UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

before the

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

Release No. 99858 / March 27, 2024

Admin. Proc. File No. 3-21790

In the Matter of

ERIC CHRISTOPHER CANNON

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO AMEND ORDER INSTITUTING PROCEEDINGS AND 

DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY PROCEEDING

On October 31, 2023, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued an order 

instituting proceedings (“OIP”) against Eric Christopher Cannon pursuant to Section 15(b) of the 

Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

1

 On January 15, 2024, Cannon filed an answer in which he 

alleged that the OIP misstates or mischaracterizes the allegations of the complaint (the 

“Complaint”) in the underlying federal civil litigation on which this follow-on proceeding is 

based and does not acknowledge the operative judgment in that action. 

On January 19, 2024, Cannon filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, stay this 

proceeding until a federal court resolves his appeal of the underlying civil injunctive action. In 

that motion, Cannon also again alleged that the OIP misstates or mischaracterizes the allegations

in the Complaint. After the parties were ordered to address whether the OIP contained any 

errors,2the Division of Enforcement filed an unopposed motion to amend the OIP. We address 

each of these motions below.

I. We grant the Division’s unopposed motion to amend the OIP.

The Division moves to amend three aspects of the OIP that Cannon contends are errors. 

First, the Division seeks to amend the OIP to state that the Complaint alleges that Cannon used 

interstate commerce to “‘effect transactions in’ unregistered securities.” The current OIP states

that the Complaint alleges that Cannon “effected transactions in” those securities. Second, the 

1 Eric Christopher Cannon, Exchange Act Release No. 98827, 2023 WL 7180201 (Oct. 

31, 2023). 

2 Eric Christopher Cannon, Exchange Act Release No. 99434, 2024 WL 307046 (Jan. 26, 

2024).
2

Division seeks to amend the OIP to delete any reference to the specific amount of transactionbased compensation that Cannon received. The OIP currently states that the Complaint alleges 

that Cannon received $485,000 in commissions, but the Division acknowledges that amount is 

inconsistent with the Complaint, which alleges that Cannon received $658,000 in commissions.

Third, the Division seeks to amend the OIP to allege that an amended final judgment was entered 

against Cannon on December 12, 2023. That amended final judgment, the Division notes, was 

entered approximately six weeks after the OIP was issued to correct the amount of disgorgement 

that had initially been ordered against Cannon on August 10, 2023.

Rule of Practice 200(d)(1) provides that, “[u]pon motion by a party, the Commission 

may, at any time, amend an order instituting proceedings to include new matters of fact or law.”3

Such amendments to OIPs “should be freely granted, subject only to the consideration that other 

parties should not be surprised nor their rights prejudiced.”

4

 Amending the OIP in the manner 

sought by the Division does not prejudice or surprise Cannon since he is already aware of those

facts.5 Indeed, the Division represents that Cannon does not oppose the Division’s motion and

that he agrees that the amended language accurately summarizes the proceedings in the district 

court and the Complaint. 

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Division’s motion to amend the OIP is granted. 

The amended OIP is attached to this order. Service of this order and the amended OIP shall be 

made consistent with Rule of Practice 141(a).6 After the service of the amended OIP, the 

Division shall promptly file with the Office of the Secretary a record of service consistent with 

Rule of Practice 141(a)(3).7 Cannon shall file an answer to the allegations contained in the 

amended OIP within 20 days of service of the amended OIP.

II. We deny Cannon’s motion to dismiss or stay the proceeding.

We deny as moot Cannon’s request to dismiss or stay the proceeding to the extent his 

motion relates to the alleged errors in the OIP. As noted, the Division’s unopposed motion to 

amend the OIP appears to address the concerns identified in Cannon’s motion, and the Division 

represents that Cannon agrees that the amended language accurately summarizes the proceedings 

in the district court and the Complaint. 

3

17 C.F.R. § 201.200(d)(1). 

4 Ronald Shane Flynn, Exchange Act Release No. 99443, 2024 WL 360868, at *1 (Jan. 29, 

2024) (internal quotation marks omitted).

