-49 DirOPI

for Press, 10 Aug 49, ibid; hr Early to James H. McGraw, Jr., (President, McGraw-Hill

Publishing Co.), 29 Sep 49, ibid; memrcd Wayne Althaus, 10 Feb 50, ibid; memo SecsMiIDepts for SecDef, 17 Mar 50, cited in draft paper [Hist Off OSD], "Development of DoD Public

Relations," [ca 1958], ibid; briefing notes and diagrams [DetMgmtCte], [Apr 50], ibid;

unsigned draft memo OSD, 17 May 50, ibid; extract mins DefMgmtCte, 18 May 50, ibid; Itrs

William Frye to E. John Long, 20 Dec 50 and 2 Feb 51, ibid; draft memo DirOPI, 22 Dec 52,

w/memo DirOPI for DirOLL OASD(L&L), 22 Dec 52, RG :\:\0, CD 334 (Armed Services

Committee); Rearden, Formative Years, 77-83.

44. Memo Frye for Gen Prichard et ai, 28 Mar 49, OSD Hist; draft paper [Hist Off OSD),

"Development of DoD Public Relations," [ca 1958], ibid; Official Register of the United

States, 1950, 122-23; Semiannual Report of the SecDef . January 1 toJune 30, 1951,

75.

45. Memo SecDef, 28 Mar 49, quoted in paper OffCounsel OASD(L&L), "Summary of Provisions .," lca 1952], 25-26, OSD Hist; Official Register ofthe United States, 1950, 118;

interv with Leva, 10 and 14 Jun 77, 13.

46. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et ai, 10 Aug 49, Condit file, OSD Hist; PR 113-49 OPI OSD, 10

Aug 49, OSD Hist; DoD Directives, 12 May 50 and 2 Aug 50, ibid; Semiannual Report ofthe

SecDef· . July 1 to Decemher 31, 1949,45; Semiannual Report ofthe SecDef. . Ju~y

1 to December 31, 1951,75.

47. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et ai, 10 Aug 49, Condit file, OSD Hist.

48. Testimony SecDcf, 28 Jun 49, House Cte on Armed Services, Hearings . Sundry

Legislation, 2698; testimony SecDef, 28 Sep 49, US Cong, House, ete on Appropriations,

National Military Establishment Appropriation Rillfor 1950: Preconference Hearings, 81

Cong, 1 sess (1949), 37-38; testimony SecDef, 21 Oct 49, House ete on Armed Services, The

National Defense Program-Unification and Strategy: Hearings, 614-16; paper DefMgmtCte, 2 May 50, "Statement of Principles," Condit file, OSf) Hist.

49. PI. 81-216 (10 August 1949).

50. Ibid; testimony Johnson, 15 Jun 51, CS Cong, Senate, Ctes on Armed Services and Foreign

Relations, Military Situation in the Far East: Hearings, 82 Cong, 1 sess (1951), pt

4:2702-03.

51. Memo SecDef for SecsMilDepts et ai, 4 May 50, RG 218, CCS 334 AFPC (12-2-47); AFPC

agenda and "significant actions reports," ibid; testimony John F. Floberg (ASecNav(Air», 29

Mar 53, OSD Cte on Department of Defense Organization (hereafter cited as Rockefeller ete),

"Hearings" (mimeo), 13, 39-40, OSD Hist.

52. Rearden, Formatil.e Years, 35. 49; testimony Finlettcr, 29 Mar 53, Rockefeller ete,

"Hearings," 29-.30, OSD Hist; testimony SecDef, 26 Jul 50, Senate Cte on Appropriations,

Hearings on Supplemental Appropriations j(Jr 1951, 295-96; testimony Johnson, 1... Jun
550 Notes to Pages 28-32

51, Senate Ctes on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East:

Hearings, pt 4:2622-23; memo SecAFPC for MbrsAFPC, 7 Jun 50, RG 330, CD 114-2-34.

53. Memo SecDef for USecDef et ai, 5 May 49, Condit file, OSD Hist; addendum to agenda

SecStfCouncii OSD, 11 Aug 49, RG 330, CD 122-1-4.

54. Memo George M. Elsey (AdmAsst to Pres) for SplCounsel to Pres, 7 Jul 50, Elsey papers, Harry

S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo; memo ExecSecNSC for SecDef, 1 Sep 50, RG 330, CD

320.2.

55. Memo ExecSecNSC for Pres, 7 Jul 50, Truman papers, President's Secretary's files: NSC

(PSF:NSC), Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo; Itr Pres to SecDef, 19 Ju150, RG 330,

CD 381 (Gen).

56. Llr Pres to SecDef, 19 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 381 (Gen); memo Burns for Johnson, 25 Jul 50,

ibid; interoff memo Burns for Johnson. 1 Aug 50, ibid; ItrJohnson to Truman, I Aug 50, ibid;

memo Sees Army, Navy, AF for Johnson, 29 Jul 50, with handwritten note by rna], RG 330,

CD 334 (NSC); memo Burns for Marshall, 25 Jan 51, RG 330, CD 310.1.

57. Memo ExecSecNSC for SeeState et ai, 10 Feb 49, wlmemo SeeState for Pres, 10 Feb 49, FRUS

1949,1:429; rept SplCteNSC to Pres, 31 Jan 50, FRUS 1950, 1:513-23.

58. Memo Pres for SecDef, 25 Aug 50, wlltr Pres to ChAEC, 25 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 400.112; Itr

SecDefto ChJCS, 5 Dec 50, w/intraoff memo L.W. Rogers (Asst to ChMLC) for Exec to SecDef,

1 Dec 50, RG 330, CD 400.174; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 314-15.

59. Agenda NSC mtgs and mins of attendance, NSC mtgs 58 through 128, both in Truman papers,

PSF:NSC; Rearden, Formative Years, 121.

60. NSRB [Harry B. Yoshpe), The National Security Resources Board, 1947-1953: A Case Study

in Peacetime Mobilization Planning (hereafter cited as NSRB, Peacetime Mobilization

Planning), 144; United States Government Organization Manual, 1951-52, 65; Cole,

Defense Documents, 115; Official Register of the United States, 1950, 21-23.

61. Statement ChNSRB to NSC, 6Jul 50; FRUS 1950,1:338-4 I; memo ChNSRB for ExecSecNSC,

5 Sep 50, ibid, 395-97; rept ChNSRB to NSC, I I Jan 5 I, FRUS 1951,1:7-18; memo ChNSRB

for Pres, [nd), ibid, 2 I 33, 33n22; five memos ExecSecNSC for Pres, 24 Nov 50, 29

[erroneously dated 241 Nov 50, 15 Dec 50, 25 Jan 51, 23 Feb 5 I, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.

62. NSRB, Peacetime Mobilization Planning, 39,41, 145-59; testimony Finletter, 29 Mar 53,

Rockefeller Cte, "Hearings," 16.

63. United States Government Organization Manual 1951-52, 270-72, 326-34; NSRB, Peacetime Mobilization Planning, 145-59; interv with Symington, 27 May 81, 23, OSD Hist;

Congressional Quarterly Service, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, 260, 356-57; PL

81-774 (8 September 1950).

64. PL 81-599 (30 June 1950); PL 81-604 (10 July 1950); PL 81-624 (27 July 1950); PL 81-655

(3 August 1950); Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964,261; EO 10270 (6 July 1951); EO

10148 (27 July 1950).

65. PL 81-779 (9 September 1950); statement and testimony SecDef, 22 Aug 50, US Cong,

Senate, Cte on Armed Services, Universal Military Training: Hearings, 81 Cong, 2 sess

(1950),21-33; Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964,260-61.

66. Lecture ChDefMgmtCte at AWC, 8 Nov 50, 13, Condit file, OSD Hist; testimony Johnson, 14

Jun 51, in Senate Ctes on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far

East: Hearings, pt 4:2622-23; memos SecAFPC for MbrsAFPC, 11, 12, and 19 Jul 50, in both

RG 330, CD 114.2, and RG 218, CCS 334 Armed Forces Policy Council (12-2-47).

67. Semiannual Report of the SecDef. January 1 to June 30, 1950, 51-52; lecture

ChDefMgmtCte at AWC, 8 Nov 50, 12, Condit file, OSD Hist; memo ASD(L&L) for

DepSecDef, 15 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 400.12.

68. Memo DirPPS for SecState, 12 Jul 50, FRUS /950, 1:341-42, 341n 1; Dean Acheson, Sketches

from Life ofMen / Have Known, 162.

69. Llr SecDef to SecTreas, 13 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea).
Notes to Pages 32-36 551

70. Memo ActingSecAFPC for MbrsAFPC, 5 Jul SO, RG 330, CD 334 (AFPe); memo SecArmy et

al for SecDef, 29 Jul SO, RG 330, CD 350.001; memo ExecSecOSD for Jt Sees, 7 Aug SO,

w/enc, State, 3 Aug SO, Condit file, OSD Hist.

71. NY Times, 26 Aug SO, as quoted in Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision

to Enter the Korean War, 96.

72. Testimony SecDef, 30 Aug SO, in Senate Cte on Appropriations, Supplemental Appropriations for 1951: Hearings, 296; Hanson Baldwin in NY Times, I Sep SO, cited in Whiting,

China Crosses the Yalu, 96; Coletta, "Francis P. Matthews," 819-20, 822.

73. Robert H. Ferrell, ed, Offthe Record: The Private Papers ofHarry S. Truman, 191-93; diary

entry Eben A. Ayers, 3 Jul SO, in Ayers papers; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 441; Ken

Hechler, Working with Truman: A Personal Memoir of the White House lears, 148-49.

74. Comments Charles S. Murphy (SplCounsel to Pres), [ca 1976], in Francis H. Heller, ed, The

Truman White House: The Administration ofthe Presidency, 1945-1953, 217; address and

remarks Johnson, 7 Dec 49, 14 Feb SO, and 3 Mar SO, Hist Off OSD, comp, Puhlic Statements

ofSecretary ofDefensejohnson, 1949-1950, II1:65 1-53,745-46,767-69; interv with Leva,

10 and 14 Jun 77,4041; Walter S, Poole, 1950-1952, vol IV in The History ofthe joint Chiefs

of Staff The joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 60-62; editorial, "Johnson to

Marshall," NY Times, 14 Sep SO; Harold B, Hinton, "Johnson A Victim of Economy Moves,"

ibid; Hanson W. Baldwin, "Defense Gain Is Seen In Johnson Exit," ibid.

75. News confs, 3 and 31 Aug SO, Public Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States: Harry S.

Truman, 1950 ,(hereafter cited as Truman Puhlic Papers with year), 570,606-08; ltr

Eleanor Roosevelt to Pres, 9 Aug SO, Truman papers, official files (OF).

76. Ferrell, Off the Record, 189-93; memrcds Elsey, 13 Sep SO, w/enc, and 16 Sep SO, both in

Elsey papers; editorial, "Johnson to Marshall," NY Times, 14 Sep SO; interv with McNeil, 7

Jun 76, 1-2.

77. Harry S. Truman, lears of Trial and Hope, vol II in Memoirs by Harry S. Truman (hereafter

cited as Truman, Memoirs II), 112; Ferrell, Offthe Record, 189-93; memrcd Elsey, 13 Sep SO,

w/enc, Elsey papers; Itr Pres to ChSenateArmedServicesCte and ChHouseArmedServicesCte,

13 Sep SO, Truman Public Papers, 1950,633-34.

78. Robert H. Ferrell, ed, The Eisenhower Diaries, 103-07; Forrest C. Pogue, George C.

Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 32-35, 98, 148-50, 275-301, 348; Truman, Memoirs Il, 115.

79. Truman, Memoirs Il, 90-91, 103-04, 109, 112-19, 122-31; editorial, "Marshall in China,"

NY Times, IS Sep SO; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 140-42,212-19,226-37,259-67;

Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History: 1929-1969, 258-71; editorial, "West Is Pleased Over

Marshall," NY Times, 14 Sep SO.

80. Ferrell, Offthe Record, 189-90; Fulton Lewis, Jr., "Sees Marshall Appeasing China Reds," NY

journal American, 14 Sep SO; Times-Herald [Washington], 14 Sep SO; John O'Donnell,

"Capitol Stuff," Daily News [New York City], 14 Sep SO; "Congress Acting To Let Marshall Be

Defense Chief:' NY Times, 14 Sep SO; "Taft and Wherry Oppose Marshall:' ibid, 15 Sep SO;

"AfterJohnson: Marshall of Defense:' ibid, 17 Sep SO; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 365;

Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, 261-62; US Cong, Congressional Record, IS Sep SO,

81 Cong, 2 sess, vol 96, pt 2:14914 Oenner quotes).

81. For an analysis of the votes on the waiver and on confirmation, see Ronald J. Caridi, The

Korean War and American Politics: The Republican Party as a Case StUdy, 64-65, 282-87;

William S. White, "Congress Acting To Let Marshall Be Defense Chief:' NY Times, 14 Sep SO;

Acheson, Present at the Creation, 215-16; Congress and the Nation, 1945-/964, 261-62.

82. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 441.

83. Interv with Robert A. Lovett by Doris M. Condit, 7 Jun 76, 11-12, OSD Hist; interv with

Marshall S. Carter and George V. Underwood, Jr., by Alfred Goldberg, Doris M. Condit, 22

Apr 77,9, 17-19, ibid; interv with Leva, 10 and 14 Jun 77,24; memrcd Doris M. Condit, 4

Nov 77, re conv with Foster, Condit file, OSD Hist; interv with Nathaniel H. Goodrich by

Doris M. Condit, 10 Apr 84, 14-15, 37-39, OSD Hist; Ferrell, Eisenhower Diaries, 52;
552 Notes to Pages 36-42

Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, 303-04; Borklund, Men ofthe Pentagon, 102; Acheson, Present at

the Creation, 140-41. '

84. PR OPI OSD re Robert Abercrombie Lovett, [28 Sep 50), OSD Hist; interv with Lovett by

Alfred Goldberg, Harry B. Yoshpe, 13 May 74, 8, ibid; Jonathan Foster Fanton, "Robert A.

Lovett" (unpub ms), 16-26, OSD Hist; Lewis L. Strauss, Men and Decisions, 161; Marx Leva,

"The Papers of a Defense Secretary," NY Times Book Review, 4 Oct 5 I.

85. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 236-37; interv with Lovett, 7 Jun 76,4, 10-11, 19-21;

Edward B. Lockett, "Again the Marshall-Lovett Team," NY Times Magazine, 29 Oct 50, 12,

24-25; Edward B. Lockett, "Leave It To Lovett," Colliers (30 June 1951), 31ff.

86. Intervs with Lovett, 13 May 74, 3, 8, and 7 Jun 76, 11; PR OPI OSD re .. Lovett, 28 Sep

50, ibid; OASD(PA), Department ofDefense Fact Book, 1985, 10; Marshall quoted in Lockett,

"Leave It To Lovett," Colliers (30 June 1951), 31ff. The Senate confirmed Lovett as deputy

secretary on 29 November 1950 (Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, 261-62).

87. Intervs with Lovett, 7 Jun 76, 1, and 13 May 74, 8; Hanson W. Baldwin, "Lovett an Ideal

Choice," NY Times, 13 Sep 50; Edward B. Lockett, " 'There Is No Other Way But Strength,' "

NY Times Magazine, 23 Sep 51, 12ff; Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, 268; remarks

Pres, 16 May 52, in Truman Public Papers, 1952-53,339-41. Marshall was distressed by

several instances of memory failure during congressional hearings, according to Acheson

(Sketches from Life, 165).

88. Quoted in Lockett, "Again the Marshall-Lovett Team," NY Times Magazine, 29 Oct 50, 12,

24-25; interv with Carter and Underwood, 22 Apr 77, 24, 52; interv with Leva, 10 and 14

Jun 77, 39; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 715-16; Acheson, Sketches from Life, 75-77.

89. Interv with Lovett, 7 Jun 76, 5-6; interv with Carter and Underwood, 22 Apr 77,6-7, 37-38;

interv with McNeil, 7 Jun 76, 3-7, 21-23, 33-35, 107-08; interv with William C. Foster by

Alfred Goldberg, Samuel A. Tucker, 27 Feb 74,5-7, OSD Hist; Lockett, "Leave It To Lovett,"

Colliers (30 June 1951), 31ff. For an opposing view, see Thomas K. Finletter, Power and

Policy: US. Foreign Policy and Military Power in the Hydrogen Age, particularly 246-72.

90. Ltr SecDef to US H1COG, 17 Dec 51, Condit file, OSD Hist; comments Lovett (Nash

testimony), 29 Mar 53, Rockefeller ete, "Hearings," 31-32, ibid.

9 I. Interv with Foster, 27 Feb 74, I, 4-5; memrcd Doris M. Condit re conv with Foster, 4 Nov

77, 1, Condit file, OSD Hist; Who's Who in America, 1956-1957, 880; OASD(PA),

Department of Defense Fact Book, 1985, 10.

92. Interv with Foster, 27 Feb 74, 3; memrcd Doris M. Condit re conv with Foster, 4 Nov 77, 5-6;

interv with Lovett, 7 Jun 76, 12-13.

III. THE NORTH KOREAN ATTACK

I. Mins Charles E. Bohlen, rca 8 Feb 45], US Dept State, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta,

1945 (hereafter cited as Malta and Yalta), in Foreign Relations of the United States series,

770; Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, vol II in Memoirs by Harry S. Truman

(hereafter cited as Truman, Memoirs 11), 316-17; Dept State Pub No 2933, Korea's

Independence, in Far Eastern series 18, 16-17; James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, The

Korean War, vol III in The History of the joint Chiefs of Staff The joint Chiefs ofStaff and

National Policy, pt 1:1-3; Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 350.

2. Dept State, Korea's Independence, 2; memo ASecState(FE) for ChfDiv HistPolicyRes, 12 Jul

50, US Dept State, Foreign Relations ofthe United States, 1945 (hereafter cited as FRUS with

year and volume number), VI:I-39; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:4-9.

3. Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt I: 10-12; Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in

Korea: KMAG in Peace and War, in United States Army Historical Series, 3-33; paper rna],

"u.s. Aid to Korea Since Close of World War II," rca summer 1950], Ohly papers, OSD Hist;

Arthur L. Grey, Jr., "The Thirty-Eighth Parallel," Foreign Affairs (April 195 I), 482-87.
Notes to Pages 42-46 553

4. James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, in United States Army in the Korean

War series, 24: Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1: 11-12; comments by John Muccio,

in Francis H. Heller, ed, The Korean War: A 25-Year Perspective. 103.

5. Sawyer. Military Advisors in Korea. 27: Lovett-Molotov correspondence in FRUS 1947,

Vl:771-74, 779-81. 790, 827-28, 836-37; exchange of notes, II Aug-17 Sep 47, in Dept

State. Korea's Independence, 50-60.

6. Memo SWNCC for SJCS, FRUS 1947, Vl:789: memo SecDef for SecState, 29 [erroneously

dated 26] Sep 47, ibid, 817-18; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:13-14.

7. Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:14-15,17-18; msg US PolAd Korea for SecState, 26

Sep 47, FRUS 1947, Vl:816-17.

8. Note ExecSecNSC to Pres, 2 Apr 48, w/NSC 8, FRUS 1948, VI: 1163-69, 1164n3; Schnabel

and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:16-18; Steven L. Rearden, The Formative Years, 1947-1950,

vol I in History of the Office of the SecretarJ! ofDefense, 258-60.

9. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, 32-33: Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 26-28; Schnabel

and Watson, Korean War, pt 1: 18-19: Rearden . .Formative Years, 260-61; Dept State Pub No

3305, Korea, 1945 to 1948: A Report on Political Developments and Economic Resources

with Selected Documents, in Far Eastern series 18, 14-20: memo Dean Rusk (DirllNA State)

for SecState and USecState. 10 Sep 48, FRUS 1948, VI:1299-15<)O; position paper liS Deleg,

22 Oct 48, ibid, 1315-I7; Leland M. Goodrich. Korea: A Study of u.s. Policy in the United

Nations, 63, 65-66.

10. Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt I: 19: Goodrich, Korea: A Study, 64; msg USAmb Korea

for SecState, 16 Sep 49, FRUS 1949, VII, pt 2:1080.

11. Msg Jacobs (lJSPoiAd Korea) for SecState, 24 Aug 48. FRUS 1948, VI: 1287-88; four msgs

liSSplRep Korea for SecState, 28 Oct 48 and 5, 12, 19 Nov 48, ibid, 1317-18, 1320-21,

1325-27, 1331-32, 1332nl; Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, 28-40,73-75.

12. Rept NSC to Pres, 22 Mar 49, FRUS 1949, VII, pt 2:972; Schnabel and Watson. Korean War,

pt 1:21-23; Goodrich, Korea: A Study, 65--:'1. 7'1.

13. Msg CINCFE for Dept Army. 19 Jan 49, cited in Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:23;

Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 34-35.

14. Ltr SecArmy to SecState, 25 Jan 49. FRUS 1949, VII. pt 2:94';-46; Itr SecState to SecArmy, 25

Jan 49, ibid, 946; CIA-ORE 3-49. 28 Feb 49. cited in Rearden. Formative Years, 262-63.

15. Rept NSC 8/2 to Pres, 22 Mar 49, FRUS 1949, VII, pt 2:970 (quote). 977-78.

16. Speech at National Press Cluh Acheson. 12 Jan 50, in The Department of State Rulletin (23

January 1950). I I 1-18 (116, quote).

17. Schnabel and Watson. Korean War, pt I:27: Sawyer, ,Hilitary Advisors in Korea, 45,48-51,

69 (quote).

18. Statement SecDef to Senate Cte on Foreign Relations, P Aug ';0, RG 330, CD 032.3:

testimony Sec'State, 6 Jun 51, US Congo Senate. Des on Armed Services and Foreign Relations,

Military Situation in the Far East: Hearings, 82 Congo I sess (19'; I), pt 3: 1993-94: msg

USAmb Korea for SecState, 19 Dec 49, FRUS 1949, VII, pt 2: I I 12; Sawyer. Military Adl'isors

in Korea, 96-97, 103; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt I:27-28: Rearden, Formatil'e

Years, 265.

19. Memo ChfKMAG for KMAG AdVisors, 5 May 50, FRUS 1950, VII:93-96; memoActingDirMDAP for ASecState(FE), 10 May 50, ibid, 82-83, 83nl: memcon OIC KoreanAffs, 10 May ';0,

ibid, 78-81; msg llSAmb Korea for SecState, 23 May ';0. ibid, 86-88, 86n2; Sawyer, Military

Advisors in Korea, 72-75, 90-95, 106; msg LJSAmb Korea for SecState, 19 Oct 49, FRU5;

1949, VII. pt 2:1088-89; msg llSAmb Korea for SecState, 10 Nov 49, ibid, 109';-96; msg

lfSAmb Korea for SecState, 21 Jan 50, FRUS 1950, VII: 14; msg lISAmh Korea for SecState, 21

Jan 50, w/enc, ibid. 15-18; draft paper OftDepDirMDA, "Chronological Summary of l:.S.

Military Assistance to the Republic of Korea," Ica 16 Aug ';OJ, 11-12. 14-P, Ohl)' papers,

OSD Hist.

20. Msgs LJSChge Korea for SecState. both II May SO, FRUS 1950, VIUl3-84, 8\-85; memo CIA,

19 Jun SO, ibid, 118-19; memo SecArmy to SecState, 21 Jul ';0, w/draft rept, R(; 330. CD 092
554 Notes to Pages 47-52

(Korea 38th Parallel). Sawyer, Military Adl'isors in Korea, 105, placed North Korean forces

at 135,000.

21. Msg USAmb Korea for SecState, 14 Jun 50, FRUS 1950, VII: 105; memo CIA, 19 Jun 50, ibid,

110-1 1.

22. Editorial note, ibid, 266; Sawyer, Military Adl'isors in Korea, 73-75, 103-04, 112.

23. Five msgs USAmb Korea for SecState, all 25 Jun 50, FRUS 1950, VII: 125-26, 129, 132,

132-33, 133-34; memo SecArmy for SecState, 21 Jul 50, with draft rept, RG 330, CD 092

(Korea 38th Parallel); Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:57, 64.

24. Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:63-66; Truman, Memoirs 11, 332.

25. Truman, Memoirs 11, 333; J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of

Korea, 13; msg Sebald (ActingPolAd Japan) for Dulles and Allison for SecState, 25 Jun 50,

FRUS 1950, VII: 140; msg Barbour for Acheson, 25 Jun 50, ibid, 139-40; Dept State 01R IE

No 7, 25 Jun 50, ibid, 148-54.

26. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 405; Wilbur W. Hitchcock, "North Korea Jumps the Gun,"

in Norman A. Graebner, ed, Nationalism and Communism in Asia: The American

Response, 97-1 09.

27. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 404-05; resolution adopted by UNSC, 25 Jun 50, FRUS

1950, VII: 155-56; Ernest A. Gross, The United Nations: Structure for Peace, 57; Goodrich,

Korea: A Study, 104-06,221-22.

28. Testimony Johnson, 14 Jun 51, Senate Ctes on Armed Services and Foreign Relations,

Military Situation in the Far East: Hearings, pt 4:2579-80.

29. Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:71-73, "19; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 406;

memcon Jessup (Amb at Lge), 25 Jun 50, FRUS 1950, VII: 157-58.

30. Testimony Johnson, 14 Jun 51, Senate Ctes on Armed Services and Foreign Relations,

Military Situation in the Far East: Hearings, pt 4:2580-81; memcon Jessup, 25 Jun 50,

FRlfS 1950, VII: 158-60 Oohnson quote as paraphrased by Jessup).

31. Truman, Memoirs 11, 335-36; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 406-07; memconJessup, 25

Jun 50, FRUS 1950, VI1:l60-61.

32. Three msgs USAmb Korea for SecState, all 26 Jun 50, FRlfS 1950, VII: 167-68, 168, 170; msg

USRep UN for SecState, 26Jun 50, ibid, 171-72; editorial note, ibid, 207.

33. Testimony Johnson, 14 Jun 51, in Senate Ctes Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Military

Situation in the Far East: Hearings, pt 4:2593; memcon Jessup, 26 Jun 50, FRlfS 1950, VII:

178-83 (183, quote); mSg SecState for USEmb UK, 27 Jun 50, ibid, 186-87; statement Pres,

27 Jun 50, ibid, 202-03; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 407-08; Schnabel and Watson,

Korean War, pt 1:89-94.

34. MemconJessup, 27 Jun 50, FRUS 1950, VII:200-02; statement Pres, 27 Jun 50, ibid, 202-03;

resolution UNSC, 27 Jun 50, ibid, 211; memo OffUSecState, 28 Jun 50, ibid, 212-13; msg

USAmb Yugo for SecState, 28 Jun 50, ibid, 215-16; msg USAmb Yugo for SecState, I Jul 50,

ibid, 280, 280n5; two editorial notes, ibid, 207, 266; Acheson, Present at the Creation,

408- 10; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:93-96; Goodrich, Korea: A Study, 109-14,

222. For a sympathetic view of the Indian attitude toward the Korean War, see Chester

Bowles, Ambassador's Report, 238-43.

35. Msg USAmb Korea for SecState, 28Jun 50, FRlfS 1950, VII:21O-11; msg eSChge Korea for

SecState, 29 Jun 50, ibid, 220-21; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 411; Schnabel and

Watson, Korean War, pt 1:97-99; Sawyer, Military Adl'isors in Korea, 125-27, 133.

36. Ltr SecState to SecDef, 28 Jun 50, w/enc, FRUS 1950, VII:217; Schnabel and Watson, Korean

War. pt 1:100-102.

r. Memo ExecSecNSC for Pres, 29 Jun 50, Truman papers, President's Secretary's files:NSC

(PSF:NSC), Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.

38. Memo JCS for SecDef, 29 Jun 50, with draft msgJCS for CINCFE, in [OJCS], comp, "Pertinent

Papers on Korean Situation" (mimeo) (hereafter cited as "Pertinent Papers"), 11:208-10, OSD

Hist; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War. pt I: 10:\-06.

39. Memo ExecSecNSC for Pres, 30 Jun 50, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.
Notes to Pages 52-58 555

40. Ibid; msg USAmb USSR for SecState, 29 Jun 50, FRlfS 1950, VII:229-30.

41. Msg JCS for CINCFE, 29 Jun 50, FRlfS 1950, VI1:240-41; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War,

pt 1: 108-09.

42. Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (subsequently cited as Appleman,

South.. North), 44-46; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 74, 77n51; Courtney Whitney,

MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History, 325-33; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt

1: 110-11.

43. Msg CINCFE for JCS, 30 Jun 50, "Pertinent Papers," 11:222-24; memo telconf Dept Army, 30

Jun 50, FRlfS 1950, VII:250-53; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1: 113-16, 127-29.

44. Editorial note, FRlfS 1950, VII:255; msg JCS for CINCFE, 30 Jun 50, ibid, 263; msg JCS for

CINCFE, I Jul 50, ibid, 271; Truman, Memoirs II, 343; Acheson, Present at the Creation,

412; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:118.

45. Paper George M. Elsey (Asst to Pres), (30 Jun 50), Elsey papers; Acheson, Present at the

Creation, 413; editorial note, FRUS 1950, VII:257; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt

1:119-21.

46. Testimony Johnson, 14 Jun 51, Senate Ctes on Armed Services and Foreign Relations,

Military Situation in the Far East: Hearings, pt 4:2581, 2584.

47. Ltr SecDef to SecState, 6Jul 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo JCS for SecDef, 5 Jul 50, ibid;

Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1: 131-34; Itr CB. Marshall to author, 3 Apr 84, Condit

file, OSD Hist.

48. Memo JCS for SecDef, 8 Jul 50, "Pertinent Papers," 11:234; msg JCS for CINCFE, 10 Jul 50,

ibid, 238; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt I: 135-36.

49. Msg CSGPO for CINCFE, 12 Jul 50, "Pertinent Papers," 11:239; memo ExecSecOSD for JCS,

29 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo SJCS for ExecSecOSD, 3 Aug 50, ibid; Itr

ASecState(UNA) to SecDef, 13 Oct 50, ibid; Itr ASecState(UNA) to ATSD(FMA&MA), 13 Jul 50,

w/enc, ibid.

50. Memo JCS for SecDef, 5 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo SecDef for JCS, 17 Jul 50,

ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 29 Jul 50, ibid; Itr SecDef to SecState, 2 Aug 50, ibid; Itr USecState

to SecDef, 8 Aug 50, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 9 Aug 50, ibid. There were 76 reports from

the U.S. Government to the UN Security Council in the period 25 July 1950-31 August 1953

concerning action taken under the UNC

51. Memo ExecSecNSC for Pres, 30 Jun 50, Truman papers, PSF:NSC; testimony Johnson, 15 Jun

51, Senate Ctes on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, ,tfilitary Situation in the Far East:

Hearings, pt 4:2669-71; msg JCS for CINCFE, 30 Jun 50, Elsey papers.

52. Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1: 142-47; NY Times, 9 Jul 50.

53. Memo JtSecs for SecDef, 7 Jul 50, with Johnson's note-"Mr. President, General Bradley and

I concur," RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo JtSecs for SecDef, 13 Jul 50, ibid; memo

ATSD(FMA&MA) for SecDef and DepSecDef, 13 Jul 50, ibid.

54. Memo JCS for SecDef, 14 Jul 50, ibid.

55. Ibid; memo SecDef for JCS, 20 Jul 50, ibid; memo SecDef for JCS, 21 Jul 50, ibid; Itr

DepUSecState to ATSD(FMA&MA), 25 Jul 50, ibid; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt

1: 151-52.

56. Two memos JCS for SecDef, both 22 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); ltr SecDef to

DepUSecState, 27 Jul 50, ibid; Itr SecDef to SeeState, 12 Sep 50, ibid.

57. Ltr SecState to SeeDef, 24 Jul 50, ibid.

58. Paper SDISI I020/Rev 2 [State], 27 Jul 50, ibid; memo SeeDef for ./CS, 31 .luI 50, ibid; memo

./CS for SecDef, 8 Sep 50, ibid; ltr SecDef to SeeState, 25 Sep 50, ibid.

59. Memo ./CS for SeeDef, 7 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 091.3 (MDAP Korea); memo SeeDef for

SeeArmy et ai, I Sep 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); Itr DepUSeeState for SecDef, 27 Sep 50,

ibid; Itr SecDef to SecState, 30 Sep 50, ibid; Itr ActingSecState to SecDef, 22 Sep 50, RG 330,

CD 092 (India); Itr SeeDef to SecState, 27 Sep 50, ibid.

60. Ltr SecTreas to SeeDef, 2 Oct 50, RG :no, CD 092 (Korea); memo SeeState for Pres, 6 Oct 50,

ibid; Itr SecDef to SecTreas, 18 Oct 50, ibid; memo SecArmy for SecDef, I Nov 50, w/enc,
556 Notes to Pages 58-64

ibid; Itr DepSecDef to SecState, 15 Nov 50, ibid. The matter came up again in 1952: memo

SecArmy et al for ATSD(ISA), 15 Feb 52, ibid; memo DepATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 26 Feb 52,

ibid; ltr DepSecDef to SecState, 4 Mar 52, ibid; Itr SecTreas to SecDef, 29 May 52, ibid; Itr

ActingSecState to SecDef, 29 May 52, ibid; ltr DirBoB to SecDef, 18 ]ul 52, ibid; Schnabel and

Watson, Korean War, pt I: 167-68.

61. Tabulation OSD, 5 Jan 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); msg CINCFE for Dept Army, 2 Jan 52,

ibid; ltr DepSecDef to ASecState(UNA), 6 Jan 52, ibid; memo ASecState(UNA) for USRep UN,

10 Feb 53, FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt I: 760-67; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt

I: 172-75; Table II OSD, "United Nations Military Participation in Korea by Country and

Service," 30 Nov 51, OSD Hist.

62. Table II OSD, "United Nations Military Participation ..," 30 Nov 51, OSD Hist.

63. Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:177. 180, 185; Collins, War in Peacetime, 80

(quote); Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 45, 53-57.

64. Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:150, 178-80, 183; Russell A. Gugeler, Combat

Actions in Korea, 3-19; memo ExecSecNSC for Pres, 7 ]ul 50, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.

65. Msg C57379 CINCFE for ]CS, 7 ]ul 50, "MacArthur" folder, OSD Hist; msg CD57066 CINCFE

for ]CS, 2 ]ul 50, ibid.

66. Schnabel and Watson. Korean War, pt 1: 181-83; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 93-94; two

memrcd Elsey, both 8 ]ul 50, Elsey papers; PR 821-50 OPI OSD, 7 ]ul 50, OSD Hist.

67. Msg CINCFE for ]CS, 9.1ul 50, "Pertinent Papers," 11:235; Schnabel and Watson. Korean War,

pt 1: 185.

68. Collins, War in Peacetime, 78 (quote).

69. Ibid, 81-83; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:191.

70. Collins, War in Peacetime, 83-85; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1: 192.

71. Memo ]CS for SecDef, 13 ]ul 50, with interaff memo ExecSeeOSD for ASD(L&L), 20.lul 50,

RG 330, CD 384.5; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:186-88.

72. Memo ExeeSeeNSC for Pres, 14 .lui 50, Truman papers, PSF:NSC; Acheson, Present at the

Creation, 414-15; memred Elsey, "Preparation of President's Message. .," [nd], Elsey

papers.

73. Spl msg Pres to Cong, 19 ]UI 50, Public Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States: Harry

S. Truman, 1950 ..., 527-37; Pres's address to American people, 19.1ul 50, ibid, 537-42.

74. Memo Pres for SecDef, 19 ]ul 50, RG 330. CD 370.01; memo SeeDef for SeeAF, 20 ]ul 50,

w/note: "Identical memoranda to Secretary of the Army and Secretary of the Navy," RG 330,

CD 381.4; US Cong, House, Cte on Armed Services, SurvEry oj Armed Forces Manpower

Requirements, 1950, 81 Cong, 2 sess (1950), 21; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt

1:189, 195,200; memo ChMB for SecDef, 10 Aug 50. RG 330, CD 381.4.

75. Memo SeeDef for SeeArmy et ai, 10 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 111; Itr ChMB to DirSeleetiveSv, 14

Aug 50, RG 330, CD 381.4; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:188, 192-201.

76. Memo Elsey for ExeeSecNSC, 12 .lui 50. Elsey papers; memo ExecSeeNSC for NSC, 17 ]ul 50,

FRUS 1950, Vl1:410.

77 Memo ExecSeeNSC for SecDef. 29 ]ul 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo ]CS for SecDef, 10

.lui 50, ibid; memo SecDef for ExecSeeNSC, 20 ]ul 50. ibid.

78. Briefing paper for SecDef, "Item 2 NSC 76," rca 27 .lui 50), RG 218, CCS 334 NSC

(9-25-47); Red of Actions NSC, 27 .lui 50, action 323, ibid; annotated list, 22, wlmemo

ExeeSecNSC for NSC, 17 Feb 59, Condit file, OSD Hist.

79. Memo SeeDef for ExecSeeNSC, 11 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 320.2; two memos on NSC

consultants' mtgs [Statel. both 29.1un 50. in FRUS 1950, 1:324-26, 327-30, 330n5; draft rept

NSC 73, [l.luI50]. wlnote ExeeSecNSC to NSC, 1]uI50, ibid, 331-38; memo.lCS for SecDef,

8.1ul 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea).

80. Memo Bohlen, 13 ]ul 50, FRUS 1950, 1:342-44; memo Kennan (Counselor State) for SecState,

8 Aug 50, ibid, 361-67; ]CS revised draft, lca 30 ]ul 50), RG 330, CD 092 (Australia); briefing

paper for SecDef, "Item 2 NSC 73/2," rca 10 Aug 50], RG 218, CCS 334 NSC

(9-25-47); memo .ICS for SecDef, 14 Aug 50, w/enc. RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo
Notes to Pages 64-68 557

ExecSecOSD for ExecSecNSC, 16 Aug 50, ibid; Rcd of Actions NSC, 10 Aug 50, action 337,

RG 218, CCS 334 NSC (9-25-47); briefing paper for SecDef, rca 24 Aug 50), "Item

2 .. NSC 73/3," ibid; rept 73/4 NSC, wlmemo ExecSecNSC for Pres, 25 Aug 50, Truman

papers, PSF:NSC.

81. Draft memo 000,31 Jul 50, FRUS 1950, VII:502-1O; for State positions, see ibid, 449-54,

458-61, 469-73; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 451-52.

82. Memo JtSecs for SecDef, 24 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo ExeeSecOSD for

ExeeSeeNSC, 29 Aug 50, ibid.

83. Memo ExeeSeeNSC to NSC, 1 Sep 50, with NSC 81, FRUS 1950, VII:685-93; briefing paper

for SeeDef, "Item 2 . NSC 81," rca 7 Sep 50), RG 218, CCS 334 NSC (9-25-47);

Acheson, Present at the Creation, 452.

84. Briefing paper for SecDef, "Item 2 NSC 81," rca 7 Sep 50], RG 218, CCS 334 NSC

(9-25-47); memo JCS for SeeDef, 7 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo [ExeeSeeNSC]

for Pres, 8 Sep 51, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.

85. Rept NSC 81/1 NSC to Pres, [9 Sep 50], FRUS 1950, V11:712n3, 716.

86. Ibid, 720.

87. Ibid, 719; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:227-28.

88. Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:183,196-97,201-03,212-14; for another view of

the Inch'on landing, see Roy K. Flint, The Tragic Flaw: MacArthur, the joint Chiefs, and the

Korean War, 215-37.

89. Sherman is quoted in Collins, War in Peacetime, 123; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt

1:203-14; Collins, War in Peacetime, 116, 118-29 (126, quote); Acheson, Present at the

Creation, 447-48.

90. Testimony Johnson, 14 Jun 51, Senate Ctes on Armed Services and Foreign Relations,

Military Situation in the Far East: Hearings, pt 4:2618; Acheson, Present at the Creation,

447-48; Collins, War in Peacetime, 128-29; msg JCS for CINCFE, 8 Sep 50, "Pertinent

Papers," 11:268.

91. Johnson remarks at American Legion convention, 9 Oct 50, in Hist Off OSD, eomp, Public

Statements of Secretary of Defense johnson, 1949-1950, IV: 1088; Collins, War in Peacetime, 130-40; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:217-18, 238; Appleman, South

. North, 488-606.

92. Memo JCS for SecDef, 25 Sep 50, "Pertinent Papers," 11:271, Itr DepUSecState to SecDef, 27

Sep 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea 38th Parallel); msg SecState for ActingSecState, 26 Sep 50,

FRUS 1950, V11:785; ltr SecDef to Pres, 27 Sep 50, with handwritten note: ''Approved

9/27/50 Harry S. Truman" and enc draft directive, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea 38th Parallel); msg

JCS for CINCFE, 27 Sep 50, "Pertinent Papers," 11:274-76.

93. Msg JCS for CINCFE, 27 Sep 50, "Pertinent Papers," 11:274-76.

94. Msg CINCFE for JCS, 28 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea 38th Parallel); Appleman,

South . North, 609- 12 .

95. Memo ChJCS for SecDef, 29 Sep 50, with handwritten note: ''Approved by the President and

Secretary of State at a luncheon meeting 29 September 50 at Blair House. G.C.M.," RG 330,

CD 092 (Korea 38th Parallel); msg JCS for CINCFE, 29 Sep 50, in "Pertinent Papers," 11:278.

96. Msg SecDef for CINCFE, 29 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, VII:826; msg C65304 CINCFE for SecDef,

30 Sep 50, "MacArthur" folder, OSD Hist.

97. The State Department initiated the UNC message, which Acheson, Marshall, and Truman

approved. Msg SecState for ActingSecState, 26 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, VII:785-86, 786nl; msg

CINCFE for ]CS, 28 Sep 50, ibid, 796-97; Schnabel and Watson, KoreanWar, pt 1:238.

98. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 454-55; Ernest A. Gross, The United Nations: Structure

for Peace, 57, 59-61; UN Resolution 376 (V), adopted by UN General Assembly, 7 Oct 50,

FRUS 1950, VII:904-06; Goodrich, Korea: A Study, 126-36, 223-26.

99. Msg ]CS for CINCFE, 6 Oct 50, "Pertinent Papers," 11:285; Acheson, Present at the Creation,

455; editorial note, FRUS 1950, V11:913-l4; msg Bevin for BrAmb Wash, II Oct 50, ibid,

931-32.
558 Notes to Pages 68-72

100. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 455.

101. Memo JCS for SecDef, 6 Oct 50, w/draft msg, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); intraoff memo

ATSD(FMA&MA) for DepSecDef, 7 Oct 50, ibid; Itr DepUSecState to ATSD(FMA&MA), II

Oct 50, ibid; hr DepSecDef to Pres, 7 Oct 50, w/handwritten note "Approved 10/8/50 Harry

S. Truman," FRUS 1950, VIl:91 1-12, 911nl; msgJCS for CINCFE, 9 Oct 50, "Pertinent

Papers," 11:286.

102. Collins, War in Peacetime, 164-68; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:249; Schnabel,

Policy and Direction, 219; Appleman, South .. North, 618-21.

103. Robert J. Donovan, Tumultuous lears: The Presidency of Harry S Truman, 1949-1953,

284; Truman, Memoirs II, 362-63.

104. "Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island Conference on 15 October 1950," camp by

Omar N. Bradley ChJCS, FRUS 1950, VII:948-60; Whitney, MacArthur, 387-89; Collins,

War in Peacetime, 197-98; Truman, Memoirs II, 362-70.

105. Collins, War in Peacetime, 175-79, 183; Appleman, South .. North, 638-66,672-73.

106. Msg CINCUNC for CG EUSAK et ai, 24 Oct 50, "Pertinent Papers," 11:302; msg JCS for

ClNCFE, 24 Oct 50, ibid, 303; msg CINCFE to JCS, 25 Oct 50, ibid, 304.

107. Collins, War in Peacetime, 179-81; Appleman, South .. North, 670-73 (673, Walker

quote); Flint, Tragic Flaw, 337-38. Collins later wrote, "The JCS tacitly accepted MacArthur's reply and made no move to countermand the order ." O. Lawton Collins,

Lightning joe: An Autobiography, 370).

108. Collins, War in Peacetime, 183-85, 187-89, 196-97; Flint, Tragic Flaw, 345-46; Appleman, South. . North, 673-708.

109. Appleman, South. North, 688,736-37; Collins, War in Peacetime, 190-91,193,196;

memo SJCS for SecDef, 18 Dec 50, with UNC rept, 16-30 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea).

IV. THE CHINESE ENTRY INTO THE WAR

I. Draft rept NSC [73J, [1 Jul 50J, US Dept State, Foreign Relations ofthe United States, 1950

(hereafter cited as FRUS with year and volume number), 1:331-41; rept NSC 73/4, [25 Aug

50), ibid, 375-89, especially 388; rept NSC 81/1, [9 Sep 50J, FRUS 1950, VII:712-21,

especially 717-18.

2. Msg USConGen Hong Kong for SecState, 22 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, VII:765-66; msg

USConGen Hong Kong for SecState, 2 Oct 50, ibid, 852, 852n 1 (quote); msg USAmb London

for SecState, 3 Oct 50, [OJCS], camp, "Pertinent Papers on Korean Situation" (mimeo)

(hereafter cited as "Pertinent Papers"), 11:281, OSD Hist; msg USAmb Neth for SecState, 3

Oct 50, FRUS 1950, VII:858-59; memo DirCA for DepASecState(FE), 4 Oct 50, ibid,

864-66; msg ActingSecState for lJSEmb India, 4 Oct 50, ibid, 875-76; msg USChge USSR for

SecState, 21 Oct 50, ibid, 989-90; hr DepUSecState to ATSD(FMA&MA), 25 Oct 50, w/biog

rept from DivBioglnfo State, 18 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 201.35.

3. Msg ActingSecState for USEmb India, 4 Oct 50, FRUS 1950, VII:874-75; msg ActingSecState

for USAmb India, 4 Oct 50, ibid, 875-76; msg USAmb India for SecState, 10 Oct 50, ibid,

921. Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War,

examines the Chinese decision to enter the Korean conflict from the viewpoint of the

People's Republic of China (PRC).

4. Three memos CIA, 12 Oct 50, FRUS 1950, VII:933-38; msg USConGen Hong Kong for

SecState, 13 Oct 50, ibid, 946; msg USAmb Neth for SecState, 17 Oct 50, ibid, 974; msg

lJSAmb Burma for SecState, 14 Oct 50, ibid, 944; ltr Matthews (DeplJSecState) to Burns

(ATSD(FMA&MA)), 19 Oct 50, ibid, 980-81.

5. "Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island Conference on 15 October 50:' camp by

Omar N. Bradley ChJCS, ibid, 948-60 (quotes on 949,953); memo ASecState(FE), [nd], ibid,

961-62 (quote); Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences, 362; Harry S. Truman, lears of Trial
Notes to Pages 73-76 559

and Hope, vol II in Memoirs by Harry S. Truman (hereafter cited as Truman, Memoirs II),

362-63, 365-67; Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History, 387.

6. Truman, Memoirs II, 365-67, 381-82; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in

the State Department, 456-57; msg USAmb Neth for SecState, 17 Oct 50, FRUS 1950,

VII:974.

7. Address in San Francisco, 17 Oct 50, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:

Harry S. Truman, 1950 . . . (hereafter cited as Truman Public Papers with year), 674-75.

8. Memo ADirOFMA for Lovett, [nd but ca 13 Oct 50), RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); Truman,

Memoirs II, 346-47; memo ExecSecNSC for SecDef, 28 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea);

memo Louis Johnson for JCS, 2 Aug 50, ibid; msg JCS for CINCFE, 5 Aug 50, OSD Hist.

9. Memo Kenneth T. Young (OATSD(FMA&MA)) for Burns and A.C. Murdaugh, 12 Aug 50, RG

330, CD 092 (Korea); ItrJ.E. Webb (USecState) to Johnson, 14 Aug 50, ibid; ItI' DepUSecState

to ATSD(FMA&MA), 15 Aug 50, wlltr CounseiorState to SecState, 14 Aug 50, ibid; James F.

Schnabel and Robert J.Watson, The Korean War, vol III in The History ofthe Joint Chiefs of

Staff The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, pt 1:252.

10. Handwritten notes on ItI' USecState to Johnson, 14 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea) and on

ItI' DepUSecState to Burns, 15 Aug 50, ibid; Itr USecState to SecDef, 16 Aug 50, ibid.

11. Memo ChJCS for SecDef, 21 Aug 50, ibid; Itr Johnson to Acheson, 21 Aug 50, ibid.

12. Memo Finletter for Johnson, 7 Sep 50, ibid; memrcd Acheson, 7 Sep 50, FRUS 1950,

VI1:705-07, 722nl; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:253-54.

13. Memo Acheson for Truman, 11 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, VI1:721-22, 722nl; Schnabel and

Watson, Korean War, pt 1:251, 255.

14. Msg 92658 JCS for CINCFE, 26 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); msg JCS for CINCFE, 27

Sep 50, "Pertinent Papers," 11:274-76.

15. Memo DepUSecState for Burns, 10 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo Lovett for JCS,

11 Oct 50, ibid; memo [Finletter) for Lovett, 12 Oct 50, ibid; memo ADirOFMA for

DepSecDef, [ca 13 Oct 50), ibid.

16. Ltr Lovett to Acheson, 4 Nov 50, FRUS 1950, VII: 1037; memo JCS for SecDef, 17 Oct 50,

RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo DepSecDef for JCS, 20 Oct 50, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef,

1 Nov 50, ibid; ItI' Lovett to Acheson, 4 Nov 50, FRUS 1950, VI1:1037, 1001n3.

17. Memo DCl for Pres, 1 Nov 50, FRUS 1950, VI1:1025-26.

18. Msg USConGen Hong Kong for SecState, 31 Oct 50, ibid, 1019-20; msg USConGen Hong

Kong for SecState, 3 Nov 50, ibid, 1034-35; memo DirOCA for ASecState(FE), 1 Nov 50, ibid,

1023-25; memo ActingOlCPolAffs OCA for ASecState(FE) et ai, 3 Nov 50, ibid, 1029-30.

19. Msg BrSecState(FgnAffs) for BrAmb Washington, [3 Nov 50), ibid, 1032-33; memcon

DepDirOCA, 3 Nov 50, ibid, 1031-32.

20. Msg USChge Korea for SecState, 2 Nov 50, ibid, 1026-27; Robert Frank Futrell, The United

States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953, 205-07; Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong,

North to the Yalu (hereafter cited as Appleman, South . .. North), 715; Schnabel and

Watson, Korean War, pt 1:287-90; Truman, Memoirs II, 373; msg CoSUSA for CINCFE, 3

Nov 50, "Pertinent Papers," 11:321; msg CINCFE for CoSUSA (for JCS), 4 Nov 50, ibid,

322-23; msg CINCFE for Dept Army, 4 Nov 50, ibid, 324. MacArthur's special report of 5

November 1950 to the UN Security Council is printed in US Cong, Senate, Cte on Judiciary,

Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments: Hearings, 83 Cong, 2 sess, 23 Nov

54, pt 25:2076-77. (These committee hearings appear on different dates as numbered parts.)

21. Appleman, South . . . North, 715; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:290-91.

22. Msg SecState for USMission UN, 5 Nov 50, wldraft resolution, FRUS 1950, VII: 1049-50; ItI'

DepUSecState to ATSD(FMA&MA), 6 Nov 50, ibid, 1058-59; memcon DepSecDef, [ca 6 Nov

50), RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); two memcons SecState, both 6 Nov 50, both in FRUS 1950,

VII: 1055-57; msg JCS for CINCH, 6 Nov 50, ibid, 1057-58.

23. Msg CINCFE for DeptArmy, 6 Nov 50, "Pertinent Papers," 11:325; Truman, Memoirs II,

375-76.

24. Msg JCS for CINCFE, 6 Nov 50, FRUS 1950, VI1: 1075-76.
560 Notes to Pages 77-83

25. Msg CINCFE for )CS, 7 Nov 50, "Pertinent Papers," 11:328-29; msg CINCFE for )CS, 7 Nov

50, ibid, 331-32; msg CINCFE for )CS, 7 Nov 50, ibid, 330; testimony LtGen George E.

Stratemeyer, 24 Aug 54, Senate Cte on Judiciary, Interlocking Subversion in Government

Departments: Hearings, 25 Aug 54, pt 22:1718-19, 1721-23, 1729-30.

26. Both msgs quoted in Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:296-98.

27. Interview with Marshall S. Carter and George V. Underwood, )r., by Alfred Goldberg, Doris

M. Condit, 22 Apr 77, 12-13, OSD Hist; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:298.

28. Memo ASecState(FE) to SecState, 7 Nov 50, FRUS 1950, VII: 1077.

29. Draft memo Exec to SecDef, lea Apr 51 J, with corrections in SecDef's handwriting, Marshall

papers, "MacArthur Marshall" folder, George C. Marshall Foundation, Lexington, Va;

memo SecAF for SecDef, 8 Nov 50, RG 330, CO 092 (Korea); NIE-2 CIA, 8 Nov 50, FRUS

1950, VII:II01.

30. Msg )CS for CINCFE, 8 Nov 50, ibid, 1097-98; msg CINCFE for )CS, 9 Nov 50, ibid,

1107-10; memo )CS for SecDef, 9 Nov 50, ibid, 1117-21; Truman, Memoirs II, 378.

31. Memo IExecSecNSC] for Pres, 10 Nov 50, Truman papers, President's Secretary's files:NSC

(PSF:NSC), Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Editorial notes, FRUS 1950, VII:1126-27, 1158,1161,1165, 1183;newsconf, 16 Nov 50,

Truman Public Papers, 1950, 711-12; Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of us. Policy

in tbe United Nations, 150-55; memcon ASecState(FE), 13 Nov 50, FRUS 1950, VII: 1141-

42; msg SecState for USMission UN, 13 Nov 50, ibid, 1143-44.

36. Msg Bevin for Franks, 13 Nov 50, FRUS 1950, VII: 1138-40; msg SecState for USEmb UK, 13

Nov 50, ibid, 1144-45; msg USRep UN for SecState, 14 Nov 50, ibid, 1156-57; msg USAmb

Canada for SecState, 15 Nov 50, ibid, 1159-60; memcon DepDirOffNA, 16 Nov 50, ibid,

1161-62; Itr Acheson to Marshall, 16 Nov 50, ibid, 1163; msg Bevin for Franks, 16 Nov 50,

ibid, 1172; msg USAmb Neth for SecState, 18 Nov 50, ibid, 1185.

37. Msg Bevin for Franks, 16 Nov 50, ibid, 1172, 1172nl; msg Bevin for Franks, 17 Nov 50,

ibid, 1172-73; msg Bevin for Franks, 17 Nov 50, ibid, 1173-75; draft memo Exec to SecDef,

lea Apr 50J, with corrections in Marshall's handwriting, Marshall papers, "MacArthur .

Marshall" folder; Truman, Memoirs II, 382-83.

38. Memcon USPoIAd)apan, 14 Nov 50, FRUS 1950, VII:1148-49; memcon USAmb Korea, 17

Nov 50, ibid, 1175-76, 1149n2; memrcd DirNavlntell OCNO, 10 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 092

(Korea); brief of FECOM telecon [OSOJ, 17 Nov 50, ibid; James F. Schnabel, Policy and

Direction: Tbe First Year in United States Army in the Korean War series, 259-73; H.A.

DeWeerd, "Strategic Surprise in the Korean War," Orhis (Fall 1962),447-51.

39. Memo Marshall for Burns, 15 Nov 50, w/memo Burns for Marshall, 14 Nov 50, RG 330, CD

092 (Korea); memo Burns for Marshall, 17 Nov 50, ibid.

40. Brief of FECOM telecon OSO, 19 Nov 50, initialed by Marshall, ibid; brief of FECOM telecon

DepDirEXOS OSD, 20 Nov 50, initialed by Marshall, ibid; memo Burns for Marshall, 21 Nov

50, ibid.

41. Memo SplAsst to SecState, 21 Nov 50, FRUS 1950, VII:1201-03; memcon Amb at Lge, 21

Nov 50, ibid, 1204-08.

42. Msg CoSUSA for CINCUNC, 24 Nov 50, ibid, 1222-24; msg CINCllNC for )CS, 25 Nov 50,

ibid, 1231-33.

43. Memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 24 Nov 50, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.

44. Msg USAmb Korea for SecState, 23 Nov 50, FRUS 1950, VII: 1216-17; msg llSAmb Korea for

SecState, 24 Nov 50, ibid, 1218; NIE-2/1 CIA, 24 Nov 50, ibid, 1220-22; telecon TT4058

DeptArmy, 24 Nov 50, Condit file, OSD Hist.

45. Msg CX69811 CINCFE for OeptArmy et aI, 25 Nov 50, Condit file, OSD Hist; msg CD69852

CINCFE for DeptArmy et aI, 26 Nov 50, ibid; msg CX69909 CINCFE for DeptArmy et ai, 27

Nov 50, ibid; msg CINCFE for )CS, 28 Nov 50, FRUS 1950, VlI: 1237-38; MacArthur,
Notes to Pages 83-89 561

Reminiscences, 372-73. Appleman, South North, 768-69, later estimated Chinese

forces in Korea at that time at 300,000 of which 180,000 faced Eighth Army.

46. Memo Burns for Marshall, 28 Nov ';0, RG 330, CD 381 (Gen); intraoff memo DirEXOS OSD,

rca 29 Nov ';0], ibid.

47. Memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 29 [erroneously dated 24J Nov ';0, Truman papers, PSF:NSC;

excerpt of mins AFPC mtg, 28 Nov ';0, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, Federal Records

Center, Suitland, Md; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:338.

48. Memo SecArmy et al for SecDef, 28 Nov ';0, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea).

49. Memconjessup (Amb at Lge), 28 Nov ';0, FRUS 1950, V11: 1242-49; memo [ExecSecNSC] for

Pres, 29 [erroneously dated 24] Nov ';0, Truman papers, PSF:NSC. This account is a

composite drawn from the two sources.

50. Memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 29 [erroneously dated 24] Nov ';0, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.

51. Msg CINCFE for JCS, 29 Nov 50, "Pertinent Papers," 11:3';3; msg jes for CINCFE, 29 Nov

';0, FRUS 1950, V11:12';3-';4; memo [SecDef] for ChJCS, 29 Nov ';0, RG 330, CD 092

(Korea).

';2. Msg JCS for CINCFE, 29 Nov 50, "Pertinent Papers," 11:3';4; msg CINCFE for JCS, 30 Nov

';0, FRUS 1950, V11: 12';9-60; testimony Edward M. Almond, 23 Nov ';4, Senate Cte on

Judiciary, Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments: Hearings, 23 Nov ';4, pt

25:2101-04; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:34';, 345-46nl

53. Msg CINCFE for JCS, 30 Nov ';0, FRUS 1950, VII:1260; msgJCS for CINCFE, 30 Nov ';0,

"Pertinent Papers," 11:3';6; memcon Amb at Lge, I Dec ';0, FRUS 1950, V11: 1277-78;

Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:346-47.

54. Editorial notes, FRUS 1950, V11: 1249, 1254, 1261-62, 1268; Goodrich, Korea: A Study of

us. Policy in the United Nations, 155; msg llSRep UN for SecState, 30 Nov ';0, FRUS 1950,

V11:1272-7';; msg USRep UN for SecState, 1 Dec ';0, ibid, 1300-0/.

'i'i. Press conf, 30 Nov ';0, Truman Public Papers, 1950, 727; Acheson, Present at the

Creation, 4"72; quoted indirectly in memcon Amb at Lge, 1 Dec 50, FRUS 1950, V11: 1276;

memo Battle (SplAsst to SecState), 3 Dec ';0, ibid, 1270-7/.

';6. Memcon Amb at Lge, 1 Dec ';0, FRUS 1950, VII:1276-81; memo CIA, [2 Dec ';0], ibid,

1308-10.

57. Memo Battle, 3 Dec ';0, w/memcon Amb at Lge, [nd], ibid, 1310-13.

58. Msg CINCliNC for JCS, 3 Dec ';0, ibid, 1320-22; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt

1:356-';8.

59. Memcon Amb at Lge, 3 Dec 50, FRUS 1950, VII: 1323-34; memcon William J. McWilliams

(DirExecSect State), 3 Dec ';0, ibid, 133';-36; Acheson, Present at tbe Creation, 47';;

Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War: How We Met the Challenge, 61-62.

60. Memcon Amb at Lge, :3 Dec ';0, FRUS 1950, VII:1323-34.

61. Ibid; memcon DepDirExecSect State, 3 Dec 50, ibid, 1336-39; msg JCS for CINCFE, 3 Dec

50, ibid, 1333n5; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:361-62.

62. Memo Battlc for SecState, 4 Dec ';0, FRUS 1950, VII: 134';-47; Acheson, Present at the

Creation, 47';, 476-77.

63. Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:362-63; memo JCS for SecDet', 4 Dec ';0, w/paper,

FRUS 1950, VII: 1347-49.

64. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 481; Alan Bullock, Ernest Revin, Foreign Secretary

1945-1951. 820-2';; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:373-74; Rosemary J. Foot,

"Anglo-American Relations in the Korean Crisis: The British Effort to Avert an Expanded

War, December 19';0-January 19'; 1," Diplomatic History (Winter 1986), 45-46.

65. Discussion of the Truman-Attlee talks in this and following paragraphs is based on the U.S.

minutes of the first, second, fifth, and sixth talks, 4, ';,7,8 Dec ';0, printed in FRlfS 1950,

V11: 1361-74 (1365, quote), 1392-1408 (1403, quote), 1449-61, and 1468-79; memcon

McWilliams (DirExecSect State), '; Dec ';0, ibid, 1382-86; memrcd Battle, 7 Dec ';0, ibid,

1430-32; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 481-8';; C.IClementl R. Attlee, As It Happened,

280-83.
562 Notes to Pages 89-98

66. US Mins-I, -2, -6, USDeieg, 4, 5, 8 Dec 50, FRUS 1950, V11:1361-74 (1367, quote),

1392-1408 (1405, quote), 1468-79.

67. Memo Battle (State), 7 Dec 50, ibid, 1431.

68. Communique, [8 Dec 50], ibid, 1476-79; memrcd Amb at Lge, 7 Dec 50, w/memrcdArneson

(SplAsst to SecState(AE», 16 Jan 53, ibid, 1462-65; Acheson, Present at the Creation,

484-85.

69. Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:380.

70. Memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 12 Dec 50, Truman papers, PSF:NSC; memo ASecState(FE),

[11 Dec 50], FRUS 1950, V11: 1518-20; Russell H. Fifield, The Diplomacy ofSoutheast Asia:

1945-1958, 147; Goodrich, Korea: A Study, 156-59.

71. Ltr SecDef to SecState, 12 Dec 50, w/memo JCS for SecDef, 12 Dec 50, FRUS 1950,

V11: 1528-31; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:382-84.

72. Editorial note, FRUS 1950, VB: 1542; msg USRep UN for SecState, 24 Dec 50, w/statement

Chou En-Iai, 22 Dec 50, ibid, 1594-98; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:384-85;

Goodrich, Korea: A Study, 156-61, 226.

73. Memcon ASecState(FE), 19 Dec 50, w/annex, FRUS 1950, VII: 1570-76.

74. Ibid; synopsis notes AFPC mtg, 19 Dec 50, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "AFPC Actions

During the Korean War Buildup" folder.

75. Memcon Battle, 27 Dec 50, FRUS 1950, V11:1600-02.

76. Msg JCS for CINCFE, 29 Dec 50, ibid, 1625-26; J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The

History and Lessons ofKorea, 246-48.

77. Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History, 432-34 (432, quote).

78. Msg CINCFE for JCS, 30 Dec 50, FRUS 1950, VB: 1630-33.

79. Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs ofMatthew B. Ridgway, 201,204-11; Ridgway,

The Korean War, 79-97; Collins, War in Peacetime, 236-46; Whitney, MacArthur, 431-32;

Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:380, 386-88; Schnabel, Policy and Direction,

304-10; Ridgway's msg for MacArthur is in msg CINCFE forJCS, 8Jan 51, "Pertinent Papers,"

11:394-95; msg USAmb Korea for SecState, 9 Jan 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:40-41.

80. MsgJCS for CINCFE, 9 Jan 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:41-43.

81. Msg CINCFE for JCS, 10 Jan 51, ibid, 55-56; Whitney, MacArthur, 435-36.

82. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 515; Collins, War in Peacetime, 248-49.

83. Testimony Marshall, 7 May 51, US Cong, Senate, Ctes on Armed Services and Foreign

Relations, Military Situation in the Far East: Hearings, 82 Cong, 1 sess (1951), pt 1:329;

memo Battle, II Jan 51, FRUS 1951, V11, pt 1:57-60.

84. Memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 13 Jan 51, Truman papers, PSF:NSC; memcon Amb at Lge, 12

Jan 51, FRUS 1951, V11, pt 1:68-70; memo JCS for SecDef, 12 Jan 51, ibid, 71-72; msgJCS

for CINCFF., 12 Jan 51, paraphrased in Senate Ctes on Armed Services and Foreign Relations,

Military Situation in the Far East: Hearings, pt 2:907-08; Acheson, Present at the

Creation, 515-16; Truman, Memoirs 11,434; Collins, War in Peacetime, 251-52.

85. Memo ActingExecSecOSD for ExecSecNSC, 12 Jan 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo

ExecSecNSC for NSC, 15 Jan 51, w/draft NSC 10111, FRUS 1951, V11, pt 1:79-81; memo

StateRep on NSC Staff, 19 Jan 51, ibid, 93-94; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 516.

86. Marshall is indirectly cited in memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 13 Jan 51, Truman papers,

PSF:NSC.

87. Truman, Memoirs 11,434-36; msgJCS (SecDe!) for CINCFE, 13 Jan 51, FRUS 1951, VB, pt

1:77-79; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 516; Whitney, MacArthur, 436-39; Collins,

War in Peacetime, 254-55; MacArthur, Reminiscences, 382.

88. Memo Battle, 19 Jan 51, FRUS 1951, V11, pt 1: 102-05; Collins, War in Peacetime, 253.

V. A POLICY OF LIMITED WAR

1. Msg USRep UN for SecState, 24 Dec 50, US Dept State, Foreign Relations ofthe United States,

1950 (hereafter cited as FRUS with year and volume number), V11: 1594-98; editorial notes,
Notes to Pages 98-101 563

FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:64, 76, 91-93; James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, The Korean

War, vollIl in The History ofthe joint Chiefs ofStaff The joint Chiefs ofStaffand National

Policy, pt 1:421, 428-30; Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of u.s. PoliLY in the United

Nations, 160-62.

2. Msg SecState for USMission lJN, 1.3 Jan 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:74-76; msg SecState for

Certain Dipl and Cons Offices, 15 Jan 51, ibid, 83-85; msg SecState for lJSMission UN, 20 Jan

51, ibid, 109-10, 1I0nnl, 2; msg SecState for USEmb France, 20 Jan 51, ibid, 110-11;

editorial notes, ibid, I 15-16, 117.

3. Editorial notes, ibid, 117, 130-31, 148-49; two msgs USRep UN for SecState, both 23 Jan; 1,

ibid, 118-19, 120; msg lJSAmb UK for SecState, 23 Jan 51, ibid, 119-20; msg SecState for

USEmb UK, 24 Jan; I, ibid, 123-24; resolution 498(V) adopted by lJNGenAssem, 1 Feb 51,

ibid, 1;0-;1; Goodrich, Korea: A Study, 162-69, 173-77,226-27.

4. J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea, 243-46, 2;;-62;

Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:406-07, 427, 434, 44 I, 450-52, 460, 466; James F.

Schnabel, PoliL}' and Direction: The First Year in United States Army in the Korean War

series, 340.

5. Ltr SecState to SecDef, 5 Dec 50, FRUS 1950, VII: 14 11-12; Itr SecDef to SecState, 30 Jan 51,

FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:147; Itr SecState to SecDef, 23 Feb 51, ibid, 194-95; Itr ActingSecDef

to SecState, 31 Mar 51, ibid, 284; Itr SecState to SecDef, 26 Apr 51, ibid, 3HO-H3; Schnabel,

Policy and Direction, 294-96; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:.'143-44,391-93,

408-10.

6. Ltr DepUSecState to ATSD(FMA&MA), 12 Dec 50, FRUS 1950, VII: 1531; msg JCS for

ClNCUNC, 4 Jan 51, in US Cong, Senate, Ctes on Armed Services and Foreign Relations,

Military Situation in the Far East: Hearings, H2 Cong, I sess (1951), pt ;:3;30-31; Itr

SecDef to SecState, 19 Jan 51, w/memo JCS for SecDef, 17 Jan 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt

1: 105-07.

7. Memo SecDef for Pres, 19 Feb; I, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo SecState for SecDef, 19 Feb

; I, w/note SecDef to ChJCS, [20 Feb; 1], ibid; memo telecon ASecState(FE), 1 Mar 51, FRUS

1951, VII, pt 1:201-02; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:452-;6.

8. Ltr DepASecState(FE) to DepSecDef, 4 Apr; I, w/memo [Dept State], 3 Apr 51, RG 330, CD

092 (Manchuria); msg SecState for USMission UN, 3 Apr ;1, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:291-92;

memcon ASecState(UNA), 6 Apr 51, ibid, 306-07; memcon DirPPS, 6 Apr 51, w/memo JCS

to SecDef, 6 Apr 51, ibid, 307-09; memcon ActingOIC India-Nepal-Ceylon Affs, 7 Apr ;2,

ibid,316-17.

9. Memo ASecState(FE), 11 Feb 51, FRUS 195/, VII, pt 1:165-67 (166, quote); memo

DepUSecState for ChJCS, 13 Feb 51, w/paper, ibid, 172-74.

10. Memrcd State-JCS agreed text, 1.3 Feb 51, ibid, 174-77, 174n 1; press conf, 15 Feb 51, Puhlic

Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951 . (hereafter cited

as Truman Puhlic Papers with year), 155.

11. Ltr SecState to SecDef, 23 Feb ;1, w/enc draft memo, FRUS 195/, VII, pt I:IH9-94.

12. Memo JCS for SecDef, 27 Feb 51, ibid, 203-06; ltr SecDef to SecState, I Mar 51, ibid, 202-03,

203n2; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:463-64.

13. Memo PlngAdviserFE for ASecState(FE), 14 Mar 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:228-29, 229n2.

14. Editorial note, ibid, 234-35; news cont', 15 Mar 51, Truman Puhlic Papers, 195/, IHH; msg

lJSAmb Korea for SecState, 17 Mar 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:244-46.

15. Memo F. Reinhardt (DirEE) for SecState, 17 Mar 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:241-43; memcon

Nitze, 19 Mar 51, ibid, 246-47, 246n 1; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My lears in

the State Department, 5 17- 1H. .

16. Msg JCS for CINCFE, 20 Mar 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:251; memcon Ward P. Allen (EUR), 21

Mar 51, ibid, 256-5H; msg CINCUNC for JCS, 21 Mar 51, ibid, 255-56.

17. Editorial note, ibid, 2;H-59; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:465-66,473; Schnabel,

Policy and Direction, 361-64; Collins, War in Peacetime, 262.
564 Notes to Pages 102-06

18. Draft text proposed presidential statement on Korea, [23 Mar 51), FRUS 1951, VII, pt

I :263-64; MacArthur's statement, Senate Ctes on Armed Services and Foreign Relations,

Military Situation in the Far East: Hearings, pt 5: 3541-42.

19. Testimony SecDef, 10 May 51, Senate Ctes on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Military

Situation in the Far East: Hearings, pt 1:483-84. It was not immediately clear that the

MacArthur statement would abort the peace effort-see memcon DirNA, 30 Mar 51, w/enc,

FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:278-82; msg 1342 lJSRep UN for SecState, 29 Mar 51, ibid, 272-75;

memcon Allen (EUR), 29 Mar 51, ibid, 275-77.

20. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 518-19; Collins, War in Peacetime, 270-71; Harry S.

Truman, lears of Trial and Hope, vol II in Memoirs by Harry S. Truman (hereafter cited as

Truman, Memoirs If), 442-43, 445; editorial note, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:266-68.

21. News conf, 29 Mar 51, Truman Public Papers, 1951,203,206; FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:276nl;

editorial note, FRUS 1951, VIl, pt 1:277; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:473-74;

Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 362-63.

22. Interv with Frank Pace by Alfred Goldberg, Harry B. Yoshpe, 13 May 74, 29-30, OSD Hist;

Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Mattheu' B. Ridgway, 220; Schnabel, Policy

and Direction, 363-64; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:473-74.

23. Memrcd [Eben Ayers?), 28 Apr 51, Truman papers, President's Secretary's files: NSC (PSI':

NSC), Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo. Truman later wrote that he had made up

his mind to recall MacArthur before 5 April 1951 (Truman, "MacArthur Was Ready to Risk

General War. I Was Not," US. News & World Report (I"' February 1956), 173).

24. Editorial note, FRUS 1951, VIl, pt 1:298-301.

25. Collins, War in Peacetime, 282, indicates that Bradley told the Joint Chiefs late on 5 April

1951 that "consideration was being given at the White House to the relief of General

MacArthur"; the president is indirectly quoted in Elsey notes on MacArthur, 3, Ayers papers,

Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.

26. Truman, Memoirs II, 447; memrcd SJCS, 24 Apr 51, with Bradley notes 6-10 Apr 51, Bradley

papers, USArmy Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa; memrcd "ofgm," 25 Apr 51,

w/notes on 5-10 Apr 51, ibid; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 521.

27. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 518, 521.

28. Among many able accounts of MacArthur's personality and career, see Richard H. Rovere and

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The General and the President and the Future of American

Foreign Policy, 24-95; Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History; and

.John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War.

29. Memrcd SecDcf, [Apr 511, Marshall papers, "MacArthur Marshall" folder, George C.

Marshall Foundation, Lexington, Va; Truman, Memoirs II, 447; Acheson, Present at the

Creation, 521-22.

30. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 522; memo Ch.JCS for SecDef, 18 Apr 51, Marshall papers,

"MacArthur Marshall" folder; memrcd "ofgm," 25 Apr 51, w/notes on 5-10 Apr 51,

Bradley papers; memrcd SecDcf, [Apr 511, Marshall papers, "MacArthur Marshall"

folder.

31. Memrcd "ofgm," 25 Apr 51, w/notes, Bradley papers; memrcd [Eben Ayers?), 28 Apr 51,

Truman papers, PSI'; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 522.

32. Collins, War in Peacetime, 283; Truman, Memoirs II, 448; testimony SecDef, II May 51,

Senate Des on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East:

Hearings, pt 1:345, 518; memrcd [SecDef] rca Apr 511, Marshall papers, "MacArthur ...

Marshall" folder.

33. Memrcd [Eben Ayers'l, 28 Apr 51, Truman papers, PSI'; Elsey version, Eben Ayers papers;

interv with Pace, 13 May 74, 29-31; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:542-43,

546-47 , n79; Truman, Memoirs II, 449-50; Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences, 395;

Whitney, MacArthur, 471-72, 480, 483; D. Clayton James, Triumph and Disaster, 1945-

1964. vol III in The Years of MacArthur, 599.
Notes to Pages 106-11 565

34. Senate Ctes on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far Bast:

Hearings, pt 5:3569-71; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:547; Rovere and Schlesinger, The General and the President, 179.

35. Testimony MacArthur, 3-5 May 51, Senate etes on Armed Services and Foreign Relations,

Military Situation in the Far East: Hearings, pt 1: 19-20, 29-30, 39-40. 42-50, 64-81,

103-04, 110, 113-16, 121, 146-47,282-85.

36. Ibid, 98, 130-32, 139, 142-48.

37. Memo DirEXOS OSD for Ch)CS, 23 Apr 51, w/note, Marshall papers, "MacArthur 1950-

1951" folder; memrcd DirEXOS OSD, 24 Apr 51, ibid; memo Carter for SecDef, 3 May 51,

ibid; memo Ch]CS for DepSecDef, 3 May 5I, wlenc, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); Forrest C.

Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 27-28; Truman, Memoirs II, 7-11; Robert H.

Ferrell, ed, Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman, 213-14. Baruch is

indirectly quoted in Carter's 3 May 1951 memo (cited above).

38. Testimony SecDef, 7 May 51, Senate etes on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Military

Situation in the Far East: Hearings, pt 1:323, 343-47, 380, 392-93, 408-13, 428-29, 513.

39. Ibid, 323-26, 348-49; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 526.

40. Testimony SecDef, 7 May 51, Senate etes on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Military

Situation in the Far East: Hearings, pt 1:351-54, 365-67.

41. Ibid, 372-74,494-502,541-66,577-617,686-90.

42. Memo llSRep UN to ASecState(UNA), 23 May 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:447-54; Morton

Halperin, Limited War: An Essay on the Del'elopment Of tbe Theory and An Annotated

Bibliography, 46.

43. Senate Ctes on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East:

Hearings, pt 5:3162-64; Ferrell, Off the Record, 212-13; memconf AdmAsst to Pres, 8 )un

51, Elsey papers, "MacArthur" folder. For other views of the effect of the MacArthur recall,

see Acheson, Present at the Creation, 521-28; Rovere and Schlesinger, The General and the

President, 235-52; Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Control'ersy, 257-77.

44. Msg C1NCFE for )CS, 25 Apr 51, [O)CS], compo "Pertinent Papers on Korean Situation"

(mimeo) (hereafter cited as "Pertinent Papers"), 111:438-42, OSD Hist; two msgs CINCH: for

)CS, both 30 Apr 51, ibid, 443-51.

45. Msg CINCFE for )CS, 25 Apr 51, "Pertinent Papers," III:438-42;). Lawton Collins, Lightning

joe: An Autohiography, 175; Schnabel, PoliL)' and Direction. 378-82; Ridgway, The Korean

War: How We Met the Challenge, 157, 162-64.

46. Memcon Robert E. Barbour (FE), 24 Apr 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:378-79; memcon Windsor

G. Hackler (FE), 4 May 51, ibid, 414-15, offers details of Army briefings for ambassadors of

UN countries participating in Korean conniet; Schnabel, PoliL)' and Direction, 379-80.

47. Schnabel, Policy and Direction. 387-89; Ridgway, The Korean War, 171-74.

48. Msg C1NCFE for JCS, 17 Apr 51, "Pertinent Papers," III:436; msgjCS for CINCFE, 19 Apr 51,

ibid, 437; Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway, 222-23;

Ridgway, Tbe Korean Ifnr, 168-69; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:485-88.

49. Msg C1NCFE for JCS, 27 Apr 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:385-86; msg)CS for CINCFE, 28 Apr

5 I, ibid, 386-87; memo DepASecState(FE) for ASecState(FE) et ai, 2 May 5 I, ibid, 399-400;

Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:487-88, '53'5.

