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i 

98–892 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–83] 

ACQUISITION REFORM: STARTING 

PROGRAMS WELL 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 3, 2016 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

THOMAS MACARTHUR, New Jersey 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

ROBERT DAIGLE, Professional Staff Member 

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

ABIGAIL GAGE, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Davis, Hon. Susan A., a Representative from California, Committee on Armed 

Services ................................................................................................................. 2 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac,’’ a Representative from Texas, Chairman, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Fox, Christine, Former Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation 

in the Office of the Secretary of Defense ............................................................ 2 

Hale, Robert, Former United States Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) ................................................................................................................... 4 

Winnefeld, ADM James A., Jr., USN (Ret.), Former Vice Chairman, Joint 

Chiefs of Staff ....................................................................................................... 7 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Fox, Christine ................................................................................................... 35 

Hale, Robert ...................................................................................................... 46 

Winnefeld, ADM James A., Jr. (biography and disclosure only) .................. 59 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Coffman ...................................................................................................... 66 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 65 

Mr. Thornberry ................................................................................................. 65 

(1) 

ACQUISITION REFORM: STARTING PROGRAMS WELL 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 3, 2016. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ 

Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. The committee 

meets today to continue to examine the defense acquisition system 

to improve its agility so that we can get needed capability into the 

hands of the warfighter faster. Critical to getting our troops what 

they need is starting programs well, which is the title of today’s 

hearing. Too often programs start the acquisition process in an unstable position, beginning with significant technical and programmatic risks. And, unfortunately, this leads to delays, cost overruns, 

performance shortfalls, and, as we have seen all too often, cancelation of programs. Many argue that the stovepipe requirements, 

budgeting, and acquisition processes contribute to this problem and 

that better aligning these three could shorten, simplify, and improve our acquisition system. 

Also it is important to make hard decisions early about achievable requirements that balance affordability, capability, and speed 

to force. Starting programs well was the focus of a lot of the reforms we made in last year’s NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]. But getting the early steps right is critical to further improvements. This morning, we are privileged to have three witnesses who have had considerable experience in the course of this 

process. And since all of them have been here to testify before, I 

appreciate their courage in coming back to testify now that they 

have moved on to other pursuits. Ms. Fox, Mr. Hale, and Admiral 

Winnefeld have been very involved in the cost estimation, budgeting, and requirements process. And so we look forward to their 

insights about further steps that we can work with the Department 

[of Defense] on to improve—further improve—this acquisition process. 

In the absence of the ranking member, I am pleased to yield to 

the gentlelady from California, Mrs. Davis, who is taking his place 

today. 
2 

STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN A. DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to all of you. As the chairman stated, I think our 

witnesses today are very well-suited to address us on those issues, 

having served in the Pentagon, having been through, I guess, the 

highs and lows on a number of acquisitions. And we certainly wish 

that you will share with us as forthright and honestly as you can 

what goes well and sometimes what doesn’t go so well. What are 

those lessons learned? It is important for us to really take a close 

look at that and be sure that we are doing everything that is the 

most efficient and the most agile in terms of acquisition but, at the 

same time, encouraging people to innovate and even to take risks 

where that is appropriate. Sometimes the whole concept of being 

free to fail is something that often is not discussed as well as I 

think it should. And we know that there are certain areas in which 

that is more possible and others in which it certainly is not. 

I think we also want to get your thoughts on the impact of Congress, where we are constantly changing the acquisition system. 

We know that each year a portion of the NDAA, known as title 

VIII, includes dozens and sometimes hundreds of pages of new law. 

In last year’s bill, for example, both this committee and our Senate 

counterparts added around 75 multifaceted and detailed new acquisition laws. So while this annual effort to fix the acquisition system 

is well intended, there is certainly a chance that these constant 

changes in the law could be making it more difficult for DOD [Department of Defense] to make good decisions on programs. 

We welcome your input today and look forward to what you have 

to say. Thank you very much for being here. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. The committee is pleased to welcome 

Ms. Christine Fox, who formerly was Director of Cost Assessment 

and Program Evaluation in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

is currently affiliated with Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory; Mr. Robert Hale, formerly the Comptroller at the Department 

of Defense, currently affiliated with Booz Allen; and Admiral Sandy 

Winnefeld, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who 

is currently teaching at the Sam Nunn School and also associated 

with the Kennedy School up at Harvard. 

Again, thank you all for being here. 

Without objection, your full written statement will be made part 

of the record. And now you will be recognized for any comments 

you would like to make. 

Ms. Fox. 

STATEMENT OF CHRISTINE FOX, FORMER DIRECTOR OF COST 

ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION IN THE OFFICE 

OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Ms. FOX. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry, Representative 

Davis, and distinguished members of this committee. 

First, I appreciate all of the work you have done and continue 

to do on acquisition reform. And I appreciate the opportunity to 

speak with you today on this important topic. During my tenure in 

the Department of Defense, my colleagues and I spent considerable 
3 

energy to improve the affordability and feasibility of the major defense acquisition programs. In my current position at the Johns 

Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab, I have the pleasure of 

working closely with scientists and engineers who are innovating 

with technologies that will enhance our Nation’s security. 

My full statement has been submitted for the record. I would like 

now to summarize briefly its major recommendations. 

First, I would emphasize the importance of continuing to require 

independent cost estimates for major programs. When I became 

CAPE [Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation] Director in November of 2009, many weapons programs were in the red for both 

cost and schedule, some of which eventually breached NunnMcCurdy thresholds. The reasons are varied and unique to each 

program. But a common factor was a strong want and need for the 

program, coupled with institutional incentive to be overly optimistic. In short, they thought: This time will be different. But these 

optimistic assumptions rarely became reality. 

The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 changed all 

that by forcing the Department to have an independent cost estimate developed by CAPE for all major program milestones and its 

certifications for programs experiencing cost overruns. No longer 

could the Department base program decisions just on the projections of a program’s most ardent advocates. Sustaining the progress of recent years will be all the more important as the Department implements the acquisition reform provisions of the fiscal 

year 2016 NDAA, which moves milestone decision authority to the 

military departments. 

One recommendation I can offer this committee is to amend the 

law to ensure that CAPE continues to provide independent cost estimates for all programs for which they currently have responsibility, regardless of where the milestone decision authority resides. 

Another key factor in starting programs well is getting the requirements right. My colleague, Admiral Sandy Winnefeld, when he was 

the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, took significant 

steps to ensure that CAPE and AT&L [Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics] had a voice as requirements were debated at the 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council. For example, technology 

maturity is now as much a part of the requirements discussion 

early in a program’s life cycle as is cost and schedule realism. This 

important collaboration really should continue. 

With respect to the acquisition workforce, while much progress 

has been made, I am still concerned that too often program managers are incentivized to get their program to the next milestone, 

regardless of whether it should go forward. No one wants to throw 

up bureaucratic roadblocks and unnecessary delays, but program 

managers must have the experience and confidence and encouragement to stand up and tell hard truths when needed, that it is not 

ready to go to the next milestone, or maybe it is never going to be 

ready or even we don’t need it anymore. 

In all, process improvements led by AT&L and the Joint Staff 

are allowing us to design and field programs more efficiently and 

effectively. But it still takes time. In the fiscal year 2016 NDAA, 

the Congress has made important changes to facilitate rapid prototyping and fielding of new capabilities. We must also consider ways 
4 

to develop DOD unique technologies and keep them at the ready, 

on the shelf for the day when the Nation has an immediate need 

and/or when the budget environment changes, as it certainly will— 

I hope. 

In addition to working with industry to prepare for these transitions, the promise of advances in manufacturing would give us the 

ability in the future to take a technology from design to production 

on demand in the future. We must continue to pursue these types 

of initiatives. 

Now, to be sure, we wouldn’t accept a rapid prototyping tech onthe-shelf approach to build, for example, the strategic nuclear submarine force. For those large programs, we are pushing out risk 

and are increasingly following a realistic and achievable path to 

procurement. 

But what if we are not taking enough risk in our technology development? In today’s world, our potential adversaries are rapidly 

fielding new technologies that might require us to push ourselves 

in certain select areas. Perhaps we need to knowingly take risk. 

This should be a new category of acquisition programs in which we 

push the boundaries of our technologies with full awareness and 

acceptance of the inherent cost and scheduled risk. 

In my view, this is an acceptable approach only if there is an 

agreed upon need, and we are candid in our assessments of the 

risk. In closing, the worst outcome in all of these areas would be 

for the Department to be allowed to go back to the days of believing 

in magic with regard to cost and schedule. With prudent risks and 

proper controls on cost estimates and requirements, the Department’s acquisition system will provide better outcomes for both the 

warfighter and the taxpayer. Thank you again for the opportunity 

to appear before you today. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Fox can be found in the Appendix on page 35.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Hale. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT HALE, FORMER UNITED STATES 

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER) 

Mr. HALE. Chairman Thornberry, Mrs. Davis, and all the members of the committee, I appreciate the chance to be here. 

I will talk today about the budgetary aspects of acquisitions, 

starting with discussing acquisition unit costs. But I will focus particularly on the need to control operating and support costs. It is 

so important that I believe it should be the next frontier for acquisition reform. 

Before I turn to those topics, I would like briefly to comment on 

the effects of budgetary turmoil in the Department of Defense. 

Since 2010, DOD and many other agencies have seen near constant 

budgetary turmoil: sequester, shutdown, furloughs, continuing resolutions. We all know the list. And it is frustrating. It has bad effects on program management in the Department, takes away time 

that senior leaders could better spend on things like acquisition reform. It wastes money. It damages the morale of DOD employees, 

especially civilian employees, who make up a lot of the acquisition 

workforce. I would ask everyone on this committee, I would plead 
5 

with you to do all you can to get back to a more normal budget 

process. 

Let me turn now to holding down—I will start with—unit acquisition costs by starting programs well. For many years, DOD has 

seen relentless growth in the unit cost of its programs. It is typical 

for, as we go from one generation to the next generation of a weapon, to see growth of a factor of two or more, even after adjustment 

for inflation. Some of these higher acquisition costs led to improvements in capability that were needed to keep up with potential adversaries. However, the higher acquisition costs, especially when 

you combine them with the operating and support costs I am going 

to discuss in a moment, forced the Department to reduce the overall size of its forces. If we want to avoid further force cuts, then 

we need program managers to make hard tradeoffs early in the life 

of a weapon, first, to set baseline costs that are consistent with 

likely future budgets and then to try to ensure that there isn’t unanticipated growth in costs above those baselines. Both of those efforts are needed. 

In recent years, the Department has made significant and I 

think commendable progress in holding down unanticipated cost 

growth. That cost growth has slowed. We have seen fewer violations of the Nunn-McCurdy thresholds. But the Department also 

needs to make those hard tradeoffs to get reasonable baseline costs 

to start with. That is why I am glad to see that DOD is establishing what it is terming affordability caps. It described them in 

the September 2015 report on the performance of the acquisition 

system. These affordability caps cover both acquisition costs but 

also sustainment or operating and support costs. They cover the 

full life-cycle costs of a weapon system. According to that September 2015 report, we have seen 29 caps established for major defense programs, organizations set up in the services, as well I believe as in CAPE to monitor efforts to do this. I am hopeful that 

DOD will use these affordability caps as a vehicle for continuing 

to monitor and try to hold down acquisition cost, so long as we are 

consistent with assumptions of what we need to meet the threats. 