5

See Sergey Pustelnik, Exchange Act Release No. 91399, 2021 WL 1139270, at *2 (Mar. 

24, 2021) (finding no prejudice to respondent from amending an OIP to include reference to the 

entry of an amended judgment).

6

17 C.F.R. § 201.141(a).

7

17 C.F.R. § 201.141(a)(3).
3

We also deny Cannon’s request to dismiss or stay the proceeding to the extent it relates to 

Cannon’s pending appeal of the underlying civil injunction. In doing so, we construe Cannon’s 

request for a stay as one for postponement under Rule of Practice 161.

8

 That rule authorizes 

adjournments and postponements for “good cause shown.”9 But motions to postpone a 

proceeding are “strongly disfavor[ed]” unless the movant makes “a strong showing that the 

denial of the request or motion would substantially prejudice [his] case.”10 And Cannon has 

failed to make such a showing.

We have repeatedly held that the pending appeal of a civil or criminal proceeding does 

not justify a delay in a related follow-on administrative proceeding;

11 a fortiori, neither does the 

pendency of an appeal justify the outright dismissal of a such a proceeding. Although a 

respondent is entitled to appeal the underlying case against him, we have explained that such an 

appeal “does not alter the effect” of respondent’s having been found to have violated the 

securities laws or the court’s imposition of an injunction against him.12 Because the public 

interest is advanced by promptly enforcing the securities laws, even while other proceedings are 

under way, we have thus held that it is not appropriate to grant an indefinite stay so that 

respondent can pursue other relief.

13

8

17 C.F.R. § 201.161; see Francis V. Lorenzo, Exchange Act Release No. 82755, 2018 

WL 994316, at *1 (Feb. 21, 2018) (construing motion for stay as request for postponement under 

Rule of Practice 161). 

9

17 C.F.R. § 201.161(a). 

10 Id. § 201.161(b). Although we ordered that “all reasonable requests for extensions of 

time will not be disfavored” with respect to the filing and service of papers, Pending 

Administrative Proceedings, Securities Act Release No. 10767, 2020 WL 1322001 (Mar. 18, 

2020), that standard does not apply to requests such as this to adjourn or postpone the proceeding 

itself pending an appeal of the underlying suit. See, e.g., Donald J. Fowler, Exchange Act 

Release No. 89226, 2020 WL 3791560, at *1 n.10 (July 6, 2020) (denying motion to stay, 

postpone, or adjourn proceeding).

11 See, e.g., Shreyans Desai, Exchange Act Release No. 80129, 2017 WL 782152, at *6 

n.42 (Mar. 1, 2017) (denying request to stay or adjourn the proceeding until planned appeal was 

resolved); Paul Free, CPA, Exchange Act Release No. 66260, 2012 WL 266986, at *2 (Jan. 26, 

2012) (same). 

12 Ran H. Furman, Exchange Act Release No. 65680, 2011 WL 5231425, at *2 (Nov. 3, 

2011) (quoting Daniel S. Lezak, Exchange Act Release No. 50729, 2004 WL 2721400, at *2 & 

n.16 (Nov. 23, 2004)); cf. Seghers v. SEC, 548 F.3d 129, 136-37 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that 

the Commission’s refusal to stay follow-on administrative proceeding during pendency of appeal 

from the district court’s underlying judgment did not deprive the respondent of due process).

13 See, e.g., Anita Sgarro, Exchange Act Release No. 97040, 2023 WL 2351154, at *2

(Mar. 3, 2023); Daniel Joseph Touizer, Exchange Act Release No. 85321, 2019 WL 1225724, 

at *2 (Mar. 14, 2019).
4

Cannon claims that the Commission “routinely stays administrative proceedings pending 

the outcome of related court proceedings,” where, as here, the proceeding was instituted less than 

a year ago, fact discovery is not closed, and no evidentiary hearings have been held. But Cannon 

cites only a single case to support his position: Joshua Abrahams, CPA.