50. Memcon OICKoreanAffs State, 18 Apr 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:362-64; msg CINCFE for

DeptArmy, I May 51, "Pertinent Papers," III:4'52; msg C1NCFE for DeptArmy, 5 May 51, ibid,

464-67; msg USAmb Korea for SecState, 6 May 51, FRUS 195/, VII. pt 1:419-20; Itr

ActingSecDef to SecState, 26 May 51, ibid, 463; msg USAmb Korea for SecState, 26 May 5 I.

ibid, 463-65; Jtr 'I)'uman to Rhee, 5 )un 51. ibid, 503; Schnabel, Policy and Direction.

394-95; Ridgway, The Korean War, 16 I. .

51. Msg )CS for ClNCFE, I May 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:394-98; Schnabel and Watson, Korean

War, pt I:489-90; Schnabel, Policy and Direclion, 383-8'5.

'52. Msg CINCH: for JCS, 9 May 51, "Pertinent Papers," 111:468; Schnabel, POlil)' and Direction,

383-87,395; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:490-')2.
566 Notes to Pages 111-16

53. Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:466-68.

54. Memo ]CS for SecDef, 27 May 5 I, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); Schnabel and Watson, Korean

War, pt 1:457, 469.

55. Ltr ActingSecDef to SecState, 3 I Mar 5 I, wl2 intraoff notes, rca 28 and 29 Mar 5 I), RG 330,

CD 092 (Korea); Itr SecDefto ChSenateCteArmed Services, 23 May 51, ibid.

56. Memo]CS for SecDef, 5 Apr 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:295-96, 296nl.

57. Briefing paper [DefRepSrNSCStf?), 2 May 51, RG 218, CCS 334 National Security Council

(9-25-47); memo ]CS for SecDef, 30 Apr 5 I, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:387-88, 388n6; memo

DirPPS for SecState, 2 May 5 I, ibid, 400-0 I.

58. Memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 3 May 5 I, Truman papers, PSF:NSC; draft substitute para

SecDef, 2 May 5 I, RG 218, CCS 334 National Security Council (9-25-47); briefing paper

[DefRepSrNSCStf?), 2 May 5 I, ibid.

59. NSC 48/4 para 6-e, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:421n2; memo]CS for SecDef, II May 51, ibid,

431-32; memo ActingExecSecNSC for NSC, 15 May 5 I, w/proposed revision NSC 48/4, ibid,

437-38; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:479.

60. Memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 17 May 5 I, Truman papers, PSF:NSC; Schnabel and Watson,

Korean War, pt 1:480.

61. Memo w/sections re Korea from NSC 48/5, 17 May 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:439-42.

62. Rept NSC 48/5,17 May 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:35-37,48,51-52.

63. Ibid, 36, 53-54.

64. Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:492-95.

65. Four memcons Windsor G. Hackler (FE), 18, 22, 25 May 5 I, 19 ]un 5 I, all in FRUS 1951, VII,

pt 1:442-44, 444-46, 455-57, 531-34; msg CINCFE for ]CS, 14 ]un 5 I, "Pertinent Papers,"

III:482; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 389-90, 397-99; Ridgway, The Korean War,

174-80.

66. Interv with Marshall S. Carter and George V. Underwood, ]r., by Alfred Goldberg, Doris M.

Condit, 22 Apr 77, 17, OSD Hist; Ridgway, The Korean War, 193; memcon Doris M. Condit

with Forrest C. Pogue, 3 ]un 86, Condit file, OSD Hist.

67. Msg ]CS for CINCFE, 20 ]un 5 I, "Pertinent Papers," III:483; msg CINCFE for ]CS, 22 ]un 5 I,

ibid, 484-86; Ridgway, The Korean War, 180-82; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 399-403.

68. Memo]CS for SecDef, 27 ]un 51, w/directives, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memrcd Ch]CS, 10

]ul 5 I, w/memo ]CS for SecDef, 9 ]ul 5 I, ibid; two msgs]CS for CINCFE, both 10 ]ul 5 I, both

in "Pertinent Papers," III: 5 14-22; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 402.

69. Msg ]CS for CINCFE, 10 ]ul 5 I, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:646-48.

70. Msg CINCFE for ]CS, 2]uI51, ibid, 610-11; NIE-55/I, 30]uI52, FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt

1:436-37; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 405-06.

7 I. Msg CINCFE for ]CS, 30 May 5 I, "Pertinent Papers," III:480; memo Kennan for DepUSecState, 3 I May 5 I, FRUS 1951, VII, pt I :483-86; memo Kennan for DepUSecState, 5 ]un 5 I,

ibid, 508; memo ASecState(UNA) for USRep UN, 14 ]un 5 I, ibid, 529-30; msg USAmb USSR

for SecState, 27 ]un 51, ibid, 560-61; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 532-33; quote in

FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:508.

72. Editorial note, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:546-47; msg USAmb USSR for SecState, 25]un 51, ibid,

551-52; Truman, Public Papers, 1951,362.

73. Two msgs USAmb USSR for SecState, 27 and 28 June 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:560-61,

579-80.

74. Memcon]ohn R. Heidemann (FE), 29 ]un 5 I, ibid, 592-95; Acheson, Present at the Creation,

533-34.

75. Three memcons DirNA, 28, 29, and 29]un 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:566-67, 586-87, and

597; msg USAmb Korea for SecState, 30 ]ul 5 I, ibid, 604-05; msg]CS for CINCFE, 29 ]un 5 I,

"Pertinent Papers," III:491.

76. Memrcd P.M. Kearney (AdmAsst to Ch]CS), 3 ]ul 5 I, "Pertinent Papers," III:504; msg ]CS for

CINCUNC, 30 ]un 5 I, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:598-600.
Notes to Pages 117-22 567

77. Memcon OICKoreanAffs State, 28 ]un 51, FRUS 1951, VlI, pt 1:574-76; msg SecState for

USAmb Korea, 29 ]un 51, ibid, 588-90; memcon Heidemann, 29 ]un 51, ibid, 592-95.

78. Memcon 01CKoreanAffs State, 30 ]un 51, ibid, 601-04; msg USAmb Korea for SecState, 2 ]ul

51, ibid, 611; msg USAmb Korea for SecState, 7 ]ul 51, ibid, 635-36; Itr Korean Amb to

SecState, 30 ]un 51, RG 59, 795.00/6-3051.

79. Note and editorial note, FRUS 1951, VlI, pt 1:616n2, 622-23, 624; msg CINCUNC for ]CS,

10 ]ul 51, ibid, 648-49.

80. Msg CINCFE for ]CS, 2 ]ul 51, ibid, 610-11, 649-56.

VI. FIGHTING BUT TALKING

1. Ltr Harry S. Truman to George C. Marshall, 12 Sep 51, Public Papers oftbe Presidents oftbe

United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951 . . . (hereafter cited as Truman Public Papers with

year), 516.

2. James F. Schnabel and Robert]. Watson, Tbe Korean War, vol III in Tbe History of tbe joint

Cbiefs ofStaff: Thejoint Cbiefs ofStaffand National Policy, pt 2:574-76, 581-82; Matthew

B. Ridgway, The Korean War: How We Met tbe Challenge, photos 64, 65, 66, and following

196; C. Turner Joy, How Communists Negotiate, viii-ix, 11-12.

3. Msg CINCFE for ]CS, 6 Aug 51, [O]CS), camp, "Pertinent Papers on Korean Situation"

(mimeo) (hereafter cited as "Pertinent Papers"), III:585, OSD Hist; Ridgway, The Korean War,

197-202, 204; Joy, How Communists Negotiate, 1-17. A far more complete view of joy's

attitude at the negotiating table is given in Allen E. Goodman, ed, Negotiating While

Fighting: The Diary ofAdmiral C. TUrner joy at the Korean Armistice Conference, with a

brief overall report of the wrangling in the chronology, 439-58.

4. Harry S. Truman, H?ars of Trial and Hope, vallI in Memoirs by Harry S. Truman (hereafter

cited as Truman, Memoirs 11), 459; ]. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: Tbe History and

Lessons of Korea, 331-32; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 2:589-94, 623-25; Joy,

How Communists Negotiate, 168-69, 172-75.

5. Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 2:582-83.

6. Ltr SecDefto SecState, 20]uI51, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); hr SecState to SecDef, 27 ]uI51,

ibid.

7. Msg CINCFE for ]CS, 25 ]ul 51, US Dept State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951

(hereafter cited as FRUS with year and volume number), VlI, pt 1:724-29; Schnabel and

Watson, Korean War, pt 2:583-87.

8. Msg CINCUNC for ]CS, 26]ul 51, FRUS 1951, VlI, pt 1:735-37. There are slight variations

in the text of the five agenda items as given in Joy, How Communists Negotiate, 27; for his

account of reaching agreement on the wording of item 1, see 18-29.

9. Msg CINCUNC for ]CS, 26]ul 51, FRUS 1951, VlI, pt 1:735-37; msg CINCUNC for ]CS, 27

]ul 51, ibid, 739-45.

10. Msg CINCUNC for ]CS, 28 ]ul 51, ibid, 747-53; msg CINCFE for ]CS, 24 Aug 51, ibid,

850-54; memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 23 Aug 51, Truman papers, President's Secretary's

files:NSC (PSF:NSC), Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo; Schnabel and Watson,

Korean War, pt 2:595-600.

11. Msg CINCFE for ]SC, 6 Aug 51, "Pertinent Papers," III:583-85; msg CX51493 CINCFE for

]CS, 24 Sep 51, cable files, OSD Hist; Joy, How Communists Negotiate, 30-38; Schnabel and

Watson, Korean War, pt 2:600.

12. Msg CINCFE for ]CS, II Sep 5 I, FRUS 1951, VlI, pt 1:900-0 I; msg HNC 311 CINCUNC for

]CS, 19 Sep 51, cable files, OSD Hist; msg C51315 CINCUNC for ]CS, 21 Sep 51, ibid; msg

CINCUNC for ]CS, 25 Sep 51, FRUS 1951, VlI, pt 1:937-39.

13. Msg 82092 ]CS for CINCFE, 21 Sep 51, cable files, OSD Hist; msg ]CS for CINCUNC, 21 Sep

51, FRUS 1951, VlI, pt 1:927-28; msg]CS for CINCFE, 26 Sep 51, ibid, 963; telecon]CS and
568 Notes to Pages 123-27

State w/CINCUNC and staff, 25 Sep 5 I, ibid, 946-5 L msg CINCFE for ]CS, 26 Sep 51, ibid,

952-55; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 2:602.

14. Msg C69431 CINCFE for ]CS, 22 Aug 51, cable files, OSD Hist; msg C69187 CINCFE for ]CS,

18 Aug 51, ibid; memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 23 Aug 51, Truman papers, PSF:NSC; Bradley

indirectly quoted in memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 30 Aug 51, ibid.

15. Msg CINCUNC for ]CS, 25 Sep 5 I, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:937-39; Schnabel and Watson,

Korean War, pt 2:603-04.

16. Memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 11 Oct 51, Truman papers, PSF:NSC; memo Counselor State for

SecState, 4 Oct 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:990-94.

17. Msg ZX41988 ClNCFE for ]CS, 7 Oct 51, cable files, OSD Hist; msg CINCFE for ]CS, 8 Oct

51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:1008-09; msg CINCUNC for lCS, 10 Oct 51, ibid, 1011-14; msg

CINCUNC for ]CS, 25 Oct 51, ibid, 1061-62.

18. Msg CINCFE for lCS, 31 Oct 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1: 1076-77; msg CINCFE for ]CS, 1 Nov

51, ibid, 1079; msg HNC 420 CINCFE for ]CS, 3 Nov 51, cable files, OSD Hist; msg CINCFE

for ]CS, 4 Nov 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:1087-89; msg ]CS for CINCFE, 6 Nov 51, ibid,

1092-93; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 2:617-18:

19. Msg CINCFE for ]CS, 7 Nov 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1: 1097-99; msg CINClJNC for ]CS, 8 Nov

51, ibid, 1100-02.

20. Msg 86797 ]CS for Pres's Naval Aide, 12 Nov 51, Condit file, OSD Hist; msg Pres's Naval Aide

for S]CS, 13 Nov 51, ibid; msg ]CS for CINCFE, 13 Nov 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1: 1126; msg

C57216 CINCFE for ]CS, 13 Nov 51, cable files, OSD Hist; msg CINCFE for ]CS, 14 Nov 51,

FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:1132-33; msg C1NCFE for ]CS, 15 Nov 51, ibid, 1133-34; msg]CS for

ClNCFE, 14 Nov 51, ibid, 1131-32.

21. Msg ClNCFE for]CS, 15 Nov 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:1133-34; msgCINCFE for]CS, 16Nov

51, ibid, 1143; msg CINCFE for ]CS, 17 Nov 51, ibid, 1147-48; msg CINCFE for ]CS, 23 Nov

51, ibid, 1172; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 2:621-22.

22. Memo]CS for SecDef, 14 Aug 51, "Pertinent Papers," VIll:131O-14; msg]CS for CINCFE, 29

Aug 51, "Pertinent Papers," app:item (E); Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front

in United States Army in the Korean War series, 73-81.

23. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 80-97 (casualty figures on 86 and 96); for a personal

account, T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness, 500-16.

24. Memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 24 Oct 51, Truman papers, PSF:NSC; Hermes, Truce Tent and

Fighting Front, 97-103.

25. Msg CX57143 CINCFE for CG EighthArmy(Adv) Korea, 12 Nov 51, cable files, OSD Hist;

Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 175-81.

26. Memcon Barnes (DepDirExecSect State), 28 Nov 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1: 1189-93,

especially 1190.

27 Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 2:625; Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front,

177-82.

28. Msg G3192 TAC EUSAK for CG 187thAbnRegt, 27 Nov 51, quoted in Hermes, Truce Tent and

Fighting Front, 177; msg DA 88203 PIa DeptArmy for ClNCFE, 28 Nov 51, cable files, OSD

Hist; news conf, 29 Nov 51, Truman Public Papers, 1951, 637; msg C58327 CINCFE for ]CS,

30 Nov 51, cable files, OSD Hist.

29. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 180-82.

30. Ibid, 181-88, 349-51; memo Ralph]. Watkins (SplAsst for SecArmy) for K.R. Bendetsen

(lJSecArmy), 28 Aug 52, 3, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea).

31. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 198-99.

32. Ibid, 199-200; Ridgway, The Korean War, 195.

33. Memo [ExecSecNSC) for Pres, 24 Apr 52, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.

34 Draft paper Exec to SecDef, w/handwritten corrections by SecDef, [ca Apr 51), Marshall

papers, "MacArthur Marshall" folder, George C. Marshall Foundation, Lexington, Va;

Itr DepASecState(FE) to DepSecDef, 4 Apr 51, w/memo [State], 3 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 092
Notes to Pages 127-31 569

(Manchuria); memeon Nitze (DirPPS), 6 Apr'; 1, w/memo JCS for SeeDd, 6 Apr'; 1, FRUS

1951, VII, pt 1:307-09, 309n6.

3';. Memo SeeAF for JtSec;, 19 Apr ';1, w/proposed statement, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo

SeeAF for DepSeeDd, 19 Apr'; 1, ibid.

36. Memo SeeAF for JtSees, 19 Apr'; I, w/proposed statement, ibid; memo JtSees for DepSeeDef,

19 Apr 51, ibid; memo ChJCS for SeeDet', 23 Apr 51, ibid.

37. Intraoff memo DirEXOS for SeeAF, [ea 23 Apr'; I], w/draft statement by Finletter and revision

by Marshall, ibid; memo SeeAF for DepSeeDd, 19 Apr ';1, w/draft statements marked "Gen.

Marshall's draft/Proposed Statement by Air Secretary Finletter" and "Acheson draft," ibid.

38. Memo CINCH for SeeAF, IS jun 5 I, RG 330, ATSD&DepSeeDef files, 'l\FPC Actions During

the Korean War Buildup" folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md; memo SeeAF for

SeeDef, 19 Jun 51, ibid.

39. Memo SeeAF for SeeDet', 22Jun 51, w/msg VO 221, Weyland for SeeAF, RG 330, CD 4';2.01;

memo [ExeeSeeNSC] for Pres, 28 Jun 51, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.

40. Memo [ExeeSeeNSC] for Pres, 28 Jun 51, Truman papers, PSF:NSC; msg CINCFE for JCS, 21

Jul 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:718-19, 719nI; msg CINCH for JCS, 23 Jul ';1, ibid, 721-22;

msgJCS for CINCFE, 25 Jul 51, ibid, 730-31, 730n3, 731n5; msg ClNCFE t(JrJCS, 1 Aug 51,

ibid, 766-67; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 2:607-08.

41. Memo JCS for SeeDet', 10 Aug 51, w/handwritten note-"Done by Gen Ilradley/L" [Lovettl,

RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo ATSD(lSA) for SeeDef, 4 Aug ';1, ibid; FRUS 1951, VII, pt

1:767n3; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 2:608-12.

42. Memo SeeDef for SeeAF, 12 Oct 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo SeeAF for SeeDef. 1 Nov

51, ibid; memo [ExeeSeeNSC] for Pres, 24 Oct ';1, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.

43. Memo SeeAF for SeeDet', 1 Nov 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo w.G. Whitman (ChRDIl)

for DepSeeDcf, 28 Nov'; I, w/rept AR 204/2, 28 Nov'; 1. RG 330, CD 4';2.1; memo SeeAF for

SeeDef, 24 Dec 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea).

44. Memo SeeAF t<)r SeeDef, 24 Dec'; 1, RG .no, CD 092 (Korea)

45. Memo SeeDef for JCS, 26 Dec 51, ibid; memo George Wyeth (Asst to JtSees), 8 Jan 52, RG

330, CD 129-1-14 through 70; excerpt from mins mtg JtSees, 10 Jan 52, RG 330,

ATSD&DepSeeDef files, "AFPC Actions During Korean War Buildup" folder.

46. Memo JCS for SeeDet', 6 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memred H.P. Smith (DirOFMA), 15

Feb 52, ibid.

47. Ltr SeeDdto ChSenateCteArmedServiees, I'; Mar ';2, w/exeerpts from speech SeeAF, RG 330,

CD 4';2.02.

48. Memo JCS for SeeDcf, 13 Jul '; 1, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:667-68.

49. Ltr SeeDet'to Pres, 18Ju151, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo Pres for SeeDef. 19Jul ';1, ibid;

two memos by j.D. Hickerson (ASeeState(UNA)) and L.T. Merebant (DepASeeState(FE)) for

SeeState, both 3 Aug ';1, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:770-74; memo WFM '1'-10 State, 18 Aug ';1,

ibid, 831-35; memo WFM 1'-1011 State, 18 Aug ';1, ibid, 835-42.

';0. Memo JCS for SeeDef, 31 Aug 5 I, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:878-79; memo JtSees for SeeDcf, 30

Aug 51, RG 3.~0, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); Itr SeeDcf to SeeState, 4 Sep '; I, FRUS 1951, VII, pt

1:877-78.

51. Memo JCS for SeeDef, 29 Aug'; I, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:880-81; memo JtSees for SeeDef, 30

Aug 5\, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); ltr SeeDef to SeeState, 4 Sep 51, w/ene, FRUS 1951,

VII, pt 1:87 9-81; memo SeeDd for ExeeSeeNSC, 4 Sep 5 I, ibid, 881-82; memo ATSD(ISA)

for SeeDcf, [.~ Sep 51], RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); ltr AetingSeeDcf to SeeState, 12 Sep

51, ibid.

52. Ltr DepUSeeState to SeeDd, 10 Sep ';1, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memoJCS for SeeDd, 12

Sep 51, FRUS 195/, VII, pt 1:912-14; intraoff memo K.T. Young (Asst to DirOFMA) for

ATSD(ISA), 13 Sep '; I, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); intraoff memo ATSD(ISA) for SeeDd, 13 Sep

';1, ibid.

53. Ltr SeeDcfto SeeState, U Sep 51, FRUS 195/, VII, pt 1:911-12; memo JtSees for SeeDcf, 2';

Sep ';1, RG 330, CD 0923 (NATO Gen).
570 Notes to Pages 131-36

54. Memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 27 Sep 5 I, Truman papers, PSF:NSC; msg CINCFE for ]CS, 30

Sep 51, FRUS /95/, VII, pt 1:974; memo ]CS for SecDef, 3 Nov 51, "Pertinent Papers,"

IV:687-90.

55. Memo ]CS for SecDef, 3 Nov 51, "Pertinent Papers," IV:687-90; memo ActingSecDef for

ExecSecNSC, 9 Nov 5 I, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo ActingASecState(FE) for SecState, 17

Dec 51, FRUS 195/, VII, pt 1:1349-52; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 2:636-37.

56. Memo Wyeth for SecArmy et aI, 7 Dec 51. RG 330, CD 129-1; memo SecAF for SecDef, IO

Dec 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); intraoff memo, 23 Dec [5 I], and handwritten note- "Practically everything SecAir recommends was approved 12/19 by NSC 118, FCN[Frank C.

Nash]," ibid.

57. Memo ActingExecSecNSC for NSC, 7 Dec 5 I, w/draft statement [NSC I 18/1], FRl/S 195/, VII,

pt I: I 259-63, deals with this and preceding paragraphs.

58. Ibid, 1261.

59. Memo]CS for SecDef, 18 Dec 51, ibid, 1357-59; memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 20 Dec 50,

w/statement, ibid, 1382-87; memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 21 Dec 51, Truman papers,

PSF:NSC.

60. Memo]CS for SecDef, 18 Dec 51, FRlIS /951, VII, pt 1:1357-59; memo ExecSecNSC for

NSC, 20 Dec 50, w/enc statement, ibid, 1382-87; memo [ExecSecNSC) for Pres, 21 Dec 51,

Truman papers, PSF:NSC.

61. Memo ActingExecSecNSC for NSC, 7 Dec 51, w/draft statement, FRUS /951, VII, pt

1:1259-63; memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 20 Dec 51, w/draft statement, ibid, 1382-87.

62. Memo DepDirEXOS for ]CS, 28 Dec 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); FRUS 1951, VII, pt

I: 1382n I.

63. Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 2:713-19; Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front,

156-59.

64. Msg CINCUNC for HqUNC Korea, 5 Dec 51, FRlIS /95/, VII, pt 1:1243-45; msg]CS for

CINCFE, 19 Dec 51, ibid, 1377-81: msg]CS for CINCFE, 24 Dec 51, ibid, 1435; Schnabel

and Watson, Korean War, pt 2:714.

65. Msg CX60640 CINCUNC for ]CS, 2 Jan 52, cable files, OSD Hist; msg 911 22 ]CS for CINCFE,

4 Jan 52, ibid; msg 900075 ]CS for CINCFE, I Feb 52, ibid; msg 900323 ]CS for CINCFE, 5

Feb 52, ibid.

66. Msg C62999 CINCFE for .rCS, 6 Feb 52, ibid; msg HNC 875 CINCUNC for ]CS, 6 Feb 52, ibid;

msg 900453 ]CS for CINCUNC Adv(Korea), (, Feb 52, ibid; msg C63 198 CINCFE for ]CS, 9 Feb

52, ibid; msg ZX25662 CINCFE for ]CS, 9 Feb 52, ibid; msg C67670 CINCUNC for ]CS, 28

Apr 52, 32, ibid.

67. Msg C63308 CINCFE for .rCS, IO Feb 52, ibid; msg C63307 CINCFE for ]CS, 10 Feb 52, ibid;

msg CX63309 CINCFE for ]CS, IO Feb 52, ibid; msg C63432 CINCFE for ]CS, 12 Feb 52, ibid;

msg C63731 CINCFE for ]CS, 16 Feb 52, ibid.

68. Msg DA 901349 CoSUSA for CINCFE, 16 Feb 52, ibid; msg C63797 CINCFE for ]CS, 17 Feb

52, ibid; msg C63834 CINCFE for ]CS, 18 Feb 52, ibid; msg C63907 CINCFE for .rCS, 19 Feb

52, ibid; msg C63907 (correction) ClNCFE for ]CS, 19 Feb 52, ibid; msg C67670 CINCUNC

for ]CS, 28 Apr 52, 32, ibid. See also final text of art IV, in Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting

Front, 531.

69. Msg C572 17 CINCFE for .rCS, 13 Nov 5 I, cable files, OSD His!.

70. Memcon Barnes (DepDirExecSect State), 28 Nov 51, FRUS 195/, VII, pt 1:1189-93.

7 I. Msg CINCFE for .rCS, 27 Nov 5 I, ibid, I 186-88; msg CINCFE for ]CS, 28 Nov 5 I, ibid,

1194-95.

72. Msg CINCFE for .rCS, 28 Nov 51, ibid, 1194-95; msg CINCFE for .rCS, 30 Nov 5 I, ibid,

1206-08.

73. Msg CINCFE for ]CS, 3 Dec 51, ibid, 1229-30.

74. Msg CINCFE for ]CS, 4 Dec 51, ibid, 1234; msg CINCFE for ]CS, 4 Dec 51, ibid, 1234-37;

msg ClNCFE for ]CS, 4 Dec 5 I, ibid, 1237; msg CINCFE for ]CS, 4 Dec 51, ibid, 1239-40;

msg CINCFE for AdvHqUNC Korea, 5 Dec 51, ibid, 1240-43.
Notes to Pages 136-42 571

75. MsgjCS for CINCFE, 5 Dec 51, ibid, 1247.

76. Msg jCS for Pres, 7 Dec 51, ibid, 1278-79; msg Pres for jCS, 8 Dec 51, cited in Schnabel and

Watson, Korean War, pt 2:659; msgjCS for Pres, 8 Dec 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:1281-82;

msg 89173 jCS for CINCFE, 10 Dec 51, cable files, OSD Hist.

77. Msg CINCUNC for ]CS, 18 Dec 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:1366-72, especially 1368-69; msg

jCS for CINCFE, 19 Dec 51, ibid, 1377-81.

78. Msg CINCFE for jCS, 29 Dec 51, ibid, 1464-67; msg CINCUNC for DeptArmy, 7 jan 52, FRUS

1952-1954, XV, pt 1:10-12.

79. Memcon TCT-CONV-2 SecState, 14 jan 52, RG 330, CD 337 (Truman-Churchill Talks);

TCT-Mins-3 Ridgway Knight (State), 9 jan 52, 6-8, ibid; msg jCS for CINCFE, 10 Jan 52,

FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt 1:13-14.

80. Msg C62825 CINCFE for jCS, 3 Feb 52, cable files, OSD Hist; msg C62892 CINCFE for jCS,

4 Feb 52, ibid; msg C67670 CINCUNC for jCS, 28 Apr 52, 8-9, ibid; Schnabel and Watson,

Korean War, pt 2:720.

8 I. Msg C67670 CINCUNC for jCS, 28 Apr 52, 10-11, cable files, OSD Hist; memo [ExecSecNSC)

for Pres, 6 Mar 52, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.

82. Msg C67670 CINCUNC for jCS, 28 Apr 52, 12-15, cable files, OSD Hist; msg 902160 jCS for

CINCFE, 27 Feb 52, w/notes indicating SecDef, SecState, and presidential approval, ibid;

Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 2:728, 764-65; Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting

Front, 167-74.

83. Msg C67677 CINCFE for jCS, 28 Apr 52, cable files, OSD Hist; msg 907375 jCS for CINCFE,

26 Apr 52, ibid; msg C67900 ClNCFE for ]CS, 2 May 52, 6, ibid.

VII. THE PRISONERS OF WAR

1. Msg CINCFE for ]CS, 25 Dec 51, US Dept State, Foreign Relations ofthe United States, 1951

(hereafter cited as FRUS with year and volume number), VII, pt 1: 1439; james F. Schnabel

and Robert j. Watson, The Korean War, vollII in The History ofthe joint Chiefs ofStaff The

joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, pt 2:696; Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and

Fighting Front in United States Army in the Korean War series, 233.

2. Memo OffCounsel OASD(L&L) for ASD(L&L), 12 jun 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); Schnabel

and Watson, Korean War, pt 2:672-73, 675.

3. Memo Alan N. Alpern (OffCounsel OASD(L&L) for ATSD(ISA», [5 jun 52], RG 330, CD 092

(Korea); memo DepATSD(ISA) for AetingSecDef. [ea 23 Nov 51], ibid; memo JCS for SeeDef,

8 Aug 51, ibid.

4. Ltr SeeState to SeeDef, 27 Aug 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:857-59; memo SeeDef-designate for

ATSD(ISA), 14 Sept 51 (quote), RG 330, CD 383.6; memo SeeDef for jCS, 25 Sep 51, ibid.

5. Memo]CS for SeeDef, 15 Oct 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); msg CINCFE for jCS, 27 Oct 51,

FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:1068-81; memo jCS for SeeDef, 15 Nov 51, w/draft msg, ibid,

1168-71; ltr ActingSecDef to SeeState, 23 Nov 51. ibid, 1167-68.

6. Ltr AetingSecState to SeeDef, 4 Dec 51, w/revised draft msg for CINCFE, FRUS 1951, VII, pt

1: 1232-33, 1244n4; Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, vol II in Memoirs by Harry

S. Truman (hereafter cited as Truman, Memoirs 1I), 460-62; Schnabel and Watson, Korean

War, pt 2:684-88.

7. Memcon U. Alexis johnson (DepASeeState(FE», 5 Dec 51, w/note, FRUS 1951, VII, pt

1:1243-45, 1244n4; msg ]CS for Pres's Naval Aide [for Pres], 7 Dec 51, ibid, 1276-78,

1276nnl,4; editorial note, ibid, 1296; msg 89172 jCS for CINCFE, 10 Dec 51, cable files,

OSD Hist.

8. Msg CINCFE for jCS, 11 Dec 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:1306-07; msg CINCFE for jCS, 12 Dec

51, ibid, 1315-17; msg JCS for CINCFE, 15 Dec 51, ibid, 1340-41; msg CINCUNC(Adv)
572 Notes to Pages 142-46

Korea for ]CS, 18 Dec 5 I, ibid, 1366-72; msg ]CS for CINCFE, 19 Dec 5 I, ibid, 1377-81,

especially 1380.

9. MsgCINCFEfor]CS, 18Dec51,ibid, 1373-74, 1374nl;msgHNC587ClNCUNC(Adv)Korea

for ClNCUNC, 18 Dec 5 I, cable files, OSD Hist; ltr ROKMinFgnAffs to ClNCUNC, 16 Jan 52,

RG 330, CD 383.6; Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 141, 141n21; msg CINCFE for

]CS, 27 Oct 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:1069.

10. Msg HNC 593 CINCUNC(Adv) Korea for CINCliNC, 19 Dec 5 I, cable files, OSD Hist; msg

CX59780 CINCFE for ]CS, 21 Dec 51. ibid; msg]CS for ClNCFE, 20 Dec 51, FRUS 1951, VII,

pt 1:1399-1400; msg CINCiJNC for ClNCUNC(Adv) Korea, 21 Dec 51, ibid, 1402-03.

11. Msg CINCFE for ]CS, 21 Dec 5 I, FRUS 1951, VII, pt I: 1403-04; msg CINCUNC for ]CS, 22

Dec 51, ibid, 1421-23; msgHNC 1156 CINClJNC(Adv) Korea forCINCiJNC, 25 Apr52, cable

files, OSD Hist; msg CX67538 CINClJNC for .ICS and CG ElJSAK, 25 Apr 52, ibid.

12. Msg CINCUNC for .ICS, 22 Dec 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:1418-19; Schnabel and Watson,

Korean War, pt 1:697-98; msg CINCFE for ]CS, 24 Dec 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:35; msg

218450 CINCFE for ]CS, 2 Jan 52, cable files, OSD Hist.

13. Two msgs CINCFE for ]CS, both 24 Dec 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:1428-29, 1435-36; msg

CINCFE for ]CS, 15 Dec 51, ibid, 1342-44; msg CI;\ICUNC for ]CS, 25 Dec 51, ibid, 1445-47,

14, Msg CINCFE for ]CS, 29 Dec 51, ibid, 1461-62; msg CINCFE for .ICS, 30 Dec 51, ibid,

1469-70; msg C60583 CINCFE for ]CS, I Jan 52, cable files, OSD Hist; msg 218450 CINCFE

for ]CS, 2 Jan 52, ibid,

15, Msg C60704 CINCFE for ]CS, 3 Jan 52, cable files, OSD Hist; msg C61049 CINCFE for .ICS,

8.1an 52, ibid; msg 0914132 CINCFE for ]CS, 9 Jan 52, ibid; msg 92059 ]CS for CINCFE, IS

Jan 52, ibid, The FRUS 1952-1954 volumes do not contain the extensive documentation of

the truce talks given in the 1951 series (see editorial note, FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt 1:7).

16. Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 2:728-32.

17. Memrcd DepASecState(FE), 4 Feb 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt 1:32-34; memrcd DepASecState(FE), 8 Feb 52, ibid, 40-41.

18. Ibid, 42-43; memo SecState for Pres, [8 Feb 52), ibid, 44-45.

19. Memrcd [SecDef], 8 Feb 52, w/encs, RG 330, CD 383.6 (1952).

20. Ibid; memo SecState, 8 Feb 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt 1:43-44; mins [000) mtg, II Feb

52, RG 330, CD 383.6 (1952).

21. Mins [DoD] mtg, II Feb 52, RG 330, CD 383.6 (1952); memrcd CINCUNC, 19 Feb 52, FRUS

1952-1954, XV, pt 1:56-57; memcon DepASecState(FE), 25 Feb 52, ibid, 58-59; msg

ClNCUNC for ]CS, 27 Feb 52, ibid, 66-67.

22. Memcon DepASecState(FE), 27 Feb 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt 1:68-69; msg ]CS for

CINCFE, 27 Feb 52, ibid, 70-71.

23. Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 2: /35-3/; Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War:

How We Met the Challenge, 205-08.

24. Msg C64158 CINCFE for ]CS, 23 Feb 52, cable files, OSD Hist; msg C64508 CINCFE for ]CS,

29 Feb 52, ibid; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 2:738-39; Ridgway, The Korean War,

207-08.

25. Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 2:738-39, 749; Ridgway, The Korean War, 209.

26. Msg CINCUNC for ]CS, 17 Mar 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt 1:91-94; msg CINCFE for ]CS,

20 Mar 52, ibid, 108-09; memrcd [State] State-]CS mtg, 21 Mar 52, ibid, 112-14; msg]CS for

CINCFE, 22 Mar 52, ibid, 116-17; msg C66006 ClNCUNC for ]CS, 27 Mar 52, cable files,

OSD Hist; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 2:750-54.

27. Msg C66285 CINCFE for ]CS, 2 Apr 52, cable files, OSD Hist; msg 66397 CINCFE for ]CS, 4

Apr 52, ibid; msg HNC 1120 ClNCUNC for ]CS, 4 Apr 52, ibid; msg C67292 CINCUNC for

]CS, 21 Apr 52, ibid; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 2:756.

28. Msg C66649 CINCFE for DeptArmy, 10 Apr 52, cable files, OSD Hist; msg 67067 CINCUNC

for ]CS, 17 Apr 52, ibid; msg C66832 CINCUNC for DeptArmy, 12 Apr 52, ibid; msg C66864

CINCUNC for DeptArmy, 13 Apr 52, ibid; msg C67178 CINCUNC for DeptArmy, 19 Apr 52,

ibid.
Notes to Pages 146-50 573

29. Msg C67292 ClNCUNC for jCS, 21 Apr ';2, ibid: msg HNC 1182 C1NCLJNC for ]CS, 24 Apr

';2, ibid; msg CX6"7';00 C1NCLJNC for ]CS, 2'; Apr ';2, ihid: msg C6"7';.39 CI:"lCUC\JC for ]CS,

2'; Apr ';2, ibid: msg CX6760,; CINCUNC for CSAmh Korea, 26 Apr ';2, ibid; Schnahel and

Watson, Korean War, pt 2:760.

:\0. Msg C6760.3 C1C\JCllNC for ./CS, 26 Apr ';2, cahle files, OSD Hist: msg C6"7677 CINCH for

./CS, 28 Apr ';2, ihid; msg C67900 CINCH for ./CS, 2 May ';2, ibid: memo ATSD(ISA) for

SecDct',7 Mav ';2, RG .3.JO, CD 092 (Korea); Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 2:761-68.

:\ I. Msg CX677';O C1NCUNC for ./CS, 29 Apr ';2, cable files, OSD Hist: msg CX';777 TacKCG

CINCFE for ./CS, 8 May ';2, ihid; testimony Ridgway, 21 May ';2, in US Cong, Senate, Cte on

Armed Services, General Ridgway: Hearing, 82 Cong, 2 sess (21 May ';2), .3-4; Ridgway, The

Korean War, 214-1 ';: Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 2.3.3-62.

32 Msg C68366 CINClJNC for ]CS. 12 May ';2, II, cahle files, OSD Hist .

.33. Telecon TT';819 Ch]CS et al with CINCFE et ai, 1.3 May ';2, cable files, OSD Hist: msg 666

USAmb]apan for SecState, 21 Aug ';2, ibid: testimony Mark W. Clark, 10 Aug ';4, in IIS Cong,

Senate, Cte on ./udiciary, Interlocking Subl'ersion in GOl'ernment Departments: Hearings,

83 Cong, 2 sess (10 Aug ';4), pt 2 I : 1692: Ridgway. The Korean War, 2 I 5-16; Hermes, Truce

Tent and Fighting Front, 2';9-61; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 2:"7"72_"7·\, 821-24,

836-38 .

.34. Memo [ExecSecC\JSC] for Pres, 6 Mar ';2, Truman papers, President's Secretary's files:NSC

(PSF:NSC), Harry S. Truman Lihrary, Independence, Mo; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War,

pt 2:809-10 .

.3';. Msg 1861 LJSAmb IISSR for SecState, 22 May ';2, RG :\.30, CD 091.412; msg 67 .3 Austin

(USAmb UN) for SecState, 4 Apr ';2, cable files, OSD Hist: msg .360.3 I:SAmh India for SecState,

4 Apr ';2, ibid; msg PD220 CIA for CoSl!SA et ai, '; Apr 52, ibid; msg "7"72 SecState f(lr

lJSConGen Geneva, II Apr ';2. ibid; msg 4200 L'SAmb India for SecState. \.J May ';2. ibid;

Chester Bowles, Amhassador's Report, 224: Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 2:809-

I';; memo SecAF for SecDct', 22 Apr ';2, RG 330. CD 091.412.

.36. Mins press conI' SecDef, 16 May ';2. Hist Off OSD, comp, Puhlic Statements of Secretarv of

Defense UJI'ett, 1951-1953, IV:841-42 (841. quote); memo Lee Hargus (OPI OSD) for

Clayton Fritchey (AdmAsst to Pres). 20 May ';2, RG :1 ..10. CD 091.ef 12: Hermes. Truce Tent and

Fighting Front, 2.3 1-:\2; William Lindsay White, The Captil'es ofKorea: An IinoJficial White

Paper on the Treatment of War Prisoners: Our Treatment o( Theirs: Their 7i'eatment o(Ollrs,

166-82. 2';6-62: David Rees, Korea: The limited Wiu; :\';2-6.3: Schnabel and Watson,

Korean War, pt 2:81';-1"7.

r. Msg ./CS for CI;\ICfE, '; Jun ';2. FRUS 1952-195·}, XV, pt 1:.J09: memo ASecState(FF) for

SecState. It .lui ';2, ibid, 405-06: msg DA 912"71:1 DeptArmr PSYWAR for C1NCFE, :\ .luI ';2.

cable files. OSD Hist: memo Pres for SecDct'. II ./un 52, RG }dO, CD 092 (Korea): memo

ATSD(lSA) for DepSecDct', 12 ./un ';2. ibid: memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDct', 20'/un ';2. ibid;

memo ActingATSD(lSA) t(ir SecDd', .31 .lui ';2, ibid; Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation:

My Years in the State Department, 6';';: Schnabel and Watson, Korean Wilr, pt 2:816.

:18. Msg C683';O CINCfE for ./CS, 12 \Iar ';2 (quote), cable files, OSD lIist: msg C68';0~ CINCH:

f(ir ./CS, I'; 'lay ';2. ibid; msg C68446 CL'\JCl 'NC for JCS. 1ef May 52. ibid.

:19. MsgJCS for C1;\1CH, 16 May ';2. FRUS 1952-/95·j, XV, pt l:20.3-0ef; msg SrDelllNCDeleg

for CINCII;\IC, 19 May ';2, ibid, 209: notes SecState stfmtg, 22 May ';2. ibid, 22.3-2';.

40. Msg CX68')~5 <:INCIiNC for DeptArmy. 2:1 Mar 52. cable files, OSD His{; msg UNCI 'NC f(lr

.ICS,,31 May ';2, FRUS 1952-1954, Xv. pt I:rO-~ef, especially rl: ms~]CS for UNCFE, ';

]un ';2, ibid ..310-1'1: memo DepATSD(ISA) for SecDcf, 2.1un ';2, R(; :1.30. CD 092 (Korea):

Schnabel and Watson. Korean War, pt 2:82';-:10

41. Msg 9' 12·Hl.JCS for UC\JCFE. 1.3 .Iun ';2, cable tiles. OSD Hist: tl1sg CX'; 1O'i:\ UNCI'!' for jCS.

29 ]un ';2, ibid: msg ClNCIiNC for .ICS. '; .Iun ';2, FRUS 1952-/954, XV, pt 1::llef-16;

Schnabel and Watson. Korean W£I1; pt 2:H:I I. H:I:I-:\H, H(lH. H~:\.
574 Notes to Pages 150-56

42. Msg CINCFE for ]CS, 3 ]ul 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt 1:374; msg C51435 C1NCUNC for

]CS, 6 ]ul 52, cable files, OSD Hist; msg C1NCUNC for ]CS, 11 ]ul 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XV,

pt 1:399-401; msg]CS for CINCFE, 11 ]ul 52, ibid, 402.

43. Msg C52147 CINCFE for ]CS, 18 ]ul 52, cable files, OSD Hist; msg]CS for CINCFE, 25 ]ul 52,

FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt 1:419-20; Lovett indirectly quoted in memcon Charles A. Sullivan

(DirPolDivOFMA ISA OSD), 20 Aug 52, ibid, XIV, pt 2:1314-16; Schnabel and Watson,

Korean War, pt 2:880.

44. Memo DepATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 27 Aug 52, w/draft presidential statement, RG 330, CD

334 (State-]CS); msg ActingSecState for USEmb USSR, 27 Aug 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt

1:463-64; msg Kennan (USAmb USSR) for State, 28 Aug 52, ibid, 464-65; msg CINCUNC for

]CS, I Sep 52, ibid, 467-70; msg 917260 ]CS for CINCFE, 29 Aug 52, cable files, OSD Hist;

memrcd SecDef, 15 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt

2:882-84.

45. Msg CINCUNC for ]CS, 1 Sep 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt 1:470-74; memo State, 2 Sep 52,

ibid, 477-83; memo DepATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 3 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 334 (State-]CS).

46. Memo DirPPS to DepUSecState, 3 Sep 52, w/draft presidential statement, FRUS 1952-1954,

XV, pt 1:486-89; memo DepATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 9 Sep 52, w/draft radiograms ]CS for

CINCFE, RG 330, CD 334 (State-]CS); Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 2:887-88.

47. Memo State, 8 Sep 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt 1:492-99; memo DepATSD(ISA) for

DepSecDef, 9 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 334 (State-]CS); msg CINCFE for ]CS, 1I Sep 52, FRUS

1952-1954, XV, pt 1:506-09.

48. Truman and Libby are indirectly quoted in memrcd SecDef, 15 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 092

(Korea); msg CINCFE for ]CS, 25 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 334 (State-]CS); Schnabel and Watson,

Korean War, pt 2:897-99.

49. Memo [State] State-]CS mtg, 16 Sep 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt 1:514-21; memo

DepASecState(FE) for SecState, 17 Sep 52, ibid, 521-22; memcon DepASecState(FE), 17 Sep

52, ibid, 522-25; memcon CNO, [17 Sep 521, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea).

50. Memo ExecSecNSC for Pres, 24 Sep 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt 1:532-38. The Defense

argument was later elaborated in memo Ch]CS for SecDef, 17 Nov 52, ibid, 648, and Itr

SecDef to SecState, 18 Nov 52, ibid, 649-51.

51. Memo ExecSecNSC for Pres, 24 Sep 52, ibid, 537-38.

52. Msg ]CS for CINCFE, 25 Sep 52, ibid, 539-40; msg Pres for CINCFE, 26 Sep 52, ibid, 544;

msg CINCUNC for ]CS, 28 Sep 52, ibid, 545-48.

53. Msg CINCFE for ]CS, 8 Oct 52, ibid, 554-57; msg 920224 ]CS for CINCFE, 4 Oct 52, cable

files, OSD Hist; msg CX56973 CINCUNC for CINCUNC(Adv) Korea, 14 Oct 52, ibid;

Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 2:905-09.

VIII. THE FINAL ROUND

1. Memcon DepASecState(FE), 17 Sep 52, CS Dept State, Foreign Relations ofthe United States,

1952-1954 (hereafter cited as FRUS with year and volume number), XV, pt 1:523.

2. Memo jExecSecNSC) for Pres, 24 Apr 52, Truman papers, President's Secretary's files:NSC

(PSF:NSC), Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo; NIE-55/l, 30 ]ul 52, FRUS

1952-1954, XV, pt 1:437-38; Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front in United

States Army in the Korean War series, 284-310 (296, quote).

3. Rohert Frank Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953, 496 (quote); Hermes,

Truce lent and Fighting Front, 310-18

4. Futrell, US Air Force in Korea, 493-97; Malcolm M. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, The Sea War

in Korea, 391-97; James A. Field, ]r., History of United States Naval Operations: Korea,

444-45; Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 369-"70, 375-89.
Notes to Pages 156-60 575

5. Futrell, US Air Force in Korea, 233, 457-64, 471-80 (471, quote), 587-98, 603; memcon

Johnson (DepASecState(FE)), 17 Sep 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt 1:522-25, especially 523.

6. Futrell, US Air Force in Korea, 430-31, 493-97, 503-08; Field, US Naual Operations:

Korea, 387, 391.

7 Field, US Naual Operations: Korea, 417-20; Cagle and Manson, Sea War in Korea, 241-43;

Futrell, US Air Force in Korea, 296-97, 403, 405-13, 497-500.

8. Futrell, US Air Force in Korea, 448-53, 457-59, 480-93; Cagle and Manson, Sea War in

Korea, 441-50; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department,

656-57; msg ActingSecState for OSEmb OK, 24 Jun 52, FRUS 1952-1954, xv, pt 1:353-54;

memrcd State, 25 Jun 52, ibid, 356-57; memcon ASecState(FE), 26 Aug 52, ibid, 458-59.

9. Futrell, US Air Force in Korea, 575-87; Cagle and Manson, Sea War in Korea, 450-53,

461-62; memoJCS for SecDef, 17 Nov 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt 1:649-51.

10. Testimony Gen J. Lawton Collins, 20 Apr 53, OS Cong, Senate, Cte on Armed Services,

Preparedness Subcte No 2, Ammunition Shortages in the Armed Services: Hearings (hereafter cited as Senate Cte on Armed Services, Ammunition Shortages: Hearings), 83 Cong, I

sess (April 1953), 598-99, 605-06; intraoff memo DirProgRepts&StatsDiv OASD(C) for

ASD(C), II Jul 52, w/enc, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front,

96, 224-27; testimony Lovett, 8 Apr 53, Senate Cte on Armed Services, Ammunition

Shortages: Hearings, 66-67, 97, 102, 104-05; memo :\lcNeil (ASD(C)) for Hugh Dean

(SplAsst to SecDef), II Dec 52, RG 330, CD 471.

II. Testimony Collins, 20 Apr 53, Senate ete on Armed Services, Ammunition Shortages:

Hearings, 629; testimony Lovett and McNeil, 8 Apr 53, ibid, 60, 79-80, 89, 129; ltr McNeil

to Sen Margaret Chase Smith, 18 Apr 53, ibid, 631-32; J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime:

The History and Lessons ofKorea, 318-19; Hermes, Truce 7ent and Fighting Front, 224-25.

12. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 227-29; Itr CG EUSAK, 2_~ Jun 52, in Senate Cte on

Armed Services, Ammunition Shortages: Hearings, 10-1 I; memo SecArmy for SecDef, 5 Jul

52, RG 330, CD 471.

13. Testimony Lovett, 8 Apr 53, Senate Cte on Armed Services, Ammunition Shortages:

Hearings, 90, 102; Itr SecDef to CINCFE, 24 Nov 52, quoted in ibid, 64-65; memo R.R.

Klanderman (aSD) for Clay P. Bedford (Asst to SecDef), 15 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 20 I

(Bedford).

14. Ltr SecDef to CINCFE, 24 Nov 52, quoted in Senate Cte on Armed Services, Ammunition

Shortages: Hearings, 64-6';; memo SecDef for SecArmy, 15 Aug 52, w/early drafts, RG 330,

CD 471; msg 921809 SecArmy for CINCFE (for DepSecDef), 22 Oct 52, ihid; Hermes, Truce

Tent and Fighting Front, 337-39.

15. Testimony Lovett, 8 Apr 53, Senate Cte on Armed Services, Ammunition Shortages:

Hearings, 102-05 (103, quote); memo SecArmy for SecDef, 12 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 471;

memo SecDef for SecArmy, 21 Nov 52, ibid; memo USecArmy for ACoS G-4, 21 Nov 52, ihid;

memo Hugh Dean (SplAsst to SecDet) for ASD(C), 20 Nov 52, ibid.

16. Testimony Lovett, 8 Apr 53, Senate Cte on Armed Services, Ammunition Shortages:

Hearings, 63-65,98; msg DEI' 924436 SecDef for CINCFE, 21 Nov 52, RG 330, CD 471;

testimony Gen James A. Van Fleet, I Apr 53, Senate Cte on Armed Services, Ammunition

Shortages: Hearings, 9; msg C59373 ClNCFE for SecDel', 27 Nov 52, RG 330, CD 471.

17. Graph, "Comparison of Monthly Production & Expenditures .," 30 Nov 52, RG 330, CD

471; memo Johnson (USecArmy) for ACoS G-4, 21 Nov 52, ibid; staff rept

VChPdn&RqmtsMB, I Dec 52, RG 330, CD 400.174 (Mil Urgency); memo Lovett for Pace, 3

Dec 52, RG 330, CD 471; memo Dean for ActingSecDef, 12 Dec 52, ihid; memo Foster

(ActingSecDet) for SecArmy, 13 Dec 52, ibid; memo Dean for ACoS G-4, 23 Dec 52, ibid;

memo Johnson (USecArmy) for SecDef, 30 Dec 52, ihid; ltr SecDef to DirODM, 30 Dec 52,

RG 330, CD 400.1 17.

18. Testimony Lovett, 8 Apr 53, Senate ete on Armed Services, Ammunition Shortages:

Hearings, 60-61,95; testimony Collins, 20 Apr 53, ibid, 615, 649; statement Williston B.
576 Notes to Pages 160-66

Palmer, IApr 53], before Senate Cte on Armed Services, Ammunition Shortages: Hearings

(off-the-record remarks), 1-2, RG 330, CD 471; msg C59373 CINCFE for SecDcf, 27 Nov 52,

ibid.

19 Testimony Collins, 20 Apr 53, Senate Cte on Armed Services, Ammunition Shortages:

Hearings, 649.

20. Testimony Van Fleet, 1 Apr 53, Senate Cte on Armed Services, Ammunition Shortages:

Hearings, 7-9, 14-15, 18-20; testimony Lovett, H Apr 53. ibid, 91; statement Sen J.S.

Cooper, I Apr 53, ibid, lH; testimony Collins, 20 Apr 53, ibid, 607-09, 613-15, 627-29,

64"7-48, 652.

21. Memo ASD(L&L) for SeeDcf, 7 Nov 50. RG 330, CD 334 (AFPC); address SeeDef, 29 Nov 50,

NY City, in Hist Off OSD, comp, Public Statements of Secretary of Defense Marshall,

1950-19'51, 1:106-07, OSD Hist; memo JCS for SecDe!', 26 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 091.711

(Korea); memo JCS for SecDet', 29 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 353; Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting

Front, 213, 341, 345

22. Memo IExecSecNSq for Pres, 13 Jan ';1, Truman papers, PSF:NSC; memo ATSD(ISA) for

SecDef, 25 May 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); itr ActingSecDef to SecState, 26 May 51, ibid;

memo ASD(L&L) for SeeDef. 7 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 3.14 (AFPC).

23. Rept to NSC by ExecSecNSC INSC 4H/5], FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:53-54; memoJCS for SecDet',

23 May 51, RG 330. CD 092 (Korea); itr ActingSecDef to SecState, 26 May 51, ibid; itr Dean

Rusk (ASecState(FE)) to SecDet', 6Jun 51, w/msg llSAmb Korea for SecState, 5 Jun 51, ibid;

Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 214-15.

24. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 216-20; Itr Clarence E. Meyer (ChtUnifiedCmdMission to Korea) to SecState, 24 May 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt 1:238-42.

25. Msg C63287 CINCFE for CoSUSA, 25 May 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); msg C63422 CINCFE

for DeptArmy, 26 May'; 1, ibid; Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War: How We Met the

Challenge, 161; Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 209-10, 213-14. 360.

26. Ltr Truman to Rhee, 4 Mar 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt 1:"74-76; NSC 118/2, 20 Dec 51,

FRUS 1951, VII, pt I: U84-H7. For detailed discussion of NSC 118/2, see ch VI.

27. Memo JCS for SecDef, 23 Jan ';2, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea).

28. Mins AFPC [excerpts] [OASD(C)], 8 Apr 52, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDcf files, "AFPC Actions

During Korean War Buildup" folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md; Hermes, Truce

Tent and Fighting Front, 2 I 1-12, 340.

29. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 340-41, :>45-46.

30. Memo JtSecs for SecDet', HJul 52, RG 330, CD 353; memo ActingATSD(lSA) for SecDet', 25 .lui

52, ibid; memo SecDet' for JCS, 30 Jul ';2, ibid; memo SecDe!' for JCS, 31 Ju152, RG 330, ISA

files, Nash papers, "Korea" folder, National Archives, Washington, DC; memrcd ATSD(lSA),

14 Aug ';2, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); testimony McNeil, 14 May ';3, us Cong, House, Cte on

Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1954: Hearings, 83

Cong, I sess (1953),444-4';; Hermes, Truce limt and Fighting Front, 342.

31. Memo JCS for SecDef. 19 Sep ';2, RG 330, CD 091. 711 (Korea); memo JCS for SecDef, 26 Sep

52, ibid; memo DepSecDef for JCS, H Oct 52, ibid; memo JCS for SecDet', 10 Oct 52, ibid.

32. Memo SecArmy for SecDe!', 16 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo Rosenberg

(ASD(M&P)) for ATSD(ISA), 2H Oct 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Korea" folder, is

dated after the decision was made, but Rosenberg's views were undoubtedly known in

Lovett's office before 25 October; Itr SecDef to Pres, 25 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 091.711 (Korea);

memo SecDef for JCS, 30 Oct ';2, ibid.

3:). Msg DA 920585 CoSUSA for CINCFE, 9 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 091 71 I(Korea); msg C57893

CINCFE for DeptArmy, 2M Oct 52, ibid; memo SecArmy for SeeDet', 17 Nov 52, ibid.

34. Memo SecDe!' for JCS, '; Dec 52, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 29 Ocr ';2, RG 330, CD 353;

Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 343-44.

35. MsgJCS for CINCH: and CINCUSPAC, 23 Sep [521, FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt 1:527-28; James

F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, The Korean War, vol /II in The History ofthe Joint Chiefs

of Staff The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, pt 2:928-30.
Notes to Pages 167-69 577

36. Schnabel and Watson. Korean War, pt 2:930-.13; msg C1NClJNC for JCS, 29 Sep 52. FRUS

1952-1954, XV, pt 1:548-50; memo SecArmy for SecOef, 16 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 092

(Korea).

37. Notes [AsstNSCAffs ISA], [ca 6 jun 53], RG 330, CD 334; Mark W. Clark, From the Danube

to the Yalu, 233; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 2:934-36.

38. Rept DoD to NSC, [6 Aug 52], 12-19, RG 330, CO 381 (War Plans NSC 114); memo

DepASecState(P) for SplAsst to SecState(PubAf), 3 Sep 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt 1:484;

testimony ChjCS, 10 Feb 53, US Cong, Senate, Cte on Foreign Relations, Eighty-Third

Congress, First Session, 1953, in Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee (Historical Series) (1976), V: 114; interv with lyman l. lemnitzer by Alfred

Goldberg, Lawrence Kaplan, Doris M. Condit, 4 Mar 76, 36-40, OSD Hist; Schnabel and

Watson, Korean War, pt 2:613-14, 614nlOI.

39. Memo SecMilStfCte USDelegUN for SecDd, 7 Nov 52, RG 330, CD 334(lJN); memo

SecMilStfCte!:SDelegUN for SecDef, 14 Nov 52, ibid.

40. Draft memcon [State!. [ca 16 Nov 521, FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt I: 637-45; memo JCS for

SecDd, 17 Nov 52, ibid, 649-51; Itr SecDd to SecState, 18 Nov 52, ibid, 648; editorial note,

ibid, 647; mins lJNGenAssemDeleg by Charles D. Cook (Adv to USPermMission UN), 17 Nov

52, ibid, 653-57.

41. Msg SecState for State, 24 Nov 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt 1:677-79; Itr SecState to Pres, 26

Nov 52, ibid, 683-86; ltr SecState to Pres, 26 Nov 52, ibid, 686; msg SecState for State, 26

Nov 52, ibid, 689-91; resolution 61O(VlI) UNGenAssem, 3 Dec 52, ibid, 702-05; editorial

note, ibid, 712; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 700-05.

42. Editorial note, FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt 1:712-13; memo DepASecState(FE) for DepUSecState, 29 Dec 52, ibid, 718-19; Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 404-07.

43. Memo S. Everett Gleason (DepExecSecNSC), 12 Feb 53, FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt 1:769-72;

memo Robert Cutler (AdmAsst to Pres) for SecOd, 21 Mar 53, ibid, 815; memo Gleason on

31 Mar 53 mtg NSC, 7 Apr 53, Eisenhower papers. Whitman file, Dwight D. Eisenhower

Library, Abilene, Kans; paper [Asst for NSCAffs ISAI, [ca 6 May 53j, RG 330, CD 334; memrcd

Gleason on 13 May 53 NSC mtg, (14 May 531, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file; Dwight D.

Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956, vol I in 1be White House Years, J"79-80;

Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 2:936-40.

44. Memo JCS for SecDd, 11 Feb 53, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Korea" folder; Schnahel

and Watson, Korean War, pt 2:940-48, 1048-49.

45. Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 2:962-68; Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front,

411-19; Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, 240-56; news conf, 2 Apr 5,), Papers of the

Presidents 01" the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower. 1953 (hereafter cited as

Eisenhower Public Papers with year), 147-48

46. Schnabel and Watson. Korean War, pt 2:969-80; Hermes. Truce 1imt and Fighting Front,

459-65.

47. Draft memo [State], 27 Mar 53, PRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt1:817-18; note ExecSecNSC to NSC,

2 Apr 53, w/enc NSC 147. ibid, 838-57; draft memo Gleason, [7 Apr 53j, on Spl NSC mtg 31

Mar 53, ibid, 826; paper [Asst fllr NSCAffs ISAj, [ca 6 May 531, RG 330, CD .B'l; memo

Gleasonon6May 53 NSCmtg, 7 May 53, PRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt 1:975-79. especially 97"7.

48. Memo Gleason on 13 May 53 NSC mtg, [14 May 531. ibid, 1014: memo Asst for NSCAffs [SA

for DepSecDef, 15 May 53, wfbriefnotes ., RG 330, CD 334

49. MemojCS for SecDef, 19 May 53, FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt 1:1059-63; memo Gleason on

20 May 53 NSC mtg, 123 May 53], ibid, 1064-68; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt

2:958-62.

50. Eisenhower, Mandate j(Jr Change, 181; Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report: 1be Storr of the

Eisenbower Administration, 48-49.

51. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 426-33, 527-31, 534; Schnabel and Watson,

Korean War. pt 2:981-82, 995-97; Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 183-84.
578 Notes to Pages 169-73

52, Paper [Asst for NSCAffsISA], [ca6Jun 53], RG 330, CD 334; Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting

Front, 465-70,

53, Msg USAmb Korea for State, 26 May 53, FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt I: 1102-03; msg CINCUNC

for JCS, 7 Jun 53, ibid, 1149-51; editorial note, ibid, pt 2: 1196-97; Itr Rhee to Clark, 18 Jun

53, w/enc, ibid, 1197-99; Eisenhower indirectly quoted in memcon Gleason on 18 Jun 53

NSC mtg, [19 Jun 53], ibid, 1200; Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 448-51; Schnabel

and Watson, Korean War, pt 2:990-94, 999-1008; Kyung Cho Chung, Korea Tomorrow:

Land of the Morning Calm, 270-71,

54, Msg CINCUNC for JCS, 20 Jun 53, FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt 2: 1224-25,

55, Msg CINCUNC for JCS, 28Jun 53, FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt 2: 1280-82; memrcd [State], 3Jul

53, ibid, 1317-23; msg CINCUNC for JCS, 9 Jul 53, ibid, 1363-64, 1363n4; editorial note,

ibid, 1364-65; msg CINCUNC for JCS, 14 Jul 53, ibid, 1378-80: Schnabel and Watson,

Korean War, pt 2:1014-33: 1035-39; Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 470-72, 477,

482-84,

56, Msg CINCUNC for JCS, 17 Jul 53, FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt 2: 1402-03; Hermes, Truce Tent

and Fighting Front, 470-78,

57, Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 484-91; editorial note, FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt

2: 1403-04; editorial note, ibid, 1443-44; msg CINCUNC for JCS, 26 Jul 53, ibid, 1441; msg

CINCUNC for JCS, 27 Jul 53, ibid, 1442-43; David Rees, Korea: The Limited War, 430-33,

58, Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 2: 1053-56: Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front,

491-97,

59, Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 495-96; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt

2:1056-58,

60, Table P28, I, ProgRepts&Stats OASD(C), 4 Nov 54, OSD Hist; table 28,51, ProgRepts&Stats

OASD(C), 20 Apr 55, ibid,

61, For opposing views of US prisoner-of-war behavior, see Eugene Kinkead, In Every War But

One; William L. White, The CaptilJeS ofKorea: An Unofficial White Paper on the Treatment

of War Prisoners: Our Treatment of Theirs: Their Treatment of Ours; and Albert 0,

Biderman, March to Calumny: The Story of American POW's in the Korean War.

62, Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 2: 1055-59; Hermes, Truce lent and Fighting Front,

494-95, 497,

IX. FORMOSA: A REVERSAL OF POLICY

I, News conf, 5 Jan SO, Public Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States: Harry S, Truman,

1950 " (hereafter cited as Truman Public Papers with year), 11-12; memcon SecState,

5 Jan SO, US Dept State, Foreign Relations ofthe United States, 1950 (hereafter cited as FRUS

with year and volume number), VI:258-63; "The Legal Status of Formosa," The Economist

(8 July 1950), 66-67,

2, For views on Chiang's regime in China and later in Formosa, see Itr Min-Counselor USEmb

China to DirFE State, 12 Jun 48, FRUS 1948, Vl1:294-98; memcon Allen B, Moreland (State

rep w/Huber CongCte on FE tour), 5 Sep 49, FRUS 1949, IX:544-46; memo DirCA State for

ASecState(FE), 20 Oct 49, ibid, 558-61; memcon SecState, 5Jan SO, FRUS 1950, VI:258-63;

Itr SeeState to SecDef, 7 Mar SO, ibid, 316-17; memcon Dulles (Consultant to SecState), 25

May 50, ibid, 343-44,

3, Note Sidney W. Souers (ExecSeeNSC) to NSC, 1 Dec 48, w/memo JCS for SecDef, 24 Nov 48,

FRUS 1949, IX:261-62; memo Souers to NSC, 4 Apr 49, w/memo SecDef for ExecSecNSC, 2

Apr 49, ibid, 307-08; note by Souers, 22 Aug 49, w/memo JCS for SecDef, 17 Aug 49, ibid,

376-78,

4, Note Souers to NSC, 27 Dec 49, w/memo JCS for SecDef, 23 Dec 49, ibid, 460-61; memeon

SecState, 29 Dec 49, ibid, 463-67,
Notes to Pages 174-76 579

5. M~mcon S~cStat~, 29 D~c 49, FRlfS 1').i9, IX:46:\-67.

6. News conf, 5jan 50, Truman Public Papers, 1950, 11-12; not~ Leffingw~ll (OMA OSD), 17

jul 50, RG 330, CD 091.3 (MDAP China); Itr SecState to S~cDef, 14 Apr 50, ibid; int~rnal

m~mo [Douglas] MacArthur [III (RA State) for Rusk (AS~cStateFE), 5 May 50, RG :\:\0, CD :\:\7

(Four Powers); Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department,

357.

Memo [Gen] MacArthur, 14 jun 50, FRlJS 1950, VII: 161-65; msg Sebald (ActingPolAd japan)

for Acheson, 22 jun 50, ibid, 366-67; Richard P. Stebbins et ai, The United States in World

Affairs, 1950,43-61.

Msg USAmb USSR for SecState, 25 jun 50, FRUS 1950, VII: I :\9-40; memcon jessup (Amb at

Lge), 25 jun 50, ibid, 157-61; memconjessup, 26jun 50, ibid, 178-83; Robert H. Ferrell, ed,

Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman, 185; aide-memoire Acheson for

ChAmb US, I ju150, FRUS 1950, VII:276-77; msg S~bald for Ach~son, 7 ju150, FRUS 1950,

VI: 370; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 406, 408, 412.

Statement re Korea, 27 jun 50, Truman Public Papers, 1950, 492.

Ltr DepUSecState to ATSD(FMA&MA), :\ jul 50, w/summary of recent Chinese Communist

propaganda, RG :\:\0, CD 091.412; msg l:SAmb India for SecState, 5 lui 50, FRUS 1950,

VI:368-69; msg USAmb India for S~cState, 9 jul 50, ibid, :\71-73; msg LJSAmb USSR for

SecState, 12 jul 50, ibid, 374-75.

Memo Counselor State for SecState, 17 jul 50, FRlJS 1950, VI::\80-81; spl msg Pr~s to Cong,

19 jul 50, Truman Public Papers, 1950, 527-36 (531, quote).

Msg Bevin for Franks, 7 jul 50, FRUS 1950, VII:329-31; msg Douglas (USAmb UK) for

SecState, 8 jul 50, ibid, 331-32; msg SecState to USEmb UK, 10 jul 50, ibid, 347-51; msg

Douglas for SecState, 11 jul 50, ibid, 361-62; msg Kirk (USAmb USSR) for S~cState, 1:\ jul 50,

ibid, 370-71; memo McGhee (ASecStateNE) for SecStat~, 13 .lui 50, ibid, :\72-73; msg

Douglas for SecState, 14 .lui 50, ibid, 380-85

Memo SecDel' for SecArmy et ai, 12 .lui 50, RG ,BO, CD 210.681; memo SecNavy for SecDef,

1:\ .lui 50, ibid; intraoff memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for SecDef, 20 juI150), ibid; m~mo DirOMA

for ATSD(FMA&MA), 18 .lui 50, RG 330, CD 091.:\; Itr ATSD(FMA&MA) to ASecState(FE), 18

.lui 50, FRUS 1950, VI: 382; Itr SecDef to SecStat~, 19Jul 50, ibid, 383; Itr S~cState to SecDef,

24 jul 50, RG 330, CD 091.:\; memo SecDef for SecArmy et ai, 27 jul 51, ibid; mins 62d NSC

mtg, item 5, 27 .lui 50, Truman papers, President's Secretary's files:NSC (PSF:NSC), Harry S.

Truman Library, Independence, Mo; memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for S~c to jtSecs, :\ 1 .lui 50, RG

3:\0, CD 092.

Memo SecDel' for JCS, 14 .lui 50, RG 3:\0, CD 061.2; memo JCS for SecDef, 27 .luI 50, FRUS

1950, Vl:391-94.

Memo [ExecSecNSC) for Pres, 27 jul 50, Truman papers, PSF:NSC; memo Ex~cSecNSC for

NSC, 3 Aug 50, w/~nc, FRUS 1950, Vl:413-14; memo SecDef for SecArmy et ai, :\ Aug 50,

RG 330, CD 091.:\.

Ltr Pr~s to SecDef, 25 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 091.3; FRlJS 1950, Vl:414n4; memo ActingDepDirMDA State for DirOMA, 18 Sep 50, ibid, 508.

Memo ActingDepDirMDA State for DirOMA, 15 Sep 50, FRlJS 1950, VI:501-03; memo

DepDirMDA State for DirOMA, 31 Oct 50, ibid, 547-48; msg USChgc China [Formosa) to

SecState, 9 Nov 50, ibid, 552-53, 552n2; msg SecState for lJSEmb China [Formosal, 21 Nov

50, ibid, 579; memo Richard E. johnson (OCA State) for DirOCA, 8 Dec 50, w/annex, 7 Dec

50, ibid, 590-96; memo ACS G-3 for SecDef, 20 Dec 50, RG :\:\0, CD 092 (Formosa);

unsigned memo Army for DirEXOS OSD, 12 jan 51, ibid.

Memo SecDef for JCS, 6 jul 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Formosa); msg C58994 ClNCFE for JCS, 29

jul 50, ibid; msg SecState for USEmb China [Formosa), 7 jul 50, FRUS 1950, VJ:371.

19, Msg SecState for l!SChgc China [Formosa], 24 jul 50, FRlJS 1950, Vl:391; Itr SeeState to

SeeDef, 29 jul 50, ibid, 399-400; Itr SecDef to SecState, 2 Aug 50, ibid, '106; msg SecState for

USChge China [Formosa], 14 Aug 50, ibid, 4:H-3H.

8

9

10.

II.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.
580 Notes to Pages 176-79

20. Msg USChge China [Formosa) for SeeState, 10 Jul 50, ibid, 373-74, 374n3; Itr SeeDef to

SeeState, 17 Jul 50, ibid, 379-80; msg SeeState for USEmb China [Formosa), 22 Jul 50, ibid,

387; memo JCS for SeeDef, 21 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 092 (China); Itr SeeState to SeeDef, 29 Jul

50, FRUS 1950, VI:399-400; Itr SeeDef to SeeState, 2 Aug 50, ibid, 406; msg SeeState for

USEmb China [Formosa], 4 Aug 50, ibid, 419; Itr AetingSeeState to SeeDef, 28 Sep 50, ibid,

522-24, 524n3; msg SeeState for USEmb China [Formosa], 26 Oct 50, ibid, 541-42; Itr

SeeDef to SeeState, 15 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 092 (China).

21. Msg USChge China [Formosa) for SeeState, 14 Jul 50, FRUS 1950, V1:375, 375nl; msg

SeeState for USEmb China [Formosa], 21 Jul 50, ibid, 385; memo JCS for SeeDef, 28 Jul 50,

ibid, 401, 40ln I; memo JCS for SeeDef, 29 Jul 50, w/ene CINCH msg C58994, 29 Jul 50, RG

330, CD 092 (Formosa); Itr SeeDef to SeeState, 29 Jul 50, ibid; Itr SeeState to SeeDef, 31 Jul

50, FRUS 1950, VI:402-04, 404n2.

22. Two msgs USChge China [Formosa) for SeeState, botb 3 Aug 50, FRUS 1950, VI:41O-11,

411-12; msg AetinglJSPolAdJapan for SeeState, 3 Aug 50, ibid, 415; msg USChge China

[Formosa) for SeeState, 4 Aug 50, ibid, 416-17; Harry S. Truman, >ears of Trial and Hope,

vol II in Memoirs by Harry S. Truman (hereafter cited as Truman, Memoirs II), 354; Acheson,

Present at the Creation, 422.

23. Memo SeeArmy for SeeDef, 3 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Formosa); memo ExeeSee to SeeDef

for JCS, 3 Aug 50, ibid; memo JCS for SecDe[, 3 Aug 50, ibid; memo AetingExeeSee to SeeDef

for SJCS, 18 Nov 50, ibid; msg SeeDef for CINCH, 4 Aug 50, FRUS 1950, V1:423; msg

C1NCFE for SeeDer, 5 Aug 50, ibid, 423-24; mins 63d NSC mtg, item 2, 3 Aug 50, Truman

papers, PSF:NSC.

24. Msg USChge China [Formosa] for SeeState, 4 Aug 50, FRUS 1950, VI:416-17; extracts

memeon Harriman, 20 Aug 50, ibid, 427-30; msg JCS for CINCFE, 14 Aug 50, ibid, 439;

Truman, Memoirs II, 349-54.

25. Directive SeeDer for [CINCFE), 26 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Formosa); memo Battle (SplAsst

for SeeState), [26 Aug 50], w/annex, FRUS 1950, VI:453-60; memo SeeState for USeeState, 27

Aug 50, ibid, 460-62; memeon Rusk (ASeeStateH), 14 Oct 50, ibid, 533-34; Acheson,

Present at the Creation, 423-24; Truman, Memoirs II, 354-58.

26. Msg SeeState for lJSEmb China [Formosa], 14 Aug 50, FRUS 1950, VI:434-38, 450nl; msg

SeeState for USEmb China [Formosa], 31 Aug 50, ibid, 472; memeon DepUSeeState, 31 Aug

50, w/ene, ibid, 473-76; news eonf, 31 Aug 50, Truman Public Papers, 1950, 607.

27. Memo JCS for SeeDef, 8 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, VI:491-92; Itr SeeDer to SeeState, 11 Sep 50, RG

330, CD 092 (Formosa); Itr ActingSeeState to SeeDef, 13 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, VI:497.

28. For effect of Chinese Communist invasion of Tibet, see 3 msgs, USAmb India for SeeState, 31

Oct and 3 Nov 50, FRUS 1950, VI:545-47, 548-50, 550-51; Itr SeeState to SeeDef, 11 Nov

50, w/ene, ibid, 554-56; memo SeeDer for JCS, 15 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Formosa); Itr

SeeDef to SeeStatc, 15 Nov 50, FRUS 1950, VI:573-74.

29. Memo JCS for SeeDer, 21 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Formosa); Itr AetingSeeDef to SeeState,

24 Nov 50, FRUS 1950, VI:579-80; Itr SeeState to SeeDef, 4 Dec 50, ibid, 587-88; US Cong,

Senate, Ctes on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East:

Hearings, 82 Cong, I sess (1951), pt 1:337-38.

30. Mins 1st, 2d, 5th, and 6th Truman-Attlee talks, 4-8 Dec 50, FRUS 1950, VII: 1361-74,

1392-1408,1449-61,1468-79 (see particularly 1402-03, 1405-08, 1437, 1450-51, 1453,

1455, 1458, 1477); memeon Jessup (Amb at Lge), 7 Dec 50, ibid, 1435-42.

31. Memo SecDe[ for JCS, 20 Dec 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Formosa); memo JCS for SecDe[, 2 Jan

51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 2:1474-76.

32. Senate Ctes on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East:

Hearings, pt 1:331-33, 337; James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, The Korean War, vol

III in The History of the joint Chiefs of Staff The joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy,

pt 1:399-410.
Notes to Pages 179-82 581

33. Memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, w/memo JCS for SecDef, 12 Jan 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:70-72;

memo Rusk for SecState, 17 Jan 51, ibid, pt 2: 1514-17; memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 18 Jan

51, Truman papers, PSF;NSC.

34. Draft memo PPS State, [6 Feb 51), FRUS 1951, Vll, pt 2:1536-42, 1536n1; memrcd [PPS

Statej, 6 Feb 51, ibid, 1566-68; memo Rusk for Mercbant (DepASecStateFE), 7 Feb 51, ibid,

1569; msg C1NCFE for JCS, 23 Feb 51, ibid, 1579-81; msg ClNCFE for JCS, 24 Feb 51, ibid,

1582-83; msgJCS for CINCFE, 28 Feb 51, ibid, 1588; memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 17 Feb 59,

w/enc, OSD Hist.

35. Editorial note, FRUS 1951, Vll, pt 2:1639; testimony MacArthur, 3 May 51, Senate Ctes on

Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East: Hearings, pt 1:21,

22,24; "An Old Soldier Fades Away Into New Glory," Life (30 April 1951), 23-34.

36. Testimony Marshall, Senate Ctes on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Military Situation

in the Far East: Hearings, pt 1:323-25, 350-51, 368-69.

37. Memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 21 Mar 51, w/excerpts fromJCS study, 14 Mar 51, FRUS 1951.

Vll, pt 2:1598-1605; memo JCS for SecDer, w/enc study, 16 Mar 51, RG 330, CD 092

(Korea); msg C1NCFE for JCS, 23 Feb 51, FRUS 1951, Vll, pt 2:1579-81.

38. Memo [ExecSecNSC) for Pres, 3 May 51, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.

39. Memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 17 May 51, ibid; NSC 48/5 ExecSecNSC to NSC, 17 May 51,

w/annexes, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:33-63.

40. NSC 48/5 ExecSecNSC to NSC, 17 May 51, w/annexes, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:33-63; memcon

Merchant, 20 Apr 51, ibid, Vll, pt 2: 1641-43; memo DirPPS for SecState, 30 Apr 51, w/enc,

RG 59, SIP files, lot 64 D563, NSC 101 series; editorial note, FRUS 1951. Vll, pt 2:1671-72.

41. Msg Walter P. McConaughy (USConGen Hong Kong) for SecState, 8 Feb 51, FRUS 1951. Vll,

pt 2: 1571-73; msg Rankin (USChge China [Formosa]) for SecState, 19 Apr 51, ibid, 1637-39;

memcon Merchant, 20 Apr 51, ibid, 1641-43; msg 1068 USChge China [Formosal for

SecState, 10 Feb 51, RG 59, 793.001/2-1051.

42. Msg Nava1Attache USEmb China [Formosa) for CdrSeventhFleet, 11 Apr 51, FRUS 1951. Vll,

pt 2:1626-27; msg Acheson for USEmb China [Formosal, 25 Apr 51, ibid, 1648-51; memo

Barnett (OIC ChEconAff State) for Rusk, 3 Oct 51, ibid, 1816-27; memo Barnett for Rusk, 3

Oct 51, ibid, 1816-27; memcon [OFMA OSDI, 14 Nov 52, RG 330, CD 092 (China).

43. Msg ActingSecState for USEmb China [Formosa], 27 Feb 51, FRUS 1951. Vll, pt 2: 1584-85;

memo Cabot (DirISA State) for Scott (DirOMA OSD), 7 Mar 51, ibid, 1591; msg Rankin for

SecState, 20 Apr 51, ibid, 1640-41; 1tr Rankin to Rusk, 13 Aug 51, ibid, 1778-85; OMA Dept

Def, MDAP (Mutual Defense Assistance Program): Department of Defense Operations

(hereafter cited as MDAP: DoD Opns), Jul 51, 24, Jan 52, 2, OSD Hist; rept on NSC 128,

DefMbrSrNSCStf to :\ISC 128 Steering Cte, 13 Jun 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XIV:66-70. The

figure of "approximately $190 million" [$188.8 million) for FY 1952 was reached by

subtracting $71.2 million (FY 1951 military assistance) from FY 1951-52 total of $260

million.