I have focused so far on DOD’s efforts. I would like to note Congress is also playing a role here, especially in last year’s authorization bill. You made a number of changes, some of which may help 

hold down acquisition costs. I note, for example, involving the service chiefs more in the requirements process, they at least will have 

a sense of budget problems. 

Let me turn now to operating and support costs, which are very 

important to the Department from a budgetary standpoint. Operating and support costs make up more than half of the total cost 

to buy and operate a weapon over its life cycle. They also make up 

today almost two-thirds of the total defense budget. They are so 

important or controlling them is so important, as I said, I believe 

they should be the next frontier for acquisition reform. In recent 

years, these operating and support costs have grown sharply, even 

as force size has declined. If you take operating and support costs— 

and by that, I mean the dollars in the operation and maintenance 

appropriation, military personnel—the adjustment for inflation, 

take out wartime or OCO [overseas contingency operations] costs, 

they have grown by 20 percent since the year 2000. At the same 
6 

time, the size of the military force, as measured by the number of 

Active Duty personnel, has declined by 4 percent. So what is causing—and I should say this is a trend that occurs in all the military 

departments. And it didn’t just start in 2000, it has been going on 

for decades. 

So what is causing operating and support costs to grow and what 

can DOD do about it? Some of the growth in these costs is not directly related to weapons. It is related to programs or issues like 

military compensation and health care. Working with the Congress, 

the Department of Defense has had significant success in slowing 

the growth in healthcare costs and compensation costs. More effort 

is needed. I am pleased to see that Congress and key Members 

have indicated they will tackle military healthcare reform in this 

session or an upcoming one. They also need to look at hard issues, 

like closing unneeded facilities and continued efficiencies. 

A substantial part of that operating and support growth can be 

tied directly to weapons. So while DOD has devoted much attention 

to controlling and holding down acquisition costs, it has not yet 

paid as much attention to holding down operating and support 

costs. The new affordability caps, which I mentioned earlier, include, they call them sustainment costs, but it is essentially operating and support costs. I very much hope they provide the Department with a vehicle for working to control these costs because of 

their budgetary importance. 

Congress can also play an important role in slowing the growth 

of operating costs. For example, Congress convenes hearings. I am 

amazed I would come here and ask for a hearing, but I am not in 

the House, so I wouldn’t get away with that. I think it would be 

especially important for this committee and other defense committees to hold hearings on the implementation and enforcement of 

these affordability caps with a focus on the operating and support 

portions. Congress can also use reporting requirements to shine a 

spotlight on operating and support costs. The Nunn-McCurdy legislation requires reporting on weapons programs that breach thresholds for unit acquisition costs. And I know from personal experience, sitting in staff meetings, these focus the attention of senior 

leaders. It is time to consider similar reporting requirements for 

operating and support costs. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, in sum, program managers supervising DOD weapons have a lot on their management 

plate, especially early in the life cycle of a weapon. But during that 

period, they do need to consider tradeoffs between requirements 

and costs and pay attention to these affordability caps if we are to 

sustain reasonable levels of forces. And they particularly need to 

focus, in my view, on operating and support costs. It should be the 

next frontier for acquisition reform. And given its budgetary importance, it is critical that we conquer this frontier. 

Mr. Chairman, that completes my remarks. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hale can be found in the Appendix on page 46.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. 

Admiral. 
7 

STATEMENT OF ADM JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN (RET.), 

FORMER VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Good morning, Chairman Thornberry and 

Mrs. Davis and members of the committee. 

Believe it or not, it is good to see you again. And I thank you 

for the opportunity for me to be able to contribute my thoughts on 

the important topic of acquisition reform. It is also a pleasure to 

appear alongside two of my longstanding former colleagues of 

whom I think so highly. As we approach this very important topic, 

I think we should be mindful of the fact that acquiring the tools 

that DOD needs to protect the American people is not an easy task. 

We are talking about conceiving, designing, budgeting, prototyping, 

building, testing, adjusting, and evolving the most advanced technology around and not doing it on the scale of the iPhone. 

It isn’t easy. And it isn’t cheap. And it isn’t always fast. Though 

some nations do it faster than we do and some do it for less money, 

nobody produces a better final product than the United States. And 

when some pretty capable people from both government and industry are trying to do this immensely complex task in a cost-competitive environment within a chaotic budget environment with a rapidly evolving threat and quickly evolving technical landscape, it 

should come as no surprise that we sometimes have cost, schedule, 

and performance challenges. 

That said, there is no question that we can do better. And we are 

doing better. But I also applaud the committee for the attention 

that you are giving in the interest of good stewardship of our taxpayer dollars and our readiness to fight. My participation today 

really regards the front end, the requirements process, and, most 

specifically, the joint requirements process, where I believe we have 

made some pretty solid progress. Specifically, during the 4 years 

that I was privileged to serve as vice chairman and oversaw this 

process, we did the following: We sped up the joint document process by dramatically shrinking the size of our documents and by 

compressing the time allowed for our stakeholders to review them. 

For example, initial capability documents that were once 2- to 300 

pages are now limited to 10 pages. What once took 6 months or 

more to approve in an initial capability document is now limited to 

97 days, which sounds like a lot, but there are a lot of wickets they 

have to jump through. We also worked hard to inculcate the provisions of the 2009 Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act 

[WSARA], which was a good piece of legislation, into the requirements process, including bringing cost, schedule, and technical maturity considerations into joint requirements deliberations. We actually considered those as factors. We shrank the Joint Requirements Oversight Council meetings from an auditorium full of people to a much smaller group in a much smaller room. And we really leveraged what the WSARA asked us to do, and that is our outside experts, our AT&L experts, our comptroller expert, our USD 

[Under Secretary of Defense] policy experts, and CAPE and 

DOT&E [Director, Operational Test and Evaluation] experts, specifically asking for their advice in every single meeting. 

And I think they would tell you, as Ms. Fox said, that they felt 

like they were included in that process. We formalized the joint 

emergent operational needs and the joint urgent operational needs 
8 

requirements processes and executed them both with discipline and 

dispatch, taking only 15 to 31 days for the whole requirements 

process to run its course. We worked with our CAPE partners to 

speed up the analysis of alternatives processing, including experimenting with doing the work ourselves rather than putting it out 

for contractors to do it. Whenever it was appropriate, we took a 

portfolio view rather than looking at capabilities in stovepipes. And 

we started including special access program capabilities into that 

process, which was very important. And while ensuring the 

COCOMs [combatant commands] knew that they were welcome as 

members of the JROC [Joint Requirements Oversight Council], we 

also imposed discipline on their integrative priority lists to ensure 

they reflected capability requirements, not just requests for more 

capacity. During my tenure, not a single joint requirement group, 

in fact, working with program offices, we actually trimmed a few 

that made sense for the warfighter and saved money and heartburn in the process. We even instituted quarterly meetings among 

the requirements, acquisition, and budgeting leadership. But because there were so few issues because we think we were getting 

that process under control, we really never had a contentious discussion. And we were transparent. To my knowledge, we never 

once have turned down a request from Congress for a copy of a 

JROC document, which I think is important. 

I don’t want to monopolize the time by talking too much in detail 

about the provisions of the 2016 NDAA. There are some good ideas 

in there. You have done some good work. There may be a few that 

are legislating what is already working, but that is okay. I would 

say that we were asked to have the JROC strongly consider the 

service chiefs’ views on the requirements process. And I am not 

sure where that came from, because it is kind of like the GEICO 

commercial: If you are at JROC, it is what you do, is consider the 

chiefs’ views. That is why it exists. 

I also support the strong service chief role in the milestone decision process. But I would flip it on its ear and say this is less about 

giving them something they never had, and I think this is what 

you intended, by the way, less about giving them something they 

never had than it is holding them accountable for something that 

they already have and could do any time they wanted. And some 

of them were actually good at that. I couldn’t agree more with the 

initiatives you have to enhance rapid prototyping. It is the only 

way we are going to keep our competitive edge in a dynamic world. 

And without causing more confusion in the process, I think we 

need to look deeper into how we can institutionalize rapid prototyping so we don’t end up with a thousand different flowers blooming, and we have a little bit of control over the process, which I 

think we have, but we might be able to do better. I would like to 

see some funds specifically set aside for and that perhaps even for 

the deputy secretary and the vice chairman to control those funds, 

because there are sometimes things that the joint world needs that 

the services just don’t love enough to make it into their budget 

process. But I also would tell you that I think it would be a mistake to fund something like this with a penalty for cost overruns. 

For one thing, we would like to get rid of cost overruns, which 

would mean there would be no money for such a program. And for 
9 

the other thing, I do believe it could cause some unintentional bad 

behaviors if you start penalizing programs for cost overruns. We 

want to limit those as much as we can. But you could have some 

odious behavior in the process of trying to do that. Absolutely agree 

with the legislation’s emphasis on better development of acquisition 

professionals. I would ask that we all be cautious about adding 

more reporting requirements. We have enough paperwork. And I 

also think we need to keep a sharp eye on the testing process. I 

would like to make just a couple of final points. 

First, I think we could grant more flexibility to the Department 

with full visibility to the Congress. That would help. We need a little more authority I believe for reprogramming. But, more importantly, I think we could give DOD some upfront discretionary 

money for starting programs, obviously, again, with strict accountability to Congress, that would dramatically speed time for the initial development of a system before an appropriation cycle catches 

up with it. We are going to have to have that kind of flexibility if 

we are going to keep up with countries that don’t operate under the 

same model we do. 

And, finally, back to who I started with, I think we should be 

mindful of the fact that it takes a while to see the effects of change 

in this business. I think Congress has made some very good improvements with the WSARA and the NDAA most recently. We 

have also made some very good improvements inside DOD with 

Better Buying Power and the like. We should take a deep, though 

very watchful, breath and let the good work of the past few years 

in reforming acquisition take effect. We have made a lot of 

progress. Just look at the Virginia-class submarine as an exemplar. 

Let’s see how the new system works for us. 

Once again, I want to thank you for the opportunity to be here 

this morning. And I do look forward to your questions. Thank you, 

sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Admiral, there is a book that suggests that if you are tackling 

complex problems, you ought to start with why: Why are you doing 

this. What is this about? And both you and Ms. Fox kind of touched 

on this. The testimony we have had before this committee over the 

last year is that probably never before in the country’s history have 

we faced so many complex national security challenges all at the 

same time. While technology evolves at an increasingly rapid rate, 

while key competitors are making investments to deny us advantages, leading to the Third Offset and other initiatives at the Department, and, essentially, that the way the world is and the 

threats are moving is faster than our processes internally. So do 

you share that concern? Because to me, that is the why—we want 

to save money. You know, we also need to get enough stuff to matter, not just have a handful of items because of cost overruns, but 

having the agility to keep up with technological changes and adversaries that are moving much more rapidly in some cases than we 

can is the bottom line of the why, to me, on this acquisition. I 

would like, because of the position you have held, I would like to 

hear your views. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Chairman, I am in violent agreement. I 

think you are absolutely spot on in that regard. We are going to 
10 

have to be agile and quick without, you know, a haste-makes-waste 

phenomenon injecting itself. But we are going to have to be very 

agile here. And I think there are two—even though we are doing 

better by the way—I think there are two contributors to why we 

might not be as agile as we would like to be. One of them, candidly, 

is recognizing that change needs to occur in the way we approach 

warfighting. If somebody is going to try to deny us access to their 

space, we may have to try a new idea in there. And I think that 

is very hard for the services to do. Richard Pascale, who wrote 

‘‘Surfing on the Edge of Chaos,’’ said equilibrium is the precursor 

to death. And, in fact, if we find ourselves in stasis in our operational concepts and we don’t sort of wake up and say, ‘‘You know, 

we need to change a few things,’’ then it is our own fault for doing 

that. 