14 There, the 

Commission postponed the proceeding not because, as here, respondent was seeking a 

postponement pending his appeal of an underlying civil action, but because the parties had 

jointly requested a stay pending the Supreme Court’s consideration of SEC v. Jarkesy.

15

 And we 

have consistently denied motions where, like here, a respondent seeks to stay proceedings 

pending an appeal of underlying injunctions or convictions, even when the proceeding was at a 

comparably early stage of litigation.16 

Cannon also contends that the Commission’s interest in prompt enforcement of the 

securities laws is diminished here because “the conduct alleged in the underlying federal 

complaint dates back over 13 years, and the Commission elected not to initiate this proceeding at 

any time during those 13 years.” But the injunction that provides the statutory predicate for this 

proceeding was entered approximately seven months ago, and the Commission instituted this 

proceeding less than three months after the district court first entered final judgment.

17

 

Cannon further asserts that the Commission does not typically resolve follow-on 

administrative proceedings before the federal appellate process concludes, so a stay would not 

harm the public interest. But he again cites only one example of this—Donald J. Fowler—in 

which the Commission resolved the matter about two and half years after the Second Circuit 

affirmed the underlying civil judgment.18 But the Commission has also repeatedly resolved 

matters while an appeal of the underlying criminal or civil proceeding was still pending.19 And 

14 Exchange Act Release No. 98122, 2023 WL 5203091 (Aug. 14, 2023).

15 No. 22-859, 2023 WL 4278448 (June 30, 2023) (cert. granted).

16 See, e.g., Justin W. Keener, Exchange Act Release No. 97192, 2023 WL 2631010, at *1 

(Mar. 23, 2023) (denying motion to stay pending appeal where motion was filed 17 days after 

administrative proceeding was instituted); Carl E. Dilley, Exchange Act Release No. 96079, 

2022 WL 9194055, at *1 (Oct. 12, 2022) (denying motion to stay pending appeal where motion 

was filed 19 days after administrative proceeding was instituted); Micah J. Eldred, Exchange Act 

Release No. 96083, 2022 WL 9195015, at *1 (Oct. 14, 2022) (denying motion to stay pending 

appeal where motion was filed 21 days after administrative proceeding was instituted); cf. Free, 

2012 WL 266986, at *1-2 (denying motion to stay pending expiration of the time allowed for 

respondent to file the underlying appeal where motion was filed less than a month after 

administrative proceeding was instituted).

17 See Exchange Act Section 15(b)(4)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(C).

18 See Exchange Act Release No. 99084, 2023 WL 8469512, at *2 (Dec. 5, 2023). 

19 See, e.g., Conrad P. Seghers, Advisers Act Release No. 2656, 2007 WL 2790633, at *3-4

(Sept. 26, 2007) (noting pendency of Fifth Circuit appeal of underlying injunction), petition 

denied, 548 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 2008); James E. Franklin, Exchange Act Release No. 56649, 

2007 WL 2974200, at *3 & n.11 (Oct. 12, 2007) (noting pendency of Ninth Circuit appeal of 
5

Cannon himself acknowledges that if he were to prevail on appeal, he could seek vacatur of any 

sanction imposed in this proceeding that was based upon the overturned judgment.20 We thus 

find that Cannon has not made the necessary “strong showing that the denial of the request 

would substantially prejudice [his] case.”21

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Cannon’s motion to dismiss or stay the proceeding is 

denied.22

By the Commission.

Vanessa A. Countryman

Secretary

underlying injunction), petition denied, 285 F. App’x 761 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Charles Phillip 

Elliott, Exchange Act Release No. 31202, 50 S.E.C. 1273, 1992 WL 258850, at *1 (Sept. 17,

1992) (noting pendency of appeal of underlying criminal conviction), aff’d, 36 F.3d 86 (11th Cir. 

1994); cf. Eugenio Garcia Jimenez, Jr., Advisers Act Release No. 6482, 2023 WL 7731075, at 

*1 & n.2 (Nov. 14, 2023) (barring respondent only three months after the district court imposed a 

sentence for his underlying criminal conviction).

