NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

JULIO VILLARS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee.

______________________ 

2014-5124

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:13-cv-00363-EJD, Judge Edward J. 

Damich.

______________________ 

Decided: November 7, 2014

______________________ 

JULIO VILLARS, of Chicago, Illinois, pro se. 

NATHANAEL B. YALE, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department 

of Justice, of Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. 

With him on the brief were JOYCE R. BRANDA, Acting 

Assistant Attorney General, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

Director, and STEVEN J. GILLINGHAM, Assistant Director. 

______________________ 
2 VILLARS v. US

Before TARANTO, BRYSON, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Julio Villars sued the United States in the Court of

Federal Claims, invoking the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1491, for jurisdiction. His complaint alleges that he 

entered into a contract with federal law-enforcement 

authorities to serve as an informant for the government, 

in exchange for which the government promised him 

monetary compensation and assistance in obtaining 

lawful permanent residency. Alleging that the government did not live up to its end of the bargain, the complaint states causes of action for breach of contract. It 

also alleges an unlawful taking.

The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the contract 

claims based on two distinct but related premises: it 

construed the alleged contract as limited to a government 

promise of immigration assistance, and it construed the 

complaint as requesting no relief other than an “order [to] 

the Attorney General of the United States to issue” Mr. 

Villars a particular visa. Villars v. United States, No. 13-

363 C, at 4–5 (June 4, 2014). On those bases, the court 

seemed to conclude that the contract did not carry the 

usual implied monetary remedy for breach and clearly 

concluded that the complaint in this case did not ask for 

monetary damages, but only for specific performance, as 

relief. Id. Accordingly, the court dismissed the contract 

claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the 

Tucker Act, which applies to a contract claim only if the 

contract carries monetary remedies for breach and if the 

claim seeks money damages. Id. The court also dismissed the takings claims for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted. Id. at 5–6. 

We reverse the jurisdictional dismissal of the contract 

claim, rejecting both premises of the dismissal. Mr. 

Villars has not appealed the dismissal of the takings 

claim, so that dismissal stands. 
VILLARS v. US 3

BACKGROUND

The Court of Federal Claims expressly stated that it 

was granting the government’s “motions to dismiss” under

Rule 12(b) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims

(RCFC). Accordingly, in reviewing the dismissal on 

appeal, we take the facts from the complaint. We read 

the complaint for what it fairly indicates and with the pro 

se status of Mr. Villars in mind. See Erickson v. Pardus, 

551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). At this stage, we must assume the 

truth of the alleged facts. 

Mr. Villars is a citizen of Honduras who has lived in 

Chicago, Illinois, since 1995. In early 2008, Mr. Villars 

was arrested by the Bureau of Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE)—part of the federal government’s 

Department of Homeland Security—and placed in detention to await removal to Honduras. He subsequently 

wrote two letters, one to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and one to the Drug Enforcement Agency

(DEA), offering to serve as an informant if the government would help him obtain an informant Green Card, or 

“S visa.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(S) (granting the 

Attorney General authority to issue nonimmigrant visas 

to foreign nationals who assist federal or state law enforcement authorities).

A special agent from the FBI and an unnamed federal 

prosecutor came to see Mr. Villars and sought his assistance as an informant in targeting drug-trafficking organizations. The government agents assured him that he 

would not be removed to Honduras and entered into a 

“contractual agreement,” under which they would (a) 

arrange for him to obtain lawful permanent residence, (b) 

reimburse him for expenses incurred during his work as 

an informant, (c) pay him for his work, at least $5,000 per 

case or a lump sum (perhaps a percentage) in case of a big 

seizure, and compensate him for any loss he incurred in 

his work, and (d) assist him to relocate and change his 
4 VILLARS v. US

identity in the event his safety was compromised. J.A. 5

(¶¶ 17, 19), 11–12 (¶ 56). Higher government officials 

provided authorization for or ratification of the agreement, and the government accepted Mr. Villars’s services 

for more than two years, paying him some compensation, 

and adjusting his immigration status on three occasions 

to ensure that he remained in the United States. Id. at 2 

(¶ 6), 6–7 (¶¶ 23-32). 

From 2008 to 2010, and under the direction of federal 

authorities, Mr. Villars “used his trucking company to 

transport drugs and money, record incriminating conversations, ma[ke] drug buys, [and create] wire and video 

recordings.” Id. at 3 (¶ 7). His work resulted in arrests of 

30 suspects and the seizure of $750,000 in cash and large 

quantities of illegal drugs.