And then the second piece is having the mechanisms in place so 

that when you do recognize change is needed, that you can make 

it happen quickly. And I think the Department is pushing hard for 

that. And Congress is pushing us to push hard for that. And that 

is the right thing. I just want to make sure we get a good, stable 

mechanism in place where we can actually make that happen in 

the right way. And there are a lot of—the Air Force has a terrific 

Rapid Capabilities Office. There is a tremendous effort going on up 

in the Office of the Secretary of Defense with a little group that 

works up there. The vice chairman has a small group who works 

for him in trying to rapidly generate SAP [special access program] 

programs. We ought to just make sure that we empower those and 

that we keep an eye on them and do the best we can to make sure 

they are doing the right things. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hale, Ms. Fox suggested that maybe we need 

a new category of acquisition because maybe we are not taking 

enough risks, thinking about experimentation and prototyping. I 

think the admiral talked about prototyping too. 

Okay. You had to deal with the budget aspects of this. So what 

sort of challenges would we face if we thought that that was a good 

idea, that we needed to take some more risk in experimenting with 

technological—not just new technologies but their use? 

Mr. HALE. Well, I don’t think the mechanical problems would be 

an issue, Mr. Chairman. I mean, you can authorize and appropriate funds in the category as you wish. And I don’t assume you 

have to make major changes in the budget. Moreover, I suspect 

that usually programs are pretty inexpensive when they are starting, that this would not be a large budget issue. The problem 

comes when you get to the full development and especially the procurement, the budget problems. So it seems like a reasonable thing 

to me, and I don’t see—if there is agreement in Congress and hopefully also in the Department, I don’t see why there would be budgetary obstacles that couldn’t be surmounted. 

The CHAIRMAN. I guess my thought was some of the pressures 

you have been under were, okay, everybody is under budget pressure; you see a pot of money, and everybody starts grabbing for it. 

So it is not a technical or a mechanical issue. It is more of a cultural question. 

Mr. HALE. And a senior leadership issue. I mean, if a secretary 

or a vice chairman and a chairman want these programs, and they 
11 

have a rationale for them, they will survive the budget process. I 

think innovation is probably doing pretty well right now under Secretary Carter. I listened to his speech yesterday. He obviously feels 

pretty strongly on this issue. So if the senior leaders want this, I 

don’t see budgetary obstacles now. Now, the problem is going to 

come when you get things out of that you want to buy. And if that 

increases the number of those without offsets or if we don’t succeed 

in things like controlling operating and support costs, then we are 

going to have a problem but not just the starting. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. If I could add very, very briefly. One of the 

things that kept me awake at night in that regard was: Where is 

the idea out there that I am not hearing about that I can empower? 

Because Bob is right, the vice chairman and the deputy, we can 

make things happen. It is just: Where is that thing being suppressed where it isn’t getting the voice that it should have? 

The CHAIRMAN. Good point. 

Ms. Fox, do you see other challenges with a new category of acquisition to encourage experimentation and prototyping like you 

suggested? 

Ms. FOX. I do. I think the biggest challenge, honestly, is this 

human nature self-incentive to be overly optimistic. And so I really 

do believe that if we were to follow my recommendation, it would 

be vitally important that the Congress continue to demand, in this 

case in particular, those independent cost estimates. And a good 

independent cost estimate, and I think the team at CAPE is excellent, needs to say: Hey, you know, there is a lot of risk here. But 

if you think back to some of our greatest programs, I will just take 

quickly GPS [Global Positioning System] as an example. We started with a program called Transit, but we quickly saw that we needed to move to something that gave us three-dimensional position 

information. Went to GPS, it was actually a high-risk program. 

And that program was almost canceled multiple times because of 

the risk. I don’t think we were straight up at the beginning about 

the risk. If we all agreed it was worth it—and I think it is pretty 

clear that it was—then perhaps we would have been able to go forward without the constant risk of cancelation. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to go back just a second to the changes in the law and 

the independent estimates and just to drill down a little bit further 

because I think, Admiral Winnefeld, you spoke, maybe it was Mr. 

Hale, that talked more about the operation and support costs, the 

difficulty in getting those right. What is missing as we look at 

those that we need to change or build on? 

Ms. FOX. Let me, if I could just, the Weapon Systems Acquisition 

Reform Act did require CAPE to stand up an operating and support 

cost cost-estimating capability. And that is in progress. And from 

the enactment of WSARA, the ultimate operating and support costs 

of a program has become a part of the defense acquisition boards, 

an explicit part. So the Congress legislated that we start doing this 

a while ago. The Department is responding. But to echo something 

Admiral Winnefeld said: Sometimes these things take time. And 

developing a good historical basis for how technology equates to op-
12 

erating and support costs in the fielding, it is going to take time 

to build up that technology, I am sorry, that database so that we 

understand the implications of technology. 

So I think work is in progress, not at all to be confused with we 

have solved it. But the mechanisms are in place. The focus is there, 

more than it was. Mr. Hale talked about the affordability costs, 

caps. I think that is a piece of it. And I agree that it needs to be 

a part of how Congress looks at programs, such that we are looking 

for that long-term implication. 

Mrs. DAVIS. When we think of innovation and we are often thinking about technology, per se. And having fresh eyes on that is always helpful. I am wondering in this area as well as perhaps in 

others, are we really going outside the Pentagon community, if you 

will, to bring that in? Even in this area, where private industry is 

looking out at it a whole different way, have we done as much as 

we can in that area? 

Ms. FOX. No, absolutely not. And I think a key to bringing in 

those ideas as innovative ideas on how to get O&S [operating and 

support] costs down is it is tied back again to requirements. For 

a long time, it was performance that drove requirements. And you 

end up with a very high-performing jet engine, for example, but it 

uses a lot of fuel. So if you now crank into requirements, as Admiral Winnefeld clearly just testified he started to do, an eye towards 

that, then you start to mobilize industry and commercial ideas for 

how to innovatively get high-performance engines with lower fuel 

consumption. That has to be a part of our innovation process. 

Again, I think it is starting. But, again, much more does need to 

be done. 

Mr. HALE. May I add just one point? I agree that it is starting. 

I also think there is a human nature problem here. If you are a 

program manager early in the life cycle of a weapon, you want to 

get this system going. The key to that is to keep the acquisition 

costs reasonable so that it gets through the early stages. The operating and support costs are 5 to 10 years out. They are somebody 

else’s problem. And I don’t want to be meanspirited and suggest 

they are not thinking long range. But I do think they tend to focus 

more on the acquisition. I think we need pressure from within the 

Department to pay more attention. I certainly didn’t see the same 

interest in operating and support costs as I did, the same concerns 

about them as I did in acquisition and maybe something like exception reporting a la the Nunn-McCurdy requirements. That said, I 

would first be quick to acknowledge—and conversations I have had 

with Frank Kendall I think bear this out—it is hard to estimate 

operating and supports costs early on. You are 10 years out. You 

have only a general idea of the design of the weapon. This isn’t 

easy. But I think it is not impossible. And I think we need to continue to pay attention to it and probably pay more attention. 

Mrs. DAVIS. All right. Thank you. 

And perhaps, again, getting those additional eyes on it, if that 

can be built in, to some extent. Sounds like that would certainly 

be helpful. Just very quickly, one of the differences, perhaps, we 

have had in moving forward is the difference in classified versus 

nonclassified acquisition systems, et cetera. Do we handle them differently? Is that rapid innovation more cultural with classified sys-
13 

tems and less so? And what could we learn from that? How do we 

fuse those in a way that is responsible? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. I think colloquially the way I would describe it is that the classified programs have a lot less hair on them 

that has to be accounted for, fewer critics that have visibility into 

it that can slow a program down. Yet, they seem to be fairly successful programs most of the time, not always. 

Mrs. DAVIS. What would do you do? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Without getting into specifics, I think you 

could, it might make sense maybe to demand or encourage a study 

that does compare what are the characteristics of a classified program acquisition compared to an unclassified? And what can you 

bring out that is legal, doable, makes sense in the unclassified 

world, and what can’t you bring out? Some of those things you 

probably couldn’t do. But I think it is a worthwhile effort to examine that. Because we all have this instinct that the classified programs just work much more smoothly. 

There are fewer people involved, fewer inboxes, you know, that 

sort of thing. 

Ms. FOX. May I add to that? While I agree that they tend to be 

more rapid, right, because there are fewer people involved, I think 

the CAPE perspective is that there have been some fairly impressive failures in that category of development as well. So it isn’t a 

total panacea. And I just would add that in the comparison. I think 

that the CAPE roles of looking at these systems is still important. 

And in most cases, but not all, CAPE did have the opportunity to 

look at the highly classified programs in much the same way as it 

looked at the other programs. But Admiral Winnefeld is correct in 

that we don’t have these large meetings where everybody is free to 

opine on the value and virtues of the program, which does make 

it more rapid. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. And to Ms. Fox’s point on failures, I mean, 

one of the reasons sometimes those programs are classified—it is 

not the only reason—is because they are so advanced. And anything that is really advanced is going to be a big challenge. So 

there have been challenges in those things. But there is just less 

bureaucracy associated with those programs. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Hale, while not directly related to acquisitions per se, all of 

that evaluation data comes from the books and records of the Department of Defense. And I would be remiss if I didn’t ask you your 

thoughts on auditing the Department of Defense, in particular the 

work that would have to get done to audit the rollup of DOD writ 

large, as opposed to the individual pieces that are going on, and 

then visit with us a little bit about your perspective on transitioning to new leadership next year and the risks to maintaining the 

pace and the momentum that is currently I perceive to be going on 

with respect to the audit role. 

Mr. HALE. So I never escape audit, is that the—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. That is exactly right. No good deed goes 

unpunished. 
14 

Mr. HALE. So I remain fully convinced that largely for public confidence reasons, it is very important for the Department of Defense 

to achieve auditable financial statements. I am not involved in it 

day to day, but I believe they are making progress. I am particularly pleased that they have auditors now involved in three of the 

services, and I think are close on the Marines for at least portions 

of their budget statement. And I think it is very important that we 

get outside auditors involved. The Department will make progress 

and learn more. You asked about the rollup. I don’t think—I long 

ago learned that this is an esoteric area where I always need help. 

And I don’t have it anymore. But I don’t think the rollup problem 

would be as much of a problem with the Department of Defense because they are carving up the pieces in a way that doesn’t overlap. 

It will be a major problem for the government as a whole if DOD 

does get close to an audit, and you want to turn to a full audit of 

the government. Because there are a lot of exchanges of money 

that will have to be sorted out. 

Let me come to your last question, which I think is critical. 

There are several things Congress can do to help in the audit area. 