20 See, e.g., Seghers, 2007 WL 2790633, at *3.

21 Rule of Practice 161(b), 17 C.F.R. § 201.161(b); see also, e.g., FTC v. Standard Oil Co. 

of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 244 (1980) (holding that the “expense and disruption of defending 

[oneself] in protracted adjudicatory proceedings” does not constitute irreparable injury). 

22 Cannon also argues that the Commission’s Office of the General Counsel (“OGC”) may 

not decide his motion by delegated authority. But OGC does not have delegated authority to 

resolve motions to amend an OIP or dismiss a proceeding. See 17 C.F.R. § 200.30-14(j)(2). Our 

issuance of this order resolving all of the parties’ pending motions thus moots Cannon’s 

argument. 
1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Before the

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING File 

No. 3-21790 

AMENDED ORDER INSTITUTING 

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 

PURSUANT TO SECTION 15(b) OF THE 

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND 

NOTICE OF HEARING

I.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) deems it appropriate and in the 

public interest that public administrative proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted pursuant to 

Section 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) against Eric Christopher 

Cannon (“Respondent” or “Cannon”). 

II.

After an investigation, the Division of Enforcement alleges that:

A. RESPONDENT

1. From at least September 2010 through April 2015, Respondent was a sales 

agent with Pacific West Capital Group, Inc. (“Pacific West”), where he engaged in the sale of 

unregistered securities consisting of fractionalized interestsin universal life insurance policies 

offered by by Pacific West and the PWCG Trust. Respondent further acted as a broker for that 

securities offering without being registered as a broker or associated with a registered broker-dealer.

In the Matter of

ERIC CHRISTOPHER 

CANNON,

Respondent.
2

B. ENTRY OF THE INJUNCTION

2. On December 12, 2023, an amended final judgment was entered against 

Respondent, permanently enjoining him from future violations of Section 5 of the Securities Act of 

1933 (“Securities Act”) and Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act, in the civil action entitled 

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Pacific West Capital Group, Inc., et al., Civil Action 

Number 2:15-CV-02563-DDP-ASx, in the United States District Court for the Central District of 

California.

3. The Commission’s complaint alleged that from September 2010 to April 

2015, Respondent sold unregistered securities, in the form of fractionalized interests in universal 

life insurance policies, or “life settlements,” offered by Pacific West and issued by the PWCG 

Trust, in violation of Section 5(a) and (c) of the Securities Act. The complaint further alleged that 

Respondent acted as a broker, by effecting transactions in securities for the accounts of others by 

soliciting investors, providing investors with disclosure documents, participating in taking 

investors’ orders, and receiving transaction-based compensation from the sales of life settlement 

securities to investors in the form of an 8% commission, without registering independently as a 

broker or being affiliated with any registered broker, in violation of Section 15(a) of the Exchange 

Act.

III.

In view of the allegations made by the Division of Enforcement, the Commission deems it 

necessary and appropriate in the public interest that public administrative proceedings be instituted 

to determine:

A. Whether the allegationsset forth in Section II hereof are true and, in connection 

therewith, to afford Respondent an opportunity to establish any defensesto such allegations;

B. What, if any, remedial action is appropriate in the public interest against Respondent 

pursuant to Section 15(b) of the Exchange Act. 

IV.

IT IS ORDERED that a public hearing before the Commission for the purpose of taking 

evidence on the questions set forth in Section III hereof shall be convened at a time and place to be 

fixed by further order of the Commission, pursuant to Rule 110 of the Commission’s Rules of 

Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.110. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent shall file an Answer to the allegations 

contained in this Order within twenty (20) days afterservice of this Order, as provided by Rule 

220(b) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.220(b). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Division of Enforcement and Respondent shall 

conduct a prehearing conference pursuant to Rule 221 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 17 
3

C.F.R. § 201.221, within fourteen (14) days of service of the Answer. The parties may meet in 

person or participate by telephone or other remote means; following the conference, they shall file 

a statement with the Office of the Secretary advising the Commission of any agreementsreached at 

said conference. If a prehearing conference was not held, a statement shall be filed with the Office 

of the Secretary advising the Commission of that fact and of the efforts made to meet and confer.