44. Memcon Merchant, 28 Aug 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 2: 1793-94; rept on NSC 128 SrMSMbrNSCStf to NSC 128 Steering Cte, 28 May 52, FRUS 1952-1954. XIV, pt 1:54-59; memo

DirEXOS for Marshall, 20 Apr 51, w/notes signed "GCM," RG 330, CD 092 (Formosa);

MDAP: DoD Opns, Jan 52, 2, OSD Hist.

45. Memcon Merchant, 28 Aug 51, FRUS 1951, Vll, pt 2: 1793-94; memo Reuben E. Jenkins (ACS

G-3 Army) for DirOMA OSD, 16 Aug 51, w/rept, RG 330, CD 092 (Formosa); Itr Rankin to

Rusk, 13 Aug 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 2:1778-85.

46. Memcon C.B. Marshall (PPS State), 4 May 51, FRlfS 1951, Vll, pt 2: 1652-53; memcon C.B.

Marshall, 7 May 51, ibid, 1653-54; SE-5 [Intelligence Advisory ete], 22 May 51, w/apps, ibid,

1673-82; editorial note, ibid, 1716; NIE-32 [Intelligence Advisory ete], 10 Ju1 51, ibid,

1737-43; memo George Perkins (DepDirOCA State) for Merchant, 1 Aug 51, ibid, 1764-68;

Itr Rankin to Rusk, 13 Aug 51, ibid, 1778-85; msg McConaughy for SecState, 15 Aug 51, ibid,

\787-89; msg McConaughy for State, 13 Dec 51, ibid, 1869-71; memo DirPPS for K.C.
582 Notes to Pages 182-88

Krentz (BrFgnOff), 22 Jun 51, RG 59, SIP files, lot 64D563; Itr Smith (DCI) to SecDef, II Dec

51, RG 330, CD 092 (Formosa).

47. Memo JCS for SecDef, 24 Oct 51, FRUS 1951, Vll, pt 2: 1842-45; memo Nash (ATSD(1SA)) for

SecDef, [ca 28 Oct 51), RG 330, CD 092 (Formosa).

48. Ltr Lovett to Acheson, I Nov 51, FRUS 1951, Vll, pt 2:1841-45; Itr Hickerson (ASecState

(UNA) for Acheson) to Lovett, 7 Dec 51, wlpaper, ibid, 1858-64; ltr Walter B. Smith to Lovett,

II Dec 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Formosa); NSC 118/2 ExecSecNSC to NSC, 20 Dec 51, FRUS

1951, Vll, pt 1:1382-99.

49. Ltr Smith to Lovett, 30 Jan 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Formosa); memo JCS for SecDef, 4 Mar 52,

ibid; memo Nash for SecDef, 19 Mar 52, ibid; memo ActingSecDef for ExecSecNSC, 22 Mar

52, ibid.

50. Memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 3 Apr 52, Truman papers, PSF:NSC; draft memo by State re

State-JCS mtg, 9 Apr 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XIV, pt 1:31-42; memo State, Def, CIA

SrMbrsNSCStf for ExecSecNSC, 23 Apr 52, ibid, 45-46.

51. Msg Rankin for DeptState, II Apr 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XIV, pt I :42-43; memo SecDef (by

DepDirEXOS) for JCS, 29 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 092 (China); memo JCS for SecDef, 6 May 52,

FRUS 1952-1954, XIV, pt 1:48-49; ltr SecDef to SecState, 9 May 52, w/intraoff memos, RG

330, CD 092 (China); msg SecState for USEmb China [Formosa], 9 May 52, FRUS 1952-1954,

XIV:49-50.

52. Memrcd Fleischer (DepDirOLL), 19 Jun 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Formosa); memo DirEXOS for

SecDef, 17 Jul 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "NGRC-Formosa" folder; memo JCS for

SecDef, 5 Aug 52, ibid.

53. Memrcd Lovett, 7 Aug 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "NGRC-Formosa" folder; memrcd

[probably ATSD(lSA)], 14 Aug 52, ibid; memo State re State-Def mtg, 19 Aug 52, FRUS

1952-1954, XIV, pt 1:88-94.

54. Memo SecDef for JCS, 23 Aug 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "NGRC-Formosa" folder;

memo ExecSecNSC for Pres, 24 Sep 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt 1:537-38.

55. Msg Rankin for DeptState, 27 Oct 52, FRUS 1952-/954, XIV: 113; msg Rankin for DeptState,

8 Dec 52, ibid, I 17-18; memo ASecState(FE) for Dulles (SecState-Designate), 24 Dec 52, ibid,

118-20; memo Dulles for Eisenhower (Pres-Elect), 2 Jan 53, ibid, 125-26.

56. MDAP: DoD Opns, Jan 52, 22, Jul 52, 22, Jan 53, 25, OSD Hist.

57. State of Union msg Pres to Cong, 2 Feb 53, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United

States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, /953 ... , 16-17; Walter S. Poole, 1950-1952, vol IV in

The History of the joint Chiefs of Staff: The joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy,

409-10; Byron Fairchild et ai, 1957-/960, vol Vll in The History ofthe joint Chiefs ofStaff:

The joint Chiefs ofStaff and National Policy, 669-95.

X. JAPAN: A NEW RELATIONSHIP

1. Lovett is indirectly cited in memcon C.A. Sullivan (OFMA OSD), 20 Aug 52, US Dept State,

Foreign Relations of the United States, /952-1954 (hereafter cited as FRUS with year and

volume number), XIV, pt 2:1314-16

2. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My li?ars in the State Department, 428; Robert

Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 343; Steven L. Rearden, The Formative li?ars, 1947-

/950, vol I in History ofthe Office ofthe Secretary ofDefense, 244; John Gunther, The Riddle

ofMacArthur: japan, Korea and the Far East, 226-31.

3. On the question of the Japanese peace treaty, see FRUS /947, VI:446ff; for General

MacArthur's views, see msg Atcheson (PoiAd Japan) for SecState, 21 Mar 47, ibid, 452-53,

and memo MacArthur, 21 Mar 47, ibid, 454-56; Shigeru Yoshida, The Yoshida Memoirs: The

Story ofjapan in Crisis, 245; John M. Allison, Ambassador from the Prairie or Allison

Wonderland, 141, 154.
Notes to Pages 188-91 583

4. Rept NSC 13/3, 6 May 49, FRUS 1949, VII, pt 2:730-36.

5. Note ExecSecNSC to NSC, 15 Jun 49, w/rept JCS [9 Jun 49), ibid, 77 3-77. For an account of

Japan under u.s. occupation and consideration of a Japanese peace treaty between 1947 and

1950, sec Rearden, The Formative lears, 244-55.

6. Ltr SecDef to SecState, 23 Dec 49, w/memo JCS for SecDcf, 22 Dec 49, FRUS 1949, VII, pt

2:922-23; memcon Hamilton (FE), 24 Dec 49, ibid, 924-46; memo ExecSeeNSC for NSC, 30

Dec 49, w/enc, ibid, 1215-20; memcon Howard (SpecAsst to SecState), 24 Apr 50, FRUS

1950, VI: 1175-82; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 430-31.

7. Memo SCAP, 14 Jun 50, FRUS 1950, VI: 1213-21; memo Dulles (Consultant to SecState), 30

Jun 50, ibid, 1229-30; memo SCAP, 23 Jun 50, ibid, 1227-28.

8. Msg ActingUSPolAd Japan for SecState, 27 Jun 50, ibid, 1228-29; Acheson, Present at the

Creation, 432; Frederick S. Dunn et ai, Peace-Making and the Settlement with japan,

96-97.

9. Memo Burns (ATSD(FMA&MA)) for SecDef, 7 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 387 Oapan); memo Dulles

for SecState, 19 Jul 50, FRUS 1950, VI: 1243-44, 1244n1; memcon SecState, 24 Jul 50, ibid,

1255; Itr SecState to SeeDef, 1 Aug 50, w/draft treaty, RG 330, CD 388 (Gen).

10. Johnson is directly quoted in memo re tclecon Dulles, 3 Aug 50, FRUS 1950, VI: 1264-65.

11. Allison, Ambassador from the Prairie, 149-50; FRUS 1950, V1:1273n2; memo W.].

Sheppard (DepDirExecSect State) for w.G. Hackler (FE), 21 Aug 50, ibid, 1276; memo

SeeState for Jessup, w/memo JCS for SecDef, 22 Aug 50, ibid, 127H-H2.

12. Memo JCS for SeeDef, 22 Aug 50, FRUS 1950, VI: 127H-82.

13. Memo SecState for Amb at Lge, 22 Aug 50, ibid, 1278; memo DirNA for SeeState, 29 Aug 50,

ibid, 1288-90; memo MajGen Carter B. Magruder for SecDef, 30 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 388

(General); memo Magruder for SecDef, 6 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 3Hl (General); memo DirNA for

SeeState, 4 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, VI:1290-93; ltr SecState to SecDef, 7 Sep 50, w/enc, ibid,

1293-96; memo JCS for SecDef, 7 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 381 (General); Itr SecDef to Pres, 7

Sep 50, ibid; Allison, Ambassadorfrom the Prairie, 150; Acheson, Present at the Creation,

434

14. Ltr U.A. Johnson (DepDirA) to Sebald (ActingUSPolAd Japan), 14 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, VI:

1303-04; memo SecState and SecDef for Pres, 7 Sep 50, ibid, 1293-96.

15. Memo Pres for SecDef, 8 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 3H70apan); news conf, 14 Sep 50, Public

Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950 . . . (hereafter cited

as Truman Public Papers with year), 637-40; four memos Magruder for SecDcf, 30 Sep 50

and 17, 23, 30 Oct 50, all in RG 330, CD 387 Oapan). For the "vigorous" reactions of other

countries, including the Soviet Union, to the treaty draft, sec Allison, Ambassadorfrom the

Prairie, 151-53.

16. Memo Burns (ATSD(FMA&MA)) for SecDef, 7 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 387 Oapan); Walter S.

Poole, 1950-1952, vol IV in The History ofthejoint Chiefs ofStafI Thejoint Chiefs qfStaff

and National Policy, 447; Dunn, Peace-Making, 107-13.

17. Ltr SecState to SecDef, 13 Dec 50, w/paper, 13 Dec 50, FRUS 1950, VI: 1363-67.

18. Msg CINCFE for DeptArmy (for JCS), 2H Dec 50, ibid, 13H3-85, 1385nl; msg CINCFE for

JCS, 4Jan 51, FRUS 195/, VI, pI 1:7HO-HI.

19. Repl 2180/2 JSSC to JCS, 28 Dec 50, w/drafl memo .JCS for SecDef, FRUS 1950, VI: 1385-92;

msg SecState for USPolAdJapan, 3 Jan 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pI 1:778-79.

20. Memo AClingDirNA, 6.Jan 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pI 1:7H4-H6, 784n2; llr SecSlate to SecDef, 9

Jan 51, w/memo for Pres and draft llr Pres to Dulles, 110 Jan 511, ibid, 787-89, 787n2,

788n3; memo DepSJCS for AClingExecSec OSD, 9 Jan 51, RG 330, CD 387 Oapan).

21. Ltr Pres to Dulles, [10 .Jan 51j, FRl/S 1951, VI, pI 1:788-89, 788n3; Itr Allison (Dep to

Consultant to SecState) to USPolAd SCAP, 19 Jan 51, ibid, 805-07, 806nl; memo Robert A.

Fearey (NA), [7 Feb 511, ibid, H63-66; Itr Dulles to SecState, 6 Mar 51, RG 330, CD 387

Oapan); Allison, Ambassadorfrom the Prairie, 15·].
584 Notes to Pages 191-94

22. Memo JCS for SeeDef, 29 Jan 51, RG 330, CD 092 Oilpan); memo JCS for SeeDef, 29 Jan 51,

w/note DepDirEXOS to DirEXOS, 26 Feb 51, ibid; memo DirEXOS for SeeDef, 23 Feb 51,

ibid; memo DepSeeDef for ChJCS, 23 Feb 51, ibid; Poole, 1950-1952, 452.

23 Memo Fearey, [nd, ea 6 Feb 51 J, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:861-63; memo Fearey, [7 Feh 51], ihid,

863-66; memeon CSPolAd SCAP, 10 Feb 51, ibid, 873-74; Itr Dulles to SeeState w/annexes,

10 Feb 51, ibid, 874-80; Yoshida, Yoshida Memoirs, 174, 250-51; Allison, Ambassador

from the Prairie, 156-57.

24. Memeon Fearey, 7 Feb 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:866-69; hr Dulles to SeeState, 10 Feh 51,

annex lll, ibid, 876.

25. Memo Baheoek for Earl D. Johnson (ASeeArmy), 26 Feh 51, RG 330, CD 387 Oapan); memo

Fearey, 17 Feb 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:169-72; draft treaty, 17 Feh 51, ihid, 172-75; memo

Fearey, 17 Feh 51, ibid, 885-87; hr Dulles to FW. Doidge (NZMinExternaIAffs), 18 Feb 51,

ibid, 175-76; Itr Dulles to MacArthur, 2 Mar 51, ibid, 176-78; hr SeeState to SeeDef, 5 Apr

51, w/draft memo for Pres, ibid, 183-85.

26. Ltr SeeState to SeeDef, 5 Apr 51, w/draft memo for Pres, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:183-85; hr

SeeState to SeeDef, 6 Apr 51, w/ene, ibid, 187-89.

27. Memo JtSees for SeeDef, 10 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 387 Oapan); memo JCS for SeeDef, 11 Apr

51, ibid; Itr SeeDef to SeeState, 13 Apr 51, ibid; memo Dulles for SeeState, 13 Apr 51, FRUS

1951, VI, pt 1:202-04; statement Pres, 18 Apr 51, Truman Public Papers, 1951,234-35.

28. Memo Dulles, 12 Apr 51, FRUS 1')51, VI, pt 1:972-76; memeon Allison, 12 Apr 51, ihid,

977-79, 979n 1; Yoshida, Yoshida Memoirs, 45-46, 244-48; Dunn, Peace-Making, 136.

29. Ltr SeeDefto SeeState, 19 Apr 51, w/memoJCS for SeeDef, 17 Apr 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt

1:989-93, 992n5; msg USPolAd SCAP for SeeState (for Rusk and Allison), 22 Apr 51, ibid,

IO03-06; memo ASeeArmy for SeeDet', 24 Apr 51. RG 330, CD 387 Oapan); memo Dulles for

SeeState, 25 Apr 51, w/memo of meeting, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:1019-21.

30. Ltr DepUSeeState to ATSD(ISA), 27 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 387 Oapan); memo ASeeArmy for

ATSD(ISA), 2 May 5 I, ibid; msg DA 90239 DeptArmy for SCAP, 3 May 51, ibid; Itr [msg]

ClNCFE to SeeDef, 6 May 51, ihid; hr [msg] SeeDef to [CINCFE], 8 May 51, ibid; memo JCS

for SeeDet', 14 May 5 I, ihid.

31. Memred K.T. Young (Asst to AetingDirOFMA), 16 May 51, ihid; memo Young for Carter

(DirEXOS), 17 May 51, ibid; memo Young for DirEXOS, 18 May 51, ibid; hr SeeDef to

SeeState, 18 May 51, ihid.

32. Memo Young for DirEXOS, 18 May 51, ibid; Itr SeeState to SeeDef, 22 May 51, ihid; Itr SeeDef

to SeeState, 28 Jun 51, RG 330, CD 092 Oapan); Itr SeeState to SeeDef, 16 Jul 51, RG 330, CD

387 Oapan); memo JCS for SeeDef, 17 Aug 51, ibid; Itr AetingSeeDef to SeeState, 24 Aug 51,

ihid.

33. Editorial note, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:1003; memeon Allison, 12 Apr 51, ihid, 977-79; art 4,

Jt US-UK Draft Peace Treaty, [3 MaYl1951, ibid, 1026; msg USAmb UK for SeeState, 5 Jun 51,

ibid, 1106-07; William J. Sebald, with Russell Brines, With MacArthur inJapan: A Personal

History of the Occupation, 266-67.

34. Jt US-UK Draft Peace Treaty, [3 May] 195 I, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:1024-39; editorial note, ibid,

1021-22; rev US-UK draft Japanese peace treaty, 14 Jun 51, ibid, 1119-33; hr Dulles to

SecDef, 15 Jun 51, RG 330, CD 387 Oapan); msg USPolAd SCAP for SeeState, 23 Jun 51, FRUS

1')51, VI, pt I: 114 1-42; memcon ThirdSee USMission Japan, 25 Jun 51, ibid, 1143-46;

Sehald, With MacArthur inJapan, 266-67; Allison, Ambassadorfrom the Prairie, 164-66.

35. Ltr Dulles to SeeDer. 15 Jun 51, RG DO, CD 387 Oapan); Itr SecDef to SeeState, 28 Jun 51,

w/memo JCS for SeeDef, 26 Jun 51, FRUS 1')51, VI, pt 1: 1155-59; Itr SeeState to SeeDet', 28

Jun 51, RG 330, CD 387 Oapan); memo SeeState for Pres, 28 Jun 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt

1: 1159-61; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 541.

36. Memo SeeState for Pres, 28 Jun 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1: 1159-61, 1161n3; Lovett indirectly

quoted in memcon SecState, 29 Jun 51, ihid, 1163-64: Acheson, Present at the Creation,

541.
Notes to Pages 194-98 585

37. Memo JCS for SecDef, 11 Jul 51, RG 330, CD 387 (Japan); ltr ActingSecDef to SecState, 13 Jul

51, w/enc [excerpt], FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:1192-94; editorial note, ibid, 1266; memcon

DepDirExecSect State, 13 Aug 51, ibid, 1266-67; Allison, Ambassador from the Prairie,

167; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 541-42.

38. Draft agreement, 5 Feb 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:856-57; Itr Dulles to SecDef, 10 Jul 51,

w/draft treaty, 10 Jul 51, ibid, 1186-88; draft treaty, 31 Jul 51, ibid, 1233-34.

39. Memo JCS for SecDef, 17 Jul 51, w/annex, RG 330, CD 387 (Japan).

40. Memcon Asst to ActingDirOFMA, 23 Jul 51, RG 330, CD 300-1-1; Itr SecState to SecDef, 24

Ju151, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:1223-24, 1223nl; Itr ActingSecDefto SecState, 11 Aug 51, ibid,

1256-57.

41. Memo Henderson (Of[Counse! OSD) for ASD(L&L), 13 Aug 51, RG 330, CD 387 (Japan); Itr

James E. Webb (ActingSecState) to SecDef, 15 Aug 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:1272-73; memo

Dulles for USecState, 10 Sep 51, ibid, 1344-47.

42. Ltr ActingSecDefto SecState, 22 Aug 51, w/memoJCS for SecDef, 8 Aug 51, FRUS 1951, VI,

pt 1: 1281-84 and notes.

43. Ltr ActingSecDef to SecState, 22 Aug 51, w/enc, ibid, 1281-83; memo Allison for Rusk, 22

Aug 51, ibid, 1285-88; memo Dulles for USecState, 10 Sep 51, ibid, 1344-47.

44. Memo JCS for SecDef, 9 Jul 51, RG 330, CD 387 (Japan); Itr SecDef to SecState, 20 Jul 51, ibid;

Acheson, Present at the Creation, 541, 687-88.

45. Memo JCS for SecDef, 6 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Philippines); statement Pres, 18 Apr 51,

Truman Public Papers, 1951,234-35; memo ChJCS for ATSD(ISA), 16 Aug 51, with third

draft presidential address, Dulles, I Aug 51, RG 330, CD 387 (Japan); Itr SecState to SecDef,

2 Aug 51, ibid; memo DepDirEXOS for JCS, 2 Aug 51, ibid; Allison, Ambassador from the

Prairie, 166-67.

46. Memo JtSecs for SecDef, 8 Aug 51, RG 330, CD 387 Uapan); memo JCS for SecDef, 8 Aug 51,

ibid; Itr Dulles to SecDef, 9 Aug 51, ibid; memo Asst to DirOFMA for DepSecDef, 10 Aug 51,

ibid; memo ChJCS for DepSecDcf, 10 Aug 51, ibid.

47. Third draft presidential address, Dulles, 1 Aug 51, ibid; memo ChJCS for ATSD(ISA), 16 Aug

51, ibid; memo Asst to DirOFMA for ATSD(ISA), 27 Aug 51, ibid; memo DirJtStfOJCS for

ATSD(ISA), 29 Aug 51, ibid.

48. Memo Asst to DirOFMA for ATSD(ISA), 27 Aug 51, ibid; address Pres, 4 Sep 51, Truman

Public Papers, 1951, 504-08

49. Ltr ASecState(FE) to Sen H. Alexander Smith, I Apr 52, FRllS 1952-1954, XIV, pt 2:1223-24;

memo ATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 13 Aug 51, RG 330, CD 387 (Japan).

50. Richard Goold-Adams, john Foster Dulles: A Reappraisal, 50-52; Yoshida, Yoshida Memoirs, 256; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 542-50; Allison, Ambassadorfrom the Prairie,

163,168-72; editorial note, FRUS 1951, VI, pt I:I.B9

51. Memo DepDirEXOS for ChJCS et ai, 31 Aug 51. w/memo SecState for Pres, 30 Aug 51, RG

330, CD 38"7 (Japan); msg SecState for ActingSecState, 6 Sep 51, FRllS 1951, VI, pt

1: 1334-35; memo Marshall for Bradley, 7 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 387 (Japan), For Nash's

presence in San Francisco, see Itr Dulles to USecState, 10 Sep 51, FRllS 1951, VI, pt

I: 1344-47, especially 1346.

52. Ltr Dulles to USecState, 10 Sep 51. FRllS 1951, VI, pt 1: 1344-47; Allison. Ambassadorfrom

the Prairie. 161-62; Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 346-47.

53. Ltr SecDef to SecState, 28Jun 51. w/memoJCS for SecDef, 26Jun 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt

1: 1155-59; memcon CINClJNC, 14 Dec 51, Ridgway interview file, OSD Hist; memrcd

Dulles, 9 Jan 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XIV, pt 2:1075-77; memcon Allison (ActingASecState(FE)), 10 Jan 52, ibid, 1077-80; msg SecState for USEmb ROC [Formosa], 15 Jan 52, ibid,

1087; Goold-Adams, john Foster Dulles, 45-46; Leon D. Epstein, Britain-Unea,)' All)',

228-29; Howard Schonberger, "Peacemaking in Asia: The United States, Great Britain, and

the Japanese Decision to Recognize Nationalist China, 195 I-52," Diplomatic History

(Winter 1986), 59-73.
586 Notes to Pages 198-200

54. Ltr PM Japan to Dulles, 24 Dec 51, FRlfS 1951, VI, pt I: 1466-67; Acheson, Present at the

Creation, 603-05.

55. Ltr USPolAdv SCAP to SeeState, 9 Oct 51, w/ltr PM Japan to USGovt, 7 Oct 51, FRlfS 1951,

VI, pt I: 1374-75, 1375n3; UP press dispatch, 3 Nov 51, quoted in msg C56512 CINCFE for

JCS, 3 Nov 51, RG 330, CD 092 Oapan); Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with

History, 237-38.

56. Memo JCS for SecDef, 9 Nov 51, w/msg C56512 ClNCFE for ]CS, 3 Nov 51, RG 330, CD 092

Oapan); ltr DepUSecState to AetingSecDef, 14 Nov 51, ibid; memo Asst to DirOFMA for

Underwood (Exec to ATSD(ISA», 19 Nov 51, ibid; interaff memo DepATSD(ISA) for SeeDef,

21 Nov 51, ibid; ltr AetingSeeDef to DepUSecState, 23 Nov 51, ibid.

57. Memo Dulles for USecState, 10 Sep 51, FRlfS /95/, VI, pt 1:1344-47; memo Dulles for

ASeeState(FE), 22 Oct 51, ibid, 1380-81; memo JCS for SeeDef, 14 Jan 52, RG 330, CD 387

Oapan); memo ASecState(FE) for SeeState, 9 Feb 52, FRlfS 1952-1954, XIV, pt 2:1147-49.

58. Memo SeeState and SeeDef for Pres, 18 Jan 52, w/draft [extract], FRUS 1952-/954, XIV, pt

2:1095-1102; memeon SecState, 22 Jan 52, w/attach, ibid, 1110-12; memo [SeeState] and

AetingSecDef for Pres, 26 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 387 Oapan).

59. Memo Kreps (DepDirEXOS) for SecArmy et ai, 29 Jan 52, RG 330, CD 387 Oapan); memo

[SeeState] and ActingSecDef for Pres, 26 Feb 52, ibid; memo ASecArmy for SeeDef, 4 Mar 52,

ibid.

60. Memo JCS for SeeDef, 16 Nov 5 I, ibid; ltr AetingSeeDef to SeeState, 14 Dec 51, ibid; memo

JCS for SeeDef, 14 Jan 52, ibid; memo SeeState and SeeDef for Pres, 18Jan 52, w/draft, FRlfS

1952-1954, XIV, pt 2: 1095-1102; memo ASeeState(FE) for SeeState, 9 Feb 52, ibid, 1147-49.

61. Msg CX63132 Rusk for SeeState, 8 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 387 Oapan); memeon Niles W. Bond

(Counselor USMission Japan), 18 Feb 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XIV, pt 2: 1175-79; msg C63919

ASecArmy for ATSD(ISA), 19 Feb 52, cables files, OSD Hist; memo JCS for SecDef, 20 Feb 52,

RG 330, CD 387 Oapan); memo [SeeState] and ActingSecDef for Pres, 26 Feb 52, ibid; memo

ASecArmy for SeeDef, 4 Mar 52, ibid.

62. Memo State re State-JCS mtg, 6 Feb 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XIV, pt 2: 1133-34; msg SeeDeffor

ASeeArmy, 7 Feb 52, quoted in ibid, 1132n2; editorial note, ibid, 1216-17; memo DirOFMA

for DepSeeDef, 23 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 387 Oapan); Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors,

339; Mark W. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, 132-33.

63. Memo, Acting SeeState and SeeDef for Pres, w/enes, 15 Feb 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XIV, pt

2: 1159-65.

64. Ltr AetingASecState(FE) to ATSD(ISA), 7 Feb 52, w/enc, ibid, 1138-40; memo ActingSecState

and SeeDef for Pres, 15 Feb 52, w/encs, ibid, 1159-65; ltr ActingSeeState to DepSeeDef, 15

Feb 52, RG 330, CD 387 Oapan); memo Pres for ActingSeeState and SeeDef, 20 Feb 52, ibid;

interoff memo DirOFMA for DepDirEXOS, 28 May 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Far East); memo C.A.

Sullivan (lSA) for ATSD(ISA), 10 Jun 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Japan" folder,

National Archives, Washington, DC; memo DirNA to ASeeState(FE), 10 Jun 52, FRUS

1952-1954, XIV, pt 2:1271-72; memo JCS for SeeDef, 28 Jul 52, ibid, 1289-90; notes

[extract] of SecState stfmtg, SM N-55, 5 Aug 52, ibid, 1295-96.

65. Memo DepASeeState(E) for AetingSeeState, 6 Aug 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XIV, pt 2: 1298-

1300; note ExecSeeNSC for NSC, 7 Aug 52, w/rept NSC 125/2, ibid, 1300-08.

66. Note ExecSecNSC for NSC, 7 Aug 52, w/rept NSC 125/2, FRUS 1952, XIV, pt 2:1300-08.

67. Ibid; memo Dulles for USecState, 10 Sep 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt I: 1344-47; memcon State re

State-JCS mtg, 2 Apr 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XIV, pt 2: 1224-27; memo Smith (DirOFMA OSD)

for ATSD(ISA), 2 Apr 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Japan" folder; memo JCS for

SecDef, 15 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 092 Oapan); memo DepSeeDef for SecArmy et ai, 29 Aug 52,

ibid; Itr DepSecDefto SeeState, 29 Aug 52, w/encs, FRUS 1952-1954, XIV, pt 2:1318-19; Itr

AetingSecDef to SeeState, I Oct 52, RG 330, CD 092 Oapan); memo DirNA for ASecState(FE),

12Jan 53, FRlfS 1952-1954, XIV, pt 2:1376-78; memo ASecState(FE) for SecState, 18 Mar

53, ibid, 1397-1400.
Notes to Pages 201-02 587

68. Memred Asst to DirOFMA OSD, 15 Feb 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan); memo ASeeState(FE) for

AetingSeeState, 22 Feb 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:888-95; Yoshida, Yoshida Memoirs, 191.

69. Ltr SeeDef to SeeState, 15 Feb 51, w/draft memo SeeDef for Pres, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan);

memo ASeeState(FE) for AetingSeeState, 22 Feb 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:888-95; interoff

memo ATSD(ISA) for SeeDef, 23 Apr 51, w/ltr SeeDef to SeeState, 26 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 092

(Japan); memo ASeeState(FE) for SeeState, [2 Mar 53, FRUS 1952-1954, XIV, pt 2:1392-94;

Yoshida, Yoshida Memoirs, 182-84, 186.

70. Memo JCS for SeeDef, 9 Feb 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:884-85; memred Asst to DirOFMA OSD,

15 Feb 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan); memo ATSD(ISA) for SeeDef, 14 Feb 51, ibid; ltr SeeDef

to SeeState, 15 Feb 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:884; ltr AetingSeeState to SeeDef, 1 Mar 51, ibid,

898-900; memo JCS for SeeDef, 28 Mar 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan); Itr SeeDef to SeeState,

20 Apr 51, w/draft ltr, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:1001; ltr SeeDefto Pres, 1 May 51. RG 330, CD

092 (Japan); memo Pres for SeeDef, 3 May 51, ibid.

71. Memo CoSUSA for ATSD(1SA), 17 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan); memo ATSD(ISA) for

SeeDef, lea 18 Apr 51), ibid; Itr SeeState to SeeDef, 30 Apr 51, ibid; memo CounselOMA for

DirOMA OSD, 29 Jan 52, RG 330, [SA files, Nash papers, "Japan" folder.

72. MemoJCS for SeeDef, 14 Sep 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:1349-50; Itr SeeDefto SeeState, 19 Sep

51, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan); Itr AetingSeeState to SeeDcf, 28 Sep 51, ibid.

73. Memo JCS for SeeDef, 29 Oct 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan); ltr SeeDef to SeeState, 6 Nov 51,

ibid; memo DepDirNA for ASeeState(FE), 8 Nov 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:1395-97; ltr

AetingSeeState to AetingSeeDef, 29 Nov 51, ibid, 1418-19; memo AetingSeeDef for JCS, 5

Dee 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan).

74. Memo AetingSeeDef for JCS, 8 Nov 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan); memo JCS for SeeDcf, 2 Nov

51, ibid; memoJCS for SeeDef, 12 Dee 51, ibid; memoJCS for SeeDef, 17 Dee 51, RG 330,

CD 471.6 (Atomic Energy); memo AetingSeeDef for SeeState, 3 [ Dee 51, ibid.

75. Msg DA 89795 CoSUSA for ClNCFE, 17 Dec 5 [, OJCS files; disposition form DepACoS G-4

Pgms to CompArmy, 19 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan); msg C59752 C1NCFE for JCS, 20

Dee 51, Condit file, OSD Hist; msg DA 90318 CoSl!SA for C[NCFE, 22 Dee 51, OJCS files.

76. Memo Haydoek (OASD(L&L» for DepGenCounseI, 4 Apr 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers,

"Japan" folder; disposition form DepACoS G-4 Pgms to CompArmy, 19 Mar 52, RG 330, CD

092 (Japan).

77. Ltr DMS to SeeDef, 20 Mar 52, RG 330, [SA files, Nash papers, "Japan" folder; memo Samuel

Efron (AGenCounsel) OASD(L&L) for DepGenCounsei and DirOLS OASD(L&L), 8 Apr 52,

ibid; memo Efron for ASD(L&L), [1 Ju[ 52, ibid, "Brief for Mr. Nash, OMA Activities

folder; msg C51823 C[NCFE, 12 Ju[ 52, quoted in memo JCS for SeeDe!", 21 Ju[ 52, RG 330,

CD 092 (Japan); msg SeeState for lTSEmb Japan, 29 Ju[ 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XIV, pt

2:1291-92.

78. Memo ASD(L&L) for DirOFMA, 23 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan); memred ASD(L&L), 25Jul

52, ibid; memo Smith (AetingATSD([SA)) for SeeDef, 25 Jul 52, ibid; Itr DepSeeDef to Pres, 29

Ju[ 52, w/handwritten note, "Approved 7/31152 Harry S Truman," ibid; memo DepSeeDef for

JCS, 4 Aug 52, ibid; msg USAmb Japan for State, [4 Aug 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XIV, pt

2: 1313-14.

79. Ltr SeeDef to Pres, 29 ,lui 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan); memeon C. A. Sullivan (OFMA OSD),

20 Aug 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XIV, pt 2:1314-16; Itr CINCH: to USeeArmy, 30 Sep 52, RC;

330, CD 092 (Korea).

80. Memo JCS for SeeDef, 28 Ju[ 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan); NSC 125/2 par 7b(2), quoted in

briefing paper [OMA OSDJ for ATSD(ISA), [ea 14 Oet 52), HG 330, ISA files, Nash papers,

"OMA Briefing File " folder; msg 920166 JCS for ClNCFE, 3 Oet 52, OJCS files.

81. Msg SeeState for USEmb Japan, 29Jul 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XIV, pt 2: 1291-92; Itr SeeDef to

Pres, 29Ju[ 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan); memo ASeeState(FE) for SeeState, 12 Mar 53, FRlfS

1952-1954, XIV, pt 2:1392-94; Yoshida, Yoshida Memoirs, 187.

82. Yoshida, Yoshida Memoirs, 187; msg CX58 128 C1NCFE for JCS, 31 Oet 52, OJCS files; Isaae

Shapiro, "The Flap Over Japan's Security," Wall Street.!ournal (27 May 51).
588 Notes to Pages 203-08

83. Memo ]CS for SecDef, 13 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 092 Oapan); Itr SecDef to SecState, 26 Apr 51,

ibid; Itr SecDef to Pres, 28 Aug 51, w/handwritten note, "Apvd/Aug 29, 1951/Harry S

Truman," FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:1330-31, 1331nl; interoff memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 31

Aug 5 I, w/ltr SecDef to SecState, 4 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 092 Oapan); Poole, 1950-1952, 474.

84. Ltr ActingSecDef to SecState, 17 ]uI52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "]apan" folder; memo

ASecState(FE) for SecState, 12 Mar 53, FRUS 1952-1954, XIV, pt 2:1392-94; Yoshida,

Yoshida Memoirs, 187-88; Poole, 1950-1952, 474.

85. Memo ]CS for SecDef, 12 Dec 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:1432-36; msg 920166 ]CS for

CINCFE, 3 Oct 52, O]CS files; msg CX58128 CINCFE for ]CS, 31 Oct 52, ibid.

86. Memo ]CS for SecDef, 7 Nov 52, RG 330, CD 381 (General); msg 923816 ]CS for CINCFE, 14

Nov 52, O]CS files; msg C58941 CINCFE for ]CS, 18 Nov 52, ibid; msg USAmb]apan for State,

12 Jan 53, FRUS 1952-1954, XIV, pt 2: 1378-79.

87. Msg ]CS for CINCFE, 10 Mar 53, FRUS 1952-1954, XIV, pt 2: 1390-92.

88. Memcon [excerpt] CINCFE, 26 Mar 52, ibid, 1218; memo ASecState(FE) for SecState, 7 Apr

52, ibid, 1230-33; rept ASecState(FE) [extract], [5 Dec 52], ibid, 1365-68; editorial note,

ibid, 1383-84; msg USAmb Japan for State, 13 Feb 53, ibid, 1384-86; Yoshida, Yoshida

Memoirs, 191-92.

89. Msg SecState for USEmb]apan, 12 Mar 53, FRUS 1952-1954, XIV, pt 2:1394-97; Yoshida,

Yoshida Memoirs, 195.

90. Indirectly quoted in memcon C. A. Sullivan (OFMA OSD), [20 Aug 52], FRUS 1952-1954,

XIV, pt 2:1314-16.

XI. INDOCHINA: THE THREAT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

1. Rept State to NSC, 27 Feb 50, w/draft rept NSC 64, 27 Feb 50, US Dept State, Foreign

Relations ofthe United States, 1950 (hereafter cited as FRUS with year and volume number),

VI:744-47; memo ActingASecState(FE) for SecState, 7 Mar 50, w/memo DepASecState(FE) for

ASecState(FE), 7 Mar 50, ibid, 749-51; ltr DepUSecState to ATSD(FMA&MA), 7 Mar 50, ibid,

752. The Indochina war is variously dated from the French bombardment of Haiphong,

which left 6,000 dead on 23 November 1946, or from 19 December 1946, when Ho made

a surprise attack on the French.

2. Memo ]CS for SecDef, 10 15?] Apr 50, Dept Defense, comp, United States-Vietnam

Relations, 1945-1967 (hereafter cited as US- Vietnam Relations with volume number), H

Cte print (1971), VIII:308-13.

3. Briefing paper [DefRepSrNSCStf], "Item I, Current Situation in the Far East," 28 ]un 50, RG

218, CCS 334 NSC (9-25-47).

4. Memo ]CS for SecDef, 2 May 50, US-Vietnam Relations, VIIl:315-17; briefing paper ]CS for

SecDef, 2 May 50, ibid, 318-20; briefing paper [DefRepSrNSCStf], "Item 1, Current Situation

in the Far East," 28 ]un 50, RG 218, CCS 334 NSC (9-25-47).

5. Memo SecState for Pres, 17 Apr 50, FRUS 1950, VI:785-86; memo DirOMA OSD for

DirMDAP State, 19 Apr 50, ibid, 787-89; Itr Pres to SecState, 1 May 50, ibid, 791; msg

SecState for USEmb UK, 3 May 50, ibid, 792; rept USecState to ExecSecNSC, 15 Mar 51, FRUS

1951, VI, pt 1:397-400.

6. Memo SecState for Pres, 3 ]ul 50, FRUS 1950, VI:835-36, 835nn1,2; Itr Pres to SecDef, 8 ]ul

50, RG 330, CD 091.3 (MDAP Indochina); memo R.E. O'Hara (OASD(C» for DirOMA OSD,

14 ]ul 50, ibid; msg SecState for USLegn Saigon, 1 ]ul 50, FRUS 1950, VI:833-34; ]CS Hist

Div, History ofthe Indochina Incident, 1940-1954 (hereafter cited as History ofIndochina

Incident) in The History ofthejoint Chiefs ofStaff The joint Chiefs and the War in Vietnam,

186.

7. Notes on consultants' mtg, 25 ]ul 50, US-Vietnam Relations, VIII:341-42; prog rept [NSC

64] USecState for ExecSecNSC, 15 Mar 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:397-400; Itr]t State-Def
Notes to Pages 208-10 589

MDAP Survey Mission SEA to FMACC, 6 Aug 50, FRUS 1950, VI:840-44; ibid, 821nl; msg

USMin Saigon for SecState, 9 Aug 50, ibid, 849-51.

8. Memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for DirNavalIntel, 31 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Indochina); msg USMin

Saigon for SecState, 7 Aug 50, FRUS 1950, VI:845-48; briefing paper [DefRepSrNSCStf],

"Item 3, Situation in the Far East," 10 Aug 50, RG 218, CCS 334 NSC (9-25-47); memo PPS

State, 16 Aug 50, FRUS 1950, VI:857-58.

9. Note ExecSecNSC to NSC, 25 Aug 50, w/rept NSC, FRUS 1950, 1:375-89.

10. Memo JCS for SecDef, 7 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Council of Ministers).

11. Ltr SecDef to SecState, 11 Sep 50, ibid; SFM Min-4 US De1eg, [14 Sep 50], FRUS 1950,

III: 1224-28; msg ~ctingSecState for lJSLegn Saigon, 16 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, VI:880-81.

12. Memo info DirNavalIntel, 17 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 091.3 (SE Asia); msg USMin Saigon for

SecState, 15 Oct 50, FRUS 1950, VI: 894-96; msg USMin Saigon for SecState, 24 Oct 50, ibid,

906-09 (908, quote); memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for SecDef, 28 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 092

(France).

13. Memo K.T. Young (OFMA OSD) for (MajGen Harry J.) Malony (DefMbr SEAAidPoICte), 13 Oct

50, US-Vietnam Relations, VIII: 369-70; msg USMin Saigon for SecState, IS Oct 50, FRUS

1950, VI:894-96; memrcd Young, (ca 17 Oct 50], US-Vietnam Relations, VIII: 373-76;

memo SPS [MajGen Sidney P. Spalding) for SecAF, 19 Oct 50, ibid, 391-92.

14. Memcon DirOMA OSD, 13 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 300-1-1; memcon DirOMA OSD, 16 Oct 50,

ibid; draft memo JCS for SecDer, [I4 Sep 50], enc A w/JCS Decision 1966/46, 14 Sep 50, RG

330, CD 104-1 (1950); draft memo JCS for SecDef, [18 Oct 50], enc A w/JCS Decision

1992/32, 18 Oct 50, ibid; memcon A.C. Murdaugh (OFMA OSD), 5 Jan 51, RG 330, CD

300-1-1; History ofIndochina Incident, 176, 178.

15. History ofIndochina Incident, 177-78; draft memoJCS for SecDef, [18 Oct 50], enc A w/JCS

Decision 1992/32, 18 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 104-1 (1950); PR 1066 Dept State, 17 Oct 50,

US-Vietnam Relations, VIII:371-72; prog rept USecState to ExecSecNSC, 15 Mar 51, FRUS

1951, VI, pt 1:397-400.

16. Memo SEAAidPolCte for SecState and SecDef, II Oct 50, w/draft statement (SEAC 0-21 Rev

1), 11 Oct 50, FRUS 1950, VI:886-90; msg USMin Saigon for SecState, 13 Oct 50, ibid,

890-93; memo Young for Malony, 13 Oct 50, US-Vietnam Relations, VIII:369-70; memo

SPS (Spalding] OSD for SecAF, 19 Oct 50, ibid, 391-92; msg SecState for USLegn Saigon, 25

Oct 50, FRUS 1950, VI:909-10; memo JCS for SecDef, 27 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 091.3

(SEAsia); msg USMin Saigon for SecState, 15 Nov 50, FRUS 1950, VI:921-23; memo

ExecSecNSC for NSC, 21 Dec 50, w/memoJCS for SecDef, 29 [dated 2H in error] Nov 50, ibid,

945-53.

17. Msg SecState for USLegn Saigon, IH Oct 50, FRUS 1950, VI:898-99; msg USMin Saigon for

SecState, 23 Oct 50, ibid, 902-05; memo DepDirMDAP State for SecState, 20 Nov 50,

w/memo Ohly for SecState, 20 Nov 50, ibid, 925-30. Dean Acheson acknowledged Ohly's

"perceptive warning" in Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department, 674.

18. Memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 21 Dec 50, w/memo JCS for SecDef, 29 [dated 2H in error) Nov

50, w/enc, FRUS 1950, VI:945-53.

19. Ibid; mins [extract] Truman-Attlee convs, 4 Dec 50, FRUS 1950, VII: 1367; memo SecDeffor

ExecSecNSC, 20 Dec 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Indo-China).

20. PR 1187 Dept State, 27 Nov 50, US-Vietnam Relations, VIII:397; msg lJSAmb France for

SecState, 2 I Nov 50, FRUS 1950, VI:930-32; msg llSAmb France for SecState, 24 Nov 50,

ibid, 936-37; msg SecState for Certain Dipl Offs, 27 Nov 50, ibid, 938; msg llSAmb France

for SecState, 6 Dec 50, ibid, 941-43; memo Robert E. Hoey (PSA State) for Amb at Lge, 27 Dec

50, ibid, 955-58; memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for SecDef, 5 Jan 51, w/enc, RG 330, "Briefings"

binder; mins SEAC M-13 SEAAidPoICte, rca 7 Feb 51], FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:376-78; memo

USecState for ExecSecNSC, 15 Mar 51, ibid, 397-400; History of Indochina Incident,

181-84.

21. Msg lJSAmb France for SecState, 6 Dec 50, FRUS 1950, VI:941-43; mins SEAC M-13, [ca 7

Feb 51], FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:376-78; msg lJSMin Saigon for SecState, 23 Oct 50, FRUS 1950,
590 Notes to Pages 210-13

VI:902-05; msg USMin Saigon for SeeState, 20 Jan 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:350-52; memeon

Chf USSplTeeh&EeonMission Saigon, 19 Mar 51, ibid, 406-07; msg USMin Saigon for

SeeState, 9 Ju1 51, ibid, 444-45; msg USMin Saigon for SeeState, 30 Jul 51, ibid, 466-68.

22. Msg USMin Saigon for SeeState, 24 Feb 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:384-85.

23. Editorial note, ibid, 366-67; msg SeeState for lJSLegn Saigon, 30 Jan 51, ibid, 368-69;

History ofIndochina Incident, 215-17.

24. OMA OSD, MDAP (Mutual Defense Assistance Program): Department of Defense Operations (hereafter cited as MDAP: DoD Opns), Apr 51, 26; prog rept lJSecState to NSC, 15 Mar

51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:397-400; memo JCS for SecDef, 29 Dec 50, RG 330, CD 091.3

(MDAP China); msg Bohlen (chge in France) for SecState, 21 Mar 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt

1:408-09, 409n2; msg lJSMin Saigon for SeeState, 23 Mar 51, ibid, 409-10; msg USMin

Saigon for SecState, 24 Mar 51, ibid, 410-12.

25. Memo JCS for SeeDef, 11 May 51, w/apps, RG 330, CD 092 (Indo-China); History of

Indochina Incident, 211-12; rept ExecSecNSC to NSC, 17 May 51, w/ene NSC 48/5, FRUS

1951, VI, pt 1:33-63; Itr ATSD(ISA) to SecState, 17 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 337; conf rept

Tripartite Mil Talks on SEAsia, Singapore, 15-18 May 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:64-71.

26. Msg Heath (lJSMin Saigon) for SecState, 29 Jun 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:432-39, 436n2; msg

Heath for SecState, 14 Jun 51, ibid, 425-28 (428, quote); msg Heath for SecState, 30 Jun 5 I,

ibid, 439-4 I; msg Chf SplTech&EconMission Saigon for ECA Admr, 12 Jul 51, ibid, 450-52;

mins mtg with de Lame, 17 Sep 51, ibid, 511-I 5.

27. Msg lJSMin Saigon for SecState, 29 Jun 51, ibid, 432-39, 439n3; memo ADir NonEuropeanAffs OISA State for ASecState(FE), 12 Jul 51, ibid, 447-49; msg USMin Saigon for

SecState, 18 Jul 5 I, ibid, 454-56; msg lJSMin Saigon for SecState, 20 Jul 51, ibid, 457-59.

28. Msg lJSMin Saigon for SecState, 17 Mar 5 I, ibid, 402-04; msg lJSChge Saigon for SecState, 18

Aug 5 I, ibid, 480-84, 480n3; mins [State] mtg with de Lattre, 17 Sep 5 I, ibid, 506- 11.

29. Memcon Gibson (PSA State), 14 Sep 51, ibid, 502-04; mins [State) mtgs 1 and 2 with de

Lame, 17 Sep 51, ibid, 506-11, 511-15; mins mtg with de Lame, 20 Sep 51, ibid, 517-21;

msg SecState for lJSLegn Saigon, 26 Sep 51, ibid, 524-25; ltr SeeDef to SecState, 1 Oct 51,

ibid, 525-26; memcon William W. Gibson (PSA), 12 Oct 5 I, ibid, 530-32; msg SecState for

lJSLegn Saigon, 15 Oct 51, ibid, 532.

30. Msg USMin Saigon for SecState, 30 Nov 5 I, ibid, 547-48; msg USConsul Singapore for

SecState, 30 Nov 51, ibid, 548-50; msg USMin Saigon for SeeState, 9 Dec 51, ibid, 558-59;

msg ActingSecState for USLegn Saigon, 12 Dec 51, ibid, 560-61; msg lJSMin Saigon for

SecState, 27 Dec 51, ibid, 578-79.

31. Memo ActingASecState(FE) for SecState, 19 Dec 51, ibid, 562-63; msg SecState for USEmb

France, 20 Dec 51, ibid, 563-64; notes [State] State-JCS mtg, 21 Dec 51, ibid, 568-70; msg

lJSAmb France for SecState, 22 Dec 51, ibid, 571-72; msg lJSMin Saigon for SeeState, 22 Dec

51, ibid, 572-73; msg llSAmb France for SeeState, 26 Dec 51, ibid, 573-78; paper [DoD],

"Brief Estimate of Situation in Indochina. .," [ca Feb 53), RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers,

"French Talks" folder.

32. Msg USMin Saigon for SecState, 5Dec 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:556-57; notes [State] State-JCS

mtg, 2 I Dec 51, ibid, 568-70; msg lJSMin Saigon for State, 17 Jan 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XIII,

pt 1: 18-21; NIE 35/1 CIA-lAC, 3 Mar 52, ibid, 53-60; Bernard B. Fall, Street Without joy:

Indochina at War, 1946-54, 42-54.

33. Msg USMin Saigon for State, 17 Jan 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XlII, pt 1:18-21; msg ActingSecState for lJSEmb France, 2 Feb 52, ibid, 39; msg lJSMin Saigon for State, 26 Feb 52, ibid,

40-42; memo ASeeState(FE) for DeplJSecState(PolAffs), 28 Feb 52, ibid, 42-43; msg lJSMin

Saigon for State, 29 Feb 52, ibid, 46-48; msg USMin Saigon for State, 6 Mar 52, ibid, 62-63;

msg llSAmb France for State, 22 Apr 52, ibid, 104n7; Fall, Street Without joy, 54-55 (quote).

34. Msg lJSEmb France for SeeState, 22 Dec 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:571-72; memo SeeState for

Pres, 29 Dec 51, ibid, 579-80; memred ATSD(ISA), [ea 26 Nov 51], RG 330, CD 334

(State-JCS); ltr SeeDef to SeeState, (, Jan 52, w/memo JCS for SeeDef, "Indochina ., 28
Notes to Pages 213-16 591

Dec 51," FRUS 1952-1954, Xll, pt 1:3-5; memo JCS for SecDef, "Defense of Southeast

Asia ...," 28 Dec 51, ibid, 6-7.

35. Notes SJCS and DepSJCS, 11 Jan 52, FRUS 1952-1954, Xll, pt 1:8-22; msg SecState for

USLegn Saigon, 15 Jan 52, ibid, 14-16; History ofIndochina Incident, 240-42.

36. Memo VAdm A.C. Davis for JCS, 5 Feb 52, with encs, FRUS 1952-1954, Xll, pt 1:36-44;

History ofIndochina Incident, 243-46.

37. Memrcd [State] State-JCS mtg, 16 Jan 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XII, pt 1:22-34; memrcd

[extract] [State] State-JCS mtg, 23 Jan 52, ibid, 35-36; rept ExecSecNSC to NSC, 13 Feb 52,

w/draft NSC 124, ibid, 45-51; memrcd [State] State-JCS mtg, 5 Mar 52, ibid, 55-68.

38. Memo JCS for SecDef, 3 Mar 52, US-Vietnam Relations, VlII:486-501; briefing paper

[DefRepSrNSCStf], " ... Southeast Asia (NSC 124)," 5 Mar 52, ibid, xxv, 502-05; memrcd

[State] State-JCS mtg, 5 Mar 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XII, pt 1:55-68; History of Indochina

Incident, 246-47.

39. Memo DepASecState(FE) for SecState, 3 Mar 52, FRUS 1952-1954, Xll, pt 1:54-55; memrcd

[State] State-JCS mtg, 5 Mar 52, ibid, 55-68; paper [DefRepSrNSCStf to SecDef?), "Item

3 ... (NSC 124)," 5 Mar 52, US-Vietnam Relations, Vlll:xxv, 502-07; memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 6 Mar 52, Truman papers, President's Secretary's files:NSC (PSF:NSC),

Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.

40. Memcon ASecState(FE), 15 Mar 52, FRUS 1952-1954, Xlll, pt 1:71-72; msg USMin Saigon

for State, 19 Mar 52, ibid, 72-73; memo ASecState(FE) for SecState, 25 Mar 52, ibid, 80-81.

41. Memo JCS for SecDef, 8 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Southeast Asia); Itr SecDef to SecState, 1

May 52, w/memoJCS for SecDef, 18 Apr 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XlII, pt 1:113-17; memrcd

DepDefRepSrNSCStf, 12 May 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Southeast Asia); memo JCS for SecDef, 8

Apr 52, w/enc 2, memo SecArmy, SecNavy, ActingSecAF for SecDef, 8 Apr 52, FRUS

1952-1954, Xlll, pt 1: 117-18.

42. Memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 21 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Southeast Asia); memo JCS for

SecDef, 8 Apr 52, w/enc 3, draft memo 000, 3 Apr 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XlII, pt 1: 119-24;

Itr SecDef to SecState, 1 May 52, w/encs, ibid, 113.

43. Memo ASecState(FE) for SecState, 7 May 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XIII, pt 1: 124-29; memrcd

DepDefRepSrNSCStf, 12 May 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Southeast Asia); memcon DirPPS State, 12

May 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XIII, pt 1:141-44.

44. Memo [extract] Lucius D. Battle (SplAsst to SecState), 19 May 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XlII, pt

1: 144-45; memo ASecState(FE) for SecState, 21 May 52, FRUS 1952-1954, Xll, pt 1:94-96;

Itr SecState to SecDef, 23 May 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Indochina).

45. US Mins SCEM MIN-2 Part One, Tripartite FgnMinsMtg, 28 May 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XIII,

pt 1: 157-66; memo ATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 11 Jun 52, w/transcript, RG 330, CD 092

(Indochina).

46. Draft memrcd J.D. Mitchell (OSD), 16 Jun 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Indochina"

folder; memrcd [OSD], "JSSC Discussion with Minister Le Tourneau [sic]," [ca 16 Jun

52], ibid; mins [State] US-Fr mtg, 16 Jun 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XlII, pt 1: 189-95; memo

[OSD] for DepSecDef, 17 Jun 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Indochina). .

47. Memrcd Mitchell, 19 Jun 52, RG 330, ISA files. Nash papers, "Indochina" folder; memo

DepDirOMA for ATSD(ISA), 17 Jun 52, w/enc, ibid; mins [State] US-Fr mtg, 17 Jun 52, FRUS

1952-1954, XIII, pt 1:197-202; msg SecState for USLegn Saigon, 20Jun 52, ibid, 204-08;

msg ActingSecState for USEmb India, 28 Jun 52, ibid, 213-15; msg lJSAmb Saigon for State,

17 Jul 52, ibid, 221-22.

48. Mins [State] US-Fr mtg, 17 Jun 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XIII, pt I: 197-202; editorial note, ibid,

203-04; PR 476 Dept State, 18 Jun 52, Condit file, OSD Hist.

49. PR 473 Dept State, 18Jun 52, US-Vietnam Relations, VIII:518-19; memo ASecState(FE) for

ActingSecState, 25 Jun 52, FRUS 1952-1954, Xll, pt 1: 119-23; memo JCS for SecDef, 24 Jun

52, RG 330, CD 092 (Southeast Asia); memo SecArmy, SecAF for SecDef, 24 Jun 52, ibid;

memo SecNavy for SecDef, 25 Jun 52, ibid.

50. Memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, [26Jun 52], FRUS 1952-1954, Xll, pt 1:123-25.
592 Notes to Pages 217-20

51. Memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 25Jun 52, w/statement of policy [NSC 124/2, 25Jun 52), ibid,

125-34.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. Mins [Sute) MTL USUK-3, 26Jun 52, ibid, 135-37; mins [State] MTL TRI-2, 27 Jun 52, ibid,

137-41; msg USAmb UK for State, 28Jun 52, ibid, 143-44.

56. Memo JCS for SecDef, 5 Aug 52, w/app, ibid, 184-86; msg ActingSecState for USEmb UK, 20

Aug 52, ibid, 210-11; rept Five-Power MilConf on SEA, Washington, 6-17 Oct 52, ibid,

230-32; memo DepDirStratPlans JtStaff OJCS for ChJCS, 23 Oct 52, ibid, 234-37; memo JCS

for SecDef, 14 Nov 52, ibid, 239-42; History ofIndochina Incident, 255-58.

57. Mins [State) ANZUS Council, 1st mtg, 5th sess, 6 Aug 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XII, pt I: 186-94.

58. Rept StfPlanners to MilReps ANZlJS Council, 25 Nov 52, ibid, 242-56; memo DirPSA Sute for

ASecState(FE), 17 Feb 53, ibid, 267-74; msg SecState for USEmb France, 28 Feb 53, ibid,

277-78; rept [OSD] Five-Power Pearl Harbor conf, 6-10 Apr 53, [ca II May 53), ibid,

303-06.

59. Paper [DoD), "Brief Estimate of Situation in Indochina ..," [caJan 53), RG 330, ISA files,

Nash papers, "French Talks" folder; msg USAmb Saigon for State, 27 Jul 52, FRUS

1952-1954, XIII, pt 1:225-27; memo DepASecState(FE) for USecState, 24 Oct 52, ibid,

270-71; memo ASecState(FE) for SecState, 28 Jan 53, ibid, 366-71.

60. Memo AGenCounsei (OASD(L&L)) for SupDiv OMA, 28 Aug 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash

papers, "Indochina" folder; memo DepATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 4 Sep 52, ibid; memo SecDef

for SecAF, 5 Sep 52, ibid; memo SecDeffor DirMS, 10 Sep 52, ibid; memo DepSecDefforJCS,

12 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Indochina); Itr DepSecDef to SecState, 12 Sep 52, ibid; Itr

SecState to DepSecDef, 25 Sep 52, ibid; memo ExecOffATSD(ISA) for DMS, 30 Oct 52, ibid;

memo DepATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 3 Dec 52, ibid.

61. Msg USEmb Saigon for SecState, 5 Dec 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XIII, pt 1:308-09; msg Def

927003 DirOMA for ChMAAG Indochina, 20 Dec 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers,

"Indochina" folder; memo DepSecDeffor SecAF, 20 Dec 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Indochina);

msg SecState for USEmb Saigon, 22 Dec 52, US-Vietnam Relations, VIII:540; Itr DirOMA to

ChMAAG France, 2 Jan 53, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Indochina" folder.

62. Memo DepATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 18 Dec 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Indochina); memo

ExecOftlSA for DepDefRepSrNSCStf, 19 Dec 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Indochina"

folder.

63. Ltr ChMAAG Vietnam to CoSlJSA, 20 Dec 52, US-Vietnam Relations, IX:2-3; memcon

SecState, 22 Dec 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XIII, pt 1:323-25; msg USAmb Saigon for Sute, 20

Dec 52, ibid, 325-28; memo ASecState(FE) for DepUSecState, 29 Dec 52, ibid, 332-36;

memo ASecState(FE) for USecState, 30 Dec 52, ibid, 337-38; 3 memos ASecState(FE) for

SecState, 28-29 Jan 53, ibid, 363-66, 366-71, 372-74; msg USAmb Saigon for Sute, 29 Jan

53, ibid, 371-72; paper [DoD), "Brief Estimate of the Situation in Indochina ...," [ca Feb

53), RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "French Talks" folder.

64. Memo DirPSA State for ASecState(FE), 18 Nov 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XIII, pt 1:287-98;

editorial note, ibid, 298-99; memo DepATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 12 Dec 52, RG 330, CD

092 (France); memo ASecState(FE) for DepUSecState, 29 Dec 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XIII, pt

I :332-36; memo ASecState(FE) for SecState, 28Jan 53, ibid, 366-71; memo ASecState(FE) for

SecState, 29 Jan 53, ibid, 372-74; msg USAmb Saigon for State, 31 Jan 53, ibid, 374-76;

editorial note, ibid, 377-78.

65. Memrcd ATSD(ISA), 13 Jan 53, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Indochina" folder; memo

ASecState(FE) for SecState, 28 Jan 53, FRUS 1952-1954, XIII, pt 1:363-66 (365, quote);

memo DepSecDef for JCS, 19 Jan 53, US-Vietnam Relations, IX:4.

66. Editorial note, FRUS 1952-1954, XIII, pt 1:39; MDAP: DoD Opns, Jan 53,25; memoJCS for

SecDef, 14 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); memo ActingSecDef for JCS, 31 Mar 52, ibid.
Notes to Pages 220-26 593

67. Anthony Eden, Full Circle. 94; memo ASeeState(FE) for SecState, 28 Jan 53, FRUS 1952-

1954, XIII, pt 1:363-66, 376-77 (377, quote).

XII. A BUDGET FOR KOREA-FY 1951

1. Ltr OASD(C) to DirBoB, 15 Sep 49, RG 330, ATSD&DepSeeDef files, "FY 1951 Budget"

folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md; Itr OASD(C) to DirBoB, 13 Dec 49, ibid; Itr

DirBoB to SeeDef, 16 Dec 49, ibid. For explanations of the defense budget process, see

Arthur Smithies, The Budgetary Process in the United States, 101-47, 229-77; Samuel P.

Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics ofCivil-Military Relations,

407-12; testimony BrigGen Robert S. Moore ($plAsst to ASD(C»), US Cong, House, Cte on

Appropriations, Fourth Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1951: Hearings, 82 Cong, 1

sess (1951), 2-3; Steven L. Rearden, The Formative Thars, 1947-1950, vol I in History ofthe

Office ofthe Secretary ofDefense, 336-37, 361-76.

2. Memo Lyle S. Garlock (AComp(Budget) OASD(C)) for ASD(C), 11 Apr 50, w/enes, RG 330,

ATSD&DepSeeDe[ files, "FY 1951 Budget" folder; memo SeeDer for SeeArmy et aI, 5 Jul 49,

ibid; testimony SeeDer, 12 Jan 50, US Cong, House, Cte on Appropriations, Department of

Defense Appropriations for 1951: Hearings, 81 Cong, 2 sess (1950), pt 1:45.

3. Testimony SecDef, 12 Jan 50, House Cte on Appropriations, DoD Appropriations for 1951:

Hearings, pt 1:42-66 (48, quote); testimony GenArmy D.D. Eisenhower, 29 Mar 51, ibid,

685,690.

4. Ltr ASD(C) to DirBoB, 26 Apr 50, RG 330, ATSD&DepSeeDef files, "FY 1951 Budget" folder;

table EISED-059, OASD(C), 17 Aug 54, OSD Hist.

5. Memo AetingSeeAFPC for MbrsAFPC, 5 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 114.2 (1950).

6. Memo JCS for SeeDef, 6 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 111 (195 I); memo JCS for SecDef, 13 Jul 50, ibid;

memo JCS for SeeDef, 18 Jul 50, w/4 apps, ibid; memo SeeDer for ChNSRB, 19 Jul 50, ibid;

AF strengths modified by table [OASD(C)), ["Regular FY 1951 Budget, Suppl 51 Request, Total

Fiscal 1951"), 22 Jul 50, RG 330, ATSD&DepSeeDef files, "Fiseal 1951 Suppl" folder.

7. Memo SeeDef for SeeArmy et ai, 6 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 111 (195 I); memo SeeDer for SeeArmy

et aI, 14 Jul 50, ibid; memo SeeDef for SeeArmy et aI, 19 Jul 50, ibid.

8. SeeDef for SeeArmy et ai, 14 Jul 50, wiatt, ibid.

9. Table P-22.2 DirMgtInfo OPS&Control OASD(C), 18 Apr 77, OSD Hist; table [OASD(C)),

[1951 Budget info), 22 Jul 50, RG 330, ATSD&DepSeeDef files, "Fiscal I95 I Supplemental"

folder. Rounded figures given in memo SeeDef for ChNSRB, 19 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 111

(1951).

10. Memo SecArmy, SecNavy, SecAF for SecDef, 15 luI 50, RG 330, CD I I 1 (195 I); memo ASD(C)

for SecDef, 16 lui 50, RG 330, CD 452.1 (1950).

11. Memo CNO for ASD(C), 16 lui 50, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDe[ files, "Supplemental Appro Jul

& Dec 1950" folder; note Sees to JCS, 5 Jul 50, aCS 1800/94), w/memos of 4 Jul 50,

corrigendum of 12Ju150, RG 218, CCS 370 (8-19-45); memoJCS for SecDef, 18Ju150, RG

330, CD 111 (1951).

12. Memo McNeil for Johnson, 21 Jul 50, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "Supplemental Appro

Jul & Dec 1950" folder; memo [USecNavy (Kimball)] for Capt McDill, 21 Jul 50, Kimball

papers, box 2, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo; Itr SecDef to DirBoB, 21 Jul 50,

RG 330, CD 111 (1951).

13. Truman indirectly cited in memred DirBoB, 22 Jul 50, Lawton papers, Harry S. Truman

Library, Independence, Mo.

14. PR 24 Jul 50, [Pres Itr to Cong, 24 Jul 50), RG 330, ATSD&DepSeeDef files, "Fiscal 1951

Suppl" folder.

15. Testimony SeeDef, 25 Jul 50, US Cong, House, Cte on Appropriations, The Supplemental

Appropriation Billfor 1951: Hearings, 81 Congo 2 sess (1950),4,8.
594 Notes to Pages 227-32

16. Ibid, 9-14.

17. Memo ASD(C) for SecDef, 28 ]uI 50, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "Supplemental Appro

]ul & Dec 1950" folder.

18. Memo ASD(C) for SecDef, 27 ]ul 50, ibid.

19. Ltr ASD(C) to DirBoB, 29 ]ul 50, ibid; Itr DirBoB to SecDef, 9 Aug 50, ibid; memo SecDef for

SecArmy et ai, 13 Sep 50, ibid.

20. Intraoff memo Foster Adams (OASD(C)) for Nathaniel H. Goodrich (AGenCoun), 25 Sep 50,

ATSD&DepSecDef files, "Fiscal 1951 Suppl" folder. Amount given as $11.729 billion in

FAD-182 OASD(C), 24 Oct 60, OSD Hist; $ 11.724 billion in table [Alaska money removed),

BudgetDiv OASD(C), 27 Sep 50, Condit file, OSD Hist; $11,728,594,000 in table EISED-059

[Alaska included], OASD(C), 17 Aug 54, OSD Hist.

21. Memo ExecSecNSC for AdHocCte on NSC 68, 28 ]ul 50, FRUS 1950, 1:351-52.

22. Intraoff memo Glenn V. Gibson (OASD(C)) for DepSecDef, 11 Oct 50, wtJCS presentation for

Lovett ., RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68); table BudgetDiv OASD(C), rev 4 Aug 50,

RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "NSC 68" folder; table [BudgetDiv OASD(C)), rev 19 Aug

50, ibid.

23. Memcon ExecSecNSC for NSCStf, 23 Aug 50, FRUS 1950,1:373-74.

24. Memo SecDef for ]CS, 24 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).

25. Intraoff memo Ralph N. Stohl (SecAFPC) for DepSecDef, 1 Sep 50, w/memo ]CS for SecDef,

[I Sep 50], RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "AFPC Actions During the Korean War Buildup"

folder.

26. Intraoff memo Stohl for DepSecDef, I Sep 50, wltable, "Flash Estimate .," BudgetDiv

OASD(C), 5 Sep 50, ibid; transcript [AFPC] mtg [OASD(C)), rca 5 Sep 50), ibid.

27. Transcript [AFPC] mtg [OASD(C)], [ca 5 Sep 50], ibid; memo SecAFPC for MbrsAFPC, 5 Sep

50, RG 330, CD 114.2.

28. Memo ]tSecs and ]CS, 7 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).

29. Transcript [AFPC] mtg, 12 Sep 50, 2, 4, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "AFPC

Actions " folder.

30. Ibid, 5-17.

31. Ibid, 18-20.

32. Memo SecDef for Pres, 12 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68); memo DepExecSecNSC for AdHocCmte on NSC 68, 12 Sep 50, ibid; memo ExecSecNSC for NSCStf, 12 Sep

50, ibid.

33. Brief of Annex 10 of NSC 68, "Economic Implications .," w/intraoff memo William H.

Mautz (DirEconDiv OASD(C)) for ASD(C), 23 Sep 50, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "NSC

68" folder.

34. Memo ActingExecSecNSC for NSC, 18 Sep 50, RG 218, CCS 334 NSC (9-25-47).

35. Memo Col Kenneth R. Kreps (ActingExec for SecDef) for ]tSecs, ]CS, et ai, 23 Sep 50, RG 330,

CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).

36. For overall costs of NSC 68, see briefing paper on NSC 68 mtg, 29 Sep 50, "Item 1 .," RG

218, CCS 334 NSC (9-25-47); for costs of military program, see table BudgetDiv OASD(C),

rev 12 Sep 50, mc w/memo ExecSecNSC for NSCStf, 12 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans

NSC 68).

37. Memo ]tSecs for SecDef, 26 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68); memo ]CS for

SecDef, 27 Sep 50, ibid; memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 28 Sep 50, ibid.

38 Memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for SeeDef, 28 Sep 50, ibid.

39. Mins [ExecSecNSC], 68th NSC mtg, [ea 29 Sep SOl, Truman papers, President's Secretary's

files: NSC (PSF:NSC), Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo; memo [ExecSecNSC] for

Pres, 2 Oct 50, ibid.

40. Memo [ExecSeeNSC] for Pres, 2 Oct 50, ibid; rept ExeeSecNSC to NSC, 30 Sep 50, US Dept

State, Foreign Relations oj the United States, 1950 (hereafter cited as FRUS with year and

volume number), 1:400.
Notes to Pages 232-36 595

41. Rept ExecSecNSC to NSC, 30 Sep 50, FRUS /950, 1:400; memo DepSecDef for All Concerned,

5 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC (8).

42. Presentation for Lovett, JCS, 9 Oct 50, w/intraoff memo Gibson for DepSecDef, 11 Oct 50,

RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC (8); memo Gibson for BrigGen D.P. Booth et ai, 11 Oct 50,

RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "NSC 68" folder.

43. Mins [excerpt] AFPC mtg of 17 Oct 50, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDcf files, "AFPC

Actions ." folder.

44. Memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 2 Oct 50, Truman papers, PSF:NSC; since Marshall referred to

NSC 68 conclusions by number, see FRUS 1950, 1:287-92 for NSC 68; excerpt AFPC mtg, 17

Oct 50, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "APFC Actions ..." folder.

45. Table "Total Cost of National Security Programs .," ProgRepts&Stats OASD(C), rev I Nov

50, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "NSC 68" folder; table ProgRepts&Stats OASD(C),

"Federal Budget Receipts, Expenditures, and Deficits," rev I Nov 50, ibid; memo for files

ASD(L&L), 14 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 334 (AFPC).

46. Memo ChJCS for SecDef, 31 Jul 50, RG 330, CD III (1951); ltr SecDef to Pres, 31 Jul 50, ibid;

tab B, FY 1951 Army Program Objectives, w/memo ASecArmy for ASD(C), 7 Sep 50, ibid;

memo SecDef for SecArmy et ai, 13 Sep 50, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "Supplemental

Appro Jul & Dec 1950" folder; paper [OASD(C)], [Summary of Personnel Increases], rca 19

Sep 50], ibid.

47. Memo SecArmy for SecDef, 24 Aug 50, RG 330, CD Ill; memo ASecArmy for ASD(C), 7 Sep

50, RG 330, CD 111(1951).

48. Memo SecArmy for SecDef (through DepSecDef), 10 Oct 50, RG 330, CD III (1951); draft

Itr Marshall to Sen Margaret Chase Smith (Ch Subcte on Ammo Shortages), 29 Apr 53, RG 330,

ASD(C) files, "Ammunition April 1953" folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md.

49. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et ai, 13 Sep 50, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "Supplemental

Appro Jul & Dec 1950" folder.

50. MemoJCS for SecDef, 22 Sep 50, w/encs, RG 218, CCS 370 (8-19-45). Since two requests

had previously been submitted to Congress, the military labeled this the "third" request.

Congress, however, combined the first two requests into one supplemental FY 1951

appropriation and the "third" request thus became the second supplemental appropriation.

The confusion did not end there. Correcting themselves, Defense planners then called the

next request also the "third" request, but the Congress confounded them again by passing the

third FY 195 I supplemental without any Defense money before it got around to considering

the Pentagon's request. Thus the second so-called "third" request was to become the fourth

supplemental FY 195 I appropriation. There is no way to clarify this situation except by

careful notice of dating and internal evidence in the documents.

51. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et ai, 27 Sep [50], RG 330, CD III (Gen); memo SecDef for

SecArmy et ai, 27 Sep 50, ibid; memo for files ASD(L&L), 14 Nov 50, 4, RG 330, CD 334

(AFPC)

52. Memrcd DirBoR, 25 Oct 50, Lawton papers; memo SecArmy for SecDef, 10 Oct 50, RG 330,

CD Ill.

53. Memo SecArmy for Pres, I Nov 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo ActingExecSecOSD for

DirJtStfOJCS, 10 Nov 50, ibid.

54. Intraoff memo Carter for DepSecDef and SecDef, 8 Nov 50, ibid; memo Carter for DepSecDef

and SecDef, 9 Nov 50, ibid.

55. Memo JCS for SecDcf, 9 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 320.2; memo SJCS for SecDef, 13 Nov 50,

w/cncs, RG 330, CD III (1951); testimony SecDef, 1 Dec 50, US Cong, House, Cte on

Appropriations, Second Supplemental Appropriation BillJor /95/: Hearings, 81 Cong, 2

sess (1950), pt 1:20-21.

56. Memo for file ASD(L&L), 14 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 334 (AFPC).

57. Memo DepSecDcfforJCS, 17 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 111(1951).

58. Memo JCS for SecDef, 19 Nov 50, w/encs, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC (8); table PBA

OSD, 19 Nov 50, ibid; memo DepSeeDef for ExeeSeeNSC, 20 Nov 50, FRUS /950, 1:416.
596 Notes to Pages 236-44

Costs were figured by subtracting already appropriated funds from the total; the naval

manpower reduction was determined by subtracting the 19 November figure from that given

on 13 November.

59. Memo (unsigned, on DepSecDef letterhead), [Concern Over Chinese Communist IntentionsJ,

with two handwritten notes initialed by Marshall, 18 Nov SO, RG 330, co 381 (War Plans

NSC 68). In a telephone conversation on 10 November 1977 Lovett informed the author that

he had not written the memorandum of 18 November 1950 and thought it sounded like

something by an outside consultant (it was not unusual, he said, for typing to be done in his

office using his letterhead). He did not remember ever seeing such a memo or having

discussed it with Marshall. It was Lovett's practice, furthermore, to sign or initial all papers

seen by him; this memo does not bear such an endorsement.

60. Memo DirPPS State for SecState, 22 Nov SO, FRUS 1950, 1:418-20; NSC Action 386, 72d NSC

mtg, 22 Nov SO, ibid, 418nl.

61. Memo William F. Schaub (DepChtEstsDiv BoB) for DirBoB, 30 Nov SO, Truman papers,

PSF:NSC; memo [ExecSecNSC) for Pres, 29 [incorrectly dated 24J Nov SO, 2, ibid.

62. Memo Schaub for DirBoB, 30 Nov SO, ibid.

63. Testimony McNeil, 12 Dec SO, House Cte on Appropriations, Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1951: Hearings, pt 1:53-54.

64. Testimony at the budget hearings for the FY 1951 Second Supplemental shows that this

budget was to provide for the JCS recommendations of 19 November 1950, particularly a

naval strength of 683,872, a 68-wing Air Force, and a 16-division Army. See House Cte on

Appropriations, Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1951: Hearings, pt 1:79, pt

2:3, and pt 3:19.

65. Ltr DepSecDef to DirBoB, 30 Nov SO, w/enc, RG 330, CD 111 (1951); House Cte on

Appropriations, Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1951: Hearings, pt 1:23-24,

41, 59; memo DirBoB for Pres, I Dec SO, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "Supplemental

Appro Jul & Dec 1950" folder.

66. Special msg Pres to Cong, 1 Dec SO, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:

Harry S. Truman, 1950 ... (hereafter cited as Truman Public Papers with year), 728-31.

67. House Cte on Appropriations, Second Supplemental Appropriation Billfor 1951: Hearings,

pt 1:16-18.

68. Testimony SecDef, 1 Dec SO, ibid, 18-19.

69. Ibid, 25.

70. Ibid, 20.

71. FAD-182 OASD(C), "Chronology of Budget Estimates .," 24 Oct 60, RG 330,

ATSD&DepSecDef files, 2, "Budget History 1950-1953" folder; PL 81-911 (6January 1951).

72. Initialed note on unsigned memo on DepSecDefletterhead, 18 Nov SO, RG 330, CD 381 (War

Plans NSC 68).

73. Table EISED-059 OASD(C), 17 Aug 54, OSD Hist; memo JCS for SecDef, 6 Dec SO, w/enc,

FRUS 1950, 1:475-77; memo SecDef for Pres, 14 Dec SO, ibid, 474; itr SecDef to DirBoB, 20

Dec SO, RG 330, CD III (Gen); memo SecDef for SecArmy et ai, 6 Jan 51, RG 330, CD 381

(War Plans NSC 68); House Cte on Appropriations, Fourth Supplemental Appropriation Bill

for 1951: Hearings, 93,301-02,308; Senate Cte on Appropriations, Fourth Supplemental

Appropriation Bill, 1951: Hearings, 27.

XIII. A BUDGET FOR REARt\1AMENT-FY 1952

I. Memo SecDeffor SecArmy et ai, 23 Jan SO, Condit file, OSD Hist. OSD sent tentative planning

ceilings to the services on 1 March: three memos SecDef for [SecsMiiDepts], 1 Mar SO, RG

330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "Budget FY 1952" folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md.
Notes to Pages 244-49 597

2. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et ai, 22 Feb 50, RG 330, CD 380 (Gen); chron on FY 1952 budget

development [OASD(C)), [9 Nov 50], RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "Budget History

1950-1953" folder.

3. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et ai, 25 May 50, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "NSC 68"

folder.

4. Note SecsMiiDepts to JCS, 5Ju150, w/memo SM-141O-50 for Pgm&Budget Advisors, 4Jul

50, RG 218, CCS 370 (8-19-45); table of estimates for SM-1410-50 IOASD(C)j, 10 Jul 50, RG

330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "1952 Budget Tables" folder.

5. Memo SecDef for JCS, 11 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 111 (1952); memo SecDef for SecArmy et ai,

10 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).

6. Memo JCS for SecDef, [1 Sep 50], RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, 'AFPC Actions During the

Korean War Buildup" folder.

7. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et ai, 13 Sep 50, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "Supplemental

Appro Jul & Dec 1950" folder; memo JCS for SecDef, 22 Sep 50, RG 218, CCS 370

(8-19-45).

8. Two memos SecDef for JCS, both 27 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 111 (Gen).

9. Memo JCS for SecDef, 9 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 320.2 (1950); memo JCS for SecDef, 13 Nov 50,

w/apps, RG 330, CD 111 (1951).

10. MemoJCS for SecDef, 19 Nov 50, w/apps and tables, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68);

table OASD(C), "Comparison of Costs Under NSC 68," [nd), RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC

68).

11. Memo DepSecDef for ExecSecNSC, 20 Nov 50, w/memo JCS for SecDef, 19 Nov 50, FRUS

1950, 1:416-18, 418n1.

12. Quoted in Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, 476.

13. Memo IExecSecNSCJ for Pres, 29 [incorrectly dated 24] Nov 50, Truman papers, President's

Secretary's files: NSC (PSF:NSC), Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.

14. Note ExecSecNSC to NSC, 8 Dec 50, US Dept State, Foreign Relations of the United States,

1950 (hereafter cited as FRUS with year and volume number), 1:425-26; memo SecDef for

Pres, 14 Dec 50, w/memo ChJCS for SecDef, 6 Dec 50, w/enc, ibid, 474-77.

15. Rept ExecSecNSC to NSC, 8 Dec 50, w/memo ChCEA, 8 Dec 50, w/rept ChCEA, both encs as

App B, ibid, 427-31.

16. Memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 12 Dec 50, Truman papers, PSF:NSC; Harry S. Truman, !-ears

of Trial and Hope, vol II in Memoirs by Harry S. Truman (hereafter cited as Truman,

Memoirs 11),418-19.

17. Mtg of President w/congressionalleaders, 13 Dec 50,5-9, George M. Elsey papers, Harry S.

Truman Library, Independence, Mo; Truman, Memoirs ll, 420-26.

18. Memo ChJCS for SecDef, 6 Dec 50, w/encs, FRUS 1950,1:475-77; memo SecDeffor Pres, 14

Dec 50, ibid, 474.

19. Table of Projected Costs Under NSC 68, IOASD(C)), 13 Dec 51, RG 330,

ATSD&DepSecDef files, "NSC 68" folder; memo ASD(C) for ExecSecNSC, 14 Dec 50, RG

330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC (8).

20. The account of the meeting in this and following paragraphs is drawn from memo

[ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 15 Dec 50, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.

21. Note [on NSC Action No 393] ExecSecNSC, 14 Dec 50, FRUS 1950,1:467-68.

22. Rept NSC 68/4 NSC to Pres, 14 Dec 50, ibid, 468-74, particularly 468-69; memo JCS for

SecDef, 13 Dec 50, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).

23. Note [on NSC Action No 3931 ExecSecNSC, 14 Dec 50, FRUS 1950, 1:467-68,

24. Radio and TV rept, 15 Dec 50, Public Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States: Harry S.

Truman, 1950 (hereafter cited as Truman Public Papers with year), 741-46; Presidential Proclamation 2914: Proclaiming the Existence of a National Emergency, 16 Dec 50,

ibid, 746-77. For an eyewitness account of the informal speechwriting session with the

pn:sident on the night of 14 December 1950, see John Hersey, Aspects of the Presidenc}',

67-87.
598 Notes to Pages 249-53

25. Ltr SeeDef to DirBoB, 20 Dec 50, RG 330, CD III (Gen); memo SeeDef for SeeArmy et ai,

6 Jan 51, RG .BO, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).

26. Intraoff memo NatlSeeBr BoB for DirBoB, 13 Apr 51, RG 330, CD III (1952); statement

DepSeeDef, 7 May 51. US Cong, House, Cte on Appropriations, Department of Defense

Appropriations for 1952: Hearings, 82 Cong, 1 sess (1951), pt I: 5.

27. Statement DepSeeDef, 7 May 51, House Cte on Appropriations, DoD Appropriations for

1952: Hearings, pt 1:3, memo Lyle S. Garlock (OASD(C)) for DepSeeDef, [22 Feb 51], RG

330. CD 111 (Gen); memo USeeNavy, USeeAF, ASeeArmy for DepSeeDef, 2 Mar 51, RG 330,

(loose merna in box 292); memo Garlock for DepSeeDef, 7 Mar 51, RG 330, CD 111 (Gen).

28. Table FAD-182 OASD(C), 24 Oct 60, 2, OSD Hist; US Cong, House, Cte on Appropriations,

Fourth Supplemental Appropriation Billfor 1951: Hearings, 82 Cong, 1 sess (1951),31-33,

302-05,607-09; memo ASD(C) for SecArmy et ai, 24 Mar 51, ibid. The House Committee on

Appropriations initiated the reduction (ltr Mahon to DepSecDef, 23 Mar 51, w/enc, RG 330,

ATSD&DepSeeDef files. "1952 Budget" folder).

29. Unsigned memrcd [Lehrerl OASD(C), 26 Jul 51, w/table, "Comparison of Obligational

Authority Projected on 13 December 1950 .." RG 330, ATSD&DepSeeDef files, "NSC

68" folder.

30. House ete on Appropriations, Fourth .'jupplemental Appropriation Billfor 1951: Hearings,

2-3

31. 1ntraoff memo NatlSecBr BoB for DirBoB, 13 Apr 51, w/enc paper, "Summary of Staff

Proposals on FY. 1951 Third [Second] Supplement and FY. 1952 Budgets," RG 330,

CD 111 (1952).

32. Statement and testimony DepSecDef, 7 Mar 51, House Cte on Appropriations, DoD

Appropriations for 1952: Hearings, pt 1:2-3, 10-12; testimony SeeArmy, 7 Jun 51, US

Cong, Senate, ete on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1952:

Hearings, 82 Cong, 1 sess (1951), 17-18; testimony Lovett, ibid, 54-55.

33. 1ntraoff memo NatlSecBr BoB for DirBoB, 13 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 111 (1952).

34. Tables on Action on FY 1952 Budget Requests [OASD(C)], rca 16 Apr 51), RG 330,

ATSD&DepSeeDef files, "1952 Budget Tables" folder; testimony DepSeeDef, 11 Jun 51,

Senate Cte on Appropriations, DoD Appropriations for 1952: Hearings, 54-55; memo

USecAF for SecDef, 19 Apr 51, w/ene FY 1952 Budget, 19 Apr 51, RG 330, CD III (1952).

35. Memo JCS for SeeDef, 5 Jan 51, w/enes, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68); merna JCS for

SeeDef, 10 Jan 51, ibid; memo ASD(C) for SeesMilDepts, 13 Jan 51, ibid.

36. Memo JCS for SeeDef, 6 Apr 51, w/handwrittcn note: "OK/G.C.M.," RG 330, CD 381 (War

Plans NSC 68); merna DepDirEXOS for ExeeSeeNSC, 23 Apr 51, ibid. At that time, the

Department of the Army wanted the planning assumption date to be extended to 30 June

1952 (memo AetingSecArmy for SeeDef, 11 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea)).

37. Intraoff memo NatlSeeBr BoB for DirBoB, 13 Apr 51, RG 330, CD III (1952); House Cte on

Appropriations, DoD Appropriations for 1952: Hearings, pt 3:8-9, 28-29, 32, 479.

38. House Cte on Appropriations, DoD Appropriationsfor 1952: Hearings, pt 1:45; Senate ete

on Appropriations, DoD Appropriations for 1952: Hearings, 45,717,1490,1493, 1495,

1498, 1673; mins [extract]IASD(C)] AFPC mtgs, 26 Jun 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSeeDef files,

"AFPC Actions During the Korean War Buildup" folder; memo ASD(M&P) for DepSecDef, 26

Jul 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).

39. This paragraph and the following one are based on intraoff memo NatlSeeBr BoB for DirBoB,

13 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 111(1952).

40. Statement and testimony DepSeeDcf, 7 May 51, House Cte on Appropriations, DoD

Appropriations for 1952: Hearings, pt l:4(quote), 15(quote); statement Bradley, 18Jul 51,

ibid, 203-08; table [OASD(C)), lea 16 Apr 511, "Resume of Action on FY 1952 Budget

Requests," RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDcf files, "1952 Budget Tables" folder; tables "Action on

FY 1952 Budget Requests," [OASD(C)], lea 16 Apr 51 j, ibid; hr Lovett to Lawton, 19 Apr 51,

w/tables, RG 330, CD 112.1 (1951).
Notes to Pages 254-62 599

41. Ltr DepSecDef to DirBoB, 19 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 112.1; memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 7 Aug

51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 114).

42. Msg Pres for SpkrHouse, 30 Apr 51, House Cte on Appropriations, DoD Appropriations for

1952: Hearings, pt 1:6-8; Itr DirBoB to SecDef, 23 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 111 (1952).

43. Memrcd [Lehrer?) OSD, 26 Jul 51, w/table, 26 Jul 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "NSC

68" folder; note ExecSecNSC, 8 Aug 51, w/rept NSC 114/1, FRUS 1951, 1:127-57,

particularly 132-33.

44. Memo USecAF for SecDef, 19 Apr 51, w/enc, RG 330, CD III (1952); for figure submitted

by Lovett, see Itr DepSecDef to DirBoB, 19 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 112. I.

45. Memo DepSecDef for USecAF, 23 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 111 (1952).

46. Statement at mtg on Defense production program, 27 Apr 51, Truman Public Papers, 1951,

256-60.

47. House Cte on Appropriations, DoD Appropriations for 1952: Hearings, pt 1:5, 9-12,

20-21; Senate Cte on Appropriations, DoD Appropriations for 1952: Hearings, 57.

48. Testimony Lovett, 7 May 51, House Cte on Appropriations, DoD Appropriations for 1952:

Hearings, pt 1: 11-12, 20,46-47.

49. Memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 7 Jun 51, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.

50. House Cte on Appropriations, DoD Appropriations for 1952: Hearings, pt I: 195-96.

51. Testimony Marshall, 18Ju151, ibid, 196-97; interv with W. Averell Harriman by Doris M.

Condit, 18Jun 77,20-23, OSD Hist.

52. Testimony Marshall, 18 Jul 51, House Cte on Appropriations, DoD Appropriationsfor 1952:

Hearings, pt 1: 197-99.

53. Senate Cte on Appropriations, DoD Appropriations for 1952: Hearings, 1482, 1487-89,

1503, 1529-30; table C-13002 [OASD(C)], [ca 30 Jun 52], RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files,

"1952 Budget Tables" folder; table C-15952 BudgetDiv OASD(C), 19 Sep 51, ibid.

54. Senate Cte on Appropriations, DoD Appropriations for 1952: Hearings, 1256, 1262, 1280,

1512, 1515-17; intraoff memo NatiSecBr BoB for DirBoB, 13 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 111

(1952).

55. Senate Cte on Appropriations, DoD Appropriations for 1952: Hearings, 1479, 1507.

56. Memo Finletter for Lovett, 13 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 112.1 (1951); table, "Action on FY

1952 ...," Budget Div OASD(C), 19 Sep 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "1952 Budget

Tables" folder; memo SecAF for SecDef, 25 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 111 (1952); memo SecArmy

for SecDef, 26 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).

57. US Cong, Senate, Cte on Appropriations, Department ofDefense Appropriations for 1953:

Hearings, 82 Cong, 2 sess (1952), II; table FAD-182 OASD(C), 24 Oct 60,3, OSD Hist.

58. Table FAD-182 OASD(C), 24 Oct 60, 3, OSD Hist; Congressional Quarterly SerVice, Congress

and the Nation, 1945-1964, 266.

59. US Cong, Senate, Cte on Appropriations, Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Bill, 1952:

Hearings, 82 Cong, 2 sess (1952), 2, 70, 71. The additional cost of Korean combat operations

in FY 1952 was estimated at $5 billion (memo ASD(C) for ASD(M&P), 17 Jun 52, RG 330, CD

381 (War Plans NSC 68)).

XIV. A STRETCHOUT BUDGET-FY 1953

1. News conf Pres, 19 Jan 52, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S.

Truman, 1952-1953 ... (hereafter cited as Truman Public Papers with year), 60.

2. AFPC mins [excerpt] [OASD(C)], 20 Jun 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, ''AFPC Actions

During the Korean War Buildup" folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md; memo SecAF

for SecDef, 19 Jun 51, ibid.

3. Memo JCS for SecDef, 16 Jul 51, w/encs, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).
600 Notes to Pages 262-68

4. Ibid; memo SecAF for SecDef, 16 Jul 51, ibid; AFPC mins [excerpts] [OASD(C)], 7 Aug 51, RG

330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "AFPC Actions ." folder.

5. Memo ExecSecNSC for SecState and SecDef, 7 Jun 51, RG 330, CD 381 (Gen); memo

ExecSecNSC for NSC, 12Ju151, w/dircctive, Pres to NSC, [12JuI51], US Dept State, Foreign

Relations ofthe United States, 1951 (hereafter cited as FRUS with year and volume number),

I: 1()l-03

6. Memo DirEXOS for DepSecDef, 21 Jun 51, RG 330, CD 381 (Gen); memo SecDef for

SecArmy et ai, 22 Jun 51, ibid; memo Frank C. Nash for SecDef, 13 Feb 51, RG 330, CD 092

(Greece).

7. Memo Asst to JtSecs for Lovett, 23 Jun 51, RG 330, CD 381 (Gen); memo ActingSecDef for

SecArmy et ai, 30 Jun 51, ibid.

8. Memo ActingSecDef for JCS, 13 Jul 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68); memo JCS for

SecDef, 27 Jul 51, w/routing slip 8258, ibid.

9. Memo DirPPS State for SecState, 31 Jul 51, FRUS 1951, I:11O-12.

10. Ibid.

11. Memo Asst to JtSecs for SecDef, 31 Jul 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 114).

12. Memo JCS for SecDef, 31 Jul 51, ibid; paper [DefMbrSrNSCStf], [ca 1 Aug 51j, RG 218, CCS

334 NSC (9-25-47).

13. Memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 2 Aug 51, Truman papers, President's Secretary's files: NSC

(PSF:NSC), Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.

14. Memo ATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 7 Aug 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 114); memo

Nash for Lovett, "Possibilities of Stepping Up Military Program (NSC 114)," 7 Aug 51, ibid.

The changes in NSC 114 are summarized in memo Bray (ISA State) for DirISA, 2 Aug 51, FRUS

1951, I:117-18.

15. AFPC mins [excerpt] [OASD(C)], entry of 6 Aug 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "AFPC

Actions. ." folder; paper [DefMbrSrNSCStf], [ca 8 Aug 51], RG 218, CCS 334 NSC

(9-25-47).

16. Note ExecSecNSC, 8 Aug 51, w/rept NSC 114/1, Condit file, OSD Hist, and FRUS 1951,

I: 127-57, particularly 129-32. The military program is not printed in FRUS.

17. NSC 114/1, FRUS 1951,1:131-34, 138-40.

18. Ibid, 132-34, 138-40.

19. Ibid, 134-36, 138.

20. Ibid, 147-48.

21. Memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 9 Aug 51, Truman papers, PSF:NSC; memo ExecSecNSC for

NSC, 9 Aug 51, FRUS 1951,1:157-58.

22. Walter S. Poole, 1950-1952, vol IV in The History ofthejoint Chiefs ofStaff Thejoint Chiefs

ofStaffand National Policy, 97-99; memoJCS for SecDef, 15 Aug 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War

Plans NSC 68).

23. MemoJCS for SecDef, 15 Aug 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68); AFPC mins [excerpt]

[OASD(C)], entry of 16 Aug 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, '1\FPC Actions ..."

folder; memo JCS for SecDef, 16 Aug 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).

24. Memo ASD(M&P) for SecDef, [nd), RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68); memo DepSecDef

for JCS, 18 Aug 51, ibid.

25. Ltr SecDef to Pres, 29 Aug 51, ibid; memo DirEXOS for JCS, 30 Aug 51, ibid; memo JCS for

SecDef, 28 Sep 51, ibid; rept NSC 114/2, 12 Oct 51, 34, OSD His!.

26. Memo ActingSecDef for JCS, 9 Aug 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).

27. Memo CoSUSAF forJCS, 12 Sep 51, with AF Program Objectives FY 1953 (JCS 1800/168), RG

218, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 35.

28. Memo CoSUSAF for ASD(M&P), 7 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).

29. Memrcd Exec to DepSecDef, 18 Sep 51, w/tableJS-3507/DS 51-1357,13 Sep 51, RG 330,

Lovett papers, "Lovett, 17 Sep 51 to 20 Jan 53" folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md,
Notes to Pages 268-74 601

30. ]tSecs mins [excerpts] [OASD(C)], [ca 11 and 13 Sep 51], RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files,

"AFPC Actions ." folder; memo CoSUSAF for ]CS, 12 Sep 51, RG 218, CCS 370

(8-19-45) sec 35.

31. Memo ActingSecDef for ]CS, 15 Sep 51, RG :330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68); memo S]CS for

Ch]CS et ai, 17 Sep 51, RG 218, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 35; memo S]CS for Ch]CS et ai, 18

Sep 51, ibid.

32. AFPC mins [excerpts) [OASD(C)], entry of 18 Sep 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "AFPC

Actions ." folder; memrcd DepS]CS, 18 Sep 51, RG 218, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 35;

memrcd Carey A. Randall (Exec to SecDef), 18 Sep 51, w/enc, RG 330, Lovett papers, "Lovett,

17 Sep 51 to 20Jan 53" folder.

33. Ltr James R. Killian, Jr. (ChOSDPanel) to SecDef, 20 Sep 51, RG 330, Lovett papers, "Lovett,

17 Sep 51 to 20 Jan 53" folder.

34. Memo ]CS for SecDef, 26 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68); memo R.E Good

(Navy) for Secretariat]CS, 25 Sep 51, RG 218, CCS 370 (8-19-45).

35. Memo]CS for SecDef, 28 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68); draft paper Lynch

(OASD(M&P», 9 Oct 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "Budget 1953" folder.

36. Memo ]CS for SecDef, 26 Sep 51, w/handwritten note "Oct. 2, 1951. Seen but not studied.

H.S. T. ," RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68); memo ActingSecDef for SecArmy et ai, 15 Oct

51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "Budget 1953" folder.

37. Memo ASD(M&P) for SecDef, 7 Dec 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 168 [sic]); memo]CS

for SecDef, 11 Oct 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "NSC 68" folder.

38. Memo ActingSecDef for ]CS, 20 Aug 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68); memo

ActingSecDef for SecArmy et ai, 6 Sep 5 I, ibid.

39. Memo SecDef for Pres, 25 Sep 51, ibid. Original copy is in file with "Approved 9/25/51, Harry

S Truman" in president's handwriting.

40. For discussion ofJCS report here and in following paragraphs, see memo JCS for SecDef, 11

Oct 51, ibid.

41. Testimony ASD(C), 23 and 24 Jan 52, US Cong, House, Cte on Appropriations, Department

afDefense . Appropriationsfor 1953: Hearings, 82 Cong, 2 sess (1952),142-43,195;

memo ActingSecAF for SecDef, 18 Oct 51, w/memo DepDirBudget Dept AF for SecAF, 18 Oct

51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 114); draft paper [OSDI, "The Military and Mobilization

Program," lca 11 Oct 51], 7-10, w/encs, ibid.

42. Rept ActingExecSecNSC, 12 Oct 51, w/NSC 114/2, FRUS 1951,1:182-92.

43. Ibid, 187-89.

44. Ibid, 184-92

45. Memo PPS State for SecState, 16 Oct 51, ibid, 224-29; memo DirPPS State for SecState, 17

Oct 51, ibid, 232-34.

46. Memo ]CS for SecDef, 15 Oct 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 114); memo Col Kenneth

R. Kreps (DepDirEXOS OSD) for ExecSecNSC, 17 Oct 51, ibid; memo Bohlen for SecState, 17

Oct 51, FRlfS 1951,1:234-35; memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 16 Oct 51, ibid. 229-30.

47. Memo PPS State for SecState, 16 Oct 51, FRUS 1951,1;224-29.

48. Memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 18 Oct 51, Truman papers, PSF:NSC; memo ExecSecNSC for

NSC, 16 Oct 51, FRlfS /951,1:229-30.

49. Memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 18 Oct 51, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.

50. Ibid; statement ChCEA, 16 Oct 51, FRUS /95/,1:230-32.

51. NSC Action 575, 17 Oct 51, FRUS 1951,1:235-37; memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 18 Oct 51,

ibid, 237-38.

52. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et aI, 2 Oct 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "Budget-1953"

folder; memo SecDef for SecArmy et aI, 5 Oct 51, ibid; memo ]CS for SecDef, 28 Sep 51, RG

330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).

53. Memo ActingSecAF for SecDef, 18 Oct 51, w/memo DepDirBudget USAF for SecAF, 18 Oct

51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 114); memo SecDef for SecArmy et ai, 29 Oct 51, ibid;
602 Notes to Pages 274-81

memo ASD(C) for SecArmy et ai, 29 Oct 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDeffiles, "Budget 1953"

folder; memo ASD(C) for SecArmy et ai, 5 Nov 51, ibid.

54. NY Times, 11 and 20 Nov 51; AFPC mins [excerpts] [OASD(C)], entry of 20 Nov 51, RG 330,

ATSD&DepSecDef files, "AFPC Actions. ." folder.

55. Mins [excerpt) Staff Council [OASD(C)), 23 Nov 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "AFPC

Actions ." folder; memo [BoBI, "Budgetary Implications .," 16 Oct 51, wltable, RG

5 1, BoB Series 5 1. 142.

56. Memo SecNavy for SecDef, 21 Nov 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "Budget 1953"

folder; memo ASecArmy for ASD(C), 30 Nov 51, ibid; table EISED-214 OASD(C), 28 May 52,

OSD Hist; JtSecs mins [excerpts] [OASD(C)], 6 Dec 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files,

"AFPC Actions ." folder.

57. Lovett indirectly quoted in JtSees mins [excerptsl [OASD(C)), 6 Dec 51, RG 330,

ATSD&DepSecDef files, 'AFPC Actions ." folder; memo ASD(C) for SecDef, 1 Dec 51,

RG 330, ATSD&DepSeeDef files, "Budget 1953" folder; memo Asst to JtSecs for SecArmy,

SeeNavy, SeeAF, 7 Dec 51, RG 330, CD 129-1.

58. Memo [OSD for Attendees], 7 Dec 51, RG 330, ATTSD&DepSeeDef files, "Budget 1953"

folder; hr SeeDef to DirBoB, 17 Dec 51, ibid; memo John H. Ferguson (DepDirPPS State) for

USeeState, 12 Dec 51, FRUS 1951,1:261; table E1SED-214 OASD(C), 28 May 52, OSD Hist.

59. Ibid; Table EISED-214 OASD(C), 28 May 52, OSD Hist; memo DirBoB for Pres, [nd, ca 19 Dec

511, RG 51, BoB series 51.14a. Lovett asked for $51.6 billion in hr SeeDefto DirBoB, 17 Dec

51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "Budget 1953" folder; he increased the Army request by

$ 300 million, raising the total to $ 51.9 billion in hr SeeDef to DirBoB, 21 Dec 51, ibid.

60. Ltr SecDef to DirBoB, 17 Dec 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef, "Budget 1953" folder.

61. JtSecs mins [excerpt] [OASD(C)], 20 Dec 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "AFPC

Actions ." folder; memo DirBoB for Pres, [nd, ca 19 Dec 51], RG 51, BoB series 51. 14a.

62. Memrcd DepSecDef, 28 Dec 51, RG 330, CD 110.01.

63. Ibid.

64. Memo DirBoB for SecDef, 29 Dec 51, RG 330, CD III (1953); memo SecArmy for SecDef,

31 Dec 51, ibid.

65. Memo SeeDef for Pres, 4 Jan 52, ibid; memrcd ASD(C), 3 Jan 52, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef

files, "Budget 1953" folder; memo ASD(C) for SecDef, 4 Jan 52, ibid.

66. MemoJCS for SecDef, 1 Apr 52, wlenc, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 114); memo SecDef

for ExecSecNSC, 10 May 52, wlrept to NSC, ibid.

67. Proposed draft status rept [NSC 1351 DoD, lea 26 Jul 52\. RG 330, CD 381 (Gen).

68. Memo JCS for SecDef, 4 Jan 52, RG 330, CD III (1953).

69. Ltr SecDefto Pres, 4 Jan 52, ibid; table E1SED-214 OASD(C), 28 May 52, OSD Hist; ltr DirBoB

to SecDef, 5 Jan 52, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "Budget 1953" folder; House Cte on

Appropriations, DoD Appropriationsfor 1953: Hearings, 133-35; The Budget ofthe

United States (;Ol'ernment for the Fiscal Year Endingjune 30, 1953, M5-6, M10-13, M81,

610.

70. Memo ASD(C) for SeeDef, 5 Jan 52, RG 330, ATSD&DepSeeDef files, "Budget 1953" folder;

memo SeeDef for SeeArmy et aI, 10 Jan 52, RG 330, CO III (1953); memo SecDef for

SecNavy et ai, 10 Jan 53, ibid; memo SecDef for SeeAF et ai, J() Jan 52, ibid.

71. Annual budget msg, 21 Jan 52, Truman Public Papers 1952-1953, 63-117.

72. House Cte on Appropriations, DoD Appropriationsfor 1953: Hearings, 84, 126-30.

73. Table EISED-085, OASD(C), 16 Nov 53, OSD Hist.

74. Testimony SecDef, 4 Feb 52, US Cong, Senate, Cte on Appropriations. Department ofDefense

Appropriations for 1953: Hearings, 82 Cong, 2 sess (1952), 11-12; hr SeeDef to Sen

O'Mahoney, 24 Apr 52, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "Budget 1953" folder; ltr SecDef to

DirBoB, 27 May 52, ihid; tahle EISED-085 OASD(C). 16 Nov 53, OSD Hist.

75. Testimony SecDet', 30 Apr 52, Senate Cte on Appropriations, DoD Appropriationsfor 1953:

Hearings. 19';-96. 228. 230-33 (quotl's).
Notes to Pages 281-89 603

76. Testimony SeeM~ 26 May 52, ibid, 570-71, 581, 606, 611, 617, 620-21, 623-24, 627;

testimony SeeNavy, 16Jun 52, ibid. 1023, 1029, 1044, 1052; testimony SeeArmy, 18Jun 52,

ibid, 1184-85, 1190,1192,1195; testimony lJSeeArmy, 11 Jun 52, ibid, 889.

77. John Fisher, "House Clamps Double Curb on Defense Costs," Chicago Daily Trihune, 10 Apr

52; Gerald Griffin, "House Limits Arms Spending to $46 Billion," The [Baltimore] Sun, 9 Apr

52; Congressional Quarterly Service, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, 270.

78. Ltr AdmrDPA to SeeDef, 29 Apr 52, RG 330, ATSD&DepSeeDef files, "Hearings on 1953

Budget" folder; paper [OASD(C)], 30 Apr 52, "Effect of a $46,000,000,000 Expenditure

Limitation on the Department of Defense," ibid; testimony SeeDef, 30 Apr 52, Senate Cte on

Appropriations, DoD Appropriations for 1953: Hearings, 195-243, particularly 215-17,

219-28, (224, quote), 235-43.

79. Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, 270-71; table EISED-085 OASD(C), 16 Nov 53, OSD

Hist.

80. Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, 270-71; table EISED-054 OASD(C), 23 Jun 54, OSD

Hist; table EISED-085 OASD(C), 16 Nov 53, ibid.

81. Table EISED-OB5 OASD(C), 16 Nov 53, OSD Hist; table EISED-054 OASD(C), 23Jun 54, ibid;

ltr AetingSeeDef to ChSenateAppropriationsCte, I Jul 52, RG 330, ATSD&DepSeeDef files,

"1953 Budget" folder.

82. Table EISED-OB5 OASD(C), 16 Nov 53, OSD Hist; table EISED-054 OASD(C), 23 Jun 54, ibid;

Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, 276.

XV, THE LAST TRUMAN BUDGET

1. President's news eonf, 12 June 1952, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:

Harry S. Truman, 1952-53 . . . (hereafter cited as Truman Public Papers with year), 416.

2. Memo ASD(C) for ASD(M&P), 17 Jun 52, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).

3. Memo JCS for SeeDef, 16 Jan 52, ibid.

4. Memo ASD(M&P) for SeeDef, II Feb 52, ibid; memo DepDirEXOS OSD (for SeeDef) for JCS,

II Feb 52, w/3 intraoff memos, ibid.

5. Memo JCS for SeeDef, 15 Feb 52, ibid; Marine Corps strength increase given in App A,

"Implications of Continued Hostilities in Korea," w/memo ASD(M&P) for ASD(C), 28 May 52,

ibid.

6. Memo SeeArmy for SeeDef, 4 Mar 52, ibid.

7. Memo ASD(M&P) for ASD(C), 28 May 52, ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Memo JCS for SeeDef, 4 Jun 52, ibid; memo DepSeeDef for ASD(C), 10 Jun 52, RG 330,

ATSD&DepSeeDef files, "FY 1954 Budget (McNeil file)" folder, Federal Records Center,

Suitland, Md.

10. Memo ASD(C) for ASD(M&P), 17 Jun 52, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).

I I. Intraoff memo ASD(C) for SeeDef, 19 Jun 52, ibid; memo SeeDef for SeeArmy et ai, 24 Jun

52, ibid.

12. Memo SeeDef for ASD(C), 2 Jul 52, ibid.

13. Memo SeeDef for ExeeSeeNSC, 2 Jul 52, ibid; memo c.P. Noyes (DepDefRepSrNSCStf) for

SeeDef, 11 Jul 52, ibid.

14. Memo SeeArmy for SeeDef, 9 Jul 52, ibid; memo SeeNavy for SeeDef, 15 Jul 52, ibid; memo

ComdtUSMC for SeeDef, 24 Jul 52, ibid; memo SeeAF for SeeDef, 17 Jul 52, ibid.

15. Memo JCS for SeeDef, 30 Jul 52, ibid.

16. Memo SeeArmy for SeeDef, 31 Jul 52, RG 330, CD III (Gen); memo AetingSeeArmy for

SeeDef, 6 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).

17. Memo SeeDef for SeeArmy, 15 Aug 52, RG 330, CD III (Gen).
604 Notes to Pages 290-94

18. Memo ATSD(ISA) for ASD(M&P), 22 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo DirEXOS for

ExeeSeeNSC, 4 Dec 52, ibid; mins Staff Council [excerpt] [OASD(C)], [ea 19 Sep 52], RG 330,

ATSD&DepSeeDef files, "AFPC Actions " folder.

19. Memo Asst to DefRepSrNSCStf for Asst to ]tSees, 20 May 52, RG 330, ISA files, "NSC 135

Status of U.S. Programs for Mil. Sec." folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md; memo

ExeeSeeNSC for NSC, 30 ]un 52, ibid; memo Pres for SeeDef et ai, 28 ]un 52, RG 330, CD III

(1954).

20. Memo DirEXOS (for SeeDef) for SeeArmy et aI, 16]un 52, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC

68); memo ExeeSeeNSC for SeeDef, 29 May 52, ibid; draft military status rept OSD, [ea 26 ]ul

52), RG 330, CD 381 (Gen).

21. Draft military status rept OSD, lea 26 ]ul 52], RG 330, CD 381 (Gen).

22. Ibid, as amended by memo]CS for SeeDef, 30]ul 52, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 114).

23. Draft military status rept OSD, [ea 26]uI52], RG 330, CD 381 (Gen); memo]CS for SeeDef,

30 ]ul 52, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 114).

24. Memo ASD(C) and ATSD(ISA) for SeeDef, 16 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 114);

memo SeeDef for SeeArmy et ai, 21 Aug 52, ibid.

25. Memo ASD(C) and ATSD(ISA) for SeeDef, 16 Aug 52, ibid; memo SeeDef for SeeArmy et ai,

21 Aug 52, ibid.

26. Memo ]CS for SeeDef, 29 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 135); memo SeeDef for

]CS, 9 Sep 52, ibid.

27. NSC 135, 6 Aug 52, Military Program (No I), Condit file, OSD Hist. Note Marine Corps at 100

percent strength, even though only at 72 percent readiness.

28. Acheson indirectly quoted in memo [ExeeSeeNSC) for Pres, 4 Sep 52, Truman papers,

President's Secretary's files:NSC (PSF:NSC), Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo;

memo ExeeSeeNSC for All Holders NSC 135,4 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans 135).

29. Memo ]tSees for SeeDef, 8 ]ul 52, RG 330, ISA files, "NSC 135 Status ... "folder.

30. Based on briefing paper [DefRep or DepDefRepSrNSCStf for SeeDef], [ea 3 Sep 52], "Item 3

(for Consideration)-NSC 13511 ," ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid; memo ]CS for SeeDef, 29 Aug 52, ibid; memo ASD(M&P) for SeeDef, 30 Aug 52, RG

330, CD 381 (War Plans 135).

33. Memo USeeArmy for SeeDef, 2 Sep 52, RG 330, ISA files, "NSC 135 Status ... "folder;

briefing paper [DefRepSrNSCStf for SeeDef], [ea 3 Sep 52], ibid; memo SeeAF for SeeDef, 2

Sep 52, ibid.

34. Memo ExeeSeeNSC for NSC, 2 Sep 52, w/views ChNSRB on NSC 13511, ibid; briefing paper

[DefRepSrNSCStf for SeeDef], [ea 3 Sep 52], ibid.

35. Lovett indirectly quoted in memo [ExeeSeeNSC) for Pres, 4 Sep 52, Truman papers, PSF:NSC;

memo ExeeSeeNSC for SeeState, SeeDef, OMS, 4 Sep 52, RG 330, ISA files, "NSC 135

Status " folder; memo Walter N. Walmsley (OffCounselor State) to SeeState, 4 Sep 52,

US Dept State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954 (hereafter cited as FRUS

with year and volume number), II, pt 1: 125-26.

36. Memo DepDefRepSrNSCStf for ExeeSeeNSC, 8 Sep 52, w/revisions to NSC 13511 proposed by

DefMbr, RG 330, ISA files, "NSC 135 Status " folder; memo DepDirEXOS OSD (for

SeeDef) for SeeArmy et ai, 17 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans 135); memo Bohlen for

SeeState, 22 Sep 52, FRUS 1952-1954, II, pt 1: 134-35.

37. Memo ]CS for SeeDef, 22 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans 135); memo ]tSees for SeeDef,

23 Sep 52, RG 330, ISA files, "NSC 135 Status. ." folder; briefing paper [DefRepSrNSCStf for SeeDef], [ea 24 Sep 52], "Item I-Reappraisal . ," ibid.

38. Memo [ExeeSeeNSC] for Pres, 25 Sep 52, FRlfS 1952-1954, II, pt 1: 136-39; note ExeeSee to

NSC, 25 Sep 52, w/ene, ibid, 142-56.
Notes to Pages 295-99 605

39. Memred Acheson, 24 Sep 52, ibid, 140; paper Jack Gorrie (ChNSRB), lea 24 Sep 521, ibid,

141-42; paper Paul Nitze and Carlton Savage (PI'S State), 11 :'110\' 51, ihid, 182-84; note

ExeeSeeNSC to NSC, 19Jan 53, w/ene NSC 141, ibid. 209-11; memo Savage, 10 Feb 53, ibid,

231-34.

40. Memo JCS for SeeDef, II Mar 52, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans :'IISC (8); memo SecDel' for

SeeArmy et al. 21 Mar 52, ibid.

41. Memo SecDel' for SeeArmy et ai, 7 Apr 52, ihid; memo JCS for SeeDer. .., Jul 52, ibid; memo

ChRDB for DepSeeDef, 13 Aug 52, RG 330, Lovett papers, "1952" folder. Federal Records

Center, Suitland, Md.

42. Memo SeeNavy for SeeDef, 2 Sep 52, RG 330, CO III (1954); memo SeeAF for SeeDef, 2 Sep

52, ibid.

43. Memo AetingSeeArmy for SeeDef. "Transmittal," 2 Sep 52, ibid; memo AetingSeeArmy

for SeeDef, "Statements of Accumulated Risks," Sep 52, ibid; memo ASO(C) for SeeArmy, 29

Sep 52, RG 330, ATSD&DepSeeDef files, "FY 1954 Budget (McNeil file)" folder.

44. Memo DirMnpwrRqmts OASD(M&P) for ASO(M&P), 25 Aug 52, RG .BO, CD III (1954);

intraoff memo ASD(M&P) for SeeDct', 5 Sep 52 (resubmitted), ibid; memo SecDel' for

SeeArmy, 5 Sep 52, ihid.

45. Memo SeeArmy for SecOct', 1 Oct 52, ibid; memo SeeDef for SeeArmy, 21 Oct 52, ibid.

'16. Memo SeeArmy for SecDel', 24 Oct 52, ibid; memo SeeArmv for SeeDef, 28 Nov 52. ihid.

47. Table EISEO-088 OASD(C), 24 Dec 52, OSO Hist.

48. Mins [OSOI, "SeeDef Review of FY 1954 Budget Request," lea 27-31 Oct 521, RG 330,

ATSO&DepSeeDct' files, "FY 195'1 Budget ("'leNeil file)" folder.

49. Mins 10SDI, "SeeDef Review of AI' FY 1954 Budget Request." [ea 27 Oct 52], ibid; memo

SecDel' for SeeAF, 5 Nov 52, RG 330, CD ..181 (War Plans :'liSe: (8); memo ASD(M&P) for

SeeDct', 3 :'IIov 52, ibid.

50. Mins rOSOl, "Secoct' Review of AI' FY 195'1 Budget Request," [ea 27 Oct 521, RG 330,

ATSD&DepSeeDef files, "FY 1954 Budget (Me:'>Jeil file)" folder; paper [OASD(C)), "Summary

of Action Taken ." Indj, ihid; table EISEO-088 OASD(C), 2'1 Dec 52, OSD Hist.

51. Memo SeeArmy for SeeDef, 24 Oct 52, RG 330, CD I I I (1954); mins 10SD[, "SecDel' Review

of Army FY 1954 Budget Request," [ea 28 Oct 521, R(; 330, ATSD&DepSeeDef files, "FY

1954 Budget (McNeil file)" t()Jder; memo DirMnpwrRqmts OASD(M&P) for (ASD(M&P)?], ..,

Nov 52, RG 330, CD 350.05 (Briefing); draft ltr (;arloek and "'leNeil (for SeeDef signature) to

Pres, [ea 1"7 Nov 521, RG 330, ATSD&DepSeeDeffiles, "FY 195'1 Budget (Me:'\leil file)" folder;

hr AetingSeeDef to DirBoB. 13 Dec 52, ibid; testimony ASD(e:), 25 feh 53. I'S Cong, House,

Cle on Appropriations. Department of De(ense Appropriations JiJl" 1'J54: Hearings,

83 Cong, 1 sess (195 ..1), 'I"'.

52. Mins 10SOI, "SeeDef Ikview of AI' FY 195'1 Budget Request," [ea 27 Oct 521, 3, RG 330,

ATSD&OepSecDef files. "FY 1954 Budget (Mel';eil file)" folder; mins IOSDI, "SecDef Review

of Army fY 195'1 Budget Request," [ea 28 Oct 521, I, ibid; Alfred Goldberg and Donald

Smith, Army-Air Force Relations: The Close Air Support Issue, X-II; Rohert Frank Futrell,

The United Slales Air Force in Korea 1'J50-1'J5j, 5..n

53. Futrell, US Air Force in Korea. 535-..15; mins [OSDI, "SeeDef Review ot AI' fY 195'1 Budget

Request," [ea 27 Oct 521 ...I, RG 550. ATSD&DepSeeDef files, "fY 195·j Budget (McNeil file)"

folder; Goldherg and Smith, Army-Air Force Relations, 11-1.3. finletter, in testimony 29

March 1955 (OSD Cte on Department of Defense Organization. "Hearings," (April (955),

5'1-35, OSD His!), later claimed that the two chiefs decided the technical points and the

secretaries took the "burden of the unpopular decision." foster \'iewed the 1952 PaceFinletter agreement as a wise decision, based strictly on the merits of the case (memrcd Doris

M. Condit. 26 Oct ..,.." com' with William C. foster " Condit file. OSD Hist).

'i4. Ltr Lovett to Lawton. 1 :\{O\' 'i2. w/encs. R(; 550. ATSD&lkpSecDef files. "FY 1954 Budget

(McNeil file)" folder.

55. Tahle ElSED-OHH OASD(C). 2'1 Dec 52, OSD Hist; mins IOSDI. "SecDef Review of :'\Ian' fY

195'1 Budget Request," rca 51 Oct 'i2[. 1-5. R(; 350, ATSD&DepSecDef files. "fY 195'1
606 Notes to Pages 299-309

Budget (McNeil file)" folder; memo B.D. Godbold (for DirMnpwrRqmts OASD(M&P)) for

[illegible], 7 Nov 52, RG 330, CD 350.05 (Briefing).

56. Table EISED-088 OASD(C), 24 Dec 52, OSD Hist; mins [OSD), "SecDef Review of Navy FY

195.{ Budget Request," rca 31 Oct 52J, 16-17, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef, "FY 1954 Budget

(McNeil file)" folder; hr Lovett to Lawton, 1 Nov 52, w/encs, ibid.

5"" Table EISED-088 OASD(C), 24 Dec 52, OSD Hist; mins [OSD), "SecDef Review of Navy FY

1954 Budget Request," lca 31 Oct 521, 9-16, 2""-32, w/Gariock indirectly quoted on 30, RG

330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "FY 195-1 Budget (McNeil file)" folder.

58. Mins (OSD), "SecDefReview .," Ica 31 Oct 52), 30, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDeffiles, "FY

I 954 Budget (McNeil file)" folder.

59. Ibid, 14, 2""-32; table EISED-088 OASD(C), 24 Dec 52, OSD Hist; hr SecDef to DirBoB, 22

Dec 52, RG 330, CD 452.01. Almost all ($2.346 billion) of Lovett's $2.355 billion budget

item was accounted for by the $ 1.789 billion OSD-BoB staff estimate plus $ 135 million for

guided missiles plus $422 million for aircraft.

60. Memo SecDef for DirBoB, 1 Nov 52, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "FY 1954 Budget

(McNeil file)" folder; hr DirBoB to SecDef, 13 Dec 52, ibid; hr ActingSecDef to DirBoB, 13

Dec 52, ibid; table EISED-088 OASD(C), 2.{ Dec 52, OSD Hist; memo Godbold (for

Dir'\lnpwrRqmts OASD(M&P)) for lillegiblel, "" Nov 52, RG 330, CD 350.05 (Briefing); table

EISED-088 OASD(C), 24 Dec 52, OSD Hist.

61 Memo ASD(C) for SecArmy, Sec"lavy, SecAF, 8 Nov 52, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files,

"Budget 1953" folder.

62. Memo SecArmy for SecDef, 28 Nov 52, RG 330, CD III (1953); ltr ActingSecDefto DirBoB,

13 Dec 52, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "Budget 1953" folder; ltr Foster to Lawton, 19

Dec 52, ibid; ltr Foster to Lawton, 31 Dec 53, ibid.

63. Memo JCS for SecDef, ]0 Dec 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea).

64. Ltr DirBoB to SecDef, 13 Dec 52, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "FY 1954 Budget (McNeil

file)" folder; memo SecDeffor Pres, 22 Dec 52, RG 330, CD 452.01; hr SecDefto DirBoB,

22 Dec 52, ibid; memo ASecArmy for SecArmy, 22 Dec 52, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files,

"FY 1954 Budget (McNeil file)" folder.

65. kstimony McNeil. 25 Feb 53, House Cte on Appropriations, Department of Defense

Appropriations for 1')54: Hearings, 46-4""; table EISED-088 OASD(C), 24 Dec 52, OSD

Hist.

66. The Budget of the United States GOl'ernment for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1954

(hereafter referred to as US Budget, FY 1')54), M5-M55 (especially MI2-MI4), 554-694

(563, quote).

6"". Ibid, 563; ltr DirBoB to SecDef, 3 Feb 53, RG 218, CCS 334 NSC (9-25-47) sec 8.

68. Msg Pres to Cong, 9 Jan 53, US Budget, IT 1')5-4, A6, M6-M7, :\110; 000 estimates, ibid, 554.

69. 'Iable EISED-I 17 OASD(C), nan 53, OSD His!; table FAD-182 OASD(C), 24 Oct 60, ibid; msg

Pres to Cong, 9 Jan 53, US Budget, FY 1954, M13-M 14; OASD(C), National Defense Budget

Estimates jrJr FY 1')8"', May 86, 73-""5, OSD Hist.

XVI. NATO: THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE

I. Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, vol II in ,Uemoirs by Harry S. Truman (hereafter

cited as Truman, Memoirs If), 3HO-H 1. Laurence W Martin, "The American Decision to

Rearm Germany," in Harold Stein, ed, American Cil'i/-,Uilitary Decisions: A Book of Case

Studies, 652.

2. Text of Brussels Treaty, American Foreign Policy, 1')50-1')55: Basic Documents, /;96H-7I;

text of North Atlantic Treaty, US Dept State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949
Notes to Pages 310-15 607

(hereafter cited as FRUS with year and volume), IV: 281-8';; Lord Ismay, NA7U: The First Fire

Years, 1949-/954, 7-9, 29-50; NATO Information Service, The NATO Handbook, 6-""',

5';-)7

3, The NATO Handbook, 18-19; Ismay, NA7D, /949-/954, 24-27, 1"'2-8'1.

4. Ismay, NATO, /949-/954, 24-27, 17';-78, 180-8 I; First Semiannual Report on the Mutual

Defense Assistance Program, 81 Cong, 2 sess, H Doc 6 U (19';0), 26-29.

';. Ismay, NATO, /949-/954, 28-29; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the

State Department, 599.

6. Memo Col Royden E. Beebe, Jr. (ADirOFMA OSD) for Douglas MacArthur 11 (State), 29 Jun ';0,

RG 330, CD 6-4-18; Ismay, NATO, /949-/954, 51,48 (quote).

""' Memo Burns (ATSD(FMA&MA)) for SecDet', 5 Jul ';0, RG 5:JO, CD 6-4-18: memo ExecSecOSD

for JtSecs et ai, 27 Jul ';0, RG 550, CD 092.5 (NATO Gen); memo JCS for SecDe!, 8 Aug ';0,

ibid; Itr DepSecDet' to DepUSecState, 16 Nov ';0, ibid; memo Burns for MarshalL 28 Nov ';0,

ibid; memo Burns for DepSecDet', 15 Dec ';0, ibid.

8. Ltr RalphJ. Burton (BoB) to ATSD(FMA&MA), 12 Dec ';0, w/draft terms, 8 Dec ';0, RG 550,

CD 092.5 (NATO Gen); memo ActingSecDe! for JCS and Ch:\lB, 29 Dec ';0, w/approved

terms, 16 Dec ';0, ibid.

9. PL 81-529 (6 October 1(49); First Semiannual Report on ilJDAP. 1.3,7.3-7'1; note SecNADC

to NADC, I Dec 49, w/enc strategic concept, FRUS 19''i'), IV:5';2-';6; Ismay, NATO,

/949-/954, 27.

10. Kenneth W. Condit, /947-1949, vol 11 in History o[theJoint Chief~ ofStaJr TheJoint Chiefs

of Staff and National Policy, 404-07; Ismay, NATO, /94')-/954, 28, 102 (quote); memo

Burns for SecDet', 17 Aug ';0, w/paper, RG 550, CD 0925 (NATO Gen)

II. Final communique NAC, 4th sess, 1';-18 May ';0, London, in Ismay, NATO, /')4')-/954,

182-84; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 596-400.

12. Ismay, NATO, /949-1954, 29-:JO; msg Dept:SRepNAC for SecState, 26 Jul ';0, FRUS /950,

111:145-44; [IS Cong, House, Cte on Foreign Affairs, Mutual Security Program, Part I, in

Selected Executire Session Hearings, 1')5/-56 (Historical Series, 1980), IX:228-29; US

Cong, House, etc on Foreign Affairs, Huropean Problems in ibid, XV: 192; Acheson, Present

at the Creation, 599

15. Msg 89656./CS for CINCEUR et aL 24 Aug ';0, RG 218, CCS 092 W Eur (5-12-48) sec));

discussion of OFFTACKLE plan in Condit, /94 7-/')4'), 294-502; Walter S. Poole, /')50-

/952, vol IV in History (~f the Joint Chief~ of Stafl The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National

Policy, 190-9 I .

14. :\1sg DepllSRepNAC for SecState, 26Jul ';0, FRUS /950,11\: 145-4'1; memo SecsMilDepts and

./CS for SecDef, U .lui ';0, ibid, 155-54; Itr SecDd to Pres, 14 Jul ';0, RG 5:JO, CD 092.5

(NATO Gen).

I';. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 420-21; memcon SecState, 21 Jul ';0, w/paper, FRUS /')50,

III: 156-57.

16. Two msgs DepUSRepNAC for SecState, both 'I Aug ';0, FRUS 1950, III: 18';-86. 188-89;

memo Beebe for DirO:\1A OSD, 7 Aug ';0, R(; 5.30, CD 091..3 (MDAP Gen); msg DepliSRepNAC for SecState, 27 Jul ';0, FRUS 1950, III: 1'1';-'16; Poole, 1'J50-/,)52. 18'1, 18""'.

17. Ltr CSecState to SecDct', 18 Aug ';0, RG 5:JO, CD 092.5 (NATO Gen): memo SecDe! for ./tSecs

et ai, 14 Aug ';0, ibid; memo Bradley (L;SRepS(; t\ATO) for SecDe!, l""' Aug ';0, ibid; memo

llSRepMPSB NATO for SecDet', I""' Aug ';0, ibid.

18. Memo JCS for SecDet', 17 Aug ';0, ibid; memo JtSecs for SecDet', I""' Aug ';0, RG 2 18, CCS 092

W Eur (5-12-cJ8) sec)).

19. Memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for SeeDe!, 17 Aug ';0, w/paper, RG 5:JO, CD 092 ..3 (NATO Gen);

memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for Asst to JtSecs, 22 Aug ';0, ibid: Itr ChNACDeps to ChNADC, 2 Sep

';0, ibid; Itr ChNADC to ChNASG, 12 Sep ';0, ibid.

20. Msg SeeState for DepliSRepNAC, 21 Aug ';0, FRUS /950, 1Il:228-50; msg Depl:SRepNAC for

SecState, 24 Aug ';0, ibid, 2cJ 1-'1'1.
608 Notes to Pages 315-20

21. Memo ]CS for SecDef, 18 Aug 50, RG 330, co 092.3 (NATO Gen); msg DepUSRepNAC for

SecState, 22 Aug 50, FRUS 1950, IlI:232-36; msg lJSChge UK for SecState, 3 Sep 50, ibid,

262-63.

22. Memo Beebe for MacArthur (State), 31 Aug 50, w/draft msg, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO

Council of Ministers); memo Beebe for DirOMA OSD, 6 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO

Gen); Itr ChNADC to ChNAC, 12 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, 111:288-89.

23. Msg OepCSRepNAC for SecState, D ]ul 50, FRUS 1950, Ill: 144-45.

24. Hen'e Alphand (DepFrRepNAC) indirectly quoted in msg DeplJSRepNAC for SecState, 28 ]ul

50, ibid, 148-50. The original French memo was dated 5 August 1950; see editorial note,

ibid, 1382. Supplementary French memo of J7 August 1950 translated in msg USAmb Fr for

SecState, J7 Aug 50, ibid, 220-24. Also see ibid, 14"7-48, 150-61, 165-67 for related

documents.

25. Msg SecState for lJSEmb Fr, 8 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, IlI:272-73; msg DeplJSRepNAC for

SecState, 24 Aug 50, ibid, 246-48; msg SecState for DepUSRepNAC, 25 Aug 50, ibid, 249-50;

Lawrence S. Kaplan, A Communi~y ofInterests: NATO and the Military Assistance Program,

1948-1951, 107-09.

26. Msg DeplJSRepNAC for SecState, 28 ]ul 50, FRUS 1950, Ill: 148; memo ]CS for SecDef, 2 May

50, cited in memo ]CS for SecOd, 12 May 50, RG 330, CD 337 (Four Powers); memo ]CS for

SecDd, 17 May 50, ibid.

D. Brfg paper on item 3 (NSC 7 I and NSC 71/1) [DefRepSrNSCStffor SecDef], 6 ]ul 50, RG 218,

CCS 334 NSC (9-25-47), sec 2; memo ExecSecOSO for ]CS, 8 ]ul 50, RG 330, CD 388.3

(Germany); memo [ExecSecNSC) for Pres, 7 ]ul 50, Truman papers, President's Secretary's

files:NSC (PSF:NSC), Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.

28. Msg SecState for CSEmb Fr, I Aug 50, FRUS 1950, Ill: 172-74; msg CSAmb Fr for SecState, I

Aug 50, ibid, 168-72; memo]CS for SecDd, 18 Oct 50, w/encs, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO

Gen); msg lJSAmb Fr for SecState, 28 ]ul 50, FRUS 1950, Ill: I 57; msg HICOG for SecState, 3

Aug 50, ibid, 180-82; msg USAmb USSR for SecState, 9 Aug 50, ibid, 192-94.

29. Memrcd SecState, 3 I Jul 50, FRUS 1950, Ill: 16"7-68; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 437,

30. Memo Barbara Evans (PersAsst to SecState) 3[4] Aug 50, FRUS 1950, Ill: 182-83; memcon

SecState, 10 Aug 50, ibid, 205.

31. Ltr DeplJSecState to ATSD(FMA&MA), 16 Aug 50, w/enc, ibid, 211-19.

32. Memo DeplJSecState(Adm) for SecState, 17 Aug 50, ibid, 225-26; Itr SecDef to SecState, 17

Aug 50, ibid, 226-27; memo ]CS for SecDe[, 17 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen);

memo IExecSecNSC) for Pres, 25 Aug 50, Truman papers, PSF:NSC; Itr Pres to SecState, 26

Aug 50, FRUS 1950, 111:250-5 I; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 438.

33. Memo]CS for SecDd, 30 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe).

34. Konrad Adenauer, i'vlemoirs 1945-53, 274-80; Itr HICOG to SecDd, 5 Sep 50, RG 330, CD

091.7 (Europe); Itr SecDe[ to HICOG, 12 Sep 50, ibid; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 439.

35. Memo ./CS for SecDef, 5 Sep 50, w/draft, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe).

36. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 439; see Dirk Stikker's remarks cited in msg Katz (SRE) for

SecState, 6 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, IlI:269; memo ./CS for SecDef, 7 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 091.7

(Europe).

P Llr SecState and SecDefto Pres, 8 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, 111:273nl, 273-78; Acheson, Present

at the Creation, 440; statement, 9 Sep 50, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United

States, Harry S. Truman, 1950 (hereafter cited as Truman Public Papers with year),

626.

38. For documents on British viewpoint, see pers msg BrSecState(FgnAffs) for USSecState, [4 Sep

50), w/ene, FRUS 1950, 111:264-66; msg SecState for USEmb UK, 8 Sep 50, ibid, 271-72;

Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary 1945-1951, 804-1 I. For the French viewpoint, see msg USAmb Fr for SecState, 5 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, 111:267-68; msg USAmb Fr for

SecState, 7 Sep 50, ibid, 269-70; msg USAmb Fr for SecState, 7 Sep 50, ibid, 270; memcon

Lucius D. Battle (SplAsst to SecState), 12 Sep 50, ibid, 285-88; msg SecState for lJSAmb UK

et al. 14 Nov 50, ibid, 452-53. For details of the talks, see mins lJSDeleg, 12 and 13 Sep 50,
Notes to Pages 321-26 609

ibid, 1191-1223; mins private conf [Battle], 14 Sep 50, ibid, 293-301; msg SecState for Pres,

14 Sep 50, ibid, 3(lI-02.

39. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 442-43; rept RAdm T.H. Robbins, Jr., for SecDef, 28 Sep

50, RG 330, CD 092-3 (NATO Council of Ministers); msg SecState for Pres, 14 Sep 50, FRUS

1950,111:301-02; msg SecState for Pres, 15 Sep 50, ibid, 1229-31; memcon Battle, Ica 15 Sep

50], w/enc, ibid, 305-08.

40. Msg SecState for ActingSecState, 16 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, 111:308-09; msg SecState for USEmb

Fr, 17 Sep 50, ibid, 314-15; msg SecState for ActingSecState, 17 Sep 50, ibid, 316-20; msg

SecState for ActingSecState, 18 Sep 50, ibid, 327-29; msg SecState for ActingSecState, 19 Sep

50, ibid, 330-32; memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for SecDef, 20 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe).

41. Doc 37 (final) US-UK-Fr FgnMins, 19 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, 111:1286-99.

42. Msg SecState for USEmb Fr, 17 Sep 50, ibid, 314-15; David S. McLellan, Dean Acheson: The

State Department Years, 331; memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for SecDef, 20 Sep 50, RG 3::\0, CD

091.7 (Europe); memcon Beebe, II Oct 50, RG ::\30, CD ::\00-1-1.

43. Msg SecState for ActingSecState, 23 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, 1Il:::\38-40

44. Msg SecState for ActingSecState, 23 Sep 50, ibid, ::\40-42.

45. Ibid; msg ActingSecState for HICOG, 25 Sep 50, ibid, 346-47; note SecDef to Henry A.

Byroade (DirGER State), 29 Sep 50, w/draft msg SecDef for HICOG, [nd], RG 330, CD 092

(Germany).

46. Msg SecState for ActingSecState, 2::\ Sep 50, FRUS 1950, 111:342-4::\; msg SecState for

ActingSecState, 23 Sep 50, ibid, 343-44; memcon ActingSecState, 26 Sep 50, ibid, 353-54;

msg SecState for ActingSecState, 26 Sep 50, ibid, :147-48.

47. Msg SecState for Pres, 14 Sep 50, ibid, :101-02; memo ASecState(EUR) for USecState, 25 Sep

50, ibid, .)45-46; intraoff memo Murdaugh (OFMA) for ATSD(FMA&MA), 22 Sep 50, RG ::\:10,

CD 091.7 (Europe); memcon ActingSecState, 25 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, 1Il:344-45.

48. Final communiques NAC 5th sess, New York, 16-18 and 26 Sep 50, in Ismay, NATO,

1949-1954, 185-86; memo Amb at Lge for ExecSecNSC. 9 Oct 50, FRUS 1950, 1Il::l66-68;

msg SecState for ActingSecState, 26 Sep 50, ibid, :ISO-52.

49. Msg SecState for ActingSecState, 26 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, Ill::l50-52; final communique NAC

5th sess, 26 Sep 50, in Ismay, NATO, 1949-1954, 185-86.

50. Memo SecDef for JCS, 2 Oct 50, FRUS 1950, 111::156-57; memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for SecDef,

1:\ Oct 50, RG :1:10, CD 092.:1 (NATO Gen); memo SecDef for SecArmy et aI, 27 Sep 50, RG

:130, CD 092.3 (NATO DC); Itr DepUSecState to SecDef, II Oct 50, ibid.

51. Ltr ATSD(FMA&MA) to DirJtStfJCS, 2 Oct 50, RG :1:10, CD 091.'7 (Europe); ltr DepUSecState

to ATSD(FMA&MA), :I Oct 50, ibid; memo Amb at Lge for ExecSecNSC, 9 Oct 50, FRUS 1950,

1Il::l66-68

52. Draft memo State-Def WkgGrp for NAC, 6 Oct 50, FRUS 1950, 111:362-64.

53. Memcon DirPPS, 9 Oct 50, ibid, :164-66; memcon ADirOFMA, [I Oct 50, RG :1:10, CD

:100-1-1.

54. Memo JCS for SecDef, "German Contribution ," [::\ Oct 50, w/apps, RG :130, CD 091. '7

(Europe); memo without attachments in FRUS 1950, 111:375-77.

55. Memo JCS for SecDef, "Integrated Force in Europe ," [3 Oct 50, FRlfS 1950,

111::172-75; memo JCS for SecDef, 20 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe).

56. Llr SecState to SecDef, 16 Oct 50, RG ):\0, CD 091.7 (Europe); memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for

SecDef via DepSecDef, 18 Oct 50, w/enc "Draft Memo for NAC," apvd by Marshall, RG :130,

CD 091.7 (Europe); Truman, Memoirs 11, 257.

57. Llr Byroade to SecDef. 16 Oct 50, w/enc, RG 330, CD 092 (Germany).

58. Msg SecState for CSEmb Fr, 17 Oct 50, FRUS 1950, Ill::l84; msg SecState for USEmb Fr, 18 Oct

50, ibid, :188-89; msg SecState for USEmb Fr, [9 Oct 50, ibid, :196-97.

59. Memcon ADirOFMA, 19 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 300-1-1.

60. Memcon Ass! to SecState, 26 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, 1Il:352-5:1; msg l:SChge Fr for SecState, 15

Oct 50, ibid, :177-80; memcon SecState, 25 Oct 50, ibid, 40:1-04; msg SecState for USEmb Fr,

27 Oct 50, ibid, 410-12; memcon ADirOFMA, 27 Oct 50, RG :1:10, CD :100-1-1; Acheson,
610 Notes to Pages 326-31

Present at the Creation, 4SS-S9. For background on French thinking and particularly the

role of Jean Monnet in this matter, see George W. Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern:

Memoirs, 90-93.

61. Msg SecState for USEmb Fr, 27 Oct S0, FRUS 1950, III:41O-12; msg USAmb UK for SecState,

27 Oct S0, ibid, 412-15; memo ChJCS for SecDd, 27 Oct SO, RG 330, CD 091. 7 (Europe).

62. Memcon ADirOFMA, 19 Oct S0, RG 330, CD 300-1-1; memo ChJCS for SecDef, 27 Oct S0,

RG .BO, CD 091.7 (Europe); Marshall indirectly cited in memcon Murdaugh (ActingDirOFMA), 27 Oct S0, re Shinwell, RG 330, CD 300-1-1; memcon Murdaugh, 27 Oct S0, re

Portuguese Minister, ibid; memcon Murdaugh, 27 Oct S0, re s'jacob, ibid.

63. Memcon ADirOFMA, "Inclusion of Germany," 27 Oct S0, RG 330, CD 300-1-1.

64. Msg SecState for USEmb Fr, 29 Oct SO, FRUS 1950, III:4IS-IS; msg SecState for llSEmb Fr,

30 Oct S0, ibid, 4IS-23.

65. Ibid; msg SecState for llSEmb Fr, 31 Oct S0, ibid, 423-26, 426n3; memo SecDef for

ExccSecNSC, 8 Nov S0, ibid, 438-39. For CS plan, see DC 29 NADC, 26 Oct S0, ibid,

406-09, 406nl

66. Msg SecState for llSEmb Fr, 30 Oct S0, ibid, 423-24; Truman, Memoirs 11, 2S7-SS; interv

with Lyman L. Lemnitzer by Alfred Goldberg, Samuel A. Tucker, 21 Mar 74, 29-33, OSD Hist.

6"7. Msg SecState for llSEmb Fr, 31 Oct SO, FRUS 1950, III:423-26; msg SecState for llSEmb Fr,

3 Nov S0, ibid, 426-31; msg SecState for USEmb Belg, 9 Nov S0, ibid, 439-40.

68. Inten' with Lyman L. Lemnitzer by Alfred Goldberg, Lawrence Kaplan, Doris M. Condit, 4

Mar 76,30-31, OSD Hist; msg SecState for l:SEmb Fr, 31 Oct S0, FRlfS 1950, III:423-26.

69. Memo ,lCS for SecDe!', 18 Oct S0, wlmemo for USRepSG and 3 apps, RG :\30, CD 092.3

(NATO Gen); memo SecDd for ,lCS, 23 Oct S0, ibid; msg SecState for CSEmb Fr, 3 Nov SO,

FRUS 1950, III:426-31; memo [unsigned] for SecDef, 31 Oct S0, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe);

memo ADirOFMA for ATSD(FMA&MA), I Nov S0, ibid; memo SecDef for ExecSecNSC, S Nov

S0, FRUS 1950, llI:43S-39. DC 28 figures derived from memo,lCS for SecDef, 28 May 51,

wlapps, RG 21S, CCS 092 WEur (3-12-48) sec 82.

70. Msg SecState for llSEmb Fr, 3 Nov S0, FRUS 1950, III:426-31; memcon SecState, 3 Nov S0,

ibid, 432; msg llSAmb Fr for SecState, 4 Nov S0, ibid, 433-34; msg USAmb Fr for SecState,

12 Nov S0, ibid, 445; msg DepCSRepNAC for SecState , 13 Nov S0, ibid, 446-4S; msg

DeplJSRepNAC for SecState, 13 Nov S0, ibid, 448-50; memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for DepSecDe!', 14 Nov S0, RG .BO, CD 091. 7 (Europe).

71. Memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for DepSecDe!', 14 Nov S0, RG330, CD 091.7 (Europe); two msgs

SecState for USEmb CK, both 14 Nov "0, FRUS 1950, III:4"0-53; memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for

DepSecDef, 17 Nov "0, RG 3:\0, CD 091.7 (Europe).

"72. Msg llSAmb UK for SecState, 16 Nov "0, FRUS 1950, III:460-61; msg DepUSRepNAC for

SecState, 16 Nov "0, ibid, 4"7-60; msg USAmb Fr for SecState, 17 Nov "0, ibid, 461n2,

465-67.

"73. Memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for DepSecDct', J7 Nov "0, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); msg SecState

for DepliSRepNAC, 18 Nov "0, FRUS 1950, III:471-72; memo Murdaugh for DepSecDef, 20

Nov "0, RC; 330, CD 092 (Germany).

"74. Msg Dep1:SRepNAC for lISEmb Fr, 20 Nov "0, FRUS 1950, 111:474-7"; msg Dep1:SRepNAC

for SecState, 21 Nov S0, ibid, 47"-"79.

"7". Msg Depl'SRepNAC for SecState, 2" Nov "0, ibid, 482-S"; msg DepUSRepNAC for SecState,

27 :-Iov S0, ibid, 488-90; msg DepL'SRepNAC for SecState, 2S Nov ,,0, ibid, 493-95; msg

SecState for l:SEmb Fr, 29 Nov "0, ibid, 496.

76. Msg DepliSRepNAC for SecState, 3 Dec "0, ibid,S 1-1-1 5; Acheson, Present at the Creation,

482-83.

Acheson, Present at the Creation, 482-83; msg SecState for l'SEmb Fe 29 Nov SO, FRUS

1950, IlI:496; msg SecState for l:SAmb Fr, 29 Nov "0, ibid, 496-9S; msg lJSAmb Fr for

SecState, 30 Nov S0, ibid, 498-99; msg DepliSRepNAC for SecState, 2 Dec "0, ibid, ,,08-11;

msg DeplJSRepNAC for SecState, 2 Dec "0, ibid, ,,11-13; msg DepCSRepNAC for SecState, 3

Dec SO, ibid, 51:\-14; msg Depl'SRepNAC for SecState, 3 Dec SO, ibid, 514-15.
Notes to Pages 331-38 611

78. Mins US Truman-Attlce convs, 4-6 Dec 50, FRUS 1950, III: 1709, 1711, 1733-34,1747-48,

1750-52.

79. Mins US 4th mtg Truman-Attlee convs, 6 Dec 50, ibid, 1750: memo JCS for SecDef, "Effect

of Far East. ," 4 Dec 50, RG 330, CD 092.3 (Truman-Attlee); memo JCS for SecDef,

"European Defense Arrangements ," 4 Dec 50, ibid; two Itrs SecDef to SecState, 4 Dec

50, ibid. A recommendation to increase U.S. military preparations had also been sent to the

Secretary of State (see Marshall's intraoff note. 4 Dec 50, attached to memo JCS for SecDef,

"Effect of Far East ," 4 Dec 50, ibid).

80. Memo SecArmy, SecNavy, SecAF for SecDef, 4 Dec 50, RG 330, CD 092.7 (Korea); mins US

4th mtg Truman-Attlee convs, 6 Dec 50, FRUS 1950, III: 1750.

81. Memo Burns (ATSD(FMA&MA» for DepSecDef, 5 Dec 50, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe), bears

the initials of both Lovett and Marshall, indicating they both saw it, and an attached intraoff

memo states, "Action closed by Acheson-Truman-Attlee discussion"; mins US Truman-Attlee

convs, 5-7 Dec 50, FRUS 1950, III: 1738, 1747, 1749, 1757-58.

82. Msg SecState for USEmb Fr, 5 Dec 50, FRUS 1950, III:523-24; msg SecState for lJSEmb Fr, 6

Dec 50, ibid, 525-26; msg USAmb Fr for SecState, 7 Dec 50, ibid, 527-28; msg DeplJSRepNAC for SecState, 8 Dec 50, ibid, 528-30.

83. Rept D-D/196 (final) NAC Deps, 9 Dec 50, ibid, 531-38, especially 537-38.

84. Ibid, 532-35.

85. Rept DC 24/3, NAMC to NADC, 12 Dec 50, ibid, 548-64; rept D-D/I96 (final), NAC Deps,

9 Dec 50, ibid, 531-38; rept D/MC-D/2, NAMC, 12 Dec 50, ibid, 538-47, 538nl, 586n2;

msg SecState for USEmb Belg, 8 Dec 50, ibid. 530-31.

86. Msg, SecState for lJSEmb Belg, 8 Dec 50, ibid; memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for SecDef, 12 Dec 50,

RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo Beebe for Pace, 9 Dec 50, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe);

memo Murdaugh (for Burns) for Marshall, [nd, ca 9 Dec 50), RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO).

87. Memcon Barbara Evans (State), 15 Dec 50, FRUS 1950, 1Il:578-80.

88. Memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 15 Dec 50, Truman papers, PSF:NSC; Acheson, Present at the

Creation, 487: msg USAmb Fr for SecState, 14 Dec 50, FRUS 1950, III:571-72; msg

DepUSRepNAC for SecState, 14 Dec 50, ibid, 572-73; msg DepUSRepNAC for SecState, 14

Dec 51 [50), ibid, 573-75.

89. Brief of Bonn 319 in memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for SecDef, 20 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 092

(Germany); Ger reactions at mtg of Council of Europe Assembly, in msg USAmb Fr for

SecState, 25 Nov 50, FRUS 1950, 1Il:485-88.

90. Msg USChge UK for SecState, 15 Dec 50, FRUS 1950, III: 576-77; Itr SecState to SecDef, 13

Dec 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Germany); Itr DepSecDefto SecState, 16 Dec 50, ibid; msg SecState

for HICOG, 16 Dec 50, FRUS 1950, 1Il:580-82.

91. Ltr SecDef to SecState, 16 Dec 50, FRUS 1950, 1Il:582; msg lJSAmb Belg for SecState, 18 Dec

50, ibid, 583-84.

92. Mins USDeleg NAC and NADC. [18 Dec 50J, ibid, 585-95: testimony Pace and Collins, 22

Dec 50, in US Cong, Senate, Cte on Foreign Relations, Reviews of the World Situation:

1949-1950: Hearings Held in Executil'e Session (Historical Series, 1974),81 Cong, I and 2

sess, 434-35; mins USDeleg NAC and :'IIADC, 19 Dec 50, FRUS 1950, 1Il:595-96.

93. FRUS 1950, 1Il:595-96; Itr Truman to Eisenhower, 19 Dec 50, ibid, 604-05.

94. Memo [ExecSecNSC) for Pres, 26 Dec 50, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.

XVII. BUILDING A NATO STRUCTURE

1. Msg USAmb USSR to SecState, 4 Nov 50, US Dept State, Foreign Relations of the United

States, 1950 (hereafter cited as FRUS with year and volume numbn), IV:902-03; msg

SecState to USMission UN, 21 Dec 50, ibid, 920-21; msg HICOG for SccState, 7 Dec 50, ibid,
612 Notes to Pages 338-41

66H-71; FRUS 1951, III, pt 2:1747n4; Richard P. Stebbins et ai, Tbe United States in World

Affairs, 1951 (hereafter cited as Stebbins, US in World Affairs with appropriate year),

70-72.

2. Msg HICOG for SecState, 15 Dec 50, FRUS 1950, IV:671-73; Konrad Adenauer, Memoirs

1945-53, 272-309 (304, quote), 366.

3. Msg Ln&PolReptgDiv for OffHICOG, 13 Jan 5 I, FRUS 1951, III, pt 2: 1747-49; msg HICOG

for SecState, 18Jan 51, ibid, 1749-51, 1749n2; note Adenauer to ChAHC, 9 Mar 51, ibid,

1765-66, 1766n3; editorial note, ibid, 1766; Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1951,73-74.

4. Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1951, 62-63; msg DepHICOG for SecState, 2 Feb 5 I, FRUS

195/, III, pt 1:1003-05; paper ETS D-2 PPS State, 28 Dec 50, ibid, 1048-51; Lord Ismay,

NATO: Tbe First Piue Years, 1949-1954, 40.

5. Dean Acheson, Present at tbe Creation: My Years at tbe State Department, 55 I.

6. Ibid, 553-55; msg SecState for lJSEmb Fr, 8 Jan 51, FRUS 1951, III, pt I: 1058-60; note

USAmb USSR to SovietFgnMin, 19 Feb 5 I, ibid, 1083-84; editorial note, ibid, 1086; msg

USAmb USSR for SecState, I Mar 51, ibid, 1084-H5; msg Philip C. Jessup (USRep

Four-Power Exploratory Talks) for SecState, 5 Mar 5 I, ibid, 1087-89; msg Jessup for

SecState, 2H Mar 51, ibid, 1111-12; memcon State, 29 Mar 51, ibid, 11 12-17; msg Jessup

for SecState, 3 I Mar 5 I, ibid, I I IH-19 .

.., Msg Jessup for SecState, 3 Apr 51, ibid, 1120; msg SecState for Jessup, 13 Apr 51, ibid,

1124-26; note SecState to SovietFgnMin, [12 Jun 51], ibid, 1158-59; note SovietGovt to

USGO\'l, 20Jun 51, ibid, 1159-60; msgJessup for SecState, 22Jun 51, ibid, 1161-62,

1161n2.

8. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 491-92, 494; Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1951, 49;

Ronald J. Caridi, Tbe Korean War and American Politics: Tbe Republican Party as a Case

Study, 135; David R. Kepley, "The Senate and the Great Debate of 1951," Prologue: Journal

oftbe National Archiues (Winter 19H2), 2 17-19; statement Pres, 9 Sep 50, Public Papers of

the Presidents oftbe United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950 . (hereafter cited as Truman

Public Papers with year), 626; news cont', 11 Jan 51, Truman Public Papers, 1951,20;

editorial notes, FRUS 1951, III, pt 1: 14, 22-24. Text of the Wherry resolution is in US Cong,

Senate, Cte on Foreign Relations, Assignment ofGround Forces oftbe United States to Duty

in the European Area: Hearings, H2 Cong, 1 sess (1951),37-38.

9. Kepley, "Senate and the Great Debate of 1951," 220-24; memo JCS for SecDef, 29 Jan 5 I,

w/intraoff memo DepDirEXOS for DirEXOS, 26 Feb 51, RG 330, CD 371 (Europe).

10. Paper Henry M. Wriston, "Eisenhower Study Group 1tr to Pres Truman, 12 Dec 50," 22 Apr

68, Dwight D. Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers, 1916-52 (Eisenhower PPP), Dwight D.

Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kans; notes George M. Elsey (AdmAsst to Pres), 31 Jan 51,

FRU'i 1951, III, pt 1:449-5H; testimony Eisenhower, 1 Feb 51, Senate Cte on Foreign

Relations, Assignment of Ground Forces. in the European Area: Hearings, 1-35,

particularly 15-16,25,31.

II. Testimony Marshall, 15 Feb 51 [erroneously dated 15 Feb 50), Senate Cte on Foreign

Relations, Assignment of Ground Forces in tbe European Area: Hearings, 38-42,

46, 50, 55, 59-60, 65-66; memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 14 Feb 5 I, Truman papers,

President's Secretary's files (PSF), Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.

12. Senate Cte on Foreign Relations, Assignment of Ground Forces in tbe European

Area: Hearings, iii; for the committee's internal discussion concerning the form the

resolution should take, see US Cong, Senate, Cte on Foreign Relations, Eigb~y-Second

Congress, First Session, 1951, Executiue Sessions oftbe Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), (1976), III, pt 1:1-10, 47-100, 131-258, 299-342, 559-606;

Congressional Quarterly Service, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, 264-66; editorial

note, FRUS 1951, III, pt 1:22-24; Kepley, "The Senate and thc Grcat Debate of 1951,"

221-26; Caridi. Korean War and American Politics, 134-37.

U. Press conf. 5 Apr 51, Truman Public Papers, 1951,215.

1-4, Acheson, Present at tbe Creation, 495; Robert H. Ferrell. ed, The Eisenhower Diaries, 189.
Notes to Pages 341-45 613

15. Ltr Marshall to Eisenhower, 8 Mar 51. Eisenhower 1'1'1'; Itr Eisenhower to Harriman (SplAsst

to Pres), 8 Mar 51. ibid. "Harriman" folder.

16. Memo DepSeeDef for JtSees and JCS, 8 Feb 51. wlenes D-D(51 H NACDeps. 4 Jan 51, and

0-0(51)20, App A. RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo DepCanRepNAC for NACDeps.

17 Nov 50, FRUS 1950, Ill:461-64; memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for SeeDd, 22 Nov 50, RG 330.

CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); ltr SeeDd to SeeState, 5 Dec 50, ibid.

17. Ismay, NATO, 1949-1954,40.128; memo ASeeArmy for DepSeeDef, 3Jan 51, RG 330. CD

092.3 (NATO DefPdnBd); memo ASeeArmy for SeeDd, 3 Jan 51, ibid; memo DirONATA

OSD for W. T Van Allen (MB), 15 Jan 51, ibid.

18. Paper, "Activities in Europe Concerned with Materiel Support of NATO and MDAP," Ica Nov

51], 29-30, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); 1tr DepSecDef to ViceDepUSRepNAC. 14 Dec

51, ibid; memo CbMgmtCte OSD for DepSecDcf, 15 Jan 52, ibid; memo SecDef for Pres, 3

Jan 51, RG 330. CD 092.3 (NATO DefPdnBd).

19. Ismay, NATO, 1949-1954,35,68; memo ChJCS for SeeDd, 19 Oct 51. RG .BO. CD 0923

(NATO Gen); rept DC 24/3 NAMC to NADC, 12 Dec 50, FRUS 1950. 111:548-64, especially

551,

20. Memo DirONATA for ATSD(ISA), 23 Jan 51, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); Itr DirlSA State

to DepSecDef, 31 Jan 51, ibid; two ltrs DirlSA State to DepSeeDd, both 7 Feb 51. ibid;

memo DepSeeDcf for JtSees and JCS, 8 Feb 51, w/State's proposed US position. ibid.