One is to continue constructive hearings. And I give this committee 

and particularly you, Mr. Conaway, a special credit for the hearings and attention to the issue. Also be patient. I wish DOD had 

started 15 years ago at this, but they didn’t, at least not in the 

same way they have done in the last few. It is going to take a number of years to actually get there. There are significant problems. 

The biggest thing that worries me, though, and where you can help 

is the transition, as you mentioned, to the new group of senior 

leaders. We need to have a situation that prevailed during my tenure there when the Secretary of Defense and the deputy cared 

about this, when it was important, obviously, to the comptroller, to 

the new Under Secretary of Management, and to the service leaderships because they have a lot of the action now. We definitely 

need the new crop of political appointees to understand this is important. It would be easier for your Senate colleagues to do this because they will need to confirm them. But you can definitely, in my 

view, play a role by expressing your interest in letters and meetings and perhaps asking questions at hearings once these people 

get confirmed. So we need at least one more administration and 

probably a couple to actually get through all of this. And we need 

to make sure that it remains a high priority. And you can play a 

role there. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you. 

Admiral, could you talk to us how, at your level, the Joint Chiefs, 

how that, coming from the top with respect to getting the audit 

done is communicated to lower levels of the organization? How did 

that work while you were there? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. I think the chiefs are supportive, very 

much so, of the audit requirement, the need to be able to audit. 

Most of that is done by, candidly, the civilian comptroller side of 

the service secretariats and that sort of thing. So I don’t know that 

the chiefs have their hands on that machinery. But my sense is 

that they support the need to do that. And not only because of a 

public accountability issue where we have to really be able to show 

the books, but it helped them manage their own world. I would 
15 

point to the Navy, not because I am a former Navy guy, but their 

former vice chief, Admiral Ferguson, he would hold contractor court 

where he would bring in folks and really rake them over the coals 

to make sure that we were getting the right bang for the buck out 

of those contracts. And that is the sort of thing that will benefit 

from having much cleaner visibility into how the money is being 

spent. They are supportive of it, but they don’t really have their 

hands in it. 

Mr. CONAWAY. But without that support, though, those civilian 

folks won’t react the way that they ought to. Well, thank you all 

for your longstanding service to our country. 

And I yield back. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am going to start with a rhetorical question—it is one of those 

to make a point. And this is not a criticism of the contractors or 

of the Navy or of DOD generally. But Next-Gen Jammer is finally—we are moving forward on that. But that thing has been 

Next-Gen so long, I am wondering if it should be called Now-Gen 

or Previous-Gen Jammer. And the point is this isn’t even a large 

submarine or aircraft carrier. This is a smaller pod to put on a 

platform. And it still took and is still taking a long time to get to 

the point where we can deploy it. But we are getting there. And 

it is great. So I want to be clear about that. But the point I want 

to make is that, big or small, it seems that the acquisition process 

takes a long time. And so for you, Ms. Fox, looking at MDAPs 

[major defense acquisition programs], is the MDAP problem a platform problem? Is it a program problem? Are there certain things 

in MDAPs that drive budget and timelines over set budgets and 

timelines? Are there things in MDAPs that actually get done on 

time and on budget? 

Ms. FOX. Thank you. On an example like Next-Gen Jammer, 

where I completely understand your observations and frustrations, 

it is a capability we needed. But when it was started, it was not 

realistic on the technological risks. And so we are getting through 

it. And we are going to have a capable jammer. And we need it. 

But some of the advanced electronics and the need to miniaturize 

them and the threat advances that have happened during the 

course of that program, all of which combined to make it take 

longer than we wanted. So I think that the MDAP program, again, 

it all starts well when we all have shared expectations of both need 

and risk. And that gets to time and cost and the technological risk. 

And that is what I think we have worked hard to improve. But in 

places like the Next-Gen Jammer, we did not cancel that program. 

We have worked through those problems. But that is the big thing. 

MDAPs tends to last for a very long time. So it is really important, 

in my opinion, that we go through the process to get to a system 

that we want to last for a very long time that is sustainable 

affordably and upgradeable. Those are all aspects of MDAP that 

need to be considered and that do take the time. But I think we 

can avoid our disappointments if we are more realistic at the beginning. 

Mr. LARSEN. It seems to me that the problem is part of what 

makes MDAP sustainable is us. It may not be affordable, but we 
16 

sustain it. That is, we end up rewarding it being over budget and 

not meeting the schedule by keeping it going because we need it. 

So there is no incentive on the front end to get it as right as we 

need it if we continue it despite what happens later. 

Ms. FOX. You know, I think that, my opinion, the Nunn-McCurdy 

process has actually done a lot to push on that problem. I can tell 

you right now, so from a CAPE perspective, we didn’t hate NunnMcCurdy. We thought they forced a process of looking at things 

critically. Of course, CAPE had a big role in Nunn-McCurdys. And 

I think we try hard to play that role. But I can tell you, the services hate Nunn-McCurdys. I mean, they will do anything they can 

now to get a program started such that they don’t Nunn-McCurdy 

because of the challenges of starting over, right, the assumption of 

cancelation. And that has made a big difference. So, again, I think 

there are things now in place that help us with the very problems 

that you are targeting that we need to continue to push on but that 

over time are making a difference. And I, at least, certainly saw 

that in my time. When I got there, we had a lot of Nunn-McCurdys 

to work through. It took a lot of time. It forced us to scrutinize 

these programs in new ways. There are not very many now. People 

don’t like them. It is good. They shouldn’t. 

Mr. LARSEN. That gets to my question about whether or not you 

can build affordability as a goal. That is more than rhetorical. 

Ms. FOX. Well, it requires you to be willing, throughout the entire process, to trade requirements for affordability as you develop 

the program. And that is exactly the collaboration that Admiral 

Winnefeld talked about, that I referred to, and that I think is going 

on with these affordability caps and must continue. 

Mr. LARSEN. All right. I think I heard you use Nunn-McCurdy 

as a verb. So I guess we have advanced a long way if it is now a 

verb. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank all of you for being here today. I appreciate the strong 

commitment of Chairman Mac Thornberry on acquisition reform 

and his persistence. As chairman of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, my greatest concern has been and will be 

getting the newest and most effective technology to the warfighter 

to protect against cyberattacks. Do you believe that our current 

construct allows for this? And how do you believe rapid acquisition 

might play a role in achieving this goal? And also does this promote public-private cooperation? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. I would say that we, sir, we have built into 

the requirements process the, essentially, cybersecurity of programs, that they be resistant to that. I worry less about the program itself than I worry about the people who are building it and 

their networks candidly. I think we are making some progress in 

that regard to hold our cleared defense contractors accountable for 

the security of their networks so that we don’t lose our technology 

to a potential adversary. But we are very mindful of the need for— 

and not just Internet cybersecurity, I mean, the overall security of 

the electronics in that platform, which could be potentially quite 

vulnerable. So we are paying attention to that. I presume that is 

continuing on after I have left. But it is a valid concern. It is a sin-
17 

gular vulnerability that we have—it is a new vulnerability that we 

have to watch for. 

Mr. WILSON. And I appreciate the efforts of Secretary Ash Carter 

to visit Silicon Valley, to meet with leaders of IT [information technology] as to what can be done to facilitate, again, the most effective and up-to-date capabilities. And for each of you, could you give 

us an example of the best practice that the Department of Defense 

acquisition community should be following to improve how they 

start programs? And can you name a program where they—have 

actually been used in practice? Beginning with Ms. Fox. 

Ms. FOX. I believe that, as I have said, the best practice is honest 

realism. And I think that the, I am going to say this probably with 

some trepidation, I think the process we have attempted to use to 

start the new bomber really worked hard at looking hard at requirements, need, and affordability. It was to my, in my experience, 

in my time, the first one to have an affordability cap written into 

the direction from then Secretary Gates to the Secretary of the Air 

Force. It explicitly directed this tradeoff throughout the course of 

the program between requirements and costs. So I think there were 

some efforts taken there that have the potential to have started 

that program well. We will see as it goes forward. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. 

Mr. HALE. So I will stay on my soapbox and say I think the best 

practice needs to continue to look for better ways to control the 

growth in operating and support costs, not that the Department 

hasn’t done anything, they definitely have. And the affordability 

caps provide a forum for that debate. I can’t tell you a program 

where this has worked well. I am not close enough to it now. I can 

tell you one where I think it is important and that would be the 

Bradley fighting vehicle replacement. As the Army develops this, 

they will buy it in, hopefully, very large numbers. And so it will 

have some substantial effects on operating and support costs. So I 

think that is one way they definitely need to pay close attention to 

the affordability cap in the operating and support costs portion of 

it. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. So there are probably a number of best 

practices to talk about. In regards to the ability to field things 

quickly when the warfighter needs them, we have instituted the 

JEONS and JUONS process. The JUONS is a joint urgent operational needs statement. I will give you a couple of examples of 

that. During the Ebola epidemic, Transportation Command submitted a joint urgent operational needs requirement in October of 

2014. That was validated as a requirement by the JROC in October 

of 2014. And it was delivered in March of 2015. And that gave us 

the capability to transport Ebola patients safely on DOD aircraft. 

Another example of that would be a full motion video dissemination system that was submitted by CENTCOM [Central Command] 

in December of 2014. It was validated in January of 2015, within 

that 30-day window I talked about. And its initial operational capability was May of last year. And they have three systems up and 

running as of September of last year. So that is the urgent side. 

The middle ground, which is really sort of challenging for us, is 

the joint emergent operational needs statement, which if something 

is, you don’t have to have it tomorrow to protect a warfighter in 
18 

something that is ongoing, but this is an imminent conflict where 

we really need to get something moving quickly. And we have responded to a Central Command request for real-time ID [identification] capability that was validated in November of 2014. And its 

initial operating capability will be this June, within this 2-year period. So I think what we are doing is we are working hard to unveil 

best practices as we find them and to try to accelerate things when 

the warfighter really needs it. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I guess my question will be to former Deputy Secretary Hale. I 

look forward to seeing progress in fielding the Long Range Strike 

Bomber, the capability that we certainly need. So as we look forward in the acquisition process, can you speak to how we can apply 

lessons learned to keep what will be a long-term program in check, 

time and costwise? 

Mr. HALE. I think I am going to defer to the former Deputy Secretary, Ms. Fox. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Ms. Fox. 

Ms. FOX. Thank you. I agree completely about the importance of 

the new bomber. And as I referred to a minute ago, the initial start 

of that program specifically suggested that the Department needs 

to debate throughout the course of the program affordability and 

requirements to make sure the Department gets the capability it 

needs but that it stays affordable, such that the Department can 

buy it in sufficient numbers. So we have both capability and quantity. And I think that the most important thing is that dialogue 

continue. I think that the 2016 NDAA has things in there that will 

enhance the dialogue or, you know, Admiral Winnefeld pointed out 

that opportunity already existed. And I completely agree with that. 

But I think the legislation pushes more for that kind of collaborative dialogue throughout the course of the program. 

But the Joint Staff, the military department, and OSD [Office of 

the Secretary of Defense], and industry needs to constantly be talking about these tradeoffs as it goes forward such that we get a 

bomber, a timely bomber, that is also capable and is affordable 

enough to buy in numbers. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I don’t know if you mentioned the time, but I also 

asked for costwise. 