U.S. immigration authorities eventually revoked Mr. 

Villars’s “deferred action” status, and apparently (the 

complaint suggests) he became at risk of deportation. The 

government detained him from mid-November 2010 to 

late-January 2011 as a material witness in a criminal 

prosecution of others. At some point, because of the 

status change, and perhaps because of his detention, Mr. 

Villars’s truck was repossessed and his family evicted 

from their home. 

In May 2013, Mr. Villars filed suit in the Court of 

Federal Claims, alleging an unlawful taking in one count 

and breach of contract in three counts.1 As to the contract 

claims, the complaint alleges that “the government has 

breached the agreement[] by failing to compensate Mr. 

Villars for [his] services[ and] by failing to provide[] Mr. 

Villars with legal permanent residence.” J.A. 13 (¶ 66). 

1 The Court of Federal Claims treated three counts 

of the complaint as contract claims, and the government 

has not disputed that treatment on this appeal.

 
VILLARS v. US 5

The complaint “seek[s] compensation/damages and relief 

for” breach of contract. J.A. 3 (¶ 8). Two of the three 

claims treated as contract claims ask for actual, incidental, and consequential damages (J.A. 14 (¶¶ 69, 73)) 

and the third asks for exemplary or punitive damages of 

$1,000,000 (J.A. 16 (¶ 80)). The general prayer for relief 

seeks “damages in an amount to be determine at trial for 

[the alleged] violations [in] an amount not less than 

$2,250,000. J.A. 16 (¶ 82). 

In September 2013, the government filed a motion 

seeking dismissal on the merits under RCFC 12(b)(6) or, 

in the alternative, summary judgment under RCFC 56. It 

did not question the court’s jurisdiction. Regarding the 

contract claims, it argued that there was no actual or 

implied authority for, or proper ratification of, the alleged 

contract.

In late April 2014, the Court of Federal Claims raised 

a jurisdictional issue on its own. It stated that the complaint “appears to request that this Court order the 

Attorney General to issue an S visa which would enable 

Plaintiff to later become a legal permanent resident.” J.A. 

35. Saying that it “doubts it has jurisdiction to order such 

relief,” the court ordered supplemental briefing on the 

issue. Id. Mr. Villars did not respond. See Villars, No. 

13-363 C, at 3. The government responded in early May 

2014 by filing, under RCFC 12(b)(1), a new motion to 

dismiss the contract claims for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction. J.A. 36–41.

The court dismissed the action on June 4, 2014. It 

held that it lacked jurisdiction over the contract claims, 

for the reasons advanced in the government’s new jurisdictional motion. Citing Mr. Villars’s statement in his 

complaint that his “only purpose” in entering the alleged 

contract was to secure lawful residency status, J.A. 11 (¶ 

55), the court concluded (seemingly) that monetary remedies were not contemplated for the alleged contract and 
6 VILLARS v. US

(definitely) that the complaint sought only specific performance—in either event taking the contract claims 

outside the Tucker Act. Villars, No. 13-363 C, at 4–5. 

The court also held that the takings claim (over which 

jurisdiction was unquestioned) failed to state a claim on 

which relief could be granted. Id. at 5–6.

Mr. Villars timely appealed. He has presented only 

the contract claims on appeal. We have jurisdiction over 

this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION 

We review de novo the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for 

failure to state a claim. Gallo v. United States, 529 F.3d 

1345, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

The Tucker Act authorizes the court to hear claims 

against the United States for money damages. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). The statute “does not create any 

substantive right enforceable against the United States 

for money damages,” a right that must be found outside 

the Tucker Act itself. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 

392, 398 (1976). “The other source of law need not explicitly provide that the right or duty it creates is enforceable 

through a suit for damages,” but only that it “can fairly be 

interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal 

Government.” United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 

287, 291 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see

United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216–17 (1983); 

Testan, 424 U.S. at 400; Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United 

States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1009 (Ct. Cl. 1967). And a contract 

claim presumptively meets that standard: “when a breach 

of contract claim is brought in the Court of Federal 

Claims under the Tucker Act, the plaintiff comes armed 

with the presumption that money damages are available, 

so that normally no further inquiry is required.” Holmes 

v. United States, 657 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 

The claim must, however, seek money damages to come 
VILLARS v. US 7

within the Tucker Act, though not necessarily only money 

damages. See Lee v. Thornton, 420 U.S. 139, 140 (1975);

Gonzales & Gonzales Bond and Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Dep’t

of Homeland Security, 490 F.3d 940, 943 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

Mr. Villars’s contract claims meet the Tucker Act’s 

standard. To begin with, the Court of Federal Claims 

incorrectly characterized the relief sought. The complaint 

expressly and repeatedly asks for monetary relief, as 

described supra. Even the part of the request that would 

cover compensation promised but not paid is a request for 

money damages. See Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. 

Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 211 (2002) (“ ‘suits seeking . . . to 

compel the defendant to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff are suits for “money damages,” as that phrase has 

traditionally been applied, since they seek no more than 

compensation for loss resulting from the defendant’s 

breach of legal duty.’ ”) (quoting Bowen v. Massachusetts,

487 U.S. 879, 918–19 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). And 

the damages requests plainly are not limited to those 

amounts, covering actual, incidental, consequential, and 

exemplary or punitive damages.

That is enough to satisfy the relief-request part of the 

jurisdictional standard. It is hardly clear that Mr. Villars’s complaint asks for an order directed to the Attorney 

General to issue him a visa, as the Court of Federal 

Claims concluded, or for any other non-monetary relief. 

But it does not matter if it does ask for such relief. The 

presence of such a nonmonetary-relief request would not 

alter the fact that the complaint expressly and repeatedly 

seeks money damages. The monetary-damages request 

suffices under the Tucker Act. See Voge v. United States, 

844 F.2d 776, 779 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (affirming the Claims 

Court’s jurisdiction over plaintiff’s request for money 

damages under the Tucker Act even where court lacked 

authority to grant nonmonetary relief arising out of the 

same controversy); Doe v. Civiletti, 635 F.2d 88, 95 (2d 

Cir. 1980) (affirming trial court’s jurisdiction over plain-
8 VILLARS v. US

tiff’s damages requests under Little Tucker Act even 

where court lacked jurisdiction to grant equitable relief

arising from same breach claim); Speed v. United States, 

97 Fed. Cl. 58, 68 (Fed. Cl. 2011) (denying government’s 

motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Tucker Act claims under 

RCFC 12(b)(1), but limiting her remedies to money damages, even though she requested both money damages and 

specific performance); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 

Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 559 (2005) (“The 

presence of other claims in the complaint, over which the 

district court may lack original jurisdiction, is of no moment. If the court has original jurisdiction over a single 

claim in the complaint, it has original jurisdiction over a 

‘civil action’ within the meaning of § 1367(a), even if the 

civil action over which it has jurisdiction comprises fewer 

claims than were included in the complaint.”). 

The Court of Federal Claims was also wrong to the extent that, beyond its reliance on what relief it saw requested in the complaint, it found no jurisdiction by 

deeming the underlying alleged contract not to be one 

that carried a monetary remedy for its breach. Mr. Villars is entitled to the presumption, as Holmes makes 

clear, that monetary relief is available for the alleged 

contract. And there is nothing in the contract as alleged 

that overcomes that presumption. Indeed, as recited 

supra, the alleged contract includes both monetary and 

non-monetary performance obligations by the government, including payment for services to be rendered and 

compensation for loss incurred in performing services. 

Neither the Court of Federal Claims nor the government 

has cited any authority for treating that kind of contract 

as an exception to the default rule that contracts carry 

monetary remedies for their breach.

In nevertheless concluding that the “contract never 

contemplated monetary damages,” Villars, at 5, the Court 

of Federal Claims said nothing about the terms of the 

contract alleged in the complaint. Instead, it relied solely 
VILLARS v. US 9

on the complaint’s statement that Mr. Villars’s “only 

purpose” in entering the contract was to “reap the 

[i]mmigration benefits” from getting an S visa and “becom[ing a] legal permanent resident. J.A. 11 (¶ 55). 

Villars, No. 13-363 C, at 5. But the statement of an 

essential, even sole, motivation for entering into a contract cannot fairly be taken to erase the express allegations of what terms were part of the deal that was 

actually reached. There is no necessary contradiction. 

Especially given that the claimant is pro se, the complaint’s express allegations of the terms of the contract 

must control the issue on a motion to dismiss. 

CONCLUSION 

The judgment of the Court of Federal Claims dismissing the contract claims for lack of jurisdiction is reversed. 

REVERSED