21. Memo Asst to JtSecs for SecDel', 22 Feb 51, ibid; memo JCS for SeeDd. 22 Feb 51. ibid.

22. Ltr ActingSeeDcf to SeeState, 24 Feb 51, ibid. and repeated in msg ActingSecState for

DeplJSRepNAC, 26 Feb 51, FRUS 1951, Ill. pt 1:65-66; Itr DepSeeDcf to DirODM, 27 Feb

51, ibid, 67-68.

23. Memo ATSD(ISA) for DepSeeDef, 11 Mar 51), RG 330, CD 0923 (NATO Gen); Itr DepSeeDcf

to AetingSeeState, 7 Mar 51, FRUS 1951, Ill, pt 1:89-91: msg AetingSeeState for USEmb UK,

10 Mar 51, ibid. 95-97; msg SecState for DeplJSRepNAC, 29 Mar 51, ibid. 106; Itr ATSD(ISA)

to DepUSRepNAC, 27 Apr 51, RG 330. CD 092.3 (NATO Gen).

24. Communique Spofford (ChNACDeps), 5 May 51, FRUS 1951, III. pt I: 156-59; Itr DepUSRepNAC to ATSD(ISA), 24 May 51, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen).

25. Ltr ATSD(ISA) to DepUSRepNAC, 20 Aug 51. RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo Bradley

for SecDef, 13 Aug 51, ibid; memo DirONAIA for SeeDef. 14 May 51. wlene, ibid; memo

JCS for SeeDd. 10 Aug 51. ibid; ltr Lovett to SeeState, 2 Aug 51. FRUS 1951. Ill, pt

1:232-33; memo A.R. Matter (ONATA) for ATSD(ISA). J.l Aug 51. RG 330. CD 092.3 (NATO

Gen).

26. Memo AetingSeeDd for SecArmy et ai, 14 Nov 51, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NAI'O Gen); memo

Underwood (EXOS) for Carter (DirEXOS), 13 Nov 51. ibid; Itr Foster to SeeState. 15 Nov 5\,

ibid.

27. Final communi4ue NAC 7th sess, 15-20 Sep 51, Ottawa, in Ismay, NATO: 1949-1954,

187-89; State background paper LIS D-3, 15 Jan 52, RG .~30, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); prog

rept Harriman (ChTCC) to NAC, 26 Nov 51, FRlfS 1951. Ill. pt 1:357-63, especially 359;

memo AI'SD(ISA) for SeeDef, 23 Jan 52, w/US Comments on TCC Repr, 22 Jan 52.17-18.

RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo Lincoln (DdAdv to lJSRepTCC) for SeeDcf, 21 Dec

51, 5-6, RG 330. CD 092 (NAI'O (;en); msg Harriman for ECAAdmr. 13 Dec 51, RG 330. CD

092.3 (NAro Defl'dnBd).

28. Memo JCS for SeeDef. 9 Jan 52, RG 330, CD 092 (NATO Gen); memo ASD(C) for AI'SD(ISA),

10 Jan 52, wlenc, ibid; Itr SeeDd to SeeState. 15 Jan 52, ibid.

29. State background paper LIS 0-3. 15 Jan 52. RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo

ATSD(ISA) for SeeDd, 23 Jan 52. wit'S Comments on TCC Rept. 22 Jan 52. 17-18, ibid;

memo DirONAIA for AI'SD(ISA), 5 Jan 52. ibid; memo DepDirEXOS for SeeArmy et al. 19

Jan 52. ibid.

30. Paper C9-D/-l (Revise) NAC, 29 feb 52. FRUS 1952-1954, V. pt 1'198-203; doc C9-D/22

(final) NAC. 26 feb 52, ibid. 177-79; Ismay. NAIV: 1949-1954, 55-57,70.
614 Notes to Pages 345-51

:) I. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 625; msg SRE for ECAAdmr, 13 Dec 51, RG 330, CD

092:) (NATO Detl'dnBd); msg SecState to UKFgnSec, 7 Mar 52, FRUS 1952-1954, V, pt

I :293-95; memo ATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 7 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen).

32. Memcon Battle (SplAsst to SecState), 10 Mar 52, FRUS 1952-1954, V, pt 1:295-97, 297n2;

General Lord Ismay, The Memoirs of General Lord Ismay, 459, 461-62; Robert S. Jordan,

with Michael W. Bloome, Political Leadership in NATO: A Study in Multinational

DijJlomac}', 23-54, particularly 29-31.

33. Ltr DepLJSRepNAC to SecDef, 15 Dec 51, RG :)30, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); msg DEPTO 1157

DepL'SRepNAC for SecState, 5 Apr 52, RG 330, Lovett papers, "Classified Cables

Pawley's ." folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md; msg DEPTO 1159

DepLJSRepNAC for SecState, 4 Apr 52, ibid; editorial note, FRUS 1952-1954, V, pt 1:297.

34. Memcon ActingSecState, 4 Jan 49, FRUS 1949, VI:231-33; rept NSC 42/1, NSC to Pres, 22

Mar 49, ibid, 269-79; msg llSChge Greece for SecState, 24 Aug 50, FRUS 1950, III:240-41;

Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1951, 261-63; spl msg Pres to Cong, 12 Mar 47, Truman

Public Papers, 1947, 176-80; Steven L. Rearden, The Formative Years, 1947-1950, vol I in

History of the Office of the Secretar}' of Defense, 9.

35. Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, 164-67; Rearden, Formative Years, l48-69; memo

AetingSeeState for ExeeSeeNSC, 19 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, V:41O-16, 411n7, 1317-20.

36. Rept 42/1 NSC to Pres, 22 Mar 49, FRUS 1949, VI:269-79 (279, quote).

37. Memo OICTurkishAffs State, 25 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, V: 1322-24; Rearden, Formative }ears,

166-69; memeon lJSeeState, 27 Apr 50, FRUS 1950, V: 1252-53; memeon USeeState, 14 Jun

50, ibid, 1272-73.

38. Memo Henry S. Villard (PPS) for DirPPS State, 1 Mar 51, FRUS 1951, V:1126-27; Stebbins,

US in W(Jrld Affairs, 1950, 284-86; spl msg Pres to Cong, 19 Jul 50, Truman Public Papers,

1950, 532; memo ExeeSecNSC for NSC, 25 Aug 50, w/NSC 73/4, FRUS 1950, 1:387.

39. Ltr DepUSeeState to Burns, 18 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); ltr SecState to

SecDef, 31 Aug 50, FRUS 1950, 111:257-61; memo JtSees for SeeDef, 5 Sep 50, RG 330, CD

092.3 (NATO Gen).

40. Memo JCS for SeeDef, 9 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, V: 1306-09, 1309n4; Itr SecDef to SecState, II

Sep 50, FRUS 1950, 111:278-79; msg AetingSeeState for USEmb Turkey, 13 Sep 50, FRUS

1950, V:UI3-15.

41. Mins SFM Min-3 USDeleg, rea 13 Sep 50], FRUS 1950,111:1209-23, particularly 1217-20,

1218nlO; editorial note, FRUS 1950, V:1315; Itr DepUSecState to ATSD(FMA&MA), 3 Oct

50, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO DefCmte).

42. Memo SeeDef for JCS, 9 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 092.3 (:-.lATO Gen); memo JCS for SecDef, 19

Oct 50, ibid; memo SeeDef for JCS, 10 Nov 50, ibid.

43. Msg SecState for ActingSecState, 19 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, V:1320-22; msg USAmb Turk for

SecState, 14 Dee 50, ibid, 1337-38; memcon ASeeState(NEA), 24 Jan 51, FRUS 1951,

V:IIIO-13; memo Henry S. Villard for DirPPS State, 5 Feb 51, ibid, 1117-19; memo

DepUSecState for ExeeSecNSC, 6Jul 51, ibid, 489; Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1951,

332-34; Itr SecState to SeeDef, 24 Mar 51, FRUS 1951,111, pt 1:501-05.

44. Memo JtSees for SeeDef, 29 Mar 51. RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo JCS for SeeDef,

10 Apr 51, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 30 Apr 51, RG 3:)0, CD 092 (Turkey); memo JCS for

SeeDef, 22 May 51, ibid; Itr SecDcfto SecState, 14 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen).

For Eisenhower's views on 2 April 1951, see FRUS 1951,111, pt 1:507, editorial note.

45. Statement of Poliey NSC [NSC 1091 approved by President 24 May 51, FRUS 1951,

V: 1148-51, 1148n I; NSC Staff Study INSC 109], ibid, 1151-62; NSC 103/1 (Greece),

approved by President 15 Feb 5 I, amended and approved by President 24 May 5 I, ibid,

485n2.

46. Memo ATSD(ISA) for DepSeeDef, 6 Sep 51, RG 3W, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); editorial note,

FRUS 1951, V: 1180; memo DepATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 15 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO

Gen); Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1952, 94n36; Ismay, NATO, 1949-1954, 20-21,

39-40.
Notes to Pages 351-54 615

47. Msg 884 USAmb Turkey for State, 7 Mar 52, RG 59, 740.5/3-752; msg 1355 l:SAmb Turkey

for State, 31 May 52, RG 59, 882.2553/53152; msg 632 CSAmb Turkey for State, 12 Nov 52,

RG 59, 882.2553/11-1252; memcon USAmb Turkey, 2 May 53, RG 59, 782.5 MSP/5-853.

48. MSG 994 USAmb Turkey for State, 31 Mar 52, RG 59, 780.5/3-3152; memcon ActingASecState(EUR), 6Jul 51, FRUS 1951, lll, pt 1;554-55; draft Anglo-US Agmt by LlKRepSG NATO,

[JuI51], ibid, 559-61; rev draft State, 18Jul 51, ibid, 563-64; msg ActingSecState for lJSEmb

Turkey, 20 Sep 51, ibid, 576-77; Itr Georgc C. McGhee to Nash, 18 Jul 52, w/memcon

USAmb Turkey, 2 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Yugoslavia).

49. Ltr McGhee to Nash, 18 Jul 52, w/memcon LlSAmb Turkey, 2 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 092

(Yugoslavia); Itr USChge Turkey to USAmb-Desig Turkey, "Major Issues in U.S.-Turkish

Relations," 13 Jul 53, RG 84, Ankara Emb files, lot 571'72, "400 Turkey-Effectiveness

Armed Forces."

50. Msg USAmb Turkey for SecState, 22 Aug 50, FRUS 1950, Y: 1299-1300; msg USAmb Turkey

for SecState, 12 Jan 51, ibid, 1353-54; Itr DepUSecState to ATSD(lSA), 31 Jan 51, FRUS

1951, Y:1113-15.

51. Ltr DepUSecState to ATSD(ISA), 31 Jan 51, FRUS 1951, Y: 113-15; memo JCS for SecOef, 2

Feb 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Turkey); Itr DepUSecState to ATSO(ISA), 15 Mar 51, ibid; Itr SecOef

to SecState, 1 Jun 51, ibid; memo SecNavy for SecDef, 27 Feb 51, ibid; Itr ATSD(lSA) to

DepUSecState, 2 Mar 51, ibid; Itr DepUSecState to ATSO(ISA), 3 Apr 51, ibid; Itr DepSecDef

to SecState, 9 Jun 52, ibid; msg 313 Ellsworth Bunker (USAmb Italy) for State, 21 Jul 52, RG

59,782.517-2152; memcon USAmb Turkey, 2 May 53, RG 84, Ankara Embassy files, lot

571'72, "322.2 Straits 1953."

52. Memo ASecState(EUR) for OepUSecState, 2 Jun 52, RG 59, 711.5638217-2252; memo

ASecState(EUR) for DepUSecState, 9 Oct 52, RG 59, 711.56382/10-952.

53. Memo ASecState(EUR) for OepUSecState, 9 Oct 52, RG 59, 711. 56382/10-952; memo SecAF

for SecDef, 31 Dec 52, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Turkey); memo ASecState(EUR) for SecState, 8Jan

53, RG 59, "711.56382/1-853; msg 979 USAmb Turkey for State. 7 Feb 53, RG 59,

711.56382/2-753; memcon USAmb Turkey, 2 May 53, RG 84, Ankara Emb files, lot 571'72,

"322.2 Straits 1953"; Itr USChge Turkey to Amb-Desig Turkey, 13 Jul 53, ibid, "400

Turkey-Effectiveness Armed Forces."

54. Memo ASecState(NEA) for DeplJSecState, 14 Aug 50, FRUS 1950, Y;1289-92; memcon

MajGen Horace L. McBride (ChfJAMMAT), 28Jun 50, ibid, 1275-77; memcon DirGTl State,

12 Feb 51, FRUS 1951, lll, pt 1:466-73.

55. Memcon ChfJAMMAT, 28Jun 50, FRUS 1950, Y:1275-77; memo 01CTurkishAffs State, 25

Sep 50, ibid, 1322-24; memo ActingSecState to ExecSecNSC, 26 Jun 52, RG 59, S/S-NSC

files, lot 630351, "NSC 109 series"; msg Topol 47 USAmb Turkey for SRE, 21 Mar 53. RG

59,782.5/3-2153.

56. Msg 642 lJSAmb lurkey for State, 21 Jan 52, RG 59, 611.82/1-2152; memcon USAmb

Turkey, 24 Oct 52, RG 59, 782.5 MSP/lI-652; msg 60 lJSChge Turkey for State, 30 Jul 53,

RG 59, 611.8217-3053; memo ActingSecState for ExecSec NSC, 26Jun 52, RG 59, S/S-NSC

files, lot 63D351, "NSC 109 series."

57. Msg 60 LlSChge Tlirkey for State, 30 Jul 53, RG 59. 611.82/7-3053; Itr lJSChge Turkey to

USAmb-Desig Turkey, 13 Jul 53, RG 84, Ankara Fmb files, lot 571'72, "400 Turkey-Effectiveness Armed Forces."

58. Msg USRepUN for SecState, 10 Dec 46, FRUS 1946, Y: 1083-85; msg SeeState for USRepUN,

30 Dec 46, ibid, 1090; Itr SecState to ChSenForeignRelationsCte, 18 Jan 50, FRUS 1950,

Ill: 1549-55; memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 7 Jul 50, Truman papers, PSI'.

59. MemoJCSfor SecDef, 16 Dec 47, RG 330, CD 1-1-35; memoJCS for SecOef, 16Apr49,

RG 330, CD 6-1-35; memo JCS for SeeDef, 27 Apr 50, RG DO, CO 337 (Four Powers);

memo JCS for SecDef, 3 May 50, FRUS 1950, lll: 1560-61; Itr Pres to SecState, 16 Jun 50,

ibid, 1562; rept NSC 72/ I, SecSt:lte to NSC, 3 Jul 50, ibid, 1570-72.

60. Memo SecDd for Pres, 31 Jul 50, FRlfS 1950, III: 1572-"73, 1573n 1; memrcd ActingDirBoB,

6 Sep 50, Frederick J. Lawton papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.
616 Notes to Pages 354-57

61. Editorial note, FRlfS /950, 111:1577; news eonf, 2 Nov 50, Truman Public Papers, /950,

697; news eonf, 28 Dec 50, ibid, 762; memo JCS for SeeDef, 12 Jan 51, RG 330, CD 092

(Spain); memo ASeeState(ElJR) for SeeState, [25 Nov 50), FRlfS /950, Ill: 1577-79; memo

SeeDef for ExeeSeeNSC, 29 Jan 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Spain); notes Elsey, 31 Jan 51, 10-11,

Elsey papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo; memo (ExeeSeeNSC] for Pres, 2

Feb 51, Truman papers, PSF:NSC; rept NSC 72/4, 1 Feb 52, FRlfS /95/, IV, pt 1:789-90.

62. Msg AetingSeeState for USEmb Spain, 6 Mar 51, FRlfS /95/, IV, pt 1:802-()4, 804n4; msg

USAmb Spain for SeeState, 15 Mar 51, ibid, 807 -09; tbree memcons State, 19 Mar 51, 30 Mar

51, 2 Apr 51, all in RG 330, CD 092 (Spain); Itr SeeDef to SeeState, 1 May 51, ibid; memo

ASeeState(ElJR) for SeeState, 14 May 51, FRlfS /95/, IV, pt 1:816-17; Itr SeeState to SeeDef,

16 May 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Spain); memo for file E.S. Hartsborn, Jr. (OFMA OSD), 21 May

51, ibid; memo DepASeeState(EUR) for SeeState, 3 Jul 51, FRlfS /95/, IV, pt 1:825-26.

63. Editorial note, FRUS /95/, IV, pt 1:818-19; memoJCS for SeeDef. 19Jun 51, RG 330, CD

092 (Spain); memo JtSees for SeeDef. 26 Jun 51, ibid; memo [ExeeSeeNSC) for Pres, 28 Jun

51, Truman papers, PSF:NSC; rept NSC 72/6, 27 Jun 51, approved by Pres 28 Jun 51, FRUS

/95/, IV, pt 1:820-22; editorial note, ibid. 834-35.

64. Msg SeeState for USEmb Spain, 12 Jul 51, FRUS /95/, IV, pt 1:828-29; memo

DepASeeState(EUR), 21 Nov 51, w/ene, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Spain); memo CNO for SeeDef,

11 Jul 51, ibid; memeon CNO, 16 Jul 51, FRUS /95/, IV, pt 1:832-34; editorial note, ibid,

838: Itr Hist OSD to Aandahl (OffHistBurPA State), 12 Jan 78, w/ene A, OSD Hist.

65. Ltr ASeeState(EUR) to ATSD(ISA), 24 Aug 51. RG 330, CD 092.2 (Spain); memo JCS for

SeeDef, 7 Sep 51. ibid; Itr SeeDefto SeeState, 10 Sep 51, ibid; mins USDeleg 5th mtg US, UK,

Fr ForMins Washington, 13 Sep 51, FRUS /95/, Ill, pt 1: 1286; memeon DepASeeState(EUR),

19 Nov 51, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Spain); memo Ohly (Asst to DMS) for StateMbrMAAC, 21 Nov

51, RG 330, CD 091.3 (MDAP/Spain).

66 Memcon [Chge] USEmb Spain, 29 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Spain); news eonf, 7 Feb 52,

Truman Public Papers, 1952-53, 141, 144; Itr DepUSeeState to SeeDef, 28 Mar 52, RG 330,

CD 091.3 (Spain).

67. MemoJCS for SeeDef, 16Jan 52, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Spain); memo DirOFMA for ATSD(ISA),

29 Jan 52, ibid; memo ChMAAC ODMS for All MAAC Mbrs, 2 Feb 52, ibid; memo ATSD(ISA)

for SeeDef. 24 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Spain); Itr DepUSeeState to SeeDef, 11 Feb 52,

RG 330, CD 092.2 (Spain); memo JCS for SeeDef, 3 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Spain); Itr

SeeDef to SeeState, 12 Mar 51, ibid; memo AetingSeeDef for JCS, 24 Mar 52, ibid; Itr

DepUSeeState to SeeState, 28 Mar 52, ibid; memo G.A. Wyeth (Asst to JtSees) for SeeDef, 15

Oct 52. w/ene paper ISA, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Spain).

68. MemoJCS for SeeDef, 15 Feb 52, RC; 330, CD 091.3 (Spain); Itr SeeDefto SeeState, 4 Mar

52, ibid; memo SeeAF for SeeDef, 11 Mar 52, ibid; memo AetingSeeDef for SeeAF, 29 Mar

52, w/3 enes, ibid; memo ASeeAF for DepSeeDef, 2 Apr 52, ibid; memo DepSeeDef for JCS,

5 Apr 52, ibid; memo JCS for SeeDef, 23 May 52, ibid; MSA, Third Report to Congress on

the Mutual Securi~}' Program, 31 Dec 52, 6-7

69. Memred lJSEmb Spain, [ea 5 Jul 52), RG 59, 752.517-552; msg 41 USAmb Spain for State, 12

Ju152, RG 59, 711.56352/7-1252; Itr Truman to Franco, 23Ju152, RG 59, 611.5217-2352;

msg 82 USAmb Spain for State, 25 Jul 52, RG 59, 711.5635217-2552; msg 352 USAmb Spain

for State, 30 Oct 52, RG 59, 711. 56352/10-3052.

70. Msg 46 USAmb Spain for SeeState, 14 Jul 52, RG 59, 711. 5635217-1452; memo ATSD(ISA)

for SeeDef, 8 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Spain); memo lJSAmb Spain for SpMinFgnAffs, 6

Oct 52, RG 59, 711. 56352/10-952; memo lJSAmb Spain for SpMinFgnAffs, 7 Oct 52, ibid;

msg 362 USAmb Spain for State, 4 Nov 52, RG 59, 711.56352/11-452; msg 360 USAmb

Spain for State, 4 Nov 52, ibid.

71. Memo DepASeeState(EUR) for DepUSeeState, 5 Sep 52, RG 59, 752.5 MAP/9-552; intraoff

memo Wyeth for SeeDef, 15 Oct 52, w/paper ISA, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Spain); Itr SeeDef to

SeeState, 8 Dec 52, RG 59, 752.5/12-852; memred R.M. Burnett (OMA), 24 Dec 52, w/enes,
Notes to Pages 357-60 617

RG 330, CD III (1954); msg 572 USAmh Spain for State, 24 Jan 55, Rti 59, "711.56552/

1-2455; Itr AetingSecState to SecDef, 5 Feh 55, RG 59, 752.5MSP/2-555.

72. Memo ActingSecDef for JCS, 24 Jan 55, RG 550, ISA files, Nash papers, "MDAP Progress"

folder; msg 572 USAmh Spain for State, 24 Jan 53, RG 59, 711.56352/1-24B; Dept State,

American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, puh no 6446 (\ 957), 1: 1696-91'1.

73. Memo DepLJSecState for ExeeSecNSC, 31 Jan 50, FRUS 1950, IV: 1360-61; msg SecState for

lJSEmh Yugo, 1 Mar 50, ibid, 1371'1; msg SeeState for lJSEmh Yugo, II Mar 50, ihid,

131'14-86; memo ActingSecState for ExecSecNSC, 16 May 50, ihid, 1418-20.

74. Rept NSC 11'1/4, 17 Nov 49, ibid, 1342-4::\, 1345-48; msg USChge for SecState, "7 Jan 50,

ibid, 1352; memo DeplJSecState for ExecSecNSC, ::\ I Jan 50, ihid, 1::\60-61; msg SecState for

USEmh Yugo, 11 Mar 50, ibid, 1::\1'14-86; memo JCS for SecDef, 21'1 Apr 50, RG 350, CD .B7

(Four Powers); memo AetingSeeState for ExecSecNSC, 16 May 50, FRUS 1950, IV: 1418-20;

msg SeeState for USEmh Yugo, 28 Jun 50, ibid, 14::\ 1-::\2.

75. Msg SeeState for USMission UN, 24 Jul 50, FRUS 1950, IV: 1436-37; memo ExecSecNSC to

NSC, 17 Aug 50, ibid, 1439-40; memo JCS for SeeDef, 2::\ Aug 50, ibid, 1441-44; memo

ASeeState(EUR) for DepLJSecState, 25 Sep 50, ibid, 1451-54; editorial note, ihid, 1482-83;

Itr ATSD(FMA&MA) to DepUSeeState, ::\0 Oct 50, RG ::\30, CD 092 (Korea); memo

ActingExecSecOSD for SecArmy, 31 Oct 50, ibid.

76. Msg ActingSecState for USEmb Yugo, 20 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, IV:1450-51; memo DepDirMDA State for DirOMA OSD, 9 Oct 50, ibid, 1462-6::\; Itr SecState to ChScnForeignRelationsCte, ::\1 Oct 50, ihid, 1491-92; memo IExecSecNSC] for Pres, 1::\ Oct 50, Truman

papers, PSF:NSC; memcon SecState, 19 Oct 50, FRlfS 1950, 1V:1474-78; msg l'SAmb Yugo

for SeeState, 1 Nov 50, ibid, 1492-9::\; msg SecState for USEmb Yugo, 1 :'\Iov 50, ibid, 1494;

msg SeeState for lJSEmh Yugo, 14 Nov 50, ihid, 1499-150 I; msg L:SAmb Yugo for SecState,

26 Nov 50, ibid, 1505-06.

77. Paper State, 25 Oct 50, FRUS 1950, 1V:14HO-H2; memcon SecState, 27 Oct 50, ibid,

1484-85; msg LJSAmb Yugo for SecState, 31 Oct 50, ihid, 1481'1-89; msg SecState for

(Certain Diplomatic Offices], ::\ Nov 50, ihid, 1494-96; editorial note, ihid, 1507-09.

71'1. Memo ActingExecSee for JCS, 1 Nov 50, RG ::\::\0, CD 091.3 MDAP (Yugoslavia); msg SecState

for LJSEmh Fr, 4 Dec 50, FRUS 1950, IV: 1509; memo JCS for SecDcf, .., Dec 50, 4-5, RG ::\::\0,

CD 091.3 MDAP (Yugoslavia).

79. Memo JCS for SecDef, 1'1 Jan 51, RG 330, CD 091:\ MDAP (Yugoslada); Itr ATSD(lSA) to

DepLJSecState, 1 Feb 51, ibid; memeon Frank A. Lindsay, 2::\ Nov 50, RG 59, 768.5/112::\-50;

memo Robert P. Joyce (PPS State) for DepUSecState and DirEE, 12 Dec 50, RG 59,

768.5/12-1250; memo Joyce for DepLJSecState and DirEE, 2Jan 51, ibid; memrcd Wisner,

3Jan 51, ibid; editorial note, FRUS 1951, IV, pt 2:1721.

1'10. Ltr DepllSeeState to DepSeeDef, 17 Jan 51, FRlfS 1951, IV: 161'14-1'16: notes Elsey, lea :\ 1Jan

51], 10, Elsey papers; memo JCS for SecDcf, 2 Feb 51, FRlfS 1951, IV, pt 2: 1719-21: memo

JCS for SecDel', 10 Mar 5 I, RG 330, CD 09 1.:\ MDAP (Yugoslavia); memo AetingSecDef for

SecArmy, :\0 Jul 5 I, ibid.

81. Memeon Bromley K. Smith (SplAsst to SeeState), 1::\ Feb 51, FRUS 1951, IV. pt 2:17:\1-:\2;

msg SeeState for USEmh UK, 14 Feh 51, ibid, 17::\:\-::\4; msg l!SAmh USSR for SeeState, 20

Feb 5 I, ibid, 17::\1'1-40.

82. Msg llSAmb Yugo for SecState, 26 Jan 51, ibid, 1701-02; msg LlSAmb Yugo for SeeState. 19

Feb 51, ibid, 1736-38

83. Paper NSC (NSC 18/6),7 Mar51, RG 59, S/S-:'IJSC files, lot63D:\51, "NSC 18 series"; memo

JCS for SeeDcf, 6 Mar 51, RG ::\:\0, CD 092 (Yugoslavia); memo ExeeSeeNSC for Pres, "7 Mar

51, Truman papers, PSF:NSC; memo ExeeSeeNSC for NSC, 17 Feh 59, w/cne, 6, OSD Hist.

84. Memo ASecState(EUR) for DepUSeeState, 16 Mar 51, FRUS 1951, IV, pt 2: 1755-55; editorial

note, ihid, 1775-76.

1'15. Memo ATSD(lSA) for DepUSeeState, "Military Assistance Discussions ," ::\0 Apr 5 I, RG

:\:\0, cn 091.::\ MDAP (Yugoslavia); memo ATSD(ISA) for DepllSeeState, ::\0 Apr 51, FRUS

195/, IV, pt 2:1786-88; memoJCS for SeeDef, 2Ju151, w/ene, RG :\:\0, CD 091.3 MDAP
618 Notes to Pages 360-65

(Yugoslavia); Itr ActingASecState to SecDef, 6 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Yugoslavia); memo

JCS for SecDcf, 19 Dec 52, ibid.

86. Ltr YugoAmb to SecState, 28Jun 51, RG 59, 768.5/6-2851; editorial note, FRUS 1951, IV,

pt 2:1838; memo ChfJtMDAPSurveyMission for SecDef, 24 Sep 51, w/enc, RG 330, CD

091.3 MDAP (Yugoslavia); msg SecState for USEmb Yugo, 9 Oct 51, FRUS 1951, IV, pt

2: 1851-53; msg ActingSecState for USEmb Yugo, 30 Oct 51, ibid, 1856-58; editorial notes,

ibid, 1840, 1862-63.

87. MemoJCS for SecDef, 7 Nov 51, RG 330, CD 091.3 MDAP (Yugoslavia); OMA OSD, MDAP

(Mutual Defense Assistance Program): Department ofDefense Operations, Jan 52, 21, Jan

53, 24.

88. Ltr McGhee (USAmb Turkey) to Nash, 18Jul 52, w/memcon, RG 330, CD 092 (Yugoslavia);

Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1952, 422-23.

89. Ltr SecDef to SACEUR, 21 Dec 50, Eisenhower PPP, "Marshall" folder.

90. In memo ASD(C) for DepSecDef, lea 24 Feb 51), RG 330, CD 370.21, McNeil criticized the

initial reliance on too many U.S. personnel; Ismay, NATO, 1949-1954, 37-38,70; SACEUR,

Annual Report to The Standing Group North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2 Apr 52, 8.

91. Ltr Eisenhower to Capt E.E. Haslett, 1 Nov 50, Eisenhower PPP, box 56; details of trip in

FRlfS 1951, Ill, pt 1:392-458; Itr SACEUR to Harriman, 14 Jan 51, Eisenhower PPP,

"Harriman" folder. Eisenhower quoted in notes Elsey, 31 Jan 51, FRUS 1951, Ill, pt

1:449-58

92. Ltr SACEUR to Marshall, 12 Mar 51, RG 330. CD 370.21 (SHAPE); Itr SACEUR to Harriman,

24 Feb 51, Eisenhower PPP, "Harriman" folder; Itr SACEUR to Bradley, 30 Mar 51, ibid,

"Bradley" folder.

93. Ismay, NATO, 1949-1954, 165; Itr SACH::R to Harriman, 20 Apr 51, Eisenhower PPP,

"Harriman" folder.

94. Editorial note, FRUS 1951, III, pt 1:498; Itr SACEUR to Marshall, 12 Mar 51, RG 330, CD

370.21 (SHAPE); Itr Marshall to SACEUR, 21 Mar 51, ihid.

95. Editorial notes, FRUS 1951, Ill, pt 1:498. 507, 535; interoff memo DirONATA for SecDef,

18Jun 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe). Ismay, NATO, 1949-1954,72-74, indicates that

SACElJR's direct command of Allied Forces Central Europe continued until July 1953 under

Ridgway.

96. Ltr SACEUR to Harriman, 24 Feh 51, Eisenhower PPP, "Harriman" folder. The correspondence between these two men corroborates that the arrangements Eisenhower discussed in

the 24 February 1951 letter did in fact materialize.

97. Ltr SACEUR to Harriman, 12 May 51, Eisenhower PPP. "Harriman" folder; Itr Harriman to

SACEUR, 18 May 51, ibid.

98. Msg Marshall for SACEUR, 12 Sep 51, Eisenhower PPP. "Marshall" folder; SACEUR to

Marshall, 15 Sep 51, ibid; Itr Marshall to SACEUR, 24 Sep 51, ibid.

99. Memo DepASecState(ElJR) for SecState. 21 May 52, FRlfS 1952-1954, V, pt 1:298-300;

editorial note, ibid, 297.

100. Msg SecState for DepUSRepNAC, 6 Feb 51. FRlfS 1951, Ill, pt 1:464-65; msg DepUSRepNAC

for SecState, 20 Feh "iI, ibid, 4"74-7"i; msg DeplJSRepNAC for SecState, 22 Feb "iI, ibid,

47"i-76; msg DepUSRepNAC for SecState, 26 Feb "i 1, ibid, 477-79; Itr SACEUR to Harriman,

2 Apr 5 I, Eisenhower PPP, ., Harriman" folder.

101. Msg ActingSecState for DepUSRepNAC, 9 Mar "iI, FRlfS 195/. III, pt 1:488; draft rept State,

Ica 14 Mar 51), ibid, 488-96; Walter S. Poole. 1950-1952, vol IV in The Historv oftheJoint

Chiefs (~f Staff The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policr, 239-42.

102. MemoJCS for SecDef, 2"1 Apr "i1. w/enc, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); Itr ActingSecDef

to SecState, 26 Apr 51, ibid; Itr SecState to SecDef, 9 May 51, ibid; memo ChJCS for

DirONATA. 11 May "i I, ibid; Itr ActingSecDef to SecState, 12 May "i 1, ibid; editorial note,

FRUS 1951, III, pt 1:"i22-24; memcon DepDirGTI State, 10 Aug "iI, ihid, V:162-63.

103. Memo Ch./CS for SecDel'. 13 ./ul "i I. RG :\50, CD 091."7 (Europe); msg SecState for

DepUSRepNAC, 14.1ul "i 1. FRUS 1951, III, pt 1:559; Itr AetingSecDef to SecState, 17.1ul 51,
Notes to Pages 365-70 619

RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); memo DirONATA for DepCNO(Ops) and DirJtStfJCS, 7 Aug 51,

ibid; memo ATSD(lSA) for DepSecDef, 20 Aug 51, ibid; memo ActingDirONATA for VCNO,

23 Aug 51, ibid; editorial note, FRUS 1951, Ill, pt 1:574.

104. 1nteroff memo Matter (for DirONATA) for SecDef, 18 Jun 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe);

memo DirONATA for SecDef, 14 May 51, w/NATO Summary Report, 13-14, RG 330, CD

092.3 (NATO Gen); msg USAmb Fr for SecState, 11 Ju151, FRUS 1951,111, pt 1:556-58;

working paper State, 28 Aug 51, w/encs, ibid, 568-74; editorial note, ibid, 574. Eisenhower

pushed for a southern European command under Carney-see ltr SACEleR to Harriman, 1

Jun 51, Eisenhower PPP, "Harriman" folder.

105. Working paper State, 28 Aug 51, w/apps, FRUS 1951,111, pt 1:568-74, particularly 572;

memo ASecState(EUR) for USecState, 9 Oct 51, ibid, 591-92; msg USAmb Greece for

SecState, 12 Oct 51, ibid, 594-95; msg Depto 454 DepUSRepNAC for SecState, 15 Oct 51,

RG 59, 740.5/10-1551; msg DepUSRepNAC for ActingSecState, 31 Oct 51, FRUS 1951, 111,

pt 1:602-04.

106. Ltr DepUSecState to SecDef, 31 Oct 51, w/statement, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen);

Acheson, Present at the Creation, 562-65; Ismay, NATO, 1949-1954, 73.

107. Memo OC1NCNELM for Holmes (USMin UK), 7 Nov 51, FRUS 1951, 111, pt 1:605-07; mins

2d formal mtg Truman and Churchill, 7 Jan 52, FRUS 1952-1954, VI, pt 1:770-73;

Acheson, Present at the Creation, 601-03; memo ATSD(ISA) for DirOLL, 23 Dec 52,

w/paper, "Middle East Defense Organization," RG 330, CD 334 (Armed Svs Cmte); memo

ATSD(lSA) for SecDef, rca 28Jan 52], RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); Itr SecDefto Pres, 28Jan

52, ibid; Ismay, NATO, 1949-1954, 74-77.

108. Ismay, NATO, 1949-1954, 73; memo DepATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 9 May 52, RG 330, CD

092.3 (NATO Gen).

109. Memo DepATSD(lSA) for SecDef, 9 May 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); Ismay, NATO,

1949-1954, 73.

110. Ismay, NATO, 1949-1954,77-78; Poole, 1950-1952, 282-84.

111. Memo DirONATA for SecDef, 14 May 51, w/NATO Summary Report, 12, RG 330, CD 092.3

(NATO Gen).

XVIII. INCREASING NATO STRENGTH

1. SACEUR, Annual Report to the Standing Group, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(hereafter cited as SACEUR, First Annual Report), [2 Apr 52], 13; NATO Information

Service, The NATO Handhook, 1Jan 52, 29; briefing book State for SACEUR, rca 1 Jan 51],

US Dept State, Foreign Relations o/the United States. 1951 (hereafter cited as FRUS with

year and volume number), III, pt 1:460-64, 461n3.

2. Briefing book State for SACEUR, rca 1 Jan 51], FRUS 1951,111, pt 1:460-64, 461n3; memo

Col Royden E. Beebe, Jr. (DirONATA) for DepUSRepSG NATO, 5 Jan 51, RG 330, CD 091.7

(Europe); draft rcd [State] State-JCS mtg, 20 Feb 51, FRUS 1951, 111, pt 1:58-64; paper (ISAC

D-4/7a) [extract] ISAC State, [ca 20Jun 51], ibid, 193-97, 193n1; msg ActingSecState for

DepUSRepNAC, 17 Aug 51, ibid, 248-53, particularly par 9, 252.

3. Notes on White House mtg by George M. Elsey (AdmAsst to Pres), 31 Jan 51, FRUS 1951, 111,

pt 1:449-58 (454, quote); memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 14 Feb 51, Truman papers,

President's Secretary's files (PSF), Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo; msg

DepUSRepNAC for SecState, 5 Apr 51, FRUS 1951, Ill, pt I: 119-21.

4. Memo JCS for SecDef, 28 May 51, w/apps, RG 218, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec

82. Memo DirONATA for SecDef, 21 Jun 51, RG 3.10, CD 091.7 (Europe), states that the gap

amounted to 438 naval vessels and 3.459 aircraft. Ltr AdmAsst in Pres Off to DirONAfA

OSD, 27 Jun 51, w/paper, "US Forces in Defense of Western Europe," ibid, gives slightly
620 Notes to Pages 370-74

different divisional requirements figures but maintains the gap at 4, 11, and 12 divisions for

the three time periods.

5. Memo Lovett for Omar Bradley, 26 May 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); draft rcd [State)

State-JCS mtg, 7 Mar 51, FRUS 1951, lll, pt 1:82-86 (82, quote).

6. Ltr Lincoln Gordon (EconAdviser to SplAsst to Pres) to Burns (ATSD(lSA)), 7 Jun 51, RG 330,

CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo DirONATA for SecDef, 14 May 51, w/NATO Summary Report,

6, ibid.

7 Memo Burns, Scott (DirOMA), and Beebe for SecDef, 20 Jun 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe);

ISAC paper (D-4/7a) [extract], ISAC State, [ca 20 Jun 51], FRUS 1951, lll, pt 1:193-97,

193n 1.

8. Memo Burns, Scott, Beebe for SecDef, 20Jun 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); memcon

Martin (DirOEurRegAffs State), 21 Jun 51, FRUS 1951, lll, pt 1: 197-204; memo SecDef for

ChJCS, 26Jun 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe).

9. Ltr Rose A. Conway (AdmAsst in Pres Off) to DirONATA. 27 Jun 51, w/paper, "US Forces in

Defense of Western Europe," w/handwritten note, "Approved 6/27/51 Harry S Truman," RG

330, CD 091.7 (Europe); msg SecState for Dep USRepNAC, 26Jun 51, FRUS 1951, lll, pt

1:210-11; memo DirONATA for Nash, 4 Jul 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe).

10. Memo SecDef for ChJCS, 26 Jun 51, RG 330, CD 091. 7 (Europe); memo JCS for SecDef, 28

Jul 51, w/encs, ibid; memo ActingSecDef for DeplJSRepSG NATO [VAdm Jerauld Wright), 10

Aug 51, w/encs, RG 330. CD 092.3 (NATO).

11. Ltr ATSD(lSA) to DirlSA State, 17 Aug 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); Itr DirONATA to

SplAsst to CoS SHAPE, 6 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); msg ActingSecState for

DeplJSRepNAC, 17 Aug 51, FRUS 1951, lll, pt 1:248-53.

12. Intraoff memo DirONATA for DepSecDef, [ca 28 Jul 51], w/memo JCS for SecDef, 28 Jul 51,

RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe). OSD knew some of the thinking in Eisenhower's headquarters-see memo DirONATA for DepUSRepSG NATO, 5 Jun 51, ibid, and memo ATSD(lSA) for

SecDef, 25 Aug 51, ibid.

13. Memo DirONATA for DepUSRepSG NATO,S Jun 51, ibid; memo ATSD(lSA) for SecDef, 25

Aug 51, wlintraoff memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 25 Aug 51, ibid.

14. Ltr DirONATA to SplAsst to CoS SHAPE, 6 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO); Itr DirONATA

to SplAsst to CoS SHAPE, 28 Sep 51, ibid; memo ATSD(lSA) for DeplJSRepSG, 11 Sep 51,

ibid.

15. Ltr SecDef to SecState, 18 Sep 5 I, ibid; OTT D-l 0 State, 12 Sep 51, w Idraft statement on US

defense effort, DoD, ibid; editorial note, FRUS 1951, lll, pt 1:272; final communique NAC

7th sess, 15-20 Sep 51, in Lord Ismay, NATO: The First Five li'ars, 1949-1954, 187-89.

16. Msg lJSDeleg 8th sess NAC for ActingSecState, 27 Nov 51, FRUS 1951, lll, pt 1:731; briefing

memo [OEurRegnlAffs] State, (17 Dec 51], ibid, 389-92; memo JCS for SecDef, 23 Jul 52, RG

330, CD 092.3 (NATO). Walter S. Poole, 1950-1952, vol IV in The History ofthejoint Chiefs

ofStaff The joint Chiefs ofStaffand National Policy, 274, 276, gives 1,099 major combat

vessels and 9,212 aircraft.

17. Msg lJSDeleg 8th sess NAC for ActingSecState, 25 Nov 51, FRUS 1951, III, pt 1:717-20;

memo OIC Pol-MilAffs OEurRegnlAffs State for CoordlJSDeleg 8th sess NAC, 26 Nov 51,

ibid, 721-22; msg USDeleg 8th Sess NAC for ActingSecState, 27 Nov 51, ibid, 735-37,

735n4.

18. Memo ActingSecDef for SecArmy et al. 15 Oct 51, RG 330. CD 092.3 (NATO Gen);

background paper [LIS D-4/Ia] Vass (OEurRegnlAffs State), [6 Feb 52]. FRUS 1952-1954, V,

pt 1:203-06, 203n1.

19. Memo ActingSecDef for SecArmy et ai, 15 Oct 51, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); rept

C8-D/8 ChTCC NATO to 8th sess NAC Rome, 26 Nov 51, FRUS 1951, III, pt 1:357-63;

editorial note. ibid, 316; memo Gordon for SplAsst to Pres, 19 Sep 51, ibid, 279-80; interv

with W. Averell Harriman by Doris M. Condit, 18 Jun 77,5-6, OSD Hist.
Notes to Pages 374-78 621

20. Memo ActingSecDef for SecArmy et ai, 15 Oct 51, w/encs, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen);

rept C8-D/8 ChTCC NATO, 26 Nov 51, FRUS 1951, III, pt 1:357-63, especially 358,

360-61.

21. Memo Col G.A. Lincoln (SplAsst to SecDef) for SecDef, 21 Dec 51, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO

Gen); memo Lincoln for SecDef, 31 May 51, w/paper, "Lessons from Preparation of MSP,"

30 May 51, Lincoln papers, "Chronological" folder, OSD Hist; interv with Harriman, 18 Jun

77,6-7.

22. Memo DepDirEXOS (for SecDef) for SecArmy et ai, 21 Oct 51, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO);

memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 29 Oct 51, ibid; ItrJean Monnet (ActingChExecBurTCC NATO)

to SecDef, 1 Nov 52, ibid; memo DepDirEXOS for SJCS, 10 Nov 51, w/intraoff memo

ExecOffiSA for DepDirEXOS, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 12 Nov 51, w/encs, ibid.

23. Memo DirOMA for DepDirEXOS, 20 Oct 51, ibid; memrcd Knight (OEurReglAffs State), 26

Oct 51, FRUS 1951, III, pt 1:333-34.

24. Rept "The Politico-Economic Capability of the United States for Meeting Defense Requirements" [US response to the TCC questionnaire], 2 Nov 51, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen);

Itr ActingSecDef to ChTCC NATO, 6 Nov 51, w/enc, ibid; msg Lincoln for SecDef (for

DirONATA), 11 Nov 51, ibid.

25. Msg USDelegTCC for ActingSecState, 10 Dec 51, FRUS 1951, III, pt 1:373-74; Ismay, NATO,

1949-1954, 102; briefing memo [OEurRegnlAffsStatej for SecState, [17 Dec 51], FRUS

1951, Ill, pt 1:389-92.

26. Memo Lincoln for SecDef, 21 Dec 51, 4, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); Itr ASD(C) to

DepUSRepNAC, 9 Feb 52, w/enc, ibid; briefing memo [OEurRegnlAffs State] for SecState, [17

Dec 51], FRUS 1951, Ill, pt 1:389-92, 389n1. Background paper [LIS D-4/la] Yass, [6 Feb

52], FRUS 1952-1954, Y, pt 1:203-06, 203nl, summarizes the TCC report.

27. Ltr Edwin M. Martin (State) to DirOEurRegnlAffs State, 12 Nov 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash

papers, "NATO Annual Review" folder.

28. Ltr SACEUR to ChTCC NATO, 14 Dec 51, FRUS 1951, Ill, pt 1:377-79 (378, quote); memo

ExecOffiSA for DirEXOS, 8Jan 52, w/paper, "Point for Discussion ," RG 330, CD 334

(Armed Services Committee); memo Lincoln for SecDef, 21 Dec 51, 2, RG 330, CD 092.3

(NATO Gen).

29. Memo JCS for SecDef, 9 Jan 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo SecNavy for SecDef,

8 Jan 52, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 20 May 52, ibid.

30. Ltr SecDef to SecState, 15 Jan 52, ibid; memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 23 Jan 52, w/enc, ibid.

31. Suppl rept [provisional text] TCC, 8 Feb 52, FRUS 1952-1954, Y, pt 1:211-18. Poole,

1950-1952,291, gives revised figures of $2.36 billion and $1.16 billion. Memo Bradley for

SecDef, 20 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen), quotes msg SACElJR [for SG NATOj.

32. Mins of convs [State], 23 Feb 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, ''Aid for France" folder.

33. Memo BrigGen D.P. Booth for SecDef, [25 Sep 52], w/final rept Annual Review Ad Hoc Cte,

10, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); Poole, 1950-1952, 293, 305. Poole's figure of 51";,

M+ 30 divisions on page 305 is corroborated by Booth, who gives lower figures for major

naval combat vessels for 1952 but may have included different types of ships under the

category.

34. Memo ActingSecDef for SecArmy et ai, 31 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); costing

study E&ISE OASD(C), II Apr 52, ibid; Poole, 1950-1952, 292-93.

35. Msg SecState to Pres, [24 Feb 52], FRUS 1952-1954, Y, pt 1:174-75, 174nl; briefing paper

MS D-206/5 Def-MSA-State, 13 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 312.1; prog rept ChTCC to NAC 8th

sess, 26 Nov 51, FRUS 1951, Ill, pt 1:360-62; memrcd Roger Ernst (Asst to DirONATA), 8

Feb 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen).

36. Briefing paper MS D-206/5 Def-MSA-State, 13 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 312.1; pgm No 3,

ODMS, 24, w/NSC 142, Feb 53, Condit file, OSD Hist; Fact Sheet No 243-52 OPI DoD, 29

Dec 52, ibid.

37. Msg 6045 SecState for USAmb UK, 21 Jun 51, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo

ASecArmy for DepSecDef, 28 Jun 51, ibid; memo ASecArmy for DepSecDef, 19 Jul 51, ibid.
622 Notes to Pages 378-80

38. Memo ASecArmy for DepSecDef, rca 19 Jul 51), w/6 encs, RG 330, CD 301-1-1

(Memorandum of Conversation); memcon Ernst, 19 Jul 51, ibid; revised paper, "US

Participation in Financing of NATO Infrastructure," 18 Jul 51, ibid; memo Ernst for

DepSecDef, 26Ju151, ibid; memo Ernst for Nash, 26Ju151, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen);

Itr ActingSecDef to SecState, 26 Jul 51, w/enc, ibid; memo ActingSecDef for SecArmy et ai,

26 Jul 51, ibid.

39. Memo ASecAF for SecAF, 27 Sep 51, w/encs, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo

DepDirEXOS for SecArmy et ai, 6 Oct 51, ibid; memcon OSD, "Convs between SecDef and

Fr Mins," 10 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 101-1-1; pgm No 3, ODMS, 23, w/NSC 142 (Feb 53),

Condit file, OSD Hist.

40. Memo DepDirEXOS for SecArmy et al, 6 Oct 51, w/memrcd ATSD(ISA), [nd), RG 330, CD

092.3 (NATO Gen); memo ATSD(ISA) for DirOll, [18 Oct 51], ibid; msg Def 901870 ASD(C)

for USAIRA Lisbon, 23 Feb 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Infrastructure" folder; msg

AL0828 USlO for ATSD(ISA), 11 Mar 52, ibid; briefing paper MS D-206/5 Def-MSA-State,

13 Mar 52, 3, RG 330, Lovett papers, "Classified Cables . Pawley's ..." folder,

Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md.

41. Briefing paper MS D-206/5 Def-MSA-State, 13 Mar 52, 8, RG 330, Lovett papers,

"Classified Cables Pawley's ." folder; memo ATSD(ISA) for DirOll, [18 Oct 51),

RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo DepDirEXOS for SecArmyet ai, 6 Oct 51, w/memrcd

ATSD(ISA), [ndj, ibid.

42. Memo Ernst for D.H. Grear et ai, 8 Nov 51, w/draft paper State, rca 8 Nov 51), RG 330, CD

092.3 (NATO Gen); memrcd Ernst, 8 Feb 52, ibid.

43. Memo DirONATA for AT5D(ISA), 11 Jan 52, RG 330, CD 092.2 (General); msg AL0625 USlO

SHAPE for ATSD(ISA), 12 Jan 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Infrastructure" folder;

briefing paper MS D-206/5 Def-MSA-State, 13 Mar 52, 9, RG 330, Lovett papers,

"Classified Cables Pawley's ." folder.

44. Memo Ernst for ATSD(ISA), 24 Jan 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo Ernst for

ATSD(ISA), 22 Jan 52, ibid; memo Ernst for ASD(C), 19 Feb 52, RG 330, 15A files, Nash

papers, "Infrastructure" folder.

45. Msg SecState for State, 23 Feb 52, FRUS 1952-1954, Y, pt 1: 192-93 (with British pounds in

text converted at rate of $2.80 per pound); Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years

in the State Department, 625; briefing paper MS D-206/5 Def-MSA-State, 13 Mar 52, RG

330, Lovett papers, "Classified Cables Pawley's .. " folder; pgm No 3 ODMS, 23,

w/NSC 142, Feb 53, Condit file, OSD Hist.

46. Mins of convs [State], 23 Feb 52, initialed by Acheson and Schuman, 25 Feb 52, RG 330, ISA

files, Nash papers, 'Aid for France" folder; memo understanding FrGovt and USGovt, 25 Feb

52, FRUS 1952-54, Y, pt 1:273-77; msg USDeleg for State, 25 Feb 52, ibid, 142-46.

47. Ltr SecDef to UKSecState(Commonwealth Rels), 6 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen);

memo ATSD(ISA) for ASD(C), 14 Aug 52, ibid; memo ActingAT5D(ISA) for SecDef, 30Ju152,

RG 330, CD 311.5; memo Robert E. O'Hara (BudgetDiv OASD(C)) for ASD(C) and

subsequently sent SecDef and DepSecDef, 18 Nov 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen).

48. Msg Topol 763 ActingSecState for USAmb Fr, 21 May 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen);

memo JCS for SecDef, 10 Sep 52, ibid; notes w/final rept Annual Review Ad Hoc Cle, [25 Sep

52), ibid.

49. Memo DepATSD(ISA) for ADirPgmODMS, 22 Oct 52, w/paper, RG 330, ISA files, Nash

papers, "Infrastructure" folder; memo Dep(Eur)MSA ISA for ASD(C), 21 Nov 52, ibid; memo

DepATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 5 Dec 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); pgm No 3 ODMS, 24,

w/NSC 142, Feb 53, Condit file, OSD Hist.

50. Msg SecState for Pres, 17 Dec 52, FRUS 1952-1954, Y, pt 1:351-53; OMA, MDAP(Mutual

Defense Assistance Program): Department of Defense Operations (hereafter cited as

MDAP: DoD Opns), Feb 53, xii, and Dec 52, xi-xii; memo ASD(ISA) for ChMAAC ODMS, 25

Feb 53, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Infrastructure" folder.
Notes to Pages 380-84 623

51. Memo JCS for SeeDef, 4 Mar 53, RG 330, CD 380 (Gen); pgm No 3 ODMS, 24-25, w/NSC

142, Feb 53, Condit file, OSD Hist.

52. Memo DepSeeDef for SeeArmy et ai, 31 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo

ATSD(ISA) for DepSeeDef, [31 Mar 52), ibid.

53. Memo ASD(C) for SeeDef, 15 Apr 52, wltable, ibid; memo W.H. Mautz (E&ISE ASD(C) for

Nash, 18 Apr 52, ibid; memo DepATSD(ISA) for SeeDef, 22 May 52, w/eomparison of SG

force goals, ibid; Itr AetingSeeDef to SeeState, 23 May 52, ibid.

54. MemoJCS for SeeDef, 20 May 52, w/apps, ibid; memo DepATSD(ISA) for SeeDef, 22 May 52,

ibid.

55. Memo AetingSeeDef for JtSees, ChMB, ASD(C), 23 May 52, ibid; memo Mautz for ASD(C), 29

May 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Force Levels); memo SeeArmy and SeeAF for SeeDef, 2

Jun 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo SeeNavy for SeeDef, 9 Jun 52, ibid; memo

JCS for SeeDef, 2 Jun 52, ibid.

56. Ltr AetingSeeDef to SeeState, 23 May 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo

DepATSD(ISA) for SeeDef, 22 May 52, ibid; Itr SeeState to SeeDef, 19 Jun 52, FRUS

1952-1954, V, pt 1:301-08.

57. Memo ATSD(ISA) for SeeDef, [ea 20 Jun 52), RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo SeeDef

for Bradley, 20 Jun 52, w/ene, ibid; memo SeeDef for JCS, 20 Jun 52, ibid; memo DepSeeDef

for ChJCS, 8 Aug 52, ibid; memo ATSD(ISA) for DepSeeDef, 6 Aug 52, ibid.

58. Memo Booth for SeeDef, 25 Sep 52, ibid; except for Lisbon goals, figures in table in text,

page 382, are from memo DirONATA for ATSD(ISA), 24 Nov 52, ibid. Several totals in the

latter document were corrected for errors in addition. All 1953 goals included a German

army contribution, and MRC-12 air goals included 279 German aircraft. Lisbon 1953 goals

are from Poole, 1950-1952, pages 293 and 305, and include a German army and air force

contribution but none from Greece or Turkey; compare with memo rna] for Nash, 18 Sep

52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "NATO Annual Review" folder.

59. Final Rept [DoD) Ad Hoc (Booth) Cte, [25 Sep 521, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo

Booth for SeeDef, 25 Sep 52, ibid.

60. Memrcd Gerhardt (ONATA OSD), 24 Oct 52, ibid; memo ATSD(ISA) for SeeDef, 14 Oct 52,

ibid; memo JCS for SeeDef, 8 Oct 52, ibid; Itr SeeDef to SeeState, 14 Oct 52, ibid; memo

SeeDef for JCS, 16 Oct 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Annual Review" folder; memo

SeeDef for JCS, 24 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen).

61. Memo DepSeeDef for SeeArmy et ai, 4 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo

ATSD(ISA) for ASD(C), 22 Aug 52, ibid; memo ATSD(ISA) for ASD(C), 20 Sep 52, RG 330, ISA

files, Nash papers, "NATO Annual Review" folder; presentation on estimated force levels

Col Brousseau OAMAG), 24 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); Itr Booth to Nash, 14 Oct 52,

RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); Itr Booth to Nash, 26 Nov 52, ibid.

62. Ltr Martin to Dir OEurRegnlAffs State, 12 Nov 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "NATO

Annual Review" folder.

63. Ltr Booth to Nash, 14 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo USMbrPlngTeam "D"

SG NATO for DepUSRepSG NATO, 1 Oct 52, RG 330, Lovett papers. "1952" folder; note

CPN [Charles P. Noyes? (DepDefRepSrNSCStf)) to DirONATA, 3 Oct 52, ibid; memo A.C.

Davis (DepUSRepSG NATO) for Beebe (DirONATA), 1 Oct [52], ibid.

64. Memo ATSD(ISA) for SeeDef and DepSeeDef, 18 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen);

memo DepATSD(ISA) for SeeDef and DepSeeDef, 4 Sep 52, ibid; memo ATSD(ISA) for

DepSeeDef, 23 Sep 52, ibid; memo DirONATA for ATSD(ISA), 17 Sep 52, 6, RG 330, ISA

files, Nash papers, "NATO Annual Review" folder; memo ATSD(ISA) for SeeDef, 18 Nov 52,

w/ene Ib, RG 330, CD 350.05 (Briefing).

65. Memo DirONATA for ATSD(ISA), 19 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo

ATSD(ISA) for DepSeeDef, 23 Sep 52, ibid; msg USPermRepNAC to State, 22 Sep 52, FRUS

1952-1954, V, pt 1:327-29.

66. Memo ATSD(ISA) for SeeDef, 18 Nov 52, will enes (see especially No 3), RG 330. CD

350.05 (Briefing); memrcd DepDirONATA, 2 Dec 52, RG 330, CD 311.5; memo DepATS-
624 Notes to Pages 384-87

D(ISA) for SeeDef, 5 Dec 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Russia); memo ExeeOffSRE/DEF Annual

Review Group OSRE for Dep(Eur)MSA ISA OSD, 6 Dec 52, w/rev 1953 Booth goals, RG 330,

CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo SJCS for USRepSG NATO, 3 Dec 52, ibid; rept No 30DMS,

1-3, w/NSC 142, Feb 53, Condit file, OSD Hist.

67. Rept No 3 ODMS, 17-22, Condit file, OSD Hist; memo SACEUR for SeeDef, 16 Dec 52,

w/enes, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Force Levels); memred Gerhardt (ONATA ISA), 22 Jan 53,

ibid; rept SACEUR to SG NATO, 11 Apr 53, w/ene, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file, Dwight

D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kans.

68. Rept SACEUR to SG NATO, 11 Apr 53, w/ene, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file; memo

DepATSD(ISA) for SeeDef, 5 Dec 52, w/JCS views and msg Polto 861 SRE for SeeState, 2 Dec

52, RG 330, CD 092 (Russia); memo JCS for SeeDef, 5 Dec 52, w/draft msg, ibid; memo JCS

for SeeDef, 4 Mar 53, RG 330, CD 380 (Gen).

69. Ismay, NATO: 1949-1954, 187; memo DepUSRepSG NATO for FrRepSG and BrRepSG, 13

Jun 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe).

70. Msg DepHICOG for SeeState, 10 Jan 51, FRUS 1951, III, pt 1:990-91; Poole, 1950-1952,

256-58; Itr SeeDef to ChSenForeignReiationsCte, 28 Feb 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe).

71. Msg HICOG for SeeState, 5 Jan 51, FRUS 1951, III, pt 2:1317-21; msg HICOG for SeeState,

25 Jan 51, ibid, 1411-12; msg SeeState for OHICOG, 7 Feb 51, ibid, 1412-13; msg SeeState

for OHICOG, 23 Feb 51, ibid, 1321-26; msg AetingSeeState for OHICOG, 27 Feb 51, ibid,

1326-27.

72. Memo ATSD(ISA) for SeeDef, 4 May 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); memo DirONATA for

DepSeeDef, 3 May 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Germany); hr SeeDef to SACEUR, 7 May 5 I, RG 330,

CD 091.7 (Europe).

73. Ltr SACEUR to SeeDef, 18 May 51, RG 330. CD 091.7 (Europe); memo AetingSeeDef for JCS,

I I Jun 51, ibid; memo AetingSeeDef for DirOMA, 1I Jun 5 I, ibid; Itr AetingSeeDef to

SeeState, 11 Jun 51, ibid; memo DirONATA for SeeDef, 11 Jun 51, ibid; interoff memo Beebe

for DirEXOS, 13 Jun 51, ibid; hr USAmb France to Beebe (DirONATA), 18 Jun 5 I, ibid.

74. Ltr Henry A. Byroade (DirGER State) to SeeDef, 19 Jun 51, w/Couneil covering hr to Three

Allied Governments, ibid; agenda and notes for mtg with McCloy, 15 Jun 51, w/brief of

Bonn report, ibid.

75. Memo DirONATA for SeeDef, 11 Jun 51, ibid; memo DirONATA for DepSeeDef, 21 Jun 51,

ibid; memcon DirONATA, 16Ju1 51, ibid.

76. Editorial note, FRUS 1951, III, pt 1:765-67; msg USAmb Netherlands for SeeState, 17 Oct

51, ibid; 888-91; msg HICOG for SeeState, 4 Jun 51, ibid, 785-86.

77. Ltr HICOG to DirGER State, 8Jun 51, FRUS 1951, III, pt 2:1482-85; memo DirONATA for

DepSecDef, 21 Jun 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); memo DirONATA for DirJtStOCS, 20 Jun

51, ibid; Itr USAmb Fr to DirONATA, 18 Jun 51 (quote), ibid; memo DirONATA for

DepSeeDef, 21 Jun 51, initialed by Marshall, ibid.

78. Ltr DirGER State to DepSeeDef, 19 Jun 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); memred SecState,

16 Jul 51, FRUS 1951, III, pt 1:836-38; memo DirONATA for DepSeeDef, "German

Rearmament," 21 Jun 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); memo DirONATA for DepSeeDef,

"EDC," 21 Jun 51, ibid.

79. Memeon DirONATA, 26 Jun 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); Itr SplAsst to HICOG to

DepSeeDef, 28 Jun 51, w/msg SeeState for SACEUR, [ea 27 Jun 51), RG 330, CD 092

(Germany); memo AetingSeeDef for JCS, 27 Jun 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe).

80. Msg [Douglas) MacArthur [II) (CounselorUSEmb Fr) for SecState, 7 Jul 51, FRUS 1951, III, pt

1:820-21; Max Beloff, The United States and the Unity ofEurope, 78; memeon DirONATA,

16 Jul 51, w/draft ltr SeeDef to SeeState, [ndl, (with appended note: "This letter was not

signed but represents present viewpoint of the Secretary of Defense (16 July 1951)."), RG

330, CD 091.7 (Europe).

81. Memeon DirONATA, 16Ju151, w/draft Itr, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); memcon DirONATA

(revised to incorporate "certain changes and additions which reflect the understanding of
Notes to Pages 387-90 625

the Secretary of State"), 16 Jul 51, ibid; memcon SecState, 16 Jul 51, FRUS 1951, III, pt

1:836-38.

82. Memo SecState and ActingSecDef for Pres, 30 Jul 51, FRUS 1951, III, pt I:849-52; editorial

note, ibid, 847-49. Memo JCS for SecDef, 28 Apr 50, RG 330, CD 9-4-29, shows that JCS

had wanted Germany in NATO for some time.

83. Ltr DepUSecState to DepSecDef, 15 Aug 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); hr ActingSecDef

to DepUSecState, 21 Aug 51, ibid; hr SecDef to SecState, 4 Oct 51, ibid.

84. Rept HlCOM/P(51)69 Final, 9 Aug 51, FRUS 1951, III, pt 2:1501-11; editorial note, ibid,

1521-22; communique US, UK and Fr FgnMins, 14 Sep 51, ibid, pt 1:1306-08; tripartite

declaration D-5 Fr, UK, and US FgnMins, 14 Sep 51, ibid, 1306; statement ChAlliedHICOMGer to Chancellor FRG, 24 Sep 51, ibid, pt 2: 1528-34.

85. Ltr DirGER State to SecDef, 19 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); memoJCS for SecDef,

5 Oct 51, ibid; Itr SecDef for SecState, 17 Oct 51, ibid; msg SecState for OH1COG, 19 Oct

51, FRUS 1951,111, pt 2: 1555-57; msg SecState for Pres and ActingSecState, 23 Nov 51, ibid,

1609-11.

86. Proclamation 2950, Termination of State of War with Germany, 24 Oct 5 I, Public Papers of

the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951 (hereafter cited as

Truman Public Papers with year), 598-99; Richard P. Stebbins et ai, The United States in

World Affairs, 1951 (hereafter cited as Stebbins, US. in World Affairs with year), 348.

87. Memo SplConsultant to SecArmy for Col Samuels et ai, 21 Nov 51, w/report HICOM/

P(51)91, 17 Nov 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Germany); Acheson, Present at the Creation, 583;

communique, US, UK, Fr, and WGer FgnMins, 22 Nov 51, FRUS 1951, Ill, pt 2:1607-09;

msg SecState for Pres and ActingSecState, 23 Nov 51, ibid, 1609-1 I; editorial note, ibid, pt

1:932-33

88. Editorial note, FRlfS 1951, III, pt 1:980-81; memo SplConsultant to SecArmy for Samuels

et ai, 21 Nov 51, w/rept HlCOM/P(51)91, 17 Nov 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Germany).

89. Memo JCS for SecDef, 15 Oct 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); hr SecDd to SecState, 25 Oct

51, ibid; memo ATSD(lSA) for SecDef, lea 24 Oct 51 j, ibid; Itr SecDd to SecState, 7 Nov 51,

RG 330, CD 092 (Germany).

90. Memo ASecArmy for SecDef, 5 Nov 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Germany); memo WSM [Col Willis

S. Matthewsl for ChJCS, 28 Nov 51, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO (;en); memo ATSD(ISA) for

Matthews, 19 Dec 51, w/notes ATSD(lSA), 28 Nov 51, ibid; msg HICOG for SecState, 3 Jan

52, FRlfS 1951, Ill, pt 2:1614-17.

91. Background paper LIS D-5/la State, [31 Jan 52], RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); Acheson,

Present at the Creation, 552; interim rept Delegs to Conf for Orgn of EDC (Paris) to

Participating Govts, 24 Jul 51, FRUS 1951, III, pt I:843-46; memo JCS for SecDef, 7 Sep 51,

w/apps, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe).

92. Ltr ActingSecDef to SecState, 12 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); memo JCS for SecDef,

7 Sep 51, ibid.

93. Declaration \:S, UK, Fr FgnMins, 14 Sep 51, FRUS 1951, III, pt 1:1506; msg USDeleg for

ActingSecState, 22 Nov 51, ibid, pt 2: 1605-0"'; communique UK, \"S, Fr. FRG FgnMins, 22

Nov 51, ibid, 1607-09.

94. Msg lJSDcleg for ActingSecState, 29 Nov 51, FRUS 195/, Ill, pt 2:1611-12; memo

DirONATA for ATSD(lSA), 12 Dec 51, RG 330, CD 091.'" (Europe); background paper LIS

D-5/1a State, I Feb 52. RG 3:\0, CD 0923 (NATO Gen).

95. Msg SecState for ActingSecState. 29 Nov 51, FRUS /95/, III. pt 1:947-48; msg ActingSecState for l'SEmb Italy, 28 Nov 51, ibid, 947; editorial notl:, ibid, 962-63; background paper

LIS D-5/la State, I Feb 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen).

96. Background paper LIS D-5/la State, I Feb 52, RG 330, CD 0923 (NATO Gen); Acheson.

Present at the Creation. 608-10; Poole, /950-/952. 288-90; editorial note, FRlfS

1952-1954. V, pt 1:36-38.

97. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 611-12, 615-21, memo DepATSD(ISA) for DepS<.:cDef.

20 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 337 (Four POWl:fs); mins of mtg of FgnMins w/Adenau<.:r, (s<.:<.: par 5),
626 Notes to Pages 390-95

24 May 52, FRUS 1952-1954, VII, pt 1:95-100, 95nl; Itr Chancellor FRG to SecState, 27

May 52, ibid, 167-68.

98. Poole, 1950-1952, 292; Stebbins, US. in World Affairs, 1952, 125-26; Acheson, Present at

the Creation, 624-25, 629-32, 640; memo SecState for USecState et ai, 8 Apr 52, FRUS

1952-1954, VII, pt 1:24-25; msg SecState to OHICOG, II Apr 52, ibid, 25-28.

99. Ltr SecDefto SecState, 19 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); draft memo prepared by J.]'

Binns for USecArmy, 22 Apr 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Germany" folder; msg

6971 USAmb Fr for SecState, II May 52, ibid; paper [OSD), "McNeil Formula," 12 May 52,

w/encs, ibid; memo USecArmy for SecDef, 15 May 52, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe).

100. Ltr SecState to SecDef, 9 May 52, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); Acheson, Present at the

Creation, 643-47; msg 5 ATSD(ISA) for USecArmy, 25 May 52, ibid; memo USecArmy for

SecArmy, 29 May 52, ibid; Stebbins, US. in World Affairs, 1952, 156-57; memo [ExecSecNSC) for Pres, 12 Jun 52, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.

101. Editorial note, FRUS 1952-1954, VII, pt 1:111-12; Acheson, Present at the Creation,

643-47; Poole, 1950-1952, 325-26; MDAP: DoD Opns, May 52, xi.

102. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 647; memrcd Col Ernest C. Harden, Jr., 13 Jun 52, RG

330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Germany" folder; memo ASD(L&L) for DepSecDef, 28 Jun 52,

w/enc, ibid; Congressional Quarterly Service, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, 108;

memo ATSD(lSA) for DirOLL, 23 Dec 52, w/encs 5 and 28, RG 330, CD 334 (Armed Svs

Cte); Stebbins, US. in World Affairs, 1952, 395-40; Poole, 1950-1952, 326-27.

103. Stebbins, US. in World Affairs, 1952, 391-92; MDAP: DoD Opns, Jan 52, viii, Jun 52, xiii,

Jul 52, 21.

104. Memo SecDef for JCS, 10 May 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Germany" folder; memo

DirEXOS (for SecDef) for JCS, 4 Jul 52, ibid; memo DepSecDef for JCS, 4 Aug 52, ibid;

memo ATSD(lSA) for SecDef, "Military Assistance to Western Germany," 17 Sep 52, w/4th

draft plan, 16 Sep 52, ibid.

105. Ltr ActingSecDef to SecState, 13 Jun 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Germany); memo JCS for

SecDef, 16 Jul 52, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 22 Aug 52, ibid; Itr SecDef to SecState, 11 Aug

52, ibid; MDAP: DoD Opns, Jul 52, vii, Jan 53, 19, 24.

106. Stebbins, US. in World Affairs, 1952, 392-95, 398-401; memo ATSD(ISA) for DirOLL, 23

Dec 52, w/encs 5 and 2H, RG 330, CD 334 (Armed Svs ete); memo by SecondSecUSEmb

Paris, 16 Sep 54, FRUS 1952-1954, V, pt 1:1104-13.

107. Final rept [NPC (54)50) Working Party on Termination of tbe Occupation, 2 Oct 54, w/encs,

FRUS 1952-1954, V, pt 2: 1339-44; Final Act of Nine Power Conference [London, 28 Sep-3

Oct 54). ibid, 1345-66; Itr SecState to Pres, 12 Nov 54, w/enc, ibid, 1470-80; The NATO

Handbook, Aug HO, 79-HO; MDAP: DoD Opns, Dec 54, x-xi, 17; conv author w/John H.

Ohly, 28 Jun H2, Condit files, OSD Hist.

108. Msg SecState for ActingSecState (for Pres), 15 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, 111: 1229-31.

109. Lawrence S. Kaplan, A Community of Interests: NATO and the Military Assistance

Program, /948-195/, 172.

1I0. Alan K. Henrikson, "Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance, 1948-1952," Naval War

College Rel'iew (May-June 1980), 29-31; msg Acheson for ActingSecState (for Pres), 15 Sep

50, FRUS /950, 111: 1229; "Should the U.S. Stay in NATO''' Harper's (April 1984), 31-38,

59-61,63-71.

XIX. ORGANIZATION FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE

1. Testimony SecDef, 29 Ju149, US Cong, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mutual Defense

Assistance Act of 1949: Hearings, 81 Cong, 1 sess (1949), 45, 49; PL 81-329 (6 October

1949), reprinted in First Semiannual Report on the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, 81

Cong, 2 sess (1950), H Doc 613, 57-62. A good account of the Marshall plan is given in
Notes to Pages 396-401 627

William F. Sanford, "The Marshall Plan: Origins and Implementation," Department of State

Bulletin aune 1982), 17-83.

2. Comments John H. Ohly, 29 Oct 81, C-23-E-17, Condit file, OSD Hist; First Semiannual

Report on MDAP, 20-24.

3. First Semiannual Report on MDAP, 23-25; EO 10099, 27 Jan 50, reprinted in ibid, 63-64;

announcement 194 Dept State, [25 Nov 49], ibid, 64-65. For Acheson's high opinion of

Ohly's judgment, see Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State

Department, 674, 678.

4. First Semiannual Report on MDAP, 24-26; directive SecDef for SecsMilDepts et ai, [25 Nov

49), ibid, 65-68; comments Ohly, 29 Oct 81, C-25-E-22; memo SecDef for SecArmy et ai,

3 Aug 49, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Germany" folder; Official Register ofthe United

States, 1950, 121,1951, 107,1952, 111-12.

5. Paper MAP D-F, approved by FACC (cited as basis for initial organization), 15 Jun 49, US Dept

State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949 (hereafter cited as FRUS with year and

volume number), 1:328-36; interv with John H. Ohly by Doris M. Condit, 28 Apr 77,30-31,

OSD Hist; comments Ohly, 29 Oct 81, C-23-E-II; Harold A. Hovey, United States Military

Assistance: A Study of Policies and Practices, 134. Policy paper FMACC D-4, 13 Feb 50,

FRUS 1950, I: 148-53, 148n2, gives an example of the use of working groups in the FMACC.

6. First Semiannual Report on MDAP, 29-31; paper MAP D-F, approved by FACC, 15 Jun 49,

FRUS 1949, 1:328-36.

7. First Semiannual Report on MDAP, 29-30; interv with Ohly, 28 Apr 77, 52; US Cong,

Senate, Ctes on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, Mutual Security Act of 1951:

Hearings, 82 Cong, I sess (1951), 312-13, 5I1-12; memo DirOMA OSD for ATSD

(FMA&MA), 6 Sep 50, w/ltr William Frye (OffExecDirECC) to ASD(L&L), 6.1ul 50, RG 330,

CD 091.3 (MDAP Gen); comments Ohly, 29 Oct 81, C-23-E-12-13.

8. First Semiannual Report on MDAP, 31-32, 34; FRUS 1950, 111: 132n2; Itr SecDef to

CINCEUR, 25 Nov 49, Condit file, OSD Hist; ltr ATSD(lSA) to DirEurRegAffs State, 1 Oct 52,

RG 330, CD 092.2 (Europe); Lawrence S. Kaplan, A Community ofInterests: NATO and the

Military Assistance Program, 52, 141.

9. Ltr SecDef to CINCEUR, 25 Nov 49, Condit file, OSD Hist; memo SecDef for SecsMilDepts

et aI, 25 Nov 49, ibid; JCS Hist Div, History of the Unified Command Plan, 20 Dec 77, 7;

H.H. Lumpkin, "USCINCEUR & DEFREPNAMA" (ms), Ica 1961[, 1-2, OSD Hist; First

Semiannual Report on MDAp, 32.

10. First Semiannual Report on MDAP, 28-29; Senate Ctes on Foreign Relations and Armed

Services, Mutual Security Act of 1951: Hearings, 276-78; comments Ohly, 29 Oct 81,

C-23-E-15-16

II. First Semiannual Report on MDAP, 32, 55, 41-44; comments Ohly, 29 Oct 81, C23-E-15-16

12. Comments Ohly, 29 Oct 81, C-23-E-17; First Semiannual Report on MDAP, 14-15, 33.

13. Interv with Gen Lyman 1.. Lemnitzer by Alfred Goldberg, Lawrence Kaplan, Doris M. Condit,

4 Mar 76, 6, OSD Hist; memo DirEXOS (for SecDet) for ASD(C) et ai, 10 Nov 52, w/paper

SecMAC, [ca 10 Nov 52], RG 330, CD 142-1-1.

14. For this paragraph and the preceding one, see memo Humelsine (DepASecState(Adm)) for

Heneman, 3 Oct 50, Ohly papers, OSD Hist; memo DepDirMDA State for SecState, 6 Nov 50,

ibid; comments Ohly, 29 Oct 81, C-23-E-19-22, 24; Harry S. Truman, Years (if Trial and

Hope, vol II in Memoirs by Harry S. Truman (hereafter cited as Truman, Memoirs /1),

227-35; Congressional Quarterly Service, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, 168; memo

DepDirMDA State for SecState, 6 Nov 50, Ohly papers.

15. Memo DirBoB for Pres, 30 Sep 50, w/Truman's handwritten approval, RG 330, CD 091.3

(MDAP Gen); ltr DirBoB to SecDef, 3 Oct 50, ibid; memo DirOMA for DepSecDef, 12 Oct 50,

ibid; memo DirOMA for ATSD(FMA&MA), 9 Oct 50, ibid; memo SccDef for Harriman, II Oct

50, ibid; mcmo Heneman for DepDirMDA State, 5 Oct 50, w/enc rev draft memo for Pres, 3

Oct 50, Ohly papers; memo DirOMA for DepSecDef, 12 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 091.3 (MDAP
628 Notes to Pages 401-05

Gen); memo JCS for SecDer, 29 Nov 50, ibid; ltr ATSD(FMA&MA) to ADirAdmMgmt BoB, 6

Dec 50, ibid.

16. Memo understanding State et ai, [19 Dec 50), FRUS 1950, 1;484-86; memo SecDef for

SecsMiiDepts et ai, II Jan 5 I, Condit file, OSD Hist; ltr SecDer to SACEUR, 31 May 51, RG

330, CD 370.21 (SHAPE); Third Semiannual Report to Congress on the Mutual Defense

Assistance Program, October 6, 1950 to March 31, 1951 (1951), 41-42.

17. Memo of understanding State et ai, [19 Dec 50], FRUS 1950, 1:484-86; Third Semiannual

Report on MDAP, 42; ltr SecDef to SACEUR, 31 May 51, RG 330, CD 370.21 (SHAPE); Itr

DirISA State to H. Christian Sonne, 19 Jun 51, w/paper on organization to administer MSA,

II Jun 51, 5, Ohly papers; memo SecDef for SecsMiiDepts et ai, 11 Jan 51, ibid.

IH. Memo ExecSecOSD for JCS, 25 Jul 50, wlterms ref, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo

Col Royden E. Beebe, Jr. (ADirOFMA) for ATSD(FMA&MA), 17 Aug 50, ibid; memo Asst to

JtSecs for SecDef, 28 Jul 50, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, H Aug 50, ibid; memo DirOMA for

ATSD(FMA&MA), 12 Aug 50, ibid.