Ms. FOX. So there is actually an affordability cap on the bomber, 

or at least there was when I was there. I can’t say that I am current anymore, but there was a cost cap on that, and that is directly 

related to the time to field. 

So I believe that the intent is there for time, cost, requirement 

tradeoffs to go through the process. I think that the thing that the 

Congress can look for is, is that dialogue happening, and if any of 

those requirements are changing, why, and is there a justified 

need, so that, again, it is all about keeping eyes open so that we 

know what we are getting into. 

And there was an attempt at the beginning of that program to 

put that kind of eyes-open tradeoffs into the process. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 
19 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to thank our panelists for joining us. You all had 

mentioned affordability. I want to ask a question in that realm. It 

seems like where affordability goals have been used, they have 

been successful. I have a question, though, or a direction in how 

they are being utilized. 

Are they being used across all acquisition programs? Are they 

being used early in a program’s life? Are they managed by someone 

at a senior level, at a deputy level, who has oversight over all the 

aspects of the program, requirements, budgeting, program management, acquisition? 

So I guess my question is this, is how often does DOD use affordability constraints or goals in the management of a process, and 

should those affordability goals be inserted at Milestone A, so they 

can have an effect early on in the process? I would like to get your 

perspective on that. 

Mr. HALE. Well, I think right now there is—according to the September 2015 report again, I don’t have up-to-date information. 

They said there were 29 caps. They said it was about 29—or 70 

percent, I should say, of the MDAP programs have them. I think 

most of them are put in place as you get near Milestone B, and because I think you have a better sense then of a weapon that you 

can cost out. Some of them precede Milestone B. 

They didn’t get a lot of attention in the September 2015 report. 

There was one page describing them, but they are also, I think, relatively new, and so I think, as I said, I believe this is an area 

where Congress can—should continue to ask questions of the DOD 

witnesses that come before them as to how well they are doing in 

both implementing and enforcing them. And as you heard me say 

several times, I would pay particular attention to the operating and 

support cost portions of those caps, since I think they are newer, 

harder to do, and probably don’t get quite as much attention as the 

acquisition side. Is there anything you want to add to that? 

Ms. FOX. If I may, I would like to add. So I do think Secretary 

Hale said that they are new, so I think we need to give it time. 

The bomber example is one that is a little further along. However, 

I would want to go back to emphasize, in my view, the importance 

of the conversation about affordability goals early and throughout 

because if you stick strictly to the affordability caps, you may be 

trading capability throughout that makes the program less valuable when it is ultimately fielded. 

This gets back to the risk discussion that we had earlier. Sometimes I worry that in the interest of—you know, the pendulum 

swings right, so we were taking nothing but risk and had terrible 

red cost and schedule situations. But we don’t want it to go so far 

back the other way that we squeeze all the risk out, and therefore, 

we have got affordability caps, but we don’t end up with programs 

that actually advance capabilities. So it is a conversation. Congress 

has to be part of the conversation, in my view, transparent but 

eyes open. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yeah. And let me ask you this. You know, the 

whole idea of affordability, I think, has to include the concept of 

value, and if you do that, it has to start in the program writing 
20 

process to make sure there is continuity there, to the process where 

you get to a proposal, to the process where you get to program 

managers, and there is a stovepiping of that that happens right 

now. 

So along the way, affordability might get mentioned or value 

might get mentioned, but it doesn’t continue through the process. 

That is why, I think the question—Admiral Winnefeld, I would love 

to have your perspective there since you served at that level. How 

important is it for senior decision makers at the deputy secretary 

level to look at the continuity of this, to make sure that if we are 

going to use affordability as a part of that, that value transfers 

from stovepipe to stovepipe, from requirements to proposal writing 

to program management to acquisition? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. First of all, it is about communication. It 

is about inclusion, making sure you have got the right people in the 

right meetings. I do think that the—if the value is represented by 

whether the requirement is being achieved, or you know, the distance between threshold and objective or however you want to 

characterize it, I think that does get carried through the process. 

And in fact, as the JROC, we would not just sort of hand off a requirement and wash our hands and, you know, somebody else’s 

problem. We would get frequent briefs. For example, I got a brief 

every 6 months on the F–35 that was very detailed on the status 

of that program in front of the entire JROC and the advisors. 

And so we would be able to assess whether the value was being 

retained as the program marks through its various, you know, 

progress. It is an important goal you are stating that we need to 

make sure we don’t lose sight of that as you are focused now on 

manufacturability and cost and O&S and that sort of thing. But I 

think we are okay there. It is just something that senior leadership, as you point out, needs to keep an eye on. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ma’am, gentlemen, thank you for being here. 

Admiral Winnefeld, I had the opportunity to watch my Bulldogs 

whip up on the Yellow Jackets this year. I don’t know if you made 

it to the game or not, but it is usually a pretty good one. I couldn’t 

help it. But I know you have been affiliated with Georgia Tech for 

a long time, and I hope to see you there in short order. 

And I just wonder, as I listen to things and look at the way 

things happen in Washington, if the fear of failure sometimes isn’t 

stronger than the desire to succeed. And when we get into things 

at the Pentagon, it seems that the getting something that is good 

enough ends up with so much criticism that we strive for something that in some cases isn’t attainable when we spend a lot of 

money getting nowhere. 

I look back at the purchase of the F–22 and what happened 

there, and I think right now we would be very happy to have more 

F–22s. But I have watched the one program that I have had the 

most experience with has been the JSTARS [Joint Surveillance 

Target Attack Radar System]. It was something that was—we were 

looking at the recapitalization of this when I got here. It certainly 
21 

seems that we are starting to move forward with this, and the 

recap long term is estimated to save $11 billion in operating 

sustainment over 20 years, and when we look—we have waited too 

long now. We know we are going to have a capability gap with that 

intelligence platform. 

Is there enough emphasis on the making sure that those major 

acquisition programs stay on schedule, I guess, is my primary 

question. 

Ms. FOX. So, again, I do believe that the schedule part of the 

Nunn-McCurdy legislation puts a point on it, for sure. I also think 

schedule and costs are so intertwined that the cost overrun aspects 

of it are so tied to schedules, that that is a concern. But I take your 

point, and I just have to harken to Secretary Hale’s point about the 

budget pressures, which I know this committee also wrestles with. 

When you have this kind of budget pressure and uncertainty, the 

Department responds by what we call slips and slides, slip-andslide programs, which stretches schedules, stretches and adds cost, 

and it is what the program does in response to wanting—to being 

over-programmed but having genuine needs. JSTARS is a good example, I think. 

So this budget environment is very difficult, frankly, for maintaining cost and schedule. And the Department is slipping and sliding. I think that there is a lot of oversight to try to prevent that 

as much as possible every year through program review, but I can 

tell you from personal experience, every year in program review, 

we slip and slide things, and every time you do that, you add cost 

and schedule. 

Budget predictability is critical, and adequate budget to support 

the operations that were—that the Department needs to do, the 

size of the force that goes with that, and then modernization, it is 

all part of the package. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. I just want to underscore that. And I do so 

in full recognition that this committee has actually tried very, very 

hard to get that stability into the budget that Mr. Hale talked 

about, both under Chairman McKeon and under Chairman Thornberry, so please keep that going. 

But it would break your heart to sit in on some of these what 

we call DMAGs, Deputy’s Management Action Groups, and look at 

the trades that are having to be made with these literally budget 

line items from year to year that are shifting around constantly because of the churn in the budget. Not having, you know, first of all, 

three-quarters of a years’ worth of time to work because the NDAA 

doesn’t get passed or the appropriations thing doesn’t get passed 

until the end of year, and then only having 2 years of predictability, it just introduces incredible turbulence and churn into 

these programs. And we literally sit there at the table and you’re 

moving numbers around, and you can just see the breakage about 

to happen in these programs. It is underestimated impact. 

Mr. SCOTT. So I would just point out that—and you know this, 

that, you know, the acquisition cost of the first unit is a lot different than what it takes to produce the second one, and I just 

wonder if some of the accounting that gets done at GAO [Government Accountability Office] and other areas, if their pricing technology is a variable cost instead of as a fixed cost because once it 
22 

has been sunk into this, the new weapons system, it is gone. Thank 

you. 

Thank you for being here, and I hope to see you in Georgia. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Go Jackets. 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, there is—I think all of you have expressed some support for affordability caps or goals. One of the concerns that I have heard is that, okay, if you start out with this affordability goal, then the military is going to dial back the requirements to fit within the affordability goal. And so what is your view 

about that concern, not really saying what they need but just trying to try to calibrate what they can get? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. It is a good question, and I would say at 

the front end of that process, the WSARA asked us to consider cost 

when we were formulating requirements. It didn’t say you have to 

put a cost cap on. It didn’t say, you know, that should be the principal and only variable when you are considering a requirement. It 

just said consider it. 

And I think that we have taken a mature approach to that, 

looked at it as I think the spirit of Congress intended, and that is: 

Look, don’t give us a gold-plated requirement that is just going to 

be unrealistic from the start, that is going to—doomed to failure either from a cost perspective because of the technical risk or what 

have you, and I think—I don’t have any examples at the tip of fingers. It has been too long since I have been there. 

But I do recall several times when we said, you know, we have 

just got to be really careful here. This technology is tight, and you 

know, we are going to have to maybe dial either back the timeline 

or the actual requirement. So—but I don’t know that it ever really 

had a major impact on what a warfighter was looking for. 

And then there is the whole process of threshold and objective 

that builds in a little bit of flexibility there for what—you know, 

a stretch goal for the requirement, you know, to try to achieve that 

by trying to hop across that threshold and get there successfully. 

The thing I worry about with program managers, who are paid to 

spend every last dollar getting as far as they can from the threshold to the objective, there is a knee in the curve there somewhere, 

and we ought to reward those folks when they come back and say, 

you know, I could spend 90 percent of this money just getting another 2 percent towards the objective, maybe reward them when 

they take a better approach than that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. And I want to—go ahead, sir. 

Mr. HALE. There are two sides to this coin, and we need innovation for sure, and I think Secretary Carter made that clear yesterday and is getting emphasis, but we also, when we develop something innovative, need to have balanced the cost versus the requirements in a way that we can buy a reasonable number of them 

and pay to operate them. 

So I think the affordability caps don’t need to stifle innovation, 

much of which occurs before they are set. I hope that they will help 

the Department make tradeoffs so that it gets reasonable numbers 

of these weapons and not the B–2 sort of situation where we 

bought, what, 21 of them, and I hope we don’t do that with this 

bomber. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah, yeah, me, too. 
23 

Mr. Hale, message received on operation and support costs. Do 

you think it is feasible to have some sort of cost goals or caps for 

pure services that the Department contracts for, which is an increasing part, as you well know, of the Department’s budget? 

Mr. HALE. So that is a good question and not one I thought about 

a lot. I think it is worth thinking about. It probably would have— 

I mean, for some cases and services, we do fixed-price contracts if 

we have one, but many of them are not, and it probably deserves 

some more thought. 

And maybe perhaps I could ask Dr. Fox here if she has some 

thoughts on that one since I don’t have anything really good to say. 

Ms. FOX. It is not doctor, but that is okay. Thank you for the 

compliment. 

So, okay, service costs, yes. You know, it all gets down to the 

number of efficiency reviews that the Department has done. And 

I saw Secretary Carter’s speech yesterday, apparently continues to 

do, and service costs are a key part of that. 