If Respondent failsto file the directed Answer, or fails to appear at a hearing or conference 

after being duly notified, the Respondent may be deemed in default and the proceedings may be 

determined against him upon consideration of this Order, the allegations of which may be deemed 

to be true as provided by Rules 155(a), 220(f), 221(f) and 310 of the Commission’s Rules of 

Practice, 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.155(a), 201.220(f), 201.221(f), and 201.310. 

This Ordershall be served forthwith upon Respondent by any means permitted by the 

Commission’s Rules of Practice.

The Commission finds that it would serve the interests of justice and not result in prejudice 

to any party to provide, pursuant to Rule 100(c) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. 

§ 201.100(c), that notwithstanding any contrary reference in the Rules of Practice to service of 

paper copies, service to the Division of Enforcement of all opinions, orders, and decisions 

described in Rule 141, 17 C.F.R. § 201.141, and all papers described in Rule 150(a), 17 C.F.R. § 

201.150(a), in these proceedings shall be by email to the attorneys who enter an appearance on 

behalf of the Division, and not by paper service. 

Attention is called to Rule 151(a), (b) and (c) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 17

C.F.R. § 201.151(a), (b) and (c), providing that when, as here, a proceeding is set before the 

Commission, all papers (including those listed in the following paragraph) shall be filed 

electronically in administrative proceedings using the Commission’s Electronic Filings in 

Administrative Proceedings (eFAP) system access through the Commission’s website, 

www.sec.gov, at http://www.sec.gov/eFAP. Respondent also must serve and accept service of 

documents electronically. All motions, objections, or applications will be decided by the 

Commission.

The Commission finds that it would serve the interests of justice and not result in prejudice 

to any party to provide, pursuant to Rule 100(c) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. 

§ 201.100(c), that notwithstanding any contrary reference in the Rules of Practice to filing with or 

disposition by a hearing officer, all filings, including those under Rules 210, 221, 222, 230, 231, 

232, 233, and 250 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.210, 221, 222, 230, 

231, 232, 233, and 250, shall be directed to and, as appropriate, decided by the Commission. This 

proceeding shall be deemed to be one under the 75-day timeframe specified in Rule of Practice 

360(a)(2)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a)(2)(i), for the purposes of applying Rules of Practice 233 and 

250, 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.233 and 250. 

The Commission finds that it would serve the interests of justice and not result in prejudice 

to any party to provide, pursuant to Rule 100(c) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. 

§ 201.100(c), that the Commission shall issue a decision on the basis of the record in this
4

proceeding, which shall consist of the items listed at Rule 350(a) of the Commission’s Rules of 

Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.350(a), and any other document or item filed with the Office of the 

Secretary and accepted into the record by the Commission. The provisions of Rule 351 of the 

Commission’s Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.351, relating to preparation and certification of a 

record index by the Office of the Secretary or the hearing officer are not applicable to this 

proceeding.

The Commission will issue a final order resolving the proceeding after one of the 

following: (A) The completion of post-hearing briefing in a proceeding where the public hearing 

has been completed; (B) The completion of briefing on a motion for a ruling on the pleadings or a 

motion forsummary disposition pursuant to Rule 250 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 17

C.F.R. § 201.250, where the Commission has determined that no public hearing is necessary; or

(C) The determination that a party is deemed to be in default under Rule 155 of the Commission’s 

Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.155, and no public hearing is necessary.

In the absence of an appropriate waiver, no officer or employee of the Commission engaged 

in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions in this or any factually related 

proceeding will be permitted to participate or advise in the decision of this matter, except as witness 

or counsel in proceedings held pursuant to notice. Since this proceeding is not “rule making” within 

the meaning of Section 551 of the Administrative Procedure Act, it is not deemed subject to the 

provisions of Section 553 delaying the effective date of any final Commission action.