19. Ltr DepUSecState to DepSecDef, 4 Nov 50, w/terms ref, ibid; memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for

ASD(L&L), 10 Nov 50, ibid; ltr DepSecDef to DepUSecState, 16 Nov 50, ibid; memo

ATSD(FMA&MA) for SecDer, 2H Nov 50, ibid; memcon Beebe, 27 Nov 50, RG 330, 300-1-1

(1950 Dec) [green binder No 2, "Memorandums of Conversation"]; memo ActingSecDef for

JCS, ChMB, 29 Dec 50, w/enc, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen).

20. Third Semiannual Report on MDAP, 42-43; ISAC D-H/I, 6 Mar 51, w/enc, "Memorandum

of Understanding [State-Defense-ECAj," Ohly papers.

21. Ltr SACEUR to SecDef, 12 May 51, RG 330, CD 370.21 (SHAPE); Itr SecDef to SACEUR, 31

May 51, ibid.

22. Lumpkin, "USCINCEUR & DEFREPNAMA," 3-4; H.H. Lumpkin, "SACEUR/CINCEUR Concept" (ms), (1957), 9, OSD Hist.

23. Intraoff memo Bell (ISA State) for Ohly, 23 May 51, w/draft paper, Ohly papers; Itr Cte on

Present Danger to DepSecDef, 7 Jun 51, w/draft rept, 12-13, RG 330, CD 334 (Comte on

Present Danger).

24. Memo George A. Lincoln (SplAsst to SecDef) for DepSecDef et ai, 26 Mar 51, Lincoln papers,

"Chronological File" folder, OSD Hist; memo Lincoln for DepSecDef, 30 Mar 51, ibid;

memrcd Lincoln, [20 Apr 51], ibid; memo Lincoln for DepSecDef et ai, 24 Apr 51, ibid;

memo Lincoln for SecDef, 31 May 51, w/rept, Lincoln to SecDef, 30 May 51, ibid.

25. Testimony SecState, 26 Jul 51, Senate Cles on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, Mutual

Securizy Act of 1951: Hearings, 24; testimony SecDef, 27 Jul 51, ibid, 58; testimony ECA

Admr, 30 Jul 51, ibid, 102; testimony DepUSecState, 7 Aug 51, ibid, 516; statement and testimony DirISA State, 7 Aug 51, ibid, 479-H4, 495-9H, 501-07; paper, ". . Issues.

and Solutions Proposed .," ISA State, lca Summer 51], Ohly papers; US Cong, House, Cle

on Foreign Affairs, The Mutual Securizy Program for Fiscal Year 1952, H Rept 1922, H2 Cong,

I sess (1951),47-48.

26. Testimony Marshall, 26 Jul 51, Senate Ctes on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, Mutual

Security Act of 1951: Hearings, 5H; testimony Bradley, 9 Aug 51, ibid, 692-93. For views of

Katz, Batt, Spofford, and Kibler, see ibid, 262-65, 288-91.

27. Ltr Tannenwald to Historian OSD, 2 Feb 79, OSD Hist; comments Ohly, 29 Oct 81,

C-25-E-9-ll; Mutual Security Act of 1951, PL 82-165, secs 506(a) and 506(b), in US Cong,

House, Cle on Foreign Affairs, Mutual Security Act of 1951 and Other Basic Legislation with

explanatory notes, 82 Cong, 2 sess (I952), 11-12.

28. Mutual Security Act of 1951, particularly secs 501(e)and 502; EO 10300, I Nov 51, reprinted

in US Cong, House, Cte on Foreign Affairs, Legislation and Documents Relating to the

Mutual Security Act of1951 with explanatory notes, 82 Cong, 2 sess (1952), 1-3; comments

Ohly, 29 Oct HI, C-25-E-14-15; First Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program,

31 Dec 51, 45-46.

29. First Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program, 31 Dec 51,45-46; comments Ohly,

29 Oct 81, C-25-E-14-16, 18; comments Theodore Tannenwald, in Francis H. Heller, ed, The
Notes to Pages 406-10 629

Truman White House: The Administration ofthe Presidency, 1945-1953, 220-21; hr DirMS to

SecState, 1 Nov 51, Ohly papers; memo Asst to DirMS for SecState et ai, 2 Nov 51, ibid; deleg of

auth DirMS, 31 Mar 52, ibid; memo DirMS Exec 18, WilliamJ. Sheppard (ExecAsstODMS), 29 Apr

52, w/memo DirMS, ibid; ltr Tannenwald to Historian OSD, 2 Feb 79.

30. Comments Tannenwald, in Heller, Truman White House, 220-21; comments Ohly, 29 Oct

81, C-25-E-18.

31. Comments Tannenwald, in Heller, Truman White House, 221; comments Ohly, 29 Oct 81,

C-25-E-2l. For examples of ODMS-OSD friction, see Itr Tannenwald to ATSD(lSA), 5 Nov

51, Tannenwald papers, "Military Assistance" folder, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence,

Mo; draft memo IS. Efron] for DirOMA, 19 Nov 51, ibid; memo ADirPgmODMS for DirOMA,

6 Feb 52, Ohly papers; memo Tannenwald for ATSD(ISA), 8 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen).

32. Msg 412 DirMS-State-Def-ECA for Certain AmDiplOffs, [l Nov 51), Ohly papers; Itr Pres to

Eisenhower, 19 Dec 50, FRUS 1950, 1ll:604-05; Lumpkin, "USCINCEUR & DEFREPNAMA,"

4.

33. [William H. Maehl (HqUSAREUR)], "Relations of the European Command with Supreme

Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, December 1950-June 1952" (ms), (1953), 5, OSD Hist;

Lumpkin, "USClNCEUR & DEFREPNAMA," 4-5.

34. Testimony Draper, 21 Mar 52, US Cong, Senate, ete on Foreign Relations, Mutual Securi~y Act

of 1952: Hearings, 82 Cong, 2 sess (1952), 176, 180-81; memo DirMS for Perkins (State),

Nash (OSD) et ai, 23 Jan 52, w/terms ref, 12 Jan 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers,

"Reorganization in Europe" folder.

35. Memo DirMS for Perkins (State) et ai, 23 Jan 52, w/terms ref, 12 Jan 52, RG 330, ISA

files, Nash papers, "Reorganization in Europe" folder; memo SRI', 17 Mar 52, ibid; msg

1157 Spofford for SecState, 4 Apr 52, RG 330, Lovett papers. "Classified Cables

Pawley's . " folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md; Second Report to Congress

on the Mutual Security Program, 30 Jun 52, 5-6; testimony Draper, 21 Mar 52, Senate

Cte on Foreign Relations, Mutual Security Act of 1952: Hearings, 180-81; announcement

No 1 SRE, 4 Apr 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Reorganization in Europe" folder.

36. Msg 905027 DepSecDef for Batt, 29 Mar 52, RG 330, Lovett papers, "Classified Cables

Pawley's " folder; Itr ATSD(ISA) to Perkins (ASecState), 7 May 52, RG 330, CD 092.3

(NATO Gen); hr ActingSecDef to SecArmy, 14 May 52, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Europe); memo

Ruffner (DepATSD(ISA)) for SecDef, 29 May 52, RG 330, ISA files. Nash papers, "Reorganization in Europe" folder; ltr SecDcf to Finlay, 29 May 52, ibid.

37. Memo D.L. Van Syckle (OMA OSD) for ATSD(ISA), 19 Dec 52, w/encs, RG .BO, CD 092.3

(NATO Logistic Ping); memo ATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 26 Dec 52, w/memo and MSP

employment rept, RC; 330. CD 0913 (C;en).

38. Memo DirMS for Perkins (ASecState) et ai, 23 Jan 52, w/memo on position of USSRI' in

Europe. 12 Jan 52, RG 3W, ISA files, Nash papers, "Reorganization in Europe" folder; Itr

ATSD(ISA) to DirOffEurRegAffs State, 1 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Europe); Lumpkin,

"USCINCELJR & DEFREPNAMA," 3, 5-6.

39. US Cong, House, Cle on Expenditures in Executive Departments, Federal Supply Management (Overseas Survey): Sixteenth Intermediate Report, 82 Cong, 2 sess (1952), H Rept

1994, 1-5, 10-12,54-66; Lumpkin, "SACEUR/CINCECR Concept," 16-18.

40. Memo Pawley (SplAsst to SecDe£) for SecDcf, 17 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 370; Lumpkin,

"SACEUR/CINCELJR Concept," 17-18, 23-44.

41. Lumpkin, "SACEUR/CINCEUR Concept," 19, 21-23; msg 900687 JCS for USLO SHAPE (for

Eisenhower), 8 Feb 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers. "Reorganization in Europe" folder;

msg 850 SACEl'R for SecDef and ChJCS, 14 Mar 52, ibid.

42. Lumpkin, "SACEUR/CINCElJR Concept," 49-50; memo Beebe for Historian OSD, 20 Mar 53,

OSD His!.

43. Lumpkin, "SACEUR/CINCEUR Concept," 50-52; msg SX 4226 Handy (CINCElIR) for ACoS

G-3. 12 Apr 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Reorganization in Europe" folder.
630 Notes to Pages 410-14

44. Memo DirONATA for ATSD(ISA), 18 Apr 52, w/enc, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers,

"Reorganization in Europe" folder; ltr ADir and Counsel ODMS to SecDef, 24 Apr 52, w/enc,

ibid; memo JCS for SecDef. 2 May 52, w/enc, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Europe); memo

SecsMilDepts for SecDef, 29 Apr 52, cited in Lumpkin, "SACEUR/CINCEUR Concept," 53.

45. Memo DirONATA (for Nash) for SecDef, lea 8 May 52), RG 330, CD 092.2 (Europe); memo

DirONATA for ATSD(ISA), II Jun 52, ibid; Itr ADir and CoS ODMS to SecDef, 18 Jun 52,

w/enc, ibid; memo DepSecDef for ChJCS, 28 Jun 52, ibid.

46. Lumpkin, "SACEUR/CiNCEUR Concept," 53; memo DirONATA for SecDef, 2 May 52,

w/handwritten note in margin, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe).

47. Memo JCS for SecDef, 9 May 52, w/draft msg for Eisenhower, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Europe);

msg Polto 1184 SRE for SecState, 22 Apr 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Reorganization

in Europe" folder.

48. Msg 1091 SACEUR for SecDef, 19 May 52, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Europe); msg Defto 61

DirONATA for DepATSD(ISA), 19 May 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Reorganization in

Europe" folder; Lumpkin, "SACEUR/CiNCEUR Concept," 54-55.

49. Memo JCS for SeeDef, 23 May 52, w/enc draft msg JCS for SACEUR, RG 330, CD 092.2

(Europe); msg 1144 SACEUR for JCS, 29 May 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Reorganization in Europe" folder.

50. Msg 910102 JCS for SACEUR, 29 May 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Reorganization in

Europe" folder; msg 1159 SACEUR for JCS, 30 May 52, ibid; Lumpkin, "SACEUR/CiNCEUR

Concept," 56-60.

51. Lumpkin, "SACEUR/CINCEUR Concept," 60-68; msg SACEUR for JCS, II Jun 52, RG 330,

ISA files, Nash papers, "Reorganization in Europe" folder.

52. Memo JCS for SecDef, 30 Jun 52, w/draft msg for Ridgway, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Europe),

memo Carter (for SeeDet) for Draper- 15 Jul 52, ibid; memo RAdm H.P. Smith (DirOFMA) for

SecDef, 7 Jul 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Reorganization in Europe" folder.

53. Memo SecDef for Pres, 7 Jul 52, w/handwritten note on original, "Approved/July 7,

1952/Harry S Truman," RG 330, CD 092.2 (Europe). Handy's letter of instructions is

contained in msg ALO 1375 US CINCEUR for JCS, 21 Jul 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers,

"Reorganization in Europe" folder.

54. Ltr SecDef to DirMS, 7 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Europe); memo DirMS Exec 30, 29 Jul 52,

w/ene terms of ref, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); merna SecDef for SRE andJCS, 15 Jul 52,

RG 330, CD 092.2 (Europe); memo DirEXOS (for SecDet) for USSRE, 15 Jul 52, ibid.

55. Lumpkin, "SACEUR/CINCEUR Concept," 71,73, 119; interoff control sheet N 473 Beebe, II

Jul 52, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Europe); memo DirEXOS (for SecDef) for SRE, 15 Jul 52, ibid; msg

ALO 1375 Ridgway for JCS, 21 Jul 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Reorganization in

Europe" folder; Itr SecDef to SACEUR, 22 Nov 52, ibid; msg DEF 925104 ATSD(ISA) for US

CINCEUR, 30 Nov 52, ibid.

56. Merna Beebe for Historian OSD, 20 Mar 53, OSD Hist.

XX. GROWTH OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE

I. Lawrence S. Kaplan, A Community ofInterests: NATO and the Military Assistance Program,

1948-1951, 35-49, describes MDAP; First Semiannual Report to Congress on the Mutual

Defense Assistance Program, 81 Cong, I sess (1950), H Doc 613, 9, 50-52, 73; Second

Semiannual Report on the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, 82 Cong, I sess (1951), H

Doc 119, 27-29.

2. Testimony SecDef, 5 Jun 50, us Cong, Senate, Ctes on Foreign Relations and Armed Services,

Mutual Defense Assistance Program, 1950: Hearings, 81 Cong, 2 sess (1950), 19-47 (22,

quote); testimony SecDef, 5 Jun 50, US Cong, House, ete on Foreign Affairs, To Amend the

Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949: Hearings, 81 Cong, 2 sess (1950), 24-42.
Notes to Pages 414-18 631

3. Testimony George C. Marshall, 7 Jun 50, US Cong, House, Cte on Foreign Affairs, To Amend

the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949: Hearings, HI Cong, 2 sess (1950), H5-109,

particularly 8H, 10 1.

4. us Cong, House, Cte on Foreign Affairs, Extending the Mutual Defense Assistance Act (if

1949,81 Cong, 2 sess (1950), H Rept No 2538, 1-2,44-53, 57-6H; editorial note, US Dept

State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950 (hereafter cited as FRUS with year and

volume number), 1:321-23; PL 81-759 (6 September 1950).

5. US Cong, House, Cte on Appropriations, The Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1951:

Hearings, I'll Cong, 2 sess (1950),281 Oohnson), 304 (Acheson); notes SecState, rca 30 Aug

50j, FRUS 1950, 1:393-95; memo Lemnitzer for McNeil through Burns, 14 Jul 50, wi

handwritten note by Burns, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDcf files, "Supplemental Appros Jul &

Dec 1950 (McNeil file)" folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md; memo Lemnitzer for

Burns, 17 Jul 50, ibid.

6. Handwritten note Burns on memo Lemnitzer for McNeil. 14 Jul 50, RG 330,

ATSD&DepSecDef files, "Supplemental Appros Jul & Dec 1950 (McNeil file)" folder; memo

Lemnitzer for Burns, 17 Jul 50, ibid.

7. Ltr SecState to SecDer, 21 Jul 50, w/rev memo, 21 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 092.:\ (:\jATO Gen);

memcon SecState, 21 Jul 50, w/enc, FRUS 1950, Ill: 136-37; msg DepUSRepNAC for SecState,

29 Jul 50, ibid, 162-6:\.

8. Memrcd ASD(L&L), 27 Jul 50, RG :\:\0, CD 091.:\ (MDAP Gen); memo DirOMA for DepACoS

Dept Army et ai, :\ 1 Jul 50, ibid; Itr John H. Ohly to John 0. Bell (AdviserUSDelegNAC), 29

Jul 50, Ohly papers, OSD Hist; memo Gibson for Lovett, 26 Oct 50, w/presentation Lemnitzer

for DepSecDef, 19 Oct 50, 9-12, RG :\30, CD :\HI (War Plans NSC 68); ltr Pres to Spkr House

Reps transmitting suppl estimate of appros for mil asst, I Aug 50, Public Papers of tbe

Presidents of the United States: Harrl' S. Truman, 1950 (hereafter cited as Truman

Public Papers with year), 564-66; House Cte on Appropriations. tbe Supplemental

Appropriation Bill for 1951: Hearings, 274-76.

9. us Cong, Senate, Cte on Appropriations, Supplemental Appropriationsfor 1951: Hearings.

81 Cong, 2 sess (1950), 264-:\01; comments Ohly. 29 Oct HI. C24-E-H-II. Condit file. OSD

Hist; Second Semiannual Report on MlJAP. 29.

10. Memo Gibson for Lovett, 26 Oct 50. w/presentation Lemnitzer for DepSecDef, 19 Oct 50. 4:\.

RG 330, CD :\H 1 (War Plans NSC 6H).

11. Memo DepExecSecNSC for AdHocCte on NSC 6H. 1:\ Sep 50, w/estimates for MDAP State.

ibid; memo DepDirMDA State for Matthews (DepUSecState). 4 Dec 50, w/enc, subsequently

distributed by memo ExecSecNSC for NSCSrStf, 5 Dec 50, ibid; mins 75th mtg NSC, 14 Dec

50, Decision 1. Truman papers, President's Secretary's files: NSC (PSF,NSC), Harry S. Truman

Library, Independence, Mo.

12. Memo DepSecDef for JCS. 27 Dec 50, RG 330, CD 091.:\ (MDAP); memo DirOMA for SecDcf,

22 Dec 50, ibid; memo DirOMA for ATSD(FMA&MA), 26 Dec 50, ibid; annual budget msg to

Cong, 15 Jan 5 I, Truman Public Papers, 1951, 71.

13. Memo DepSecDefforJCS. 27 Dec 50. RG :\:\0, CD 091.:\ (MDAP Gen); memo SecDefforJCS,

9 Nov 50, ibid: memo JCS for SecDef, 7 Feb 51. w/apps, ibid; draft paper, "How Was MDAP

'52 Program Built," [Col George A. Lincoln (SplAsst to SecDct)], :\ Apr 51. Lincoln papers.

"Chronological File" folder, OSD Hist; rev draft Lincoln. "Notes on the Relationships ," :\ May 5 I, 5. ibid.

14. Memo Lincoln for SecDef, :\ 1 May 51, w/enc paper on "Lessons from ," :\0 May 51,

Lincoln papers. "Chronological File" folder.

15. Memo Lincoln for SecDef, 26 Mar 51, ibid; memrcd Lincoln, 26 Mar 51, ibid; memo Lincoln

for SecDef, 30 Mar 51. ibid; memo Lincoln for DepSecDef, :\ Apr 51, ibid.

16. Draft II Lincoln for DepSecDef, "NATO Requirements for MTDP," II Apr 51, ibid; memrcd

Lincoln, 1:\ Apr 51. ibid; memo Lincoln for DepSecDef, 17 Apr 51, ibid; memo Lincoln for

DirJtStfJCS, 20 Apr 51, ibid; mcmrcd Lincoln. 24 Apr 51, ibid.
632 Notes to Pages 418-23

17. Memo Lincoln for DepSecDef, 17 Apr SI, ibid; memrcd Lincoln, 17 Apr 51, ibid; memo

DepSecDef for SecsMiiDepts et ai, 17 Apr S1, ibid.

18. Memrcd Miller (Asst to Lincoln), 18 Apr 51, re conv wiGen Bradley, ibid; memo SecDef for

JCS, 19 Apr 51, w/memo Lincoln for SecDef, 18 Apr SI, ibid; Itr Lincoln to Col R.]. Wood

(SHAPE), 19 Apr SI, ibid; memrcd Lincoln, "mtg with Gen Bradley," 19 Apr 51, ibid.

19. Memrcd [BoB mtg] Lincoln, 27 Apr SI, ibid; memo Lincoln for DepSecDef, 27 Apr SI, ibid.

20. Draft notes [Lincoln] on briefing, 2 May SI, 4, ibid; memo Lincoln for DepSecDef,

"Briefing on 3 May S I," I May SI, ibid; memrcd [on managing MSP] Lincoln, 30 Apr

SI, ibid.

21. Paper, "Basic Data Rearmament," lca 8 May SI], ibid; interoff memo Lincoln for Burns,

10 May SI, w/memrcd on MTDP planning basis, 10 May 51, ibid; rev notes [on costing study]

Lincoln, 9 May SI, ibid; Itr Lincoln to LtGen Cortlandt Schuyler, SHAPE, 9 May SI, ibid.

22. Memrcd Lincoln, 16 May SI, ibid; memo Lincoln for DepSecDef et ai, 22 May SI, ibid.

23. Spl msg for Cong, 24 May SI, Truman Public Papers, 1951,304, includes administrative

expenses in Title I; memo Lincoln for DepSecDef, 16 May SI, Lincoln papers, "Chronological File" folder.

24. As Marshall's representative, Goodrich accompanied both congressional groups through

Europe. See interv with Nathaniel H. Goodrich by Doris M. Condit, 10 Apr 84, 7, 8, 10,

28-35, OSD Hist; ltr Goodrich to Historian OSD, 29 Feb 84, w/comments, ibid; telecon

Goodrich w/Condit, 16 Mar 84, Condit file, OSD Hist; testimony SACEUR, 9 Jul51 (Paris), US

Cong, Senate, Cte on Foreign Relations, United States Foreign-Aid Programs in Europe:

Hearings, 82 Cong, 2 sess (l9SI), 20.

25. US Cong, Senate, Ctes on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, Mutual Security Act of 1951:

Hearings, 82 Cong, I sess (I9S I), 35-68, 694; ltr SecDef to Sen Brien McMahon, 29 Aug 51,

RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); memo DirOMA for SecDef, 24 Aug 51, ibid.

26. US Cong, House, Cte on Appropriations, Mutual Securi~y Program Appropriations for

1952: Hearings, 82 Cong, I sess (1951), pt 1:2; see secs IOI(b), S13, 526 of PL 82-16S, in

US Cong, House, Cte on Foreign Affairs, Mutual Security Act of 1951 and Other Basic

Legislation with explanatory notes. 82 Cong, 2 sess (I9S2), 1-22; Second Report to

Congress on the Mutual Securitv Program, 30 Jun S2, 16.

27. The new budget request and justifications were available to Congress at least as early as 18

September. See House Cte on Appropriations, Mutual Security Program Appropriations for

1952: Hearings, pt 1:S, 7-8, pt 2:747.

28. Ibid, pt 1:2; Congressional Quarterly Service, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, 169; PL

82-249 (31 October 1951), in US Cong, House, Cte on Foreign Affairs, Legislation and

Documents Relating to the Mutual Security Act of 1951 with explanatory notes, 82 Cong, 2

sess (I9S2), 4-7.

29. Memo ATSD(lSA) for DirMS, 8 Nov S1, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "1952 Budget"

folder; memo ATSD(lSA) for SecDef, Ica 10 Jan 52), RG 330, CD 09 I. 3 (Gen); memo JCS for

SecDef, 16 Jan 52. w/apps, ibid; memo DepSecDef for JCS, 13 Feb 52, ibid; memo William

H. Mautz (OASD(C)) for Lyle S Garlock (OASD(C)), 10 Mar S2, w/paper, "Categorical

Distribution. .Mutual Security Assistance Program," 27 Feb S2, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef

files, "NSC 114/2 (FY53)" folder; US Cong, Senate, Cte on Foreign Relations, Mutual

Security Act of 1952: Hearings, 82 Cong, 2 sess (1952), S67-68.

30. Memo JCS for SecDef, 16 Jan S2, w/apps, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen).

31. Ltr ActingAdmrECA to DepSecDef, 22 Dec 51, w/paper, "Effect of Economic Aid in Support

of UK Defense Program," RG 330, CD 091.3 (MDAP/UK); Itr DirMS to Pres, 2 Feb 52, w/encs,

RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); Ohly comments, 29 Oct 81, C-26-E-25-26, Condit file, OSD Hist.

32. Ltr DirMS to Pres, 2 Feb 52, w/apps and tables (see particularly table II, "Distribution of

Economic Aid Title I"), RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); memo DepSecDef for Pres, 4 Feb 52, ibid;

memo DepSecDef for JCS, 13 Feb S2, ibid; memo DepSecDef for Pres, 4 Feb 52,

w/handwritten note, ibid; Itr Pres to DirMS, 4 Feb 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Aid

for France" folder.
Notes to Pages 423-27 633

33. Memo DepSeeDef for JCS, 13 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); memo Mautz for Garlock, 10

Mar 52, w/paper, 27 Feb 52, RG 330, ATSD&DepSeeDef files, "NSC 114/2 (FY53)" folder;

Senate Cte on Foreign Relations, Mutual Security Act of1952, 567-68; memo JCS for SeeDef,

18 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); memo SeeDef for JCS, 1 Mar 52, ibid; memo SecDef for

JCS, 13 Mar 52, ibid; memo DepSeeDef for JCS, 3 May 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers,

"MDAP Programs" folder; OMA OSD, MDAP (Mutual Defense Assistance Program): Department of Defense Operations, Jun 52, 13.

34. Ltr DirONATA to SplAsst to CoS SHAPE, IOJul 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); prelim rept

NSC, Status and Timing ofCurrent U.S. Programsfor National Security (NSC 114/1),8 Aug

5 I, 14- 17, OSD Hist; NSC, US Programs for National Security (NSC 114/2), 12 Oct 5 I,

38-45, ibid. Annex No 2 of NSC 114/2, ISAC, (12 Oct 51], is also printed in FRUS 1951,

1:412-24.

35. NSC, US Programs for National Security (NSC I 14/2), 12 Oct 5 I, 31, OSD Hist; memo

[ExeeSeeNSC] for Pres, 18 Oct') I, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.

36. Memo DepSecDef for JCS, 2 I Jan 52, w/ene table, "MDAP: Programmed Deficiencies ," RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); memo JCS for SeeDef, 3 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 091.3

(Cnited Kingdom); memo Ferguson (DepDirPPS State) for Webb (USecState), 12 Dec 5 I, FRUS

1951,1:261; paper Robert W. Tufts (PPS State), [12 Dec 51], ibid, 262-63; memo Robert M.

Macy (BoB) for ADirBoB, 18 Dec 51, RG 51, BoB series 142.

37. Memo [ExecSeeNSC] for Pres, 18 Oct 51, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.

38. Memred DepSecDef, 28 Dec 51, RG 330, CD 110.0 I; annual budget msg to Cong, 2 I Jan 52,

Truman Public Papers, 1952-5,3, 74; memo ASD(C) for SeeDef. 5 Jan 52, RG 330,

ATSD&DepSecDef files, "Budget- I953" folder.

39. Memrcd DepSeeDef, 28 Dec 5 I, RG 330, CD I l(l.() I.

40. Memo JCS for SecDef, 16 Jan 52, RG 330, CD 091.:\ (Gen): annual budget msg to Cong, 21

Jan 52, Truman Public Papers, 1')52-53,73-7"'.

4 I. :\oIemo DepSeeDef for JCS, 21 Jan 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 «(;en); :\oIS D-206/5, "FY 1953

Mutual Security Presentation," prepared by Defense-MSA-State, 13 Mar 52, wlbriefing paper

on NATO infrastructure, 4, RG 330, CD 312.1.

42. MemoJCS for SeeDef, I Feb 52, w/encs, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen).

43. Memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, lca 5 Feb 52], ibid; memo DepSecDef for JCS, 9 Feb 52, ibid; hr

SACECR to SecDef, 28 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe).

44. Special msg to Cong on the Mutual Security Program, 6 Mar 52, Truman Public Papers,

1')52-53,179-90 (179, quote); memoJCS for SecDef, 3 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (United

Kingdom). To the figure of 5535 billion given in the special message should be added 575

million placed in Title I for administrative and international security expenses, to reach

$';.425 billion: see US Cong, Senate, Cte on Foreign Relations, Tbe Mutual Security Act of

1')52, 82 Cong, 2 sess (30 Apr ';2), S Rept No 1490, 5, 25

45. US Cong, House, Cte on Foreign Affairs, Mutual Security Act Extension: Hearings, 82 Cong,

2 sess (19';2), particularly 20, 179-82, 205-12; Senate Cte on Foreign Relations, Mutual

Securit-y Act of 1')52: Hearings, particularly 143, 167, 169-7 3. Memrcd DepDirOLL, 9 May

52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen), shows tenor of remarks in executive session meeting of 9 May

1952.

46. Senate Cte on Foreign Relations, Tbe Mutual Security Act of 1')52, S Rept 1490, 3; liS Cong,

House, Cte on Foreign Affairs, Mutual Securit-y Act of 1')52, 82 Cong, 2 sess (12 May 52), H

Rept 1922, 29; US Cong, House, Mutual Security Act of 1')52: Conference Report, 82 Cong,

2 sess (4Jun 52), H Rept 2031, particularly 13-15; PI. 82-400 (20June 1952)

47. PI. 82-400 (20 June 1952); memo DirEXOS (for SeeDe() for JCS, 10 Jul ';2, RG 330, (SA files,

Nash papers, "FY ';3 Programs" folder; briefing notes [OMAj osn, "FY 1953

Program ," [ea 2'; Jul 521, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Briefing Notes 25

July 52" folder.

48. Testimony Lovett, 4 Jun 52, US Cong, House, Ctc on Appropriations, Mutual Security

Appropriationsfor 1953: Hearings, 82 Cong, 2 sess (1952),204.
634 Notes to Pages 427-34

49. Brief [OMA) OSO, "Mutual Security Legislation, FY 1953," rca 15 Jul 52], RG 330, ISA files,

Nash papers, "Brief for Mr. Nash, OMA Activities .." folder; memrcd IHist Off OSO), 7

Jul 52, Condit file, OSD Hist; House Cte on Appropriations, Mutual Security Appropriations

for 1953: Hearings, pt 2:1-25.

50. Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, 171; statement upon signing Supplemental Appropriation Act, 15 Jul 52, Truman Public Papers, 1952-53, 478-80, (479, quote).

51. Memo DepSecDef for JCS, 24 Jun 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); memo DirEXOS (for SecDef)

for JCS, 10 Jul 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "FY 53 Programs" folder.

52. Memo ChJCS for DepSecDef, 19 Ju152, w/memo JCS for SecDef, 18 Ju152, w/Apps A and B,

RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); memrcd [OMA) OSD, rca 25 Jul 52), RG 330, ISA files, Nash

papers, "Brief for Mr. Nash, OMA Activities " folder.

53. Memeon Najeeb Halaby (DepEurMSA ISA), 29 Ju152, RG 330, CD 334 (Gen); memo DepACoS

G-4 (FgnMilAid) Dept Army for DirOMA OSD, 4 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); memo

DepSeeDef for JCS, 29 Jul 52, ibid; memo ATSD(ISA) for SeeDef, 12 Aug 52, ibid; memo

DepSeeDef for JCS, 14 Aug 52, ibid.

54. Memo DirEXOS (for SeeDef) for JCS, 11 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); memo AetingATSD

(ISA) for SeeDef, 11 Jul 52, ibid.

55. Memo DirEXOS (for SeeDef) for JCS, 11 Jul 52, ibid; memo AetingATSD(lSA) for SeeDef, 11

Jul 52, ibid; briefing note, FY 1954 Program Proposed Programming Cycle, lea 25 JuI52), RG

330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Briefing Notes 25 July 1952" folder.

56. Memo JCS for SeeDef, 29 Jul 52, w/enes, RG 330, CD 091. 3 (Gen); memo Nash for SeeDef,

8 Aug 52, ibid.

57. Memo DepSeeDef for JCS, 9 Aug 52, ibid; memo JCS for SeeDef, 30 Oet 52, ibid; Itr

ADir(Pgm)ODMS to DirBoB, 18 Nov 52, 36, ibid; memo AetingDirOMA for DirMS, 26 Aug

52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "MDAP Progress" folder; memo ADir(Pgm)ODMS for

DirBoB, 16 Oet 52, w/ene, ibid, "FY 1954 MSP" folder.

58. Memo DepATSD(lSA) for DirMS, 4 Nov 52. w/4 enes, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "FY

1954 MSP" folder.

59. Ltr Ohly to DirBoB, 18 Nov 52, partieularly 30-47, (33, quote), w/Annex A, RG 330, CD

091.3 (Gen).

60. Memo [ISA/), "BoB Markup," [ea 17 Dee 52), RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "FY 1954 MSP"

folder; table w/notes, FY 1954 MDAP Budget Reclama, lea 22 Dee 52), ibid, "MDAP

Progress" folder; ltr Ohly to DirBoB, 18 Nov 52,36-37, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen).

61. Ltr ATSD(ISA) to ADir(Pgm)ODMS, 25 Nov 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); interoff memo

Halaby for Nash, 24 Nov 52, ibid; memo [ISA?], "BoB Markup," lea 17 Dee 52), RG 330, ISA

files, Nash papers, "FY 1954 MSP" folder.

62. Memred Col Robert M. Burnett (OMA), 24 Dee 52, w/enes, RG 330, CD III (1954).

63. Memo MeNeil (AetingSeeDef) for JCS, 24 Jan 53, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "MDAP

Progress" folder; annual budget msg, 9 Jan 53, Truman Public Papers, 1952-53, 1139;

memo lISA'), "BoB Markup," lea J7 Dee 52), RG :130, ISA files, Nash papers, "FY 1954 MSP"

folder.

64. Memo Ohly for Martin (DirOEurRegnlAffs State) et ai, 9 Jan 53, w/draft Annex A, RG 330, ISA

files, Nash papers, "FY 1954 MSP" folder; memo MeNeil (AetingSeeDef) for JCS, 24 Jan 53,

ibid. "MDAP Progress" folder.

65. US Cong, Senate, ete on Foreign Relations, Mutual Security for Fiscal tears 1948 to 1959:

Authorizations, Appropriations, Obligations, and Expenditures, 85 Cong, 2 sess (4 Mareh

1958), ete print, 2, 8. This souree gives appropriation figures adjusted for transfers and

reimbursements.

XXI. IMPLEMENTING MILITARY ASSISTANCE

1. Oftl'rogRepts&Stats OSD, Report on Operations: Mutual Defense Assistance Program, 28

Aug 50, 33, OSD Hist; OMA, MDAP (Mutual Defense Assistance Program): Department of
Notes to Pages 434-38 635

Defense Operations (hereafter cited as MDAP: DoD Opns), 27 Feh 5 I, 25-26, Jul 5:\, 18, OSD

Hist; testimony MajGen Lyman L. Lemnitzer, 2 Aug 50, US Cong, House, Cte on Appropriations, The Supplemental Appropriation Bill jrJr 1951: Hearings, 81 Cong, 2 sess (1950),

:\ 12-14; memo SeeArmy for SeeDef, 16 Aug 50, RG :\:\0, CD 091.:\ (MDAP Gen). Some idea

of the logistical and administrative problems involved is given in First Semiannual Report on

the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, 81 Cong, 2 sess (1950), H Doc 61:\, 44-45.

2. Memo DirOMA OSD for SeeDcf, 10 Jul 50, RG :\:\0, CD 091.:\ (MDAP Gen); memo SeeDef for

SeeArmy et ai, 10 Jul 50, w/enes, ibid.

:\. Memo SeeAFPC for MbrsAFPC, I:\Jul 50, RG 218, CCS :\,)4 (AFPC) (12-2-47) sec 6; memo

ExeeSeeOSD for JCS, 20 Jul 50, RG :\:\0, CD 091.:\ (MDAP Korea).

4. Memo SeeArmy for SeeDef, 16 Aug 50, RG :\:\0, CD 091.:\ (MDAP Gen).

5. Memo DirOMA for SeeDef, II Aug 50, w/draft memo, ibid; memo SeeDef forJCS, 18 Aug 50,

ibid.

6. MemoJCS for SeeDef, 12 Sep 50, ibid; memo DirOMA for ATSD(FMA&MA), 18 Sep 50, ibid;

memo SeeDef for JCS, 18 Sep 50, ibid; memo JCS for SeeDef, 27 Oct 50, ihid; memo SeeDef

for SeeArmy et ai, 7 Nov 50, ibid.

7. JCS Decision on 1966/46,14 Sep 50, w/ene A, draft memoJCS for SeeDcf, 114 Sep 50J, RG

:\:\0, CD 104-1 (1950); memo JCS for SeeDct', 18 Oct 50, RG :\:\0, CD 091.:\ (MDAP

Indochina); memo JCS for SeeDef, 29 Dec 50, RG :\:\0, CD 091.:\ (MDAP China).

8. Memo SeeArmy for SeeDef, 5 Sep 50, RG :\:\0, CD 091.:\ (MDAP Gen); memo DirOMA for

SeeDef, 8 Sep 50, ihid; memo SeeDcf for SeeArmy, 8 Sep 50, ihid.

9. Interv with John H. Ohly hy Doris M. Condit, 28 Apr 77, 55-56, OSD Hist; Itr AetingSeeDef

to SeeState, 20 Sep 50, w/intraoff memo ASD(C) for SeeDef, [nd], RG :\:\0, CD 091.:\ (MDAP

Gen); comments Ohly, 29 Oct 81, C-24-E-14, Condit file, OSD Hist; memo SeeDct' for

SeeArmy, 28 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 091.3 (MDAP Korea).

10. Memo Webb (AetingSeeState) for Truman, 21 Sep 50, Ohly papers, OSD Hist; Itr AetingSeeState to SeeDef, 2:\ Sep 50, RG 330, CD 091.:\ (MDAP Korea); memo SeeDef for SeeArmy, 28

Sep 50, ihid.

II. Memo DirOMA for ATSD(FMA&MA), 25 Sep 50, RG :\:\0, CD 091.:\ (MDAP Gen). On advance

procurement of planes, see comments Ohly, 29 Oct 81, C-24-E-14-1 5.

12. MemoJCS for SeeDef, 8 Dec 50, w/apps, RG .BO, CD 091.3 (MDAP Korea).

13. MDAP: DoD Opns, Aug 52,13, 15-17.

14. Statement SeeDef, 27 Jul 5 I, US Cong, Senate, Ctes on Foreign Relations and Armed Services,

Mutual Securi(y Act of 1951: Hearings, 82 Cong, I sess (195 I), 38-39.

15. MDAP: DoD Opns, Jan 52, 6, 9, 14.

16. Memo Ohly for Nash (ATSD(ISA», 4 Feh 52, RG 3,'\0, CD 091.:\ (Gen); memo Nash for Ohly,

II Feb 52, ibid; MDAP: DoD Opns, Jan 52, v.

17. Memo SeeDef for SeeArmy, SeeNavy, SeeAF, 5 Mar 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "MDAP

Progress" folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland, .\lid; testimony SecDe!", 19 Mar 52, US

Cong, Senate, Cte on Foreign Relations, Mutual Securi(y Act oJ 1952: Hearings, 82 Cong, 2

sess(1952),131.

18. MDAP: DoD Opns, May 52, 15.

19. Memo DirEXOS for ATSD(ISA), 22 Apr 52, RG :\30, CD 400.12; memo ASD(L&L) for SeeDef,

9 May 52, w/ene, 8 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); memo DirOMA for DepATSD(ISA), 14

May 52, RG :\30, ISA files, Nash papers, "Allocations and Priorities" folder; memo

DepATSD(ISA) for SeeDef, 21 May 52, ihid, "MDAP Progress" folder.

20. MDAP: DoD Opns, May 52, IS, Jul 52, IS; memo DepATSD(ISA) for SecDe!", 22 May 52, RG

330, ISA files, Nash papers, "MDAP Progress" folder; memo SeeDef for SeeAF, 27 May 52,

ibid.

21. MDAP: DoD Opns, Jun 52, viii, 13, Jul 52, 14, Jan 53, 16; memo ATSD(ISA) for SeeDct', 8 Oct

52, RC :\:\0, CD 091.:\ (Cen); comments Ohly, 29 Oct 81, C-26-E-29-30.
636 Notes to Pages 438-41

22. MDAP: DoD Opns, Jul 52, 14; memo JCS for SecDef, 10 Jul 51, RG 330, CD 380 (Gen); Itr

SecDef to Pres, rca 23 Oct 51], w/paper on Allocations Policies, Truman papers, President's

Secretary's files-General (PSF-General), Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.

23. Ltr SecDef to Pres, rca 23 Oct 51], w/paper on Allocations Policies, Truman papers,

PSF-General; memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 18 Oct 51, Truman papers, PSF;NSC; memcon

Lucius D. Battle (SplAsst to SecState), 18 Oct 51, US Dept State, Foreign Relations of the

United States, 1951 (hereafter cited as FRUS with year and volume number), 1;238-40.

24. Memo SecArmy for SecDef, I Feb 12, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); paper, "Questions or

Assumptions; Military Aid .," RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "MDAP Progress" folder;

memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 23 Jan 12, w/paper, "US Comments on TCC Report," 22 Jan 52,

5, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo ActingSecDef for SecArmy et ai, 28 Dec 51, ibid;

msg ALO 623 CoS SHAPE for SecDef, 12 Jan 12, RG 330, [SA files, Nash papers, ''Allocations

and Priorities" folder.

21. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et ai, 21 Dec 51, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); ltr Pres to SecDef, 9

Jan 12, ibid.

26. Ltr DMS to SecDef, 14 Jan 13, RG 330, [SA files, Nash papers, ''Allocations and Priorities"

folder; MDAP: DoD Opns, Jan 53, 17.

27. Memo ATSD([SA) for SecDef, 23 Jan 52, w/paper, "US Comments on TCC Report," [22 Jan

12], 8, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); annual budget msg to Cong, 21 Jan 52, Public Papers

of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1952-53 ... (hereafter cited as

Truman Public Papers with year), 74; memo ASD(L&L) for SecDef, 9 May 52, w/paper

ODMS, 8 Apr 12, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen).

28. Memo DirONATA for ATSD(ISA), 23 Jan 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (Gen); Itr DirJAMAG to

ATSD(ISA), 28 Feb 52, w/enc, "Report on Effect of Slow Deliveries. .," 28 Feb 52, RG

330, CD 091.3 (Gen).

29. Memo ASD(L&L) for SecDef, 9 May 12, w/paper ODMS, 8 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen).

30. Memo ASD(L&L) for SecDef, 9 May 12, ibid; memo DirOMA for SecDef, [14 Apr 52],

w/handwritten note, RG 330, [SA files, Nash papers, "MDAP Progress" folder; memo

DirOMA for DepATSD([SA), 14 May 52, ibid, "Allocations and Priorities" folder.

31. Memo DepATSD([SA) for DepSecDef, 20 May 12, RG 330, [SA files, Nash papers, ''Allocations

and Priorities" folder; memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 29 Apr 52, ibid, "MDAP Progress"

folder; memrcd Dennis F. Aughavin (OASD(C), 29 Apr 52, ibid; memo DirOMA for

ATSD([SA), 12 Jun 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen).

32. Memo SecDef for SecArmy, SecNavy, SecAF, 1 May 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "MDAP

Progress" folder.

33. Memo DepATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 21 May 52, ibid; MDAP: DoD Opns, Ju152, v, 13. Figure of

$8.2 billion arrived at by subtracting from $11.67 billion (total 1950-13 MDAP funds

earmarked for DoD), $4.22 billion (1953 appropriation) and $3.22 billion (cumulative

expenditures through June 1912), to equal what had not been expended by the end ofJune

1952.

34. Ltr DirMS to SecDef, 26 Apr 12, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); Itr SecDef to DirMS, 2 Jun 52, ibid;

memrcd Najeeb Halaby (DepEurMSA [SA), 1 Aug 12, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Annual

Review).

35. Report [OMA], "European NATO Area and Western Germany, Highlight Summary," rca 18 Aug

52], 2, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "NSC 1[4/2" folder, Federal Records Center,

Suitland, Md; memo DirOMA for ATSD([SA), 26 Nov 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen).

36. Memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 20 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen). For Air Force diversions

of aircraft, see memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 15 Aug 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers,

''Allocations and Priorities" folder; briefing MajGen Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., before the

Munitions Allocations Council, 16 Feb 53, ibid, unlabeled folder.

37. Memo ATSD(ISA) for ASD(C), 26 Aug 12, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); memo ActingDirOMA for

ATSD(ISA), 26 Aug 52, ibid; memo DepComp Dept Army for DepComp(Accounting Policy)

OSD, 7 Oct 52, ibid; agenda Munitions Allocation Council, "Fourth Meeting. on 8
Notes to Pages 441-45 637

January 195.~," w/ene Tab A-7, memo ASD(C) for ATSD(ISA), 20 Dec 52, RG :\:\0, ISA files,

Nash papers, unlabeled folder.

:\8. Memo DirMS to DepSeeDet', 17 Jul 52, w/me, 17 Jul 52, RG :\:\0, CD 091.:\ (Gen).

:\9. Memo SeeDet' for SeeArmy et ai, 14 Jan 52, ibid; memo SecNavy for SeeDet', 12 Feb 52, ibid;

memo SecArmy for SeeDet', I Feb 52, ibid; memo SeeAF for SeeDet', I Feb 52, ibid.

40. Memo ATSD(ISA) for DirMS, 4 Feb 52, ibid; memo DepATSD(lSA) for SeeDet', 14 Feb 52, RG

.BO, CD 092:\ (NATO Gen).

41. Ltr DirMS to SeeDet', 4 Feb 52, RG :\:\0, CD 091.:\ (Gen); msg ATSD(lSA) for Col George A.

Lincoln, 7 Feb 52, RG :\:\0, ISA files, Nash papers, "Alloeations and Priorities" folder; memo

ATSD(lSA) for SeeDet', II Feb 52, ibid; interoff memo [Underwood] for DepDirEXOS, 14 Feb

52, RG :\:\0, CD 091.:\ (Gen); Itr SeeDet' to DirMS, 15 Feb 52, ibid.

42. Interoff memo ATSD(ISA) for SeeDet', 28 Jan 52, RG :\.~O, CD 092.:\ (NATO Gen); interoff

memo LtCol S.W. Dziuban for ATSD(ISA), :\ I Jan 'i2, ibid; memo SeeDef for JCS, :\0 Jan 52,

ibid; memo JCS for SeeDet', 20 Feb 52, ibid.

4:\. Memo JCS for SeeDet', 14 Mar 52, w/encs, RG :\:\0, CD 091.:\ (Gen).

+l. Memo AetingSeeDef for JCS, :\ I Mar 'i2, ibid; Itr AetingSeeDet' to DirMS, :\ I Mar 52, ibid.

45. Ltr DirMS to SeeDef, 8 Apr 52, ibid.

46. Memo ATSD(ISA) for SeeDet', II Apr 52, ibid; memo DirEXOS (for SeeDe!) for JCS, 12 Apr 52,

ibid; memo JCS for SeeDef, 7 May 'i2, ibid; Itr SecDel' to DirMS, 21 May 52, w/ene, ibid.

47 . Ltr DirMS for SeeDef, 18 Jun 52, ibid; memo JCS for SecDet', 21 Aug 'i2, w/ene, ibid: Itr

SeeDet' to DirMS, 8 Sep 52, ibid; memo SeeDef for JCS, 16 Sep 52, ibid: ltr DirMS to SeeDef,

-, Oct 'i2, ibid; Itr DirMS and SeeDef to Pres, II Oct 'i2. w/enc. ibid.

48. Memo ATSD(lSA) for SeeDef, 20 Sep 'i2, RG :\50, ISA files, Nash papers, "Alloeations and

Priorities" folder; memo AetingSeeDef for JCS, I Oct 52. ibid; memo JCS for lJSRepSG

NA,\IC, :\1 Oct 52, R(; :\:\0, CD 0'.)2.:\ (NATO Gen).

-!9. Memo Burns for Nash (ATSD(ISA)), 'i :'11m' 51, w/rept, R(; :\:\0, CD 091.:\ (Gen); memo

ChMgmtCte OSD for SeeDet', 1-'Jan 'i2, ibid; memo SeeDef for SeeArmv et a!. 14 Feb 52, ibid:

memo ATSD(lSA) for SeeDet', II Feb 52, ibid: memoJCS for SeeDet', II Apr 52, ibid; memo

ATSD(ISA) for DepSeeDef, II Aug 'i2, w/handwritten note. RG 550, ISA files, Nash papers,

"Alloeations and Priorities" folder.

50. Memo W.M. Leffingwell (AChfSupDirOMA) for DirO,\lA, 15 Mav 'i2, R(; 550, ISA files, :"lash

papers, "Allocations and Priorities" folder.

51. MemoJCS for SeeDef, 15 Aug 52, R(; .~:\O, CD 091.:\ (Gen); memo ATSD(ISA) for SeeDef, 20

Aug 'i2, ibid: Itr DirMS and SeeDef to Pres, II Oct 'i2, ibid.

52. DoD Directive No 'i 156.1 15105-5J, -! and'.) Oct 52; memo SecMAC OSD for DepSeeDef, 16

Oct 52, w/mins first mtg of Munitions Allocation Council OSD. RG :\:\0, CD 142-1-1

5:\. MDAP: DoD Opns, Jan 5:\, 17: Itr DirMS to SecDef, ['I Jan 5:\, RG 5'~o, ISA files, Nash papns,

"Allocations and Priorities" folder.

54. Llr Oscar Cox to Theodore Tannenwald (ADirODMS), 8 Mar 52, ",'/study, "Off-Shore

Procurement Program ," I Mar 52, Tannenwald papers, "Military Assistance" folder,

Harry S. '[ruman Library, Independence, Mo; Itr William L. Batt (MSA in London) to Nash, 10

Jul 52, RG :\:\0, CD 470.8: memo DirOMA for ATSD(lSA), 'i Sep 51, R(; :\:\0, CD -!OO.I"':

comments Ohly, 2'.) Oct 81, C-2""-E-8-1 'i; memo DirOMA for ATSD(ISA), 5 Sep 51. R(; :\.~O,

CD 400.1""; memo VChStoekpile&lntlProg ,\1B for ChMB, 11 Jan 'i2, ibid: memo ChMB for

I'SeeArmy et a!. 12 Jan 52, ibid: intraoff memo ChOIPISA for DirOMA, 5 Feb 52, ibid; Itr

ATSD(lSA) to Batt, 28 Apr 52, ibid: memo DirOIPISA for ATSD(ISA), 2'.) Apr 'i2, ibid.

'i'i Memo Roger Ernst (O:"lATA) for ATSD(ISA), 2'i Jul 'i I, RG :\50, CD '100.12.

'i6 DoD Directive 600. l'i-I, I'" Aug 51, OSD Hist; briefing papers ISA, lea II Oct 511, RG :\50,

ISA files, Nash papers, "Briefing for Mr. Foster" folder; Franco-American memo of

understanding, 25 12:\1 Feb 'i2, Nash papers, "Aid for France" folder.

5"'. PR 1""5-'i2 OPI DoD, 15 Feb 'i2, R(; 550, CD 400.12; memo DirOMA for ATSD(ISA), 1-! Apr

52, ibid; statement SeeDef, I'S Cong, !louse, Cle on Expenditures in the Exec Depts, 2; .Iun

'i2, in lIist Oil OSD, eomp, Puhlic Statements o(Secretarj' of Defense LOl'elt, /')5/-/')53,
638 Notes to Pages 445-47

V:92i'-:\ I, OSD Hist; brief, "Status of Offshore Procurement .," [OMA], rca 26 Jun 52],

RG :\:\0, ISA files, Nash papers, "Briefing Book July 1952" folder.

';1'. Ltr Cox to Tannenwald, 8 Mar ';2, w/study of "Off-Shore Procurement Program .," 1

Mar ';2, 7, 1:\, Tannenwald papers, "Military Assistance" folder.

';9. Memo USecArmy for ASD(lSA), :\ I Mar 52, RG :\:\0, CD .f00.12; memo SplAsst to SecArmy for

USecArmy,:\1 Mar ';2, ibid; memo DirOMA for ATSD(ISA), 14 Apr 52, ibid; memo ATSD(lSA)

for Gordon (ADir(Pgm) ODMS), 28 Apr ';2, ibid; Itr ADir(Pgm) ODMS for ATSD(lSA), 13 May

52, ibid; memo DirOMA for ATSD(ISA), :\1 May ';2, RG 330, CD 4';2.01.

60. Ltr ATSD(lSA) for ChRenegotBd, 14 Dec'; I, RG :\:\0, CD 400. 12; intraoff memo DepDirEXOS

for DirEXOS, 14 Dec'; I, ibid; Itr SecDef to USAmb Fr, I' Feb ';2, ibid; Itr DepSecDef to

ChRenegotBd, 11 Mar 52, RG :\:\0, CD 400. 1/'.

61. Msg Musto 247 W. John Kenney (DepDirMSA) for HICOG, 19 Mar 52, RG :\:\0, Lovett papers,

"Classified Cables Pawley's ." folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md; memo

ActingSecDef for SecArmy et al. 24 Mar ';2, RG 3:\0, CD 091.:\ (Gen); memo DepDirEXOS for

ASecAF, 21' Mar ';2, ibid; memo ATSD(ISA) for ADirODMS, II Apr ';2, RG :\:\0, CD 091.:\

(France); MDAP: DoD Opns, Mar ';2, ix-x.

62. Memo ATSD(lSA) for USecArmy, 6 Mar ';2, RG :\:\0, CD 091.:\ (Gen); memo Sam Efron

(CounselOMA) for ATSD(ISA), '; Mar ';2, ibid; memo USecArmy for ATSD(ISA), 14 Mar ';2,

ibid; memo ActingSecDef for SecArmy et ai, 24 Mar ';2, ibid; Itr SecDef to SecState, '; Apr ';2,

ibid; memo I'SecArmy for ODMS, 2 Apr ';2, RG :\:\0, CD 400.12; memo DepSecDcf for

SecNavy, :\0 Apr ';2, ibid.

6:\. Memo ATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 21 Apr ';2, RG :\:\0. CD 400.12, originally addressed to the

SecDef and initialed by Lovett.

64. Memo USecAF for SecDe!', II \Iar ';2. RG :\:\0, CD 091.:\ (France); memo ActingSecDcf for

USecAF, 29 Mar ';2, ibid; memo ASD(L&L) for ATSD(ISA), II Apr ';2, RG :\:\0, CD 400.12.

M. Memo DirOMA for ATSD(lSA), 14 Apr ';2. RG :\:\0, CD .fOO.12; memo ChfOlP MB for

ATSD(ISA), 6 May ';2, ibid; MDAP: DoD Opns, Jul ';2. vii, 2';, Feb ';:\, x, Mar ';:\, ix.

66. Memo JCS for SecDef, 1 Feb ';2, with encs, RG :\30, CD 091.:\ «jen); memo JCS for SecDef,

II' Jul ';2, ibid; memo Leffingwell for DepSecDef et ai, 16 Oct ';2, w/enc, RG DO, CD

142-1-1; memo DirMS for ATSD(ISA), 1'; Oct ';2, RG :\:\0, CD 091.:\ (Gen).

6"' Memo ASD(lSA) for SecDef, 19 Feb ';:\, RG :\:\0, ISA files, Nash papers, "Aid for France"

folder; mins French-l:S conversations held 23 Feb ';2,2'; Feb ';2, ibid; mSg HAR 11'7 SRE for

SecDef, '; Mar ';2. RG :\:\0. Lovett papers, "Classified Cables Pawley's .," folder;

MDAP: DoD Opns, Jul ';2, vii.

61'. Memo Pawley (SplAsst to SecDef) for SecDef. 14 Mar ';2, RG :\:\0, CD 0922 (Gen); msg Niact

';6"'0 SecState for \'SAmb Fr, 24 Mar ';2, RG :\:\0. Lovett papers, "Classified Cables

Pawlev's ." folder; memo DepATSD(lSA) for SecOct', 4 Apr ';2, with handwritten note

initialed by Lovett, R(j .:\:\0, CD 091.:\ (France); memo DirOMA for ATSD(ISA), 29 Apr ';2,

w/hrief. 2:\ Apr ';2, R(j :\:\0, ISA file, Nash papers. 'Aid for France" folder.

69. Memrcd John F. Kiernan (OMA), II' Jul ';2, RG :\:\0, CD 091.:\ (France); memo Acting

ATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef. 20 Jul ';2, RG :\:\0, ISA files, :'IIash papers. "Aid for France" folder;

memo ASD(ISA) for SecDef, 19 Feb ';3, ibid.

"'0. \lemo Gordon for ATSD(1SA), II' .lui ';2, RG :\:\0, CD 091.:\ (France); memrcd DirEXOS, 21

Jul ';2, ibid; memo IThomas C.I Schelling (ODMS) for Ohly, I'; Aug ';2, w/paper, "History U.S. Aid :'IIegotiations With France for FY 19';:\:' ibid.

"' I. Memo ActingATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 20 .lui ';2, RG :\:\0, ISA files, Nash papers, "Aid for

France" folder; memrcd DirEXOS. 21 Jul ';2. R(j :\:\0. CD 091.:\ (France); Itr ChtMAAG France

to ATSD(ISA) and DirOMA, 14 Aug ';2, ibid; memcon Ridgway Knight (State), 21' Aug 52, ibid;

memo DirOMA for AfSD(lSA), 2'; Sep ';2. RG :\:\0, ISA files, Nash papers, 'Aid for France"

folder.

"'2. \Iemo Obly for :'IIash (AfSD(ISA)) and [Harlan] Cleveland (ADir(Eur)MSA), 7 Oct 52, RG :\:\0,

ISA files, Nasb papers, 'Aid for France" folder; memo [ASD(ISA)] for SecDef, rca 11 Mar 5:\],
Notes to Pages 447-49 639

ibid; memo DirMS for ATSD(ISA), 15 Oct 52, RG ))0, CD 0') I.) ((jen); MDAP: DoD Opns.

Mar 5), x-xi.

7). Memo DepSecDef for JCS, 1-4 Oct 52, RG .BO, CD 0') 1.:\ (Gen); memo JCS for SecDef, :\ Nm'

52, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef. 20 Nov 52. ihid; memo Cleveland for Ohly, :\1 Dec 52.

wltahle, "Defense Support and Economic Aid tlJr \\btern Europe ,," RG :\:\0, ISA files,

Nash papers, "fY 1')5:\ Programs" folder; memo ATSD(ISA) for DirOMA, "' Oct 52, RG :\:\0,

CD 0')1.3 (France); Itr ChfMAAG lOr to A1'SD(ISA) and DirOMA. 10 Oct 52. R(; :\:\0, ISA files,

Nash papers, "MDAP Progress" folder.

74. Memo A1'SD(lSA) for DirOMA, 7 Oct 52, RG :\30, CD 0') 1.:\ (France); Second Report to

Congress on the Mutual Securitv Program, :\0 Jun ';2, 11-1:\; Itr ChfMAAG lOr to A1'SD(ISA)

and DirOMA, 1:\ Oct 52, RG 330, ISA files, :-.lash papers, "MDAP Progn:ss" folder; memeon

SecDef, II Dec 52. R(; :\:\0, CD 0')2 (France); MDAP: DoD Opns, Dec ';2. xiv, Jan 5:\, xi, feh

53, ix, Mar 5:\, xi.

75. Memo ASecState(EUR) for SecState, 3 Mar ';2, FRUS 1952-1954, VI, pt I:H65-6"'; testimony

W. Averell Harriman. 1-4 Mar ';2, Senate Cte on Foreign Relations, Mutual Security Act of

1952: Hearings, .W--40; testimony William S. Batt, 26 Mar 52. ihid, 2') 1-'):\; MDAP: DoD

Opns, Aug 52. 2:\-2et; memo ATSD(ISA) tlJr SecDef. Ica "' Sep 5 II, RG :1:\0, CD 0') 1.:\

(MDAP/l:K); memo A1'SD(ISA) for DepSecDef. "' Sep 5 I, w/paper, ibid; msg Anthony Eden

(LJKForSec) for SecState. 10 Mar 52, w/paper. FRUS 1952-1954, VI. pt 1:H6H-"'0; memo JCS

for SecDef, 16 Jan 52, RG 3:\0, CD :\HO (Gen); First Report to COllgress Oil the ilJutual

Security Program, :\ I Dec 5 I, ')- 1O.

76. Memo ASecState(El'R) for SecState. :\ Mar 52, FRUS 1952-1954. VI. pt I:H65-6"'; Senate Cte

on Foreign Relations, !"tutual Securitr Act of 1952: Hearings, 2')1. :\00. :\:\6. :\7'); memo

Cleveland for Ohly, )1 Dec ';2, RG :\:\0, ISA files, Nash papers, "lOY 1')5:\ programs" folder;

memo Bradlev for Foster. I') Jul 52, w/memo JCS for SecDef, IH Jul 52. w/apps. RG :1:\0, CD

0') 1.:\ (Gen).

"'"' Msg '](Jmus 22-4 MSA London for MSA Wash, 12 \Jar 52, HG .~:\O. I.mett papers. "Classified

Cables Pawley's ." folder; msg 1'omus 2.~H MSA London for MSA Wash, 14 \Iar 52.

ibid; ltr ATSD(ISA) to ChfSplMissionUK \ISA, 126 Jun 521, RG :\:\0, CD etOO.12; memo

DepEurMSA ISA for DepSecDef, 26 Jun 52, RG :\50. CD -4"'OX

7H. Ltr A1'SD(ISA) to DepUSSRE, 1:\ Sep 52, H(; .~:\O, CD -400.12; memo DepA1'SD(ISA) for

ActingSRE, IH Sep 52, RG .BO. CD -470.H; memo DepATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 2 Dec 52, RG

:\:\0, CD -400. 12; memo DirEXOS (for SecDef) for SecArmy et aL et Dec 52, ibid; Third Report

to Congress on the Mutual Security Program. . I Dec 52, ); MDAP: DoD Opns, Feb 5:\, x.

7'). Msg UKPrimeMin for Pres, 10 Mar 52. FRUS 1952-1954, VI, pt I:H6"'; msg Eden for SecState,

10 Mar 52, w/paper. ibid. H6H-70; msg 1'omus 22-4 MSA London for MSA Wash, 12 Mar 52,

RG :\:\0, Lovett papers. "Classified Cables Pawley's ." folder; memo DirO:"iATA

for A1'SD(ISA), IH Mar 52, w/aide memoire. RG :\:\0, ISA files, Nash papers, "Aid for 11K File"

folder.

HO. FRUS 1952-1954. VI. pt I:H"'On-4; interoff memo IExecOffISA] for Pawley, Ind], RG :\:\0,

Lovett papers "Classified Cables Pawley's." tlJlder; memo \laurice P. Arth

(ODMS) for Ohly et al.:\1 Jul 52. w/encs, R(; :\:\0. CD -452.01; briefing note on production

of aircraft. Ica 25 Jul 521. RG :\:\0. lSA files, Nash papers. "Briefing Notes 25 July

1')';2" folder.

HI. Memo ChI'011' MB for Chtl'rocDiv OMA, ') \lay 52. w/paper, "Relationship of I'S and

European Military Production," HG :\:\0, CD 0')1.:\ (Europe); Itr ActingDepDirMS to SecDef,

2:\ Jul 52, RG 330, CD -471; briefing note on relationship of end-item programming. Ica 25

Jul 52], RG :\:\0, ISA files. Nash papers, "Briefing Notes 25 July 1')52" folder; memo

ADir(Pgm) ODMS for ATSD(ISA). 2') Jul 52, RG :\50. CD -45 I; memo Acting DirOfEDA ISA for

DepEurMSA ISA. 26 Sep 52. RG 330, CD 0')1.:\ (Europe).

H2. Memcon DepEurMSA ISA, HAug 52, RG :\:\0, ISA files. Nash papers, "\lDAP Progress" folder;

routing slip 0'105, II Aug 52, w/2 attached interoffmemos, CD -452.01; memo ATSD(ISA) for

SecAF, 15 Aug ';2. ibid; Itr ExecSecOSRE to DepDirEXOS OSD, 15 Sep 52, w/summary rcd.
640 Notes to Pages 449-54

5 Sep 52, ibid; Itr Halaby to Luke Finlay (DepSRE), II Sep 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers,

"Reorganization in Europe" folder; memo DepATSD(ISA) for DirMS, 4 Nov 52, w/paper, RG

330, ISA files, Nash papers, "FY 1954 MSP" folder; memo DepSecDef for SecAF, 4 Dec 52,

RG 330, CD 452.0I; memo DepSecDef for SRE, 4 Dec 52, ibid; Itr DepSRE to DepSecDef, 15

Dec 52, ibid; memo CSecAF for SecDef, 13 Nov 52, w/msg RLl073 lJSecAF for ASecAF, 5 Sep

52, ibid; Itr ADir(Pgm) ODMS to ATSD(lSA), 20 Oct 52, ibid; testimony Nash and comments

Lovett. 29 Mar 53, Cte on DeptDefOrg (hereafter cited as Rockefeller Cte), "Hearings"

(mimeo), 31-32, OSD Hist.

83. MDAP: DoD Opns, Dec 52, xiii-xiv, Mar 53, x, xiii-xiv, Jan 53, ix, Mar 53, x; memo

DepSecDef for SecAF, 4 Dec 52, w/encs, RG 330, CD 452.01; Itr ADir(Pgm) ODMS for

ATSD(ISA), 20 Oct 52, ibid; Itr DepEurMSA ISA OSD to ADir(Pgm) ODMS, 31 Oct 52, ibid.

84. Memo ChfOIP MB for DirOMA, 5 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 471; memo ActingDirOFEDA ISA for

DirONATA ISA, 24 Nov 52, w/staff paper, ibid; memo ActingATSD(lSA) for SecDef, 25 Jul 52,

ibid.

85 Memo ActingSecDef for DepDirMSA, 19 Jun 52, ibid; memo George A. Chadwick (FgnAidDivOIP MB) for DirOIP MB, 28 Apr 52. ibid; memo ActingDirOFEDA [SA for DirONATA, 24

Nov 52, w/staff paper, ibid.

86. Memo ActingSecDef for DepDirMSA, 19 Jun 52, w/memrcd, 12 Jun 52, and interoff memo

DepATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 17 Jun 52, ibid; Itr AetingDepDirMS to SecDef, 23 Jul 52, ibid.

8~. Ltr DepCSSRE to ATSD(ISA), 19 Aug 52, RG 330, CD '100.12; Itr SRE to SecDct', 16 Sep 52,

ibid; memo DirEXOS for ASD(C), 10 Nov 52, w/staff paper, RG ,130, CD 142-1-1; memo

ActingDirOFEDA ISA for DirONATA, 24 Nov 52, w/staff paper OFEDA ISA, rca 24 Nov 52], 2,

RG 330, CD 471.

88. Ltr DirMS to DepSecDef, I Dec 52, RG 330, CD 400. 12; Itr SecState to SecDef, 5 Dec 52, ibid.

89. Memo DepEurMSA ISA for DepSecDef, 13 Dec 52, ibid; memo DirOMA for SplAsst to

SecState(MSA), 12 Dec 52, ibid; MDAP: DoD Opns, Dec 52, xiv-xv; Itr DirMS to DepSecDef,

23 Dec 52, RG 330, CD 400.12.

90. Mins of 4th mtg MAC, 8 Jan 53, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, unlabeled folder. For French

ammunition procurement and feasibility of competitive bidding, see MDAP: DoD Opns, Mar

53, ix.

91. MDAP: DoD Opns, Mar 53, xii, Apr 53, x, give a combined FY 1952-53 total of $287 million

of OSP contracts by 2 May 1953, from which a FY 1952 total of 5141.9 million was

subtracted (ibid, Feb 53, x); ibid, May 53, x, for aircraft contract.

92. MDAP: DoD Opns, Feb 53, x, Jun 53, 35

93. Rept DepUSCINCEUR, lca 18 May 53J, in l:S Cong, House, Cte on Foreign Affairs, Mutual

Security Act Extension: Hearings, 83 Cong, I sess (1953),399-400.

94. First Semiannual Report on MDAP, 40-4 I; Second Semiannual Report on the Mutual

Defense Assistance Program, 81 Cong, I sess (1951), H Doc 119, 41.

95. MDAP: DoD Opns, Jan 53,31; rept Depl;SC1NCn:R, lca 18 May 53], in House ete on Foreign

Affairs, JJutual SeCllri~)' Act Extension: Hearings, 399-400.

96. MDAP: DoD Opns, Jan 53, 14, 15, Jul 53, vi, 32; Itr ATSD(lSA) to ADir and CoS ODMS, 15

Jan 53, w/rept [OSDJ, 8-10, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 135).

9~. Ltr ATSD(lSA) to ADir and CoS ODMS, 15Jan 53, w/rept, [OSDJ, 1-5, RG 330, CD 381 (War

Plans :'IISC 135); rept no 3, ODMS, NSC 142, Status of United States Programs for National

Security as ofDecember 31, 1952, RG 330, CD 334; memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDct', 23 Dec 52,

w/briefing note on status of NATO forces ., ibid. Nash's earlier opinion is given in memo

ATSD(lSA) for SecDef, 4 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 20 I.

98. Ltr ATSD(lSA) to ADir and CoS ODMS, 15 Jan 53, w/rept [OSDI, 1-5, RG 330, CD 381 (War

Plans NSC 135); memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDer. 23 Dec 52, w/briefing note on status of NATO

forces. RG 330, CD 33-l.

99. Ltr Pres to Cong, 16 Jan 53, in Third Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program,

31 Dec 52, v-xiii.
Notes to Pages 456-59 641

XXII. OSD NUCLEAR RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Memo Robert LeBaron (ChMLC) for DepSeeDef. 8 Dec 50, RG 330, ChMLC papers, "Atomic

Energy Commission and General Advisory Committee" folder; ltr DepSecDef to ChAEC, 11

Dec 50. ibid; paper ChMLC, "Summary of Remarks by Mr. Blair of Time Magazine 19 Oct

51." [31 Oct 51]. RG 330, ChMLC papers, "Congressional and Legislative" folder. Richard

G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield, 1947/1952, vol II in A History ofthe United

States Atomic Energy Commission, 397-98,411-12,474-75, gives some flavor of the

AEC-MLC relationship.

2. Memo SeeDef for SecsMilDepts et aI, 17 Jan 51, w/direetive, 17 Jan 51, Condit file, OSD

Hist; memo SeeDef for ChMLC, 17 Jan 51, ibid; Lee Bowen, The Development of Weapons,

vol IV in Lee Bowen and Robert D. Little et ai, A History of the Air Force Atomic Energy

Program, 1943-1953, pt 2;350.

3. Memo ChMLC for DepSecDef, 7 Mar 51, w/status rept No 1 to AEC, RG 330, CD 471.6

(A-Bomb); memo ChMLC for ChAEC, 14 May 51, w/status rept No 2 to AEC, RG 330, CD

319.1; Itr Thomas E. Murray (AEC Cmsr) to SeeDef, 17 Mar 53, RG 330, CD 471.6

(A-Bomb); intraoff memo ChMLC for SecDef, 9 Jun 53, RG 330, CD 045.92.

4 Ltr ChJCAE to SeeDef, 13 Feb 52, RG 330, ChMLC papers, "Atomic Energy Act" folder.

5. Ltr SeeDef to ChJCAE, 11 Mar 52, ibid.

6. DoD Directive 20.15-1, 8 Mar 52, OSD Hist; memo William A.M. Burden (SplAsst to

USecAF) for SecAF, 21 May 52, RG 330, CD 471.6.

7. See US Dept State, Foreign Relations ofthe United States: Conferences at Washington and

Quebec, 1943, 1117-19; US Dept State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The

Conference at Quebec, 1944. 492-93; Vincent C. Jones, Manhattan: The Army and the

Atomic Bomb, in United States Army in World War II, 227-52.

8. Lewis L. Strauss. Men and Decisions, 369-74; Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: "W:V

Years in the State Department, 164-68; Walter Millis, ed, The Forrestal Diaries, 338.

9. Memo Subgroup on Tech Coop for CPC, 12 Dec 47, in US Dept State, Foreign Relations of

the United States, 1947 (hereafter cited as FRUS with year and volume number), 1:894-95;

mins CPC, 7 Jan 48, w/annexes, FRUS /948. I, pt 2;679-87; memo of Blair House 14 Ju149

mtg, R. Gordon Arneson (SplAsst to l:SecState for Atomic Energy Policy), 20 Jul 49, FRUS

1949, 1:476-81; memo ChMLC for SecDef. 20 Oct 52, w/paper, "Historical Review

RG 330, CD .~1-1-35

10. Memo ChMLC for SecDer, 20 Oct 52, w/paper, "Historical Review .." RG 330, CD

31-1-35; memo UKMinDef for SecDef. (l Sep 48], FRUS /'J48, 1, pt 2: 7 50-52; memo

Arneson for ActingSecState, 27 Sep 48, ibid, 767-70; memo ExecSecNSC for Pres, 2 Mar 49,

w/annex, FRUS 1949, 1:443-61; memo Arneson. [20 Jul 491. ibid, 476-81; memrcd

Arneson, 20 Jul 49, ibid, 490-98; memo SecState, 25 Jul 49, ibid. 498-99; memo Arneson,

27 Jul 49, w/annex, ibid, 503-06; memo ChMLC for SecDef, 10 Jan 50, w/app 11, RG 330,

ChMLC papers, "CPC Policy 1950-51" folder; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 314-20.

11. Memo Arneson, [ndl, FRUS 1949,1:513-14; memcon SecState, 18 Aug 49, ibid. 516; memo

Arneson for SeeState, 18 Aug 49, ibid. 516-17; memcon ActingSecState, 1 Oct 49, ibid, 543;

memo Arneson for USecState, 6 Oct 49, ibid, 558; Itr SecDefto SecState, 16 Mar 50. RC; 330,

ChMLC papers, "CPC Policy 1950-51" folder; memrcd ChMLC, 6 Sep 50, ibid; memo

[ChMLC'l for ChJCS, 6 Sep 50, ibid; memo ChMLC for SecDef, 20 Oct 52. w/enc "Historical

Review.," 2, RG 330, CD 31-1-35; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 320-21; David

E. Lilienthal. The Atomic Energy Years, /945-/950, vol II in The journals of Dal'id E.

Lilienthal, ':;65, 574-77, 601, 615, 634-35.

12. Mins mtg USMbrsCPC, 7 Sep 50, FRUS 1950.1:572-75; memo LeBaron for DepSecDef, 19

Jun 51, RG .~30, ChMLC papers, "CPC Policy 1950-51" folder; off memo Col W.B. Kieffer

for Cdr L. W. Rogers, 26 Oct 50, ibid.
642 Notes to Pages 459-63

1:1. "lemo Ina) for CoSLJSAF, 6 Dec 50, RG :1:10, ChMLC papers, "CPC Policy \950-5 I" folder;

memo LeBaron for DepSeeDef, 19Jun 5 I, ibid.

l-t. Memo SeeDef for ChCPC, :11 Jan 5\, RG :1:10, CD 47 1.6 (A-Bomb); Itr SeeDef to DirBoB,

2\ Dec 50, RG :1:10, ChMLC papers, "Atomic Energy Act" folder.

\5. Memo Kieffer for MbrsMLC, 10 May 5\, RG 330, ChMLC papers, "CPC Policy \950-5\"

folder; memo ExeeSeeNSC for SeeState et aI, 2\ May 5\, w/3 enes, FRUS 1951, \:72\-30;

memo ExeeSeeMLC for AEC, 27 Mar 51, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo JCS for

SeeDef, 20 Apr 5\, w/memo JCS for "ILC, 20 Apr 5 I, ibid; memo [ChMLOI for ASD(L&L),

30 Apr 5\, RG .'.10. CD :1\-1-35.

16. "1cmo LeBaron for DepSeeDef, 19 Jun 5 I, RG .BO. ChMLC papers, "CPC Policy \950-5\"

folder; Itr ASeeState to ChJCAE. U Aug 51, FRUS 1951.1:752-55; mins mtg CSMbrsCPC, 24

Aug 5\. ibid. 755-63; memo JCS for SeeDef. 3 Jul 51. RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb).

17. ,."kmeon ChMLC, 20Jun 51, R(; .BO. ChMLC papers, "CPC Policy \950-5\" folder; diary

entry ChAEC. 20 Jun 5\, Gordon Dean "Diary," DOE archives.

IH. Ltr ChAEC to SeeDeI', 10 Aug 51, RG :\30, CD ..J71.6 (A-Bomb); memo ChJCS for SeeDer,

16 Aug 51. ibid; memo AetingSeeDef for lJSChCPC, IH Aug 51, ibid; memeon Arneson, 2

Aug 5\, FRUS 195/, \:74H-50; mins mtg CS:\lbrsCPC, 24 Aug 5 \. ibid, 755-6:\; mins CPC

mtg, 27 Aug 5\, ibid, 76:\-67.

19. Memo ChMLC for Sedlef. 29 Aug 5\, w/notes. RG 330, CD 47\.6 (A-Bomb); memo SeeDef

for JCS, \8 Sep 5\, w/interoff memo ChMLC for SeeDef. \:\ Sep 5\, ibid.

20. \nteroff memo Asst to ChMLC for Arneson. 17 Sep 51, w/draft paper, "Defense

Views ,," RG :1:10, ChMLC papers, "CPC Policy 1950-5\" folder (draft paper only in

FRUS 1951,1:769-72, 769nl); ltr LeBaron to ChAEC, I-t Sep 51, RG :1:10, ChMLC papers,

"CPC Policy 1950-5 I" folder; ltr ChAEC to William C. Foster (AetingSeeDef), 27 Nov 5\,

FRlfS 1951, 1:7H5-8H; memo Ch"\LC for SeeDef. -t Dec 51. RG 3:10, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb).

21. :\1emo SeeDef for JCS. 18 Sep 51, R(; :1:\0, CD ..{71.6 (A-Bomb); memo JCS for SeeDef, 10

Oct 5\, ibid; memo SeeDef for ChCPC, 12 Oct 51, FRUS 1951, 1:776-77 ; Itr BrAmb

Washington to SeeState, 26 Dec 61, ibid, 79H-99; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 32\.

22. Ltr ExeeDirJCAE to ChMLC. 29 Sep 5 I. w/AEC proposal. RG :130, ChMLC papers, ''Atomic

Energy Act" folder; memo ChMLC for SeeDef, 20 Oct 52, w/paper, "Historical

Review.," 4-5, RG :1:10, CD :11-1-:15; memo LeBaron for SeeDef, 17 Oct 52, RG 330,

CD :1:14 (Combined Policy etc)

2:1. Memo ChMLC for SeeDef, 29 Sep 5\, RG 330, CD ..{71.6 (A-Bomb); memo DepSeeDef for

ExeeSeeNSC, I Oct 5\, RG :1:10, CD 47\.6 (Atomic Energy); Itr SeeDef to DirBoB, 29 Oct 5\,

ibid; ftr ChAEC to SeeDef, \ Oct 51, w/2 enes, RG 330, ChMLC papers, "Atomic Energy Act"

folder; Itr ASD(L&L) to DirBoB, 19 Oct 5\, ibid. PI. H2-235 (:\0 October 195\) amended

section 10 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (FRUS 1951, I: 777n I ).