So there are two really hard things about this, if I could. One is 

you really need to understand what we need these people to do. So 

if you want to take out service costs, we want to make sure that 

we are understanding that we might have to take out things that 

they are doing and look at the products, the services they provide. 

And then the other side, which is really far from that, is management because a lot of them are maybe not doing critical things, 

right. There may be we have just let the services grow. 

So you have this very hard detailed work that is required to 

trade off—to look hard at have we grown, because things grow, and 

so you need to push that down, which we always need to do, and 

then you get to a point, and in some areas of services in DOD, I 

believe that there are points where you have gone too far, and then 

you start to see people in uniform performing services that it would 

be far better and cheaper to have contractors perform. 

So what does it all come down to? A lot of hard detailed work. 

You have to peel it all back, ask: What are they doing? Is it managed well? It is constant. You have got to be vigilant about it. I certainly think, for the three secretaries I had the privilege to work 

for, they pounded on me and us to do that, and it is constantly 

needed, and so keep pounding is my best answer. Sorry. 

Mr. HALE. With a moment to think, let me add a thought, and 

that is, some significant contracts occur in the support of weapons 

systems. And I think if we find ways to shine a bit more of a spotlight on O&S cost, which I think is starting to happen, but continue that, we will accomplish some of the goal of trading off contracts for services as well as other aspects of operating and support 

costs, but it is a good question, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Fox, you mentioned at one point earlier 

today about the incentives of the program managers to do certain 

things. One of the conclusions that I think most of us have reached, 

as we have looked at acquisition, is that is really crucial. You 

know, we can pass whatever laws we want to, but it is the incentives for the decision makers that really control the outcome. 

Do you have any other thoughts or guidance for us on incentives 

that may not be operating in the way that leads to—that lead to 

the results we want? 
24 

Ms. FOX. So it is—I agree with you completely. I think the incentives have moved with the emphasis on starting programs well, but 

there still are an enormous number of incentives in the system that 

start from how people are assigned to how long they are assigned 

to how they are promoted and rewarded that are all about the momentum of the process. 

So, for example, one of the aspects of the acquisition process— 

so you get a program manager who is trying to get to that next 

milestone, that is their incentive or they’re incentivized to do that, 

and they find a better way. A contractor comes along with some 

new idea, or there is some new innovation. Their incentive is not 

to say, ‘‘Oops, wait, stop, let’s do that,’’ because what they are looking at are all the things they have to do to get it right back to 

where it is right now in the process. 

So the things that this committee is doing, the things that I 

think Secretary Kendall is trying hard to do in streamlining the acquisition process, those are all necessary parts to incentivize people 

to do smart things along the way. And right now those incentives 

aren’t there because it just feels like they are pushing a boulder 

up the hill, and they don’t want to lose ground. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think back to keep pounding away, that 

is one of the areas where we do need to understand what it is like 

to be doing that day to day and try to improve. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just quickly, I think as you were speaking, Ms. Fox, you know, 

sometimes we know what people do, but asking why we are asking 

them to do it is different. And sometimes that is a little harder to 

incorporate. 

We have a better budget right now in terms of predictions. I 

mean, there is a little bit more predictability in the budget. I hope 

that is correct. And I am wondering, is there a way of tracking, if 

you will, how people are performing, how we are doing as a result 

of that, and being able to go back so that future Congresses will 

see the difference? And I am—you know, really some metrics that 

get a handle on the impact, the consequences of doing things in a 

more predictable fashion. Is this a good time to look at that? What 

would those metrics look like? 

Ms. FOX. So absolutely this is a good time to look at that, and 

my answer is not restricted to this time. This is a historical view, 

and one of CAPE’s roles is to collect that data over time, and they 

do that well, and they should be continued to do that well and be 

required to do that because without historical data, you can’t do 

the very important thing that you just suggested. 

I will refer you, if I could, to a study done by Dave Nichols, who 

used to be the cost director in PA&E [Program Analysis and Evaluation] formerly and is now at the Institute for Defense Analyses, 

and he did exactly the study you are suggesting where he tried to 

correlate the performance of programs to different acquisition reform initiatives, and interestingly, in a nutshell, he found that not 

much correlation there but a very strong correlation to precipitous 

budget drops. 

Whenever the budget dropped or became very uncertain, the Department went into that slips and slides method that I referred to 
25 

earlier, and that is when the costs started to grow. So he did that 

long-term view that reinforces exactly the question that you are 

asking, and I do hope that we are starting a new period of predictability such that we can recover that and get back to performance 

predictions and achieving the best that we can. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. You know, it might be interesting sometime, and I hope I don’t put my former DOD colleagues on the spot 

on this, but to just have them bring maybe one slide over from one 

of those decision briefs that we have, to show you the kind of puts 

and takes that they are looking at with budget uncertainty. And, 

well, you know, we have option A, option B, option C, option D, and 

what all those little options do to crunch the program, and you 

know, if you have to save X amount of money, what it really does. 

That might be sort of maybe for a small group, maybe for the 

chairman and ranking member and some staffers to just kind of 

walk through that process and see what people are going through. 

Mr. HALE. So I would just add, we have some predictability for 

2017, and I am thankful for that. Although I think the issue of 

OCO will arise and may affect that. 2018, we are potentially back 

in the soup, and there needs to be a broad budget deal in a new 

administration that looks beyond just discretionary spending but 

also at entitlements and probably revenues as well, and a device 

to get rid of this meat-ax sequester that was put in place by the 

Budget Control Act, and I hope that happens. It hasn’t been debated much so far, but I hope that it does get debated and that it 

happens in a new administration. 

The CHAIRMAN. For what it is worth, I hope it happens, too, and 

I hope that—— 

Mr. HALE. Be open—too. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. The stability we thought we were 

achieving last year is the stability that we do achieve this year, regardless of the increased operational costs, which, you know, are a 

fact, given the way the world is moving. 

So, Mr. Veasey, you have a question? You are good. 

Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for having 

this important hearing, and thank you all for your contributions. 

Former Admiral Winnefeld, I want to ask you in particular, and 

by the way, thank you for your distinguished service, and it was 

good to get to know you when you came to Colorado Springs. As 

the chairman’s designee heading the JROC, how do you feel the 

current service-led acquisition system serves national requirements, including nuclear forces, NC3 [nuclear command, control, 

and communication], space, and missile defense, are these capabilities service priorities? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. I think they are becoming more and more 

a service priority. I think we are on a good trajectory there. We 

were not several years ago, and—but I think the senior leadership 

within the services, particularly the Air Force and the Navy, who 

are most concerned with the particular programs you are talking 

about, have really stepped up recently. They have had some encouragement from a number of forums, the—Frank Kendall, the 

head of AT&L, and I co-chaired a forum on the command and control system, nuclear command and control system, that brought all 
26 

the stakeholders together in a very cooperative fashion and tried 

to stitch things together there. 

I think that Deputy Secretary Fox, when she was in power, and 

also Deputy Secretary Work put a lot of emphasis on that, and I 

personally put a lot of emphasis on this, and the service secretaries 

and chiefs have responded very well. They knew that this needed 

to happen. I think we are on a much better trajectory, I will tell 

you, than we were a couple of years ago in the nuclear command 

and control arena. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Excellent. That is great to hear. And kind of a followup, can you explain why strategic missile warning, ITW/AA [integrated tactical warning/attack assessment], is important? Should 

this capability be considered a part of NC3 as opposed to a space 

system, which it currently is? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. First of all, it is important because it links 

the sensors that would detect a missile launch or other thermal 

event to the people who need that information, the command and 

control leadership, so it is a very, very important system. I am not 

convinced that it belongs in a nuclear command and control system. It is a space system, just like GPS is a space system. 

People who are space savvy both on the technical side and the 

operational side probably ought to be the ones running it, and in 

some cases, those platforms ride on other platforms as well. I don’t 

think there is any harm in leaving it where it is, and I think you 

have actually got maybe right now really good ownership of the 

space piece. 

We have got a very good trajectory also on the space executive 

agent inside DOD, the Secretary of the Air Force, so I would tend 

to not want to tamper with that, but it is something that we have 

got to pay very close attention to because, you know, I always say 

the most vital national security interest of the United States is the 

survival of the Nation, and being able to detect somebody who is 

threatening that with a missile launch is absolutely critical, so 

we’ve got to make sure we pay close attention to it. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Well, thank you. And as another followup, 

have you seen the Air Force apply appropriate priority to its modernization? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. This falls back into your first question 

where they are on a better trajectory, I think, than they were several years ago. They have stepped up to the plate. They realize 

that. I haven’t been in for 6 months to look at where it actually 

fell out in this year’s budget, so I can’t make an assessment there, 

but I have sensed, as I was leaving, that they were strongly committed to that program, so it would be interesting to see what pops 

out in the budget. I lost visibility over that 6 months ago. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Now, what would you tell Air Force senior 

leadership if someone were to suggest that, well, we can trade 1 

or 2 minutes’ worth of missile warning time in exchange for saving 

some budget resources, which we can apply elsewhere, what kind 

of tradeoff would you consider that? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. The only tradeoff I would consider is to get 

one or two more minutes of warning time in that regard. We need 

everything we can get there. Again, the critical element of the defense of this Nation from the most catastrophic attack you can 
27 

have, and I wouldn’t want to trade any time. Obviously, if somebody said, ‘‘Well, it is going to cost you a trillion dollars unless you 

accept this 1 minute,’’ you know, there is—every man has his price, 

I suppose, but I really would be reluctant to consider any decrease 

in the amount of warning time we give the President in relation 

to an attack on this country. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. And Mr. Hale, Ms. Fox, in the short time 

we have left, do you have any observations on our dialogue? 

Mr. HALE. I don’t have anything to add. 

Ms. FOX. I would just add that I completely agree with Admiral 

Winnefeld. These are critically important areas. I think that the 

Department is focusing on them more and needs to continue to do 

that, and resources are going to be required to modernize these important areas in the future, and it is going to continue to be a 

stress on the budget, more so. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Veasey. 

Mr. VEASEY. I did have one question that I wanted to ask the 

panel. As far as acquisition reform is concerned, and someone may 

have already asked this, so if they have, please forgive that. But 

if there was one area of reform that you could pick and you can 

only pick one, like where would it be? And it could be a policy or 

a technique or anything that would just maybe be the beginning 

of something really good as far as acquisition reform is concerned. 

Ms. FOX. I would think about how to add back risk into the equation of acquisition programs with eyes open, making sure that we 

completely understand the cost and schedule implications of that 

risk, but I—that is the one aspect of reform that I think we haven’t 

focused enough on since we have done so much good and important 

work on swinging us back to predictable programs. I think now we 

need to worry just a little bit about whether we have become too 

risk-averse. 

Mr. HALE. Well, as I said in my statement, I would try to build 

on the framework the Department has to do a better job of controlling operating and support cost because they are so important to 

the budget, two-thirds of the total defense budget, more than half 

of the life-cycle cost of weapons. We have got a framework to do 

that, and this affordability caps that the Department has used, I 

think it needs more attention and effort to try to control these 

costs. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. And while I am in absolute agreement with 

what my two colleagues have said, because those are very important, I would at least potentially open a dialogue with the Department, including AT&L and the comptroller and CAPE on: Does it 

make sense to provide money—discretionary money upfront to the 

Department so that they can accelerate development of programs 

once the requirement has been established so you can visualize in 

rough crude terms that the requirement hits the street, now we 

have got a budget for it, and because of our cycle process—you 

know, it is 11⁄2 or 2 years before the thing really gets money. If 

there were a pool of money where we could actually accelerate development in that space, you might actually bring some of these 

programs forward significantly in time at relatively low cost, you 
28 

know, just not—just eliminating that waiting game for the budget 

to catch up to the requirement would probably be something at 

least to entertain a dialogue with the Department on. 

Ms. FOX. If I could just add to the importance of the access to 

money. I do believe that the NDAA includes a rapid prototyping 

and fielding fund, if I read it correctly, not really sure that I appreciate exactly how that will be implemented, but ideas like that to 

allow the Department to do the kinds of things Admiral Winnefeld 

suggested, I think, are critically important to increasing our ability 

to get new ideas out to the operators. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. And just to amplify. I think Ms. Fox would 

agree with me. We really are talking about two different things 

here. One is a pool of money for rapidly experimenting with new 

ideas and seeing if they bear fruit and then turning those into programs. 

The other thing is maybe even a stable, fairly vanilla program 

that just is running through its life cycle and not having to wait 

that year and a half or two to get it started. It doesn’t take much 

money to get these things going, but if you are having to wait that 

year and a half just pro forma because of our process, then you are 

losing time. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Brooks, do you have questions? 

Mr. BROOKS. I do. Acquisition reform is something that we need 

as a matter of good government, but I would submit further that 

it is very quickly becoming a matter of financial necessity. I am not 

sure if you have seen the kind of economic financial data that we 

have been seeing in Congress, but it has taken a dramatic turn for 

the worst. 

By way of background, I was elected in 2010. Since 2010, one of 

the things that the Republicans in Congress could at least point to 

every single year the deficit got lower—i.e., better—still horrible at 

$439 billion, which was last year’s deficit, but that is a whole lot 

better than the string of trillion dollar deficits that we had. 

In the first quarter of this fiscal year, revenue has been up 4 percent, which is a good thing, but spending went up 7 percent. According to the Treasury Department, the first fiscal year, we had 

a $36 billion worsening of our deficit situation compared to the first 

quarter of the previous fiscal year. By extrapolation, that would 

suggest that we are going have a $144 billion deficit worse than 

what we had in a bad $439 billion deficit last year. However, the 

CBO [Congressional Budget Office] is a little bit more optimistic 

saying: Well, we think it will only be $130-something billion worse, 

putting it somewhere in the neighborhood of $570 billion. 

They are also telling us that while we blew through the $19 trillion debt mark recently, within a decade we are going to blow 

through the $30 trillion debt mark, which means that we are looking at a 10-year average of over a trillion dollars a year in deficits. 

That being the case, what is your judgment that the Pentagon is 

really serious about streamlining acquisition efforts through the 

Federal acquisition regulations, changing that, or what have you, 
29 

in order to maximize the bang for the buck that the taxpayer has 

to allocate to national security? 

Mr. HALE. Well, my evidence is a little out of date, but I think 

they are serious, and I think they have made some progress in important areas of acquisition reform. To go to your broader statement, Mr. Brooks. We need a broad budget discussion in this country, not just the discretionary spending, not just defense and nondefense discretionary spending, which make up about 30 percent of 

our spending, as I think you know. 

We need to get at the other 70 percent, entitlements, mandatory 

spending, and interest on the debt, and probably revenues as well, 

and as I said earlier, I hope that in the new administration, we see 

a broad budget deal that goes beyond. I might add, Alice Rivlin, 

who I worked for many years ago and I have great respect for, 

working, I think, with Senator Pete Domenici suggested what Congress ought to do is start authorizing and appropriating entitlement funds so you don’t just focus on the discretionary spending 

but that you focus on closer to 100 percent of what the government 

spends. I think that would be a good process reform, but we need 

substantive reform and a budget deal. 

Mr. BROOKS. But you are telling me that you are optimistic that 

the Pentagon is in fact going to start becoming better at streamlining the acquisition process? 

Mr. HALE. Well, I think there are measures that suggest they 

have already had some success, and again, I invite my colleagues 

to comment. 

Mr. BROOKS. Okay. Any chance that there would be dramatic 

success of the kind needed to reflect the worsening financial condition of the United States of America? 

Mr. HALE. I don’t know if you would call it dramatic or not, but 

I think they have made progress. 

Mr. BROOKS. Anybody else want to add any insight on that? If 

not, I will go to my second question. 

Okay. Mr. Fox [sic], a lot of discussion today has focused on affordability constraints. If affordability goals were required in Milestone A for all programs, it would force conversations and coordination early in the acquisition process. 

Mr. Fox, can you please—excuse me, Ms. Fox, misreading my 

notes here—can you please speak to the accuracy of cost estimates 

early in the process? Is there enough fidelity to inform affordability 

goals at Milestone A? 

Ms. FOX. I believe that the accuracy of the independent cost estimates have shown that the ICEs are more right than wrong over 

time, and I believe that the more data that they have, the more 

accurate that they are. I think that there has been a tremendous 

amount of progress in bringing independent cost estimates to the 

Milestone A discussion and the conversation in the Department of 

tradeoffs between requirements and costs, so I believe that those 

changes are in fact taking place and have been taking place for a 

few years now. 

I think that it may take time for that to play through so that 

it is more visible, but I believe that those changes have been made 

and that independent cost estimates are having impact. 
30 

Mr. BROOKS. Well, Mr. Hale and Ms. Fox, thank you for your responses. 

And Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Great. 

Thank you all, not only for being here today but for the many 

ways that each of you has served the country. 

I have one other favor. As we did last year, we are going to introduce a stand-alone bill on acquisition reform this year in March, 

and the idea is that the people who deal with the acquisition system, have experience and insights, can give us feedback about how 

it can be improved before we actually mark up the defense authorization bill for this year. 

So to the extent you are looking for something to do some Saturday night, if you have some suggestions when we release that, your 

feedback to the committee—further feedback to the committee 

would be very much appreciated. So, again, thank you all for being 

here. 

With that, the hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 3, 2016 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

FEBRUARY 3, 2016 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 3, 2016 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Specifically, what are the root causes of operating and support 

(O&S) cost growth related to weapons? Does the acquisition system itself, or any 

of its processes and features, contribute to O&S cost growth? If so, how could the 

acquisition system be changed to combat the growth of O&S costs? 

Mr. HALE. Research suggests that key drivers of O&S costs include manpower, 

fuel, and maintenance. These in turn are influenced by factors including weight, 

computerization, and special characteristics such as stealth. Unfortunately, there 

has only been limited research into the specific causes of O&S growth. I believe that 

Congress should direct DOD to conduct more careful research into this critical topic, 

perhaps making use of its FFRDCs to help provide analysis. Congress should also 

direct the Department to improve the parametric models used to project O&S costs. 

How does the acquisition process affect O&S costs? The current incentives in the 

acquisition process lead program managers (PMs) to focus heavily on acquisition 

costs, which will be known during their tenure as PMs. O&S costs will occur well 

after PMs leave their jobs and probably after they retire from the military. So there 

is limited incentive to focus on them. DOD and Congress need to consider ways to 

change these incentives. Congress could direct DOD senior leaders to certify that 

an O&S estimate has been prepared and reviewed at each of the acquisition milestones. Because of uncertainty regarding early O&S estimates, Congress should 

leave unchanged the requirement to report O&S costs in the SARs starting at Milestone B. This might prompt more attention to O&S. Once the Department has developed better tools for creating O&S estimates, it may be appropriate to require reporting of major breaches of O&S estimates in a manner that is now done for procurement costs under the Nunn-McCurdy legislation. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. (a) Why is a survivable and endurable NC3 system important for 

this country? (b) As you know, our NC3 system is a system of systems composed 

of over 103 different program elements. These systems are scattered across the CIO, 

Navy, Air Force, STRATCOM and NORTHCOM. Is this a good system for ensuring 

the successful integration and operation of a survivable and endurable communications capability for the nation’s senior leaders? (c) Does the Air Force, which owns 

70% of these programs, appropriately prioritize budget resources for NC3 compared 

to tactical aviation? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. (a) Our nuclear deterrent is only as effective as the command and control that enables it to function. Nuclear Command and Control (NC2) 

is the exercise of authority and direction, through established command lines, over 

nuclear weapon operations by the President. NC2 is supported by a survivable network of communications and warning systems that ensure dedicated connectivity 

from the President to all nuclear-capable forces. This survivable network of communications is the Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) System. A 

survivable, enduring NC3 is a prerequisite for an effective nuclear deterrent. The 

fundamental requirements of NC2 are paramount; it must be assured, timely, secure, survivable, and enduring in providing the information and communications for 

the President to make and communicate critical decisions without being constrained 

by limitations in the systems, the people, or the procedures that make up the systems used by the Nuclear Command and Control System. 

(b) The present U.S. NC3 architecture is described in two layers. The first layer 

is the day-to-day and crisis architecture, which can also be described as a ‘‘thickline.’’ This architecture supports current U.S. national policy in that it responds 

under all conditions in both peacetime and war to provide the means to exercise 

positive control and direction by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and Combatant Commanders; provides secure, reliable, immediate, and continuous access to 

the President; and provides robust command and control over nuclear and supporting government operations. 

The second layer provides the survivable, secure, and enduring architecture 

known as the ‘‘thin-line.’’ The thin-line responds to policy that requires assured, un-
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broken, redundant, survivable, secure, and enduring connectivity to and among the 

President, the Secretary of Defense, the CJCS, and the designated commanders 

through all threat environments to perform all necessary NC2 functions. The thinline NC3 architecture must be sustained and supported during any modernization 

effort to ensure presidential requirements can be met. 

(c) The Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control and 

Communications System (CONLC3S) has been instrumental in bringing together 

the appropriate stakeholders, including the Air Force, and working to prioritize NC3 

modernization efforts. I believe we are achieving proper prioritization of NC3 modernization as a result of the Council’s work. 

Mr. ROGERS. Currently, our efforts to develop left-of-launch and homeland cruise 

missile defense are ad hoc depending on specific senior leader interest. Is this an 

appropriate set-up for the development of these capabilities? If not, what would you 

recommend? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Development of left-of-launch and homeland cruise missile 

defense capability development is not ‘‘ad-hoc’’. The Deputy Secretary of Defense 

through his Advanced Capability Deterrence Panel has specifically chartered an organization supported by the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, and Defense Agencies to address left-of-launch capability development. 

Execution of homeland cruise missile defense operations are clearly the responsibility of the Commander of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the North 

American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). These requirements are derived 

from the national strategic direction, which result in operational and contingency 

plans developed by the Combatant Commands. A limited capability with clear chain 

of command, exists today, with capabilities provided by the services. NORAD– 

NORTHCOM is also directly involved in identification and development of additional service capabilities needed to meet future threats. 