24. :\lemo JCS for SeeDef, 26 Oct 5\. w/intraoff memo DirEXOS for ChMLC. RG 3.'\0, CD 47\.6

(A-Bomb); Itr AetingSeeDef to ChAEC, 2 Nov 51, FRUS /951. 1:7H4-H5; ftr ChAEC to

AetingSeeDef,27 Nov 51, ibid. 7H5-HH: memo ChMLC for DepSeeDef, 6 Dec 5\, w/intraoff

memo, RG :1:10, CD .\71.6 (Atomic Energy).

25. Memo JCS for SeeDef, 20 NO\' 51. R(; :1:10, CD -t 7 1.6 (Atomic Energy); memo Acting SeeDef

for ASD(L&Lj, 7 Dec 51, ibid; memo SeeDef for JCS, 21 Jun 52, RG 330, CD :\\3.:1 (Gen

Counsel); memo ChMLC for SeeDer. I-t Oct 52, ibid; memo ChMLC for ChJCS, 17 Oct 52,

ibid.

26. Memo Arneson for SeeState, 15 Jan 52. FRlfS 1952-1954, II, pt 2:H46-4H; memo LeBaron

for SeeDef, 17 Oct 52, RG :1:10. CD :1:14 (Combined Policy etc); memo ExeeSeeNSC for

SeeState and SeeDef, 2H Aug 52, RG :1:10, CD :150.05 (UK); memo SeeDcf for SeeState and

ChAEC, 6 Oct 52, ibid.

r. Memo ChMLC for SeeDef. 1-t Nov 52, RG :\30, CD 350.05 (t:K); interoff memo ChMLC for

SeeDef, 6 Dec 52, ibid; memo AetingSeeDef for I :SSeeCPC, \2 Ike 52, ibid; ftr LeBaron to

Paul W. McDaniel (AFCl. 27 Aug 52, R(; :1:10, CD :1:1'1 (Combined Policy etc).

2H. Strauss, Men and Decisio1/s, 37 1_7-t.
Notes to Pages 463-66 643

29. PL 79-585 (1 August 1946), sees 5, 6, 9; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 136, 150-53,

154-60, 165-"'0, 354-55. Bowen, The Development of Weapons, pt 2:348, claimed that

the commission did not possess an "inalienable right to be the sole custodian of

stockpiled weapons." For a detailed account of the custody question between 1947 and

1950, see Steven L. Rearden, The Formative Years, 1947-1950, vol I in Historr ofthe OfFee

of the Secretarr of Defense, 425-32.

30. Ltr SecDef to Pres, 11 .lui 50, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo JCS for SecDcf, 10 Aug

50, RG 330, CD 471.6; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 521-22, 524-25, 538-39;

memo SecDe!' for ChJCS, 11 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 471.6; memo SecDef for ChJCS, 22 Aug

50, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); OATSD(AE), Historr of Custody and Deployment of

Nuclear Weapons:ju~r 1945 throughjune 1975, 15-16, OSD Hist; Lulejian & Associates,

Inc., Supporting Study: U S. AircraJ~ Carriers in the Strategic Role, pt I in Historr of the

Strategic Arms Competition, 1945-1972, 165-66; Norman Friedman, US. Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated Design History, 248.

31. Memo SecDcf for Pres, 16 Dec 50, RG 330, CD 400.112; memo Naval Aide to Pres for

SecDef, 18 Dec 50, ibid; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 524-25, 538-39.

32. Intraoff memo ChMLC for SeeDef, 28Jun 52, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); Itr SecDef to

SecState, 29Jun 52, ibid; memo ActingSecDef for ,/CS, 22 .lui 52, RG 330, CD 471.6; memo

DepSecDcf for JCS, 29 .lui 52, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memrcd SecDef, 19 Aug 52, RG

350, Lovett papers, "1952" folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland. Md.

33. Memo SecDef for JCS, 27 Aug 52, RG 330, Lovett papers, "1952" folder; Hewlett and

Duncan, Atomic Shield, 538-39; Walter Poole, 1950-J952, vol IV in The Historv of the

joint Chiefs of Staff: The joint Chiefs of Staff and National Potier. 152. OATSD(AE),

History of Custody and Deployment, 18, 171, cites a joint memo MLC-AEC for JCS. 26

April 1951, and reports that the JCS disapproved it without further explanation.

34. Memo ChMLC for SecDef, 13 May 53, RG 350, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo DirEXOS (for

SecDef) for JCS, 14 Jan 53, ibid; memo SecDef for ExecSecNSC, 8Jun 53, ibid; Poole,

1950-1952, 155-57; OATSD(AE), Historr ofCustodv and Deployment, 24.

35. Ltr ChAEC to SecDef, 8 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 385.2; OATSD(AE), Historr of Custody and

Deployment, 21, 171; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 522-23, 537-39.

36. Quoted in memoJCS for SecDef, 1I Mar 53, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb).

37. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 579; memo ChAEC for ExecSecNSC, 27 May 52,

w/paper, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo State, 11 Jun 52, FRUS 1952-1954, II, pt

2:969-73, particularly 973.

38. Agreement Relating to Atomic Energy, 19 Aug 43, apvd by Roosevelt and Churchill, FRUS:

Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1913, 11 17-19. See also references to earlier

conversations and documents on this matter at Hyde Park and Casablanca in FRUS: The

Conferences at WaShington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943, 432, 803. For the first

Quebec conference, sec FRUS: Conferences at Washington and Quehec, 1943, 630-53,

894; NSC 30, 10 Sep 48, FRlfS 1948,1, pt 2:624-28; draft memo SplAsst to SecState, 24 Apr

51, FRlfS 1951,1:822.

39. Memo DepDirEXOS (for SecDef) for JCS, 17 Apr 51, RG 330. CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo

JCS for SecDef, 23 May 51, ibid; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 539.

40. Memo ChMLC for DepSecDef, 19 Oct 51, RG 330, CD 471.6 (Atomic Energy); memo

ChMLC for DcpSccDef, 26 Oct 5 I, ibid.

41. Memo SecDeffor ChJCS, 3 ;\Jov 51, RG 330, CD 4'" 1.6 (A-Bomb); memo ChMLC for SecDef,

20 Dec 51, ibid; memo SecDef for JCS, 29 Jan 52, ibid; memo SecDef for ExecSecNSC, 6 Feb

52, w/cnc, "Views ofJCS .," FRlfS 1952-1954, II, pt 2:863-68, 863n3.

42. Memo ChAEC for ExecSecNSC, 27 May 52, w/cnc, "Views of the AEC . ,," FRUS

1952-1954,11, pt 2:947-53; memo State comments onJCS paper. 1I Jun 52, ibid. 969-73;

staff study reps of NSCSpICte(AE), 11 Jun 52. ibid, 973-79; memo SplAsst to SecState(AE)

for SecState, 10Jun 52, ibid. 964-68; memcon SecState, 13Jun 52, ibid, 981; Hewlett and

Duncan, Atomic Shield, 579-80.
644 Notes to Pages 466-69

43. Mins [State] mtg of NSCSpICte(AE) and ChjCS, 17 jun 52, FRUS 1952-1954, II, pt 2:984-88.

44. Memo ExeeSeeNSC for SeeState et al. w/ene, 3 jul 52, RG 330. CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo

ExeeSeeNSC for SeeState et ai, 5 Aug 52, w/draft. ibid; memo ChMLC for SeeDef, 6 Aug 52,

w/handwritten note re Bradley's concurrence, ibid; memo SeeDef for ExeeSeeNSC, 8 Aug

52. ibid; memo SeeDef for Bradley. 30 Aug 52, ibid; memo ChjCS for SeeDef, 4 Sep 52, ibid;

memo SeeDef for ExeeSeeNSC, HSep 52. ibid; memo ExeeSeeNSC for SeeState et ai, 10 Sep

52. w/Agreed Concepts. FRUS 1952-1954, II, pt 2:1010-13.

45. Memo ChMLC for SeeDef, 10 Oct 52. w/AFSWP staff study, 30 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 471.6

(A-Bomb).

46. Memo SeeDef for Bradley, 21 Oct 52, ibid; memo JCS for SeeDef, 7 Nov 52, ibid; memo

SeeDef for ExeeSeeNSC, 21 Nov 52, ibid; memo JCS for SeeDef, II Mar 53, ibid; memo

AetingSeeDef for ExeeSeeNSC, 30 Mar 53. ibid; memo ChMLC for SeeDef. 13 May 53, ibid;

memo SeeDef for ExeeSeeNSC, 8 jun 53, ibid; OATSD(AE), History of Custody and

Deployment, 24. 172.

47. Memo ChMLC for SeeDef, 26 Sep 50, RG 330, ChMLC papers, "Fissionable Material

Expansion Program 1949-1950" folder; memo ChMLC for SeeDef, 29 Sep 51, w/draft

paper, "A Chronological Listing .," RG 330, CD 4'71.6 (A-Bomb); ltr ChjCAE to SeeDef,

8 May 52, w/paper, "The Scale and Scope of Atomic Production," 4-5,9-11,22, ibid.

4H. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 426; memo ChMLC for SeeDef, 7 Sep 50, RG 330, CD

401.1; memo ExeeSeeNSC for Pres, II jan 51. RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo ChMLC

for SeeArmy, 7 Nov 51, ibid.

49. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 380; Congressional Quarterly Service, Congress and

the Nation, 1945-1964, 259; annual budget msg Pres to Cong, 9 jan 50, Public Papers of

the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950. . (hereafter cited as

Truman Public Papers with year), H8-H9; memo SeeDef for JCS, 10 Mar 50, RG 330, CD

400.174.

50. Ltr ChjCAE to SeeDet', 10 Mar 50. RG 330, ChMLC papers. "Congressional and Legislative"

folder; Itr SeeDet' to ChjCAE, 5 May 50, ibid; memo lCS for SeeDef, 26 Apr 50, ibid; Itr

ChjCAE to SeeDet', 6 May 50, ibid; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Sbield, 431.

51. Ltr ChjCAE to SeeDet', 19 May 50, RG 330, ChMLC papers, "Congressional and Legislative"

folder; memo ChMLC for SeeDef, 31 May 50, w/draft reply, ibid; Itr SeeDet' for ChjCAE, I

jun 50, RG 330, CD 23-1-15.

52. Ltr ChJCAE to SeeDet', 8 May 52. w/paper, "The Scale and Scope ..," 22, RG 330, CD

471.6 (A-Bomb); intraoff memo ChMLC for SeeDet', II Jul 50, ibid; editorial note, FRUS

1950, 1:565; Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964. 263.

53. Memred lOLL] on jCAE hearings, 22 jun 50. (, jul 60, RG 330, ChMLC papers, "Congressional and Legislative" folder; ltr ChjCAE to ChMLC, 28 jun 50, ibid; memo ChMLC for

SeeDet'. 24 jul 50, ibid.

54. Memo JCS for SeeDef. I Aug 50, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo SeeDef for Pres, 2 Aug

50. ibid; Itr ChJCAE to SeeDet'. H May 52, w/paper, "The Scale and Scope ," 23-24,

ibid; transcript JCAE mtg w/johnson and Bradley, 2 Aug 50. ibid.

55. Memo SeeDef for ExeeSeeNSC, 7 Aug 50, RG 330, ChMLC papers, "Fissionable Material

Expansion Program 1949-1950" folder; memo ExeeSeeNSC for SeeState et ai, 8 Aug 50,

FRUS 1950, 1:570; Itr Sen Henry M. jackson OCAE) to SeeDef, 9 Aug 50, RG 330, ChMLC

papers, "Congressional and Legislative" folder; Itr ChjCAE to SeeDef, 22 Aug 50, RG 330,

CD 400.174; memo SeeArmy et al for SeeDet', IH Sep 50, ibid.

56. Ltr ChjCAE to SeeDef, 8 May 52, w/paper, "The Scale and Scope .," 25-26, RG 330, CD

471.6 (A-Bomb); memo LeBaron for SjCS, 14 Sep 50, RG 330, ChMLC papers, "Fissionable

Material Expansion Program 1949-1950" folder; memo SeeDet' for ChMB, 14 Sep 50, ibid;

memo DirStfMB for SeeDef' (attn LeBaron), [21 Sep 50), ibid; memo ExeeSeeNSC for

SeeState et at, 29 Sep 50, w/draft rept NSC for Pres, 4, ibid; memo SeeArmy et al for SeeDef',

18 Sep 50, RG 330. CD 400.174; memo SeeDef and ChAEC for ExeeSeeNSC, 18 Sep 50,

ibid; memo JCS for SeeDef. 2 Oct 50, ibid.
Notes to Pages 469-71 645

5"7. Ltr SeeDef to ChJCAE, 19 Sep 50, RG 330, ChMLC papers, "Congressional and Legislative"

folder.

58. Ltr ChJCAE to SeeDef. 21 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, 1:5"76-n; Itr SeeDd' to ChJCAE, 26 Sep 50,

RG 330, ChMLC papers, "Congressional and Legislative" folder.

59. Memo ChMLC for SeeDd', 26 Sep 50, RG :\:\0, ChMLC papers, "Fissionable Material

Expansion Program 1949-1950" folder; memo ExeeSeeNSC for SeeState et ai, 29 Sep 50,

w/draft memo NSCSplCte(AE) for Pres, 6, 8-9, ibid.

60. Memo Asst to DCS/OpsAE HqllSAF for SeeAF, 2"7 Sep 50, w/initialed agreement of Finletter,

ibid; memo CNO for SeeNavy, 2"" Sep 50, w/signed agreement of Matthews, ibid; memo

SeeDef for ExeeSeeNSC, 29 Sep 50, ibid; memo SeeArmy for SeeDd', 29 Sep 50, RG 3:\0, CD

400.174.

61. Memo SeeDd' for ChJCS, II Oct 50, RG 330, CD 400.174; memo ExeeSeeNSC for SeeState

et ai, I I Oct 50, RG 3:\0, ChMLC papers, "Fissionable Material Expansion Program

1949-1950" folder; Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, 263, 266, 268; spl msg to Cong,

I Dec 50, Truman Public Papers, 1950, "728-:\1.

62. Ltr ChJCAE to ChMLC, 4 Dec 50. w/ltr ChJCAE to ChAEC, 4 Dec 50, ChMLC papers, RG

330, "Congressional and Lcgislath'c" folder; intraoff mcmo ChMLC lilr SeeDef', 19Jun 5 I.

wl"Log of Significant Evcnts," entries II and 29 Dec 50, 12 Feb 51, RG :\:\0, CD r 1.6

(A-Bomb); memo ChMLC for CoSIISAF, 1"7 Feb 5 I, ibid; ltr SeeDd' to ChJCAE, I Mar 5 I, RG

330, ChMLC papers, "Congressional and Legislative" folder; memo JCS for SeeDef. 2"7 Mar

5 I, ibid; memo ChJCS for SeeDd', 2 Apr 5 I, ibid; ltr SeeDef to ChJCAE, 2 Apr 5 I, ibid.

63. LtrChJCAE toSeeDd', 2 May 51. R(; 330, CD 4"71.6 (A-Bomb); ItrSeeDd'toChJCAE, 18Jun

51, ibid; ltr ChJCAE to SeeDd', 8 May 52, w/paper. "The Scale and Scope .," 26, 28,

ibid; Itr SeeDd' to ChJCAE, 20 Jun 51, R(; :\30. ChMLC papers, "Congressional and

Legislative" folder; ltr ChMLC to ExeeDirJCAE, II Jun 5 I, ibid.

6.... Ltr ChJCAE to SeeDef. 8 May 52, v.'!paper, 'The Scale and Scope .," 26-2"7 (quote), RG

330, CD 4"71.6 (A-Bomb); ltr ChAEC to ChJCAE. 22 Jun 5 I, ibid; memo DirBoB for Pres,

21 Jun '; I, Truman papers, President's Secretary's files (PSF), Harry S. Truman Library,

Independence. \10.

65. l.tr ChJCAE to SeeDd', ..., Jun 5 I, RG 330, CD ... "" 1.6 (A-Bomb); Itr ChJCAE to SeeDd', 21 Aug

5 I, w/memo J.K. Mansfield OCAE) for ChJCAE. I'; Aug'; I. FRUS 195/. I: 158-6:\: Hewlett

and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 54"", 556-5""

66. Editorial note, FRUS 195/,1:"""72; ltr ChJCAE to SeeDd'. 8 May 52. w/paper. "The Scale and

Scope .," n, 29, R(; :\:\0, CD·J"'" 1.6 (A-Bomb); Congress and tbe Nation, 1')45-1')6~1,

268.

6"". l.tr Sen Homer ferguson to SeeDeL 19 Sep 5 I. R(; :\30, ChMLC papers. "Congressional and

Legislative" folder; mins SeeDd' press eonL 25 Sep '; I, in !list Off OSD, eomp, Public

Statements ofSecretarr olDelense Lm'ett, 1')5/-1')53,1:8-10; PR 214-51S OPI OSD, 25

Sep '; I, OSD Hist; Lloyd Norman, "Wonder Arms Still a Myth, LO\Ttt Warns," Chicago

Tribune, 26 Sep 5 I; "Finletter Backs Atomic Increase," N}' Times, 2"" Sep 5 I. editorial,

"Lovett's Bow," ibid.

68. Ltr ChJCAE to SeeDef. 8 Ma\ 52. w/paper, "The Scale and Scope .,'. 32-,'>3, R(; .'>30, CD

·j"71 .6 (A-Bomb).

69. Editorial note, FRt!S 1')51. 1:"""":\-""... , ""82n2; Congress and the Nation. 1')15-1')64, 268.

The president signed both bills on I November 195 I

""0 Ltr AetingChAEC to SeeDef. 8 Oet '; I. R(; 330. CD .j"" 1.6 (A-Bomb): memo Ch\ILC for

Sedlef through DepSeeDef. 19 Oet 51, ibid; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 559-60,

562-6:\, 5""9-8 I.

""1. Ltr ChJCAE to SeeDd', 1"7 Oct ';1, R(; :\:\0, CD ...-1.6 (A-Bomb); memo Ch\lLC for SeeDd'

through DepSeeDd', 19 Oet 5 I. ibid .

..., 2. Memo ExeeSee~SC for SeeSt:tte et al. l'i Oet 'i I. w/ltr ChJCAE to :'\ISC SpIUe(AE), 2... Oct'; I.

ibid: ltr Sedlef to ChJCAE, 25 Oet 51. R(j 5.'>0, CD ... ""1.6 (Atomic Energy).
646 Notes to Pages 471-75

"75. Ltr AetingChAEC to SecDe!. 2 Nov 51, RG 550. CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo ExecSecNSC for

SecState et al. 5 Dec 51. w/cncs. RG 550. ChMLC papers, "Thermonuclear Weapons

Program-Misc" folder; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 564-67; ftr AetingSecDef to

ChAEC, 5 Dec 51. RG 550, CD 471.6 (Atomic Energy); memo ChMLC for DepSecDef, 15

Dec 51, wlhackground comment. ibid.

"74. Memo SecDeffor ExecSecNSC. II Dec 51, RG 550, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo ChMLC for

SecDe!. .., Jan 52, ihid; memo DepDirEXOS for DirEXOS, 15 Jan 52, ibid; Hewlett and

Duncan. Atomic Shield. 572.

"75. Memo ExecSecNSC for SecDe! et al. 26 Dec 51, w/memo SecState for ExecSeeNSC, 21 Dec

51. RG 550, ChMLC papers, "Thermonuclear Weapons Program-Mise" folder; memo

ExecSecNSC for SecState et ai, 8 Jan 52. w(memo DirODM for ExecSeeNSC, 7 Jan 52, ibid;

memo ChMLC for SecDe!, 11 Jan 52, RG DO, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb).

76. Memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 17 Jan 52, FRUS /952-/954.11, pt 2:851-58.

Ibid; Hewlett and Duncan. Atomic Shield, 5"76-"78. The president formalized his decision

on n January 1952.

78. Ltr ChJCAE to SecDef. 11 Jan 52. RG 550, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo ChMLC for SecDef,

12 Jan 52, ibid; response to JCAE resolution, ihid; ftr ChJCAE to SecDe!, 2 Apr 52, ihid; Itr

ChJCAE to SecDe!, 8 May 52, w/paper, "The Scale and Scope .," 58. ihid; JCAE,

"Hearings on Status of Atomic Energy Program" (typescript), 6 Feh 52. ibid; Hewlett and

Duncan, Atomic Shield, 578.

"79. Memo SecDe! for ExecSecNSC, 8 Feh 52. RG 550. CD 091.D; memo SecDef for

ExecSecNSC, 25 Apr 52, ibid; memo ExecSecNSC for SecState and SeeDef, 11 Jun 52,

w/memo ChAEC for ExecSecNSC. 10 Jun 52, ibid; memo ExecSecNSC for SecState and

SecDe!, 18 Sep 52, w/memo ChAEC for ExeeSecNSC. 16 Sep 52, ihid; memo ChMLC for

SecDe!, 5 Oct 52. ihid; rev agenda mtg CSMhrsCPC, 9 Oct 52, w/rept, "Status of

Cranium Ore Production," RG ,BO. CD 554 (Comhined Policy ete); mins mtg USMbrsCPC,

9 Oct 52. FRUS /952-/954,11, pt 2: 1026-52: Hewlett and Duncan. Atomic Shield. 551-52.

56"7

80. Ltr ChAEC to ExecSecNSC, 8 May 52, RG 550, ChMLC papers. "Thermonuclear Weapons

Program-Misc" folder; ftr Pres to ChSuhetelndepenOffs. Senate Cte on Appropriations, 28

May 52, ihid; memo ExecSecNSC for Pres, 20 May 52, w/annexes, FRlfS 1952-/954, II, pt

2:955-58; memo ChMLC for SecDef, 5 Jun 52, RG 550. CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); Congress and

the Nation, /945-/964. 275.

81. Ltr SecDefto ChAEC, 20 Aug 52, RG 530, CD 471.6 (A-Bomh); Itr ChAEC to SecDef, 8 Sep

52, ibid; memo ChMLC for DirOLL, 24 Dec 52. RG 550, ChMLC papers, "Congressional and

Legislative" folder.

82. Memo ChRDB for SecDef, 28 Sep 49. RG 3,)0, CD 11-1-35; memo ChRDB for SeeDef, 9 Jun

50, RG 550. CD 470; memo SecDef for ChRDB, n Jul 50, ihid; interv with K.D. Nichols by

Doris M. Condit, 17 Apr 84. 29-50. OSD Hist.

85. Memo ChRDB for SecDe!. 28 Sep 49. RG 330, CD 11-1-33; memo lJSecNavy for SecDef,

21 Aug 50, RG 550, CD 470; memo ChRDB for DepSecDef, 16 Oct 50, ihid; memo SecDef

filr JtSecs. 1"7 Oct 50. ihid; memo SecDeI' for DepSeeDef et aI, 24 Oct 50, OSD Hist; inten'

with Nichols, 17 Apr 84. 51

8'1. :\1emo SecDef for DepSecDef et al. 24 Oct 50, OSD Hist; PR 884-55 OPI OSD, 18 Sep 55,

ihid; ftr K.T. Keller (DirGuidedMissiles OSD) to Pres. 10Jul 51, Truman papers, PSF; interv

with Nichols, ]"7 Apr 84, 28-29, r.

85. Inten' with Nichols, J"7 Apr 84, 51-55; Herbert F. York and G. Allen (;reh, "Military

Research and Development: a Postwar History," The Bulletin (1 the Atomic Scientists

(January 1(77 ). 19.

86. Memo Keller for SecDef. 14 Dec 50. RG .550, CD 470; memos SecDef for SecArmy and

ASD(C), 12 Jan 51 (re Nike), 20 Mar 51 (Corporal), 15 Apr 51 (Hermes A-5), ibid; memos

DepSecDe! for SecNavy and ASD(C), 15 Jan 51 (Sparrow), 14 Jan 51 (Terrier), 20 [30) Mar

51 (Regulus). 27 May 51 (Rigel), 26Jun 51 (Sparrow 11 and Ill), 2 Jul 51 (Petrel), ibid; memos
Notes to Pages 475-77 647

SecDef or ActingSecDef for SecAF and ASD(C), 20 Mar 51 (Matador), :)0 Mar 51 (Falcon), :)0

Mar 51 (Snark), 1:) Apr 51 (Navaho), 1:) Apr 51 (Bomarc), 16 May 51 (Rascal), ibid; memo

ChRDB for SecDef, 4 Apr 51, RG :):)0, CD Ill. Talos, Meteor, Oriole, and Terrier (Navy),

Hawk (Army), and others were reviewed and recommended later that year.

87. Ltr Keller to Pres, 10 Jul 51, w/rept, Truman papers, PSI'.

88. Table OSD, "Funds for OSD Guided Missile Programs .," 9 May 51. RG :):)0, CD 470;

memo Keller for ChRDB, 9 Jan 52, ibid; Itr DepSecDcf to Pres, 24 Jul 51, ibid; ltr ChAEC

to SecDcf, 1 Oct 51, w/testimony ChAEC before House Cte on Appropriations, RG :):)0,

ChMLC papers, "Atomic Energy Act" folder; PR 884-5:) OPI OSD, 18 Sep 5:), OSD Hist;

memo SecDef for SecArmy et ai, 12 Nov 5:), ibid; interv with Nichols, 17 Apr 84, 41-44;

York and Greb, "Military Research and Development," 19-20.

89. Table GM-12 ProgRepts&Stats OSD, "Tentative Obligations for Guided Missiles Program-FY 1950 and Prior Through FY 1957," -t feb 57, RG :):)0, ASD(C) files, "House

Hearings on Guided Missiles" folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md.

90. Memo ChMLC for SecDef, 19 Oct 51, RG :):)0, CD -P1.6 (A-Bomb); memo ChMLC for

SecDef, 7 Feb 52, ibid; memo ChMLC for SecDef, 10 Mar 52, RG :):)0, CD 471.6 (Mark 6

Weapons); memo ChMLC for DepSecDef, 28 Apr 52, RG DO, CD ei71.6.

91. Ltr ChAEC to ChMLC, 18 Oct 51, RG :):)0, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); Itr ChMLC to ChAEC, :) I

Oct 51, RG :):)0, CD 471.6 (Atomic Energy); memo ChMLC for DepSecDef, :) I Oct 51, ibid;

memo SecNavy for SecArmy and SecAF, 6 Nov 51, ibid; memo ChMLC for DepSecDef, 28

Apr 52, RG :):)0, CD ei71.6 (May-July 1952).

92. Memo SecNavy for SecArmy and SecAF, 6 Nov 51, RG :):)0, CD ei71.6 (Atomic Energy); ltr

ActingSecDef to ChAEC, 5 Dec 51, ibid; memo ChMLC for DepSecDef, 28 Apr 52, RG :):)0,

CD 471.6.

9:). Ltr ChAEC to llSecAF, 14 Apr 52, RG :):)0, CD 471.6; memo ChMLC for DepSecDcf, 28 Apr

52, ibid; intraoff memo DirEXOS for SecDef and DepSecDef, 28 Apr 52, w/Lovett's

handwritten note, ibid; intraoff memo DepSecDef, lei May 52, ibid.

94. Ltr ChAEC to CSecAF, 15 May 52, ibid; Itr USecAf to ChAEC, :) Jun 52, Condit file, OSD

Hist; informal mins [Statel mtg NSCSpICte(AE) and ChJCS, 17 Jun 52, FRUS 1952-1954, II,

pt 2:984-88, particularly 987.

95. Memo ChMLC for DepSecDef, 22 Sep 52, Condit file, OSD Hist; memo ChMI.C for

DepSecDef et aI, 22 Sep 52, ibid.

96. l.tr ActingSecDef to ChAEC, 2 Oct 52, RG :):)0, CD ei71.6 (A-Bomb); memo ChMLC for

SecDer, 19 Jan 5:), ibid; memo ChMLC for ASD(C), 24 Mar 5:), ibid; memo USecArmy for

SecDef, 7 Feb 5:), ibid.

97. Ltr ChAEC to Pres, 6 Feb 5:), RG :):)0, CD :)85.2; memo ActingExecSecNSC for SecState et

al, 21 Feb 5:), ibid; ltr SecDef to ChAEC, 9 Mar 5:), RG :,j(), CD 4--' 1.6 (A-Bomb); memo

SecArmy for SecDef. 27 Jul 5:), RG :':)0, CD 160; memo ActingChMLC for SecDef, 1 Dec 5:),

w/encs, RG DO, CD 471.6 (Atomic).

98. The British informed the United States of Fuchs's espionage on 27 January 1950, before his

formal arrest on 2 february 1950. Sec R. Gordon Arneson, "The H-Bomb Decision,"

Foreign Seruice journal Oune 19(9), pt 2: 26; Herbert F. York, The Aduisors: Oppenheimer,

Teller, and the Superhomh, 69. See also Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 406-08;

Warner R. Schilling, "The H-Bomb Decision: How to Decide Without Actually Choosing,"

Political Science Quarterly (I')61), 24-46; Itr Pres to ChAEC, .) 1 .Ian 50, RG :):)0, CD

16-1-17; Hans A. Bethe, "Comments on the History of the H-Bomb," Los Alamos Science

(Fall 1(82), 46-47. For a recent account of the H-bomb decision, see Rearden, Formatiue

Years, 4ei6-5:); for an AEC view, see David E. Lilienthal, Atomic Energy Years, 580-84,

587-91,61:\-1",620-:\4.

99. Memo ChMLC for SecDcf, 10 Feb 50, RG :\:\0, CD 16-1-17; Itr SecDefto Pres, 24 Feb 50,

w/2 notes: (I) "This paper unanimously concurred in by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ONB

[Omar N. Bradley!" and (2) "Original left with the President feb 28, 1950 by L.J [Louis

Johnson]," ibid; memo ExecSecNSC for SecState et al, 10 Mar 50, w/rept, ibid; memo
648 Notes to Pages 478-80

ExecSecNSC for SecDef and ActingChAEC, 12 Jun 50, ibid; York, Advisors, 70; Harry S.

Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, vol II in Memoirs hy Harry S. Truman, 311 (subsequently

referred to as Truman, Memoirs If); paper AEC 11"'10, "A History of the Expansion of AEC

Production Facilities," 16 Aug 63, 16, RG 326, Secretariat Collection, "History" folder, DOE

archives.

100. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield. 530-31. 535-57, 539-41; Barton J. Bernstein,

"Truman and the H-Bomb," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (March 1984), 13-15;

York, Adl'isors, 62-63. 75-76, 81, 121-35; Bethe, "Comments on the History of the

H-Bomb," 49-50, 53.

10 1. Ltr ChMLC to SecDef, II Oct 51, w/annual rept MLC to SecDef (FY 1951), 14, RG 330, CD

319. I; memo ExecSecNSC for SecDef and ChAEC, 9 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 400.174; Bethe,

"Comments on the History of the H-Bomb," 47-48.

102. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 537, 541-45, 554-56; York, Advisors, 77-81 (quotes);

Truman, Memoirs II, 313.

103. Ltr Sed)ef to ChJCAE, 9 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); Bethe, "Comments on the

History of the H-Bomb," 49, 53.

104. Memo ActingSecArmy, ActingSecNavy, and SecAF for SecDef, 27 Mar 52, FRUS 1952-1954,

11, pt 2;880-81; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 582-83; Fred Kaplan, "Scientists at

War; The Birth of the RAND Corporation," American Heritage Oune-July 1983), 62; memo

ChMLC for ChJCS, lea 27 Mar 52], RG 330, CD 4"71.6 (A-Bomb); memo JCS for SecDef, 1"'1

Apr 52, ibid; York, Advisors, 129-30.

105. Memo AetingSeeDef for SecState and ChAEC, 28 Mar 52, FRUS 1952-1954,11, pt 2;878-80;

Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 583; York, Advisors, 130-33; Itr SecDef to ChAEC, 25

Apr 52, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); ltr ChJCAE to Pres, 30 May 52, FRUS 1952-1954,11,

pt 2;955-57; Itr Pres to ChJCAE, 10 Jun 52, ibid, 963-64; memo ExecSecNSC for SecState

et ai, 12 Jun 52, RG 330, ChMLC papers, "Thermonuclear Weapons Program Miscellaneous" folder.

106. Ltr ActingChJCAE to SeeDef, 3 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 4"71.6 (A-Bomb); memo JCS for SecDef,

29 Jul 52, ibid; Itr SeeDef to ActingChJCAE, "7 Aug 52. ibid; Itr ChJCAE to SeeDef, 20 Aug

52, ibid; Itr SecDef to ChJCAE. 26 Aug 52, ibid; ltr ExeeDirStt)CAE to ChMLC, 20 Aug 52,

RG 330, ChMLC papers. "Congressional and Legislative" folder; Hewlett and Duncan,

Atomic Shield, 584.

107. Memo William A.M. Burden (SplAsst to l'SeeAF) for SeeAF. 21 May 52, RG 330, CD 471.6

(A-Bomb); ltr ChGAC AEC to ChAEC. 30 Oct "'19. w/enes, FRUS 1949, \;569-73.

108. Memo State panel of consultants on disarmament, lea Aug-Sep 52], FRUS 1952-1954,11, pt

2 ;994-1 008.

109. Memrcd SeeDef, 8 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 400.112; memo ExecSecNSC for SeeState and

SeeDef. 15 Aug 52, w/memo ChAEC for NSCSpICte(AE), 15 Aug 52, ibid; memo Arneson for

AetingSeeState. 15 Aug 52, FRUS 1952-1954, II, pt 2:989-91, 991n2; Hewlett and Duncan,

Atomic Shield, 591.

110. Memrcd Arneson, 9 Oct 52, FRUS 1952-1954. II, pt 2;99In2. 1032-33; Hewlett and

Duncan, Atomic Shield, 590-93; Truman, Memoirs II, 313-14

Ill. Draft memo Arneson for SecState, 29 Sep 52, FRUS 1952-1954, II, pt 2:1017-25.

112. Ibid; Lovett is indirectly quoted in memred Arneson, lea 9 Oct 521, ibid, 1033-36; notes

Arneson, lea 30 Dec 52), ibid. 10"'19-55; editorial note, ibid, 881-83.

113. Memo ChMLC for DepSecDef, 28 Nov 52, RG 330, CD -171.6 (A-Bomb); interaff memo

ChMLC for DepSecDef, 28 Nov 52, ibid; York. Adl'isors, 90, 133-34; Truman, Memoirs II,

313-14; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 592-93.

114. Memo SecDef for ExecSecNSC, 12 Nov 52, RG 330. CD -171.6 (A-Bomb); memo Col D.G.

Williams (MLC) for SecDef. 10 Nov 52, ibid; memo ExeeSecNSC for ChAEC, 12 Nov 52, RG

330, ChMLC papers, "Thermonuclear Weapons Program Mise" folder; PR -156 AEC. 16 Nov

52, FRUS 1952-1954,11, pt 2:10-12.
Notes to Pages 481-85 649

115. Memo Rainbow Team JtStratPlansGp JCS for BrigGen Matthews OCS), 20 Nov 52, RG 330,

CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); intraoff memo DepDirEXOS for MLC, [ca 26 Nov 52], ibid; memo

SecDef for ExecSecNSC, 26 Nov 52, ibid; memo ChMLC for DepSecDef, 28 Nov 52, ibid.

116. Notes Arneson, [ca 30 Dec 52), FRUS 1952-1954, II, pt 2: 1049-50.

117. Annual msg on state of union, Pres to Cong, 7 Jan 53, Truman Public Papers, 1952-53,

1114-28 (1125-26, quotes).

118. This is not to say that the Soviet explosions were as powerful as the U.S. tests. See York,

Advisors, 87-96; Bethe, "Comments on the History of the H-Bomb," 53.

XXIII. THE SEARCH FOR GREATER EFFICIENCY

I. US Dept Defense, Semiannual Report ofthe Secretary ofDefense . . . january 1 to june

30, 1951 (reports hereafter cited as Semiannual Report ofthe SecDef . .. with dates), 43,

49-50; comments Marshall (Kimball testimony), 4 Apr 53, OSD Cte on DeptDefOrg

(hereafter cited as Rockefeller Cte), "Hearings" (mimeo), 21, OSD Hist; memo SecDef for

DepSecDef et ai, 26 Sep 50, ibid; paper [OASD(L&L) Gen Counsel), "Summary of

Provisions .," [ca Spring 1952), 25-26, ibid; memrcd Doris M. Condit, "Conversation

with. Foster .," 4 Nov 77, 2-3, ibid.

2. Memo SecDef for SecsMiiDepts et ai, "Functions and Duties [EXOS)," 15 Mar 51, OSD Hist;

memo SecDef for SecsMilDepts et ai, ".. Use of Signature Line .," 15 Mar 51, ibid;

interv with Marshall S. Carter and George V. Underwood, Jr., by Alfred Goldberg, Doris M.

Condit, 22 Apr 77, 1-3, ibid.

3. Memo Carter for Lovett, 13 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 350.001; interv with Carter and

Underwood, 22 Apr 77, 1-3; Official Register ofthe United States, 1951, 103, 1952, 100.

4. Memo DirEXOS for All Staff Personnel ., 31 Mar 52, Condit file, OSD Hist; memo

ADirEXOS for DirEXOS, 22 Jun 52, ibid; interv with Carter and Underwood, 22 Apr 77,

2-3, 40-4~ 53-54.

5. Interv with Carter and Underwood, 22 Apr 77,2-4,30-41,43-47; memo ADirEXOS for

DirEXOS, 22Jun 52, OSD Hist; memrcd Condit, "Conversation with Foster .," 4

Nov 77, 1,2, Condit file, OSD Hist; telecon Carter, 6 Apr 84, ibid; interv with Marx Leva by

Doris M. Condit, Steven L. Rearden, 10 and 14 Jun 77, 25-26, OSD Hist; interv with

Nathaniel Goodrich by Doris M. Condit, 10 Apr 84, 44-48, ibid; Semiannual Report ofthe

SecDef· . january 1 to june 30, 1951,75; Semiannual Report of the SecDef.

january 1 to june 30, 1953, 88.

6. Memo SecDef for SecsMiiDepts et ai, "Functions and Duties of the Director of Administration ..," 15 Mar 51, Condit file, OSD Hist; Official Register of the United States, 1951,

103-04, 1952, 100-01; Semiannual Report of the SecDef . .. january 1 to june 30,

1951, 75; Semiannual Report of the SecDef. . january 1 to june 30, 1952, 70;

Semiannual Report of the SecDef. . january 1 to june 30, 1953, 88.

7. DoD Directive 20.10-1, 11 Jul 51, OSD Hist; paper [OASD(L&L) Gen Counsel), rca 1952],

"Summary of Provisions .," 2, ibid; interv with Carter and Underwood, 22 Apr 77,8;

memo DirEXOS for Col K.R. Kreps et ai, 4 Oct 51, RG 330, CD 319.1.

8. Memo ExecOff ATSD(ISA) for DMA 0ISA, 23 Sep 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Memo

to 01SA Directors" folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md; memo DirEXOS for Kreps

et ai, 4 Oct 51, RG 330, CD 319.1; DoD Directive 5116.1,18 Sep 52; memrcd Condit,

"Conversation with. Foster ...," 4 Nov 77, 6, Condit file, OSD Hist; "Highlights"

StfCouncii mtgs SecStfCouncilOSD, 29 Sep 52-1 Feb 53, RG 330, CD 122-2-13 through

22.

9. Address ChDefMgmtCte, 8 Jun 51, 4, OSD Hist; 000 Directive, 2 Aug 50, "Defense

Management Committee," ibid; memo SecDef for SecArmy et ai, 5 Oct 50, ibid.
650 Notes to Pages 485-89

10. Addresses ChDetMgmtCte, 8 Jan 5\ and 8 Jun 5\, ibid; Semiannual Report of the

SecDef· .. January 1 toJune 30, 1951,43,50-52.

\\. Memo SecDef for SecsMiiDepts et ai, 5 Oct 5\, w/DoD Directive 20.09-2, 5 Oct 5\, OSD

Hist; PR 36-52 OPI OSD, 10 Jan 52, ibid; Official Register ofthe United States, 1952, 1\2.

\2. DoD Directive 5\38.\,2\ Jun 52.

\3. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et ai, 27 Sep 50, OSD Hist; memo ASD(C) for SecArmy et ai, 5

Dec 50, ibid.

\4. Memos ASD(C) for SecsMiiDepts et ai, 10 May 5\ and \7 Aug 5\, ibid; Semiannual Report

ofthe SecDef . .. January 1 toJune 30, 1951,45-47; hr Henry Glass to OSD Historian,

9 Apr 84, OSD Hist.

15. Ltr Henry Glass to Historian OSD, 9 Apr 84, OSD Hist; interv with Wilfred]. McNeil by

Doris M. Condit, Ronald Hoffman, 7 Jun 76, 24-26, ibid; interv with Frank Pace by Alfred

Goldberg, Harry B. Yoshpe, \3 May 74, 22-23, ibid; testimony SecDef, 20 May 52, in US

Cong, Senate, Cte on Armed Services, Preparedness Subcte, "Hearing" (exec sess) (transcript), 46-48, RG 330, CD 334 (Armed Svs etc).

\6. Interv with J. Lawton Collins by Alfred Goldberg, Roger R. Trask, Doris M. Condit, Steven

L. Rearden, 2 Jul 81, \3, OSD Hist; interv with Carter and Underwood, 22 Apr 77, 3, 35-36

(quote), 38-39; hr Henry Glass to Historian OSD, 9 Apr 84, OSD Hist.

17. Semiannual Report ofthe SecDef . . January 1 tOJune 30, 1951,75, ibid,January 1 to

June 30, 1953, 88.

18. Comments Lovett (McNeil testimony), 29 Mar 53, Rockefeller Cte, "Hearings," 8-9, 34;

memrcd G.A. Wyeth (OSD), 5 Mar 53, OSD Hist.

19. Interv with Leva, 10 and 14 Jun 77, 24-25, 29-30; memo Historian OSD for David E.

McGiffert (ATSD(LA)), 25 Aug 65, w/encs, OSD Hist; interv with Carter and Underwood, 22

Apr 77, 34-35; interv with Goodrich, 10 Apr 84, 39-43.

20. Official Register of the United States, 1952, 102; Semiannual Report of the

SecDef . .. January 1 to June 30, 1951, 75; Semiannual Report of the SecDef .

January 1 to June .30, 1953, 88.

2\. Memo SecDef for SecsMiiDepts et ai, \\ Jan 51, OSD Hist; Official Register of the United

States, 1951, 107.

22. Ltr Burns to Pres, 12 Jul 5\, Condit file, OSD Hist; press release OPI OSD, "Frank C. Nash,"

rca 13 Aug 53), ibid; interv with John H. Ohly by Doris M. Condit, 28 Apr 77,59-60 (quote),

ibid; interv with Carter and Underwood, 22 Apr 77, 35; interv with Goodrich, 10 Apr 84,

37-39

23. Memo SecDef for SecsMiiDepts, 3 Nov 5\, OSD Hist; DoD Directive 20.08-\, 3 Nov 51.

24. Official Register ofthe United States, 1952, \1\-12; memo Dep5ecDef for 5ecsMiiDepts et

ai, 29 Jul 52, OSD Hist; DoD Directive 5\32.\, 29 Jul 52; ODirAdmOSD, Office of the

Secretary of Defense Organization Manual, [19 Nov 52], sec 7, Sep 52, 05D Hist;

Semiannual Report of the SecDe!. . January 1 to June 30, 1951, 75; Semiannual

Report of the SecDef . .. January I toJune 30, 1953,88.

25. Remarks SecDef, ". Visit of Mrs. Anna Rosenberg," 10 Nov 50, 05D Hist; paper

ASD(M&P), "Summary of Manpower and Personnel Activities," LJan 53), ibid; Semiannual

Report ofthe SecDef . .. January I tOJune 30, 1951,43; hr ASD(A) to Pres, [nd), Condit

file, OSD Hist; Itr Pres to ASD(A), 8 Nov 50, ibid.

26. PR 1392-50 OP\ OSD, 9 Nov 50, OSD Hist; PR 1408.50 OPl 05D, \5 Nov 50, ibid;

background note on Rosenberg OPI OSD. [caJul 5\], ibid; remarks SecDef, 10 Nov 50, ibid;

interv with Carter and Underwood, 22 Apr 77. 8, 36.

27. Joseph E. Short, "Mrs. Rosenberg Picked as Marshall's Assistant," Baltimore Sun, 9 Nov 50;

"Anna Rosenberg Is Appointed Aid to Marshall on Man Power," NY Herald Tribune, 10 Nov

50; David Lawrence, "Marshall's Sekction of Mrs. Rost:nbt:rg Is Vit:wed as Wise Move,"

Evening Star [Washington], \4 Nov 50. For an exhaustivl:: rl::vit:w of the charges, SI::I:: a sl::ries

of fivl:: artieles by Alfrl::d Friendly, "Anna M. Rosl::nbl::rg," Washington Post, 15-\9 Jan 51.
Notes to Pages 489-92 651

28. !nterv with Leva, 10 and 14 Jun 77, 24; "Rosenberg Red Charges Beaten, 13-0:' Washington

Post, 15 Dec 50; "Committee Clears Anna M. Rosenberg," NY Times, 15 Dec 50; "Perjury

Study of Rosenberg Charges Asked," Washington Post, 11 Jan 51; "Mrs. Rosenberg

Confirmed ..:' Washington Post, 22 Dec 50.

29. !nterv with Robert A. Lovett by Doris M. Condit, 7 June 76, 11-12, OSD Hist; telecon

Condit with Goodrich, 5 Apr 84, Condit file, ibid; memo SecDef for SecsMilDepts et ai, 4

Jan 51, OSD Hist.

30. Memo SecDef for SecsMiiDepts et ai, 13 Apr 51, OSD Hist; memo SecDef for SecsMiiDepts,

4 May 51, ibid; paper ASD(M&P), "Summary of Manpower and Personnel Activities," [caJan

53], 36-37, 53-56, ibid; Official Register of the United States, 1951, 106-07; 000

Directives 20.22-1, 13Jun 51,20.22-2, 13Jun 51,20.05-3,17 Aug 51,20.05-4,12 Mar

52; PRE 1068-51 OP! OSD, 11 Aug 51, OSD Hist; 000 Directives 5120.7,15 Aug 52 (rev

22 Oct 52),5120.1, 19 Jan 53.

31. !nterv with Carter and Underwood, 22 Apr 77,8; memo ASD(M&P) for SecDef, 23 Aug 52,

RG 330, CD 333; memo ASD(M&P) for SecDef, 8 Dec 52, ibid.

32. Paper ASD(M&P), "Summary of Manpower and Personnel Activities," Uan 53], 42-46, OSD

Hist; memo ASD(M&P) for SecAF, 23 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 333; memo ASD(M&P) for SecAF,

24 Dec 52, ibid; memo ASD(M&P) for Gen Clark, 3 Dec 52, ibid; memo ASD(M&P) for

SecArmy, 24 Dec 52, ibid.

33. Official Register of the United States, 1952, 103-04; Semiannual Report of the

SecDef . .. january 1 tojune 30, 1953,88-89.

34. Paper ASD(M&P), "Summary of Manpower and Personnel Activities," Uan 53], 4, 37-39;

Congressional Quarterly Service, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964,267,271-72.

35. Ltr Eisenhower to Marshall, 18 Oct 50, Eisenhower papers, Pre-Presidential Papers (PPP),

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kans; ltr Marshall to Eisenhower, 23 Oct 50, ibid.

36. Paper ASD(M&P), "Summary of Manpower and Personnel Activities," Uan 53], 8; PR 7-51S

OP! OSD, 10 Jan 51, OSD Hist; ltr SecDef to House Speaker, 6 Apr 51, ibid; PL 82-51 (19

June 1951).

37. PL 82-51 (19 June 1951); memo SecDef for SecArmy et ai, 2 Apr 51, OSD Hist; 000

Directive 20.05-1, 2 Jul 51; paper ASD(M&P), "Summary of Manpower and Personnel

Activities," [Jan 53], 8-9, 13, 17-18, OSD Hist; draft ms [OSD] for mbrs Am Soc of

Newspaper Editors, ''Analysis and Status of Universal Military Training and Service Legislation," 20 Apr 51, ibid; Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, 266-67, 271.

38. PR 819-51 OP! OSD, 19 Jun 51 (quote), OSD Hist; memo ASD(M&P) for SecArmy et ai, 22

Dec 51, w/enc, RG 330, CD 353; Itr ActingSecDef to DirBoB, 29 Dec 51, ibid; paper

OASD(M&P), "UMT Cost," 17 Jan 52, OSD Hist; paper ASD(M&P), "Summary of Manpower

and Personnel Activities," Uan 53], 8; US Cong, House, Cte on Armed Services, Universal

Military Training, 82 Cong, 2 sess (1952), H Doc 315, 20-21; interv with Lovett, 7 Jun 76,

17-18; interv with Leva, 10 and 14 Jun 77,34-35; Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964,

271-72.

39. Statement ASD(M&P) before House Armed Services Subcte on Reserve Policies, 18 Apr 51,

OSD Hist; Charles Joseph Gross, Prelude to the Total Force: The Air National Guard,

1943-1969, 68-69,73,75; ltr SecDef to Omar B. Ketchum (VFW), 30 Mar 51, OSD Hist.

40. PR 1334-50 OP! OSD, 27 Oct 50, OSD Hist; George Beveridge, "Marshall Appoints Special

Board to Map New Reservist Rules," Evening Star [Washington], 27 Oct 50; memo SecDef

for SecArmy, SecNavy, SecAF, 6 Apr 51, w/enc, RG 330, CD 381.4; announcement 516-51

OP! OSD, 18 Apr 51, OSD Hist; ltr SecDef to E.H. Burgess (ChCivComponentPolBd), 13 Jun

51, ibid.

41. Statement ASD(M&P) before the House Armed Services Subcte on Reserve Policies, 18 Apr

51, OSD Hist; table P52.1, R12.0 DirStatSvsOSD, 18.Jun 69, ibid; fact shcct 71-51S OP!

OSD, 13 Apr 51, ibid; "Standard Policies on Reserves Asked," NY Times, 2 Jul 51; PR

867-51 OP! OSD, 28Jun 51, OSD Hist; testimony ASD(M&P), [29 May 52J. US Cong, Senate,
652 Notes to Pages 492-96

Cle on Armed Services, "Hearings of Long Special Subcommittee concerning H.R, 5426"

(typescript), 12, ibid.

42. PL 82-476 (9 July 1952); Semiannual Report of the SecDef. . january 1 tojune 30,

1952, 15-17; Semiannual Report ofthe SecDef. . january 1 tojune 30, 1953,69-75;

paper ASD(M&P), "Summary of Manpower and Personnel Activities," Dan 53], 6.

43. Paper ASD(M&P), "Summary of Manpower and Personnel Activities," Dan 53], 1, 10-11;

memo ASD(C) for SecArmy et ai, 30 Apr 51, w/statement Pres, 27 Apr 51, RG 330,

ATSD&DepSecDef files, "Budget FY 1952 (McNeil File)" folder, Federal Records Center,

Suitland, Md; Semiannual Report ofthe SecDef. . january 1 tojune 30, 1951,43-45;

Semiannual Report of the SecDef. . january 1 to june 30, 1952, 18-20; statement

ASD(M&P), "Testimony . . . House Appropriations Committee," [May 52], 2-6, OSD Hist.

44. Statement ASD(M&P), "Testimony House Appropriations Committee," [May 52], 5-7;

paper ASD(M&P), "Summary of Manpower and Personnel Activities," Dan 53], 10-11.

45. Paper ASD(M&P), "Summary of Manpower and Personnel Activities," Dan 53], 17-18;

MorrisJ. MacGregor, Jr., Integration ofthe Armed Forces, 1940-1965, in Center for Military

History, USA, Defense Studies, 433-34, 463-66 (Smith quoted on 464).

46. MacGregor, Integration ofthe Armed Forces, 432-34, 436. Memrcd of telecon MacGregor

and Condit, 5 Sep 86, Condit files, OSD Hist, explains that the 81 percent figure on page

434 of Integration of the Armed Forces should be 89 percent.

47. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et ai, 2 Apr 51, OSD Hist; MacGregor, Integration ofthe Armed

Forces, 394-96, 618-19 (quote).

48. MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces, 439, 442-45, 447 (quote), 450, 454.

49. Ibid, 404, 406-07, 415, 420-22, 468-69; paper ASD(M&P), "Summary of Manpower and

Personnel Activities," Dan 53), 39-40 (quote).

50. Paper ASD(M&P), "Summary of Manpower and Personnel Activities," Dan 53], 57; 34-35;

Bess Furman, "Services To Open Drive for Women," NY Times, 27 Sep 51, (quote); PR

1436-51 OPI OSD, 24 Oct 51, OSD Hist; table ProgRepts&Stats OASD(M&P), "Women

Military Personnel, 30June 1948-31 December 1953," [cajun 54), ibid.

51. Paper ASD(M&P), "Summary of Manpower and Personnel Activities," Dan 53], 57; interv

with Carter and Underwood, 22 Apr 77, 8.

52. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et ai, 19 Jul 50, OSD Hist; memo SecDef for SecArmy et ai, 20

Jul 50, ibid; memo SecDef for SecArmy et ai, 2 Jan 51, ibid; memo ChAFMPC for George A.

Wyeth (OSD), 9 Mar 53, w/paper ''Armed Forces Medical Policy Council .," ibid; PR OPI

OSD, 8 May 51, ibid; PR 1650-51 OPI OSD, 15 Dec 51, ibid; Official Register ofthe United

States, 1952, 112; Semiannual Report ofthe SecDef ... january 1 tojune 30, 1951,75;

SemiannualReportoftheSecDef . .. january 1 to june 30, 1953,88.

53. Memo SecDeffor SecsMilDepts et ai, 2Jan 51, w/direetive, OSD Hist; memo DirMedSvsOSD

for DepSecDef, 15 Nov 50, w/Tab A, RG 330, CD 632.

54. Memo DirMedSvsOSD for DepSecDef, 15 Nov 50, w/Tab A, 10-14, RG 330, CD 632; Itr

SecDef to PresARC, 20 Jul 50, cited in working paper [Hist Off OSD], rca Jun 51],

"Important Documents AFMPC," OSD Hist; Semiannual Report of the SecDef

... january 1 tojune 30, 1951,28; Semiannual Report ofthe SecDef . .. january 1

tojune 30, 1952,27-28; remarks Casberg at press conf OPI OSD, 17 Nov 53, 18-19, OSD

Hist.

55. Working paper [Hist Off OSD], "Important Documents AFMPC," OSD Hist, contains

summaries of memos of 16 August 1950 and 13 October 1950 and directive of 30 August

1950; memo DirMedSvsOSD for DepSeeDef, 15 Nov 50, w/Tab A, 13-14, RG 330, CD 632;

PR 198-50S OPI OSD, 5 Oct 50, OSD Hist; Semiannual Report of the SecDef

... january 1 to june 30, 1951,28.

56. Semiannual Report ofthe SecDef ... january I tojune 30,1951,28, ibid,january I to

june 30, 1952,27; memo DirMedSvsOSD for DepSecDef, 15 Nov 50, w/Tab A, 16-17, RG

330, CD 632; annual rept ChAFMPC OSD, 30Jun 51,159-61, OSD Hist; memo ChAFMPC
Notes to Pages 496-99 653

for SecsMiiDepts et aI,S Feb 51, ibid; memo ChAFMPC for SecsMilDepts et ai, 1 May 51,

ibid; 000 Directive 50.05-4 DirOffprogRepts&Stats OASD(C), 12 Sep 51, ibid.

57. Memo SecDef for SecsMiiDepts et aI, 4 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 70S; draft working paper

"Health," [Hist Off OSD), lca 30 Jun 51), 4, Condit file, OSD His!.

58. Memo Howard A. Rusk for Pres, 18 Jan 51, OSD Hist; memo Pres for SecDef, 3 Feb 51, ibid;

memo SecDef for SecsMiiDepts et aI, 9 Feb 51, ibid; PR 237-51 OP1 OSD, 16 Feb 51, ibid;

memo ChAFMPC OSD for SecsMiiDepts et aI, 12 Mar 51, ibid; PR 931-52 OP1 OSD, 22 Aug

52, ibid; Semiannual Report of the SecDef. . january I to june 30, 1952, 27.

59. Semiannual Report ofthe SecDef . .. january 1 tojune 30, 1951,27; "Army Issues Call

for 3,000 Nurses," NY Times, 20 Dec 50; Itr SecDef to Sen Millard Tydings, 23 Aug 50, OSD

Hist; PR 198-50S OPI OSD, 5 Oct 50, ibid.

60. PR 1125-50 OP1 OSD, 9 Sep 50, OSD Hist; PR 198-50S OP1 OSD, 5 Oct 50, ibid; Sam

Stavisky, "AF Will Start Drafting April 1 .," Washington Post, 11 Jan 51; memo

ChAFMPC OSD for DirOLL OASD(L&L), 23 Dec 52, RG 330, CD 334 (Armed Services

Committee); Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, 261; Alice C. Calc et aI, The Department ofDefense: Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944-1978, 114.

61. Ltr SecDef to Pres, 13 Apr 51, wlhandwritten note, "Approved 4/16/51 Harry S Truman," RG

330, CD 320.2; Itr ASD(M&P) for Lewis Hershey (DirSelectiveServiceSystem), 23 Apr 51,

ibid; memo ActingSecDef for SecMilDepts et aI, 22 Dec 50, OSD Hist; Semiannual Report

of the SecDef· .. january 1 tojune 30, 1952,26.

62. PR 139 aDM, 8 Set 52, w/enc, Summary Report. . August 1950-August 1952,3, OSD

Hist; Semiannual Report ofthe SecDef ... january 1 tojune 30, 1952,26; Semiannual

ReportoftheSecDef . .. january 1 to june 30, 1953,31-32.

63. Remarks Casberg at press conf OPI OSD, 17 Nov 53, 16-19, OSD Hist.

64. Draft ms [Hist Off OSD), "Development of Department of Defense Public Relations," rca

1958), OSD Hist; Itr William Frye (former DirOPI OSD) to E. John Long, Hist Off OSD, 20

Dec 50, ibid; DirOP1 OSD for SecDef, 12 Dec 50, RG 330, CD 350.001; Official Register of

the United States, 1951, 113-14, 1952, Ill; Semiannual Report of the SecDef.

january 1 to june 30, 1952,71.

65. Memo Pres for SecState et ai,S Dec 50, RG 330, CD 350.001; draft memo Kreps (for SecDe£)

for DepSecDef et aI, [11 Dec 50), ibid; memo ActingSecDef for DepSecDef et aI, 30 Dec 50,

ibid; memo Joseph Short (Sec to Pres) for SecState et aI, 23 May 51, Condit file, OSD

Hist; memo ActingSecDef for DepSecDef et aI, 25 May 51, ibid; 000 Directive 20.20-1,

27Jul51.

66. Paper OSD, "000 Budget Limitations on Public Information Activities," rca 1960], OSD

Hist; draft ms [Hist Off OSD], "Development of Public Relations," rca 1958), ibid;

memo DirOPI OSD for DirOLL, 22 Dec 52, w/draft for briefing, 2 (quote), RG 330, CD 334

(Armed Services Committee); Semiannual Report of the SecDef. . january 1 to june

30, 1951,75; Semiannual Report of the SecDef. . january 1 tojune 30, /953,88

67. United States Government Organization Manual /951-52, 66-70, 270-72, 326-27;

NSRB [Harry B. Yoshpe), A Case Study in Peacetime Mobilization Planning, The National

Security Resources Board /947-/953, 159; Official Register of the United States, 195/,

380, /952, 439.

68. United States Government Organization Manual /95/-52, 66, 69, 317-19, /952-53,

325-29; Official Register of the United States, /95/, 505-08, 1952, 516-18; Harry B.

Yoshpe, ed, Requirements: Matching Needs With Resources, 36 (hereafter referred to as

Yoshpe, Requirements).

69. Testimony DirODM, 17 May 51, in US Cong, House, Cte on Appropriations, Department of

Defense Appropriations for 1952:Hearings, 82 Cong, 1 sess (1951), pt 1:238,240,245,

251,253; US Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1966,252.

70. Congress and the Nation, 1945-64, 358-61; PL 82-96 (31 July 1951); PL 82-429 (30 June

1952).
654 Notes to Pages 500-04

71. MB notes for SecDef, 3 and 25 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 334(MB); Harry S. Truman, Thars of Trial

and Hope, vol II in Memoirs by Harry S. Truman (hereafter cited as Truman, Memoirs II),

468-78; Robert J. Donovan, Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S Truman,

1949-1953, 382-91; mins press conf SecDef, 23 Jul 52, in Hist Off OSD, camp, Public

Statements of Secretary of Defense Lovett, 1951-1953, V:1012 (quote); Maeva Marcus,

Truman and the Steel Seizure Case: The Limits ofPresidential Power, 74-75, 80, 87-101,

197,212-14,252-53,258-59.

72. House Cte on Appropriations, Department ofDefense Appropriationsfor 1952: Hearings,

238; FAD-119, OASD(C), 24 Jan 66, OSD Hist, used for all statistics. The Bureau of the

Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1966, 252, gives somewhat different

figures.

73. Bur of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957: A

Statistical Abstract Supplement, 117, 125.

74. Budget of the United States, 1953, M5, Mil, 1954, M6; Congress and the Nation,

1945-1964,358,360,408-13.

75. Memo DirOffProgRepts&Stats OASD(C) for DepSecDef, 24 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 381

(General); testimony ASD(C), 14 May 53, in US Cong, House, Cte on Appropriations,

Department ofDefense Appropriationsfor 1954: Hearings, 83 Cong, 1 sess (1953),

444.

76. Official Register of the United States, 1950, 124-28; 000 Directive 250.10-2, 11 Feb 52;

memo SecDef for DepSecDef et ai, 6 Oct 50, ibid; Semiannual Report of the SecDef

... January 1 toJune 30, 1951,52.

77. John A. Giles, "Mrs. Rosenberg Works on New Duties; Small is Munitions Chief," Evening

Star [Washington], 14 Nov 50; Official Register ofthe United States, 1950, 124-28,1951,

109-13; testimony DirAdmOSD, 17 Jul 51, House Cte on Appropriations, Department of

Defense Appropriations for 1952: Hearings, 85-86.

78. Memo DepSecDef for SecsMilDepts et ai, 8 Mar 51, w/enc, OSD Hist; memo ActingSecDef

for SecArmy et ai, 31 May 51, ibid; 000 Directive 250.01-1, 17 Ju151; memo DepSecDef

for SecsMiiDepts et ai, 17 Nov 50, OSD Hist; memo SecDef for SecsMilDepts et ai, [28 Sep

511, wlDoD Directive 20.16-1, ibid.

79. Memo ActingSecDef for SecArmy, SecNavy, SeeAF, 31 May 51, RG 330, CD 313.3 (General

Counsel); memo ActingSeeDef for SecArmy et al. 31 May 51, w/DoD Directive 250.03-4,

OSD Hist; DoD Directives 250.01-1, 17 Jul 51, 250.11-2, 9 Aug 51; MB Orders 52-11, 10

Aug 51,52-18, 16 Nov 51, OSD Hist.

80. Memo ASD(L&L) for AGenCounsei OSD, 9 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 313.3 (General Counsel);

memo AGenCounsel OSD for ASD(L&L), 15 Feb 52, ibid; memo ASD(L&L) for DepSecDef,

29 Jan 52, ibid; memo ASD(L&L) for DepSeeDef, 15 Feb 52, ibid.

81. Memo ASD(L&L) for DepSecDef, 29 Jan 52, ibid; memo ASD(L&L) for DepSeeDef, 17 Jun

52, w/ene, ibid.

82. Memo ASD(L&L) for DepSecDef, 21 Feb 52, ibid; memo ASD(L&L) for DepSecDef, 7 Mar 52,

ibid; memo L. Niederlehner (CounselMB) for ASD(L&L), 12 Mar 52, ibid; paper [ASD(L&L)],

"Outline of Proposed Report .," rca Sep 52], OSD Hist; memo ASD(L&L) for SecDef, 10

Apr 52, RG 330, CD 313.3 (General Counsel).

83. Ltr SeeDef to Clay Bedford, 18 Dec 51, Condit file, OSD Hist; PR OP1 OSD, rca 8 Sep 52],

ibid; Itr SeeDef for Strauss, 11 Dec 51, w/ene, ibid; statement DepSecDef, 29 Jan 52, in US

Cong, House, ete on Appropriations, Department of Defense . . . Appropriations for

1953: Hearings, 82 Cong, 2 sess (1952), 322; testimony SecDef, 20 May 52, Sen Cte on

Armed Services, "Hearing held before the Preparedness Subcommittee (exec sess)" (typescript), 1:62-67, OSD Hist.

84. Memo ASD(C) for SeeDef and DepSeeDef, 24 Jan 52, RG 330, CD 313.3 (General Counsel);

memo ASD(C) for SecDef and DepSecDef, 28 Jan 52, ibid.

85. Memo ASD(L&L) for DepSecDef, 26 Mar 52, ibid; memo ASD(L&L) for SeeDef, 10 Apr 52,

ibid.
Notes to Pages 504-08 655

86. Memrcd GenCounselOSD, 26 May 52, ibid; memo ActingChMB for ASD(L&L), 13 Jun 52,

ibid; US Cong, House, ete on Expenditures in the Exec Depts, Federal Supply Management

(Overseas Survey); Sixteenth Intermediate Report, 82 Cong, 2 sess (1952), H Rept 1994,

7-8,85-86.

87. Memo ASD(L&L) for DepSecDef, 17 Jun 52, RG 330, CD 313.3 (General Counsel); memo

GenCounsei OSD, Dir and DepDirFiscalMgmtStf OASD(C) for ASD(C) and ASD(L&L), [16

Jun 52], w/proposals, ibid; "New Efficiency Report Plan," Army-Nally-AirForceJournal (9

May 1953).

88. Memo ASD(L&L) for DepSecDef, 17 Jun 52, RG 330, CD 313.3 (General Counsel); statement

SecDef, 24 Jun 52, US Cong, House, Cte on Expenditures in the Exec Depts, Federal SuPp(y

Management (Air Force Supply-Munitions Board), 82 Cong, 2 sess (1952), 3-4.

89. Statement SecDef, 24 Jun 52, House ete on Expenditures in ExecDepts, Fed Supply Mgmt,

2-3 (quote), 5-6, 10, 21, 35, 53

90. Ibid, 10-11, 15 (quote), 20-21, 23,43-45,48.

91. Memos ASD(L&L) for DepSecDef, 25 Jun 52,11 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 313.3 (General

Counsel); memo ASD(L&L) for DepSecDef, 30 Jun 52, ibid; memrcd Condit, "Conversation

with Foster .," 4 Nov 77,4; DoD Directive 5126.5, 29Ju152.

92. Paper [ASD(L&L)], "Outline of Proposed Report .," [ca Sep 52J, RG 330, CD 313.3

(General Counsel); memo statement ASD(C) [for Rockefeller Cte], 29 Mar 53, 17, OSD Hist;

memo ChMB for DirLL OASD(L&L), 24 Dec 52, w/MB memo, 17-19, RG 330, CD 334

(Armed Services Committee).

93. Memo DepSecDef for SecsMiiDepts et ai, 29 Jul 52, Condit file, OSD Hist; memo

ExecVChMB for DirDefMgmteteStf, 25 Apr 52, w/encs, RG 330, CD 334 (Munitions Board);

Official Register ofthe United States, 1952, 104-09.

94. DoD Directives 5126.4, IOJul 52, 5126.7,12 Sep 52,5131.1,20 Sep 52,5131.2,25 Sep

52; paper [ASD(L&L)], "Outline of Proposed Report .," [ca Sep 52], RG 330, CD 313.3

(General Counsel); memo ASD(L&L) for DepSecDef, 11 Jul 52, ibid; Semiannual Report of

the SecDef. . January 1 to June 30, 1953,88.

95. Semiannual Report of the SecDef . .. January 1 to June 30, 1951, 75; Semiannual

Report ofthe SecDef . .. January 1 toJune 30, 1953, 88; memo SecDef for ChMB, 1 Aug

52, RG 330, CD 334 (Munitions Board).

96. DoD Directive, 14 Sep 49, Research and Development Board, OSD Hist.

97. Memo SecDef for SecsMiiDepts et aI, 1 Feb 5 I, w/directive, OSD Hist; testimony ChRDB, 24

Jan 52, in House ete on Appropriations, DoD. . Appropriations for 1953:Hearings,

[pt 1J:203; Herbert F. York and G. Allen Greb, "Military Research and Development: A

Postwar History," The Bulletin ofthe Atomic Scientists Oanuary 1977), 18.

98. PR 1029-5 I OPI OSD, 1 Aug 5 I, OSD Hist; testimony ChRDB, 24 Jan 52, in House Cte on

Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1953: Hearings, [pt

1J:202-04.

99. Memo ASD(L&L) for DepSecDef, 14 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 334 (Research and Development

Board); memo ASD(L&L) for DepSecDef, 26 Mar 52, w/enc, 25 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 313.3

(General Counsel); memo ASD(L&L) for DepSecDef, 27 Mar 52, ibid; memo ASD(L&L) for

SecDef, 10 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 334 (Research and Development Board); testimony Walter

Whitman (ChRDB), 21 Mar 53, Rockefeller Cte, "Hearings," 7-8.

100. Memo ASD(L&L) for SecDef, 15 Apr 52, w/enc, RG 330, CD 334 (Research and Development Board).

101. Ibid; DoD Directives 5128.7,5 May 52,5128.10,17 Dec 52; statement Whitman, 19 Mar

53, testimony Whitman, 2 I Mar 53, Rockefeller etc, "Hearings," 2-3, 4, 6.

102. These figures included guided missile work. RDB 236/19, "Summary of the Research and

Development Program as of 6/30/53," 30 Ju153, RG 330, CD 381 (Gen); Semiannual Report

ofthe SecDef. . . January 1 toJune 30, 1951, 7'); Semiannual Report (!{the SecDef .

January 1 to June 30, 1953,88.
656 Notes to Pages 509-21

103. Statement Whitman for Rockefeller Cte, 19 Mar 53, testimony Whitman, :l1 Mar 53,

Rockefeller Cte, "Hearings," 1-3; Melvin Bell, "Office of the Director of Defense Research

and Development: Its Organization and Administration," PhD diss, American Univ, 1980,

2:2-23.

104. Testimony Whitman, 21 Mar 53, Rockefeller Cte, "Hearings," 4-6,9, 13-14.

105. Speech Truman to ICAF, 16 Dec 52, Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry 5. Truman,

1952-53, 1080-82; comments Leon H. Keyserling, May 75, in Francis H. Heller, ed, The

Korean War: A 25-li>ar Perspective, 174-79; comments Robert Griffith, ibid, 168, 191-92.

Bur of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1960, 389, shows that the

federal debt rose from $257.4 billion as of mid-1950 to $271.3 billion in mid-19S4. Ltr

DirBoB to SecDef, 5 May 54, w/draft memo DirBoB for Pres, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef

papers, "Korea, Cost of" folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md.

106. US Cong, Senate, Cte on Appropriations, Mutual Security Appropriations for 1954:

Hearings, 84 Cong, 1 sess (1955), 140; memo Rudolph A. Winnacker (Historian OSD) for

Tracy Voorhees, 18 Nov 59, w/enc, OSD Hist.

107. Raymond E. Manning, Cost of us. Wars, 3-5, 27-33; Bureau of the Census, Historical

Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, pt :l:table Y849-903, 1140. J.G.

Fish. "An Analysis of U.S. War Costs," Douglas Paper 5366 (October 1968), 7, used

Manning's work and concluded that the United States was "more able to afford the relatively

expensive" conflict in Vietnam than earlier wars, including the Korean.

108. Table fAD-l 19 OASD(C), 24 Jan 66, OSD Hist.

XXIV. THE CIVIL-MILITARY DIMENSION

I. Interv with Robert A. Lovett by Doris M. Condit, 7 Jun 76, 16-17, OSD Hist; interv with

William C. Foster by Alfre(/ Goldberg, Samuel A. Thcker, 27 Feb 74, 4, 26-28, ibid; interv

with Robert A. Lovett by Alfred Goldberg, Harry B. Yoshpe, 13 May 74, 24, ibid.

2. Steven l. Rearden, The Formative Years, 1947-1950, vol I in History of the Office of tbe

secretary ofDefense, 74.

3. US Dept Defense, Semiannual Report of the Secretary ofDefense . . . January 1 ta June

30, 1951 (hereafter cited as Semiannual Report ofthe SecDefwith year), 53-54, Semiannual

Report of the SecDef· .. January 1 to]une 30,1952,37-38,40-41.

4. u. S. Government OrganiZation M.anual 1966-67, 211.

5. Sir John SJessor, Strategy for the West, 2.

6. Testimony SecDef, J J May 51, US Cong, Senate, Ctes on Armed Services and Foreign

Relations, Military Situation in tbe Far East: Hearings, 82 Cong, J sess (J95l), pt 1:501.

7. lnterv with J. Lawton Collins by Alfred Goldberg, Roger R. Trask, Doris M. Condit, Steven L.

Rearden, 2 Jul 81, 12, 47-48, OSD Hist; interv with Marshall S. Carter and George V.

Underwood, Jr., by Alfred Goldberg, Doris M. Condit, 22 Apr 77,5-6, ibid; comments Lovett

(Vandenberg testimony), :21 May 53, Cte on DeptDefOrg (hereafter cited as Rockefeller Cte),

"Hearings" (mimeo), 13, OSD Hist.

8. Comment Loven (Nash testimony), 29 Mar 53, Rockefeller Cte, "Hearings," 33.

9. Paper, "Outline of Proposed Report ..," [ASD(L&L)j, rca Sep 52}, 3, 7, RG 330, CD 313

(General Counsel); testimony Nash, 29 Mar 53, Rockefeller Cte, "Hearings," 10-11, 32-35.

10. Harry S. Truman, li>ars ofTrial and Hope, vol Il in Memoirs by Harry S. Truman (hereafter

cited as Truman, Memoirs 11), 344; J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and

Lessons of Korea, 372; testimony Collins, n Mar 53, Rockefeller Cte, "Hearings," 15-18.

II. Memo Vandenberg for Rockefeller Cle, 3 Apr 53; testimony Finletter, 29 Mar 53, 5-7,

testimony Adm W.M. Fechteler, 21 Mar 53, 8-9, testimony Collins, 22 Mar 53, 24, all in

Rockefeller Cte, "Hearings."

12. Collins, War in Peacetime, 379.
Notes to Pages 522-26 657

13. Telecon Condit with Underwood, 28Jul 77, Condit file, OSD Hist; George V. Underwood, Jr.,

"The Role of the JCS in the National Command Structure" (ms), (Army War College study,

1954),14-15, OSD Hist; testimony Pace, 29 Mar 53, 7-8,11-12,25-26, testimony Collins,

22 Mar 53,6-7, testimony Alfred M. Gruenther, 29 Mar 53, 24-25, all in Rockefeller Cte,

"Hearings"; interv with Collins, 2 Jul 81, 18,47-48.

14. 1ntraoff memo ASD(C) for DepSecDef, 18 Jul 52, w/draft msg, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Europe);

memo SecArmy for SecDef, 18 Jul 52, ibid; memo SecArmy for SecAF, 22 Jul 52, ibid.

15. Memo SecDef for SecArmy, 30 Jul 52, quoted in Underwood, "Role of JCS in National

Command Structure," 14-15; memo ActingSecArmy for SecDef, 11 Aug 52, RG 330, CD

092.2 (Europe).

16. Memo ASD(L&L) for SecDef, 8 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Europe); memo SecDef for ChJCS,

11 Aug 52, ibid; memo Chairman's StfGrpJCS for ChJCS, 13 Aug 52, w/encs, ibid; testimony

Coolidge, 21 Mar 53, Rockefeller Cte, "Hearings," 8.

17. Memo SecArmy for SecDef, 10 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 322 (EUCOM); memo DepSecDef for

SecArmy et aI, 3 Dec 52, ibid.

18. DoD Directive 5114.1,13 May 52; interv with Carter and Underwood, 22 Apr 77,31-32;

paper [ASD(L&L)I, "Outline of Proposed Report Re Unification Progress," [Sep 521, 2, OSD

Hist; paper Townsend W. Hoopes (Asst to DetRepSrNSCStt), [late 1952], ibid.

19. Testimony Finletter, 29 Mar 53, 22-23, testimony Nash, 29 Mar 53, 6-9, 17, both in

Rockefeller Cte, "Hearings."

20. Comment Marshall (Finletter testimony), 29 Mar 53, ibid, 23-26.

21. Testimony Kimball, 4 Apr 53, 11-12, testimony Fin/ettee 29 Mar 53. 14-16. testimony Pace.

29 Mar 53, 17, all in Rockefeller ete, "Hearings."

22. Comment Lovett (Finletter testimony), 29 Mar 53, ibid, 33-34; memo [ExecSec NSC) for Pres,

28 Jun 51, Truman papers, President's Secretary's files:NSC (PSF:NSC), Harry S. Truman

Library, Independence, "'10; memo JCSRepNSC for ChJCS, 29 Jun 51, RG 218, CCS 334

National Security Council (9-25-47). There is no record that the JCS disputed Marshall's

views on this procedure, although Collins later wrote (lfilr in Peacetime, 2(5) that for

Marshall to refer a State Department memo to the service secretaries was an "unusual step"

that, if regularly done, "would have tended to interpose them between the JCS and the

Secretary of Defense." It was, in fact, common practice.

23. Comment Lovett (Finletter testimony), 29 Mar 53, 30, 34. testimony Pace. 29 Mar 55. 26-28,

both in Rockefeller Cte, "Hearings"; K. Jack Bauer. "Dan Able Kimball, 31 July 1951-20

January 1953" in Paolo E. Coletta, ed, American Secretaries o/the Nal~Y, 1913-1972, II:83.

24. Memo SecDef for EXOS OSD, 8 Sep 52, Condit file, OSD Hist; comment Lovett (Finletter

testimony), 29 Mar 53, Rockefeller Cte, "Hearings," 34; memrcd DirEXOS, 15 Sep 52, Condit

file, OSD; memo George A. Wyeth (ADir for Councils) for DepSecDef' 7 Nov 52. RG 350. CD

350.05 (Briefing).

25. Memo Hoopes for Nathaniel H. Goodrich (DepGenCounsel), 18 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 313.3

(General Counsel); paper [ASD(L&L)J, (Sep 52J. "Outline of Proposed Report .," OSD

Hist; comment Lovett (Finletter testimony), 29 Mar 53, Rockefeller ete. "Hearings," 31-32,

33-34.

26. DoD Directive 5114.1. 13 May 52; testimony John F. Floberg, 2 Apr 53, Rockefeller Cte.

"Hearings," 40.