Mr. ROGERS. (a) How satisfied are you with the current division of responsibility 

between DOE and DOD for the modernization of the nuclear deterrent? Is this system serving the nation well? (b) How often did one or the other departments make 

a commitment in the Nuclear Weapons Council that it did not perform on later? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. DOD and DOE/National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA) both face challenges in modernizing the platforms, warheads, and the supporting infrastructure over the next two decades to sustain the Triad and ensure 

the U.S. nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective. Regardless of the division of responsibilities, the biggest challenge to-date and into the future for both 

Departments is large required investments over many programs under constrained 

budgets. Regarding the DOE/NNSA warhead modernization, I believe management 

improvements may be possible under different governance structures but I also believe DOD and DOE/NNSA can effectively manage this under the current structure 

through the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC). To do so, increased and continued 

transparency and collaboration regarding DOE/NNSA budgets and priorities is required to best serve the nation. While I do not recall a specific instance of either 

Department not delivering on a commitment within the NWC, budget pressures and 

changes in program scope or priorities caused re-evaluation of the overall NWC 

modernization plan and adjustments to warhead modernization programs. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN 

Mr. COFFMAN. The panel highlighted the importance of independent cost estimates. Please identify when and how DOD first looks at program affordability. 

What are your thoughts on looking at affordability earlier in the acquisition process? 

Ms. FOX. My experience in the Department convinced me that affordability was 

usually considered at every point in the acquisition process. Affordability is always 

a factor in the Analysis of Alternatives (AOAs) and is often a key area of assessment 

at Milestone A, as well as all subsequent milestones. I understand the Services are 

now begitming to establish affordability goals early on to enable stronger leadership 

communication to the program manager of what is and what is not acceptable from 

a program-cost perspective. 

While it is great that the Services are beginning to establish their own affordability goals, I would like to add my concern about a risk to affordability assessments and the quality of AOAs for the future. I point to the recently released report 

to the Congress from the Chief of Staff of the Army regarding acquisition authorities 

(ref. b). In that report, the Army writes: 

‘‘. . . , giving the respective Service full oversight of their analysis of alternatives 

associated with their programs would also go further toward aligning decision authority with the responsible party. The Service, as the decision-making authority, 
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should have the responsibility for deciding what analysis needs to be done and when 

that analysis is adequate to inform their decision-making.’’ 

CAPE’s oversight of AOAs ensures that the Services examine a reasonable range 

of alternatives, include quality affordability analysis, adhere to good analytic processes, and develop measures of effectiveness and performance that sufficiently articulate the benefits and risks accrued from the alternatives. I know of cases where 

the Service analysis was not adequate to inform decision making, so I worry about 

excluding CAPE oversight. 

I must add that what is ‘‘affordable’’ today may change over the course of a program’s life due to many external factors such as: the evolution of the threat, defense 

budgets, and competing funding demands from both the inside and outside any one 

program’s portfolio. And, as we discussed during my and my colleagues’ testimony, 

operating and support costs are a critical element of that affordability equation. We 

are just beginning to develop the tools, databases, and methodologies to improve our 

estimating capabilities for these ownership costs. We need to recognize the uncertainty in these early estimates, and ensure we account for that uncertainty when 

making decisions. The Department’s ability to measure a program’s cost, in particular its ownership costs, will improve over time as the system’s components and 

overall reliability become directly measurable, instead of analytically estimated, and 

understanding of the system’s sustainment approach grows. 

To be most effective, affordability goals should be established early; have a defined, logical basis agreed to by stakeholders; be documented and transparent to 

oversight organizations; and be continuously measured against the latest cost estimates. And these goals must also be continually re-evaluated in light of the overall 

national security environment. 

Mr. COFFMAN. The panel highlighted the importance of maintaining CAPE oversight of the independent cost estimate (ICE) process. What can Congress due to empower a robust, independent cost estimate process? 

Ms. FOX. There are two important ways Congress can strengthen the independent 

cost estimate process. First, Congress should clarify the Office of Cost Assessment 

and Program Evaluation (CAPE) role as the lead for all Acquisition Category 

(ACAT) I ICEs, regardless of who has Milestone Decision Authority (MDA). As I 

stated in my testimony, I believe recent changes from the 2015 National Defense 

Authorization Act (NDAA) have created uncertainty in the Title 10 language regarding CAPE’s specific role for ACAT I programs when the Milestone Decision Authority is not the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 

(USD(AT&L)), which is becoming increasingly more common. 

Today, for the majority of the ACAT I programs for which USD(AT&L) is not the 

MDA, CAPE delegates, and closely monitors, the ICE development to the Service 

cost centers. Additionally, CAPE reports on these Service cost center ICEs in its annual report to Congress. As the Service Acquisition Executives (SAEs) assume the 

role of MDA on an increasing number of ACAT I programs, I fear there will be a 

strong push to limit CAPE’s authority for development and/or oversight of the ICEs 

and for setting the relevant estimating policies and procedures. I need only point 

to the recently released report to the Congress from the Chief of Staff of the Army 

regarding acquisition authorities (ref. b). In that report, the Army writes: 

‘‘The responsible Service should also have responsibility for cost estimation supported by the validation of a third party and reported where appropriate to Congress. As the Services are responsible for making tradeoffs, they should also have 

control over the methodologies, assumptions, and level of rigor necessary to make 

decisions.’’ 

In my view, this is a slippery slope. The cost group within CAPE was created 

years ago to ensure consistent application of rigorous costing methodologies and to 

document clearly articulated program assumptions as a basis for cost estimates. 

CAPE has since further improved the cost-estimating process through a deliberate 

collection of historical cost and schedule data that add further rigor. We cannot afford to lose ground here. 

I believe the reform changes that began with the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act in 2009 gave CAPE exactly the right authorities to ensure rigorous costestimating processes continue. CAPE’s authority to review Service efforts and, if 

necessary, take back the responsibility of producing the ICE ensures that the Services properly collect data and perform quality cost analyses. In turn, this oversight 

ensures programmatic decisions are informed by the best estimates of cost. I fear 

the loss of CAPE’s authority will quickly erode the overall cost community’s ability 

to collect necessary data and information and to establish and govern cost estimating policies and procedures within the Services. 

The second way Congress can strengthen the independent cost estimating process 

is to provide CAPE, and, by extension, the entire DOD cost community, with the 
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authority to establish the data collection requirements necessary to develop sound 

estimates. Today the acquisition community largely holds the authority for which 

data are collected and when, and we often find data are collected without a strategic 

perspective. We want a holistic and long-term view that understands the benefits 

of a comprehensive data collection process. 

The lack of authority to collect the data the cost community requires for independent cost analyses will impede the ability of the cost community to produce the 

high quality ICEs that the Department and Congress rely so heavily upon to inform 

resource allocation and decision making. Acquisition streamlining in the 1990s led 

to the wholesale removal of cost data collection on contracts that—to this day—negatively affects the quality of cost estimates produced by the DOD cost community. 

Even today, virtually no cost data is collected on ACAT II and III programs due to 

the acquisition community’s cultural reluctance to do so. 

Providing CAPE with the authority to define and ensure implementation of the 

cost and related data collection processes, and to make available these important 

resources to the broader cost community within the Department, will continue to 

improve cost estimates Department-wide and significantly improve decision-making. 

I should add further that CAPE has been working to modernize the collection process and reduce the cost burden of collecting data from defense contractors. 

There is also a fear that CAPE will overreach on this data collection authority, 

especially when it comes to commercial items. As I learned as the Director of CAPE, 

if a commercial item’s price is regulated through a competitive marketplace, CAPE 

has little need, or even interest, in collecting detailed cost data on the item. It is 

only when items are not actually commercial and are not subject to normal commercial market price regulating mechanisms that the government has a right to know 

the cost of those systems. It is on these systems that CAPE must have the authority 

to set policies for the collection of cost data. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Please discuss the DOD Comptroller’s role in affordability discussions and cost-schedule-performance trade space discussions. When in program development does the DOD Comptroller first participate in affordability discussions? 

How is the Comptroller involved during Milestone Decision Authority decisions for 

MS A, B, and C? 

Mr. HALE. During my tenure as Comptroller, I was regularly involved in senior 

meetings (chaired by the Deputy Secretary) that assessed acquisition budget proposals. Affordability was often discussed, especially as it related to the five-year 

budget plan. The discussions almost always focused on acquisition costs, rarely on 

O&S costs. As Comptroller I was rarely involved personally in the milestone decision meetings for weapons. However, my senior staff attended these meetings and, 

along with CAPE analysts, raised affordability issues as appropriate (again focusing 

almost always on acquisition costs). My senior staff provided me feedback on key 

results from the meetings. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Sustainment costs are still a significant portion of program costs. 

Efforts to consider total life cycle costs are still challenging. What can be done to 

be sure we understand the total costs for a program and the impact on budget beyond the FYDP? 

Mr. HALE. Sustainment costs make up more than half of the life cycle costs of 

a typical weapon. But DOD still pays relatively little attention to these costs during 

the design of new weapons. I would suggest two approaches as first steps toward 

increasing the attention paid to sustainment costs. First, I believe that Congress 

should direct DOD to conduct more careful research into this critical topic, perhaps 

making use of its FFRDCs to help provide analysis. Among other topics, this research seek a better understanding of what drives O&S costs. Congress should also 

direct the Department to improve the parametric models used to project O&S costs. 

DOD has better models for predicting acquisition costs early in the life of a weapon 

compared to those available to forecast O&S. Second, DOD and Congress need to 

consider ways to change the incentives in the acquisition process. Currently those 

incentives cause program managers to focus almost entirely on acquisition costs, because these costs will be apparent during their tenure as the manager. To help 

change incentives, Congress could direct DOD senior leaders to certify that an O&S 

estimate has been prepared and reviewed at each of the acquisition milestones, 

starting at Milestone A. Because of the uncertainty regarding early estimates, Congress should leave not change the current requirement that O&S costs be reported 

in the SARs starting at Milestone B. This certification will hopefully lead to more 

attention to O&S. Once the Department has developed better tools for O&S estimates, it may be appropriate to require reporting of major breaches of O&S estimates in a manner that is now done for procurement costs under the Nunn-McCurdy legislation. 
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Mr. COFFMAN. How do we both lock in requirements to have stable estimates and 

funding, yet also have flexibility to adapt to new innovations and new threats? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Stability is most important for major weapons systems, including large ‘‘platforms.’’ Agility should be largely found in flexible ‘‘payloads,’’ 

whether they are organic capabilities or weapons. Thus, the Department should continue its efforts to do rapid prototyping for payloads, while ensuring a predictable 

and stable requirements and acquisition path for major platforms. As such, it is possible to lock in requirements early provided that the system that is ultimately derived from this initial requirement set is sufficiently agile to accommodate both new 

innovations and new threats. That means weapon system platforms in the future 

must be designed around adaptable ‘‘plug-and-play’’ architectures that will allow integration of future payloads and modernization of platform components relatively 

easily and at a reasonable cost. There also must be suitable funding agility available 

to the requirements sponsor to enable systems to evolve to counter new threats, 

mitigate technology obsolescence, and achieve advantage from emerging technology 

opportunities. Additionally, having discretionary money up front for the Department 

to begin to advance a new requirement in parallel with the budget cycle would help 

avoid early obsolescence issues. 

As an important aside, recently JCIDS incorporated procedures for Critical Intelligence Parameters (CIP) of threat-sensitive Key Performance Parameters. This integration of intelligence support to acquisition in the requirements community facilitates risk assessments and mitigation of requirements determinations to be responsive to emerging threats. 

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