27. Paper [ASD(L&L)), [Sep 521, "Outline of Proposed Report .," 2. osn Hist; paper Hoopes.

[late 1952], ibid; memo Hoopes for Goodrich, 18 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 313.3 (General

Counsel); testimony Nash, 29 Mar 53, 35, testimony Finletter, 29 Mar 55. 15-16, testimony

Floberg, 2 Apr 53, 13, 39-40, all in Rockefeller ete, "Hearings"; memrcd Wyeth OSD, 10

Mar 53, OSD Hist; memo DepSecDef, 18 Nov 50, w/paper and note ["Hold for later

consideration by me. GCM"I, RG 350, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).

28. Paper [ASD(L&L)], [Sep 521. "Outline of Proposed Report ," 3-4, 8, osn Hist; memo

Coolidge for SecDef, 8 Oct 52, RG 330. CD 313.3 «ieneral Counsel) Originally. Coolidge felt

that Congress should give the JCS chairman greater powers. but he withdrew this recom-
658 Notes to Pages 526-36

mendation in October on the assumption that "energetic action by the SecDef, backed maybe

by the President" could correct the situation.

29. Paper [ASD(L&L)] to SecDef, [Sep 52], "Outline of Proposed Report ..," 5-6, 8, OSD Hist.

30. Memo George M. Elsey (Asst to OMS) for Harriman (OMS), 17 Nov 52, Elsey papers, Harry S.

Truman Library, Independence, Mo; Truman, }Ears of Trial and Hope, vol II in Memoirs by

Harry S. Truman, 509, 513-21; Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandatefor Change, 1953-1956,

vol I in The White House }Ears, 85.

31. Semiannual Report of the SecDef . .. january 1 to june 30,1951,49-50,75; Semiannual Report ofthe SecDef· .. january 1 to june 30, 1953, 88-89.

32. Except where otherwise indicated, this section is drawn from ltr Lovett to Pres, 18 Nov 52,

in Alice C. Cole et ai, The Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and

Organization, 1944-1978 (hereafter cited as Cole, Defense Documents), 115-26.

33. Testimony Kimball, 4 Apr 53, 10-11, testimony Pace, 29 Mar 53, 17, testimony Finletter, 29

Mar 53, 2, all in Rockefeller Cte, "Hearings"; Herbert F. York and G. Allen Greb, "Military

Research and Development: A Postwar History," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

(January 1977), 20.

34. Two memos Coolidge for SecDef, both 23 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 313.3 (General Counsel);

memo SecDef, DirBoB, SplCounsel to Pres for President, 10 Feb 49, RG 330, CD 12-1-1.

35. Semiannual Report ofthe SecDef. . january 1 tojune 30, 1952,65-67; Austin Stevens,

"Lovett Criticizes Defense Machine as Weak in Crisis," NY Times, 2 Jan 53; PR OPI, 8 Jan 53,

w/enc, OSD Hist.

36. Memo Lovett for SecDef designate, 9 Jan 53, RG 330, Lovett papers, "Lovett 17 Sep 51 to 20

Jan 53" folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md.

37. Ibid; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My }Ears in the State Department, 733.

38. Ltr Nelson A. Rockefeller (ChCte on DeptDefOrgn) to SecDef, 11 Apr 53, w/rept, in Cole,

Defense Documents, 127-43; msg Eisenhower for Cong, 30 Apr 53, ibid, 149-57; Reorgn

Plan No 6, effective 30Jun 53, ibid, 157-58.

39. Reorgn Plan No 6, effective 30 Jun 53, in Cole, Defense Documents, 157-58.

40. Msg Eisenhower for Cong, 30 Apr 53, ibid, 151-52, 154.

xxv. CONCLUSION

1. ProgRepts&StatDivOSD, Installations and Personnel Outside the Continental US as of 30

September 1956, 1-2, 3-4, 5-6.
Note on Sources

and

Selected Bibliography

The Military Reference Branch of the National Archives and Records

Administration (NARA), Washington, D.C., is the major repository for the

official records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and its

subsidiary offices for the years 1947-54. The OSD files, with the exception of

those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and some interdepartmental agencies, are

identified by record group number RG 330 and arranged under the appropriate OSD office. The central files of the secretary of defense for 1950-53 are

organized under the "Correspondence Control Section of the Administrative

Secretary." Of this material, the author reviewed some 1,700 folders in 231

boxes. Most folders were identified by a CD number, based on a modified

Dewey decimal and Navy records system; some had a subject written across

the top. These records formed the core of the research in OSD files.

NARA also holds many additional RG 330 records. Records filed under

the "Office of the Assistant Secretary (International Security Affairs)" were

important to this project, particularly the papers of Frank C. Nash, the

assistant to the secretary of defense for international security affairs from 1951

to 1953. The records of the chairman of the Military Liaison Committee to the

Atomic Energy Commission were especially helpful in the chapter on nuclear

matters. JCS records, identified as RG 218, were consulted throughout, as

were the records of interdepartmental agencies under the control of the

secretary of defense, contained in RG 334 and RG 374. Other record groups

were also useful: RG 51 for Bureau of the Budget documents; RG 59 for

Department of State records generally and RG 84 for foreign service post

records, including the United Nations Mission; and RG 273 for records of the

National Security Council.
660 Bibliography

NARA's Washington National Records Center (formerly Federal Records

Center) at Suitland, Md., holds retired but not yet accessioned post-1954

records, including numerous OSD materials for the 1950-53 period which

were retired with later collections sent to Suitland. Especially valuable were

the files of Wilfred J. McNeil, the assistant secretary of defense (comptroller)

until 1959, which were retired by the comptroller's office in 1965, and the

papers of the assistant to the secretary of defense and the deputy secretary of

defense, Henry E. Glass, which include many of the comptroller papers for

the 1951-54 period. At Suitland also are papers of the assistant secretary of

defense for international security affairs (in addition to those in the National

Archives) and certain Lovett papers that were particularly rewarding for this

study.

The OSD Historical Office provided essential documentary collections and

extensive topical reference files containing newspaper and magazine clippings,

DoD budget tables, organization charts, memoranda, press releases, and directives. On the Korean War and armistice talks, a collection ofincoming cables

from the Commander in Chief, Far East (used by Marshall and Lovett) and an

eight-volume JCS compilation, "Pertinent Papers on the Korean Situation,"

deserve special mention among the Historical Office holdings. Typescripts of

the testimony of Pentagon officials at the 1953 hearings of the OSD Committee

on Department of Defense Organization (Rockefeller Committee) yielded unusually frank views on OSD operations during 1950-53. Without the series of

monthly OSD reports on MDAP (Mutual Defense Assistance Program): Department ofDefense Operations, checking the figures for military assistance

might have proved impossible. The files of Col. George A. Lincoln offered

insights into NATO and military assistance arrangements.

Of President Truman's papers at the Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo., the collection most central to this study was the President's

Secretary's File, which includes memoranda describing NSC meetings. In

addition, the papers of presidential staff members Eben A. Ayers and George

M. Elsey were enlightening for their revelations of Truman's thinking during

the period of General MacArthur's dismissal. The Library also contains the

papers of Dan A. Kimball, Frank Pace, Jr., Thomas K. Finletter, Frederick J.

Lawton, and Theodore Tannenwald, Jr.

The papers of the secretaries of defense were less revealing than anticipated. Secretary Johnson's papers at the Alderman Library, University of

Virginia, are sparse on the period of his Defense tenure. During research for

this volume, the Marshall papers held by the George C. Marshall Research

Foundation in Lexington, Va., were being utilized in the preparation of the

final volume of Marshall's biography by Forrest C. Pogue, who was kind

enough to allow review of some 1950-51 folders, particularly those relating
Bibliography 661

to the recall of General MacArthur. To various biographers and researchers,

including the present one, Secretary Lovett maintained that he possessed no

papers of use to the historian.

Classified papers of General Omar N. Bradley, then chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, are at the United States Army Military Institute at Carlisle

Barracks, Pa.; his unclassified papers are at West Point. The Pre-Presidential

Papers in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kans., contain diaries

and correspondence relating to the general's duty as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in 1950-52.

The author benefited from materials contributed by a number of individuals. Robert J. Donovan sent copies of several key documents from the John

Foster Dulles papers at the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton

University, and the Wellington Koo papers at Columbia University. Roger

Anders, archivist at the U.S. Department of Energy, supplied excerpts from

Gordon Dean's diary and the very useful manuscript, "A History of the

Expansion of AEC Production Facilities," held in the Atomic Energy Commission Secretariat Collection (RG 326) in the DOE archives. Nathaniel Goodrich

supplied a copy of his study on Department of Defense problems in the 1950s.

Personal papers ofJohn H. Ohly made available to the author were illuminating generally and a crucial source for the military assistance section of this

work. Maj. Gen. Kenneth D. Nichols lent the author his study on "The Period

of Atomic Scarcity, 1945-52," and General George V. Underwood, Jr., sent a

copy of his manuscript on "The Role of the JCS in the National Command

Structure. "

Interviews listed in the bibliography are chiefly from the oral history

collection of the OSD Historical Office. Other interviews came from the Harry

S. Truman Library and the JCS Historical Division.

While many documents exist only in official repositories or private

hands, many others are in the public domain and readily available. Robert H.

Ferrell has selected and edited a body of Truman papers in Offthe Record: The

Private Papers ofHarry S. Truman. Truman's public messages, speeches, and

statements are available in the official Public Papers of the Presidents of the

United States: Harry S. Truman. Eisenhower's early papers have been selected

and edited, first by Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., and later by Louis Galambos, in The

Papers ofDwight David Eisenhower. The Public Papers of the Presidents of

the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower begins with January 1953. The

Eisenhower Diaries, edited by Robert H. Ferrell, contains entries from the

SACEUR period.

Department of State records are of critical importance in any rendering of

Department of Defense history, and particularly during this seminal and busy

period for national security policymaking. Among State's published records,
662 Bibliography

indispensable is the mammoth collection of papers in Foreign Relations ofthe

United States, which contains numerous DoD documents; in 1987 the series

was almost complete for the period 1950-54. The weekly Department of

State Bulletin is a useful compendium of contemporary foreign policy and

national security documents and information.

Among Department of Defense publications, The Department ofDefense:

Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944-1978, edited by Alice

C. Cole and others (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office ofthe Secretary

of Defense, 1978), contains documents and commentary on the evolution of

DoD organization. The official reports of the secretary of defense and the

secretaries of the military departments were published as the Semiannual

Report ofthe Secretary ofDefense and the Semiannual Reports ofthe Secretary

ofthe Army, Secretary ofthe Navy, Secretary of the Air Force, 1950-53. The

OSD Historical Office compiles the public statements of the secretary of defense in bound volumes, a series that brings together a wide range of material

from press conferences, interviews, speeches, and news accounts, much of it

not available elsewhere. The Public Statements ofSecretary ofDefenseJohnson

fill six volumes; those of Marshall, four; Lovett, six. The periodically issued

"Department of Defense Fact Sheet" provides limited but handy information

about DoD organization and key personnel since September 1947. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff Historical Division has prepared a number of histories covering

JCS activities during 1950-53, several of which have been published. The three

military departments and the U.S. Marine Corps have published extensively on

their participation in the Korean War.

Congressional publications, notably committee hearings and reports,

offer a wealth of information on a gamut of Defense affairs and national security issues during the period. The Committees on Armed Services in both the

House and the Senate held authorization hearings for various budgets; the

Committees on Appropriations in both chambers heard testimony on military

assistance and Defense appropriations. During 1951 the Senate Committees

on Foreign Relations and on Armed Services held joint hearings on the issue

of troops for Europe and on MacArthur's recall. Much testimony held in

executive session during 1950-53 has since been published in Historical

Series compilations issued by each house. Special panels, such as the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, conducted probes of Defense Department

operations and published their findings. Congress has also published various

reports and papers on Defense-related subjects prepared by such agencies as

The Brookings Institution and the Legislative Reference Service of the Library

of Congress, many of them relevant and instructive for the purposes of this

study.
Bibliography 663

PRIMARY SOURCES

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Congressional Record. 1950-52.

U.S. CONGRESS: HOUSE HEARINGS

Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Department of the Air Force Appropriations. Department of the Air Force Appropriationsfor 1953. 82d Cong., 2d

Sess., 1952.

---. Subcommittee on Armed Services Appropriations. Fourth Supplemental

Appropriation Billfor 1951. 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951.

---. Subcommittee on Department of the Army Appropriations. Department of

the Army Appropriations for 1953. 3 parts. 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952.

---,---,. The Prisoner of War Situation in Korea. 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952.

---. Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations. Department of

Defense Appropriations for 1951. 5 parts. 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950.

---. The Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1951. 81st Cong., 2d

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---,---. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1951: Military Construction. 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950.

---. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1952. Part 1. 82d

Cong., 1st Sess., 1951.

------. Department ofDefense and Related Independent Agencies Appropriationsfor 1953.2 parts. 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952.

---,---. Department ofDefense and Related Independent Agencies Appropriationsfor 1954. 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 1953.

---. Subcommittee on Independent Offices. The Supplemental Appropriation

Billfor 1953. Part 3. 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952.

---,. Subcommittee on Department of the Navy Appropriations. Department Of

the Navy Appropriations for 1953.3 parts. 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952.

---. Subcommittee. National Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for

1950: Preconference Hearings. 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949.

---. Special Subcommittee on Economic Cooperation Administration. Mutual

Security Program Appropriationsfor 1952. 3 parts. 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951.

---. Special Subcommittee on Mutual Security Appropriations. Mutual Security

Appropriationsfor 1953. Part 2. 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952.

---. Special Subcommittee on National Defense Appropriations. Second Supplemental Appropriation Billfor 1951.3 parts. 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950.

Committee on Armed Services. The National Defense Program-Unification and

Strategy. 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949.

---. Sundry Legislation Affecting the Naval and Military Establishments, 1949.

81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949. Vol. II, no. 95.

Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations. Federal Supply Management (Air Force Supply-Munitions Board). 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952.

------. Federal Supply Management (Implementation of Military SuPP(V

Regulations). 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1953.

Committee on Foreign Affairs. Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. 81st Cong., 1st

Sess., 1949.

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Vol. XlV. US. Foreign Policy and the East-West Confrontation.

Vol. xv. European Problems.

Vol. XVI. The Middle East, Africa, and Inter-American Affairs.

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1950.

Committee on International Relations [Foreign Affairs]. Selected Executive Hearings,

1943-50. Historical Series, 1976.

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U.S. CONGRESS: HOUSE DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS

Department ofDefense Appropriation Bill, 1953. 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952. H. Rept.

2483.

Mutual Security Act of 1952. 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952. H. Rept. 2031.

Reorganization Plan No.6 of 1953. 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 1953. H. Doc. 136.

Supplemental Estimate of Appropriation and Contract Authorization to Provide

Assistance Under Mutual Assistance Act of 1949. 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949. H.

Doc. 352.

United States Defense Policies Since World War 11. Prepared by Charles H. Donnelly,

Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, for Melvin Price. 85th Cong.,

1st Sess., 1957. H. Doc. 100.

Committee on Appropriations. Department of Defense Appropriation Billfor 1953:

H.R. 7391. Explanatory Notes. 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952. Committee Print.

---. Department ofDefense Appropriation Bill, 1953. 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952.

H. Rept. 1685.

Committee on Armed Services. Survey of Armed Forces Manpower Requirements,

1950. A report of investigation by the Special Subcommittee. 81st Cong., 2d Sess.,

1950. Committee Print.

---. United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967. Study prepared by the Department of Defense. 12 vo1s. 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 1971. Committee Print.

---. Universal Military Training. 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952. H. Doc. 315.

Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. Federal Supply Management (Overseas Survey). Sixteenth Intermediate Report. 82d Cong., 2d Sess.,

1952. H. Rept. 1994.

Committee on Foreign Affairs. Background Information on Korea. 81st Cong., 2d

Sess., 1950. H. Rept. 2495.

---. Extending the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. 81st Cong., 2d Sess.,

1950. H. Rept. 2538.

---. Legislation and Documents Relating to the Mutual Security Act of1951 with

explanatory notes. 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952. Committee Print.

---.. Mutual Security Act of 1951 and Other Basic Legislation with explanatory

notes. 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952. Committee Print.

---. Mutual Security Act of 1952. 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952. H. Rept. 1922.
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---and Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The Mutual Security Program for

Fiscal Year 1952. Basic data supplied by the Executive Branch. 82d Cong., 1st

Sess., 1951. Committee Print.

U.S. CONGRESS: SENATE HEARINGS

Committee on Appropriations. Fourth Supplemental Appropriation Bitt, 1951. 82d

Cong., 1st Sess., 1951.

---.. General Provisions: General Appropriations Act, 1951. 81stCong., 2dSess.,

1950.

---. Mutual Security Appropriations for 1952. 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951.

---.. Mutual Security Appropriationsfor 1956. 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955.

---. Second Supplemental Appropriation Billfor 1950. 81st Cong., 1st Sess.,

1949.

---. Second Supplemental Appropriation Bitt, 1951. 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950.

---. Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1952. 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951.

---. Supplemental Appropriations for 1951. 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950.

---. Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1953. 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952.

---. Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Bitt, 1952. 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952.

---.. Subcommittee. Department ofDefense Appropriationsfor 1951. 81st Cong.,

2d Sess., 1950.

---. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1952. 82d Cong., 1st

Sess., 1951.

---.---. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1953. 82d Cong., 2d

Sess., 1952.

Committee on Armed Services. Ammunition Supplies in the Far East. 83d Cong., 1st

Sess., 1953.

---. General Ridgway. 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952.

---. Mutual Security Act of 1952. 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952.

---. Nomination of General of the Army George C. Marshall to be Secretary of

Defense. 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950.

---. Selective Service Extension Act of 1950 and Manpower Registration and

Classification Act. Blst Cong., 2d Sess., 1950.

---.. Universal Military Training. 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950.

---. Preparedness Subcommittee No.2. Ammunition Shortages in the Armed

Services. 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 1953.

---and Committee on Foreign Relations. Military Situation in the Far East. 5

parts. 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951.

Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. Tb Improve BUdgeting,

Accounting, and Auditing Methods of the Federal Government. 81 st Cong., 2d

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Committee on Foreign Relations. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations

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Vol. Ill. Eighty-Second Congress, First Session, 1951. Partsl and 2. 1976.

Vol. V. Eighty-Third Congress, First Session, 1953. 1977.

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---. Mutual Security Act of 1952. 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952.

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Government Departments. 26 parts. 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 1954.

U.S. CONGRESS: SENATE DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS

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Cong., 2d Sess., 1952. S. Rept. 1861.

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---. SarnoffCommission Report. Final Report of the Citizens Advisory Commission on Manpower Utilization in the Armed Services. 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 1953.

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and Committee on Foreign Relations. Compilation of Certain Published

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Kimball. Daniel A. Papers. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.

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june 19(9): 27-29; 24-27, 43.

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---. The Korean War. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967.

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of the Occupation. New York: w.w. Norton, 1965.

Slessor, Sir John Cotesworth. Strategy for the West. New York: Morrow, 1954.

Strauss, Lewis L. Men and Decisions. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1962.

Taylor, Maxwell D. Swords and Plowshares. New York: W.W. Norton, 1972.

---. The Uncertain Trumpet. New York: Harper, 1959.

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Truman, Harry S. "MacArthur Was Ready To Risk General War. 1 Was Not." U.S. News

and World Report (17 February 1956): 54, 168-75.

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Truman, Margaret. Harry S. Truman. New York: Morrow, 1973.

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---. The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story ofjapan in Crisis. Translated by Kenichi

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* INTERVIEWS

Bendetsen, Karl R. Interviewed by Jerry N. Hess. New York, N.V. 24 October and 9,21

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Carter, Marshall S. Interviewed by James F. Schnabel and Walter S. Poole. Washington,

D.C. 19 March 1973. Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Washington, D.C.

--- and George Vernon Underwood, Jr. Interviewed by Alfred Goldberg and Doris

M. Condit. Washington, D.C. 22 April 1977.

Collins, J. Lawton. Interviewed by Alfred Goldberg, Roger R. Trask, Doris M. Condit,

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Harriman, W. Averell. Interviewed by Alfred Goldberg and Doris M. Condit. Washington, D.C. 29 May 1975.

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1976.

Nichols, Kenneth D. Interviewed by Doris M. Condit. Washington, D.C. 17 April 1984.

Nitze, Paul. Interviewed by Alfred Goldberg, Ernest R. May, John D. Steinbruner, and

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Pace, Frank. Interviewed by Alfred Goldberg and Harry B. Yoshpe. New York, N.Y. 13

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SECONDARY WORKS

GENERAL REFERENCE

Congress and tbe Nation, 1945-1964: A Review of Government and Politics in

Postwar Years. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1965.
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Index

Acheson, Dean, 314; and atomic energy, 459, 461, 466, 472, 480, 481;

and Communist aggression, 8, lO11, 45, 48-49; and Formosa, 173-

77, 181, 183; and Germany, 317-

18, 325-26; and Indochina, Z08,

209,211, Z14, 215, 216, 221; and

Japan, 188-97, 201; and johnson,

1, 5 (see also johnson, Louis-relations with State); and Korea, 50,

51-52, 54, 57, 65, 73, 80, 85-86,

88, 92, lOl, 13Z-33; and MacArthur, 51-52,68,82,84,92, 94n,

104, 105; and military assistance,

272, 396, 402, 404-05, 415, 417,

424,438,447,450; and NATO, 329;

and NSC 135, 294; and prisoners of

war in Korea, 141, 144, 152; and

relations with Defense, 34, 514;

speech at National Press Club, 45,

174,211

Adams, john G., 487

Adenauer, Konrad, 338

Air Force, U.S.: and FY 1951 budget,

226, 237, 241 (Table 5); FY 1952

budget, 251, 252 (Table 6), 253,

254; FY 1953 budget, 270, 274-75,

277, 279 (Table 10), 282, 283 (Table

II), 284 (1able IZ), 302; FY 1954

budget, 295, 296, 297, 302; and

military assistance, 427-29, 437,

440-42,444,449,453; and NSC 68

goals, 228; readiness, 245n, Z90-

91, 292, 295n; strength, 224, 225

(Table 2), 234, 238 (Table 3), 240

(Table 4), 244, 245, 246, 252, 255,

258, 261-62, 266-67, 269-70,

275, 277, 278 (Table 9),281,287,

289,290, 29Z, 295,301 (Table 13),

304 (Table 14)

Air power, U.S., 51, 128-29

Air Training Command, 440

Aircraft, U.S., 156, 297

Aleman, Miguel, 151

Aleutian Islands, 174, 187

Allen, Leven c., Maj. Gen., 27

Allison, John M., 189

Almond, Edward M., Maj. Gen., 66,

67, 70

Ammunition, 157-61; procurement

of, 159; production, by European

countries, 449-50; shortages in Korea, 157-58, 159-60, 161; supply,

160 (Table I); usage rates in Korea,

157-58

AMP (Additional Military Production)

program, 400

Anderson, Frederick L., 407

Annam, 219

ANZUS Treaty, 192, 193, 195, 196,

197, 204

Appropriations, Department of Defense, 3,4,241 (Table 5),262 (Table

8), 284 (Table 1Z)

Armed forces, U.S.: ceilings, 31; integration, 24, 493-94; strength, 3,4,

31, 58-61, 62, 80, 83-84, 225

(Table 2), 238 (Table 3), 255 (Table

685
686 Index

7), 278 (Table 9), 301 (Table 13),

535-36

Armed Forces Examining Stations Policy Board, 491

Armed Forces Policy Board: role of,

524-25

Armed Forces Policy Council (AFPC),

17, 27-28, 83-91, 163, 224, 232,

235, 264, 288, 495; and atomic energy matters, 457, 462, 474; members, 518; and military assistance,

434-35,437,440

Armed Forces Reserve Act of 9 July

1952 (PL 82-476), 489n, 492

Armed Forces Special Weapons Project

(AFSWP), 24, 456, 466

Armed Services Procurement Regulation, 505

Army, U.S.: and FY 1951 budget, 226,

237,241 (Table 5); FY 1952 budget,

251, 252 (Table 6), 253, 259 (Table

8); FY 1953 budget, 270, 274-75,

277,279 (Table 10), 283 (Table 11),

284 (Table 12); FY 1954 budget,

296, 297, 302, 304 (Table 14); and

military assistance, 427-29, 434,

436, 440-41, 446, 452; and NSC 68

goals, 228, 232, 245; and offshore

procurement, 445, 449-51; readiness, 245n, 290-91, 292, 295;

strength, 224, 225 (Table 2), 233,

234, 238 (Table 3), 240 (Table 4),

244, 245, 246, 252, 255 (Table 7),

261-62, 266-67, 269, 270, 275,

277, 278 (Table 9), 281, 287, 289,

290, 292, 295, 297-98, 301 (Table

13)

Arnold, WilLiam H., Maj. Gen., 352

Associated States. See Indochina

Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 456, 458,

459,461,463

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 29,

455-56, 460-61, 463-64; General

Advisory Committee, 477; Special

Committee on Atomic Energy, 29

Atomic weapons, 124, 166, 167, 168-

69;A-bomb,6,85-86,89, 131, 137;

costs, 468n, 473, 475n; custody,

455-56, 464-67; delivery, 296; deployment, 463-64; exchange of information on, 458-63; H-bomb, 5,

6, 29, 477, 480; nonnuclear components, 475-77; and role of Joint

Chiefs, 467-72 passim; Soviet, 5,

264, 271-72, 293, 467, 471, 482;

stockpile, 455-56, 460-67, 470-

72, 473; tactical, 268; tests, 272,

480, 482; tests, British, 460, 461;

warheads, 268

Attlee, Clement, 3, 85, 86, 88-89,

178,331

Austin, Harold R., 50S

Australia, 213, 217, 218; and Japanese

settlement, 192, 204

Austria: and military assistance, 442

Babcock, E. Stanton, Col., 191

Baa Dai, 210, 213, 219

Barkley, Alben, 105, 112

Baruch, Bernard, 107

Batt, William L., 342, 402, 404

Bedford, Clay, 158

Beebe, Royden E., Jr., 401, 410-11,

488

Belgium: and military assistance,

4360, 448

Bendetsen, Karl, 296, 378, 485, 529n

Berding, Andrew, 498

Bethe, Hans, 477

Bevin, Ernest, 320, 321

Blacks in armed forces, 493-94

Blaisdell, W. Carl, 486

Boatner, Haydon L., Brig. Gen., 147,

148

Bohlen, Charles E., 8-9, 120n, 123,

294

Bonesteel, Charles H., Col., 399, 417n

Bonin Islands, 187, 190, 191,200

Bonner Subcommittee, 503-04

Borden, William 1., 478

Bradley, Omar N., Gen., 1-2,23, 197,

198; and atomic matters, 459, 461,

465, 466; and budget, 227, 258,

268; and Indochina, 215; and Korea, 49, 65, 78,80,86,91, 100; and
MacArthur, 84, 85, 104-05; and military assistance, 405, 411, 418, 421,

423, 425-26; and the Philippines,

196, 197; role as Chairman, JCS,

520; and unified commands, 522

Bridges, Styles, Sen., 108

Briggs, James E., Maj. Gen., 457n

Brind, Patrick, Adm. Sir, 362

Brink, Francis G., 208

Bruce, David, 213, 317

Bruce, James, 396

Brussels Treaty, 308-09; and Western

Union Defense Organization, 309

Buckley, Oliver E., 507

Budget: FY 1951 first supplemental,

223-27,241; FY 1951 fourth supplemental, 240 (Table 4), 242, 250;

FY 1951 second supplemental,

233-40, 242; FY 1952, 243-44,

250-51, 252-54, 258-60 (Table 8);

FY 1953, 261, 276, 279 (Table 10),

280-83, 284; FY 1954, 285, 302-

04,305; ceilings, 4, 9, 15,33; NSC

68, 227-33, 246, 303; NSC 114,

270-71,273; summary, 4

Bunker, Howard G., Maj. Gen., 457n

Bureau of the Budget (BoB), 9, 225,

237, 252-54, 274n, 302-03; and

Defense budget, 486; and military

assistance, 399, 416-17, 419-20,

424,429-31

Burgess, Edwin H., 25, 492

Burgess, Guy, 460n

Burke, Arleigh A., Adm., 119n

Burma, 205, 217; and Japanese peace

treaty conference, 194

Burns, James H., 6, 9, 20-21, 73,

81-82, 100, 396, 401, 404, 415,

443, 486, 488; and budget matters,

231,232; and Japan, 189,201; and

NATO, 329, 370-71

Cabot, Thomas D., 401-02, 404-05,

419

Cain, Harry, Sen., 108

Cairo Conference declaration: re Formosa, 173, 175; re Korea, 41

Index 687

Caldwell, Millard F., 249, 272, 484n

Cambodia, 205, 208, 216

Canada, 213, 342, 367, 414n, 419,

442

Cannon, Clarence, Rep., 280

Career Compensation Act of 1952 (PL

82-346), 490

Carney, Robert B., Adm., 363, 409

Caroline Islands, 187

Carter, Marshall S., Col., 36, 107, 114,

235,263,483,484,519

Casberg, Melvin A., 495, 496, 497

Cataloging and Standardization Act (PL

82-436), 506

Cease-fire, 86, 87-91, 99, 101-02,

151 (see also Korean War-armistice); and MacArthur statement,

101-02

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14,

44, 46-47, 72, 75, 77-78, 82; and

Formosa, 182-83

Centurion tanks, British sale to U.S. of,

448, 450, 452

Chase, William c., Maj. Gen., 181-82

Chiang Kai-shek, 5, 173, 174-76,

177n, 180, 181, 184-85, 187n; offer to send troops to Korea, 175

China: and the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, 395

China, People's Republic of, 126-29

(see also Korean War-Communist

Chinese forces in); antigovernment

resistance forces in, 182; blockade

of, 88, 93,113,137; effect of intervention in Korea, 237, 242, 24;,

248; entry into Korean War, 53,71-

96, 98, 113, 126, 190, 201, 209;

and Formosa, 17;-8;; and Indochina, 208, 210-11, 213-19

Chou En-lai, 71, 148, 169, 17;, 177

Church, John H., Brig. Gen., 50, 51,

52-53

Churchill, Winston, 37,137,344,366;

and atomic matters, 458, 462; meeting with Truman, 444

Civil defense, 249, 272, 293-94, 295;

Office of Civil Defense, 484n
688 Index

Civilian Components Policy Board,

18, 25, 489, 492

Clark, Mark, Gen., 140, 147, 150-51,

159-60, 164, 165, 166, 171; and

Japan, 199, 202, 203

Clay, Lucius, 407

Coe, Charles F., Rear Adm., 457n

Collins,). Lawton, Gen., 14, 23, 490;

and ammunition, 160-61; and

atomic weapons, 86, 169; and budget: FY 1951, 226-27, 229-30, 232;

FY 1952, 262; FY 1953, 274; FY

1954,296-97; and integration, 494;

and interservice problems, 520; and

Korea, 49, 60, 83, 84, 89, 164; and

Lovett, 519; and MacArthur, 105;

and military assistance, 425-26; and

Pace-Finletter agreement, 298; on

role of secretary of defense, 521;

and trip to Far East, 94-95

Combat Duty Pay Act of 1952, 490

Combined Policy Committee (CPC),

455, 458, 459, 460, 462

Commander in Chief, Far East

(CINCFE), 114

Commander in Chief, U.S. European

Command (CINCEUR), 399, 406

Committee of Four, 28

Communist challenge to West, 2-3, 4,

5,6,8-9,10-11,106,359. See also

Korea-Communist intervention

Comptroller, OSD, 9, 18-19, 32; and

Advisory Council on Accounting

Policy and Financial Procedures,

486; Fiscal Management Staff, 486

Congress, U.S., 62; and 050, 53. See

also House of Representatives, U.S.;

Senate, U.S.

Coolidge, Charles A., 401, 487, 504,

505; and 000 organization, 525,

526; and role ofJCS, 522

Coudert, Frederic R., Rep., 281

Council of Economic Advisers (CEA),

9, 230, 264, 303

Craigie, Laurence c., Maj. Gen., 119n

Czechoslovakia: at San Francisco Conference, 197

Dean, Gordon: and custody of atomic

weapons, 464, 466; and exchange

of atomic information, 459-60,

462; and nonnuclear components,

470, 476, 479; and weapons stockpile, 468-73

Dean, Hugh, 159

Defense Advisory Committee on

Women in the Services (DACOWITS),489

Defense Appropriation Act of 1953,

505

Defense Management Committee, 27,

485

Defense Management Council, 485

Defense Mobilization Board, 499

Defense Mobilization, Office of

(ODM), 254, 264, 270

Defense Production Act of 1950, 499

Defense Production Administration,

254-56, 499

Defense Production Board, 342

Defense Supply Management Agency,

506

de Lattre de Tassigny, Jean, Gen., 210-

13

Denfeld, Louis E., Adm., 16

Denmark; and military assistance,

436n, 448

Department of Defense: and atomic

matters, 456, 460, 463, 471, 473;

and Congress, 38; and Japan, 192,

193, 196; and military assistance,

395-97, 399-402, 404-06, 415-

25,430-34,436-37,440-41,446-

48, 450, 453; relations with field

commanders, 517. See also Secretary of Defense, Office of; Service

secretaries

"Doctors Draft," 31; and "Doctors

Draft" bill (PL 81-779),497

Dodd, Francis T., Brig. Gen., 146, 147

Douglas, Lewis, 397, 402

Draper, William H., Jr., 347,407,409-

12, 445-46, 449-50

Dulles, John Foster, 48; and Japan,

188-93, 196-97

Durham, Carl, Rep., 479
Early, Stephen T., 15-16, 26, 56, 497

Economic Cooperation Administration

(ECA), 395-96, 399-402, 404-05,

417-18; and Indochina, 212

Economic and International Security

Estimates Division, 486

Economic Stabilization Agency, 499

Economy, U.S., 500 (1able 22)

Eddleman, Clyde D., Brig. Gen., 360

Eden, Anthony, 135

Edwards, Daniel K., 195, 344, 407,

487

Egypt, 365-66

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 150n; and

atomic matters, 467, 476, 481; and

Defense reorganization, 530-31; as

field commander, 5 17; and FY 195 I

budget, 224; and Formosa, 184-85;

meeting with Truman, 526; and military assistance, 402, 404, 407,

409-11, 420, 425-26, 428, 431,

438-39, 441, 451, 453; and NATO

forces, 340, 341, 349n, 358, 372,

374-75 (Table 16),385; and officer

fitness reports, 504n; and prisoners

of war in Korea, 170; State of the

Union message, 220; as Supreme

Commander, NATO, 333-34, 360,

361-62; and use of atomic weapons, 167-69

Elbe River, 316-17

Elsey, George M., 62

Elugelab, 480

Eniwetok, 478

Erskine, Graves B., Maj. Gen., 208

European Coal and Steel Community.

392n

European Coordinating Committee

(ECC), 397, 399, 402, 404, 406,

409, 445

European Defense Community (EDe),

389-90, 429. 453

Evans, James c., 27

Everest, Frank F, Maj. Gen., 457n

Executive Group: preparation of mutual security legislation, 417-19

Executive Orders: EO 10099, 396; EO

10161, ..,0-.)1; EO 10300,405-06

Index 689

Far East Air Forces (FEAF), 52,75, 128,

157,203

Fechteler, William M., Adm., 17, 23,

143,151,365; and FY 1953 budget,

274; and interservice problems,

521; and military assistance, 425-

26

Federal Catalog System, 501

Fermi, Enrico, 477

Finlay, Luke w., 407

Finletter, Thomas K., 17, 29, 73, 75,

77-78,91,127-29,131,216; and

Air Staff, 523; and atomic matters,

478, 481; and budget matters, 226,

262. 274, 276, 289, 297; and interservice issues. 298, 521; and military assistance. 437, 441, 449; and

NSC 68, 231; and role of service

secretary, 523-25

Fleischman, Manly, 31, 281

Foreign Economic Defense Affairs, Office of, 488

Foreign Military Affairs, Office of, 20,

488

Foreign Military Affairs and Assistance,

Office of, 486

Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee (FMACC), 396-97,

399,401,414-16,434-35

Formosa. 52, 114, 205; and China

Lobby,S. 54, 174; and Chinese Nationalist forces, 53, 84, 217; reappraisal of US. policy toward, 173-

""4; l:.S. military assistance to, 184,

422, 429. 435, 442; IT.S. Military

Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG)

in, 181-82; U.S. military base rights

on, 184-85; U.S. military survey

mission (Fox mission) to. 176. 181;

FS. pre-1949 support of, 207

Formosa Strait, 178

Forrestal, James, 4. 13,24,26,27,28,

458n, 497,513,575

Foster, William C., 38, 131; and atomic

matters, 461, 462, 476, 481; and FY

1953 budget, 274, 288; and FY

1953 force recommendation, 269;

and Formosa, 183; and Indochina,
690 Index

216,220; and japan, 201; and military assistance, 410-1 I, 417, 419,

426-30,441-44,447,449-50; and

NSC 134, 289-90; and NSC 135,

294-95; and OSD organization,

485, 505, 506; and Pace-Finletter

agreement, 298; and Spain, 355;

and Truman, 514

Fowler, ).W., Rear Adm., 506

Fox, Alonzo P., Maj. Gen., 176

France: and Indochina, 205-20; and

NATO, 209, 220, 320-23, 324, 325-

27,329-30,332-33,334; U.S. economic and military aid to, 219n,

420,422-23, 436n, 445-51

French Union Forces. See Indochina

Fritchey, Clayton, 498

Fuchs, Klaus,S, 6, 459, 477

Garlock, Lyle A., 18, 299

Germ warfare. See Korean War

Germany, 391, 392-93; and military

assistance, 416-19, 420, 424, 436n,

442,449, 451-53; participation in

NATO, 318-35, 384-90, 534; rearmament of, 219, 316-20, 320-35,

338,385-86,391-92, 393

Gilpatric, Roswell, 446, 449

Good, Roscoe E, Rear Adm., 268n

Goodrich, Nathaniel H., 420, 487

Gordon, Lincoln, 405

Gorrie, Jack 0.,273,293-95

Gray, Gordon, 16

Great Britain: and Formosa, 175; and

Indochina, 211, 213, 214, 217, 218;

and japanese peace settlement,

192-94, 198; and Malaya, 220; and

military assistance,417, 420, 422-

23, 436n, 444, 446, 448-52; and

NATO, 320-23

"Great Debate," 97, 104, 339-41

Greece, 347, 35 I; and the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, 395;

u.s. military assistance to, 4 I 3,

411-16,422-23,434,452; U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group

(MAAG) in, 397

Griffis, Stanton, 314, 355

Griffith, Paul H., 18, 19,489

Gruenther, Alfred M., Lt. Gen., 312n,

361

Guided missiles; with atomic warheads (see Atomic weapons); development of, 473-75; Director of,

OSD,474

H-bomb, 455, 477, 478, 479, 481; test

(MIKE), 477-82

Halaby, Najeeb, 20-21, 417n, 428, 488

Hallinan, Vincent w., I SOn

Han River, 50, 53

Handy, Thomas T., Gen.; and military

assistance, 399,402,406-07,410-

12,411

Harriman, W. Averell, 29, 82, I77n;

and budget matters, 276, 294; as

ECA special representative, 397; and

military assistance, 417, 419, 423-

24,428-31,438-51; and Office of

the Director for Mutual Security,

405-06, 407, 410-12; as president's

special assistant, 401, 404

Harrison, William K., Maj. Gen., 149,

151,152-53,171

Heath, Donald R., 208, 210, 212

Herod, William R., 342

Hickenlooper, Bourke B., Sen., 108,

458n

Ho Chi Minh, 205, 210, 212

Hoa Hinh, 213

Hodes, Henry I., Maj. Gen., 119n

Hodge, john R., Lt. Gen., 42, 44

Hong Kong, 176, 213

Hoopes, Townsend W., 488

Hospitals, military, 496

"Hot pursuit," 126, 130-31

House of Representatives, U.S.; atomic

matters, 461

House Committees; on Appropriations, 226, 420, 503, 508; Armed

Services, 233, 420, 426; Expenditures in the Executive Department,

503; Foreign Affairs, 420, 426

Houser. Harold A., 19
Houston, john c., jr., 505

Howard, Herbert, 21, 502

Hsieh Fang, Maj. Gen., 119

Iceland, 414n

Inch'on, 42, 66n, 67, 98

India, 205; and japanese peace treaty

conference, 194

Indochina, 413, 423, 429; French

Union Forces in, 207, 208, 210,

216, 219; impact of Korean War on,

207; jCS support for UN membership, 209-10; joint State-Defense

survey mission to, 208; possible role

of UN regarding, 217; possible use

of Chinese Nationalist forces in,

214; U.S. aid to, 207, 211, 216, 217,

219, 220, 422, 435, 440-42, 446-

47; U.S. Military Assistance Advisory

Group (MAAG) in, 208

Indonesia, 205, 217, 413

International Security Affairs Committee (ISAC), 401-02, 404-05, 417,

423-24, 445

International Security Affairs, Office

of, 506

Interservice problems, 298, 518, 521,

536

Iran: and the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949,395; u.s. military

assistance to, 413, 415-16, 422,

434, 436n

Ismay, Lord Hastings, 345, 444, 448

Italy: 1953 national elections in, 450;

u.s. military assistance to, 420,

446n, 448, 450-51

japan, 174, 205; air force, proposal

for, 203; and Allied Council, 187;

defense of, 93, 99, 114-15; effect of

Korean War on, 534; and Far Eastern

Commission, 187, 190; and Formosa, 198n; membership in UN,

200; and military assistance, 417,

428-30, 442; and peace treaty, 69,

188-94,200,202,203; and People's

Index 691

Republic of China, 198, 200; rearmament of, 200-04; Security Board,

202; U.S. Administrative Agreement

with, 198-99; U.S. naval vessels for,

203; U.S. security treaty with, 190,

194-95, 198,204

japanese Maritime Safety Board, 20 I,

203

japanese National Police Reserve

ONPR) (subsequently the Hoantai),

201, 202, 204

jaujard, Robert, Vice-Adm., 362

jenner, William E., Sen., 34-35

johnson, Earl D.: and japan, 191-93

johnson, Louis A., 16,23,31,33-34,

73, 74; and atomic energy matters,

6,459,468,469,477; and Communist aggression, 8; and Defense budget, 15; and FY 1951 budget, 224-

30, 233-34; and FY 1952 budget,

244; and Formosa, 15, 174-76; and

hospitals, 496; and Indochina, 209;

and japan, 188-89; and Korea, 1,2,

11, 48-50,51-52,54,56-57,59,

61-62, 63, 65, 73; relations with

Congress, 33; relations with State, 8,

15,514; resignation, 178; and Truman, 28, 33, 513; and U.S. military

assistance, 395-96, 413-15, 434-

35; and Western European defense,

314-16,318

johnson, Lyndon B., 503

Johnson, lJ. Alexis, 120n

Johnston, Eric, 31, 499

joint American Military Advisory

Group OAMAG), 399, 406-07, 409-

12,417,439

joint Chiefs of Staff OCS), 6, 8, 17, 21,

22-23, 49, 51; and atomic matters,

456, 460, 463; and atomic stockpile, 468-71; and atomic weapons

custody, 464-67; and budget: FY

1951 budget, 222, 225, 233-36; FY

1951 supplemental, 233-36, 240;

FY 1952 budget, 245n, 265-66,

267,268; FY 1953 budget, 271, 278

(lable 9), 279, 285-88; FY 1954

budget, 285-87, 289, 292, 302;
692 Index

Coolidge critique of, 526; executive

agent system, 518, 521, 531; and FY

1952 force levels, 238 (Table 3),255

(Table 7); and FY 1953 force levels,

262, 267-70, 278 (Table 9); and FY

1954 manning levels, 295, 301

(Table 13); and Formosa, 53, 173-

80,182-84; and Germany, 317,

318-19; and Indochina, 207 , 209,

210, 213,214, 215,220;andJapan,

188-89, 191-95, 198-99, 201-03;

and JCAE, 479; and JCS directives,

67,68,74,76,84,92,93-94, 109,

110-11, 113, 114-15, 127, 133-

34, 141-42, 151-52; and Joint Staff,

530; and Korean War, 57-58, 61,

62-65, 67, 68, 70, 74, 76, 78, 84,

85,87-88,90-92,93,99,100,105,

107, 109, Ill, 112, 113-14, 116,

124, 128, 129-31, 133, 136, 141-

42,150,151-52,157,163,164-66,

167n, 168, 169; Lovett's view of,

528-29; and military assistance,

399, 401, 409-11, 416-18, 422-

29,431,435-36,438-39,441-43;

and NATO, 343; and NSC 68, 228-

29, 230, 231, 232, 244, 263; and

NSC 114, 262-65, 269-73, 291;

and NSC 13 5, 290-95; relations

with Secretary of Defense, 519; relations with service secretaries, 521,

523, 525; and research and development matters, 509; I:.S. military representative in Europe (USMILREP),

399, 409-1 I; and Western Europe,

314, 318-19

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

OCAE), 450, 457, 459, 470, 479

Joint Munitions Allocation Committee,

435

Joint Secretaries, 31, 264, 378, 523-24

Joy, c. lurner, Vice Adm., 119n, 122,

123, 133, 137, 149

Juin, Alphonse, Marshal, 362

Kaesong, 47, 117, 122

Katz, Milton, 399, 402, 404, 406

Keller, Kaufman T., 474, 475, 476

Kennan, George F, 6, 7, 88,101,115,

148, 150; and Chinese intervention

in Korea, 245; and Formosa, 174-

75

Kent, Roger, 487

Key West Agreement, 23

Keyserling, Leon, 424; and NSC 68,

246,247; and NSC 114, 273n

Kibler. A. Franklin, Maj. Gen., 399,

406-07. 409

Kim 11 Sung, 68, 117, 168

Kimhall, Dan A., 17, 163, 216; and

budget, 274, 276, 281, 289, 296,

299: and guided missiles, 474, 476;

and role of service secretaries, 523-

25

Kimpo airfield, 47, 51, 66

Kirk, Alan G.. 9, 116. 317

Knowland, William F, Sen., 54, 108

Knowles, Nathaniel, Jr., 505

Koje-do. 145-46, 147-48

Korea, 212; invasion of South, 1, 2,

10. 41, 47-48, 307; and Congressional military appropriations, postinvasion, 414; division of, 41-46

passim; North Korea (Democratic

People's Republic of Korea), 43, 65-

70; pre-invasion status, 41-47; Provisional Military Advisory Group

(KMAG). 44, 46, 47, 53; Soviet role

in, 42-43; UN role in, 1,42-44; U.S.

assistance to, 45-46,220,307,413,

434. 440; U.S. political objectives

in, 78, 94; C.S. role in, 42, 43,

44-46

Korea, Republic of, 43, 54, 67, 116-

17; army, 45; KATUSA, 161-62,

164-65; military forces of, 46-47,

50-51, 70, 80; and the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, 171,

395; U.S. assistance to, 45-46, 49-

50, 51-52, 53, 54

Korean War: air war: 74, 75, 109-10,

126-29, 156-57; airfields, 136-37;

"choke" operations, 157; close support. 156; interdiction campaign,

60. 128. 156-57 ; reconnaissance,
73, 78; strategic bombing, 73, 74,

75-76, 99; Anglo-American cooperation in, 75, 88-90, 110, 137; armistice: 110, Ill, 115-16, 117, 119-

39,165-72,535; agenda, 119-21,

137-38; Item 3, 134-38; Item 5,

133-34; negotiating procedures,

120; recess, 150-55; violations,

122; and blockade of North Korea,

157; casualties, 86-87, 91, 93, 99,

115, 124-25, 126, 156, 170, 171-

72; channels of command (Chart 2),

96; commitment of U.S. forces to,

54, 58-62; Communist Chinese

forces in, 76, 82, 83, 85, 127-28,

156, 170; Communist intervention

in, 53, 73, 74-75; costs of, 164n,

500 (Table 22), 509, 511; demarcation line, 120-24; effect on U.S.

defense policy, 23,-), 26,-), 291; effect

on U.S. military budget, 223, 240-

41,243,248-49,257,261,286-87,

291, 300-01, 303; GHQ Advance

Command and Liaison Group in Korea (ADCOM), 50-51; and hydroelectric complexes, 75, 76, 77, 99,

157; intelligence, 81,109,127,128;

Military Armistice Commission,

172; and morale of UN forces, 94;

Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, 1/2; North Korean troops

in, 59, 60, 65-66, 68, 155; Operation SHOWDOWN, 156-57; and

People's Republic of China, 52,71-

72, 74-75, 87, 89, 91, 93, 98, 113;

political objectives, 78, 80, 84, 86,

90, 94, 99, 100, 101, 102, 106,

107-08, 111-15, 116, 121, 131-

32; prepared defense lines, 93; prisoners of war, 139-54; ROK troops

in, 70, 99, 110, 114, 124-25, 126,

161-65, 168, 170; sanctuaries, 76-

77,81,98, 102, 126-27, 131; Soviet intervention in, 62-64, 101,

109,112.114-15; 38th parallel,

51-52, 62-71, 73, 82, 87-88, 89,

91, 97-118, 121-22, 171; LIN

forces in, 52, 56-:;7, 58, 66, 126

Index 693

(see also UN Command); lJNC withdrawal from, 86, 87, 91-96, 98,

109, 120-21; and U.S. allies, 57,

8:;-86, 87-88, 89, 98, 101, 102,

1I), 116, 140-41, 144, 169; U.S.

forces in, 60, 62, 80, 99: Eighth

Army, 56, 66, 67, 69, 70, 81, 82-83,

85,86,87,90,92,93, 95, 98, 99,

102-03, 109, 114, 124-25, 157;

Seventh Division, 70; X Corps, 67,

69, 82-83, 8:;, 86, 87, 90; and

united Korea, 64, 6:;, 68, 90, 100,

116-17, 172 (see also political objectives)

Kurile Islands, 187, 189, 190, 194

Landon, Truman H., Maj. Gen., 6

Laos, 205, 208, 218; national army of,

216

Larkin, Felix, 19,487,489

Latin America: militarr assistance to,

41/,430 '

Lawrence, Ernest 0., 478

Lawton, Frederick S.: and atomic matters, 470, 471, 472; and FY 1951

budget, 225; and FY 1952 budget,

249, 253; and FY 1953 budget, 275,

276, 277, 279; and military assistance, 401, 419, 430

Lay, James S., Jr., 29

LeBaron, Robert, 24, 29; and atomic

matters, 4:;6-:;8; and atomic stockpile, 468, 471-73; and custodv of

atomic weapons, 465-66; and' exchange of atomic information, 4:;8,

460-62; and nonnuclear components, 476; and thermonuclear test,

480,481

Lemmonier, Andre, Adm., 362

Lemnitzer, Lyman 1.., Maj. Gen., 20;

and military assistance, 396-97,

400,414-16,434-36

Lend-lease program, 431

Letourneau, Jean, 213, 216; and request for US. military and economic assistance, 447
694 Index

Leva, Marx, 18, 19-20, 35, 61, 420,

486, 487, 489

Libhy, R.E., Rear Adm., 143, 151

Lincoln, George A., Col., ",74, 404

417-20,424 . ,

Lishon Conference, 376-77, 390-91,

426-28, 439, 445-~6, 452

Livermore Laboratory, 478, 479

Loftis,). Robert, 484

Loper, Herbert B., Brig. Gen., ~57n

Los Alamos, 478, 480

Lovelace, W. Randolph, 11, 495

Lovett, Robert A., 36-38, 187, 333,

.334; and ammunition shortages,

158-59, 160; and atomic matters

124, 457, 458, 460-62, 466, 470~ 73; and budget: 230, 233, 235-36,

239; FY 1951 supplemental, 237;

FY 1952 budget, 2-i5, 2-i7, 249,

250-58 (Table 6); FY 1953 budget,

262, 264-65, 266, 269, 270-71,

272-74, 275-77, 279, 280-82; FY

1954 budget, 285-86, 287-90,

292-300, 302; and Communist propaganda, 148; and Congress, 515;

and executive agents, 522; and Formosa, 178, 181-84; and guided missiles, 475; and Indochina, 212-21;

and Japan, 194-204; and Joint

Chiefs, 519, 520, 521; and Joint

Secretaries, 523-25: and Korea, 74,

75,86, Ill, 130-31, 132-33, 134-

35,136,151,165; and MacArthur,

102; and manpower, 493; and military assistance, 401, 404, 406, 410-

12, 416-19, 421-28, 431, 433,

437--i6, 449-51, 453; and Munitions Board, 501, 503, 505-06; and

NATO, 343-44; and Office of Public

Information, 498; and organization,

485, 511, 513, 525, 526-30; as policymaker, 51-4-15; and presidentelect Eisenhower, 526; and prisoners of war, 14 l-e.f 5; and Research

and Development Board, 508, 509;

and role of secretary of defense,

527; and thermonuclear test, 478,

479, 480; and Truman, 514; and

unification, 515; view of NSC, 530

Luxembourg: and U.S. military assistance program, 436n

MacArthur, Douglas, Gen., 1, 44, 49,

52-53, 56, 59-60, 65-70, 72, 74,

75-77, 78, 83, 84-85, 88, 89, 92-

93, 93-94, 99, 100-02; and Formosa, 173-76; and Japan, 188-91,

201; recall, 99-103, 103-08, 180,

192-93, 418, 516-17; speech to

Veterans of Foreign Wars, 177; and

Truman, 69, 84-85, 88, 94-95,

102n, 103, lOS

McBride, H.L., Maj. Gen., 348

McCarthy, Joseph R., Sen., 5, 54, 537

McCloy, John)., 319, 386

McCone, John A.: budget matters, 254

Maclean, Donald, 460n

McMahon, Brien, Sen., 268, 421; and

atomic matters, 456, 457, 462, 467-

72, -i78

McNamey, Joseph T., Gen., 27, 312n,

443; and budget, 229-30; and Defense Management Committee, 486

McNeil, Wilfred J., 18, 35, 345, 514,

5 15; and budget: FY 195 1 budget,

229, 230, 237, 239; FY 1952 budget, 253, 258; FY 1953 budget, 270,

274, 279, 280; FY 1954 budget,

286-88, 290, 291-92, 296-97,

300; and FY 1951 supplemental,

225, 227; and cost of Korean War,

509; and guided missiles, 474; and

military assistance, 415, 418-19,

430, 441, 444, 449; and military

force strength, 228; and Munitions

Board, 503; and NSC 114,263; and

OSD management, -i86-87

Magruder, Carter B., Maj. Gen., 189,

191

Mahon, George H., Rep.: FY 1951 budget, 226, 239; FY 1952 budget, 251

Malaya, 205. 217

Malik, Jacob, ·48n, 115-16, 147-48
Manchuria, 73-76, 77-81, 98, 99,

110, 180n, 187. See also Korean

War-sanctuaries

Manpower, 488-95

Mao Tsc-tung, 5, 173, 187

Marcus Island, 190

Mariana Islands, 187, 190

Marine Corps, U.S.: and FY 1951 budget, 226, 237, 241 (Table 5); FY

1952 budget, 251-53; FY 1953 budget, 270, 274-75, 288; FY 1954

budget, 297; 1st Marine Division,

70; and NSC 68, 228, 244; readiness, 245n, 290-92, 295; strength,

224, 225 (Table 2), 234, 238 (Table

3), 240 (Table 4), 244, 245, 246,

252,255 (Table 7),261-62,266-67,

269, 275, 278 (Table 9), 287, 289,

290,292,295,300,301 (Table 13)

Marshall, George c., 34, 35-37, 119;

and atomic matters, 457, 459, 463,

465,469,470; and budget: FY 1951

budget, 230, 234, 236-37, 239-40;

FY 1952 budget, 245-51, 257, 258;

FY 1953 budget, 263, 266; and Congress, 515; and Formosa, 178, 180,

181; and Indochina, 209, 210, 211;

and Japan, 190-96, 20 I, 204; and

Joint Chiefs, 519; and Korea, 42,58,

77, 80, 82, 83-84, 86, 87-88, 90,

91,92,94, 100, 102, 111, 127, 130,

333; and Lovett, 36-37, 37-38; and

MacArthur, 67-68, 69n, 84, 89,

94n, 97, 104-05, 107-08; and manpower, 488-89, 493; and medical

affairs, 496-97; and military assistance, 401-02, 404-05, 414, 416-

18,420-21,424,43],433,435-38;

and Munitions Board, 501; and

NATO, 322, 324, 325, 326-27,328,

331,340,342-43,385; and Office

of Public Information, 498; and

OSD organization, 483, 485-86,

511; as policymaker, 514, 515; and

Research and Development Board,

507; and Ridgway, 114; and service

secretaries, 523, 525; on Soviet policy at San Francisco Conference,

Index 695

197; trip to Korea and Japan, 114;

and Truman, 513; and unification,

515; and Universal Military Training, 490-91

Marshall Islands, 187, 190

Marshall Plan, 3, 4, 395, 447

Martin, Joseph w., Jr., Rep., 103

Matthews, Francis P., 16-17, 32n; and

budget matters, 226, 231

Matthews, H. Freeman, 73, 120n

Mautz, William H., 486

Medical personnel shortage, 496-97

Medical Services, Office of, 18,25-26,

495

Medium Term Defense Plan (MTDP),

312,322,369-70,372, 417n, 418,

425

Meiling, Richard L., 26, 495

Melby, John F., 208

Merchant, Livingston, 120n

Michelsen, Stanley R., Brig. Gen.,

457n

Middle East: and Defense organization,

351; and tripartite pact, 351; and

U.S. military assistance program

4]7,422, 429-30

Military Air Transport Service, 31

Military assistance, 4, 314, 315, 3]6,

355-56n, 357-58, 359, 360, 370,

374, 381, 385, 392-93, 399, 402,

412, 452; coordination with economic assistance, 403 (Chart 7),420

(Table 19); counterpart funds,356n;

evaluation of, 451-54; and procurement, Army Allocations Committee,

441; and role of Military Assistance

Advisory Group (MAAG), 397; and

service secretaries, 410, 437

Military Assistance Office, OSD, 402,

440, 488

Military Construction Act (PI. 82-534),

506

Military Liaison Committee, 18, 21,

23, 24, 456-59, 474-75

Military Representatives Committee,

342

Military Sea Transportation Service, 31

Military Traffic Service, 31-32
696 Index

Mobilization, 230, 236, 239, 245-48,

256,265,276,293,498-501,511;

activation of National Guard (see

Reserve forces)

Moch, Jules, 209, 321-22, 325-26,

327, 328

Monnet, Jean, 326

Montgomery, Viscount, Field Marshal,

316, 362

Moore, Robert S., Brig. Gen.: and budget matters, 251

Mountbatten, The Earl, Admiral, 367

Muccio,)ohn)., 1, 43n, 44, 45, 46, 48,

50,51, 117

Munitions Allocation Council, 443-

44, 450

Munitions Board (MB), 17, 21, 444,

446, 528; and atomic energy matters, 469, 473; organization, 502,

504-06; role of, 501-03

Munitions Board Cataloging Agency,

501

Murdaugh, Albert c., Capt., 488

Murphy, Charles, 481

Murphy, Robert, 199

Mutual Assistance Advisory Committee, 447

Mutual Defense Assistance Act of

1949, 18, 20, 45, 395, 399-400,

444

Mutual Defense Assistance Program

(MDAP), 400, 402, 413-15, 419,

434-36,438-41,446,453; organization, 398 (Chart 6)

Mutual Security, 408 (Chart 8), 412,

426-28; appropriations, FY 1953

(Table 20), 422

Mutual Security Act of 1951 (PL 82-

165),404-06,410,421,444

Mutual Security Agency (MSA), 405-

06, 450

Mutual Security Appropriation Act of

1952,421

Mutual Security, Office of the Director

for (ODMS), 275, 405, 433

Na San, 218, 219

Nam II, 119n, 122, 134, 135-36, 171

Nanpo Shoto, 190

Nash, Frank c., 100, 351, 372-73,

380, 486, 488; and budget matters,

263, 264, 290, 291, 292; and Formosa, 182-83; and Indochina, 215;

and )CS, 520, 523; and military assistance program, 396, 410-12,

422, 428, 430, 437-39, 441, 443-

44,447,449,452; at San Francisco

Conference, 197

National Production Authority, 256,

499

National Security Act, 13, 14, 35;

amendments-1949, 13, 16,22; Title IV, 18-19. See also Comptroller,

OSD

National Security Agency, 515

National Security Council (NSC), 8,

14,20,29,30,51,62,63,78,82,

84, 94, 100, 112, 132, 169, 530;

meetings, 30, 231, 236, 237, 245,

246, 247, 256, 265, 272, 292, 294,

318, 359; Senior Staff, 29, 77-78,

246, 272, 273, 294, 488', Special

Committee on Atomic Energy, 29,

463,464,466,469,471,477-81

National Security Council (NSC) papers: NSC 8, 43, 44-46; NSC 13,

188; NSC 18, 359; NSC 20, 7, 8;

NSC 48, 111-13, 131, 180, 181,

188, 211, 218; NSC 60, 190; NSC

64, 207; NSC 68, 6-10, 216, 227-

31, 232, 244, 245-48, 262, 263,

269, 283, 416, 418, 424; NSC 73,

63, 71; NSC 73/4, 208, 218, 348;

NSC 76, 63, 355; NSC 81, 64-65,

71; NSC 82,320; NSC 101,94,179;

NSC 114, 262, 263, 264, 283; NSC

114/1, 264, 265, 269, 271, 272,

291; NSC 115,387; NSC 118, 131-

32, 163; NSC 124, 210, 214, 216-

18; NSC 125/2,200,202; NSC 128,

183-84; NSC 134, 289, 290; NSC

135,290,292-94

National Security Resources Board

(NSRB), 9, 14,30,63,293
National Security Training Commission, 491

Nationalists, Chinese. See Formosa

Navy, U.S.: and FY 1951 huldget, 224,

226,227,2.17,241 (Tahle 5), 250;

FY 1952 hudget, 251-52 (Table 6),

253n, 259 (Tahle H), 265, 267; FY

1953 hudget, 269, 270, 274, 275,

277, 279 (Table 10), 280 (lahle 11),

284 (Tahle 12), 285; FY 1954 budget, 294, 296-97, 298-300, 302,

304 (lahle 14); and military assistance program, 427-29, 441; and

NSC 68,228,244; readiness, 245n,

290-91, 292, 295; reserve units,

299; Seventh Fleet, 49-50, 174-75,

179-81, 184; strength, 224, 225

(lahle 2), 228, 2.35-54, 256, 238

(lahle 3), 240 (lahle 4), 244-45,

246, 252, 255 CEtble 7), 261-62,

266-67, 275, 277, 278 (Tahle 9),

281,290-91,292,295,301 (lable

15)

Netherlands: and C.S. military assistance, 436n, 448

"New Look," 537

New Zealand, 192,204,213,217,218

Nichols, Kenneth D., Maj. Gen., 474

Nitze, Paul Ii., 6, 32, 112, 120n; and

hudget matters, 236, 262, 264, 272

Norstad, Lauris, Gen., 362, 409

North Atlantic Council (NAC), 310-

11,312, 3-t5. 37H. 390-91; reorgan·

ization of. -t07

North Atlantic Treaty, 4, 395

North Atlantic Treaty Affairs, Office of.

401,488

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), 313 (Chart 3), 336 (Chan

4), 351, 364 (Chart 5); commands,

319-20,321,323. 32H, 361, 362,

363-65, 366, 367 ; and Defense

Committee, 312, 323; and Defense

Production Board. 402, 44H; and

dispatch of U.S. troops to Europe,

191, 318. 339, 393-94; effect of

Korean War on, 5:;4; force goals,

528-29, 377 (Tahle 17), 3HO-H4.

Index 697

5H2 (labIe IH), 428-30; forces,

312-14 (Chan 3), 315-16, 318-19,

32H-29, 340-41, 370, 375-77,

380-84; "Gap," 369-77, 371 C!ahle

15); and Greece and Turkey, 347-

53; and Indochina, 219; infrastructure, 377-HO, 429; and military assistance, 399, 400-01, 405-06,

410, 414-15, 418, 423-25, 434-

55,439,441-43,446-47,449-50;

organization, 310-11, 316, 318,

34 1-47, 361-67 (see also Charts 3,

4, 5); and Spain, 353-61; Standing

Group, 311-12, 416, 427, 442; Supreme Commander, 320, 321, 325,

324-25,328,331-32,333-35; U.S.

attitude toward, 3(j7, 309; and Yu·

goslavia, 353-61

NATO Temporary Council Committee,

438-39

Norway: and U.S. military assistance

program, 419, 436n, '44H

Noyes, Charles 1'., 4H8

Offshore procurement program (OSP),

444-51

Ohly, John Ii., 48H; and Indochina,

209; and military assistance, 396-

97,405-06,414,429-30,435-38

Okinawa, 174, IH8

Olmsted, George H., Brig. Gen., 359,

396. 447, 48H

Oppenheimer,]. Rohert, 477, 479, 480

Pace, Frank, Jr., 16,48, I05n, 105-06,

159, 163, 165, 166-67, 298, 373,

57-t; and hudget: FY 1951 hudget,

226, 229, 231, 233-35; FY 1953

hudget, 276, 281; FY 1954 budget.

287, 2H9, 296-97; as executive

agent, 522; and Formosa, 176; and

Indochina, 216; and integration in

armed forces, 494; and military assistance, 434-36, 441; relations
698 Index

with Army Chief of Staff, 521-22;

and role of service secretary, 523-

25

Pace-Finletter Agreement, 298

Pacific collective security, 69; and Pacific Council, 196; and Pacific military pact, 190-91, 192

Paik Sun Yup, Maj. Gen., 119n

Pakistan, 205

Panikkar, Kavalam Madhava, 72, 80-

81, 175

Panmunjom, 123

Pawley, William D., 409, 446

Peng Teh-huai, Gen., 117, 168

Personnel Policy Board, 18, 21, 25,

489

Pescadores, 176, 184, 187, 190

Philippines, 174, 187, 205; and Formosa, 192; and japanese peace settlement, 192; U.S. military assistance to, 413, 434; U.S. mutual

defense treaty with, 196, 197

Pleven, Rene, 211, 326n, 329, 446-47

Poland: at San Francisco Conference,

197

Pontecorvo, Bruno, 460n

Popovic, Koca, Col. Gen., 360

Portugal, 414n, 419

Potsdam Conference Declaration on

japan, 187; and on Korea, 41

Princeton Conference, 478

Prisoners of war, 139-54; compounds,

145-50, 170; lists of, 142-43, 145;

Operation BIG SWITCH, 171; Operation LITTLE SWITCH, 168; repatriation of, 139-45, 149, 167. 169;

screening of, 145-46, 149, 150; violence, 145-46, 147

Public Information, Office of (OPl),

18, 26, 32, 496-97

Public laws: PL 3 (82 Cong., 1 sess., 10

Mar 51), 253n; PL 81-621, 414; PL

81-759,224,414; PL 81-771, 490;

PL 81-774, 30-31; PL 81-814,

272n; PL 81-843,415; PL 81-909.

27n; PL 81-911. 240; PL 82-165,

421; PL 82-179.258; PL 82-249,

421; PL 82-254, 260; PL 82-400.

427; PL 82-410, 490; PL 82-431,

260; PL 82-488, 282; PL 82-547,

282

Pusan, 42, 52, 65-66, 89

P'yongyang, 67, 69, 128

Quebec Agreements, 458n

Radford, Arthur w., Adm., 183

Randall, Carey A., Col., 484

Rashin, 73, 74, 128. See also Manchuria; Korean War-sanctuaries

Rayburn, Sam, Rep., 105

Redstone missile, 475

Renegotiation Board, 445

Renfrow, Louis H., 27

Reorganization Plan No.6, 530

Reorganization Plan No. 25, 30

Research and development, 508

Research and Development Board

(RDB), 17,21, 22, 506, 507n; and

Atomic Energy Committee, 456;

Lovett's view of, 528; review of

guided missiles, 473

Reserve forces, 31, 50, 60-62, 91-92,

93,95,491,492; and Burgess Committee, 492; National Guard, 61,

191,233

Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB),

489

Rhee, Syngman, 43, 44, 51, 66, 101,

117,162,164, 169-70

Richards, George J., Maj. Gen., 447

Ridgway, Matthew B., Gen., 95, 249;

and armistice, 122, 133-34, 136,

137; and atomic weapons, 137; as

field commander, 517; and integration, 494; andjapan, 193, 198, 199,

201, 202; and Korean cease-fire, 87;

and military assistance, 411-12,

428, 451; and prisoners of war in

Korea, 144-45; replacement for

MacArthur, 93, 103n, 108-11; as

SACElJR, 363; and South Korean

troops, 163-64

Ring, Morton L., Rear Adm., 505
Roberts, Osgood, 27, 498

Roberts, William L., Brig. Gen., 44, 45,

46, 53

Rockefeller, Nelson A., 530

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 458

Rosenberg, Anna M., 35, 165; appointment of, 489; and budget, 266-67,

286-88, 293, 297-98, 299; and

manpower activities, 489-95

Royall, Kenneth c., 16

Ruffner, Clark L., Maj. Gen., 488

Rusk, Dean, 72, 88, 91, 100, 120n,

199

Russell, James S., Capt., 457n

Ryukyu Islands, 187, 190, 191,200

Sakhalin Island, 187, 189, 190, 194

Salan, Raoul, Gen., 213, 218

San Francisco Peace Conference, 196-

98, 201

Saunders, Sir Hugh, Air Chief Marshal,

362

Sawyer, Charles, 248

Schneider,]. Thomas, 25,489

Schuman, Robert, 320, 322

Science Advisory Committee, 507

Scott, Stanley L., Maj. Gen., 396,488

Secretary of Defense, Office of (OSD),

12 (Chart 1), 17-28,510 (Chart 9);

and atomic matters, 455, 461; and

budget matters, 237, 251, 270, 275,

285, 286; and Executive Office

(EXOS), 483-84, 487, 526; and

Joint Chiefs, 519-23; and personnel, 527; staffs, 5 I 5

Secretary of Defense: role of, 13-14,

16,23,27-28,31,84-85,514-15,

519,521,527-28

Selective Service, 4,31,50

Senate, U.S.: and atomic matters, 461;

ratification of Japanese peace and

security treaties, 198-99

Senate Committees: on Appropriations, 258, 282; Armed Services,

106, 339, 340-41, 489, 503; Foreign Relations, 106, 339, 340-41,

426, 4.)7

Index 699

Seoul, 42,51,66,93, 100

Service secretaries, 8, 13-14, 16-17,

28,51,56-57,61,64,83,88,100,

130-31,164,314-15,523-25

Shepherd, Lemuel c., Gen., 289

Sheppard, Harry R., Rep., 227

Sherman, Forrest P., Adm., 16,23,49,

66,86,87, 91, 226, 256, 262, 355

Shinwell, Emanuel, 322

Ships, U.S.: Coral Sea, 463; Forrestal,

253; Franklin D. Roosevelt, 463;

Langley, 211; Midway, 463; Saratoga, 281; United States, 15,253

Singapore, 211

Slessor, Sir John, Air Marshal, 518

Small Defense Plants Administration,

499

Small, John D., 444; and Munitions

Board, 502, 505

Smith, Alexander, Sen., 53

Smith, H.P., Rear Adm., 488

Smith, Howard w., Rep., 281

Smith, Oliver P., Maj. Gen., 70, 493

Smith, Walter Bedell, 75, 78, 86; and

Formosa, 182-83

Snyder, John w., 29, 247, 272, 276

Sofu Gan, 190

Souers, Sidney W., 29

Southeast Asia (see Indochina): and

military assistance, 434

Soviet Union, 52, 216,414; effect on

U.S. strategic planning, 230-31;

257, 264, 271-72, 293, 294 (see

also Korea); Far Eastern policy, 187;

and]apan, 190, 191, 194,203; and

MIG-ISs, 75, 127, 128; military capabilities, 264, 271, 272, 295; and

NATO, 337-39; and NSC 68, 230;

and NSC 135, 293, 294; nuclear

weapon stockpile, 533; at San Francisco Conference, 197; U.S. budget

considerations of, 237, 257, 264

Spain, 353-54, 355; military assistance to, 355-57, 417, 420, 421,

422 (Table 20), 427, 429, 431, 442

Spalding, Sidney P., Maj. Gen., 29

Spofford, Charles M., 310-11, 315,

330, 344, 402, 404, 406-07
700 Index

Staff Council, OSD, 28, 485

State, Department of, 81, 97, 98, 99,

100, 101, 127, 130, 141, 143-44,

150, 151; and atomic energy matters, 465, 466, 473; and Formosa,

175, 181-84; and Indochina, 205,

207, 209,212, 214,215;andJapan,

189-91, 193, 195, 196, 198-201;

and military assistance, 395-96,

399-402, 415, 433, 436, 450; and

NSC 68, 236; and NSC 114, 264;

Policy Planning Staff, 6, 8,271,272;

relations with Defense Department,

15,20,32,35,54 (see also Johnson,

Louis-relations with State)

Steel strike, 158-59, 499-500

Stevenson, Adlai, 150n

Stimson, Henry L., 36

Stohl, Ralph N., 19,484

Stokes, Marcus B., Jr., Brig. Gen., 268n

Stone, Charles B., lll, Lt. Gen., 268n

Strategic policy, effect of Korean War

on, 536

Strauss, Lewis L., 478

Sullivan, John L., 16

Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic

(SACLANT), 438

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

(SACEUR), 406, 409, 411, 428, 443

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers,

Europe (SHAPE), 361, 362, 402,

404, 407, 409, 418-19, 438, 443

Symington, W. Stuart, 14, 16, 30n, 63,

231, 247

Taber, John, Rep., 508

Taft, Robert A., Sen., 5, 34, 54, 339

Tan Van Huu, 213

Tannenwald, Theodore, Jr., 405-06

Teller, Edward, 477, 478, 479

Thailand, 205, 217, 219

Thorp, Wakeman P., Capt., 488

Tibet, 178

Tito Oosip Broz), 358, 359, 360

Tonkin, 205, 211, 216, 218, 219;

Delta, 213, 214, 215

Treasury, Department of, 32, 303, 401

Trieste, 360n

Truman, Harry S., 152, 339; and

atomic energy matters, 85, 456,

462, 463, 466-68, 472, 477, 480-

81; and budget: 3,4; FY 1951 budget, 223-25, 236, 240; FY 1951

supplemental, 250; FY 1952 budget,

254; FY 1953 budget, 261, 266,

269, 276, 279, 280, 283; FY 1954

budget, 302, 303; and China (PRC),

98; and civil defense, 272, 295; and

Communist aggression, 10; conference with president-elect Eisenhower, 526; "Doctors Draft," 497;

and Formosa, 174, 176, 177, 181;

and guided missiles, 474, 475; and

Indochina, 207, 211, 215, 216; and

industrial mobilization, 498-99;

and Japan, 188-94, 197-99, 201-

03; and Korea, 48-49, 50, 51-52,

53,55,59-61, 100, 130, 151, 152;

and MacArthur, 69, 84-85, 88, 94-

95. 102, 103, 105, 516; meetings

with Attlee, 88-89, 331; and military assistance program, 396, 401-

02,405-07,412,414-15,420-28,

430, 432, 434, 436, 439-41, 443-

44, 453-54; and National Security

Council, 30; and NSC 68, 246, 248,

249, 256, 262; and NSC 114, 265,

269,272; and NATO, 319, 323, 328,

354,372;andprisonersofwar, 141,

144; special message to Congress,

175; and steel strike, 499-500

Turkey, 348, 351, 352-53; military assistance to, 415-16, 420, 422-23,

434, 436n, 452; and the Mutual

Defense Assistance Act of 1949,

395; u.s. MAAG in, 397

Ulam, Stanislaw M., 478

Underwood, George v., Col., 484

Unified commands, 518, 522 (see also

North Atlantic Treaty Organization)

United Nations, 3,98, 140; Cease-Fire

Group, 98; Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
(UNCURK), 68; Commission on Korea, 43, 49-50; and Formosa, 175,

178; General Assembly, 68, 90-91,

98, 167; policy on Korea, 517-18;

propaganda against U.S., 148-49;

seating of People's Republic of

China, 177; Security Council, 48,

50n, 55, 80, 85; trusteeships in the

Pacific, 187

UN Command, 55-58,62, 64, 75, 80,

82, 99, 115, 149; air power, 156,

157; casualties, 86-87, 156; CINCUNC, 114-15; foreign military

units, 56-58. See also Korean War

Universal military training and service,

31,61-62,490, 491, 529

Universal Military Training and Service

Act (PL 82-51),490,491

U.S. Air Forces, Europe (USAFE), 409

U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe (US

CINCEUR),411-12

U.S. European Command, 409

U.S. military representative for military

assistance in Europe (US MILREP),

399, 406

U.S. Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and

Mediterranean Command, 409

U.S. Special Representative in Europe

(SRE),407

U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC),

234, 286

Vandenberg, Arthur H., Sen., 458n

Vandenberg, Hoyt S., Gen., 23, 49, 60,

83,84,91,94-95, 143; and atomic

matters, 472; and budget, 226-27,

258,262,267,268; and interservice

problems, 521; and military assistance program, 425-26; and PaceFinletter agreement, 298

Van Fleet, James A., Lt. Gen., 109,

114, 117, 124-26, 156, 157-58,

160-61, 162-63

Veterans Readjustment Act, 490

Viet Minh, 205, 209, 213, 216, 218,

219,220

Index 701

Vietnam, 205, 208, 209, 212, 217n;

national army of, 216, 220

Vinson, Carl, Rep., 233

Vinson, Fred, Chief Justice, 105, 500

Von Braun, Werner, 475

Wage Stabilization Board, 499

Wake Island conference, 69, 72-73.

See also MacArthur; Truman

Walker, Walton H., Lt. Gen., 56, 66,

69-70,93

Weapons System Evaluation Group

(WSEG),22

Webster, William, 22, 507

Western Europe, 86, 307-09, 311,

322, 393-94. See also North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Weyland, Otto P., Lt. Gen., 131

Wherry, Kenneth S., Sen., 53, 54, 339

Whitman, Walter G., 295, 507, 508,

509

Wilkinson, James R., 71-72

Wilson, Charles E. ("Electric Charlie"): and atomic matters, 472; and

budget, 249, 256, 272, 273, 276; as

Director of ODM, 29n, 499, 500

Wilson, Charles E. ("Engine Charlie"),

Secretary of Defense, 530

Wilson, Roscoe C, Maj. Gen., 457n

Withington, Frederic S., Rear Adm.,

457n

Women in armed forces, 494-95

Wousan, 67, 69

Wood, C Tyler, 417n

Wooldridge, E. T., Rear Adm., 29,77

Yalu River, 69-70, 80, 82, 180n

Yokusuka Naval Base, 188

Yoshida, Shigeru, 191, 192, 198-200,

202n, 203

Yugoslavia, 351, 353, 357, 360; at

Japanese peace treaty conference,

194; military assistance to, 414,

417,422-23,442